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 THE KUSUMANJALI, 
 
 OB 
 
 HINDU PROOE OE THE EXISTENCE OF 
 A SUPEEME BEING, 
 
 BY 
 
 UDAYANA A CHARY A, 
 
 WITH THE 
 
 COMMENTARY OF HARI DASA BHATTACHARYA, 
 
 EDITED AND TEANSLATED BY 
 
 E. B. C O W E L L, M. A., 
 
 ASSISTED BY 
 
 PANDITA MAHE'SA CHANDRA NYAYARATNA. 
 
 CALCUTTA: 
 
 PEINTED AT THE BAPTIST MISSION PRESS, CIRCULAR BOAD. 
 
 1864.
 
 StacK 
 Anne)^ 
 
 ■-%::?.-? 
 
 TO 
 
 PROFESSOR MAX MULLER, 
 
 IN MEMORY OF 
 OLD OXFORD DAYS; 

 
 CT
 
 C O p. II I G E X D A 
 
 FajeM), l.2\. Vov "capacity" read "desert." 
 
 Page 23, /. 10. Dele "since your major premiss will not 
 be universally true," and substitute "since your own 
 example 'blue' is not found everywhere."
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 The following treatise is very celebrated amongst Hindu 
 logicians, and, however little it may be calculated to interest the 
 general Enghsh reader, it will certainly not be without a use 
 and interest to those Europeans whose studies are directed to 
 the higher branches of Sanskrit literature. They will hardly 
 fail to be attracted by a work which, though obscure and techni- 
 cal, professes to grapple, from a Hindu standing-point, with 
 the world-old problem, how the existence of the Supreme Being 
 is to be proved ; and perhaps those who are interested in the 
 Listory of philosophy may turn over some of the pages with 
 curiosity, especially when they occasionally recognise old fa- 
 miliar arguments and objections in their quaint Oriental dis- 
 guise. The Kusumanjali is as much inferior to the tenth book 
 of Plato^s Laws or the twelfth of Aristotle^s Metaphysics, as Hin- 
 du philosophy itself is to that of Greece ; but nothing can rob 
 India of the merit of an original system of logic and metaphy- 
 sics, unborrowed from any other land. It has been said that 
 the past history of philosophy is the record of glorious failures 
 in the attempt to solve an insuperable problem ; a ad it cannot 
 be uninteresting to trace the brave efforts of a Hindu thinker, 
 far away from the circle of Christianity, who, perplexed by the 
 doubts or open disbelief taught in many of the systems current 
 in his day, endeavoured, however vainly, to build for his country- 
 men the first truth of Theology on a firm logical foundation. 
 
 — — Audacia certe 
 
 Laus erit ; in maguis et voluisse sat est. 
 
 Udayana Acharya, like nearly every old Hindu writer, is a 
 name and nothing more. He shines like one of the fixed stars 
 in Indians literary firmament, but no telescope can discover any 
 appreciable diameter ; his name is a 2^oint of light, but we can 
 detect therein nothing that belongs to our earth or material
 
 VI 
 
 existence. The details of liis life are a blank,* and tlie very cen- 
 tury in wliicli lie flourished is an unsettled question in Hindu 
 literary history. 
 
 Dr. Hall, in his valuable ^ Index to the Bibliography of the 
 Hindu philosophical systems/ (p. 20,) has endeavoured to 
 identify Udayaua with Uddyotakara, (whom he places not 
 later than the seventh century, f) but this is untenable, as will 
 be proved, I think, in the sequel. 
 
 The first point to settle is the order of the series of ancient 
 Nyiiya works, ' the sutras of Gotama and Kanada having been 
 explained and annotated by a triple [or rather quadruple] set 
 of commentaries. J ^ The order which I venture to propose is 
 as follows, 
 
 I. — The original SiUras or Aphorisms ascribed to the Rishi 
 Gotama or Akshapada. 
 
 11. — The Nydya-bhdsliya, — a commentary on No. I. by 
 Pakshila Swamin, sometimes called Yatsyayana. 
 
 III. — The Nydya-vdrfika, — a commentary on No. II. by 
 Uddyotakara Acharya. I procured lately, from a pandit of 
 Nuddea, a fragment of this work containing a portion of the 
 first book.§ 
 
 IV. — The Nydya-vdrtilia-tdtjKirya-fikd — a commentary on 
 No. III. by Yachaspati Mis'ra. 
 
 V. — The Nyaya vdrtika-tdtiiarya-ijarisuddld — a commenta- 
 ry on No. lY. by Udayana Acharya. 
 
 My reasons for this arrangement are the following. 
 
 * The only incident I have met with, ii? the dubious tradition given in the 
 •Rational Refutation of Hindu philosophical systems,' p. 6, note. 
 
 t Uddyotakara is mentioned in Subandhu's Yasavadatta, which Dr. Hall has 
 proved to be fully 1200 years old. 
 
 X Colebrooke. 
 
 § There is an incomplete ^IS. in the Asiatic Society's Library, which professes 
 to contain the third and fourth adhyayas {itij ainhhjotakariiie nijdyavdrfal-e, &c.,) 
 bnt it is only Yachaspati Mi'sra's tika. — Tlie Nuddea fragment contains only the 
 vartika to the first three sutras, — its colophon is
 
 Vll 
 
 In tlie Calcutta Sanskrit College Library there is a MS. of 
 the Nydya-vdrtLlia-tdfjjarya-tllcd, the opening lines of which 
 I subjoin. 
 
 pT^^ ^TflW^^t^T^^^XTT^T^ mT^^ II s^ II 
 ^T^^Tf^^cTlfq^^^Ti^Tf^f^m^t || ^ || 
 
 ^§m^T:^^iimrc?"5ri:^?t ^^^T:^Tcr nan 
 
 This passage is evidently a commentary on the work of 
 Uddyotakara Acharya, whose opening words {ijad Alshcqmdah,) 
 the author professes to quote and explain j and he states that 
 the Nyaya 'Sastra was originally delivered by Akshapada or 
 Gotama and completed by Pakshila Swamin, and that Uddyo- 
 takara compiled his Vartika or ' annotations^ in order to clear 
 away the erroneous interpretations of Dinnaga and others. 
 The Sanskrit College has also a MS. of the Tatparya paris'uddhi 
 of Udayanacharya^ which is nndoubtedly a commentary on 
 No. IV. Thus it commences with an invocation to Saraswati, 
 
 and it then proceeds to comment on the first 'Sloka quoted 
 above—f^^T^T^ ^^^ ^^-^^^-^ ^^ 
 
 Now if Vachaspati Mi'sra commented on a work of Uddyo- 
 takara, and Udayana again on the work of Vachaspati Mi'sra^ 
 Uddyotakara and Udayana must be different persons.
 
 Vlll 
 
 A second question liowever now arises, — who is tlie Paksliila 
 Swamin, to illustrate whose work Uddyotakara compiled his 
 Vartika ? 
 
 The only Nydi/a-hhdshya now known to exist is that which 
 bears the name of Vatsyayana. By the kindness of Professor 
 Griffith, I have procured a MS. of it from the Benares College 
 Library,* and, on comparing this work with the quotations 
 from Pakshila Swamin^s hhdsJuja which are frequently given 
 in the fragment of the Vcirtilca and in Yachaspati's Tdtparya- 
 (tld, I have discovered that the two works are the same. A 
 few extracts will make this evident. 
 
 The Nydya IJidsJuja of Vatsyayana thus commences, 
 
 ♦fl'^SJI^rxfrrT! I Now the fragment of the Vartika commences, 
 ^^"^^I^: ^^^T TT^^T ^HT^ ^T"5^ ^^JT'^T ^ITl^ | 
 
 Similarly in the third leaf of the Tdtjiarya-til'd we read, cT^qf 
 
 ^^^ ^fecT^ ficlf^fwf^TfTcT f^^3-ifTWl^T^t ^^ ^^^2"- 
 ^im: xr^TcT ^^T^ ^S-^ ^^^^I^ I cT^ -^T^fT^^^I^WT^* I 
 The words of the vdrtUca, with their enclosed quotation from 
 the hhdshyaj are thus quoted and explained in the tikd. After 
 discussing some doubts, it goes on, 
 
 TfcT 1 ^"^^ ^I^^TXTTTfTf ^Tfc?^^TT^[^T^^T f^^^f^^TiT: II 
 * It contains 123 leaves, and its colophon is ^fff -^l^l^ift^ l<JT^*il^
 
 IX 
 
 The third Adhyaya of Vatsy ay ana's Ntidyahhdsliya openi=5 
 with Xfrtf^cTTf?! ^HT^TfsT ?[H^f?T^T^T X?rt^^ cT^Tfi^Tft^STT- 
 f^\ f%f%^^ I and similarly the third adhyaya of the Tdtparya 
 tiJm commences, ^^ITT^ 'xj^f^clTpl if^T^Tpf Tl^^fiT^T^ 
 Xl€1^§' T^T ^xTT^sfi^^iT Then again, a few lines after, 
 ^^m g^^HcT ^TfS^ Xrrl^t ^ ^^?IT^^fiTlSfcr ^T^ 'cT^T- 
 ^1^10?' TpT I Shortly afterwards it adds cT^cI^ ^ifc^^- 
 
 There can, therefore, be hardly a doubt as to the Nyaya- 
 bhashya of Pakshila Swamin and that of Yatsyayana being the 
 same work.f The latter name seems to imply that the author 
 wrote the book while his father or elder brother (compare 
 Panini 4. 1. 105 with 4. 1. 94, 101, 163 and 164,) was alive. 
 Pakshila was his private, Yatsyayana was his generic, name. 
 Swamin may imply his becoming an uddsina, or it may have 
 been merely an honorary title. The Pandits similarly have 
 a tradition that a Nyaya-vartika was written by Bharadwaja. 
 Dr. Hall mentions in his Catalogue that Uddyotakara belonged 
 to the gotra of Bharadwaja, and the same thing is stated in 
 the colophon to the Nuddea fragment ; and thus the two ap- 
 pellations, Yatsyayana and Bharadwaja, will mutually illustrate 
 each other. 
 
 We may thus consider it as proved that Udayana Acharya is 
 the fflh, not the third, in the series of Naiyayika authorities ; 
 but are we able to determine anything as to the time in which 
 lie flourished ? We can hardly hope to fix it with precision, 
 but we are not left wholly to conjecture, as we have, I think, 
 a terminus a quo as well as a terminus ad quern to limit our 
 chronological uncertainty. 
 
 We must here again have recourse to our former expedient of 
 arranging the different authors by their respective quotations, — 
 
 * Similarly the lines quoted from Pakshila Swamin in the Sarva D. Sangraha, 
 p. 115, are found in Yatsyayana, (MS, fol, 4.) 
 
 t I hope that the Asiatic Society will publish the Nysyabhashya in the Bi- 
 liotheca Indica, as a second MS. has been just procured from Nuddea. No work 
 could be of greater importance for giving an insight into the older Nyaya.
 
 the only data wliicli the total absence of literal^ liistory in 
 India allows us to use. In this way we can establish a second 
 series of writers^ viz. S'ankara Acharya, Vachaspati Mis'ra, 
 Udayana Acharya and Madhava Acharya ; and, as in this series 
 the dates of the first and last are known, we can approximate- 
 ly determine the dates of the intermediate pair. We cannot 
 be far wrong in assigning S'ankara Acharya to the beginning 
 of the ninth century of our era,* and we know by the testi- 
 mony of copper land-grants as well as tradition that Madhava 
 Acharya and his patron Virabukka flourished in the earlier 
 lialf of the fourteenth century. f Now Vachaspati Mis'ra, the 
 fourth in our previous series of Naiyayika authors, wrote one of 
 the most celebrated glosses (the BJtdmati) on S'ankara Acha- 
 rya^s commentary on the Yedanta Sutras. J We have seen 
 that Udayana Acharya commented in turn on Vachaspati ; and 
 his own work, now presented to the reader, is several times 
 quoted by Madhava in his Sarva Dars'ana Sangraha.§ Now in 
 Indiaa writer must have long ceased to have any visible con- 
 nection with the present before a Pandit would trouble himself 
 to write commentaries on his works or qaote from them as a 
 well-accepted authority ; and perhaps therefore we may, with- 
 out fear of much error, fix Vachaspati Mis'ra in the tenth, and 
 Udavanacharva in the twelfth centurv. It is something^ to 
 think that the author of the Kusumanjali may have been an 
 unknown contemporary of Abelard. 
 
 The Kusumanjali consists of seventy-two I'drlhas or memo- 
 rial couplets, divided into five chapters ; and as the author's 
 aim was to pack his arguments into the smallest possible com- 
 pass, the book is of course unintelligible without a commen- 
 tary. It is not generally known that the author himself com- 
 piled such a commentary ; and in fact it is not improbable 
 
 * Colcbrooke's Essays, vol. I. p. .332. Wilson's Sanskrit Diet, preface, 1st ed. 
 t Wilson's Mackenzie Cat. vol. I. p. cxl. Colcbrooke's Essays, vol. I. p. 301. 
 J Both the Bhd^no.ti and the Nijdiia-vdrHl-a-tdtpririia-filid are mentioned in 
 Vachaspati's own list of his works, see Dr. Hall's Catalomic, p. 87. 
 § As e.g. p. 7, 1. 18 ; p. 113, 1. G j p. 120, 1. 13 j p. 133, 1. 4.
 
 XI 
 
 that the work, as it originally appeared, was in verse and 
 prose, — the latter portion consisting of detached passages of 
 varying length, introduced between the stanzas to supply the 
 necessary links for understanding the argument. There is an 
 imperfect MS. of this description in the Sanskrit Coll. Library. 
 It is called the Kusumanjali, and contains the first chapter in 
 24 foil. ; but it unfortunately ends abruptly at the beginning 
 of the second. It is remarkable that there is no sign of division 
 between the two chapters, — the discussion of the second objec- 
 tion goes on in unbroken continuity with that of the first. As 
 the work is very rare and Dr. Hall does not notice it in his 
 very copious Catalogue, I subjoin a few more details.* 
 
 It commences with the first Karika (satjjrcdipakshaj as the 
 opening invocation ; then follows the second (sivanjdpavarga' 
 yoh.) Then follows the long prose passage (beginning with ihci 
 yadyapi, and ending with ahhdvdchcheti,) which is always given 
 as supplying the place of the third karika. This is followed by 
 the first additional remark. 
 
 c?-^^ Hir^Ti ^^:,^W:, ^T^^^cqfTftWTf^Oiere follows s'l. 4.)j 
 
 * Udayana is not specified as the author of the commentary, but it seems to 
 belong to the same author as the karikas, since there is only one mcmgcddcha- 
 rana for both, and the pi'ose and verse follow each other as from the same pen. 
 Unfortunately the MS. is carelessly transcribed and full of blunders. My ex- 
 tract contains many conjectural emendations.
 
 Xll 
 
 if, fiT^gfV(€vif^^<TT"^fk^^ "^T ^T^Tf^c^^^T^TcTTcT^ | if 
 
 ^5^^y?Tf^ cTc^T^ ^T^TcT ^^^T c^#^ c^(^T^ f^i^XT^T^XT- 
 ^TITVTT^i?fr^fV^ I[T^fxr cT^^9: ^T^^ ^T^g^lfTc? | '^^ § 
 
 Besides this commentary of the original author's, various 
 pandits have written commentaries to illustrate the work, — for 
 an account of these and the secondary glosses which these have 
 in turn elicited, I refer the reader to Dr. HalFs Catalogue, pp. 
 82-84. 
 
 The Kusumanjali was first printed in Calcutta in the 'Saka 
 year 1 709, with the commentary of Haridasa Bhattacharya, — 
 and it was subsequently reprinted in Bengali letters in the 
 vSamvat year 1916. For the present edition, two old MSS. 
 have been collated,* which have been long in the possession 
 ofNaiyayika families ; and from these I have introduced several 
 emendations into the old text of the commentary. 
 
 I have endeavoured to make my translation as accurate as I 
 could, but I cannot fail to have left inadvertencies, for which I 
 must plead in excuse the thorny nature of the subject. I have 
 consulted pandits in all difficulties, but, as their explanations are 
 necessarily given in Sanskrit or Bengali, it is not always easy to 
 detect the frequent subtil distinctions of Hindu metaphysics. 
 Tlie translation is as literal as I could make it so as to be in- 
 telligible, and I have every where endeavoured to supplement 
 it by copious notes. But I cannot hope that the general reader 
 
 * Lent to mc by Tandita Jayanarayana Tarkapanchauana and Pandita Malies'a- 
 cLandra Nyayaratna.
 
 Xlll 
 
 will be much interested in the major part of the treatise. Hindu 
 philosophers reject all attempt to mix the dulce with the utile ; 
 and, as Dr. Rcier has well observed,* " the punishment of this 
 mystery and exclusion is the want of interest felt in the study of 
 their works. '^ I have subjoined a short synopsis of the whole 
 argument, which will shew the ground over which our author 
 professes to travel ; and I hope that any one interested in the 
 subject will be able with a little attention to master most of it. 
 The only really abstruse portions are the latter half of the first 
 and third chapters, and the discussion on the meaning of vidhi 
 in the fifth ; and these will certainly not repay an English 
 reader for the trouble of understanding them. 
 
 In my translation I have frequently borrowed Dr. HalFs 
 terminology, as found in his admirable translation of Pandita 
 Nehemiah Nilakantha 'Sastri Gore^s ' Rational Refutation of 
 the Hindu Philosophical systems,^ and I beg to express my 
 continual obligations to the pandit and his translator. 
 
 But my acknowledgments are especially due to the Pro- 
 fessors of the Sanskrit College, without whose assistance hardly 
 one page of my translation could have been made. I have 
 associated the name of Pandita Mahes'achandra Nyayaratna 
 with my own on the title page, as I read the original with him ; 
 he has also helped me in the collation of the MSS., and his 
 short gloss on the more difficult passages will be of great ser- 
 vice to the Sanskrit student. But I must not omit to express 
 my many obligations to Pandita Jayanarayana Tarkapancha- 
 nana and Pandita Taranatha Tarkavachaspati, the Professors of 
 Philosophy and Grammar, — the two most learned Hindus I 
 have met during my residence in India, and whose names, I 
 hope, will be not wholly unknown in Europe from their re- 
 spective editions of the Vais'eshika Sutras and the Siddhanta 
 Kaumudi. 
 
 E. B. C. 
 
 Calcutta, March, 1864. 
 
 * Categories of Nyaya Philosophy, Introd. p. v.
 
 XIV 
 
 SYNOPSIS OE THE KUSUMANJALI. 
 
 First Cluster. 
 The contemplation of God produces liberation ; but the doubt 
 arises is there a God for us to contemplate ? the universal prac- 
 tical consent of mankind is conceded, but a fivefold theoretic objec- 
 tion is raised against His existence, i. — iii. 
 
 A. There is no such supernatural cause of another world as 
 adrishta or desert. 
 
 This leads to a discussion on the relation of cause and effect, 
 iv., v., the Mimansaka notion of a distinct category, called capacity, 
 and the Yedantist and Sankhya tenet of one common material cause, 
 
 vi. xiii. ; the Sankhya system is discussed, xiv. ; the materialist, 
 
 XV. ; the Bauddha, xvi,, xvii. Objections against causality answered 
 in xviii., xix. Adrishta being unintelligent, its acceptance involves 
 the concession of a Suprem.e Being to direct it, xix., xx. 
 Second Cluster. 
 
 B. Sacrifices &c. are a sufficient cause of another world, and we 
 need not assume any Supreme Being. 
 
 This is met by arguments drawn from the need of an external 
 authority, and the fact of successive creations and destructions of 
 the world, which involve the destruction of the Yeda from seon to 
 seen, i. — iv. 
 
 Third Cluster. 
 
 C. There are arguments to prove God's non-existence, as drawn 
 from the six current proofs (pramanas), — 
 
 a, from perception (pratyaksha,) as He is not perceived. 
 This is met by a discussion on the nature of non-perception, i. — iii. 
 /3. From inference (anumdna) iv.— vii. 
 ■y. From comparison (upamdna,) viii. — xii. 
 8. From testimony (s'ahda) xiii.— xvii. 
 €. From presumption (urtMpatti) xviii., xix. 
 l. From non-perception (anupalahdhi) xx. — xxiii. 
 The two last are denied to be proofs, — the four first are shewn to 
 be silent against Theism.
 
 XV 
 
 Fourth Cluster. 
 
 D. Some of the Mimansakas hold that even if God did exist He 
 could not be an authority (pramdiia) to us. 
 
 The Mimansaka definition of pramd is shewn to be erroneous, 
 i. — iv., and its true definition given in v., vi. 
 
 Fifth Cluster, 
 
 E. There is an absence of any positive argument for God's exist- 
 ence. 
 
 To meet this, eight separate arguments are given in i. These are 
 discussed, ii. — v. 
 
 A new interpretation of i. is then suggested which would give 
 eight vaidic arguments. This is interrupted by a discussion on the 
 true meaning of vidhi or ' command,' vi. — xiv. The second interpre- 
 tation of i. is resumed, xv., xvi. The subject is summed up, xvii. — 
 xix.
 
 
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 KUSUMANJALI, 
 
 OE 
 
 THE HANDFUL OF FLOWERS. 
 
 FIRST CLUSTER. 
 
 I. — May this ban df 111 of flowers of faultless logic, devo- 
 ted to the twofold proof* of God, delight my mind without 
 hindrance while bee-like hovering over it, — this handful of 
 flowers, opening under favourable auspices, and aff'ord- 
 ing a banquet to the upright by the inhalino- of its 
 fragrance, — one which will not fade, however closely 
 handled, — the home of a honey that distils the nectar 
 of immortality, t 
 
 IT. — " But is there not an absence of evidence to establish any con- 
 nection between such a fruit as liberation and your aro-ument devoted 
 to the twofold proof of the existence of God, — sinee the word soul 
 which signifies that soul which is the object of the so-called essential 
 knowledge,J merely means that individual soul which is the object of 
 
 * I. e. the arguments which estabhsh his existence, and the discussion as to 
 the vahdity of the premisses which becomes necessary if these are not accepted. 
 The words may also mean ' laid at the feet of God.' 
 
 t The latter half of this s'loka (the former in the original) has a double 
 meaning, as nearly every word has a technical or logical sense, — " this handful 
 of flowers, which reveals the knowledge of true minor terms and affords a banquet 
 to the intelligent by the perception of an undoubted universal connection 
 [between the middle and major terms] &c." — I may add that the proverb alluded 
 to in the commentary uf%f^^T V?T^T ItW^rJ ^^Til^ is quoted to shew that 
 though rasa properly denotes an attribute, it here means the sul^ject which 
 possesses it. 
 
 X Alluding to such passages as that in the Brihadarany. Upanishad (ii. 4, 5,) 
 ' behold the soul (dtmd) is verily to be seen, heard, contemplated and pro- 
 foundly meditated upon.'
 
 the illusory knowledge that is the cause of the sensible world ; and 
 therefore the contemplating of this is the true means of liberation ?"* 
 To meet this doubt he replies, 
 
 II. — That Being, whose worship the wise consider as the 
 means of the two heaven-like liberations, — He, the Su- 
 preme Soul, is here ascertained (as the object of our 
 contemplation) . 
 
 The ' two heaven-like liberations' [as intensely desirable from the 
 absence of all pain,] are the liberation while still remaining in 
 this life, and the absolute emancipation. The contemplation of God 
 is a means of liberation through the merit produced thereby or 
 through the knowledge of one's own soul. This S'rutif is the proof 
 that it is such a cause, ' having known him only one goes beyond 
 death ; there is no other path to obtain it.' And that the knowledge 
 of one's own soul is the cause of liberation is proved by the s'ruti,;J: 
 * When a man truly discriminates the soul and says " I am he," what 
 can he wish for ? or in desire of what object can he follow the conti- 
 nuous onflow of mundane events ?' 
 
 III. — Now althouo'h with reo^ard to that Beinor whom all 
 men alike worship, whichever of the [four wellknown] ends 
 of man they may desire, — (thus the followers of the Upa- 
 nishads as the very Knower, — the disciples of Kapila as the 
 perfect first Wise, — those of Patanjali as Him who, untouch- 
 ed by pain, action, fruit or desert, having assumed a body 
 in order to create, revealed the tradition of the Veda and 
 is gracious to all living beings, — the Mahapas'upatas as 
 the Independent one, undefiled by vaidic or secular viola- 
 tions, — the S'aivas as S'iva, — the Vaishnavas as Purush- 
 ottoma, — the followers of the Puranas as the great Father 
 (Brahma), — the Ceremonialists as the Soul of the sacrifice, — 
 the Saugatas as the Omniscient, — the Jainas as the Unob- 
 structed, — the Mimansakas as Plim who is pointed out as 
 
 * This being the seat of the great error, it is to this that our contemplations 
 shonlcl be directed. 
 
 f S'vvetas'watara Upanishad, iii. 8. 
 
 + Brihadnr. Up. iv. 1-, 12. — S'anknra rrad qSTS^Trf Tor ij^ ^w
 
 to be worshipped, — the Charvakas as Him who is estabhsh- 
 ed by the convention of the world, — the followers of the 
 Nyaya as Him who is all that is said worthy of Him, — why 
 farther detail ? whom even theartizans themselves worship 
 as the great artizan, Vis'wakarman,) — although, I say, with 
 regard to that Being, the adorable S'iva, whom all recog- 
 nise throughout the world as universally acknowledged 
 like castes, families, family invocations of Agni, schools, 
 social customs, &c. how can there arise any doubt ? and 
 what then is there to be ascertained? — Still this logi- 
 cal investigation may be well called the contemplation 
 of God, and this is really worship when it follows the 
 hearing the S'ruti. Therefore that adorable one who hath 
 been often heard mentioned in the S'ruti, Smriti, narrative 
 poems, Puranas, &c., must now be contemplated, accord- 
 ing to such a S'ruti as ^ He is to be heard and to be 
 contemplated,^ and such a Smriti as ' by the Veda, 
 inference and the delight of continued meditation, — in 
 this threefold manner producing knowledge, a man obtains 
 the highest concentration.^ Now there is, in short, a 
 fivefold opposition to our theory, — as based, first, on the 
 non-existence of any supernatural cause of another world (as 
 adrlshta, the merit and demerit of our actions) ; — or second- 
 ly, on the possibility of our putting in action certain causes 
 of another world (as sacrifices,) even if God be allowed to 
 be non-existent; — or thirdly, on the existence of proofs 
 which show the non-existence of God ; — or fourthly, on the 
 opinion that, even if God does exist, he cannot be a cause 
 of true knowledge to us ; — or fifthly, on the absence of any 
 argument to prove his existence. 
 
