EDUG. 
 LIBRARf 
 
I 
 
 / 7 S 'A/ ^ T^ 
 
 ESSAY 
 
 ON 
 
 INSTINCT, 
 
 AND ITS 
 
 PHYSICAL AND MORAL RELATIONS. 
 
 By THOMAS HANCOCK, M.D. 
 
 For Reason raise o'er Instinct, as you can} 
 
 In this 'tis God directs, in that 'tis man. Pope. 
 
 A man's nature runs either to herbs or weeds: therefore let him season- 
 ably water the one, and destroy the other. Bacon. 
 
 HonDon: 
 
 TAINTED AND PUBLISHED UY WILLIAM PHILLIPS, GEORGE VARl) 
 
 LOMBARD STREET; 
 
 SOLD ALSO BV HATCHARD AXD SOX, PICCADILLY; 
 
 AND BY W. & C. TAIT, EDINBURGH. 
 
 J82L 
 

 • I ip 
 
 /y.3 
 
 EDUC. 
 
 PSYCH. 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 A concise view of the following argument 
 was communicated, about two years since, to 
 a Literary Society. Whether it appeared 
 novel, or the subject was in itself interesting, 
 a request was soon after conveyed to me, 
 that it might be given to the public. In 
 considering the subject, it was obvious, that it 
 not only admitted of copious illustrations, but 
 that it involved many abstract discussions more 
 adapted to the closet than to the Lecture-room , 
 Accordingly, some of my leisure has since been 
 employed in making such an arrangement of 
 facts, illustrations, and reasonings, as, I am in- 
 duced to think, will present a more clear and 
 consistent view than was contained in the ori- 
 ginal discourses. I am, notwithstanding, fully 
 aware, that, in its present state, it is not with- 
 out many imperfections ; and yet they appear 
 
iv Preface. 
 
 to be such, as it is scarcely in my power 
 to remedy. To do justice to an argument of 
 this nature, I need not say, that the most 
 patient thought and undivided attention would 
 be necessary. But the time of professional 
 men, whilst engaged in public duties, in this 
 city, is seldom at their own command : or if 
 any portion be at their command, it is that 
 which the wearied mind claims for its repose 
 rather than for active thought. The con- 
 sequence has been, that I have had many in- 
 terruptions to any regular plan of study. So 
 that, instead of being able to follow up some of 
 my reasonings closely and methodically, I have 
 often had to lament that they were broken ; and 
 subsequently, found it no easy task to resume 
 them. Being, also, under the necessity of 
 seizing opportunities, as they offered, and of 
 writing, often, in a hurried and desultory man- 
 ner, I fear that I have been led occasionally 
 into some repetitions. Hence, it is possible, 
 that arguments may have been left incomplete, 
 and the same thing may have been expressed 
 over again in different terms. However this 
 may be, when an author comes before the 
 public, urged by whatever motive, he must 
 naturally expect, that his work will be esti- 
 
Preface. v 
 
 mated according to what it is, and not accord- 
 ing to contingencies, which might have tended 
 to make it more or less perfect. 
 
 In so far as illustrations from Natural His- 
 tory were necessary to my purpose,, I have not 
 scrupled to avail myself freely of the scientific 
 labours of others — I trust, however, with pro- 
 per acknowledgments. And, though I con- 
 sider the speculations in the First Part as but 
 secondary and introductory to those in the 
 Second, I am aware, that there is a class of 
 readers who will give them the preference. I 
 have therefore studied to make the former 
 more interesting to this class, by a greater 
 number of quotations than I should have other- 
 wise thought necessary. 
 
 One object it has been my study to pursue, 
 and that is, the inculcation in the minds of my 
 younger friends, (to whom principally the out- 
 line was addressed) of, what I consider, right 
 opinions, or at least, such opinions as agree 
 with the fundamental principles of Revealed 
 Religion. And as an inquiry of this nature 
 could not well be prosecuted without some- 
 thing of what is called metaphysical discussion, 
 wherever I have had occasion to tread upon 
 this uncertain ground, I have endeavoured to 
 
vi Preface. 
 
 clear my path by using phrases easily under- 
 stood, and avoiding questions too intricate, 
 and subtleties too refined. 
 
 As I do not wish to anticipate any of my 
 conclusions, I forbear to enter into a general 
 view of the principles it is my object to sup- 
 port : For believing the subject to be con- 
 nected in a chain of reasoning, however loosely 
 in some parts, I have the less reluctance in re- 
 questing my reader to follow it, with what pa- 
 tience he may be able to exercise, to the end. 
 
 I do not flatter myself that the view I have 
 taken is original ; yet I think it, on the whole, 
 important. Neither do I flatter myself, that the 
 inferences I have drawn will be generally re- 
 ceived ; though I believe them to be founded 
 in Truth. For, some of them seem to be op- 
 posed to great authorities; but I have satis- 
 faction in thinking that they are not opposed 
 to the greater authority of Scripture. In re- 
 ference therefore to the authors with whom I 
 differ — and I am not alone in differing from 
 them — I can feelingly apply the often quoted 
 saying, — Amicus Socrates, amicus Plato, sed 
 magis arnica Veritas. 
 
TABLE OP CONTENTS, 
 
 -*+*- 
 
 PART I. 
 
 OF THE PHYSICAL RELATIONS OF INSTINCT. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Introductory Remarks ^ 1 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 General view of different writers opi- 
 nions ON THE SUBJECT : THE ARRANGE- 
 MENT proposed. Instinct contrasted 
 
 with Reason 7 
 
 Sect 1. General view of different writers opi- 
 nions^ Sfc ib. 
 
 2. Instinct contrasted with Reason 14 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 Examples of Instinct in the works of 
 animals, and the care of their young, 
 
 and choice of food remarks on the 
 
 adaptation of structure to climate, 
 and of habit and disposition to struc- 
 TURE 17 
 
 Sect. I. Examples of Instinct in the works of 
 
 Animals and care of their i/ozcng . . . ib. 
 2. Of Instinct in Animals in their choice 
 
 offood 23 
 
viii Table of Contents. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Sect. 3. Of the adaptation of structure to cli- 
 mate 27 
 
 4. Adaptation of Habit and Disposition 
 
 to structure, S?c 32 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 Of the Instincts in Man 40 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 OF CERTAIN ACTIONS IN THE LOWER ANIMALS, 
 
 in some degree distinguishable from 
 
 the operation of Instinct 52 
 
 Sect. I. Of the effects of Human Intercourse on 
 
 the lower Animals ib. 
 
 2. Of the perfection of the natural Senses, 
 
 as distinguishable from Instinct .... 63 
 
 3. Of the migrations of Animals 70 
 
 4. Of the power of Reasoning in Animals 77 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 Of the accommodating power of Instinct, 
 and inferences from the facts 102 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 Of the ascending scale of Instinctive or 
 Unconscious Motions — comprising in- 
 animate, vegetable, and animal mo- 
 tions 112 
 
 Sect. 1. Of inanimate and vegetable motions. . . ib. 
 
 2. Of animal motions 123 
 
 3. Of the connected chain of functions in 
 
 vegetable, muscular, and nervous 
 systems 131 
 
 CHAP. TIL 
 On the Zoological Lectures of Wm. 
 Lawrence, F.R.S 143 
 
Table of Contents. ix 
 
 CHAP. VIIL page 
 
 Recapitulation — the perfection of In- 
 stinct IN ITS PHYSICAL OPERATIONS, AND 
 THE IMPERFECTION OF HUMAN REASON. . . . 162 
 
 Sect. 1. Recapitulation ib* 
 
 2. Perfection of Instinct 1 68 
 
 3. Imperfection of Reason 173 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 
 Of Reason, and the extremes of opinion 
 
 respecting it its extent or uses, and 
 
 limitation or insufficiency 177 
 
 Sect. 1. Of Reason* and the extremes of opinion 
 
 respecting it ib. 
 
 2. Uses of Reason 180 
 
 3. Limitation of Reason 182 
 
 PART II. 
 
 OF THE MORAL RELATIONS OF INSTINCT. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Of the opinions of Philosophers on the 
 subject of a dlvlne intelligence in 
 the Human Mind 199 
 
 Sect. 1. Authorities in support of the view now 
 
 taken ib. 
 
 2. Of the testimonies in favour of such a 
 
 principle analogous to Instinct and 
 superior to Reason 205 
 
 3. On the enlarged use of the word Reason 211 
 
x Table of Contents. 
 
 CHAP. II. PAGE 
 
 Of the nature of the Mental Faculties, 
 and the primary elements of reason- 
 ING and Moral Feeling 228 
 
 Sect. 1. Of the nature of the Mental Faculties, ib. 
 
 2. Of the 'primary elements of Reasoning 235 
 
 3. Of the primary elements of Moral Feel' 
 
 ing 244 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 On the System of Locke 256 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 Of the analogy between Mental Prin- 
 ciples and Seeds, and between Educa- 
 tion and Culture 277 
 
 Sect. 1. Of the analogy between Mental Prin- 
 ciples and Seeds ib, 
 
 2. Of the office and effect of Education 
 
 compared with Culture 290 
 
 3. Illustrations of the same subject 295 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 Of First Principles and Innate Ideas . . . 311 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 Of the Seeds of Vice and Virtue, and of 
 
 Benevolence and Self-love 333 
 
 Sect. 1. Of the Seeds of Vice ib. 
 
 2. Of the Seed of Virtue 339 
 
 3. Of Benevolence and Self-Love 359 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 Of Conscience and its significations — 
 including remarks on the reasonings 
 of Locke on Innate Moral Principles 364 
 
 Sect. 1 . Of its comprehensive signification ib. 
 
 2. Of its limited signification 376 
 
Table of Contents, xl 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Sect. 3. On the reasonings of Locke on Innate 
 
 Moral Principles 383 
 
 4. Conscience always includes the notion 
 
 of a Moral Principle 3S6 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 Of the true source of Moral Sentiments, 
 and of the various opinions respecting 
 A Moral Principle 407 
 
 Sect. 1. Of Moral Feeling, the source of Truth ib. 
 
 2. Moral Truth is not unfolded with uni- 
 
 versal clearness 415 
 
 3. Of the Diversity of Religious Notions 
 
 among mankind 419 
 
 4. Illustrations of the foregoing reasonings 429 
 
 5. Of the various opinions concerning the 
 
 nature of the Moral Principle 441 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 
 Of the Divine Spirit in the Soul ....... 450 
 
 Sect. 1. Introductory remarks ib. 
 
 2. Of the Seed of Divine Truth 453 
 
 3. Of its cultivation 461 
 
 4. This influence is not under human con- 
 
 troul 472 
 
 5. Of Wisdom, Divine and Human, 
 
 Faith, Enthusiasm, Revelation .... 479 
 
 6. OfChrist 531 
 
PART I. 
 
 OF 
 
 THE PHYSICAL RELATIONS 
 
 OF 
 
 INSTINCT. 
 
Published by the same Author, and sold by TV. Phillips, 
 George-yard, Lombard-street, Price Ss. boards, 
 
 RESEARCHES 
 
 INTO THE 
 
 LAWS AND PHENOMENA OF 
 
 PESTILENCE . 
 
 5 
 
 INCLUDING A MEDICAL SKETCH AND REVIEW OF THE 
 
 PLAGUE OF LONDON, IN 1665 ; 
 
 AND REMARKS ON QUARANTINE. 
 
 With an Appendix ; containing Extracts and Observations relative to 
 the Plagues of Morocco, Malta, Noya, and Corfu; being the subject 
 of the Anniversary Oration, delivered before the Medical Society of 
 London, in the Spring of 1820, and published at their request. 
 
 By THOMAS HANCOCK, M.D. 
 
 Licentiate of the Royal College of Physicians, and Physician to the 
 City and Finsbury Dispensaries. 
 
 *' To the volume of Dr. Hancock we are desirous of calling especial 
 notice, not with a view to invidious comparison, but as being a com- 
 prehensive and candid investigation of the whole question" 
 
 44 Upon the whole we may confidently assert that it has not often fallen 
 to our lot to inspect the production of a controversial author so free and 
 fearless in its admissions, or so candid and temperate in its conclusions. 
 Dr. Hancock has brought forward a vast body of testimony of the most 
 unequivocal kind, illustrative of the proposition, that the origin, spread, 
 and decline of pestilence, has for the most part, more reference to the 
 local peculiarities of the soil and climate in which it appears, than to 
 any foreign importation ; and that plague, if it be sometimes a con- 
 tagious and transportable, is for the most part an indigenous or endemic 
 distemper." — Quarterly Review ■. 
 
 *' We have perused Dr. Hancock's work, and we accord to him the 
 
 meed of applause for candour, zeal, research, and ingenuity It is 
 
 a very able and elaborate critical examination of the principal writings 
 which have appeared at different times on the subject of Epidemic and 
 Pestilential diseases ; and we have no hesitation in saying, that its 
 perusal will be very advantageous, in as much as it [will help to pre- 
 pare the way for more correct views and settled opinions on those im- 
 portant and much disputed points Distrusting our own powers 
 
 we put this volume into the hands of three friends successively; all of 
 them interested in the discussion. They all returned the work with this 
 observation — that it contained a great deal of interesting research and 
 legitimate deductions, but that no analysis could give a fair or satisfac- 
 tory view either of the data or inferences." — Medico-Chirurgical Review. 
 
 " Dr. Hancock has lately supplied the chasm (respecting the manner 
 in which Epidemics are propagated) by a very able critical examination 
 of the principal writers which have appeared at different times on the 
 subject of Epidemic, and Pestilential Diseases, and to this work we beg 
 to direct the reader's attention." — Sec Medical Jurisprudence, by J. A. 
 Paris, M.D. and J. S. M. Fonblanque, Bar. at Law. 
 
 " We have never, in truth, risen from the perusal of any treatise on a 
 controversial subject, with such a thorough feeling of satisfaction, as 
 that which has been occasioned by Dr. Hancock's book. It is, beyond 
 all measure, the best book on the subject of which it treats that it has 
 la Hen to our lot to examine." — Medical Repository. 
 
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. 
 
 Man is especially distinguished from the lower 
 animals by the consciousness of a Supreme Ruler of 
 the world, and by the dominion he is enabled to exer- 
 cise over the earth and its productions. He is distin- 
 guished also by the restless and insatiable desire of 
 knowledge, the capacity to attain it, and the power 
 to perpetuate it from one generation to another. 
 
 But, notwithstanding so wide a barrier separates 
 him from the brute, yet the national and intellectual 
 varieties among mankind are so great as, on a superfi- 
 cial view, almost to constitute specific distinctions ; 
 and to establish as near an affinity, in point of intelli- 
 gence, between the lowest of these and the most sa- 
 gacious brute, as between the most enlightened and 
 ignorant of the human family. As one man differs so 
 widely from another, we may also distinguish the wise 
 man from the simple by the consistency of his conduct, 
 and by the use he is accustomed to make of his ac- 
 quired knowledge. 
 
 Now, the departments of human knowledge are va- 
 rious like the motives which actuate different persons 
 in the pursuit. Some individuals have a natural in- 
 
 A 
 
2 Introductory Remarks. 
 
 clination to one subject of inquiry, and some to 
 another. Some seek after knowledge for gain ; some 
 for estimation in the world ; some from a restless and 
 unprofitable spirit of curiosity without limit, and 
 almost without object ; some that they may become 
 expert in disputation ; some from pride and ostenta- 
 tion ; few, as is well observed by Lord Bacon, that 
 they may employ the gift of reason for the benefit of 
 the human family, and for the glory of Him who 
 gave it. " As if," adds the same illustrious author, 
 in that strong and figurative language for which his 
 writings are so remarkable, adapting his metaphor to 
 the different motives and characters of men — " as if 
 there was sought in knowledge a couch whereon to 
 rest a searching and restless spirit ; or a terrace for a 
 wandering and variable mind to walk up and down 
 with a fair prospect ; or a tower of state for a proud 
 mind to raise itself upon ; or a fort or commanding 
 ground for strife and contention ; or a shop for profit 
 and sale ; and not a rich storehouse for the glory of 
 the Creator, and the relief of man's estate."* 
 
 But, as knowledge is thus various, and may be re- 
 ceived into minds so variously constituted and affected ; 
 how important is it that we duly consider the objects 
 of intellectual improvement we may individually pro- 
 pose to ourselves, and the motives by which we are 
 actuated in the search ! 
 
 We may admit the saying of Locke, that " this life 
 is a scene of vanity," and perhaps may bring our- 
 
 * Advancement of Learning, book, i. 
 
Introductory Remarks. 3 
 
 selves to comprehend the acknowledgment of Grotius, 
 one of the most illustrious scholars of his age, and 
 a man of exemplary piety, that "he had consumed 
 much of his life in laboriously doing nothing." — 
 We may have dipped so far into philosophy as to be 
 persuaded of this truth, that the greatest attainments 
 in natural knowledge are immeasureably insignificant, 
 when compared with the proper business of life ; and 
 unspeakably vain, when inflating the proud mind to 
 search into the counsels of omniscience. — We may 
 have been instructed, also, by the experience of the 
 wisest and best, how little, after all our inquiries, can 
 be known. Yet the advances which have been made 
 in the sciences, strictly so called, viewed abstractedly 
 as evidences of the unassisted powers of Man, of his 
 superiority to the Brute, and his relation to some 
 higher sphere of existence, while they ennoble human 
 genius, urge us to lament its misapplication. 
 
 But even in the sciences, (where demonstration, as 
 in Mathematics, and analysis and synthesis, as in 
 Chemistry, prove the proposition and the law,) we 
 must still come to something which is not revealed, — 
 some link in the chain of natural causes, where the 
 philosophic inquirer must rest, and infer an agency* 
 whose mode of working is unknown. 
 
 When Sir Isaac Newton had discovered that it was 
 by the law of gravitation the planetary motions were 
 to be explained, he doubtless saw it would be a vain 
 speculation to inquire in what manner this gravitating 
 principle or law acted; whether by an electrical 
 
 a2 
 
4 Introductory Remarks, 
 
 aather, or impalpable aerial fluid, or by some other 
 subtile medium. And, in the same way, we may 
 reasonably conclude that it will ever be fruitless to 
 inquire whether, in the human body, a nervous fluid 
 or a mere vibration conveys the impulse of the will 
 to the voluntary muscles, or the impression of the 
 senses to the brain. The profoundest researches of 
 the physiologist cannot explain how a man performs 
 the simple act of raising his arm, nor how the eye 
 and ear transmit their respective sensations to the 
 mind. 
 
 In every department of human knowledge, there- 
 fore, there is a point where inquiry must rest; and 
 where it becomes the true philosopher to contemplate 
 in awful humility the wonders of Almighty Power, 
 adoring in silent reverence that infinite wisdom, 
 which has only unlocked, as it were, to man, the ves- 
 tibule of the great Temple, that contains thousands 
 of Nature's secrets yet unopened, and thousands 
 more, perhaps, never to be revealed. 
 
 Now, in this view, it must be considered highly 
 incumbent upon all, who prosecute physical or moral 
 inquiries, to direct them in the plain and simple path 
 of observation, which may lead to profitable results ; 
 and equally incumbent to avoid the giddy heights of 
 speculation, where the mind is too much disposed to 
 look down upon the laborious inquirer, and to in- 
 dulge in vain conceits of superior intelligence. For, 
 hence arise the evils of a wild untutored imagination, 
 — that roving faculty of the mind, which is to be found 
 
Introductory Remarks. 5 
 
 any where but at home. It is ready to grasp at the 
 notions of others, calling them its own ; and to grasp 
 at its own phantoms, calling them realities. How 
 necessary that it should be bridled, and brought 
 within the limits of sober and legitimate investi- 
 gation ! We may take it for granted, that knowledge, 
 which is so readily gleaned from others, does not 
 properly constitute mental improvement. The cul- 
 tivation of the mind, in order that it may bring forth 
 good fruit, requires a steady persevering labour. It 
 is true, indeed, that some soils, from a kind of native 
 luxuriance, produce abundantly, with but little out- 
 ward aid ; but, in these as much labour is often re- 
 quired to check an extravagant growth, and to root 
 up the weed, as in ground which is less fertile, to 
 manure and water in its season. 
 
 Knowledge must be conveyed to the mind, as food 
 to the body, if it be intended for profit, by healthy 
 digestion and assimilation of the materials to our 
 actual substance. It is by reflection and meditation 
 upon the truths afforded by others, that we make them 
 our own ; and this observation applies to our moral 
 and religious, as it does to our intellectual, advance- 
 ment. 
 
 Hence it is that the man who can boast little else 
 than a capacious memory, though his mind may be 
 stored with the records of past ages, is often ex- 
 tremely deficient in the faculty of Reason, and in 
 common discretion, when placed in the embarrassing 
 concerns of life : while he who may want this prompt 
 
6 Introductory Remarks. 
 
 recollection of the past, but is notwithstanding* pos- 
 sessed of a sound discriminating judgment, and can 
 recur in every emergency to a counsellor placed in 
 his own bosom, — who troubles himself little in con- 
 sidering how others would act in similar circum- 
 stances, will frequently extricate himself from diffi- 
 culties, by which the other would be overwhelmed. 
 So much, therefore, does it behove every one to 
 labour for his own supplies, whether physical or 
 moral; and so great is the distinction between that 
 which is received from without, and that which is 
 produced within, — between the observations of others 
 and our own, — between that which makes the heart 
 better, and that which only fills the head, — in a word, 
 between wisdom and knowledge. 
 
 Cowper has very accurately marked the distinction. 
 
 u Knowledge and wisdom, far from being one, 
 Have ofttimes no connection. Knowledge dwells 
 In heads replete with thoughts of other men, 
 Wisdom in minds attentive to their own. 
 Knowledge, a rude unprofitable mass, 
 The mere material with which Wisdom builds, 
 'Till smooth'd and squared and fitted to its place, 
 Does but encumber whom it seems to enrich : 
 Knowledge is proud that he has learned so much, 
 Wisdom is humble that he knows no more." 
 
 Task, Book 6. 
 
CHAPTER I. 
 
 GENERAL VIEW OF DIFFERENT WRITERS 
 OPINIONS ON THE SUBJECT : THE ARRANGE- 
 MENT PROPOSED. INSTINCT CONTRASTED 
 WITH REASON. 
 
 Sect. I. 
 
 General view of different Writers opinions on the Sub- 
 ject : the Arrangement proposed. 
 
 In surveying the diversified classes of phenomena, 
 which are presented to the view in the wide field of 
 Natural History, none appear more interesting than 
 the acts of the Brute creation. It is natural therefore 
 to compare these acts, which have generally been 
 supposed to result from a peculiar principle, named 
 Instinct, with the operations of Human Reason. 
 
 It is scarcely necessary to remark, that very con- 
 fused notions exist upon this subject, not only in the 
 works of the learned, but in the minds of the multi- 
 tude; some referring the actions of the Brute exclu- 
 sively to Instinct, and the actions of Man exclusively 
 to Reason ; some considering the boundaries of these 
 principles perfectly distinct, yet too nice to be ascer- 
 tained ; and others, of no mean authority, asserting, 
 that there is no difference between them, — one set 
 
8 General view of the Subject, 
 
 of writers classing Reason among the Instincts, and 
 another set maintaining that every act of the lower 
 animals is an act of Reason, such, in kind, as it is 
 exhibited in Man. Now, we may observe, that ob- 
 scurity, in a greater or less degree, has been cast 
 over every subject, when men have stepped beyond 
 the proper business of philosophy in explaining 
 causes or hidden operations, and establishing spe- 
 cific distinctions often depending on words, instead 
 of classifying or arranging facts. Without pretend- 
 ing that I shall be able to throw any new light upon 
 so intricate a subject, in which, it is obvious, there 
 is a great deal that is never likely to be understood ; 
 I shall endeavour to distinguish and classify the 
 phenomena in question, according to the most im- 
 partial view I may be qualified to take, and the best 
 means of information within ray reach. 
 
 The arrangement, therefore, which I propose to 
 myself in the elucidation of the subject, will comprise 
 the following considerations : viz. 1st. How far Rea- 
 son appears to differ from Instinct. 2ndly. How far 
 the actions of some Brutes may be entitled to the 
 appellation of Reasoning. And 3rdly, how far the 
 perfect Instinct of the lower animals bears an analogy 
 to that most exalted principle in Man, by which we 
 are taught to believe, that his nature is capable of 
 being dignified. I shall, therefore, bring forward 
 some facts and illustrations from Natural History, 
 in order to show, that there is a power which 
 operates in the physical economy of brute animals 
 
Arrangement proposed. 9 
 
 with consummate wisdom ; not only adapting the 
 structure to their peculiar habits, and to the climate, 
 element, and situation in which they are designed to 
 live; but directing them with wonderful precision 
 in the choice of food, and in the care and preserva- 
 tion of their offspring, by many complicated la- 
 bours. I shall endeavour to point out the difference 
 in effect, between this power and the variable and 
 inconstant operations of human Reason ; and shall 
 consider the evidence we have of Reasoning in the 
 lower animals, and of Instinct in Man. 
 
 In looking downwards from man, and surveying 
 what may be called his physical relation to the in- 
 ferior works of creation, I shall notice the analogy 
 that appears to subsist between the operations of 
 instinct, and the laws of brute and organized matter, 
 exhibited in gravitation and in the unconscious motions 
 of vegetable and animal life. We shall thus have 
 grounds for considering, how far man seems to an- 
 swer the end and design of his existence, as a 
 rational being, compared with the inferior orders of 
 animated nature, which are accounted irrational or 
 governed by instinct. 
 
 But in looking upwards from man, and surveying 
 his higher and moral, or, as they may be termed, his 
 spiritual relations, we shall consider, if Reason is so 
 inadequate to procure the present happiness of man, 
 and preserve order and harmony in the world, what 
 means and power it possesses to procure an intimate 
 knowledge of the Creator, and the final reward of 
 
10 Arrangement proposed, 
 
 eternal happiness. If it should indeed be found to be 
 insufficient, it might be fair to inquire what principle 
 it is, by whose operation and influence man is brought 
 to a nearer acquaintance with his Maker, instructed 
 in his duties, and enabled to perform them. 
 
 For most of the facts I am to produce, relative to 
 the instinct of animals, I shall be indebted to several 
 writers on Natural History and Physiology. 
 
 Des Cartes, with some other philosophers, imagined 
 that all the actions of the lower animals might be 
 explained by the simple laws of mechanism. Hence 
 he considers them as machines wholly devoid of life 
 and sentiment, like a clock or orrery, but so curious- 
 ly constructed by the Creator, that the mere impres- 
 sions of light, sound, and other external agents on 
 their organs of sense, produced a series of motions 
 in them, and caused them to execute those various 
 operations which had before been ascribed to an 
 internal principle of life. 
 
 Buffon partly adopts the opinion of Des Cartes, 
 but admits the brute animals to have life, and the 
 faculty of distinguishing between pleasure and pain, 
 together with a strong inclination to the one, and 
 aversion to the other. By these inclinations and aver- 
 sions he undertakes to account for all, even the most 
 striking operations of animals. 
 
 Other philosophers, as Helvetius and Darwin, have 
 endeavoured to show that most of the actions of 
 brutes were performed by a process of reasoning 
 analogous to that in man.* 
 
 * Rees Cyclop. Art. Instinct. 
 
Arrangement proposed. 11 
 
 In a new system of Natural History of Animals, 
 published at Edinburgh in 1791, it is laid down that 
 " the laws of analogical reasoning do not justify the 
 opinion, that the brutes act, on any occasion, abso- 
 lutely without design." And, on the other hand, it 
 has been maintained by Smellie, in his Philosophy of 
 Natural History ; " that between reason and in- 
 stinct there is no difference, and that the reasoning 
 faculty is itself the necessary result of instinct." 
 
 Some have considered that a material structure, 
 or simple arrangement of organs, endowed with the 
 principle of life, or living organic structures possess- 
 ing vital properties, give rise to all the phenomena 
 of which we see the brutes to be capable; and that 
 it is not necessary to have recourse to a principle 
 which they affirm to be mysterious and inexplicable 
 like that of Instinct : and others, as I before stated, 
 in attempting to raise the dignity of human nature 
 far above the brute, without giving themselves any 
 trouble to analyse their respective actions, have 
 thought to establish the grand distinction, by assign- 
 ing exclusively to man the faculty of Reason, and ex- 
 clusively to the brute, the blind or unerring principle 
 of Instinct. 
 
 We may perhaps find that all these philosophers 
 have pushed their conclusions too far, by attempting 
 to generalise too much ; and while we are almost 
 compelled to smile at some of their notions, we cannot 
 but believe that some of them erred in seeking to mark 
 distinctions between the structure and nature of the 
 
12 Arrangement proposed, 
 
 human and the brute animal, without knowing much, 
 if any thing, more, either of one or the other, than 
 was to be learned by their respective actions. 
 
 For, the principle in matter by which a stone falls 
 to the ground, and the principle in mind, by which 
 a living organized intelligent being thinks and acts, 
 as in man, are equally unknown. Consequently, all 
 the principles or modifications of action, between 
 these extremes, in minerals, vegetables, insects, rep- 
 tiles, fishes, birds and beasts, are entirely hidden 
 from our keenest search. So that Gravitation, Cry- 
 stallization, Vegetation, Irritability, Sensation, In- 
 stinct, &c. are words used to denote certain effects, 
 the causes of which we are ignorant. It is therefore 
 vain to agitate metaphysical questions about diversi- 
 ties or similitudes, which depend more upon our 
 own words than upon any clear knowledge we can 
 have of the things we define ; as, whether brutes differ 
 from man in degree or in kind, whether there be 
 an essential distinction between the rational and 
 animal nature, and whether a being capable of sub- 
 duing all, is only raised a single step above one or 
 two of the higher 9pecies of brutes ; — inquiries better 
 fitted for scholastic exercises, (about which much 
 may be said, and but little can be known,) than for 
 the improvement of knowledge. 
 
 The observations of Smell ie on this point, though 
 he has drawn conclusions on others which can 
 scarcely be admitted, are worth our attention. 
 
 " It cannot," says he, "escape observation that all 
 
Arrangement -proposed. 13 
 
 the sagacity and laborious industry exerted in the 
 various instances of animal architecture, have one 
 uniform tendency. They are all designed for the 
 multiplication, protection, and nourishment of off- 
 spring. But many of them are so artful, and require 
 such persevering labour, that the human mind is be- 
 wildered when it attempts to account for them. 
 Recourse has been had by Des Cartes, Buffon, and 
 other philosophers, to conformation of body and 
 mechanical impulse. Their reasonings, however, 
 though often ingenious, involve the subject in tenfold 
 obscurity. We can hardly suppose that the animals 
 actually foresee what is to happen, because, at first, 
 they have not had even the aid of experience ; and 
 particularly in some of the insect tribes the parents 
 are dead, before the young are produced. Pure in- 
 stincts of this kind, therefore, must be referred to 
 another source. In a chain of reasoning: concerning; 
 the operations of nature, such is the constitution of 
 our minds, that we are under the necessity of resort- 
 ing to an ultimate cause. What that cause is, it is 
 the highest presumption in man to define. But, 
 though we must for ever remain ignorant of the 
 cause, we are enabled to trace, and even to under- 
 stand, partially, some of the effects ; and from these 
 effects we perceive the most consummate wisdom, the 
 most elegant and perfect contrivances, to accomplish 
 the multifarious and wonderful intentions of nature. 
 In contemplating the operations of animals, from 
 man down to the seemingly most contemptible insect, 
 
J 4 Justine t contrasted with Reason. 
 
 we are necessarily compelled to refer them to pure 
 instinct, or original qualities of mind, variegated by 
 nature according as the necessities, preservation, and 
 continuation of the different species require. Let 
 any man try to proceed a step farther, and, however 
 he may deceive himself, and flatter his own vanity, 
 he must find at last that he is clouded in obscurity, 
 and that men who have a more correct and unpreju- 
 diced mode of thinking, will brand him with absur- 
 dity, and acting in direct opposition to the constitution 
 and frame of the human mind." * 
 
 Sect. II. 
 Instinct contrasted with Reason. 
 
 On surveying the actions of Men and Brutes, there 
 seem to be sufficient logical grounds for making two 
 grand distinctions ; the one, comprising those actions 
 which appear to be done blindly or without premedi- 
 tation and without experience ; and the other, those 
 which are done with forethought by combining means 
 to accomplish ends, which are often the result of 
 individual or social experience and instruction. 
 
 These general facts seem to be so obvious, that 
 they lead us at once to call them by different names, 
 and to conclude that they arise from different pro- 
 
 * See Philos. of Nat. Hist. vol. ii. p. 118. 
 
Instinct contrasted with Reason. 15 
 
 pensities or faculties : and the words Instinct and 
 Reason come up as nearly to the view of the case as 
 any others we could employ. Hence, while Reason 
 acts with intelligence and design, (variably indeed 
 and inconstantly,) profiting by experience, comparing 
 motives, balancing probabilities, looking forward to 
 the future and adapting itself to every change of cir- 
 cumstance ; Instinct operates with uniformity in all 
 individuals of the same species, and performs its office 
 with unerring certainty, prior to all experience. 
 
 It is proper for me here to remark, that the word 
 Reason is used in senses which are extremely dif- 
 ferent ; sometimes to express the whole of those 
 powers which elevate man above the brutes, and 
 constitute what is called his rational nature ; more 
 especially, perhaps, his intellectual powers ; and 
 sometimes to express the power of deduction or argu- 
 mentation. The former is the sense in which the 
 word is used in common discourse. It is in the latter 
 restricted sense, as indeed is implied a little above, 
 that I wish the word Reason to be understood, where- 
 ever it occurs in this Essay, viz. the discursive facul- 
 ty, wholly depending on outward evidence for its 
 conclusions.* Hence, if there be any actions which 
 are performed with every indication of design, fore- 
 thought, and wisdom, which are not the result of 
 instruction nor of individual experience, but of a 
 power operating above the consciousness of the crea- 
 ture, and directing it with unerring certainty to some 
 
 * See Outlines of Moral Philosophy by Stewart, Sect. 9. 
 
16 Instinct contrasted with Reason. 
 
 specific ends by means far beyond its comprehension, 
 whether in man or in the brute ; these actions are 
 instinctive. And on the other hand, if there be any 
 actions, which evidently result from observation and 
 instruction, indicating an intelligent power of com- 
 bining means and adapting them to ends of which 
 the creature is conscious ; these actions come within 
 the province of Reason. 
 
 According to this view of the subject, we shall 
 find, that Man himself, more especially the human 
 infant, is not without his instincts ; which immedi- 
 ately tend to the preservation of his existence, at times, 
 when Reason, either from its tardy growth or want 
 of promptitude, and general inefficiency, would be 
 unable to superintend the different offices of the ani- 
 mal economy, for which the former are appointed. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 EXAMPLES OF INSTINCT IN THE WORKS OF 
 ANIMALS, AND THE CARE OF THEIR YOUNG; 
 AND IN THEIR CHOICE OF FOOD.— REMARKS 
 ON THE ADAPTATION OF STRUCTURE TO 
 CLIMATE, AND ADAPTATION OF HABIT AND 
 DISPOSITION TO STRUCTURE, &c. 
 
 Sect. I. 
 
 Examples of Instinct in the Works of Animals, and the 
 Care of their Young, 
 
 " The works of animals, says Dr. Reid, present us 
 with a wonderful variety of instincts ; the nests of 
 birds so similar in their situation and architecture in 
 the same kind, so various in different kinds ; the 
 webs of spiders; the ball of the silk worm; the nests 
 of ants and other mining animals ; the combs of wasps, 
 hornets, and bees ; the dams and houses of beavers. 
 
 " But while every manufacturing art among men 
 was invented by some man, improved by others, and 
 brought to perfection by time and experience, and 
 known only to those who have been taught them ; in 
 
 1 
 
18 Of Instinct in Animals in 
 
 the arts of animals no individual can claim the inven- 
 tion. Every animal of the species has equal skill 
 from the beginning, without teaching, without ex- 
 perience or habit. Ever?/ one has its art by a kind of 
 inspiration ; not that it is inspired with the principles 
 or rules of the art, but with the ability and inclina- 
 tion of working in it to perfection, without any know- 
 ledge of its principles, rules, or end. 
 /" The youngest pair of birds, it is known, without 
 instruction or experience, build their first nest of the 
 materials commonly used by their species ; in situa- 
 tions too most secure and convenient for incubation 
 and the rearing of their young."* This cannot be 
 imitation ; for, as Addison says, " Though you hatch 
 a crow under a hen, and never let it see any of the 
 works of its own kind, the nest it makes shall be the 
 same, to the laying of a stick, with all the other nests 
 of the same species. It cannot be reason : for were 
 animals endued with it to as great a degree as man, 
 their buildings would be as different as ours, accord- 
 ing to the different conveniencies that they would 
 propose to themselves." + 
 
 The work of every animal is, like the works of 
 nature, perfect in its kind, and can bear the most 
 critical examination of the mechanic or the mathema- 
 tician. Let us take an example from the Bee. Dr. 
 Reid further remarks, that "there are only three pos- 
 sible figures of the cells which can make them all 
 
 * Reid's Essays, vol. Hi. chap. 1. + Spectator, vol. ii. 
 
(heir &orks, and care of their Young. \9 
 
 equal and similar, without any useless interstices. 
 These are the equilateral triangle, the square, and 
 the regular hexagon. Mathematicians know that 
 there is not a fourth way possible, in which a plane 
 may be cut into little spaces that shall be equal, 
 similar, and regular without useless spaces. Of the 
 three figures, the hexagon is the most proper for 
 eonveniency and strength. Bees, as if they knew 
 this, make their cells regular hexagons." 
 
 But the bottom of each cell rests upon the par- 
 titions between the cells on the other side, which 
 aerve as a buttress to strengthen it ; and this gives it 
 all the strength possible. 
 
 "Again, it has been demonstrated that, by making 
 the bottoms of the cells to consist of three planes 
 meeting in a point, there is a saving of material and 
 labour no way inconsiderable. The bees, as if ac- 
 quainted with these principles of solid geometry, 
 follow them most accurately. It is a curious mathe- 
 matical problem, at what precise angle (lie three 
 planes which compose the bottom of a cell ought to 
 meet, in order to make th6 greatest possible saving, 
 or the least expense, of material and labour. This rs 
 one of the problems which belong to the higher parts 
 of mathematics. It has accordingly been resolved 
 by some mathematicians, particularly by the ingeni- 
 ous Maclaurin, by a fluxionary calculationj which is 
 to be found in the Transactions of the Royal Society 
 of London. He has determined precisely the angle 
 required, and he found by the most exact mensuration 
 
 b2 
 
20 ,<*jv Of Instinct in Animals in 
 
 the subject would admit, that it is the very angle in 
 which the three planes in the bottom of the cell of a 
 honey-comb do actually meet. 1 ' 
 
 It has been therefore demonstrated, (as far as geo- 
 metry and mathematics can show it,) that Bees build 
 their cells in the strongest possible manner ; and with 
 the least possible expense of labour and materials. 
 And hence it is proved, that on the supposition that 
 they act with a view to consequences, they are more 
 skilled in geometry and mathematics, than the most 
 philosophical and learned men, and that too from the 
 earliest ages. " We must therefore conclude that, 
 although the Bees act geometrically, yet they under- 
 stand neither the rules nor the principles of the arts 
 which they practise so skilfully; and that the geometry 
 is not in the Bee, but in the great Geometrician who 
 made the Bee, and made all things in number, weight, 
 and measure." * 
 
 Now when we see that animals, by Instinct, arrive 
 at once to perfection in their art, while man is left to 
 the exercise of his Reason, in other words, to his own 
 skill and ingenuity, and very slowly attains to per- 
 fection, we must conclude that the former are guided 
 by a more perfect wisdom than the latter, at least in 
 these outward concerns of life. 
 
 In the second volume of the Spectator, Addison 
 has taken a view somewhat similar, which illustrates 
 not only the difference between Instinct and Reason, 
 but the perfection of the former in its operations. 
 
 nofc£«e Reid's Essay, ami Rces's Cyclopaedia, art. Instinct. 
 
their zeorks, and care oflhttr Young, 21 
 
 He observes, "Animals in their generation are wiser 
 than the sons of men ; but their wisdom is confined 
 to a few particulars, and lies in a very narrow com- 
 pass. Take a brute out of his instinct, and you find 
 him wholly deprived of understanding. To use an 
 instance that comes often under observation. 
 
 " With what caution does the hen provide herself 
 a nest in places unfrequented, and free from noise 
 and disturbance ? When she has laid her eggs in such 
 a manner as she can cover them, what care does she 
 take in turning them frequently, that all parts may 
 partake of the vital warmth ? When she leaves them 
 to provide for her necessary sustenance, how punc- 
 tually does she return before they have time to cool 
 and become incapable of producing an animal? In 
 the summer you see her giving herself greater free- 
 doms, and quitting her care for above two hours 
 together; but in winter, when the rigour of the sea- 
 son would chill the principles of life, and destroy the 
 young one, she grows more assiduous in her at- 
 tendance, and stays away about half the time. When 
 the birth approaches, with how much nicety and 
 attention does she help the chick to break its prison ? 
 not to take notice of her covering it from the injuries 
 of the weather, providing it proper nourishment, and 
 teaching it to help itself; nor to mention her for- 
 saking the nest, if, after the usual time of reckoning 
 the young one does not make its appearance. A 
 chemical operation could not be followed with greater 
 art or diligence than is seen in the hatching of a 
 
2g Of Fasti-net in Animals in 
 
 chick; though there are many other birds that show 
 an infinitely greater sagacity in all the forementioned 
 particulars. 
 
 " But at the same time, the hen, that has all this 
 seeming ingenuity, which is indeed absolutely neces- 
 sary for the propagation of the species, considered in 
 other respects, is without the least glimmerings of 
 thought or common sense. She mistakes a piece of 
 chalk for an egg y and sits upon it in the same manner; 
 she is insensible of any increase or diminution in the, 
 number of those she lays ; she does not distinguish 
 between her own and those of another species; and 
 when the birth appears of never so different a bird, 
 will cherish it for her own. In all these circum- 
 stances, which do not carry an immediate regard to 
 the subsistence of herself or species, she is a very 
 idiot." 
 
 With reference to such examples of pure instinct, 
 Addison says, that there is not, in his opinion, "any 
 thing more mysterious in nature than this instinct in 
 animals, which thu9 rises above reason, and falls 
 infinitely short of it." And he seems to consider \\ 
 cc the immediate direction of Providence, and such an 
 operation of the Supreme Being, as that which deter- 
 mines all the portions of matter to their proper cen- 
 tre." A modern philosopher, quoted by Bayle in his 
 learned Dissertation on the souls of Brutes, delivers 
 the same opinion, though in a bolder form of words, 
 where he says, c Deus est anima brutorum,' God 
 himself is the soul of brutes." 
 
their Choice of Food, Sfc 93 
 
 " For my own part," he concludes, " I look upon 
 Instinct as upon the principle of gravitation in bodies, 
 which is not to be explained by any known qualities, 
 inherent in the bodies themselves, nor from any laws 
 of mechanism, but, according to the best notions of the 
 greatest philosophers, is an immediate impression from 
 the first Mover, and the divine energy acting in the 
 creatures." * 
 
 Sect. II. 
 Of Instinct in Animals in their choice of Food. 
 
 In a sketch like the present, it cannot but be inter- 
 esting to the lover of truth, to see and compare toge- 
 ther the opinions of different eminent writers, espe- 
 cially when they coincide. I shall therefore have re- 
 course to them as often and use them as freely, as 
 may appear necessary ; because they will afford me, 
 if not more solid, at least more satisfactory grounds, 
 than my v own limited observations could do, for the 
 subsequent reasonings which 1 shall build upon them. 
 Hence I shall consider them as facts not only well 
 attested, but as grave authorities to which I shall ap- 
 peal, in drawing some conclusions that do not appear 
 to have suggested themselves to the writers in ques- 
 tion. 
 
 * Spectator, vol. ii. No. 120. 
 
24 Of Instinct in Animals in 
 
 If we would take another view of the wonderful 
 manner in which pure instinct operates, we may turn 
 our attention to the choice which different animals 
 make of plants for food, prior to all experience, — 
 plants which are poisonous to other animals ; avoiding 
 whatever is noxious or unwholesome to themselves. 
 
 Smellie remarks that there is hardly a plant that is 
 not rejected as food by some animals, and ardently 
 desired by others. The horse yields the common 
 water hemlock to the goat, and the cow the long- 
 leafed water hemlock to the sheep. The goat, again, 
 leaves the aconite, or wolf's bane, to the horse. 
 The euphorbia, or spurge, so noxious to man, is 
 greedily devoured by some of the insect tribes.* The 
 Indian buceros feeds to excess on the colubrina, or 
 nux vomica, used in this country as a poison for rats ; 
 and the land crab on the berries of the hippomane, or 
 manchineel tree. The leaves of the bread-leafed kal- 
 mia are feasted upon by the deer, and the round- 
 horned elk, but are mortally poisonous to sheep, to 
 horned cattle, to horses, and to man. The bee ex- 
 tracts honey without injury from the flower of this 
 plant, but the man who partakes of that honey, after 
 it is deposited in the hive-cells, falls a victim to his 
 repast. In the autumn and winter of the year 1790, 
 at Philadelphia, extensive mortality was occasioned 
 among those who had eaten of the honey collected in 
 the neighbourhood of that city, or had feasted on the 
 common American pheasant, or pinnated grous, as 
 
 * Smelliff, vol. i, p. 350. 
 
their choice of Food. 25 
 
 we call it. The attention of the American govern- 
 ment was excited by the general distress ; a minute 
 examination into the cause of the mortality ensued ; 
 and it was satisfactorily shewn that the honey had 
 been chiefly extracted from the flowers of the kalmia 
 latifolia, and that the pheasants which had proved thus 
 poisonous, had fed harmlessly on its leaves. The 
 consequence was, that a public proclamation was 
 issued, prohibiting the use of the pheasant as a food 
 for that season.* 
 
 Dampier, in his travels, tells us, that when seamen 
 are thrown upon any of the unknown coasts of America, 
 they never venture upon the fruit of any tree, how 
 tempting soever it may appear, unless they observe 
 that it is marked with the pecking of birds ; but fall 
 on without any fear or apprehension where the birds 
 have been before them.t 
 
 But as what nourishes birds may be injurious to 
 man, this cannot always be a safe guide. 
 
 The following passage from St. Pierre conveys an 
 interesting illustration of the same subject in his own 
 animated style, and concludes with a simple and 
 happy allusion to the varied working of that power, 
 which is ever performing its wonders in the creation. 
 
 " The sluggish cow pastures in the cavity of the 
 valley ; the bounding sheep on the declivity of the 
 hill ; the scrambling goat browses among the shrubs 
 of the rock ; the duck feeds on the water plants of the 
 river; the hen, with attentive eye, picks up every 
 
 * Oration by Dr. Mason Good, p. 24. + Spectator, vol. ii. 
 
26 Of the adaptation of structure to climate, fyc. 
 
 grain that is lost in the field : the pigeon, on rapid 
 wing, collects a similar tribute from the refuse of the 
 gtove ; and the frugal bee turns to account even the 
 small dust on the flower ; there is no part of the earth 
 where the whole vegetable crop may not be reaped. 
 Those plants which are rejected by one, are a deli- 
 cacy to another; and even among the finny tribes 
 contribute to their fatness. The hog devours the 
 horse-tail and henbane ; the goat the thistle and the 
 hemlock. All return in the evening to the habitation 
 of man, with murmurs, with bleatings, with cries of 
 joy, bringing back to him the delicious tribute of in- 
 numerable plants, transformed by a process the most 
 inconceivable, into honey, milk, butter, eggs, and 
 
 Sect. III. 
 Of the adaptation of Structure to Climate> Sfc. 
 
 The nice adaptation of their instincts to the situa- 
 tion in which different animals are placed, is itself a 
 sign of superior wisdom and power, operating in them 
 for their well-being. 
 
 Thus the animals of the torrid zone, as the monkey, 
 the elephant, and the rhinoceros, feed upon vegeta- 
 bles that grow in hot countries, and therefore in these 
 they have their allotted bounds. The rein-deer is 
 fixed in the coldest part of Lapland, because its 
 
Of the adaptation of structure to climate, #c. 27 
 
 chief food is the lichen, or moss, which grows there 
 more abundantly than in any other country. 
 
 The camel frequents the sandy and burning deserts 
 in order to feed on the dry camel's hay : and here in 
 reference to this animal, we may exclaim — how won- 
 derfully has the Creator contrived for him ! He is 
 confined to the deserts, where oftentimes no water is 
 to be found for many days. All other animals would 
 perish with thirst, while the camel feels no inconve- 
 nience ; being furnished with numerous cells in his 
 stomach where he keeps water, as in a reservoir, fresh 
 and perfectly good for a long time together ; it is said 
 even 10 or 12 days. The Arabians consider the camel 
 as a gift sent from heaven, a sacred animal, without 
 whose assistance they could neither subsist, nor tra- 
 vel. The milk of the camel is their common food. 
 They also eat its flesh ; and of its hair they make gar- 
 ments. Where shall we find his equal but in the rein- 
 deer of the north ? The inhabitants of Lapland have 
 little dependence on the fruits of the earth. They 
 neither sow nor reap. Their comparative riches con- 
 sist in the number of rein-deer. Their chief nourish- 
 ment is derived from the flesh and milk of these ani- 
 mals ; with the milk also they make cheese ; the skin 
 serves for clothing ; the hair for fur ; the horns and 
 hoofs for glue ; the sinews are split into thread which 
 is very strong : bow-strings are made of the tendons; 
 and the bones are manufactured into spoons. 
 
 Another instance of the beneficent care of the 
 Creator may be noticed in the broad palmated horns, 
 
£8 Of the adaptation of structure to climate, S?c. 
 
 or brow-antlers, bending forwards, with which the 
 face of the rein-deer is nearly covered : for, it has 
 been suggested, that were it not for this structure of 
 the horns the poor animal would perish in the midst 
 of plenty : as it is thus enabled to get at a sufficient 
 quantity of its favourite moss, which lies buried dur- 
 ing the winter at the bottom of the snow ; and we can 
 thus account for a circumstance that would otherwise 
 appear singular : namely, that contrary to the nature 
 of all other deer, the female is furnished with horns 
 as well as the male.* 
 
 Lawrence observes, that there are instances, in 
 which whole tribes of human beings depend for the 
 supply of all their wants, on one or two species of 
 animals. " The Greenlander, and the Esquimaux of 
 Labrador, placed in a region of almost constant snow 
 and ice, where intense cold renders the soil incapable 
 of producing any articles of human sustenance, are 
 fed, clothed, and lodged from the seal. The flesh 
 and blood of the seal are their food ; the blubber, or 
 sub-cutaneous stratum of fat, affords them the means 
 of procuring light and heat; the bones and teeth are 
 converted into weapons, instruments, and various 
 ornaments; the skin not only supplies them with 
 clothing, but with the coverings of their huts and ca- 
 noes. The stomach, intestines, and bladder, when 
 dried, are turned to many and various uses : in their 
 nearly transparent dry state they supply the place of 
 glass in the windows; they form bladders for their 
 
 * See Smellie, Linneeus, Church, &c. 
 
Of the adaptation of structure to climate, S?c. 29 
 
 harpoons, arrows, nets, &c; when sewed together 
 they make under garments, curtains, &c; and are 
 employed in place of linen on many occasions. Thus 
 every part of the animal is converted, by a kind of 
 domestic anatomy, to useful purposes, even to the 
 tendons, which, when split and dried, form excellent 
 threads. The Tschutski, the north-west Americans, 
 the Aleutians, and other neighbouring islanders, as 
 well as the Greenlanders, surprise us by manufactur- 
 ing thread from the carcase of the whale ; splitting 
 the fibres of its cutaneous muscle into lengths of a 
 hundred feet or more ; and preparing from it a double- 
 threaded twine, which, in the united requisites of 
 fineness and strength, will bear comparison with any 
 productions of European industry.* 
 
 An instance of very wonderful adaptation in the 
 physical economy of two insects of different species is 
 recorded in the history of the ant. 
 
 It is well known that many insects become torpid 
 in extreme cold ; and that in this state they require 
 no food. Ants present a remarkable exception to this 
 rule : for they are not benumbed till the thermometer 
 has sunk to 27° of Fahrenheit, or 5° below freezing. 
 They therefore need a supply of provision through 
 the greatest part of winter. 
 
 Now, it is singular that the principal resource of 
 the ant is the honey of another insect called the aphis, 
 an insect which abounds on the plants that are usually 
 found in the vicinity of ant-hills. This honey is an 
 
 * See Lectures on Zoology, &c. by W. Lawrence, F.R.S. p. 44. 
 
30 Of the adaptation of structure to climate, #c. 
 
 exudation from the body of the aphis, and is absorbed 
 greedily by the ants without any detriment to the in- 
 sect that yields it. It is voluntarily given out by the 
 aphis when solicited to do so by the ant. A single 
 aphis supplies many ants with a plentiful meal. 
 
 Now, it is a striking example of the coincidence 
 or wise harmony subsisting in nature, that the aphis 
 becomes torpid at precisely the same temperature as the 
 ant. 
 
 Some species of ants, we are told, bring the aphides 
 to their own nests, instead of seeking them when the 
 cold is excessive ; and lodge them near the vegetables 
 on which they feed : while the domestic ants prevent 
 them stirring out, guarding them with great care, and 
 defending them as their own young. 
 
 They even collect the eggs of the aphis ; and super- 
 intend their hatching; continually moistening them 
 with their tongue, and preserving them till the proper 
 season for their exclusion ; and in a word, bestow all 
 the attention which they give to the eggs of their own 
 species. 
 
 The ants defend them from the ants of other 
 societies. 
 
 That they have some notions of property in these 
 insects would appear from their occasionally having 
 establishments for their aphides at a distance from the 
 city, in fortified buildings, which they construct for 
 this purpose alone, in places which are secure from 
 invasion. Here the aphides are confined as cows in 
 a dairy, to supply the wants of the metropolis.* 
 
 * See Huber on Ants, and Edinb. Review, vol. xx, p. 156. 
 
Of the adaptation of structure lo climate, fyc. SI 
 
 Lawrence justly observes, m that we must take re- 
 fuge either in verbal quibbles, or in exaggerated and 
 unreasonable scepticism, if we refuse to recognize in 
 the relation between peculiarity of structure and func- 
 tion those designs and adaptations of exalted power 
 and wisdom, in testimony of which all nature cries 
 aloud through all her works." 
 
 " I shall be contented," he adds, B with two illus- 
 trations, which, although different from each other, 
 are analagous in their purpose. The large cavities of 
 birds, and the interior of their bones are filled with 
 air ; thus they are rendered light and buoyant ; capa- 
 ble of raising themselves into the higher regions of the 
 atmosphere, of sustaining themselves with little effort 
 in this rare medium, and cleaving the skies with won- 
 derful celerity. Humboldt saw the enormous vulture 
 of the Andes, the majestic condor, dart suddenly from 
 the bottom of the deepest vallies to a considerable 
 height above the summit of Chimbora^o, where the 
 barometer must have been lower than ten inches. He 
 frequently observed it soaring at an elevation six times 
 higher than that of the clouds in our atmosphere. 
 This bird, which reaches the measure of 14 feet with 
 the wings extended, habitually prefers an elevation, 
 at which the mercury of the barometer sinks to about 
 16 inches. 
 
 u The mammalia, which live entirely, or princi- 
 pally in the sea, as the whale kind, the walrus, the 
 manata, and the seal, are rendered buoyant in this 
 dense fluid by a thick stratum of fat laid over the 
 
32 Of the adaptation of habit 
 
 whole body under the skin. From this, which is 
 called blubber, the whale and seal oil are extracted. 
 The object of this structure in lightening these huge 
 creatures, and facilitating their motions, is obviously 
 the same as that of the air-cells in birds in relation to 
 the element they inhabit."* 
 
 Naturalists tell us, that the pelican chooses dry 
 and desert places to lay her eggs ; but like the camel, 
 she is formed for the wilderness. When her young 
 are hatched, she is compelled to bring them water 
 from great distances. For this purpose Providence 
 has furnished her with a very large bag under the 
 lower mandible of her bill, which she fills with a 
 quantity of water sufficient for many days. (Some 
 will hold from 10 to 20 quarts.) This water she pours 
 into the nest, which is usually hollowed in the ground, 
 to refresh her young, and to teach them to swim. 
 And it is said, on good authority, that lions, tigers, 
 and other rapacious animals resort to her nest to 
 quench their thirst, but do no hurt to the young. 
 
 Sect. IV. 
 Adaptation of habit and disposition to structure. 
 
 I shall in this place insert a few remarks taken from 
 some eminent physiologists, by Herder, on the adap- 
 tation of the structure of beasts to their habits and dis- 
 positions, instanced in the elephant, the lion, and the 
 
 * Lectures on Zoology, &c. 
 
and Disposition to Structure. 33 
 
 sloth. They are somewhat abridged from the work 
 of this author on the Philosophy of Man, but display 
 the glow and colouring for which the German writers 
 pre distinguished. 
 
 " The elephant, shapeless as he seems, displays 
 physiological grounds enough of his superiority to 
 other beasts, and resemblance to man. His brain 
 indeed is not very large in proportion to the size 
 of the animal, but it bears a striking resemblance 
 to that of man. The cranium is small in pro- 
 portion to the head, because the nostrils extend far 
 over the brain, and fill the cavities of the forehead 
 with air, at once to afford an extensive surface for the 
 strong muscles that move the ponderous jaw, and to 
 spare the creature an insupportable burthen of solid 
 bone. The nerves of the animal are chiefly spent on 
 the organs of the finer senses, and his trunk alone re- 
 ceives as many as the whole bulk of his vast body. 
 The trunk is the organ of a delicate feeling, an acute 
 smell, and the freest motion. In it, therefore, many 
 senses are combined and assist each other. The ex- 
 pressive eye of the elephant, like no other animal, 
 but man, is provided with hairs, and a delicate mo- 
 tion in the lower eye-lid, and has the finer senses for 
 its neighbours : and these are separated from the taste 
 which governs other beasts. The mouth, which forms 
 the predominant part of the visage in most other 
 beasts, particularly of the carnivorous kind, is here 
 almost concealed. The weapons of defence, the tusks, 
 are distinct from the organs of nutrition ; he is not 
 
 C 
 
34: Of the adaptation of Habit 
 
 formed, therefore, for savage voracity. Though his 
 bowels are necessarily large, his stomach is small and 
 simple, so that probably raging hunger cannot tor- 
 ment him as it does beasts of prey. Peaceably and 
 cleanly he crops the herb, and as his smell is separate 
 from his mouth, he employs in this more time and 
 caution. For the same caution has nature fashioned 
 him in drinking, and in every other function of his 
 massy structure; no sexual appetite inflames him 
 with rage. The periods of his life, during which he 
 grows, is in vigour, and decays, resemble those of 
 man ; his hearing is so delicate, that besides music 
 of which he is passionately fond, he can understand 
 human language in fine discrimination of the tones 
 of command and of the passions. His ears are larger 
 than those of any other animal, thin and extended on 
 all sides ; and the whole of the small occiput is a 
 cave of echo, filled with air. Thus nature has wisely 
 diminished the weight of the animal, and united the 
 strongest muscular force with the most refined ner- 
 vous economy : by which he is distinguished for sa- 
 gacious quiet, and intelligent purity of sense. 
 
 " How different a king of beasts is the lion ! Nature 
 has established his throne on muscular force, not on 
 mildness and superior intellect. His brain is small, 
 and his nerves so weak, that they are not even pro- 
 portionate to those of a cat : while his muscles are 
 large and strong, so fixed as to produce the greatest 
 force, instead of diversity and delicacy of motion. 
 One »Teat muscle that lifts the neck; a muscle of the 
 
and Disposition to Structure. 35 
 
 forefoot which serves to grasp ; the joint of the foot 
 close to the claws; these large and curved, so that 
 their points cannot be blunted, as they never touch 
 the earth : — these were his gifts for the purposes of 
 life. His stomach is long, and much curved; its 
 friction and his hunger, therefore, must be fearful. 
 The cavities of the heart are longer and broader than 
 in man, the parietes twice as thin, and the aorta 
 twice as small ; so that the blood of the lion, as soon 
 as it quits the heart, flows with four times the velo- 
 city, and in the small branches with a hundred times 
 that of the human circulation. The heart of the 
 elephant on the contrary beats slowly, almost as 
 much so, as in cold-blooded animals. The broad 
 tongue of the lion is furnished with prickles an inch 
 and half long, lying on the fore part, with their 
 points directed backwards ; hence the danger of his 
 licking the skin, which immediately fetches blood, 
 and excites his thirst of it. As the tongue tastes 
 acutely, and his fiery hunger is a kind of thirst, it is 
 natural that he should have no appetite for putrid 
 carrion. To kill his own food, to suck the warm 
 blood, is his royal taste. Benevolent nature has 
 blunted his senses; his eye is afraid of fire, and can- 
 not even bear the sun ; his scent is not acute, the 
 situation of his muscles only fitting him for great 
 springs, not for running, and nothing putrid excites 
 him. His forehead is small, compared with his ra-* 
 venous jaws and masticating muscles; his nose large 
 and long ; his neck and fore legs of amazing strength ; 
 
 c 2 
 
36 Of the adaptation of Habit 
 
 his mane and the muscles of his tail ample ; but his 
 hinder parts are more feeble and slender. Nature, 
 to use a German expression, had exhausted his fear- 
 ful powers, and made him in disposition, when not 
 tormented with the thirst of blood, a generous and 
 noble beast. So physiological are thus also this 
 creature's mind and character. 
 
 " The sloth, in appearance the most shapeless of 
 beasts, may serve us for a third example. His head 
 is small and round ; his limbs too are round, thick, 
 shapeless, and like stuffed cushions ; his neck stiff, as 
 if it were one piece with the head ; the hair of it has 
 a contrary direction to that of the back ; the wretched 
 head, in place, form and functions, being* subordinate 
 to the belly and posteriors, which appear the prin- 
 cipal parts ; for the organs of voracity far exceed 
 those of sense ; and even the heart and lungs are 
 slightly formed. Hence his blood is so cold as to 
 border on that of amphibia; his heart palpitates long 
 after being taken out, and the legs are agitated after 
 the heart is gone, as though he were in a slumber. 
 Thus while he wants susceptible nerves, and even 
 active mu?cular powers, he possesses a more diffused 
 and exquisite irritability, like the polypus or earth- 
 worm. This singular animal, therefore, may be less 
 unfortunate than he seems. He loves warmth and 
 the quiet of sleep; when he wants warmth he sleeps; 
 and as if lying down were painful to him, he fastens 
 himself to a bough with his paws, and feeds himself 
 with one of them, while, hanging from it like a bag 
 
and Disposition to Structure. 37 
 
 he enjoys in the warm sun-beams his grub-like ex- 
 istence. Thus the mishapen form of his feet is a bene- 
 fit to him. From the peculiarity of their structure, 
 the tender animal cannot support himself on their 
 balls, but only on the convexity of his claws; on 
 which as on the wheels of a waggon, he shoves 
 himself slowly and commodiously along. His six 
 and forty ribs, the like of which no other qua- 
 druped possesses, form a long vault for his store- 
 house of provisions, and are the ossified rings of a 
 voracious leaf-bag of a grub."* 
 
 To the preceding may be added a few similar 
 observations on the mole, a creature whose form and 
 structure are admirably suited to its mode of life. 
 " What more palpable argument of Providence than 
 the mole ?'' says Cardan, cited by Dr. More, " Her 
 body is so exactly fitted to her manner of life; for 
 her dwelling being under ground where nothing is 
 to be seen, nature has so obscurely provided her with 
 an organ of sight, that naturalists have doubted 
 whether she have any eyes at all or not ; but for 
 amends, she has very eminently conferred upon her 
 what she is capable of for defence and warning of 
 danger; for she is exceedingly quick of hearing. 
 And then we see to what purpose are her short tail 
 and short legs, but broad fore-feet armed with sharp 
 claws; she so swiftly working herself under ground 
 and making her way so fast in the earth, as they that 
 
 * See Herder's Philosophy of Man, Vol. 1. Book 3. 
 
S8 Of the adaptation of Habit 
 
 behold it cannot but admire it. Her legs are short, 
 that she need dig no more than will serve the mere 
 thickness of her body ; and her fore feet are broad, 
 that she may scoop away much earth at a time ; and 
 little or no tail she has, because she courses not on 
 the ground, like' the rat or mouse of whose kindred 
 she is, but lives under the earth, and digs herself a 
 dwelling there. And she making her way, through 
 so thick an element, which will not yield easily, it 
 had been dangerous to have drawn so long a train 
 behind her ; for her enemy might fall upon her rear, 
 and fetch her out, before she had completed or got 
 full possession of her works." 
 
 Boyle remarks pretty correctly, that although the 
 mole is not totally blind, she has scarcely sight enough 
 to distinguish particular objects. It is supposed that 
 her eye is so constructed as to give her the idea of 
 light and nothing else, and that this idea or sensa- 
 tion is probably painful to the animal. Hence when 
 she comes into broad day she might be in danger of 
 being taken, unless she were thus affected by a light 
 striking upon her eye, and immediately warning her 
 to bury herself in her proper element. More sight 
 would be useless to her, as none at all might be 
 fatal ?* 
 
 There would be no end of physiological facts and 
 reasonings, tending to prove the intelligence and 
 design displayed in the formation and habits of the 
 
 * Spectator, Vol. 2. No. 120. 
 
and Disposition to Structure. 39 
 
 lower animals. All the writings upon natural the- 
 ology, as it is called, abound in such observations ; 
 and there is scarcely a single animal, whose nature 
 and habits are at all known, that might not afford an 
 obvious illustration. 
 
CHAP. III. 
 OF THE INSTINCTS IN MAN. 
 
 The examples, which have been hitherto selected, 
 afford some tolerable notion of the views and ground 
 intended to be taken in the following reasonings. 
 Whether we regard the form and internal structure 
 of the lower animals, physiologically, or their acts 
 and general economy, physically, we have the clearest 
 evidence that their instinctive actions are regulated 
 by the most perfect intelligence. And because means 
 are so wonderfully adapted to their ends, we are 
 compelled to suppose that these actions are not 
 entirely under their own direction ; but, as all are 
 perfect in their kinds, and all conspire, (every indi- 
 vidual in its limited sphere) with astonishing, unerring 
 precision, to one great end, — the support and con- 
 tinuance, and order of the outward creation, — we 
 must conclude, that the whole are governed by a 
 power infinite in wisdom, working in them by its 
 energy, through the instrumentality of their respective 
 
Of the Instincts in Man. 41 
 
 And, again, we are necessitated to conclude, that 
 however human sagacity may have succeeded, in a 
 few obvious instances, in explaining the relation of 
 the structure of any organ to its outward use, yet 
 there is not an animal act in the creation which does 
 not involve the supposition of an ultimate cause, 
 mysterious and inexplicable. 
 
 Nay, we are warranted in determining, from ana- 
 logy, if we look at the simple law of gravitation, as 
 well as from the constitution and frame of the human 
 mind, (which always bewilders itself in attempting to 
 comprehend the abstract relation of physical cause 
 and effect,) that the theory of these animal instinctive 
 operations never can be clearly discovered to the 
 natural human understanding. 
 
 But, before 1 proceed, it' may be proper for me to 
 prepare the ground-work a little better for further 
 observation, by noticing in this place, a few of those 
 simple instinctive operations which belong to Man 
 himself;— operations, which, being of paramount 
 importance to the individual welfare of the human 
 creature, notwithstanding he is dignified by his 
 rational powers, have not been entrusted to Reason, 
 we may safely presume, because of its insufficiency to 
 the several offices. 
 
 Hence, we cannot wonder that Man should be un- 
 able to comprehend in the Brute, what is going for- 
 ward in his own system, as darkly and mysteriously, 
 as respects his own conception or knowledge of the 
 operation, (perhaps it may be said, as independently), 
 
42 Of the Instincts in Man. * 
 
 as if he had never been endowed with the inquisitive 
 and penetrating faculty 'of Reason. He is as much 
 at fault in explaining satisfactorily the operation of 
 any one of his own organs, with the most skilful 
 anatomist at his service, as he would be in tracing 
 the classes and orders of his ideas laid up in the store- 
 house of his mind, or in ascertaining how he recalls, 
 associates, and compares these invisible elements of 
 thought. 
 
 The most philosophical view of human Instincts 
 which I have seen, is contained in Dr. Reid's Essays 
 on the powers of the Mind. Dr. Gregory in his Com- 
 parative View, though he often alludes to them, has 
 given us but little special information ; neither dis- 
 tinguishing nor enumerating these original powers. 
 Smellie has dismissed the subject with a very brief 
 general notice. 
 
 All seem to agree that Instinct is a principle com- 
 mon to Man and the whole animal world ; — that many 
 things necessary for our preservation must be done 
 by it, — that our Instincts are adapted to the weakness 
 of our understandings, — and that the most remarkable 
 appear in infancy, when we are ignorant of every 
 thing, and therefore (in the language of Dr. Reid), 
 " must perish if we had not an invisible Guide, who 
 leads us blindfold in the way we should take, if we 
 had eyes to see it." 
 
 It may be proper again to define Instinct to be w a 
 natural blind impulse to certain actions, without 
 
Of the Instincts of Man. 43 
 
 having- any end in view, without deliberation, and 
 very often without any conception of what we do." 
 
 Thus, the act of breathing is performed by the 
 alternate contraction and relaxation of certain mus- 
 cles, by which the chest is expanded in its dimensions 
 or contracted, and consequently the capacity of the 
 lunffs increased or diminished: so as either to brine: 
 the blood nearly in contact with the atmospherical 
 air, that it may undergo a chemical change essential 
 to life, or, when freed from its carbonaceous prin- 
 ciple, that it may be withdrawn into the general 
 circulation. 
 
 " We cannot suppose," says Dr. Reid, " that the 
 infant knows any thing about the chemical or the 
 mechanical theory of this important vital function ; 
 yet he breathes as soon as he is born with perfect re- 
 gularity, as if he had been taught, and had acquired 
 the habit by long practice. 
 
 11 By the same kind of instinct a new-born child 
 sucks and swallows its food as perfectly as if it knew 
 the principles of the operation, which is very complex. 
 About thirty pair of muscles must be employed in 
 every draught, yet not simultaneously, but succeeding 
 each other in certain order. This regular train of 
 operations is, however, carried on according to the 
 nicest rules of art by the infant who has neither art 
 nor science, nor experience nor habit. That it knows 
 nothing of the mean's by which the sensation of hunger 
 may. be removed, is evident — for it will suck indis- 
 
44 OJ the Instincts in Man, 
 
 criminately every thing brought into contact with its 
 mouth." 
 
 By a like principle, Dr. Reid supposes, that infants 
 cry when they are pained or hurt ; that they are 
 afraid, when they are left alone ; that they start when 
 in danger of falling; that they are terrified by an angry 
 countenance or angry tones of voice, and are soothed 
 and comforted by a placid countenance and by soft 
 and gentle tones of voice. 
 
 In the more perfect of the lower animals we see 
 much the same instincts as in the human kind. 
 
 Dr. Reid again remarks, that " besides the instincts 
 which appear only in infancy, and are intended to 
 supply the want of understanding in that early period, 
 there are many which continue through life and 
 which supply the defects of our intellectual powers 
 in every period." Of these he notices three classes. 
 
 " First — There are many things necessary to be 
 done for our preservation, which even when we will 
 to do, we know not the means by which they must be 
 done. A man knows that he must swallow his food 
 before it can nourish him. But he knows nothing of 
 the names and nature and office of the various nerves 
 and muscles which must co-operate to this action. 
 If it were to be directed by his understanding and 
 will, he would starve, before he learned how to per- 
 form it. These nerves and muscles are moved by 
 some impulse, of which the cause is unknown, with- 
 out any thought, will, or intention on his part — they 
 
Of the Instincts in Man. 45 
 
 are moved instinctively. And this is the case, in 
 some degree, in every voluntary motion of our body, 
 as in stretching out the arm. We neither know, nor 
 think any thing of nerve or muscle, when we stretch 
 out the arm, yet they immediately produce the effect 
 which we designed. 
 
 " A second case, in which we have need of Instinct, 
 even in advanced life, is, where the action must be so 
 frequently repeated that to intend and will it every 
 time it is done would occupy too much of our thought, 
 and leave no room for other necessary employments 
 of the mind. 
 
 " We must breathe often every minute whether 
 awake or asleep. We must often close the eye-lids, 
 in order to preserve the lustre of the eye. Nature 
 gives us an impulse to do them without any thought 
 at all. 
 
 " A third case, in which we need the aid of Instinct, 
 is when the action must be done so suddenly, that 
 there is no time to think and determine. When a 
 man loses his balance, either on foot or on horseback, 
 he makes an instantaneous effort to recover it by 
 instinct. The effort would be in vain, if it waited the 
 determination of reason and will. 
 
 " When anything threatens our eyes, we wink hard 
 by instinct, and can scarcely avoid doing so, even 
 when we know that the stroke is aimed in jest, and 
 that we are safe from danger." 
 
 Dr. Ileid concludes, that " thus the merciful author 
 
46 Of the Instincts in Mem. 
 
 of our nature hath adapted our instincts to the 
 weakness of our understanding. 
 
 " In infancy we are ignorant of every thing; yet 
 many things must be done for our preservation, and 
 these are done by Instinct. When we grow up there 
 are many motions of our limbs and bodies necessary, 
 which can be performed only by a curious and com- 
 plex machinery, of which the bulk of mankind are 
 totally ignorant, and which the most skilful anato- 
 mist knows but imperfectly. All this machinery is 
 set a going by Instinct. 
 
 a Some actions must be so often repeated through 
 the whole of life, that if they required attention and 
 will, we should be able to do nothing else. These are 
 done by instinct. Our preservation from danger often 
 requires such sudden exertions, that there is no time 
 to think and to determine. Accordingly we make 
 such exertions by instinct." 
 
 In addition to the preceding observations on human 
 instinct, Dr. Reid has made some judicious remarks 
 on the appetites which seem to apply, to the present 
 subject. 
 
 " The ends," says he, li for which our natural ap- 
 petites are given, are too evident to escape the obser- 
 vation of any man of the least reflection. The reason 
 of mankind would be altogether insufficient for these 
 ends, without the direction and call of appetite. 
 Though a man knew that his life must be supported 
 by eating, reason could not direct him when to eat 
 
Of the Instincts in Man, 47 
 
 or what; how much, or how often. In all these 
 things appetite is a much better guide than reason. 
 Were reason only to direct us in this matter, its calm 
 voice would often be drowned in the hurry of busi- 
 ness, or the charms of amusement. But the voice of 
 appetite rises gradually, and at last becomes loud 
 enough to call off our attention from any other em- 
 ployment. Without our appetites, even supposing 
 mankind inspired with all the knowledge requisite 
 for answering their ends, the race of men must have 
 perished long ago ; but by their means, whether man 
 be savage or civilized, knowing or ignorant, virtuous 
 or vicious, the race is continued from one generation 
 to another. 
 
 " By the same means, the tribes of brute animals, 
 from the whale that ranges the ocean to the least 
 microscopic insect, have been continued from the be- 
 ginning of the world to this day."* 
 
 I have thus enumerated a few of those actions in 
 mankind which suggested themselves to Dr. Reid, as 
 appertaining to the province of Instinct. It is true, 
 they appear somewhat different from the examples 
 that have been given of pure instinct in the brute; 
 and it is possible, that many may question how far 
 some of them belong to this class of animal opera- 
 tions. Some perhaps may refer them entirely to me- 
 chanical impulse. But whether the moving cause 
 act in the first instance by mechanical impression ; 
 or whether the term Instinct deserves to be applied 
 
 * See Reid's Essays, vol. 3. Essay 3. Chap. I. 
 
48 Of the Instincts in Man. 
 
 to them or not ; they certainly do not come within 
 the province of Reason ; for they are common to 
 some of the lowest of the brute animals with man; 
 and so far, the conclusion, that they are inde- 
 pendent of conscious intention or deliberation, must 
 remain unshaken. 
 
 Admitting with Dr. Priestley, that none of these 
 actions are instinctive, and that they are wholly to be 
 explained on mechanical principles, it is easy to see 
 that we must come at last to precisely the same con- 
 clusion respecting a divine Intelligence, whether we 
 suppose that it acts in the first instance on mechanical 
 or on vital powers. But, one would think, it was 
 now sufficiently settled, that none of the acts of any 
 living organised being can be explained on purely 
 mechanical principles, without some inherent vital 
 energy, communicated by the Creator. Therefore 
 the acts of breathing and sucking, though they may 
 implicate some degree of mechanical agency, are in 
 their nature eminently vital, and have no more to do 
 with outward instruction than the germination of a 
 seed has to do with it. Consequently they arise from 
 an instinctive physical impulse directed by Supreme 
 Wisdom. 
 
 It appears, therefore, that we have no need to look 
 to the lower animals in order to feel the conviction 
 that many operations, marking singular intelligence, 
 are going forward in the animal economy, which are 
 not under the direction of Reason, and which we are 
 unable to comprehend. Neither are we under the 
 
Of the Instincts in Man. 49 
 
 necessity of being confined to doubtful instances in 
 the human system : for, to rely on these would only 
 weaken our argument, if they were the best or only 
 ones we could adduce. But it is certain that the 
 most important functions of the human body, as 
 digestion, assimilation, nutrition, absorption, secre- 
 tion, circulation, respiration, and many others, are 
 performed by instinctive living actions, with the 
 operation of which our reason or volition has no 
 immediate concern. Science has pointed out to us, 
 obscurely, the mechanism or fabric of the organs on 
 which some of these functions depend. I say, 06- 
 scurely^ for every fresh insight we get by the micro- 
 scope or by injection, only shews a new series of 
 wonders in their structure. But about the mode of 
 their working we are as ignorant, as if we knew 
 nothing at all of the mechanism. 
 
 In truth, the only material difference that seems to 
 exist between these instinctive actions and others in 
 principle, is this, that they are internal and almost 
 invisible, except by their effects ; whereas the others 
 properly called Instincts, display themselves openly 
 to our view. 
 
 The caterpillar, when shaken off the leaves of a 
 tree, that returns and crawls up t{ie trunk and along 
 the branches till it regains the situation best fitted 
 for its present support and future transformation, 
 does not exhibit a phenomenon differing much in 
 principle from the stomach that digests, or the gland 
 that secretes, or the lacteal that absorbs. The chief 
 
 D 
 
50 Of the Instincts in Man. 
 
 difference is, that the latter are parts of a system, and 
 the insect to which I have alluded constitutes a whole 
 or entire self-moving' structure. But the perfection 
 with which the several organs of the body discharge 
 their functions, when in a state of health, is as worthy 
 of admiration as any phenomenon without us among 
 the insect tribes. And we may presume, as they are 
 none of them the works of man, that the evidence of 
 wisdom should equally appear in one class of pheno- 
 mena as in another — consequently, the perfection and 
 efficiency of the acts as well as of the divine work- 
 manship. 
 
 When a bone is broken, the surgeon does not in 
 fact produce a union between the fractured ends. 
 That process is effected by a power of self-restoration 
 in the human body, to which his skill cannot reach ; 
 and because he can go no farther, he calls it a law of 
 the animal economy. He may, indeed, aid and 
 assist, or he may thwart: so much power has been 
 given to man, to good or to evil, over the body as 
 well as the mind : but the ultimate efforts are not 
 his own, nor can he wholly command their obe- 
 dience. 
 
 Hence has arisen the term vis medicatrix natures, 
 or healing power of nature, to designate a power 
 implanted in the bodily constitution to preside over 
 all its functions, vital and natural, for its support in 
 health, and its preservation from injury, — a principle, 
 powerfully active in effect, whether the term be ad- 
 mitted or rejected, and under all its appellations 
 
Of the Instincts in Man, 51 
 
 meaning the same thing, though the cause be un- 
 known. Therefore, whether it be called the Qvo-ts 
 of Hippocrates, the archceus of Van Helmont, the 
 anima of Stahl, or the vis medicatrix of Cullen ; whe- 
 ther it be dignified as the vital principle or degraded 
 to mere mechanical and organic impulse ; it is used to 
 imply a mysterious innate faculty or power, from the 
 moment of birth, — even from the first rudiments of 
 living action, — ever watching and sustaining the body 
 in its struggles with the various accidents of time to 
 the last hour of human existence, when by an irre- 
 versible decree its efforts must cease. 
 
 n 2 
 
CHAP. IV. 
 
 OF CERTAIN ACTIONS IN THE LOWER ANI- 
 MALS, IN SOME DEGREE DISTINGUISHABLE 
 FROM THE OPERATIONS OF INSTINCT. 
 
 Sect. I. 
 
 On the effects of Human Intercourse on the lower 
 Animals. 
 
 Having given a few examples of Instinct, or of a 
 power operating above the conscious intelligence of 
 the creature, I shall for the present digress from my 
 immediate subject to notice certain actions of the 
 lower animals ; some of which seem to be referable 
 to human instruction, some to a conscious intelli- 
 gence or modified rationality in the creature, some to 
 natural acuteness of the organs of sense, and some to 
 the operation of a sense or faculty which appears to 
 be altogether inexplicable. 
 
 It is pretty obvious that Instinct acts more imme- 
 diately and determinately in the lower animals, like 
 the appetites in man, for the preservation of the 
 
On the effects of human intercourse, Sfc. 55 
 
 individual and the multiplication of the species. The 
 lower animals have also their appetites; but these 
 are wisely placed under the government of Instinct, 
 while the appetites of man require the controul of his 
 higher principles. 
 
 The means which the brutes have of procuring 
 food, of defending themselves from danger, and of 
 providing for their offspring, are conducted with ad- 
 mirable skill and economy. This is an institution 
 of nature under her own especial care. But beyond 
 these objects we find them capable of many acts and 
 services, which in various ways we turn to our own 
 advantage. 
 
 We may perhaps adopt the general conclusion that 
 Instinct governs the Brutes, and still admit the ex- 
 ception that some of their actions are not compre- 
 hended in this rule ; as we may lay down the general 
 position that man is a rational being, though we know 
 that the conduct of many is often highly irrational; 
 and, besides, many actions of the human frame are sub- 
 ject to the laws of instinct. But to draw the universal 
 conclusion that man is under the exclusive dominion 
 of Reason, and the brute under that of Instinct, would 
 perhaps be assuming more than is consistent with 
 sound philosophy. 
 
 It is, therefore, of importance to ascertain under 
 what peculiar circumstances the lower animals ex- 
 hibit phenomena. of the doubtful character alluded 
 to ; so that some of the wisest men should say, the 
 barrier between Instinct and Reason is too nice to be 
 
54 On the effects of human intercourse 
 
 apprehended ; and, as Pope expresses it, " that these 
 principles are for ever separate, yet for ever near." 
 
 It appears, then, as far as we can range in the field 
 of nature to survey the instincts of animals, that the 
 farther they are removed from the confines of human 
 intercourse, the more perfect are their instincts. 
 And, on the contrary, the more their natural habits 
 are changed by the artificial modes of life common in 
 human Society, they lay aside pure instinct, and the 
 more do the actions, at least of the more perfect ani- 
 mals, approach to the rule or line of rationality. 
 Indeed, we see something of this kind to happen in 
 our own species; for if instinct, as it is commonly 
 understood, have any thing to do with the perfection 
 of the senses, we know that in the rude or natural 
 state of human society, they go far to excel those of 
 the brute; and even the sight and hearing and smell 
 are so wonderfully acute, as, in many important 
 points relating to their personal advantages, to con- 
 vey clearer information to the unenlightened Indian 
 than the philosopher could attain by all his scientific 
 experience. Hence, it would appear, that, as man- 
 kind is compressed in society, their instincts like those 
 of the brute, give place to the culture of Reason : 
 while, as man takes his range in the wilds of unculti- 
 vated nature, and seeks no other guide for his direc- 
 tion, his senses acquire a perfection which sometimes 
 far exceeds the laboured deductions of reason. Dr. 
 Gregory had a view somewhat similar to this, which 
 he has expressed in the following passage: " Some 
 
on the lower animals. 55 
 
 of the advantages, says he, which the brute animals 
 have over us are possessed in a considerable degree 
 by those of our own species, who, being but just 
 above them, and guided in a manner entirely by in- 
 stinct, are equally strangers to the noble attainments 
 of which their natures are capable, and to the many 
 miseries attendant on their more enlightened brethren 
 of mankind." 
 
 " Is it not notorious," he adds, " that all animals, 
 except ourselves, enjoy every pleasure their natures 
 are capable of, that they are strangers to pain and 
 sickness, and, abstracting from external accidents, 
 arrive at the natural period of their being ? We 
 speak of wild animals only. Those that are tame 
 and under our direction, partake of all our miseiies." 
 " Is it a necessary consequence of our superior facul. 
 ties, that not one of 10,000 of our species dies a natural 
 death, that we struggle through a frail and feverish 
 being, in continual danger of sickness, of pain, of 
 dotage, and the thousand nameless ills that experience 
 shows to be the portion of human life ?"* 
 
 Dr. Gregory intimates that this is not the designed 
 order of nature ; and that these evils are adventitious 
 and unnatural to our constitution. 
 
 u There is a remarkable uniformity," continues 
 Dr. Gregory, u in the works of animals. But the 
 only exception to this uniformity of character in the 
 different species of animals seems to be among those 
 who are most connected with mankind, particularly 
 
 * See Comparative View. 
 
56 On the effects of Human intercourse 
 
 dogs and horses : animals under our direction par- 
 take of all our miseries.'' So then, by bringing the 
 lower animals under the direction of our reason, 
 we abridge their enjoyments while we degrade their 
 instincts. 
 
 Now I apprehend, this effect in the lower animals 
 can only arise from a departure from the original 
 institutions of nature, in consequence of their con- 
 nection with the artificial usages of human society. 
 But if brutes by this connection partake of some of 
 our miseries, it is reasonable to think they should be 
 compensated by partaking of some of our advantages : 
 and if they lose their natural instincts, what compen- 
 sation can we afford them except by imparting a 
 portion of our Reason ? 
 
 Accordingly, this view of the case has been taken 
 by others, and it has, I think, been satisfactorily shewn, 
 that Brutes, in the extreme of utter estrangement 
 from man, when they are unprotected by human power 
 and intelligence, require the play of all their instincts 
 to provide for their wants and to avoid or subdue 
 their enemies. But when they are admitted to inti- 
 mate familiarity with man, and receiving kindness 
 and a sort of culture at his hands, they seem to be 
 enlightened with a ray of human reason, and warmed 
 with a degree of human affection. But, it is in that 
 intermediate state, when the animal has lost the wild 
 freedom of the forest, and is become the slave of man, 
 without acquiring the privilege of being his friend 
 and companion, that instinct languishes without being 
 
on the lower animals. 57 
 
 replaced by the borrowed beam from human intelli- 
 gence. * Now, it is easy to perceive, that something 
 of the same kind may be traced in our own species, so 
 wonderfully does the analogy run between man and 
 the brute, in this case as in many others. For we 
 observe a similar effect to that above stated on com- 
 paring the lofty independence of the native Indian, 
 exulting in a life of freedom, and enjoying his natu- 
 ral powers in full perfection, with the opposite ex- 
 treme, in which a high state of civilization and of 
 civil liberty call forth the exercise of the rational 
 powers in the improvement of art and science : while 
 in that intermediate state, — the deplorable condition 
 of slavery and oppression, under which so many thou- 
 sands of our fellow creatures groan, — a listless torpor 
 is manifest, which affords neither exercise to the natu- 
 ral senses or instincts, nor scope for the developement 
 of reason. And it cannot but be interesting to notice, 
 how mankind and the brutes, respectively, afford 
 striking examples, according to the situations in 
 which they are accidentally thrown, either of the 
 rude and hardy instructions of nature on the one 
 hand, or of the higher but enfeebling cultivation of 
 art on the other; participating as it were in the ad- 
 vantages and disadvantages of each state, as if to a 
 certain extent they were compounded of the same 
 elements. But we need not be alarmed at this partial 
 resemblance, while we consider that in one important 
 
 * See a similar remark in "Instinct Displayed," by P. Wakefield, 
 JLetter 34. 
 
58 On the effects of Human intercourse 
 
 light they will bear no comparison. For, so long as 
 man is conscious of his Maker, and the brute uncon- 
 scious, so long in point of abstract relation to the 
 eternal source of Wisdom and Goodness, must the 
 most intelligent brute be placed on equality with 
 the plant or stone. And when we trace the relations 
 of man in some striking analogies with the lower 
 animals, we only trace his affinity to the earth out of 
 which he was formed, in earthly affections and desires. 
 But when we contemplate his mind, soaring into 
 infinity, seeking to comprehend what is at present 
 incomprehensible, taking a glimpse into the world of 
 spirits, and looking forward into futurity with a cu- 
 riosity unceasing and unsatisfied, we trace at once 
 his relation to another state of being, and discover 
 that he is animated by a spark of divine intelligence. 
 
 To return to the train of reasoning, we may ob- 
 serve the degradation of the natural instincts to which 
 I have alluded, in kine, sheep, goats, fowls, &c. when 
 domesticated. In horses and dogs, too, these original 
 instincts are much diminished; but in the latter, a 
 compensation, as I before remarked, is provided in 
 the borrowed light of reason. It is not to feed upon 
 them, but to make their strength, their diligence, 
 their sagacity and attachment subservient to our own 
 wants, that we tame and teach these faithful animals. 
 But this is not the case with the other class, which 
 we merely protect and fatten without expecting from 
 them any services like those of the dog or horse ; 
 services that require a recollection of the past, antici- 
 
on the lower animals, 59 
 
 pation of the future, and the exercise of those powers 
 which do not, like instinct, operate uniformly, and 
 therefore are allied to human reason, or as an able 
 writer expresses it, " are a kind of borrowed light 
 from the rational powers of the thinking and govern- 
 ing nature.'* 
 
 In a wild state, kine for instance, possess an acute- 
 ness, both of sight and smell, and a spirit and fierce- 
 ness in defending their young, which disappear when, 
 by domestication, we have reduced them to a con- 
 dition in which the former of these qualities would be 
 of no value, and the latter dangerous to themselves 
 and others. In their wild state, they distinguish by 
 the smell, the grass where the footsteps of man are to 
 be traced, with symptoms of peculiar agitation, as of 
 rage and horror. 
 
 The beaver in his native state is superior to most 
 other animals in forethought and something like in- 
 telligence. He is politic, vigilant, and social, labour- 
 ing incessantly for the public good. He is not only- 
 most industrious, but most versatile in the modes of 
 his industry. He is neither discouraged by difficulties, 
 nor exhausted by toil. He sees the labour of years 
 swept away by the floods, and instantly begins, with 
 renewed activity, to repeat the same labours. 
 
 But in a state of captivity what a change! No 
 creature can then appear more awkward and less 
 adapted to serve or please. His fine instinct is de- 
 graded or perverted. The only distinction it shows 
 its master, is not biting him. From its habits of 
 
<J0 On the effects of Human intercourse 
 
 ceaseless industry, it works, except in the depth of 
 winter, the whole night long. For when wild, it 
 collects food in the day ; and cuts and drags wood in 
 the night ; but, when tamed, which can only be done 
 by taking it when very young, it is necessary on 
 account of its restlessness to leave it out in the yard. 
 There it employs itself the whole night, in carrying 
 fire-wood from the pile, and blocking up the door 
 with it: so that when the family rise in the morning, 
 they find themselves barricadoed with a quantity of 
 wood, that takes no small time to remove.* 
 
 But although the beaver is so useless in a state of 
 captivity, yet we know not if the necessities of man 
 required his education, to what important purposes 
 his industry might be made subservient. It is clear, 
 however, that he loses, or omits to exercise, his origi- 
 nal instincts, because they are not needed ; and he is 
 not trained to useful habits, because man does not 
 know how to employ them to advantage. If, how- 
 ever we take an individual of our own species, who 
 may have advanced to superior skill in any art, from 
 the field of his labour, and place him in a new situa- 
 tion where he cannot exercise it, how ignorant do 
 we often find him, and how awkward in the concerns 
 of life ! This is the case even in men whose minds 
 are well imbued with speculative knowledge ; that 
 they are as ignorant of many things obvious to the 
 unlettered, as if they had had no experience of the 
 
 * See the letter above quoted, from which some of the preceding 
 observations are taken. 
 
on the lower animals. 61 
 
 world: so that, proficiency in one department does 
 not render a person equally qualified to succeed in 
 another; and the necessities of brutes oblige them, 
 more than those of man, to concentrate their powers 
 on a particular object. 
 
 We have spoken of the degradation of kine when 
 domesticated ; but we find that a surprising sagacity 
 is developed by education in some countries, highly 
 useful to their possessors. Thus, the bunched oxen 
 of the Hottentots, not only submit to all kinds of 
 domestic labour, but they become favourite domes- 
 tics, and companions in amusements ; and they par- 
 ticipate in the habitation and table of their masters. 
 As their nature is improved by the gentleness of their 
 education, and the kind treatment they receive, they 
 acquire sensibility and intelligence, and perform ac- 
 tions which we would not expect from them. The 
 Hottentots train their oxen to war. In all their 
 armies there are considerable troops of these oxen, 
 which are easily governed, and are let loose by the 
 chief when a proper opportunity occurs. They instant- 
 ly dart with impetuosity upon the enemy. They strike 
 with their horns, kick, overturn and trample under 
 their feet every thing that opposes their fury. They 
 run ferociously into the ranks, which they soon put 
 into disorder, and thus pave the way for an easy 
 victory to their masters. 
 
 They are also instructed to guard the flocks ; which 
 they conduct with dexterity, and defend them from 
 the attacks of strangers and of rapacious animals. 
 
62 On the effects of Human intercourse, fyc. 
 
 They are taught to understand signals ; and when 
 pasturing, at the smallest signal from the keeper, they 
 bring back and collect the wandering animals. They 
 attack all strangers with fury ; so that they prove a 
 great security against robbers. They know every 
 inhabitant of the kraal or village, and these they 
 suffer to approach the cattle with the greatest safety.* 
 
 With respect to sheep, Buffon, I think, rashly 
 maintains, that the race must have been long ago 
 extinct, if man had not taken them under his pro- 
 tection. But sheep are endowed with a strong asso- 
 ciating principle, and when threatened with an attack, 
 they form a line of battle, and boldly face the enemy. 
 In a natural state, the rams constitute one half of 
 the flock. They join together and form the front. 
 When thus prepared for repelling an assault, no lion 
 or tiger can resist their united impetuosity and force, t 
 
 Upon the whole, it seems to be established as a 
 principle, that, where there is no room for the exer- 
 cise of pure Instinct, either by man's interposition or 
 otherwise, it will languish, like all the natural senses, 
 or even the higher faculties of the mind. 
 
 * Smellie, ii. 324. + Ibid, ii. 284. 
 
On the Perfection of the Natural Senses, $c. 63 
 
 Sect. II. 
 
 On the Perfection of the Natural Senses as distinguish- 
 able from Instinct. 
 
 In closely examining the subject, in order to ascer- 
 tain to what principle certain actions of the brutes 
 belong, there seems a propriety at least in our present 
 state of knowledge in distinguishing between instinct 
 and the natural senses. And it must be admitted that 
 there is a perfection of these senses which brutes 
 often retain when in closest familiarity with man. 
 We cannot clearly perceive that the operation of in- 
 stinct depends on an acute smell or a sharp sight, or 
 on any of the natural senses carried to perfection. 
 
