I THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OK MODERN PHILOSOPHIC THOUGHT, dtlTlCtLLY AND HISTORICALLY CONSIDERED. EUDOLPH EÜCKEN, Ph. D., PROFESSOR IN JKNA. Translated by M. STUART PHELPS, Ph. D., PEOFESSOK IN SMITH COLLEGE, WITH ADDITIOXS AND CORRECTIONS BY THE AUTHOR, AND AN Inteoduction by NOAH PORTER, PEE8LÜENT OF YALE COLLEGE. NEW YORK: D. APPLETON AND COMPANY, 1, 3, AND 5 BOND STREET. 1880. I COPYRIGHT BT D. APPLETON AND COMPANY. 1880. / IIl^TEODUCTOEY ESSAY. The author of tins volume has undertaken tlie very important service of writing a critical history of the terms and conceptions which are of special interest at the present time in literary and philosophical circles. The table of contents shows on what principle they have been selected. The list is very far from including all the technical terms of either science or philosophy. It contains few which are strictly scholastic or techni- cal. The few which originated in the schools of mod- ern speculation and criticism have come forth from the schools and taken a strong hold of thoughtful and cul- tivated men who are neither philosophers nor scientists by profession. Most of these — like Suhjective and Ob- jective, Mojiism and Dualism, Development and Evo- lution, Idealism and Idealism, 0_ptimism and Pessi- 7nism, Culture and Humanity — have come into current use within the past few years, and represent some new principle or distinction in philosophy, some important theory or discovery in science, or some novel doctrine or conceit in ethics, art, or criticism. Scarcely one, how- ever, is a product of the present century, like those multi- iv INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. tudinous teclmical terms of cliemistry or natural history wliicli originally designated conceptions as novel as tlicir names. Most of tlie terms treated in tliis volume Lave been in use for many generations, tliougli only a small number may bave been long employed in tbe special significations wliicb tbey have finally assumed, and wbicb give them tbeir present interest and importance. It is obvious that the gradual emergence of such terms from occasional and uncertain use into permanent rec- ognition with sharp and definite meanings must neces- sarily indicate a positive movement of human thinking for better or for worse. JS^ot infrequently such a move- ment is equivalent to a revolution in literary opinion or scientific theory. In every instance the question is always curious and often insti-uctive, What was the popular and general meaning of the term before it crystallized into its special and fixed meaning ? Or, if it were originally a term of the schools, by what steps of transition did it proceed from one meaning to another, till finally it took on a signification which was the 02')posite of that which it originally bore, or till two correlated terms completely interchanged their significations ? The remark of Cole- ridge is often repeated, that " there arc cases in which more knowledge of more value may be conveyed by the history of a word than by the history of a campaign." This is emphatically true, and more ; for, in cases not a few, the history of a word is the history of an actual campaign of patient research or active controversy. INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. V Wc may not forget, however, that the history of words does not always record the progress of exact tliinking or verified truth. The shifting and subtle changes of meaning in words may as effectually ob- scure and mislead the thinking of an age or a school as make it clear and solid. Especially is this true of terms of science or of philosophy. Words of very high generalization may, by reason of their abstract char- acter, be more easily used by the philosophical magi- cian, first to bewilder himself, and then to mislead his fellow men. The history of speculation in every age enforces the truth that, the more abstract an important term becomes, it may be the more readily personified into a living force or law by the vivid imagination or the confident reiteration of a brilliant theorist. The farther a word is removed from common use, the more easily may it be worshiped as a bedizened fetish by the devo- tees of a philosophic leader, or hooted at as a scare- crow by his antagonists. The more remote any subject matter is from any possible verification by experiments or the realities of every-day life, the more brilliant and delusive may be the attractions of plausible hypotheses, if these arc only set off by the jugglery of philosophic word-play. For these reasons it becomes especially important, in an age of intense scientific activity and philosophical enthusiasm, that every earnest seeker after truth should scrutinize with the utmost care the tenns that are occuppng the attention of the public, if he desires to master the conceptions for which they stand. vi INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. Tliere is no metliod by which he can do this bo effectu- ally, and I may add so pleasantly, as by the study of their history. In this way, and in this way only, will he be able intelligently to accept and successfully to de- fend what is true in the new thinking: which is sure to arouse every generation, and at the same time to reject what is false with an enlightened and liberal spirit. The author of this volume has very wisely limited himself to a few topics, which he has as wisely selected because of their comprehensive interest and importance. The conceptions of which he gives the history, and which he subjects to acute criticism, are all of present and exciting interest. Many of them have a practical as well as a speculative importance. Some of them concern the grave and interesting problems of Duty and Faith and Immortality. To the history and criti- cism of these conceptions, and their terminology, Pro- fessor Eucken has brought thorough and careful read- ing, acute and candid criticism, and a clear and solid style. While he is at home among the systems of the past, he seems equally familiar with the controversies of the present. Above all, he has studied brevity, and lias mastered the art of exjDressing in few words the results of patient research and critical discrimination. The writer of this notice was constrained to recom- mend the work for translation to his friend and former pupil by his estimate of the intrinsic value of the trea- tise, and the desire that it might be brought within the reach of English readers, as eminently suited to the INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. vii times. He can say with an assured confidence that there are few books witliin his knowledge which are better fitted to aid the student who wishes to acquaint himself with the course of modern speculative and sci- entific thinking, and to form an intelligent estimate of most of the current theories. He trusts also that Pro- fessor Phelps has succeeded in the somewhat difiicult task of rendering such essays as these into neat and readable English, and that his labor may be rewarded by the consciousness that he has contributed somewhat to the progress of solid and scientific thinking at a time when such thinking is greatly needed and always re- spected, even though it may not always be loudly cried in the market-place. Noah Poetee. Yale College, January^ 1880. AUTHOR'S PEE FACE. The concepts wliicli enter into onr thoughts and actions are the outgrowth of a definite relation which we hold to the interests and problems of our time. They show with what problems we are occupied, and h(jw we treat these problems. A consideration of the concepts of an individual, a school, or a time, must then give us an explanation of what is striven after, and what is accomplished. A criticism of concepts must become a criticism of the entire contents of the con- scious intellectual life of the man, or the school, or the period. This task, however, can not well be undertaken without attempting also to undei-stand these concepts in their historical formation and their historical associa- tion ; since onlj in that way is it possible to carry back to its sources and fundamental principles that which is given us in its present developed form. And, indeed, the concatenation of things carries us a step farther, so that we must pay a certain amount of attention also to the clothing of the concept, that is, to its verbal ex- X - AUTHOR'S TREFACE. pression, since we can hope to obtain a just estimate of a concept only when we understand clearly the relation between its signification and its present form of phra- seology. In attempting to establish such a consideration of the questions of our day, we should expect to meet with difficulties in the method of execution, rather than with scruples as to the undertaking itself. First of all, we limit the problem in a way which is perfectly practicable. We do not propose to discuss the concepts which now arc most prominent in what is specifically philosophical, or technically scientific; but those, rather, which, proceeding from philosophy and the general scientific development, have become a power in life as a whole. The subject of our investigation will be, not the concepts of the philosophy of to-day, but the pliilosox)hical concepts of to-day. By to-day, how- ever, we understand the last decade, as it is limited by the reaction against the Constructive and generally sys- tematic philosophy, and, further, by the preponderat- ino" infiuence of the natural sciences. In so doing, we have specially in view the development in the German thought- world ; but believe that we can from that ob- tain also a judgment which shall extend far outside, since the specific tendencies of modern science are no- where so distinctly manifested as they are among the Germans. But how many considerations and questions arise, if the method of our investigation is to be still f ui-tlicr AUTHOR'S PKEFACE. ^ _-- justified! AVliat are the measuring iJßnÖ^-fcf^^ our*^ day, and within what limits do individm in the highest degree, in a joint action that iT AVliich concepts are to be considered as therein the leading ones ? How extensive, or how limited, should be our consideration of them ? In short, so many ques- tions arise, that, to answer them in any measure, we should have to discuss at the outset our method of dis- cussion. Instead of this, we much prefer to plunge at once into our subject, and run the risk that some topic may be thought missing here, or superfluous there, and that, everywhere, we may be accused of a certain arbi- trariness in our choice and treatment of material. Only, we ought to be allowed to vindicate ourselves in this respect : if isolated sections seem to stand in un- connected sequence, wc do not thereby renounce all claim to a logical progress in the discussion. There need be no lack of unity in the whole, because one proceeds from many isolated points. But we would further beg to be allowed to make no claims for the followins: dis- cussions which they are not intended to satisfy. Choos- ing, as they do, for their object a province which lies between science and common life, they must necessanly maintain a certain middle ground in their form ; what is specifically technical must be kept, as far as possible, in the background. It is then involved in the whole nature of the task, that the philosophical investigation which is here under- taken can, emphatically, lead only to negative results. xii AUTHOR'S PREFACE. The principle is essentially involved in the investi- gation itself, that a~ positive treatment of concepts can be usefully given only in connection with a systematic philosophy; and, for that reason, we have abstained from even occasionally entering upon such discussion, although greatly tempted to do so. We may be blamed for our limitation of the discussion ; but we make no pretensions of passing into what is excluded by that limitation. "We will not shun the positive side of the work ; but, for the present discussion, we beg the favor of the Platonic expression : Trdvra ravra irpooL^ud eVrty avTOV Tov vofjLOV 6v Sei jia^uv* CONTENTS PAGE Subjective — Objective .....•! ExrERIENCE .....••'* 4 81 92 A Priori — Innate ...••• Immanent (Cosmic) . . . . • Monism— DcALisM . . . • • • .113 Law . . . .... 1S5 Development . . • • ■ • • ' ' Primary Concepts of Causation . . • . • ^^^ Mechanic — Organic . . • • • .182 Teleology . . . • • • .106 Cl'ltcre ....••• Individuality ...••• Humanity ....••• Realism — Idealism . . . • • Optimism — Pessimism . . . • • Conclusion ...••• . 215 231 . 219 2o8 . 271 294 THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS. SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE. IvvrhaKTaL bri [irj kmicööcov rb cbv tu Tzavri. — PloTINUS. The history of the expressions shows the develop- ment which the concepts " subjective " and " objective " have undergone in modern philosophy. In the course of the centuries, they have simply interchanged mean- ings. In Duns Scotus, who was the first to use them in their present antithesis,* subjectivum signifies that which refers to the subject of the judgments, and so to the concrete objects of thought ; objectivuniy on the contrary, signifies that which lies in the pure ohjicere, that is, in the act of making ideal, and so is assigned to the perceiving mind. (See Prantl, "History of Logic in the "West," iii. 208.) In this sense, the expressions remained unchanged until the commencement of modern philosophy. In the controversy between Descartes and Gassendi, sub- jective is used synonymously ^'\\\\ formaliter in se ij)siSy and objective with idealiter in intelledu. More com- monly, to be sure, the antithesis was between objective and formaliter, which was still undisputed in the first half of the eighteenth centur}\ Toward the end of * According to Prantl ("History of Logic," i. 581), suhjedivus in a purely logical signification occurs in the works of Appulciua. 2 MODERN nilLOSOnilCAL CONCEPTS. Scliolasticism a certain vacillation appeared in isolated instances, and this increased in proportion to the en- trance of modern thought. In that which was called objective, things cut themselves loose from thought and gained an independent existence. By subject, how- ever, the thinking mind began to be understood, instead of the logical concept. (See, for example, Leibnitz, Erdmann's ed., 645 b, " Subjectum ou Tame meme.") The change of meaning, however, toward which this tended, was not completed until the expressions passed over into the German language. I find the first examples of the new meaning in 1730. For example : in the " Introduction to Philosophical Science," by A. F. Müller (1733), ii. 63, objectivum is explained as '^ in itself and outside of the understanding"; formale, as "in the understanding," With A. Baumgarten the new usage seems already to predominate ; while Cru- sius, Lambert, and Tetens employ the terms just as we do.* But the way in which they were employed in the controversy between Lessing and Götze f shows plainly that they were still used as thoroughly scholastic terms ; so that we can say that they first entered upon their common use with Kant. The new signification spread especially to France, and then to England. In the latter country, although the application of many terms customary in the middle ages had penetrated into the living language, % this new * But Crusius and Tetens usually said suhjedivisch and objcciivisch. •j- The distinction which Götze made between the subjective and ob- jective consideration of Faith can be traced back to Baumgarten, " Ger- man Metaphysics," § 738. I Sec, for example, Berkeley (Frazcr's ed., ii. 477) : " Natural phe- nomena are only natural appearances. They are, therefore, such as we see and perceive them. Their real and objective natures are therefore the same." SüBJECin^E— OBJECTIVE. 3 usasre was for a long time felt to be stranf^e and echo- lastic. The concepts are, of course, older than the expres- sions. But, if we follow their history backward, from the culmination of the middle ages, we must search for a long time before we find them distinctly formulated. In the fii*st half of the middle ages, as among the earlier Romans, we find only circumlocutions ; * but no deter- minate significations, until we reach the later Greek antiquity. AVhen the Stoics and others place in con- trast eTTLvoela^ai and vTrdpx^iv, Kar eirivoLav and ko^ vTTOGTao-Lv (viTap^Lv), th.Q\ express the same antithesis that is contained in our subjective and objective ; and the disputes which arose over the concepts signified by the terms are very similar to those of later times. But the concepts themselves extend beyond these expressions; they are numbered among those which, although in different degrees of clearness, must be pres- ent in every philosophical system. As the object of our thouo-ht is to obtain a knowledge of nature in detenni- nate content, and this content can be obtained only by labor and struggle, we must make obvious everywhere, where we suppose an act of knowledge, the distinction between that knowledge which is, at least for us, abso- lutely valid and that which is only empirical to the individual. But, as a matter of fact, the comprehen- sion of this distinction will ever vaiy, according to one's theories of knowledge. The Skeptic, for example, can not avoid distinguishing in phenomena that which is * So, to adduce only one illustration, Scotus Eiigcna gives as the antithesis, "De Divisione Naturae," 523 a: in nostra eonicmplatione —in ipsa rerum natura ; 492 d : dum in sc ipsis naturaliter pcrspiciun- tur—in ipso solo raiionis contuitu ; 493 d: in rebus naiuralibus—sola raiione. 4 MODEKX rniLOSOnilCAL COXCEPTS. common from tliat which is purely individual ; * and the constructive philosopher, who would constitute the whole world out of thought, will be discreet enough not to confuse the necessary processes and results of thought with the impressions or fancies that vary with the ex- perience of the individual. But, to the common sense of men, the question in- volved in this problem is that of the relation of thought to a world which is independent of it ; and, inasmuch as this view is uniformly the ruling one with the masses of mankind, we can assume that the concepts subjective and objective have no significant meaning to the com- mon consciousness, until a chasm is opened between the thought- world and the real world. This again de- pends, in the great life of the whole, on the general view taken of the position of mankind in the world. The more closely a man believes himself to be bound up in the life of the whole, the more he regards him- seK as its culmination, so much the more will he be convinced that, in the act of knowledge, he seizes the essence of things ; and, conversely, every doubt in re- spect to the former behef will be accompanied by a vacillation in the latter. In this way,- the contest over objectivity and subjectivity not only reflects the shift- ing relation of thought and being, but also expresses the entire estimate made of the meaning of the life of man. Thus the Stoical distinction between the objective and the subjective in knowledge is only the conse- quence of a change in the view of man's position in * Sextus Empiricus, rrphs X07, ii. 8 : oi irepl rhv A.l^7](ri^r)fiov \4yov(ri Ttua Twj/ (paivofiivuif 5ia(popdv, Ka\ cpaal Tovrwy to /j.iv koivujs iraai (pali^eff^ai TO. Se Idloos Tii/i, uiv aKij^?! fiki/ eJuai to koivüs vüffi ^aiy6fxti^a, \^eü5^ 6e rä fi^ Toiavra. SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE. 5 relation to the world ; which change came in with the most flourishing period of ancient thouglit ; and from that time, in the development of history, the conflict became more and more violent, and the sense of it had ever greater power over the consciousness of man, until at last all pleasure in life and in action was destroyed. Then we And Plotinus making the bold attempt to restore the connection between the world and the mind, by making Being the product of creative thought. But the world at which he arrived by that means was not, even to himself, that which is present to the senses, but sometliing supra-mundane ; and, if his doctrine amounts ultimately simply to this, that all our knowl- edge arrives only at a likeness (an olov) of truth, it must be admitted that the chasm which seemed to be overcome will open again in some other place. Not till we reach Christianity, where life receives anew a concrete meaning through its ethical-religious definition^ does mind, in its connection with the whole, obtain again a firm confidence in itself and its responsi- bilities. But now other dangers at once stepped in. The conviction that man's ethical life is essentially the ob- ject of all that happens in the world, and controls the destinies of the universe, led to the reference of eveiy- thing directly to that life, and to the interpretation of the whole plan of the world, with reference to the con- siderations and postulates involved in the practical life of man. The serious consequences of such an endeavor ap- pear already in the system of Augustine. Revealing as it does an astonishing knowledge of human nature, everything in it is so shaped as to bring out the great- est possible exertion of forces for etliical - religious — 6 MODERN PniLOSOPniCAL CONCEPTS. often, in fact, only for clmrclily — aims ; and, in so do- ing, the human is unreservedly found in the universal ; purely psychical occurrences are projected outside of the mind ; wishes change into facts, presentiments into certainties. The later thinkers, lacking Augustine's theoretical interest and speculative power, went carelessly to a greater extreme in this dangerous direction ; and to it there was no effective counterweight in the Aristotelian philosophy, which was finally adopted, to supplement this cosmology. For there has never been a great thinker who was so absolutely convinced as was Aris- totle of the connection of the human life with the events of the world, and thus of the objectivity of our knowl- edge. 'No one, therefore, had less hesitation in carry- ing over into the physical universe without ceremony the peculiarities of psychical beings. A soul was im- planted in all things : every event was explained as re- sulting from an endeavor : qualitative distinctions and oppositions took possession of all nature : a good and an evil, a normal and an anomalous, a natural and a violent appeared everywhere distinguished, and in hostility rent asunder every natural bond. In this way, every variety of being became a mere copy of human life. Wherever man looked, he found himself ; and, accordingly, how- ever far the investigation might extend, he remained everywhere shut up in a closed circle, and hemmed in by a limitation which must have appeared far more oppressive than the narrow bounds of the world's phys- ical horizon, which seem to us to be peculiarly charac- teristic of those times. The modern interpretation of the universe was di- rectly opposed to this. Knowledge and action con- tained a fuller meaning ; and mankind, tearing off the SUBJECTIVE -OBJECTIVE. 7 limitations of the past, sought to extend its own life into the infinite. That which was specifically human appeared to be everywhere too small. It was the cus- tom rather to seek the explanation of man in the world, than to seek the exi)lanation of the world in man. In order to obtain an *' interpretation " of nature, in place of an " anticipation," all concepts must be transformed. Everything was hereafter to be measured by the known universe, and the meaning of human existence was to be recognized only in so far as it gave expression to the general order.* If, however, the universe is to make itself known to the mind, and is to disclose the soul of nature, that must leave behind it all that is arbitrary and fantastic, and submit itself to the great laws of the whole ; but this is to be done only that, through knowledge, eleva- tion above the universe and supreme control over it may be reached. What was lost to the mind from its presumed possessions seemed evanescent in comparison with that which was to be won ; to realize an end so high, it became worth while for man to exert his strength to the utmost. When this happened to succeed, mod- ern science built itself up, the powers of man were broadened, and life itself was transformed. To oppose such a tendency, after the position of man in relation to the world had been radically changed, * Bacon, " rarasceve ad Ilistoriam Xaturalem," apbor. iv. : " In his- toria quam rcquirimus et animo destinamus, ante omnia videndum est, ut late pateat et facta sit ad mcnsuram universi. Xcque cnim arctandus est mundus ad angustias intellectus (quod adliuc factum est) sed expandcn- du3 intellectus et laxandus ad mundi imaginem rccipiendam, qualis inveni- tur." Spinoza, "Tract, thcol. pol.," chap. xvi. 10 : "Natura non legibus bumanrc rationis, qua non nisi hominum verum utile et conservationcm intendunt, intercluditur, sed infinitis aliis, qua) totius natura?, cujus homo particula est, aetemum ordinem rcspiciunt." 8 MODERN PniLOSOrniCAL CONCEPTS. was to attack modern science, and the culture wliich re- sulted from it. But we need not do this, in order to recognize the fact that this revolution produced a com- motion, which necessarily introduced at the outset per- plexity and discord into the entire apprehension of the problem. First of all, the mechanical natural philosophy estab- lished with perfect clearness the distinction between the qualities which phenomena offer to scientific thought, and those which they offer to common-sense perception. What Democritus had already substantially afiirmed now found exact confirmation in Descartes. Even be- fore the investigation of nature had achieved important results, the interpretation of the specific qualities of things was limited to their effects upon the sentient soul, and ultimately only masses and movements re- mained.* When in this way it was found that we to a great extent create the very world itself, which seems to be opposed to us as something objective, not only was our faith shaken in the truth of all that is in general pres- ent to consciousness, but even the substance of the men- tal life seemed to be cut off from the world. Moreover, the mental life itself was made the subject of criticism. Here, too, it was customary to discrimi- nate between facts and interpretations, between real and imaginary powers, in order thus to advance to pervad- ing laws, which might render possible a control over the motive power of the soul through the knowledge of its hidden springs. But, though the most prominent thinkers attacked in their theories only what was superficial, in order to * Boyle and not Locke was the first to apply the scholastic phrase " primary and secondary qualities " to the new distinction. SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE. make room for the free action of that wliich they thought was essential, in the common life the doubt, once excited, went beyond this. Pragmatic psycholo- gists showed how much the picture which a man draws of himself differs from what he really is. A man like Pierre Bayle endeavored to show how essentially unim- portant those attempts are which we like to consider as the most important ; how little expression of actual con- viction there is, even in those propositions wliich are defended in good faith. lie was the first to make use of the phrase, which since then has been repeated to satiety, that "men only believe that they believe."^ Similar endeavors were made by other men, especially in France, who were in like manner repelled from a comprehensive knowledge of the whole by their keen analysis of the individual. The chasm between the immediate percept and that which was supposed to be really existent became continually greater. The purely natural instincts appeared to become more and more established, as all there was to real existence ; and these were little fitted to entitle the mind to -any kind of a prominent position in the universe. Even the oppo- nents of such a tendency seemed to be seized with doubt, and were therefore poorly qualified to offer suc- cessful opposition.! To investigate anew the position of mind in the uni- verse was imquestionably the problem of philosophy ; * Sec the article " Socinius," which, in the discussion of the present question, is emphatically worthy of consideration. In the eighteenth cen- tury Lichtenberg, apparently independently of Baylc, defended the same sentiment. See " Mi?ccllaneous "Writing?," i. 158. f Pascal, "Pensees," art. xxv., 40: " L'un dit que mon eentimcnt est fantaisie ; I'autre que sa fantaisie est sentiment. II faudrait avoir unu r^glc. La raison s'offre ; mais ellc est pliable k tous sens, et ainsi il n'y en a point." 10 MODERX nilLOSOrmCAL CONCEPTS. but here we see tlie systems differ from the outset, and diverge evDn to antagonism. Bacon, throughout whose system nature determines the formation of the universe, shows an incKnation to consider w^hat is s^^ecifically mental as something which lies outside of material events. In some degree related to this, w^e see later English thinkers studious to treat the province of the mind as self-contained, and relatively independent of the material world. One renounces here the connec- tion with the whole, so as not to endanger what is spe- cifically mental in its own sphere. The speculative thinkers on the Continent went beyond such a limitation. Spinoza and Leibnitz, above all, believed that they had no right to renounce a close union between the mind and tlie material world. But with Spinoza there is a vast difference between intention ^ and execution. From the beginning he wishes surely to guarantee to the mind, as an attribute of the infinite ^^ substance, both significance and permanence ; but w^hen, in the actual development of his system, he derives all its meaning from that which is outside of it, and as- cribes reality to its life only in so far as it reflects the external, he is compelled to oppose as phantoms all forms of life peculiar to it, such as estimates of value, designs, etc., and to degrade it finally to a pure form. Spinoza's mental world is nothing more than that part of the material universe which is brought into conscious- ness ; the soul is matter regarded as an idea ; and thus, I in this pretended reconciliation, the one is sacrificed to the other. Leibnitz saw this clearly, and tried to evade the difficulty in another way. lie found his solution in the principle that all heterogeneity in the world is ulti- mately resolved, in different grades, into one and the SÜBJT3CTIVE— OBJECTIVE. / Y^ ^ \\ same power, and hence from each unit ^^aotu fbrfft W-'Y il concept of the whole. If, then, the mind ocferljiics .«ncb^ a position in the gradation of existence, we can under-' stand all other existence from it, provided we investi- gate its essence ; and, at the same time, it can itself be justified as a specific existence. It finds itself again everywhere in the world, and can in thought reestab- lish the closest connection between itself and the uni- verse. But, to accomplish this, in fact, we must strip off everything that is specific, and so we lose in content what we «rain in extent. Leibnitz's essential force, the idea, is in truth no longer a psychological concept ; it has become ontological (union of plurahty in unity) ; and so here, too, what is specifically mental is ultimately sacri- ficed to the whole. "When we see the most prominent thinkers placed in a dilemma where they must either isolate mind or else abandon its peculiar properties, we are not sui-prised to find that the chasm wa^ only widened by the attempt to bridge it over, and that the problem became more com- plicated, until, in the hands of Kant, the discussion took a new turn. He brought out more clearly than any one else had done the antithesis between subjective and ob- jective. He established everywhere fixed criteria by which to distinguish the two ; and he made it seem so evident that this distinction was the leading problem of philosophy, that the whole discussion, which up to that time had been preponderatingly either metaphysical or psychological, was now very properly directed toward the doctrine of knowledge. Xot improperly did Lich- tenberg suppose that to determine the relations 1)0- tween the Subjective and the Objective was to think in the Kantian spirit.* * See " Miscellaneous Writings," i. 101. 12 MODERN rillLOSOrniCAL CONCEPTS. But it is well known how little this peculiarly posi- tive attempt at solution accomplished. Even in the de- cisive questions a divergence of opinion arose, which could not be repressed. If mind was once completely shut off from the world, with no means of pressing out into it beyond its own narrow circle, then, on the other hand, it came to the world with its own limitations, and produced out of itself a peculiar kingdom. What was taken away by one hand was given back by the other ; and so, according as one started from the Theoretical or from the Practical Reason, he found himself led to wholly opposite estimates of the material universe. The endeavor to overcome this antithesis was the motive of further discussion. The Constructive thinkers wished to adjudicate to the reason in general the rights before held by the practical reason, and thus to allow all being to S2">ring from it. But in that case the reason must naturally be conceived not as empirical and individual (subjective), but as absolute and universal (objective);* and this view is in fact often rendered prominent by them. But they passed very lightly over the question as to how we can arrive at such a concept, and secure it against disturbance and assault. In place of the thoughtful analysis of the earlier writers, we find here bold leaps, a "free flight" of thought, which might produce ingenious performances here and there, but which could not prevent what is contingently empirical from mixing itself in with the pure forms of thought, and could not restrain the 'introduction into the con- cept of the material world of what js specifically hu- man. It was an inevitable result that such an attempt to * Jacob! used the expression "objective reason." Sec " David Iluine," p. 191. SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE. 13 solve the great problem should be followed by a sud- den revulsion ; and with that we come to the present day, the situation of which is easily understood frum this historical development. We see a problem very important in its bearing upon the entire thought-life of our day — in -fact, a decisive j^roblem — reduced to its simplest terms, and thus intensified almost bej^ond en- durance. A comprehensive solution is courageously undertaken ; and it endeavors to gain an inlluence in all departments of thought. But the catastrophe enters suddenly. That the endeavor is one-sided, unsatisfac- tory, and defective, is rather felt in its consequences than shown in its principles. But the counter-movement is sanctioned by the wdiole work done in the exact sci- ences ; it seems to find a philosophical basis in the criticism of the pure Reason ; and — what is more sig- nificant than all — it is supported by that practical com- mon sense, to which the chasm between mind and the material world, in spite of all the labor of philosophers and others to the contrary, has always increased in width. There are thus many causes, permanent and tem- porary, which favor that tendency of thought which w^ould cut man's knowledge and life loose from the ma- terial universe, and which regards it, therefore, as one of the prime objects of scientific investigation to make conspicuous, everywhere, the antithesis between subjec- tive and objective. Our modern use of terms shows what heterooreneous elements are brousrht toGrcther in this tendency. At the outset, subjective and objective express plainly enough a relation between the act of perception and the object perceived. But soon some one understands by it the position of the single individ- ual in relation to the entire mass of persons judging ; 14 MODERN PIIILOSOrniCAL CONCEPTS. and then the relation of the specifically human view of the world to the real nature of things ; and, finally, the relation of thought to being in general. Then, however — and this is peculiarly characteristic the use of the terms is so extended that all that is in general assumed in a spiritual being is set down as sub- jective : and then one is everywhere inclined without further ceremony to substitute the subjective for the imaginary, and the objective for the real. The different significations thus play into one an- other in many ways ; so that, even in the following discussion, it will be occasionally necessary to bear in mind the narrower signification of the terms. This dis- cussion, however, will not investigate in any way, from the positive side, the question as presented ; since such a discussion can be undertaken only in connection with a systematically philosophical investigation. It aims only to glance critically at the views of the subject which predominate to-day ; and especially to raise the question whether that which is set down sometimes as self-evi- dent, sometimes as being the valuable result of modern investigation, is not often, after all, only an inference from very doubtful and dogmatic suppositions. First of all, subjectivism attacks the possibility of any kind of certain and adequate knowledge. Since, as it claims, we remain always and for ever, no matter what we may undertake, shut up in the narrow circle of our own ideas, and we can not possibly put our- selves into a position where we can compare the sub- ject and the object, it follows that we are once for all shut off from any knowledge of real things, whether they lie outside of us or within us. Even the shades of Kant are conjured up to defend this proposition, as if we could not derive such an opinion from the SUBJECTIVE— OBJECT! 15 early Sopliists,* or find it shrewdly and effectively de- fended by Sextus, the Empiricist. Not that Kant as- serted the proposition ; but its significance is found in the way in which he laid the foundation for it, and carried it through, and supplemented it, as involved in the development of his system. But what was for him only an element in the whole, and by no means the point at which he finally stopped, is now esteemed the final result of philosophy and the sum of all wisdom. And yet this whole doctrine rests simply upon an interpretation of the conception of truth which is dog- matic, and, for modern philosophy, emphatically unsci- entific. It supposes truth to be the harmony of the thought concerned in the act of knowledge with ()l)jects which can be present independently of that thought, luiowledge is supposed to come by the reflection of what lies outside of the mind, which furnishes no means of determining how far the mirrored picture is an accu- rate one. Here the question at once arises, by what means thought in general arrives at the supposition of an ex- istence independent of it. Surely, if we do not wish to appeal simply to the material world, as given in the percept of common sense, the supposition nmst arise from elements found in thought itself and its activity ; and, if we adopt this position, the definition of truth as just explained is rendered worthless. The study of the history of the definition shows, too, that it belongs to that period in which thought had not worked its way to an independence of the ideas of the world as given by the psychical mechanism. It un- derlies the entire system of Aristotle ; and at any time *Gorgias (see MuUach, Frg. 16): rh ^^u cTvat a(payts, f^h rvx^y toD Soxtlv' rh 5e Soke?;/ aa^ei'is, fih tux^*' "^^^ fhai. 10 .LO.^OPmCAL CONCEnS. it may, ' j^ic of tliouglit, steal back again into scientific choc , >n. Yet, even witli the ISTeo-Platonists, still more with tne more distinguished thinkers of the middle ages, and specially with all the j^rominent syste- matic philosophers of modern times, it is considered a settled doctrine that knowledge is to be regarded, not OS a pure reception and reflection, but as an inner ac- tivity." There may be divergent opinions on this point. Some may consider the material universe as cooperating with this activity, and furnishing elements of its own, as a suggestive force ; others, on the contrary, may treat the material world simply as a production of thought. But it is a common principle of all those who maintain the idea of an independent task for philosophy, that in the discussion of knowledge the question deals with that wliicli is internal, and that, for this reason, the criteria of knowledge are to be found in thought itself. German Idealism, culminating in Ilegel, has carried out to its full development the principle that the entire antithesis of subject and olgect arises originally in the thinking activity, and that we are compelled to postu- late a world in antithesis to the thinking subject, not by any power perceived by the senses, and forcing itself in from the outside, nor by any necessity set over against thought, but simply by the nature of thought itself. Skepticism, which is opposed to this, finds itself in an untenable position, midway between the material world of common sense and the world of a systematic, scientific philosophy. Common sense furnishes it the principle that the knowing mind cognizes an existence independent of itself, which is not subject to its con- trol ; but the development of science has brought out * Duns Scotus, tlic most distinguished thinker of the middle ages, called kuowlcdsre an " actus iinmanens." SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE. 17 clearly the antithesis of subject and object ; .'A^n\ so tlie problem of the objectivity of knowled?|},,,:uiiich had l)een previously investigated as one ^oi the questions involved in the nature of the thinking activity, is now taken up and discussed by itself, as a supplementary question. AYe are not surprised that the answer of skepticism is all that can be given, if knowledge is made entirely dependent upon that which is external. In that case we see only what we have read into external objects. This confusion of tlieories of the world, as viewed from these two different standpoints, has penetrated, as well, into the individual concej)ts, and has introduced perplexity even where, as a matter of j^rinciple, skepti- cism would be rejected. The concept of the phenome- npn is taken to express simply the objects of thought without any estimate of their metaphysical worth ; but it is used also to denote the ideas which are produced in us by things lying outside of us, and so becomes the in- strument of a specific and thoroughly dogmatic theory of the relation of the mind to the material world. If even men like Kant and Herbart have allowed themselves to be led into fallacies by this ambiguity, we can not be surj^rised at the various eiTors of the present day. Many an investigator transforms the world given through the senses into an ideal one. But he forgets that the origi- nal ai^prehension is destroyed, just in proportion to the progress of this transformation. The world given by the senses remains as actually existent, by the side of the one furnished by scientific philosophy ; and so we have two worlds, when in fact we are discussing only two different ways, or perhaps grades, of ap])rchending one and the same world. But, for the doubt which will nowhere place any confidence in the activity of 18 MODERN rniLOSOPniCAL CONCEPTS. tlionglit, wo must blame the work of science itself, wliicli alone can relieve this doubt. In any case, we should not allow ourselves to be brou£!:ht, throuirh doc- matic suppositions and confused concepts, to those vague doubts which no arguments can overcome — for the very good reason that they are founded uj^on no arguments. But here arises, ultimately, the theoretical doubt in- volving the uncertainty of man's position in relation to the universe in general ; and we are thus compelled to examine a little more closely the particular j)oints which come under consideration. First of all, our idea of the specific nature of the external world as subjective is valid, in the sense that it possesses no reality beyond the inner life of man. When the scientist, as we saw, di-aws a sharp distinction be- tween that appearance which is the result of our specific organization and that which offers itself to scientific in- vestigation as the last j)oint reached in the analysis, the result is that only masses and inovements constitute the objective world, while everything else belongs to the spJiere of the subject. The philosoj^her, to be consist- ent, is compelled to remember that what the scientist thus regards as an objective world comes as well as the' rest under the common conditions of the mind's com- j)rehension, and hence, for philosophy, needs a new ex- amination. Matter and motion, as well as secondary qualities, j^re- suppose thought-activity, and can not therefore be set over against the mind as the final essence of things. The ol^jective world of the scientist is, accordingly, to the philosopher only a determinate system of plienomena Avhich are distinguished by the quality of persistence, but which are always de2)endent upon the mind, and therefore, like everything else, relative to it. The dif- SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE. 19 ference between sueli plicnomcna as tliesc and the sec- ondary qualities is, to be sure, a great one. Moreover, we must not forget that even our very capacity for sensation is itself a part of the world, and stands in causal connection with the whole, and that for this reason there is something in it which, as a legitimate occurrence, should not be set aside as imaginary. Yet, aside from this, as one man may reason from this differ- ence between the phenomena of matter and motion and those of the secondary qualities to the conclusion that consciousness is shut off from the material w^orld, an- other can conclude that, in ultimate analysis, the essence of things must be determined to be something different from its presentation in moved masses ; and so we ar- rive at wholly different results, according to the connec- tion into which the data are brought. Tliis doubt penetrates still more deeply into our theory of the processes which are specifically spiritual. Here the concealed phenomena find no external sup- port ; a strictly scientific analysis of them seems to be excluded by their anomalous heterogeneity, which gives what appears to be a simple series of discounected pro- ductions ; and so the wdiole thought-realm is explained as subjective, in the sense that in it there can be only individual opinions, and not acts of knowledge of uni- versal validity. There is certainly an obvious distinc- tion between these phenomena and those of the exter- nal world. Yet the question arises, whether such a negative judgment of them does not really have its foundation in the fact that, in spite of what is involved in the judgment, purely psychical phenomena are esti- mated by a standard which has been verified only in its application to physical phenomena. Particular phe- nomena are often taken up just as they originally pre- 20 MODERN rillLOSOPIlICAL COXCErTS. sent tliemsL'lves, and are thrown together in a heap ; and then men expect that a law will spontaneously spring forth, and the scattered parts will suddenly com- bine into a whole. But, as a matter of fact, the dis- tinctions remain, and develop into contradictions. We find divergent tendencies. Theories formed at differ- ■cnt times lack connection ; and, on the sup]30sition that, in view of all this, no general fundamental principles can be discovered, judgment is passed upon the whole just as it is presented. But it is not valid reasoning to reject a thing because we can not receive it in the pre- cise form in which it is originally presented. If, in the province of natural science, phenomena must be trans- forn^ed before they are in j^rojDcr condition for scien- tific investigation, it is even more true of the mind that its j)henomena, as originally given, are often only a remote and transformed consequence of the reality behind. There are, to be sure, differences between these two kinds of phenomena. In mental phenomena the rela- tion of the individual to the whole is different from wliat it is in physical phenomena. The individual has a far greater independence, and so can not be conceived simply as an expression of the whole, and with propor- tionate ease be formulated under a comprehensive law : no more, however, can the individual be treated in it- self alone, since it is always found in coml)i nations, and is succrestive of a connection with the whole. From such a condition of things problems arise which seem almost to demand an artistic as well as a scientific efficiency of treatment. It results from this that in thought-action we have, not a system of uni- formly persistent forces, but a becoming, and a self -for- mation in the act of becoming. If single phenomena SUBJECTIVE— OlIJECTIVE. 2 I can not be adjusted to one another, a chaos is inevi- table ; but, as soon as tlie investigation is directed toward the impelling forces and their inner connec- tions, harmonious boundaries and comprehensive es- sential forms can easily be established above all differ- ences; progressive formations can be recognized in aj)- parently lawless events; the divergent tendencies are seen to approach in their development, and even that which is aj^parently antagonistic will not resist the process of reduction to its j^roper place in the general system. If, for example, in tbe province of etliics, phenom- ena torn off in isolation are brought together, it is easy to establish contradictions, and so to prove the contin- gency of moral endeavors, judgments^ and sensations in general. Yet it is surely an established fact that, in general, sucfli activities actually exist ; and, before v/e discuss tlie "what," we must recognize tlie "that." But, then, the meaning of peculiar cases will cease to be unintelligible, so far as the individual is made a part of the whole, and the temporary form finds its justification in the entire historical development. The difiiculty of the problem may in this way allow more room for the play of arbitrariness in the solution of it by the individual, but such an uncertainty is not caused primarily by the thing itself, but by our relation to it, and should not be allowed to prejudice our estimate of it.* But if we should question tlie possibility of an objective scientific knowledge in all cases where there can be a difference of opinions, and resign the field to a subjective arbitrariness wherever no law is revealed at the first glance, in that case we prejudge most em- * See Leibnitz, 314 a: "Notre incertitude ne fait rien ä la nature des clioscs." 22 MODERN rillLOSOPIIICAL CONCEPTS. pliatically every scientific i^roblcm."^^' It would be a natural result that whole realms of great importance would be withdrawn from the sphere of scientific knowledge — a result which would be as convenient for the individuals as it is dangerous for the matter involved. To reject nothing should be the first prin- ciple of all investigation. It is still more preposterous to introduce into science itself, as permanent limitations, the contradictions inci- dent to our treatment of it ; and also to slight whole sciences as " subjective," because at the outset opinions and theories diverge on account of the difficulty of the problem, and the dependence of our judgment of the individual case upon the investigation of the whole. It is certainly very advantageous to be aljle to treat cer- tain provinces of science without taking into considera- tion the ultimate questions involved ; yet it is advan- tao-eous only in so far as such sciences are taken in detail, and considered out of relation to the knowledge of the whole. But, as soon as we go beyond this, that which is peculiar in each becomes involved in the fate of the whole ; and especially if philosophy, as the sci- ence which lies beneath all othei's, is endangered, it nuist react on the value of the results of every special science. To extol the trustworthiness of single sci- ences, as opposed to philosophy, is thus seen to be es- sentially a renunciation of the prerogative of knowl- edge as involved in science itself ; and the delight in such an objectivity proceeds from a conception of it * Sec Kepler, " Opera," i. 243 : " Si absurdum et falsuni iJ censeri debet, quod uni alieui honiinum coctui tale videtur, nihil erit in tota physi- ologia, quod non pro crassissimo absurdo liaberi debet. Yariro sunt homi- uum sentontinß, varii captus ingeniorum. Quid auteni ex his verum sit, quid falsumj penes vcrc philosophum est deccrnere." SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE. 23 M'liicli may perliaps 1)C suited to ii day-laborer, ])iit cer- tainly not to an architect. In brief, we must reject the distinction between objective and subjective sciences. - Tliere are, to be sure, different methods and different grades of certainty in knowledge ; we can set each indi- vidual science off for consideration by itself ; but ulti- mately the contest over truth is a general one, and so the danger involved in this contest becomes general also. The decisive problem, however, the one which essen- tially includes the preceding ones, is that of the reality and the significance of spiritual processes in general. The doubt which finds its expression in the other prob- lems has its origin in this. Kow, if we set aside the utterly crude materiahsm as a doctrine lying altogetlier beyond and outside of all philosophical investigation, we find that the independent existence of mind is called in question, in modem times, specially by two schools of thought. The one of these is based upon the natural sciences, and starts with Bacon ; while the other is philo- sophical, and appeals to Spinoza for support. Tlie par- tisans of the former take up their standpoint in nature, the investigation of which occupies all their attention. They judge mind to be something which lies outside of the realm of science, and should therefore be let alone ; and then, before long, they judge it to be unsubstantial and of no account. The whole specific meaning of the thought-process is degraded to a species of illusion. It often seems as if we were to believe that ingenious law-givers, and theorists inclined to spiritualistic inter- pretations, had invented the whole province of appa- rently independent thought- activity, and had succeeded in convincing others of the reality of their invention. But such opinions can be held only where the nature of the world and the philosophy of natural science are '24: MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. iL'giirded as sim2)ly synonymous. Whenever a more ex- tended view is taken of tlie realm of science, tliat which is specifically mental must be recognized as something which belongs to the world. For if a phenomenon occurs in the mind, it also occurs in the universe, and by that fact is protected against a simply dogmatic rejection. Xo matter what conception one forms of the world, as soon as he earnestly considers the thought of a compre- hensive causal connection, mind must form a part in the structure of the whole, and, as interpreted, must be included in its working. Even if it were to be regarded only as a production of physical forces, it can not stand out, as such, suddenly and immediately, like a deus ex rnachina ^ but the elementary forces must be so con- ceived, according to their general nature, that this ulti- mate result is seen to be eventually possible. It is, strictly, a mistake in methodology to form the ideas of the world, first of all, out of the non-mental, and then, by way of addition, to interpolate mind as an unrelated fragment. For, as Aristotle rightly remarked, the uni- verse is not divided into episodes, like a poor tragedy ; and the responsibility for the denial of the reality of the thought-process, the motive of which is explained in this way, rests entirely upon the observer, who forms concepts too narrow to embrace the whole, and who has not the faculty of holding firmly, in an investigation, to the idea of a comprehensive causal connection. The philosophical tendency, however, which leads to the questioning of the independence of what is spe- cifically mental, attained its culmination in Spinoza. We have already seen Jiow far removed from him such a tendency was at the outset ; but his speculative thought was not powerful enough to achieve its own design ; and the action of the materialistic propositions which arc SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE. 25 ultiiiiatuly decitfive is all the greater, as one believes that, in accordance with his siij)positions, the philo- sophical problem is solved. As soon as a point is reached where the mind is nothing else than the consciousness of an existence lying ontside of it, and independent of it, it is divested of all substantial meaning. If, indeed, all of its processes contain reality and value only through their relation to what is external, everything that forms its independent existence is condemned as illusion. To ascribe anything to spiritual essence signifies the declaring it to be a phantom ; and in like manner, in rigid consistency, all specific forms of thought-action, estimates of value, de- signs, etc., are 'banished from the actual world as delu- sions.^ This doctrine, which at first was vehemently re- jected,f but afterward commended in its idealizing in- terpretation, has now become the conviction of a large number of men — though without the limitations which it always received from Spinoza, and without the specu- lative reason on which he based it. Xot a few scientists consider that this is the only possible way of recognizing mind, without endangering an exact and causal compre- hension of the material world. But there is at the basis of this whole doctrine a irpwrov -»/reOSo?, viz., the inteq^re- tation of the meaning of the mind itself, that is, the in- 'terpretation which makes mind and consciousness iden- tical. Whether the relation of consciousness to external * Si^inoza's error, regarded as a pure concept, and viewed in its con- nection with his system, lay in the fact that he referred mind, as con- sciousness, not to the absohite substance, as was demanded by his first principles, but to the material world, and so substituted this for the in- finite cxi.-^tence. f And this, not only by zealous theologians, but also by such men aa Leibnitz and Baylc. 