THE LIBRARY
OF

THE UNIVERSITY

OF CALIFORNIA

LOS ANGELES

> N HtUDI MENTALS;

BEING

R§]IT^

The Principles of Government — The Government of

England — The East India Company — The Court of

Directors — The Board of Control — The System of

Government in India ; and on Jurisprudence or

the Principles of Administrative Justice-.

ADDRESSED TO THE NATIVES

INDIA.

GEORGE ^NORTON, Esq.

£JL : , . J SEffiA3BSl£s,So

M ADR A S :
J. B. I'll A 110 AIL

184 1.

AJlia.vJiu:* PUESS—J. hall, fhixteh,

P> ■

THE PEOPLE OF INDIA

THIS WORK

IS DEDICATED AND PRESENTED

GEORGE NORTON,

1351861

CONTENTS.

♦

Pages
PRELIMINARY ADDRESS 1

Discourse I. — On the Principles of Government.

SECTION L— Of the quality and usefulness of the Science of

Political Government 25

II. — Of the Origin of Political Government 27

III.— Of the Objects of Political Government 29

IV. — Of the necessity of a settled Plan of Power— or

a Constitution 32^

V.— Of the Marks and Characteristics of a well-con-
stituted Government. First ; attention due to
the habits, feelings, and manners of the People 37
VI. — The same subject continued. Second ; Changes

should not be sudden 40

VIL— The same subject continued. Third ; the Exter-
nal and Natural condition of a countrj', and

of its Inhabitants, to be observed 43

VIII. — The same subject continued. Fourth ; of the
Share which the People should have in the

Administration of the Government 46

IX. — The same subject continued. Fourth ; of the
Share of the People in the government exer-
cised by a System of Representation 52

X. — Reflections on the Marks and Characteristics of
good government which have been discussed ;

and on the Political condition of India GO

XI. — Of the evils of Arbitrary Government (j 1

Discourse II.— On the Government of England.

SECTION L— Of the Nature and Origin of the English Con-
stitution | yj

. ■ II. — Of the Supreme or Legislative authority of the

English Government. 75

U CONTENTS.

Pages

SECTION III.— Of the Queen in her Legislative capacity 77

IV.— Of the House ofLords 82

V. — Of the House of Commons 88

VI.— Of the mode of enacting Laws, or Statutes 100

VII.— Of the Executive Branch of the English Go-
vernment..... 106

Discourse III. — Of the East India Company.

SECTION I.— Introductory Observations 119

II.— Of the meaning of the term Company; and of
the Nature and Objects of such an Associa-
tion :. 123

III.— Of the Origin and Formation of the East India

Company 123

IV.— Of the Progress of the East India Company,

until they became a Political Power 133

V.— Survey of the Political Progress and Condition
of the Native States of India, previous to the

Conquests of the East India Company 140

VI. — Of the Progressive Conquests of European Na-
tions in India, and the effects 148

VII. — Of the Means and Resources of the East India

Company for the conquest of India 152

VIII. — Of the Component Members of the East India

Company — the Proprietors of Stock 16}

Discourse IV.— Of the Court of Directors, and Board of Control.

SECTION I.— Of the Qualifications of Individual Directors.... 1G9
II.— Of the course by which the Directors act, as

a Court , 174

HI. — Of the Powers of the Court of Directors. 179

IV.— Of the Board of Control 192

DiscocnsE V. — Of the Government in India.

SECTION I,— Preliminary Observations on the subject of this

Discourse 199

II. — History of the formation and course of the* Eng-
lish Government in India, previous to the fiis-t .
regulating Act of 1773 204

CONTENTS. Ill

Pages
SECTION III.— Of the Progress of the Eng.iSh Governments of
India, from the year 1773 until the passing of

the last Charter Act of 1833 21

IV. — Of the manner in which the Governments of In-
dia are constituted, and of what members

these Governments are composed.. 220

V. — Of the course and method by which the Govern-
ments of India exercise their Functions 226

VI,_ Of the Powers exercised by the Governments of
India: and, first, of the Superintending and
Controlling powers of the SupremeGovernment 231
VII.— The same subject continued : History and na-
ture of the Legislative powers of the Supreme

Government . ••• 236

VIII.— The same subject continued : of other peculiar

powers of the Supreme Government 247

IX.— The same subject continued: of the Powers ex-
ercised by the Subordinate Governments 249

X. — Reflections on the quality of the system of Go-
vernment in India; and notices of some de-
fects , 256

Discourse VI. — On Jurisprudence : or the principles of Administrative

Justice.

SECTION I.— Of the quality of Justice as a Virtue, and of the
quality of the Science of Administrative Jus-
tice 271

II.— Of the nature and object of human laws for the

Administration of Justice 276

III.— Of the origin and nature of Property 279

IV. — Of the transfer of and succession to Property... 282

V. — Of the security of the Person 2S

VI — That the laws on which Administrative Justice is

founded should be certain and clear 285

VII. — In what manner Laws should specify and define

righta 290

VIII. — Of the Civil Code — for the restoration of Rights,

and the redress of Injuries , 292

IV C O N T K K T S.

Pages
SECTION IX.— Of the Criminal Code for the punishment of

Injuries 295

X. — That revenge is not a just principle or object of

laws against Crime 298

XI. — The legitimate object of human Punishment .... 302
XII. — Of the Code of Judicial Procedure, and its

nature and objects 30G

XIII. —Of the evils arising from a defective method of

Judicial Procedure 312

XIV. — That the laws of a country ought to depend on
certain general principles, and be arranged ac-
cording to some system — the knowledge ©f

which forms a Science 316

XV. — Of the quality of the English system of Law 320

XVI. — Of the causes of Litigation, independently of

tlie quality of Laws 325

XVII. — Of the expediency of reducing the laws of a

country to a systematic Code 327

T has appeared requisite to offer to the English reader
some explanation of the nature and object of the present
work.

The substance of the ensuing Discourses formed part of
a series of Lectures delivered in years 1833 and 1834, in
the College Hall of Madras, to an audience chiefly compos-
ed of Natives in a respectable class of life.

These Lectures weve delivered from Notes ; and, with
the exception of the Preliminary address, were couched in
the most familiar style, both in language and manner.
Every effort was resorted to for the purpose of keepin g
alive the attention of a Native audience, and facilitating
their comprehension — as, by local and personal illustration,
and even occasionally by colloquial discussion.

In reducing the multifarious materials of these Lectures
into a connected work, of course such a character of com-
position could not be adopted. Nevertheless, to warrant
any reasonable hope of attracting the perusal, or fixing the
attention, of a Native reader, a peculiar style and a pecu-
liar treatment of the subjects had to be attempted. The
Author who would write well or agreeably to an English
reader, upon the topics treated of in this work, must write as
addressing those who already know much, and have thought
much. He who seeks to impart information of this nature
efficiently, even to the most enlightened portion of the Na-
tive Public who understand English, must address himself

Jj ADVERTISEMENT.

to those who know little, and have thought less upon these
subjects. He has td recollect that, not only are many of
the expressions he is constrained to use new to the Native
reader, as well as peculiarly comprehensive and abstract—*
but that his ideas, and his sentiments, and his narrative
statements are also new to him. They are often alien alto-
gether to such a reader's preconceptions, and even to his
personal feelings. It is seldom that allusion is permissible
— explanation is necessary at every step. Literary graces
must be freely sacrificed— literary faults must sometimes
be leaned to.

These considerations have constantly operated on the
Author's mind ; and, indeed, have occasioned his main
difficulties in composition. His chief study has been to
write suitably to Native comprehension — he has at the same
time felt a desire to elevate their thoughts and feelings.
He has likewise kept in view the contingency of some at-
tempt at an exposition of the subject-matter of these trea-
tises through the medium of the Native languages. Actu-
ated by th<'se impressions he has from time to time commu-
nicated portions of his manuscript to intelligent Natives,
and has been in some degree guided and encouraged by
their approbation.

The Author has thought it due to himself to offer these
explanations to the English reader upon the style and
quality of the ensuing treatises. He is prepared to be
criticised by such without favour, but he is unwilling to be
judged without fairness.

It may be surmised, perhaps, in reference to the above
observations, that this publication is at least premature —
that it neither deserves, nor is calculated, to be popular ;
and therefore it is not likely to be useful. This is so novel
an undertaking that the Author indulges no speculation as

ADVERTISEMENT. Jjj

to its popularity with any classes of the Native public.
But he is nevertheless buoyed up by the J hope of its becom-
ing useful, even though it may never become popular. Since
the time when the Lectures above alluded to were delivered,
a very extraordinary change has become notorious in the
sentiments of Native Society throughout India. An at-
tachment to the British rule has gradually extended, and
an admiration of its institutions. A spirit of social inter*
course has begun to prevail, and a desire of amalgamation
as fellow-subjects of one Empire. But, above all, a convic-
tion of the advantages of English education, and an earnest
desire to promote it, and thereby to gain the only true quali-
fications for office and station, in the state and in society,
has spread widely among the superior classes of the Native
population. This change of feeling can no longer be disput-
ed nor despised. Seventy thousand Natives of respectabili-
ty entreating by one single petition the patronage of Go-
vernment to the cause of education is a sufficient proof at
least that such a spirit is awakened. If, indeed, the dif-
fusion of knowledge and the increase of scholastic instituti-
ons has hardly kept pace with the wants and wishes of the
people, yet the care of the Indian Governments and the be-
nevolence of societies and of individuls have provided a
whole rising generation of Native students in English litera-
ture. A Native public so directing their attention to these
noble and national objects ; and arising generation so vers-
ed in the more useful departments of English learning, can
hardly devote their inquiries to topics of more true interest
to themselves and to their country, than such as are treated
of in the ensuing pages.

If there existed any English works which compendiously
and suitably expounded the principles of Government and
of law, and the fundamental constitution of the English and
Indian Governments, to which enlightened Natives might

ADVERTISEMENT.
IV

resort with an assurance of easy and adequate information,
the following work would perhaps neither merit nor receive
any notice. But, if it would be vain to point to English lite-
rature for such purposes, the attempt in some degree to sup-
ply such a deficiency is not a misguided one. It may serve
to direct Native thought into new and productive channels-
it may serve thereby to strengthen the union of the Native
people under the British rule. It may at least prepare the
way for the more successful labours of those who may bring
that interrupted leisure, and apply that continuous thought,
to their task, which, however necessary, the avocations of the
author of these Essays would not permit.

It may be objected to the following Discourses that, as
they contain little that has not been better written before by
accredited authors, it would have been fair, and useful to
the studiou.s inquirer, to have quoted copiously and distinct-
ly the authority from which most of the positions appear to
be taken. But the truth is that not much has been borrow-
ed from preceding authors. What is not new has been at
least newly treated of; and very little consultation has been
given to the great writers on politics, moral philosophy, and
jurisprudence, until after the task of composition was
closed. The work has, indeed, been corrected, and some-
times adorned, on subsequent references to such authorities
—and the learned reader (if any should be at the pains to
take up this Volume) will be reminded, occasionally as he
proceeds, of Bacon, of Locke, of Montesquieu, of Hume, of
Mill, of Aristotle, and of others. But he will see, at the
same time, that there is not room for frequent reference
to such authorities, in consequence of the manner in which
their common subjects have been worked up in these treatis-
es. Some positions, it is believed, are altogether new— as,
for instance, what have been advanced as the true distin-
guishing principles of the Civil and Criminal Codes. The
most frequent resemblance may perhaps be found between

ADVERTISEMENT. ^

some portions of (his work and some portions of Bodin's*
Republic, and of Paley's Moral and Political Philosophy — and
yet not a line of either of those treatises was ever read by
the Author till after these Discourses had been written, nor
has a line been since altered in consequence of such perusal.
He was, however, forcibly struck with the following obser-
vation in the preface of the latter writer ; which observa-
tion he adopts for himself: ff My method of writing has
<c been, to extract what 1 could from my own stores and my
" own reflections in the first place, to put down that, and
" afterwards to consult upon each subject such readings aa
" fell in my way : which order, I am convinced, is the
" only one whereby any person can keep his own thoughts
" from sliding into other men's trains." Of course these re-
marks apply only to the didactic portion of the work.

It has been in the Author's contemplation to proceed
somewhat further with these dissertations ; and to add dis-
courses on the nature and quality of the laws of England,
as administered in the Supreme Courts of India, and on the
law of India, as administered in the Provinces. These
might be followed up by expositions of the course of judi-
cial procedure in the Supreme Courts (and particularly as
regards the administration of criminal laws,) and of the
course of judicial procedure in the Provincial Courts. It
will be allowed, perhaps, that such disquisitions, if ade-
quately treated, would not be without interest or without
use. It remains, however, to learn whether the reception of
this volume should encourage a repetition of the present expe-

• It has been remarked by a great ciitic and Philosopher (Dugald Stewart) that the
observations of no political writer " have been more frequently transcribed without
" acknowledgment," than those of Bodin. And, certainly, the palpable resemblance
of many of his positions, and much of his reasoning to those in the 1st and 6th of the
following Discourses would lead a learned reader to class their Author (but for his posi-
tive assertion to the contrary; as open to the same imputation. BoJin, however,
abounds in errors, and even absurdities ; and, had a transcriber used his pages, he
would hardly have avoided noticing, or refuting tin in. The Author has not done no
for the obvious reason that, at the time of writing, he was not aware of them.

v { ADVERTISEMENT.

rim'fent. In the mean time it has been announced, that Lord
Auckland's government has suggested to the Boards who
have the superintendence of Rational education in India,
the expediency of measures f6r engaging qualified indivi-
duals in the composition of various Elementary 1 reatises,
as manuals of public instruction— among which are very
judiciously included treatises on local law. It may be
reasonably hoped that individuals will be found ready to
engage in such an honourable duty, who are not only far
more conversant in the local law of India than the Author
of this work pretends to be — but who are more likely, from
their acquaintance with Oriental languages, and an intimate
knowledge of the mental character and disposition of the
Natives, to fall into a happier vein of composition. At all
events they will possess that requisite leisure for the task,
which this Author cannot command.

The Author has but one further observation to make —
which is upon his having affected to present, as well as to
dedicate, his work to the people of India. It is not that
he assumes to put any value upon it — it may be altogether
"worthless, and continue to be thought so. On the other
hand, it is possible that it may attain a higher degree of
attention than at present he can expect. In that case he
wishes it to be known that he claims no copyright. He
has so little of an Author's regard for his work, that he
cares not who may think fit to print it, or to extract from
it, or to use up any portion of it. He has been desirous of
affording a fair profit to the publisher of the first Edition-
fixing the price as low as is compatible with such profit—
and he has also fixed some price with a view to save him-
self from any serious pecuniary loss. But, if either of those
purposes are answered, he places no other restriction on
any benefit the Public is able to derive from this work.

Madras, May 30M/1841.

* PRELIMINARY ADDRESS.

Right Honorable Sir,] Gentlemen, and mij Friends,

1 am about to undertake a task, which I cannot hope
justly to fulfil ; but it is an effort in which any success what-
ever must diffuse wide and lasting benefits. I aim at open-
ing to the minds and reflection of the Native Community
a knowledge of the principles of government and of justice
— an acquaintance with the plan of government under
which they live— a knowledge of the nature of its laws, and
of the appointed course for the administration of justice un-
der them.

I have meditated much on the difficulties of this under-
taking ; and, now, on the entrance of my path, I pause in
hesitation and doubt. The only encouragement on which
I rely, and which animates me at this moment, is that zeal,
and that anxiety, which the spectacle before me of so nu-
merous a body of Natives of the first class proves. Other
feelings subside in gratification while addressing myself
to those who evince such an unequivocal desire of availing
themselves to the utmost of the means of improvement my
labours can offer.

* The substance of this address (a note of which was published at the
time) was delivered in the College Hall of Madias as the commence-
ment of a scries of Lectures on the present and other subjects. It is hero
republished as an introduction to the subsequent discourses.

t 'lhe Governor, Sir Fbedlkick Adam, was present.

2 PRELIMINARY ADDRESS.

I have reason to know that you have become aware of
the honorable policy uhich for some years past has char-
acterized the measures of the governments, both of Eng-
land and India towards the Natives. The prospects and pri-
vileges now opened to you, of attaining to important offices
in the civil government of jour country, and in the admi-
nistration of its laws, are at the same time dependent on
your qualifications to sustain them. You have been for-
ward in shewing yourselves worthy of the opportunities thus
afforded of advancing your political and social position.
Much of this was expected of you by your fellow-subjects.
They have not been deceived. Be assured that .your en-
deavours will be cordially fostered by the government in
England ; and that the same disposition is felt in India re-
quires no better proof than the presence of the Governor and
of so many of the heads of society on the present occasion.

Of one voluntary effort on the part of the Hindoo com-
munity for the advancement of sound knowledge amongst
themselves it behoves me here to speak. I allude to the
institution of a Hindoo Literary Society, among the first
fruits of which is the undertaking in which I am now engag-
ed. I am gratified to find that this Society has deemed the
principles of government and of law, the plan of power,
the quality of the laws under which they live, and the ad-
ministration of those laws, to be among the most valuable
departments of useful knowledge. Under this impression
seme of its most respected members have from time to
time consulted me on the best method of prosecuting their
own studies or of directing the application' of others ;
and it is scarce necessary to inform those versed in learn-
ing of this nature, and who are acquainted with the pre-
sent progress of your community in English literature,
that no satisfactory advice could be afforded. I might
point in vain to the learned works of European scholars in
politics and in laws ; I might look in vain amongs't these
works for the most elementary opening of such branches

PRELIMINARY ADDRESS. 3

of knowledge, such as might at once be adapted to the
peculiar circumstances which characterise the present con-
dition of the people of this Empire, and to their present
state of mental cultivation.

All that I could accomplish in furtherance of these honor-
able desires — all that lies in my power in advancing that
great interest in the native public at large to become worthy
of the prospects placed before them— I am now about to
attempt. I have thought it possible to effect something for
the public benefit, in bringing before your view, through
an easy and popular style of delivery, such as I now
aim at, some outline of the principles of Government,
of Justice, and of Law — some intelligible explana-
tions of what plan of government, and what course in
th« administration of the law, prevails throughout this
your native land. To these my best services 1 bid you
welcome. I hope to excite at least an impulse in your minds
to consider the vast national importance of your progress in
this department of knowledge, on which all your dearest
interests are wound up. Hereafter (and the sooner that
time arrives the better) you, or those who come after you, will
better attain such information through Boobs and Treatises
adapted to your progress in literature and experience in life.

Let me endeavour to engage your attention by enlarging
swhat further on topics calculated to infuse a desire and
Confidence on your parts in the pursuit to which 1 invite you,
and at the sain \ time to cheer my own spirit at this com-
1 1 of my lab urs. If we rest our momentary no-

tice on the early and feeble beginnings of a great work,
how insignificant do they appear— but that our contempla-
is are soon absorbed in the worth and magnificence of the
work designed, llosv trivial a thing in itself is the first
plunge of the pi mghshare in the wild soil of a wasted
country. — how animating an I sublime the vision of expand-
ed fertility to which it directs our thoughts. Let us not be

4 PRELIMINARY ADDRESS

disinheartened at the quality of these our first attempts, nor
by the apprehension of the little we may accomplish. I call
to mind what were the fears and sensations of one,* who,
in opening to the view of my own countrymen in England
a systematic display of the nature of the English law and
government, proved in the result one of the greatest be-
nefactors of his age. I call to mind what were his feelings
when, without patronage, or office, or duty, he first on a
mere voluntary engagement, and before a few private
students, undertook that task which afterwards became the
source of a vast national boon, and of his own perpetual
fame.

Pretensions such as these I do not advance — but I can-
not fail to draw encouragement from the similarity of our
undertakings. This eminent man, meditating upon the
duty cast on every enlightened citizen to become acquaint-
ed in some degree with the laws of his country, and
mindful how necessary was the profound study of those
laws to all who sought professional or political distinction,
points out in forcible language how discouraging, even
to the English student, was the entrance to the study of
the law —without public direction in what course to pur-
sue his enquiries — no private assistance to remove the dis-
tresses and difficulties which will always embarrass a be-
ginner ; so that the student might be left to a tedious
lonely process of extracting from a mass of undigested
learning : and, he adds, it was little to be wondered at,
under disadvantages like these, that men of moderate capa-
cily confused themselves at first setting out, and continued
dark and puzzled during the remainder of their lives.

If with these considerations on his mind this learned and
patriotic man resolved to devote his talents and acquirements

* Sir William Blackstone, the author of the Commentaries on the
Laws of England.

PRELIMINARY ADDRESS. £

to that great object in which his success was so conspicuous
— how much more forcibly do the prese_nt difficulties which
overwhelm the efforts of the native community of India to
attain to this valuable knowledge appeal for assistance. To-
wards such an object, indeed, I might venture to trust that
my present services are not ill-directed. But how am I to
disguise, and how can I explain a way, those difficulties
which, not only the very nature of my task, but the peculiar
quality of my audience must necessarily oppose to my suc-
cess. The subjects on which I am about to discourse are
in themselves profound and, to any but an attentive and an
intelligent mind, repulsive. When Blackstone addressed
himself to well educated English youths, burning with a de-
sire to enter on those studies on which their fame or fortune
were to depend, he could not refrain from expressing his
fears lest an inadequate manner might beget a distaste
to the learning he aimed at imparting, or lest a defective
execution should leave a blight upon its fruits. Gifted with
an eloquence that could charm attention — abounding in all
the requisite knowledge — and addressing an assembly of
scholars, as greedy to receive instruction, as competent and
willing to applaud his labour — he, nevertheless, hesitated at
the thought of a failure which might hinder, rather than ad-
vance, the object of his rational hopes.

But if any such considerations could justify diffidence in
him — I cannot deny that they operate with far greater
weight on my own reflection. Neither can I shut out from
my own view — nor will 1 attempt to do so from yours —
other more discouraging obstacles to my success. I cannot
but be conscious how incapable I may be deemed of so ex-
pressing myself in a language not your own, as at once to
carry with me your comprehension, and to give due effect
to my meaning. The novelty of such studies as these — your
indistinct and unconsidered notions of government, and of
law — your peculiar tenets of religion and of caste — your pe-
culiar domestic habits —and your very modes of thinking

PRELIMINARY ADDRESS.

and of expression, so widely differing from those of my own
countrymen— these are all sources of perplexity, which, if
they do not overwhelm me with despondence, palpably warn
me of what I have to struggle against.

Such are without disguise the obstacles in our path — let
us turn our more cheerful regard to those means by which
through our united exertions we may surmount them — never
losing sight of the noble result we aspire to, in the advance-
ment of the best and national interests of your community.

I would first exhort you not to distrust your own men-
tal powers, or the effects of persevering labour at improve-
ment. Mad I attempted ten years ago to address myself
to the native community at Bombay as I now address this
audience, I doubt if three natives could be found there to
whom I should have made myself intelligible. Were 1 now
to invite such an attendance in that city, I am fully per-
suaded that more than one hundred enlightened and
anxious students would flock to such a call. To what
powerful cause was this to be attributed? To the pa-
triotic wisdom and to the energy of one man — who made it
the care of his government that the plain — the infinite —
advantages of sound knowledge should be unfolded to the
view of the heads of native society in that presidency.
To Mr. Elphinstone, and the zealous and able agents of his
policy in forwarding the same cause in which I am engag-
ed, are your neighbours indebted for that extraordinary
advancement, both political and social, which cannot fail
to have attracted your admiration and interest. But, were
I to compare the condition of the native community of
that presidency, as I first knew it, in point of acquaint-
ance with the English language, and progress in literary
acquirements, with the position of yourselves at this mo-
ment, I can feel no hesitation in declaring the superiori-
ty to be with you. But the necessary effects, and the value
of mental cultivation (and I know of no more important

PRELIMINARY ADDRESS. 7

objects of it than those I propose to discuss) have been fully
appreciated by your Bombay fellow- subjects. The better
orders have seconded by their own zealous exertions the
efforts of their English friends— and their reward has been
almost as immediate as it has proved lasting.

The infinite advantages, indeed, of a liberal education it
is quite needless I should expatiate upon, and it may be
thought by some that your need of them, and your partial
acquaintance even with the language in which 1 address
you, must preclude altogether any effectual progress in the
higher departments of knowledge through such a medium
of instruction as I resort to. Some little experience
in intercourse with such members of our community as
I see before me has inspired me with better hopes. I
do indeed believe that any elaborated treatise, thus deli-
vered verbally, must necessarily fail of practical success
—and, although such a work might, or at least may
hereafter, prove an useful assistance to those who nobly de-
dicate themselves to such studies (provided it should be
adapted to your present circumstances and condition) yet
it could only become so by being used as a source of private
labour and meditation. These considerations have prompted
the mode of addressing you which I propose to pursue. By
delivering myself, to the best of my endeavours, in the fami-
liar language rather of conversation than of lecture, I may
perhaps not only become the easier understood, but 1 may
better draw out your attention and interest towards the sub-
jects I discuss. I can take opportunities of repeating anel
enforcing in various ways topics not at first clear to your per-
ception — and I may attract (as I now invite) your own per-
sonal inquiries anel discussion as we proceed. Let us not
despair, therefore, of effectual progress together in thes:e new
and unexplored paths. Come jou with B sincere desire to
understand what you ought not to feel satisfied in not under-
standing-*- be you but willing to learn, anel resolute in pay-
ing •attention— and I think I jnay safely promise that you
will not go thanklessly away

PRELIMINARY ADDRESS.

Connected with these hopes it is but fair and just that I
should remind you ot" the many examples of wise and talervted
men who have from time to time adorned the annals of your
native history — and left their memory for your encouragement
to dismiss all idle apprehensions of knowledge of this nature
being too high for you. From old times down to the present
moment, many have arisen among you who truly deserved
the titles of moralists, of statesmen, of lawgivers. It is im-
possible but that most of you have often heard the name of
Menu — and there are many other ancient writers whose
maxims and doctrines I might quote with respect. The pro-
gress of the Mahometans of many countries in literature is
well known and appreciated ; and I do but repeat, what in,
justice has often been acknowledged, that the European
nations owe much of their advancement to the learning of
Mahometans in the deeper and more useful branches of
knowledge and science. The Madras System of Education
has been the source, also, of a valuable boon to the whole
European world, as exemplifying the plan of mutual instruc-
tion now so common in the schools of England, which has
produced astonishing effects in disseminating the elements
of knowledge throughout the youthful classes of the people.

True, indeed, it is, that this learning, these maxims, and
these doctrines of Eastern Sages, are characterized with
many errors and defects— (so my own reason compels me
to avow) — and no system of political government or of
jurisprudence has ever yet been taught or prevailed in
these countries but such as falls far short of the intellectual
standard of those systems generally prevailing in Europe.
But it serves sufficiently the objects of our present meeting
to know, that strength of mind, much knowledge of human
nature, much sagacity and quickness of apprehension are
abundantly testified — and perhaps it required but that the
minds of these eminent men should have been regulated and
directed by the same bias as that which swayed the studies
of the great men of Europe, to have enabled them to ex-
hibit similar results.

PRELIMINARY ADDRESS, g

Are you then the true descendants of such honored coun-
trymen — or are we to suppose that your, faculties are no
longer the same ? Happily our own personal experience has
proved to us the contrary. You have all heard of Ham Mo-
hun Hoy — you know that he has earned the credit of an
excellent English scholar and writer. I can further assure
you that his advice and opinions have been consulted — not
without real advantage — by the ablest statesmen in Eng-
land on subjects connected with the good government of
this country, and the mode of administering justice within
it. Here is a plain proof that there is no deficiency of
capacity, or of talent, for pursuits such as those to which I
invite your attention, among the natives of this country.
I am enabled also to state, from the communication of
one who knew him well (Sir John Malcolm) the name and
genius of another eminent individual gifted with anilities
which, if they did not form the plan of government of an
Empire, were qualified for even so exalted a task. I speak
of Poorneah, who was the Dewan of Mysore, at the period
of the deposition of Tippo Saib and his family. Many days
of discussion — many of anxious thought — were devoted by
two of the greatest statesmen of this age, the Great Duke
of Wellington (then Sir Arthur Wellesley) and Sir Barry
Close, in settling the future plan of government to be
administered -but Sir John Malcolm, who was present at
those discussions, informed me that, after all, the able sug-
gestions of Poorneah were those finally confided in.

In naming before you Sir John Malcolm, who was per-
sonally known to several of you now present, I call on you,
my native friends, to revere the memory of that man : for
he was one who truly loved, and laboured for, and served
this country. He had his faults — which some called vani-
ties—but they were faults which testified a clear and noble
spirit — for they were of a kind which proved the first ambi-
tion, of his heart was to be useful to mankind.

JO niELIMlNARY ADDRESS.

But, before I quit this topic, I must commemorate one
more native individual, lately living among us, whose sound
judgment, and many acquirements raised him to a very con-
spicuous eminence as well in the estimation of us Englishmen,
as in that of the native community of this place. I allude to
one whom I need not name, who was the author of the En-
glish document I hold in my hand ; which, in the force and
accuracy of its language, as well as in the expanded views it
unfolds, evinces at once a capacity and a cultivation of intel-
lect which I can hardly desire should be surpassed by any who
honor me at this moment wilh their attention. In reading
this his solemn dying advice to his sons, I warm in'admira-
tion of a mind soaring above all local prejudices, and preg-
nant with the wisdom of a reflecting experience. How just,
how clear, how convincing, and how weighty is every sen-
tence in which he inculcates those lessons of independence,
of self-government, and self-exertion, which he shews ought
to supersede all slavish bonds of ignorant customs ! In leav-
ing this his best legacy to his children, he may be said to
have left a legacy to human kind.*

* The document was the Will of Chinnatoraby Moodelly, which verba-
tim inhis own English ended as follows:— "With a view to the real welfare
' of my said Sons, and considering that a life of activity and persever-
' ance is the only certain path to independence and respectability, I
" earnestly recommend that they shall respectively on attaining the age
" of 21 year3 establish themselves in separate houses, each living on his
" own separate means, and by his own separate acquisitions, in the sole
" enjoyment of the fruits of his own industry, as this mode of life will
" be the best adapted to avoid internal domestic disputes and quarrels,
u which too frequently occur where too many persons compose a family,
" and are interested in a joint common stock ; in which latter case the
" idle, the illiterate, and ill -principled live in indolence and waste at the
' expence of the diligent, ingenious, and industrious members of the
' same family. My reason for giving this recommendation proceeds
' from my own observation through life, and from conviction that a
«' state of dependence equals that of slavery ; as he that has a. confidence
" in the support of another, seldom has ambition to support himself
" for his own advancement, and consequently neglects the improvement

PRELIMINARY ADDRESS. \\

And when I thus presume to scan and measure the
scope of your intellectual powers, and profess to test
the quality of your means of comprehension— when I con-
trast what may be your present position in these respects,
with that advancement to which your neighbours of the
other presidencies have arrived, and to which this my hum-
ble effort is aimed at contributing — can I be unmindful of
what history has proclaimed of the English Nation— from
what a debasement to what an eminence it has emerged,
through the influence of equal laws and a well constituted
form of government ? You see before you the scanty por-
tion of a distant people— and that portion subdivided in
petty societies, and scattered individually throughout a
country ten times larger than their native land, and amidst
a population outnumbering them more than teu thousand
fold. You learn that by the force of their arms, or by the
wisdom of their political measures, vast kingdoms have
been brought under their sway — you see that a mighty and
extended empire is governed throughout all its branches, in
peace and prosperity, under the guardianship as it were of
one master spirit. You observe that by their arts of com-
merce new kinds of wealth are spread over the country —
new lines of industry are opened — new sources of national in-
terest are flowing. The question arises in your minds
instinctively — how were these wonders atchieved ? — and a
moment's reflection supplies the instant answer. By their
wise and well established government— by their just and
well administered laws — this people have thus arisen : By
their energy, of soul and character, by their advancement
beyond their fellow-men in science, in the arts of life, and
in knowledge of every quality, have they commanded means

" of his mind, having little or no occasion for the exercise of genius or
" penetration, owing to hie being a stranger to business and indifferent
" about his own reputation, or the good opinion which respectable and
" praiseworthy characters never fail to establish in the world by a strict
" adherence to instruction aud useful pursuits."

PRELIMINARY ADDRESS.

which could not be resisted, and founded Kmpires where they
but recently sought reception among strangers. But, should
I call you from this contemplation, and picture to your ima-
ginations the original race from which this people descend-
ed, I should summon you to behold savage hordes of men,
roving through woods and wastes, without clothing — at a pe-
riod whenlndia contained flourishing cities and well cultivated
plains, swarming with a people who lived under regular go-
vernments, and who were almost as far advanced in civiliza-
tion and in the agreeable arts of life, as they were one hun-
dred years ago. Judge for yourselves, then, what are the
true sources of national advancement ; and doubt <not that
the same mental cultivation may accomplish for the people of
India that which it has effected for a nation of barbarians.

It was the lot of the English nation, in these ancient
times, to be invaded by a people whose empire was more
powerful and extended than even that of England at the
present moment. Borne down at once to subjection they
gained from their conquerors far more than a compensation
in the introduction of such laws and regular government
as soon raised them from a savage state into that of civi-
lization. Cities were founded, fertility overspread the
plains, the arts of peace began to flourish, and literature
began to raise her schools where the beasts of the forest had
but lately ranged.

But events which change the destinies of Empires and of
mankind drew from the laud those conquerors who had be-
come protectors — and the helpless natives, bereft of the su-
perintendence of a regular authority, and a prey to internal
divisions, soon relapsed into almost their former condition of
privation and misery. A letter which they addressed for
succour to their late governors (I speak of the Roman peo«
pie), who had been compelled to abandon them for the pro-
tection of their own immediate homes, was entitled " The
u groans of the Britons." [' The Barbarians," they say,

1'RELIMINARY ADDRESS.

" drive us into the sea ; the sea throws us back on the
" barbarians. We have but the hard choice to perish either
" by the waves or the sword." Such was the state of the Bri-
tish people some fourteen hundred years ago — sunk once
more into their original ignorance and helplessness, at. a pe-
riod when India was composed of many wealthy and luxuri-
ous nations, living from age to age under the influence of
settled laws and organized governments.

I could hardly fail of exciting your interest in tracing the
progressive history of the English nation from so wretched
a political condition ; and it would not be altogether foreign
from the object of my present address to do so. But I
must restrain myself to a passing glance.

With many bloody struggles against a new invasion of
foreign foes — after many desolating wars throughout, all
parts of I he country — after two hundred years of confusion
and internal disorders during which neither laws nor litera-
ture could find a resting place, nor scarce a government
existed but in name — the English at last became again an
united people under one settled and constituted plan of
power. Then first began to be laid, under the superin-
tendence of one of the wisest of monarchs, the foundations
of a regulated system of government and of the adminis-
tration of justice, from which has gradually sprung (after
many vicissitudes) that splendid structure of political power
and digested laws which has become a model for other
nations to imitate. 'The details, indeed, of this system,
such as it existed in early times, were very different from
such as characterize that of the present enlightened period ;
but you will learn with some interest that in many parti-
culars they resembled such as by long custom have prevailed
in many parts of India. In ': id, as in India, Villages

had their Head-men; and many Villages, forming one Dis-
trict, were under the control of one magisterial chief.
There too, as here, it was a custom for Villages to supply

PRELIMINARY ADDRESS.

certain of their inhabitants to be pledges for the good
behaviour of the rest — districts for inhabitants of districts
— and cities for the dwellers within cities. It is at least a
curious, if not an instructive, circumstance to mention that
it was also customary at this early period of English history,
when well considered laws began to be made and promulgat-
ed, for certain persons best acquainted with those laws and
the course of administering justice to discourse before as-
semblies of the people, in the way of Lectures, upon those
regulations and ordinances, which the public were called upon
to obey. Some attempts, moreover, were made to digest into
a regular code the whole body of the prevailing laws and
customs of the people — and not without success.

But now occurred another invasion by a multitude of
foreigners — the ruling power was overthrown — strangers
succeeded to paramount authority — and, then, as too gene-
rally happens upon such violent political change, a long and
miserable period of oppression and wrong ensued. The
land became tilled with but two classes, the foreign con-
querors and their dependents.

At this crisis, however, of their third invasion, the people
had already arisen to the rank of an independent nation.
They had already felt the pride of self-government, as well
as experienced the incalculable advantages of equal laws.
They were never destined again to be subdued, or to fall
beneath the weight of arbitrary power. It was in vain that
a series of wilful or imperious monarchs, or that the band
of their attendant chiefs who overspread the realm, essayed
by new and burthensome mandates to destroy their spirit,
or overthrow their institutions. They still claimed their
ancient laws and customs as their rules of right and secu-
rity—they still exerted themselves to obtain a settled and
regular course of government, under which, through constitu-
ted forms, the voice of the people at large might be "heard,
and the general interests be the better pursued. As useful

PRELIMINARY ADDRESS. ]5

knowledge became more and more diffused, and as men-
tal cultivation advanced, the people ^ould not fail to
be further encouraged in their efforts, in proportion as
they observed the evils of uncertain and uncontrolled
authority, and contrasted them with the benefits of ascer-
tained rights. They sought, therefore, their ancient insti-
tutions, and loved their ancient laws — not because they
were old, but because experience had taught them they
were beneficial. For, as intelligence prevails, men become
reconciled, however slowly, to the abandonment of the dear-
est and most inveterate prejudices which reason condemns ;
while they will at the same time contend against constitut-
ed authorities even for new principles of law and govern-
ment which their deliberate judgment shall have approved.
In the end the true cause of the English people triumphed.
Their last invaders found their best interests in becoming
united in rights and in duties with those whom they had
begun by oppressing. By slow gradations, and after several
hundred years, a peaceful and settled government was
once more established — based on certain and just laws
towards the people, and on well arranged forms as regarded
the security and strength of the supreme power of the State.

I date the period as no longer back than about four
hundred years, when, the frame and outline of the English
plan of government having been thus placed on settled
foundations, and the administration of justice now proceed-
ing on ascertained rules and principles, the qualities of both
began to form the subjects of general study among the
best educated and superior classes of the community.
Long previously, indeed, schools of law existed, and many
learned persons had during the course of two or three
centuries taken up the task of expounding portions of the
national jurisprudence — to which circumstance the acknow-
ledged merit to which in aftertimes it attained has been
said to be greatly owing. But, at this latter period, the pro-
gress of these national laws towards perfection had suggested

PRELIMINARY ADDRESS.

the redaction of them into some regular order, such as gave
to them the character and dignity of a science ; and it be-
gan to be evident that on the learning of its professors must
depend in no small degree the maintenance of those laws,
and with them the security and the prosperity of the whole
people.

The course adopted for inculcating a public sense of the
value of these important studies, and of instructing the
class of aspirants at this most distinguished of all the
branches of human knowledge, was mainly by the delivery
of public lectures. You imagine to yourselves a Jiterary
people, reposing in internal peace ; amongst whom the arts
of life had already spread plenty and refinement, and minis-
tered leisure for the highest mental occupation. Not so.
The students who at this period, to the number of 2000,
are said to have flocked around the fountains of
legal knowledge, and all of them members of the highest
class of the English people, lived in cities for the most part
built of wood and clay, and were content with earthern
floors in their houses strewed with rushes in the place of
carpets. In the self same age we learn that Beejapoor exist-
ed in all its grandeur. We read of the Emperor of India step-
ping forth from his marble palace— and Akbar, reigning over
thousands of flourishing cities and a population of one hun-
dred million souls, surveyed the sources of a nation's wealth
and prosperity, and found his empire to be the richest on the
earth. Pausing in meditation on the varied subsequent
fortunes of these two countries, who cannot see in the gra-
dual decay of the one, and in the astonishing advancement
of the other, wherein lies the real and permanent strength
of a nation ? Who is so cold in feeling as not to gather ex-
citement from such thoughts, as the path to national honor
opens to his view ?

These Lectures I have spoken of, delivered to a compara-
tively rude and unrefined people, making their early efforts

PRELIMINARY ADDRESS. 17

in the attainment of political and legal science, under equal
disadvantages with yourselves, were of £ar inferior extent
and merit to those afterwards commenced by the great ex-
pounder of English law in modern times — Blackstone. In
the progress of three or four centuries, as the national power
and greatness increased, so also increased the commerce,
the wealth, and the population of England — and in proportion
with that increase necessarily accumulated the laws which
regulated the enjoyment of rights and of property. As
education also became more generally diffused among the
people, it might be presumed that the quality of the laws
would improve, and the true principles of a just and stable
government become better understood. But, now, at a
period when the interests of the people most required that
their laws and rights should be thoroughly known and guard-
ed, not only had these laws become a mass so vast and in-
coherent, from want of some system originally in the enact-
ment and promulgation of them, as almost to defy the grasp
of the human intellect, but the custom also of expounding
them through scholastic lectures had gradually ceased from
the same cause. It was then that the master-mind of
Blackstone conceived the design of digesting into one con-
sistent whole an exposition of all those general rules of law
on which the government of England, the rights of persons,
the security of property, and the well-being of society
throughout all its gradations, were founded. And he did
not undertake a task too mighty for his accomplishment.
In four short volumes he has described an outline, which,
though faintly marked in some parts, encircles the whole
body of the English law,

I have thus traced, though by slight allusions, the progress
of the English people, of its government, and of its laws—
because true history, which teaches wisdom by examples,
reads a more impressive lesson to those who will think, than
any which the most eloquent reasoning could supply. That
we may turn such a lesson to account, let us take a survey

jg PRELIMINARY ADDRESS.

of that political prospect, which now, if you, the people,
will begin your carper in rivalling the prosperity and power
of other nations, lies before you. Let us contemplate what
are those hopes, and objects, and advantages, which all per-
suade an acquaintance with your government and its laws.

The people of India now for the first time in the known
history of the world live under a stable government, the
power of which is too widely extended, and too firmly con-
solidated, to be easily shaken, either by external foes or in-
ternal disorders. And this consideration carries with it,
indeed, the promise of those chief national blessings,, securi-
ty and peace : but, how far your union in interests with the
greatest of nations may assure you of more extensive privi-
leges than what depend on the mere strength of government
—in short, of those valuable rights and means which distin-
guish your fellow-subjects, and have rendered them what you
find them to be— must depend on the policy of the governing
powers under which your lot is cast. Of that honorable po-
licy I have already spoken, and I should not find it difficult
to corroborate by instances its liberal quality. You have be-
come witnesses of its disposition to advance the common pros-
perity through eqval andjixed laws— its measures for facilita-
ting your access to office and authority must have been felt
by those who have inquired. If you shall look around you,
to mark what is doing at the other presidencies, you will
find that the promulgation of those arts and sciences which
most contribute to the happiness of mankind has become
the public care. Nor need I to point out to your notice the
increasing spread of commercial enterprise, which must ever
be the most copious source of wealth and civilization, or its
attending benefits in advancing a more social intercourse
among all classes. All these considerations, be assured, af-
ford proofs of that liberal policy which aims at uniting the
■whole community through the same interests. Neither can
wealth abound, nor the arts flourish, nor distinctions in so-

PRELIMINARY ADDRESS; 19

ciety be coveted, where the government is oppressive, or the
laws unequal : for justice in government is the staff of peace
and of honor.

If these are the national prospects before the people of
India, it surely behoves you to reflect on their value, and
lend your endeavours in warding off all disastrous change.
The evils of foreign conquest, or of the overthrow of a set-
tled government, those who have experienced can never find
language to express. But, unless you have some knowledge
of the nature and plan of your government, and of your
general and common duties under it, you cannot have a sense
of its benefit. While you shall obey without reason — while
you shall be incapable of forming an attachment or an inter-
est towards those laws under which you live, from ignorance
of their quality, what aversion can there arise in your mind
to change, or union and firmness in resisting it ? That
national virtue which is a peculiar characteristic of a great
people, and which the English call loyalty, is not more an
attachment to any monarch, or particular family of monarchs,
than a love for the plan of power, and system of law, upon
which the prosperity and glory of the country depends.
Upon this principle of loyalty men are always found ready
to sacrifice all they have, and their very lives also, for the
preservation of their country's independence. But of this
noble virtue you can have no just notion while unable to
value or understand that which is its only source. Having no
other care or object but to obey — incapable of judging the
difference between any two modes of government —content
to live as servants — you would cast aside all hopes of further
advancement, and he ever the prey to oppressors whom
your indifference to change had most served to invite.

Thus may you be led to perceive that it is a duty which
all good citizens, who aspire to share the full benefits of a
liberal government, owe to the slate, to become more or less,
according to their means and circumstances, acquainted with

PRELIMINARY ADDRESS.

the nature of the laws under which they live. So much so,
that in that state, which once was the mistress of the civiliz-
ed world, the very boys were obliged to learn its funda-
mental laws. But it is not merely a duty — it is a most im-
portant personal concern to every one of you who listen to
me, and who look to be entrusted with a share in the offices
of authority. How can you expect to exercise the functions
of such offices in acknowledged ignorance of the duties they
impose? What but contempt can pursue the mischievous
efforts of such unqualified persons ? Can it be expected, for
instance, that those can be qualified to act as magistrates
who know none of the rules which the law lays down for the
detection of crime and the awarding of punishment ? But,
whether as magistrates, or as grand jurymen, or as jury-
men, you should ever understand that you will be required
to exercise your functions as by law provided, and not
according to mere natural sense or the human will— for
nothing is less to be trusted to, as between the magistrates
and the people, than the human passions, or the varying
suggestions of half- informed natural sense.

I hope the time may not be far distant when, not only
in the Provincial Courts, but also in the highest, such
duties as myself and others exercise therein will be shared
by individuals chosen from among tho native community.
But those who aspire to the higher stations in the de-
partment of the laws must acquire that sufficient knowledge
of its rules as to enable them to advise on the rights and
remedies which certain and fixed laws declare. Much shall
I rejoice if, even in my time, some of the rising genera-
tion shall be incited under the guidance of these principles
to undertake a profession of so honorable a character : for £
am of opinion that the laws of this land will never be ad-
ministered with their fullest and most beneficial effects,
until practitioners shall be selected from the natives them-

PRELIMINARY ADDRESS. 21

selves — beginning with (hose who shall first surmount the

difficulties which at present beset their way.

•

It is not, however, to such alone that I now address myself.
I hope to awaken an interest, and to stir that spirit within
you, which, after generating a conviction in your own minds
that some knowledge of your government and of the laws
is every enlightened man's concern, shall diffuse its influ-
ence over your community at large, and produce its fruit
in aftertimes.

To you, then, whose honorable zeal in so noble a cause
has brought you from the ease and habits of your homes
in search of knowledge, however hard to find — to you,
who set your fellow-countrymen an example never, I trust
to be forgotten among them, and advance from the foremost
ranks of your society to render yourselves but as pupils and
children before a teacher— to you I earnestly appeal to pur-
sue the path you have thus begun to tread. Among you the
liyht of knowledge must first spread -as the dawn must
first gild the summits before it pierces to the levels and
depths. Be mindful of those great benefits you thus pre-
pare to hand down to your children's children. Let the
difficulties and embarrassments, which may now attend your
efforts in mature life to acquire the elements of that know-
ledge which most interests you as a people, teach you to
weigh well the better means held out to your children
through education.

Turn your reflection on the prospects of prosperity held
out to your country through the diffusion of that valuable
knowledge in political government — in rights — and in the
laws, on which alone national welfare can be based. Cherish
these feelings, as they may arise in your own breasts ; en-
courage them as they may spring up in the contemplation
of others. Then may I hope for the day — and that not far
off— when one from among yourselves shall worthily fill this

22 PRELIMINARY ADDRESS.

place which I now assume. Then may you trust that many
will be born among you, who shall pass through a life of
usefulness, and honor, and dignity, in the service of their
country, and bequeath their illustrious example for the be-
nefit of a grateful posterity.

DISCOURSE I.

Of the Principles of Government.

F the quality and usefulness of the Science of
Political Government. Of the Origin of Political Go-
vernment. Of the Objects of Political Government.
Of the necessity of a settled Plan of Power— or a Con-
stitution. Of the Marks and Characteristics of a well-
constituted Government : First ; attention due to the Habits,
Feelings, and Manners of the People. Second; Changes
should not be sudden. Third ; the External and JVatural
Condition of a country, and of its inhabitants to be ob-
served. Fourth; of the Share wliich the people should
have in the administratio7i of the Government. That the
share of the people in the government to be exercised by
means of a system of Representation. Reflections on the
marks and characteristics of good government which have
been discussed; and on the political condition of India.
Of the evils of Arbitrary Government.

DISCOURSE. I.

On the Principles of Government.

SECTION I.

Of the quality and usefulness of the Science of
Political Goiiernment.

\ purpose in my present address to discourse on the nature
of Political Government, and on its true principles. This
is a topic the due investigation of which requires much
thought, and extensive reading. It has exercised the most
powerful minds throughout all ages. The doctrines from
time to time laid down on this subject have been the result
of much insight into human nature, and of a careful com-
parison of the laws, the manners, and the history of many
nations. The proof and explanation of those doctrines have
taxed the intellectual faculties to the utmost. And those
who would study the quality of Political Government, with
a view to practical application in public life, must bring with
them habits of reflection, and a vigor of mind, beyond the
ordinary endowments of mankind.

It would, therefore, be a vain thing in me to deceive the
reader into an impression that through the course of one
short Lecture T could afford that complete information in the
Science of Political Government, which scarce any single
voluminous treatise could supply. And some may perhaps
feel disheartened at a commencement in my labours, which
announces a call upon their attention, such as may be ap-
prehended to be almost beyond their present capacity, and
which at the same time appears to promise but very inade-
quate results. But to such let me hasten to say that the
labours of many distinguished Philosophers of various coun-
tries have already furnished for the instruction of mankind
a number of general and indisputable positions or principles,

05 O^ THE PRINCIPLES OP GOVERNMENT.

the truth and value of which will be found by no means dif-
ficult of comprehension — and to all, let me say, that, con-
fining myself to such fundamental rules, I trust to attract
some interest in the discussion of them, and to satisfy my
readers that such a discussion is entirely appropriate to ob-
jects we have in view.

In all well-governed countries there are certain right
principles to be looked for, as distinguishing the plan of
power which prevails, whence justice must flow, and where-
on depend the well-being and the prospective advancement
of the people at large. It is obviously fit that all those su-
perior members of society who aim at understanding and
contributing towards the welfare of their country should
form clear notions of what these right principles are. But,
more especially should it be a care with those who, warmed
with that zeal for useful knowledge which I have endeavour-
ed to excite, desire an acquaintance with the quality of the
English Government. Those who, like myself, have been
bred under the protection of that form of government, and
who have had occasion to study its character, have been led
to the conviction that there never has existed in any other
country a system of government so powerful and so just —
so calculated to defend the rights of individuals — to ensure
the upright and effectual administration of justice, between
man and man — and to protect every subject from violence
and wrong. But it is for the people of India, as well as
for their English rulers, to form a true judgment of the nature
and value of the English plan of government, out of which
is derived that under which they live, by conceiving just
impressions as to what are the characteristics of good go-
vernment. And my persuasion is that, the better the just
principles of Political Government are known, the more
firmly will the people of India become attached to the Bri-
tish rule, and the better prepared will they be to understand
and to assist in improving that plan of government, and
that system of law, under which their own rights are to be
protected, and their political hopes advanced.

SECTION II.

Of the origin of Political Government.

The origin of government must be traced to human nature
itself. The helplessness of infancy falls necessarily under the
protection called forth from the natural love of the pa-
rents. The incapacity of the child, as contrasted with
the superiority of the father, imposes the duty of obe-
dience on the one, and that of direction on the other.
Gifted with the faculty of speech, whereby to commu-
nicate their thoughts amongst each other, the whole
race of mankind are drawn by this natural impulse to
associate together. From such an association they im-
mediately perceive their increased means through com-
bination in pursuits. Such combination can however,
have no existence without personal rule, or ascertained
law, directing the common aims and actions of the
whole body to the same ends. Neither can such combination
be held together for any the least permanent purpose without
greater security than each individual can assure to him-
self by his own unaided strength against the violence
arising from human passions, and the mischiefs arising
from human errors. As in the case of a family, so in
the more enlarged circle of human society, in the bond
of which mankind are equally by nature held, the differ-
ences in the intellectual power necessarily lead to the con-
trolling influence and authority of such as are most highly
endowed. Hence the directing and governing and controll-
ing power of one, or of a portion, and the dominion of
some fixed regulations, over a body of men held together
by a greater or less strength of union. Government must
thus be perceived to be co-existent with the very being
of man : and we know of no tribe or race so entirely

OF THE ORIGIN OF POLITICAL GOVERNMENT,

degraded from human attributes, as to be altogether
dissolved from every obligation to political authority.

In the progress of human affairs governments of al-
most every conceivable quality — over every variety of
people — and of every territorial extent have existed
in the world; and we have before our attention the
histories of a thousand nations, from which we mav draw
instruction as to the comparative success, or the inherent
merits, of the one form of government over another. The
records of these various plans of power all disclose ex-
cellencies as well as defects. Every one of them' fall far
short of absolute perfection. Relieving ourselves from
the copious controversies, and the laboured reasonings
which many ages of disquisition on topics so interesting to
every civilized nation has engendered, let us proceed to
pass in review before us some of those positions which the
ablest of political Philosophers have established as settled
truths and principles, applicable to the consideration
of every system of dominion.

SECTION III.

Of the objects of Political Government.

The just object of government can only be that of
the happiness of the people— and it might he said, gene-
rally, that was the best form of government which best
provided for their happiness. But in what consists the
happiness of a whole embodied People ? That of an
individual greatly depends on circumstances having no
other than peculiar and personal influence — his taste, his
habits, his temper, his wisdom, his virtue, and so on.
But, to form an idea of the well-being of a whole com-
munity, we must conceive some notion of more universal
and permanent benefits— indiscriminately to be partici-
pated in by all. Let us fix it by adopting as a maxim
(as it appears to me we safely may) that the happiness of
a people consists in the perfect enjoyment of private
rig/its and acquisitions, and personal security from wrong.
These, then, are the main and final objects of good
government.

Now, it is with a view to protection of all in their
rights and acquisitions, and in their personal security,
that, as well every provision to guard against foreign
aggression, as all public internal laws, will, upon tracing
objects to their principles, be found to be directed. It
is the first practical application of the authority of a go-
vernment, which is founded on a system or plan, to appoint
the Ministers and Commanders for maintaining the inde-
pendent strength of the country, and Magistrates with
sufficient powers to enforce those public laws. These
are the duties to which all such magistrates and func-
tionaries of every grade and quality are pledged ; and it

30 *>F THE OBJECTS OF POLITICAL GOVERNMENT.

is in consideration of the just performance of those
duties — so directed to these final objects of a well
constituted government— that the emoluments and the
honors of the magistracy are conferred. Thus we may
gain an intelligent view of the whole scope and aim
of political authority : for we must acknowledge that such
is the best government which best ensures the happiness
of the people ; we can agree in the conception of what
constitutes national happiness— namely, the perfect enjoy-
ment of property, and security from personal wrong — and
we are prepared to understand whence these sources and
constituents of national happiness are supplied and upheld,
namely, from the just performance of the assigned duties
of rulers and their officers. The prosperity and strength
of a nation does but little depend on a fertile soil, or the
bounties of nature — inasmuch as the history of the world
has proved to us that the most fruitful parts of the earth
have often become deserts through the foreign invasions
they have continually invited, or through internal decays ;
while great nations have flourished in those parts to which
nature has denied almost every thing. But we must look
for strength, and wealth, and internal peace, in those na-
tions, where a settled government, and just, equal, and
well administered laws have place, and in which every
citizen is ready in his vocation to fulfil his duty to the
State.

Observe, therefore, that supreme rulers, and all who bear
authority under them, have but one just origin, and should
have but one just object — namely, the good of the people.
And this, indeed, is so evident a truth, that I might have
spared to state it, did not the history of this country and
of the surrounding Asiatic nations develope little else but
one long continued violation of that plain maxim. It is
fit that the people of India should know, and reflect on the
evil, that the labour of multitudes in these countries has

OF THE OBJECTS. Or POLITICAL GOVERNMENT. 3]^

been for ages expended in the supporting the pageantry,
the idle indigencies, and the mischievous vices of such
rulers, and their families and their favourites, whose only
arts of government have been how best to secure the fruits
of their people's toil for their oivn private purposes.
Monarchs who thus act, and those who would uphold them
in their system of dominion, can never have reason or jus-
tice on their side ; unless there be reason in supposing
governments to be established for the aggrandizement of
one individual, or of one family, or one set of men, and
not for the safety and welfare of all. But it behoves those
who would think justly of the quality of any system of
government, to inquire if there be any who, out of the
labour of the people, appropriate wealth which has never
been earned by their own or their ancestor's exertions, and
receive it for the purpose of maintaining the magnificence
of royalty, and the rank and honors of magistracy, with-
out any corresponding duties whatever assigned, or ade-
quately performed for the benefit of that country which
supports them. If such there be, it will be well to consider
them as leeches of the Common-wealth, who drain its
blood but for waste. None can less deserve to be members
of it than 6uch as, having no concern whatever for the
public, seek from the public toil to gratify but tlieir own
private interests. The world unwillingly contributes to the
maintenance of men so utterly empty of desert.

SECTION IV.

Of the necessity of a settled Plan of Power — or a

Constitution.

It is next to be shewn that it is of the very essence of
Political Government that its plan or scheme of power —
or what the English term the constitution of government
— should be fixed ; and that its method of exercise ^should
be by the course of laws. Without this there can be no
certainty of property, or security of person ; which we
have seen to be only purposes of government. Nor in-
deed, can property or personal safety be said to exist at
all, when the power to which we must necessarily submit is
constantly liable to change, and when the exercise of uncon-
trollable authority is restrained by no rules. It is an eternal
truth that every man is by nature disposed to abuse that
power which depends solely on his will, and that his abuse of
it will extend up to very checks he may feel to be imposed
against such abuse.

But, it may be said, have there not been great states —
powerful in relation to their neighbours — peaceful and pros-
perous in themselves — who have been governed by the ab-
solute authority of even one man ? And do we not know of
such states thus governed even at this day ? This is a point
I may do well to explain ; for it will be found, nevertheless,
that the maxims I have laid down are just.

It is true that great nations have arisen, and for a while
have flourished, or appeared so to do, under no other rule of
government than what depended on the arbitrary will of
one man. But observe — first, that those nations which
have been most famous in history for the power they have
attained under one, or some few successive leaders, have

OF THE NECESSITY OF A SETTLED PLAN OF TOWER, 33

been also the most conspicuous for their oppression of their
conquered subjects — and among such , unhappy people,
who have thus been reduced to hold their lives and their
property at the mere discretion of their oppressors, Poli-
tical Government, in its true sense of a fit exercise
of power towards the just object of the public happi-
ness, cannot be said to exist. Moreover, the original
followers or subjects over whom such absolute monarchs
have gained and put in force a pure arbitrary control,
are far from the enjoying internal peace or security, even
among themselves : inasmuch as it will be found that all the
wealth and luxuries of life fall to the share of the monarch
himself and of his favorites; who, while they devour those
who are beneath them, tremble daily at the evils with which
their superior may in a moment visit them ; and inasmuch
as the infernal strength of the people, as an independent na-
tion so governed, arises from the promptitude with which
every individual sacrifices each wish and pleasure, and sub-
mits all his very faculties to the ordering of his prince.
And, secondly, observe— that power of this arbitrary nature
— a scourge to surrounding nations, and the unfailing source
of much misery, and more discontent, to those subjected to
it— can never last long. The struggles of ambitious men,
which no regular laws restrain, and the vengeance of the
oppressed, which soon or late becomes too strong for the
fear of any consequences, unite to produce internal convul-
sions thvf ughout the state, and rebellions also from with-
out. The country soon becomes an ever-changing scene
of wrong ; and usually, in the end, surrenders itself either
to a better government or to a more powerful people.