 For how these should wholly direct the beaver or 
 
 r 
 
 the bee, is beyond our comprehension. It appears 
 therefore that the perfection of the five outward 
 senses is neither to be accounted an evidence of 
 pure instinct on the one hand, nor of extraordinary 
 sagacity and reason on the other. For it is obvious 
 that a camel may scent water at the distance of half a 
 league in the desert, or a blood-hound may trace his 
 master among hundreds of people in a fair, from the 
 sense of smelling alone ; as the vulture's eye may per- 
 ceive a carcase from heights in the air beyond the 
 power of human vision to reach ; yet pure instinct or 
 that mysterious power which operates blindly and 
 uniformly, as in the bee, may have no part in these 
 perceptions. While on the other hand, the instances 
 
G4 On the Perfection of the Natural senses, 
 
 of fidelity in the dog, and intelligence in the elephant, 
 are as little to be considered depending on the per- 
 fection of the natural senses. 
 
 Boyle gives us a remarkable account of acute smell 
 in a dog. " A person of quality, to whom I am near 
 allied, assured me, that to try whether a young blood- 
 hound was well made, he caused one of his servants, 
 who had not killed or touched any of his deer, to walk 
 to a country town, four miles off, and then to a market 
 town three miles distant from that ; which done, this 
 nobleman, a competent while after, put the blood- 
 hound upon the scent of the man, and caused him to 
 be followed by a servant or two; the master himself 
 going after to know the event ; which was, that the 
 dog, without ever seeing the man he was to pursue, 
 followed him by the scent to the above mentioned 
 places, notwithstanding the multitude of market 
 people who went along in the same way, and of tra- 
 vellers who had occasion to cross it : and when the 
 blood-hound came to the chief market town, he passed 
 through the streets without taking notice of any of 
 the people there, and left not till he had gone to the 
 house where the man he sought for rested himself, 
 and found him in an upper room."* 
 
 "A gentleman of my acquaintance, who has often 
 occasion to employ blood-hounds, assures me, that if 
 a man have but passed over a field, the scent will lie 
 so as to be perceptible to a good dog of that sort for 
 several hours after. An old ingenious hunter informs 
 
 • * Boyle's works, Effluvia. 
 
as distinguishable from Instinct. 65 
 
 me, he has observed that the scent of a flying and 
 heated deer will sometimes continue on the ground 
 from one day to the next."* 
 
 We might collect a great variety of instances of 
 the exquisite perfection of the senses in the lower 
 animals; and we know that man in his state of nature 
 possesses them in an extraordinary degree ; the Indian 
 being able by his sight alone to trace footsteps in the 
 woods, on the leaves upon the ground, which could 
 not be discovered by others. Blind men acquire 
 so keen a sense of touch, that the tip of the finger is 
 almost like an eye in discovering the qualities of near 
 objects ; and they can distinguish colours merely by 
 a nice discrimination of that peculiar state of the sur- 
 face of bodies to which each colour belongs. Boyle 
 mentions that he knew a physician, who, in a fever, 
 had his sense of hearing so nice and tender that he 
 very plainly heard soft whispers, made at a consider- 
 able distance, which were not in the least perceived 
 by the healthy by-standers; but when the fever left 
 him, he heard as other men. And a medical friend 
 of mine stated that he knew an instance of a gentle- 
 man whose sense of smell was so painfully acute, as 
 to occasion him serious inconvenience. He could 
 even distinguish his friends in a room, and different 
 individuals, by the sense of smell alone. 
 
 An interesting illustration of the acuteness of sense 
 is given by Dugald Stewart, concerning James 
 Mitchell, a boy, born both blind and deaf, who hav- 
 
 * Boyle'* works, Effluvia. 
 E 
 
6G On the Perfection of the Natural senses, 
 
 ing no other senses by which to keep up a connection 
 with an external world than those of smell, touch, 
 and taste, chiefly depended for information on the 
 first, employing it on all occasions, like a domestic 
 dog, in distinguishing persons and things. By this 
 sense he identified his friends and relations, and con- 
 ceived a sudden attachment or dislike to strangers 
 according to the nature of the effluvium that escaped 
 from their skin. He appeared to know his friends by 
 smelling them very slightly, and he at once detected 
 strangers. It was difficult, however, to ascertain at 
 what distance he could distinguish people by this 
 sense ; but he appeared to be able to do so at a con- 
 siderable distance from the object. This was par- 
 ticularly striking when a person entered the room, as 
 he seemed to be aware of this before he could derive 
 information from any sense than that of smell. When 
 a stranger approached him, he eagerly began to touch 
 some part of the body, commonly taking hold of his 
 arm, which he held near his nose, and after two or 
 three strong inspirations through the nostrils, he ap- 
 peared to form a decided opinion concerning him. If 
 it were favourable, he shewed a disposition to become 
 more intimate, examined more minutely his dress, 
 and expressed by his countenance more or less satis- 
 faction. But if it happened to be unfavourable, he 
 suddenly went off* to a distance with expressions of 
 carelessness or disgust.* 
 
 Collins relates " that the quickness of the New Hol- 
 
 * Good's Study of Medicine, vol.iii. p. 257. 
 
as distinguishable from Instinct. 67 
 
 landers' eye and ear is' equally singular : they can 
 hear and distinguish objects which would totally 
 escape an European. This circumstance renders 
 them very acceptable guides to our sportsmen in the 
 woods, as they never fail to point out the game before 
 any European can discover it." 
 
 Another author says of a New Zealander, who ac- 
 companied him to England, " It was worthy of remark 
 how much his sight and hearing were superior to 
 other persons on board the ship; the sound of a dis- 
 tant gun was distinctly heard, or a strange sail readily 
 discernible, by Moyhanger, when no other man on 
 board could hear or perceive them." 
 
 The Hottentots " by the quickness of their eye, 
 will discover deer and other sorts of game when very 
 far distant; and they are equally expert in watching 
 a bee to its nest. They no sooner hear the humming 
 of the insect, than they squat themselves on the 
 ground, and, having caught it with the eye, follow it 
 to an incredible distance." 
 
 Barrow relates the following anecdote of one whom 
 he had left behind ill on a journey : " He had fallen 
 asleep about the middle of the preceding day, and 
 had not awakened till night. Though very dark and 
 unacquainted with a single step of our route, he had 
 found us by following the track of the waggon. At 
 this sort of business a Hottentot is uncommonly clever. 
 There is not an animal among the numbers that range 
 the wilds of Africa, if he be at all acquainted with it, 
 the print of whose foot he cannot distinguish. The 
 
 e2 
 
68 On the Perfection of the Natural senses, 
 
 print of any of his companions feet he would single 
 out among a thousand." 
 
 Dr. Somerville confirms this statement, and refers 
 the superiority of the Hottentots in these points to 
 constant exercise of the organs. 
 
 In his frequent intercourse with the Nomadic tribes 
 of Asia, Pallas had the best opportunities of observing 
 their capabilities. " The Calmucks," he says, " have 
 a fine nose, a good ear, and an extremely acute eye. 
 On their journeys and military exeditions they often 
 smell out a fire or a camp, and thus procure quarters 
 for the night, or obtain booty. Many of them can 
 distinguish by smelling at the hole of a fox or other 
 animal, whether the creature be there or not. By 
 lying flat, and putting their ear to the ground, they 
 can catch at a great distance the noise of horses, of a 
 flock, or of a single strayed animal. But nothing is 
 so surprising as the perfection of their eyes, and the 
 extraordinary distance at which they often perceive, 
 from inconsiderable heights, small objects, such as 
 the rising dust caused by cattle or horsemen ; more 
 particularly as the undulation of the boundless steppes, 
 or plains, and the vapours which rise from and float 
 upon them in warm weather, render things very ob- 
 scure. In the expedition which the Torgot Vicechan 
 Uaschi led against the Kubanians, the Calm uck force 
 would certainly have missed the enemy, if a common 
 Calmuck had not perceived, at the estimated distance 
 of thirty versts, the smoke and dust of the hostile 
 army, and pointed it out to other equally experienced 
 
as distinguishable from Instinct. 69 
 
 eyes, when the commander, Colonel Kischinskoi, 
 could discern nothing with a good glass. They pur- 
 sue lost or stolen cattle, or game, by the track for 
 miles over deserts. Kirgises, or even Russians, in 
 the wild parts of the empire, are equally able to fol- 
 low and discriminate tracks by the eye. This, indeed, 
 is not difficult on soft ground, or over snows; but it 
 requires great practice and skill to choose the right 
 out of several intermingled traces, to follow it over 
 loose sand or snow, not to loose it in marshes or deep 
 grass, but rather to judge from the direction of the 
 grass, or from the depth of the print in snow or sand, 
 how long it has been made."* 
 
 In civilized as well as savage life, a considerable 
 degree of acuteness in some of the natural senses is 
 often acquired by use. Mariners, it is well known, 
 acquire a wonderful power of vision, by directing the 
 eye habitually to distant objects on the horizon, while 
 as Dr. Smith remarks, " men of letters who live much 
 in their closets, and have seldom occasion to look at 
 very distant objects, are seldom far-sighted." " It is 
 often astonishing to a landsman to observe with what 
 precision a sailor can distinguish in the offing, not 
 only the appearance of a ship, which is altogethei 
 invisible to a landsman, but the number of her masts, 
 the direction of her course, and the rate of her sail- 
 ing. If she is a ship of his acquaintance, he fre- 
 quently can tell her name before the landsman has 
 
 * See Lawrence's Lectures on Zoology, &c. chap. vi. where the above 
 passages from the works of Collins, Barrow, and Pallas are cited. 
 
70 On the migrations 
 
 been able to discover even the appearance of a 
 ship."* 
 
 It will, I think, hardly be contended that the pre- 
 ceding examples of acuteness in the natural senses, 
 whether in man or in the brute, belong to Instinct as 
 it is above explained. Boyle, I observe, makes a 
 clear distinction between Instinct and what he calls 
 " a tenderness or quickness of sense." And from all 
 that has been said, I think there is ground for such a 
 distinction. 
 
 Sect. III. 
 
 On some singular acts of the lower Animals, particu- 
 larly their migrations from one place to another. 
 
 It is well known that different tribes of animals 
 are endowed with a sense or faculty which enables 
 them to steer their course with astonishing precision 
 from one place to another, through trackless regions 
 of the air, and even of the ocean, and through strange 
 and unknown countries. For it is a sense common to 
 birds and fishes as well as to beasts. 
 
 We have numerous anecdotes of dogs and cats, 
 which, after being conveyed to distant places, have 
 found their way home, and often by a different 
 route, or through a country they had never traversed 
 before. 
 
 * Dr, Adam Smith on the External Senses. 
 
1 of Animals. 71 
 
 The carrier pigeon affords a striking example of the 
 facility and speed with which this bird pursues its 
 flight from one place to another : but some might 
 explain the fact by referring it to a degree of instruc- 
 tion, and by supposing that its extensive view would 
 aid the bird in fixing on objects by which its course 
 might be directed. 
 
 But that an ass, a serpent, and a sheep, — animals 
 one would suppose to be naturally dull and stupid, in 
 regard to their power of outward observation, — should 
 each be able to transport itself through a strange 
 country to a considerable distance, and to reach some 
 known spot, with scarcely any delay, is hardly to be 
 accounted for on any natural principles. 
 
 Dr. Good entertains a question whether there be 
 any other than the five senses common to man and 
 the higher classes of animals ; and remarks, " that we 
 occasionally meet with peculiarities of sensation that 
 can hardly be resolved into any of them. Thus, 
 the bat appears to be sensible of the presence of 
 external objects and obstructions that are neither 
 seen, smelt, heard, touched, nor tasted : for it will 
 cautiously avoid them, when all the senses are 
 purposely closed up. And hence many naturalists 
 have ascribed a sixth sense to this animal. It is 
 equally difficult," he adds, " by any of the known 
 senses of fishes or birds, to account for the accuracy 
 with which their migratory tribes are capable of 
 steering their annual course through the depths of 
 the ocean or the trackless regions of the atmosphere, 
 
72 On the migrations 
 
 so as to arrive at a given season on a given coast or 
 a given climate, with the precision of the expertest 
 mariner." 
 
 Bees return home to their own hive after an ex- 
 cursion of some miles, though, from the convexity of 
 their eye, it is supposed that they cannot see more 
 than a yard distant 
 
 Dr. Beattie mentions that he knew an instance of 
 a dog which had been carried in a basket thirty miles 
 through a country he never saw, finding his way, a 
 week after, to his former dwelling. I have heard of 
 a dog which had been conveyed from London to 
 Scotland by sea, making his way by land the whole 
 distance back again to London : and a still more re- 
 markable case was related to me of a dog that had 
 been transported across the Atlantic — not liking his 
 new abode — actually taking a passage in another 
 vessel, and again finding his master in England.* 
 
 Although sheep are considered so stupid in their 
 domesticated state, yet, we are told, that a sheep 
 which was driven from Scotland into Yorkshire, made 
 its escape, and after passing through towns, crossing 
 rivers, &c. revisited its native spot in the hills of 
 Annandale. And another from Perthshire came back 
 
 * The following anecdote is taken from the Times newspaper : — " A 
 terrier dog, belonging to Mr. Watkins, was taken on Friday to London 
 by his servant, in a close covered cart, and was left tied up in a yard 
 near Grosvenor-square that evening ; in the night it broke from its 
 confinement and came home through London, and was at its master's 
 door in Arundel the next afternoon, a distance of near 60 miles.— Jan. 
 JO, 1823." 
 
of Animals. 73- 
 
 *• 
 
 to a farm twenty miles from Edinburgh. When it 
 reached Stirling, it was fair day : the animal would 
 not venture through the town among the populace, 
 but rested itself at the north side till the fair dis- 
 persed, and came through late in the evening. 
 
 In " Instinct Displayed" we have several interest- 
 ing anecdotes to this point, which appear to be well 
 
 authenticated. 
 
 i 
 
 A sparrow which had been conveyed to London 
 from Fulham in a covered cage, found its way back 
 again, after some' time, having flown out of the 
 window, looking towards Northumberland Gardens, 
 in quite a contrary direction. 
 
 Pennant tells us, that after the Earl of Southampton, 
 the friend of Essex, in his fatal insurrection, had been 
 confined a short time in the Tower, he was agreeably 
 surprised by a visit from his favourite cat ; which, 
 according to tradition, having found her way thither, 
 descended the chimney of his apartment, and seated 
 herself by her master. 
 
 A cat was taken to the West Indies, and when it 
 returned to the port of London, made its escape from 
 the vessel, through the intricacies and windings of 
 the metropolis to its former residence at Brompton. 
 And another was taken from a place near Saffron 
 Walden to Hampshire, from which it returned to its 
 former mistress, as was supposed through London.* 
 
 Cats which had been transported in bags and 
 baskets, have returned in this way from considerable 
 
 * See Letter xxv, 
 
74 On the migrations 
 
 distances. By what sense, or faculty, this is effected, 
 we are quite ignorant : and yet there is nothing in the 
 act which assumes the character of Instinct. 
 
 With respect to mankind, we sometimes meet with 
 persons who are so peculiarly affected by the presence 
 of a particular object that is neither seen, smelt, 
 tasted, heard, nor touched, as not only to be conscious 
 of its presence, but to be in great distress till it is 
 removed. The presence of a cat not unfrequently 
 produces such an effect ; and Dr. Good remarks that 
 he has himself been "a witness of the most decisive 
 proofs of this in several instances, and thinks it pos- 
 sible that the peculiar sense, may, in suck cases, 
 result from a preternatural modification in some of 
 the branches of the olfactory nerve, which may render 
 them capable of being stimulated in a new and pecu- 
 liar manner : but the individuals thus affected are no 
 more conscious of an excitement in this organ of sense 
 than in any other ; and from the anomaly and rare 
 occurrence of the sensation itself, find no terms by 
 which to express it."* 
 
 Boyle tells us that a lady assured him, she could 
 very readily discover, whether a person who visited 
 her in winter came from a place where there was any 
 considerable quantity of snow : and this not by feel- 
 ing any unusual cold, but from some peculiar impres- 
 sion, which, she thought, she received by the orgau 
 ofsmelling.t 
 
 * Good's Study of Medicine, vol. 3. ch. 4. 
 + Boyle's works, vol. 1. p. 429. 
 
of Animals, 75 
 
 In Germany it has of late been attempted to be 
 shown that every man is possessed of a sixth sense, 
 though of a very different kind from those just re- 
 ferred to ; for it is a sense not only common to every 
 one, but to the system at large ; and consists in that 
 peculiar kind of internal but corporeal feeling re- 
 specting the general state of one's health, that induces 
 us to exult in being as light as a feather, as elastic as 
 a spring; or to sink under a sense of lassitude, 
 fatigue, and weariness, which cannot be accounted 
 for, and is unconnected with muscular labour or 
 disease. (Good's Study of Medicine.) 
 
 But, as far as I am capable of judging, there are no 
 good grounds for this hypothesis. 
 
 The following is one of the most extraordinary 
 instances 1 have met with of this faculty of finding 
 home, and is communicated on the authority of Lieu- 
 tenant Alderman, Royal Engineers, who was ac- 
 quainted with the fact.* 
 
 In March, 1816, an ass, the property of Captain 
 Dundas, R.N., then at Malta, was shipped on board 
 the Ister frigate, Captain Forrest, bound from Gib- 
 raltar for that island. The vessel having struck on 
 some sands off the Point de Gat, at some distance 
 from the shore, the ass was thrown overboard to give 
 it a chance of swimming to land, — a poor one, for the 
 sea was running so high, that a boat which left the 
 ship was lost. A few days afterwards, however, 
 
 * i?ee Introduction to Entomology, by Kirby and Spence, vol. 2, 
 .502. 
 
76 On the migrations 
 
 when the gates of Gibraltar were opened in the morn- 
 ing-, the ass presented himself for admittance, and 
 proceeded to the stable of Mr. Weeks, a merchant, 
 which he had formerly occupied, to the no small sur- 
 prise of this gentleman, who imagined that from some 
 accident, the animal had never been shipped on 
 board the Ister. On the return of this vessel to 
 repair, the mystery was explained; and it turned out, 
 that Valiante, as the ass was called, had not only 
 swam safely to shore, but, without guide, compass, 
 or travelling map, had found his way from Point de 
 Gat to Gibraltar, — a distance of more than 200 
 miles, through a mountainous and intricate country, 
 intersected by streams, which he had never traversed 
 before; and in so short a period, that he could not 
 have made one false turn. His not having been 
 stopped on the road, was attributed to the circum- 
 stance of his having been formerly used to whip 
 criminals upon, which was indicated to the peasants, 
 who have a superstitious horror of such asses, by the 
 holes in his ears, to which the persons flogged were 
 tied." 
 
 Lord Monboddo relates the following singular 
 anecdote of a serpent. u I am well informed of a 
 tame serpent in the East Indies, which belonged to 
 the late Dr. Vigot, and was kept by him in the 
 suburbs of Madras. This serpent was taken by the 
 French, when they invested Madras, in the late war, 
 and was carried to Pondicherry in a close carriage. 
 But from thence, he found his way back again tp his 
 
of Animals. 77 
 
 old quarters, which it seems he liked better, though 
 Madras be distant from Pondicherry above 100 miles. 
 This information, he adds, I have from a lady, who 
 then was in India, and had seen the serpent often 
 before his journey, and saw him after he returned."* 
 
 In considering the very singular acts above noticed, 
 which are observed in so many different species of the 
 lower animals, it would seem that they arise from 
 some natural sense of which we are wholly ignorant, 
 and perhaps can form no more reasonable conception 
 than of the cause of magnetical attraction. For as 
 the acts themselves do not appear to be of essential 
 importance in the economy of nature, like those 
 which embrace the care of young and the supply of 
 food, (unless the periodical migrations of some ani- 
 mals be an exception to this remark,) it is most pro- 
 bable that, however mysterious, the acts in question 
 are not from immediate supernatural agency, but 
 from the determination of some hidden physical 
 influence. 
 
 Sect. IV. 
 
 On the power of Reasoning, or drawing inferences 
 in Animals. 
 
 If we come to consider the instances of attachment, 
 cunning, fidelity, sagacity, gratitude, &c. in many of 
 the lower animals, as well as the difference between 
 
 * See Ancient Metaph. vol. 2. book iv. chap. 6. 
 
78 On the power of 
 
 old and young in point of experience and usefulness, 
 we cannot refer them to Instinct as above explained. 
 For we find them so numerous and well authenti- 
 cated, and these individual actions so diversified and 
 adapted to times and circumstances, that if man is 
 beholden to Reason for this power of adaptation, we 
 must also admit that the brutes are likewise pos- 
 sessed of a degree of rationality. For as far as we 
 are enabled to judge of the uniformity of Instinct, 
 and of the power of the natural senses, these in- 
 stances of sagacity belong neither to one nor the 
 other. Consequently they must belong to Reason, 
 or that intermediate power which compares and 
 combines, adapting means to ends, and varying these 
 means according to emergencies. For, supposing the 
 higher orders of brutes are conscious of the acts, 
 they can be classed with no other operations of mind, 
 with which we are acquainted. 
 
 Yet it would appear, that all the acts of apparent 
 reasoning in the lower animals have reference to 
 some immediate object of perception, or depend on 
 the faculty of memory. As they seem to be nearly 
 incapable of forming any abstract notions or specu- 
 lations apart from sensible objects; and the want of 
 articulate language must ever oppose an insurmount- 
 able barrier to their progress in acquired knowledge, 
 beyond the merest individual experience. 
 
 Of simple acts of comparison between a few ideas, 
 we have numberless examples in the brute creation, 
 as well as of their using means to attain their ends. 
 
Reasoning in Animals* 79 
 
 To begin with a few plain illustrations : An old 
 monkey was shown in Exeter Change, who having 
 lost his teeth, when nuts were given to him, took a 
 stone and cracked them one by one ; thus using tools 
 to effect his purpose. 
 
 A friend of Dr. Darwin saw on the north coast of 
 Ireland above a hundred crows preying upon muscles, 
 which is not their natural food ; each crow took a 
 muscle up into the air twenty or forty yards high, 
 and let it fall on the stones, and thus by breaking the 
 shell got possession of the animal. Ravens, we are 
 told, often resort to the same contrivance. And a 
 lady of the Doctor's acquaintance saw a little bird 
 repeatedly hop upon a poppy stem, and shake the 
 head with its bill, till many seeds were scattered, 
 when it settled on the ground, and picked up the 
 seeds. 
 
 Lord Bacon tells us of a raven, " which in a 
 drought, threw pebbles into an hollow tree where she 
 espied water, that the water might rise so as she might 
 come to it/'* 
 
 Linnaeus informs us that the martin dwells on the 
 outside of houses in Europe under the eaves ; and 
 that when it has built its nest the sparrow frequently 
 takes possession of it. The martin unable to dislodge 
 his intruding enemy, convokes his companions, some 
 of whom guard the captive, whilst others bring clay, 
 completely close up the entrance of the nest, then fly 
 away, leaving the sparrow to be suffocated." 
 
 * See Advancement of Learning, book ii. 
 
80 On the power of 
 
 It is known that the foot of the goat is peculiarly 
 formed for climbing precipices ; and the animal i3 
 fond of ascending rocky heights. 
 
 Two goats, grazing about the ramparts of Ply- 
 mouth citadel, got down upon the narrow ledge of 
 the rock, and one of them advancing before the other, 
 till it came to an angle, was enabled to return ; but 
 in its way back, met its companion, which produced 
 a most perplexing dilemma, as it was impossible for 
 them to get past each other. Many persons saw 
 them without being able to lend any assistance. 
 After a considerable time one of the goats was ob- 
 served to kneel down with great caution, and crouch 
 as close as it could lie; which was no sooner done, 
 than the other, with great dexterity, walked over 
 him, and they both returned the way they came in 
 perfect safety. And at Ardinglass, near Glenarm, in 
 Ireland, two goats, moving towards each other, over 
 a precipice 1000 feet high, on a narrow ledge of the 
 rock, were seen to extricate themselves from danger 
 by a similar expedient.* 
 
 In both these instances the animals looked at each 
 other for some time, as if they were considering their 
 situation, and deliberating what was best to be done 
 in the emergency. I apprehend that mere Instinct 
 would have prompted them immediately to act, in- 
 stead of thus comparing and judging by their outward 
 senses of danger and expedients. 
 
 * Instinct Displayed, pp. 66 & 97. 
 
Reasoning in Animals, 81 
 
 The author of the article c Instinct' in the Encyclo- 
 paedia Britannica has related the following fact, on 
 the testimony of a gentleman whose veracity was 
 unquestioned, and who being totally unacquainted 
 with the theories of Philosophers, had of course no 
 favourite hypothesis to support. 
 
 " In the spring of 1791, a pair of crows made their 
 nest on a tree, of which there are several planted 
 round his garden ; and in his moVning walks he had 
 often been amused by witnessing furious combats 
 between them and a cat. One morning the battle 
 raged more fiercely than usual, till at last the cat 
 gave way, and took shelter under a hedge, as if to 
 wait a more favourable opportunity of retreating to 
 the house. The crows continued for a short time 
 to make a threatening noise; but perceiving that on 
 the ground they could do nothing more than threaten, 
 one of them lifted a stone from the middle of the 
 garden and perched with it on a tree planted in the 
 hedge, where she sat watching the motions of the 
 enemy of her young. As the cat crept along under 
 the hedge, the crow accompanied her by flying from 
 branch to branch and from tree to tree ; and when at 
 last puss ventured to quit her hiding place, the crow, 
 leaving the trees and hovering over her in the air, 
 let the stone drop from on high on her back." The 
 author adds, " that the crow on this occasion reasoned, 
 is self evident; and it seems to be little less evident, 
 that the ideas employed in her reasoning were en- 
 larged beyond those ideas which she had received 
 
 F 
 
83 On the power of 
 
 from her senses. By her senses she may have per- 
 ceived that the shell of a fish is broken by a fall, but 
 could her senses inform her, that a cat would be 
 wounded or driven off the field by the fall of a stone? 
 No; from the effect of the one fall preserved in her 
 memory, she must have inferred the other, by her 
 power of reasoning." 
 
 We have many instances of kind and affectionate 
 attachment in the brute animals to each other, not 
 only of the same but of different species. Even dogs 
 and cats, in the same house, have exhibited this 
 attachment, as well as cats and birds. 
 
 A curious anecdote of the raven is related in the 
 Gentleman's Magazine. He lived many years ago at 
 the Red Lion Inn, Hungerford, and was called Rafe. 
 It is given in the words of a gentleman who lodged 
 at the inn. 
 
 " Coming into the inn yard," says he, u my chaise 
 ran over and bruised the leg of my Newfoundland dog ; 
 and while we Were examining the injury, Rafe was 
 evidently a concerned spectator ; for, the minute the 
 dog was tied up under the manger with my horse, 
 Rafe not only visited him but brought him bones and 
 attended on him with particular and repeated marks 
 of kindness. I observed it to the hostler, who told 
 me that the bird had been brought up with a dog, 
 and that the affection between them was mutual, and 
 all the neighbourhood had been witnesses of their 
 many reciprocal acts of kindness. Rafe's poor dog 
 after a while broke his leg, and during the long time 
 
Reasoning in Animals, 85 
 
 he was confined, Rafe waited on him constantly, car- 
 ried him his provisions, and never scarce left him 
 alone. One night, by accident, the stable door had 
 been shut, and Rafe had been deprived of the com- 
 pany of his friend the whole night ; but the hostler 
 found in the morning the door so pecked away, that 
 had it not been opened, in another hour Rafe would 
 have made his own entrance. My landlady confirmed 
 this account, and mentioned several other acts of 
 kindness shewn by this bird to all dogs in general, 
 but particularly to maimed or wounded ones." 
 
 In Rees's Cyclopaedia, an instance is mentioned of 
 singular sagacity in a cat. A lady had a tame bird, 
 which she used to let out of its cage every day. One 
 morning as it was picking up crumbs from the carpet, 
 her cat, who always before shewed great kindness to 
 the bird, seized it on a sudden, and jumped with it, 
 in her mouth, upon a table. The lady, alarmed for 
 the fate of her favourite, on turning about, observed 
 that a strange cat had just come into the room. After 
 turning it out, her own cat came down from her place 
 of safety, and dropped the bird, without inflicting 
 the least injury." 
 
 Now, it seems very clear, on considering this act, 
 that various circumstances must have influenced this 
 sagacious animal. She must have known that the 
 bird was in danger from this intruder, and must have 
 reflected on the best means of rescue ; and we may 
 take it for granted that Instinct could not, on the 
 same principle, have prompted the one cat to destroy, 
 
 f2 
 
84 On the power of 
 
 and the other cat to save, at the same moment of time. 
 But the manner in which the preservation was ef- 
 fected is instructive, and affords a very striking 
 example of reasoning in the brute, the more striking, 
 as cats are not remarkable for sagacity. 
 
 In < Instinct Displayed,' an anecdote is related of a 
 cat, which, by giving timely warning in the best way 
 she could, to the parent of a child in extreme danger, 
 was the means of saving it from drowning.* 
 
 Instances of gratitude, docility, and intelligence in 
 the dog are familiar to almost every one. And we 
 find that exclusively of the peculiar sagacity of every 
 variety of this animal, as the shepherd's dog, the 
 pointer, the beagle, the mastiff and others, their fide- 
 lity to their master is always conspicuous. 
 
 Dr. Abell, in one of his Lectures on Phrenologj r , 
 related a very striking anecdote of a Newfoundland 
 dog in Cork. This dog was of a noble and generous 
 disposition ; and when he left his master's house was 
 often assailed by a number of little noisy dogs in the 
 street. He usually passed them with apparent uncon- 
 cern, as if they were beneath his notice. But one little 
 cur was particularly troublesome, and at length car- 
 ried his petulance so far as to bite the Newfoundland 
 dog in the back of his foot. This proved to be a step 
 in wanton abuse and insult beyond what was to be 
 patiently endured ; and he instantly turned round, 
 ran after the offender, and seized him by the skin of 
 the back. In this way he carried him in his mouth 
 
 * See Letter xiii. 
 
Reasoning in Animals. 85 
 
 to the quay, and holding him some time over the 
 water, at length dropped him into it. He did not 
 seem, however, to design that the culprit should be 
 punished capitally; and he waited a little while till 
 the poor animal, who was unused to that element, 
 was not only well ducked but near sinking, when he 
 plunged in, and brought him out safe to land. 
 
 It would be difficult to conceive any punishment 
 more aptly contrived, or more completely in cha- 
 racter. Indeed, if it were fully analysed, an ample 
 commentary might be written in order to show what 
 a variety of comparisons, and motives, and generous 
 feelings entered into the composition of this act. It 
 supplies at least a good moral lesson. It shows the 
 difference between magnanimity and meanness, and 
 by what lawful means the former may correct the 
 latter. 
 
 It may not perhaps be going beyond the truth (o 
 assert, that the lives of many thousand human beings 
 have been saved by the prompt aid and sagacity of 
 the dog ; as from drowning, from perilous situations, 
 by accidents of various kinds, from premeditated mur- 
 der, and from fire. 
 
 Dr. Beattie lays much stress upon an instance of 
 this sort that occurred to a gentleman named Irvine, 
 in crossing the river Dee, then frozen over, near 
 Aberdeen. The ice gave way about the middle of 
 the river, and he sunk; but having a gun in his 
 hand, he supported himself by placing it across the 
 opening. The dog used many fruitless efforts to save 
 
86 On the power of 
 
 his master, and then ran to a neighbouring village, 
 where he saw a man, and with most significant ges- 
 tures pulled him by the coat, and prevailed on him 
 to follow him. The man arrived at the spot in time 
 to save the gentleman's life. Beattie attributes this 
 act to an interposition of heaven, conceiving that 
 " the animal was qualified for it," to use his own 
 expression, " by a supernatural impulse." And he 
 concludes, " Here certainly was an event so un- 
 common, that from the known qualities of the dog, 
 none would have expected it ; and I know not whe- 
 ther this animal ever gave proof of extraordinary 
 sagacity in any other instance." 
 
 Now, in as much as we might collect some hundred 
 examples quite as striking, it is matter of surprise to 
 find an author so well informed as Dr. Beattie, ex- 
 pressing himself after this manner. Whatever ex- 
 planation may be given of the circumstance, it is 
 difficult to separate the idea of direct providential 
 interference from the following fact, which appears 
 to be well authenticated. 
 
 " At Ditchley, near Blenheim, now the seat of 
 Viscount Dillon, but formerly of the Lees, Earls of 
 Lichfield, is a portrait of Sir Henry Lee, by Janson, 
 with that of a mastiff dog which saved his life. One 
 of Sir Henry's servants had formed the design of 
 assassinating his master, and robbing the house ; but 
 on the night he had intended to perpetrate it, the 
 dog, for the first time, followed Sir Henry up stairs, 
 took his station under his bed, and could not be 
 
Mcasonins in Animals. 87 
 
 '» 
 
 driven thence : in the dead of the night, the servant 
 not knowing the dog was there, entered the room to 
 execute his diabolical purpose ; but was instantly 
 seized by the dog, and being secured, confessed 
 his intentions. In a corner of the picture are these 
 lines — 
 
 (l But in my dog, whereof I made no store, 
 I find more love than those I trusted more."* 
 
 An instance somewhat resembling this of un- 
 doubted authenticity, is to be found in Gmelin's Sys- 
 tem of Natural History. 
 
 In the year 1791, a person went to a house in 
 Deptford, to take lodgings, under pretence that he 
 was just arrived from the West Indies; and, after 
 having agreed on terms, said he would send his trunk 
 that night, and come himself the next day. About 
 nine o'clock at night, the trunk was brought by two 
 porters, and was carried into his bed-room. Just as 
 the family were going to bed their little house dog, 
 deserting his usual station in the shop, placed him- 
 self close to the chamber door, where the chest was 
 deposited, and kept up an incessant barking. The 
 moment the door was opened, the dog flew to the 
 
 * See Gmelin's Natural History and Zoological Journal, No. I. 
 
 The circumstance which strikingly indicates an immediate inter- 
 position of Providence in the preservation of a horse and the punish- 
 ment of a daring infidel, is related by Cowper in his Task. I believe 
 it is a true story given under the fictitious names of Misagathus and 
 Evander ; and the fact is supposed to have happened in Cornwall. 
 
88 On the power of 
 
 chest, against which it barked and scratched with 
 redoubled vehemence and fury. At first they tried 
 to get the dog out of the room, but in vain. Calling 
 in some neighbours, and making them eye witnesses 
 of the circumstance, they began to move the trunk 
 about, when they quickly discovered that it contained 
 something alive. Suspicion falling very strong, they 
 were induced to open it, when to their utter astonish- 
 ment, who should present himself, but their new 
 lodger, who had been thus conveyed in, to rob the 
 house. 
 
 A vessel deeply laden with corn in the Ipswich 
 river, had a dog on board, which, when they had got 
 only a few leagues out to sea, suddenly left the 
 vessel, and jumped into the boat. The crew were 
 surprised at this ; and the captain suspecting some- 
 thing was wrong, ordered the hatches to be opened, 
 when they discovered that a plank had been started, 
 and the hold was filling fast with water. They had 
 only time to get into the boat, being unable to save 
 any thing out of the vessel, which soon sunk. 
 (Wakefield.) 
 
 The sagacity of dogs employed in conducting blind 
 mendicants, is known to almost every one, and vo- 
 lumes might be filled with anecdotes of them. 
 
 A short time since 1 observed an interesting ac- 
 count of a dog in New York. This animal belonged 
 to the carrier of a newspaper; and his master being- 
 ill, his son took his place; but being ignorant of the 
 
Reasoning in Animals. 89 
 
 subscribers, the dog who had attended his father in 
 his rounds, trotted along before him and stopped at 
 every subscriber's door, without a single mistake. 
 
 The keeper of a tap room in Glasgow has a dog of 
 the Irish bull breed, possessed of uncommon sagacity : 
 so that he is said to be as good as a servant. Nearly 
 three years since it began to carry its master his 
 breakfast in a tin-can between its teeth. When the 
 family moved, the dog altered his route, and has 
 never gone wrong : nor will he accept of any favour, 
 when on his master's business. He avoids any of his 
 own species also when on business. Though what he 
 carries is often tempting, he faithfully delivers it un- 
 touched; he carries letters; and brings beef from 
 market to the extent of half a stone. He carries his 
 master's hat or shoes. He will take a snuff box or 
 other article to such of the neighbours as he knows. 
 He will take a bank note to the tap-room and bring 
 the change in silver. He understands Gaelic as well 
 as English. 
 
 I presume most of my readers are acquainted with 
 the beautiful lines by Scott, on the melancholy death 
 of Charles Gough, who lost his way near Hel- 
 vellyn Mountain in a fog, and fell down a precipice ; 
 at the bottom of which his bones were discovered 
 three months after, attended all that time by his faith* 
 ful dog. 
 
90 On Hie power of 
 
 iC Dark green was that spot, 'mid the brown mountain 
 heather, 
 
 Where the pilgrim of nature lay stretched in decay ; 
 Like the corpse of an outcast, abandoned to weather, 
 
 Till the mountain winds wasted the tenantless clay ; 
 Nor yet quite deserted, tho* lonely extended, 
 For, faithful in death, his mute favourite attended, 
 The much lov'd remains of his master defended, 
 
 And chased the hill-fox and the raven away." 
 
 Scott. 
 
 One cannot reflect on the innumerable instances of 
 the love and usefulness of this animal without being 
 grateful to Providence for having given to man a 
 creature capable of many of those noble and disin- 
 terested feelings, which we are accustomed to appre- 
 ciate so highly in our fellow-creatures, and almost to 
 look upon as constituting the perfection of the human 
 character. 
 
 The following is a striking instance of sagacity in a 
 bull, communicated on undoubted authority. 
 
 A gentleman in Scotland near Laggan, had a bull 
 which grazed with the cows in the open meadows. 
 As fences are scarcely known in that part, a boy was 
 kept to watch, lest the cattle should trespass on the 
 neighbouring fields and destroy the corn. The boy 
 was fat and drowsy, and was often found asleep : he 
 was of course chastised whenever the cattle tres- 
 passed. Warned by this, he kept a long switch, and 
 with it revenged himself with an unsparing hand if 
 they exceeded their boundary. The bull seemed to 
 
Reasoning in Animate. 91 
 
 have observed with concern this consequence of their 
 transgression : and as he had no horns he used to 
 strike the cows with his hard forehead, and thus 
 punish them severely, if any one crossed the boundary. 
 In the mean time he set them a good example him- 
 self, never once entering upon the forbidden bounds^ 
 and placing himself before the cows in a threatening 
 attitude, if they approached it. At length his honesty 
 and vigilance became so obvious, that the boy was 
 employed in weeding and other business, without fear 
 of their misbehaviour in his absence.* 
 
 Much might be said on the imitating qualities of 
 the ape, but imitation is very inferior to the qualities 
 we have been considering. The parrot in this way 
 can be taught to repeat words as well as the jay, 
 magpie, and starling; but these birds do not seem 
 capable of reflexion, much less of rational comparison. 
 Education seems to give them what the American 
 mock bird possesses by Instinct. The natural notes 
 of this bird are musical and solemn, and it can assume 
 the tone of every other animal in the wood, from the 
 wolf to the raven. It seems even to sport itself in 
 leading them astray. It will sometimes allure the 
 lesser birds with the call of their mates, and then 
 terrify them when they have come near with screams 
 like the eagle. There is no bird in the forest which 
 it cannot mimick. But its own notes are so sweet and 
 various as to equal, if not exceed, the nightingale. 
 For what end nature endowed it with such peculiar 
 
 * Instinct Displayed, Letter xxxir. 
 
92 On the power of 
 
 versatility of notes, or natural imitative powers, does 
 not appear. (Goldsmith.) 
 
 Although the parrot is chiefly remarkable for his 
 learning to speak by rote, jet the account which 
 Locke has given from an author of great note, of a 
 parrot in Brazil, would lead us to conclude that these 
 birds are capable of a considerable degree of reflexion. 
 Indeed it would scarcely be credited, if it was not 
 supported by such authority. 
 
 u I had a mind (says he) to know from Prince 
 Maurice's own mouth, the account of a common, but 
 much credited story, that I had heard so often from 
 many others, of an old parrot he had in Brazil, dur- 
 ing his government there, that spoke, and asked, and 
 answered common questions like a reasonable crea- 
 ture ; so that those of his train there, generally con- 
 cluded it to be witchery or possession ; and one of his 
 chaplains, who lived long afterwards in Holland, 
 would never from that time endure a parrot, but said 
 they all had a devil in them. I had heard many par- 
 ticulars of this story, and assevered by people hard 
 to be discredited, which made me ask Prince Maurice 
 what there was of it. He said, with his usual dry- 
 ness and plainness in talk, that there was something 
 true but a great deal false of what had been reported. 
 I desired to know of him, what there was of the first? 
 He told me short and coldly, that he had heard of 
 such an old parrot when he came to Brazil, and 
 though he believed nothing of it, and it was a good 
 way off, yet he had so much curiosity as to send for it; 
 that it wajs a very great and a very old one, and when 
 
Reasoning in Animals. 93 
 
 it came first into the room where the Prince was, 
 with a great many Dutchmen about him, it said pre- 
 sently, c What a company of white men are here !' 
 — They asked it what he thought that man was, 
 pointing at the Prince : — it answered, i Some general 
 or other.' When they brought it close to him, he 
 asked it, * D'ou venez-vous?'— -it answered, c de 
 Marinnan.' (The Prince.) e A. qui etes-vous?' — 
 (Parrot.) i A un Portugais.' — (Prince.) ' Que fais-tu 
 la V — (Parrot) c Je garde les poules :' — The Prince 
 laughed and said, c Vous gardez les poules?' — The 
 parrot answered, 6 Oui moi, et je sais bien faire;' — 
 and made the chuck four or five times, that people use 
 to make to chickens when they call them. — I set down 
 the words of this worthy dialogue in French, just as 
 Prince Maurice said them to me. I asked him in 
 what language the parrot spoke, and he said in Bra- 
 zilian; I asked whether he understood Brazilian; he 
 said, No : but he had taken care to have two inter- 
 preters by him, the one a Dutchman that spoke Bra- 
 zilian, and the other a Brazilian that spoke Dutch; 
 that he asked them separately and privately, and both 
 of them agreed in telling him just the same thing 
 that the parrot said. — I could not but tell this odd 
 story, because it is so much out of the way, and from 
 the first hand, and what may pass for a good one; for 
 I dare say this prince, at least, believed himself in all 
 he told me, having ever passed for a very honest and 
 pious man; I leave it to naturalists to reason, and to 
 other men to believe, as they please upon it; however, 
 
94 On the power of 
 
 it is not perhaps amiss to relieve or enliven a busy 
 scene sometimes with such digressions, whether to the 
 purpose or no."* 
 
 Of all animals, with whose history and manners we 
 are properly acquainted, the elephant is most remark- 
 able both for docility and intelligence. On this sub- 
 ject, however, I shall be very brief, as it is needless 
 to repeat the various anecdotes which are to be found 
 in works of natural history relative to this animal. 
 
 In the East, the elephant not only contributes to 
 the state and pomp of princes, but is employed in 
 various useful labours requiring art and strength. 
 He lades a boat in a river with surprising dexterity, 
 carefully keeping all the articles dry, and disposing 
 them so judiciously that their arrangement seldom 
 needs to be changed. In raising wheeled carriages, 
 heavily loaded, up an acclivity, he pushes the carriage 
 forward with his front, advances, supports it with his 
 knee, and renews his effort. When dragging a beam 
 of wood along the ground, he removes obstacles to 
 make it run smoothly and easily. 
 
 The elephant loves his keeper. He distinguishes 
 the tones of command, of anger, and of approbation, 
 and regulates his actions by his perceptions. His 
 attachment and affection are sometimes so strong and 
 durable that he has been known to die of grief when, 
 in an unguarded fit of rage, he had killed his keeper. 
 He is more easily tamed by mildness than by blows. 
 He is proud and ambitious, yet so grateful for good 
 
 • Locke's Essay, Chap, xxvii. 
 
Reasoning in Animals. 95 
 
 usage, that he has been often known to bow the head 
 in passing houses where he had been hospitably re- 
 ceived. Elephants are remarkably fond of children, 
 and seem to discern the innocence of their manners. 
 They often allow themselves to be led and commanded 
 by a child, and sometimes act as its keeper. Dr. 
 Darwin assures us that it is not uncommon for the 
 keeper of an elephant, in his journey in India, to 
 leave him fixed to the ground by a length of chain, 
 when he goes into the woods to collect food for him, 
 with a child yet unable to walk, under his protection; 
 and the intelligent animal not only defends it, but as 
 the child creeps about, when it arrives at the ex- 
 tremity of his chain, he wraps his trunk gently round 
 its body, and brings it again into the centre of his 
 circle. 
 
 A very affecting story is told by Pliny. Elephants 
 used to be exhibited at Rome to be driven about 
 in the circus, and slain with darts. A number of these 
 animals were on one occasion, exhibited in this way 
 by Pompey ; and when they found themselves destined 
 to immediate death, they made a vigorous effort to 
 break through the iron railing in which they were 
 enclosed : frustrated in the attempt, with a wailing 
 voice, and in a suppliant posture, they seemed to im- 
 plore the compassion of the spectators; and so im- 
 pulsively were the whole people affected with the 
 distress and sensibility of those majestic animals, that 
 with one assent, they arose, and in tears imprecated 
 destruction on the head of the magnificent general, 
 
96 On the power of 
 
 who entertained them with that splendid spectacle ;— • 
 imprecations, says the historian, which soon after took 
 effect. 
 
 D'Obsonville says, that in Laknaor, the capital of 
 Soubah, during the rage of an epidemic disease, the 
 principal road to the palace gate was covered with 
 sick and dying wretches, extended on the ground, 
 and unable to move, at a time when the nabob was to 
 pass on his elephant. The cold selfishness of the 
 prince, the haste with which he was to pass, and the 
 heavy steps of the elephant, seemed to threaten in- 
 evitable death to a number of the miserable subjects. 
 But the noble animal, without receiving any com- 
 mand to the purpose, and even without slackening 
 his pace, dexterously assisted the poor creatures with 
 his trunk, removing some, raising others, and stepping 
 over the rest, so that none suffered the slightest 
 injury. 
 
 On taking a review of most, if not all, the actions 
 of the lower animals we have been last considering, 
 I think it must be obvious, that whether we allow 
 them reason or not, the actions themselves compre- 
 hend those elements of Reason, if I may so speak, 
 which we commonly refer to rational beings. So 
 that if the same actions had been done by our fellow 
 creatures, we should have ascribed them without 
 hesitation to motives and feelings worthy of a rational 
 nature. It is certain that most of these animals in 
 their several rational acts (if I may call them such) 
 show every outward sign of consciousness or knowledge 
 
Reasoning in Animals. 97 
 
 of the end of their actions — a consciousness, too, 
 immediately directed to the welfare of man ; not like 
 the fixed and uniform operations of Instinct, which 
 pays no regard to man, but, when acting in the 
 brutes, is wholly employed in their self-preservation) 
 or in providing for their young. 
 
 As no man, then, can clearly point out, by what 
 delicate and hidden steps, even the human mind is 
 conducted in passing from premises to conclusion ; 
 as he cannot trace what animal propensities, and feel- 
 ings of his sensitive nature, and prejudices, and moral 
 principles govern and influence his various decisions, 
 constituting what he calls an act of human reason, 
 farther than the end can be accounted for by the 
 means ; so neither can he comprehend the impelling 
 motives of the brute, except by their visible actions. 
 If these visible actions, therefore, correspond with 
 his own ideas of what is excellent in feeling and judg- 
 ment, they must either proceed from faculties like 
 those of that part of human nature to which the brute 
 is clearly allied, or from a much higher source. But 
 as they do not appear to belong to Instinct, or a 
 necessary and unavoidable impulse compelling them 
 to act, nor yet to those more dignified principles of 
 the human character, of which the brute shows no 
 signs; they may be considered analogous to those 
 principles which govern human beings themselves 
 under corresponding circumstances ; and consequent- 
 ly presuppose a limited degree of rationality, as we 
 strictly apply the term. 
 
93 On the power of 
 
 Instances of sagacity in many other animals might 
 also be collected ; — sufficient to show that when occa- 
 sion seems to call forth their energies, a display of 
 intellect follows which ought rather to be considered 
 as a matter of course, than of very anomalous occur- 
 rence. For these instances of sagacity are too nu- 
 merous in the brute creation to constitute what may 
 be termed rare exceptions. We might with nearly 
 as much propriety make extraordinary instances of 
 sagacity in our own species, exceptions to the com- 
 mon rule, by taking uncivilized tribes as models from 
 which to form a true estimate of the human character. 
 Animals in the wild state fulfil the intentions of nature 
 more perfectly than man in the civilized. And, again ? 
 many animals, when domesticated or trained to use- 
 ful purposes, and associated with civilized man, dis- 
 play signs of affection, gratitude, and ingenuity, with 
 other noble and excellent traits of character, which, 
 considering they are not bound by the obligation of 
 any moral duties, are truly wonderful. 
 
 It would be easy to add anecdotes of many other 
 animals to those I have collected : and I would just 
 repeat the observation, that in contemplating the acts 
 in question, there is every reason to think, the ani- 
 mals are in a good degree conscious of the end and 
 design of such acts, perhaps as much so as many of 
 our fellow creatures are, when lending their assist- 
 ance to us in the same way. But this cannot be 
 proved : nor can it ever amount to more than a high 
 degree of probability ; for the want of artificial signs, 
 
Reasoning in Animals. 99 
 
 without doubt very wisely, prevents all mental inter- 
 course between man and the brute. So that we can 
 never understand to what degree they are conscious 
 agents, beyond the outward evidence of natural lan- 
 guage. If it should be thought by some a mark of 
 the irrational or brute nature not to comprehend the 
 connexion of means and ends and to be unconscious 
 of design, it is on the other hand sufficiently clear, 
 that like the lower animals in many instances, multi- 
 tudes of our fellow creatures suffer themselves to be 
 employed in various operations, and frequently act 
 without having any clear knowledge of the compli- 
 cated means or end which the superior understanding, 
 whatever it is, to which they submit themselves, has 
 in view. 
 
 How far the words rational and irrational, have 
 been used legitimately, to distinguish man and the 
 brute, I shall not pretend to say. But if I may appeal 
 to such an authority, there appears to me no ground 
 in Scripture for the use of the word Reason, as it is 
 applied in the present day, in this distinguishing 
 sense. It occurs only in Daniel, as a power of the 
 intellect, where it is said " Nebuchadnezar's reason 
 returned unto him: , ' and the same Hebrew word, 
 two verses before, is translated, Understanding; in 
 other parts, Reason is used for mere argument, or 
 discussion of opinion. Understanding is the term we 
 meet with in Scripture, which refers to something 
 higher than mere human or outward knowledge, and 
 
 g2 
 
100 On the potter of 
 
 is generally classed with Wisdom. " Buy wisdom 
 and instruction, and understanding" — " He hath 
 stretched out the heavens by his understanding" — 
 " The inspiration of the Almighty giveth under- 
 standing" — " My people have no understanding" 
 
 It is clear that the word applies to knowledge, 
 above that which relates to the common concerns of 
 life : and, it moreover appears, that a mere reasoning 
 or comparing faculty is not once referred to as the 
 exclusive privilege of man. 
 
 I mention these few things to show that so far as 
 we can gather from the use of terms, the Scripture 
 affords us no light by which we can discriminate be- 
 tween the truly intellectual and animal nature, (for I 
 do not now speak of the divine influence in man,) and 
 that the words rational and irrational, as applied 
 specifically to make a formal distinction between 
 man and the brute, with regard to their respective 
 faculties for acquiring outward knowledge, are in- 
 ventions of the schools, rather by assumption than 
 by proof. 
 
 I wish therefore to be understood to say, that there 
 is no more ground for making an essential distinction 
 between those outward faculties in man and the 
 brute, which compare ideas in order to draw simple 
 inferences, than for making a distinction in kind 
 between their respective powers of remembering. 
 So that, if the brute can remember by his creaturely 
 mind or animal nature, so may he reason, as far as 
 
Reasoning in Animals. 101 
 
 ■& 
 
 his limited capacity will enable him to do so, by the 
 same animal nature. I make no reference here, to 
 those higher principles in the human mind, which 
 are far above outward reason ; and of which the 
 brute certainly knows nothing. 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
CHAP. V. 
 
 OF THE ACCOMMODATING POWER OF IN- 
 STINCT, AND INFERENCES FROM THE FACTS, 
 
 -+++- 
 
 In the preceding Chapter, I have spoken of pure 
 Instincts, which act without any instruction, prior to 
 all experience, I have also spoken of the natural 
 senses and their perfection in man and the brutes, as 
 well as of some anomalous acts of the latter exhi- 
 bited in their migrations ; and have lastly given some 
 examples of the higher qualities in the minds of 
 brutes, which are depending on instruction and edu- 
 cation, like human reason. I shall now very briefly 
 notice another train of actions or modified instincts, 
 if they may be so called, in which the brutes, without 
 instruction from man, appear to deviate in some 
 degree from the unerring rule of Instinct, and adapt 
 their conduct to circumstances. Dr. Darwin is very 
 anxious to prove that these deviations arise from a 
 reasoning faculty. 
 
 We are told by Adanson, that Rabbits in the island 
 of Sor, near Senegal, do not burrow in the earth ; 
 
Of the accommodating power of Instinct. 103 
 
 hence Dr. Darwin suspects that their digging them- 
 selves houses in this cold climate is an acquired art. 
 
 In Senegal, where the heat is great, the Ostrich 
 neglects her eggs during the day, but sits upon them 
 in the night. At the Cape of Good Hope, however, 
 where the heat is less, she sits upon her eggs, both 
 day and night. 
 
 It is said that the Bees that were taken to Bar- 
 badoes and other islands of the West Indies, ceased 
 to lay up honey after the first year, as they found it 
 not useful to them ; and are now become very trou- 
 blesome to the inhabitants, by infesting their sugar 
 houses. 
 
 In Jamaica, however, they continue to make honey, 
 as the cold north winds or rainy seasons of that island 
 confine them at home, for several weeks together. 
 
 And the Bees of Senegal, which differ from those of 
 Europe only in size, make their honey not only su- 
 perior to ours in delicacy of flavour, but it has this 
 singularity, that it never concretes but remains liquid 
 as syrup. 
 
 This accommodating variation in the instinct of the 
 bee, may, however, be partly explained by the ope- 
 ration of human intercourse. Because, if the bees 
 had not sugar houses or some other large depositories 
 of this sweet substance to resort to, it is most pro- 
 bable, they would make honey in the usual way. 
 And the difference in the qualities of the honey in 
 Senegal from our own, may be referable to a difference 
 in the flowers from which it is collected. We know 
 
104: Of the accommodating 
 
 that even in England and Ireland, the honey made in 
 one district frequently differs in flavour, and some- 
 times in other qualities, from that made in another. 
 
 The Wasp of this country fixes his habitation under 
 ground, that he may not be affected with the various 
 changes of our climate ; but in Jamaica he hangs it 
 on the bough of a tree, where the seasons are less 
 severe. 
 
 Loubiere, in his history of Siam, says, " That in a 
 part of that kingdom, which lies open to great inun- 
 dations, all the Ants make their settlements upon 
 trees; no ants' nests are to be seen any where else." 
 Whereas in our country the ground is their only 
 situation. 
 
 In countries infested with monkies, birds, which 
 in other climates build in bushes and clefts of trees, 
 suspend their nests on slender twigs, and thus elude 
 their enemies. The same species of birds build their 
 nests differently, when climate and circumstances re* 
 quire it. (Rees' Cyclop.) 
 
 Dr. Darwin has collected many facts to show that 
 the Cuckoo in some places hatches and educates her 
 own young: while in others, she builds no nest, but 
 uses that of some lesser bird, as the wagtail or hedge 
 sparrow, and depositing one egg in it, takes no further 
 care of her progeny. 
 
 The Swallow sometimes migrates; sometimes is 
 found torpid in the hollow of rocks, and even under 
 water. Other birds migrate from some countries and 
 remain stationary in others; as is the case with 
 
power of Instinct. 105 
 
 certain animals. So that emigrations would seem to 
 depend on want of food, inclement seasons, or un- 
 friendly climates. 
 
 Ulloa mentions that in Juan Fernandes the Dogs 
 did not attempt to bark, till some European dogs were 
 put among them ; and then they gradually began to 
 imitate them ; but in a strange manner at first, as if 
 they were learning a thing that was not natural to 
 them. Linnaeus, indeed, observes, that the dogs of 
 South America do not bark at strangers; and the 
 European dogs, carried to Guinea, are said in three 
 or four generations to cease to bark, and only howl 
 like the dogs, natives of that coast. 
 
 From some of these and other similar facts, Dr. 
 Darwin contends, " That the migrations of birds are 
 not instinctive, but accidental improvements, like the 
 arts among mankind, taught by their contemporaries, 
 or delivered by tradition : — that the arts of bees, 
 wasps, and ants, if we were better acquainted with 
 their histories, have arisen in the same manner from 
 experience and tradition, as the arts of our own 
 species; though their reasoning is from fewer ideas." 
 — u And, that as animals seem to have undergone 
 great changes, as well as the inanimate parts of the 
 earth, and are probably still in a state of gradual im- 
 provement, it is not unreasonable to conclude, that 
 some of the actions, both of large animals and of 
 insects, may have been acquired in a state preceding 
 the present one; and have been derived from the 
 parents to their offspring by imitation or other kind 
 
106 Inferences 
 
 of tradition : — For that, as the eggs of the crocodile 
 are hatched by the sun, and the eggs of insects and 
 spawn offish, by the vernal warmth, this might have 
 been the case with birds in warm climates, in their 
 early state, and they might have learned to incubate 
 their eggs, as they became more perfect animals, or 
 removed into colder climates."* 
 
 Dr. Darwin was possessed of uncommon genius, 
 and yet one would wonder that any man of scientific 
 observation would give the authority of his name to 
 such opinions. He certainly carries the notion of a 
 reasoning or adapting power in insects and brutes, to 
 the very extreme of that hypothesis. According to it, 
 the lower animals have no instinct at all; but expe- 
 rience and observation determine all their actions; 
 and it must appear strange, that while many eminent 
 philosophers maintain that the human infant could 
 not subsist without its instincts ; by this hypothesis, 
 the lower animals should all be guided in every case 
 by reason. The error seems to lie in confounding all 
 the motive powers and faculties of brutes together; 
 so that instinct, and sensation, and memory, and imi- 
 tation, and feeling, as gratitude and revenge, are all 
 resolvable into reason. This is as absurd, as to re- 
 solve them all into instinct. 
 
 It is much more consistent with the nature of all 
 the various phenomena we have been considering, to 
 suppose— 
 
 ♦ See Temple of Nature, Notes, 40. 
 
from the Fads, 107 
 
 First, — That seeing many of the natural operations 
 of the lower animals are so complicated, yet so per- 
 fect and invariable, it is almost irrational to suppose 
 them acquainted with the rules of the arts which 
 they practice so skilfully or the ends for which they 
 operate; and therefore, that they are guided by an 
 instinctive power, only known to Him who thus di- 
 rects them unerringly in all their ways. 
 
 2d. — Taking Instinct therefore to be a principle 
 in the constitution of animals, given them by their 
 maker for the purpose of preserving the individuals 
 and continuing the kind; its accommodating itself to 
 circumstances and situations, is no argument against 
 its existence, nor a good proof that it is always the 
 result of reasoning. Because He who made it a part 
 of the constitution of his creatures, knows that the 
 same ends must be often sought by different means ; 
 especially when times, places, and circumstances, are 
 altered. For if this accommodating property were 
 not imparted to Instinct, it would not produce the 
 effects for which it seems intended ; as we know that 
 it is impossible that similar means should produce 
 similar effects, when circumstances, climates, and 
 situations, are different. The accommodating va- 
 riations only occur where the disadvantages exist, 
 against which the Instinct is intended to provide.* 
 
 Therefore, so far as I can judge, the examples 
 which have been given, — and they are chiefly selected 
 from the Zoonomia of Dr. Darwin, — as proofs of this 
 
 * See Rees' Cyclop, article Instinct. 
 
108 Inferences 
 
 accommodating faculty, are not strong enough to 
 weaken the force of the general definition of Instinct. 
 These examples serve rather to show that instinct in 
 the brute is not so mechanical in its operation as to 
 admit of no possible deviation: and that animals 
 themselves, unlike pieces of mechanism, are capable 
 of being instructed by circumstances, in what imme- 
 diately concerns their well-being. For it is to be 
 understood, that in the wise economy of nature, no 
 species of animal can be detached from the rest with- 
 out more or less disorder; and that its well-being is 
 subservient to the whole scheme of Providence in the 
 outward creation. 
 
 3dly. — That as the natural senses in man, by ne- 
 cessity and particular modes of life, are often pos- 
 sessed in high perfection, so likewise are the na- 
 tural senses in the lower animals; and as we do not 
 confound our own natural senses with our instincts, 
 so neither ought we to confound the perfection of the 
 natural senses in animals with their instincts, nor yet 
 with that conscious intelligence they sometimes dis- 
 play in their intercourse with man. 
 
 4thly. — That some animals do, notwithstanding, 
 show indications of a sense which is quite anomalous 
 and inexplicable, yet scarcely to be classed with in- 
 stinctive propensities, as was spoken of in the bat, in 
 some migratory tribes, and even in the sheep and 
 dog. 
 
 And lastly. — That by education and training, in 
 their intercourse with man, many of the higher orders 
 
from the Facts. 109 
 
 of brutes are rendered capable of important changes, 
 and display signs of uncommon sagacity and reason- 
 ing : but while they acquire knowledge and many 
 useful qualities, fitting them to be our companions, 
 they lose their instincts or natural propensities, or 
 may even be brought to act in a manner directly con- 
 trary to these instincts. 
 
 Upon the latter qualities in the lower animals, — 
 especially their docility and intelligence, it may be 
 useful to subjoin a few remarks, with which I shall 
 conclude this outline of a very extensive subject. 
 By means of their docility, we may perceive, to 
 what important purposes they are subservient in the 
 economy of human society : and yet their intelligence 
 or power of comparing and drawing conclusions, and 
 adapting means to ends, is so wisely limited by divine 
 Providence, that they are prevented from ever com- 
 bining or rebelling in concert to injure their pro- 
 tector, who sometimes proves their oppressor; while 
 they are capable of such a measure of reasoning, as 
 qualifies them to know our wants and desires, to 
 comprehend the reliance we place upon their ready 
 service, and to afford their prompt assistance in ex- 
 tricating us from danger. It is easy to perceive that 
 they are fixed by an unalterable decree to a subordi- 
 nate station in the world, and that they are hence in- 
 capable of rising above a certain rank in the creation. 
 But if we adopted Darwin's opinion, there is no say- 
 ing how far their fancied progressive improvement 
 might reach. Within this limited range, therefore, 
 
110 Inferences 
 
 their powers of reasoning extend. It seems as evi- 
 dent to me, says Locke, that some animals do, in 
 certain instances, reason, as that they have sense ; 
 but it is only in particular ideas, just as they receive 
 them from the senses." Locke is not disposed to 
 allow them the power of abstraction. It is however 
 well observed by the writer of the article Instinct in 
 Rees' Cyclopoedia, that " there are many facts from 
 which it is evident, that brutes on some occasions 
 exhibit proofs of this faculty." And to this opinion 
 I assent.* 
 
 Now, if we compare our own mental constitution 
 with that of brutes, — however we may excel them, as 
 we certainly do, in some noble capacities and prin- 
 ciples, exclusively belonging to our moral nature ; — 
 yet we possess many faculties and powers precisely 
 analogous to theirs; and the motives and combined 
 operation of these, it is often as difficult to under- 
 stand, as it is those of the lower animals. So that it 
 might be as hard a matter to prove that many acts of 
 human volition were deliberate acts of the reasoning 
 faculty in its abstract sense, as many actions of the 
 lower animals: — such a variety of motives and ini- 
 
 * In allusion to the reasoning of animals, Milton says, — 
 
 " Is not the earth 
 With various living creatures, and the air 
 Replenished, and all these at thy command 
 To come and play before thee ? Know'st thou not 
 Their language and their ways? They also know 
 And reason not contemptibly. With these 
 Find pastime." 
 
from the Facts. Ill 
 
 pulses may govern the decision of a human being, 
 prompting him to act, not according to the standard 
 of reason, but according to the scale of sense or pas- 
 sion, and low desire. For, how rarely does en- 
 lightened reason, setting aside the higher influence of 
 moral duty, determine the conduct of man ! 
 
 In common with the brutes we have our instincts, 
 our imitative powers, our natural senses perfect or 
 imperfect according to their use, our capabilities of 
 improvement by discipline and education, our animal 
 propensities and passions, our feelings benevolent 
 and malevolent, our faculties of remembering and of 
 comparing or judging. Perhaps also they may par- 
 take with us in some others. But these are sufficient 
 to show what a compound is man, — of mean and noble 
 — of evil and good — how prone to the impulse of 
 nature from his very constitution, like the brute, and 
 how rarely asserting the prerogative of his superior 
 rank in the creation, by purifying his rational and 
 moral decisions and general conduct from the con- 
 tamination of sordid motives, so as to reason and act 
 like a being formed after the image of the Deity. 
 
CHAP. VI. 
 
 OF THE ASCENDING SCALE OF INSTINCTIVE 
 OR UNCONSCIOUS MOTIONS — COMPRISING 
 INANIMATE, VEGETABLE, AND ANIMAL MO- 
 TIONS. 
 
 Sect. I. 
 Of Inanimate and Vegetable Motions. 
 
 I am ready to believe that we shall be better able 
 to judge of the relation, which appears to subsist 
 between Instinct and the higher attributes of the 
 human mind, as well as of that subsisting between 
 man and the brute, after we have ascended the scale 
 of natural operations, even from those of inanimate 
 matter, through the several gradations of Being, up 
 to man himself. 
 
 We shall find that at every step in this ascent, al- 
 though many of these operations may not be justly 
 denominated instinctive, yet in as much as they are 
 surely and deter minately, though in some cases blindly 
 
Of unconscious motions in Unorganized Matter. 113 
 
 effected, they are analogous to those of Instinct, and 
 are only referable to the same ultimate cause. 
 
 Hence, this survey may be the means of connecting 
 in the mind more perfectly the chain of argument; as 
 we shall thus have an opportunity of referring In- 
 stinct to its proper source — the pervading influence of 
 the Deify in all his works; and also of referring 
 reason to its proper source — the outward or reflected 
 light of nature, alone and unassisted, constituted as 
 the leader of the natural faculties, which, by expe- 
 rience and observation, enables man to use the means, 
 placed abundantly within his reach, for all his out- 
 ward conveniencies and lawful enjoyments in life. 
 
 Of unconscious Motions in Unorganized Matter. 
 
 In contemplating the phenomena of the material 
 world, we perceive that all the grand operations of 
 nature are in perfect harmony, and proceed with 
 admirable order. The motion of the earth in its 
 orbit; the vicissitudes of the seasons; the distribution 
 of heat and cold ; the growth and decay of vegetables 
 and animals, and their mutual dependencies: — in 
 short, all the phenomena taking place upon our globe 
 that are not under the immediate controul of man, 
 are displayed with consummate wisdom. 
 
 H 
 
114 Of unconscious Motion in unorganized Matter. 
 
 We may observe, however, that when man inter- 
 feres, — so far as he can interfere, by reason of the 
 portion of free agency with which his Maker has 
 endowed him, — then, he may either co-operate with, 
 or oppose, the intelligent designs of Providence; and 
 his happiness or misery, — and in degree also the 
 beauty or deformity of the Lord's creation, — are the 
 result of his own free will. For, to a limited extent, 
 we have power over the face of nature, as well as 
 rightful dominion over the beast of the field. We 
 can plant a forest in the plain, or disencumber the 
 plain of the shady forest. We can cultivate the 
 barren field, and drain the noisome marsh, or leave 
 it to exhale pernicious effluvia, hurtful to man and 
 beast ; so that the very soil may be either a blessing 
 or a curse to its possessor. For he may raise the 
 poisonous weed, instead of the wholesome nutritious 
 grain ; and by his imprudence may suffer the flocks 
 to be cut off from the fold, and, through want of 
 timely care, thousands of his dependent fellow- 
 creatures to languish in misery, who might otherwise 
 rejoice around him. 
 
 Now, if we consider the stupendous phenomena of 
 the material world, celestial and terrestrial, we 
 cannot hesitate to believe, that with regard to the 
 heavenly bodies, either in their internal structure or 
 in the element through which they move, a power 
 has been impressed upon these masses of matter by 
 Omnipotence, which directs them, though uncon- 
 sciously, with unerring certainty in their course. 
 
O f unconscious Vegetable Motions. 115 
 
 The earth completes its orbit, and the moon per- 
 forms its revolutions; the tides swell and retreat; 
 and the currents of the atmosphere flow, either in 
 gentle breezes or in blustering storms. Heat and 
 cold have their appointed limits like the ocean ; and 
 the potent electric fire passes from the earth to the 
 air, and from the air again to the earth. — They all 
 execute their commissions with sure and determinate 
 efficiency; and the reason of man has no power either 
 to aid or retard a single event. 
 
 Now these effects, whether they proceed from the 
 secondary laws of attraction and gravitation, or from 
 some other hidden cause, are without doubt under 
 the immediate controul of the divine architect. The 
 mode of their impulse is indeed mysterious and un- 
 known ; but we neither think it fit to designate this 
 impulse by the term Instinct, Reason, or Inspiration, 
 as the ruling principle of action. 
 
 In the vegetable kingdom, likewise, the seed 
 chooses the fit soil ; it spreads the root to receive 
 nourishment; the plant soon appears at a time when 
 the outward air is fitted to cherish its growth, and 
 the juices are propelled forward through a thousand 
 tubes to promote the fructification and the increase : 
 but this is all in obedience to a moving and living 
 energy infused by the Creator. 
 
 This living energy in plants, though perfect in its 
 kind, is, notwithstanding, of a very inferior nature 
 compared with that of animals: but in what way the 
 
 h 2 
 
116 Of unconscious Vegetable Motions. 
 
 internal structure gives rise to the phenomena of 
 vegetation, the human mind is unable to comprehend. 
 The micros-cope has done no more than show us a, 
 difference of structure in every different plant. The 
 active power is as great a mystery now, as it was ages 
 ago. The manner in which the organization of a 
 plant is excited by outward stimuli is unknown. If 
 we call it irritability to distinguish it from sensation, 
 or the sentient principle of animals, we only remove 
 the difficulty one step. , We reason in a circle instead 
 of coming nearer to the point; and distinguish one 
 thing from another — as the vegetable from the ani- 
 mal — without knowing the principle of life in either. 
 In fact we distinguish them only by a few obvious or 
 outward shades of difference, without being able to 
 mark out the true lines of separation. 
 
 The transition from plants to animals is allowed to 
 be almost imperceptible. For, the animated sea- 
 nettle fixed to the rock, that stretches out its nu- 
 merous feelers to receive its food, is but a little way 
 removed from the plant fixed in the earth, that pushes 
 its roots in the direction of water, or whatever else in 
 its vicinity may contribute to its growth. And the 
 motions of some plants in appearance come very near 
 to the principle in animals, which is expressed by the 
 term conscious feeling. Yet, though we do not under- 
 stand them, we cannot believe that it is any thing but 
 appearance. Some of these motions in vegetable life 
 are, indeed, remarkable. For, a plant, reared in a 
 dark cellar, (if some light be admitted) will bend 
 
Of unconscious Vegetable Motions. 117 
 
 itself towards the light; or, if made to grow in a 
 flower-pot, with its head downward, it will turn its 
 head upward, according to the natural position of a 
 plant. If a root be uncovered, and not exposed to 
 much heat, and a wet spunge is placed near it, but in 
 a direction opposite to that in which the root is pro- 
 ceeding, in a short time the root will turn towards the 
 spunge. In this way the direction of roots may be 
 varied at pleasure. 
 
 All plants m&ke the strongest efforts by inclining, 
 turning, and even twisting their stems and branches, 
 to escape fiom darkness and shade, and to procure the 
 influences of the sun. If a vessel of water be placed 
 within six inches of a growing cucumber, in twenty- 
 four hours the cucumber alters the direction of its 
 branches, and never stops till it comes into contact 
 with the water. When a pole is placed at a con- 
 siderable distance from an unsupported vine, the 
 branches of which are proceeding in a contrary di- 
 rection from that of the pole, in a short time it alters 
 its course, and stops not till it clings around the pole. 
 But the same vine will carefully avoid attaching itself 
 to low vegetables nearer to it, as the cabbage. Hence 
 Pliny and Cicero remark, that the vine hates the 
 colewort and cabbage ;* as if it possessed the facultjr 
 of perception and the power of choosing. 
 
 * " The vine hates the cabbage and all kinds of pot-herbs." 
 
 Pliny. 
 
 M The vine is said to avoid the colewort and cabbage, if planted near 
 it, as if they were noxious and pestilential.'* Cicero. 
 
118 Of unconscious Vegetable Motions. 
 
 In his Philosophy of Natural History, Smellie has 
 given several examples of different kinds of motion in 
 the vegetable kingdom. 
 
 "When the roots of a tree meet with a stone, or 
 other obstacle, in order to avoid it, they change their 
 former direction ; and when trees grow near a ditch, 
 the roots which proceed in a direction that would 
 necessarily bring them into the open air, instead of 
 continuing this noxious progress, sink below the 
 level of the ditch, then shoot across^ and regain the 
 soil on the opposite side. They turn from barren to 
 fertile earth, which indicates something analagous to 
 a choice of food. 
 
 " The mimosa or sensitive plant possesses the faculty 
 of motion in an eminent degree. The slightest touch 
 makes its leaves suddenly shrink, and together with 
 the branch, bend down toward the earth. But the 
 hedysarum movens, or moving plant, furnishes one of 
 the most singular examples of vegetable motion. It 
 is a native of the East Indies. Its movements are 
 not excited by the contact of external bodies, but 
 solely by the influence of the sun's rays. The mo- 
 tions of this plant are confined to the leaves; which 
 move briskly in every direction when the sun shines. 
 They move upward and downward; but sometimes 
 turn almost round, twisting their foot-stalks. As 
 long as the heat of the sun continues, these motions 
 go on incessantly ; but they cease during the night, 
 and when the weather is cold and cloudy. 
 
 "The American plant, called dionoca muscipula or 
 
Of unconscious Vegetable Motions. 110 
 
 Venus's fly-trap, affords another instance of rapid 
 vegetable motion. lU leaves are jointed and fur- 
 nished with two rows of strong prickles. The sur- 
 faces of the leaves secrete a sweet liquor, which al- 
 lures the approach of flies. When these parts are 
 touched by the legs of a fly, the two lobes of the leaf 
 instantly rise up, the rows of prickles lock themselves 
 fast together, and squeeze the poor captive to death. 
 A straw or pin will excite the same motions. 
 
 " Many leaves, as those of the mallow, follow the 
 course of the sun. In the morning their upper sur- 
 faces are presented to the east ; at noon to the south ; 
 and at sun-set to the west. During the night, or in 
 rainy weather, their leaves are horizontal." 
 
 " The sleep of plants , as it has been called, affords 
 another curious instance of vegetable ruction. The 
 leaves of many plants fold up during the night ; but 
 at the approach of the sun they expand. The modes 
 of folding in the leaves are extremely various : but it 
 is peculiarly worthy of attention, that they all dispose 
 themselves so as to give the best protection to the 
 young stems, flowers, buds, or fruit. For example, 
 the leaves of the tamarind tree contract round the 
 tender fruit, and protect it from the nocturnal cold. 
 The cassia or senna, the glycine, and many of the 
 papilionaceous plants, contract their leaves in a simi- 
 lar manner. The leaves of the chickweed, of the 
 asclepias, atriplex, &c. are disposed in opposite pairs. 
 During the night they rise perpendicularly, and join 
 so close at the top, that they conceal the flowers. 
 
120 Of unconscious Vegetable Motions. 
 
 The leaves of the sida or althea Theophrasti, of 
 the ayenia, and Oenothera, are placed alternately. 
 Though horizontal, or even depending during the 
 day, at the approach of night they rise, embrace the 
 stem, and protect the tender flowers. 
 
 " The leaves of the solan um or night shade, are 
 horizontal during the day ; but, in the night they rise 
 and cover the flowers. The Egyptian vetch erects its 
 leaves during the night, in such a manner that each 
 pair seem to be one leaf only. The leaves of the 
 white lupine, in the state of sleep, hang down and 
 protect the young buds from being injured by the noc- 
 turnal air." 
 
 The flowers also, as well as the leaves, have the 
 power of moving. During the night, many of them 
 are inclosed in their calyx. Some, as of the German 
 spurge, geranium striatum, and common whitlow 
 grass, when asleep, hang their mouths toward the 
 earth, to prevent the noxious effects of rain or dew. 
 It is probable that such flowers are not defended by 
 their leaves. 
 
 It would appear that this sleep of plants was de- 
 signed for the perfection of the seed. For, those 
 plants, the seed-receptacles of which are sufficiently 
 secure, never sleep; and a plant after fructification 
 sleeps no more. 
 
 The cause of these movements in plants has been 
 ascribed to the presence or absence of the sun's rays. 
 Some motions are evidently excited by heat. But 
 plants kept in an etjual temperature in a hot-hoyse, 
 
Of unconscious Vegetable Motions. 121 
 
 fail not to contract their leaves, or to sleep, in the 
 same manner as when they are exposed to the open 
 air. This fact evinces, that the sleep of plants is 
 gather owing* to a peculiar law, than to a quicker or 
 . slower motion of the juices. 
 
 All the facts I have enumerated on vegetable life, 
 tend obviously to prove that plants are endowed with 
 internal powers of self preservation quite independent 
 of man, which watch over them continually, in a 
 manner as incomprehensible, yet as efficient, as the 
 instinctive actions of animals. And this power, for 
 want of a better name, or a better knowledge of the 
 cause, has been termed the principle of vegetation. 
 But, in what manner the motions of plants just noticed 
 differ from the motions which are thought to depend 
 on a distinct principle belonging to a muscular fibre 
 in animals, we are quite ignorant. It is hardly likely 
 that the fibrous texture of plants and of their vessels, 
 though possessed of elasticity, has any thing like the 
 property of alternate contraction and relaxation 
 known to exist in the true muscular fibre of animals; 
 yet plants, as we have seen, are excited to very curious 
 movements. So that in the infinitely wise economy 
 of nature, similar effects may be accomplished by a 
 different organization. Varied, however, as this may 
 be, there is still something beyond which is inex- 
 plicable. We cannot doubt that the structure of 
 leaves and flowers is as well adapted to the delicate 
 stimuli acting upon them to excite their movements, 
 such as light and heat, as the structure of animals is 
 
122 Of Animal Motions. 
 
 to the grosser kind of elements with which they come 
 in contact. On whatever principle vegetable motions 
 depend, elasticity or irritability, it is generally al- 
 lowed that the motions of animals arise from the 
 irritability of a muscular fibre. This irritability, 
 however, though admitted as a fact, is obscure or in- 
 explicable in its cause and mode of operation. It 
 is no less mysterious how a simple muscular fibre 
 should possess the inherent power of contraction and 
 relaxation, should become weak or strong by ex- 
 haustion or tone ; than it is how the simplest animal 
 structure should be able to commence, continue, and 
 suspend its spontaneous motions. 
 
 Sect. II. 
 
 Of Animal Motions. 
 
 Beyond the sphere of vegetation, the system of vital 
 irritability is presumed to commence; but the barrier 
 is so ill defined, that we can scarcely tell where the 
 first actually terminates, and where the latter begins. 
 
 Notwithstanding the subject of muscular motion 
 has been investigated by some of the most learned and 
 ingenious men, it still remains involved in the greatest 
 obscurity. A medical writer well observes, that " al- 
 though many curious observations have been made, 
 and as far as the laws of dead mechanism can be ap- 
 
Of Muscular Motion. 123 
 
 plied to a living machine, the investigators may have 
 been successful : yet still there has been a ne plus 
 ultra, a certain barrier by which their investigations 
 have been limited, which no person has hitherto been 
 able to pass, and which it is very improbable ever 
 will be passed." 
 
 That unknown property by which a muscle when 
 wounded, touched or irritated, contracts, indepen- 
 dently of the will of the animal that is the object of 
 the experiment, and without its feeling pain, is called 
 by Haller, its vis insita, or inherent power. 
 
 Now it is to be observed that the vis nervea, or 
 nervous power, which Dr. Monro, in accounting for 
 muscular motion, contrasts with the vis insita, comes 
 to the muscle from without, that is, from the influence 
 of a brain and nervous system ; whereas the vis insita 
 resides constantly in the muscle itself. The nervous 
 power ceases when life is destroyed ; the other ap- 
 pears, from experiments, to remain for some time 
 after death ; the nervous power is also suppressed by 
 tying a ligature upon the nerve, by hurting the 
 brain, or by taking opium. The vis insita suffers 
 nothing from all these circumstances; it remains 
 after the nerve going to the muscle is tied; it con- 
 tinues in the intestines, though they be taken out of 
 the body and cut in pieces; it appears with great 
 strength in such animals as are destitute of brain : 
 that part of the body is moved which has no feeling ; 
 and the parts of the body feel which are without 
 
124 Of Muscular Motion. 
 
 motion. The will excites and removes the nervous 
 power, but has no power over the vis insita* 
 
 Sir Gilbert Blane in his Croonian Lecture, de- 
 livered in the year 1788, considers, in the course of 
 his reasoning, that the nervous system is not only a 
 mere appendage to life, or muscular irritability, but 
 that it tends to impede its operation, and to shorten 
 its existence. Hence he maintains that muscular 
 irritability does not depend upon a sentient principle. 
 Many animals, it is well known, exist without brain 
 or nerves. This was first observed by Haller, and 
 was confirmed by Hunter : who maintains farther that 
 the stomach is the centre or seat of life, and more 
 essential to it than the brain. That the stomach 
 should be an organ of so much consequence, seems 
 natural enough, from the importance of its function, 
 which is that of assimilation or nutrition; and life 
 can be more immediately and completely extin- 
 guished by an injury done to it, such as a blow, than 
 by the same violence to any other part of the body. 
 It is also well known, as before observed, that the 
 muscular fibres of animals endowed with a nervous 
 system, will retain their irritability for some' time 
 after their separation from the brain and nerves. 
 And from the phenomena of vegetation, he thinks 
 irritability may exist in nature, without sensation, 
 consciousness, or any suspicion of the existence of a 
 nervous system. Besides, those animals which are 
 
 * Edinburgh Medical and Surgical Diet. 
 
Of Muscular Motion. 12.5 
 
 destitute of brain and nerves, are of the class vermes^ 
 the most simple in nature, having only one function, 
 viz. that of assimilation ; and therefore not requiring 
 that variety of action, and those perceptions, which 
 are pecular to more complex animals. 
 
 Lastly, the state of an egg before incubation, and 
 the condition of those animals which become torpid 
 from cold, and afterwards revive, afford facts which 
 favour this opinion ; as they show that there is a 
 certain principle of self-preservation, independent 
 not only of the operation of the nervous system, but 
 also of the circulation : for, in this quiescent state, 
 those portions of animal matter are preserved, for a 
 great length of time, from that corruption to which 
 they would otherwise be liable; and their fluids are 
 prevented from freezing in a degree of cold which 
 would congeal them, were they destitute of every 
 principle of life. 
 
 Sir Gilbert Blane adds, that simple life will not 
 only survive sensation, but will survive it longer, if 
 the animal is killed by destroying the nervous system, 
 than ifit had been killed by haemorrhage, suffocation, 
 or other violence. If a fish, immediately on being 
 taken out of the water, be stunned by a violent blow 
 on the head, the irritability and sweetness of the 
 muscles will be preserved much longer than if it had 
 been allowed to die with the organs of sense entire. 
 This is so well known to fishermen, that they put it 
 in practice, in order to make them longer susceptible 
 of the operation called crimping, A salmon is one of 
 
J 20 Of Muscular Motion. 
 
 the fishes least tenacious of life, insomuch that it will 
 lose all signs of life in less than half an hour after it 
 is taken out of the water, if suffered to die without 
 any farther injury; but if, immediately after being- 
 caught, it receives a violent blow on the head, the 
 muscles will show visible irritability for more than 
 twelve hours afterwards. 
 
 The same author observes, that in warm-blooded 
 animals, an excessive exertion of voluntary motion, 
 immediately before death, prevents the muscles from 
 being rigid when cold, and renders them more prone 
 to putrefaction. Thus, if an ox is killed soon after 
 being over-driven, the carcase will not become stiff 
 when it grows cold, nor is it capable of being pre- 
 served by means of salt. Hence also, in some dis- 
 orders of the brain, as hydrocephalus, and apoplectic 
 palsy, in which the functions of the brain are sus- 
 pended, the office of digestion is sometimes better 
 performed than in health. 
 
 Sir Gilbert Blane concludes with Hunter, that the. 
 exercise of sensation is inimical to mere animal life, 
 and that a sort of fatigue is induced by this, as well 
 as by voluntary motion ; so that all that intercourse 
 carried on through the nerves, whether towards the 
 brain in the case of sensation, or from the brain in 
 acts of volition, tends to wear out the animal powers, 
 in other words, to exhaust the irritability. And, as 
 intense and long continued thought, though not 
 terminating in any outward action, tends also to pro- 
 duce an inability for farther exertions, it would 
 
Of Muscular Motion. 1 27 
 
 appear, that the brain or sensorium is more particu- 
 larly the organ which is subject to that species of 
 sufferance called fatigue. From these facts we may 
 perceive the necessity of sleep, which consists in a 
 temporary suspension of sensation, volition, and 
 thought; and is a resource of nature, whereby the 
 powers of life recover themselves after satiety and 
 fatigue, which are provided as guards to warn us when 
 nature is in danger of being strained, either by re- 
 pletion, or over-exertion ; and it is evident that such 
 barriers were absolutely necessary, in order to set 
 bounds to operations which are only occasionally 
 requisite, and which would otherwise depend on the 
 caprice of the will. The exercise of sensation and 
 voluntary motion, in a moderate degree, is conform- 
 able to the intention of nature, and therefore salu- 
 tary ; and it is only when they are excessive, that they 
 tend to wear out the powers of life, and more espe- 
 cially if these are not duly recruited by sleep. Man 
 is formed for action, and without it neither mind nor 
 body can attain its vigour. But the excess may lead 
 to untimely decay, as the deficiency to a torpid 
 vegetable kind of existence. Hence, in reasoning on 
 these things, we must observe the mean. For to 
 such a creature as man it would be no ultimate ad- 
 vantage that he should improve and cherish his un- 
 thinking muscular power, at the expense and loss or 
 deterioration of his sensitive and intelligent capacities. 
 We see, therefore, how completely it is in his power 
 to degrade himself, by cultivating the grosser principles 
 
1 28 Of Muscular Motion. 
 
 of his frame, or to raise himself to his proper rank 
 and dignity by attention to the nobler capacities of his 
 mind. He can scarcely be perfect in intellect, and 
 perfect in animal power at the same time : and either 
 of these parts of his constitution will suffer, it appears, 
 by exclusive devotion to the other. 
 
 I have considered the facts and observations on 
 muscular motion, not only as highly interesting in 
 themselves, but as leading us to distinguish that pro- 
 perty of animal life called irritability, which seems to 
 depend on the vis insita of the muscular fibre, from 
 the simpler irritability or contractility of the vege- 
 table structure, below it, in the chain, as well as from 
 that more exquisite and elaborate appendage to ani- 
 mal life called nervous power, above it. Some per- 
 sons have, indeed, doubted whether any animal, how- 
 ever simple, can have the least consciousness of exist- 
 ence, or the least degree of sensation, without some 
 kind of nervous structure more or less perfect. This, 
 however, would be to assume more than we are war- 
 ranted in doing, from the latest discoveries in com- 
 parative anatomy. As far as our present knowledge 
 reaches, distinct laws seem to belong to each of these 
 states. And at each link of the ascending chain, by 
 general confession, there is an impassable barrier to 
 human research, an incomprehensible and active 
 power working in each, like the law of gravitation in 
 dead matter. We cannot therefore pretend to dis- 
 tinguish these states — viz. vegetation, irritability, and 
 nervous power, any farther than by their effects. 
 
The definitions of Reimar and Herder. 129 
 
 I am disposed to think, notwithstanding, that even 
 this slight view will enable many to correct some 
 erroneous notions, and popular ones too, on this 
 subject. 
 
 As an example, I may mention the common im- 
 pression that the writhings, distortions, and convul- 
 sive motions, we sometimes see in animal bodies, are 
 accompanied with pain or feeling. This is proved 
 undoubtedly not to be always the case. It seems, 
 however, a natural association in the mind, and pro- 
 bably a wise appointment to excite our humanity. 
 Hence that philosophy must appear cold and insen- 
 sible which would attempt to reason away oui 
 natural sympathies for suffering, as if they had no 
 foundation in fact. Convulsive motions do sometimes 
 indicate pain. But the most violent pain is often 
 endured without them : and, inversely, the most 
 violent convulsions are often unaccompanied with 
 sensation. 
 
 It appears evident that those animals, which possess 
 this irritability in the greatest perfection, are endowed 
 with the least nervous power; and the more perfect 
 the nervous structure, the more it seems to impede 
 the full exercise of the vital irritability. This will 
 be more obvious when we take into our consideration 
 the facts I am about to mention : and here I may 
 notice by the way, that although in the next section I 
 follow some of the views of Herder in his Outlines 
 of the Philosophy of Man, yet I cannot altogether 
 subscribe to some of his conclusions. For after 
 
 i 
 
130 The definitions of Reimar and Herder. 
 
 quoting the opinion of Reimar, who has written one 
 of the most enlightened works on the subject, 'that the 
 instincts of animals are to be explained from the me- 
 chanism, senses and feelings, with which they are 
 endued, and that we must admit particular determinate 
 natural powers, and natural innate capacities, which are 
 susceptible of no farther explication,'* Herder an- 
 nounces that he does not acquiesce in the latter senti- 
 ment, but substitutes an opinion, vaguely enough 
 expressed, that u the composition of the whole machine 
 from certain given powers, senses, feelings, and con- 
 ceptions ; in short, the organization of the creature 
 itself constitutes the most sure direction, — the most per- 
 fect determination, that nature could impress upon her 
 work" 
 
 If we examine this position, it leaves us as much in 
 the dark, with respect to the agency of a ruling super- 
 intending power, as that of Reimar; and, by implying 
 that the organization of the animal is self sufficient, 
 gives that countenance to the sceptic which I believe 
 Herder did not intend. It seems to imply that we 
 may come to something capable of explanation ; and 
 yet makes nothing clearer after all the circumlocutory 
 terms of the proposition. If Herder had not made 
 the objection to the former, his own proposition might 
 have appeared more admissible in itself. But the 
 attempt to make animal organization dependent on 
 its own powers and resources, and to explain by 
 
 * See Outlines of Philosophy, Vol. 1. Book 3. Chap. 2. 
 
Plants. 131 
 
 technical phrases what is inexplicable, however sci- 
 entifically and cautiously expressed, is too much after 
 the manner of Lucretius. And yet if we take the 
 word nature in the last line, to mean what Herder 
 wishes it to be understood to mean, " Almighty 
 •power ; goodness, and wisdom,"* the effect may be 
 in part neutralized. It is certain that he did not 
 intend to exclude such an ultimate cause; though 
 the expressions he has used lean to that view of the 
 question. 
 
 Sect. III. 
 
 On the connected chain of functions in Vegetable, 
 Muscular, and Nervous systems. 
 
 After the preceding facts and observations on the 
 instinctive motions of the vegetable and muscular 
 fibre, as they are exhibited in the living phenomena of 
 plants and animals, I shall proceed to notice, in a 
 connected series, the leading offices and distinguishing 
 characters of the most prominent links in the natural 
 chain of Being, from the simple functions of plants to 
 the complicated power and intelligence of man. 
 
 In plants we may observe the two natural instincts, 
 if such they may be called, of nutrition and propa- 
 gation ; and the results of these are works of divine 
 
 ■• See the Preface to Herder's Outlines. 
 
 i 2 
 
132 Zoophytes. 
 
 art, such as are scarcely equalled by the most exqui- 
 site performance of any insect : they are the bud and 
 flower. Plants exist, therefore, to vegetate and bear 
 fruit — a subordinate end, it may appear, yet the basis 
 of every other in the creation. This end they accom- 
 plish to perfection; and it is scarcely necessary to 
 remark, that it is attained the more completely, as 
 they labour at it the more incessantly, and as the 
 end or object is less divided. Plants may be multi- 
 plied by suckers, slips, and cuttings, as well as by 
 seeds; and where they can, they exist in the whole 
 germ — branch, leaf, and flower, being often included 
 in it, — and protrude new shoots and buds, when not 
 arrested by cold, with incessant powers of multipli- 
 cation. And thus a single branch may represent the 
 whole tree ; for what the whole effects, each part or 
 shoot is capable of effecting also. Plants imbibe food 
 by the roots, the trunk, and the branches, and, in the 
 opinion of some, also by the leaves and flowers. 
 The plant is compensated for every thing it has been 
 denied, by the intensity of the single power that 
 operates in it. It neither requires the faculty of loco- 
 motion, nor the knowledge of other plants around it. 
 But it attracts and enjoys after the manner of plants, 
 heat, light, air, and the juices that nourish it : and 
 the propensity to grow, to bloom, and to multiply its 
 species, it exercises more truly and incessantly than 
 any other creature. 
 
 The transition from plants to the zoophytes, or 
 animal flowers, as they are sometimes called, shows 
 
Teslucta. 133 
 
 this more clearly. These seem to connect the animal 
 with the vegetable life. Most of this order take root 
 like the plant, as it were, and grow up into stems ; 
 multiplying life in their branches and deciduous buds, 
 and in the transformation of their animated blossoms 
 or polypes, which are endued with spontaneous 
 motion. They possess therefore a degree of sensa- 
 tion and the organs of locomotion. In these the 
 organs of nutrition are separated — not as in plants; 
 but their principal organic powers are nutrition and 
 propagation. But, like plants, the polypus puts forth 
 shoots from its body, and not only so, but as a stimu- 
 lated muscle displays more energy, so the polypus 
 when divided into portions exerts all its powers to 
 repair the loss ; pushing forth limbs after limbs with 
 astonishing powers of reproduction. Each section 
 becomes an animal of the same kind. No division, 
 however minute, can deprive the animal of life : 
 even when inverted, as a man inverts the finger of a 
 glove, the polypus begins to take food and to perform 
 its natural functions. Different portions of one poly- 
 pus were engrafted by Tremblay on another, — as of 
 the head of one polypus on the body of another, — 
 and in this way the most fantastic forms were pro- 
 duced.* 
 
 In the order Testacea, the Snail exhibits a some- 
 what higher range of obscure vital powers, developed 
 only in a few members. It possesses fine tentacula 
 
 * See Linnaeus, Herder, Smellic. 
 
134 Insects. 
 
 or feelers; some slight appearance of nerve; eves of 
 the most simple construction, at the extremities of 
 its horns ; an open mouth ; something like a beating 
 heart; and a wonderful power of reproduction. The 
 animal renovates head, horns, and eyes. It not only 
 forms its shell and again wears it away, but produces 
 a living being with similar shells. Hence it is capa- 
 ble of effecting, in its low rank, what no other crea- 
 ture with more perfect limbs can perform ; its living 
 powers working more intensely, in proportion to the 
 limited sphere in which it has to act. 
 . If we rise to the Insect, we see an exquisite and 
 artful structure accompanied with actions equally 
 artful. Its nerves are delicately fine ; and its muscles 
 extremely minute. The muscles of a caterpillar 
 amounting to nearly four thousand, while those of the 
 human body are supposed not to exceed four hundred 
 and fifty. They are generally defended without by 
 a hard covering. Insects do not appear to have a 
 regular circulation as in the larger animals. The 
 muscular strength of insects is astonishing compared 
 with their size. It is said that a flea will draw a 
 chain one hundred times heavier than itself. The 
 vast burden carried by a chafer, and the force exerted 
 by an angry wasp, are proofs of this strength of 
 muscle. 
 
