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KUSUMANJALI,
OE
THE HANDFUL OF FLOWERS.
FIRST CLUSTER.
I. — May this ban df 111 of flowers of faultless logic, devo-
ted to the twofold proof* of God, delight my mind without
hindrance while bee-like hovering over it, — this handful of
flowers, opening under favourable auspices, and aff'ord-
ing a banquet to the upright by the inhalino- of its
fragrance, — one which will not fade, however closely
handled, — the home of a honey that distils the nectar
of immortality, t
IT. — " But is there not an absence of evidence to establish any con-
nection between such a fruit as liberation and your aro-ument devoted
to the twofold proof of the existence of God, — sinee the word soul
which signifies that soul which is the object of the so-called essential
knowledge,J merely means that individual soul which is the object of
* I. e. the arguments which estabhsh his existence, and the discussion as to
the vahdity of the premisses which becomes necessary if these are not accepted.
The words may also mean ' laid at the feet of God.'
t The latter half of this s'loka (the former in the original) has a double
meaning, as nearly every word has a technical or logical sense, — " this handful
of flowers, which reveals the knowledge of true minor terms and affords a banquet
to the intelligent by the perception of an undoubted universal connection
[between the middle and major terms] &c." — I may add that the proverb alluded
to in the commentary uf%f^^T V?T^T ItW^rJ ^^Til^ is quoted to shew that
though rasa properly denotes an attribute, it here means the sul^ject which
possesses it.
X Alluding to such passages as that in the Brihadarany. Upanishad (ii. 4, 5,)
' behold the soul (dtmd) is verily to be seen, heard, contemplated and pro-
foundly meditated upon.'
the illusory knowledge that is the cause of the sensible world ; and
therefore the contemplating of this is the true means of liberation ?"*
To meet this doubt he replies,
II. — That Being, whose worship the wise consider as the
means of the two heaven-like liberations, — He, the Su-
preme Soul, is here ascertained (as the object of our
contemplation) .
The ' two heaven-like liberations' [as intensely desirable from the
absence of all pain,] are the liberation while still remaining in
this life, and the absolute emancipation. The contemplation of God
is a means of liberation through the merit produced thereby or
through the knowledge of one's own soul. This S'rutif is the proof
that it is such a cause, ' having known him only one goes beyond
death ; there is no other path to obtain it.' And that the knowledge
of one's own soul is the cause of liberation is proved by the s'ruti,;J:
* When a man truly discriminates the soul and says " I am he," what
can he wish for ? or in desire of what object can he follow the conti-
nuous onflow of mundane events ?'
III. — Now althouo'h with reo^ard to that Beinor whom all
men alike worship, whichever of the [four wellknown] ends
of man they may desire, — (thus the followers of the Upa-
nishads as the very Knower, — the disciples of Kapila as the
perfect first Wise, — those of Patanjali as Him who, untouch-
ed by pain, action, fruit or desert, having assumed a body
in order to create, revealed the tradition of the Veda and
is gracious to all living beings, — the Mahapas'upatas as
the Independent one, undefiled by vaidic or secular viola-
tions, — the S'aivas as S'iva, — the Vaishnavas as Purush-
ottoma, — the followers of the Puranas as the great Father
(Brahma), — the Ceremonialists as the Soul of the sacrifice, —
the Saugatas as the Omniscient, — the Jainas as the Unob-
structed, — the Mimansakas as Plim who is pointed out as
* This being the seat of the great error, it is to this that our contemplations
shonlcl be directed.
f S'vvetas'watara Upanishad, iii. 8.
+ Brihadnr. Up. iv. 1-, 12. — S'anknra rrad qSTS^Trf Tor ij^ ^w
to be worshipped, — the Charvakas as Him who is estabhsh-
ed by the convention of the world, — the followers of the
Nyaya as Him who is all that is said worthy of Him, — why
farther detail ? whom even theartizans themselves worship
as the great artizan, Vis'wakarman,) — although, I say, with
regard to that Being, the adorable S'iva, whom all recog-
nise throughout the world as universally acknowledged
like castes, families, family invocations of Agni, schools,
social customs, &c. how can there arise any doubt ? and
what then is there to be ascertained? — Still this logi-
cal investigation may be well called the contemplation
of God, and this is really worship when it follows the
hearing the S'ruti. Therefore that adorable one who hath
been often heard mentioned in the S'ruti, Smriti, narrative
poems, Puranas, &c., must now be contemplated, accord-
ing to such a S'ruti as ^ He is to be heard and to be
contemplated,^ and such a Smriti as ' by the Veda,
inference and the delight of continued meditation, — in
this threefold manner producing knowledge, a man obtains
the highest concentration.^ Now there is, in short, a
fivefold opposition to our theory, — as based, first, on the
non-existence of any supernatural cause of another world (as
adrlshta, the merit and demerit of our actions) ; — or second-
ly, on the possibility of our putting in action certain causes
of another world (as sacrifices,) even if God be allowed to
be non-existent; — or thirdly, on the existence of proofs
which show the non-existence of God ; — or fourthly, on the
opinion that, even if God does exist, he cannot be a cause
of true knowledge to us ; — or fifthly, on the absence of any
argument to prove his existence.
" Very" — without any second ; " knower" — existing in the form
of pure knowledge ; " first wise" — existing in the form of intelligence
at the first beginning of creation ; " perfect" — as possessed of the eight
divine faculties ; ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and tenacity of
mundane existence, are the five " pains ;" sacrifice, injuring others, &c.
B 2
as causing merit and demerit, are the " actions ;" rank, length of life
and enjoyment are the " fruits ;" merit and demerit the " deserts" left
as a residue in the mind. " Eevealed" — ^^ e. manifested [as a previously
existing object], since the Veda is eternal. He is " gracious" as being
the original instructor in arts, as of making jars, &c. " S'iva," void of
the three qualities ; the " great Father" as the father even of the
father ; " omniscient" with a momentary omniscience.* The " obstruc-
tions" are ignorance, desire, aversion, delusion, and tenacity of mun-
dane existence,, — " pointed out as to be worshipped" as the Yaidic
mantras, ko.- — possessed of " all that is said w^orth}^ of him" in the
various descriptions of God. "School" (cliarand) means here recension
(s'dklid)-\ Although the existence of God is indeed established by
the S'ruti's evidence, yet, if we wash to employ inference, the absence of
doubt need not be a fault in our argument.;]; He therefore proceeds
towards the close of the passage to propose a doubt, according to the
principle of satisfying an opponent.
IV. — We have to meet the opponent's first objection by establishing
the existence of a supernatural cause of another world in the form of
merit and demerit, and, if this be established, then it follows that a
God is established as the superintendent thereof, since a non-intelligent
cause can only produce its effect by the superintendence of something
intelligent. He therefore proceeds to establish this.
lY . — From dependence, — from eternity, — from diversity,
— from universal practice, — and from the apportionment
to each individual soul, — mundane enjoyment implies a
supernatural cause [i. e. ' desert.^]
Our proposition is that there exists a supernatural cause of another
world, i. e- a cause beyond the reach of the senses, a. First of all, then,
to establish the class of causes in general, he says " from dependence."
Dependence means here that the effect is occasional. All effects must
have a cause since they are occasional, like the gratification produc-
* The Maclhyamika Bauddhas hold that everything is momentary, irdvTa pei.
t For the original difference between charana and s'akha cf. Muller's Ancient
Sanskrit literature, p. 125. On pro/i'ara, see ibid., p. 386.
X In ordinary cases people do not take the trouble of arguing if there is no
douljt to be solved.
ed by food ; [otherwise, if they did not depend on a cause, they
could be found everywhere and always], h. " But if the cause of ajar, &c.
were eternal, would it not follow that the jar, &c. would also be eternal,
and therefore we must assume the jar's cause to be itself only
occasional, and therefore the perpetual series of causes must be all
occasional, each dependent on its previous cause ?" To meet this ob-
jection of a regressus in infinitum he says " from the eternity [of tlie
succession of cause and effect]," like the continued series of seed
and shoot,* — the meaning being that a regressus in infinitum ceases
to be a fault, if, like this one alleged in our illustration, it can be
proved by the evidence of our senses, c. " But [if you require a cause,]
why not say [with the Vedantin] that Brahma alone is the cause, or
[with the Sankhya] Nature in the form of various individual
intellects ?" To meet this, he says " from the diversity [of effects, as
heaven, hell, &c.]" — ais the effects imply a diversity of causes, from their
being diverse as effects, d. " But why not accept a visible cause as
sacrifices, &c. — why have recourse to an invisible desert (adrislita) .''"
To meet this, he adds " from the universal practice," i. e. from the
fact that all men, desiring fruit in another world, do engage in
sacrifices, &c. It is only the conviction that they do produce heaven,
&c. as their fruit, which makes men engage in sacrifices, &c. ; and
these [passing away when the action is over] cannot produce this
fruit unless by means of some influence which continues to act after
the rite is over, — and hence is this invisible influence, called merit or
demerit, established, e. " But why not say that this desert does not
reside in the same subject as the enjoyment [i. e. the individual
soul,] but produces the enjoyment by abiding in the thing enjoyed ?"
He replies " from the apportionment to each soul." Since the enjoy-
ment resides in each soul severally, we should be unwarranted to attri-
bute its production to a desert residing elsewhere.
V. — " But why may we not suppose that the effect arises without a
cause, according to the adversary's opinion given in the Nyaya Sutras
(iv. 22), ' there is an origination of entities fi'om no cause, for we see
the sharpness of a thorn, &c. ?' " He replies.
* Cf. Cowper's remarks on liis cucumber, " I raised the seed that produced
the plant, that produced the fruit, tliat produced the seed, that produced the
fruit I seut you."
V. — "Without a cause^^ cannot mean the denial of a
cause or of production, nor can it imply that the effect
itself or an unreal thing is the cause ; and if you sug-
gest " spontaneously/' it cannot mean tli at , from effects
being definitely limited.
Does your " without a cause" mean that a. there is no cause at
all ? or b. does it deny all production ? or c. does it imply the rejection
of all foreign causes ? or d. of all real causes ?* Under either pair of
alternatives the ultimate result is that you have no cause at all, and
under the latter pair, the additional absurdity of a false cause. t — Or e-
does it mean " spontaneously ?" But effects are definitely limited,
since, if they were not, occasionalness would be at an end, [as they
might then arise always and everywhere.]
YI. — " But if we are to assume an eternal succession of causes and
effects (as otherwise we cannot account for the occasionalness of
effects/) — still even then, as that which is distinguished by the nature
of fire (scil. fire) will not always be found only where straw, &c., are,
these latter will have to be excluded from being causes, and therefore
we shall again have our old difficulty of occasionalness being precluded,
as no other cause can be mentioned." Here the Mimansakas come in
and maintain that we must assume as a cause the fact of there being
present a capacity favourable to fire, and thus " capacity" must be
allowed to be a separate category :|: varying according to each individual,
non-eternal in the non-eternal thing, described as it is in the line
' Eternal in the eternal, and in the non-eternal produced by
the cause of that thing in which it resides.'
Or as another opinion holds [that of Srikaracharya] *' there is an
eternal capacity favourable to fire, abiding in straw, the arani wood,
and the burning gem." — The Naiyayikas however maintain that there
is an actual difierence of class which accompanies the being produced
from straw, arani or the burning gem, — since, if we assumed a capacity
favourable to one and the same thing {i. e. to fire,) and yet itself
existino" in things of different classes (as straw, &c.,) then on seeing
* That is, there can be imagined false causes.
t Under any one of the four cases you have really no proper ' cause' at all (thus
in the third, the thuig must precede itself to fulfil the definition of a cause ;) and
hence any supposed cause (as in c, and d.,) can only be a false one.
+ Cf. Siddhanta Miiktavali, pp. 3, L
smoke^ &c., you could not draw the inference of fire, &c.* And again,
[if this assumption were correct], we shouhl not have such respec-
tive colligations of concurrent causes of fire, as straw and blowing,
arani wood and rubbing, or the burning gem and the reflected rays
of the sun, since we see in other cases that that which possesses the
property that determines causation {i. e. according to the present
theory, capacity) will produce its effect in conjunction with anything
which similarly possesses some other property that determines
causation ; and therefore, in tlie present case, we should be led to
expect fire to result from sucli a conjunction as the gem and blowing.
If you would meet this by assuming that there is one capacity
favourable to fire, which resides not in any one thing alone (as straw,)
but in the several combinations, as straw and blowing, and the rest, —
this is not the true solution, but you must rather accept (from its
greater simplicity) my theory that a difference of class resides in the
various fires produced by straw, &c., as is seen by the evidence of the
senses, like the fire of a lamp, &c.t Hence Capacity is not to be assumed
as a separate category. These discussions are condensed in the fol-
lowing couplet.
VI. — This succession of causes and effects has no be-
ginning, nor has it one capacity abiding in things of dif-
ferent classes [as straw, &c.] ; we must diligently strive for
ourselves to fix the several limitations, by determining
the constant accompaniments and separations. J
The meaning of this is that we must assume a difference of class (i. e.
species,) in effects produced by different causes. [If you ask " Then,
in reference to ivhat cause, is the class of fire (as the genus,) the de-
termining notion of all the various special fires as effects, I reply,] heat
as possessing a peculiar hot quality to the touch§ is the cause in the
case of all the various fires. [In the case of the difierent species of fire
* Fire would not be the cause of smoke, in its nature as fire, but simply
as having a capacity for producing smoke ; and therefore on seeing smoke, our
true inference would be that the mountain has not " fire" but " a capacity for
producing smoke."
t The fire in a lamp lights the house, while fire from wood or cow- dung-
produces little or no light.
X E. g. Fire may be found, and yet no straw, but a gem ; and vice versa.
§ This epithet is added to exclude ' gold.'
8
we have different causes, straw, &e., but in all alike we have the general
cause 'heat,' i. e. heat is the necessary and universal antecedent].
VII. — " But may we not say that as one and the same lamp gives
light, destroys the wick and illumines different objects as jars, &c., so we
may have one common cause, either as the one Brahma (with the
Vedantin,) or as Nature (with the Sankhya) which is not to be distin-
guished from the various intellects apportioned to the different souls, as
the cause and effect are identical ; — and hence the existence of God
will not be established as the superintendent of merit and demerit,
[since our supposed causes will evolve their own effects, and we there-
fore need not assume adrishta as the special cause of the world] ?"
To meet this he says,
YII. — Of one there can be no succession^ of the same
there can be no variety ; it is not a special capacity since
this cannot be severed, — nature is hard to be violated.
From one cause alone there can be no determinate succession of
effects [as they would be all produced simultaneously ;] and from the
same cause, i. e. one general cause (as the Sankhya's prakriti) there
cannot be a variety of effects, i. e. effects of different kinds ; and therefore
since we find successive effects produced, we must conclude that there
are successive causes, and, since we find effects of various kinds, we
must conclude the causes to be likewise various in kind.
He now refutes the doubt that perhaps various effects might be
produced from one general cause by special capacities, by the words
*' it is not a special cajDacity, since this cannot be severed" from the
subject in which it resides, as the power and that which possesses
the power are really identical ; and if you sever them, then we shall
have to accept the power as the true cause, and in this way your
unity of cause is destroyed, and duality follows. — " May we not hold
that one cause can produce various effects simply by its own
nature ?" ' He replies "nature is hard to be violated." If that same
nature which existed when one effect had to be produced, continued to
exist at the time of the production of another, then the nature of
water, &c., might exist in fire, — that is, a thing's real nature
cannot remain concealed. The instance of the lamp is not in point,
as it can be explained by a difference in the concurrent causes neces-
9
sary to produce the different effects.*
VIIT. " But why may we not say that the potter's staff, &c. may
be a cause in the case of jars, &c., but not sacrifices, &c. in the
case of heaven, &c. ?" Pie replies,
VIII. The universal practice is not fruitless,, nor can
it have trouble as its only fruit ; nor can it have as its
fruit some visible gain; nor can there be such a deception
[as this would involve if all were false].
The activity in performing sacrifices to obtain heaven, which all
display who desire another world, cannot be fruitless, nor can it
have trouble as its sole result, — since activity arises only from a con-
viction that such a course will be a means to obtain the desired
object. Nor can we say that its fruit is the attainment of some
visible object, i. e., reputation for sanctity, wealth, &c., since even
those perform sacrifices who have no regard to such objects. Should
you reply that some knave first devised the custom of offering sacri-
fices as means of obtaining heaven, and the rest of mankind were
cajoled into following his example, this is met by the words " nor
can there be such a deception." For who could be so utterly
different from the rest of mankind as for the mere sake of deceiving
others to impose upon himself a round of actions which necessarily
cause all sorts of trouble ? and hence we may safely infer that the
universal practice of sacrifice is a proof that sacrifices do produce
heaven as their result.
IX. " Well, then, why not say that sacrifices, &c., may be the
direct causes of [our obtaining] heaven, &c., and not any merit which
they are said to produce ?" He replies,
IX. A thing long passed cannot produce its result
without some continuant influence over and above. The
souls^ having no distinction^ could not have enjoyment
even though the objects were affected by aclrisJita.
* Thus for the g-iving light we have the conjunction of the flame and wick,
&c. ; for the burning of the wick we have the destruction of the conjunction
previously existing between the particles of the wick; for the illumining of
objects we have the conjunction of the eye with the jar, and that of the jar with
th'e light.
10
A " thing long passed," i. e. the sacrifice, &c., " without some con-
tinuant influence over and above," i. e. an operation favourable to
producing the result, cannot produce that result ; for a cnuse which
has long ceased to be, can only act as a cause by means of some
operation [or influence] that continues to exist after it, just as the
transient perception of the senses only produces recollection by
means of the impression which it leaves in the mind, [to produce
the actual recollection w^e require some reminding association to
arouse the dormant impression.] — " May we not say that adrishta
may be the cause, as residing in the thing to be enjoyed [and not
as merit in the person enjoying ?]" He replies by the subsequent
line. If the souls had no distinction, one from the other, in the
form of different kinds of merit, they could not receive different
degrees of enjoyment [as we see they do] from different bodies
[higher or lower in the scale], even though these were affected by
adrishta, — since these bodies are properly common to all souls. In
other words, the varying enjoyment can only be produced by the
different bodies and their organs as attracted, in each case, by the
respective merit of the individual souls.
X. " But" [the Mimansaka will say,] " wh}^ not allow a certain im-
perceptible property [i. e. the before-mentioned capacity] residing in
the objects to be enjoyed, which produces the enjoyment in each
particular case, just as we accept a particular kind of capacity which
abides in fire, &c., and produces their special effects, as burning, &c. ?
Otherwise [i. e., if the fire burns of itself and not by its capacity,]
we should have to expect the effect of buri^ng to be produced wher-
ever there was contact between the fire and the hand, even though
the latter wore the fire-extinguisliing gem. Nor ma^^ 3'ou say that
the absence of this gem should be considered as also a cause of
burning, — because causation must always imply presence and exis-
tence.* The true statement is that the gem produces the destruc-
tion of the burning capacity, and hence its common name ' the
obstructor ;' and hence we maintain that the category of Capacity
must be accepted." He replies,
X. As existence, so too non-existence is held to be
See Jaimini Sutras i., Mitakshara iii.
11
a cause as well as an effect ; obstruction is the absence of
means, and that which causes this is ' an obstructor/
As we prove by constant accompaniment and separation that
absence or non-existence {ahhdva,) i. e. emergent non-existence,* may
be an effect, similarly we can prove that it may be a cause, — since
there is no reason to establish such a maxim as yours, that * causa-
tion must imply presence and existence.' — The second line replies
to the objection that an inanimate thing cannot be said to be an obstruc-
tor. Obstruction (pratihancUta) signifies " the absence of means,"
i. e. of causes to produce such and such an effect ; and this in our
present topic would be " the absence of the extinguishing gem's
absence," i. e, the presence of the gem itself. Properly speaking
the man who places the gem is the obstructor {pratihandhaha) ; but
by the grammatical rule which allows the affix ka to be added
pleonastically, we may accept i^ratibandhaka to be used for prati-
bandha, the ' obstructor' for the ' obstruction.'
The modern Mimansakas, liowever, maintain that " there is a
needless complication in assuming such a cause as the absence of
such a fire-extinguishing gem as is attended by the absence of all
[excitants as the fire-exciting gem, charms, &c. ;]t it is more simple
to assume an eternal capacity in fire, &c., and, when the gem is
present, this capacity is deadened. (Nor may you say that ' a
capacity is first produced from the straw, &c. the causes of the fire, —
this capacity resides in the fire, and is destroyed by the extinguish-
ing gem and resuscitated by the exciting gem ; and any objection on
the ground of the indeterminate nature of the cause of the capacity:|:
might be met by the assumption that its cause is only such a cause
by virtue of itself possessing a capacity favourable for producing
the former capacity.' This, we repeat, is unwarranted, because
* Emergent nou-existence is the destruction of a tiling previously existing.
We prove that it is an effect because the desti'uction of a jai' is only seen when
it is preceded by some cai:se as the blow of a hammer, &c. and whex-ever these
are not found, there the jar is not destroyed. The Mimansa holds that abhava,
being really nothing, cannot be a cause. But he proves that absence can be
similarly shewn to be a cause, — where absence of the hre-oxtinguisher is, there
is burning, and where there is not this absence, there is no burning.
t If the fire exthiguisbing gem were present icith the fire-exciting gem, its
effect would be neutralised. Cf. Siddhanta Muktiivali, p. 4.
X Its cause being somclimeii straw, &o. and jiumcLiiucs the exciting gem.
12
rather than assume such a multitude of successive capacities re-
siding in the fire, it would be more simple to assume [with
our opponents, the followers of the Nya3^a,] that the one cause is
the absence of such an extinguishing gem as is attended by the
absence of a fire-exciting gem.) Therefore we maintain that in the
case of burning we must assume, as the determining notion of causa-
tion, the presence of an undeadened capacity." Thus hold the
modern Mimansakas ; but we cannot agree with them, because we
should then have to assume an endless number of different capacities,
as that of the extinguishing gem to cause the deadening of the
burning capacity, that of the exciting gem to destroy the deadening,
d'c. This is a brief summary of the discussion.