Such is the fate, and such the inevitable result, of arbi-
trary power, direr' ed by no rule, and exercised purely in
subserviency to tlie human passions. But it must be allow-
ed that the form or quality of government, known by the
term of absolute monarchy, has not always exhibited the.-e

34 °P THE NECESSITY OF A SETTLED PLAN OF POWER.

characteristics. It has sometimes happened that the union
of mental talent, and a benevolent disposition towards
mankind, has combined to establish fiimly, and to govern
prosperously, an extensive and powerful State. 1 here have
been also instances in which under the same supreme arbi-
trary authority of one man, such established states have
been happily ruled, although much of that talent, and even of
that disposition, has been wanting. But in these cases, it
"will be found, upon scrupulous examination, that one of
these two solutions offer. Either the qualify of the monarch
is such that the course of his government is as surely di-
rected towards the well-being of the state and the hajppiness
of his people, as if it was directed by fixed laws — a rare
occurrence, and so rare that it can scarce be quoted except
from fabulous story — or that such absolute monarch is con-
tent to govern by fixed laws already settled, or newly enact-
ed by such an appointed course as may best ensure their
wisdom and efficiency. In fact, it is in proportion as great
and good princes are observed to resign the exercise of pow-
er according to the dictates of the human will, and to sub-
mit to those checks upon its abuse which either fixed laws
themselves impose, or prudent and respected counsellors ad-
minister, that their subjects can be considered as enjoying
the blessings of political government.

It may be admitted, therefore, that absolute monarchies
may exist, without implying the absence or utter dissolution
of any systematic plan of government whatever — although,
if such a course of exercising power was in reality followed
out in 'practice, so as to exhibit in all acts of authority
nothing more than the measures suggested by the pure arbi-
trary and unchecked will of one or more individuals, such
an exercise of power would necessarily end in confounding
all notions of right and wrong, apd in a violation of all the
essential qualities of political government. And, indeed,
confined as the use of absolute power really is (with such
exceptions I shall hereafter notice) in practice, by such re-

OF THE NECESSITY OF A SETTLED PLAN OF POWEE. 35

strain ts as laws and a due respect to the sense of the
community imposes, that is a form of government which is
not altogether without some advantages. For it must be
confessed that it is a merit in any scheme of government
that it should be beet calculated to ensure promptness in the
resolving upon measures, and vigour in working them out —
a merit which is conspicuous in governments under absolute
monarchs. So powerful are these considerations, that some
philosophers, not sufficiently weighing the true principles of
government, and in what consists that public happiness
which depends on those principles, have been led to affirm,
that no scheme of government can so thoroughly accomplish
the good of a people, and uphold their national strength, as
the absolute will of a wise, and virtuous, and benevolent
Prince.

Rut, even if this could be granted, and if we could
suppose that under the form of absolute monarchy such in-
stances of an union of great and good faculties were by no
means rare — if we could suppose that the appetite for an
undue share of the enjoyments of life in such princes and their
obedient ministers would submit to the dictates of reason
and of justice, or if we could hope that such would be satiat-
ed with wealth and the power by which it was to be gained
— yet this form of government must ever manifest counter-
vailing defects. There never could be any certainty as to
the permanence of these dispositions, either in such riders
themselves, or in their successors. The established method,
of governing might at any moment be changed. The laws
themselves have existence and operation frail as the human
breath. Those who shall consult the page of history wil*
read of many great nations rising to eminence under the
guidance of some powerful mind, and prospering for a time
— but for a time only. A great conqueror collects an im-
mense concourse under his banners, who over run wide
countries, and establish wealthy empires, and such empires

35 OF THE NECESSITY OF A SETTLED PLAN OF POWEK.

are perhaps well governed for a season. But as soon as the
founder is no more, it usually has happened that his govern-
ment has fallen with him. There being no settled plan of
power, no fixed rule for the guidance of his successors —
such governuients are not calculated to stand the test of
time; but are necessar ly subject to accidents, bringing in
their train confusion, anarchy, and civil wars.

And in these respects there is no difference whether a
nation be reduced to subjection to the will of one arbitrary
monarch, or to the absolute power of many or of few who
shall wield the full authorities of the state. For it is very
possible that a large delegated assembly, or that a few
who may have been born to, or have attained, supreme
dominion in a state, may resolve to govern by no regulated
plan, and may disregard all laws made for the protection of
property or of the person. Whether they will govern with-
out law, or whether the people shall find a sure refuge
aqainst wrong, and a plain guidance in their mutual affairs
with each other, in their laws and the administration of them,
must depend on whether such a scheme or plan for the exer-
cise of the power of the state exists, as may more or less
prevent the gratification of the mere will — for, in the ab-
sence of any such checks, human nature will impel the
possessors of power, whether many or few, to accumulate
at the expence of those who cannot resist them an undue
share of the enjoyments of life, until all the just ends of
political government are openly abandoned.

Thus, under whatever form or course of government a na-
tion may be ruled, we must look to find some fixed systematic
scheme or plan for the conduct of it, and to see that this
scheme itself, and the method of exercising authority under
it, should be founded on laws — before we can agree that the
essential objects of political government are arrived at.

SECTION V.

Of the Marks and Characteristics of a well- constituted
Government. First ; attention due to the Habits,
Feelings, and Manners of the People.

Contemplating, then, political government as the means
to a certain end— as a human device, through a certain
settled scheme and through a course of prescribed laws,
for accomplishing the social happiness of a people— let
us next examine some of those marks, or characteristics, hy
which we may, perhaps, hest judge of its being adapted to
its object.

The history of the world — exemplifying the progress of
man in obeying the dictates of his nature, by first congregating
into rude societies scarce held together by force of any law
or compact, and afterwards by extending their social unions
into populous nations, occupying fixed habitations — is a his-
tory in great measure of habits, feelings, and manners among
the human race. These habits, feelings, and manners have
grown up, not according to any st:t of rules and principles
laid down according to reason and upon deliberation, but by
force of mere circumstances and accident. Every age and
nation has its peculiar code of morals and of manners ; and
the qualities of government are more dependant on them,
than they on the force of authority or laws. Jt requires but
a little reflection to perceive such to be the necessary result
of the progress of mankind from rude barbarism, or savage
life, to civilization ; and we shall presently advert to some
of these accidental and external circumstances. But it is a
well known saying, that habit is a second nature — and
habits, therefore, however they may have arisen, will, like

3g CHARACTERISTICS OF A WELL-CONSTITUTED GOVERNMENT.

the propensities of human nature itself, imperatively in-
fluence all plans and contrivances by which men seek to
accomplish that which they conceive most to their interest
and well being ; and, amongst others, every system which
may have been gradually built up of political government.

But, if such systems of government have thus become con-
nected with habits, and the quality of these habits has de-
pended on accidental circumstances, it must follow that such
systems or modes of government must be as various as the
several nations who live under any settled rules of power. It
must also follow that after these habits have grown up, and
are interwoven as it were, and identified, with the feelings,
or even the prejudices, of a people, and thus become a
second nature, any violation of them would be a counterac-
tion of nature itself, and a cause of distress and discontent.
As, therefore, we see that diversities of government must
arise, and the modes of rule must have become consonant
to the various qualities, and peculiarities of feeling, of vari-
ous people — so it is a just principle of government that its
scheme and course of operation should continue to res-
pect such habits as are found to prevail. It must be recol-
lected that it was not in the maturity, but in the infancy, of
civilization that governments took their rise ; and that, how-
ever competent through power, through natural wisdom,
through studious comparison of numerous political systems
and laws, and through sagacious reflection on their scope and
tendency, any rulers, or the ministers of such rulers, may in
these later times have become to frame a just plan of power
for the government of any given nation — such competency
must necessarily have been attained long after certain cus-
toms and modes of life, certain common and confirmed opi-
nions, and certain dispositions of the mind and feelings have
taken too deep a root to be contended against without gene-
ral mischief.

CHARACTERISTICS OF A WELL-CONSTITUTED GOVERNMENT. 39

For this reason it is a commended saying of an ancient
lawgiver, who framed a plan of government for the most
enlightened nation of old times, that "his laws were not,
" indeed, the best; but they were the best which that peo-
" pie were capable of receiving." For this reason we may
judge that caution to beat once benevolent and wise which
restrains the Supreme Government of England, in the
plenitude of its power, from imposing throughout their new-
ly acquired Indian Empire the same scheme of political go-
vernment, and the same fundamental laws, (however good in
themselves, and however valued) as those which have arisen
out of, and become adapted to, the condition of another
class of our fellow-subjects. It will be sufficient that I
should notice that implicit obedience to the personal dicta-
tion required by those in authority, and as willingly yielded
by all others, which throughout many ages has been habi-
tual to the natives of these countries —that gpn^ral distaste
and inaptitude to political discussion and legislation — I have
but to allude to their zealous attachment, to the institution
and rules of Castes, to the customs of Descent and Division
of property, and of Marriage, to satisfy my Native readers
that a total subversion of such rules and customs, and an en-
deavour to square the feelings and domestic habits of one
people with the laws made for anoth-r, would be as gieat a
tyranny and violation, as the forcible transfer of their pos-
sessions without reason, and without right. For habits and
customs, which do not originate in laws, ought to be amend-
ed by the introduction of other habits and customs: and it
is an ill policy to attempt to change them by Laws.

SECTION VI.

The sime subject continued. Second; Changes should

not be sudden.

I do no more than add the necessary consequence of the
principle I am discussing, when I affirm the political maxim
that all innovations in government should be gradual ; and
rather follow, than aim at guiding, the sense of the people.
We know that change is a law of nature : it is not more ex-
hibited in ail material things around us, than in the mind and
spirit of mankind, A blind or prejudiced adherence to ar-
rangements once made, but which can have had no other
origin than the exercise of the human intellect, is, not only
to surrender the superior powers of an understanding neces-
sarily improved by the force of experience, but i3 in truth a
contest against necessity. Such contests, however, though
vain as regards the issue, may have their effect in prolong-
ing the endurance of evil. Modes and systems of govern-
ment must change ; and, like all other prospects in human
affairs, they fitly form the subject of human consideration.

But, the mass of mankind are doomed to toil for the neces-
sities and comforts of life, and can have li'tle leisure to study
the nature or value of political and legislative change. They
are more prone to pursue with avidity, and to enjoy in com-
placency, the objects of their dispositions and habits,
than to submit such feelings to the reason of any others.
Opposition to these fixed propensities can, when the
occasion of it is not seen and estimated, serve but to
produce pain and anxiety of mind. Conformity with order
and the law is the bond of peace and the test of the people's
prosperity — but cheerful obedience to authority can only be

CHANGES SHOULD NOT BE SUDDEN. 4^

looked for from those whose passions are calm. Kow, then,
since political changes must and ought tv be contemplated,
are such changes best to he effected ? By such only who,
having sagacity to perceive what measures may be profita-
ble, and maturely reflecting on their tendency and conse-
quences, will watch also the spirit of the age; and jvill be
cautious that new laws, if they do not altogether conspire
with that .spirit, shall at least not counteract it — by those
who shall ever he mindful that reverence for the law is the
only stable foundation of government.

It deserves to he considered that no change is made
without inconvenience, and that there is certain advantage
in constancy and stability. There may be evil in settled or
hereditary institutions — but, if they he slight, they should
rather he endured than corrected at the imminent risk of
greater mischiefs. For every alteration of fundamental
laws tends to subvert that reverence for authority by which
the force of law is sustained. And it may be that ancient
laws which are good are preferable to novelties which are
belter. So that the fabiic of government should be always
touched with a fearful and trembling hand, and its very
TUSt should be respected. It is not change itself, but sud-
denness and violence in change, which at once excites the
disgust of the multitude, and loosens the ties which bind
them in obedience : and he that shall investigate the pro-
gress of civil dissension wi41 find as many to have arisen
from sudden violation of prejudices, and even caprices, as
from actual oppressions. Hut, when the unthinking multi-
tude shall overthrow the frame of government and trample
on its laws, we may be assured that they will govern rather
in the fury of passion than in thoughtfulness of wisdom.
In t he violence of fheir innovations they will probably,
indeed, conform to the temper of the times ; but their
measures will always, and the rather sometimes for that
very reason, offend against the true principles of govero-

CHANGES SHOULD NOT BE SUDDEN.

ment. In all circumstances of a nation, therefore, we may
justly fear the sudden introduction of political change.
In all innovations (it has been wisely and aptly said) we
should imitate Time. For Time, though the greatest of all
innovators, so skilfully insinuates change, as to deceive our
very senses.

SECTION VII.

The same subject continued. Third ; the External and

Natural condition of a Country, and of its

Inhabitants, to be observed.

Among those accidental circumstances which cannot fail
to impress on the inhabitants of various countries varying
qualities of feeling, habit, manner, and intercourse, we must
chiefly reckon the external or natural condition of each such
country — and it becomes a mark of the just observance of
the true principles of government, that its plan of power
and the spirit of its laws should have reference to that
external or natural condition. It is impossible to doubt
that the difference of climate, or temperature of the air,
according to the position of each country on the globo,
occasions a difference in the corporeal strength, and power
of exertion, and consequently in the sensibilities, and even
in the intellectual faculties, of mankind. Moreover, the
great dissimilarity in the soil and situation of different coun-
tries produces a corresponding variety of pursuits. Ft
would lead me into a wide field of curious observation, and
perhaps of controversy, were I to examine into all the
effects of such causes as these. We must be content with
noticing what are most obvious.

It must be the natural result of that deficiency of
strength and power of exertion, that love of quietness and
repose, and that delicacy or tenderness of feeling,
which a great comparative warmth in the climate
begets — that the people living under it should become
averse to change, that they should be incompetent to
the heats and conflicts of political discussion, and that they

; 14 CONDITION OF A COUNTRY TO BE OBSERVED,

should be roused with painfullness, and collected together
with difficulty, for the duty of withstanding agression. In
colder countries, on the contrary, the condition of the body
and animal spirits urges to incessant activity and contempt
of danger. If we survey the diversities in the surface of
various countries, we find that the situation of some, as
being islands, or abounding in wide rivers, impels the in-
habitants to the arts of commerce, and to a stretch of do-
minion over distant colonies. The quality of others,
as composed of fertile and separated plains, leads to a
crowded population and a facility of intercourse. Over
barren deserts tribes wander in the lawless independence
of savage life — throughout the fastnesses of a mountainous
district are scantily dispersed a few families, who know little
of one another, and scarce any thing at all of the rest of
mankind.

Here, therefore, we perceive general and conspicuous
effects produced by these external circumstances I speak of,
which as they have contributed to form the peculiar charac-
ters of the various nations of the earth, so must they have
influenced the modifications of their several governments,
and so must they ever dictate its principles and fundamen-
tal laws. In some countries the people are naturally more
prone to implicit obedience to constituted authority, and
adhere with greater stedfastness to the institutions and cus-
toms of their ancestors. Among them we may expect will
prevail a greater discretion reposed in personal authority,
and at the same time a greater permanence and simplicity
in their laws. The inhabiiants of another clime are less
easily controlled, more inquisitive and more eager in all
their interests, and more bold in their pursuit of them.
Among them, it is observed that (should not counteracting
causes prevent it) a system of government will be aimed
at admitting a greater extent of popular management,
and of means for the expression of the public sentiments

CONDITION OF A COUNTRY TO BE OBSERVED.

The openness and fertility of one country will be the per-
petual source of attraction to fierce invaders, and preclude
any long term of national independence — the barren rugged-
ness of another will repel the avidity for conquest. The
small extent and the close population of some states will
suggest the greater union of councils, and keep down (he
accumulation of laws — the wide expanse, the slenderly
connected portions, or the vast commerce, of other states
produce necessarily a proportionate delegation of authority,
and complexity in the rules of property. The mi
gets puzzled in the endeavour to trace the bearings of all
these diversities on political government. It has ac-

complished, however, with great success in the
writings of some eminent philosophers; and in a manner
as instructive as interesting to the studious inquirer.
But these are details quite bey-nd the scope of a discourse
so comprehensive as this ; which must confine itself to
the extraction of general maxims and positions. It. must
be sufficient if we can make it manifest, how vain must be
any idea that the fancied perfection of any particular system
of government must recommend it to the universal adoption
of all nations, however circumstanced. Let us rather feel
assured that the natural causes of national character are
altogether above any human sway ; for the empire of the
elements is stronger than many generations of lawgivers.

SECTION VIII.

The same subject continued. Fourth ; of the Share which

the People should have in the Administration

of the Government.

But the most important mark of the true principles of
government, in the consideration of such as concern them-
selves practically in the just observance of them, is — that
the bulk of the people should have some share in the
administration of that government which the whole com-
munity is bound to obey.

Let us inquire what it is to have a share in the govern-
ment. A man may be said to have a share in the polifical
government of his country, either when he assists, or has a
voice in, the supreme ordaining of the larvs of the state,
under which its scheme subsists, and the administration of
all its powers is conducted— or when he contributes person-
ally to the actual administration of those powers, under the
control of such supreme authority. Let it be observed,
here, that I speak of a political government subsisting
under some regulated scheme or plan of power, and govern-
ing by and under laws — and I speak of those who personally
contribute to its administration according to such constitut-
ed scheme, and under the guidance of such laws. A mo-
narch, or an united band of men, governing a people with-
out any settled scheme, independently of any rules of law,
and under no check, cannot be said properly to constitute any
political government whatever. If he, or they, should govern,
merely by the impulse of their own will and passions, how
are they otherwise than in a state of nature ? For a state of
nature is that in which people act purely according to their

SHARE OF THE PEOPLE IN THE GOVERNMENT. 47

own temporary inclinations, and their own notions of self-
interest. So neither can he who performs the functions
assigned him in a state, according to the mere will of a mo-
narch or governing body, he properly said to have any .share
in political government. He is a mere tool in the hands
of others. He cannot have a share in that which has no
substantial existence. He possesses no political rights of
any kind. He is but the medium through whom anuther
party acts— and acts as if in a state of nature.

Some such a share in the political government of a
country as I have above defined a portion of the people must
enjoy under every form or scheme of government which is
based on fundamental laws, and which aims at governing
by a course of general laws, and not by mere arbitrary and
personal discretion. The share enjoyed may be very unim-
portant, and the portion of the people possessing such share
may be very small. But, still, so long as these -fundame.n'- 1
laws on which the scheme of government is constituted has
force,and the general rules of laws according to which it is to
be administered are observed, no man can have an unli-
mited power to govern by his own will. The wishes and
interests of others, as protected by the laws, must be res-
pected as well as his own, in the administration of the
government. There must be one or more persons who
has independent authority to advise at least, if they do
not actually partake in the exercise of the supreme po*ver ;
there must be several to whom the administration of the
affairs of government is intrusted, who are to be guided in
the performance of their duties by the laws only, and not
by any individual's arbitrary direction, and who are respon-
sible only to the control of that supreme authority which is
shared in some degree by a portion of the people, and not
to the sole authority of one man. \\ hen all participation
and influence in the supreme governing powers of the
state are' denied to any portion of the people, and all means
of administering the laws independently of arbitrary dicta-

4$ SHARE OP THE PEOPLE IN THE GOVERNMENT.

tion Rre destroyer], the foundations of regular political
government are torn up.

When, however, that share in the exercise of the supreme
power is very limited, and when it is extended, moreover,
to hut a small portion of the people, such a scheme of
political government can hy no means heconsidered as found-
ed on jnst principles. There is no security whatever that
the fundamental laws on which it is based will long
subsist — and still less that justice will long continue to
be administered according to any settled rules of laws by
such as exercise offices in the state. And for this reason^
— because every man (as has been observed before) is im-
pelled hy his very nature to seek the gratification of his own
private interests, and to exert all hi-i power in administering
to his own inclinations, rather than to labour for the general
good of a community. And, as there is no limit to his desire
to attain what he considers the pleasures and enjoyments of
life, so neither will-tfhere beany limit to his consequent efforts
at engrossing all the power he can, as the means of enabling
him to appropriate to himself as large a proportion of them
as possiMe. With this view he will always feel disposed
to disregard laws of every quality which he is not compelled
to obey. And. thus, when one single man, or a very few in-
dividuals, shall have once obtained the supreme governing
authority, and only a small number of the people have a
very limited share in influencing or guiding the measures
of the state, those who govern will be almost sure to abuse
their power. They will be engaged in a continual struggle to
abolish, or to abandon, all those settled rules and forms
according to which the government is to be conducted.
They will ever be more or less labouring to overawe, or to
annihilate, the suggestions of others. They will hardly
allow any who are under them to exercise the offices of the
stale according to any equal rules of law, but only as their
own tools, subject to their own absolute control. The

SHAKE OF THE PEOPLE IN THE GOVERNMENT. 49

tendency of such a struggle is to destroy political govern-
ment, and reduce society again to a state pf nature, in which
the strongest govern, and seize to themselves whatever
they desire.

It must, then, be obvious that, in considering the question
how far just, principles characterize any particular form of
government, we have not merely to enquire whether one
single person possesses the whole power, or whether a few
persons possess it, or whether even a larger number of indi-
viduals possess it. But the question is, whether so large
a number share in the supreme power, and have in their
various gradations a share in executing the duties of office,
as to product an effectual check on the inclinations of one
portion of the people to pursue their own interests at the
expence of the rest. A few men, or even a large number,
may combine to govern for themselves alone ; and history
has abundantly shewn that they often will do so. But when
the sharers are very numerous, such a combination becomes
more difficult. The interests of many being at stake, it
becomes the less likely that they can all be equally gratified
through the oppressions and wrongs clone to the body of the
people who have no share in the government. The interests
of one portion of the governing body become a check and
control upon the exorbitant desires of the other. The num.
ber is increased of those who love their country and respect
its laws, and who act from such motives. And if, besides
this, the system of government be such as to admit of any
methods by which the sentiments and feelings of the
Public at large can be made known — so that their
opinions may influence, although they cannot actually
direct the measures and councils of those who govern — the
chances become the greater that these measures will be di-
rected to the common good of the nation. Moreover, when
the various offices of the state are distributed widely among
the people, and all the members of the community, having

50 SHARE OF THE PEOPLE IN THE GOVERNMENT.

free scope for their industry and talents, are admissible to
those offices, according to the gradations to which they at-
tain in society and the qualifications they possess, there is
the less probability of their becoming the mere instruments
and tools for performing the will of others, rather than their
just duties according to the established laws.

It follows from this that the merit and perfection of any
plan of political government ought to be judged of according
as it admits the largest number of the people to have such a
share in its administration, as they are qualified to exercise.
And no system of political government can be completely
well constituted, unless it shall admit of the bulk of the
people to some such share. For, let the number be as large
as it may of (hose who govern, if there be any portion what-
ever of the people of a nation who have not the slightest
power or influence in the state, nor the capacity of attaining
to any ; but are bound to submit at once, without any means
of resistance or even of remonstrance to the measures of
others — that portion will be certainly wronged in some de-
gree. For the governing body will govern for their own
interests generally, without regard to the interests of this
portion of the people. The governing body will be the
masters — attending in the name to their own advantages and
enjoyments— the others will be either as slaves or strangers
in the land.

It is manifest, however, that each member of a whole
community cannot act for himself, either in the framing and
ordering the laws of his country, or in contributing to the
administration of them. Nay— it is only a very few indeed,
compared with the whole number of a people, who can exer-
cise the most limited functions of the supreme power, or who
can be called on to fill the any of the various offices of the
state. The mass of the people must be destined to pursue
their several private avocations in life, and to yield obedi-

SHARE OF THE PEOPLE IN THE GOVERNMENT. §\

ence to the few who govern, whether such few do indeed
govern according to the laws, or according only to their own
will. All efforts by the body of the people to govern for
themselves, would — even in the least populous of nil nations — -
lead to confusion and the struggle of factions ; and, in, the
end, to the mastery of one, or of some small united
body. And thus it would appear that, so far from the bulk
of the people, by the share that it was possible they could
attain to in the political government of their country,
having the means of checking the natural impulse in the
few who govern to destroy the scheme of government, and
to disregard the laws — a small portion of the people must
necessarily have the whole power ; they will certainly strive
to abuse it ; the rest of the community will certainly be more
or less wronged : and they will be treated either as slaves or
strangers in the land. Hence it might be concluded that
under no scheme of government can it be properly a princi-
ple that the bulk of the people should have some appropriate
share in its administration.

The world may perhaps be still young— and the pro-
gress of civilization has, it may be hoped, left mankind as
yet far short of that maturity in understanding, and in social
happiness, which may be destined for our race. But, alas!
the history of nations has hitherto afforded few examples of
a frame of government likely to last; or which has not, in
the mean3 supplied of disregard to the common interests,
carried in their very constitution the seeds of decay and
death. If this, indeed, was the law of human nature,
lamentable would be the condition of mankind. Impelled by
human feelings and necessities to unite in societies— uphold-
ing that social union by force only of political government —
establishing schemes of government which must become, as
it were, self-acting engines of oppression — the race of man
would appear to have been created as the sport of demons ;
and the history of nations would be but the history of alter-
nations in human suffering.

SECTION IX.

The same subject continued. Fourth; of the Share o)

the People in the government exercised by a System

of Representation.

We must not, however, pronounce all idea of correct prin-
ciples, and of permanency, in the constitutions of political
government to be a mere fanciful illusion. There have been
some approaches towards perfection, An investigation into
the qualities of those national governments whose merits
have been most conspicuous will disclose the true spring
and force of such government to consist in its representative
faculty. The bulk of the people cannot, indeed, engage
in the actual administration of the affairs of the state, or in
the duties of office. But they can exercise their share in
the government through the medium of others who shall
represent them. In this lies the virtue of political go-
vernment. It advances towards perfection, according as the
system devised for having the interests of the national com-
munity represented approaches perfection. And, in this view,
it is certainly one mark and characteristic of a well-con-
stituted government that its system provides for all ranks of
the people, according to their station in society or their
qualifications, the means of access to office. It is true that
but few can actually attain to office— yet if it be open to
all by their industry or their talents to attain the requisite
qualifications for office, and if no individual so qualified is
absolutely excluded from being selected by the constitut-
ed authorities, then do all ranks of the people to a certain
extent possess a share in the administration of the govern-
ment of their country. And this share, from the circum-

8HARE OF THE PEOPLE BY REPRESENTATION. £Q

stance of the means of attaining office being so generally
diffused throughout the community, becomes in truth a share
according to the system of representation. For the highest
councellors of the state, and the highest magistrates, even
though they should hold their offices by hereditary right,
do not act according to their private will, but for the
sake and on behalf of the body of the people. And, although
these particular individuals who have themselves inherited
such offices and functions in the state cannot be said to
hold their offices through the express will of any particular
portion of the community, or to perform their duties in the
place, and as representatives, of any such particular portion —
yet, when this station itself so clothed with the privilege of
transmission by course of heirship, is attainable by all classes
according to certain merits and qualifications, we may justly
consider such hereditary magistrates as representing, and
exercising on behalf of the public, some share in the admi-
nistration which belongs to the people at large. More
plainly is this the case as regards offices to which function-
aries are appointed, either by the constituted authorities, or
by the express voice of the people themselves.

Such a share as this in the government of their country —
consisting in the means of access to all the honors and
offices of the state being afforded to the bulk of the people
— whereby the interests of the whole community are more
or less represented and protected, is a mark or characteristic
of most of the civilized governments of Europe. But, with
far the greater number of them, it is the only share in the
government possessed by the general community. A share
in the actual supreme controlling and legislative authority
of the state, exercised by means of representatives freely
and expressly appointed by a qualified portion of the people
themselves, is a characteristic of very few of such govern-
ments. It does not follow, indeed, that such countries are
ill-governed ; or that the true end and aim of all good go-

54 SHARE IN THE GOVERNMENT BY REPRESENTATION.

vernment may not have been eminently accomplished in
such governments. Neither does it follow, even, that such
countries could be better governed by the adoption of a more
complete system of representative administration. For, as
has been shewn before, there are various other principles of
government, besides this of a share by representation, which
ought to be observed in adopting a scheme of political
government to its ends and objects. The habits of a people
have to be respected — sudden innovations in government
have to be avoided— and the condition and circumstances of
the people, and of the country, have to be regarded, from
whatever causes they have arisen.

But although, under the circumstances of some countries,
a more perfect form and scheme of political government by
representation may not be at once practicable, yet it is fitting
that this most important quality and principle of good go-
vernment should be at least thoroughly understood, so that
its application be kept in view as far as a due consideration
of the position of the people will allow. For the bulk
of the people m?y have the means of access to power,
yet if the selection to office is to depend on the mere
will of one man, or body of men, at the head of the state,
who govern altogether independently of the opinions or in-
fluence of the people, the parties selected for office will
rather be servants of the head of the state than of the bulk
of the people, and will do his bidding rather than their's,
And, even though such functionaries may be appointed by the
express voice of the people, yet if they be no longer afterwards
dependant on the voice of the people, they will be apt to
govern for themselves or for their other masters. The con-
stituted scheme for the government of the state, and the
public duties assigned for the protection and prosperity of
the people, rest not on a durable foundation. They are lia-
ble to change, and to disregard, according to the interests of
those who have the entire power of pursuing their own in-

SHARE IN THE GOVERNMENT BY REPRESENTATION. 55

clinations. The system of government is imperfect, and as
a natural tendency to the rule of the arbitrary and tyrannical
few, aiming mainly to gratify their own unlimited desires,
over the submissive many who have neither influence nor
power to check them. There is wanting, therefore, something
more to render a representative faculty in the government
complete. There requires a system of representation which
is to have continual operation — a representative system
which is to have a controlling and a restraining influence as
a supreme authority — which is to aid, directly or indirectly,
in every measure of the state, and even in the preservation
and improvement of the very plan of power itself under
which the administration of government is conducted.

An absolutely perfect system of representation would
provide for supplying a fit number of the best qualified per-
sons to express the will, and to protect equally the interests,
of the whole body of the people. For if every law and
every act of the government, was in precise conformity with
the will of the whole body of the people, ii is certain no in-
justice could by possibility be done to any single person
throughout the nation ; since no man would will his own
injury, nor would even a majority of the people will any
thing which would be the gain of a few only, and a detri-
ment to the majority. And, if the equal interests of all
were aimed at, and such persons were appointed to govern
on behalf of all who were best qualified to judge of "hose
common interests, human wisdom could neither devise nor
desire any better scheme for the protection and advancement
of those interests. But such a system of represent at ion is
a mere conception, and practically impossible. It would be
utterly vain to seek for an unanimous desire or an unani-
mous opinion of even a small portion of the people upon any
political subject. If the opinion of the majority of the peo-
ple, or of any portion of the people could by possibility be
ascertained upon any political measures ; it is certain that

50 SHARE IN THE GOVERNMENT BY REPRESENTATION.

but very few of such a majority are competent to form a
judgment of the- quality and tendency of such measures or
even to give their attention to them. It is manifest, there-
fore, that the will of the people, expressed under any system
of representation, can only extend to the mere election of
their representatives, and to the retention or change of
them, according as their general conduct and services may,
or may not, give satisfaction. #

But what is that mode of election which is best calculated
to ensure the services of those who are best qualified to
pursue, and to pursue honestly, the equal and true interests
of the whole body of the nation ? It would be vain to say
that a mere majority of the people could best decide on such
qualifications, and could be relied on for choosing such as
possessed them. Suppose the whole community divided into
so many sections, and each section should elect one or more
representatives by a majority of the members, each having
a single and equ^l vote. Then might, and probably would,
the least educated, the most incapable, the poorest and
most dependent on others (which constitute much the
largest proportion) out-vote by a great majority the opinions
and decisions of the wisest in the nation. No one could
rationally desire that women, or children, or those so utter-
ly destitute in their circumstances as to be dependent
altogether on the will of another for the means of life,
3hould exercise equal rights with all others in choosing
representatives to rule the state on behalf of the people.
In every system of government which has admitted, in
however extensive a degree, the principle of representation,
some portion of the population have been excluded from
such right of election.

A sound and beneficial system of government through
which the bulk of the people are to obtain their share of
political power by representation must depend, therefore,

SHARE IN THE GOVERNMENT BY REPRESENTATION. 57

on some appropriate test of qualification being required in
the electors. The true tests, indeed, of •such qualifications
are moral virtue and intellectual ability. But, as no rules
can be practically enforced for examining into and ascer-
taining the mental and moral qualities of individuals — where
nature herself has not fixed the stamp of incapacity, as in the
instances of children, or of dependence, as in the instance of
females — some other external test has to be resorted to, if any
there be, which may be betoken the probable existence of
these qualities in a greater or less degree. The only test of
this kind which can be appealed to is that of Property. The
possession of wealth does by no means afford the absolute
assurance of superior mental cultivation, or of superior mor-
al virtue : neither do those qualities always increase in
proportion to the increase of riches. But the experience of
nations has proved that, generally, (unless a vicious scheme
of political government should oppose it) the mind becomes
elevated, the manners become refined, the moral virtues
expand, and intellectual cultivation prevails, according as
the national wealth abounds. It must be plain that inde-
pendent means raise the possessor above the temptation of
many of the meaner and most injurious vices ; and they
also supply that needful leisure for education, which alone
can render the mental powers efficient. And, as property
is the most likely test of the requisite qualities in
those who are to choose their Representative, so is
it the fairest. For the acquisition of property, as among
the means of human power and social happiness, is the
most open of any to all classes of the people in a well-
governed state. But, in truth, the influence of property must,
from the very nature of things, always be supreme in a
veil-governed state ; because the self-interests of mankind
will always impel them to give their labours and services to
those who are most able and most willing to reward them.
If those who had little or nothing did not pursue their own
private interests by this course, they would still nevertheless

58 SHAKE IN THE GOVERNMENT BY REPRESENTATION.

pursue them ; and the only other course open to them
would be by lawlessly invading the property of others.
Property would thus change hands, but either it would have
its supreme influence, in these new hands — or else it would
in like manner be invaded and destroyed again. But, to
suppose a total insecurity and open violation of property, is
to imply a dissolution of the bonds of government, and even
of society.

From these considerations it will appear that the merit of
a system of government, in which the bulk of tlu> people have
a share by means of Representation, does not consist in any
provision for the will of the people prevailing and becoming
actually operative, as regards the measures of the state— but
in just provisions being made for their electing such as are
most competent to act for their interests, and through
whom their opinions, and wishes can be expressed. Still,
however, this is not enough. A fitting and well-qualified
portion of the people may have been constituted to exercise
the power of electing Representatives. Those Representa-
tives may be the best capable of perceiving and pursuing
the measures most conducive to the service of the common
■welfare of the nation. They may be of sufficient number,
and may possess sufficient power to check and prevent the
misgovernment of the other constituted authorities of the
state. But they may themselves abuse their power, and
seek to serve their own interests, rather than those of the
community whom they are delegated to represent, and on
whose behalf they are appointed to act. And it is likely
they will do so, unless the community has the means of
securing itself from their misgovernment, by making it
more their interest to govern well, than to govern ill.

These means it may have by limiting the duration of
their authority, and making them responsible, at the peril of
losing their appointment, in case of betraying their trust, or

SHARE IN THE GOVERNMENT BY REPRESENTATION. 59

of evincing incapacity to fulfill their duties. The mass of the
people are not, indeed, capable of judging # well of the various
measures of state ; nor is it possible to provide them with
the power and opportunity of dictating such measures j
but they are competent, as a body, to judge of the general
conduct of their Representatives, and to determine on the
quality of flint, conduct by the effects. Dishonesty, corrup-
tion, and tyranny can hardly escape their notice. If the
duration of their appointment be so short as that no ad-
vantage gained in such a period would compensate for their
consequent dismission from office, the public would have
the security of their own interests for the faithful fulfilment
of their duties by their Representatives. In that case, also,
the sacrifice <>t the interests of the community by measures
injurious to (he common w-elfare would be the sacrifice of their
own interests as a members of that community. The in-
terests of those who represent become in this way the very
same as those of the represented. A complete practical
union of the whole body of the people is formed for check-
ing the injustice, and rectifying the misgovernment, of the
few to whom the actual exercise of political power must
necessarily be entrusted.

SECTION X.

Reflections on the Marks and Characteristics of good
Government which have been discussed ; and on the
Political conditio?! of India.

Thus have we examined, though but superficially, into
this characteristic virtue of political government,— consisting
in the share therein to be vindicated by the bulk of the peo-
ple — and which is the most difficult and controverted pro-
blem in the science of politics. It is very fit that this qua-
lity of government should be sifted and known by all
enlightened citizens. But such citizens will be cautious how
they are led away by specious and half- considered doctrines
on such momentous topics. It behoves all such to weigh in
their minds that, as no system of government can be per-
fect, so none can be adapted to every variety of people.
Bearing in remembrance the true, though ideal, principles
of government, the reflecting and influential portion of every
nation will still hold in their consideration the peculiar cir-
cumstances of their country, both external and personal, as
regards the people. They will have to mark what is their
general advancement in civilization, in sound knowledge, in
religions purity, in moral disposition, and in rational habits.
On this must depend the qualifications, not only for con-
ducting wisely and beneficially the powers of the state, but
for even selecting such as can be entrusted with such autho-
rity. Each man's share in the government must depend
not only on the general condition of his country, but on the
varying personal qualification of the individual. Give the
flute to the musician, and the helm to the pilot. Let the
lawyer advocate causes —let the statesman propound laws.

REFLECTIONS, &c. Q\

It is a vain, and it is a fearful thing for a people to aim at
fundamental changes in their schemes pf government, by
grasping at a greater share of power than their qualifications
in mind and manners will allow of. More than two thousand
years have elapsed since many just principles of govern-
ment have been from time to time expounded. Hut
experience has proved that a wise and efficient repre-
sentative system of government must be the slow growth
of ages ; and perhaps but one such system has ever arisen
on the earth.

That no such empire should, in the fortune of nations,
ever have been founded hitherto in India, will be easily ac-
counted for by those who shall have studied i(s history with
reflection and discernment, and computed the various com-
binations on which the formation and endurance of every
mode of government must depend. Independently of those
inherent natural causes influencing the destiny of nations,
on which I have already dwelt — independently of consi-
derations of the national religion and the customs of Caste
(topics which I have purposely abstained from touching
upon in this discourse but which, as all must feel, incul-
cate a peculiar degree of implicit obedience to mere personal
authority) — there are other causes for the past ami present
political condition of India which can only be sought for
in the great chapter of worldly events. What the real
history is of the various tribes inhabiting this vast country
during many early ages, we must be content to be ignorant
of. Hut we know that, during the progress of several
later ages, India has been subjected to repeated conquests.
It might have been well if the conquering invaders, had
brought liberal institutions, liberal arts, and sound know-
ledge, in their train. Hut, unhappily, this wide country has
ever, till of late, fallen the ea^y prey of savage nations ;
who, without civilization amongst themselves, without ra-
tional laws or any systematic plan of political government,

go REFLECTIONS, 8tc.

have conquered but for the purpose of plunder, or have ruled
with no other object than exterminating oppression. If,
under 'he decrees of Providence, the people of India have
now fallen under the sway of another foreign nation, it will
be well for them to estimate what changes have been there-
by introduced, as regards the happiness of the general
community — consisting, as I have declared, in the more
perfect enjoyment of private rights and acquisitions, and
personal security from wrongs. It will be well that the
people of India should estimate how far it is sought that
society should be held together by requiring that every man
should do his duty by his neighbour, and assist in obliging
his neighbour to do his mutual duty towards others — that
they should examine t he quality and tendency of their new
institutions in rendering them fellow -subjects, and not
dependents and slaves. Those who shall follow me in the
task I have set myself will, I trust, learn how, as such
fellow -subjects, they may, and ought to, contribute toward
the preservation of t lie present government. I hope to
exhibit to view a plan of power introduced here which,
excluding no subject from office and honors, is framed to
call forth the interest and assistance of all, and is rightly
founded on principles which, according to what is benefi-
cially practicable, shall accord to the people at large their
just political share.

There can be no standard of a perfect government, fram-
ed for eternal duration. For even were it within the com-
pass of human genius to devise such a plan of power as
might unite every true principle of political government (as
it assuredly is not) yet are the human passions beyond the
scope of legislation. The force of ambition and desire
continually ur#es us into new efforts for their gratifica-
tion, as irresistibly as the external elements work out their
chanceful revolutions. Vicissitude is the inherent and uni-
versal law of nature. In vain, therefore, have the chiefest

REFLECTIONS, &c. Q3

among philosophers projected schemes of a perfect com-
monwealth ; the very names of which have come prover-
bially to denote impossibilities. 1 qually vain, but far more
mischievous, are those agitations of the people impelling
them to seek for liberty— constitutional liberty — political
liberty (terms as yet unknown to my readers, and but ill un-
derstood by those who most use them) in some peculiar mo-
dification of the powers of government, whereby the actual
sense of the whole community shall be taken in every act of
the state. The plentiful experience of many nations has
taught us that under governments of this kind as much op-
pression, and as frequent dissension and change, will arise
as under any other.

What, indeed, is political liberty I should at present
vainly attempt to explain ; nor will it admit of exact defini-
tion. But, from what I have observed, I think all may rest
convinced that no man can pronounce it to consist necessa-
rily in this or that particular modification of the powers of
government; but we may confidently assume it to exist in
proportion as those principles of government which I have
endeavoured to lay open are observed. We may look for it
under those governments — where the plan of rule, or con-
stitution, expressly provides against the abuse of power —
where the law sets bounds to the human will. It consists in
security from wronJPfcwhuh the arbitrary will of another
might inflict ; and in the opinion of safety. Freedom under
government is that freedom which is left, after the just pro-
tection of the social rights of others shall have been provid-
ed for by standing rules to live by, common to all — a freedom
to follow our own will only in those things where such
sound and just standing rules prescribe not. For there
can be no liberty without law.

SECTION XL

Of the Evils of arbitrary Government.

I cannot better enforce these last observations, and close
the important subject of this discourse, than by contrasting
a scheme of government framed on these just principles
with that arbitrary power which is guided by no other rule or
measure than the will of the supreme governor.

Under such a government, there can be no other good
or evil than such as depends on the passions of an ignorant
Prince. Me errs— for who will be bold enough rightly to
instruct, him whom all must at every peril please ? He is
vicious — for there is no restraint on his appetites. The
good is as subject to accident as his caprice — but the evil
is as sure as the propensities of men are wicked.

Under such a government there can be no real love for
the Prince, nor reverence for the Laws. For, how can those
who have any independence or nobleness of spirit love one
whom ihey are ever bound io flatter , amd whose very fancies
and most unjust commands they are bound to obey ? How
can there be any reverence for laws which can never be
certainly known ? Fear is the true spring of such a govern-
ment. Not the fear of bad men to break the law and wrong
their neighbours ; but the fear of good men, as well as bad,
to disobey the very worst command of an absolute Prince,
or to resist his utmost oppressions. For such an arbitrary
governor will know that, should the sense of terror be
relaxed, and any dare to dispute, or even discuss, his orders,
his authority, the sole power of his government, is weakened—
those who under such a tyrannical sway cease to fear instant

OF THE EVILS OF ARBITRARY GOVERNMENT.

destruction from disobedience will assuredly begin to
govern for themselves.

Obedience, therefore, must be instant and implicit —
without reasoning, without remonstrance, without representa-
tions. For if terror be the grand instrument of such a
course of government, the mo" arch will set no bounds to his
desire of increasing the force and perfection of this instru-
ment. To some, tor his own ease, he must entrust a por-
tion of his powers — but they will not he many, as they
would occasion faction and conspiracies ; nor will they be
virtuous or hi^h minded, as such might lean to resistance.
From the few, therefore, who govern in his name, the ab-
solute monarch will exact precise conformity with his will,
under pain of the heaviest and most certain punishment.
The few submissive minions, who govern in his name the
mass of the people, must accomplish the commands, and
uphold the power, of their master by the same course.
Where are the limits, then, of cruelty and oppression ?

Under such a government there can be few, if any, faith-
ful advisers. All must advise in peril of their fortunes and
of their lives. Those who should counsel the Prince well for
the interests of their country, would advise something con-
trary to the bent of his inclinations or to the exorbitancy
of his desires.. They would advise equal and certain laws,
and measures which would conduce to the security and
independent spirit of the people. Their counsels, therefore,
would tend to weaken the force and main spring of the
government ; namely, that fear, which dictates instant sub-
mission to arbitrary will. They would advise what would
end in convulsions in the state, or else in destruction of
themselves.

Can such a state prosper? Look at the nations around In-
dia, governed as they are, and have been for ages, by

66 OF THE EVILS OF ARBITRARY GOVERNMENT.

arbitrary rule. Compare their condition with that of
any other, even the worst governed, nation in the
civilized world. It is throughout these Eastern regions
of the globe that the most prominent examples of this
species of government have prevailed— but, although we
find there the most ancient of nations, we find among them
the slowest advances made in all that constitutes the hap*
piness and resources of a people. Such as they were several
thousands of years ago — such are the most of them at this
present moment. With minds debased by fear they can
have little taste and little appetite for knowledge — nor will
the cause of education thrive where the supreme ruler, aware,
that knowledge is power, will never seek to abate that igno-
rance in which lies his own preservation. Can science or the
arts of life flourish, or can industry abound, where there is
no safety for the person, or security for possessions ? Why
labour — why seek to amass wealth — why engage in enterpris-
es-it by the displeasure or rapacity of one man all may in a
moment be ruined, and there is no certainty of enjoying any
condition of life, or the fruits of toil, even for a day ? In for-
mer times there have been governments in India, under
which every individual's possessions fell to the Rajah at his
death — with whom it rested to seize or to resign them to his
family. Can any spirit for useful exertion survive in such
a state as this ?

Riches, indeed, or what the ignorant herd of mankind
deem to be such — may abound. The precious metals— which
are of no value in themselves, and do but represent, ox give
pledge for, the commodities of life in the same manner as
scraps of paper money may— are often found to accumulate.
Costly jewels, which have no other value than what the fan-
cy may invest them with, are seen to glitter in brilliant
heaps. Many of the sources, also, of sensual pleasures, and
of amusement to the unthoughtfnl and uninformed mind, may
exist to excite desire, or even admiration. Riches such as

OF THE EVILS OP ARBITRARY GOVERNMENT. (fl

these may abound for a time in nations knowing no other
law than the will of their monarchs. And they will be
found spread, as it were, round the footstool of the throne,
for the enjoyment of the Prince and of those whom he may
be pleased to favor— the spoils of forced labour and extor-
tion. But, of that true wealth of a nation, consisting in the
general diffusion of all the products of labour — which nou-
rishes a healthful population— and fosters the universal spirit
of a people to maintain their possessions in security — there
can seldom be any signs. The hoarded treasures of the
monarch, however, generally becomes, soon or late, the
prey of some conquering spoiler, whom it little concerns the
people at large to resist. For what can a people governed as
these are suffer from any political change ? Having nothing
they can securely call their own ; doomed to their share of
general toil for the benefit of others; and holding their lives
at the disposal of a master ; can it matter to them by whom,
or how, they shall be governed ? " I will send my boot to
" govern you," said the absolute Prince to his subjects,
lamenting his protracted absence from his country.

Nor if such a people could escape the frequent miseries of
plundering invasions, can they ever hope for any duration
of internal peace. For where there is no settled constitu-
tion or plan of power, there can be no regular succession to
authority. It may he that the sense of the people, or the
will of the monarch, may destine the succession to proceed in
a certain line. Hut the will of the monarch continually
changes. By force or by fraud he may be made to change
the destined succession — by falsehood he may be represent-
ed to have changed it. There is no rule but the power of
a faction to determine it. Accordingly we find, in all the
countries round about us, the demises of their sovereign oc-
casion periodical convulsions throughout those states. Few
instances of such demises occur without a struggle for the
supreme dominion— nor are such struggles ever unattended

gg OF THE EVILS OF ARBITRARY GOVERNMENT.

by bloodshed and violence ; often do they convert the land
into a scene of universal devastation.

Such is government without law. Let us turn our eyes
to a different— a noble spectacle.

DISCOURSE II.

On the Government of England.

F the Nature and Origin of the English Constitu-
tion. Of the Supreme Legislative Authority of the English
Government. Of the Queen in her Legislative Capacity.
Of the House of Lords. Of the House of Commons. Of
the Mode of Enacting Laws, or Statutes. Of the Exe-
cutive Branch of the English Government.

DISCOURSE II.

On the Government of England.

SECTION I.

Of the Nature and Origin of the English Constitution.

HE people of England have established a certain
peculiar plan of government which has become cele-
brated throughout, the world by the general term of its
Constitution It consists of a scheme pf rules, according to
which fha supreme uncontrollable authority, prescribing
what shall be done, and prohibiting what is not to be done,
is to be exercised.

It may be thought to require some explanation how any
such form of government can be said to be established — or
how, if so established, this can ba said to have been accom-
plished by the people. It may be objected, that in whatever
person, or body of persons, and under whatever set of rules,
the supreme authority may have been confided, such autho-
rity being supreme and uncontrollable may enable the go-
vernors to alter these rules and change the model of the con-
stitution altogether. And it may be asked, how can it by
possibility be shewn that the people at any time, or by any
direct course, or even by any indirect method as acting by
representation, arranged and settled this scheme of power.

But the constitution of England may be truly said to be
established, in this sense. Those who come to the exercise
of their supreme controllable authority were not originally
bom with it. A people with a governing body were not all

72 ORIGIN OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION.

at once created by supernatural power. Those who take up
the sceptre of supreme authority do so either by wrong and
violence, and injustice to others (which is a course of go-
vernment without any plan or rule whatever — and not the
subject of our present consideration) or else upon conces-
sion and agreement of the community either express or
understood, as regards the terms and objects of their go-
vernment. Tf, therefore, such rulers, taking up their autho-
rity upon concession and terms, shall betray their trusts,
shall abandon their duties, reject the terms, and overthrow
the prescribed constitution by which they are to govern —
things have reverted to the same condition in which they
were before any course of government was conceded or
agreed upon. The rulers on the one hand, acting without
any sanction of the people, and without any reason or justice
on their side, have recourse to new methods of political as-
sociation—and the people, are called on to devise or concede
to some new plan of power, which, with justice and right on
their side, they are entitled to have recourse to. There is
no longer any political government at all, until either by
wrong, on the one side, or by the exercise of the natural right
of the community at large, on the other, to concede or agree
to the terms on which they will he governed, a new scheme
of power is settled. That form of government, therefore,
may be properly said to have been established, independent-
ly even of that supreme uncontrollable authority appointed
for exercising the powers of government, when the consti-
tutional rules of such government are set and prescribed for
the rulers as well as the subjects, and cannot be invaded or
altered even by the supreme appointed authority itself — un-
less the sense of the community at large be newly taken as
agreeing to such changes — or except such supreme authority
shall, by dissolving altogether the bonds of all political go-
vernment, remit to the whole community at large the origi-
nal natural right of acting for themselves.

ORIGIN OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 73

So, also, may it justly be said that the people of England
have established that scheme of government by the consti-
tutional rules of which the supreme authority may be bound
to be guided by in the exercise of political powers. It is
true that no precise period can be pointed out when any
particular form and scheme of government was laid down
by general consent. It is true, indeed, that the fundamental
rules of the English Constitution, or frame of government,
has been constructed gradually, and as it were piecemeal —
one rule of government after another. And this is, in fact, a
peculiar merit, and source of stability, in the English scheme
of government, that, instead of being the product of mere
prospective contrivance, it is the growth of ages of experi-
ence, and of the reflection of many generations of powerful
minds on the true sources of political evils which have been
actually suffered, and of political excellencies actually prov-
ed. Id the long history of national vicissitudes through
which the English government has passed, ample scope and
opportunities have been afforded, not only for ascertaining
under what rules and principles the people can be best go-
verned so as best to secure the true and just ends of politi-
cal government, but also to collect the general and repeat-
ed expression of the united public voice of the people at large
on behalf of the political interests of the community. Of-
ten have the oppressions and selfish grasp of power by the
Sovereigns of England extorted the indignant and success-
ful opposition of the bulk of the people — sometimes the par-
tial and overgrown authority of the higher orders in the ex-
ercise of the political functions entrusted to them, have re-
quired restraint at the hands of the people or at those of the
Sovereign himself — often, also, has the wild or misdirected
passion of the multitude overborne the deliberative councils
of those most competent to conduct with regularity and ef-
ficiency the course of government ; and thereby the people
have themselves come to learn by disastrous experience how
fatal to national prosperity is the absence of control over the

74 ORIGIN OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION.

popular will, or rather over the violence of the various par-
ties who struggle to guide that will. It has been in the pro-
gress of vicissitudes of this nature that the people of Eng-
land, as a general body, acting in their various classes, and
according to their positions in the state or in society, have
come gradually to fix rules and limits for the exercise of the
supreme authority in its various branches. By some they
have been introduced— by others they have been conceded
to — by all parties capable of judging they have been for many
generations examined, discussed, and proved. They now
form a plan of power fixed in the conviction and in the af-
fections of the people — a noble fabrick raised by the labour
of many centuries, the pride of our nation and the envy of
our neighbours. It has been able to resist the storms of
political ferments through many ages ; and it can never be
overthrown till the whole body of the English people shall
have become so corrupt, or so cowardly, as to surrender to a
faction, or to an oppressor, what the united sense of the
people has established. Let us now contemplate this noble
object in all its parts.

SECTION II.

Of the Supreme or Legislative authority of the English

Government.

The supreme authority in England, as in all other coun-
tries, is the legislative power. Other authoritative functi-
ons in the state may be exercised by high magistrates act-
ing altogether independently, and to whom entire discretion
may be entrusted in respect of the acts of administration
delegated, according to the rules of the Constitution, to be
performed by them ; such as the administration of justice
by the judges, and the making of war and peace by the King.
But, still, such functionaries are not absolutely supreme —
for this plain reason — because those who have the power of
making laics can at any time interfere by regulating how,
and according to what rules, they shall exercise their functi-
ons, and pronounce their judgments, for the future, and may
even alter what such functionaries may have done. Nay,
more — the legislative authority, having the power to make
all or any laws, may, practically, even change the quality of
the powers which, according to the fundamental rules of the
constitution, are specifically entrusted to the exercise of par-
ticular functionaries under particular limits. To do that, in-
deed, would be (as I have said) to overthrow — as far as such
legislative interference went — the constitution itself; and,
therefore, it never could be justified, except by the ascertain-
ed 3ense of the body of the people concurring. And this is
a concurrence which in essential matters, as it must always
be very difficult to ascertain, so is it both perilous, and per-
haps hopeless, to attempt attaining. Still, as there is no
practical,' or actual limit (though certain constitutional rules

75 °F THE SUPREME LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY.

have been set) in the exercise of the power of making laws
upon all and every subject-matter — it is this legislative au-
thority and this only, which we must consider as supreme.

The legislative authority, according to the English Con-
stitution, is reposed in a body composed of three separate
organs, or agents, of political power. These are 1st, the
King or Queen * who acts with the advice, and generally
through the persons, of his or her ministers, who are respon-
sible for all the royal acts — 2d, an assembly called the House
of Lords ; and 3rdly, an assembly called the House of Com-
mons. The Queen has other powers, besides those in her
legislative capacity, of which I shall have to speak. At
present we will regard her as one of the component mem-
bers of the supreme authority of the realm. The body, so
composed of these three constituent authorities, is called
The Parliament. The mode in which its actual and ope-
rative powers are exercised is by the passing of laws by
their united concurrence — which laws are, accordingly,
termed Acts of Parliament. Let us examine the quality
and functions of each of these three authorities ; first sepa-
rately, and afterwards conjunctively.

* As a Queen is at present the occupant of the English throne (which
may she long continue) the royal authority will in the ensuing pages be
designated by that title, or by that of " the Crown," " the Sovereign,"
" the Monarch."

SECTION III.

Of the Queen in her Legislative capacity.

1. The Queen. — The Queen of England, exalted as her
rank is — and revered as her person must be, not more as
representing a long line of ancestors who have held the
same eminent station, than from the vast national import-
ance attached to the performance of her functions — holds
her highest title to the affection and obedience of her sub-
jects as being the First Magistrate in the kingdom. As such
she has her duties, like all other magistrates, and the cares
of royalty are bound up in the welfare and good government
of her people, according to the principles of the Constitution.
By the rules of that constitution, she succeeds to her
station in virtue of her birth, and as an hereditary right ;
and not according to the varying decision of any course of
election by the people. For historical experience has long
proved to the conviction of the people of England, that a
fixed regular appointed course of succession is the surest
course of preserving the internal peace of the nation ; and
they have relied on the rules and limitations, under which
they have established that the Monarch shall execute her
great powers, for the protection of the general interests of
the community in all her acts of state. They have relied
on these appointed rules, rather than on any vain efforts to
ascertain or secure the personal qualifications of their first
magistrate, as the assurance of their government according
to those principles of the constitution — and they have
appointed institutions through which the Monarch himself
is admonished of his own powers and the relative rights
of the people. In a government so constituted it has been
thought that no sufficient reason existed for excluding fe-

73 OF THE QUEEN IN HER LEGISLATIVE CAPACITY.

males from inheriting the crown ; although their claims
have been to a certain extent postponed in favour of a male
succession. By the constitutional law of England the Sons,
all of them according to priority of birth, and their descend-
ants in a right line, succeed to the crown in the first in-
stance : in default of any sons, or descendants of sons, the
daughters and their descendants in like manner succeed,
according to priority of their birth. And, whether a male
or female sovereign reigns, they hold precisely the same
powers.

As a member, and the Head of the Parliament, the
Queen is entrusted with the authority of summoning that
Body to meet for the purpose of consulting upon the
affairs of the nation, and of passing laws from time to
time as may appear requisite. And by the constitutional
laws of England she is bound thus to call the Parliament
together at least once in three years — and is enjoined so
to summon this body once every year, if need be — which
need, as it in fact necessarily does arise, the Parliament
is summoned, in practice, to meet in the course of every
passing year.

Each of these yearly meetings is called a sessions of the
Parliament; and it rests with the Queen, according to her dis-
cretion, to put an end to each such session — which is an
adjournment of the sitting of the same members of each
respective assembly — until such time in the course of the
ensuing year as the Queen may in thus adjourning fix for
the meeting again. This adjournment is termed the Proro-
guing of Parliament, and the period of their separation is
termed the Recess.

The same Parliament cannot meet at these several
sessions for more than seven years successively. In the
course of that period, and at any such time as the Queen in

OF THE QUEEN IN HER LEGISLATIVE CAPACITY. 79

her discretion may resolve, her Majesty must put an end
to the Parliament itself, and not merely to the sessions of
the Parliament : and if the Queen should fail so to put an
end to the Parliament, it expires of itself by a sort of natural
death. This ending of the Parliament by the monarch is
called dissolving the Parliament. The effect of a dissolu-
tion of Parliament is, that the functions and authority of
each member of the two legislative bodies altogether ends.
Another appointment must be made of each of these mem-
bers, according to the course provided by the scheme or
constitution of the government, which will presently be ex-
plained ; and the Queen, by her next summons of a meeting
of Parliament, calls together, not a new sessions, but the first
sessions of a new Parliament. Moreover the Parliament
comes to an end by the death of the King or Queen— for it
can only exist as a Parliament for six months thereafter, and
may be dissolved at an earlier period by the successor to
the Crown.

Upon the summoning together of the two Houses of Par-
liament for a Sessions, it is usual for the Queen to go
herself personally in great state to the Parliament House
to receive the members of them : although sometimes
authority is given to one or more high functionaries
to act for, and represent, the monarch on this occasion.
Upon the arrival of the Sovereign she proceeds to her
throne, or royal chair of state, and, the members of
both houses being on that occasion assembled together
in the room of the House of Lords, the Queen from
her throne addresses the united body in a written speech.
In that speech she usually alludes to the external condi-
tion of the country, with reference to foreign powers — its
internal condition with reference to the public peace and
quiet, and all matters of chief concern to the interests and
prosperity of the nation — and to the various topics requiring
the consideration of Parliament, as connected with the con-
dition and prospects of the country, and with the measures

gO OF THE QUEEN IN HER LEGISLATIVE CAPACITY.

contemplated or in progress by the Queen acting through her
ministers in the exercise of the powers entrusted to her (as
hereafter explained) in the government of the country.
This grand ceremony is called the opening of Parliament.
After the delivery of her address the Queen retires, leaving
the two houses, each in their separate assembly, to proceed
to the business of the sessions, and who themselves adjourn
their own meetings from day to day, until the whole session
shall be closed by the Prorogation. In the conduct of the
business of the two houses the monarch takes no part,
save by sending a message occasionally through some one
of his or her ministers who may happen to be a member of
the house, recommending some particular subject to their
consideration. The only further legislative duty and power
confided to the monarch, as a constituent member and Head
of the Parliament, is that of assenting or dissenting to the
acts which are proposed or passed by the united houses ;
without which assent no proposed law can have validity.