26 MODERN rniLOSOPniCAL COXCEPTS. objects, as assumed by Spinoza, may not conceal inner contradictions, is not a question we need discuss here. The fact is enough for us, that the powers of mind are not exhausted in a mere consciousness of external things, but that it creates an inner world, an independent ex- istence {Fürsichseiri) for itself, in which consciousness first makes its aj)pearance and obtains significance. Those forms of thought-activity which Spinoza op- posed do not belong merely to consciousness, and still less to mere reflection ; but they penetrate the entire being, and are, in this essential form, thoroughly inde- pendent of any strife of oj)inions. It was not a reflect- ing brain which first invented estimates of value and designs ; but, from the very beginning, these rule hu- man life, and show that they exert a power far beyond mere reflection in all that pertains to the soul. Reflec- tion and error are only the particular formations which these essential elements assume in the conscious life. Here the criticism of the philosopher can take posses- sion, and find rich material to work upon. But the fact that fallacies, frauds, and encroachments are of frequent occurrence here does not in the least justify us in reject- ing these essential elements themselves. We must therefore make a more exact distinction than is usually made between consciousness and reflec- tion. Reflection is that which has to deal, in a peculiar sense, with what is in many waj'B mediate and depen- dent, and so is continually involved in errors and ex- posed to doubts and assaults. The strife of parties reaches just as far as the reflecting judgment reaches ; and here, where the question is one of opinions and in- terpretations, science must certainly explain as subjective imagery much of the reality of which the ordinary com- mon sense of men is fully convinced. But such doubts SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE. 27 and contests affect only Avliat is siij)ci'fici;il : they do not reiicli tlie depths of the tlioiiglit-process, and even that, which, in the form in which it presents itself to us, can not he retained, should not he thrown away 6ini})ly as something subjective, but should much rather be traced back to its cause. We are not through with a thing as soon as it is explained as a delusion ; for the delusion also demands exj^lanation, and even error points, in ultimate analysis, to something true. Perhaps the ancient Paracelsus is here superior in profundity to many shrewd thinkers of the present day, when he says (Ed. of Iluser, ii. 248), *' There may also be no shadow, and, so far as there is none, thou- hast nothing of the same sun that would then make shadows." The independent existence of the mind does not need, as soon as recognized, a confirmation from outside that it may serve as real. Only when we make the at- tempt to unite mind and nature in a systematic cosmol- ogy do we take into consideration their reciprocal rela- tion, and the significance of each to the whole. Such a cpiestion, in fact, ho^tever little it may be confounded with the preceding one, will not allow it- self to be placed in a subordinate position. Many per- sons have declared, " This is for us thoroughly tran- scendent, and it is a matter of practical indifference what value our life has to us, since we always remain in the same identical circle "• ; but, in spite of that, the most distinguished thinkers are plainly always turned, yes, driven back again to this problem by an inner neces- sity. Since the mind has the universe as the object of its activity, to renounce the explanation of its position in that universe signifies for it nothing else than to doubt the knowledge of itself and its own life ; and, the less successful it is in this, the more certainly will 28 MODERN rniLOSOPniCAL concepts. it ever turn back to the problem of tbe world, to add to its own self-knowledge whatever it may there obtain. In sj^ite of -all doubts, the question which Schelling (see " Works," vi. 75) makes prominent will always again arise : " Would the mind strive to fathom this relation (that of man to the universe) ? I answer, if it would not, still it must. It always has striven after it ; and, in the future, it always will strive after it." It is therefore impossible to maintain the attempt at mediation which has recently been made, by letting the world of mind stand by the side of the Avorld of nature, without specifying their mutual relations — that is, if this is to be considered a decisive cosmological theory. In this one world thous^ht does not admit two kinds of reality : the one kind will always rej^ress the other; and, since mind, in this case, much more readily suffers dis- advantage, and is much more easily etherealized into a purely subjective world, it is the only element which is damaged by such nncertaiuty and indeterminateness. And even the uncertainty becomes insupportable when it reaches the point where conviction might otherwise awaken powers which are great and ordinarily difficult to excite. Even if we would seek rest in the faith that the world given in thought is a dream, the possibihty of a doubt destroys our natural resignation to the illu- sion. The ideal world, which the phantasy paints as el3'sium, could comfort us only so long as it serves as a full and complete actuality : as a recognized delusion, it would be man's greatest torment — hence something to be unconditionally removed. The problem thus allows itself neither to be pushed to one side nor to be evaded ; and it is the task of phi- losophy always to turn back to it again. Our purpose, however, is limited to the attempt to show the prejudices SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE. 20 wliicli stand at tlie present day in the way of an impar- tial treatment of the subject. From the first, tlioii^rht- activity appears unimportant to niany, simply because, when measured by its external extension, it sepms to disappear when contrasted with the infinite universe. Kepler opposed such a notion, for the very reason that, in an iilimeasurably extended world, the significance of that which was small externally seemed to him to be especially worthy of admiration ; and he held that we ought not to draw conclusions as to the value of anything simply from its bulk.^^ But, now, the ghmce into in- finity seems to confuse many, and they are inclined to communicate the unavoidable defect- of the percept to the things themselves. It is not true that all that is individual and internal is absolutely transitory and worthless, for the reason that, to our glance, the indi- vidual disappears before the Infinite, or that we can not measure the worth of the internal as we do. the dimen- sions of time and space. It would be most decidedly a foolish undertaking to compare mind and nature with each other according to their external circumference. Setting aside the question how far we are justified in regarding as a reliable standard the contingent duration of the experience which offers itself to us, the man who, from internal evidence, thinks mind unique; would be only strengthened in this estimate by its rarity. But he who should bring it into a close causal relation with the rest of existence, and should maintain the similarity of nature in all the events in the world, could not refuse to * Kepler, "Opera," i. 68 : "At hercle recrcat me non leviterdum pcr- pendo, non tarn dcbere nos mirari ingentcm et infinitae similein ultiiui coeli amplitudinem, quam e contra nostrum homuncionum nostnequc hujus exilissimsD frlebulae adeoque mobilium omnium exiguitatcm. Ncmpc Deo mundus non est vastus, at nos mundo, me Christc, perquam cxigui surous. Xeque ex mole judicium est do pncr^tantia faciendum." 30 MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. extend it beyond and beneath tlie superficial indications of experience. And, setting all that aside, what opin- ion should we form of a physicist who thought he could take the liberty of ignoring unquestionable phenomena, which happened to contradict his individual hypothe- ses, because these were of rare occurrence ? A further objection, that mind lacks independent reality, because it appears only in the development of universal history, after going through a process of f or- ^nation, and vacillating in m^any ways, has already been met, in part, by the remarks made above concerning the cognizability of spiritual phenomena. It can be added, that it does not in the least follow from its gradual crea- tion that anything is, in the universe, only an inciden- tal result and a transitory phenomenon ; because it is still an open question whether it arises in the process as a supplement, or was determined from the beginning, along with the process itself. If we were to predicate of all being, which receives its particular formation only in the progress of universal history, a less degree of re- ality than that which we give to the unchangeably per- sistent, we should destroy the whole significance of the world-process and of development ; and it would not be the mind only which would be degraded to the position of a fleeting phenomenon. He, who, in his conception of development, always maintains the characteristics of causality and legitimacy, will be much more inclined to deem that to be pecu- liarly worthy of consideration which is created later in its processes. But, we hear it remarked, mind not only appears at a late date, and in a solitary position, in the world's history ; it is also the result of very complicated con- ditions and of various combinations, and is therefore far SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE. 3i^^ more dependent and changeable than ^le-^iiri pic ele- ments which lie at the basis of the compounTi ; am i , th ] it is a valid axiom in science to proceed from the simi)le to the complex in an explanation, we can in no case make the mind our starting-point in our conception of tlie world. Yet this whole demonstration rests on the dogmatic assumption that mental activity as it appears in the phenomenon reveals its own intrinsic essence. That activity of course supposes our organization, which must be regarded as very complicated and variably com-, pounded ; but we must not, for that reason, in philoso- phy esteem the mind itself as something composite- that is, the very being which, single and alone among the things accessible to us, possesses an internal unity, and must claim the highest degree of reality whenever it is viewed in the light of philosophy. If, indeed, as now almost universally happens, the antithesis of lower and higher is to be made the equiva- lent of that between the simple and the complex, we must regard the higher as the dependent, and dei-ive it from the lower. But even in that judgment there is already the concealed expression of a determinate theory, which, nevertheless, is not self-evident. Empedocles and De- mocritus may consent to it, but exactly the reverse is held by Platonism, in which the highest stage is formed by the simple, the plainly coined, while the lower seems to be something which is hemmed in, confused, little by little struggling out from pressure into freedom. Here, too, a gradual development can be fully vouchsafed ; but in it our concept of the lower woiüd be formed from that of the higher.* *Scc, for example, Aristotle, 1252 b, 32: v tpiffis rtKos IcttIv ohv CKaoToo 32 MODERN rUILOSOrUICAL CONCEPTS. Thus we see that the contempt for the existence and activity of thought rests everywhere on assumj^tions, which, within certain limits and referred to mere phe- nomena, may have their full justification, but which, so far as they enter with the claim of being decisive facts of philosophical knowledge, are to be rejected as dog- matic presuppositions. That such dogmatic presupposi- tions should have been able to obtain so great an influ- ence in science is explained in greater j)art by the fact that, on the other hand, the chief endeavor of modern investigation to form an idea of mind as something cos- mic, and of what is human as a part of the universe — that this endeavor, if not given up, still has not been prosecuted with sufficient energy. Even in the contests of science we continually gee the idea of the world, which the mind forms in accordance with the tendencies and postulates arising immediately in consciousness, without hesitation presented as a conception of the objective world ; while the fact is, that what is thus present in consciousness has usually come into the form in which it offers itself to us only through a varied accommoda- tion and transformation, and therefore needs to be thoroughly worked over before it becomes generally applicai)le in science, and furnishes a building-stone for the whole. And, then, the human does not give the measure for. the universe. If, from the human as a point of vision, new views of the whole are opened, and a change is to that extent introduced into the entire conception of the universe, still even this supposes an elevation above what is exclusively specific, and so, in theory and in practice, a clianged position in relation to the world, as was the case in the experience of the joast. The appeal, too, to what are supposed to be practical interests, as opposed SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE. 33 to merely .tlicoretical results, is here often only a device for putting aside nnveriüed ideas as beyond the reach of science. The phenomena of active life must indeed und an explanation and a guarantee within the theory ; but this must be done in connection with the whole, and under the common conditions of knowledge. Modem science is unfavorable to all sjiecial privileges. Whoever lays claim to anything of this sort, only betrays the weakness of his own position. It is no part of our present undertaking to explain how much truth has been in the mean time worked out throuo^h and in the contest of erroneous theories. This much should be evident from the preceding considera- tions : that the scientific idea of consciousness stands, in a variety of ways, under the influence of a subjective skepticism. Perhaps this also is evident, that the rea- sons by which that idea is supported, considered in themselves, do not possess a high degree of essential force. But even this weakness in the reasons shows that we have to do here, not so much with a theory of science as with a great tendency in the universal histoiy of all life. And for this reason success in the stniggle after a truth raised above these divergences of opinion depends on conditions which no investigation of science can provide ; it depends on the faith of the mind in itself — on the consciousness which it has of problems which are positive and important in their relation to the universe. Science is powerless as soon as doubt and negation rule in the place of this faith, because it falls itself, with its entire contents, within the province of that which the doubt destroys. expepje:n^ce. " Science is the mother of experience ; and without science is there nothing in it." — Paracelsus. SixcE the famous utterance of Polus,^ the import of experience has passed through a variety of changes. Plato and Aristotle understood by the i/jbTrecpta of sci- ence very different things. The former combined ijjiireLpia and rpißr]. Aristotle, who had studied the concept more searchingly, and who first coined the ex- pressions ifjUTreipLKo^; {ifiTreipLKm), understood by ifiTretpia only the summing up of single acts of judgment, with no hnowledfice of the universal— in accordance with which meaning, it can, of course, form only a first step in science.f The Stoics were the first to distinguish definitely the scientific {ipLireipla fMeSohcKJ]) from the common experi- ence, and the same distinction was made by Polybius, who in principle and in phraseology was closely allied * Sec Plato, "Gort^ias," 448 C: iroXXai rlx^ai eV av^ptanois etVlv cK ru)V i/jLTreipiwy ifxireipcos cjpr\}JL4vai. c/xTreipia /xev '}ap iroiet rhv aiwya r/fxiav TTopsvea^ai Kara Texvr)V, äireipla 5e Kara rvxnv. I Sec "Metaphysics," 981 a, V : Tt) jxkv ix^iv vTr6\T}'pu on KaWia Kauyovri rrj^SI tV v^'Tov to51 (rvvrjueyKe Kol Sw/cparci Koi Ka^' 'ixacrrov ovTU TToKKois, ifXTTtipias iffTiv- rh S' OTi iratTi toTs Toio7ade ko-t tl5o; ey O(^opi(r^er(r:, Kaixvouai ttjujI t> vSary, ffui/rtueyuev olov toIs (f>\ey(MaTd>oe(nv EXrERIEXCE. 35 with the Stoics.* Yet this employment of the term does not seem to Lave come into general use. The Platonists, and especially the Peripatetics, adhered to the Aristotelian dehnition, and S(^ it remained to the end a matter of dispute whether or not the ifiiretpia were fiynon}^nous with the rixi'V-f I^ the contest between tlie medical schools, also, it was regarded as characteris- tic of the Empiricists that they renounced all investiga- tion into causes. X This signification, according to which empiricism was distinguished from science^ is the one which passed over into the middle ages in the word empiricus ; and it continues to exert an influence even in the present day. Bacon drew the line sharply between the standpoint of the Empirics and his own. Still more often, in the eighteenth century, we find the scientific experience separated from that which is empirical or common ; and also in Kant we notice a distinction between em- pirical knowledge and experience in a strict sense. The name of the school. Empiricism^ although first used in the eighteenth century, and frequently employed by Kant, was brought into a wider use especially by * See i. 84, 6, where the e>7re (avr^ /xev yap 7] e/xireipia rpißh ris iffri Koi fpydris firex- v6s Tf Ka] 6.\oyos, eV \pi\fi -rrapaTtip-ficrfi Koi (Tvyyvixvaaia «ei/xei/r?, ij 5e T'OM" HaTiK)] Texvv KadcVTTjKev). Olympiodonis oppopcs ffnrtipiKSs to KoyiKSi (see Creuzer's ed., 135) : oySe Zia^pfpei 6 op^o^^affriKhs rod i-iriffTvp-ovos, d fi^ rh elSfvai rrju ahlau oimrep ow5e o \oyiKhslarpos rov ifxireipiKov 5ia(pfpei' 4v rfi TTpd^et yap ra aiird iroiovcriu. (124.) X Sec, on thi3 point, Häser, " History of Medicine," 3d od., i. 245 et seq. 3G MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. Sclielling, and generally gave the impression that the doctrine signified by it was an inferior one. ^E^ireipia itself, however, was replaced by exj)erientia, which was nsed {exjperientz) for a while by German writers ; as, for example, by Paracelsus, Kepler, and others. In the middle ages the plural, exj^erienticB, experiences, was also formed ; as, for example, by Eoger Bacon. AVe find the term scientia exjperimentalis in Nicolaus Cusanus. Our German word ervarn (properly found originally in varn^ to acquire, to search) dates very far back. In the oldest philosophical writer in the Ger- man language, Notker, we find comp^ehendere so trans- lated. In the middle ages the expression is in general use. Erfahrung {ervarunge) occurs at that time, also prominently in Luther. Paracelsus was the first to employ the word erf alining in a strictly scientific sense, as well as erfaJtrmiss, and the predominant eifaliren- lieit. Erfahrenheit signified with him the activity involved in the reception of the objects presented through the senses, as well as the totahty of ^vhat was given.* This expression, which was used as well by Kepler and others, assumed later a narrower signification ; f and, as erfahrniss and exjperientz went out of use, er- fahr ung alone remained, and now unites in itself a variety of significations. It signifies on the one side, subjectively, the act of perception itself, the particular acts of knowledge involved in perception, and the sum total of such acts of knowledge ; then, however, objec- *Sec iii. 78, "Weg der Erfahrenheit ; ii. 380, " Erforsehung der Erfahrenheit.'''' f Adelung makes the remark, after he has cited the signiEcation which is at present predominant, that " In Upper Germany this word is used also for Erfahrung, as ... . I have it from Erfahrenheit:' EXPERIENCE. 37 lively, it signifies the object of perception,* and the Sinn total of that which is accessible to perception — a variation in signification which continually occasions confusion in our definitions. The concept became naturally a problem for philo- sophical investigation at every point where the (piestion of the sources of knowledge was discussed; but this question did not become a center of philosophical ac- tivity until the modern era. An empirical and a specu- lative tendency then acted together to change the rela- tions of the question. As opposed to the cosmological theories of the middle ages, there was brought to bear at this point the desire to comprehend whatever is founded on fact with less embarrassment, and with more precision; to distinguish this sharply from all addition on the part of the recipient subject, and to construct science anew on what was thus obtained, as on a sure foundation. If we remember that, simultane- ously with the discussions of a Bacon, so distinguished a thinker as Suarez made searching investigations into the psychology of the angels, we shall understand the full extent of this change. The consideration of essential facts became an infinitely more difficult task than it had previously seemed to be, partly because the established cosmical theories were being slowly undermined, and partly because of the discovery of scientific instmments ; and for this reason the exact nature of experience ne- cessarily became much more important. To Bacon belongs the merit of having brought out, with a stimulating vivacity, the problems which arise from such a condition of things, even though he failed to solve them. He drew the line most sharply between * Especially at the time when the expression Thatmchc was not yet in general use. 38 MODERN PniLOSOrniCAL CONCEPTS. that which in ordinary life is called exjDerience (the edo- mricntia vaga) and that which is alone valuable to sci- ence, and he described the essential characteristics of the latter, lie insisted upon a peculiarly scientiiic experi- ence (an experientia Uterata)^ by which observations and results might be communicated among men, to the end that a continuous total of human experience might be formed. He developed for the first time the funda- mental principles and problems of the inductive method, and extended these to all provinces of investigation, so that he could rightly call his philosophy inductive,* and claim to introduce a reform in all sciences. But this inductive tendency is supplemented by one which is speculative, which would transform tlie whole relation of thought to the world, and essentially change the problems of science. The inquiry proceeds from the assumption that we know things, not according to their real existence, but only by means of their action in and upon us ; hence we are not at liberty, in our ex- planation, to proceed to something lying beyond our activity, but are compelled to endeavor to reduce the various phenomena to these first principles, which are simple and actually capable of proof, and then, in turn, from these to derive all phenomena by a legitimate pro- cess. This tendency, which is already noticeable in the * "Nov, Org.," i. 12Y: "Etiam dubitabit quispiam potius quam ob- jicict, utrura nos dc natural! tantum philosophia, an etiam de scicntiis rc- liquis, logicis, cthicis, politicis, secundum viam nostram perficiendis loqua- mur. At nos ccrte de universis h;cc qufe dicta sunt intelligimus, atque qucmadmodum vulgaris logica, quic regit res per syllogismura, non tan- tum ad naturales, scd ad omnes scicntias pertinet, ita et nostra, qua3 pro- cedit per inductionem, omnia complcctitur." '* Philosophia nostra induc- tiva" appears in the beginning of the thema creli. Further, induction as a distinct method was first used by Socrates (sec Arist. " Mctaph.," 1078 b, 27). Aristotle gave it a name {iiraywyf) and iiroKTiKÖs), and also an exact investigation : the translation {inductio) was introduced by Cicero. EXrERIENX'E. 39 prominent tliinkers of the transitional period (among the Germans, for example, in Nicolaus Cusanus, Kicolans Taurellus, and Kepler), obtained in Descartes a classical expression. Ilere the ancient categories are replaced by new ones. According to Descartes, we know, es- sentially, only forces, but are com2:)elled, where we find a single force, to add the substance, in thought, as a supplementary concept. The qualities which had dwelt in the substance as little souls, and which, as concealed properties {qualitatcs occidtce), had stood in the way of exact knowledge, gave way to modifica- tions {modij mod ificat tones), which exist only as con- nected, and constitute a determinate form of the essen- tial force.* To be sure, as was usually the case in the writings of Descartes, these new doctrines appear in the forms of the ancient terminology. And yet, in spite of that, they show unmistakably that a reformation in princi- ples has been effected, which would extend to all the sciences, and transform the whole method of scientific * "Princ. Philos.," i. § 52 : " Xon potest substantia primum animad- verti ex hoc solo, quod sit res cxistcns, quia hoc solum per sc nos non aflBcit ; scd facile ipsam agnoscimus ex quolibct ejus attributo," etc. § 53 : " Et quidem ex quolibct attributo substantia cognoscitur ; sed una tamen est cujusque substantine pra:cipua proprietas, quaj ipsius naturam essentiamque constituit et ad quam alia) omncs referuntur." Since the concept of substance thus reaches no farther than the activity, sub- stance must be conceived as continually actins;. See, for example, " Epist.," vol. ii. 4, 14 : '* Xccessarium videtur ut mens semper actu cogitct ; quia cogitatio constituit ejus essentiam, qucmadmodum extensio constituit cs- sentiam corporis." It is noted as one of the two leading principles of his physics (" Epist.," ii. 116): "Me nullas in natura qualitatcs reales supponere, qua? substantia) tribuantur, tanquam animuhe quaMam corpo- ribus suis, et quae possint ab ilia per divinam potentiam separari ; atquc ita plus rcalitatis non tribuo motui aut aliis substantiic mutationibus, quas qualitatcs vocant, quam vulgo philosophi tribuunt figunc, qu» apud illos non est qualitas rcalis, scd tantum modus." 40 MODERN rillLOSOPIIICAL CONCEPTS. investigation. It was seen to be especially important that we discover the simple forces, reduce to them the heterogeneous elements in phenomena, and establish the conditions under which the special formations may admit of the coexistence of these simple forces. This entire doctrine is not superior to attacks ; it rests upon a determinate theory of the world, and of the re- lation of the thinking subject to it: but it received a striking confirmation from the mechanical concep- tion of nature; and, when it then sought to estab- lish itself everywhere, it ruled completely the science of the seventeentli and eighteenth centuries, until it was shaken by Kant within the province of phi- losophy. In the entire realm of science, the inductive and the speculative tendencies now acted upon each other, and mutually made good progress. The one restricts the investigator to what is given, and insists upon an abun- dance of material ; the other, on the contrary, gives the standard for the proper estimation of what is given, and for the working of it ; and so each enhances the value of the other. It is just this close connection of the two which invests with such an intensity the strug- gle over truth at the present day, and stamps modern science with that peculiar character which distinguishes it from all earlier developments, and gives to all the different systems certain points of contact and resem- blance. There is even in the contest concerninf): the sources of knowledge far more harmony than would appear at first sight. All agree that this is a process in the material world and in life : knowledge is not sup- posed to be received, as something inherited, or inborn, or in general ready-made, but much rather to be some- thing immediately produced ; and hence all agree in EXrERIEXCE. 41 desiring of it clearness, evidence, and constant capabil- ity of verification. Debate arises only over the question where the forces producing such results are to be souglit ; and, if here some decide in favor of the activity of the mind originating from within, and others in favor of the forces of the external world rev^ealing themselves to it, the dispute must become the more fierce the less endur- able is a mere juxtaposition of the two theories in the one closely coherent world which all j^arties assume. It is not possible to enter here upon the particular j^hases of this dispute, nor is it necessary, since, by the turn which Kant gave to the problem, the leading feature of the discussion has lost, for us, its immediate significance. Besides Kant's definition, only that of Leibnitz remains, as of independent value. Leibnitz was far from despising experience ; but he believed that it is impossible for us to stop with it, be- cause our stri^^ng after knowledge is satisfied only by the discovery of causes throughout the whole world — a discovery which experience can not give. The facts of exjoerience seem to him to be material which is to be transformed by the work of science into principles of the reason. Actual knowledge is ultimately possible only when the data are reduced to principles in which, as in equations, the agreement of subject and predicate is immediately evident, so that the task of philosophy is found to be an attempt to analyze what is confused into such simple propositions." This, however, can be fully attained only by nc- * See "De Libcrtate" (Foucher, ii. 181): " Demonstrarc nihil aliud est, quam rcsolvcndo terminos propositionis ct pro definito definitioncra aut ejus partem substitucndo, ostcndcre wquationem quandam scu coin- cidentiam prfcdicati cum subjecto in propositionc reciproca ; in aliis vero saltern inclusioncm." 42 MODERN PfllLOSOPniCAL CONCEPTS. cessary truths {veritcs de raison) ; while by contin- gent truths {verites de fait) the finite mind is able to approach the sohition only in a process incapable of comj)letion. Although it is peculiarly the task of phi- losophy to transform knowledge through experience into rational knowledge, and a complete assurance and verification of judgments are possible only so far as we succeed in this,* still exj^erience is necessary, not only as a point of departure and means of progress, but also as giving a residuum, the significance of which can never be fully explained.f Kant agrees with Leibnitz in this, that philosophy has experience not as its principle, but as its problem ; yet, in accordance with his own peculiarity of method, he considers the activity exerted by philosoj^hic thought upon the phenomena as something which dissects and analyzes ; and this activity is all the more searching the more it comprehends the nature of experience itself and tests the process over the results of which there has been so long a contest. But, because the funda- mental distinction between the understanding and the sensitive faculty was in general of essential importance to the formation of his system, the two are separated in experience also ; and experience thus apj^ears as " the product of the understanding, from the materials fur- nished by the sensitive faculty." % -^^ t^^is distinction between matter and form was made in the definition, * Sec, for example, 314 b: "La liaison des plienomencs, qui garantit les veritcs de fait ä, Tcgard des choses sensibles bors dc nous, sc verific par le moyen des verites de raison ; comme les apparences dc I'optique s'eclaircissent par la g6omctrie." f Leibnitz thus comes near to the distinction between analytical and synthetical judgments ; but he considers the whole distinction as relative, and as one which disappears in infinite development. X Sec " Works," llartcnstciu's ed., iv. 64. EXrERIENCE. tlic one being assigned to tilings, tlie other to the mind, it became everywhere a problem to analyze what is em- pirically given into these factors, in order to bring sn]> sequently into one system that which had been thus sepa- rated. By his grand execution of this great endeavor, all that hitherto had been foremost in the certainty of philosophical knowledge was shaken, and, above all, the problem of experience itself was completely changed ; but the change, in turn, brought with it so many new questions, as practically, for the first time, to inaugu- rate w^hat is now the real contest. First of all, the starting-point can itself be involved in doubt. Kant discussed the question as to how expe- rience is possible ; but it happened here, as in another decisive point in his system (that of his doctrine of free- dom), that the question whether the object of the inves- tigation was something real was everywhere kept in the background. This is the one place in which skepticism can always insinuate its attacks upon the Kantian doc- trine.* The empirical school, however, can find fault with the fact that experience, with its factors, is pre- sented too much as something completely given, and capable of being from its very beginning reviewed. We are compelled to remember here that much of that which is asserted to be necessary knowledge a priori has, as a matter of fact, worked itself out from what was really contingent, as the result of a long struggle, and by the aid of experience — for wdiich reason we can by no means consider further changes to be absolutely excluded. In * Herbart's objection (sec "Works," vi. 2Sß) to tins is not without foundation: that there is a. pdilio principü\nvo\vd in tlic statement tliat *' experience possesses an objective validity, which contains in itself an absolute solidity, and is of a far higher rank than that of a universal, uniform habit of men." 44 MODERN rniLOSOPniCAL CONCEPTS. ultimate analysis, the relation of the reason to expe- rience, in the speculative philosophy, does not seem to be determined beyond all contradiction. Thought was considered superior to experience as its product, and the assumption that thought produces the material world out of itself seemed to be imminent ; still the necessity of the thing-in-itself was maintained, and the reason was limited to this material world as given. This in- volved a contradiction, which was clearly expressed by Kant himself in the Transcendental Dialectic^ and which he attempted to escape by the different defini- tions of the theoretical and the practical reason. The Constructive philosophers carried out an exten- sive and one-sided develoj)ment, in the doctrine of the practical reason. Since they desired to j)roduce the whole world by the activity of thought, experience could no longer be to them the starting-point, but only the final goal. It ^vas to be brought into the compari- son which tests it only at the conclusion of the philo- sophical process, which process should follow only its own laws, without regard to what was presented to the senses. The difference between empiricism and science consisted in this, that the former showed as already pro- duced that wdiich the latter had formed by the activity of thought.* Moreover, this school took possession by degrees of the whole province of science. With Fichte, philosophy deals only with universal and necessary deti- * Schclling calls (iv. 97) " experience not a principle, but a problem ; not a fcrminicfi a quo, but a icrmiiius ad quem of construction." He says (iii. 2S3) : "The antithesis between empiricism and science rests on the fact that the former regards its object in Being as something ready-made and completed, while science reszards its object in Becoming and as some- thing to be first produced." In general, Schellinghas paid more attention than any of the other German Idealists to the problem of the relation of philosophy to experience. EXPERIENCE. 45 iiitiuiis," while kiiowledgü fruni exj)criencc gives tlie luiture of particular things. He thus guards himself emphatically against a nature-philosophy, as against any historical philosophy which claims to be able to evolve the individual from the concept. Schelling goes a step farther in his nature-philosophy ; and in his mental sci- ence we see him, in his hrst Period, f ever tending more and more toward philosophical construction, until at last this development culminates in Ilegel, who leaves no- where to experience an independent significance. The thoughtful theory of Ilerbart, which recognized experience everywhere as the starting-point, but which, through the contradictions 2:)rominent in it, was led into philosophy and a consequent transformation of the data furnished by experience, if succeeded in making no far- ther advances ; and so the reaction from that sovereign position whicb thought had claimed for itself proceeded not so mucli from philosophy as from the special sci- ences and from common sense. Common sense, which has a concealed hatred fur every philosophy, as for all higher ambitions of the rea- son, and which concerns itself with the systems only to point out what is fallacious, absurd, and ridiculous, found in the doctrines of the Constructive philosophers a rich field for its attacks. So long as one did not deal * But here, too, experience is a condition of the empirical conscious- ness. See vi. 313: "All laws of reason are grounded in the nature of our minds, but they come into empirical consciousness only through an experience to which they are applicable." f The discussions of the second Period, belonging here, in spite of many strikingly appropriate remarks, are too far removed from modem investigation to be included in the vital questions of science. X He fails to prove, in fact, the right of thought thus to test ex- perience by its OAvn laws, and also to prove the special criteria by which the process was to be conducted. 46 MODERN PniLOSOPniCAL CONCEPTS. with tlie elements of the decisive problems of philoso- phy and the historical development of thought, that for which one fought necessarily appeared Quixotic ; and we can not wonder that many a man fancied that he demonstrated his own mental superiority if he over- whelmed with ridicule doctrines the foundation and connection of which appeared to him simply enigmas. Inasmuch, however, as such anti-philosophical tenden- cies prefer the covering of a philosophical theory. Em- piricism was assumed as a verbal symbol of the attack. Those who defended the special sciences, i3articu- larly the Scientists, had better reasons for their position. For a long time their work was not affected nor ruled by the preponderating influence of the Constructive philosophy — by no means as much as is often to-day asserted ; yet the essential significance of those sciences, with all their devoted and productive labor, was un- doubtedly called in question by a system which sup- posed it possible to develop the whole content of expe- rience out of pure thought. It thus became evident what errors the Constructive thinkers committed in ille- gitimately claiming this province for philosophy. The rejection of this claim from the side of the ex- act sciences was thus thoroughly justified, and their change of attitude to the aggressive is easily explained. The only danger was that one might in that way judge the principles involved simply from their consequences, and often from consequences which were very remote, and so, on his side, pass beyond his proper province, and undertake the decision of problems the treatment of which really involved many otlier conditions. There were in fact some such men who, in addition to their regular work, attempted in a measure to solve in their leisure hours questions which had taxed the greatest skill EXPERIENCE. 47 of a Leibnitz and a Kant. Tiie nttcranccp, however, wliicli came from tliis side, virtually agreed in reso- lutely contesting the right of philosophy to extend itself to the results of these special sciences. This justifiable protest against the Constructive philosophers led, in this way, to a distaste for all systematic philosophy. And then there arose at last, within pliilosophy it- self, a development in favor of the Empiricism which had been undervalued in the discussions of the earlier writers. Those elements of science which favor Em- piricism, which had often been passed over superficially, now asserted their claims to notice with renewed energy. With Empiricism, moreover, were associated many re- sults of the special sciences, which, when carried over into philosophy, made necessary a transformation of the question concerning the origin of knowledge. At this point comes into consideration the principle of the posi- tive characters of the forms of knowing and being wdiich shows once for all the weakness of a philosophical con- struction of the contents of experience out of the most universal concepts. "While Empiricism has Kant as its companion, in this respect, up to a certain point, yet it turns against him when it admits the gradual de- velopment of its rigidly valid forms — allying itself here with Ilerbart, but, above all, submitting the rpiestion to a special investigation. ^ The further prosecution and philosophical accom- plishment of such fully justifiable tendencies must, liowever, lead to an essential change in philosophy, and in its relation to the special sciences ; and we can there- fore only thank Empiricism for insisting emphatically upon the validity of those points. It is to its advan- tage, in its influence over popular thought, that in its work it understands how most fully to appreciate and 48 MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL COXCEPTS. to utilize in the greatest degree the investigations of the exact sciences, while the suj^porters of other schools, as it seems, either oppose them or are unable to make use of them. But all these different tendencies act simultaneously in popular thought, and a2)pear united in a complex whole, in which it is difficult to distinguish the single elements. The philosophical, the unphilosophical, and the anti-philosoj^hical come together and interpenetrate. It is not easy to decide where the one begins and the other ceases. For this reason the criticism of modern Empiricism involves a peculiar difficulty. In this con- fusion we are in danger of making the one element re- sponsible for another — in fact, of treating the friend as an enemy, and the enemy as a friend. But this very union of heterogeneous elements in a total effect is characteristic of the state of things in our day. Espe- cially, the important fact for our consideration is not the philosophical Empiricism of particular scientists, but Empiricism as a complete phenomenon ; and hence we must regard, as well as we can, the leading fea- tures of the entire development, at the risk of placing less value upon the critical discussions of particular sci- entists than upon the dogmatic assertions of the mass. The question in dispute, as universally considered, is primarily this : How high a value are we to place upon the activity of thought in the conception of the mate- rial world ? Is the mind essentially receptive, and ac- tive only as it forms in itself transcripts of things ; or is it its right and its duty to subject what is presented to it to the test of its own laws, and according to these to form its results? In particular, is it the province of philosophy simply to receive and combine what is furnished to it by the special sciences ; or has it, on the EXrERIEXCE. 49 contrary, with an independent nietlKjd, an independent task ? Many »gradations are possible on both sides ; but a specilic antithesis remains in the fact that, in the ßys- teniatic construction of philosophy (not in the psycho- logical development), the process is, on the one side, from thought to objects — on the other side, from ob- jects to thought. It may, however, be considered a special characteristic of the kind of Empiricism which is to-day commonly predominant, that the inductive method is esteemed as the peculiar means, not only of scientific investigation, but of philosophical knowledge as well. In this view the independent activity of the mind, as contrasted with its objects, is degraded to a most insignificant position ; thought is compelled, es- sentially, to limit itself to the clear presentation to consciousness of that which things accomplish by them- selves ; the formation of the individual object of thought into definite shape seems to be determined by things from without ; and science is built up by degrees into a whole in the manner of a j^yramid." Of this strictly inductive method, we assert that it does not even nile in the province to which it lays especial claim, that of the natural sciences ; that it falls still more into the background in the other realms of thought ; and that it does not reach at all to the ulti- mate problems of philosojihy. The first statement becomes sufiieiently evident, from a close examination of the processes and methods involved in the work of the natural sciences. If we analyze, so far as we can, such concepts as hypothesis, analysis, law, and others ; if we consider the categories under which phenomena here, not arrange themselves, * Bacon is the classical tvpe of all tbi;^. 50 MODERN PniLOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. but arc arranged by us ; if we, finally, glance tlirougli the systematic articulation of these sciences, we shall find that, to all these, induction is an invariably neces- sary assistant, an indispensable condition, but that no- where is it the sufiicient or even the most important productive power. But perhaps it is simpler to glance at the historical development of these sciences, because it is here that the different forces are presented most conspicuously. We believe that we can say here, that every one who is familiar in any measure with the vigorous thought- contests which accompanied the unusually difficult tran- sition from the Aristotelian-Scholastic to the modern, from a na'ive to a scientific explanation of nature — that any such person will drop as untenable the supposition that in these contests the inductive method of investi- gation turned the scale. Induction presupposes that the particular cases can be observed for themselves, and for themselves can furnish a definite result ; that then the particular classifies, arranges itself, etc., until a whole is attained. But how now if the whole foundation is shaken ; if questions are raised concerning the stability and ultimateness of the individuals ; if everything ex- isting is dissolved before the glance of the investigator, and the question is to discover the elements of a new world, and to distinguish the ultimate forms remaining in the confused mass ? When the thing to be done is to construct anew something solid out of an immense chaotic mass, and we are called upon to formulate and to conceive the phenomenal under new relations and from a new point of view, induction then stands be- fore problems which overpower it ; for, while it can build up what is given it, it can not essentially and in- trinsically transform a world. EXPERIENCE. 51 Xor was the doctrine of categories, in which the modern explanation of nature is involved, discovered by Descartes by. means of induction. Is it by induction that the investigation of nature is determined as involv- ing the comprehension of the phenomenal as something thoroughly compound, and as involving, first, its reduc- tion to simple primary forces, and, secondly, its deriva- tion from these by the hel^) of the idea of development ? In harmony with such a theoretical determination of the task, not induction, but analysis was the peculiar instrument of progress in the actual work of scientists — of such men as Kepler and Galileo, Descartes and New- ton. They saw that it was, above all, their task to ana- lyze what was confused in a phenomenon, that they might arrive at simple forces, and from those again work back to what was originally given. They went out be- yond this, only that they might return to it again ; but it was only by this exercise of thought that it became possible to see in the given phenomena anything else than had been seen there before; only so could they hold and conceive, as itself a legitimate product, that which, received unchanged, was involved in complica- tions and contradictions. To this end, of course, a precise determination and a constant consideration of the phenomenal were uncon- ditionally necessary ; and, so far as this went, modern natural science had undeniably an inductive character. But for the really decisive work itself induction was thoroughly insufficient, since the object which it ob- served was itself already complicated ; experience " be- came conscious at the same time of laws and excep- tions" (see Goethe, "Ausg. letzter Hand," 50, ir.O); and hence the circumstances under which it could form a decision required a t4'ansformation of its material. 52 MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. Facts of knowledge, as the so-called law of inertia, the law of the persistence of force, etc., have not been dis- covered, in gradual ascent, from single data — for these all contained at the ontset more or less apparent con- tradiction — but they became possible only through the fact that scientists knew how to span the totality of things with comprehensive glance ; that they grasped the heterogeneous, not as an aggregate, but as a sys- tem ; that in thought they followed out series by them- selves into the infinite ; and that, by all this, they ob- tained a position from which they could form a new world, without a conflict with those apparent contradic- tions. In this way have been achieved all those great discoveries which excite our astonishment. The mathematical character of modern natural sci- ence is also a witness for this interpretation of its meth- od. If Kant's statement is correct, that natural science contains only so much science as it does mathematics, and hence the knowledge of laws and forms is to be re- garded as of primary importance, then induction must be content with the second place. For the mathemati- cal element, through its primary concept of pure quan- tity, turns out to be, in princij^le, superior to the induc- tive element. And, as a matter of fact, the first scientist wdio formulated mathematical laws in nature, John Kep- ler, did not proceed to these by direct highways from phenomena; but, after sufiicient inquiries in the mate- rial world, he first calculated possibilities and hypothet- ical ly developed consequences, and not till then turned back to experience for comparison and decision. Only because the mind produces the mathematical forms in its constant, inner activity, did he consider it possible that it could find laws in nature: for w^hich reason such a cognition is explicitly expressed as a recogni- EXPERIENCE. 5;> tion.* The other great scientists came much nearer to this method which Kepler employed tlian to that which was recommended by Bacon. A man like Xewton might, in many statements, apparently profess to be a follower of the inductive tendency ; but a scientist's opinion of his own method and that method itself are two different things. In his actual process Newton agrees with Kep- ler and Descartes much more than with Bacon and Locke. Surprise is sometimes expressed that a scientist, who recognized the methods of the natural sciences as accurately as Bacon did, should have advanced scientific knowledge so little by his own work. But there is no cause for surprise, since the assumption itself is inac- curate. Bacon, in some details, recognized correctly many processes and methods of natural science, and brou£i:ht out the value of this knowledc^e with all the vivacity and perspicuity of his style. But his doctrine of method, considered as a whole, neither corresponds to the scientific process of our day,f nor could it be pro- ductive in the condition of science in his time. In brief, we believe that the peculiarity of modern natural science is misunderstood, and that especially the important thought-labor involved in it is undervalued, if it is supposed to be chiefly the creation of induction. After the path is once brokeii, induction can accomplisli the work of the day ; and it is not at all strange that it is far more prominent to the reflective consciousness * See " Opera," V. 216: "Idoncam invcnirc in sensibilibua propor- tionem est dctcfrcre et agnoscere et in luccra profcrre similitudinom illiu3 proportionis in scnsibilibus cum certo aliquo vcrissiniai harmonise archc- typo, qui intus est in animo." In general, Kepler's doctrine of knowledge, which is especially developed in the fourth book of tlie " Ilamionicc Mundi," should not be so wholly forgotten, in favor of the Ilu-oTuan doc- trine. f This is evident from his undervaluation of mathematics. 5i MODERN PniLOSOPniCAL CONCEPTS. than operations which are of superior power and im- portance ; for that which is the most important, not being produced by reflection, escapes our notice while in operation, and even after it has been employed, and so the real process remains concealed beneath what is actually present in consciousness. Unless we are j^re- pared to identify with what is the decisive power in- volved what is only its necessary condition, or to inter- pret the concept of inductive investigation as involv- ing the assertion of something self-evident, we are compelled to coordinate induction with and subordi- nate it to other methods. But, then, this same method is supposed to be trans- ferable to the mind as well, because of the analogy be- tween the experience of internal and that of external phenomena. We can not of course defend what the Mystics understood by inner experience.* There can, among scientific men, be no doubt that it leads to a contradiction to establish something which avoids the essential conditions and forms of knowledge (as such an inner experience does) as a source of an act of knowl- edge, and indeed of a knowledge which surpasses all other forms of judgment. If, then, we carefully dis- tinguish between inner experience and the experience of internal phenomena, the demand that the latter shall share in the definite establishment of a cosmology is fully justified. But it becomes a very problematical as- sertion if the specific form, which the concept of expe- rience has received in the investigation of the material world, is transferred to the thought-world without modi- fication, and if an exclusive sway is demanded for meth- * Weigel, especially, introduced the phrase into German (" innere Erfahrenheit " and " innere Erfahrung "). See " Christi. Gespräch vom wahren Christcnthum," Cup. ii. EXPERTENTE. 55 ods wliich, even tliere, are employed only in connection with and after other methods. Before we take up the watchword of the uuhirtlve ■psychology, so attractive to the predominant tendency of our day, it is especially necessary to ask whether the conditions of applying the inductive method to this material are given, at least to the same extent as they are in the case of the investigation of nature, provided we hold that a method should be adapted to the nature of its material, rather than that the material should be constrained to forms not fitted to it, for the sake of a system. But, as a matter of fact, there is in this respect unmistakably a great difference between the internal and the external world. The phenomena of the former do not immediatelv arran^ce themselves in a world which is connected, permanent, and common to all observers ; so that, though there may be a perception of the internal, there is no internal intuition, and that which we have experienced is exposed to constant change in the pro- gressive development of the whole.* The particular phenomena are not in general given as relatively inde- pendent, and hence can not be held as solved by them- selves, but they are always influenced by their connec- tion and occurrence in combinations. And, moreover, the universal does not proceed simply from the particu- lar, and absorb it in itself without residue ; but in every combination the particular preserves a certain indepen- dence. But here we face problems for wliich the in- ductive method is by no means a match. * Ilerbart says correctly (vi. 358): "Every fact which we assume as known in previous time, through consciousness, or in general as having already happened, and being present in plain sight, can be called in doubt — in fact, must be called in doubt — because of the vacillation in all in- ternal perception, and because of the extreme ease with which some cle- ment can be insidiously interpolated in such a fact." 56 MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. On tliis account, while there is, of course, no doubt that induction has an important significance in psychol- ogy,* still it can here, as in natural science, oi3erate only on the border-land between nature and the soul. As soon as the problem becomes specifically psychological, induction is banished into narrower limits. We may, for example, ask how a system of ethics or religion can be inductively proved from j^sychical phenomena. Is it through combination of the similar, and ascent to universal propositions ? But we must have formed a previous judgment, in order to decide what material belongs here ; and we must have ascertained the boun- daries, in order to discover what is similar, w^hich, in this case, must possess intrinsic similarity. Or are we to obtain a law by stril^ing an average ? From all this it can be inferred, with sufficient clearness, on how weak a foundation an inductive psy- chology would stand as a system, and how absurd it would be to construct the whole system of philosophy on such a basis. This would be true even if that which is immediately present to perception and observation were pure fact ; while, in reality, it has passed through our own apprehension, and the combinations and for- * We have no objections at all to make to an empirical psycliology, so far as it claims to be only a preparation for philosophy. For our part, we desire it. But the descriptions, classifications, and analyses, which it is able to give, establish no science, and do not lead to an ultimate dis- tinction between what is actually existent and wl\at is added in thought. And then we can always be mindful, here, of Schelling's warning (iii. 282), "that only those warm admirers of Empiricism, who, faithful to the con- cept of Empiricism, extol it at the expense of science, have desired to sell to us as Empiricism, not their own judgments and what is inclosed in nature, but rather what has been forced upon objects ; for, although many may believe that they can sagely discuss the subject, still there is much more involved than many imagine in seeing clearly the events of nature and in accurately translating what has happened." EXPERIENCE. 57 mations in which it now meets us arc the results of a process. It is not the metaphysician who first begins a transformation of the original facts. If it were, he could not be blamed too severely. Eut every man who thinks performs it from the very beginning, even though unconscious of it ; and so we find that in what is presented there are already results, perhaps highly complicated results, the actual contents and simple ele- ments of which can be discovered only by philosophical methods. There is something tempting in the thought of pro- ceeding from the soul, as what is nearest and most ac- cessible to us, and of binding all further knowledge to what is obtained from it ; and it is fully justified in this sense, that what Descartes called the Archimedean point for philosophy is to be sought in the thinking consciousness. But, if we take the sj)ecific contents of the human life as our starting-point, we are met by the fact that it is the very thing which lies nearest that offers the greatest difficulties to our knowledge. The whole development of the mind shows that the evolu- tion does not proceed from a microcosm to a macrocosm, but from the latter to the former. The truths which the thinking mind comprehends it has always first re- ferred to the whole world, and only subsequently sought to employ in the interpretation of itself. Only when tnith is thus brought to its notice, as world-wide in its sway, has it obtained power enough to be applied to the interpretation of internal phenomena as well ; and then, in fact, every important judgment concerning the whole has proved itself to be tnie and forcible, in that it enlightens us concerning ourselves. For this reason it is true, whether we like it or not, that psychology is dependent upon the philosophy of 58 MODERN nilLOSOPIIICAL COXCEPTS. the universe — that is, upon metaphysics. If we examine more critically its history, the formation of its general principles, even the coinage of its terminology, we shall find it all dependent on the general development of tlie whole system. We shall see that, everywhere, even what was believed to be recognized as a fact was con- ditioned by the starting-point, and by the connections of the method of observation. For phenomena do not, from the outset, obtrude here upon consideration, but they wait for the observer, and do not come into the field of vision until the attention has been directed to that particular point. What is then discovered seems to be self-evident, although the real circumstances of the case prove the opposite, namely, that much which every one now believes he sees immediately and in- tuitively has come into consciousness only at a late stage of the progress of scientific thought, and later still has come to an explicit recognition. If we examine them closely, our ideas of the soul present themselves essen- tially as theories and hypotheses (as even the concept of the soul itself^ empirically regarded, is an hypothe- sis), dependent, indeed, upon the general nature of our thought, but dependent, also, upon its historical forma- tions. It is under the influence of such theories that our method in psychology now stands. It can not, then, be sufficient, in order to penetrate to the real facts, sim- ply to lay aside the metaphysics of philosophy ; for, in so doing, we should only place ourselves under the in- fluence of an uncontrolled metaphysics. And with this we have arrived at the decisive point of the whole discussion. It is certain that thought has not the least right to extend itself beyond the starting-point of ordinary Em- piricism, and, on its own responsibility, to undertake to EXPERIENCE. 