XI. But the Mimansakas reply, " In the Vaidic injunction ' he
sprinkles the rice, he shells the rice,' do we not assume an operation or
capacity [i. e. sanskdra,'] produced by the sprinkling, which abides in
the rice and produces the future shelling, since what we understand by
the expression is that only that rice which is sprinkled is capable of
being shelled ? and it may be taken as a general rule that whenever
anything is done through desire of an eff*ect which will reside in some
other thing, the former produces an operation which produces the
result residing in the latter, as is the case wdth sacrifices. [Sacri-
fices are done for the sake of happiness (as heaven, &c.) residing in
the man ; therefore the means thereto, the merit produced by the
rite, must also reside in the man.] And again, unless we accept a
continuant capacity, how can we account for rice, and rice only,
being produced from sown rice, though the seed is dissolved in
the ground into its component atoms ? and similarly we must say
that ploughing in the month Magha (Jan. — Feb.) produces a
capacity residing in the ground [which eventually produces a good
harvest in Nov. and Dec.]" He answers,
XI. AVe accept an influence produced in man by such
acts as sprinkling the rice, &c. ;* the qualities of the
atoms, as form afi'ected by contact with fire, &c._, cause the
distinction!
- * Some say that there are three ways of sprinkling — prol'sMna with the
Bnpine hand, 0.11111111; shana with the inverted hand, and arokshana by a motion
of the hand sidewavs. Bnt other authorities give them differently.
13
By sprinkling, &c. there is produced in man an influence which
we call ' desert,' — since it is simpler to assume one single influence
residing in the soul directly producing the shelling which is indi-
rectly produced by sprinlding, &c.,* than to assume a variety of
capacities for each parcel of rice,— and since some power or attribute
must be assumed to be produced by a veda-commanded act which
tends to a future result, as there is no visible means for the result
being brought about. From the phrase " purified rice" we assume
that the influence resides in the rice by a connectionf which is the
same as the nature of the thing [while it resides in the man by the
so-called intimate relation ;] and so too in the case of consecrated
water, branches, &c. there is produced an influence or merit residing-
in the man favourable to producing such and such a result [as the
consecration of the jar.] [Nor may you say that " if the merit pro-
duced do not reside in the rice but in the man, then why is vrikm
in the objective case, as wherever there is this objective case we find
the effect residing there, as in ' he cooks rice,' — here the effect produced
by cooking, i. e., softening, resides in the rice, &c."— as we reply that]
your vaidic example stands on the same footing as such a common
secular phrase as " he sprinkles the fried barley flour," — here there is no
Vaidic injunction, yet we find an objective case used, the real meanino*
of which is this, viz. the possessing a result produced by the action of
another (i. e. the man), which result is the conjunction of the water
produced by that action, i. e, the sprinkling. Besides your general
maxim that ' whenever a thing is done through desire of an efiect, &c.'
fails in such cases as the hawk-sacrifice, which is performed for the sake
of tlie slaughter of an enemy [which slaughter of course resides in
him,] while it produces a result [hell] which resides in the performer.
* In other words adrishta is the vydpdra of the spriiikiing-, accordiuo- to the
prJBciple taj-janyative sati taj-janya-janaJco hi vydpdrali,
t In Hindu philosophy there are three principal relations, — 1. the samavdya
or intimate relation, i. e. that which exists between the whole and its parts, a
substance and its qualities, or both these and their genus ; 2. tixesanyoga or con-
junction, as between a pot and the soil on which it stands ; and 3. sivarupa or
the natui'e of the thing. This last may be generally said to take up all those
relations which are not included in the two former, such as the relation between
an object and the knowledge of it (vishayatd), that between abhava and the
spot of ground from which the absent thing is absent, &c., and that between
a distinguishing attribute (not a proper quality or action) and its subject, as
akas'atwa in akas'a. Hence the swarupa sambandha is sometimes called vislia-
yata-sambandha. The two former are something other than the things related j
the swarupa sambandha is really one or the other of them.
It
He now explains by the second line the determined production of
barley, &c., from the several seeds as sown. The qualities of the
atoms, such as form affected by contact with fire, &c.* produce the
distinction, i. e. the atoms as possessed of tlie qualities of form, mois-
ture, &c. affected by contact with fire, tend to produce such and such
effects [rice or barley, as it may be, — the desert of the individual acting
as the concurrent cause.] In the case of healing [where the opponent
might allege that the medicine produced an after effect by means of his
supposed continuant capacity,] the drinking of the medicine produces
an equilibrium between the three humours, and this is. the means of
the subsequently produced destruction of the disease. f
XII. " But how then [except by the assumption of our special cate-
gory ' Capacity,'] will you account for sensible touch, &c. in the case of
air, &c. [which seem cold, &c. to the body,] where there is no form
produced by contact with fire, [as there is in earth ?] or again how is
the natural liquidity of water stopped in ice, &c. ? or how in images, &c.
do such ceremonies become effectual as those for inviting the deity to
take up his residence therein, &c. ? We hold therefore that we must
admit such a thing as a capacity produced by the rite pratislithdX
which can be destroyed by the touch of impure persons as the Chan-
dala, vtc, which capacity renders the image a fit object of worship."
He replies,
XII. The perceptible form, &c. and their absence [in ice
and air] arise from contact with special causes j the deities
are worshipped through their coming [into the image] or
through the worshipper^s consciousness of having duly
performed the rite.
The ' special causes' are the various kinds of merit in the person
[gratified by the cold air or ice.] The deities become conciliated by
* It is a peculiai-iiy of the element earth that its form, taste (or moisture,)
smell and touch are changed by contact with fire.
t Our author does not notice the objection of the ploughing in Magha.
Anotlicr w-riter Pakshadharamitra in his Padtutlia Mala supphes the omission.
According to liim " Through the ploughing in Magha the original soil ia
destroyed by the series of acts tending to the separation of the atoms which des-
troys their original conjunction, and subsequently by the disintegration a new
B(jil is produced, and through this is the ploughing in Magha a cause of the
cxceUent hai-vest afterwards."
X The ceremony of consecrating an image of a deity.
the ceremony of consecration, and shew it by coining to take up their
residence, i. e. by their appropriation of the image and transference
of self-consciousness thereto ; but by the touch of an impm-e person
such appropriation and self-consciousness are rendered void. Even on
the Mimansaka view which disputes the intelligence of the deities, we
can say that it is the idea [in the worshipper's mind] that the
worship has been performed in due manner, and that the image
has been duly consecrated, — this idea being also necessarily accom-
panied by the absence of the touch of any impure person,—^
which constitutes the image's fitness as an object of worship;,
and the ceremony's importance lies in its contributing to produce
this idea. But in reality it is the absence of any impure contact
as wdth a Chandala, &c. at the time of the pratislithd ceremony and
also after the ceremony is over, which constitutes the fitness of the
image as an object of worship ; since the rule " let him worship it
when duly inaugm-ated by the ceremonj pratishtM'" implies that the
ceremony must be already over. Such is a summary of the discussion.
XIII. " But ought we not to say that in the weighing ordeal, &c.
a power or capacity is produced in the scales by the ceremony of the
brdeal, and by that a result is produced such as the nsing or sinking
of the defendant in the scales ?"* He replies,
XIII. Only for the discovering of the concurrent of the
cause of victory or defeat^ — which cause abides as an
attribute in the person examined, — are the rules of the
ordeal instituted.
Only to discover the concurrent, favourable to the desii'ed result
(i. e. the rising or sinking in the scale), — the concm-rent of the
desert which is the proper cause of the victory or defeat in the
ordeal, — are the rules of the ordeal instituted. " I who according
to the rule of the ordeal now mount tlie scales am innocent or
guiltv," — this consciousness in the man's own mind is the concur-
rent. — Or another interpretation is " only to discover the residing
of (i. e. to produce,) merit or demerit are the rules of the ordeal
instituted," and thus in relation to innocence such as is conformable
* For this kind of ordeal see Professor Stenzler's essay on ' die Indischeti-
Giottesurtheile' in the Zeitschrift d. D. M. G. vol. ix. p. 665.
16
to tis protestation merit is produced, and demerit in relation to his
guiltiness.* The second mode is preferable, as in this way an objec-
tion is obviated which would apply to the former, viz., — " in the case
of a man falsely accused of killmg a Brahman, &c., as his not
having done it is not meritorious, how could his consciousness of
innocence be a concurrent cause ?"t
XIV. But here the Sankhyas come in with their system, — " There
is Soul, the abode of intelligence, but not a cause of anything, and
consequently unchangeable and eternal ; and Nature which is one,
unintelligent, subject to development and eternal ; the first develop-
ment from Natm-e is Intellect, the so-called ' great' first principle, —
in it are eight attributes, viz. knowledge, ignorance, might, weakness,
freedom from passion, subjection to passion, merit and demerit, or the
eight may be otherwise enumerated as knowledge, pleasm'e, pain, desire,
aversion, effort, merit, and demerit, — as this school does not accept
the Naiyayik self-reproductive quality of imagination, hhdvand, since
they hold that at the time of memory the perception itself does remain
in a very subtil form. As without the assumption of soul we
cannot account for the unintelligent product of Nature, Intellect,
imagining itself to be intelligent, we conclude that the existence
of soul is hence established, — identical with its essential attribute
intelhgence, since the subject and attribute are always undistin-
guishable. From Natm-e arises the Great one, from the Great one
Egoism, from Egoism the five subtil elements, form, flavour, smell,
touch and sound, and the organs [of perception and action], the eye,
skin, nose, tongue, ear, and mind, and the voice, hand, foot, anus and
generative organ ; while from the subtil elements are produced the
gross elements, eai*th, water, fire, air and ether. This has been thus
described, [in the Sankhya Karika,] " Original Natm-e is not an
evolute ; the seven, intellect, &c. are evolvent and evolute j the set of
sixteen are only evolute ; while Soul is neither evolvent nor evolute."
The set of sixteen is made up by the five gross elements and the eleven
organs of perception and action. [Should you ask why we assume
ir:ind as om* eleventh organ, we reply,] a. if the eternal Soul were
* By the former interpretation merit and knowledge act conjointly in pro-
ducing the result, by the second merit alone.
t This negative knowledge could not be the sahakdri of a previous punya,
as there is no 'panya in the absence of an action.
17
itself associated with the objects of inherent joy and pain, it would
follow that there could be no liberation ; h. if the connection with
objects took place in dependence on Nature, it would equally follow
that, since Nature is eternal, there could be no liberation ; c, if the
non-eternal objects, jars, &c., were associated with the essential
intelligence, it would follow that there could be no such distinction
as * seen' and ' not seen,' [as all the things now existing would neces-
sarily be seen at one and the same moment ;] and d. if the association
of objects and intelligence depended on the external organs only,
we could not account for the perceptions through different organs
not being simultaneous ; and hence we must assume the existence
of a distinct organ, mind, in connection with which the external
organs produce the association of the object and intelligence. In
dreams when a person thinks himself a tiger, &c, there is not present
to him the consciousness that he is a man ; hence we must also
assume the existence of a faculty, egoism, whose function is the
assuming the consciousness of various objects. Since we see inspira-
tion and expiration ceaselessly going on, in waking, dreams, and
sound sleep, we must assume the existence of a faculty which con-
tinues acting throughout, viz. the principle of Intellect endued with
the eight attributes before mentioned ; the object being brought into
connection with Intellect's development, viz. cognition, conceals the
real nature of Soul, and hence it is that liberation arises when, from
the destruction of the principle Intellect, there ceases to be any con-
nection with objects ; while the idea ' I, the intelligent, act' arises from
the nonperception of the difference between the (witness) soul and the
active intellect. This has been explained in the Bhagavad Gita " ac-
tions are ever done by the qualities of nature, the soul blinded by egoism
thinks ' I am the doer.' " And this Intellect consists of three por-
tions, the reflection of the Soul, the reflection of the object, and
the arising determination, as in the thought ' this must be done by
me,' — here ' hij me' shews the reflection of the intelligent Soul, which
is not an actual intercourse, but only illusory in consequence of the
nonperception of the distinction between the Soul and Intellect ;
* this'' shews the reflection of the object ; and the arising resolve
' must he done' is dependent upon both these. The connection of
the Soul, as reflected in Intellect, with the object, is what we
call knowledge, and the connection of the Soul with this know-
D
18
ledge is seen in the determination ' I, the ijitelligent, act,' " [whereas
in reality the intelligent cannot act and the acting faculty cannot
tliink.]
To meet this, he says,
XIV. The attributes of the agent are the determiners
[that knowledge and action reside in the same subject] ;
and the intelligent is our only agent ; otherwise, we
should necessarily have no liberation or else no mundane
succession of events.
The attributes merit, demerit, desire and aversion must reside in the
same subject with action, since experience of happiness and misery
resides in the same subject with action [and these produce all such
experience] ; and in the same way we hold that the inteUigent soul is
alone the agent, as is proved by the impression ' I, the intelligent, act.'
The second line adds another refutation of the Sankhya doctrine. If
Intellect were eternal, then there could be no liberation, as the Soul
would always remain associated with Intellect ; if it were non eternal,
then it must be allowed to have been produced, as a noneternal thing
cannot but have been produced ; and in this case, previously to its
production, as the attributes belonging to it would be also then non-
existent, it would follow^ that their effects, the various bodies, organs,
&c., assigned to individuals, w^ould as yet be equally unproduced, and
consequently there would be no mundane succession of events, [and
therefore no bondage of soul, and consequentl}^ no need of liberation.]
XV. Here steps in the Charvaka, " well, let desert be an attribute
of an intelligent being ; but this intelligent being is not eternal and
all-pervading, but a certain kind of element moditied in the form of the
bod}'', since such phrases as ' I, the pale one, know' prove that it has
form [and form is a corporeal attribute.]" He answers,
XV. One does not remember what another has seen ;
the body remains not one and the same from decay ; there
cannot be transference of impressions, and if you accept
a non-momentary existence there is no other means.
If intelligence belonged to the body, there could be no remembrance
in vouth of things experienced in childhood, just as Maitra cannot
remember what Chaitra saw ; nor can you say that the body conti-
19
nues one and the same in cliildliood and youth, because of its
" decay," i. e. destruction, since by a difference of size the thing
itself becomes different, as the destruction of the former size
is brought about by the destruction of the subject in which it
resided. Nor may you maintain that the second body, as the effect,
may still remember what had been experienced by its cause the
previous body, because " there cannot be transference of impressions,"
otherwise we should have the child in the womb rememl)ering the
experiences of its mother. " But may there not be a transference
of impressions from the material cause to the effect ?" [the subsequent
bod^^ being made out of the previous one.] He replies " if you accept
a non-momentary existence, there is no other means." In other words,
if you do not accept the Bauddha doctrine that all things are in a
continual Hux, — one heap of atoms the next moment producing
another heap, — but allow that things do last from moment to momeut,
then the parts, as the hands, &c., are the material cause of the body ;
and, if so, then on your hypothesis, if a person's hand were cut off,
the maimed body ought not to remember a former experience of
that hand, as it would now no longer be a part (i. e. material cause)
of the body. Nor can you say that "intelligence belongs to the
atoms and therefore there is remembrance because these remain,"
because, if so, remembrance ought to be imperceptible [while yet it is
perceptible by the internal organ, mind,] just as the form of the
atoms is imperceptible ; and also there ought to be no remembrance
of anything once experienced by the atoms of the hand, if there be
no longer union with those atoms, the hand being severed from
the body.
XVI. "Well then, why not allow, with the Bauddhas, that all
things are dissolved every successive moment, and that each previous
heap of atoms, as a material cause, produces a succeeding heap as its
effect ? in this way there is no difliculby to account for memory."
He replies,
XVI. This could not bo without difference of kim,],
and if this latter were true there could be no inference ;
and without inference even your hypothesis could not
stand ; nor could there be perception without ascertainment.
By " diilcrcncc of kind" he means the Bauddha notion of " ctlicieut
D 2
20
form,"* without wliicli " this," i. e. the doctrine of a continual flux,
could not be estabhshed ; [and this notion cannot be proved] since,
on the simple hypothesis of the seed &c. continuing on from moment
to moment, you can easily account for the production or non-produc-
tion of the effect respectively by the presence or absence of the
concurrent causes, water, &c., and thence you can account for the
production of the shoot by the nature of the seed [without assuming
any ' eiScient form ;'] so that if the individual seed be allowed to
continue on, how can there be any such momentary flux ? — Again, even
if 3''ou assume this peculiar kind of species, ' efficient form,' to abide
in the perceptible individual but to be itself beyond the cognizance
of the senses, there could be no such thing as inference, as fire can
only then be the cause of smoke, when its nature as fire acts as the
eflicient form of the first moment's smoke; but even if you suppose
that one special smoke (the first moment's,) is produced by fire,
you cannot thereby infer that fire is the cause of all smoke, because
by your own hypothesis you must allow that this very smoke is the
cause of its own special effect, the second moment's smoke, [and this
of the third, &c. ;] and hence it would follow that all inference
would be abolished, as it would be impossible to establish the univer-
sal major premiss, which depends for its validity on an argument to
preclude the possibility of an instance where the middle term is
found disjoined from the major, which argument must be always
based on the relation of cause and effect [as existing between the
major and middle. t] And without inference it is impossible to
establish your own hypothesis of a momentary flux, since it can only
be cognized by means of inference. Nor can you say that " perception
itself is the evidence of flux," because, according to your doctrine,
the only perception which can really have authority is the inde-
terminate J (nirvikalpaha) since that alone is produced by the object ;
* As the ISTaiyayikas hold that the species jar (gliatatvja) resides in all jars, so the
Bauddhas hold that a quasi-jdti, called kurvddrupatwa, resides in each thing when
that thing is actively employed in producing its effect, as a jar in holding water,
or rice in producing a plant. When there is no effect being produced this
kurvadruxjatwa is absent. But for their assumption of this occasionally present
principle, every thing would ahrays produce its effect.
t Cf. S. Muktav. p. 122. There is an interesting attempt in the Sarva Dar's.
Sangraha, pp. 7, 8, to establish the authority of the universal proposition from
the relation of cause and effect or of genus and species.
:J; The Hindus hold that on the contact ot iho organ of sense with an object, as
e. g. a jar, there arises the idea of a jar and also the idea of the nature, i. e.
21
yet — since even this is only inferred from the subsequent determinate
perception, — in the case of an object which only lasts one moment,
there can be no such determinate perception, and consequently, with
the failure of this, fails likewise the indeterminate. Again, the
so-called species of efficient form in the case of seed-produced plants
is not a true species, as it is obnoxious to the charge of ' confusion,'
since, a., it will be found present in barley without the species
rice, — h , it will not be found in rice stored in a granary [and
therefore lying idle and not producing its effect] while the species
rice is found present there, — and, c, both species [' efficient form' and
' rice'] are found simultaneously conjoined in sown rice when it is
actually producing its shoot. — Hence \;ve Naiyayikas (to avoid this
fault of ' confusion,') assume that there are many subdivisions of the
species 'jar' (and not merely one undivided) — these subdivisions being
severally pervaded by [i. e. included under] ' silver' &c. [as silver jars,
earthen jars, &c.] And [if you ask why we call them all by the common
name jar, we reply that] the general appellation jar arises from our
viewing them as all possessed of one common attribute, viz. the being
composed of parts which [however different in material] possess a
particular kind of arrangement [called kambugriva in the case of jars].
XVII. " Well, then, let us consider the flux hypothesis as still
undetermined, [_i. e. it is at any rate not shewn to be impossible ;] for as
for any argument against it on the plea of recognition (' L e. this is
the jar I saw yesterday,') we overthrow it by maintaining that there
is a doubt as to its being the same jar." He replies,
XVII. There can be no doubt as to things continuing,
nor as to perception, nor can there be as to authority of
proof from the self-contradiction, — as the same proof which
establishes the oneness of the object duriog the moment
may establish it during a longer time.
There can be no doubt as to the continuance of objects as we can
perceive it by recognition ; nor can there be doubt as to our recogni-
tion, as we can ascertain its correctness by our being conscious of
ItSos of jar (both being equally objects of perception,) but the two ideas are
distinct, — this is nirvikalpaka. Subsequently the mind combines them into one
idea, ' a jar possessing the species or nature of jar,' and this is savikalxjaka. We
are however not conscious of the first step, — it is only recognised as necessary
from an analysis of the subsequent compound idea.
22
possessing this knowlcdi^e. Nor can there be douht as to the authori-
ty of (dl evidence " from the self-contradiction" which it involves,
since if you doubt of the authorit}'" of your own consciousness of doubt
the very existence of your doubt is itself unproved ; and again, if
you cannot establish any thing as authoritative, you cannot have
any doubt even as to authority, because you will not have established
your point to doubt upon [and your doubt will have no foundation].
" Well, but may we not doubt [not of all authority but] of the
authority of your so-called recognition, since we can see cases of
erroneous recognition, as when we say of a man whose hair has
grown again after it was cut, ' this is the same hair as before,'
&c. ?" To meet this he gives the second line. The same proof,
viz., the absence of opposite qualities, by which we know in the
case of the jar which exists oulj one moment, that during that
moment it is the same and not a different jar, — may teach us in
the case of the jar which is supposed to continue on from moment to
moment, that it too is the same jar and not a different one. Since
just as one cognition may be connected with many different objects
[as e. y. a table with the things on it,] so too one object, as a jar, may,
without inconsistency, be connected with many different moments,
the connection wdth those moments being necessarily successive,*
because it depends on the succession of the moments, its causes.