It is impossible to contemplate this imposing spectacle of
the opening of the British Parliament without a feeling of
elevated veneration. The pomp of processions and the
glitter of wealth, considered as a mere shoiv, will but little
affect the higher orders of mind. It is the occasion only
that gives dignity to the scene. It is not the diadem on
the Sovereign's brow, nor the robes with which the nobles
of the land are clothed, whiu* are the sources of rational
admiration. But the thought arises that upon that brow
rest the cares of an Empire, the mightiest on the earth —
under those robes stand forth the great counsellors of this
illustrious state, each of whom boars his share in the bur-
then of its government. They are met, as representing the
united body of the governor and the governed, practically
to renew by a formal example the great compact between
the monarch and her subjects, under which the constitution
is maintained, and the rights of the people and the glory

OF THE QUEEN IN HER LEGISLATIVE CAPACITY. Q\

of the nation are to he preserved. We see standing
amongst them the ablest statesmen, and the most power-
ful orators— we think of the vast human interests entrusted
to their charge— and we know that on their voice will de-
pend the well being of millions, and the fate of nations.
They are met, as the grandest and most potent assembly
ever invested with authority over their fellow-men, to take
part in the first solemn act of entering upon political duties,
the influence of which will extend throughout the whole
civilized globe.

SECTION IV.

Of the House of Lords,

2. Let us next examine the quality and functions of the
higher of these two assemblies — the House of Lords.

The Members of the House of Lords are such high dig-
nitaries, who have been themselves, or whose ancestors (to
whose rights and honors they have succeeded by course of
inheritance) have been, raised to such eminent station by
the grace and favor of the Sovereign. Those who, ihe first
of their families, are thus raised to such high dignity, are
presumed to be selected on account of conspicuous services
rendered to the state in the course of public employments,
or of pre-eminent talents and qualifications for the public
service, and sometimes on account of that extensive influ-
ence among the people which great wealth, justly accumu-
lated and liberally disbursed for the public good, naturally
confers. All these individuals are termed Lords of Par-
liament. Among those who have been themselves thus
selected, and whose rights and honors do not descend to
their families, is a body of persons who, under the tides of
Arch Bishops and Bishops, have confided to them by the
Sovereign certain duties and authorities in support of reli-
gion — and who in virtue of such office are entitled to a seat
in this house, with all the same legislative powers as the
other Lords ; although they seldom take any active share
in any other business of the legislature save that which is
more or less connected with religious affairs. The other
members of this house, whose honors and rights descend
in course of inheritance, are termed Peers ; and' are some-

OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS. g3

times called temporal Lords, to distinguish them from the
other religious Lords who are denominated spiritual Lords.

These Peers, or temporal Lords, although all equal in
respect of their powers and privileges as members of one
of the Houses of Parliament, hold different ranks and pre-
cedencies among one another, and before the public. Their
rank (with the exception of such of the King's own family
who may happen to be Peers, and who always rank highest,
and of a few other instances of rank according to some
particular offices in the state) depends on the quality of
their title, called their title of nobility. The first or high-
est title is that of Duke; 2d. that of Marquis; 3d. that
of Earl; 4th. that of Viscount; and 5th. that of Baron.
But, it may here be noticed that the rank of an Archbishop
is before all other Lords of Parliament except those of the
royal family ; and that the rank of a Bishop is next after
that of Viscount.

It has been noticed that it is the King or Queen, acting
by his or her mere grace and favor, who calls up from out
of the body of the people such as he or she may think
deserving to be advanced to the dignity of a Lord of Par-
liament. It must be obvious that to such high authority
only can a power of this important nature (which must be
personally delegated to some person or party) be entrusted.
If a judgment is to be formed of the merits of a statesman,
or public servant, that judgment should rather be formed
by the most exalted personage of the slate, whose labours in
the duties of the government have been assisted by him,
and who is the supreme magistrate over all classes, than by
any party of men in the state, who, having no supreme au-
thority in themselves over their fellow-subjects, but having 1
necessarily objects of separate ambition or interest,
would in all likelihood render such power of advancing
others subservient to the private purposes of a faction.

g4 OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS.

Still, it may be thought, that the Queen herself, having such

a t tnary power of creating members with a voice in

f
stale affairs, miyht have inducements to fill an assembly

of this nature with her own creatures, pledged to execute

her own will and designs, and thereby overbalance the

co-equal power entrusted by the constitution to the other

house, and give a casting majority in the House of Lords

itself. But, here, the principles and fundamental

rules of that constitution would oppose a barrier. For

all the nation could judge that these rules were broken and

betrayed, were it apparent that Peers were plentifully

created — not for any purpose of the general public service,

or as an honorable reward for great national exploits — but

merely with a view to particular favourite measures, or to

aggrandize the power of the Sovereign. And while the body

of the people have the means, through those who we shall

presently see represent them in the other house, it can

never be hoped that arbitrary and unconstitutional views of

this nature can be indulged without soon meeting an effectual

check.

In alluding to the mode of dissolving Parliaments, it was
said that, after a dissolution of the Parliament, newly
appointed members were called to the next Parliament
summoned. And this is literally true with regard to the
members of the House of Commons — but, as respects the
members of the House of Lords, it is to be noticed that
the Queen summons each individual member personally (as
if he was then newly appointed) at every meeting of a new
Parliament; which summons, however, cannot be refused
to any Peer. The only actually new persons, therefore,
summoned as Lords to any new Parliament called together,
are, 1st, those who may have been newly appointed Spiri-
tual Lords in the place of those deceased ; 2dly, those who
may have succeeded as heirs to Temporal Lords deceased;
and 3dly, those who may have been newly created Peers by
the grace and favor of the Crown.

OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS. g«j

The Lords are attended at their sittings by more or less,
and sometimes (as the greatness of the occasion may sug-
gest) by all the Supreme Judges, and* by other functi-
onaries of eminence in the law, for the purpose of assisting
them with advice on legal points. But none of these legal
dignitaries are members of the house, or have any right to
vote ; nor have they any right to speak therein, except
when called upon.

Each of the Lords may delegate any other Lord in his
own absence to vote for him upon all or any questions dis-
cussed before the house. This may be thought, perhaps,
to be somewhat an unreasonable privilege, inasmuch as it
miybt appear like voting blindfold, and for mere party
purposes, to decide questions of policy, without hearing the
discussion of ihem. I will, however, only notice so much
in explanation of a privilege the expediency of which has
occasionally been canvassed, but has now for many ages
been allowed to subsist as not having been found incom-
patible wiib propriety — that the Lords (as has been explain-
ed) are not liable to be changed at every new Parliament,
and that each of them therefore alicays forms a component
portion of the legislature. 1 1 " is among the duties of his
whole life and station always to be informed of the
general policy and course of government of his country,
and to become acquainted with the principles on which
any particular class of ministers selected by the Crown con-
duct the affairs of the state. Indeed, most of the indivi-
dual measures of the more important quality, and which
usually occupy most time in debate, he may be presumed
to have more or less previously considered. As, therefore,
the Peer is not the representative of any other body, but
himself, always intrusted with an actual share in conducting
the affairs of government, and may be presumed to have
studied the tendency of most of the measures under discus-
sion, there is nothing so unreasonable, as might at first ap-

OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS.

pear, in his exercising the influence of his vote, even on occa-
sions when he may not be present personally to enforce his
own opinioi* and co listen to those of others.

Upon all questions debated in this House, each Peer has
the privilege of entering upon the books of the public pro-
ceedings his dissent, and his reasons of dissent, to the mea-
sure proposed. And the only other distinguishing privilege
of this House of Lords, which seems necessary to be noticed
separately, is that of solely examining, discussing, and decid-
ing on such of their rights as are supposed to exist, already,
and of solely originating any legislative measures which may
affect their future rights, individually, as Lords of Parlia-
ment, or as a body composing this separate assembly. These
Acts, or measures, may be rejected or assented to by the other
house, but the latter has no power to change or alter them.

Such are the Lords of Parliament — a body as old as the
independence of the national government, and the institu-
tion and existence of which is bound up with the prosperity
and glory of the British nation. For the distinction of rank
and honors is necessary in every well-governed state, as the
reward of public services, and the appropriate incentive to
great actions. Those who are actuated by a generous emula-
tion for such distinction among their fellow-subjects can
never be unmindful of the dictates of virtue and loyalty to
the Sovereign and to the constitution. Those who succeed
by inheritance to such honors, if they may not. surpass or
rival the glory of the.ir ancestors, will scorn to disgrace their
name. Holding their honors and their position in the slate
independently, they will feel an interest in protecting the
constitution from invasion by any combinations of the Sover-
eign's ministers against the freedom or political rights of
the people, or by any encroachment of the mass of the peo-
ple upon the due authority of the Crown ; since every advance
towards new or arbitrary powers by the monarch, or towards

OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS.

uncontrollable rule by tbe people, must tend to diminish or
overwhelm their own influence. Removed by ^ir wealth,
or at least, competency, from all those cares whiWthe neces-
sity of earning a livelihood imposes, they have the greater
leisure, as well as the great er inclination, to dedicate them-
selves to the public service, and to all those departments
of liberal education which may best fit them for the affairs of
government. Nor is the grand test of national experience
wanting to stamp the tried value of such an institution of
dignified men, with their distinct assembly, distinct delibe-
rations, and distinct powers. For often have the Peers of
England proved the firm and successful champions of the
people, against the Crown, itself for the attainment and main-
tenance of their best laws, and just political rights — and as
often have they withstood the folly and fury of the people,
whose factions would otherwise have utterly overthrown all
government and all law.

SECTION V.

Of the House of Commons.

Lastly, let us inquire into the quality of the third con-
stituent part of the supreme legislative council of England —
the House of Commons,

The members of this assembly are called the Commons^
inasmuch as they are members of the community at large;
not having any titles of dignity as Peers or Lords of Parlia-
ment, but chosen or delegated by certain qualified classes
of the people to represent them especially among the rest of
the community, and to act on their behalf.

We have seen that, after a certain number obsessions and
prorogations of the Parliament composed of the two assem-
blies, that Parliament is at length dissolved, and a new Par-
liament is to be summoned. The Lords are summoned by
a special letter directed by the authority of the Queen to each
individual Lord. Let us see how the members of the House
of Commons are summoned.

This is managed by a similar letter directed to certain
officers, having the same name and executing similar duties
to those performed by the Sheriff's in India. These Sheriffs
are required to hold meetings in their several districts
(called in England Counties, into one hundred and sixteen,
of which the whole of the British territories of England,
Wales, Scotland and Ireland are divided; for the election of
one, two, and in some instances more, members for each
sut h district ; and they are likewise required to cause certain
officers, or head authorities, in certain specified chief Cities
and Towns in their several districts to hold like meetings for

OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. g9

the election of one, two, and sometimes more, members for
each such city or town. The number of members, and the
districts or cities or towns which at such meetings are to
elect, are all expressly specified hy the law. These mem-
bers so elected are said to represent the places for rather
the people of the places) for which, and at which, they are
elected — and are commonly called The, Members for such
places The number of members for Counties is 252, that
for Cities, Boroughs, and three Universities is 40G. The
whole amount of members is 653.

There are certain qualifications requisite to make persons
eligible as members of the House of Commons — and they
are these : 1st. The candidates must be of the age of 21.
years. 2nd. Tltey must be subjects born in some part of
the Queen's dominions. 3rd. They must not be any of the
Supreme Judges. 4th. They must not be persons dedicated
to the administration of the national religion. 5th. They
must not he any of the persons (such as sheriffs and others)
appointed by law to manage the elections. Gib. They must
nol be persons connected with certain offices for the collec*
tion of taxes. 7th. They must not be persons enjoying any
pension by the bounty of the Queen; and if any member
takes an office of profit paid hy the Crown, he must there-
upon vacate his seat — hut he may here-elected. 8th. They
must not have been convicted of any of the more serious
crimes. 9th. They must (with certain few exceptions) have
property in land to the value of 600£ per annum, to he eligi-
ble as members of Counties — and of 300£, to be eligible for
any City or Town.

The qualifications for /Vectors of members are; 1st, that
they should have a certain amount of interest in landed
property— according to the nature of that interest. Hut
the amount and nature of this interest vary so much, ac-
cording to the ancient customs of the several districts and

90 0F THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

places, that it would be tedious, in a general discourse of
this quality, to detail all the differences and peculiarities of
rights to elect, ' founded on this property. The obvious
principle on which this qualification is required, is that
property gives some assurance, not merely of independence
in the exercise of this important right, hut. also of some
cultivation of mind and knowledge of the world — qualities
so much needed in the direction of a free and competent
choice. But it is equally a constitutional principle that
the right of electing should be extended to all classes of
the people, as far as is consistent with that competency and
independence; and, accordingly, the property qualification is
reduced to a very low standard — the mere renting* a house
of the value of 10£ per annum being a sufficient qualifica-
tion in some instances, or the owning lan*l to the amount
of 2£ per annum being sufficient in others, and the merely
inhabiting any house as a tenant being sufficient in others.

In some few places the right depends on being enrolled as
or members of some particular trades ; and in two instances,
those of the two Unive>sities (as the great central institu-
tions for the education of the superior orders are called)
the qualification depends on advancement to a certain, rank
among the members of such Universities.

Further qualifications are— 2nd. That the Electors shall
be 21 years of age. 3rd. That they shall not have been
convicted of any of the more serious crimes, or of that of per-
jury, or of having been bribed at any Election. 4th. That
they shall only have one vote for each distinct property, or
other qualifying right to vote.

Next is to be considered the mode of Election. This is
settled bv special laws, which contain a multitude of pro-
visions directed to ensure, as far as human laws can,
the unbiassed and nncorrupted exercise of a free, choice by
the Electors, according to their own discretion — to afford

OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. 9][

full opportunity to all who have the right of Election
for exercising that right — ami for precluding false or erro-
neous claims to the exercise of it. With this view all
military persons are to absent themselves from the place
of Election, during the time of voting— all Lords of Par-
liament are forbidden to interfere, as are various other
persons holding offices of influence. These precautions
have reference to the exclusion of all undue bias or
intimidation. But further and very strict provisions have
been made to prevent bribery through the proffer of any
gifts or oln ;es of em dument. I have no occasion fur-
ther to detail the nature of these provisions, being of so
local an interest ; but a feeling of regret is not to be dis-
guised (hat the depravity of mankind is too often superior
to the utmost legislative efforts to guard against influences
of this nature.

On the days appointed for holding the Elections, the
Sheriffs presiding at. the meetings of their several Counties,
and the other head functionaries presiding over those of
the Ci -id Towns, declare the purpose of each i ly.

'I hereupon any Elector proposes any person who happens
to he a candidate, or whom he supposes willing to become
so, which proposition is seconded by another Elector. The
same course is pursued for each person nominated as a
candidate. After such propositions of the several candi-
dates the sense of the meeting is taken by the President
calling for a show of hands. If no more candidates are
proposed than the place has the right to elect, ami if any
number whatever vote by their show of hands for such candi-
dates, they are thereupon at once declared duly elected, and
the meeting closes. Bui, if there are more such candidates,
the President judges from the show of hands which of them
have the majority, and declares the election to have fallen
Upon such as have such majority. Upon this declaration
every candidate, or proposer of a candidate, who is in the

92 OP THE HOUSE OP COMMONS.

minority, has the right to demand that the separate votes
shall betaken of all the Electors, both present ana absent,
who may within the time prefixed for such purpose, come
and proffer his vote. And this is a course, in fact, gener-
ally had recourse to, when a greater number are proposed
than the place can elect— inasmuch as the casual attendance,
personally, and show of hands at the meeting can give but
little insight into the wishes of the whole body of Electors ;
and it may be presumed that each candidate who has any
serious pretensions desires that the express opinion of the
whole body should be declared. The proffering and record-
ing of votes then proceeds — each Elector presenting himself
openly in public for that purpose. If required, he must
swear to his qualification, every precaution having in the
meantime been taken by the course pointed out by law of
registering and ascertaining his right of voting. The
President of the meeting presides also from day to day at
the taking of the votes, assisted by such advisers as he may
think fit, and he has the original power (subject to subse-
quent appeal) of admitting or rejecting the votes offered,
according to the nature of any objections raised. At the
end of the time prefixed by law for receiving votes, the
numbers voting for each candidate are ascertained, and,
according to the majority, the members are declared to be
duly elected.

The Sheriffs, after receiving these reports from the pre-
siding officers of the Cities, and Towns within their Coun-
ties, send them, together with the reports of the result of
the Elections in their several Counties, to the appointed
government office. These reports are termed their /?<?-
turns. — Upon the next meeting of Parliament any can-
didate may petition the House of Commons to examine and
decide on the legal validity of any return, and for the re-
turn being amended by his own name being inserted instead
of that of any o^her candidate. A delegated number of the

OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

members are thereupon appointed for this purpose, — and
their determination finally adjudges the right of sitting as
a member.

Thus it is that the people of England (among whom I
include those of Scotland and Ireland") have and exercise their
share in the supreme government. Those whom the Elec-
tors of each place shall choose do not, indeed, represent
those Electors only — although by the very act of such choos-
ing each of these bodies of Electors expressly participate in
some degree in the government. But each member of the
Commons' house of Parliament acts for, and represents, the
ichole body of the people. He does not go to Parliament as
a delegate or agent, merely, to submit, and act upon, the
instructions of those who elect him. If it were so, it would
be plainly requisite that the body who send him should
themselves, not only be competent, but have the means of
discussing and determining previously all measures and laws
which Parliament is to pass. This discussion, however, as
well as the determining, is not entrusted to the Electors, but
to the Parliament. That assembly is the deliberative organ
of the whole nation. Those who go there, therefore, ought
to bring their own judgment, to bear on proposed laws ; and
not the instructions of those who have not entrusted to
them the power or the means of deciding on political mea-
sures. It would be a strange absurdity that members of the
national legislature should meet and discuss questions which
others, who have not discussed them, have previously decid-
ed and given their orders upon. The opinions come to by the
Electors, who for the most part are of the middle and inferior
classes of the industrious — formed without any regular
debate, often taken up without personal inquiry, and often-
cr without due .information and reflection — are not only
liable to change, but are peculiarly exposed to delusion and
error. He, therefore, that should on all occasions blindly
pursue the dictates of such instructors would generally be-

94 0F THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

tray, rather than serve, the interests of those who had, chosen
him for a legislator. Besides this, it is to he recollected
thai, in the government of such a vast and various empire
as composes the whole British nation, the legislature is call-
ed on to deliberate and decide on a mass of interests so nu-
merous and so intricate, that very few of them indeed can
have ever become the subject of consideration in each place
which elects a member for Parliament.

But, still, in the general public conduct of the Representa-
tive elected, and in many of the more important measures
on which he is called on to pronounce his sentiments or his
vote, there is, and ever must be, a close union and corres-
pondence between the member and his constituents. And,
besides that, the local interests of each place, which are
sometimes (and especially in large districts or commercial
cities) of national importance, also require an especial or
in the grand assembly of the legislature. !t is this tie between
the electors and the elected, and this special duty imposed
on the former by the latter on their own local behalf which
renders (he whole body of the House of Commons the true
Representatives of the whole body of the people, who thereby
exercise a practical influence, not only in the formation, but
also in the measures, of the government. No doubt the elec-
tors have, and generally use also, the right of calling on their
Representatives from time to time for afull explanation of all
their political sentiments and acts — and the electors have
the means of meeting and comparing, for their general guid-
ance, their own common feelings in regard to those measures
in which their Representatives have taken their part. The
expression of such common feelings.must ever be entitled to
respect, and will assuredly have its weight. And, with this
view, our admirable constitution provides that once in seven
years, at least, all the electors in the empire shall necessari-
ly have this opportunity of sanctioning or repudiating the
proceedings of their Representatives, through the course of

OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. 95

re-electing them, or by their rejection in favor of other
candidates. Thus it is that, by possessing these sure and
ample means of uniting their wishes and sentiments with
those of their Representatives in all their polit ical acts, the
people are enabled to identify their own interests with
those of the individuals who form one, and the greatest,
of the organs of the Supreme Government of the nation,
and thereby to exercise in a substantial sense their
share in such government. While their voice can thus be
at all times plainly and clearly heard, and while that influ-
ence which must ever attend the expression of that general
voice shall he exerted, as a component portion of the will of
government itself, it is certain that neither the arbitrary
power of one, nor of a few, nor of any portion whatever, among
the people can arise to overthrow the common interests, and
establish the reign of misgovernment, terror, and injustice.

This system, moreover, of Representation, such as I have
endeavoured to explain it, is intended (as far as human
foresight, and the experience of past ages can accomplish
it) to comprise substantially the whole body of the people.
It is obvious, if we look at the aim and principle of election,
thai, as regards those who ought to exercise this riyhf, we
can only take into our consideration such as are competent
to it in point of understanding and independence. i\ large
portion of the people must, consequently, be struck out of
the number of Electors, as either not fit to he represented,
or represented by identification with others. Thus Chil-
dren and those who are utterly ignorant and destitute, (to
say nothing of criminals can hardly be expected to become
Electors. Thus, also, our constitutional law, having reference
to domestic ties and to the general dependence of all fe-
males in every station of life, excludes them from such
privilege. But, besides 'hoc, there is a verj huge class of
the community so entirely dependent on the inclination or
power of others, in regard to their interests — or who, from

OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

their very low pecuniary circumstances, may be made so,
that to give such parties the right of Election would in ef-
fect be no more than unduly to increase the votes of the
wealthier classes. No political subject whatever has occa-
sioned more heats or controversy in England than this of
the proper extent of the right of Election. It has generally
been supposed that by late Acts of Parliament this right
has been extended up to the very verge of expediency — and
many consider far beyond it. The lovers of peace now
trust that agitations on this topic may cease : and it surely
may be some reason in the minds of the well-disposed for
such cessation, that to all classes of the male population
is this right open to attainment, by mere freedom from
crime, and by the acquisition of the most slender pecuniary
stake in the country.

Having now enquired into the mode of Election of the
members of the House of Commons, and examined into
the nature and operation of that Share which the whole
people of England have thereby in the government of their
country, it remains but to say that this house has the
sole authority to discuss and decide questions affecting their
own existing rights, or to originate legislative measures
affecting their own future rights, either individually or as
a body, and to notice one other important particular, as dis-
tinguishing the functions of this House from those of the
House of Lords. It is a privilege of the people of England
that they cannot be taxed for any public purposes of govern-
ment except by their own consent, expressed through their
legitimate organ the House of Commons, with whom alone
any act for taxation, or any grant of the public funds, can
originate. This privilege is the very corner-stone of that
structure of government whose foundation is the duly ascer-
tained sense of the people. As it is a necessary principle
of every form of government that the support of its charges
shall fall upon the industry of the people, so is it a' principle

OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. 97

of the British constitution that the people themselves shall
through their Representatives guard the supply from the
demands of those other powers of the state, who, having
private interests of their own apart from those of the people
at large, might be influenced to increase the public burdens
for their own objects. At the same time, although it would
prove a factious violation of the constitutional law to refuse
those supplies which are evidently necessary for the pur-
poses of government, or at all events to refuse them except
in self-defence against palpable violations of that law by
those entrusted with the administration of government, yet
this exclusive power over the finances of the country furnishes
to the people's branch of the legislature another absolute
check against the encroachments of arbitrary authority,
should any monarch or his ministers be so rash as to attempt
them.

It may readily he presumed that, next to the Lords them-
selves, the members of the House of Commons are among
the most eminent men of the nation. Large wealth will un-
doubtedly in itself clothe the possessors with that influence
which would go far towards ensuring an election to this
august body. But it is seldom that the mere possession of
riches is the main qualification of such as gain that station.
The people naturally look to their Representatives taking
more or less share in the public business of the assembly:
it is very certain that no part can be efficiently taken with-
out some talents, and much information. But those who
aspire to distinction in an assembly like this will know
that such an ambition would be vain and hopeless to any
but such as possess surpassing abilities, qualifying them to
conduct or advocate the vast and various interests of an
Empire on which the sun never sets. It is in this assembly,
therefore, that have shone forth, and still flourish, those
great men whose fame fills the whole earth. It is among
the debates of this body that we must look for the examples

98 OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

of that eloquence, which, while it convinces, delights, or
amazes, fixes fo^ ever the prosperity of nations. From this
assembly we are to trace the many grand measures and laws
which are the glory of the English nation and the admira-
tion of the world. In this nursery have been fostered
statesmen who have become the lights of political govern-
ment, and by whose genius Empires have been raised or
overwhelmed.

Constituted as this assembly is, it must always have the
chief influence in the state. For, being the organ of the
whole body of the people, and being through its members
individually in continual correspondence with the people,
the permanent and decided expression of its sentiments can
hardly be resisted. In the conduct of the legislative business,
and in the passing of Acts, though all these branches of this
legislature must concur, yet they each act distinctly, and
each House proposes and discusses separately. The mea-
sures originated by the Lords, however wise they may 'be,
yet, as exemplifying the sense of only a very small though
important portion of the people, they will hardly be pressed
against the united conviction of the people themselves as ma-
nifested in their own House. This former body, will, there-
fore, watch and seek to instruct, rather than to force, the gene-
ral sense of the people in the political projects they them-
selves introduce. And in the consideration, also, by the Lords
of the measures proposed to them by the Commons, their
great constitutional service in the state will be best evinced
by the wholesome check which their discussions, as well as
their power, will impose on hasty and ill-considered legis-
lation, and by the sagacious and discreet improvements they
will make in the laws submitted to them. The Sovereign,
in the mean while, possesses in the power of Dissolution the
means of personal appeal to the people, upon all great politi-
cal questions about which the two great Councils of the na-
tion may differ. But, when this House of Lords shall have

OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. 99

learnt the incontestible sentiments of the united people and
their steady perseverance in them, or when the monarch shall
have been thus instructed in relation to the steps that should
be taken in the administration of his government, or in the
choice of his ministers appointed to conduct it, there can be
few cases, indeed, in which a continued resistance to those
expressed sentiments would be justifiable, and fewer still in
which such resistance would be prudent. Such cases of
justifiable resistance may arise — our constitution supposes the
possibility of them. But we should rather lament than con-
template that possibility of their occurrence, in the appre-
hension that they would be cases when a large majority of
the whole people should aim at overturning the system it-
self of the government, and its constitutional rules.

SECTION VI.

Of the mode of enacting Laws, or Statutes.

Let us now turn our attention to the proceedings of the
whole legislative body conjunctively — in other words to the
mode of passing Acts, and to the quality of other business of
the Parliament, in the conduct of which each house observes
substantially the same course.

With a view to the better and more independent perform-
ance of these great duties on behalf of their country, the
members of both Houses of Parliament are exempt from any
arrest of (heir persons by the legal process of any Courts of
Justice, except for crimes. But a more important and
necessary privilege enjoyed by the members, for the same
end, is that of entire freedom of speech, subject only to the
rules of each house for the preservation of regularity and
decorum. No magistrate and no functionary in the kingdom
is so high, but that his conduct may be examined and censur-
ed in these assemblies — no measures in the administration
of government, by whomsoever advocated or effected, are
free from attack and exposure. However mistaken the
censurer may be, either as to facts or opinions, he is not
to be questioned for the statement of his sentiments— for,
great as may be the inconveniences from occasional publici-
ty given to prejudice and error, they are as nothing when
compared with the ill consequences of any hindrance to a
fearless discharge of duty to the state. For the better go-
vernment, however, of the business and debates of Parlia-
ment, each house has its President, whose prominent duty
it is to enforce those rules of the Houses which have been

MODE OF ENACTING LAWS OR STATUTES. \Q\

framed for ensuring propriety in debate, and due order in
the conduct of business ; and whose word upon such subjects
is the law.

The Statutes, or Acts of Parliament, are laics: and, like all
other proceedings of the House, must be passed through all
its stages by a majority. When a new law is to be propos-
ed, the member desiring to propose it must first move for'
and obtain leave from the House to bring in, or exhibit to
be read, such law. Upon the motion being made, it must
be seconded by another member — and then every member
is at liberty to state his sentiments upon the motion. Upon
the debate concluded, the president (who in the House of
Commons is a member elected among themselves, and call-
ed the Speaker, and in the House of Lords is the highest
judge in the realm, called the Lord Chancellor) puts the
question. The votes are given openly by voice ; and the
majority of those then assemble.d on the question being put
decide it by assenting or dissenting. It is seldom*, however,
that any debate arises on this preliminary question of
asking leave to bring in a law ; and leave is not often refused.

The bringing in the law, which until finally passed is
called a Bill, is by delivering it, at the proper time after
leave given, into the hands of an officer in the House, while
sitting, and then moving that it be read a first time. This
motion must be seconded ; and the same course is pursued
in deciding upon that motion, as before in asking leave to
bring the Bill in. It is seldom that any serious debate or
opposition arises to this first reading.

At a competent time the member again moves that the
Bill be read a second time. And it is upon this motion
that, according to the nature and importance of the law, a
debate (if there be any opposition intended) arises. If the
Bill is allowed by a majority to be read a second time, the

102

MODE OF ENACTING LAWS OR STATUTES.

next course is to refer it to the examination, of a Committee,
who discuss the Bill, clause by clause, with a view to any
amendments which may appear requisite in the details ; all
which amendments, on being proposed, are carried or reject-
ed by a majority. After it has thus passed through a
Committee it is moved to be read a third time —
which though occasionally, and especially in very im-
portant matters, opposed, is usually allowed without de-
bate. Finally, the President puts the question whether the
Bill shall now pass — which may in like manner be opposed,
but very seldom is so. The Bill has now gone through all
the forms and discussions required in the House where it
originates, and is thereupon taken and delivered into the
hands of an officer of the other House. Some member of
that House must there propose it to be read in his own House;
otherwise the Bill drops altogether — but if any member shall
so take up the Bill, the same course must be pursued in hav-
ing it read and debated three several times, as has been be-
fore pursued in the other House. Whatever alterations are
made, the Bill must be returned to the House wherein it ori-
ginated for its concurrence, without which the bill must
either be allowed to pass without the alterations, or else it
must be dropped altogether. And, it is to be observed, that
a Bill once rejected cannot be brought forward again during
the same sessions.

The Bill having passed in this way through both Houses is
finally presented to the Queen, or some person authorized to
represent her on the occasion, for her assent. For the rea-
sons already alluded to, an instance has not happened for
near two hundred years of the refusal of the Royal assent to
a bill thus brought forward by both Houses of Parliament.
The Bill then becomes an Act of Parliament, sometimes
called a Statute, and becomes part of the imperative sure
law of the land.

MODE Of ENACTING LAWS OR STATUTES. JQ3

It is worthy to be observed with how many precautions,
and with what provisions for ample consideration and dis-
cussion, the constitution has guarded the enactment of the
national laws. It is not to be expected that any Bill would
be introduced to the notice of such an assembly as the Par-
liament without mature reflection on the principles of the
projected law, and without an accurate scrutiny even of its
very language. The opportunities for debate are such as to
preclude all hasty and unadvised decisions by those to whom
the laws are submitted for sanction. At the same time the
necessity of passing every law by the same course through
both Houses, acting independently, renders each assembly a
check upon the exorbitances of the other; and, thus, each
branch of the legislature is said to support and be supported,
to regulate and be regulated, by the other.

Such is the method of passing Acts of Parliament, which
are the Statutes, and form a large portion of the laws of the
English Empire ; and by such course it was that, after the
examination of many volumes of evidence delivered before
the two Houses,the last great Charter Act for the government
of India was enacted. But there are many other important
political functions performed by the Houses of Parliament,
the chief of which should be enumerated before we pass to
the consideration of the administrative branch of the Eng-
lish government.

Among these functions one is, to receive petitions from any
recognized portion of the people, or even from any indivi-
dual, which petitions have for their object any public
measures for the relief, or for the benefit of the petitioners,
and which relief or benefit may not happen to hi within the
ordinary compass of the existing laws. Another is, that of
passing resolutions upon the quality of any public measures,
or the conduct of any public men, or on other topics, directed
to the support, or introduction, or amendment of proceed-

[I 4 MODE OF ENACTING LAWS OR STATUTES.

ings connected with the administrative government of the
country. Another is, that of passing addresses to the Sover-
eign upon the same or similar topics. And, lastly, I shall
notice that momentous power vested in the Common's House,
of bringing charges to be tried before the Lords of Parlia-
ment, sitting on such occasions as the highest judicial
court of the whole Empire, against any individuals for such
high crimes against the state, or the constitutional liberties
or rights of the people, as the ordinary laws of the country
cannot reach. Thus all acts of oppression in the conduct of
any branch of the government by great officers of the state,
all attempts by them to subvert the fundamental rules of the
constitution, are subjects of these charges brought by the
body of the people themselves, through their Representatives,
against such powerful delinquents. This formidable power,
against which not the mightiest Minister of state can prevail,
affords the last of those efficient securities which I have had
to enumerate for the maintenance of English constitution,
and for the protection of all the subjects of the British Em-
pire from arbitrary and tyrannical government.

All these various topics of debate form the copious subjects
of those Reports of Parliamentary proceedings with which
the English newspapers during the Sessions of Parliament
are for the most part filled. It is beside my present object
to explain the nature and effects of that liberty of writing
and printing whatever each man thinks proper, subject only
to responsibility to the Courts of Justice for any injury to
the public, or to any private individual, thereby, which among
the Natives of this country, as well as in England, is com-
monly known by the terms of Liberty of the Press. I notice
it now, merely for the sake of shewing its operation in diffus-
ing far and wide over the whole civilized earth, and among
all classes, a full and accurate account of whatever any
member of Parliament utters in that assembly of the slight-
est importance in a public point of view. The art of noting

MODE OF ENACTING LAWS OR STATUTES, ]Q5

from the mouth of a public speaker the purport of his
speeches is one of considerable skill, ar.d the arrangements
for a speedy publication of such notes are 1 curious and ex-
tensive. But to such perfection has the method been
brought in England that, within a very few hours after each
individual has delivered his speech, or even an observation,
and after the debate has closed, the whole purport of the
discussion, with all its peculiarities and interruptions, and
in many instances incorporating the very words themselves
of the speakers, is presented to the reader of the English
newspaper. By this means, not only is an enlightened
curiosity gratified, but an exact knowledge is continually
gained of the conduct and sentiments of every member of
the government, and of every public measure in contempla-
tion. The body of the people thereby become themselves
the guardians of their own political rights and interests.

SECTION VII.

Of the Executive Branch of the English Government.

We will now direct our attention to another, and not less
important, branch of the English political government, as
settled to be conducted by the rules of the constitution,
which is the Administrative government, or the Queen's
government — and usually termed the Executive govern-
ment.

It must be obvious that but a small part of government
consists of making laws — for the greater practical busi-
ness of government is that of carrying on its affairs accord-
ing to those laws, and the rules of the constitution.

This Administrative, or Executive, department of govern-
ment is entrusted to the discretion of the Queen — or, as I
shall choose to denominate the power personally resting
in the monarch who may be either King or Queen, the
Crown. That discretion is no otherwise limited than by
the requisite observance of the laws actually existing, and
the legislative authority of the Parliament. But, to under-
stand correctly the nature and the limits of that discretion,
we must examine in detail the powers of the Crown, known
in England by the term its Prerogatives.

The first I shall notice is that of the Crown's personal in-
dependence of all other jurisdictions. As it is said in the
terms of the English law — the King can do no icrong.
This, it is true, is a mere notion, or doctrine, or supposi-
tion. The wearer of the Crown may commit error ; may

EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT. \Q7

even betray the trusts reposed— but it is a principle of the
constitutional law not to suppose it, and therefore on no ac-
count personally to charge it. In the Executive department
the Crown is personally supreme ; in the Legislative it is a
component portion of the uncontrollable supreme authority
of the whole Empire. No tribunal, therefore, can have superi-
ority over the monarch personally. The rules of the consti-
tution provide that every thing shall be presumed to have
been done by the, Crown through the advice of her Ministers
—and accordingly they, and they only, are held responsi-
ble for all her measures. This doctrine of the respon-
sibility of the Ministers for all acts of the Crown, while it
imposes no injustice whatever on those Ministers who can al-
ways refuse their assent, or ask (heir dismissal from office,
on occasions when they disapprove of the proposed mea-
sures of the Crown, provides a sure remedy against those
abuses which evil counsellors or agents of the Crown might
attempt under its sanction. But though the exalted quali-
ty of the monarch exempts her personally from any human
tribunal, yet, such is the system and frame of the constitu-
tion, that any positive efforts (which the law in decency will
not even suppose) through her chosen agents to subvert the
rules and the rights of the people, would at least meet
with effectual opposition, and endanger the enjoyment of
that regal capacity, which in truth by such a course of con-
duct would have been abandoned. The monarch has her
duli; and obligations, like other inferior functionaries of the
state, which main duty is, to govern according to law.

In the exercise of the Sovereign's vast powers for the pub-
lic good, according to her mere discretion through her res-
ponsible ministers, we must, therefore, look to those matters
in which the positive laws of the state, and the acknowledg-
ed rules of the constitution are altogether silent. The next
Prerogative power, then, which we will notice, as entrusted
to the Crown's discretion is, Secondly, that the monarch

203 EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT.

shall act as the sole representative of the people in all mat-
ters iu the relation of the British Empire with foreign in-
dependent powers.

Thus, the Crown has sole authority of declaring war or
peace with foreign nations, and of carrying on with that
despatch, decision, and consistency which is obviously ne-
cessary (but which a numerous community or body of coun-
sellors could never so well accomplish) the important and
complicated concerns attending on the waging of wars, or
the maintenance of peace. It is the Crown which appoints
all Ambassadors, and makes all treaties with foreign states.
It is the same authority which allows, or prohibits, the ac-
cess or residence of foreigners within the British territories.
It is the Sovereign who raises, and who is the supreme head
over all the Military and Naval forces, and the governor
over all Forts, and over all havens and ports of the sea.

Thirdly, should be mentioned, the royal Prerogative of
assenting to, or dissenting from, Bills of Parliament ; which,
having been alluded to before, is only repeated now as ex-
plaining that, in whatever cases (as in the instance of the
Government of India) any prerogatives of the Crown are de-
legated to subordinate governors, the Queen does in effect
exercise her own Prerogative by herself voluntarily concede
ing, in her capacity of head of the Parliament, such powers,
to be applied according to the specified arrangements pro-
vided by the Act or Statute.

Fourthly, the Crown is the source, or fountain, and the
general distributor, of justice throughout, the Empire. It
is not to be supposed that justice flows from the royal
mind as having its origin there. The law is the true origin
and source of justice ; the Sovereign is rather the reservoir,
and the supreme administrator of justice. And in early times
the King himself personally sat as the supreme judge in all

EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT. JQg

causes — but such a course is quite incompatible with the
condition of civilized countries, and with a state of things
when accurate certainty and extensive learriing becomes ne-
cessary for right adjudication according to the laws. It
has, consequently, become a principle in the English con-
stitution that the King shall administer justice through
appointed Judges.

The Queen, therefore, alone has the power of erecting all
Courts of Judicature — as in India the King originally did,
until the whole course of the India Government became
settled by Statute. The Crown still, however, exercises that
authority in erecting the Supreme Courts of Judicature in In-
dia, and appoints the Judges of those Courts. It is under
this Prerogative we must class the sole power of pardoning
criminals — a power often delegated to the governors of
Colonies, as to a very considerable extent it is entrusted to
the Governments of India ; but which is still reserved to
the Crown as regards all criminals convicted before the
Supreme Court. Before quitting this subject, I should no-
tice that no portion of the constitutional law is more strict-
ly guarded than that which is directed to ensure the inde-
pendence of the Judges. The fearless discharge of their
duty, unawed and unbiassed by the Crown or the ministers
of Government, is considered of far more importance than
even their freedom from error or ignorance. For it is ever
the dearest privilege of Englishmen that they shall be
under the dominion of the law, and not of any man's will,
or wishes, or inclinations. It is, therefore, ;so provided, that
nothing short of the Parliament itself, can interfere, upon
clear cause shewn, for the displacing a Supreme Judge
in England— and great, though by no means so extensive,
precautions of a similar kind surround the character and
independence of the Supreme Judges even of the distant
Colonies,

110

EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT.

Fifthly, the Sovereign is the true fountain of honor and
office. Her sole authority of making Lords of Parliament
has already been explained. But there are many other
gradations of rank, and of titles, and of personal distinc-
tions, known in England. Thus Lords who are not Lords
of Parliament may, and sometimes are, created by the
Crown. Thus, likewise, the people of India are familiar
with other distinguishing titles in the Army and Civil Ser-
vice, such as persons bearing the title of Right Honorable,
and Honorable, Baronets, and Knights of various classes.
So also, the holding of offices under the state is, in itself, a
species of distinction and honor ; and all such offices spring
originally from the Crown. For instance, in England, all
Justices of the peace are so appointed by the Queen herself
— and it is only by authority of an Act of Parliament that
this appointment of Justices of the peace is made by the
Governments of India. In'like manner all Commissions,
and Ranks in the Army and Navyiare held from the Crown ;
although those in the East India Company's Army and
Navy are given by the Directors of that Company by au-
thority of statutes.

Sixthly, the Sovereign is the supreme Governor and ar-
biter in the affairs of Commerce. As regards foreign
trade the Crown can, indeed, by this Prerogative interfere
but little — inasmuch as independent states will not be con-
trolled by the authority of other states. Neither can the
Crown legally dictate or regulate the terms of such trade,
beyond such matters as concern the portion of that trade
necessarily conducted within her own dominions. Moreover,
all such regulations of foreign trade, as well as that which
is carried on between England and the Queen's own foreign
dominions, have been provided, upon a just observance of
the infinite number of commercial interests, by Acts of
Parliament— as, particularly, the trade between England
and the eastern countries; which, however, originally was

EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT. ] ] {

regulated by the authority of the Crown alone. But, as
regards the domestic or internal commerce of England
itself, various exercises of Prerogative still prevail, such as
the erection of any new public markets— the regulation of
fixed weights and measures — and, what is the most mate-
rial of all, the sole right of coining money, of whatever
denominations or declared value, but which must be of
either gold, silver, or copper. I will not expatiate upon so
extensive a subject as the nafure and use of current money
— which nature and uses, rightly understood, must neces-
sarily govern this exercise of the royal Prerogative. It
will be sufficient to say that this royal authority is not of that
mere discretionary or arbitrary nature, as that the pecu»
niary concerns of the people can be exposed to confusion or
ruin thereby. It is a power, which, as it must for the sake
of certainty and regularity in such concerns be reposed
somewhere, is reposed in the Crown under settled limits
calculated to preserve the integrity of all pecuniary deal-
ings between man and man.

Lastly, the Sovereign is the supreme Governor over
the affairs of Religion. This does not imply that the
Crown can dictate the religious Faith, or the modes of Wor-
ship, among her subjects. That is left to their own consciences
and convictions. It cannot be properly made the ""subject
of force. But, in England, there are rules or doctrines of
religious Faith, as regards the nature of the Deity, and the
disclosure by him to mankind of his will in respect of their
conduct towards him and towards their fellow-creatures,
which have been received as sacred truths by the governing
power of the state, and are consequently maintained by its
authority. In this sense, the Queen, as the Chief Magistrate
of the state, is the. head and chief governor in matters of
religion. It is she that appoints the functionaries of the
Church, and all priestly magistrates having authority in the
conduct of the national worship. Thus, she not only ap-

|]2 EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT.

points all Bishops in England, but also the Bishops in In-
dia, and in all other parts of the British dominions.
Other religions are not only permitted, but they are under
the law protected — so that every man may worship God
according to his own form of Faith in peace and security.

By the English law all charities axe considered as founded
in religion, and consequently they fall within the Sovereign's
protective Prerogative. The Queen has the governance and
control over air charitable foundations and gifts, under
whatever form of Faith, or for whatever humane pur-
poses dedicated. This, is a necessary consequence of
the Sovereign's possessing the chief administrative
power ; as, otherwise, this property would have "no spe-
cific owner — which is obviously requisite for insuring
the just objects of all charitable dispositions. For if the
royal authority was not interposed through her appointed
officers for the protection of such Institutions against fraud
and spoliation, what hope could there be for the maintenance
and prosperity of any of these public establishments, whether
for education, or relief to the sick or destitute ? For the ob-
jects of such institutions are too weak to befriend them-
selves.

Thfift, it will be seen, that the royal authority ranges over
the whole compass of the administration of government —
and is the supreme Executive power of the State. Supreme
in one sense, because there is no superior authority from
which orders in the Administrative department can flow, nor
any to which appeal can be made for the control of those
measures entrusted to the discretion of the Crown. But,
still, this discretion and these powers are not altogether
arbitrary and absolute ; but are to be guided by certain
references and principles. The Queen must govern accord-
ing to the Laws — the monarchy is said to be "a limited mon-
archy"— -limited by the rules of the constitution, and by the

EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT. ] 13

express laws made by the supreme legislative authority of
the Empire. What negociations shall be made with foreign
powers — whether war or peace shall prevail — what armies
shall be raised, and who shall bear command in them — what
courts of law shall be established, and who shall preside in
them — how to maintain the national religion and whom to
appoint its ministers — and such like prerogatives, are all
within the sole consideration of the Crown. But, to deliver
up the national independence to foreign powers — to make
war for private objects of ambition — to cover the land
with standing armies, and compel the people to serve in
them — to erect courts with unusual judicial powers,
and to dictate the law, or how that law shall be
administered — to change the national religion, or to attempt
force upon the conscience in matters of Faith — are all be-
yond the power of the monarch herself. And the law of
the constitution has appointed a course of calling in question
those acts of the Crown which violate the rules of that con-
stitution, or are wickedly directed against the private rights
or political liberties of the people. For, although the person
of the King or Queen's majesty is sacred from all human
visitation — yet the Ministers of that Crown are answerable to
the people, through the Parliament, for all the measures
emanating from the royal authority. The Queen, therefore,
governs through her Ministers.

In the choice of these Ministers the Queen's sole discre-
tion is supreme. Influenced indeed in all cases, and even
governed in some extremities, that discretion must ever be
by the united voice of Parliament. For that is an authority,
which under a judicial course of procedure may condemn
that Minister who may have betrayed his country's interests
to death itself — and no royal inclinations can withstand the
opposition of a whole people against the disastrous measures
of a weak or wilful ministry. But, according to the ordinary
course of administering the government, it is within the

J J ^ EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT.

Queen's breast to select those irfwhom to repose her confi-
dence, and with whom to consult in the exercise of the pow-
ers of her Prerogative. Thus, one high functionary of state
is placed over the affairs of the nation with foreign countries
— another over the affairs of the law— another over those
of the colonies — another specially over the affairs of India- —
and so on. Over the whole body of Ministers one is selected
as the more immediate organ of the Crown, and is
termed the Prime Minister, by whose name the particular ad-
ministrations of government during the time of his presiding
is usually distinguished.

Limited as the powers of the Crown are, the limitations,
are of a character rather to exalt, than to lower, the true dig-
nity of the monarch. The real rank and dignity of a monarch
must be estimated, not so much by the extent of his domi-
nions and the obedience he can enforce, as by the independ-
ence of those dominions of all influence or control from
foreign states — by the wealth and resources of his people— by
their love towards the Sovereign's person — and by their quali-
ty and advancement among the civilized nations of the earth.
Judged by all, or any, of these standards, where shall we
find a monarch who can surpass, or even rival, the Queen
of England ? It is not on the splendour of her palaces and do.
mestic court that the Englishman loves to dwell in uphold-
ing the personal honor of his Queen — it is in pointing at the
glory of that nation which she has been called to govern —
its great deeds, and great men— its abounding and industri-
ous population — its wealth and security— the many, the im-
mense, and the distant countries under her sway — and the
proud feelings which inspire this mighty people to preserve
their renowned station among states even against the world in
arms. It can never impair the true dignity and honor of a
monarch over such a people, that its assigned powers are
united with duties ; and that they are bound by rules

EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT.

115

founded on t lie experience of ages, as best calculated to en-
sure the national prosperity against human error or caprice.

By the dispensation of Providence these wide countries of
India have been brought under the sway of this great Em-
pire — and the dictates of its government, the principles of
which I have endeavoured to unfold, all who live in this
land equally obey. For the Natives of this country,
and the English and others who find in it a home, are
all equal in the sight of the law. To all of us the same
protection is due, and by all the same rights may be
claimed. The sole difference lies in our various quali-
fications ; and arises from the exercise of that sound discre-
tion and judgment which the local governments of this
country— guided and controlled as they are under provisions
made by the superior authority of our common Government
of England— are bound to exercise for the political and ge-
neral benefit of all.

But these considerations lead me to a new, and perhaps
a more interesting, subject.

DISCOURSE 111.

Of the East India Company.

NTRODUCTORY Observations. Of the meaning
of the word " Company ,•" and of the Nature and Objects
of such an Association. Of the Origin and Formation
of the East India Company. Of the Progress of the East
India Company, until they became a Political Power.
Survey of the Political Progress and Condition of the
Native States of India, previous to the Conquests of the
East India Company. Of the Progressive Conquests of
European JYations in India, and the Effects. Of the
Means and Resources of the East India Company for
the Conquest of India. Of the Component Members of
the East India Company : the Proprietors of Stock.

DISCOURSE III.

Of the East India Company.

SECTION I.

Introductory Observations.

T was about the year 1590 of the Christian era that a
few merchants, travelling from Aleppo on the coast of the
Mediterranean Sea, down the Tigris to Bagdat, and sailing
from the mouth of that river across the Persian Gulf to
Goa, planted the first English footsteps on the shores of
India. They traced their way from Goa northward to the
cities of Agra and of Lahore. They thence traversed the
fertile plains of Bengal. Embarking again at the mouths
of the Ganges, they gradually compassed the whole circuit
of India ; and, finally, retracing their course across the
Persian Gulf, and thence by the Tigris and the Mediterra-
nean Sea, they returned to their native country.

These venturous men, weak strangers in a foreign land,
passed from city to city over the dominions of various
powerful rulers governing under the supreme authority of
one great Potentate. They depended for safety and pro-
tection on the mere curiosity of the people around them,
and on the consideration yielded to the humble insignificancy
of their character. They were the first to give an account
to their countrymen of the existence of an Empire which,
as regards natural wealth and resources, was one of the
most magnificent on the fuce of the earth ; and which
contained a population outnumbering by ten times the
whole of the people at that time under the British sway.

120

INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS.

Within two centuries and a half from that period this
vast Empire has been totally overthrown ; and all the ex-
tensive dominions subjected to its authority have become
consolidated anew, under the rule of a nation separated
from them by fifteen thousand miles of ocean. It has
been subdued by a body of Englishmen whose political
power and means were of little consideration, compared
with those of the other governing authorities of England.
They have achieved this conquest with less than one-twen-
tieth .part of the military strength of a Nation whose whole
territory was no larger than an Indian Province. State
after state has been reduced under the government of their
servants. At length the supreme power of the great
Mussulman Chief over all, whose armies had from age to
age spread desolation throughout the ancient Hindoo Go-
vernments, and established the despotism of many foreign
masters in their place, was destined to give way to English
domination. The wide regions enclosed by the Himmalaya
Mountains on the north, the Berhampootra on the east, the
Punjab on the west and by the wide ocean reaching round
from the Indus to the Ganges — including a hundred ancient
nations — has finally become an united portion of the great
British Empire.

So firmly is the English Government established through
its well regulated plan of power, that the evils of internal
war and devastation have long ceased ; and all commotions
attempted to be raised have become plainly desperate.
With so much wisdom and foresight have the resources of
national strength been called forth and organized, that
surrounding nations stand in awe of that might they can
never hope to match, and which is competent to defy and
to repel the whole world in arms. So regular and settled is
the administration of the government and the laws, that the
people enjoy a peaceful security hitherto unknown since
the time of its history, and have made advances in national
prosperity which no former government has ever witnessed.

INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS. J 21

The course of events which has effected this stupendous
change is the wonder and admiration of the world. Few
but must have some curiosity to learn the' origin and pro-
gress of transactions such as these. Some, however,
are content to read of the battles, sieges, marches, and
all the vicissitudes of warfare— the politic devices,
and the turns of fortune — through which Princes have
been deposed, and countries won ; without casting much
thought on the creation and quality of those original pow-
ers out of which the means arose of attempting these grand
objects, or through which they were actually accomplished.
Others, and for the most part the Native community of In-
dia, who have as yet so little access to that genuine history
and information on these topics which must naturally in-
terest the great bulk of the people, are constrained to at-
tribute these events to some incomprehensible but all-
powerful political body, of which they know no more than
its designation of "the Company." Their minds are utterly
puzzled to account for its resources and authority — they do
but know that, under whatever reverses, their means have
ever appeared to be unexhausted, and they settle to the
conviction that their power is irresistible. Others, again,
can with difficulty believe that any other cause than mere
delusion and accumulated mischances could have occasioned
the overthrow of so many kingdoms, and so great an Empire.
They cling to the notion that common energy on the part
of the people would have prevented all conquests heretofore.,
and that some union of efforts might still raise the fallen
powers into existence again. They indulge a false estimate
of past times — and most erroneously suppose that greater
peace, and tranquillity, and plenty, prevailed under ancient
governments ; and would so prevail again, should some
general insurrection" succeed in restoring them.

It will be my business in the ensuing pages, to explain
what that body called " The East India Company" really is —

122

INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS.

how it originated — what is the quality of its constitution—
and according to what plan, or system its powers are exer-
cised — what were its efficient means of subjecting India to
the British Empire — and by what course it continues to
superintend and control the government of the country.
The details of those glorious victories, and able political
measures, by which the subjection of the country was ac-
complished, and by which, so many distinguished men
among the Company's servants have immortalized their
own fame and that of their country, is the proper theme for
the historian's pen. That portion only of the historian's
task will be mine, whereby may be unfolded tbe sufficient
causes and means of these great achievements; and whereby
it may be shown that the condition of the country, of its
governments, and of its people, gave ample scope for those
successes which military valour and political talent ensured.
It will then be perceived by reflecting minds that no exer-
tion on the part of the people, and no efforts on the part of
their misgoverning rulers, could long have retarded the sub-
version of the country under some new dominion. And it
may be hoped that all who have just views of the true pros-
perity of a nation will become convinced, that the destruc-
tion of the British power and of its plan of government,
whether by the successful force of Native or of Foreign con-
querors, would assuredly involve this vast country in uni-
versal rapine and violence, and remove to distant ages all
prospect of a settled rule under equal laws.

SECTION ir.

Of the Meaning of the term Company; and of the Nature

and Objects of such an Association.

Any number of men associated together for a particular
purpose may be properly called a Company : but the term
is most usually applied to those bodies who bind themselves
together by some mutual covenants or rules, with a view to
carry on some general course of trading, or some particular
branch of manufacture or commerce. Thus, four or five
persons, and sometimes a greater number, agree together to
become partners in carrying on commercial dealings, when
the business they engage in is of that extent, and requires
so large a capital, as to suggest a subdivision of labour,
and a joint contribution of funds. They settle the terms
on which their affairs shall be managed, and the profits
divided, by some express written instrument. They there-
by become a Company, and trade under that designation —
one such Company being distinguished from another by
a reference to the names of some one or more of its mem-
bers, or by a reference to the nature of the business carried
on, or the object of their association. Thus we hear of
Arbuthnot and Company, the British Iron Company,
Duarkath Tagore and Company, the Equitable Insurance
Company, and so on.

Private and voluntary associations such as these, provid-
ing as they do for a succession of members as vacancies oc-
cur in the partnership, are calculated, when their affairs
are judiciously managed, to last long; and some such houses
of trade, through their extensive dealings and large accu-

]24 0F THE MEANING OF THE TERM COMPANY, &c.

mulations of capital have exercised great influence on a
whole nation's commerce. The union of many such houses
for the purpose of representing and protecting the general
interests of all trading classes will necessarily have weight
with even the Council of Government, and will sometimes
qualify, and sometimes dictate, its commercial measures.
But such private partnerships have in their very constitu-
tion the seeds of gradual decay — the bond of association by
which they are kept together is uncertain and discretionary in
point of duration — their capital, and the power and influ-
ence depending on its amount, is necessarily confined with-
in very narrow limits. For, in the first place, each individual
member being responsible in his person and estate for the
whole amount of the Company's debts, their speculations
would naturally be the less bold and extensive. In the next
place, it must be expected that, in a long series of years and
changes of members, the mischances of trade, or the mis-
management of the partners, would at some time or other
dissipate the whole existing capital, and thus at once dis-
solve the association. In the third place, it has always hap-
pened that the expenditure, or the accumulation of each
member for his own personal objects, has kept the current
capital, and the consequent extent of their dealings, within
such bounds as would always leave the Company exposed to
the various chances of dissolution. And, lastly, the exist-
ing members commonly, at onetime or other, combine in
the desire to abandon the labours of their business, and
either appropriate their whole funds by division, or trans-
fer some remnant of them into the hands of other parties,
who commence a new course of dealing, or one upon some
smaller scale. Under all these circumstances there are few
instances of private trading houses sustaining their existence
as an associated Company beyond the period of a hundred
years ; and none of their effecting any of political results
beyond the immediate commercial objects of their uniting in
partnership.

OF THE MEANING OF THE TERM COMPANY, fee. ] 95

But there are some commercial enterprises of such mag-
nitude, calling for so large an extent of capital, involving so
much risk, demanding so much the discussion of able and
experienced men, and requiring the various labour of so
many in the management of them, that they are quite be-
yond the means, as well as the courage, of a few individuals
bound together only by their private mutual covenants.
They can only be undertaken by the strength of the govern-
ment itself, and the employment of the national funds of the
people, or else by some numerous association of a public
quality, sustained by special privileges and powers, and se-
cured from sudden dissolution, and the individual ruin of its
members, by express public rules and laws. It is seldom
that a Government can engage advantageously in any trad-
ing affairs, which so peculiarly depend on that activity and
zeal which is only to be kept alive by some personal inter-
est in the results. It has, therefore, been the constant
policy of the English Government rather to encourage such
speculative undertakings by those who are altogether uncon-
nected with its administration ; and which undertakings it
has always shewn itself ready to assist by the delegation of
all those powers and privileges, which, according to the spe-
cific quality of each such speculation, those who engaged in
them might appear to stand in need of.

Objects of this nature have suggested the formation
of Companies of a different, a more extensive, and a
far more powerful and permanent quality, than those
Companies which arise out of mere trading partnerships
governed by the private covenants of the members. Vari-
ous as may be the powers granted by the Government to
such associations— various as may be the peculiar advan-
tages conceded, in .proportion to the risk of losses in the
undertaking— and various as may be the systems laid down
for conducting their respective affairs, there are some char-

J OQ OF THE MEANING OF THE TERM COMPANY, &c.

acteristics which all such Companies have in common, and
which it is expedient to hring to particular notice.

The acquisition of the great capital required can only be
accomplished by dividing the shares into a large number,
the price of each being of so moderate an amount as that
every person joining in the undertaking may take a larger
or smaller stake in the concern proportionate to his means.
According to the amount of the capital must therefore be
the number of the shareholders— and that number is never
so small but that a selection must be made from the general
body of some small portion who are to represent all parties,
and conduct, or at least govern, on behalf of the whole
association, the details of their business. Each individual
member is only to be responsible to the extent and value
of the contribution by which he has purchased his share.
With that view, the whole body is to be considered by all
who deal with them as if it was one individual person ; its
joint properly being only liable to be made available for the
payment of debts, and for the satisfaction of engagements,
but not the private property of any of the members, and
still less their persons being subject to imprisonment, as
other private persons would be for the purpose of enforcing
payment of their private debts. Such a scheme for the
transfer and inheritance of the shares of each member, and
also for election to all vacancies arising among the directors
or governors of the affairs of the Company, is provided by
the express laws constituting the Company, that the exist-
ence of the Company must last as long as the law itself
lasts on which its existence is based. Not even the loss of
all their property can put a final end to the Company. It
may still raise new funds, or it may still exercise any pow-
ers or privileges which do not depend on the employment
of capital. And, lastly, such a plan for the internal go-
vernment of the united body is ordained, as that the reso-
lutions of a majority, in some cases that of general assem-

OF THE MEANING OF THE TERM COMPANY, &c. ] 27

blies of all who will attend, in others that of the selected
governors — in some cases a simple majority, in others a
majority of some larger proportion — shall' bind the whole
Company : and in a similar manner general regulations are
allowed to be passed, for permanent observance in the con-
duct of their affairs.