59 transform the phenomena which are given to it — pro- vided the phenomena thus given are to be regarded simply as matters of plienomenal occurrence. It is, however, not only the rig] it, but the duty of thonght to do this, when we are compelled to recognize in the phe- nomena a previously determined cosmical theory, which has come into the condition in which we find it only as the result of a thought-process. In this case, thought does not create for itself, at pleasure, a world of phan- tasy by the side of the actual world ; but, by its activity, corrects the original errors, and in a measure restores the integrity of that which comes under its considera- tion. Whether we regard the nature of this activity, with Leibnitz, as the passage from a confused to a distinct knowledge ; or, with Kant, as the solution of the com- plex into its factors, and as the systematic combina- tion of ultimate elements ; or, with the Idealists, as the transformation of the quiescent and dispersed in a unifying process involving the whole ; or, with Herbart, as the removal of contradictions from the concepts of experience ; or whether we adopt any other methods of procedure — still it is the common conviction that it is an error " to consider a concept valid because it is already given " (see Herbart, iii. 82) ; that, for impera- tive reasons, what is given can not be retained just as it is given ; and that it is a fundamental mistake not to proceed to a metaphysical working-over of materials.* While Empiricism ends simply with what is given it, it presumes to assert a thesis, which is none the less * Herbart has asserted this most emphatically. lie finds (vi. 314) the origin of a fal?e raetaphysics in the fact "that the first principles of experience are allowed to remain, and are assumed as valid, just as they are first brought to light by the psychological mechanism. Sins of omia- sion are what prevent us from advancing to a true metaphysics." 00 MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. positive because it takes a negative form when it for- bids us to proceed beyond experience ; and wbich has none the less a metaphysical character because it identi- fies ultimate being — or what is, so far as accessible to us, ultimate being — with the phenomenal.* The weight of this thesis lies in the fact that it seems to be immedi- ately evident, and that the power of the impression thus made holds its ground against the attacks of thought. It is manifest that the mind is, at first, a tabula rasa. Only by degrees do acts of insight appear and individ- ual objects arrange themselves into shape. Tlie forms of knowledge, even, which in the Kantian philosophy were something firm, and given in combination, are separated into single elements, and developed in their order. But this development is seen everywhere to be suggested and determined from without ; and whence but from without should its universal content come, unless we are to take refuge in the now exploded in- nate ideas ? There is, then, only so much in the mind as it has earlier or later received from outside. Knowl- edge has truth only so far as it reflects the facts which lie without : it is verified only by reference to those facts. But, since we call this reception of the external experience^ the conclusion follows, that all knowledge arises from experience, and it is as foolish as it is use- less to wish to go beyond that by the aid of speculation. This whole reasoning seems simple — if anything, rather too simple ; for it might lead some one to raise the question, How, then, can it be explained that men, for examj^le, like Leibnitz and Kant, made a mistake in what was so evidently the real condition of things ? and, once started on such a line of questioning, he might * We are reminded bore of Plato's statement : Toa-ovry fxiiwSi/ ttViv, oioi OJK oiovTai, oTi o-j-x). oioyrai (" Tlicaitctus," 176 D.) EXrERIENCE. (Jl then very easily feel prompted to ask further, whether the reason for this conflict of opinion, instead of lying in a mistaken judgment of tangible facts, were not to be found in a dilference in tlie significance and value given to those very facts. And this is the actual state of things. That objects present themselves externally, as Empiricism asserts, the other schools also grant, although with occasional protests. But, that this which seems to happen in the phenomenon is identical with what happens in very substance, does not appear to them absolutely certain. They do not deny that the mind originally, regarded from outside, seems like a tabula rasa ^ * but they hesi- tate to suppose a being without any kind of activity, and assume that no action can come in from without, unless it is received by an action from within. It does not escape their notice that the mind, in its relation to things, appears to be only passively receptive. But, more closely examined, the concept of pure passivity seems to them untenable, in that it assumes action with- out counteraction ; and so they are aroused, by deep- er penetration into the matter and keener analysis of the processes involved, to prove also an activity of the mind in its connection with things. f They readily recognize the formation, from simple elements, of what is finally presented as a complex total ; but they can * It has often been noticed, on the si Je of the speculative philosophers, that this idea essentially regards the mind as something corporeal. For example, Nicolaus Taurellus. Leibnitz, too, in a further comprehension of the question, says (223 a) : " L'arae a-t-elle des fenetrcs, rasscmble- t-elle ä des tablettes ? est-elle comme de la cire ? II est visible, que toua ceux qui penseni ainsi de Tame la rendent corporellc dans Ic fond." f The Empirics always say that things arc given ; but there must also be something to which they are given. Or do thoy mean that things are found so and so in the world ? but, thon, who and what is the finder? 62 MODERN PniLOSOPmCAL CONCEPTS. not desist from the question whether this formation is absolutely conditioned from without, and whether every combination of the heterogeneous does not point also at inner laws. They are ready to value experience as highly as possible ; but it is to them a problem to dis- cover what is already presupposed by experience, and to ask whether this is not itself complex, and therefore needs to be analyzed into different factors. The problem which arises from all this is wholly different from that from which Empiricism originally proceeded. The question is not how knowledge arises, from a psychological point of view, and whether it starts from experience and is held to experience, but what the origin is of that which is known through experience, and, accordingly, what opinion should be formed of ultimate facts. The contest, then, concerns not the de- termination of what phenomenally happens, but what ultimate judgments should be passed upon the events themselves, and what opinions should be formed, by reason of such a judgment, concerning ultimate action and existence. It is, then, thoroughly absurd for the Empiric to compel his opponents to discuss that which is primarily factitious, and to contest something which can be experimentally proved.* Kant, too, stated the matter correctly (see viii. 536), when he carefully distinguished the question whether all knowledge arises from experience, as a qiicestio facti, from the qucestio juris whether it can be derived from experience alone as the highest ground of knowledge. We prefer to-day, in dealing with this problem, not to tear apart roughly the questions of right and of fact ; * The difference between Locke and Lcil)nitz is not so irreconcilable as is p;encrally supposed. The one may be right at the beginning, the other at the end. EXrERIEN'CE. (]3 but, tlien, it does not yet follow from this that they should be simply confounded. In every Ccose, if we start the question of right, the investigation assumes another meaninc: and another character. We can then no loncrer form a decision immediately concerning individual cases; but their justification must be found in their connec- tion, while the method and reason of this connection must themselves be systematically considered and ex- plained. From the first, the starting-point is changed from the psychological investigation, which is engaged with the empirical production of knowledge, to the transcen- dental investigation, which seeks to discover the origin of knowledge, and the metaphysical, which seeks to fathom its ultimate significance. In the former, the process in the empirical advance of knowledge is from the external to the internal, starting from the world as something objective. In the latter, where the question concerns the ultimate origin, the mind must, first of all, be considered. Again, in the former, one must simply describe from observation what goes on in the process, and be content with the facts presented. In the latter, where the object is to discriminate between the mind and the world, and to advance to the last facts attainable by us, the results of the former process can serve only as phenomenal, and to be understood must be tested and transformed. But such a definition of the problem, and the transformation involved in it which changes the investigation by descriptive aggregation into one which is analytically systematic, must essentially afi!ect the na- ture of all single concepts. The Empiric usually appeals to facts ; that is, to " objects of concepts, of which the objective reality .... can be proved" (see Kant, v. 482). But what, then, in Gi MODERN PniLOSOPniCAL CONCEPTS. general, is comprehended under this concept ? Only the sino^le event in the external world ? Or are there also general facts — are there also subjective facts ? And is Kant to be considered a fantastic visionary in thinking that he derived an idea from the reason, namely, the idea of freedom, which he regarded as a fact (see Kant, v. 483) ? But, then — and this is the most important question here — are phenomena, as they are immediately present to consciousness, already pure facts ? Every in- quirer in his own sphere, according to his own method, will agree with the philosopher, in his ultimately com- prehensive and decisive investigation, in asserting that the facts in the phenomena can be ascertained only by the work of thought ; ^ that this problem can be treated only by the criticism of all the elements involved ; and that the single data obtain a firm significance only through their connection f with one another in this whole. Moreover, the concept of verification changes as the concept of a fact changes. Verification is usually thought to mean the comparison of the constituents of a percept with the external object ; but this definition is not sufiicient even for the sj)ecial sciences. In mathe- matics, for example, we can confirm the truth or falsity of the process only by the consistency of the thought- process itself, which reduces what is problematical to * Schelling says rightly (x. 228) that, in all possible investigations, the determination of the pure, the true facts, is the first and the most impor- tant thing to be done ; but that it is, at the same time, the most difficult. f The expression Thatsachc (fact) is, aside from other reasons, an un- fortunate one, in that it seems to represent something as firmly grounded and self-contained while it is still to be tested. The word occurs first in the last half of the eighteenth century (as, for example, in Lcssing's con- troversial writings against .Götze, in Herder, and others). But Adelung wanted to banish it as " unfit, and compounded contrary to analogy," and " liable to misinterpretation." Fichte insisted upon the concept of That- kandlvMCfy as opposed to niataacJtc. EXrERIEXCE. (»5 immediate judgments.* But in philosophy, where not only the entirety of the external world, as such, but also knowledge in general, can be called in question, wholly new problems are opened, which can be taken up and discussed, as far as is in general possible for us, only by a systematic investigation. The idea of solv- ing such questions of general principles by isolated data should be decidedly rejected. And now, lastly, we consider the concept of experi- ence itself, from which all knowledge is supposed to originate. If this means that we obtain all that we know from the thought-activity which appears and acts in relation to the world, no one w^ill have any objections to make to it. If we are to understand by it that this activity is always restrained by the objects opposed to it, the assertion is more problematical, and a glance not only, for example, at ethics,f but also at pure mathe- matics, can excite doubts concerning it. But if it is asserted that in this co-existence the mind ultimately retains all that comes from outside, without any forma- tive activity on its own part, we have no longer a pres- entation of empirical occurrences, but a specifically dog- matic thesis concerning their contents :j; — a thesis, the * The first philosopher who seems to have thoroughly investigated the problem of verification in general science, Roger Bacon, presented mathe- matics as the means of verification for the rest of knowledge, and cspe- . cially for natural science. (See "Specula Mathematica," dist. I.) f See Kant, iii. 2C0 ; " In the consideration of nature, experience sug- gests to us the rule, and is the source of truth ; but, as for ethical laws, experience is, alas ! the mother of illusion ; and it is highly objectionable to wish to derive from or to limit by that which is done the laws for that which I ought to do." I Hence the erroneousness of the customary way, in language, of op- posing experience and reason, and of regarding that which obtains sig- nificance for knowledge only by scientific activity, as something ready- made in distinction from that activity, and given as fixed. Boyle, " the 66 MODERN PIIILOSOPniCAL CONCEPTS. ordinary demonstration of wLich suffers from a constant petitio princlpii / for in it the external world is usually regarded as something given and presented to the mind ready-made : but this fact, which may seem self-evident to the unphilosophical consciousness, is just what is called in question ; for the very point in dispute is whether we do not often, in such reception, only receive back something which we ourselves have attributed to the world, and whether the Empiric does not forget something which is a concomitant of experience — the observer himself. There is thus an ambiguity if it is asserted that we should not go out beyond experience. If the idea is that phenomena are to be left unchanged, just as they are given to us, then not only philosophy, but every kind of science, is destroyed ; for every act of knowing, if it seeks to discover laws and causal connections, and to solve the comj^osite in phenomena, or to unite what is apparently independent, must go beyond the senses and transform what is immediately presented to them. The Constructive philosophers were entirely right when, supposing this to be the meaning of experience, they attacked the concept of an experiential science,* and saw a complete contradiction in the using as a principle — and, indeed, as the highest principle — in philosophy, experience itself, whose very essence consists in the fact that it never leads to a principle (see Schelling, vi. 78). Christian virtuoso," toward the end says, with reason, in regard to this : " When we say experience corrects reason, 'tis an improper way of speak- ing ; since 'tis reason itself that, upon the information of experience, cor- rects the Judgment it had made before." * Thus SchelHng calls (iii. 282) the concept of an experiential science an " hermaphrodite concept, under which nothing connected, or rather nothing at all, can be thought. What is pure empiricism is not science ; and, conversely, what is science is not empiricism." EXrEKIENCE. 07 The only mistake tlicy made was in givinp; any scien- tilic brain credit for such a concept of experience. Of course, it is the scientific experience whicli we sliould profess. But, then, the question arises whetlier, ac- cording to what has just been said, even this does not presuppose an independent thought-activity ; and the champion of sueli an experience enters into a discussion which, wlien carried out consistently, must necessarily adjudicate to philosophy a* problem of its own beyond experience. The Empiric falls into the dilemma either of seeing himself driven back upon the common expe- rience by the consistent denial of thought-activity, or of denying in philosophy that which he defends in the special sciences ; the consequence of which is a constant vacillation in the concept of experience itself. But, if one concedes the right of changing the form of what is given, he can not evade the question whether such a transformation (entirely without regard to the relativity of the concept's form and content) does not lead further in regard to its matter also ; and whether thought-activ. ity does not thus rise, by its very nature as truly as in fact, above the foundation fui*nished by the phenomena, and advance legitimately beyond it. But the essential fact for us, here, always remains — that the problems and claims of philosophy constitute the highest development of the entire work of science, so that they can not be laid aside as something wholly adventitious. And this is particularly true of modern science, which assumes a far more free position in rela- tion to what is given in sense-perception, and which by its analysis has recreated the whole nai've cosmic theory. Although the special sciences neither formulate the general question nor pursue it to its final answer, still philosophy undertakes to do this, and so takes up the CS MODERN PniLOSOrniCAL CONCEPTS. nature of knowledge as a necessary and comj^reliensivo problem in order to justify the entire work of science.* Moreover, tlirougli this it first obtains for itself a clear and definite task, a systematic arrangement and method of its own. It is now, for the first time, that the ques- tions, by their philosophical treatment, enter upon a practically new sphere. The general j^rinciples are transformed. The experiences of the external and of the internal, otherwise divergent, can now be united in a whole. Philosophy ceases to be an appendage to other sciences, a mere crowning of the structure, or a rendezvous for the fancies of the common understand- ing: it becomes rather the science of sciences, which forms properly the very soul of all knowing activity, and gives it its inner unity. But, from the standpoint of Empiricism, such an independent task for philosoj^hy, and hence philosophy itself as a unique science, can not be consistently main- tained. For a part of the concept of a science is that of a systematic combination of acts of knowledge under general principles, and also that of a specific method. The Empiric, however, must either adjudicate to phi- losophy the m^re grouping of the results of the other sciences, or else limit it to the observation of psychical occurrences as a specific province. In the first case, we should have no science at all ; in the second, at least, no central science of principles. But modem Empiricism does not seem in a single instance to advance a claim to a peculiar method for philosophy, for it professes only those methods which we are accustomed to rec-ard as belonging to the natural sciences. Yet the renunciation * So the special manner in wliicli this pliilosopliical problem is treated in any period of time is closely connected with the distinctive peculiarity of the scientific work of that time. EXrERIENCE. C9 of pliilosopliy as an independent science can not well be ex2)ressed more frankly than in such a renunciation of its peculiar method. Answering to this description, then, modern Em])iri- cism, judged by what it has hithei-to attained as posi- tive * results, has made little advance beyond a new for- mulation and hypothetical extension of facts of knowl- edge in natural science. As soon as it deviates from the territory of the natural sciences, it finds itself re- ferred to the common sense of men ; and so we can w^ell say, wdthout being unfair, that, if Empiricism contains science as well as philosophy, the tw^o can not harmonize. AVhat. is here science is not philoso^^hy, and what is phi- losophy is not science. Corresponding to this view, the influence of Empiri- cism on the thought-activity of the present day is duo less to its specifically philoso23hical productions than to tendencies of a general character. The most prominent cause is a distaste for all speculative and systematic philosophy, which w\as first turned against Hegel and the Constructive thinkers, and then extended far be- yond this exciting occasion. It is not so much a clear judgment as it is a confused feeling which lies at the bottom of such an agitation. It is the antipathy to an abstract and purely formal knowledge ; to the forcible construction of a system out of concepts claiming to be pure, and in truth often devoid of meaning; to the whole estrangement of philosophy from the positivity of material phenomena. This reproach may be aimed especially at Hegel ; it applies essentially to all modern systematic philosophy, with the exception of Kant. * In general, a negation has far more weight, and the Empirics can not be thankful enough to the Constructive philosophers for their aber- rations. 70 MODERN nilLOSOPIIICAL CONCEPTS. Pervasively, and to an increasing extent in modern plii- losopliy, all existence was reduced to the operations of the understanding, and all positive content of the ma- terial world more and more dissolved. The opposing reaction has now entered ; the thhst for a real and con- crete cosmology has become powerful ; and, since it finds no satisfaction in philosophy, it has turned against it, and favors every view which does homage to the im- mediate phenomenon. The tendency which leads to this change we con- sider fully justified, and we rejoice in it most heartily. But, if it would obtain significance and permanence, it must w^in for itself a place inside of philosophy, and must not remain stationary within the prejudices, of vulgar impressions. As matters are situated at present, all possible elements are mixed together ; all that is in general opposed to idealistic tendencies is united to fight against, not this or that philosophy, but against all systematic philosophy. To defend philosophy from such attacks is to degrade it. The final question is not how the age judges philosophy, but how philosophy will judge the age. Only in one point would we oppose a misunderstand- ing which has taken possession of scientific circles — the misunderstanding of the real province of metaphysics. The expression metaphysics has become one of those war-cries which do not allow the exercise of quiet re- flection. All the odium that is attached to the ab- struse, the arbitrary, and the empty, is heaped upon one such appellation, and the result is in this way ren- dered certain. Now, the term metaphysics is certainly an unfortu- nate one, because it easily suggests the idea that it treats of a knowledge which is transcendental, and lies outside of all experience. But a glance at liistoiy>fillo^fe'Tm\v^v^ little justitication there is for making one single pTönii- nent thinker responsible for it — to say nothing of j)hi- losophy as a whole. Originated in a misunderstand- ing, then carried over from the Neo-Platonic to the Transcendental side,* the phrase, in the sense of Ontol- ogy, became a favorite with the Scholastics, and was also employed with favor in modern jihilosophy in the Wolffian school, where the Scholastic spirit was retained the longest. From this, and in fact without distorting it, Kant formed the concept of metaphysics, which he opposed. If, now, no thinker of any prominence has ever taken nmch j^leasure in the use of the expression, w^e can easily see in that fact evidence that the deeper problem of philosophy is not affected by the attacks on " MetajDhysics." That upon which all systematic think- * As is well known, the expression was originally derived from the order of the writings of Aristotle. As Gassendi conjectured, Androni- cus of Rhodes, who arranged the writings of Aristotle, is to be regarded as its originator. Then the word was quickly adopted as the symbol of the science (to fxera to :nificant still could master them. 'No man thinks that, perhaps, they also knew them all ; but how, then, conld they possibly swim against the stream of evidence ? Many are convinced that Plato, if he could only have read Locke, would have gone out from his presence in shame. Many a man believes that even Leibnitz, were he to rise from the dead and goto school to learn of him for an hour, would be converted. And how many fledglings are there who have not sung songs of triumph over Spinoza's grave ? " All such encroachments of common sense affect the systems, so far as those systems postulate for philosoph- ical investigation an independent problem. The nearer the systems remain to the ordinary idea of the world, the sooner can they count upon being pardoned by that practical common sense. This usually grants to Em- piricism a certain favor, which in tnith its scientific de- fenders have not reciprocated. For the philosophical treatment of the present questions, this whole partisan- ship of the masses has no value at all. The transcen- dental and metaphysical problem is one which is evt'r\'- where so difficult, and presupposes so much scientific 74 MODERN rniLOSOnilCAL CONCEPTS. and pliilosopliical labor, and lies, moreover, so far away from the naive idea of the world, that popular opinicjns have here about as much significance to philosophers as the vulgar ideas of the heavenly bodies and their move- ments have to astronomers. But the confusion has at the present day forced its way out from the circle of unreflecting minds into that of scientific investigators. That the philosophical prob- lem in its distinctive nature is not understood, is evident from the arguments for Empiricism which are asserted even by men who occupy a prominent position in the spe- cial sciences. Thus, for example, an argument for philo- sophical Empiricism is fabricated from the fact that, in the psychologico-physiological problem of the formation of our idea of space, the scale seems tQ turn in favor of the empirical rather than the intuitional explanation. But the two questions are radically different. In the one case we discuss the j)sychical production and devel- opment in consciousness; in the other, the ultimate origin. We might answer the psychological problem entirely in the sense of Empiricism, without being in the transcendental sense a philosophical Empiric. The identification of the two questions shows a decided mis- understanding of the Kantian philosophy, against which Kant has often expressly guarded himself. The very man who has most highly valued the originality of the forms of knowledge has carefully distinguislied the prob- lem of originality from the question whether these forms are to be regarded as ready-made and innately given, or as first developing themselves in the experience of life, and has unambiguously expressed his sympathy for what has since been called the empirical explanation.* * Definite quotations will be given in the discussion of the concepts a priori and innate. EXPElilENCE. 75 Further, the recent invcstiii^ations in regard to tlie principles of geometry, from wliich it is concluded that our idea of space is determined from among other pos- sible ideas, are understood as if the Kantian doctrines were overthrown by the knowledge of this positive fact, and the question were decided in favor of Empiiicism, because that newly discovered propeiiy of the idea of space is learned only by experience. But, for philoso- phers, the question is not at all by what process we bring the judgments into our consciousness, but it is from what source they originally arise ; and it is a very different thing to construct something by a process of pure thought, from concei\ang it as produced by men- tal activity after it is known. Therefore the schools which defend the originality of the forms of thought do not in the least need to derive these from pure con- cepts ; but they can admit without hesitation a specific nature which we first know through experience. Yet I should connect that expression. There can be no talk about an " admission," for it is by the systematic school itself that this fact of experience is first asserted. For Leibnitz, it was a peculiarly attractive and in his sys- tem important principle, to apprehend what is actually existent in every case as one of different possibilities. But, in Kant, one of the leading elements of his trans- cendental Idealism was the conviction that the defini- tive property of the intuition of space— as under three dimensions — could not be inferred from the general concept of space.* He would then have greeted with * See ii, 410: "Non dari in spatio plures, quam trcs dimensioncs, inter duo puncta non esse nisi rectam unieam ; c dato in supcrficie plana puncto cum data recta circulum circumscribcre etc., non ex univcrsali aliqua spatii notione concludi, sed in ipso tantuui, velut in concreto, ccmi potest." Y6 MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. especial pleasure tlie very investigations by means of wliicli many men now believe that tliey could over- throw him.* And, in general, is there not, in the fact that the mind knows the peculiar forms of the sense- intuition as something specific, an advancement beyond their limits ? Is it not one of the greatest triumphs of thought to be able to construct a geometry wliich is independent of the specific conditions of this very intu- ition ? With the Empirics, the demonstration of this point is always involved in darkness, for they appeal simply to the phenomenon as empirically known. But to test and to estimate the value of this is just the problem, yet the result of this testing may very easily be a trans- formation of the original phenomenon. Perhaps with some reason Leibnitz says (page 591 b) : "II leur parait d'abord, que tout ce que nous faisons n'est qu'impulsion d'autrui ; et que tout ce que nous concevons vient de dehors par les sens, et se trace dans le vuide de notre esprit, tanquam in tabula rasa. Mais une meditation plus prof onde nous apprend que tout (meme les percep- tions et les passions) nous vient de votre propre fonds, avec une pleine spontaneite." At all events, however, all that scientific labor can obtain by way of results — that is, all that it can prove in relation to the develop- ment and the positive character of our mental products — can be entirely recognized and fully esteemed by a systematic philosophy. According to our conviction, it * Whatever position one may assume in other respects, in relation to this problem, the question of the origin of mathematical knowledge in general is not decided by it. We should be curious, for example, to see the concept of pure quantity derived from experience — if one does not stop short w ith empty words, as, for example, " abstraction from what is given." For how is such an " abstraction " possible ? EXrEIUEXCE. 77 can find the full realization of its principles only in such a pliilosophy. There is already sufficient confusion of concei)ts ; but even this is increased by the favorite way, in certain circles, of representing the opponents of Empiricism. It appears, according to the expressions of many, as if no supporter of a systematic philosophy could be any- thing else than the friend of a system which constructs it out of concepts in the style of Hegel : by which view, again, the picture of such a philosophy is wantonly dis- torted. But, however one may judge Hegel, by what right are others made responsible for his principles? Shall we have in philosophy, too, such a doctrine of im- putation that all must atone for the sins committed by one? or are we, non-empirics, supposed to allow^ our- selves to be set back into the middle ages, and, by the command of the Empirics, to be robbed of the privilege of learning something from the mental progress of modern times ? Further, without regard to any histori- cal connection, care must be taken that every one who defends an independent significance of philosophy as systematic science is not put do^vn by the great mass of men as confused, fantastic, and incomprehensible. Even Leibnitz was compelled to rebuke the rudeness, intro- duced by Locke, of designating anything removed from one's own thought-process as incomprehensible,* and so of pushing it aside. He characterizes this style of * As opposed to this, the dilcttant Empiricism gladly uses as a weapon the " self-evident " — an inadequate means in the contest for truth. For this which is self-evident either belongs to the sphere of the naive intu- ition of the world, which itself in turn becomes the problem of science, or it is only that which is unconsciously received as the result of i)rcvious scientific processes. Most of the advances in the knowledge of the world, in respect to principles, have proceeded from the point where a man l)cgan to doubt something "self-evident." Y8 MODERN rniLOSOPniCAL CONCEPTS. reasoning appropriately, when lie says (451 a) : " Je remarque souvent que certaines gens taclient deluder ce qu'on lenr dit par cette affection d' ignorance comme ß'ils n'y entendaient rien ; ce qii'ils font non pas pour se blamer eux memes, mais ou pour blamer ceux qui par- lent, comme si leur jargon etait non intelligible, ou pour s'elever au dessus de la chose et de celui qui la debite, comme si eile n'etait point digne de leur attention." It can be added to this, that he who fancies that he can treat the question so cavalierly gives up all com. munity between different kinds of scientific labor. If, after all this, one imagines the picture which many men make to-day of the "metaphysicians" — those men who rashly, without a compass, steer out be- yond all the limits of experience, and who, disinclined to earnest effort, wish to seize by a bold flight of the imagination that which can be obtained only by earnest effort, and who in this way boast of their superiority to those who actually labor — if this picture is true, it seems as if we could feel only detestation of an outrage so gross, and could not guard ourselves too strongly against the men who share in it. But now, if one looks more closely at the company of these non-empirics and anti-empiiics, he finds not only men like Plato and Plo- tinus, Spinoza and Hegel, but also Descartes and Leib- nitz, Kant and llerbart — in short, nearly all the men who have had any significance in j)hilosophy; and I fear there will always still be many who prefer, in the company of such men, to be condemned by the high priests of common sense, rather than to share with them the favor of philosophical dilettanteism, which they 2:)rize so highly. But enough of joking : we should not anticipate the serenity which subsequent centuries will feel in the con- EXrERIEXCE. 79 sidcration of this sprawling, prosily earnest dilcttanteisin, which phiys the sclioohnaster over great problems and great men inditterently. We would rather simply, ivom one point of view, protect our presentation of the sub- ject from an undesirable misunderstanding. Among the men devoted to philosophical investigation are many usually counted as Empirics, who could with reason shield themselves from our representation of their school. We see these men busied with concrete and weighty problems, in thoughtful and critical labor — a labor which commands our highest respect, and which, in its re- sults, brings nearer together those who at the outset are situated far apart. Perhaps such men will allow us to use here Fichte's expression : '' lie who finds what we say superfluous is not one of those for whom we have said it." What we really oppose is, that anti-philosophi- cal tendency in popular thought which rejects the great problems of thought and endeavor because it does not understand them ; which denies to the mind all inde- pendent and formative force in the world, and which, nevertheless, wishes to assume a philosophical garb, in order, witli tlie appearance of right, to make a virtue of their deficiencies. To oppose such tendencies in a directly scientific way is impossible. But all engaged in philosophical investigations, without distinction of party, should com- bine in defense of the independence and greatness of philosophical science, and of its significance in the sys- tem of knowledge at which mankind aims. This sig- nificance is not measured by the sum of single dogmas, which can be demonstrated to every one, nor by the wonderful discoveries at which the common under- standing is astonished, but by the fullness of mental power which is developed by such discoveries, by the 80 MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. tendency of this mental power to valuable ends, and by the general elevation of the level of mental and sci- entific labor which is thus accomplished. That such benefits may be preserved, it is necessary to hold fast to the complete greatness of the problem, even if we have to-day so little faith and so httle power to advance in its solution. " For fire is not extinguished every- where because it is extinguished with you " ; * and the ultimate aims of mankind can not in any way be made dependent upon the humors of the day. But — and this is what especially concerns the act of knowledge — we assert that a systematic philosophy is justified by the fact that only by means of this is it possible to vouchsafe a free investigation of phenom- ena as they occur, to make experience itself a prob- lem, and to avoid stamping what is from the outset contingent as something necessary. H-egel has repeat- edly brought out conspicuously the fact that the knowl- edge of a limit points at an inner advancement beyond that limit ; but the proposition also admits of the in- version, that we must be beyond a limit in order to be truly conscious and mindful of it. In order, then, to be thoughtful and circumspect in our investigations within experience, there is need of a philosophy which does not end with experience. * Plotinus, 205 : cTrel owS' airoa-ßivuvuivov roT iu crol irvphs rh oXoy Trvp airier ßt]. A PEIOPJ— INNATE. Ubique in natura aliquid agitur. — IvErLEK, TnE problem of experience involves the concept of the a priori. In the modern use of this concept there is a great deal of obscurity, and it may require a some- what exhaustive historical treatment to clear away that obscurity. The expressions a jpriori and a jposterxori refer back, ultimately, to Aristotle's custom of calling tlie universal the earlier (as a concept), and the particu- lar the later ; ^ but this usage was not fully established until the last half of the middle ages. In Albertus Magnus we find the antithesis between knowledge from causes and knowledge from effects ex- pressed by the phrases jper priora and per posteriora. A priori and a posteriori first occur, according to Prantl, in Albert of Saxony, a scholar of the fourteenth cen- tury.f These expressions continued to be used as un- derstood in the middle ages, until, in the seventeenth century, Luther (see " Tischreden," Förstemann's ed., * Sec chap. ii. of Book A of the " Metaphysics " ; also Trendelenburg, "Elements of Aristotelian Logic," § 19. t Prantl (" History of Logic," iv. 78) adduces the following passage where the expression does not indeed seem to enter exactly as a new one: *' Demonstratio quajdem est procedens ex causis ad cffcctiim ct vocatur demonstratio a priori et demonstratio propter quid et poti^.^ima ; alia est demonstratio procedens ab effectibus ad causas, et talis vocatur demon- stratio a posteriori et demonstratio quia et demonstratio non potissima. Hence knowledge by induction is more often opposed to knowledge a priori. 82 MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. iv. 300) translated a priori, " from what precedes " (von vornen her),^ a posteriori, " from that which fol- lows after " {von dem was hernach folget). Men like Kepler, Hugo Grotius, Descartes, and Spinoza employed the terms as established scholasticisms, but the last evi- dently felt that they were obsolescent, and direct attacks upon them were not wanting. f But a change in the use of the concepts began ^vith Leibnitz, although, in fact, as was uniformly the case in his writings, the old usage almost concealed the new. He recognized a priori knowledge as knowledge from causes ; but because, for him, ultimate causes lay in the reason itseK, the expression began to denote such judg- ments as have their origin in the kno^^ng activity of the mind, and thus involve a complete correspondence of the ground of the knowledge with the cause of the thing. A posteriori, as opposed to this, denoted the knowledge which comes from experience. X * Still this usage was a frequent one in the preceding century. f Gassendi holds, for example, that the meaning of the words can be simply converted, since a posteriori knowledge is the earlier and more cer- tain, and itself produces a priori knowledge. See " Exercitationes parad. adv. Aristotclcos," v. : " Quocirca non immerito quispiam existimaverit, cum omnis notitia (ct proinde demonstratio) quae dicitur a priori pendeat ac pctatur ex ea, qua3 haberi dicitur a posteriori, necessarium esse banc semper haberi et evidentiorem et certiorem ilia." X A priori is found in Leibnitz, Erdmann's ed., 80 b, 99 a, 272 b, 393 a, 451 b, 465 a, 494 b, 515 b, 740 b, 778 b; Foucher, i. 38, ii. 184, 253, 357, 361. In 778 b, the "philosophic experimentalo qui proc^de a posteriori''^ is contrasted with the knowledge through " la pure raison, QU a priori.'''' The peculiarity of the new signification appears most clearly in 393 a : " Particuliörement et par excellence on I'appelle rai- son, si c'est la cause non seulement de notrc jugement, niais encore de la verite mume, ce qu'on appelle aussi raison n priori^ et la cause dans Ics choscs repond ä, la raison dans les verites." (Yet this passage be- longs to the " Nouveaux Essais," which, as is well known, was a later production.) A PRIORI— INNATE. 83 This new signification stniggled at first with tlic old one ; but the change corresponded so well with the gen- eral tendency of philosophy, that there was no doubt of its ultimate success. Accordingly, in AV^ollf and his school, a 'priori and a posteriori denoted the antithesis of rational and experiential knowledge ; but the keen distinction* of principles in this antithesis, which had been introduced by Leibnitz, was again lost. For, by this school, every judgment is called a priori which we obtain by pure inference from facts of knowledge al- ready held in the mind, without passing judgment upon the ultimate origin of this knowledge.* Wolff thus falls back again in this respect into Scholasticism. In the earlier writings of Kant, in contrast to this, we find in different places a keener comprehension of the prob- lem, which approximates to the position of Leibnitz rather than to that of "Wolff ;f but the concept of a knowledge free from all experience was first distin- guished with complete clearness by Lambert.:}: A sim- ilar though less precise meaning is found in Hume ; § and in many ways a preparation was thus made for the * See " Psychol. Empirica " (in which, more than in all the other pro- ductions of "Wolff, these expressions are employed and explained), § 434 : ** Quod experiundo addiscimus, a posteriori cognoscerc dicimur : quod vero ratiocinando nobis innotescit, a priori cognoscere dicimur." § 425 : *' Quicquid ex iis colligimus, qufe nobis jam innotuere, cum ante ignotum esset, id ratiocinando nobis innotescit, adeoque idem a priori cognoscimus." See also § 4G1. f See, for example, ii. 134, 145, 136, 366, 386. \ "Neues Organon" (appeared in 1764), Dianoiol., § 630 : "Wo wish, then, to assume that absolutely, and in the strictest understanding of the term, only that can be called a prioH in which we owe absolutely nothing to experience." § See " Philosophical Essays," iv. : " If we reason a priori, and con- sider merely any object or cause as it appears to the mind, independent of all observation." 5 84 MODERX PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. later Kantian interpretation, according to wliich the a 'priori denotes what belongs originally to the mind.* But this Kantian principle served in turn as the starting-point of new developments of the concept. When the Constructive philosophers attempted to over- come the dualism of Kant's doctrine, and undertook to develop the whole world out of the activity of the mind, they referred the a p^^iori, throughout, to this activity ; and, according to the position which they everywhere assigned to mental activity, they could understand the antithesis of a priori and a posteriori as the consid- eration of things, not as arising from ultimately dis- tinct sources of knowledge, but from different ways of viewing them. AVhen things are considered as produced by the necessary activity of the mind, we have a gen- eral knowledge a priori / when they are considered as met with ready-made, and hence contingent, we have a special knowledge a posteriori : a definition which en- counters all the doubts to which such a Constructive philosophy is exposed,f and which naturally calls out the rejoinder, as, for example, among the Positivists, that the a priori is supposed to exj)ress something arbi- trarily set up without regard to what is actually true, and thus something only subjectively valid.:]: And * Yet, in fact, he frequently uses a priori in a looser sense. f See Fichte, ii. 355 : " The scientific doctrine, without any regard to the perception, derives a priori that which by virtue of it appears even in the perception, and so a posteriori. Thus these expressions do not denote diifei'ent objects, but only a different view of one and the same object; somewhat as the same watch is used a priori in the demonstration of it, a posteriori in the actual perception." On a closer examination, many differences between single thinkers appear here ; and in this concept one could point out the finer distinctions between them, as well as the grada- tions of development in individuals. X Bourdet, " Vocabulaire des principaux terraes de la philosophic posi- tive " (1875), p. 129 : " II y a plusicurs methodes : 1, la methode a priori^ A TRIORI— INNATE. 85 then, finally, in most recent times, on the side of the Darwinian scientiste, the a priori is identified with the innate, but in this sense is regarded as sometliing inlier- itcd. The individual docs not obtain everything from experience, but what he receives from his ancestors' is, in tiltimate analysis, formed by them from experience ; so that all a priori knowledge is resolved, essentially, into that which is a posteriori* The history of the concept thus reflects the history of the struggle over tlie doctrine of knowledge. All the different forms which the concept has assumed have left traces behind them ; and on the modern usage the Scholastics and Leibnitz, Kant and Ilegel exert an in- fluence in confused combination. Kant's influence pre- dominates only so far as the question of the origin of knowledge is joined to this concept, at least as used in science — the question which, in the problem whether knowledge is innate {eingeboren) ■[ or obtained from without, extends through the whole of philosophy. Hence, all the diflSculties and misunderstandings which are involved in that problem are centered to-day on the concept of the a priori. At all times, the specific question was whether knowledge originated from within the mind X or came metaphysique ou subjective, dans laquelle le3 propositions qui servont de point de depart, au lieu d'etre deduites de rexpericncc, sont et restcnt purement rationelles." * See Häckel, " Natural History of Creation," -Ith ed., p. G36 : "Knowl- edge a pi'iori has arisen only by long-continued inheritance of acquired tendencies in the brain, from what was originally empirical 'a posteriori knowledge '." f Angeboren must, for this concept, be unconditionally rejected. It is not suitable to use here the an, which expres.^c? what come.-' from with- out, and remains on the surface. (See Grimm's Diet.: "an denotes the surface.") Paracelsus used eingcborn in the sense desired here. X The prominent thinkers even of the middle ages always used the SQ MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. to it from without. As to tlie general principle, it was the conviction of most of the prominent thinkers that an essential and inner relation of the mind to the ob- jects was presupposed in an adequate and legitimate * knowledge. But the specific application of this gave rise to an infinite number of disputes and errors. The subjective appeared as something received in a state of completeness, held by the memory and preceding all activity. In the very beginning of the discussion, Plato always failed to distinguish carefully enough between what is contributed by the form of an idea and what is furnished by the contents of a concept ; and, as a result of this, criticism began with Aristotle, who rec- ognized only a Bvvafii<; avfjLcpvTo^ KpcrtKrj (see Anal. Post. 99 b, 35), and when discussing the mind purpose- ly used, not the customary Platonic e/K^fro?, but rather (TVfjL(f)VTO<;. But the philosophic contrast which these two men present extends through the whole of philosophy. They agree essentially in the belief that knowledge in- volves an independent activity of mind ; f but the one limits this activity wholly and completely to the phe- nomena of life, while the other believes that all which happens here is conditioned and determined by wider connections and deeper relations. This Platonic doc- expression *' innate" (injiaius) with great caution, and with care to avoid misunderstandings. See, for example, Roger Bacon, "Specula Mathe- matica," i. 3 : " Mathcmaticarum rerum cognitio est quasi nobis innata. — Cum sit ciuasi innata et tanquam prsDcedcns inventionc et doctrina ; seu saltom minus indigens eis, quam alia3 scientitr." * See Plotinus, 481 : "Ep-nfiou Se r&u &\\ü3U ^eupvfJidTwv ov Set vofiiC^Lv. €t Se fi^, iffTai ovk4ti r^x^iKhu ouSe iTriut the powerful influence of Spinoza's doctrines was due to * Sec Pranti, iii. 215. 94 MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. tlie fact that they seemed self-evident, and yet, from the historical standpoint, opened out decidedly new paths of speculation. For how could man, by any exertion of thought, ultimately carry himself beyond the limits of the world (in its widest philosophical sense) ? . Although he cre- ates the supra-mundane, still can he put into it any- thing except what comes from this world ? Yet, self- evident as this seems, there is undoubtedly some danger involved in this process. When such a supra-mundane entity is once formed, it frees itself from its connec- tions ; it appears to be something set over against the world ; and, as such, it is easily emj)loyed for the ex- planation of material events in general, or of any single occurrences which appear peculiarly enigmatical. But since, on this theory, the intrinsic connection of phenomena under the causal relation is lost sight of, and we no longer resolve phenomena back to that some- thing which is essentially contained in them (which res- olution constitutes the definite problem of knowledge), it seems as if such a transcendent explanation not only here and there broke through the scientific conception of the world, and in general limited it, but also, as if, in prin- ciple, it destroyed such a scientific conception. Such an explanation is to be banished all the more decidedly, the more it gives the appearance of science by its reference to something supra-mundane, and by that appearance lulls to sleep the impulsive desire for actual knowledge. Who would wish to mistake the truth contained in such propositions ? The theory of our relation to the world which was predominant in the middle ages is made for ever impossible by modern science ; and, if religion were bound to an external supra-mundane in- terpretation, there would arise, of course, between it IMMANENT (COSMIC). 95 and science an irreconcilable antithesis. In any case, the immanent character of its explanation of nature is essential and necessary to the whole of modern science, so that ev^ery attack upon this claim is to be regarded as an attack upon science itself. But now the question arises, What then, more ex- actly, is to be undei*stood by an immanent explanation ? That causes ai*e to be presented as manifesting them- selves in the world, and that every kind of individual is to be understood in connection with the whole, and according to universal laws — this can be first of all as- serted ; but we must insist upon it that, if statements of this kind are to have any sort of valuable meaning, it must be clear what the specific meaning of the word " world " is. But here we find ourselves before an im- mense problem. For, however simple this concept may appear to the common sense of men, a brief glance at its history shows that it is not so simple in the realm of science. Every great system has its own concept of the world, and the great epochs of history show through- out, in this respect, distinctive characteristics. To the ancients, the concept of the world was, first of all, that concept which embraced everything ; it included everything mental and material, ideal and sensitive, di- vine and human, actual and possible.* Only at a later date, and under the influence of Christianity, was the concept of the supra-mundane formed. f There was * See, for example, Seneca, "Nat. Quiest.," ii. : "Omnia qua} in noti- tiam nostram cadunt aut cadere possimt, mundus complectitur." f 'rnepKSa-fiios and the contrasted iyK6aixios are used in Pscudo-Archv- tas (pee Mullach, Frg. i. 574 b, 6). In Proclus the antithesis of {nr(pK6:ation. But these are all formal definitions — in a measure, subsidiary concepts, which thought creates to satisfy its own claims. This is seen especially in the fact that infinity is regarded as the most important characteristic of the concept of Deity. This infinity, as has been many times clearly shown, is not, of course, to be understood in a quantita- tive sense, but it expresses a concept of Being which is pure, limitless, superior to all determination and all limitation. But thus the concept of Deity has no other significance than to lend completeness and ultimate va- lidity to the concept of the world. We find, of course, much divergence in the views held concerning this general principle ; yet even in Leibnitz, with whom there seems to be the irreatest de- gree of connection with the earlier theories, on careful examination we find that the modern views are pre- dominant. Though Leibnitz calls God a supra-mun- dane Intelligence,* he still understands by the world only particular phenomena, so far as they are associated without connection ; and he presents, therefore, a dis- * It is always worthy of notice that he prefers to say supra-mundane rather than extra-mundane. See 571 a: " Dieu selon nous Intelligentia cxtramundana, comme Mart. Capella I'appelle, ou plutut supramundana." IMMANENT (COSMIC). ]i)[ tinctioii in concepts rather than a dillerence in essence. In its real meaning, Leibnitz's concept of God is far nearer to tliat of Spinoza than to that of Christianity. But it can not be doubted that such a concept of God has no significance for the practical religious life, and it is, of course, equally worthless in any special sci- ence, because, in such scientific investigation, by com- mon consent it can nowhere be used for the explanation of the particular event, and it appears as necessary only in the attempt to find a pliilosophical conception of the universe when regarded as a whole. Accordingly, such a concept puts an end to the theory of a transcendent religious derivation of phenomena. This became evident even in the transitional period. Giordano Bruno found the difference between the de- vout theologian and the true philosopher in the fact that the one, in his exj^lanations, ascended above IS'a- ture, the other confined him.self within her limits.* Kepler shows the difference between his own convic- tion and that of his orthodox friend Fabricius, when he says (i. 332): ^' Tihi Dens in naturara venit^ mihi natura ad divinitatem asjyiraV ; and when Spinoza identifies the concepts {de^is sive naturcL) God and iSTature (of course in the philosophical sense), and estab- lishes only a eingle world, all that before this rational analysis had been justified as supra-natural must be removed as contra-natural.f The concepts of the eter- * See " Delia Causa, Principio et Uno," 4th Dialogue. f See "Tract. Theol. Polit.," vi. 27: "Ncque hie ullain acrnosco dif- fercntiam inter opus contra naturam et opus supra naturam ; hoc est, ut quidam aiunt, opus, quod quidem natura? non repugnat, attamcn ab ipsa non potest produci aut efBci. Nam cum miraculum non extra naturam, sed in ipsa natura fiat, quamvis supra naturam statuatur, tamcn nccesse est, ut nature ordinem intcrrumpat, quem alias fixum at quo immutabilem ex Dei decretia concipiraus." 102 MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. nity of being and of the legitimacy of all events dis- place such concepts as those of creation and miracle, and the immanent conception of the world receives here a typical form.* But the world, which thus serves as that which is highest and unique, is then as a whole brought into contrast with the particular existence. The latter takes rank according to its worth in view of the world as a whole, and adapts itself to it in its forms of action. This makes it necessary that the whole method of considera- tion shall be different from the earlier methods. No- thing particular, even though, as in the case of man, it is the highest in what is empirically given, can refer all events to itself; for that was the very cause of the numerous mistakes of the past. Rather must every individual be judged by the whole. The speculative thinkers, who take this concept of the whole in its stricter sense, believe that everything individual can be, as a concept, discovered from tlie concept of the whole : all apparent contradictions disappear from the world, if the observer, to use Leibnitz's expression, fixes his eye upon the sun, and views things from this point. It is believed that the most difficult problems, even those of the thought-process, can be solved by such a change in the point of observation. But the whole, to which everything is subordinate, is not sesthetical, as in an- cient times, nor ethical, as in Christianity ; but it is * So far as the expressions are concerned which serve to indicate the positions occupied by the different parties in religious philosophy, we find that they all belong to modern times. Naturalist and Deist extend back into the sixteenth century. In the course of the seventeenth and eigh- teenth centuries there were various attempts to distinguish between Deist and Theist ; but the distinction made by Kant has been generally though not universally adopted. Pantheist was used by Toland in 1705 ; Pan- theism by his opponent Fay. nnrAXEXT (cosmic). 