 The head, eyes, antennae, wings, &c. of insects, and 
 their various works of art effected by their limbs and 
 senses, all show a wonderful perfection of organic 
 living powers operating in every part. But these 
 
Amphibia, 155 
 
 parts cannot be reproduced like inferior limbs in the 
 creatures above noticed. The trembling avulsed leg 
 of a spider or a fly, shows the force of vital irritability 
 it retains, when separated from its trunk. This living 
 power is distributed by nature throughout all the 
 limbs even to the most minute. The antennae or 
 feelers, are senses; and the slender legs, muscles, and 
 arms ; each nervous plexus or ganglion, a smaller 
 brain; and each irritable vessel, almost a beating 
 heart : and thus all its delicate operations are accom- 
 plished ; astonishing us by their perfection and ex- 
 quisite art. 
 
 In cold-blooded animals, we see the same excess of 
 irritability. The tortoise moves a long time without 
 brain or even head. Redi opened the head of a tor- 
 toise, took out its brain and washed the cavity. Yet 
 the animal walked away, as if it had sustained no 
 injury, and it lived for six months, moving its limbs 
 as in health : it necessarily became blind. Redi at 
 last cut off the head, and the tortoise lived twenty- 
 three days after its separation: the head, when re- 
 moved, rattling the jaws for above a quarter of an 
 hour like a pair of castanets. 
 
 If the jaws of a dead crocodile be pulled asunder, 
 they are capable of biting off the incautious finger. 
 The frog will live and jump several hours after its 
 head has been cut off. It will continue active though 
 all its bowels are taken out ; and will live many days 
 even if it be stripped of its skin. In some of its acts 
 its limbs may be torn oft* before it will relinquish its 
 
136 Amphibia. 
 
 purpose. The teeth of a viper inflict a mortal wound 
 three, eight, nay twelve days, after the head has been 
 separated from the body. The less therefore the 
 vital powers are under the controul of a nervous sys- 
 tem and ample brain, the more active are they in the 
 offices of supporting life, of repairing losses, and of 
 reproducing parts of the system. 
 
 This must appear, when we take into account, that 
 even in warm-blooded animals, their flesh moves 
 more languidly in connexion with the nerves; and 
 their intestines are more forcibly affected by stimuli 
 when the animal is dead. How often do we see, 
 when sentient life is retiring, that the body is con- 
 vulsed with involuntary struggles, that are nothing 
 more than the indications of muscular power impeded 
 by nervous animal irritability, in which sensation and 
 perception have no part! We know to a certainty 
 that in the most violent of convulsive motions, as in 
 epilepsy, there is no pain: yet the voluntary muscles 
 are frightfully distorted. The epileptic, during the 
 paroxysm, has no consciousness of suffering, and 
 therefore no recollection of any when he has reco- 
 vered from the fit. The power of reproducing parts 
 is lost in the more perfect animals, as they are called, 
 that is, as they ascend higher in the scale — for each 
 is perfect in its kind : at certain ages scarcely can 
 they restore a tooth, or heal a wound or a fracture: 
 and animals which possess the reproductive faculty, 
 are not able to renew those parts in which muscular 
 powers are condensed, like those which are, as it 
 
Observations on the Facts. 137 
 
 were, but sprouts : for instance, the lobster can push 
 out new claws, but not a new tail; in which great 
 part of its vigour lies. 
 
 The farther the muscular powers enter the sphere 
 of the nerves, the more are they imprisoned, as it 
 were, in this organization. The more numerous and 
 delicate the nerves of an animal, the more they are 
 allied to nobler parts and senses : and, on the con- 
 trary, in those animals, in which irritability over- 
 powers perception, and the muscular powers the 
 nervous system; — where the latter is employed on 
 mean functions and appetites, especially hunger, 
 the species, according to our own standard, is less 
 perfect in structure, and more gross in its manners; 
 while in those possessed of an ample brain, the sen- 
 sations and perceptions are remarkably exalted — -just 
 as the clownish part of human nature is capable of 
 being changed and refined into the gentleness and 
 accomplishment of taste and sentiment. 
 
 These, then, are the facts — the obvious rules, by 
 which it has pleased Divine Providence to connect 
 life and motion with the phenomena of perception 
 and thought; in various degrees in the ascending 
 scale; and yet so mysteriously in every gradation, 
 that we can in no case separate that which is material 
 from the immaterial; nor determine how much is 
 attributable to mind and how much to matter. But 
 it is clear that every where, and in every species, an 
 active and intelligent principle must be inferred. 
 Without it the materialist must find himself be- 
 
13S Observations on the Facts. 
 
 wildered. For as the bodies of brutes have their 
 natural life and spring from the dust, so the body of 
 man has analogous propensities, and may claim 
 kindred with the worm, and with the earth out of 
 which it was formed. 
 
 I may, indeed, be told, that the mechanism of the 
 animal, in other words, its material structure, is suffi- 
 cient to account for its operations; and that to in- 
 troduce any thing of mind or an immaterial prin- 
 ciple, operating in the lower animals, is to make them 
 partakers of that immortal nature we conclude to be 
 imparted only to man. But the latter consequence 
 can with no good reason be drawn from it: because, 
 upon this principle, every thing, in which traces of the 
 divine finger are manifest, must be immortal also. 
 Now, all nature bears these marks —and every hair 
 of the head, every vessel, and every joint, is a miracle 
 of divine workmanship. Every blade of grass, and 
 every flake of snow, — the bird's feather and the fishes 
 scale, have each their wonders. Yet these are not 
 immortal. Nor does it appear that a spark of the 
 divine, free, or self-acting nature, is communicated to 
 any sublunary being but to Man. 
 
 It is quite impossible to separate the mechanism 
 from the Art or Intelligence that designed, and the 
 Power that formed. And however I may admit that 
 the animal is capable by its own mechanism of pro- 
 ducing those actions which are under its controul, I 
 cannot with reason ascribe to its own power other 
 actions going forward in its animal structure — actions 
 
Observations on the Fads, 139 
 
 of vital necessity — of which, notwithstanding, it is 
 wholly unconscious. Therefore, all its unconscious 
 vital motions, together with the skill and perfection 
 of its formation, must, by a necessary consequence, be 
 referred to some intelligent agent. 
 
 But, if we believe that the earth, with all contained 
 in it, was originally formed by an Almighty power — 
 a position which very few, even professed materialists, 
 deny; — we must also believe that the frame and con- 
 stitution of nature are continued and sustained by the 
 same power. Hence we must conclude that the 
 divine energy pervades every part of the great system; 
 every atom and every orb ; the minute insect and the 
 mighty whale ; the invisible seed and the lofty oak. 
 For, if we could imagine the divine superintendence 
 to be withdrawn, even for a moment of time, anarchy 
 and chaos would resume their ancient dominion. It 
 is quite absurd and derogatory from the attributes of 
 the Deity to suppose, as some do — and I state the argu- 
 ment with reverence — that the Supreme Being, having 
 established laws, as they are pleased to say, by which 
 all nature is governed, takes no farther trouble in 
 the administration of these laws, but relinquishes his 
 divine care, and 1 eposes as a wearied mortal after his 
 toil. This cannot be conceived of what is infinite in 
 power. And the eye " that sleeps not by day, nor 
 slumbers by night," represents an ever-watchful and 
 bountiful Providence. 
 
 The materialist cannot show, notwithstanding this 
 singular gradation in structure, movement, and action, 
 
140 Observations on the Facts. 
 
 that we have observed in the scale of being up to 
 man, how a single animated object in the creation 
 regulates its own movements. The mechanism is not 
 its own contrivance: and with this the unthinking 
 animal has as little to do, as the infant with a know- 
 ledge of the structure and functions of its brain or 
 heart. 
 
 There is a strict alliance, then, between man and 
 every thing beneath him and around him ; — an alli- 
 ance in the elements of his body, in the mode of its 
 production, of its nourishment, and its decay. He is 
 dependent upon the grass of the field. He has appe- 
 tites and passions like the reptile and the brute. 
 
 But, with all these powerful affinities that bind him 
 to the earth, he has within him a principle that looks 
 beyond the present world ; that tells him all he sees 
 and contemplates in this life relates only to the in- 
 ferior propensities of his nature; and that convinces 
 him he alone is the visible lord of the creation, for 
 whom all these things were made; and consequently 
 that he must be the connecting link between the visi- 
 ble and invisible worlds. 
 
 Consider the higher operations of the human mind. 
 Calculate its wonderful capacities. Examine the range 
 of its contemplations, and its conceptions of ideal hap- 
 piness and perfection, even when unaided by revela- 
 tion. Observe the good man in adversity, — his mind 
 supporting itself with a godlike magnanimity : — And 
 what relation have these sparks of a brighter flame — 
 these indications of a noble and superior nature, to 
 
Observations on the Facts, 141 
 
 the present constitution of things? — what congruity 
 have these gleams of light that are now and then per- 
 mitted to shine over us, with the darkness and change- 
 ableness, and reptile forms, that are here continually 
 before our eyes ! 
 
 Whatever the materialist may theoretically con- 
 clude, he cannot seriously persuade himself, that a 
 little difference in form, or a nicer texture in the brain, 
 constitutes all the difference between himself and the 
 highest order of brutes. 
 
 Human imagination cannot conceive a being des- 
 tined to fill the station occupied by man on this earth, 
 with a different constitution of body from the present, 
 to which numberless objections might not be readily 
 advanced by any considerate mind. Of what ele- 
 ments, it might be asked, would the materialist have 
 the human structure to be composed? If they were 
 essentially different from those every where else ob- 
 servable in nature, there could be neither affinity nor 
 harmony between them: and their growth, increase, 
 and dissolution, would be quite inconceivable. If the 
 elements were the same, the body must be subject to 
 the same laws. But, if subject to the same laws, and 
 other creatures inferior in the scale were also designed 
 by infinite wisdom as necessary to complete the chain j 
 and that these also should be subject to the same na- 
 tural laws ; their organization must needs have exhi- 
 bited various lines of affinity and outward resemblance 
 to that of man. Hence, the resemblance to the brute, 
 in all that concerns the material structure of the 
 
142 Observations on the Facts. 
 
 human frame, can be no reasonable argument in favour 
 of materialism; nor the gradual ascent, from the 
 living movements of a plant, through the several mo- 
 tions of zoophytes, molluscae, insects, fishes, birds, and 
 beasts, up to man, any argument of the human mind 
 being composed of the same essence in its higher 
 powers, with the inferior propensities of animated 
 nature. And, in the whole chain of our reasoning, 
 we have found it necessary to suppose an active energy 
 operating in every particle of matter, organic and 
 inorganic, according to its laws — an energy so 
 efficient and intelligent as to entitle it to no other 
 appellation than that of divine — to no lower origin 
 than that of omnipotence. 
 
CHAP. VII. 
 
 ON THE ZOOLOGICAL LECTURES OF 
 WM. LAWRENCE, F.R.S. 
 
 It may not be irrelevant in this place to notice 
 what different conclusions may be drawn from the 
 same facts. Since most of the preceding observations 
 have been written, I have had the curiosity to exa- 
 mine some of the reasonings of the respectable writer 
 whose name is at the head of this Chapter : and a few 
 remarks have occurred to me on reading a passage in 
 his third Lecture, which seem to be intimately con- 
 nected with this subject. The passage to which I 
 refer so much resembles the view I have taken, that 
 it would seem to have been written purposely for my 
 argument. 
 
 This author had, just before, been endeavouring to 
 prove, that " the same kind of facts, the same reason- 
 ing, the same sort of evidence altogether, which show 
 digestion to be the function of the alimentary canal, 
 motion (that) of the muscles, the various secretions of 
 
144 On the Zoological Lectures 
 
 their respective glands, prove that sensation, percep- 
 tion, memory, judgment, reasoning, thought, in a 
 word, all the manifestations called mental or intellectual, 
 are the animal functions of their appropriate organic 
 apparatus, the central organ of the nervous system : i. e. 
 the brain." 
 
 The author does not merely state the analogy of the 
 two cases, or two classes of effects ; which might, 
 possibly, in a qualified sense at least, have been ad- 
 mitted; but he goes farther, and maintains that a 
 material organization does actually produce the phe- 
 nomena in question ; — not only those of the bodily 
 system, but the highest operations of mind.* We 
 cannot read the following sentence without being 
 convinced that the writer wholly identifies himself 
 with the materialists. " The immaterialists will not 
 concede the obvious corallary of all these admissions 
 — that the mind of man is merely that more perfect 
 exhibition of mental phenomena, which the more 
 complete developement of the brain would lead us to 
 expect, and still perplex us with the gratuitous diffi- 
 culty of their immaterial hypothesis." 
 
 The author discards a vital principle. He discards 
 an immaterial principle. He also discards a material 
 bttt very subtle and invisible agent, superadded to the 
 obvious structure of the body, to enable it to exhibit 
 vital phenomena : — each of which notions has been 
 warmly maintained by others. I leave the reader to 
 
 * See 4th Lecture. 
 
of W. Lawrence, F.R.S. 145 
 
 judge of the substitute he offers. " The primary or 
 elementary animal structures are endued with vital 
 properties; their combinations compose the animal 
 organs, in which, by means of the vital properties of 
 the component elementary structures, the animal 
 functions are carried on. The state of the animal, in 
 which the continuance of these processes is evidenced 
 by obvious external signs, is called life." Again, he 
 lays a charge against " those who think it impossible 
 that the living organic structures should have vital 
 properties without some extrinsic aid ; that they re- 
 quire no such assistance for the equally wonderful 
 affinities of chemistry, for gravity, elasticity, or the 
 other properties of matter."* This I conclude to be 
 a mistake ; for, on the contrary, it will appear as ne- 
 cessary to suppose it in the latter cases as in those of 
 life. 
 
 Now, I am persuaded that the author, in thus arguing 
 for the possibility of matter refining itself or being 
 refined into thought, and for its unaided efficiency for 
 all the subordinate operations in which it is physically 
 concerned, lays himself open to the charge of an 
 assumption, or petitio principii, which, consistently 
 with the acknowledgment he afterwards makes, and 
 if he had followed strictly the rules of inductive 
 reasoning, he could scarcely have been warranted in 
 advancing. 
 
 The passage to which I first referred, with the 
 
 * See 3d Lecture. 
 
 K 
 
146 On the Zoological Lectures 
 
 acknowledgment contained in it, follows this question, 
 a Shall I be told that thought is inconsistent with 
 matter; that we cannot conceive how medullary sub- 
 stance can perceive, remember, judge, reason? I 
 acknowledge that we are entirely ignorant how the 
 parts of the brain accomplish these 'purposes — as we 
 are how the liver secretes bile, how the muscles con- 
 tract, or how any other living purpose is effected : — 
 as we are how heavy bodies are attracted to the earth, 
 how iron is drawn to the magnet, or how two salts 
 decompose each other. Experience is in all these 
 cases our sole, if not sufficient instructress ; and the 
 constant conjunction of phenomena, as exhibited in 
 her lessons, is the sole ground for affirming a neces- 
 sary connexion between them. If we go beyond this, 
 and come to inquire the manner how, the mechanism 
 by which these things are effected, we shall find 
 every thing around us equally mysterious, equally 
 incomprehensible :— from the stone, which falls to the 
 earth, to the comet traversing the heavens : — from 
 the thread attracted by amber or sealing-wax, to the 
 revolutions of planets in their orbits : — from the 
 formation of a maggot in putrid flesh, or a mite in 
 cheese, to the production of a Newton or a Franklin."* 
 He acknowledges that " every thing is equally 
 mysterious and equally incomprehensible." Yet, 
 amidst all this darkness, he undertakes to clear up 
 the difficulty by deciding that a peculiar conforma- 
 
 * See Lectures, &c. p. 105. 
 
ofW. Lawrence, F.R.S. 147 
 
 tion of matter produces all the phenomena in brute 
 and intelligent natures, which we see in the world. 
 He assumes, gratuitously enough, that matter alone, 
 in an organized or inorganic state, executes all the 
 purposes he has assigned to it. Yet he admits that 
 " the manner how, and the mechanism" — in other 
 words, if I may express it — the power and the wisdom 
 — " are equally mysterious and equally incompre- 
 sible." 
 
 I take for granted that he makes the assumption I 
 have stated ; because he seems to think that he has 
 brought the arguments of his opponents to that state 
 which is called by logicians a reductio ad absurdum, 
 by compelling them to admit the following conclu- 
 sion. That M if the intellectual phenomena of man 
 require an immaterial principle superadded to the 
 brain, we must equally concede it to those more 
 rational animals, which exhibit manifestations differ- 
 ing from some of the human only in degree. If we 
 grant it to these, we cannot refuse it to the next in 
 order, and so on in succession to the whole series ; to 
 the oyster, the sea anemone, the polype, the micro- 
 scopic animalcule. Is any one prepared to admit the 
 existence of immaterial principles in all these cases ? 
 if not, he must equally reject it in man." 
 
 Now I do not perceive that there is any thing 
 absurd in the supposition that an immaterial principle 
 should operate or be at work in the creatures formed 
 by the same principle. If the Deity has condescended 
 to the workmanship, is it unreasonable that he should 
 
 k 2 
 
148 On the Zoological Lectures 
 
 guide the machine and superintend the movements ? 
 If we admit the existence of a Creator, we are called 
 upon to admit the actions of those creatures, which 
 are not accountable, and therefore cannot resist his will, 
 as part of his works also. The divine energy ope- 
 rating in his works is no new idea in philosophy. 
 Some of the wisest men have entertained the per- 
 suasion ; because, without it, the skill and design 
 manifest in the creation could not be explained. 
 When a caterpillar moves its four thousand muscles 
 in regular order, it knows nothing of the astonishing 
 perfection of the mechanism: therefore it mnst obey 
 a power superior to itself. But it does not follow, 
 because we concede that an immaterial principle 
 guides and directs all the objects in the creation, 
 that it should therefore become a part of the consti- 
 tution of those objects, and make them divine also — 
 that it should, as it were, become united to them, as 
 though it were one with their substance. This is no 
 necessary consequence. It is in vain that we inquire 
 how the divine power operates — mediately or imme- 
 diately. This we can never know. But we may 
 safely presume that it pervades every atom in the 
 universe : and this has been the general opinion from 
 Cicero and Virgil to INewton and Pope. 
 
 Magnetism and gravitation may show us that actual 
 contact between masses of matter is not necessary to 
 produce a simple physical effect. How much less 
 should actual union be necessary between a divine 
 immaterial spirit and a material form ! Yet the pos- 
 
of W. Lawrence, F.JR.S. J 49 
 
 sibility of the latter is not denied, though it is beyond 
 our comprehension ; nor is a divine influence ques- 
 tioned in regulating all physical events. 
 
 A stone cannot fall without it, nor a crystal shoot, 
 a plant cannot vegetate, an animal move a limb, nor 
 an intelligent being think and act. But we must 
 distinguish between the power that communicates a 
 faculty or endowment, and the absolute divinity and 
 immateriality of the faculty; — for this reason, that in 
 the present scheme of things, it has pleased Divine 
 wisdom universally to connect these manifestations of 
 his power both in nature and in man, with certain 
 states of material conformation. Consequently, to 
 assert that, in this state, the mental constitution of 
 man is absolutely and independently immaterial, might 
 be as unphilosophical as to assert that it was material. 
 By natural research we come to something which 
 cannot be explained by any laws of matter ; and by 
 natural research we prove an intimate and indissoluble 
 connexion during life, between mental phenomena 
 and cerebral configuration. This is what Lawrence 
 expressly aflirms, and what is freely granted to him. 
 The exclusive inference which he draws, by implica- 
 tion, in ridiculing any immaterial agency, is objected 
 to, on his own grounds. 
 
 That brutes and every thing else of an inferior 
 nature, are guided, in the best manner, and to the 
 best ends, which regard their being, is surely no 
 argument against a divine interference. And the 
 argument that as man does not himself follow that 
 
150 On the Zoological Lectures 
 
 which is best, therefore he cannot be under such an 
 influence, is fallacious, and only proves that he does 
 not submit himself and his actions to the same divine 
 government ; because he has been gifted with a power 
 to withstand it : — But is no proof that he does not 
 possess it. 
 
 There is no difficulty in conceiving — nor is it a 
 strained hypothesis, — that in every creature God has 
 made, his power should continue to act, at least in the 
 mechanism composing it, — in every creature up to 
 man. If this be the case, we cannot imagine the 
 moving power to be material ; because, it is divine. 
 For, a divine principle composed of divisible particles 
 is quite inconceivable. 
 
 But, in the case of man, we have the same law 
 holding, in every act of his animal nature, that is not 
 implicated in his free agency, as a rational and moral 
 being. But there is superadded a portion of the 
 divine nature immortal in its essence; and he has 
 the power to resist or obey the Creator's will. 
 
 The Almighty has never, that we know of, made 
 the brute animals accountable for their acts, or given 
 them the power to contravene any divine statutes. 
 He has appointed them an earthly ruler. He has not 
 held out to them, as he has to the most destitute 
 savage, the longing hope of immortality in a happier 
 state of being. He has not given to them peace and 
 joy — the present reward of good actions, and remorse 
 and pain for evil conduct; because the knowledge of 
 good and evil is withheld, Man, therefore, in all 
 
/>/ W. Lawrence, F.R.S. 151 
 
 these things, is essentially different from the brute ; 
 and may approach nearer to the likeness of his 
 Maker, or recede farther from the divine image, by 
 his own free choice. 
 
 Now, in this view, we neither make the brute a 
 spiritual agent, nor the human mind a pure imma- 
 terial principle, in this its natural state. The former 
 is, what it is, by necessity ; incapable of moral im- 
 provement, because it has no knowledge but of the 
 duty and allegiance it owes to man : the latter may 
 degrade itself to mere animal affection, and become 
 absorbed in sensuality, or may rise from these bonds 
 and look abroad in unshackled and conscious dignity. 
 But a mind, while it is still united with the body — 
 still subject to the dominion of sense and appetite, 
 and imprisoned, as it were, in an earthly tenement ; 
 which can loosen itself from this connexion, subdue 
 its low desires, overcome its natural tendencies, and 
 already anticipate by its virtues a better state ; what- 
 ever the materialist may think, certainly proves its 
 superiority to the elements that surround it ; clearly 
 demonstrates that it has no essential and indissoluble 
 affinity with these elements, and discloses its real 
 tendency towards a state of existence in which the 
 opening bud of its virtues can alone blossom into per- 
 fect life. 
 
 For, if man be the only creature under heaven, as 
 we cannot doubt he is, who feels he has the power to 
 disobey his Maker's commandments, and to obtain his 
 favour by obedience; this exclusive privilege must 
 
J 52 On the Zoological Lectures 
 
 assuredly have been granted for some high purpose, 
 and it stamps him with the impression of peculiar 
 estimation. — A power to resist Omnipotence, and to 
 rise by free choice, or virtuous conformity to the divine 
 counsels, into nearer union with the source of infinite 
 perfection! what an inestimable privilege, and how 
 greatly is it abused ! He cannot surely conceive that 
 the creatures appointed for his temporal use, what- 
 ever likeness they may bear him, can have any interest 
 in that immortal state, to which his own hopes instinc- 
 tively point; or that they hold any relation, like that 
 springing up in his own mind, from new sympathies, 
 affections, and desires, wholly unconnected with this 
 world, to superior intelligences and kindred spirits, 
 with whom his budding capacities are alone capable 
 of enlargement. 
 
 Now, to return to the subject; the gradation in 
 organized nature up to the human form, and the inti- 
 mate connexion of an amply developed brain with the 
 perfection of human intellect, and also between dis- 
 eased cerebral structure and deranged mental power, 
 are points freely admitted to the author of the Lec- 
 tures, on the principles 1 have laid down. Indeed 
 they are facts which it would be folly to deny. All 
 that I wish, therefore, to maintain, is, that that which 
 is " mysterious and incomprehensible," according to 
 this writer, is the divine energy of the Deity operating 
 in his own works. But whether it operates by the 
 immediate agency of an immaterial principle, or 
 some equally incomprehensible material structure, 
 
of W. Lawrence, F. U.S. 1 53 
 
 quickened by his power — which perhaps may mean 
 the same thing — does not appear to be of the least 
 importance, either as it regards the agent or the 
 object. For, I presume, it never can be demonstrated 
 one way or the other; the essence of mind as well as 
 of matter being unknown. 
 
 1 wish however to be guarded in expression, that 
 although we admit the divine energy acting in and 
 throughout the creation, it does not follow that every 
 act of the lower animals should be considered as a 
 divine act, pure from materiality, and of free un- 
 fettered divinity. For the power is in every case 
 modified by the structure : otherwise we should not 
 perceive such a variety in the works of the same 
 divine artist, some creatures endowed with more and 
 some with fewer capacities and powers. And it seems 
 to have been ordained that that which is superior 
 should sometimes be imprisoned by that which is 
 inferior— the divine by the earthly — the mind by the 
 body— the good by the evil tendencies. Why this 
 should be the case, is a question with which we have 
 nothing at present to do. 
 
 With respect also to what is ordained as a law of 
 .nature or of the Deity, I apprehend it can mean 
 nothing more than his power. Hence, if he acts ac- 
 cording to certain laws, he acts by his power. For 
 his laws cannot be independent of his power. 
 
 It was the error of Stahl and some other reasoners 
 of his school, that the rational soul, as it was called, 
 was said to superintend every operation in the body 
 
154 On the Zoological Lectures 
 
 as well as the mind. But the simplest view of the 
 animal economy will convince us that those things, 
 which are done without animal consciousness, cannot 
 be referred to the same identical motive power, which 
 acts in cases of free animal volition. 
 
 Our volition is no more immediately concerned in 
 our own secretion, assimilation, nutrition, absorp- 
 tion, &c. than if these functions belonged to another 
 being. Therefore our own rational soul (admitting 
 the expression) can have nothing to do with these 
 functions; for they belong to the brute equally with 
 ourselves. But our mind can determine and act ac- 
 cording to certain laws, and display certain pheno- 
 mena purely its own, i. e. arising from its own capa- 
 cities and powers: In like manner can the brute. 
 Therefore, two principles are at work simultaneously 
 in each. The one, divine and omniscient, superintend- 
 ing vital actions in their very elementary motions, 
 entrusted neither to man nor to brute, because re- 
 quiring nothing short of divine power to execute 
 them : the other, limited in each, according to the 
 measure granted by the Deity for certain specific ends, 
 entrusted to the creature's own senses, appetites, and 
 mental endowments, varying in every creature accord- 
 ing to its organization, though derived originally from 
 the same Almighty power. 
 
 Hence a portion of voluntarily, or spontaneity, or 
 power of commencing voluntary motion, is given to 
 animals, which they can exercise — not independently 
 altogether of the divine will, but to a certain extent 
 
of W. Lawrence, F.R.S. 155 
 
 as free agents in physical actions ; just as the human 
 mind has the power of free agency to a certain extent 
 in moral actions. 
 
 It is clear, therefore, that there is a two-fold agency 
 of mind in these cases : — a pure, unlimited, intelli- 
 gent, regulating impulse, independent of the creature; 
 and a limited, uncertain, irregular, inefficient power 
 of volition, according to the degree of mental energy 
 varied infinitely in different creatures, dependent on 
 the physical structure of each, and quiescent or active 
 as the creature may determine. In animals this 
 power of volition is exceedingly limited, and confined 
 to a few actions, mostly animal, in some few, intelligent, 
 or perhaps intellectual. In man it has a wider range, 
 and not only embraces the animal and rational acts in 
 which some of the brutes seem to take a part, but his 
 moral actions likewise. 
 
 Now I have considered it remarkable, that the 
 author of the Lectures, after professing his total 
 ignorance, does not at once suggest, in connexion 
 with his reasoning, that the mysterious and incompre- 
 hensible acts manifested in nature might be legiti- 
 mately referred to an all-wise, omnipresent Creator: 
 In the course of his investigation, it is clear that he 
 observed innumerable instances of the most perfect 
 adaptation between structure and uses, and the most 
 obvious connexion between means and ends, implying 
 design and intelligence of the highest order. I be- 
 lieve that in strict philosophical propriety there are 
 better grounds for supposing, that, beyond the im- 
 
156 On the Zoological Lectures 
 
 passable barrier which impedes human research, in 
 all these matters, a wise and intelligent agent is at 
 work, than the materialist can have for assuming that 
 some incomprehensible condition of the elements or 
 of the minute particles of matter, by their own self- 
 moving energy, causes the phenomena. There is 
 obviously more reason for the former hypothesis, 
 because the existence of such an all-wise power in the 
 creation may be collaterally inferred. But it is im- 
 possible to conceive that any configuration of the 
 particles of matter, without some intelligent artist, 
 operating in and upon them, can do any thing at all. 
 
 It is very clear that the author of the Lectures 
 intrenches himself behind that maxim of the schools, 
 which is good in its place, that insists upon nothing 
 being taken for granted which is not first proved ; 
 and that he indulges a sort of self-complacency for 
 having imagined nothing beyond the evidence of the 
 dissecting knife. If we ask for an explanation of 
 what is meant by " elementary animal structures, 
 endued with vital properties," — on which he makes 
 the phenomena of animal life wholly to depend, I 
 suspect we shall know nothing more than if they had 
 been called, the Atoms of Epicurus, or the Monads of 
 Leibnitz. 
 
 I put it to the plainest understanding to decide 
 whether the notion of a supreme power, who formed 
 the structure of an animal, still continuing to direct 
 the functions of the animal made by his own art, is 
 not more simple, intelligible, and consistent with 
 
of TV. Lawrence, F. U.S. J 57 
 
 every thing around us, than that of u elementary 
 animal structures, endued with vital properties," 
 produced by we know not what, — governed by we 
 know not what, — and supported we know not how. 
 
 It has appeared to me surprising, that a philosophic 
 inquirer into the laws and order of nature, should 
 content himself with having recourse to some in- 
 extricable dilemma — something dark and unknown ; 
 instead of that obvious reference to a supreme intel- 
 ligence, which in its very principles constitutes the* 
 foundation of piety and religion, and has been the 
 resort of true philosophy in all ages. 
 
 I do not wonder, as he has hinted, that an anatomist 
 should think he sees no traces of a principle distinct 
 from matter in the dissecting-room — in a loathsome 
 body returning to the elements out of which it was 
 formed. Nor ought we to be surprised, that any one, 
 who has spent great part of his life in comparing the 
 structure of one animated being with another, and 
 each with its peculiar faculties, from those of loco- 
 motion and nutrition up to perception and thought, 
 should see these things as a mere physiologist, and 
 should take a less comprehensive view of the human 
 mind and its diversified relations than others. 
 
 For, after all, the mind is the chief subject that 
 concerns a moral and intelligent agent : and the 
 anatomist will never be able to tell us more of its 
 propensities by all his discoveries, than we already 
 know; nor to find out in the brain a single new 
 
158 On the Zoological Lectures 
 
 faculty. We have this knowledge independently of his 
 skill ; and he is the last to whom a rational creature 
 should apply for information touching an immaterial 
 and immortal principle. So far as this can be dis- 
 covered by the knife, or by physiological research, he 
 is the last: — though anatomy, of all pursuits, abounds 
 with lessons of wisdom, from innumerable examples 
 of contrivance, skill, and exquisite workmanship. 
 
 If, as the author confesses, and every candid mind 
 must allow, cc the sublime dogmas" — comprehending 
 " the theological doctrine of the soul, and its separate 
 existence" — " could never have been brought to light 
 by the labours of the anatomist and physiologist" — 
 " and rest on a species of proof altogether different;" 
 and that " an immaterial and spiritual being could 
 not have been discovered amid the blood and filth of 
 the dissecting-room:" conversely, it appears to me 
 obvious, that it is highly unreasonable, if not pre- 
 sumptuous, for the anatomist to employ his discoveries, 
 or the geologist his researches, so as to arrange a 
 system of argument to overturn that proof, by in- 
 validating the truth of those sacred records, which 
 form the venerable basis on which alone the " sublime 
 dogmas" in question are built. For, notwithstand- 
 ing the author seems to draw his proof from what he 
 calls the universal belief of mankind " for ages and 
 ages before the period to which our remotest annals 
 extend," independent, too, of Scripture testimony; 
 yet I cannot perceive any other legitimate source 
 
of W. Lawrence, F.R.S. 159 
 
 of outward proof for these " great truths" than the 
 sacred writings. 
 
 The author distinctly asserts, that u the instances 
 of America, New Holland, and some other islands, 
 afford unanswerable arguments against the creation 
 of all animals in one spot." 
 
 And again, ¥, To the grounds of doubt respecting 
 inspiration, which arise from examination of the 
 various narratives, from knowledge of the original 
 and other oriental languages, and from the irrecon- 
 cileable opposition between the passions and senti- 
 ments ascribed to the Deity by Moses, and that reli- 
 gion of peace and love unfolded by the Evangelists, I 
 have only to add, that the representations of all the 
 animals being brought before Adam in the first in- 
 stance, and subsequently of their being all collected 
 in the Ark, if we are to understand them as applied to 
 the living inhabitants of the whole world, are zoolo- 
 gically impossible." (Sect. 2. Chap. 1.) 
 
 It is scarcely necessary to remark, that if these 
 strong assertions could in any degree shake the au- 
 thenticity of the Hebrew Scriptures, they must im- 
 mediately tend to destroy that species of proof on 
 which the sublime dogmas alluded to must ultimately 
 rest for their support. The Hebrew Scriptures look 
 forward with clear predictions to the time of the 
 Evangelists : and the promulgator of the gospel him- 
 self looks back to these sacred records, points out 
 their completion, and sanctions their truth. Hence, 
 
160 On the Zoological Lectures 
 
 to vindicate the truths of the gospel, and at the same 
 time to question the divine authority of Moses and the 
 Prophets, are incompatible labours. If the writings 
 of the latter be not received as genuine in themselves, 
 I know not where we shall find the proof of those 
 sublime dogmas, which is admitted to exist. Jesus 
 Christ, by fulfilling the laws and ordinances of Moses, 
 confirmed their divine obligations upon all the de- 
 scendants of Abraham till his time: in short, by ful- 
 filling the law he set his seal to the divine commission 
 of Moses who was its author. And therefore a con- 
 trast of the two dispensations, with invidious and 
 disparaging reflexions upon the first, must inevitably 
 weaken the foundations of credibility in the last. 
 
 In concluding my remarks on the work under 
 review, I am, however, anxious to do the author 
 justice. Although I cannot find the reference to an 
 Almighty Power, in immediate connexion with his 
 reasoning on the movements of animal life; yet I 
 am gratified in being able to produce an incidental 
 allusion to such a Divine principle, in the Second 
 Lecture. He observes, " The ends or final purposes 
 of the Creator will be placed in the strongest light 
 by selecting any animal of marked peculiarity in its 
 economy, and comparing together its structure and 
 mode of life.'' — I gladly quote also a passage, to be 
 found in one of the Introductory Lectures, published 
 about three years before the principal work made its 
 appearance. It is to the following effect. — " The 
 
of W. Lawrence, F.R.S. 161 
 
 Power of Reproduction" — " forms one of those deci- 
 sive and grand characters, which distinguish at once 
 the machines, that proceed from the hand of the 
 Creator, from all, even the most ingenious and boasted 
 productions of human skill." 
 
 
CHAP. VIII. 
 
 RECAPITULATION— THE PERFECTION OF IN- 
 STINCT IN ITS PHYSICAL OPERATIONS, AND 
 THE IMPERFECTION OF HUMAN REASON. 
 
 -#-♦-#- 
 
 Sect. I. 
 Recapitulation. 
 
 Having now considered those instinctive motions 
 in organized matter, which indicate the operation of a 
 moving power, called Mind, vitally inherent in every 
 animated structure, and acting very frequently with- 
 out the creature's direction, — whether it may act ac- 
 cording to chemical or mechanical laws, or may obey 
 a finer impulse peculiar to living organs; — I shall re- 
 capitulate very briefly the chief heads of which we 
 have been treating, before I proceed to apply the 
 foregoing reasonings in connexion with the subject 
 more immediately proposed in this Essay — viz. the 
 relation which Instinct, in all its different modifica- 
 tions, bears to the highest acts of the human mind. 
 
Recapitulation, 163 
 
 We have seen, and must be assured, that in every 
 particle of dust, there are properties entirely incom- 
 prehensible ; and that in the fall of a stone and the 
 shooting of a crystal, a blind but infallible impulse 
 operates ; which, from ignorance of the cause, we are 
 used to term a Law of Nature. For, though this 
 impulse be blind, as it regards the substance, yet it 
 is wise and unerring, as it regards the Creator; and 
 because it acts with uniform energy — in a manner too 
 inscrutable to human reason, — we refer it to a power 
 impressed by the Deity. For, if the law, by which a 
 stone falls to the ground, be the same with that by 
 which the heavenly bodies are moved in their orbits, 
 how wonderful must be its operation, how far trans- 
 cending human knowledge, and how worthy of the 
 divine architect.* 
 
 If we notice the elements by which we are sur- 
 rounded, how perfect are they in their respective 
 natures; — the air, water, fire ! — how essential in every 
 vital operation to every thing that grows and breathes, 
 yet how powerful when suffered even to exert their 
 limited force in the earth : — as witness the hurricane's 
 fury, the raging sea, the far-extended devastation of 
 the earthquake, the overwhelming eruption of the 
 
 * " Gravity (says Woodward) does not proceed from the efficiency 
 of any contingent and unstable agents ; being entirely owing to the direct 
 concourse of the power of the Author of Nature." 
 
 " True philosophy has shewn it (gravity) to be unsolveable by any 
 hypothesis, and resolved it into the immediate will of the Creator. — 
 (Quincey.) 
 
 " Universal gravitation (says Bentley) is above all mechanism : and 
 proceeds from a divine energy and impression." 
 
 L 2 
 
164 Recapitulation. 
 
 volcano, and the awfully swift destruction of light- 
 ning! With such amazing capabilities of reducing 
 the earth to its original chaos, how admirably are 
 these potent elements restrained and regulated ; and, 
 with what transcendent skill, are they adapted to the 
 form and habitudes and senses of animals ! 
 
 Rising from gravitation and the laws of the more 
 subtile though unconscious elements, to crystalliza- 
 tion and chemical attraction; in the solid parts of our 
 globe, what infinite wonders ! — If the ultimate par- 
 ticles of matter be the same in all bodies, how mar- 
 vellously and in what inexhaustible variety are they 
 formed into metals, gems, earths, salts, and their 
 innumerable compounds; — each precious stone, and 
 each salt, earthy or metallic, affecting its own crystal 
 by an inherent tendency altogether inscrutable ! 
 
 But, if from the rude crust of the earth, the inor- 
 ganic stone, we ascend a single step towards the 
 animal kingdom, we see the plant springing upward 
 from its seed, and bearing fruit, with inherent powers 
 which defy all explanation by chemical or mechanical 
 laws. The structure is so delicate, the growth and 
 nutrition so elaborate, that the utmost effort of human 
 skill cannot form a fibre of the simplest leaf, or com- 
 pound the juice of the meanest herb. And therefore, 
 we seem justified in ascribing the phenomena of the 
 vegetable kingdom, so perfect, so diversified, so 
 adapted to their ends, — the continuance of the several 
 species, the delight and support of animated nature, 
 and the beauty and harmony of the creation — to a 
 
Recapitulation, 165 
 
 vivifying principle, whose internal working is inex- 
 plicable, and can only be referred to an all-wise effi- 
 cient Power. 
 
 But leaving plants, if we follow up the chain of 
 organized matter, from the polypus, the snail, and the 
 oyster, to the most perfect animal structure ; whether 
 we contemplate the living forms adapted to the air, 
 the water, or the earth — as the zoophyte, the reptile, 
 the insect, the fish, the amphibia, the bird, or the 
 beast; we see them all exquisitely fashioned, and 
 perfect in their kinds. 
 
 We see that the arts, by which the several tribes 
 are preserved, and the species perpetuated, are varied 
 in so many thousand ways, that it is nearly demon- 
 strable, nothing but a Supreme and infinitely wise 
 Ruler, could have so diversified their forms, and 
 adapted their structure so wonderfully to their dif- 
 ferent instincts. For, whether they are endowed 
 with more or less sagacity, it is plain, that every one 
 answers the design of its creation as completely, 
 though in its limited sphere, as the Sun, the Moon, 
 or any of the planetary orbs. 
 
 There is a remarkable coincidence in the ideas con- 
 tained in the following passages from Virgil and 
 Pope, which is too obviously connected with the pre^ 
 ceding reasonings, to require further comment. 
 
166 Recapitulation. 
 
 u All are but parts of one stupendous whole, 
 Whose body Nature is, and God the soul ; 
 That changed thro' all, and yet in all the same, 
 Great in the Earth, as in the etherial frame ; 
 Warms in the Sun, refreshes in the breeze, 
 Glows in the Stars, and blossoms in the trees, 
 Lives thro* all life, extends thro' all extent, 
 Spreads undivided, operates unspent ; 
 Breathes in our soul, informs our mortal part, 
 As full, as perfect in a hair as heart — 
 As full, as perfect, in vile man that mourns, 
 As the rapt Seraph, that adores and burns'* 
 
 u Who taught the nations of the field and wood 
 To shun their poison, and to choose their food ? 
 Prescient, the tides or tempests to withstand, 
 Build on the wave, or arch beneath the sand? 
 Who made the spider parallels design 
 Sure as Demoivre, without rule or line ? 
 Who bid the stork, Columbus-like, explore 
 Heavens not his own, and worlds unknown before ? 
 Who calls the council, states the certain day, 
 Who forms the phalanx, and who points the way ? 
 GOD, in the nature of each being, founds 
 Its proper bliss, and sets its proper bounds." 
 
 Pope's Essay on Man. 
 
 It is necessary to premise that Virgil had some 
 leaning to the Pythagorean doctrine of Metempsy- 
 chosis. 
 
Recapitulation. 167 
 
 " Know first, that heav'n and earth's compacted frame, 
 And flowing waters, and the starry flame, 
 And both the radiant lights, one common soul 
 Inspires and feeds — and animates the whole. 
 This active mind, infus'd through all the space, 
 Unites and mingles with the mighty mass. 
 Hence men and beasts the breath of life obtain, 
 And birds of air, and monsters of the main ; 
 The etherial vigour is in all the same ; 
 And every soul is filled with equal flame — 
 As much as earthy limbs and gross allay 
 Of mortal members subject to decay, 
 Blunt not the beams of heav'n and edge of day. 
 v From this coarse mixture of terrestrial parts, 
 Desire and fear by turns possess their hearts, 
 And grief and joy; nor can the groveling mind 
 In the dark dungeon of the limbs confined. 
 Assert the native skies, or own its heavenly kind." 
 
 Dryden's Virgil. 
 
 Justin Martyr gives the following summary of the 
 opinion of Pythagoras : viz. " God is one; he is not 
 as some conjecture, exterior to the world, but in him- 
 self entire, pervades the universal sphere, superintends 
 all productions, is the support of all nature, eternal, 
 the source of all power, the first simple principle of 
 all things, the origin of celestial light, the father of 
 all, the mind and animating principle of the universe, 
 the first mover of all the spheres."* 
 
 * See Aikin's General Biography — Justin Martyr. 
 
168 Perfection of Instinct in its operations. 
 
 Sect. II. 
 
 Perfection of Instinct in its operations. 
 
 It seems evidently to be the design of nature, that 
 not only the vegetable kingdom, but the different 
 tribes of the animal, should be subservient to the uses 
 of man ; for whom we may legitimately presume they 
 were created, because we see no other animal supe- 
 rior to ourselves. We find therefore that the preser- 
 vation and perpetuation of the several species have 
 been guarded and secured by an Intelligence more 
 vigilant and active, and more perfect than the most 
 enlightened human reason. And this Intelligence, 
 operating in the brutes from the highest to the lowest, 
 for these special purposes, we have been accustomed 
 to designate by the term of Instinct. But from every 
 thing we can discern, it does not appear, that brutes 
 themselves in accomplishing those purposes for which 
 they were obviously designed, have any rational 
 notions of the end of their own works. It simply 
 appears, that by the direction of this powerful prin- 
 ciple, in obedience to certain modes of structure and 
 bodily sensations prompting them to act, they pursue, 
 blindly and without foresight, those ends or operations, 
 on which, as far as they are individually concerned, 
 the integrity of the whole scheme of nature and its 
 
Perfection of Instinct in its operations. 169 
 
 durability depend. It is obvious, that to harmonize 
 and order aright so many thousand created things ; 
 varying infinitely in structure, in habits, and propen- 
 sities; interfering too continually in their several 
 objects and mutual wants; supporting and destroying 
 one another ; nothing short of the most comprehensive 
 and exalted Intelligence would be required. We 
 have, therefore, the evidence of wisdom in each, as 
 well as in the whole; — in the individual fibre and the 
 entire animal ; — in each animal separately, and in its 
 relations to every thing around it, — to the complete 
 circle of animated beings. 
 
 What I aim, therefore, to impress, is this, that every 
 thing which regards the administration of the physical 
 government of the world, the Deity has reserved to 
 his own keeping: so that whatever is of supreme im- 
 portance to the general good ; whether in the uncon- 
 scious elements, the vegetating plant, the moving 
 reptile, or the living animal; whether in the highest 
 order of thinking brutes, or even in the physical 
 economy of man himself; is under the immediate 
 controul and superintendence of Divine Wisdom, and 
 not of human Reason. 
 
 Where Reason, therefore, would be a feeble and 
 uncertain guide, sometimes ready for service, and 
 sometimes slumbering at its post, Instinct is ever 
 found to be a prompt minister, faithful to its trust. 
 
170 Perfection of Instinct. 
 
 Say, where full Instinct is the unerring guide, 
 What Pope or council can they need beside ? 
 Reason, however able, cool at best, 
 Cares not for service, or but serves when prest. 
 Stays till we call, and then not often near, 
 But honest Instinct comes a volunteer. 
 This too serves always, Reason never long ; 
 One must go right, the other may go wrong. 
 
 But if the brute is thus directed by a wise and un- 
 erring principle, in fulfilling the design of its crea- 
 tion — a principle which we can only regard as an 
 emanation of Divine wisdom; are we to consider that 
 the better part of man is left to a secondary and infe- 
 rior guidance — the faint and fluctuating reflected 
 light of Reason? — That man, the noblest of sublunary 
 existences, created for the purpose of his Maker's 
 glory, can be conducted by this light to the complete 
 summit and full attainment of the objects of his 
 Being ? 
 
 I take it for granted that the main and ultimate 
 objects of his being are not like those which concern 
 the brute : — neither the mere provision for the body, 
 nor yet provident care for his offspring; — but essen- 
 tially different, and rising far above animal sense. I 
 take it for granted that neither the rational enjoyments 
 of life, nor the rational pursuits of science, can, in 
 themselves, prepare and fit the human mind for an 
 immortal union with its Maker. 
 
 We have already partially considered the chief ends 
 and subordinate uses of the lower animals in the 
 
Perfection of Instinct. 171 
 
 creation, and how these are accomplished — viz. by 
 pure Instinct. It would be a grave and elaborate 
 inquiry to consider the chief ends of the creation of 
 man himself; and how these are to be accomplished : 
 — viz. by what lights, intuitions, and notices from his 
 Maker, and through what means, he is best instructed 
 in his moral duties. 
 
 I may neither be qualified for such an arduous 
 undertaking, nor may this be a suitable occasion to 
 enter upon it. But as a subject of natural investi- 
 gation, it is certain, that it has been liable to much 
 difference of opinion. 
 
 The question is simply, whether it be the faculty of 
 Reason, as it is above defined, that can elevate Man 
 to the perfection of his Being ; or a divine emanation, 
 somewhat analogous to that in brutes, by which he is 
 enabled to follow the path of undeviating rectitude, 
 and to claim reverential affinity to his Maker. 
 
 It is necessary to be understood, that M we are now 
 discoursing," as Sir Matthew Hale expressed himself 
 on a similar occasion, " in the outward court of the 
 Gentiles." We are not availing ourselves of those 
 helps which Revelation offers to us; because, in a 
 natural inquiry, those who rest on outward notices, 
 are apt to slight supernatural manifestations, through 
 whatever medium they may be offered. 
 
 Considering the analogy of Reason's incompetence 
 in the physical relations that have come under our 
 notice, we should be led to infer a priori that Reason 
 
172 Perfection of Instinct. 
 
 is not the principle to which the high moral offices in 
 question are intrusted. 
 
 If, in the physical economy of man, many animal 
 functions, necessary to his outward existence and 
 temporary welfare, must be exercised, without his 
 controul if not his cognizance ; if, in all these in- 
 stances Reason would be a weak and imperfect guide ; 
 is it credible that so erring a faculty would be in- 
 trusted with those dignified operations of the mind 
 which appertain to its immortal interests; or that 
 Reason could effect that for the most noble principle 
 in man — his soul or spiritual essence, which it is in- 
 capable of effecting for the least noble part — his bodily 
 frame ? 
 
 We see, that although man has been constituted 
 lord of the creation, and the lower animals have 
 been appointed for his use; though he has been 
 endowed with reason as a noble faculty by which he 
 is enabled to exercise dominion over them ; yet the 
 government of their instincts is taken away from their 
 delegated ruler — clearly, because Reason is incom- 
 petent to the task. 
 
 Therefore, in all that concerns the natural offices of 
 Instinct, it must be considered a more sure and in- 
 fallible guide than Reason ; and consequently a more 
 direct sign of the immediate working of the Deity. 
 But, withal, the low^r animals, however perfect, are 
 not brought a step nearer to the God of Nature by 
 their Instincts, than the plant or the stone ; though, 
 in all that concerns the part they have to act in the 
 
Imperfection of Reason. 173 
 
 grand scheme of Providence, their mode of action 
 must be held to be conformable to the divine will. 
 But this admission, on the one hand, does not elevate 
 them above man, because Instinct is a better, what 
 if we say, a more divine guide than Reason ; nor, on 
 the other, does it make the more perfect animals 
 machines, because they are directed to ends which they 
 do not see. 
 
 Sect. III. 
 Imperfection of Reason. 
 
 It has been justly considered, that man differs 
 essentially from the lower animals, not merely in 
 degree, as one species differs from another, but in 
 kind. It has however been added, that the distin- 
 guishing feature is the faculty of Reason. Accordingly 
 Reason is set forth as the ennobling characteristic of 
 man ; and Instinct as the degrading attribute of the 
 brute. 
 
 Now it cannot be doubted that both are gifts emi- 
 nently useful, each necessary in its place, and wisely 
 allotted by the Creator ; and that a talent bestowed 
 for cultivation, which may be improved by the 
 creature's own care and assiduity, and thus rendered 
 capable of important blessings to society, is highly to 
 be appreciated. Such is the faculty of Reason. But 
 
!74 Imperfection of Reason, 
 
 it neither appears that Reason, in itself, forms the 
 only ground of distinction between the brute and 
 human species ; nor yet that the natural light derived 
 from outward experience and observation, in other 
 words, that the Discursive Faculty % by all its acquire- 
 ments, can raise the mind to that degree of excellence 
 in which it becomes, as it were, an instinctive worker 
 of the divine will. And this, we must surely con- 
 sider to be the perfection of our being ; provided it 
 be granted that we owe the Universal Parent un- 
 questioning filial obedience. 
 
 If every thing around us, from the least to the 
 greatest, animate and inanimate, acts in conformity to 
 the counsels of the Almighty, — a fact we cannot for a 
 moment doubt — why should not the most perfect 
 specimen of God's workmanship, his creature man ? 
 And why should Reason belie its assumed dignity, in 
 falling short of those performances, which inferior 
 natures readily execute ? The fault must be in Rea- 
 son, or else Reason is not the faculty to which the 
 most excellent operations of the human soul are 
 intrusted. For, if Reason be the faculty, on which 
 so much depends, its inferiority, compared with the 
 infallible direction vouchsafed to the brute, is at once 
 apparent. But, abstractly, we cannot conceive that 
 an inferior principle would be given to man for 
 superior ends and purposes : and, therefore, because 
 man, so far as he is governed solely by a reasoning 
 faculty; so far, I mean, as he is beyond the sphere of 
 Instinct, does not, in the majority of cases — scarcely 
 
Imperfection of Reason. 175 
 
 perhaps once in a thousand instances — attain to the 
 perfection of which his nature is susceptible ; it must 
 be pronounced, that Reason is not the faculty to 
 whose influence and operations, the highest degree 
 of moral excellence is wholly to be ascribed. 
 
 I apprehend, it will be granted, that brute animals 
 fulfil the ends of their creation ; and am not aware 
 that the proposition, in a moral sense, can be denied, 
 that man does not fulfil the ends of his creation. For 
 if he did, we should see purity of conduct instead of 
 vice and wickedness overspreading the world. 
 
 But brute animals are governed by Instinct or the 
 superior guidance of Providence : and man, in the 
 usual course of affairs at least, is governed by Reason, 
 that is, his own discretion. I state the proposition 
 generally; which is the only way it can be taken. 
 
 Therefore, in fair deduction, Reason does not 
 enable man to fulfil the ends of his creation ; and his 
 own discretion, however competent to his outward 
 affairs, sleeps, or is overpowered, so far as his better, 
 that is, his immortal interests are concerned. For, if 
 Reason enabled man to fulfil the ends of his creation ; 
 this governing principle of human nature might be 
 expected to produce effects as universal as the instinct 
 of brutes. 
 
 The argument avails little which some may oppose, 
 that Reason is not suffered to have the mastery, be- 
 cause other principles, antagonists to good, are supe- 
 rior in strength : and, hence, that the fault is not to 
 be laid to Reason. Suffice it to say, that whatever 
 
176 Imperfection of Reason. 
 
 is boasted of as a special endowment, constituting the 
 pride and glory of a creature, ought to have dominion; 
 nay more, it would be doing injustice to Providence 
 to suppose that it might not have dominion : and if 
 Reason could accomplish all that is ascribed to it, I 
 believe, it would have the dominion. 
 
CHAP. IX. 
 
 OF REASON, AND THE EXTREMES OF OPINION 
 RESPECTING IT— ITS EXTENT OR USES, AND 
 LIMITATION OR INSUFFICIENCY. 
 
 Sect. I. 
 
 Of Reason, and the extremes of opinion respecting it. 
 
 Reason is a term, as I before remarked, compre- 
 hensive in its meaning ; and when we consider it as 
 including the whole rational and moral powers which 
 distinguish man from the brute, it takes in more than 
 can strictly be allowed.* It may be proper, therefore, 
 to show, not only, positively, what Reason, in its fair 
 legitimate acceptation, can do; but negatively, what 
 it can not do. In this way we shall have a more dis- 
 tinct notion, both of its value and its insufficiency,— 
 in other words, of its extent and its limitation. 
 
 It is a fact to be lamented, that some assertors of 
 its dignity or usefulness, have given it all power and 
 
 * " Man is more distinguished by devotion than by reason, as 
 several brute creatures discover something like reason, though they 
 betray not any thing that bears the least affinity to devotion." 
 
 Addison. 
 M 
 
J 78 Extremes of opinion 
 
 supremacy in the human mind; and, on the contrary, 
 some assertors of its insufficiency have spoken of the 
 necessity of putting out its light, in order that a better 
 might be substituted in its place. 
 
 Now, it is clear, that both these extremes may 
 lead to error. We cannot consistently imagine that 
 it is possible for Reason to inform us, what is done in 
 Heaven ; nor that a divine principle, governing our 
 eternal interests, should supersede our temporal 
 faculties and wants on earth. 
 
 If Reason, therefore, cannot do all that its professed 
 advocates would have it do, let us not underrate its 
 powers, and overlook its real uses : if it can do more 
 than the apostles of a wild fanaticism and bigotry 
 will admit, we must not bring down, as from its holy 
 seat in the temple of the heart, into every secular act 
 appointed to reason and sense, a superior principle 
 designed for the highest spiritual offices of an im- 
 mortal soul. 
 
 To favour the one class, we must not exalt too 
 high the faculty of reason, by deprecating the neces- 
 sity and ridiculing the supposition of superior help to 
 so frail a being as man : nor must we depress it too 
 low, by claiming the immediate guardianship of 
 Heaven, — the pointings of the divine finger, in every 
 step we are to take in the daily walks of life. How 
 needful it is that] the golden mean should be preserved ! 
 Whoever presumes that he may direct his own steps, 
 and that he has no need of Providence for his guide, is 
 in danger of the precipice that lies in the way of high- 
 
respecting Keaso?2. 179 
 
 minded arrogance and short-sighted practical impiety: 
 whoever closes his outward senses when he may per- 
 ceive, and refuses to exercise the rational powers his 
 Maker has given him, when he may understand, (in 
 expectation that, in this passive state, miracles will 
 be wrought for his deliverance) like one wilfully 
 blindfolded, may also fall into the snare of tempta- 
 tion. For he also presumes on the other side, tempt- 
 ing Providence and resting on divine protection, 
 whilst he is neglecting earthly concerns, as if already 
 translated to Heaven. 
 
 Let the errors of the one preserve us from a way- 
 ward enthusiasm, in which reason s taken captive in 
 wild delusions; and the errors of the other equally 
 guard us from the dark counsels vhich lead to the 
 desolating abyss of scepticism. There surely is a 
 mean — a safe and middle path. Aid, because human 
 nature is liable to the first error, let us not therefore 
 slide into the second; nor, because we are liable to 
 the second, let us too rashly conchde, that man is 
 left wholly to himself, and suppos that an instinc- 
 tive, unflattering, superior, and sujernatural Guide, 
 leading into paths of moderation md sound discre- 
 tion, is nothing but a chimaera of he brain, the off- 
 spring of bewildered fancies, and, rever, in this day 
 of reason's boasted ascendancy, vjuchsafed to the 
 human mind. 
 
 m 2 
 
] 80 Uses of Reason. 
 
 Sect. II. 
 
 Uses of Reason. 
 
 Let us now proceed to follow up the inquiry re- 
 specting the immediate uses to which reason exclu- 
 sively is subservient. 
 
 And I may premise that we may place it at the 
 head of all those intellectual powers that take cog- 
 nizance of outward events, and suppose their co- 
 operation, as perception, attention, memory, associa- 
 tion,* &c. We nay lawfully admit that by this noble 
 faculty, which, acording to the exercise we give it, 
 determines our se'eral stations, not to say our des- 
 tiny in life, and fxes our allotments, as it were, for 
 ourselves, man is enabled to treasure up knowledge 
 of the past and ;o profit by the lights of experience. 
 It enables him, >y art and skill, to combine means 
 with wonderful precision, for the attainment of certain 
 ends; to proviie with sagacious foresight for the 
 
 * " For know that in the soul 
 
 Are marv lesser faculties that 6erve 
 Reason as chief. Among these, Fancy next 
 Her offict holds. Of all external things, 
 Which thf five watchful Senses represent, 
 She fornw imaginations, airy shapes; 
 Which Reason joining or disjoining, forms 
 All what we affirm, or what deny, 
 And call our knowledge or opinion. 
 
 Milton. 
 
Uses of Reason. 181 
 
 future by observation of the past; and to adapt his 
 conduct to climate and season, and to endless changes 
 in his outward situation. It enables him to subject 
 even the elements to his use, — fire, air, water, mi- 
 nerals, and metals ; to discover their properties and 
 various relations ; and even to ascertain with mathe- 
 matical certainty the laws and complicated movements 
 of some of the heavenly bodies. By Reason also he 
 tames the natural fierceness of brutes, and makes 
 them obedient to his service. 
 
 Moreover, by the native strength and unassisted 
 light of Reason, man may be enabled to discover the 
 rules of a wise and consistent conduct ; because ex- 
 perience proves that immorality entails misery and 
 disgrace both to individuals and to society ; and 
 nothing is more certain than that the devoted slave of 
 appetite and passion is degraded below the brute. 
 Reason, unquestionably, must be considered that 
 instrument of the understanding, without which the 
 knowledge of external relations could never be ob- 
 tained, except by inspiration^ For, though the out- 
 ward senses might discover the qualities of things as 
 they do to brute animals ; and though they are neces- 
 sary ministers to reason ; yet the latter alone can 
 search into, and compare ; trace analogies, and ar- 
 range; observe the consequences of actions; and 
 deduce the laws and principles of events. Hence it 
 must be considered the founder and builder of human 
 knowledge. For, no other power can lay the mate- 
 rials in order, select, and fit them in their places. 
 
182 Limitation of Reason* 
 
 and raise the superstructure. This is the master- 
 work — the peculiar office of Reason : and it bears 
 the same relation to the subordinate faculties, that 
 the architect of a building does to the labourer and 
 mason, 
 
 Sect. III. 
 Limitation of Reason, 
 
 Now, after all the discursive range we have given 
 to Reason, it does not seem in any way to follow from 
 its functions or its capacity, that although it should 
 make the circuit of natural knowledge it could ap- 
 proach a single step nearer to the knowledge of 
 nature's God. For, natural knowledge, or philo-^ 
 sophy so called, can amount to nothing more, after 
 all its pretensions, than to a mere speculative know- 
 ledge of the manifest qualities of bodies and the laws 
 of their mutual relations. It cannot reach to the 
 hidden power which gives energy, life, and motion. 
 
 Therefore a knowledge of the Deity, or more pro- 
 perly of his attributes, obtained through the medium 
 of outward things, that is, of his works, would, to 
 man, be as obscure, distant, and imperfect, as the 
 knowledge of the Sun ascertained in no better way 
 than by its reflexion upon the Moon : it is only as 
 it shines immediately upon the eye of the beholder, 
 
Limitation of Reason, 183 
 
 that he can form the least conception of its majesty. 
 And, in like manner, it is only as the ray of divine 
 light is emitted from the fountain itself upon the 
 mind, that any human being, so favoured, can form an 
 adequate notion, however faint and imperfect, of its 
 transcendent glory. It is in the mind of man, there- 
 fore, that the only true knowledge of the Creator can 
 be discovered. Because, without, all is mediate, like 
 sounds to the deaf, or colours to the blind. We 
 cannot discover an obvious connexion between out- 
 ward knowledge and inward feeling. The cold and 
 heartless acknowledgment of a Creator, may be made 
 perhaps by reason, when in physical inquiries, it is 
 driven to an ultimate first cause. But the know- 
 ledge of his works does not necessarily tend to pro- 
 duce the warm internal evidence of his love and 
 power. How much so ever Reason can know, it has 
 no pretension to feeling. By reasoning, no human 
 being can tell that a benevolent Creator regards him 
 with the smiles of his favour ; nor can outward ob- 
 servation ever discover that the soul of man has a 
 near affinity with the supreme ruler of the world. 
 The hearing of the ear cannot make the heart glow 
 with love and gratitude. Nor can he, who sets him- 
 self inquisitively to examine the outward proofs of 
 the existence of a Deity, — who questions them one 
 by one, and resolves to admit no other evidence, 
 expect to meet that approving welcome, — that love 
 and sympathy, and sunshine of the heart, which it 
 might be supposed an illustrious parent would give 
 
184 Limitation of Reason. 
 
 his child anxiously seeking his acquaintance, to whom 
 he was unknown. 
 
 It is not, surely, by standing aloof, and distrusting 
 every outward sign, that an individual whose highest 
 interest it is to cultivate an acquaintance with some 
 distinguished relative, warmly disposed to do him 
 service, can gain his favour. Yet this is the predi- 
 cament in which the advocates of Reason's sufficiency, 
 excluding a divine intelligence, would place the 
 human mind in relation to its author. They would 
 make a wider barrier between man and his Creator, 
 than is known to subsist between the natural parent 
 and his child. But is any one prepared to say that 
 there is a closer affinity in the latter case than in the 
 former ? We all stand in the relation of children to 
 one Almighty Parent: we all owe him love and 
 obedience, and depend upon his care. Now in what 
 manner does the natural parent proceed with regard 
 to his son ? — He instils into his mind the principles 
 of knowledge ; he watches the opening of his under- 
 standing; he caresses him with fondness, cheers him 
 with encouragement, approves with smiles of favour, 
 and punishes with looks of disapprobation. He re- 
 quires of him, in return, docility, perfect obedience, 
 unremitting watchfulness, and humility. But, accord- 
 ing to the doctrine in question, the benevolent Father 
 of all, who himself formed the soul, after having 
 endowed it with Reason, resigned the government to 
 this faculty, making it his sole vicegerent. Conse- 
 quently the natural energies of the creature are sup- 
 
Limitation of Reason, 185 
 
 posed to do all, and held to be sufficient for every 
 moral and physical want ; and the decision of Reason 
 is paramount to that of every other intelligence ! 
 There is, therefore, upon this principle, no imme- 
 diate intercourse between God and the soul of man; 
 and smiles and frowns, irradiations, monitions, and 
 other testimonies of divine notice are withheld. For, 
 Reason, by its very constitution, jealously maintains 
 its authority against every thing that has the appear- 
 ance of enthusiasm — against every intrusion of 
 thought and impulse that does not come by outward 
 observation of the senses. Reason, it must be con- 
 fessed, if these are its prerogatives, and it thus stands 
 us instead of a Divine Intelligence, is a highly in- 
 vested leader ; and we should expect to see adequate 
 fruits of so distinguished a guide — the fruits of 
 order, consistency, rectitude, and harmony, in the 
 moral relations of man ! 
 
 Now, it is fair to ask, are all things under the 
 government of Reason conducted with such a wise 
 and consistent economy ? 
 
 We see that every thing under the guidance of 
 Instinct in the natural world, is maintained and regu- 
 lated with consummate wisdom : — There is no want 
 of harmony, — no disorder. But, in the moral world, 
 so far as it is under the jurisdiction of reason, it is 
 plain, that human affairs are not administered accord- 
 ing to the rules of peace and harmony and wisdom. 
 In the closets of the learned, we find what ought to 
 be the state of human society : in support, too, of 
 
186 Limitation of Reason. 
 
 these wise political and moral maxims, the universal 
 concurrence of mankind is amply afforded. But, in 
 the practical concerns of life, it too often happens, 
 that both he, who propounds the truth, and he who 
 adds his assent, transgress the principles of justice. 
 In communities, great and small, we perceive the pre- 
 valence of evil; unworthy motives; fierce antagonist 
 passions; dishonourable conduct; mean subterfuges ; 
 unmanly compliances; hostile contentions; and de- 
 structive wars. We perceive, that whole nations are 
 sometimes actuated by a wild, irrational impulse ; — 
 rulers and their people hurried away by infuriated 
 zeal ; as if reason not only suffered the most brutal 
 passions to riot in extravagance of disorder, but with 
 all its energies, fanned the flame, and urged the ebul- 
 lition. 
 
 Men speak of the gradual amelioration of society, 
 as if it were produced by reason ; and as if the dis- 
 coveries in art and science would be infinitely pro- 
 gressive, and so by themselves work an important 
 change in human affairs. But it appears to me ex- 
 tremely doubtful, whether the general comforts of 
 society are greater now, than they were 3000 years 
 ago. Though we travel more expeditiously on land, 
 or navigate the sea with more certainty, or have 
 improved machinery, compared with past ages ; there 
 is no necessary connexion between any of these things 
 and moral advancement, or outward happiness. And 
 though knowledge is infinitely preferable to igno- 
 rance, and a step towards moral cultivation, yet it is 
 
Limitation of Reason. 187 
 
 questionable whether the reliance upon reason only 
 has not kept back the human race in a state little 
 superior, as to the aggregate of good, to what it was 
 centuries ago. Take men, as they submit themselves 
 wholly to this guidance, I mean, to outward obser- 
 vations, customs, and maxims, in different nations 
 and among different sects; and their moral conduct 
 indicates nearly the same general results. The tur- 
 bulent principles of human nature are uppermost, un- 
 less restrained by the strong arm of law ; and civil so- 
 ciety among Jews and Mahometans, Pagans and Chris- 
 tians, saving superstitions and idolatry, exhibits one 
 uniform aspect of moral deformity, over the world. 
 
 We do not state the proposition, as though moral 
 disorder necessarily sprung from the reasoning prin- 
 ciple. We simply state, that man, by excellence^ a 
 rational being, too often degrades himself below the 
 brute, which is the creature of Instinct; and that 
 consequently, the empiie of human Reason is a scene 
 of confusion and disorder compared with the empire 
 of brute Instinct. For if it be objected that the moral 
 disorder, to which I have alluded, is not attributable 
 to Reason, but to the unruly passions of men: what 
 is this but the admission of Reason's incompetency 
 to controul these bad passions, and to keep them in 
 good government? 
 
 We must perceive, therefore, without any laboured 
 inference, that man, in a general way, does not fully 
 answer the ends of his creation ; unless indeed, we 
 make these ends to consist in a few outward secular 
 
188 Limitation of Reason, 
 
 pursuits; by which he must be degraded to the rank 
 of the meanest insect, and assigned no other office 
 than that of coming into the world, and for a little 
 space breathing the vital air, that he may leave a 
 succession behind him. 
 
 We might presume, without having recourse to 
 revelation, that a being for whom so comely a world 
 was evidently designed, graced as it is with so much 
 to delight and instruct, was not sent into it, merely 
 by his art and skill to supply his temporal wants, to 
 bring other creatures into subjection, and like these 
 to live and die, having provided a succession. For, 
 it is clear, that if he were only intended for the 
 limited duration of this life, he stood no more in need 
 of a knowledge of his Maker, than the animals over 
 which he ruled. 
 
 I say, then, we might presume, that man, alone 
 gifted with a knowledge of his Maker, alone account- 
 able for his actions, alone capable of gratitude and 
 devotion and adoration, and alone susceptible of the 
 influence of divine love, should possess a principle by 
 which impressions like these might be appreciated 
 and felt, congenial to its nature, as light is congenial 
 to the eye, sweets to the taste, sounds to the ear, and 
 speculative truth to the understanding. — We might 
 presume, that he should possess a higher principle 
 than Reason, than that faculty with which he is 
 qualified to manage his outward affairs, to compare 
 his rank in the creation, to adapt his conduct to 
 emergencies, and to understand the nature and obli- 
 
Limitation of Reason. 189 
 
 gation of human laws; — in a word, that he should 
 have a better guide than fluctuating, weak and fal- 
 lible reason. It would be natural to conclude that 
 he should possess a principle infallible and unerring 
 like the brute, analogous to instinct, but accompanied 
 with a consciousness of the Giver; by the cultivation 
 of which, and of which alone, the true object of his 
 creation, the heartfelt, not the speculative, knowledge 
 of God and of his will might be obtained. For, it is 
 manifest, that, if this were not the case, with all his 
 other advantages, man would be circumstanced un- 
 equally with the lower animals. These, it is clear, 
 have an infallible direction. But where is the in- 
 fallible Guide that leads man himself, the most 
 perfect of all. in the path most acceptable to his 
 Maker ? Is Reason that faithful counseller and un- 
 erring rule ty which he can direct his steps to the 
 object that most concerns him in this life ? 
 
 Instead cf pursuing the train of my own reflections 
 in answer to this question, I feel satisfaction in 
 quoting tie words of Dr. Gregory, who had no par- 
 ticular Has to the views I am adopting. 
 
 " In considering the effects (says he) which the 
 faculty of Reason, that boasted characteristic and pri- 
 vilege of the human species, produces among those 
 whc possess it in the most eminent degree; and from 
 the little influence it seems to have in promoting 
 either public or private good, we are almost tempted 
 fo suspect, that Providence deprives us of those 
 fruits we naturally expect from it, in order to 
 
190 Limitation of Reason. 
 
 preserve a certain balance and equality among man- 
 kind."* 
 
 Indeed, it is difficult to conceive, how the most 
 assiduous cultivation of Reason, and the most zea- 
 lous co-operation with its feeble and fluctuating light, 
 can lead the mind to any knowledge of supernatural 
 truths, or to any union or harmony with the source 
 of infinite purity. As the light of the Sun will dull and 
 extinguish artificial flame, so it would appear to be 
 consistent with the nature of things, in other words, 
 with the divine economy, that the light of heaven, 
 before it can have the complete ascendancy, should 
 dim and overpower natural reason, especially where 
 the latter opposes its entrance into the mind, at 
 least in all the moral or spiritual relations of man. 
 
 For after all that Reason can do, and all it can 
 know, still the mysteries of the invisible world are 
 far beyond its reach. When Reason in former times 
 attempted to speculate on these things, what vanity 
 and folly marked its delusions ! The wo:ds of Cow- 
 per are very apposite to this point : — 
 
 " All truth is from the sempiternal source, 
 Of light divine. But Egypt, Greece, and Rome> 
 Drew from the stream below. More favoured we 
 Drink, when we choose it, at the fountain head. 
 To them it flowed much mingled and defiled 
 With hurtful error, prejudice and dreams 
 Illusive of Philosophy, so called, 
 But falsely. Sages after sages strove 
 
 * See Comparative View, 
 
Limitation of Reason. 191 
 
 In vain to filter offa crystal draught 
 Pure from the lees, which often more enhanced 
 The thirst that slak'd it, and not seldom bred 
 Intoxication and delirium wild. 
 
 In vain they pushed inquiry to the birth 
 And spring time of the world ! Ask'd whence is man ? 
 Why form'd at all ? and wherefore as he is? 
 Where must he find his Maker? with what rites 
 Adore him ? will he hear r accept, and bless ? 
 Or does he sit regardless of his works ? 
 Has man within him an immortal seed ? 
 Or does the tomb take all ? If he survive 
 His ashes, where ? and in what weal or woe ? 
 Knots worthy of solution, which alone 
 A Deity could solve. Their answers vague 
 And all at random, fabulous and dark, 
 Left them as dark themselves. Their rules of life 
 Defective and unsanctioned, proved too weak 
 To bind the roviug appetite, and lead 
 Blind Nature to a God not yet revealed. 
 'Tis Revelation satisfies all doubts, 
 Explains all mysteries except her own, 
 And so illuminates the path of life, 
 That fools discover it, and stray no more." 
 
 Cozoper. 
 
 From all this we may conclude, that Reason is a 
 faculty as ill-suited to fee] the effusion of divine 
 love shed abroad in the human heart, as the ear to 
 relish sweets, or the tongue to judge of melody. 
 
 But although the ancients could not discover by 
 Reason or outward research, what revelation was 
 
J 92 Limitation of Reason. 
 
 alone capable of unfolding, it appears that they made 
 one discovery — and a very important one to the point 
 I am discussing, that man, with all his reasoning 
 powers, has not wisdom sufficient to make himself 
 happy. The remarks of Lord Monboddo in his 
 u Ancient Metaphysics," are so clear on this point, 
 that I shall make no apology for quoting his own 
 words. 
 
 This author says, that " by the use of intellect, and 
 the arts and sciences invented by us, we have formed 
 a system of life altogether different from the natural; 
 for the perfection of which we believe intelligence 
 alone is sufficient. But this was not the opinion of 
 the wiser ancients, who thought that human reason 
 alone could not properly conduct human life, without 
 the counsel and assistance of superior powers. And 
 this has been so much the general sense of mankind in 
 all ages and in all nations, some methods have been 
 practised to obtain that favour and assistance. There 
 has, therefore, always been religion in the world, 
 grounded upon this persuasion, that man, with all his 
 superior faculties, has not wisdom sufficient to make 
 himself happy. But as men, the more they dege- 
 nerate, grow the vainer, they come at last to believe 
 that without divine assistance, by their own wisdom 
 merely they may be happy ; and in such a degenerate 
 state, even, a philosopher may arise,* who will in- 
 form them that the less religion they have, the happier 
 they are." 
 
 * David Hume. 
 
Limitation of Reason. 193 
 
 The same author remarks further, in another place: 
 " As to what I have said of vanity being the source 
 of irreligion, I think it is evident, both from the 
 nature of the thing, and from the characters of the 
 men who in different ages and nations of the world, 
 have been the great apostles of infidelity. "+ 
 
 Now, it is clear, whatever delusions existed for- 
 merly, that the ancients, with fewer advantages, had 
 irradiations of light, — transitory gleams of truth, 
 which proved that Reason was not their only in- 
 structor ; and they arrived at some conclusions which 
 might put modern sceptics to shame. We have no 
 need, therefore, to confine our views to former ages 
 for proofs of Reason's imbecility, when it reaches 
 forward to things beyond the power of its attainment. 
 It is only necessary to look round us in our own day 
 to perceive, in what mazes and labyrinths of confusion 
 men are involved, who place their dependance upon 
 Reason as the potent instrument of good — the only 
 sufficient guide to instruct them in the Divine coun- 
 sels. We see how easily this faculty may be warped ; 
 how artfully what is advanced on one side may be 
 repelled by the other; how soon " the worse" may be 
 made to appear u the better reason," so that men even 
 of sober judgment may be led away, as it were, by a 
 kind of infatuation ; and how productive a source of 
 animosity is verbal disputation : how the peace of 
 families is thus broken ; the order of public assemblies 
 
 t Ancient Metaphysics, vol. ii. B. iv. Ch. 6. 
 
 N 
 
194 Limitation of Reason. 
 
 often violated ; the gravity of national deliberations 
 turned to uproar ; the solemnity of religious discus- 
 sions into unseemly contention ; and how vengeance 
 is often fulminated by kingdom against kingdom, 
 with appeals to Reason and Justice, frequently offen- 
 sive both to God and man. 
 
 I can scarcely do justice to my subject without 
 noticing the following passage from Cowper. 
 
 " I see that all are wand'rers, gone astray, 
 Each in his own delusions; they are lost 
 In chase of fancied happiness, still woo'd 
 
 And never won I sum up half mankind 
 
 And add two thirds of the remaining half 
 And find the total of their hopes and fears 
 Dreams, empty dreams. The million Jlit as gay, 
 As if created only like the fly r , 
 That spreads his motley wings in th' eye of noon 
 To sport their season, and be seen no more. 
 The rest are sober dreamers, grave and wise, 
 And pregnant with discoveries new and rare. 
 Some write a narrative of wars and feats 
 Of heroes little known, and call the rant, 
 
 A History Some drill and bore 
 
 The solid earth, and from the strata there 
 Extract a register, by which we learn 
 That He who made it, and revealed its date 
 
 To Moses, was mistaken in its age 
 
 Some, more acute, and more industrious still, 
 
 Contrive creation ; travel nature up 
 
 To the sharp peak of her sublimest height, 
 
 And tell us whence the stars; why some are fixed 
 
Limitation of Reason. MB 
 
 And planetary some; what gave them first 
 Rotation, from what fountain flow'd their light. 
 Great contest follows, and much learned dust 
 Involves the combatants ; each claiming truth 
 And truth disclaiming both. And thus they spend 
 The little wick of life's poor shallow lamp 
 In playing tricks with nature, giving laws 
 To distant worlds and trifling in their own. 
 
 When I see such games 
 
 Play'd by the creatures of a pow'r, who swears 
 That he will judge the Earth, and call the fool 
 To a sharp reck'ning, that has liv'd in vain: 
 And when I view this seeming wisdom well, 
 And prove it in th> infallible result 
 So hollow and so false — I feel my heart 
 Dissolve in pity, and account the learn'd. 
 
 If this be learning, most of all deceiv'd." 
 
 " God never meant that man should scale the heavens 
 By strides of human Wisdom^ in his works 
 Tho' wondrous; he commands us in his word, 
 To seek him rather, where his mercy shines." 
 
 Cowper's Task) Book 3. 
 
 If we examine the writings of the greatest men, we 
 have nearly the same opinion of Reason's utter in- 
 sufficiency for the chief purposes of life. But, it is 
 scarcely necessary to augment the number of testi- 
 monies in support of this argument. I apprehend it 
 must be now obvious that Reason of itself can know 
 nothing but what relates wholly to the present scene; 
 that it cannot feel the evidence of a divine spirit, 
 though it may prove the probability of its existence ; 
 that it can neither taste any one of the streams of that 
 
 2f 2 
 
196 Limitation of Reason. 
 
 fountain from which good springs, nor supply a 
 single draught of vital consolation to the soul in 
 affliction; and, that human reason, however dignified 
 it may be,— yet, as human reason, with all the world's 
 possessions at its command, in the unceasing pursuit 
 of ever-varying earthly enjoyments, — never can fully 
 satisfy the mind. 
 
 Therefore, as the soul of man, when engrossed with 
 the love of pleasure, or eager for fame, or ambitious 
 of power, or even ardent in the search after know- 
 ledge, refuses to be satisfied, — and reason, though 
 abundantly engaged in the pursuit, cannot satisfy it 
 in any of these sublunary things; it must have an 
 affinity to something above sense, which is immortal. 
 But its immortal nature, having other desires than 
 those which spring from earth — other appetites than 
 those of sense, is rendered incapable of being nou- 
 rished but by spiritual food, and of being instructed 
 but by a spiritual principle. 
 
 It will be our next business to inquire concerning 
 the nature of this principle. 
 
PART II. 
 
 OF 
 
 THE MORAL RELATIONS 
 
 OF 
 
 INSTINCT. 
 
CHAP. I. 
 
 OF THE OPINIONS OF PHILOSOPHERS ON THE 
 SUBJECT OF A DIVINE INTELLIGENCE IN 
 THE HUMAN MIND. 
 
 Sect. I. 
 Authorities in support of the view now taken. 
 
 I proceed next to treat of Instinct in its moral 
 relations — a subject involving the highest privileges 
 of man. 
 
 And here I shall not stop to inquire whether that 
 principle, which constitutes the glory and establishes 
 the preeminence of human nature, be more fitly de- 
 nominated an Instinct, Power, Faculty, Sense, be- 
 longing intrinsically to the creature as a natural 
 endowment; or a spiritual emanation, divine intelli- 
 gence, supernatural gift, freely bestowed by the 
 Creator's bounty. As we proceed, this point will be 
 gradually elucidated. But in the course of my specu- 
 lations, if any of the terms above noticed, as Instinct, 
 
200 Authorities in support 
 
 Sense, Faculty, Power, &c. should occasionally be 
 applied to this principle, I hope it may not be thence 
 inferred that I regard them as altogether suitable: 
 for, I shall only use them, while the subject is under 
 discussion, for no other reason than this, that I may 
 not appear to prejudge the question. 
 
 We have, I conceive, attained to one important 
 step in this inquiry, namely, that the principle or 
 power in brute animals, as well as in man, which 
 directs physical events not under the creature's con- 
 trol, is far superior in efficiency to that which he 
 himself is accustomed to exercise for the purpose of 
 regulating his ordinary conduct in life. I take it for 
 granted that this point must be admitted by everyone 
 who compares the operation of Instinct with that of 
 Human Reason, in the true sense and fair acceptation 
 of the terms. 
 
 It follows again, as a natural consequence from the 
 preceding views, that Human Reason, as a guide and 
 director of human conduct, in a variety of ways mani- 
 fests its weakness. Through all ages down to the 
 present time, it has been found insufficient either for 
 the attainment of true knowledge, or, in its ordinary 
 influence over mankind, to promote human happiness. 
 We see its weakness in its effects. And it was even 
 acknowledged by the wise ancients, who were igno- 
 rant of a divine, or rather an extraordinary revelation, 
 to be incompetent of itself to lead man to the perfec- 
 tion of his Being. 
 
of the view now taken, 201 
 
 Now, " when we consider," in the words of Boyle, 
 " how exquisitely the Great Creator has supplied his 
 animated works with means admirably fitted to attain 
 their respective ends, we cannot but think it highly 
 probable that so wise and bountiful a Being has 
 never left his noblest visible creature man, unfur- 
 nished with means to procure his own welfare, and 
 obtain his true end, if he be not wanting to himself.' 1 
 And the same author concludes, that " Man is very 
 credibly informed, that God hath actually been 
 pleased to discover, by supernatural means, what kind 
 of worship and obedience, — which by Reason alone 
 he could but guess at, — will be most acceptable to 
 him."* 
 
 I have taken occasion to notice the preceding pas- 
 sage from Boyle, not only to point out the opinions 
 of that illustrious author, but to show them in con- 
 nexion with the views I have adopted. Indeed it 
 has been to me a source of satisfaction, after I had 
 pursued this inquiry to some extent, embracing, as I 
 proceeded, very important considerations, to find, 
 that in looking over some of the writings of eminent 
 men upon the subject, I was in some degree antici- 
 pated. For I discovered that I had been following 
 the same natural association of thought which seems 
 to have led others before me from the instinct of 
 brutes to revelation or the inspiration of man. 
 
 The allusions these writers have made, as I appre- 
 
 * Boyle's works, vol. 2. Christian virtuoso, page 244. 
 
202 Authorities in support 
 
 hend, sufficiently shield me from the imputation of 
 indulging a desire for barren metaphysical discussions, 
 and of straining my inferences unnaturally in thus 
 passing from the one consideration to the other. As 
 to metaphysical pursuits, purely such, they must be 
 considered to be generally unprofitable; audi should 
 tread with reluctance on that slippery and uncertain 
 ground, if the nature of my inquiry did not neces- 
 sarily lead me to notice several of the metaphysical 
 writings most celebrated in the present day. I do 
 so the more willingly, because it is with the view of 
 extracting as much as natural reason has been ready 
 to admit, in support of what I apprehend to be one 
 of the most important and sacred truths in the phi- 
 losophy of the human mind. 
 
 It is not meant to be implied that the sublime truths 
 of Revelation — with which, in their purest sense, I 
 believe the views I shall take will strictly agree — 
 absolutely require the support of natural reason, as it 
 is, or can be, afforded by any of the most enlightened 
 philosophers. On the contrary, I am persuaded, that 
 supernatural light can gain nothing by the feeble 
 glimmering of Reason's lamp, which is the only guide 
 of philosophy in its outward discoveries. But, as this 
 is professedly a natural investigation ; and as I mean 
 to go a little farther than those believers in Reve- 
 lation who take the Holy Scriptures as the only re- 
 vealed will of God to his creature man, I shall avail 
 myself of any admission or discovery, which, in the 
 present as well as in former ages, philosophers may 
 
of the view now taken. 203 
 
 have either stumbled upon, as it were, unwittingly; 
 or may have been induced to make, by fair deduo 
 tion; or may have received from immemorial tra- 
 dition, or from that light itself which must always 
 bear testimony to its own sufficiency and authority, 
 when the weakness of Reason is made manifest. I 
 shall therefore collect these outward testimonies for 
 these special purposes. 
 
 Sir Matthew Hale in his M Primitive Origination 
 of Mankind" has very forcibly pointed out the ana- 
 logy, above adverted to, between the instincts ob- 
 servable in animated nature, and the original en- 
 graven instincts of the mind. His style is, indeed, a 
 little antiquated; but the notions are clearly ex- 
 pressed, only that he uses the term ' Discursive 
 Ratiocination' as the word Reason is used in this 
 Essay; and he employs the latter term to denote the 
 whole rational nature of man as distinguished from 
 the brute. Therefore he calls them rational Instincts, 
 in contradistinction to the animal instincts; but 
 clearly distinguishes them from Reason, or a mere 
 discursive faculty, by making them antecedent to its 
 exercise. H For," he says, " though they are truths 
 acquirable and deducible by argumentation, yet they 
 seem to be inscribed in the very texture of the soul, 
 antecedent to any acquisition by industry or the exercise 
 of the discursive faculty"* — " That, as we see in brutes, 
 there are lodged certain sensible instincts, antecedent 
 to their imaginative or sensitive faculty, whereby they 
 
 * Sec " Primitive origination of Mankind." 
 
204 Authorities in support, 8fc. 
 
 are predetermined to the good and convenience of the 
 sensible life ; so there are lodged in the very consti- 
 tution of the soul certain rational instincts, conna- 
 turally engraven in it — antecedently to any discursive 
 ratiocination, whereby it is predisposed, inclined, and 
 biassed to the good and convenience proportionable 
 to a rational and intellectual life."* 
 
 It is proper also to notice that in the terra " ra- 
 tional and intellectual life of man," he comprehends 
 his moral and religious capacities : and to the 
 " rational instincts," he adds the epithets " specula- 
 tive and moral" 
 
 I have already quoted a passage from Lord Mon- 
 boddo's Ancient Metaphysics, which shews the same 
 analogy: and Dr. Hartley in his work " On Man," 
 has compared the instinctive direction of brutes to 
 the inspiration of the human mind.t All these au- 
 thorities, therefore, justify the allusion. 
 
 I shall next consider the natural evidences or testi- 
 monies in favour of the principle in question. 
 
 * Hale's Origin, cap. 2. 
 
 + " The direction in brutes, to provide for themselves and their off- 
 spring, would be a kind of inspiration, mixing itself with and helping 
 out that part of their faculties which corresponds to Reason in us, and 
 which is extremely imperfect in them — only this Inspiration might be 
 called natural, as proceeding from the same stated laws of matter and 
 motion, as the other phenomena of nature ; whereas the inspiration of 
 the sacred writers appears to be of a much higher source, so as to be 
 termed supernatural properly, in contradistinction to all knowledge re- 
 sulting from the common laws of nature. And yet it may result from^ 
 some higher laws of nature. For sacred Inspiration would lose nothing 
 of its authority, though it should appear to be within such laws, as by 
 their fixedness might be termed nature," Hartley on Man. 
 
Testimonies in favour, 8?c. 205 
 
 Sect. II. 
 
 Of the testimonies in favour of such a principle, ana- 
 logous to Instinct and superior to Reason. 
 
 Of the testimonies in favour of any moral truth or 
 principle, when we desire to exclude all evidence but 
 that of the most unprejudiced minds, and at the same 
 time to reconcile that truth with the discoveries made 
 to man by God himself with unquestionable clear- 
 ness, none appear to me more striking than those of 
 the ancient philosophers, who were totally unac- 
 quainted with a written revelation, and followed the 
 native light of their own minds, in other words, built 
 their conclusions upon the fundamental principles of 
 human nature. For, whether these conclusions have 
 been derived from a primeval revelation, by tradition, 
 or from an internal spark of original divine light, still 
 feebly animating the human soul, and though ob- 
 scured, unextinguished, they are highly to be valued. 
 On the subject before us, no inconsiderable autho- 
 rities may be produced. My object, therefore, is 
 simply to show, that it has been a general impression 
 among mankind from the earliest ages down to the 
 present time, that a principle, or guide, or light, or 
 teacher^ superior to discursive Reason, was implanted 
 
206 Testimonies in favour 
 
 in the human mind; — a principle which might, in- 
 deed, have the assistance of reason, the highest 
 natural gift to man, but was antecedent to it, and 
 above it, and had rules for government distinct from 
 reason, evidence of another kind, and objects wholly 
 different. For, as Reason or the natural understand- 
 ing has objects — the qualities, modes, or relations of 
 external things — fitted to its apprehension, with strict 
 congruity between the faculty and its objects, like 
 that subsisting between the outward senses and their 
 natural objects, or between various other tastes and 
 perceptions peculiar to different men, and the respec- 
 tive objects of these tastes ; so has this principle ob- 
 jects, tastes, and feelings, peculiarly its own. For, 
 to suppose that the same power of the mind may be 
 officially engaged in ascertaining the properties of a 
 triangle, or discovering the relations of natural things 
 by comparison and inference, and in seeking for divine 
 counsel in retirement, in feeling remorse for evil con- 
 duct, or in prostrating the soul in humble reverence 
 before the throne of the Almighty Creator, would 
 seem as incongruous as for the imagination to busy 
 itself with the truths of geometry, or the ear to judge 
 of the shades and beauties of colour, or the eye 
 of odours and sounds. Every one must admit that 
 when men of cultivated minds in different ages and 
 nations are generally agreed in opinion upon any 
 philosophical question, we have the strongest reason, 
 short of revelation, to conclude, that it is founded in 
 truth. And the opinion of a few opposed to such a 
 
of a superior Principle. 207 
 
 cloud of witnesses can have little weight in invali- 
 dating the conclusion. 
 
 We find Pythagorean, Stoic, Peripatetic, and those 
 of the Academic school admitting the same truth. 
 We find also Greek and Roman poets coinciding in 
 opinion ; and even their historians confirming the 
 doctrine by facts deduced from particular races of 
 men. 
 
 It is fair, indeed, to admit, that 1 Pythagoras con- 
 fused his notion of a " derived intelligence' ' and 
 " divine principle" in the soul, with many absurd 
 speculations ; and Plato obscured his doctrine of a 
 " spiritual emanation" with some romantic and 
 visionary conceptions. But though this was the case, 
 the point in which they agreed with many enlightened 
 philosophers, ancient and modern, is not to be con- 
 founded with the mystical allusions that were super- 
 added. Whilst they admitted some divine intelligence 
 in the human mind, they erred in the expression, 
 making the mind itself a divinity. But it was the 
 opinion of the Platonic philosophers, that the same 
 God, who made all things, is himself the light of 
 our minds, by which we are enabled to learn true 
 wisdom. 
 
 It is to be observed, too, that the ancients, as well 
 as many moderns, have used the word Reason to 
 comprehend all the rational nature of man, by which 
 he is elevated above the brute. Hence, a little con- 
 fusion may be observed in their mode of expression ; 
 as, when they speak of Divine reason in the soul. 
 
208 Testimonies in favour 
 
 The distinction between that power of the mind 
 which takes a discursive range and draws inferences 
 by its own strength, from the comparisons, relations, 
 congruities, and incongruities of things already ascer- 
 tained, and an instinctive principle which teaches as 
 it were by intuition, without the medium of formal or 
 specific propositions, must be obvious to every one. 
 The first only is properly entitled to the name of 
 Reason. 
 
 Epictetus says, that " God has assigned to each 
 man a director, his own good genius — a guardian 
 whose vigilance no slumbers interrupt, and whom 
 no false reasonings can deceive. So that, when you 
 have shut your door and darkened your room, say not, 
 that you are alone ; for your God is within, and your 
 Guardian is with you."* 
 
 Marcus Antoninus observes, " That seeing we 
 ought to live to God; he who is well disposed will do 
 every thing dictated by the divinity — a particle or 
 portion of himself, which God has given to each as a 
 guide and leader."t 
 
 Aristotle says, that " the mind of man hath a near 
 affinity to God, and that there is a divine ruler in him. 
 
 v ns Qsois o-vyymararoS) to 6hov ev olvtw ccpyot. He also declares, 
 
 according to Cudworth, that there is in the mind 
 Aoy« n KpsTrrov which is Aoya apyy — u Something better 
 than reason and knowledge, which is the principle 
 and original of it." For, says he, Xoyn «p^ a hoyos, ak\x 
 
 * Epictot. Lib. 1. Ch. 14. 
 t M. Antonin. Lib. 5. Sect. 27. 
 
of a superior Principle. 209 
 
 rt xfurrou " The principle of reason is not reason, but 
 something better. " We have all of us," Cudvvorth 
 adds, " by nature, punrwfJM n (as both Plato and Aris- 
 totle call it,) a certain divination, presage and vatici- 
 nation, in our minds, of some higher good and perfec- 
 tion than either power or knowledge. " Intellectual 
 System, p. 203,* Aristotle further observes, that 
 " knowledge is acquired by diligence, but wisdom and 
 discretion come from God." 
 
 Plutarch says, " the light of truth is a law, not 
 written in tables or books, but dwelling in the mind ; 
 always as a living rule, which never permits the soul 
 to be destitute of an interior guide." 
 