 " Very" — without any second ; " knower" — existing in the form 
 of pure knowledge ; " first wise" — existing in the form of intelligence 
 at the first beginning of creation ; " perfect" — as possessed of the eight 
 divine faculties ; ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and tenacity of 
 mundane existence, are the five " pains ;" sacrifice, injuring others, &c. 
 B 2
 
 as causing merit and demerit, are the " actions ;" rank, length of life 
 and enjoyment are the " fruits ;" merit and demerit the " deserts" left 
 as a residue in the mind. " Eevealed" — ^^ e. manifested [as a previously 
 existing object], since the Veda is eternal. He is " gracious" as being 
 the original instructor in arts, as of making jars, &c. " S'iva," void of 
 the three qualities ; the " great Father" as the father even of the 
 father ; " omniscient" with a momentary omniscience.* The " obstruc- 
 tions" are ignorance, desire, aversion, delusion, and tenacity of mun- 
 dane existence,, — " pointed out as to be worshipped" as the Yaidic 
 mantras, ko.- — possessed of " all that is said w^orth}^ of him" in the 
 various descriptions of God. "School" (cliarand) means here recension 
 (s'dklid)-\ Although the existence of God is indeed established by 
 the S'ruti's evidence, yet, if we wash to employ inference, the absence of 
 doubt need not be a fault in our argument.;]; He therefore proceeds 
 towards the close of the passage to propose a doubt, according to the 
 principle of satisfying an opponent. 
 
 IV. — We have to meet the opponent's first objection by establishing 
 the existence of a supernatural cause of another world in the form of 
 merit and demerit, and, if this be established, then it follows that a 
 God is established as the superintendent thereof, since a non-intelligent 
 cause can only produce its effect by the superintendence of something 
 intelligent. He therefore proceeds to establish this. 
 
 lY . — From dependence, — from eternity, — from diversity, 
 — from universal practice, — and from the apportionment 
 to each individual soul, — mundane enjoyment implies a 
 supernatural cause [i. e. ' desert.^] 
 
 Our proposition is that there exists a supernatural cause of another 
 world, i. e- a cause beyond the reach of the senses, a. First of all, then, 
 to establish the class of causes in general, he says " from dependence." 
 Dependence means here that the effect is occasional. All effects must 
 have a cause since they are occasional, like the gratification produc- 
 
 * The Maclhyamika Bauddhas hold that everything is momentary, irdvTa pei. 
 
 t For the original difference between charana and s'akha cf. Muller's Ancient 
 Sanskrit literature, p. 125. On pro/i'ara, see ibid., p. 386. 
 
 X In ordinary cases people do not take the trouble of arguing if there is no 
 douljt to be solved.
 
 ed by food ; [otherwise, if they did not depend on a cause, they 
 could be found everywhere and always], h. " But if the cause of ajar, &c. 
 were eternal, would it not follow that the jar, &c. would also be eternal, 
 and therefore we must assume the jar's cause to be itself only 
 occasional, and therefore the perpetual series of causes must be all 
 occasional, each dependent on its previous cause ?" To meet this ob- 
 jection of a regressus in infinitum he says " from the eternity [of tlie 
 succession of cause and effect]," like the continued series of seed 
 and shoot,* — the meaning being that a regressus in infinitum ceases 
 to be a fault, if, like this one alleged in our illustration, it can be 
 proved by the evidence of our senses, c. " But [if you require a cause,] 
 why not say [with the Vedantin] that Brahma alone is the cause, or 
 [with the Sankhya] Nature in the form of various individual 
 intellects ?" To meet this, he says " from the diversity [of effects, as 
 heaven, hell, &c.]" — ais the effects imply a diversity of causes, from their 
 being diverse as effects, d. " But why not accept a visible cause as 
 sacrifices, &c. — why have recourse to an invisible desert (adrislita) .''" 
 To meet this, he adds " from the universal practice," i. e. from the 
 fact that all men, desiring fruit in another world, do engage in 
 sacrifices, &c. It is only the conviction that they do produce heaven, 
 &c. as their fruit, which makes men engage in sacrifices, &c. ; and 
 these [passing away when the action is over] cannot produce this 
 fruit unless by means of some influence which continues to act after 
 the rite is over, — and hence is this invisible influence, called merit or 
 demerit, established, e. " But why not say that this desert does not 
 reside in the same subject as the enjoyment [i. e. the individual 
 soul,] but produces the enjoyment by abiding in the thing enjoyed ?" 
 He replies " from the apportionment to each soul." Since the enjoy- 
 ment resides in each soul severally, we should be unwarranted to attri- 
 bute its production to a desert residing elsewhere. 
 
 V. — " But why may we not suppose that the effect arises without a 
 cause, according to the adversary's opinion given in the Nyaya Sutras 
 (iv. 22), ' there is an origination of entities fi'om no cause, for we see 
 the sharpness of a thorn, &c. ?' " He replies. 
 
 * Cf. Cowper's remarks on liis cucumber, " I raised the seed that produced 
 the plant, that produced the fruit, tliat produced the seed, that produced the 
 fruit I seut you."
 
 V. — "Without a cause^^ cannot mean the denial of a 
 cause or of production, nor can it imply that the effect 
 itself or an unreal thing is the cause ; and if you sug- 
 gest " spontaneously/' it cannot mean tli at , from effects 
 being definitely limited. 
 
 Does your " without a cause" mean that a. there is no cause at 
 all ? or b. does it deny all production ? or c. does it imply the rejection 
 of all foreign causes ? or d. of all real causes ?* Under either pair of 
 alternatives the ultimate result is that you have no cause at all, and 
 under the latter pair, the additional absurdity of a false cause. t — Or e- 
 does it mean " spontaneously ?" But effects are definitely limited, 
 since, if they were not, occasionalness would be at an end, [as they 
 might then arise always and everywhere.] 
 
 YI. — " But if we are to assume an eternal succession of causes and 
 effects (as otherwise we cannot account for the occasionalness of 
 effects/) — still even then, as that which is distinguished by the nature 
 of fire (scil. fire) will not always be found only where straw, &c., are, 
 these latter will have to be excluded from being causes, and therefore 
 we shall again have our old difficulty of occasionalness being precluded, 
 as no other cause can be mentioned." Here the Mimansakas come in 
 and maintain that we must assume as a cause the fact of there being 
 present a capacity favourable to fire, and thus " capacity" must be 
 allowed to be a separate category :|: varying according to each individual, 
 non-eternal in the non-eternal thing, described as it is in the line 
 
 ' Eternal in the eternal, and in the non-eternal produced by 
 the cause of that thing in which it resides.' 
 
 Or as another opinion holds [that of Srikaracharya] *' there is an 
 eternal capacity favourable to fire, abiding in straw, the arani wood, 
 and the burning gem." — The Naiyayikas however maintain that there 
 is an actual difierence of class which accompanies the being produced 
 from straw, arani or the burning gem, — since, if we assumed a capacity 
 favourable to one and the same thing {i. e. to fire,) and yet itself 
 existino" in things of different classes (as straw, &c.,) then on seeing 
 
 * That is, there can be imagined false causes. 
 
 t Under any one of the four cases you have really no proper ' cause' at all (thus 
 in the third, the thuig must precede itself to fulfil the definition of a cause ;) and 
 hence any supposed cause (as in c, and d.,) can only be a false one. 
 
 + Cf. Siddhanta Miiktavali, pp. 3, L
 
 smoke^ &c., you could not draw the inference of fire, &c.* And again, 
 [if this assumption were correct], we shouhl not have such respec- 
 tive colligations of concurrent causes of fire, as straw and blowing, 
 arani wood and rubbing, or the burning gem and the reflected rays 
 of the sun, since we see in other cases that that which possesses the 
 property that determines causation {i. e. according to the present 
 theory, capacity) will produce its effect in conjunction with anything 
 which similarly possesses some other property that determines 
 causation ; and therefore, in tlie present case, we should be led to 
 expect fire to result from sucli a conjunction as the gem and blowing. 
 If you would meet this by assuming that there is one capacity 
 favourable to fire, which resides not in any one thing alone (as straw,) 
 but in the several combinations, as straw and blowing, and the rest, — 
 this is not the true solution, but you must rather accept (from its 
 greater simplicity) my theory that a difference of class resides in the 
 various fires produced by straw, &c., as is seen by the evidence of the 
 senses, like the fire of a lamp, &c.t Hence Capacity is not to be assumed 
 as a separate category. These discussions are condensed in the fol- 
 lowing couplet. 
 
 VI. — This succession of causes and effects has no be- 
 ginning, nor has it one capacity abiding in things of dif- 
 ferent classes [as straw, &c.] ; we must diligently strive for 
 ourselves to fix the several limitations, by determining 
 the constant accompaniments and separations. J 
 
 The meaning of this is that we must assume a difference of class (i. e. 
 species,) in effects produced by different causes. [If you ask " Then, 
 in reference to ivhat cause, is the class of fire (as the genus,) the de- 
 termining notion of all the various special fires as effects, I reply,] heat 
 as possessing a peculiar hot quality to the touch§ is the cause in the 
 case of all the various fires. [In the case of the difierent species of fire 
 
 * Fire would not be the cause of smoke, in its nature as fire, but simply 
 as having a capacity for producing smoke ; and therefore on seeing smoke, our 
 true inference would be that the mountain has not " fire" but " a capacity for 
 producing smoke." 
 
 t The fire in a lamp lights the house, while fire from wood or cow- dung- 
 produces little or no light. 
 
 X E. g. Fire may be found, and yet no straw, but a gem ; and vice versa. 
 
 § This epithet is added to exclude ' gold.'
 
 8 
 
 we have different causes, straw, &e., but in all alike we have the general 
 cause 'heat,' i. e. heat is the necessary and universal antecedent]. 
 
 VII. — " But may we not say that as one and the same lamp gives 
 light, destroys the wick and illumines different objects as jars, &c., so we 
 may have one common cause, either as the one Brahma (with the 
 Vedantin,) or as Nature (with the Sankhya) which is not to be distin- 
 guished from the various intellects apportioned to the different souls, as 
 the cause and effect are identical ; — and hence the existence of God 
 will not be established as the superintendent of merit and demerit, 
 [since our supposed causes will evolve their own effects, and we there- 
 fore need not assume adrishta as the special cause of the world] ?" 
 
 To meet this he says, 
 
 YII. — Of one there can be no succession^ of the same 
 there can be no variety ; it is not a special capacity since 
 this cannot be severed, — nature is hard to be violated. 
 
 From one cause alone there can be no determinate succession of 
 effects [as they would be all produced simultaneously ;] and from the 
 same cause, i. e. one general cause (as the Sankhya's prakriti) there 
 cannot be a variety of effects, i. e. effects of different kinds ; and therefore 
 since we find successive effects produced, we must conclude that there 
 are successive causes, and, since we find effects of various kinds, we 
 must conclude the causes to be likewise various in kind. 
 
 He now refutes the doubt that perhaps various effects might be 
 produced from one general cause by special capacities, by the words 
 *' it is not a special cajDacity, since this cannot be severed" from the 
 subject in which it resides, as the power and that which possesses 
 the power are really identical ; and if you sever them, then we shall 
 have to accept the power as the true cause, and in this way your 
 unity of cause is destroyed, and duality follows. — " May we not hold 
 that one cause can produce various effects simply by its own 
 nature ?" ' He replies "nature is hard to be violated." If that same 
 nature which existed when one effect had to be produced, continued to 
 exist at the time of the production of another, then the nature of 
 water, &c., might exist in fire, — that is, a thing's real nature 
 cannot remain concealed. The instance of the lamp is not in point, 
 as it can be explained by a difference in the concurrent causes neces-
 
 9 
 
 sary to produce the different effects.* 
 
 VIIT. " But why may we not say that the potter's staff, &c. may 
 be a cause in the case of jars, &c., but not sacrifices, &c. in the 
 case of heaven, &c. ?" Pie replies, 
 
 VIII. The universal practice is not fruitless,, nor can 
 it have trouble as its only fruit ; nor can it have as its 
 fruit some visible gain; nor can there be such a deception 
 [as this would involve if all were false]. 
 
 The activity in performing sacrifices to obtain heaven, which all 
 display who desire another world, cannot be fruitless, nor can it 
 have trouble as its sole result, — since activity arises only from a con- 
 viction that such a course will be a means to obtain the desired 
 object. Nor can we say that its fruit is the attainment of some 
 visible object, i. e., reputation for sanctity, wealth, &c., since even 
 those perform sacrifices who have no regard to such objects. Should 
 you reply that some knave first devised the custom of offering sacri- 
 fices as means of obtaining heaven, and the rest of mankind were 
 cajoled into following his example, this is met by the words " nor 
 can there be such a deception." For who could be so utterly 
 different from the rest of mankind as for the mere sake of deceiving 
 others to impose upon himself a round of actions which necessarily 
 cause all sorts of trouble ? and hence we may safely infer that the 
 universal practice of sacrifice is a proof that sacrifices do produce 
 heaven as their result. 
 
 IX. " Well, then, why not say that sacrifices, &c., may be the 
 direct causes of [our obtaining] heaven, &c., and not any merit which 
 they are said to produce ?" He replies, 
 
 IX. A thing long passed cannot produce its result 
 without some continuant influence over and above. The 
 souls^ having no distinction^ could not have enjoyment 
 even though the objects were affected by aclrisJita. 
 
 * Thus for the g-iving light we have the conjunction of the flame and wick, 
 &c. ; for the burning of the wick we have the destruction of the conjunction 
 previously existing between the particles of the wick; for the illumining of 
 objects we have the conjunction of the eye with the jar, and that of the jar with 
 th'e light.
 
 10 
 
 A " thing long passed," i. e. the sacrifice, &c., " without some con- 
 tinuant influence over and above," i. e. an operation favourable to 
 producing the result, cannot produce that result ; for a cnuse which 
 has long ceased to be, can only act as a cause by means of some 
 operation [or influence] that continues to exist after it, just as the 
 transient perception of the senses only produces recollection by 
 means of the impression which it leaves in the mind, [to produce 
 the actual recollection w^e require some reminding association to 
 arouse the dormant impression.] — " May we not say that adrishta 
 may be the cause, as residing in the thing to be enjoyed [and not 
 as merit in the person enjoying ?]" He replies by the subsequent 
 line. If the souls had no distinction, one from the other, in the 
 form of different kinds of merit, they could not receive different 
 degrees of enjoyment [as we see they do] from different bodies 
 [higher or lower in the scale], even though these were affected by 
 adrishta, — since these bodies are properly common to all souls. In 
 other words, the varying enjoyment can only be produced by the 
 different bodies and their organs as attracted, in each case, by the 
 respective merit of the individual souls. 
 
 X. " But" [the Mimansaka will say,] " wh}^ not allow a certain im- 
 perceptible property [i. e. the before-mentioned capacity] residing in 
 the objects to be enjoyed, which produces the enjoyment in each 
 particular case, just as we accept a particular kind of capacity which 
 abides in fire, &c., and produces their special effects, as burning, &c. ? 
 Otherwise [i. e., if the fire burns of itself and not by its capacity,] 
 we should have to expect the effect of buri^ng to be produced wher- 
 ever there was contact between the fire and the hand, even though 
 the latter wore the fire-extinguisliing gem. Nor ma^^ 3'ou say that 
 the absence of this gem should be considered as also a cause of 
 burning, — because causation must always imply presence and exis- 
 tence.* The true statement is that the gem produces the destruc- 
 tion of the burning capacity, and hence its common name ' the 
 obstructor ;' and hence we maintain that the category of Capacity 
 must be accepted." He replies, 
 
 X. As existence, so too non-existence is held to be 
 
 See Jaimini Sutras i., Mitakshara iii.
 
 11 
 
 a cause as well as an effect ; obstruction is the absence of 
 means, and that which causes this is ' an obstructor/ 
 
 As we prove by constant accompaniment and separation that 
 absence or non-existence {ahhdva,) i. e. emergent non-existence,* may 
 be an effect, similarly we can prove that it may be a cause, — since 
 there is no reason to establish such a maxim as yours, that * causa- 
 tion must imply presence and existence.' — The second line replies 
 to the objection that an inanimate thing cannot be said to be an obstruc- 
 tor. Obstruction (pratihancUta) signifies " the absence of means," 
 i. e. of causes to produce such and such an effect ; and this in our 
 present topic would be " the absence of the extinguishing gem's 
 absence," i. e, the presence of the gem itself. Properly speaking 
 the man who places the gem is the obstructor {pratihandhaha) ; but 
 by the grammatical rule which allows the affix ka to be added 
 pleonastically, we may accept i^ratibandhaka to be used for prati- 
 bandha, the ' obstructor' for the ' obstruction.' 
 
 The modern Mimansakas, liowever, maintain that " there is a 
 needless complication in assuming such a cause as the absence of 
 such a fire-extinguishing gem as is attended by the absence of all 
 [excitants as the fire-exciting gem, charms, &c. ;]t it is more simple 
 to assume an eternal capacity in fire, &c., and, when the gem is 
 present, this capacity is deadened. (Nor may you say that ' a 
 capacity is first produced from the straw, &c. the causes of the fire, — 
 this capacity resides in the fire, and is destroyed by the extinguish- 
 ing gem and resuscitated by the exciting gem ; and any objection on 
 the ground of the indeterminate nature of the cause of the capacity:|: 
 might be met by the assumption that its cause is only such a cause 
 by virtue of itself possessing a capacity favourable for producing 
 the former capacity.' This, we repeat, is unwarranted, because 
 
 * Emergent nou-existence is the destruction of a tiling previously existing. 
 We prove that it is an effect because the desti'uction of a jai' is only seen when 
 it is preceded by some cai:se as the blow of a hammer, &c. and whex-ever these 
 are not found, there the jar is not destroyed. The Mimansa holds that abhava, 
 being really nothing, cannot be a cause. But he proves that absence can be 
 similarly shewn to be a cause, — where absence of the hre-oxtinguisher is, there 
 is burning, and where there is not this absence, there is no burning. 
 
 t If the fire exthiguisbing gem were present icith the fire-exciting gem, its 
 effect would be neutralised. Cf. Siddhanta Muktiivali, p. 4. 
 
 X Its cause being somclimeii straw, &o. and jiumcLiiucs the exciting gem.
 
 12 
 
 rather than assume such a multitude of successive capacities re- 
 siding in the fire, it would be more simple to assume [with 
 our opponents, the followers of the Nya3^a,] that the one cause is 
 the absence of such an extinguishing gem as is attended by the 
 absence of a fire-exciting gem.) Therefore we maintain that in the 
 case of burning we must assume, as the determining notion of causa- 
 tion, the presence of an undeadened capacity." Thus hold the 
 modern Mimansakas ; but we cannot agree with them, because we 
 should then have to assume an endless number of different capacities, 
 as that of the extinguishing gem to cause the deadening of the 
 burning capacity, that of the exciting gem to destroy the deadening, 
 d'c. This is a brief summary of the discussion. 
 
 XI. But the Mimansakas reply, " In the Vaidic injunction ' he 
 sprinkles the rice, he shells the rice,' do we not assume an operation or 
 capacity [i. e. sanskdra,'] produced by the sprinkling, which abides in 
 the rice and produces the future shelling, since what we understand by 
 the expression is that only that rice which is sprinkled is capable of 
 being shelled ? and it may be taken as a general rule that whenever 
 anything is done through desire of an eff*ect which will reside in some 
 other thing, the former produces an operation which produces the 
 result residing in the latter, as is the case wdth sacrifices. [Sacri- 
 fices are done for the sake of happiness (as heaven, &c.) residing in 
 the man ; therefore the means thereto, the merit produced by the 
 rite, must also reside in the man.] And again, unless we accept a 
 continuant capacity, how can we account for rice, and rice only, 
 being produced from sown rice, though the seed is dissolved in 
 the ground into its component atoms ? and similarly we must say 
 that ploughing in the month Magha (Jan. — Feb.) produces a 
 capacity residing in the ground [which eventually produces a good 
 harvest in Nov. and Dec.]" He answers, 
 
 XI. AVe accept an influence produced in man by such 
 acts as sprinkling the rice, &c. ;* the qualities of the 
 atoms, as form afi'ected by contact with fire, &c._, cause the 
 distinction! 
 
 - * Some say that there are three ways of sprinkling — prol'sMna with the 
 Bnpine hand, 0.11111111; shana with the inverted hand, and arokshana by a motion 
 of the hand sidewavs. Bnt other authorities give them differently.
 
 13 
 
 By sprinkling, &c. there is produced in man an influence which 
 we call ' desert,' — since it is simpler to assume one single influence 
 residing in the soul directly producing the shelling which is indi- 
 rectly produced by sprinlding, &c.,* than to assume a variety of 
 capacities for each parcel of rice,— and since some power or attribute 
 must be assumed to be produced by a veda-commanded act which 
 tends to a future result, as there is no visible means for the result 
 being brought about. From the phrase " purified rice" we assume 
 that the influence resides in the rice by a connectionf which is the 
 same as the nature of the thing [while it resides in the man by the 
 so-called intimate relation ;] and so too in the case of consecrated 
 water, branches, &c. there is produced an influence or merit residing- 
 in the man favourable to producing such and such a result [as the 
 consecration of the jar.] [Nor may you say that " if the merit pro- 
 duced do not reside in the rice but in the man, then why is vrikm 
 in the objective case, as wherever there is this objective case we find 
 the effect residing there, as in ' he cooks rice,' — here the effect produced 
 by cooking, i. e., softening, resides in the rice, &c."— as we reply that] 
 your vaidic example stands on the same footing as such a common 
 secular phrase as " he sprinkles the fried barley flour," — here there is no 
 Vaidic injunction, yet we find an objective case used, the real meanino* 
 of which is this, viz. the possessing a result produced by the action of 
 another (i. e. the man), which result is the conjunction of the water 
 produced by that action, i. e, the sprinkling. Besides your general 
 maxim that ' whenever a thing is done through desire of an efiect, &c.' 
 fails in such cases as the hawk-sacrifice, which is performed for the sake 
 of tlie slaughter of an enemy [which slaughter of course resides in 
 him,] while it produces a result [hell] which resides in the performer. 
 
 * In other words adrishta is the vydpdra of the spriiikiing-, accordiuo- to the 
 prJBciple taj-janyative sati taj-janya-janaJco hi vydpdrali, 
 
 t In Hindu philosophy there are three principal relations, — 1. the samavdya 
 or intimate relation, i. e. that which exists between the whole and its parts, a 
 substance and its qualities, or both these and their genus ; 2. tixesanyoga or con- 
 junction, as between a pot and the soil on which it stands ; and 3. sivarupa or 
 the natui'e of the thing. This last may be generally said to take up all those 
 relations which are not included in the two former, such as the relation between 
 an object and the knowledge of it (vishayatd), that between abhava and the 
 spot of ground from which the absent thing is absent, &c., and that between 
 a distinguishing attribute (not a proper quality or action) and its subject, as 
 akas'atwa in akas'a. Hence the swarupa sambandha is sometimes called vislia- 
 yata-sambandha. The two former are something other than the things related j 
 the swarupa sambandha is really one or the other of them.
 
 It 
 
 He now explains by the second line the determined production of 
 barley, &c., from the several seeds as sown. The qualities of the 
 atoms, such as form affected by contact with fire, &c.* produce the 
 distinction, i. e. the atoms as possessed of tlie qualities of form, mois- 
 ture, &c. affected by contact with fire, tend to produce such and such 
 effects [rice or barley, as it may be, — the desert of the individual acting 
 as the concurrent cause.] In the case of healing [where the opponent 
 might allege that the medicine produced an after effect by means of his 
 supposed continuant capacity,] the drinking of the medicine produces 
 an equilibrium between the three humours, and this is. the means of 
 the subsequently produced destruction of the disease. f 
 
 XII. " But how then [except by the assumption of our special cate- 
 gory ' Capacity,'] will you account for sensible touch, &c. in the case of 
 air, &c. [which seem cold, &c. to the body,] where there is no form 
 produced by contact with fire, [as there is in earth ?] or again how is 
 the natural liquidity of water stopped in ice, &c. ? or how in images, &c. 
 do such ceremonies become effectual as those for inviting the deity to 
 take up his residence therein, &c. ? We hold therefore that we must 
 admit such a thing as a capacity produced by the rite pratislithdX 
 which can be destroyed by the touch of impure persons as the Chan- 
 dala, vtc, which capacity renders the image a fit object of worship." 
 He replies, 
 
 XII. The perceptible form, &c. and their absence [in ice 
 and air] arise from contact with special causes j the deities 
 are worshipped through their coming [into the image] or 
 through the worshipper^s consciousness of having duly 
 performed the rite. 
 
 The ' special causes' are the various kinds of merit in the person 
 [gratified by the cold air or ice.] The deities become conciliated by 
 
 * It is a peculiai-iiy of the element earth that its form, taste (or moisture,) 
 smell and touch are changed by contact with fire. 
 
 t Our author does not notice the objection of the ploughing in Magha. 
 Anotlicr w-riter Pakshadharamitra in his Padtutlia Mala supphes the omission. 
 According to liim " Through the ploughing in Magha the original soil ia 
 destroyed by the series of acts tending to the separation of the atoms which des- 
 troys their original conjunction, and subsequently by the disintegration a new 
 B(jil is produced, and through this is the ploughing in Magha a cause of the 
 cxceUent hai-vest afterwards." 
 
 X The ceremony of consecrating an image of a deity.
 
 the ceremony of consecration, and shew it by coining to take up their 
 residence, i. e. by their appropriation of the image and transference 
 of self-consciousness thereto ; but by the touch of an impm-e person 
 such appropriation and self-consciousness are rendered void. Even on 
 the Mimansaka view which disputes the intelligence of the deities, we 
 can say that it is the idea [in the worshipper's mind] that the 
 worship has been performed in due manner, and that the image 
 has been duly consecrated, — this idea being also necessarily accom- 
 panied by the absence of the touch of any impure person,—^ 
 which constitutes the image's fitness as an object of worship;, 
 and the ceremony's importance lies in its contributing to produce 
 this idea. But in reality it is the absence of any impure contact 
 as wdth a Chandala, &c. at the time of the pratislithd ceremony and 
 also after the ceremony is over, which constitutes the fitness of the 
 image as an object of worship ; since the rule " let him worship it 
 when duly inaugm-ated by the ceremonj pratishtM'" implies that the 
 ceremony must be already over. Such is a summary of the discussion. 
 XIII. " But ought we not to say that in the weighing ordeal, &c. 
 a power or capacity is produced in the scales by the ceremony of the 
 brdeal, and by that a result is produced such as the nsing or sinking 
 of the defendant in the scales ?"* He replies, 
 
 XIII. Only for the discovering of the concurrent of the 
 cause of victory or defeat^ — which cause abides as an 
 attribute in the person examined, — are the rules of the 
 ordeal instituted. 
 