XVIII. " Well then let it be considered as proved that there is a
cause of another world (i. e. adrislita ;) but here the doubt may arise, a.
is causality essential or communicated by some thing else, — if the lirst,
tlien it ought to act indifferently towards all things, just as blue
is blue to all ; if the second, then if we allow the ' communicating
something' to have essential causation, it too will be liable to the
aforementioned objection ; and if, on the other hand, its causation is
communicated, we shall have a regressus in injinitum, as we shall
require an intinite series of such communicating somethings ? b.
And again if causation be essential, effects ought to be produced
from the very first moment of the existence of the cause." Ho
replies,
XVIII. Without first determining the power of the
* 7. e. there must be this clifferoncc between the t\YO couucctions aUiuIed
to, — one is contemporary, the other successive.
23
cause, even blue &c. are not actual existences; it becomes
capable when associated with something else, why then
should it not be allowed to be universal ?
The ' power of the cause' is the cause's nature as a cause, i. e.
causality [^. e. its being such a thing as a cause ;] until we have
ascertained this, the ' blue' of your illustration has no authority
[because, if it has no cause, it must be nierely an error;] and so
your argument would fall to the ground, viz. " all that is real is
universal in its action, as blue, &c. and therefore if causality be not
universal in its action, it is not real," since your major premiss will
not be universally true if you admit that there is a cause for your
quoted ' blue,' as indeed there must be, since it is non-eternal,* — there
being no prcof of the existence of an eternal blue. — The second lino
overthrows the second paragraph (6.) " It" the cause, when " asso-
ciated with something else" ^. e. with the concurrent, t " becomes
capable" of producing the effect ; hence it does not result that its
causality must shew itself in action from the very first moment of the
cause's existence. The latter words express that the author has no
objection to admit universality of action, if properly understood, " why
then should it not be universal ?" Even the universality of action which
you ascribe to blue, &c., only means really that all men speak of and
treat them as blue, &c. ; and this kind of universality is equally found
in the cause when associated with its concurrents [as fire &c. with
fuel, or the seed with water, air, &c.] since it is an established fact,
that we all do apply the term ' causality' to such cases, and treat
them as such.
XIX. " But if we even accept your opinion that desert may reside in
the soul, must we not still say that it is not produced by the soul as a
material cause,:J: since in the case of an eternal and all-pervading
substance [like soul] there can be no nega.tive instance either in point
of space or of time, and causality can only be proved by an induction
from affirmative instances together with negative, a cause being
defined as that the absence of which necessitates the absence of
* If a non-etenial thing is real, it must have a cause, and therefore your
very illustration proves the fact of non-universal causation.
t Our ' condition.'
X The Nyaya holds that knowledge, desert, &c. reside in the soul as its qualities,
and the subject is the material cause of its qualities.
24
something else [scil. the effect]. But since in this way desert will
have no material [intimate] cause, of course it can have no non-
intimate and instrumental causes, since they are allowed to be causes
onl}'- as acting in close proximity to the other ;* and hence it will
follow that desert will be eternal [as it is uncaused,] and therefore,
being eternal, it cannot be conceived as producing enjoyment, limited
to particular souls at particular places and times." He replies,
XIX. Surely precedence is causality, since it is proved
by any argument ; likewise for the eternal all-pervading ;
otherwise there could not be the idea of the subject.
Causality does not always imply the existence of negative instances,
but its true definition is " necessary precedence without superfluous
determination. "t The negative instance is not the only means of
proving causality, since it may be equally proved by the evidence
which establishes its subject ;X hence the causality of the eternal and
all-pervading soul " may be proved by any argument." " Otherwise
there could not be the idea of the subject," [as the proof of the soul's
existence is that we require a subject for pleasure, pain, &c,] and
hence the subject's (i. e. tlie soul's,) being a cause is established
by the same argument which establishes the subject's existence.
From seeing that the component halves are always found where jars are
and jars never found where these are not, we learn that substance as
substance is a material cause to the effect connected with it by
intimate relation ; and hence, by rejecting earth, &c., we can establish
by exhaustion that for the qualities knowledge, desire, &c, there nmst
be a material cause other than earth and the rest, i. e. soul.
But in reality there is one kind of argument from negative
instances§ which does establish material causation as follows, " that
which is not a half, has no jar connected with it by intimate relation ;
and similarly, that which is not soul has not knowledge, &c. thus
* Siddhanta Muktavali, p. 12 .
t For the five kiuds of Sui^ei-fluous determination of causation see S. Mukta-
vali, pp. 13 — 16. The anyatJid^iddlia kdrojia is that pseudo-cause whose absence
does not directly necessitate the absence of the effect.
X We have a good instance of this kind of argument in the Sankhya argument
for the assumption of the internal organ mind in p. 17. Mind is assumed in order
to account for the fact that two cognitions are not simultaneous, — the same
proof will of course equally establish that mind is a cause of cognition.
§ This is called the anyonydbhdva vyatireka in contradistinction to the
otyantdblidva vyatireka — the latter is in the form — " where there is no half,
there is no jar."
25
connected with it.' So too \vc may argue in the case of time [althougli
time is eternal and all-pervading] ' that which is not time cannot
have a jar connected with it in that particular relation [called
temporal ;'] and in this way the argument from negative instances
may be applied to prove that time is a condition as the temporal
site in which the jar is made.
Thus there is no contradiction between our conclusions and the
declaration of S'ruti which affirms that ' the world is delusive,' since
the terms Delusion, Nature, Ignorance, &c. really mean only ' desert.'
And hence the existence of God is established as the superintendent
of desert in producing its effects [by §. iv.]
XX. He thus sums up the substance of the chapter,
XX. May He whose unparalleled concurrent energy
this is, — called Maya from its being so hard to unravel,
or Nature from its being the first principle, or Ignorance
from its horror of right knowledge ;
May He that deity by whom is lulled the turmoil of the
waves of mundane existence, — immediately, himself being
the witness, the passionless^ create in my mind devotion
towards himself.
* This' the concurrent cause in the form of desert, — it is unparalleled
since all effects depend upon it, — the word Maya is used to mean
* desert' by metonymy, [as it primarily means Delusion,] ' resem-
blance' being the cause of the extension of meaning,* as each is alike
hard to be unravelled.
* Cf. Sahitya Darpana, ii. §. 18.
26
Kote on the term ' Avachhedaka' (p. 7.)
The term AvacJiJiedaka has at least three meanings, as distinguish-
ing, particularising and determining.
a. In the phrase ' a blue lotus' ' blue' is the distinguishing ava-
cliliedaJca (i. e. vis'eshana,) of the lotus, — it distinguishes it from
others of different colours.
h. In the sentence ' the bird sits on the tree, on the branch,'
¥"% Ti:!^!^! ^"^t, s'dkhdi/dm particularises the exact spot, — this is the
ekades' dvaclili edaka.
c. But the third is the usual Naiyayika use of the word, i* e,
as determining, niydmaka. Wherever we find a relation which is not
itself included in any one of the seven categories but is common to
several, we require something to determine its different varieties ; thus
if we say that fire is the cause of smoke, or, vice versa, smoke the
effect of fire, we do not mean only this particular case but any fire
or smoke ; we therefore require, to determine this particular relation
of causality, something which shall be always found present with it.
This in ' fire is the cause of smoke' will be vaJinitwa, the species or
TO TL rjv livai of all fires. This will always be found present wherever
the causation of smoke is found, and it is therefore called the dhuma'
IcAranatdvachTiedaka, as dhumatwa would be the valinikdryatdvachheda-
ka. If we have several causes or effects (as e. g. green wood in the case
of smoke,) each kdranatd or kdryatd will require its own avacliliedaka.
But we could not say that ' substance' is the avacliliedaka of ' quality*
although it does always accompany it, — because quality is a category
by itself and not common to several. An avacliliedaka is always
required for such relations as kdrariatd, kdryatd, s'akyatd, jneyatd,
fratiyogitd^ &c. Thus gotwa is the avacliliedaka of the go-s'abda-
a'akyatd, as otherwise the word go might be restricted to mean only
this particular cow or extended to include every animal ; and in
■^IJ^T^^ ^ffT^TJft "^f^J we have valinitwa as the avacliliedaka of the
jjratiyogitu. This determining notion need not be always a species ;
thus in ^1^^ 5J«r^«' ■%^T^T«f_c72e6f/^fa is the avacliliedaka of kdranatd^
and cliesJitd is included in the category of ' action.'
27
SECOND CLUSTER.
I. The Second objection was that there is no proof of God, since
the means of attaining paradise can be practised independently of
any such being. That is to say, " sacrificesXvhich are the instruments
of obtaining paradise can be performed even without a God, since
it is proved by the Veda that sacrifices Are a means of obtaining
heaven, and the Veda possesses authority from its eternity and
freedom from defects, and we can also gather its authority from its
having been accepted by great saints [as Manu and others ;] and
therefore you cannot establish the existence of God, on the ground
that he is the author of the Veda ; or we may suppose that the Veda
was made by Sages like Kapila and others, who gained omniscience
by their preeminence in concentrated devotion." — He replies,
I. Since right knowledge requires an external source,
since creation and destruction take place, and since none
other than He can be relied on, — there is no other way
open.
The right knowledge caused by testimony is one which is produced
by a quality in the speaker, viz. his knowledge of the exact meanino-
of the words used ;* hence the existence of God is proved, as he
must be the subject of such a quality in the case of the Veda. " But
may we not allow that such a quality as the knowledge of the exact
meaning of the words used is required in the case of an effect which
implies an agent ; but in the case of the uncreated Veda it is its
freedom from defects which produces its authoritativeness, and we
can know its authoritativeness from its having been accepted by great
* All right knowledge, pramd, is produced by some virtue in the means used,
as all wrong knowledge by some defect. Thus in sense-perception the virtue
required is the dp err? of the eye &c. ; in inference it is the knowledge of a real
vyapti ; and in testimony the right knowledge must be produced by a speaker
who knows the true meaning of the words used. The speaker's claim to this
knowledge is vitiated by conscious deception as well as by unconscious ignorance ;
as in the former case the speaker's right knowledge is in abeyance, and it is his
assumed erroneous cognition (dhdrya-jndna) which is the immediate cause of the
words used. (Cf. Plato, Rep. p. 382.)
r 9
28
saints?" He replies "because erealion ami destruction take place."
After a mundane destruction, when the former Veda is destroyed,
how can the subsequent Veda possess authority, since there will then
be no possibility of its having been accepted by great saints ? And
again the non-eternity of sound is proved by the universal conviction
* the letter g is produced,' and an eternity in the form of an unbroken
succession is stopped by the possibility of mundane destruction.
*' "Well, then, let us say that at the beginning of a creation Kapila and
others were its authors, who had acquired omniscience by the power
of merit gained by the practice of concentrated devotion in the former
a^on." He replies " none other than He can be relied on." If you mean
bv omniscient beings, those endued with the various superhuman
faculties of assuming infinitesimal size &c, and capable of creating
every thing, then we reply that the law of parsimony bids us assume
only one such, namely Him the adorable Lord. There can be no
confidence in a non-eternal and non-omniscient being, and hence it
follows that according to the system which rejects God, the tradition
of the Veda is simultaneously ov-erthrown, — ' there is no other way
open.'
II. " But may we not reply that your assumption of a mundane
creation and destruction is un wan-anted, since there is no evidence for
it, and there are also several arguments against it. Thus a. there is a
law that day and night are, fiom their very nature, uninterruptedly
preceded by day and night ; h. the nature of time in itself is always
accompanied by the perception of the fruit of former works, for time
brings to effect the various pre-existing deserts [ripening them as seeds
sown ;] and you cannot prove that desert can suddenly be stopped in
its action ; c. a Brahman nsust be born from a Brahman, but since at
the beginning of a creation no one could be a Brahman [for want of
previous merit] you could not establish the necessary succession of
caste in the succeeding generations ; d. as there could then be no
teacher or learner, there could have been no acceptance of the con-
ventions of language, and hence you could not establish the tradition
of words ; and e. at the beginning of a creation there could be no
dexterity in the ditferent necessary arts of life as making jars,
&c., since this requires previous instruction froni another, and tlius
the chain of the tradition of all the arts of life would be cut short."
lie re[)lies,
29
II. As in the days of the rainy season &c., time as
determining mundane existence is the condition ; there is
cessation of action as in deep sleep ; the castes originated
as herbs and scorpions ; the conventions of words^ &c.,
are like jugglery.
a. If you would prove that the days of the rainy season have been
luiinteiTuptedly preceded by similar rainy days, you must first have
the condition that they have been preceded by a certain period of the
sun's course defined by his entrance into certain signs of the Zodiac,
[as Taurus and Gemini,] — and so here if you would prove that day
and night must have been uninterruptedly preceded by day and night,
you must have as the condition an uninterrupted series of previous
mundane works ; or in other words, the limiting condition is the nature
of time as determining this mundane existence [and you cannot argue
from the mere nature of time in itself.] h. As in time of deep sleep*
there is a cessation of the desert which produces the fruit enjoyed by
certain individuals, so at special times there may be a cessation of all
desert for all souls, hence he says, " there is cessation of action as in
deep sleep." c. A certain herb can be produced by the seed of that
particular herb and also by the manure of rice-dust ;t or again a
scorpion can be produced from cow dung as well as from a scorpion ; and
so at special times by a special desert (or fate) acting alone a Brahman
can be produced,}; while at the present time a Brahman can only be
produced from a Brahman parent ; — there will be no contradiction
as (by I. vi.) we allow that diff'erence of species [though not of genus]
does reside in diff'erent efi"ects. d. Just as a juggler having made a
puppet pulled by strings, bids it bring a jar and the jar is brought,
and thus instructs a child, so likewise God, having assumed two bodies
in the mutual connection of master and disciple, and thus initiated
* The Vedantins and Sankhyas hold that in deep sleep there is pleasure, but
the Naiyayikas deny it, as without jndna there can be no suklia.
t The water in which rice has been washed is considered an excellent manure
from the fertilising nature of the rice-dust. Besides the tusha or husk, there is a
red covering easily pulverised adhering to the rice-berries, called in Sanskrit
■;^i|I in Bengali '^^ and in Hindustani ^^_ This is alluded to in the Atharva
Veda, xi. 3, 5. ^-z^y, ^tjtt 3TT?^^^T ^¥i:^T^TsrT: .
-♦ \j
X A similar notion of spontaneous production (t3>^j.J ) after a mundane renova-
tion is found in the Akhlaki Jalali, Introd.
30
tl\e tradition of words, taught tlieir meanings to the men then newly
created, e. In the same manner having himself originated the
tradition of making jars &c., and the other useful arts, he instructed
them therein.
III. The opponent's attempt to preclude any discussion being
overthrown, he adds some confirmatory reasons.
III. The gradual failure of the tradition of the Veda^
&c. may be inferred from the observed failure of genera-
tion_, ceremonial purification, learning, &c. and the power
of study and of performing ceremonial works.
The argument runs thus, — The tradition of the Yeda, &c. is inferred
to be subject to entii'e interruption from its gradually failing, just like
a lamp, as it burns on. The rest of the couplet is added to establish the
fact of the reason given, a. 'Failure of generation ;' originally creatures
were produced from the mind,* then by sexual intercourse solely for the
sake of issue, but now entirely through desire of sensual gratification.
h. ' Failure of ceremonial purification ;' originally the very food of the
parentsf was ceremonially purified, [in the putreshti yaga,] then after-
wards the child in the womb, then the child after birth, and now
hardly at all any how. c. ' Failure of learning ;' originally they studied
the whole Veda with its thousand S'akhas and eventually one S'akha
only, thus it has gradually decayed. By the &c. we may understand
* livelihood,' ' duty,' &c. d. ' Failure of livelihood ;' originally they
lived on gleanings, then on unsolicited alms, then on agriculture,
&c., and lastly they supported themselves on the wages of ser-
vitude, e. ' Failure of duty,' originally duty had four legs, as-
ceticism, knowledge, sacrifice and charity ; in each subsequent age,
as the Treta &c., it lost one leg, until in the Kali it totters on a
single leg, charity iX oi" again [taking dharma in the sense of ob-
serving the prescribed duties of caste, &c.,] once they ate the leavings
of the sacrifice, then next the leavings of a guest, then food prepared
by themselves, and lastly they ate even with menial servants, f. Then
we may notice the failure of power to study one's daily portion of the
Veda and to perform works as sacrifices &c. ; from the failure of the
power of study as the cause results failure of the power of learning as
* As Brahnid's mind-begotteu sous. See also Iiidische Stud. ii. p. 97.
t Cf. Ramayana, i. 15.
X Cf. Mann, i. bl, 82, 86.
31
the effect, hence in the S'loka we have the * power of study' mentioned
separately from * learning.' And in this way with the destruction
of the universe are all included living beings destroyed. Thus do we
establish the fact of these universal destructions. — The Veda is
authoritative as having been received by great saints who displayed a
zealous earnestness in the practice of sacrifices, &c. — which earnestness
was untainted by such vicious causes as a wish to deceive, association
with heretics, acting for some secret motive, addiction to eristic dispu-
tation, living as one pleases,* heedlessness of the distinction between
lawful and unlawful food and drinks, &c.f
IV. He sums up the substance of the chapter.
IV. Him who in sport having repeatedly made this
strangely wonderful world by his illusive power^ again
causes it to collapse, and having destroyed it again re-
makes it as a magic show, — that Deity, S'iva, the might
of whose will bursts forth unhindered into accomplishment,
— him I salute, the sole ground of confidence, and may I
continue to pay him homage even unto the end.
* As by unlawful trades.
t Other Pandits di\dde the original differently and explain it to mean " addic-
tion to eristic disputations, desire of a livelihood, or reckless (adwaita) lust of
food and di-ink.' "
32
THIRD CLUSTER.
I. The third objection was that there were positive arguments
to prove God's non-existence. " Just as we infer a jar's absence in a
given space of ground, [i, e. its non-existence there,] so we infer God's
non-existence from His not being perceived. If 3^ou reply that ' the
Supreme Being is not a legitimate object of perception, and, therefore,
since we cannot here have a valid non-perception, we cannot assume
His non-existence,' — we retort that in the same way we might prove
that a hare's horn may exist since we have only to maintain that it is
not a legitimate object of our perception." He answers,
I. In an illegitimate object [of perception] how can
there be a valid non-perception ?* and still more, how can
you establish your contradiction ? How can the harems
horn be precluded as absurd if it be an illegitimate object ?
and how can you have an inference without a subject to
base it on ?
In the case of the Supreme Being who is not a legitimate object,
how can there be a valid non-perception ? It is only this which
precludes a thing's existence ; but the absence of perception which
obtains in the case of God cannot exert this precluding influence,
as otherwise we should equally be forced to deny the existence of
ether, merit, demerit, &c. But a horn must be a legitimate object of
perception, — how then can your retort contradict our argument ? If
you say that a hare's horn is an illegitimate object of perception, then
of course its existence is not necessarily precluded, — there is only an
absence of proof to establish it ; but this cannot be retorted against us
as the fifth Cluster will fully shew that there are positive arguments to
establish God's existence. t " But may we not infer God's non-
* A valid non-perception is when an object is not seen and yet all the usual
concun-ent causes of vision arc present, such as the eye, light, &c.
f We infer that there i.s no jar when we do not see one, because had there
been one, we should have seen it, but in the case of the Supreme Being, ghosts,
&c. as they are acknowledged to be imperceptible, we could only at tnost&^y that
their existence is ' not proven ;' and this is here not admissible in the face of the
positive argument of the fifth chapter.
83
existence from the absence, in His case, of a body whicb always
accompanies an agent, and also of any assignable motive for action ?"
He replies, — how can you have an inference where the minor term
is itself controverted ? while on the other hand the very proof which
will establish the existence of the subject (God), is itself sufficient
to debar your subsequent inference [that there is no God].
II. " Well, then, let us say that God is introduced through an
error, and that the subsequent argument is to prove either the non-
existence of any agency in this wrongly assumed subject or the
subject's non-existence." He replies,
II. The very possession of the absence of some rejected
attribute proves the subject's reality, since it makes it a
locus. The state of a counterentity [to non-existence]
i. e. the absence of the absence, must belong to a some-
tiling,
" It makes it a locus" — i. e. it gives to the absence a ' local habi-
tation' in the subject, and therefore an unreal thing can never properly
be a subject. [If you shift your ground and say that the argument
is to prove God's non-existence, we reply that] the state of a counter-
entity to non-existence, i. e. the absence of the absence, cannot belong
to a no-thing, or, in other words, just as that subject from which a
given attribute is excluded cannot be unreal, so neither can an unreal
thing be the object of a negation.
III. " But why may we not learn the absence (or non-existence)
of a thing by its non-perception, even though the thing itself be an
illegitimate object of perception ?" He replies,
III. In the case of a hare's horn, &g. the validity of
their perception would imply defective means thereof; but
if these be present, perception would ensue, and if there
be no perception, there can be no such means.
Non-perception can prove the non-existence of a thing only where
it is the so-called ' valid non-[)erception ;' otherwise we should have
to concede the non-existence of all such things as are beyond the reach
of the senses. — 'Valid non-perception' means the })rcsencc ol all the
various means of perception, other than the thing itself [which is
supposed to be absent] or the attributes [as form «&e.] inseparably
F
31
connected with it. Hence if we allowed that in the case of the [non-
existent] hare's horn there was valid non-perception, this non-percep-
tion must be accompanied by a set of means connected with certain
defects* [like a jaundiced eye &c. ; as this is ' the presence of the
various means of perception other than the thing itself or its insepar-
able attributes.'] But tliis is unallowable, as in such cases a percep-
tion [however erroneous, as of a reall}^ white shell appearing yellow,]
would ensue ; and if perception does not ensue, it proves that it is
not a case of valid non-perception.
IV. Here the atheistic Sthikhya will interpose, "why not say
that the soul is in some respects ignorant, and that the earth, &c.,
do not prove creative power to reside therein from the very fact of
its having the nature of soul r" He replies,
IV. If you mean the well-known soul, our point is
gained, if the uuknowm, your reason is unproved ; the
general consent brings the same result, and in the case of
the class it equally holds.