 " The light and spirit of God (says Plato), are as 
 wings to the soul, or as that which raiseth up the soul 
 into a sensible communion with God, above the 
 world." — " Wisdom is a tree that springeth from the 
 heart" 
 
 Plotinus, one of the Platonic school, observes, that 
 " as the Sun cannot be known but by his own light ; 
 so God cannot be known but with his own light' 
 And as the eye cannot see the Sun but by receiving 
 its image ; so man cannot know God, but by receiving 
 his image," 
 
 According to Seneca, " There is a holy spirit in us, 
 that deals with us, as he is dealt with by us." — 
 " God is near thee, and he is in thee ; the holy spirit 
 sits or resides within us, the observer of our good and 
 
 * See Dawson's Origin of Laws, and Stewart's Elements, vol. 2. p. 21. 
 
 O 
 
210 Testimonies in favour 
 
 evil notions, Every man has a judgment and a wit- 
 ness within himself of all the good and ill that he 
 does." — " A good man is influenced by God himself, 
 and has a kind of divinity within him." 
 
 " The conscience of man," says Antisthenes, "is 
 (in himself) a secret knowledge, a private opener, 
 testimony, or witness — a tormentor or a joyful quieter 
 of the mind of man in all his doings."* 
 
 In accordance with the views which have been 
 given, it was generally agreed that the human intel- 
 lect, embracing all its capacities, was of divine ex- 
 traction. 
 
 The saying of Pythagoras, 0*/ov yhos «<m fiporoiaij and 
 that of the Poets Aratus and Cleanthes, quoted by the 
 Apostle, ra yap xoti yevos ca^£v,t accord with the testi- 
 mony of the inspired Law-giver, that man was created 
 after the image and likeness of his Maker. 
 
 Antoninus calls the mind or rational principle of 
 man u Qstx ocvo^oipx, ot-moaxd^oC — a portion or particle of 
 the Divinity, 
 
 Epictetus designates it " Tw A/<* ^o*," a part of the 
 Deity. 
 
 Euripides and Menander — " o nvs ya.p v^?* «cm» 
 o 0foff," the mind or understanding in us is a divine 
 principle. 
 
 Horace dignifies it as " divinae particulam aurae," 
 a particle of divine life or essence. 
 
 * See Bockett's Gentile Divinity, p. 21. See also the Sayings of 
 Pythagoras, Timaeus, Socrates, &c. in Clarkson's Portraiture, vol. 2. 
 ch. 6. to the same effect. 
 
 f Acts xvii. 28. 
 
of a superior Principle. 211 
 
 Seneca calls it " Scintilla divinae lucis/'— -"« spark 
 of divine light," corresponding- to Cicero's expression, 
 Radiatio Dei, — u a ray of the divinity" And in ano- 
 ther place Cicero thus speaks of the human under- 
 standing : " Humanus animus, decerptus ex mente 
 divina, cum alio nullo, nisi cum ipso deo, si hoc fas 
 est dictu, comparari potest.'' " The human soul being 
 extracted from the divine Intelligence, can be com- 
 pared with no other Being, if it be lawful so to speak, 
 save with God himself.''* 
 
 Sect. III. 
 
 On the enlarged use of the word Reason. 
 
 Having now seen the human mind — as far as these 
 extracts will enable us to view it — tracing its affinity 
 through the mists and obscurity of its natural powers, 
 to the Supreme Fountain of Light; and, though grop- 
 ing, as it were, in darkness, claiming for itself the dis- 
 tinction of possessing an internal guide of the same 
 illustrious descent; it should be our next business to 
 inquire respecting the operation of this power, and 
 to consider by what process the partially enlightened 
 heathen supposed that Divine truth was received, 
 that maxims of religious duty were made known, 
 
 * Ciceronis Tusc. Quaest. 1. 5. s. 13. 
 
 o 2 
 
212 Enlarged use of the word Reason. 
 
 and that moral laws of eternal and immutable obli- 
 gation were discovered : — whether by a process of 
 laborious research, like that by which all outward 
 knowledge is attained, or by an immediately actuating 
 impulse, springing from the inherent principles of the 
 human mind. But on this head I shall only make a 
 brief remark ; and, after I have shown by several 
 examples, in what an enlarged sense the word Reason 
 has been used, shall proceed to consider, whether we 
 are wholly the creatures of education, and our know- 
 ledge received like pictures on a dark wall, or like 
 liquor into an empty vessel ; or whether the mind has 
 not originally in itself the elements or seeds of virtue ; 
 which, by proper care and culture, may be developed 
 into various degrees of religious and moral excellence. 
 It is difficult to imagine that the ancients, whose 
 opinions are quoted, could have expressed themselves 
 as they have done, had they not believed that man 
 possessed, in his own mind, a light, principle, or 
 guide, which, if heeded and obeyed, would instinc- 
 tively point out to him the truth, so far as it might 
 concern him to know it, and thus lead him to pursue 
 the path of rectitude. For, no sophistry can elude 
 the force of the argument, that fundamental laws of 
 human belief — principles or emotions universally dif- 
 fused, common to all men in all ages, and entering as 
 much into the constitution of human nature as the 
 appetites, affections, or outward senses, cannot in 
 their origin be traced from without. Consequently, 
 they must be engraven within, and constitute an in- 
 
} 
 
 Enlarged use of the word Reason. 213 
 
 ward law, though discoverable by Reason, yet an- 
 tecedent to the exercise of Reason, and therefore a 
 natural instinctive revelation from the Source of 
 Wisdom. And, when we consider that this secret 
 intelligence, these instinctive intimations are not de- 
 signed fcr mere outward advantage, like the reasoning 
 faculty, but for the chief ends of man's beh?g — his 
 eternal interests, a priori we should conclude, that 
 such a revelation of the will of God, — not confined to 
 soil or to climate, to tribe or to nation, — not intrusted 
 only to the casualty and uncertainty of a written law, 
 or only to the learned in outward knowledge, would 
 be communicated to man, rather than that the ele- 
 ments of his moral duty should be left wholly to the 
 tardy deductions of human reason, to be excogitated 
 and propounded by this faculty. 
 
 But it is evident that the ancients, who recognised 
 this universal principle, gave it different appellations, 
 as, the Light of Truth, the Divine Spirit, Conscience, 
 and also Reason. It was the God within the soul of 
 Pythagoras and Epictetus; the Genius or Guide of 
 Socrates and Timaeus ; the Light and Spirit of God 
 of Plato; the Divine Principle ofPlotin; the Divine 
 Power and Reason of Philo. Hence, the word Rea- 
 son comprehended the most excellent powers of the 
 human mind, as it has been used by many of the 
 moderns. It comprehended the whole rational na- 
 ture of man that elevates him above the brute; in 
 short, it implied the highest degree of perfection to 
 which the human intellect, by whatever means en- 
 
214 Enlarged use of the word Reason. 
 
 lightened, can attain ; and included the speculative 
 or discursive faculty, which discovers truth by weigh- 
 ing outward evidence, with nothing but outward facts 
 and observations for its materials, as well as the power 
 which offers its elements or seeds, or first principles 
 of right and wrong spontaneously to the mind, and 
 which sits as a judge of moral actions to approve or 
 to condemn. 
 
 In modern works we may notice the same latitude 
 of meaning. And it is scarcely going too far to say- 
 that it has been productive of modes of thinking which 
 have led to unfavourable, not to say unphilosophical 
 conclusions, in matters of religion and morality. 
 Notwithstanding: the light of Revelation has been so 
 amply afforded, this comprehensive use of the word 
 Reason has led many of the moderns as far from the 
 notions of the ancients, as above detailed, as if it had 
 never been suggested by the heathen philosopher, nor 
 revealed by the Christian law-giver, that a divine 
 spirit which draws not its teaching from men, instruct- 
 ed immediately the human mind. 
 
 Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Antoninus, and others, use 
 Reason in this comprehensive acceptation, while they 
 seem to have admitted that Truth may be received 
 without a regular process of reasoning or argumenta- 
 tion, according to the notion of an eminent writer 
 that u there is a sanctity of soul and body of more 
 efficacy for the receiving of divine truths than the 
 greatest pretences to discursive demonstration."* 
 
 * Mole's Divine Dialogues. 
 
Enlarged use of the word Reason, 215 
 
 It is singular enough that the word Aoyos, used by 
 the Greeks, and translated Reason, is the very Logos, 
 or divine Word, of the evangelist John. At the same 
 time it is generally understood to mean the faculty of 
 Reason, or power of ratiocination ; and the word 
 Logic itself, which signifies the science of reasoning, 
 confirms the etymology. 
 
 I shall now refer to some examples of this compre- 
 hensive use of the word Reason, on which I am com- 
 menting, in the writings of the moderns. 
 
 Dugald Stewart, in his Philosophy of the Human 
 Mind, makes some valuable observations on the use 
 of the word Reason, which he employs " to denote 
 merely the power by which we distinguish truth from 
 falsehood, and combine means for the attainment of 
 our ends." " The word Reason, " he says, H is far 
 from being precise in its meaning. In common and 
 popular discourse, it denotes that power by which we 
 distinguish truth from falsehood, and right from 
 wrong; and by which we are enabled to combine 
 
 means for the attainment of particular ends These 
 
 different capacities are all included in the idea which 
 is generally annexed to the word reason; and the 
 case, so far as I know, is the same with the corres- 
 ponding term in all languages whatever." — He ob- 
 serves, though in opposition to the high authorities 
 of Dr. Johnson and Dr. Beattie, that " for many 
 years past, reason has been very seldom used by phi- 
 losophical writers, or, indeed, by correct writers of 
 any description, as synonymous with the power of 
 
216 Enlarged use of the word Reason. 
 
 reasoning. To appeal to the light of human reason, 
 from the reasonings of the schools, is surely an ex* 
 pression to which no good objection can be made, on 
 the score either of vagueness or of novelty,"* 
 
 He is therefore desirous not to confound our ra- 
 tional powers in general, in which he includes the 
 elements of Reasoning itself in other words, the fun- 
 damental laws of human belief with that particular 
 branch of them, known among logicians by the name 
 of the Discursive Faculty. And he says, " the remark 
 of Dr. Campbell, 'that without the aid of some other 
 mental power than the discursive faculty, we could 
 never attain a notion of what is good, is undoubtedly 
 true, and may be applied to all those systems which 
 ascribe to Reason the origin of our moral ideas, if 
 the expressions Reason and Discursive Faculty be 
 used as synonymous." 
 
 The foregoing remarks are extremely important, 
 and merit very mature consideration. 
 
 But though he does not u call in question the ac- 
 curacy of those who have ascribed to it the function 
 of distinguishing right from wrong," he does not him* 
 self assign to Reason this function.+ 
 
 Some authors are quoted by this writer to shew the 
 enlarged acceptation in which the word has been used. 
 
 " Reason (says Hooker) is the director of man's 
 will, discovering in action what is good; for the laws 
 of well-doing are the dictates of right reason." 
 
 Stewart also quotes a passage from a discourse by 
 
 * Elements of Philosophy, vol. 2, p. 67. + lb. vol. 2, p. IU 
 
Enlarged use of the word Reason. 217 
 
 Dr. Adams of Oxford, in which he says, " Power may 
 compel, interest may bribe, pleasure may persuade, 
 (to do what appears to our moral judgment wrong;) 
 but Reason only can oblige. This is the only autho- 
 rity which rational beings can own, and to which they 
 owe obedience." Milton dignifies the faculty of Rea- 
 son in the same manner, in that part of his poem, where 
 he says — 
 
 " There wanted yet the master-work, the end 
 Of all yet done ; a creature, who, not prone 
 And brute as other creatures, but endued 
 With sauctity of Reason, might erect 
 
 His stature." " In devotion to adore 
 
 And worship God supreme, who made him chief 
 Of all his works." 
 
 In the following passage, where Locke contrasts 
 the light of Reason with that of Revelation, Stewart 
 takes for granted that when he speaks of truth as the 
 object of natural reason, it was principally, if not 
 wholly, moral truth, which he had in his view : 
 " Reason is natural Revelation, whereby the eternal 
 Father of Light, and Fountain of all Knowledge, 
 communicates to mankind that portion of truth which 
 he has laid within the reach of their natural faculties. 
 Revelation is natural Reason, enlarged by a new set 
 of discoveries communicated by God himself." 
 
 Upon this passage it is my intention to make a few 
 comments hereafter. I only introduce it at present 
 to show the very great latitude in which the word 
 Reason has been used. 
 
218 Enlarged use of the word Reason* 
 
 Huygens also affords us an apt illustration of the 
 same thing, when he says, " It is Reason which pro- 
 duces the sense of justice, honesty, praise, mercy, gra- 
 titude, and teaches us to distinguish between good 
 and evil universally.'' 
 
 Now the question is not whether these eminent 
 writers and others were wrong in their use of the 
 word Reason in this comprehensive signification ; but 
 whether it is possible for the human mind to be in- 
 structed and enlightened, so as to apprehend many 
 important elementary truths, by an innate light, as it 
 were, intuitively; or whether it is wholly by a dis- 
 cursive act and labour of its own, that such knowledge 
 is attained : for upon the former point, the whole 
 force of the argument I am endeavouring to maintain, 
 manifestly hinges. If the term Reason properly in- 
 cludes such a power, the matter is easily settled. 
 
 It is very clear, however, that the former opinion 
 has been embraced by many : otherwise we should not 
 hear of " the innate light of the rational faculty more 
 primary than the rules of reasoning" as used by 
 Jjovle ; — the stock of rational instincts, inscribed in Vie 
 soul, or " connatural and engraven truths" noticed 
 by Judge Hale; — u the law written in all men's 
 hearts'' 1 mentioned by Hooker; — the light and law of 
 nature spoken of by the Apostle Paul, by Cicero, and 
 by many others. 
 
 It would not be easy to find, in the works of any 
 writer, a description more beautifully illustrative of 
 this light or law of Reason common to the whole 
 
Enlarged use of the word Reason, 219 
 
 human family, than in that passage preserved by 
 Lactantius from the lost book of Cicero, " de Re- 
 publica." 
 
 " Right Reason (says he) is truly and properly a 
 law, agreeable to man's nature universally. It is a 
 law constant and eternal, which calls upon men to do 
 good, and prohibits the doing of evil. Good men hear 
 it and obey it, but the wicked resist its voice. This 
 law is not to be abrogated by any power on earth. 
 Neither prince nor senate nor people can absolve from 
 it. Nor are we to seek for any other expounder and 
 interpreter of this law but its own light. This law is 
 eternal and unchangeable; it doth not assume one 
 aspect at Athens, and another at Rome; but looks 
 upon all nations and persons with an impartial eye, 
 and shines upon ages and times with a perpetual 
 light. It is the same yesterday, and to-day, and for 
 ever. There is but one Law-giver, one Lord and 
 Supreme Judge of this law: God was the contriver 
 of it, the commander of it, the promulgator of it: 
 and none can be exempted from it, unless he will be 
 banished as it were from himself, and renounce the 
 nature of man : and this punishment would have 
 sting enough in it, though he should escape a thou- 
 sand more, which may be due for so foul a transgres- 
 sion." — And again, in his book, De Legibus, Cicero 
 says, " I perceive, therefore, it was the opinion of the 
 wisest men, that LAW was not originally discovered 
 by the ingenuity of man, as a spark struck from the 
 human intellect, or kindled and blown up with 
 
220 Enlarged use of the word Reason. 
 
 popular breath ; but is to be considered as an eternal 
 light shining from God himself to illuminate and 
 guide the universe — The obliging power of law is 
 more ancient than cities and nations — yea, as ancient 
 as God the king and ruler of heaven and earth : — So 
 that if there had not been any positive law at Rome, 
 in the reign of Tarquin, to restrain his lust; yet there 
 was an eternal law, which did not then begin to be a 
 law when it became written, but when it began to 
 exist ; and its existence is as ancient as that of the 
 Divine intellect." " Therefore Law is nothing else 
 than such a right Reason, as enjoins what is good, 
 and prohibits the contrary, and derives its origin from 
 God himself."* 
 
 We may conclude that Strabo referred to this law, 
 in his character of the Scythians, when he says, that 
 u they were found in the practice of justice, not by 
 the enforcement of any written laws, but by the light 
 and testimony of their own natural genius:" and 
 hence that it was not by the exercise of Reason, ac 
 cording to some outward rule of expediency, that they 
 discovered the superior excellence of virtue. " For 
 it seems wonderful," he remarks, " that Nature 
 should have given to them what the Greeks have 
 never been able to attain, either by a long succession 
 of the doctrines of their wise men, or by the precepts 
 of their philosophers, and that the manners of a bar- 
 barous should excel those of a refined people."+ 
 
 * See Dawson's Origin of Laws, book 1. ch. 2. 
 + See Clarkson's Portrait, vol. 2. ch. 6* 
 
Enlarged use of the word Reason. 221 
 
 As a further illustration of the subject, and as a 
 proof of the coincidence of opinion in the minds of 
 different persons, I shall select a passage from Dryden's 
 Religio Laici, and another from Dawson's Origin of 
 Laws, to which I have just referred. 
 
 The latter writer identifies this Law of Reason, as 
 it has been so often called, with the law of nature 
 written in the heart ; and not only so, but with " the 
 light, that lighteneth every man that cometh into the 
 world." From which it will appear, that, unless we 
 are willing to call Reason, natural revelation, and 
 natural revelation, Reason, convertibly, we must be 
 satisfied to have no distinction between original im- 
 planted instincts, — the foundation of this universal 
 law, and acquired maxims, elicited by the strength of 
 the human intellect, — the offspring of the discursive 
 faculty. 
 
 " It is most certain," he observes, " that the Gen- 
 tiles who never heard of Moses, or of Christ, or the 
 law and the Prophets, or had ever any divine positive 
 law given them, or some of them scarcely any human 
 positive law; yet, were they under the obligation of 
 a law, and that law could be no other than the law of 
 Reason. ■ For the Gentiles (saith St. Paul J who had 
 not the law, did by nature the things contained in the 
 law ; and having not the law were a law to themselves :' 
 which shews that the work of the law was written in 
 their hearts. There is therefore a No^o* y?a.%ros, a law 
 writ by the finger of God, in the heart of every one ; 
 which is that which we call the Law of Reason. 
 
222 Enlarged use of the word Reason, 
 
 This is also confirmed by our blessed Lord and only 
 Law-giver : For (saith he) and why even oft/ourselves 
 judge ye not what is right P As if he had said, you 
 have a light within you, by which you may discern 
 what is right and wrong, and just and unjust ; that is, 
 you have a rule, by which, you may, if you will, 
 measure and square your actions, or a law, which 
 plainly doth decree, and judiciously determine of 
 these matters, which is f that light which enlighteneth 
 every man which cometh into the world,' or the Law 
 of Reason."* 
 
 Now I am ready to think, it will appear, that in the 
 following passage from Dryden, the word Reason has 
 a more distinct and appropriate signification, than it 
 has in some of the preceding illustrations. 
 
 Dryden supposes " that the principles of natural 
 worship, are only the faint remnants or dying flames 
 of Revealed Religion in the posterity of Noah; and 
 that our modern philosophers, nay, and some of our 
 philosophising divines, have too much exalted the facul- 
 ties of our souls, when they have maintained, that by 
 their force, mankind have been able to find out that 
 there is one supreme Agent or intellectual Being, 
 which we call God : that praise and prayer, are his 
 due worship; and the rest of those deducements, 
 which, lam confident, 1 '' he adds, " are the remote effects 
 of revelation, and unattainable by our Discourse (Rea- 
 son); — I mean, as simply considered, and without the 
 benefit of divine illumination : so that we have not 
 
 * See the Origin of Laws, ubi supra. 
 
Enlarged use of the word Reason. 223 
 
 lifted up ourselves to God, by the weak pinions of 
 our Reason, but He has been pleased to descend to 
 us ; and what Socrates said of him, what Plato writ, 
 and the rest of the Heathen Philosophers of several 
 nations, is all no more than the twilight of Revelation 
 after the Sun of it was set in the race of Noah."* 
 
 Notwithstanding what is above stated, it seems to 
 have been Dryden's opinion that that portion of re- 
 vealed truth which was communicated by Noah to his 
 descendants, was carried down by tradition until it 
 was gradually " eclipsed to the greater part of man- 
 kind, when the light of nature, as the next in dignity, 
 was substituted ; and that is it which St. Paul con- 
 cludes to be the rule of the Heathens, and by which 
 they are hereafter to be judged." Dry den does not 
 seem to have entertained the question, whether this 
 light of nature, as it is called — " the rule of the 
 Heathen" be not itself a spark of divine revelation, 
 though greatly obscured by the depravity of human 
 nature. He has not clearly explained, whether, ac- 
 cording to his ideas, this twilight of Revelation, with 
 which some of the wise men of old were favoured, has 
 been diffused by tradition only; or whether it is 
 still emitted from the fountain of Light through an 
 
 * " Dim as the borrow'd beams of moon and stars, 
 To lonely, weary, wand'ring travellers, 
 Is Reason to the soul : and as on high, 
 These rolling fires discover but the sky, 
 Not light us here : so Reason's glimm'ring ray 
 Was lent, not to assure our doubtful way, 
 But guide us upward to a better day." 
 
 Dry den. 
 
224 Enlarged use of the word Reason. 
 
 obscured atmosphere of the mind, and in °reater or 
 smaller measure distributed to mankind universally, 
 as the privilege of a being* created after the simili- 
 tude of God himself.* The latter, I apprehend, after 
 what has been said, must be viewed as the true state 
 of the case. 
 
 I have thus endeavoured, in this Section, to point 
 out, not only what has been commonly received among 
 the learned as the authorised, but what appears to be 
 the true signification of the word Reason. Yet I am 
 aware that in producing passages from different au- 
 thors to illustrate the meaning of words, the attention 
 is apt to be distracted and turned away from the im- 
 mediate object in view. It appears, however, to be 
 more necessary to have clear ideas on this point, be- 
 cause we so frequently hear of debates on the use and 
 province of Reason in religious matters ; as by some, 
 it is contrasted with, and opposed to, revelation ; by 
 many too much exalted, as if it needed no other 
 helper, and by many undervalued, as if any of the 
 Lord's gifts— and especially the moderating principle 
 of our outward conduct and instrument of the sciences 
 — was bestowed upon us in vain. 
 
 * With regard to the universal consent of mankind on a very impor- 
 tant truth, Maximus Tyrius, a Platonic philosopher, affords us a very 
 striking testimony : — speaking of the existence of the Deity, he says, 
 *« In such a contest, and tumult, and disagreement, (about other matters 
 of opinion) you may see this one law and language acknowledged by 
 common accord. This the Greek says, and this the barbarian says, and 
 the inhabitant of the continent, and the islander ; and the wise and the 
 
 unwise." See the original quoted by Stewart — Elements, vol. 2. 
 
 p. 80. 
 
Enlarged use of the word Reason. 225 
 
 We see, then, that Reason is sometimes used for 
 the light of the intellect, or for the perfection of 
 human intellect, howsoever enlightened, compre- 
 hending the rational as well as moral powers of the 
 mind, cultivated to the highest pitch of excellence : 
 and in this sense, perhaps it may be said, that Reason 
 and Revelation cannot justly be placed in opposition. 
 But when the word is employed, as it commonly is, in 
 modern speculations, for the Discursive faculty alone, 
 or to designate what is meant by the strength and 
 power of human wisdom, unaided by divine counsel, 
 or unassisted by revelation, — which seems to be its 
 proper place, — then it becomes essentially necessary 
 to distinguish them. 
 
 For, it is clear, from some of the preceding quota- 
 tions, that, if the term be rightly used, to Reason be- 
 long the highest court and office in the human mind. 
 I cannot therefore but freely confess my own opi- 
 nion, that to include in the word Reason, while it is 
 liable to such an ambiguity of meaning, all that ex- 
 cellence of the human character, which arises from 
 the cultivation of our highest endowments, is far from 
 being conducive to the interests, much less the dif- 
 fusion, of a pure and vital Christianity. 
 
 As I shall have to consider this subject more fully 
 hereafter, it will be necessary to enter a little more 
 into the nature and office of the Reasoning faculty, 
 than I should otherwise have done. No one, I ap- 
 prehend, can doubt, that, when the word Reason is 
 employed in modern discourse, as applicable to 
 
 p 
 
226 Enlarged use of the word Reason. 
 
 matters of religion, it is never meant to include 
 Revelation mediate or immediate — however it may be 
 supposed, according to Locke, to be invested with 
 legitimate right to take cognizance of revelation. 
 
 Now, it may be observed, that Reason, in the en- 
 larged acceptation to which I have alluded, embraced 
 three powers or principles very necessary to be dis- 
 tinguished. 
 
 First — It included that power of the mind, which 
 enables it to investigate and find out Truth specu- 
 latively, as in science and the common business of life, 
 by observation and experience, and to distinguish it 
 from falsehood, by means of propositions, compari- 
 sons, and deductions; hence properly called the Dis- 
 cursive faculty or power of Reasoning. 
 
 Secondly — It comprehended the elements of Rea- 
 son itself — the rudiments, seeds, or principles from 
 which all natural reasoning must spring; denominated 
 by Judge Hale " rational instincts," — by Boyle a the 
 innate Light of Reason, or primitive ideas and rules 
 of true and false," — by Cudworth u innate cognos- 
 citive power," — by Stewart, u the fundamental laws 
 of human belief, or primary elements of human rea- 
 son," — by Reid and Beattie, " the principles of com- 
 mon sense," as being common to all mankind; — by 
 others, " self-evident truths, axioms, common senti- 
 ments, and intuitive principles." 
 
 Thirdly The power or source of moral sentiment 
 
 from which man receives primarily the emotions which 
 give rise to the knowledge of right and wrong, good 
 
Enlarged use of the Word Reason. 227 
 
 and evil ; and by which he is enabled to feel the obli- 
 gation of duty to God and to his fellow creature ; in 
 which power may be included the first principles or 
 seeds of moral truth, the sparks of a divine intelli- 
 gence in the soul, the light that enlighteneth every 
 man — from the necessity of the case, changing the 
 metaphor to express the meaning more fully; also 
 variously denominated " the law written in the 
 heart,"* — " connatural moral instincts"t — " the first 
 rudiments of natural justice, charity and benignity.''^ 
 
 * Hooker. t Hale. J ibid - 
 
 r 2 
 
CHAP. II. 
 
 OF THE NATURE OF THE MENTAL FACULTIES, 
 AND THE PRIMARY ELEMENTS OF REASON- 
 ING AND MORAL FEELING. 
 
 -♦♦+- 
 
 Sect. I. 
 
 Of the nature of the Mental Faculties. 
 
 As it is my intention to make some general obser- 
 vations on the developement of the various powers of 
 the human mind from their original rudiments or 
 seeds, I shall take this opportunity of premising a 
 few particulars, by way of illustration, on the elements 
 both of our rational and moral principles. For, if it 
 be proved, or deemed highly probable, that in order 
 to constitute the power of Reasoning, some original 
 seeds, or, as they have been called, u inchoatae in- 
 telligentiae" must be presupposed, as already im- 
 planted in the mind by the Author of our being ; we 
 cannot wonder that the same thing should be true, 
 but in a more eminent degree, of the moral principle 
 and its seeds, or instincts. 
 
On the Mental Faculties. 229 
 
 And, by adopting this method, I flatter myself, 
 that we shall be better prepared to examine and ap- 
 preciate the tendency of a very celebrated writer's 
 opinion on this subject, — a man whose name cannot 
 be mentioned but with respect and admiration, both 
 for his virtues and his genius, I mean, — the enlight- 
 ened Locke. In laying this foundation, I conceive it 
 to be particularly important to produce such a coin- 
 cidence of unbiassed authorities before my reader, as, 
 while it qualifies him to determine what degree of 
 deference may be due to these authorities, may enable 
 him also to judge how far the notion is consistent 
 with sound analogy, which assumes, that the human 
 mind, in its infant or undeveloped state, may with 
 propriety be compared to "a white sheet of paper' * 
 or " to an empty cabinet." I propose therefore to 
 adduce some testimonies on this point; and first 
 relatively to the ground-work of reason ; which, as 
 before remarked. I use in the signification with which 
 I set out in the beginning of this Essay. I shall 
 afterwards proceed to consider the elements or seeds 
 of moral sentiments. 
 
 Now, as we can have no true conception of the 
 nature, constitution, or essence of the mind, but from 
 its powers or faculties and the phenomena of their 
 enlargement, — in like manner, as we can know no- 
 thing of the rudiments or original state of the body, 
 but from the position and developement of its limbs 
 and organs, — I am well aware that in attempting to 
 describe the elements or principles of human thought, 
 
230 On the Menial Faculties. 
 
 it is extremely difficult to use proper expressions, in 
 as much as they must all be borrowed from material 
 objects. Hence, in endeavouring to give correct 
 notions of what is meant by a seed, first principle, 
 primary tendency, instinct, or original impulse of the 
 mind, influencing its judgments or its moral conduct; 
 it is possible there may be great variety of expression, 
 and yet that one and the same class of phenomena 
 may be distinctly referred to under all this variety, as 
 different authors may have laid hold of one analogy 
 or another. And this is evinced by the different 
 appellations above recited, given to the same thing ; 
 just as the understanding is considered to be capable 
 of containing within itself either originally, the 
 seeds or elements, fountains, germs, or rudiments of 
 knowledge, or of being furnished in a secondary way 
 with its materials, like a dark room with pictures 
 or images, representing external things, successively 
 painted on its walls. It can hardly be doubted that 
 the enlargement of the intellect and the developement 
 of the mental capacities, bear some analogy to the 
 evolution, growth and expansion of the several parts 
 of the ovum and of a seed or germ. For it would 
 seem as unphilosophical to suppose that immaterial 
 knowledge should be conveyed into the mind, wholly 
 from without, in the mechanical way that shells are 
 conveyed into a cabinet or wine into a cask, as to 
 expect that the shell of a nut, without the organized 
 kernel, would form a tree; or that the mere husk of 
 a grain of wheat, with all the care of outward culture 
 
On the Mental Faculties. 231 
 
 that could be bestowed upon it, would appropriate to 
 itself nourishment, and shoot up into the stem the 
 blade and the ear. Every rudiment, or seed in na- 
 ture, has inherent in itself certain appetencies by 
 which it draws and attracts to itself something with- 
 out,. These appetencies are its own ; and though 
 some tendencies may be acquired, it has, notwith- 
 standing, strong native tendencies towards the pur- 
 poses of its creation. And the more its design in the 
 creation is fulfilled, and the ends of its being accom- 
 plished, the more do these original appetencies dis- 
 play themselves to the praise and glory of the great 
 Author. Do the materials of knowledge bear a dif- 
 ferent relation to the mind, from that which the out- 
 ward elements, air, earth, heat, and moisture, bear to 
 the seed or plant ? If they bear the same relation, it 
 is obvious, that the mind must have originally in 
 itself, all the rudiments of all its capacities, the germs 
 of its propensities, the latent spark of intellect, the 
 fountain of its benevolent affections, the dawning light 
 of its immortal affinity and seed of divine Truth ; 
 ready to be opened, expanded, enlarged ; or to remain 
 closed, obscured, contracted, according to the neglect 
 or care of cultivation. 
 
 But to return to the consideration of a suitable 
 phraseology, as it will be difficult, if not impossible, 
 to distinguish in effect between the original im- 
 planted instinct, influencing the will by an immediate 
 impulse to action, and the acquired rule or motive 
 secondarily produced by tradition or intellectual 
 
232 On the Mental Faculties, 
 
 research, so it will be difficult to find suitable forms 
 of expression, to denote these respective mental phe- 
 nomena. It is also clear, that different analogies 
 will suggest different modes of expression, as the 
 mind may be said to contain within itself a seed, a 
 root, a fountain, a spark, a light, a rudiment, a germ, 
 an idea or image. It is remarkable that every one 
 of these things, except the last, refers essentially to 
 something naturally engendered and figuratively in the 
 mind itself; but the word idea or image is well 
 chosen for that system, which considers the mind like 
 a dark room or a white sheet of paper, and which 
 makes the resemblances of outward things to consti- 
 tute the chief materials of intellectual operations and 
 intellectual expansion. How mere images or forms 
 should enlarge a mental faculty, is as inconceivable, 
 as that immaterial conceptions should expand any 
 bodily organ. In the case of the brain this is said to 
 be possible : but the degree and the mode are equally 
 unknown ; and there is clearly a limit, — a very 
 straitened expansion, if the fact should be admitted. 
 
 Leaving, however, this discussion for the present, 
 as I hope to resume it in a more proper place, I may 
 observe that the extracts from the writings of Boyle, 
 Sir Matthew Hale, and Cudworth, will perhaps be 
 open to animadversion when they are judged accord- 
 ing to the standard of expression in modern meta- 
 physical works; and may be thought by some ob- 
 solete on this account. But although the phraseology 
 may be uncouth, yet if we can understand what the 
 
On the Mental Faculties. 233 
 
 mean, and can gather important truths or facts in the 
 philosophy of the human mind from their writings, 
 the end will be sufficiently answered. It would 
 seem, indeed, that the clearest metaphysical heads are 
 liable to some degree of obscurity on this point : be- 
 cause most of them differ in expression, if they do not 
 in opinion. Though Locke introduced a greater pre- 
 cision of language than had been known before his 
 time, yet his use of the word Idea in so general 
 a sense as he employed it, has drawn a sort of 
 apology from himself,* and has given rise to very 
 strange if not absurd conclusions, perhaps logically 
 deduced, from others, as Hume and Berkley. Dugald 
 Stewart seems to be fully aware of this verbal ambi- 
 guity, and passes some just remarks on the " Common 
 Sense" of Beattie and Reid, which appears to have 
 been used by these writers in by far too general a 
 signification. A volume might be written in pointing 
 out the different meanings in which words in most 
 common use relative to mental principles, powers, 
 capacities, and operations, are employed by different 
 authors. But it would be a discouraging circum- 
 stance, if amidst all this variety, we could not come 
 at some general truths acknowledged by all. With 
 respect to the word Instinct, as applicable to the 
 original tendencies of the human mind, and especially 
 as applicable to the first movements or elements of 
 intellectual and moral power, it may be liable to some 
 objection. Yet it is desirable to have some words as 
 
 * See Introduction to Essay on Human Understanding. 
 
234 On the Mental Faculties. 
 
 remote as possible from objects of sense, to denote 
 the inherent and original workings of the mind itself: 
 and Instinct may be one of these. For, it is clear, 
 that objects of sense are only the occasion, remote or 
 immediate, they are not the instruments, of the mind's 
 operations; they are the exciting causes, but not the 
 state of excitement or operation itself. The excite- 
 ment and the instruments or faculties belong intrinsi- 
 cally to the mind. Impressions from outward objects 
 may affect the mind with what are called Ideas, as, 
 to employ a coarse analogy, outward food may excite 
 the animal system, and rouse the animal functions. 
 But it is its own labour upon these ideas, by its own 
 inherent vigour, with its own innate powers, that can 
 convert them to its use, and enlarge the various fa- 
 culties, according to the quality of the impressions 
 received ; as it is by the powers of digestion and assi- 
 milation, that the aliment is appropriated to the 
 several bodily organs. Hence human knowledge, 
 whether it consists in the acquirement of art or sci- 
 ence, or literature, or in the growth and enlargement 
 of our best affections, by the exercise of different 
 mental capacities, is not something without the mind ; 
 any more than food appropriated to bone, vessel, 
 gland, muscle, by the action of different organs, is 
 something without the body. But what is true of the 
 profound and elaborately deduced logical proposition 
 or mathematical theorem, is truo also of the primary 
 elements of the proposition. They belong essentially 
 to the mind : and education cannot, in the true sense 
 
Primary elements of Reasoning. 235 
 
 of the word, or absolutely, impart them, though it may 
 enable the mind to draw them forth, as the word im- 
 plies, and to recognize them as something congenial 
 to its own nature — in fact, as truth, commanding its 
 implicit assent, immediately they are fairly brought 
 under its notice. 
 
 Sect. II. 
 
 Of the "primary elements of Reasoning. 
 
 From the preceding considerations, it will follow, 
 that all enlargement of the mind, all improvement of 
 its capacities, all real knowledge, must consist, and 
 can only consist, in the evolution of its own powers, 
 as these are severally acted upon by external things, 
 or by external qualities of mind in others. For as 
 external material things have a congruity to the na- 
 tural senses, and vice versa, the eye to light, the ear 
 to sounds, the tongue to sweets, the smell to per- 
 fumes ; so the qualities or manifestations of mind in 
 our fellow creatures, as gratitude, humanity, justice, 
 honesty, sincerity, temperance, modesty, and their 
 opposites, have a congruity to certain innate powers 
 in us, affecting us with pleasure or pain, love or 
 aversion, the sense of good or ill desert, and many 
 other feelings common to our nature. But it is a 
 low and degrading idea to suppose that the cultiva- 
 
236 Piimary dements of Reasoning. 
 
 tion of mental power consists in the mind being as 
 it were mechanically filled with its thoughts or emo- 
 tions from without, as jewels are placed in a casket; 
 or in its being ornamented with outward resem- 
 blances and images, as figures are represented in a 
 looking-glass. This analogy may at first sight 
 appear plausible, for on abstruse subjects we are 
 willing to lay hold of any analogy that may seem 
 calculated to explain even part of the difficulty; but, 
 if it is examined, it will be found not to have one 
 particle of the analogy of nature ; and therefore to 
 be false and to lead to erroneous conclusions. Know- 
 ledge has no relation whatever either on the one 
 hand to empty shadows, or, on the other, to the 
 gross materials of a cabinet. For, real substantial 
 knowledge in the mind, must be as unlike any thing 
 received from without, or discovered without, except 
 in the minds of others; as a piece of bread is unlike a 
 living muscular fibre, or as air, earth, and water, are, 
 in themselves, unlike the living organized system of 
 a plant. What is communicated from without, may, 
 indeed, be assimilated by intellectual labour, till it 
 constitute effective and substantial truth or know- 
 ledge ; as air, earth, and water, with the aid of heat 
 and light, may be subdued and assimilated by the 
 power of vegetation to the very nature and substance 
 of the plant. Neither perception, nor memory can 
 do this. The mere act of treasuring ideas in the 
 memory does not add a single iota to the real in- 
 tellectual power of the mind. 
 
Primary elements of Reasoning, 237 
 
 This observation, I apprehend, to be intimately 
 connected in principle with that theory of original 
 seeds or elements of thought in the mind, which I am 
 disposed to maintain. I shall now subjoin a few 
 illustrations. 
 
 On this head the language of Boyle is particularly 
 appropriate : because he does not argue for one opi- 
 nion more decidedly than another; I shall, therefore, 
 give several extracts from his writings. 
 
 " God hath made us men of a limited nature in 
 general, and of a bounded capacity ; and accordingly 
 hath furnished man either with certain innate ideas or 
 models, and principles ; or with a faculty or power 
 and disposition easily to frame them, as it meets with 
 occasions to excite them. But, because God intended 
 the mind of man of a limited capacity, his understand- 
 ing is so constituted, that the inbred or easily ac- 
 quired ideas, and primitive axioms, wherewith it is 
 furnished, and by relation or analogy whereto, it 
 judges of all other notions and propositions, do not 
 extend to all knowable objects whatsoever ; but reach 
 only to such as have a sufficient affinity, or bear 
 some proportion to those primary ideas and rules of 
 truth; which are sufficient, if duly improved, to help 
 us to attain, though not the perfect knowledge of 
 truth of the highest order, yet the competent know- 
 ledge of as much Truth, as God thought fit to allow 
 our minds, in their present state of union with our 
 bodies." 
 
 " The innate light of the rational faculty, is more 
 
238 Primary elements of Reasoning. 
 
 primary than the very rules of reasoning." 
 
 " There are some things which the intellect usually 
 judges of in a kind of organical way ; — that is, by the 
 help of certain rules or hypotheses'' — " but there are 
 others which it knows, without the help of these 
 rules, more immediately and, as it were, intuitively, 
 
 by evidence or perception." "And it seems 
 
 to me that the internal light which the Author of 
 nature has set up in the mind of man, qualifies him, 
 if he makes a right use of it, not only to apply the 
 instruments of knowledge, but also to frame and exa- 
 mine them."* 
 
 It cannot be doubted that the preceding passage 
 applies exclusively to the elements of reason : as does 
 the following from Sir Matthew Hale. 1 have already 
 taken notice of the analogy drawn by this writer 
 
 * See Boyle's works abridged by Shaw, vol. 2, pages 201, 206, 209, 
 and 220. 
 
 " The rational soul that is already furnished with primitive ideas and 
 rules of true and false" — in other words, " when duly excited, is fur- 
 nished with a light that may enable her to judge, even of many of those 
 original notions, by which she judges of other things." " For, by the 
 help of this light, the understanding is enabled to look about, and both 
 to consider apart, and compare together, the nature of all kinds of 
 things; without being necessitated to employ in its speculations, the 
 rules, or dictates of any particular science, or discipline; being suffi- 
 ciently assisted by its own light, and those axioms and notions, that are of a 
 general nature, and perpetual truths ; and so of a higher order than the 
 dictates or rules of any particular or subordinate science." 
 
 M These are supposed to be connate — and are assented to upon their 
 own account, without needing any medium or discursive act to prove 
 them: becau>e, that, as soon as they are plainly proposed to the under* 
 standing they discover themselves to be true so manifestly by their own 
 light, that they want no proposition to make the understanding ac- 
 quiesce in them." 
 
 EoNle's works abridged, vol. 2. p. 201— 20G. 
 
Primary elements of Reasoning. 239 
 
 between human and brute instincts. He says that 
 " as there are animal instincts in brutes, directing 
 them to what is useful and convenient to the sensible 
 life ; so there are engraven in the soul certain rational 
 instincts; implanted and connatural anticipations, 
 antecedent to any discursive ratiocination; — which, 
 though they are not so distinct and explicit as the 
 former (those of brutes) yet they are secret biases 
 whereby it is disposed, and inclined to the good and 
 convenience proportionable to a rational and intel- 
 lectual life." Besides this, Sir Matthew Hale con- 
 siders that " each individual has a certain congenite 
 stock of rational sentiments and inclinations; im- 
 plying that he has original instincts determining hiin 
 to such a way of life as is suitable to his nature."* 
 And he observes, that "the high exercise of ratioci- 
 nation might evince the truth and excellency of these 
 connatural principles, because they are in themselves 
 highly reasonable, though there were no such origi- 
 nally inscribed in the mind. But this no more 
 concludes against the supposition, (of their being 
 originally inscribed), than it would conclude against 
 the supposition of implanted instincts in brutes."t 
 See page 62. 
 
 * Hale Prim. orig. sect. 1. cli. 2. 
 
 + In the 4th section, the same idea is expressed in other words: — 
 c< As we find in the sensitive natures certain congenite or connatural in- 
 stincts, whereby they are secretly and powerfully biassed, and inclined, 
 and carried to their proper sensitive good" — " so there seems to be 
 lodged in the intellective and rational nature certain rudiments and ten- 
 dencies whereby they are carried to the good of an intellectual life, 
 
240 Primary elements of Reasoning. 
 
 The judicious Hooker remarks, " That the main 
 principles of Reason are in themselves apparent. 
 For to make nothing evident of itself unto man's 
 understanding, were to take away all possibility of 
 knowing any thing. And herein, he adds, that of 
 Theophrastus is true, \ They that seek a reason of all 
 things do utterly destroy all reasoning.' In every kind 
 of knowledge, some such grounds there are, as that 
 being proposed, the mind doth presently embrace 
 them, as free from the possibility of error, clear and 
 manifest without proof."* 
 
 Aristotle himself, the prince of logicians, admits, 
 « That it is altogether impossible that every thing- 
 should be susceptible of demonstration ; otherwise the 
 process would extend to infinity, and after all our 
 labour, nothing would be gained. "t 
 
 Cicero says, " That unless there were some antici- 
 pations of knowledge in the mind, it would not be in- 
 quisitive, or discursive, or attain to any knowledge 
 at all.":): And this is partly explained by an obser- 
 vation of Cud worth, " That where any new ideas are 
 presented to the mind by sense, it cannot understand 
 or know them, except by something of its own, — some 
 active anticipation within itself, that occasionally 
 
 certain communes notitiae lodged and implanted in the intellect, which 
 serve as a kind of connatural inward stock for the understanding to 
 work upon, and also as a bias to carry him on to the good of an intel- 
 lectual life." Page 366. 
 
 * Hooker Eccles. Pol. book I. 
 + Stewart's Elem. vol. 2. 
 X De Nat. Deor. lib. 1. 
 
Primary elements of Reasoning. 241 
 
 reviving and meeting with it, makes it know it, 01 
 take acquaintance with it." " And," he adds, " this 
 is the only true sense of that old assertion of Plato, 
 that Knowledge is Reminiscence, not that it is the 
 remembrance of something which the soul had some 
 time before actually known, in a pre-existent state; 
 but because it is the mind's comprehending of things 
 by some inward anticipations of its own, something 
 native and domestic to it, or something actively ex- 
 erted from within itself."* 
 
 Dugald Stewart observes, " The remark is un- 
 doubtedly true — that if there were no first principles, 
 or in other words, if a reason could be given for every 
 thing, no process of deduction could possibly be 
 brought to a conclusion." And in reference to this 
 point, he cites D'Alembert, Boyle, and Dr. Campbell, 
 to prove that all the sciences rest ultimately on first 
 principles, which must be taken for granted without 
 proof, t 
 
 " All reasoning (says Dr. Reid) is from principles — 
 the first principles of every kind of reasoning are given 
 us by nature, — The conclusions of reason are all built 
 upon first principles, and can have no other founda- 
 tion." Most justly therefore do such principles dis- 
 dain to be tried by Reason, and laugh at the artillery 
 of the logician when it is directed against them." — 
 And in another place, he adds, u How or when I 
 got such first principles, upon which I build all my 
 
 * On Morality, p. 129. See also Hale, p. 43. 
 t See Elements, vol. 2. 
 
242 Primary elements of Reasoning. 
 
 reasoning, I know not ; for I had them before I can 
 remember; but i am sure, they are parts of my con- 
 stitution, and I cannot throw them off."* 
 
 Dr. Watts well observes, in reference both to first 
 principles in mathematics and in religion — " That it 
 is the vain affectation of proving every thing, that has 
 led geometricians to form useless and intricate de- 
 monstrations to support some theorems, which are 
 sufficiently evident to the eye by inspection, or to the 
 mind by the first mention of them." — " Some things 
 have more need to be explained than to be proved, as 
 axioms, or self-evident propositions ; and indeed all 
 the first great principles, the chief and most important 
 doctrines both of natural and revealed religion ; for, 
 when the sense of them is clearly explained, they 
 appear so evident in the light of nature or Scripture, 
 that they want no other proof."+ 
 
 u Our perception of this self-evidence in any pro- 
 position, is called Intelligence. It is our knowledge 
 of those first principles of truth, which are, as it were, 
 wrought into the very nature and make of our minds ; 
 they are so evident in themselves to every man who 
 attends to them, that they need no proof. It is the 
 prerogative and peculiar excellence of these propo- 
 sitions, that they can scarce ever be proved or denied." 
 — " These propositions are called axioms, or maxims, 
 or first principles ; these are the very foundations of 
 all improved knowledge and reasonings, and on that 
 
 * Rcid's Inquiry, pp. 136 and 324. 
 + See Logic, part iv. ch. 2. 
 
Primary dements of Reasoning. 243 
 
 account these have been thought to be innate propo- 
 sitions, or truths born with us."* 
 
 Dr. Beattie asserts, that " All mathematical truth 
 is founded on certain first principles, which common 
 sense, or instinct, or the constitution of the human 
 understanding, or the law of rational nature, compels 
 us to believe without proof, whether we will or not." 
 Hence, according to this writer, " there is a power in 
 the mind which perceives elementary truths or first 
 principles, and commands implicit belief, not by pro- 
 gressive argumentation, but by an instantaneous and 
 instinctive impulse; derived neither from education, 
 nor from habit, but from nature;" and he concludes, 
 " that except we believe many things without proof, 
 we never can believe any thing at all ; for that all 
 sound reasoning must ultimately rest on principles 
 intuitively certain, or intuitively probable."+ 
 
 * Logic, part 2. ch. 2. §. 9. 
 
 Even Locke himself admits, that " In intuitive knowledge consists 
 the evidence of all those maxims, which nobody has any doubt about, 
 but every man (does not, as is said, only assent to, but) knows to be 
 true, as soon as ever they are proposed to his understanding. In the 
 discovery of, and assent to these Truths, there is no use of the Discursive 
 Faculty, no need of Reasoning, but they are known by a superior and 
 higher degree of evidence." — Essay, book 4. ch. 17. 
 
 + Beattie on Truth, part 1. ch. 1. 
 
 Q 2 
 
244 Elements of Moral Feeling. 
 
 Sect. III. 
 Of the 'primary elements of Moral Feeling. 
 
 I apprehend the authorities I have last quoted will 
 be deemed sufficient to establish the position that the 
 elements or first principles of reasoning, belong essen- 
 tially to every rational being. And, though it is 
 likely, some use will be made of the preceding conclu- 
 sions, in our subsequent speculations; yet it is of 
 far more importance to be determined, that the funda- 
 mental principles of morality and religion also are 
 deeply laid in the constitution of the human mind. 
 For, as the first only relate to the good and con* 
 venience of the present rational life ; so the higher 
 and eternal interests of the soul are deeply involved 
 in the last. We are therefore to consider that as 
 we cannot even attain to any speculative knowledge 
 without building our reasonings upon certain rational 
 instincts, implanted truths, primary elements, or first 
 principles, as they are variously denominated ; so we 
 cannot attain to any practical virtue without building 
 upon the fundamental principles of morality and 
 religion, which we have reason to think are laid 
 originally in the mind by the great Author of our 
 being. In what manner such original elements of 
 truth are inscribed, how their roots or seeds are im- 
 
Elements of Moral Feeling. 245 
 
 planted, or in what way they are developed, we can 
 never know. But if the concurring testimony of the 
 wisest men can avail any thing to establish a position, 
 we seem justified in drawing the foregoing conclu- 
 sion. I am, indeed, aware of a notable exception, — 
 that the opinions of Locke and others are opposed to 
 this view of the subject; but these I must leave to be 
 considered hereafter. I may, however, premise, that, 
 from the peculiar nature of the argument, if it be 
 impossible by natural reasoning to arrive at demon- 
 stration one way or the other, then, in order to decide 
 the question, we must place authority against autho- 
 rity; and to whatever side the sanction of Holy 
 Scripture more especially leans, the triumph must be 
 awarded. 
 
 In reference to the following, and many other quo- 
 tations, brought forward to illustrate the different 
 parts of this Essay, I take this opportunity of stating 
 my conviction generally, that there is no more certain 
 way of attaining a distinct notion (provided the sub- 
 ject will admit of it) of any moral or speculative Truth, 
 than in looking at it under that variety of aspect, 
 which different minds of acknowledged depth and 
 clearness, will naturally take in describing the same 
 mental phenomena. I have no doubt that more real 
 service would be done to philosophy, if systematic 
 writers would give due credit to those who have pre- 
 ceded them, and candidly avow their obligations; and 
 if they were more disposed to lean to the concur- 
 ring sentiments of men of enlightened minds, when 
 
246 Elements of Moral Feeling, 
 
 these all tend to a given point, than to the single 
 efforts of their own unassisted genius. I know it is 
 often a boast with some that they have spun out every 
 thing in their lucubrations, from their own store, by 
 diligent inspection of their own minds. But, when 
 we consider the liability of all to adopt some favourite 
 hypothesis, and to push it to its utmost limits, this 
 exclusive reliance on their own energies is little to be 
 commended. For, it is too much the practice, for 
 those who feel, or imagine that they are, capable of 
 thinking for themselves in every point, to slight or 
 overlook the conclusions of others, and to give the 
 world their own system as the consummation of the 
 subject ; when perhaps, if carefully examined, there 
 would be found but few original ideas, really their 
 own. I do not, at the same time, pledge myself to 
 support every opinion in these quotations. 
 
 The remark of Lord Bacon is short and apposite. 
 " It cannot be doubted (says he) that a great part of 
 the moral law is too sublime to be reached by the 
 light of nature. Nevertheless, it is most truly de- 
 clared, that even from the light and law of nature 
 men receive some knowledge of virtue and vice, right 
 and wrong, good and evil. It must, however, be 
 stated that the light of nature is to be taken in a two- 
 fold signification. In the first place, as it arises from 
 sense, induction, reason, argumentation, according to 
 the laws of heaven and earth. Secondly : as it shines 
 upon the human soul by an internal instinct, according 
 to the law of conscience : which is, as it were, the 
 
Elements of Moral Feeling. 217 
 
 spark and remains, of pristine and primitive purity. 
 In this latter sense, especially, the soul is a partaker 
 of such a portion of light, as enables it to behold and 
 discover the perfection of the moral law ; yet this 
 light is not sufficiently clear, but is afforded in such a 
 manner that it rather reproves for vice, than fully 
 informs us of our duties. Wherefore, the doctrine of 
 Religion, as well moral as mystical, is not to be at- 
 tained but by inspiration and revelation from God."* 
 
 Sir Matthew Hale testifies, that w Whatever may 
 be said of other matters, certainly, the first draughts 
 and strictures of natural religion and morality are 
 naturally in the mind:" — u and by his faculties man is 
 rendered into a capacity of knowing the will of 
 Almighty God, and what is acceptable to him ; for it 
 is in a great measure inscribed in his soul" This 
 eminent man " appeals to the most knowing men in 
 the world, who have but had the leisure to think 
 seriously and converse with themselves; — whether 
 next under Divine revelation their best and clearest 
 sentiments of morality at least have not been gathered 
 from the due animadversion and inspection of their 
 own minds, and the improving of that stock of morals 
 that they there find, and the transcribing of that ori- 
 ginal which they founders* written there ."t 
 
 It is remarked, by the profound Bishop Butler, 
 " that nothing can be more evident, than that, ex- 
 clusive of revelation, man cannot be considered as a 
 creature left by his Maker to act at random;— but 
 
 * Advancem. of Learning. f Piim. Orig. of Man, 
 
248 Elements of Moral Feeling, 
 
 that from his make, condition, or nature, he is in the 
 strictest and most proper sense a law to himself. — He 
 hath the rule of right within ; what is wanting is only 
 that he honestly attend to it." — " Let any plain 
 honest man, before he engages in any course of action, 
 ask himself, is this I am going about right, or is it 
 wrong ? Is it good, or is it evil ? I do not in the 
 least doubt, but that this question would be answered 
 agreeably to truth and virtue, by almost any fair man 
 in almost any circumstance."* 
 
 " The soul," says Dr. Cudworth, ^ is not a mere 
 Rasa Tabula, a naked and passive thing, which has 
 no innate furniture or activity of its own, nor any 
 thing at all in it, but what was impressed upon it 
 without ; for if it were so, then there could not pos- 
 sibly be any such thing as moral good and evil, just 
 and unjust. The anticipations of morality do not 
 spring merely from notional ideas, or from certain 
 rules or propositions, arbitrarily printed upon the 
 soul as upon a book, but from some other more in- 
 ward, and vital principle, in intellectual beings, as 
 such, whereby they h^ve a natural determination 
 \n them to do some things, and to avoid others; 
 which could not be if they were mere naked passive 
 things."f 
 
 Dr. Hutcheson remarks, that " The Author of 
 Nature has much better furnished us for a virtuous 
 conduct, than our moralists seem to imagine, by 
 
 * See Sermons on Human Nature, ii. & iii. 
 f Eternal and Immut. Morality, eh. 6. 
 
Elements of Moral Feeling. 219 
 
 almost as quick and powerful instructions, as we have 
 for the preservation of our bodies. He has given us 
 strong affections to be the springs of each virtuous 
 action." — He also adds, " The perception of moral 
 good is not derived from custom, education, example 
 
 or study ..We are not to imagine, that this 
 
 Moral Sense, more than the other senses, supposes 
 any innate ideas, knowledge, or practical proposition : 
 we mean by it only a determination of our minds to 
 receive the simple ideas of approbation or condem- 
 nation, from actions observed, antecedent to any opi- 
 nions of advantage or loss to redound to ourselves 
 from them." — u Notwithstanding the mighty Reason 
 we boast of above other animals, its processes are too 
 slow, too full of doubt and hesitation, to serve us in 
 every exigency, either for our own preservation, 
 without the external senses, or to influence our actions 
 for the good of the whole, without this moral sense." — 
 *,< The universality of it and that it is antecedent to 
 instruction, may appear from observing the sentiments 
 of children, upon hearing the stories with which they 
 are commonly entertained as soon as they understand 
 language." — In conclusion, Dr. Hutcheson queries 
 that if according to many of our moralists, the ultimate 
 end is to each one his own happiness; and yet this 
 he seeks by Instinct : " may not another Instinct 
 toward the public or the good of others, be as pro* 
 per a principle of virtue, as the Instinct towards 
 private happiness £"* 
 
 * See Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil. 
 
250 Elements of Moral Feeling. 
 
 " Happily for the human race," says Dr. Rush, 
 <c the intimations of duty and the road to happiness are 
 not left to the slow operations or doubtful inductions 
 
 of Reason It is worthy of notice, that while second 
 
 thoughts are best in matters of judgment,^ rst thoughts 
 are always to be preferred in matters that relate to 
 morality. Second thoughts in these cases are gene- 
 rally parlies between duty and corrupted inclinations. 
 Hence, Rousseau has justly said, that " a well regu- 
 lated moral instinct is the surest guide to happiness."* 
 
 Dr. Reid states, H That there must be in morals as 
 in all other sciences, first or self-evident principles, 
 on which all moral reasoning, as to whether the con- 
 duct of moral agents be good or bad, in a greater or 
 less degree, or indifferent, is grounded, and in which 
 it ultimately rests. Without such principles, we can 
 no more establish any conclusion in morals, than we 
 can build a castle in the air, without any foundation. H 
 —The first principles of morals are the immediate 
 dictates of the moral faculty. By it, as an original 
 power of the mind, we have the conceptions of right 
 and wrong in human conduct, of merit and demerit, 
 of duty, and moral obligation, &c. — He that will 
 judge of the first principles of morals must consult 
 his moral faculty, when he is calm and dispassionate." 
 — " We shall find that all moral reasonings rest upon 
 one or more first principles of morals, whose truth is 
 immediately perceived without reasoning, by all men 
 come to years of understanding. ,, — " It is a first 
 
 * Influence of Physical Causes on the Moral Facul'y. 
 
Elements of Moral Feeling, 251 
 
 principle in morals, that we ought not to do to ano- 
 ther, what we should think wrong to be done to us in 
 like circumstances. If a man is not capable of per- 
 ceiving this in his cool moments, when he reflects 
 seriously, he is not a moral agent, nor is he capable of 
 being convinced of it by reasoning."* 
 
 I am aware that in quoting the opinions of Lord 
 Shaftesbury and Rousseau, either by way of autho- 
 rity or illustration, I may be supposed to favour 
 their general writings. It is therefore incumbent 
 upon me to express my regret, that men, who could 
 take so interesting and just a view of human nature, 
 in many particulars, as may be noticed in several parts 
 of their respective works, should have been betrayed 
 into any impotent attacks against the sacred and im- 
 pregnable bulwarks of Revealed Truth. The author 
 of the " Characteristics" was perhaps the most consis- 
 tent, and sincere, yet withal too frequently vapid in 
 his reasonings, and given to unbecoming levity on 
 serious subjects. But Rousseau, while, at one time, 
 he wrote as if his mind was deeply embued with virtue 
 from the streams of Inspiration itself, at another, he 
 displayed the depravity and weakness of the libertine 
 and unbeliever. We cannot, therefore, regard the 
 acknowledgments which have fallen from such men, 
 but as the unconstrained testimony of the human 
 mind on the side of virtue, or the spontaneous 
 homage which is paid by all men in their cool and 
 
 * Essays on the Powers of the Human Mind, vol. 3. ch. 6. 
 
252 Elements of Moral Feeling. 
 
 and serious moments, to the universal and immutable 
 light of Truth. 
 
 Rousseau thus forcibly expresses himself. " Cast 
 your eyes over all the nations of the world, survey all 
 their histories ; among so many absurd and inhuman 
 forms of worship, among such a prodigious diversity 
 of manners and of character, you will find every where 
 the same ideas of justice and probity, every where the 
 same notions of good and evil." — " There is there- 
 fore in the bottom of our souls an innate principle of 
 justice and of virtue, by which, in spite of our pecu- 
 liar maxims, we judge our own actions and those of 
 others to be good or evil." In another place he 
 justly says, " I know not for what reason men would 
 attribute to the progress of philosophy the beautiful 
 morality of our books ; this morality, drawn from the 
 Gospel, belonged to Christianity before it did to phi- 
 losophy. The precepts of Plato are often very 
 sublime ; but how frequently does he err, and to what 
 extent do his errors not reach ? As to Cicero, can 
 we believe, that, without Plato, this rhetorician 
 would have discovered his duties ? The Gospel 
 alone, as to its morality, is always certain, always true, 
 always perfect, and always consistent with itself."* 
 
 " Sense of right and wrong" according to Shaftes- 
 bury, " being as natural to us as natural affection 
 itself, and being a first principle in our constitution and 
 make; there is no speculative opinion, persuasion, or 
 belief, which is capable immediately or directly to 
 
 * Pensees dc Rousseau. 
 
Elements of Moral Feeling. 253 
 
 exclude or destroy it. That which is of original and 
 pure nature nothing beside contrary habit and custom 
 (a second nature) is able to displace. And this affec- 
 tion beine; an original one of earliest rise in the soul : 
 — It's impossible that this can instantly, or without 
 much force and violence, be effaced, or struck out of 
 the natural temper, even by means of the most extra- 
 vagant belief in the world."* 
 
 There appears, to me to be great propriety in the 
 following remarks from Dr. Beattie. tt Truth is 
 something fixed and determinate, depending not upon 
 man, but upon the Author of Nature. The funda- 
 mental principles of truth must therefore rest upon 
 their own evidence, perceived intuitively by the under- 
 standing." 
 
 " Why should not our judgments concerning Truth 
 be acknowledged to result from a bias impressed upon 
 the mind by its Creator, as well as our desire of self- 
 preservation, our love of society, &c. ? If those 
 judgments be not instinctive, I should be glad to know 
 how they come to be universal : — If those judgments 
 be not instinctive, I should be glad to know how men 
 find it so difficult, or rather impossible to lay them 
 aside. "+ — " Morality is founded on certain first prin- 
 ciples." — f* I do not say," observes Beattie in ano- 
 ther place, " that any particular moral principle is 
 innate, or that an infant brings it into the world with 
 him : this would be as absurd as to say that an infant 
 
 * Characteristics, vol. 2. 
 + Beattie on Truth, part. 2. ch. 2. 
 
254 Elements of Moral Feeling. 
 
 brings the multiplication table into the woild with 
 him. But, I say that the moral faculty which dic- 
 tates moral principles, and the intellectual faculty 
 which ascertains proportions of quantity and number, 
 are original parts of man's nature; which, though 
 they appear not at his birth, nor for some time after, 
 even as the ear of corn is not seen till long after the 
 blade is sprung up, fail not, however, provided out- 
 ward circumstances be favourable, to disclose them- 
 selves in due season."* 
 
 * Beattie, Elements of Moral Science, part, 3. ch. 2. 
 
CHAP. III. 
 ON THE SYSTEM OF LOCKE. 
 
 Before I enter further into this subject, it may be 
 proper to take a very general view of the fundamental 
 principles in the system of Locke, as they are laid 
 down in his Essay on Human Understanding. A 
 work so celebrated, the first appearance of which 
 might be said to form an era in the philosophy of the 
 human mind, ought of necessity to claim our serious 
 attention. But, independently of his work, and the 
 great original genius of its author, the virtues of the 
 man, and the piety of the Christian, are entitled to 
 unqualified respect. That he accomplished much, is 
 acknowledged by those who impugned his arguments; 
 and that his system has many defects is admitted even 
 by his friends. It is not, however, my object, neither 
 is it my place, even if I were so qualified, to set forth 
 his merits, or to expose his faults. But, as it will be 
 necessary to make frequent reference to his principles, 
 and as the consideration of them -is intimately con- 
 
256 On the Sit/ stem of Locke. 
 
 nected with the present argument, a short previous 
 notice seemed indispensable. In the course of my 
 speculations I shall pass no farther comments upon 
 them than a desire to discover truth, wherever it can 
 be found, and sincere conviction, may seem bolh to 
 justify and to require. Yet I shall always endeavour 
 to strengthen my own views by concurring opinions, 
 rather than to exhibit them alone unsupported by 
 authority ; more especially when opposed to so grave 
 an authority as that of Locke. 
 
 I must here, however, forewarn my reader, that, in 
 entering upon some of the following speculations, 
 with no other guide than human reason to direct, he 
 will have to launch with me into a sea of unfathom- 
 able depth, clouded with more or less metaphysical 
 obscurity, in which few real discoveries have yet been 
 made by the unassisted light of nature. Yet, al- 
 though we may have to steer our course by this feeble 
 light, and may frequently be involved in perplexities 
 and doubts in consequence, I am not without hope, 
 that by keeping a constant eye to a better guide, we 
 shall be enabled to make our way through conflicting 
 tides of opinion, to escape from the darkness and un- 
 certainty of outward speculation, and to discover a 
 polar star, that will give us clear and steady light, and 
 lead us at last to the haven of Truth. 
 
 Locke endeavours to show, that the human mind in 
 its natural or ordinary state, has received no impres- 
 sions originally from its Maker, and is therefore desti- 
 tute of every kind of innate principle. Hence he 
 
On the System of Locke. 257 
 
 compares it to "a white sheet of paper," — "an empty 
 cabinet," — and "a dark room." He considers that 
 the only objects it contemplates are what he calls its 
 Ideas : and that these are either received from with* 
 out by the senses ; or the mind, by exercising its facul- 
 ties in reflecting on these materials, forms new con- 
 ceptions, and thus acquires by experience all its know- 
 ledge. He argues, that as it has no innate ideas, — 
 no instinctive rule to distinguish truth from false- 
 hood; so it can have "no innate practical prin- 
 ciples," but is moral or immoral by education, de- 
 praved or virtuous entirely by custom, having no 
 greater tendency, naturally, to good than to evil ; to 
 approve what is honest, benevolent, or disinterested, 
 than the contrary, farther than what is virtuous is 
 found to be profitable to society ; consequently, that 
 the ideas of a Supreme Being, of moral and religious 
 obligation, and of virtue and vice, are all acquired. 
 Hence he infers, that man, either by process of argu- 
 mentation, has discovered these Truths : or, where 
 they have been above human research, that they have 
 been made known by Revelation in the written letter 
 of Scripture; nothing, in fact, having been inscribed 
 on the table of the heart by the Creator. For, as 
 Reason or outward research affords the only natural 
 light, and as there are many things which it cannot 
 know, by all its labour, some revelation from above 
 was necessary to man : therefore, that the volume of 
 Holy Scripture supplies that necessity, and now con- 
 stitutes the common measure and extent of that reve- 
 
 R 
 
258 On the System of Locke. 
 
 lation: consequently, that our duties can only be 
 known by the laboured deductions of Reason on the 
 one hand, or the Inspired Writings on the other ; and, 
 mediately, by outward instruction. 
 
 The following passages, in the writer's own words, 
 will explain the matter more fully. " I doubt not 
 but to shew that a man, by the right use ofhis natural 
 abilities, may, without any innate principles, attain 
 the knowledge of a God, and other things that con- 
 cern hirn — and may arrive at certainty without any 
 such original notions or principles."* 
 
 " Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, 
 white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas; 
 how comes it to be furnished ? Whence has it all 
 the materials of reason and knowledge ? To this, I 
 answer, in one word, from Experience : in that, all 
 our knowledge is founded : and from that it ultimate- 
 ly derives itself." Book 2. Ch. i. 
 
 " Methinks, the understanding is not much unlike 
 a closet wholly shut from light with only some little 
 opening left to let in external visible resemblances, 
 
 or ideas of things without," Book 2. Ch. xii " The 
 
 great source of most of the ideas we have, depending 
 wholly upon our senses, ai}d derived by them to the 
 understanding, I call Sensation. The other fountain 
 from which experience furnisheth the understanding 
 with ideas, is the perception of the operations of our 
 own minds within us, as it is employed about the ideas 
 it has got— I call this Reflection." " These two 
 
 * See Essay, Book 1. Ch. it. 
 
On the System of Locke. 259 
 
 are to me the only originals from whence all our ideas 
 take their beginnings." — " The understanding seems 
 to me not to have the least glimmering of any ideas, 
 which it doth not receive from one of these two. 
 External objects furnish the mind with the ideas of 
 sensible qualities — i. e. The senses at first let in par- 
 ticular ideas and furnish the yet empty cabinet." — 
 " And the mind furnishes the understanding with the 
 
 ideas of its own operations." Book 2. Ch. i " For 
 
 white paper receives any characters." Book 1. Ch. iii. 
 
 And again, with regard to moral duties, he says, 
 " I doubt not, but, without being written on their 
 hearts, many men may, by the same way that they 
 come to the knowledge of other things, come to as- 
 sent to several moral rules, and be convinced of their 
 obligations ; others also may come to be of the same 
 mind, from their education, company, and customs of 
 their country ; which persuasion, however got, will 
 serve to set Conscience on work." 
 
 " If conscience be a proof of innate principles, 
 contraries may be innate principles ; since some men, 
 with the same bent of conscience, prosecute what 
 others avoid." Book 1. Ch. iii. 
 
 From this system it follows, according to the same 
 writer, that " Conscience is nothing else but our own 
 opinion or judgment, of the moral rectitude or pravity 
 of our actions;" — that " Virtue is approved, not be- 
 cause it is innate, but because it is profitable',''' — that 
 " Good and Evil are nothing but pleasure or pain, or 
 that which occasions or procures pleasure or pain to 
 
 it 2 
 
260 On the System of Locke. 
 
 us;"— that " Truth signifies nothing but the joining 
 or separating of signs, as the things signified by them, 
 do agree or disagree with one another : the joining 
 or separating of signs being what is called a propo~ 
 sition ;" — that " Light, true Light in the mind, is or 
 can be nothing else but the evidence of the truth of 
 any proposition ;" — that " Faith is nothing but a firm 
 assent of the mind to the truth of any proposition;" 
 —and that u Reason must be our last judge and 
 guide in every thing."* These are Locke's defini- 
 tions and opinions in his own words. 
 
 Now, I think it may easily be seen, that this Sys- 
 tem, considered as a whole, is united in its parts; 
 and, that it gives a very plain, what if I say, mecha- 
 nical view of the human intellect, and of the mode and 
 materials of its instruction or enlargement. 
 « It omits all notice of instincts, inherent determi- 
 nations, impulses, and innate principles, speculative 
 or moral. 
 
 A few remarks, however, by way of explanation or 
 previous information, are all that I can now with pro- 
 priety offer. The system of Locke is too comprehen- 
 sive ; his reasonings too profound and connected, 
 and my own ability, and the space I have to allow 
 myself, too limited, to permit me to say much on the 
 subject, if any thing, in so small a compass, that will 
 be likely to prove either satisfactory to myself or to 
 my reader. Yet the little I offer, will, I trust, be 
 fully corroborated. As I proceed in this inquiry, I 
 
 * See Es^ay on Human Understanding. 
 
On the Sj/stem of Locke, 261 
 
 flatter myself that suitable opportunities will be af- 
 forded, to explain my views of the tendency of some 
 of his principles more fully. 
 
 I am, notwithstanding, desirous of abating some- 
 what of the influence which such an author must pos- 
 sess, and of showing, in limine, that his reasonings are 
 far from being considered by many eminent writers as 
 entitled to implicit credit ; so that, if I differ with him 
 in some important points, I do not differ alone. It is 
 for this reason that I adduce the testimonies at the 
 end of this Chapter. But if there did not appear to 
 be a stronger sanction than even human authority in 
 support of the view I take, I should hardly venture to 
 hint at opposition. 
 
 It will appear from the preceding extracts, that 
 Locke considers Experience to be the only foundation 
 of all our knowledge; that Sensation furnishes the 
 mind with information concerning the qualities of out- 
 ward material objects; and Reflection furnishes the 
 understanding with a knowledge of the mind's own 
 operations, by means of the different faculties, me- 
 mory, association, abstraction, imagination, reason, 
 &c. 
 
 This is undoubtedly a very simple view of the case; 
 and the clearness and simplicity are rendered still 
 more striking by the comparison of the human under, 
 standing, in its unfurnished state, to a dark closet, — 
 an empty cabinet, — a white sheet of paper. It is no 
 wonder, therefore, that a system, built upon such plain 
 intelligible principles, should gratify every one who is 
 
262 On tJie System of Locke. 
 
 desirous of having clear ideas on a subject that is 
 usually considered to be involved in perplexing 
 obscurity. Many of those terms, also, to which we 
 are used to annex ideas more or less abstract and re- 
 fined, and to connect them with something of sacred 
 import, as Faith, Light, Truth, Conscience, are 
 stripped of these allusions, and presented to us as 
 things more plain and cognizable by the natural un- 
 derstanding than readers of divine mysteries would 
 imagine. Another principle must also, to many, be 
 highly satisfactory, viz. that " men, barely by the use. 
 of their natural faculties, may attain to all the know- 
 ledge they have, without the help of any innate im- 
 pressions; and may arrive at certainty, without any 
 such original notions or principles." Certainty of 
 knowledge is a high human attainment, promised too, 
 to the exercise of the natural faculties. 
 
 It is however true, that, notwithstanding the seem- 
 ing simplicity of its principles, this System requires, 
 in its details, an infinite deal of metaphysical acumen 
 and complicated reasoning, to reconcile to it a very 
 considerable number of mental phenomena — particu- 
 larly in moral and religious operations, sentiments, 
 and exercises ; and to explain satisfactorily the origin 
 of some of our ideas. 
 
 In this last attempt even the mighty genius of Locke 
 has failed him in many instances. Locke was un- 
 questionably a profound thinker : and no other sys- 
 tem could have been devised which would have given 
 such scope to his natural genius as that he adopted. 
 
On the System of Locke. 263 
 
 For as, conformably to his theory, every idea in the 
 mind was acquired by some intelligible intellectual 
 process; it was incumbent upon him to prove, and he 
 exercises his ingenuity accordingly in showing by 
 what direct or intricate steps he supposes the mind to 
 attain all its most abstract notions. Hence, not only 
 is a very technical and artificial origin assigned to 
 some of our ideas, but a very mechanical notion is 
 given of the mind itself, as to its nature and deve- 
 lopement. For, after all the display of simplicity, 
 even if the principles were granted, the manner in 
 which an intelligent Being, dignified also as a moral 
 agent, digests and elaborates the ideas of outward 
 things into art and science, morality and religion, 
 would be still a mystery as deep and inscrutable as 
 the evolution of a seed into radicle and plume, stem 
 and branch, bud and fruit. This is a living work; 
 and no living work was ever yet comprehended by 
 the human mind. Though this is done by successive 
 stages, it does not follow, that the tendencies are not 
 innate; and although the mental faculties are de- 
 veloped one after another, it does not follow that this 
 developement is effected by human art. 
 
 If Experience mean process or lapse of time, the 
 proposition, in a qualified sense, may be true, that 
 Experience is the foundation of all our knowledge and 
 all our principles. But if it mean the labour and un- 
 assisted energy of the creature, the truth of the as- 
 sertion may fairly be doubted : because as the growth 
 of a plant proceeds from one degree to another by its 
 
264 On the System of Locke. 
 
 inherent powers, without human assistance (which 
 may, indeed, aid or retard, but cannot give the powers 
 themselves); so in the developement of the mind, the 
 internal seeds, faculties, or talents, may be gradually 
 unfolded, by native tendencies or principles of thought 
 and action, which, if they may not be strictly called 
 innate, are, nevertheless, not introduced, though they 
 may be excited from without : — And this is something 
 more than a barren metaphysical distinction. 
 
 The question is not whether a great and profound 
 genius such as Locke, might attain to certain know- 
 ledge, by what he calls the right use of his natural 
 faculties ; for, such a capacity might only be granted 
 to one in a million : but, whether the human mind is 
 furnished by its Maker with those simple intelligible 
 principles of right and wrong, true and false, which 
 will enable the million, however simple, wayfaring 
 and illiterate, by the common or ordinary use of the 
 talents committed to them, to think and act like ra- 
 tional beings, to comprehend their duties to God and 
 man, and by obedience to perform them. 
 
 When we consider the origin which Locke has as- 
 signed to the principles of human knowledge in ge- 
 neral, we cannot wonder that his theory of moral 
 truth should follow the fate of his theory of every 
 other kind of truth. Speculative maxims and prac- 
 tical principles are however essentially different : and 
 though men may not be born with the former, yet it 
 is going far to say that the human mind is not na- 
 turally endowed with any of the latter. For an 
 
On the System of Locke. 265 
 
 outward source of moral truth to a moral agent, would 
 plainly be more serious in its effects than an outward 
 source of speculative truth. That a being who is only 
 accountable to his Maker should be sent into the 
 world with no one internal principle to instruct him 
 in a single act of conduct that would be agreeable in 
 the sight of God, but wholly dependent on the de- 
 ductions of his own reason and experience, or on the 
 casual instruction that might be thrown in his way by 
 others of the same race, is surely not according to the 
 theory of morals which we are taught by Divine Reve- 
 lation. 
 
 Locke seems to me to take it for granted, that un- 
 less every intimation of duty, measure of light, degree 
 of evidence, manifestation of truth, in the mind, can 
 be reduced to the form of a proposition, it can have 
 no practical effect. This does not seem to be the 
 opinion of others : and it surely must be admitted 
 that various practical principles seem to operate, as 
 in the lower animals, without any corresponding pro- 
 positions of truth being objectively in their minds. 
 
 Dr. Watts, I observe, takes notice of the concession 
 which Locke has made, c that there are such things as 
 innate practical principles— viz. the desire of happi- 
 ness, and aversion to misery ;' and he says that the 
 mind u contains in it the plain and general principles 
 of morality, not explicitly as propositions, but only as 
 native principles by which it judges, and cannot but 
 judge virtue to be fit, and vice unfit for intelligent 
 and social creatures which God has made."* 
 
 f Philosophical Essays. 
 
266 On the System of Locke, 
 
 Although therefore the tendency of Locke's reason- 
 ing is to prove that there are no innate principles, 
 either speculative or practical; v yet he admits of one 
 exception, and is led to confess that " Nature has put 
 into, man a desire of happiness, and an aversion to 
 misery ; and that these, indeed, are innate practical 
 principles, which do continue constantly to operate 
 and influence all our actions, without ceasing." But, 
 he observes, " these are inclinations of the appetite 
 to good, not impressions of truth on the understand- 
 ing." And he adds, " I deny not, that there are 
 natural tendencies imprinted on the minds of men; 
 and that from the very first instances of sense and 
 perception, there are some things that are grateful, 
 and others unwelcome to them; some things that 
 they incline to, and others that they fly :" He con- 
 cludes, however, " this makes nothing for innate 
 characters on the mind, which are to be the principles 
 of knowledge, regulating our practice."* 
 
 With great deference, 1 think it may be presumed 
 that if the comprehensive word Happiness were re- 
 solved into the pursuit and possession of the various 
 objects at which different individuals aim, and into 
 the various principles put in action to attain it, per- 
 haps it would include more of original native im- 
 pulses than might have been contemplated in the pro- 
 position. Some place it in one thing, some in ano- 
 ther. Happiness may be something that is remote, 
 or that is immediate. It may refer to moral as well 
 
 * Book 1. Ch. 3. 
 
On the System of Locke, 267 
 
 as to natural gratifications. It may include the 
 objects of our appetites, our desires, and our affec- 
 tions, as also of our higher and nobler principles. 
 
 Locke, however, has not given it this latitude of 
 meaning, but plainly implies in the expression, im- 
 planted desire of happiness, " an inclination of the ap- 
 petite to good," that is, sensual gratification. 
 
 But, leaving appetites, if we come to imprinted 
 tendencies, desires, and affections, it must be con- 
 fessed, that these do often urge to action, as practical 
 principles, without the medium of propositions or 
 acquired knowledge. For, implanted tendencies are 
 plainly in the stead of knowledge, and imparted, 
 through defect of knowledge, for ends which are as 
 fully, if not better answered when the mind is 
 prompted by an original native impulse, than when 
 it is directed by an impression of truth in the under- 
 standing. All the natural impulses of the mind, what- 
 ever they be, stand us in stead of impressions of truth 
 in the understanding, that is, instead of formal propo- 
 sitions. They supply the deficiencies of Reason. 
 The only difference is, that the source from which 
 they spring is a higher wisdom than our own : and 
 the consequence is, that the design is more perfectly 
 accomplished. But when the mind is actuated by a 
 moral impulse, consequently under the influence of a 
 higher wisdom than its own, does it follow, that in 
 every such case, there should be a formal proposition 
 in the understanding:? The Beaver and the Bee are 
 impelled to action, not by impressions of truth on the 
 
268 On the System of Locke. 
 
 understanding, not by acquired principles of know- 
 ledge; but by native practical principles, which urge 
 them as determinately, as man is urged by the innate 
 desire of happiness. 
 
 It would seem therefore to be a fundamental error 
 in philosophy to assume that an intelligent being can- 
 not be led or directed to what is good, unless by the 
 influence of some speculative maxim or proposition, 
 formally present in the mind. For it is certain that 
 the instinctive actions in men and brutes, which con- 
 cern the welfare of the body, are not directed by this 
 kind of influence ; — the power which urges them to 
 act not being an acquired notion but an original law, 
 the nature and design of which they cannot often see. 
 And it is not an unfair supposition, (for as much as the 
 analogy is good,) that the highest interests of man 
 should be influenced or directed ■primarily by instinc- 
 tive impulses, without the medium of formal impres- 
 sions of truth on the understanding. It is not more 
 difficult to conceive an original inclination of the 
 mind to its highest good, subject nevertheless to the 
 power which it has of abuse, than an original incli- 
 nation of the appetite to its lowest or sensual good, 
 subject to the very same power. Neither is it more 
 difficult to conceive that there should be instinctive 
 or inbred determinations to think and act after a cer- 
 tain rule as rational and moral agents, than that there 
 should be such determinations to act after a certain 
 rule as irrational or animal agents. But, in the 
 latter case, it is incontrovertibly true, that the prills 
 
On the St/stem of Locke. 269 
 
 clples of action are innate — as in animal instincts:— 
 they are certainly not acquired by experience, yet 
 they are practical principles, involving in some cases 
 high degrees of geometrical knowledge and exquisite 
 art ; — they are true practical principles without any 
 propositions of truth formally objective in the mind. 
 Why then, it may be asked, may not human beings 
 act both as rational and moral creatures, without 
 formal propositions of truth in their understandings, 
 simply from natural and constitutional determinations, 
 to reason according to certain universal rules of 
 speculative truth, or to act according to certain uni- 
 versal principles of right and wrong? The only 
 difference is that man may pervert his reason ; and 
 may choose evil instead of good. In other words, he 
 is not bound by his constitution always to reason 
 absurdly or the contrary ; nor to act always vir- 
 tuously or wickedly. But his Maker hath shewn him 
 what is good; consequently what is evil. And he is 
 formed constitutionally to distinguish truth from 
 falsehood; for if his rational principles do not un- 
 fold themselves in due time and order, as in his neigh- 
 bours, he is not fit for human society. It is impossible 
 to conceive that any human being, as man, whether 
 in civilized or savage society, sound in heart and 
 mind, can be altogether ignorant of the relations of 
 true and false^ and right and wrong. 
 
 It will appear, to some, singular enough, that this 
 eminent writer, by adopting the notion, which may 
 Well be called paradoxical, that the mind does not 
 
270 On the System of Locke. 
 
 perceive external objects themselves, but only the 
 idea, image or representation of those objects, in 
 some unaccountable way brought before it, should 
 have helped to lay the foundation for the scepticism 
 of Hume and Berkley, with regard to the existence 
 of a material world. This however is the fact : and, 
 in so far, this Ideal System, as it has been termed, has 
 led some of its followers to adopt conclusions revolt- 
 ing to the common sense of mankind. 
 
 Des Cartes, Malebranche, and Locke attempted to 
 prove, what needed no proof by argument, the exist- 
 ence of a material world. Yet it appears, according 
 to Dr. Reid, that " these three great men with the 
 best good will, have not been able, (upon their own 
 principles) from all the treasures of Philosophy, to 
 draw one argument that is fit to convince a man that 
 can reason, of the existence of any one thing without 
 him." " Neither Des Cartes nor Locke perceived 
 the consequences of their system concerning ideas. 
 Bishop Berkley was the first who discovered it. ,? 
 " Thus we see that Des Cartes and Locke take the 
 road that leads to scepticism, without knowing the 
 end of it ; but they stop short for want of light to 
 carry them farther. Berkley frighted at the appear- 
 ance of the dreadful abyss, starts aside and avoids 
 it. But the author of the Treatise of Human Nature, 
 (David Hume) more daring and intrepid, without 
 turning aside to the right hand or the left, like Virgil's 
 Alecto, shoots directly into the gulf." For, the last 
 
 * See Inquiry into the Human Mind. 
 
On the System of Loche, 271 
 
 argued, upon Locke's principles, not only against 
 the existence of matter, but of mind or spirit, and 
 held that Ideas were the only things existing in the 
 Universe ! To such a degree will the human mind 
 suffer itself to be bewildered when it leaves the simple 
 instructions of Nature and Revelation ! 
 
 After alluding to some of the advantages which re- 
 sulted to Science from the publication of Locke's 
 Essay, Dugald Stewart remarks, that " with these 
 great merits, his work has capital defects ; and, per- 
 haps, in no part of it are these defects more impor- 
 tant, than in the attempt he has made to deduce the 
 origin of our knowledge entirely from Sensation and 
 Reflexion. These, according to him are the sources 
 of all our simple ideas ; and the only power that the 
 mind possesses, is to perform certain operations in 
 the way of Composition, Abstraction, Generalization, 
 Comparison, &c. on the materials which it thus collects 
 in the course of its experience." " This system led 
 Mr. Locke to some dangerous opinions, concerning 
 the nature of moral distinctions ; which he seems to 
 have considered as the offspring of education and 
 fashion.* Stewart adds, that " the late learned Mr. 
 Harris in particular frequently mentions this doctrine 
 of Locke, and always in terms of high indignation.'* 
 
 Dr. Beattie says that " nothing was further from 
 the intention of Locke, than to encourage verbal 
 controversy, or advance doctrines favourable to scep- 
 
 * Outlines of Moral Phil. sect. 6. See also Elements of Philosophy, 
 chap. 1. sect. 4. 
 
272 On the System of Locke. 
 
 ticism. To do good to mankind, by enforcing virtue, 
 illustrating truth, and vindicating liberty, was his 
 sincere purpose : and he did not labour in vain. But 
 candour obliges me to remark, that some of his tenets 
 seem to be too rashly admitted, for the sake of a 
 favourite hypothesis. That some of them have pro- 
 moted scepticism is undeniable. He seems, indeed 
 to have been sensible that there were inaccurracies 
 in his work." — " The first book of his Essay, which 
 with submission, I think the worst, tends to establish 
 this dangerous doctrine, that the human mind, pre- 
 vious to education and habit, is as susceptible of any 
 one impression as of any other : a doctrine which if 
 true, would go near to prove that truth and virtue 
 are no better than human contrivances; or at least 
 that they have nothing permanent in their na- 
 ture, but may be as changeable as the inclinations 
 and capacities of men. Surely this is not the doc- 
 trine that Locke meant to establish; but his zeal 
 against innate ideas, and innate principles, put him 
 off his guard, and made him allow too little to in- 
 stinct for fear of allowing too much.* 
 
 " Sensation and Reflexion," in the words of Dr. 
 Price, " have been commonly reckoned the sources 
 of all our ideas ; and Mr. Locke has taken no small 
 
 * Essay on Truth, part 2, chap. 2, p. 137. 
 
 Beattie adds, " Locke's discourse against innate ideas and principles, 
 is too metaphysical. Some of his notions on that subject are, I believe, 
 right; but he has not explained them with his wonted precision; and 
 most of his arguments are founded in an ambiguous acceptation of the 
 words idea and innate."\ 
 
 t Essay on Truth, part 3 chan. 2, p. 247. 
 
On the System of Locke. 273 
 
 pains to prove this. How much, soever, on the whole, 
 I admire his excellent Essay, I cannot think him 
 sufficiently clear or explicit on this head."* " Nor 
 does there seem to be any thing necessary to con- 
 vince a person, that all our ideas are not deducible 
 from sensation and reflexion — except taken in a very 
 large and comprehensive sense, besides considering', 
 how Mr. Locke derives from them our moral ideas.''' 
 " It is undoubted that this great man would have de- 
 tested the consequences (deducible from this system); 
 and, indeed it is sufficiently evident, that he was 
 strangely embarrassed, and inconsistent in his notions 
 on this, as well as some other subjects. "+ 
 
 In regard to the question of a moral faculty, on 
 which he dissents from Locke, Dr. Rush modestly 
 states ; " The only apology I shall make for pre- 
 suming to differ from that justly celebrated oracle 
 Mr. Locke (who has confounded the moral principle 
 with Reason) shall be, that the eagle-eye of Genius 
 often darts its views beyond the notice of facts, which 
 are accommodated to the slender organs of percep- 
 tion of men, who possess no other talent than that of 
 observation."^: 
 
 * Review of the principal questions in Morals, by Dr. Price, p. 18. 
 
 t Ibid. p. 63. 
 
 | See Influence of physical causes on the Moral Faculty. 
 
 Bishop Berkley observes that " if any one were able to introduce the 
 general idea of a triangle into the mind, it would be the author of the 
 Essay on Human Understanding. He who has so far distinguished 
 himself from the generality of writers by the clearness and significancy 
 of what he says. But that it is made up of manifest staring contradic- 
 
274 On the System of Locke. 
 
 It will be generally admitted that Dr. Watts was 
 distinguished for exemplary moderation in all that 
 he wrote on controversial subjects. This candid and 
 judicious author states — M There has been a great 
 controversy about the origin of ideas, namely, whether 
 any of our ideas are innate or no, that is, born with 
 us, and naturally belonging to our minds. Mr. Locke 
 utterly denies it ; others as positively affirm it." Dr. 
 Watts implies that W the controversy may be com- 
 promised, by allowing that there is a sense, wherein 
 our first ideas of some things may be said to be in- 
 nate;" — and he adds, " though Mr. Locke supposes 
 sensation and reflexion to be the only two springs 
 of all ideas; yet abstraction is certainly a different 
 act of the mind. Nor can I think Mr. Locke him- 
 self would deny my representation of the original of 
 abstracted ideas, nor forbid them to stand for a dis- 
 tinct species."* 
 
 In his philosophical Essays Dr. Watts thus ex- 
 presses himself, " There are many admirable chapters 
 in the Essay of Human Understanding, and many 
 truths in them, which are worthy of letters of gold. 
 But there are some opinions in his philosophy espe- 
 cially relating to intelligent beings, their powers and 
 operations, which have not gained my assent." . . . ic His 
 writings relating to Christianity have some excellent 
 
 tions." He adds, " That a man who thought so much, and laid so 
 great stress on clear and determinate ideas, should nevertheless talk at 
 this rate, seems very surprising." New Theory of Vision. 
 
 * See Logic, part 1, chap. 3, sect* 1. 
 
On the System of Locke. 275 
 
 thoughts in them, though 1 fear he has sunk some of 
 the divine themes and glories of that dispensation too 
 much below their original design "* 
 
 In reference to the last remark I may add, that a- 
 mongst thinking men, the most ready and effectual way 
 to acquire the submission of Faith has generally been 
 by a smooth and easy passage from the outworks of 
 Reason. If Faith imposes nothing more than what 
 may be ingeniously reconciled to the outward views 
 of Reason, the assent of the latter is easily gained ; 
 but when many difficulties are started, and a for- 
 midable barrier is thus raised between them, the 
 contest is long and arduous ; even miracles them- 
 selves are slighted, and the strong hold of Reason 
 seldom is abandoned. On the other hand, if " the 
 wise and prudent of this world" can please them* 
 selves with the notion that what are mysteries to the 
 common mass are brought down to their own com* 
 prehension; and mountains are removed and crooked 
 things made straight — by their Reason not their 
 Faith ; — then Reason and Revelation are said to go 
 hand in hand ; and the natural pride of the human 
 understanding is made to agree (if it be possible for 
 it to agree) with the simplicity and meekness of Re- 
 vealed Truth. 
 I A system, therefore, like that of Locke, which at- 
 tempts to exalt the human mind to an adequate com- 
 prehension of divine mysteries, and to bring them 
 down^ as it were, to its own level, must needs have 
 
 * Philosophical Es3ays by Dr. Watts. 
 8 2 
 
276 On the System of Locke. 
 
 ready access to the closet of the speculative Christ 
 tian. If Reason is rightly proclaimed to be " our 
 last judge and guide in every thing," whatever there 
 be of faith and doctrine and mystery, difficult to be 
 understood, must undergo narrow scrutiny ; and they 
 who know how jealously Reason maintains its autho- 
 rity against every thing short of formal demonstration, 
 will be at no loss to determine how such difficulties 
 are likely to be settled. We must indeed admit, that, 
 seeing mankind are prone to extremes, and the best 
 things liable to abuse, therefore a check ought to be 
 devised, by which extravagance and error may be 
 prevented. It must also be admitted, that the system 
 of Locke is well calculated to repress the wildness of 
 enthusiasm ; and at the time he wrote, there were many 
 pretenders to divine illumination. But it is equally 
 clear, that what checks exuberance may also check 
 the kindly growth of what is good. And there is 
 cause to fear that some of Locke's principles have 
 had the latter effect. He that plucks up the tares 
 should take heed that he root not up the grain like- 
 wise. 
 
CHAP. IV. 
 
 OF THE ANALOGY BETWEEN MENTAL PRIN- 
 CIPLES AND SEEDS, AND BETWEEN EDUCA- 
 TION AND CULTURE. 
 
 Sect. I. 
 Of the Analog?/ between mental Principles and Seeds. 
 
 We have now taken a review of several important 
 testimonies, in favour of some universal law or light 
 of truth, existing in the mind antecedently to out- 
 ward observation, and leading mankind — the wise and 
 unwise — to certain general opinions — with regard to 
 the existence of a supreme Being, the obligation and 
 excellence of virtue in its various forms, and the 
 sacred rights and supremacy of conscience. For we 
 cannot conceive any human society to subsist, with- 
 out some impressions more or less distinct, of these 
 primary and essential truths. 
 
 We have also taken notice of the opinion very 
 generally entertained by philosophers, that even 
 speculative truth itself, of every description, is found- 
 ed upon some first principles or intuitive axioms, in- 
 capable of proof, and yet, by the constitution of our 
 
278 Of the Analogy between 
 
 nature, commanding implicit assent. And it seemed 
 to follow, as a necessary consequence, that moral 
 truth, likewise, should be built upon some original 
 principle in the mind. From such small beginnings, 
 therefore, it was to be presumed, the greatest stretch 
 of intellect, and the highest degree of moral excel- 
 lence, took their rise. 
 
 A question therefore naturally presents itself, whe- 
 ther these Elements of Reason and of Moral Feeling 
 — if they may be so denominated — constitute part of 
 the original fabric of the mind, or only bear such a 
 relation to it, as a cargo of merchandize does to a 
 ship, or an assortment of jewels to a cabinet. 
 
 We have partially reviewed the leading principles 
 of Locke's system, and, if we may judge from his 
 comparisons, the latter must have been his opinion. 
 We have seen, notwithstanding, that very grave au- 
 thorities are opposed to this eminent writer ; and it 
 will be proper to enter into a brief discussion, on the 
 developement of the mental faculties ; without which 
 developement, it is to be presumed, the understand- 
 ing can neither be cultivated, nor embued with know- 
 ledge. For, the developement is one thing, and the 
 cultivation another. A limb may grow, and a branch 
 may shoot out ; the former without being properly 
 exercised, and the latter without being properly 
 trained. 
 