Under such a constitution as this, and with these funda-
mental powers for their support, many important Companies
of a national interest and character have been formed in
most of the countries of Europe. In none, however, have
they existed so numerously as in England ; and in no other
country have such extensive enterprises been undertaken or
accomplished through such bodies. But neither in England
itself, nor in any nation on the face of the globe, has there
ever arisen an association, which— whether we look to the
enormous amount of its expenditure and of its accumulated
wealth, or to its influence on the commerce of the world, or
to the vast political changes it has effected — has equalled
that of the East India Company in real grandeur and im-
portance. Its origin, constitution, powers, and privileges we
will now proceed more particularly to examine.

SECTION III.

Of the Origin and Formation of the East India Company.

The trade between Europe and India had from the ear-
liest ages been carried on partly by way of the Persian Gulf,
and so by a tedious and dangerous journey across a large
portion of the continent of Asia, and partly by the course
of the Red Sea, and so through Egypt. The first discovery
of a passage to India by sailing round the Cape of Good
Hope was made by the Portuguese towards the end of
the fifteenth century of Christ. The comparative cheap-
ness, facility, and certainty of this new route of com-
munication between the ports of India and Europe,
entirely by sea, led to the abandonment of the ancient
courses of traffic. The Portuguese by seasonable presents
and successful negociations with some of the stronger states,
and by the terror of their arms and naval forces employed
against the weaker class of states, established in the course
of a hundred years settlements and factories, not only on
various parts of the Indian Coasts, but on many of the
Islands washed by the Indian seas, and even upon the shores
of China. Possessed of all these advantages, and undis-
turbed for many years in their prosperous career, they soon
formed the resolution of engrossing to themselves the whole
of that trade, by the first fruits of which they had become
enormously enriched. They prepared themselves at any
sacrifice of their wealth, by the utmost exertion of their in-
fluence with the various Native governments, and even by
open warfare, to crush all attempts by any other merchants
to open a course of commerce with any of those Eastern
territories with whom they had effected an intercourse —

ORIGIN AND FORMATION OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY. Jgg

which attempts they presumptuously held to be an invasion
of their rights as the first discoverers.

Such was the state of things when, at the close of the
sixteenth century of Christ, many of the merchants of Eng-
land combined in the determination to contend for a share
in the lucrative trade with the East. It must be obvious
that any efforts of one, or of a few private individuals, to
open such a traffic must fail. The pre-occupancy by the
Portuguese of a trade which had been established at an im-
mense outlay of national funds, and which funds had been
increased to a vast amount through the gains of a hundred
years,'enabled them easily to undersell and ruin any such pri-
vate speculatists. It was also fully to be expected that, soon
or late, this right of trade must have to be contended for by-
force of arms. At the same time it was seen to be an object
of great national concern to the growth of the commercial
prosperity of England. It was felt to be a public reproach
that a nation, boasting itself as inferior to none in maritime
strength, should be excluded, at the will of one of the most
insignificant states of Europe, from any participation in a
trade which by nature lay open to all mankind.

The plain and the only method of engaging in this enter-
prise which, under the circumstances related, could justify
any confidence of success, was by the formation of a public
Company upon those principles and upon that plan of associ-
ation which has already been in some degree explained. It
was necessary that naval expeditions should be prepared on
such a scale as might promise some protection, if not secu-
rity, against violence— and at the same time might win
respect from the Native powers. It was necessary that the
value of the merchandize, and the amount of purchase
money, should be of such an extent as to attract the con-
sideration of the people with whom they proposed to open
a permanent commerce. Competent persons had to be en-

130

ORIGIN AND FORMATION OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY.

gaged for the task of effecting negociations and treaties with
the Native powers. A large expenditure had to be provided
for in the purchase of land, the construction of warehouses,
factories and residences, and for a variety of other purposes,
needless to enumerate. The capital to be contributed for
objects of such magnitude and extent must necessarily be
large — the risk of failure manifest — but eventual success
would be shared by the whole nation, as well as by the ad-
venturers. All these considerations were sufficient to sus:-
gest, not only the organization of a great public Company,
with all those constitutional powers requisite for maintaining
its existence, its union, and good government — they sug-
gested, likewise, to the British Government the expediency
of giving peculiar encouragement to the undertaking by the
grant of extraordinary privileges and advantages.

It may be remembered that, when referring in the last,
discourse to those independent powers of the Crown
which are termed Prerogatives, mention was made of that
by which the reigning King or Queen regulates the conduct
of the national trade, It is chiefly with a view to the en-
couragement and regulations of commercial affairs that
the Crown has been used to exercise another
Prerogative power ; which, though distinct in itself, I
have thought it most convenient to notice in connection
with the subject of this present discourse ; and which consists
in the creation of those associated bodies, usually termed
Companies, but also named by the more general term of Cor-
porations, having perpetual existence by course of succession,
as vacancies arise, or by addition to their number according
to any scheme for the admission of new members. The docu-
ment by which the Crown creates this associated or corporate
Body, or Company, is called a Charter ; and the characteris-
tic qualities common to all public Chartered Companies
formed for the purposes of trade have been already
alluded to. It was formerly usual for the Crown, in grant-

ORIGIN AND FORMATION OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY. | 3 |^

ing Charters to these trading Companies, not merely to con-
cede to them the faculty of acting as if it was one individual,
with the same powers of making contracts, holding property,
suing in courts of law, and being responsible only through
its common property for debts and liabilities incurred, but it
was also customary for the Crown to grant to them the liberty
of exercising many of its royal powers, and many exclusive
privileges and advantages, which, however expedient, could
only be legally granted, according to the true constitutional
laws of the E lglish Government, by the authority of the
supreme legislature itself. It will be seen in the progress
of this discourse that, as the laws of the English constitu-
tion have become better settled and known, all the powers
and privileges of the East India Company were at length
sanctioned by the legislature itself in a series of Statutes.
But, at the time of the first formation of the Company, re-
course was had only to the authority of the then reigning
Queen of England, Elizabeth, who granted to them their
first Charter in the year of Christ 1600.

By this Charter all the merchants and adventurers, who
were willing to contribute such sums as might be agreed
to be received by the governing portion of such subscribers,
were declared to constitute a Corporation, or Company, with
all those inherent powers and qualities which have been
shewn to be the common characteristics of such associations.
They were to be governed by a governor and twenty-four
individuals, in this Charter called Committees but subse-
quently termed Directors, and who were to be chosen an-
nually by the subscribers, who have been since denominated
Proprietors. And, besides the grant of some exemptions from
the payment of duties on their exports from England, the
Charter conveyed the important privilege of a sole and ex-
elusive right of trading with all countries eastward of the
Cape of Good Hope. The association was named " The
" Goveruor and Company of Merchants of London trading

132 ORIGIN AND FORMATION OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY.

" to the East Indies." The duration of the Company was,
however, limited to fifteen years, with a right of renewing
it for fifteen more with the consent of the Crown — and the
Crown at the same time was empowered to abolish the
Company at any lime upon giving two years' notice.

SECTION IV.

Of the Progress of the East India Company, until they
became a Political Power.

Under the terms and privileges of the Charter of Eliza-
beth, often renewed by succeeding monarchs, the Company
continued to prosecute their trade for a course of sixty years.
They raised funds from time to time of various amounts,
which were managed sometimes as a common stock in a
joint trade, and sometimes as separate stocks of one or
more of the subscribers, and traded with on their separate
accounts. The voyages were made at no regular periods, and
the ventures of capital in each voyage were of the most va-
rious and uncertain amounts. Their successes, though often
clouded by reverses, were on the whole prosperous enough
to encourage their perseverance. Throughout this first
period of their trading, they were involved in continual war-
fare and contests, uot only with the Portuguese nation, but
also with the Dutch, who, with far more energy than the
Portuguese, engaged in such an extent of commerce, and
founded such numerous and extensive settlements, as at
one time threatened to overwhelm all competition for the
trade of the East. The Company had likewise to endure
many contests with rival traders and Companies of their
own countrymen, who prosecuted a trade in defiance of their
exclusive Chartered rights. In the result, however, the
commercial intercourse between England and India, through
the agency of the Company, was by the year of Christ 1660
fixed on a permanent basis, and no less than eight
Settlements or Factories had at that period been established
on various parts of the coast of India, governed by two
Boards, each consisting of a President and Council, who con-

134 PROGRESS OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, &c.

ducked all the business required to be transacted in this
country. One of fh^se Boards was stationed at Surat; which,
under the permission of :he Mogul Emperor, was in the
year 161^, the first settlement founded by the English in
India. Under the presidency of this Board were placed
the Factories of Cambay, Ahmedabad, Gogo and Calicut.
Under the presidency of that ot Fort St George were placed
the Factories at Hooghly and Masulipatam.

But in 1681, through another Charter granted by King
Charles 2d, the Company became vested with further im-
portant powers. After confirming all former privileges, the
King granted them the authority to judge according to
the laws of England all persons living under thejn at
their Settlements, and to make war and peace with all
Native states. This was. in truth, to empower this Company
to found and govern Colonies in whatever parts of India
they might obtain any territory. I* ach settlement became,
as it were, a petty nation, over which the Company ruled
with regal authority ; and the whole of these settlements
acting in combination, and supported by the naval force
which the numerous vessels employed in carrying on the
trade could at all times supply, displayed a national strength
calculated at least to deter any hasty aggression by the
surrounding Chiefs, This local strength was very consider-
ably increased by the acquisition of the Island of Bombay,
which the same King, (to whom it was ceded by the Crown
of Portugal) granted in full property to the Company,
shortly after the gift of his Charter.

The objects of the Company, however, were still for
many subsequent years, solely confined to the prosecution of
their trade. As their powers became augmented, so also
did their knowledge in the most profitable methods of carry-
ing on their traffic improve. Greater union and greater
regularity marked their proceedings ; the number of mem-

PROGRESS OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, &c. J 35

bers, and the amount of their subscriptions proportionably
increased. Their command of money enabled them to es-
tablish additional Factories and Settlements, as well as to
expend the dimensions of those they already possessed.
Pi i ley, Cossimbazar, and Balasore — and soon afterwards
Calcutta and Govindpore, in the interior of Bengal, and
Vizagapatam and Fort St. David on the eastern coast,
were added to their territorial possessions. Many of their
towns contained a numerous population of Natives and Eng*
lish, who were governed as subjects, and protected by the
erection of military fortifications.

In thus fixing themselves permanently within the
dominions of the Indian states, the Company doubt-
less had in view their independence and security
against the violence of the surrounding Native powers.
But, although the firm establishment of their commercial
intercourse, and the gradual augmentation of the trade by
which they were continually enriched, was for a long period
the sole principle which actuated these and all their
measures, nevertheless, in the progress of events, transac-
tions occurred which, perhaps unconsciously to themselves,
clothed the Company still further with a National and Sover-
eign character, and in reality placed them in the position
of one of the political states, among whom the territories
of India was divided. In the year 168.5 the Company, re-
senting many oppressions and wrongs which their servants
at their Factories in Bengal had endured at the hands of the
neighbouring Native powers, fitted out an armed fleet of
ten ships, with several hundred soldiers, and also a Kegi-
ment supplied by the King himself, for the purpose of venge-
ance and future security by force of arms. They
maintained a warlike struggle for many years with
their oppressors, and at length called down upon them-
selves the forces of the Mogul Emperor Aurungzebe himself,
who at first resolved on expelling the English altogether

{36 PROGRESS OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, Sec.

from India. But so formidable were the military resources
of the Company, that, after much fighting and various for-
tunes, an amicable adjustment of all differences was effected,
and the Company were left in possession of all their acquired
territories. About the year 1G90 the Company resolved to
raise a revenue from the inhabitants, living under their go-
vernment — that being, as the Directors expressed them-
selves, " as much a subject of their care as their trade ; for
g by it they must maintain their forces , and make themselves
11 a nation in India."

We have now arrived at the end of the first century of
the Company's intercourse with India, at which period a
further and more important change was made in its Quality,
resources, and internal constitution ; and when such an im-
proved organization of its government was arranged, as ren-
dered it at length capable of those vast conquests, it was
eventually destined to achieve. Under this new organiza-
tion and settlement of its powers, it was enabled to main-
tain its rule over those large provinces it gradually brought
under subjection ; and under the same principles of its con-
stitution, modified in some details by subsequent Acts of
Parliament, it continues to direct and superintend the admi-
nistration of the British Empire in India to this day. This
change arose out of a circumstance which, at first, rather
threatened ruin to the Company than any addition to its
strength.

The people of England, according as the fundamental
rules of its political government came to be canvassed and
settled, saw that the exclusive privileges and sovereign pow.
ers granted to the Company by the sole authority of its
monarchs, and not by the supreme legislature, were incon-
sistent with the constitutional law of the land, and might
fairly be disputed by such as chose to make it their interest
so to do. These considerations led to the formation of a

PROGRESS OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, &c- 1 37

powerful rival Company determined to claim their share of a
commerce, the extensive advantages of which, both commer-
cial and political, became continually more apparent, and in
which it. was commonly asserted that every Englishman had
an equal right to partake. This rival Company was establish-
ed under the express authority, and under the special regu-
lations, of a?i Act of Parliament ; which act authorized the
King to grant another Charter in conformity with its provi-
sions to the new Association. The Charter was in 1698 ac-
cordingly granted to them by King William the Third, under
the name of" The English Company trading to the East In-
dies" — (the old Company having been termed the London
Company) — and thus two Companies, with opposite interests,
and no small animosity against each other, engaged in the
same commercial field. The Charters of the old Company,
indeed, being limited in point of duration, would have short-
ly expired ; and thus the new Company trusted they might
have become relieved from their powerful competition. But
the old Company, being still in possession of so many valuable
settlements, and having influence enough to get their former
Charters partially renewed, still kept their ground. It was
soon seen how mutually prejudicial, if not ruinous, the con-
tests of two such Companies must prove; and, after some
years of warm discussion, an union of them was accomplish-
ed, under the new Charter lately granted to the English
Company ; and, as the grant of this Charter had been previ-
ously sanctioned by an express Act of Parliament, so, uipon
the union of the two Companies becoming completed) it
was afterwards confirmed in favour of both the Companies
united by the express sanction of another Act. Under
this new arrangement the Company surrendered all their
old Charters, and the two Companies took the one deno-
mination of " The United Company of the Merchants of
England trading to the East Indies." This continued
to be its legal and proper name, until (he passing of the last
statute for the regulation of the Company, and of the Go-

J38 PROGRESS OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, &c.

vernment of India, in the year 1833, when its title was alter-
ed to that of" The East India Company."

This Charter of William 3rd, so sanctioned and subse-
quently confirmed by statute, was dated in the year 1698.
It granted (with many modifications, and in a more specific
and detailed form) to the new English Company similar
powers, and exclusive privileges, to those which had been
granted in the previous Charters of the old London Com-
pany. It ordained what persons might become members of
this Company under the name of Proprietors, and upon
what terms. It regulated by what body the whole affairs
"were to be managed, and the mode of their meeting and
course of transacting business. It regulated the qualifications
cf those Proprietors who were to be eligible as Directors. It
laid down the course of holding general assemblies for pur-
poses of elections, and for making ordinances and regula-
tions for general observance in the exercise of their powers
and functions. And, lastly, it laid down certain general
rules for the mode of conducting the government, and the
administration of justice, in India. I shall have occasion to
notice in greater detail some of the provisions of this Char-
ter, after referring to those later Statutes by which they
have been modified and extended, and when I come to ex-
plain the nature of those present existing powers, and that
settled plan of rule, by which the Company still superin-
tends and directs the course of government in India. In
the mean time we will pursue the history of the Com-
pany's progress.

Greatly as the Company's means were augmented by
the union of this numerous body of members, from whom a
capital stock was shortly raised, of upwards of three milli-
ons sterling (or three crores of Rupees) — greatly as their
political ambition might be supposed to be excited by the
consciousness of their own strength, by the assurance of

PROGRESS OP THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, &c. J 39

every needful military assistance on the part of the English
Government, and by the firm security in which their ex-
tensive territorial possessions were held— t'ney still confined
their whole attention for the course of the next forty years,
to the prosecution of their commerce, satisfied with the
amount of annual dividends which their successful manage-
ment of it produced. About the year of Christ 1749,
however, unforeseen and apparently casual circumstances
(but such as the real condition of the people naturally gave
rise to), urged them upon that career of territorial conquest,
in which they found themselves unable, even though so in-
clined, to stop, until the mighty Empire of India was reduced
under their rule. In order that such a result may be ration-
ally understood, instead of its being the theme of ignorant
wonder, it will be useful to make some survey of the poli-
tical posture of the various states of India up to this period
as well as of the means and powers which on the other
hand sustained the Company throughout the contest.

SECTION V.

Surrey of the Political Progress and Condition of the

A"ative States of India, previous to the Conquests of

the. East India Company,

Those who have examined with care all the genuine
materials of information, as regards the true condition of
the people of India in ancient times, and before its inva-
sion by the Moguls, and who have at the same time been
capable of drawing probable inferences from such inform-
ation, have been led to the conclusion that the whole
country has ever been the scene of internal wars and con-
vulsions . They have found no reason for supposing that
any considerable portion of the country ever long enjoyed
peaceful repose under a strong and just government ; and
still less are there traces of any settled plan of power, un-
der laws regularly framed, and as regularly observed. The
country seems to have been from the earliest times divided
into numerous petty states, which their several rulers go-
verned on no other principle than their arbitrary will.
Sufficient has been said in a former discourse, to shew that
little happiness, tranquillity, or security can be enjoyed
by any people in such a condition.

It is a plain proof of the correctness of this view of the
former condition of the people of India, that the first invasion
of IheMussulmenfrom the north- west,\vas repeated under the
same chief twelve times, and with scarce any other object
than devastation and plunder. Twelve times did Mahmoud
issue with his horde of undisciplined barbarians from Giiizni,
and the neighbouring cities —and, overcoming with ease

SURVEY OF THE NATIVE STATES, &c. 141

every opposition, spread carnage and desolation over one
nation after another, down to the very shores of Guzerat.

From the period of these invasions, which occurred near
the year of Christ 1000, we may trace the gradual subjuga-
tion of one portion of India after another, to the yoke of
the Mussulman Emperors, till Aurungzebe, the most power-
ful, and perhaps, the most tyrannical and oppressive, of all
these conquering despots, finally, towards the year 1700,
extended his actual sway over most part of the country,
from north to south — ami rendered even those petty states
•which he spared the mere dependants on his favour
and protection. According to the course observed by his
predecessors, he appointed over numerous wide districts
masters who, in his name and as his deputies, ruled the
people at discretion —and whom he vainly hoped would be
kept, in subordination and obedience to his own supreme
authority, and that of his successors. These inferior mas-
ters, again, parcelled out portions of the territories con-
signed to their government to their own subordinates,
T\ho in the same manner were empowered to rule by
no other law than their own arbitrary will. Thus the
people of India were prostrated beneath a hundred petty
tyrants, most of whom derived their origin from foreign
lands. They all governed upon the same principal policy,
tlial of draining from the common toil of their subjects, those
resources which should maintain themselves in luxury and
splendour, and at the same time furnish them with the
means of engaging in revolts against their immediate su-
periors.

Throughout the progress of those seven centuries, down
to the reign of Aurungzebe, during which the Mussulman
invaders continued with various fortunes, to push their con-
quests in India, such had been the character of their sway,
and such the condition of the subjected people. They were

J 42 SURVEY OF THE NATIVE STATES, &c.

o^en opposed, with more or less permanent success, by the
ancient Native states. The supreme authority of the Em-
peror, and the limits of his actual dominions, were often
reduced to narrow hounds, by the incursions of new foreign
invaders, or by the successful rebellion of powerful subjects.
No sooner had one great sovereign established by his vic-
tories, or his talents for government, an extensive and well
united dominion, then his death followed by domestic dis-
sensions, and violent competitions for his throne, again
threw the whole Empire into confusion. The chief officers
of the government divided into factions, each headed by a
competitor for the supreme power. The party eventually
prevailing in the struggle, usually owed his success to bloody
battles, spoliations, and extortion. Amidst such scenes na-
tional industry, the offspring of national security, and the
only parent of national wealth, can never thrive. It is true,
indeed, that the well-ordered governments of able and power-
ful Monarchs would sometimes create seasons of repose, and
with them the return of confidence, and a corresponding in-
crease of the general prosperity. But such seasons were but
temporary, and usually short, because not based on any set-
tled plan of power, which alone can impart firmness and per-
manency to political institutions. It is true that vast riches
and resources would be sometimes accumulated in the coffers
of the rulers, and sometimes be expended in the construction
of magnificent buildings, or in maintaining the splendour
and luxury of a royal palace. But these are no proofs
either of the political strength of a people, or of their happi-
ness. Such wealth may be the fruits of the forced labour
of those who can retain little for themselves. Such struc-
tures may be the work of groaning slaves. We must judge
of the power and the prosperity of a nation — not merely
from the personal grandeur of its ruler, or the stupendous
monuments he may build — but from the general diffusion of
wealth, and the enjoyments of life among the bulk of the
people, the security of property, the attachment of the in-

SURVEY OF THE NATIVE STATES, &c. ]43

fluential men to the form of government under which they
live, and their sense of its benefits; and above all on the
spread of education and useful knowledge. »

From the death of Aurungzebe, in the year 1707, we may
date the gradual decay and dismemberment of the Empire
of the M guls. By the year 1749 (when the career of En-
glish Conquest began) the authority of the reigning Em-
peror was little more than nominal over the greater part of
India : and by the year 1770 he had become a mere tool at
the disposal of one or other of the various contending states
of India ; till at length, through the subsequent conquests of
the English, all his real authority as a ruler sunk, and was
extinguished for ever. The nominal title, however, is still
claimed by a descendant of the family, though no longer de-
ferred to by the actual successor to the imperial power — the
GovernorGeneral of India. The feeble-minded descendants
of Aurungzebe, involved in perpetual contests for mastery
over each other, could no longer control the ambition of
their subordinate chiefs, who seized on every such occasi-
on of weakness and dissension to assert, and secure, their
own independence. More concerned in seeking assistance
from them, than in punishing their rebellion, the competi-
tors for the imperial throne were obliged to connive at that
disregard of their authority, which they felt it impossible to
prevent. Amidst these struggles for dominion, this disunion
among the revolted rulers, and this breaking up of the Mus-
sulman Empire into separate states, those Hindoo nations
which had never been actually, or only partially, subdued,
found opportunities of rearing other distinct sovereignties,
and of claiming their own share in the general scramble
for territory.

The most conspicuous among these Native powers, was
that of the confederated Marhattas. It is beyond the scope
of this discourse to record the history of their origin and
extensive conquests. But it is material to notice that the

|44 SURVEY OF THE NATIVE STATES, fee.

associated nation, more than any other body of people, con-
tributed to the downfall of the imperial power of the Moguls,
by a long series of successful invasions. Like the Mussul-
man Empire, however, which that of the Marhattas at one
time almost equalled in extent, this new state was soon
destined to fall asunder from the same unfailing causes.
Without any settled system of government, it never could
be held together in union and obedience. Every vacancy of
the supreme rulership led to intestine war. Every commander
of an army aimed at, and often succeeded in, establishing a
sovereignty for himself. At the period when the English
Company first entered into the list of Indian powers, the
Marhatta confederacy was already composed of several inde-
pendent states, acknowledging only a nominal master in the
person of the Peishwah at Poonah. And, although these
nations once more united their arms to oppose an Afghan
invader, they on that occasion, in the year 17G0, at Pan i put
near Delhi, sustained a defeat, the most memorable in the
annals of history for the dreadful amount of slaughter.
From that blow they never wholly recovered; but remain-
ing split into several separate states, each in its turn had
to sustain individually the shock of the approaching contest

with the English.

•

Such, then, was the posture of the various political pow-
ers of India, at the dawn of those events which ended in
the foundation of the British Empire in the east. Rivals
in ambition, rivals in interest, revengers of past oppressi-
ons, or claimants of lost authority, each state regarded its
neighbour as an immediate or a probable enemy. The
ruler of each nation having, in most instances, attained to
dominion either by domestic bloodshed, or by rebellion,
made it his first care to secure himself against the opposition
of his own subjects, and his next to aggrandize his original
dominions by the overthrow of surrounding countries. The
security of his own government, based on no fixed laws,
but solely upon arbitrary will, could only be maintained by

SURVEY OF THE NATIVE STATES, &c. }45

enforcing the principle of all absolute governments — name-
ly, a fear calculated to produce universal and instant obe-
dience. The power of such rulers over thesT own subjects,
and their strength to resist or attack other states, depended
entirely on the amount of the labour and services of those
subjects which they could engross for their own objects, or
on the amount of wealth they could amass, through which
such labour and services, or those of others, were to be
purchased. Neither did they scruple to avail themselves
of any foreign assistance which chance or intrigues enabled
them to procure. When a state happens through these or
other means to have acquired a preponderating power and
extent of territory, resources of this nature may ensure
a temporary period of internal quiet, or of successful con-
quest. But such a course of government is nevertheless,
in itself, the source of national weakness. The people
having no cause for attachment to their government, im-
poverished by its exactions, and harassed by continual
strife, are always ready to fall off, and seek the protection
of new masters under whom they may hope to enjoy more
repose, and better security in their possessions. As the
whole authority of the state rests in the hands of one man,
the overthrow of that one man, and generally his defeat in
one battle, decides the fate of the nation. The assistance
of foreign powers can only be purchased by concessions,
which are calculated to raise an humble ally into a supe-
rior adversary. These sources of weakness bring on the
gradual decay and dismemberment of the mightiest Empire.
But when an extensive country has already become divided
into a great number of petty states, all labouring under the
same defective course of government, their mutual weakness
is likely, in the midst of perpetual and common disturbances,
to keep them all down to the same political level, till some
new power, stronger than any one of them singly, shall
become a competitor for general dominion.

]46 SURVEY OF THE NATIVE STATES, &e.

If, therefore, the nations of India had been left to them-
selves after this period of their fortunes, there is every pro-
bability that they would long have remained in the same
condition. Having regard to the submissive habits of the
people— the many ages of servitude in which they had ac-
quiesced, either under foreign masters or adventurous usurp-
ers — and to the absolute nature of their government — there
is no good reason for supposing that the internal strength of
any one of them was soon destined to improve by any dura-
ble augmentation of the national wealth, or by greater sta-
bility of the governments established. The Marhatta
states, which had become the most powerful, directed their
efforts more to the plunder, than to the permanent con,'
quest, of other territories, or the good managementof their
own. The Mussulman powers, sometimes banded against
one another, and sometimes against their common foes —
the Marhattas — each with difficulty preserved its own inde-
pendent existence, and continued to govern by the same
system which had failed to form a stedfast and united Em-
pire in the course of eight centuries of changeful domination.
The other states of India, either leaning upon each other
for their common safety, or rendering themselves subor-
dinate and tributary, first to one, and then to another, of their
more potent neighbours, as each in turn was considered best
capable of affording protection, maintained their own posi-
tion by thus adjusting, through their own weight, the balance
of power between hostile nations. Those countries border-
ing on India, which formerly sent forth the armies by which
it was so often devastated, and finally for the most part sub-
dued, had themselves become weakened by continual wars
and convulsions. But, whatever may have been, soon or
late, the political state of India, had these nations of the
East been .'eft to themselves, of this we may be certain— that
none of the existing forms of government nor any change
which conquests among one another could produce, would
ever raise the country from that condition which I have en-

SURVEY OF THE NATIVE STATES, &c. ]47

deavoured to pouvtray. Such as had been the state of the
people from their earliest history under the same forms of
government, and under the yoke of conquerors who intro-
duced no better, such it is reasonable to conclude would ifc
have continued.

These conjectures upon the probable fate of India, in the
absence of any interference by European powers, may serve
to reconcile its people to those political vicissitudes which it
is the destiny of all the nations of the earth to undergo ;
and especially to such change as should introduce a settled
scheme of government, liberal institutions, and the blessings
of internal peace : but there can be no useful purpose in fur-
ther dwelling upon them. The time had arrived when,
circumstanced as the whole country was, it must of neces-
sity have become subject to one or other of the foreign con-
tending states, which had gained a firm footing on its soil.

SECTION VI.

Of the Progressive Conquests of European Nations in
India, and the effects.

The Portuguese, and after them the Dutch, had, as we
have seen, for a long series of years kept up a formidable
resistance to the earliest attempts of the English to partici-
pate in the trade with India, which they had engrossed to
themselves. If through that naval strength, whiph both
these nations in their contests with each other were com-
pelled to maintain— through the vast capital they employed
in this profitable trade — through their numerous and con-
siderable territorial possessions — and through that influence
which all these advantages combined gave them amongst
the Native states — either of these European powers had
been enabled to crush the early efforts of the infant
English Company to establish their position in India,
it is impossible to assign limits to their probable pro-
gress towards Eastern dominion. That these resources
were sufficient to raise each of these two nations to
the rank of an independent power among the states of
India is no unreasonable presumption. The superiority of
their arts and arms, and the strenuous support of their
governments in Europe, were calculated to extend and
strengthen tbeir further acquisitions. But these were na-
tions altogether unequal to cope with the might of England.
Their advance was at once cut off as soon as political
superiority became the common cause of the English Com-
pany, and also of its government. In the mean time a
far more powerful competitor for the Indian sceptre than
either the Portuguese or the Dutch stept into the field.

PROGRESSIVE CONQUESTS OF EUROPEAN NATIONS, &c. ]4Q

This was the French nation. France and England, the
two most considerable nations in Europe, had at this period
(1746) declared open war ; and it was not tong before these
distant regions of the East were destined to feel the effects
of their contention. A French Company, in imitation of
that of England, had with a similar view to trade possessed
itself of several settlements in India, all under the govern-
ment of a President and Council established at the then
strongly fortified town of Pondicherry. They also held the
islands of the Mauritius and Bourbon in the Indian Sea,
from whence they were enabled to obtain easy supplies, and
even to fit out vessels of war upon emergencies. In the
year 1746, by a sudden attack, for which the English were
unprepared, they had made themselves masters of Madras.
The Nabob of the Carnatic, whose assistance the English
had in their extremity sought and obtained, sent his son
with an army of ten thousand men for the purpose of re-
capturing that fortress from the hands of the French. The
French marched out to meet them with a body of four
hundred European soldiers only. To the utter astonish-
ment of the opposing host this small band of Frenchmen
gained a decisive victory ; and set the first example of the
vast proportionate superiority of disciplined European troops,
over Natives of less robust bodily frame, and altogether
unversed in the art*)f war. The French nation now openly
aimed at political supremacy in India.

An ambition of so magnificent a character, deliberately
formed, and acted upon by a few individuals at the head of
scarce fifteen hundred of their countrymen — settled in the
midst of numerous Native states, the weakest of which could
gather together an army of ten thousand men — may seem
presumptuous beyond all bounds of reason. Nevertheless
the history of events will shew that at least temporary
success must have attended this gigantic scheme of con-
quest, but for the opposition maintained by the English.

150 PROGRESSIVE CONQUESTS OF EUROPEAN NATIONS, S:c.

The interests of the French in India were at this period
presided over by a succession of the most able men that
ever served a negligent and ungrateful country. By the
overthrow of the English at Madras, and by the discomfi-
ture of the forces of the Nabob of the Carnatic, the French
found themselves, relieved from the immediate pressure of
any enemy, and in possession of a territory inhabited by a
considerable and industrious population. Additional forces,
both naval and military, arrived — and their strength was
still further augmented by the formation of several com-
panies of Sepoys, whom the French were the first to train
according to the European rules of discipline. They now
commenced strenuously, and with confidence the apparently
easy task of wresting from the English the slencier hold
which, after the loss of Madras, they had upon any
portion of the Carnatic. At the same time they formed al-
liances, as well with a formidable competitor for the Nabob-
ship of the Carnatic, as with a still more powerful Prince, a
claimant for the Subadarship of the Deccan itself (of which
the Carnatic was but one of the dependencies)— and they
soon discovered that the might of their assistance decided
the possession of both the one throne and the other. In the
progress of these distractions, and of the bloody contests
they produced, the French gained such an ascendancy as
enabled them to set up and destroy one fuler after another,
as it suited their objects of increasing their own power : till
at length, in a grateful mood, one of the rival Subadarsof the
Deccan, who owed his elevation entirely to their interfer-
ence, constituted the French Governor chief of all the coun-
tries on the coast of Coromandel from the Kistna to Cape
Comorin, and appointed the Nabob of the Carnatic to be
his deputy. While the French were thus becoming mas-
ters of a wide tract of country, and Sovereign controllers
of the affairs of the whole Deccan, they were also gaining
ground, and strengthening their position in Bengal. It was
said without much appearance of exaggeration, that the
Emperor at Delhi would soon tremble at their name.

PROGRESSIVE CONQUESTS OF EUROPEAN NATIONS, &c. ]^J

But all these grand designs were destined shortly to be
frustrated, and the French influence in India extinguished
for ever by the victorious successes of the Fmglish. It will
not, however, appear foreign to the subject of this discourse
if I cast a cursory glance at what would probably have been
the eventual fate of India, had any other European nation
but England attained that supreme power which was once
so nearly within the grasp of the French.

The Portuguese nation, one of the very feeblest of the
European powers, unable to subsist at all but by the pro-
tection of more powerful allies, and often on the very verge
of destruction by foreign enemies, it is certain could never
have retained but for a few years their hold upon such an
Empire, which chance might have placed under their go-
vernment. The Dutch, who with difficulty attained the
rank of an independent state in Europe, were themselves af-
terwards subjugated by the arms of the French. The
French after a series of wars which deluged all Europe in
blood, were twice utterly overthrown, and received their
political destinies at the will of their conquerors.

It is obvious, therefore, that, had it been the fortune of
either of these nations to have attained dominion over In-
dia, new wars and struggles must have devastated the coun-
try. After another age of national misery, tranquillity might
have been restored, and a new era of prosperity have begun,
by the firm foundation of such an Empire as the English
have now established, or on the other hand, the country might
have been resigned again to that state of universal disunion
and misgovernment which from ancient times had prevailed.

SECTION VII.

Of the Means and Resources of the East India Company
for the conquest of India.

It was at this crisis of the highest political fortunes of
the French, that the English Company — first, in compul-
sory resistance of attacks which threatened their utter ruin
and expulsion from India, and afterwards from the force of
circumstances — began in the year of Christ 1749 tp engage
openly in that contest for territorial dominion which ended
in their settled supremacy. Having surveyed the posture
of the various Native states, and the feeble condition or de-
pendency to which most of them were reduced and the qua-
lity as well as extent, of that power and influence which
the French had built up — let us turn to examine what
were the means and resources which supported the Company
through the arduous career upon which they were about to
enter.

From the year 1698, the date of that Charter, the provisi-
ons of which I have in a general way alftady rehearsed, to
the period which I am now alluding to, no addition had been
made, either by the legislature or by any Royal grant, to the
powers and privileges of the Company, nor any alteration
in those already conferred. The Government of England
was content with renewing from time to time their Charter
rights for further terms of years, providing at the same time
for the more secure enjoyment of their exclusive trade.
The King interfered by his own Prerogative no farther than
by regulating the course of administering justice at the
three Presidencies, which were now those of Madras, Bom-
bay and Calcutta. A treaty of peace, however, had been

RESOURCES OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, &e, I53

arranged in 1749 in Europe between France and England,
under one of the stipulations of which Madras was restored
to the English Company.

In the meantime the Company had, by their own previous
negociations with the Native powers, obtained no less than
thirty. seven towns in the neighbourhood of Calcutta, and
added three villages to their possessions at Madras. At
each of these settlements they maintained a garrison of about
300 European soldiers ; and it may be presumed that no less
a force was kept up at some other stations. At Cuddalore,
including the adjacent fortified town called Fort Saint
David, they had acquired a territory still more extensive
and populous than their settlement of Madras. Their ca-
pital stock subscribed by the Proprietors amounted to near
three millions sterling, as we have seen — and, such was
the prosperous course of their trade, that they not only were
able to pay annually dividends to the amount of eight per
cent to the Proprietors of stock, but they had credit to bor-
row no less a sum than six millions sterling, on which they
paid regular annual interest. With this command of money
they had in a long course of years erected numerous and
strong fortifications, and supplied them with extensive war-
like stores ; they had maintained, and continued to enlist in
their service, bodies of English troops and naval armaments ;
and they had increased their territory from time to time by
purchases, until from their landed possessions alone, they
derived a revenue large enough to sustain the expences of
administering a local government, which will be shewn to
have been at this period of no inconsiderable importance.

The population of the English settlement of Madras,
amounted at this time to about 250,000 souls. That at
Cuddalore could not be reckoned at less : and, besides these
settlements, the several others under the Madras Presiden-
cy may be presumed to have contained many thousands.

]54 RESOURCES OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, Sec.

The population under the government of the Bengal Presi-
dency, a more fertile, and a more extensive district than
that of Madras, would surely surpass the number we have
assigned to the latter Presidency. The Island of Bombay,
together with the adjacent island of Salsette, has never been
supposed to contain a less population than 300,000 ; and the
English settlements at Surat and at other places on the wes-
tern coast, would contribute materially to swell the whole
amount of the Native subjects of the Company. They might
probably be reckoned at between one million and fifteen
hundred thousand souls.

The power of the Company by 3ea had come to be of the
most formidable character. In their first contests with the
French, and before a step had been taken in hostility with
the Native states, no less than from fifteen to seventeen
vessels of war, some of them of the largest class, besides
eleven vessels for the transport of troops, appeared at one
time in the Indian seas. Some of these vessels, with their
officers and crew, were in the regular pay of the Company;
some were supplied by the King with a view to the glory
of the nation and victory over its principal foe. Such a
force was alone sufficient, if well conducted, to sweep the
ocean of every antagonist, and to pour the tide of conquest
upon any state in India it might attack.

But all the resources which the Company could command,
sunk in importance when compared with that constant and
resolute support which the government of England was it-
self invariably ready to furnish in a cause which was seen
so much to concern the national interests. It was no longer
the cause of a trading Company struggling for profits,
which were more or less to enrich two or three thousand
British subjects. '1 he question of pursuing the English con-
quests in India was one which was to decide whether Eng-
land should become one of the greatest Empires on the

RESOURCES OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY. &c. [55

earlb, or whether it was to yield in political power to some
other nation, even at the possible loss of its own independ-
ence. From the beginning, therefore, of these vast conten-
tions to their close, the Royal army of England continued, as
occasion demanded, to send forth its warriors. " I see," said
the tyrant of Mysore, " those who are before me, and I
" fear them not : it is that power which I cannot see of
" which I stand in awe." The daring exploits performed
by the great generals and officers of the Company rendered
it unnecessary that the military might of England should
have been more than very partially put forth : but the con-
sciousness of fhei) country's cause, and not that of private
individuals merely, nerved the soldiers' arm, and inspired
the statesman's deliberations, with augmented energy. The
Company strove for themselves ; but it was as representatives
also of the English nation, and with a nation's strength.

Such were the means with which the Company commenc-
ed their contest for dominion in India. They were the
means, not of a body of merchants, but of a powerful
and populous colony, firmly settled, and politically governed
as a nation. The rulers over it were wealthy in themselves,
but wealthier in the financial support of their government.
Their means were not easily to be exhausted by reverses ;
and they were necessarily increased by success. Their
power was not like that of the French Company, who were
feebly sustained by their own Government, and had but
little capital to fall back upon. The power of the French,
therefore, as it was originally founded upon intrigues with
the Native states, so also did its progress depend chiefly on
personal influence, and not on any substantial political
strength. They could be no match in the long run for an
enterprising and persevering enemy like the English ; though
it soon became obvious that supremacy in India would be
decided by the superiority of one or the other of these two
nations.

156 RESOURCES OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, &c

During those first great successes of the French which I
have noticed, the Government of Madras was occupied in
gaining some small accession to their territories. But the
overwhelming authority with which the Subahdar of the Dec-
can had invested the French Government at once revealed
to the Company that either their own extinction, or that of
the French, as a political power in India, had now to be de-
termined by the sword. In this conviction the Company
first began to strengthen themselves by espousing the claim
of another competitor for the throne of the Carnatic, who,
besides the possession of the fort of Trichinopoly, maintained
a considerable army in the field. The price of this alli-
ance was a grant by the rival Nabob to the English Com-
pany of the Jaghire of Madras. The French, somewhat in-
ferior in European forces, acted with a far superior Native
army, under the banners of their own Nabob. The contest
was nominally between these two Princes, but in reality be-
tween the two European states. After a war of five years'
duration, in the course of which many hard battles were
fought, and some of the most astonishing feats of bravery
were displayed that ever adorned the military annals of a
nation, all the objects of the French ended in defeat. Their
Nabob was made captive and slain. The authority of his
rival was permanently established. The possessions of the
Company, with the addition of the recently granted Jaghire,
were confirmed. Those of the French were reduced within
their original limits : and the predominating influence of
the English prevailed over the whole extent of India south
of the Kistna. -

A far more extensive scene of conquest now opened to
the enterprise of the Company. Their settlements in
Bengal were wantonly invaded by the Subahdar of the pro-
vinces of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, to whose immedi-
ate government these settlements were politically subordi-
nate. His sole motive was his rapacity ; but his barbarous

RESOURCES OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, &c. \ 57

cruelty threw all other atrocity into the shade. Calcutta
was stormed, and given up to plunder — and 146 defenceless
English prisoners were on the evening of the assault shut
up in a small dungeon, and, before morning, all but 23
expired of suffocation, the necessary consequence of this
inhuman treatment. But this memorable murder of the
Black Hole of Calcutta, was the cause of still more memo-
rable results. The just vengeance of the English in India
was roused. They collected all their forces under Clive,
the most daring soldier and the ablest general of his age.
They gave battle, with 900 Europeans and 2,200 Native
troops, to the host of the Subahdar, amounting to near
70,000 men, and in the famous plain of Plassy utterly rout-
ed this mighty army. The consequences of such defeat
were the dethronement and death of this Prince, and the
eventual reduction of his dominions under the English sway.

As will be presumed, this vast accession of power, toge-
ther with the treasures which thereby fell to the disposal
of the Company, soon led to the destruction of the rival
authority of the French. With such means as they still
possessed — aided by the co-operation of some Native states
over whom they still had influence, and directed by the
talents of many very able men — they protracted the vital
contest through a constant warfare of four years after the
victory of Plassy. But a series of bloody defeats ended
in the siege and capture of Pondicherry, the seat of their
government, and their last strong hold in India. From
this final discomfiture in 1761, they never recovered; and
the English Company were thereafter left to pursue their
fortunes in India, free from all armed interruption, or the
apprehension of it, by any foreign nation.

We have now traced the history and progress of the
East India Company from its first formation to the period

J^S RESOURCES OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, See,

when it had acquired the consistency and rank of one of
the most powerful and influential among the Eastern states.
The limited obje u ct of this portion of my discourse being
but to shew the capacity of this extraordinary political
body to construct that vast Empire now under its settled
Government — and which capacity the gradual acquisition
of the position they had now attained, by the course I have
attempted to explain, will rationally account for — [ shall
here close that discussion which more properly befits the
historian. For sixty more years the Company and its
Governments were engaged in extensive warfare with Native
powers : but it is their boast that throughout these conten-
tions they have never been the aggressors ; that they have
never made war for the sake of unrighteous conquests ; that
they have never broken the faith of treaties. If, under that
providence by whose control Empires rise and fall,
flourish and decay, this wide country has in the course
of so many vicissitudes been at leng'h subjected to
English Government, that government has never lost
sight of the paramount duty of governing for the benefit
of the people. It was no idle spirit of display which
induced the House of Commons, after a laborious inves-
tigation of every detail in the conduct of the Indian
Governments, to record their solemn testimony to " the
" unremitting anxiety that has influenced the efforts of
"those to whom the Government of our Indian possessions
" has been consigned, to establish a system of administra-
" tion best calculated to promote the confidence and con-
" ciliate the feelings of the Native inhabitants, not less by
" a respect to their own institutions than by the endeavour
" gradually to engraft upon them such improvements as
<: might shield, under the safeguard of equal law, every
" class of the people from the oppressions of power, and
" communicate to them that sense of protection and assur-
" ance of justice, which is the efficient spring of all public
" prosperity and happiness. "

RESOURCES OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, &C. J 59

While through the lapse of 70 years, from the year 1749
to the year 1820, (he English Empire of India was being
gained and consolidated, the legislature of England kept
pace with its progress by its enactments for the better re-
gulation of the Company and of the authority which it ex-
ercised. Up to the year 1773, the Company continued to
conduct its affairs upon the basis of the Charter of 1698, as
it had done up to the year 1749 when its career of conquest
began. But, in the year 1773, a regulating Statute introduced
many alterations of detail both in the internal constitution of
the Company, and its method of governing the extensive
countries it had acquired. This act was followed by others —
the chief of which were one in 1784, first constituting a
Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India (commonly
called the Board of Control)— and by three more, usually de-
nominated Charter Jets, by which in the years 1793, 1813,
and 1833, the Government of India by the East India Com-
pany was delegated to that body for the respective periods
of 20 years by each act. All these acts, except the two
last, continued to the Company their exclusive privileges of
trade, but the act of 1813 first allowed a free and general
participation in it by British public ; and the last act of 1S33
abolished the right of trade by the East India Company
altogether.

Such a revolution in the essential quality of the Company
may seem to require some explanation. It must be ob-
served that this body, from the time that it had become a
ruling power over a populous and extensive Empire, acted
in two capacities, each of which was in its nature totally
distinct from the other. It was quite as competent to the
British Parliament (and indeed this was at one time in its
contemplation) to have constituted another entirely new
Board of Governors to conduct the government of India, as
to leave that authority in the hands of u Company of mer-
chants, who made it equally their business to carry on their

15Q RESOURCES OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, &c.

trade. That this government was still continued in the
hands of the Company was owing merely to considerations
of policy, and te a conviction that the success and justice of
its administration rendered that measure most expedient.
The same policy had suggested the continuance of the ex-
clusive privileges of trade, the expediency of which was sup-
ported on two grounds— first, that of contributing by the
profits to the better maintenance of their growing political
power; secondly, that of preventing a sudden influx of Eng-
lishmen, who with their free legal rights and love of
enterprise, might probably embarrass a new and unsettled
government, and at the same time lead to the oppression of
the Natives. But in 1813, when the English sway in India
was more firmly fixed — wh»n equal laws had begun to be
regularly administered — and the Native people had become
more sensible of the true advantages of the British rule—*
these precautions were swept away with the most benefi-
cial results to the public commerce of both countries. From
this period the trade of the Company, like the trading of
all Governments in competition with that of the public,
not only dwindled gradually away, but was proved to be car-
ried on at a manifest loss. The abolition, therefore, of all
further trading by the governing body was a relief to the
public, who gained consequently a greater share of the
traffic. It was also a financial benefit to the Company
itself, and a disincumbrance of a branch of affairs which
detrimentally interfered with their more important duties,
as a Government.

SECTION VIII.

Of the Component Members of the East India Com-
pan. y— the Proprietors of Slock.

We must now consider the East India Company as a body
temporally organized by the sovereign authority ot the
English nation, for the responsible government of an im-
mense component portion of the whole undivided British
Empire. This powerful body may be said to consist of the
Proprietors of India Stock — (who may be properly deemed
to constitute the aggregate Company) — the Directors, who
being themselves Proprietors are by delegation of the whole
mass appointed to manage and superintend its affairs, as
their Representatives— and the Board of Control, which in
the name of the King's executive authority exercises an
appellate, and to some extent a directory, power of inter-
ference. The functions and duties of each of these bodies
are copiously detailed in the Acts to which 1 have referred.
'J bose of the Proprietors will occupy the remainder of this
discourse. Those of the Directors, aod of the Board of
Control— who, together, constitute the supreme government
of India, acting through the Governors and Council at each
Presidency as their ministers— will form the subject of the
next.

It will be convenient fo consider of the qualifications and
functions of the Proprietors, as extracted from all the regu-
lating Charters and Statutes, under three heads— 1st, the
mode of tluir becoming Proprietors ; 2ndly, the course by
which they act ; and 3rdly, the powers with which this
body is invested.

I. The original objects of the Company having been

Jg2 0F THE PROPRIETORS OF STOCK.

purely commercial, no restrictions were imposed on the capa-
city of every person to purchase shares in the common stock,
and thereby to'become a member of the Company as a
Proprietor. Although the altered character of the Company
might have warranted a change in the qualifications of its
members, yet, owing to the very limited powers exercised
by the Proprietors at large, it has never been deemed re-
quisite to resort to any such measure. All persons whatever,
who are of the age of 21 years, whether foreigners or natural
born subjects of England, and without distinction of religion,
profession, or even sex, are competent to become Proprie-
tors by the purchase of a share or shares in the capital
stock of the Company, which shares are saleable and trans-
ferable like any other property. This stock, which, as we
have seen, was formerly the capital on which dividends
were made on profits of trade, is now converted into a right
to a certain amount of the surplus revenues of the Indian
Empire, after all expences of its administration are defrayed.
At the end of the term of 20 years, for which period the go-
vernment of India is further entrusted to the Company by
the last Charter Act of 1833, the Government of India may
finally become a portion of the general government of the
whole British Empire, and the stock of the Company, agreed
to be reckoned at twelve millions sterling, is to become a
charge on that general government.

A Proprietor of shares to a less amount than 1000£,
though a member of the Company in some sense, is not
clothed with any of the administrative powers of a Propri-
etor. If the owner of 500£ stock, he may be present at
the meetings (or General Courts as those meetings are
called) of Proprietors assembled for the transaction of
business, although he cannot vote. A Proprietor under the
age of 21 years, to whom any amount of stock may have
devolved by inheritance, by bequest, or by marriage, can
exercise none of his functions as such, until he becomes of

GENERAL COURTS OF PROPRIETORS OF STOCK. J 53

that age. A Proprietor of 1000£ stock has one vote at all
elections to be made, and upon all questions to be decided,
at the Courts of Proprietors : a Proprietor of 3000£ stock
has two votes : a Proprietor of 6000£ has three votes :
and a Proprietor of I0,000£ has four votes. No Proprie-
tor can have more than four votes, whatever may be the
amount of stock held by him. With a view to the preven-
tion of combination to serve immediate occasions, no Pro-
prietor is allowed to vote, unless he has been truly and
really possessed of the requisite amount of stock for one
whole year ; except in the instances of such stock devolv-
ing by course of inheritance, or by bequest, or through
marriage.

IT. — All proceedings of the Proprietors are transacted by
General Courts ; at which the votes of a majority present
decide ; or at which a demand may be made by any nine
Proprietors of an adjournment for the purpose of taking
the personal votes of all duly qualified members who desire
to attend and vote, — whereupon the majority of votes so
taken decides.

These general Courts are summoned by the Directors,
who may assemble them as often as they shall see cause,
and who must assemble them at least four times in each
year ; namely, one in the month of December, another in
March, another in June, and another in September. Should
the Directors, or a majority of them, fail in so summoning
any of these Courts, any three Directors may call together
a Court in the next ensuing month. And, further, any
nine of the Proprietors holding 1000£ stock may require,
by a special demand, that a Court shall be summoned by
the Directors within ten days.

When any demand is regularly made for taking the
votes of the Proprietors, generally, on any question, or

jg4 POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF PROPRIETORS OF STOCK.

when any election is to be made, the method of giving in
and recording votes is by what is termed the Ballot. By
that course each voter delivers in a paper containing his
simple assent or dissent to any measure proposed, or the
name of the candidate or candidates for whom he gives
his suffrage ; depositing the paper in one of several large
glasses. Certain Directors are appointed by the Court to
receive the votes into the glasses, and others to count out
the votes and report the result. No balloting nan com-
mence at any earlier period than 24 hours after the ad-
journment of the Court for the purpose of a ballot being
taken ; nor can the ballot commence before noon, or be
closed before six o'clock of the same day. The Court be-
fore separating adjourn to some day which it fixes as the
day for balloting. By the last Charter Act of 1833. Proprie-
tors are allowed to vote at Elections by their attornies pro-
ducing a duly executed authority.

III. — The powers of the Proprietors are as follows : 1st.
They form the constituent body out of whom the managing
body, the Directors, are elected. As by the constitution
of the Court of Directors six of its members must vacate
their office every year, there must be an annual election,
which is appointed for the second Wednesday of April, at
which each Proprietor may give in his list of names of
candidates not exceeding six. Every other vacancy, occur-
ring by death, retirement, or removal, must be filled up
within forty days after the vacancy declared ; and ten days
notice must be given by the Court of Directors of the day
appointed for the election. The Proprietors have also the
power of removing any Director from his office for just
cause. — 2nd. The Court of Proprietors is authorized to
make regulations (termed Bye-laivs,) as well with a view to
the actual government of India, and of the Company's
affairs generally, as with a view to the course and method of
conducting business by the Court of Directors, and to the

POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF PROPRIETORS OF STOCK. Jg^

proper demeanour of the individual Directors in the exer-
cise of their offices. This power of making bye-laws would,
therefore, on the face of it imply a suprenje and practical
authority in administering the affairs of the Company. In
reality, however, it has no such effect. In the first
place it gives no authority to make any regulation con-
trary to any provision of a Statute ; and, since almost all
the powers and authorities exercised by the Company are
regulated by Statute, very little scope for discretionary legis-
lation by this privilege remains. In the next place, these
Statutes, having not only placed the entire administration of
all matters relating to the Civil or Military Government, or
to the Revenue of India, in the Court of Directors, but hav-
ing also forbidden the revocation, suspension, or varying of
any of this Court's orders relating to these subjects by any
general Court of Proprietors,their practical authority is there-
by almost nullified. And, lastly, so cumbrous a mode of
executing the functions of a government, as this of pro-
posing general laws, which would be sure to be opposed by
the whole influence of the Directors, if aimed at the defeat
of their measures, would never become efficient, even if any
Proprietors couid be found troublesome enough to attempt
it. Nevertheless, this legislative authority is not without
some practical and beneficial objects. By it the orderly
course of transacting the business of the general Courts is
provided ; and a considerable power is still thereby retained
in regard to the disposal of any portion of the revenues of the
Company : insomuch that no sum beyond G00£ can at
any time be voted by the Court of Directors by way of gra-
tuity to any person, nor more than 200£ per annum by way of
pension, or salary of anew office, unless with the sanction of
two general Courts of Proprietors. — 3rd. The Court of Pro-
prietors are empowered to take into their consideration all
new proposed Statutes, affecting the interests of the Company,
and to discuss the merits of such laws, and to offer in the
name of the whole Company, as well to Parliament as to the

166

POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF PROPRIETORS OF STOCK.

Court of Directors, the opinions resolved on by the majority
of a Court. In like manner this Court is empowered to
call for information on any topics connected with the ad-
ministration of affairs by the Court of Directors, and to pass
resolutions of censure or approbation upon their measures,
or to suggest others ; although not competent to enforce
the execution of the measures so suggested. With the
same view to the public expression of the opinion of the
body of Proprietors on the mode of administration of the
Government by the Court of Directors, that Court is re-
quired to lay before the General Courts of Proprietors an
annual account of the finances of the Company. It is in
the exercise of this branch of their functions, and in the
duty of elections, that the General Court of Proprietors is
mainly engaged.

Upon a review of all these powers and functions of the
body of Proprietors its true usefulness will appear to consist
in its constituting a fair, an enlightened, and at the same
time a popular, source of power, upon a s v. stem of repre-
sentation ; and in its supplying a solemn check on the
conduct and measures pursued by those to whom the im-
portant executive duties of governing the vast East Indian
Empire is entrusted.

DISCOURSE IV.

Of the Court of Directors, and Board of

Control.

F the Qualifications of the Individual Directors. Of
the course by ichich the Directors act as a Court. Of the
Powers' of the Court of Directors. Of the Board of
Control.

DISCOURSE IV.

Of the Court of Directors, and Board of

Control.

SECTION I.

Of the qualifications of individual Directors.

M PROPOSE to treat of the constitution and quality of
the Court of Directors under three several heads — First, the
qualifications of the individual Directors, and the mode of
their election : Second, the course in which they exercise
their functions : Third, the powers with which the Court of
Directors is invested.

First. Every person, to be eligible as a Director, must
be a Proprietor of stock to the amount of 2000£, at least.
This amount of the pecuniary qualification of a Director
was first fixed by the Charter of 1G98.

No Proprietors but such as are English subjects can be
elected Directors. Every person born within any part of
the dominions of the Crown of England is by his birth-right
an English subject : consequently, every Native born within
the territories of India under British Government is eligible
as a Director, provided he is otherwise qualified. So also
any foreigner may become entitled to all the rights of an
Englishman, by being what is termed naturalized (that is
having the rights of a natural born subject conferred upon
him; by Act of Parliament. This qualification of being an

]70 QUALIFICATIONS OF INDIVIDUAL DIRECTORS.

English subject, is not required in Proprietors ; but the
Directors, being invested with extensive political powers of
a national character, ought obviously to be under the obli-
gation of every public duty and feeling to uphold the national
interests.

No person who has held office in India, and who shall
have been declared by the Court of Directors to have pecu-
niary accounts unsettled with the Company, or against whom
that Court shall have declared that a charge for misconduct
is under consideration, is eligible to be a Director for the
term of two years after his return to England, unless those
accounts be sooner settled, or such charge sooner decided.

Every Director is required to take an oath of office within
ten days after his election, before certain appointed authori-
ties, otherwise his election becomes void. The oath is of
an impressive character, and is to the following effect :

The Director swears to his being duly and truly qualified
in respect to the amount of stock owned by him : he swears
that, in case he is in any way interested in any dealings, con-
tracts, or purchases, made by or with the Company, he will
record the same previous to the discussion or the making of
any treaty or negociation upon any subject, connected with
such dealings, and withdraw, without giving any vote : he
then proceeds to swear, ' f that he will not, directly or indi-
" reetly, accept or take any perquisite, emolument, fee, pre-
" sent, or reward, upon any account whatsoever (or any
" promise or engagement for any) for or in respect of the ap-
" pointment, or nomination, of any person to any place or
" office in the gift, of the Company, or of himself as a Direc-
'• tor, or for or on account of, or any ways relating to, any
" other business or affairs of the Company :" he further
swears, " that he will be faithful to the Company, and, ac-
" cording to the best of his skill and understanding, give

QUALIFICATIONS OF INDIVIDUAL DIRECTORS. \J\

* f his best advice, counsel, and assistance for the support of
" the good government of the Company :" and, lastly, he
swears <e that in the office of a Director* of the Compa-
" ny he will be indifferent and equal to all manner of per-
" sons, and will in all things faithfully and honestly demean
" himself, according to the best of his skill and understand-
" ing."

Every Director, going beyond sea from England, must
report to the Court such his intention ; and, in case he con-
tinues absent more than one year, the Court, of Directors
must report his absence to the next General Court of Pro-
prietors ; who may, if they think fit, thereupon remove him '
from his office. This General Court has likewise power to
remove (if they think fit) any Director who shall take any
office of emolument under the King's government. And,
further, any Director may be displaced by the proceedings of
two General Courts ; at the first of which the grounds of
the motion for removal must be brought forward and re-
corded, and at the second of which the question for removal
is to be decided by the votes of the Proprietors then pre-
sent. All these liabilities to removal are created by the
Bye-laus of the Company, passed by the General Courts
of the Proprietors.

The number of Directors is twenty four. Until the year
1773 all these Directors were chosen annunlhj : but in that
year a Statute provided that six only of the Directors
should go out of office every year by rotation : consequently,
no Director can serve for a longer period than four years.
There must necessarily, therefore, be an annual election of
six Directors in the room of those who go out by rotation ;
which election is appointed to take place on the second
Wednesday of every April. Previously to that day two
lists are printed of all Proprietors entitled to vole: one list
is to be ready to be delivered to any Proprietor demanding

J72 QUALIFICATIONS OF INDIVIDUAL DIRECTORS.

it five months before the day of the annual election ; and
the other list, which must comprehend all Proprietors who
have become such since the delivery of the last list, is to
be ready fourteen days before the election. Every candi-
date must signify in writing to the Secretary of the Court
his desire to become such, thirty-two days before the day
of election ; and a list of all the candidates is published
thirty days before the election. The mode of balloting for
these annual candidates, and for others, as individual va-
cancies occur, has been explained in the last discourse.
When an individual vacancy occurs, not in the course of
annual rotation, the candidate elected in his place can only
serve for the remainder of the period which his predeces-
sor had to serve. Such a vacancy, when it occurs, must
be published by the Court — a day for electing another to
the office must be fixed within forty days of such declara-
tion of the vacancy — and ten days public notice of the day
of election must be given.