103 supposed to be metaphysical, yet is in fact mathemati- cal, whether of a geometrical or an arithmetical na- ture (Spinoza or Leibnitz). The individual accordingly serves ultimately only as an integral part of a magni- tude; and, if everything is understood as thus homo- geneous, there can be no longer a claim to any speciiic significance of the individual. But, independently of such speculative attempts, there was a general conviction of the similarity of na- ture in all events. Time and space do not elfect the least change in them, and in every point something per- vasive and eternal can be apprehended. Everything ap- parently specific must reduce to something simple, and thus admit of a place in homogeneous classifications. The prosecution of such tendencies necessarily chano^ed the whole method of constructincj a cosmol- ogy. With every external extension of the horizon, things appeared to move in their nature still nearer to man, for in everything was operative the law which ruled his own life. All concepts seemed to extend further out over the narrow circle which had been broken ; and, since it escaped attention at first that the content must diminish with the extension of the cir- cumference, it seemed as if a decided advantage had been obtained. The abundance of the concrete life, jsvhich the historical developments contained in their comprehension, might now pour itself out in the entire universe, and animate it. Life thus appeared greater and freer. "Who would complain of the time which brought such principles to their expression, if it gave itself up wholly to the new doctrines, and hoped for a complete change for the better as a result of this im- manent interpretation of the world ? Only by degrees the limitations and difficulties of 104 mode;rx piiilosophical coxcepts. this theory came into sight. Above all, is it certain that here, too, a duality in the world is established, and perhaps more firmly than ever before. For the world which scientific thought constructs is thoroughly dis- tinct from that which is present to sense-perception, and the chasm becomes the greater the nearer thought ap- proaches its boundaries. What is given is dissected and brought into new connections, but in that way its con- tents and the relations of single objects are completely changed from their original form, so that science gives back the world in an essentially different condition from that in which it received it. And the further we advance in the progress toward simple forces the further away do we get from what was originally given ; and so, in , a peculiar manner, does investigation seem to remove the world further from us, as fast as it teaches us a knowledge of it. At any rate, the world of exact sci- ence is at least as much estransred from the world of common sense as was formerly the world of artistic in- tuition from that of religious faith. But, in regard to the simple phenomena as well, prob- lems arose, the answers to which diverged even to contra- diction. In the ordinary idea of the world, the mental and the material elements seem to stand side by side, but such juxtaposition can not be allowed here in ulti- mate analysis : an inner connection, or a reduction of the^ one to the other, must therefore be obtained. From one point of view, then, the content of the world is regarded as mental anjj specifically intellectual ; for it is particu- larly characteristic of modern times to limit the mental by thought. The sum total of what is presented is ac- cordingly supposed to be transformed into the forms of thought and of knowledge : the world presents a com- plete process evolved by the constant activity of the IMMAXEXT (COSMICjr >^t. 105 mind, in wliich process everything particVilar is'insortcdj as a single gradation. Herein is founcPtkeJiigTie^ ta^ir of science : what is ininiediatelj presented, the'crTidely material, is taken np and transformed ; what is appar- ently at rest is set in motion ; in everything external something mental is recognized ; but the limitation re- mains, that in such an interpretation we do not pass beyond purely formal determinations, and, as is well known in the case of the systems of the Constructive philosophers, we must renounce the apprehension of everything concrete. On the other side, external nature, scientifically con- sidered, serves as the true world. Here the specifically modern categories find their full realization : the hetero- geneous is more and more conceived as the result of simple primary activities ; laws are discovered, in ac- cordance with which all events proceed ; through the concept of progressive formation, the complex is, as a matter of fact, obtained from the simple. The imma- nent explanation thus receives a concrete meaning ; it opens to scientific treatment an infinite abundance of material, an immense kingdom of forms. But we do not arrive here literally at a concept of the world. In- dividual objects are considered as acting in juxtaposi- tion, with no conception of their coexistence ; harmony is found in the forms of events, without an understand- ing and a justification of the inner nature of this har- mony ; so that, finally, the concept of law hovers in the air, new grooves are formed, and the whole advances, yet not according to a necessity of the whole, but from the accidental conjunction of single forces acting aim- lessly for themselves. If law and form can not thus be truly understood in their o\\ti province, the thouglit- process involved presents an impassable limit : we have 106 MODERX PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. no concept of that very thing which supports and con- ditions the whole science — that is, the observing and in- vestigating mind itself. So, though the whole theory may attain, in its own sphere, what is astounding and indubitable, it is all valid only under so many condi- tions and limitations that it can never furnish an ulti- mate apprehension of the universe. It is evident from all this that the two tendencies are reciprocally related, and we must have a broader concept of the world than that offered by either one- sided idea. This problem was so evident that none of the prominent speculative minds could overlook it, and a history of the concept of the world in modern philos- ophy would mirror its general development as well as the peculiarities of individual writers. But Leibnitz unquestionably presents the best at- tempt at a solution of this problem. With him nature and the thought-world are united in the fact that they can be known as different degrees in our comprehension of one single world. After each for itself had been con- structed completely and without interference, the two should be united in an ultimately comprehensive philo- sophical consideration, and this should be done after these elements had been adjusted to each other. But it was a necessary condition of this union of nature and mind that Leibnitz should extend his concept of the world, as regards its principles, so far as to include not only the forces e\ndently active in the phenomenon, but also the latent yet still active forces. What was pre- sented to the senses appeared thus as the consequence of events extending further and deeper, and these con- cealed events must be added in tli ought to bring causal connection into individual phenomena ; and the ques- tion then arose whether it was not possible, by such a IMMANENT (COSMIC). 107 transformation of the concept of the world, to raise the concepts into a sphere where the antitlicsis between na- ture and mind could be overcome. Leilmitz exerted himself to the utmost to accomplish this ; but we shall be compelled with Kant to deny ^hat he has succeeded in the essential thing, in spite of all the brilliant discov- eries and all the extensions of the realm of knowledire to which this endeavor led him. There was, in fact, a union, but in a kingdom of shadows, Ontology : the concrete determinations remained at the end still unde- cided. But, in the primary concept of possibility, the physical significance of tension and the logico-meta- physical significance of the (legitimately) thinkable al- ways diverge, in spite of every attempt to unite them ; and the endeavor to join together an intellectual and a sensuous world is thus wrecked. The clear knowledge of the impossibiKty of solving the problem from the given premises was a determin- ing factor in the formation of the Kantian philosophy. The antithesis is still maintained, but, together with all knowledge, is transferred to the province of the phe- nomenon. In this way the whole concept of the world is changed, and the modern doctrine of categories given up. Things in themselves {Dinge an sich) are sepa- rated from phenomena ; the endeavor to reduce the heterogeneity of tlie forms of action to a primary force is relinquished ; a multiplicity of powers is left in juxta- position ; the significance of the coexistence of things is decidedly undervalued ; in short, an important revolu- tion commences here, upon the closer study of which^ however, we can refuse to enter in this connection^ since the principles, and with them the problems, of the seventeenth century have, in spite of this system, re- mained predominant, in their importance and their 108 MODERN rHILOSOPHICxVL CONCEPTS. completeness, in actual scientific investigation. It may, then, be nnliesitatinglj asserted that at the present day, as well, we lack wholly a concrete philosophical concept of the world, to which the different realms and kinds of existence are subordinate. JSTot only mind and matter, but also content and form, are divergent concepts. One man thinks primarily of the one, another of the other ; and only the word conceals in some measure the fact that we think something utterly different, provided that we in general think anything at all under the term. With this problem of the determination of the con- tent of the world, other problems are connected, and they likewise present difficulties to an immanent ex- planation. The single phenomenon is to be conceived entirely through that which is comprehensive, or, rather, what is valid, as derived, is to be conceived through what is simple ; only the question arises whether every special formation can be so understood, and whether we are not compelled to recognize a certain individuality in specific groups and in single objects. The Naturalistic school, especially, is in danger here of presenting to us as cosmic, without further question, that which is empirically the most distinct, and is from the outset given as purely phenomenal, or as unique, without regard to any combinations in which it may occur, and is thus in danger of considering every spe- cific formation as a casual and independent result. Yet it may be that what thus appears only in unique forma- tions is of great importance in its beaming upon our ulti- mate theory of the world. What is apparently specific may compel us to change our most general principles. Instead of insisting upon a comprehensive concept of the world as a substitute for a concept confined to strict- ly human limitations, men, in ordinary discussion, are IMMANENT (COSMIC). 109 very easily led to accept simply tlie positive contrary of any proposition which they may oppose. Thus, when they deny that the human sphere gives us the truly cosmic, they assert at once that the inorganic sphere must serve as the cosmic. Modern investigation incurs great danger from its readiness to consider a thing as already proved simply because its positive contrary has been shown to be inadequate. The concept of the world and the immanent ex- planation find no less difficulty in the relation of events in time to primary forces acting outside of time-rela- tions. Understood as a process of development, events seem to be bound up in time. The later supposes apd assumes tlie earlier, but in that way it becomes de- pendent ; so that the problem arises, how determinate formations can be reconciled with the immediateness and freedom from time-relations of the primary forces. There is also a weakness in the explanation as given, in the fact that the present can be understood only by the past, and yet an immediate verification is insisted upon. This dilemma appears most evidently in the Hegelian system. As a matter of principle, develop- ment must be understood as something constantly turn- ing back to itself, and so outside of time-relations ; but, then, the different elements in the system are essentially distinct, and either time and all that happens in it must be considered a pure illusion (which view at once starts a number of new questions), or else the speculative pri- mary principle must be modified, if not given up. The Xaturalistic school has to encounter the same difficulty. It must regard any special evciit as some- thing partaking of the general nature of the whole, and above time-relations, and so must assume it to be some- thing simply existent rather than a manifestation of 110 MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL COXCEPTS. force, or else it must regard that which comes later in a series as something wholly new, and devoid of all suf- ficient causal connection. The dilemma thus continu- ally faces us, either to limit ourselves to the elements which appear under time-relations, or to give up the doctrine of the pure immediateness of knowledge ; and the old problem of the relation between history and eternity remains unsolved. From all this we can easily see what judgment we are to pass upon the demand for an immanent explana- tion of the world, which is made to-day with increased emphasis. There is a truth in this explanation which, in its general application, we must admit as being above all contest and doubt. Only what manifests itseK as acting can be recognized as existing ; and it is the prob- lem of an explanation to reduce to such actively mani- fested forces everything which is an object of experi- ence. The general dijfference between our day and other periods, especially the middle ages, lies in the fact that we hold this truth firmly in consciousness, and therefore recognize nothing as existing which can not be obtained, in a strictly causal connection, from that starting-point. But the question immediately arises, how far thought is compelled to go out beyond what is immediately presented in order to apprehend what is ultimately and independently active, and so to arrive at an actual explanation, instead of a mere periphrasis ; and, in view of this question, every answer is a wholly definite thesis, which must be carefully established, and can in no way be regarded as covered by that general truth from which it starts. If the immanent explanation of the world asserts here as much as this, that we are to stop with what is immediately given in external nature, then, as we have IMMANENT (COSMIC). HI Bccn, the entire work of modern science, and, in general, law and form, and even all tliouglit-activity, remain, in their own spheres, devoid of suitable concepts. And, even if the i)ractical physicist easily corrects here in his concrete work the original mistake, on the other hand, the theorizer in physics is inclined to increase the error, and to call that an immanent explanation of the world which is the precise opposite of what the expression asserts. He speaks of immanence, where the question is one of purely external relations ; of the world, where the idea of a universe is given up before the overwhelm- ing power of isolated phenomena ; of explanation, where only a juxtaposition of external events is given. But, if the demand for an immanent explanation of the world expresses the principle that what is present in nature and in mind is to be taken as the measure of truth, immediately, as it presents itself, one leaves out of consideration the activity of the mind, and particu- larly the transformation of the idea of the world which in our day proceeds from it. If, finally, thought-activ- ity is recognized, but is limited to a purely formal trans- formation of what is given to the senses, the question arises whether such a transformation does not neces- sarily lead still further, in regard to the material itself as well as its forms, and give to the world of thought a richer content than it does to the world of phenomena. Such problems and difiiculties, which grow upon us all the more as we advance, need not, as a matter of course, weaken the general postulate of an immanent explanation, but they do seem to justify the question whether the definite method and the whole style of treatment laid down by modern science accomplish their aim, whether, in order to advance perhaps a sin- gle step, broader starting-points must not be sought out, 112 MODERN rniLOSOPIIICAL CONCEPTS. whether other, concrete definitions of that which acts must not be adopted, whether other methods corre- sponding to. these must not be constructed. But we treat such questions unjustly, if we touch upon them only hurriedly. MONISM— DUALISM. " I assert that to present an actual antithesis in all its strict- ness is as advantageous to science as to present an identity." — SCHELLIXG. One of the leading diflSculties in the way of a uni- versal concept of the world, and an immanent explana- tion of it, consists in the distinction between material and mental being. Hence all attempts to diminish or to remove this distinction must be of serious conse- quence in their bearing upon the entire work of sci- ence, and for this reason the Monism of modern natural science can be sure of commanding universal attention. So far as the expression goes, Dualism is older than Monism. It is first used by Thomas Hyde, in his work "De Religione Yeterum Persarum," to denote a reli- gious system, in which an evil principle is placed by the side of the good principle, and in this sense the word was accommodated to a wider application by Bayle (see the article " Zoroaster ") and by Leibnitz (see " Theo- dicee," ii. 144, 199).* Wolff first forms the antithesis of Monism and Dualism, but applies it to metaphysics, and not to religious philosophy. He calls Monists those thinkers who assume only one principle, whether of a mental or material nature, so that " Idealists " as well * See, for example, Brucker, 2d ed., i. 116: "Ex ratione systematia quod vocari ita solet dualistici." 114 MODERN PniLOSOrniCAL CONCEPTS. as " Materialists " * are comprehended under tlie term ; while Dualists are those who consider matter and mind as mutually independent substances. Among the latter Wolff wished to be reckoned himself. The word Dual- ist obtained a tolerably wide usage in this signification (see Kant, " Kritik d. r. Yernunft," 1st ed. [in Har- tenstein's ed., iii. 599] ; Fichte, ii. 88 : for another meaning, see Kant, vi. 360). Monism, on the contrary, led a miserable existence f in philosophical dictionaries, until, as a denotation of the Hegelian philosophy, it obtained a very wide use (see Göschel's "Monism of Thought," 1832). It had again in some measure fallen out of use, when it was taken up by modern natural philosophy, and made the watchword of a doctrine which considers mind and matter neither as separated nor as derived from each other, but as standing in an essential and inseparable connection. Matter receives, as an original determination, a mental characteristic, which in the progress of formation develops into the activity of full consciousness. Mind thus becomes a part of the general world-process, and is controlled by its physico-mechanical laws. Accordingly, as the term Monism has thus passed over into what is nearly the contradictory of its original signification, our estimate of its value is also changed. AYhile the followers of AYolff believed that they could not guard themselves with too great care against Monism, at the present day that doctrine of natural philosophy ds almost never contested, except to substitute for it another form of Monism. Such a transformation can well be inter- * Idealism will be treated later in detail. " Materialist " I find first used by Boyle (as in his work, which appeared in 1674, " The Excellence and Grounds of the Mechanical Philosophy"). f In Fichte (ii. 88) we find Unitism used as the correlate of Dualism. MONISM— DUALLSM. 1| 5 preted as a sign tliat in the present problem different points of view are possible, and different elements intersect ; and this, on closer examination, we find to be the fact. On a superficial consideration, and still more after a scientific investigation, mind is found to be so closely connected with matter that every forcible separation of them appears violent ; to this we add that metaphysics demands unity of the ultimate principle, and, at the end, the aesthetic intuition refuses to allow the separa- tion of the sensuous and the mental. On the other hand, there appears at the outset a rea- son of equal weight for the impossibility of success in this attempt, if the self -consciousness of the mind, the con- sciousness of a unique content of life, leads to the claim of a peculiar and a superior position in the world ; such a demand is also, in fact, supported by the analysis of the specific contents of both spheres of existence, and this analysis presents such pervasive differences between the two spheres that a simple union or identification of them seems to be impossible. So each kind of existence stands opposed to the other — each strong enough to assert itself, yet too weak to carry through the over- throw of the other. Among the Greeks the principles of Monism were predominant, but with them the doctrine assumed very different forms. At the outset, mind was associated with matter only as one of its characteristics, until Anaxagoras introduced that distinction which consti- tuted the preliminary condition of the doctrine of the Socratic school. After Plato had endeavored to give to mind the leading place in the universe, a speculative Monism was constructed in the Aristotelian philosophy, which sought to embrace both elements, and which, in 116 MODERN PniLOSOPniCAL COXCEPTS. spite of many vacillations in its execution, may be re- garded as the culmination of Greek thought. The later schools, too, maintained a Monisrn, only there was an unmistakable falling off in the fact that the principle became more abstract with the Stoics, more crude with the Epicureans. The genuine tendency of thought was toward a Dualism, which, partly from its association with Plato, partly from its submission to Oriental influ- ences, assimilated the antithesis of mind and matter with that of good and evil, while it expressed this an- tithesis most distinctly.* J^evertheless, the development of Grecian thought rose yet again to a monistic conception of the world, and created in the doctrine of Plotinus a system in which matter was inserted in the spiritual-intellectual life simply as a phenomenal form and degree. But an age of decadence was not capable of vigorously carry- ing through this principle of a spiritualistic Monism: in the very attempt to overcome the antithesis of mind and matter, the world was divided into an ideal element, and one known phenomenally through the senses, and matter pressed in again as a positive force, the force of evil. Greek philosophy always arrived at a goal di- rectly opposite to that from which it started. Mind, at first buried out of sight in the events of nature, worked its way by degrees to independence and freedom, and clearly maintained itself there ; yet, in the struggle to defend this position, it was ever more and more com- pelled to degrade, and even to give up, the phenomenal Avorld, until it at last transformed it into a simple simili- tude of true existence. As the Idealism of the Greek character showed itself, if anywhere, in the sacrifice of * Plutarch, " Isis and Osiris," 45 (cd. of Parthey) : Set '^(vc(tiv l^luv »col a.p)(}}v uiffKep ayci^ov koI kukov Tr,v (pvcriv tpi^etj/. MONISM— DUALISM. 1 1 7 the phenomenal world rather than in tliat of the reality of the thought-process, so its speculative power was per- haps best manifested in the fact that, in spite of the immense pressure which at that time weighed heavily upon thought, it was unwilling to end with a disunited world, and sought in itself the ultimate unity. We can attribute to Christianity an absolute Monism, so far as it makes the mind, as a free personality, the source of all existence. Still, here, as in many other places, the general theory is determined more by the phenomenon with which we come in immediate contact than by its ultimate cause. But in that phenomenon the distance between matter and mind appeared so great that man was usually designated as something compound (avvre^ev, comjpositum). The estimate of the ethico- religious content of the thought-hfe not only excluded its degradation into a simple event of nature, but also forbade a too close connection of mind and matter ; and this gave rise to many schools. Hobbes could well ap- peal to the materialism of Tei-tullian, while, for Augus- tine * and the Mystics, mind alone formed tlie ultimate existence. But the discussion of this problem reached its cul- mination in modern times. Powerful impulses to each tendency came in anew, and increased the vehemence as well as the fruitfulness of the contest. Monism had usually a little the start. On its side was especially active the endeavor to attain an immanent conception of the world, by which endeavor the demands for unity and connection in the universe were so increased that * See Aujrustine, i. 254 D : " Intelloctus in quo nniver?a sunt vcl ipse potius universa " ; vi. 96 C : " CoUigitur non esse causas efficientcs omnium quae fiunt, nisi voluntarias, illius natura; scilicet qujc ppiritus vitoe est," 118 MODERN PniLOSOnilCAL CONCEPTS. two different primary forces were not allowed to remain in juxtaposition. Added to this were the tendencies to Monism arising from the increasing knowledge of the dependence of the thouglit-j^rocess on bodily functions ; from the theory of the relationship of the human to the lower forms of life, which seem to be dependent upon matter ; and from the principle of development, in view of which nothing can assert for itself an isolated existence. From the first it was believed that the problem could be solved by a simple union of the two elements, and already in the sixteenth century a principle was ad- vocated in scientific circles which shared in many of the features of the Monism of to-day. An inner life was attributed to everything corporeal, and in all occur- rences in nature an analogy to the activity of the soul was assumed. Paracelsus, for example, found in all things a soul, or rather something " conformable to the soul " ; * and the chief apostle of this new philosophy of nature, Giordano Bruno, announced with enthusiasm that even the smallest particle contained in itself the properties of a soul, and that matter and mind could be traced back to a common source.f The maintenance of this position was, nevertheless, opposed by weighty scientific reasons, especiallj^ in phys- ics, but also in philosophy. It was an indispensable pre- supposition of all exact cosmology, that matter should * "Phil. ad. Ath.," ii. 6 : "To better understand what an clement is — an element is nothing else than a soul. Not so much that its essence is as a soul, but is conformable to a soul. For there is a difference be- tween the soul of the element and the eternal soul. The soul of the element is the life of everything created." f '* Delia Causa," ii. : " Spirto si trova in tutte le cose, c non h mini- mo corpusculo, che non contegna cotal porzione in sb, che non inanimi " ; iii. toward the end : '* In Bomma I'una e I'altra si riduca ad uno esscre et una radice." MONISM— DUALISM. ]1<) be freed from those inner chiiracteristics which had been read into it by tlic Scliohistic Aristotelianisni. For the very reason that all action was reduced to inner forces, and the peculiarities of the thought-process were continually carried over into nature, there could be no scientific knowledge, in the modem sense of the term. The primary principles of this knowledge are valid only so far as everything subjective is given up, and nature is regarded as something soul-less. But much painful labor has been necessary to carry that principle through ; men like Kicolaus Taurellus, Kepler, Galileo, and oth- ers, have been compelled to lay out their whole strength upon it, and have advanced to their goal only step by stej:). The human mind was compelled to separate nature from itself and to renounce all immediate union with it, a renunciation which demanded a dcOTce of strencrth and a sacrifice which command our highest respect. Moreover, just as the analytical process in physics had come to its first conclusion with Galileo, it passed over into philosophy through Descartes. With the lat- ter, matter and mind were from the first distinguished in principle ; the activity of consciousness and extension, although closely and legitimately united in action, could not be reduced to one essence ; so that we can assert, not a oneness of nature {imitas naturce)^ but only a one- ness of composition {vnitas compositionis). Descartes was compelled to judge thus if he wished to be con- sistent with the first principles of his philosophy ; for, if a substance is inferred only from its action, or rather is added to that in thoufirht, an existence with two en- tirely different forms of action can not be allowed. Yet, in fact, on the other hand, in the progress to- ward a single immanent conception of the world, two forces essentially unconnected could not be left un- 120 MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. molested, so that the two most powerful tendencies in modern philosophy became thus contradictory. In either case the naive Monism of the sixteenth century was destroyed, and the problem became so extensive that an advance in its solution could be hoped for only by means of a speculative transformation of the phe- nomena. Of the solutions offered, the most important for us are those of Spinoza and Leibnitz. The former, leav- ing the Cartesian concepts of matter and mind almost unchanged, attempted to remove the difficulties by the way in which he defined their relations to each other and to substance. His principle of essentially uniting matter and mind in the concept of the world is, in its general content, so necessary and so convincing, that his mistake in the development of it is often over- looked. It is enough for us to remember that his com- prehension of the principle and his complete develop- ment do not agree. According to his principle, Spi- noza would have been compelled to refer mind to the absolute substance as a conscious subject ; in which case, of course, his philosophy would have become mys- ticism, and the relation of his concept of substance to that held in the middle ages would have been clearly evident. If, on the other hand, the material world, in its actual existence, underlies that absolute substance, a concrete content is thus, to be sure, obtained, and a position in the realm of modern science is assured to the mind ; but mind, so far as its specific essence is concerned, is sacrificed,* and Spinoza's entire philoso- * It 19 of especial significance to this that the law of inertia is pre- sented as a primary law of all being, even of that which is mental. See "Tract. Theol. Pol.," xvi. 4: "Lex summa naturae est, ut unaquaeque res in suo statu, quantum in se est, conetur perseverare, idque nulla al- terius, sed tantum sui habita ratione" ("Eih.," iii., Prop. 6). MONISM— DUALISM. 121 phy becomes a naturalism, and even a materialism, on the basis of a mysticism. This a])parent reconciliation of the incongruous practically contributed not a little to the extreme results at which he arrived. The attempt of Leibnitz is superior to that of Spi- noza, because with him the meaning of the concept was not simply taken from another philosopher, but was more exactly determined by means of an indepen- dent analysis. In matter the characteristic of force took precedence of that of extension, but the concept of mind was so enlar2;ed that it embraced also uncon- scions activity. And then the attempt was made to understand matter as a legitimately precedent appear- ance of mental being, a jphcenomeiion bene fundatum^ and to conceive the whole external world as a mirage of the mental Cosmos presenting itself to the finite, and therefore confused, percipient mind. In this way all physical determinations were subordinated to the determinations of mind, and even the primary laws of motion were supposed to be derived from the idea of the most perfect world.* The impossibility of repre- senting mind as the origin of sensuous phenomena (since it will never be possible to a theory to bring into a simple sequence what is given to knowledge under essentially different conditions f) testifies less against this gigantic attempt than does the fact that, in such an endeavor to establish mind as the unique world- * He says (082 b) : " Physicam neccssitatcm sic eiplicui, ut sit con- sequens moralis." f Leibnitz him?clf has clearly shown the inconsistency of such a de- mand (358 b): " Vouloir que ces phantümcs confus deraeurent et que cependant on y demele les Ingrediens par la phantaisie meme, c'cst se contrcdire, c'est vouloir avoir le plaisir d'etre trompe par une agreable perspective et vouloir qu'en mume terns Toeil voie la trorapcrie, cc qui serait la irater." 122 MODERN nilLOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. power, all that is specific in tlie contents of mind is lost. The monads are ultimately, according to the phi- losopher's own expression, only " metaphysical points," and no longer spiritual substance ; the idea, with its. comprehension of plurahty in unity, is no longer a psy- chological, but an ontological concept. "^ If, then, Spi- noza subordinated to nature, and thus destroyed, the concrete content of mind, Leibnitz sacrificed mind and nature to ontologico-mathematical definitions ; and, if Spinoza's concepts directly contradicted the facts of mind, those of Leibnitz were exact only for an abstract comprehension, the way back from which to concrete properties could not be found. The fact thcät Spinoza's doctrine, with all its one-sidedness, had a definitely ex- pressed meaning, was in great part the reason of its accomj)lisliing far more, and appearing to defend more vigorously the principles of Monism. For anything which can be expressed in a concrete form is often practically influential and successful, whatever may be its errors. When the school of Leibnitz, presenting tamely the fluent and vivid principles of their master, made of his Monism a lifeless Dualism, it was a natural result that, as opposed to them, freer and more penetrative minds greeted Spinozism as a solution of the problem, and that Spinozism thus appeared as a new system, and attained an idealistic interpretation. Scientific and artistic elements combined to produce an instinctive opposition to "the infamous Two »in the world" (see Lichtenberg, " Miscellaneous Writings," viii. 151). * Kant's reproach (iii. 231), that Leibnitz intellectuah'zcd phenomena, rests on a very superficial understanding of tlie subject. It is rather the fact that he ultimately subjected both mind and nature to a third some- thin":. MONISM— dualism/ t'J?>x' ■ But the synthesis which seemed so ncc demanded rather than estabHshed, and tlie ^}■^tL■nlatic pliilosophy was especially inHuenced by the failure of tlie monistic attempts of Spinoza and Leibnitz. The prominence of the specific difference between matter and mind, between sensitivity and understanding, and the knowledge of the impossibility of reducing these to each other were what to a great extent determined tlie formation of the Kantian philosophy. If the world, as it is phenomenally given, is composed of two factors, as what is reached in ultimate analysis, then there is no finally valid decision concerning the real relation of those factors. Yet, since for us this question is a pure- ly transcendent one, the difference between them re- mained, and the surprising power with which the dis- tinction was developed in Kant's system necessitated the overthrow of all previous forms of both naive and speculative Monism as a matter of science, and brought the question into a third stadium. But it is a fundamental principle of our nature that analysis always calls out new attempts at synthesis ; and the German philosophers now undertook most boldly a synthesis, in which they were agreed in deriv- ing the material universe from a mental one, as from what is the ultimate existence and the source of the phenomenal world, while in other respects they were very diverse in their opinions, and allied themselves with various points in the historical discussion. What- ever judgments we may form of the results of these endeavors, as a matter of fact they have played their part in the crisis of philosophy, and have become par- alyzed by the influence of common sense. Such a state of affairs was to the advantage of Materialism, which, powerless against every scientific philosophy, always 124 MODERN PHILOSOPniCAL CONCEPTS. steps forward instantly in a time of speculative exhaus- tion, justifies itseK bj an abundance of phenomena, and so easily obtains an extensive influence. The Monism of to-day may be considered as an ad- vance upon what preceded it. Clearly recognizing the impossibility of producing what pertains to the soul by composition from matter, however abstractly considered, it prefers to recognize a mental character- istic as essential to all being, and explains this more fully by attributing to matter in general the capacity of sensation and consciousness, while yet in this extension of the concept it raises the laws of material being to the rank of universal principles. This modern Monism has not so much undertaken to subject matter and mind to a new analysis, after their leading historical connec- tion and in a critically systematic method, or to explain the general conditions under which being is given to us as material or mental, and, as connected with these con- ditions, to make a comprehensive use of all the data now presented, as it has been inferred from groups and connections of phenomena which have not been philo- sophically treated, which for the most part have been previously recognized and used as individual data, and which have now been brought together and combined into a sort of Darwinian view of the world. Prominent here is the knowledge of the dependence of psychical on physical events. The results of science have put an end to the convenient theory of former times, which considered matter only as the instrument of the mind, so that the latter unrestrainedly j^roduces its ac- tivity purely from within.* Science has driven us more * We can furthermore request those who gladly ascribe this idea to philosophy in general to name a single thinker of importance who has been contented with it. MONISM— DUALISM. 125 and more to the principle that matter lias an important inlluence upon the processes which common sense re- gards as absolutely mental, since it not only, in some cases, refuses its services to thought, but also positively limits that thought, and even compels the mind to fol- low definite paths (as is demonstrable in cases of insan- ity). And it is a fact of especial importance here, that we thus establish a general connection between mind and matter, and also that it is shown to be probable that there is a dependence of determinate mental pro- ductions upon material functions — a dependence which occurs frequently, although it has been as yet discov- ered only as manifest under certain specific relations. Accordingly, that which is apparently simple and inde- pendent is thus proved to be compound and variously conditioned ; what seems to be unique and intrinsic is still further analyzed ; and life is judged to be not a presentation of something which as presented is essen- tially complete, but simply a creative process toward a new formation. In this way, a change was introduced into the esti- mate of the human mind, in its general relations and its special form. After its relation to lower gradations was recognized, and certain primary forms were shown to be common to all life, the lofty isolation of mind could be no longer maintained. The facts of hered- ity, as they were more closely observed, brought the individual into an extensive connection with other phenomena in the series, and in that way rendered it dependent,* so that the " development theory " was * The presentation of the phenomena of heredity, in a materialistic- monistic theory, extends back to the Stoa. Sec Cleanthcs (Zeller, iii. 1, 2d ed., p. 180): ov fxSvov Ö/j-oioi rots yoviici yiy6;x(i^a Kara rh trw^ia, oAXi Koi Kara rriv ^vxhv, Tots Tradctri, rots fj^fffi, rals Sia.^(a«riy' ad^ros 5^ rh ofioioy kjI avS^oiov, ov-)(\ 5« aaayuxrov' aufia &pa t] ^vx^- 126 MODERN nilLOSOPIIICAL COXCEPTS. inclined to transfer such analogies to the universe as well, and to conceive of everything of a higher degree, not only as produced in causal connection with the lower, but also as genetically originating from it. All this conceals an infinite amount of the proble- matical. Hypotheses and observations are mixed up in an almost inseparable entanglement, and the wish not only hurries far ahead of the results, but also brings them from the first into very questionable connections. Yet, in spite of this, we can not fail to recognize in the principle of development as a whole a great and justifiable advance in scientific investigation. To the confusion of concepts, by no means the least contribution has been made by those Idealists who, uniting essential and eternal truths with narrow and contingent principles formed in the development of historical discussion, supposed that the foundations of these truths were threatened by the scientific endeavors here described, and tried to contest that tendency in every point, and, so far as they could, to counteract it. Such men often concentrated attention upon the un- avoidable deficiencies in such an investigation, and, thus clinging to what was confused, aroused against them- selves the whole interest of the theoretical reason. Every advance in the new direction which science achieved was a defeat to such attacks upon the princi- ple, and so the principle itself seemed to receive a sanc- tion which the facts by no means warranted.* On the other hand, we should recognize without * That raany phenomena which are in dispute can be very differently interpreted in different connections (as often happens to-day) is shown by Origen (" Contra Celsus," iv. 84) : oaa irKeiova \eyei twv a\6ywv ^ycöv iyKcvfiia, TOffovrfii ttXuou {k^v ft?) ^eA.??) au^ei rh rov vavTa KOO'fiT'ia'avTQS \.6yov ipyoy. MONISM— DUALISM. |27 hesitation both the particular investigations and the gen- eral tendency of the monistic theory. The old desire to bring matter and mind into a more intimate connec- tion than that in which tliey present themselves to the ordinary judgment has, for various reasons, increased so much that it must of necessity find expression in philos- ophy, and lead to new results. But, the moment the question comes up as a philosophical one, the whole treatment of the subject must be changed ; for, where the question concerns only the establishment of empiri- cal events, it may be desirable to comprehend the phe- nomena in the simplest manner possible ; but, where we strive after a conception of primary principles, the ex- planation can advance only in the systematic connections of philosophy. It is one thing to endeavor to show the leo^itimate connection of material and mental action ; it is another thing to derive the primary forces of the one ultimately from the other, or to bring them into an essential relation as concepts. The former is the prob- lem of natural science and of empirical psychology ; the latter belongs to systematic philosophy. In the province of the former, the advantage of Monism is unmistakable ; in the province of the latter, it is in any case question- able. The ultimate union of both methods of considera- tion is an undeniable postulate ; their confusion is a palpable error. It is not self-evidently justifiable to carry over to what is essential the relations of what is phenomenal without further investigation, because every phenomenon is bound up in the conditions and activities of our nature, and what is given to conscious- ness must perhaps be transformed before it can be defin- itively recognized. This especially concerns the con- cept of matter, for that concept, although within cer- tain limits it appears simple, is, if more closely examined 128 MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. and tested, clearly seen to be a product of mental activ- ity, evolved from the phenomena of mental life ; and thus it involves problems, and even contradictions, which drive us to a transformation of the conception of mat- ter, and so, beyond what is immediately presented to the senses, into the realms of metaj^hysics. But the man who wishes to avoid these ultimate ques- tions is compelled to demand of our modern Monism, as a philosophical doctrine, that it shall advance at least one step : it must bring the separated provinces into a closer union in essence, and so approximate to a unify- ing comprehension of the world. General concepts must thus be found to which the particular concept is subordinate, or an intrinsic union of different charac- teristics must be constructed if we would obtain for a philosophical conception of the world anything beyond a mere collocation of events. A necessary prerequisite of this would be a new and thorough analysis of the single departments of science, and a reduction of what is heterogeneous to comprehensive forms of action. As the method of synthesis is essentially conditioned by the precedent analysis, so the significance of a Monism is measured, to a great extent, by the Dualism which it undertakes to overcome. But, among modem Monists, we usually search in vain for a subtile comprehension of the peculiarities of different provinces of knowledge. To many of them, the concepts of mind and of matter seem to be in the same condition of inseparable coexistence as with the Ionian Hylozoists. Others in their doctrine come nearer to Giordano Bruno. Where the concepts are brought out most clearly, one could perhaps appeal to Spinoza. In fact, the theory of Spinoza, freed from Spinoza's speculative first principles, forms the philosophical con- MONISM— DUALISM. 129 tent of modern Monism, so that the latter encounters all the doubts and objections to which the former was exposed.* As we have already touched upon this ques- tion several times, we would refer here only to the one fact that the inner world, as compared with the exter- nal, is so unique, has such contradictory primary forms and laws of action, that it can never be considered as a mere copy, or a parallel, provided that its specific con- tent in general receives proper attention. Throughout the one world we find a juxtaposition and a composi- tion ; in the other, a coexistence and an intrinsic union : in the one, in a given system, all change coming from -without; in the other, a designed endeavor, which in the course of its development obtains independence and subjectivity : in the one, everything is in quan- titative gradations ; in the other, even in the lowest forms, there are unmistakable sensations of contrast. f How can we simply unite together what is so dif- ferent ? It is not, then, enough to attach mind in- cidentally to matter, but the meaning of its sphere must be altered, if Monism is to receive a philosophi- cal character. Such a demand can not be avoided by supposing that the mental sphere is possibly small, and almost vanishing; for, in all its variations, there always re- mains something unique, which uniformly pervades all its forms, ßuch a treatment of the subject is to be judged as we judge that of many Materialists, when they, by an exactly inverse process, take sensation in the most subtle way possible, and at last transpose dcli- * We are not contradicted by the fact that individual investigators have obtained a deeper apprehension of Monism : in the general tendency which we are considering, the development, as explained, is predominant. f The Pythagoreans called the soul ipi^fihs (ovrhy cä^wy. 130 MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. cate sensation into thought : the difference may be di- minished so far as the imagination is concerned, but it is unshaken as regards the concept itself. The leap from mind to matter is as great as is that from matter to mind ; mind remains for this stage of the discussion, according to Schelling's expression, uniformly an " eter- nal island." Nor, in this connection, do we intend to surrender the recognition of the specific meaning of the higher forms of thought. The fact that, in general, mental life can soar to such a subjectivity and fullness of power as is practically the case with mankind — that alone is enough to overthrow the naturalistic empirical form of Monism. However it may have been pro- duced, to however many conditions it may be subjected, however much it may disappear into the universe when we try to consider it — still, if such thought-power has appeared at only one point, and in one element of the universal life, it would be decisive against a theory which makes mind a simple dependence upon the events of nature. The adjustment striven after is ob- tained in no case in such a way. For, if the laws of mechanical events are, to the exclusion of all others, recognized as the laws of the universe, all is practically yielded which Materialism can demand. For the thing to be done is not to make for mind a place in the world, but to bring it into recognition in the forms of its life and action. If these forms are abandoned, the one member of the antithesis is simply sacrificed to the other. But, further, if consciousness and sensation (taken in the widest sense) are added to matter, as to some- thing extended and moved, we may well ask whether the possibility of this addition is so simple. Attributes MONISM— DUALISM. 131 can not be glued together at pleasure ; for they may be contradictory in the form in which they are presented, or, at least, they may resist an immediate union, so that a transformation by philosophical labor would be neces- sary. Yet we are met by the objection that the question is not if the concepts seem to us to be contradictory or harmonious, since experience shows the fact of the union ; and one raises perhaps, with Lichtenberg (i. 54:), the query, " Can we infer that what in our opinion can not happen through things which we know must hap- pen through things other than those which we know ? " We answer, By no means; but they must happen through things in another sense, and with a different determination from that in which they are jBrst pre- sented to us. The concej)ts of consciousness and ex- tension have no settled meaninor outside of thought, but are the products of thought ; and it is only a self- criticism if, in the progress of knowledge, the first form of them is changed — a self-criticism which is em- ployed only for the purpose of arriving at the actual facts. This whole problem, which since the time of Descartes has given abundant occupation to the great- est thinkers, the problem of the relation and the ap- parent contradiction of effects as produced in exten- sion and as produced in consciousness — has this prob- lem to-day suddenly disappeared, or do we perhaps pass over the rocks because our ship draws less water ? In our judgment, if the determinations of mind and of matter remain so peacefully in juxtaposition, we accept again the Dualism which was to be removed, only it is transferred from the plienomenon to the con- cept, and so to the place where it is the least endurable 132 MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. for philosophic thought.* In either case, we must give up the whole doctrine of the categories held in modern philosophy — which is also the foundation of exact natu- ral science — if we admit such a concept of a being with two radically different forces. In brief, to receive the characteristic of consciousness, the concept of matter must be essentially changed ; but in that case we should find ourselves again referred to metaphysics. In this connection, moreover, the extent of this monistic theory starts a doubt. By what right is sen- sation attributed to all matter ? Hardly from any rea- sons furnished by natural science ; while, from a philo- sophical stand})oint, the subject would have to be treated in a wholly different manner. And what re- mains of the mind in such an application beyond the province of life? If anything at all, it is a certain analogy with sensation, so that we should arrive again at the " conformable to the soul " of Paracelsus. But by what right can we assume such a concept as a fact ? and what does such a concept accomplish in scientific investigation ? We might not blame the liberality of the scientist who gives a soul to everything material, so long as that exerts no influence upon his explanation of physical phenomena ; but of what use, then, is such an assumption of a soul ? But the physicist and the metaphysician alike are compelled to be on their guard against any such influence : the former, because he would find the first principles of his exact science en- dangered ; the latter, because he is compelled to discuss the question from a different standpoint, in different methods, and with different aims. In brief, we confess that in this form of Monism we * Wc are reminded here of the sentence : rh iiravSp^wfid still seems to many to be the highest goal, though it must, first of all, be determined that the establishment of such a goal is permitted by the nature of the realm of knowledge concerned. If it were cer- tain that phenomena can be viewed everywhere as complex, and be completely resolved into their single elements, that what is given can be regarded as a system of persistent forces, that all distinctions are in ultimate analysis quantitative, and if we could hope to be able to establish all this empirically, then it would, indeed, be a problem to strive after the laws peculiar to nature. But where the conditions are not fulfilled, or, at least, are not yet established to our satisfaction, or where they imply still other conditions, the labor in- volved will not have its corresponding result. Although single provinces adjacent to mind and matter may have been found to admit of such treatment better than was formerly supposed, the attempts to carry it over into that which belongs specifically to the soul do not seem to us to have overcome in any way the doubts concern- ing the principles involved. We can admit many doubts on this point, without on that account calling into question in any way the strict legitimacy of all mental events ; * the only ques- tion is, whether the specific meaning of a law of nature applies, and, also, whether even the general idea of the modem concept of law satisfies the peculiarities here presented. For, although the concept of law is based upon an original and persistent action of the reason, the * Especially is it improper to infer that we can know here orJy rules and not laws ; for we mean by a rule that which marks a method and a stadium of our apprehension, while in real existence there are for science no rules, but only laws. LAW. 151 definite historical interpretations of the concept can not be relied upon, since they arise from a specific tlieory of the world, and are valid no furtlier than thej admit of confirmation ; and so, being still open to question, they can not resist a sufficiently established supple- ment, or any additions or changes in their mean- ings, resulting from a broader cosmic theory. We must also maintain here the principle that the whole method of modem science is not something self-evi- dent and exclusively true, but only one among other possible methods. The outlines of these problems and difficulties, which the concept of law brings with it into the realm of psy- chology, appear prominently in the application of the concept to the individual ; but, in society and history in general, the difficulties are increased by further com- binations and complications. It is here, too, necessary that the general principle of legitimate occurrence should be rendered valid, and this involves a not unim- portant advance, but the distance from this principle to the discovery of definite laws of social and historical action, in any proper sense of the word " law," is pecu- liarly gi'eat. In the combined action of many forces, groups of phenomena may appear, which admit of a separate and relatively definite establishment. But, as soon as the attention is directed to the living whole and to the ultimate causes, the difficulties increase so as to exclude at the outset all thought of tlie formulation of laws. When, in particular, the sphere of social life is sub- jected to an examination which seeks to discover its laws, the outlook is essentially changed by the assertion of this purpose, and both the problem and the object of the investigation have everywhere an increased impor- 152 MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. tance ; yet the perception that, even in what at first appears contingent and arbitrary, an astonishing uni- formity is to be discovered, that apparently indepen- dent occurrences are permanently connected, and that, throughout, constancy increases with the extension of the sphere of observation — this perception seems to have almost intoxicated many an investigator. Purely empirical data are announced as necessary truths, ex- tremely com]3lex events as simple primary forms, the average as something belonging in essence to each in- dividual. The concept of law lies everywhere ready to be applied ; and not rarely, in an uncircumspect prose- cution of single series of considerations, definite formu- lae are asserted with a boldness which can hardly be ex- plained except by the proverb in rebus dubiis plurima est audacia. There is less occasion to examine more closely the various errors into which such attempts, and particularly the so-called law of averages, have led, because the matter, in its scientific aspects, has been presented with perfect justice by prominent scientists;* but, unaffected by that, the errors con- tinue in popular thought, and carry with them serious dangers. In the other realms of mental science, the use of the comparative method, especially, gives occasion to many doubts. Since the beginning of the modern era, that method has been of the greatest service to the knowl- edge of law, from the fact that by stripping off what is contingent and bringing into prominence what is persistent, it has contributed, as nothing else could, to the discovery of primary forms. Especially where the application of a law of nature is established do we * Sec, for example, Riimelin, " Concerning the Concept of a Social Law " ; and Lexis, " On the Theory of Groups of Phenomena." LAW. 153 see the method of comparison at once employed, so that it would be an interesting task to follow out its gradual extension. Yet the question arises, whether that which it can furnish has perhaps anything more than a coordinate significance in the realm of pure mind, or can be justified in its claims, except by the fulfillment of certain conditions. For it is a matter of no little diöiculty here to mark out the field of what in general can be compared, as distinct from what is only apparently comparable. To be sure, many a man bold- ly begins to compare without having clearly understood what should properly be compared ; but the fact is, that every particular formation stands in connection with a coexistence of events, from which it must be freed, be- fore its value can be estimated, and before it can be used in an actual explanation. In the way in which the individual is presented to us, an external harmony can very easily have proceeded from wholly different elements ; and, conversely, apparent divergence can have an internal and essential connection. The mere prominence of a common element is not enough, in this case, to maintain simple primary forms ; rather is an exhaustive analysis essential, which demands a constant- ly attendant systematic thought-process. Only as this is done can the production of new material really ad- vance our knowledge ; only then can we avoid the reproach of directing the attention to the abundance of what is external, for the purpose of avoiding the descent into the depths. But in this respect, as in the others, the lax use of the concept of law is less the fault of the investigations in special sciences than of the superficial composition and employment of the results of such investigations, for in the former the pervading error is quickly discov- 154 MODERN PIIILOSOPniCAL CONCEPTS. ered, and the problem is presented in its purity ; in the latter the confusion takes firm root ; that which is the highest aim is suddenly removed from us : and thus it happens that we often deal the more boldly with the concept of law the further away w^e are from real things. DEVELOPMENT. AfZ öe fir/ 7^7.TjdevaL Trdrepov TrpocfjKei, /.eyeiv^ Trüg iKacrov y'lvtcr^ai irkcpvKE fiaXkov ^ Tzüg eariv. — Aeistotle. The consideration of tlie concept of development is involved in almost insuperable difficulties. It seems of course undeniable that mankind can be conceived of as sharing in a historical development ; we gladlj and easily believe in a continual progress ; and then our glance turns to the universe, and it does not seem over- bold to exhibit here, too, an advance. But how many problems does such a principle involve if it is to be pre- cisely determined, scientifically carried out, and philo- sophically justified ! The most different kinds of in- fluences act upon the elements which determine the methods of treatment : rational postulates and special facts of knowledge, permanent tendencies and transitory moods, the whole influence of interests arising from each one's special work — all these cooperate to produce that which ultimately appears as judgment and conviction. But, since it would carry us far beyond the limits set to our investigation to even touch upon all this, we must content ourselves with bringing out some few points which are specially worthy of consideration be- cause of their relations to the science of our day. First let us, according to our custom, trace out the origin of the terms used. A definite term for develop- 156 MODERN PniLOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. ment was apparently first coined in modem philosophy, and the confidence with which the term was employed from tlie outset marks the significance of the concept contained in it. Ex])licatio^ in the philosophical sense of a real, not simply of a logical, development, is a favorite phrase with Kicolaus Cusanus : its contrary is com2)licatio, for which Giordano Bruno, the pupil of Nicolaus, usually substitutes imjylicatio. In Nicolaus we find also, as an equivalent phrase, the word evolutio, though it is much less often used. It probably appears in his writings for the first time employed in this sense.