 Only to discover the concurrent, favourable to the desii'ed result 
 (i. e. the rising or sinking in the scale), — the concm-rent of the 
 desert which is the proper cause of the victory or defeat in the 
 ordeal, — are the rules of the ordeal instituted. " I who according 
 to the rule of the ordeal now mount tlie scales am innocent or 
 guiltv," — this consciousness in the man's own mind is the concur- 
 rent. — Or another interpretation is " only to discover the residing 
 of (i. e. to produce,) merit or demerit are the rules of the ordeal 
 instituted," and thus in relation to innocence such as is conformable 
 
 * For this kind of ordeal see Professor Stenzler's essay on ' die Indischeti- 
 Giottesurtheile' in the Zeitschrift d. D. M. G. vol. ix. p. 665.
 
 16 
 
 to tis protestation merit is produced, and demerit in relation to his 
 guiltiness.* The second mode is preferable, as in this way an objec- 
 tion is obviated which would apply to the former, viz., — " in the case 
 of a man falsely accused of killmg a Brahman, &c., as his not 
 having done it is not meritorious, how could his consciousness of 
 innocence be a concurrent cause ?"t 
 
 XIV. But here the Sankhyas come in with their system, — " There 
 is Soul, the abode of intelligence, but not a cause of anything, and 
 consequently unchangeable and eternal ; and Nature which is one, 
 unintelligent, subject to development and eternal ; the first develop- 
 ment from Natm-e is Intellect, the so-called ' great' first principle, — 
 in it are eight attributes, viz. knowledge, ignorance, might, weakness, 
 freedom from passion, subjection to passion, merit and demerit, or the 
 eight may be otherwise enumerated as knowledge, pleasm'e, pain, desire, 
 aversion, effort, merit, and demerit, — as this school does not accept 
 the Naiyayik self-reproductive quality of imagination, hhdvand, since 
 they hold that at the time of memory the perception itself does remain 
 in a very subtil form. As without the assumption of soul we 
 cannot account for the unintelligent product of Nature, Intellect, 
 imagining itself to be intelligent, we conclude that the existence 
 of soul is hence established, — identical with its essential attribute 
 intelhgence, since the subject and attribute are always undistin- 
 guishable. From Natm-e arises the Great one, from the Great one 
 Egoism, from Egoism the five subtil elements, form, flavour, smell, 
 touch and sound, and the organs [of perception and action], the eye, 
 skin, nose, tongue, ear, and mind, and the voice, hand, foot, anus and 
 generative organ ; while from the subtil elements are produced the 
 gross elements, eai*th, water, fire, air and ether. This has been thus 
 described, [in the Sankhya Karika,] " Original Natm-e is not an 
 evolute ; the seven, intellect, &c. are evolvent and evolute j the set of 
 sixteen are only evolute ; while Soul is neither evolvent nor evolute." 
 The set of sixteen is made up by the five gross elements and the eleven 
 organs of perception and action. [Should you ask why we assume 
 ir:ind as om* eleventh organ, we reply,] a. if the eternal Soul were 
 
 * By the former interpretation merit and knowledge act conjointly in pro- 
 ducing the result, by the second merit alone. 
 
 t This negative knowledge could not be the sahakdri of a previous punya, 
 as there is no 'panya in the absence of an action.
 
 17 
 
 itself associated with the objects of inherent joy and pain, it would 
 follow that there could be no liberation ; h. if the connection with 
 objects took place in dependence on Nature, it would equally follow 
 that, since Nature is eternal, there could be no liberation ; c, if the 
 non-eternal objects, jars, &c., were associated with the essential 
 intelligence, it would follow that there could be no such distinction 
 as * seen' and ' not seen,' [as all the things now existing would neces- 
 sarily be seen at one and the same moment ;] and d. if the association 
 of objects and intelligence depended on the external organs only, 
 we could not account for the perceptions through different organs 
 not being simultaneous ; and hence we must assume the existence 
 of a distinct organ, mind, in connection with which the external 
 organs produce the association of the object and intelligence. In 
 dreams when a person thinks himself a tiger, &c, there is not present 
 to him the consciousness that he is a man ; hence we must also 
 assume the existence of a faculty, egoism, whose function is the 
 assuming the consciousness of various objects. Since we see inspira- 
 tion and expiration ceaselessly going on, in waking, dreams, and 
 sound sleep, we must assume the existence of a faculty which con- 
 tinues acting throughout, viz. the principle of Intellect endued with 
 the eight attributes before mentioned ; the object being brought into 
 connection with Intellect's development, viz. cognition, conceals the 
 real nature of Soul, and hence it is that liberation arises when, from 
 the destruction of the principle Intellect, there ceases to be any con- 
 nection with objects ; while the idea ' I, the intelligent, act' arises from 
 the nonperception of the difference between the (witness) soul and the 
 active intellect. This has been explained in the Bhagavad Gita " ac- 
 tions are ever done by the qualities of nature, the soul blinded by egoism 
 thinks ' I am the doer.' " And this Intellect consists of three por- 
 tions, the reflection of the Soul, the reflection of the object, and 
 the arising determination, as in the thought ' this must be done by 
 me,' — here ' hij me' shews the reflection of the intelligent Soul, which 
 is not an actual intercourse, but only illusory in consequence of the 
 nonperception of the distinction between the Soul and Intellect ; 
 * this'' shews the reflection of the object ; and the arising resolve 
 ' must he done' is dependent upon both these. The connection of 
 the Soul, as reflected in Intellect, with the object, is what we 
 call knowledge, and the connection of the Soul with this know- 
 
 D
 
 18 
 
 ledge is seen in the determination ' I, the ijitelligent, act,' " [whereas 
 in reality the intelligent cannot act and the acting faculty cannot 
 tliink.] 
 
 To meet this, he says, 
 
 XIV. The attributes of the agent are the determiners 
 [that knowledge and action reside in the same subject] ; 
 and the intelligent is our only agent ; otherwise, we 
 should necessarily have no liberation or else no mundane 
 succession of events. 
 
 The attributes merit, demerit, desire and aversion must reside in the 
 same subject with action, since experience of happiness and misery 
 resides in the same subject with action [and these produce all such 
 experience] ; and in the same way we hold that the inteUigent soul is 
 alone the agent, as is proved by the impression ' I, the intelligent, act.' 
 The second line adds another refutation of the Sankhya doctrine. If 
 Intellect were eternal, then there could be no liberation, as the Soul 
 would always remain associated with Intellect ; if it were non eternal, 
 then it must be allowed to have been produced, as a noneternal thing 
 cannot but have been produced ; and in this case, previously to its 
 production, as the attributes belonging to it would be also then non- 
 existent, it would follow^ that their effects, the various bodies, organs, 
 &c., assigned to individuals, w^ould as yet be equally unproduced, and 
 consequently there would be no mundane succession of events, [and 
 therefore no bondage of soul, and consequentl}^ no need of liberation.] 
 
 XV. Here steps in the Charvaka, " well, let desert be an attribute 
 of an intelligent being ; but this intelligent being is not eternal and 
 all-pervading, but a certain kind of element moditied in the form of the 
 bod}'', since such phrases as ' I, the pale one, know' prove that it has 
 form [and form is a corporeal attribute.]" He answers, 
 
 XV. One does not remember what another has seen ; 
 the body remains not one and the same from decay ; there 
 cannot be transference of impressions, and if you accept 
 a non-momentary existence there is no other means. 
 
 If intelligence belonged to the body, there could be no remembrance 
 in vouth of things experienced in childhood, just as Maitra cannot 
 remember what Chaitra saw ; nor can you say that the body conti-
 
 19 
 
 nues one and the same in cliildliood and youth, because of its 
 " decay," i. e. destruction, since by a difference of size the thing 
 itself becomes different, as the destruction of the former size 
 is brought about by the destruction of the subject in which it 
 resided. Nor may you maintain that the second body, as the effect, 
 may still remember what had been experienced by its cause the 
 previous body, because " there cannot be transference of impressions," 
 otherwise we should have the child in the womb rememl)ering the 
 experiences of its mother. " But may there not be a transference 
 of impressions from the material cause to the effect ?" [the subsequent 
 bod^^ being made out of the previous one.] He replies " if you accept 
 a non-momentary existence, there is no other means." In other words, 
 if you do not accept the Bauddha doctrine that all things are in a 
 continual Hux, — one heap of atoms the next moment producing 
 another heap, — but allow that things do last from moment to momeut, 
 then the parts, as the hands, &c., are the material cause of the body ; 
 and, if so, then on your hypothesis, if a person's hand were cut off, 
 the maimed body ought not to remember a former experience of 
 that hand, as it would now no longer be a part (i. e. material cause) 
 of the body. Nor can you say that "intelligence belongs to the 
 atoms and therefore there is remembrance because these remain," 
 because, if so, remembrance ought to be imperceptible [while yet it is 
 perceptible by the internal organ, mind,] just as the form of the 
 atoms is imperceptible ; and also there ought to be no remembrance 
 of anything once experienced by the atoms of the hand, if there be 
 no longer union with those atoms, the hand being severed from 
 the body. 
 
 XVI. "Well then, why not allow, with the Bauddhas, that all 
 things are dissolved every successive moment, and that each previous 
 heap of atoms, as a material cause, produces a succeeding heap as its 
 effect ? in this way there is no difliculby to account for memory." 
 He replies, 
 
 XVI. This could not bo without difference of kim,], 
 and if this latter were true there could be no inference ; 
 and without inference even your hypothesis could not 
 stand ; nor could there be perception without ascertainment. 
 
 By " diilcrcncc of kind" he means the Bauddha notion of " ctlicieut 
 D 2
 
 20 
 
 form,"* without wliicli " this," i. e. the doctrine of a continual flux, 
 could not be estabhshed ; [and this notion cannot be proved] since, 
 on the simple hypothesis of the seed &c. continuing on from moment 
 to moment, you can easily account for the production or non-produc- 
 tion of the effect respectively by the presence or absence of the 
 concurrent causes, water, &c., and thence you can account for the 
 production of the shoot by the nature of the seed [without assuming 
 any ' eiScient form ;'] so that if the individual seed be allowed to 
 continue on, how can there be any such momentary flux ? — Again, even 
 if 3''ou assume this peculiar kind of species, ' efficient form,' to abide 
 in the perceptible individual but to be itself beyond the cognizance 
 of the senses, there could be no such thing as inference, as fire can 
 only then be the cause of smoke, when its nature as fire acts as the 
 eflicient form of the first moment's smoke; but even if you suppose 
 that one special smoke (the first moment's,) is produced by fire, 
 you cannot thereby infer that fire is the cause of all smoke, because 
 by your own hypothesis you must allow that this very smoke is the 
 cause of its own special effect, the second moment's smoke, [and this 
 of the third, &c. ;] and hence it would follow that all inference 
 would be abolished, as it would be impossible to establish the univer- 
 sal major premiss, which depends for its validity on an argument to 
 preclude the possibility of an instance where the middle term is 
 found disjoined from the major, which argument must be always 
 based on the relation of cause and effect [as existing between the 
 major and middle. t] And without inference it is impossible to 
 establish your own hypothesis of a momentary flux, since it can only 
 be cognized by means of inference. Nor can you say that " perception 
 itself is the evidence of flux," because, according to your doctrine, 
 the only perception which can really have authority is the inde- 
 terminate J (nirvikalpaha) since that alone is produced by the object ; 
 
 * As the ISTaiyayikas hold that the species jar (gliatatvja) resides in all jars, so the 
 Bauddhas hold that a quasi-jdti, called kurvddrupatwa, resides in each thing when 
 that thing is actively employed in producing its effect, as a jar in holding water, 
 or rice in producing a plant. When there is no effect being produced this 
 kurvadruxjatwa is absent. But for their assumption of this occasionally present 
 principle, every thing would ahrays produce its effect. 
 
 t Cf. S. Muktav. p. 122. There is an interesting attempt in the Sarva Dar's. 
 Sangraha, pp. 7, 8, to establish the authority of the universal proposition from 
 the relation of cause and effect or of genus and species. 
 
 :J; The Hindus hold that on the contact ot iho organ of sense with an object, as 
 e. g. a jar, there arises the idea of a jar and also the idea of the nature, i. e.
 
 21 
 
 yet — since even this is only inferred from the subsequent determinate 
 perception, — in the case of an object which only lasts one moment, 
 there can be no such determinate perception, and consequently, with 
 the failure of this, fails likewise the indeterminate. Again, the 
 so-called species of efficient form in the case of seed-produced plants 
 is not a true species, as it is obnoxious to the charge of ' confusion,' 
 since, a., it will be found present in barley without the species 
 rice, — h , it will not be found in rice stored in a granary [and 
 therefore lying idle and not producing its effect] while the species 
 rice is found present there, — and, c, both species [' efficient form' and 
 ' rice'] are found simultaneously conjoined in sown rice when it is 
 actually producing its shoot. — Hence \;ve Naiyayikas (to avoid this 
 fault of ' confusion,') assume that there are many subdivisions of the 
 species 'jar' (and not merely one undivided) — these subdivisions being 
 severally pervaded by [i. e. included under] ' silver' &c. [as silver jars, 
 earthen jars, &c.] And [if you ask why we call them all by the common 
 name jar, we reply that] the general appellation jar arises from our 
 viewing them as all possessed of one common attribute, viz. the being 
 composed of parts which [however different in material] possess a 
 particular kind of arrangement [called kambugriva in the case of jars]. 
 XVII. " Well, then, let us consider the flux hypothesis as still 
 undetermined, [_i. e. it is at any rate not shewn to be impossible ;] for as 
 for any argument against it on the plea of recognition (' L e. this is 
 the jar I saw yesterday,') we overthrow it by maintaining that there 
 is a doubt as to its being the same jar." He replies, 
 
 XVII. There can be no doubt as to things continuing, 
 nor as to perception, nor can there be as to authority of 
 proof from the self-contradiction, — as the same proof which 
 establishes the oneness of the object duriog the moment 
 may establish it during a longer time. 
 
 There can be no doubt as to the continuance of objects as we can 
 perceive it by recognition ; nor can there be doubt as to our recogni- 
 tion, as we can ascertain its correctness by our being conscious of 
 
 ItSos of jar (both being equally objects of perception,) but the two ideas are 
 distinct, — this is nirvikalpaka. Subsequently the mind combines them into one 
 idea, ' a jar possessing the species or nature of jar,' and this is savikalxjaka. We 
 are however not conscious of the first step, — it is only recognised as necessary 
 from an analysis of the subsequent compound idea.
 
 22 
 
 possessing this knowlcdi^e. Nor can there be douht as to the authori- 
 ty of (dl evidence " from the self-contradiction" which it involves, 
 since if you doubt of the authorit}'" of your own consciousness of doubt 
 the very existence of your doubt is itself unproved ; and again, if 
 you cannot establish any thing as authoritative, you cannot have 
 any doubt even as to authority, because you will not have established 
 your point to doubt upon [and your doubt will have no foundation]. 
 " Well, but may we not doubt [not of all authority but] of the 
 authority of your so-called recognition, since we can see cases of 
 erroneous recognition, as when we say of a man whose hair has 
 grown again after it was cut, ' this is the same hair as before,' 
 &c. ?" To meet this he gives the second line. The same proof, 
 viz., the absence of opposite qualities, by which we know in the 
 case of the jar which exists oulj one moment, that during that 
 moment it is the same and not a different jar, — may teach us in 
 the case of the jar which is supposed to continue on from moment to 
 moment, that it too is the same jar and not a different one. Since 
 just as one cognition may be connected with many different objects 
 [as e. y. a table with the things on it,] so too one object, as a jar, may, 
 without inconsistency, be connected with many different moments, 
 the connection wdth those moments being necessarily successive,* 
 because it depends on the succession of the moments, its causes. 
 
 XVIII. " Well then let it be considered as proved that there is a 
 cause of another world (i. e. adrislita ;) but here the doubt may arise, a. 
 is causality essential or communicated by some thing else, — if the lirst, 
 tlien it ought to act indifferently towards all things, just as blue 
 is blue to all ; if the second, then if we allow the ' communicating 
 something' to have essential causation, it too will be liable to the 
 aforementioned objection ; and if, on the other hand, its causation is 
 communicated, we shall have a regressus in injinitum, as we shall 
 require an intinite series of such communicating somethings ? b. 
 And again if causation be essential, effects ought to be produced 
 from the very first moment of the existence of the cause." Ho 
 replies, 
 
 XVIII. Without first determining the power of the 
 
 * 7. e. there must be this clifferoncc between the t\YO couucctions aUiuIed 
 to, — one is contemporary, the other successive.
 
 23 
 
 cause, even blue &c. are not actual existences; it becomes 
 capable when associated with something else, why then 
 should it not be allowed to be universal ? 
 
 The ' power of the cause' is the cause's nature as a cause, i. e. 
 causality [^. e. its being such a thing as a cause ;] until we have 
 ascertained this, the ' blue' of your illustration has no authority 
 [because, if it has no cause, it must be nierely an error;] and so 
 your argument would fall to the ground, viz. " all that is real is 
 universal in its action, as blue, &c. and therefore if causality be not 
 universal in its action, it is not real," since your major premiss will 
 not be universally true if you admit that there is a cause for your 
 quoted ' blue,' as indeed there must be, since it is non-eternal,* — there 
 being no prcof of the existence of an eternal blue. — The second lino 
 overthrows the second paragraph (6.) " It" the cause, when " asso- 
 ciated with something else" ^. e. with the concurrent, t " becomes 
 capable" of producing the effect ; hence it does not result that its 
 causality must shew itself in action from the very first moment of the 
 cause's existence. The latter words express that the author has no 
 objection to admit universality of action, if properly understood, " why 
 then should it not be universal ?" Even the universality of action which 
 you ascribe to blue, &c., only means really that all men speak of and 
 treat them as blue, &c. ; and this kind of universality is equally found 
 in the cause when associated with its concurrents [as fire &c. with 
 fuel, or the seed with water, air, &c.] since it is an established fact, 
 that we all do apply the term ' causality' to such cases, and treat 
 them as such. 
 
 XIX. " But if we even accept your opinion that desert may reside in 
 the soul, must we not still say that it is not produced by the soul as a 
 material cause,:J: since in the case of an eternal and all-pervading 
 substance [like soul] there can be no nega.tive instance either in point 
 of space or of time, and causality can only be proved by an induction 
 from affirmative instances together with negative, a cause being 
 defined as that the absence of which necessitates the absence of 
 
 * If a non-etenial thing is real, it must have a cause, and therefore your 
 very illustration proves the fact of non-universal causation. 
 
 t Our ' condition.' 
 
 X The Nyaya holds that knowledge, desert, &c. reside in the soul as its qualities, 
 and the subject is the material cause of its qualities.
 
 24 
 
 something else [scil. the effect]. But since in this way desert will 
 have no material [intimate] cause, of course it can have no non- 
 intimate and instrumental causes, since they are allowed to be causes 
 onl}'- as acting in close proximity to the other ;* and hence it will 
 follow that desert will be eternal [as it is uncaused,] and therefore, 
 being eternal, it cannot be conceived as producing enjoyment, limited 
 to particular souls at particular places and times." He replies, 
 
 XIX. Surely precedence is causality, since it is proved 
 by any argument ; likewise for the eternal all-pervading ; 
 otherwise there could not be the idea of the subject. 
 
 Causality does not always imply the existence of negative instances, 
 but its true definition is " necessary precedence without superfluous 
 determination. "t The negative instance is not the only means of 
 proving causality, since it may be equally proved by the evidence 
 which establishes its subject ;X hence the causality of the eternal and 
 all-pervading soul " may be proved by any argument." " Otherwise 
 there could not be the idea of the subject," [as the proof of the soul's 
 existence is that we require a subject for pleasure, pain, &c,] and 
 hence the subject's (i. e. tlie soul's,) being a cause is established 
 by the same argument which establishes the subject's existence. 
 From seeing that the component halves are always found where jars are 
 and jars never found where these are not, we learn that substance as 
 substance is a material cause to the effect connected with it by 
 intimate relation ; and hence, by rejecting earth, &c., we can establish 
 by exhaustion that for the qualities knowledge, desire, &c, there nmst 
 be a material cause other than earth and the rest, i. e. soul. 
 
 But in reality there is one kind of argument from negative 
 instances§ which does establish material causation as follows, " that 
 which is not a half, has no jar connected with it by intimate relation ; 
 and similarly, that which is not soul has not knowledge, &c. thus 
 
 * Siddhanta Muktavali, p. 12 . 
 
 t For the five kiuds of Sui^ei-fluous determination of causation see S. Mukta- 
 vali, pp. 13 — 16. The anyatJid^iddlia kdrojia is that pseudo-cause whose absence 
 does not directly necessitate the absence of the effect. 
 
 X We have a good instance of this kind of argument in the Sankhya argument 
 for the assumption of the internal organ mind in p. 17. Mind is assumed in order 
 to account for the fact that two cognitions are not simultaneous, — the same 
 proof will of course equally establish that mind is a cause of cognition. 
 
 § This is called the anyonydbhdva vyatireka in contradistinction to the 
 otyantdblidva vyatireka — the latter is in the form — " where there is no half, 
 there is no jar."
 
 25 
 
 connected with it.' So too \vc may argue in the case of time [althougli 
 time is eternal and all-pervading] ' that which is not time cannot 
 have a jar connected with it in that particular relation [called 
 temporal ;'] and in this way the argument from negative instances 
 may be applied to prove that time is a condition as the temporal 
 site in which the jar is made. 
 
 Thus there is no contradiction between our conclusions and the 
 declaration of S'ruti which affirms that ' the world is delusive,' since 
 the terms Delusion, Nature, Ignorance, &c. really mean only ' desert.' 
 And hence the existence of God is established as the superintendent 
 of desert in producing its effects [by §. iv.] 
 
 XX. He thus sums up the substance of the chapter, 
 
 XX. May He whose unparalleled concurrent energy 
 this is, — called Maya from its being so hard to unravel, 
 or Nature from its being the first principle, or Ignorance 
 from its horror of right knowledge ; 
 
 May He that deity by whom is lulled the turmoil of the 
 waves of mundane existence, — immediately, himself being 
 the witness, the passionless^ create in my mind devotion 
 towards himself. 
 
 * This' the concurrent cause in the form of desert, — it is unparalleled 
 since all effects depend upon it, — the word Maya is used to mean 
 * desert' by metonymy, [as it primarily means Delusion,] ' resem- 
 blance' being the cause of the extension of meaning,* as each is alike 
 hard to be unravelled. 
 
 * Cf. Sahitya Darpana, ii. §. 18.
 
 26 
 
 Kote on the term ' Avachhedaka' (p. 7.) 
 
 The term AvacJiJiedaka has at least three meanings, as distinguish- 
 ing, particularising and determining. 
 
 a. In the phrase ' a blue lotus' ' blue' is the distinguishing ava- 
 cliliedaJca (i. e. vis'eshana,) of the lotus, — it distinguishes it from 
 others of different colours. 
 
 h. In the sentence ' the bird sits on the tree, on the branch,' 
 ¥"% Ti:!^!^! ^"^t, s'dkhdi/dm particularises the exact spot, — this is the 
 ekades' dvaclili edaka. 
 
 c. But the third is the usual Naiyayika use of the word, i* e, 
 as determining, niydmaka. Wherever we find a relation which is not 
 itself included in any one of the seven categories but is common to 
 several, we require something to determine its different varieties ; thus 
 if we say that fire is the cause of smoke, or, vice versa, smoke the 
 effect of fire, we do not mean only this particular case but any fire 
 or smoke ; we therefore require, to determine this particular relation 
 of causality, something which shall be always found present with it. 
 This in ' fire is the cause of smoke' will be vaJinitwa, the species or 
 TO TL rjv livai of all fires. This will always be found present wherever 
 the causation of smoke is found, and it is therefore called the dhuma' 
 IcAranatdvachTiedaka, as dhumatwa would be the valinikdryatdvachheda- 
 ka. If we have several causes or effects (as e. g. green wood in the case 
 of smoke,) each kdranatd or kdryatd will require its own avacliliedaka. 
 But we could not say that ' substance' is the avacliliedaka of ' quality* 
 although it does always accompany it, — because quality is a category 
 by itself and not common to several. An avacliliedaka is always 
 required for such relations as kdrariatd, kdryatd, s'akyatd, jneyatd, 
 fratiyogitd^ &c. Thus gotwa is the avacliliedaka of the go-s'abda- 
 a'akyatd, as otherwise the word go might be restricted to mean only 
 this particular cow or extended to include every animal ; and in 
 ■^IJ^T^^ ^ffT^TJft "^f^J we have valinitwa as the avacliliedaka of the 
 jjratiyogitu. This determining notion need not be always a species ; 
 thus in ^1^^ 5J«r^«' ■%^T^T«f_c72e6f/^fa is the avacliliedaka of kdranatd^ 
 and cliesJitd is included in the category of ' action.'
 
 27 
 
 SECOND CLUSTER. 
 
 I. The Second objection was that there is no proof of God, since 
 the means of attaining paradise can be practised independently of 
 any such being. That is to say, " sacrificesXvhich are the instruments 
 of obtaining paradise can be performed even without a God, since 
 it is proved by the Veda that sacrifices Are a means of obtaining 
 heaven, and the Veda possesses authority from its eternity and 
 freedom from defects, and we can also gather its authority from its 
 having been accepted by great saints [as Manu and others ;] and 
 therefore you cannot establish the existence of God, on the ground 
 that he is the author of the Veda ; or we may suppose that the Veda 
 was made by Sages like Kapila and others, who gained omniscience 
 by their preeminence in concentrated devotion." — He replies, 
 
 I. Since right knowledge requires an external source, 
 since creation and destruction take place, and since none 
 other than He can be relied on, — there is no other way 
 open. 
 
 The right knowledge caused by testimony is one which is produced 
 by a quality in the speaker, viz. his knowledge of the exact meanino- 
 of the words used ;* hence the existence of God is proved, as he 
 must be the subject of such a quality in the case of the Veda. " But 
 may we not allow that such a quality as the knowledge of the exact 
 meaning of the words used is required in the case of an effect which 
 implies an agent ; but in the case of the uncreated Veda it is its 
 freedom from defects which produces its authoritativeness, and we 
 can know its authoritativeness from its having been accepted by great 
 
 * All right knowledge, pramd, is produced by some virtue in the means used, 
 as all wrong knowledge by some defect. Thus in sense-perception the virtue 
 required is the dp err? of the eye &c. ; in inference it is the knowledge of a real 
 vyapti ; and in testimony the right knowledge must be produced by a speaker 
 who knows the true meaning of the words used. The speaker's claim to this 
 knowledge is vitiated by conscious deception as well as by unconscious ignorance ; 
 as in the former case the speaker's right knowledge is in abeyance, and it is his 
 assumed erroneous cognition (dhdrya-jndna) which is the immediate cause of the 
 words used. (Cf. Plato, Rep. p. 382.) 
 r 9
 
 28 
 
 saints?" He replies "because erealion ami destruction take place." 
 After a mundane destruction, when the former Veda is destroyed, 
 how can the subsequent Veda possess authority, since there will then 
 be no possibility of its having been accepted by great saints ? And 
 again the non-eternity of sound is proved by the universal conviction 
 * the letter g is produced,' and an eternity in the form of an unbroken 
 succession is stopped by the possibility of mundane destruction. 
 *' "Well, then, let us say that at the beginning of a creation Kapila and 
 others were its authors, who had acquired omniscience by the power 
 of merit gained by the practice of concentrated devotion in the former 
 a^on." He replies " none other than He can be relied on." If you mean 
 bv omniscient beings, those endued with the various superhuman 
 faculties of assuming infinitesimal size &c, and capable of creating 
 every thing, then we reply that the law of parsimony bids us assume 
 only one such, namely Him the adorable Lord. There can be no 
 confidence in a non-eternal and non-omniscient being, and hence it 
 follows that according to the system which rejects God, the tradition 
 of the Veda is simultaneously ov-erthrown, — ' there is no other way 
 open.' 
 