 It seems, therefore, to be of importance that we 
 should inquire whether the mind has any analogy to 
 the other works of divine Providence, or stands alone 
 
'WERSI 
 
 Menial Principles and Seeds, 270 
 
 and distinct, in its affinities, propensities and deve- 
 lopement, from every other object of the Lord's 
 Creation. I believe, we shall find, although we can- 
 not pretend to know any thing of its real essence, 
 that, in its constitution, faculties and endowments, 
 whether these be natural or acquired, it still holds a 
 near and beautiful relation to the objects with which 
 we are surrounded. 
 
 I conclude, therefore, that a suitable object of com- 
 parison, will help us to form as clear a notion of the 
 matter as the nature of things will admit. But as to 
 the question whether the mind be purely immaterial, 
 or be absolutely depending on material organs to 
 execute its functions, the analogy I allude to, will be 
 equally applicable. 
 
 It seems, therefore, to be perfectly consistent with 
 the phenomena, to consider the mind in its original 
 state, as a living principle possessed of inherent 
 powers, or germs of thought and feeling, each of 
 them capable of astonishing enlargement. And these 
 are precisely the properties we ascribe to a germ or 
 seed. The mode in which the mind is at first enabled 
 to apprehend the most simple truths, or elements of 
 knowledge, and afterwards by slow degrees to en- 
 large its comprehension, so as to take in systems ; 
 as well as the order in which its powers are gradually 
 unfolded; afford the clearest illustration of this ana- 
 logy, as well as substantial evidence that it is not, in 
 its nature, whatever that may be, of the same capacity 
 or dimensions, (if the term may be allowed,) origin- 
 
280 Of the Analogy between 
 
 ally, as it is when brought to maturity. But what 
 applies to the mind as a whole, applies to its several 
 faculties, in particular. The brain is an organ, of 
 whose functions we know little more than this, that 
 it is subservient to the operations of mind. How f far 
 its different parts belong to different mental capa- 
 cities and propensities, is a theory yet in its infancy. 
 That there is some natural connexion is highly prob- 
 able ; and illustrations from Comparative Anatomy 
 may be fairly brought forward in support of such a 
 theory. But, our business on the present occasion is 
 with it as a whole : and so far as its developement is 
 connected with the production of thought, it is a 
 structure unique in the creation. Yet we cannot 
 doubt that it follows the analogy observable in na- 
 ture. The brain, however, is only part of a system, 
 not the whole. This is not the case with a seed. 
 
 But of the internal organized structure — the ori- 
 ginal vital energies of a living seed, we know no- 
 thing. Or, if we rise from a vegetable to an animal 
 similitude, we may compare the mind to the ovum. 
 The rudiments of life and the lineaments of organiz- 
 ed structure, observable in the embryo, are analogous 
 to the undeveloped characters of the mind ; and the 
 members of the body are analogous to the various 
 faculties. But as the body is one and distinct, united 
 in every part by common sympathies, though there 
 are many functions ; so also is the mind. The facul- 
 ties are only different modifications of mental power; 
 as the outward limbs and organs, some voluntary in 
 
Mental Principles and Seeds. 281 
 
 their action, some involuntary, are instruments of 
 physical use, appertaining to the body.* 
 
 Something of the same analogy may be traced in a 
 seed ; and it might be more correct, and, certainly is 
 more appropriate to the common usage of language, 
 to consider the mind as a receptacle of various seeds, 
 corresponding to the different tendencies, affections, 
 and principles, with which it is naturally endowed. 
 
 It may not, indeed, be philosophically correct to 
 speak of seeds in the mind, as the principles from 
 which its actions spring ; but if we must compare it 
 with any thing external, the better to understand its 
 operations; — an alternative to which we are com- 
 pelled to have recourse, in the present limited state 
 of our knowledge, — we should compare it with some- 
 thing that the Creator himself has formed, and not 
 with some mechanical contrivance or composition of 
 human art, such as a cabinet or room, or a sheet of 
 paper. These similes — all of them without life — it 
 must be confessed, are chosen with singular infelicity; 
 as if there was nothing in the whole works of Pro- 
 vidence, — nothing in the wide circle of organized 
 
 * Dr. Good justly observes that " the faculties are to the mind, what 
 organs are to the body. We, sometimes, however, are apt to speak 
 of them as distinct and separate existences from the mind. The faculties 
 of the mind are so many powers ; and as powers, are mere attributes of 
 a being or substance, and not the being or substance itself." — " We ac- 
 custom ourselves to describe the will as being overpowered by the 
 judgment; or the judgment as being overpowered by the imagination; 
 or the mind itself as being carried headlong by the violence of its own 
 passions. By all which, however, we only mean, or should only mean, 
 ihat the mind does not on such occasions, exert its own faculties in a 
 fitting or sober manner." — Good's Study of Medicine, vol. 3, p. 52. 
 
282 Of the Analogy between 
 
 beings, or of animated nature, that bore a closer 
 analogy to the mind, or afforded an apter similitude ; 
 and therefore that something artificial must be re- 
 sorted to, as the best example, to illustrate the nature 
 and operation of the noblest sublunary work of God, 
 — the human intellect. 
 
 Some writers have displayed their eloquence in 
 describing the wonderful constitution of the mind, its 
 faculties, affections, passions, and propensities; but 
 if we take our notions of its capabilities from the 
 similes just noticed, we shall have but a mean idea of 
 its powers, and, I am disposed to think, an erroneous 
 idea of the manner in which they are developed. 
 
 I have insisted the more on this point of fixing a 
 proper analogy; because upon it the just conception 
 and clear understanding of the origin of human know- 
 ledge seems to depend. It is, indeed, easy enough to 
 conceive how a white sheet of paper, or clear marble 
 tablet, should be covered with legible characters ; or 
 how an empty cabinet may be filled with different 
 classes of assorted materials ; or a dark room may be 
 gradually illuminated with pictures of external things 
 figured upon its walls. But not to mention that only 
 one of the external senses — that of vision — can repre- 
 sent outward objects by a sort of image, and conse- 
 quently that impressions made upon the other senses 
 cannot be considered as images conveyed to the mind ; 
 it is plain that the powers by which these invisible ma- 
 terials of thought are recalled, associated, compared, 
 generalized, separated, and combined, so as to form 
 
Mental Principles and Seeds. 283 
 
 truth and knowledge, and the curious vital process by 
 which these wonderful operations are carried on, are 
 entirely overlooked in this theory. So that, after all, 
 it is as difficult to explain how any speculative or 
 moral truth is produced and appropriated, as it was 
 before. 
 
 The assimilating powers of the mind, if I may so 
 express myself, are analogous to the assimilating 
 powers of the body, or of a seed ; but according to 
 the simile of a dark room, or white sheet of paper, 
 they are absolutely incomprehensible ; and the rela- 
 tions to the latter appear quite incongruous. For a 
 seed might as fitly be compared to a dark room, be- 
 cause it has an implanted or original tendency to 
 germinate by the contact of earth and moisture ; as 
 the human mind, because it has an innate tendency to 
 expand its powers by the impulse of external things 
 acting on the senses, and awakening the dormant 
 faculties. It is the impulse of external things which 
 excites the living powers of the seed, and of the 
 embryo to develope themselves : and it is the im- 
 pulse of external things which gives the first occa- 
 sion to exercise, and calls into activity, the innate 
 energies of the mind. 
 
 In explaining this point, I am aware that I am 
 liable to be led into some diftuseness, and perhaps 
 into repetition, from a desire to be perspicuous; but 
 as many of the subsequent reasonings depend upon 
 the view now taken and the explanation here given, 
 
284 Of the Analogy between 
 
 I have to intreat a little indulgence, should this be 
 the case. 
 
 After what has been said, therefore, to speak of the 
 mind as a dark room, or tabula rasa, can scarcely be 
 thought correct. For, in this state, it must be sup- 
 posed to be destitute of those living energies, which, 
 though in the strict sense of the terms, they may not 
 be denominated original characters, or innate ideas, 
 inscribed by the finger of God, yet are they innate 
 propensities and original determinations to good and 
 to evil — to act and to be acted upon, according to the 
 laws of its constitution*. 
 
 One could hardly have believed that the human 
 mind, with implanted capabilities far above the most 
 wonderful powers of the brute animals, would have 
 been reduced, as it is by this theory, to a state so much 
 resembling an inanimate substance, as a dark cell 
 ready to receive the images of external things, or 
 white paper on which any ideas might be inscribed. 
 Every one must perceive that it is an active and in- 
 telligent principle, complex, and admirable in its 
 make and qualities, containing within itself, as it 
 were, in embryo, what may be termed susceptibilities, 
 capacities, sensibilities, faculties, or figuratively, seeds, 
 talents, elements, waiting for expansion and for out- 
 ward objects on which to exert their native power, 
 and by which to grow to their full developement. 
 
 It is impossible, as I before observed, to find words 
 except those borrowed from outward things to de- 
 
Mental Principles and Seeds. 285 
 
 scribe the powers of the mind; and therefore we must 
 always use some analogy to express what we mean ; 
 and that perhaps will do it imperfectly. But, as a 
 seed, that, with Certain inherent properties, only waits 
 the suitable adaptation of outward circumstances, as 
 earth and moisture, and afterwards access to light 
 and air, to answer the intentions of nature, cannot 
 be supposed to have any analogy to a room or a 
 cabinet ; so the mind that has more wonderful capa- 
 cities than a seed, is still farther removed in resem- 
 blance from these objects to which it has been com- 
 pared by the theory in question. 
 
 Now, so far as material and visible things may be 
 compared with invisible and immaterial ; — and we 
 have no means of knowing the relations of one but by 
 the other; — there appears to be the strictest analo- 
 gy between the outward natural seed and the in- 
 ternal constitution of the mind. And, indeed, if I 
 may be at liberty to anticipate what will come more 
 in order in another place, we have, in confirmation 
 of this analogy, the very highest authority to which 
 man can appeal, even that of the Divine Founder of 
 Christianity ; whose instructions to his hearers were 
 mostly illustrated by some simile or parable, as of a 
 seed, a grain, a root, a branch, a vine, and that not 
 supposed to be originally formed or planted by man 
 but by his Maker. 
 
 According to the outward circumstances in which 
 the mind is placed, it will indeed vary its complexion ; 
 but it will still exhibit the grand lineaments of hu- 
 
> 
 
 286 Of the Analogy between 
 
 man nature, as well as the peculiar shades and dis? 
 positions which, diversify human character : and as 
 we have power by cultivation and change of soil to 
 change the appearance of the plant, so have we power 
 to vary the complexion of the mind. We may train 
 it by wholesome discipline so as to exhibit the fruits 
 of virtue ; like the vine planted in a good soil and 
 well watered and skilfully pruned, and removed from 
 all hurtful things : or, we may place it in an ungenial 
 situation, and suffer vice like noxious weeds to spring 
 up and to rob it of all moral beauty, and render it 
 baneful to society. All this we may do with the 
 mind, as we do with the plant. But in all this pro- 
 cess, we only check or bring into action powers al- 
 ready existing ; and either give them a right direc- 
 tion, or turn them aside from that natural perfection 
 to which they would ultimately tend. 
 
 Upon these principles it would be as incorrect to 
 say of a seed planted in the ground, that culture was 
 the foundation of its growth and increase, as to say 
 of the mind that u experience was the foundation of 
 all its knowledge."* The foundation of every thing 
 which has life and living faculties, and has the power 
 to expand itself morally or physically, is the talent, 
 seed, rudiment, or spark, formed at first by the Creator, 
 and by Him endowed with inherent tendencies, which 
 no human power can bestow, though it may alter. 
 Now, in the circle of natural operations, there is not 
 a single instance, where we have improvement or 
 
 * gee Locke, 
 
Mental Principles and Seeds. 287 
 
 enlargement of a physical power; that such improve- 
 ment or enlargement is not effected by addition, or 
 accretion, to some element, seed, or rudiment, «/- 
 ready in existence. And, I believe it will be found a 
 parallel and universal truth, that there can be no 
 growth — no enlargement — no expansion of intellec- 
 tual or moral power, which is not also effected by 
 co-operation with, and assimilation or addition to, 
 some original seed, or primary mental principle. 
 Therefore, if the capacity or power, the propensity or 
 instinct, the taste or sense, be not implanted by the 
 Creator, it is in vain that education can make an 
 effort to improve, enlighten, or expand. 
 
 u Doctrina vim promovet insitam." Hor. 
 
 In a seed there is a natural tendency to germinate^ 
 —in one part to shoot downward, in another to shoot 
 upward, a power to attract and assimilate the sur- 
 rounding elements, provided they are congenial to it, 
 and to evolve itself by growth into branches and 
 leaves. It has also an inherent tendency to bear 
 fruit in its season, and to multiply its kind, to become 
 torpid in winter, and to flourish again in summer. 
 Now, the great end may be frustrated, and is often 
 frustrated by human art or negligence ; but the 
 original tendencies remain the same ; and the speci- 
 fic characters of the seed or of the plant, are so de- 
 fined, that by no human power can they be inter- 
 changed, 
 
288 Of the Analogy between 
 
 The seed of a bramble differs essentially from 
 that of a vine; and, to whatever outward circum- 
 stances they may be subjected, each preserves its in- 
 dividual and proper character, though the purpose of 
 its creation may not be fully attained. These dif- 
 ferent tendencies in a seed may be exhibited in suc- 
 cession ; but their successive developement does not 
 prove that they are the work of man. In like man- 
 ner, the capacities and propensities of the mind may 
 some of them be successively developed ; yet it is 
 from nature they are derived and not from art. The 
 succession of changes may have been wrought under 
 man's superintendence, as advances are made by 
 education, but the succession of changes does not 
 prove that it is wholly the effect of human power. 
 In every mind are sown the seeds of intellectual and 
 moral excellence, for the world to ripen to perfection 
 or to corrupt. The world gives it none of its capa- 
 cities or propensities,, any more than it gives a brute 
 his instincts or a seed its tendencies : it only affords 
 occasion for their exercise and developement. The 
 world is the soil in which the living principle of the 
 mind is thrown by an all-wise Creator, to be acted 
 upon by outward things, only in proportion as this 
 living principle has been endowed with innate powers 
 or capacities to receive impressions from these out- 
 ward things. 
 
 But these outward things, which thus make im- 
 pressions upon the senses and upon the internal 
 faculties, may either be qualities of external natural 
 
Mental Principles and Seeds, 289 
 
 objects, or qualities of human character and conduct. 
 For, we have principles within us that fit us by na- 
 ture for intercourse with one another, as well as those 
 which fit us for intercourse with the external world ; 
 and as we are capable of receiving pleasure and pain 
 from the latter, so are we capable of receiving pleasure 
 and pain from the former. Without these several 
 excitements, and the due regulation and balance of 
 these excitements, we cannot exercise ourselves to 
 virtue, and attain the perfection of our being. We 
 are prompted by natural feeling to do good to our 
 fellow creature, as we are to do good to ourselves. 
 For there is an instinct or affection of Benevolence ; 
 as well as a principle or instinct of Self-love. 
 
 Now, impressions of outward things are varied 
 according to the sense, faculty, or power, which is 
 appointed to receive them. And even some human 
 beings are capable of receiving impressions which 
 cannot be made upon others. 
 
 Impressions of light and colours are unavailing upon 
 the blind, or of sounds upon the deaf. Impressions 
 of kindness are made in vain upon a soul incapable of 
 love and reciprocal attachment, or of natural beauty 
 on one destitute of taste. Emotions of distress for 
 human suffering cannot be excited in a mind without 
 sympathy, or of grateful feeling in one that has no 
 sensibility. Impressions of physical, mathematical, 
 or speculative truth, however plain and simple and 
 self-evident, cannot possibly be received where there 
 is not an original capacity to comprehend — an 
 
 T 
 
290 Education. 
 
 internal eye to perceive relations, proportions, or 
 equalities. And lastly, no impressions as to the love- 
 liness or deformity of moral actions can take effect, 
 where there is not an internal power or instinct to 
 feel the varied and opposite emotions of moral senti- 
 ment. 
 
 If these positions were not true, brutes might be 
 made to feel and know most of those things which now 
 distinguish and exalt human nature.* 
 
 Sect. II. 
 
 Of the office ard effect of Education compared with 
 Culture. 
 
 Let us therefore properly understand the office and 
 effect of education. It cannot be to introduce into 
 the mind notions and relations of things which have 
 
 * According to Locke " White paper," (comparing it to the mind), 
 * l receives any characters ;" but Cudworth appears to have had a 
 clearer notion of the matter, when he said, " If Intellection and Know- 
 ledge were mere receptions of extraneous and adventitious forms, then 
 no reason could be given at all why a mirror or looking-glass should not 
 understand." 
 
 " If Intellection and Knowledge were a mere passive Perception of 
 the soul from without, and nothing but sense or the result of it, then 
 what Reason could be given, why brute animals, that have all the 
 senses that men have, and some of them more acute, should not have 
 Intellection also, and be as capable of logic, mathematics, and meta- 
 physics, and have the same notions of Morality, of a Deity, and Religion, 
 that men have?" — Treatise concerning Morality, p. 130. 
 
Education. 291 
 
 no affinity to its own nature; to pour into it, as into 
 some passive receptacle, any sort of ingredients ; to 
 which it is to be considered as perfectly indifferent, 
 as though it had no original tastes or predilections. 
 Instead of having none, we find that it has opposite 
 or contending tastes and predilections. Hence the 
 office and effect of good education upon the mind 
 must be to enlarge innate capacities and feelings 
 essentially its own, to teach them to shoot in a vir- 
 tuous direction, to convey proper nourishment by 
 placing it in the circle of good example, to defend 
 the opening buds of intellect, sensibility, and moral 
 feeling, from every thing that would harm them ; — in 
 a word, to encourage the growth of the good seed 
 planted in every mind, and to prevent the grow th of 
 evil propensities, and destroy those noxious prin- 
 ciples, which, if allowed to spring up, would debase 
 and deform the character.* For, as good example 
 could never have effect, if there were not good prin- 
 ciples in the mind to attract and cherish it ; so bad 
 example could not have effect, if there were not evil 
 propensities to lay hold of it and embrace it. There 
 is, therefore, antecedent to all instruction, a prin- 
 ciple or seed, an appetite or affection, with instinctive 
 tendencies towards certain external relations in cha- 
 racter and in moral conduct, just as there is in the 
 
 * " To'teach the young Idea to shoot," is a beautiful and apt image; 
 but, surely, no one ever thinks that the Idea so taught is some external 
 representation brought incidentally into the mind. I take it to be the 
 germ of thought itself. 
 
 T 2 
 
292 Education, 
 
 structure of the eve a congruity to light, or in that of 
 the ear to sounds, long before these organs receive 
 any impressions. Education, therefore, is to the 
 mind, what cultivation is to the plant or seed. It is 
 that methodical training which leads to the gradual 
 evolution and expansion of powers and principles and 
 propensities, connate with the mind, and essential to 
 its constitution. It cannot create new powers : but 
 as a bad education may increase and cherish evil pro- 
 pensities, and produce bad fruit from the growth of 
 evil seed ; so a good education may foster virtuous 
 propensities, and produce good fruit from the evolu- 
 tion of good seed. 
 
 Whatever, therefore, is received from without, 
 must have a connatural affinity with some primary 
 taste, capacity, or feeling within. For, if it have not 
 this affinity or eongruity, it can no more .be assimi- 
 lated and appropriated to the mind's improvement, 
 than light can be perceived by the ear, or musical 
 sounds by the eye. Every Sense has its peculiar and 
 appropriate object or quality in nature; and so has 
 every appetite ; and the same may perhaps be said of 
 every passion and emotion. 
 
 Every internal power has also its object in its ex- 
 ternal relations ; and external impressions can never 
 produce a practical effect further than they quicken, 
 rouse, and animate the internal power to which they 
 are appropriate, and upon which they act. Hence, by 
 communicating or imprinting new thoughts, we only 
 bring into the mind something possessing a close 
 
Education. 29$ 
 
 adaptation in its nature, to the constitution of that 
 inherent faculty to which it is applied, analogous to 
 the nourishment which is conveyed to a plant, and 
 assimilated to its substance. The outward senses, I 
 need not repeat, take cognizance of the qualities of 
 matter; the inward faculties, of intellectual abstrac- 
 tions in physics as well as of moral relations in human 
 conduct. Thus, the eye has a natural affinity for 
 light, the tongue for tastes, and the ear for sounds; 
 and we might as well imagine that discord and har- 
 mony, bitter and sweet, odoriferous and putrid ef- 
 fluvia, should make the same impression, prior to 
 experience, or be equally agreeable to their respec- 
 tive organs of sense; as that vice and virtue, right 
 and wrong, truth and falsehood, gratitude and in- 
 gratitude, should, when first presented intelligibly to 
 the mind, be indiscriminately and equally acceptable 
 to the internal faculties or principles, which take 
 cognizance of these different relations. 
 
 It must be obvious, then, that virtue is naturally 
 lovely and vice hateful, — and it would be idle to set 
 about explaining what these words mean, — in short, 
 that virtuous actions are as universally agreeable, and 
 vicious the contrary, as, to the generality of mankind, 
 sugar is sweet, and gall is bitter. And it is the de- 
 cree of Heaven and the constitution of human nature 
 which make it so ; and which have established these 
 immutable distinctions. 
 
 We are compelled, therefore, to conclude, that 
 there must be original affections, dispositions, talent?, 
 
294 Education, 
 
 — in other words, native* seeds, implanted by the 
 Creator, in every mind; without which it might 
 labour in vain upon the imported materials, to fabri- 
 cate Truth and Science. But, whatever is thus im- 
 ported must be congenial to its nature, and possess a 
 fitness and congruity. Thoughts and impressions in 
 the mind, acquired by education, are rather impulses 
 from without by the Senses, acting on its own inherent 
 energies, than any abstract metaphysical substances, 
 under the name of ideas, introduced to its acquaint- 
 ance. 
 
 What can we conceive but that a cold and insen- 
 sible marble tablet, destitute of every original bias, 
 might just as well receive one impression as ano- 
 ther ? And surely no reason can be assigned, why, 
 on such a principle, one set of notions could be more 
 congenial to the natural feelings than another ; why 
 falsehood should be less acceptable than truth, or 
 gratitude than ingratitude, or vice than virtue; till 
 men should be instructed by experience to give the 
 preference to truth and virtue, as matter of expe- 
 diency or cold conventional agreement, and not the 
 effect of sacred immutable obligation, or rather of 
 warm original impulse in the mind. 
 
 It is undoubtedly true, that certain qualities m 
 human actions, related to the virtues, such as grati- 
 tude, generosity, humanity, fidelity, integrity, &c. are 
 embraced and cherished by the affections of man, like 
 the very life-blood by the heart; and the sympathetic 
 
Education. 295 
 
 bound of feeling in the mind of almost every human 
 creature, is as responsive to the impulse. 
 
 Education, surely, cannot change the original bias 
 or instinct of the human heart so entirely, that the 
 foundation of what we call Virtue, and Innocence, 
 and Gratitude, and Mercy, can be subverted ; so that 
 their opposites shall claim unreserved respect in any 
 human society. The human mind is not left so un- 
 provided, even by nature, that it must depend on the 
 learned and experienced to teach it the simplest 
 maxim of moral duty. Discipline, undoubtedly, 
 may do much in fostering the good, and checking the 
 evil tendencies ; but it cannot make the choleric man 
 placid and torpid in his sensibilities, nor the cold and 
 deliberate, impetuous and quick of apprehension. It 
 cannot convert a natural genius for one art or science 
 into a genius for another. So that it is absurd to 
 speak of education constituting all the difference we 
 find in human character. Natural and insuperable 
 obstacles are opposed to an equality of talent, or 
 of natural and moral sensibility in our fellow- 
 creatures. 
 
 Sect. III. 
 
 Illustrations of the same Subject. 
 
 I shall now proceed to show, by a few illustrations, 
 that the general view, which I have attempted to 
 lay down, is not entirely a fanciful picture of my own ; 
 
296 Illustrations. 
 
 but that it has at least the recommendation of being 
 sanctioned by the forms of expression and authority 
 of some eminent writers. 
 
 The reader will soon perceive that I do not con- 
 fine my view to the seeds of moral truth only : and that 
 the words seed, rudiment, and fountain, are severally 
 employed as the original or element from which every 
 kind of truth must spring. 
 
 " It is sufficient," says Bishop Butler, speaking of 
 good will in man towards man, " it is sufficient, that 
 the seeds of it be implanted in nature by God. There 
 is, it is owned, much left for us to do upon our own 
 heart and temper; to cultivate, to improve, to call it 
 forth, to exercise it in a steady uniform manner. 
 This is our work; this is virtue and religion."* 
 
 Though, in the following passage, Hooker may 
 perhaps allude to the seed of virtue being planted in 
 the mind by man instead of his Maker ; yet the pos- 
 sibility of its growing up to perfection as a plant 
 from its seed, is fully implied in the expression, 
 " The seed of whatsoever perfect virtue groweth 
 from us, is a right opinion touching things divine. " 
 
 It is observed by D'Alembert, as the passage is 
 cited and translated by Stewart, in his Elements, 
 that " Truth in metaphysics resembles truth in mat- 
 ters of taste. In both cases, the seeds of it exist in 
 every mind ; though few think of attending to this 
 latent treasure, till it be pointed out to them by more 
 curious inquirers."t 
 
 * Sermon on Hum. Nat. + Elements of Philosophy, rol. 2. 
 
Illustrations. 297 
 
 Lord Bacon uses the metaphorical expression 
 fountain instead of seed ; but he plainly alludes to an 
 original not a factitious source of law. " For there 
 are in nature certain fountains of Justice, whence all 
 civil laws are derived, but as streams; and like as 
 waters do take tinctures and tastes from the soils 
 through which they run, so do civil laws vary accord- 
 ing to the regions and governments where they are 
 planted, though they proceed from the same foun- 
 tains,"* 
 
 Causabon, who is styled by Lord Shaftesbury, 
 " one of the greatest and most learned of moderns," 
 expresses himself to the following effect : " But 
 great men have not transmitted to posterity the pre- 
 cepts and examples of virtue, in order that we may 
 know them for the mere empty purpose of outward 
 gratification of the ears, or the vain boast of useless 
 erudition; but that they might animate us by their 
 labours, to dig up and bring into active usefulness 
 the seeds of integrity and virtue ; which, as they may 
 have been received from nature, surrounded notwith- 
 standing with vices, and almost overwhelmed, with- 
 out proper cultivation, continue latent in our minds, 
 like seeds utterly sunk and buried deep in the 
 ground. "t 
 
 Dr. Johnson remarks, that " nothing is more un- 
 just than to judge of man by too short an acquaint- 
 ance, and too slight inspection; for it often happens, 
 that in the loose, and thoughtless, and dissipate, 
 
 * Bacon Adv. of Learn. B. 2. f Shaftesbury Character, vol. 1. 
 
298 Illustrations. 
 
 there is a secret radical worth, which may shoot out 
 by proper cultivation; that the spark of heaven, 
 though dimmed and obstructed, is yet not extinguished, 
 but may by the breath of counsel and exhortation, be 
 kindled into flame."* 
 
 Sir Matthew Hale has the following passage : — 
 " I have before said, that the goodness of God had 
 lodged an inward stock in man whereby to improve 
 his intellectual nature, namely, those common notions 
 (communes notitiae) of the existence of a God, and 
 that he is to be worshipped, served, and obeyed, the 
 common root of Religion in mankind ; these are in 
 him like the first rudiments of the Foetus, the Embryo 
 of religion, or the egg, as it were, out of which it is 
 hatched. The contemplation of the admirable works 
 in the world doth exceedingly fortify and improve 
 those first rudiments of natural Religion, and digests 
 them into their just formation."t 
 
 The idea suggested in the concluding words of the 
 last author, may perhaps recal some of the remarks 
 recently made on the assimilation of food to the mind. 
 But, I am not acquainted with the writings of any 
 author, who has expressed himself in such frequent 
 allusion, 01 so decidedly in illustration of the analogy 
 I am supporting as Cudworth. 
 
 In opposition to those who, to use his expression, 
 " would make the soul as naked a thing as possible," 
 he contends, that " it is enabled, as occasion serves 
 
 * Rambler, No. 70. 
 + Prim. Orig. Sect. iv. Ch. 8. 
 
Illustrations. 299 
 
 and outward objects invite, gradually and successively 
 to unfold and display itself in a vital manner, by fram- 
 ing intelligible ideas and conceptions within itself; 
 as the spermatic or plastic power doth virtually con- 
 tain within itself the forms of all the several organical 
 parts of animals, and displays them gradually and 
 successively, framing an eye here, and an ear there." 
 And he adds, " The primary and immediate objects of 
 intellection and knowledge are not things existing 
 without the mind, but the ideas of the mind itself 
 actively exerted, that is, the intelligible Reasons of 
 things, — which are its own, — and which it protrudes 
 from within itself," — " those things, which," in an- 
 other place, he says, " are the pure offspring from 
 the mind and sprout from the soul itself." " As the 
 intelligible forms by which things are understood or 
 known are not stamps or impressions passively printed 
 upon the soul from without, but ideas vitally pro- 
 tended or actively exerted within itself.". . . .The fol- 
 lowing remarks or corollaries I consider too impor- 
 tant to be omitted : " Hence it is also, as experience 
 tells us, that scientifical knowledge is best acquired 
 by the soul's abstraction from the outward objects of 
 sense, and retiring into itself, that so it may the better 
 attend to its own inward notions and ideas. And 
 therefore it is many times observed, that over-much 
 reading and hearing of other men's discourses, though 
 learned and elaborate, doth not only distract the 
 mind, but also debilitates the intellectual powers, 
 and makes the mind passive and sluggish, by calling 
 
300 Illustrations. 
 
 it too much outwards. For which cause that wise 
 philosopher Socrates, altogether shunned that Dic- 
 tating way of Teaching used by the sophisters of that 
 age, and chose rather an Aporetical (doubting or in- 
 quisitive) method ; because knowledge was not to be 
 poured into the soul like liquor, but rather to be in- 
 vited and gently drawn forth from it ; nor the mind 
 so much to be filled therewith from without, like a 
 vessel, as to be kindled and awakened. From hence is 
 that strange parturiency that is often observed in the 
 mind, when it is solicitously set upon the investiga- 
 tion of some truth, whereby it doth endeavour, by 
 ruminating and revolving within itself, as it were, to 
 conceive it within itself, to bring it forth out of its own 
 womb; by which it is evident, that the mind is na- 
 turally conscious of its own active fecundity, and also 
 that it hath a criterion within itself, which will enable 
 it to know when it hath found that which it sought." 
 u For, the Truths and Essences of Things are not 
 Dead Things , like so many statues, images, or pic- 
 tures hung up somewhere by -themselves alone in a 
 world : neither are truths mere sentences and pro-* 
 positions written down with ink upon a book, but 
 they are Living Things, and nothing but modifica- 
 tions of mind or intellect. " Treatise on Morality. 
 
 Some of the preceding notions of Cudworth may 
 perhaps be quaintly expressed, and may also appear 
 extravagant; and it might not be easy to defend 
 every expression or turn of thought ; but the general 
 meaning, which it is not difficult to collect, is to my 
 
Illustrations. 301 
 
 mind sufficiently obvious, and will I think be found 
 in unison with the observations of many others. 
 
 I observe, indeed, that Stewart* has animadverted 
 strongly upon a passage, quoted from Cudworth and 
 partly sanctioned by Dr. Price, chiefly in reference 
 to abstract ideas, where he says, " the cognoscitive 
 power of the mind contains in itself virtually (as the 
 future plant or tree is contained in the seed) general 
 notions or exemplars of all things, which are exerted 
 by it, or discover themselves as occasions invite and pro- 
 per circumstances occur ;" but I confess, that to me 
 it appears, more like an extravagant application of a 
 principle in itself correct, than to be condemned as 
 altogether whimsical. 
 
 John le Clerc, one of the most distinguished scholars 
 and critics of his age, observes, in relation to the 
 matter before us, that, " although, accurately speak- 
 ing, there are no ideas planted in our minds by nature ; 
 yet no one can deny that the faculties of our minds 
 are so formed by nature, that as soon as we begin to 
 reason, we may also begin in some measure to dis- 
 tinguish truth from falsehood, and good from evil. 
 For, he adds, the form or image of Truth is always 
 pleasing to us; on the other hand, that of Falsehood 
 is displeasing : Nay more, we prefer virtue to vice, 
 on account of the seeds planted in us ; which then 
 begin to shoot forth to the light, when we are able 
 to reason ; and they become more fruitful the better 
 
 * See Elements of Phil. vol. 2, p. 122. 
 
302 Illustrations. 
 
 we reason, and the more carefully our minds are 
 disciplined by education."* 
 
 Dr. Reid, after stating that there are some powers 
 which nature seems both to have planted and reared, 
 so as to have left nothing to human industry ; such as 
 those which are necessary to the preservation of the 
 individual, and the continuance of the kind, observes, 
 that " there are other powers of which Nature hath 
 only planted the seeds in our minds, but hath left the 
 rearing of them to human culture." — " The savage 
 hath within him the seeds of the logician, the man of 
 taste and breeding, the orator, the statesman, the man 
 of virtue, and the saint ; which seeds, though planted 
 in his mind by nature, yet, through want of culture and 
 exercise, must lie for ever buried, and be hardly per- 
 ceivable by himself or by others."+ 
 
 Gray has made a corresponding allusion, in a poeti- 
 cal fragment " On the Alliance of Education and 
 Government:" 
 
 cc How rude so e'er th' exterior form we find, 
 Howe'er opinion tinge the varied mind, 
 Alike to ally the kind, impartial heav'n 
 The sparks of truth and happiness has giv'n" 
 
 I come next to take notice of a few passages to be 
 found in Locke's Treatise on Education. In his 
 Essay on the Understanding, I cannot find a single 
 allusion to the view of the subject we have been con- 
 sidering; as might indeed have been anticipated, 
 
 * See Shaftesbury's Charac. vol. 3. t Reid's Inquiry, chap. 1, sect. 2. 
 
Illustrations, 303 
 
 from a theory which denies the existence of every 
 innate practical principle, and every thing analogous 
 to it. In his Thoughts on Education, written at a 
 time, when, it would perhaps be unbecoming in me to 
 hint, he might have been less under the influence of 
 theory, he has fallen into the use of language, if not 
 so correct, at least more common and natural, and 
 therefore approaching more nearly to the expressions 
 already quoted from other eminent writers ; but how 
 far it favours the view now taken must be left to 
 others to be decided. 
 
 In conformity with established usuage, Locke 
 speaks of the " seeds of vice'' in the mind, " the roots 
 of injustice and contention, which are to be carefully 
 weeded out," — ti the foundations and fountains of 
 right and wrong, &c. At the same time, I must con- 
 fess, either that I have been somewhat at a loss to 
 discover his real meaning, or else that there is, at 
 least, the appearance of inconsistency between the 
 language of his Essay, and that in which he has 
 conveyed his unbiassed sentiments on Education. 
 
 He seems, in the first place, very clearly to admit 
 orginal diversities of human character, independent 
 of custom or education ; and secondly to imply that 
 . there are natural principles in the mind, the innate 
 seeds of vice. A third opinion is also to be inferred, 
 that, although we have naturally the seeds of vice, 
 we have not naturally the seeds of virtue. If the two 
 first cases be proved, they seem to me to strike at the 
 very foundation of his own theory: — that the mind is 
 
304 Illustrations. 
 
 orginally a blank which must receive its principles of 
 thought and action from without. 
 
 Upon the first point he says, " Some men, by the 
 unalterable frame of their constitutions, are stout, 
 others timorous, some confident, others modest, tract- 
 able or obstinate, curious or careless, quick or slow. 
 There are not more differences in men's faces, and 
 the outward lineaments of their bodies than there 
 are in the makes and tempers of their minds ; only 
 there is this difference, that the distinguishing charac- 
 ters of the face, and the lineaments of the body grow 
 more plain and visible with time and age; but the 
 peculiar physiognomy of the mind is most discernible 
 in children, before art and cunning have taught them 
 to hide their deformity, and conceal their ill inclinations 
 under a dissembled outside" — " God has stamped 
 certain characters upon men's minds, which like their 
 shapes, may perhaps be a little mended, but can 
 h:\rdly be totally altered and transformed into the 
 contrary. 
 
 u He, therefore, that is about children should ob- 
 serve what their native stock is, how it may be im- 
 proved, and what it is fit for :" — u For, in many 
 cases, all that we can do, or should aim at, is, to make 
 the best of what nature has given, to prevent the vices 
 and faults to which such a constitution is most in- 
 clined, and give it all the advantages it is capable of. 
 
 And again, " There are some men's constitutions 
 of mind and body so vigorous and well framed by 
 nature, that they need not much assistance from 
 
illustrations. 305 
 
 others, but by the strength of their natural genius, 
 they are from their cradles carried towards what is 
 excellent ; and by the privilege of their happy con- 
 stitutions are able to do wonders."* 
 
 I conclude that these positions will be universally 
 acknowledged, and that they prove the force of na- 
 tural or innate propensities, whatever may be said 
 about innate ideas. For if propensities lead the mind 
 to good or to evil, by some natural impulse, they 
 have the force and influence of innate practical prin- 
 ciples, whether these can be conceived in the form 
 of regular propositions or not. It appears clear from 
 Locke that, it is in childhood, u that the peculiar 
 character of the mind most strongly discovers itself," 
 that is, before education has exerted any power: 
 but, according to his own principle, the minds of 
 children, prior to education, as being orginally blank 
 paper, should manifest the least variety, conformably 
 to what he says afterwards, " that the difference to 
 be found in the manners and abilities of men is owing 
 more to their education than to any thing else." Is 
 there not, here, some appearance of contradiction ? 
 
 Now, with regard to the second point, that 
 there are principles naturally in the mind, the foun- 
 dation or seed of vice, there is a little ambiguity in 
 Locke's notions, as I shall endeavour to point out. 
 For we might be led to conclude from some expres- 
 sions, as where he speaks of seeds, that they were 
 
 * Sec Sections 1 and 101. 
 U 
 
306 Illustrations. 
 
 implanted by nature, and from others, that they were 
 sown by art. 
 
 " Stubbornness, lying, and ill-natured actions, are 
 not to be permitted in him from the beginning, what- 
 ever his temper may be. Those seeds of vices are not 
 to be suffered to take any root, but must be carefully 
 weeded out, as soon as ever they begin to shew them- 
 selves in him ; and your authority is to take place, 
 and influence his mind, from the very dawning of 
 any knowledge in him, that it may operate as a na- 
 tural principle — and it will be as hard for him to resist 
 it, as the principles of his nature ." Again, " The 
 love of power and dominion shews itself very early — 
 This is theirs/ original of most vicious habits, that 
 are ordinary and natural. We see children, as soon 
 almost as they are born (I am sure long before they 
 can speak,)- cry, grow peevish, sullen, and out of 
 humour, for nothing but to have their wills. " 
 
 " Another thing wherein they shew their love of 
 dominion, is their desire to have things to be theirs : 
 He that has not observed these two humours work- 
 ing very betimes in children has taken little notice of 
 their actions : and he who thinks that these two roots 
 of almost all the injustice and contention, that so dis- 
 turb human life, are not early to be weeded out, and 
 contrary habits introduced, neglects the proper season 
 to lay the foundations of a good and worthy man." 
 
 " Parents by humouring them when little, corrupt 
 the principles of nature in their children, and wonder 
 afterwards to taste the bitter waters when they them- 
 
Illustrations. 307 
 
 selves have poisoned the fountain :" — " and then, 
 perhaps too late, would be glad to get out those weeds 
 which their own hands have planted, and which now 
 have taken too deep a root to be easily extirpated/* 
 ft I desire to know what vice can be named which pa- 
 rents, and those about children, do not season them 
 with, and drop into them the seeds of, as soon as they 
 are capable to receive them ?" u The foundations 
 on which several duties are built, and the fountains 
 of right and wrong from which they spring, are not 
 perhaps easily to be let into the minds of grown 
 men." 
 
 I have made these quotations from Locke's work 
 on Education, not to criticise the opinions, most of 
 which are excellent ; but to ascertain the true sense 
 in which he used the words " seeds of vice" and 
 " fountains of right and wrong." It may be observed 
 that he clearly admits natural and constitutional 
 diversities among mankind, which shew themselves 
 almost from the cradle : and are therefore indepen- 
 dent of any kind of education. These constitute the 
 foundation of peculiarities in human character. 
 
 He also speaks of certain humours appearing al- 
 most as soon as children are born, which he calls 
 " the first original of most vicious habits, that are 
 ordinary and natural," in other words — " the roots 
 of injustice and contention." These must be sup- 
 posed to constitute the original seeds of vice. For 
 it is plain, they cannot be acquired; as they are 
 universal, and appear too early to be the effect of 
 
 u 2 
 
SOS Illustrations. 
 
 education. They are the " native propensities" which 
 lead to " stubbornness, lying," &c. and, in order to 
 counteract these, Locke is led to contrast the force 
 of an acquired principle, such as the influence of 
 parental authority, with that of what he terms " the 
 principles of nature," or " a natural principle." But 
 when we consider that in his Essay, Locke has de- 
 nied the existence of any innate principle, we are at 
 a loss to comprehend what the expression ' natural 
 principle' can mean ; unless we forget his theory and 
 call it simply, if a vicious propensity, the seed of 
 vice. 
 
 For we are told, as may be seen above, " the love 
 of dominion and of possession," which is not in itself 
 evil, " is yet the first original of most vicious habits 
 that are natural." Consequently this original of 
 vice must be an innate seed; because its budding- 
 appears long before education can have any happy 
 influence. Nay, it might be said, that most parents 
 resist it from the very beginning, 
 
 Now, these propensities, humours, or natural prin- 
 ciples, appearing so early, and leading all men so 
 directly to vicious habits, even with the advantages 
 of a watchful education, might be supposed, naturally 
 enough, to constitute the seeds of vice, without any 
 superaddition, but that of bad example. But we 
 find that Locke has used the expression of " parents 
 dropping into their children's minds the seeds of 
 vice;" and we also find the expression " letting into 
 the mind the foundations and fountains of right and 
 
Illustrations. 309 
 
 wrong." And hence arises some difficulty in appre- 
 hending how much, in the view of Locke, was original 
 and how much acquired.— what seeds were natural 
 and what were sown by art. If the native bias of the 
 mind be to evil, and to shew its vicious propensities 
 from the cradle, it would be superfluous to fill the 
 mind with artificial seeds when it has already a native 
 stock, and only requires to be placed in a fit soil to 
 ripen them into all the various forms of wickedness 
 and depravity. But it is a lamentable truth, if 
 Locke's expressions clearly indicate the existence of 
 original propensities to vice, and of none to virtue- 
 it is a lamentable picture of human nature, I say, if 
 such be the fact, that, while a natural principle or 
 innate propensity is urging the mind to evil, it has 
 to depend on an acquired rule or adventitious prin- 
 ciple to direct it to good — having no innate bias 
 to virtue ! Yet the expression, " corrupting the 
 principles of nature in their children" — cannot 
 apply with truth to evil principles, but to those 
 which would lead to good : because, to corrupt 
 evil principles would involve an absurdity. But 
 to corrupt good natural principles would imply 
 the existence of such originally, that is, of their 
 seeds; and therefore Locke's own expression, upon 
 a more full examination, may perhaps defend him 
 from the conclusion, which would follow from the 
 supposition of there being a native propensity to 
 vice, and none to virtue. His language, at the same 
 time, clearly indicates that there are some original 
 
310 Illustrations, 
 
 implanted tendencies, native propensities, roots or 
 seeds of vice ; and it would not perhaps be difficult 
 to take the other side and shew, how early children 
 discover the buddings from the native seeds of 
 virtue. 
 
 But, it must be observed, that although we use 
 the words seeds of vice and virtue, as being naturally 
 in the mind, we speak only of propensities to action ; 
 and it is not meant that the seeds or principles which 
 lead to vice, do therefore constitute vice ; or that 
 the seeds and principles which lead to virtue consti- 
 tute virtue. It is the fruit and not the seed that 
 degrades or dignifies; for due care may correct or 
 extirpate what is hurtful, as it may train and 
 strengthen what is good. 
 
CHAP. V. 
 OF FIRST PRINCIPLES AND INNATE IDEAS. 
 
 We shall now consider more particularly the First 
 Principles from which all Knowledge and Moral 
 Feeling* spring. We have concluded from analogy, as 
 well as from the phenomena, that the intellectual and 
 moral powers are at first in an undeveloped state. In 
 conformity, therefore, with this view of the mind, we 
 might be prepared to expect that these powers should 
 at first only be capable to receive the simplest truths, 
 and comprehend the plainest axioms. We find this, 
 accordingly, to be the case. In every branch of hu- 
 man knowledge, the rudiments or elements can only 
 at first be acquired, because the capacity is small; 
 and the expansion or progress from Truth to Truth 
 is afterwards as imperceptible, and I may add as unin- 
 telligible, as the evolution of a germ into its leaf and 
 blossom. 
 
 Now, as far as regards the origin of our knowledge 
 and the question of Innate Ideas, about which so 
 
312 Of First Principles and Innate Ideas. 
 
 much has been written, it would seem incongruous to 
 suppose that any truths, involving the least abstract 
 notion, should be imprinted upon an undeveloped 
 power; or that they should discover themselves in 
 situations, where no outward object existed to call 
 forth the exercise of that power to which these truths 
 or principles specifically belonged. It would be as 
 reasonable to expect that a plant should grow and 
 bring forth fruit, where it had neither earth and 
 water nor light and air; or that the body should be 
 enlarged in the dimensions of its limbs and organs 
 without a supply of food. Yet it would not follow, 
 but that the laws of its developement might give rise 
 to these first principles or primary truths in the mind, 
 as determinately and universally, as if they were 
 originally in existence and absolutely innate. 
 
 The discussion then about Innate Ideas seems to 
 reduce itself to a narrow compass. If the capacities 
 of the mind open as a bud (and it is matter of ex- 
 perience that different mental powers are unfolded in 
 succession) we might as well look for fruit, and leaves, 
 and branches, in the seed, as, for the evidence of an 
 innate idea of a Supreme Being, or of any other 
 sacred truth, imprinted on the understanding of an 
 infant. Indeed it is almost an abuse of terms to 
 speak of an understanding where there is no power 
 to comprehend, or to speak of an original implanted 
 Truth, laid up in a faculty which has no capacity to 
 conceive or entertain a thought! And, therefore, 
 whatever rudiment of such a conception might be 
 
Of First Principles and Innate Ideas. 313 
 
 supposed naturally to exist, must needs have the 
 same relation to mental power and its modifications, 
 that the speck of living matter has to the animal to 
 which it glows. 
 
 Whence, then, do First Principles arise. We can 
 scarcely conceive that they have any other source 
 than the native tendencies and original laws of the 
 mental constitution. 
 
 And, though we should consider these truths or 
 first principles in Science and Religion, as forming an 
 essential part of the mental constitution, when it is 
 fully expanded^ and fairly awakened ; it would not be 
 necessary to suppose them innate. For if the mind is 
 placed in a situation favourable to the developement 
 of its powers, it will naturally form to itself and em- 
 brace these principles. 
 
 But what are these First Principles. What is their 
 number, and in what form or terms can they be an- 
 nounced ? 
 
 We might as well inquire what is the Faculty of 
 Reason in its original state, or the Moral Principle ? 
 The attempt to give form and precision to any Truth 
 in its elementary state, would, I apprehend, be as 
 unavailing as to embody the make and constitution 
 of the mind itself, and to give it tangible shape. 
 Locke, therefore, in his laudable zeal after certainty 
 of knowledge, while he insists upon the necessity of 
 putting every thing that is in the mind into some 
 intelligible form, without doubt, assumes more than 
 
31 4? Of First Principles and Innate Ideas. 
 
 is capable of proof, when he asserts, that, if it cannot 
 be reduced to an intelligible form, it can have no 
 existence; though, at the same time, he may be jus- 
 tified in censuring those who contend for the exist- 
 ence of innate maxims and formal Truths in the un- 
 furnished intellect. 
 
 In the strict sense of the words, and in fact, the 
 mind, cannot have original and innate impressions, 
 except they be those which belong to its infant state, 
 appropriate to its mere sensitive existence, when it 
 is no more capable of thought than a plant or shell- 
 fish. 
 
 But, although this concession be made, and we may 
 admit that there are no innate ideas, according to the 
 strict meaning of the term, and no formally inscribed 
 truths, like established propositions, to be discovered 
 in early life ; for as much as every process of growth 
 and expansion is from small beginnings in the mind 
 as well as the body ; yet it is fair to presume that the 
 rudiments or inherent propensities leading to mental 
 and corporeal perfection are still essentially in exist- 
 ence. For, if we cannot find the matured Idea — the 
 perfect proposition in the unfurnished intellect ; such 
 as an imprinted truth, that might be expected to show 
 itself immediately and universally, and in a determi- 
 nate form of words, would imply ; yet we may rea- 
 sonably conclude that the element of that idea, — in 
 short, the element of all knowledge and all good, 
 belongs to the mind intrinsically as part of its essence; 
 
Of First Principles and Innate Ideas. 315 
 
 yet in such a manner as that, like every tendency in 
 the human mind, it may be perverted and turned to 
 Evil. 
 
 Therefore, if all truth must arise from some small 
 beginnings in every mind, it is difficult to conceive a 
 perfect proposition of any sort, however simple, to be 
 originally in it. But if it be granted that the ele- 
 ments of all truths be in any way analogous to the 
 elements of vegetable expansion in a seed, it must 
 follow that they are innate. Hence we have 'potentially 
 in our minds the principles from which every moral 
 maxim may be derived. But we have no moral 
 maxim nor any speculative truth or proposition, per- 
 fect, as it were, from our cradle. Nor is it necessary, 
 we may presume, that, in the present scheme of things, 
 this should be the case. An obvious intelligible 
 truth is like an unfolded leaf which can be looked at 
 and examined ; but, which, when latent in the bud, 
 or not protruded, is almost as inaccessible to human 
 inquiry, as if it had no positive existence. Hence, 
 because we cannot discover in the infant mind the 
 manifest signs of an original innate truth or concep- 
 tion that there is a God, and the simple propositions 
 relative to moral and religious duty, we are not to 
 conclude that it has no tendency to develope these 
 notions. 
 
 A seed is indeed something more than a tendency ; 
 it is an embodied, organized structure ; and yet when 
 we speak of the mind, we cannot assign shape and 
 figure and substance to its faculties : but they are as 
 
316 0/ First Principles and Innate Ideas. 
 
 real, notwithstanding, as the parts of an outward or 
 natural seed. Yet there is as great a difference be- 
 tween the seed or element of a truth or proposition 
 and the truth itself, as between the bud and matured 
 fruit. They are, however, of the same nature re- 
 spectively, that is, the proposition and its element, 
 and the fruit and its seed, are respectively allied ; 
 and if we could know what the essence of the mind 
 really is, we should have no occasion to use the word 
 seed, or root, as applied to its native propensities. 
 Now, as it is from a portion of living matter, — an 
 embryo, in many cases, not larger than a speck, that 
 the strong and perfect animal is formed ; so it is from 
 the smallest beginnings, which in this sense may be 
 called natural principles, that truths, or thoughts, 
 which are modifications of mind, originate. But 
 how thoughts originate is utterly inconceivable. It 
 is a mystery belonging to that hidden system of mind, 
 which it is presumed, can never be revealed. It 
 would be no easy task to take a thousand different 
 seeds of as many different plants, and attempt by the 
 aid of the microscope or any other invention, to 
 understand their structure, to explain the essential 
 difference between them, and to show the manner in 
 which the peculiar growth in each is effected by the 
 power of assimilation : yet this would be light in 
 comparison. In those operations of divine power 
 which are accompanied with creative energy ; as is 
 the case in every instance of the generative process, 
 f>f whatever kind, in plants or animals; there are 
 
Of First Principles and Innate Ideas. 317 
 
 ultimate facts, which limit the most profound and 
 scrutinizing researches. It is possible that a few 
 more laws than we know, may yet be discovered : 
 but a few more than these, and many more even in 
 addition, would still leave a veil of darkness beyond 
 that never could be pierced. There is nothing, which 
 can reasonably induce us to think, that the great 
 Creator of the Universe will ever intrust any mortal 
 with the secrets of his creating power. We have 
 neither senses nor faculties competent to unravel the 
 mighty mystery ; nor, I may add, do we seem to have 
 a system of duties compatible with the knowledge. 
 If presumption can rise to such a height in those who 
 only reach the threshold of this science, what would 
 it not aim at, if it was permitted to human vanity to 
 enter, as with the Deity, into these hidden wonders of 
 his works, and to know the secret springs of life in 
 any of his creatures ? 
 
 Seeing, therefore, we can expect to attain so little 
 real knowledge of creating power in tangible cor- 
 poreal things, how can we hope that the human ca- 
 pacity will ever be enlarged so as to comprehend the 
 generation of thought? We know that the human 
 understanding is neither a cell, nor a cabinet, nor yet 
 a seed. But we also know that, like the last, it de- 
 velopes its powers in succession ; that the capacity of 
 these is at first very small, and only fit to receive the 
 simplest elements of knowledge ; that the mind must 
 be watered, cultivated, and trained, — the good pro- 
 
318 Of First Principles and Innate Ideas, 
 
 pensities cherished, and the evil rooted up ; and that 
 according to the labour, such will be the fruit both 
 in quality and abundance. 
 
 This is matter of experience, and requires no meta- 
 physical ingenuity to prove or make it more clear. 
 It is matter of experience also, that some natural 
 principles lead to strife and jealousy, while others 
 tend to harmony and good will; that some are selfish, 
 whilst others are generous, and prompt us to various 
 disinterested offices for the good of others,, But it 
 affords ground of fair inference that principles in the 
 mind which operate universally in this way, with more 
 or less power, must be intrinsically its own. And, it 
 surely does not follow, that because they may happen 
 to be more or less developed in different human 
 beings; and because, by a wise moral ceconomy, one 
 man may instruct another, therefore they are infused, 
 as it were, from one mind into another : and that, in 
 this way, principles of Good and Evil are wholly at 
 the disposal of mankind to embue each other with, as 
 accident and circumstances, favourably or unfavour- 
 ably combined, may determine. 
 
 This cannot be considered a just view of the case. 
 In the mind as in nature there are sown various seeds. 
 Why those tending to evil should be the native pro- 
 geny of the mind is not now a question with which we 
 have any thing to do. It is certain that such propen- 
 sities do exist ; and it is our duty to conclude, that, so 
 far as concerns the great author, an all-wise merciful 
 
Of First Principles and Innate Ideas. 319 
 
 Being is clear, and to be fully justified in all his 
 institutions. If therefore we see depravity, it must 
 arise from man himself. 
 
 Now, it is not within the limits of human power to 
 create any thing anew. But every thing has some 
 standard of perfection to which it may attain ; and 
 the divine workmanship, in the case of man, may he 
 marred, or carried forward to this standard of perfec- 
 tion by the cooperation of man himself. The seeds 
 are already planted. There must be antagonist pro- 
 pensities, or there could be no internal struggle, and 
 consequently no virtue. But as each is accountable to 
 God alone for his opportunities as well as for his 
 talents, it is not conceivable that moral and account- 
 able agents should be absolutely and entirely de- 
 pendent on their fellow creatures to plant this or the 
 other seed ; so that all the fruit should be exclusively 
 of vice, or all exclusively of virtue. We have no 
 such power over each other, by our very best in- 
 struction, or by our worst example. Instead of 
 planting, unless he plants by the power of God him- 
 self, — a commission which is granted but to few — 
 Man is only the humble minister to weed and to 
 water. His work is plain and simple before him; 
 and there is enough for him to do in training the 
 good and rooting out the bad, either in himself or his 
 neighbour. The influence or power of bad example 
 is not in effect the introduction of some new and 
 foreign seed into the soil of the heart : it is the cor- 
 ruption of what is originally good, or if not positively 
 
320 Of First Principles and Innate Ideas. 
 
 good, which has at least the germ of good, — it is the 
 contagion which blights the opening morals, in other 
 words, the vicious element, in which its own native 
 weeds become rank, engendering poison, and con- 
 verting that which might be the cultivated retreat of 
 purity and virtue, into the baneful inclosure of im- 
 morality and irreligion. 
 
 From the foregoing views we may perceive how 
 writers have erred on the subject of Innate Ideas and 
 Innate Practical Principles. Some, and among them 
 Locke, because they could not discover in the infant 
 mind certain precise and intelligible truths, which 
 could be put in the form of regular propositions, have 
 denied all innate principles of truth, and with them, 
 the original seeds, elements, or foundations, on which 
 they are built. Others have maintained that man is 
 born with engraven notions and moral maxims; 
 though in attempting to define these original truths, 
 they have evidently failed of success; either reducing 
 them to an enunciation so simple as, like identical 
 propositions, to mean nothing, or magnifying them 
 into important propositions, which the mind, in its 
 unevolved state, is clearly unable to comprehend. 
 We see, therefore, how prone is man, in speculation, 
 to run into extremes ; and, when he cannot attain 
 certain knowledge, how ready to affirm or deny, with 
 positive assurance ; notwithstanding, that the truth 
 may lie in a medium between these opposite opinions. 
 However desirable certain knowledge may be, the 
 nature of things often refuses that precise and definite 
 
Of First Principles and Innate Ideas. 321 
 
 form of words in which propositions are sometimes 
 announced ; and perhaps there are no points in which 
 affirmation and negation are so decided, as those in 
 which both parties are absolutely in error, and where 
 each party should abate somewhat of his own opinion, 
 and concede something to his opponent. Hence 
 there would seem to be a legitimate medium between 
 the opinion of those who maintain against Locke, 
 some innate notions of things or engraven truths, and 
 those who maintain, with him, that all truth arises 
 from without, by the senses or some reflex operation 
 of the mind on its acquired notions. When Boyle, 
 Hale, Herbert, and others, spoke of innate truths or 
 congenite propositions engraven on the mind by the 
 Deity ; perhaps they erred as well as Locke, who as- 
 serted that the mind was absolutely a blank — con- 
 taining nothing original — not even the seed or spark 
 or fountain of a single truth. 
 
 It is for these reasons that I have hesitated to pro- 
 duce anv examples of what are called First Principles 
 in Reasoning and Morals. Yet I am well aware that 
 where so much stress is laid upon them, some par- 
 ticular notice of them will naturally be expected. I 
 believe, however, that like the foundation of a build- 
 ing or the roots of a plant, the true and genuine 
 source of reason and morality must remain hidden. 
 I have seen no enumeration with which I am satis- 
 fied. Let us for a moment consider the following, 
 which have been put forth as the primary elements or 
 first Truths in question. 
 
 x 
 
322 Of Fiist Principles and Innate Ideas, 
 
 Of the class belonging to Reason are such as these : 
 — " It is impossible for the same thing to be and not 
 to be." — " Two and two make four." — " A part is 
 less than the whole." — " Nothing can be the cause 
 of itself." — " Two contradictory propositions cannot 
 be both true," &c. &c. 
 
 Of the class belonging to Morals are such as these : 
 — " Reverence is due to God." — " Gratitude is due 
 to benefactors." — " Veracity and justice are to be 
 practiced." — " It is wrong to take from another the 
 fruit of his labour." — " We should do to others as 
 we would wish them to do to ourselves," &c. &c. 
 
 The first class are self-evident Truths; and, as 
 Locke has suggested, a man might know them with- 
 out proceeding much farther in knowledge, or being 
 much helped by them to attain it. 
 
 The second class comprehends so many important 
 Truths, that they can hardly be viewed in the light of 
 the simplest and most obvious principles, which spring 
 from the root of Moral Emotion. And therefore as 
 the first cannot be accounted the foundation of our 
 reasonings; the second are by far too complex to 
 allow us to consider them as innate principles, fa- 
 miliar to childhood, and the only ground-work of 
 morality and religion. 
 
 I have been inclined to think, that what the sim- 
 plest vocal sounds of an infant are to perfect speech, 
 or, their representatives, the letters of the alphabet, 
 to written language ; such is the relation of the 
 native and primary elements of Reason to correct 
 
Of First Principles and Innate Ideas. 323 
 
 rules of Judgment, and of the native primary elements 
 of moral feeling to the perfect rules of moral obli- 
 gation. 
 
 We know that there is a foundation in nature, that 
 is, in the structure of the organs of speech, for those 
 elementary articulate sounds, which may afterwards 
 be combined by art into discourse and language. 
 And there is good reason to think that there is a 
 foundation in nature, that is, a tendency in the origi- 
 nal make of the mind, to form those primary shoots of 
 Reason which may afterwards be improved into art 
 and science ; as well as a foundation or tendency to 
 protrude those buddings of moral emotion (such as 
 may be seen very early in children to mark their in- 
 stinctive sense of shame or demerit) — which may be 
 afterwards refined into the perfect System of Virtue 
 and Piety. 
 
 Now the simple sounds of the vocal organs — the 
 elements of language — mean little in themselves; 
 though when combined, they are so important. And, 
 it appears that the attempt to give precise form to the 
 primary elements of speculative and practical prin- 
 ciples, would be unavailing and unsatisfactory. For, 
 it is probable that too much of a definite character 
 would be claimed by the advocate for Innate Truths, 
 and that too little, if any thing, would be admitted by 
 the precise reasoner, who must either have an intel- 
 lible maxim and decided proposition before him, or 
 none at all. 
 
 The following remarks from Dr. Watts, on the 
 x 2 
 
324 Of First Principles and Innate Ideas, 
 
 subject of fir9t principles in Reasoning and Morals, 
 which I was so fortunate as to meet with, after most 
 of the preceding observations were written, will, I 
 flatter myself, serve to confirm some of the views I 
 have taken. 
 
 " It is so much the very nature" and make of the 
 soul to see and judge of things in this manner, that I 
 take it to be a part of Reason itself which, as it were, 
 implicitly contains in it these natural axioms of Truth 
 or principles of Judgment inwrought by the Creator of 
 our souls ; not in the explicit form of propositions, but 
 as principles and springs of judgment and reasoning ." 
 
 1 allow also in the same manner, that there 
 
 is such a thing, which may be called a Moral Sense in 
 the mind, which inclines the man to judge right, and 
 especially in the more general, plain, and obvious 
 queries about virtue and vice: — But this Moral Sense 
 is still the same thing, — is the very nature and make of 
 the mind — and it contains in it these plain and general 
 principles of morality not explicitly as propositions, 
 but only as native principles, by which it judges and 
 cannot but judge virtue to be fit and vice unfit for 
 intelligent and social creatures which God has 
 
 made."* " To determine how great is the 
 
 number of these propositions is impossible; for they 
 are not in the soul as propositions ; but it is an un- 
 doubted truth that a mind awaking out of nothing 
 into being and presented with particular objects, 
 would not fail at once to judge concerning them 
 
 * Philosoph. Essays, Sect. 4. 
 
Of First Principles and Innate Ideas. 325 
 
 according to, and by the force, of some such innate 
 principles as these, or just as a man would judge who 
 had learnt these explicit propositions ; which indeed 
 are so nearly allied to its own nature, that they may be 
 
 called almost a part of itself." " Therefore I 
 
 take the mind or soul of man not to be so perfectly 
 indifferent to receive all impressions as a rasa tabula, 
 
 or white paper." " Hence there may be some 
 
 practical principles also innate, in the foregoing sense, 
 though not in the form of propositions.''''* 
 
 It was before observed, that it is as impossible to 
 comprehend the nature of a seed or spark of Truth, 
 (that is, of a First Principle taken in this sense) as 
 the generation of thought itself. And therefore it 
 may be objected, that to insist upon this analogy 
 against the theory of Locke, is to argue for something, 
 if possible, more hypothetical than any of his prin- 
 ciples. I acknowledge the objection might have some 
 weight, if Locke himself had not admitted, by the 
 motto which he has chosen, as 1 think may be fairly 
 inferred, the utter ignorance of man on this subject. + 
 Voltaire has evidently taken up the same idea. 
 " What inconsistency !" says he, " we know not how 
 the earth produces a blade of grass, or how the bones 
 do grow in the womb of her who is with child ; and 
 
 * Philosoph. Essays, Sect. 3. 
 
 •f The motto is this: " As thou knowest not what is the way of the 
 Spirit, nor how the bones do grow in the womb of her that is with 
 child: Even so, thou knowest not the works of God, who maketh all 
 things." — Eccles. xi. 5. 
 
325 Of First Principles and Innate Ideas. 
 
 yet we would persuade ourselves that we understand 
 the nature and generation of our ideas."* 
 
 Cudworth, in his quaint style, has made some 
 pointed allusions to the same thing. He animadverts 
 in the following terms on what he calls the double 
 error of philosophers : — First, that they would make 
 " Sensible Ideas to be totally impressed from with- 
 out in a gross corporeal manner upon the soul, as 
 upon a dead thing : and, secondly, they suppose that 
 Intelligible Ideas are to be made out of these Sensible 
 Ideas, — as it were, by the hewing off certain chips 
 from them, or by hammering, beating, or anvilling 
 of them out into thin Intelligible Ideas ; as if solid 
 and massy gold should be beaten out into thin leaf 
 gold." " To which purpose," he adds, " they have 
 ingeniously contrived and set up an Active Under- 
 standing, like a smith or carpenter, with his shop or 
 forge in the brain, furnished with all necessary tools 
 and instruments for such a work. Where I would 
 only demand of these philosophers, whether this their 
 so expert smith or architect, the Active Understand- 
 ing, when he goes about his work doth know what he 
 is to do with these Phantasms (or Ideas) beforehand, 
 what he is to make of them, and unto what shape to 
 bring them. If he do not, he must be a bungling 
 workman; but if he do, he is prevented in his design 
 and undertaking, his work being done already to his 
 hand ; for he must needs have the Intelligible Idea 
 
 * See Voltaire's account of Newton's Discoveries, also Stewart's 
 Philosophical Essays, where the passage is cited. 
 
Of First Principles and Innate Ideas, 327 
 
 of that which he knows or understands, already within 
 himself '; and, therefore, now to what purpose should 
 he use his tools and go about to hew and hammer and 
 anvil out these phantasms into thin and subtle Intel- 
 ligible Ideas merely to make that which he hath al- 
 ready, and which was native and domestick to him." 
 
 It is difficult to imagine that Harris, the author of 
 Hermes, had not the preceding passage in view when 
 he wrote the following remarks on Locke's system, 
 quoted by Dugald Stewart. " Mark," says he, "the 
 order of things, according to the account of our later 
 metaphysicians. First, comes that huge body, the 
 sensible world. Then this, and its attributes beget 
 Sensible Ideas. Then, out of Sensible Ideas, by a 
 kind of lopping and pruning, are made ideas intelli- 
 gible, whether specific or general. Thus, should they 
 admit that mind was coeval with body ; yet, till body 
 gave it ideas, and awakened its dormant powers, it 
 could at best have been nothing more than a sort of 
 dead capacity; for, innate ideas it could not possibly 
 have any." — u For my own part, when I read the 
 detail about Sensation and Reflexion, and am taught 
 the process at large how my Ideas are all generated, 
 / seem to view the human soul in the light of a crucible, 
 where truths are produced by a kind of logical che- 
 mistry" 
 
 Before quoting this passage, and in reference to it, 
 Stewart takes occasion to observe, that it is now a 
 considerable time since this fundamental principle of 
 Locke's system (that all our knowledge is derived 
 
328 Of First Principles and Innate Ideas, 
 
 from Sensation and Reflexion) began to lose its au- 
 thority in England ; " and," he adds, " the sceptical 
 conclusions, which it had been employed to support 
 by some later writers, furnished its opponents with 
 very plausible arguments against it."* 
 
 This eminent writer further observes, that " the 
 mind cannot, without the greatest absurdity, be con- 
 sidered in the light of a receptacle which is gradually 
 furnished from without by materials introduced by 
 the channel of the Senses; nor in that of a tabula 
 rasa upon which copies or resemblances of things ex- 
 ternal are imprinted :" — and he seems to prove very 
 sufficiently, by a consideration of the Senses of Hear- 
 ing and Smelling, apart from the other three, that, 
 u although certain impressions on our organs of sense 
 are necessary to awaken the mind into consciousness 
 of its own existence, and to give rise to the exercise 
 of its various faculties ; yet all this might have hap- 
 pened without our having any knowledge of the qua- 
 lities or even of the existence of the material world." 
 This author admits, that with some qualifications, the 
 origin of all our knowledge may be referred to the 
 impressions made on our organs of sense, and that 
 without these impressions it would have been impos- 
 sible for us to arrive at the knowledge of our facul- 
 ties." But he remarks in another place, that " when 
 it was first asserted that there is nothing in the Intel- 
 lect, which does not come to it through the medium 
 of sense; there cannot be a doubt, that by this last 
 
 * See Elements of Philosophy, vol. i. p. 96. 
 
Of First Principles and Innate Ideas. 329 
 
 term were understood exclusively our powers of ex- 
 ternal perception. In process of time however it 
 came to be discovered that there are many Ideas 
 which cannot possibly be traced to this source, and 
 which of consequence afford undeniable proof that 
 the scholastic account of the origin of our Ideas is 
 extremely imperfect."* 
 
 Upon the whole, we may conclude, that too much 
 stress has been laid upon innate original truths, as 
 well as upon the opposite opinion; and that an un- 
 qualified admission of either doctrine will lead to error. 
 It is, however, scarcely credible that so many acute 
 and eminent writers could have used the word seed 
 or spark, with reference to some native original rudi- 
 ments of speculative and moral truth, had there not 
 been good natural grounds for the application. It 
 may, nevertheless, be true, that some outward occa- 
 sion is at first necessary to call forth the internal 
 power, whatever it may be, into activity : and the 
 probability is, that were it not for outward circum- 
 stances, many of the native original powers pf the 
 mind would never exhibit themselves. Because it is 
 by such outward circumstances, affording the occasion 
 of excitement, that is, by their use, that man experimen- 
 tally knows he possesses those talents, propensities, 
 and principles which were given him by his Maker, 
 and which would otherwise remained concealed and 
 unemployed. It would be easy to illustrate this po- 
 sition by a reference to the senses, appetites, feelings, 
 
 * Elements of Philosophy, vol. I. chap. I. 
 
330 Of First Principles and Innate Ideas. 
 
 &c. which have all their respective objects, either in 
 the qualities of matter or the qualities of human 
 actions. 
 
 The mind has as natural a tendency to form to 
 itself a first principle in reasoning or in morals — 
 as any of the outward senses has to convey agree- 
 able or disagreeable impressions to the seat of 
 thought. We must however except, that it is a later 
 and higher work, — in as much as sensitive operations 
 in nature precede mental ; — the vegetative, in order 
 of time, going before the animal, and the animal be- 
 fore the intellectual. Truth and falsehood, right and 
 wrong, good and evil, have their abstract, (may I not 
 say,) their immutable relations,— as well as sweet 
 and bitter, harmony and discord, beauty and its op- 
 posite in form and colour, and what is delicious and 
 offensive in odours. 
 
 These things are all independent of the will of 
 man, or of any arbitrary customs or decisions. It 
 was said formerly, and the denunciation has immuta- 
 ble truth for its basis : " Wo unto them that call 
 Evil Good, and Good Evil; that put Darkness for 
 Light, and light for darkness ; that put bitter for 
 sweet, and sweet for bitter." Isa. v. 20. The nature 
 of things, whether in physics or ethics, cannot be 
 changed without doing violence to the whole scheme 
 of God's institutions appointed for the natural and 
 moral goverment of the world. For, in their exist- 
 ing state, natural and moral relations maintain a 
 beautiful harmony. But he who would confound 
 
Of First Principles and Innate Ideas, 331 
 
 orginal distinctions, which are as widely separated as 
 light from darkness, would make variable human 
 enactments the rules of his conduct ; and would put 
 the uncertain opinions of man before the ordinances 
 of his Maker. 
 
 It is scarcely necessary for me to point out the con- 
 nection of the following quotation, from the writings 
 of Dr. Samuel Clarke, with the subject under our 
 notice. This author judiciously states that " It was a 
 very wise observation of Plato, received from Socra- 
 tes : that if you take a young man, impartial and un- 
 prejudiced, one that never had any learning, nor any 
 experience in the world ; and examine him about the 
 natural relations and proportions of things, (or the 
 moral differences of Good and Evil,) you may, only 
 by asking him questions, without teaching him any 
 thing at all directly, cause him to express in his 
 answers just and adequate notions of Geometrical 
 Truths, (and true and exact determinations concern- 
 ing matters of right and wrotig.) From whence He 
 thought it was to be concluded, that all knowledge 
 and learning is nothing but memory, or only a re- 
 collecting upon every new occasion, what had been 
 before known in a state of pre-existence. And some 
 others, both ancient and moderns, have concluded 
 that the Ideas of all first and simple Truths, either 
 natural or moral, are Innate and originally impressed 
 or stampt upon the mind. In their inference from 
 the observation, the authors of both these opinions 
 seeni to be mistaken. But thus much it proves un- 
 
332 Of First Principles and Innate Ideas. 
 
 avoidably : that the differences, relations, and pro- 
 portions of things both natural and moral, in which 
 all unprejudiced minds thus naturally agree, are cer- 
 tain, unalterable and real in the things themselves; 
 and do not at all depend on the variable opinions, 
 fancies or imaginations of men prejudiced by educa- 
 tion, laws, customs, or evil practices : and also, that 
 the mind of man naturally and unavoidably gives its 
 assent, as to natural and geometrical truth, so also to 
 the moral differences of things, and to the fitness and 
 reasonableness of the obligation of the everlasting 
 Law of Righteousness, whenever fairly and plainly 
 proposed." — Clarice's Evidence of Nat. and Rev. 
 Relig. p. 44. 
 
r r tn 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 OF THE SEEDS OF VICE AND VIRTUE, AND 
 OF BENEVOLENCE AND SELF-LOVE. 
 
 Sect. I. 
 Of the Seeds of Vice. 
 
 If Man has the seeds of good and evil in himself, 
 it may be asked what are the native propensities or 
 original principles from which vice and virtue pro- 
 ceed, and in what order are they developed ? 
 
 As we argue on the presumption that he is not 
 wholly a factitious being, we are bound to show that 
 it is not necessary to look to any other source than 
 his own heart, for the roots or fountains from which 
 good and evil, in their various shapes and appear- 
 ances, have their ramifications. It is rather too much 
 for any one to assume, that, while man evidently dis- 
 plays the seeds of vice (or those principles which 
 may lead to vice) original and inherent in his nature; 
 he is indebted to his fellow-creature or to the deduc- 
 tions of his own reason, and not to the free bounty of 
 Providence or nature for his incitements to virtue: 
 
33-4 Of the Seeds of Vice. 
 
 in other words, it is going far to say, that while he has 
 evil propensities within, his good propensities must 
 come by observation or from without, — Yet this is 
 plainly the sum of the argument we are opposing. 
 When we take a review of the Natural Appetites, 
 Desires and Affections, we may easily discover that 
 these classes of Active Principles have in themselves 
 the germs of vice ; — illustrating that sacred Truth, 
 that when man is tempted, he is not tempted of God, 
 but of the lusts and desires of his own heart. For in 
 all these things the Benevolent Parent of the Uni- 
 verse is fully justified. 
 
 I shall treat of the Appetites, Desires, and Affec- 
 tions, in order. 
 
 I. Appetites. The Appetites were implanted for 
 especial use in the physical economy ; and all philo- 
 sophers agree that without these natural impulses, 
 reason would be incompetent to provide for the pre- 
 servation of the individual and the continuance of 
 the species. But, by their abuse, these very appetites 
 give rise to gluttony, drunkenness, and sensual indul- 
 gence in all its various modifications. In consequence 
 of this, notwithstanding his higher endowments, man 
 is brought down to a level with the brute : nay, he 
 is sunk still lower; for he even uses his higher en- 
 dowments as means to stimulate his appetites to 
 unnatural excess, and prostitutes that which is noble 
 to the vilest ends. 
 
 One of the Appetites does not indeed show itself 
 at birth, nor for a long period afterwards. But it is 
 
Of the Seeds of Vice. 335 
 
 easy to perceive the wisdom of that institution, by 
 which the stimulus of this Appetite is deferred to a 
 suitable age ; so that it shall not interfere with 
 rational pursuits, nor add its influence too early in 
 the passionate excitements of the mind. 
 
 And, although it is developed after so many years ; 
 it affords one decisive proof, that whatever emotions 
 appear in the mind, are not always excited by edu- 
 cation or outward circumstances. For, what could 
 education effect, if the seeds of this animal propen- 
 sity were not laid in the bodily organization ? It is 
 at the same time unquestionable, that effeminacy, 
 luxury, and dissipation of thought, with a genial 
 climate, may induce a premature developement ; that 
 is, Art may ripen, but it does not implant the seed 
 
 II. Desires. The Desires, as they are called, are 
 active principles inherent in our nature which, as 
 Locke observes, in regard to the love of Power, > of 
 Possession, and of Esteem or Commendation, appear 
 almost from the cradle. The Desires do not take 
 their rise from the body, nor do they operate periodi- 
 cally after certain intervals, and cease on the attain- 
 ment of their objects. In these respects they differ 
 from the Appetites. They are original instinctive 
 impulses of the mind, and we cannot doubt that they 
 were implanted for wise purposes. These purposes, 
 however, it is not my business to point out. But 
 although, from the impulse of these Desires, we may 
 trace useful and important ends; it is no less true 
 that, from the same origin, we may trace many evils. 
 
336 Of the Seeds of Vice. 
 
 Among the principal of these Desires we may reckon, 
 1. The Desire of Knowledge, or the principle of 
 Curiosity. 2. The Desire of Power and of Posses- 
 sion. 3. The Desire of Esteem. 4. The Desire of 
 Superiority, or the principle of Emulation. 
 
 On the first it is scarcely necessary to make a 
 remark. 
 
 The second, or the Desire of Power, it is easy to 
 see, when carried to excess, must prove a fruitful 
 source of evil. It is in fact " the root of almost all 
 the injustice and contention that so disturb human 
 life."* It is one of the first active principles that 
 appear in children. The Love of Power is the root 
 of Ambition and Strife: and the Love of Possession 
 is the root of Avarice, Theft and Covetousness. 
 
 From the natural Desire of Esteem, which, Stewart 
 observes, appears very early in infants, who long 
 before they are able to reflect on the advantages re- 
 sulting from the good opinion of others, and even 
 before they acquire the use of speech, are sensibly 
 mortified by any expression of neglect or contempt — 
 from this Desire, (which, well used, raises the mind 
 from low pursuits) when carried to excess, pride and 
 vanity, and the love of fame, take their origin. 
 Locke himself even admits, " That we are all even 
 from our cradles vain and proud creatures." — 
 Thoughts on Education, p. 130. 
 The Desire of Superiority, or Emulation, is an ac- 
 
 » See Locke on Education, s. 105 ; and Stewart's Outlines of Moral 
 Philosophy, part 2. 
 
Of the Seeds of Vice. 337 
 
 tive principle nearly allied to the two last, and is one 
 of the leading springs of human improvement. From 
 this root arises Envy, in its excess, one of the most hate- 
 ful passions. Their affinity is thus marked by Pope : 
 
 u Envy, to which th' ignoble mind's a slave, 
 Is Emulation in the learn'd or brave." 
 
 IIL Affections. The Affections are those active 
 principles or natural impulses, by which man is dis- 
 posed to communicate good or ill to his fellow-crea- 
 tures. Hence they are divided into the benevolent 
 and malevolent. I am now to notice the latter. The 
 natural root of all the malevolent feelings appears to 
 be the instinctive principle of Resentment : which 
 Dr. Butler and others have justly considered to be the 
 only principle of this kind implanted in us by nature; 
 and that its object is to guard us against sudden vio- 
 lence in cases where Reason would come too late to 
 our assistance. Resentment very soon subsides when 
 we are convinced, that no injury was intended. In- 
 dignation is the feeling excited, when we see one per- 
 son intentionally injuring another without cause. 
 
 Hatred, Malice, Rage and Revenge are evil 
 branches springing from this root; and according to 
 the usages of civilized and savage society, display 
 themselves in a great variety of complex acts, into 
 which, Deliberation, the characteristic of a rational 
 being, more or less enters. For, in this case, as in 
 that of the Appetites and Desires, the higher faculties 
 of the mind are often employed in subserviency to 
 
338 Of the Seeds of Vice. 
 
 the lower propensities; not only in aggravating the 
 malignity and bitterness of the latter, but in devising 
 means, by cunning, treachery, or open violence, for 
 the attainment of their objects. Hence arises cruelty 
 in all its forms, with brutal ferocity and murder. 
 And hence proceed the vices of those who call them- 
 selves civilized, Retaliation, Duelling, and that out- 
 rage upon all Reason, Humanity and Religion — 
 Systematic Warfare. 
 
 From all that has been said, of the active principles 
 above enumerated, I apprehend it may be fairly con- 
 cluded that there is not a vice, which deforms the 
 human character, that may not be traced from a few 
 simple natural propensities or seeds, which appear in 
 children, almost as soon as they discover any signs of 
 character at all, and therefore long before that period 
 when Education has power to make its impressions. 
 
 The remarks of Dr. Price, in allusion to this sub- 
 ject, are deserving of attention : " Tis true," he ob- 
 serves, " that these very principles, the necessity of 
 which, to the preservation and happiness of the 
 species, we so evidently see, often prove, in event, 
 the causes of many grievous evils, and the most 
 dreadful calamities. But they are plainly intended 
 for good. These evils are the accidental, not the pro- 
 per and direct consequences of them : they proceed 
 from the unnatural abuse and corruption of them ; 
 and happen entirely through our own fault and folly, 
 contrary to what appears to be the will and consti- 
 tution of our Maker. It is impossible to produce one 
 
Of the Seed of Virtue. 339 
 
 instance, in which the original and ultimate direction 
 of nature is to evil, or to any thing", not upon the 
 whole, best." See Price's Review, chap. 3. 
 
 The last opinion, must however be received with 
 the annexed cautions, and those limitations which are 
 pointed out in a subsequent part of this Essay. 
 
 In the preceding enumeration of the roots and 
 branches of the several vices, I have not spoken of 
 the Passions : for they seem to be turbulent emotions 
 of the mind, restricted to none, but arising from all 
 the active principles, when they exceed the rule of 
 moderation ; that is, when they are carried beyond 
 the bounds of reason. As ships, in a storm, without a 
 pilot, are in danger of being driven upon rocks and 
 shoals ; so is the mind in peril, when it is tossed by 
 the tempest of Passion, and unwilling or unable to 
 hear the voice of Reason. 
 
 Sect. II. 
 
 Of the Seed of Virtue. 
 
 It is an arduous task, by any process of natural in- 
 quiry, to trace Virtue to its original source. Dr. 
 Hutcheson has remarked, that " it is a difficult ques- 
 tion, involving a threefold consideration, namely, 
 whether it comes to man by Nature, or by Custom 
 and Education, or by some Divine Instinct." Dr. 
 Hutcheson does not profess to solve the difficulty, 
 but he observes, that learning, instruction and exercise 
 
 y 2 
 
340 Of the Seed of Virtue. 
 
 will improve the implanted powers ("vires insitas") : 
 and expresses his wish that all these causes may co- 
 operate. For, that " nature itself and divine in- 
 stinct will sometimes avail without learning; but 
 without some implanted disposition to good («^w*)— 
 some natural virtuous inclination, " which," he be- 
 lieves, " is scarcely denied to any, learning will avail 
 nothing, 1 ''* 
 
 It is not my business to discuss the abstract ques- 
 tion above noticed : metaphysical discussions of this 
 sort, being as far from my purpose as they are beyond 
 my ability. 
 
 Virtue, I may premise for the sake of brevity, has 
 been understood, in opposition to vice, by some, to 
 comprehend what is good and excellent in human 
 character — of which the unbiassed testimony of the 
 heart is the witness ; and by others, to be the prac- 
 tical observance of every civil, moral, and religious 
 duly. Hence it would appear to be that which the 
 Christian may account his glory as well as the Stoic : 
 but it is received by the first as the free gift of Pro- 
 vidence with humble thankfulness ; and boasted of by 
 the last, as the attainment of man's unassisted power, 
 with pride and self-complacency. 
 
 With many other eminent philosophers, whose opin- 
 ions I have already quoted on this point, Dr. Hutche- 
 son has admitted that we have innate seeds of virtue A 
 
 * Phil. Mor. Inst. Compend. lib. 1. cap. 3. 
 
 + " Quamvis haud spernendos dederit natura igniculos, ingeniisque 
 nostris innata sint quac&am virtutum semina, qua? quidem raro adolescere 
 patimur." — Hutches. Phil. Mor. lib. 1. cap. 1. 
 
Of the Seed of Virtue. 3U 
 
 It is natural, therefore, to inquire, what are the ear- 
 liest indications of virtue in children : for, what so 
 many have taken for granted, can scarcely rest on a 
 false foundation. 
 
 We have, I think, cause to lament the proneness 
 of human nature to vice ; and it must appear evident 
 to those who watch the openings of character in chil- 
 dren, that some of the first mental indications, when 
 they are able to show the signs of any active prin- 
 ciples, are not, so far as can be judged, of a virtuous 
 tendency. This appears to be a moral fact, common 
 to every age and nation, however it may be explained. 
 The seeds of virtue do not appear to show themselves 
 so early as the seeds of vice, whatever may be the 
 advantages of outward good example. But, in as 
 much as virtue is a plant of nobler and later growth, 
 it may obey that natural law, which subjects the 
 things that are more excellent to a more tardy deve- 
 lopement. For, as that was notjirst which is spiri- 
 tual, but that which is animal, and afterward that 
 which is spiritual ; so, it may be consistent with the 
 right order of things, that the animal, sensual or in- 
 ferior propensities should appear before the moral or 
 spiritual. Indeed, we can scarcely see for what end 
 these latter noble principles should appear in an in- 
 fant, before it has discovered one spark even of in- 
 tellect ; for to it, moral conduct must be, in effect, 
 a mere name. 
 
 There is a progression or rising scale in nature, — 
 in the different orders of beings, and even in the 
 
342 Of the Seed of Virtue. 
 
 same being : — a sensitive, an animal, an intellectual 
 and a moral state, gradually unfolded, when things 
 proceed in order. The foundation is as deeply laid 
 for one degree in the scale as for another, — implanted 
 principles being as necessary for the succeeding 
 change, as for that which went before. But, what 
 is slowly developed, and slowly comes to maturity, 
 is commonly most perfect. The propensities, which 
 appear first, are not so excellent as those which un- 
 fold themselves later. A being created for this earth 
 as its first abode, helpless in body and feeble in mind, 
 would of necessity protrude those animal powers, 
 suited to its temporary state of existence, before it put 
 forth the buddings of virtue and religion, — fruit des- 
 tined for a better world, — from its immortal seed. 
 It would not, therefore, follow, as some have been 
 ready to infer, that because the manifestation of a 
 propensity or power had not priority, it must be 
 accounted adventitious, — the effect of education, and 
 not of original institution. Though something is 
 left to man, yet all is not of man ; he is still debtor 
 for his talents. Though he may abuse these talents, 
 or bury them in a napkin ; he cannot plead that he 
 has not received them. 
 
 As the seed takes root downwards in the earth, 
 before it springs upwards into light ; so has the hu- 
 man mind its earthly attachments, and manifests the 
 inferior propensities of its nature before the superior. 
 What precise direction would have been given to 
 jthese same inferior propensities, had man been en- 
 
Of the Seed of Virtue. 343 
 
 abled by the constitution of his nature, to pursue one 
 uniform course of virtue, and to continue in a state of 
 innocence ; or whether these propensities have been 
 modified and actually changed so as to assume a more 
 corrupt tendency, than was at first designed by the 
 Creator, and therefore have been adapted to a less per- 
 fect moral system, can only be matter of conjecture. 
 We see enough, on the most superficial view, to con- 
 vince us, that man is of nobler descent than his pur- 
 suits commonly indicate ; that by some means his 
 purity is tarnished; that he has only, as it were, some 
 feeble sparks and relics of a better nature; and that 
 he has anticipations of Good, which in himself and by 
 himself he has no power to realize in this world. 
 Man's early tendency to vice, therefore, demonstrates 
 an inherent infirmity ; of which his subsequent virtuous 
 efforts and exercises, in the generality of mankind at 
 least, tend only to confirm the proof; notwithstanding 
 every thing that some writers have boasted in regard 
 to the native excellence and moral perfectability of 
 human nature. We are not however at liberty to 
 say, that the very principles which lead to vice, are 
 not in themselves good. Amidst all the depravity of 
 human nature, we see the marks of Divine Wisdom — 
 the signs of supreme Benevolence in every faculty 
 and propensity ; and can have little difficulty in con- 
 ceiving that a proper and useful direction might have 
 been originally given to every propensity or root 
 that is now so prone to engender evil. 
 
344: Of the Seed of Virtue. 
 
 TEMPERANCE. 
 
 I shall now proceed to consider what relation some 
 of the branches of Virtue bear to the different active 
 principles, as the Appetites, Desires, and Affections. 
 These may be good in themselves, but they are liable 
 to abuse. 
 
 The Ancient Philosophers were aware that the 
 chief good of man did not consist in unrestrained in- 
 dulgence of these active propensities ; and, in order 
 to oppose their excess, very early suggested the rules 
 of a virtuous life ; which they comprehended under the 
 general title of the four Cardinal Virtues, and deno- 
 minated Temperance, Prudence, Fortitude, and Jus- 
 tice. Though it may be questioned whether this 
 heathen enumeration of the virtues may not include 
 more of pride than of humility, and may not belong 
 to a Stoical system of morals more than to a Chris- 
 tian; yet we must allow that these virtues are in 
 themselves truly excellent, when practised under the 
 only right influence, Piety and the Love of God. But 
 there are virtues which are not included in this classi- 
 fication. The Christian Virtues of Faith, Hope, 
 Charity, and Meekness, open a different view of the 
 relation we stand in to God and to our neighbour 
 from any thing we can gather from those above 
 named. 
 
 If the abuse and excess of the natural Appetites 
 lead to vicious indulgence, — Intemperance, dissipa- 
 tion, and dissolute conduct, — a state of anarchy, like 
 
Of the Seed of Virtue. 345 
 
 that of the body politic, in which the lower principles 
 of the mind usurp dominion and exercise authority 
 over the higher; — it is easy to see that on the other 
 hand, the proper use will lead to Temperance in all 
 its forms, — sobriety, chastity, well-ordered frugality 
 and contentment. The Habit of Temperance, which 
 is the Virtue, is therefore built upon this foundation, 
 and springs from the appetites themselves; but could 
 never be formed without the direction of some regu- 
 lating principle: hence, the relation is not imme- 
 diate. For it is obvious that the relation between 
 the Appetites and Virtue, as it is here pointed out, 
 implies the intervention of some wise directing power, 
 which may discover what is the use and what the 
 abuse. We must allow that children, at first, or pre- 
 viously to their parents' understood will, do not seem 
 to have any idea, but of gratifying the appetite or 
 present inclination, in every thing they can procure, 
 without the least visible moral check ; and this con- 
 tinues until they are warned by some means or other 
 that this gratification may be inordinate and hence 
 injurious. Experience, indeed, will often demonstrate 
 that self-denial, which is an exercise of Temperance, 
 is generally rewarded with some future advantage. 
 Conscience and Reason, being later in growth than 
 Appetite and Sense, which are more needful to the 
 animal state, or giving only feeble intimation of duty 
 in these things, do not afford the necessary counter- 
 acting influence, either for the perfection of the 
 rational or moral state. With children, therefore, 
 
346 Of the Seed of Virtue. 
 
 Appetite is at first the stronger, and hurries to enjoy- 
 ment, because the antagonist or virtuous principle is 
 not firm enough to oppose its career. If the innate 
 power of virtue were at first adequate, there would 
 be no need of outward discipline; which every parent 
 knows to be necessary to bend the untoward will, 
 to restrain the violence of temper, and to lead the 
 youthful desires, which are the elements of active 
 pursuit, in the right path. This very want in the 
 moral system, as well as in the intellectual, lays the 
 foundation for outward instruction, and, in the right 
 economy of things, is beautifully supplied by those 
 parental cares, which, in fulfilling these natural duties, 
 kindle the charities of human nature, awake the en- 
 dearments of kindred, and cement the bonds of so- 
 ciety. Besides, it is questionable how far the tender 
 minds of children would bear a natural check or moral 
 restraining power, to act on theirs/ occasions when 
 Appetite and Desire influence the will, in opposition 
 to these natural impulses: for they are the very 
 spring of early activity, and can scarcely be seriously 
 abused while children have the necessary guardianship 
 of parents to direct and take care of their youth. If 
 nature itself supplied every lesson appertaining to 
 virtue, the youthful mind, in these things, would be 
 independent of parental instruction. 
 
 PRUDENCE. 
 
 The Desires have already been spoken of, as the 
 Second Class of active principles from which vice may 
 
Of the Seed of Virtue. 347 
 
 spring: and as these, like the Appetites, may be 
 carried to excess, they will require some branch of 
 virtue to restrain their extravagance, and to make 
 them subservient to usefulness. 
 
 . The Desire of Knowledge, that of Power and Pos- 
 session, of Esteem, and of Superiority, it has been 
 observed, appear very early in life. 
 
 Prudence or Discretion, in words and actions, is the 
 name assigned by some to that cardinal virtue by 
 which the Desires are regulated, and the mind turned 
 to the only fit objects of a virtuous life. Prudence is 
 Wisdom applied to Practice.* 
 
 Desire is as apt to grow out into weeds as Appetite ; 
 and a single object of pursuit may occupy the mind 
 with its extravagance, to the exclusion of every 
 praiseworthy enterprise. As we have the Voluptuary, 
 who devotes himself to the lowest gratifications ; so 
 have we the Ambitious, the Covetous, the Proud, the 
 Inquisitive, raised a step above sensual desire, and 
 each pursuing his object with the whole bent of his 
 mind; till that pursuit seems practically to constitute 
 the end of his being. But, amidst all the variety of 
 pursuits, there is but one true end of a rational and 
 immortal nature — which is, to do the will of God. 
 Variety of pursuit is in itself laudable and necessary ; 
 
 * Whether it be right to call it Prudence or not, it is plain, that some 
 virtue is necessary for the end proposed ; and we can find no other of 
 the four which applies; for 1 am not now speaking of the Christian 
 Virtues: I would not, however, be understood to say that Prudence is 
 not sometimes assisted by Temperance, and perhaps also by Justice. 
 All spring from the same fountain ; and the active powers may be va- 
 riously united in impelling the mind. 
 
348 Of the Seed of Virtue. 
 
 and indeed it arises from original diversities of cha- 
 racter ; but it is permitted to no man to make one 
 secular object of pursuit, however laudable, the end 
 of his being. And nothing but his own heart can tell 
 him, amidst the delusions which self-love will always 
 practice, whether it is the love of his Almighty Parent, 
 which is first in his affections. 
 
 He that is unwearied in adding to his riches, and 
 unsatisfied with his gains, accumulates to himself 
 many cares ; and too often leaves his possessions be- 
 hind him to be worthlessly squandered — a mere engine 
 of covetousness, unprovided with the best treasure. 
 And, though he plead that a provision for his family 
 is the object; the unhallowed pursuit can neither 
 prove a blessing to him nor them. 
 
 He that is over-curious, busies himself in other 
 men's affairs, whilst his own are neglected ; or vexes 
 himself with the vain pursuit of forbidden knowledge, 
 proposing an endless variety of questions in Science 
 and Religion (many of them incapable of solution) 
 and at the same time overlooking the plain and ob- 
 vious path of duty, in which, it is said, the way-faring 
 man, though a fool, cannot err. 
 