* Kej)ler was the first to use cvolvi for the development of ideas.f Leibnitz makes an antithesis between evo- lutio and involutio : in his French writings he gener- ally employs envelojpjyement and develojypement. After AYolff had established the doctrine of Epigenesis in his " Theoria Generationis," evolution became the specific term for the theory of the inclosed germ in generation. AnswicMiing and sich cmswickeln first meet us, in philosophic use, in Jacob Böhme : % according to Grimm, entwickeln occurred first in Stieler. § Baum- * I. 89 a : " Linea est puncti cvolutio. Qnomodo intelligis lincara puncti evolutionem ? Evolutionem id est explicationcm." Elsewhere conipUcaiio is-uscd in connection with rcplicatio ; further, involutus and convoluiiis are used by Scotus Erigena. In the logical sense the antithesis of invohcrc and cvohcre is found in the classic Latin writers (see Cicero, Top. 9 : ** Turn dcfiuitio adhibetur qua3 quasi involutum evolvit id de quo quwritur"). f V. 229 : " Sensiones pcrceptionesque alite naturales — opus habcnt motu, quo intercedente omnia, qute quantitatis causa confusa? essent, per tempora succedentia evolvantur, ut singula sola sensibus accidant." X The most significant passages are found in the eighth chapter of the book on Election. § Stieler, " Genealogy of the German Language," 2530, adduces, after Auswickeln {invohdum evolvo-c)^ Ilerauswickdn {cxpedire sc), and then adds, Entwickeln idem cat. DEVKLorMENT. IHT garten speaks of an entwlcTcdt- and cingewicheltwerden of ideas : in general, the active signification is at first predominant, and especially do we often find the devel- opment {cntwlcklung) of a concept, of a proof, of a dog- ma, etc., spoken of. The ecpiivalent employment of the term, in our use, I can show first in wider extent in the earlier writings of Kant : he seems, in fact, to employ auswicklung more frequently than enhcic'klung ; yet he prefers entwiclceJn, and also sicJi entwickeln (see i. 212). Through Herder, who used the word purposely and from preference, and Tetens, who first employed it as the title of a book,* it came into the common speech, and in the nineteenth century it has been extended so far that it is nearly worn out ; and, outside of certain definite spheres, it has become almost unfit for use. Yet there is no doubt but that the expression, taken in a strict sense, does not at all correspond to the concept which the modern era would have it denote. For, in '•' development," the thought is practically that of something endowed from the beginning with deter- mined properties and powers, so that what comes later unfolds itself as from an organic germ. Hence it was entirely proper that in the times when the sense of the word was still more clearly conceived, an involution {einwichlung) was opposed to the evolution {entwick- lung^ auswicklung). But the philosophy of our own day does not wish to understand the sj^ecific formation as something already furnished, or the event as a mere expansion ; but the formation is supposed to be con- structed originally and ultimately in the process itself. The " development " in this sense constitutes the con- necting link between the material substance as presented * Ilis chief work ig entitled " Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Xatur und ihre Entwickclun-' " 1777. 158 MODERN rniLOSOPIIICAL CONCEPTS. to "US and the simple primary forces, and renders it pos- sible to understand tlie former from the latter. Such a theory has, of course, only gradually been carried out in full : the earlier expressions and forms of principles are closely connected with the modern ones, and, even where they do not limit them, they still act as disturbing influences.* The idea, which we can not lay aside, always pressed in, as if that which is pro- duced had been present beforehand in some concealed way ; f in brief, the pure forms of the jDrinciple force their way out only slowly ; yet they are undoubtedly the impulsive force in the j)rocess, and they determine espe- cially the distinctive feature of our scientific methods. The genetic method is certainly, in its general mean- ing, nothing new, for it was used by Greek thinkers of all schools; and, especially by Aristotle, was highly esteemed for the significance of the principles in- volved.:]: Aristotle's ^'Politics" and the treatise on * This is especially true of Leibnitz, who, in the matter of external forms, is clearly related to the past, although a correct presentation of his concept of the principle is enough to cause him to appear in a different light. IIow little justice there is in the ordinary criticisms upon his doc- trine of development is seen in the fact that he was the first to present the possibility of the single origin of the different species of a genus (317 a): "Peut-etrc que dans quelque tems ou dans quelque lieu del'univers lea esp^ces des animaux sont ou etaient ou seront plus sujets ä changer, qu'elles ne sont presentement parmi nous, et plusieurs animaux qui ont quelque chose du chat, comme le lion, le tigre, et le lynx, pourraient avoir et6 d'une meme race et pourront etre maintenant comme de sousdivisiona nouvelles de I'ancienne esp^ce des Chats." f See Goethe, 23, 2G9 : " The concept of production is wholly denied to us : for, when we see anything become, we think that it was already there. In this way the system of evolution becomes conceivable to us." X See " Polit." 1252 a, 24: 'Ei 5r] ns e| apxiis to irpdy/xaTa (pv6ij.€va ß\(\l/ei€U, wfftr^p iv rois &Wois, Kol eV tovtois KaWiar av outu ^ewpijaeiev. He demands genetically-causal definitions, "De Anima," 413 a, 13: Ot fx6vov rh It I Se? t^j/ opiffTiKov x6\o./ d:]Xoiu, a?^\ä ical Tr,v alrlo-v CuuTrdpx^iv Kol iix(paii/t(r^ai, (i sctj. DEVELOPMENT. 159 the production of animals can be regarded as good illustrations of the ancient genetic method. But just liere the essential diüerence between that and the method of modern science becomes clearly a])parcnt. Adhering to the Platonic theory, it was held that existence precedes the becoming; the type is present originally and out of time relations, and, from the be- ginning, limits the formation ; * the whole precedes the parts, and the higher degree, as the normal, explains the lower, which serves as something restrained, which has not yet forced its way through to pure form. To such a theory the later antiquity, the earlier Christian era, and the middle ages held firmly, so far as they concerned themselves at all with the problem as a part of a speculative system. f There was in fact no lack of divergent opinions : in the middle ages Abe- lard is especially noteworthy for the assertion of the proposition that everything simple is from its nature /^ earlier than the complex;:}: noteworthy, too, for the consequences which he derived from it, as affecting * See especially " De Part. Anima." 640 a, IS : ^ ycvtais ev€Ka ttJs obalas ea-rlv, aAA.' ovx h ovaia eVewa tT/s ycvea-ews. B. 1 : iirel B'tari tqiovtov, t))U yeyecriv wSl /col roiavrr\v crvyißaiviiv avayKoiov. f Among the Church Fathers, Augustine especially paid critical atten- tion to this : he compares (and was perhaps the first to do so) all the events of the world to the development of a tree. See iii. 148 d. Lac- tantius, on the other hand, defends the ordinary orthodox theory when he says ("Institut." ii. 2): "Nihil potest esse in hoc mundo quod non sic permaneat ut coppit." The idea that the higher is the original aim of a development, and so forms the measure for the lower, appears especially prominent in the Platonizing and mystical philosophers. See Eckhnrt, 104, 32 : "Alles komcs nature meinet weizcn, alles Schatzes nature polt, alliu geberunge meinet mensche." As regards the con?equenccs of this to the doctrine of knowledge, compare Boethius, " Dc Cons. Philos.," v. 131. X " Dialogus inter Philos.," etc., chap. 4 : "Omuc simplicius naturali- ter prius est multipliciori." IGO MODERN PIIILOSOrniCAL COXCEPTS. tlie liistorico-pliilosophical theory of Ethics and Re- ligion. But onlj after modern philosophy had placed action before existence did it become possible to recognize, and everywhere to apply, as the chief method, that which starts from the concept of becoming.* This shows the process of reducing phenomena which seem to be formed from simple forces to their elements, and so of making them conceivable. We arrive here at ultimate points which resist any further analysis ; yet only those forces can be regarded as thus ultimate which are continually manifested as active, and the forms of action of which can be everywhere appre- hended, and shown at every moment. That which is confused and mysterious thus disappears from the world, or is, at least, so far as possible, put into the background ; in everything we recognize that -which continually sur- rounds us. If history thus becomes a means of causal knowledge, it profits itself, since it strips off all that is strange and difficult to explain, permits us to find again that which is our own at all stages, and so comes within the reach of a systematic treatment. Since it is every- where evident that " the old is new, and the new old," it seems as if the antithesis of historical and eternal, so far as it is at all possible, were here overcome. Wherever such a method was carried over into any special science, it produced, of necessity, a comprehen- sive change. Things in juxtaposition came into inner * Next to )Spinoza, Tschirnhausen especially insisted on genetic defini- tions. See " Medic. Mentis," pp. 67, 68 : " Omnis sane legitima seu bona definitio includct gcnerationem." So far as the expression is concerned, genetic definitions were first spoken of in the school of Wolff (see Wolff, " Ontolog.," § 263 ct scq.) ; in the last half of the last century (as by Herder) genetic seems to have been used for the real explanation of the process of becoming. DEVELOPMENT. 101 connection, and legitimate knowledge took possession of the entire realm of matter; what was plienomenally given appeared as a step in a ])rugrcs3ive series of events, and the apparently dead wakened to full life. Since the different primary tendencies of modern science thus Und here their first verification and confir- mation, the successful prosecution of the genetic method justly shows the victory of the specifically modern method of investigation. The physics of Descartes forms the first fully conscious and systematic attempt of this kind.^^ The method has, in general, agreeably to its nature, followed the path from the external to the internal, and from the great to the small. In the ex- planation of nature, it has known how^ to find the way from the cosmological and astronomical 2:)roblems to the secrets of organic life ; and in like manner, in the sphere of mind, it was first the more general formations which one sought to conceive from the process of be- coming, until at last the individual elements also were included in the same method of consideration. f But, the more this tendency was developed in the consideration of what is individual, the less prominent were its general presuppositions ; so that finally that was regarded as self-evident which, nevertheless, rests * Clauberg, " Op. Philos.," 755, aptly sums up the method employed by Descartes as follows : " Ilanc mcthodum Cartcsiana physica tcnen> — considerat omncs res naturales non statim quales sunt in statu perfoc- tionis suae absoluto (ut vulgo fieri solet ab aliis), sed prius agit dc (luibus- dam earundem principiis valde simplicibus et facilibus, di'inde explicat, quomodo paulatim ex illis principiis, suprcma causa certis legibus opus dirigente, oriantur et flaut, aut certe oriri aut fieri possint, donee tan- dem tales evadant, quales esse experiniur dum consummatiP et absoluta) sunt." f See Beneke, "Pragm. Psychologie," 41 : "Among the fonns which we find in the perfected soul there is not a single one which had not be- come, and become through a long series of developments." 162 MODERN rniLOSOPIIICAL CONCEPTS. upon a specific theory of the world and of our relation to it. What is phenomenal must admit of simplification and reduction to j)rimary forces ; these forces must pro- duce all formations in uniform methods of action ; these formations must fall into a single series ; and, more- over, all this process must be such that we can fully and completely apprehend it in the evident events of the world. Yet all this taken together is not so self-evident, after all ; but it needs special proof in each department of knowledge. It is by no means enough to point out some few developed forms, and to follow out from them an empirico-historical development ; for it is not in the least determined that the beginning and the origin, the first appearance and the primary force, are the same ; and just as little is it proved that the legitimate product appears in a pure form in the empirical event. For in the phenomena Av^e have to recognize a coexistence ; forces are given in perfectly definite combinations, in which they interpenetrate and intersect, limit and re- condition, thus carrying out the results of preceding events, and accordingly forming a whole so intricate that the original production and the first appearance may be different, and the simple and essential elements in an event may be concealed way behind that which is given to us superficially. "VVe may make use of the empirical occurrence as the starting-point of the inves- tigation ; but both the scientific j^recision of the inves- tigation in general and the value of the genetic method would be most seriously shaken, if we should draw in- ferences from that empirical occurrence with no further tests, and should believe that we have formed concepts of things by the establishment of their sequences. By such an uncritical equalization of the superficial and DEVELOrMEXT. 103 the ultimate nature of things, the most important tasks of modern science — penetrative analysis and discovery of law — would be seriously endangered. The mere knowledge and description of '^ development " should not so take possession of all sense and thought that we forget to ask, What, then, is developed, and how and into what it is develojied ? Moreover, we should not overlook the fact that the genetic method, as it includes all the problems involved in the concept of development, can also be interpreted in all the different forms which development has as- sumed. In the motley variety of forms in our own day one contradiction is particularly prominent. On the one hand, the world is suj^posed to be produced from the original activity of one primary force, and everything individual to be legitimately determined by some unity ; but, on the other hand, many forces acting in juxtaposition are assumed, only from the coexistence of which does any formation gradually acquire a dis- tinct character. In the one case, the prominent thought is of a mental, in the other, of a material existence : in the one case, the process is from unity to multiplicity; in the other, from the simple to the complex : in the one case, we have a production from internal agency ; * but in the other, a superposition of what is external : f in the one case, the chief means of carrying out the * See Uerder, " Ideas upon the Philosophy of Ilistorv," v., 2 ; '* — so, I think, we ?pcak improperly, if we talk of germs which were only devel- oped, or of an epigenesis, according to which the members increase by additions from external sources. It is a product (genesis), an action of internal forces, etc." f This, of course, does not involve the assertion that no original and legitimate dispositions of things can be included in the superposition. In any case, the denial of this would give to the theory a much narrower meaninjr. 1G4 MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. process is tlie antitliesis involved ; in the other, the process seems to be completed by a simple ascent. Since the time of IS^icolans Cusanus, the former theory has been especially cultivated by speculative philosophy, and it culminated in Hegel, who found the production of all being in the development of the con- cept. The latter lirst appeared distinctly in Descartes,^' and has attained a wide-spread influence, more recently, m a specific form, in the Darwinian theory. This theory has such control over modern thought that, in its popular sense, the doctrine of development is usually limited exclusively to it. The term itself should be avoided as suffsrestinof a confusion of concej^ts. For, if it is supposed to express the thought of anything definitely " developed," it is not strictly adapted to designate the modern doctrine of progressive formation, as we have seen. Moreover, if it is to be referred to one specific theory, the specu- lative appropriation of it would have a far earlier claim. But, in a Darwinian philosophy, there could be no dis- cussion over a formation by internal forces, or a rigidly directed advance according to original tendencies. It falls entirely without the province of this work * Thus, he gives it very cautiously as his opinion ("Princ. Philos ," iii. 58), that it is also possible to explain phenomena on the hypothesis of an original chaos : " Vix aliquid supponi potest, ex quo non idem eflEee- tus (quamquam fortasse opcrosius) per casdcm naturaB leges deduci pos- sit, cum enhn illarum ope materia formas omnes quarum est capax, suc- cessive assumat, si formas istas ordine considereraus, tandem ad illam quae est hujus mundi, potcrimus deveuire." Again (" De Methode," 24 and 25) : " Ut sine ulla in creationis miraculum injuria credi possit, eo solo res omnes pure materiales cum tempore quales nunc esse videmus effici potuisse." Among other things, the significance attributed here to time is characteristic. Leibnitz decidedly opposed this (144), and because of it accused Descartes of Naturalism. See '* Refutation inedite de Spi- noza," p. 48 : " Spinoza incipit ubi Cartesius desinit ; in naturalismo." DEVELOPMENT. 1(;5 to discuss this theory in its practical bearings; yet the concepts involved in it, especially so far as they have a universal and philosophical validity, should not be passed over. The force of the doctrine, even for the consideration of ])ure concepts, lies unquestionably in the fact that it carries out to its legitimate consequences the principle of explaining any formation by the co- existence of forces. Sucli an attempt gives to natural science this great advantage, that the phenomena called -in question can be tested and precisely established ; while the assumption of inner powers introduces confu- sion in this field, and can not come within the reach of the princi])les of the modern philoso]:>hy of nature. So the theory has at the outset a presum2)tion in its favor, since it allows more room than the others to the en- deavor to obtain a knowledge of causes, and allies itself more easily with established principles ; and the ordi- nary prejudices against it are to be rejected as resting, for the most part, on a bungling handling of conse- quences, which is not even scientiüc. Yet the theory is, of course, subjected to all the limitations and dangers of the modern concept of de- velopment, and in some respects is subjected to them to a peculiarly great extent, on account of its peculiar outcome. The genetic explanation of our day is, as we have seen, of scientific value only so far as it establishes facts of causation. While the mere establishment of sequences and the description of consecutive occur- rences may be a necessary precondition of knowledge, yet, if exclusively presented, they can hardly belong to strict science. But this danger is especially prominent where the question concerns something which comes in from without. So much the more must we insist upon the imperative demand that conformity to law shall be 1G6 MODERN THILOSOrniCAL COXCEPTS. shown in every individual respect as well as in tlie for- mation of the whole ; that is, that the phenomenal event shall be conceived as the expression of primary forces in original forms of activity. But since, in this sphere, conformity to law is determined primarily as mechani- cal,"^ it becomes a more difficult task to maintain the genetic method of explanation when closely united with the mechanical, and in no case to allow the for- mer to drive out the latter. But very often no atten- tion is paid to such a demand, and the collision of the two methods is overlooked. Especially is a new formation not infrequently ad- duced as something which appears unexpectedly upon the scene ; although it mast necessarily have a causal foundation. However much justice there may be in the polemic against those ancient doctrines, according , to which a new event was regarded as already previously \ present in some concealed way, that does not at the I same time aifect the theory which supposes a new form to be produced originally from the essence of the pri- mary forces. Some primary force is not to be dispensed with, unless we would fall into a theory of absolute becoming, which puts an end to all exact knowledge. The element, not of precedence in time, but of freedom from time relations is necessary to a scientific concep- tion of tlie world. Without going back to the Aristo- telian doctrine that the being precedes the event, we must insist that original forms of action appear as self- manifesting in every particular event, and that, so far, everything actual is to be conceived as a something possible. Thus, point for point, by the side of a ge- netic investigation, which examines the production of determinate combinations, must tliere be a mechanical * For the concept of the Mechanical, see the section on that subject. DEVELOrMENT. 107 explanation which derives this production from the essential action of forces, and considers each event hy itself as a whole every time it ha])pcns. Both problems may snppoi-t each other in many ways ; neither can re- place the other, or make it superfluous. But what is thus true, in particular respects, can be extended to the foraiation as a whole. However little, according to this doctrine, a primary innate tendency to a delinite end is assumed, still whatever happens must, according to universal laws, stand in a connected sequence and causal union. As an advocate of tliis doctrine, one could say that the actual event does not exhaust all the possibilities, and that it can not be in- ferred simply from the general properties of the pri- mary forces, but that it always refers to the historical process itself. Yet it does not follow from this that whatever happens is not involved in original and essen- tial forms. One is supported hj a fundamental prin- ciple of modern science, if he struggles against l)ringing into a specific tendency the entire development from the beginning ; but that involves forgetf ulncss of the fact that tendencies, and a general tendency, must be lemtimatelv formed from the universal itself. Moreover, a discussion of phenomena which is not sufficiently strict involves confusion, because it treats very lightly the question of the permanence and main- tenance of what has once been obtained. Because of definite reasons, forces are brought into a combination in which they produce new forms. If these are once provided, it seems to many that the problem of the in- vestigation is solved, and it is believed that tlie inquiry can be dropped. But if, as is assumed, definite forma- tions arise ultimately from merely opportune interaction of forces, how is it conceivable that such formations 1G8 MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. maintain themselves outside of these interactions of forces? If nothing original and essential is brought into action by the external forces, the proposition must in the strictest sense be valid, cessante causa cessat effec- tus, and we find, from necessity, only fleeting and tran- sitory forms in the events of nature.* But, since this is not the fact, the impelling forces must either continue to act or else must be replaced by others ; for a definite condition can be maintained only by reason of the per- sistence of forces, and nothing remains as it is at any given time without expenditure of force. Such prob- lems become more difiicult when we consider the vicis- situdes of individual formations, and they offer im- mense difficulties to the whole mechanical theory of explanation ; yet many persons simply disregard those difficulties, and cling to the concept of heredity, as if that, in its turn, did not involve all these problems. This whole failure to appreciate the strictly causal conception, which naturally is the fault, not so much of scientists, properly so called, as of occasional writers, destroys, further, the comprehension and the proper estimation of the world-process itself. If the formative event is not understood as standing in a legitimate con- nection, then every formation is something contingent, incidental, and joined at random to others as regards primary forces ; so that the simple elements, regardless of all combination, are all that have any essential sig- nificance in the world, while the entire result of the process from them is superficial and ultimately void of meaning. The further the development advances, the more remote does it become from what is properly real, and the more of the contingent does it involve ; so that * As soon as one employs the concept of the type, the doctrine of occasion is given up, as it finds a limit in the whole science of morphology. DEVELOPMENT. 1C9 the higher degrees iimst be conceived as tiie least origi- nal, and thus as the least scientific. The " evolution'' would thus not lead to, but diverge from, the actual truth. The reason of all this lies in the fact, that the causal principle has not sufficient power to provide for the event, and to include the lower and the higher in one and the same world-process. The single parts break asunder, and we receive a mere juxtaposition, where science has no right to renounce a systematic combi- nation. All these doubts increase in force as we pass beyond the original province of investigation, and attempt to gain a philosoj^hic view of the world. But the obliga- tions which are involved in the essentially changed j^roblem have been observed too little in such attempts to justify us in a closer study of them. The decisive problems are scarcely touched upon ; the cosmic idea of popular thought is adopted without being tested at all, and the whole philosophy finally results in the at- tribution of universal validity to the conclusions and methods of natural Science without any further justifi- cation. Of all this we can notice only the way in which these results are transferred to the specific sphere of mind ; because we recognize here a tendency which is characteristic, and, in the present state of thing?, not without influence. ^ Above all, there is of course no doubt but that by the suggestion of those investigations in natural science much in the sphere of mind as well has been brought into a new, or a clearer light. The knowledge of the mutability of those formations which are regarded by popular thought as immutable, and the higher estima- tion of thouo-ht- events in jreneral, and of external fac- tors in particular — all this necessitated such a change in 170 MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. the fundamental idea of mind, that it could no longer be regarded as something which was from the begin- ning completely determined, and directed toward an aim from which it could not be diverted. The significance of the contest, in which Heraclitus, and later J. Böhme and Hegel were involved, was now, by the more con- crete interpretation, brought nearer than ever to popu- lar thought. The principle of the gradual and slow ad- vance of the mind, as defended in connection with this interpretation, found various confirmations in exhaus- tive sj)ecial investigations ; and from these and other points of view many outlooks were opened up, which extend far out beyond what is even yet clearly visible. But it is one thing to recognize such principles within the peculiar province of mind, and another thing from this point of view to define mind according to its essential nature. The doctrine that all content comes into a thing from outside is of special signifi- cance in such attempts to give to the interpretation of mind the analogy of natural events as the only rule of that interpretation. The mind appears as a tabula rasa, to which the external world gives certain charac- ters. Whether that happens suddenly or gradually, everything has ultimately the same origin ; and even what seems to be justly considered as essentially pecu- liar, as the forms of intuition and of thought, is suj)- posed to have arrived at the form in which it is now presented to us, from vanishing beginnings through oc- casional minute additions. No small amount of shrewdness has been employed to make such doctrines conceivable, and practically to apply them. It is supposed, for example, that we arrive at our belief in causality through the fact that phe- nomena appear in uniform connections and sequences : DEVELOPMENT. 171 tlie combination of these develops a habit ; this extends its ap])licati(m l)cyond the individual cases ; and the un- consciously developed activity serves finally as an origi- nal law of mind. The attempt is made to form from outside forces a similar concept of the ethical endeavors and emotions. The impulse which seeks essentially simply self-preservation recognizes only what is useful. But in the life of the community enters the necessity of preserving many beings, and, therefore, of placing a limit to the rights of the individual. At this point, either an instinct is adduced, and the question thus only carried back one step, or it is asserted that education, penal laws, etc., give what is necessary in the form of what is good in itself; man becomes accustomed to such a consideration, and finally does, as if from inner impulse, that which is still only suggested to him from outside. This method of explanation, in this and in other cases, results in the theory, that the action of the external upon the internal asserts itself beyond the immediate oc- casion, and gradually attains such firmness that it seems to be an original primary form of thought-activity. But the question arises whether such a process of argument, which seems to blind some men, does not have a variety of defects and more than one weak spot ; and whether, further, as a matter of fact, the analogy of natural events does not hint at other interpretations than this. Above all, is not an inactive thing such as the mind must be, if considered as a tabula rasa, in- tolerable as a concept ? For how can we speak of an existence without attributing to it original powers ? * Further, can anything empty and inactive receive any * Leibnitz called the concept of a substantia inconipUta a vioiistruin in philosopMa. See further, 223 C : '* Lea puissances veritables nc eont jamais des simples possibilitös." 172 MODERN rUILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. action from without ? and is any action in general pos- sible without a counteraction — beins^ thus a result which is determined only on one side ? * Moreover, if, in what is subjective, there undeniably takes place an essential change in what comes in from without, this, too, demands a causal explanation, and can not be dis- patched by merely disregarding it. As we do not gain a concept of the meaning of a book by supposing it to be copied from some other, and so on, without limit, so in this case we can not entirely disregard the assump- tion of some original event. Such an element may ap- pear in the phenomenon under various interpretations and conditions ; still the decisive fact is that the mind constructs out of things something wholly different from that which they offer to direct apprehension ; and in this we can not avoid the recoa^nition of an essential and unique action of its own. Only reasoning in a circle can mistake this necessity. In causality, for example, it can at the very outset be asked, whether the j)sychical processes which pro- duce habit do not presuppose a certain original com- bination ? In any case, the very act of transforming the perception of the coincidences of j^henomena into a belief in their necessary connection would not be possible, unless the formation of the habit itself were made a problem, and an attempt made to give a causal explanation of it. Why does not man stop with it at the same point that the brute does ? The mind could never, even by mistake, transpose habit into causal con- nection if the process had not an essential foundation in his own nature. * All such objections can be met by placing one's self in the position of complete materialism ; but the question arises whether equally great difficulties do not arise in that case from the other side. DEVELOPMENT. I70 The same thiiif^ holds true of judgments of value. The concept of something estimable in itself, in con- trast with the useful in general, nnist be originally formed, in order that the first individual may make use of it ; and this nmst find some foundation in his nature, provided that he is to be persuaded of it : it must always be able to arise a second time, in order to continue to act permanently. All misuse which such ideas admit of still displays the power which they natu- rally possess for us ; and the delusive appearance as well can be understood only on the presupposition of a real- ity beneath it. However much may everywhere have come from the outside, it is not enough to solve the problem of the establishment of a mental principle. How iß it pos- sible that what is foreign to the mind becomes an inde- pendent inner power ; that it frees itself from all con- tingent connections, and strives after a dominion over the whole ? It is a matter of indifference to the main question how often or how rarely this happens ; if it happens a single time, judgment is pronounced upon the doctrine which makes all that is subjective absolutely dependent upon the external. It is also incidental how much in the process belongs to conscious, and how much to unconscious (better, perhaps, unreflecting), active forces ; for the only point is, whether it does or does not happen in the mind. The predilection for the un- conscious is often connected with the endeavor to carry the question, as far as possible, out of the field of vision, and the belief seems almost to be predominant in regard to this that what we can no longer observe is no longer present, and hence is no problem of science. To lose sight of a problem, and to solve it, would be, according- ly, nearly synonymous. But to show how many doubts 174 MODERN PUILOSOrniCAL CONCEPTS. such an explanation brings with it, owing to the confu- sion in which it is involved — according to Aristotle's expression an eKvvKTO'^ yevvav — is not within the prov- ince of this treatise. Yet we seem to overlook something which is essen- tial to the correct judgment of this whole method of explanation, and that is the circumstance that it dis- sects the psychical structure into small factors, and so obtains a point of approach to that which as a whole it can not reach. If the beginning seems to be easily ex- plicable as something nncrosco})ic, an advance is effect- ed by the cumulation of new diminutive parts, and by a gradual synthesis. In a measure the result which we now have is attained ultimately by addition. But against this explanation itself many doubts in turn arise, not so much as regards the fact asserted, that the pres- ent condition is reached by a slow ascent from small be- ginnings, as concerning the way in which this fact is ultimately conceived. Something small or single is supposed at the begin- ning ; does that essentially change the problem in any way ? The fact that phenomena, like those of belief in causal connection and judgments of value, are in general possible at any point and to any extent whatever ad- mits us at once into a new world, and essentially changes the whole comprehension of the question. It may be an unavoidable weakness in our principles that we consider anything small as more easily conceivable than something great ; but shall this weakness serve as the foundation of an explanation of the essence of things ? Every one who is mindful of the specific na- ture of the thought-activity of man will hold firmly to the fact that the disjoined phenomena, although at first appearing singly, still have their roots in the whole, and DEVELOPMENT. 175 in the course of the development strive to extend them- selves to the whole. And this course of development — is it really so simple to conceive that the one part is added to the other, and the whole is thus pushed on ? Is not a sjTithetic ac- tivity necessary to the combination of the many, and must not the mind itself furnish this activity unless every process is to be simply on it, and not in it ? \yho- ever conceives of thought-activity as at every stage a process combining di fie rent elements and as an indepen- dent existence, in which there is mutual interpenetra- tion of parts, and in which the one part seeks a connec- tion with the others — whoever has such a conception of it will readily recognize the fact that the whole process is carried out only in that thought-activity ; yet he will insist that, if it is to be carried out, the heterogeneous elements in the mind must be reduced to an essential unity. But, if this is maintained, the question still arises, whether the development of mind is to be ulti- mately conceived just as it superficially presents itself at the outset ; whether there are not inner laws to be discovered here, and critical points in the development to be recognized, instead of explaining the whole as only a gradual increase. Our judgment of the formation and the general result of the thought-activity will depend upon our answers to all these questions. lie who maintains in all this process an originality and legitimacy of men- tal force will by no means judge the fact of a gradual formation to be a proof of a diminished significance of mind as related to the events of the world. Under this interpretation, an event may have, for popular thought, less that is astonishing and novel ; while, for science, it increases in value. 176 MODERN rniLOSOPniCAL concepts. But it is specially evident in the method which is sometimes distinguished by the name of " analytical," that in considering these problems many investigations aim only to make the matter as intelligible as possible to the common understanding. The truth is that a treatment which deserves to be called analytical pre- supposes comprehensive thought-labor ; for, to be able to analyze phenomena, one must have assured himself of the leading points of view, of tendencies, even of categories, and this can be accomplished only by sys- tematic activity of thought. But now, not infrequent- ly, the whole is simply separated into its empirically prominent parts ; these parts are exhibited in their se- quences', and are l)rought into combinations, and thus one believes that he has comprehended the process. The great problem of philosophers and of the ages has become a sort of piece of artificial work, a matter in- volving only dexterity and quickness of manipulation. Whether such an analysis into single elements is scien- tifically possible ; whether these pretended elements actually form independent primary forces ; and whether the whole can be produced by a simple coexistence — all this is passed over very lightly. What appears first in the phenomenon serves as impulsive force ; what ia here given as single serves as ultimately simple ; de- terminations which arise from the whole are attributed to the parts ; and, since the finished form always absorbs the attention, everything seems to be immensely simple. Thus no question is anywhere raised concerning a cau- sal conception and a strictly scientific treatment ; the investigation stops at just the point where the problem begins to become a scientific-philosophical one. So far as all originality and inner conformity to law are denied to the thought-process, there can consistently DEVELOPMENT. I77 be no more discussion of a pystematic and causal con- ception of tlic thouc^ht-powcr ; for the mind only re- ceives, like a magazine, what comes from without, and is dependent upon an event in which it has no share. The actual unity and the comprehensive connection of parts in the thought-process, the reciprocal agreement of individuals and of ages, and the eternal truths there- in involved — all these must be renounced in such a theory ; and then the causal significance of the genetic metliod itself must also be denied. This, if nothing else, might suggest material for re- flection : namely, that with the conformity to law of the inner life that of the forms of knowledge as well is de- stroved : and so science itself, with its entire meanins: as science, is made worthless. For if it once comes into the mind, it must share the fate of the mind. Of course, its practical tasks would like^vise be included in such a fate. AYliat comes into the mind from without can not lay claim to any greater power than that involved in the psychical force ; and this power, as entering surrepti- tiously, must so far as possible be destroyed by an inves- tigation which insists upon finding the truth. This process would, in fact, involve at the outset a contra- diction ; but it is in any case absurd to maintain acts of reason after the reason itself, so far as it is essential and original, has been taken out of the world. AVe do not mean to hold the Darwinian theory and its advocates in any way responsible for such errors in individual attempts at philosophizing. Such pseudo- philosophers only use this theory as a dress for old doc- trines which in their germ can be traced back to the Sophists, but which have found their typical expression in the French materialism and sensationalism of the eighteenth century. Whoever wishes to see every- 178 MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. thing internal keenly and quickly reduced to that which is external, everything original transformed into that which is derived, every whole analyzed into its parts, and everything valuable degraded to mere natural in- stinct, turns to those men ; but he should not forget that, not only has the development in France itself passed beyond such crude ideas, but also that the great achievements of thought in Germany have resulted in a direct contradiction of them. Xot simply some pe- culiar theories of the schools, but the whole conscious- ness of an age which is powerful in thought and origi- native in creations has opposed those doctrines, and the most prominent individuals of that age have expressed that opposition with the utmost emphasis. The leading illustrations of this are Kant and Goe- the. Kant, in opposition to that false analysis, has made valid use of an analysis which truly deserves the name. For him, refusing as he did to recognize any- thing as simple because a superficial Empiricism offered it as such, preferring rather to test analytically by a systematic investigation everything which is given us, even experience itself — for him, it was evident that an original mental activity must everywhere be assumed to render possible that which, superficially regarded, might serve as the simple and ultimate element. Goethe also everywhere defended the necessity of an inner and synthetic activity, and in so doing made prominent the obstacles, even to the verbal expressions used, which arose from that atomistic sensational ten- dency;* and, in his own shrewd and apt style, has * 50, 2 14. ** We believe that we see here, in the individuals as in the whole, the after-effects of those epochs in which the nation was j^ivcn up to sensationalism, and was accustomed to make use of materialistic, me- chanical, atomistic expressions ; for at that time the inherited vocabulary ■ L; DEVELOPMENT. I rKlVEl^';^!'!''?^^ V Qj , > ,,^ fj showed the difRculties and contradictioM^^^^wEfcK tbac tendency is entangled. How directly suited to our own day the words seem in which he described the method of those Frenchmen (see correspondence with Schiller, iv. 127): "They do not at all conceive that there is anything in man, unless it has come in to him from the outside. Thus Meunier has recently assured me that the ideal is somethini:: combined from different beauti- ful parts. And when I asked, Whence, then, the con- cept of the beautiful parts came ? and how man came to demand a beautiful whole \ and whether the expression ' to combine ' were not too weak for the operation of genius, since it makes use of the elements of experience ? — for all these questions he had answers in his own lan- guage, since he asserted that to genius for a long time uiie Sorte de creation has been ascribed. And so is all their discourse. They start out resolutely from a con- cept of the understanding ; and, if one carries the ques- tion into a higher region, they show that for this new relation they have in every case a word, without troub- ling themselves to ask whether it contradicts their first assertion or not." It is a clear proof how little the studies of such men have penetrated the real thought-process, if that which they have not so much opposed, as believed to lie far beneath them, appears again with peremptory claims, and, instead of being universally and at once rejected, is commended by not a few as something new and great. Yet ever again to oppose that which has often been overthrown is of especial necessity to the interests of the principle of development itself. If the stricter was sufficient for common dialogue ; but, as soon as the conversation rose to the subject of mind, the wiser opinions of distinguished men were openly contradicted." '9 180 MODERN PniLOSOPHICAL COXCEPTS. scientific interpretation of it is given up, and if narrow forms everywhere forcibly assume control, then not only is it obstructed in its widespread influence upon the wliole realm of scientific investigation, but it is also most seriously shaken in its intrinsic validity. It is thus seen to be the duty of all who stand upon the basis of modern science to appear as opponents of what im- perils its fundamental concept. PRIMAEY CONCEPTS OF CAUSATION. "Nihil veritati prejudicare, sed hoc obtinero quod ipsius rei inducit natura." — " Cod. Justin." Although our judgments of the causal relation demonstrate the existence of a mental judgment which is original and comprehensive, yet the actual investiga- tions of science have, at different times, led in the direction of a different theory. Moreover, the con- cepts pertaining to causality have been formulated only by a gradual process.* Although it would be an important and attractive undertaking to follow out care- fully both tendencies in their historical development, we can here, of course, refer to this development only so far as this is necessary for the understanding of the * The oldest of the words expressive of the concept of cause is apx'f) (p7'incipium, quelle in Wolff), for it is found in the first philosopliical work of historic culture, the writing of Aximander irepl {is. "We find alria, after being used by Pindar and others, in a strictly scientific sense first used by Plato. Then Aristotle, as is well known, distinguished the four kinds of causes ; while the Stoics first brought out a term for cause and effect {aKoKov^ia, iiraKoKov^ticris), and coined the phrase aiTiwSrjSj which the Latins, and especially Augustine, in this specific sense, trans- lated as causalis. Causalitas is first found in the translations of Arabian philosophers (as Aviccnna) ; the Scholastics probably took it from them. Grund and vrsachc, which are used indifferently by Eckhart, were first distinguished by Wolff (" German Metaphysics," i. § 29, ii. § 13), in that f/rund should express the ratio, ursachc the catisa. 182 MODERN PniLOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. l^resent condition of things. We tliereforo content our- selves with following to some extent the history of the concepts of the Mechanic and the Organic, and also of Teleology. Mechanic — Organic. The expression firj'^avtKo^; (shrewd, inventive, artful), which is found, for example, in Xenophon, appears as an established technical term in Aristotle. Mechanics is a limited science, the sphere of which is more closely examined in the work which is so entitled.* The word was taken up by the later Latin writers, and was re- tained throughout the middle ages ; in the German lan- guage it was first used by Paracelsus. Bacon was the first to undertake the extension of its significance on the philosophical side, in that he called mechanical the motion which uj) to that time had been distinguished as violent (motus molentus). But Descartes made ready use of the analogy of me- chanics as characterizing his conception of nature ; yet he employed the expression mechanic in a wider sense only in isolated passages.f The term came into gen- eral use through Boyle, who had a peculiar predilection for it, and gladly placed it at the head of his works. The word organic appears first in Aristotle, and, as employed by him, signifies nothing more than instru- mental. It suggests particularly the idea of the com- bination of diverse parts in a joint production ; and, when he speaks of nn organic body, he is so far from de- noting thereby an inner vital principle that some quali- * This book is not genuine, but the use of the term is sufficiently at- tested by passages in unquestionably authentic works. •f For example, " Epist.," i. 67, where the mechanicum and the cor- poreum are opposed to the incorporcum. MECUANIC— ORGANIC. 1S3 f jing phrase must be added to express this thought. '•' In this sense of the term there can be no antithesis be- tween mechanic and organic. This Aristotehan use of the tenn was maintained, without any essential change, through ancient philos- ophy and the middle ages.f In Descartes, also, organi- cus and instrumentalis are simply synonymous ; first in Leibnitz do organic and organisnixis appear used in any peculiar sense. Yet even by Leibnitz they are em- ployed to signify, not the " inner principle " essential to life, but its appropriate organization carried out to infinity. The organic is embraced in the concept of the mechanic. The organism is a natural mechanism, which differs only quantitatively from the artificial one. This definition continued through the eighteenth cen- tury. We find organic (natural) and artificial mechan- isms coordinated ; and, just before the change intro- duced by Kant, Tetens maintains the Leibnitzian prin- ciples when he says ("Philosophical Investigations of Human Mature," ii. 4T5) : " The organization is an in- finitely complex mechanism. But this characteristic, however infinite it may be, can still be regarded as a distinction of size and multiplicity." In Kant's earlier writings, also, the same position is maintained ; and it should not be forgotten that, before he, at a later date, introduced a decided change of defi- nition, the peculiar nature of the organic had been made prominent from another point of view. Thus, Jacobi said (" Hume," 172) : " To conceive the possibility of * In his well-known definition of the soul, as ivre\ix^ia t) irpuT-q (Tufxaros rinciple in the realm of organic life is united with that of tlie superi- ority of the whole to the parts, the discussion of design obtains here a peculiarly rich meaning. The completed TELEOLOGY. 201 activity of tlie whole is the goal toward which every- thing particular is to be directed, and with a view to wliicli it is to be conceived. Whatever judgment we may form of such a Tele- ology, it has greatly contributed to the subordination of the material universe to unifying points of view ; and by it has been introduced the possibility of whole sci- ences, like those of comparative anatomy, historical de- velopment, etc. And in no respect was it behind the science of the time in which it appeared. We can not deny that there is an antithesis in prin- ciples between this Aristotelian doctrine of design and the primary tendencies of modern science. It presup- posed the Platonic doctrine of ideas by which events appeared as the realization in matter of forms acting out of time relations ; while with modern tl linkers matter and form coincide in a unity, and, in fact, in the unity of the process. It is not a combination of differ- ent kinds of being wliich gives us the process, but the process, rather, which gives us all being. Whatever formation may appear is to be considered as having its original source in the general process, and hence must always be judged simply as a provisional conclusion, and not as an ultimate end. The Aristotelian concept of the ivepyeia is given up ; in mind and in nature the pressure is to the infinite ; it always produces the new, and can be content with no attainment. The action of forces is, therefore, independent of fixed aims, and we can speak only of a sort of tendency which points to tlie infinite. In the closest connection with this stands a second characteristic, the dissolution of the organic connection of the world, the recognition of the independence of the individual, with the subordination of all events to 202 MODERN rniLOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. simple and universal laws. It is these laws which pro- tect the unity of the world ; they are immediately mani- fested in every individual, and all particular formations can be reduced to these. It is no longer held that one specific form makes use of the forces of nature, and turns all motion toward itself. And so, too, the uni- verse as an entirety is not considered a completed whole which refers to itself everything particular as an instru- ment. In place of the antithesis of parts and whole appears that of simple and complex; instead of, with Aristotle, interpreting the individual only through the whole, the form must be resolved into its elements to be scientifically conceived. It is, then, all things con- sidered, the genetico-analytic character of modern sci- ence which necessarily destroys the principles of the Aristotelian doctrine of design. Although these decisive reasons have not often been very prominent in the attacks of reflective thought upon that doctrine, yet they have determined the scientific development of the method of discussion, so that the treatment of the question has finally assumed an entire- ly new shape. Wherever design was defended, it was essentially changed from its earlier form. But its sup- porters are divided into two classes, since some com- bine it as well as they can with the primary principles of modern science ; others wish to show it as some- thing intrinsically demanded by those very principles. Among the former, the most prominent are Boyle and Kant, in his earlier writings ; among the latter, Leib- nitz and Kant, in his later writings. Boyle teaches that a strictly applied mechanical theory needs design as its counterpart to make con- ceivable the tendencies observed in the phenomena of the universe and the rational order which makes itself TELEOLOGY. 203 apparent.* The further an intrinsic character and es- sential connections are removed from the events of nature, the more necessary does it seem to be to sup- plement these events by something transcendent. But tliis defense of design involved a change in the general theory, since Boyle adduces the concept of cosmic de- signs,t to which the nature and relative position of individual forms must be subordinated. With Boyle it was the immediately phenomenal nature of the world which led to the j^jrinciple of de- sign. But Kant, in his earlier writings, went a step fur- ther back in his analysis of princij^les. It seemed to him especially suspicious in the ordinary teleology that the contingency of the perfection of nature was necessary to the inference of a wise originator, and hence that any absolutely necessary order in the world should become a serious objection to that teleology. Yet, when he in- sisted that every special formation should be conceived as necessarily formed according to general laws, those laws themselves gave him the opportunity of bringing in design again with a new meaning. The fact that from extremely simple forces a well-ordered whole is formed by legitimate development, and that a multitude of what seemed to be mutually independent things are in reality united in a connected way, appears to him a de- cisive reason for believing that the whole originates from a supreme intelligence. The very fact that the forces of nature can produce this world without the in- terference of anything supra-mundane testifies that rea- * See " De ipsa Xatura," section iv. : " Harum autem partium motum Bub primordia rerum infinita sua sapientia ac potestatc ita dircxit, ut tandem (sive breviore tempore sive longiore, ratio definirc ncquit) in speciosam banc ordinatamque mundi formam coaluerint." f See, especially, " Final Causes of Natural Things," Prop. IV. : "Cosmical, primary, and overruling ends." 10 20i MODERN PHILOSOPniCAL CONCEPTS. son controls the world. All order is indeed a result of necessity ; but, he says, " is this harmony the less strange because it is necessary ? I consider it all the more so for that reason." (II. 138.) This doctrine comes pretty close to that of Leibnitz, which is to be judged in the same way, and which had considerable influence upon its formation. It can well be considered as the highest form of an identification of a scientific conception of nature with a religious cosmology. Yet here, too, although something situated above and be- yond the world is necessarily involved in the design, we have a right to demand that the design be imme- diately and intrinsically combined with the world. This last element, which must be furnished to jus- tify the doctrine philosophically, was undertaken by Leibnitz, and by Kant in his later writings. From the outset, Leibnitz defended the doctrine of design as something coordinate with the explanation of efficient causes. He emphasized the fact that the two are in no way mutually exclusive, but the teleological considera- tion can be of great assistance to the setiological. Yet, in these considerations, he does not go very far beyond the ordinary principles of design : his teleology es- sentially exhausts itself in mere invention ; and he as- serts distinctly that in ultimate analysis it is subordi- nate to aetiology.* * For all this see *' Works," 143 b, and Foucher, II. 357. In the latter place we read : " Cependant je trouve que la voye des causes efficientes» qui est plus profondc en efcet et en quelque fa9on plus immediate et a priori, est en recompense assez difficile, quand on vicnt en dötail, et je croy que nos philosophes le plus souvent en sont encor bien öloignes. Mais la voye des finales est plus ais6e, et ne laisse pas de servir souvent k deviner des verites importantes et utiles qu'on seroit bien long temps k chercher par cette autre route plus physique." In support of this, tho fact can be adduced that many important discoveries of modern science are actually made in this way. TELEOLOGY. 