 II. " But may we not reply that your assumption of a mundane 
 creation and destruction is un wan-anted, since there is no evidence for 
 it, and there are also several arguments against it. Thus a. there is a 
 law that day and night are, fiom their very nature, uninterruptedly 
 preceded by day and night ; h. the nature of time in itself is always 
 accompanied by the perception of the fruit of former works, for time 
 brings to effect the various pre-existing deserts [ripening them as seeds 
 sown ;] and you cannot prove that desert can suddenly be stopped in 
 its action ; c. a Brahman nsust be born from a Brahman, but since at 
 the beginning of a creation no one could be a Brahman [for want of 
 previous merit] you could not establish the necessary succession of 
 caste in the succeeding generations ; d. as there could then be no 
 teacher or learner, there could have been no acceptance of the con- 
 ventions of language, and hence you could not establish the tradition 
 of words ; and e. at the beginning of a creation there could be no 
 dexterity in the ditferent necessary arts of life as making jars, 
 &c., since this requires previous instruction froni another, and tlius 
 the chain of the tradition of all the arts of life would be cut short." 
 lie re[)lies,
 
 29 
 
 II. As in the days of the rainy season &c., time as 
 determining mundane existence is the condition ; there is 
 cessation of action as in deep sleep ; the castes originated 
 as herbs and scorpions ; the conventions of words^ &c., 
 are like jugglery. 
 
 a. If you would prove that the days of the rainy season have been 
 luiinteiTuptedly preceded by similar rainy days, you must first have 
 the condition that they have been preceded by a certain period of the 
 sun's course defined by his entrance into certain signs of the Zodiac, 
 [as Taurus and Gemini,] — and so here if you would prove that day 
 and night must have been uninterruptedly preceded by day and night, 
 you must have as the condition an uninterrupted series of previous 
 mundane works ; or in other words, the limiting condition is the nature 
 of time as determining this mundane existence [and you cannot argue 
 from the mere nature of time in itself.] h. As in time of deep sleep* 
 there is a cessation of the desert which produces the fruit enjoyed by 
 certain individuals, so at special times there may be a cessation of all 
 desert for all souls, hence he says, " there is cessation of action as in 
 deep sleep." c. A certain herb can be produced by the seed of that 
 particular herb and also by the manure of rice-dust ;t or again a 
 scorpion can be produced from cow dung as well as from a scorpion ; and 
 so at special times by a special desert (or fate) acting alone a Brahman 
 can be produced,}; while at the present time a Brahman can only be 
 produced from a Brahman parent ; — there will be no contradiction 
 as (by I. vi.) we allow that diff'erence of species [though not of genus] 
 does reside in diff'erent efi"ects. d. Just as a juggler having made a 
 puppet pulled by strings, bids it bring a jar and the jar is brought, 
 and thus instructs a child, so likewise God, having assumed two bodies 
 in the mutual connection of master and disciple, and thus initiated 
 
 * The Vedantins and Sankhyas hold that in deep sleep there is pleasure, but 
 the Naiyayikas deny it, as without jndna there can be no suklia. 
 
 t The water in which rice has been washed is considered an excellent manure 
 from the fertilising nature of the rice-dust. Besides the tusha or husk, there is a 
 red covering easily pulverised adhering to the rice-berries, called in Sanskrit 
 
 ■;^i|I in Bengali '^^ and in Hindustani ^^_ This is alluded to in the Atharva 
 
 Veda, xi. 3, 5. ^-z^y, ^tjtt 3TT?^^^T ^¥i:^T^TsrT: . 
 
 -♦ \j 
 
 X A similar notion of spontaneous production (t3>^j.J ) after a mundane renova- 
 tion is found in the Akhlaki Jalali, Introd.
 
 30 
 
 tl\e tradition of words, taught tlieir meanings to the men then newly 
 created, e. In the same manner having himself originated the 
 tradition of making jars &c., and the other useful arts, he instructed 
 them therein. 
 
 III. The opponent's attempt to preclude any discussion being 
 overthrown, he adds some confirmatory reasons. 
 
 III. The gradual failure of the tradition of the Veda^ 
 &c. may be inferred from the observed failure of genera- 
 tion_, ceremonial purification, learning, &c. and the power 
 of study and of performing ceremonial works. 
 
 The argument runs thus, — The tradition of the Yeda, &c. is inferred 
 to be subject to entii'e interruption from its gradually failing, just like 
 a lamp, as it burns on. The rest of the couplet is added to establish the 
 fact of the reason given, a. 'Failure of generation ;' originally creatures 
 were produced from the mind,* then by sexual intercourse solely for the 
 sake of issue, but now entirely through desire of sensual gratification. 
 h. ' Failure of ceremonial purification ;' originally the very food of the 
 parentsf was ceremonially purified, [in the putreshti yaga,] then after- 
 wards the child in the womb, then the child after birth, and now 
 hardly at all any how. c. ' Failure of learning ;' originally they studied 
 the whole Veda with its thousand S'akhas and eventually one S'akha 
 only, thus it has gradually decayed. By the &c. we may understand 
 * livelihood,' ' duty,' &c. d. ' Failure of livelihood ;' originally they 
 lived on gleanings, then on unsolicited alms, then on agriculture, 
 &c., and lastly they supported themselves on the wages of ser- 
 vitude, e. ' Failure of duty,' originally duty had four legs, as- 
 ceticism, knowledge, sacrifice and charity ; in each subsequent age, 
 as the Treta &c., it lost one leg, until in the Kali it totters on a 
 single leg, charity iX oi" again [taking dharma in the sense of ob- 
 serving the prescribed duties of caste, &c.,] once they ate the leavings 
 of the sacrifice, then next the leavings of a guest, then food prepared 
 by themselves, and lastly they ate even with menial servants, f. Then 
 we may notice the failure of power to study one's daily portion of the 
 Veda and to perform works as sacrifices &c. ; from the failure of the 
 power of study as the cause results failure of the power of learning as 
 
 * As Brahnid's mind-begotteu sous. See also Iiidische Stud. ii. p. 97. 
 t Cf. Ramayana, i. 15. 
 X Cf. Mann, i. bl, 82, 86.
 
 31 
 
 the effect, hence in the S'loka we have the * power of study' mentioned 
 separately from * learning.' And in this way with the destruction 
 of the universe are all included living beings destroyed. Thus do we 
 establish the fact of these universal destructions. — The Veda is 
 authoritative as having been received by great saints who displayed a 
 zealous earnestness in the practice of sacrifices, &c. — which earnestness 
 was untainted by such vicious causes as a wish to deceive, association 
 with heretics, acting for some secret motive, addiction to eristic dispu- 
 tation, living as one pleases,* heedlessness of the distinction between 
 lawful and unlawful food and drinks, &c.f 
 
 IV. He sums up the substance of the chapter. 
 
 IV. Him who in sport having repeatedly made this 
 strangely wonderful world by his illusive power^ again 
 causes it to collapse, and having destroyed it again re- 
 makes it as a magic show, — that Deity, S'iva, the might 
 of whose will bursts forth unhindered into accomplishment, 
 — him I salute, the sole ground of confidence, and may I 
 continue to pay him homage even unto the end. 
 
 * As by unlawful trades. 
 
 t Other Pandits di\dde the original differently and explain it to mean " addic- 
 tion to eristic disputations, desire of a livelihood, or reckless (adwaita) lust of 
 food and di-ink.' "
 
 32 
 
 THIRD CLUSTER. 
 
 I. The third objection was that there were positive arguments 
 to prove God's non-existence. " Just as we infer a jar's absence in a 
 given space of ground, [i, e. its non-existence there,] so we infer God's 
 non-existence from His not being perceived. If 3^ou reply that ' the 
 Supreme Being is not a legitimate object of perception, and, therefore, 
 since we cannot here have a valid non-perception, we cannot assume 
 His non-existence,' — we retort that in the same way we might prove 
 that a hare's horn may exist since we have only to maintain that it is 
 not a legitimate object of our perception." He answers, 
 
 I. In an illegitimate object [of perception] how can 
 
 there be a valid non-perception ?* and still more, how can 
 
 you establish your contradiction ? How can the harems 
 
 horn be precluded as absurd if it be an illegitimate object ? 
 
 and how can you have an inference without a subject to 
 
 base it on ? 
 
 In the case of the Supreme Being who is not a legitimate object, 
 
 how can there be a valid non-perception ? It is only this which 
 
 precludes a thing's existence ; but the absence of perception which 
 
 obtains in the case of God cannot exert this precluding influence, 
 
 as otherwise we should equally be forced to deny the existence of 
 
 ether, merit, demerit, &c. But a horn must be a legitimate object of 
 
 perception, — how then can your retort contradict our argument ? If 
 
 you say that a hare's horn is an illegitimate object of perception, then 
 
 of course its existence is not necessarily precluded, — there is only an 
 
 absence of proof to establish it ; but this cannot be retorted against us 
 
 as the fifth Cluster will fully shew that there are positive arguments to 
 
 establish God's existence. t " But may we not infer God's non- 
 
 * A valid non-perception is when an object is not seen and yet all the usual 
 concun-ent causes of vision arc present, such as the eye, light, &c. 
 
 f We infer that there i.s no jar when we do not see one, because had there 
 been one, we should have seen it, but in the case of the Supreme Being, ghosts, 
 &c. as they are acknowledged to be imperceptible, we could only at tnost&^y that 
 their existence is ' not proven ;' and this is here not admissible in the face of the 
 positive argument of the fifth chapter.
 
 83 
 
 existence from the absence, in His case, of a body whicb always 
 accompanies an agent, and also of any assignable motive for action ?" 
 He replies, — how can you have an inference where the minor term 
 is itself controverted ? while on the other hand the very proof which 
 will establish the existence of the subject (God), is itself sufficient 
 to debar your subsequent inference [that there is no God]. 
 
 II. " Well, then, let us say that God is introduced through an 
 error, and that the subsequent argument is to prove either the non- 
 existence of any agency in this wrongly assumed subject or the 
 subject's non-existence." He replies, 
 
 II. The very possession of the absence of some rejected 
 attribute proves the subject's reality, since it makes it a 
 locus. The state of a counterentity [to non-existence] 
 i. e. the absence of the absence, must belong to a some- 
 tiling, 
 
 " It makes it a locus" — i. e. it gives to the absence a ' local habi- 
 tation' in the subject, and therefore an unreal thing can never properly 
 be a subject. [If you shift your ground and say that the argument 
 is to prove God's non-existence, we reply that] the state of a counter- 
 entity to non-existence, i. e. the absence of the absence, cannot belong 
 to a no-thing, or, in other words, just as that subject from which a 
 given attribute is excluded cannot be unreal, so neither can an unreal 
 thing be the object of a negation. 
 
 III. " But why may we not learn the absence (or non-existence) 
 of a thing by its non-perception, even though the thing itself be an 
 illegitimate object of perception ?" He replies, 
 
 III. In the case of a hare's horn, &g. the validity of 
 their perception would imply defective means thereof; but 
 if these be present, perception would ensue, and if there 
 be no perception, there can be no such means. 
 
 Non-perception can prove the non-existence of a thing only where 
 it is the so-called ' valid non-[)erception ;' otherwise we should have 
 to concede the non-existence of all such things as are beyond the reach 
 of the senses. — 'Valid non-perception' means the })rcsencc ol all the 
 various means of perception, other than the thing itself [which is 
 supposed to be absent] or the attributes [as form «&e.] inseparably 
 F
 
 31 
 
 connected with it. Hence if we allowed that in the case of the [non- 
 existent] hare's horn there was valid non-perception, this non-percep- 
 tion must be accompanied by a set of means connected with certain 
 defects* [like a jaundiced eye &c. ; as this is ' the presence of the 
 various means of perception other than the thing itself or its insepar- 
 able attributes.'] But tliis is unallowable, as in such cases a percep- 
 tion [however erroneous, as of a reall}^ white shell appearing yellow,] 
 would ensue ; and if perception does not ensue, it proves that it is 
 not a case of valid non-perception. 
 
 IV. Here the atheistic Sthikhya will interpose, "why not say 
 that the soul is in some respects ignorant, and that the earth, &c., 
 do not prove creative power to reside therein from the very fact of 
 its having the nature of soul r" He replies, 
 
 IV. If you mean the well-known soul, our point is 
 gained, if the uuknowm, your reason is unproved ; the 
 general consent brings the same result, and in the case of 
 the class it equally holds. 
 
 If you mean by soul the well-known mundane individual soul, we 
 are quite willing to grant what you say ; but if you mean the unknown, 
 i. e. the Lord, your reason is unproved [as we may dispute that ' the 
 nature of soul' resides in God]. If you reply that all allow that the 
 subject (soul) has the nature of soul, then, according as you decide the 
 alternative — is this ' soul' of yours similar to omy jivatind or different, 
 — we shall accept your argument as proving our own point, or meet 
 you by denying your proposed reason [or middle term]. The last clause 
 of the verse meets the reply " let the species^ soul, be our subject," — 
 because in this case too " it equally holds." We agree with you so 
 far as that it is not the species that is the maker of the world [but 
 an individual Supreme Soul ;] still as the ' nature of soul' [i. e. the 
 idea or species] does not abide in the species itself [but in the 
 individuals] we still deny your middle. 
 
 * To understand this, we must remember that the means of perception are 
 twofold, — those connected with the object, i. e producing right impressions, 
 and those connected with a defect in the senses (as jaundice &c.) i. e. producing 
 wrong impi-essions. The non-existent hare's horn cannot be a case of the fomier, 
 as it is invisible ; nor can it be a case of the latter as this would necessitate some 
 perception, however eiToneous. — I have followed the Pandits in taking yoriydim- 
 'paloMhi as a Tcarmadhdraya-samdsa, but it would make this passage easier, if 
 we could take it here as a shashti'tatjpuriisha, i. e. as equal to yoijiiasydnuimlabdhi.
 
 V. " But wliy not say [with the Vedantin] that the ahsence of 
 creative agency is to be proved of that soul which is estabUshed by 
 the S'ruti, &c. ?" He replies, 
 
 V. If the S'ruti, &c. have authority, your negative 
 argument is precluded ; if they are fallacious, our old 
 'baseless inference^ [of §. i.] is stronger than ever. 
 
 If you admit that the S'ruti, &c. have authority, then, as the exis- 
 tence of God's creative agency &c. is thereby established, your argument 
 to prove their non-existence is already precluded. On the other 
 hand, if they have no authority, our old difficulty of a ' baseless 
 inference' returns in full force [as the minor term, soul, in which the 
 middle ' the nature of soul' was to reside, is itself unproved]. 
 
 YI. Here the Charvakas step in, " why talk of such a thing as 
 * valid non-perception?' [§. iii.] let us lay it down as a rule that 
 whatever is not perceived, does not exist, and hence let the mere 
 absence of perception be a sufficient proof of a thing's non-existence. 
 As for this rule of ours overthrowing all inference, we are perfectly 
 content to have it so, and we grant at once that, on the perception 
 of smoke, to conclude that fire accompanies it is mere supposition." 
 He replies, 
 
 VI. There is no doubt in seeing or not seeing, since 
 the existence or non-existence of the thing is ascertained ; 
 even perception becomes impossible, if its cause is pre- 
 cluded by its not being seen. 
 
 a. [We reply that ' supposition' will not explain men's inferring fire 
 from smoke, for] Supposition is " doubt ;" but this does not exist in the 
 case of seeing, as the thing seen is then ascertained ; nor does it exist 
 in the case of not seeing, as the absence of the thing is then, in your 
 opinion, concluded, h. If the e^^e &c., the causes of perception, are 
 precluded as causes by the fact that they are not themselves objects of 
 perception, there will not be even such a cause of knowledge as your 
 perception ; but if you grant that these exist even at the very time 
 when they are not perceived, your argument proves too much, and 
 therefore the mere fact of a thing's not being seen does not necessitate 
 its non-existence, c. And again a Charvaka, when he leaves his house 
 ought to bewail as being well assured that his wife and children have
 
 3^ 
 
 ceased to exist ; and even on his return he ought not to find his family 
 there, otherwise the mere fact of ' not seeing,' as it proves too much, 
 would be no longer a valid reason, [and he should hold like a true 
 philosopher * arnica uxor, magis tamen arnica Veritas']. 
 
 YII. " But if non-perception be not a proof of non-existence, then 
 would it not follow that a universal proposition can never be deter- 
 mined, as there will always be the fear of some condition at present 
 ■unseen, and hence an ever recurring fear of some instance of smoke 
 unattended by fire ? and if so, what becomes of inference ?" He 
 replies, 
 
 YII. If there be doubt, there is inference ; still more 
 if there be no doubt. Discussion is allowed by all to stop 
 fears, since fear is limited by direct inconsistency. 
 
 If, after being assured that in the present instances before us [_i. e. 
 this smoke and fire,] there is no false assumption of connection, you 
 go on to fear that there maj^ be such in similar instances in another 
 time and place, this very supposition of another time and place comes 
 from inference ; hence inference is proved. If there is no such fear, 
 then, in the absence of any fear of the contrary, inference is all the 
 more established. If you ask " what is to stop this fear ?" it is replied 
 that this fear is precluded by a discussion to stop any opposite 
 instances. " But have we not here the fault of an ' in infinitum 
 regressus,' since this discussion is itself based on an universal propo- 
 sition \i. e. the major premiss in which the middle term is declared to 
 be invariably connected with the major ?]" he replies ' fear is limited by 
 direct inconsistency ;' there cannot be any doubt regarding the major 
 premiss on which the discussion is based, when this doubt would 
 contradict some acknowledged principle. Thus supposing that a doubt 
 should arise as to whether the effect might not be produced without 
 any assumed cause, — it would of course follow, if this doubt were 
 legitimate, that we should not seek food to satisfy hunger or employ 
 words to produce an impression on the hearer's mind, [as these and 
 other similar effects could arise without their causes being employed ;] 
 and therefore a limiting condition which is only suggested by an 
 unsupported doubt, is of no validity where there is no discussion to 
 back it. This has been thus expressed by a logician, '* so long as 
 there is reason to fear even the hundredth particle of a connection
 
 37 
 
 between the midJle term and some opposite instance [i. e. one which, 
 though it contains tlie middle, does not contain the major term, 
 as the redhot iron ball in the argument ' the mountain has smoke 
 because it has fire,'] how can the middle term have any power to 
 convince ?" Now the fear of a too general assumption of connection 
 depends on the fear of there being some limiting condition to be 
 supplied ; as has been said, " some reasons \i. e. middle terms which 
 are too general, as ' fire' to prove the existence of smoke,] are dependent 
 on universal connections supplied by others [as that between smoke 
 and ' fire produced by wet fuel ;'] these too general reasons, even 
 when seen to be present, do not establish the conviction of the major 
 term." Thus the universal connection with the major term, which 
 exists in a middle term that is limited by a ' condition,'* is cognized 
 as included in the former middle term [as fire] distinguished by 
 the determining notion necessary to define its relation as a middle 
 term \_sc. the species fire,t] hence it may be said to transfer its own 
 attribute of universal connection with the major term to the old 
 middle term which is, as it were, in juxta-position with it and abides 
 in the same subjects ; and therefore the word upadhi, here used for 
 * the condition,' is used by us in the same sense as when it signifies 
 [with the Vedantins] the China rose which transfers its own redness 
 to the colourless crystal. These too general middle terms, even when 
 they are actually perceived to exist in the subject, do not produce 
 certainty as to the existence of the major term, since the too general 
 attribute [the possession of fire] creates a doubt as to the desired 
 major [smoke.] 
 
 VIII. [Thus far for Inference; the opponent, however, may 
 still retort,] "But may we not say that Comparison {Upamana) 
 precludes the existence of God ?]:" Now the Vais'eshikas reply that 
 it does not preclude, inasmuch as they do not allow that Comparison 
 is a distinct species of proof [as it is included under inference, 
 
 * As e. g. fire produced by wet fuel. 
 
 f See note on Avadihedaka, p. 26. 
 
 X Upamdna is the knowledge of a resemblance, wliicli produces an inference 
 consisting in the knowledge of the relation of a name to something so named. 
 Thus a man is told that a gavaya (bos gava^us) is like a cow, and on seeing the 
 animal in the forest he infers that this is what was meant by the word gavaya. 
 Similarly here we have the inference " whatever is like the individual soul is 
 not omniscient nor omnipotent, and this being which is like the indivicUial soul 
 is what is meant by tlie word God."
 
 38 
 
 See Nyaya Sutras, ii. 46-4^]. Here the Mimaiisakas come in aiul 
 maintain, that Comparison is that proof which o:ives us the know- 
 ledge of a separate category called Likeness. They reason as follows, 
 — a. Likeness cannot be a substance or a qnaJifu or an action, because 
 it is found residing b}' intimate relation in qualities [and substance 
 cannot thus reside in qualities, nor can a quality or action thus 
 reside in another quality or action.*] h. It cannot be community 
 [or genus.] because it depends on its correlative [i. e. the other thing 
 with which the first is compared,]t and also because it may reside in 
 genera,J &c. [as we may say ' the genus of cow is, like that of 
 horse, eternal.] c. Nor can it be non-existence, since it is not cogniz- 
 ed in its relation to the counterentity.§ d. Moreover, likeness is 
 not known through perception, since it is not cognized by a simple 
 exercise of our senses [but requires some thought and consideration ;] 
 nor can you say that the senses may give us the knowledge of it, 
 when there is the contemporary knowledge of the correlative, — because, 
 after the cognition that the bos gavaius is like a cow, we may also 
 have the cognition that that cow is like a bos gavseus, but this latter 
 cognition cannot be produced by perception as the cow is supposed to 
 be out of sight, e. Nor can the knowledge of Likeness be produced 
 by inference, since it is produced even in the absence of any sign [or 
 middle term].|| /. Nor can it be produced by testimony, since this 
 is not present everywhere^ -To meet this theory (of Likeness being 
 a separate category,) he replies in this and the following couplets 
 in the character of a Vais'eshilca. 
 
 * Cf. Bhasha Paricliclilieda, s'l. 13. and Siddhanta Mukt. p. 4. 
 
 t Likeness is not identity — it implies the existence of points of difference. 
 
 :|; Community or genus resides in the first three categories only. I may 
 add here that the Nyaya does not recognize our subordination of genera and 
 species. The genus is not superior to, but co-ordinate with, the species. Thus 
 a'sivatwa and sattd both abide in as'ica, but satfd also abides with ghatatu-a in 
 ghato. and with s'uUatira in s'uMa. Hence sattd is called para, and the others 
 apara. 
 
 § Kesemblance implies the con-elative, but not the opposite, as absence does, 
 e. g. ' the absence of a jar,' where the knowledge of the absence depends on the 
 knowledge of a jar. 
 
 11 The supposed inference would be " That cow is like the bos gavfieus, because 
 the former is the correlative to the likeness residing in this latter." But the 
 knowledge called upamiti may be found when this middle term is not explicitly 
 recognized. 
 
 ^ The information was to the effect that the bos gavoDus is something like a 
 cow ; and the man's subsequent inference is in a different form, viz. ' that cow 
 is like a gavaya.'
 
 39 
 
 VIII. In the case of contradictories, there can be no 
 middle course ; nor can you assume the two contradictories 
 to be identical, because the fact of their contradiction is 
 directly asserted. 
 
 " There can be no middle course,*" i. e. you cannot make some third 
 supposition different from either, from the very fact that they are 
 contradictories [and therefore the one or the other must be true] ; 
 nor can you assume them to be identical. The word * contradic- 
 tories' in the second line is an instance of the so-called hetu- 
 garbha-vis'eshana, or attribute which contains an implicit reason, t 
 [i. e. this very word shows why you cannot assume them to be 
 identical.] When you say ' it is not non-existence,' we know that it 
 must be existence, and when you say ' it is not existence,' we know 
 that it must be ' non-existence.' The whole purport of this is as 
 follows, — Likeness must be either existence or non-existence, J since 
 no one knows of any third alternative. If the latter, then it at once 
 falls under non-existence, the seventh category [of the Vais'eshikas ] 
 If the former, then, a. if it possess qualities, it must be under the cate- 
 gory of substance ; b. should it not possess them, but possess genus, and 
 be other than a quality, it must be under action ; and c. should it be 
 other than an action, it must be under quality, d. Should it be 
 without qualities and genus, but not itself reside by intimate relation, 
 it must be under the category of intimate relation ; e. should it be 
 found residing in intimate relation and that too in many subjects, it 
 must be under the category oi genus ; f. but if found residing in only 
 one subject, it must be tlie (vais'eshika) category of 'particularity . — 
 In the same way we may refute the supposition of such additional 
 categories as Capacity, Number, &c. 
 
 IX. " But why should not Likeness be only a common property, 
 and Comparison be that proof which produces the cognition there- 
 of ?"§ He replies, 
 
 * We have here our ' excluded middle.' 
 
 t In this it differs from the swarupa vis'eshana, which is simply descriptive 
 and nothing more. Cf. the hdvyalinga in Ehetoric (Sahitya Darp. X. §. 710). 
 
 X What follows can only be understood by a reader acquainted with the seven 
 Categories of the Vais'eshikas (Cf. Dr. Boer's translation of the Bhasha Parich- 
 chheda, pp. 1 — 8.) 
 
 § This was the view of the Vedantins (see Vedanta paribhiisha, iii.) according 
 to which the instrument, in knowledge derived from comparison, was tlie 
 cognition that ' this animal is like a cow,' and the conclnsinn was that ' the 
 cow is like this bos gavasus.' It is refuted by the supposed Vais'eshika.
 
 4a 
 
 IX. As Likeness, so too Unlikeness ; and so a new 
 proof would be required. If you answer, ' the latter is 
 only a case of Presumption,' then why not say the same 
 of the former ? 
 