If you mean by soul the well-known mundane individual soul, we
are quite willing to grant what you say ; but if you mean the unknown,
i. e. the Lord, your reason is unproved [as we may dispute that ' the
nature of soul' resides in God]. If you reply that all allow that the
subject (soul) has the nature of soul, then, according as you decide the
alternative — is this ' soul' of yours similar to omy jivatind or different,
— we shall accept your argument as proving our own point, or meet
you by denying your proposed reason [or middle term]. The last clause
of the verse meets the reply " let the species^ soul, be our subject," —
because in this case too " it equally holds." We agree with you so
far as that it is not the species that is the maker of the world [but
an individual Supreme Soul ;] still as the ' nature of soul' [i. e. the
idea or species] does not abide in the species itself [but in the
individuals] we still deny your middle.
* To understand this, we must remember that the means of perception are
twofold, — those connected with the object, i. e producing right impressions,
and those connected with a defect in the senses (as jaundice &c.) i. e. producing
wrong impi-essions. The non-existent hare's horn cannot be a case of the fomier,
as it is invisible ; nor can it be a case of the latter as this would necessitate some
perception, however eiToneous. — I have followed the Pandits in taking yoriydim-
'paloMhi as a Tcarmadhdraya-samdsa, but it would make this passage easier, if
we could take it here as a shashti'tatjpuriisha, i. e. as equal to yoijiiasydnuimlabdhi.
V. " But wliy not say [with the Vedantin] that the ahsence of
creative agency is to be proved of that soul which is estabUshed by
the S'ruti, &c. ?" He replies,
V. If the S'ruti, &c. have authority, your negative
argument is precluded ; if they are fallacious, our old
'baseless inference^ [of §. i.] is stronger than ever.
If you admit that the S'ruti, &c. have authority, then, as the exis-
tence of God's creative agency &c. is thereby established, your argument
to prove their non-existence is already precluded. On the other
hand, if they have no authority, our old difficulty of a ' baseless
inference' returns in full force [as the minor term, soul, in which the
middle ' the nature of soul' was to reside, is itself unproved].
YI. Here the Charvakas step in, " why talk of such a thing as
* valid non-perception?' [§. iii.] let us lay it down as a rule that
whatever is not perceived, does not exist, and hence let the mere
absence of perception be a sufficient proof of a thing's non-existence.
As for this rule of ours overthrowing all inference, we are perfectly
content to have it so, and we grant at once that, on the perception
of smoke, to conclude that fire accompanies it is mere supposition."
He replies,
VI. There is no doubt in seeing or not seeing, since
the existence or non-existence of the thing is ascertained ;
even perception becomes impossible, if its cause is pre-
cluded by its not being seen.
a. [We reply that ' supposition' will not explain men's inferring fire
from smoke, for] Supposition is " doubt ;" but this does not exist in the
case of seeing, as the thing seen is then ascertained ; nor does it exist
in the case of not seeing, as the absence of the thing is then, in your
opinion, concluded, h. If the e^^e &c., the causes of perception, are
precluded as causes by the fact that they are not themselves objects of
perception, there will not be even such a cause of knowledge as your
perception ; but if you grant that these exist even at the very time
when they are not perceived, your argument proves too much, and
therefore the mere fact of a thing's not being seen does not necessitate
its non-existence, c. And again a Charvaka, when he leaves his house
ought to bewail as being well assured that his wife and children have
3^
ceased to exist ; and even on his return he ought not to find his family
there, otherwise the mere fact of ' not seeing,' as it proves too much,
would be no longer a valid reason, [and he should hold like a true
philosopher * arnica uxor, magis tamen arnica Veritas'].
YII. " But if non-perception be not a proof of non-existence, then
would it not follow that a universal proposition can never be deter-
mined, as there will always be the fear of some condition at present
■unseen, and hence an ever recurring fear of some instance of smoke
unattended by fire ? and if so, what becomes of inference ?" He
replies,
YII. If there be doubt, there is inference ; still more
if there be no doubt. Discussion is allowed by all to stop
fears, since fear is limited by direct inconsistency.
If, after being assured that in the present instances before us [_i. e.
this smoke and fire,] there is no false assumption of connection, you
go on to fear that there maj^ be such in similar instances in another
time and place, this very supposition of another time and place comes
from inference ; hence inference is proved. If there is no such fear,
then, in the absence of any fear of the contrary, inference is all the
more established. If you ask " what is to stop this fear ?" it is replied
that this fear is precluded by a discussion to stop any opposite
instances. " But have we not here the fault of an ' in infinitum
regressus,' since this discussion is itself based on an universal propo-
sition \i. e. the major premiss in which the middle term is declared to
be invariably connected with the major ?]" he replies ' fear is limited by
direct inconsistency ;' there cannot be any doubt regarding the major
premiss on which the discussion is based, when this doubt would
contradict some acknowledged principle. Thus supposing that a doubt
should arise as to whether the effect might not be produced without
any assumed cause, — it would of course follow, if this doubt were
legitimate, that we should not seek food to satisfy hunger or employ
words to produce an impression on the hearer's mind, [as these and
other similar effects could arise without their causes being employed ;]
and therefore a limiting condition which is only suggested by an
unsupported doubt, is of no validity where there is no discussion to
back it. This has been thus expressed by a logician, '* so long as
there is reason to fear even the hundredth particle of a connection
37
between the midJle term and some opposite instance [i. e. one which,
though it contains tlie middle, does not contain the major term,
as the redhot iron ball in the argument ' the mountain has smoke
because it has fire,'] how can the middle term have any power to
convince ?" Now the fear of a too general assumption of connection
depends on the fear of there being some limiting condition to be
supplied ; as has been said, " some reasons \i. e. middle terms which
are too general, as ' fire' to prove the existence of smoke,] are dependent
on universal connections supplied by others [as that between smoke
and ' fire produced by wet fuel ;'] these too general reasons, even
when seen to be present, do not establish the conviction of the major
term." Thus the universal connection with the major term, which
exists in a middle term that is limited by a ' condition,'* is cognized
as included in the former middle term [as fire] distinguished by
the determining notion necessary to define its relation as a middle
term \_sc. the species fire,t] hence it may be said to transfer its own
attribute of universal connection with the major term to the old
middle term which is, as it were, in juxta-position with it and abides
in the same subjects ; and therefore the word upadhi, here used for
* the condition,' is used by us in the same sense as when it signifies
[with the Vedantins] the China rose which transfers its own redness
to the colourless crystal. These too general middle terms, even when
they are actually perceived to exist in the subject, do not produce
certainty as to the existence of the major term, since the too general
attribute [the possession of fire] creates a doubt as to the desired
major [smoke.]
VIII. [Thus far for Inference; the opponent, however, may
still retort,] "But may we not say that Comparison {Upamana)
precludes the existence of God ?]:" Now the Vais'eshikas reply that
it does not preclude, inasmuch as they do not allow that Comparison
is a distinct species of proof [as it is included under inference,
* As e. g. fire produced by wet fuel.
f See note on Avadihedaka, p. 26.
X Upamdna is the knowledge of a resemblance, wliicli produces an inference
consisting in the knowledge of the relation of a name to something so named.
Thus a man is told that a gavaya (bos gava^us) is like a cow, and on seeing the
animal in the forest he infers that this is what was meant by the word gavaya.
Similarly here we have the inference " whatever is like the individual soul is
not omniscient nor omnipotent, and this being which is like the indivicUial soul
is what is meant by tlie word God."
38
See Nyaya Sutras, ii. 46-4^]. Here the Mimaiisakas come in aiul
maintain, that Comparison is that proof which o:ives us the know-
ledge of a separate category called Likeness. They reason as follows,
— a. Likeness cannot be a substance or a qnaJifu or an action, because
it is found residing b}' intimate relation in qualities [and substance
cannot thus reside in qualities, nor can a quality or action thus
reside in another quality or action.*] h. It cannot be community
[or genus.] because it depends on its correlative [i. e. the other thing
with which the first is compared,]t and also because it may reside in
genera,J &c. [as we may say ' the genus of cow is, like that of
horse, eternal.] c. Nor can it be non-existence, since it is not cogniz-
ed in its relation to the counterentity.§ d. Moreover, likeness is
not known through perception, since it is not cognized by a simple
exercise of our senses [but requires some thought and consideration ;]
nor can you say that the senses may give us the knowledge of it,
when there is the contemporary knowledge of the correlative, — because,
after the cognition that the bos gavaius is like a cow, we may also
have the cognition that that cow is like a bos gavseus, but this latter
cognition cannot be produced by perception as the cow is supposed to
be out of sight, e. Nor can the knowledge of Likeness be produced
by inference, since it is produced even in the absence of any sign [or
middle term].|| /. Nor can it be produced by testimony, since this
is not present everywhere^ -To meet this theory (of Likeness being
a separate category,) he replies in this and the following couplets
in the character of a Vais'eshilca.
* Cf. Bhasha Paricliclilieda, s'l. 13. and Siddhanta Mukt. p. 4.
t Likeness is not identity — it implies the existence of points of difference.
:|; Community or genus resides in the first three categories only. I may
add here that the Nyaya does not recognize our subordination of genera and
species. The genus is not superior to, but co-ordinate with, the species. Thus
a'sivatwa and sattd both abide in as'ica, but satfd also abides with ghatatu-a in
ghato. and with s'uUatira in s'uMa. Hence sattd is called para, and the others
apara.
§ Kesemblance implies the con-elative, but not the opposite, as absence does,
e. g. ' the absence of a jar,' where the knowledge of the absence depends on the
knowledge of a jar.
11 The supposed inference would be " That cow is like the bos gavfieus, because
the former is the correlative to the likeness residing in this latter." But the
knowledge called upamiti may be found when this middle term is not explicitly
recognized.
^ The information was to the effect that the bos gavoDus is something like a
cow ; and the man's subsequent inference is in a different form, viz. ' that cow
is like a gavaya.'
39
VIII. In the case of contradictories, there can be no
middle course ; nor can you assume the two contradictories
to be identical, because the fact of their contradiction is
directly asserted.
" There can be no middle course,*" i. e. you cannot make some third
supposition different from either, from the very fact that they are
contradictories [and therefore the one or the other must be true] ;
nor can you assume them to be identical. The word * contradic-
tories' in the second line is an instance of the so-called hetu-
garbha-vis'eshana, or attribute which contains an implicit reason, t
[i. e. this very word shows why you cannot assume them to be
identical.] When you say ' it is not non-existence,' we know that it
must be existence, and when you say ' it is not existence,' we know
that it must be ' non-existence.' The whole purport of this is as
follows, — Likeness must be either existence or non-existence, J since
no one knows of any third alternative. If the latter, then it at once
falls under non-existence, the seventh category [of the Vais'eshikas ]
If the former, then, a. if it possess qualities, it must be under the cate-
gory of substance ; b. should it not possess them, but possess genus, and
be other than a quality, it must be under action ; and c. should it be
other than an action, it must be under quality, d. Should it be
without qualities and genus, but not itself reside by intimate relation,
it must be under the category of intimate relation ; e. should it be
found residing in intimate relation and that too in many subjects, it
must be under the category oi genus ; f. but if found residing in only
one subject, it must be tlie (vais'eshika) category of 'particularity . —
In the same way we may refute the supposition of such additional
categories as Capacity, Number, &c.
IX. " But why should not Likeness be only a common property,
and Comparison be that proof which produces the cognition there-
of ?"§ He replies,
* We have here our ' excluded middle.'
t In this it differs from the swarupa vis'eshana, which is simply descriptive
and nothing more. Cf. the hdvyalinga in Ehetoric (Sahitya Darp. X. §. 710).
X What follows can only be understood by a reader acquainted with the seven
Categories of the Vais'eshikas (Cf. Dr. Boer's translation of the Bhasha Parich-
chheda, pp. 1 — 8.)
§ This was the view of the Vedantins (see Vedanta paribhiisha, iii.) according
to which the instrument, in knowledge derived from comparison, was tlie
cognition that ' this animal is like a cow,' and the conclnsinn was that ' the
cow is like this bos gavasus.' It is refuted by the supposed Vais'eshika.
4a
IX. As Likeness, so too Unlikeness ; and so a new
proof would be required. If you answer, ' the latter is
only a case of Presumption,' then why not say the same
of the former ?
After the cognition, * this (camel) is unlike a cow,' j^ou must sup-
pose another cognition, ' that cow is unlike this (camel,') which must,
on your view, he produced by a new proof [i. e. a fifth]. — " No, this
clearly arises from the process called Presumption,* as you cannot
have in tliis thing unlikeness to tliat without also having in that
thing unlikeness to tliisP But the same process will equally apply
in the former case, as you cannot have in the bos gavasus likeness to
the cow without also having in the cow likeness to the bos gavseus.
So that there is no need to accept a new proof (Comparison) which
is to produce a knowledge of Likeness.
X. [Thus far the Vais'eshikas, whose opinion we Naiya'yikas
accept so far as it overthrows our common antagonists, the Mini'an-
sakas ; but as they have gone further and have attempted to over-
throw the existence of this assumed proof,] the X^aiy'ayikas here step
forward in defence of the impugned proof, Comparison.
X. They hold that the knowledge of the connection of
a name with the thing named is the result of Comparison,t
since it cannot arise from Perception, &c.
The ' knowledge' or ascertainment of the ' connection' — i, e. power
or meaning, — of the 'name,' as bos gavieus, with the 'thing named'
i. e. the animal distinguished by the species bos gavajus, is the result
of the particular kind of proof called Comparison : ' since it cannot
arise from Perception, etc' as the several causes of those other proofs,
i. e. the senses, sign (or mid.dle term,) and testimony have no power
to produce it.
XL "But why may there not be a knowledge of the word's
* " Presumption is deduction of a matter from that wliicli could not else be.
It is assumption of a tiling not itself perceived but necessarily implied by
another whicli is seen, heard or proved." (Uolebrooke) — See Siddlianlii Mukta-
vali, p. 128. The Mnuansakas make this a separate proof, but the Naiyayakaa
make it only a particular kind of infei-ence, eorrespondhig to our disjunctive
Hypothetical Syllogism (see Bhaslui P. s'l. 143.)
t Tliis is the Maiyayika view of Uijam;iua, cf Xy^J^-^ siitras, i. G, and Tarka
Sangraha, §. (ib.
41
meaning from* the information previously given, that an animal like
a cow is what is meant by the word gavaya ; or from the inference
drawn therefrom, that an animal distinguished by the species gavaya-
twa is what is m.eant by the word gavaya from the very fact of likeness
to a cow ?" He replies,
XI. Since mere Likeness cannot be the determining
attribute, and since the determining attribute is not then
known, the definite meaning [fixed by the will of God or by
human convention,] cannot be made known by testimony
or inference previously [to seeing the gavaya itself.]
The ' definite meaning' means here the connection [between the
name and the thing named] in the form of the word's power as deter-
mined by the species gavayatLva.-\ This cannot be obtained from testi-
mony or inference, as the man previously [to seeing the actual gavaya
in the forest] had not any idea of the true species of the animal. :J:
Nor can you assume that the mere idea of likeness can be the deter-
mining notion to fix the word's meaning, as it is too vague to possess
such an authority.
XII. "But why not say that even although, on first hearing the
information given, there is no knowledge of the species bos gava^us,
yet when the species is known by perception, then from the informa-
tion ' a thing like a cow is what is meant by bos gavaeus,' — which by
metonymy comes to mean the species, — we may gain the knowledge
of the meaning of the word in that form [by testimony and not by
comparison ?"] He replies,
XII. The sentence, having already logical connection,
is complete and seeks nothing further ; we only need con-
nection with an implied meaning, where the existing con-
nection of the meanings of the words is incomplete.
When the verbal testimony has produced the knowledge of what is
* The opponent endeavours to shew that this knowledge can be accounted for
by testimony or inference, without assuming such a new proof as Comparison.
t The Nyaya holds that a word does not properly mean a species or an indivi-
dual, but an individual as distinguished by such and such a species ; thus the
species is the determining notion by which the word can mean any individual of
the species. See S. Muktavali, pp. 82, 83.
X At first he only knew vaguely that the word gavaya meant a something
like a cow ; but he did not know the actual species of the animal, its peculiar
attributes, form, &c., until ho had positively seen it.
42
meant by the word gavaya, from its being applicable wherever the attri-
bute ' likeness to a cow is found,' — it has no further tendency [or nisus'\
to produce any verbal knowledge of the species, because its logical con-
nection is already complete. For it is only where the primary meanings
of the words are deficient in their logical connection, — i. e. are in any
way incompatible with one another, — that we have to search for a
connection with some other meaning produced by metonymy, as in the
stock example ' a herd station on the Ganges,' [where the word Gan-
ges, primarily meaning a 'river,' by meton^^my means the 'bank].'
"But may we not say that the generic argument* "the word
gavaya is possessed of that which causes direct significance, because
it is a word properly formed according to the rules of grammar," —
as we can disprove any other assumed cause of direct significance, — •
will ultimately, by exhaustion, necessitate our accepting the species
gavayatwa as the cause of the word's direct significance ?" We reply,
no, because your major term in the conclusion cannot have any other
form than that which it had in the major premiss. f Nor can you
say that "the word gavaya is possessed of ^«yffj/a^i(?« as the cause
of its direct significance, because it has some such cause and all
other causes are severally precluded," because such a negative argu-
ment is not valid, as your proposed major term is not current, [i. e.
your major term " possessed of gavayatwa &c." is only applicable
to this one word, and is therefore not a ' major'' term at all.] And
again, the cognition that "the abode of gavayatwa is what is meant
by the word gavaya'"' is established by consciousness as actually
experienced, even in the absence of any negative inference ; and
hence we are compelled to assume a special proof for it, viz., uj^amd-
na or Comparison. [As for any attempt, as in § ix., to establish a separ-
ate proof from unlikeness, we reply, — ] After understanding the
meaning of such a sentence as ' Shame on the camel with its extra-
ordinarily long neck and eating the hardest thorns, the outcast of
beasts,'^ the cognizing, on seeing such an animal, that this was what
* For this and the other two kinds of anumdna see Nyaya Sutras I. 5. It is
defined by the Commentator as " that which is recognised from generic proper-
ties, its own specific ones being unnoticed."
t II' from pioniisses which estabbshed that wherever smoHe was, fire was, and
that the mountain liad smoke, we inferred by exhaustion that the mountain had
the lu-e peculiar to mountains and not cubnary or digestive fii'e, this would be an
improper inference ; and, similarly, here we cannot infer that, because the word
gavaya is possessed of that wliich causes dii-ect significance, it therefore must be
possessed oi' (jaoayatica as that cause.
X Cf. Nyaya S^tra Vritti, i. 6.
43
was meant by the word ' camel' is also produced by Comparison,
[which is equally the recognition of likeness or unlikeness.] — Our
conclusion is that Comparison, which properly only ascertains the
direct significance of a word [and has nothing to do with establishing
the object's existence or non-existencej cannot preclude the existence
of God.
XIII. [We now proceed to examine the fourth proof, ^. e. Testi-
mony; — and here] the Vais'eshikas at once assert that there is no
need to fear lest Testimony should preclude the existence of a Su-
preme Being, as this supposed proof is not different from Inference,
[and has therefore been already discussed.] On hearing the words
spoken and consequently recollecting their meanings, an inference
arises, [they say,] to establish a logical connection between these
meanings,* — this inference being in the one or the other of the two
following forms, — a. " These meanings of words are mutually connect-
ed from the very fact that they are brought to recollection by the
aid of words which possess expectancy, compatibility, and juxtaposi-
tion,t just as in the special case of the meanings brought to our recollec-
tion by the aid of the words, ' drive the cow with the stick' ;" or b.
" these words must have been preceded by the speaker's right cogni-
tion of the connection between the several meanings which these
words respectively call to our recollection, — from the very fact that
they are words possessing expectancy, &c. ;" — the latter inference
establishing the hearer's knowledge of the connection, from the
general rule that * the cognition of a cognition must have the same
object as the original cognition,' [and therefore when I know that
such and such was the speaker's meaning, my knowledge must have the
same object as his, and consequently no such pramcvm as ' testimony'
or s'abda is needed.] — He replies,
XIII. If your alleged inference implies certainty, it in-
volves too much ; if only possibility, there is no ascertain-
* S'dbda-hodhco is often called anvaya-hodha, sc. the knowledge of a logical
connection between the meanings of the words. There is a current dei&nition,
t " Expectancy means a word's incapacity to convey a complete meaning
without some other word to complete the construction. Compatibility consists
in a word's not having a meaning incompatible with that of other words in the
sentence. Juxtaposition consists m the enuuciation of the words without a long
pause between them." Dr. Ballantyne's Tarka Sangraha, § 71.
G 2
44
ment; expectancy is a cause [of Verbal knowledge] by
its very presence ; juxtaposition^ if accompanied by com-
patibility alone, is unrestricted.
a. In the case of the former inference where the subject is the
* meanings of words,' — we must mean the conclusion to be either that
they are ce;'^^/??/^ mutually connected or tliat they are ^o^siZ/Zy con-
nected, i. e. possess a capability of being connected.*
The former alternative involves too much, as it would apply in
such phrases as ' he sprinkles with water,' [which would not hold in
the case of water in the form of ice ;] — under the second, there is no
ascertainment of connection at all, and there is also the fault of
superfluous inference, as your conclusion, i. e. ' possessing capability of
being mutually connected,' is already included in your alleged reason
* from the very fact that they are brought to recollection by the aid
of words which possess compatibility, &c.' — as the ' compatibility' there
mentioned only means that they indirectly possess a characterf which
necessitates a logical connection between their meanings.
5. As for the second inference, ' Expectancy' is properly the mind's
inquiry after certain additional meanings, which are supplied by words
suggested by the construction, — as, e.g. on hearing the word cya^At^m the
mind goes in search of a fresh meaning supplied by a suggested affer or
vide^ and on hearing the word ctffe)\ it similarly supplies cyathum or ves-
tem ; Expectancy is therefore a cause of verbal knowledge by its very
presence, [i, e. whether it is definitely known or not ; but if it were
to be included in the middle term of your inference, it must be
actually known in order to be so included].
c. " But why may we not say that the cause of verbal knowledge
is juxtaposition together with compatibility, [thus excluding ex-
pectancy ?]" — He rephes that they are ' unrestricted,' i. e. they are
not limited by any ' universal connection' with verbal knowledge J [and
are therefore useless to produce a conclusion.] Thus in such a sentence
as liic adestJUius regis homines siunmoveantur,^ the words regis and
liomines possess compatibility and juxtaposition, and would therefore,
* Similarly a cause (Kdmnn) is said to be swm-iqm-yogya and phalopadhdyaka,
^m the former case it exists Swdfici, in the latter ivepyeia.
f Paya.stiva resides directly in the paddrtha but indirectly in the pada.
X Scil. they may be found present where it is absent, as fire is found without
smoke.
45
according to your view, possess a logical connection and produce verbal
knowledge, although there is no expectancy, [as the sense is already
satisfied by the logical connection between Jllius and re^is^.
XIV. But here the Prabhakaras* come in and say, " Testimony can
be a source of right knowledge in tlie case of the Veda, as the Veda is
not made by man and consequently there can be no inference to estab-
lish the speaker's knowledge ; but in secular matters there is required a
previous knowledge, viz., that the testimony is given by a reliable \_i. e,
worthy, dpta,'] speaker. And thus we have first such an argument as
* tliis speaker possesses a correct knowledge of the meaning of the sen-
tence which he uses, because he uses a sentence produced by a know-
ledge of its meaning which knowledge does not arise from mistake,
&c.,' [sc. he himself knows, and speaks to inform me ;] and this argu-
ment will establish the sentence's meaning indirectly, as being the
distinguishing characteristic of the speaker's knowledge. We may
next proceed to use a second argument, [having previously by the
former one established that the speaker's knowledge is correct,] viz.,
* these meanings of the separate words are mutually connected, be-
cause they are the object of the speaker's correct knowledge,' and
thus directly establish the meaning of the sentence. In this way,
i. e. only after these two arguments, does the knowledge of the con-
nection of words [i. e. the knowledge produced by testimony,] arise
from words whose meaning is previously fixed by compact ; and hence
testimony in secular matters is only a repetition [of what is previous-
ly known,] and consequently not itself a source of right knowledge at
all.f To meet this, he replies,
XIV. Since the meaning is already ascertained^ before
the inference^ from the words whose signification has been
ascertained, it is the middle term of your inference which
will be a repetition, since the recollection of a universal
proposition implies delay. »
Even in secular cases the meaning of the sentence is ascertained pre-
viously to any supposed inference, since the meaning of the words has
* The Prabliakaras are the followers of the gi^eat iMimansaka doctor, Prabha-
kara. He is also called the Guru in contradistinction to the Bhatta, i. e. Bhatta
Kumarila.
t The Prabhakaras define right knowledge as agrihita grdhahativam * the
apprehending something previously not apprehended' — see the fomth chapter.
4G
been already determined in tlie Veda [as you yourselves admit ;] and
therefore it is your middle term which is obnoxious to the charge of
superfluous repetition, since inference must always produce a slower
cognition than testimony, as the former is unavoidably impeded
through the delay involved in recollecting the necessary universal
connection (vydpti).
XV. " But since knowledge produced by testimony is out of the
question, where there is any doubt as to the speaker's being reliable
and still more where it is certain that he is not, — why should we not
hold that the ascertainment of this point is the real cause of such
knowledge, — and a thing's being spoken by a reliable speaker will
mean that it is produced by an accurate knowledge, in the speaker^
of the original meaning of the sentence ? — thus the knowledge of the
meaning of the sentence must originally be derived from inference."
He replies,
XV. Since even tliere we must establish our point by
an inference^^^ these Vaidic meanings are mutually con-
nected from their being brought to our remembrance by
words which are themselves free from any imputation of
defects incident to a human being^, — how can even the
Yeda itself be cleared from tliat ?
There is no evidence to prove that the ascertainment of the speak-
er's being reliable is a cause of verbal knowledge ; [a truer cause is
the one generally admitted to be a concurrent to S'abda, viz., the
ascertainment of compatibility between the words used,] since in an
incompatible sentence we see the knowledge of the connection [i. e.
the so-called verbal knowledge,] stopped in consequence of the know-
ledge of the compatibility — i. e. the absence of any manifest contra-
diction, — being retarded [and hence the two seem related as cause
and effect.]* If not, then, in the case of the Veda, let the knowledge
of its being unproduced b}^ a person, be the cause of verbal know-
ledge ; and as we shall thus have the connection between even the
Taidic meanings established by an inference such as this, — 'these
* This will no doubt require an inference, but this inference will not establish
the S'abdabodha but only clear away any apprehended contradictions and leave
-the way open to the pruper cause S'ahda-jndna. The inference is only a nega-
tive, the S'obbda-jndna is the positive, cause. — I may add that this discussion on
S'abda is one of the obscurest parts of the book. The old printed text was here
very corrupt, and that now given is from the two old MSS. mentioned in the
preface.
47
Vaidic meanings are mutually connected from their being brought
to our remembrance by words which are themselves free from any
imputation of defects incident to a human being,' — how can we clear
the Veda itself from ' that,' i. e. the old charge of superfluous re-
petition ?
Some, however, have said that " it is not the tcord but the
word's meaning which is the instrumental cause of verbal know-
ledge, — hence we can understand written poetry, &c., because
the knowledge of tlie meaning of the sentence is produced by the
meanings of the words [although the words are here not spoken*].
[It might be said in objection that, if this were true, the accusative
dwdram ' januam' ought to produce verbal knowledge by itself; but
to this we should reply that] even though we grant the knowledge of
*janua,' there can be no knowledge of connection, i. e. verbal know-
ledge, in the absence of the quality of ' expectancy'f which necessarily
resides in the word's meaning,;]: according to the rule ' verbal expec-
tancy is fulfilled by words alone. '§ In this way we should refute the
opinion of the Guru Mimansakas, viz., that ' the meanings of words
are [not the cause of verbal knowledge but] only the distinguishing
mark of the phrase ' knowledge of tlie meaning of the icorcl,' since
without the knowledge produced by words there cannot be the know-
ledge of the connection of the meanings of words, || as has been said,
" from their coming first, from their power of conveying a meaning,
and from their conveying the speaker's intention, the power of causa-
tion must pre-eminently be held to reside in words." ' This opinion we
repeat, is overthrown, — because, if we only substitute ' reliable speakers'
(aptdndm) in the s'loka quoted, for ' words' (paddndm), we see directly
that the ' being spoken by a reliable speaker' is only a distinguishing
mark of the phrase, ' the knowledge of its being spoken by a reliable
speaker ;'^ and since the knowledge of the word's meaning must be
granted, the word per se is a superfluous, and not a true, cause." — This
* Pada means a word spoken, cf. S. Muktavali, p. 78.
t See Ballantyne's transl. Saliitya Dai'pana, p. 14.
X In written poetry none of tlie words are properly pacZas and therefore there
can be anvaya and dkdnlcslid between them ; but not so between one spoken
word as januam and another not spoken as the understood claude.
§ In written poetry it is drthikdkdnlcsltd.
II That is, according- to the Guru, there is a series, 1, the pada, 2, the paddr-
thopasthiii, 3, S'dhdahodha, but the first is the true cause of the third.
% That is, the supposed series wall be, 1, djjta, 2, dptoktatwajnana, 3, B'dhdxi-
hpdha ; but all allow that dpta is not the cause of verbal knowledge but only of
the spoken words. Similarly 'pada cannot be the true cause in the former series.
48
laboured exposition is, however, mistaken, since the meanings of words
cannot be the cause of verbal knowledge, from the ver^^ fact that they
may apply to past or future as well as to what is actually present ; nor
can we say that the recollection of the word's meaning is an instrumen-
tal cause, since it has no operation (vyapdra)* The true instrumental
cause is the knowledge of the word [produced by hearing,] and its
accompanying operation is the recollection of the word's meaning —
[these directly and indirectly producing verbal knowledge.] In the
objected case of written poetry, &c., the instrumental cause of verbal
knowledge is a mental knowledge of the word, [its corresponding
operation remaining still the same, i. e. the recollection of the word's
meaning].
XVI. [Having thus established the fact that testimony is a
separate proof against the Vais'eshikas in § xiii. and having over-
thrown the wrong notions of the proof as held hj the Mimansakas
in §§ xiv. and xv., he now proceeds to shew that this proof cannot
preclude the existence of a Supreme Being.]
" Well, then, let us concede that Testimony is a distinct kind of
Proof ; but why should it not preclude God's agency as a Maker Pf
Thus we read in the Bhagavad Gita " Though actions are ever done
by the qualities of Nature, the soul, blinded by egoism, thinks ' I am
the doer.' " ' Nature' means here the principle. Intellect, — the ' quali-
ties' goodness, &c. ; the soul thinks through delusion that itself does
the actions done by these. Hence agency is imaginary, not real. But
in the case of an omniscient Being there could be no such imagina-
tion, since He would see every thing as it really is.— For the gram-
mar of the couplet quoted, we make Kartd govern the accusative
instead of the genitive, in accordance with the rule in Panini (ii. 3.
69.)" He replies,
XVI. The testimony of an unworthy person has no
force of proof ; there can be no ' worthiness^ in the case
of a thing not seen [by the speaker]. We must have
an omniscient Being to see the invisible, and an eternal
Yeda is untenable.
* The Naiyayikas maintain, a^^ainst tlie Yedantins, that every Karana must
have a vyapdra, — for the latter's definition, sec supra p. 13, note.
t In which case it would prechide las existence, as the Naiyayikas only
accept a Supreme Being as a Creator, aud not as an Epicurean deity.
49
If this testimony of the 'Sruti, which you hring forward to esta*
blish that God is not the Maker of all things, is the testimony of an
unworthy person, it has no authority ; if it is tlie testimony of a
worthy person, then one who possesses the knowledge of such trans-
cendental facts must possess an eternal and all-embracing know-
ledge, since all allow tliat He has no organs, &c.* The eternit}^ of
the Veda has been already disproved [in the second cluster ;] and
therefore the existence of an eternal and omniscient Author of the
Veda is established.
XVII. " But if so, then what becomes of those passages of 'Srutif
which declare that there is no such Maker ?" He replies,
XVII. Such passages have more than one meaning,
since the S'ruti also declares His existence; they may
merely mean that He is unstainGd [by attributes j] and if the
S'ruti declares His existence, it cannot imply the opposite.
These passages, to wliich you refer, do not necessarily bear only
one meaning, i. e. His non-existence,— since there are many other
passages which establish His existence, as e. g. that from the Gita,
" from me all proceeds ;" and the two meanings cannot be equally
valid, since they are mutually contradictory. If we examine them
more closely to decide which alternative is the true one, we shall find
that the [apparently] opposing passages really mean only that God is
to be contemplated as the Soul void of all special qualities ; while the
confirmatory passages become the properly authoritative, inasmuch
as they are supported by the inference, based on the discussion of the
relation of cause and effect, &c., [which will be given in Chapter V.].
XVIII. [Having thus shown that Testimony cannot preclude the
existence of God, he next proceeds to examine the supposed fifth
Proof of the Vedantins and Purva Mimansakas, i. e. Presumption or
ArtMimtti.'] " But if this Being were om.niscient, would He not cause
us to act, even without giving us definite instructions [as in the Veda ?]
— and hence the uselessness of Vaidic instructions, thus involved in
your hypothesis, is of itself sufficient to preclude the existence of God,
* The &c. includes body, middle term in inference, &c. These causes of
knowledge being thus excluded, God's knowledge must l)e unca isod, and there-
fore eternal. If any should be inclined to attribute them to Gud, on him must
lie the onus prohandi.
t E. g. the Rig- Veda, Ico addlul vcda, SjX,
50
You cannot say that Tie docs not know how to make men act in a
certain way unless He gives them clcfinitc instructions, — since this
would overthrow His supposed omniscience. This is a case of Pre-
sumption,* and Presumption we hold to be a fifth kind of Proof."
He replies,
XVIII. Since the absence of the cause involves the
absence of the effect^ there can be no knowledge without
proof; and in the absence of knowledge there can be no
action. The same rule will hold even on an atheistic
theory of sacrifice.
If there be no cause of knowledge, (pramana) there can be no
knowledge, (pramd,)\ since the absence of the cause necessitates
that of the effect ; and if knowledge be wanting, there can be no
action, since action is caused by knowledge. Now, in the present
instance, the only cause of knowledge is such a Yaidic injunction as
" let him who desires heaven offer the Agnishtoma sacrifice," &c., —
hence Yaidic instructions are by no means useless. Otherwise [i. e. if
you allow the possibility of ceremonial works without an authoritative
command {vidhi,)'] " the same rule will hold even on an atheistic
theory of sacrifice" [like that of the Mimansa ;] as we can similarly
prove that the Veda is still useless, since destiny can set men in
action without it. But the true view is that Presumption is not a
separate kind of Proof.
XIX. This latter viev/ he now proceeds to establish,
XIX. If there were no limitation, there could be no
inconsistency, — that which does not limit cannot estabhsh
[any absurdity ;] there can be no real contradiction be-
tween two equally trustworthy proofs ; and if Presumption
w^ere admitted, it would equally apply to the commonest
cases of Inference.
a. The well known example of Presumption is — that on ascer-
taining that the living Devadatta is not in the house, there arises
the knowledge that he is out of doors. But in this very instance, if
there were no limitation or understood * universal affirmative connec-
* For Colcbrooko's definition, see supra, p. 40, note.
t Pram a here means only jndna, — it simply implies a com-iction in the
agent's mind, whether right or wrong.
51
tion' (anvaya-vyapti,) there could not arise that conviction of absurdity
or inconsistency with the premisses which any other conclusion would
involve, [which forms the very essence of Presumption ; since it is
only valid by adding as a suppressed major premiss that the living
Devadatta must be either within or out of doors.] " That which docs
not limit," — i. e. that which does not invai-iably accompany the middle
term — cannot establish your presumed inconsistency, since this in-
consistency is only valid where the absence of the including major
term necessarily involves the absence of the included middle.* Hence
the recognition of such a threatened inconsistency [as you maintain
in this proof of Presumption] can really be resolved into the recogni-
tion of a general negative proposition {yyatireka-vyapti,) which would
necessitate a negative conclusion contrary to the facts. f
&. It has also been maintained that *' after the cognition that ' he
is somewhere but he is not in the house,' there arises the idea of
contradiction, and our proof of Presumption comes in to resolve this
apparent contradiction by shewing tliat the words ' he is somewhere'
really mean that he is somewhere else than in the house." But this
is untenable. For two equally trustworthy evidences:]: cannot be con-
tradictory, because, in such a case, one would necessarily have to give
way ; but wherever we have such an apparent contradiction, inference
will serve to establish that they must relate to different subject matters,
as we may reason that an [apparent] contradiction must relate to
different subjects from the very fact that it is established by certain
proof, for if it did relate to the same subject it would involve an
absurdity. If this were not so, you might have such a Presumption as
* smoke will establish the existence of fire,' since without fire it would
be absurd, and thus there would be no such proof as the Infei-ence which
our opponents allow as well as we. Again, we might have such an
apparent contradiction as ' fire is not perceived at the foot of the hill,
and yet the seen smoke is a proof that tliere is fire somewhere,' and we
should have to call in the assistance of your Presumption to estab-
lish the existence of fire in some other part of the hill. [Nor can
* I. e. The absence of fire (the vydpaJca in an anvaya-vydpti,) necessarily
involves the absence of smoke {yydpya).
t I. e. His not being out of doors (when he is not within,) is always accom-
panied by his non-existence.
X As c. ^. the sense-perception that he is not in the house, and the testimony
that he is somowhere, drawn from the infalHblo dictum of astrology that our
x-riend will live a hundied years,
u 2
52
the opponent object to tills that " inference must still alwa^^s be
granted, as without it the proof that establishes the constant accom-
paniment of smoke by fire could not establish the conclusion that
fire exists in the present case, — because we reply that] even if there
were no such thing as inference at all, the proof that establishes* the
constant accompaniment of the middle term by the major would still
establish the existence of the major term in the present case [i. e. that
there is fire in this mountain] by Presumption. Hence the admission
of Presumption as a proof would only abolish Inference.
XX. That Non-perception (Anupalahdhi.) [which the Vedantins
and Purva Mimansakas add as a sixth proof or source of right
knowledge,] cannot preclude the existence of God, has been already
shewn in the first couplet of this chapter ; but in reality this is not
a distinct kind of proof at all. This he now proceeds to shew,
XX. From the cognition of non-existence not being
mediate — from the senses not being then engrossed in
other objects — from its instrumental cause not being
cognized, — and from the internal sense having to do with
actual entities,
a. All must allow that tliat knowledge is a case of '■perception^ the
cause of which is a non-perception whereof we are ourselves uncon-
scious,t — since that knowledge of an object's non-existence which was
produced by a conscious non-perception would be a case of * infer-
ence'X ^"^^ ^ knowledge is produced by the senses which is non-
eternal § and immediate. By its ' not being mediate' we mean that
it is ' not caused by knowledge,' [which is the distinctive mark of
perception, as contrasted with inference, comparison and testimony.]
h. The senses are the instrument in the perception of a jar's ab-
sence as of its presence, since there is no preferable object to engross
their energy, — for assuredly we cannot say that their energy is then
eno-rossed in the perception of the site, since the ear can detect the
cessation of sound (i. e. its dwans'dbhdia,) even where there is no
* See Bhaslia parichchheda, 'si. 136, o.
t A common defiuition of perception is * that knowledge whose cause is not
cognized', ajnata-Mranoltam jnananiy e. g. the sight does not perceive the eye,
&c.
+ The inference is thrt a jar is not here from tlie fact that it is not perceived.
§ I. e. janya. The Divine 'pratyal^slM is of course eternal.
53
perception of its site, etlicr, — and the eye can similarly detect the
absence of form in the air. c. We can also conclude by inference that
the knowled<^e of a thing's absence is produced by the senses, — from
its being a knowledge produced by an instrumental cause wliich is itself
not recognized, d. Our perception of external objects is universally
produced by the mind (or internal sense,) assisted by instrumental
causes [as the senses] which are themselves actual entities [and not*
like Non-perception, a mere negation]. For these four reasons we
conclude that the senses, and not the so-called Non -perception, are the
true instrumental cause in the perception of a thing's absence from a
given spot.*
XXL He now adds other reasons for this opinion, as follows.
XXI. It must be the senses, from their power of perceiv-
ing the counterentity ; from the inseparability of the
operation from the cause; from the fact that defects
reside in the senses ; and from determinate perception.
Our intended conclusion is that the senses are the true instrumen-
tal cause in the perception of a thing's absence.
a, " From their power of perceiving the counterentity" to the
absence, [^. e. the thing said to be absent]. Just as Inference can
make known to us a thing's absence as well as its presence, so also
can the senses, h. " But may we not say that the power of perceiv-
ing the counterentity is not a proper reason for your inference, since
all causes are of course subject to the condition of ' being free from
superfluous causation ?'t and in the present case, the senses perceive the
site, and are therefore ' superfluous causes' for perceiving the absence in
that ^\ie,X [the perception of the site being the true cause of the per-
ception of the absence]. To this he replies, "from the inseparability
of the operation [from the cause]." Tlius the senses are not a 'su-
perfluous cause,' — because the perception of the site [wliich you erro-
neously take to be the cause] is only the operation (vyupdra) which
invariably accompanies an instrumental cause. § If this were not so,
* Both parties allow that non-existence is an object of perception, but tlie
Vcdrutins hold that cmupalahdhi is its proper cause, while the Naiyayikas hold
that the senses are the true instrumental cause and anuj.>cdti.hd]ii only a con-
current.
t For npddhi and aayatlidsiddliatxva, see p. 37, and note, p. 24*.
X Just as the father of the potter is a superfluous cause for making the jar.
§ The vijdjjdra is the caiLsa caaaata (taj-janyatwe sati taj-janya-janakah.J
54
the eye, &c., would be superfluous instrumental causes in the percep-
tion of a thing's existence, in consequence of such an operation as
the conjunction of the eye with the object, c. We must all allow
that an erroneous perception of a thing's absence, [when it is really
present,*] arises from a defect in the instrumental cause, and defects
reside only in the senses, &o., for non-perception in itself admits of
no defect, and the true faults of the senses are such as jaundice, &c.
Hence he adds " from the fact that defects reside in the senses."
d. A determinate perception of the spot of ground and the absencef
cannot [according to your opinion] be produced by the senses, because
it is a perception of absence or non-existence, — nor can it, on the other
hand, be produced by Non-perception, as it partly includes existence
[so far as the spot of ground is concerned ;] — hence we must accept
the senses as the cause of determinate cognition. J
XXII. [The opponent may, however, raise an objection to our
last argument,] a. " Why may we not say that Non-perception, [al-
though it does not produce the determinate cognition,] produces the
[indeterminate] cognition of the absence of the jar, and then follows
the cognition of the spot of ground as possessing the absence of the
jar, [which latter cognition is produced by the senses, acting by a
transcendental relation calledy«a?2«Z«Z:s7/««(7,] just as the transcenden-
tal perception by the eye that ' sandal wood is sweet'§ is said to follow
the perception of its sweetness by the proper sense, i. e. that of smell ;
and in this way non-perception may be called an instrumental cause as
producing the cognition of absence. By examining a determinate percep-
tion we are compelled to infer that the object must be first perceived
indeterminately and is then subsequently perceived determinately by
the senses, h. Again, how can we be said to have any proper ' sense-
* As when a jaundiced eye does not see a wliite shell but a yellow one. See
sv{pra, p. 27, note.
f I. e. this spot of gi'ound has the absence of a jar, — see supra, p. 20, note.
j By the opponent's opinion this particular determinate pci-ceptiou can be
produced neither by inJ/riya nor by anupahxhdhi ; but according to ours there is
no difficulty, as indriya is equally the insti'umental cause in cases of hlidva
and ahhdva, the difference being that in the former indriya-scmyoga, in the latter
anupo.laJjdJii, is the concurrent.
§ This is the so-called jndna-lalshand which takes j^lace where one sense
supplies a pei'ccption which is properly given by another. (Cf. Chasha-jiari-
chhoda, si. 64.) It is said to cognize the object (as saii/rahha,) per sc, apart from
any thing connected with it, antl is thus distinguished from tlie sdiadnya-lalishand
which cognizes all the cognate objects under the form of the species, as definitely
perceived in the individual object, e. g. all jars past, present, and future, as
possessing the species of this jar. Buih. arc trunbcendeutul (idaukilM) perceptions.
55
perception' of non-existence since it has no direct connection with the
senses ? for the only relation which ahscnce could be said to be capable
of, i. e. that called the vis' eshanatd samhandlia^ cannot but involve
another relation simultaneously existing with it. Hence we must allow
that the instrument [in the cognition of ahlidv(i\ cannot but be our
unavoidably assumed Non-perception, and not any one of the senses."
He replies,
XXII. From the cognition of the distinguishing mark,
if such is accepted,— from the superfluousness of the
assumed proof, if such is not accepted, — from the 'in
infinitum regressus' if we assume another relation ; and
if you do not accept my view, any other explanation is
untenable.
a. Those who hold that the cognition of the ' distinguishing mark,' —
i. e. the cognition of the counterentity,t — is the cause of the percep-
tion of alhara, must also hold that there can never be an indeterjni-
nate cognition of abhdva at all, since we find in this case the means
for producing determinate cognition only ;J but in the perception of
a real object, as a jar, there must be first the indeterminate cognition
alone, since at that moment there can be no cognition of the distin-
guishing mark as distinguishing, [i. e. g1iatatwa\ which is the cause
of the subsequent determinate cognition, b. But those who hold
that we can perceive abhava apart from its counterentity, \i. e. with-
out bringing in the idea of any relation between them,] can also al-
low that we have an indeterminate perception o? abJidva; and as
this can be easily derived from the senses like any other case of in-
determinate perception, it follows that the supposition of Non-percep-
tion as a distinct proof is superfluous.
c. " From the * in infinitum regressus,' if we assume another rela-
tion." The relation called ' the nature of the thing' and not any new
* Vis' eslmnatd means * the state of being a vi'seshana or distinguishing mark
or property ;' thus the jar on a given spot is the distinguishing peculiarity of that
Bpot, and there are thus two relations wliich the jar holds to its site, that of
* distinguishing' {vis' e si w no id) and that of ' contact' (sanyoya). But since iu
ahlidva there is no such second relation, we have no right to suppose the first.
The Naiyayikas, however, hold that tliis is really included iu the sivarwpa sani'
handha, see supra, p. 13, note.
f The avachchheda or vis'eshana, in the phrase ghatdhhdva, is of course
the counterentity or pratiyo(]i, i. e. ghata.
X In the indeterminate, you have not as yet the idea of the relation of ' dis-
tinguishing' and ' distinguished,' — see p. 21, note.
56
categ'orv, is really the only relation existing between the ahhuva and
its site, — since tlie assumption of such a relation here as a special vis'e'
sliamtd* would certainly lead to an endless succession of relations ;t
and hence we must accept such a relation as that called ' the nature
of the thing,' [and this being sui generis requires no second relation].
[If you ask " how can abhdva be an object of sense perception at all,'*
we reply,] that its sense-perception is possible because the relation
between the eye and its object, which is necessary in every act of
perception, is here fultillcd (in the case of an absent jar,) at second
hand by the relation between the spot of ground and the said absence,
which we call the distinguishing relation. J
d. If you do not accept my explanation of this swariqja relation
between the jar's absence and its site, then it will be extremely
difficult to establish any other principle, even on your hypothesis that
a proof called Xon-perception is an instrumental cause. For to explain
more fully, — all allow that no proof or source of right knowledge
[and therefore- not even your own Xon-perception.] can apprehend
any thing subsequently which was not originally an object of indeter-
minate cognition, § and thus even in inference, &o., we all admit that
there must have been some previous indeterminate cognition of fire,
&.c.,\\ [and therefore there must be an indeterminate cognition of
abhdva, and this can only be caused by the senses alone.] Again,
the very phrase, ' a site of ground possessing the jar's abhdva'' compels
our opponents to admit some relation between the abhdva and the site
[and this can only be that called swanqm, which we have previously
established.]
* Understanding by it a separate relation from sifarupa.
f I. e. just as the relation of contact requires another relation, i. e that of
intimate relation, so this relation would reqiure a relation to connect it with its
related subjects, and so on. The Nyaya holds that sainavdya and ahhdca abide
in their subjects by the simrujoa sarnbandha only.
X The spot being distinguished by the absence of the jar, fjliatdhlidvavad
hTiutalam. This will be clearer to the reader if he will compare the description
in the Siddhanta Muktavali, p. 51, how the eye sees the jar by direct contact,
its form by the intimate relation existing between the jar iuid its qualities, and
the form's species {rv.patt>-a) by the intimate relation between that species and
the ri({pa. It may be illustrated algebraically -j (a + t) + c | -f (/.
§ The indetei-minatc knowledge is neither irramd nor hhrama, and therefore
tliere is no 'pravuda.i for its production.
i| Similarly in testimony, before we can understand the sentence Devadatto
[facii'-V.iwti, {i. e. Devadatto ganiavakartd asti)j wc must have hud an indetermi-
nate cognition of Devadatta and garimna.
57
XXII T. He thus sums up the substance of the chapter.
XXII T. Paralysed in their power bj^ necessarily looking
to His countenance^* the various proofs, — Perception
and the rest, — fail even to attain their proper nature,t
and the threatened rise of contradiction is utterly crush-
ed down j to Him, then, the one to whom all are sub-
ject, who delights in the sportive exercise, unrivalled
and independent, of His almighty power, — to Him, the
god even of gods, we betake ourselves with our highest
faith aroused.
" Paralysed in their power by necessarily looking to His counte-
nance," i. e. their force precluded by positive arguments which prove
the subject's actual existence. ' He delights in the sportive exercise
of his power,' since He is the one primary cause of the absence of
pain. J
* They depend on God, as otherwise, by § 2, the inference would be baseless
without a subject; and this defect is only removed by the inference itself
being overthrown — in other words the ds'raydsidAM is only avoided by Iddlio..
t They cease to be ' proofs' at all.
X Cf. the definition of Final Libei'ation in the Nj'-aya Sutras, I. 22 as ' abso-
lute deliverance from pain.'
58
FOURTH CLUSTER.
I. The fourtli objection was tliat even if God did exist, he could
not be a cause of right knowledge to us. " God cannot be an au-
thority to us, because he has no right knowledge, as his knowledge
lacks the indispensable characteristic of cognizing an object uncog-
nized before ;* hence he neither possesses right knowledge himself
nor can produce it in us, and who would trust the words of a being
who cannot be a cause of right knowledge ?" He replies,
I. Cognizing for tlie first time is no true mark_, as it is
both too narrow and too wide ; w^e hold right knowledge
to be an independent impression w^hich corresponds to
the reality.
Your ' cognizing an object uncognized before' is not an indispen-
sable characteristic mark of right knowledge, as it fails to apply in
such an affirmative instance as repeated knowledge \_i. e. seeing a
thing a second or third time], and wrongly applies to such a nega-
tive instance as the erroneous judgment that 'this [nacre before me]
is silver.' He then gives his own detinition in the second line. The
ancient Pandits did not apply the term ' right knowledge' to remem-
brance, because it is necessarily ' dependent,' as it has the same object
as the original impression which produced it, and therefore its au-
thoritativeness must stand or fall with that of its originator. Hence
he adds the epithet 'independent.'
II. " a. But" (reply the opponents) we may deny that our defi-
nition is too narrow as not applying to repeated knowledge. We
maintain that cognition must produce a particular quality, [_i. e.
cognizedness,] residing in the object,t — otherwise there would not be
* The P. Mi'mansa concludes that as God must always know, his knowledge
would not fall under the definition of ' right knowledge.' They deny that remem-
brance can be right knowledge ; the other schools generally allow that it is a
kind of prama but not independent.
t The Sanskrit reader will observe that this is the opinion of the Bhatta Mi-
mansakas in the S. Muktavali, p. 118. They hold that all cognition is super-
69
in cognition the definite distinguishing of the object, \_i. e. that this
thing is cloth and not a jar ;] and hence, even in repeated cognition,
we have ' the cognizing of a thing before uncognized,' [since each
separate act of cognition on our part produces anew this particular
influence or qualit}^ in the object, and this therefore is ever cognized
anew.] b. [Again, 3'ou would prove the existence of God by tlie
argument that the creation of the world must imply a previous
knowledge of the material cause, — i. e. the atoms, out of which it was
made, — from the very nature of effects, since all effects, as jars, &c., im-
ply such a knowledge ; and as this knowledge is not found in indivi-
dual souls, it must belong to the Supreme Soul. But we would meet
this by proposing a dilemma.] When you talk of ' God's know-
ledge of the world's material cause,' do you allow that this knowledge
produces this particular quality of cognizedness in its object or not ?
If you allow it, then you must also concede a second similar quality
of cognizedness, residing in the knowledge itself, in order to distin-
guish definitely that it is the knowledge of the material cause, [i. e.
to know that he knows it,] and this again will necessitate a third
and so on,— thus we have a regressus in infinitum. If you do not
allow it, then your alleged reason (or middle term) ' the very nature
of effects' fails from being too general, — since in this very instance
' cognizedness' is an effect and yet you own that it is not produced
by a previous knowledge of the material cause. Hence we cannot
admit that the existence of God is proved as the Maker of the
world." He replies,
II. In the absence of the object^s real nature to distin-
guish it, it would be useless to seek help [from cogni-
zedness ;] and even supposing that, without this (nature),
you might succeed in an existing object, yet what could
you do in a non-existing ?
The especial nature of the thing is that which definitely distin-
sensuous ; but after the cognition of a jar there is produced in the jar a quahty
called cognizedness, — this cognizedness becomes an object of perception in the
form ' this jar is cognized by me ;' hence I infer the existence of the cognition
from its effect, and I also at the same time infer the coiTectness of the cogni-
tion. The Nyaya holds that the three steps, 1, knowledge, 2, consciousness or
knowing the knowledge (anuvyavasdya,) and 3, the knowledge of its coiTectness
are successive ; the Mimansa holds that the two last are simultaneous and in
fact identical.
I 2
60
guisbes the object [so that we determine it to be not a jar but
cloth ;] otherwise there would be no definite distinction, even though
vour quality of ' cognizedness' had been communicated to it. And
again, even although we granted that 'cognizedness' is pro-
duced in the case of an existing object, yet it could not arise in
the case of a non-existing object, [as e. g. a jar now destroyed,]
since its material cause, [i. e. that object,] would be non-existent ; and
hence it would follow that here, at any rate, there would be nothing
definite to distinguish the object. We therefore conclude that a
thing's special nature is that which alone definitely distinguishes it.
TIT. " But may we not apply the general rule, ' an action must
produce some effect on its object,' and hold that the action of cogni-
tion similarly produces a quality residing in its object ?" He replies,
III. ^ Action^ cannot serve you as a reason to prove any-
new quality [such as ' cognizedness/] since it is either
too general or falsely assumed; nor will perception
prove it, since it shews that cognition is itself the
distinguishing connection.
a. If vou mean by ' action' the signification of the verbal root, then,
as in such an instance as ' he unites his arrow to the sky' there is no
effect produced by the action on its object the [impassive] sky, your
assumed reason is too general, h. If you mean by ' action' the opera-
tion of the instrumental cause,* then again also your reason will be
too general, as no effect is produced on the jars by the contact of the
oro-ans of perception therewith, c. If you say that ' action' means
motion, then, as cognition is not a motion at all, your reason is falsely
assumed in the subjeet.f d. " But may we not say that such phrases
as 'the jar is cognized,' 'the jar is intuitively known,' &c., shew that
perception is the proof of this very quality of cognizedness ?" [as
' cognized,' &c., really mean ' possessed of cognizedness,' &c.] He
replies by the second line of the s'loka. Wherever you have a de-
* Cf. Bhasha P. 'si. 58. and supra, p. 13, note.
f Sv:arupdsiddhi is that fallacy where the assumed middle term is not pre-
sent in the subject or minor term, as ' the lake has fire, because it has smoke.'
In the present case the argiament is ' cognition produces an effect on its object
from the very fact that it belongs to the class action,' action being defined to
piean ' motion.'
61
finitely distinguished cognition, you have as its object the distin-
guishing attribute, the thing distinguished, and the connection which
exists between them ; and this connection may sometimes be
that of contact [as in such cases as ' the spot of ground possessing a
jar on it ;'] in others it may be the connection constituted by the
nature of the things connected.* Now just as we see in such [re-
versed] phrases as 'the cognition of the jar'f [where the jar is that
which distinguishes the cognition, and the Mimtinsakas allow that
their cognizedness only resides in an object and not in the cognition,]
that the latter kind of connection is that which exists between the
cognition and the jar, so the same connection appears to be found in
such phrases as 'the jar is cognized' [where the cognition is that
which distinguishes the jar;]:]. Otherwise, if this were not the con-
nection, you would have to assume in such cases as ' the jar is desir-
ed,' 'the jar is produced,' novel connections such as ' desiredness' and
producedness.'
IV. [If the opponent reply, " why should we assume these novel
connections ? The well known swarupa-sambandha, i. e. the connec-
tion constituted by the nature of the things, will suffice in these
cases ;" to meet this] he now proceeds to shew that the swarupa-
samhandha will equally serve in the original case of dispute, [i. e.
the same connection which holds in such cases as ' the jar is made,'
*the jar is desired,' &q., will equally hold in ' the jar is cognized.']
IV. The cognition is distinguished by its object alone^
since the cognitions themselves have no definite form to
distinguish them from each other; and in the common
phrases abont the objects of actions it is the verb which
distinguishes.
Just as [in such phrases as ' a cognition of the jar'] we have the
knowledge distinguished by its object the jar, [i. e. it is that which
* See note, p. 13.
t Here all agree that the cogTiition does Bot reside by intimate connection (as
the geuus in its individuals,) nor by contact (as the jar on the gi-ound ;) and
therefore by exhaustion it must be the vislmyatd-samhandha. Glmta-jndyiam
therefore means vishayatayd ghatavad jnciiiam, and similarly jna^o ghatah means
vishayatayd jndna-vis'ishto ghatah.
X The Munansa holds that jndtald is a quality in the object, the Nyaya that it
is a swarujpa nainhandha between the jadiirx and the object.
62
makes this cognition different from other cognitions ;] and just as
in common phrases about the objects of actions, as jars, &c., we have
the particuhir meaning of the verbal root as that which distinguish-
es the particular phrase [and thus makes it diifer from other similar
phrases,]* so too in such alleged cases as ' the jar is cognized,' it is
the cognition alone which distinguishes this particular knowledge in
regard to the jar, and it is not from an^^ other supposed attribute [as
your 'cognizedness'].
V. " May we not, however, still maintain that God's knowledge
is not properly ' riglit knowledge' (pramd) since it is not produced
by proof (pramuna ;) and therefore God can neither be a right
knower (^ramdta) Himself nor be a cause of right knowledge to us,
since the essential conditions for both are absent in Him r" He
replies,
Y. Eight knowledge is accurate comprehension and
right knowing is the possession thereof; authoritative-
ness is, according to Gotama^s school, the being separat-
ed from all absence thereof. f
Right knowledge is a notion corresponding to the object ; and this
is not inconsistent with God's knowledge, even though His know-
ledge be not produced [but eternal]. 'Right knowing' \i. e. the
being a right knower,] means the being connected with right know-
ledge by intimate relation, \i. e. that relation which connects a
substance and its qualities \X\ ^''^^ ^^^^ ^^'^ ^^ established of God,
even though He be not a cause of right knowledge to us. In the
same way God is an authority as being Himself ever connected with
right knowledge, i. e. as being ever ' separated from all absence
thereof.' There is no need to include as absolutely necessary in
your definition that He must be an instrument of right knowledge
to others, since God's authoritativeness is thus declared in the Xya-
ya Sutras, (II. 68.) " The fact of the Yeda being an authority, [i. e.
an instrument of right knowledge,] like the spells [against poison, &c.,]
* Thus in ' a jar is made,' ' a jar is broken, &c.,' — it is the verb which dis-
tinguishes the several sentences,
t J. e. there may be a partial pramd even in a case of error, (thus the jaundiced
perception is right as to the s^hell, though wrong as to its colour;) but irrdradnyOj
can never be found where there is anj', even only a partial, abs3nce of pramd.
X God is prarixdna-kartd, i. e. prarndtd, but kortd must n )t be taken in its
usual meaning (as his knowledge is eternal,) but in that of d^'raya^
63
and the medical science, follows from the authoritativeness of tlie
fit person [who gave it"]. Nor need you ohject that this will lead
to God's being a fifth cause of right knowledge, (p7'amana) and thus
our old division of four pramdnas will be violated, — because our old
division will still hold as applying to instrionental causes of right
knowledge, [and the Veda, our fourth pramdna, is God's instru-
ment]. Nor need you object that " God's knowledge [if He be
omniscient] will embrace error [as well as truth,] and apprehend the
objects of error [as well as those of truth,] and therefore will itself
be liable to the imputation of error," — since the nature of right
knowledge is not violated so long as the knowledge is not associated
with a contradictory object, \i. e. so long as I do not apprehend
silver in what is not silver but nacre]. Now it is an actual fact that
in error there is a definite object, as nacre, and also that it is viewed
under the notion of silver ; and God's right knowledge cannot be
impaired by his apprehending this fact.
VI. He now gives a s'loka recapitulating the purport of the
Chapter.
YI. He^ in whose intuitive unerring perception, insepar-
ably united to Him and dependent on no foreign inlets,
the succession of all the various existing objects is con-
tained, — all the chaff of our suspicion being swept away
by the removal of all possible faults as caused by the
slightest want of observation in Him, — He, 'Siva, is my
authority ; what have I to do with others, darkened as
their authority must ever be with rising doubts ?
" The succession of all the various existing objects" — i. e. all the
world is the object of God's perception. " All possible faults," as
partiality, aversion, &c. " All the chaff of our suspicion is swept
away," — all our suspicion as to the Veda's want of authority.
*' Others," i, e. heretics.
64
FIFTH CLUSTER.
1. The fifth objection was ' from the absence of positive proof/
" May we not say that there are no proofs to establish God's exist-
ence ?" He replies,
I. From effects, combination, support, &c., traditional
arts, authoritativeness, 'Sruti, the sentences thereof,
and particular numbers, — an everlasting omniscient
Being is to be established.
a. The earth, &c., must have had a maker because they have the
nature of ' effects,'* like a jar ; by a thing's having a maker we
mean that it is produced by some agent who possesses the wish to
make, and has also a perceptive knowledge of the material cause out
of which it is to be madcf &. ' Combination' is an action, and
therefore the action which produced the conjunction of two atoms,
initiating the binary compound, at the beginning of a creation, must
have been accompanied by the volition of an intelligent being,
because it has the nature of an action, like the actions of bodies
such as ours. c. ' Support, &c.' The world depends upon some
being who possesses a volition which hinders it from falling, because
it has the nature of being supported, like a stick supported by a bird
in the air ; by being supported we mean the absence of falling in the
ease of bodies possessing weight. By the ' &c.,' we include destruc-
tion. Thus the world can be destroyed by a being possessed of
volition, because it is destructible, like cloth which is rent. d. ' From
traditional arts.' Pada [which is not used here in its usual sense
of ' word,' see wfra § v.] is derived from the root jjada, i. e. ' that by
* This is proved because the world consists of parts whicli are arranged in a
certain way and are severally produced and destroyed, (see Sarva D. Sangraba,
p. 81, last line).
The argument from Kdnjativa is really the same as that employed by Chalmers
(in his Natural Theology,) to rebut Hume's objection to the a posteriori argu-
ment on the ground that the world is only a singular effect.
t Cf, Bhasha Tarichchheda, § 149,
65
which something is known,' i. e. the traditional arts of mankind.
The traditional arts now current, as that of making cloth, &c.,
must have been originated by an independent being,* from the
very fact that they are traditional usages like the tradition of
modern modes of writingt [invented by men independently, as
systems of short-hand, &c.] e. ' From authoritativeness.' The
knowledge produced by the Veda is produced by a virtue residing in
its cause, J because it is right knowledge, just as is the case in the
right knowledge produced by perception &c.§ f. * From S'ruti,' i. e.
the Veda. The Veda must have been produced by a person from its
having the nature of a Veda|| like the Ayur-veda (i. e. the upaveda
so called, treating of medical science ) g. Again, the Veda must
have been produced by a person because it has the nature of ' sen-
tences,' like the Mahabharata ; or, in other words, the sentences of
the Veda were produced by a person because they have the nature
of sentences, just as the sentences of beings like ourselves, h, ' From
particular numbers.' The measure of a binary compound is produced
by number since it is a derived [i. e. not eternal] measure and at
the same time is not produced by measure or aggregation,^ like the
measure of a jar composed of three kapdlas which is larger than that
of one composed of two such kapdlas [and this increase can only be
due to numher, as the kapdlas in themselves are all equal ;] for the
* Sioatantratwam is defined as asmacliya-vyavaMrdnddhina-vyavahdra-'kar-
tritwatii,
f The Hindus liold that the Devanagari alphabet is of divine, wliile Bengali,
Persian, &c. are of human, origin. — There is a current s'loka of Brihaspati,
\»
X See Bhasha P. §§ 130-3. Wrong knowledge or error is produced by a fault
in its cause, as jauudice, &c. in the eye ; and right knowledge is produced by a
guna or vii*tue, (like Aristotle's ocpdaX/xov aperr) or jSeXTiarr] elis). This virtue in
the case of the Veda is its quality of being uttered by a fit person, i. e. one pos-
sessing a true knowledge of words and meanings.
§ Some say that the g-una here is the absence of jaundice, &c., others the
direct contact of the organ with a true object.
1] By Nyaya Silt. ii. 68, we learn that ' that is Veda where the fact of being a
cause of right knowledge is admitted.'
^ Cf. Bhasha P. § 110. The iufinitesimality of atoms is eternal.
66
measure of an atom* does not produce measure because its measure
is eternal [and therefore incapable of change] or because it is the
measure of an atom. Hence at the beginning of a creation there
must be the number of duality abiding in the atoms, which is the
cause of the measure of the binary compound, but this number cannot
be produced at that time by the distinguishing perception of beings
like ourselves. Therefore we can only assume this distinguishing
faculty as then existing in God.f — By the last words of the text it is
meant that it is the Being, possessed of this attribute [of omniscience,]
who is everlasting,^ and hence is established his eternal omniscience.
II. " a. But may we not say that inasmuch as only one pos-
sessed of a body can be a maker, the existence of Grod is precluded
as the distinguishing attribute of a maker is precluded ? h. We have
also the contrary syllogism, that we cannot allow the earth, &c. to have
been produced by a maker, as there is the absence of the being produced
by a body which invariably accompanies the being produced by a
maker, c. There is also an opposing universal proposition, viz. that
only one possessed of a body can be a maker, d. By the induction
* Ibid. § 14. The atoms of Hindu philosophy, being infinitesimal, woxild only
produce still smaller totalities (like multiplied fractions or added negative quan-
tities) as measure can only produce a further result homogenous with itself. It
is the tertiary compound, which, as having finite magnitude fmahattiva,) pro-
duces measure, just as the jar's measure is caused by that of its two halves.
t To understand this argument, we must remember that the K'yaya holds that
all number beyond unity is produced in tilings by an eSbrtofour mind, — in nature
all things exist singly, and it is we who combine them into sets of two, three, or
more at our pleasure. The first operation is that distinguishing perception
called aijelcsJidbuddlii, by which we say of each thing, ' this is one,' ' this is one,'
&c. This produces duality, &o. in the objects, as e. g. in two jars, which duality
resides by intimate relation in each of the objects, but resides in both by a pecu-
liar connection called jparydiM — it is this last which gives the idea of " two
pots," and not merely that of one pot possessing duality here and another
possessing it there. As the binary compound only differs from the atom by
number and not by measure or size, (as both are, as far as we are concerned,
alike infinitesimal, however one may be i-eally larger than the other,) we must
have recoui'seto the Supreme Being's apekshdhuddhi to account for the existence
of number in the binary compound at the time of creation. The smallest per-
ceptible size is the tertiary compound, consisting of three binaiy ones. See
Colebrooke, i. p. 278. It is singular that the Nyaya should adopt such a concep-
tualistic view of number, while it yet holds such realistic notions of genus.
;|; There are two kinds of ojivaya or logical connection, vis'islita-vidhayd and
upalakshaiia vidhayd. The former is where the epithet is emphatic and is
therefore never disjoined from the subject ; the latter is where the emphasis is
laid on the subject and the epithet or predicate may be sometimes separated.
(Thus Pliidias the sculptor is not always actually sculpturing.) In the present
case the epithet ' everlasting' belongs to the former class and can never be
sepai-atcd from its subject the Supreme Being as distinguished by the attribute
of omniscience, and this attribute is therefore everlasting.
67
which extends over every case presented by experience [as jars, &c.,] we
infer that a maker must have a body, but by the relation existing
in the present argument between the minor term earth, &c. and the
major term it would appear that the maker is incorporeal [as no
maker is in this case perceptible] — hence the possibility of the al-
leged major term is unproved, and there is also a mutual contradic-
tion between the subject, [maker,] and the attribute ascribed to it,
[incorporeal.] e. We may also establish the fallacy of a too gene-
ral middle term by inserting the condition § " from being produced
by a corporeal agent" instead of the old middle " from being an
effect," Thus there are five separate fallacies involved by the alleged
middle term." He replies,
II. There is no precluding, as this, [our middle term,] is
indispensable ; nor are there any valid counterarguments,
as those alleged are too weak ; whether our assumed con-
nection be established or overthrown, there is no mutu-
al contradiction ; nor can you have a too general middle
term, without any reason for it.
a. Because the possession of a body is precluded in the case of
the subject [sc. the Supreme Being,] it does not follow that his
possession of the attribute of being a maker is precluded, since
* this,' i. e. our middle term ( — " having the nature of an effect" — )
which necessarily establishes the existence of the subject [as every
effect implies a cause] is too powerful to be set aside, as it is
this which must undoubtedly be looked to as producing the know-
ledge of the subject at all, and without the knowledge of the
subject, as we have previously proved, [in III. § ii.] it is im-
possible to establish the knowledge of non-existence. And thus
there is no such pretended perception as would preclude the existence
of God because his distinguishing attribute as maker is precluded.
Nor again is there any such precluding inference as " God cannot be
a maker because he has no body," [since in your opinion the very
existence of God is unproved, and how then can you discuss his attri-
butes ?]
b. We cannot admit as a valid opposing argument " the earth,
* For JJpddM, the condition wliicli must be supplied to restrict a too general
middle term, see sit;pra, p. 37.
G8
&c, are destitute of a maker because they were not produced by a
body," because your middle term is fallacious as assuming too much,
since the words ' by a body' are superfluous.*
c. The middle term in our argument, " having the nature of aa
effect," is more valid than that of the opposite argument ['' the earth,
&c., are not produced by a maker from their not being produced by a
body,"] because ours is supported b}^ its being actually found as an
attribute of the minor term [earth, &c.], and there is also an argument
to stop any certain negative instance ;t while on the other hand your
alleged universal proposition " only one possessed of a body can be a
maker," is too weak to stop us [as it is not found as an actual attribute
of the minor term and there is moreover no such acknowledged prin-
ciple.]
d. If by the connection existing between the minor and major
terms it be established that the maker is incorporeal, then there is
no contradiction, since in that case it is understood that being a
maker may coexist with incorporeality ; and, again, if it be not esta-
bHshed, then, even in this case, there is no contradiction, [i. e. your
alleged fault falls to the ground,] from the want of any subject in
which it is to abide.
e. Since there is an argument on our side by which to pre-
clude any certain negative instance, there cannot be here such an
inconclusiveness as a mistake as to the major premiss caused
by the absence of any such precluding argument, i. e. the fallacy of a
too general middle term ; and moreover your pretended ' condition/
" produced by a body" — is itself overthrown by the absence of any
argument on t/oid' side to preclude a negative instance. J
III. " But may we not bring forward the opposing argument, that
' if God were a maker he would have a body ?' while at the same time
there is no argument of equal weight to support your view." He replies,
* The older Naiyayikas maintained that the argument " the mountain has
fire because it has blue smoke" involved the fallacy of vyapyatwasiddhi, because
the alleged middle term was unnecessarily restricted. See Siddhanta Muktav.
p. 77. The moderns however moi-e wisely consider it as a harmless error, and
they would rather meet b. in the text by asserting that there is no proof to
establish the validity of the assumed middle term.
t I. e. wherever you have an effect, you iinist have a producing cause, — there-
fore you cannot have an effect without a maker,
X There are two readings here f^Xf ^^T^«(nV[T^«r ^^^^ f^^'^^T'^SfTT^rTT^^.
If we adopt the latter, it means " by the presence of an argument on our side
to preclude a negative instance."
69
III. Our opponents^ arguments^ being' defective^ cannot
invalidate our reasoning by their fallaciousness, — while
the favourable argument from the abolition of effects
tells on our side.
These opposing arguments are ' fallacious' because they are siih-
jectless, so long as the existence of their subject, God, is itself un-
proved. But the argument " there could not be an effect without
a causer," is ' on our side.' There is also S'ruti to prove it, " I
am the origin of all, from me all proceeds."* And that S'ruti has
pre-eminent force which is supported by reasoning, according to the
verse, [of Manu,] " He, and none else, knows religion, who investigates
the Veda and the religious teaching of the Rishis by means of such
reasoning, as is not contrary to the Veda and the S'astras."
IV. " But how does the fact of a thing's being an effect neces-
sitate that it should have been produced by volition ?" He replies,
IV. If it [the atom] acts independently, it ceases to be
brute matter, — desert does not abolish visible causes ;
if there be no cause there is no effect ; a particular
effect has a particular cause.
There cannot be an effect without a causer. If the atom were
endued with volition it would follow that the atom was intelligent,
since an unintelligent thing can produce an effect only when impelled
by an intelligent being ; and desert [or fate] can only produce effects
by the concurrence of visible causes.f Nor may you say that " the
volition of the conscious agent is the cause in effort J only and not in
all action generally," because even though a particular kind of voli-
tion may be the cause in the case of effort, this does not preclude
volition generally as the cause of action generally ; otherwise, because
a particular seed is the cause of a particular shoot, it would follow
that seeds in general [_i, e. the class, seed] could not be the causes of
shoots in general. §
* Bhagavad Gita, x. 8.
t Otherwise all things would be produced by desert alone, and all other
causes would be superfluous.
X There is a memorial verse, ^T^5J^T ^'^f^'^T T'^T^^T Vfiw^ ??%• I
lif?r5J^T vi^€T ^Sm^T Vriw f^^T H IchckUd is chalcirshd, krlti is yatna or
* volition.'
§ This argument depends on two principles, — a. the same relation of cause
70
V. " But what is the proof tliat support, &c. (§ i.) are produced
by volition ?" He replies,
V. In tliis way ' support' and ' destruction' require
no limiting condition because they are effects ; and the
same thing holds of ^ traditional arts' and ' authoritative-
ness, &c/ through an interruption [of the tradition] .
* Support' and ' destruction' do not require any limiting condition
[i. e. they are not too general middle terms,] because they are pro-
duced by volition \i. e. inasmuch as they are effects, they involve
volition by § iv,] Since, through the interruption of the tradition, —
i. e. through a partial destruction of the world [as of one loka,] —
there is an absence of all patterns, &c. the succeeding copier cannot
himself be the origin of the tradition since he does not know the
ti'adition ; hence is established the existence of some being who, at
the beginning of a creation, originated the various traditional arts, as
of making jars, &c.* In the same way we may prove that the
authoritativeness of the ideas produced by the Yeda, &c. are not too
general middle terms, [Cf. § xvi. infra.']
YI. Or we may interpret the first couplet of this Chapter in the
following manner.
a. ' Effect ' may mean ' purport' \i. e. the ' effect' to be produced
on the hearer's mind ;] it has been said that words are authoritative
only in reference to their purport, and therefore he is God whose
purport is declared in the Yeda.
b, ' Combination' may mean ' explanation ;' the Yedas must have
been explained by some one who knew their meaning, since their
sentences have been received by great saints ; and, if they had not
been explained, these saints, not knowing their meaning, would not
have fulfilled their injunctions by sacrifice, &c., and if a finite being
had explained them, his explanation could not have been relied on.
and effect which exists between particulars exists likewise between theii- re-
spective classes ^^ f^^^^y: ^r^^TK^WI"^^rr^ ^TiIT^^TX:fg and 6. the
general causes only produce their eftects when conjoined with the particular
causes, ^^T^'^T^^I f^^^^T^^^f^^^ ^T^* oj^^fcT. Thus Archbishop
Whately has made a book on Logic, — man can therefore make logical books 5
only in each particular case we requh-e the concurrents, education, leisure, &c,
* See su]jra, p. 28. It is interesting to compare this with Isaiah xxviii. 26.
Cf. also the Greek legend of Triptolemus, and Whately's Lectures on Pol.
Economy, pp. 79, 84.
71
c. * Support' may mean ' preserving the tradition.' The &c. may
inchide * performance.'
d. The existence of God is also established by the meaning
of the ' words' I's'wara, ' &c.,* as has been said, " Denominationf
is purport, the explanation of an all-seeing one is valid ; the
words I's'wara, &c. must have a meaning in accordance with the
custom of mankind." ' Denomination' here implies a particular
kind of wish. In the same way in such verses as " I am the origin
of all" the word " I" means an independent utterer, since even in
secular matters that word alone has authoritativeness which possesses
a definite meaning ; and in accordiince with the rule, " he who
knows secular things knows Vaidic also," the same rule holds in a
transcendental subject which holds in the case of a secular ' I,' &c.
e. The word irratijaya which we formerly rendered ' authoritative-
ness' may also mean ' affix,' i. e. the affix of the imperative implying
* let' [as in ' let him sacrifice ;'] the meaning of the command has
been defined as ' the will of a fit person ;' and He whose will it is,
is God.+
VI. Activity is really volition, fyafnaj and this springs
from the desire to act, and this from knowledge, and the
object of this knowledge is a command, or [as we would
hold] it is rather that which causes a command to be
inferred.
After the knowledge produced by a command arises ' activity ;'§
and this activity springs directly from a certain wish, i. e. ' the
desire to act ;' and this desire arises from the ' knowledge' that the
thing is to be accomplished by action and that it is the means to
obtain the desired end [happiness] ; and the object of this know-
ledofe is the fact that the thins' is to be done and is a means to our
obtaining the desired end, i. e. the fact of its being a command.
This was the opinion of the ancient Naiyayikas ; but he expresses his
* Tlie &c. includes Om, &c.
t Colebrooke translates uddes'a by ' enunciation,' — " tlio mention of a thing
by its name, — that is, by a term signifpng it, as taught by revelation ; for
language is considered to have been revealed to man."
X This interpretation of pratyaya leads to a long and intricate discussion on
vidhi which lasts to the end of § xiv. He goes on with his explanation of § i.
in § XV. — The first question is, since vidhi is 'pravartalm vdkya, what is pravritti ?
§ Prayatna is divided into three kinds (Bliasha P. § 14S,)—]pravriUif
nivritti and jivana^Tidrana, i. e. activity, cessation from activity, and vitality.
72
own in the last words of the couplet ' or rather it is that which causes
a command to be inferred,' i. e. the real meaning of the tense affix
expressing command is ' the will of a fit person,' which causes the
hearer to infer that to act accordingly will be the means to obtain
the desired end.
YII. He now proceeds to prove b}^ exhaustion what is the object
of that knowledge which causes that wish which produces activity,
\i. e. he here shews what it is not, his own view will be given in
§ xiv.]
VII. [The various current notions of the meaning of
*" command^ are wrong ; thus] it cannot be an attribute
in the agent^ either from improper exclusion and
inclusion, — or because activity does not always ensue,
— or from the ensuing inconsistency, — or from the
non-existence of the action-producing wish, — or from
the involved uselessness [as a cause] of the knowledge
that such an action is a means, — or from confusion.
a. If vou say that an attribute in the agent, — muscular
action, — produces ' activity,' [and is therefore the meaning of
' command,'] then it would follow that in such a command as ' let
him know the soul' we should properly have no activity at all,
while, on the other hand, on hearing such an indicative sentence
as ' he goes to the village' we should have activity produced
in the hearer, h. If you say that the real meaning of ' com-
mand' is ' volition,' then follows the fault that activity does not
always ensue ; since, although voUtion is also implied by other tense
sio-ns than those of the potential and imperative, yet no activity
follows if we do not ascertain that it is a means to a desired end,
or if we know that it is a means to an undesired end.
c. If you say that ' wish' \i. e. the agent's, as in ' let him who
desires swarga offer such a sacrifice'] is the proper meaning of ' com-
mand,' then you incur the fault of ' inconsistency.' If ' wish' be the
meaning of ' command,' then on the one hand the knowledge of the
wish [i. e. the knowledge of the command] can only be produced by
the previously existing wish [as all knowledge depends on the prior
existence of its object,] — while on the other hand the wish must be
73
produced by the knowledge of the wish,* — ^henee you reason in a
circle, — which is called in the couplet, * inconsistency.'
d. But an opponent may reply that ' the abovementioned know-
ledge of the wish [i. e. the mere knowledge of the wish itself as im-
plied in the terms of the command ^ swargakamo yajeta^ this knowledge
of the meaning not being accompanied by any conscious ivish in the
person's own mind,] is produced by the tense affix,'t — to this he
replies, ' from the non-existence of the action-producing wish.' Even
if the knowledge of such a wish be produced, yet no activity will
ensue, as there is no such wish present as we defined in § vi. to be
the cause of activity, since only such a wish can produce activity
as is a cause by its own nature (and not simply from its being
Jcnowri),X and even on your own shewing there cannot be such a wish
at the time of hearing the tense affix of the command, but only that
knowledge of a wish which is produced by the spoken word. e. But it
may be replied " is not this very wish produced by the tense affix of the
command 'Ze^ him, &c. ?' " he replies, that the universally acknowledged
cause, knowledge, will be overthrown. The knowledge that the action
enjoined is a means to the desired end, which all accept as tlie
cause of the wish, will be in danger of being overthrown, as the effect
will be sometimes produced by the tense affix, even where this ac-
knowledged cause is not found.
f. But some may say that ' the meaning of the command is a
wish [for the end] produced in the mind of the agent by a knowledge
determined by happiness, &c-§ (as the ultimate fruit to be desh-ed) at
the time of hearing the command,' — he replies, ' this will cause con-
fusion.' All allow necessarily that the knowledge that the action is a
means to the desired end is the cause of the wish for the means \i. e.
the required action of sacrifice,] and as there is no other cause for
* I, e. you "will have a consecutive series, 1, ichchhd ; 2, ichchhd-jndna or vidhi'
jndna ; 3, ichchlid. The second ichchhd is ' the desire to act' of § vi. which arose
from the knowledge that such an action is commanded. — The true order is, 1.
ishta-sddhanatd-jndna ; 2. ichchhd, (updyechchhd ;) ^. pravritti. He here proves
that vidhi cannot mean the second ; he subsequently shews that it cannot be the
third. Udayana and the old Nyaya differ as to th.Q first, see § xiii.
t I. e. by S'ahda, not by ichchhd.
J There are two kinds of causes swarupa sat and jndta ; an example of the
former is ' eating is the cause of satisfying hunger,' of the latter * smoke is a cause
of fire (being inferred').
§ The &c., includes ' absence of pain.' The former fault will not apply here
as tlxis knowledge of the desire for the fruit tvill cause action, — if a man does not
desire heaven, the command Sivargakdmo yajeta is not a command to him.
74
this knowledge that the action is the means to the desired end,
the tense sign of the command must be its cause ; — hence the know-
ledge of the wish for the end is not a cause of activity, as activity can
be found where it does not exist [if only the knowledge of the action's
being a means to a desired end exist ;] and hence there Avould be
confusion of the two causes, because your cause 'the knowledge of the
desire for the fruit' is always found accompanied by ony cause, ' the
knowledge that the action is a means to a desired end' [and as in
certain cases mine is found where yours is not found, mine will be
sufficient by itself and wdiy then need we bring in yours at all ?]
The commentator adds another objection in the fact that as there is
no proof that the knowledge of the wish for the fruit produces the
wish for the means, [this being produced by the knowledge that the
means will produce a desired end] it follow's that the former cannot be
the meaning conveyed by the tense affix of the command [because
this meaning whatever it be, must necessitate action].
VIII. " Well, but why not say that the knowledge of volition
[as implied in the potential used imperatively] is alone that which
sets men in action, but that no tense-sign besides this does express
volition, since all the other tense-signs express only an operation in
accordance with the meaning of the root ? For we fmd this the case
in such instances as ' the chariot goes' [where we have an operation
but no volition."] He replies,
VIII. In consequence of the fixed rule about applying
the term ' maker' drawn from the distinction between the
use of the phrases ^ made' and ^ not made,^ making or ac-
tion means volition only ; and that action which is
causative in reference to a subsequent thing is the
meaning of the tense-sign.
In accordance with such phrases as ' the pot is made,' ' the shoot
is not made,' we may say that the potter, &c,, are makers but not
the other instrumental causes [as the wheel, &c.,] hence we may
say that the meaning of the root Kri is making or action, [i. e.
Jcriti, or volition.] — "But if so, would not the words 'volition' and
' tense-sign,' be synonyms ? [as all tense signs can be resolved into
Icritit i. e. yafnaJ'^ He replies by the last paragraph. That making
or action, which is the means in reference to an actual sub-
75
sequent end, is the meaning of tlie tense-sign, — i. e. the meaning
of the tense-sign is only a volition in accordance with the end.
Or (according to another view) the meaning of the tense-sign is a
volition which produces a repetition of the meaning of the root, in
the form of successively repeated operations in accordance with the
desired end, one following the other. In this way the tense-sign
will have three meanings, volition, accordance with the root and
successive repetition [while under the first view it will have only the
two first ; under either view, however, the tense-sign will involve more
than simple volition and therefore cannot he its synonym].
IX. " But may we not allow that the root Kri may mean voli-
tion, and yet maintain that the tense-sign only means an operation
in accordance with the root, the volition being only understood by
an inference ?"* He replies,
IX. The meaniug of the tense-sign is a volition and this
applies to all tense-signs equally ; since by it all can be
clearly developed, and since the alleged inference can-
not be established.
As by ' it,' — i. e. making, or the word which expresses making
(Jcaroti) the meaning of the tense-sign is developed at length, as in
fcikam Icaroti^ ' he makes cooking' for pachati, ' he cooks,' — we must
have ' making,' i. e. volition, as the meaning of the tense-sign ; [and
again your supposed inference fails] since an operation in accordance
with the root does not always imply a volition, as an operation in
accordance with the root ' cook' in the present case can be found even
in an unintelligent thing [as in the wood, fire, pot, &c,, where of
course there can be no volition.]
"But, if so, why on hearing the objective case 'boiled rice,' do we
naturally require the sentence to be be filled up by ' he cooks' or ' he
eats ?' [On my hypothesis it is easily explained, as I maintain that all
tense-signs imply an operation in accordance with the root's meanino-,
and from this we can infer volition in this instance ; but on your
hypothesis, it is not so obvious."] This can be explained, in our
view, by the fact that an objective case is invariably accompanied bj
a volition [expressed by the tense-sign,] just as on the other hand
=* The inference will be in this form — wherever there is no volition there is
no operation in accordance with the root.
76
on hearing the verb ' he cooks,' we naturally require the sentence to
be filled up by some object.
X. " But since by developing the full meaning we do obtain an
agent (as in ' he makes cooking' for ' he cooks') why should we not
say that the tense-sign signifies also an agent ?" He replies,
X. We must not suppose that the tense-sign directly
signifies [an agent,] as this which is connected with
number can be obtained by inference ; and in the ob-
taining of that which is connected with number, the
rule holds for that only which has expectancy.
We must not suppose that the tense-sign signifies an agent, since
this ' agent' is gained by an inference from the number expressed by
the tense-sign. What we mean by ' being gained by an inference'
is that something is qualified by the meaning of the tense-sign, while
at the same time it is expressed by a word ending in the nominative
case. We use the former phrase ' qualified by the meaning of the
tense-sign' to exclude such ambiguous cases as ' having eaten Deva-
datta goes away,' &c.,* and we use the latter phrase * while at the
same time, it is expressed by a word ending in the nominative case,'
because in such instances as ' it is slept by Devadatta,' &c., it is the
meaning of the root, ' sleep,' which is qualified by present time,
as implied in the tense-sign [and verbal roots have no cases.] [Nor
may we say that the object is connected with the tense-sign as well
as the subject,— because] in such phrases as * Chaitra cooks rice,' &e.
since the meaning *rice' is already connected with the idea of object
as implied in the objective case, we are not to suppose that there is any
further dependence (as of expectancy) on the volition expressed by the
tense-sign ; hence the tense-sign is connected with the meaning of the
crude form as expressed in the unmodifiedf ' casus rectus.' Hence in
accordance with the rule that ' the number [of the tense] is connect-
* Here Devadattais qualified by nTiTnber and volition throngh the meaning of the
tense-sign, i. e. Bevadatto.. eko.ticavdn l-ritimdnscha ; but hlwMvjd is not thus qualifi-
etl^ — it itself is an advei-b and qualifies the verb. According to Hindu gi-ammar
the advei-bial suffix hcd involves the elision of the nominative affix (cf Pan.
2, 4, 82) and therefore the second part of the definition would apply, but not
the former.
f I. e. Kon-oblique case, i. e. not a hdrol-a. ■53^ means here rectus ; there is a
Sutra ^^I rT ^ ^T «1^« I ' "^^^ signs of the ^Nominative case are used after a
word which is the subject of a verb.' — The * casus rectus' will be Chaitras in the
Kartrivdchya sentence, and tandulam in the Karmavdchija.
77
ed with that with which the volition implied by the tense-sign is
connected,' — since this follows because this volition and number are
expressed by the same tense sign, — the nominative case is em-
ployed only where the number cf the agent, &c.,* are already signified
by the tense-sign. And in the same way the object cannot be said
to be directly signified by the tense-sign.f
XI. "Well, but," say the Mimansakas, " may not the command
be the attribute of the object ?" He replies,
XL The object cannot be the meaning of the command
because it would apply too far ; nor can the produced
desert (apttrva) since it would lose its very nature ; nor
can an especial effect^ since it is not always found pre-
sent ; nor, also, can the act, since men do not neces-
sarily engage in the performance.
a. If you say that the objects [of the sacrifice] are heaven, &c.,J
and the meaning of the command is an attribute in them, i. e. the fact
of their having to be produced, — it is answered ' the object cannot be
the meaning of the command because it would apply too far,' — since,
if, as you say, the attribute of their having to be produced resides
in heaven, &c., it would follow that a person possessing this know-
ledge might engage in any other action than sacrifice [as eating, &c.,
since ' the having to be produced or accomplished' resides, according
to your opinion, in the object and not in the act.'\
* I, e. the agent Kartd in most sentences, and the object Karma in snch as
* the prize is gained by Devadatta.' As in the sentence ' Devadatta goes'
the tense- sign signifies the vohtion Ckriti) and not the agent, but by the
connection we gain the latter, so in the sentence " the prize is gained by
Devadatta" the tense-sign equally signifies the volition, and by the connection
we gain the object.
f In the sentence Cliaitras tandulam pacJiati, tandula means simply ' rice' and is
connected with the affix am which signifies that tandula in the singular number
is the object ; this am is connected with the root 'paclia which means ' cooking ;'
pacha is connected with the afiix tip which means 1, vartamdna-kdla, 2,
yatna. 3, sanhhyd. The present time as implied by tip is connected with yatna,
and yatna and sankhijd are connected with the Icartd Chaitra. In the sentence
Chaitrena tandulam pachyate, the same process can be traced ; chaitra is con-
nected with the afiix td, td with the root pacha, pacha with the aSix te, and te aa
before with tandulam. The grammarians maintain that in the former case the
real meaning of the verbal afiix is directly Kartd, in the latter Karma ; the
Nyaya maintains that in both cases it is yatna (sc. Kriti), but indii-ectly by
anvaya it may be respectively Kartd or Karma.
[J; As in such commands as " let him who desires heaven offer the jyotishtoma
sacrifice," &c. — The opponent maintains that their real meaning is, " heaven ia
to be produced," sivargah kdryah, but not * the sacrifice is to be performed.'
78
b. If you say that the ' object' means apurva* and that the mean-
ing of the command is an attribute in it, i. e. the fact of its having to
be produced,! then it is answered, ' it woukl lose its very nature ;' for
the very word ainirva [as compounded of a ' not' and purva ' previ-
ously existing'] implies that it was not known before the verbal
knowledge was produced by hearing the command ; and if it is known
before [as it must be, if the words of the command are to im})ly
it,] J then it would cease to be ajourva at all ; and, on the other
hand, if it is not known before, then how can you have any know-
ledge of the meaning of the tense-sign in the command, and conse-
quently how can you have any verbal knowledge of apurva produced
by this tense-sign ?
c. If the Mimansaka replies, * why should there not be a previous
knowledge that apurva is the meaning of the command, so far as
reo-ards its general character as a thing to be produced, — but when
the verbal knowledge is gained, then in consequence of the compati-
bility§ there arises a knowledge of apurva as an especial thing to be
produced,' to this it is answered, ' because we do not always find this
especial apurva present,' i. e. it would follow that there is no apurva\\
in necessary observances [as the morning and evening prayer, &c.,]
or in absolute prohibitions [as that from injuring living creatures,]
since we find no persons enjoined to perform them as they desire
certain fruit to ensue [which fruit is to be attained by the produced
apurva as the means, — and consequently the tense-sign as in md liin-
syctt becomes meaningless.]
d. Or we may take this third sentence of the original in a differ-
ent sense as follows. An objector might say, " but why might we
not hold that we recognise that the word means a particular apurva
* Tlic unseen efficacy wliicli arises from the sacrifice cf. p. 10.
+ In this view the meaning of the command will be ' by liini who desires
heaven, the merit which is the cause of its attainment, is to be produced by the
jyotishtoma sacrifice.'
+ ' The knowledge of the power of a word is necessary, for if the power of a
word be not apprehended previously, there could not be any recollection, — since
this depends upon that relation called ' power' (i. e. the connection between a
word and its meaniug), — even though the word might be heard' (Siddh. Mukt.
p. 79.) The knowledge of the connection between a word and its meaning ia
the cause of the meaning's being recollected when the word is heard, and from
this recollection ensues verbal knowledge.
§ Expectancy, compatibility and juxtaposition are the tlu-ee causes, or rather
necessarv conditions, of verbal knowledge, see supra-, p. 43.
11 Sec'^Dr. Hall's llefutatiou of Hindu Philosophy, pp. 22—24.
79
*accompanied ^though not necessarily so) by being an effect, just as
the word ' earth' means a something necessarily distinguished by
possessing a certain nature but not necessarily accompanied by the
attribute of smell ?" To this it is answered " because we do not find
it so," i. e. because we cannot so know an apurva distinguished by
the character of apurvatwa. It is possible for the substance possessed
of the special nature of earth to be known to possess smell, by means
of memory or inference from a previous perception ; but such a sup-
position is precluded in the present case by the very name apurva,
which implies an absence of any previous perception, and which
would therefore be rendered nugatory.
e. " Well, why not take the sacrifice as the 'objcct,'t and then
the meaning of the command will be an attribute of it, i. e. the fact of
its having to be performed ?" To this it is answered in the last words
of the original verse. Your view cannot hold, since we do not see
that men engage in the performance of the sacrifice, if there be pre-
sent in their minds the idea that it will be only a means of trouble
and expense, [while on your view the simple fact of their knowing
it to be a command that 'by him who desires heaven the jyotishtoma
sacrifice is to be performed' should impel them irresistibly to the
performance thereof.] — The word ^ also' implies that the object can-
not mean ' apurva,' since the very same objection will hold as in the
previous supposition of ' the sacrifice.'
XII. " But may we not say that words are the instrument of
verbal knowledge, and that the enforcing power is an attribute
residing in them,X and that the knowledge thereof incites men to
engage in the enjoined rites ; — hence it is said, ' the tense-signs
such as the imperative, &c., express a special signification i. e. an
enjoining pov/er, while the common signification of all the tense-signs
is an eflfbrt of the asrent in accordance with the mcanino: of the
root.' There arises from the tense affix of the imperative the idea of
an enforcing power, setting a man to perform the enjoined sacrifice ;
* For vpalalcsliita see note ;|: in p. 66.
t Under this view the real meaning of the command will be ' by him who
desires heaven the jyotishtoma sacrifice is to be perfoi-med..'
X According to the Mimansa, hlidvand resides in the agent as a volition (yatna)
to perform some act to attain a desired end, and it may be expressed by any
tense-sign ; bnt it resides m tlie eternal Yeda as an enjoinmg power (preroMaJ,
the end of which is tbe prodiiction of the former volition of the heai'er, — this
is only expressed by the imperative or potential.
80
while the general meaning of all the tense-signs is an effort tending
to the production of a certain action [thus Devadatto gacliclthati
means that ' Devadatta is possessed of a volition tending to produce
going.' "] He replies,
XII. This enforcing power of the imperative, &c., is not
to be maintained, since it cannot be proved, and
since men do not engage in the performance, even
though they know of the existence of this presumed
enforcing power, [i. e, unless they have also the
knowledge that it will be a means of procuring their
wishes j] and again exhaustion is difficult to rest upon,
as contradiction equally applies to this view, as well as
to the others.
If you ohject that as every other meaning of the imperative tense-
sign is excluded, it follows by exhaustion that this enforcing power
must be its meaning, he replies that the contradiction equally applies
to this opinion, as well as to the others, [as action does not necessarily
follow from the knowledge of it.]
XIII. " But," says the Naiyayika, " why should not the meaning
of the command be the fact that the rite is a means to a desired
end, — this residing as an attribute in the instrument, the sacri-
fice r"* He replies,
XIII. [This cannot be] because it is sometimes given as
the reason for the command -, because the command may
be inferred therefrom ; from the absence of this meaning
in the second and third persons [of the imperative] ; from
its recognition in other meanings ; and because on this
view prohibition could not be established.
a. Because the fact of its being the means to the attainment of
a desired ohject is often alleged by the speaker as proving the mean-
ing of the command ; and as a thing cannot be its own proof [it
follows that the fact of its being a means to a desired object cannot
be the meaning of the command]. Thus when it is said as a secu-
* The old Nyaya maintained the meaning of vidlii to be x;s^T^«f^ ^T^'^'W.
Udayana maintains it to be '^TTf^Wrvrsn^ .* The modem Nyaya (t. c. Siddhauta
Mukt.) gives ^^^^fif^T^TfT^^l^'JI^^W
81
lar command, ' let liim who desires fire rub two pieces of ariini wood
together,' if you ask ' why ?' the utterer of the command replies,
' because the rubbing two pieces of wood together is a means of
producing fire.'
h. Another reason against your view is — because a command may
be inferred even, after the knowledge that the action is a means
to the desired end has been produced by the artliamda [or supple-
mentary passage explaining the purpose of the command] ;— but if
by the command which is thus inferred we were only to understand
the fact that the action in question is a means to the desired end, then
this inference would be wholly superfluous. Thus on hearing the
S'ruti 'he crosses over death, he crosses over Brahmanicide [who
offers the As'wamedha'], all the systems allow that there arises the
inference of a command in such a form as ' let him who desires to cross
over death and Brahmanicide, offer the As'wamedha.'
c. " From the absence of this meaning \i. e. its being a means to the
desired end,] in the second and third* persons of the potential used
imperatively ;" in such phrases as ' you should do it' and ' let me do it'
an injunction, or wish is implied [but not the fact of its being a means
to a desired end,] — injunction means here the wish of the speaker ;
and consequently we ma}^ conclude that the first person also onlj^
means the wish of the speaker [and not the fact of the action being
a means to the desired end.]
d. " From the fact that this meaning of ' wish' is acknowledged
in the other meanings of the potential," as for instance in its mean,
ing of ' respectftd solicitation. 'f
e. " Because on this view prohibition could not be estabhshed."
Thus in the injunction "let him not eat the Kalanja,"J you cannot
maintain that it is not the means to a desired end [as of course the
eating will produce its proper pleasure.] Nor can you say [with
the modern school,] tliat the meaning of the command is that
the action is not accompanied by a predominant undesirable result,
because this will not apply to such cases as ' let him who desires
* In Hindu grammar tlie third person corresponds to our first.
t "^^TSfTrri is tbe ^T^ t^ of Panini (3, 3, 161). The Sankshipta Sara explains
X Some hold the Kalanja to be the flesh of a deer killed b}^ a poisoned arrow
— others hemp or bhang, — others a kind of garlic. See Raghuuandana's Eka-
da%'i tattwa.
82
to kill his enemy Ly incantation offer a liawk' [because this rite
produces hell as its fruit]. And [if you say that in the case
of the offerer, hell is not considered by liim as a predominant undesi-
rable result, since he still performs the ceremony, I reply that this does
not hold, as] you cannot maintain that the sacrifice ^e??dr«/Zy does not
produce a result which the mass of mankind regard with predomi-
nant aversion, because the man who does oiof perform the sacrifice
certainly has this predominant aversion which restrains him from
yielding to the temptation of the gratification of a present revenge
at the risk of a future torment in hell.
XIV, [After this lengthened discussion of the various current
opinions on the nature of vidlii or command,] the author now pro-
ceeds to deliver his own.
XIV. The primary meaning of the potential used im-
peratively,, &c.^ is the will of the speaker in the form of
a command enjoining activity or cessation therefrom ;
while w' e conclude by inference that it is the means to a
desired end for the doer.
The will of a fit person, i. e. God, having for its object engagement
in the performance of an act [/. e. as in command] or refraining there-
from, [i. e. as in prohibition.] is the primary meaning of the affixes of the
potential, &c. ; and from these is to be inferred [see § vi.) that it is the
means to obtain a desired end, [and hence the existence of ' command'
proves the existence of a commander, God].
But the commentator here adds as a remark, that this view of
Udayanacharya is untenable, as by it you could not properly have prohi-
bition at all, since ever}* action of every kind is in one sense the object
of God's will, \i. e. nothing, whether good or evil, takes place with-
out his will]. If you reply that 'command' is ' God's will,' mean-
ing by ' will' such a will as is unaccompanied by any predominant
undesirable result, w^e object that the definition becomes needlessly
complicated ; and the old Xaiyayika opinion of § xiii. is after all the
best.*
* Udayana gives as his definition of ' command' the ' will of a fit person/ i. e,
God. It is replied that this will include too much as even evil actions are in
one sense done with God's will. The donnition is then corrected to ' such a will
as is improductive of any predominant undesirable result/ — in this view we may
allow God's will in the case of an evil action, but here we shall not have vidhi,
• command/ — as it is such a will of God as produces hell to the doer. — The cdra-
83
XV. He now [resumes tlie interpretation of tlie first S'loka, in-
terrupted by the late discussion onvidJii ^^ vi. — xiv. and] proceeds to
give the second meaning of ' S'ruti.'
XV. All the Vecla refers to the Supreme Being as its
object; only, by means of its own primary meaning, like
the words Mieaven/ &c._, can it refer to a command.
In every part of the Veda is God's existence established, as for
instance in such passages as, 'Vishnu verily is the sacrifice' (passim),
Mie sees without eyes,' (Swefc. Up. iii. 19) ' by the command of this
(previously mentioned) indestructible being, Gargi, heaven and
earth stay upheld in their places, (Brihadar. Up. iii. 8, 9.) Nor may
you say with the Mimansa, that ' these passages, being declaratory
or indicative* [and not expressed in the potential or imperative, as
commands are,] refer to something else, i. e. a command else-
where expressed,' [or in other words they are the arthavdda of a
previous vidhi~\, — because even according to jonv own opinion, these
passages about God do possess an authority to establish the existence
of their primary meaning, from their agreeing with such positive
commands as ' let him adore God,' just as the passages declarative of
heaven, hell, &c., [establish the objects which they primarily mean,
because they are connected with such positive commands, as ' let him
who desires heaven offer such a sacrifice,'] — otherwise the very words
* heaven,' ' hell,' &c., would have no authority to establish their own
primary significations. Hence he adds the latter line of the /Sloka,
since it is only by establishing its own primary meaning that a de-
claratory passage can be said to agree with a command.
[The commentator now proceeds to give a second explanation of ' the
sentences thereof in § i.] The ' sentences thereof,' — /. e. the sen^
tences of the Veda, expressing praise and blame, — must have been
preceded, in the speaker's mind, by the knowledge of praise and
blame, from the very fact that they are sentences which express
mentator objects to this as needlessly complicated ; bat it is not uninteresting to
find the same thought in Anselm's ' cur Deus homo ?' " although man or an evil
angel be unwilling to submit to the will and ordinance of God, yet he cannot
escape from, it, because if ho will flee from the will of God commanding him, he
comes under the will of God punishing him."
* According to the Mjmansa those passages which ai'e not vidhi are siddlm as
opposed to sddhijo, ; they describe something past or present (sivanipakathanamjf
while the vidhi relates to something future which is to be performed.
Y 2
84
l>raise and blame, like such a secular sentence as ' the mango fruit
is very sweet when ripe,' [as none could say this with authority un-
less he possessed previous knowledge thereof],
XVI. He now gives a second explanation of ' particular number'
in § i.
XVI. In such phrases as Met me be/ *" I was/ ' I will
be/ &c., the number belongs to a speaker; nor could
there be the current names of the 'Sakhas_, without a
primal utterance.
a. The first person singular as used in the Yeda declares the
' number' of an independent speaker, — there being many such in-
stances, as in the passage* " It reflected, ' let me, the one, become
many,' " &c.
b. He now gives a third meaning of the word sanJcJ/t/d, as making
it the same as another derivative from the same root, samdkhi/d,
' name, fame,' — " nor could there be &c." There are traditional names,
in the Yeda, of all the various 'Sakhas (or current recensions,) as
Kathaka or that belonging to Katha, Kalapa or that belonging to
Kalapa, &c. ; nor can we explain this on the hypothesisf that these
men first read that particular recension only, [others having before
then read many or all,] since the number of readers is endless and
in the eternal succession others besides these mentioned may well be
supposed to have read those 'Sakhas only, [and why then were not
the 'Sakhas called by their names ? ] Therefore we are driven to
the belief that the adorable Supreme Being, seeing all supersensuous
objects and possessed of boundless compassion, did at the beginning
of each creation assume a particular body belonging to Katha, Kala-
pa, &c. which body was moved by the merit of beings like our-
selves.J and the 'Sakhas which He thus uttered were severally called
by these particular names.
* The two old MSS. read this quotation as I havo printed it. Some copies
read ^ for ffs- but none have the usual reading found in Chhand. Up. vi, 2.
t Cf, 'Sabai'a's Comin. on Jaimini, i. 1, 30.
X The final cause of God's assumins; these bodies was to render possible the
happiness due to the merit of men like ourselves, — adrislita is an impelling-
cause of every thing down to the junction of tAvo atoms, see Muktavali, pp.
lOi, 105.
85
Thus have we established that it is the contemphxtion of God, which
is the true means of liberation, (see I. ii.)
XVII. He now adds a couplet in reference to those who believe
not in God.
XVII. Iron-soulecl are they in whose hearts Thou canst
find no place^ though thus washed by the repeated
inundations of ethics and Vaidic texts ; yet still in
time_, Oh merciful one^ Thou in thy goodness canst
save even those who oppose our proposition, and make
them uudoubtiug in their conviction of Thy existence.
XYIII. But as for us, Thou essentially Fair, though
our minds have been long plunged in Thee, the ocean
of joy,* yet are they verily restless still and unsatisfied;
therefore, oh Lord, haste to display Thy mercy, that our
minds fixed only on Thee, we may no more be subject
to Yama^s continual inflictions.
XIX. This garland of flowers of ethics, radiant in its
beauty, — what matters it, whether it perfumes the right
and left handf or not ? — only may the Guru of Indra^s
GuruJ be pleased by my presenting it as an oftering at
his footstool.
* For addlid explained as tattvjam, see 'Sis'upala-badha, iii. 42, schol.
f Or ' the sapaksha and vipaksha of my argument.'
X 'Siva, as the gnru of Brihaspati. Brihaspati is represented as the guru of
Indra in the Aitareya Brahman a, VII. 28,
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY
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