205 The peculiar service which Leibnitz rendered to the doctrine of design lay rather in the fact that he brought tlie teleological and the purely physical considerations into an intrinsic and essential relation. The problem, the prosecution of which leads him to a doctrine of universal design, is the nature of the general laws themselves. He considers these, like the whole order of the world, as something positiv^e, in so far as they realize one of various possibilities ; and the question now arises, whether this definite nature is not subordi- nate to some one particular point of view, and does not lead up to some one particular principle. And here it seemed to him to follow, from many considerations, that all laws of events are determined by the first principle that the greatest possible quantity of force is utilized. Everywhere the shortest paths to the goal are followed, and the simplest means to the end are chosen.* The world, because ruled by this principle, is judged to be absolutely complete and conformable to design, al- though, since it is a question only of the quantity of being, not of a definite quality, what is asserted is the form of conformity to design, rather than a definite purpose ; it is a tendency which disappears in infinity, rather than a specific aim of development.! Such a teleological theory is not coordinate with the setiological-physical one ; but, including the latter, * See 14Y b : " Semper scilicet est in rebus principium detcrminationis quod a maximo mininove petendum est, ut nempe maximus prnestetur effectus minimo ut sic dicam sumtu." 605 b, he remarks, in view of the question, whether the same result could not be produced by pure neces- sity : " Ccla serait vrai, si par exemple les loix du mouvement, et tout le reste, avait sa source dans une n6cessit6 goometrique de causes efficientcs ; mais il se trouvc que dans la demiöre analyse on est oblige do recourir ä quelque chose qui depend des causes finales ou de la convenance." f Practically Leibnitz considers the world, not as complete, but 03 developing itself to completeness. 206 MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. stands above it. It is not limited to any specific sphere, as that of organic life, but is related to all events, and is found to be especially fruitful in its explanation of what the ordinary method of treatment leaves as an axiom. Even the primary laws of motion, the whole method of causal agency, etc., are illuminated by it. For special investigations, it started from the maxim that the shortest way should everywhere be sought ; but, since the ultimate aim was the most complete pro- duction of power in the universe, the power of the in- dividual could give only approximate results in this direction ; and a general problem was brought out, the solution of w^hich could only gradually be attained in the advance of scientific discovery. Meanwhile Leib- nitz held that the data given, in connection with their causes, were enough to justify the reason in its confi- dence in the general princij^le, and in admitting the unsolved mysteries of the universe, by the use of the well-known maxim, " What I understand of it pleases me : I believe that the rest, too, would please me, if I understood it " (p. 548 a). Still, the event which is conformable to design is regarded, in this philosophical theory of Leibnitz, as something occurring within the world itself, since ulti- mately all events reduce to occurrences having their own intrinsic nature, while these are controlled by the form of conformity to design. Since the idea (the elementary magnitude of Leibnitz) involves immedi- ately an inclination toward something else, and exertion consists in this inclination alone, the design, the mov- ing force, will result throughout from activity and law. Design controls the world, because it controls the thought-activity, which is the foundation of all exis- tence ; of course that wliich is specifically human, the TELEOLOGY. 207 power of reflection, is wholly remote from sucli a con- cept of design. We have a metaphysical concept, to which the psychological interpretation is subordinated as a special case ; but, nevertheless, it seems to be set- tled that the human illustration of design need not be thrown away, but finds its place in the great whole. We need not ask, what doubts can be started con- cerning such a doctrine of design. This much is cer- taiuj that it is raised above the customary objections. Especially would it be absurd to contrast this theory with a strictly causal investigation of JSTature, since the theory starts from the very desire to form a causal con- ception, with which desire scientists usually are content to stop. The idea of design, which determines every- thing from one principle, seemed indispensable, even for the complete removal of accident from the world. If we should make any objection to this doctrine, vre should say that it attempts too much, rather than too little. It necessarily presupposed an unlimited and in- desti-uctible faith in the power of the reason concerned in the act of knowledge ; and it was the destruction of this presupposition, not the attacks of adversaries made upon the theory itseK, which finally repressed it. Such an abandonment of the presupposition here involved appeared in the later writings of Kant ; since all causal connection was judged to be a form of knowl- edge which is purely subjective. Hence, however de- sign might be defined and employed, it was nothing more than one method of our human comj)rehensi()n. But, further, all the peculiarities and excellences of the Kantian method appear in his treatment of the subject. He undertakes at the outset to give a distinct definition of the concept. Design is (v. 439) " the perceived ef- fect, the perception of which is at the same time the 208 MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. reason whicli leads the rational acting cause to deter- mine its production," and tliat is accordingly considered conformable to design (vi. 385), " the existence of which seems to j)resuppose a previous idea of the same thing." It is evident that in this way the concept is much more strictly and specifically defined than it is by Leibnitz, and at the same time that such a concept can never be used, otherwise than symbolically, outside of the realm of what pertains specifically to the soul. But now experience leads our faculty of judgment (v. 378, et seq.) " to the concept of design in nature only when we must predicate a relation of cause and effect, which predication we are able to regard as legitimate only because we include the idea of the effect in that of the causality of the cause, as the very fundamental condition of the possibility of the former " ; and, so far as this goes, it can be said (v. 383) " a thing exists as design in nature when it is of itself cause and effect." At first this concept is applied to organized being ; but from that we are necessarily led (v. 391) " to the prin- ciple that all nature is a system controlled by design, by which principle all the mechanism of nature must be subordinated to an accordance with the dictates of rea- son." The ultimate ground of this is, that our under- standing makes a distinction between the universal and the particular. The particular, regarded from the po- sition of the imiversal, seems to be contingent ; and hence, to establish a connection, design must be in- troduced ; though, if we were to judge the particu- lar in its relation to a universal which is regarded as a synthetic whole, such a necessity would not arise. Design thus serves us by filling up the gap between the universal and the particular, the possible and the actual. TELEOLOGY. 209 It is clear how far this doctrine is rchated to, and how far divergent from, that of Leibnitz. In keenness of conception the Kantian theory is unquestionably as much superior to the Leibnitzian as it is inferior to it in inÜuence upon general investigation. Yet it may be that, in the development of his first principle, Kant brought out more prominently the fact that mechanism, as well as design, is thus tinged with subjective ele- ments ; also, that every advance in the mechanical con- ception, so far from repi'essing, rather demands the teleological conception. For, with every advance in that kind of knowledge, the chasm between universal and particular, possible and actual, becomes greater, and so the connection which the idea of design offers be- comes all the more necessary. The successors of Kant attempted to go beyond the presuppositions of the Kantian doctrine. The Con- structive philosophers tried to prove that what they hypotheticall}^ assumed as an intelligence which knows by intuition actually existed. The scientists, however, endeavored to dislodge the concept of design from the realm of organic life which had been adjudicated to it, and, after many vain at- tempts, they succeeded, at any rate, in advancing one step by the doctrine of Darwin, according to which it seemed possible to understand the adaptation appa- rent in the world without having recourse to the gen- eral principle of design. The maxim of Leibnitz — to explain everything by means of the smallest amount of force — could be fully realized here, as Darwin ex- pressly appeals to the lex minimi formulated by Mau- pertius ; yet this maxim was now freed from its ori- ginal connection with a teleological conception of the world. But, after the doctrine of design is thus ban- 210 MODERN PniLOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. islied from the natural sciences, we lose all interest in its pliilosopliical appKcation, and so it seems ulti- mately to be given up, and the supporters of teleol- ogy are compelled to see themselves driven out from modern discussion in company with the supporters of astrology. Perhaps this historical discussion may serve to mod- erate this " teleophobia " ridiculed by K. E. von Baer. It is especially necessary that those who oppose teleol- ogy should deal with its scientific forms, and should not waste their attacks uj)on forms which have never kept up with the advance of the investigation. The consid- eration of the more important forms, which the philo- sophical doctrine of design has assumed, shows us espe- cially its complete distinction from all the theories held in popular thought. There has been no assertion of any relation to specifically human interests. Design has been defended, not as the peculiar property of par- ticular realms of its application, but as including the whole of nature and the world. Mechanism, as the form of events, has been everywhere presupposed and recognized ; * and the discussion of design has been undertaken purely in the interests of a causal compre- hension of the world. And, indeed, what was thus de- fended was not a material design, lying somewhere out- side of the world, but only the form of conformity to design found within the world, and defended in the interests of a systematic monistic cosmology. The par- ticular element which design was supposed to provide for this end differed, of course, according to the gen- eral theory ; but the fact that even the most critical * Mechanism can, in general, be opposed to the doctrine of design only so far as the latter presupposes that every event is ultimately to be conceived under the causal relation. TELEOLOGY. 2 1 1 thinkers believed that they must reduce again to unity the workl which had been analyzed in their investiga- tion, and that, in this endeavor, they all had recourse to design, should make it evident to us that the question here is not simply one of individual mistakes. This leads, moreover, to such a result that design stands everywhere in a close causal connection with the distinctive feature in the whole cosmology. Even a certain connection of development could be found to be manifested in the fact that the earlier forms of the doctrine are not wholly rejected by the later, but are only degraded to the position of subjective maxims. What Aristotle used as really valid, Leibnitz would defend as valuable in its suggestions ; and what Leib- nitz himself asserted is maintained, in their own way, by Kant, and even by those who oppose design alto- gether. We easily see, from all this, how many difficulties and doubts such a philosophical doctrine of design has to contend against. It has to suffer, from the outset in the discussion, from the fact that it can be justified, not by any special topical consideration, but only by a sys- tematic cosmology. If we approach it as an isolated problem, its principal elements can not be rendered valid, and every positive assertion must be regarded as arbitrary.* Yet, without treating the subject specifically, the use and the meaning of the concept can be assailed. The doctrine of design is employed in the theory of the unity of the world ; but is not this theory itself in the highest degree problematical, and incapable of being justified ? And with what right is a concept, which * Accordingly design, in its leading features, is not a scientific, but a philosophical problem. 2r2 MODERN PniLOSOrHICAL CONCEPTS. is valid only within a narrow sphere, extended beyond that sphere into the universe? However worthy of consideration such donbts may be, we can allow them to be ultimately decisive for us only when we misunder- stand the distinctive peculiarity of our judgment and of all our primary concepts, and emphasize one point only when the whole mental action should be considered. In the formation of our ultimate concepts, we must every- where start out from ourselves ; the only question is to form a connection with something essential in our nature. But even such a significance in design is disputed. In our own life, as well, it seems to be something inci- dental, derived, subjected to the power of reflection. Yet the mistake in this can be easily pointed out. The special meaning of conscious design is substituted for the form of the activity of design itself. The latter alone concerns us here. Thus regarded, design does not arise simply incidentally in our life, so that in some way it is a product of the reflective activity ; but the possi- bility of reflection itself presupposes design. And, how- ever men may be mistaken in their use of it in the sphere of reflection, still the decisive facts are that they can form designs in general, and that they can think and act under the form of design far beyond the limits of all reflection. Then, in the use of the concept outside of the realm with which we are best acquainted, the dilemma arises that we either give an anthropomorphic form to the idea of the world, or that, by abstract comprehension, we deprive the concept more and more of meaning. Yet we might ask at what point of philosophic investi- gation one believes that he can escape this dilemma. Though our concepts of the universe ever remain in- TELEOLOÜY. 213 adequate, ßhall and can we for tliat reason give u]) investie^ation ? A peculiar difficulty, then, is involved in the em- ployment of design, from the fact that it makes use of an idea of the reason which rises above all phenomena, since it was undertaken in the interest of a monistic connection of phenomena in the world ; but the world is not, by any means, given to us as a unit and a whole. Yet this question, too, becomes at once part of a wider one, because we are concerned here, ultimately, with the decisive problem of the whole doctrine of knowl- edge — with the relation of thought to the world, and with the meaning and the significance of the activity of thought. According to its relation to this problem, the use of the principle of design must appear either an arbitrary fancy or a duty. Yet to decide between these alternatives is not a matter so perfectly simple, espe- cially if we bear in mind the fact that even a negative answer is still an answer. Even if we should decide to make use of design, then, too, we must not forget that it can not give us a completely exhaustive conception of the problem, but can only serve, by means of the concept of the activity of design, to bring us in some measure nearer to fundamental relations which are oth- erwise incomprehensible. But, even if we can approach a truth only mediately, still we should not question the fundamental principle involved, and we should not re- ject the means employed if they are of real service to that approximation. Other difficulties are added to all these, and coinpli- cate the question more and more. And yet, without any regard to what we have positively attained in the contest, the problem is valuable and significant to us, because it shows us the incompleteness and insufficiency 214: MODERN PHILOSOPH IC AL CONCEPTS. of the theories with which we so easily round off our ideas of the world. To whatever Hmitations and em- barrassments our thought and endeavor lead us, the process can not be regarded as something unimportant. For there is a value to us not only in those judgments which add something new to our knowledge, but also in those which teach us more rightly to value our possessions, and which open to us an outlook into the universe. CULTUEE. Uaiöeia fiev ovv (j)ipEi Kai viktjv^ v'lktj o'eviore aTraidevotav. — Plato. As tlie concept of culture belongs far more to com- mon life than to any special science, tlie expression was in general use long before it found an exact definition in pliilosoplij. In the latter part of the ancient era, as from the time of the Kenaissance, the phrase ciiltura animi was often used, and the phrase was until recently intei-preted far more figuratively than it is now. Bacon first attempted to insert the concept in a philosophical system, when, in ethics, he contrasted with the deter- mination of the highest good the investigation of the way in which the mind is led to it, and called this pro- cess culture, the " georgics " of the mind.* Although culture is here treated as a part of ethics, i/ it assumed, later, an independent coordinate position, so that it becomes necessary to determine more precise- ly their mutual relations. In German philosophy there are two antagonistic principles, and, again, it is Kant who brings out the distinction the most shai-ply. For, when he understands by culture the " production in a rational being of an ability to accomplish its desired * See " De Augm, Scient.," vii. chap. 1 : *' Partiemur igitur ethicam in doctrinas principales duas ; alteram de exemplari sive imacrine boni, alteram de regimine et cultura animi, quam ctiam partem georgica animi appellare consucvimus. Ilia naturam boni dcscribit, hioc regulaa de animo ad illas conformando procscribit." See chap. 3. 216 MODERN rillLOSOPmCAL CONCEPTS. aims in general (consequently in its freedom)," lie leaves the settlement of the aim itself entirely an open ques- tion, and culture and ethics become distinct. Fichte, on the other hand, defended their identity. When he included the ethical problem under the eleva- tion of the mind to control over all events, and closely united form and import in the concept of freedom, it became possible for him to subordinate to culture the entire content of life. He makes culture (vi. 80) the " exercise of all one's powers in the design of complete freedom, of complete independence of everything which is not ourselves, our pure selves." But he includes all other ]3roblems in this, so that " nothing in the world of sense, none of our impulses, actions, or passions, con- sidered as phenomena, have any value, except in so far as they affect our culture." Religion, science, and vir- tue are expressly reckoned as the higher aims of the cultured reason (vii. 16G) ; culture also creates the po- litical aim (vii. 146), so that the state which the philoso- pher defends can be called a culture state.* The modern estimate of culture thus dates back primarily to Fichte, and he gave typical expression to the one principle which lies at the basis of the whole modern theory — the principle that the ultimate jDrob- lem of the life of the individual and of the mass con- sists in this, that all the forces given to man should be * This concept is opposed to the comprehension of the state as only a *' juridical institution." But at first he drew a contrast between the cul- ture state and the national state (vii. 212). "What is, then, the Father- land of the truly educated Christian European ? In general, it is Europe ; in particular, it is, in every age, that state in Europe which is the most highly cultured." Fichte learned, later, to place a higher value upon what is national, although it was always of value to him (this is brought out also in his " Reden an die deutsche Nation ") only as an expression of something common to mankind. CULTURE. 217 fully developed, sliould be increased infinitely, until they attain power over nature, over the life of man, over the world, and then arrive at the pleasures in ex- istence which arise therefrom. The distinctive peculi- arity of modern life consists in the fact that this is pre- sented as the essential and comprehensive problem, and that all special aims are made subordinate to it. To the ancient world, also, the development of power was considered important and essential ; what was dormant in man should be awakened to living ac- tivity ; what was formless should receive form. But it was supposed, at least in the highest attainment of Grecian thought, that the development was always di- rected to a goal fixed by nature, and from the beginning was controlled by regulations which referred to this goal. Greek philosophers never raised the question of an infinite advance, of an unchaining of forces, with no determination of their tendencies. Education, which with them is devoted to supplementing and supporting nature, " is, consequently, conducted from the beginning with a zealous care for the upholding and management of the activity of the soul : all powers are judged to be useless which are not subordinated to valuable aims.f But, in general, all development, as simply an endeavor, forms a mere preliminary to an activity which is com- pleted in itself and externally manifested ; this gives both the goal and the measure of the development. All this is true of the life of the mass as well as of the individual. With the aggregate, also, not every power should be developed, but only those which can * Sec " Arist, PoHt.," ISoY a, 1 : ttuo-o tc'x»''? koI TraiSeia rh TrpoaXfliroy ßouXiTai rrfs (pJcreus avairXripovv. f See Plato's " Republic," vi. 491, et seq. ; Aristotle's " Pulitics," L, chap. 2. 218 MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL COXCEPTS. arrive at a completed activity of life, so that, under the given relations, there is only a very small part of man- kind which lives itself out fully, and attains the plea- sures of existence which spring therefrom. The advance of mankind does not go on infinitely, but moves toward fixed goals, then to give place to a retrograde movement. The infinite in life and in doctrine signified the endless and indefinite ; but this was regarded as something un- desirable, in view of the comprehensive concept of the value of order. This whole theory was endangered in the decline of ancient thought, by the w^eakening of the belief in real goals in the world which surrounds us, and, consequent- ly, the development assumed a more formal character. Although we, perhaps, might call culture the defective way of conducting life to which this theory led, still it lacked that element which gives its most decisive sig- nificance to modem culture, the power of comprehend- ing all the relations of life and of striving after a reno- vation of the entire condition of the world. In Christianity the purpose of desire and action is incomparably more important than the power devel- oped by it or its actual execution. Innumerable utter- ances of Church fathers would admit of the interpreta- tion that they were opposed to the development of cul- ture. Yet their real wish was to make prominent the superiority of the ethical element, and to justify the withdrawal of attention from the more external activi- ties to the intrinsic nature of man's character. It was often the most comprehensive and critical investiga- tors who believed that they could not degrade deeply enough all that pertains to the simj^le improvement of powers, as contrasted with their ethico-religious use. In such utterances, too, the peculiar kind of intrinsi- CULTURE. 210 < cally empty and decaying culture wliich then existed can not escape notice. Yet, more than all this, Tve shoukl notice that Chris- tianity is essentially connected with the problem of cul- ture, in that it presupposes an attempt to exercise every power in order that each might assume its own position. Only when man has done his utmost in the struggle after truth and fortune, and is moved to his innermost deptlis, and becomes conscious of impassable barriers, can the peculiar nature of Christianity be fully under- stood and justified. Wherever the element of culture is restrained and esteemed of little value, there, along with its essentially peculiar nature, the inner truth of Christianity will be threatened. But, since the primary presupposition of culture was not made an integral part of the Christian system, the further development of that system was exposed to the danger of laying aside the element of culture, or of recognizing it only so far as it immediately served its own ends. There has been practically, in the course of its history, no recognition of the principles of the problem of culture, and no in- trinsic adaptation of it to Christianity. Culture has, as a whole, remained a separate province by the side of Christianity ; and an indifference to all questions which lie outside of the "specifically" religious sphere has been brought to light, and even paraded on the part of the supporters of a strictly dogmatic idea of culture — an indifference which shows the unfitness of this princi- ple to properly treat and estimate the whole circle of human interests. Modem thought has assumed a certain form of op- position to this principle of Christianity. There has been an immeasurable extension of the sphere of life. It is not simply this or that particular aim which is al- 220 MODERN PniLOSOPniCAL CONCEPTS. lowed to lay claim to all action, but whatever can be- come a question of human activity is to be taken up and developed. It is not a definite quality which gives a decided value to action, but the highest task is the action itself — the development of power, the increase of vital activity. Living itself is the aim of life. No- thing can remain quiet and established ; and, if it is brought to its complete effect, its result becomes at once the starting-point of a new development ; new faculties are ever formed by the advance, so that the pressure goes further and further toward the infinite. Accordingly, modern life is characterized by its rest- lessness ; the glance is ever directed toward the future ; the desire is never satisfied, so that there is no longer any place for the ancient concept of an activity which finds rest in itself — the Aristotelian " energy." This definition of life is not originally supposed to contradict the others, but to include them all. What- ever of power was offered for the attainment of any particular aim should be recognized and accepted, on the condition that it subordinate itself to the decisive struggle after completeness of life. But in this way the ancient principle receives an essentially new significance, as becomes particularly prominent in the problems of ethics. The question here is not of an inner change, a " regeneration." But perfection {se perfectionner) becomes the aim ; yet this perfection is only the outcome of Being itself.* When tlie other questions also are included in this way under the one struggle for completeness of life, everything * AH the leading thinkers of modern times identify perfcctio and re- aUtas, and Leibnitz says, still more definitely, perfcctio nihil aliud quam essentia; quantitas (147 b). But, in general, all definitions of value aro reduced to that of force. CULTURE. 221 should be used, nothing thrown away as useless. And, since the aroused activity finds its value not so much in its external production as in the inner exertion of pow- er, the deepest depths must be penetrated, and every- thing motionless must be brought to life and motion. Externally and internally as well, the striving, cre- ative mind has an infinity before it ; not only does it produce a whole world from itself, but it ever takes it back again into itself, so that the external becomes the internal, and the mind above all increases its own supe- riority over external things. If, in such a connection, the mind forms, according to the marked expression of ^NTicolaus Cusanus, a " universal seed " which unfolds itself into the world, then uj)on its development depend meaning and fortune for the life of the individual as of the whole. "We have to think even of the universe, in this connection, as progressing infinitely.^ But, however we may include all particular devel- opments in this universal one, and regard the question of culture as absolutely universal, still, as a matter of fact, there are always definite conditions by which the * Leibnitz, " German "Writings," ii. 36 : " The perfection of crea- tures, and so of ourselves, consists in an unimpeded vigorous impulse to new and ever new perfections." Wolff and his school defined the highest good as pcrpctims sive non impcditus ad majores pcrfcdiones pro- ffrcssus. The concept of progress appears throughout ancient thought. Plato and Aristotle have for it the expressions iiriSoffis and iiriBiSSyai ; but later the Stoic irpoKo-jr-n became far more prominent, atid we find it used (as in Polybius) in the same sense in which we now use the fortschritl. The idea of a progress toward the infinite was suggested by the Xeo-Plato- nics and Mystics, but has been fully carried out only in modem philosophy, and there first by Xicolaus Cusanus, This idea reached its culmination in Leibnitz (150 a): "In cumulum etiam pulchvitudinis perfectionisque universalis operum divinorum progressus quidam perpetuus liberrimusque totius universi est agnoscendus, ita ut ad majorem semper cultum pro- cedat," et seq. The expression fortschritt (progress) seems to have be- come a fixed term in the latter part of the last century. 222 MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. activity is controlled, and definite directions in which it moves. Our life is subjected to historico-psycliical in- fluences which specify aims and endeavors, so that there can no more be a culture than a universal religion with- out detailed boundaries. Hence modern culture, in the comprehensive sense, occupies a peculiar position, which must be recognized and tested before we can venture to pass judgment upon its value. "We notice particularly here the conscious refusal to admit anything transcendent. The development of power is supposed to fall wholly within and to pene- trate this world. Whether the world be regarded as a whole formed by the reason or as a collection of phe- nomena, the principle is the same, that all action refers to it and proceeds within it. "What is not attained here is, in general, not attained at all, and what is not made use of here is absolutely lost. All demands of the rea- son must be met here, all obstructions removed, all opposition overcome. A contradiction, a difference, between reason and reality, can nowhere be admitted. From all this it becomes a necessary principle that all power should be exerted at every moment ; and thus modern culture receives a radically changed character, a fact of which its leading advocates have been clearly conscious. But intelligence serves as the peculiar substratum of life and development. When modern psychology seeks to reduce all mental events to j)rocesses of knowl- edge,* when practical philosophy makes happiness and capacity dependent upon knowledge, and metaphysics seeks to produce the whole world out of thought, these scientific doctrines only express the common conviction * Nicolaus Cusanus says, i. 91 b : " Ego mentcm intcllectum esse af- tiimo." CULTURE. 223 of mankind. This conviction also makes knowledge the source of all power and all good ; ignorance, on the contrary, is held to be the source of weakness and evil. Knowledge gives us control over nature, so that we can bring all its forces into our service, and thus immeasurably increase our own power. But it gives us no less power over ourselves and our race, whose des- tiny can be influenced by us by reason of our insight into its controllino^ laws. If, in view of all this, increase of knowledge is to be considered the task and acquisition of life, the progress in which we believe is more exactly defined as an intellectual one.* Moreover, knowledge has a wholly different nature and position in modem life from what it had in earher times. It is not a quiet intuition of the world, a ^ewpelvy but a transformation of that intuition, in order to survey that world within its own sphere of power. The proposition that knowledge is power is now asserted so that knowledge and power are considered synonymous. The demand that theory and practice be closely united is found in all the systems since the sixteenth century, and is extended more and more until it claims that knowledge and life shall coin- cide. Thus a new place is made for science in the his- torical development. Hegers statement that the owl of Minerva first begins its flight in the dark may be en- tirely appropriate as applied to ancient thought ; in our own day science carries the torch before it. AVhat has been unconsciously formed in history is not conceived as supplementary and thus justified before the reason, but science sets up its aims of itself, and then demands that their execution follow in actual life. * See Nicolaus Cusanus (ii, 188 a): "Posse semper plus et plus in- telllgerc sine fine, est similitudo aetemaD sapicntiie." 224 MODERN PniLOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. But all demands which arise from the idea of cul- ture receive peculiar importance from the fact that they are made valid, to a full and uniform extent, for every individual. The question in modern life is not that of a simple general process to which the individ- ual is annexed bodily as a member or element ; but, just as in the theoretical cosmology we have seen the anti- thesis of particular and universal overcome by the con- cept of law, so here, practically, the individual is not something under or in the whole ; special existences are rather, to use Leibnitz's celebrated expression, partes totales. Each one carries in itself the whole world, since it forms a wholly rational power which extends itself infinitely. The historical development thus works itself out, not above, but in the individuals. In every individual the entire world-process goes on, so that we have an infinite number of infinite worlds. This the- ory is conditioned upon the principle of the essential similarity of all individuals, so that this, too, is de- fended by scientific thinkers.* J^o less necessary is the condition that the development of the individual must correspond to that of the universe, and that the latter, with all its empirical imperfection, still always finds it- self on the right path. ]N'o proposition is more hostile to the modern idea of culture than the doctrine of a radical evil. If these conditions be granted, we look out upon immense problems extending far beyond the field of vision. If the individual be the only object endowed * Doscartcs, perhaps, expresses most simply the general principle when he says (in the beginning of the Method) : " Eationcm quod attinet, quia per illara solam homines sumus, »qualcra in omnibus esse facile credo." The reason adduced here is also the basis of Fichtc's doctrine of the similarity of everything " which has the human face." CULTURE. 225 with life, we must assign to liim the entire result of culture, and, above all, must make all the fruit of intel- lectual labor attainable to him. Kothing more can be said of an isolated position of prominent individual thinkers and an esoteric kind of knowledge : it is ra- ther our duty to carry the light from the heights into the valleys, and to spread abroad everywhere enlighten- ment and education.* It is not necessary to prove exhaustively how much mankind is indebted to this general idea of culture, how the whole method of life has been changed by it, how all our thought and feeling have been determined by it, so that even those who would oppose it every- where betray its influence, and insensibly modify the ancient theory which they try to defend. But, were we to call attention to the most prominent points illustra- tive of this, the increase of the power of man over na- ture and the world and the deliverance and elevation of the individual would be most conspicuous. A^ould these advantages be seriously given up by those who hardly ever speak of modern culture except to find fault with it ? And yet, can it be denied that the execution and realization of its leading principles ha\e led to ever deeper problems, complications — even catastrophes, and that even now, however exaggerated many of the fears regarding the immediate present may be, we are in a crisis which embraces the whole world of culture ? The danger to modern culture arose from an intrinsic con- tradiction^ — the relation of what we might call the im- agined individual of the ideal world to the empirical * The expression hildung (traiuing) as used here is comparatively recent ; only since the middle of the last century has it been transferred from physical to mental development. 226 MODERN PEILOSOPIIICAL CONCEPTS. individual of the phenomenal world. Since the former could not be raised too high, the chasm became ever greater, until the bridge parted, and the empirical indi- vidual then demanded his own share, and began to esti- mate the advantage which the modern definition of life brings to himself. If the question were put in this form, the answer would come promptly. The modern idea of culture, with its immeasurable undertakings, demands both a combination of many forces in common action and an activity which pervades all races and times ; whatever of that the temporary life of the individual can com- prehend disappears in comparison with the whole, and diminishes in proportion to the advance of the whole. And this, indeed, is especially true in view of a prepon- derantly intellectual definition of the problem of life, while no great use can be made of the means which are offered as a remedy. If, for example, in the completed results something is to be bestowed upon the individual which he can not intrinsically live out, it is evident that the very thing is thus lost which in our day constitutes the value of knowledge — its pervasive and transforming power. But if the subjective understanding of the em- pirical individual would lay claim to the rights belong- ing to the general reason, and would refer everything to the passing moment and to what is serviceable to itself, then culture itself is essentially destroyed, together with its general work and its historical foundations. This danger was very evident in Rousseau ; it increased as the idealistic tendency, wliich regarded man as a par- ticipant in an intelligil:>le world, was repressed ; and, with all which it involves, it remains concealed from sight only because the empirical individual at first, as a result of its historical development, has its own king- CULTURE. \ • 2ÖT J dorn in interests and feelings of a general nature, which it judges to be adapted to itself. But, beyond this, the faith in the omnipotence of the intellectual has suflered many severe shocks. Dis- regarding the difficulties which oppose point for point the scientific application of its fundamental principle, we find that in popular thought doubt and distrust continually increase, however much the ancient thesis may be externally maintained. The doctrine, that by advance in " education " all the wounds of mankind can be healed, is no longer held in the confident faith of the day. One often attempts, to be sure, to lay all the blame upon semi-education, and, as this is abused, to heap praises upon true knowledge ; but we thus estab- lish at the outset a contrast which not only is far removed from but exactly contradicts the fundamental tendencies of our own day ;* since the question at once arises, what is the source of this semi-education of the extent of which other times knew nothing ? Yet by all this the further question would be sug- gested, whether it is not in the imperfect intellectualistic definition of life itself that we find the reason for the mistake, by which doubt is naturally directed not against knowledge in itself, but only against that exclusive con- trol given to it which keeps in the background all other elements. All this leads to immense thought-conflicts, which are all the more irrepressible and fatal the more our * Periods of active thought have ever the peculiarity of scizinp upon and making prominent the imperfect side of an idea. The sharp distinc- tion between a " true " and a " false " interpretation already shows the beginning of a crisis ; as, in general, this distinction often only conceals the decline or the surrender of the original conviction. One is usually on the verge of an inconsistency when he insists so zealously upon the '* true " form of a principle. 11 228 MODERN PHILOSOPIIICAL CONCEPTS. day insists upon passing judgment upon everything there is in the world which surrounds us. Since every- thing comes under a single series of events, and this serves as ultimately definitive, every gap must become a defect, every contrast a contradiction. Yet the more the power of the idea of culture is prejudiced by such prominence of defects and contra- dictions, so much the more increases the danger of a compression of the original sphere of life, the danger that some of the heterogeneous elements which were at first included in that sphere might later be set off as foreign, and even hostile. Particularly, both at the out- set and throughout the discussion as well, should mind and nature find equal recognition, as in science both speculative and inductive tendencies have worked to- gether. In the contact and mutual growth of both tendencies is found bv no means the least cause of the vigorous development of j)Ower in modern times; so that this must suffer a sudden decline as soon as either of these tendencies is repressed in thought or in life. At the time when thought-power is bold, man feels strong enough to take up into his own life's plan the results of earlier developments. Perhaps in olden times, in spite of the lack of exact knowledge, men stood in a closer relation to each other than we do to- day ; but, in any case, they wished to appropriate to themselves the substance of Christianity, and to use it to supplement and to deepen life. We can call it only an unworthy accusation to explain, as a mere regard for the ruling power, the position in reference to Chris- tianity occupied by men like Spinoza, Locke, Leibnitz, instead of seeking a deeper reason for it — a reason which led thinkers of all schools, amid all the differ- CULTURE. 229 ences of their interpretation of Christianity, to be un- willing to give it lip, and to make the greatest effort to unite it closely with modern ideas. But, while there was thus a pressure to extend the narrow circle as far as possible, and to recognize in everything foreign some relation based on the unity of reason, the opposite tendency soon developed itself — the tendency to return to the specific, and so to what was contradictory of this. The development of culture was more and more limited in its import with every exter- nal extension, and, in contrast with the other fomis of life, assumed that negative character which in the realm of mind, by its limitation of the horizon, finally injures its supporter far more than do its active opponents. This new turn of affairs was unquestionably occa- sioned, not by the arbitrariness or the malice of indiWd- uals, but by an inner necessity. But for this very reason it is a fact of the greatest importance, that the idea of culture has narrowed more and more, and, what is worse, has become more superficial. For, the more it was set off by itself, the more its contradictions disap- peared, so much the less opportunity was there to pene- trate its depths and to solve the problem by introver- sion. How infinitely broader, freer, and deeper is the definition which a man like Leibnitz has given to the problem and meaning of culture than we find to-day in its most famous advocates ! AVe often reproach other ages for narrowness and one-sidedness, and not without reason ; but with the narrowness was not rarely united a grand depth of life ; and is it not worse than any kind of limitation to have a narrowness of treatment which can be comprehensive only because it understands no- thing of the inner nature of life ? It is unavoidable that such a state of affaii-s, which 230 MODERN PniLOSOPHICAL COXCEPTS. endangers the acquisitions of centuries of conflict, should excite a doubt concerning the principle of culture it- self ; that this principle should be blamed for all the imj^rojDrieties and deteriorations of times and of individ- uals ; that every specific development should be attrib- uted to the conception itself ; and that the permanent limits and imperfections of human life should be re- duced to an essential and irresistible tendency to a nar- rowness of content in the concept of culture. In view of such unjust and often paltry attacks, it becomes a question, how we shall defend both the significance of culture and the original aims of modern thought. Wher- ever the limits of culture in general and of modern culture in particular may lie, no exhaustive development of life and the world is possible without that develop- ment of power in which modem times find their goal, without a tendency of the individual toward the uni- verse in all the fullness of its import. The ethical prin- ciple, too, which is not rarely opposed to culture, can be advanced only in the general life of mankind where action finds a rich and universal significance, in which the individual is apprehended in his whole being, is aroused in his inner nature, and is raised to active work beyond himself. Where the development of power is not attempted, everything which can come down to man remains for him something external, and the most complete life becomes paralyzed when it is not given up to the exertion of a living energy. mDIYIDUALITY. " L'individualite enveloppe I'infini." — Leibnitz. In our discussion of the principle of individuality we take the liberty, as before, of glancing first at the history of the word and the concept. Individuus was used from the time of Cicero as the translation of Aris- totle's dSialperof;, or of the arofio^ of Democritus, so that it serves to denote that which can not be further dissected.* DlviduiiSy from the beginning, was em- ployed as its opposite. This was its chief meaning in the middle ages.f But at the end of the ancient era that signification of the term began to come into vogue which later became controlling. Developing the con- cept of Porphyry, Boethius calls individumn the single object as unique ; \ and this usage was retained in the * See Seneca, *' De Provid.," 5 : " Quoedam separari a quibusdam non possunt, coha;rent, individua sunt." Notker translates individuus by " unspaltir/." f Hence we must take care not to interpret the expressions of the middle ages strictly in the modern sense. t See "Com. on Porphyry" (ed. Basil. 1570, p. 65): "Individuum autum pluribus dicitur modis. Dicitur Individuum quod omnino secari non potest, ut unitas vel mens ; dicitur Individuum quod ob soliditatcra dividi nequit, ut adamas ; dicitur individuum cujus pra?dicatio in reliqua similia non convenit, ut Socrates ; nam cum illi sunt caeteri homines similes, non convenit proprietas et prajdicatio Socrates in coetcris, ergo ab iis quae de uno tantum prsedicantur genus differt, eo quod de pluribus pra?dicetur." Prantl quotes from Porphyry (i. 629) : 6.roiia X^yerai to. Toiavra, un i^ 232 MODERN PUILOSOPUICAL CONCEPTS. logico-metaplijsical discussions of the middle ages, and was gradually extended until it came into wider and general employment through Leibnitz. The concept which lies beneath the term was first formulated and defended by the Stoics ; but the EjdIcu- reans and Skeptics took it up at once, each, in fact, to make use of it for their own ends. With the Stoics the doctrine of the individual distinction of all beings is an integral part of a systematic cosmology. From the idea of the perfection of the universe arose the propo- sition that each single object is distinct, and that every one contributes something peculiar and indispensable to the whole. It was in accordance with their w^hole style that they should exert themselves to the utmost to give the sharpest possible expression to this principle ; no two hairs, no two leaves, to say nothing of two living beings, are to be considered as alike.* The Epicureans, on the other hand, defended the significance of the individual in order to justify the in- dependence of each one, while the Skeptics used the idioT-fiTui/ (Tvv(crTT)iuv '^Kaffrov, wv rh a^poia-fxa ovk ai^ eV aAXov Tiv6s irore rh avrh yivono twv Kara /xepos, and, in the same place, from Boethius : *' Incommunieabilis Platonis ilia proprietas Platonitas appelletur." now- little change was made in this definition in the lapse of time is shown by the definition given by Jacob Thomasius, the teacher of Leibnitz : " In- dividuum est quod constat ex proprietatibus quanim collectio numquam in alio eadem esse potest." Lidividualis appeared in the first half of the twelfth century (Prantl, ii. 129, 131, 141) ; individualitas is found in Avicenna (translation) : it was adopted into modern usage especially by Leibnitz. * See Cicero, "Acad.," qufrst. ii. : *' Dicis nihil esse idem quod sit aliud, Btoicum est quidcm ncc adraodum credibile, nullum esse pilum omnibus rebus talem, qualis sit pilus alius, nullum granum," etc. Sene- ca, "Ep.," 113, 15 : "Nullum animal alteri par est, circumspice omnium corpora : nulli non et color proprius est ct figura sua et magnitude." 10: "Tot fecit genera foliorum : nullum non sua proprietate signatum." Pliny, " Nat. Hist.," lib. vii. INDIVIDUALITY. 233 concept of an individual distinction (mental and ma- terial) as a weapon against tlie possibility of any univer- sally valid knowledge. In its interpretation of this principle, the Neo-Pla- tonic school goes decidedly further. Xot only does Plotinus base the pecuharity of individual existence on the diversity of the creative acts of reason (and this in a method which transcends all experience), and thus clear the way for the new forms of the doctrine,"*^ but, f lu'ther, it is asserted by him, and still more by his fol- lowers, that every individual in a peculiar manner con- tains intrinsically the whole world, and so that it is the problem of life to fully develop what is thus intrinsi- cally given. The ancient doctrine, that the little world is an image of the greater, thus receives definite mean- ing and increased imjDortance.t The middle ages gave to the whole question a predominantly logico-metaphysical interpretation. The most important discussions here are those of Duns Sco- tus upon the relation of the universal to the particular, and of the necessary to the contingent ; and the way * See Plotinus, 540. f The doctrine that everything is contained in everything else, '^vith an expressed limitation to the physical world, was, as is well known, first advanced by Anaxagoras, while the idea that the particular living being, especially the human, offers an image of the universal originated in the Platonic philosophy. The contrast of the fx4yas SiaKoa-nos and ßiKphs BiaKoa/jLos is found as a title in the writings of Democritus ; see, further, Aristotle, '* Phys." 252, h 2i: el 5'eV C<^w roxno Swarhu yevea^ai ri KuXvei rh avTh (Tvjxßrivai K(xi Kara to iruu ; et yap iu jxiKpy KSff/xf^ yli/€Tai, Kcd iv /ti^yaAo'. Plotinus carries the Platonic doctrine further (see 284 G): eTTt KoX TToWa 1] ipvxh foJ Travra Kcä to. 6.vo} koL to. k6.to) a5 fJ-^XP^ TraCTjs ((^"iS Koi iayXv eKaa-ro^ kSt/jlos yorjTSs) and adds the definition of the individual diversity, which was then further defended by Porphyry and Proclus ; sec Proclus ('* Cr." iii. 103): iraWa iu -iraa-iu. olKeius S'tv (KdcTTCf). The word microcosm {fj.iKp6KO(Tfj.os) was first coined after the development of the concept, and at a much later date. 234 MODERN PUILOSOPniCAL CONCEPTS. ill which the independence and positivity of the latter were defended undoubtedly exerted a direct influence upon the whole system of Leibnitz. Modern thought, through Xicolaus Cusaitus, brings the concept of individuality at once to the front. Al- though he is in general allied with the Neo-Platonics, yet he unquestionably makes important improvements and changes in their doctrines. The concept of the infinite development of the individual becomes far more prominent, and its independence and intrinsic nature are more clearly recognized.* But, then, the principle of individual peculiarity receives with its changed basis a new form. Separate existences are distinct, because if they were alike they would simply coincide — a dem- onstration which is justified only in the construction of a cosmology wdiich comprehends all existence as con- ceivable in thought."!' But when the whole in which the individual stands is finally considered as something gradually ascending, each individual is regarded as unique and as representing nothing else, and yet at the same time as referring to the others and to the whole, inasmuch as the one grade can not exist without the others. * This is seen, for example, in the representation made of the mind as a living mirror of the universe, which figure may have been borrowed from Eckhart, 326, 39: "Als in einem spicgel widerschinet manigcrleie bilde, were aber in dem Spiegel ein ouge, daz mühte alliu diu bilde sehen als einen widerwurf siner gesihtc." See, also, 142, 26, et seq. That the individual loses itself in the whole was expressly denied by Nicolaus, i. 92, a : "Si in una camera multa) ardeant candelao et camera ab omnibus illuminetur, manet tamen lumen cujuslibct candelac distinctum a lumine alterius." f See i. 210 b: "Non possunt plura esse praecise jequalia, non enim tunc plura essent sed ipsum a>quale." The so-called principle of in- discerniblcs was thus first suggested by Nicolaus Cusanus, and not by Leibnitz. INDIVIDUALITY. 235 Giordano Bruno, who first employed tlie expression " monads " for individual unities as unities, constituted the transition to Leibnitz, in whom we find many valu- able suggestions on this subject. For Leibnitz was not deceived by the apparent significance of the forms under which objects are casually first apprehended. lie was original and ingenious in his consistent development and systematic construction of principles which by any other method of treatment had been left in isolation. He was equally original in his attempt to give the pre- cise definition, and at the same time the broadest pos- sible application, of the principle of individuality which was characteristic of his discussions of this subject.* From his earliest youth he defended this principle ;t he brought it into relation to all the more important problems, and used it in the solution of them, and thus very properly introduced it into the whole realm of scientific discussion. With him the concept passes from the school into common life, and, thus receiving a prominent place in thought, it became the object of those various contests which continue even in our day. J These scientific investigations are closely connected with, though not directly dej)endent upon, the general demand, that individuality be asserted in connection with the general life of the nation and the race. Long before the concept of the individual was philosophically * There is, of course, in all this much which is specifically new ; but, to bring this out and to properly estimate it, belongs rather to a strictly philosophical discussion. •j- As is well known, his first philosophical treatise is the " Disputatio Metaphysica de Principio Individui." :j: In their discussion of the concept, the later champions of individu- ality, like ITerbart, Schleierraacher, Schclling in his later writings, have not gone beyond Leibnitz, so that all discussion of the problem mu^t lead back to him. 23G MODERN nilLOSOPniCAL COXCEPTS. explained and justified among the Greeks, it had made its way into common life. The complete subordination and sacrifice of the individual expressed in Plato's idea of the state arose from his opposition to a tendency of the times which he considered pernicious, and so is characterized rather by moral energy and intensity of feeling than by the cpiet and simple resignation to the objective which we find in the great men of the pre- ceding periods. Aristotle tried to maintain a medium position by granting to the individual free scope and a certain recognition within the community.* The Stoics, as we have seen, wished to insure to the individual a place within the system of the world. But the popular thought, unconcerned with such replies and mediations of philosophy, went further and further in the estab- lishment of the rights of the individual, although in fact only so far as to give to it a power coordinate with that of the whole, not superior to or conflicting with it. The relation of the ancient state to Christianity shows most plainly what fixed limits were placed upon all this freedom of action ; yet, on the other hand, the principle of individuality was carried so far that even so mild a nature as Quintilian was compelled to oppose its exten- sion into education.f In the course of the centuries, parallel with the de- cline of universal principles as applied to the social re- lations, to the relation of the sexes, and the relation of * For his idea of the relation of the individual to the whole in the state, the following passage is especially significant ; " Pol.," 1263 b, 31 : Se7 fx(u yap chai ttcos fxtav Kot rT]v oIkIuu kuI ttjv -kSXiv, aW'ob irivTus. iart Hey yap cds ojk tarai irpoiovcra Tr6\is, tan h^cas tcrrai fx(v, iyyvs d'ouaa tov fi7] irSXis elvai tcrrai x^^P^v it6\is, uxrirep k&u el ris T7]p (ru/xcpuylav TrotiVetev 6/xo(pü>viav J) TOV pvBfxov ßdcriv fxlav. See, also, 1204 b, 17. f See " Instit. Orat.," ii. 8 : "An secundum sui quisque iugcnii natu- ram doccndus sit." INDIVIDUALITY. 237 man to nature, we find an increasing freedom granted to the inner life, and a greater prominence given to tlie feeling of individuality. Although such a tendency was powerful enough to unfold a new world to the individual life in personal dispositions and feelings, still it was not capable of remodeling the development of life as a whole. This was reserved for modern times, the pro- ductions of which are connected with the results of the decadence of ancient thought by many often invisible threads. It is no easy task to show the relation of Christianity to the problem of individuality, because it involves dif- ferent and conflicting elements. Viewed in connection with a cosmology which makes the ethico-religious ele- ment the sole meanino^ and desio^n of the world and of life, the events which occur in the experience of each individual must be, above all, the most important, and the individual must thus receive an immeasurably increased significance. The Church Fathers generally believed (in opposition to the ancient theory) that every individual is the object of divine care, for which reason the activity of the Church must be directed to each individual. The doctrine of the unlimited freedom of the will, generally held during the earlier centuries, by the form which it gave to action insured an indepen- dence to the individual ; and the distinctive feature of that doctrine was recognized in the idea of an organic union of individuals in a comprehensive whole.