There is no restriction, however,against the same Directors
who have gone out by rotation becoming candidates to
succeed to the next annual vacancies — and, in practice,
they always do become so, unless they choose voluntarily
to retire from office. For experience having shewn the
advantage of retaining the services of those who have
previously become versed in the affairs of the Company,
and who may at the time of their turn for vacating have
become engaged in originating or carrying into effect some
important measures, it proved an obvious policy to re-elect
such Directors as soon as their legal competency to act
was restored. Moreover, the individual Directors would
not be so likely to pay such zealous attention to their
duties, or to be so free from every bias to serve their pri-
vate objects, if they apprehended that their authority might
terminate within a short period by the changes and chances
of a popular election. With a view to ensure such re-elec-

QUALIFICATIONS OF INDIVIDUAL DIRECTORS. 1 73

tion against any opposition of Proprietors who from caprice,
or favor to other candidates, might be disposed to reject
such old Members, without there existing, any just cause
for their removal, it has been for many years the custom
for all the Directors to join in recommending the six late
Members to the suffrages of the Proprietors, and in sup-
porting them by their own votes, and those of all others
whom they can influence, in case any rival candidates
should appear. This recommendation of the old Members
by the Directors is termed " Publishing the house list"
and it never fails of its object. In practice, therefore, there
are thirty Directors ; six of whom by rotation vacate their
office for one year— and it must be acknowledged that the
original policy of this rule of rotation, which was that of
affording to the constituents of the Directors a periodical
discretion in the appointment of their representatives and
rulers has been frustrated.

SECTION II.

Of the course by ivhich the Directors act, as a Court.

Second. All the measures are transacted, direct-
ly or indirectly, through Courts, at which a simple
majority decides on all questions and proceedings. But,
by a bye-law of the General Court of Proprietors,
every Director, whether present or not, may, within
fourteen days after any measure resolved on, enter his
dissent, with his reasons, on the records of the Court. No
Court is competent to proceed on business, unless thirteen
members attend. By a bye-law the Court of Directors is
required to meet once at least in every week for the purposes
of business. By another bye-law the Court of Directors
annually appoint one of their members to be their Chairman
(which is a term commonly used in England for the Presi-
dent of any assembly, as being the person occupying the
principal seat) and another their Deputy Chairman for the
ensuing year. The Deputy Chairman usually, though not
as of course, succeeds to the office of Chairman for the next
year. The duties of the Chairman (and in his absence of
the Deputy Chairman) are, to govern the course of proceed-
ings at all Courts and other meetings at which he presides
— to bring forward ordinarily the various matters to be dis-
cussed — and to be the organ of personal conferences with
the President and Board of Control, upon such affairs of the
Company as require such communication. The Chairman
is allowed by his brother Directors a large proportionate in-
fluence in the disposal of appointments in- the gift of the
Court, and also in other matters.

For the greater facility of business the Court is divided

COURSE BY WHICH THE DIRECTORS ACT. J 75

into several Committees. These Committees consist of dif-
ferent numbers, but the Chairman and Deputy Chairman are
always two of their members. The principal committees
are : —

1st. The Committee of Correspondence.

2nd. The Committee of Secrecy.

3rd. The Committee of Accounts.

4th. The Committee of Treasury.

It will be expedient to notice, in a general \vay, the quality
of business delegated to each of these four principal commit-
tees. There are several other Committees of less considera-
tion — such as that of Lawsuits, that of the House, that of the
Civil College in England for the instruction of those nomi-
nated to become Civil Servants in India, that of the Military
Seminary for the instruction of Cadets, that of the Library,
and that of the Military Fund for retired officers, and their
widows and families.

The Committee of Correspondence is the most important
of all the Committees. It is their province to consider of
and prepare all orders to be issued to the Governments of
India in the Public, Political, Military, Revenue, Judicial,
Law, and Ecclesiastical Departments. They receive all
Despatches from the Governments of India in these Depart-
ments, and prepare replies. They receive all Petitions and
Memorials addressed to the Court by individuals complain-
ing of grievances, or requesting favors. To their conside-
ration and report also are remitted most of the appoint-
ments of the great officers in the service of the Company.

The Committee of Secrecy is one which is expressly di-
rected to be appointed by a Statute passed in the year 1784.
The appointment of a Secret Committee was first made by
the Court itself upon the commencement of those contests

176 COURSE BY WHICH THE DIRECTORS ACT.

with the French, which have been referred to in the preced-
ing discourse. The object was that of considering all
political mat terg arising, as between the Company and those
nations which might be at war with the English, and as be-
tween the Company and the various Native States. Such
matters as these were common to the consideration of the
English Government and the Company— and it often be-
came of the utmost importance that the ministers of the
Crown, and certain organs of the Court of Directors, should
communicate confidentially together — and that the subjects
of their joint deliberations should be kept entirely secret, not
only from the public, but even from the numerous members
of the Court. The subjects of such deliberations were, com-
monly, projected wars, invasions, campaigns, treaties'acquisi-
tions of territories, and alliances,— and all such projects were
obviously liable to defeat or failure by being prematurely
disclosed. The formation of such a Secret Committee was,
therefore, naturally suggested by the important political
position the Company gradually arrived at. It was render-
ed compulsory by the act passed in 1784, and was limited to
three members only. la time of peace the duties of this
Committee, although of eminent importance, are neither so
numerous nor so urgent as in time of any war. The mem-
bers and all the officers of the Committee are sworn to
secrecy, and communicate only with the Board of Control.

The Committee of Accounts have the custody of the books
in which the transfers of stock are registered, and the investi-
gation of transfers and superintendence of such registry.
They receive all bills drawn on the Company, and accept or
not according to advices. They receive and report on all
bills of charges, and manage the issuing of all the Compa-
ny's bills of exchange and notes issued in England. They
superintend the correspondence with the accountant's offices
in the several Presidencies of India. They have the pre-
paration of annual accounts of the Company's cash, of their
stock, produce of revenues,, sales, disbursements, receipts,

COURSE BY WHICH THE DIRECTORS ACT. ] 77

payments and debts, and an estimate of the same for the
current year, to be laid before the Board of Control and be-
fore both Houses of Parliament, and also before the gene-
ral Court of Proprietors.

The Committee of the Treasury provides for the payment
of all dividends on stock, and interest on Company's bills and
notes, and negociates the Company's loans. They super-
intend the communications between the Court and the
Indian Governments in the departments of their general
treasuries at each Presidency. They have the custody of
the Company's seal, used in England for the purpose of exe-
cuting the deeds and contracts of the Company, and see
to the due affixing the seal on instruments to be executed.
And, generally, they have the care of and dealing with the
cash and bullion of the Company.

None of these Committees, it is to be observed, have any
power in themselves ; unless any matters are by special or-
ders of the Court directed to be carried into effect by them.
Their only actual duties, in ordinary, are to inquire and re-
port, and to nominate ox recommend to certain appointments.
These reports must be signed by the members ; and, unless
they are laid before the Court itself within eight days after
being so signed, they become null and void. It is rather,
therefore, with a view to the requisite information of the
whole body of the Court, and for the sake of obtaining the
opinion of members who have made it their business to as-
certain all details of the matter under discussion, that these
Committees are appointed, than with any vfew of delegating
that authority which can only be exercised by the Court it-
self, consisting of no less a number than thirteen of its
members.

Copies of all the proceedings, resolutions, and orders of
each Court must, within eight days after the holding of the

178

COURSE BY WHICH THE DIRECTORS ACT.

Court, be forwarded to the Board of Control. Copies, also,
of ail letters, ad vices, and dispatches received from India,
which relate in' any manner to its government, or to its
revenues, or to the appropriation of them, must be laid be-
fore the Board of Control immediately after their receipt.
I shall explain the objects of submitting all this information
to the Board of Control, when I come to treat of the func-
tions and authority of that body : in the meanwhile it will
be sufficient to mention, that no orders or instructions what-
ever, relating to the government or revenues of India, can
be sent out by the Court, until either approved by that
Board, or such a course be taken by the Board, with
a view to a revising or alteration of such dispatches, as
will be hereafter noticed.

SECTION III.

Of the Powers of the Court of Directors.

Third. The powers of the Court of Directors over India,
for as long as the Parliament of England have so determin-
ed, and subject to such control as has been, and will be
further, detailed, are in their nature those of a supreme sove-
reign authority. Thegreat distance, however, of this supreme
governing body from the actual scene of their operations
renders it necessary that a system of subordinate local
Governments should be organized— to which Governments
very large discretionary powers are given ; some by the
general instructions and orders of the Court, and some by
the Statutes of the English legislature itself. But, what-
ever discretionary powers are exercised by the chief or
other local Governments of India, they are all, neverthe-
less, subject to such interference, sanction, revision, or
reversal, as the Court in its paramount authority may judge
expedient.

By the terms of supreme sovereign authority is not to be
understood a pure arbitrary power, without any constitu-
tional rules of action, and without law. The Court is
created by a law ; and it governs according to laws. The
law which has constituted its plan of government is, like
that of the law of- the English constitution itself, a law
to be traced to the general will of the people, expressed
in this instance by a Statute of the Imperial Parliament,
which is the organ of the whole English nation. The laws,
according to which the Court governs, are either such Sta-
tutes (which this Court cannot repeal or disobey)— or they
are the ancient unaltered local laws of India, or laws

]gQ POWERS OF THE COURT OF DIRECTORS.

made by themselves or their local Governments of India,
all of which the Court must conform to, until they through
their Indian Government, or the Indian Government it-
self, shall alter or annul them. By saying, therefore, that
the nature of the Court's authority is supreme is meant,
that it has the legislative power, by which it may dictate
what shall be law, and what shall not — with the exception
of such laws as its own constitution is dependent upon,
and such as the Parliament of the united nation, by which
itself was created, shall have laid down for its guidance.
Moreover, the Court unites in itself the executive, as well
as the legislative, authorities of Government — there being
no separate branch of this Court (as is the case with the
supreme authority of England) entrusted with the adminis-
tration of that authority according to those express laws
which may have been enacted, or according to sound dis-
cretion in all cases not provided for by express laws. It
is true, indeed, that, by Statute, the Governor General of
India in Council is entrusted with authority to make ge-
neral laws ; but its laws may be annulled by the Court of
Directors ; and the laws which that Court may require to
be enacted must be passed by the Government in India.
That Government, therefore, is in all respects subordinate,
and not in itself supreme in any sense ; although the Go-
vernment of the Governor General in Council is usually
called the supreme Government of India, for the sake of
distinction. The regulated power, also, of the Board of
Control to reject, or alter, . the orders and instructions of
this Court in matters of government, certainly qualifies its
political supremacy : but, inasmuch as the Board is not
empowered to originate any measures or orders, its autho-
rity operates but as a check ; and is not altogether subver-
sive of the supreme character of the Court's powers of
Government subject to the restrictions I have noticed —
subject to the express Statutes of the British Parliament—
and subject to the interference of the Board of Control,

POWERS OF THE COURT OF DIRECTORS, |gj

by the specially appointed course, and to a limited extent —
the laws and administrative powers of the Court of Direc-
tors, so long as its constitution continues,' have absolute
force over the property, liberty, and lives of all who dwell
within the Company's territories in India.

To the Court of Directors, then, is delegated the power
of issuing such orders and directions, to be carried into effect
by the local authorities of India, and of framing such laws to
be observed in the conduct of Government, and in the ad-
ministration of justice, as to them may be expedient. Upon
submitting such measures to the consideration of the Board
of Control, and receiving notice of its disapproval, or of its
revisal, of them, they are authorized to make such repre-
sentations and explanations as they may think fit
respecting the matters upon which any disapprobation
has been expressed, or variations suggested, by the Board ;
which representations, the Board is required to give attention
to, and then finally to decide upon. If any difference of
opinion shall arise, as to whether the subject-matter of the
Board's disapproval, or alteration, has relation to the Go-
vernment or Revenues of India (upon which subjects only
the Board is entitled to exercise its powers of control) or
as to whether their orders or directions are in any other
respect beyond the scope of their legal authority, the Court
is empowered to submit any such question to the adjudi-
cation of certain of the judges of England.

By the last Charter Act of 1833, the Court has been re-
quired to draw up, and submit both to Parliament and to the
Board of Control, a body of standing general rules for the
guidance of the Supreme Government of India in the super-
intendence and administration of the affairs of the country.
These general rules have referpnce to the mode of exercis-
ing the powers entrusted to the local Governments, and to
the expedient course to be adopted in giving publicity to
the laws of the country. This is one of the many precau-

182

POWERS OF THE COURT OF DIRECTORS.

tions devised for ensuring some systematic flan in conduct-
ing the administration of the Indian Governments and for
imposing limits' upon the discretion even of the executive
branch of those governments, as far as a due regard to their
efficiency would allow of.

The Governor General of India (as will be in a future dis-
course explained) has, under authority of a Statute, certain,
powers of acting, in matters entrusted to the administration
of the governments of India, by his own sole authority,
without any previous communication with any of the Councils
of India. To the Court of Directors, however, is reserved
the power of suspending and restoring the liberty of exercis-
ing this special privilege. All individual power and'discre-
tion is contrary to the spirit of the constitutional laws of
England, which in all political measures aims at securing
the advantages of free discussion and union of opinions.
Although, therefore, emergencies may arise, during the ab-
sence of the Governor General from his Council, calling for
immediate resolutions — yet, so jealous is the English Go-
vernment of all arbitrary authority, that it provides against
all defects of a personal quality, and supplies the means of
denying to the rashness of one man a power which may be
safely reposed for a time in the cautious discretion of another.

The Court of Directors has but very limited power in
granting away the funds and revenues of the Company, for
the mere benefit of individual persons. No pecuniary grants
can be made of any gratuity beyond 600£, or of any pension,
or of any new or increased salary, beyond 200£ per annum,
without the consent, not only of the Board of Control, but
also of two general Courts of Proprietors.

All the chief and most important offices held in India,
both in the Civil and Military Departments of its Govern-
ment, are in the appointment of the Court of Directors. To

POWERS OF THE COURT OF DIRECTORS.

183

some of these offices the Court appoints directly and ex-
pressly — as regards others (which form a vast proportion of
the appointments held in India) the Court selects two
classes of persons, out of which classes only can individuals
be chosen to fill such offices. One of these classes is that
of the Civil Servants, each of whom is originally appointed
by the Court under the name of a Writer — the other is that
of the Military servants, who enter the service of the Com-
pany under the denomination of Cadets. Of the military
servants, who also hold commissions in India as military
officers of the Queen, and who rise in rank and are govern-
ed in a similar way to that in which all other portions of
the English army are governed, I have no occasion to make
further mention. Upon the quality of the Civil Service it
may appear to the purpose to offer, presently, a few observa-
tions.

The Court of Directors appoints expressly to the office of
the Governor General of India, to that of all the members of
his Council (save one), to that of Governor of each of the
other Presidencies of India, to that of all members of those
Governors' Councils, to that of Commander-in-Chief of all
the military forces of India, to that of Commander-in-Chief
of the forces of the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay, and
to some other minor offices which it is unnecessary to enu-
merate. The functions of one of the Councillors of the Su-
preme Government of India are confined exclusively to the
legislative department of that government.

The appointments to the office of the Governor General
of India, to that of the Governor of each of the Presidencies
of India, to that of the Commander-in-Chief of India, to
that of the other Commanders-in-Chief, and to that of the
legislative Member of the Supreme Government, are neither
of them valid or complete until approved of by the Crown.

|g4 POWERS OF THE COURT OF DIRECTORS.

This provision of the British legislature supplies another
link in the chain by which the destinies of India are bound
up with those of, the whole English Empire. The Court is
necessarily compelled, through the risk of rejection, to select
persons to fill these high political stations whose principles
of government, and whose qualifications, are satisfactory
to those who administer the general affairs of the English
Government. These ministers of the Crown can, themselves,
hold their authority no longer than while their own measures
are satisfactory to the British Parliament, as being condu-
cive to the national strength and prosperity. And thus is
secured, as far as human designs can perhaps accomplish, an
union of councils and of policy through all gradations of au-
thority, from the supreme organ of the state down to the
humblest official entrusted with a share of political power.

The Court of Directors, can, at their own discretion,
and without assigning any other cause than such as they
may see fit to specify remove from their offices either the
Governor General, or any Governor, or Commander-in-Chief,
or Member of Council ; and in like manner may suspend, or
dismiss altogether, from their service any of their Civil or
Military Servants. There is, however, one case of exception
to this power of removal provided by the last Charter Act
of 1833 — which is, that when, upon any vacancy of any
office in the appointment of the Court, that Court shall make
default in appointing within the time prefixed by the Act,
(which is two months from the time of the vacancy being
notified to the Court) and the Crown shall consequently, ac-
cording to the course by that act detailed, make the appoint-
ment to any such vacant office, then the Court shall not have
the right of removing the party so appointed, not by them-
selves, but by the Crown, and the power of removal of this
party shall be solely in the Crown.

The exclusive power of this Court to appoint all persons

rOWERS OF THE COURT OF DIRECTORS. |g^

who are to be engaged in the civil administration of the
Government of India, is open to serious objections. As my
object is to explain, and not merely to set forth, the consti-
tution and quality of the Company and of its system of go-
vernment, I shall proceed to examine and comment upon
these objections.

So long as the Company pursued purely, or mainly, their
objects of trade, it was no proper concern of the rest of the
public at large, whom the organs of the Company's Govern-
ment employed as the servants to superintend or manage
their affairs. Such appointments necessarily fell to the private
patronage of those members of the Company, to whom
were entrusted the Company's private interests ; and there
was a sufficient security in the common interests of all that
such a patronage would be employed to the best advantage
of all.

But, when the Company no longer had the care of any
private interests — when their trade was totally abandoned,
and the political government of the country, and the pubhc
concerns of the people were their sole occupation ; — the case
become very different. It must be obvious that the inter-
ests of the whole nation were those alone to be considered,
as well in the system of making appointments, a« in every
other mode of exercising their functions — and that in the
appointment to all public offices the just and most efficient
administration of the government should be exclusively had
in view. In the system, however, of appointing individual*
to the Civil Service the private patron acre and interests of
certain members of the Company is had in view, as well as
tho^e of the nation at large— and it remains to enquire
whether that nystetn does not operate prejudicially to the
government of the country.

The original appointments to the Service are given to

Jgg POWERS OF THE COURT OF DIRECTORS.

youths between the ages of 16 and 21. The qualities which
will eventually characterize a person's manhood cannot be
ascertained with much accuracy at that period of life,
though existing abilities to a certain extent may be pro-
nounced upon. But, whatever the Civil Servant may after-
wards prove, in point of capacity, his qualification to be
employed in the administration of the Indian Government
has been definitively settled. Unless absolutely deficient in
intellect, he can hardly be rejected from employment at any
period of his after life — but if the greatest genius, in the full
strength of manhood, should be a candidate for employment,
he could not be admitted if he had not originally been ap-
pointed to the Service in his youth ; and the other must be
placed in office in preference.

The Court require, before granting an appointment to the
Service, that the probationer should pass through a certain
course of education, or at least evince his acquirements by
passing successfully through a scholastic examination. The
scale of competency is, however, not beyond what a youth of
ordinary intellects, with ordinary exertion, by the age of 18
may attain. As no one can be a candidate but such as are
nominated by the Court, no amount of talents or attainments
could obtain for their possessor the liberty of devoting them
to the service of the Company, without such nomination,
The Court secures the Government of India against the ab-
solute incompetency of the Civil Servant at the time of his
appointment ; but their objects of private patronage would
be interfered with, if they made provisions to secure to
their service the most competent servants that could be
obtained, in preference to those nominated by themselves —
and, therefore, no such provisions are made. Indeed, it
may be said that to some degree this power of patronage
operates to the preference of a comparatively inferior no-
minee. For, if a nomination be secured to any party, and
he can give it to one of several whom he desires to

POWERS OF THE COURT OF DIRECTORS. Jg<y

advance in the world, he might with reason propose to the
ablest youth to make his way in some ordinary occupation
or profession in which he was likely to gajn distinction ;
and he might reasonably give the appointment to the Civil
Service to another, who, though not incompetent to that
employment, might have less chance from his capacity
to succeed in any other.

If these were all the objections to the system of appoint-
ment to the Civil Service, there might appear scarcely a
sufficient inducement to notice them; for it must be allow-
ed that, out of so large a number of well educated youths,
a considerable supply is made of talents for the exigencies
of the Indian Governments. But these are not the only
objections. Those who thus enter the service are usually
such in whose progress their patrons take a personal inter-
est. They come out with an acknowledged claim to be,
not only put in some office of emolument, but to be ad-
vanced according to their seniority to the higher and
more important offices in the administration. They are
presumed to be provided for duiing life with an am-
ple income, and also with the means, by a prudent
course of management, of realizing a competent, or perhaps
a large, fortune. The Governments, of India would, in
justice, manifest much caution in exercising a preference
of one servant over another on the mere score of superior
abilities — they would be still more cautious in rejecting
from important employment any party on the ground of
absolute incompetency. The total exclusion from any lu-
crative employment, merely on the ground of absolute defi-
ciency of intellect, or of industry, or of acquirements, is a
circumstance almost unheard of. The raising to high office
of a junior, altogether out of his class, and over the heads
of a large proportion of his seniors, on account of eminent-
ly superior qualifications for the public service, is equally
unknown. Such measures as these would be universally consi-

188

POWERS OF THE COURT OF DIRECTORS.

dered, as well by the body of the Civil Servants, as by the
Court itself, to savour of injustice. The Governments of
India cannot direct an unlimited discretion towards select-
ing those who are to administer the chief affairs of the
state, according to the test of their superior ability to fill
their posts for the public benefit. Their choice must be
chiefly influenced, if not guided, by a deference to the pri-
vate interests, and to the claims hy seniority, of individuals.
Ihey can exercise some discretion in excluding the incom-
petent, but very little in promoting the most meritorious.

It may be justly apprehended that the effect of this sys-
tem is to mortify emulation, in proportion as it diminishes
hope. The aim of a virtuous and elevated mind is, riot the
mere attainment of a high station, but the attainment of
it through pre-eminent qualifications. The possession of
a distinguished office is chiefly valuable to a man of supe-
rior talents and honorable principles, as affording him
the means of performing some conspicuous public
services. But such qualifications can only be acquired,
and such services can only be rendered, by laborious
exertion — and the only incitement to exertion is the
just expectation of reward. In proportion, therefore, as the
system of advancement in the Civil Service holds out equal
expectations to the negligent, the ignorant, and the weak-
minded, and to the able and industrious, must it be reason-
ably expected that there will be a deficiency of that exertion
on which high qualifications for public duties depend. In
that proportion has it a tendency to lower the level of the
Civil Service, and reduce all its members to that same level.
As far as birth, and manners, liberal education, and the pre-
valence of honorable principles can serve to raise that level,
it must be allowed that it is a high one. The majority of
its members, appealing to such well founded credit, and also
to the exalted merits of several among them whose abilities
and public virtues have gained them an illustrious name in

POWERS OF THE COURT OF DIRECTORS. Jgg

the history of tin's country, will probably deny the justice
of these remarks, or disregard them. Those, however, vvho
feel a consciousness of superior talents — who turn with a
noble ambition for the enlarged means of serving the inter-
ests of their country — and who toil to attain eminence by
improving those qualities by which they may adorn it—such
men will regret that they can only advance with the
throng ; they will be sensible that the true dignity and re-
putation of their service is impaired by the obstacles which
oppose the rise of its most meritorious members ; and they
will scarce think justice is duly observed towards the people
in neglecting the very best means of securing an efficient ad-
ministration of their government. They will reflect with
pride on that character for integrity, and general talent, which
has been justly earned by the body to which they belong ;
but they will not mistake these merits for those of the most
exalted quality which can be displayed in the government
of a vast Kmpire. They will appreciate the excellencies of
those of their body, who by their conspicuous public services
have done honor to the first offices of the state; but they
will distinguish between those services which may have been
accomplished in spite of a^aulty system, and the merits of
the system itself.

If no other consideration is likely to lead, ere long, to
some change in the mode of selection to civil employments,
the growing intelligence and qualification for civil duties
of the Native community must necessarily produce it.
Hitherto this question has attracted little concern amongst
them ; and, however important in a general and political
point of view, it has been one of little moment as respects
their immediate individual interests. Until the Empire of
India was consolidated, and its plan of government thorough-
ly brought into operation, and (irmly settled, it would have
been not only useless, but disastrous, to have attempted these
great and beneficial objects through the Natives themselves,

190

POWERS OF THE COURT OF DIRECTORS.

to whom the domination of the English was new, and by
whom their principles of government were scarcely in any
degree understood. But the condition and the feelings of
the Native people have greatly altered. As internal tran-
quillity, the security of possessions, social intercourse, and
useful knowledge has increased— so has advanced the attach-
ment of the. people to the British rule, and their natural and
laudable desire to share in the honors, as well as the labours,
of public employment. These are sentiments which must
be respected. These are wishes which cannot be disap-
pointed. The access of Natives to power and office is ac-
knowledged to be just on principle, and expedient upon
sound policy. In the spirit of these generous views the
authorities, both in England and in India, are forward in
holding out these encouraging prospects to the Native com-
munity. The author of these pages contributes his humble
labours to promote so great and so just a national cause. For
it must ever be borne in mind that it is by such intellectual
exertion as that which engages the Native reader in his
present task — it is by the extent and quality of his inform-
ation, as well as by his ability, his incorrupt integrity,
and his love of truth — that the Native candidate must jus-
tify his claim for public employment. But, when qualifica-
tions and virtues such as these shall mark his character
and pretensions, I know not the office, however eminent for
honor, and however important for usefulness, which may
not (as I earnestly hope it will) be open to Native ambition.

Before quitting this examination of the powers of the
Court of Directors, I would desire to advert to one other
particular, which is rather among the duties than the powers
of that Court : namely, that of receiving and pronouncing
upon petitions. All persons, of whatever rank or condition,
living under their Government are at liberty to address
themselves directly to the Court itself upon any subject
within that Court's authority to redress. It is, however,

POWERS OF THE COURT OF DIRECTORS. 191

a rule observed by that Court to require that every such
petition stating any grievance or cause of complaint should
be addressed to them through the Government of the Pre-
sidency. The reason of this is, that the Government may
have an opportunity, before the consideration of the Court
is given to the subject, of making all expedient inquiry on
the spot into the truth and grounds of the statement made,
and of affording whatever explanation the case may appear
to call for. Without such information from the Govern-
ment, or some competent authority, it must be obvious that
no reliance can safely be placed on any representation from
an interested party. It is another rule that the Court never
interferes in matters upon which the ordinary tribunals of
justice can afford redress. The propriety of this rule
is clear. These tribunals are expressly appointed for
the purposes of deciding on all rights claimed, or crimes
charged. They are clothed with all necessary powers —
and their course of investigation is expressly regulated with
view to the attainment of truth, through a fair hearing of both
sides. The interference of any other authority would be
an arbitrary violation of the laws of the country, and >the
substitution of a discretionary and inadequate trial of
rights or of wrongs, for that course of trial which has been
appointed by law for no other reason than because it ap-
pears to be the best. But, still, there are many wrongs and
oppressions which are beyond the reach of the laws; there
are modes of doing injustice by evading the law ; and there
are injuries which powerful men are able to inflict in defi-
ance of the law. It is of importance, therefore, that this
door for relief should be widely opened ; and that, from the
highest political magistrate to the lowest, every person in
authority should be aware that he is responsible for every
act of his power, even to the meanest individual who should
be aggrieved by it.

SECTION IV.

Of the Board of Control.

I am now to advert to (hat body, whose office is appro-
priately designated by its title, namely, the Board of Con-
trol. I will first shew how it is constituted, and will then
notice its functions.

The authority of this Board was first created by a Statute
passed in the year 1784. It took its rise out of long and
violent discussions in the British Parliament on the whole
conduct of the Company's Government. A strong dispo-
sition prevailed amongst a powerful party in the legislature
to new-model the system of the Indian Government alto-
gether, and to repose the administration of it in some new
constituted body. But, although that proposal was after
much contest rejected, yet a very large majority, both in
the general Court of Proprietors and in the Parliament,
ultimately concurred in the expediency of some measure
by which all the governing functionaries of tha Company
might be made more responsible to superior authority, by
which their proceedings might be checked and superintend-
ed, and by which the administration of the Indian portion
of the British Empire might be more effectually united with,
and made dependent upon, the supreme sovereign povver of
the state.

Accordingly, this Board, with its important duties, and
composed of some of the highest officers engaged in conduct-
ing the executive department of the English Government,
was appointed. Its powers were further regulaled by a Char-
ter Act which passed in 1793. Additional powers were de-

OF THE BOARD OF CONTROL. |93

legated by the subsequent Charter Act of 1813: and the
constitution and functions of the Board were finally adjust-
ed and settled by the last Charter Act bf 1833. The
President of this Board, is always, in consideration of his
high office, selected by the Crown as one of those Ministers
of state, to whose management (as far as depends upon the
executive Government of England) the administration of
all the affairs of the British Empire is entrusted. He receives
a salary for the performance of his duties. The other mem-
bers of the Board are — the Prime Minister, the Minister of
the Finances, and most of the other Ministers of the Crown,
(as standing members by virtue of their offices as such
Ministers) together with such other members as the Crown
may think tit to appoint. None of these latter members re-
ceive any salary.

Every member, before entering on the duties of his office,
must take the following oath :

He " faithfully promises and swears that, as a Commis-
" sioner or member of the Board for the affairs of India, he
" will give his best advice and assistance for the good go-
" vernment of the British possessions in India, and the due
" administration of the revenues of the same, according to
11 law ; and will execute the several powers and trusts re-
" posed in him according to the best of his skill and judg-
ement, without favor or affection, prejudice or malice, to
" any person whatever."

The meeting of any two or more members constitutes a
Board qualified to act/ The President, and in his absence
the member next in the or ler of nomination in the list of
the commissioners who happens to be present, is entitled to
a casting vote, in all cases of equal divisions. The signa-
ture of one of their Secretaries to their proceedings gives
them formal validity.

]94 OF THE BOARD OF CONTROL.

The functions of this Board are, generally, " to superin-
" tend, direct, and control, all acts, operations, and con-
" cerns of the Company, which in any manner relate to, or
" concern, the Government or Revenues of the territories
" of India." With a view to these comprehensive objects
the Board may have access to all records and papers of the
Company, and can call for all requisite statements and in-
formation. The general Court of Proprietors are likewise
required to submit all their proceedings; and the Court of
Directors are required, as we have seen, to lay before the
Board all advices and dispatches which they receive from
India, and all orders and instructions which they propose to
send out to India (except such as belong to a class, which
the Board may have exempted from such previous reference)
relating to its Government or Revenues. The Board are
thereupon empowered, within two months, to approve or
disapprove of any orders or dispatches proposed to be sent
out, or to revise or alter them. In case of any such altera-
tions, the Board must state in writing their reasons at large
for such alterations with a view to the Court of Director's
making (within fourteen days) such representations as they
think fit with respect to them. After considering these re-
presentations (if any shall be made) the Board's decision is to
be final. The Board may, further, call upon the Court to
frame and transmit to them instructions for dispatches to
be sent to India on any subject connected with its Govern-
ment or Revenues, and if the Court shall neglect for four-
teen days to forward to the Board for their consideration
such dispatches to be sent out, the Board may itself frame
the dispatches and instructions, and require them to be sent
out ; unless, upon any representations of the Court, the Board
such think fit to alter them. The Board may also send
any instructions or orders connected with the making war
or peace, or with negociations with foreign Powers or Native
Princes, and which they may consider to require secrecy,
to the Secret Committee of the Court ; and those dis-

OF THE BOARD OF CONTROL,

195

patches are to be forwarded at once by that Committee,
without any disclosure in any quarter.

And, lastly, this Board has authority to disallow, and
cause to be repealed, all laws made by the supreme Go-
vernment of India ; and in like manner to disallow of any of
those general rules which the Court of Directors are re-
quired to frame, for the course of procedure by the supreme
Government in the exercise of its powers, and in promul-
gating the laws it may pass.

The experience of fifty years has so manifested the
wisdom wiih which the establishment of this controlling
authority was planned, and the advantages which have re-
sulted through its means, that the expediency of its conti-
nuance for twenty years longer, as provided by the last
Charter Act, seems to have been admitted by common
consent. It is impossible to point out under any civilized
Government, or perhaps to devise, an institution more
calculated to ensure justice and consistency in all political
measures, and the protection of the people from every
species of oppression. The Board is so constituted as that
wilh a'l its extensive powers, as well in mere matters of
detail, as in concerns of national moment, it acts never-
theless under constant and effectual responsibility. It acts
in immediate communication with the whole body of the
Queen's Ministers; and all its proceedings, in common with
their'?, are under the continual review and superintendence
of the British Parliament. The President and Members
of it are not appointed for life, and their possession of
office depends, not only on the quality of their own in-
dividual conduct in office, but on that of the general policy
of the Ministry with whom they are united. They have
no certain private interest to serve ; they have no perma-
nency of power to render them reckless. Both interest and
power are dependant on the honor of their reputation, and

196 0F TIIE BOARD OF CONTROL.

the efficiency of their talents. Subject, however, to res-
ponsibilities like these, their authority over all persons
connected with the Indian Governments and over all acts
and proceedings, done, or proposed in the administration
of them, is complete and supreme. They can command
the full knowledge of every thing : they can displace all
Indian functionaries, from the Governor General himself
to the humblest political servant of the Comoany : they
can revise, change, and (acting through the Court of Di-
rectors) even direct, every measure in the civil, military,
or financial departments of the Indian state. As every
thing connected with these objects can be done by them,
so can nothing be done without them. Still, with all
these vast powers, necessary for the unobstructed discharge
of its great and innumerable duties, the Board is not an
active, but strictly a superintending and controlling body.
It cannot correspond directly with the functionaries and
offices engaged in carrying on the administration of the
Indian Governments. Its organization is not calculated for
transacting the extensive business entrusted to the ordi-
nary management of the Court. Its occupation is to
examine into every proceeding, and to interfere only as
occasion may seem to demand. Limited as the practical ex-
ercise of its functions is, its powers are unbounded as re-
gards the accomplishment of its appropriate duties— the
checking that which is wrong, the preserving that which is
right, and the advancing that which is expedient.

DISCOURSE V.

Of the Governments in India.

RELIMIKAR Y Observations on the subject of this
Discourse. History of the Formation and course of the
English Government in India previous to the first regu-
lating Act of 1773. Of the Progress of the English Go-
vernments in India, from the year 1773 until the passing
of the last Charter Act of 1833. Of the manner in which
the Governments of India are constituted, and of what
members these Governments are composed. Of the Method
and course in which the Governments of India, exercise
their Functions. Of the Powers exercised by the Govern-
ments of India : and, first, of the Superintending and
Controlling poivers of the Supreme Government. Of
the History and nature of the Legislative powers of the
Supreme Government. Of other peculiar powers of the
Supreme Government. Of the poivers exercised by the
Subordinate Governments of India. Reflections on the
quality of the System of Government in India ; and notices
of some defects.

DISCOURSE V.

Of the Governments in India.

SECTION I.

Preliminary Observations on the subject of this

Discourse.

O subject of the English Empire, whether Native or
British born, who is settled in India, can be altogether
indifferent to the nature and quality of the Government
under which he lives — none but those of the most abject
condition can rest content in utter ignorance of its scheme
— none who aim at a superior station in life, to be useful in
the state, and to reap the fruits of a liberal education, can
rationally indulge such hopes, without an acquaintance with
its course and plan, even in its details.

It might be expected, therefore, that a discourse, which
apparently professes to open briefly anil clearly to the mind
of a Native, or an unlearned reader, an exposition of the
political plan of power according to which the Govern-
ments in India are conducted, would prove an attractive
source of interesting in formation to the general body of the
Indian public, and be consulted with avidity by all ranks
of the people to whom books have become the means of
knowledge. And, if a just comprehension of the frame and
scheme of the Indian Governments, which has been built
up under the counsels of a succession of the ablest men

200 PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON THIS DISCOURSE.

who have ever engaged in the weighty task of forming and
of ruling a state, and of men who under the heaviest res-
ponsibility to tqeir countrymen guided themselves by those
principles of government which best conduce to the per-
manent prosperity of the people — if a just comprehension
of the scheme of the Indian Governments, thus construct-
ed, could be imparted in a few plain words, suited to the
general capacity of even the humbler class of readers,
there could scarcely be a national benefit in the power of an
individual to perform which could be so worthy of his am-
bition. It might serve to diffuse a spirit of attachment to
a system of rule which has beyond all others promoted the
well- being of the people of this land, and to excite a com-
mon interest in its preservation. It might serve at least
to protect them from those discontents which so often
spring from erroneous views of a country's political con-
dition, and are so often founded on the assertion of public
grievances which have never in fact existed. For those
who are loudest in upbraiding their Government and its
measures are not always the most competent to expose
what is wrong. These reproaches more commonly flow
from such as are unwilling to learn, and incapable to teach.
Those, who from accurate inquiry and sound knowledge are
induced to cast blame on real evils, are generally as remark-
able for their moderation, as for their firmness and earn-
estness of purpose. They desire amendment rather than
overthrow, and amelioration rather than change.

But an exposition of the system and plan upon which
the local Governments of India are framed are beyond the
scope of a few plain words, or of a brief popular discourse.
The student who would gain a competent acquaintance with
the mighty machinery, whereby the right's, the peace, and
the security of a hundred millions of subjects are maintain-
ed in regulated order, must bring to the inquiry a greater
store of knowledge than a few hours reading can supply.

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON THIS DISCOURSE. 201

For— not to mention that course of education through
which alone the meaning and application of the appropriate
terms used in discussions of this sort can, be learnt— he
who would rightly comprehend the nature of the Indian
Governments, and judge of their character, must have
directed his reflective attention to the circumstances under
which they arose, and to the principles on which they
are founded. He should know something of the origin
and objects of political government ; he should have
acquired some information of the former history and
condition of this country ; he should have traced and
understood the progress of the British power ; he should
have gained some conception of that constitutional form
of tbe British Government with which the system and
course of the Indian Governments are bound up ; and,
lastly, he should have inquired in what way the peculiar
structure of these Governments has conformed to the ne-
cessity of event*, and the state of the Indian community.

These are the considerations which have induced me to
prepare the reader of this present discourse by others which
are preliminary to that which may probably be his more
immediate concern : nor can I commend the impatience of
that reader who, instead of regarding this and my previous
discourses as one consistent whole, shall attempt, as it were,
to snatch from the few ensuing pages some vague and general
notion of the plan and character of the Governments in India,
without the requisite power of discrimination, and without a
just understanding even of the language and expressions
employed. The knowledge, indeed, of things as they exist,
and of effects as they appear, is more or less needful, and
can never be useless : as he who knows what is the shape
and structure of the earth, or the course of the planets and
the system of the universe, or has become proficient in any
of the arts of life, will have furnished bis mind with some-
thing that may be necessary to him in his occupations, or

202 PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON THIS DISCOURSE.

somewhat that may be a source of pleasure, as well in his
private reflections as in his intercourse with society. But
such knowledge, as it is imperfect in itself, so is it, compara-
tively, unfruitful in improvement. The mind may still he left
involved in perplexities, errors, and superstitions. That
knowledge only is certain or complete which explains effects
by their causes, measures by their reasons, and appearances
by their origin : as he can know little of the astronomical
system of the world, who knows not by what power the pla-
nets move in their courses, and in what way light and dark-
ness, cold and heat, revisit the earth.

And thus, also, a thorough knowledge of the political
constitution of the Government in India is not to be asquir-
ed by merely ascertaining who are the local ruling authori-
ties, under what legislative regulations they are invested
with their powers, and by what course they exercise their
functions. He who would gain a certain and complete
knowledge of them must inquire into the history, the origin,
the objects, and the principles of these institutions — com-
paring them with such as they have superseded, and exa-
mining them by their conformity to those general principles
of government which tend most to the welfare of a nation.
It is such knowledge alone that can give ability to judge of
the merits or demerits of the existing system of govern-
ment, or a capacity to serve the interests of the state in
upholding that which is right, amending that which is
faulty, and improving that which is defective.

Any endeavour to spread political instruction of this
quality among the bulk of the people , must be vain. But
it is not only a desirable, and a feasible, but a most essential
object that it should be disseminated amongst those classes
who have leisure and ambition to attain a liberal education,
and out of whom are to be chosen such as aspire to fill of-
fices and stations in the service of their country. It is

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON THIS DISCOURSE.

203

from the influence, and talents, and information of such as
these that the masses of the population must form their
opinions ; and, in proportion to the correctness and accura-
cy of political knowledge among the influential orders, is the
probability of national peace. For civil distractions grow not
so much out of public grievances as out of the misrepresenta-
tions of the ignorant and uninformed : neither is there a
greater security against the perversions of designing men
than in the sound intelligence of those whose common
interest it is to oppose them.

SECTION II.

History of the Formation and course of the English
Government in India previous to the first regulating

Act of 1773.

In tracing the history of that scheme of political power
which, in the result, has heen framed for the local Go-
vernment of India, the reader will have gathered some
information from the two last discourses which it is im-
possible to avoid partially repeating.

During the first sixty years of the existence of the East
India Company, after their incorporation by the Charter
of Queen Elizabeth, dated in the year 1600, they exercised
no authority which could be properly denominated a Govern-
ment, either in England or at any of their settlements
formed in India. By that Charter, and another granted by
King James 1st, in 1609, to a similar purport, they were in-
vested with such powers and privileges as have been already
noticed as characteristic of corporations / and they were
also empowered to make regulations and by-laws, agreeable
to the laws of England, " for their good government," and
to impose punishments by fine and imprisonment on offenders
against those by-laws. There is reason to believe that
an authority of this indefinite nature, expressed in such
general terms, was abused contrary to law ; especially by
those at a distance. But, as those Charters invested not
the Company, or any of their servants, with the power of
administering justice, appointing Judges, or holding Courts,
we can only consider these powers of regulating, and of in-
flicting punishment, as the means of arranging among

FORMATION AND EARLIEST COURSE OF THE GOVERNMENT. 205

themselves the course by which they should pursue the
object of their institution, namely, their trade — under the
same obligation, nevertheless, which bound all other sub-
jects, ofappealing to the ordinary tribunals of justice to
enforce the observance of those arrangements by ali who
were members of the Company.

The peculiar nature of the settlements which the Com-
pany gradually formed in India — the extent of territories
permanently occupied, and of the population inhabiting them,
both British and Native, all of whom were their own imme-
diate servants — and the distance of these settlements from
the mother-country, rendered necessary the establishment of
some political government, directed to other objects than the
mere management of commercial affairs. The warlike con-
tests both by sea and land, not only with the Portuguese and
the Dutch, but also with the Native powers, had led to the
Company's raising and maintaining INI ilitary bodies, and to
the erection of Forts. And, although their settlements
were originally founded for the mere purpose of facilitating
their means of trade, and for the convenient residence of
their commercial servants ; and, although these settlements
were properly held under the laws and government of those
Native powers by whom they were originally granted — not
as the colonial establishments of an independent people
— but as the private property of sojourners owing obedience
to the supreme authority of the rulers in whose territories
they were situate — yet, this position gradually ceased to be
recognized, practically, by the Company and their servants.
In claiming to be governed by their own laws, and to set up
tribunals of their own for settling disputed rights, and punish-
ing crimes — in supporting the treaties and right which had
been granted to them by force of arms— in fortifying them-
Selves within their territories — they acted in all respects as
an independent nation. The exercise of such authorities as
these is quite inconsistent with the condition of subjects of
any state which should permit it.

206 FORMATION AND EARLIEST COURSE OF THE GOVERNMENT.

But, although such was the position which had
been assumed by the Company and their servants in
India, it was not until the year 1661, that these territories
were formally treated by the Supreme Government of
England as if they had become a component part of the
British Empire, and that some course of rule was provided
for the government of the people residing therein, as though
they were a portion of the subjects of the British Crown. In
that year the Company were authorized, by a Charter of
King Charles 2d, to appoint Governors to govern the Plan-
tations, Forts, and Factories which they had established in
India. These Governors, with their Council, were empow-
ered to exercise both civil and criminal jurisdiction^ ac-
cording to the laws of England. They were further
empowered to fortify any places within their limits of trade ;
to raise military and naval forces ; and to make war a?id
peace with surrounding nations. By a subsequent Charter,
granted by the same King in 1683, and by another granted
by King James 2d, in 1686, the Company were authorized
to erect Courts of Justice, and to appoint a person leaned in
the civil law and two merchants to be judges of them ; and
also to appoint Courts for the trial of offences committed
at sea.

Such powers as these comprise all the essential functions
of a political government. The Charters conferring them
do not, however, attempt to provide any specific plan, or
lay down any detailed rules, for the guidance of those in
authority who were to exercise these powers. The very
general, comprehensive, and indefinite language of them,
necessarily, therefore, gave loose to much arbitrary discre-
tion, both as regards the extent of these functions of go-
vernment, and as regards the mode of administering them.
In particular, no express sanction was given for passing laws ;
although at the same time the exercise of legislative au-
thority could not be considered as clearly prohibited. If any

FORMATION AND EARLIEST COURSE OF THE GOVERNMENT. OQ-r

such legislative power was granted, it would be difficult to
determine what were to be its limits — and no course of draw-
ing up or enacting laws was provided. Again j^these Charters
are by no means clear, as regards the parties icho are to be
subject to their civil and criminal jurisdiction — though they
would seem to imply that all persons in the service of the
Company, or inhabiting their settlements, were to become
so. Hut, if this jurisdiction was to be exercised overall
such, indiscriminately, and according to the laics of Eng-
land — there was an evident injustice in such a course, as
applied to the Natives, and an evident impossibility of
making all the laws of England operative in these foreign
settlements, as respects the English themselves. By the
general rules of the English law the Natives ought to be
governed according to their own ancient laws, until altered
by the Supreme Government under which they became
subjected : and, in foreign countries, Englishmen ought to
be ruled only by such laws as were applicable to their
new condition. But it is impossible to decide, upon refer-
ence to these Charters, how far such general rules of the
Epglish law were, or were not, intended to be annul! ."d by
them. Besides this, the Governors appointed for those
settlements, and those appointed to administer justices with-
in them (although provision had been made by the two last
Charters for one of the Judges to be learned in the civil
law) were men altogether unlearned in the laws of England,
if they were not in truth totally ignorant of them. We
cannot wonder therefore, that the history of the proceed-
ings of these, local governments should proclaim very great
abuses in the exercise of the authority delegated — and great
deviations from the just laws of England. Audit may be
accounted for, although it cannot be defended, (hat one of
the Governors of -the Company in England should have
written out to a Governor whom he had by his influence ap-
pointed over Bombay, '•' that, he expected his orders were to
" be his rules of government, and not the laws of England."

208 FORMATION AND EARLIEST COURSE OF THE GOVERNMENT.

In these progressive steps towards political power and
the foundation of various colonies in India, the Company,
it will be recollected, began by establishing various small
factories, consisting of warehouses for their goods and re-
sidences for their servants, which factories were subsequent-
ly converted into fortified towns and enlarged by the grant of
adjacent territory. The first factory established was that of
Surat in 1612. Over this settlement was placed, under the
genera] authority granted to the Company by the Charter of
Elizabeth a President, and certain persons to assist him
with their advice. This body was denominated, accordingly,
the President and Council ; and the settlement at which
they assembled came to be termed the Presidency, as soon as
other factories were founded and placed under their control.
Under the Presidency of Surat were placed all the other
factories as they were gradually formed in the Western part
of India— namely, Cainbay, Ahmedabad, Gogo, and Calicut.
A factory, which soon after 1600 had been established on
the Island of Java, subsequently in 1625 formed a subordi-
nate factory at Masulipatam, and afterwards in 1638 another
at Madras ; where a Fort was immediately built under the
name of Fort St. George. But, in 1653, as well Masulipa-
tam, as another factory at Hooghly, were placed under the
Government of a separate President and Council at Fort
St. George, which accordingly became the second Presi-
dency constituted in India.

After the Island of Bombay was granted to the Com-
pany by Charles 2d in 1668, the Presidency of Surat was
abolished, and transferred to Bombay. This city was in
1687, declared by the Company to be the chief seat of
Government in India : all the settlements in the country,
including the Presidency of Fort St. George, the factories
already mentioned in the Western portion of India, and the
subsequently acquired factories in Bengal, of Pipley, Cossim-
bazar, and Balasore, and of Vizagapatam, and Fort St. David,

PORMATION AND EARLIEST COURSE OF THE GOVERNMENT. 209

on the Coromandel Coast, being made subordinate to the
President and Council of Bombay. This general and con-
trolling authority of the Presidency of Bomb'ay does not,
however, appear to have continued long to be actually ex-
ercised. In 1699, the Company obtained the towns of
Calcutta (where a Fort called Fort William was built) and
Govindpore; and in 17 1.5, in consequence of the grants of
many commercial privileges, and of a considerable district
round Calcutta, by the Mogul Fmperor, that city was erect-
ed into a third independent Presidency under the name of
the Presidency of Fort William, having government over
all the Company's possessions in Bengal. From this period
the three Presidencies of Bombay, Fort St. George, and
Fort William conducted their course of government for
many years independently of each other, although in mutual
communication ; until, in the progress of events, the Go-
vernment of Bengal, as will hereafter be noticed, became
vested with a general and controlling power over the other
Presidencies, as well as with its own independent authority
over the immediate Presidency of Bengal itself.

In thus tracing the history of the establishment of the
three Governments of India at the three Presidencies of
Bombay, Madias, and Calcutta, we find that, from the year
1G00 to 1653, there existed but one Government and Pre-
sidency in India, which was that of Surat ; and that its only
political powers were derived from the general terms of the
Charter of Queen Elizabeth. After the foundation of the
Government and Presidency of Madras in 16.53, these two
Presidencies still governed the districts and factorie's
placed under the respective control by virtue of the same
Charter until 16(51, when their political powers were in-
creased by the Charter of Charles 2nd. Under these Charters,
and those subsequently granted in 16^3 and 1686, these two
Presidencies (that of Surat having in the mean time been
transferred to Bombay) continued to conduct their govern-

210 FORMATION AND EARLIEST COURSE OF THE GOVERNMENT.

ment until the establishment of the Government and Pre-
sidency of Calcutta in 1715. Previous to the foundation of
this last Presidency another Charter had been granted in
1608 to a new rival Company, in which Charter was incor-
porated not only similar political powers and privileges, in
greater detail, to those which by the above noticed Charters
had been granted to the original Company, but also some
more particular rules for the conduct of their government
in India. As this new Company, however, did not possess
any territories or settlements in India, the Charter granted
to them had no effect in regard to regulating the Govern-
ments of India, until by the union of the two Companies un-
der this same ("barter, and by the surrender of the old Com-
pany of all its own previous Charters, this last Charter of
1608 was brought into operation. The union was not ef-
fected until the year 1709 : and within six years afterwards
the third Presidency of Calcutta was established. From
the time, therefore, that the union of the two great Com-
panies was thoroughly accomplished, all the functions and
powers of government granted to the united Company came
to be exercised at these three Presidencies — each of them
having its respective subordinate factories — each of them
under the administration of a President and Council— and
all of them directing their proceedings according to the
provisions of the Charter of 1098, and of the Statutes autho-
rizing and confirming those provisions.

The clauses of this Charter of 1698, are for the most part
directed to the formation of the new Company, to the
framing rules for its constitution and self-government, and
to prescribing the course by which functionaries are to be
appointed for conducting its affairs. Indeed it is upon the
bases of this Charter that the functions and authorities of
the Court of Directors and of the Proprietors, as exercised
at this day, are founded. At the same time the Charter de-
legated to the new Company, in a more specific manner

FORMATION AND EARLIEST COURSE OF THE GOVERNMENT. 21 I

than the former Charters had conferred upon the original
Company, the commercial privileges and political powers
with which they were to he vested. It conferred the sole
right of trade. It empowered them to erect and hold and
govern Forts, and appoint Governors over territories. It
authorized them to make War and Peace with surround-
ing countries It conceded the important power of iv.is-
ing Military and Naval forces. But the pot le-

gislation was restricted within definite and narrow limits
— and consisted barely in providing by-laws for regulat-
ing their trade, and the conduct of the Company's servants
and others engaged in it ; which by-laws could only extend
to the infliction of reasonable imprisonments, or fines,
for the breach of them, and were required not to be repug-
nant to the principles of the English laws. The judicial
jut isdiclion to be exercised under this Charter was also made
definite, and greatly restricted. The Courts to be erected
in India were to have jurisdiction only in certain mailers of
minor criminality, and in civil suits connected with trade, or
arising out of injuries and trespasses. And no persons were
contemplated as subject to the jurisdiction of these Courts,
except such as proceeded to India or engaged in trading
thereto, or were members of the Company, or engaged di-
rectly or indirectly in their service.

On the whole, therefore, this Charter must be consi-
dered as limiting and diminishing the political powers ex-
ercised by the original Company, anil as in some degree
tending to subvert that national position of the English in
India, which it was the apparent policy of the former ('bar-
ters to further and uphold. But, it is to be recollected,
that this Charter of 1698 was framed with the view of
establishing a totally new Company, and a new course of
trade. For this new Company was without any territories,
or Forts, or factories in India — and, however necessary
might appear the political powers conferred on it, with a

2]2 FORMATION AND EARLIEST COURSE OP THE GOVERNMENT.

view to their gradually attaining the permanent means of
trade, yet trading, and not colonizing, was the main pur-
pose of incorporating the new Company, and the total
abolition of the old Company was contemplated. It might
be expected, indeed, when the two Companies became unit-
ed, and all the territorial acquisitions became added to the
united capital of both Companies, that the strength and
extent of their political powers would have been increased,
with a view to the permanent maintenance of that national
position which had previously been founded by the original
Company in India. But such a policy seems for the time

to have been abandoned. Trade, and not colonization

and still less conquest— seems to have been again regarded
as the only true and useful object of the English connec-
tion with India. Moreover, the powers and authority exer-
cised and abused under the old Charters would ill endure
the scrutiny of the British Parliament, under whose control
the trade with India now came to be placed. These
reasons may appear sufficient to account for the future
political Government of India having thus become regulat-
ed under the sole and restrictive Charter of 1698, upon
the union of the two Companies being effected, and to
have suggested the surrender by the old Company of those
Charters under which they had advanced so far as a politi-
cal state in India.

Under the provisions of this Charter of 1 60S , the Com-
pany continued to govern their possessions and servants in
India until the year 1773. Various Statutes passed in the
mean while, continuing from time to time all the rights
and powers granted by this Charter. Two Charters for the
better regulation of the course of administering justice
"were also granted by the King; one by George 1st, in 1726,
and another by George 2nd, in 1753. But none of these
Statutes or Charters introduced any essential alterations in
the political powers of the Company, or in their mode of
exercising them. The vast conquests, however, made by

FORMATION AND EARLIEST COURSE OF THE GOVERNMENT. 213

the Company from the year 1749 up to the year 1765, natu-
rally called for the attention and interference of the British
Government. Two temporary Statutes ware accordingly
passed in the years 1767 and 1769, for securing to the
Company the possession and government of the newly
conquered territories. Hut in the year 1773, the first great
regulating Statute was enacted for the .systematic govern-
ment of the British possessions in India.

Up to this period the Governments at each Presidency
consisted of a President and his Council. The members of
the Council to each Government was unlimited ; and they
sometimes amounted to ten, and sometimes to but two.
There was no prescribed course of appointing them ; and
still less was there any regular scheme laid down under
which they should conduct their government. No powers
whatever of legislation had ever been delegated to those
local Governments. There were no Judges expressly ap-
pointed by the King, and properly qualified, to administer
justice in his name among his subjects ; according to the
laws of England ; and as well between the Company itself
and others, as between the various persons living under
their rule. The Dewanny, or the right of collecting the
Revenues of the provinces of Bengal, which had been con-
ferred in 1765 upon the Company by the Mogul Emperor,
were of so uncertain and indefinite a nature, both as regard-
ed political power and judicial authority, that it was impos-
sible to say to what the Dewanny rights extended, or under
what limitations they were bound.

The Governments had no immediate connection with the
King's government in England, nor were the Governors in
India dependant in any manner on the King's authority.
In short the provisions of the early Charters and Statutes,
then in operation, were only adapted for the conduct of
trading concerns, and the regulation of good order at com-
mercial factories established in foreign lands.

SECTION III.

Of the Progress of the English Governments of India,
from the year 1773 until the passing of the last Charter

Act of 1833.

The Act of 1773 was the first to establish a Governor
General and Council over Bengal ; who were also to ex-
ercise a controlling direction over the Governments of the
other two Presidencies. The first members of this Govern-
ment were named in the Act itself — and it was provided
that the succeeding members to be appointed by the Company
(during the next five years) should have the approbation
of the King. It prescribed the course for conducting
their proceedings, and laid down in general terms the ex-
tent of their political and legislative powers. It provides
for the transmission to the King's government in England
copies of all their proceedings. It enabled the King to
graut a new Charter for the administration of justice ; and
prescribed a very ample extent of jurisdiction to be exer-
cised by the new Court, the nature of the law to be ad-
ministered, and the quality of the Judges, as professors of
the English law, who were to preside in it. It further en.
acted many provisions for the personal conduct of the mem-
bers of Government, and of other high functionaries, with a
view to the repression of wrong and misgovernment.

Extensive and beneficial as this Act was, in first provid-
ing a systematic and detailed scheme for the Government
of British India, and the administration of justice therein —
it proved eminently defective when brought into operation.
It happened that the first members of this general govern-
ment differed widely upon the policy to be pursued in pub-

PROGRESS OF THE INDIAN GOVERNMENTS FROM 1773. 215

lie measures. The countries over which they ruled were
not only in an unsettled state ; but, as no regular method of
government had been constituted in them, *and no settled
laws prevailed, it was not easy to say what was legal and
according to order, and what was otherwise — what was
unjust and oppressive, and what was consistent with the
general welfare of the people. This naturally gave rise to
disputes as to the legality, as well as propriety, of the acts
of Government — and such disputes were aggravated by
others which put in question the mode of conducting the
authority and proceedings of the Government, and the re-
lative powers of the Governor and of the different mem-
bers. The Act, which had not been prepared in anticipa-
tion of the rigorous scrutiny of such disputants, nor, indeed,
with any mature investigation of the condition of the coun-
try, could little afford a solution to such difficulties as those.
A still greater embarrassment, however, arose to all regular
and effective government under this Act, from the miscon-
ceptions which prevailed as to the extent of jurisdiction
with which the Court (now first designated the Supreme
Court of Judicature) was invested — and, as the King's
Judges were entirely independent of the local Government,
a collision between those two authorities on such a subject
necessarily produced confusion throughout all its affairs.

Into the distraction of those times, both in the adminis-
tration (if the government and of the law, it is not expedient
in this discourse to enter. It is sufficient to say that they
gave occasion to several remedial Statutes, under which
the Government of British India was better regulated, and
the causes for dissensions gradually removed. In the year
1781, two Acts passed renewing for ten years, and three
year's subsequent notice, all the chartered rights and
privileges heretofore granted to the Company — regulat-
ing the mode of appointing the Governor General and
his Counsellors — defining more specifically their powers

0\Q PROGRESS OF "THE INDIAN GOVERNMENTS FROM P73.

and responsibilities, and exempting their official acts from
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court— increasing their
powers of legislation, with a view to the better admi-
nistration of justice in the Provincial Courts, free from
all interference of the Supreme Court— and regulating
and limiting the judicial authority and mode of proceeding
by the latter Court. In the year 1784, the Statute was enact-
ed which first established the Board of Control : and
by the same Statute various further important provisions
were made for regulating the course of government in India.
The supreme Government, as well as the subordinate Govern-
ments were, each, to consist of a President and three Coun-
sellors ; of whom the President of Bengal was denominated/
as before, the Governor General, and the other Presidents
Governors. One Commander-in-Chief of all the forces in
India was to be appointed, and a subordinate Commander-in-
Chief of the forces of each of the minor Presidencies — and
these Commanders-in-Chief (when appointed to be members
in Council also) were to rank next to the Governor General
and Governors, respectively ; but were never, unless
specially so appointed, to succeed to the actual government
as Governor General or Governor. Other provisions of
this Statute it will be unnecessary to notice here, as they
were either re-enacted, or modified, or repealed by sub-
sequent Acts to which I shall have occasion to advert.