 And he that is restless after power, and ambitious 
 of worldly honours, is forced to acknowledge when 
 they are attained, that something is still wanting to 
 complete his happiness, — another height to ascend, as 
 with Alexander, another world to conquer. 
 
 And lastly, whoever is infatuated with the Love of 
 Fame, so as to sacrifice every thing to its delusions, 
 
 I 
 
Of the Seed of Virtue. S49 
 
 whether it be for a name in art, science, or literature, 
 notwithstanding these are raised a step in dignity 
 above the objects last stated, is not alive to his real 
 interest : — what does he follow but a Dream ? Unless 
 ' art, science, and literature, laudable however they be, 
 constitute virtue, he has not aimed at the all-important 
 prize. For, a niche in the Temple of Fame does not 
 entitle its possessor to a name amongst the virtuous 
 and good : — and these alone are truly wise. 
 
 It is Prudence, therefore, that limits the Desires; 
 so that their ends shall be lawful, and be attained by 
 lawful means; the end and means being strictly in 
 harmony, and agreeing with the same rule. For, in 
 the enterprizes of true Wisdom, the very best end — 
 even what carries the semblance of necessity, — will not 
 justify the use of means bearing the stamp of dishonour. 
 The purest ends cannot wipe away the stain of uncon- 
 secrated means : for, if once the standard is lowered, 
 there is not an expedient, however base, which the 
 sophistry of reason will not bring itself to approve. 
 Therefore, no object, whether it be proposed as a 
 mean or an end, must be suffered to eclipse the beauty 
 and light of virtue. 
 
 FORTITUDE. 
 
 When we come to examine the ground on which the 
 virtue of Fortitude is built, we shall find that it is not 
 on Appetite, Desire, or Affection; but that it has a 
 foundation equally natural, and springs from the 
 make and constitution of man, and from the very cir- 
 cumstances in which he is placed. Fortitude is the 
 shield — the necessary defence of an intellectual and 
 
S50 Of the Seed of Virtue. 
 
 moral being*, endowed with feelings corporeal and 
 mental, that expose him continually to the pain and 
 anguish, the perils and unavoidable afflictions, which 
 are incident to Humanity. He who expects to live a 
 life of ease, and supposes that he can make himself 
 independent of suffering, is therefore sure to be dis- 
 appointed; unless he is destitute of feeling both in 
 mind and body. For we may be tried with Pain as 
 well as Sorrow. It is one thing to be indifferent to 
 the calamities of life, from an affected stoical or na- 
 tural insensibility ; and another to rise above them, 
 whilst they are acutely felt , with virtuous magnanimity. 
 The thoughtless libertine seeks to drown his cares in 
 what he calls pleasure — the shortlived enjoyment of 
 sense; and the afflicted mourner, who is pressed 
 down with grief, often sinks into an abject state of 
 despondency. Hence there is a necessity for some 
 virtue, which shall support the mind against these 
 extremes, and enable it to preserve a degree of firm- 
 ness competent to the arduous duties of life. As, from 
 the cradle, the body is liable to pain, and the mind to 
 innumerable sources of affliction; the first must be 
 endured with Patience and the last with Resignation. 
 The child that is not early instructed by some kind 
 and experienced friend in the practice of this virtue, 
 when the slightest occasion occurs for its exercise, 
 is but ill prepared for the certain trials that will 
 eventually befal his mature age. 
 
 To the good man struggling with adversity, or en- 
 gaged in correcting the vices and reforming the man- 
 ners of a corrupt age. Fortitude is more immediately 
 
Of the Seed of Virtue. 351 
 
 necessary ; as, by it he is strengthened to follow the 
 path of Duty, even in the midst of dangers and per- 
 secuting enemies. And thus, true Fortitude, while it 
 permits human nature to feel — when tossed and buf- 
 fetted by the storm, keeps the mind erect and serene, 
 even in the last extremity. 
 
 JUSTICE. 
 
 The Virtues we have been considering do not 
 spring up immediately and necessarily from the active 
 principles on which they are founded, as a plant does 
 from its seed, bearing fruit of the same kind: for it 
 must be evident that " if vice and virtue be matter of 
 choice," and not of blind impulse, they must consist 
 in voluntary actions.* But the voluntary actions 
 which characterize the virtues in question, presup- 
 pose the exercise of a Supreme regulating power in 
 the mind, — of moral Judgment or Conscience, the 
 vicegerent of God himself, which sooner or later 
 begins to exert its authority, and thus to point to 
 man's chiefest good, by subjecting Appetites, Desires, 
 and Affections, to the Divine will. 
 
 It has indeed been asserted by some sceptical 
 writers, that Justice, of which I am now to treat in 
 order, is an artificial and not a natural Virtue, ap- 
 proved solely for its utility; and deriving all its 
 obligation from the Political Union. There seems, 
 however, to be good reason for supposing that it is 
 founded on natural principles like the rest. 
 
 * See Reid's Essays, v. ch. v. 
 
352 Of the Seed of Virtue. 
 
 It is certain that there is a natural principle of 
 Attraction in man towards man, L e. a principle of 
 Benevolence, and, connected with it, Gratitude for 
 favours. And it is equally certain that he is armed 
 against injury by a strong instinctive principle of 
 Resentment. The first leads him to do good to his 
 fellow creature ; the last is the root of Malevolence. 
 " Justice fills up the middle between these two :" 
 for it neither implies favour nor injury.* Now if 
 there be no natural principle of Justice, there is a 
 natural principle of Resentment ; which amounts to 
 the same thing. Because a notion of injustice neces- 
 sarily leads to a notion of its opposite. In the lan- 
 guage of Stewart, cc Although there is no implanted 
 principle prompting us by a blind impulse to Justice; 
 there is a very strong implanted principle which 
 serves as a check on Injustice; the principle, to wit, 
 of Resentment, which is surely as much a part of 
 the human constitution, as Pity or Parental Affec- 
 tion.'^ 
 
 Now, it is difficult to conceive that any rule can be 
 more natural, just, or obvious to the unprejudiced 
 mind, than that which imposes upon every man the 
 necessity, obligation, or duty, of rendering unto 
 others, what be would that others should render unto 
 himself. He has within his own breast, when he 
 coolly consults his reason and conscience, that cri- 
 terion which determines the measure of what he owes 
 to his neighbour: and if he would not that others 
 should injure him he will not injure others; for he 
 
 * Reid's Essays, v. ch. v. t See Outlines, § 347. 
 
Of the Seed of Virtue. 353 
 
 may look for the same resentment which rises in his 
 own mind against injury. 
 
 Dr. Reid has illustrated this point so clearly, that 
 I shall avail myself of his remarks. " When a man's 
 natural rights are violated, he perceives intuitively, 
 and he feels, that he is injured. The feeling of his 
 heart arises from the judgment of his understanding ; 
 for if he did not believe that hurt was intended, and 
 unjustly intended, he would not have that feeling. 
 He perceives that injury is done to himself, and that 
 he has a right to redress. The natural principle of 
 Resentment is roused by the view of its proper ob- 
 ject, and excites him to defend his right. Even the 
 injurious person is conscious of his doing injury; he 
 dreads a just retaliation; and if it be in the power 
 of the injured person, he expects it as due and de- 
 served. 
 
 " That these sentiments spring up in the mind of 
 man as naturally as his body grows to its proper 
 stature ; that they are not the birth of instruction, ei- 
 ther of parents, priests, philosophers, or politicians, 
 but the pure growth of nature, cannot, I think, with- 
 out effrontery, be denied. We find them equally 
 strong in the most savage and in the most civilized 
 tribes of mankind; and nothing can weaken them but 
 an inveterate habit of rapine and bloodshed, which 
 benumbs the conscience, and turns men into wild 
 beasts."* 
 
 * Reid's Essays, vol. 3, p. 511. 
 Z 
 
354 Of the Seed of Virtue. 
 
 In conclusion, Justice is that branch of Virtue, 
 which interposes its authority between the Benevo- 
 lent and Malevolent affections, in regulating their 
 activity, and influencing Hie conduct so as to render 
 every man his due. It instructs him to be sincere, 
 candid, and upright, to observe the strictest veracity 
 and fidelity, and in all things to uphold the standard 
 of probity. 
 
 In some of the ancient definitions of this virtue, 
 Justice not only comprehended what is due from one 
 man to another, but also the duties man owes to God, 
 as his maker, preserver, and righteous Judge — the 
 duties of love, obedience, and adoration. 
 
 Now, the several virtues, Temperance, Prudence, 
 Fortitude, and Justice, are only different forms under 
 which the same controlling and regulating influence 
 appears practically in the concerns of life, — in the 
 conduct of rational and moral agents, who have power 
 to choose either vice or virtue. But if Virtue, in the 
 strict acceptation of the word, consists in resisting 
 temptation, and Vice in yielding to it, it is clearly 
 necessary that the power which determines the choice 
 in favour of the former, should be sufficiently deve- 
 loped, in order to maintain the struggle ; and it is not 
 reasonable to expect that, in children, faith should 
 conquer sense, so that, in their pliant and infirm minds, 
 the prospective good of virtue should immediately 
 outweigh the present appearance of happiness. Hence 
 appetite, desire, and selfish feelings, appear at first to 
 have the ascendancy in by far the greater number. 
 
Of the Seed of Virtue. 355 
 
 But in many, at a very early age — a period which 
 differs considerably in different children, — we may 
 perceive the signs of very acute moral perception on 
 the side of virtue : and these moral perceptions have 
 all the greenness and liveliness and purity which we 
 see in the young bud. There is nothing of that cold- 
 ness, and insipidity — that withered autumnal decay, 
 which moral feeling is apt to assume in manhood, 
 when it has been slighted and chilled, and its culti- 
 vation neglected ;— a proof that these feelings are na- 
 tural and not acquired. 
 
 Hence, it follows that the true groand-work of 
 Virtue, as it respects the Appetites, Desires, natural 
 Feelings, and Affections, must be sought for in the 
 first openings and admonitions of that principle, which 
 has been appointed the Governor and Director, and 
 variously denominated the Moral Faculty, Conscience, 
 the Divine Principle of Truth, the seat and throne of 
 God in the mind. This is the seed ; and the Virtues 
 which have been enumerated, are branches from this 
 root : they are not different seeds. For, if like begets 
 its like. Virtue can have no congenial affinity with 
 Appetite or Desire : and therefore the Appetites, De- 
 sires, and Affections, which need this controul, are 
 hot the root of virtue, but the occasions which call 
 forth its exercise ; without which occasions, we can- 
 not even conceive the notion, much less the existence 
 or necessity, of a virtuous action. 
 
 There is reason to believe that some of those 
 writers, who used the expression seeds of virtue, gave 
 
 z 2 
 
35G Of the Seed of Virtue. 
 
 the word Virtue a more enlarged signification, and 
 comprehended in it all those benevolent feelings, 
 instincts, or impulses, of the human heart, which are in 
 themselves and in their nature intrinsically o-ood, and 
 have a tendency to produce good fruit; such as kind- 
 ness, parental and filial affection, gratitude, compas- 
 sion, and friendship, as well as the pure principle of 
 truth. 
 
 Dr. Hutcheson remarks, that Bishop Cumberland 
 always uses the word Benevolence, to denote the in- 
 ternal spring of Virtue. But it is easy to see that our 
 Appetites and Desires, having no relation to others, 
 do not require a virtuous principle, in other words, a 
 restraining power, whose sole object is the good of 
 others, but a restraining power, whose sole object is 
 our own good. Consequently, Benevolence cannot be 
 considered the root from which every branch of virtue 
 springs. Not but the good of individuals leads ulti- 
 mately to the good of their fellow-creatures. The 
 seed of virtue, is, however, deeper grounded than even 
 in the love of man to man, which is only one of its 
 shoots. It is grounded in the Divine principle of 
 Truth. 
 
 The following passage from Lord Bacon clearly 
 shows that virtue was taken in the enlarged sense to 
 which I have adverted : — a sense comprehending not 
 only the habitual exercise of the mind in the pursuit 
 of what is good and praiseworthy, but the seed or foun- 
 tain of all that is originally good and amiable in 
 itself. Besides, this passage points to the important 
 
/the Seed of Virtue. 357 
 
 fact I have incidentally noticed, viz. that goodness 
 of nature is deeply implanted in the human mind. 
 
 " Goodness of nature, of all virtues and dignities 
 of the mind, is the greatest, being the character of 
 the Deity" — " The inclination to Goodness is im- 
 printed deeply in the nature of man ; insomuch that 
 if it issue not towards man, it will take unto other 
 living creatures."* 
 
 Bishop Butler says, u There is a natural principle 
 of Benevolence in man" — "such a natural principle 
 of attraction in man towards man that having trod the 
 same tract of land, having breathed in the same cli- 
 mate, barely having been born in the same artificial 
 district or division, becomes the occasion of contract- 
 ing acquaintances and familiarities many years after:" 
 and he concludes, that, " as any thing may serve the 
 purpose," these and other " relations merely nominal, 
 are in truth merely the occasions, upon which our 
 nature carries us on according to its own previous 
 bent and bias."t 
 
 It is far from my intention, in these and the pre- 
 ceding observations on vice and virtue, to enter into 
 what may be called an analysis of the mind. I have 
 thought it desirable to come at as clear an under- 
 standing as may be, of what is meant by the expres- 
 sion " seeds of virtue," used by so many critical and 
 philosophical writers; and therefore have endea- 
 voured to show upon what foundation some of the 
 
 * Bacon's Essays, xiii. 
 + Butler's Sermons. 
 
358 Of the Seed of Virtue. 
 
 virtues are built, as well as the true spring of virtue 
 in the mind. I have endeavoured to show that this 
 foundation is not laid by man; that the principles are 
 within his own breast ; and that all virtue must ulti- 
 mately be resolved into the pure unbiassed dictates of 
 the Conscience or Moral Principle as its root and 
 source. Men may differ about names; and they may 
 ascribe virtue to Reason, or to Self-love, or to Utility, 
 or to Benevolence ; or may have it to consist in con- 
 duct agreeable to the Fitness of things. But they are 
 agreed upon the fruit : they know what is good and 
 excellent in conduct ; and, on the other hand, what 
 is base and dishonourable. And, as under right in- 
 fluence (if it be lawful here to give virtue its full 
 Christian acceptation) it elevates man to the perfec- 
 tion of his moral nature; they must acknowledge 
 that, whatever be its source, that, which constitutes 
 the true dignity of man, is not likely to be adven- 
 titious, or brought from without, — while every prin- 
 ciple that has a tendency to degrade, is natural, or 
 implanted within. They must still admit its in- 
 trinsic value. In whatever way, therefore, they con- 
 nect it with other principles of the mind— the under- 
 standing or the heart — such as Reason or Benevo- 
 lence, it is far above them all in excellence, and 
 has an indefeasible title to the love and veneration 
 of mankind. As Reason may shew itself without 
 Virtue, Reason cannot be Virtue ; and the same may 
 be said of Self-love and Benevolence; for Reason may 
 be cultivated to the highest pitch of natural discern- 
 
Of Benevolence and Self-Love. 359 
 
 inent, without one particle of virtue : and therefore 
 whether philosophers will allow it to occupy its seat 
 in the mind, on an independent footing, or by the 
 mediation, support, and exercise of some other prin- 
 ciple; it will assuredly establish its throne, wherever 
 Piety, Humility, and Self-denial are suffered to pre- 
 vail, with an authority which subjects Reason, Self- 
 love, Affection, Sympathy, and Desire, to its govern- 
 ment : But all this may be said, and perhaps more 
 properly, of that seed or principle of moral emotion, 
 from which alone true Virtue springs, and which has 
 obtained many different appellations, of which Con- 
 science is perhaps the chief. 
 
 Sect. III. , 
 Of Benevolence and Self-Love. 
 
 Before I proceed to treat of Conscience and its 
 supremacy, with its laws and modifications, and the 
 various denominations under which it has passed, I 
 am anxious to say a few words on the Benevolent 
 affections, by way of attempting to remove from hu- 
 man nature the imputation of Selfishness, which has 
 been thrown upon it in some celebrated systems of 
 morals. It cannot be doubted, that there are in 
 human nature implanted feelings of Benevolence, 
 undefiled with selfish motives. But these benevolent 
 feelings, in themselves, I am inclined to think, have 
 no immediate relation to Virtue, because we see 
 
36Q ' Of Benevolence and Self-Love. 
 
 some of them at times in the brute creation~the off- 
 spring of pure nature. 
 
 These Benevolent Affections display themselves in 
 various ways towards others, as in parental and filial 
 Affection, in Sympathy or Compassion for the afflicted 
 and distressed, in Esteem and Veneration for the wise, 
 generous, and good, in Gratitude towards our bene- 
 factors, in Friendship for those of kindred sentiments 
 and feelings, &c. 
 
 Now, he must entertain a mean and contracted 
 notion of human nature, who can see nothing in the 
 kind impulse of these Affections, but a secret and 
 selfish view to our own interest; making the ground 
 of Attachment, of Generosity, and of the Social 
 Union, to consist in the cold calculations of Self-love, 
 and not in the warm unpremeditated feelings of na- 
 tural Benevolence. 
 
 Every one of these impulses was given us by the 
 provident Author of Nature, for claims of social good, 
 which Reason would be too slow to answer, too cold 
 to estimate, and too formal to fulfil. 
 
 Nay, we find that, in proportion as Reason obtains 
 the ascendancy, subjecting thought and motive and 
 action to rigid rule, feeling is superseded, and natu- 
 ral impulse becomes weak. The heart has then no 
 voice, and is not permitted to dictate to the head. 
 The warmth of youthful emotion is chilled by the 
 caution of age. Liberality may indeed discover it- 
 self; but its offerings are like the tardy fruits which 
 a rigid plant in some churlish soil is compelled to 
 
Of Benevolence and Self- Love. 361 
 
 yield by stubborn labour: while the other may be 
 compared to those supplies which bountiful nature, in 
 the warmth of a genial climate, pours forth in spon- 
 taneous abundance. However age and intercourse 
 with the world may tend to chill these natural emo- 
 tions, and to make considerations of interest enter 
 into every act and motive; it is certain, that the 
 warm-hearted youth has no conception that he is 
 playing the game of Self-love, while he is acting under 
 the influence of Pity, Gratitude, or Friendship, or 
 submitting with cheerfulness to toilsome privations, 
 for the support of a destitute parent. 
 
 When an anxious mother extends her numerous 
 cares, and deprives herself of many comforts for the 
 sake of her beloved offspring ; — when a good Sama- 
 ritan pours in the oil and wine to allay the sufferings 
 of some afflicted stranger ; — when a man is impelled 
 by the ardour of feeling to rush into the flames or 
 to plunge into the sea, at the risk of his own life, to 
 rescue a fellow mortal from imminent danger ; — when 
 an act of unlooked-for kindness has made such an im- 
 pression, that Gratitude swells in the heart and speaks 
 in the language of sincerity from every feature, seek- 
 ing every occasion to show the obligation more than 
 to repay the debt, — can we believe that, in any of 
 these instances, self-love, or the prospect of some ad- 
 vantage remote or near, is the spring of action ; and 
 would not the individuals, actuated by such Affections, 
 turn with a natural surprise, mingled with amiable 
 contempt, from any one, as though he were callous 
 
Of Benevolence and Self- Love. 
 
 to the noblest feelings of human nature, who would 
 so far belie their motives as to insinuate that interest 
 was their object ? 
 
 When Speculation, for it does not deserve the name 
 of Philosophy, will not hear the voice of nature, it 
 leaves the straight- for ward path that leads to Truth. 
 But the voice of nature cannot be mistaken on this 
 question ; and therefore the Selfish System must be 
 pronounced to be more visionary than true. 
 
 It must indeed be admitted that the Benevolent 
 Affections are possessed in very different measures or 
 proportions by different individuals, — in some, one or 
 more of these active principles nearly absorbing all 
 others, — in many, what is called Goodness of Nature 
 making up the strongest feature in the character, — 
 and in others, a seeming apathy throwing its shade 
 over every social endearment. Yet amidst all the 
 natural varieties, which this part of the mental con- 
 stitution presents to our notice, an example of pure 
 unmixed selfishness is almost anomalous in the human 
 family. For I do not here speak of those miserable 
 objects, who, by brooding over wealth have extin- 
 guished the sparks of generosity, and, to their far 
 greater loss, have nearly smothered the sparks of 
 virtue; like aliens from God and man, forsaking both, 
 for that which was given them by their Maker, not as 
 an idol to be worshipped, but as an instrument in their 
 hands to benefit their fellow-creature. — Nor yet do I 
 speak k of those isolated beings, who, from whatever 
 cause, by voluntary seclusion, and a studied morose- 
 
Of Benevolence and Self Love. 363 
 
 ness, have perverted their best feelings so as to ac- 
 quire an insensibility to social enjoyments, and almost 
 a hatred of their species. 
 
 These are blots in the fair scheme of social order, 
 swerving alike from human and from natural institu- 
 tions, and alike disowned by humanity and by reason. 
 They appear to serve no end in the creation, but as 
 beacons, to warn others to shun the poison of cor- 
 roding solitude, which dries up the fountain of social 
 warmth and virtue in the heart; and to avoid the early 
 tomb in which the votary of Riches buries, amidst his 
 hoards, his usefulness and his best affections, becoming- 
 dead, as it were, to the world, before the appointed 
 time when he is called upon to surrender for others* 
 use what he has neglected to employ. 
 
 It seems to have been a two-fold error in the phi- 
 losophy of Pope, that he made Self-love to compre- 
 hend the whole active principles on the one hand ; 
 and Reason to comprehend the regulating balance, 
 check, and supreme authority, on the other. For, 
 besides Self-love, if Appetite and Desire may be in- 
 cluded in the term, we have the several disinterested 
 Affections of which I have spoken, as springs of ac- 
 tion: And besides the " comparing balance" of Rea- 
 son, we have a still higher principle, Conscience, to 
 preside and govern. 
 
CHAP. VII. 
 
 OF CONSCIENCE AND ITS SIGNIFICATIONS,— 
 INCLUDING REMARKS ON THE REASONINGS 
 OF LOCKE ON INNATE MORAL PRINCIPLES. 
 
 Sect. I. 
 
 Of its comprehenshe Signification. 
 
 From what has been last stated we may conclude 
 that there is a principle in Man, to which all his 
 Appetites, Desires and Affections, as well as his ra- 
 tional or intellectual nature ought to be subservient. 
 For, as his rational or intellectual nature may be 
 wholly employed in ministering to the indulgence of 
 these lower propensities ; seeing we have around us 
 the proofs of system, skill, experience, knowledge, 
 art, in numerous instances where the moral good 
 either of individuals or of society is not even once 
 presumed to be the ultimate object (and into all these 
 combinations of means to ends Reason essentially 
 enters,) it follows, that Reason itself must be sub- 
 jected and sanctified by some higher principle. For, 
 it is the very nature and business of the rational 
 faculty to be occupied in the things of time ; or, if 
 it chance to contemplate the things of eternity, in 
 
Of Conscience, 365 
 
 forming to itself speculative notions, which may 
 prove altogether barren with respect to purity of 
 conduct. But, in the subjection of Reason, its legi- 
 timate uses may still be preserved ; seeing that in the 
 best and wisest of mortals, sense and appetite, and 
 desire and affection, may be lawfully exercised, with- 
 out prejudice to moral and religious advancement. 
 
 It is observed by Dr. Beattie, and the remark 
 illustrates the concluding observation of the last 
 chapter, that " Conscience being proved to be the 
 Supreme regulating Principle of human nature, it 
 follows that virtuous action is the ultimate end for 
 which Man was made." Without Conscience, or some 
 analogous principle, it is plain, that there would be 
 no internal guide to virtue — no judge of thoughts and 
 actions, to approve or to condemn. It is, therefore, 
 the power that constitutes man a moral and account- 
 able agent, and virtue is its object. 
 
 Conscience, however, is a word which has been 
 used in various senses; and though almost every one 
 may seem to understand it, the precise meaning is far 
 from being agreed upon. 
 
 I have already apprised my reader that, in an Essay 
 of this sort, embracing a comparative view of dif- 
 ferent authors' opinions, and resting in the first in- 
 stance on natural reasoning, he must expect to find 
 a good deal of confusion and ambiguity, both in re- 
 ference to such opinions and to the terms in which they 
 are conveyed. These appear to be inseparable from 
 all human efforts, by the light of nature, to pierce the 
 
36G Of Conscience. 
 
 veil which hides the operation of supreme Power oh 
 the mind of man. But if by natural reason we can 
 come to nothing clear and demonstrative, it may at 
 least be satisfactory to show, by reference to the con- 
 flicting or various opinions of different authors, how 
 far this light extends, and how little concerning moral 
 truth and its source, the feeble lamp of reason really 
 discovers. 
 
 In the use of the word Conscience, there appears 
 to be considerable diversity, both as to its meaning 
 and the precise relation it bears to the other faculties. 
 Of this I shall attempt a more full explanation. 
 
 Some represent the Conscience to be a distinct 
 faculty, synonymous with what is called a Moral 
 Sense ; others take it to be a modification of Memory, 
 others of Reason ; and some assign it the same place 
 in moral perception, that simple consciousness holds 
 in every natural operation of the mind. In the last 
 sense it is the secret testimony or immediate know- 
 ledge, which the mind has in itself concerning the 
 pravity and rectitude of its oivn thoughts, words and 
 actions. This perhaps is its most correct etymolo- 
 gical meaning: and it agrees best with Scripture. 
 
 Before I proceed further, it may be proper to no- 
 tice two very different significations in which Con- 
 science has been frequently employed, each of which 
 has been sanctioned by eminent authorities. In 
 the first of these it appears to stand as an indepen- 
 dent principle : in the second as a simple modification 
 of some other power, filling only a subordinate office. 
 
Its comprehensive Signification. 367 
 
 In the one it is set forth as the vicegerent of God 
 himself, legislating, controlling, judging, according 
 to immutable truth : in the other it is said to follow 
 the judgment, to receive its dictates secondarily from 
 Reason, and to be as variable as climate, customs and 
 local institutions can make it. 
 
 Bishop Butler and his followers advocated the doc- 
 trine of its supremacy alluded to in the first signi- 
 fication : the direct tendency of Locke's argument, 
 in his work on Human Understanding, is to support 
 the second. 
 
 In the writings of others it is made at once to hold 
 its authority and independence, as the seat, throne, 
 or umpire of God in the soul ; and yet with some 
 appearance of inconsistency, it is allowed to bend its 
 rule to circumstances, such as customs and religious 
 institutions, however various; — to lower its standard, 
 so as to acknowledge inferior rules of duty, and yet, 
 even in this state of comparative humiliation, to claim 
 the respect due to some sacred and inviolable truth. 
 
 These are phenomena in the mental constitution 
 that are worthy of examination : indeed, it is im- 
 possible to understand what is meant by the inviol- 
 ability of Conscience, which every truly enlightened 
 mind in the present day is willing to acknowledge, 
 without some illustration of the principles according 
 to which these seeming inconsistencies may be re- 
 conciled. 
 
 I shall proceed to give a few examples of the first 
 signification. 
 
368 Of Conscience. 
 
 " Mankind," says Bishop Butler, " have various 
 instincts, or principles of action, which brutes have 
 not ; particularly Conscience." — " Conscience, com- 
 pared with the other principles of action in man, 
 plainly bears upon it marks of authority over all the 
 rest, and claims the absolute direction of them all, 
 to allow or forbid their gratification." — " To preside 
 and govern, from the very economy and constitution 
 of Man, belongs to it* This faculty was placed with- 
 in to be our proper governor, to direct and regulate 
 all undue principles, passions and motives of action. 
 This is its right and office : thus sacred is its au- 
 thority.— Had it strength, as it has right ; had it 
 power, as it has manifest authority ; it would absolutely 
 govern the world. As in civil government, the con- 
 stitution is broken in and violated by power and 
 strength prevailing over authority ; so the constitu- 
 tion of man is broken in upon and violated by the 
 lower faculties or principles within, prevailing over 
 that which is in its nature supreme over them all." 
 w Conscience does not only offer itself to shew us the 
 way we should walk in, but it likewise carries its 
 own authority with it, that it is our natural guide : 
 the guide assigned us by the Author of our nature." 
 
 Milton has well described its dignity and office : 
 
 " And I will place within them as a guide 
 My umpire Conscience, whom, if they will hear, 
 Light after light, well used, they shall attain, 
 And to the end persisting, safe arrive." 
 
Its comprehensive Signification, 369 
 
 " Conscience, Conscience !" exclaims Rousseau, in 
 one of his happiest lucubrations : u Divine Instinct, 
 immortal and heavenly Voice, sure Guide of a being 
 ignorant and limited, but intelligent and free, infal- 
 lible Judge of good and evil, by which Man is made 
 like unto God ! It is thou that constitutest the ex- 
 cellence of his nature and the morality of his actions: 
 without thee I feel nothing in myself that raises me 
 above the brute, but the sorrowful privilege of wan- 
 dering from error into error by the assistance of an 
 understanding without rule, and of a rational faculty 
 without principle." 
 
 Cowper also, who in many of his poetical flights 
 had a deep and clear insight into true philosophy, 
 as well as into sound Christianity, when speaking of 
 the internal light of the wise heathen, expresses him- 
 self in the following words : 
 
 " Their fortitude and wjsdom were a flame 
 Celestial, tho' they knew not whence it came, 
 Derived from the same source of light and grace, 
 That guides the Christian in his swifter race, 
 Their Judge was Conscience, and her rule their law : 
 That rule, pursued with reverence and with awe, 
 Led them, however faultering, faint and slow, 
 From what they knew, to what they wished to know." 
 
 Cozvper, Truth, 
 
 Dr. Reid nearly agrees with Butler in his descrip- 
 tion of this Power. " Conscience," he says, pre- 
 scribes measures to every Appetite, Affection, and 
 Passion ; and says to every other principle of action, 
 
 2 a 
 
370 Of Conscience. 
 
 i so far thou mayst go, but no farther !' It is evi- 
 dent, that this principle has from its nature, author- 
 ity to direct and determine with regard to our con- 
 duct; to judge, to acquit or condemn, and even to 
 punish ; an authority which belongs to no other 
 
 principle of the human mind It is the candle of 
 
 the Lord set up within us to guide our steps." Essay 
 3. ch. 8, p. 310. 
 
 " It would seem," says Dr. Rush, " as if the su- 
 preme Being had preserved the Moral Faculty in man 
 from the ruins of his fall, on purpose to guide him 
 back again to Paradise; and at the same time had 
 constituted the Conscience, both in man and fallen 
 spirits, a kind of royalty in his Moral Empire, on 
 purpose to shew his property in all intelligent crea- 
 tures, and their original resemblance to himself." 
 
 Lord Bacon very clearly bears testimony — and a 
 most important testimony it is — to the principle that 
 " the light of Nature not only shines upon the hu- 
 man mind through the medium of a rational faculty, 
 but by an internal Instinct, according to the law of 
 Conscience, which is a sparkle of the purity of man's 
 first estate." Most other writers, as Locke, make 
 the light of nature to consist wholly in the deductions 
 of a rational faculty, and set aside any internal light 
 or instinct. But Bacon in this as in many other sub- 
 jects, went deeper than some of the moderns, whose 
 discoveries are thought to have superseded the pene- 
 trating views of that astonishing genius. 
 Pope evidently points to an original inherent right, 
 
Its comprehensive Signification. 37 1 
 
 and not to any acquired authority of Conscience, in 
 one of the stanzas of his Universal Prayer : — 
 
 " What Conscience dictates to be done 
 
 Or warns me not to do ; > 
 
 This teach me more than hell to shun, 
 That more than heav'n pursue." 
 
 Barclay says, " The Conscience of man is the seat 
 and throne of God, in him, of which God is the alone 
 proper and infallible Judge." 
 
 " The dictates of Conscience," says Beattie, " are 
 to every good man the highest authority in matters 
 of duty, — what more interesting than to know, whe- 
 ther his notions of duty and of truth be the dictates 
 of his nature, that is, the voice of God, or the posi- 
 tive institutions of Men V* See Essay on Truth, part 
 1. ch. 2. 
 
 Blair remarks u That when Conscience threatens 
 punishment to secret crimes, it manifestly recognizes 
 a supreme Governor, from whom nothing is hidden. 
 The belief of our being accountable to him arises not 
 merely from reasoning, but from internal sentiment. 
 Conscience is felt to act as the delegate of an in- 
 visible Ruler; both anticipating his sentence and 
 foreboding its execution. — Conscience is the guide or 
 the enlightening and directing principle of conduct." 
 Sermons, 13 vol. I & 5. 
 
 From the foregoing citations, which, it will be seen, 
 have a remarkable coincidence, (and their number 
 2 a 2 
 
372 Of Conscience. 
 
 might be much increased) it appears that Conscience, 
 as its nature and office are thus defined, represents a 
 light, spark, faculty, or principle in the human mind 
 of the very highest rank and authority : and that 
 there is such a power is taken for granted by all with- 
 out any shadow of doubt. Nothing appears but that 
 it is an original independent principle, sacred and 
 inviolable, because accountable only to God, and 
 receiving its dictates immediately from Him. The 
 only question is, to what degree of humiliation or de- 
 pression it may be liable, from the general weakness 
 and depravity of human nature. 
 
 The common opinion seems to be, that the Con- 
 science, with every ordinary help internal and ex- 
 ternal, is not fully competent to ascertain its duties, 
 (according to the Christian model of duty) without 
 the written letter of Revelation. For it is known to 
 be easily warped, and men are liable, from various 
 causes, to be mistaken with regard to their duties. 
 Where then is the ultimate criterion or standard, — in 
 Scripture or in the mind ? If in Scriptuie, What is the 
 rule that binds those who are without it ? If in the 
 mind, Is Scripture to be undervalued and set aside ? 
 
 Without the ground-work of Conscience (taking 
 the term in its most comprehensive meaning) it is to be 
 presumed, that Scripture would be a dead letter, 
 wholly inapplicable to the state of man and unintelli- 
 gible. — The foundation is therefore laid in the mind. 
 But, without Scripture, the superstructure of Faith 
 and Practice, with its accompanying supports, could 
 
Its comprehensive Signification. 373 
 
 not be distinctly known. Yet, after all, outward 
 knowledge, however perfect, is only one of the means 
 of leading to inward purity. And it is for God alone 
 to judge how far this outward knowledge by Scrip- 
 ture is essential to the great end of Life. Scripture 
 is one of the purest and clearest streams that have 
 ever issued from the fountain of divine Goodness, 
 which has established a native spring sf Truth and 
 Virtue in every soul. The pure dictates of one can- 
 not therefore oppose the pure dictates of the other : 
 seeing their source is the same. 
 
 If we change the metaphor ; the degree of light 
 may vary according as one man has a greater measure 
 than another. But the light of an apostle is not one 
 thing, and the light of the heathen another thing, 
 distinct in principle. They differ only in degree of 
 power, distinctness y and splendor of manifestation :— * 
 and, so far only, does a Gospel truth differ from the 
 natural unsophisticated moral rule of the unlettered 
 Indian, who sees the Majesty of Heaven in clouds and 
 hears his voice in thunder. 
 
 In the descriptions of Conscience by the writers 
 above quoted, its rule and authority are set forth 
 without conditions or limitation, as the distinguish- 
 ing and glorious privilege of man. It is considered 
 to be the Guide of conduct, the light of the mind, the 
 candle of the Lord, the spark of divine purity, the 
 throne and vicegerent of God himself. It is not pre* 
 sumed that Education can do more than call it forth, 
 by directing the attention of the mind to a hidden 
 
374 Of Conscience. 
 
 treasure, and thus by cultivation improving it, like 
 every other talent; but it is not implied, that its 
 rule and light are of necessity to come from without. 
 The spark is kindled by the Almighty ; and man has 
 to cherish it into a flame. The seed is planted by the 
 Creator ; and human vigilance must secure the fruit. 
 If it were wholly dependent on others, it would be 
 a rule and standard fabricated by man ; or even if it 
 were dependent on Scripture, although the medium 
 might be of divine original, yet the source being re- 
 moved, the benefits would be circumscribed, and 
 millions would be deprived of the blessing. 
 
 If the moral rule and standard are wholly from 
 without, how should it happen that the maxims im- 
 bibed are of so much more sacred and obligatory a 
 character, than those of speculative truth conveyed 
 by the same outward medium ? For, there is an in- 
 herent authority in the pure Conscience which stamps 
 its dictates with no second-hand commission. Scarcely 
 any one speaks of it but as the power by which man 
 holds direct intercourse with his Maker, and by which 
 peace is whispered in the soul, or the bosom is stung 
 with remorse, by an immediate divine influence. 
 
 It would be strange if, in all thejirst lessons taught 
 by this principle, man should be the only teacher, and 
 they should come by the outward ear ; while in all 
 the subsequent steps of its progress, the Almighty 
 himself should exercise the government, and issue 
 his mandate immediately from his own sanctuary. 
 This is surely not consistent with the moral economy 
 
Its comprehensive Signification. 375 
 
 of a Universal Parent, who acknowledges the inha- 
 bitants of the whole earth as his children; who is 
 himself their only Judge; and who exacts no more 
 service from any mortal than he has given ability to 
 perform, nor a greater measure of obedience than he 
 has afforded light and knowledge of duty. For, 
 without presuming to anticipate the righteous deci- 
 sions of a Being excellent in wisdom, confiding never- 
 theless in the faith of his own declarations, and more- 
 over persuaded that the Gospel of Christ is the most 
 glorious revelation of God's will to man ; — I speak it 
 with reverence — it is still possible that the scattered 
 tribes of the human family most remote from civilized 
 society, and least acquainted with the real condition 
 of man, may rise up in judgment against the most en- 
 lightened ; if the first obey the few precepts enjoined 
 by their simple consciences ; and the last, possessing 
 all knowledge, all faith, and all Scripture, are yet 
 wanting in their obedience to the light they have 
 received. 
 
 But I am anticipating a discussion that is to follow 
 in another place. 
 
 Enough is said to show that Conscience is usually 
 taken in that latitude of meaning which comprehends 
 the only principle by which man can have access to 
 his Maker; and it directly involves tlje notion of 
 natural or ordinary Revelation. And however it may 
 include that knowledge of duty which properly be- 
 longs to the understanding, (which, it must however 
 be allowed, agrees best with the etymology of the 
 
376 Of Conscience. 
 
 word) it invariably includes that instinctive percep- 
 tion of vice and virtue, or moral beauty and defor- 
 mity—that internal sense of right and wrong, prompt- 
 ing the will — which is implanted by the Deity, and 
 is to be accounted the foundation of Morality and 
 Religion. 
 
 Sect. II. 
 
 Of Conscience — its limited Signification. 
 
 When Conscience is stated to be an insufficient 
 Guide without the light of Scripture, or independent 
 of holy writ; and when it is also stated that different 
 moral rules are held conscientiously sacred in differ- 
 ent countries ; it is evidently brought somewhat lower 
 in our estimation as a regulating principle of the 
 mind; in one case, requiring help which is often 
 casual or incidental ; and in the other, from an um- 
 pire and witness for God, being reduced to the state 
 of an uncertain rule, that varies its standard according 
 to the customs and local institutions of men. 
 
 Now, there can be no doubt that, by a law of 
 our nature, the human mind may be brought to that 
 state in which it shall regard as a sacred obligation 
 what is not the dictate of immutable truth. And the 
 fact proves two things — First, The facility with which 
 mankind bind themselves to acts of supposed duty ; 
 and secondly, the docility with which they tacitly 
 submit, or at least acknowledge, themselves to be 
 creatures accountable to sOme invisible Supreme 
 
Its limited Signification. 377 
 
 Power. These are natural tendencies independent 
 of all creeds, forms, notions, and modes of worship. 
 And so far the existence of this Law may be safely 
 affirmed. 
 
 But it is a very different thing to affirm that the 
 variable moral maxims so received in different coun- 
 tries, are the dictates of the pure infallible principle 
 of Truth itself; or, on the other hand, to contend that 
 these variable moral maxims disprove the existence 
 of such a principle altogether. I apprehend that 
 neither of these conclusions can be drawn from a fair 
 statement of the argument. It is, unquestionably, 
 true, that the name of Conscience has been abused 
 and applied to sanction some frightful enormities; 
 and also true, that the purest principle of the soul — 
 the light of life — the secret guide and unerring wit- 
 ness, may be slighted, resisted, despitefully treated, 
 and, as it were, trampled under foot. But, admitting 
 that this rightful Governor and King may at times 
 seem to be absolutely dethroned, as in the complete 
 anarchy of vice ; or to be innocently drawn (as a 
 royal prince surrounded from the cradle with crafty 
 attendants) to give his sanction to many absurd us- 
 ages; or to be laid asleep as the mind is given up to 
 natural indolence and outward ease ; or to be treated 
 with studied neglect and despised, so that his voice 
 is no longer heeded ; or to be seduced to compliance 
 with established forms, because practiced by near 
 kindred and those to whom reverence is naturally 
 due ; or to be roused to acts of cruelty by the rage 
 
378 Of Conscience. 
 
 of bigotry and fanaticism, or to acts of wild enthu- 
 siasm by mistaken zeal for the cause of religion : 
 
 though all these things may be done, and, some of 
 them, under pretence of being done for Conscience' 
 sake ; they surely do not afford any good ground for 
 supposing that the legitimate Sovereign is really dis- 
 possessed, or that the mind, in which so much moral 
 disorder prevails, is all this while actually without 
 a supremely wise Director and unerring Judge, pro- 
 vided the state of anarchy would admit its lawful 
 interference. 
 
 Now it is not a little strange, that, because this 
 principle does not first discover itself in every human 
 being with a regular series of what are called prac- 
 tical principles or moral maxims, commanding im- 
 plicit assent, and forbidding any deviation, its exist- 
 ence should be denied, and no other source of moral 
 obligation admitted, than Reason, Education, or Scrip- 
 ture. It is strange that the only true basis on which 
 Conscience can found its right to exercise dominion 
 and prescribe the path of duty, as soon as ever the 
 infant mind shall require its controul, — the basis of an 
 inherent delegated power in the mind — should be 
 overlooked if not discarded ; and that it should be 
 allowed to claim no other importance than what at- 
 taches to the promulgator of some casual, local, 
 ephemeral, notions of duty ; nor entitled to any other 
 authority than what belongs to such a secondary and 
 dependent station. It is strange that the latter, the 
 only point which is weak, variable, and uncertain, in 
 
Its limited Signification. 379 
 
 the nature of Conscience, when it is really defiled 
 with other principles, as I shall next explain, should 
 be fixed upon as that which substantially charac- 
 terizes it. Yet by these means of treating it, have 
 some attempted to fritter away its inherent rights, 
 and to leave it nothing but the mere shadow of au- 
 thority. 
 
 The definitions I am now to notice, will, however, 
 point out more clearly the grounds of the second 
 signification of Conscience to which I have alluded ; — 
 a signification that has been already anticipated in 
 some degree by the preceding remarks. 
 
 Dr. Fleming- considers Conscience to be nothing 
 more than a Modification of Memory. In a late work 
 on the "Philosophy of Zoology," he remarks, that 
 " Bv the help of memory we acquire an astonishing 
 quickness of perceiving whether we act conformably 
 or oppositely to the standard of duty" — and that 
 " to tfye operations of memory in such cases, theo- 
 logians apply the term Conscience, and others the 
 Moral Sense." In coincidence with this notion he 
 states that " the discovery of duty is an intellectual 
 process," — and yet that " the question, what is duty ? 
 in reference to its rules or standard, is one which un- 
 assisted reason cannot resolve." Hence, he con- 
 cludes, " arises the necessity of a Revelation" — and 
 " the Christian religion supplies this moral want." 
 
 Doctor Fleming here admits the principle for which 
 we are arguing, that the question of Duty is one 
 which unassisted Reason cannot resolve ; and yet he 
 
380 Of Conscience. 
 
 states that the discovery of Duty, is an intellectual 
 process ; placing Reason and intellectual process nearly 
 in opposition. 
 
 He also admits the principle for which we are 
 arguing, that Revelation is necessary to supply the 
 moral deficiency in our rational nature : and yet it is 
 plain that by inference he confines this revelation to 
 the outward knowledge of Scripture. 
 
 The standard of duty, when it is sought to be dis- 
 covered by an intellectual process, must of necessity 
 vary with degrees of intellect, with notions of ex- 
 pediency, and with local ^institutions. But, it can 
 hardly be supposed that any well-disposed mind is 
 without a principle which is able to bring these 
 changeable things into order — a still small voice which 
 speaks to man in the meek and tranquil state of the 
 soul, to comfort and direct the good, and often in the 
 voice of thunder to alarm the guilty. Hence, it is 
 only when Conscience is perplexed with the grand 
 sophisticator, human Reason, or blinded by Passion, 
 or opposed by the many impediments of Sense liable 
 to be thrown in its way, that its light becomes ob- 
 scure, and its rules uncertain and difficult to be 
 ascertained. For, notwithstanding all the varieties 
 of moral notions among men, there are still funda- 
 mental principles acknowledged by all, and which 
 have been accounted as sacred, though men practice 
 the contrary, from the foundation of the world. 
 
 When Barclay represented " the Conscience to be 
 the seat and throne of God in the soul," and that it 
 
Its limited Signification, 381 
 
 was accountable to Him only, it seems probable that 
 he included in the term the notion of the Spirit of 
 Truth itself. But when he stated the proposition that 
 li Conscience followeth the Judgment, doth not in- 
 form it, ? ' he was contrasting it as a natural power 
 with this spirit or supernatural emanation, and con- 
 sidering the variableness of outward creeds and modes 
 of worship. 
 
 Now, in this, there is less inconsistency than may 
 appear. For, as it is said, that in the Conscience the 
 voice of Truth is heard, Conscience as the seat is put 
 by metonymy for the power. And further, if Con- 
 science be simply the knowledge or inward testimony 
 of the mind as to the rectitude and pravity of its own 
 thoughts or actions, and consequent Judgment upon 
 them according to some previous rule of duty (in 
 whatever way this rule may be acquired) ; it is plain 
 that this testimony or judgment may vary according 
 to the degree of light and knowledge received : and 
 thus Conscience may follow the judgment or opinion. 
 
 This it must be allowed is the common meaning of 
 the word in Scripture : because the Scripture recog- 
 nizes only one divine operative principle in man— 
 the spirit of God — the light of Truth — the measure of 
 Grace — the immediate revelation of the Divine will, 
 &c. If Conscience, therefore, does not include this 
 scripture principle, it simply means the testimony of 
 the mind as above stated ; or if these two meanings 
 be discarded (as when the word Conscience is used by 
 those called Moral Writers, in the comprehensive 
 
382 Of Conscience. 
 
 acceptation of which I have given so many examples) 
 it applies to some power of the mind of which we can 
 have no possible conception either from Reason or 
 Revelation, and as such may justly be called in ques- 
 tion. 
 
 If we believe that the spirit of God, or a divine 
 monitor in the soul, operates universally in man, 
 when it is not slighted and resisted, we shall not 
 easily make out the difference between its operations 
 and those of what is called a moral sense or natural 
 conscience, which prescribes to the heathen the path 
 of duty, and at the same time excludes the two Scrip- 
 ture ideas just noticed. For, it will hardly be said 
 that there are two principles, distinct in their nature, 
 yet pointing to the same end ; the one earthly, the 
 other heavenly ; the one a natural faculty, the other 
 a divine principle ; whose office and operation are the 
 same : — small in the beginning — humble in the ap- 
 pearance—slow in the developement — improved by 
 docility and obedience — heard only in the calm — in 
 the storm of passion, silent or unheeded — not only 
 premonitory in counsel, and checking in temptation, 
 but swift in reproof for evil, — comforting the good 
 even in affliction — goading the wicked with remorse-^- 
 and ceasing to strive when constantly rejected. 
 
Reasonings of Locke on Morals considered. 383 
 
 Sect. III. 
 
 The Reasonings ofLocJce on Innate Moral Principles 
 considered. 
 
 To the opinions of Locke I have already made some 
 allusion : and as I have before hinted, it would ill 
 become any one to make light of so great a name — an 
 ornament to his country, a profound and candid phi- 
 losopher, a devout and humble Christian, exemplary 
 in his life and character. 
 
 His reasonings on the subject of Conscience and of 
 moral distinctions, have drawn upon him, notwith- 
 standing, the severe animadversions of some eminent 
 authors. But whether he meant to imply all that is 
 inferred from his writings, I will not take upon my- 
 self to determine. If his opinions be not correct, the 
 errors of so good a man must be diffused as widely as 
 his fame, and make an impression on the mind deep 
 and lasting, in proportion to his virtues, and the 
 depth of his understanding. 
 
 In so far as Locke considered Conscience to be 
 " nothing else but our own opinion or judgment of 
 the moral Rectitude or Pravity of our own actions ;" 
 his observations seem to be pertinent, and his reason- 
 ings on them conclusive. For, according to this 
 meaning, Conscience may be said to follow the moral 
 
384? Reasonings of Locke 
 
 rule or notion of duty in the mind (however it be ac- 
 quired), to be directed by it, and to do nothing more 
 than bear its secret testimony to the fulfilment or 
 transgression of this rule. If this rule be misunder- 
 stood, or by any means perverted, Conscience will be 
 perverted also. But there is another most important 
 question relative to the origin, principles, and foun- 
 dation of this rule itself. And when he undertook to 
 prove that there was no other foundation for it than 
 the light afforded by our own experience, and the 
 labour of our natural abilities— a doctrine implied in 
 these words and in his subsequent reasonings, that 
 fc without being written on their hearts, men may, by 
 the same way that they come to the knowledge of 
 other things, come to assent to several moral rules, 
 and be convinced of their obligations" — " and that a 
 man by the right use of his natural abilities may, 
 without any innate principles, attain the knowledge of 
 a God and other things that concern him" — and also 
 that " some people are wholly without ideas of God 
 and principles of Morality"* — consequently must be 
 without any Conscience, so far as, by his own defini- 
 tion, principles of morality are concerned ; he seemed 
 to take a widely different view of the rights and su- 
 premacy of Conscience, as well as of the immutable 
 foundation of moral truth, from those whose opinions 
 are already quoted. 
 
 And when we add to this, the leading points of his 
 system, that the human mind in its infant state is a 
 
 * Essay, Book 1, Ch. 4, § 12. 
 
on Morals considered. 385 
 
 perfect blank, equally indifferent to good or evil, and 
 without any seed or element of virtue ; it is scarcelv 
 surprising that he should have appeared to some to 
 overturn the basis of moral and religious obligation, 
 by denying an innate source of moral sentiment, or 
 implanted principle of duty, — by whatever name it 
 may be distinguished — the name signifying little, if the 
 fact be admitted. 
 
 It is indeed true that, to enforce his argument, he 
 has collected a number of alleged facts, some of them 
 of doubtful authenticity, from such obscure travellers 
 as Garcilasso de la Vega, Thevenot, and Baumgarten, 
 to prove the existence of certain moral enormities in 
 different countries, practised, he says, " without the 
 least remorse of conscience." And he argues that, 
 seeing such atrocities are committed, there can be no 
 internal rule of moral conduct — no standard of duty, 
 natural to mankind, and therefore no universally ac- 
 knowledged practical principles among men ; some 
 nations generally approving what others condemn. 
 
 But, admitting these reports to be true to their full 
 extent, they would only show — what we have evidence 
 of every day — the depravity of human nature: and 
 we need only look to the uneducated rustic, the un- 
 cultivated Indian, the idiot, and the insane, for proof 
 of man's moral imbecility, when he is placed in cir- 
 cumstances unfavourable to his improvement, or phy- 
 sically incapacitated for attaining it. 
 
 A seed thrown among rubbish will not grow and 
 bear fruit ; yet it does not cease to be a seed. And, 
 
 2 b 
 
386 Reasonings of Locke 
 
 likewise, admitting the reasonings of Locke to be just, 
 they would prove as much against the Gospel prin- 
 ciple of Light and Truth, which is said to be given to 
 every man to profit with, and to be a law written in 
 the heart, as against the instinctive direction of a 
 natural Conscience. For, it surely is not pretended 
 that mere outward education can give the Spirit of 
 God to man. It is incommunicable by man, unless 
 under immediate inspiration, when he is employed 
 instrumentally to call it forth, to increase its growth 
 and power, and to shed upon it the dew of heaven. 
 
 Nay, as it will afterwards appear, the same reason- 
 ings would also prove against the existence of the 
 faculty of Reason. 
 
 It was one thing to assert, what cannot well be 
 denied, that, as man is constituted, he can adopt an 
 inferior and variable rule of duty, and bring him- 
 self to abide by that rule, and make what is called 
 a Conscience of obeying it ; and another thing 
 to maintain the proposition, that there is no moral 
 principle implanted in the human mind distinct from 
 Reason, that is, from outward observation : " For 
 moral principles, " says Locke, " require reasoning 
 and discourse, and some exercise of the mind to dis- 
 cover the certainty of their truth." But if it be true 
 of all moral principles " that they require reasoning 
 and discourse, &c." — it must be true of the simplest 
 as well as the most complicated, of the groundwork 
 and elements, as well as of the elaborate system. 
 Consequently the tendency of this argument is to 
 
on Morals considered, 387 
 
 show that there is no innate principle at all, distinct 
 from Reason, whose office it is to show the loveliness 
 of virtue, and the hatefulness of vice, and to prescribe 
 the path of duty. Such a notion is directly opposed 
 to the numerous convincing testimonies above ad- 
 duced from the wisest philosophers. It will be 
 shown, how far it is opposed to the testimony of 
 Scripture. 
 
 Locke admits that " a great part of mankind give 
 testimony to the law of nature," and that " several 
 moral rules may receive from mankind a very general 
 approbation without either knowing or admitting the 
 true ground of morality;" "which," he says, "can 
 only be the will and law of God" — a will and law, 
 according to his system, discovered either by reason 
 or extraordinary revelation, and in no other way — 
 that is, partially by reason and more fully by divine 
 revelation. Yet, as if the law of nature could do 
 nothing for them, he asks the question, after enu- 
 merating the moral enormities " practised in dif- 
 ferent ages and countries without remorse of con- 
 science" — " where then are those innate principles 
 of Justice, Piety, Gratitude, Equity, Chastity ? or 
 where is that universal consent that assures us 
 
 there are such inbred rules?" " There is scarce 
 
 that principle of morality to be named, or rule of 
 virtue to be thought on, which is not somewhere 
 or other slighted and condemned by the general 
 fashion of whole societies of men, governed by prac- 
 2b2 
 
388 Beasonings of Locke 
 
 tical opinions, and rules of living quite opposite to 
 others." 
 
 It may be noticed that through great part of the 
 3d Chap, of the 1st Book of his Essay, Locke takes 
 for granted that all these enormities are practised 
 without remorse, nay, with general unqualified assent, 
 — such as, the uncondemned and unscrupled practice 
 of exposing children to perish in woods by famine or 
 wild beasts, "among whole nations of the most civi- 
 lized people " and of burying them alive with their 
 deceased mothers ; among others, the killing their 
 parents " without any remorse at all," — among others, 
 " the rearing up their own children to devour them;" 
 among others, Revenge and Cannibal-appetite ac- 
 counted their chief virtues ; and even many whole 
 nations without the vestige of an idea of God, with- 
 out religion or any form of worship !* 
 
 Though we might be prepared to see a fearful pic- 
 ture of the depravity of human nature and to own its 
 truth ; and though the nations of the earth are de- 
 plorably sunk in wickedness, so that one is almost 
 reluctant to step forward as the advocate of humanity 
 to defend it from such a charge ; yet the position, 
 above stated, contains so strong a reflexion upon our 
 benighted fellow-creatures — of the same origin with 
 ourselves— the same blood — the same natural endow- 
 ments, sympathies, and feelings — heirs, too, of the 
 same glorious immortality; that I venture to think 
 
 * Essay, Book I. Chaps. 3 and 4. 
 
on Morals considered. 389 
 
 few persons could be found who would give credit to 
 one half of these rumours, without at least asking for 
 proof upon proof of their authenticity. For, even if 
 the evidence for acts so revolting to our feelings were 
 ever so strong, one would still linger in the hope, and 
 wish to believe, that they were not true. That I may 
 notice no other than the last ; even before the Chris- 
 tian era, Plutarch and Cicero both declared that there 
 was no nation to be found upon earth so savage as to 
 be without some conception of a God. Yet a Chris- 
 tian philosopher of the 18th century discovers that 
 these illustrious heathens were wrong ! — wrong in a 
 vital principle of religion — the universal diffusion of 
 the divine spirit among men — the cardinal point of 
 Christian doctrine. 
 
 It is to be observed that these enormities are not 
 spoken of as casual deviations from the rule of mora- 
 lity; they are not spoken of as practices for which 
 the nations themselves might possibly assign some 
 sort of reason, religious or civil, to justify their usages, 
 and thus, by way of excuse, to cover the violation of 
 some natural duty ; which would itself show their 
 internal sense and acknowledgment of those duties : 
 but they are spoken of as practices universally ap- 
 proved among whole societies of men, the rule of 
 virtue subverted, and that of vice passing current in 
 its place, without remorse, without conscience, nay with 
 general consent. 
 
 It would be almost as credible that whole societies 
 of men might be found, who should systematically 
 
390 Reasonings of Locke 
 
 agree to call honey bitter and wormwood sweet, as 
 that, among whole communities, virtue should be 
 accounted vice, and right and wrong should be ren- 
 dered so indiscriminately acceptable to the natural 
 feelings of the mind ; even setting aside every consi- 
 deration of the expediency and usefulness of virtue to 
 society. For there is a natural congruity in virtue to 
 the human heart, and an incongruity in vice; as there 
 is a congruity in music to the ear, and in sweets to the 
 taste. 
 
 We know that there are some human beings of 
 perverted tastes and senses. But this is a state con- 
 trary to nature, or the original institution of things ; 
 and one might as well believe that whole communities 
 should agree to fix certain agreeable or disagreeable 
 qualities to the sensible objects in question, just as 
 the humour of different societies might dispose them 
 to vary these relations, as that mankind should be 
 brought to consider gratitude under any circumstances 
 hateful, and ingratitude amiable : — for this may be 
 given as one of the examples of Locke's general pro- 
 position. Though man may sink himself below the 
 brute in depravity, when he is actuated by vicious 
 propensities, yet it is scarcely possible to believe 
 that, in their cool moments, any tribes on the face of 
 the earth should so completely and systematically 
 mistake the distinguishing characters of right and 
 wrong. For it would be a libel against Reason, as 
 well as against Moral principle and Humanity ; and 
 if such a state existed, it would be as fair to argue 
 
on Morals considered. 391 
 
 that such human beings were devoid of a rational 
 faculty, because they acted so irrationally, as that 
 they were without a Conscience or moral Principle, 
 because they acted so immorally. But if the first im- 
 pressions of virtue and vice are equally acceptable to 
 the cool and unadulterated human heart, there can 
 be no such implanted principle. 
 
 The admission of this author is, indeed, of some 
 value that, " certain moral truths may be discovered 
 and moral rules receive approbation among mankind 
 by the light of nature" But, if this light of nature is 
 not meant to include some knowledge, however ob- 
 scure, of that eternal law of Righteousness, which 
 requires a degree of natural revelation to unfold it, 
 the previous admission will not much qualify the 
 ground which Locke has taken, and is far from re- 
 conciling his conclusions either to Reason or Scrip- 
 ture. Locke does not deny that man may attain to a 
 knowledge of his duty by the right use of his natural 
 abilities. He affirms the proposition; and so far, it 
 may be said, there is no just reason for opposing his 
 argument. If, indeed, it was only a question whe- 
 ther the principles of morality are innate, or are dis- 
 covered in a secondary way by some circuitous pro- 
 cess of the intellectual faculties ; provided it was 
 acknowledged, that grounds were laid in the nature 
 of man for their early discovery, and that they are by 
 some means or other made known ; we should not 
 perhaps have much cause of disagreement. But, when 
 he further asserts that whole societies of men may 
 

 392 Reasonings of Locke 
 
 arrive at adult age u without any principles of morality 
 at all" and are in the practice of vice without re- 
 morse, as if it were virtue ; he maintains an opinion 
 widely different from the former ; which, it is humbly 
 conceived, cannot be supported on any sound prin- 
 ciples. 
 
 Therefore, in reference to his various comments on 
 the word Innate, as applied to speculative and moral 
 rules — a denial of which is made the ground of such 
 alarming conclusions with regard to the foundation of 
 morals — it may at once be conceded that they are not 
 innate, and yet his inferences be questioned ; it being 
 plainly of little moment whether principles are innate, 
 or they develope themselves according to certain de- 
 terminate laws of the mind, when it is placed under 
 the ordinary advantages of culture in human society. 
 Hence though we admit all his reasonings, in prov- 
 ing the negative of innate principles, to be valid, we 
 may justly question his conclusions, when he contends 
 that whole societies are without any principles of 
 morality at all. For, in making the latter assertion, 
 he leaves the former ground of argument; and, in 
 attempting to prove that men in society, in other 
 words, come to the use of reason, (which he alleges 
 to be capable of knowing right and wrong and of dis- 
 tinguishing vice from virtue,) are, notwithstanding, 
 without these principles of morality ; he evidently 
 attacks the competency of Reason itself, and makes 
 as little even of the light of nature, to which he 
 before allowed some capability in the discovery of 
 
on Morals considered. 393 
 
 moral rules. As all men have the light of nature, 
 and the light of nature is said to be competent to the 
 discovery of some moral principles, it follows that all 
 men are to be considered more or less partakers of 
 these principles ; as much as they are to be considered 
 partakers of the common principles of reasoning, 
 which are the privilege of every rational being. To 
 take away from a moral agent the very principles by 
 which his moral accountability is only to be judged, 
 is to take away an essential part of his mental con- 
 stitution, and to make him in fact not a man. It 
 would be impossible by any sound logic to prove 
 that a moral agent could exist without moral prin- 
 ciples ; or a rational agent without rational princi- 
 ples ; or a sensual agent without sensual principles ; 
 or an instinctive agent without instinctive principles; 
 or a mechanical agent without mechanical principles. 
 Therefore, if the principles are wanting, the agency 
 is destroyed; and so far the essential character of 
 moral, rational, sensual, instinctive, or mechanical, 
 is lost. 
 
 It is plain, therefore, that any system, however 
 clear and plausible its arguments, which goes to 
 prove that whole societies of men are not moral 
 agents, should be received with very great hesitation. 
 When it can be proved that human beings are never 
 visited by any monitions of conscience, then, indeed 
 we must acknowledge they are in no way to be con- 
 sidered accountable for their actions. But a man 
 bred up in society without conscience, is a being of 
 
394 Reasonings of Locke 
 
 whom we can form no conception : and a conscience 
 without some sort of moral principles is a building 
 without any foundation. Therefore conscience is as 
 essential to man as reason or sense. 
 
 Some men may indeed do violence to their natural 
 feelings and sear the conscience, as they may blunt 
 even the edge of appetite and cloy the senses ; and 
 others may lose their understanding, or like idiots 
 may be incapable of reasoning at all. But he who 
 cannot distinguish vice from virtue or right from 
 wrong, and confounds the sacred distinctions of good 
 and evil, as if they were mutable relations, has as 
 diseased and perverted a moral perception, as he that 
 reasons amiss may be considered to have a perverted 
 use of his rational faculty, or he that see amiss has a 
 perverted use of the organ of vision, or he that tastes 
 amiss has a vitiated palate. 
 
 Hence, it would seem as consistent to believe, that 
 whole societies of men should agree to overturn the 
 understood relations of truth and falsehood, so as to 
 think and act like so many madmen ; or to put sweet 
 for bitter, and bitter for sweet, from some unaccount- 
 able and unnatural motive ; as that they should agree 
 by general compact to confound the distinctions of 
 right and wrong, and to call evil good, and good 
 evil. 
 
 We call custom arbitrary, and fashion changeable, 
 and common sense revolts at their inconsistencies : 
 but we turn with delight and confidence to the belief 
 that there are pure unerring principles (whether a 
 
on Morals considered. 395 
 
 man's rational or moral conduct is concerned,) which 
 can regulate both one and the other according to a 
 right standard ; and that this standard is to be ulti- 
 mately found no where else, but in his own unper- 
 verted and unsophisticated reason and conscience; 
 just as the outward senses in their pure and natural 
 state convey true and unperverted impressions to the 
 mind of the qualities of external things. 
 
 If at any time the multitude, by passion, careless- 
 ness or ease, have been hurried away by preposte- 
 rous usages, there have seldom been wanting among 
 any people a few honest censors who have examined 
 their own hearts, and discovered what was right, and 
 raised their voices against the prevailing evil. Be~ 
 sides, however the multitude may seem to be carried 
 down the current of popular opinion, without a 
 thought of the immorality or absurdity of any prac- 
 tices amongst them ; it is difficult to conceive that, as 
 human nature is constituted, there are not some who 
 now and then feel a secret wound. Is is not, how- 
 ever, dangerous to assume the negative ? And is it 
 possible for any philosopher to know that human 
 beings are not visited by secret upbraidings for omis- 
 sions and commissions, for unkindness and ingrati- 
 tude, for ebullitions of passion and violations of 
 faith and truth, even in the most savage state of 
 society ? And what are these upbraidings of a man's 
 own heart, but the evidence and the effect of moral 
 principles ? Without them no human society can be 
 imagined to exist. And, therefore y we may with con* 
 
396 Conscience supposes a Moral Principle. 
 
 fidence presume, that there never was any human society 
 without some sort of moral principles. 
 
 If the passages I have quoted from Locke on this 
 subject, did not carry their own evidence of his mean- 
 ing along with them, many might suppose that some 
 unfair advantage had been taken in the selection. 
 iAnd I almost doubt whether I should have ventured 
 to comment so freely on the writings of so eminent 
 an author, if the way had not been in some measure 
 opened before me. For, I do not believe that such 
 men as Reid, Price, Stewart, Watts, Beattie, and 
 others, would have made similar comments on the 
 tendency of his principles, if these had not naturally- 
 led to conclusions unfavourable to, what the writers 
 above named apprehended to be, the only sure foun- 
 dation of morality and religion, viz. an implanted 
 principle of Truth. 
 
 Sect. IV. 
 
 Conscience always includes the notion of a Moral 
 Principle. 
 
 I have thus endeavoured to illustrate the two senses 
 in which the word Conscience has been usually em- 
 ployed : in the one signifying an original principle, 
 light, governor, or teacher — the internal propounder 
 of the moral law and the guide of life ; in the other a 
 secret testimony and judgment of the mind, varying 
 with its knowledge or speculative opinions, yet carry- 
 
Conscience supposes a Moral Principle. 397 
 
 ing a sense of moral obligation, and agreeing with 
 some acquired rule of duty, so as to condemn or ap- 
 prove as this rule is broken or obeyed. 
 
 Now, that man should have been constituted so as 
 to hold fast even error with a kind of sacred attach- 
 ment, is in itself a direct proof of an instinctive 
 tendency in the mind to some sort of religious obli- 
 gation. For, what is to be conceived of even an 
 erroneous conscience, but of a secret testimony im- 
 plying conviction, that whatever rule of duty has been 
 adopted must be obeyed, and that punishment will 
 follow disobedience ? This secret sense therefore is 
 the ground-work of moral accountability, and is no 
 farther answerable for any subsequent speculative 
 aberrations, than the perfect original structure of a 
 good eye is answerable for all the errors of vision to 
 which it is liable. 
 
 In the first sense, conscience appears to involve the 
 notion of an internal legislator or propounder of an 
 engraven law; in the second, that of a judge deter- 
 mining according to the knowledge of this law. 
 There are various ways in which the law may be 
 misapprehended ; and various ways also in which the 
 judge may be misinformed. 
 
 If the human mind were not on all hands beset 
 with infirmities and with snares, with seeming friends 
 and with cunning foes, the law would be always seen 
 in its purity, and the judgment always sound. A man 
 born and reared in the dark, is not called upon to 
 give an account of things which he never saw. It 
 
398 Conscience supposes a Moral Principle. 
 
 cannot be expected that any human being brought up 
 in an impure moral atmosphere should be free from 
 taint. Nor is it likely that amidst ignorance and 
 barbarism he should escape delusion. If things were 
 otherwise, the whole moral system would be changed. 
 As it is, we cannot doubt that no man will be called 
 upon to give an account of fruit or increase dispro- 
 portioned to the talents he has received; nor for 
 greater moral excellence thari the light and know- 
 ledge put in his way will enable him to attain. Let 
 us for a moment suppose, that all men under every 
 variety of circumstance had the same clear notions of 
 duty impressed upon their minds. This would cer- 
 tainly be a different dispensation from that under 
 which we live. It has pleased the Divine Governor, 
 to measure out Truth in different proportions to indi- 
 viduals. For all are not possessed of the same talents — 
 neither are all called to the same service ; and the labour 
 and exercise of the diligent would be thrown away, 
 if the indolent could know as much as themselves. 
 Besides, that rule in the divine economy — at once the 
 test and reward of obedience, would be set aside : 
 that when a little knowledge of duty is well used, 
 more is added in due measure ; just as greater trust 
 is reposed in the steward who has been found faith- 
 ful. If all men were to see and know their duty 
 alike, at what age should this knowledge commence ? 
 But it is known to be taken away from some who have 
 resisted the light in their consciences. How is the 
 supposed law of universal clearness in apprehending 
 
Conscience supposes a Moral Principle. 399 
 
 duty, to be reconciled with this its temporary ab- 
 scence, with the entire want of mental cultivation, 
 and with the unevolved state of the infant mind ? 
 
 The fact, therefore, that the principles of the moral 
 law are not in all men clearly developed in distinct 
 characters, is no argument against its universality. 
 We can hardly conceive the present moral govern- 
 ment of the Deity to be compatible with such an un- 
 equivocal diffusion of its precepts. Yet on the other 
 hand, we cannot doubt, from every thing we see, that 
 there is a most impartial moral administration : and 
 that the most enlightened has no room to glory over 
 the most ignorant, but in his greater submission to his 
 Maker's will, and greater prostration of body, soul, 
 and spirit, before Him. 
 
 To turn from this digression, I may add, in allusion 
 to the two significations of Conscience above noticed, 
 that it appears in the first to involve the notion of a 
 perception of the heart springing from an innate prin- 
 ciple of moral accountability; and in the second a 
 judgment of the understanding varying with degrees of 
 outward knowledge. 
 
 I believe the latter meaning is more agreeable to 
 the tenor of its use in Scripture, for the reason before 
 assigned. 
 
 In one sense, therefore, it has a relation to the 
 understanding. But Conscience, taken in whatever 
 sense, universally presupposes, if it does not include, 
 the notion of a Moral Principle. 
 
400 Conscience supposes a Moral Principle, 
 
 I proceed to show that different writers have been 
 aware of this. 
 
 Bishop Butler observes, that " it is manifest great 
 part of common language and of common behaviour 
 over the world is formed upon supposition of a moral 
 faculty; whether called Conscience, Moral Reason, 
 Moral Sense, or Divine Reason ; whether considered as 
 a sentiment of the understanding, or as a perception of 
 the heart, or which seems the truth, as including both."* 
 
 Dr. Reid also states, that " the moral faculty or 
 Conscience, is both an active and an intellectual power 
 of the mind." " By it solely we have the original 
 conception of right and wrong/' — " The bulk of man- 
 kind cannot follow long trains of reasoning." — Con- 
 science commands and forbids with more authority, 
 without the labour of reasoning. — The Supreme Be- 
 ing who has given us eyes to discern what may be 
 useful and what hurtful to our natural life, has also 
 given us this light within f to direct our moral con- 
 duct." 
 
 Dr. Reid has not explained very clearly in what 
 respect he considered Conscience an intellectual 
 power.* His definition refers to the first signifi- 
 cation. 
 
 Dr. Rush has made a very marked distinction be- 
 tween the moral faculty and conscience, as he con- 
 ceived the one to relate to the heart, and the other to 
 
 * Inquiry on Virtue, 
 t Esjay 3. Ch. 8. 
 
Conscience supposes a Moral Principle. 401 
 
 the understanding, in the following passage. " The 
 moral faculty," says he, " is to the Conscience what 
 Sensation is to perception. It acts without reflection, 
 while Conscience follows with deliberate steps, and 
 performs the office of a lawgiver while Conscience 
 perforins the office of a judge : it exercises itself on 
 the actions of others, while Conscience confines its 
 operations only to its own actions : and the will (as 
 the source of all the active powers) may be accounted 
 the seat of the moral faculty, and the understanding 
 the seat of the Conscience."* 
 
 The only difference between Dr. Rush's definition 
 and that of others, I suppose to be, that he confines 
 the use of the term moral faculty to what I have con- 
 sidered as the first signification of the word Con- 
 science, and the latter expression to denote the 
 second. 
 
 The philosophy of Dr. Paley is grounded so much 
 upon the system of Locke, that I have scarcely thought 
 it necessary to advert to it. Some advocates of 
 Paley's doctrines have, however, alleged that, if he 
 did not deny, he made little account of a moral prin- 
 ciple, and I have heard his authority quoted against 
 the opinion. 
 
 I will not take upon myself to say what direct in- 
 ference is to be gathered from his " Moral Philo- 
 sophy" on the question : the passages I shall select 
 must speak for themselves. But I am very sure that 
 
 * See Influence of Physical Causes on the Moral Faculty. 
 
 2 c 
 
402 Conscience supposes a Moral Principle. 
 
 what he says in his Sermons bears the most satisfac- 
 tory testimony in favour of the argument I am sup- 
 porting. * 
 
 In the conclusion of his Chapter on the Moral 
 Sense, he says, " Upon the whole, it seems to me, 
 either that there exist no such instincts as compose 
 what is called the moral sense, or that they are not 
 now to be distinguished from prejudices and habits ; 
 on which account they cannot be depended upon in 
 moral reasoning." — And further, " In a word, when 
 almost every thing else is learned by imitation, can 
 we wonder to find the same cause concerned in the 
 generation of our moral sentiments?" 
 
 The following extracts from his Sermons seem to 
 speak a different language. 
 
 " It being confessed, that we cannot ordinarily 
 distinguish at the time the suggestions of the Spirit 
 from the operations of our minds, it may be asked, 
 how are we to listen to them ? The answer is, by 
 attending universally to the admonitions within us.— 
 Men do not listen to their Consciences. It is through 
 the whisperings of Conscience that the Spirit speaks. 
 If men then are wilfully deaf to their Consciences, 
 they cannot hear the Spirit. If hearing, if being com- 
 pelled to hear, the remonstrances of Conscience, they 
 nevertheless decide, and resolve, and determine to go 
 against them ; then they grieve, then they defy, then 
 they do despite to the Spirit of God."—" He that 
 misuses or abuses the portion and measure of spi- 
 
Conscience supposes a Moral Principle. 403 
 
 ritual assistance, which is afforded him, shall lose even 
 that." 
 
 " Is it superstition ? is it not on the contrary, a 
 just and reasonable piety to implore of God the 
 guidance of his Holy Spirit, when we have any thing 
 of great importance to decide upon or to undertake." 
 
 11 Conscience, our own Conscience, is to be our 
 Guide in all things." 
 
 According to Hutcheson, " Conscience denotes 
 primarily the sense of right and wrong : or at least 
 this sense is necessarily included in every notion of 
 Conscience ; without which no form of virtue and vice 
 could be discerned." 
 
 It is evident that the great Apostle of the Gentiles 
 distinguishes the law written in the heart from the 
 conscience which bears witness to the obedience or 
 transgression of this law. " For when the Gentiles 
 who have not the law (of Moses) do by nature the 
 things contained in the law ; these, having not the 
 law, are a law unto themselves ; who shew forth 
 the work of the law written in their hearts; their 
 Conscience also bearing witness; and their thoughts, 
 or reasonings (koyuxnui) accusing or else excusing one 
 another." 
 
 He distinguishes the Conscience, taken in this 
 sense, from the Gospel principle of light and truth. 
 And, in as much as the Conscience, though weak, 
 might be obedient to the light it had received, he was 
 cautious of offending the weak conscience of his in- 
 experienced brethren; and seemed indulgent even 
 2 c 2 
 
404 Conscience supposes a Moral Principle. 
 
 towards those, who, while they acted conscientiously, 
 erred only through ignorance. But a higher rule than 
 any which outward Conscience could afford — the 
 revelation from heaven through the spirit of Truth, 
 was the only foundation on which this dignified 
 teacher and his fellow-labourers built their assurance, 
 "that they had a good Conscience;" and that "in 
 simplicity and godly sincerity, they had had their con- 
 versation in the world." 
 
 Now, if Conscience be simply the knowledge or 
 testimony which the mind has in itself of its own state, 
 it is clear that this testimony must be built upon some 
 primary rule or law previously admitted : and it is 
 liable to vary, as the complexion of the mind in dif- 
 ferent societies among different nations, from early or 
 acquired habits, may vary the rule of conduct. Con- 
 science therefore, in this acceptation, does no more 
 than point out to the mind its real state, according to 
 the light it has received. If this light be small, Con- 
 science is weak; if this light has been faithfully 
 obeyed, it is pure ; if this light has been transmitted 
 through a false medium, so as to distort the natural 
 appearance of things, Conscience is erroneous or per- 
 verted; if it has been wantonly disobeyed, it is evil. 
 Hence, Conscience is also said to be defiled, hardened, 
 seared, benumbed. 
 
 But, putting it for the mind, an evil Conscience may 
 give a true and correct testimony of an evil heart, as 
 a pure Conscience may utter the language of peace, 
 and be void of offence, and a seared Conscience may 
 
Conscience supposes a Moral Principle. 405 
 
 denote a mind hardened against the impressions of 
 guilt. So that, the Conscience, in itself, may be a 
 faithful monitor, though the soul be impure :< and the 
 impurity, as is often the casein Scripture phraseology, 
 is transferred from the mind generally to the witness 
 of the mind. Of this we have a remarkable instance 
 where u the light of God" is said " to become dark- 
 ness" — which in itself, or morally, is impossible : 
 but, the mind may become darkened in which other- 
 wise the light of heaven would shine. In this sense, 
 with reference only to the treatment it receives from 
 man, the Spirit of God may be despised and put to 
 shame, quenched, resisted; — the truth of God, changed 
 to a lie, and the word of God corrupted, as it regards 
 the state of the heart and soul : — but, in itself, this 
 Spirit, Truth, Word, (which is one and the same 
 thing) is invincible, incapable of any thing but glory, 
 immutable, and incorruptible. 
 
 I shall conclude these illustrations with a passage 
 from Dr. Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments; 
 which, while it supports the- limited acceptation of the 
 word Conscience, passes by, as a point not quite 
 settled among men, the name of that Power, which 
 Conscience always supposes, and which is acknow- 
 ledged to be the internal Sovereign of the mind. 
 
 u The word Conscience does not immediately denote 
 any faculty or moral sense by which we approve or 
 disapprove. Conscience supposes indeed the existence 
 of some such faculty , and properly signifies our con- 
 sciousness of having acted agreeably or contrary to 
 
406 Conscience supposes a Moral Principle. 
 
 its directions. When Love, Hatred, Joy, Sorrow, 
 Gratitude, Resentment, with so many other passions, 
 which are all supposed to be the subjects of this prin- 
 ciple, have made themselves considerable enough to 
 get titles to know them by, is it not surprising that the 
 Sovereign of them all should hitherto have been so 
 little heeded, that, a few philosophers excepted, 
 nobody has yet thought it worth while to bestow a 
 name upon it ?" 
 
 The fact is, that by some it has been called Con- 
 science, by others Moral Sense, by others the Light of 
 the World, the Divine Principle of Truth, and the 
 Spirit of God in the Soul. 
 
CHAP. VIII. 
 
 OF THE TRUE SOURCE OF MORAL SENTIMENTS; 
 AND OF THE VARIOUS OPINIONS RESPECT- 
 ING A MORAL PRINCIPLE. 
 
 ■♦+♦- 
 
 Sect, I. 
 Of Moral Feeling, the source of Truth. 
 
 It has been laid down in this Essay as a position of 
 some importance, that there is a power or faculty, viz. 
 the Conscience or Moral Principle, (by whatever 
 name it may be distinguished) and that it is the root 
 and ground-work of virtue. It has been also admitted, 
 that moral sentiments do not appear as early as some 
 other principles in children ; and are liable to be per- 
 verted by custom, and changed by education. 
 
 From these admitted facts, however, some have 
 contended that there is no moral sense, nor other 
 guide and rule of conduct, than the imperfect instruc- 
 tion of Reason, by, what is called, the light of nature, 
 on the one hand, and the clear discovery made by 
 
408 Of Moral Feeling, the source of Truth. 
 
 Scripture on the other : Hence, according to this 
 view, Reason is the only guide to those who have no 
 access to Scripture. But it was also held by Locke, 
 that man received his knowledge of right and wrong 
 by observation, or from without ; at least that he had 
 Do certain criterion in his own breast distinct from 
 Reason, to inform him of these distinctions ; and a 
 still stronger point was even urged, that scarce a 
 virtue could be named, (excepting those which are 
 necessary bonds to society) but, in some parts of the 
 world, entire communities were agreed in setting it 
 aside, and dispensing with its obligation, as it were, 
 by universal consent; and, conversely, scarce a vice, 
 which in some place or other, did not rise into the 
 dignity of a virtue : for, one position seems to be a 
 natural consequence of the other. So unprovided, it 
 was to be inferred, was man with any moral instruc- 
 tor in his own breast; and so mutable were all moral 
 distinctions; therefore, so little depending upon any 
 original feelings of the mind; and so much depending 
 either upon the outward proof that virtue was in 
 itself profitable, and vice the contrary, (which is a 
 deduction of Reason) ; or on the persuasion, derived 
 from Scripture, that it was the Will of God, and 
 consequently a rule of conduct. It is obvious, that 
 Feeling, or an internal source of moral emotion, is 
 entirely excluded from such a system. 
 
 Some reasons have been already assigned in oppo- 
 sition to this argument; and it has been urged that 
 when the genuine features of moral conduct, in other 
 
Of Moral Feeling, the source of Truth. 409 
 
 words, the various actions arising from Gratitude, 
 Integrity, Justice, Fortitude, Benevolence, and their 
 opposites (which we suppose must enter into the 
 vocabulary of all languages) are fairly brought before 
 the uncorrupted and unprejudiced view of the mind — 
 they are discerned as clearly to be virtuous or vicious, 
 praiseworthy or blameable, and right or v/rong, by 
 an internal sense or moral tribunal ; as sounds are 
 discovered by the unobstructed ear to be harmonious 
 or discordant, or as objects of sight are seen to be 
 beautiful or otherwise by a sound eye — without mote 
 or film — when looking through a clear medium with 
 a steady light. 
 
 For, as many things are necessary, in the natural 
 state, to perfect outward vision, and in fact to clear 
 perception, by any one of the outward Senses ; so 
 many things are necessary, in the moral state, to a 
 correct moral judgment. 
 
 But, as we do not consult Reason to know whether 
 an object is beautiful, or a flower is fragrant, or a 
 fruit is sweet; so neither do we use it in feeling the 
 first emotions excited by the moral qualities of human 
 actions. By the constitution of our minds we are 
 compelled to feel certain emotions in perceiving these 
 actions ; for which we can give no other explanation 
 than this, that it is a law imposed upon our nature. 
 That we may pervert this original law, is very true ; 
 and that we may reason and rebel against these feel- 
 ings so as to reduce, change, corrupt, stifle, and al- 
 most annihilate, until we scarcely know what they 
 
410 Of Moral Feeling, the source of Truth. 
 
 were originally, is also certain. But their univer- 
 sality proves their common origin ; and that they 
 belong as much to human nature, as taste or smell ; 
 which are liable to be corrupted as well as the pri- 
 mary emotions in question. These emotions strike 
 us at once without a long previous inquiry ; and we 
 pronounce judgment at once ; though an investigation 
 of Reason may sometimes be necessary in order to 
 show that the moral actions we contemplate, are in 
 reality such as they appear to us. If they are not, our 
 moral judgments may be qualified, and heightened, or 
 softened, according to the intention or demerit of the 
 agent. For a man may inadvertently do an act of 
 apparent inhumanity, when in the pursuit of a bene- 
 volent purpose. And the moral feeling may in itself 
 be correct, which condemns him upon that presump- 
 tion. But, though it be a correct decision, according 
 to the knowledge of the case, it may not be correct 
 absolutely, if it gives judgment upon insufficient 
 data. Hence, the knowledge of the case, in other 
 words, of the real intentions of our fellow-creatures, 
 being often imperfect, from our own short-sighted 
 vision, we are instructed not to condemn too hastily ; 
 and from this view, a door is opened for the extension 
 of much mutual charity. We may therefore vary our 
 moral sentiments of the case, according to our more 
 perfect knowledge of the circumstances, without any 
 variation in the rule or standard itself. Here it is 
 that reason assists the moral perception, with regard 
 to the actions of others ; but with regard to our own, 
 
Of Moral Feeling, the source of Truth. 411 
 
 we are too often blinded by self-delusion, and make 
 Reason a party strongly in our favour, against the 
 remonstrance of Conscience, or moral principle. 
 
 Now, as it is not by man or any of his institutions 
 that the eye is formed to see, and the ear to hear, 
 and the tongue to taste ; so it is not by man or his 
 institutions, that the heart is formed to feel moral 
 approbation and disapprobation. And as the qua- 
 lities of sensible objects have an original congruity 
 or incongruity to the fabric (what if I say the taste) 
 of the several organs, antecedent to their use and 
 inherent in their very structure, so as to affect these 
 senses with agreeable or disagreeable sensations : so 
 the moral qualities of actions, whether our own or 
 of others, convey to the unsophisticated heart of man 
 certain emotions which constitute the primary source 
 of our ideas concerning vice and virtue. 
 
 And it is upon this foundation, (excluding the light 
 of Scripture on this point from our reasonings) whe- 
 ther the mind be warped by prejudice, or blinded by 
 passion, whether truth be obscurely or clearly seen, 
 whether it be unfolded by distinct propositions or 
 not, whether man attends to the cultivation of his 
 hidden treasure or neglects it ; — upon the foundation 
 of truth itself, (the seeds of which are laid in his soul 
 to withstand the corruptions springing from his na- 
 ture) that we are taught to believe morality and 
 religion can alone be built; and from the general 
 survey of the human race we have every reason to 
 think, that in his very lowest estate, man is not left 
 
4 12 Of Moral Feeling, the source of Truth. 
 
 without a moral guide, lawgiver and witness, mani- 
 festing itself by some more or less obscure indica- 
 tions. 
 
 It is true, that the most excellent seat in the mind 
 is liable to be usurped by many inferior principles 
 struggling to obtain the mastery : for, in the breast 
 of a single individual, principles are at work analo- 
 gous to the turbulent and conflicting principles act- 
 ing in a community ; some attempting to deceive with 
 plausible pretences ; some to seduce with the allure- 
 ments of pleasure, and to drown suspicion in the lap 
 of ease ; some secretly to undermine ; some violently to 
 overturn, — all aiming their attacks at the very power 
 that would keep them in order, and establish a beau- 
 tiful harmony. And, so much liberty is given to the 
 will of man, too often they carry on their machina- 
 tions with effect; so that lawful dominion is sub- 
 verted. And it is this state of anarchy — this subver- 
 sion of the moral principle, when good is put for 
 evil, and evil for good, and when even reason itself 
 is conspiring with, and heading the usurpation of, vice 
 against virtue, that some philosophers have told us, 
 we are to consider man is originally placed ; and that 
 he is constitutionally without any legitimate internal 
 Ruler. As if it were argued, that because the reins 
 of government were taken away, there had never 
 been a lawful sovereign ; or because the garden of 
 the mind, like an uncultivated waste, from neglect, 
 was overgrown with weeds, no good seed had ever 
 been sown there. This would surely be considered 
 
Of Moral Feeling, the source of Truth. 413 
 
 very inconclusive reasoning ; and as inconclusive to 
 maintain that any moral agent, obviously endowed by 
 the constitution of his nature, with opposing princi- 
 ples, should nevertheless be unable of himself to dis- 
 criminate between their effects, and to know the good 
 fruits from the bad, by any light or law of his own 
 mind. Certainly, upon the principles laid down by 
 these philosophers, that virtue may pass current for 
 vice, and vice for virtue, among whole societies of 
 men, this internal knowledge must be rejected. 
 
 For, say they, where will you find those universal 
 moral maxims, those innate practical principles, those 
 clear self evident truths and propositions, which must 
 necessarily be proved to exist, if man is to be directed 
 by the light of his own mind I But, to this it may be 
 answered, that every principle, talent, faculty, or 
 power given to man to profit with, is given him at 
 first only as a rudiment or seed. And this may be 
 called the seed of Truth, though it be not, in the 
 language of Watts, as a perfect proposition in the 
 mind. 
 
 As a general rule pervading the natural and moral 
 system, it may be observed, that, in the beginnings of 
 all created things, endowed with capabilities of en- 
 largement and improvement, it has pleased divine 
 Providence to disclose nothing to human research, 
 but general outlines and general tendencies. And 
 though there be a general resemblance among man- 
 kind, both in lineaments and character, over all the 
 world and in e\ery age, yet there are individual, local, 
 
414 Of Moral Feeling, the source of Truth. 
 
 and national peculiarities ; so that two minds are not 
 more exactly alike than two faces or two leaves. 
 Now, with regard to the foundation of speculative 
 and moral maxims, none of the original tendencies 
 are laid down in precise and determinate rules, like 
 an innate code of laws hung up for constant inspec- 
 tion, and applicable to every case of conduct, and to 
 every outward situation of life, without labour and 
 inquiry. The truths of Christianity itself were not 
 ushered into the world in the form of a precise code 
 of formal rules. The Gospel inculcated principles, 
 not details, to reform the heart, more than to instruct 
 the head. So far, the analogy of Christian doctrine 
 to the natural and moral system is complete. 
 
 But though man does not receive from his Maker, 
 either speculative or moral maxims, as rules of judg- 
 ment and of conduct, like so many perfect innate pro- 
 positions enforcing assent in his very infancy ; yet he 
 has received that constitution of mind which enables 
 him to form to himself the general rules, or first prin- 
 ciples on wjhich religion and science must be built, 
 when he allows himself those advantages of cultivation 
 and exercise which every talent he possesses absolutely 
 requires. And this is all that is pleaded for; and it 
 is sufficient for the end. Nor is there any thing either 
 mystical, or unphilosophical, or unscriptural in the no- 
 tion. For if the proposition be not strictly innate, 
 it arises from an innate power, which, in a sound 
 mind, cannot form a proposition in any other way 
 that will harmonize with enlightened reason and 
 
Truth not unfolded with universal clearness. 415 
 
 purified moral sentiment, than in that to which the 
 natural bias of the mind leads. 
 
 Sect. II. 
 Moral Truth is not unfolded with universal clearness. 
 
 We come, then, to this fact, in the present state of 
 man. acknowledged and to be deplored, — proof 
 enough of his natural weakness and need of help — 
 that the dictates of truth and knowledge of duty are 
 not unfolded with universal clearness, nor imparted 
 in all states of the mind and under all circumstances, 
 with that convincing evidence which commands im- 
 plicit assent, and wholly excludes error. 
 
 Truth, like an object before the natural eye, some- 
 times is seen dimly ; sometimes it is distorted ; some- 
 times other objects intervene ; sometimes it is en- 
 veloped in darkness ; sometimes the organ itself is 
 blind, and cannot see ; sometimes the reflecting orb 
 of Reason eclipses the true light of the mind. These 
 are conditions which attach to mortality — to frail and 
 imperfect man ; they belong to the infirmity of his 
 nature — conditions to which not only the senses but 
 the nobler faculties are liable, in this state of being. 
 
 Truth is a ray of practical wisdom, which man must 
 not expect to see, in the storm of passion, nor in the 
 lap of sensual indulgence, nor in the false light or 
 mist of prejudice, nor in the darkness of ignorance, 
 
416 Truth not unfolded with universal clccwness. 
 
 nor under the veil of self-deceit, nor even in the 
 dreams of enthusiasm — the delicious extacy of fancy's 
 brightest visions, nor on the mountains of speculation, 
 where human reason tries its own strength in draw- 
 ing it down as it were from the fountain of light 
 itself. 
 
 Truth is found in the pure sunshine of the soul, in 
 the low valley of humility, the retreat of calmness 
 and peace, where all storms are at rest; by those 
 only who seek it with earnestness and patience ; by 
 the simple in heart, who endeavour to subject their 
 wills and affections to the will of their Maker. No 
 man can command its presence ; not even the best. And 
 whoever hath it and uses it not to profit, possesses it 
 to his condemnation. So that the mere knowledge of 
 divine things, by whatever means obtained (even by 
 the ministration of Angels) is worth nothing, if it is 
 not obeyed. Is it possible then for man to find it by 
 the exercise of a faculty, which in its pride and ele- 
 vation, is ever more disposed to say like the haughty 
 Assyrian, " By my own arm I have done it," than in 
 prostrate meekness to petition for divine help — a 
 faculty which, it need not be told, is often the first to 
 challenge and doubt the appearance of Truth itself; 
 so as almost to set itself in array against Omniscience, 
 and to ask for demonstration when heart-felt evidence 
 is all that in the nature of things can be offered ? 
 
 I speak of Truth — the living water from God's 
 throne — the pure manna from heaven, food of an im- 
 mortal spirit — the ray of divine effulgence which can 
 
Truth not unfolded with universal clearness. 417 
 
 alone enlighten the imprisoned soul with true light : 
 — of that truth, the formal object of Faith, an in- 
 ternal sense God only can awaken ; which no man 
 can give his neighbour, but under the same influence 
 with which God himself would give it ; and there- 
 fore which has its source, by immediate Divine in- 
 fluence, in the very inmost recesses of the heart. 
 
 I do not speak of natural truth, chemical, mechani- 
 cal, geometrical or astronomical, the object of phy- 
 sical science, nor of formal propositions, moral, po- 
 litical, or religious, cognizable by speculative reason, 
 however good and excellent in themselves; which it 
 is possible for human power to attain by intellectual 
 labour, without a single thought of the divine Author, 
 merely from outward observation ; whose source is 
 therefore external. 
 
 Is it the speculative philosopher, who only possesses 
 Truth ? How comes it, then, that of all men specula- 
 lative philosophers differ most among themselves ; 
 each claiming it and each denying it the other ? But 
 Truth, as above explained, is not a thing which can 
 be divided, as it were, by argument, and a morsel 
 given to each disputant for his reward; or to be car- 
 ried off as an exclusive prize by the high-minded ex- 
 ulting victor. It is one and indivisible ; which a man 
 may have in greater or less measure, and more or 
 less complicated with error; but is the same thing in 
 all,* and consists not in mere outward opinion. It 
 
 * " From hence it comes to pass, that Truth*, though they be in 
 never so many several and distant minds apprehending them, yet they 
 
 2 D 
 
418 Truth not unfolded with universal clearness. 
 
 has a root whose vitality is maintained from another 
 source, to which, opinions, never so correct, cannot 
 immediately supply one drop of nourishment, not- 
 withstanding such opinions may ultimately lead the 
 mind, by various channels, to draw its own supplies 
 from the divine fountain from which Truth is primarily 
 and essentially derived. 
 