* On the other hand, the assumption of an absolute value in the individual was contradicted by the doctrine of eternal punishment, and we need hardly explain that, at that time, nothing was said of any rights of the indi- * All things considered, of the Church Fathers Origen has best estab- lished the principle of individuality. 238 MODERX ruiLOSorniCAL concepts. vidual as opposed to the general interests. As soon as the individual deviates from the general order he is considered as one who has gone astray, and is to be brought back to the truth, even though by coercion. The whole everywhere precedes the individual ; it com- municates itself to it as an objective power, demanding faith and obedience, so that all which occurs in the in- dividual is intelligible only by the appropriation of a meaning which is raised above the arbitrary judgment of any one Inan. 'No salvation is possible for the individ- ual, except as salvation for the whole has been and is an all-comprehensive fact, " that the opposition in itself has been removed constitutes the condition, the presup- position of the possibility that each subject should re- move it for himself " (Ilegel, xii. 228). Whether these two tendencies have been equally worked out is more than questionable ; we must rather answer negatively, because, as a matter of fact, the rec- ognition of the individual was ever more and more re- pressed. No one contributed more to this than Augus- tine, who, above all others, both in his whole idea of the world and of life, and in his personal appropriation of Christianity, made the fullest use of his own indi- viduality. To be sure there was no lack, in the middle ages, of a counter-tendency. Among individual thinkers, Abe- lard was especially prominent in defending, in life and in doctrine, the rights of the individual, and he made permanent additions to the discussion, especially by his theories of conscience and personal disposition. More- over, as a general tendency, the influence of the Mystic was felt, who could not insist, as he did, upon the sub- jective nature of the religious life, without applying the whole process of life far more directly to the individ- INDIVIDUALITV. 039 ual."*^ But it was reserved for the Refoniiatioil, and espe- cially for Luther, to recognize the religious life of the in- dividual person as the basis of Christianity as a whole, and so, as a matter of principle, to insure to the indi- vidual a complete independence. f Only we must not forget that the freedom which Luther so energetically demanded, he straggled after, not for mankind abso- lutely, but only for Christians, so that it has a fixed condition and a determinate content. An abstract and vague freedom finds no defender in Luther. Yet, on the other hand, for modern thought, indi- viduality and the individual freedom of man as man are the basis of the whole doctrine of life. Eveiy one is supposed to refer the whole world to his own inner nature, to receive and appropriate it to himself, and then to establish outside of himself what has been formed within. There are involved here a release from all limitations and an expansion of the sphere of life which essentially surpass the most extreme extension of the horizon of the world. As, in the conception of nature, after the destruction of the narrowing horizons, the field of vision opened without bounds, so here, too, * Eckhart says, characteristically (3, 6) : " Ez sprichet sanctus Aug:us- tinus, daz disiu fjeburt (nämlich Gottes in der Seele) iemer geschehe. So si aber in mir niht geschihct, was hilfet mich daz ? Aber daz si in mir geschehe, da lit ez allez an." So Luther (" De Libertate Christiana ") de- ^ sires, " ut non tantum sit Christus, sed tibi et mihi sit Christus." f His work " De Libertate Christiana " is especially to the point. Sec, further, " De Capt. Babyl. de Sacr. Bapt." : " Xeque papa nequc episcopus neque ullus hominum habet jus unius syllaba? constituendfc super Christi- anum hominem, nisi id fiat ejusdera consensu ; quicquid aliter fit, tyran- nico spiritu fit." " De Matrim." : " Quis dedit hominibus hanc potcs- tatem ? Este, fuerint sancti et pio zclo ducti, quid meam libcrtatem vexat aliena sanctitas ? Quid me captivat alicnus zelus ? Sit sanctus ct zelotes, quisquis volet et quantum libet, modo altcri non noceat et liber- tatem mihi non rapiat." 210 MODERN PIIILOSOrmCAL CONCEPTS. was shattered all that had confined man and his action to restricted circles ; here, too, every one was supposed to have the immeasurable as his task ; yet here the in- finity, in which, in the other case, the individual was lost, could be comprehended and experienced in the " universal seed-corn " of the rational being. Instead of one world, there exist worlds so numberless that the possible progress of the life of mankind is indefinitely extended. Hence it is not so much the element of extent, as it is that of depth, which distinguishes the new theory from the old. When the individual receives the world into itself, it reduces it to its own intrinsic and essential nature ; what is external is changed, animated, spirit- ualized ; mental life itself is thus filled out and strength- ened, so that the success of the one goes with that of the other, and they advance together in the unlimited progression. Depth has here no more a limit than breadth. Ko order of the phenomenal world can confine the individual as thus conceived. For, as the germ of the infinite, and the supporting as well as transforming power of the universe, it is as incomparably superior to every other fonnation, of whatever value, as is the in- finite to the finite, however developed. Neither State nor Church can exhaust the aims of the being which has immediately within itself the whole world of reason. Such combinations, instead of appearing as organisms which include the individual as a member, are rather formed from and supported by the individual as the point where the infinite and eternal enter into phenomena. If we seek for a form of coexistence, it can be found only in the society in which everything is reduced to the free, though not always intrinsically indefinite, will INDIVIDUALITY. 241 of the individuals. State and Church are now seen to be simply kinds of society.* The freedom of the individ- ual goes so far that it can not recognize any compulsory opposition. It has the law of its own life in itself, and produces from its own being the forms of its action, so that, just as in the legitimately ordered events in na- ture, the antithesis of the individual and the universal seems to be removed. But such an exaltation of the individual was origi- nally united with very definite conditions. Every in- dividual is regarded as a participant in an intelligible rational world, and it is only his relation to this which can justify the infinite value attributed to himself. It is, then, not the actual but the ideal individual — the in- dividual as an ideal concept — to which this principle is adapted. Yet, as such an ideal individual, it is not something ready-made and completed, but something which develops itself and advances infinitely ; not some- thing isolated and opposed to the world and humanity, but something which includes the world and humanity, and receives them into its own circle. If the individual ever lives only for itself, from its very nature it can not do this without at the same time living for the whole world ; and if it is its right, and, under some cir- cumstances, its duty, to place itself in opposition to all established order, this can happen only because it has a fixed position in the rational world, and because it is from this relation that its freedom is realized and direct- ed. It is not the reflective arbitrariness of the subjec- tive reason of the single man which controls life, but the law of the objective reason, the meaning of which coincides with the universe. Though such a theory may protect the principle of * This principle is brought out with special clearness by Locke. 2:1:2 MODERN nilLOSOPEICAL CONCEPTS. individualitj from tlie ordinary attacks made upon it, it undoubtedly involves in itself a difficult problem and a serious conflict of oj^inions, found in the practical dif- ference between the individual as he actually exists and the individual as thus idealized. In actual fact the in- dividual is something situated by the side of other things, dependent, limited, selfishly standing aside and shutting out the ideals of reason. Now, this empiri- cal individual is supposed to develop, broaden, improve itself ; and it is strictly held that what is apparently irrational is only a lower degree of what is rational, and that tliere is no such thing as a radical evil. But in any case the distinction exists at the outset, and what is empirical is undeniably a jDower in life. To lay stress on only one j)oint. How, in this view of it, is a coexis- tence of men according to rational princij^les to be made possible ? Can a system of social ethics, defended alike by ancient and by Christian thought, be maintained here ; and is there not danger that a systematic unity in human life and action will be destroyed by such a theory as this ? Moreover, in modern times, the contrast between the idealized and the actual individual has become greater than ever before. As the former is made prominent, the latter falls into the background. While in olden times it was possible for a single man, like Aristotle, to fathom all knowledge, in modern times even a Leibnitz must be contented to determine simj^ly outUnes, and to sketch distant views, and the share of the individual in the general possessions becomes con- tinually smaller. For, however rapid advance the in- dividual may make, the whole moves forward still more rapidly. Moreover, the technical control of man over nature, INDIVIDUALITY. 2-1.3 which is a distinguishing characteristic of our day, is obtained only by the fact tliat the individual takes his place as one member of a series, and, in his place, ac- complishes only his own work. AVhen Franklin calls man a '' tool-making animal," it is evident how far that presupposes the community of labor. For what more can the most distinguished individual do than in some single respects to take a few steps forward, thus pre- supposing and using all earlier productions ? In the business of a manufactory there appears a pecuharly tangible problem, which is common to the whole of modem life ; there are a danger and a necessity that the individual must consider himself as a part of a great machine, and give up all claim to the whole. However immeasurably the grand result may be advanced, we can not keep back the question, TTho, then, is profited by it in strictly mental culture ? In the development of social life, too, there has ap- peared an increasing dependence of the individual. In the place of a free society, we have the economy of the community, in which the individual seems to be more restricted than ever before by the regulations of Church and State. But, aside from the fact that such problems have appeared only gradually, it is also true that, whenever they have been present to consciousness, they have themselves, in times of bold thought, served to m-ge power on to the utmost, rather than to deter it from the risks involved. Moreover, where one granted tlie incongruity between the ideal and the actual, despair did not seem to be in the least degree justified, since from the contradiction between the infinite and the finite arose the very problem of the world and of life, and no events had any significance except as they 214 MODERN PniLOSOrniCAL CONCEPTS. tended to overcome tliat contradiction in the process of the development. Yet still further complications arose from the fact that another theory of the individual was united with the one just given — a theory which is based upon a strictly physico-mechanical conception of the world. This considers the individual as given only empirically, as the medium through which all other events are evolved. It is the unchangeable atom, out of which all further formation is constructed, and to which every- thing must be reduced, if it is to possess any reality in the world. Its significance, then, does not consist in any relation to a rational realm, and consequently no prin- ciple involving the employment of a concept of value can be introduced ; but the individual can find recog- nition only so far as it exists and acts as a force. Power and right must be considered here as coinciding per- fectly. Regarded from this point of view, the develop- ment of the community seems to be a physico-mechani- cal problem : it serves to bring the single powers into such a relation that they mutually disturb one another as little as possible, and, of course, ideal questions here find no place. Such theories (which we find fully developed in Hobbes, the most consistent political philosopher of modern times) are open to criticism in their fundamen- tal principles, and they do not furnish the least assist- ance in clearing up the confusion of concepts involved in the discussion. But they add greatly to the embarrass- ment, from the fact that to this empirical atomistic in- dividual is transferred the whole estimate of value which had been won for the ideal concept of an infinitely ad- vancing microcosm. The single individual as empiri- cally given is considered as valuable in itself. Inde- INDIVIDUALITY. 245 i) pendcntly of all combinations in communities and in history, without any connection with an ideal world, it is presented as rationally justified, and as botli the basis and the measure of all truth. The normal condition, which in the earlier theory floated before the endeavor as its goal, seems to be given from the outset here, and the whole arrangement of life is constructed on this supposition.* The consequences of such an idealization of the phe- nomenon can be easily seen. The deification of the contingent element in the single individuals must neces- sarily lead ultimately to the degradation, even to the negation, of those operations involved in the reason, and must seriously endanger all ideal meaning in hfe. The individual is now judged to be something which can everywhere demand absolute recognition and enjoyment of existence, and, independently of all determination and activity, can establish its rights and claims ; f every- thing arbitrary and base can screen itself behind the principle of the infinite value of its individuality, al- though, as a matter of fact, only the ideal concept has any right to appeal to such a principle. Moreover, the absolutely worthless and subjective freedom here de- * Up to the present clay, to presuppose normal men and normal rela tions is characteristic of all practical life, as in theories of education, and especially of legislation. f It is worthy of notice, at the present time, that the priority of rights over duties is frequently proclaimed without any attempt at con- cealment, although evidently without any suspicion of the ultimate con- sequences involved in it. See Bourdct, " Vocabulaire des Principaux Termcs de la Philosophie Positive," p. 55 : " Les religions, soit revelees, Boit metaphysiques, placent les devoirs avant les droits ; mais la science experimentale lea pose inversement. Pour eile, les prerogatives per- sonelles sont Ic fait necessaire de la vie et de la civilisation." But, for such a confusion of concepts, no one individual nor one school can be especially blamed, since it is a result of the general development. 2^6 MODERN PniLOSOPIIICAL CONCEPTS. fended, if assumed as an ultimate principle, must render impossible, not only this or that particular form, but every rational development of the general life; and, although at first it exerts its dissolving power on what comes to it as foreign, ultimately it must make a most destructive attack upon the princij)les by the misrepre- sentation of which it has become an historical power. In this connection we should remember that this idealization of the empirical individual at first served to stimulate to effort all the powers of man. Men seriously believed in the perfection of the theory, and from this faith derived an inducement to great deeds ; but it was inevitable that the contradiction should soon become apparent, and the intrinsic falseness of the whole process of idealization be established. The germs of this confusion in concepts can be traced back to the beginning of the modern era. Such confusion is clearly prominent in Spinoza; while in Locke it is the foundation of his whole practical phi- losophy, and from him it exerts an influence in all di- rections. Yet among the English the principle of the absolute value of the individual, and his absolute free- dom from the general historical development, was sup- plemented and toned down to such an extent that its full consequences did not appear. It was left for Eous- seau to develop them by a broader application of the principle. He carried out, in a classic style and in a complete form, the subjection of the entire content of the world to the intrinsic nature of the empirical in- dividual. But in his writings, more clearly than any- where else, appears the absurdity of ascribing to the isolated individual endeavors and feelings which are formed only in the life of the whole, and as the conse- quence of a long and gradual development. INDIVIDUALITY. 247 A reaction naturally entered with the culmination of these doctrines in Ivousseau and in the French devo- lution wliic'h put his theories into practice. Various at- tempts were made to overthrow the principles which were thus practically illustrated. German idealism, with all its diversities in other respects, was agreed in maintaining the necessity and universal validity of the aims of the reason as against the contingency of the empirical individual. In common life the recognition of the facts of general development gained ground, whether one's sympathies were with the Church or the State, and the desire for a hetter defined social reernla- tion of life and action became ever stronger. But, however far we may agree on this point in our criticism, and in single abstract propositions, as soon as it becomes a question of a positive concrete system in- volving the topics discussed, the paths diverge, and we meet difficulty after difficulty. Socialism, in its nar- rower sense, can be recognized as a reaction which pro- ceeds from a consistent application of this pnnciple of individuality, and, so far at least, as an historical power which is a peculiar growth of modern times ; but it maintains and even increases the confusion of the ideal and the actual, and satisfies the deeper mental needs so little that, with all its justification in the individual, it is very far from solving the problem before us. Yet just as little can we expect to find that solution in a straining and idealization of the churchly concept of the middle ages, or of the ancient concept of the state. Such developments are not broad enough to com- prehend the fullness and depth of the life which mod- ern times have opened to the individual. That which constitutes the real meaning of the world can not again return to naiTOwer forms, and that which presses into 218 MODERN rHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. unfathomable depths can not exhaust its being in the organizations of the phenomenal world. The thought of the inlinite value of the individual as a whole en- dowed with reason can no more assume a secondary place than it can be lost sight of. Our own day thus stands in the midst of contradiction and contest, and is all the more agitated the more directly these influences affect the life of the individual man. nOIAXITY. " L'homme n'cst ni ange ni bete ; ct le malheur veut que qui vent faire Tange fait la bete." — Pascal. It is no easy task to gain a limited meaning for the concept of humanity. In scientific and popular defini- tions alike, narrower and wider significations are gen- erally confused, almost without being noticed ; and it is not the least important consequence of this vacillation that it often escapes our attention how many different problems are involved in this concept. For our con- sideration, two ideas are in particular to be distinguished, though the distinction does not involve the impossibility of their being combined — that of humanity as a special virtue in a system of ethical life, and humanity as a comprehensive principle which controls all action and feeling. Both concepts first received distinctness of expres- sion and general significance as the \*igor of ancient thought began to decline. The term (pCkav^poiTria is found among the older writers, but was first employed by the Stoics * in the specific sense in which we here consider it. It was necessary that the narrower forms of Life, which had tiU then laid special claim to man, * (piXäv^puyiTos and (piKavheyKia served at first only to signify a friendly conduct toward men (as especially on the part of the gods) ; how little scientific significance the concept had is shown by the fact that the sub- stantive (piXavbpanria never occurs in Aristotle. 250 MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. should be, if not destroyed, at least restrained suffi- ciently to allow man to consider what is human as the essential element. The Stoic estimate of the value of man rested upon his position in relation to reason; but the concept formed from such a connection was very soon taken hold of on other sides, brought into other relations, and so transformed. In the later part of the ancient era, the different theories, with all their problems and distortions, diverged and interpenetrated one an- other as they do to-day. Yet from that time the histories of the stricter and tlie broader principles become distinct. After it was once clearly presented, the thought could not of course again be lost, that certain tasks and feelings arise from the relation of man to man. But the principle that this relation is regarded as the one which penetrates and controls the whole activity of life is involved in certain cosmological presuppositions, and nmst be considered a characteristic of the times in which it is found. Yet, in the concept of humanity, in the narrower, and, as a principle, the generally accepted sense, as soon as we question more closely the definition of its mean- ing, we find so much divergence of opinion that we can make the concept include what is exactly contradictory. At the outset, the origin of this humanity is twofold ; namely, the conviction of the peculiar value of the human being, and then that complex feeling which is generated by the social life of man. The conviction involves the consideration of the whole theory of the world and man's position in it. According to what man seems to be, in relation to the whole, will he be esteemed by his fellow man ; and so the meaning of humanity, and its significance in the questions of human life, as- sume dijfferent phases, and have their share in the his- HUMANITY. 251 torical development of thought. Yet the action caused by such humanity is always conditioned and limited by fixed general aims ; and, moreover, it is a common ele- ment in all varieties of theory to conceive of humanity as a duty, the defense of which by a man lends value to himself so far as he esteems and promotes the inter- ests of other rational beings. But the purely natural impulses are of no less value to humanity. It is the similarity of the conditions of life, of destinies, of feelings, which makes the interests of one the immediate concern of the others. Spinoza has keenly shown how sjmipathetic feelings and actions must arise from the common mechanism of the psychi- cal life ; and although perhaps influences from other directions are involved in what he prizes so highly, still it is not necessary that we should give up that element of the simple impulse of feeling, in order that humanity may become a power to individuals and to the whole. This humanity of feeling has no previously deter- mined content and definite task arising from its nature, but it allows objects to approach it that it may seize upon them here and there where it is most aroused. And it is not so much the vigorously active man, who calls for a share in it, as the one who suffers ; not the rational being, ruled by design, but the empirical indi- vidual, with all his contingencies and needs, which are here considered only as weaknesses. The significance of this kind of humanity, so nearly related to pity, consists especially in its intrinsic appli- cation to the individual of the rational obligation to as- sume a human relation to his fellows, and in its partici- pation in man's natural instincts. It consists, further, in its presentation of a counter-weight to what might other- wise become defects in the interpretation of the con- 12 252 MODERN PniLOSOPHICAL COXCEPTS. cept. Yet, exclusively adopted, it would decline into an indefinite and formless condition, since we could be sure of meeting the greatest confusion of concepts, wliere tLis kind of humanity was made the starting-point in the man- agement of life. Moreover, humanity as arising from these feelings has never become an historical power ; for such feelings, with all their significance for the individual life, are still too deficient in persistent and common con- tent to be able to furnish anything of importance to the general relations of mankind. Everything contingent and defective can take refuge under the protection of those feelings, and can demand and receive recognition, just so far as such a humanity conflicts with moral order and the general designs of the race. In the historical development of the concept both kinds of humanity are naturally interwoven, sometimes the one and sometimes the other being the more promi- nent ; yet to the specific meaning is always given the pre- ponderance over the ideal. To follow out these devel- opments is beyond the limits of our undertaking ; biit, in the endeavor to explain a possible confusion of con- cepts, we can not refrain from pointing out the essential difference between the Christian and the modern idea of humanity. In the view of Christianity, man did not possess by nature an incontestable value, but all his importance came from his relation to God ; so that, in the general life of the race, he can be an object of value and of active care only as he is presumptively a member of the divine kingdom. The humanity of Christianity, as well as its whole ethical system, can not be severed from its re- ligious basiSo The ultimate purpose of active humanity must, therefore, be the winning of the individual to the ethico-religious life, for which reason it directs its at- HUMANITY. 253 tention clücfly to tlic inner nature, in the endeavor to transform and re-create it. So far as external things are concerned, misfortune and misery are considered as something which can not be removed from this sinful world ; it is of no use, then, to try to remove them en- tirely ; we can only escape their consequences where they endanger and oppress the individual. Yet here a ricli abundance of feelings finds expression, and Chris- tianity proves itself to be far more mild and tender than were the Idealists of the decline of the ancient era.* But, when modern thought raises its estimate of man because of his share in the common reason, hu- manity must free itself from all dependence, and take precedence of the other duties. AYhen, moreover, the aim of life is taken to be the development and employ- ment of every power, the new age must consider it its duty to the individual to bring him into such an ac- tivity, to realize all his endowments, to provide the external means by which action is conditioned, and to remove all impediments which stand in his way. The individual is thus intrinsically regarded as something naturally and normally developed, so that it is not a question of a change, but only of an increase of life. Yet the modern idea of humanity can not be criticised, as paying attention only to the external relations ; it taught rather, originally, that everything external min- isters to the inner life ; until gradually the dangerous tendency appeared of looking for all happiness, as aris- ing from the care for the external relations, and from the removal of external impediments. But, so far as these impediments are concerned, they are regarded, not only * This appear3 in the way in which the Fathers, especially of the Latin Church, defended, as against the Stoics, the principles of Christian charity. 25-i MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. as sometliing which is to be opposed here and there, and the results of which are to be reduced to a minimum, but as something which in a-rational world should no- where be allowed to exist, and which, by the exercise of activity, should be utterly removed. Hence, in view of the evils of the world, a far more comprehensive and pervasive activity is displayed than ever before. Yet the ultimate aim of this activity everywhere is not, as it is in the case of Christianity, to mitigate suffering, but to positively increase active exertion and prosperity. While, beneath all divergencies of opinion on this point, there is a common and uncontested ethical basis, w^e still find a broader idea of the concept in the view which regards human existence, with the determination of action which springs from it, as the essential mean- ing of life ; and this broader idea not only involves a specific cosmology, but also is dependent upon the his- torical development of the principle. The significance of the particular connections in which the individual is otherwise placed must have been withdrawn, to make place for the operation of the human reason in general ; and the demand of the reason, in its general endeavors and feelings, must be admitted and maintained, if it is to become a power controlling the life of the whole. There must be certain great common aims and desti- nies, by w^hich mankind may learn to understand and feel its unity in the universe, through which individ- uals may find themselves brought into mutual relations and driven to community of action. AVe find these views confirmed in those two epochs in which the concept of humanity assumed a controlling position in life — in the decline of the ancient, and the ambitious rise of the modern era. In the former, the theory of the philosophers was based upon the practical HUMANITY. 255 universality of culture. Yet tlic significance of hu- manity was found, not so niucli in any power to pro- duce a thorough change in the life of the whole, as in the fact that it freed the results of the restricted sphere of life from their original limitations, and extended and developed them in all directions. Its problem was to raise the content of life to a universal power. Yet, for that very reason, considered from the standpoint of those times, it had a preeminently abstract character ; and, as the earlier thinkers used it, contributed directly rather to the dissolution of what existed, than to its recon- struction, and it became more closely united with con- stnictive forces only in Christianity, to which it was a necessary condition. But, as the earlier interpretation of life was undermined, and faith in the great objective position of man in the universe was shaken, so much the more did humanity become simply a sentiment founded on the consciousness of the common misery and common need of help, such as serves to bring men tosrether. The humanity of modern times, on the other hand, is characteristic of a period of ambitious development. ITew and important duties are opened up to life, from before which everything recedes which pertains to special realms of action. Only mankind as a whole can undertake to know the world, to receive it into its sphere of power, to subject it to its aims. In order to approach such goals man must extend the hand to his fellow man, and all must work together for the common end. In this connection, humanity is especially the formative principle ; it does not advance from the par- ticular to the universal, and so analyze all specific forms, but it derives everything particular from a comprehen- sive cause, and limits, constructs, and forms it by that 256 MODERN PIIILOSOPniCAL CONCEPTS. cause. But, by tliis activity, not only tlie position of tlie Avliole but that of the individual also is incompara- bly advanced. Of the being which internally and ex- ternally controls, forms, and even creates the world, we can not have too high an opinion ; so that, in fact, sci- entists can hardly find words in which fittingly to ex- press so high an estimate of the position of man. In so close a connection of the idea of humanity with the peculiarities of modern cosmology, it was un- avoidable that the former should be drawn into all the conflicts in which the latter is involved. There is all the less necessity of our entering upon this question more fully, since there is here a repetition of essentially the same development which we have discussed when considering the princi23le of individuality. Here, too, we find a confusion of what is ideal with what is actual, and connected with it an alienation of the general prin- ciple, a gradual development of the contradiction in- volved, and, finally, an insupportable incongruity be- tween the doctrine and practical life. The conception formed of the relation of man to the universe is in marked contrast to the estimate of his value in the realm of practical ethics. The latter takes into con- sideration, not so much the fact that man is brought by his physical organism into a series with the other liv- ing beings, and is conceived as subject to universal laws (for this would not help at all in the ultimate de- cision of his value), as the fact that the ideal concept of mankind and of men, and the theory of their par- ticipation in an ideal world, although not given up, are still seriously shaken. Thus the individual as actually existent, with narrowly limited power, remains sub- jected to his selfishness, and usually degrades the high- est things to the littleness of his own private aims. HUMANITY. 257 And even if we are not ready to give up tlie trans- fer to tlic actually existent individual of the comprehen- sive estimate which arises from the ideal concept of mankind, and is based upon that alone, this, theoretically regarded, is only holding on to the consequences when the premises are surrendered. But, practically, the dan- ger arises of glorifying that which is phenomenal and contingent, and of employing the idea of humanity in the palliation of all that is wrong, and in the weakening of all the nobler duties of mankind, and also of awa- kening claims and justifying estimates, the foundations of which are perhaps exactly contradictory to the real meaning of life. EEALISM— IDEALISM. " Non quia difficilia sunt non audemus, sed quia non audemus difficilia sunt." — Sexeca. The term idea has a history long and full of vicis- situdes, which mirrors with tolerable completeness the decisive changes in philosophy. As is well known, Ihea first received a sj^ecific meaning in Plato, who used it to denote the forms which lie at the basis of every ex- istence, but which are not considered as arising origi- nally in the mind, although comj)rehended by it. In this sense the expression remained specifically a scho- lastic term, so that it was always used with express reference to Plato. Toward the end of the ancient era, with its entire transformation of the theories of the world, this defini- tion also was changed ; so that ideas were considered as originally existing in the mind of God, and thus re- ceived an essentially spiritual nature. Philo is the one in whom this change first appeared ; many Church Fa- thers followed his example ; and the new usage was fully establislied after Plotinus, on the basis of the Greek philosophy, had completed the transformation of the idea into something purely spiritual. Accordingly, in the middle ages, ideas were consid- ered as archetypes of things in the divine mind (Eckhart usually translates by vorgmde hilde), in which man has REALISM— IDEALISM. 250 a share only tlirougli liis relation to God. But gradu- ally, and especially tlirough Nominalism, the transition was made to a purely subjective and human intei-preta- tion.* In this sense the word seems to have been first used in popular speech in France (we find in Montaigne idee as about synonymous with the German Vorstellung) ; but it received a specific coinage at the beginning of modern philosophy, wlien it was used by Descartes, and others who followed his example, to denote all that is immediately apprehended by the mind, and so as the expression of the simplest psychical element. f Yet it was necessary from the beginning to carefully avoid referring the word simply to the sensuous pictures of representation. Wolff translated idea hj Vorstellung^ to which term it has been restricted by the Germans from the outset ; and, as a scientific term, it has gradu- ally lost its original meaning, except in its special uses, as in Locke's " association of ideas." After a number of attempts in the eighteenth cen- tury to give a more precise and exjDressive definition, a new tendency, starting from Kant, was more success- ful. In so far as he understood by idea a necessary concept of the reason, to which no counterpart in the * See Goclen, " Lexicon Philosophicum, " under Idea : " Ideae sumun- tur nonnunquam pro conceptionibus seu notionlbus communibus." f Descartes, " Responsiones," iii. 5 : " Ego passim ubiqueac pnccipue hoc ipso in loco ostendo me nomcn idese sumere pro omni eo, quod im- mediate a mente percipitur, adeo ut cum volo et timeo, quia simul pcr- cipio me velle et timere, ipsa volitio et timor inter ideas a me numerentur, ususque sum hoc nomine, quia jam tritum erat a philosophis ad formas perceptionum mentis divinse significandas." Spinoza, " Ethics," ii. def. 3 : " Per ideam intelligo mentis conceptum, quem mens format, proptcrea quod res est cogitans." In England, following the lead of othors (as Cud- worth), Locke, in particular, made a place for the new signification, though not without a struggle. In our language, Leibnitz was the first so to use the word. 260 MODERN PHILOSOPmCAL CONCEPTS. senses can be given, lie in a measure followed Plato ; except that what Plato considered as something actually existent previous to the existence of the mind, he lo- cated in the mind itself ; and what had been before a form of being superior to all becoming was now limited to impulsive force and law of action. The later phi- , losophers carried out further the tendency here sug- gested ; and although each one has given to the concept something peculiar to himself, yet in its general mean- ing the controlling influence of the Kantian definition can not be mistaken. Most other nations have held to the use of the term as seen in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. We must, then, distinguish four stages in the history of the term. What had been at first the primary con- cept of an sesthetic-metaphysical cosmology passes over into a religious sense, and there receives a purely spiritual significance, and then that which belongs to the power which controls the world is gradually transferred to the individual thinking being, until at last the expression is limited to a subjective psychological signification. But then a reaction sets in, since a universal and objective force acting within the mind is recognized as the im- pulsive power of thought. The meaning of " ideal " naturally follows that of " idea." Ideal is first found in the best period of Scho- lasticism, in Albert, Thomas, and others, in the sense of archetypal. Although " real " is often opposed to it, yet the ideal should not for that reason be degraded to the imaginary.* But then the same change took place in this term as in the leading concept ; and, especially * JRcalis I find first in Abelard's " Dialectics " ; realitas is a coinage of Duns Scotus. lieallsta, as a party term, is found first, according to Prantl, in Silvester de Prieria (x. 1523). REALISM— IDEALISM. 261 after the time of Gassendi, ideal and real, as well as idea and reality, became antithetical. Yet, in the spe- cific phraseology of the schools, the whole mental being, so far as it consists of ideas, was called ideal ; and the name Idealist was thus formed, to signify those who, in direct opposition to the Materialists, reduce all being to ideas, and deny the existence of external tilings.* Kant follows this definition ; yet, in jAaee of the " material or psychological " Idealism, he substitutes the " transcendental " (also formal, or critical) Idealism, ac- cording to which " all objects of an experience possible to us are only phenomena ; that is, mere ideas, which, as represented, have no existence in themselves outside of om- thought " (iii., 34G, 3^7). Fichte then gave to IdeaHsm a decidedly practical tendency, since he under- stood it as the philosophical doctrine which explains the determinations of consciousness by the action of the intelligence. In opposition to tliis is ßealism, particu- larly Dogmatism, which considers the phenomenal world as an existence independent of the mind. This signi- fication given by Fichte, notwithstanding the many divergent definitions of the later philosophers, has re- mained the standard for the general understanding and use of the term. At all events, the reference of the term to the practical side of the question now predomi- nates over its purely theoretical signification.f If, in examining the question, we employ this in- * "Wolff especially establishes the phraseolofry, when he enumerates " three erroneous sects among the philosophers," namely, the " Skeptics, Materialists, and Idealists " (see in his " Works," 5S3). But Leibnitz, in whom I find the first antithesis of Materialists and Ideah'sts, uses the ex- pressions in a less specific sense, since he calls Plato the greatest Idealist (186 a). f The distinction between the expressions ^^ ideal" and ^^ ideell" is worthy of notice. 262 MODERN rniLOSOPniCAL CONCEPTS. terpretation, wliicli has now become prevalent, tlic his- tory of Idealism mnst involve the discussion of the tendency and nature of all human action. Though in all kinds of Idealism it may be an essential and common principle that man, in knowledge and action, is deter- mined rather by the world present to the mind than by the phenomenon given through the senses, still this principle has received in its historical development very different forms, of which three are specially prominent. In the ancient Idealism the world of pure forms is something which is objectively present, and manifests itseH in the phenomenon, so that the mind is not under the necessity of producing it, in order that it may exist; the ideal powers act from eternity to eternity throughout the whole world; but with them the an- tithesis of what is material is eternally present, and it can never disappear. The ideal presents itself in the world, and constitutes in all events the essential and valuable force ; but it can not form the world wholly as an addition to itself, and absorb it completely into it- self. Our function is to know it, to recognize it, to use it in action without mistake ; but ancient thought was far from demanding that the ideas be brought to a full realization in the world, and that the phenomena be conformed wholly to reason. In Christianity, the antithesis -of two worlds is not original and eternal, but an outgrowth ; it is never for- mally recognized, and, if recognized, is to be, in part at least, again removed. The events of a higher world overarch and temporarily include empirical events, and are evidently manifested in them ; but within this world the antithesis can not be removed; the evil is considered as empirically the more powerful ; so that the problem here is, not so much to transform what is REALISM— IDEALISM. 2C3 permanent, according to tlie demands of ethics, as to rise essentially above the pressure of what is antagonistic, and not to allow one's faith in the reality of the higher world to be shaken by anything apparently contradic- tory to it in the phenomenal world. With all the difference there is between these two kinds of Idealism, we can not fail to detect essential characteristics which are common to them, as contrasted with the modem doctrine. Each in its own way makes it possible to unite with all struggle and pain the cer- tain rest of ultimate possession. This earlier Idealism has none of the restless, impetuous, timidly doubting, passionate nature, which at the present day we often necessarily associate with the concept. Modern Idealism has from the outset a thoroughly peculiar character. AVe have here, too, an antithesis ; the antithesis of reason and phenomenon in an intelli- gible and an empirical world. But this antithesis is comprehended in a single universe. Reason is not some- thing floating over the world, and only participating in it ; but it has its home in it, and lays claim to the very place which the phenomenon occupies. Its elements meeting thus in one point, the antithesis becomes a full contradiction, which must be absolutely removed ; and the process of the removal of this contradiction is, strict- ly speaking, what we have given to us in the events of the world. The ideal is thus not something archetypal, which one can make his aim, with the consciousness of never being able to attain it, but it is a power exercised wholly in the phenomenon. It is not so much some- thing in itself estimable as something simply powerful in being and in action. In this view, mind, which seeks to be self-active and to determine everything by 26:1: MODERN rniLOSOPHICAL COXCEPTS. itself, is not given as something ready-made in the world, to manifest itself as representing or creating, but it goes through a process of development, and at- tains full control only gradually, as it advances from one stage to another. It always requires a more vigorous effort of thought to develop this theory, because it strikes far more deeply into what is empirically given than was the case with the earlier forms of Idealism. Since there can not be the least gap left between reason and phe- nomenon, the whole world must be apprehended, trans- formed, and worked over into a thought-reahn. The ever-returning and ever-repeated demand is to make everything rational real, and everything real rational. Here, and here for the first time, it is considered as precisely the same thing to show anything to be rational and to claim that it is realized. Hence, while Idealism before was always in danger of mistaking the mutual dependence of the internal and the external, and of leaving the visible condition of the world unchanged, and while it was formerly a favorite way of avoiding disagreeable demands to praise the in- trinsic elevation of the mind above the world, it after- ward came to be considered an unavoidable task to make the phenomenal world itself the abiding-place of reason, to establish everywhere the conditions of a ra- tional life, and to remove every opposing element.* We need not follow out the immeasurable influence * Sec Fichte, "Reden an die deutsche Nation " (" Works," vii. 379). It is a natural instinct of man, to be given up only in a case of real necessity, to find heaven already on this earth, and imagine something as floating along before him, which is eternally permanent, in his daily work on earth ; to plant and cherish what is imperishable in what is itself tempo- ral, and to connect this life with the eternal, not merely in an inconceivable way and only by a chasm which is inscrutable to mortal sight, but in a way evident to the mortal eye itself. REALISM— IDEALISM. 205 of this general tendency in sj^ecial lines of illustration, since the whole of modern history bears witness to it. But a part of its general effect is found in the two ten- dencies which we have so often seen acting with and against each other in modern thought. The theory which judges the reason to be the ra- tional explanation of the world's existence and the force which directs its history may explain all events by the speculative tendency of thought reaching out far beyond the philosophical schools ; bnt, for the ap- prehension of the phenomenon, and its union with the problem of the reason, the empirical tendency takes the precedence. In the former, the danger arises of being satisfied with a purely theoretical transformation of the phenomenal world ; in the latter, there is great danger of limiting one's self to the activity of what is external, and, without deeper insight into the nature of the ra- tional process, of demanding its immediate realization in actual occurrences. Out of this latter tendency arises the peculiar form of modem Radicalism, which, in the com-se of time, has always gained ground. In fact, modern Idealism is thoroughly radical, since it desires to carry out in the phenomenal world the demands of the reason, wholly and without abatement, and not to let the least thing remain without a rational justification. But it gives to this problem, at the outset, so deep an interpretation that it attempts to understand the inner reasons of the development of things ; and, as soon as that happens, it follows as a matter of course that the attainment of the goal is not possible in any given moment, but involves the entire process of the events of the world. Kot that it should be made an objection to any such tendency, that it follows out its aims too rcgardlesslv, or with too 2G6 MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. much energy ; for we can not understand Low one in carrying out the pi'inciples of the reason is bound to re- gard any other claims, and how he can exert too much energy. The mistake is rather that the interpretation given is too foreign to the subject, and the aim is fixed absohitely or predominantly only on the development of the external relations and bearings of life, while the subjective relations are assumed as a side issue, and so are usually disregarded. In fact, what is to be attained is considered an external production, for the delaying of which there is not the least reason ; so that, of course, from the given premises. Radicalism alone is the legiti- mate conclusion. But with all the development of ex- ternal power which it adduces, the depth of human na- ture remains untouched, and all the deeper interests of life are neglected. But if the pecuhar nature of ration- al existence and action finds no recognition, we can say that, philosophically considered, the whole school derives its name of "Radicalism" from its real contradictory, since it never goes back to the primary root of things. In any case, in the historical development of this school, the value of the subjective relations has been diminished, as the demand for an immediate realiza- tion of the ideal has become more pressing. It is not so much that greater claims have been made as that their relation to actual events has been changed. So far as claims are concerned, one can hardly demand more from any one, and can hardly express himself more ex- plicitly, than did Sir Thomas More. But his Utopia lies outside of the world, while these ideal formations ap- proach the world more and more closely, and finally claim to entirely absorb it.* * For this reason thoughtful minds have clearly foreseen great trans- formations. Even Leibnitz spoke of the general revolution which threat- ÜNJ REALISM— idealism; ' It is further worth our while to notice the contradic- tion between the real doctrine of this school and the form which it assumes. For, so far as the doctrine is concerned, one can not at all maintain here an idealistic cosmology as a system which has for its fundamental presupposition the predication of the thought-element of human life and of the universe alike ; and yet this whole system is carried out under the form of Idealism, and there are, perhaps, relatively more idealists in the subjective sense in this than in any other school. Whatever theoretical objections may be made, it can not be denied that modern Idealism has ever as- sumed more and more the form of Radicalism in the sense just explained. This development, as we have seen, tends to alienate itself, and becomes narrowed w^ith every advance ; and whatever is not included in it has for the most part lost its foothold among the first principles of that Idealism itself.* But ^oubt and dissent have extended beyond this, and led to a general reaction which has frequently called itself " Realism." Reality is here supposed to be the measure and the goal of the endeavor. TThenever idea and experience become contradictory, the latter is to turn the scale ; aU advance is to be limited by the rela- encd Europe (p. 387 a), and Rousseau said with great definiteness, "nous approchons de I'etat du crise et du siecle des revolutions " (" Emil," Bk. iii.). * It is not for us to explain the reason of this ; we would only show that it is a most superficial view to take of it, to suppose that the whole commotion is produced by the fact that some parties have gone *' too far " in carrying out their modern principles, and that the whole blame thus lies with the '* excesses " of Radicalism. For, whatever oltjcctions may be made to modern culture, it is by no means to be treated so slight- ingly as to suppose that it could be seriously endangered by such ele- ments as these. These could never have obtained influence, had they not been fairly deduced from the doctrines laid down. 2G8 MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. tioiis wliicli are given in the phenomena, and so is to be a gradual process. Of the latter truth, the leading idealists themselves might apparently be called as witnesses, provided it were certain that the unattainableness of the idea was caused purely by the immeasurableness of its content, and that it was not our own weakness which removed the goal far from us. Yet, if the meaning is that ideal and reality should never be brought into contra- diction, such a view is free from danger only when there is no doubt involved in the concept of reality. Are we to understand by that what is momentarily present in the phenomenon? Then every one must contradict it who acts and strives with design. And, further, does reality signify the world with or without mind ? The usual method of the opponent of Idealism is to represent the world as already existent without the aid of the mind, and then, to the endeavors of thought, to oppose what is thus permanent as an insu- perable power; but this assumption presupposes the very point at issue. All Idealism starts from the prin- ciple tliat mind can enter into the phenomenon as an active and formative power, and, of itself, can change the condition of things — a principle which is empha- sized by modern Idealism, in that it considers the mind as something which continually increases, and is capable of infinite development. Where shall such a being find stationary and impassable limits ? Where, as opposed to it, shall anything external establish an absolute com- pulsion ? Such a faith is the possession of ambitious times. Kations and individuals dare to indulge it in the con- sciousness of inner power to oppose the relations in which they are placed, and to make the world a work- REALISM— IDEALISM. 269 ßliop of the mind. It is not wliat is given wliicli forms here the measure of the possible ; but one desires to pass beyond this, and boldly dares to strive after and obtains that which to the reflective consideration seems utterly impossible. For to such reflection everything great must appear incomprehensible before being realized, since its ideas are limited by what is common2:)lace and ordinary. That, too, which ultimately brings resist- ance and obstruction does not at such times act at the outset to invalidate the determination of the problem, but makes itseK felt only in the struggle to carry it out. And, finally, man prefers to yield externally rather than to sm-render absolutely, since even in his failure he saves that which constitutes the content and worth of life, and raises himself into an intelligible world. But, on the contrary, it is very different when the intellectual activity of a period has passed its culmina- tion ; when the insufficiency of the individual life as contrasted with the universal problem of the reason is clearly seen ; when the antitheses present from the be- ginning show themselves, in the decay of the power of penetration, to be contradictions, and thus fall asunder. Then what is external appears immense, the pressure of its power over us invincible, the mind, with all that it can undertake, insignificant. It is not that the world has thus become different, but we have changed ; things appear larger, because we have become smaller : yet we involuntarily seek to lay the blame on something out- side of ourselves, and wish to explain as absolutely impos- sible that for which we have no longer the strength.* * In the decline of ancient thought, Seneca especially has made this fact prominent (see " Ep.," 116, 8) : "Nolle in causa est, non posse prae- tenditur" ; likewise the passage before quoted. Among modem writers, Fichte especially has opposed the comfortable yielding to circumstances. See vi. 70, et seq. 270 MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. And if we have once lost faith in our own strength, we are really, as a matter of fact, weaker, and every ad- ditional doubt and failure increases this weakness. Re- flective wisdom, the virtue of old age, shows us most vividly the contradictions of theories and the impos- sibility of their execution ; the more closely we examine them, the more do the opposing elements seem to in- crease, while our own force shrivels up ; everything hu- man becomes small, persons and actions alike ; and, in fact, regarded from this point of view, they are small ; only the view is not broad enough to include any living, active, creative being in the world. That ideas are then degraded to abstract thoughts, even ultimately to arbitrary images of imagination, is as little to be wondered at as that opponents of such ideas believe that they are superior to all those who maintain them in any form. But, in such tendencies of thought, of course nothing is decided concerning the ultimate signification of ideas in history and in life. Whatever occurs here that is great, for this they remain the most important power in the world ; and, at all times, the development of thought will be ultimately deter- mined by the school which can show that its doctrines are based upon ideas, and can be defended by the ideal theory. OPTIMISM— PESSIMISM. "Tu audoas dicere, hoc et illud est in mundo malum, cujus explicare, dissolvero nequo originem valeas nequc causam ? " — Ar- NOBirS. I CAN give but insuflScient information concerning the origin of the terms Optimism and Pessimism. Op- timism is the older, as it was generally used in the first half of the eighteenth century to denote Leibnitz's doc- trine of the best world ; while Pessimism seems to be a production of this century, and to have been brought into general use especially by Schopenhauer. We have no occasion to discuss the varied and vacil- lating meanings in which the terms are employed as applied at present ; only it is important to distinguish carefully their use in a system of philosophy from their use in common life. The former concerns especially a theoretical judgment upon the significance and value of the universe ; the latter, an estimate of the lot of mankind, or of the individual Hfe ; so that the answer will depend, in the one case, on an entire system of philosophy, but, in the other, on the relation of the hu- man race to the problems of its life. The many doubts in which the first undertaking is involved are as evident as is the fact that the question itself can be raised only upon certain presuppositions. The question can find no place, except in connection 272 MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. with a ejstem of cosmology which hopes to pass judg- ment upon the essence of things and the final causes of events. But the circumstance that, practically, it as- sumes a prominent position in all systems of the kind leads us to suspect that we are dealing here with some- thing more than a mere logico-dialectical trifle. It is founded rather upon the instinct which leads us to jus- tify to the practical reason as valuable that which the theoretical reason has wrought out as the essence of the world, and thus to overcome a dualism in the reason it- seK, which is at the outset as unavoidable as it is ulti- mately unendurahle. However much the ontological consideration of things and the estimates of their value are to be kept separate ; however little we can from the one arrive directly at the other ; and however much it may seem a superhuman undertaking to try to combine the two as a unity ; still, as they both concern the same world, our thinking, so far as it remains true to its high- est functions, will be unable to give up that attempt, and will feel itself impelled to new hazards by every failure. From this point of view there is not merely a single kind of philosophical Optimism, but there are as many species as there are attempts to obtain an adequate knowledge of the world. Every great gen- eral tendency essentially justifies itself when it proves that what it shows to be essential is at the same time valuable. At the basis of every theory there is a common presupposition : the conviction that, ultimately, good and being are essentially united, and that evil is not something 6ul)stantial, but something which manifests itself on the surface of things and in coexistence with them. This presupposition, which arouses at once all the objections to a philosophical Optimism, was ex- OPTIMISM— PESSIMISM. 