In the year 1793, the time had nearly arrived when
(upon a three year's notice previously given) the chartered
powers, rights, and privileges of the Company, which, in
the year 1781, had been renewed for ten years and three
year's notice, would expire. It was then resolved by the
British legislature to renew all these rights, and delegate
the Government of India to the Company for the period of
twenty years. Upon this occasion the first of those
comprehensive acts passed, which from the extended
duration of the grant, and the specific detail of the

PROGRESS OF THE INDIAN GOVERNMENTS FROM 1773. 217

provisions for the constitution of the Company itself, and for
the scheme of their Government in India, came to be deno-
minated the Charter Acts for India. This Act of 1793 is
formed upon a review of all the royal Charters and Statutes
which had passed from time to time — and, adopting or modi-
fying almost the whole of them, it embodied within itself such
an exposition of all the Company's rights, powers, and
privileges, and of the system upon which the local Govern-
ments were to be conducted, as left but little to be searched
out by references to the older enactments.

Under this first Charter act, which rather consolidated
and amended the many previous Statutes for the Govern-
ment of India, than introduced any essential change in
its plan, the country continued to be governed until the
year 1813, when it was made to expire. In the mean
while, however, other Statutes passed directed to some
further improvements in its administration, without al-
tering its general scheme. In particular, the mode of ad-
ministering justice was further regulated, and the constitu-
tion and judicial powers of the Courts of Justice at Madras
and Bombay were enlarged ; and the former was in 1799,
made a Supreme Court with similar jurisdiction to that
of the Supreme Court at Calcutta. The legislative powers,
also, which had previously been confined to the Supreme
Government, were extended to the subordinate Governments
of the minor Presidencies. But, in 1813, the second great
Charter act passed granting all existing rights, powers,
and privileges to the Company for a further term of twenty
years , and occasion was again taken to modify the course
of government in some respects, though without introduc-
ing any very essential alterations. From that period until
the passing of the last Charter act of 1833, which has de-
legated the administration of India to the Company for
another term of twenty years, the political powers of the

218 PROGRESS OF THE INDIAN GOVERNMENTS FROM 1775.

local Governments were exercised with scarce any variation
whatever, according to the rules prescribed in the two
Charter acts of 1793 and 1813, and in those other less
comprehensive Statutes whose provisions were not modified,
or repealed by, or incorporated in these two more general
Acts.

This last Charter act of 1833 has introduced several very
important modifications in the scheme and course of the
Governments in India— at the same time it has left the ge-
neral plan of Government, as regulated by the two former
Charter acts and several other Statutes, and also a
great number of the specific provisions of all those Statutes,
in full operation. The plan and course of the- Indian
Governments has, therefore, to be extracted from an
investigation and exposition of all the existing provisi-
ons enacted bv these various laws. It would certain-
ly be very desirable that all the details of this scheme of
local Government should be consolidated into one well
arranged Statute. The mind necessarily becomes confused
by a reference to so large a mass of various laws, proposed
at distant periods, under every change of political affairs,
by various-minded persons, and often under the influence
of peculiar and temporary circumstances. So many enact-
ments for the self same objects, and often for the purpose
of mere modifications, but occasionally interspersing new
and important provisions, has given rise to numerous repe-
titions — and, what is worse, to many variations in the lan-
guage of clauses where no difference of meaning is to be
surmised. It would be a tedious, and probably an unprofit-
able, task to conduct the Native reader through an examin-
ation of the purport and tendency of these numerous
Statutes, with a view to trace historically the various new
provisions, and subsequent alterations from time to time
made. The chief and most comprehensive of them have
already been noticed for the more accurate guidance of the

PROGRESS OF THE INDIAN GOVERNMENTS FROM 1773. £19

learned student who may have occasion to refer to them.
The general reader will perhaps be satisfied by a summary
and systematic account of the scheme and,, quality of the
local Governments of India, as derived from a review of the
whole mass of the laws upon which those governments are
founded.

SECTION IV.

Of the manner in which the Governments of India are.
constituted, and of what members these Governments

are composed.

It may be convenient for the purposes of this further
inquiry to shew : First, in what manner the Governments
of India are constituted, and of what members composed;
Secondly, by what course, and according to what method
they exercise their functions ; and Thirdly, with what pow-
ers these Governments are respectively invested.

First. Of these governments, that of Bengal is termed
Supreme. It governs the Presidency of Bengal, and exer-
cises a controlling and directory authority over the other
Presidencies of India, which are now three ; namely, Madras
(or Fort St. George), Bombay, and Agra, a Presidency first
constituted by the last Charter act of 1833. We will first
consider the constitution of the Supreme Government.

The Supreme Government consists of a Governor General
and four ordinary Members of the Supreme Council, be-
sides the Commander in Chief of all the Company's forces in
India, in case the Court of Directors shall think fit to
appoint him a Member ; and who thereupon becomes an
extraordinary Member of the Supreme Council. As this
body (except in one particular instance to be hereafter
noticed) acts in union, and by a majority, this Supreme
Government is termed that of " The Governor General
" of India in Council ."

The appointment of all the members of this Government

CONSTITUTION OF THE SUPREME GOVERNMENT OF INDIA. £21

is in the Court of Directors. But the appointment of the
Governor General is subject to the approbation of the
Crown, transmitted through the President o£ the Board of
Control. The effect of this provision is that the high
functionary appointed to this important post— the most
distinguished of any throughout the colonial dominions of
England — is always selected from those elevated and en-
lightened individuals who at once enjoy the gracious favor
of the Monarch, the confidence of the executive Govern-
ment of England, and a well founded reputation for superior
political talents in the estimation of the Court of Directors.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Company's forces in
India, when appointed to he an extraordinary Member of
the Supreme Council, ranks next to the Governor General.
His appointment as Commander in-Chief, like that of the
Governor General, depends on the approval of the Crown ;
for the vast authority entrusted to this officer of the com-
mand and government of an army composed of no less
than two hundred thousand soldiers, is of too important
and confidential a nature to he reposed in the absolute
choice of any body of subjects whatever, independently
of the Crown. But his post of an extraordinary Mem-
ber of the Supreme Council does not require the same
confirmation. The Commander-in-Chief is precluded from
ever being at the head of the government of the Presi-
dency of Bengal, or from ever succeeding to any absolute
vacancy of the Governor Generalship of India (unless
expressly appointed to succeed provisionally in case of
either of such vacancies) — hut, in case of the temporary
absence of the Governor General from Calcutta, the Go-
vernor General in Council may nominate him, or any
other Member of the Supreme Council, to execute his
functions of Governor General, during such his temporary
absence for the purpose of visiting any part of India, under
the designation of the President in Council.

222 CONSTITUTION OF THE SUPREME GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

Three of the four ordinary Members of the Supreme
Council are appointed by the Court of Directors out of
the Civil or Military servants of the Company, of ten years*
standing in their service at least ; and their appointment
does not require the approbation of the Crown. But the
fourth ordinary Member of the Supreme Council is appoint-
ed by the Court merely for the purpose of assisting at the
Councils held for the purpose of pa.ssi.7ig Laws ; and he
cannot interfere or vote in any other business of Government.
Accordingly, this Member is selected from among the emi-
nent lawyers of England: and, with a view to the better
securing that extent of professional ability (of which the
Ministers of the Crown are better qualified, probably, to
judge than the Court of Directors) this member's appoint-
ment must be confirmed by the approval of the Crown.

In case of any vacancy, by death, resignation, or other-
wise, in either of the offices of Governor General or of any of
the Members of his Council, the Court may appoint, Pro-
visionally, any Member to succeed ; so as such successor as
Governor General, or fourth Member of his Council, has
the previous approbation of the Crown. And, in case no
such provisional appointee happens to be on the spot to suc-
ceed as Governor General upon any such vacancy, then the
senior ordinary Member is to succeed and act until a re-
gular appointment is made of a permanent successor. In
case no such provisional appointee is on the spot to succeed
to the office of an ordinary member, then the Governor
General in Council may select from out of the Civil or
Military servants any person of ten years' standing to succeed
and act until a regular appointment is made by the Court. A
vacancy in either of these appointments may occur, not only
by death, or a formal resignation, but also by a voluntary
departure of either of these functionaries with a view to re-
turn to England, or by their being recalled by the Crown,
or by the Court of Directors.

CONSTITUTION OF THE SUBORDINATE GOVERNMENTS.

223

A temporary vacancy of the office, as well of Governor
General as of the Governor of the Presidency may likewise
arise by the Governor General himself, suspending his own
functions. For it is provided, that the Governor General
in Council can, at any time when he thinks it expedient,
appoint any one of the ordinary Members of Council to be
Deputy Governor of the Presidency of Bengal ; and, on any
occasion of his absence from the seat of Government to
visit any part of India, he is at liberty, by a lata or regula-
tion to be expressly passed for that purpose, to appoint any
one of the Members of his Council to act as Governor Ge-
neral of India during such his absence, under the name of
President in Council. But such President in Council cannot
pass any laws, without the assent in writing of the Governor
General himself to each such law.

Such is the constitution and composition of the Supreme
Government of India, under all the emergencies which can
arise. Let us now look to the constitution of the subordinate
Governments of the several other Presidencies of Madras,
Bombay, and Agra.

The constitution of these several Governments is the same
in all. They each consist of a Governor and three Councillors
only ; and are styled " The Governor in Council of Fort St.
George," " Bombay," and " Agra," respectively. But the
Court of Directors is authorized to reduce the number of
Councillors, or to suspend the appointment of any Council-
lors whatever, at either of these Presidencies — an authority
which has been exercised, as regards Agra — in which case
the Governor of such Presidency acts alone, with all the
powers of a Governor in Council.

When, however, the minor Government consists (as is
the case at Madras and Bombay) of a Governor and three
Councillors, the Commander-in-Chief of the forces of

224

CONSTITUTION OF THE SUBORDINATE GOVERNMENTS.

the Presidency may be one of these Councillors. The
others (or all of them, in case the Commander-in-Chief is
not appointed to be one; must be chosen from the civil ser-
vants only of the respective Presidencies, of twelve year's
standing at least.

The Governor is appointed by the Court, subject to the
approbation of the Crown : but the other three Councillors
need not have such approval ; although the Commander-in-
Chief, as such, must. When appointed to the Council he
ranks next to the Governor ; but he can in no case of vacancy
succeed to the office of Governor, unless specially appointed
provisionally so to succeed. Should the Commander-in-Chief
of all the forces in India happen to come into one of the minor
Presidencies of India on duty, he supersedes and takes the
place of the Commander-in-Chief of the forces of that Pre-
sidency, in Council— if the latter happens to a member of
Council,

Vacancies in the office of Governor, or of any members of
Council, may occur by the same means as in the case of the
Supreme Government. And the Court may, in like man-
ner, appoint provisionally to any such vacancies ; subject, in
the case of the Governors, to the approval of the Crown.
In case no such provisional appointee as Governor is on the
spot, the senior civil member is to succeed ; and, in case no
such provisional appointee is on the spot as member in
Council, the Governor in Council may select any Civil ser-
vant, who has attained the rank of Senior Merchant, to
ac* until a permanent successor is appointed. The Gover-
nor of a minor Presidency has no authority to appoint any
Deputy Governor, or other President of his Council.

There are two other cases to be mentioned in which per-
sons may become, or act as, members of either of the Go-
vernments in India. One is the case of a default made by

CONSTITUTION OF THE SUBORDINATE GOVERNMENTS. OO5

the Court of Directors in appointing a successor, within two
months after they have notice of a vacancy of the office of
the Governor General, or of any member c/f either of the
Governments — upon which default the authority to appoint
to any such vacant office falls to the Crown ; and the Court
loses also the power of revoking such appointment, or of re-
calling the party so appointed by the Crown. The other case
is upon occasion of the illness or absence of any member of
Council, so as he should be prevented from attending any
particular Council held, and the Governor should desire the
advice of a full council upon any particular measure then to
be considered of. In this case the Governor is at liberty to
call in the Provisional Member, or, in case there be none,
any Civil Servant of the rank of a Senior Merchant, from
time to time, to attend and assist at the Council Board on
such occasion.

SECTION V.

Of the course and Method by which the Governments
of India exercise their Functions.

Secondly, we have to consider by what course, and accord-
ing to what method, these Governments exercise their func-
tions : which course and method is the same, as well in the
Supreme Government as in the subordinate Governments.

All the acts and proceedings of the Governments are
done, either directly or indirectly, at meetings of the mem-
bers, termed Councils. Their legal validity depends altoge-
ther upon their being done in Council —and, accordingly,
the form of all their orders and resolutions runs in the
name of " The Governor in Council." And it is required,
in testification of these acts and proceedings having been
done by the Council Board, that they should be signed by
one of the Secretaries of Government.

But, although such must be the quality of their acts, that
they must all emanate from, or be confirmed by, some Coun-
cil Board- yet the members of Government are not
restricted to any particular formal course of transacting
the current business of Government ; provided only
that this essential qualification of all their acts and
proceedings be observed, namely, thatin the result they all
proceed from the Governor in Council. Accordingly, it
is usual that propositions and communications be circulated
in writing amongst each other, preparatory to any orders
or resolutions being discussed or passed at the Council
Board ; and a great portion of the business for the consi-
deration of Government, arising out of the numerous re-

METHOD OF PROCEDURE BY THE INDIAN GOVERNMENTS. 227

ports, applications, references, and addresses to Government
from the various functionaries of the state, as well as from
private individuals, are in like manner circulated amongst
the members of Government by the Secretaries and other
officers of Government, previous to any debate or decision
come to upon them in open Council.

Neither is there any particular form, according fo which,
the sentiments of each member of the Government may
be expressed, or according to which the final resolution
or decision of the Government is to be framed. For each,
member can either verbally at the Council Board, or by
his signature in favor of or against any resolution, or by
any representation at large in writing (commonly termed
his Minute) freely, and according to his own method,,
deliver his sentiments for the consideration of the Board
— and in the more important matters (especially when
there is a difference of opinion) these minutes are usu-
ally recorded, not only with a view to the more deli-
berate and mature attention of the other members of
the Government, but with a view to the final notice of
the authorities at home. Indeed, it may truly be said, that
these minutes are often recorded for the instruction of pos-
terity. For among them are to be found a vast number of
documents (many of which have been printed) so abounding
in maxims of political wisdom, and in information upon all
topics connected with the history and prosperity of this
country, that they are scarcely surpassed by the public
records of any nation. Those who have had access to
these excellent works can with difficulty repress the expres-
sion of their admiration of the genius and character of
those distinguished men — the truest benefactors of this land
— who have thus recorded their eminent services to their
country and to mankind : and it seems a kind of duty im-
posed on the writer of these pages to offer to the veneration
of his readers the names of dive, of Warren Hastings, of

228 METHOD OF PROCEDURE BY THE INDIAN GOVERNMENTS.

Cornwallis, of Wellesley, of Lord Hastings., of Munro, of
Fullerton, of Elphinstone, of Malcolm, and of Bentinck;
although their reputation cannot be increased by any notice
from him.

The Council Board is competent to act when the Gover-
nor General or Governor and one Member is present, in all
matters, except in the passing of laws; for which latter
purpose the Governor General and three ordinary mem-
bers of the Council of India at least must be present.

It is the privilege of the Governor General or Governor,
at every Council, first to propose any measure to be dis-
cussed and disposed of — and, afterwards, any of the other
Councillors may propose other subjects for consideration.
r I he Governor can, however, by his own sole authority ad-
journ, if he thinks fit, the further discussion of any such
matter proposed by a Councillor to a future day ; but not be-
yond forty-eight hours, nor more than twice. The objects
of these regulations are two— first, to enable the Governor
General or Governor to bring forward such questions with-
out delay which he himself judges of the most urgent
importance, and to secure timely and calm attention to
propositions of doubtful policy — and secondly, to preclude
the Governor by his own sole authority from preventing
the free introduction, and the certain and prompt disposal,
of such questions as any member of his Council may deem
worthy of the Government's attention.

All measures are passed by common consent, or else by
a majority of votes — and, in case of ah equal division, the
Governors have a casting vote. If, however, any measure be
proposed which, in the opinion of the Governor General or
Governor, is of essential importance to the interests of the
Company, or to the safety and tranquillity of the state, and
expedient either to be carried or to be wholly rejected, and

METHOD OF rilOCEDUEE BY THE INDIAN GOVERNMENTS. OOQ

the whole Council present shall dissent, from the opinion of
the Governor — in this case, a discretionary authority is giv-
en to the Governor to carry or reject the measure by his
own sole decision. This independent and discretionary
authority has been given in consequence of many disputes
and contentions between the Governors and their respect-
ive Councils which formerly occurred, and which, though
usually ending in favor of the Governor's policy and autho-
rity, yet greatly impaired the vigour and dispatch of the
public measures. But, as, on the other hand, such a power
might tend to arbitrary Government, and weaken the inde-
pendence and weight of the Council, it has been guarded
with cautious restrictions. And, first, the question must
be one of the highest emergency and importance, affecting
in the greatest degree the public welfare. Secondly, all
the members of Government must state their respective
reasons in writing — so that it will appear whether, on the
part of the Council, their opposition is founded on any
factious, or personal, or other than a sincere public ground ;
and, on the part of the Governor, whether his decision is
actuated by sound judgment, or at least a regard for the
public w^al : and all parties will have the best means of
hire deliberation on the proposed measure. Thirdly, it
is expressly declared by Statute that the Governor, and he
alone, is to be responsible for the measure so carried, or
for the negative so passed against the measure proposed.
Fourthly, this sole authority does not extend to any act
which it was not legally in the power of the Governor in
conjunction with his Council to carry. Fifthly, three espe-
cial case9 are excluded from any such sole decision ; name-
ly, 1st, any act in their j'udi vial capacity ; as when adjudi-
cating as an Appellate Court upon any matter of right or of
crime— 2ndly, the making, or repealing any law or regula-
tion — or 3rdly, the imposing any lax or duty. These two
last acts of authority can, however (under the provisions
of the last Charter act of 1833) only bo exercised by the

230 METHOD OF PROCEDURE BY THE INDIAN GOVERNMENTS.

Governor General of India in Council; and, consequently,
the restrictions upon them do not any longer apply to the
Governors of t.he subordinate Presidencies. It is further
to be observed, that this power in the Governor of acting
by his sole discretion is not confided to any Governor act-
ing during any temporary vacancy ; and that the Court
of Directors are authorized to suspend the exercise of this
sole discretion, as often, and for as long a time, as they
think fit.

It remains only to note, under this head, that the Governor
General of India in Council may appoint from time to time
any place in India at which the Council of India may as-
semble ; and, when they shall happen to assemble within
either of the minor Presidencies, the Governor of that Pre-
sidency becomes an extraordinary member of the Council
of India. The Governor General may also, when absent
from Bengal, and without his Council attending him, issue
his orders and instructions to the Governments of either of
the Presidencies, or to any of the officers or servants serving
under them ; and which orders and instructions are to be
obeyed in the same manner as if they had issued from the
Governor General in Council. He is directed, however,
immediately to send copies of his orders, so issued on
his own sole authority to any such officers or servants, to
the Governments to which such officers or servants belong ;
and also to send copies of such orders and instructions,
whether sent to the Governments or to such officers, to the
Court of Directors ; and to state his reasons and induce-
ments for issuing them. And he alone is to be responsible
for all acts done under such orders or instructions.

SECTION VI.

Of the Powers exercised by the Governments of India

and, first, of the Superintending and Con' rolling

powers of the Supreme Government.

Thirdly. In the third place we will consider of the
functions and powers with which the several local Govern-
ments in India are invested, With this view we will first
notice those of the Supreme Government of India— and,
next, those of the several other Governments, including
that of the Presidency of Bengal. For, although the
particular government of the Presidency of Bengal is ad-
ministered by the self-same functionaries who preside over
the Supreme Government of India, and these functionaries
cannot consequently act under the control of any local
superior, yet, when the members of the Supreme Govern-
ment act merely as the Governor and Council of the parti-
cular Presidency of Bengal, they exercise precisely the same
powers and functions in respect of the Government of that
Presidency (with the exception of any reference or obedi-
ence to a superior local authority) as those which the
Governors in Council exercise over the other subordinate
Presidencies.

The powers of the Supreme Government of India in the
control and direction of the subordinate Governments were
originally much more limited than they are at present.
Those which were first assigned to the Government of Ben-
gal, by the Statute passed in the year 1773, were confined
to interferences in those matters only which affected the rela-
tions of the other Presidencies with other Native states.
The Government of Bengal was to have " the power of

O^O CONTROLLING TOWER OF THE SUPREME GOVERNMENT.

u superintending and controlling the Governments" of the
other Presidencies, in so far that it should not he lawful for
them to make, war or peace, or any treaty with any Indian
State, without the previous consent of the Bengal Govern-
ment ; except in emergent cases, when there might not be
time to communicate with the Supreme Government. And
it was further provided that the subordinate Governments
should constantly transmit to that Government advice of
all their transactions in matters relating to " the Govern-
" merit, revenues, or interests of the Company."

But another Statute, which passed eleven years afterwards,
in the year 1784, considerably increased, and at the same
time more specially defined, these superior powers of the
Bengal Government. It was by that Act provided, that the
Bengal Government should " superintend, control, and du
(l rect" the Governments of the other Presidencies " in all
" points which relate to any transactions" with the Native
powers, or to war or peace, or to the application of the
revenues or of the forces of these Presidencies in time of
war ; and also in all points specially referred by the Court
of Directors to such controlling power. And the subordi-
nate Governments were directed to obey all orders, whe-
ther they might judge them to be on the above points or
not, unless they contradicted express orders from the Court
of Directors, themselves, which had not come to the know,
ledge of the Supreme Government. These contradictory
orders they were to communicate to the Bengal Govern-
ment, if occasion arose, who would thereupon issue their
further instructions. It was further provided, that no subor-
dinate Government should declare war or peace, or make
any treaty with another state, except in pursuance of an ex-
press order from the Supreme Government — unless in cases
of sudden emergency.

It was soon after considered that even these powers of

CONTROLLING POWER OF THE SUPREME GOVERNMENT. O33

superintendence, control, and direction were not sufficient —
for, by the first great Charter act which passed in 1793,
this power of control and direction was extended, not only
to all transactions with other states, the making war and
peace, and all treaties — but also, to the collection and ap-
plication of the revenues of the other Governments, and to
the employment of their forces at these Presidencies, with-
out any restriction as to time of war— and the Act further
provided, in general terms, that the Bengal Government
should exercise these powers in all points which related " to
" the civil or military government of those Presidencies."

It would be difficult to say what particular measures of
government were to be considered as excluded from the
control and direction of the Supreme Government constitu-
ted by the comprehensive terms of this Statute. But that
some acts and powers of the subordinate Governments were
intended still to be exempted from the interference of the
Supreme Government seems clear from this — that provision
is again made, by this Act for the obedience of the subordi-
nate Governments, although a doubt should arise whether
the orders of the Supreme Government had reference to
those points under its superintendence. N\ e may, perhaps,
justly consider all the acts of the subordinate Governments
in the current administration of justice according to the
laws of the country and the regulations of Government, and
all their appointments to offices, as exempt from this con-
trolling interference,

However this may be, the consciousness of the Supreme
Government that its controlling powers wore under some
limitations, not exactly defined, begat a caution and a re-
serve in interfering with the ordinary course of Government
in the minor Presidencies, and directed that interference
chiefly, if not altogether, to those affairs more specifically
noticed in the Statutes which have been referred to —

°34 CONTROLLING POWER OF THE SUPREME GOVERNMENT.

namely, the negotiations and treaties with Native states,
the declarations of war, or the making of peace, and the em-
ployment of tho military forces as the general interests of
the Indian Empire might suggest. In almost all other
respects a general latitude and discretion was reposed in
the subordinate Governments to carry on their adminis-
tration according to the course provided by the laws ; and
subject only to the control and direction of the Home
Authorities of the Court of Directors and the Board of
Control.

The next Charter act, of the year 1813, made no change
in the relative authorities of the supreme and subordi-
nate Governments ; and for the course of forty years, from
the year 1793 to the year 1833, this limited and guarded
measure of superintendence and direction continued to
be observed by the Government of Bengal. But in the
latter year a policy seems to have prevailed with the Minis-
ters of England of better uniting and consolidating the
Governments of India, and of giving greater consistency
and uniformity to all the public measures in the adminis-
tration of the Indian Empire. It is probable, also, that
it was judged expedient to remove at once all doubt and
difficulty as to the extent of the controlling powers of the
Supreme Government, by at least enabling it to direct
its interference towards all political objects whatever,
which, consistently with the powers confided to the local
Governments of India, could occupy the attention of the
newly arranged Supreme Council of India. The last
Charter act of 1833, accordingly provides, in the fullest
terms, that the Supreme Council of India shall have the
superintendence, direction, and control of the icliole
civil 8nd military Government of India, generally — " with
t! full power to superintend and control the Governors and
" Governors in Council of the other Presidencies, in all
c< points relating to the civil or military administration of

CONTROLLING TOWER OF THE SUPREME GOVERNMENT. 235

" those Presidencies ;" and these Governments are " hound
" to ohey the orders and instructions of the Governor.
" General in Council, in all cases whatsoever. There are
now no limitations to the Supreme Government's power of
interference, either in respect of doubts of the subject-
matter on which its orders are to be given, or as regards
any supposed contradictory orders from the Court of Di-
rectors, or from any other authority.

The result, therefore, of this constitution of the Supreme
Government is — that, as regards the Presidency of Bengal,
it governs the affairs of that quarter of India without any
other restriction or control than such as are supplied by
the direct provisions of the Statutes which lay down general
rules for its measures and course of administration, or
which are supplied by the express orders of the Court of
Directors, delivered as from themselves, or as communi-
cated from the Board of Control. But, as regards the
subordinate Presidencies, the Supreme Government of
India may either allow of their exercising the functions de-
legated to them, without interference, or it may prescribe
general rules and principles according to which those functi-
ons are to be exercised, or it may expressly and specifically
direct, or reject, or annul, any particular measures — in which
latter case the members of the subordinate Governments
become, in truth, nothing more than the agents or .Ministers
through whom the governing authority acts.

SECTION VII.

The same subject continued : History and nature of the
Legislative powers of the Supreme Government.

The second peculiar power of the Supreme Government
of India is that of Legislation. It may appear expedient
to trace a little more at large than has been hitherio done
the origin and progress of this power of Legislation in the
local authorities of India, which is now confined solely to
that of the Governor General of India in Council.

All powers of enacting laws or regulations were at first
limited, as we have seen, to the Company itself — ihat is to
the Directors or Governors of the Company, who had the
entire government of its affairs. The first Charter of Eli-
zabeth, dated in 1600, having reference merely to the for-
mation of a trading Company, and not to a political colony
dependent on the British Crown, authorized no other course
of legislation than that which might be necessary for the
good conduct of all the members and servants of this new
trading corporation — and the rules and regulations they
were empowered to enact, with a view to that object, were
limited to the imposition of moderate fine and imprison-
ment, as penalties for the breach of such regulations. This
Charter gave no power to try, or to erect Courts for the
trial of, such breaches.

When colonies had been actually established in various
par's of India, the Charters of Charles 2d, and of James
2d, in the years 1661, 1683, and 1686, gave general juris-
diction to administer justice according to the laws of Eng-
land, and to erect Courts for that purpose. Accordingly

LEGISLAL1VE POWERS OF THE SUPREME GOVERNMENT. 937

these Courts were empowered to judge of the breaches of
the Company's rules and regulations, and to impose the
punishment affixed for such breaches, as w.ell as to try all
other civil or criminal suits. But no express extension of
the power of legislating for the people of the newly acquir-
ed .settlements was conferred on the Company, and still
less upon either of the local Governments of India ; although
there is every reason to believe that far greater powers of
law-making, as well as of law-administering, were in reality
exercised under these Charters to the Company, than
either they or the laws of England in any way sanctioned.

Upon the surrendering all the previous Charters, and
uniting with the new formed Company started in 1G98,
all the rights, powers, and privileges, of the United Com-
pany (and among them, of course, that of legislating) came
to be altogether regulated and defined by the provisions of
the Charter of that date, and those of the Statutes giving
effect to such Charter. The powers of legislation, by these
provisions, was expressly limited to the Company itself —
and extended no farther than to the regulating the conduct
of their servants and others engaged in carrying on their
trading affairs, and to the imposing fine and imprisonment
for breach of such regulations — which were not to be re-
pugnant to the laws of England.

These were the only powers of legislation ever granted
to the Company — save such as were subsequently delegat-
ed to if acting through the local Governments in India.
But the acquisition of the extensive territories in Bengal
and in the neighbouring districts necessarily led to the
formation of some regular scheme for the government of
those territories, which should also comprise some authori-
ty in the local government of enacting laws. This power
was accordingly conferred by the first great regulating Act
for the Government of India, passed in the year 1773.

233 LEGISLATIVE POWEHS OF THE SUPREME GOVERNMENT.

It is observable, however, that, although the territorial
possessions attained by the Company at this period in
India, and reduced under the direct administration of
their local governments, formed in reality a populous
Empire composed of several ancient kingdoms ; and,
although the whole civil and military government of all the
states was confided to the supreme and subordinate
Governments which had been established — yet the pow-
er of legislation confided to the local authorities was
confined to the narrowest limits. It was a power con-
fined to the Bengal Government only, and extended no
farther than to <e the settlement at Fort William and other
" factories and places subordinate thereto." It follows
that all those other territories, which, by conquest or treaty
became annexed to the British dominions, and were subject-
ed to the administration of the local Government of that
Presidency, to which each portion of these newly acquired
territories was attached, were required to be governed
according to the existing laws of that scheme of power,
which had theretofore prevailed. Neither the Company
itself, nor either of its local Governments, had authority to
enact any wewlaws or any new course of government. For it
is a principle of the constitutional law of England that, when
a new country is added to the dominions of the Crown,
the people of that country are to be governed according
to their old laws, un til they are changed by the supreme
authority of the state— and that all English subjects who
come to reside within this new country are to be governed
by their own laws, as far as they are applicable to their
circumstances in that country.

Confined as this legislative power of the Supreme Go-
vernment was to the local limits of the settlement of Fort
"William, and of the factories and places subordinate to
that settlement, it was also narrowly restricted in point
of extent. It reached no farther than to the making rules,

LEGISLATIVE TOWERS OF THE SUPREME GOVERNMENT. Oj9

ordinances, and regulations for the good order and civil
government of this settlement and its subordinate fac-
tories, the breach of which were to be punished by fines
or forfeitures. They were to be " just and reasonable,"
and " not repugnant to the laws of England ;" and they
were not to be valid or of any force, unless or until they
were consented to and recorded by the Supreme Court of
Judicature by the same Statute erected at Calcutta : and
provisions were made whereby all parties might have the
opportunity of being heard before that Court, and after-
wards by appeal from the decision of that Court, in objection
to any such laws which should be proposed. As the force
of such laws operated only by the course of punishment^
they were limited to such as were of a penal nature, and
for the repression of public offences— and could not affect
any private rights, or the course of justice as regarded pro-
perty and claims between man and man through civil
sails. And, as the amount 'of punishment which could
be awarded was to consist only of fine or forfeiture, these
laws could only have reference to such offences against
" the good order" of society as were of a petty or trivial
description. In short, the power was merely that of better
preserving the public peace and good behaviour by the en-
actment of such Police Regulations as either the English law
had not provided, or which (if existing) could not well be
made applicable in this country, x^ccordingly, when an
increased and more unlimited authority was conferred on
the local Governments of making " Regulations" for the
general administrations of justice in the provinces through-
out India, these law.s, which were thus enacted for the
better preservation of good order at the immediate spats of
government, came to be termed " rules, ordinances, and
regulations," by way of distinguishing them from those
laws of a more general efficacy, which were passed for the
Governmenfof the provinces and were termed " Regula-
tions :" and these " rules, ordinances, and regulations"

240 LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE SUPREME GOVERNMENT.

are now more commonly known by the term of " Police
Regulations."

It may appear extraordinary that, considering the condi-
tion of the various nations over which the full powers of Go-
vernment were now to be exercised in the name of the
Company, no greater authority for legislation was entrusted
by the Statute ofl773, to the local authorities than such as
have been explained. The English subjects, indeed, were
few ; and those were all of them in the immediate service
of the Company. But still, even with regard to them, it
would be found impossible to apply all the laws under
which they had been governed, and enjoyed their rights in
England, to their altered position in India— and it has al-
ways, in fact, proved a hopeless task to ascertain which of
the laws of England did strictly apply to them, and what
were clearly inapplicable to them in the circumstances under
which they were placed. But, with respect to the Natives
— a large class of whom were made by this Statute subject
to the laws of England generally — and the rest of whom
had been for ages before governed at the mere despotic
will of their rulers, and amongst whom the settled rules of
justice were few, and the method of administering the law
almost discretionary — it would seem that the power of de-
claring what laws did not apply, and what should, and what
should be the course of administering justice, as well as the
power of providing new regulations according as the altered,
and still changing, condition and circumstances of the peo-
ple might suggest, was essentially requisite ; and that the
authority of Government could never be complete, nor
operate effectually to the public benefit without it. Even
the slender power of passing Police regulations of a certain
minor quality proved to be reduced to an inferior degree
than what was intended, in consequence of the indefinite
and obscure terms of the language in which the authority
was granted. For the requisition of the previous " consent

LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE SUPREME GOVERNMENT. 241

and approbation''' of the Supreme Court, gave to that tri-
bunal a power of rejecting laws on account of any supposed
inexpediency — although the members of t\\e Court, not
being concerned in the passing of the laws, or being made
acquainted with the grounds of them, were obviously incom-
petent to form a true judgment of their expediency. More-
over, no accurate decision could even become to, as to
what parts of Bengal, other than the seat of Government
itself, were intended by the terms " factories and places su-
" bordinate to that settlement"— and, consequently, the power
of legislation exercised under this act, has always been confin-
ed to the immediate Presidency itself. And, lastly, it be-
came a continual contest and difficulty to discern what of
these proposed u rules, ordinances, and regulations" were
" repugnant to the laws of England," and what were consist-
ent with such laws. Rules and principles were, indeed,
from time to time laid down by the Courts, as disputes and
appeal arose, by which this repugnancy or otherwise wa3 to
be judged — but no act of the legislature ever settled such
rules and principles. It more than once happened that
while one Court rejected a proposed laws, for being as " re-
"pugnant to the law of England" as " light was to dark-
•* ness" — (which was an expression used by a judge in re-
jecting a regulation restricting the liberty of the press)
another Court approved of and recorded the selfsame laws,
as in no manner contradicting either the letter or princi-
ples of the English law.

Nevertheless under this legislative power of the local
Governments, and this only, were British subjects — and also
all Natives while resident icithin the limits of the
ral immediate Presidencies, or seats of government —
ruled until the late Charter act of 1833. The subordinate
Presidencies of Madras and Bombay, indeed, possessed no
legislative power whatever, to be exercised over British
subjects, and others resident at those Presidencies, until the

242 legislative towers of the supreme government.

year 1807— when precisely the same power was conferred
on those Presidencies, in precisely the same terms, for passing
" rules, ordinances, and regulations for the good order and
" civil government of the Towns of Madras and Bombay,
" and the factories and places subordinate thereto."

But, as regards the Native people resident out of the
immediate Presidencies, or, as it is phrased, in the Mofus-
sil, the necessity of a more enlarged power of legislation
soon began to be felt. In the progress of the eight years,
from the passing of the first regulating Act for the local
Government of India in 1773 until the year 1781, a conti-
nued series of disputes between the Supreme Court of
Judicature first established in the former year/ and the
Government's Provincial Courts, in respect of the legality
or otherwise of the judgments by the latter Courts, put an
end to all regularity and all safety in the administration of
justice. The Parliament of England at once perceived the
nature of the remedy to be applied ; and, while it restrict-
ed within appropriate bounds the extent of jurisdiction to
be exercised by the Supreme Court, and particularly ex-
empted all judicial acts of the Mofussil Courts from its
interference, it conferred on the local Government of Bengal
a power of legislation for the provinces of that settlement,
which, in effect, comprised every subject-matter of laws.
In the year 1781, the Governor General of Bengal was
authorized to enact " Regulations for the Provincial Courts
" and Councils," which were to be " of force and authority
" to direct the said Provincial Courts" — subject to revision
by the executive Government of England. The extent of
this legislative power, showing it to be in truth a general
authority, appears sufficiently from a subsequent Statute
passed in the year 1797 ; which— after noticing that regula-
tions had used to be passed by the Governor General in
Council" for the better administration of justice within
« the provinces/' whereby the Natives of India had been

•

LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE SUPREME GOVERNMENT. 943

made acquainted with the privileges and immunities
granted to thpni by the British Government" — proceeds to
provide, that all such regulations " affecting ihe rights, per-
" sons, or property of the Natives or others \\ ho are amenable
" to the Provincial Courts should be registered, and form-
" ed into a regular code, and that the grounds of each
" regulation should be prefixed to it." It was not, how-
ever, till the year 1799, that the Government of Madras was
enabled to pass laws " for the Provincial Courts and Coun-
" cils ;" nor until the year 1807, that similar authority was
conferred on the Government of Bombay — in which last
year both those subordinate governments were likewise
empowered, as before noticed, to pass " rules, ordinances,
" and regulations" (subject to being registered in the Su-
preme Court) for the " good order and civil government" of
the immediate Presidencies.

General as this legislative authority was assumed to be
by the respective Governments of India, there were two
subjects of legislation on which doubts from time to time
arose as to their being comprehended within it — namely,
the right to make laws for the government, of Native sol-
diers, and for their trial by Courts- Martial, and the right
of making laws for taxation of the people of India. It
may have been argued, that the power of making laws, with
a view to the administration of justice, had reference to the
ordinary course of justice as between all classes of the
people equally — and not to any special course for a
peculiar class, such as soldiers, who were to be governed
in a c;reat degree by arbitrary discretion, whose first duty
was undisputing obedience, and whose conduct was to be pro-
nounced upon by the judgment of military persons, judg-
ing without the form's of the ordinary Courts. And, with
respect to taxation, it may have been conceived that, for
a government (without, some express constitutional autho-
rity — existing from old custom, or from a direct allowance

044 LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE SUPREME GOVERNMENT.

of the highest legislative power of the state) -to take at its
own arbitrary will any portion to itself of the property of
the people, weuld be rather an overthrow and subversion of
law and justice, than an enactment for the furtherance of
either.

Still, the local Governments had, without scruple, been
used to make regulations as well for the purpose of taxa-
tion, as for the government of their Native armies by
martial law. The right of taxation was, at last, expressly
conceded by the legislature of England by the Charter
act of 1813. But this power — in itself sufficient, unrestrain-
ed, to constitute an absolute despotic government — was re-
stricted, as regards the imposition of new taxes, and the
increase of existing taxes, on exports, imports, and transit
of goods, to passing laws with the previous consent and
sanction both of the Court of Directors and the Board of
Control. By another Statute, passed in 1814, all previous
regulations for imposing and levying taxes were declared
legal and valid. By the Charter act of 1813, the power of
making regulations and articles of war for the govern-
ment of the Native army, and for the trial of Native
soldiers and officers is specifically delegated to the res-
pective Governments of India — and all former regulations
made with this view are confirmed as legal and operative.

Such were the legislative powers exercised by the several
Governments of India until the time of passing the last
Charter act of 1833. But they had been found defective
and insufficient. They did not extend to the passing of
laws which might affect the Supreme Courts, and their
authorities, and jurisdiction — neither did they extend to
the making of laws, which should have operation within
the immediate Presidencies ; except in matters of mere
police, as has been already explained — nor could any even
of these latter regulations be passed without the sanction

LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE SUPREME GOVERNMENT. 245

of the Supreme Court itself. By the last Charter act of
1833, however, an ample and more independent legislative
authority is created ; but, instead of beipg distributed
among all the local Governments, it is concentrated in the
Supreme Government of India, with a view, not only to
the greater political strength and competency of the body
enacting the laws, but to the more general uniformity ia
the laws themselves.

Full power, accordingly, is given to the Governor General
of India in Council to make, repeal, and alter all kinds of
laws and regulations for the government of India, and for
the administration of justice therein; which may operate
throughout all parts of British India, which may regulate
all Courts of Justice, as well the Supreme Courts as all
others ; and none of which shall need any sanction from
those Courts. The following are the restrictions and
limitations imposed on the exercise of this legislative power.
First, all laws made are to be subject to the sanction of the
Court of Directors — which Court is subject itself to the
orders of the Board of Control. Until, however, they are
repealed by such authorities, they are (with the exception
of some hereafter noticed) to be operative — so that laws for
taxation no longer require the previous consent of the
Court of Directors. Secondly, no such laws are to affect, or
to be deemed to affect, the full Imperial power of the British
Parliament to pass laws for India, and to repeal or al-
ter any laws made by the local Government. Thirdly,
no such laws are to be contrary or repugnant to the
Charter act itself of 1833 — or to any future Slatutes, or
to the Statutes already made for the government of British
soldiers. Fourthly, no such laws are to affect the Preroga-
tives of the Crown (which have been enumerated and ex-
plained in the second Discourse) — or those constitutional,
fundamental, laws of the whole British Empire, which re-
quire the obedience of every subject of the British Crown

045 LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE SUPREME GOVERNMENT.

to its government and laws — which obedience is termed
his allegiance. Fifthly, no such laws are to affect or alter
any of the rights or powers conferred by the Govern-
ment and Crown of England on the East India Company
itself — as represented by the two bodies of the Court of
Directors and the Court of Proprietors. Sixthly, no such
laws are to impose the punishment of death on any British
subjects, without the previous sanction of the Court of Di-
rectors. And, Seventhly and lastly, no such laws are to
abolish either of the Supreme Courts of India, though they
may regulate them, and the law and course of justice to be
administered by those tribunals. Such is the nature and
extent of the second peculiar power of the Governor General
of India in Council.

SECTION VIII.

The same subject continued', of other peculiar powers
of the Supreme Government.

The third peculiar power of the Supreme Government is
that of transacting all affairs, of negociating all treaties, and
of making war or peace, with foreign states. Such affairs and
treaties, we have seen, can only be carried on, or comple-
ted, under the express orders of the Supreme Government,
except any sudden emergency should arise — and, the better
to ensure this superintendence and control, the Act passed in
the year 1784, requires that any such treaty made with a
foreign state by, or through the medium of a subordinate
Government, should in the body of it contain a clause making
the treaty conditional on the ratification of t lie Supreme
Government. An important and memorable restriction is
imposed by the same Statute on the exercise of this power
even by the Governor General himself. That Act solemnly
declares that, " to pursue schemes of conquest and extension
u of dominion in India, are measures repugnant to the wish,
" the honor, and policy of the British nation." It, accord-
ingly, prohibits the declaration of war, or the commencement
of hostilities, against any people, or the guaranteeing
the possessions of foreign Princes, without the express com-
mand and authority of the Court of Directors — except in
those cases in whicb.it shall appear that war has been com-
menced, or preparations made for war, against the British
nation, or against any other nation which the local Govern-
ments have engaged to defend. And in these excepted
cases the Supreme Government is directed, at the earliest
opportunity, to convey all requisite information of its pro-
ceedings to the Court of Directors.

248 CONTROLLING POWERS OF THE SUPREME GOVERNMENT.

The fourth peculiar power of the Supreme Government is
that of directing the collection and application of the Beve-
nues of all India. This power is, in its nature, of a very gene-
ral and of a controlling quality. A large portion of the reve-
nues of India is specifically appropriated by Statutes — as
in the paying of dividends to the Proprietors of stock, the
maintenance of the forces, and the salaries of the high func-
tionaries of the Indian Governments. Almost all the rest
is required for the current and ordinary expenditure of the
several Governments, according to the course provided for
their administration. The occasions, therefore, for its spe-
cial directions are few, compared with those in which each
local Government is left to apply the financial resources of
the country to the exigencies of the public service. Still, it
has been thought expedient that the Supreme Government
should have power, not only to lay down general rules for
all extraordinary expenditure, but also upon occasion to
interfere, expressly, either in prohibiting, or in directing,
particular modes and amount of outlay. And this is a
power that is much and often practically exercised.

The fourth and last peculiar poiver of the Supreme Go-
vernment that appears necessary to be noticed, is that of
directing the employment of all the military forces of
India. This, also, under ordinary circumstances, is rather
a controlling than a directory power. But it is obviously
requisite that, as emergencies arise, the supreme local power
of the state should have the active direction, as well as the
general superintendence, of its armies.

SECTION IX.

The same subject continued : of the powers exercised by the
Subordi?iate Governments.

The last subject of this discourse is the consideration of
the functions and powers of the Subordinate Governments
of Madras, Bombay, and Agra ; including also such of those
of the Presidency of Bengal as are not obviously merged
with the peculiar powers of the Supreme Government itself.

And, first, their legislative functions are now confined to
the mere preparation of drafts or projects of regulations,
which are to; be submitted to tjie Supreme Government,
together with their reasons for proposing them ; and upon
which the Supreme Government is required to form and
communicate its resolutions.

Secondly, the subordinate Governments have the appoint-
ment to all offices held in the respective Presidencies :
among which is the office of a Justice of the peace, whose
authority is exercised, not in the name of the local Govern-
ment, but in the name of the Queen herself.

But, it is to be observed, that the Presidency of Agra has
no distinct establishment of civil or of military servants, but
that those appointed to" the Presidency of Bengal may hold,
as before, offices in either of those two Presidencies. All
these principal offices in the state (with the exception of
that of a justice of the peace) — both civil and military — are
at present filled by those who are nominated to the service
of the Company in India by the Court of Directors. But,

250 POWERS OF THE SUBORDINATE GOVERNMENTS.

although the persons nominated by the Court of Directors
to such service, and eventually appointed by the local Govern-
ments to such offices, have hitherto been those subjects
of the British Empire termed British subjects, by way of
distinguishing them from the Asiatic subjects, still there is
lio restriction imposed by the law under which India is go-
verned, either upon the local Governments or upon the Court
of Directors, against the appointment of Natives. This
may probably be new and appear incomprehensible to many
Native readers of this work. No one instance has ever
been known of a member of the Native community having
attained to any office which could be held by a civil ser-
vant, or to any step of that rank in the army , which a
commissioned English officer holds. But the last Charter
act has nevertheless declared, " that no Native of the ter-
** ritories of British India shall, by reason only of his reli-
« gion, place of birth, descent, colour, or any of them,
«< be disabled from holding any place, office, or employment,
" under the Company."

"What, then, are the grounds of disqualification which
prevent members of the Native community attaining the
very highest stations which can be aspired to in the govern-
ment or service of the Indian Empire ? They are these
only. That a certain quality of civil offices are by the
standing rules of the Court of Directors to be filled by such
only as are by them nominated to the Civil service of India
as Writers ; and by Statute it is ordained that no person
shall be appointed to the Civil service, as a writer, unless he
shall have been educated at Haileybury College in England.
But both the rules of the Court of Directors, and the Sta-
tute requiring this course of education, are founded on this
principle — that by force of such provisions those who are
sufficiently qualified by mental cultivation, by loyalty to the
British Government, and by moral integrity, are likely to
be furnished for the service and preservation of the Indian

NATIVES LEGALLY COMPETENT TO OFFICES. 251

Empire. And on the same principle is the supply made by
the Court of Directors of certain persons, denominated Ca-
dets, out of whom only those military officers 'of the Native
army are to be appointed who are to hold any rank from that
of Ensign or Cornet upwards. While, therefore, the Court of
Directors shall continue to enforce these provisions for the
supply of persons to fill the higher classes of civil and military
office, the local Governments, who owe obedience to the
orders of this Court, must conform to them. At the
same time it is unquestionable, that, should the policy
appear sound, a?id lending to the real prosperity of the
country, and should the just and necessary qualifications
exist, there is nothing in the present laics under which
India is governed, which should prevent the Court of Di-
rectors from nominating any Native to even the highest post,
military or civil, in their disposal ; or which should preclude
that Court from nominating any Native to enter their
service, generally, as a writer, who should by possibi-
lity have gone through the requisite course of educa-
tion at Haileybury ; or which should restrict that Court
from nominating a Native as a cadet. Nay, further —
there is nothing in the law or constitution of the Indian
Governments which should preclude a Native from attain-
ing the highest office in Tndia, conferred by the Queen of
England, such as that of a Judgeship even of the Supreme
Court— so only that such Native should by his mental and
moral qualities, and by his acquirements, prove himself to be
competent to the duties of it.

That the appointment to these superior offices, both
Civil and Military, should have been constantly confined to
British subjects must be explained by the history of past
events, and the political necessities of the country, as well
as by the condition of the people. But the period seems
approaching when this policy will appear no longer neces-
sary or expedieut. So long as the struggle for dominion

252 NATIVES LEGALLY COMPETENT TO OFFICES.

was maintained among rival powers, whose success depended
only on the sword — so long as the British Empire in India was
unsettled and unstable, its institution forming, and its
scheme of administration new — so long as the whole body
of the people were strangers to all systematic government
founded on the supremacy of regular laws, ignorant even of
its principles', unenlightened by education, and as yet unat-
tached by feeling to the British rule — it would have been
obviously premature, and indeed absurd, to have opened
the attainment of influential office to the Natives so recent-
ly subjected to the British rule. It would have been at once
to have abandoned the country to civil war and destruction,
or to have consigned it to the grasp of some other foreign
dominion. But, with the diffusion of knowledge and intel-
lectual cultivation, has sprung up a sense of the benefits
of a liberal and well regulated government, and some con-
viction that the prosperity of the country must depend on
the permanency of its strength*. The spirit, of faction— and
even that of social repulsion — has been gradually allayed.
And, at. last, public institutions are forming, not only for the
general elementary education of the people at large, but for
imparting literary, scientific, and professional proficiency,
calculated to raise Native qualifications to a level with the
resources of the country, and the capacities of the people.

It is not to be doubted, therefore, if the Native commu-
nity shall be true to themselves and their real interests, that
all the offices of state, and in the administration of the af-
fairs of the country, will be gradually open to their ambition,
in proportion to their proved competency to sustain them.
As regards the Military rawAheld by British subjects, it will
perhaps be long before the members of the higher classes of
the Native community will desire to share the responsibili-
ties of such posts. They may probably consider it most
conducive to the military strength of the Empire, and most
consistent with their own habits and avocations in life, that

POWERS OF THE SUBORDINATE G 0VERNMENT5. 253

the Native army should be composed of that quality of men
who now embrace that line of public service ; and that
they should be led into the dangers and enterprises of war
by the same energy and skill that has for a long series of
years shed a glory on the Sepoy arms. But, as regards the
offices and honors of civil life, the ambition of the superior
Natives, who are qualified and well-affected towards the
British Government, naturally grows in proportion to
their right to attain them. It is sufficient to say that, as
well the local Governments as the Imperial Government of
England, and its functionaries the Court of Directors, have
recognized this right so founded ; the rest must depend on
the character, the public spirit, and the exertions of the
Native people themselves.

Thirdly, may be mentioned the very limited authority
reposed in the subordinate Governments of transacting
affairs, and negociating treaties^ with foreign Native states,
and of declaring war or making peace with them. This
authority they can only exercise (as we have seen) in cases
of emergency. All such negociations must under ordinary
circumstances be conducted by the Supreme Government —
and all treaties entered into by the subordinate govern-
ments in extraordinary cases must be made on the face of
them subject to ratification by the superior Government.
Neither can any local Government, Supreme or Subordinate,
declare war (except in the circumstances of necessity which
have been already noticed) without the express orders of the
Court of Directors.

The fourth function of the subordinate Governments to
be adverted to is that of the government and direction of
the army belonging to each respective Presidency— which
military government is administered, mainly, through the
Commanders-in-Chief of each Presidency. It is to be remark-
ed, however ; that the Presidency of Agra has no separate

254 POWERS OF THE SUBORDINATE GOVERNMENTS.

and distinct military establishment ; and accordingly, for
all military purposes, that Presidency is still considered, as
before, a portion of that of Bengal. The Supreme Go-
vernment has (as we have seen) the power of superseding
the ordinary course of governing and directing the armies
of the other Presidencies, by itself directing the application
and employment of those forces, under commanders of its
own appointment. This, however, is an authority never
exercised except with a view to the employment of those
forces in active service. But in time of peace, and in the
active duties of the armies within the precincts of their
own Presidencies, the subordinate Governments conduct
the whole of the responsible and important duties of the
Military, as they do those of the Civil Government.

Fifthly, the subordinate Governments have the ordinary
management and disposition of the revenues of their re-
spective Presidencies. In 4 his financial administration,
however, they have, first, to observe those requisitions
of Statutes which have expressly regulated the general ap-
plication of such revenues ; and, secondly, to obey the spe-
cial orders, as well of the Court of Directors as of the
Supreme Government, in this department of their duties.

Sixthly, it rests with the Governments of Calcutta,
Madras, and Bombay, to fix the boundaries of the Towns of
those names, and extend the limits of them, as expediency
may seem to require. The districts composing the terri-
tories of each Presidency are to be settled from time to
time by the sole authority of the Court of Directors ; and
any order of the local Governments fixing the limits of the
Towns of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, must also have
the previous sanction of that Court. This authority for
limiting the boundaries of the seats of these local Govern-
ments is founded on various Statutes, which enabled those
Governments to make regulations for the municipal or in-

POWERS OF THE SUBORDINATE GOVERNMENTS. 355

ternal police government of those Towns, and which have
made the jurisdiction of the Supreme Courts co-extensive
(as regards Natives) with those limits. •

Such, then, are the various functions and powers entrust-
ed to the local political authorities of India (subordinate
and supreme) for the administration of the whole Civil and
Military government of the British Empire established in
that country. Many details, as well in respect of these
powers, as in respect of the constitution and form of
these Governments and the method in which they act, have
in a work of this nature been necessarily omitted. They
can only be learned, thoroughly, by a reference to the copious
volumes of Statutes and Regulations, and to the several
works explaining and commenting upon them. But, it is
trusted that a general and intelligible account of the scheme
of these Governments has been given, sufficient for all the
ordinary objects of such information, and well calculated
to form the basis of that further and more accurate acquain-
tance with the subject which professional or official duty
may impose.

SECTION X.

Reflections on the quality of the system of Government
in India ; and notices of some defects.

And, now that the reader has; arrived at the con-
elusion of this division of my labours, it may per-
haps interest him to cast a glance over the course he has
passed, and to pause in reflection on the quality of that
knowledge he may have gained,

If he shall be induced once more to review with studious
consideration those doctrines of political Government which
have been summarily expounded in the first of these discours-
es, he may probably find his facility of comprehending them
increased, and his conviction of their soundness confirmed,
by the practical information derived from the ensuing
pages. On the other hand, a just conception of those prin-
ciples which lie at the base of all well constructed govern-
ments, will serve forcibly to impress on his understanding
the origin and quality of that system of local Government
under which the Empire of British India is administered.

It will be found that the Government of the British do-
minions, throughout all their extent, is a consiste?it whole.
The constitution of England is the grand source of every
plan of political administration established in each portion
of those dominions. Over that administration the constitu-
tional powers of the British Government hold a constant
and an operative superintendence. But the English con-
stitution is not a mere gigantic fabric, without proportion or
symmetry — resting on no other foundation than its own
weight, or the arbitrary will of its founders. Its parts so

QUALITY OF THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT IN INDIA. g.57

correspond and fit with each other as to manifest political
judgment and skill of the highest order, expanded through
many generations upon its construction. It ,js reared upon
the foundations of human nature itself in its social relations,
and of human reason as applied to those relations.

Whether the English constitution be, or be not, founded
on the just principles of Government — and whether there
be, or be not, that correspondence between its fundamen-
tal rules, and the true ends of Government, viz. that happi-
ness of the people, which consists in the perfect enjoyment
of private rights and acquisitions, and personal security from
wrong — can only be determined by ascertaining what those
just principles are, and then by a thoughtful comparison
between those principles and those constitutional rules. An,
easier, and if not a surer, perhaps a more satisfactory, judg-
ment may be formed of the tendency of those rules, from a
consideration of their effects. JFor undoubtedly the effects
of those rules are apparent in a greater measure of political
strength , prosperity, glory, and intellectual advancement than
has ever befallen a nation through the history of mankind.
It is a judgment formed from such sources as these which
must qualify a subject of the British Crown to serve the poli-
tical interests of the nation with effect — it is such a judgment,
alone, which can inspire him with that loyalty to the Prince,
and that permanent and rational attachment to the institu-
tions of his country, in which true patriotism consists.

Although considerations such as these may appear to de-
mand some stretch of thought and of reflection, yet the
commonest attention 'to the details of the preceding dis-
courses must suffice to shew the intimate bo/id of connection
between the plan , of the local Governments of India,
and the general system of government under which
the whole British Empire is ruled. The Supreme Govern-
ment of India (as it is called; and the subordinate Govern-

258 '.QUALITY OF THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT IN INDIA.

ments of the Presidencies, are all constituted and regulated
by British Statutes — and to (he British Parliament are all
Indian functionaries responsible for the just exercise of
the powers entrusted to them. The Company is no
more than a body of our own fellow subjects, through
whom (subject to the control of a Board composed of
another body of our fellow subjects) — acting ordinarily
by their appointed Governors and officers— -the adminis-
tration of the Indian Governments is carried on. This
Company consists, as we have seen, of an associated number
of Proprietors of India Stock, whose chief and almost
only active duty is that of electing from among themselves
such qualified persons, who are to act on behalf of the
whole Company, in the exercise of those authorities en-
trusted for a time by the Parliament of England. But
it is obvious that the Parliament of England might have
selected any other body of our fellow subjects, to wield
the same powers as are reposed in the Company — subject
to the same control and the same responsibilities. The
legislature might have selected another body of Electors
than such Proprietors— it might have selected at. once, and
"without any election by others, a certain number of in-
dividuals, who, as Directors, or under any other name,
should have conducted, as the highest active authority,
the Civil and Military government of India ; and who might
have to conduct it upon a different plan, and through the
medium of different Governors and officers, than is at
present ordained. It is plain that the system of govern-
ment for India, is only a method and a medium, through
which the Supreme Government of England governs a
portion of the subjects of the British Empire — in the same
way as that Supreme Government, to a certain extent,
regulates the course of authority exercised in certain cities
and districts of England itself.

But it is not enough to observe that the Governments in

QUALITY OF THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT IN INDIA. 259

India have been modelled on the basis of the English con-
stitution—has been regulated through the same legislative
authority which dictates the course of Government in Eng-
land — and depends altogether upon such future interference
of the British legislature as may be deemed from time to
time expedient. The form and frame of the Indian Go-
vernments are so planned, that the system of policy pur-
sued by them, and all their general and important measures,
are influenced, and often directed, and always controlled
by the self-same Councils which rule the political adminis-
tration of the European portion of the Empire. This re-
sults from the institution of the Board of Control, as a con-
stant operative power in the scheme of our Indian Govern-
ment. For the President of that Board, being himself by
virtue of his office one of the Queen's Ministers — and the
majority of the Board itself being composed of others of
those Ministers — it must follow that this Board, in the
actual exercise of its superior 'powers in the government
of India, must conform both to the general views and ex-
pressed wishes of the existing Ministry of England. Thus
the great national measures undertaken through and by the
local Governments of India become — like all others pursued
by the Executive Government of England — the subjects of
debate and revision by the British Parliament. On the
approbation, or otherwise, by that august assembly of the
national measures and general course of policy under which
India is ruled, the question of a continuance, or of a change,
of the Queen's Ministers may depend — in the same
manner (though not in an equal degree) as upon the
approbation, or otherwise, by that body of the measures
of the ministry in the internal administration of Eng-
land itself. For instance, the late war in Afghanistan
was undertaken under the influence, if not the immediate
direction, of the English Ministry, and upon their res-
ponsibility. And many even of suck projects as are li-
mited to general improvements in the condition of the people

260 QUALITY OF THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT IN INDIA.

— such as a change in the system of taxation, a better digest-
ed code for the administration of justice, or a comprehensive
plan of national education — can scarcely be entertained
without the concurrence and support of the same Ministry.

When, therefore, it is commonly said that the terri-
tories of India are governed by the Company— and that the
people of India live under the Company's Government— and
when we hear of the distinction of Native subjects, and of
British subjects— we ought to have a right comprehension
of the meaning of these terms. The people of India live
under the Company's Government, as the people of England
live under the Executive Government, the body^ of the
Queen's Ministers. The Company, as represented by the
Court of Directors acting through their officers, are no more
than a body of our fellow subjects appointed according to the
constitutional scheme of power laid down by the supreme
authority of England, to govern India in conformity with
the fundamental rules established for its government.
And, in like manner, the Ministers of the Queen of England
are a certain body of our fellow subjects appointed according
to scheme of the English constitution, for the government of
the English Empire in conformity with the fundamental rules
of that constitution, and in strict observance of the Statutes
ordained by the supreme authority of the realm. The people
of India, like the people of England, are all subjects of the
Queen, and not of the Company. If some of the Queen's
common subjects settled in India are termed Native sub-
jects, and others British subjects, it is because justice, and
the equal benefit of all, require that different laws, and a
different mode of administration of those laws — with special
reference to peculiar customs, religious tenets, and habits —
should regulate private rights ; and therefore some term for
distinguishing the different classes of the Queen's subjects
became necessary. But this distinction does not imply that
a different measure of protection in the enjoyment of private

QUALITY 01' THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT IN INDIA. 05^

rights, and of security from personal wrong, is dealt out to-
wards the separate classes — or even that the law and con-
stitution of the Indian Governments recognize any difference
in the political rights and privileges of the one class over
the other. A consideration of the qualifications of the can-
didates for offices and honor, and a judgment to he exercised
by the regular appointed authoritits bearing rule over this
country upon such qualifications, are the only principles of
selection which are founded on the law of the land. The
Englishman arriving in India submits himself to the self-
same rules and course of government as bind his native
fellow subject — the Native, should he visit England, par-
takes in common with his British fellow subject every poli-
tical, social, and legal right.

In contemplating the various gradations of authority— the
multiplied dependencies — and the checks upon checks —
which characterize the scheme of the Indian Governments,
many who have little reflected on the just principles of Govern-
ment, on the tendencies of all political power to abuse, and on
the facilities of evading responsibility by rulers governing at a
distance from the supreme organs of the State, may deem
that scheme too complicated for effectual management, and
that a greater simplicity would impart a proportionate increase
of strength and national prosperity. But the perfection of a
work is not so much to be judged of by the simplicity of its
construction, as by the facility and exactness of its operations-)
The most stupendous of machines, the steam engine, pre-
senting to the eye of ignorance a confused mass of combina-
tions, and of intricate, movements, directed to a multitude of
diverse objects, is yet so precisely fitted in all its parts, and
its motions so appropriately adjusted through all their
series to the prime impelling force, that its gigantic task
may be accomplished under the guidance of one man's
hand. And, in like manner, the grand machine of politi-
cal Government may be constructed of powers so propor-

2QO QUALITY OF THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT IN INDIA;

tioned to the duties assigned, so regulated in their de-
pendencies on each other, and so intimately connected to-
gether by a common bond of union, that the direction
of its mightiest, and of its most minute, motions can
receive its impulse as from one single mind. The scheme
of Government for British India works well. The su-
preme influence of the British constitution is felt through-
out the whole system. So long as the rulers and the offi-
cers engaged, according to their various gradations, in the
administration of the Indian Governments proceed in the
correct and ordinary discharge of their duties, there arises
no intermeddling to embarrass, nor is much occasion taken
to occupy vainly the public attention, or that of the supreme
authorities of the State. But, should any design be con-
ceived, or any enterprise be undertaken, affecting the na-
tional welfare — should the Collector project an improve-
ment of the national revenues, or the judge suggest an ame-
lioration of the laws — these is a just consideration en-
sured to these undertakings throughout all the organization
of Government, up to that of the British Parliament itself.
It is seldom that such beneficial labors have failed in secur-
ing for their authors public honors, and more conspicuous
duties. On the other hand negligence, malpractices, and
public wrongs can hardly escape notice, retribution, and
redress. 1 he public voice is instantly lifted up against them.
The scrutiny of a connected gradation of responsible au-
thorities is called forth in judgment upon them. And
these are the surest testimonies of a good and efficient sys-
tem of government — that the national energies have room
to expand, while oppression stands r rebuked before the
frown of authority.

But it is not the object of these discourses to glorify the
system of Government for British India ; but rather to en-
able the reader to form an intelligent judgment upon it.
It may not be, therefore, altogether unbefitting such de-
sign to point at even its defects, when they appear obvious.

SOME DEFECTS IN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA. 2G3

I shall close this discourse by noticing two that seem to he
such.

1st. — Having regard to those just principles of Go-
vernment, which it was the object of the first of these dis-
courses in some measure to set forth, it will be remarked
as a violation of those principles, that any man, or body of
men, should be maintained in wealth and luxury, out of the
toil and property of the people, as public and national objects
of expenditure, who have no public duties to perform, or who
are unable or unwilling to perform them adequately. But
the Government of British India — compelled originally by
the force of circumstances which still have their influence —
fosters in no small degree this violation of just political prin-
ciples.

I wish not to speak particularly here of that support afforded
to various Native powers, by which the dominion of certain
families is upheld over the people, without any interference
being conceded on behalf of the interests of the people them-
selves against the misgovernment of their rulers. This char-
acteristic of the British policy — prompted solely by
a regard to the interests of England — may be disas-
trous enough to those Native states who suffer under
it. By removing all check upon misgovernment through
the intervention of the people themselves, the ruler is
encouraged in abusing his power for his own private
objects. His sense of the dependence, both of his own
authority, and of his people's prosperity, on the inter-
ests and will of a more powerful nation, deadens within him
all hope of raising his country to the level of a rivalry (which
might be thought dangerous) — and all desire to govern well
at the good pleasure of another power, and at the risk of its
disapprobation. The people, in the mean while, submit and
crouch down under the utmost severity of oppression —
for they cannot effect a change by a revolution in their own
Government ; nor can they overthrow the treaties by which

26£ SOME DEFECTS IN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

they are rejected from becoming subjects to another Go-
vernment. These treaties are not made with the nation on
their public behalf; they are rather made with their ruler on
his private behalf. But this is a topic of more concern to
other states than to our own.

But the British Government sustains within its own ter-
ritories numerous sovereigns, who are such only in name —
and who, being neither subjects nor rulers, are bereft indeed,
through the vigilance exercised overall their actions, of all
power to do mischief— but at the same time are incapacitated
through such control from doing good — and are doomed to
lead a life of indolence and unmeaning pageantry, which, if
not a burden to themselves, is at least an almost intolera-
ble burden to their country. These are dignitaries who,
sprung from ancestors once the real rulers over the country,
are now left to be supported by the common toil and resour-
ces of the people, although tjie objects for which such con-
tributions were made have long since ceased. If, indeed,
these personages, upon losing all real authority as monarchs,
had surrendered also the rank and pretensions of royalty, and
had been content to become dignified subjects, in possession
of ample means to maintain the highest position in society —
it had been well for their own true interests, and well for
those of their people. Neither would the public welfare have
been affected by the apportionment of an amount of the
public property sufficient for such objects. But, then, all
that vain expenditure wasted upon thrones and courtiers,
where there is no Government — and upon magistrates and
functionaries who have no duties— might be spared for
more rational purposes. Those who held their property,
and their rank in society, upon the same terms of being res-
ponsible to the opinions of society and to the laws for the
propriety and usefulness of their lives, in the same manner
as all other subjects under a regular Government, would
at least be independent of all that other andyar more enslav*

SOME DEFECTS IN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, 2G5

ing control to which, in the unreal capacity of sovereigns,
they are placed in suhjection. There would then be some
probability that their fortunes might be expended upon
objects in which the rest of the public might have an interest
as well as themselves, and which would be productive of be-
nefit in advancing the arts and general industry. It might
be expected that a contrary course of mere unmeaning waste
and extravagance would be persisted in only so long as
neither sense nor self-interest had any influence.

As it is, the common resources and means of the people
are exhausted by a constant drain productive of no common
or public advantage whatever. A sort of double govern-
ment is maintained, one for the public purposes of the state,
and another for empty show, and the enforced sloth of a
royal court without subjects. Vain pageantry and idle
amusement become of necessity the only occupation of such
a court. For he that enjoys the rank of a monarch, is at
the same time deprived of all power of interference in the
business of the state — and, claiming to be above the law, and
under no responsibility for his conduct, he is not allowed
the same freedom of action, or even the same liberty of ma-
naging his own means, as is conceded to the ordinary sub-
jects of Government who are under the restraint of the law,
It must be plain that it would be the same thing if the peo-
ple of a country were to tax their labour, and contribute
their wealth, to fill up the sea, as to bestow it in nourishing
the pomp and wastefulness of such as can render no services
to the public, nor even share in their common interests. It
is to be observed that it is not a large amount of properly
thus .surrendered once for all — ample to support its possessor
in all the affluence and dignity which is consistent with the
highest station of a subject — and granted in consideration of
power formerly held and duties formerly performed. It is the
unceasing and certain expenditure of an enormous portion of
the public revenues of the slate for sustaining the false splen-

250 SOME DEFECTS IN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

dour of a royal establishment. No nation can make any
prosperous progress under such a load. Those resources
which might be devoted to public works, to extending the
means of communication, to the encouragement of the arts,
to fertilizing the soil, and to the spread of education, are al-
most all swallowed up.

But this is the result of public treaties — of treaties made
with the former rulers of the land— not, indeed, made for the
public benefit of their people, but made for the private bene-
fit of themselves. But the faith of public treaties must ever be
observed : and, so long as the people can endure the injustice
of them, and those with whom such treaties have been made
shall deem it for their interest also that such endurance shall
continue, the faith of such treaties will be observed. The
evil of them is, nevertheless, a truth — and a truth which
should be known. For the time may come when the real
advantage of all parties concerned may combine with their
common desire for their modification.

2d. The other defect in the system of Government for
British India, which I would notice, is the want of any plan
of political representation.

It will be remembered that an endeavour was made in the
first of these discourses to establish, as one essential princi-
ple of just government, that the People should have a
share in itr, administration. That share was shown to
consist, partly in the means afforded to the bulk of the
people of attaining to the offices and honors of the state,
and partly in the means afforded them of influencing and
co-operating in the actual measures and proceedings of the
supreme authority itself. The exercise of this last species
of express share in the administration of the Government,
it was shewn, could only arise out of some well organized
system of representation through election. And, in the

SOME DEFECTS IN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA. 267

second of these discourses, an illustration of such a system
was attempted by explaining that of the British constitu-
tion.

Upon the nature of that share in the administration of
the Government which the people of India possess or may
attain to, and which consists in the access afforded to all
classes, according to their qualifications, to the honors
and offices of the state, I have perhaps already observed
sufficiently in this present disccurse. But we look in vain
throughout, the system of government fur India for any
trace of that share which the people of India can only exer-
cise through some plan of political representation by the
election of Representatives. It remains to offer some re-
marks on the resulting disadvantages.

They may be gathered by the reflecting inquirer from
that portion of the first of these discourses to which the
reader's attention has just been diiected. A full and com-
plete system of representation, such as has been there
pourtrayed, and such as our fellow subjects in England
enjoy under its constitution, cannot be reasonably or bene-
ficially advocated for India. Such a system would not be
compatible with the present condition of the people, nor
with the necessary security and strength of the Government.
Its great distance, moreover, from the seat of Empire,
and the place of Parliamentary assembling, presents diffi-
culties in the details of any arrangement, not easy to be
overcome. But these considerations may not appear suffi-
cient for abandoning all efforts at introducing some practi-
cal approach to a better constitution of the Indian Govern-
ments, ^o long as the whole body of the Native commu-
nity of India are without representatives in the supreme,
or even in the subordinate, councils of the nation — so long
are they without adequate means of exposing the mischiefs
of any measures of misgovernment, or of suggesting those

2G8

SOME DEFECTS IN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

which may be most conducive to the national prosperity.
It is only from the people themselves that rulers can
faithfully be taught the good and evil effects of their policy
before it is too late. While the people do but grieve and
silently submit, public and common disasters become the
only monitors. It is doing little to give free liberty of
printing, and invite the general attention to the quality and
tendency of laws before they are passed. A public
cannot be thus created for any practically useful purpose.
The people require a common bond of union ; some suffi-
cient organ through whom their sentiments may be made
known, and their interests be vindicated. Such are politi-
cal representatives, having constant communion with those
who appoint them. It would be their especial task to
watch on behalf of those whom they represent— it would
be their express duty to protect them against unjust or
erroneous measures— and it would become their peculiar
glonj to advance the prosperity of that country whose des-
tinies are confided to their care. It is only by some means
of political representation that the common interests of
the people of both these portions of the English Empire
can be identified, and their union as fellow subjects be per-
manently fixed. These means are at present wanting to the
people of India ; but it is no vain expectation that they
will before long be supplied.

DISCOURSE VI.

On Jurisprudence : or the Principles
of Administrative Justice.

F the quality of the Virtue of Justice ; and of the

quality of the Science of Administrative Justice. Of
the nature and object of human laws for the adminis-
tration of Justice. Of the origin and nature of Pro-
perty. Of the transfer and succession of Property
Of the security of the Person. That the laws on
which Administrative Justice is founded should be
clear and certain. In what manner laws should
specify and define rights. Of the Civil Code, for
the restoration of rights, and the redress of wrongs.
Of the Criminal Code for the Punishment of wrongs.
That revenge is not a just principle or object of la us
for the punishment of Crime. Of what is the legi-
timate object of human Punishment. Of the Code of
judicial procedure : its nature and objects. Of the
evils arising from a defective method of judicial
procedure. That the laivs of a country ought to de-
pend on certain general principles; and be arranged
according to some system — the knowledge of which
forms a Science. Of the quality of the English sys-
tem of law. Of the causes of litigation independent-
ly of the quality of laws. Of the expediency of
reducing the laws of a Country into a systematic
Code.

DISCOURSE VI.

On Jurisprudence : or the principles
of Administrative Justice.

SECTION I.

Of the quality of Justice as a Virtue, and of the quality
of the Scie?ice of Administrative Justice.

HAT is Justice ? What does (hat term imply in
the English language ? What are the ideas and meanings
called into our mind by the word ? What are the terms
employed in the various languages of the earth to express a
notion comprehending so much signification among men of
cultivated understanding and virtue ?

These are speculations of weight and interest to all ele-
vated minds. They concern, and they more or less in truth
occupy, the thoughts of every rational being. The simplest
savage has a sense of what has contradicted, or of what has
accorded with, some principle or idea of Justice, or fairness,
towards himself or his neighbour. lie confines his notion
of justice to the few circumstances attending, or giving rise
to, the personal pain, or the personal privation, or the perso-
nal pleasure, he is capable of or exposed to. He probably,
has no general term in use by which he can communicate
that notion, apart from the actual thing suffered or enjoyed.
But the civilized man,— a member of human society in its
most exalted state,— the man of meditation and refinement, —

272

OF JUSTICE AS A VIRTUE.

casting his reflections over the vast variety of human actions
and passions in the innumerable relations of civilized life,
seeks for some general term or expression by which he can
characterise that quality which is common to an infinite
multitude of the acts and feelings of mankind, and which ia
his mind he considers to be the quality of justice.

So soon does the necessity of this classifying term arise,
as the relations of social life and of Government are enlarg-
ed, that a nation hardly deserves the name, nor can be con-
sidered as emerged from barbarism, whose language pos-
sesses no special word to denote some ge?ieral idea of justice,
apart from the term denoting any specific act itself which
may be considered just. And, in proportion as "a nation
extends the various relations of social life, and has advanced
in intellectual cultivation, will the significance of the term
justice be extended, and comprehend a larger variety of
applications.

In its general signification among the best cultivated and
most intelligent of mankind, the term justice includes many
more applications than are appropriate to the immediate
object of this discourse. It may be said, indeed, to include
every duty we owe in social life to every class and quality of
our fellow creatures.

For if justice consists in conceding to every man what
God or our conscience declares to be his due, it is a virtue
which requires of us neither to grasp at, nor to withhold,
nor even to entertain designs against, his property — it re-
quires that we should lend our help to our fellow creature*
in that same proportion as we feel we may fairly look for
it from others— it requires that we should respect the very
feelings of others, so that we should inflict no mental distress
for the sake of our own gratification — it requires that we
should protect and advance those who by nature, or by the

OF JUSTICE AS A VIRTUE. 273

circumstances of life, are made dependent on us— and, to ac-
complish these our duties, it requires of us such strict regard
to truth, as that no paltry fears or interests should induce a
deviation from it. Estimated according to such a measure
of its signification, the idea or notion of justice is that of
the first, or rather the queen, of virtues ; for it governs and
employs all others.

And that truth is the very stay and strength of Justice is
plain from this — that those who are willing to do every duty
by their neighbours can never give effect to their virtues
under ignorance or delusion ; and those who are base
enough to seek the injury of their neighbours will scarce
avow their feelings or intentions, but endeavour to disguise
them by every species of falsehood. For, if all the
bonds by which society is held together would be burst
asunder, if men should altogether disregard the rules of
Justice, it is equally certain Unit such rules could not
be regarded without a true knowledge of the actions
and feelings to which those rules were to be applied.
And thus, also, as we abhor the oppressor, who in the inso-
lence of power openly tramples on the rights of others, so do
we despise and punish those who violate those rights through
fraud or falsehood. The honesty of the merchant is, that
he is true and just in all his dealings — the honor of man
with man is that he holds sacred his icord ; that " he
" sweareth to his neighbour and disappointeth him not,
" though it were to his own hindrance" — the honor of a
nation is the observance of national faith. Out of these
principles of truth arises Justice—and upon Justice is found-
ed as well the individual welfare of every man as member of
society, as the prosperity of a nation. We honor the man
of truth, because he scorns private and unjust advantage,
and because he is above even the sensation of fear. And
although in singular instances it often happens that fraud or
falsehood promotes a temporary advantage (which base men

274

OF JUSTICE AS A VIRTUE.

are usually tempted to trust will fall to themselves) yet it
generally happens otherwise ; and it is absolutely certain
that, in the main, the real interests of the whole body of the
people, which ought to be the common cause, suffer. Experi-
ence, therefore, has assuredly shewn that national civilization
and prosperity advances in proportion to the love of truth
and justice.

But I must avoid wandering into discussion rather be-
longing to the moralist than to the expounder of the princi-
ples of human laws and rules of right, which are more pro-
perly the subjects of my present discourse, and to which
these observations are but introductory.

Of justice, therefore, in its highest and most general
meaning — or of that natural sense of what is due to each
man in his station, which inspires the disposition of a virtu-
ous man— or of that habit of mind which leads him volunta-
rily to render to each what is due— and how this sense and
habit of justice tends to human happiness— I am not about
to treat. Neither shall 1 examine into those principles of
justice which by common consent are, or ought to be, ac-
knowledged between independent nations ; who, having no
power to prescribe rules to each other, refer themselves only
to that natural and rational sense of right and wrong which
suggests voluntarily duties. But there are particular acts of
justice which are enforced, and particular acts of wrong
which are prohibited, by express regulations of human origin,
to which we give the name of laics. These laws settle and
declare what are rights and what are wrongs— and the ob-
servance of them depends, not on the opinions or inclinations
of those who live under them, but on the power of the magis-
trates appointed to enforce them. There are many things
which nature itself, or the revealed will of God, has taught
us should be done, or should be forborne, and whereby the
human race may best attain true happiness in life, which

OF JUSTICE AS A VIRTUE. 275

things are, nevertheless, left to the dictation of our consci-
ences, or of our feeling, or of our religious faith. But other
matters for the hetter advancement of the peace and inter-
ests of mankind, and for the very preservation of the bonds
of society, have been necessarily made the subjects of im-
perative rules, and could not have been left to the erring
opinions or frail dispositions of mankind, fn the application
of these rules to human actions consists that particular
quality of justice which may be termed administrative
justice.

These rules, or laws, must be various in different nations,
according to the circumstances of each. But all are, or
ought to be, governed by certain common principles which are
the laics of laws. There are definite purposes and objects
of all laws having in view a true course of administrative
justice— and in ascertaining what these objects are, and
what are the essential qualities of just laws, as tending to
effect such objects, consists the science of Jurisprudence.

SECTION II.

Of the nature and object of human laws for the
Administration of Justice.

It would be vain to expect that such a disquisition as I
propose to engage in can be made attractive to the general
reader, curious only for amusement. The doctrines and
propositions to be submitted involve many considerations,
and much reasoning ; and are not of a nature to be com-
prehended without some mental effort. The reader should
be warned, therefore, that, unless he brings to his assist-
ance a thoughtful reflection upon the passages he is about
to peruse, his attention wilj be unprofitably wasted. For
it is not to be denied that the science of jurisprudence
must be classed among those whose province it is to enrich
the understanding with fruitful and important truths, rather
than to entertain the imagination with pleasing fancies.

Since the happiness of man as a member of Civil Socie-
ty, or of an united community, is equally the final end
and object as well of all law as of all Government— and since
that happiness consists in the perfect enjoyment of private
rights of property and personal security from wrong — it
must be obvious that the proper function of all human laws
for the administration of justice must be to prescribe cer-
tain rules for the enjoyment of property, and certain rides
for the personal conduct, by the observance of which, those
private rights and personal security .are best attained.
Laws, therefore, can never be properly employed, as some
writers have incorrectly suggested, in matters which are
indifferent : for personal security and private rights can

OBJECTS OF HUMAN LAWS. 277

never be matters of indifference. Much good writing has
been vainly expended in discussing whether all human laws
are binding on the conscience ; or whether every man may
not be at liberty to obey, or not, so?ne sort of laws, provid-
ed he is willing to undergo, or risk, the punishment affixed
to disobedience. But all just and expedient laws whatever
— whether existing by nature in our minds, or revealed to
us by God himself, or taking their origin purely from hu-
man device— are more or less binding on our consciences ;
because they all have more or less tendency to the same
object; namely, to promote hnman happiness. If once
assumed to be just and expedient, they must also be assum-
ed to be conducive to the end of administrative justice, which
is the happiness of man in civil society ; and, consequently,
they cannot fairly give rise to any question as to their
being indifferent, and of no moral obligation. Thus, if a law
shall prescribe that all boats used for particular purpose
shall be painted with letters iji a particular form, it would
be a vain distinction to say that this law springs merely out
of human opinion, and is not a law by nature. It is a law
expressly made for the purpose of better protecting the per-
sons or the property of those using the boats— and it is as
much a conscientious duly, though in an inferior degree, to
obey such a law, as another made for denouncing theft.
Neither is any individual member of the Community au-
thorized to judge and decide for himself whether any par-
ticular law is just and expedient, and therefore to obey it,
or not, according to the dictates of that private judgment.
For to exercise and act on such private judgment, is to
disobey the fundamental laws of Government and Society,
which require the surrender of a man's private will and
judgment to general rule and order — and which funda-
mental laws are by nature and necessity ; since society and
Government are necessary to human happiness. Every
man, therefore, is bound by conscience to submit his own
opinion to that of the Government under which he lives,

278 OBJECTS OF HUMAN LAWS.

so long it is an acknowledged subsisting Government —
otherwise there could be neither right nor wrong, nor any
fixed notion of justice. But, as to when and how Govern-
ments themselves are to be amended or established, that is
not a subject of the present discourse.

Still, no human laws can bind us which contradict any
law of nature. This, however, is not because human laws,
merely as such, are not obligatory on our consciences— but
because it being impossible to obey both, we must observe
which is Superior, atad bend to that law which by contra-
dicting repudiates, and as the superior authority nullifies,
the other. And we can have no doubt that the law of na-
ture is the superior law— for the human intellect continually
errs, but nature never. If, therefore, any human law shall
prescribe the destruction of children by their own parents,
or a cruel burning of innocent and defenceless persons
by those on whose protection alone necessity has thrown
them, we may be sure that such a law is neither a
law of God nor of nature— for it is contradicted and repu-
diated by the natural feeling of mankind. The superior
law is that of nature, universal and eternal in our hearts,
and it forbids obedience to the human law which would
outrage the natural law.

SECTION III.

Of the origin and nature of Property.

When we speak of private rights, and of property, and

of personal security, the protection of which is the object
of laws, it is fit that we should have a clear understand-
ing of what is meant by such terms. What is property?
How come men to any right to the exclusive enjoyment
of it ? and what is that perso?ial security to which all men
have a claim ?

Whether we consider mankind in that original state of
nature from which many savage nations have not even yet
emerged — or whether we consider man in the most advanc-
ed stage of civil society — we shall find, upon reflection,
that rights to property must depend on labour, which is
the true origin of all wealth. The savage who roams the
jungle in search of food has by his labour in capturing his
prey acquired a property in it, which cannot be violated by
another, who has not labored for it at all, without a viola-
tion also of our natural sense of justice. The savage set-
tling in his hut, and fencing in and cultivating some portion
of the unoccupied earth originally common to all, by that
labour creates the fruits of it, and gains a natural right to the
enjoyment of it. The manufacturer who produces some new
thing out of raw materials, or who exchanges his own pro-
ducts f»r other commodities (or for money which is the
current symbol and procurer of all commodities) comes by
the valuable thing he thus creates, or obtains in exchange,
through his personal labour, and thus establishes a claim
to it which none else can have. The merchant who buys

280

ORIGIN AND NATURE OF PROPERTY.

for little, and sells for more, obtains the surplus through
his labour. The lawyer, the physician, the painter, the
musician, the dancer, although they produce nothing
tangible, yet, in so far as they either usefully contribute
by their exertions to the attainment of those commodities,
"which are obtained by labour, or to what is agreeable to the
senses or to the minds of mankind, they accomplish some-
thing which is desired, and which but for them would not
exist at all. The return made to them by commodities
or money, is that return which has been created by other's
labour, and is given in exchange for what they have created
by their own labour. And it can signify nothing whether
food, or raiment, or any other tangible commodity, be the
production, or whether the service of the lawyer, or
physician, be the contribution, for which the other com-
modity or money is given in exchange — for if food is
necessary, so is health, and if raiment be necessary, so is a
knowledge of the law and a" successful advocacy of claims.
It would be too much, indeed, to say that a particular
delicacy in food, or a peculiar finery of apparel, is more
rationally desirable, than the harmony of the musician, or
even than the gestures of the skilful dancer. Thus we
see that desirableness is the incentive and valuation of
labour, and labour, as it is the true origin, so is it the only
foundation for right or just claim to property. It is a
right which co-exists with the very nature of our being ;
for a maa must have as plain and just a right to that
which is solely and exclusively produced by his own
labour, as he can have to the use of his own faculties —
both rights being subject only to be abridged or modified
by such rules of Government and Society, without
which rules of some kind or other no rights whatever could
.subsist.

Hence we must also see how vain must be every preten-
sion to property, or in other words to those commodities

ORIGIN AND NATURE OF PROPERTY.

281

created by labour, by those who have neither contributed
their own exertions or services towards the creation of it,
nor have derived it from those who have earned it by their's.
For no man can naturally, or according to that sense of
justice implanted by nature in every man's conscience,
claim to make his fellow-man labour for him without re-
quital If one man could demand the labour of another, with-
out any return or remuneration, he might with equal justice
demand the labour of one hundred or of one million.
Neither Society, nor Government, nor the well-being of
mankind under Government or in Society, require this.
Every man desires, and would endeavour, if nothing pre-
vented him, to get as much of the labour (on which proper-
ty depends j of other men as he can ; and there is no limit
to human desires. But it is the business of human laws
to prevent men from helping themselves at their own mere
will to what they desire, and to limit the right of every
man according to what he <mn himself do or supply in
exchange for his possessions, or to what has theretofore been
done or supplied by others in exchange for those posses-
sions. The King on his throne, as has been said before,
has his duties to perform in exchange for all he enjoys, in
the same manner as the labourer in the field must give his
services or his toil for the remuneration he receives.

SECTION IV.

Of the transfer of and succession to Properly.

But property, and the right to it, having once originated
by labour, must be sustained, and kept in existence : it
must not be abandoned again to some chance occupier, or
to the strife of the strongest. Of the various possessions
which men even by their own labour gain they can them-
selves consume or enjoy but a small portion. What is to
be done with the surplus ? It may be suggested that it
cannot justly be allowed to be utterly wasted or destroyed
— and, therefore, what a man can neither consume or enjoy
ought to return again in common. But this is not conso-
nant to justice— for if property should so return in common,
no other man could gain a natural right to it through his
labour in producing that property ; and Society, which is
naturally necessary for man's happiness, would be broken
up, if such property become continually the subject of strife.
Neither is any thing wasted or destroyed, any more from
becoming a surplus beyond what the owner can himself
enjoy or consume. Somebody will soon or late be sure to
possess or consume it. It is to be inquired how the trans-
fer to others shall be made, so as best to keep Society well
together, and conduce to the general mass of human enjoy-
ment. And, upon such an enquiry, the consideration
immediately arises that nature itself has placed others in
necessary and immediate dependence on almost all men ;
and, in particular, he is impelled to provide for his own
family. Be&ides this, every man derives a pleasure in bes-
towing portions of his property, at least upon his children,
and usually upon his friends— and as this is a pleasure he

TRANSFER OF AND SUCCESSION TO PROPERTY. 9g3

has earned by his labour, he has a natural right to the enjoy-
ment which is had in exchange for that which his labour
created. It is clear, therefore, that the right to property
carries with it the free right of disposal of it to others.

And this right is not put an end to even by a man's
death. In most civilized nations, a possessor of property
has the right by will to bequeath his property entirely at
his own discretion — in others, various modifications and
limits are imposed on this discretion. But, in all countries,
gome provision is made for sustaining a property in some
one, after the right of the last possessor has ceased by
death. The mode in which property after the possessor's
death shall descend, or be distributed, is indeed purely a
matter for human opinion. In the more barbarous and op-
pressed nations, we find human custom or express law has
given the property to the King or Chief — thus, not only de-
stroying the main incentives to industry, but unjustly in-
creasing the share of enjoyments falling to the Prince, and
also his power by the command of those means. In other
countries, the provision for children or relatives i3 enforced
to a greater or less extent. But, us society itself could not
subsist while property was left to be continually and univer-
sally the source of violent strife, the right to it, when once
property has been created, must necessarily be sustained by
providing a never-failing object for its transfer.

Such is property, and such the origin and nature of rights
to it— let us next examine what is meant by personal secu-
rity, and of rights to that.

SECTION V.

Of the security of the Person.

This security of person can consist of nothing else than a
man's freedom from the infliction of death, or of bodily or
mental pain, by the acts of others. And this freedom from
wilful injury by another to life, or to the feelings, or to the
person, is what the inherent sense of every man informs
him he has a claim to in justice, or, in other words,. a right
to, unless by some determination of the rules of that society
or Government under which he lives (which society and Go-
vernment, with its rules of action, are also of natural neces-
sity to mankind) he shall have forfeited such right of ex-
emption from personal injury. And it is plain there could
not exist any natural right to property, or even to subsist-
ence, without the natural right of full security of person
against the unauthorized violence of others. For every man
must have a free liberty, as well from bodily pain as from
personal imprisonment or restraint, in order for the appli-
cation of his labour, on which property depends. So, also,
though in a minor degree, there must exist a natural right
to a man's deserved reputation and good character ; for,
not only is much misery of mind endured by the conscious-
ness of hatred excited against us, but all our faculties are
impaired, and our means and opportunities of industry frus-
trated, by the aversion of others which slander may have
raised.

SECTION VI.

That the Lair a on which Administrative Justice is found-
ed should be certain and clear.

These rights, then, are the objects, and the sole objects,
of administrative justice — for if the rights of private proper-
ty, and those of personal security are fully protected, every
good that man can derive from civil Government and Laws
is attained. The business, therefore, of laws being the
protection of these rights, it remains to enquire what are
the essential qualities of those laws which best tend to ac-
complish that end.

It may be thought a propositkm too plain and self evident
to require discussion, that the laws for the administration of
justice should be certain and clear. And yet, plain as the
proposition is, the bulk of mankind are apt to misunder-
stand or misinterpret it. Among barbarous and unenlight-
ened nations there are very few rules of right, founded
on principle, by which the administration of justice is guid-
ed ; although it often happens that their bodies of law are
made up of a large accumulation of details, applicable to,
and probably suggested by particular cases and circumstan-
ces, but dependent on no general principles. Decisions or
rules of this nature, formed for the most part from the sug-
gestions of the natural sense of various-minded judges bear-
ing on individual instances, usually abound in inconsisten-
cies. As each case must have its own peculiar characteris-
tics, there is no good reason for excluding the authority of
the same natural sense in deciding new controversies, which
sense alone had dictated the rule of right on previous occa-
sions. Uncivilized nations, therefore, whose rules of law

2SG LAWS SHOULD BE CERTAIN AND CLEAR.

are so imperfect, easily submit to a customary course of de-
viation from them : they can conceive no fairer mode, nor
any cheaper and more ready, of ascertaining rights than
the appeal to 'the upright judgment of a good man; and
their minds are slow to apprehend the advantage, or even
the possibility, of any system of (Wed rules which shall
comprise every quality of rights, and the most expedient
method of securing them.

But, further, it is very common to find, among the most
enlightened and best governed nations, those who under-
value the rules of law according to which justice is admi-
nistered , making continual appeals to reason and common
sense ; as though all forms and requisitions of such rules
should be set aside when the judge's natural uninstructed
sense could suggest a different view of the case, or a dif-
se of arriving at that view ; and as though all
such forms and requisitions,, were but so many whims and
:es invented for the purpose of shackling the efforts of
a free understanding. Such notions, however prevalent,
are in truth too shallow to deserve refutation. We may
assuredly declare that the universal experience of mankind
throughout all countries, independently of what our re-
flective reason would explain, has shewn that a people's
prosperity must entirely depend on the certainty and merit
of their rules for the administration of justice between
man and man. Those who are versed in such laws, who
watch and see their operation, who best can observe how
peace and security are preserved thereby, can shew forth the
grounds and reasonableness of the general rules by which
the} are guided. But such as prefer the impressions of
what they call plain and common sense (but by which they
can only mean their own understanding) are impatient of
the restraint of set rules, the meaning and application of
which they do not comprehend — they are averse to the
trouble which a studious examination of them would im-

LAWS SHOULD BE CERTAIN AND CLEAR, 0$7

pose — and they are mortified at every exposure of the errors
which their unguided impressions betray them into. For
if ignorance begets a plain boldness of decision in an
arbitrary judge, it perplexes and renders helpless one who
is constrained to adjudicate according to law.

In no portion of the civilized world are the rules of
justice so uncertain, so obscure, and so contradictory as
in India — and if justice is not worst administered there,
it is owing rather to the integrity of its functionaries
than to any merit of Indian law. It has been said by an
Indian Judge of great experience and learning, that " there
" is scarce a question of Hindoo law which may not be
" affirmed, and also denied, upon the authority of some
" book." It may be well therefore to pass in review some
of the more obvious mischiefs arising from the want of
certain and clear rules for the administration of justice.

If judgments shall be given According to the individual's
sense of what is just — for want of any plain and sure
guide in the admitted law — how could any man distinguish
between what was the Judge's real sense of what was just, and
what was his mere caprice and feeling ? If such indi-
vidual sense, or caprice, or personal feeling, was the sole
origin of a judgment, who could say, that any judgment
was right, or was wrong ? For there would be no guide.
Every man might say that his own sense was as good as
that of another— every man might ascribe to his sense of
right, the judgments which, in truth, were dictated by his
evil passions ; and there could be no check against corrup-
tion. No man could feel, nor could he in reality be, safe
in his person or his property. Let any one inquire " hat
powers the Hindoo king, or even the Hindoo Brahmin
possesses, over the persons of others, and he would seek
to define them in vain. The power of the king is absolute
and uncontrollable— he is a powerful divinity— but he is

2S8

LAWS SHOULD BE CERTAIN AND CLEAtt.

directed to act on advice, and generally through the minis-
tration, of the Brahmins—" a divinity in the human form"
his first and main duty is " to inflict punishment according
"to the Shasters." How then do the Shasters direct
punishment to be inflicted— hy what rules and for what
specific criminal acts ? And how does the Brahmin con-
tribute his advice, and execute his office? " If a blow,
" attended with much pain, be given to human creatures
" or cattle, the king shall inflict on the striker a punish-
" merit as heavy as the presumed suffering ! "A Gold-
" smith who commits fraud the king shall order to be cut
"piece-meal with razors." " Robbers who break a wall,
" or steal in the night, the king shall cut off their hands,
" and transfix them with a stake." " If a man steal a horse
" of small account , the magistrate shall cut off one hand
" and one foot — if any small animal, exclusive of a cat or
" weasel, the magistrate shall cut off half his foot" &c. &c.
" A Brahmin is a powerful divinity, whether learned or
" ignorant." " He need not complain to the king of any
" injury — even by his oivn poicer he may chastise those
" who injure him." '• For ill language to a Brahmin
" the Sooder must have a red hot iron style, ten fingers
" long, thrust into his mouth — for offering a Brahmin
" instruction hot oil must be poured into his mouth and
" ears — for sitting on a Brahmin's carpet he shall be liable
" to have his buttock cut off." " But a Brahmin himself
" shall neither lose his property, nor be hurt in his person,
" although he commits all possible crimes." " Whatever
<: orders the Brahmins shall issue conformably with the
" Shasters, the magistrate shall execute" (Vide Laws of
Menu). Let any one examine the institutes of Menu to
ascertain when and how a Hindoo son becomes incapable
of inheritance. He will read of " those distinguished by
" science and good conduct being allowed to take a greater
" share"— but, among those utterly excluded from any in-
heritance at all, are enumerated " lame, blind, deaf, afflict-

LAWS SHOULD BE CERTAIN AND CLEAR.

289

" ed with any incurable disease (as, amongst others, dysen.
ie tery) — those who have no principle of religion — those
" who have lost the use of a limb." It is plain that such
general indiscriminate language as this — to say nothing of
the palpable injustice of such rules— must leave the appli-
cation of such laws open to mere arbitrary discretion.
"What a fertile source of dispute is the capacity, or not of
a Hindoo to bequeath ! What are the rights of members
of undivided, and of divided families ?

Thus a vague and obscure text — together with the
peculiarity and variety of irrational customs in different castes
— confounds the most vital interests in uncertainty — and
arbitrary constructions must supersede all regularity in
judgments. In such a state of things no certainty of legal
advice is attainable — and where no rights can certainly be
known, there can be no end of litigation. Industry, the,
fountain of wealth, becomes dried-. up in the barrenness of
insecurity of possessions. The people who do not see, or
who do not heed, such evils as these must be content to
live in poverty and dependence — as herds obedient to the
voice of their master. What right in another to respect,
and what right of his own to claim, no man can surely
know — what act under what penalty to refrain from, what
duty to undertake, no man can learn. " If the trumpet
" give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself for
" the battle." Those laws, therefore, are best which leave
least within the breast of the judge. And a judge, to be
truly such, is not one who is merely sagacious in discernment.,
and imbued with a sincere and upright sense of the prin-
ciples of justice ; but one who is learned in definite laws*
For he is the best judge who leaves the least to himself.

SECTION VII.

In ichat maimer Laws should specify and define rights.

Laws, then, which are to be the sure test of rights, and
to be the certain guide to the magistrate in the dispensation
of justice, instead of his own wayward and arbitrary will,
ought to ascertain and specify those rights : they ought to
set forth how they are acquired, and they ought to point
out under what circumstances and in what manner they
finally cease.

As to what are the rights of personal security, they are
few and plain, and have been sufficiently enumerated per-
haps already. But the rig'hts of property are so various ;
and subject to so many qualifications — they become so in-
finite in number and complicated in quality, in proportion
as the industry of mankind increases and improves the
sources of enjoyment — that in the highest civilized nations
the currency of legislation can scarcely keep up with them.
An exact definition of rights becomes continually more
difficult, and a clear and ready knowledge of them requires
long and laborious study.

Looking in the present inquiry no farther than to the
principles of administrative justice, and to what should
be the main and universal characteristics of human laws
directed to enforce it, we must be content with laying
down and establishing general positions, without follow-
ing them up in detail. We may recognize, upon re-
flection, this position— that all rights of property must
consist in the power conceded by the community of
using or employing things or persons in particular modes,

LAWS SHOULD SPECIFY AND DEFINE RIGHTS.

291

so as to derive a gratification from such use or employment.
A perfect definition of rights, therefore, should comprise and
specify all the various modes of using or enjoying things,
and of employing persons. Thus, a piece of land, or a house,
may be used in a limited or in an unlimited manner — for a
limited or an unlimited time — upon certain conditions
or without any conditions. And so also of other and
movable articles of property, a man may have the abso-
lute uncontrolled power of using and of disposing of
it, or various limitations and conditions may be annex-
ed. And, again, the services of persons may belong to
others, either for the purpose of creating or increasing tan-
gible property, or of contributing to the gratification of the
senses or intellectual faculties. Accordingly, our enumeration
of powers over things, and over persons, for these Gbjects
should not only specify the modes of using and employing
them, but also the extent of those powers, or in other words
rights. The definition of these rights will further ascertain
the beginnings or grounds of them — such as by labour, or
by contact, bequest, succession, or the declared will of the
legislature. And, lastly, it will proceed to specify those facts
and circumstances which put an end to such rights. Such,
cessation of right, independently of those circumstances
above noticed as expressly transferring such previous rights
to others, may arise, not only of necessity, as by death, but
by forfeiture, or by some inexpediency in the further exist-
ence of such rights — as for instance rights over slaves — or
by abandonment, or by dedication to public objects, and in
various other ways. Laws must be proportionally defective
as they fail to enumerate and define such various rights of
property —for it must be vain to attempt the protection of
rights, the existence and nature of which are altogether
unknown.

SECTION VIII.

Of the Civil Code— for the restoration of rights, a?id the

redress of Injuries.

If the various rights of personal security, and of property
with all its subdivisions and qualifications, have been speci-
fied and ascertained, it becomes the next essential charac-
teristic by which a good system of laws is to be estimated,
that it provides efficient means for securing every member of
the social community against the violation of those rights.
This can be done by two courses only : 1st, By supplying a
restoration of such rights, or adequate redress when resto-
ration is impossible ; and, secondly, by the infliction of so
much pain and suffering on the party who shall invade them
as may suffice generally to deter the bulk of mankind from
such wrong.

Hence arises a two fold division of laws for the adminis-
tration of justice. 1st, That body of laws which expounds
the nature of rights, and a course of procedure for recompens-
ing the violation of those rights — 2ndly, That class of laws
which define what acts shall be offences or crime?, and
which laws also prescribe a course of procedure with the
view of punishment. There is no apt term recognized in
the English language to distinguish the first class of laws ;
but it is generally termed the Civil Code, and we may desig-
nate it as the Code of rights ; the second division is with
more meaning termed the Criminal, or penal Code— or the
Code of crime.

This two fold division of laws is founded on reason and
principle ; as will appear if we pass in review the distin-

OF THE CIVIL CODE. 293

guishing qualities of each body of laws. The code of rights
having in view the definition of the rights of property in
persons or things— that is, the modes by which services de-
rivable from persons or things shall be enjoyed — how the
rights shall be acquired, and how they shall cease — will ne-
cessarily be various in different countries. They will be
altogether regulated according to the situation, the climate,
the quality of the Government and other peculiar extrinsic
circumstances of those different countries. There is
no standard general rule of right for each such law, appli-
cable under all circumstances. Whether a law shall declare
that all sons shall inherit equally, or whether it shall declare
that they shall succeed in certain proportions — whether a
law shall allow the taking of interest, at 5, or at 12 per
cent, or at any indefinite amount — may be questions of mere
social policy ; and either law may be best, according to the
condition of the people. Neither is there any natural
and universally acknowledged guilt in deviations from the
greater portion of such laws, except in so fur that all ex-
press laws under settled Governments ought for that rea-
son, to carry with them our conscientious obedience. Such
laws must also necessarily vary according to the national
wealth, and the stage of advancement in civilization of the
people— and they also necessarily change in the same coun-
tries according to the progress of wealth and advancement.
In proportion to such increase must be the number of cases
which combine new and unprecedented circumstances,
unforeseen and unprovided for in express detail, and which
either must be shewn to class under the general rule and
reason of laws already existing, or else become the subject
of new laws, or of original decision according to some na-
tural sense of justice. Contests arising out of such new
cases of doubtful rights imply no guilt — each contending
party may assert his pretensions in good faith — they may
be set up through mere misapprehensions of facts, or of law,
and such misapprehension may be unavoidable. More-

294 0F THE CIVIL CODE.

over there are some omissions of duty, and some devi-
ations from known rules of law, which, however wilful
or unjustifiable, yet, being confined in their effects to
the interests "of one or a few individuals, may be suffici-
ently restrained or rectified by a course of law which may
nullify such injurious effects, or afford a full restoration of
the rights invaded. The distinguishing characteristics of
the Civil Code, or code of rights, therefore, are that it
merely ascertains rights, and supplies remedies for the in-
vasion of 'hem, through restoration or redress to the injur-
ed party. As this object can only be accomplished by means
of Properly, to property alone are its operations confined
when called into action. Its aim is not the infliction of any
pain or suffering ; except, indeed, such become the means,
and the only means, by which its real aim that of restora-
tion or redress can be attained. Its method of procedure
for the investigation of facts, the declaration of the law,
the award of recompence, and the enforcement of its judg-
ments, admits of many differences, according to the nature
of the right to be ascertained, and that of the injury to be
redressed : but all these differences are guided and govern-
ed by the characteristic objects in view, namely, redress
through the regulation or transfer of property. As the
questions which arise in civil litigation are very various, and
often difficult, its course of procedure for the ascertain-
ment of facts, for the exposition of the law, and for the
enforcing of the judgments is the more cautious and com-
plicated. Since no guilt is assumed on either side, or at
least beyond the power of redress, its judicial process is equal
between the opposing parties ; and as property alone is the
subject matter contested for, the immunity and liberty of
the person is the more respected.

SECTION IX.

Of the Criminal Code for the punishment of Injuries.

The code of crime, or criminal code, although it has the
same general view as th 3 code of rights— namely, the
protection of property and personal security — has reference
to an entirely distinct quality of wrongs against property
and person, and prescribes a different course for the pre-
vention of such wrongs. It selects a series of acts which
contradict the rules of justice hetween man and man, and
the well-being of the social community, which acts it de-
nounces, not as deviations to be rectified, but as offences,
or crimes, to be retributed by public hatred and personal
suffering. Acts of this quality are, or ought to be, such
only as our natural conscience suggests to us as unjust.
Laws against crime, therefore, are very similar in all coun-
tries—all depending on one common principle, and guided by
the common sentiments of human nature. The guilt of theft,
or murder, depends not on any questions of social policy.
Nature itself has stamped the odious and injurious charac-
teristics of such acts. Little controversy can arise respect-
in"- the quality of direct, lawless, criminal invasions of
ri"hls, compared with the infinite diversity of questions
arising out of the contests and doubts attending the acqui-
sition and enjoyment of property. Long and black as the
catalogue of human delinquencies may be, they are but few
■which come within the scope of the Criminal Code. Crimes
are distinguished as those acts which effect injury through
fraud, or through terror, or through actual violence — which
thereby create a general apprehension of insecurity — and
which inflict wrongs for the most part beyond the means of
redress : and to such acts may be added some which are

£96 0F TIIE CRIMINAL CODE.

criminal only because the perpetration of them excites a na-
tural hatred and abhorrence. The remedy aimed at is, not
the rectification of that which is wrong, or merely the re-
compence to be made to the individual injured — which is
generally impossible, and always inadequate to the total
amount of mischief— but the future protection of the com-
munity generally, through the personal punishment of the
Criminal.

Such being the subject-matter, and such the immediate
object of the Criminal Code, as distinguishable from those
of the Code of Rights, we may expect that its course of
procedure will also exhibit some corresponding differences.
As every course of legal procedure, whether as it regards
civil rights or criminal acts, is similarly concerned in the
investigation of facts, the exposition of the law, and the
enforcing of judgments pronounced — some writers have
been induced to designate this as a third and separate
branch of jurisprudence, under the term of The Code of
Procedure, and such a threefold division may not be an
inconvenient or an incorrect method of classifying the whole
subject-matter of human laws. But, as each of the former
divisions of jurisprudence, the Code of rights and the
Code of Crime, effect their final objects in the protection
of property and personal security through different modes
of judicial proceeding, and different resulting operations,
those distinctions ought not to be lost sight of, so as to con-
found the judicial procedure for the investigation and pro-
tection of civil rights with that for the investigation and
punishment of crimes,

"When a crime has been committed, it is Society that
suffers, and not merely an individual— it is the further se-
curity of society that is to be protected by the punishment
of the criminal, and not the party injured to be personally
redressed. There is no personal interest at stake, there-

OF THE CRIMINAL CODE. 297

fore, which may bias any individual in putting the law into
force. Every man in pursuit of justice against the offender
has, or ought, and is supposed to have, a 'public object
only in view — and every member of society is more or less
concerned in lending his aid. As a sense of public duty
is to be assumed as actuating the party accusing, and some
presumption of guilt is fixed upon a party actually charged
by any testimony of facts, the accuser and the culprit do
not submit the case for judicial enquiry and judgment with
equal relative rights and equal relative responsibilities, in
the same manner as litigants do when contesting civil rights,
each with a view to his own private interest. The quality
of the acts charged, the nature of the personal suffering to
be undergone by the guilty party, and the presumption of
the existing guilt as soon as a specific accusation is credibly
made, dictate also a stricter course for ensuring the personal
appearance to answer the charge made, in cases where the
accused can by his person only, and not by his "property,
atone for his crime. And, lastly, in proportion to the se-
vere, and sometimes irremediable, consequences of punish-
ment on the guilty, ought to be the various safeguards sup-
plied for the ascertainment of truth and the defence of the
innocent.

SECTION X.

That revc?ige is not a j ust principle or object of laws against

Crime.

But, before I proceed further to comment on that branch
of administrative justice which respects the objects and
method of Judicial Procedure, some further considera-
tion appears due to the governing principles of crime and
punishment.

The appetite for revenge is a passion so naturally allied
to the sense of injury, that it is difficult for the
ordinary and unreflecting masses of mankind to con-
ceive that the gratification of it is not as conformable to
morality as it is urgent upon our feelings. Our anger
is not voluntary : its mastery over the reason is proverbial :
for, although the occasions are rare (and usually arising out
of habitual indulgence) when sudden wrath utterly over-
throws all the powers of the mind, yet it is altogether im-
possible to prevent such excitement having in some degree
its bias on our reason, and too often on our actions. Even
our resentment — which we may distinguish as thoughtful
anger — will, in spite of self-control, still rankle in our breasts,
so long as the author of our wrongs triumphs in careless im-
punity. Nay, it is a feeling that has so much of dignity and
manliness in it, as to carry a sort of commendation
among the bulk of mankind.

There is no doubt, therefore, that the propensity to re-
venge has been implanted in our bosoms by the God of na-
ture for wise — and, if wise, we must say for beneficent— pur-
poses. It is, in truth, that natural impulse by which man-

REVENGE NOT AN OBJECT OF CRIMINAL LAV. 299

kind are led to protect themselves against injury through
the infliction of-suffering upon the wrongdoer, and where-
by the softer feelings of sympathy with our fellow-creatures
is, with a view to the general well-being of all, stifled for
the time. For revenge is a sort of wild justice —and its
growth in the mind is in proportion to its want of rational
culture. The nearer that a savage people approach a state
of nature, the more they are governed by their passions.
By vengeance they not only gratify a raging appetite, but
they also preserve their social existence, which could no
longer continue if universal wrong could not by some
such course be prevented. And even afterwards, as ci-
vilization, and government, and law gradually gather and
keep together a people, converting wandering tribes into
settled nations, we find that they are slow to perceive the
true object of human punishments, and slow to resign the
gratifications of revenge. In proportion to the civiliza-
tion of a people, does vengeance»cease to be applauded; and,
afterwards, to be tolerated — and thus we may reckon
among the tests of the ignorance and barbarity of a nation
the cruelty of its punishments.

Allowing, then, that we may regard the desire of revenge
as a natural feeling, which would not exist at all but for
purposes consonant to the well-being of mankind, we must
regard it also as an impulse, which, like those of all other
passions, will drive us into misery and evil, unless guided
by our reason — and, in that guidance, we must entirely re-
spect the end which the creator of man must have intended.
That end was not any gratification to be derived from hu-
man suffering. So far from it, this gratification is but of
short duration, and generally gives rise to compunction or
sorrow, rather than to any lasting complacency. And this
happens because men are usually inordinate in their desire
of what tends to their own gratification— and there is always

300 REVENGE NOT AN OBJECT OF CRIMINAL LAW,

something repulsive in the reflecting contemplation of the
suffering of another which has produced no benefit to any
body. It would, indeed, be hard to say what measure of
vengeance would be sufficient to satiate resentment in any
given case ; and it would be equally difficult to say to what
degree the desire of revenge may be satiated without caus-
ing some resulting regret. Such a gratification cannot, there-
fore, be good for its own sake, or as a source of virtuous
happiness. The impulse which excites us towards it must
have another aim and object — the gratification is but as the
means to an end, and not the end itself. On the contrary, our
more reflecting sentiments teach us sympathy, fellow-feeling,
and the forgiveness of injuries.

But, if neither reason, nor a true sense of morality, will
sanction the gratification of revenge — still less is it the pro-
vince of human laws, which in their best sense are the per-
fection of reason, to administer to such an appetite. The
office of the law is either to weed out altogether that wild
justice which derives its growth from the passions of savage
nature, or else to change its rudeness through culture. It
looks only to the happiness of man in society, and not to the
gratifications of his solitary feelings, still less of his unsocial
appetites. Bodily suffering it contemplates as a pure
evil in itself ; it regards the infliction of it as justifi-
able only in preventing worse evils. If the infliction
of personal punishment becomes necessary for the mainte-
nance of personal security and of private property, which are
the resulting objects of all human laws, the extent of such
punishment is limited by the bounds of such necessity. Every
amount of pain administered beyond the existing necessity
for such, the only just, objects of human laws is a mere
sacrifice to malignity — a creation of evil to answer no useful
purpose — an unmixed mischief. This is a maxim which
ought never to be lost sight of by the wise legislator or the
enlightened citizen. Cruel laws will not be carried into

REVENUE NOT AN OBJECT OF CRIMINAL LAW. ^Q\

effect by a humane and intelligent people— and, therefore,
become nugalory, and for that reason an encouragement to
crime. But if inordinate and vindictive punishments are
resolutely inflicted, it either betokens discontent among the
people, or serves to brutalize their dispositions, and retard
their social prosperity.

SECTION XI.

The legitimate object of human Punishment.

The only legitimate way in which punishment can
operate in protection of rights, is by the terror of example.
It, accordingly, becomes the object of a just Government to
ascertain, as far as its limited capacity will allow, the amount
of punishment which will suffice to inspire so mu.ch terror
as may induce a voluntary abstinence from crime. This
amount of punishment can never, in truth, be absolutely
ascertained — for there is no severity of it, not even certain
death by extreme tortures, which will assuredly deter all
mankind from the commission of some sort of crime. His-
tory records many instances of the perpetration of crime,
through vengeance, or excited passions, which the malefactor
has dared, in spite of the expectation of the manifest and
immediate retribution of a cruel death. And it is also the
subject of continual experience, that men will sometimes
purchase a temporary gratification at the certain cost of
greater suffering than they can inflict, or than such gratifica-
tion can, even in their own opinion, compensate for. But,
still, in all ordinary cases the promptness and certainty of
any the smallest amount of suffering or privation to be un-
dergone beyond the gratification or gain acquired by the
commission of the crime, would be sufficient to quell all
temptation to it. It is plain that there could scarcely be a
theft, if the plunderer should be sure that he would imme-
diately have to surrender his booty, and' something more.
And so it may be said of most other crimes, when an imme-
diate retribution should be made to surpass in the slightest
degree the gratification. A greater amount of punishment

LEGITIMATE OBJECT OF HUMAN PUNISHMENT. 3Q3

becomes necessary only for these two reasons — First,
because it is impossible to make the retribution either certain
or immediate ; Secondly,, because there are human passions
and appetites so strong, as that in some cases} neither ihe
certainty nor the immediateness of a much larger share of
suffering than that inflicted, or than may overbalance
the temporary gratification of such passions, will deter men
from rushing on the guilt. The effect of mere delay and
uncertainty of any retributive evil in deadening its influ-
ence on the apprehension is as remarkable as it is obvious
to our reflection. Thus, the uncertain period, and the fan-
cied remoteness, of death itself, the most appalling and the
most assured of all evils, renders us all but indifferent to its
terrors. And it must be quite unnecessary to point out how
commonly the human appetites impel us unscrupulously to
acts, which our own judgment clearly shews to be, eventually,
productive of a real disadvantage.

It follows from these considerations that, in the endeavour
(for it can be no more) of a Government to affix a sufficient
amount of punishment to deter from the commission of crime,
it must necessarily adopt, so far as it is possible, a scale of
retribution very considerably beyond that of the injury inflict-
ed, or the gratification enjoyed from the perpetration of the
crime. It must endeavour to compensate for the influence of
the delay and uncertainty of the retribution in deadening
our sense of apprehension— and it must strive to counteract
by severity the bias of the passions over the judgment and
conscience of mankind. At the same time it is to be ob-
served that, in proportion to the promptness and cer-
tainty of punishment', should be its leniency— and that,
since all unnecessary pain is an evil, a wise legislature will
aim at perfection in the rules for preventing and detecting
crime, and ensuring penal retribution with a view to increas-
ing the dread of criminality, rather than trust to any vindic-
tive cruelty in punishment. For severity can never be just-

304 LEGITIMATE OBJECT OF HUMAN PUNISHMENT.

ly or effectually made a substitute for that certainty and re-
gularity which may be attainable by a good Criminal Code
well administered. Either humanity shudders and revolts
at the disproportioned punishment— or, else, all just feeling
must be uprooted from the heart through ignorance and
barbarity. For the same reason simple death ought to be
the utmost punishment inflicted for the greatest crime.
Because, although death through accumulated tortures may
be the more dreadful to endure, yet the increased terror at
crime thereby occasioned will by no means compensate for
the outrage on all proper feelings of humanity, or for the
evil effects of the insensibility of a people to such horrors.
Moreover, it is reasonably doubted whether criminals, who
disregard the penalty of death, will be induced to refrain
through the apprehension of additional tortures.

Of the various prevalent modes of punishment it would
be an useless labour to rehearse a list, unless with a view to
discuss the appropriate application, or otherwise, of each, or
else with a view to gather some general rules in the adapta-
tion of punishments to crimes. Both the one and the other
of such objects would lead me far beyond the scope of this
discourse— and, indeed, so much controversy has been rais-
ed, and still exists, on these points that I could advance but
few positions as indisputably settled on sound argument.
It is clear that the nature of the punishment ought not al-
ways to depend on the quality of the crime, but must some-
limes be regulated by the quality of the criminal. Of
punishments, some are purely corporal, others operate chiefly
on the mind and feelings. The lash, or heavy labour,
may be all that is felt in the infliction of such suffering on
the low-born, ignorant, and hardened pauper —exposure to
public scorn, privation of all present property, banishment
from his country, may be penalties of which he could scarce
be sensible. By the man of birth, or respectable station in
life, on the contrary, personal pain may be in itself compara-

LEGITIMATE OBJECT OF HUMAN PUNISHMENT. 3O5

lively despised ; but the disgrace and infamy which may attend
the infliction of it may he more intolerable than death itself:
and, to him, exposure merely, deprivation of rank or fortune,
or transportation from his home, must necessarily be a pun-
ishment of the severest nature. Again, the assault or the
slander committed by the low-bred common labourer
against his equal neighbour may be of little account — that
of the rich man, or the nobleman, against his equal may
testify the most, injurious outrage or villany. These con-
trasts, according to persons and circumstances, might be
copiously exemplified, and they serve to shew that
there can be but few general rules in the adoption or rejec-
tion of particular modes of punishment. One, however,
appears to gain ground in the consideration of most civilized
nations — which is, the avoiding, as far as possible, the infliction
of corporal pain, and the resort to such punishments as may
rather enforce and embitter reflection. And this princi-
ple in punishment seems well founded, inasmuch as while
the penalty which the criminal is made to endure may
be, in itself, a sufficient warning and example, it tends
at the same time to his reformation, and thereby to
relieve him, eventually, in some degree from that load of pub-
lic hatred and personal disgrace which aggravates his suffer-
ing beyond what is due, and renders him an useless in-
cumbrance on society.

SECTION .XII.

Of the Code of Judicial Procedure, and its nature and

objects.

I have thus endeavoured to point out what are Ihe rights
which are the ohjects of administrative justice— to shew
that they should be ascertained by clear laws — and to ex-
plain the quality and the principles of that body of laws
directed to expounding rights and affording redress for the
invasion of them, and of that body of laws directed to the
punishment of a criminal violation of rights. It now be-
comes expedient to add a few further observations on the
quality and principles of that branch of jurisprudence which
is concerned in setting forth 1 the method of judicial proce-
dure, which I have considered as forming part of each of the
above twofold division of human laws, but which has
been sometimes treated of separately as a third division^
under the term of Me code of procedure.

The ohjects of judicial procedure are — the investigation of
alleged facts or charges — the exposition of the rules of law
as applicable to ascertained facts — and the enforcement of
the judgments pronounced with a view to redress or punish-
ment. For these purposes regular Courts of law should
be established, with distinct and well ascertained powers
and jurisdiction ; and the judges, who preside over them
for the administration of justice according to the settled
rules of law, should be such ashy a long course of education
and experience in the laws of the land have proved their
competency to such duty. Their decisions, should be open-
ly and publicly pronounced ; and so long as they stand, and
subject to such correction and rectification by superior au-

OF THE CODE OP JUDICIAL PROCEDURE. 3Q7

thority as by express law may have been provided, they
should be uncontrollable. That their decisions may be given
according to the dictates of their true knowledge and of
their conscience, judges of every quality should be made,
as far as possible, independent of all bias from interest and
from fear, in respect of any consequences of their judgments.
But by this it is not to be understood that judges should
be exempt, from all superior control or personal responsibili-
ty. The ignorant judge should be displaced, the unjust judge
should be punished. But their independence should be that
of the mere discretionary power of any party to favor or to
injure them With reason, therefore, does a just system of
law and of Government throw around all judicial functiona-
ries so large a share of protection in the performance of their
duties, that nothing short of deliberate and full proofs,
before some well constituted tribunal of enquiry, of guilt or
incompetency in such performance should affect their inter-
ests, their reputations, or their security. And thus much it may
be sufficient to observe upon the principles which should
prevail in the establishment of Courts, and the quality of the
judicial authority— for it is not intended here to discuss the
expedient constitutions of various Courts, their relative ex-
tent of jurisdiction, or the respective qualifications of their
presiding magistrates or ministerial officers.

But the objects of judicial procedure are very far from
being attained by the mere establishment of regular Courts,
and the appointment of able, learned, and conscientious
judges to administer justice therein according to law. That,
they may be enabled to ascertain facts— to apply the rules of
law to such stale of facts — and efficiently to carry their judg-
ments into execution — they require to be guided by certain
settled forms and' rules, such as long experience, the con-
tinued exercise of sagacity, and a consideration of the cir-
cumstances of the people of the country, have suggested
as most conducive to the accomplishment of these ends.

308 0F TIIE CODE OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE.

For it is to be considered that, with a view to the just as-
certainment of facts, or the subject-matter .in controversy,
and the exposition of the law applicable to the case, it is
necessary, first, to provide that the charge or complaint made,
as well as the point or charge denied, should be precise, spe-
cific, and clear; so that the judge may perceive exactly
and plainly what is the matter of fact to be investigated, or
ivhat the matter of disputed law to be adjudicated upon :
and, secondly, it is requisite to provide for the due admis-
sion of proper proofs. So, also, as regards the efficient exe-
cution of judgments, when pronounced, all evasions must
be prevented, and all excesses provided against. All these
purposes require some regulated course of stating facts —some
regulated means of compelling disputant parties to answer
or admit each other's statements — some method by which in-
quiry into disputed facts should be prosecuted — some process
by which the testimony of witnesses or of documents should
be adducible — some rules as 6 to what testimony or evidence
is relevant or receivable, and for sifting and examining the
quality of that which is to be received — some order in the
delivery, of judgments, and also in obtaining a rectification
of such as may have been erroneous— and, finally, certain
specific modes of enforcing on the person, or upon the pro-
perty, of delinquent parties, the work of restoration, recom-
pense, or punishment.

A slight reflection on this complicated subject will teach
us that to frame a body of rules best calculated to effect
these objects in the practical administration of justice among
a populous and civilized nation, must be a task of great labour,
of much sagacity, and also of experienced knowledge. Such
a system of judicial procedure has rather to be built up in
the progress of ages, than to be devised at once from the
mere force of invention. If parties complaining of wrongs, or
demanding rights, or imputing crimes, are not to be left en-
tirely to their own discretion as regards the modes of bringing

OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE. 3Q9

forward thoir claims or charges — lest the ignorant or the
weak-minded should inadequately represent the subject-
matter of inquiry — lest the statements made should be ob-
scure, or comprise long and vain details -lest the opposing
party may not be able to perceive distinctly what he has to
answer— lest a full and fair opportunity be not given him to
make his answer— then is it requisite that some forms and
methods should be devised, by compelling an adherence to
which these defects and evils will be best avoided. So, if
parties are to be heard in denial or on explanation, and to
be condemned in default of either— they must have due
times and seasons allowed for such purposes, and such a
course must be prescribed for their meeting the claims or
charges made, as that they may have full opportunity of
stating all that they desire to state which is relevant to the
matter, and none of evading or deviating from the ques-
tions to be considered of. So, again, if he who is to judge
between the parties is not to ?,dopt that course of inquiry
and hearing which he in his discretion may in each indi-
vidual case choose to direct— then must it be settled by
what course a question of disputed law may best be dis-
cussed and considered of, or a question of disputed fact
best be tried and examined, allowing to each party the
means of adducing all available testimony on points of
fact, and all applicable arguments upon points of law. If
all representations by witnesses, or through the medium of
writings and documents, are not to be admissible and heard
as evidence upon matters of fact, and upon equal terms as
regards its weight, of whatsoever quality it may be, and
from whatever quarter it may chance to come — then must
some general rules be laid down as to incompetency in some
parties to give testimony, whether from the infamy of their
characters, or their defective understanding, or their bias
through some serious interest at stake in the question to be
decided ; and also as to the inadmissibility of some quali-
ties of evidence, from not being relevant to the matter

3J0 OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE.

previously put in dispute, or from being merely the state-
ment of absent parties, and not within the actual knowledge
of the witness, or from other such causes. For, it is to be
borne in mind, that the legitimate object of all rules in the
respect of evidence is to ensure, as far as possible, the true
knowledge of facts. The question for consideration is,
whether the admission of all sorts of evidence or testimo-
ny—that which a party interested may give — that which a
witness may relate as said by others who are absent — that
which an absent party may write— that which a husband
or wife may say for or against each other— that which an
infamous or perjured person may state, and so on— may not
as often lead to falsehood, and the disguise or concealment,
as to the establishment, of truth. If there is any justice
in such apprehension, it must follow that sound reason,
much insight into the moral qualities of human nature, and
an extensive acquaintance with the business of mankind in
civil life, must be exercised in the framing a body of rules
for that department of judicial procedure which regulates
the reception, or the rejection, and the appreciation of evi-
dence. Again, in the order of delivering judgments obvious
topics for consideration arise ; such as the expedient
publicity, the assignment of reasons, the notice to parties
concerned in order to their presence, and the mode of so-
lemnly recording the decisions. So also, if any means for
rectification of judgments pronounced are to be allowed — the
modes, and the terms of appeal, the quality of the appellate
tribunal, and the limitations of the power of appeal,
have to be ordained — with so much prudence as that, while,
on the one hand, a check is afforded against ignorant
or heedless adjudications, and a thorough deliberation on
difficult points of inquiry is ensured — efficient obstacles may
be supplied, on the other, to vain and vexatious litigation.
Lastly, if the execution of judgments requires any safe-
guards against oppression, and any forces to cope with re-
sistance or evasion— a regulated course, and prescribed

OF THE COBE OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE. 3 J J

methods, have to be ascertained, whereby judgments may
be made effectual according to their strict objects, and all
deviations from them be restrained.

In such or similar details must every system of judicial
procedure be occupied; and, so necessary a part is it of
administrative justice, that the merit of the whole judicial
system in every civilized counfry is mainly to be judged
of according to the quality of this portion of it. Its im-
portance in the laws of every country would appear
from the circumstance of its preceding even the rules
for ascertainment of civil rights, and for the redress and
punishment of wrongs. Even while all rights, and all
qualities and amount of redress and punishment, are left to
the consciences or arbitrary will of those who wield the powers
of Government, the methods for hearing, trying, adjudicat-
ing, a?id enforcing obedience are usually regulated with,
some detail, and on some principles of equity, as between
man and man. In India, this is the only department of
the judicial system which has been reduced into any thing
like a systematic code ; for he who shall examine the re-
gulations of Government will find that the processes of the
law, and the modes of procedure, occupy almost all that body
of the volume which is not dedicated to the collection of
revenue — and the previous prevailing laws of the land have
been left but partially modified, and iudeed almost un-
touched.

SECTION xnr.

Of the evils arising from a defective method of Judicial

Procedure.

Still, it is by slow degrees that nations, as they emerge
from barbarism, perceive the advantages of a detailed
system of uniform rules for judicial procedure; and those
who either will not, or cannot, justly reflect on the nature
of its objects, not uncommonly hold a language worthy of
a barbarous age. It is still made a question by some,
whether common sense would not suggest, that every judge
should receive with equal attention all complaints— should
prosecute his enquiries, according as the individual circum-
stances of each case might suggest to his uncontrolled views
— should give his judgment of the law, and extort obedience
to his decision, in such manner and by such means as his
sense of justice and expediency may dictate. I have al.
ready adverted to the importance of clear and certain
rules of law for the settlement and protection of rights;
and most of my observations will equally apply to this
portion of such rules as are concerned in regulating details
of Procedure. It seems fit, however, that I should further
enforce those general observations, by a few others of more
specific application in manifesting the mischiefs of a de-
fective system of judicial administration— for it is certain
that, as it is sometimes said that such 'plan of Government
is best which is best administered, so with much more
truth may it be declared that the most perfect code of
civil rights, and of crime, may become the mere engine
of oppression, unless the administration of it be regulated
by a clear and certain method of procedure.

EVILS OF DEFECTS IN JUDICIAL PROCEDURE. 3^3

It must he obvious that where the judge has no guide,
save his own discretion, in his course of hearing and prose-
cuting inquiries, or in his mode of enforcing obedience to his
judgments, the course of all investigations, and adminis-
tration of the settled law, must vary according to the talents,
and also according to the disposition, of the judge. New,
and different, and often contrariant, modes of enquiry will
be adopted by each separate judge. The ignorance, or the
weak understanding, of one man may betray his integrity
into errors subversive of justice — the abiliti . rmay

facilitate the wilful partialities which a malevolent or cor-
rupt inclination may inspire It will always he in the
judge's power to make the details of each case before his con-
sideration hear whatever complexion may suit his 1
views -'but, whether those views !)•• right or • :, mul
whether the details he full, and true, and fair, must altoge-
ther depend on the mental and moral qualities of
We may he sure that uncontrolled power naturally to

corruption, and that the uninform lerstanding natural*

ly deviates into error. But where no certain pre
rules supply a check, or impart instruction, it. is manifestly
vain to seek either from the uncontrolled will, or from the
common ignorance, of superior authority. The arbitrary
judge can scarce be blamed for pursuing the dictates even
of a defective understanding, in default ofany other rule of
guidance ; ami he may defy the scrutiny which woul 1 dis-
tinguish ' el ween the wilful abandonment of what a natural
sense of ju ti ts, and the inability to porceive it.

The controlling authority of a superior affords no security
either for a sounder intellect, or a more upright disposition.
When, tip , the discretion of the judge, and not any

settled rules, shall determine his course of executing his
functions.it seems plain that, even under the best code of
laws, prescribi >t is right and prohibiting what is wrong,

there is no greater certainty of the prevalence of true justice,

314 EVILS OF DEFECTS IN JUDICIAL PROCEDURE.

than there is the certainty of wisdom without learning, and of
integrity without any checks upon corruption.

If it. were conceded that the utmost efficiency in point of
intellectual power, and the purest moral sense, should
characterise the judge, yet, in the absence of any regulated
system of procedure, would his ablest efforts often be thwart-
ed, and as often be encumbered, with doubts, delays, and
difficulties. When every suitor or accuser can have access
to the ear of the judge in whatever manner and by what-
ever course his own views of his interests, his own cunning,
or his own excited feelings, may prompt — no common rules
existing for the equal restraint and equal instruction of all —
these two results may be expected : first, that the judge
must be continually exj osed to unfair attempts to bias his
mind ; and, secondly, that his examinations will be loaded
■with irrelevant inquiries leading to no definite end. Hav-
ing no guide as to what statements he ought to receive, and

what to reject, or when and how they are to be delivered to
him, or by what course they are to be made known to and
answered by the opposite party, he must admit alt repre-
sentations, or else run the risk of repressing those which
may be the most important. Hence arises that custom of
private petitioning, so common among people whose laws
are not administered according to any settled rules or forms.
Hence all those arts and contrivances, by which the design-
ing and dishonest seek to create a secret influence, are en-
couraged. The impartial, and conscientious judge will, indeed,
resolve to deal openly, and may disclose to each party every
act done and every allegation made. But it will then be-
come obvious to what confusion and imperfect results such
a course of indiscriminate hearing and examination would
lead. As the matters alleged on each side are likely to be
numerous, indistinct, and various— so must the points to be
proved be as various and uncertain also. It will be impossi-
ble for either party to know which of them may be consider-

EVILS OF DEFECTS IN JUDICIAL PROCEDURE.

31.

ed altogether unimportant, and often difficult to know which
may be the most important to be established. Mew matter
for enquiry may continually be advanced, which either
side may require time and opportunity to answer or disprove.
There being no settled rules for the reception or rejection of
evidence, the parties can never know beforehand what will
be admissible, and what not. Thus it will be impossible
that either party can be certainly prepared at the time of tri-
al, either as regards the nature and extent of the testimony
he ought to adduce, or the quality of the witness who may
be allowed to testify. Reference must be made to the judge
for directions at every step — and he becomes alternately the
adviser of each party, instead of the indifferent arbitrator
between both. Much more might be said in exposition of
the mischiefs of a mere discretionary course of administer-
ing the law, but it needs some illustration by detailed exam-
ples to make them thoroughly comprehended. To give a
general notion of the nature and-objects of a regulated plan
of judicial procedure is all that can be aimed at in a.
discourse like this.

SECTION XIV.

That the laws of a country ought to depend on certain

general principles, and, be arranged according to some

system — the knowledge of which forms a Science.

All knowledge of which (he details can he reduced under
certain- gei rules, founded on rational principles,

becomes a science. As jurisprudence, which inculcates
the laws of laws, or (he principles on which all laws for
the clue a< ition of justice ought to be founded—

(which principles fire derived from observation on the na-
ture of man in sojciety, and on the qualities and tendencies
of political Government) -must itself be a science, so, also,
must a knowledge of the few or rules of justice, as estab-
lished in every free and civilized nation, become a science.
The construction of a body of laws, whereby the rights of
property may he secured, and the person may he protected
from injury, is no more than the adaptation of the princi-
ples of administrative justice to the affairs of man in so-
ciety. Among a savage people, without any form of con-
stitutional Government, among whom there exist but few-
rights of property, and the only personal injury to be pro-
vided against is corporal violence, the rules of justice are
necessarily very scanty. Under a despotic Government,
where arbitrary will decides all rights, and pronounces upon
all wrongs, the laws may, also, be simple and few — for
under such a Government no man can claim any thing as
surely and independenlly his own, and every man is expos-
ed to suffer without possibility of redress what some other
may choose to inflict. But under constitutional Govern-
ments, and among a people abounding in all the commod-

Or JURISPRUDENCE AND LAW AS SCIENCES. 3^-7

ities and wealth which go to make up the resources and
enjoyments of civilized life, I he case is very different.
Among such a people we roust hear of property in land,
and the various modifications of such property — of property
in an infinite number at.d variety of goods — of descents
and successions — of transfers, conveyances, and contracts —
of differences in rank and condition, giving rise to dis-
tinctions in rights and privileges. Under Governments
where the life and the liberty of the subject is precious, and
his rights of property held sacred, no man can be deprived
of either without careful and regulated inquiry, and without
the fullest means afforded of defence. Hence, among free
and civilized nations, the laws and rules of justice cease to
be obvious to every man's plain uninstructed understanding,
or to be dependent on his uncontrolled discretion : they be-
come multiplied in proportion to the amount and variety of
rights, and to their progress in freedom and wealth. The
knowledge of the law necessarily becomes an object of la-
borious study— for the judge must decide, and he who would
be an adviser and practitioner in the law must perform his
task, not according to their own crude uninformed notions
of what is right and wrong, but from the suggestions of a
mind stored with a vast mass of distinct rules, and with an
insight info the principles on which those rules are founded,
and also with a capacity to apply these rules and princi-
ples to the infinite variety of circumstances, which in the
dealings of mankind give occasion to contest and doubt.

It is the common complaint of the vulgar, and of such as
do not weigh such considerations as these, that the admi-
nistration of justice according to systematic law, is tedious,
troublesome, and expensive. Such complaints do not. arise
among barbarous and misgoverned nations — for where there
is little property, or where the greater share of it is mono-
polized by the ruler himself or his favorites and sup-
porters and despotic power orders every thing, there is

gig OF JURISPRUDENCE AND LAW AS SCIENCES.

little occasion for litigation, or suits, and wrangling. But
these complaints prevail most where the rights of the
people are most numerous and various, and where the
rules for their support against violations are most
cautious and precise. In other words they prevail
most in proportion to the prosperity, wealth, and ci-
vilization of the people among whom they arise. But,
if all these rules and forms of justice — leading as they do
to harassing delays, trouble, and expence, as well in the
establishment as in the defence of rights — are considered
with the relation they bear to the security of property and
of the person, and to the degree of freedom enjoyed by the
subject under a wise and liberal Government, they- will be
found to constitute the necessary result, and the price which
must be paid for such security and freedom, on which the
prosperity and wealth of a nation must depend. The ordinary
and unreflecting portion of mankind, who view with a partial
eye their own interests, and (heir claims or wrongs when,
they happen to be contested or denied, are impatient at all
restraints upon a speedy decision, and at all forms which
stand between them and what they deem justice. But, it
should be recollected, that these same forms of justice,
which are to them so irksome and inexpedient in cases
which in their partial view may erroneously appear to be
plain and simple, are the safeguards against such as may
be put forward by the crafty and dishonest, and a pro-
tection against judgments given according to no fixed
rule of right, but according to mere wayward and wil-
ful discretion. If we enquire among what nations the
course of judicial decision is the most speedy, cheap,
and conclusive, we shall assuredly discover it among those
lawless tribes who remain nearest to the state of nature, or
among those nations, in which the bulk of the people are little
better than slaves. Whether in the horde of Tartar savages,
amongst whom property has scarce a name, or under the

OF JURISPRUDENCE AND LAW AS SCIENCES. 3}$

most ancient Mussulman Governments where the word of
the Prince or Magistrate is the inflexible law, every matter
of dispute is quickly and finally settled. The judge de-
cides as he pleases — he is guided by no rules — and he is
swayed by no responsibility. It is indifferent to him how
he decides, so that he determines the case — and obedience
is equally and peremptorily exacted, let the decision be
what it may. To desire such a measure, and such a course,
of cheap and speedy justice, is to desire such a condition of
the people as can alone admit of it. It is to desire that
there should be but few rights, and a small amount of pro-
perty to decide about — it is to desire political slavery rather
than liberty — and that right and wrong should become
mere matter of chance.

SECTION XV.
Of the quality of the English system of Law,

The English nation enjoys a most eminent degree of
political freedom, because its Government, is settled upon
just principles and constitutional rules. Its laws and rules
of justice under which that freedom is preserved, under
which property is secured, and the person is protected, have
long ago been laid down and fixed — growing up under the
watchful care of learned, able, and virtuous men throughout
many ages : Under these laws the national wealth, and the
national power, has increased to a height beyond that with
which any Empire on the earth has hitherto been favored.
Amidst the many gradations of rank and condition —
amidst the infinity of rights, and modifications of rights,
which these gradations and the accumulation of pro-
perty, with its endless variety of uses, have given rise
to — and amidst the complicated and numerous causes
for controversy naturally consequent on this position
of society— -the law of the land lias provided the cer-
tain means of assurance and redress, applicable to the
peculiar circumstances of almost every case. Jurispru-
dence has become a science, as well as the law depending on
its principles ; to the study and exposition of which men of
cultivated understanding devote their lives. For the learn-
ing, as well as the integrity, not only of the judges who admi-
nister the law, but of the counsellors and practitioners who
advise or assist in its efficient operation, thqre is every secu-
rity which interest, and a sense of honor, and a love of reputa-
tion can supply. It may be supposed, therefore, that among
such a nation the administration of justice must be eminent-

OF THE ENGLISH SYSTEM OF LAW. 321

ly exact — that able and upright judges have but to open
their eyes and see — that vexatious or ignorant litigation must
be vain, and therefore likely to be rare — and that wrongs
should diminish in proportion to the certainty and adequacy
of retribution. How happens it, then, it may be asked,
that so great a number of legal Courts, with every
variety and quality of jurisdiction, should be spread over
the land — that lawsuits, controverted claims, and criminal
punishments, should abound wherever the English law pre-
vails—and that accusations of its uncertainty should be as
common as those of its delay and expence ?

That much of this accusation arises from ignorant clamour
and misconception is an assertion so easily made that it will
meet with little attention, unless borne out by some proof ; but
to exhibit decisive proofs would lead to a lengthened discus-
sion. Considering, however, that all human institu-
tions and regulations run into abuse, it will deserve remark
how seldom occasions are taken to propose before the legis-
lature, amendments and alterations in the settled laws, and
how few are the calls for such legislative interference except
with a view to the correction of those abuses from which the
most perfect judicial system can never be exempt. An ex-
planation is sometimes offered, that lawyers and judges
gain by the uncertainties, defects, and abuses of the law ;
bnd therefore they will uphold them, having as a body power
f nough to control the united voice of the people, and the
supreme legislature itself. Such an explanation implies that
a large majority of these functionaries are among the most
mercenary and dishonest of mankind— that their cunning
and their talents are more than a match for the general sense
of the nation — and that their influence in the state surpasses
that of the executive powers ofGovernment backed by the sup-
port of a i oppressed people. How far this class of functionaries
may merit such a character, whether of corruption or of po-
litical power in the state, may perhaps be sufficiently an-

qOO OF THE ENGLISH SYSTEM OF LAW.

sweredby a reference to public opinion— but it is certain that
from this class have sprung all those laws which have sewed
most in fixing and preserving the free constitution of the
Government, and the most important of those also which
concern the due and equal administration of justice between
man and man. Indeed, it would be very difficult to shew
how the personal interests, any more than the reputation of
those distinguished lawyers, whose opinions have influence
in the state, can be advanced by the maintenance of profes-
sional abuses. A more rational and consistent explanation
why the legislature is far less occupied in correcting the
laws as they stand, and so much more in adding to and im-
proving them, according as the new creations of pro-
perty and the continual changes in the condition of the
people suggest, may perhaps be this — that those who un-
derstand thoroughly the reasons and principles of the En-
glish laws, and their operation, seldom see occasion for es-
sential alterations ; and thftse who yield to their own ill-con-
sidered notions or those of others, in seeking their amend-
ment, either find the task they undertake beyond their men-
tal strength, or become convinced, upon calm investigation
and the just reasoning of such as are most competent to
judge, that their projects are mischievous, and their corn-
plaints without foundation.

It would be an undertaking not more curious than profit-
able to compare the operation and results of the English
system of law, with those of the various systems adopted in
other civilized countries— with reference, not to its effects
on political freedom (which, however, is one important ob-
ject of laws) — but merely with reference to those main ob-
jects of administrative justice between man and man — the
security of property, and the security of the person.

As far as regards the expence of litigation for the recove-
ry of rights, and for the prosecution of crimes, it may be al-

OF THE ENGLISH SYSTEM OF LAW.

323

lowed that it is an evil attending the administration of Eng-
lish law far surpassing that which attends the course of
administering justice in most other countries in the world.
I3ut the expence of litigation increases in proportion to those
other characteristics in the administration of the law which
tend most materially to the ends of justice. It increases in
proportion to the amount and precision of those rules which
ascertain rights, which protect every man in the enjoyment of
them, and multiply the means of defence against unjust de-
mands and accusations. It increases in proportion to the in-
tegrity, the learning, the competency, and the honorable sta-
tion in society, of those who dedicate themselves to profes-
sional and judicial duties. When objects of this nature are
the real and only causes of increased expence, they more than
compensate for an evil which thus becomes of unavoidable
necessity. The absence of such causes will ensure cheap
judgments, but not cheap justice : and it scarce needs to be
noticed what an encouragement, to vexatious and vindictive
litigation must be the opportunity afforded of embarking in
it without personal trouble or charge. And, let it be further
observed, that the cheapness of judicial decisions is not al-
ways and necessarily in proportion to the absence of such
causes of expence as these I have enumerated. It is assert-
ed by a writer on the judicial system of India that litigation
in the Sadder Courts of India is, in the result, at least as
expensive as that in the Supreme Courts. But it will hard-
ly be said that the above noticed causes of expence apply in
an equal degree to the system of law as administered in
both those classes of Courts.

In regard, however, to the comparative prevalence of
crime, and of delays and uncertainties in the administra-
tion of the law, under the English judicial system, and
under that which obtains in some other countries, an inqui-
ry has been madp, the results of which deserve attention
and command confidence. It has been ascertained that in

324 QF THE ENGLISH SYSTEM OF LAW.

Sweden, which there is no reason to distinguish as the
worst governed of European nations, or the least advanced
in civilization, the convictions for crimes, punishable as such
by all civilized Governments are, compared with those in
England, as four to one at least. (Laing's Travels in Swe-
den, 1838.) It has been shewn by a writer on the judicial
system of India, as regulated by its local Governments for
administration in the provinces, that the time occupied, on
the average, in obtaining a decision is at least four times
as long as that expended in the average course of litigation
in England; and that, whereas scarce one judgment out of
thousands under the English law is appealed against, and
not one in six reversed or even altered, out of those which
are appealed, no less than one-half of the original decisions
are overruled or amended by the Courts of Appeal, under
that administered in the Indian provinces. And we may be
sure that, when such is the case, almost every decision by
the original Court either is appealed against, or would be so
if it could.

SECTION XVI.

Of the causes of Litigation, independently of the quality

of Laws.

Thus much I have thought it not impertinent to observe
in proof of the misapprehension of those who inconsiderately
urge peculiar defects and faults in the English judicial sys-
tem, but it will be more to the purpose to advert to some of
those causes of litigation which must ever prevail, not only
under that system, but under the most perfect code of laws
that human wisdom can construct.

Among these causes are the human passions, which will
never cease to breed violence 'and fraud ; and which even
repels the bulk of mankind from making voluntary compen-
sation for injuries that cannot be denied. There are, fur-
ther, the mistakes and uncertainties, as regards facts.
Such may arise from corrupt evidence, inciting to unjust
claims, or defeating those which are just — or from deficient
evidence, which may induce as "well the wrongful as the
rightful claimant to hold by what he may happen to possess
— or from erroneous evidence, which may lead the most up-
right to litigation under a misconception of right. To these
causes must be added the long list of those springing from the
frequent necessity of seizing and distributing property by
legal processes ; as,, on occasions of insolvency, or of the con-
fiiction of numerous creditors of the same party, or of resort
to mortgaged property for the satisfaction of debts. And,
lastly, among the principal causes of necessary litigation
must be enumerated the doubts in the application of even
the plainest rules of law, according as complicated cases,
and new combinations of circumstances arise. When this

326 0F THE M0ST COMMON SOURCES OF LITIGATION.

large amount of the unavoidable sources of litigation is
subtracted from the whole sum of those which enter into the
administration of justice under the English law, it will pro-
bably be found that but a small portion of that litigation is
derived from such sources as the uncertainty, or obscurity,
or defects of the law itself, or the unrighteous claims and
accusations which such a state of the law is calculated to
beget. It is, indeed, rather a subject of surprise that,
among a swarming population enjoying so large a share of
personal and political freedom — among whom the smallest
aggression against the person or the property has its speci-
fic legal remedy— among whom the presumed innocence of
every man is supplied by the amplest means of defence-r-
among whom commercial transactions are of such unbound-
ed extent, and property subdivided and qualified in a
thousand ways— the various and complicated rights of
every individual should be so exactly adjusted and secured,
as to lead to so little litigation as does actually prevail.
We must rather look for proofs of the demerit of any judici-
al system in the amount of erroneous and contradictory
judgments, than in that of the number, duration, or ex-
pence of the causes tried.

SECTION XVII.

Of the expediency of reducing the laws of a Country
to a systematic Code.

It must be allowed, notwithstanding what has been said,
that the administration of justice according to the laws of
England is not only encumbered, with many imperfec-
tions in details, but that the legal system itself stands in
need of amendment. In the application of the existing
laws to the infinite variety of new cases, and new combi-
nations of circumstances, the decrees of the Courts neces-
sarily multiply to a vast extent. As each of these decrees
is an authority and precedent for like judgments to be
pronounced in similar cases, they become so many rules of
law. Bat, since it is seldom that two cases which give rise
to controversy can be exactly alike in all their circum-
stances, the distinctions which exist often occasion differ-
ences of opinion, where no difference in principle really
exists — and thus arise uncertainties, and even contradictions,
in (he very rules of law themselves. [Moreover, not oidy
e rules of low, but also those express laics which the
supreme authority from time to time enacts, and which
are often confined to peculiar evils, or directed to tempora-
ry objects, gradually become inapplicable to the altered
times and condition of the people. The accumulation of
these rules of law involved in judicial decisions upon indi-
vidual cases, and of these express enactments of (he legis-
lature suggested, from temporary causes, grows al length to
be too vast for the grasp of the human intellect, and the
ssiiy becomes apparent of correcting inconsistencies,
and of digesting and arranging the whole heap under gene-

328 EXPEDIENCY OF REDUCING LAWS TO A CODE.

ral rules and principles. In England this task, how-
ever ably and skilfully fulfilled, has been left to the
labour of private authors and compilers—but such
a digest of * the national law is the more appro-
priate task of the supreme legislature ; not more for the
sake of ensuring uniformity and completeness, than for that
of fixing upon that law the stamp of authority. This it is
to reduce the laws of the land to a systematic code— a work
which, as it is the most laborious and the most difficult in
which the powers of the mind can be engaged, so is it that
which most conduces to the perfection of administrative jus-
tice, and the consequent prosperity of a people. It may be
expedient, therefore, in concluding this discourse, to point
out those general characteristics in the prevalent laws of a
country which suggest the reduction of them into a code.

The reasons which should induce the formation of the
laws of a country into a regular code, are — 1st, that they
have become obscure through antiquity, or through changes
in times and the circumstances of the people — 2ndly, that
they are not easy of access ; as when they are dispersed;
amongst various treatises, argumentative disquisitions, re-
ports of judgments pronounced, and enactments of the legis-
lature comprehending many unconnected subjects — 3rdly,
when the laws have become bulky and numerous, ho as to
abound in repetitions, and to comprise a multitude of rules
and regulations upon the same topics without any substan-
tial distinctions— 4thly, when laws have been ill-prepared
through the incompetency of the framers, and ill-arranged
through neglect ; whereby confusion and doubts are chiefly
caused, and contradictions insensibly creep in — and, lastly,
when new laws have been prematurely introduced, before
the state of a country, or the condition of a people has be-
come adapted to the change ; as when a new Government
introduces its own laws into a foreign country, without due
consideration of the peculiar national customs and habits.

EXPEDIENCY OF REDUCING LAWS TO A CODE. 329

All these reasons for a reform in national laws, with the
exception of the last, do with more or less force apply to
the English judicial system ; and it is a mark, of the en-
lightened views of the present age that this should be seen
and acknowledged. The extensive amendments, and con-
solidations of various distinct masses of the English laws,
which these views have lately led to, gives an earnest of fur-
ther efForts towards accomplishing the greatest and most
beneficial of all human undertakings — the systematic digest
of the whole body of the national law. So vast and compre-
hensive, a labour, requiring the united and long continued
exertions of many powerful minds, may appear to surpass
the strength of any single effort of Government , and per-
haps it may be wiser to await the gradual correction and
digest of each distinct department, than to attempt at once
an uniform arrangement of the whole body of the laws.
When, however, the cautious vigilance, the copious remedies,
and the ample securities, which' pervade the administration
of justice under the English law, are referred to as the ef-
ficient causes of its practical merit as it stands, it should
be recollected that the more plentiful the materials are of a
legal code, and the sounder the principles on which they
depend, the more is the construction of a code facilitated,
and the more perfect may it be expected to prove.

Rut, if most of the reasons I have above enumerated have
more or less application to the state of the English law, they
all of them more unquestionably bespeak the expediency of
a digested arrangement of the laws which are to prevail in
governing the administration of justice in India. The mate-
rials, indeed, of such a code are far more scanty, and the
principles of the existing native laws must be acknowledged
to be far less sound. But if the construction of a body of
wise and beneficial laws for this country becomes, therefore,
the more difficult, it becomes also the more necessary.
The original laws of the various tribes and castes, living

330 EXPEDIENCY OF REDUCING LAWS TO A CODE.

under the guidance of different religious doctrines, under
various forms of government, were, like the earliest and
imperfect laws of all other nations, identified with their
precepts of religion — and so they still remain — although
the rights and conduct of men in civil society have but in few
respects any natural connection with their duties towards
the deity, their forms of worship, or their tenets of faith ;
and, amidst the great differences in such forms and tenets,
it must appear obvious that no system for the administration
of justice ought to be made dependent on the casualty of
any particular doctrine of religious belief. It may be rea-
sonably surmised that, in ancient times, the distractions of
political change, and the oppressions of petty rulers, as they
may have retarded the advancement of the people of India
in civilization, so they may have precluded the improve-
ment of their laws : and we know that in more modern
times foreign conquests, and continual internal wars, must
have produced such their usual results. The ancient laws,
therefore, which have thus remained in their original im-
perfection, have gradually become more and more loaded
with obscurities, vagueness, and uncertainties, while com-
ments, constructions, and arguments have supplied the
place of express laws, sanctioned by just principles. It
must be admitted that, as the English sway has extended,
and its empire become consolidated, much has been attempted
towards regulating the administration of justice in India ;
but it must be admitted, at the same time, that the at-
tempt has been made by those who could learn but little
to the purpose from the native laws, and who brought but
little learning,either in jurisprudence generally, or in the laws
of their own or any other cc ntry, to bear upon their task.

It has been, perhaps, upon some such considerations as
these, and certainly upon a deliberate survey of the state
of the law, and the defective course of administering justice
throughout the Indian empire, that the supreme legisla-

EXPEDIENCY OF DEDUCING LAWS TO A CODE. 33I

ture of England has, under the last Charter act detailing
the scheme for the future government of India, entrusted
to a body of Commissioners the duty of collecting materials,
and reporting suggestions, with the view to a digest and
consolidation of the judicial system of the country, What-
ever success may attend an undertaking involving great
difficulty and labour, we may hail its policy as that of a
beneficent Government making the prosperity of its people
the rule of its measures,

FIJS/ 1 S.

INDEX.

Absolute Government, (Vide Arbitrary.)

Administrative Justice, what '274.

Agra, (Vide Subordinate Governments.)

Ahmedabad, 13-1,208.

Arbitrary Government, Defects in that form of Government 33, How
:d in what respect such form sometimes beneficial 34. May
be in many as well as in few 30. Evils of (14. Laws simple
and few under 310.

Archbishops, 82,83.

Army, (Vide Military.)

Aurungzebe, his dealings with the English 135. His power in India 141.

Balasore 35,208.

Barbarous Nations, addicted to revengeful punishments 299. Among
them laws simple and few 316,318.

Bengal, when first settled 134,135,208. Conquests of the English in
15G. Presidency of, first founded 2UU. Government of, en-
gaged in disputes 215.

Bills, of Parliament what, and how brought in as Statutes to be passed
101. Reading- of, what 101. How assented toby the Crown
102.

Bishops, 82,83.

Black Hole of Calcutta 157.

Bourn of Control, (Vide Control.)

Bombay, when first granted to the Company 134,208. Made Chief
Presidency in India 208. Limit! of the Town of, fixed by the
Government of Bombay 254. (Vide Subordinate Govern-
ments.)

Bbabmins, their unlimited and uncertain authority according to the Hin-
doo Sbnsters 28m

BuiTiaii Subjects, meaning of the distinction between British and Na-
tive Subjects 2G0.

Cadets, who 183, 2JI.
Calicut, 13-1,208.

Calcutta 134,209. Taken L67. Black Hole of 157. Limits of the

Town of, fixed by Bengal Government 254,
Cambay, 134,208.
Cate of Good Hors, first voyage to India by 128.

n INDEX.

Carnatic, conquests of the French in 150. Nabob of, becomes depen-
dent on the French 150. Rival Nabob of, set up by the Eng-
lish 156. And established 156.

Certainty in Laws, why necessary 285. In punishments more effieaci'
oils than severity 302.

Changes, in Political Government, how necessary 40. By whom to be
introduced 41= How changes in Government produce a cer-
tain portion of evil 41. Why they should be gndual 41,42
People of warm countries averse to changes in Government 43.

Charles 2d, his Charter to the Company 134,209,236.

Charities, under the protection of the Crown 112.

Charters, meaning of the term 130. Abuse of the authorities granted
by 204. Nature of the authorities conferred by the early
Charters 206. How .lefectiie in establishing a regular Go-
vernment in India 206. Charter Acts, what 217- (Vide
Elizabeth, Charier, James, William, George.)

Checks System of, in the Government of India 261.

Church (Vide Prerogatives.)

Clive, his victory of Plassy 157.

Civil Service discussion as to the mode of appoin'ingto 184. Defects
in the system of appointing to 184. Advancement of Natives
to appointments made in 189. By whom appointments in In-
dia made 250.

Civil Code of Rights, what 292. How distinguished from Criminal
Code 294.

Code when and why laws of a country should be embodied in a systema-
tic Code 327. The reasons inducing the formation of such
Codes 328. Required for the English Laws, and more so for
the Local Laws of India 329. (Vide Civil Code, Criminal
Code.)

Commanders-in-Chief how appointed 183,216,221,224. Their rank
and limited authority 221.

Commission, Law Commission for consolidating the Judicial System of

India 330.
Committees of Court of Dihectors, have no powers in themselves

177- (Vide Court of Directors.)

Commons Hocsjb of, what 88. Number of Members, qualifications of
Members 89. Of Electors 89. Mode of electing Members 90.
Has sole power of Taxation 96- Influence of in the English
Government 98. Freedom of Speech 1 00. Mode of passing Acts
100. President, or Speaker of 100. Power of bringing charges
against great public delinquents before the House of Lords
104. (Vide Parliament, Members, Electors.)

Company, what the East India Company is 119. Meaning of the term
Company 123. Origin and formation of the East India Com-
pany 128,204. Quality of Associated Companies for trading
125. Of Companies which are Corporations 130. East India
Company a Corporation 130. Trade their sole object for
many vears 133,134. Their Charter from Elizabeth 131,204.
Their" Charter from Charles 2d 134,209. Their exclusive
rights of trade invaded by a rival Company 136. Newly orga-
nized and united with the English Company 136,137,210.

INDEX- ut

Charter from William 3d, 1S7.237. Surrender their previous
Charters and are governed under the Charter of William 3d
137,210. . Their trade gradually abolished, the effects of this
159.

Conquest, all schemes of repudiated by the English Governmant 247.
Control, Board of 192 Origin of 192. Members of 193. Oath of

the Members 193. Powers pud Functions of 194. Beneficial

effects of 105,216.

Constitution ok England, what, and how established 71,73.

Corporations, what 130. East India Company a Corporation 130,204.

Cossisibusar, 204,135,208.

Councillors (ViJe Members in Council.)

Councils, course of proceeding at 226. All Acts to be done in name
of the Councils 216. Minutes in Council, what 226. (Vide
Members in Council )

Counties Number of, in Great Britain and Ireland 88.

Countries External Condition op, necessarily affects their form of
Government 43. Influences, manners, habits, and feelings. 43

Court of Proprietors, what, 163. Course of proceeding at 763. Mode
of voting 163. Their Legislative powers 104.

Court of Directors, what and how held 174. Chairman and Deputy
Chairman, who, and kheir duties 174. Committees IJo. Of
Correspondence 175. OfSeereay 175. Of Accounts 176. Of
the Treasury 177- Functions of the Court 179. How their
authority is Supreme 179. Powers of Court restricted and
guided by Laws ISO. How all their Proceedings controlled by
Board of Control 181. Powers of the Court in suspending the
sole authority of Governors in India 132. Of the appointments
in their gift 18-'. (Vide Directors.)

Coubt of Judicature, Supreme Court in Bengal established 215. Its
disputes with the Government 215. Supreme Courts at Madras
and Bombay established 217. The powers of the Supreme
Courts formerly of, rejecting regulations 240. This authority
repealed 245. These Supreme Courts not to be abolished by
Supreme Government 2l0. Regularly constituted Courts of
Law a necessary portion of Judicial Procedure 300. How
Courts of Law should deliver their judgments 310. Rules
necessary for rectifying their judgments 310.

Courts MARTIAL on Natives (Vide Regulations.)

Criminal Code, what 292. How distinguished from Civil Code 205,296-
(Vide Punishment.)

Crown (Vide Queen, Prerogatives.)

Cl'ddalore, Settlement of 153.

Despotic Govfrnmknt (Vide Arbitrary Government.)

Delay, in Punishment reduces its efficiency 303.

DeWANNBB, rights of, what and when conferred 213.

Directors, how qualified individually 169. All English subjects may
become so 169. Their oath of office 1?0. Removals of in
case of absence, or for misconduct 17L Number of, and how

iv INDEX.

elected J 71. Their House List 172. Chairman of 175. (Vide
Court of)

Dutch, when first settled in India 133. Decay of their Power 148.

Duties of life spring from a sense of Justice 273.
o

East India Company (Vide Company.)

Election, of Political representatives, how it should he regulated 50.
Mode of Electing Members of Parliament 90. Election of Di-
rectors of the East India Company 171. (Vide Electors, Di-
rectors.)

Electors for Members of Parliament who, and how to be qualified 89.
Certain classes excluded from such right of Election, and why
95. (Vide Election Directors.)

Elizabeth, Queen, her first Charter to the East India Company 131,204.

Emperor, or great Mogul of India (Vide Moguls.) English, their first
arrival in India 118. Effects and strength of their Government
in India 119. Their contests with the French 152,156. Ob-
tain the Jaghire of Madras 156. (Vide Carnatic.) *

English Company formation of, under Charter of William 3d 13G. (Vide
Company.)

English Law, system of, and its quality 320. Accusations against it 321.
Comparison of it with other systems 322. Expences of litiga-
tion under English Laws 322. Crime less prevalent under it
than in other civilised countries 3-3. In what respects defi-
cient 3^7. Why the English Laws should be reduced into a
systematic Code 329.

Evidence certain fixed rules of necessary with a view to the just investi-
gation of facts 309.

Executive Government, what 106.

Factories, (Vide Settlements.)

Fort St. David, 135,208.

Fort St. George, Presidency of, when founded I34,20S.

French, tlnir settlement in India 149. Contests and influence with
'the Native Powers 149. Capture Madras 150. Influence over
the whole Deccan 150. Nabob of Carnatic made Dependent
on 150. Their contest with the English 156. Neglected by
their own Government 153. Defeated by the English and
their influence finally destroyed 156.

George 1st and 2d, their Charters 212.

Gogo 134,208.

Government (Vide Political Government, Arbitrary Government.)

Governments of India, Preliminary observation's on 199. Bond of
Connection between them, and the Government of England 257
Government of India not the Company's but the Queen's Go-
vernment 260. S\ stem of checks in the Government of India
261. Defects in 262. (Vide Political Government, Subordi-
nate Governments.)

INDEX. v

Government Supreme of India, how constituted and of what members
composed 220. Vacancies how filled up 222,224,225. Tem-
porary vacancy of the Governor Generalship '223. When and
how vacancies supplied by the Crown '225. Its course and
method of procedure 226. How the Governor General may
act solely 228. Supreme Government may be held in any part
of India 230. Controlling Powers of SupremeGovernment 232-
M ide unlimited 234. Its Legislative powers. 230. Originally
defective 236,238. Progressive increase of 237- ItsLegislativc
powers in the Provinces 241. What granted under the Char-
ter Act of 1833,214. Limitations of the Legislative power
245,246. The exclusive powers of Supreme Government in
relation to Native States 247. Its controlling powers as lo
Revenue 24H. And as to Military Forces 248.

Government of Bengal — (Vide Bengal.)

Governments of Madras, Bombay, and Agra, — (Vide Madras, Bom*
bay, Agra, Subordinate Governments.)

Governors, when first appointed by that name 214, 21G.

Governor General how appointed 183,220. How his vacancy filled up
222,228,224. When may be filled up by the Crown 225.
When and bow he may excrcbe sole authority 228. May
assemble his Council in any part of India 230.

Governors, how appointed, 183. When first appointed by that name,
211,216. How and when they may exercise sole authority, 228.
When and bow they become extraordinary Members of the
Supreme Government 230. •

Govindtoue 209.

Gkatoities, limitations on the power of the Court of Directors to grant 1S2

Habits, Forms of Political Government originating partly in, and de-
pendent upon 37. And vary accordingly 38. Habits arise
partly out of external condition of countries 38

HAPPIES B, individual and social, distinction between 29. In what
consists social happiness 29,37.

IIoogiily, 134,208.

House of Lords, Commons. — (Vide Lords, Commons.)

Honors an I offices (vide Prerogatives, Offices.)

India, causes which have obstructed a more perfect system of Govern-
ment in India 61. Reasons for being content with the Bcheme
for Indian Government 62. Laws passed for India by the
English chiefly to regulate Judicial Procedure 811. The law
of India very defective, and why 287,329. They require to
be redo :ed to a systematic code 329.

Indian GOVERNMENTS— (Vide Governments.)

JAMBA 1st, bis ( barter to the East India Company 204. 2d, his Char-
ter 206,236.

Judge, character of a good Judge 289. In what way Judges should be
independent oVj.

vi INDEX.

Judgments of Courts how they should be delivered 310. Rules necessary
for enforcing, and for rectifying 310.

Justice, the meaning of the term 271. In what the general virtue of
Justice consists 272. Justice prescribes all the duties of
life 27j?. Administrative Justice, what 274. Natural sense
not a sufficient guide in administering justice, 2S5.

King, (Vide Queen,)

Labor, the foundation of property 279.

Laws, objects and ends of 275. No laws ever employed in matters
indifferent 276. All laws obligatory on the conscience 277.
Why they should be certain and clear 285. Evils of uncer-
tainty in laws 287. They should specify and define rights 290.
In what manner 291. Civil code of rights, what 292. How
distinguished from Criminal Code 294,295. Criminal Code,
-what 295. How distinguished from Civil Code 295,296. Laws
■when reduced to a system form a science 316. Are few and
simple among barbarous nations, and under despotic Govern-
ments 316,318. Why numerous and complicated among weal-
thy nations, and under well-constituted Governments 317.
When and why they should be reduced to a systematic Code 327.
(Vide English Law, India.)

Law Commission for India, — (Vide Commission.)

Legislative authority, nature of, in England 75. How constituted 76.

Legislative powers of Indian Governments, history of 236. Originally
defective 236,237. What defects in the Statute of 1773 con-
ferring them 238. What conferred by Statutes of 1781,1797,
240. What conferred by Statutes of 1799,1807, on the subor-
dinate Governments of India 238. What powers conferred on
the Governments of India to legislate for the provinces 241,
249. What conferred on the Supreme Government by the
Charter Act of 1833,244. (Vide Governments, Subordinate
Governments, Regulations.)

Limitation, how the Government of England a limited monarchy 112.

Litigation, how expences in arise 322.' Natural causes of, independ-
ently of the quality of laws 325.

Lords, House of, what 82. How created i 2. How summoned to Par-
liament 84. Power of voting by delegates 85. Have the sole
right of originating laws affecting their own rights as Lords of
Parliament 8b. Right of recording their dissent 86.

Madras taken by the French 150. Jaghire of, granted to the East India
Company 156. Limits of the Town to be fixed by Government
of Madras 254. (Vide Subordinate Governments, Presi-
dencies.)

Mahmoud of Ghizni, his invasions 140.

Manners, Political Government originating in, and partly dependent
on 37. Governments vary accordingly 38. Manners partly
dependent on the external condition of countries 38. (Vide
Political Government.)

INDEX vii

Marhattas, their rise and conquests 143. Quality of their Power and
Government 144. Its decay 144.

Masulifatam 134,20S.

Members of Parliament, number of in -House of Commons 89. How to
be qualified 9. Qow elected 88,89,90. How ) returned as
elected 92. Not the Agents merely of those who elect them 93
Connexion and union between the members and their consti-
tuents 94. (Vide Parliament, Commons, Election, Returns.)

Members of Council, who, and how appointed, 183,203,213. How va-
cancies of supplied 225. When and how a Civil Servant can
be called in to vote specially at a Council 225.

Menu, extracts from his laws 287.

Military Fopces, powers of Supreme Government over 2 18. Powers of
Subordinate Governments over 253. (Vide Subordinate Go-
vernments, Cadets.)

Military Service, in what respect, and to what extent confined to Bri-
tish Subjects 251,252. (Vide Cadets.)

Ministers, of the Crown their responsibility for all public measures 107,
113. How chosen 113. Of the Prime Minister 114. (Vide
Queen Prerogatives, Executive Government.)

Minutes of Council, what 226.

Moguls, first invasions and conquest of India 140. Quality of their Go-
vernment in India 141. Decay of their Power 143.

Monarchies, absolute (Vide Arbitrary Governments.)

Money (Vide Prerogatives) '

Mussulman (Vide Moguls.)

Nabob (Vide Carnatic.)

Naval, (Vide Sea.)

Natives, all legally competent to hold any offices, if qualified 250
Causes of their disqualifications hitherto 250. Native Subject?
meaning of the distinction between British and Native Sub-
jects 'J 00.

Native States Powers of Suprorrte and Subordinate Governments in re-
lation to '247,25:5. Why their dependence on British Govern-
ment prejudicial to their subjects 2G3.

Native Sovereigns. (Vide Sovereigns.)

Natural Law, superior to Laws of human origin 278,

Offices, what at the disposal of the Governments of India 2l!>. Natives
legally competent to hold, if qualified 250. Why hitherto dis-
qualified 250. (Vide Prerogatives)

Opening op Parliament, what 79.

■

Parliament, how summoned 7S. Opening what 79. Sessions of what
7$. Prorogation of what 78. How long to continue 78. Dis-
solution of what 79. Business of, not being of a Legislative
quality 103. Reports of Debates 104. (Vide Queen, Lords,
Commons.)

via INDEX.

Peers, (Vide Lords.)

People of England, how they have established the English constitntion
73. (Vide Share.)

Petitions to the Court of Directors, nature, object, and limitations
of 190.

Pipley 135,208.

Plassey, Battle of 157.

Political Government. That there are certain fundamental principles to
be observed in all good schemes of Government 25. Origin of
Government 26. Great variety in 28. Objects and aims of
Poliiical Government 29. Should be founded on some scheme
or plan 32. Defects in Absolute Governments 33. Absolute
Governments may consist of many rulers as well as of one or a
few 36. The forms of Government partly arise out, and are
partly dependent on Feelings, Manners, and Habits 37. And
vary accordingly 38. Why not the same scheme, of Govern-
ment in India as in England 39. Changes in Political Govern-
ment how necessary 40. By what kind of persons to be in-
troduced 41. Why all changes in some degree prejudicial 41".
That Political changes should be gradual 42. That the form
of Political Government is partly dependent on the external
condition of countries 43. No perfect standard of 15. (Vide
Representation, there)

Political Liberty what 63. Pondicherry, First French settlement 149.
Taken by the English 157.

Population of the Company's Xerritokies in 1749 153.

Portuguese first discover passage to India by the Cape of Good Hope 123
Are the first Europeans who settled in India 128. Measures
by to engross the whole trade of India 128. Their progress
towards political Power in India, and causes of failure 148.

Precedence (Vide Rank.)

Prerogatives of the Crown what 106. Personal independence of the
Queen 106 Power to male treaties and to declaie war and
peace 108. The authority of dispensing Justice 1US. Bestows
all honors and offices 110. Orders all affairs of National Com-
merce 110. Exclusive powee of coining Money 111. Governs
the affairs of the National Religion or Church 111. Right of
the Qmen to choose her own Ministers of State 114. Not to
be affected by Laws made by the Supreme Government 245.
(Vide Queen, Ministers.)

President first foundation of the Boards of President in Council 208,
213. (Vide Governors.)

Presidencies, first foundation of 208. Put under the Bombay Govern-
ment 208. Limits of Territories under each to be fixed by the
Court of Directors 254.

Press, liberty of the 104.

Procedure, different courses of Judicial Procedure, and why 294,296.
Objecls of Judicial Procedure 306,308. Regularly constituted
Courts a necessary part of 306. Certain forms and settled
rules of necessary 307,311. And why so necessary 309. Should

INDEX. ix

be guided by fixed rules of Evidence 309. Rules of Proce-
dure should regulate the modes of delivering, of enforcing, and
of rectifying judgments -S09,.n0. Evils of a defective method
of Judicial Piocedure 312. The Regulations of the Indian
Governments chiefly directed to regulate Judicial Procedure
311. Natural sense not a sufficient guide for, without rules
311. (Vide Courts of Judicature.)

Prorogation of Parliament, what 7b.

Property, a fit test as a qualification, for Electors of Political Repre-
sentatives 57. Origin and foundation of 279. Necessity of
rules for its transfer 2H2.

Proprietors of Stock, who 161. Their qualifications 162. Their
rights of voting 162. Estimated amount of iheir Stock 162.
Their lowers and Functions 164. (Vide Company,- Court of
Proprietors.)

Provincial Courts Powers granted to the Governments of India of Le-
gislating for 242. (Vide Regulations, Legislative Authority.)

Punishment of Crimes, Legitimate object of human Laws for Punish-
ment 302 Delay and uncertainty of Punishments reduces
their efficacy 303. How they should be proportioned to crime
303. How they require adaptation to the quality of Persons aa
■well as to that of Crimes 304. Should be calculated to enforce
Reflection 305. (Vide Revenge,)

Queen, Her Legislative capacity 77. Her hereditary right to the
Throne 77- Her power of summoning Parliamen s 78. To
Prorogue, and to dissolve them 78. Her mode of opening Par-
liaments 79. The Executive Government of the Queen what
10B. Her dignity 114. How a limited Monarch 112. (Vide
Prerogatives Governments.)

Rank Precedency among Lords and the Nobility of England 83.

Rkgllating Acts of, 1773,1 784,1793,1 M3, 1833. 159.

Regulation, Power of making how limited 2^16, et. seq. The quality
and extent ol it originally 238. Power of passing Police Regu-
lations 238. Authority formerly of Supreme Courts to reject
241. Inexpediency of that power 241. Power to pass Regu-
lations for Native Courts Martial 243. 'And for Taxation 243.
Government Regulations chiefly directed to Judicial Procedure
311. (Vide Governments, Legislative Authority)

Reflections, on the quality of the Indian Governments 256.

Rllioion, (Vide Prerogatives) Representation, Perfection of all
systems of Government, proportionate to the perfection of
the system of political representation 52. Consists partly
in the bulk of the People having access to honors and
offices 52. Why such a Rcpn sentative share not a suffi-
cient share in the Government 54. That the system of
Political Representation should extend to the Supreme
Power in a state 55. That the bulk of the People can
only exercise such a share in the Supreme Power by
means of electing Representatives 56. Of the proper ex-

s INDEX.

tent and limits of this power of Election and of the pro-
per qualifications of Electors 50. That the system of
Political Representation should limit the duration of the
Representative's authority 5S. Why the People of India
have no share in the Government by the system of Repre-
sentation (51, '266. Why defective on that account 267- (Vide
' Governments, share )

Representatives, (Vide Representation, Commons, Election, share Go-,
vernments.)

Rrturns of Members of Parliament, what 92.

Revenge, not a legitimate object of human Punishment 298. The
nature and object of this pa-sion 299. The gratification of
revenge only an object of Punishment by the laws of barba-
rous nations 299. (Vide Punishment.)

Revenue, when first raised from the people of India by the Company
136. A controlling power in the collection and applica;
tion of in the Supreme Government 2-18. (Vide Governments,
Subordinate Governments.)

Saxsettf, 154.

Science, how Jurisprudence, and systems of local Law become Sciences

3 1 6
Sea, Power of the Company at Sea 15 L
Security, personal, rights to 284.
Sense, natural .sense not a sufficient guide for administering Justine

285. Advocated as a guide only by ignorant and uncivilized

People 286. Not a sufficient guide for the method of Judicial

Procedure 311. (Vide Laws.)

ions of Parliiament, what 78. (Vide Parliament.)
Settlements or Factories, the first existing in India 133.

Share, t!

share 'HI. A portion of the People must necessarily ..ave a
share in the Administration under every form of Government
■17. Why a .small portion of the People so sharing is not suf-
ficient IS. How large a portion of the People should have
a share 49. That the bulk of the People should have a share
60. Why a large portion cannot actually exercise the functions
of Government 50. Having a share in the Government, partly
consists in the bulk of the People having access to offices and
honors 52. Reflections on that quality of a good system of
Government, consisting in the People having a share in its Ad-
ministration 60. Why no Representative share by the People
in the Government of India 61,2(36. (Vide Representation )

Sni.RiFrs, in what manner they superintend elections of Members of
Pai'liameftt 88. Their returns of Members 9'A _

Sovereigns, Native of India, why their having no independent Political
Power burthensome to the People 264.

Speaker, of the Houses of Parliament 100,101.

Statctl-s, what 100. Various 21 ',1-37,192. Of 1773. 215,237,242.

..iat the hulk of the People should exercise some share jn the
\d;iinistration of Government 46. What it is to have Luch a

INDEX. xr

* .

1793, the first of those called Charier Acts 216. Of 1813, of
. 1833 217,218. Of 1781, and of 1797 212. Of 1799 and
1S07. 243. Of 1813, of 1814, and of 1833 244. The confu-
sion arising from the number and variety of 218.

Stock, East India Company's amount of 153,162.

Subordinate Governments first invested with Legislative Powers 217.
How Supreme Government constituted 220. How Subordi-
nate Governments constituted 223. How vacancies filled up
223,224,225. Course of proceeding at Councils 22o'. Minu-
tes in Council, what 226. When and how sole authority of
Governors exercised 228. Governors of, become extraordinary
Members of Supreme Government when and how 230. Powers
of the Subordinate Governments to legislate for the Provinces,
origin and progress of 241,249. Their powers and functions.
249. Their powers in relation to Native States 25J. In rela-
tion to th" Revenue 254. To fix limits to the Towns of Cal-
cutta, Madras, ;.ud Bombay 254. (Vide Governments, Legis-
lative authority.)

Succession, order of succession to the English Crown 78. (Vide

QUC'MI.)

Summoning Parliament how and when 78. (Vide Queen.)

Supreme Authority, how it consists of the Legislative authority 75.
(Vide Governments Courts of Judicature.)

Suuat, English S itl ;ment at, founded in 1612. 134, 20S Presidency at,
transferred to Bombay 208.

Taxation, sole power of taxing the p°ople of England rests with the
House of Commons to originate measures 96. (Vide Regula-
tion-.)

Trade, exclusive, first granted 131. Gradually abolished 159. Effects
of its total abolition 159.

Tbvatibs, prejudicial effects of certain Treaties with Native Princes 2G6\

Trichinopoly I

Truth, the found ition and stay of Justice 273.

Vacani i: »,— i Vi i e Governments, Subordinate Governments)

VlZAGAPATAM, 135,208. )

William 3d, Charter of 137,138,210. Its quality 211, 237.

Writers who, and what 183,250. How appointed 185, (Vide Civil
)

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