 Disputation may cloud the mind, but it seldom 
 elicits the true spark. When men, therefore, dis- 
 pute, though it is important that the conscience 
 should be bound by sound opinions, and very impor- 
 tant to attain them, yet the effect of disputation is 
 not in either side the immediate possession of soul- 
 sustaining virtue ; unless it be the contest of meek- 
 ness, purity, innocence, supported by Truth itself, 
 against, violence, persecution, pride, led on by wicked- 
 ness. It is not in the nature of things for the pure 
 in heart to wrangle with each other about that which 
 they individually possess. Truth knows its own, 
 and has a concord with its own. For light cannot 
 oppose the light. 
 
 are not broken, multiplied or diversified thereby; but they are one and 
 the same Individual Truths in them all. So that it is but one Truth 
 and Knowledge that is in all the understandings in the world. Just as 
 when a thousand eyes look upon the Sun at once, they all see the same 
 individual object: — so in like manner, when innumerable created under- 
 standings, direct themselves to the contemplation of the same universal 
 and immutable Truths, they do all of them, but as it were, listen to one 
 and the same Original Voice of the eternal Wisdom that is never 
 silent."— Cudvoorth concerning Morality, page 258. 
 
Of the diver sity of Religious Notions. 419 
 
 Sect. III. 
 
 Of the Diversity of Religious Notions among 
 Mankind. 
 
 The tendency to moral obligation, if we may not 
 call it a practical principle, is a law firmly inherent in 
 the mind, exclusive of any particular creed or form of 
 religion ; and may be said to constitute an essential 
 part of its nature. This tendency operates so as to 
 make individuals religiously tenacious of apprehended 
 duties (provided they do not cast off all moral re- 
 straint, as each has the power to do, by wilful dis- 
 obedience) ; whether these duties may be justly im- 
 posed or be derived from perverted modes of educa- 
 tion. It even exerts itself in enforcing obedience to 
 the authority of rules, which in themselves may be 
 insignificant or absurd ; yet being objects of this 
 inherent law, they not only acquire the force of un- 
 doubted truth, particularly if impressed in early age, 
 but are regarded as if they were of sacred obligation. 
 Like the tendrils of the vine to its support, they 
 adhere so closely to the first objects presented to their 
 embrace, that they are afterwards separated with 
 difficulty from the list of indispensable duties. 
 
 This, surely, is an important feature in the human 
 mind ; and leads at once to an inquiry into the nature 
 2d2 
 
420 Of the diversity of Religious Notions, 
 
 of that law by which the observance even of trifles 
 may be regarded as if they were matters of weighty 
 concern. It is an anomaly in that system, which 
 refers all our Ideas to Sensation and Reflection : and 
 there is not a power of the mind but that above 
 noticed, which is considered to be the foundation of 
 morality and religion, that can explain the opera- 
 tion, or give rise to the phenomena, of the law in 
 question. 
 
 If we may presume to dive into the secrets of final 
 causes, we may perhaps conclude that it was esta- 
 blished to circumscribe the human mind within certain 
 limits of moral accountability to some invisible Su- 
 preme Power. This is offered as the simple deduc- 
 tion of natural Reason, in looking at the state of all 
 those nations termed savage, and of the most degraded 
 of our fellow-creatures. If a Conscience is set up 
 and calls to account for certain actions — whether 
 these actions in themselves be blameworthy or not — it 
 is plain that religious obligation, including the refer- 
 ence to a moral governor, follows as a matter of 
 course.* 
 
 Superstition is one of its effects, when the mind is 
 
 * I notice with pleasure a passage in the work of Dr. Prichard on Dis- 
 eases of the Nervous System, illustrative of the same idea. " It seems," 
 says this learned author, " that a certain persuasion of moral demerit, 
 or delinquency, has been an universal impression upon the minds of men 
 in all ages. With this is intimately connected the idea that they ar» 
 accountable beings, and that there are certain unseen powers, before 
 whose tribunal they may, and probably will, be arraigned." 
 
 See Treatise on Diseases of the Nervous System, by 
 J. C. Priehard y M.D. p; 375. Chap. ix. SecU 5. 
 
Of the diversity of Religious Notions. 42! 
 
 ill-informed and ill-directed; as Piety is the other, 
 when it has been duly enlightened and wisely directed. 
 And Idolatry, Fanaticism, Bigotry, Intolerant Zeal* 
 and the Immolation of human victims as a religious 
 rite : — whence do they arise but from the crooked 
 and perverse operation of this propensity, when it is 
 acted upon and roused by the vilest of human pas? 
 sions ? And hence we see the lamentable abuse of a 
 principle which, when rightly directed, does honour 
 to human nature, enlarges the sphere of active 
 benevolence, and tends to the Creator's glory. 
 
 Now this law, propensity, or habit of the mind 9 
 which imposes self-condemnation when we might 
 have peace, and do naturally aim at peace, and as 
 naturally shun every thing that excites internal 
 trouble, is, to say the least, a very wonderful insti- 
 tution. By no legitimate inference can it be said to 
 follow from education; nor could it ever -have been 
 imagined a priori to arise from an acquired standard 
 of moral rectitude. 
 
 An acquired standard of moral rectitude, if the mind 
 had no internal principle of moral accountability, 
 would require its followers to lay their cases for de- 
 cision, before its tribunal, with as much coldness, 
 formality, and heartless insensibility to the distinc- 
 tions of vice and virtue, as cases are ever laid before 
 some inferior outward court of justice. How different 
 is this from the manner in which the moral principle, 
 awakened to its duty, makes its decisions! There is 
 here no coldness — no formality : all is warmth and 
 
422 Of the diversity of Religious Notions. 
 
 emotion ! The process is as animated as if the law 
 sprung at once from an internal lawgiver who had 
 no subordinate commission to administer justice ; but 
 proved his authority, by the rapidity of his decisions, 
 to be derived from an original fountain of Truth. 
 
 Hence, under all its various forms in various coun- 
 tries, if the fulfilment of an act of supposed duty be 
 made matter of Conscience, remorse or satisfaction 
 follows in the mind, as the necessary consequence of 
 compliance or disobedience. 
 
 This simple fact indicates an original propensity to 
 follow some path of duty. Our Senses may be de- 
 ceived; our Reason may be deceived; and likewise 
 our Moral perceptions may be obscured and distorted. 
 But we do not deny that there may be correct obser- 
 vation by the Senses, and that their testimony ought 
 to be relied on; we do not deny that there is a reason- 
 ing faculty because we are liable to reason amiss : 
 neither should we deny the existence of an internal 
 monitor and guide of conduct, because there may be 
 variations in one country from .what are the received 
 notions of duty in another. Notwithstanding every 
 thing that has been said to the contrary, it has been 
 the opinion of some of the wisest men, that there are 
 some fundamental truths in all the various systems of 
 faith in the world, which claim the approbation of 
 mankind in every nation. It is presumed that no 
 practical opinions are so entirely absurd and revolting 
 to human nature, as not to be mixed up and im- 
 plicated, if I may so speak, with these fundamental 
 
Of the diversity of Religious Notions, 423 
 
 Truths ; by which alone they gain credit and recom- 
 mend themselves to the understanding. Unmixed 
 error, in judgment and moral feeling, is not to be re- 
 cognized in any people upon earth. 
 
 The Mahometan, the Hindoo, the African, the 
 Chinese, the Indian, the Carib, the New Zealander, 
 the Samoeide, the Tartar, and the Egyptian, notwith- 
 standing the variety in their outward creeds, from 
 early usages and modes of education, and notwith- 
 standing the perverse notions they severally enter- 
 tain ; yet have they some common original principles 
 regulating their society both public and private, 
 which are accounted sacred amongst them, and en- 
 titled to the reverence of mankind, — principles of 
 justice, honesty, veracity, faith, gratitude, humanity, 
 benevolence, afFection, sympathy, — as well as of de- 
 votion to some Supreme Power, and regard to the 
 obligations of Conscience. 
 
 Even if we look at the nations professing Chris- 
 tianity, few in comparison with Mahometans and 
 Pagans, what do they exhibit? The speculative 
 notions which they entertain, although they go so far 
 as to produce in some cases embittered hate, and even 
 to excite the worst affections, yet they do not prevent 
 the display of moral and religious feeling and the 
 acknowledgment of those duties which are common 
 to Humanity. But Christians profess to have their 
 rules laid clearly before them, and hence are less 
 excusable than some others. It must therefore be 
 allowed that some speculative differences do not 
 
424 Of the 'diversity of Religious Notions. 
 
 wholly extinguish the original sparks of truth and 
 virtue. For, upon the same ground, one Christian na- 
 tion might as well deny to another those general prin- 
 ciples of morality and religion above stated, because 
 they differed in some speculative points of doctrine, as 
 to deny them to the darkest heathen nations, because 
 they worshipped the Universal Parent in the sun or 
 cloud, or prostrated themselves before dumb idols, 
 reptiles, and beasts, through outward ignorance of 
 His Great Name. 
 
 But how greatly is the opponent to Christianity off 
 his guard, when he makes the speculative quarrels 
 among Christians a ground of argument against this 
 Divine system, and the reception of its pure princi- 
 ples ; and, placing its sublime precepts on a level 
 with those of other religions merely notional, refuses 
 to avail himself of the only clear insight into the 
 mysteries of the heavenly kingdom, which has yet 
 been revealed to man ? If I may pursue the same 
 train of reasoning a little further, what a change may 
 be wrought in public opinion, even in the same 
 Christian country, in the course of time ? 
 
 We need not look to nations characterized as 
 savage, for examples of preposterous errors in judg- 
 ment as well as practice. Within the space of three 
 centuries, enlightened England, having all the ad- 
 vantages of the outward letter of the revealed law, 
 has seen great part of the nation vindicating the pro- 
 priety of burning and enslaving the bodies of men for 
 reasons they would now be ashamed to own. En- 
 
Of the diversity of Religious Notions. 425 
 
 lightened men have even sentenced to death unhappy 
 women for the supposed crime of witchcraft — a charge 
 at which the most ignorant of the vulgar is now dis- 
 posed to smile. Are these variations in human opi- 
 nion in one country less inconsistent with right reason 
 and moral feeling than the acts of the nations above 
 specified with the standard of immutable Truth ? 
 Had men no moral principle or conscience in England 
 because they imbibed these irrational notions ? Has 
 the Carib no sense of right and wrong — no moral 
 perception — or is it seared and blunted to every other 
 moral sentiment, because he eats the flesh of his 
 enemy, — or the Esquimaux, because he leaves his 
 aged relative to perish, — or the Chinese, because he 
 exposes the new-born infant to destruction ; or the 
 Hindoo, because the deluded pilgrim devotes himself 
 to death beneath the wheels of Juggernaut, and the 
 widow, a voluntary sacrifice to the flames on the fu- 
 neral pile of her deceased husband ? 
 
 Obscurity in some things, or in part, does not ne- 
 cessarily darken the whole mind and withdraw it from 
 the casual influences of the light of Truth. If that 
 were the case, few could rank among the truly en- 
 lightened: for the majority have their prejudices, 
 their errors, and imperfect views. But notwith- 
 standing all these things, some instinctive irradiations 
 do now and then break forth in the moral gloom of 
 the most barbarous climes ; and sparks of superior 
 light may occasionally be discovered, kindling, as 
 it were, in the bosom of savage nature. 
 
426 Of the diversity of Religious Notions, 
 
 The light or talents, or opportunities and advantages, 
 with which different persons are favoured, vary ex- 
 ceedingly ; and we are not answerable to one another 
 for the fruits or consequences, except we transgress 
 the moral law to each other's injur?/. We believe that 
 we are only accountable for what we have received to 
 profit with ; we are however accountable for the 
 advantages we have thrown away. Hence the Pagan 
 or Mahometan, who, with the exception above no- 
 ticed, acts according to the measure of his knowledge 
 and fulfils the dictates of his Conscience, merits no 
 condemnation from us. Nay, he may be accepted at 
 the throne of Grace in preference to bim to whom 
 much has been given, and whose return to the boun- 
 tiful Parent has been small. While then we make 
 Conscience variable according to the light and know- 
 ledge with which any may have been favoured, let us 
 not suppose that the ultimate standard of Truth itself 
 is variable. He that now accepts the contrition of the 
 broken heart as a sweet-smelling sacrifice, accepted 
 also the outward offerings of the Law : and will he 
 not accept the simple devotion of his sincere-hearted 
 children, whether accompanied with ceremonies or 
 not, among the unenlightened heathen ? 
 
 The ultimate standard of Truth is a recondite trea- 
 sure of which few know the value; and fewer still 
 seek it where it is to be found — in their own hearts. 
 What then, it may be asked, are the Scriptures of 
 Truth to be superseded ? By no means : they are of 
 inestimable value: they point to the true teacher; 
 
Of the diversity of Religious Notions. 427 
 
 they shew us to what a measure of holiness some of 
 our fellow creatures have attained ; they show us the 
 life and doctrine of the divine pattern of Christian 
 purity: they are profitable to salvation through the 
 influence of God's spirit : but this spirit they cannot 
 give. What man, then, would not avail himself of 
 every outward means to direct and instruct him in the 
 concerns of highest interest; — the will of his Maker — 
 the dispensations of Providence to the righteous 
 and the wicked— the clear knowledge of his real 
 state — the plan of salvation — the necessity and duty 
 of obedience, patience, humility, purity of life and 
 resignation — and the undoubted hopes of immor- 
 tality ? These were given to man by an extraordi- 
 nary revelation; and it would be presumptuous to 
 reject them. 
 
 But the knowledge of good and evil, in whatever 
 way communicated to man, has been derived from 
 the same eternal fountain of Purity and Wisdom. 
 The channels have been different ; but the source 
 has been essentially the same. Whether instinctively 
 revealed by Conscience, or excogitated by Reason, 
 or promulgated on tables of stone, or displayed by 
 the Gospel, this knowledge has been a revelation 
 from God himself; varying only in the means and 
 the degrees of accompanying light. For it has 
 pleased divine goodness to measure out this light and 
 knowledge from age to age, by effusions increasing 
 both in brightness and fulness — each more perfect 
 than the last, but agreeing fundamentally in the 
 
428 Of the diversity of Religious Notions. 
 
 principles — from the simplest moral intelligence to the 
 last glorious dispensation by Jesus Christ. 
 
 So that it may be said, instinctive or natural moral 
 emotions have handed this knowledge imperfectly to 
 Reason, by the Light of Nature; Reason has ac* 
 knovvledged their fitness and congruity to the nature 
 of man, and has secondarily proved the advantage of 
 virtue and the disadvantage of vice; but primarily 
 was never able to touch the heart from which both 
 sprung, and to awake it into feeling : for Reason would 
 be as competent to digest the laws of optics without an 
 organ of vision, as to form the moral code without an 
 implanted sense or principle of moral emotion. Under 
 the Mosaic dispensation, the moral law was delivered 
 more clearly and manifestly, with extraordinary signs 
 of confirmation: and at last the light of the Gospel 
 demonstrated, by unquestionable evidence, the true 
 relation between man and his Maker, his immense 
 distance in a natural state from the source of divine 
 purity, his weakness and moral wants, and the only 
 sure and effectual remedy. 
 
 Is it then of no consequence that man should be 
 directed not only where to find his true guide and 
 teacher, but how to approach him ? 
 
 It does not appear that he knows this from instinc- 
 tive feeling ; he cannot know it from unassisted Rea- 
 son ; but he sees the object and the path in Scripture. 
 He sees what others have done and felt and known,-~ 
 their experience in holiness, — the true temper of their 
 minds, — the nature of their spiritual support^ and the 
 means of attaining it. 
 
Illustration?. 429 
 
 Sect. IV. 
 Illustrations of the foregoing Reasonings. 
 
 The following quotations are designed to illustrate 
 some or other of the preceding remarks. 
 
 " Conscience,'* says Dr. Beattie, u like every 
 other human faculty, and suitably to the whole ana- 
 logy of animal and even of vegetable nature, arrives 
 at maturity by degrees, and may either be improved 
 by cultivation, or perverted by mismanagement. 
 
 " In our early years it is improved by moral pre- 
 cept and good example ; and as we advance in life by 
 habits of consideration, and a strict adherence to truth 
 and our duty. By different treatment, by want of 
 instruction, bad example, inconsiderate behaviour 
 neglect of duty, and disregard to truth, it may ba 
 perverted and almost destroyed. From this, how- 
 ever, we are not warranted to infer as some have 
 done, that it is not a natural faculty, but an artijicicd 
 way of thinking superinduced by education ; nor 
 suppose that opposite habits and opposite modes of 
 teaching would have made us disapprove virtue and 
 approve vice with the same energy of thought, 
 wherewith we now disapprove vice and approve 
 virtue. — For let it be observed that even our outward 
 senses may be made better or worse by good or bad 
 
430 Illustrations, 
 
 management. — Even Reason itself is subject to the 
 same law of habit, as the means of improvement or 
 debasement — Yet it will not be said Reason is merely 
 an artificial thing, a way of thinking superinduced by 
 education." 
 
 Dr. Rush has the following remarks. " The low 
 degrees of moral perception, that have been dis- 
 covered in certain African and Russian tribes of men, 
 no more invalidate our proposition of the universal 
 and essential existence of a moral faculty in the 
 human mind, than the low state of their intellects 
 prove that Reason is not natural to man." — " It is 
 with virtue as with fire. It exists in the mind, as 
 fire does in certain bodies, in a latent or quiescent 
 state. As collision renders the one sensible, so 
 education renders the other visible. — There are 
 appetites that are wholly artificial. There are tastes 
 so entirely vitiated as to perceive beauty in de- 
 formity. Why under certain unfavourable circum- 
 stances may there not exist also a moral faculty, in 
 a state of sleep, or subject to mistakes ? — It would 
 be as absurd to maintain, because olives become 
 agreeable to many people from habit, that we have no 
 natural appetites for any other kind of food, as to 
 assert that any part of the human species exist with- 
 out a moral principle, because in some of them it has 
 wanted causes to excite it into action, or has been 
 perverted by example." 
 
 Dr. Price, in his excellent work on Morals, en- 
 forces similar ideas : — 
 
Illustrations. 431 
 
 " In innumerable instances," says he, " the prac- 
 tical errors of men have arisen from their speculative 
 errors : from their mistaking facts, or not seeing the 
 whole of a case : whence it cannot but often happen 
 that they will think those things right which if they 
 had juster opinions of facts and cases they would un- 
 avoidably condemn." — " It is just as reasonable to ex- 
 pect disagreement and errors here, as in the applica- 
 tion of the received principles of knowledge and 
 assent in general. Nor would it be more extrava- 
 gant to conclude, that men have not speculative 
 reason, because of the diversity in their speculative 
 opinions, than it is to conclude, they have no powers 
 of moral perception, or that there is no fixed stand- 
 ard of morality, and no certain principles and rules 
 for judging of it, because of the diversity in men's 
 opinions, concerning the fitness or unfitness, lawful- 
 ness or unlawfulness of particular practices." — " It 
 is not easy to determine how far our natural senti- 
 ments may be altered by custom, education and ex- 
 ample. — Notions, the most stupid, may through their 
 influence, come to be rooted in the mind beyond the 
 possibility of being ever eradicated, antipathies given 
 to objects naturally the most agreeable, and sensation 
 itself perverted. It would be unreasonable to con- 
 clude from hence that all we are and think is derived 
 from education. — Education and habit can give us no 
 new ideas. — The power and influence they have sup- 
 pose somewhat natural as their foundation. Were it 
 not for the natural powers by which we perceive 
 
432 Illustrations. 
 
 pleasure and pain, good and evil, beauty and defor- 
 mity, the ideas of them could never be excited in us, 
 any more than the ideas of colour in persons born 
 blind." " The sensible horror at vice, and affection- 
 ate attachment to virtue, may be impaired, the con- 
 science seared, the nature of particular practices 
 mistaken, the sense of shame weakened, the judgment 
 darkened, the voice of reason stifled, and self-decep- 
 tion practiced, to the most lamentable and fatal de- 
 gree. Yet the grand lines and primary principles of 
 morality are so deeply wrought into our hearts and one 
 with our minds, that they will be for ever legible. 
 The general approbation of certain virtues, and dis- 
 like of their contraries, must always remain, and can- 
 not be erased but with the destruction of all reason 
 and intellectual perception. The most depraved 
 never sink so low, as to lose all moral discernment, 
 all ideas of right and wrong, justice and injustice, 
 honour and dishonour. This appears from the judg- 
 ments they pass on the actions of others, and the re- 
 sentment they discover, when they are themselves the 
 objects of ill treatment. Whatever peace they enjoy 
 proceeds in a great measure from a studied neglect 
 of reflexion, and from their having learnt to disguise 
 their vices under the appearance of some virtuous or 
 innocent qualities ."* 
 
 It is observed by Dr. Hutcheson, that " it is strange, 
 Reason is universally allowed to men, notwithstand- 
 ing all the stupid ridiculous opinions received in 
 
 * Review of the principal questions in morals. «hap. 7. 
 
Illustrations. 433 
 
 many places ; and yet absurd practices, founded on 
 those very opinio?2s, shall seem an argument against 
 any moral sense, although the bad conduct is not 
 owing to any irregularity in the moral sense, but to a 
 wrong judgment or opinion"-—" Our sense of virtue 
 generally leads us exactly enough according to our 
 opinions; and therefore the absurd practices which 
 prevail in the world, are much better arguments that 
 men have no reason, than that they have no moral sense 
 of beauty in actions. " 
 
 Thus, putting the aged, the deformed and weak, 
 and children, to death, are vindicated by divers plau- 
 sible reasons, arising from unsound opinions, as well 
 as the worship of idolatrous nations — and thus we 
 find that the basest actions are dressed in some toler- 
 able mask. What others call Avarice, appears to the 
 agent a prudent care of a family or friends } fraud, 
 artful conduct; Malice and Revenge, a just sense of 
 honour, and a vindication of our right in possessions 
 or fame. Fire and sword and desolation among; 
 enemies a just thorough defence of our country; per- 
 secution, a zeal for the Truth, and for the eternal 
 happiness of men, which heretics oppose. In all 
 these instances men generally act from a Sense of 
 virtue upon false opinions."* 
 
 Dr. Thomas Brown, in speaking of the limitations 
 to which a moral principle is liable, makes some 
 judicious remarks. His reasonings come very near 
 to those of Dr. Price, and amount to this; — that 
 
 * Inquiry concerning moral Good and Evil, sect. 4. 
 2 E 
 
434 Illustrations. 
 
 though all the particulars of duty and rectitude were 
 in themselves plain and easy to be determined ; the 
 influence of other causes might have been expected 
 a priori to have this modifying effect upon a moral 
 principle, if, without considering any of the objec- 
 tions urged, we had only reflected on the analogous 
 phenomena of other principles of the mind, that are 
 allowed to be essential to it, and that are yet capable 
 of similar modifications. 
 
 " The first limitation," he observes, " relates to 
 the influence of extreme passion, which incapacitates 
 the mind for perceiving moral distinctions, as it does 
 for perceiving distinctions of every sort — virtue, 
 though lost to our perceptions for a moment, how- 
 ever, is immediately perceived again, with distinct 
 vision as before, as soon as the agitation subsides : — 
 it is like the image of the sky in the bosom of a lake, 
 which vanishes indeed, while the waters are ruffled, 
 but which reappears more and more distinctly as 
 every little wave sinks gradually to rest, — till the 
 returning calm shows again in all its purity the image 
 of that Heaven which has never ceased to shine on 
 it." " Moral Truths are to the impassioned mind as 
 little universal as the truths in geometry." 
 
 Another limitation relates to the influence of habit 
 and association. " It is pleasing," he says, " to love 
 those who are around us; above all, those domestic 
 relations to whom we owe our being, or to whose 
 society we owed the happiness of many years of 
 which we have forgotten every thing, but that they 
 
Illustrations. 435 
 
 were delightful. It is not merely pleasing to love 
 these first friends ; we feel that it is a duty to love 
 them ; that, unless in circumstances of extraordinary 
 profligacy on their part, if we were not to love them, 
 we should look upon ourselves with moral disappro- 
 bation. The feeling of this very duty mingles in our 
 estimates of the conduct of those whom we love ; and 
 it is in this way that Association in such cases ope- 
 rates; — not by rendering vice in itself less an object 
 of disapprobation, than before, but by blending with 
 our disapprobation of the action that love of the 
 Agent, which is, as it were an opposite duty. It is 
 the good that is mixed with the bad, that we love, not 
 the bad, which is mixed with the good."* 
 
 Hooker observes, " We see a general agreement in 
 the secret opinion of men, that every man ought to 
 embrace the Religion which is true, and to shun, as 
 hurtful, whatsoever dissenteth from it, but that most, 
 which doth farthest dissent. The Generalitie of which 
 persuasion argueth, that God hath imprinted it by 
 nature. — The errors of the most seduced this way 
 have been mixed with some truths." 
 
 " And whereas (speaking of the Romans) we read 
 so many of them so much commended, some for their 
 mild and merciful disposition, some for their virtuous 
 severitie, some for their integritie of life, all these were 
 the fruits of true and infallible principles delivered 
 unto us in the word of God, as the axiomes of our 
 Religion, which being imprinted by the God of nature 
 
 * Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind. 
 
 2 e 2 
 
436 lllustratious. 
 
 in their hearts also, and taking better root in some 
 than in most others, grew, though not from, yet with 
 and amidst the heaps of manifold repugnant errors, 
 which errors of corrupt religion had also their suit- 
 able effects in the lives of the self-same parties. ,, 
 
 " Seeing that mens' desire is in general to hold no 
 religion but the true; and that whatsoever good 
 effects doe grow out of their religion who embrace, 
 instead of the true, a false, the roots thereof are 
 certain sparkes of the light of truth intermingled with 
 the darknesse of error ; because no religion can wholly 
 and only consist of untruths ; we have reason to think 
 that all true virtues are to honour Religion as their 
 parent, and all well ordered common-weales to love 
 her as their chiefest stay."* 
 
 " If conscience," says Rousseau, " speaks to every 
 heart, why then are there so few that listen to it. 
 Ah ! it is because it speaks to us the language of 
 nature, which every thing causes us to forget. Con- 
 science is timid, it loves retirement and peace ; it is 
 alarmed by the noise of the world ; the prejudices 
 from which they represent it to take its origin, are its 
 most cruel enemies; it flies away or is silent before 
 them ; their noise drowns its gentle voice, and hinders 
 it from being heard ; fanaticism dares to counterfeit 
 it, and to meditate crimes in its name. It leaves us 
 at last in consequence of being neglected; it no 
 longer speaks to us, no longer answers ; and, after 
 such continued contempt for it, it costs as much to 
 
 * See Ecclesiastical Politic. Book Fifth. 
 
Illustrations, 437 
 
 recal it, as it did to banish it. Let but the form and 
 the love of virtue be imprinted by nature in the 
 bottom of my soul, I shall have my rule as long as it is 
 not disfigured : but how am I to assure myself that I 
 shall always preserve in its purity this internal image 
 which has no model among sensible beings to which 
 it can be compared ? Do we not know that inordinate 
 affections corrupt the judgment as well as the will, 
 and that Conscience is changed and modified insen- 
 sibly in every age, in every people, and in every in- 
 dividual, according to the inconstancy and the variety 
 of prejudices ? — Let us adore the eternal Being; — 
 with a breath of air we destroy these phantoms of 
 Heason, which have only a visionary existence, and 
 flee away like a shadow before immutable Truth."* 
 
 I should think myself called upon to apologize for 
 the length of the following quotation from Dr. Reid, 
 if it were not so very applicable to the view I have 
 taken. 
 
 " Our moral Judgment, or Conscience, grows to 
 maturity from an imperceptible seed, planted by our 
 Creator. It may be much aided in its strength and 
 vigour by proper culture. 
 
 " The faculties which we have in common with the 
 brutes appear first, and have the quickest growth. In 
 the first period of life, children are not capable of 
 distinguishing right from wrong in conduct ; neither 
 are they capable of abstract reasoning in matters of 
 science. Their judgment of moral conduct, as well as 
 
 * Pensees de Rousseau. 
 
438 Illustrations. 
 
 their judgment of truth, advances by insensible de- 
 grees, like the corn and grass. 
 
 " In vegetables first the blade or the leaf appears, 
 then the flower, and last of all the fruit, the noblest 
 production of the three, and that for which the others 
 were produced. According to the variation of soil, 
 season, and culture, some plants are brought to much 
 greater perfection than others of the same species. 
 But no variation of culture, or season, or soil, can 
 make grapes grow from thorns, or figs from thistles. 
 
 " We may observe a similar progress in the facul- 
 ties of the mind ; for there is a wonderful analogy 
 among all the works of God, from the least even to 
 the greatest. 
 
 " The faculties of man unfold themselves in a cer- 
 tain order appointed by the great Creator. In their 
 gradual progress they may be greatly assisted or re* 
 tarded, improved or corrupted, by education, in- 
 struction, example, exercise, and by the society and 
 conversation of men, which like soil and culture in 
 plants, may produce great changes to the better or to 
 the worse. 
 
 " The seeds of moral discernment are at first tender 
 and delicate, and easily warped. 
 
 " Our intellectual discernment is not so strong 
 and vigorous by nature as to secure us from errors in 
 speculation. It would be absurd, from the errors 
 and ignorance of mankind, to conclude, that man has 
 not a natural faculty of discerning truth, and distin- 
 guishing it from error. 
 
Illustrations. 439 
 
 " In like manner, our moral discernment of what 
 we ought and what we ought not to do, is not so 
 strong and vigorous by nature, as to secure us from 
 very gross mistakes with regard to our duty. 
 
 In matters of conduct we are liable to be misled by 
 prejudices of education, or by wrong instruction; and 
 to have our judgment warped by our appetites and 
 passions, by fashion, and by the contagion of evil 
 example. 
 
 " The natural power of discerning between right 
 and wrong needs the aid of instruction, education, 
 exercise, and habit, as well as our other natural 
 powers. 
 
 " There is a strong analogy between the progress 
 of the body from infancy to maturity, and the progress 
 of all the powers of the mind. This progression in 
 both is the work of nature, and in both may be greatly 
 aided by proper education. 
 
 u The power of vegetation in the seed of a plant, 
 without heat and moisture, would for ever lie dor- 
 mant. The rational and moral powers of man would 
 perhaps lie dormant without instruction and example. 
 Yet these powers are a part, and perhaps the noblest 
 part of his constitution ; as the power of vegetation 
 is of the seed. 
 
 " Our first moral conceptions are probably got by 
 attending coolly to the conduct of others, and ob- 
 serving what moves our approbation, what our in- 
 dignation. These sentiments spring from our moral 
 faculty as naturally as the sensations of sweet and 
 
440 Illustrations, 
 
 bitter from the faculty of taste. They have their 
 natural objects. But most human actions are of a 
 mixed nature, and have various colours, according as 
 they are viewed, on different sides. Prejudice against, 
 or in favour of the person, is apt to warp our opinion. 
 It requires attention and candour to distinguish the 
 good from the ill, and, without favour or prejudice, 
 to form a clear and impartial judgment. In this, we 
 may be greatly aided by instruction. 
 
 " The bulk of mankind have but little of this cul- 
 ture in the proper season; and what they have is 
 often unskilfully applied ; by which means bad habits 
 gather strength, and false notions of pleasure, of 
 honour, and of interest occupy the mind. They give 
 little attention to what is right and honest. Con- 
 science is seldom consulted, and so little exercised, 
 that its decisions are weak and wavering. 
 
 " He must be very ignorant of human nature, who 
 does not perceive that the seed of virtue in the mind 
 of man, like that of a tender plant in an unkindly 
 soil, requires care and culture in the first period of 
 life, as well as our own exertion when we come to 
 maturity. 
 
 " The path of duty is a plain path, which the up- 
 right in heart can rarely mistake. Such it must be, 
 since every man is bound to walk in it. There are 
 some intricate cases in morals which admit of dispu- 
 tation, but these seldom occur in practice; and when 
 they do, the learned disputant has no great advantage : 
 for the unlearned man, who uses the best means in 
 
Various opinions of a Moral Principle. 441 
 
 his power to know his duty, and acts according to his 
 knowledge, is inculpable in the sight of God and man. 
 He may err, but is not guilty of immorality."* 
 
 Sect. V. 
 
 Of the various opinions concerning the nature of the 
 Moral Principle. 
 
 We see, therefore, that, notwithstanding all the 
 seeming exceptions which have been made to the 
 doctrine of an internal teacher — exceptions which may 
 be sufficiently accounted for by the passions, conflict- 
 ing interests, and free will of man ; most of the 
 writers above quoted, admit what is called a Moral 
 Sense, or innate principle of moral obligation. It is 
 curious however to note the variety of opinions which 
 have been entertained respecting the nature of this 
 principle. Human wisdom, it would appear, is scarce- 
 ly competent to develope the true relations of a secret 
 Guide and Intelligence, to which such an important 
 office in the moral economy of man is intrusted by 
 the Author of his being. Accordingly, those who 
 have admitted the principle, have differed as to its 
 nature : and those, who have rejected it, seem to have 
 been scarcely aware of what their rejection of it in- 
 volved. 
 
 * Reid's Essays. 
 
442 Various opinions of 
 
 Some men, classed among Freethinkers, have 
 adopted an opinion quite opposite to that held by 
 those who call themselves Orthodox ; and on this oc- 
 casion, singularly enough, these opponents seem to 
 have changed sides : the first, without intending it, 
 maintaining the fundamental principle of the gospel ; 
 and the last laying claim to orthodoxy, and yet strik- 
 ing at the very root of Christianity. The first have 
 maintained that there is an implanted sense, or power 
 in the mind, which if obeyed in all its secret monitions, 
 will lead man safely in his duty : the last have denied 
 such a dogma, and have had recourse to the outward 
 revelation of Holy Scripture to make up what they 
 consider a palpable deficiency in man's moral eco- 
 nomy. 
 
 The opinion of the first, therefore, though it were 
 just in itself, might be liable to some doubt or sus- 
 picion, merely because it was embraced by authors of 
 that description. For, when the current of infidelity 
 was running strong, and natural religion was making 
 way, in contradistinction to revealed, it was objected 
 by the supposed orthodox, that the notion of a moral 
 sense or moral law-giver being implanted in the mind, 
 to dictate the path of duty, was invented for the pur- 
 pose of exalting the dignity of human nature, and 
 lessening the value and importance of Christianity. 
 
 Without question, there was some ground for this 
 imputation ; and there is good reason to believe, that 
 the class of Freethinkers did, with a sinister motive, 
 make use of such an argument : for, the more* perfect 
 
a Moral Principle. 443 
 
 they made human nature to be in itself with its own 
 natural powers, the less need there was for the sup- 
 posed adventitious aid of Christianity, or for any other 
 special dispensation from above, to teach the lessons 
 of morality and religion. In so far therefore as this 
 power was held to be a natural faculty, belonging 
 intrinsically to the constitution of the mind, like the 
 memory or fancy, there was an obvious leaning to 
 natural Religion, in contradistinction to Revealed. 
 And this opinion was accordingly rejected entirely by 
 their opponents ; who, in their rejection of the prin- 
 ciple, though they might perhaps have justly found 
 fault with the terms, appear not to have considered 
 that they were undermining the foundation of Christi- 
 anity itself. 
 
 Because, the internal light of a mbral principle, the 
 still small voice of Conscience, the candle of the Lord 
 in the soul of man, the unerring and infallible witness 
 for Truth, may be different appellations, or other 
 names, for the divine light of Christianity itself; 
 which in the language of Scripture is emphatically 
 stated to have "appeared to all men;" — and "to 
 lighten every man that cometh into the world." It 
 is moreover stated, that " a manifestation of it is 
 given to every one to profit withal." 
 
 Bolingbroke, Shaftesbury, and others, seem to have 
 been advocates for the sufficiency and natural juris- 
 diction of a Moral Sense. Locke, Berkley, Paley, 
 and their followers, appear to have been among the 
 
444 Various opinions of 
 
 supporters of that opinion which makes Reason the 
 umpire and judge, Education or human instruction 
 the medium, and Scripture the only revelation now 
 vouchsafed to man, therefore the only adequate rule 
 of faith and manners. The latter however do not 
 deny the casual operation and influence of a Holy 
 Spirit. 
 
 But a third class have ranked themselves among 
 the advocates of a moral faculty, acknowledging the 
 use of Reason, but not its entire sufficiency, therefore 
 without committing themselves on the side of Deism 
 like the first, and yet without clearly explaining the 
 relation of a moral sense to the Gospel principle of 
 Light and Truth, as Reid, Hutcheson, Stewart, 
 Beattie, and Smith. Of all these writers Dr. Reid 
 appears to have taken that view of the subject which 
 agrees best with Scripture; his description of a moral 
 principle with the accompanying illustrations and 
 analogies applying very closely to the Scripture 
 model. 
 
 It might not be a difficult task to show what errors 
 are likely to arise from that opinion, which, admitting 
 a revelation, confines it to the written record, thereby 
 limiting its effects to certain minds ; as well as from 
 that, which, extending it beyond the written record, 
 would interpose so many bars and difficulties in the 
 way of its reception, by imagining a host of dangers 
 from mistaken zeal, and insisting upon the controul 
 of an outward faculty like Reason, as would virtually 
 
a Moral Principle. 445 
 
 tend to exclude this divine influence, or negative its 
 operation, or at least to make it extremely rare and 
 partial. 
 
 On the other hand, when we consider that those 
 who admit a Moral Principle, are so divided among 
 themselves respecting its nature, that they can affirm 
 nothing certain upon the matter; we are naturally 
 led to wonder that they do not at once apply them- 
 selves to Scripture for the only clear and lucid ex- 
 planation of the difficulty which can be given. 
 
 This Moral Sense or Faculty, Moral Principle, 
 Internal Teacher, Light of Nature, Divine Reason — 
 under whatever name it may pass — represents the 
 self-same Spiritual Power, operating variously, accord- 
 ing as it has to act in greater or less measure, — ac- 
 cording to the diversity of talents intrusted to man — 
 " for there are diversities of gifts, but the same 
 spirit" — according as it has to act in the natural and 
 uncivilized state; or in those who, possessing the 
 outward knowledge, are without the inward virtue ; 
 or, possessing the inward virtue with prompt obe- 
 dience and simplicity of heart, yet have nothing of 
 human learning, or at least a mere sketch of religious 
 principle unfolded to them by outward instruction. 
 It cannot be supposed that, because different effects 
 are exhibited in these different states of the mind, in 
 different persons, the power or influence should itself 
 be different; and at one time deserve no better name 
 
446 Various opinions of 
 
 than a Moral Sense, and at another be dignified with 
 that of a Holy Spirit. At the same time, its mode of 
 action is, and ever will be, a mystery. For u as the 
 wind blows where it listeth, and thou hearest the 
 sound thereof, but knowest not whence it cometh and 
 whither it goeth ; so is every one that is born of the 
 spirit:" — so little does any man know of its power 
 and influence upon the mind. It is distributed in 
 different measures. Therefore it is not one thing in 
 the Jew and another in the Greek. In Scythian and 
 Barbarian, Christian and Heathen, bond and free, it 
 is the same; varying only in degree of intensity and 
 manifestation ; like the light of the great luminary of 
 the world from the faintest ray to the brightest beam. 
 Even those who have been enlightened may become 
 dark. " Take heed that the light in thee be not 
 darkness." 
 
 I have stated that philosophers differ in their specu- 
 lative notions respecting the nature of this moral 
 principle. With regard also to Virtue, that perfec- 
 tion of human conduct in thought, word, and deed, 
 for which we may suppose the principle in question 
 was implanted, there is a like diversity of opinion, 
 perhaps consisting more in name than in reality. 
 
 Dr. Adam Smith observes, that " it is the opinion of 
 some, that Virtue is recommended to us by the prin- 
 ciple of Self-Love, as the former tends to promote our 
 private interest: others think that Reason points out 
 the difference between one character and another in 
 the same way that it does that between truth and 
 
a Moral Principle. 447 
 
 falsehood; and others think that the virtuous cha- 
 racter is recommended by a. peculiar faculty of percep- 
 tion called a Moral Sense; which is gratified or 
 pleased, as the contrary disgusts and displeases it." 
 
 Dr. Clarke makes Virtue to consist in acting ac- 
 cording to the fitness of things • Shaftesbury, in main- 
 taining a proper balance of the affections and due 
 regulation of the passions. Cudworth and Hutcheson 
 place Virtue in Benevolence. Hume places it in 
 Utility ; and Paley, in Expediency. 
 
 In this way, finding that they could not account for 
 the origin or primary source of moral sentiments, by 
 the operation of a discursive Faculty or Reason, 
 philosophers have had recourse to various theories to 
 explain it ; some referring it to one principle and 
 some to another. Shaftesbury and Hume refer it to 
 Taste ; Dr. Hutcheson and others to a Moral Sense ; 
 Dr. Adam Smith, to Sympathy ; Dr. Richard Price? 
 following Cudworth, conceived that moral distinc- 
 tions were perceived by the Understanding, and to it 
 ascribed the origin of the ideas of right and wrong, 
 but not by any discursive process ; taking the Under- 
 standing in a more comprehensive signification than 
 is usually attached to the word. 
 
 Dugald Stewart remarks, that " if the distinction 
 between the moral faculty and our other active 
 powers be acknowledged, it is of the less consequence 
 what particular theory we adopt concerning the origin 
 of our moral ideas ; and, accordingly, Mr. Smith, 
 though he resolves moral approbation ultimately into 
 
448 Various opinions of 
 
 a feeling of the mind, represents the Supremacy of 
 Conscience as a principle, which is equally essential 
 to all the different systems, that have been proposed 
 on the subject. Upon whatever we suppose our 
 moral faculties to be founded, whether upon a certain 
 modification of Reason, upon an original instinct, 
 called a Moral Sense, or upon some other principle of 
 our nature, it cannot be doubted that they were given 
 us for the direction of our conduct in this life. They 
 carry along with them the most evident badges of 
 this authority, which denote that they were set up 
 within us to be the Supreme arbiters of all our ac- 
 tions, to superintend all our senses, passions, and 
 appetites, and to judge how far each of them was 
 either to be indulged or restrained. — It is the peculiar 
 office of these faculties to judge, to bestow censure 
 or applause upon all the other principles of our 
 nature."* 
 
 Upon the preceding passage I shall only remark, 
 that, although it may be of little consequence what 
 theory may be adopted concerning the origin of our 
 moral ideas, it must be of great importance to a 
 Christian to know how and where, in other words, to 
 what principle, and by what mental exercises, he is to 
 look for the due regulation of his conduct in the sight 
 of God and his fellow-creature ; and whether he has 
 an infallible guide and teacher in his own breast, or 
 is left to wander, as it were, at large in outward spe- 
 culation, for a knowledge of his duty. 
 
 * See Outlines of Moral Philosophy, Sect. 6. 
 
a Moral Principle. 449 
 
 The general inference, from all these different 
 opinions, is, that no speculative theory of moral 
 sentiments, excogitated by human ingenuity, has 
 hitherto explained, or is ever likely to explain, the 
 difficulties of the subject : and that no true explana- 
 tion can be given but by the light which is afforded in 
 Scripture. 
 
 I shall therefore proceed to illustrate the foregoing 
 views in the best manner I am able by this supreme 
 authority. 
 
 2 F 
 
CHAP. IX. 
 OF THE DIVINE SPIRIT IN THE SOUL. 
 
 Sect. I. 
 Introductory Remarks, 
 
 WE have seen in the foregoing review of opinions 
 on the origin of what is called moral sentiment, in 
 other words, the living operation of divine Truth in 
 the soul, that human testimony, unaided by reve- 
 lation, is much divided, and leaves us comparatively 
 in darkness ; some referring it to one source and some 
 to another. For, Reason, natural Conscience, Be- 
 nevolence, Sympathy, and Taste, have all had their 
 respective advocates ; and it cannot be said that satis- 
 factory ground is afforded for acquiescence in any of 
 the different systems. 
 
 After this statement of opinions and allusion to the 
 doubts and intricate questions which the subject, as 
 one of speculation, involves, it is natural that we 
 should enjoy a degree of liberty and satisfaction in 
 contemplating the brighter prospect presented to us in 
 
Introductory Remarks. 45 1 
 
 the light of Scripture ; like that which a man mav be 
 supposed to feel who has been wandering in a wilder- 
 ness or dark thicket, embarrassed and uncertain at 
 every turn, when he comes forth to breathe free air and 
 to see the beauties of an open country and a straight 
 path before him. Such is the prospect unfolded in 
 Scripture, compared with the views developed by 
 human speculation, in all things relating to the 
 eternal interests of man. And thus we feel, in look- 
 ing at this subject, when it is freed from metaphysical 
 subtlety and jargon, and placed before us in its own 
 beautiful simplicity, as it is illustrated and set forth 
 in those incomparable Writings. 
 
 Having thus explained myself, I do not propose to 
 speak of the beginning, developement, and operation of 
 the divine spirit in the soul, as if it were a subject 
 discoverable by human research ; but to treat of it, 
 in so far only, as it is plainly unfolded in Scripture. 
 And I am willing to think that the conclusions will 
 be found in great measure to accord with the pre- 
 ceding principles, as they are laid down in this Essay. 
 Under these impressions it is that I submit the follow- 
 ing truths or propositions for consideration. 
 
 First. — A measure of the Divine Spirit is intrusted 
 to every man, and is represented as a seed sown in 
 the heart, humble in its manifestations, and though 
 small and easily overlooked, capable of increase by 
 cultivation. 
 
 Second. — Though by outward research, or intel- 
 lectual labour, the rational faculty may in some 
 2f2 
 
452 Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 respects be accessory to the growth and developement 
 of this seed ; yet it is only an incidental help, and 
 not the necessary mean or instrument of its culti- 
 vation : for this consists immediately, in obedience to 
 the light or knowledge received; in prostration of 
 the soul before its Maker; in humble aspirations to 
 the Father of Mercies for help, direction, and preser- 
 vation ; in charity to all men ; in a life of purity 
 and self-denial ; and in true hunger and thirst after 
 righteousness, and further discoveries of the Divine 
 will. 
 
 Third The influence and operation of this Divine 
 
 spirit are not always accessible, and waiting upon the 
 creature's pleasure; but only accessible through 
 patience, watching, and prayer : for this influence is 
 frequently withdrawn from the righteous themselves, 
 to prove their faith, allegiance, and necessary de- 
 pendance upon God alone; and it is withdrawn also 
 from the disobedient, even as an accuser, after they 
 have repeatedly slighted its reproofs and rebelled 
 against its laws. 
 
 Fourth. — As the rational faculties, or natural powers 
 of the understanding, are always more or less at the 
 command and under the controul of man, and the 
 ratio of increase in the seed of Divine Grace, is not in 
 proportion to the speculative knowledge of Divine 
 Truth, but in proportion to heartfelt obedience and 
 living operative Faith; it follows, demonstratively, 
 that the discursive or argumentative faculty is not the 
 source, discoverer, and framer, by any intellectual 
 
Of its Seed. 453 
 
 process, synthetic or analytic, of Divine Truth in the 
 soul. 
 
 Fifth. — This Divine Spirit is the spirit of Christ 
 himself, in all ages the same; and its manifestations 
 are true revelations from above, perceived riot by 
 Sense nor by Reason, but by the inward eye of Faith. 
 
 I shall proceed to consider these truths or propo- 
 sitions in order. 
 
 Sect. II. 
 Of the Seed of Divine Truth. 
 
 Proposition I. 
 
 A Measure of the Divine Spirit is intrusted to every 
 man, and is represented as a seed sown in the heart, 
 humble in its manifestations, and, though small and 
 easily overlooked, capable of increase by cultivation. 
 
 We find in Scripture that different terms are used 
 to denote the same principle, as, the " grace" and 
 " gift of God"— " the manifestation of the Spirit"— 
 " the light of Christ"—" the word of God"—" the 
 Holy Spirit" — " the anointing or divine unction" — 
 " the kingdom of God" in the heart : and it is com- 
 pared, as, in the parables, — to a seed, — to a talent, — 
 to a little leaven ; each capable of making increase ; 
 as, by assimilating to its own nature, like the leaven, — 
 
454 Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 by gaining an addition, according to the use, like the 
 talent, — or by multiplying in a good and fruitful soil, 
 like the seed. 
 
 The parabolical illustration appears to be varied 
 in order to give a clearer idea of a principle which 
 either in its mode of existence or operation, could 
 scarcely be conceived in any other way than by some 
 outward analogy. The immediate followers them- 
 selves, whose minds were then partially enlightened, 
 could not at first apprehend the mysteries of Divine 
 things spiritually. But under every different view 
 the application is so pertinent as to leave no doubt 
 that the same thing is indicated. 
 
 It must, however, be obvious that this principle — 
 though of divine origin, and capable of unfolding 
 divine counsel, according to the purity and sincerity 
 of obedience — is not given to man as an irresistible, 
 unvarying impulse, like the instinct of the lower ani- 
 mals, perfect, without any previous instruction, in its 
 operations : nor, on the other hand, is it given as a 
 dark and hidden law, only deducible by abstract rea- 
 soning, to a knowledge of which the learned only 
 might claim the privilege of attaining. It therefore 
 differs from instinct, in as much as it acts in a being 
 who has power to shut out its influence or to admit it. 
 
 The universality of this Divine Gift is very clearly 
 stated in different passages of Scripture, so as scarcely 
 to admit of the least doubt ; as in the following. 
 
 " This is the true light," says the Evangelist 
 John, " that lighteth even/ man that cometli into the 
 
Of its Seed. 455 
 
 world."* The apostle of the Gentiles declares also, 
 that iC A measure or manifestation of the Spirit is 
 given to every man to profit withal. "t And further, 
 " The Grace of God that bringeth salvation hath ap- 
 peared unto all men"% 
 
 The same dignified Apostle, speaking of men gene- 
 rally, says, " That which may be known of God is 
 manifest in them; for God hath shewed it unto 
 them."§ 
 
 This principle, as before remarked, is represented 
 under the similitude of a seed sown in the heart. 
 " The kingdom of God is within you" — said Christ 
 himself, — not to the Apostles, who, it might perhaps 
 be contended, were already under Divine influence, 
 and therefore made partakers of this seed, — but to 
 the Pharisees who rejected him and were filled with 
 malice against him : — " The kingdom of God cometh 
 not with observation. The kingdom of God is within 
 
 you."|| 
 
 It is plain that it could not be in them as a living 
 operative power, sanctifying the will and affections to 
 the nature of the heavenly kingdom ; but as an un- 
 quickened, unprofitable seed that took no root in their 
 stony hearts ; — as a light to which they would not 
 give heed, and which their darkness and prejudices 
 would not permit them to comprehend ; — a free gift 
 which they not only rejected inwardly but outwardly. 
 But if the kingdom of Heaven was, in this sense, in 
 
 * John, oh. I. +1 Cor. 12. 7. % Titus 2. 11. 
 
 S Rom. 1. 19. || Luke 17. 21. 
 
456 Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 the malignant Pharisees, it is to be inferred that the 
 seed of the kingdom of Heaven is sown generally in 
 man. — At another time, the Divine author of our reli- 
 gion said to his disciples, " The kingdom of Heaven 
 is like unto a grain of mustard seed."* And this 
 declaration is further illustrated by the parable of the 
 sower in which he says, u The seed is the word of 
 God ;"t — the Word of God, and the kingdom of God, 
 in this sense, being the same, when the principle or 
 foundation in the soul, from which divine life and 
 immortal felicity spring, is indicated. For this Word, 
 we are told, was sown in different sorts of ground, 
 as in the rocky, by the way side, among thorns, in 
 good ground ; comparable to the eager, the careless 
 and superficial, the lukewarm, the worldly minded, 
 the good and honest heart, bringing forth thirty, sixty, 
 or a hundred fold. 
 
 The same analogy, differing only as the seed and 
 plant differ from the root and branch, is maintained in 
 that saying of our Lord and Master in which he was 
 speaking of his relation to his disciples; " I am the 
 vine : ye are the branches. He that abideth in me, 
 and I in him^ bringeth forth much fruit : for without 
 me ye can do nothing. If a man abide not in me, he 
 is cast forth as a branch and is withered.''^ 
 
 Two of the immediate followers of Christ have also 
 alluded to this Divine seed in the heart. 
 
 Thus Peter speaks of " Being born not of cor- 
 
 * Matthew 13. 31. t Luke 8. 11. J John 15. 5. 
 
Of its Seed. 457 
 
 ruptible seed but of incorruptible :"* and John also, 
 " whoso is born of God does not commit sin ; for his 
 sm/abideth in him."+ 
 
 These passages seem all like rajs of light, con- 
 verging to a point, in support of the same doctrine ; 
 and require little if any comment. 
 
 We observe also, in reference to the Humility of its 
 appearance, that this heavenly witness is not given to 
 man as a matured Instinct, ripe with moral lessons, 
 and embracing, as it were, a code of divine truths or 
 propositions for mere speculative instruction ; bind- 
 ing, by a sort of irresistible impulse ; or imposing, by 
 their universal clearness ; or commanding assent, by 
 their own intrinsic authority. But it [is given simply 
 as a seed, containing within itself the principles on 
 which a life of immortal blessedness is founded, for 
 amendment of the heart, and involving truly the hopes 
 and interests of a heavenly kingdom; and it is left to 
 man himself to cultivate or neglect it. — It is therefore 
 small in its beginning; and He who knew how easily 
 it might be overlooked, was pleased emphatically and 
 figuratively to represent it as " the least of all seeds. 11 
 
 Under other similitudes we find the same allusion 
 to be conveyed ; as the dawning of the light of truth 
 upon the heart shining more and more to the perfect 
 day, J — the still small voiced speaking as never man 
 spake, — the babes in Christ,)] and little children of 
 whom the kingdom of Heaven was to consist. All 
 
 * Peter 1. 2. 3. t John I. 3.7. J 2 Peter 1. 19. 
 
 § 1 Kings 19. 12. || 1 Cor. 3. I. 
 
458 Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 Scripture testimony bears upon this low and meek 
 and docile state, as the first essential, in the school of 
 Christ, to the growth and cultivation of this seed. A 
 striking illustration is afforded in the remarks on 
 little children. " Suffer little children," said Christ, 
 " to come unto me, and forbid them not; for of such 
 is the kingdom of Heaven."* And " whosoever shall 
 not receive the kingdom of God, as a little child, shall 
 not enter therein. "t We are also to notice that it 
 was immediately after the Disciples had been dis- 
 puting which among them should be the greatest, 
 that he took a child and set him in the midst of them, 
 saying, " Except ye be converted, and become as 
 little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom 
 of Heaven. Whosoever therefore shall humble him- 
 self as this little child, the same is greatest in the 
 kingdom of Heaven. "J 
 
 Upon another occasion Jesus uttered this language, 
 " I thank thee, O father, Lord of Heaven and earth, 
 that thou hast hid these things from the wise and 
 prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes."§ 
 
 The Apostle Peter counsels the early converts " as 
 new born babes to desire the sincere milk of the word, 
 that they might grow thereby. "(| And Paul addresses 
 the Corinthians as a Christian society, among whom 
 there were many as yet inexperienced, and babes in 
 Christ, whom he had fed with milk and not with meat ; 
 for they were not yet able to bear it.% 
 
 * Mat. 19. 14. f Mark 10. 15. J Mat. 18. 3, 4. 
 
 § Mat. 11. 2 j. || 1 Peter 2. 1. 5 1 Cor. 3. 2. 
 
Of its Seed. 459 
 
 From all these testimonies, we may perceive, that 
 there was an advancement, from small beginnings, in 
 the Christian life — a growing in grace, from stature 
 to stature ; and that divine knowledge was unfolded, 
 by degrees, as the spiritual senses were opened to re- 
 ceive it. — For that otherwise it could make no vital 
 impression, — and, by no other powers, could it be 
 clearly apprehended. But in proportion as this seed 
 was cultivated, and this light, however small, was 
 obeyed, religious advancement proceeded; and a 
 reward was experienced, answerable to that announced 
 to the good and faithful servant, who had occupied 
 diligently with his lord's intrusted talents : W Well 
 done, — thou hast been faithful in a few things, I will 
 make thee ruler over more."* 
 
 The view now taken, and I think fairly deduced 
 from Scripture, is not new. 
 
 In the few lines before quoted from Milton, in 
 allusion to the law of Conscience, he says, " Light 
 after light, well used, they shall attain." 
 
 Law, in his reply to Dr. Trapp, after speaking of 
 the u Fulness of the spirit in Christ," adds, "But in 
 us only a spark or seed of the word is formed and raised 
 up into a new heavenly man." 
 
 The following illustration from a modern writer is 
 applicable to the purpose. " In the same manner, as 
 the Divine Being has scattered the seeds of plants and 
 vegetables in the body of the earth, so he has im- 
 planted a portion of his own incorruptible seed, or of 
 
 • Luke 19. 17. and 16. 10. 
 
460 Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 that which in Scripture language is called the " seed 
 of the kingdom" in the soul of every individual of the 
 human race. As the Sun by its genial influence 
 quickens the vegetable seed, so it is the office of the 
 Holy Spirit, in whom is life, and who resides in the 
 temple of man, to quicken that which is heavenly. 
 And in the same manner as the vegetable seed con- 
 ceives, and brings forth a plant or a tree, with root, 
 stem, and branches ; so if the soul in which the seed 
 of the kingdom is placed, be willing to receive the 
 influence of the Holy Spirit upon it, this seed is 
 quickened, and a spiritual offspring is produced. 
 Now this offspring is as real a birfh from the seed in 
 the soul by means of the Spirit, as the plant from its 
 own seed by means of the influence of the Sun."* 
 
 " It is a point fit and necessary" — says Lord Bacon, 
 on the Interpretation of Nature, — " in the front and 
 beginning of this work, without hesitation or reser- 
 vation to be professed, that it is no less true in this 
 human kingdom of knowledge, than in God's King^ 
 dom of Heaven, that no man shall enter it, except he 
 become Jirst as a little child." 
 
 * See Clarkson's Portraiture, vol. 2. chap. 7. sect. 4. 
 
Of its Cultivation. 461 
 
 StCT. III. 
 Of its Cultivation, 
 
 Proposition II. 
 Though by outward research or intellectual labour 
 the rational faculty may in some respects be accessory 
 to the growth and developement of this seed; yet it is 
 only an incidental help, and not the necessary mean or 
 instrument of its cultivation : For this consists imme- 
 diately in obedience to the light or knowledge received; 
 , in prostration of the soul before its Maker; in humble 
 aspirations to the Father of Mercies for help, direction, 
 and preservation; in charity to all men; in a life of 
 purity and self-denial, and in true hunger and thirst 
 after righteousness and further discoveries of the Divine 
 will. 
 
 It appears to be consistent with fact that a degree 
 of mental expansion and of outward cultivation is 
 necessary for the developement of this seed, by way 
 of preparation for its complete growth ; otherwise 
 we should see it attain to perfection in the infant and 
 the uncivilized state of man. But it is certain on the 
 other hand, that the rational intellect may be enlarged 
 to a great extent without any evidence of advance- 
 ment in the growth of this seed. The growth of the 
 body by outward food, in the wise economy of things, 
 is also a necessary preparation for the growth of the 
 
462 Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 understanding. Yet the body may grow, and the 
 mind remain an uncultivated wilderness. Hence we 
 may infer, in as much as distinct fruits are to be re- 
 cognised, that the phenomena of natural, intellectual, 
 and spiritual growth, proceed from distinct principles, 
 which ought not to be confounded. 
 
 Some, however, speak of man as if he were born to 
 be entirely governed by the laws of Sense and feeling, 
 in following the bent of his animal nature ; others, 
 as if Reason were the only distinguishing mark be- 
 tween him and the brute, and competent to guide him 
 to supreme happiness ; while others argue as if Sense 
 and Reason were both to be absorbed or annihilated 
 in the enlargement of the Spiritual faculties. But 
 extremes of opinion like these are not the growth of 
 temperate minds; neither are they favourable to 
 Truth. In the present state of things, we may legi- 
 timately exercise our animal and rational, as well as 
 our spiritual natures. For, although the offices are 
 distinct and ought not to interfere, yet no man can 
 pretend to emancipate himself entirely from the power 
 of the inferior faculties : this will continue till Death 
 dissolves the connexion. It is still, however, possible 
 that Sense and Reason may be so ordered, what, if I 
 say sanctified, as to perform their respective offices in 
 the true spiritual Christian, without condemnation, 
 nay with profit. But, on the other hand, no con- 
 secration of Sense and Reason, combined or separate, 
 can, or ought to, supersede the use and exercise of the 
 spiritual faculties. 
 
Of its CuUkation. 463 
 
 The Senses are improved by active use of the seve- 
 ral outward organs : Reason is improved by com- 
 bining the observations made by the Senses, by com- 
 paring the phenomena, by tracing effects from causes, 
 by deducing inferences, and establishing laws either 
 in reference to the natural world, or to the various 
 moral incidents in the chequered scene of human life. 
 But a third class of objects, requiring peculiar mental 
 exercises, remote from those of speculative Reason, as 
 well as from those of Sense, interests the spiritual 
 faculties; — a class of objects, — if we may speak of the 
 eternal Being and of the mysteries of his kingdom, as- 
 constituting a variety of objects — which are unseen, 
 and for which the mind can find no evidence but in 
 its own secret convictions ; consequently belonging 
 to another state of existence. And these are, no less 
 than, the soul's affinity and immortality; its sense 
 of good and evil, of moral responsibility, and of self- 
 approbation and condemnation ; its obedience to 
 manifested duty; its purity and innocence, and the 
 means by which they may be attained; its natural 
 weakness and utter inability in its own strength and 
 wisdom to attain to that state of perfection which 
 it is enabled partially to comprehend, consequently 
 its need of divine help; its continual obligations to 
 Piety, and final acceptance with its Maker. Accord- 
 ingly, the spiritual faculties are improved by devout 
 and humble attention to the duties or exercises 
 which immediately flow from a consideration of these 
 objects. 
 
464 Of the Divine Spirit, 
 
 Now we prove the proposition, by showing from 
 Scripture, that the exercises, by which this seed is 
 improved, are specifically different from the exercises 
 by which the reasoning or speculative faculty is im- 
 proved : and as the means of cultivation are different, 
 so also the fruits of the Spirit are different from those 
 of the natural understanding. 
 
 These exercises consist in obedience to the know- 
 ledge received, in cultivating a spirit of humility and 
 meekness, in charity and a life of holiness, in hunger 
 and thirst after righteousness, &c. And, it is to be 
 observed, these are not passive virtues. 
 
 As to obedience, the Prophet forcibly testifies : 
 " He hath shewed thee, O ?nan, what is good; and 
 what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly 
 and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy 
 God ?"* 
 
 As to the necessity of humility, it is declared by 
 " the high and lofty one that inhabiteth Eternity ; 1 
 dwell in the high and holy place, with him also that is 
 of a contrite and humble spirit. "t And again, " God 
 resisteth the proud, but he giveth grace to the hum- 
 ble"% " The Lord forgetteth not the cry of the 
 humble"^ and " the meek will he guide in judgment/' 
 " He that humbleth himself shall be exalted." 
 
 As to Charity, it is said, " knowledge puffeth up, 
 but charity edifieth."\\ " Love is the fulfilling of the 
 Law."H 
 
 * Micah 6. 8. t Isa. 57. 15. } James 4. 6. 
 
 § Ps.9. 12. || 1 Cor. 8. 1. 5 Rom. 13. 10. 
 
Of its Cultivation. 465 
 
 Id respect to Holiness, the Apostle counsels, to 
 " follow peace with all men, and holiness, without 
 which no man shall see the Lord."* 
 
 As, in the state of the body, hunger and thirst are 
 designed to give notice of our natural wants ; so 
 hunger and thirst must be felt spiritually, in order 
 that we may be sensible we have need, not only of 
 spiritual support against our many infirmities, but of 
 spiritual food to maintain the life of religion. He 
 that is conscious of strength does not ask for assist- 
 ance; he that is whole needs not a physician. But they 
 who are sensible of their wants are induced to put up 
 their secret prayers to the never-failing source of 
 help; and thus a constant vital intercourse is kept up 
 between the Father of all and his obedient children, 
 similar to that which is maintained between the root 
 of the vine and its branches, or between the life- 
 giving energy of the Deity and the outward creation. 
 And therefore a blessing is pronounced upon them 
 that hunger and thirst after righteousness, " for," it 
 is said, " they shall be filled." " For the kingdom of 
 God is not meat and dr'nk, but Righteousness and 
 Peace and Joy in the Hoi/ Ghost. "f 
 
 It is, therefore, reasonable to suppose that the 
 Apostle referred to the exercise of the spiritual and 
 not of the natural senses, when he told the Hebrews : 
 That when, for the time, they ought to have been 
 teachers, they had need, on the contrary, again to be 
 taught the first principles of the oracles of God ; and 
 
 * Heb. 12. 14. + Rom. 14. 17. 
 
 2G 
 
466 Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 were become such as had need of milk and not of 
 strong meat. " For, every one," says he, " that 
 useth milk is unskilful in the word of righteousness : 
 for he is a babe. But strong meat belongeth to them 
 that are of full age, even those who by reason of use, 
 have their Senses exercised to discern both good and 
 evil."* 
 
 " The fruit of the Spirit," we are told," is love, 
 joy, peace, long suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, 
 meekness, temperance." § 
 
 Now, it is almost self-evident that the exercises and 
 fruits, of which I have spoken, belonging as they do 
 to the heart and not to the head, are not the offspring 
 of the reasoning faculty ; and it follows that the cul- 
 tivation of this seed, from which all these exercises 
 spring, is scarcely more to be looked for from the 
 improvement of speculative reason, in as much as the 
 objects are perfectly distinct, than from the exercise 
 of the outward senses, or of fancy, or memory, or any 
 other of the inferior faculties. At the same time, it 
 must be allowed, that in dignity the rational ap- 
 proach nearest to the spiritual, and are better helps 
 in regulating the moral conduct, and promoting the 
 great ends of virtue. 
 
 Therefore, the acts and exercises, which of all others 
 most dignify a human being, whose highest duties to 
 a bountiful omniscient Creator, are love, dependence, 
 obedience, and adoration, though consistent with the 
 highest reason, are not in themselves, specifically, acts 
 
 4 lk-b. 5. 12.14. $ Gal. 5.22. 23. 
 
Of its Cultivation. 467 
 
 of reason : for example, submissive obedience, con- 
 trition, prostration of the soul, prayer, entire de- 
 pendence, and resignation. These belong, as I have 
 said, to the heart or will more than to the under- 
 standing. They do not depend upon the activity of 
 a discursive faculty. They are acts at which Reason 
 naturally revolts, because every one of them implies 
 its insufficiency. On the other hand, Reason may 
 confirm our internal sentiment, or may inform those 
 who are in darkness, that such acts are expedient and 
 necessary for our spiritual growth, just as it may 
 inform the healthy that their daily food is necessary 
 as well as those who are without a natural appetite ; 
 and that sleep and exercise contribute to the health 
 of the body. But when the natural appetite is pre- 
 served, in a sound state of the body, these things are 
 practised without reasoning. And, on the same 
 ground, we may presume, that the offering of that 
 heart must be cold, which is prompted by reason 
 more than by affection. As there is a natural appe- 
 tite, independent of Reason ; so is there a spiritual 
 hunger and thirst, which need not apply to Reason 
 for food, either as to time or quantity. 
 
 Submissive obedience is what we require from the 
 creatures below us, which we suppose to be destitute 
 of Reason, and from our children before they attain 
 to it. As an act of homage paid to the Supreme 
 Governor of the universe, it is that entire conformity 
 to the Divine will, which the whole creation is strictly 
 bound to observe, and which no living creature, ca- 
 2g2 
 
468 Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 pable of knowing that there is a God, that is not in 
 some degree estranged from Him in heart and affec- 
 tion, can resist. 
 
 Contrition or sorrow for transgression has no ne- 
 cessary connexion with a reasoning faculty. It does 
 not spring from Reason : it is more allied to Love and 
 Fear. 
 
 Prostration of the soul is the feeling of complete 
 unworthiness experienced by a finite creature ab- 
 sorbed in suppliant adoration, and overwhelmed with 
 the glories and perfections of a Being infinite in 
 power, wisdom, and goodness* It is the act of a 
 created intelligence, submitting all the strength of 
 the understanding, the affections of the heart, and the 
 treasures of acquired knowledge, to the great Giver 
 of all, with a secret acknowledgment of their utter 
 insignificance; and counting the highest human ex- 
 cellence, but as the flower of the field in the presence 
 of his glorious Majesty. 
 
 Prayer and supplication, analogous to the cries and 
 moving complaints of a tender infant soliciting ma- 
 ternal regard, and making known its wants, are the 
 spiritual sighs and aspirations of the soul offered up 
 in moments of weakness and affliction, when it is 
 enabled to approach the throne of Mercy with the 
 petition for a little strength and consolation from the 
 Universal Parent. 
 
 Now it is obvious, that, the more a rational faculty 
 is enlarged, and dependent upon its own resources, 
 shifts, and calculations, which are all outward, the 
 
Of its Cultivation. 469 
 
 less is it disposed by its own nature and constitution 
 io seek for invisible help. Its wants must be supplied 
 from the stores of its own sufficiency : and therefore 
 it disdains to make application for assistance to any 
 Power which it cannot command. This every day's 
 experience shows us to be the case with the great 
 masters of Human Reason. These, who would con- 
 troul moral events by the wisdom of their own coun- 
 sels and the strength of their own arm, would treat 
 even Roman piety as superstition, if, in this Chris- 
 tian age, it were proposed to them for imitation. 
 Yet, with all their arts and policy, how frequently 
 abortive are their schemes ! It is, indeed, true that 
 worldly successes are often produced by worldly 
 measures : " for the children of this world are wiser 
 in their generation than the children of light." 
 Wise, therefore, in their own eyes, and prudent in 
 their own sight, they laugh at the simple-hearted who 
 look up to heaven in their extremity. And, in the 
 short reckoning of these, he that trusts in Providence 
 is an enthusiast, because the ungodly are seen to flou- 
 rish — perhaps only for a short season, in a few 
 splendid undertakings, that entail no blessing ! 
 
 Therefore, Dependence upon Providence and resig- 
 nation to his will are from the same root of humility, 
 the immediate growth of Religion, not of Reason. 
 For the whole object of outward instruction, building 
 as it does upon human experience, is to make men 
 dependent upon their own sagacity in their intercourse 
 with the world. And the natural effect is a steadiness 
 
470 Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 of purpose, in pursuing the schemes of life, rational 
 they may be called, if judiciously planned, and per- 
 haps not unlawful, yet, on the whole, tending to 
 exalt the sufficiency of Reason. This is the natural 
 effect, and we contend for nothing more. Reason, sub- 
 jected to a higher principle, in all its movements, 
 affords no ground for animadversion : governing a 
 higher principle, it subverts the whole moral eco- 
 nomy of man, proposes the lesser interests as of more 
 importance than the greater, and, with seeming and 
 specious consistency, introduces a real anarchy. 
 
 Constant dependence upon Providence, and humble 
 reliance on divine help, accompanied with the diligent 
 exercise and sanctified use of the natural faculties, 
 bring the mind down from its lofty seat, as a self- 
 sufficient agent, into a total surrender of its own 
 might and power, and an acknowledgment of the 
 dominion being vested in one Supreme God over all. 
 
 Thus we see that all the Christian virtues which 
 really dignify the human mind in the sight of God, 
 are virtues of Humility, and tend to reduce it in its 
 own estimation, increasing in strength as the natural 
 powers of intellect are brought into obedience : 
 while those, which exalt it in the common estimation 
 of the world, are virtues of an opposite character. 
 
 We have thus pointed out the means by which the 
 mind is to grow in grace; in other words, by which 
 its spiritual faculties become enlarged, and the spi- 
 ritual senses are, as it were, quickened with a new 
 life - ? and we perceive that they differ essentially from 
 
Of its Cultivation. 471 
 
 the means by which the natural faculties are expanded. 
 For, it is not by intense application of these, and by 
 labour of intellect, as in the study of any science, nor 
 by adding traditionally proposition to proposition, 
 however excellent, in Divinity so called, that spiritual 
 growth, from stature to stature, is attained. But it 
 is by mental engagements of a totally different kind, 
 by no means confined to a state of abstract and indo- 
 lent meditation : as humility, patience, charity, inno- 
 cency of life, purity of conduct, piety, resignation, 
 prayer, and supplication. 
 
 These are the exercises — the wings of the soul on 
 which it rises to the source of divine wisdom, — the 
 state of spiritual hunger in which it is fitted to receive 
 the supply of heavenly manna and of daily bread,— - 
 the pure unclouded Eden of the heart, in which the 
 light of Truth finds a ready entrance, to illuminate 
 with Divine counsel, and to warm with the influence 
 of Divine Love. 
 
472 Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 Sect. IV. 
 This influence is not under human controuL 
 
 Proposition III. 
 The influence and operation of this Divine Spirit 
 are not always accessible and waiting upon the creature's 
 pleasure, but only accessible through patience, watch- 
 ing, and prayer. For this influence is frequently with' 
 drawn from the righteous themselves, to prove their faith, 
 allegiance, and necessary dependence upon God alone; 
 and it is withdrawn also from the disobedient even as an 
 accuser, after they have repeatedly slighted its reproofs 
 and rebelled against its laws. 
 
 It is generally agreed that the Gift of the Spirit is a 
 free gift — an act of grace — bestowed liberally upon 
 all that ask it in a right disposition of mind. It is 
 also universally diffused among men, though in many 
 nations and in many minds, we have lamentable 
 proof, that it is grievously oppressed. But, as the 
 original seed was freely sown in the hearts of all 
 men, so every accession to its power and influence, 
 however small, is rightly termed a free gift, or re- 
 newed visitation, — in Scripture, a renewing of the 
 Holy Spirit, — because it is dispensed in uncon- 
 strained bounty from God himself. Therefore, as it 
 \s a free gift, so its sensible influence, for many wise 
 
Not under human controuL 473 
 
 purposes, may be occasionally withdrawn. And, 
 accordingly, it appears to be consistent with the will 
 of Providence, that no mortal should enjoy its unin- 
 terrupted effusion, so as not to stand in need of re- 
 newed supplies : whether it be that the present life 
 is incompatible with such a moral paradise; or that 
 the human soul, while clothed with mortality, is un- 
 able to bear such a continued display of divine favour, 
 lest it should be exalted above measure. The petition 
 for daily bread, which, applied to spiritual support, 
 is the renewing of the Holy Spirit, is an exercise, 
 with which no living mortal, however dignified before 
 the Lord, can dispense. For, if it were otherwise, 
 he would be independent of heavenly food — and this 
 is not more possible than that he should be inde- 
 pendent of outward food ; — and he would be living as 
 it were out of the Divine Harmony, which requires 
 that God should be all in all — not only the Creator, 
 but the Preserver, and Nourisher of his true Seed. 
 
 " No man," it is said, " hath power over the 
 Spirit to retain the Spirit."* Though it is also de- 
 clared that " he that asketh, receiveth." Therefore, 
 the influence and operations of the spirit are not under 
 the controul of man, but entirejy subject to the will 
 of God. And until it can be proved that the natural 
 abilities can lawfully interfere in spiritual things, so 
 as to make true spiritual growth and increase, it must 
 remain an incontrovertible truth, that the Spirit of the 
 Lord in the soul of man can alone direct the path of 
 
 * Eccles. 8. 8. 
 
474 Of the Divine Spirit, 
 
 the just, and is his only sufficient guide and teacher 
 in the way of Holiness. 
 
 David himself, dignified as he was, petitions the 
 Almighty not to take his Holy Spirit from him, 
 " Create in me a clean heart, O God; and renew a 
 right spirit within me. Cast me not away from thy 
 presence ; and take not thy holy spirit from me. Re- 
 store unto me the joy of thy salvation ; and uphold 
 me with thy free spirit,"* 
 
 If it be demonstrated from Scripture, that the only 
 way in which the favour, notice, or counsel of the 
 Supreme Being, in other words, the evidence of 
 Divine Truth, can be obtained or communicated to 
 his creature, is by a special act of Grace, freely given, 
 or vouchsafed to the repeated petitions and applica- 
 tions of his children ; it is clear that the effusions of 
 his love and the influence of his spirit are not always 
 accessible to man, and to be ensured by the exercises 
 of the understanding in obedience to the activity of 
 the will. 
 
 By what mysterious operation this Divine gift is 
 communicated or withheld, we are ignorant; and 
 have nothing to do with the metaphysical question 
 whether it be a part* of the mind itself as one of its 
 attributes, or a casual unconnected visitant. It is 
 sufficient that we know the fact, that the good are not 
 always able to rejoice under its influence, and that the 
 wicked do not always feel the stings of conscience, 
 being hardened against its reproofs. 
 
 * Pb. 51. to. 12. 
 
Not under human controul. 475 
 
 The true adopted child of Grace, in other words, 
 of the Heavenly Father's love and bounty, stands 
 nearly in the same state of dependance, in which the 
 outward creation is placed with regard to the imme- 
 diate care of Divine Providence. No man, by his 
 natural powers, can command the sun to shine, or the 
 rain to fall, upon the earth. His reason indeed ena- 
 bles him to provide imperfectly in their absence, and 
 he may have many contrivances and substitutes : for 
 he may have artificial light and heat, as well as arti- 
 ficial cisterns, for temporary use. But these will all 
 be partial and inefficient : and, for the growth of his 
 seed, to complete the joy of harvest, he must wait 
 the Lord's time, both for the quickening ray, and for 
 the refreshing dew. 
 
 In like manner, no human being, with all the powers 
 of the most expanded intellect, can, by reasoning, pro- 
 cure the influence of a single ray of divine light upon 
 the soul. Man has provided himself, notwithstand- 
 ing, with many substitutes — with secondary and in- 
 ferior helps — in his own will and wisdom. But at- 
 tempts to reach heaven in this way are as futile now, 
 as was the tower of Babel formerly. 
 
 Now, if the righteous, or they, who, in simplicity and 
 sincerity, endeavour to perform their duties, cannot 
 always command this influence ; how is it possible 
 that those who build upon the success of their own 
 reasonings and inquiries for an advancement in true 
 Religion, can hope to secure the blessing ? Will these 
 argue that they can do without it ? 
 
476 Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 Admitting that there is such an influence; it must 
 come in its own way : speculative Reason cannot bring 
 it. If they deny such an influence, then Reason must 
 be their God or the power in which their confidence 
 is placed ; and no argument from Scripture can make 
 an impression. If they admit such an influence, yet 
 bring themselves to believe and act as though they 
 can do without it; then they set up an authority for 
 themselves, while God hath established an authority 
 for others ; and flatter themselves that their own is 
 what preserves the world from error, and that insisted 
 upon in Revelation, is what deceives the multitude, 
 and leads its simple-hearted votaries into nothing but 
 Enthusiasm. 
 
 If God is pleased, in order to try the faith and love 
 of his children, to withdraw his light even from them 
 for a season, and to leave them as in the darkness and 
 shadow of Death, can we conceive that he will impart 
 it to the proud, and to those who in the confidence of 
 their own sufficiency will admit nothing else but 
 human wisdom for their guide and counsellor ? But 
 it is to be observed, that although the memory, what 
 if I say the intellect, may be stored with traditional 
 truths from the fountain of revelation itself, which 
 some may plead as their sufficient help ; yet these 
 truths, excellent as they are, must imbue the mind 
 with their own spirit, and impregnate it with their 
 own virtue, before they can nourish the pure seed of 
 God in the soul, and produce the fruits of the Holy 
 Spirit in life and conduct. The history of mankind 
 
Not under human controul. 477 
 
 from the beginning of the world, as recorded in Scrip- 
 ture, is nothing but the history of the Lord's dealings 
 with them by his Spirit. These dealings therefore 
 existed before the era of Scripture ; and it cannot be 
 rationally supposed that, since the first date of these 
 Sacred Writings, no spiritual operations have taken 
 place but what are transmitted to us in them. 
 
 We prove from Scripture that the holy spirit is not 
 only occasionally withdrawn from the good, but that 
 it ceases to strive with the wicked. The righteous of 
 all ages, whether Patriarchs, Prophets, or Apostles, 
 could only exercise their spiritual gifts in prophecies 
 or in miracles, as they were immediately influenced 
 by its power. That which proved like their daily 
 bread, was the object of their daily petition : and their 
 holy inspiration did not prevent their faith from being 
 sometimes low. Of this David was an illustrious 
 example; and Paul himself, though endowed with 
 the gift of healing, did not exert this gift for his own 
 interest or convenience, when he saw meet to leave 
 his sick friend and companion behind him.* It was 
 through instant watching and prayer that divine in- 
 fluence was renewed, and divine ability received to 
 work the works of God. 
 
 The momentary lapse of faith in Moses, the guilt 
 and contrition of David, the humiliation of Isaiah, 
 the incredulity of Jonah, the bitter complaints of 
 Jeremiah, the deep baptisms of Ezekiel, the defection 
 of Peter, the unbelief of Thomas, and the many spi- 
 
 * 2 Tim. 4, 20. 
 
478 Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 ritual trials of Paul, prove to what a state of tem- 
 porary desertion, these holy men seemed at times to 
 be reduced. 
 
 On the other hand, the Almighty declared that his 
 Spirit should not always strive with man; and many 
 of the Lord's servants testified that the heart might 
 be hardened against the feeling of good, and the con- 
 science seared as with a hot iron. 
 
 It is hence fair to conclude that the measure of the 
 Divine spirit in the soul, is not like a faculty or instru- 
 ment of the mind, to be played with, whenever the 
 creature is pleased to use it. The memory may be 
 exercised, the fancy may be exercised, and the j udg- 
 ment may be exercised, at all times, with more or 
 less vigour, according to the natural humour and 
 tone of the animal spirits — except indeed in idiots 
 and the insane. But if any man can exercise his 
 spiritual faculties, so as to command a morsel of 
 daily bread to restore his hungry soul, or a drop of 
 heavenly rain to allay his thirst, or the feeblest 
 ray of divine light to illuminate his darkness, he 
 has attained to a height and excellence in spiritual 
 growth, which no servant of the Lord, however dig- 
 nified, that we read of, ever experienced. Who then 
 can say that these things are attainable by the use of 
 any faculties, which, in his own way and time, and at 
 his own will and pleasure, man has the power to 
 exercise ? And surely no one will say that, if there 
 be a God, and man an accountable being, these things 
 can be dispensed with. But these positions being 
 
Not under human controuL 479 
 
 taken for granted, the conclusion follows of course, 
 that Divine assistance is as necessary to man as his 
 Providence is to the outward creation : and, more- 
 over, this assistance never was, and — unless the moral 
 scheme be changed — never can be, afforded, but 
 through the medium of his Spirit. 
 
 Sect. V. 
 
 Of Wisdom, Divine and Human, Faith, Enthusiasm, 
 Revelation, 8?c. 
 
 Proposition IV. 
 As the rational faculties, or natural powers of the 
 understanding are always more or less at the command 
 and under the controul of man ; and the ratio of in- 
 crease in the seed of Divine grace, is not in proportion 
 to the speculative knowledge of Divine Truth, but in 
 proportion to heartfelt obedience and living operative 
 Faith ; it follows demonstratively that the discursive or 
 argumentative faculty is not the source, discoverer, and 
 framer, by any intellectual process, synthetic or ana- 
 lytic, of Divine Truth in the soul. 
 
 We are now prepared to consider the fourth Scrip- 
 ture Truth, which indeed is partly implied in the two 
 last propositions, and follows as a natural conclusion. 
 But for the sake of more clearness, at the expense of 
 some repetition, I shall comprise in this section a few 
 -observations, nearly relating to the subject, on Human 
 
480 Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 and Divine Wisdom, Faith, Enthusiasm, and Revela- 
 tion. I consider that each proposition, or truth, rest- 
 ing, as it does, on the general testimony of Scripture, 
 though expressed in other words, is complete in 
 itself; and, requires no form of syllogism, to make it 
 more clear. I do not therefore pretend to follow any 
 precise logical method in these remarks. 
 
 The latter part of the proposition at the head of 
 this section, more particularly claims our attention, 
 at the present time ; as it seems to include the sense 
 of the two preceding members of the sentence, which 
 have already been partially under notice. Indeed I 
 have found it difficult to separate the consideration of 
 one part of this subject from that of another. 
 
 It seems to me of the greatest importance to mark 
 the distinction between Human Wisdom and Divine, 
 in other words, between the unassisted power of 
 the discursive faculty, and the Divine effective^Word 
 of Life — the spiritual source of all-availing Truth 
 in the Soul, — to mark it, I say, in the strongest pos- 
 sible manner. 
 
 I know that it has been the wish of some enlightened 
 moral and religious writers to bring them as closely 
 together as possible, and, if not to identify them, at 
 least to make them always coincide. It has been 
 said, perhaps justly, that the instruments God has 
 given to enlighten the mind with natural and reli- 
 gious truth, can neither deceive, when properly exer- 
 cised, nor contradict each other in their evidence. 
 Hence it has been taken for granted that the cultivation 
 
Of Wisdom, Divine and Human. 481 
 
 of one necessarily leads to the cultivation of the 
 other, and that their real ends and objects must he 
 the same. Consequently, this plausible conclusion 
 satisfies the supporters of human reason ; and if they 
 are opposed by the exclusive advocates of Revelation, 
 they are more likely to push their own doctrines to 
 an extreme. For when the proposition is extended, 
 so far as to make the instrument, whose office it is to 
 acquire natural truth, competent also to investigate 
 and judge of that which is supernatural, we are bound 
 to hesitate before we admit the conclusion — a con- 
 clusion by no means following from the premises. 
 
 Of Wisdom, Divine and Human. 
 
 Before I proceed, I shall insert a few passages from 
 Scripture, to establish in principle, the truth an- 
 nounced in the proposition relative to the difference 
 between Divine and Human Wisdom ; and, for this 
 purpose, the 1st Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians 
 appears to contain as strong a testimony as could 
 well be adduced. 
 
 " It is written, I will destroy the wisdom of the 
 wise, and will bring to nothing the understanding of 
 the prudent. Where is the wise ? where is the 
 scribe ? where is the disputer of this world ? hath not 
 God made foolish the wisdom of this world ? For 
 after that in the wisdom of God, the world by wisdom 
 knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of 
 preaching to save them that believe.' ' 
 
 2 ii 
 
482 Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 " For ye see your calling, brethren, how that not 
 many wise men after the flesh, not many mighty, not 
 many noble, are called. But God hath chosen the 
 foolish things of the world to confound the wise ; and 
 God hath chosen the weak things of the world to 
 confound the things which are mighty." 
 
 Paul himself, dignified as he was with human 
 acquirements, testifies of himself, u And, I, brethren, 
 when I came to you, came not with excellency of 
 speech, or of wisdom, declaring unto you the testi- 
 mony of God. And I was with you in weakness, and 
 in fear, and in much trembling. And my speech and 
 my preaching was not with enticing words of man's 
 wisdom, but in demonstration of the Spirit and of 
 Power. That your faith should not stand in the 
 
 wisdom of men, but in the power of God." 
 
 " What man knoweth the things of a man, save the 
 spirit of man which is in him : even so the things of 
 God knoweth no man, but the spirit of God. Now 
 we have received, not the spirit of the world, but the 
 spirit which is of God, that we might know the things 
 that are freely given to us of God. Which things 
 also we speak, not in the words which man's wisdom 
 teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth ; com- 
 paring spiritual things with spiritual. But the na- 
 tural man receiveth not the things of the spirit of 
 God ; for they are foolishness unto him ; neither can 
 he know them, because they are spiritually dis- 
 cerned." " Let no man deceive himself. If any 
 
 man among you seemeth to be wise in this world, let 
 
Of Wisdom, Divine and Human. 483 
 
 him become a fool, that he may be wise. For the 
 wisdom of this world is foolishness with God. For it 
 is written, he taketh the wise in their own craftiness. 
 And again, the Lord knoweth the thoughts of the wise 
 that they are vain."* 
 
 He also declares, " Though I have the gift of pro- 
 phecy, and understand all mysteries, and all know- 
 ledge, — and have not charity, I am nothing." 
 
 The Apostle James likewise distinguishes between 
 human wisdom and divine, in these words : " Who is a 
 wise man and endued with knowledge among you ? 
 let him shew out of a good conversation his works 
 with meekness of wisdom. But if ye have bitter 
 envying and strife in your hearts, glory not, and lie 
 not against the truth. This wisdom descendeth not 
 from above, but is earthly, sensual, devilish. For 
 where envying and strife is, there is confusion, and 
 every evil work. But the wisdom that is from above 
 is first pure, then peaceable, gentle, and easy to be 
 intreated, full of mercy and good fruits, without par- 
 tiality, and without hypocrisy."t 
 
 I know of no better way in which an identity or 
 difference can be proved, in nature and source, be- 
 tween any two principles, than by showing that their 
 modes of operation, and common effects, are identical 
 or different. 
 
 Now, we perceive thatifany thing is to be gathered 
 from Scripture more clearly than another, it is the 
 
 * 1 Cor. Chap. 1.2.3. + Chap. 3. 13. 
 
 2h 2 
 
484 Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 distinction between Divine wisdom and Human,— 
 between the outward evidence of Sense and Reason 
 from things seen, and the inward evidence of Faith 
 from things unseen, — between natural and spiritual 
 discernment, — or the outward light of the understand- 
 ing and the inward light of the Holy Spirit. 
 
 But if these distinctions in Scripture be founded in 
 truth, it cannot be right for men to attempt to join 
 principles in close union, which are discordant in their 
 nature and elements : nay, it is clear, that confusion 
 will be the result. 
 
 If the Reason of man and the source of Divine 
 Revelation in his heart are only different degrees of 
 the same principle, as branches from the same root, 
 they should always be in harmony, and what is true 
 of one should be true of the other also. But we 
 know that they are often in direct opposition in the 
 mind ; — Reason pleading hard against the gentle in- 
 timations of Truth, and these against the suggestions 
 of Reason ; — interest, expediency, and sometimes 
 necessity, being strongly urged against internal con- 
 victions; and, on the other hand, internal convictions, 
 with ignominy, disgrace, death itself in prospect, re- 
 sisting the endearments of social life, the allurements 
 of public honour, the persuasions of friends and 
 kindred, and all the sophistry of a wily, subtle, and 
 seducing reason. 
 
 • We know again, that if Faith and Reason were de*- 
 pendent on the same kind of evidence, they would 
 always act in union and lead to the same point. But 
 
Of Wisdom, Divine and Human. 485 
 
 the common sense of mankind agrees to place them in 
 contrast, and the language of Scripture confirms the 
 distinction. The evidence on which each builds its 
 conclusions is widely different. Faith leans on the 
 evidence of things not seen, far beyond human calcu- 
 lation, and has always respect to its Author: Reason, 
 upon the evidence of things which are seen, within 
 the range of natural causes and effects, and may de- 
 termine to act without any reference to God. The 
 one has a meek reliance upon invisible help; the 
 other has a stronger reliance on its own outward pre- 
 cautions. 
 
 If we come to Human Wisdom and Divine, we find 
 them, so far from agreeing as such, opposed to each 
 other both in principles and practice; — in origin as 
 well as in fruits. 
 
 For we either admit that there is a wisdom which 
 comes immediately from God, or we do not : If it be 
 not admitted, there is an end of all argument, so far 
 as the rule and authority of Scripture, as a basis of 
 reasoning, is concerned. If we admit it, we must 
 believe, that this wisdom is of a very different nature 
 from that which is earthly or natural, the product of 
 Human Reason. And the distinction is proved by 
 their fruits. 
 
 The one is short-sighted, vain, contentious, and 
 presumptuous. It puffs up the mind, and produces a 
 loftiness of deportment, which overlooks the unas* 
 suming characteristics of a better wisdom : The fruits 
 
486 Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 of Divine wisdom are meekness, gentleness, humility, 
 peace, mercy, charity, and brotherly kindness. 
 
 Between such opposite fruits there can be no pos- 
 sible agreement. And we are told distinctly, the one 
 is of earth and the other from above. Consequently, 
 the increase of one is the decrease of the other. Now 
 if it be argued, that such opposite kinds of wisdom are 
 identified in their source, and differ only in degree; 
 is it not easy to perceive that every manifestation of 
 Divine truth will be in danger of being rejected, 
 which does not come in the form of a regular propo- 
 sition, or strike the mind with that clearness of out- 
 ward evidence, which, we are told, every one is bound 
 to receive, before he gives his assent ? 
 
 For if the outward evidence seem weak, and the 
 appearance mean, as did that of Christ to the Jews, 
 the lordly powers of reason may be expected to dis- 
 miss the humble visitant with something like this 
 declaration, " we will not have this man to rule over 
 us." And, it is clear, if divine light should ever 
 insinuate itself into the soul of man, by gentle ap- 
 proaches, without any ostentatious display, it must 
 inevitably be withstood by these arrogant centinels, 
 who thus constitute themselves watchmen duly autho- 
 rised to challenge every unexpected intrusion, and to 
 admit none but a special ambassador, bearing his 
 credentials in high state. Some have taught us to 
 believe that the situation of mind best fitted to re- 
 ceive this heavenly visitation and to profit by it, is 
 
Of Wisdom, Divine and Human. 487 
 
 that of humble adoration, and meek dependence on 
 the mercy of providence, in which the wisdom of 
 man is laid prostrate in the presence of divine power; 
 so that the mind is made willing to receive, as a free 
 boon of grace, the smallest testimonial of the Almighty 
 ruler's compassionate regard : — But, between this 
 opinion and that previously stated, the difference is 
 wide indeed. 
 
 From all that has been said, therefore, I think it 
 must be evident, that the mind, when livingly and 
 effectively employed in seeking Divine Truth, and 
 appropriating it to true spiritual union, is placed in a 
 situation very different from that in which it is thought 
 to be best qualified to collect, arrange, and establish, 
 the principles of speculative knowledge of any hind. 
 Its powers are differently engaged, and the immediate 
 effect of this knowledge is to fill the head, instead of 
 adding true spiritual substance, which can alone pro- 
 duce the fruit of righteousness in the meekness of 
 wisdom. 
 
 In the one case there appears to be more of intel- 
 lectual passiveness than activity : In the other more 
 of creaturely activity. Yet the mind itself is not 
 wholly passive ; for the spiritual senses are awakened 
 and exercised in warm and living aspirations to the 
 source of wisdom. It is only those active principles 
 which would oppose the admission of this heavenly 
 messenger into the mind that must be silenced. And 
 human wisdom was never yet freely disposed to open 
 
488 Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 the gate in submissive meekness to that wisdom which 
 is from above. It is naturally too curious and in- 
 quisitive, and suspicious, and withal too self-impor- 
 tant for such an office. For it is not the nature of 
 this divine wisdom to make its entrance with display 
 and pomp and great assumption of authority. It 
 comes in humility, and in humility must be received, 
 or it quickly departs. 
 
 What man may attain by his own power, he claims 
 as his own right ; and is too apt to look upon the 
 faculties by which he makes discoveries and ascertains 
 physical and moral laws, in their exercise at least, as 
 if they were independent of his Maker. But if the 
 grace and spirit of God be a free gift, — an uncon- 
 strained illumination which is vouchsafed according 
 to certain dispositions in the moral agent,— a fact we 
 must believe, if we believe the Scripture, then it is 
 impossible for man to attain it by his own power and 
 to claim it as his own right. For the sum of all his 
 learning, even if it were to consist of unmixed specu- 
 lative truth in Divine mysteries, could amount to no 
 more than this; that he had a knowledge of his duties, 
 of the object of his Being, of his Maker's attributes, 
 and of some of the revealed glories of the heavenly 
 kingdom, of his natural infirmities, and of the Divine 
 assistance on certain conditions being freely offered 
 him. After the attainment of all this knowledge, it 
 would still be incumbent upon him to put so much of 
 it as concerned him in practice, to the very letter, in 
 
Of Wisdom^ Divine and Human. 489 
 
 fiis own individual experience, and to exhibit, in " the 
 meekness of Wisdom," the fruits of peace and righ- 
 teousness. 
 
 It is therefore a high attainment of Reason to know 
 that it is not by arguments, however clear and just, 
 and unanswerably deduced, that man can succeed in 
 reaching Heaven. Though reason may teach him to 
 know the way, he must tread the path by another 
 guide. A man may study the principles of navi- 
 gation in his closet, he may know the latitude of 
 different places, and the courses he ought to steer ; 
 and after much traverse sailing, be prepared to find 
 his exact situation. But when launched on the ocean, 
 if he does not keep an ever-watchful and steady eye 
 upon his compass — an instrument which he may not 
 have occasion to see when learning the science — 
 mysterious and inexplicable in its movements, yet 
 with some trifling exceptions, an unerring guide, he 
 will run a thousand risks of utter destruction. And 
 thus it is when launched on the ocean of life ; though 
 the mind may have been prepared with a knowledge 
 of the right course and of its many difficulties, no- 
 thing but vigilant attention to an interior Guide can 
 preserve it from ruin. So that, as the pointings of 
 this Guide do not wholly supersede the outward 
 knowledge; on the other hand, the acquirements of 
 outward knowledge do not supersede this invisible 
 direction. For as the animal powers, however per- 
 fect, do not in man supersede the use of the intellec- 
 tual faculty, so this faculty, however perfect, does not 
 
490 Of the Divine Spirit 
 
 supersede the exercise of the animal powers. The 
 head cannot say to the foot, I have no need of thee ; 
 nor Reason to Sense, I have no need of thee ; nor 
 the Spiritual Faculty to Reason, I have no need of 
 thee. 
 
 But Reason, in its vanity of research, and capacity 
 of comprehension, is ever seeking to know more of 
 divine mysteries than God has seen meet to reveal. 
 As a power purely speculative, it is always soaring 
 above the meek testimony with which Divine Truth 
 gently solicits the humble mind. Hence, by its very 
 constitution, it is disposed to rival, as it were, and set 
 itself against, Omniscience. 
 
 If Reason, or the unassisted powers of human re- 
 search, had been sufficient for the highest duties of 
 pur moral nature; no revelation, whether ordinary or 
 extraordinary, natural or supernatural, had been ne- 
 cessary. 
 
 But an extraordinary revelation having unquestion- 
 ably been made, to say nothing of ordinary, it follows 
 that Reason is not to be considered, and was not, 
 sufficient. 
 
 Therefore, as it is not sufficient, and yet may have 
 its uses, it would be very desirable to know the pre- 
 cise limits within which its lawful interference is cir- 
 cumscribed, according to that saying of Bacon, 
 " Here, therefore, I note this deficience, that there 
 hath not been to my understanding sufficiently in- 
 quired and handed, the true limits and use of reason 
 in spiritual things." At the same time it is not likely 
 
Of Wisdom j Divine and Human. 491 
 
 that they can be clearly defined ; when we consider 
 what delicate distinctions the natural use, lawful use, 
 and necessary use, of any faculty which God has given 
 to man, necessarily involve. And when we come to 
 that, which, ever restless in its inquiries, presumes 
 even to search into the secret counsels of the Al- 
 mighty, and compare it with the meek Intelligencer of 
 the Heart ; it is no wonder that we should find many 
 persons unwilling to abate of its pretensions, and 
 ready to undervalue the intimations of an instructor 
 so very opposite. It is no wonder that the relation 
 of knowledge to practical piety, though in themselves 
 entirely distinct, should be thought to approximate 
 so close as to establish an indissoluble affinity ; and 
 that the attainment of one should be thought an in- 
 dispensable help to the exercise of the other. But, 
 though they are distinct, the attempt to establish an 
 exclusive exercise either way, in the present state of 
 man — as wholly on the side of Reason, or wholly on 
 the side of Revelation — is only another instance of 
 that disposition to extremes to which we are so gene- 
 rally prone, — a disposition which is not satisfied with 
 adopting a simple truth, but supposes the adoption of 
 it must infer the rejection of another truth ; because 
 there have been superficial reasoners, who have con- 
 tended with each other, in a spirit of opposition, as 
 the avowed advocates of each opinion exclusively. 
 
 The human mind without knowledge, is in the 
 state of the brute animal : and again, Piety without 
 knowledge is a state almost inconceivable; for he 
 
492 Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 that corneth to God must know that he exists. To be 
 operated upon by the power of the Deity without 
 knowing it, and to be unconscious of design, harmony, 
 and order, is the state of blind impulse or instinct, 
 analogous to that of the stone, vegetable, and wonder- 
 working insect. 
 
 It is, however, certain, that Reason, which is pro* 
 perly the instrument of human knowledge, cannot be 
 more nobly or usefully employed, than in directing 
 the view of the mind to that which was sent as a better 
 guide to aid its natural imbecility. 
 
 When the Divine Author of the Christian Religion 
 promulgated his doctrines to the world, he referred 
 his disciples to the power and operation of his own 
 Spirit in their hearts, and the multitude he taught in 
 parables. He taught them by analogical reasoning : 
 because, it seemed that no pure and spiritual truths, 
 free from earthly admixture, could be comprehended 
 by any other mode of explanation, or find so easy an 
 entrance through their benighted reason, to the spark 
 of divinity, almost smothered as it was in the heap of 
 traditions, customs, national prejudices, and cere- 
 monies. He told them " the kingdom of Heaven was 
 * within them," but he told them by similes, which, 
 unless they had been rational beings, competent to 
 perceive the relations of things, they could not have 
 understood. 
 
 Though conveyed with heavenly wisdom, and 
 divinely illustrated, and confirmed by mighty wonders, 
 how hardly did the light of his truth pierce the veil 
 
Of Wisdom, Divine and Human. 493 
 
 even in the hearts of his followers; and how im- 
 penetrable were the obstacles by which his wisdom 
 and authority, and miracles, were withstood, in the 
 minds of the great, and noble, and wise of this world ! 
 Their reasonings were interposed like a dark cloud 
 between them and the Sun of Righteousness ; and a 
 thousand vague objections were urged as arguments 
 against his divine mission. Hence, because they 
 would neither see, nor hear, nor understand, with 
 their spiritual senses, though they saw, and heard, 
 and reasoned, with their natural faculties, he rejected 
 them ; and chose the simple to confound the wise, 
 and the weak to confound the mighty. For he 
 counted the wisdom of the world as foolishness ; for 
 as much as the world by its wisdom could not know 
 God. Wise as they were, these master-builders were 
 rejected ; they did not even know the chief stone of the 
 corner. And we have many master-builders in the 
 present day, to whom this corner stone, elect and 
 precious, is " a stone of stumbling and rock of offence," 
 as it appeared formerly to the great Sanhedrim of 
 the Jews-— as much, perhaps, because its humble mani- 
 festation offends their reason, as because the discip- 
 line of the Cross, which it enjoins, is a stumbling 
 block in their way. 
 
 Here, then, we have two examples ; one in which 
 Reason was employed, and another in which it was 
 rejected. As the outward Senses were employed as 
 inlets to the understanding, Reason was employed 
 only as an assistant in opening the spiritual eye to 
 
494 Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 perceive the excellence of the precepts, the value of 
 the doctrines, the force and beauty of Divine truth ; 
 as far as they could be seen through the medium of 
 outward things. As John pointed to the Messiah, Rea- 
 son pointed to the Truth, the pure witness in every 
 then partially awakened soul. It instructed the dis- 
 ciples, as they had never before been instructed, in the 
 knowledge of a gift, which, through the matchless 
 favour of God, they themselves, and every living- 
 mortal, possessed, in their own bosoms, — in the 
 knowledge of a seed implanted by the Creator, the 
 foundation on which they were to build their Faith. 
 It led them to the light, but it was unable to do more : 
 it could not impart to them a ray, much less fill them 
 with its glory : and it left them to its guidance, — to 
 self-denial, obedience, faith, resignation, thanksgiving, 
 prayer, and adoration. It was employed as a meek 
 and humble minister, when passion was still, and 
 vain-glory was laid asleep, and every talent was de- 
 voted to the Great Master's service. 
 
 Let us, on the other hand, consider under what 
 circumstances, the reason, or prudence, or wisdom of 
 man, unenlightened by a Divine Teacher, was re- 
 jected. 
 
 It was rejected, when it presumed on learning and 
 tradition to know the way of Salvation better than 
 Truth itself; to prescribe to its Author the terms, and 
 mode, and circumstance of his coming, on which alone 
 it would be pleased to admit the heavenly messenger. 
 It was rejected when it did not approach for Divine 
 
Faith. . 49 j 
 
 instruction in the docile state of a little child, or in 
 the prostrate attitude of a supplicant; when it puffed 
 up the soul with pride instead of bowing it with con- 
 trition. It was rejected when it put itself forth as the 
 only instrument of knowing divine things, and only 
 medium of attaining to heavenly virtue ; and closed 
 up the narrow way to that Seed of life and power in 
 every heart, which could only be quickened by the 
 supernatural influence of the Sun of Righteousness 
 himself. 
 
 Faith* 
 
 If we contrast the description of Faith as given by 
 the Apostle with that of Locke, we may well conclude 
 that they are distinct in principle, in operation, and 
 in effect. 
 
 And if we also compare the Truth and Light of 
 the Gospel, with the Truth and JLight of Locke, we 
 shall perceive a like discrepancy. 
 
 "What is Truth," says Locke, "was an enquiry 
 many ages since : Truth seems to me to signify 
 nothing but the joining or separating of signs, as the 
 things signified by them do agree or disagree one 
 with another." — " And this is what, by another name, 
 we call a Proposition.'' 1 
 
 " Light, true light in the mind, is or can be nothing 
 else but the evidence of the Truth of any propo- 
 sition." 
 
496 Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 " Faith is nothing but a firm assent of the mind." 
 H It is the assent to any Proposition, not made out by 
 the deduction of Reason, but upon the credit of the 
 proposer, as coming from God, in some extraordinary 
 way of communication." 
 
 So that, according to Locke, Truth is a Propo- 
 sition : Light, the evidence of the Truth of a Pro- 
 position : and Faith, the Assent to a Proposition, on 
 the credit of another. 
 
 But, according to Scripture, Light, true light in 
 the mind, is the illumination of the Divine Spirit : 
 Truth is the Revelation or spiritual object seen and 
 understood by this light, and by no other: and Faith 
 is that Sense or holy assurance given it by God, and 
 increasing from one degree to another, by which the 
 mind is enabled to feel and know, not from outward 
 evidence, that the Light and Truth it contemplates 
 are real, and that they are sent from God. 
 
 Now, as far as Locke's definitions are concerned, 
 Light, Truth, and Faith, are objects of natural Rea- 
 son : But as far as Scripture is concerned, they are 
 objects of a Spiritual principle. And it may be said 
 of them, as was said by an eminent writer, of Faith, 
 Love, and Humility, that " however these names be 
 common and vulgar, and make no extraordinary 
 sound, yet do they carry such a mighty sense, that 
 the tongue of man or angel can pronounce nothing 
 more weighty or excellent. Faith having the same 
 place in the Divine life, which Sense hath in the 
 natural, and being indeed nothing else but a kind of 
 
Faith. 197 
 
 Sense, or feeling persuasion of spiritual things : it 
 extends itself unto all divine truths."* 
 
 Hence, we may perceive, that there is a living 
 Faith, and a dead Faith ; the one a shadow, the other 
 a substance : as there is a Religion of the Head and 
 a Religion of the Heart ; the one theoretical, the 
 other practical. Knowledge is the object of one, 
 Feeling of the other: and these two are far from 
 being inseparable. Vital or practical Religion may- 
 exist in the bosom of the simple : and the heart of the 
 learned may be an utter stranger to its emotions, not- 
 withstanding the head is filled with creeds and 
 dogmas. Notional religion, unaccompanied with 
 inward virtue, like the religion of the Pharisee, turns 
 away the mind from .that state of contrition, in which 
 heartfelt religion can only be experienced. 
 
 It is with practical Religion as with practical Che- 
 mistry, but in a much stronger sense. He that will 
 not take the crucible in his own hand, and attend the 
 furnace himself, and patiently wait the different stages 
 of refinement, can know little of the matter as he 
 ought to know it. But seeing this process is to be 
 figuratively accomplished in his own heart, when, 
 instead of labouring at the furnace, he contents him- 
 self with some general notions of the principles of 
 the science, he can never purge away " the dross and 
 tin and reprobate silver." 
 
 We see therefore the danger which every one 
 incurs, who relies upon reasoning more than upon 
 
 * Scougal's Life of God in the Soul, page 18. 
 
 2i 
 
498 Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 feeling ; upon faith in propositions or outward assent, 
 more than upon heartfelt obedience ; and who makes 
 religious and moral duty a study of the head, instead 
 of a warm vital impulse of the heart. 
 
 However the exclusive cultivation of Reason may 
 clear the head from visionary delusions and from a 
 heated enthusiasm ; it will chill the ground of the 
 heart, and take away all its genial virtue. This close 
 vigilance of Reason in defending the mind from one 
 error tends to the opposite extreme. It represses the 
 growth of the good seed while it represses the tares : 
 and an outward acknowledgment of religious duties, 
 merely because others acknowledge them, and because 
 they are deemed expedient, will be the only return to 
 the bountiful Giver; instead of fervent gratitude, 
 and that faithful cooperation with the heavenly Seed, 
 which, according to the ability afforded, will gain the 
 thirty, sixty, or hundred fold increase, to the praise 
 and glory of the great Husbandman. 
 
 " Faith," says the Author of the Epistle to the 
 Hebrews, is the " substance of things hoped for : the 
 evidence of things not seen." 
 
 Now, as the assent to a proposition may be an out- 
 ward formal assent, it cannot in this sense coincide or 
 agree with the Apostle's definition of Faith as a sub- 
 stance. For the bare acknowledgment of a Truth, 
 and the spiritual appropriation of a Truth, by which 
 it is made/ as it were, one with the recipient, are 
 things perfectly different. And it is the spiritual 
 appropriation only, when applied to spiritual truth, 
 
Faith. 
 
 that can be called a substance. But this is a work 
 of the spiritual faculties, not of the natural. It is 
 the divine assimilation of the daily bread that comes 
 down from heaven in the soul, bringing it more and 
 more into the divine image; and " producing an assured 
 confidence in the reality and worth of eternal invi- 
 sible things, and that God will infallibly perform what 
 he has promised, whereby the believer is as confident 
 of them as if they were before his eyes and in his 
 actual possession."* Now, as the first or formal 
 assent is the work of the understanding, it cannot 
 apply to the Apostle's definition of Faith. It is as 
 different from vital operative Faith, as the shadow is 
 from the substance. 
 
 Again, " Faith is said to be the evidence of things 
 not seen" — that is, the evidence for which nothing 
 visible can be a sufficient voucher : because the things 
 are spiritually discerned which are the objects of true 
 Faith. But the Faith of Locke, according to his own 
 declaration, that " Reason must be our last Judge and 
 Guide in every thing," even of Revelation itself, re- 
 quires the attestation of that Faculty whose whole 
 business it is to judge hy things seen : that is, by mi- 
 racles or other outward proofs, before it will yield its 
 assent. Consequently, this is not the Faith that is 
 defined by the Apostle. True Faith is that " which 
 worketh by Love."+ 
 
 Almost every allusion that is made in Scripture to 
 Faith, justifies its spiritual meaning; and, in a 
 
 • See Cruden, verbo Faith. + Gal, 5. 6. 
 
 2 i 2 
 
500 Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 natural sense, would be unintelligible ; as the follow- 
 ing : " That your faith should not stand in the wis- 
 dom of men, but in the power of God."* 
 
 " Whatsoever is born of God overcometh the 
 world : And this is the victory that overcometh the 
 world, even our Faith."i 
 
 By the gospel of Christ is the righteousness of 
 God revealed from faith to faith, as it is written, the 
 just shall live by faith. % 
 
 Religion, therefore, being a practical and not a 
 theoretical concern, it is not the knowledge of Truth, 
 nor yet the formal Assent to it, though it be divine, 
 but the practical and substantial appropriation of 
 Truth, that will be availing. For knowledge alone, 
 if it does not regulate the affections and mend the 
 heart, is but an unprofitable possession. We have 
 high authority for concluding, that although a man 
 should have all knowledge, and understand all mys- 
 teries, and even have supernatural gifts, as that of 
 prophecy and of faith to remove mountains ; nay, and 
 have eloquence to speak as with the tongue of an 
 Angel ; yet if he have not the gentle flame of Charity 
 in his breast, his other acquirements will profit him 
 nothing. 
 
 Now Charity, in its comprehensive meaning, is not 
 an endowment of the understanding ; it is a virtue 
 of the heart, springing from the living seed of God. 
 And it is but one amongst the graces or virtues which 
 are brought into light as fruits, from the same seed: 
 
 * 1 Cor. 2. 5. t 1 John 5. 4. % Rom. 1. 17. 
 
' Enthusiasm, 501 
 
 and, as it is rooted and grounded in the soil of humi- 
 lity, so the fruits are kept alive in it as their con- 
 genial element, and wither away before pride, pre- 
 sumption, and the blighting contagion of what is 
 emphatically termed in Scripture Man's Wisdom. 
 
 Enthusiasm. 
 
 The manifestations of Truth, in all awakened by its 
 Divine influence, are accompanied with such humility 
 and conscious integrity of heart; and are attended 
 with such entire subjugation of the light and vain 
 propensities of human nature, as pride, enthusiasm, 
 and self-love, and with such undoubted evidence of 
 their reality, that they are known to be genuine by 
 the same Divine influence which has impressed them 
 upon the mind. It matters not whether such as have 
 been inattentive, and have not often experienced 
 these manifestations, doubt the evidence, and call the 
 notion mystical, and require other proof: On the 
 contrary, such as are really favoured with them, — if 
 they have only recently felt the impressions, like 
 those who have been blind newly restored to sight, or 
 those who have been deaf whose ears are suddenly 
 unstopped — are awakened as it were to a new sense, 
 to which the others by their own fault are strangers; 
 and therefore, these will not be reasoned out of this 
 spiritual sense any more than they will suffer them- 
 selves to be reasoned out of the evidence of any of 
 
502 Of the Divine Spirit 
 
 their natural senses. For, as truly as the sheep know 
 the shepherd's voice, they recognize the voice of the 
 gentle monitor speaking in their hearts. 
 
 I am well aware it has been argued, that, unless 
 Human Reason be interposed, as the last Judge and 
 Guide to determine the question, the voice of Truth 
 cannot be distinguished from the voice of Error ; be- 
 cause Satan, it is said, is able to transform himself into 
 an Angel of Light. But I cannot even then admit 
 the argument to be sound or the inference to be just. 
 
 The Prince of Darkness, in all his transformations, 
 can never appear any other than the Prince of Dark- 
 ness ; when he is seen in the Light of Truth. And 
 there is no other Light which can discover his specious 
 appearances and detect his wiles. When he comes in 
 the character of a Deceiver, he meets Reason on its 
 own ground; and if he be only opposed by Reason, 
 he will generally succeed. 
 
 It cannot for a moment be imagined that the subtle 
 insinuations of the Arch Enemy and the gentle mo- 
 nitions of Truth, sound the same in the spiritual ear. 
 By the outward understanding, it is allowed, that they 
 cannot be distinguished but by outward evidence. 
 This, however, is not the question. The question is 
 whether the true sheep are to know their master's 
 voice by the spiritual ear or by the outward faculties. 
 
 " I am the good Shepherd," said Christ, "and 
 know my sheep, and am known of mine." — The true 
 shepherd " calleth his own sheep by name : and the 
 sheep follow him; for they know his voice. And a 
 
Enthusiasm. 503 
 
 stranger will they not follow, for they know not the 
 voice of strangers."* 
 
 I take it for granted that this declaration applies to 
 the spiritual intercourse which Christ, the true Shep- 
 herd and Bishop of Souls, promised to maintain with 
 his flock and family throughout all ages of his church : 
 and therefore I do not adduce any other passages of 
 Scripture to support this opinion ; because it appears 
 sufficiently obvious. 
 
 Now, as the Lord hath ever spoken by his Spirit, 
 his voice can only be heard by the Spirit. But is 
 Reason, or any outward faculty, to judge, whether 
 the spiritual ear is shut or opened? If the spiritual 
 ear be opened, and the voice of an enemy be heard ; 
 then, if it cannot be distinguished from the voice of the 
 true Shepherd, the sheep do not know the Master's 
 voice. But this is contrary to Scripture — even to the 
 express declaration of Christ — and therefore the con- 
 clusion is false. 
 
 If the spiritual ear is shut, the sheep are not obe- 
 dient to the Shepherd's call, and are incapable of 
 hearing his voice ; and while it is so closed, if a 
 stranger should accost them, such may reason as much 
 as they will about the external proofs of Inspiration, 
 whether they be few or many, and weak or strong, 
 they are still liable to be deceived, let them employ 
 never so many tests. On the one hand Vanity may 
 insinuate that they are inspired, though by an 
 
 * John 10. 4. 5. 
 
504 OJ tfi€ Divine Spirit. 
 
 enemy; on the other, Scepticism may decide that the 
 Master's voice itself is nothing but enthusiasm. — • 
 Hence, in order that it may be known whether the 
 mind be influenced by the spirit, or only actuated by the 
 natural impulses of the creature, it is required es- 
 pecially that he be living conformably to those insti- 
 tutions, which become a chosen vessel fit for the Mas- 
 ter's service : — In other words, in order that the sheep 
 may, without hesitation, know the Shepherd's voice, 
 it is necessary that they be true sheep of his fold — not 
 nominal disciples — not interested followers — not slug- 
 gish in their obedience and cold in their attachment; 
 but simple, humble, gentle, watchful, and obedient. 
 What could the devices and arts of an enemy avail 
 against such qualities and defences as these? It is 
 not with such humble virtues as meekness, gentleness, 
 obedience, and watchfulness unto prayer, that the 
 Adversary contends. It is with the loftiest powers of 
 man as man, in those whom he cannot foil by sensu- 
 ality — with Reason itself, and its presumption, in 
 all its forms, that he engages : it is before these 
 that he lays his baits, and spreads his wiles, that he 
 may insnare. It is by the medium of his own instru- 
 ments and machinations — by worldly arts and worldly 
 counsels, — that he carries on an insidious warfare 
 against the Spirit and its fruits : for he does not 
 attack it openly. It is, while the duty of watchful- 
 ness is neglected, that he seduces, what can only be 
 seduced, Reason itself. For the Spirit of the Lord — 
 the faithful witness — the unerring Guide, cannot be 
 
Enthusiasm. 505 
 
 seduced from its allegiance. When it is suffered to 
 be in its own watch tower, clothed with its own ar- 
 mour — " the whole armour of God" — then the heart 
 is safe from any assault. " For the weapons of our 
 warfare are not carnal, but mighty through God to 
 the pulling down of strong holds; casting down ima- 
 ginations, and every high thing that exalteth itself 
 against the knowledge of God, and bringing into cap- 
 tivity every thought to the obedience of Christ." 
 
 But when an outward guide and protector, like 
 Reason, is presumed to be sufficient, and trusted in to 
 keep the watch, and to distinguish between spiritual 
 light and darkness, it is ever liable to be deceived. 
 The spiritual faculties never yet sought for outward 
 attestations concerning the objects presented to them. 
 They need no such attestations. It is the jealousy of 
 Reason and the weakness of man which require 
 them : and doubt or suspicion is the root from which 
 in every age of the world, and in every individual, 
 the inquiry has proceeded. 
 
 Is it, therefore, reasonable to think that the true 
 sheep can doubt when they hear the true shepherd's 
 voice, or can mistake the voice of the Arch Deceiver 
 for it ? If the spiritual ear is really opened, and the 
 spiritual voice is really uttered, is it possible that any 
 outward human interposition, like that of speculative 
 Reason, can strengthen the conviction ? Speculative 
 Reason may be employed, perhaps lawfully, in pro- 
 ducing rational conviction, by means of outward 
 proofs, in those whose spiritual ear is not yet opened, 
 
506 Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 and whose spiritual eye is not yet divinely anointed. 
 But when the ear is already opened, and the eye al- 
 ready anointed, the mystery of Godliness can never 
 be confounded with the mystery of iniquity, however 
 specious the latter may be in its appearances; and 
 therefore the suggestions of Satan cannot be mistaken 
 for the Inspiration of God. 
 
 If the Spirit be not sufficient to support its own 
 cause against the powers of darkness, but requires 
 the aid of outward discernment : then he that is in the 
 world is greater than he that is in the hearts of his be- 
 lieving children as their appointed Saviour. But this 
 is contrary to Scripture : and therefore the supposi- 
 tion cannot stand. The Spirit is invincible. Is any 
 outward faculty of man, then, to be made the media- 
 tor between God and his spirit, and necessary to seal 
 the conviction that he speaks intelligibly to that which 
 is of Himself? If the voice of the Spirit be a real 
 influence or utterance, as we cannot doubt it is, it 
 is as fair to conclude that it may be heard without 
 reasoning, as that an outward sound may be heard, or 
 an outward object may be seen, without reasoning. 
 
 Now, as the divine principle of Light and Truth is 
 distinguished from Human Wisdom in its origin and 
 effects, so it is distinguished from Enthusiasm. These 
 are the two extremes, toward which, on the one hand, 
 the cold dogmatist in Religion, and on the other, the 
 warm Zealot, naturally tend. They are equally re- 
 mote from the temperate region of Truth. The one 
 is ever roaming on the barren mountains of specula- 
 
Enthusiasm. 507 
 
 ti on, where he can reap no fruit: and the other in- 
 dulges his airy flight, in wild excursions, above the 
 sober realities of life. He that is actuated by Enthu- 
 siasm, or the workings of the imagination, has con- 
 stant access to his impetuous guide, and never fails 
 to experience the buoyancy of this heated spirit. 
 While the true believer is waiting in patience, and 
 humility, and innocence, and meekness, to receive 
 the counsels of divine wisdom, the Enthusiast — taking 
 the word in its legitimate sense — is impelled by a 
 fiery ardour in the pursuit of his object. While the 
 one is regarding the pointings of his leader with fear 
 and trembling, as at every step ; the other, slighting all 
 reasonable calculation of consequences, proceeds in 
 a confident assurance, which is as much the effect of 
 his own natural energies, as if he never entertained a 
 thought that there was a supreme Power, to whom he 
 owed allegiance, and on whom alone he ought to 
 place his dependence. 
 
 Enthusiasm, like Reason, is always prepared for its 
 own work. It mcves in its own strength, and chooses 
 its own path, and relies on its own ability. It claims 
 however the guidance of heaven ; and, therefore, un- 
 like Reason, discards the labour and task of reflec- 
 tion, as if it were a painful obstacle in its move- 
 ments. 
 
 But in speaking thus of Enthusiasm, let it not be 
 understood that there may not be zeal in a good 
 cause; and what we would say of temperate and holy 
 zeal, we would also say of Reason lawfully employ- 
 
508 Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 ed; that it is a noble instrument in good hands, 
 worthy of Him who gave it. 
 
 If it be a Truth that the spirit of the Lord does 
 not always illuminate the mind, like a light placed at 
 our command to use at our own discretion ; it must 
 be unnecessary to enlarge upon the weakness and 
 destitution in which Man would be left, if, in seasons 
 of spiritual darkness, this natural light of Reason, 
 which was given to superintend the lawful concerns 
 of life, were also to be removed. 
 
 No man can doubt that the immediate direction of 
 the Lord is superior to man's own direction. But no 
 man can doubt that it is as much above his controul as 
 the breaking forth of the Sun from behind a cloud ; 
 and that it is only vouchsafed on certain conditions. 
 Hence, though it be a Christian duty to be ever vigi- 
 lant and earnest in supplication for this light, " to 
 walk in the light and dwell in the light;" neverthe- 
 less, it is not always to be expected. 
 
 Placed, as man is, upon the Lord's earth, with senses 
 and faculties designed for various outward ends, these 
 senses and faculties must be duly exercised ; and none 
 of them with more care than the faculty of Reason. 
 Now if it would savour of presumption in any one to 
 shut his natural eyes when he might see, or close his 
 natural ear when he might hear, in vain dependence 
 upon a revelation to instruct him in the knowledge of 
 what was without ; so, it would be vain to imagine 
 that the duties devolving upon our rational faculty 
 might be suspended, and the understanding suffered 
 
Enthusiasm. 509 
 
 as it were to lie torpid for want of use, in the un- 
 reasonable expectation, that its deficiency — induced 
 by our own indolence — would be supplied by a 
 supernatural intimation on every occasion. 
 
 It cannot be doubted, that, for want of this distinc- 
 tion, many well-intentioned individuals have accu- 
 mulated difficulties to themselves, and have been in- 
 volved in errors which have proved as stumbling- 
 blocks in the way of others. 
 
 The perfect state of dependence upon Providence, 
 in which man can obey our Saviour's rule " to take 
 no thought for the morrow" is compatible with that 
 diligent labour which sows the seed, and waters the 
 plant against the time of harvest. For he that will 
 not sow must not expect to reap. 
 
 But, on the other hand, no man can pretend to 
 limit the operation of the Holy Spirit, and to say 
 " thus far shalt thou go." There cannot, there ought 
 not, to be taken a step in life, without more or less 
 necessity for some reference to a better Guide than 
 our own fallible Reason. When our better light is 
 withdrawn, Reason must be our direction ; there is 
 no alternative. Rut to let it lie dormant, in vain 
 expectation of infallible guidance, is like tempting 
 Omnipotence, and trusting to his delivering arm, 
 when there is no outward need to display his provi- 
 dential interference. 
 
 The highest faculties are for the noblest ends, and 
 the spiritual faculties relate to our eternal interests. 
 It does not appear to be consistent with its high 
 
510 Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 office that the Divine principle in the soul should be 
 engaged in every outward secular pursuit of life. 
 
 If in God we live and move and have our natural 
 being; much more in Him have we our spiritual 
 being. * 
 
 But in our natural being, we possess a natural free- 
 dom of will, like the unconscious brute, into which 
 natural freedom of will the consciousness of a moral 
 Governor of the world does not enter. It is not so 
 in our spiritual being : we cannot examine our moral 
 constitution impartially, without being conscious of a 
 Supreme Ruler. And this consciousness awakens a 
 feeling of our wants and frailties, as moral agents ; 
 and of our necessary dependence upon God in every 
 moral and religious act : so that our moral freedom 
 is, or ought to be, wholly merged in obedience to the 
 Divine will. To exercise our moral freedom of will 
 beyond the line of duty, is to launch into irregularity, 
 and to shake off the reins from our necks, which are 
 laid upon us w ith a gentle and easy hand. But he 
 that is conscious of body, soul, and spirit, being under 
 the Divine government, naturally as well as morally, 
 cannot emancipate himself in any single act from 
 God's service ; and, whatsoever he does, whether he eats 
 or drinks, endeavours to do all to His Glory. 
 
 If we suppose that the Deity operates to a certain 
 extent in brutes, through the medium of their instincts, 
 for ends of which they are unconscious, and designs 
 they are unable to comprehend, and that they have a 
 distinct animal consciousness and spontaneity of their 
 
Enthusiasm. 511 
 
 own ; in what way are these powers — the omnipotent 
 agency of the Creator and the limited agency of the 
 creature — adjusted to the general harmony of things? 
 This is a difficult question which I feel myself incom- 
 petent to answer. We may suppose that this animal 
 consciousness must vary in the different orders of 
 animals, in the scale of being, according to the sphere 
 of their animal operations. Vegetables are thought 
 to have no consciousness at all ; but they are acted 
 upon by a Divine energy of life, (operating through 
 the medium of physical agencies) perfect and un- 
 impeded, in their natural state. Insects have a de- 
 gree of animal consciousness and spontaneity, or 
 power of moving and acting, confined to their limited 
 sphere of operations ; but they have no consciousness 
 of the Supreme Intelligence, which regulates their 
 wonderful instincts. The higher orders of animals 
 have more of animal consciousness, in proportion to 
 the sphere in which they have to act, and the variety 
 of acts for which they are fitted; but they have no 
 knowledge or consciousness of any Intelligence 
 greater than that of man, which is immediately over 
 them. 
 
 It is, upon the whole, I think to be presumed, that 
 brutes like man, are enabled to perform some acts, 
 which arise from their own spontaneity, within the 
 sphere of their own consciousness, and not imme- 
 diately under Divine influence. This, however, is a 
 presumption to be received with great caution : the 
 
512 Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 slightest misapprehension would lead to error on 
 either side. 
 
 From what has been said, we may conclude, as I 
 have before noticed, that there is a two-fold agency 
 of mind in all living animals : — the one agency pro- 
 per and subordinate, by which the individual fills up 
 its own station; the other general and supreme, by 
 which it is made to conspire to the good of the whole : 
 the one within the range of its consciousness; the 
 other beyond it. 
 
 In man, this two-fold agency may be seen most 
 conspicuously, at least in his moral relations; in 
 some, diverging to the utmost limit of spontaneity or 
 human liberty, as in the face of omnipotence ; in 
 others, to that of perfect accordance with the Divine 
 will. In the good, as they submit to its guidance, the 
 Divine agency leads to as perfect a conformity with 
 the universal scheme of moral order, as the uncon- 
 scious Instinct of the brute contributes to the order 
 of the outward creation. In the rebellious, human 
 agency proceeds in the way of disorder, to its utmost 
 limit, with licentious daring : So that, as far as is in 
 the creature's power, the agency, which is designed to 
 be proper and subordinate, over-rules and impedes 
 that which is general and supreme : And, on the 
 other hand, the agency which is general and supreme, 
 by the creature's willing subjection, keeps the inferior 
 and human agency in harmony with all the Divine 
 operations in God's universe. 
 
Enthusiasm. 513 
 
 In the lowest order of animals, the Divine energy 
 seems to act with most unimpeded power. It is less 
 and less concentrated in the successive links of the 
 living chain upwards to man. It diverges more and 
 more into their own specific acts, as living creatures 
 are endowed with greater portions of mental power* 
 And as it is possible that in human beings, who ac- 
 knowledge least of Divine power, it should scarcely 
 operate at all, so as to influence their conscious moral 
 actions ; so in those who are entirely obedient to its 
 dictates, it is the sole governing principle. 
 
 Hence it follows, that at both ends of the chain, — 
 in the most simple vital actions of an animal fibre, 
 and in the most dignified acts of the inspired servant, 
 the power of the Deity is most perfect, and contributes 
 most to natural and moral order ; because it is least 
 opposed by any inferior influence. 
 
 The more the power of the Deity is suffered to fill 
 the conscious mind, the less is there of human agency ; 
 the more of human agency, the less of the Divinity. 
 What sublime views are thus opened of the human 
 character ! How consistent are they with Truth and 
 Revelation : that man should have it in his power to 
 reject or entertain the heavenly visitant ! 
 
 The lowest animal has this Divine power ; not of 
 free choice, nor consciously: the holiest of men has 
 it also; but consciously and willingly. And it then 
 becomes his ruling principle, — his Divine counsellor, 
 —his never-failing help, — a light to his feet and a 
 lanthorn to his path,— his shield in the day of battle, — 
 
 2k 
 
514 Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 his tower of refuge in the time of trouble, — his anchor 
 in the storm, sure and steadfast: — It is the good shep- 
 herd that leads him beside the still waters, and ena- 
 bles him to lie down sweetly in the green pastures of 
 life. 
 
 In conformity with the idea that a good man fol- 
 lows the prescribed path of duty, and fulfils his in- 
 dividual part in the moral system, as completely, as 
 any of the unconscious natural agents, that are wholly 
 governed by Supreme Wisdom, and cannot err, the 
 following remarks suggest themselves. 
 
 How often does the arm of Almighty Power direct 
 the steps of the righteous through the snares of this 
 world, with unerring safety, though under a guidance, 
 invisible but to the eye of Faith ! 
 
 Through dangers and conflicting interests, the 
 tenor of his course is seen to be maintained with 
 uninterrupted firmness; and the duties assigned him 
 in the scale of moral activity to be performed with 
 holy vigilance and prayer. 
 
 The opposition of evil men ; the opposition of false 
 brethren, have not power to divert him from the path 
 of rectitude. Their snares may be laid; and their 
 open violence exerted, to thwart him in his progress : 
 But a power which he sees not, confounds their ma- 
 chinations ; and he moves along with noiseless tran- 
 quillity, in the race set before him. Could any thing 
 short of Divine superintending wisdom direct in safe- 
 ty through such infinite confusion ? As well might 
 we suppose a self-moving orb, to pass unhurt, with a 
 
Revelation. 515 
 
 steady course, through blazing comets, crossing each 
 other's paths in endless physical disorder, as that a 
 human being, in the present scene of moral darkness 
 and perplexity, could direct his own steps aright by 
 the natural powers of his own mind; or apply him- 
 self effectually to the duties for which he was de- 
 signed, without providential guidance. 
 
 How consistent, then, with true philosophy is the 
 saying, that " a good man's steps are ordered of the 
 Lord !" How consistent with Christianity, and with 
 the general harmony of the universe ! 
 
 Revelation. 
 
 I have before adverted to a passage from the c Essay 
 on Human Understanding,' in which Locke does not 
 seem so much to distinguish Reason from Revelation, 
 as to endeavour to point out their coincidence, The 
 passage is as follows : 
 
 " Reason is natural Revelation, whereby the 
 eternal Father of light and fountain of all knowledge, 
 communicates to mankind that portion of Truth, laid 
 within the reach of their natural faculties : Revela- 
 tion is natural Reason, enlarged by a new set of 
 discoveries communicated by God immediately, which 
 Reason vouches the truth of, by the testimony and 
 proofs it gives that they come from God. So that he 
 that takes away Reason to make way for Revelation, 
 2k2 
 
516 Of the Dkine Spirit. 
 
 puts out the light of both : and does much the same, 
 as if he would persuade a man to put out his eyes 
 the better to receive the remote light of an invisible 
 star by a telescope."* 
 
 Although the passage above quoted is well ex- 
 pressed and highly plausible, and may seem to con- 
 tain an incontrovertible truth, yet I fear it is not 
 calculated to give settled notions on the very impor- 
 tant subject in question i and that when examined it 
 will not tend to confirm the clear view of Reason and 
 Revelation, which it appears at first sight to suggest. 
 
 If we take Reason for the whole intellectual nature 
 of man, comprehending the principle of light and 
 truth, for which I am contending, then the proposition 
 of Locke, as above announced, can hardly be objected 
 to. But if we take it to mean nothing more than the 
 outward Searcher of Truth, then I conceive the high 
 character which Locke has assigned to it in this pro- 
 position, can hardly be supported, or made to agree 
 with Scripture. But it is sufficiently obvious that 
 Locke does not mean that Reason should include any 
 internal source of moral ideas, distinct from those fur- 
 nished by a Discursive Faculty operating on the 
 materials of Sensation and Reflection ; — in other 
 words, it is clear that he considers outward obser- 
 vation or experience to be the sole ground work of 
 these notions : and therefore, it is to be inferred, that 
 his use of the word Reason, in this passage, does not 
 
 * Book 4. Chap. xix. Sect. 4. 
 
Revelation, 517 
 
 comprehend an internal light, monitor, or intelli- 
 gencer, such as we have been assuming. 
 
 This being the case, the meaning becomes more 
 involved than it appears, and requires some exami- 
 nation. 
 
 It is very certain that all truth is from the Eternal 
 Source of Wisdom, and that whatever knowledge we 
 possess must ultimately be referred to God as its 
 Author: for he gave us the faculties by which we 
 attain this limited knowledge of the natural and 
 moral relations of things. 
 
 Now there are two ways in which it has pleased 
 Divine Goodness to communicate it, — the one, imme- 
 diately, by a ray emitted from the Fountain of Light 
 into the mind, — the other, discursively, by the se- 
 condary operation of the mental powers. The latter 
 is the fruit of human research— a discovery of know- 
 ledge, proportioned to the exercise and extent of the 
 natural abilities, and has but little reference to the 
 morality or immorality, the piety or impiety, of him 
 that is imbued with it : The former is not, in the pro- 
 per sense of the term, the fruit of outward research, 
 nor a discovery proportioned to the cultivation and 
 extent of the natural abilities ; but it is a Divine 
 Intelligence in the soul, freely communicated to all 
 that are prepared and willing to receive it ; which 
 has always reference to the morality and piety of the 
 recipient : and this alone is properly entitled to the 
 name of Revelation. 
 
 These things being premised, if I might take the 
 
518 Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 liberty of making a few comments upon the passage, 
 I would previously suggest the following definitions, 
 as, in my opinion, more consonant with Scripture. 
 
 Reason is that power of the understanding whereby 
 the eternal Father of Light enables man to discover 
 that portion of Truth in art, science, moral and po- 
 litical economy, and natural Religion, which is laid 
 within the reach of his speculative faculties : and its 
 operation is wholly discursive, though it be grounded 
 on certain first principles and rules of assent, which 
 are deeply implanted in the constitution of the human 
 mind. 
 
 Revelation is the immediate communication of 
 Divine light from the fountain of Truth to the soul ; 
 and may be distinguished into ordinary and extraor- 
 dinary, or natural and supernatural : yet these differ 
 only in degree of fulness and brightness ; they do not 
 differ in kind. 
 
 Natural or ordinary Revelation is the limited effu- 
 sion of Divine light upon the soul, working on the 
 heart and conscience of every moral agent, and dis- 
 covering some common principles of duty, which how- 
 ever distorted and obscured, are still universal, like 
 the natural tastes and feelings; and form the foun- 
 dation of all moral distinctions between right and 
 wrong in human conduct, and the basis of religious 
 feeling towards the Universal Parent. 
 
 Extraordinary or supernatural Revelation is na- 
 tural Revelation enlarged by a new set of discoveries, 
 communicated immediately by God to his faithful 
 
Revelation. 519 
 
 servants, in different ages of the world; and out- 
 wardly verified and known, — by prophecies fulfilled, 
 by miracles publicly wrought, and by the testimony 
 and influence of inspired writings on the heart, left 
 on record for the instruction of future generations. 
 
 Now, of natural Revelation, it may be remarked, 
 that its operation is intuitive; felt, but not under- 
 stood, by those who are outwardly ignorant of the 
 real nature of the operating principle, as it is revealed 
 in Scripture. The operation of this Divine influence 
 upon the mind, is like the operation of light upon the 
 organ of vision, instantaneous and without reasoning. 
 The brute animal sees natural objects as distinctly as 
 the philosopher ; some brutes perhaps more so. 
 Reason, however, may apply itself to the investiga- 
 tion of certain effects; and may discover the laws of 
 optics, which the brute animal cannot know. But a 
 blind man may be able to acquire an outward know- 
 ledge of these things, and mptke them objects of his 
 speculation; just as a man spiritually blind may dis- 
 course theoretically of Divine things, and make them 
 objects of his rational faculty. And thus, it is from 
 the universal prevalence of moral feelings and emo- 
 tions among mankind, that Reason is led to form its 
 own imperfect moral system, and to ascertain the 
 speculative Truths of, what is called, Natural Reli- 
 gion. Without these feelings as a basis, no such system 
 would have been held obligatory ; nay, it is question- 
 able whether it would have ever been devised. 
 
 Ordinary Revelation, therefore, is an immediate 
 
520 Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 communication of the Divine counsel, by the free 
 Gift of Grace, universally ; though, for wise purposes, 
 in different measures, in different ages; which has 
 been vouchsafed from the beginning of the world, 
 without respect of persons, according to the obedience 
 of mankind to the dictates of Conscience ; and it has 
 never been wholly withheld. 
 
 But Extraordinary Revelation, though it was im~ 
 mediate to those of our fellow creatures, who, for 
 various benevolent purposes to the Human Family, 
 were thus supernaturally illuminated, is only mediate 
 to us. We have still our own immediate Guide, who 
 is willing to open if we will knock, to lead if we will 
 follow, to instruct if we will hearken, to dispense if 
 we will ask aright from the Eternal Fountain itself; 
 though it may be, in the smallest measures of Divine 
 Truth. 
 
 Now it is very possible that our Reason, as it was 
 with some of those who witnessed them, may require 
 the proof, which miracles afford, of any special com- 
 munication being from heaven. But it cannot with 
 truth be affirmed, that all those of our fellow crea- 
 tures, who received such an immediate communi- 
 cation, required their reason to be previously assured 
 by outward evidence, in this way, that it was from 
 God, before they proceeded to act upon it. When 
 the prophets of the Lord received commissions from 
 Him, we do not read that they had each a miraculous 
 sign to attest and seal the commission. Miracles were 
 sometimes granted to those who were weak in Faith ; 
 
Revelation. 521 
 
 and sometimes reproof and a degree of punishment 
 followed, when the hesitating servant, through a tem- 
 porary lapse of attention to his Guide, demanded 
 their evidence. It cannot therefore be doubted that 
 the true servants knew their Master's voice; that 
 they believed the internal impulse ; and were fully 
 satisfied with the illuminating evidence in their own 
 minds ; which Reason was neither competent to see 
 nor apprehend ; because it flashed upon another sense, 
 the quickened eye of Faith. And the miracle that 
 was sometimes wrought, after the delivery of the 
 Prophet's message, or after his holy preparation for 
 the event, followed, not as a confirmation to himself, 
 but as an effect of the Divine commission, and the 
 consequent holy conviction or Faith of the inspired 
 servant. We know that thousands resisted even the 
 outward evidence of miracles; consequently Reason 
 alone could avail little, when the internal eye was 
 closed by obstinacy, rebellion, and impiety. 
 
 It is clear, therefore, that something more than 
 Reason was required to produce conviction of a Re- 
 velation, even though it was accompanied with mi- 
 racles, being from God : For Reason may be so 
 blinded as not to see when the clearest evidence is 
 before it. 
 
 Hence, if Revelation be the greater light, and Rea- 
 son the less, — a proposition that must surely be ad- 
 mitted — he who would apply the natural power of 
 the human understanding to judge of Divine illumi- 
 nation, would act as absurdly as if he were to use a 
 
522 Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 candle to look at the sun. And whoever would scru- 
 tinize too narrowly a Divine intelligence by human 
 Reason, while he was professing to enlarge human 
 Reason, would run the risk of putting out this In- 
 telligence, instead of profiting by its light. For the 
 light of Heaven and the light of Earth are as little 
 identified in their operation as the sun-beam and 
 artificial flame. Whoever would put out the light of 
 Reason to make way for Revelation, would do no 
 more than eclipse the light that was common and in- 
 ferior, for the temporary illumination of a better 
 guide. For to put out the light of Reason utterly, 
 under the pretence of making way for Revelation, 
 would be to destroy the rational principle — an alter- 
 native no reasonable man could suppose necessary, 
 nor would any but the wildest fanatic contemplate the 
 idea. 
 
 Now the temporary suspension of Reason's inter- 
 ference, when the mind is better engaged, is no more 
 the abolition or alienation of the faculty, than the 
 temporary repose of fancy, and of the emotions of 
 sensibility, would imply their total abolition, when 
 the mind is absorbed in the grave deductions of Rea- 
 son. 
 
 Therefore to apply these observations to the latter 
 part of Locke's proposition above quoted, subject 
 nevertheless to proper restriction, the conclusion ap- 
 pears to be liable to doubt, or to require considerable 
 qualification, that " he who takes away Reason to 
 make way for Revelation, puts out the light of both." 
 
Revelation. 5£3 
 
 It must indeed be admitted, that to take away any 
 of the mental faculties, and one so important as 
 Reason, must in so far destroy the intellectual con- 
 stitution, and deprive the human mind of a light 
 which, while on earth, is as necessary as the outward 
 senses. But it by no means follows, that because 
 Reason is required not to interfere too curiously in 
 things above its reach, that it must therefore be taken 
 away. For to repeat what is before asserted, he who 
 silences the busy workings of fancy or of memory to 
 make way for the laborious deductions of Reason, 
 does not extinguish the former. 
 
 We may presume that it is a Truth as consistent 
 with Philosophy as with Scripture, that he who keeps 
 his eye single to the light of Heaven, in all matters of 
 spiritual moment, will be figuratively full of light : 
 while he, who seeks with the eye of Reason or out- 
 ward observation to direct his steps to that better 
 light, and uses it as the questioner of that better 
 light — in as much as he endeavours to look at two 
 kingdoms at once, whose interests are incompatible — 
 will be full of darkness. For as Reason points to 
 Earth, and Revelation points to Heaven, the eye that 
 is intently fixed on one cannot steadily regard the 
 other. Consequently, different objects being pre- 
 sented, the view must be distracted, if each is to be 
 pursued with equal attention. 
 
 When Reason is well instructed, it immediately 
 bows to Revelation : when it is not well instructed, 
 it resists with all the vigour of which it is capable. , 
 
524 Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 And, as one or other must have the ascendancy, the 
 meek submission of Reason, instead of extinguishing 
 the light of Heaven, causes it to burn with clearer 
 and brighter evidence : while, on the other hand, in 
 proportion as the light of Reason is exclusively che- 
 rished and exalted, the weaker is the heavenly flame. 
 Now, as none but a person devoid of understand- 
 ing would attempt to persuade, or be persuaded, 
 " to put out the eyes, the better to receive the remote 
 light of an invisible star by a telescope;" so none 
 but such an one would advise a man to part with his 
 Reason, or to become insane, in order that he might 
 be divinely instructed ; or conversely, to submit to 
 Divine instruction by Revelation, as a necessary step 
 to the loss of his rational faculty. The suppositions 
 refer to something, that is, in both cases, improbable 
 and unnatural. For, in the present state of things, it 
 is impossible to conceive a blind man capable of see- 
 ing, or a person filled with Divine light destitute of 
 Reason. And therefore, as the supposition involves 
 an absurdity, the comparison, however plausible it 
 may seem, is inapplicable : nor do the advocates for 
 the necessity of a true change in the nature of man, 
 and for a life conformable to the teachings of God's 
 holy spirit, by any means argue for the total abo- 
 lition of Reason. They are, on the contrary, well 
 aware, that the ignorant and unreasonable, who pre- 
 tend to Divine illumination, without the inward 
 virtue, are the greatest stumbling blocks in the way 
 of true Religion. 
 
Revelation. 525 
 
 In few words, it may be said, that, putting Reason 
 and Revelation for certain conditions of the mind, 
 Revelation without Reason would imply a state not 
 fitted for this world, as Reason without Revelation 
 would be unprepared for a better. 
 
 It has pleased the Almighty Parent to bestow those 
 animal and rational powers which fit his creature man 
 for the physical relations subsisting below : But it 
 has also pleased Him to endow this noblest earthly 
 image of himself with spiritual gifts and capacities 
 adapted to moral relations, in order to prepare him 
 for immortal happiness above. Therefore he is re- 
 quired to suffer no animal, sensual, or rational pur- 
 suit, to divert his mind from the one great object of 
 his creation ; and, further, he is required to make 
 every act of his inferior nature subservient to his 
 superior. If it be admitted that there are many ra- 
 tional pursuits, in which the immortal principle has 
 no direct interest, it is obvious that the rational nature 
 may be so occupied with them as to exclude from the 
 mind those exercises, which nourish and keep alive 
 this immortal seed : and, therefore, it is meet that 
 these pursuits should be regulated by some fit standard, 
 as well as the Appetites, Desires, and Affections — by 
 that true standard which prescribes the limit to every 
 thought, word, and deed ; and suffers no rival to the 
 Supreme Being in the heart. 
 
526 Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 I shall briefly recapitulate the chief heads of this 
 argument, in order that I may conclude this section 
 with a few remarks on the latter part of the Propo- 
 sition prefixed to it. 
 
 According to the view that has been taken, it would 
 seem to be proved by facts as well as Scripture testi- 
 mony, that the Divine influence of the Holy Spirit is 
 not to be commanded by any human being, upon all 
 occasions, at his own will and pleasure. 
 
 But it must be admitted that the use of the rational 
 powers is at all times at the command of every ra- 
 tional being : for it is scarcely necessary to make an 
 exception for the period of life when Reason has 
 scarcely begun to dawn r or for those occasions in 
 which it may have suffered a partial eclipse by some 
 physical or moral cause. 
 
 It must also be admitted that the ratio of increase 
 in the growth of the seed of Divine life, is not in pro- 
 portion to the speculative knowledge of Divine 
 Truth : because knowledge of itself, or mere outward 
 Faith, is said to profit nothing : and we know that 
 learning does not necessarily subdue the will and 
 amend the heart, so as to transform its natural affec- 
 tions into spiritual desires, conformable to the will 
 of God. 
 
 It has already been made to appear that a true 
 growth in religion can only take place, in proportion 
 to heartfelt obedience to manifested duty, and to 
 living operative Faith. We must therefore consider 
 it a fundamental error to suppose that any growth 
 
Recapitulation. 527 
 
 in grace or heavenly wisdom, from stature to stature, 
 is to be effected by the addition of proposition to pro- 
 position, however excellent in themselves, laid up in 
 the understanding, like dead and formal rules. For 
 truth in Religion, living and substantial, and Hea- 
 venly Wisdom, or Divine Light, cannot surely be said 
 to enter the mind in the form of propositions for the 
 natural judgment to examine and admit or reject as 
 it sees meet. The intimations of heavenly truth, 
 often small and gentle, comparable to the gradual 
 appearance of light at the dawning of day, cannot be 
 expected to be attended with formal and tangible 
 evidence. Yet according to the system I am op* 
 posing, so rigid are these human rules, unless the evi- 
 dence of a Divine revelation be almost overpowering 
 and accompanied with incontrovertible testimonials, 
 it must be rejected. Consequently, the still small 
 voice must pass unheeded, the meek counsellor be 
 dismissed, the gentle reprover be silenced, and the 
 gate of human wisdom closed against all humble ap- 
 plications; and it must only be opened to the loud 
 knocking of specious demonstrations and unanswer- 
 able propositions. 
 
 It is a principle in philosophy, that nothing can rise 
 higher than its source. If we apply it to this argu- 
 ment, we may infer, that as the proper business of 
 Reason is to be conversant with natural things, and 
 to ascertain their laws and relations, it cannot sit in 
 judgment upon supernatural, — at least without be- 
 traying its weakness, and running the risk of mis- 
 
528 Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 apprehending them more frequently than the con- 
 trary. For the things of a man, or natural things, are 
 naturally discerned ; but the things of the spirit are 
 spiritually discerned. 
 
 It follows therefore that the rational faculty dis- 
 tinguished from the spiritual, in its source and objects, 
 as well as in its modes of operation, of cultivation, 
 and of enlargement : and the conclusion seems to fol- 
 low that the Argumentative Faculty is not the source 
 and discoverer, by any process, synthetic or analytic, 
 of Divine Truth in the soul. 
 
 For if it were supposed that analytic research might 
 discover a Divine Truth ; where should we look for 
 the facts or materials out of which it should be formed ? 
 Analysis presupposes a mass of observations to be 
 sifted and digested. But all the materials from which 
 such a Truth could in this way be extracted, must be 
 derived from outward observation : and outward ob- 
 servation cannot look into Heaven or any of its mys- 
 teries. Now unassisted Reason, however cultivated and 
 enlarged, can only be conversant with earthly material 
 things, and their abstract relations which constitute 
 their laws. Whatever it may pretend to know of 
 things above, in the woild of spirits — as of the counsels 
 of Divine wisdom, and the true nature of man, as a 
 probationer on the earth — can never amount to any 
 thing more than vague conjecture. Even the out- 
 ward or speculative knowledge of these things can 
 only be acquired by Revelation, mediate or imme- 
 diate; much more, the inward, spiritual, or experi- 
 
Recapitulation. 529 
 
 mental knowledge which brings man into the likeness 
 of God, and into holy communion with Him, must be 
 acquired by the immediate operation, diffusion, and 
 influence of his Divine Power, through the medium of 
 his Holy Spirit in the heart. 
 
 Surely then, man can have no natural power to 
 form a Divine Truth from earthly conceptions; or 
 to extract, as it were, heavenly sweets from gross ma- 
 terial substances. 
 
 If any should suppose that the synthetic method is 
 applicable to the acquisition of Divine Truth, it may 
 likewise be urged, that the mind has no natural power 
 capable of combining the simplest elements of Divine 
 instruction together, so as to form a single Divine 
 Truth. Because, as the elements themselves are 
 from Inspiration, nothing short of Inspiration can. add 
 to the materials, and compact the spiritual growth. 
 
 For as it is improbable that any natural instrument 
 should be able to join heavenly things to heavenly, 
 by that true assimilating process, which makes them 
 one in nature and essence : so no natural instrument 
 can join earthly things to heavenly, because they are 
 wholly incompatible. It is with Divine operative 
 Truth in the spiritual part of man, as it is with na- 
 tural food in the natural body, or with natural truth 
 in the natural understanding : no substance can be 
 assimilated to another, which it does not agree with 
 in its nature ; and no true union can be effected be- 
 tween them, but by the medium of the same principle 
 which operates in each ; as the natural energy in the 
 
 2 L 
 
530 Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 living; body, the natural faculties in the mind, and the 
 spiritual principle in the immortal spirit. 
 
 Now Truth added to Truth, spiritually and sub- 
 stantially, is like particle added to living particle in a 
 seed, or fibre to organized fibre in a living body : — It 
 fa a true vital union. It does not mean the mecha- 
 nical introduction of one element of knowledge to 
 another, whether Divine or natural : this may be 
 done, though not mechanically, by outward labour ; 
 as, it is possible for memory to lay up such a store in 
 the mind. But it means, when applied to the spi- 
 ritual faculties, a Divine communication of truth from 
 the Spirit of Truth to the humble and obedient mind; 
 constituting a perfect union between the recipient and 
 that portion of Divine wisdom which is received. 
 
 I have been struck with the testimony of Milton as 
 to the effect of loading the mind outwardly with 
 knowledge, though it is not applied spiritually. But 
 there is much wisdom in the remark, and I think it 
 may be applied instructively in the present argument : 
 
 — - — ■ who reads 
 
 Incessantly, and to his reading brings not 
 
 A Spirit and Judgment equal or superior, 
 
 (Jnd what he brings, what need he elsewhere seek?) 
 
 Uncertain and unsettled still remains ; 
 
 Deep versed in books, and shallow in himself, 
 
 Crude or intoxicate, collecting toys 
 
 And t rifles for choice matters, worth a sponge, 
 
 As childten gathering pebbles on the shore.* 
 
 Paradise Regained. 
 
 * This interesting passage is associated in the mind of a late Aa- 
 
Of Christ. 531 
 
 Sect. VI. 
 Of Christ. 
 
 Proposition V. 
 
 This Divine Spirit is the Spirit of Christ himself 
 in all ages the same ; and its manifestations are true 
 revelations from above, perceived not by Sense nor by 
 Reason, but by the inward eye of Faith. 
 
 The latter part of this Proposition has been already 
 under our notice : the former part, therefore, conies 
 now more immediately to be considered. The truth 
 contained in it, is, indeed, of the last importance ; 
 and the proof of it is the sum and substance at which 
 I have all along aimed in this argument. This proof 
 I shall attempt by Scripture. 
 
 In the commencement of this volume, I have spoken 
 largely of the Divine Power, operating in the ma* 
 
 thor,* with a saying of Sir Isaac Newton, which he is reported to have 
 uttered a little before he died; and which shows his modest opinion of 
 himself and his discoveries in Natural Philosophy. 
 
 " I dont know what I may seem to the world, but, as to myself, I 
 seem to have been only like a boy playing on the sea-shore, and divert- 
 ing myself in now and then finding a smoother pebble or a prettier 
 shell than ordinary, whilst the great ocean of Truth lay all undiscovered 
 before me." 
 
 See Spence's Anecdotes, by S. W. Singer, page 54. 
 
 2l2 
 
532 Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 terial universe, as the hidden spring of the wonderful 
 works carried on in the vast scheme, in blind obe- 
 dience to the Great First Cause; and throughout the 
 kingdoms of animated nature, as the fountain of that 
 unconscious intelligence, if I may be allowed such an 
 expression, which is displayed, with more or less wis- 
 dom and design, in every tribe and family of the brute 
 creation. 
 
 I have latterly taken occasion to speak of the Holy 
 Spirit under different appellations, as the medium by 
 which Divine Intelligence is not only conveyed to the 
 soul of man, but produces in his life and conduct, 
 when properly submitted to, the fruits of undefiled 
 Religion. 
 
 I have now to say a few words on the name and 
 spirit of Christ, or the Divine Word, as the same in 
 power and heavenly nature with the eternal wisdom 
 of God, and with the influence of the Holy Spirit of 
 Grace and Truth. 
 
 In endeavouring to elucidate this point, I shall ob- 
 serve the following order. 
 
 First, — I shall produce the evidence from Scripture, 
 which seems fully to establish the identity of opera- 
 tion in question i 
 
 Secondly, — I shall consider what evidence the 
 Scripture contains of the existence of Christ's Spirit 
 in godly men, before his personal appearance 
 amongst the Jews, and outward manifestation to 
 the world : — and thirdly, I shall subjoin a very 
 
Of Christ 533 
 
 few testimonies from Christian writers to the same 
 purpose. 
 
 I. With reference to the first object, I have collected 
 a number of Scripture texts, which are disposed in a 
 kind of tabular order. In presenting a subject of so 
 sacred a character in such a form, I feel some apology 
 to be necessary, lest it should appear that I was dis- 
 posed to treat it in a way that bore any resemblance 
 to that in which the common subjects of natural 
 research are used to be illustrated. I am, on the 
 contrary, persuaded, that the sublime truths of Re- 
 vealed Religion, and especially those, which regard 
 the nature and operation of the Godhead — that mys- 
 terious Power which is incomprehensible, because 
 infinite in every perfection of which man sees and 
 knows but a little part — cannot be brought under our 
 notice ancl handled like the common topics of human 
 inquiry, without weakening in some degree that holy 
 reverence in which these sublime truths ought in- 
 variably to be held. 
 
 From this synoptical view, I presume to think, that 
 the harmony, union, and identity of operation, in all 
 the Divine works, of the Almighty Father, the Anoint- 
 ed Messiah, his eternal Word, and the Holy Spirit, 
 will be strikingly manifested. And 1 am the more 
 reconciled to the form ; because it embraces nothing 
 of my own, and presents the simple unencumbered 
 truth in Scripture language. Indeed, I believe, there 
 are many Scripture truths,— and this is one of the 
 
53k Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 most sublime that can be contemplated by men or 
 
 Angels in their nature so refined, elevated, and in* 
 
 comprehensible, that an attempt to clothe them in 
 any other language than Scripture authorizes, will 
 rather serve to show the weakness and presumption 
 of man than to unfold the least of the hidden mysteries 
 of Divine Truth. And while I have been engaged 
 in preparing this table, I have been forcibly struck 
 with the idea that the serious contemplation of such 
 a view must have a powerful tendency to check those 
 disputes which have so much disturbed and alienated 
 from each other the minds of Christians who profess 
 to take Scripture for their Guide in matters of specu- 
 lative Faith and Doctrine. For, if Scripture be re- 
 ceived as authority, as it unquestionably ought to be, 
 there can scarcely be any ground for difference of 
 opinion on this important subject; so far as it can be 
 brought within the comprehension of the human mind; 
 i. e. circumscribing opinion within those limits, which 
 can never be safely transgressed. 
 
 Scripture bears the clearest and most unanswerable 
 testimony to one only true God, doing all things 
 by his own eternal Power, Wisdom, and Word, 
 Christ Jesus, the Rock of Ages, through the imme- 
 diate influence and agency of the Holy Spirit. 
 There can be no sliding from this foundation, without 
 setting up the deductions of human wisdom, limited, 
 superficial, dark, and doubtful as it is, above the 
 Divine revelations given to Patriarchs, Prophets, 
 
Of Christ. 535 
 
 and Apostles, from the beginning of the world, as 
 well as above the express declarations of Christ him- 
 self. 
 
 If words of human invention, which Scripture does 
 not contain, could have made the truth more clear 
 than it is in Scripture, we should not have had the 
 Christian world divided, as it has been, with an in- 
 calculable number of distinctions and designations ; 
 which, it may perhaps confidently be said, have never 
 yet contiibuted to practical piety. For, disputing 
 about words, and differing about nominal distinctions, 
 they lose the substance ; and thus the Divine lifo is 
 wounded in all who make their religion to consist in 
 vain disputation?, which go beyond the written letter, 
 about things that are placed as far above human re- 
 search, as the heavens are above the earth. 
 
 And it is highly probable that the adoption of one 
 distinguishing epithet or denomination^ has driven 
 many speculative men, who could not see the thing so 
 distinctly as a supposed orthodoxy founded upon 
 arbitrary terms would require of them, to enrol them- 
 selves with the very opposite denomination. 
 
 The Table simply consists of three columns. In 
 the first column are collected from Scripture certain 
 acts predicated of God: in the second and third, 
 horizontally with the first, the same or parallel acts 
 predicated of Christ and of the Holy Spirit. 
 
 Where there is an omission in the first column, a 
 coincidence may be seen in the second and third. 
 
in 
 
 3 
 
 GO 
 CO 
 
 10 
 
 
 05 
 
 o 
 o 
 
 ti 
 
 ctf u 
 
 fc 2 
 
 sS 3 
 
 B 2 
 
 11 
 
 tj 
 
 5 - 
 
 O 03 
 
 •-a 
 
 *«=: o 
 as ^ <u 
 
 S3 S w 
 £ b . 
 
 c -£ . 
 =2 o <u 
 
 e 2 2 
 
 o 
 o 
 
 a 
 £ c 
 
 •|« 
 ?4 
 
 3 s 
 
 3 s 
 
 CO -la 
 
 if* 
 
 •a £ m 
 
 *S -u OS • 
 
 &2 %~ 
 
 52 -. d . 
 
 a w 
 
 OS 'o 
 
 CO 
 
 as 
 
 a, 
 W 
 
 CJ 
 
 'to 
 
 a a fe 
 
 o T > 
 
 ^^ 2 
 
 * 2 * 
 
 as "^ *3 
 
 ■^ «5 g 
 
 *S £ O 
 
 O +- 
 to to 
 
 as S a 
 
 - 2 g » 
 
 g h •* tf 
 
 «j « >» . a 
 
 4) i-I 
 
 ^Ok 
 
 IS 
 
 4*Q 
 
 O -S 
 
 o 
 
 H H j- 
 
 2.2*; 
 
 <u « 
 T3 g 
 
 o o 
 
 -a 
 
 c 
 3 
 
 "o 
 H 
 
 -o 
 
 c 
 
 c 
 
 a 
 
 g2 
 
 
 "^0 2 W 
 
 n^ O "3 ^ >» 
 
 c r Oo te 
 
 S 0) 0J& g 
 
 << as t-N a '"s 
 
 o 5J i 
 
 
 
 2 •=-=« 
 
 as tf^ S 
 
 a »j . « 
 
 as »*■ 
 
 Is 
 
 s 
 
 Su — • 53 
 — V. *> ^ 
 
 « S 0) jj 
 
 ^^£^ 
 .•-=2 3 
 
 St as C3 w 
 ^•p.S « 
 
 c -c E H- 
 
 c 0) 8) »i 
 O^ H 
 
 ^ ^ S) a- 
 ,2 w w 2 
 
 HKScc 
 
 • a 
 
 oj - 
 
 i-O-O 
 
 , o 
 x o 
 
 £ hO . 
 
 9 
 
 co «5 CV 
 o ^~ 
 
 00 
 
 «: 2 • 
 
 13 
 
537 
 
 o ?g 
 
 s o 
 
 8 
 
 1 
 
 •5 5 
 
 
 o OS 
 
 
 
 S S 
 
 Be -1 u&xi 
 « < O 
 
 3 2 
 
 a s 
 
 "a a 
 
 3 § 
 
 ,eS 05 
 
 • ~ M 
 
 MS* 
 
 ^ CU 1 ^ 05 
 
 o <o 
 
 o ^ 
 
 8 £ CO 
 
 ^ W e 
 
 2 H-o 
 
 », < — i 
 
 fcc<w « 
 «j . g 
 
 %!s - 
 
 8 ^ 05 
 
 "a . 
 
 h: tf.S 
 5 ° !3 
 
 x J g 
 «S Oj -Q 
 
 H3 OS 
 
 O pH 
 
 h 
 
 o g 
 
 . 05 
 
 S 2 
 
 o 
 U o> 
 
 as . 
 5 5*5 
 
 o "0 
 
 CD w ~ 
 
 - * *■ g 
 
 h"§ So* 
 
 2<s a) 
 
 a 3 . > t» 
 
 •« o O c S 
 
 ^ n _ c 05 
 
 3 * *• *£* 
 
 a; a l_l C Q " 
 
 ^>2 gfcS S 
 o s 
 
 
 
 bfi 
 
 05 CO 
 
 4 o 
 
 •o ^ 
 O ^ 
 
 w 00 
 
 s 
 
 . o 
 it? 
 
 S £ 
 
 0) 05 
 
 -5 <n 
 
 'o ■""* 
 
 C 
 
 S .1 
 
 •a o -s 
 5 ^ 
 
 — o 
 o J2 
 
 03 "U 
 
 "J 
 
 « 
 
 t-i - O K 
 
 05 ■ 
 
 S » 
 
 s ^ 
 
 <i » 
 
 ^ w 
 
 ** . w 
 
 ^ o jt 
 
 03 », . 
 
 -a o os 
 
 H .« ^ • 
 
 I K ft) I 
 I- J3 05 
 
 ^T ! s 
 
 o 
 
 2 05"£ 
 
 •^ P o 
 "a. 
 
 ^ £ "I M»0M 
 
 j; »l 5 i ^ 
 
 »i3" 
 
 > ° _S «5 
 
 £ o § 2 
 
 
 !"3 4» ad 
 
 I c o 
 
 S c 2 o 
 
 ^ O (j 51 
 
 -rt'O ft* a> 
 
 •r *s ** 
 
 O as <J 
 
 > 3 
 
 *" ° 05 "o; 
 
 ^■5 J ^ r- 
 
 w 2 
 
 «S .O 
 
 -d 05 
 
 
 fc£ o6 1 2 
 
 eg y:- a5 £ — ' 
 
 ^■^.2^0 
 
 05 tn o — 
 
 ? ^ ^ o &. 
 
 i^ 05 — . — 1 h 
 O O . i 
 
 0) ffl o __ 
 
 o 
 
 ? 
 
 
 « 
 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 
 X 
 
 a 
 
 
 B 
 
 
 -2 
 
 s 
 
 
 «t 
 
 
 
 H 
 
 
 43 
 
 
 >- 
 
 ■*■ 
 
 
 •f 
 
 
 jS 
 
 
 
 a 
 
 
 J^ 
 
 * 
 
 
 c 
 
 a 
 
 
 .3 
 
 '5 • 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 
 a; >— ' 
 
 fi 
 
 
 05 
 
 
 C— ' 
 
 
 
 5 
 
 
 X 
 
 3 
 
 
 CC 
 
 
 to OS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 bj ° r 
 
 
 
 05 
 
 «0 
 
 a ^5 
 
 a 
 
 T. 
 
 
 
 ? o 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 
 
 EM 
 
 a^ 
 
 ■ 
 
 3> 
 
 .2 
 
 
 a 
 
 
 
 
 — 
 
 O — 5 
 
 — 
 
 ~ 
 
 2J 
 
 
 
 
538 
 
 -5P 
 
 «2 
 
 at 
 
 s 
 I 
 
 •5 2 
 * . 
 
 2 
 
 0> 
 
 la 
 
 til 
 
 - , 
 
 
 a 
 
 £3 
 ^3 
 
 txo 
 
 e 
 
 i 
 
 P 
 
 i 
 
 »- 
 
 u 
 
 V 
 
 
 'Z 
 
 p 
 
 S 
 
 % 
 
 -i 
 
 
 
 
 C 
 
 2 
 
 .5 S r> 
 
 03 _. 
 
 a. 
 
 S.c 
 S 
 O § 
 
 * -1 
 s ? 
 1 I 
 
 * <* 
 
 w 1 
 
 IS S3 
 
 •2 8>o 
 
 1 Ijfl 
 
 '2 * o 
 
 
 5 § 
 
 ccC5 
 
 .Si 
 
 2 h • 
 
 * fa 2 
 
 O oj ~ 
 
 oi 2 
 
 3 ° 
 
 & 
 
 i S 
 
 H 
 
 en ,• 
 
 o H 
 
 ^ 1 
 
 N a) 
 
 03 O 
 
 "5 e 
 o 
 
 03 1— 1 -. - . 
 
 pq .Hw 
 
 S 
 
 i 
 
 y 
 
 9 
 
 -O 
 
 ■■r> 
 
 gt) a) 
 
 o . 
 
 S<» 
 
 0-~Hq 
 
 6-S 
 
 a. 
 
 •J 63 
 
 § I* 
 
 O ©J 
 
 U Ik 
 
 O 3 
 
 £ J 
 
 2 & 
 
 C » 
 
 a . 
 o> *« 
 > S? 
 
 52< 
 
 *■ 
 
 ^^ 
 
 03 _i3 
 
 H 
 
 *t pja 
 
 03 *n 
 
 *J t. 
 
 05 
 
 O 03 
 
 2 
 
 .2 * 
 
 K 
 
 
 
 
 .2 ■<* 
 
 
 
 "3-d 
 
 
 fe-C 
 
 '0 s 
 
 MM 
 
 s 
 
 03 bX) 
 
 2 e 
 
 -a > 
 
 -C C 
 
 P4 
 
 
 H 1 
 
 »t 
 
 
 1 • 
 
 a 
 
 >> 
 
 'rt 
 
 •2 
 
 B 
 a 
 
 
 O 
 
 ^ 
 
 CO 
 
 
 
 03 
 ^5 
 
 a 
 
 
 a 
 
 
 1 
 
 03 
 
 
 
 
 "2 
 
 03 
 
 1 
 
 ^ 
 
 ■5 
 
 «i 
 
 
 
 w 
 
 3 
 
 . os 
 
 S 
 
 O 
 
 
 0} 
 
 3 
 
 a 
 
 
 
 
 
 X. 
 
 t 
 
 "35 
 
 ■ 
 
 O 
 
 J3 
 
 03 
 
 06 
 
 
 «3 
 
 -* 
 
 a 
 
 1 
 
 "I 
 
 ^^ 
 
 
 .J 
 
 
 c D e 
 
 
 O 
 
 ;>h 
 
 
 x »H 
 
 "1" l-H 
 
 c c? 
 
 — oj 
 
 0) 
 
 w^ 
 
 O D 
 
 JS • 
 
 ** ee 
 
 f*1 
 
 Hg 
 
 ■ 
 
 6 
 
 3 
 
 OS 
 2d 
 
 5 § 
 
539 
 
 .Uf 
 
 
 £ -3«* 
 
 — l, . rr 
 
 O 3 « C 
 
 ** 
 
 a e 
 
 £ 22 
 
 c5 
 
 b£3 
 
 e'c,£ * o * 
 
 « o (J i£« 
 
 • 1 8 
 
 *■■ 4> r5 x 
 
 s s 
 
 H 
 
 1 
 
 ■ 
 
 5.0 « 
 
 200 
 
 c3 to 
 
 a 
 
 2 B 
 
 -J- 
 
 — 
 
 a a> 
 
 I 3 
 
 i 
 
 -G CO i» 
 GO 
 O 
 
 o £ 
 
 o 
 
 ||si 
 
 s J: "* 
 
 a M^3 
 
 si fii 
 
 0) ts . 
 
 >-» 4> 
 
 - — * s 
 h a - 
 s » - 
 
 • - o u 
 
 ci "J 
 
 . w 
 
 u ■— « 
 o . 
 
 0* ~ 
 
 §5i 
 a J. 
 
 o 4 
 .2 >» 
 
 Or 
 
 
 01 2 
 
 •? 
 
 c o 
 « •— • 
 
 c 2 
 
 O-Q 
 2- 
 
 ■5<< 
 
 ~ aJ 
 
 o *" 
 
 « o 
 
 s ? 
 
 2 1 
 
 - * 
 03 o 
 OJ DC 
 
 3 ~ s 
 
 o o 
 
 O -o ao 
 
 •CS 2 
 •- «« o 
 
 g S'2 j 
 
 £a*J 
 
 flj o 
 
 evil 
 
 ►.2 • § 
 
 ni „ al ^ 
 
 f MS. 9 
 
 ¥1 4J s- 
 
 1 
 
 V 
 
 -3 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 c 
 
 < 
 
 J= 
 
 u 
 
 
 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 'S 
 
 -2 
 
 9 
 
 
 -5"° 
 
 0) 
 
 
 
 
 
 • , 
 
 - 
 eo 
 
 ■« 
 -= 
 
 
 c 
 
 c 
 
 O 
 
 
 
 c 
 
 J 
 
 ■ 
 
 -0 
 
 c 
 
 
 'O 
 
 IS 
 
 0) 
 
 'J 
 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 ► 
 
 
 
 "C 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 
 
 p 
 
 "g 
 
 s 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 j: 
 
 ^3 
 
 s 
 
 M 
 
 0) 
 
 ■ 
 
 "i 
 
 
 M 
 
 -5 
 
 9 
 1 
 
 - 
 
 a 
 
 d 
 
 p 
 
 
 ^2 
 
 ?! 
 
 
 
 -: 
 
 | 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 £* " 
 
 ■ 
 
 4 
 
 M 
 
 
 "^ 
 
 a 
 
 m 
 
 a 
 
 
 i: 
 
 ? 
 
 ■ 
 
 .3 
 
 ^T 
 
 V 
 
 £ 
 
 a 
 — 
 
 ._ 
 
 
 ■ 
 
 — 
 a 
 
 09 
 
 c 
 
 
 
 s 
 
 3 
 
 
 53 
 
 g 
 
 
 
 & 
 
 QQ 
 
 g 
 a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ~ 
 
 U 
 
 
 
 
 11 
 
 "S 3 
 o — 
 
 5J °» 
 
 CO 
 ■£1 Bl 
 
 ^ S § 
 
 9 I 5 
 
 O O c 
 
 2i 1 
 
 c 5 * 
 I a x 
 
 a 1 " 5 . 1 
 
 j Si? 
 
 ■5 CM 
 
510 
 
 » 
 
 o 
 
 >v 
 
 
 
 a a 
 
 O 53 
 
 o s 
 
 Ji- 
 
 2 » 
 
 c o 
 
 &i 
 
 ■ CO . JT^i 
 
 73 <n 5.^ 
 
 eg 
 
 q 
 
 > X 
 
 « 
 
 ifj O ?-* 
 
 § g 1 » 
 
 I to a 
 
 OSS 
 
 to £ *« — 
 
 § IS 
 
 eg 
 s 2 
 
 
 2 Hi" 
 
 c fa<P 
 
 03 
 
 p-3 e 
 
 P5 P 
 
 Ha 
 
 8-0 1 
 
 
 •a 
 
 R,5» 
 
 - O 
 
 a*** 
 
 © p 
 ■tJ 
 
 cd > 
 
 "to '3d 
 
 O eo 
 
 £ 2 
 O O 
 
 H 
 
 03 ^ 
 
 -° ? 
 
 ©^ 
 
 r « • 
 
 TO 
 
 o 
 O £ 
 
 «*H O 
 
 O >y, 
 
 CD a 
 
 £"« 
 
 8*8 
 
 03 £» 
 
 8 
 
 11*. 
 
 S.-8J 
 
 C 03 § 
 (^■^ CO 
 
 §■5 M 
 
 So 
 
 o.S g J| 
 
 iJ? 03 2 as 
 
 SSgS-* 
 
 «j_ jj t- a _2 
 
 ° O "co ""* &- 
 
 CO J-, 
 
 -OCa 
 $ a 
 
 fa m~~ g 
 2 2 &! >* 
 
 •B a g.s a 
 _ o ,2 S.— 
 
 a » 
 
 j3 © to ») g 
 
 co * •* '-5 "*» 
 V cdt„ . >> 
 2 -a O >>ed 
 
 5^ -6 a 
 
 £o £ s . 
 
 O 03 O « 
 
 J= 9.4 
 
 2 *-Sw 
 
 03 w *a 
 •5.S i 
 
 51 a ^ 
 c2"" « 
 a rf« 3 
 
 ^°lo§ 
 
 S3; 
 
 -fi a 5 
 
 03 P 
 
 i « sp 
 
 ^ ^^ 
 
 5 I 8 
 
 ego 
 
 |J cd 
 
 r*S •" CO 
 
 ^ Cfl 03 . 
 cj 53 +J 
 
 »uc2 § 
 
 cd _ c 
 
 J2 S S o 
 
 ffi 03 £ig 
 
 ■5 2^ 
 
 o — 
 
Of Christ. 541 
 
 The preceding table scarcely requires any comment. 
 From Genesis to Revelations, it shows a remarkable 
 coincidence and harmony of operation in the Almighty 
 Father, the Messiah, his Anointed Son, and the Holy 
 Spirit. But it is a truth too grave and solemn for 
 the human mind to meddle with, or even to attempt 
 to state in different terms from those used in Scrip- 
 ture, lest, in the attempt, any one should appear to 
 be wise above that which is written. I therefore feel 
 some anxiety that the expression, harmony of opera- 
 tion, may not be misconstrued. I wish the Truth of 
 Scripture to stand on its own foundation, and to shine 
 by its own light. And, I presume, it would be diffi- 
 cult to use any form of words, that would more 
 strongly express this fundamental Truth, than those 
 which are employed in Scripture itself, particularly in 
 the examples I have selected. Yet much ingenuity 
 has been exercised, on the one hand, to bring this 
 Truth more within the grasp of the human intellect; 
 and on the other, to reason away the import of the 
 Scripture terms used to set it forth. Extravagant 
 attempts of this sort only show the weakness and 
 vanity of the human mind; and one extreme of opi- 
 nion leads or drives to another. 
 
 When men, professing to be sound in Faith, fabri- 
 cate unintelligible mysteries, they turn away those, 
 who are resolved to use their reason, from the very 
 foundation itself. And, accordingly, what is deno- 
 minated an Enlightened System of Christianity, which 
 admits of nothing but what is obvious to Reason, and 
 
542 Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 at the same time robs the Christian Religion of its 
 spirituality, or in the words of Dr. Watts, "sinks the 
 glories of the Gospel Dispensation below its original 
 design," has been proposed to the inquirer after Truth 
 for his acceptance, with a specious shew of liberality, 
 — a system which has led more to Deism and entire 
 self-dependence in the work of Religion, than to the 
 pure vital spirit of the Gospel. 
 
 And we may perceive the dilemma in which not 
 only those are placed, who, professing themselves 
 Deists, assert what they call "a natural Conscience to 
 be sufficient, and Christianity to be as old as the 
 Creation," without any miraculous and super-natural 
 display of the Divine will to benighted mankind ; 
 and yet deny an operative internal Spirit of God — 
 viz. that of Jesus Christ to be universally diffused 
 amongst men : but those also, who, professing them- 
 selves Christians, assert a revelation from above to be 
 necessary to the work of Salvation, and to include in 
 its design, universally Jews and Gentiles; and yet 
 confine this revelation, with its benefits, to the me- 
 dium and local influence of a Written Record. The 
 first make nothing of that omnipotent effective Wordy 
 in the beginning with God, without which no blessing, 
 moral or physical, ever was, or can be attained ; and 
 the last nullify in effect the Spirituality of the Gospel 
 Dispensation, which came to direct mankind from 
 types and ceremonies, and written ordinances, to the 
 living eternal substance of all true Religion — to the 
 law written in the heart, — to the kingdom of Heaven 
 
Of Christ. 543 
 
 within them, — to the Grace of God which hath appeared 
 unto all men, — to the anointing that needeth no man's 
 teaching, — to the spirit that quiclceneth, — to the tight 
 that lighieth every man that cometh into the world, — to 
 the implanted word, the incorruptible seed, — to Christ 
 within, the Hvpe of Glory, the Power of God, and 
 the Wisdom of God, — the wonderful Counsel- 
 lor, the Mighty God, the Everlasting Fa- 
 ther, and the Prince of Peace. 
 
 After what has been said, I apprehend, it will 
 scarcely be necessary for me to attempt to prove, that 
 the Spirit was in all the Lord's Prophets, and ope- 
 rated, before the outward appearance of Christ, in 
 the hearts of men universally, by its immediate power. 
 For it is clearly implied in Scripture that the spirit of 
 God strove with the rebellious, so long as their 
 thoughts and imaginations were not wholly turned to 
 evil ; and that it dwelt with the righteous as their 
 director and comforter from the beginning. On the 
 latter head we have the most ample testimony from 
 some of the Prophets themselves. 
 
 " The Lord God and his Spirit hath sent me," 
 saith Isaiah. 48. 16. " The Spirit entered into me when 
 he spake to me," saith Ezekiel. 2. 2. 3. 24. Of Daniel 
 it was testified (by a heathen indeed), that " in him 
 was the Spirit of the Holy Gods." Dan. 4. 8. 
 
 Tho Psalms of David sufficiently proclaim, that he 
 was under the same Divine influence. He prays that 
 the Holy Spirit may not be withdrawn ; petitions for 
 its return ; supplicates for its Divine aid; and rejoices 
 
544 Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 in its holy consolations. Moreover. Christ himself 
 declares, that u David in spirit calleth him Lord." 
 Mat. 22. 43. 
 
 " For many years," says Nehemiah, " didst thou 
 forbear them, and testifiedst against them by thy 
 spirit in thy prophets." Nehem. 9. SO. And Zecha- 
 riah, CJ The words which the Lord of Hosts hath sent 
 in his Spirit by the former prophets." Ch. 7. 12. 
 These examples are sufficient to show that, it was by 
 the Spirit, God revealed his will to the Prophets. 
 
 It is clear, therefore, that the passage in John, 
 where he says, " the Spirit was not yet come" cannot 
 possibly mean the actual commencement of Divine 
 Revelation by the Spirit; but must refer to that ex- 
 traordinary effusion of this heavenly gift which took 
 place on the day of Pentecost, that was promised to 
 the disciples by their Lord and Master on the eve of 
 his crucifixion ; and perhaps to the Gospel Dispen- 
 sation, as a spiritual one, open to all men, contrasted 
 with the ceremonial and partial dispensation of the 
 Law. Indeed, it is clear, that every renewed influence 
 of the Spirit was considered a new gift : and that no 
 true spiritual gift could be retained but by watching 
 and prayer. It appears to have been long after Jesus 
 had endowed his disciples with power to cast out evil 
 spirits, and that some of them, having proved its 
 efficacy, returned to him, in the joy of their hearts, 
 saying " the devils are subject to us through thy 
 name," that they relapsed into unbelief, so that they 
 were not able to heal the young man who was a 
 
Of Christ. 545 
 
 lunatic : and their master told them, with a reproof, 
 that it was because of their unbelief; for that " this 
 kind goeth not out but by prayer and fasting :" — this 
 miracle cannot be performed but by a renewed act of 
 Faith, and by watching unto prayer. 
 
 II. With reference to the second point — the pre- 
 existence of Christ in his spiritual character, though 
 it might be clearly established, by inference, from the 
 Table; yet we have the direct testimony of Christ 
 himself, as recorded by the four Evangelists, and 
 allusions to it by two of the Apostles, Peter and Paul. 
 
 Christ saith, M I and my Father are one." John 
 10. 38; and again, " Verily, verily I say unto you, 
 before Abraham was, I am/' John 8. 58. 
 
 He also interrogates the Scribes and Pharisees re- 
 specting his Divine nature in these words : " What 
 think ye of Christ ? Whose Son is he ? They say 
 unto him, The Son of David. He saith unto them, 
 How then doth David in Spirit call him Lord, saying, 
 4 sit thou on my right hand till I make thine enemies 
 thy footstool?' If David then call him Lord, how is 
 he is son ?" 
 
 We may perceive — and it is somewhat remarkable 
 — that this was one of the last of those questions put 
 to his enemies, which brought them to a stand, so that 
 they could not answer him a word. And as it appeared 
 to be his design that men should judge for themselves 
 by inference from his miracles, whether he was the 
 Messiah or not; so it appears to have been his design 
 that they should judge by inference from the prophecy 
 
 2 m 
 
546 Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 of David, whether the Messiah was anterior to David 
 or not, that is, in the beginning- with God : and he 
 urged the same truth more strongly in that decla- 
 ration, that he was before Abraham ; in order that they 
 might clearly infer, he and the Messiah were one. 
 
 As if it had been said, The miracles which I do, 
 prove that I am the Messiah ; yet ye will not believe. 
 David, by the spirit, calls the Messiah c his Lord ;' 
 yet ye will not believe the Prophet. I myself declare 
 that I was before Abraham ; yet ye will not believe 
 that I am the Christ, who, I have shewn you, was be- 
 fore David; — that I am truly the Messiah, — that 
 Seed promised to Adam, seen in the prophetic vision 
 by Abraham, and foretold by Moses — appointed to 
 restore the world from Sin, — to bring life and immor- 
 tality to light, — to point out the way to salvation by 
 the Cross, — to be the Messenger of Grace and Truth 
 — sent to preach deliverance to the captive, and to 
 the poor the glad tidings of the Gospel of Peace. 
 
 This is, therefore, a truth, which, we may surely 
 believe, cannot now be controverted, without seeking 
 to rob " the express Image of GoaV of his Divine 
 honour, and of " that eternal glory" which he him- 
 self declared, " he had with the Father before the world 
 was" John 17. 5. 
 
 In the Revelations, Christ also declares himself 
 to be the " Root" as well as " the Offspring, of 
 David." 
 
 But, further, if Christ be the " Power and Wisdom 
 of God," and " the Word of God" by whom all 
 
Of Christ. 547 
 
 things were made, as the Evangelist testifies, as well 
 as the Apostle Paul, it is absurd to argue for the 
 commencement of his spiritual existence, at the time 
 of his outward manifestation z'/z the flesh. 
 
 The Apostle Peter bears testimony to the same 
 truth when he says: "Of which Salvation the Prophets 
 have inquired, who prophesied of the Grace that 
 should come unto you, searching what, or what man- 
 ner of time the Spirit of Christ which was in them, did 
 signify, when it testified beforehand the sufferings of 
 Christ." 1. it 10, 11. 
 
 Paul also says, " They (the fathers) did all drink 
 the same spiritual drink : for they drank of that Spi- 
 ritual Rock that followed them : and that Rock was 
 Christ: 9 1 Cor. 10. 4. 
 
 In the Epistle to the Hebrews, we find the expres- 
 sion, " Jesus Christ, the same, yesterday, to-day, and 
 for ever." Heb. 13. 8. 
 
 III. I do not suppose that the opinions of any pro- 
 fessing Christians, who have written since the time of 
 the Apostles, can add weight to the doctrines con- 
 tained in the new Testament : nevertheless, it may be 
 satisfactory to some to see how this subject has been 
 viewed by enlightened men in different ages. 
 
 It is said of Justin Martyr, who is thought to have 
 had his instruction from Polycarp, the disciple of 
 the Evangelist John, that he understood by the 
 term Logos or c word* of this Evangelist, not the 
 reasoning faculty of the human mind, but the ema- 
 nating reason of the Divine nature. This Divine 
 2m2 
 
548 Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 reason he conceived to have inspired the Hebrew 
 Prophets, and to have been the Christ, who appeared in 
 flesh. He supposed it to have been participated not 
 only by the Hebrew patriarchs, but by the more ex- 
 cellent Pagan philosophers. Having been a Pla- 
 tonist before his conversion to Christianity, he con- 
 cluded that whatever was valuable in Platonism, had 
 either been communicated to Plato by inspiration 
 from the Logos, or had been transmitted by tradition 
 from Moses and the Hebrew prophets, and might 
 therefore be justly claimed as belonging to Divine 
 Revelation.* 
 
 " That blessed principle," says Penn,+ in address- 
 ing his children, " the Eternal word, I began with to 
 you, and which is that Light, Spirit, Grace, and 
 Truth, I have exhorted you to, in all its holy appear- 
 ances or manifestations in yourselves, by which all 
 things were at first made, and men enlightened to 
 salvation, is Pythagoras's great Light and Salt of 
 Ages ; Anaxagoras's Divine Mind ; Socrates's good 
 Spirit; Timaeus's unbegotten Principle and Author 
 of all Light; Hieron's God in Man; Plato's eternal, 
 ineffable, and perfect Principle of Truth; Zeno's 
 Maker and Father of all ; and Plotin's Root of the 
 Soul : who, as they thus styled the eternal word, so 
 the appearance of it in man wanted not very signifi- 
 cant words. A domestic God, or God within, says 
 Hieron, Pythagoras, Epictetus, and Seneca; Genius, 
 
 • See General Biography, vol. 5. Art. Justin, 
 t See Fruits of a Father's Love, § 13. 
 
Of Christ. 549 
 
 Angel, or Guide, says Socrates and Timaeu the 
 Light and Spirit of God, says Plato ; the Divine 
 Principle in man, says Plotin ; the Divine Power and 
 Reason, the infallible immortal Law in the minds of 
 Men, says Philo ; and the Law and living Rule of the 
 mind, the interior Guide of the Soul, and everlasting 
 Foundation of Virtue, says Plutarch." 
 
 The following passage from Cowper is likewise so 
 apposite to my purpose, that I cannot deprive myself 
 of the pleasure of quoting it. 
 
 u The Lord of all, himself through all diffus'dj 
 Sustains, and is the life of all that lives, 
 Nature is but a name for an effect, 
 Whose cause is God. He feeds the secret fire, 
 By which the mighty process is maintained, 
 Who sleeps not, is not weary : in whose sight, 
 Slow circling ages are as transient days ; 
 Whose work is without labour ; whose designs 
 No flaw deforms, no difficulty thwarts : 
 And whose beneficence no charge exhausts. 
 Him blind antiquity profan'd, not serv'd, 
 With self-taught rites, and under various names, 
 Female and male, Pomona, Pales, Pan, 
 And Flora, and Vertumnus ; peopling Earth 
 With tutelary Goddesses and Gods, 
 That were not, and commending as they would 
 To each some province, garden, field, or grove. 
 But all are under One. One Spirit — His 
 Who wore the platted thorns with bleeding brows ^ 
 Rules universal nature. Not a flower 
 
550 Of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 Bnt shews some touch, in freckle;, streak, or stain, 
 
 Of his unrivall'd pencil. He inspires 
 
 Their balmy odours, and imparts their hues, 
 
 And bathes their eyes with nectar, and includes 
 
 In grains as countless as the sea-side sands 
 
 The forms, with which he sprinkles all the earth. 
 
 Happy who walks with Him ! whom what he finds 
 
 Of flavour or of scent in fruit or flow'r, 
 
 Or what he views of beautiful or grand 
 
 In Nature, from the broad majestic oak 
 
 To the green blade, that twinkles in the Sun, 
 
 Prompts with remembrance of a present God."* 
 
 It does not seem to be necessary that I should say 
 more on this part of my subject. To prove the Pro- 
 position, we have the testimony of enlightened men 
 confirmed by Scripture ; and I know not that we 
 can establish a Truth of this nature on more solid 
 grounds. 
 
 After what has been said, therefore, in the pre- 
 ceding pages, we may, I think, adopt this general 
 conclusion — that as the unprejudiced, uncorrupted 
 dictates of what is called a Moral Faculty, Sense, or 
 Principle, or Conscience, (taken in its comprehensive 
 meaning), may be resolved into true spiritual mani- 
 festations, or immediate Divine Revelations, and are 
 identified with the limited effusions of the Holy 
 Spirit in the ordinary state of mankind, universally ; 
 so the inference seems to be warranted from Scrip- 
 ture that all Spiritual Manifestations, Divine Unc- 
 
 * Task, Book 6. 
 
Of Christ. 551 
 
 tion, Grace, or Illumination, may be resolved into 
 the heartfelt operation of the Virtue, Living Power, 
 and Influence of Christ ; and, lastly, the Revelations 
 of Christ, and the Holy Spirit, are resolvable into 
 the will and counsel of one Eternal omniscient God, 
 and Almighty Creator of the Universe. 
 
 FINIS. 
 
 London : Printed by William Phillips, 
 George Yard, Lombard Street. 
 

 ^BERKELEY 
 
 t T> 21A— l5w-4,'63 
 L CD6471sl0)476