 After the cognition, * this (camel) is unlike a cow,' j^ou must sup- 
 pose another cognition, ' that cow is unlike this (camel,') which must, 
 on your view, he produced by a new proof [i. e. a fifth]. — " No, this 
 clearly arises from the process called Presumption,* as you cannot 
 have in tliis thing unlikeness to tliat without also having in that 
 thing unlikeness to tliisP But the same process will equally apply 
 in the former case, as you cannot have in the bos gavasus likeness to 
 the cow without also having in the cow likeness to the bos gavseus. 
 So that there is no need to accept a new proof (Comparison) which 
 is to produce a knowledge of Likeness. 
 
 X. [Thus far the Vais'eshikas, whose opinion we Naiya'yikas 
 accept so far as it overthrows our common antagonists, the Mini'an- 
 sakas ; but as they have gone further and have attempted to over- 
 throw the existence of this assumed proof,] the X^aiy'ayikas here step 
 forward in defence of the impugned proof, Comparison. 
 
 X. They hold that the knowledge of the connection of 
 a name with the thing named is the result of Comparison,t 
 since it cannot arise from Perception, &c. 
 
 The ' knowledge' or ascertainment of the ' connection' — i, e. power 
 or meaning, — of the 'name,' as bos gavieus, with the 'thing named' 
 i. e. the animal distinguished by the species bos gavajus, is the result 
 of the particular kind of proof called Comparison : ' since it cannot 
 arise from Perception, etc' as the several causes of those other proofs, 
 i. e. the senses, sign (or mid.dle term,) and testimony have no power 
 to produce it. 
 
 XL "But why may there not be a knowledge of the word's 
 
 * " Presumption is deduction of a matter from that wliicli could not else be. 
 It is assumption of a tiling not itself perceived but necessarily implied by 
 another whicli is seen, heard or proved." (Uolebrooke) — See Siddlianlii Mukta- 
 vali, p. 128. The Mnuansakas make this a separate proof, but the Naiyayakaa 
 make it only a particular kind of infei-ence, eorrespondhig to our disjunctive 
 Hypothetical Syllogism (see Bhaslui P. s'l. 143.) 
 
 t Tliis is the Maiyayika view of Uijam;iua, cf Xy^J^-^ siitras, i. G, and Tarka 
 Sangraha, §. (ib.
 
 41 
 
 meaning from* the information previously given, that an animal like 
 a cow is what is meant by the word gavaya ; or from the inference 
 drawn therefrom, that an animal distinguished by the species gavaya- 
 twa is what is m.eant by the word gavaya from the very fact of likeness 
 to a cow ?" He replies, 
 
 XI. Since mere Likeness cannot be the determining 
 attribute, and since the determining attribute is not then 
 known, the definite meaning [fixed by the will of God or by 
 human convention,] cannot be made known by testimony 
 or inference previously [to seeing the gavaya itself.] 
 
 The ' definite meaning' means here the connection [between the 
 name and the thing named] in the form of the word's power as deter- 
 mined by the species gavayatLva.-\ This cannot be obtained from testi- 
 mony or inference, as the man previously [to seeing the actual gavaya 
 in the forest] had not any idea of the true species of the animal. :J: 
 Nor can you assume that the mere idea of likeness can be the deter- 
 mining notion to fix the word's meaning, as it is too vague to possess 
 such an authority. 
 
 XII. "But why not say that even although, on first hearing the 
 information given, there is no knowledge of the species bos gava^us, 
 yet when the species is known by perception, then from the informa- 
 tion ' a thing like a cow is what is meant by bos gavaeus,' — which by 
 metonymy comes to mean the species, — we may gain the knowledge 
 of the meaning of the word in that form [by testimony and not by 
 comparison ?"] He replies, 
 
 XII. The sentence, having already logical connection, 
 is complete and seeks nothing further ; we only need con- 
 nection with an implied meaning, where the existing con- 
 nection of the meanings of the words is incomplete. 
 
 When the verbal testimony has produced the knowledge of what is 
 
 * The opponent endeavours to shew that this knowledge can be accounted for 
 by testimony or inference, without assuming such a new proof as Comparison. 
 
 t The Nyaya holds that a word does not properly mean a species or an indivi- 
 dual, but an individual as distinguished by such and such a species ; thus the 
 species is the determining notion by which the word can mean any individual of 
 the species. See S. Muktavali, pp. 82, 83. 
 
 X At first he only knew vaguely that the word gavaya meant a something 
 like a cow ; but he did not know the actual species of the animal, its peculiar 
 attributes, form, &c., until ho had positively seen it.
 
 42 
 
 meant by the word gavaya, from its being applicable wherever the attri- 
 bute ' likeness to a cow is found,' — it has no further tendency [or nisus'\ 
 to produce any verbal knowledge of the species, because its logical con- 
 nection is already complete. For it is only where the primary meanings 
 of the words are deficient in their logical connection, — i. e. are in any 
 way incompatible with one another, — that we have to search for a 
 connection with some other meaning produced by metonymy, as in the 
 stock example ' a herd station on the Ganges,' [where the word Gan- 
 ges, primarily meaning a 'river,' by meton^^my means the 'bank].' 
 
 "But may we not say that the generic argument* "the word 
 gavaya is possessed of that which causes direct significance, because 
 it is a word properly formed according to the rules of grammar," — 
 as we can disprove any other assumed cause of direct significance, — • 
 will ultimately, by exhaustion, necessitate our accepting the species 
 gavayatwa as the cause of the word's direct significance ?" We reply, 
 no, because your major term in the conclusion cannot have any other 
 form than that which it had in the major premiss. f Nor can you 
 say that "the word gavaya is possessed of ^«yffj/a^i(?« as the cause 
 of its direct significance, because it has some such cause and all 
 other causes are severally precluded," because such a negative argu- 
 ment is not valid, as your proposed major term is not current, [i. e. 
 your major term " possessed of gavayatwa &c." is only applicable 
 to this one word, and is therefore not a ' major'' term at all.] And 
 again, the cognition that "the abode of gavayatwa is what is meant 
 by the word gavaya'"' is established by consciousness as actually 
 experienced, even in the absence of any negative inference ; and 
 hence we are compelled to assume a special proof for it, viz., uj^amd- 
 na or Comparison. [As for any attempt, as in § ix., to establish a separ- 
 ate proof from unlikeness, we reply, — ] After understanding the 
 meaning of such a sentence as ' Shame on the camel with its extra- 
 ordinarily long neck and eating the hardest thorns, the outcast of 
 beasts,'^ the cognizing, on seeing such an animal, that this was what 
 
 * For this and the other two kinds of anumdna see Nyaya Sutras I. 5. It is 
 defined by the Commentator as " that which is recognised from generic proper- 
 ties, its own specific ones being unnoticed." 
 
 t II' from pioniisses which estabbshed that wherever smoHe was, fire was, and 
 that the mountain liad smoke, we inferred by exhaustion that the mountain had 
 the lu-e peculiar to mountains and not cubnary or digestive fii'e, this would be an 
 improper inference ; and, similarly, here we cannot infer that, because the word 
 gavaya is possessed of that wliich causes dii-ect significance, it therefore must be 
 possessed oi' (jaoayatica as that cause. 
 
 X Cf. Nyaya S^tra Vritti, i. 6.
 
 43 
 
 was meant by the word ' camel' is also produced by Comparison, 
 [which is equally the recognition of likeness or unlikeness.] — Our 
 conclusion is that Comparison, which properly only ascertains the 
 direct significance of a word [and has nothing to do with establishing 
 the object's existence or non-existencej cannot preclude the existence 
 of God. 
 
 XIII. [We now proceed to examine the fourth proof, ^. e. Testi- 
 mony; — and here] the Vais'eshikas at once assert that there is no 
 need to fear lest Testimony should preclude the existence of a Su- 
 preme Being, as this supposed proof is not different from Inference, 
 [and has therefore been already discussed.] On hearing the words 
 spoken and consequently recollecting their meanings, an inference 
 arises, [they say,] to establish a logical connection between these 
 meanings,* — this inference being in the one or the other of the two 
 following forms, — a. " These meanings of words are mutually connect- 
 ed from the very fact that they are brought to recollection by the 
 aid of words which possess expectancy, compatibility, and juxtaposi- 
 tion,t just as in the special case of the meanings brought to our recollec- 
 tion by the aid of the words, ' drive the cow with the stick' ;" or b. 
 " these words must have been preceded by the speaker's right cogni- 
 tion of the connection between the several meanings which these 
 words respectively call to our recollection, — from the very fact that 
 they are words possessing expectancy, &c. ;" — the latter inference 
 establishing the hearer's knowledge of the connection, from the 
 general rule that * the cognition of a cognition must have the same 
 object as the original cognition,' [and therefore when I know that 
 such and such was the speaker's meaning, my knowledge must have the 
 same object as his, and consequently no such pramcvm as ' testimony' 
 or s'abda is needed.] — He replies, 
 
 XIII. If your alleged inference implies certainty, it in- 
 volves too much ; if only possibility, there is no ascertain- 
 
 * S'dbda-hodhco is often called anvaya-hodha, sc. the knowledge of a logical 
 connection between the meanings of the words. There is a current dei&nition, 
 
 t " Expectancy means a word's incapacity to convey a complete meaning 
 without some other word to complete the construction. Compatibility consists 
 in a word's not having a meaning incompatible with that of other words in the 
 sentence. Juxtaposition consists m the enuuciation of the words without a long 
 pause between them." Dr. Ballantyne's Tarka Sangraha, § 71. 
 
 G 2
 
 44 
 
 ment; expectancy is a cause [of Verbal knowledge] by 
 its very presence ; juxtaposition^ if accompanied by com- 
 patibility alone, is unrestricted. 
 
 a. In the case of the former inference where the subject is the 
 
 * meanings of words,' — we must mean the conclusion to be either that 
 they are ce;'^^/??/^ mutually connected or tliat they are ^o^siZ/Zy con- 
 nected, i. e. possess a capability of being connected.* 
 
 The former alternative involves too much, as it would apply in 
 such phrases as ' he sprinkles with water,' [which would not hold in 
 the case of water in the form of ice ;] — under the second, there is no 
 ascertainment of connection at all, and there is also the fault of 
 superfluous inference, as your conclusion, i. e. ' possessing capability of 
 being mutually connected,' is already included in your alleged reason 
 
 * from the very fact that they are brought to recollection by the aid 
 of words which possess compatibility, &c.' — as the ' compatibility' there 
 mentioned only means that they indirectly possess a characterf which 
 necessitates a logical connection between their meanings. 
 
 5. As for the second inference, ' Expectancy' is properly the mind's 
 inquiry after certain additional meanings, which are supplied by words 
 suggested by the construction, — as, e.g. on hearing the word cya^At^m the 
 mind goes in search of a fresh meaning supplied by a suggested affer or 
 vide^ and on hearing the word ctffe)\ it similarly supplies cyathum or ves- 
 tem ; Expectancy is therefore a cause of verbal knowledge by its very 
 presence, [i, e. whether it is definitely known or not ; but if it were 
 to be included in the middle term of your inference, it must be 
 actually known in order to be so included]. 
 
 c. " But why may we not say that the cause of verbal knowledge 
 is juxtaposition together with compatibility, [thus excluding ex- 
 pectancy ?]" — He rephes that they are ' unrestricted,' i. e. they are 
 not limited by any ' universal connection' with verbal knowledge J [and 
 are therefore useless to produce a conclusion.] Thus in such a sentence 
 as liic adestJUius regis homines siunmoveantur,^ the words regis and 
 liomines possess compatibility and juxtaposition, and would therefore, 
 
 * Similarly a cause (Kdmnn) is said to be swm-iqm-yogya and phalopadhdyaka, 
 ^m the former case it exists Swdfici, in the latter ivepyeia. 
 
 f Paya.stiva resides directly in the paddrtha but indirectly in the pada. 
 
 X Scil. they may be found present where it is absent, as fire is found without 
 smoke.
 
 45 
 
 according to your view, possess a logical connection and produce verbal 
 knowledge, although there is no expectancy, [as the sense is already 
 satisfied by the logical connection between Jllius and re^is^. 
 
 XIV. But here the Prabhakaras* come in and say, " Testimony can 
 be a source of right knowledge in tlie case of the Veda, as the Veda is 
 not made by man and consequently there can be no inference to estab- 
 lish the speaker's knowledge ; but in secular matters there is required a 
 previous knowledge, viz., that the testimony is given by a reliable \_i. e, 
 worthy, dpta,'] speaker. And thus we have first such an argument as 
 
 * tliis speaker possesses a correct knowledge of the meaning of the sen- 
 tence which he uses, because he uses a sentence produced by a know- 
 ledge of its meaning which knowledge does not arise from mistake, 
 &c.,' [sc. he himself knows, and speaks to inform me ;] and this argu- 
 ment will establish the sentence's meaning indirectly, as being the 
 distinguishing characteristic of the speaker's knowledge. We may 
 next proceed to use a second argument, [having previously by the 
 former one established that the speaker's knowledge is correct,] viz., 
 
 * these meanings of the separate words are mutually connected, be- 
 cause they are the object of the speaker's correct knowledge,' and 
 thus directly establish the meaning of the sentence. In this way, 
 i. e. only after these two arguments, does the knowledge of the con- 
 nection of words [i. e. the knowledge produced by testimony,] arise 
 from words whose meaning is previously fixed by compact ; and hence 
 testimony in secular matters is only a repetition [of what is previous- 
 ly known,] and consequently not itself a source of right knowledge at 
 all.f To meet this, he replies, 
 
 XIV. Since the meaning is already ascertained^ before 
 the inference^ from the words whose signification has been 
 ascertained, it is the middle term of your inference which 
 will be a repetition, since the recollection of a universal 
 proposition implies delay. » 
 
 Even in secular cases the meaning of the sentence is ascertained pre- 
 viously to any supposed inference, since the meaning of the words has 
 
 * The Prabliakaras are the followers of the gi^eat iMimansaka doctor, Prabha- 
 kara. He is also called the Guru in contradistinction to the Bhatta, i. e. Bhatta 
 Kumarila. 
 
 t The Prabhakaras define right knowledge as agrihita grdhahativam * the 
 apprehending something previously not apprehended' — see the fomth chapter.
 
 4G 
 
 been already determined in tlie Veda [as you yourselves admit ;] and 
 therefore it is your middle term which is obnoxious to the charge of 
 superfluous repetition, since inference must always produce a slower 
 cognition than testimony, as the former is unavoidably impeded 
 through the delay involved in recollecting the necessary universal 
 connection (vydpti). 
 
 XV. " But since knowledge produced by testimony is out of the 
 question, where there is any doubt as to the speaker's being reliable 
 and still more where it is certain that he is not, — why should we not 
 hold that the ascertainment of this point is the real cause of such 
 knowledge, — and a thing's being spoken by a reliable speaker will 
 mean that it is produced by an accurate knowledge, in the speaker^ 
 of the original meaning of the sentence ? — thus the knowledge of the 
 meaning of the sentence must originally be derived from inference." 
 He replies, 
 
 XV. Since even tliere we must establish our point by 
 an inference^^^ these Vaidic meanings are mutually con- 
 nected from their being brought to our remembrance by 
 words which are themselves free from any imputation of 
 defects incident to a human being^, — how can even the 
 Yeda itself be cleared from tliat ? 
 
 There is no evidence to prove that the ascertainment of the speak- 
 er's being reliable is a cause of verbal knowledge ; [a truer cause is 
 the one generally admitted to be a concurrent to S'abda, viz., the 
 ascertainment of compatibility between the words used,] since in an 
 incompatible sentence we see the knowledge of the connection [i. e. 
 the so-called verbal knowledge,] stopped in consequence of the know- 
 ledge of the compatibility — i. e. the absence of any manifest contra- 
 diction, — being retarded [and hence the two seem related as cause 
 and effect.]* If not, then, in the case of the Veda, let the knowledge 
 of its being unproduced b}^ a person, be the cause of verbal know- 
 ledge ; and as we shall thus have the connection between even the 
 Taidic meanings established by an inference such as this, — 'these 
 
 * This will no doubt require an inference, but this inference will not establish 
 the S'abdabodha but only clear away any apprehended contradictions and leave 
 -the way open to the pruper cause S'ahda-jndna. The inference is only a nega- 
 tive, the S'obbda-jndna is the positive, cause. — I may add that this discussion on 
 S'abda is one of the obscurest parts of the book. The old printed text was here 
 very corrupt, and that now given is from the two old MSS. mentioned in the 
 preface.
 
 47 
 
 Vaidic meanings are mutually connected from their being brought 
 to our remembrance by words which are themselves free from any 
 imputation of defects incident to a human being,' — how can we clear 
 the Veda itself from ' that,' i. e. the old charge of superfluous re- 
 petition ? 
 
 Some, however, have said that " it is not the tcord but the 
 word's meaning which is the instrumental cause of verbal know- 
 ledge, — hence we can understand written poetry, &c., because 
 the knowledge of tlie meaning of the sentence is produced by the 
 meanings of the words [although the words are here not spoken*]. 
 [It might be said in objection that, if this were true, the accusative 
 dwdram ' januam' ought to produce verbal knowledge by itself; but 
 to this we should reply that] even though we grant the knowledge of 
 *janua,' there can be no knowledge of connection, i. e. verbal know- 
 ledge, in the absence of the quality of ' expectancy'f which necessarily 
 resides in the word's meaning,;]: according to the rule ' verbal expec- 
 tancy is fulfilled by words alone. '§ In this way we should refute the 
 opinion of the Guru Mimansakas, viz., that ' the meanings of words 
 are [not the cause of verbal knowledge but] only the distinguishing 
 mark of the phrase ' knowledge of tlie meaning of the icorcl,' since 
 without the knowledge produced by words there cannot be the know- 
 ledge of the connection of the meanings of words, || as has been said, 
 " from their coming first, from their power of conveying a meaning, 
 and from their conveying the speaker's intention, the power of causa- 
 tion must pre-eminently be held to reside in words." ' This opinion we 
 repeat, is overthrown, — because, if we only substitute ' reliable speakers' 
 (aptdndm) in the s'loka quoted, for ' words' (paddndm), we see directly 
 that the ' being spoken by a reliable speaker' is only a distinguishing 
 mark of the phrase, ' the knowledge of its being spoken by a reliable 
 speaker ;'^ and since the knowledge of the word's meaning must be 
 granted, the word per se is a superfluous, and not a true, cause." — This 
 
 * Pada means a word spoken, cf. S. Muktavali, p. 78. 
 
 t See Ballantyne's transl. Saliitya Dai'pana, p. 14. 
 
 X In written poetry none of tlie words are properly pacZas and therefore there 
 can be anvaya and dkdnlcslid between them ; but not so between one spoken 
 word as januam and another not spoken as the understood claude. 
 
 § In written poetry it is drthikdkdnlcsltd. 
 
 II That is, according- to the Guru, there is a series, 1, the pada, 2, the paddr- 
 thopasthiii, 3, S'dhdahodha, but the first is the true cause of the third. 
 
 % That is, the supposed series wall be, 1, djjta, 2, dptoktatwajnana, 3, B'dhdxi- 
 hpdha ; but all allow that dpta is not the cause of verbal knowledge but only of 
 the spoken words. Similarly 'pada cannot be the true cause in the former series.
 
 48 
 
 laboured exposition is, however, mistaken, since the meanings of words 
 cannot be the cause of verbal knowledge, from the ver^^ fact that they 
 may apply to past or future as well as to what is actually present ; nor 
 can we say that the recollection of the word's meaning is an instrumen- 
 tal cause, since it has no operation (vyapdra)* The true instrumental 
 cause is the knowledge of the word [produced by hearing,] and its 
 accompanying operation is the recollection of the word's meaning — 
 [these directly and indirectly producing verbal knowledge.] In the 
 objected case of written poetry, &c., the instrumental cause of verbal 
 knowledge is a mental knowledge of the word, [its corresponding 
 operation remaining still the same, i. e. the recollection of the word's 
 meaning]. 
 
 XVI. [Having thus established the fact that testimony is a 
 separate proof against the Vais'eshikas in § xiii. and having over- 
 thrown the wrong notions of the proof as held hj the Mimansakas 
 in §§ xiv. and xv., he now proceeds to shew that this proof cannot 
 preclude the existence of a Supreme Being.] 
 
 " Well, then, let us concede that Testimony is a distinct kind of 
 Proof ; but why should it not preclude God's agency as a Maker Pf 
 Thus we read in the Bhagavad Gita " Though actions are ever done 
 by the qualities of Nature, the soul, blinded by egoism, thinks ' I am 
 the doer.' " ' Nature' means here the principle. Intellect, — the ' quali- 
 ties' goodness, &c. ; the soul thinks through delusion that itself does 
 the actions done by these. Hence agency is imaginary, not real. But 
 in the case of an omniscient Being there could be no such imagina- 
 tion, since He would see every thing as it really is.— For the gram- 
 mar of the couplet quoted, we make Kartd govern the accusative 
 instead of the genitive, in accordance with the rule in Panini (ii. 3. 
 69.)" He replies, 
 
 XVI. The testimony of an unworthy person has no 
 force of proof ; there can be no ' worthiness^ in the case 
 of a thing not seen [by the speaker]. We must have 
 an omniscient Being to see the invisible, and an eternal 
 Yeda is untenable. 
 
 * The Naiyayikas maintain, a^^ainst tlie Yedantins, that every Karana must 
 have a vyapdra, — for the latter's definition, sec supra p. 13, note. 
 
 t In which case it would prechide las existence, as the Naiyayikas only 
 accept a Supreme Being as a Creator, aud not as an Epicurean deity.
 
 49 
 
 If this testimony of the 'Sruti, which you hring forward to esta* 
 blish that God is not the Maker of all things, is the testimony of an 
 unworthy person, it has no authority ; if it is tlie testimony of a 
 worthy person, then one who possesses the knowledge of such trans- 
 cendental facts must possess an eternal and all-embracing know- 
 ledge, since all allow tliat He has no organs, &c.* The eternit}^ of 
 the Veda has been already disproved [in the second cluster ;] and 
 therefore the existence of an eternal and omniscient Author of the 
 Veda is established. 
 
 XVII. " But if so, then what becomes of those passages of 'Srutif 
 which declare that there is no such Maker ?" He replies, 
 
 XVII. Such passages have more than one meaning, 
 
 since the S'ruti also declares His existence; they may 
 
 merely mean that He is unstainGd [by attributes j] and if the 
 
 S'ruti declares His existence, it cannot imply the opposite. 
 
 These passages, to wliich you refer, do not necessarily bear only 
 
 one meaning, i. e. His non-existence,— since there are many other 
 
 passages which establish His existence, as e. g. that from the Gita, 
 
 " from me all proceeds ;" and the two meanings cannot be equally 
 
 valid, since they are mutually contradictory. If we examine them 
 
 more closely to decide which alternative is the true one, we shall find 
 
 that the [apparently] opposing passages really mean only that God is 
 
 to be contemplated as the Soul void of all special qualities ; while the 
 
 confirmatory passages become the properly authoritative, inasmuch 
 
 as they are supported by the inference, based on the discussion of the 
 
 relation of cause and effect, &c., [which will be given in Chapter V.]. 
 
 XVIII. [Having thus shown that Testimony cannot preclude the 
 existence of God, he next proceeds to examine the supposed fifth 
 Proof of the Vedantins and Purva Mimansakas, i. e. Presumption or 
 ArtMimtti.'] " But if this Being were om.niscient, would He not cause 
 us to act, even without giving us definite instructions [as in the Veda ?] 
 — and hence the uselessness of Vaidic instructions, thus involved in 
 your hypothesis, is of itself sufficient to preclude the existence of God, 
 
 * The &c. includes body, middle term in inference, &c. These causes of 
 knowledge being thus excluded, God's knowledge must l)e unca isod, and there- 
 fore eternal. If any should be inclined to attribute them to Gud, on him must 
 lie the onus prohandi. 
 
 t E. g. the Rig- Veda, Ico addlul vcda, SjX,
 
 50 
 
 You cannot say that Tie docs not know how to make men act in a 
 certain way unless He gives them clcfinitc instructions, — since this 
 would overthrow His supposed omniscience. This is a case of Pre- 
 sumption,* and Presumption we hold to be a fifth kind of Proof." 
 He replies, 
 
 XVIII. Since the absence of the cause involves the 
 absence of the effect^ there can be no knowledge without 
 proof; and in the absence of knowledge there can be no 
 action. The same rule will hold even on an atheistic 
 theory of sacrifice. 
 
 If there be no cause of knowledge, (pramana) there can be no 
 knowledge, (pramd,)\ since the absence of the cause necessitates 
 that of the effect ; and if knowledge be wanting, there can be no 
 action, since action is caused by knowledge. Now, in the present 
 instance, the only cause of knowledge is such a Yaidic injunction as 
 " let him who desires heaven offer the Agnishtoma sacrifice," &c., — 
 hence Yaidic instructions are by no means useless. Otherwise [i. e. if 
 you allow the possibility of ceremonial works without an authoritative 
 command {vidhi,)'] " the same rule will hold even on an atheistic 
 theory of sacrifice" [like that of the Mimansa ;] as we can similarly 
 prove that the Veda is still useless, since destiny can set men in 
 action without it. But the true view is that Presumption is not a 
 separate kind of Proof. 
 
 XIX. This latter viev/ he now proceeds to establish, 
 
 XIX. If there were no limitation, there could be no 
 inconsistency, — that which does not limit cannot estabhsh 
 [any absurdity ;] there can be no real contradiction be- 
 tween two equally trustworthy proofs ; and if Presumption 
 w^ere admitted, it would equally apply to the commonest 
 cases of Inference. 
 
 a. The well known example of Presumption is — that on ascer- 
 taining that the living Devadatta is not in the house, there arises 
 the knowledge that he is out of doors. But in this very instance, if 
 there were no limitation or understood * universal affirmative connec- 
 
 * For Colcbrooko's definition, see supra, p. 40, note. 
 
 t Pram a here means only jndna, — it simply implies a com-iction in the 
 agent's mind, whether right or wrong.
 
 51 
 
 tion' (anvaya-vyapti,) there could not arise that conviction of absurdity 
 or inconsistency with the premisses which any other conclusion would 
 involve, [which forms the very essence of Presumption ; since it is 
 only valid by adding as a suppressed major premiss that the living 
 Devadatta must be either within or out of doors.] " That which docs 
 not limit," — i. e. that which does not invai-iably accompany the middle 
 term — cannot establish your presumed inconsistency, since this in- 
 consistency is only valid where the absence of the including major 
 term necessarily involves the absence of the included middle.* Hence 
 the recognition of such a threatened inconsistency [as you maintain 
 in this proof of Presumption] can really be resolved into the recogni- 
 tion of a general negative proposition {yyatireka-vyapti,) which would 
 necessitate a negative conclusion contrary to the facts. f 
 
 &. It has also been maintained that *' after the cognition that ' he 
 is somewhere but he is not in the house,' there arises the idea of 
 contradiction, and our proof of Presumption comes in to resolve this 
 apparent contradiction by shewing tliat the words ' he is somewhere' 
 really mean that he is somewhere else than in the house." But this 
 is untenable. For two equally trustworthy evidences:]: cannot be con- 
 tradictory, because, in such a case, one would necessarily have to give 
 way ; but wherever we have such an apparent contradiction, inference 
 will serve to establish that they must relate to different subject matters, 
 as we may reason that an [apparent] contradiction must relate to 
 different subjects from the very fact that it is established by certain 
 proof, for if it did relate to the same subject it would involve an 
 absurdity. If this were not so, you might have such a Presumption as 
 * smoke will establish the existence of fire,' since without fire it would 
 be absurd, and thus there would be no such proof as the Infei-ence which 
 our opponents allow as well as we. Again, we might have such an 
 apparent contradiction as ' fire is not perceived at the foot of the hill, 
 and yet the seen smoke is a proof that tliere is fire somewhere,' and we 
 should have to call in the assistance of your Presumption to estab- 
 lish the existence of fire in some other part of the hill. [Nor can 
 
 * I. e. The absence of fire (the vydpaJca in an anvaya-vydpti,) necessarily 
 involves the absence of smoke {yydpya). 
 
 t I. e. His not being out of doors (when he is not within,) is always accom- 
 panied by his non-existence. 
 
 X As c. ^. the sense-perception that he is not in the house, and the testimony 
 that he is somowhere, drawn from the infalHblo dictum of astrology that our 
 x-riend will live a hundied years, 
 
 u 2
 
 52 
 
 the opponent object to tills that " inference must still alwa^^s be 
 granted, as without it the proof that establishes the constant accom- 
 paniment of smoke by fire could not establish the conclusion that 
 fire exists in the present case, — because we reply that] even if there 
 were no such thing as inference at all, the proof that establishes* the 
 constant accompaniment of the middle term by the major would still 
 establish the existence of the major term in the present case [i. e. that 
 there is fire in this mountain] by Presumption. Hence the admission 
 of Presumption as a proof would only abolish Inference. 
 
 XX. That Non-perception (Anupalahdhi.) [which the Vedantins 
 and Purva Mimansakas add as a sixth proof or source of right 
 knowledge,] cannot preclude the existence of God, has been already 
 shewn in the first couplet of this chapter ; but in reality this is not 
 a distinct kind of proof at all. This he now proceeds to shew, 
 
 XX. From the cognition of non-existence not being 
 mediate — from the senses not being then engrossed in 
 other objects — from its instrumental cause not being 
 cognized, — and from the internal sense having to do with 
 actual entities, 
 
 a. All must allow that tliat knowledge is a case of '■perception^ the 
 cause of which is a non-perception whereof we are ourselves uncon- 
 scious,t — since that knowledge of an object's non-existence which was 
 produced by a conscious non-perception would be a case of * infer- 
 ence'X ^"^^ ^ knowledge is produced by the senses which is non- 
 eternal § and immediate. By its ' not being mediate' we mean that 
 it is ' not caused by knowledge,' [which is the distinctive mark of 
 perception, as contrasted with inference, comparison and testimony.] 
 h. The senses are the instrument in the perception of a jar's ab- 
 sence as of its presence, since there is no preferable object to engross 
 their energy, — for assuredly we cannot say that their energy is then 
 eno-rossed in the perception of the site, since the ear can detect the 
 cessation of sound (i. e. its dwans'dbhdia,) even where there is no 
 
 * See Bhaslia parichchheda, 'si. 136, o. 
 
 t A common defiuition of perception is * that knowledge whose cause is not 
 cognized', ajnata-Mranoltam jnananiy e. g. the sight does not perceive the eye, 
 &c. 
 
 + The inference is thrt a jar is not here from tlie fact that it is not perceived. 
 
 § I. e. janya. The Divine 'pratyal^slM is of course eternal.
 
 53 
 
 perception of its site, etlicr, — and the eye can similarly detect the 
 absence of form in the air. c. We can also conclude by inference that 
 the knowled<^e of a thing's absence is produced by the senses, — from 
 its being a knowledge produced by an instrumental cause wliich is itself 
 not recognized, d. Our perception of external objects is universally 
 produced by the mind (or internal sense,) assisted by instrumental 
 causes [as the senses] which are themselves actual entities [and not* 
 like Non-perception, a mere negation]. For these four reasons we 
 conclude that the senses, and not the so-called Non -perception, are the 
 true instrumental cause in the perception of a thing's absence from a 
 given spot.* 
 
 XXL He now adds other reasons for this opinion, as follows. 
 
 XXI. It must be the senses, from their power of perceiv- 
 ing the counterentity ; from the inseparability of the 
 operation from the cause; from the fact that defects 
 reside in the senses ; and from determinate perception. 
 
 Our intended conclusion is that the senses are the true instrumen- 
 tal cause in the perception of a thing's absence. 
 
 a, " From their power of perceiving the counterentity" to the 
 absence, [^. e. the thing said to be absent]. Just as Inference can 
 make known to us a thing's absence as well as its presence, so also 
 can the senses, h. " But may we not say that the power of perceiv- 
 ing the counterentity is not a proper reason for your inference, since 
 all causes are of course subject to the condition of ' being free from 
 superfluous causation ?'t and in the present case, the senses perceive the 
 site, and are therefore ' superfluous causes' for perceiving the absence in 
 that ^\ie,X [the perception of the site being the true cause of the per- 
 ception of the absence]. To this he replies, "from the inseparability 
 of the operation [from the cause]." Tlius the senses are not a 'su- 
 perfluous cause,' — because the perception of the site [wliich you erro- 
 neously take to be the cause] is only the operation (vyupdra) which 
 invariably accompanies an instrumental cause. § If this were not so, 
 
 * Both parties allow that non-existence is an object of perception, but tlie 
 Vcdrutins hold that cmupalahdhi is its proper cause, while the Naiyayikas hold 
 that the senses are the true instrumental cause and anuj.>cdti.hd]ii only a con- 
 current. 
 
 t For npddhi and aayatlidsiddliatxva, see p. 37, and note, p. 24*. 
 
 X Just as the father of the potter is a superfluous cause for making the jar. 
 
 § The vijdjjdra is the caiLsa caaaata (taj-janyatwe sati taj-janya-janakah.J
 
 54 
 
 the eye, &c., would be superfluous instrumental causes in the percep- 
 tion of a thing's existence, in consequence of such an operation as 
 the conjunction of the eye with the object, c. We must all allow 
 that an erroneous perception of a thing's absence, [when it is really 
 present,*] arises from a defect in the instrumental cause, and defects 
 reside only in the senses, &o., for non-perception in itself admits of 
 no defect, and the true faults of the senses are such as jaundice, &c. 
 Hence he adds " from the fact that defects reside in the senses." 
 d. A determinate perception of the spot of ground and the absencef 
 cannot [according to your opinion] be produced by the senses, because 
 it is a perception of absence or non-existence, — nor can it, on the other 
 hand, be produced by Non-perception, as it partly includes existence 
 [so far as the spot of ground is concerned ;] — hence we must accept 
 the senses as the cause of determinate cognition. J 
 
 XXII. [The opponent may, however, raise an objection to our 
 last argument,] a. " Why may we not say that Non-perception, [al- 
 though it does not produce the determinate cognition,] produces the 
 [indeterminate] cognition of the absence of the jar, and then follows 
 the cognition of the spot of ground as possessing the absence of the 
 jar, [which latter cognition is produced by the senses, acting by a 
 transcendental relation calledy«a?2«Z«Z:s7/««(7,] just as the transcenden- 
 tal perception by the eye that ' sandal wood is sweet'§ is said to follow 
 the perception of its sweetness by the proper sense, i. e. that of smell ; 
 and in this way non-perception may be called an instrumental cause as 
 producing the cognition of absence. By examining a determinate percep- 
 tion we are compelled to infer that the object must be first perceived 
 indeterminately and is then subsequently perceived determinately by 
 the senses, h. Again, how can we be said to have any proper ' sense- 
 
 * As when a jaundiced eye does not see a wliite shell but a yellow one. See 
 sv{pra, p. 27, note. 
 
 f I. e. this spot of gi'ound has the absence of a jar, — see supra, p. 20, note. 
 
 j By the opponent's opinion this particular determinate pci-ceptiou can be 
 produced neither by inJ/riya nor by anupahxhdhi ; but according to ours there is 
 no difficulty, as indriya is equally the insti'umental cause in cases of hlidva 
 and ahhdva, the difference being that in the former indriya-scmyoga, in the latter 
 anupo.laJjdJii, is the concurrent. 
 
 § This is the so-called jndna-lalshand which takes j^lace where one sense 
 supplies a pei'ccption which is properly given by another. (Cf. Chasha-jiari- 
 chhoda, si. 64.) It is said to cognize the object (as saii/rahha,) per sc, apart from 
 any thing connected with it, antl is thus distinguished from tlie sdiadnya-lalishand 
 which cognizes all the cognate objects under the form of the species, as definitely 
 perceived in the individual object, e. g. all jars past, present, and future, as 
 possessing the species of this jar. Buih. arc trunbcendeutul (idaukilM) perceptions.
 
 55 
 
 perception' of non-existence since it has no direct connection with the 
 senses ? for the only relation which ahscnce could be said to be capable 
 of, i. e. that called the vis' eshanatd samhandlia^ cannot but involve 
 another relation simultaneously existing with it. Hence we must allow 
 that the instrument [in the cognition of ahlidv(i\ cannot but be our 
 unavoidably assumed Non-perception, and not any one of the senses." 
 He replies, 
 
 XXII. From the cognition of the distinguishing mark, 
 if such is accepted,— from the superfluousness of the 
 assumed proof, if such is not accepted, — from the 'in 
 infinitum regressus' if we assume another relation ; and 
 if you do not accept my view, any other explanation is 
 untenable. 
 a. Those who hold that the cognition of the ' distinguishing mark,' — 
 i. e. the cognition of the counterentity,t — is the cause of the percep- 
 tion of alhara, must also hold that there can never be an indeterjni- 
 nate cognition of abhdva at all, since we find in this case the means 
 for producing determinate cognition only ;J but in the perception of 
 a real object, as a jar, there must be first the indeterminate cognition 
 alone, since at that moment there can be no cognition of the distin- 
 guishing mark as distinguishing, [i. e. g1iatatwa\ which is the cause 
 of the subsequent determinate cognition, b. But those who hold 
 that we can perceive abhava apart from its counterentity, \i. e. with- 
 out bringing in the idea of any relation between them,] can also al- 
 low that we have an indeterminate perception o? abJidva; and as 
 this can be easily derived from the senses like any other case of in- 
 determinate perception, it follows that the supposition of Non-percep- 
 tion as a distinct proof is superfluous. 
 
 c. " From the * in infinitum regressus,' if we assume another rela- 
 tion." The relation called ' the nature of the thing' and not any new 
 
 * Vis' eslmnatd means * the state of being a vi'seshana or distinguishing mark 
 or property ;' thus the jar on a given spot is the distinguishing peculiarity of that 
 Bpot, and there are thus two relations wliich the jar holds to its site, that of 
 * distinguishing' {vis' e si w no id) and that of ' contact' (sanyoya). But since iu 
 ahlidva there is no such second relation, we have no right to suppose the first. 
 The Naiyayikas, however, hold that tliis is really included iu the sivarwpa sani' 
 handha, see supra, p. 13, note. 
 
 f The avachchheda or vis'eshana, in the phrase ghatdhhdva, is of course 
 the counterentity or pratiyo(]i, i. e. ghata. 
 
 X In the indeterminate, you have not as yet the idea of the relation of ' dis- 
 tinguishing' and ' distinguished,' — see p. 21, note.
 
 56 
 
 categ'orv, is really the only relation existing between the ahhuva and 
 its site, — since tlie assumption of such a relation here as a special vis'e' 
 sliamtd* would certainly lead to an endless succession of relations ;t 
 and hence we must accept such a relation as that called ' the nature 
 of the thing,' [and this being sui generis requires no second relation]. 
 [If you ask " how can abhdva be an object of sense perception at all,'* 
 we reply,] that its sense-perception is possible because the relation 
 between the eye and its object, which is necessary in every act of 
 perception, is here fultillcd (in the case of an absent jar,) at second 
 hand by the relation between the spot of ground and the said absence, 
 which we call the distinguishing relation. J 
 
 d. If you do not accept my explanation of this swariqja relation 
 between the jar's absence and its site, then it will be extremely 
 difficult to establish any other principle, even on your hypothesis that 
 a proof called Xon-perception is an instrumental cause. For to explain 
 more fully, — all allow that no proof or source of right knowledge 
 [and therefore- not even your own Xon-perception.] can apprehend 
 any thing subsequently which was not originally an object of indeter- 
 minate cognition, § and thus even in inference, &o., we all admit that 
 there must have been some previous indeterminate cognition of fire, 
 &.c.,\\ [and therefore there must be an indeterminate cognition of 
 abhdva, and this can only be caused by the senses alone.] Again, 
 the very phrase, ' a site of ground possessing the jar's abhdva'' compels 
 our opponents to admit some relation between the abhdva and the site 
 [and this can only be that called swanqm, which we have previously 
 established.] 
 
 * Understanding by it a separate relation from sifarupa. 
 
 f I. e. just as the relation of contact requires another relation, i. e that of 
 intimate relation, so this relation would reqiure a relation to connect it with its 
 related subjects, and so on. The Nyaya holds that sainavdya and ahhdca abide 
 in their subjects by the simrujoa sarnbandha only. 
 
 X The spot being distinguished by the absence of the jar, fjliatdhlidvavad 
 hTiutalam. This will be clearer to the reader if he will compare the description 
 in the Siddhanta Muktavali, p. 51, how the eye sees the jar by direct contact, 
 its form by the intimate relation existing between the jar iuid its qualities, and 
 the form's species {rv.patt>-a) by the intimate relation between that species and 
 
 the ri({pa. It may be illustrated algebraically -j (a + t) + c | -f (/. 
 
 § The indetei-minatc knowledge is neither irramd nor hhrama, and therefore 
 tliere is no 'pravuda.i for its production. 
 
 i| Similarly in testimony, before we can understand the sentence Devadatto 
 [facii'-V.iwti, {i. e. Devadatto ganiavakartd asti)j wc must have hud an indetermi- 
 nate cognition of Devadatta and garimna.
 
 57 
 
 XXII T. He thus sums up the substance of the chapter. 
 
 XXII T. Paralysed in their power bj^ necessarily looking 
 to His countenance^* the various proofs, — Perception 
 and the rest, — fail even to attain their proper nature,t 
 and the threatened rise of contradiction is utterly crush- 
 ed down j to Him, then, the one to whom all are sub- 
 ject, who delights in the sportive exercise, unrivalled 
 and independent, of His almighty power, — to Him, the 
 god even of gods, we betake ourselves with our highest 
 faith aroused. 
 
 " Paralysed in their power by necessarily looking to His counte- 
 nance," i. e. their force precluded by positive arguments which prove 
 the subject's actual existence. ' He delights in the sportive exercise 
 of his power,' since He is the one primary cause of the absence of 
 pain. J 
 
 * They depend on God, as otherwise, by § 2, the inference would be baseless 
 without a subject; and this defect is only removed by the inference itself 
 being overthrown — in other words the ds'raydsidAM is only avoided by Iddlio.. 
 
 t They cease to be ' proofs' at all. 
 
 X Cf. the definition of Final Libei'ation in the Nj'-aya Sutras, I. 22 as ' abso- 
 lute deliverance from pain.'
 
 58 
 
 FOURTH CLUSTER. 
 
 I. The fourtli objection was tliat even if God did exist, he could 
 not be a cause of right knowledge to us. " God cannot be an au- 
 thority to us, because he has no right knowledge, as his knowledge 
 lacks the indispensable characteristic of cognizing an object uncog- 
 nized before ;* hence he neither possesses right knowledge himself 
 nor can produce it in us, and who would trust the words of a being 
 who cannot be a cause of right knowledge ?" He replies, 
 
 I. Cognizing for tlie first time is no true mark_, as it is 
 both too narrow and too wide ; w^e hold right knowledge 
 to be an independent impression w^hich corresponds to 
 the reality. 
 
 Your ' cognizing an object uncognized before' is not an indispen- 
 sable characteristic mark of right knowledge, as it fails to apply in 
 such an affirmative instance as repeated knowledge \_i. e. seeing a 
 thing a second or third time], and wrongly applies to such a nega- 
 tive instance as the erroneous judgment that 'this [nacre before me] 
 is silver.' He then gives his own detinition in the second line. The 
 ancient Pandits did not apply the term ' right knowledge' to remem- 
 brance, because it is necessarily ' dependent,' as it has the same object 
 as the original impression which produced it, and therefore its au- 
 thoritativeness must stand or fall with that of its originator. Hence 
 he adds the epithet 'independent.' 
 
 II. " a. But" (reply the opponents) we may deny that our defi- 
 nition is too narrow as not applying to repeated knowledge. We 
 maintain that cognition must produce a particular quality, [_i. e. 
 cognizedness,] residing in the object,t — otherwise there would not be 
 
 * The P. Mi'mansa concludes that as God must always know, his knowledge 
 would not fall under the definition of ' right knowledge.' They deny that remem- 
 brance can be right knowledge ; the other schools generally allow that it is a 
 kind of prama but not independent. 
 
 t The Sanskrit reader will observe that this is the opinion of the Bhatta Mi- 
 mansakas in the S. Muktavali, p. 118. They hold that all cognition is super-
 
 69 
 
 in cognition the definite distinguishing of the object, \_i. e. that this 
 thing is cloth and not a jar ;] and hence, even in repeated cognition, 
 we have ' the cognizing of a thing before uncognized,' [since each 
 separate act of cognition on our part produces anew this particular 
 influence or qualit}^ in the object, and this therefore is ever cognized 
 anew.] b. [Again, 3'ou would prove the existence of God by tlie 
 argument that the creation of the world must imply a previous 
 knowledge of the material cause, — i. e. the atoms, out of which it was 
 made, — from the very nature of effects, since all effects, as jars, &c., im- 
 ply such a knowledge ; and as this knowledge is not found in indivi- 
 dual souls, it must belong to the Supreme Soul. But we would meet 
 this by proposing a dilemma.] When you talk of ' God's know- 
 ledge of the world's material cause,' do you allow that this knowledge 
 produces this particular quality of cognizedness in its object or not ? 
 If you allow it, then you must also concede a second similar quality 
 of cognizedness, residing in the knowledge itself, in order to distin- 
 guish definitely that it is the knowledge of the material cause, [i. e. 
 to know that he knows it,] and this again will necessitate a third 
 and so on,— thus we have a regressus in infinitum. If you do not 
 allow it, then your alleged reason (or middle term) ' the very nature 
 of effects' fails from being too general, — since in this very instance 
 ' cognizedness' is an effect and yet you own that it is not produced 
 by a previous knowledge of the material cause. Hence we cannot 
 admit that the existence of God is proved as the Maker of the 
 world." He replies, 
 
 II. In the absence of the object^s real nature to distin- 
 guish it, it would be useless to seek help [from cogni- 
 zedness ;] and even supposing that, without this (nature), 
 you might succeed in an existing object, yet what could 
 you do in a non-existing ? 
 The especial nature of the thing is that which definitely distin- 
 
 sensuous ; but after the cognition of a jar there is produced in the jar a quahty 
 called cognizedness, — this cognizedness becomes an object of perception in the 
 form ' this jar is cognized by me ;' hence I infer the existence of the cognition 
 from its effect, and I also at the same time infer the coiTectness of the cogni- 
 tion. The Nyaya holds that the three steps, 1, knowledge, 2, consciousness or 
 knowing the knowledge (anuvyavasdya,) and 3, the knowledge of its coiTectness 
 are successive ; the Mimansa holds that the two last are simultaneous and in 
 fact identical. 
 
 I 2
 
 60 
 
 guisbes the object [so that we determine it to be not a jar but 
 cloth ;] otherwise there would be no definite distinction, even though 
 vour quality of ' cognizedness' had been communicated to it. And 
 again, even although we granted that 'cognizedness' is pro- 
 duced in the case of an existing object, yet it could not arise in 
 the case of a non-existing object, [as e. g. a jar now destroyed,] 
 since its material cause, [i. e. that object,] would be non-existent ; and 
 hence it would follow that here, at any rate, there would be nothing 
 definite to distinguish the object. We therefore conclude that a 
 thing's special nature is that which alone definitely distinguishes it. 
 
 TIT. " But may we not apply the general rule, ' an action must 
 produce some effect on its object,' and hold that the action of cogni- 
 tion similarly produces a quality residing in its object ?" He replies, 
 
 III. ^ Action^ cannot serve you as a reason to prove any- 
 new quality [such as ' cognizedness/] since it is either 
 too general or falsely assumed; nor will perception 
 prove it, since it shews that cognition is itself the 
 distinguishing connection. 
 
 a. If vou mean by ' action' the signification of the verbal root, then, 
 as in such an instance as ' he unites his arrow to the sky' there is no 
 effect produced by the action on its object the [impassive] sky, your 
 assumed reason is too general, h. If you mean by ' action' the opera- 
 tion of the instrumental cause,* then again also your reason will be 
 too general, as no effect is produced on the jars by the contact of the 
 oro-ans of perception therewith, c. If you say that ' action' means 
 motion, then, as cognition is not a motion at all, your reason is falsely 
 assumed in the subjeet.f d. " But may we not say that such phrases 
 as 'the jar is cognized,' 'the jar is intuitively known,' &c., shew that 
 perception is the proof of this very quality of cognizedness ?" [as 
 ' cognized,' &c., really mean ' possessed of cognizedness,' &c.] He 
 replies by the second line of the s'loka. Wherever you have a de- 
 
 * Cf. Bhasha P. 'si. 58. and supra, p. 13, note. 
 
 f Sv:arupdsiddhi is that fallacy where the assumed middle term is not pre- 
 sent in the subject or minor term, as ' the lake has fire, because it has smoke.' 
 In the present case the argiament is ' cognition produces an effect on its object 
 from the very fact that it belongs to the class action,' action being defined to 
 piean ' motion.'
 
 61 
 
 finitely distinguished cognition, you have as its object the distin- 
 guishing attribute, the thing distinguished, and the connection which 
 exists between them ; and this connection may sometimes be 
 that of contact [as in such cases as ' the spot of ground possessing a 
 jar on it ;'] in others it may be the connection constituted by the 
 nature of the things connected.* Now just as we see in such [re- 
 versed] phrases as 'the cognition of the jar'f [where the jar is that 
 which distinguishes the cognition, and the Mimtinsakas allow that 
 their cognizedness only resides in an object and not in the cognition,] 
 that the latter kind of connection is that which exists between the 
 cognition and the jar, so the same connection appears to be found in 
 such phrases as 'the jar is cognized' [where the cognition is that 
 which distinguishes the jar;]:]. Otherwise, if this were not the con- 
 nection, you would have to assume in such cases as ' the jar is desir- 
 ed,' 'the jar is produced,' novel connections such as ' desiredness' and 
 producedness.' 
 
 IV. [If the opponent reply, " why should we assume these novel 
 connections ? The well known swarupa-sambandha, i. e. the connec- 
 tion constituted by the nature of the things, will suffice in these 
 cases ;" to meet this] he now proceeds to shew that the swarupa- 
 samhandha will equally serve in the original case of dispute, [i. e. 
 the same connection which holds in such cases as ' the jar is made,' 
 *the jar is desired,' &q., will equally hold in ' the jar is cognized.'] 
 
 IV. The cognition is distinguished by its object alone^ 
 since the cognitions themselves have no definite form to 
 distinguish them from each other; and in the common 
 phrases abont the objects of actions it is the verb which 
 distinguishes. 
 
 Just as [in such phrases as ' a cognition of the jar'] we have the 
 knowledge distinguished by its object the jar, [i. e. it is that which 
 
 * See note, p. 13. 
 
 t Here all agree that the cogTiition does Bot reside by intimate connection (as 
 the geuus in its individuals,) nor by contact (as the jar on the gi-ound ;) and 
 therefore by exhaustion it must be the vislmyatd-samhandha. Glmta-jndyiam 
 therefore means vishayatayd ghatavad jnciiiam, and similarly jna^o ghatah means 
 vishayatayd jndna-vis'ishto ghatah. 
 
 X The Munansa holds that jndtald is a quality in the object, the Nyaya that it 
 is a swarujpa nainhandha between the jadiirx and the object.
 
 62 
 
 makes this cognition different from other cognitions ;] and just as 
 in common phrases about the objects of actions, as jars, &c., we have 
 the particuhir meaning of the verbal root as that which distinguish- 
 es the particular phrase [and thus makes it diifer from other similar 
 phrases,]* so too in such alleged cases as ' the jar is cognized,' it is 
 the cognition alone which distinguishes this particular knowledge in 
 regard to the jar, and it is not from an^^ other supposed attribute [as 
 your 'cognizedness']. 
 
 V. " May we not, however, still maintain that God's knowledge 
 is not properly ' riglit knowledge' (pramd) since it is not produced 
 by proof (pramuna ;) and therefore God can neither be a right 
 knower (^ramdta) Himself nor be a cause of right knowledge to us, 
 since the essential conditions for both are absent in Him r" He 
 replies, 
 
 Y. Eight knowledge is accurate comprehension and 
 right knowing is the possession thereof; authoritative- 
 ness is, according to Gotama^s school, the being separat- 
 ed from all absence thereof. f 
 Right knowledge is a notion corresponding to the object ; and this 
 is not inconsistent with God's knowledge, even though His know- 
 ledge be not produced [but eternal]. 'Right knowing' \i. e. the 
 being a right knower,] means the being connected with right know- 
 ledge by intimate relation, \i. e. that relation which connects a 
 substance and its qualities \X\ ^''^^ ^^^^ ^^'^ ^^ established of God, 
 even though He be not a cause of right knowledge to us. In the 
 same way God is an authority as being Himself ever connected with 
 right knowledge, i. e. as being ever ' separated from all absence 
 thereof.' There is no need to include as absolutely necessary in 
 your definition that He must be an instrument of right knowledge 
 to others, since God's authoritativeness is thus declared in the Xya- 
 ya Sutras, (II. 68.) " The fact of the Yeda being an authority, [i. e. 
 an instrument of right knowledge,] like the spells [against poison, &c.,] 
 
 * Thus in ' a jar is made,' ' a jar is broken, &c.,' — it is the verb which dis- 
 tinguishes the several sentences, 
 
 t J. e. there may be a partial pramd even in a case of error, (thus the jaundiced 
 perception is right as to the s^hell, though wrong as to its colour;) but irrdradnyOj 
 can never be found where there is anj', even only a partial, abs3nce of pramd. 
 
 X God is prarixdna-kartd, i. e. prarndtd, but kortd must n )t be taken in its 
 usual meaning (as his knowledge is eternal,) but in that of d^'raya^
 
 63 
 
 and the medical science, follows from the authoritativeness of tlie 
 fit person [who gave it"]. Nor need you ohject that this will lead 
 to God's being a fifth cause of right knowledge, (p7'amana) and thus 
 our old division of four pramdnas will be violated, — because our old 
 division will still hold as applying to instrionental causes of right 
 knowledge, [and the Veda, our fourth pramdna, is God's instru- 
 ment]. Nor need you object that " God's knowledge [if He be 
 omniscient] will embrace error [as well as truth,] and apprehend the 
 objects of error [as well as those of truth,] and therefore will itself 
 be liable to the imputation of error," — since the nature of right 
 knowledge is not violated so long as the knowledge is not associated 
 with a contradictory object, \i. e. so long as I do not apprehend 
 silver in what is not silver but nacre]. Now it is an actual fact that 
 in error there is a definite object, as nacre, and also that it is viewed 
 under the notion of silver ; and God's right knowledge cannot be 
 impaired by his apprehending this fact. 
 
 VI. He now gives a s'loka recapitulating the purport of the 
 Chapter. 
 
 YI. He^ in whose intuitive unerring perception, insepar- 
 ably united to Him and dependent on no foreign inlets, 
 the succession of all the various existing objects is con- 
 tained, — all the chaff of our suspicion being swept away 
 by the removal of all possible faults as caused by the 
 slightest want of observation in Him, — He, 'Siva, is my 
 authority ; what have I to do with others, darkened as 
 their authority must ever be with rising doubts ? 
 
 " The succession of all the various existing objects" — i. e. all the 
 world is the object of God's perception. " All possible faults," as 
 partiality, aversion, &c. " All the chaff of our suspicion is swept 
 away," — all our suspicion as to the Veda's want of authority. 
 *' Others," i, e. heretics.
 
 64 
 
 FIFTH CLUSTER. 
 
 1. The fifth objection was ' from the absence of positive proof/ 
 " May we not say that there are no proofs to establish God's exist- 
 ence ?" He replies, 
 
 I. From effects, combination, support, &c., traditional 
 arts, authoritativeness, 'Sruti, the sentences thereof, 
 and particular numbers, — an everlasting omniscient 
 Being is to be established. 
 
 a. The earth, &c., must have had a maker because they have the 
 nature of ' effects,'* like a jar ; by a thing's having a maker we 
 mean that it is produced by some agent who possesses the wish to 
 make, and has also a perceptive knowledge of the material cause out 
 of which it is to be madcf &. ' Combination' is an action, and 
 therefore the action which produced the conjunction of two atoms, 
 initiating the binary compound, at the beginning of a creation, must 
 have been accompanied by the volition of an intelligent being, 
 because it has the nature of an action, like the actions of bodies 
 such as ours. c. ' Support, &c.' The world depends upon some 
 being who possesses a volition which hinders it from falling, because 
 it has the nature of being supported, like a stick supported by a bird 
 in the air ; by being supported we mean the absence of falling in the 
 ease of bodies possessing weight. By the ' &c.,' we include destruc- 
 tion. Thus the world can be destroyed by a being possessed of 
 volition, because it is destructible, like cloth which is rent. d. ' From 
 traditional arts.' Pada [which is not used here in its usual sense 
 of ' word,' see wfra § v.] is derived from the root jjada, i. e. ' that by 
 
 * This is proved because the world consists of parts whicli are arranged in a 
 certain way and are severally produced and destroyed, (see Sarva D. Sangraba, 
 p. 81, last line). 
 
 The argument from Kdnjativa is really the same as that employed by Chalmers 
 (in his Natural Theology,) to rebut Hume's objection to the a posteriori argu- 
 ment on the ground that the world is only a singular effect. 
 
 t Cf, Bhasha Tarichchheda, § 149,
 
 65 
 
 which something is known,' i. e. the traditional arts of mankind. 
 The traditional arts now current, as that of making cloth, &c., 
 must have been originated by an independent being,* from the 
 very fact that they are traditional usages like the tradition of 
 modern modes of writingt [invented by men independently, as 
 systems of short-hand, &c.] e. ' From authoritativeness.' The 
 knowledge produced by the Veda is produced by a virtue residing in 
 its cause, J because it is right knowledge, just as is the case in the 
 right knowledge produced by perception &c.§ f. * From S'ruti,' i. e. 
 the Veda. The Veda must have been produced by a person from its 
 having the nature of a Veda|| like the Ayur-veda (i. e. the upaveda 
 so called, treating of medical science ) g. Again, the Veda must 
 have been produced by a person because it has the nature of ' sen- 
 tences,' like the Mahabharata ; or, in other words, the sentences of 
 the Veda were produced by a person because they have the nature 
 of sentences, just as the sentences of beings like ourselves, h, ' From 
 particular numbers.' The measure of a binary compound is produced 
 by number since it is a derived [i. e. not eternal] measure and at 
 the same time is not produced by measure or aggregation,^ like the 
 measure of a jar composed of three kapdlas which is larger than that 
 of one composed of two such kapdlas [and this increase can only be 
 due to numher, as the kapdlas in themselves are all equal ;] for the 
 
 * Sioatantratwam is defined as asmacliya-vyavaMrdnddhina-vyavahdra-'kar- 
 tritwatii, 
 
 f The Hindus liold that the Devanagari alphabet is of divine, wliile Bengali, 
 Persian, &c. are of human, origin. — There is a current s'loka of Brihaspati, 
 
 \» 
 
 X See Bhasha P. §§ 130-3. Wrong knowledge or error is produced by a fault 
 in its cause, as jauudice, &c. in the eye ; and right knowledge is produced by a 
 guna or vii*tue, (like Aristotle's ocpdaX/xov aperr) or jSeXTiarr] elis). This virtue in 
 the case of the Veda is its quality of being uttered by a fit person, i. e. one pos- 
 sessing a true knowledge of words and meanings. 
 
 § Some say that the g-una here is the absence of jaundice, &c., others the 
 direct contact of the organ with a true object. 
 
 1] By Nyaya Silt. ii. 68, we learn that ' that is Veda where the fact of being a 
 cause of right knowledge is admitted.' 
 
 ^ Cf. Bhasha P. § 110. The iufinitesimality of atoms is eternal.
 
 66 
 
 measure of an atom* does not produce measure because its measure 
 is eternal [and therefore incapable of change] or because it is the 
 measure of an atom. Hence at the beginning of a creation there 
 must be the number of duality abiding in the atoms, which is the 
 cause of the measure of the binary compound, but this number cannot 
 be produced at that time by the distinguishing perception of beings 
 like ourselves. Therefore we can only assume this distinguishing 
 faculty as then existing in God.f — By the last words of the text it is 
 meant that it is the Being, possessed of this attribute [of omniscience,] 
 who is everlasting,^ and hence is established his eternal omniscience. 
 II. " a. But may we not say that inasmuch as only one pos- 
 sessed of a body can be a maker, the existence of Grod is precluded 
 as the distinguishing attribute of a maker is precluded ? h. We have 
 also the contrary syllogism, that we cannot allow the earth, &c. to have 
 been produced by a maker, as there is the absence of the being produced 
 by a body which invariably accompanies the being produced by a 
 maker, c. There is also an opposing universal proposition, viz. that 
 only one possessed of a body can be a maker, d. By the induction 
 
 * Ibid. § 14. The atoms of Hindu philosophy, being infinitesimal, woxild only 
 produce still smaller totalities (like multiplied fractions or added negative quan- 
 tities) as measure can only produce a further result homogenous with itself. It 
 is the tertiary compound, which, as having finite magnitude fmahattiva,) pro- 
 duces measure, just as the jar's measure is caused by that of its two halves. 
 
 t To understand this argument, we must remember that the K'yaya holds that 
 all number beyond unity is produced in tilings by an eSbrtofour mind, — in nature 
 all things exist singly, and it is we who combine them into sets of two, three, or 
 more at our pleasure. The first operation is that distinguishing perception 
 called aijelcsJidbuddlii, by which we say of each thing, ' this is one,' ' this is one,' 
 &c. This produces duality, &o. in the objects, as e. g. in two jars, which duality 
 resides by intimate relation in each of the objects, but resides in both by a pecu- 
 liar connection called jparydiM — it is this last which gives the idea of " two 
 pots," and not merely that of one pot possessing duality here and another 
 possessing it there. As the binary compound only differs from the atom by 
 number and not by measure or size, (as both are, as far as we are concerned, 
 alike infinitesimal, however one may be i-eally larger than the other,) we must 
 have recoui'seto the Supreme Being's apekshdhuddhi to account for the existence 
 of number in the binary compound at the time of creation. The smallest per- 
 ceptible size is the tertiary compound, consisting of three binaiy ones. See 
 Colebrooke, i. p. 278. It is singular that the Nyaya should adopt such a concep- 
 tualistic view of number, while it yet holds such realistic notions of genus. 
 
 ;|; There are two kinds of ojivaya or logical connection, vis'islita-vidhayd and 
 upalakshaiia vidhayd. The former is where the epithet is emphatic and is 
 therefore never disjoined from the subject ; the latter is where the emphasis is 
 laid on the subject and the epithet or predicate may be sometimes separated. 
 (Thus Pliidias the sculptor is not always actually sculpturing.) In the present 
 case the epithet ' everlasting' belongs to the former class and can never be 
 sepai-atcd from its subject the Supreme Being as distinguished by the attribute 
 of omniscience, and this attribute is therefore everlasting.
 
 67 
 
 which extends over every case presented by experience [as jars, &c.,] we 
 infer that a maker must have a body, but by the relation existing 
 in the present argument between the minor term earth, &c. and the 
 major term it would appear that the maker is incorporeal [as no 
 maker is in this case perceptible] — hence the possibility of the al- 
 leged major term is unproved, and there is also a mutual contradic- 
 tion between the subject, [maker,] and the attribute ascribed to it, 
 [incorporeal.] e. We may also establish the fallacy of a too gene- 
 ral middle term by inserting the condition § " from being produced 
 by a corporeal agent" instead of the old middle " from being an 
 effect," Thus there are five separate fallacies involved by the alleged 
 middle term." He replies, 
 
 II. There is no precluding, as this, [our middle term,] is 
 indispensable ; nor are there any valid counterarguments, 
 as those alleged are too weak ; whether our assumed con- 
 nection be established or overthrown, there is no mutu- 
 al contradiction ; nor can you have a too general middle 
 term, without any reason for it. 
 
 a. Because the possession of a body is precluded in the case of 
 the subject [sc. the Supreme Being,] it does not follow that his 
 possession of the attribute of being a maker is precluded, since 
 * this,' i. e. our middle term ( — " having the nature of an effect" — ) 
 which necessarily establishes the existence of the subject [as every 
 effect implies a cause] is too powerful to be set aside, as it is 
 this which must undoubtedly be looked to as producing the know- 
 ledge of the subject at all, and without the knowledge of the 
 subject, as we have previously proved, [in III. § ii.] it is im- 
 possible to establish the knowledge of non-existence. And thus 
 there is no such pretended perception as would preclude the existence 
 of God because his distinguishing attribute as maker is precluded. 
 Nor again is there any such precluding inference as " God cannot be 
 a maker because he has no body," [since in your opinion the very 
 existence of God is unproved, and how then can you discuss his attri- 
 butes ?] 
 
 b. We cannot admit as a valid opposing argument " the earth, 
 
 * For JJpddM, the condition wliicli must be supplied to restrict a too general 
 middle term, see sit;pra, p. 37.
 
 G8 
 
 &c, are destitute of a maker because they were not produced by a 
 body," because your middle term is fallacious as assuming too much, 
 since the words ' by a body' are superfluous.* 
 
 c. The middle term in our argument, " having the nature of aa 
 effect," is more valid than that of the opposite argument ['' the earth, 
 &c., are not produced by a maker from their not being produced by a 
 body,"] because ours is supported b}^ its being actually found as an 
 attribute of the minor term [earth, &c.], and there is also an argument 
 to stop any certain negative instance ;t while on the other hand your 
 alleged universal proposition " only one possessed of a body can be a 
 maker," is too weak to stop us [as it is not found as an actual attribute 
 of the minor term and there is moreover no such acknowledged prin- 
 ciple.] 
 
 d. If by the connection existing between the minor and major 
 terms it be established that the maker is incorporeal, then there is 
 no contradiction, since in that case it is understood that being a 
 maker may coexist with incorporeality ; and, again, if it be not esta- 
 bHshed, then, even in this case, there is no contradiction, [i. e. your 
 alleged fault falls to the ground,] from the want of any subject in 
 which it is to abide. 
 
 e. Since there is an argument on our side by which to pre- 
 clude any certain negative instance, there cannot be here such an 
 inconclusiveness as a mistake as to the major premiss caused 
 by the absence of any such precluding argument, i. e. the fallacy of a 
 too general middle term ; and moreover your pretended ' condition/ 
 " produced by a body" — is itself overthrown by the absence of any 
 argument on t/oid' side to preclude a negative instance. J 
 
 III. " But may we not bring forward the opposing argument, that 
 ' if God were a maker he would have a body ?' while at the same time 
 there is no argument of equal weight to support your view." He replies, 
 
 * The older Naiyayikas maintained that the argument " the mountain has 
 fire because it has blue smoke" involved the fallacy of vyapyatwasiddhi, because 
 the alleged middle term was unnecessarily restricted. See Siddhanta Muktav. 
 p. 77. The moderns however moi-e wisely consider it as a harmless error, and 
 they would rather meet b. in the text by asserting that there is no proof to 
 establish the validity of the assumed middle term. 
 
 t I. e. wherever you have an effect, you iinist have a producing cause, — there- 
 fore you cannot have an effect without a maker, 
 
 X There are two readings here f^Xf ^^T^«(nV[T^«r ^^^^ f^^'^^T'^SfTT^rTT^^. 
 If we adopt the latter, it means " by the presence of an argument on our side 
 to preclude a negative instance."
 
 69 
 
 III. Our opponents^ arguments^ being' defective^ cannot 
 invalidate our reasoning by their fallaciousness, — while 
 the favourable argument from the abolition of effects 
 tells on our side. 
 
 These opposing arguments are ' fallacious' because they are siih- 
 jectless, so long as the existence of their subject, God, is itself un- 
 proved. But the argument " there could not be an effect without 
 a causer," is ' on our side.' There is also S'ruti to prove it, " I 
 am the origin of all, from me all proceeds."* And that S'ruti has 
 pre-eminent force which is supported by reasoning, according to the 
 verse, [of Manu,] " He, and none else, knows religion, who investigates 
 the Veda and the religious teaching of the Rishis by means of such 
 reasoning, as is not contrary to the Veda and the S'astras." 
 
 IV. " But how does the fact of a thing's being an effect neces- 
 sitate that it should have been produced by volition ?" He replies, 
 
 IV. If it [the atom] acts independently, it ceases to be 
 brute matter, — desert does not abolish visible causes ; 
 if there be no cause there is no effect ; a particular 
 effect has a particular cause. 
 
 There cannot be an effect without a causer. If the atom were 
 endued with volition it would follow that the atom was intelligent, 
 since an unintelligent thing can produce an effect only when impelled 
 by an intelligent being ; and desert [or fate] can only produce effects 
 by the concurrence of visible causes.f Nor may you say that " the 
 volition of the conscious agent is the cause in effort J only and not in 
 all action generally," because even though a particular kind of voli- 
 tion may be the cause in the case of effort, this does not preclude 
 volition generally as the cause of action generally ; otherwise, because 
 a particular seed is the cause of a particular shoot, it would follow 
 that seeds in general [_i, e. the class, seed] could not be the causes of 
 shoots in general. § 
 
 * Bhagavad Gita, x. 8. 
 
 t Otherwise all things would be produced by desert alone, and all other 
 causes would be superfluous. 
 
 X There is a memorial verse, ^T^5J^T ^'^f^'^T T'^T^^T Vfiw^ ??%• I 
 lif?r5J^T vi^€T ^Sm^T Vriw f^^T H IchckUd is chalcirshd, krlti is yatna or 
 * volition.' 
 
 § This argument depends on two principles, — a. the same relation of cause
 
 70 
 
 V. " But what is the proof tliat support, &c. (§ i.) are produced 
 by volition ?" He replies, 
 
 V. In tliis way ' support' and ' destruction' require 
 no limiting condition because they are effects ; and the 
 same thing holds of ^ traditional arts' and ' authoritative- 
 ness, &c/ through an interruption [of the tradition] . 
 
 * Support' and ' destruction' do not require any limiting condition 
 [i. e. they are not too general middle terms,] because they are pro- 
 duced by volition \i. e. inasmuch as they are effects, they involve 
 volition by § iv,] Since, through the interruption of the tradition, — 
 i. e. through a partial destruction of the world [as of one loka,] — 
 there is an absence of all patterns, &c. the succeeding copier cannot 
 himself be the origin of the tradition since he does not know the 
 ti'adition ; hence is established the existence of some being who, at 
 the beginning of a creation, originated the various traditional arts, as 
 of making jars, &c.* In the same way we may prove that the 
 authoritativeness of the ideas produced by the Yeda, &c. are not too 
 general middle terms, [Cf. § xvi. infra.'] 
 
 YI. Or we may interpret the first couplet of this Chapter in the 
 following manner. 
 
 a. ' Effect ' may mean ' purport' \i. e. the ' effect' to be produced 
 on the hearer's mind ;] it has been said that words are authoritative 
 only in reference to their purport, and therefore he is God whose 
 purport is declared in the Yeda. 
 
 b, ' Combination' may mean ' explanation ;' the Yedas must have 
 been explained by some one who knew their meaning, since their 
 sentences have been received by great saints ; and, if they had not 
 been explained, these saints, not knowing their meaning, would not 
 have fulfilled their injunctions by sacrifice, &c., and if a finite being 
 had explained them, his explanation could not have been relied on. 
 
 and effect which exists between particulars exists likewise between theii- re- 
 spective classes ^^ f^^^^y: ^r^^TK^WI"^^rr^ ^TiIT^^TX:fg and 6. the 
 general causes only produce their eftects when conjoined with the particular 
 causes, ^^T^'^T^^I f^^^^T^^^f^^^ ^T^* oj^^fcT. Thus Archbishop 
 Whately has made a book on Logic, — man can therefore make logical books 5 
 only in each particular case we requh-e the concurrents, education, leisure, &c, 
 
 * See su]jra, p. 28. It is interesting to compare this with Isaiah xxviii. 26. 
 Cf. also the Greek legend of Triptolemus, and Whately's Lectures on Pol. 
 Economy, pp. 79, 84.
 
 71 
 
 c. * Support' may mean ' preserving the tradition.' The &c. may 
 inchide * performance.' 
 
 d. The existence of God is also established by the meaning 
 of the ' words' I's'wara, ' &c.,* as has been said, " Denominationf 
 is purport, the explanation of an all-seeing one is valid ; the 
 words I's'wara, &c. must have a meaning in accordance with the 
 custom of mankind." ' Denomination' here implies a particular 
 kind of wish. In the same way in such verses as " I am the origin 
 of all" the word " I" means an independent utterer, since even in 
 secular matters that word alone has authoritativeness which possesses 
 a definite meaning ; and in accordiince with the rule, " he who 
 knows secular things knows Vaidic also," the same rule holds in a 
 transcendental subject which holds in the case of a secular ' I,' &c. 
 e. The word irratijaya which we formerly rendered ' authoritative- 
 ness' may also mean ' affix,' i. e. the affix of the imperative implying 
 * let' [as in ' let him sacrifice ;'] the meaning of the command has 
 been defined as ' the will of a fit person ;' and He whose will it is, 
 is God.+ 
 
 VI. Activity is really volition, fyafnaj and this springs 
 from the desire to act, and this from knowledge, and the 
 object of this knowledge is a command, or [as we would 
 hold] it is rather that which causes a command to be 
 inferred. 
 
 After the knowledge produced by a command arises ' activity ;'§ 
 and this activity springs directly from a certain wish, i. e. ' the 
 desire to act ;' and this desire arises from the ' knowledge' that the 
 thing is to be accomplished by action and that it is the means to 
 obtain the desired end [happiness] ; and the object of this know- 
 ledofe is the fact that the thins' is to be done and is a means to our 
 obtaining the desired end, i. e. the fact of its being a command. 
 This was the opinion of the ancient Naiyayikas ; but he expresses his 
 
 * Tlie &c. includes Om, &c. 
 
 t Colebrooke translates uddes'a by ' enunciation,' — " tlio mention of a thing 
 by its name, — that is, by a term signifpng it, as taught by revelation ; for 
 language is considered to have been revealed to man." 
 
 X This interpretation of pratyaya leads to a long and intricate discussion on 
 vidhi which lasts to the end of § xiv. He goes on with his explanation of § i. 
 in § XV. — The first question is, since vidhi is 'pravartalm vdkya, what is pravritti ? 
 
 § Prayatna is divided into three kinds (Bliasha P. § 14S,)—]pravriUif 
 nivritti and jivana^Tidrana, i. e. activity, cessation from activity, and vitality.
 
 72 
 
 own in the last words of the couplet ' or rather it is that which causes 
 a command to be inferred,' i. e. the real meaning of the tense affix 
 expressing command is ' the will of a fit person,' which causes the 
 hearer to infer that to act accordingly will be the means to obtain 
 the desired end. 
 
 YII. He now proceeds to prove b}^ exhaustion what is the object 
 of that knowledge which causes that wish which produces activity, 
 \i. e. he here shews what it is not, his own view will be given in 
 § xiv.] 
 
 VII. [The various current notions of the meaning of 
 *" command^ are wrong ; thus] it cannot be an attribute 
 in the agent^ either from improper exclusion and 
 inclusion, — or because activity does not always ensue, 
 — or from the ensuing inconsistency, — or from the 
 non-existence of the action-producing wish, — or from 
 the involved uselessness [as a cause] of the knowledge 
 that such an action is a means, — or from confusion. 
 
 a. If vou say that an attribute in the agent, — muscular 
 action, — produces ' activity,' [and is therefore the meaning of 
 ' command,'] then it would follow that in such a command as ' let 
 him know the soul' we should properly have no activity at all, 
 while, on the other hand, on hearing such an indicative sentence 
 as ' he goes to the village' we should have activity produced 
 in the hearer, h. If you say that the real meaning of ' com- 
 mand' is ' volition,' then follows the fault that activity does not 
 always ensue ; since, although voUtion is also implied by other tense 
 sio-ns than those of the potential and imperative, yet no activity 
 follows if we do not ascertain that it is a means to a desired end, 
 or if we know that it is a means to an undesired end. 
 
 c. If you say that ' wish' \i. e. the agent's, as in ' let him who 
 desires swarga offer such a sacrifice'] is the proper meaning of ' com- 
 mand,' then you incur the fault of ' inconsistency.' If ' wish' be the 
 meaning of ' command,' then on the one hand the knowledge of the 
 wish [i. e. the knowledge of the command] can only be produced by 
 the previously existing wish [as all knowledge depends on the prior 
 existence of its object,] — while on the other hand the wish must be
 
 73 
 
 produced by the knowledge of the wish,* — ^henee you reason in a 
 circle, — which is called in the couplet, * inconsistency.' 
 
 d. But an opponent may reply that ' the abovementioned know- 
 ledge of the wish [i. e. the mere knowledge of the wish itself as im- 
 plied in the terms of the command ^ swargakamo yajeta^ this knowledge 
 of the meaning not being accompanied by any conscious ivish in the 
 person's own mind,] is produced by the tense affix,'t — to this he 
 replies, ' from the non-existence of the action-producing wish.' Even 
 if the knowledge of such a wish be produced, yet no activity will 
 ensue, as there is no such wish present as we defined in § vi. to be 
 the cause of activity, since only such a wish can produce activity 
 as is a cause by its own nature (and not simply from its being 
 Jcnowri),X and even on your own shewing there cannot be such a wish 
 at the time of hearing the tense affix of the command, but only that 
 knowledge of a wish which is produced by the spoken word. e. But it 
 may be replied " is not this very wish produced by the tense affix of the 
 command 'Ze^ him, &c. ?' " he replies, that the universally acknowledged 
 cause, knowledge, will be overthrown. The knowledge that the action 
 enjoined is a means to the desired end, which all accept as tlie 
 cause of the wish, will be in danger of being overthrown, as the effect 
 will be sometimes produced by the tense affix, even where this ac- 
 knowledged cause is not found. 
 
 f. But some may say that ' the meaning of the command is a 
 wish [for the end] produced in the mind of the agent by a knowledge 
 determined by happiness, &c-§ (as the ultimate fruit to be desh-ed) at 
 the time of hearing the command,' — he replies, ' this will cause con- 
 fusion.' All allow necessarily that the knowledge that the action is a 
 means to the desired end is the cause of the wish for the means \i. e. 
 the required action of sacrifice,] and as there is no other cause for 
 
 * I, e. you "will have a consecutive series, 1, ichchhd ; 2, ichchhd-jndna or vidhi' 
 jndna ; 3, ichchlid. The second ichchhd is ' the desire to act' of § vi. which arose 
 from the knowledge that such an action is commanded. — The true order is, 1. 
 ishta-sddhanatd-jndna ; 2. ichchhd, (updyechchhd ;) ^. pravritti. He here proves 
 that vidhi cannot mean the second ; he subsequently shews that it cannot be the 
 third. Udayana and the old Nyaya differ as to th.Q first, see § xiii. 
 
 t I. e. by S'ahda, not by ichchhd. 
 
 J There are two kinds of causes swarupa sat and jndta ; an example of the 
 former is ' eating is the cause of satisfying hunger,' of the latter * smoke is a cause 
 of fire (being inferred'). 
 
 § The &c., includes ' absence of pain.' The former fault will not apply here 
 as tlxis knowledge of the desire for the fruit tvill cause action, — if a man does not 
 desire heaven, the command Sivargakdmo yajeta is not a command to him.
 
 74 
 
 this knowledge that the action is the means to the desired end, 
 the tense sign of the command must be its cause ; — hence the know- 
 ledge of the wish for the end is not a cause of activity, as activity can 
 be found where it does not exist [if only the knowledge of the action's 
 being a means to a desired end exist ;] and hence there Avould be 
 confusion of the two causes, because your cause 'the knowledge of the 
 desire for the fruit' is always found accompanied by ony cause, ' the 
 knowledge that the action is a means to a desired end' [and as in 
 certain cases mine is found where yours is not found, mine will be 
 sufficient by itself and wdiy then need we bring in yours at all ?] 
 The commentator adds another objection in the fact that as there is 
 no proof that the knowledge of the wish for the fruit produces the 
 wish for the means, [this being produced by the knowledge that the 
 means will produce a desired end] it follow's that the former cannot be 
 the meaning conveyed by the tense affix of the command [because 
 this meaning whatever it be, must necessitate action]. 
 
 VIII. " Well, but why not say that the knowledge of volition 
 [as implied in the potential used imperatively] is alone that which 
 sets men in action, but that no tense-sign besides this does express 
 volition, since all the other tense-signs express only an operation in 
 accordance with the meaning of the root ? For we fmd this the case 
 in such instances as ' the chariot goes' [where we have an operation 
 but no volition."] He replies, 
 
 VIII. In consequence of the fixed rule about applying 
 the term ' maker' drawn from the distinction between the 
 use of the phrases ^ made' and ^ not made,^ making or ac- 
 tion means volition only ; and that action which is 
 causative in reference to a subsequent thing is the 
 meaning of the tense-sign. 
 In accordance with such phrases as ' the pot is made,' ' the shoot 
 is not made,' we may say that the potter, &c,, are makers but not 
 the other instrumental causes [as the wheel, &c.,] hence we may 
 say that the meaning of the root Kri is making or action, [i. e. 
 Jcriti, or volition.] — "But if so, would not the words 'volition' and 
 ' tense-sign,' be synonyms ? [as all tense signs can be resolved into 
 Icritit i. e. yafnaJ'^ He replies by the last paragraph. That making 
 or action, which is the means in reference to an actual sub-
 
 75 
 
 sequent end, is the meaning of tlie tense-sign, — i. e. the meaning 
 of the tense-sign is only a volition in accordance with the end. 
 Or (according to another view) the meaning of the tense-sign is a 
 volition which produces a repetition of the meaning of the root, in 
 the form of successively repeated operations in accordance with the 
 desired end, one following the other. In this way the tense-sign 
 will have three meanings, volition, accordance with the root and 
 successive repetition [while under the first view it will have only the 
 two first ; under either view, however, the tense-sign will involve more 
 than simple volition and therefore cannot he its synonym]. 
 
 IX. " But may we not allow that the root Kri may mean voli- 
 tion, and yet maintain that the tense-sign only means an operation 
 in accordance with the root, the volition being only understood by 
 an inference ?"* He replies, 
 
 IX. The meaniug of the tense-sign is a volition and this 
 applies to all tense-signs equally ; since by it all can be 
 clearly developed, and since the alleged inference can- 
 not be established. 
 
 As by ' it,' — i. e. making, or the word which expresses making 
 (Jcaroti) the meaning of the tense-sign is developed at length, as in 
 fcikam Icaroti^ ' he makes cooking' for pachati, ' he cooks,' — we must 
 have ' making,' i. e. volition, as the meaning of the tense-sign ; [and 
 again your supposed inference fails] since an operation in accordance 
 with the root does not always imply a volition, as an operation in 
 accordance with the root ' cook' in the present case can be found even 
 in an unintelligent thing [as in the wood, fire, pot, &c,, where of 
 course there can be no volition.] 
 
 "But, if so, why on hearing the objective case 'boiled rice,' do we 
 naturally require the sentence to be be filled up by ' he cooks' or ' he 
 eats ?' [On my hypothesis it is easily explained, as I maintain that all 
 tense-signs imply an operation in accordance with the root's meanino-, 
 and from this we can infer volition in this instance ; but on your 
 hypothesis, it is not so obvious."] This can be explained, in our 
 view, by the fact that an objective case is invariably accompanied bj 
 a volition [expressed by the tense-sign,] just as on the other hand 
 
 =* The inference will be in this form — wherever there is no volition there is 
 no operation in accordance with the root.
 
 76 
 
 on hearing the verb ' he cooks,' we naturally require the sentence to 
 be filled up by some object. 
 
 X. " But since by developing the full meaning we do obtain an 
 agent (as in ' he makes cooking' for ' he cooks') why should we not 
 say that the tense-sign signifies also an agent ?" He replies, 
 
 X. We must not suppose that the tense-sign directly 
 signifies [an agent,] as this which is connected with 
 number can be obtained by inference ; and in the ob- 
 taining of that which is connected with number, the 
 rule holds for that only which has expectancy. 
 We must not suppose that the tense-sign signifies an agent, since 
 this ' agent' is gained by an inference from the number expressed by 
 the tense-sign. What we mean by ' being gained by an inference' 
 is that something is qualified by the meaning of the tense-sign, while 
 at the same time it is expressed by a word ending in the nominative 
 case. We use the former phrase ' qualified by the meaning of the 
 tense-sign' to exclude such ambiguous cases as ' having eaten Deva- 
 datta goes away,' &c.,* and we use the latter phrase * while at the 
 same time, it is expressed by a word ending in the nominative case,' 
 because in such instances as ' it is slept by Devadatta,' &c., it is the 
 meaning of the root, ' sleep,' which is qualified by present time, 
 as implied in the tense-sign [and verbal roots have no cases.] [Nor 
 may we say that the object is connected with the tense-sign as well 
 as the subject,— because] in such phrases as * Chaitra cooks rice,' &e. 
 since the meaning *rice' is already connected with the idea of object 
 as implied in the objective case, we are not to suppose that there is any 
 further dependence (as of expectancy) on the volition expressed by the 
 tense-sign ; hence the tense-sign is connected with the meaning of the 
 crude form as expressed in the unmodifiedf ' casus rectus.' Hence in 
 accordance with the rule that ' the number [of the tense] is connect- 
 
 * Here Devadattais qualified by nTiTnber and volition throngh the meaning of the 
 
 tense-sign, i. e. Bevadatto.. eko.ticavdn l-ritimdnscha ; but hlwMvjd is not thus qualifi- 
 etl^ — it itself is an advei-b and qualifies the verb. According to Hindu gi-ammar 
 the advei-bial suffix hcd involves the elision of the nominative affix (cf Pan. 
 2, 4, 82) and therefore the second part of the definition would apply, but not 
 the former. 
 
 f I. e. Kon-oblique case, i. e. not a hdrol-a. ■53^ means here rectus ; there is a 
 Sutra ^^I rT ^ ^T «1^« I ' "^^^ signs of the ^Nominative case are used after a 
 word which is the subject of a verb.' — The * casus rectus' will be Chaitras in the 
 Kartrivdchya sentence, and tandulam in the Karmavdchija.
 
 77 
 
 ed with that with which the volition implied by the tense-sign is 
 connected,' — since this follows because this volition and number are 
 expressed by the same tense sign, — the nominative case is em- 
 ployed only where the number cf the agent, &c.,* are already signified 
 by the tense-sign. And in the same way the object cannot be said 
 to be directly signified by the tense-sign.f 
 
 XI. "Well, but," say the Mimansakas, " may not the command 
 be the attribute of the object ?" He replies, 
 
 XL The object cannot be the meaning of the command 
 because it would apply too far ; nor can the produced 
 desert (apttrva) since it would lose its very nature ; nor 
 can an especial effect^ since it is not always found pre- 
 sent ; nor, also, can the act, since men do not neces- 
 sarily engage in the performance. 
 
 a. If you say that the objects [of the sacrifice] are heaven, &c.,J 
 and the meaning of the command is an attribute in them, i. e. the fact 
 of their having to be produced, — it is answered ' the object cannot be 
 the meaning of the command because it would apply too far,' — since, 
 if, as you say, the attribute of their having to be produced resides 
 in heaven, &c., it would follow that a person possessing this know- 
 ledge might engage in any other action than sacrifice [as eating, &c., 
 since ' the having to be produced or accomplished' resides, according 
 to your opinion, in the object and not in the act.'\ 
 
 * I, e. the agent Kartd in most sentences, and the object Karma in snch as 
 * the prize is gained by Devadatta.' As in the sentence ' Devadatta goes' 
 the tense- sign signifies the vohtion Ckriti) and not the agent, but by the 
 connection we gain the latter, so in the sentence " the prize is gained by 
 Devadatta" the tense-sign equally signifies the volition, and by the connection 
 we gain the object. 
 
 f In the sentence Cliaitras tandulam pacJiati, tandula means simply ' rice' and is 
 connected with the affix am which signifies that tandula in the singular number 
 is the object ; this am is connected with the root 'paclia which means ' cooking ;' 
 pacha is connected with the afiix tip which means 1, vartamdna-kdla, 2, 
 yatna. 3, sanhhyd. The present time as implied by tip is connected with yatna, 
 and yatna and sankhijd are connected with the Icartd Chaitra. In the sentence 
 Chaitrena tandulam pachyate, the same process can be traced ; chaitra is con- 
 nected with the afiix td, td with the root pacha, pacha with the aSix te, and te aa 
 before with tandulam. The grammarians maintain that in the former case the 
 real meaning of the verbal afiix is directly Kartd, in the latter Karma ; the 
 Nyaya maintains that in both cases it is yatna (sc. Kriti), but indii-ectly by 
 anvaya it may be respectively Kartd or Karma. 
 
 [J; As in such commands as " let him who desires heaven offer the jyotishtoma 
 sacrifice," &c. — The opponent maintains that their real meaning is, " heaven ia 
 to be produced," sivargah kdryah, but not * the sacrifice is to be performed.'
 
 78 
 
 b. If you say that the ' object' means apurva* and that the mean- 
 ing of the command is an attribute in it, i. e. the fact of its having to 
 be produced,! then it is answered, ' it woukl lose its very nature ;' for 
 the very word ainirva [as compounded of a ' not' and purva ' previ- 
 ously existing'] implies that it was not known before the verbal 
 knowledge was produced by hearing the command ; and if it is known 
 before [as it must be, if the words of the command are to im})ly 
 it,] J then it would cease to be ajourva at all ; and, on the other 
 hand, if it is not known before, then how can you have any know- 
 ledge of the meaning of the tense-sign in the command, and conse- 
 quently how can you have any verbal knowledge of apurva produced 
 by this tense-sign ? 
 
 c. If the Mimansaka replies, * why should there not be a previous 
 knowledge that apurva is the meaning of the command, so far as 
 reo-ards its general character as a thing to be produced, — but when 
 the verbal knowledge is gained, then in consequence of the compati- 
 bility§ there arises a knowledge of apurva as an especial thing to be 
 produced,' to this it is answered, ' because we do not always find this 
 especial apurva present,' i. e. it would follow that there is no apurva\\ 
 in necessary observances [as the morning and evening prayer, &c.,] 
 or in absolute prohibitions [as that from injuring living creatures,] 
 since we find no persons enjoined to perform them as they desire 
 certain fruit to ensue [which fruit is to be attained by the produced 
 apurva as the means, — and consequently the tense-sign as in md liin- 
 syctt becomes meaningless.] 
 
 d. Or we may take this third sentence of the original in a differ- 
 ent sense as follows. An objector might say, " but why might we 
 not hold that we recognise that the word means a particular apurva 
 
 * Tlic unseen efficacy wliicli arises from the sacrifice cf. p. 10. 
 
 + In this view the meaning of the command will be ' by liini who desires 
 heaven, the merit which is the cause of its attainment, is to be produced by the 
 jyotishtoma sacrifice.' 
 
 + ' The knowledge of the power of a word is necessary, for if the power of a 
 word be not apprehended previously, there could not be any recollection, — since 
 this depends upon that relation called ' power' (i. e. the connection between a 
 word and its meaniug), — even though the word might be heard' (Siddh. Mukt. 
 p. 79.) The knowledge of the connection between a word and its meaning ia 
 the cause of the meaning's being recollected when the word is heard, and from 
 this recollection ensues verbal knowledge. 
 
 § Expectancy, compatibility and juxtaposition are the tlu-ee causes, or rather 
 necessarv conditions, of verbal knowledge, see supra-, p. 43. 
 
 11 Sec'^Dr. Hall's llefutatiou of Hindu Philosophy, pp. 22—24.
 
 79 
 
 *accompanied ^though not necessarily so) by being an effect, just as 
 the word ' earth' means a something necessarily distinguished by 
 possessing a certain nature but not necessarily accompanied by the 
 attribute of smell ?" To this it is answered " because we do not find 
 it so," i. e. because we cannot so know an apurva distinguished by 
 the character of apurvatwa. It is possible for the substance possessed 
 of the special nature of earth to be known to possess smell, by means 
 of memory or inference from a previous perception ; but such a sup- 
 position is precluded in the present case by the very name apurva, 
 which implies an absence of any previous perception, and which 
 would therefore be rendered nugatory. 
 
 e. " Well, why not take the sacrifice as the 'objcct,'t and then 
 the meaning of the command will be an attribute of it, i. e. the fact of 
 its having to be performed ?" To this it is answered in the last words 
 of the original verse. Your view cannot hold, since we do not see 
 that men engage in the performance of the sacrifice, if there be pre- 
 sent in their minds the idea that it will be only a means of trouble 
 and expense, [while on your view the simple fact of their knowing 
 it to be a command that 'by him who desires heaven the jyotishtoma 
 sacrifice is to be performed' should impel them irresistibly to the 
 performance thereof.] — The word ^ also' implies that the object can- 
 not mean ' apurva,' since the very same objection will hold as in the 
 previous supposition of ' the sacrifice.' 
 
 XII. " But may we not say that words are the instrument of 
 verbal knowledge, and that the enforcing power is an attribute 
 residing in them,X and that the knowledge thereof incites men to 
 engage in the enjoined rites ; — hence it is said, ' the tense-signs 
 such as the imperative, &c., express a special signification i. e. an 
 enjoining pov/er, while the common signification of all the tense-signs 
 is an eflfbrt of the asrent in accordance with the mcanino: of the 
 root.' There arises from the tense affix of the imperative the idea of 
 an enforcing power, setting a man to perform the enjoined sacrifice ; 
 
 * For vpalalcsliita see note ;|: in p. 66. 
 
 t Under this view the real meaning of the command will be ' by him who 
 desires heaven the jyotishtoma sacrifice is to be perfoi-med..' 
 
 X According to the Mimansa, hlidvand resides in the agent as a volition (yatna) 
 to perform some act to attain a desired end, and it may be expressed by any 
 tense-sign ; bnt it resides m tlie eternal Yeda as an enjoinmg power (preroMaJ, 
 the end of which is tbe prodiiction of the former volition of the heai'er, — this 
 is only expressed by the imperative or potential.
 
 80 
 
 while the general meaning of all the tense-signs is an effort tending 
 to the production of a certain action [thus Devadatto gacliclthati 
 means that ' Devadatta is possessed of a volition tending to produce 
 going.' "] He replies, 
 
 XII. This enforcing power of the imperative, &c., is not 
 to be maintained, since it cannot be proved, and 
 since men do not engage in the performance, even 
 though they know of the existence of this presumed 
 enforcing power, [i. e, unless they have also the 
 knowledge that it will be a means of procuring their 
 wishes j] and again exhaustion is difficult to rest upon, 
 as contradiction equally applies to this view, as well as 
 to the others. 
 
 If you ohject that as every other meaning of the imperative tense- 
 sign is excluded, it follows by exhaustion that this enforcing power 
 must be its meaning, he replies that the contradiction equally applies 
 to this opinion, as well as to the others, [as action does not necessarily 
 follow from the knowledge of it.] 
 
 XIII. " But," says the Naiyayika, " why should not the meaning 
 of the command be the fact that the rite is a means to a desired 
 end, — this residing as an attribute in the instrument, the sacri- 
 fice r"* He replies, 
 
 XIII. [This cannot be] because it is sometimes given as 
 the reason for the command -, because the command may 
 be inferred therefrom ; from the absence of this meaning 
 in the second and third persons [of the imperative] ; from 
 its recognition in other meanings ; and because on this 
 view prohibition could not be established. 
 
 a. Because the fact of its being the means to the attainment of 
 a desired ohject is often alleged by the speaker as proving the mean- 
 ing of the command ; and as a thing cannot be its own proof [it 
 follows that the fact of its being a means to a desired object cannot 
 be the meaning of the command]. Thus when it is said as a secu- 
 
 * The old Nyaya maintained the meaning of vidlii to be x;s^T^«f^ ^T^'^'W. 
 Udayana maintains it to be '^TTf^Wrvrsn^ .* The modem Nyaya (t. c. Siddhauta 
 Mukt.) gives ^^^^fif^T^TfT^^l^'JI^^W
 
 81 
 
 lar command, ' let liim who desires fire rub two pieces of ariini wood 
 together,' if you ask ' why ?' the utterer of the command replies, 
 ' because the rubbing two pieces of wood together is a means of 
 producing fire.' 
 
 h. Another reason against your view is — because a command may 
 be inferred even, after the knowledge that the action is a means 
 to the desired end has been produced by the artliamda [or supple- 
 mentary passage explaining the purpose of the command] ;— but if 
 by the command which is thus inferred we were only to understand 
 the fact that the action in question is a means to the desired end, then 
 this inference would be wholly superfluous. Thus on hearing the 
 S'ruti 'he crosses over death, he crosses over Brahmanicide [who 
 offers the As'wamedha'], all the systems allow that there arises the 
 inference of a command in such a form as ' let him who desires to cross 
 over death and Brahmanicide, offer the As'wamedha.' 
 
 c. " From the absence of this meaning \i. e. its being a means to the 
 desired end,] in the second and third* persons of the potential used 
 imperatively ;" in such phrases as ' you should do it' and ' let me do it' 
 an injunction, or wish is implied [but not the fact of its being a means 
 to a desired end,] — injunction means here the wish of the speaker ; 
 and consequently we ma}^ conclude that the first person also onlj^ 
 means the wish of the speaker [and not the fact of the action being 
 a means to the desired end.] 
 
 d. " From the fact that this meaning of ' wish' is acknowledged 
 in the other meanings of the potential," as for instance in its mean, 
 ing of ' respectftd solicitation. 'f 
 
 e. " Because on this view prohibition could not be estabhshed." 
 Thus in the injunction "let him not eat the Kalanja,"J you cannot 
 maintain that it is not the means to a desired end [as of course the 
 eating will produce its proper pleasure.] Nor can you say [with 
 the modern school,] tliat the meaning of the command is that 
 the action is not accompanied by a predominant undesirable result, 
 because this will not apply to such cases as ' let him who desires 
 
 * In Hindu grammar tlie third person corresponds to our first. 
 
 t "^^TSfTrri is tbe ^T^ t^ of Panini (3, 3, 161). The Sankshipta Sara explains 
 
 X Some hold the Kalanja to be the flesh of a deer killed b}^ a poisoned arrow 
 — others hemp or bhang, — others a kind of garlic. See Raghuuandana's Eka- 
 da%'i tattwa.
 
 82 
 
 to kill his enemy Ly incantation offer a liawk' [because this rite 
 produces hell as its fruit]. And [if you say that in the case 
 of the offerer, hell is not considered by liim as a predominant undesi- 
 rable result, since he still performs the ceremony, I reply that this does 
 not hold, as] you cannot maintain that the sacrifice ^e??dr«/Zy does not 
 produce a result which the mass of mankind regard with predomi- 
 nant aversion, because the man who does oiof perform the sacrifice 
 certainly has this predominant aversion which restrains him from 
 yielding to the temptation of the gratification of a present revenge 
 at the risk of a future torment in hell. 
 
 XIV, [After this lengthened discussion of the various current 
 opinions on the nature of vidlii or command,] the author now pro- 
 ceeds to deliver his own. 
 
 XIV. The primary meaning of the potential used im- 
 peratively,, &c.^ is the will of the speaker in the form of 
 a command enjoining activity or cessation therefrom ; 
 while w' e conclude by inference that it is the means to a 
 desired end for the doer. 
 
 The will of a fit person, i. e. God, having for its object engagement 
 in the performance of an act [/. e. as in command] or refraining there- 
 from, [i. e. as in prohibition.] is the primary meaning of the affixes of the 
 potential, &c. ; and from these is to be inferred [see § vi.) that it is the 
 means to obtain a desired end, [and hence the existence of ' command' 
 proves the existence of a commander, God]. 
 
 But the commentator here adds as a remark, that this view of 
 Udayanacharya is untenable, as by it you could not properly have prohi- 
 bition at all, since ever}* action of every kind is in one sense the object 
 of God's will, \i. e. nothing, whether good or evil, takes place with- 
 out his will]. If you reply that 'command' is ' God's will,' mean- 
 ing by ' will' such a will as is unaccompanied by any predominant 
 undesirable result, w^e object that the definition becomes needlessly 
 complicated ; and the old Xaiyayika opinion of § xiii. is after all the 
 best.* 
 
 * Udayana gives as his definition of ' command' the ' will of a fit person/ i. e, 
 God. It is replied that this will include too much as even evil actions are in 
 one sense done with God's will. The donnition is then corrected to ' such a will 
 as is improductive of any predominant undesirable result/ — in this view we may 
 allow God's will in the case of an evil action, but here we shall not have vidhi, 
 • command/ — as it is such a will of God as produces hell to the doer. — The cdra-
 
 83 
 
 XV. He now [resumes tlie interpretation of tlie first S'loka, in- 
 terrupted by the late discussion onvidJii ^^ vi. — xiv. and] proceeds to 
 give the second meaning of ' S'ruti.' 
 
 XV. All the Vecla refers to the Supreme Being as its 
 object; only, by means of its own primary meaning, like 
 the words Mieaven/ &c._, can it refer to a command. 
 
 In every part of the Veda is God's existence established, as for 
 instance in such passages as, 'Vishnu verily is the sacrifice' (passim), 
 Mie sees without eyes,' (Swefc. Up. iii. 19) ' by the command of this 
 (previously mentioned) indestructible being, Gargi, heaven and 
 earth stay upheld in their places, (Brihadar. Up. iii. 8, 9.) Nor may 
 you say with the Mimansa, that ' these passages, being declaratory 
 or indicative* [and not expressed in the potential or imperative, as 
 commands are,] refer to something else, i. e. a command else- 
 where expressed,' [or in other words they are the arthavdda of a 
 previous vidhi~\, — because even according to jonv own opinion, these 
 passages about God do possess an authority to establish the existence 
 of their primary meaning, from their agreeing with such positive 
 commands as ' let him adore God,' just as the passages declarative of 
 heaven, hell, &c., [establish the objects which they primarily mean, 
 because they are connected with such positive commands, as ' let him 
 who desires heaven offer such a sacrifice,'] — otherwise the very words 
 * heaven,' ' hell,' &c., would have no authority to establish their own 
 primary significations. Hence he adds the latter line of the /Sloka, 
 since it is only by establishing its own primary meaning that a de- 
 claratory passage can be said to agree with a command. 
 
 [The commentator now proceeds to give a second explanation of ' the 
 sentences thereof in § i.] The ' sentences thereof,' — /. e. the sen^ 
 tences of the Veda, expressing praise and blame, — must have been 
 preceded, in the speaker's mind, by the knowledge of praise and 
 blame, from the very fact that they are sentences which express 
 
 mentator objects to this as needlessly complicated ; bat it is not uninteresting to 
 find the same thought in Anselm's ' cur Deus homo ?' " although man or an evil 
 angel be unwilling to submit to the will and ordinance of God, yet he cannot 
 escape from, it, because if ho will flee from the will of God commanding him, he 
 comes under the will of God punishing him." 
 
 * According to the Mjmansa those passages which ai'e not vidhi are siddlm as 
 opposed to sddhijo, ; they describe something past or present (sivanipakathanamjf 
 while the vidhi relates to something future which is to be performed. 
 
 Y 2
 
 84 
 
 l>raise and blame, like such a secular sentence as ' the mango fruit 
 is very sweet when ripe,' [as none could say this with authority un- 
 less he possessed previous knowledge thereof], 
 
 XVI. He now gives a second explanation of ' particular number' 
 in § i. 
 
 XVI. In such phrases as Met me be/ *" I was/ ' I will 
 be/ &c., the number belongs to a speaker; nor could 
 there be the current names of the 'Sakhas_, without a 
 primal utterance. 
 
 a. The first person singular as used in the Yeda declares the 
 ' number' of an independent speaker, — there being many such in- 
 stances, as in the passage* " It reflected, ' let me, the one, become 
 many,' " &c. 
 
 b. He now gives a third meaning of the word sanJcJ/t/d, as making 
 it the same as another derivative from the same root, samdkhi/d, 
 ' name, fame,' — " nor could there be &c." There are traditional names, 
 in the Yeda, of all the various 'Sakhas (or current recensions,) as 
 Kathaka or that belonging to Katha, Kalapa or that belonging to 
 Kalapa, &c. ; nor can we explain this on the hypothesisf that these 
 men first read that particular recension only, [others having before 
 then read many or all,] since the number of readers is endless and 
 in the eternal succession others besides these mentioned may well be 
 supposed to have read those 'Sakhas only, [and why then were not 
 the 'Sakhas called by their names ? ] Therefore we are driven to 
 the belief that the adorable Supreme Being, seeing all supersensuous 
 objects and possessed of boundless compassion, did at the beginning 
 of each creation assume a particular body belonging to Katha, Kala- 
 pa, &c. which body was moved by the merit of beings like our- 
 selves.J and the 'Sakhas which He thus uttered were severally called 
 by these particular names. 
 
 * The two old MSS. read this quotation as I havo printed it. Some copies 
 read ^ for ffs- but none have the usual reading found in Chhand. Up. vi, 2. 
 
 t Cf, 'Sabai'a's Comin. on Jaimini, i. 1, 30. 
 
 X The final cause of God's assumins; these bodies was to render possible the 
 happiness due to the merit of men like ourselves, — adrislita is an impelling- 
 cause of every thing down to the junction of tAvo atoms, see Muktavali, pp. 
 lOi, 105.
 
 85 
 
 Thus have we established that it is the contemphxtion of God, which 
 is the true means of liberation, (see I. ii.) 
 
 XVII. He now adds a couplet in reference to those who believe 
 not in God. 
 
 XVII. Iron-soulecl are they in whose hearts Thou canst 
 find no place^ though thus washed by the repeated 
 inundations of ethics and Vaidic texts ; yet still in 
 time_, Oh merciful one^ Thou in thy goodness canst 
 save even those who oppose our proposition, and make 
 them uudoubtiug in their conviction of Thy existence. 
 
 XYIII. But as for us, Thou essentially Fair, though 
 our minds have been long plunged in Thee, the ocean 
 of joy,* yet are they verily restless still and unsatisfied; 
 therefore, oh Lord, haste to display Thy mercy, that our 
 minds fixed only on Thee, we may no more be subject 
 to Yama^s continual inflictions. 
 
 XIX. This garland of flowers of ethics, radiant in its 
 beauty, — what matters it, whether it perfumes the right 
 and left handf or not ? — only may the Guru of Indra^s 
 GuruJ be pleased by my presenting it as an oftering at 
 his footstool. 
 
 * For addlid explained as tattvjam, see 'Sis'upala-badha, iii. 42, schol. 
 f Or ' the sapaksha and vipaksha of my argument.' 
 
 X 'Siva, as the gnru of Brihaspati. Brihaspati is represented as the guru of 
 Indra in the Aitareya Brahman a, VII. 28,
 
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