273 pressed by Plato in the statement tliat tlic truly exist- ent (to oVto)? 6v) is coincident with the good ; and this is the origin of the doctrine which has pervaded his- tory, that evil is to be regarded as a privation.* But this general theory receives in every great sys- tem of cosmology a concrete meaning expressive of the peculiarity of that system. Throughout Greek thought Optimism has an aesthetic character. The world is good, even perfect, because it reveals everywhere mea- sure and order, connection and balance. We find this principle expressed even before the time of the Socrat- ic school. f Plato and Aristotle carried' the idea out to its full extent,:}: and it maintained itself throughout the entire Greek philosophy and cosmology, extending as they extended. There was a development or, rather, a change, only 60 far as, with the entrance of contradictions into the world and into life, it became necessary to yield to dis- cords their rights, and so to transfer harmony to a posi- tion beyond the immediate phenomenon, provided one wished to maintain it as a general principle. We find in the Stoics the doctrine that what is antagonistic to the good is likewise necessary to harmoniously supplement the whole ; but Plotinus finally brought out most em- phatically the doctrine that a completed harmony must * Augustine crave to this doctrine its most pregnant expression, espe- cially in the "Enchiridion ad Laurentium de Fide, Spe et Caritate." According to his phraseology, evil is not caxisa effidens, but only caiaa deficicns. \ See, especially, Diogenes of Apollonia (Frg. 4 by Mullach) ; ov yap 6.y ovTw BeSdalbai ol6u re ^v &vev vo^crios wffTe koI iraivrwu fierpa e^tiv, X^i/J-öiySs re Koi i^epeoy Koi vvKrhs Kol rjfJLep-qs Kol verwv koL avfixwv koI euSituu. Kal ra 6,\\a ti ris ßovXerai ivvoU(Trbai^ evpicKoi 6.v ovrco OioKfi^fva, ws ayvarhy KciWiara. X Aristotle applies it to lifo, " Eth.," 11 VO a, 19 : rh Cnv rwv ko^" avrh aya^wv Kol Tj^ecoy. upiafievov yap, rh 5' ü3pi(Tp.(vov ttjs t aya^ov cpvaeus. 274: MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. contain sharp antitheses, which are fully unij&ed only when considered in their relations to the universe. The different arts offer numerous examples of this : a Ther- sites has his place in the epic ; pictures can not be painted wholly in light ; and artistic music must con- tain discords. Even if the harmony of the world re- mains incomprehensible to us, Plotinus can refer to the saying of Heraclitus that a concealed harmony is higher than one which is revealed. The historical influence of this transcendent aesthetic Optimism extends far beyond the Grecian world, and in this form the primary principle has been able to adapt itself to all later systems. When Augustine understood the world as the seK-manifestation of the divine being, his concept of order as all-comprehensive took precedence of the good, the true, and the beauti- ful, and in ultimate analysis evil seemed to disappear. After him Scotus Erigena advocated this kind of Op- timism with great energy ; Scholasticism appropriated it, and Leibnitz endeavored to make it intelligible by further analogies.* Christianity, according to its general interpretation of the world, would have had to defend an ethical Opti- mism, in which the order of the world is shown to be one which in the most complete way realizes the moral laws. This would have involved the appearance of the antithesis between a stricter and a milder interpretation, which is seen in the old dispute, whether the world is created for the sake of the glory or of the goodness of * See 518 b: "C'est comme dans ccs inventions de perspective, oü certains beaux dcsseins ne paraissent que confusion, jusqu'il ce qu'on les rapporte i\ leur vrai point de vue, ou qu'on les regarde par le moyen d'un certain verrc ou miroir. — Ainsi les deformites apparentes de nos petita mondes se röunissent en beautös dans le grand. OPTIMISM— PESSIMISM. 275 God, Avlietlicr justice or love is ultimately decisive, and, in cither case. Optimism would have become strictly a Tlieodicee.* There was no lack of sympatliy with such attemjits. But, to the common thouglit, evil was too real, and moral guilt especially was viewed too posi- tively as something which absolutely should not exist, to allow of its recognition in any connection which jus- tilied it. In the fear of weakening the antithesis be- tween good and evil by such speculations, it was the usual custom to meet only the superficial objections, while the fundamental question was set aside as tran- scending the power of the human reason. Modern thought, however, with its unconditional confidence in the jDower of reason in the world and in the human mind, applied to the problem its full strength. There was agreement from the outset in believing that what is valuable is to be sought not in any one specific quality, but in the fullness of power and life itself ; yet the two directions of thought which we have so often met are developed here also, and pro- duce two forms of Optimism — the logical and the physi- cal. In the former, the world is justified in that, when exhaustively considered, it is seen to be a work of rea- son itself. But reason is here considered as, in its essence, theoretical ; and the world is judged to be the best because it begins and ends in thouglit. In such a case it is the formal determinations of thought which are assumed to control the world ; and, only when every real content of every kind is reduced or, rather, .is sac- rificed to these, is the real proved to be rational and the rational to be real. "What thought furnishes here as essential is, on that account, considered also as good ; and to show that anything is necessary means the same * Leibnitz seems to have originated the expression Tbeodicee. 13 27G MODERN PIIILOSOPniCAL CONCEPTS. thi]ig as ultimately to justify it.* This doctrine is de- fended especially by Spinoza and the German Construc- tive philosophers, and it may be considered as culmi- nating preeminently in Hegel. Against this derivation of the value of the universe from the logical process as thus conceived, Leibnitz fought with the utmost energy. Yet, when he charges this doctrine with confusing different concepts, the question arises whether his own attempt at a solution be not open to the same objection. When we work our way through the varied and not entirely self-con- sistent mass of material which he has heaped wp in the Theodicee in defense of his own opinion, and reach the germ which is peculiarly his own, we find that his doc- trine is not precisely what it would seem to be at the first glance. He considers the world the best, because it brings the greatest amount of existence into reality and develoj)s vital force in the greatest degree. All com- pleteness consists in quantity of being ; perfection is in- crease of that quantity, and all pleasure is the sensation of completeness and perfection. However much he thus endeavored to determine being and power by this most general concept, the image of j)hysical power al- ways forced its way in, as was evident in the fact that to him the universe appeared as an aggregation. The many are so united that the greatest exertion of power takes place in the w^hole, and thus a kind of "meta- physical geometry" is practiced in the universe.f * See Ilegcl, viii. 193: "Essential and good are synonymous." Fich- te, vii. 14: *' Necessary, and therefore good ; " ii. 135: " The moral world is not the best, but it is the only possible and completely necessary world, that is, the absolutely good." f Among the numerous passages adducible here, that from the " De Rerum Orig. Radio." (" Works," 147 b) most clearly expresses the Leib- nitzian doctrine : " Hinc vcro manifestissime intelligitur ex infinitis pes- OPTIMISM— PESSIMISM. 277 Everything wliicli apparently contradicts such a tlie- ory disappears before the consideration that wc can view as decisive, not the individual of any kind, but only the whole ; and that, in connection with this whole, the combination of individual things judged to be of less importance can often be more productive than the combination of greater things.* Evil, too, is here jus- tified, in that the world which contains it realizes more force, and so is better than a world devoid of evil. This attempt at a defense of the universe has exerted an influence upon scientific thought far beyond that in- volved in its purely scholastic form. Leibnitz derived from it the law of the least possible exertion of force ; men like Lessing and Herder approved of its funda- mental principle ; and at the present day many promi- nent scholars adhere to it, and even in Darwinism we can discover a certain application of it. It does not concern us how many objections may be urged against all these forms of philosophical Optimism sibilium combinationibus sericbusque possibilibiis existere earn, per quam plurimum essentia; seu possibilitatis perducitur ad existendum. Semper scilicet est in rebus principium determinationis quod a maximo miuimove petendum est, ut nempc maximus praestetur effectus minimo ut sic dicam sumtu. Et hoc loco tempus, locus, aut ut verbo dicam, recepti- vitas vel capacitas mundi habcri potest pro sumtu sive terreno in quo quam commodissime est aedificandum, formarum autem varictatcs respon- dent commoditati sedificii multitudinique et elegantiic camcrarum. Et scse res habet ut in ludis quibusdara cum loca omnia in tabula sunt rcplenda secundum certas leges, ubi nisi artificio quodam utare, postremo spatiis exclusus iniquis plura cogeris relinquere loca vacua, quam potcras vel volebas." * See " German "Writings," i. 412 : " An unimportant thing added to an unimportant thing can often produce a better result than the combination of two others, each of which is in itself more worthy than either of the others. Herein is concealed the secret of predestination and the solution of the difficulty. Duo irrcgularia possunt aliquando faccre aliquid regu- läre." 278 MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. in general, and against each one in particular. The mere consideration of such theories will be seriously affected particularly by the objection that all attempts at solution presuppose a complete absorption of the in- dividual in the whole, while the individual existences of the world must lay claim to different kinds of inde- pendence, according as they are parts of a work of art, elements of a logical process, or members of a sum-total. Yet in every particular form of Optimism, philosophi- cal criticism will show the onesidedness and insufficiency of its concepts and propositions as compared with the general problem. All these it will disintegrate, at leas.t in so far as they seek to offer dogmatically an ultimate solution. In connecl/on with such a criticism, theoretical Pes- simism undoubtedly finds justification. Whether it re- fers to the lack of definiteness of concepts in those posi- tive systems, or opposes to them the immediate results of experience and sensation, it presents a well-grounded opposition. But the matter assumes a different aspect when Pessimism believes that it is able to estimate the real nature of the optimistic attempts, and ultimately to overthrow them, so as to establish itself as superior to them in approximation to the truth. For it usually fails to notice the deeper motives of those attempts, and its strongest weapon is its reference to the phenomenon which stands in opposition to every kind of Optimism. But none of those systems refer to the primary phe- nomenon. They do not assert that wdiat is immediately given to the senses presents itself as rational, but only that in the events of the world something rational ulti- mately effectuates and realizes itself. But to attain this we must rise, perhaps, far above the phenomenon, and even come into opposition to it ; so that philosophical OPTIMISM— PESSIMISM. 279 Optimists, like Plato or Augustine, can be admitted to be Pessimists, so far as Empiricism goes. In any case, such men do not need to go to the school of our mo;I- ern Pessimists to be instructed concerninc: the severe side of life. The German Idealists, too, esp'ecially Fichte, did not in their judgments oveiTate the world of the immediate phenomenon ; * and, if Leibnitz can be quoted as unconditionally an Optimist, and can be brought forward as the type of that school, this is the result, not so much of his ^philosophical theory of the universe, as of the combination with that of a purely personal characteristic — the endeavor to look, as far as possible, on the bright side of everything. Optimism is certainly assailable, but, in fact, only because it ventures upon a task which surpasses our powers, and unavoidably imposes limits too narrow for the solution of a problem which stretches out into in- finity. In this respect, however, it only shares the fate of all such ideas of the reason as can be contradicted and ridiculed equally well from the standpoint of pass- ing events and from that of the reasoning understand- ing. Optimism may be attacked in the wittily frivolous style of a Yoltaire or in the bitterly coarse manner of a Schopenhauer, and in particular cases may be justly open to criticism ; while its fundamental tendency is not touched by any such attacks. But, if Pessimism then wishes to build itself up into a philosophical system, and to maintain positively * See Fichte, ii. 97 : " Often we can not form too low an ojjinion of the immediate phenomenon. However mean an image we form of it, it is often superior to experience. Yet he who thinks evil of the general pow- er of mankind caluminates mankind, and incidentally condemns himself." V. 537: "Since things are as they are, misery is still the best of all that is in the world." Moreover, it should not so often be forgotten that Hegel discriminates very definitely between phenomenon and reality. 2 so MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. the doctrine of the worst possible world, we must assert that such an attempt shares all the dangers and errors of Optimism, without being justified by any fundamen- tal tendency of the reason, or showing itself successful in comprehending an abundance of phenomena under a positive principle. If Optimism applies concepts of value to the universe, there is sense in this, at least so far as it proceeds from the postulate of an essential connection of phenomena with reason; but, how, by a separation of the two, one can succeed in carrying over such concepts into the universe, it is difficult to understand. Though one may prove again and again that misery predominates in the life of the individ- ual, of the race, of all sensitive existence, what would that prove in regard to the whole, in which all this externally disappears ? * All the great Optimists have made the fate of mankind a part of and subordinate to the fate of the universe ; and, if Leibnitz, especially, holds that imperfections in particular lines may be es- sential to the good of the whole, his philosophy would not (though his feelings might) prevent his explaining all human misery as one of these imperfections neces- sary in the interests of the whole.f In brief, we can not yield to Pessimism, as a theory, any more significance than it attains from the simple fact that it is a reaction from Optimism. The whole question of the value of the universe is open to attack ; * Pessimism is still less successful than Optimism in explaining that which offers the greatest difficulty to any estimation of the world — that is, the (apparently) indifferent. f In opposition to the Pessimists, he agrees with the idea of Maimo- nides (p. 582 b): "Que la cause de leur erreur extravagante est, qu'ils s'imaginent que la nature n'a 6t6 faite que pour eux, et qu'ils comptent pour ricn ce qui est distinct dc leur personne, d'oii ils inferent que quand il arrive quelque chose contrc leur gre, tout va mal dans I'univers." OPTIMISM— PESSIMISM. 281 but, if it is once started, then Optimism represents the positive impulse of science. But Optimism and Pessimism as ^^liilosopliical the- ories are utterly different from Pessimism and Optimism as feeling and conviction in practical life. For the question here concerns not an estimation of the uni- vei'se, but a judgment upon the events connected with the human race and the interpretation of our personal relation to our duties and our aims. Such questions will at all times be occasionally raised, and will ever receive different answers, according to the natui*e and situation of the individual. Tliat these, for the masses of men, become the most prominent questions, and in- clude all phenomena within their horizon, indicates the existence of a definite crisis in the historical develop- ment of the race. For reflection upon the value of one's actions and fate is not instinctively original to mankind. The race, as well as the individual, is so occupied with its activity in the pursuits of ambitious development and successful creation that it does not give up much time to medita- tion upon its own condition. This question presupposes a cessation of activity, a certain ascendency of reflective consideration over intense action ; it thus arises from a certain relaxation and irresolution, just as, for its own part, it increases these. The movement, once com- menced, usually extends itself quickly. The lamer the creative power becomes, so much the keener becomes the eye to detect that which restricts and disturbs, so much the more powerful becomes practically whatever counteracts it, so much the more quickly widens the chasm between task and ability. Doubt is at first di- rected toward particular conclusions ; but it soon takes a broader hold, all the problems and contradictions of 282 MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. life become prominent, and in everything the antinomy is exemplified which arises from the unsuitableness of finite power to i^ifinite tasks. The endeavor before was aimed at the perfect, tlie whole, the all-comprehen- sive ; while now limits become everywhere apparent, and even the highest thing attainable hardly seems to lead us any nearer the goal. Under snch circumstances, the disagreeable side of particular circumstances weighs the more heavily, being developed in its transitory and permanent elements alike. The problem of eternity oppresses the temporal experience, and the temporal experience with its suffering seems to extend into eter- nity. To whom can it seem a strange thing, if, under such a pressure, no joy in activity or in life can arise ? Pessimism finds its true location where the con- sciousness of such a chasm between the ideal and the real gives a character to thought and action. For ideal- ism likewise recognizes an incongruity between the two. But, since it assigns to the difference no fixed quantity, and does not consider the obstacles as an in- vincible power, it admits as the result only an occasion for a so much greater exertion of power. But Pessi- mism considers the chasm as something which can not be diminished, so that man, standing helpless before it, can only grow weary in life and in action. Yet such a view of the matter involves a self-con- tradiction. Pessimism is possible only so long as an ideal is everywhere supposed, though it may then be explained as unattainable : there must be something valuable in the world, if mourning over the deprivation of it is to be justified. The Pessimist is situated in this respect much as the skeptic is, who likewise forms the concept of truth, and only blocks up for us the ap- proach to it. Both must be led by the logical conse- OPTIMISM— PESSIMISM. 2S3 qiience of thoiiglit and life, either to give np the ideal, aud with it all interest in it, or to formulate it anew in some shape which shall render an approximation to it possible.* There is no middle position which can be pennanentlj maintained. It follows from all this that Pessimism is not some- thing fixed and easily determined, but it runs through a variety of stages, according to which its value also must vary. At first it is only a doubting idealism, and, as such, a necessary element even of the strongest con- victions ; but soon the uncertainty becomes confirmed, doubt becomes positive, the ideal becomes ever more distant, and is finally transformed into a mere phantom. Thus, only the empirical world and. the empirical man are left ; and, if the claim to any valuable element be not then given up, a contradiction must be everywhere established. Measured by the principle of reason, which is no longer a j^ower penetrating the world, everything presented to consciousness seems small and paltry. A man can prove the insignificance of every- thing which he can ever attain, and show as well that the lower elements completely control mankind ; al- though, with constant -inner hypociisy, he may repre- sent himself to himself and to others as led by some- thing nobler ; and in all this he may be right, yet he is right only in view of this contradictory position which he assumes. But this line of thought quickly advances a step * Through this, Pessimism would become Xihilism. The word Ni- hilism, which has of late beea employed so frequently, has its origin in theoretical philosophy, and designates the doctrine which denies abso- lutely all existence. In this sense Krug (" Philosophical Lexicon," 1st edition, iii., pp. 58, 59) employed the word, in 1828, as one which was well known. The transfer of the term to religious, political, and so- cial life seems first to have occurred in France about 1830 284 MODERN THILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. further when the question of happiness is substituted for that of the significance of life. One begins to con- sider, not so much what is thought and done, as what is felt and experienced. The attempt is made to measure off, in comparison, the pleasure and the pain in life ; and the answer to this can not be a dubious one, be- cause activity, the most valuable thing in life, is left out of the account, and because, with that, man aban- dons the ability to withstand the relations in which he is placed. In fact, the circumstances in which we stand have not in themselves an unchangeable value. But their value is affected by the pecuHar disposition of the person concerned, the connections into which the indi- vidual is brought, the forces which he can call to his assistance.* If the ultimate value can thus diverge widely from the superficial, and even a certain transfor- mation (of course, in the causal-legitimate connection of the inner life) can be possible, it is evidently absurd to allow that which befalls us externally to be decisive by itself. If all that concerned particular individuals re- mained essentially unchanged in the course of their his- tory, were there not thus special reasons if certain times made this fate of individuals so prominent ? ISTot only have individuals and nations alike maintained the joys of life in the hardest struggles against opposing cir- cumstances, but it has been the great destinies which have been the most safely protected against Pessimism, because they stirred man to his inmost soul and devel- oped all his powers. * Sec Augustine, "De Civit. Dei," i. 8: "Una eademque vis irruens bonos probat, purificat, cliquat ; malos damnat, vastat, exterminat. Unde in eadcm afflictionc mali Deum dctestantur atquc blasphcmant ; boni au- tcra precantur et laudant. Tantum interest, nou qualia, sed qualiscunque patiatur." OPTIMISM— PESSIMISM. 285 But if the mind is once regarded as passive, and feeling, not action, is considered the determinative ele- ment of our lives, then, of course. Pessimism alone is justified, and it is folly to continue then to haggle with it over small details. For it has been sufficiently proved from antiquity down that, in the mechanism of the feel- ings, displeasure and pain easily conquer pleasure ; and life, thus considered, is shown to be a continual va- cillation between ennui and pain. Yet these facts can be exj^lained in a way different from, and even opposed to, that adoj^ted by the ordinary Pessimism. But we need waste no words over the insignificance of the suppositions on which this form of the doctrine rests. There is, then, in the general histoiical development an antithesis, not so much between Pessimism and Op- timism, as between periods of pessimistic reflection and of realized activity. There might perhaps be a thought of Optimism only when mankind has a full consciousness that its power is a match for its tasks, or even believes it to be superior to them. Yet, though such periods occur in the course of history, when forces till then re- pressed become free to act, and the power of mankind is proclaimed in spite of a disposition to renounce it, still, these are naturally transitory periods. For the task will very soon strain that power to the utmost, and re- press any feeling of superfluous strength. Yet, if one a|> plies the name Optimism to the acquiescence in all that happens, or the idle accommodation to circumstances for the purpose of avoiding all occasion for action, such mental dullness is lower than the lowest forms of Pes- simism, since it indicates the extinction even of the capacity of reaction on the part of man, and we could well ask, with Marcus Aurelius, what reason there is for 2SG MODERN nilLOSOnilCAL CONCEPTS. living, if even the consciousness of failure is lost.^ Yet what this practically amounts to is not a theory of life, but a surrender of all theoiies, with which scientific dis- cussion has really nothing to do. As thus, in the theoretical systems, Pessimism is only a reaction against the attempts to form optimistic concepts of the world, so, conversely, in practical application. Op- timism is only an era of transition, in which a reaction is aroused against predominantly pessimistic doctrines. What are usually contrasted as Optimism and Pessi- mism do not at all come into contact ; the one belongs to science, the other to man's disposition — the one io thought, the other to feeling. It follows from all this that Pessimism, in its gen- eral bearings, is to be understood and estimated not as a scientific theory, but as an element in history ; and from this point of view no one will deny that it has been an important question in the rise and fall of his- torical forces. Every particular method of conceiving of the world and of life will be shown as too limited in its details when compared with the general problem of rational existence, and so, in the progress of the devel- opment, will necessarily be given up as a particular and dogmatic theory. In the advance of history man may unite all his exertions upon some one form in particu- lar, and overcome the antithesis of finite and infinite in the creative act ; for it is the very nature of classic times to find in the phenomenal something eternal and universal, to blend the two together, and to apprehend idea and phenomenon, content and form, in an insep- arable unity. Yet, in a further advance and self -de- velopment, the elements of insufficiency must become * See Marcus Aurelius, 7, 24 : €t yap koI rj a-jvala^rjais rod afiaprduuv OlxflCiTai, TIS €Ti TOV ^U OtTtO ; OPTIMISM— PESSIMISM. 2S7 prominent, contradictions and conflicts must be estab- lished, and the process of dissolution must commence. The historical process in the world involves the 'tragic clement, in that the very fulfillment of the inexorable demand that the particular life be justified before the thinking reason leads to its own overthrow. For, when we seek to show the particular life as of universal valid- ity, the antithesis of specific and general, of limited and universal, must come into consciousness, and with it must also appear the tendency to that retrograde pro- cess which we have just attempted to follow out. Pessimism has here, unquestionably, an important function, so far as it defends against all finite foi-ms the infinity of what is rational, and its incapacity of realization. The reflection and criticism which it prac- tices act, to be sure, directly, only as an abstract force, and so destructively ; yet, in the contest and dispute which are thus brought out, the bounds are set furtlier away, new forces are aroused, the meaning of life is deepened by the struggle and pain, and the way is thus at least prepared for positive results. The general forces which were bound up in the particular formation are loosened from this groove, and so left free for new applications. The whole may at first seem mere de- struction ; yet analysis, too, is of service to life, pro- vided we do not brinor the reason down to the antitheses of the phenomenon, but regard it as embracing these, and protecting itself in its destructive as well as its constructive work. In this way Pessimism is recog- nized as a valuable means of historical development. In any case, as regards its treatment, it follows from such an idea of it that, were every art of dialectics ex- ercised, it can never be ultimately overcome on theo- retical grounds. It follows also that we must seek the 288 MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. explanation of it in its historical development, and, by that, form our conception of its specific meaning. At the present day, too, the specific element in Pes ßimism must be brought out, and distinguished from other foi*ms. Above all, the predominant disposition of Christianity should not be brought too near to mod- ern Pessimism. Christianity, in fact, not only estab- lishes an antithesis between the real and the ideal, but it considers the evil as the stronger power in man's ac- tual experience, and explains passiveness rather than action as the problem of life ; * yet faith in the reality and superiority of a higher world is not shaken, but only the more vigorously held in opposition to this doctrine. In distinction from the wearied and despairing Pessi- mism of the decline of ancient thought, we see here an immense impulse given to life. This world is given up only to obtain again another in the place of it; and thus, taken in connection with an ethico-religious sys- tem, the importance of human life is immeasurably in- creased, so that most of the Church Fathers can not depict its misery without, at the same time, defending its real value, and thus consciously opposing ancient Pessimism.! In such a theory of the world and of life conflicting opinions are maintained, and even brought together, without restriction. Grief over the evil in the world can not be treated lightly, for it continues to be felt, and in its consequences can never be entirely removed ; * Only, in fact, passivity here is more than mere sufferance. We call attention to the phrase of Luther's so readily quoted : " passio ist summa actio." f Thus Lactantius opposes it (" Instit." ii. 1) : " Ne se, ut quidara phi- losophi faciunt, (homines) tantopere dcspiciant, neve se infirmos et nihili et frustra omnino natos esse putent, qua) opinio plerosquc ad vitia com- pcllit." OPTIMISM— rESSIMISM. 289 but the good still remains the prevailing and victorious power ; and, since as snpra-mundane it is removed from the contest, and from subjection to incompleteness, even as it is shown beyond all doubt to act upon the world as an historical fact, it becomes possible to recognize the full meaning of suffering and pain without at all di- minishing or casting doubt upon the ideal, and thus to include both members of the antithesis in the theory of life. It could even happen that the one might en- hance the other. The higher the goal was placed, so much the more painful its remoteness appeared ; and, the more keenly the misery of life was felt, so much the more firmly was the assurance of ultimate victory maintained. In fact, as historically developed, sometimes one and sometimes the other element has been the more promi- nent, and few persons have succeeded in bringing the two into an adjustment which was free from contradic- tion. While especially in the earlier centuries, and in the middle ages also, a sensitive Pessimism of purely human character was established, with an exclusiveness which renders it difficult to annex it at all to a Christian system of life," in modern times the danger has arisen of leaving out of sight the immediateness and intrinsic truth of the feeling of pain. Usually many a man has lamented the suffering and misery of life, who was, nevertheless, at the same time, inwardly perfectly con- tented ; and those have often been the most industrious in emphasizing the limits of human endeavor who have made the least effort to attain the highest good. * This is illustrated by Gregory of Nyssa, the most famous Pessimist of ancient Christianity, whose complaints often accord with the mudcm world-pain, and also by Innocent III., whose work "De Contemptu Mundi " occupies a prominent place among the pessimistic writings. 200 MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. Yet, in spite of all such misconceptions and mis- takes, there is no doubt of the value of the 'general tendency. The immeasurable deepening of the inner importance of life, established by Christianity, has been attained mainly through the antithesis and contest which we have just described, and which affected di- rectly the endeavor and the feeling of men ; and the formation of the Christian doctrine of life, the charac- teristic product of Christian skill, has also been con- siderably influenced by it. In view of all this, it is necessary to say, that in fact the recognition of the evil in the world has been to Christianity the starting-point of its whole view of life ; yet there is no question here of a strict Pessimism, since it does not conclude with that, but rather from the beginning keeps its glance directed to a certain goal beyond it. Modern Pessimism is, on the contrary. Pessimism in the strictest sense, and it must appear as such with special force in its connection with the whole process of development. Modern thought 023ened with an en- deavor arising from the feeling of an abundance of force. Man believed that he was strong enough to ac- complish great things in the world ; * he even dared, as we have seen, to undertake to make the world an ex- * Bacon can be adduced here as the type. Since he allotted to Pessi- mism a somewhat ironical treatment, he himself wished rather to repre- sent the power and greatness of mankind. See " De Augm. Scient.," iv., chap. 1. "Dcploratio humanarum ajrumnarum eleganter et copiose a compluribus adornata est, tarn in ecriptis philosophicis quam theologicis. Estque res et dulcis simul ct salubris. At ilia (sc. contemplatio) de pvse- rogativis digna visa res nobis, qua? inter desiderata proponatur." lie ex- plains it as desirable, *'ut miracula naturae humanas viresque ejus et vir- tutcs ultima), tarn animi quam corporis, in volumcn aliquod colligantur, quod fucrit instar fastorum de humanis triumphis." OPTIMISM— rESSIM ISM. 291 elusive habitation for the reason, and to realize every- thing rational in it. Such an endeavor called for the outlay of more strength, and exerted more influence on actual events than had been the case in any earlier epoch ; yet the danger increased with the venture. Everything was staked on a great question, which must be decided in history and in actual fact. The citizen of modern times has no world in which he could save his ideals from the improprieties and distortions of the phenomenal life, so that all there is of obstruction, dis- turbance, hostility, must meet him in his ultimate doc- trines. If the rational element can not be maintained in what is accepted as reality, it is hard to see how it can be defended in general. We have seen brought out, point by point, the facts that practically, in the modern concept of the world and the modern doctiine of life, the attempts to com- plete and carry out first princij)les have ever run against greater problems and dangers ; that a pervasive and in- trinsic contradiction has been prominent in them ; and that as the endeavors have been concentrated, and have become distinct, the leading tendencies themselves have been involved in doubt. [Relaxation and dissension were the natural results of the crisis which, though less clearly recognized, was still vaguely felt; and it is easy to understand how such tendencies should ap- pear with special force, after the vigorous exertion of power and self-laudation of mankind which preceded them. In view of all this, we consider the Pessimism of our own day as a phenomenon which is histoiically well founded, and which can not be kept back by any theoretical considerations. However firmly we may maintain that the whole statement of the question as 292 MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. between Optimism and Pessimism is a wrong one, and consider it the problem of philosophy, as of all activity of the reason, to raise man above the point of view which the question supposes ; still, if one does enter upon it. Pessimism is the more correct an- swer, since it gives expression to a crisis wdiich is actu- ally present. Yet many tendencies are practically united with it, which have had an important share in producing the state of things which relatively justifies Pessimism. Especially has the whole littleness of the reasoning un- derstanding now taken refuge here. While in former centuries this understanding w^as inclined to find the world endurable, and even good, and was never wea- ried with praising the best of worlds, it has now turned to the negative criticism which in self-sufliciency pre- judges the universe. Yet, more closely examined, should not rationalistic Optimism and critical Pessimism stand pretty nearly on the same ground ? Then, too, we find associated with Pessimism senti- mental and romantic ideas, which likewise run back into the past. One revels here in the confusion and incom- prehensibility of tender feelings, and, floating between a sublime mysticism and a rough naturalism, makes a luxury of pain. By the side of such tendencies, which always keep a certain connection with general historical fact, the dogmatism of party feeling and the self-suffi- ciency and paradoxism of individuals are maintained — all of which simply suggests the saying of Seneca, " Non jpotest fieri^ ut omnes querantur^ nisi querendum est de omnihifs.^^ Yet, beyond the mistakes of individuals, the sig- nificance of the general tendency can not be mistaken ; oniMiSM— rESSiMiSM. 293 and, however much any particular form of Pessimism, or professiomil Pessimism in general, may challenge contradiction, still that is not decisive of the deeper problems which the tendency indicates. As ultimate truth, Pessimism may be rejected ; as a warning, it can not be mistaken. COI^CLUSIOK "We take the liberty of glancing back at what we have thought it necessary to show regarding the history and present position of the concepts discussed. We saw at tlie outset how that wliich is to-day involved in the concepts is evidently the result of a long historical development, and how, even in the expressions used, the labor of many centuries is concerned. We are indebted for these, perhaps, less to ancient thought than to the middle ages, the scholasticism of which is of especial importance in the establishment of a scientific termi- nology. Yet nearly all that is borrowed from Scholas- ticism externally is intrinsically changed — at first by the original thinkers of the seventeenth century, and then by Kant. 'WHiat we have of independent German expressions dates back no earlier than the sixteenth cen- tury. The case is different as regards the concepts them- selves. The action of the middle ages here is almost restricted to opposition, which, to be sure, forms no small element of power, while usually the threads lead back to ancient thought. Little as we would wish to lessen the importance to us of the Socratic school, there can be no doubt that we owe far more than is gen- erally supposed to the Stoics and ÜSTeo-Platonics, and in general to the closing era of ancient philosophy. The Stoics offer to modern concepts more points of con- tact than any other system of the past ; while the Neo- CONCLUSION. 295 Platonics have left upon the history of concepts traces which, though loss numerous, have still made extremely deep impressions. The original thinkers of modern times, passing over the middle ages, have joined on to tlijs later part of ancient thought. In modem limes the seventeenth century is unques- tionably prominent, and, when in the general develop- ment two oj^posing schools here diverge, we can not neglect either of them if we wish to understand the modern treatment of concepts. The speculative system- makers have, without doubt, created more that is posi- tive ; yet the analysis and criticism of the empirical inductive thinkers have been of no less importance to the advance of the whole. Considered from this point of view, Descartes, Leib- nitz, and Kant should occupy the first rank among the leadino: minds : Descartes, because he established the general tendency of modern thought with original power, and spoke decisively on the most important points ; Leibnitz, because he made up a comprehensive system from modem ideas, and attempted to overcome, by the unifying force of his own mind, all apparent and actual antitheses ; Kant, because, in penetrating the positivity of things, and in his microscopic analysis of what is composite, he brought out everywhere most clearly the peculiar properties and presuppositions of the concepts, and so sharpened and deepened all the problems involved. Yet, were we to select from them the one who has the most positively and directly determined the con- cepts of the present day, we should name, not Kant, but Leibnitz.* * We do not here, of course, express an estimate of the ultimate value of philosophers, since what they may have accomplished in regard 206 MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. Of less prominence, in comparison with these, was the influence of the followers of Kant, and of the Con- structive philosophers, although they accomplished more, directly and indirectly, than is generally supposed. Yet, at any rate, the school is far more imj)ortant which, starting from opposition to the Constructive and Systematic philosophy, rests upon the natural sciences, and, becoming positively constructive, forms not only its own theory of the world, but also a certain system of concepts. When critically considered, it is found to be virtually a carrying out of the primary tendencies of modern thought, and its strength lies, in the main, in the fact that it seems to defend, with peculiar resolu- tion, something which, in our day, counts upon the general recognition of its self -evidence. In general, we can say that our concepts, regarded separately, can be traced back to three main roots ; that is, to ancient thought, to the seventeenth century, and to the Kantian philosophy; but, if we consider their combinations and general tendencies, we should select from history, first of all, modern thought since the fif- teenth century, and from that again the present day in the sense so often explained. In this the later always intrinsically presupposes the earlier, so that it is impos- sible to understand the tendencies of our own day with- out casting a glance at the whole. In such a variety of elements the presence of what is diverse and even contradictory in the modern system of concepts is to be expected. If we disregard the re- to modern concepts docs not at all sufficiently express their real position and importance. This is especially true of Spinoza, whose influence upon the present we arc compelled to consider as in the main unfavorable, though we do not, for all that, question his peculiar greatness. But this is decided by other elements than those which are here considered. CONCLUSION. 297 lation of what was taken from earlier times to what is modern, we und tliat in modern tliought the difTerencc between the inductive and the speculative tendencies produces everywhere a dissension, and, for the ecientific inteq^retation of concepts, the difference in principles of method in Leibnitz and Kant shows still further the results of this dissension — results which still continue. In Leibnitz, we find the endeavor to classify everything, and to show that what is heterogeneous is only one stage of the manifestation of a single force ; in consequence of this, we find a denial of the specific, a change into the cosmic, an immense synthesis of individuals into a comprehensive mechanism. In Kant, on the other hand, w^e find an assertion of the specific, and so a re- appearance of the antithesis ; an analysis of what, till then, had appeared simple into still simpler elements ; a resolution of the world into its ultimate factors, the union of w^hich naturally remains inconceivable. While Leibnitz sujierordinates and subordinates the heteroge- neous, with Kant it remains, in the main, coordinate. Our system of concepts has been taken from all this ; can it be supposed to have thus preserved completely its intrinsic unity ? Further difficulties arise from the relation of the expression to the concept. Modem thought found a comj^letely formulated terminology, drop2:)ed out much from it, to be sure, yet still retained what was imjiortant and essential ; and did this all the more because, at the outset, the change to the modern use of terms was not fully understood, and its distinguishing features were, for many reasons, brought out very slowly. Modern thought was thus interpreted through the ancient, and the way opened to much confusion. Moreover, within the whole system, different tendencies laid claim to the 298 ■ MODERN rrilLOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. same place, so that things really very divergent were mixed and interpenetrated together. Hence it fre- quently happens that concept and expression are not equivalent, and that the expressions are far from suffi- cient for concepts actually existent. A large number of concepts often meet in a single expression, and we have in general far more numerous, and far more peculiar, concepts than would seem possible from the verbal symbols. All this involved little danger so long as, in the ambitious thought-life, the concepts were energet- ically and clearly presented in their distinctions from earlier forms, and in their peculiarities as related to opposing concepts ; but, as soon as a change took place in the vigor of thought, the inadequateness of form to meaning necessarily led to great confusion. But such confusion was increased by the haste and restlessness of modern life, which no longer allowed time for the elaboration of the concepts ; by the dissi- pation of thought-activity into various directions, which restrained the endeavor to discover agreement ; and especially by the attempt to bring the results of scien- tific investigation into an immediate participation in and application to common life. For, when this aim becomes prominent, thought must ultimately be in- trinsically lowered. The part which one ever endea- vors to act becomes finally his nature, so that one thinks on the very same level to which he at the beginning wished to descend. But it is evident that the concepts especially must suffer in such a lowering of thought. For most men are interested, not in these, but in the results, the most tangible results, perceived by the senses. The consequence of all this is, that confusion of con- cepts which we have been throughout compelled to no- CONCLUSION. yj^^'J^^ ' ^< tice. And the dangers of this are not iiifiic;niticiuit. The community of thonght-life is shaken ; and, when Ave can no more exphiin tlie most important and 6ul> jective prohlems, there is danger that the individual, with the germ of its being, will be isolated, alienated from the connnon life, and this must result in a sud- den decline of the activity of thought. Yet we meet still greater problems and dangers when we consider the nature of the concepts, and we must again call attention to the fact, that our present object is not a criticism of the work of special sciences ; and, also, that a complete cross-section of cotemporary thought can not be given; but that we pretend to judge only the prevailing tendencies which do the most to unite single forces in coaction, and to determine directly and indirectly the development of thought. We can not fail to notice in these tendencies a great degree of activity, an endeavor to follow out the lead- ing thoughts on all sides, and to establish them in every particular. Yet, so far as the execution of this is con- cerned, there is unmistakably in the general concepts of the world and of life a lack of strict consistency and of systematically constructive force. A development is com- menced looking to the transformation of the naive idea of the world into a scientific idea, certain elements are established, directions of thought are marked out ; but then it is not carried out to the end, but one breaks off in the midst of the process, and turns back suddenly to the point of departure of the naive view of the world, which is now regarded as having been won and justi- fied by scientific work. The explanations employed, which it might have been necessary in the process to deepen, expand, supplement, are used now in their original interpretation as entirely suflicient. lie who 3Ö0 MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS. would go beyond them is said to oppose the " reality," and to turn investigation into scholastic subtlety. In this way something is easily presented as an ultimate determination, simply because it seems self-evident to the common feelings, the passing consciousness. The danger arises that obscure endeavors and scientific pro- ductions will be confused, and that the same certainty which is employed in the essential meaning of the pos- tulates will be claimed also for those specific applica- tions of them which are scientifically crude. Thus we see that the independence of penetrative and systematically constructive thought, as opposed to the original phenomenon, is called in question through- out ; which again, on its own part, shows the general tendency to deprive mind of its substantial importance in the events of the world, and to form all concepts and convictions by eliminating the thought-element as far as possible. Following out this idea, then, all activity which the possession of thought contributes to the pos- sessor must be understood as an arbitrary and disfiguring addition, which is to be removed if we would penetrate to an objective truth. But, where this tendency obtains control, the central unity and fundamental basis of the system of concepts must ultimately be lost ; the foun- dation of ultimate principles must be endangered ; and, through the lack of an endeavor to include the totality of things, what is empirically prominent will necessarily make a vigorous effort to usurp the whole realm of sci- ence. We have noticed in detail the lowering of the con- cepts produced by this, though less in their concrete application than in their nature, as they are obvious to the general consciousness. For the present condition of things is such that we, in fact, possess and actually CONCLUSION. 301 use much more than we believe we have before we be- gin to reflect. Instead of repeating in detail what has been already said, let us oidy glance at the way in which the investigation of causality reflects itself in our con- sciousness. Mechanism is from the first considered the only method of causality; the suppositions and con- ditions which it involves are not taken into account ; the many questions to which it gives no answer are considered not as open to discussion, but as positively decided in the negative ; the point where it leaves off the investigation forms the conclusion of the whole, as if the world came to an end where we are wearied of investigating. Moreover, this kind of explanation is confidently carried over to the realm of mind, as if the question dealt with something self-evident, though such extension, as regards the possibility of its application, presupposes an interpretation of the principles of mind, which has been for centuries the subject of dispute. And, in all this increase of its claims, the explanation lacks utterly any firm foundation and intrinsic justification of the causal connection itself. How the product of a sub- jectively psychical and externally conditioned process — for causality as usually understood is no more than this — how this can be objectively and universally apphed in the universe, and can attain even a repressive force as against the mind, all this remains completely unex- plained. ^ye find a similar state of things in regard to the other concepts, and, in fact, even more in their practical appli- cation than in their theoretical treatment — every-where misapplication, limitation, lack of intrinsic foundation and justification, without the surrender, on that ac- count, of any of the claims asserted for them ; so 302 MODERN PUILOSOrHICAL CONCEPTS. tliat wc might say tliat tlie thouglit-life of to-claj has a meaning, the premises of which are shaken, or, at least, are not established in the general consciousness. Yet, further, we have noticed an antithesis in prin- ciples between the concepts as theoretically and as practi- cally considered. For the theoretical cosmology of mod- ern times, the scientific conception of the external world of nature has been from the beginning the standard. Even with the Idealists, for the most part, the concrete nature of ultimate principles and concepts has been pre- sented as if determined by the analogy of physics. Mod- ern philosophy is essentially a universal mathematics and physics, in which mankind in general and still more the individual man assumes an extremely modest place. But, on the other hand, as practically applied, this doctrine presents an estimate of the value of thought which presupposes mind as the essential and fundamen- tal thing in the world. The philosophers, too, who proceed in purely theoretical investigation by the em- pirically incluctive method, practically interpret mind as an ideal concept, which is determined by a rational meaning, and by an inner nature valuable in itself, and superior to everything external. By this our practical life is, as a matter of fact, formulated. In law, in sociology, in education, this estimate of mind forms the foundation, though often unconsciously recognized. Science and life are brought thus into open contradic- tion. We are unable th'eoretically to justify that which practically we will not and can not give up. As a re- sult of ail this, it is not only philosophers and theolo- gians anxious about their systems who stir up problems and contradictions in the present state of things, but every man who reflects deeply upon his own life must feel them directly, and fight his way through them. CONCLUSION. 303 But, whenever we find in the general thought-life a misapplication of principles, and so a contradiction be- tween doctrine and practice, we can well call it a crisis ; and science is always right, in such a case, in subjecting the foundation of the whole to criticism. When we once find ourselves in doubt, we must turn back to the principles of modem thought itself. For that the pres- ent crisis arises from the insufficient carrvinor out of these principles can not well be asserted, in view of the wonderful mental force which was employed in their formation. AVlio would dare to solve the problem which defied the genius of a Leibnitz ? Still more erroneous is it to throw the whole blame upon the excesses and mistakes of particular persons or parties; for how did it happen that these obtained so great a power, and that the truth was so weak to resist them ? One man may contribute more to the result by what he does, anoth- er by what he leaves undone — the blame and destiny are common to both. The present condition of things is, in truth, different from that of the thought-culmination of modern times,* but it has been developed from it in causal connection, and has only brought out what had been already estab- lished. How was the misapplication possible, if the foundation was firmly laid ? How could there be a doubt as to the value of the reason, if it originally held * There is an essential difference between the present day and the period of culmination, in the fact that, in that period, not only were there other forces, especially Christianity, which acted still more powerfully, in connection with the modern principles, but also that both members of the antithesis, which we have met throughout, were still a match for one another, and by their reciprocal interaction increased and deepened each other. Idealism is not now refuted, but, in common life, it is limited to an ever-narrower sphere. After the supplementing and the contest thu3 subside a falling off must be the result. 304 MODERN PHILOSOnilCAL CONCEPTS. a secure position ? How could discord become promi- nent and powerful, unless it was present from the be- ginning in the principles ? We find ourselves thus ever referred back to an im- partial estimation and criticism of these primary prin- ciples. It is especially necessary that we do not fabri- cate dogmatically a self-sufficiency in our own range of thought^ or faith in the all-sufficiency of our own prin- ciples ; and that we oppose orthodoxy as a boastful confidence in our own reason, not only in its forms of development, but also in itself. Yet, if we understand the problems of the present day in their histori co-genetic connection, and know that the force which impels our present thought is derived from the primary tendency of the times, and if we are fur- ther convinced that this tendency has been of incom- parable service in history in general, and has produced results which can not be denied even by their most resolute opponents (as, for example, exact science, the development of culture, and the recognition of individ- uality), if we bear all this in mind, it will not be possible to criticise without at the same time making promi- nent the greatness and fruitfulness of modern princi- ples, and without rising above all petty partisan strife. Whether one man apj^ears as a friend, or another as an enemy of those principles, is a matter of the most com- plete indifference ; for we treat here of the forces of the world's history, which are independent of the arbi- trariness and opinions of individuals and of jiarties. The only question is, whether those principles exhaust the whole content of human life, and whether they do not need to be taken up into a higher connection if they are to assert themselves in their original purity, depth, and power. u RETURN CIRCULATION DEPARTMENT jQw^m^ 202 Main Li brary LOAN PERIOD 1 HOME USE ALL BOOKS MAY BE RECALLED AFTER 7 DAYS Renewals and Recharges may be made 4 days prior to the due date. Books may be Renewed by calling 642-3405. DUE AS STAMPED BELOW I^Y^'Vb ■ if '" * w^' m^ OV/*^ OCT 1 2007 k li,\i FORM NO. DD6, UNIVERSITY OF CALIF^ BERKELEY, CA 94, U.C. BERKELEY LIBRARIES C0DMQ13213 tr-: THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY