"",'lii i iii 'i M""! '■ti?!'!Lii«.'i'W""iii'i— '■ rii i I ,■ a; 
 
 "THOU 
 ^HAT TEACHEST 
 ;. ANOTHER I 
 TEACHEST THOU NOT 
 THYSELF?"
 
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 of the 
 
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 REC'DMUT 
 
 
 -9-15»)(-8,'24
 
 THE CONNECTION 
 
 BETWEEN 
 
 THOUGHT AND MEMORY 
 
 A CONTRIBUTION TO PEDAGOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY 
 ON THE BASIS OF F. W. DORPFELD'S MONO- 
 GRAPH " IJENKEN UND GEDACHTNIS" 
 
 '/^V 
 
 WITH AN IN 
 
 SQWi^&f^URfcALbUHi 
 
 G. STANLEY II.VIy.L,j|^^^,. ^, . 
 
 President of Clark University 
 
 BY 
 
 HERMAN T. LUKENS, Ph.D. 
 
 DOCENT IX CLARK fNIVEKSITY 
 
 BOSTOX, U.S.A. 
 
 D. C. HEATH & CO., PUBLISHERS 
 
 1895
 
 CorVKKiHT, 1806, 
 
 By Hekman T. huKEXS. 
 
 TTMMiBAi-iiv iir C. J. I'rrri'.KH * Son, Boston. 
 
 F»W»«W">BK BY S. J. I'ABKinLI, & CO.
 
 
 STATE NOfiJWALSCH.H,. 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 A SHOKT time ago a teacher complained to tlie author 
 that she could not get any real help in her school-work 
 from reading ps3'chologies and books on education. It is 
 hoped that the following book will give help to such teach- 
 ers, not only by the central idea that stands out so promi- 
 nently, but by its copious illustrations and descriptions of 
 mental phenomena, as well as by the practical applications 
 in the last chapters. The teacher needs descriptive j^si/chol- 
 ogy far more than metaphysical psychology. 
 
 Even a few simple exercises, such as those recommended 
 
 on page 5 for grammar school pupils, would greatly help 
 
 teachers toward appreciating the character of the mental 
 
 processes with which they have to deal. Observation work 
 
 ^ thus begun will be found so interesting and attractive that 
 
 J it will easily lead to further introspection and study of the 
 
 **> laws of association (cf. pp. 41, 42). But still more help 
 
 will be gained if teachei's will watch how their own pupils 
 
 think and reason. Make notes of the observations, and 
 
 compare them with such records as those reported in the 
 
 Pedagoijical Seminary, vol. ii. pp. 358-396. 
 
 There is nothing in all of this that any bright teacher 
 cannot readily understand. But the mistake is too fre- 
 quently made of supposing that whatever the teacher 
 learns she must forthwith tell her pupils. Nothing could
 
 iv rUKl ACK. 
 
 U" more fatal to good toachiii;-: tlian to attempt to make 
 the chilli think logiciilly, or k-aru lessons by the Herbartian 
 forin:U stei>s. Jiut every teacher should know how chil- 
 ilrvii do think, and what the necessary steps in acquiring 
 knowKnlge rtnilly an-, so as to be able to get out of the 
 way anil not hinder the pupil's progress, as well as to be 
 able when necessary to givi* just the help that is needed. 
 
 The monograph treatment is eminently adapted to a 
 work of this kind. Two of the most helpful and sugges- 
 tive lKK)ks for teaehers are already published in this form : 
 llaih'stiK'k's Jlahlt and Its Importance in Education, and 
 I-oiige's Apperception. It is earnestly hoped that others 
 will follow. Until the chief points in school-work are 
 thus treated, we cannot expect any firm basis for a general 
 work, nor would i\w teachers get much assistance from 
 such general reading. For self-instruction, the teacher 
 needs clearness, fulness, and practical apjjlicatio^is. These 
 are the qtialities aimed at in a monograph. 
 
 The (Jerman monograj)h on which the following work 
 is ha.s«'d grew out of round-table conferences in a teachers' 
 reading circle formed for the purpose of study in educa- 
 tional psychology. In writing a book for American teach- 
 ern I havi; tried to keep true to the best ideals in the 
 fJ**nnan, while at the same time being perfectly free to 
 a«ld to, omit, or modify, any statement or ideas whatever. 
 When I visited Kector Dorpfeld in ISOO, to talk over these 
 and other matters with him, he not only gave me full per- 
 niiHsi«.n to translate his work, but urged me to make any 
 chiuiges and a/lditions 1 saw tit. Thus it has come to pass
 
 that this work, while quoting very largely 'trom Dorpfeld's, 
 and being based on it so far as its essential central idea is 
 concerned, is yet in no strict sense a translation. When- 
 ever better ideas have been found elsewhere, they have 
 been unhesitatingly substituted. The explanation of the 
 common origin of the two laws of memory, for instance, is 
 radically opposed to the view expressed by Dorpfeld and 
 all other Herbartians. But I do not believe in the Herbar- 
 tian view on this ])()int, and hence have re-written that i>art 
 entirely. The same is true of many other less important 
 parts. All of the bibliographical references, and likewise 
 many of the illustrations, are additions. 
 
 On the other hand, everything that was essentially Ger- 
 man and local in its allusion has been omitted. For the 
 many controversial points with other German educators, and 
 long explanations applicable to religious instruction in 
 Germany only, the reader is referred to the German work. 
 It is now in its fifth edition, in the present issue of the 
 Collected Works of F. W. Dorpfeld, 11 vols. Giitersloh ; C. 
 Bertelsmann, 1894-1895. Dorpfeld died in October, 1893. 
 
 In conclusion, I wish to thank President G. Stanley Hall 
 
 and Dr. Wm. H. Burnham for their encouragement and 
 
 help in the work of revision and of publication. I am also 
 
 greatly indebted to the following friends : President Charles 
 
 De Garmo, Dr. C. C. Van Liew, Dr. Charles A. McMurry, 
 
 and Dr. Frank j\[. McMurry, for valuable suggestions 
 
 while the book was passing through the press. 
 
 H. T. L. 
 Clakk University, June, 1805.
 
 TABLE OF CONTEXTS. 
 
 I'Ac; !•: 
 
 Pkefack i'i-v 
 
 IXTKOUrcTiox, by rrosidcut G. .Slaiilfy Hall ix 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Preliminaky 1~^ 
 
 Statement of the TroWLMii, 1. —Orientation and p:xi)lanatiun of 
 Terms, 3. —The Study of Psychology in the Elementary School, 
 5. — Clearness of Ideas, 7. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 The Processes of Thought and Memoky S-:'.8 
 
 A. Of Thought, 8-24. 
 
 Comparison, 8. —Conceptions^ 9. — Spontaneous Concepts, .11. — 
 Judgment, 12. — Reasoning, 14.— Graphic Syllogi.sm, 17. — For- 
 mation of Sense Percepts, 19. — Elements of Thought, 'Jl.-?*- 
 -> Simple Ideas, 2:5. — Pibliograpliical Note, 24. 
 
 B. Of Memory, 24-38. 
 
 Definitions, 25. — Examples, 2().— Memory in Conception, 28.— 
 In Judgment, ;^. — Spontaneous Judgments, .31.— Memory in 
 Reasoning, 3.3. —In Perception, :i4. — Apperception, 3.5. — Sum- 
 mary, 3G. — Bibliographical Note, ;i8. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 The Laws of Thought and Memoky 30-88 
 
 A. Of ?J EMORY, .39-."):'>. 
 Derivation of Laws of Association, .39. — Ari.stotle, 39. — Des- • 
 cartes, 43. — Herbart and the Recent Writers, 4.5. — Relative Im- 
 portance of the Two Laws, 49. — Bibliographical Note, 52. 
 vii
 
 viii TABLK OF CONTEiSTS. 
 
 PACK 
 
 B. Ok TiioroHT, ri.Wl8. 
 
 Plff«»npiict» bt'twiH'n tho Law.s ot I'sychology iiud those of Logic, 
 
 "* <i«>ii(<tio Orilor of t'miiiiiirison, .liulgment, :intl Conception, 
 
 rii«» Sinj;li« Tlumjjlit-rroci'Sii, 'u. — SuiRTordinato iiuil Sub- 
 
 ' luvpts, M. — Exiimplcs. .V.I. — Chiltlreu's Use of Lan- 
 
 I.;inj;uu;;i< not a Truo Mirror ot tlio Mental Processes, 
 
 • •">. riiv Law tif Concept ii>n, 7'_'. — Causes of Spontaneous Judg- 
 
 iiiviilK, 7.1. — Exaniple.s, 74. — Disappointed Exi)ectation, 77. — 
 
 Tlirvf Forms of Jud^nient.s, .so. — Comparison of Laws of Tliouglit 
 
 and \(oiiitirk', 8'J. — Imagination, Hi. 
 
 IMI.M'TKK IV. 
 Al'IM.K ATIOV T»» PKDACJOr.Y . . . ..L 89-127 
 
 .vl- 
 
 I. imitations, M>. — Steps in Aciiuiring Knowledge, 00. — Memory 
 
 ill Appen-eption. !>.J. — Ways and Means of Committing to Mem- 
 
 ■" - o f .Mumur i it i i i g . !>". — Ivelative Value of liational 
 
 \s.s<Mi:itiuM in Intensity, Extent, and Direction, 
 
 -1 ■ill. iMi Mils Mi-nioriziiig, 102. — Immanent ^Memorizing, 
 
 III7. — Two Kornis of Hepetition. lO'i. — Treatment of Iveviews, 
 
 M-. — Advantages and Disadvantages of Mechanical Repetition, 
 
 lU. — lift S«TV ice sometimes Indispensable, 11!). — Ilecapitula- 
 
 liiMi, 121. — Mnemonics. l'_';t. — Elibinghaus's Experiments on the 
 
 Mviiior)', 1U5. — Hihliograpliy of tho Herbartian School, 127. 
 
 CMAl'TEIl V. 
 
 Il.M-^TItATIOXS TAKKN I l!(»M TIIK SUBJECT.S OF TUE 
 
 ('( ItUKl I.IM 128-1.58 
 
 Kirxt Kxiiiiiph! — History, 12K-141. 
 
 *^ d Kxiiiiiple — Natural Science, 141-14.">. 
 
 Exiiiiipli- — .Sideeti<ins to bo learned by beart, 14.'')-148. 
 l-.Miiui Example — Arithmetic, HS-L^S. 
 
 CIIAPTEll VI. 
 
 Hrw.: ...: ' -Mi.fsioN 159-10.5 
 
 likVKHKSCm LWT OK UUUKH 1G6-109
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Dr. Hermax T. Lukkxs, to whom we owe tlie presenta- 
 tion in so attractive English form of this most noted work 
 of one of the best German teachers of pedagogy, and wlio 
 as I write has just been advanced in Clark University from 
 the position of Honorary Fellow to Docent, is one of the 
 most accomplished and promising men in that choice group 
 of young Americans who have studied Education in a post- 
 graduate and professional way in Europe and at home, and 
 have deliberately chosen the work of teaching pedagogy as 
 their calling. Unlike too many members of this group, 
 Dr. Lukens, although thorouglily trained in Herbartian 
 pedagogy and in sympathy with it, does not regard it as 
 tlie consummate formidation of educational theory, nor 
 attempt to apply its ruln-ics blindly and without change to 
 the very different material and environment of American 
 pedagogy, but has felt it necessary to supplement Herbart, 
 both by modern child-study, and by some practical acquaint- 
 ance with experimental psychology. It is this that makes 
 Dr. Lukens competent to present us with a condensed 
 digest, instead of a literal translation, and to enrich these 
 pages with copious and valuable notes that render this 
 volume more valuable than the original. This, and many 
 other signs of the times pointing in tlie same direction, sug- 
 gests how speedily our country is outgrowing its excessive 
 
 ix
 
 X INTKOOrcTlOX. 
 
 ivveiviice for the (.Herman siu'culatois of half a century ago. 
 Thht thoro ;nv still some to whom it seems the acme of 
 phiK>s«>phi<' or petlagogio attainment to interpret the tomes 
 of those great and useful, but now obsolescent, writers is a 
 note c»f provincialism from which, if all indications do not 
 fail, we are siK)n to be emancipated. 
 
 Save healtli alone, there is no more important and prac- 
 ticjil topic for teachers to stud}- than that to which this 
 little lMM»k is devoted. Its subject-matter is presented in a 
 clear and elemental manner sure to have speedy fruit in 
 the s<'ln>olr«H»m, and it is worthy the attention of all prac- 
 tical teachers, to whom I have no hesitation in recommend- 
 iiig it. I cannot forebear laying still more stress than does 
 Hector D<')rpf<dd on the distinction, not only between imma- 
 nent and intentional memorizing, but between immanent 
 and intentional thinking. The latter is, of course, chiefly 
 dealt with in books, but the former is incalcAilably more 
 imiMtrtant; and to know something of the mysterious nature 
 of memory and of thought is one of the chief objects of the 
 new study of children. 
 
 G. STANLEY HALL. 
 
 I • \HK iNIVKItSirY, 
 
 Woin K!*TKit, .Mass., S<j,t. 17, JS'J5.
 
 STATE NUfiJttALSCHixw 
 
 THE 
 
 OOlSrjS'ECTIOK BETWEEN THOUGHT 
 
 A]SrD MEMORY. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PRELIMINARY. 
 
 There are undoubtedly iiiuny more books written al)out 
 the memory than about any other faculty of the human 
 mind. Great power of retention is fascinating to most 
 people and easily appreciated. The '' memory doctors " 
 are accordingly numerous, and reap a rich harvest, not- 
 withstanding repeated exposures. Thinking is, however, 
 somewhat more ditficult than remembering, and therefore 
 less attractive for most of us. But every educator, at 
 least, is interested in both divisions of our subject, and 
 must come to some conclusion in his own mind as to the 
 relation that these two. activities should bear to each other. 
 For centuries past many questions relating to thought and 
 memory have been discussed with great warmth and ear- 
 nestness. Which of these two faculties is the more im- 
 portant for culture ? Should the memory be cidtivated 
 more at one period of life, and the development of the 
 thinking powers be left for another period ? Is the great 
 importance given to memory a hindrance to productive 
 thinking ? Or, vice versa, does the too early cultivation of 
 the thinking powers weaken the memory ? There is no 
 
 1
 
 2 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 topic «>f instruction, ami no probloni of moral education 
 into which tliese considerations do not enter at all periods 
 of tl>o child's development. 
 
 AltiiouK'h our theme end)raecs, to be sure, two subjects, 
 yet the jxiint of view for their consideration is merely 
 the r,/ation in which they stand to each other. Accord- 
 ingly, there is no need of presenting either all that is known 
 about thought, nor all that is known about memory, but of 
 each subject only so much as is requisite in order to explain 
 the relation between these two mental activities — first of all 
 j»sychologically, and then ai)plied to practice in the school. 
 In the second phu'e, it must not be lost sight of that it is 
 mainly the practical field of ai)plication that gives the sub- 
 ject its broad extent. Let us take an analogous example in 
 physics. The laws of gravitation govern the material world 
 of the whole universe. Nevertheless, the conception of the 
 fon;e of gravitation, together with the most important gen- 
 end laws relating thereto, can without difficulty be made 
 intelligible by the helj) of well-chosen illustrative examples, 
 together with something of the practical application of these 
 general laws. It would be quite another thing, however, 
 to trace out their application in all directions and ramifi- 
 cations, — in the field of astronomy, geology, meteorology, 
 etc. ; further, of architecture, mechanics, navigation, and 
 the many other applied arts. What is possible in physics 
 will j)n)bably ahso Ix; possible in psychology. 
 
 Let us note once more our j)roblem distinctly. In the 
 psyoliological portion of our work we have to consider the 
 thinking j»r<x'e.s8 as well as the memory, in so far as is 
 necessary to explain their mutual relation; the practical 
 application neeils to be f(jlh)wed only as far as is requisite 
 on the one hand to make tlie above results still somewhat
 
 STATEMENT OF THK IMtOHLEM. 6 
 
 clearer, and on tlie other hand to help the reader to think 
 for himself. 
 
 The mental processes or activities are, as is well kno^s•n, 
 divided into three main classes, — activities of cognition 
 (intelligence), emotion (feelings), and volition (desires and 
 will). 
 
 The consideration of our theme will have to do, for the 
 most part, with the activities of cognition; first, because 
 thought and memory of themselves belong to this class, 
 although they stand in very close relation to both of the 
 others ; secondly, because the feelings and desires, being 
 more vague and indefinite in their very nature, present 
 much greater difficulties to closer observation and intro- 
 spection. 
 
 Knowledge begins with perceptions through the five 
 senses, — sight, hearing, smell, taste, and feeling (touch, 
 muscular sense, etc.).-' This is, however, not to be un- 
 derstood as if the sense impressions forthwith produced 
 actual perceptions. They result first of all only in sensa- 
 tions. A perception does not form until a sensation has 
 been frequently repeated, and only after certain other 
 psychic processes have taken place. 
 
 The reader should notice from this that the formation of 
 
 1 "Whoever wants to, can, even hei'e at the outset, plunge headlong into 
 philosophical and theological speculations, with all their old and all their 
 new controversies. Sensualism here, idealism there, and so forth. Let 
 the reader remember, therefore, once for all, that we are going to concern 
 ourselves with facts of experience in psijchology — not in how far meta- 
 physical doctrines can he spun from them, but simply in so far as they are 
 able to give clearness and support in our pedagouical practice. In this 
 sense we may accept the old dictum: Nihil est in intellcctn, quod antea 
 non fuerit in se?isw, understanding it to mean. There is nothing in the 
 intellect that docs not presuppose sense-perceptions.
 
 4 THOUGHT AND MILMOUY. 
 
 clear jH-n-eptions is far from bi-ing so simi)le as it at first 
 view seems and is generally considered. If a teacher is 
 in., hly familiar with the subject of the origin of 
 
 .^.; ,. he n>av assume as certain that in instruction 
 
 he will lUJike many mistakes, even in the very first stages 
 »»f the lesson, in particular by expecting more of the pupil's 
 power of iHTception than he is capable of. A step farther. 
 If such a knowledge of psychology is required in order to 
 give even an object-lesson jjroperly, where things can be 
 presentinl immediately to the senses, how much more neces- 
 sarv is it when the object must be represented in language, 
 iu which case the imagination must assist. 
 
 Hesitles the senses, the mind has still another source 
 of knowledge. The senses make report only of the phe- 
 nomena of the outer world ; i.e., of the things, properties, 
 prtK-esses (and their relations) in the world of matter. 
 They say nothing, on the other hand, of the phenomena in 
 the mind. These latter processes, belonging to the world 
 of spirit, make themselves known immediately through 
 consciousness. Thus the mind gains ideas not only of the 
 things and processes outside, but also of the phenomena of 
 its own inner life, especially of ideation itself, of feeling, 
 exercise of will, and the relations existing between these. 
 IIjiw else would the science of psychology be possible ? 
 And all the (jther sciences of mind — logic, ethics, law, 
 thcoh^gy, jx'dagogy, i)sychiatry, a'sthetics, philology, etc. — 
 '• ■ 'ssentially from this second source. 
 
 :<• is a 8i)ecial reason why pedagogy should turn its 
 lu to this sec(»nd source of knowledge. Those sub- 
 
 t the curriculum that have most directly to do with 
 
 'T-forming, as literature on its . humanistic side 
 
 and history, belong in so far to the held of psychology.
 
 THE STUDY OK PSYCHOLOGY. 6 
 
 This is shown by the vast array of names and expressions 
 there met with, that refer to mental qualities, states, and 
 processes. The usual method of presentation aims to 
 bring these concretely before the pupils' minds by the his- 
 toric events, and by associating these latter with events 
 in the experience of the pupils. But the teacher must be 
 concerned to see to it that meanwhile this second source 
 of knowledge in the pupil's mind is actually at Avork; i.e., 
 that the words call up corresponding processes and states 
 in the mind. The teacher can do considerable to help in 
 this in two ways, the first of which is applicable through- 
 out the whole course, from the lower grades up ; the second 
 is only possible in the upper grades. 
 
 The former work will be accomplished if the teacher 
 directs the pupils' attention to psychic processes and states 
 as they occur in the lesson, and does his best to make 
 them definite and distinct. Three objects will be gained 
 by this : first, this kind of instruction will be in the highest 
 degree in tlie interest of character-building; secondly, the 
 pupil learns to be observant of his inner life ; and thirdly, 
 he is collecting in this way a desirable store of psycho- 
 logical material and expressions for use later. 
 
 The second part of the work consists of a number of 
 separate lessons in psychology, using the material collected 
 as above. In these lessons nothing more is needed than 
 an arrangement and review of this material by topics; 
 e.g., expressions of knowing (to deliberate, to consider, to 
 find out ; silly, wise, ingenious ; judg- 
 ment, question, statement, etc.) ; expressions of feeling (to 
 
 mourn ; sad, desperate ; joy, sorrow, 
 
 etc.), and expressions of willing (to resolve ; stub- 
 born ; purpose, etc.). Rightly managed, this may
 
 G THOUGHT AND ISIEMORY. 
 
 witli profit be beguu with children of ten or eleven 
 years. 
 
 The jieroeptions of sense from without, together with 
 thuso of consi-iousness from within the mind, form the fun- 
 dainentjU stock in trade of the intellect. Out of this raw 
 material the soul creates new forms of knowledge, — con- 
 cepts and imaginary ideas, judgments and conclusions. We 
 may compare the intellectual activities of the soul to the 
 commercial and industrial activities of the people. We 
 di.stinguish here, (1) original production, which by agricul- 
 ture, mining, etc., furnishes raw material ; and on the other 
 hand, (2) manufactures, which make the raw goods into 
 sometliing better; and lastly, (o) commerce and transpor- 
 tation, which effect the exchange of goods of both kinds 
 Ix'tween different regions. In this comparison we would 
 call the sense perceptions (together with the inner per- 
 ceptions) the intellectual raw production, and the other 
 activities beyond these, mental manufacture and commerce. 
 Now we are going to include all of these higher activities 
 of knowledge, with the exception of imagination,^ under 
 the name of "thinking." Ordinary usage gives to the word 
 a wi<ler .sense; e.g., in the expressions, Who would have 
 tlidiight it (exjiccted or imagined it) ? Think of yourself 
 in my place! What do you think of my new hat? 
 
 The word " concept "' is also used in several different 
 senses. In tlie following pages it is always to be under- 
 stwKl as equivalent to '< general notion." Conception is 
 employed as the name of the process by which concepts 
 are formed. 
 
 ' Tti a wMor Honso. iniacination i.s inclnded in thinking, since it, too, 
 i'l<Ms; but th(;H(! ,ire never abstract, if the imagination alone 
 
 ■ 1.
 
 USK OF TERMS. 7 
 
 " In all thought the greatest heaiity is the greatest eleamess." 
 These arc very nearly the words with which Keclor Dorpl'cld began 
 a conversation w ith nie in the sunuuer of l.S!>0, when 1 visited him 
 to consult about the subject of this work. Every one will do well 
 to bear this advice ever in mind, and never be satisfied with a 
 thought until it is followed out to its logical conclusions, and is as 
 clear as it is possible to make it. Confusion of ideas is fatal to all 
 sound work. In an article by Fullerton, Oh Siniienesn and Identiti/, 
 in the Publications of the University of Pennsylvania, No. 1, there 
 are enumeratti.l and illustrated no less than srven different meanings 
 of the word ''same," which, one would think, shouhl certainly keep 
 the "same" meaning better than any other word in the language. 
 Yet, as the author points out, this very term has led to a host of 
 misunderstamlings and false reasonings in systems of philosophy. 
 Most of the prolonged and fruitless discussions in which we engage 
 are based on a difference of use in our words, and the consequent 
 misunderstandings they occasion. This is especially true of the 
 mental sciences. 
 
 The use of the word "concept" adopted in this book agrees 
 with that of the great majority of writers on psychology, both in 
 this country and in England. Indeed, I know of but two conspicu- 
 ous exceptions. These are De Garmo, in his translation of Lind- 
 ner's Psychology; and secondly, perhaps following this use of 
 concept as equivalent to idea in its generic sense, M. K. Smith in 
 her translation of Ilerbart's Psychology. I call attention to this 
 difference in use, to prevent confusion.
 
 ClIAri'KIJ IT. 
 
 TirE PROCESSES OF THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 A. (>i- Thought. 
 
 As already explained, avc understand by ''thinking" 
 (^iii the nariDwer sense) all of those intellectual activities 
 which, out of the raw material of the senses and inner 
 ]x?rcei»tions, produce new material ; viz., higher (abstract) 
 ideas. These at^tivities are usually divided into : compar- 
 ing, distinguishing, forming concepts, judging, reasoning, 
 etc. This division is not wrong; but if we examine these 
 pHK-csses closely, we shall find that they all agree in hav- 
 ing essentially to do with ideas, and differ only in the man- 
 ner t>f presentation. 
 
 Let us examine these processes singly. For simplifica- 
 tion we will take the comparison of two objects, say two 
 plants, tliat are not present to the senses. In order to 
 iouipare them, they must be so well known that their 
 mental images can be distinctly recalled to consciousness. 
 Thereupon those jjroperties are sought out in which the}'^ 
 lioth agree. When these are found and noted, — i.e., pre- 
 s«M»te(l to tlie mind singl}', — the process of comparison has 
 in so far reju'lied its end. It is, so far as w^e are now con- 
 ' ■■■'"•d, tlje same as if the objects themselves were pres- 
 •'» tlie sen.ses. In the latter case the qualities of 
 tin- objects would be presented in the mind more vividly; 
 l.,!t i.tlifTwise the ])rocess is the same. 
 
 " will take next the forming of conceptions; and first 
 8
 
 FORMATION OB^ CONCEPTS. d 
 
 the so-called class-t-oiicepts (species, kind, family, order, 
 class, etc.). The word "mountain," for instance, is asso- 
 ciated in the child's mind at first with the perception of a 
 single elevation, which he has seen and whicli he was told 
 was a mountain. Later he becomes acquainted with sev- 
 eral more such elevations, — small and large, wooded and 
 bare, steep and gently sloping, rocky and sandy, etc. ; all 
 are called mountain. Now, since those qualities wherein 
 these elevations differed came into consciousness only in a 
 few cases, perhaps only once, while those common to all 
 occurred in every perception, and therefore by this fre- 
 quent repetition became clearer and more firmly impressed, 
 therefore as a result we find very naturally that those 
 qualities occurring seldom have withdrawn, as too weak, 
 from consciousness, while those common to all have come 
 forward in consciousness, and become distinct. Finally, 
 these latter alone remain, and are the content of the con- 
 cept. But a concept may be formed on the basis of even a 
 single observation, whenever any one or more qualities in 
 a new object stand out with such prominence as to fasten 
 the attention on them, and thus separate them from the 
 other qualities. The first time a child sees a giraffe, he 
 undoubtedly forms a concept that serves him even if he 
 never sees another. But such concepts are almost sure to 
 be faulty. The mental process is purely spontaneous and 
 involuntary. Language, although not the cause of the 
 process, has favored it very much. In the instance cited 
 above, the fact that two or more different things bore the 
 same name (naountain) aroused the attention, and so led 
 to a clearer apprehension. Secondly, the result of invol- 
 untary comparison was stop l)y step fixed in language, and 
 so gotten ready for use. Of course the child has not l)een
 
 10 THOrr.HT AND MK.MOl'A'. 
 
 of any of these ])syehie processes, not even no- 
 
 ; ^ ...a tlu- nu'uninj; of the word -mountain'' has been 
 
 gradually i-hunj;ing, h>sing one after another the specific 
 • ; iitifs. ami streni,'thenint,' into clear consciousness those 
 i.:i)nion to all. Nor has he noticed that the word has 
 narrowed its nieanin;j: (t-ontent), while it has broadened 
 its application (^extent). 
 
 AU)ve is sh«)wn the involuntary, spontaneous rise of 
 
 general notions or concepts. To be sure, this mode of pro- 
 
 " It' alone will never bring the concept to full com- 
 
 ■ iiess. For even if really so nuiny examples presented 
 tliemselves for observation that all the differing qualities 
 . ' Id W eliminated, and only the similar ones retained,— 
 .'. :. i li would be expecting a good deal, — still these latter 
 are sehUim all distinctly noticed. It is very seldom indeed 
 that we can enumerate them separately. But besides this 
 a second (b'tieiency is possible. Among those qualities 
 rightly recognized as common to all, may be found some 
 insignitieant ones; i.e., such as do not change the nature 
 of the «'oiicept. whether they are included or excluded. 
 \ higically contplete concept must, however, omit such 
 
 iiiticant characteristics, and retain only such as are 
 .rial. In order, therefore, to bring to a conclusion 
 tTiLS process of conception, and give rise to entirely clear 
 and correct concepts, something additional is necessary. 
 This is a conscious and voluntary investigation, so as to 
 get rid, on the one hand, of all the accidental character- 
 
 iiid, on the other hand, to bring into clear con- 
 
 > all those that remain and are essential to the 
 jtt. Thus in concepts of classes, or in particular 
 
 ■ l>t« of individual characters, for example, if it is 
 1 what bidongs to the essential characteristics of
 
 spontanp:ous con'ckpts. 11 
 
 S(jme lii.st()ii(uil personage (Soc-rates, Napoleon, etc.), or 
 of English nationality, this conscious and voluntary part 
 of the work assumes a greater prominence. 
 
 From the above, it seems clear that only in the field of 
 science can we expect to find proper, logically complete 
 concepts. The chief intellectual intercourse, even among 
 people of culture, has to rely on the spontaneously formed 
 general notions, which are never perfectly definite, and fre- 
 quently contain something Avrong. This accounts for many 
 misunderstandings and vain disputations. It is further 
 phiin that all words, excejat proper names, denote not prop- 
 erly perceptions, — unless it be when the child hears the 
 word for the first time, — but general notions (concepts). 
 
 Next to the formation of concepts, comes the apprehen- 
 sion of the relations between things or processes, of which 
 the causal and mathematical relations are the most impor- 
 tant. Here, too, we nuike use of the word " conceive " ; 
 and we shall find thinking in this case also is only a par- 
 ticular way of presenting ideas in consciousness. We Avill 
 take an example of the causal relation. What is the 
 origin of our conception that cold is the cause of Avater 
 changing into ice ? In the beginning it is quite sponta- 
 neous. It is noticed that with a greater degree of cold, 
 ice appears ; and again, that when the cold disappears the 
 ice vanishes. This is, however, still by no means sufficient 
 to give rise to the conception of a causal connection. For 
 there are no innate ideas waiting, as it were, for outer 
 stimulus in order to make their way into consciousness. 
 The sequence of those two phenomena (cold and ice) is 
 observed not only once, but again and again. This regular 
 and invariable sequence of these phenomena produces the 
 new idea finallv that the one thing iiiiist follow the other,
 
 12 T 1 1 ore :nr and memory. 
 
 that till' t'lu' iiluiioiuriiuii i-alls foftli tlio otlior. causes it. 
 lltTfiUK.n tlu' iflatioii bi'tween the two facts, which before 
 seciueU only teiiipoi-al, becomes apprehended as causal in 
 its oritjin ; out of iioat (after) lias become pvojiter (on ac- 
 emuit i»f, by means of). The furtlier details of this causal 
 n*l:itiun can, of ctmrse, be learneil oidy by an investii^ation 
 into the physii-al nature i>f cold and of -water. That the 
 eont'cption of mathematical relations, as they occur in 
 arithmetic, for instance, in tlie rundaiiicntal operations, in 
 proportion, etc. rests likewise on simjde elementary per- 
 cr]»tit)ns, is shown Nutliciently in the schoolroom. 
 
 \\\' roiiu' now to the foiiuation of judgments. In the 
 .simple pr«»position, *• Snow is white,'' two ideas are in con- 
 sciousness, — sul)jeft and })redicate. We have here a 
 .s<M*alled analytical judgment, since the subject-concept 
 •• .snow " properly includes in it the characteristic " white " ; 
 the hitter, in order to direct attention to it, is separated in 
 thought from that comiilex. It is the same with the 
 j»roposition, "Mint is a labiate." The latter concept con- 
 tains characteristics which are already in the subject- 
 concept so far ;rs this is completely apjirehended ; but for 
 tin* lime being it is singled (mt for emphasis, that it may 
 Ik* once for all distinctly noticed. 
 
 Let us take now an incompleled judgment, such as occurs 
 in lln' qtiestion form; e.g., Ho^v much is 3X4? Here 
 tlie j)redicate idea that belongs with the subject is still to 
 l»o sought. The ability of the i)U]iil to answer depends 
 f»n wliotlier the percejits of the numbers, of which the 
 l>redicute is comjio.sed, are so clear and so mobile in his 
 mind, that the idea sought, which he has already learned 
 idding. can now arise in consciousness. Tf this takes 
 subject and jiredicate stand side by side in con-
 
 JUDGMENTS. 1 ?> 
 
 sciousness : the judgmcMit is complete. That wliicli wmild 
 cause the pupil trouble is uujicover soinething that comes 
 properly before the act of judging ; for the latter is noth- 
 ing else than an act of mental representation, wherein two 
 concepts (in the sense of subject and predicate) stand 
 together comi)lete in consciousness. (K course the judg- 
 ment may be more complex than in the above exanii)les, — 
 if either the subject or the predicate, or both, have a 
 more complicated form. For example: — 
 
 " In tlie Acadian land, on the sliores of tlic Basin of Miiias, 
 Distant, secluded, still, tlie little village <>f Giand-Pre 
 Lay in the fruitful valley." 
 
 Here are associated with the subject (the village of 
 Grand-Pre) certain characteristics (distant, secluded, still, 
 little) ; and likewise the predicate (lay) is further, in local 
 and other respects, more exactly described (in tlie Acadian 
 land, on the shores of the Basin, in the fruitful valley). 
 In this way arises one complex of ideas there grouped 
 about the subject, and another one here forming the predi- 
 cate. This does not, however, in any way change the fact 
 that in both cases we have to do merely with the prese/ifd- 
 tlon of ideds in consciousness. Although the two groups 
 of ideas are at first held asunder as subject and predicate, 
 in order that they may be more sharply examined and 
 plainly apprehended, yet they combine again in con- 
 sciousness to a compact mass of ideas which must be 
 apprehended as a whole. The peculiarity of judgments, 
 therefore, lies in this : tliat tlie two ideas or complexes 
 of ideas separating at first as subject and predicate thus 
 become more sharp and distinct, and therefore combine 
 afterwards all the more readily. JudgnuMits are, accord- 
 ingly, a chief means of niakliKj ideas plainer, and of im-
 
 [.[ TllorcJMT AND MEMORY. 
 
 prrfsiiKj t/iiiii more Jinn ft/ on tin' niimJ. Tlu' reader Avill 
 now see at oiu-e the iiuportiuu-e nl' the art of questioning-, 
 as well as it-s speeial i)uri)ose. 
 
 It shouhl Ih" renuuketl I'luthcr. that when we speak of a 
 '•tluni.u'ht " we j^'enerally mean a judgment; but the ex- 
 nri's.sjoii iiiav. in the wider sense, also stand for a single 
 idea. 
 
 We have y^t to analy/e the process of rensmihuj. Take 
 the simplest possible example : — 
 
 Major premise: New England belongs to the United 
 StJites. 
 
 Minor premise : Massachusetts belongs to New England. 
 
 (.'oiiclnsion : Therefore Massaehusetts belongs likewise 
 to the I'liited States. 
 
 -\s is re;wlily seen, to reason is to judge. What is the 
 differenee, then, between the syllogism and other judg- 
 ments ? 
 
 Logic says: reasoning means deriving a new judgment 
 from two or more given ones. Let us look at the matter 
 entire exactly from the psyt-hologieal side, and ask what 
 takes jilace in our minds \vhen we reason. 
 
 Whereas in the simple judgment only two concepts, sub- 
 ject antl predicate, are held in consciousness, and repre- 
 sented in tlieir relation to each other, in reasoning three 
 concepts are present, and therefcn-e also three relations. 
 Ill tin- ;il«)ve example the three c(mcepts are: New 
 '" ' id. >Li,ssachusetts, and tlu^ United States. It is this 
 ■ xity that makes reasoning m<jre ditfieult than the 
 other processes of thinking; or, in other words, the effort 
 Ut hold in consciousness at tlie same time so many ideas, 
 Ui^ether with their relations, in ])eifect clearness. 
 
 In thf above example the (piestion is, AVhat political
 
 REASONING. 15 
 
 relation exists hetwecn Mussarliusotts and the United 
 States? This is supposed to he unknown, or at least not 
 yet fully determined. As a help to the mind, we insert 
 between the two eoneepts, " Massaehusetts " and '• United 
 States," which are for consciousness too wide apart, an 
 intermediar}'^ concept, " New England/' whose relation to 
 Massachusetts on the one side, and to the United States on 
 the other, is already known. 
 
 The reader will have no trouble in recognizing that this 
 help to thinking — the insertion of a middle concept be- 
 tween concepts lying too far apart — is entirely similar to 
 the help that one makes use of Avhcu one is crossing a 
 creek or ditch that is too wide to jump over. If one 
 succeeds in throwing a stone into the middle of the creek 
 to step on, thus requiring instead of a big jump only two 
 little ones, the trouble is avoided, the impossible is made 
 possible. Here ive have the secret of reasoninf/, as will be 
 shown more exactly later. The above comparison may 
 further serve to call attention to another fact. It is cus- 
 tomary to begin a s3dlogism with the so-called major 
 premise ; but, as in crossing a creek as above, the second 
 step cannot be taken before the first, so one ought in 
 reasoning to begin, not with a major premise, but w^ith a 
 minor premise ; for the movement of thought proceeds 
 most easily from the minor premise to the major premise, 
 as is shown by the very name and purpose of the middle 
 term. 
 
 Let us call to mind now the mental state after the 
 insertion of the middle term, — what is known and what 
 is still sought. Known are two relations: that of the 
 first term (Massachusetts) to the middle term (New Eng- 
 land), and (hat of the middle term to the third (United
 
 1 '. 'piiorcnr ano memory. 
 
 Si.aos) ; tlio ri'iaiiuii ul llio lirst to the third is sought. 
 This hiittT rehitiou must be contained impliedly in the 
 two kuown ones; for else it could not be inferred from 
 llitMu. l>ut since it had not previously been recognized, 
 the liglit necessary to see it must have been Avanting; and 
 if it is to be really noticed now, this illumination must 
 coiiio to it from st)me source. But whence can this light 
 oiMu«'. since the j)rocrss is a purely interjial one, and there- 
 fort? cannot rweive help from the senses ? Evidently from 
 the already known ideas, the premises. The successful 
 result depends first of all on their clearness, and secondly 
 on whether tliey are retained in consciousness until their 
 light lias spread over the third relation. If this does not 
 take place at the lirst attempt, it must be owing to the 
 fa«'t that the full illumination is wanting; i.e., that the 
 pn'liniinary ctuiditions — clearness and repose of the ideas 
 in tli«> premises — are not yet fulfilled. In such case 
 those two ideas must be repeated and kept in consciousness 
 until, on the one hand, all indistinctness has disappeared 
 from thrm, and, on the other hand, no more disturbance 
 is caused by other ideas. 
 
 We see from the above that even reasoning, Avhich at 
 first api)ears so mysterious, is nothing more than a kind 
 of mental presentation of ideas, which is distinguished 
 from otlier mental presentations only in that it depends 
 on the clearness of two other groups of ideas, and on these 
 n-uiaining clear in cdiisciousness. That this is so, and 
 indeed that reas<^ning differs from the sense perception of 
 such relations only in that the former is a purely internal 
 prfH-fss. while in the latter case the ol)jects are present 
 to the senses — of this one can immediately convince one's 
 self by representing symbolically to the senses the three
 
 f;i;Ariii<' svLLO(;isNr. 
 
 17 
 
 torms of a syllo^Msm, toLictlicr willi their rcUitions. This 
 symbolical representation is usually made by three circles 
 whose size and jxisition represent the three terms with 
 their relations. In this way, as the text-books of logic 
 show, all the figures of the syllogism may be represented 
 graphically. The circle may stand as the symbol both of 
 the content as well as of the extent of the concepts. The 
 meaning of the figures will be most easily understood, how- 
 ever, if the circles stand only for 
 the extent of the concepts. The 
 example given above belongs to 
 the first and simplest figure of 
 the syllogism, and is represented 
 graphically, as in the margin. 
 
 The three terms are here rep- 
 resented in their extent by the 
 visual image of the circles. The 
 three relations of size, together 
 
 with that of inclusion or exclusion, can be apprehended 
 completely, as if they were so many sense perceptions. 
 There is, accordingly, here no possibility of any difficulty 
 in apprehending the third relation. This is, furthermore, 
 the reason why the first example was chosen from geog- 
 raphy, since the relation of size in the three terms is here 
 of itself concrete. If the teacher Avants to make trial of 
 the above drawing with his pupils, he may try it first with 
 different words, so as to direct the attention to the size 
 only. For example, the first circle (^lass.) is smaller than 
 the second (X. E.) ; the second is smaller than the third 
 (U. S.) ; therefore, etc. If he wishes to make the process 
 still plainer and more concrete, he may place three pupils 
 of different height in a row before the class. A is shorter
 
 is Tlloldirr AND MKMOUV. 
 
 tliaii r», ami 1! is sIiuiUt than ('. H' now lie asks whether 
 A is ;Uso shurU'r than ('. everv one will be ready with the 
 answer, "Yes; certainly." From the above the reader will 
 Ih? eon vi need that irasoniii;/ irlwii it takes jdace internalbj, 
 ami icltfioiit niitirani hi'lji, is still preciscl if the same process 
 as tchrn the t/irer tthjcrts are present to tlie senses. Further : 
 that tlio suet-t'ss of the unaided internal reasoning depends 
 entirely on whether the twt) premises can be clearly pre- 
 sented and ri'tainiMl f(ir a time uiulisturbed in conscious- 
 ness. The same is true of all the other forms of the 
 syllogism. Why these latter are usually more difficult does 
 nut concern us here. 
 
 We liave now I'xamined in their main features the most 
 imjMjrtant processes (comi)arison, conception, judgment, and 
 reasoning) of the human understaiuling, and have found 
 tljat each consists of a mental presentation of ideas in 
 consciousness, or of a combination of new ideas. 
 
 iM'torc wc take up the memory, I Avant to make a remark 
 alxiut sense )»erceptions. Although this may not seem to 
 lielong to our theme, still it will later be seen that the 
 al»ove discussion, particularly one point in regard to the 
 formation of concepts, is thereby desirably supplemented. 
 Tin- mental picture of a complex object — e.g., of a mountain, 
 jiiant, etc. — is usually thought of as a mental produet that 
 lia,s come all at once into existence in this complexity, 
 just as a photograph is made by one flash of the camera. 
 Of course it looks as if we adults could certainly obtain 
 a mental picture of such an object by a momentary glance 
 of the eye. This, however, is an illusion, but more es- 
 pm-irilly in the case of a child who is just beginning to use 
 lii.-> M ii»cs. For perception even the simplest object is in
 
 FOKMATIOX OF SKNSF rEliCErTS. 10 
 
 reality coiniKmiHl. It consists of form, size, color, material, 
 weijjflit, hardness, etc. ; and the form is, in addition, com- 
 posed of elements even in the case of the simplest body, 
 namely, a sphere. In a simple tone we may distinguish 
 four elements, — pitch, color, intensity, and duration. Now, 
 the only way in which any one can secure a distinct per- 
 ception of any complex object is by quickly or slowly, or 
 even at different times, examining and noticing every char- 
 acteristic separately. Furthermore, be it remembered, 
 every characteristic must be repeatedly observed before 
 the first (obscure) impression can grow into a (clear) per- 
 ception. Such a perception is, accordingly, to be thought 
 of not as a picture made with a flash light, as it were, but 
 as a mental product consisting of a number of simple or 
 single ideas; viz., as many as there were characteristics 
 noted. In short, it is a complex of ideas. In this sense 
 the saying, " Our knowledge is piece-work," may be applied 
 here. This complex appears to consciousness, of course, as 
 a whole or unit, because the object is a unit. 
 
 As a rule, concepts also, as we have seen above, are com- 
 plexes of ideas, but of an entirely different kind. In sense 
 perception the characteristics combine in the idea because 
 they are united in the object ; on the other hand, in concep- 
 tion we have only definitely selected characteri^ics ; namely, 
 such as have been chosen by comparison of several ideas, 
 thus separating, first of all, common characteristics, and 
 afterward from these, by a more exact examination, the 
 essential ones. This knowledge that both sense percepts 
 as well as concepts are complexes of ideas, should direct 
 our attention to several other important questions. 
 
 1. Why is a concrete percept fresher, more vivid, and 
 nu)V(' cl'fcclive than tlu; corrcspoiuling concept, although
 
 '20 riiorciiT anp mk.mory. 
 
 the lattor is loss (•niiipouiKl than the former? It seems 
 uow vt'i-v jfenenilly atlmitti'd that thought is always accom- 
 jKinieil bv iiuttor inaiiit'ostations. These are, of course, 
 more pronouiu-ed in the ease of sense perceptions, and de- 
 crease iti intensity more and more as the ideas become 
 uiore abstrai't. In abstrai-t ideas of the scientific sort, this 
 motor element is reduced, it would seem, to the mere word, 
 so far as it api)ears in the innervation of the muscles of 
 speech. This being the case, it would seem clear that the 
 freshness and power of concrete ideas depends, for the 
 most part, on this re-enforcement received from the motor 
 element. Some go so far as to say that all volition, even 
 tlie calling up of the visual or auditory images in the mind, 
 is cITected by the innervation of muscles, and that the only 
 jMjssible expression of will power is through muscles. So 
 far ;vs this is true it throws important light on the subject 
 of physical culture, and gives a new reason for muscle 
 training.* 
 
 L'. Since I he single ideas which go to make a concept are 
 also contained in the different complexes of ideas out of 
 wliich they were chosen, as well as in the other complexes 
 of ideius that belong under this concept, and since, further, 
 e;u-h of these single ideas united with others occurs in still 
 very many other complexes which do not belong to this 
 i'oncept, how is one to think of the existence in the mind 
 
 • Itilmt. nloiij; witli many otiiers, accepts as "a fuiulaniental law that 
 tin- rctlox 18 tlie solo tyi)*' of all iioural action, of all relation," and hence 
 t)i;it "<'v<'r)' Ktatt' of consciousness always has a tendency to express it- 
 )"l(. to iiiaiiifrHt itself, by a movement, an act." See Ribot's Diseases 
 o/ i/ir Will, pHi/rhnlnt/i/ of AUrnlio7i, and Diseases of the Memorij, three 
 liiilf booki of r_'()-'_»00 j>:it;<*s each, full of very sn,2;g;estivo ideas for every 
 i<'.i<li<T. .M UiisirrJxTjr has basud his theory of association of ideas ou the 
 motor vhriiicnt in all thought.
 
 TIIK Kr.K.MKNTS <)K TII()r<;HT. 21 
 
 of the siiii;I(> ideas, of tlie complexes of ideas, and of the 
 concepts ? In other words, and more exactly, docs such a 
 single idea (e.g., round, four-cornered, long, short, broad, 
 narrow, bitter, sweet, learned, smart, foolish, just, etc.) 
 exist many hundred times in the mind, — once pcrhajis as a 
 single idea, then so and so many hundred times in different 
 lower and higher concepts ; then, again, so and so ijiany thou- 
 sand times in sense perceptions, — or must one think of it in 
 an entirely different way? And how do the concei)ts and 
 sense perceptions themselves exist in the mind ? This is 
 not the place to attempt a final solution of these (questions 
 by argument; but a com[)arison with another field of phe- 
 nomena that lies open to every one's observation can i)er- 
 haps put us on the track of a correct understanding. This 
 field of phenomena is human society. There are here, first 
 of all, individuals ; further, families, groups of friends and 
 relations, civil and religious communities, cities, towns, 
 states, nations, federal unions, guilds, railroad companies, 
 singing-societies, missionary societies, and all the other 
 many small and large associations for different ])urposes. 
 All of these exist; but liow do they exist ? Is the exis- 
 tence of an individual of the same sort as that of a society ? 
 Does each human being exist first as an individual, and 
 then once more as a member of a family, and once more, 
 again, as a member of society, and further, as many times as 
 there are different associations to which he belongs? To 
 be sure, we say the family, the community, the state, etc., 
 exist, and of course they do exist; but what is it in each 
 of these cases that exists hodihj? Evidently that whieli 
 exists as an actual being is only the individual. The 
 names, family, circle of friends, singing-societies, etc., de- 
 note not actual beings, but only relations of bodily beings
 
 22 TiiormiT and imemouy. 
 
 or iniliviihuils to one another. They are concepts of rela- 
 tion. That which exists in human societies is nothing 
 more than tliese rchitions, and they exist only as qualities 
 of inilividuals. Thus, for instance, friendship has its ex- 
 jsionce in the mutual affection of those concerned, — the 
 nation, in the hiui^Muige Avhicli its members speak, — the 
 .stH-ial ori,'anizations in the consciousness of common in- 
 terests, and perhaps also in sympathetic feelings, etc. 
 These relatit)ns are also sometimes very well expressed 
 in outward forms to the senses : thus nationality in the 
 audildc and visible forms of language, the other associa- 
 tions by written statutes, by symbols of recognition, etc. ; 
 but all of these are only si(/ns of the relations or real quali- 
 ties of individuals. Moreover, the associations can also 
 carry on all sorts of work, great and small, — present operas 
 on the stage, build railroads, fight battles, spread culture, 
 etc. ; but the real power that accomplishes this work is not 
 in tlie "singing-society," "railroad company,'' "state," 
 «* school," etc., but in the separate children of men which 
 have applied their hands to the undertaking. There is, of 
 course, no "spirit of the times," "class spirit," etc., in ac- 
 tual existence outside of rhetoric and poetry. 
 
 Wliat you the Spirit of tlie Ages call, 
 Is uotliing but the spirit of you all. 
 
 Faust, part i. scene i. 
 
 If accordingly one wants to know what really exists in 
 the concepts, community, state, etc., one must turn to the 
 sf»j»arate human beings. Thus, a person may be by pro- 
 f«'ssion engaged as a teacher ; the same person, however, is 
 I>or]iai»s. at tiie same time, husband, father, son, brother, 
 ote. ; in another relation the same person helps represent 
 a religious and a civil community; furthermore, a state,
 
 SlMl'LK IDEAS. 23 
 
 a schoolmasters' association, a charity organization, etc. 
 Notwithstanding all of these divisions of a person's life, 
 the person docs not become divided, but remains as he is, 
 — an individual, iiiiHrlsihlc ; and just as little is he multi- 
 plied in number, remaining what he is, — a single i)erson. 
 
 It is precisely the same with the intellectual products 
 of the mind, the separate ideas and their different com- 
 binations, — percepts, concepts, imaginary ideas, trains of 
 thought, complexes, and systems of ideas. (!orres})onding 
 to the individuals in society are here the simple ideas; i.e., 
 the partial ideas or characteristics. Such an elementary 
 idea helps at one moment, united with others, to form a 
 sense preception ; at another moment, a concept or an ima- 
 ginary idea ; and so from moment to moment still other com- 
 plexes of ideas. Nevertheless, it exists in the mind only 
 once, — just as a person exists only as a single being. All 
 complexes of ideas, on the other liand, exist in the mind 
 not as separate things outside of and in addition to the 
 simple ideas — or else each of the latter would have to be 
 present as many times as it has entered into combinations. 
 Notwithstanding this, since these complexes appear in 
 consciousness as complete wholes, they seem to be separate 
 things. All that is to be regarded as essentially existing 
 in these phenomena — aside from the constituent elements 
 or simple ideas — are solely the laws of association by 
 means of which these separate ideas are called into con- 
 sciousness at the same time. This point, — namely, that 
 only the simple ideas are the proper mental existences; 
 that, on the contrary, all complexes of ideas are only tran- 
 sient combinations, — must be distinctly understood and 
 kept firmly in mind, if one is ever to escape from the fog 
 and din of psychological discussion. TUit this also opens
 
 •J I THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 ui» a viow into tlie woiulorlaiul of the soul, so that one 
 lUtea not know which to lulniire the more, — the illimitable 
 diversity of phenomena, or the extraordinary simplicity of 
 the L'ontrolliug laws. 
 
 If l\w n'ador is at all Incllneil to follow out the relation of logic to 
 psyihulogy, and particularly of the different figures of the syllogism 
 ill sonso-poroeplioii and ahstraction, he will find a very profitable 
 tlisiHission from the Hegelian standpoint in Harris's Introduction to 
 the Sillily of Philomphy, Section V., where Dr. Harris "develops 
 some new insight into the nature of sense-perception," which he 
 "has receully discovered after many years' study on the subject" 
 (p. W). 
 
 On the processes of thought, see Dewey's Psychology, chap, viii., 
 '• Thinking" ; a clear and concise account. Sully, in chap. ix. and x. 
 of the (hitliucs of Psycholoijy, is particularly good, since his descrip- 
 tion is from the psycholo</ical standpoint, instead of from the point 
 of view of loijic, as is the case with nearly all the other text-books. 
 I'reyer's Mental Detelopment of the Child contains, p. 80-83, a sym- 
 pathetic account of the development of a child's thinking powers. 
 The formation of higher ideas is described in chap. viii. ; the influ- 
 ence of language on the development of thought, p. 159-163, and still 
 more fully in Ihtclopmcnt of the Intellect, chap. xvi. p. 3-33. 
 
 The teacher will find many clear ideas and interesting points 
 brought out in James's Psychology, I., chap. xii. and xiii. on concep- 
 tion, discrimination, and comparison. Read also chaj). ix. on "The 
 •Stream of Thought." 
 
 Baldwin (Mental Development in the Child and the Pace, 1895) 
 lay.s great stress on the motor side of thought, going so far as to 
 define conception as a "motor habit" of reaction. Hence he 
 denies all content to abstract terms, and claims that they are simply 
 "attitudes, expectations, motor tendencies." Iloyce seems to agree 
 with all of this. 
 
 ]5. Of Memory. 
 
 The expression " to commit to memory " is usually em- 
 ployed in a narrow sense, being restricted to a particular 
 manner of committing; viz., by repetition. It is sometimes
 
 THE CONTENT OF MEMOllY. 25 
 
 used in a still navvowcr sense to refer only to ideas clothed 
 in words. Wliilr Mils is all riglit so far as the meaning of 
 the word is concerned, if sanctioned by usage, we should, 
 however, bear in mind that tlie word " memory " has also 
 a nuudi larger meaning, and that there are other ways of 
 committing to memory besides rei)etition. It is nowhere 
 more harmful than in the field of psychology to take the 
 traditional and ])()i)ulav meaning of an expression as a 
 scientific guide, without due consideration. For the popu- 
 lar meaning dates usually from a time when psychology 
 " had not where to lay its head," to say nothing of scien- 
 tific recognition. - The meaning referred to above assigns 
 to memory but half its field, and restricts its action in that 
 field. This is not true of the following definition taken 
 from the Crtttitri/ Bictionari/y "MemoYy is the mental 
 capacity of retaining unconscious traces of conscious im- 
 pressions or states, and of recalling these traces to con- 
 sciousness with the attendant perception that they (or 
 their objects) have a certain relation to the past." The 
 word is also used for the powder of such retention alone ; 
 while the power or act of recalling is termed recollection. 
 While it is in the larger sense above that we use the word 
 here, we must notice these two aspects of memory. The 
 first has reference to its content, the stock of ideas pres- 
 ent, together with the associated feelings and desires ; the 
 second looks to tlie power of the mind to recall tliese to 
 consciousness. Since, however, the second presupposes the 
 content of memory, the following discussion will be con- 
 fined to the power of recollection. But the reader will 
 please bear in mind that the content of the memory in-- 
 eludes, not nu^rely this or that sjjecial kind of mental 
 product, but all kinds whatsoever, every mental state, 
 whole or partial, that has ever occupied consciousness.
 
 •26 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 "With this undorstaiulini,' avo could then at once proceed 
 to consider tlie laws of memory according to which ideas 
 are rwalled to consciousness. But such general state- 
 ments as were before made in regard to the content of 
 memory ami the power of recollection are altogether too 
 liable to present to the reader many obscure points, unless 
 they have come after the consideration of a large number 
 of observed facts. AVe shall, therefore, first present ex- 
 amples of some of the different kinds of recollection. 
 
 First of all, take those instances of which we commonly 
 tliink when we speak of memory, — the reproduction of 
 groups and trains of thought which have been intention- 
 ally committed to memory by repetition ; e.g., words of a 
 foreign language, a melody, a map, a literary selection, etc. 
 
 With these the reader may compare those recollections 
 which, while likew'ise very prominent, are not the result 
 of any intentional committing to memory. Thus we can, 
 for example, call to mind, as plainly as if present to the 
 eyes, the ai>i)earance of our father's house outside and in- 
 side, witli all its rooms and furniture ; likewise our parents, 
 otlier relatives and neighbors, and the whole landscape of 
 the liome of our childhood, with all its roads and paths, 
 mountains, valleys, woods, fields, and groups of houses. 
 Similarly we can recall with ease the mental picture of 
 other houses and places in which we have lived for any 
 considerable time. The mother tongue is also learned in 
 tliis way, so far as it takes place without regular instruc- 
 ti(»n. In all of these and similar cases there has been 
 a fnvjuent repetition of the perceptions, which fact is the 
 cau.se of the distinctness, fidelity, and certainty of their 
 roprcKhiction; but the repetition has not been intentional. 
 
 The exact reverse of these examples would be such re-
 
 EXAMPLES, 27 
 
 production as takes place after only once receiving tlu; im- 
 pression. In such cases tliere is neither intentional nor 
 unintentional repetition to help the memory. Thus, for 
 example, if the teacher after relating a story, thereuixju 
 asks cpiestions in regard to its main features, or calls for 
 its repetition at once ; or if he calls on his pupils to repeat 
 after him a sentence or a verse ; (jr if a child after he has 
 once been taken to a distant place, then has to find his 
 way thither alone. 
 
 In all of the above examples the act of reproduction is 
 prominent. l>ut there are also mental processes in which 
 the memory plays a part without our usually thinking of 
 it. These cases are for our investigation (piite as impor- 
 tant as those above, and must also be illustrated by some 
 examples. 
 
 What is meant when we say that the pupils have satis- 
 factorily understood what was told them in the history 
 lesson ? What is it that has taken place in their minds ? 
 "Let us see. First of all, the pupils have heard the spoken 
 words ; or, more exactly, they have had auditory sense 
 perceptions. In the second place, with each word and sen- 
 tence as heard the sense has occurred to their minds ; i.e., 
 the mental pictures of the things denoted by these words 
 (persons, objects, processes, and relations) have had to ap- 
 pear in consciousness. Now, all this presupposes, of course, 
 that the meaning of the expressions used was already 
 known. In order to understand what was related to them, 
 the pupils have therefore had to recall continually- to mind 
 already known ideas. At the sound of the words these 
 ideas arose from the depths of the mind into consciousness, 
 and so grouped and arranged themselves that tlie story 
 seemed to take place, as it were, before the very eyes of 
 
 %
 
 28 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 the pupils. This prtx-ess of umlorstainliug devieruls accord- 
 ingly on the working together of two entirely different men- 
 tal proeesses : — 
 
 (1.) On a new perception (tlirough the ear) ; and 
 
 (^L'.) (hi a resulting reproduction of old ideas. 
 
 When we say that such an understanding requires ima- 
 gination, we mean, first of all, to say that the persons, ob- 
 jtrts, and events, which the pupils are to think of, do not 
 stand before their eyes bodily, and therefore cannot be per- 
 ceived by the senses. The expression merely emphasizes 
 the second factor of the process, — recollection.^ 
 
 All that is said above in regard to understanding what is 
 orally related is of course true of oral instruction of every 
 kind, as well as of conversation and of reading, except that 
 in the latter case sight takes the place of hearing. In 
 short, the immediate understanding of language of any 
 kind depends on the two factors named, — the sense percep- 
 tion of the verbal forms, and the resulting reproduction of 
 the a.ssoeiated ideas. 
 
 We will now examine the process of the formation of 
 concepts, to see what i)art memory plays here. We saw 
 alx)ve how the child in an entirely natural and spontaneous 
 way prm^eeds gradually from the percept " mountain," to 
 the concept " mountain." AVhen he sees another elevation, 
 and says, *' That is a mountain too,^' this shows that the 
 former image; must have occurred to him again. Even the 
 very name used is recalled ; and this fact bears witness that 
 its meaning also, the idea, has returned more or less dis- 
 tinctly. When a third, fourth, or fifth mountain is seen, 
 
 > No nlliiKJon is liere made to that free scope which tlie imi^gination 
 ha*, or iniKht have, iu such a case as the above, iu picturing the details 
 that arc not described in words.
 
 MEMORY IN CONCEPTION AND JUDGMENT. 20 
 
 this reproduction is repeated ; for if it were not, the foniui- 
 tion of the concept couhl not proceed. All of this shows 
 plainly that even in the spontaneous rise of concepts, 
 memory is an essential factor. From step to step the new 
 perception forms the first factor, and the reproduction of 
 the corresponding earlier idea, the other factor. And it is 
 the latter that is essential to the process ; while, on the 
 other hand, the sense perception, as we shall see later, may 
 in other cases be replaced by a reproduced idea. 
 
 But the spontaneous f(jrmation of concepts must be suj)- 
 plemented by instruction. With this purpose in view the 
 teacher may have his })upils observe and compare two or 
 more objects present to their senses, or pictures of such 
 objects. If, however, the objects in question are already 
 known to the pupils, the comparison might take place as a 
 purely internal process, relying on reproduction alone. If 
 they are incorporeal in their nature, as is mostly the case 
 in the field of mental sciences (e.g., if peculiarities of char- 
 acter, moral and religious causes, social relations, etc., are 
 to be considered), the comparison cannot be otherwise than 
 purely internal ; i.e., based on reproduced ideas. The only 
 reason why school instruction seeks to present material 
 objects to the senses when they are being studied, is, on the 
 one hand, to make the comparison easier ; and, on the other 
 hand, to be able to correct any mistakes promptly, — in a 
 word, in order more certainly to secure a good result. Ac- 
 cordingly, it is not essential to the process of conception, 
 that the objects be presented to the senses ; this process 
 merely presupposes that there are concrete ideas present in 
 the mind. They form the raw material, out of which' 
 something 'new is to be created ; and it makes no difference 
 whether these were gained earlier, or were just received, or 
 were again refreshed by perception.
 
 30 THOrciHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 It is viTV simihir with tlu> I'onuation oi jmhjments. In 
 this prDC'oss, as we saw before, two ideas — subject and 
 pmlirate — eonie into consciousness together, as if they 
 belonged together in this particular relation. It was 
 further to be noticed that this separation into two of what 
 was still to be thought of as one, has the purpose and result 
 of laying greater stress on one of these ideas ; namely, the 
 predicate. The judgment, "The boy is writing," means 
 essentially nothing more than the expression, "a boy writ- 
 ing." There is, however, this important difference between 
 the two mental acts, that in the latter case the character- 
 istic " writing " is of the same dignity as the rest, while in 
 the tirst case it receives all the emphasis of a chief charac- 
 teristic. One step farther. If this selection of a single 
 feature out of a complex idea, as it is outwardly repre- 
 sented in a judgment expressed in language, is actually 
 an act of the mind, which would take place according to 
 natural laws even without the mediation of language, then 
 the formation of judgments must be just as spontaneous 
 as that of concepts. I'ut if this is so, \\o\\ does the mind 
 come of itself to adopt this judgment form ? In other 
 words, what is the natural and spontaneous process of 
 making a judgment? As preliminary to the answer, we 
 may say at once, that if, instead of an ordinary complex 
 idea (for exami)le, a boy writing), there arises in the mind 
 a judgment idea (the boy writes), or, in other Avords, if out 
 of a complex idea a single characteristic rises in conscious- 
 nes.s superior to the rest, there must have been some im- 
 pulse present to cause it. We must try to find this impulse. 
 If we discover it, all that was obscure in the making of 
 judgments will ])r()bably become clear. 
 
 There is one incentive to tlie making of judgments which,
 
 SPONTANEOUS JUDGMENT. 31 
 
 though artificial in its iiuture, school practice has known 
 from time immemorial ; and wherever it has been rightly 
 understood, it has been diligently employed. It is the 
 interrogative form. A question is, as already remarked 
 above, an incompleted, half-finished judgment; one portion 
 of a complex: idea, whether subject or predicate, is named, 
 while the other part is to be sought. IJoth subject and 
 predicate may be named, of course, in the question, but 
 in such a manner as to require some further qualification 
 of the one or tlie other. The interrogative form accord- 
 ingly makes the p\q)il notice an omission in an already 
 known complex idea, and points to it with the finger, as 
 it were. That is the external impulse. In the attention 
 thereby roused and directed to this omission, lies the in- 
 ternal impulse ; so that the idea sought is, on being found, 
 brought more strongly and separately into consciousness. 
 This completes, then, the act of judgment ; for a judgment 
 is, as we must keep well in mind, not a mysterious miracle, 
 but nothing more than the simple process by Avhich, out of 
 a conscious complex idea, a partial idea arises so strong as 
 to gain separate attention. The interrogative form is there- 
 fore an example of how through language a person may 
 intentionally lead another to make use of the judgment 
 form ; but we have yet to seek the impulse that calls forth 
 spontaneous judgment. In this case the source must be in 
 the object ; i.e., some characteristic of the object itself must 
 strike one prominently. All natural circumstances which 
 arouse the attention, — provided they direct it to some- 
 thing definite, — find their expression spontaneously in the 
 form of judgments. Every good language lesson will make 
 abundant application of this principle. Teachers have 
 every cause to pay special attention to that part of psy-
 
 32 TnorniiT and isiemory. 
 
 choloijy whii'li tivats of spontaneous attention. The most 
 prominent of those incentives to attention is contrast, 
 which we will illustrate b}' a couple of examples. 
 
 Suppose a child has, until now, seen only red roses. 
 When he sees a yellow one for the first time, his attention 
 will be roused. The present sense idea recalls the earlier 
 imago of such flowers, so that there are now two ideas in 
 consciousness. In so far as they are alike they are taken 
 in as a matter of course, and no notice is taken. The 
 differing characteristic, "yellow," on the other hand, which 
 causes tlie contrast, attracts attention, and pushes to the 
 front in consciousness. Although the i\ew object is per- 
 ceived in its totality, still •this differing characteristic is 
 prominent, and therefore gains special vividnessu It is, 
 properly speaking, a new piece of information. Now, it is 
 just this peculiar state of ideas that we call a judgment. 
 It is plain to see, moreover, why the expression, " a yellow 
 rose," in which the characteristics are co-ordinated, does 
 not satisfy the mind, but only the ^^oiVi^ecZ judgment, 
 ''This rose is yellow.''^ It makes no difference whether 
 this is spoken or not; for judgment is a purely mental pro- 
 cess. Take another example. A team of two black 
 horses is passing by. To an observer the sight would prob- 
 ably pro«luce an idea such as would find expression in the 
 
 ' The Chinese language is not inflected, and, like other languages origi- 
 nally, operalefl with word roots of only one syllable. The position of the 
 qualifying wonl Ix-fon; or after the substantive distinguishes the attribu- 
 livo from the judgment form. Thus the sound ta means, without any 
 change of form, great, greatness, and to be great. If ta stands before 
 a HulMtantive, it has the meaning of an adjective. Thus ta jin means a 
 f^reat man. If tn stands after a substantive, it is a predicate, or, as we 
 ■hniihl »ay, a verb. Tliu8ji//t ta (or jin ta ye) would mean. The man is 
 «Ti-at. Sec Max Miiller, Lectures on the Science of Language, i. p.
 
 MEMORY IN JUDGMENT AND REASONING. 33 
 
 words, "two black horses." If, liowcvcr, one of tlie horses 
 is white, the contrast wonhl attract notice, and lead to the 
 more pointed expression, " One horse is l)lack ; the other 
 is white." The reason fen- the dcjiiljle judgment, as one 
 sees, is the fact that the two rival objects appear simultane- 
 ously to the senses, and therefore have ecpud claim to be 
 regarded or judged. 
 
 We now return to our t)rigin;d point of view, and inquiie 
 in what measure memory lielp^ in the formation of judg- 
 ments. Tliis depends in each case on whether the two 
 ideas which lead to the judgment are from immediate 
 observation or are reproduced. The former condition, iis 
 in the last, example, above, will seldom be fultilled. In- 
 stances' suck as 4l;^e first example aljove, in which one idea 
 is a perce[ition, the other a recollection, are much more 
 freqiient. lii, the field of the mental sciences, in which 
 most ideas are conveyed by language, both terms of the 
 judgment must be, for the most part, reproduced ideas. 
 We have been considering the unintentional or entirely 
 spontaneous judgments. When, however, the process is 
 intentional and meditated, we find just the same three 
 cases ; only it is to be noticed here, — e.g., in silent medita- 
 tion, in conversation, or in the composition of any writing, — 
 that the reproduced ideas are still more frequent. Accord- 
 ingly, an abundant supply of ideas by the memory is re- 
 quisite for the ready exercise of judgment. 
 
 It is hardly worth while to speak separately of the 
 process of reasoning, since it has to do with judgments, 
 and its conclusion is likewise a judgment; and therefore 
 all the above discussion applies equally well to it. 
 
 What has now been said of the origin of concepts, judg- 
 ments, and reasoning, shows that even in these processes
 
 ;■;} THOrC.HT AXD MEMORY. 
 
 of thinkiug proper, memory plays a much greater part than 
 is commonly believed. Nor have we called to miud yet 
 all the assistiim-t! llwit memory renders in the process of 
 thinking. 
 
 Wo saw above that the understanding produces new 
 ideas, either conceptual or judgmental in form. Either : — 
 Ftrsf, on the basis of two perceptions ; or, 
 Sn'omi/f/, on the basis of a perception and a reproduced 
 idea; or 
 
 Thirdli/, on the basis of two reproduced ideas. -^ 
 We liave assumed above that sense perception is ex- 
 clusively an activity of the senses, and that it belongs, 
 therefore, entirely to the elementary raw production of 
 the mind. This is, however, not the fact. Only in con- 
 trast to the new ideas which are produced in thought and 
 imagination can the perceptions rightly be called raw 
 products. It is, of course, true that perceptions of the 
 outer world are possible only through the senses ; but that 
 is not saying that they are exclusively a product of the 
 senses. The senses by themselves never produce anything 
 but sensations, even in the case of the practised senses qf 
 ailults. Suppose, for instance, that a certain object has 
 once j)r(Mluced a sensation in the mind ; wlien this takes 
 place later, a second time, this new sensation will recall 
 the former one. This reproduction does not, however, 
 result in a twofold sensation, or double seeing; but, since 
 the two sensations are comi)letely alike in their content, 
 they coalesce in consciousness into one act ; in other words, 
 tln'y unite in result, so as to be much stronger intensively 
 than the first sensation was. With every following new 
 
 ' For tho sake of brevity we sjieak here of two ideas, but of course in 
 •very ca»c there may bo several.
 
 APPEIlCErTION. 35 
 
 sensation coming from the same object, this reproduction 
 of previous similar sensations, or of their last total result, 
 is repeated, as well as their coalescence in consciousness. 
 As this composite act becomes intensively stronger and 
 stronger, i.e., plainer, it comes at last to be what we cull 
 perception. Thus, although an act of sensation must be 
 oft repeated if it is to give rise to a perception, still the 
 real reason of the superiority of the latter, as one sees, 
 does not lie in this repeated production of the new sensa- 
 tion, but in the resulting production of the already present 
 similar sensations. The fact that Ave are not conscious of 
 the reproduction in these cases is because the newly pro- 
 duced sensation and that which is reproduced are com- 
 pletely, or at least essentially, alike, and therefore at once 
 run together, or fuse into one act of sensation. Later on, 
 when these combined acts have perfected themselves into 
 an objective perception, we often notice very plainly that 
 a reproduction has taken place ; for in these cases we speak 
 of " recognition." If now, as we have seen, even the ap- 
 parently primitive perception receives its main strength 
 from a reproduction of former sensations, it is plain that 
 those processes of conception and judgment which are 
 prompted by a transient perception (see above, p. 34) also 
 receive this sense element chiefly from recollection, rather 
 than from the senses direct. 
 
 For the present, let us lay particular emphasis on this 
 fact, that knowledge is necessary for the assimilation of 
 knowledge. If some would object to the use of the word 
 apperception in such an extended meaning, they will at 
 least have to content themselves with the fact that in all 
 the operations of the mind the memory plays a more or 
 less conspicuous part, and is always essential to the con-
 
 3(» TllorciIT AND IMEMOllY. 
 
 Sfjous processes of thought. Lange and De Garmo do not 
 hesiUiti' to say that "all learning is apperceiving." The 
 roprtKluced ideas arc the '' api)erceptivc organs" for grasp- 
 ing and itssiniilating the new. 
 
 Wo ean elose our i-nipirieal treatment of the memory 
 here, and sum up the results as follows : — 
 
 {'I.) Mkmokv in the widest sense is the mental capacity 
 of retaining and recalling all the sensations and percep- 
 tion.>*, as well as all the products of thought and imagina- 
 tion, wliether ideas, feelings, or volitions, which have 
 cwistod in consciousness, including all the associations 
 formed among these mental states. 
 
 (ft.) In tlie memory we must distinguish a^Jrtsstwe and an 
 art ire si<le, if these expressions may be allowed for the 
 time heing. As apparently resting or passive, we under- 
 stand the memory in so far as the ideas, etc., are unco7i- 
 srioim ; as active, when these are recalled, i.e., brought 
 agjiin into consciousness. 
 
 ('•.) Wliatever of the content of memory cannot be re- 
 Ciilled, or, as we say, has been entirely forgotten, is for the 
 mind, so far as we can see, of no consequence; i.e., so 
 long as it cannot be recalled. It is t\i\& poiver of recollec- 
 t!»n, or the lu-tive side of memory, that properly forms a 
 subject for study. 
 
 (fl.) The memory is not a separate so-called " faculty " 
 of tlie mind, in the sense of a special, independent power. 
 The passive or resting side of memory only implies that 
 tlnTC are already ideas in the mind, living and existing; 
 the active side imi)lies nothing more than that these ideas, 
 under certain definite conditions, can be recalled. This 
 jK.wer of recall, however, may differ much in the different 
 ''''•'-■ '• '"■•' '■'• "-vritor or less with respect to the fidel-
 
 ^mi1?'^iUHJHiALSCHi)(if 
 
 ity or exactness of recolli'ctiofi, ^K^frtth *eBi»ect to prompt- 
 ness, rapidity, or reliability, after a Cijnsiderable interval. 
 And this depends in each separate case entirely on 
 the compactness or looseness of the idea in qnestion, and 
 on the extent to which it is advantageously associated with 
 others. The power of recollection, or the active memory, is 
 therefore an individual peculiarity of the separate ideas, 
 and not a general power behind them. If one uses the term 
 power at all, it ought to refer to the power of existence of 
 the ideas (above mentioned), meaning thereby that they 
 strive to become conscious ; and further referring to the 
 individual quality of the different ideas, the greater or less 
 completeness of their structure, and the greater or smaller 
 number of their associations. There are, therefore, to use 
 a paradoxical expression, as many differknt kinds of 
 
 MEMORY IN THE MIND AS THERE ARE IDEAS. 
 
 The memory is for the whole mental life — we have in 
 mind particularly the intellectual side — of wide and far- 
 reacJiing imimrtance. Even the most primitive ideas (the 
 perceptions) require its indispensable aid; but still more 
 necessary is it in the processes of thought and imagination. 
 VjVithout the help of the memory, not even perceptions 
 would be possible, to say nothing of concepts, judgments, 
 and reasoning, y The relation between memory and apper- 
 ception is that of means to an end ; but each is a means 
 to the other. Apperception is the assimilation of new 
 knowledge, whether percept or concept, by means of the 
 ideas called up in memory; but this process is, in turn, 
 itself the very best, if not the only, means of storing up 
 ideas, so that they will not be f orgotten^ -^_ [^^ 
 
 It need scarcely be said that this last paragraph, as Avell 
 as the whole preceding section, is not to be understood in
 
 38 THOUOHT AND IVIEiMORY. 
 
 the sense of tlie traditional memory worshipper, who be- 
 lieves that tlie main object of the school is to store the 
 memory with facts and words. In the course of our work, 
 the miserable defect in this way of teaching will be brought 
 to liglit, as well as some mistakes of those who aim at just 
 tlie opj»osite. 
 
 On the valuo ami art of questioning, consult Fitch, Art of 
 Qurxdonini/, and eliap. vi. of the Lectures on Teaching. For the de- 
 pondonoe of nioniory on attention, and the physiological hasis of 
 attention, road Kibot, The Psychology of Attention. For the most 
 giMU'ralized conoci)tion of memory, see Bering's famous lecture on 
 Memory as n yenerul function of orr/anlzed matter, in No. G and 7 
 of The O/icn Court, Chicago. See also Eellf/ion of Science Library 
 (sanir itul)lishers). There is another translation of this epoch- 
 making address in Butler, Unconscious Meniory, chap. vi. Ladd's 
 Phy-Hiiiliif/iral I'sycholoijy expresses the same ideas. " Every organ 
 — inilf'fd, every area and every element — of the nervous system has 
 its own HH-niory." (p. 553.)
 
 CTIAl^TETl HI. 
 
 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 Truly the fabric of imiital lieeco 
 
 Rusemblos a weaver's masterpiece, 
 
 Where a thousand thn'ads one treadle throws, 
 
 "NYhero fly the sliuttles liither and thither, 
 
 Unseen the threads are knit together, 
 
 And an inliuite combination grows. 
 
 Goethe's Faust : IJayaud Taylok. 
 
 Aftkr reviewing the chief processes of tlioiight and 
 memory in their many forms, it remains to discover the 
 genetic order in this manifold complexity, the active forces 
 in these processes and their laws. "What we see in the 
 world of matter, -will also manifest itself in the realm of 
 spirit; howsoever wonderfully diversified the phenomena 
 may be, even so wonderfully simple are the laws that con- 
 trol them. 
 
 The foregoing investigation led from thought to memory ; 
 the following will begin with memory, and therefore spin 
 its thread in the opposite direction. 
 
 A. Of jNIkmory. 
 
 Even Aristotle had already found out that ideas were not 
 reproduced in lawless confusion; i.e., that it was not de- 
 pendent on mere chance, whether this or that idea arose in 
 consciousness. First of all, he noticed that a previous idea 
 does not, of its own accord, return into the mind but l)y 
 invitation ; at the call, as it were, of another idea which is 
 
 39
 
 40 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 already in consciousness. This was of itself an important 
 discovery. It showed wliat one must look for in order to 
 come on the track of the ways and laws of reproduction ; 
 nanudv, for the relation existing between the two ideas. 
 
 To proceed witli his investigation, he had, accordingly, 
 first to collect a fund of examples in which one idea re- 
 caUed another, in order then to try whether the cases could 
 Ik" l)roug]it into dt'tinite order under the given point of 
 view. His task was, therefore, that of classification; and 
 the objects were, exactly expressed, the different rela- 
 tions tliat occurred between the two ideas reproducing each 
 other in those examples. 
 
 If he had. for instance, a case in view where the thought 
 of the old homestead immediately recalls the idea of the 
 adjoining trees or the neighboring house, etc., — in like 
 manner wliere the thought of a* certain plant brings to 
 njind also tlie image of the place wliere one first found it, 
 an<l the other objects in its vicinity, — he may have noticed 
 liow all of these examples agree in that the objects repre- 
 sented by the associated ideas are near together in place. 
 With the discovery of the common characteristic in these 
 cases, some order seemed already to come into the chaos, 
 and the investigator could further assume that the dis- 
 covery he h;ul made would also shed light on other cases. 
 Tliis hypothesis lia<l now to be tested. Accordingly, a 
 number of otiicr examples were sought of oljjects near 
 togetjjcr in place; and, as before, the ideas in question were 
 found to reproduce each other. This seemed, at least, to 
 esUiblish a firm standpoint from which to look out over a 
 t^dentbly large part of the field. However, there had been 
 found (.ther examjiles which, though very similar, still did 
 not quite exactly fit into the hypothetical class (" near in
 
 Aristotle's laws of association. 41 
 
 place"). Thus, fur instance, that tlie thought of an absent 
 friend recalls tlie idea of the place where we have last 
 spoken with him. Here, to be sure, the two objects, our 
 friend and this place, have been together; this contiguity 
 was, however, not constant, but only accidental. This must 
 have led the investigator to the further knowledge that in 
 tliis, as well as in the former examples, the decisive point 
 is not in the objective hebuj-Uxjathev, but in the subjective 
 bel>i(j-seen-to(jt'.ther ; not in the contiguity in space, but in the 
 contiguity in time, — in a word, in the simultaueousness of 
 perception. This new discovery, being approved by further 
 trial, showed the first hypothesis to be insuiiicient. The 
 latter had helped the investigation upon the track, but had 
 not reached the goal ; it was not entirely false, but the de- 
 cisive point was lacking ; it contained only half the truth, 
 not the whole. 
 
 Of course it does not make any difference whether the 
 Greek psychologist went to work in just this way or not; 
 his investigation resulted in a classification into four kinds 
 of relations. And, as a matter of fact, all cases of recol- 
 lection, however varied they may at first view appear, may 
 be divided into these four categories, as any one can try for 
 himself if he will take the trouble. 
 
 These four forms of recollection are as follows : — 
 
 1. Simultaneously formed ideas reproduce one another. 
 (Examples above.) 
 
 2. Ideas in continuous scries reproduce one another, — 
 most easily in the order in which they were formed. Ex- 
 amples : The words and sentences in a selection committed 
 to memory ; the stations and stages in a journey ; the events 
 in a story that has been heard or read ; the occurrences in 
 one's own life, etc.
 
 42 THOUGHT AND ISlE.MOllY. 
 
 3. Similar ideas reproduce one another. Examples:, 
 Liko-soundiiiLj exinessions, as in rhyme and alliteration; 
 similar historii-al facts (thus David and Jonathan's friend- 
 ship recalls that of Damon and Pythias; the giving of the 
 law by Moses, the legislation of Lycurgus and Solon, etc.). 
 Here belong also the cases in which a thought calls up 
 a comparison ; further, that reproduction which helps to 
 form clear i»ercei)tions out of sensations, and that also which 
 leads to the si)ontaneous forjnation of concepts and judg- 
 ments, etc. 
 
 4, Coitti'dstrd ideas reproduce one another. Examples: 
 The sight of great luxury and waste reminds one of poverty 
 and misery ; a deed of distinguished courage recalls an ex- 
 am])le of cowardice; great goodness of heart, an instance 
 of hard-heartedness ; the downfall of Prussia in 1806, its 
 uprising in 1813 ; Germany's political unity since 1870-1871, 
 its i)revious distracted condition ; the cradle, the grave, etc.^ 
 
 Tiiis was an important beginning in the illumination of 
 sueli an obscure held as that of the movement of ideas, and 
 redounds to the honor of the great Stagirite. This perform- 
 ance is all the more remarkable because in all sciences it is 
 the first steps that are the most difficult; but still more 
 Ijecause of the fact that psychological investigation during 
 the succeeding two thousand years did not make any essen- 
 tial ]»rogress in this regard. 
 
 Those four laws of recollection are, as without doubt their 
 
 > Wlio<'V<>r wislic's to get any real good out of these four laws for the 
 aAHociatioii of iih-as must not omit to ohseive his own thoughts as they 
 occur to liiin off and on, and see under which rule eacli separate case 
 )H-l<inKH. Ill the stiirly of psychology, that which is learned should he ap- 
 plied on un<l on to tiie phenomena of one's own mind, since nothing can 
 take the placf of s«'lf-<»hsfTvation. For exceedingly interesting sugges- 
 tioiin Heo Gallon, Jlunntn Faculty, p. 182-207.
 
 DESCARTES SIMinJFIKI) THE LAWS. 43 
 
 discoverer also kiunv, oiil}' si/mjifomatlr, not rausal. They 
 say that tlie ideas rciu-oduee each other in these four ways, 
 but they cannot say trhf/ tlu'y must do it; wherefore, also, 
 it remains unexplained why there are just four ways, no 
 more and no less. But aside from tliis chief omission, of 
 which we shall sjjcak later on, the Arist(itelian theory of 
 memory is also symptomatically incomjjlete, although not 
 absolutely wrong. Since Descartes (died lOrK)), this incom- 
 pleteness has been remedied. And this has been the only 
 scientific addition to the doctrine of memory until the 
 present century. Herbart (died 1841) gave a new impetus 
 to psychology in every department, and has justly been 
 called the father of modern psychology. It is this recent 
 work, more particularly in the physiological field, that has 
 contributed most toward a solution of the cause of the asso- 
 ciation of ideas. The addition made by Descartes was this. 
 lie recognized that, on the one hand, the first and second, 
 and on the other hand, the third and fourth, laws (as stated 
 above) have so much in common, that probably each pair 
 forms a single law. 
 
 In the first pair the deciding characteristic is the time; 
 more exactly, the circumstance that the two ideas in ques- 
 tion have been in consciousness together, either at the same 
 time or immediately succeeding each other. There is no 
 reference to the content of the ideas. They ma}' be derived 
 from different senses, or from the same; and in the latter 
 case they may be like or unlike, and it makes no difference. 
 If, now, both laws re(piire a ])revious co-existence of the 
 ideas in consciousness, while they differ only as to whether 
 the ideas are completely simultaneous, or whether one idea 
 has already become partly obscured when the other enters 
 consciousness, — or, in other words, whether the two ideas
 
 44 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 have lK>en togetluT in cousciousness a longer or a shorter 
 timo, — it is clear that in both cases the reason of repro- 
 (Uu'tion must be sought in the common characteristic of 
 luiving been together in consciousness. Accordingly, these 
 two laws are to be understood only as one, which may be 
 culled the law of slmiiltdneiti/. That which had previously 
 misled into thinking that there were two laws proves to be 
 merely a difference in the effect of one and the same cause, 
 
 namely, the being in consciousness at the same time, — 
 
 and in the main only a difference of degree, since the com- 
 pletely simultaneous ideas are more strongly united than 
 the half simultaneous. 
 
 The other jiair (.".. and 4. laws p. 42) differ from the first 
 pair in two ways. First of all, the matter of time does 
 not come into consideration here at all, since the ideas 
 need never have been together in consciousness. And in 
 tlie second case, that which before was not considered — 
 namely, the content of the ideas — is here the distinguish- 
 ing characteristic ; for the expressions " similar " and '< con- 
 tra-st^^-d " refer to the content of the ideas. Keeping this 
 in mind, one cannot help wondering why in the one case 
 the similarity, in the other case the dissimilarity, of mean- 
 ing should cause reproduction. It was plain that there 
 must be some mistake It was soon recognized that in 
 tlie hitter case the earlier psychologists had allowed them- 
 .selves to be deceived by outward appearance. A contrast 
 between two objects presupposes their similarity in other 
 respects. For between two entirely dissimilar or disparate 
 ideas there can be no contrast, because, as we say, they can- 
 not Ixj com] tared. Thus, for example, such ideas as have 
 tlu'ir origin in different senses, as square and sweet, red 
 and shrill, eU-. ; likewise, round and yellow (form and
 
 LATER VIEWS OF MEMORY. 45 
 
 color), although they come from the same sense. Since, 
 then, in the tliird law it is plainly only the likeness that 
 causes the reproduction, it might easily be guessed that 
 also in the case of contrasted ideas it was their like char- 
 acteristics that made one reproduce the other, and- that 
 oidy after tliis liad so far taken place the contrasted char- 
 acteristics attracted attention. This was proved to Ije true 
 by the fact that ideas completely unlike never recall one 
 anotlier, unless they have been in consciousness simultane- 
 ously, in which case the law of simultaneity alone holds. 
 From which it follows that the 3. and 4. laws are likewise 
 to be regarded as one, which may be called the law of simi- 
 larity. That which had previously misled into supposing 
 tluit there were two laws, — namely, the consciousness of 
 contrast, — proves to be merely a difference in the effect 
 of one and the same cause, and really only an after-effect of 
 tlie reproduction that has already taken place by reason 
 of similarity. 
 
 Thus a deeper examination has shown that the funda- 
 mental laws for the manifold forms of reproduction are 
 considerably simpler than was formerly believed. There 
 are not four laws of memory, but only two ; that of 
 siinultaneiti/, and that of slmUarltij. In the first a sub- 
 jective factor decides, — namely, the previous presence of 
 the ideas together in consciousness ; in the second, an 
 objective factor, — namely, their similar content. 
 
 These two laws, then, simple as they seem, are only symp- 
 tomatic, and do not yet express tlie cause of reproduction. 
 Modern psychology, physiological and experimental, has 
 been fruitful in suggestions of solutions for this question. 
 When we recall to niind an act we have done or a sensa- 
 tion we have experienced, the similarity between this and
 
 46 TiiorniTT and memory. 
 
 the original doing or feeling is so great as to leave but little 
 aoul»t that the same parts of the nervous system are con- 
 cerned in the mental reproduction as in the previous physi- 
 cal piwluetion. We know that every action leaves the 
 parts of the body with a disposition to the same action 
 again, thus making the second performance more easy. 
 This fact lies at the foundation of habit, and it would 
 seem the same fact is the basis of memory. 
 
 Thus, then, we may conclude that the senses are not 
 only necessary to receive impressions from the outside 
 world, but are also necessary for their vivid reproduction 
 in memory ; the muscles of the body are not only concerned 
 in the movement of parts of our organism, but they also 
 play a part in the remembrance of these actions afterward. 
 The memory, therefore, has no seat in any particular part 
 of the nervous system, but is everywhere. There are as 
 many species of memory as there are species of represen- 
 tiition. ^[ental work is also nerve and muscle work. 
 
 This being so, we can easily appreciate the fact that the 
 nervous discharge, when once started on a previously 
 tnivelled tract, continues till it has roused all those cells 
 to action wliich took part in the first process. Or, to put 
 it more plainly, if one portion of a previous mental state 
 returns to consciousness, the entire state, with all its ac- 
 companiments, will naturally be recalled, provided only 
 the nervous energy is sufficient. As Professor Lazarus 
 of lierlin expresses it, "Every state of consciousness tends 
 U) rejiroduce itself completely." That this law has its 
 kifiis in the anatomical structure of the brain and nervous 
 system, we can hardly doubt. 
 
 This is evidently also only another statement of the 
 foregoing law of simultaneity. For whatever ideas, feel-
 
 ASSOCIATION I5Y SIMILARITY. 47 
 
 ings, or volitions may be in llie luiiul at any one time fuse 
 together into one state ; there is strictly only one complex 
 idea in the mind at any one time. The very fact that two 
 or more ideas, etc., are in the same moment in the same 
 consciousness, unites all of these into one state. They are 
 not separate ideas, feelings, etc., until they have been 
 thought of lit sejyarate times ; i.e., in separate conscious- 
 nesses. We have, therefore, in this one statement the cause 
 both of our mental associations ayid of our viental abstrac- 
 tions. 
 
 We have next to explain the cause of associations by 
 similarity. For the sake of clearness, I shall make 
 use of a very simple concrete illustration. In the 
 ma,rgin is a very meagre outline, say of a vase. Ask 
 a shoemaker what it represents, and he will prob- 
 ably, if pressed to say something, declare it is a shoe- 
 sole. If you ask the same question of a biologist, he will 
 probably say it represents a cell of a yeast plant, with a 
 daughter cell budding off from it. Ask now a little girl, 
 and she will say it is the head and body of a doll. A 
 boatman Avill say it is the outline of some island he knows. 
 An Indian recognizes it as a representation of a canoe 
 paddle ; a cliejiiist sees in it a laboratory fask : a geo- 
 meter sees two eUipses ; a German is reminded of nine- 
 pins ; while a gymnast sees a suggestion of an Indian club. 
 This might be continued indefinitely, but enough has been 
 shown to illustrate the working of the law of similarity. 
 
 That which remained constant in all of these associa- 
 tions is the rougli outline on the paper ; but in each case 
 it called up in mind a different complement of accessory 
 ideas, thus completing for each of these observers a differ- 
 ent previous mental state. It is evident that in thus
 
 48 THOUGHT AND IVIEMORY. 
 
 redintegrating previoxis states of consciousness the same 
 process was taking place as Avas before described as asso- 
 ciation by simultaneity. 
 
 Let us take one step farther. The same person looking 
 at the alxjve figure would no doubt be reminded of differ- 
 ent objects (successively, just as we have supposed different 
 [RM-sons to be). In other words, one of these objects would 
 suggest the other throuyh the medium of the outline, which 
 is coininon to both. Now, this illustrates very clearly, I 
 take it, what occurs in the case of every instance of asso- 
 ciation by similarity. Conscioiisness concentrates on cer- 
 tain elements, — namely, on those through which the asso- 
 ciation is made, and which are therefore common to both 
 ideas ; tliereupon ])y the law of simultaneity the other 
 parts of that second previous mental state are recalled. 
 It is in this way that the mind passes from one complex 
 idea to another by simply retaining those elements common 
 to both, and then (1) drojjpinff out of consciousness the other 
 elements of the first idea, and (2) redintegrating the second. 
 
 Tlie process may be represented diagrammatically as in 
 the tigure. The flow of consciousness is represented from 
 
 left to right. The complex idea, containing elements rep- 
 resented by V, a, and y, is now in mind. The attention is 
 then concentrated on the one or more elements represented 
 by a, which therefore simply persist in consciousness after 
 X and y have dropped out. The elements a have, however, 
 alreatly formed an integral part of a previous state of con-
 
 RELATION OF TflK TWO LAWS. 49 
 
 sciousness in wliich they wcro associated Avith w and ,•:;. 
 They therefore now reproduce iv and n by the law of sim- 
 ultaneity and the second complete idea results in conscious- 
 ness. 
 
 Thus we see the process of recollection by similarity re- 
 duces to redintegration by simultaneity, and the latter is 
 therefore stamped as the original law of association. The 
 only way in which two ideas can be immediately associated 
 is by their forming parts of the same mental state at some 
 time. On the other hand, since two similar ideas are 
 associated throufjh their common elements, we might call 
 such association mediate, in contrast to the immediate 
 association of two ideas by simultaneity. This use of 
 terms, as well as the entire preceding explanation of asso- 
 ciation, is of course very far from being Herbartian. 
 
 Here, then, we have the two laws of memory in their 
 very inmost nature and causal connection before us. Not- 
 withstanding, however, their identity in origin, the two ways 
 are, psychologically, essentially different in their influence 
 on the development of the mental life. They are distinct 
 ways of reproduction, and without the recognition of this 
 fact the higher activities of thought are inexplicable. One 
 individual never goes beyond outer connection ; his memory 
 for facts appears marvellous ; we wonder <• how one small 
 head can carry all he knows " ; his stories are filled with 
 minutest unimportant details, apparently having no connec- 
 tion but that they once happened in that order. Another 
 person does not seem to know half so much, but brings 
 every fact into its logical connection. When he tells a story, 
 only such details as have relation to the main issue are 
 brouglit in ; his memory makes no great show of power, 
 but always seems to be readier in an emergency than the
 
 60 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 other iiKin's. r>iit the greatest difference of all is, the 
 latter uiulcrstmn/s things better than the former. "To 
 the i)easaiit the falling apple redintegrates only spatial 
 assoeiations of its pleasant taste ; to Sir Isaac Newton its 
 resemblance to all falling bodies suggested the law of 
 gravit^ition." 
 
 The (lift'eronce in mental economy is shown by the rela- 
 tive availability of a fact remembered by association with 
 another fact in time or space; and, on the other hand, of 
 a fact remembered by its relation of similarity with others. 
 For future use the former is frequently as good as worth- 
 less. It is bound up with other ideas with which it may 
 never again need to be in connection. Except in those 
 cases where the same processes or events are repeated over 
 and over again, siich memory has practically no use. It 
 serves us, to be sure, in remembering that the sun rose in 
 the east and set in the west, yesterday, day before, and so 
 on. It must even be admitted that it forms the basis of 
 all memory, as we have shown above ; and it has truly 
 immense importance for automatic action and all the 
 mechanism of the mind. But it cannot be too emphatically 
 reiterated that this sort of memory alone never can amount 
 to anything. All mental power of thought, invention, im- 
 agination, and character itself depends on the workings of 
 the other law (of similarity). The connection of similarity 
 is internal, and involved in the very nature of the ideas. 
 With the formation of every new link of similarity the 
 capacity of the mind is increased instead of becoming 
 taxo«l. T'ut its greatest point of superiority is in the avail- 
 ahUitij for (ill future use of ideas so associated. Wherever 
 needed, there is just where they put in an appearance. 
 They spontaneously group themselves in order, and prepare
 
 DISSOCIATION. 51 
 
 the way for all the higher activities of thinking. As we 
 have before seen, this proeess of spontaneous grouping 
 leads to conception, judgment, and reasoning. The birth 
 of all new ideas, plans, inventions, discoveries of nature's 
 laws, etc., are alone made possible by the association of 
 ideas by similarity. All science, both of investigation and 
 of formulation, consists of applications of it. 
 
 It should be noticed that in the process of recollection, 
 as just described, the first step consists in dissociation ; 
 i.e., in separating certain elements from the rest of the 
 first complex idea, which then drops out of consciousness. 
 The power to do this requires practice, and is of the 
 same nature as abstraction. This breaking up of the 
 ideas into their elements, however, must take place in 
 order to make the ideas mobile, and to dissolve their 
 connection in time and place, and introduce them into new 
 combinations with other ideas like themselves. Eeadiness 
 of thought depends on this ability ; and both steps, disso- 
 ciation and redintegration, need practice. In early child- 
 hood the facts of the external world pour in through the 
 senses, leaving no time to sort out and classify. The asso- 
 ciation fibres that are probably necessary for the latter 
 process do not get their medullary sheath and begin to 
 function for a considerable time after birth. The founda- 
 tion of all future greatness is, however, being laid in this 
 great store of concrete material received through the senses 
 and retained by sheer force of natural memory. Happy 
 the child whose mind has been furnished thus abundantly. 
 This is the raw material of school instruction that must be 
 su})plemented where deficient, and worked over into the 
 higher products of thought. The method of school-work 
 should therefore form the transition from the one form to
 
 52 TlIOUCllT AND MEMOKY. 
 
 the Other ; from nu'inory by simultaneity to memory by 
 similarity, from childish wouder to maturer thought and 
 uuderstiUidiug. 
 
 The (luostion of resolvin.^ the two laMS of memory into one prin- 
 rii.l.' has m-oupied nearly all the psychologists of note. Durpfelcl, 
 differing from the above views, follows llerbart in his metaphysics 
 of the statics ami dynamics of ideas, and hence sees in the law of 
 similarity the ground for the removal of the check from all the 
 similar ideas which tlierefore rise in consciousness of themselves (1). 
 UeiRnition is tlie assistance by which ideas which are not thus freed 
 from check can be dragged into consciousness (2). This explana- 
 tion of the two laws is concurred in by nearly all the Herbartian 
 writers. The recent translation of lifer's Introduction to the Peda- 
 goijy of Ihrhart contains the shortest unvarnished statement of 
 these views in English (particularly pp. 12-14). See Herbart's PsJj- 
 chiilo'j!/, pp. 11-10; Lindner's Psi/rholoyy, p. 81 ff. ^and two articles 
 by (J. F. Stout in " Mind'" on " The Herbartian Psychology'''' (Nos. 
 51 and 52). For a good short account with criticism, see the chap- 
 ters on Herbartian Psychology in Ribot's German Psychology of 
 To-day, pp. 21-G7. 
 
 Sjwncor seeks on another basis to reduce slnuiltaneity to simi- 
 larity. To him the essential fact in association is fusion of similars 
 in recognition. Coexistent ideas are similar in their time relation 
 and hence associate. Principles of Psychology, i. p. 207 ff. 
 
 f)n the other hand, Lazarus in Germany, and Sir William Hamil- 
 ton an<l otht-rs in England, and Dewey, James, Ladd, and Baldwin 
 in tiiis country, agree in the explanation given in the text, reducing 
 all association to the principle of coexistence in consciousness. 
 See Dewey, Ptn/chology, pp. 00-117. James, Psychology, i. p. 578 ff., 
 is ver>' clear and n-adalde. He adds that our general retentiveness 
 is unchangcalile l)y any amount of training (i. p. 603 If.). On i. 
 ]>. V.U lie gives an interesting "history of opinion concerning asso- 
 < ; ition." For a similar Ijrief summary of opinions, see Bain, Mental 
 Scienre, Appendix, pp. fll, 02; and Sully, Human Mind, ii., Appen- 
 dix, pp. 3;50-.'542. Ladd ( Psychology, descriptive and explanatory, 
 p. 27'>) says, "the influence of contiguity in consciousness is the 
 «,./, disinvi I .),!.. i.'.ychological principle of association." Baldwin
 
 BIBLIOGllAl'IIY. 53 
 
 (Ilnndhonk of Psycholor/i/, Senses and Intellect, p. 201) fonnulates 
 the priiiKuy law as follows: "Every association of mental states 
 is an integration, due to the previous correlation of those states in 
 apperception." But one has to read the context to see what all 
 of this means. Kay {Memory, What it is and how to improce it, 
 p. 278) agrees in recognizing contiguity as the one principle of all 
 association, hut fails completely when he comes to explain it. 
 
 John Stuart :Mill is of the opinion that the reduction of the two 
 ways of association to one principle must be necessarily unsuccess- 
 ful (James Mill's Analysis of the Ilnnian Mind, p. Ill, note 3.5 by 
 J. S. ilill). IluCfdiiig (Outlines of Psychology, Yi. 1,58) recognizes 
 this as the fact, but identifies the association between the parts and 
 the whole as the typical form of all association, which he calls the 
 law of totality. Sully (Outlines of Psychology, p. 2G7 ff.) describes 
 the phenomena in very much the same way, although he does not 
 undertake to formulate any general law. 
 
 For an admirable historical account of the psychology of memory, 
 see Dr. Wm. H. Burnham's articles in the American Journal of 
 Psychology, vol. ii. A very complete bibliography of memory will 
 be found at the close of these in vol. ii. pp. 014-G22. 
 
 For ilissociation of ideas, see Dewey, Psychology, pp. 117-129. 
 
 For the physiological basis of memory, see Spencer, Psychology, i. 
 p. 270; and author's preface to Kay's Memory and pp. 29-4(3 and 92 
 ff. ; James, Psychology, i. p. G43 ff. is clear and readable as usual. 
 Perhaps the most accessible and clearest explanation of recent 
 theory of physical basis for the association of ideas is contained in 
 Ziehen's Introduction to Physiological Psychology, chapter ix. 
 
 See also Bain, The Senses and the Intellect, p. 338, for liis 
 famous doctrine that " the renewed feeling occupies the very same 
 parts, and in the very same manner, as the original feeling." 
 
 B. Ok Thought. 
 The term law is applied to thought in two senses: we 
 speak on tlie one hand of psychological, and on the other 
 hand of logical, laws of thought. In the first case the term 
 law is used in the same sense as in all the natural sciencesj 
 namely, to describe the actual, uniform, and invariable pro-
 
 54 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 cesses of nature. Sucli laws allow of no exception. On 
 the other hanil, the laws of logic, like those of grammar, 
 aesthetics, ethics, music, poetry, etc., are rules laid down by 
 Art to be followed in order to secure a right result. The 
 laws of Science 7iiust be followed if there is to be any 
 result at all. The rules of Art may be and often are dis- 
 regarded, and this results only in mistakes. Since our 
 investigation is a psychological one, we have to do only 
 with the psychological laws. 
 
 In order to simplify our problem, we must try to reduce 
 the fourfold activity of tliouglit under one point of view. 
 In the second cliapter above, the four forms of thought 
 were reviewed : comparison, conception, judgment, and 
 reason. It is usual to mention only the last three. The 
 reason for this we shall see presently. 
 
 I should like to ask such of my readers as have been to 
 normal schools or have already privately studied a com- 
 pendium of psychology, just to try whether they can them- 
 selves reduce those four operations of thought under one 
 head. This problem, belonging as it does to the theory 
 of knowledge, which is the plainest and best-worked field 
 in psychology, would indeed be very Avell adapted to show 
 1h)w much, or rather how little, good can come from com- 
 pendiums. 1 shall attempt, however, first to make the 
 problem plainer by a few separate questions. In what 
 ndation, genetic or logical, do these processes of thought 
 stJind to one another? Is one iireliminary to another; that 
 is, does one prepare the way for another ? And if some- 
 thing like this is found to be true of some, is it further 
 true of all '' Do these four processes form a single genetic 
 series, one arising out of another ? In a word, when 
 riglitly understood, are there really four thought pro-
 
 GENETIC SEQUENCE OF THOUGHT-PROCESSES. 55 
 
 cesses, or three, or two, or only one? Even witli tliese 
 suggestions the reiuU'r will probably not be able to answer, 
 especially if he has studied his logic diligently. Tlie books 
 on psychology, and especially the handbooks, leave their 
 readers entirely too much in the lurch in this regard. 
 They do not even present this problem, nor so much as 
 call attention to the fact that there is such a ijroblon. Ihit 
 worse still, they usually treat of three thought-processes iu 
 the order in which they are treated in logic. Xow, logic is 
 right in its treatment ; for, since it has to do merely with 
 the forms of thought, not, however, with their origin, it pro- 
 ceeds very correctly from the simple to the complex, and 
 treats accordingly first of the concept, then of the judg- 
 ment, and then of the syllogism. If the text-books in 
 psychology choose the same order, it should be only as a 
 preliminary treatment of each of these thought-processes 
 by themselves. But if now they contain no further dis- 
 cussion of the genetic connection between the different 
 thought functions, so as to correct the false order previ- 
 ously used, then not only is the chief topic in the theory of 
 know^ledge left obscure, but if the reader tries now to work 
 this problem out for himself, he will be misled by the i)re- 
 vious confusion of treatment. My own presentation in 
 the second chapter above nevertheless follows the order 
 dictated by logic, but the reason for so doing was simply 
 for the purpose of showing the reader the contrast between 
 that want of order and the genetic sequence which I shall 
 now present. 
 
 For the sake of brevity I shall avoid the proper induc- 
 tive form of presentation, and state at once the correct 
 order of the thought-processes, leaving the proofs to fol- 
 low in connection with examples.
 
 56 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 In the first place, reasoning or inference drops out of tlie 
 list of processes, on logical grounds, because, as Ave saw 
 before, reasoning is only a peculiar kind of judgment : 
 it is the derivation of a new judgment from two or more 
 other judgments, and the conclusion is therefore sometimes 
 called a derivetl judgment. Therefore, leaving reasoning 
 out of the list, we have still three specifically different pro- 
 cesses of thought. 
 
 These three stand in a genetic relation to one another ; 
 i.e., they arise one out of anotlier, but not in the confused 
 sequence in Avhich logic treats them. There is really but 
 a shi'jle thoiKjht-jn'occss, Avhich from its purpose may be 
 caUed the formation of concepts ; but it runs through 
 several acts, just as in a flower the bud, the blossom, and 
 the ripe fruit follow each other. The three acts in the 
 thought-process are conqjarison, judgment, and conception. 
 
 Comparison is, for the present, to be counted as a sep- 
 arate act preliminary to judgment, in order to avoid any 
 obscurity, or uncertainty as to its place in the thought- 
 process. But, in point of fact, comparison and judgment 
 really form but one mental act, or, in other words, they are 
 only two diiferent expressions for one and the same pro- 
 cess, which in each case is regarded and named from a dif- 
 ferent standpoint. The word comparison regards the 
 begiiming of the process ; the word judgment, on the other 
 hand, has reference to its end, denoting, as it does, the 
 result of the comparison. Or, in other words, comparison 
 represents the process from its objective side, pointing to 
 the two or more objects in consciousness whose like or un- 
 like characteristics are to be sought; judgment, on the 
 contrary, shows the process from its subjective side, refer- 
 ring to the peculiar form of idea produced. Now, in order
 
 THE TFIOUnilT-PIlOCKSS. 57 
 
 to have a single expression for this one mental process, 
 we call it, from its result, by the name of judgment. In 
 this psychological sense, to judge is, therefore, nothing 
 more than to call up clearly in consciousness a distinct 
 mental representation or idea of the object to be judged, 
 together with those characteristics, wherein it is like or 
 unlike another object. If the 'act of judgment is com- 
 pleted, the formation of the concept follows of itself. But 
 this latter is not to be confused with the verbal expression 
 for the concept. Nor can the reader be too careful in dis- 
 tinguishing the above use of the word "judgment" in the 
 psychological sense from the usual definition of judgment 
 as given in logic. Accordingly, we may say in conclu- 
 sion : — 
 
 There is oiil// a single tlunit/Jit-process, hut it takes place 
 in two successive acts, namehj, judgmext and coxceptiox. 
 
 In this statement we have the myriad forms of thought 
 reduced to their greatest simplicity. Even popular usage 
 in speech has long since expressed the fact that there is 
 properly only one thought-process, and that it consists of 
 the two acts, judgment and conception ; and further, that 
 with the completion of judgment the conception was ready 
 of itself, and that, conversely, no concept was possible with- 
 out previous judgment. Each of the two expressions is 
 used promiscuously in jtopular language for the whole pro- 
 cess. For, when one wants to express the fact that another 
 does not understand a certain matter, one may say either 
 ''he has formed no jutlf/iiicvf in regard to it," or "he has 
 no concejjtion of the matter," and they both mean the 
 same. 
 
 However welcome the foregoing general view of the 
 process of thought may have been to the reader, such
 
 58 THOUGHT AND aiEMORY. 
 
 knowledge must still roiaaiu subject to all of those faults 
 that are inseparable from instruction by abstract ideas 
 wliioli do not rest on a concrete basis of careful observa- 
 tion. It affords, at best, very incomplete satisfaction to 
 have a broad, open field of view and yet not be able to see 
 clearly and distinctly anything in it. There is, besides, 
 much more that requires explanation, particularly in the 
 relation between the two parts of the thought-process. 
 With the help of the concrete examples let us now attempt 
 this further work. 
 
 For the correct understanding of the following examples, 
 it is necessary that the two directions of thought be first 
 properly understood. In comparison or judgment we may, 
 of course, look for either similarities or dissimilarities in 
 the object compared. Just according as we look for the 
 one or the other, will the result be a different kind of con- 
 cept. For instance, if the characteristics common to a 
 right-angled, an acute-angled, and an obtuse-angled triangle 
 are combined, the concept " triangle " is formed, which in 
 respect to the three ideas above (so far as these are them- 
 selves concepts), is called a superordinate or generic con- 
 cept. If, however, this concept were already formed, and 
 in a new comparison of those three figures the dissimilar 
 characteristics are seized upon (which process we call dis- 
 tinguishing them), there result finally the three differing 
 i(le;is : right-angled, acute-angled, and obtuse-angled tri- 
 angle. These, in respect to the concept "triangle," are 
 called sul)ordinate or species concepts. This shows us that 
 thouglit can move in two different directions ; in one way 
 it f)rocoeds to ever wider, more general, and higher con- 
 cepts ; in tlie other way, it reaches ever narrower, more 
 special, and lower concepts. In the one case, broad views
 
 FIRST EXAMPLE. 69 
 
 open up to us ; in the other, we iind exercise for our dis- 
 crimination. It is well when one head can combine both 
 abilities — far-sight and acuteness. 
 
 The following examples are mostly those of involuntary 
 or spontaneous conception, because when concepts are in- 
 tentionally formed the process is of itself somewhat more 
 transparent. The cpiestion therefore arises, what is it that 
 determines whether the spontaneous process shall take the 
 one or the other direction. When the process is voluntary, 
 the will determines by choosing the one or the other ; but 
 if it is spontaneous, the determination must come from 
 some other source. This source is in the objects them- 
 selves. For, if the objects to be compared show more 
 similar characteristics and seem so much alike that the 
 difference appears unimportant, and therefore not worth 
 considering, thought will proceed to the superordinate con- 
 cept. If, on the contrary, the dissimilar characteristics 
 exceed, or if one in particular succeeds in attracting special 
 attention, then, although the likeness will be noticed, still 
 the process Avill lead to the subordinate concepts. Thus 
 ■we see that nature has, even in the spontaneous process, 
 already provided for both directions of thought. 
 
 First Example (in the direction of superordinate con- 
 cepts). The reader has only to call to mind what was said 
 above in the second chapter on the origin of the concept 
 "mountain" in early childhood. If tlie child has already 
 once seen such an elevation, and then afterwards sees an- 
 other, the concejtt '•' mountain " is in its inception forth- 
 with present. Although a general idea has thus worked 
 itself out of the two concrete ideas, the child has not been 
 conscious of this inner process, and yet if, when he saw 
 the first elevation, he was told that it was a mountain, he
 
 60 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 would at the sight of the second undoubtedly exclaim: 
 '• That is a mountain, too." "We may well be surprised at 
 the fact that here the judgment already contains the word 
 (mountain) expressing the concept. This certainly looks 
 as if the judgment did ]iot take place before conception, but 
 rather as if judgment and concept were hoxn si multaneoxisly. 
 liut, if this is so, how could we claim before that judgment 
 was a preliminary process to conception ? And if it is not 
 so, our concrete example seems to have brought us only 
 further into the fog of imcertainty. But the reader will 
 probably conclude, and rightly too, that the example was 
 nevt-rtheless purposely chosen. The purpose Avas to call 
 attention to an important peculiarity in the spontaneous 
 formation of superordinate concepts, a peculiarity which 
 is usually not even alluded to in the text-books. This 
 example by itself, however, will not give us any full ex- 
 planation. "\\'e must therefore first take an example from 
 the other direction of thought, in which judgment and 
 concept appear strictly separate. After we have rightly 
 comprehended tlie relation in the latter case, we shall be 
 able to clear up the doubtful points in the lirst example, 
 and find out the important peculiarity Avhich it teaches in 
 regai-d to tlie formation of superordinate concepts. 
 
 Second Exumple (in the direction of subordinate con- 
 cepts). Supitose a child has repeatedly seen yellow wood- 
 sorrel (oxalis stricta). Of course there are different kinds 
 of wood-sorrel, but we will suppose that he has not yet 
 noticed their differences. Since, however, he has seen 
 various specimens of yellow wood-sorrel, his mind has 
 fonned from these concrete ideas (percepts) likewise the 
 abstra<!t idea (concept) "wood-sorrel." If after this he 
 comes across a specimen of violet wood-sorrel, he will notice
 
 SECOND EXAMPLE. 61 
 
 of course that it is similar to tlie wood-sorrel he has pre- 
 viously seen, but at the same time his attention will be 
 attracted by the strongly different characteristic of color. 
 The comparison and distinction is forthwith completed, 
 and at the same time the mental })i'0cess of judgment is 
 ready to give expression to itself in the words, "this wood- 
 sorrel is violet." — What do we find here as the result of 
 the comparison ? At all events a judgment. l>ut is there 
 not also a new concept — the species concept " violet wood- 
 sorrel " ? That there is no such concept in the judgment 
 is shown by the fact that the new idea appearing in the 
 predicate is nothing more than a characteristic (violet). 
 But, it may be asked, does not the species concept " violet 
 wood-sorrel " come into existence along with this new 
 characteristic ? For the present it does not ; for the single 
 specimen of this species that the child has seen can only 
 give rise to the concrete idea or perception " violet wood- 
 sorrel." In order for an abstract idea to be produced (in 
 this case, the spontaneous species concept " violet wood- 
 sorrel "), it woiild 1)0 necessary that several specimens of 
 this species should first be seen.^ 
 
 The relation between the act of judgment and the for- 
 mation of the concept will now probably be somewhat 
 clearer to the reader. The judgment indicates as the re- 
 sult of comparison nothing new more than a new charac- 
 teristic, but not yet the species concept, to which this 
 characteristic belongs. It prepares the way, to be sure, 
 for this concept, since it furnishes the new material (the 
 
 1 Of course it is not necessary that several different specimens should 
 be presented to the senses, but only that several different percepts or 
 mental i)rosontations, whether obtained from one or from more than one 
 object, should have taken part in the formation of the concept
 
 62 THOUGHT AND MEMOKY. 
 
 characteristic) for it ; but the judgment as such knows 
 nothing of the concept itself. It is clear, therefore, that 
 here, in the formation of subordinate concepts, the judg- 
 ment certainly comes previously to the concept — not 
 simultaneously, as seemed to be the case in superordinate 
 concepts. 
 
 It is, furthermore, important to notice that, as was just 
 pointed out, the judgment prepares the way for the species 
 i-oncept ; for, just as soon as the newly noticed difference 
 " violet " has been distinctly apprehended, or, in other words, 
 as soon as this new characteristic appears in consciousness 
 in the form peculiar to the judgment, the concept wood- 
 sorrel which was already present becomes unsettled. AVhy ? 
 It previously contained the characteristic " yellow," since 
 this characteristic had occurred in all the specimens pre- 
 viously seen, and was therefore counted in with the common 
 characteristics. But now, after a violet wood-sorrel has 
 come to view, it is seen that this characteristic " yellow " 
 does not belong to the common characteristics of this 
 genus. What result has this on the old concept ? First of 
 all, that the concept " wood-sorrel " loses the characteristic 
 (yellow) that did not belong to it, and becomes in so far 
 purified and more complete. And secondly, that beside 
 this earlier concept (wood-sorrel) on the one hand, the ready 
 formed subordinate concept " yellow wood-sorrel " arises ; 
 and, on the other hand, the way is prepared for a second 
 subordinate concept "violet wood-sorrel," co-ordinate with 
 the other.' 
 
 ' The way is prepared for the second concept but it is not yet formed. 
 This must he distinctly noticed ; for tlift judgment as such never helps in 
 the formation r»f concepts at all in any other way, since it does nothing 
 eUc than (urnisli characteristics. This is just as true of the formation of
 
 RELATION OF JUDGMENT TO CONCEPTION. 63 
 
 The second example has therefore shown us, lirst tliat 
 the judgiaent always comes before the concept, and cannot 
 come otherwise ; secondly, that the act of judgment, when 
 it relates to a dissimilar characteristic, has the effect of 
 clarifying the old concept and splitting it into two sub- 
 concepts, thus making it a genus concept. 
 
 We can now return to our first example and clear up the 
 doubts that surrounded it. Why was it that in this first 
 example judgment and conception appeared simultaneous ? 
 If in comparison, as we know, the mind is concerned only 
 with like or unlike cliaracteristics, and if the mental act of 
 
 higher as of lower concepts. In the present case, in the judgment, 
 " this wood-sorrel is violet," there is another circunistance that will 
 serve to show very plainly how strictly separate the act of judgment 
 is from the act of conception. For here the cliaracteristic "violet" 
 appears as a point of dissimilarity in contrast to " yellow; '" but a con- 
 cept, on the other hand, is always concerned with common or like char- 
 acteristics only. From this it follows that the judgment alone could 
 never give rise to the concept "violet wood-sorrel," hut that, as before 
 said, several specimens of violet wood-sorrel must first he seen. Only 
 after these have been com]>arcd can the characteristic "violet" be recog- 
 nized as common. Tiie new judgment, "all these wood-sorrels are vio- 
 let," will now lead to the sub-concept "violet wood-sorrel." The earlier 
 judgment in which " violet " was an unlike characteristic, has, there- 
 fore, strictly speaking, not directly prepared the way for this sub-concept, 
 but only indirectly, ami therefore not so much prejiared the way for it as 
 merely served as an incentive to its formation. The other sub-concept 
 (yellow wood-sorrel) did not need any new judgment, since it was already 
 contained in the old concept " wood-sorrel." This old concept experi- 
 enced a change in its content, in losing one of its characteristics; its pre- 
 vious content, on the coutrai-y, then became the S])ecies concept. This 
 illustrates veiy nicely that mutual influence between new and old ideas, 
 which is so characteristic of all apperception. 
 
 One thing more should be noticed here. Since a concept, whether 
 higher or lower, is in comparison with the ideas which it embraces in its 
 content, in the relation of superiority to these, it follows, therefore, that- 
 in the act of conception as such the movement of thought is always up- 
 ward. The two movements of thought spoken of in the text are there- 
 fore found in juilgmeut (comparisou) ouly.
 
 64 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 judgment is nothing more tlian a mental representation of 
 the result of comparison, then it follows that the predicate 
 of a mental judgment must relate to characteristics only, 
 whether like or unlike. If, on the contrary, conception 
 consists of seizing together in the grasp of a single idea 
 the similar charac^teristics, then it must be plain that judg- 
 ment and conception are two entirely distinct acts. If, then, 
 in our lirst example this distinction did not clearly appear, 
 it was owing to one or both of the following causes — ■ 
 either to a peculiarity in the spontaneous formation of 
 genus concepts, or to the interference of language. 
 
 In order to have a concrete instance in mind, let us re- 
 turn to the example (mountain) given above. Here the 
 characteristics which the objects compared with one an- 
 other had in common, are several in number, as is also the 
 case in most instances of such concepts. A child will 
 never be able at the first sight to notice distinctly all of 
 these characteristics separately ; even an adult would not 
 succeed in a single rapid glance. Now, just as the child has 
 formed only a general perception of each of the two objects, 
 so also of the characteristics in which they are alike. He 
 perhaps has the general impression that the two objects 
 are similar, i.e., have much in common, but he cannot give 
 an account of the characteristics which compose this simi- 
 larity. Suppose, however, for the sake of argument, that a 
 child really had apprehended distinctly all the common 
 characteristics, or at least some of them; still, he would 
 scarcely have at command the necessary expressions to 
 denote each of these characteristics precisely. But even 
 sujjposing he had, the child would have no incentive to 
 express these common characteristics in a series of separate 
 judgments. What concerns him is simply to make known
 
 children's use of words. 65 
 
 the generitl iinprrssion lliat the two objects are similar. 
 For this purpose the easiest means tliat offers is the name 
 of the elevation first seen — the word " mountain," whicli 
 when first heard liad for the child the meaning of a proper 
 name. 
 
 This shows us clearly whence it comes that the expressed 
 judgment, "that (thing) is a mountain," already contains 
 the concept word. The expression, mountain, which the 
 child uses in the predicate is, for him, not a concept word, 
 but a mere name, the name of the elevation first seen. 
 He means to denote by it the characteristics he has noticed 
 (in this case those that were common to both). Since, 
 however, only the total impression was noticed, or in case 
 any one of the characteristics was distinctly noticed, the 
 particular expression for it was wanting, he therefore 
 chooses the name of the object previously seen, as much 
 as to say : tlie characteristics which he has now in mind 
 here, are just the same as he had before seen there : or, in 
 other words, since the two objects have so much in com- 
 mon (judgment), they deserve the same name (concept). 
 If the meaning of the child's expression is so understood, 
 we see plainly the relation between the act of judgment 
 and the formation of the concept, although in the actually 
 spoken judgment both acts were mingled. The child's 
 manner of expression accords with his incomplete appre- 
 hension and*his poverty of language. For, because the 
 mental act of judgment is not correctly completed, and 
 because, moreover, the correct expression is wanting, while 
 the idea is, nevertheless, struggling for utterance ; the gen- 
 uine judgment form which ought to give the separate 
 characteristics is, as it were, skipped, and that forin is 
 chosen which the judgment has when it conies after the
 
 66 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 concept has been foiineil, and when it therefore is intended 
 to name, not the separate characteristics, but the concept 
 itself. This is probabl}- the correct view with reference 
 to nearly all those charming instances of childish '' exten- 
 sion of meaning" in common words, which are frequently 
 given as proof of the child's power of abstraction and con- 
 ception. One little girl, born in the South, saw snow for 
 tlie first time on a visit I^orth, and said it was "raining 
 soapsuds." Another called the crackling of the kitchen 
 fire, '' barking." A little boy, not yet old enough to pro- 
 nounce distinctly, called dipping bread into gravy giving 
 
 it a bath (<'ba'"). Baby J used the word ''bo" to 
 
 mean anything that pleased him. Darwin's little boy, at 
 twelve months, invented the word '•' mum," which he used 
 for food of all kinds. There is no proper abstraction in 
 any of these cases. A child of one or two years old uses 
 words by analogy, as was explained above, but does not 
 h;ive general concepts with any definite content. 
 
 Adults, moreover, do not do a particle better than the 
 child in the spontaneous formation of genus concepts. 
 When they pass a judgment merely on the basis of a hasty 
 comparison, without, therefore, distinctly apprehending 
 the se]jarate common characteristics, they understand very 
 well how to cover up this deficiency. They pass by the 
 genuine form of judgment and employ, instead, the expres- 
 sion which contains the ready formed concept, and perhaps, 
 besides, use a very (jcneral expression for this concept. 
 And tliis phrase must pass current for a genuine judgment, 
 and the general expression must serve as an adequate con- 
 cept. Sometimes such a word serves the purpose for 
 which it was uttered — just as light money passes for 
 full value until its deficiency is recognized.
 
 TO THINK IS TO FOKM CONCEPTS. 67 
 
 Thus wo liave shown that likewise, in the case of super- 
 ordinato concepts, there results fr<jin the comparison first 
 of all a judgment, no matter whether expressed or not. 
 But the judgment never concerns itself with anything but 
 the separate characteristics ; for the mental act of judg- 
 ment is nothing but the focusing of consciousness on a 
 single like or unlike characteristic. To sum up : not until 
 the judgments are made, that is, until the neeessary like 
 or unlike characteristics are seized upon, thus bringing to- 
 gether the material for the concept in question, — not until 
 this is done, can the concept, whether superordinate or sub- 
 ordinate, be formed. For conception is nothing but the 
 taking together {fon, together, atjiio, I take) of the com- 
 mon or essential characteristics in the grasp of one idea. 
 In just so far as the preceding judgments have been incom- 
 plete, will also the succeeding concept be incomplete. A 
 concept deserves to be called scientifically precise, only 
 when it is the result of correct and exJuu/stice judgments. 
 
 The manifold forms of thinking have thus been so far 
 simplified that we see they consist entirely of judging and 
 forjuing concepts, — or of the two successive acts : appre- 
 hension of the separate characteristics of several objects, 
 and comprehension of their like or essential characteristics 
 in the grasp of a general idea. There is, moreover, noth- 
 ing to prevent carrying this simplification farther and 
 denoting only the final act, and saying, accordingly, to 
 think is to form concepts. But one must then keep in 
 mind that this concluding act is preceded by the prepara- 
 tory act of judgment. 
 
 A further hindrance to the clear understanding of the 
 genetic relation between judgment and conception lies in 
 the use of langua.ge. Since the text-books make no men-
 
 68 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 tion of this difficulty and no attempt to remove it, we shall 
 try to supply tlie omission. 
 
 Language is in this respect by no means a true mirror 
 of the mental processes. Thus the concept, being a single 
 idea, would require, as a corresponding expression for itself, 
 a single word or a Avord with one or more qualifiers (e.g., 
 right-angled triangle, bitter tasting, beautiful and correct 
 writing, 'Hhe little village of Grand-Pre, distant, secluded, 
 still," as subject, " lay in the fruitful valley, in the Acadian 
 land, on the shores of the Basin of Minas," as predicate, 
 etc.). But in order to express any mental act, language 
 never uses a single word or an isolated phrase ■ — unless it 
 be an abbreviation, in which the omission is supplied men- 
 tally — but always employs a sentence, which is the form 
 of expression for a judgment. And since concepts always 
 occur as parts of a sentence, any one who does not thor- 
 oughly understand the origin of judgments and concepts 
 would be led to believe that concepts Avere developed before 
 judgments. The reason why language obscures the correct 
 sequence of these acts is not difficult to see. One has only 
 to remember that the speaker puts his thoughts in words 
 not for /lis oini sake, but in order to communicate them to 
 ot Iters. TluLs, if one is thinking to one's self and wishes to 
 denote in words a newly conceived idea, a shigle ivord will 
 suffice, or an isolated phrase ; but, if one wants another 
 clearly to understand a newly conceived idea, such an 
 isolated expression will not be sufficient, but the preceding 
 act of judgment must be indicated. Now, this is done by 
 f«»rmulating a complete sentence, in which the objects 
 judged appear as subject and the resulting concept as 
 jjredieate. For example, suppose the new concept is " par- 
 allelogram." If it has been gained from the study of the
 
 JUDGMHNTS AS KXPIiESSED IN LANGUAGE. 09 
 
 square and rectangle, it has been preceded by the two judg- 
 ments : " in the square the opposite sides are parallel," 
 and " in the rectangle the opposite sides are likewise 
 parallel." Hereupon the superordinate concept results 
 which we briefly call '''parallelogram." Now if this act of 
 conception is to be made known to others, it takes place 
 through the sentence, " Squares and rectangles are parallel- 
 ograms." The same is true if the concept is not entirely 
 new, but, although formed before, is not yet clarified and 
 completed. Thus, in the case before us, if, in regular school 
 work, the new concept '' parallelogram " is to be tested and 
 at the same time made complete — by application first to 
 the rhombus, we will say — there will result first of all 
 again a genuine judgment : " in the rhombus the opposite 
 sides are likewise parallel." Hereupon the clarified con- 
 cept appears in the sentence : " the rhombus is likewise a 
 parallelogram." If, after the test has been further made 
 with the rhomboid, the completed concept is now to be 
 expressed in its full extent, the sentence would be : " the 
 square, the rectangle, the rhombus, and the rhomboid are 
 parallelograms." 
 
 In this way language clothes all thoughts in the sentence 
 or judgment form ; but, if one looks closer to see what sort 
 of a mental act is thereby represented, one will find that 
 there are two sorts of judgments as expressed in language. 
 One kind expresses an actual mental act of judgment pre- 
 paratory to the particular concept ; the other kind properly 
 makes known only a newly gained or newly completed con- 
 cept, and such are therefore possible only after the concept 
 has been formed. In the first case the language is adapted 
 like a well-fitting garment expressly made to order ; in the* 
 latter case, on the contrary, it is only a borrowed suit for
 
 70 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 an emergency. Thus, aUhougli the fact that language uses 
 sentom-es exi-lusively, may easily mislead the beginner in 
 psychology into believing that the judgment forms the 
 conclusion of the thought process, a closer examination has 
 shown us that the contrary view is confirmed, viz., that 
 conception is the end and goal of thinking. For further 
 elucidation let the attention be called to a couple of ex- 
 amj)les which show that the act of conception towards 
 which the judgment is aiming is very frequently not ex- 
 pressed at all, but instead only the preceding judgment. 
 This is more particularly the case when the concept is in 
 the main already formed and the new judgment only adds 
 a further explanation. Thus, for example, the geometrical 
 proposition, '■' the angles of a triangle are together equal to 
 two right angles," is a genuine judgment. The act of con- 
 ception, to which it tends, consists in the completion of the 
 concept triangle by a new and accessory characteristic. 
 The Pythagorean proposition is likewise a judgment in 
 which the concept " right triangle " receives a new and 
 accessory characteristic. In both cases it is the act of 
 judj^'ment to which we give expression, not the act of con- 
 ception. The preceding discussion, which has, it is hoped, 
 tended very much to simplify our conception of thiidtiug, 
 has likewise simplified our search for the psychological 
 laws of thought. AVe have only to concern ourselves with 
 judgment as the preliminary act, and with conception as the 
 final and chief act. The psychological law is here to be 
 understood as meaning the cause or incentive which leads 
 the mind spontaneously (involuntarily) on the road to 
 judgment and further on to conception. We must there- 
 fore watch and observe unintentional or spontaneous think- 
 ing, since intentional or scientific thought is] influenced by
 
 THE LAW OF CONCKJ'TION. 71 
 
 the will. We will begin with couception, since we can 
 from this higher puiiit of view look back better over the 
 preliminary act. 
 
 We must, then, briefly recur to the process of conception 
 as before described in the second chapter. When a con- 
 cept is to be formed, two or more ideas, having something 
 in common, must be present side by side in consciousness. 
 There are three possible cases : in the first, two objects 
 may be immediately present to the senses, e.g., if the 
 teacher dniws two geometrical figures on the board, or 
 distributes two different kinds of plants to the class. 
 Secondly, one idea may be a sense perception and the 
 other a reproduced idea, e.g., if tlie mountain one is look- 
 ing at recalls the image of one previously seen. Thirdly, 
 both may be reproduced ideas, as is mostly the case, for 
 instance, in silent meditation. The concepts in these cases 
 are so-called class concepts, because they include in their 
 extent a number of objects. The individual concept differs 
 from these in referring only to a single individual (person, 
 thing, etc.). But in its origin it does not differ, since the 
 individual must have been seen several times and in differ- 
 ent forms, e.g., a person in different clothes, or at different 
 ages, in different mood, activity, etc. Here, onl}- the second 
 and third cases above mentioned can occur — the last, when, 
 for instance, an historian meditates on the essential charac- 
 teristics of an historical character, whose biography he has 
 read. 
 
 The process of conception always consists simply in 
 those characteristics which the two objects have in common 
 becoming clearer in consciousness, and the dissimilar char- 
 acteristics consequently being crowded back, i.e., becoming 
 indistinct. The former make up the content of the con-
 
 12 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 cept. It is possible that the like characteristics at first 
 have not been all distinctly marked, but only in the form 
 of a general impression or feeling, as people usually, but 
 very improperly, say. Nevertheless, even in such case, the 
 concept is already embryonic. The cause of the act of con- 
 ception is, accordingly, the fact that the common character- 
 istics become clearer in consciousness, since each pair of 
 characteristics corresponding to the two ideas compared 
 unite into one and are thus strengthened. This is then 
 the psychological law of conception which we have been 
 seeking.* 
 
 The next question is whether this is the only law, or 
 whether there is another in conjunction with it. There is, 
 indeed, as we shall see, a second law in all those cases 
 where one or both ideas are reproduced in memory. For 
 in these cases the meeting of two ideas in consciousness is 
 mutle possible only when an idea, momentarily in con- 
 sciousness, recalls to mind an earlier similar idea. Thus 
 we see that here the memory is actively engaged in the 
 service of conception, and we may therefore say, that in all 
 those cases where the ideas compared are not sense percep- 
 tions, the law of reproduction by similarity assists as a pre- 
 paratory factor of thought. The first case above, in which 
 this assistance is not rendered, since the objects are pre- 
 sented to the senses, occurs comparatively seldom, — and 
 for the most part only in regular school instruction, in 
 wliich case the process is intentional, whereas we are here 
 speaking of spontaneous conception. The other cases em- 
 
 ' Coiirepts, therefore, bear a striking analogy to composite portraits. 
 The term "abstract idea" is frequently not so appropriate a.s "cumular- 
 llvo l«1r'i\." Compare Oalton, Inqvirics into Human Faculty, p. 83. 
 Rn,<,» ......f,...^ tlie term ""eiieric idea."
 
 CAUSE OF SPONTANEOUS JUDGMENTS. 73 
 
 brace not only ]>y far the greater part of llie processes of 
 thought, but arc further of special importance, inasmuch 
 as through them the store of ideas already collected is con- 
 tinually being applied to the production of new thoughts ; 
 without them the older supply of ideas would remain as 
 dead capital for the mind. 
 
 In order now to discover the natural cause that leads the 
 mind to form judgments, we shall have to exclude from 
 our consideration all cases of voluntary thought, since here 
 the will too much overshadows the other natural cause for 
 us to observe. And so far as involuntary or spontaneous 
 thinking is concerned, it will again occur to the reader that 
 here the act of judgment is skipped, as it were, i.e., does 
 not show plainly, thus resulting in concepts which are 
 likewise incomplete. Hence it would appear that the very 
 process which we wish to observe is so obscured that our 
 investigation seems to be brought again to a standstill. 
 But Ave should recollect that those judgments which lead 
 immediately to conception, relate exclusively to the like 
 characteristics. Even if this half of the field is cut off 
 from our view, there still remains for observation all the 
 other half, consisting of those judgments which relate 
 to tinlike characteristics. These were already referred 
 to above as giving the downward direction to thought, 
 towards subordinate concepts. 
 
 One point is already clear to start with. Keeping in 
 mind that a judgment is nothing but a peculiar kind of 
 mental presentation, and, further, that the usual mental 
 presentation can take place without leading to outward 
 expression in language, we notice that there are two parts 
 to be distinguished in the act of judgment. In the first 
 place the apprehension of the characteristics in question,
 
 74 THOUGHT AKD MEMORY. 
 
 whereby the ordinary form of mental presentation results ; 
 and, secondly, a certain additional factor that changes the 
 ordinary mental presentation into the judgmental form. It 
 is this second factor, then, that is properly the cause of the 
 act of judgment, and is therefore the element that we are 
 seeking. The following examples will show us wherein it 
 consists. 
 
 First example: A child sees a white sheep, and at the 
 same time, alongside of it, a piece of black coal. 
 
 Second example: The child sees a white sheep, and at 
 the same time, alongside of it, a black one (supposing he 
 lias not seen sheep before at all). 
 
 'I'lie examples are evidently so chosen that the very same 
 two unlike characteristics (white and black) occur in both 
 cases. The question is now : What sort of a mental state 
 will these unlike characteristics call forth in each case ? 
 "Will they give rise to a judgment or not ? 
 
 In the first example, what arise first in the mind of a' 
 cliild are the total perceptions of the two objects. There 
 is certainly no doubt that the color characteristic Avill not 
 be wanting in either one of the perceptions, since color, as 
 is Avell known, l^elongs to the characteristics that seldom 
 escape attention. We will, therefore, assume that the 
 color characteristic has been apprehended along with the 
 rest in each object, resulting in at least an ordinary idea. 
 Will now this ordinary idea produce a judgment ? At first 
 view one might think that since these characteristics are in 
 contrast, and their difference is so great tliat it could not 
 be greater, they would strike the child as something notice- 
 able, and so lead to the formation of a judgment. Never- 
 tlicless, 1 claim that the act of judgment will not follow, — 
 wliicli is as mucli as to say, that, in spite of the contrast,
 
 A child's SrONTANEOUS -JUDGMENTS. 75 
 
 tlie uttention is not siillicioutly aroused, and tlic, apprehen- 
 sion has not been sufficifnlly lively, to make tJie ml ad feel 
 the need of (j'triiKj rent to itself hi a jiuhjment. Of course 
 it would not l)e absolutely impossible in the case of an 
 adult, although even here probably no judgment would 
 arise ; but in the case of a child in whose mind those two 
 ideas meet for the first time, it is practically impossible. 
 The two objects, sheep and coal, are so different in kind 
 that they have nothing in common in respect to most of 
 their characteristics ; they are, therefore, aside from the 
 single characteristic of color, incapable of comparison (dis- 
 parate). Although there are two oljjects, they do not make 
 a ^^a/r. The two ideas lie side by side in the mind, but, 
 since their main elements have no relation to each other, 
 they remain thorough strangers. They do not rouse each 
 other, they produce no movement of thought, but remain 
 indifferent, as if they did not concern each other at all. 
 To be sure, the two unlike color ideas, being capable of 
 comparison, could in themselves serve as a stimulus to 
 each other, and particularly so since they are in contrast ; 
 but, compared with the excess of indifferent elements, this 
 single stimulus is too weak to cause any result. If, then, in 
 such a case, where the contrast is so great, no judgment re- 
 sults, there is still less cause when the difference is smaller. 
 Turning now to the second example, we find as before 
 first of all the two total perceptions. But the rest of 
 the mental process will be essentially different when com- 
 pared with the first example. The two objects are so very 
 much alike that they have all characteristics in common 
 with the single exception of color. Accordingly, the two 
 total perceptions do not remain as strangers, indifferent to 
 each other, in stolid repose, but engage at once in inter-
 
 76 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 course as near relatives. Hereupon the law of conception 
 begins to operate, and the similar elements coalesce in 
 pairs. This movement of the like characteristics communi- 
 cates itself to those that are unlike ; they also approach 
 each other, as it were, and feel the stimulus of rivalry to 
 comjxire their content. In so far it looks as if the atten- 
 tion would be almost forcibly directed to the difference of 
 those characteristics, and, therefore, that a judgment would 
 now really result, and yet it is highly probable that such 
 will not be the case. For the very same favorable circum- 
 stani-e that brought the two unlike characteristics together 
 and stimulated comparison, viz., the commencement of con- 
 ception, contains likewise a hindrance to comparison and 
 therefore to judgment also; for, while according to the 
 law of conception the common characteristics are coa- 
 lescing, and therefore strengthening, the effect on the 
 unlike characteristics is, as we know, to crowd them back 
 in the same measure, to make them obscure, and therefore 
 withdraw them from the atte?ition. The advantage afforded 
 the act of judgment by the process of conception thus 
 seems to be lost. This case Avhich at the beginning seemed 
 to be so favorable will, therefore, as a rule, not lead to any 
 conscious comparison of the unlike characteristics and 
 tlierefore to no formal judgment. If one changes the 
 example before us so that instead of two present percep- 
 tions only one is of this kind, and the other a past per- 
 ception, and therefore now a reproduced idea, it is easy to 
 see that, so far as the act of judgment is concerned, the 
 change is not essential. We shall, therefore, not consider 
 this ca-se any farther, but shall proceed to a new example, 
 in which, on the contrary, the act of judgment appears in 
 full for.-.'.
 
 DISAPPOINTED EXPECTATION. 77 
 
 Third example : Suppose the cliikl lias seen a white 
 sheep not only once but repeatedly, so that the spontaneous 
 concept "sheep" is already formed — so far as is possible 
 from such observations. AVhat will take place now in his 
 mind when he one day happens to see a black sheep ? 
 Compared with the forej^'oing example we shall notice 
 two points of difference, both of which are owing to the 
 fact that the mind possesses an already formed concept, 
 whi(di is now recalled in consciousness. Althout,di again an 
 act of conception takes i)lace, still it is only the application 
 of an already furmed concept and therefore proceeds easily 
 and quickly, thus not occupying the attention so strongly 
 as at first. While, therefore, on the one hand, the incen- 
 tive to comparison of the unlike characteristics remains in 
 full force, the accompanying hindrance, on the other hand, 
 is weakened. This is the first advantageous change. The 
 second point of advantage is as follows. Since all the 
 sheep yet seen were white, and this characteristic was firmly 
 impressed by the repetition, and even received into the con- 
 cept as part of its content, the mind expects to find the 
 characteristic " white," again, in case such an animal comes 
 again to view. If now a black sheep appears, this expec- 
 tation is disappointed. TJiis feeling of disappointed ex- 
 2Jectatio7i directs the attention with all its force to the 
 unlike characteristic, draws the idea forward again more 
 strongly into consciousness, and then gives vent to the 
 judgment, " This sheep is black." 
 
 To sum up the results of our discussion thus far, we see 
 that in the first example the apprehension of the unlike 
 characteristics was not yet of itself sufficient to call forth 
 a judgment, even when the difference amounted to contrast. 
 What is further necessary is a stimulus to comparison ; for
 
 78 THOrcHT AXD MEMORY. 
 
 foinparison is the cliaraeteristic act which begins the 
 thoui,'h(-i)rocCbS, or the decisive point of transition from an 
 ordinary idea into a tliought.^ Only similar ideas afford 
 material and opportunity for comparison ; therefore, in the 
 first example, since the objects were too disparate, no com- 
 parison was i)ossible. The act of comparison begins uni- 
 formly with the like characteristics ; because the impulse 
 to comparison has its origin in the law of conception, 
 wliereby the similar elements coalesce, and this impulse 
 begins to operate at once, as soon as the two ideas come 
 together. The comparison of the unlike characteristics, on 
 the contrary, does not begin iintil the process of conception 
 lias been concluded, because the latter process obscures the 
 
 1 A now light is here shed on the important idea of comparison. It 
 will be rc'Mieinbi'red that at the beginning of tliis section comparison was 
 expressly counted as one of the acts of tliought. Comparison is really the 
 act out of which all the other acts of thought grow, just as the bud 
 develops into the flower and fruit. First of all, judgment — on the one 
 hand, of like, on the other hand, of unlike characteristics; hereupon fol- 
 lows conception — on the one hand (on the basis of the like characteris- 
 tics), rising to higher concepts, on the tlie otlior hand (on the basis of the 
 unlike charartcristics), descending to subordinate concepts. In the form 
 of a table these chief points iu the thought-i)rocess may be represented 
 as follows : — 
 
 Superordlnate Concepts 
 
 / 
 
 Conception rising to 
 like characteristics 
 
 Compafison gives rise to J 
 
 -< 
 
 unlike characteristics 
 
 \ 
 
 Distinction of Concepts 
 descending to\ 
 
 Subordinate Concepts.
 
 'IIIK PKKVIOUS EXPECTATION. rJ 
 
 difforoiifcs ami withdraws tlic atlciiiioii I'ldin them. As 
 au offset to this hhulraiu'e a new incentive to comparison 
 is found in tlie above mentioned feeling of disappointed 
 expectation. lUit this feeling is not itself the primal cause 
 of judgments in case of unlike characteristics ; for this 
 feeling is a derived condition and points to a still earlier 
 cause. There must evidently have lieen a j^f&vioiis expecta- 
 tion based on an eai'lier act of conception. This concept, 
 on the one hand, when it appears as a reproduced idea in a 
 new application, and the unexpected new perception, on 
 the other hand, give rise to the feeling of disappointment. 
 The primary cause of judgments in the case of unlike 
 characteristics is, accordingly, to be found in the law of 
 conception whereby like characteristics coalesce. It must, 
 moreover, not be overlooked that the other factor of con- 
 ception, the law of rei^roduction by similarity, is also at 
 work here. 
 
 A few pages back (p. 73) we passed by the judgments 
 formed in the case of like characteristics, because there 
 the act of judgment was not easily recognized. iS"ow it is 
 not to be supposed that the act of judgment is really 
 skipped, although this form of expression was before used. 
 As a matter of fact, a judgment does really take place, but 
 surreptitiously ; because a concept can only be present when 
 it has some content, and this latter can only consist of 
 those characteristics which are recognized as common, even 
 though they are not distinguished separately and precisely. 
 
 The primary cause of judgment in the case of unlike as 
 Avell as in the case of like characteristics, is therefore one 
 and the same, namely, the law of conception. The only 
 difference is, that in the case of like characteristics this 
 law serves as the only and immediate stimulus to judg-
 
 80 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 meut, whereas, in the case of unlike characteristics, it first 
 gives rise to that feeling of disappointed expectation, and 
 thus operates through this intermediate factor. 
 
 There are three recognized forms of judgments, — affirm- 
 ative, negative, and double, i.e., affirmative and negative. 
 It will certainly not be uninteresting to the reader, if, in 
 conclusion, we speak briefly of the psychological basis of 
 this threefold form, even though this does not properly 
 belong to our siibjeet. 
 
 Negative judgments relate to characteristics that are 
 missed, i.e., to such as are wanting, whereas previous ex- 
 perience has taught one to expect them. If, for example, 
 at a season of the year when trees are usually covered with 
 foliage, one comes across a tree without leaves, this natu- 
 rally attracts attention and leads to the judgment, '' this 
 tree is not covered with foliage." Or, if one meets a man 
 who has lost both his arms, one says, " this man has no 
 arms." The negative judgment thus points out a vacancy 
 or omission. Both of the other forms relate to characteris- 
 tics that are not expected. Two cases are possible. The 
 new characteristic may either supply an omission in one's 
 previous knowledge, and therefore be compatible with it, 
 or it may take the place of an expected characteristic, and 
 in this case be incompatible with one's expectations. As 
 an example of the first case, suppose a person does not 
 know how many styles there are in the apple blossom, 
 although he is otherwise well acquainted with this blossom. 
 If his attention is called to it and he finds that there 
 are five, this characteristic simply completes his previous 
 knowledge, and does not conflict with any other character-
 
 istic. Tliere results, accordingly, the simple affirmative 
 judgment, " the apple blossom has five styles." As an 
 example of the second case, let us suppose a child as yet 
 has seen only white sheep, but now comes across a black 
 one. The new mark of color conflicts with the old. liut 
 to express this resulting state of mind, a simple affirmative 
 statement is not enough; for both the new characteristic 
 and likewise its incouipcitihUlti/ Avith the old must find 
 vent. Hence arises the form, ''this sheep is not white, 
 but black." Thus the affirmative judgment relates to an 
 unexpected, but compatible characteristic ; the double judg- 
 ment, on the contrary, to an unexpected, but incompatible 
 characteristic. 
 
 Our investigation into the laws of thought is finished, 
 and we have found that the two principal acts which suc- 
 ceed each other in the thought-process, namely, judgment 
 and conception, however different from each other they 
 may be, still are based on one and the same fundamental 
 law : the coalescence of the similar elements contained in 
 the two ideas. Only in the case of judgments of unlike 
 characteristics, there is a secondary and additional cause : 
 the feeling of disappointed expectation. How simple the 
 causes appear in this field of thought, where at first the 
 processes seemed so varied and complex ! 
 
 The laws of thought, as well as the laws of memory, 
 have thus passed in review before ns. Let us now briefly 
 compare the two results, in order to make definite the rela- 
 tion between these two mental activities. 
 
 In the case of thought we have here to do only with its
 
 82 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 primary or I'hief liu'tor, and therefore with but a single 
 law ; which is as follows : — 
 
 ThoiKjId (li'peiids on the coalescence of the similar ele- 
 vxents of ideas ; or, in other words, it is the similarity of 
 ideas that determines thought. 
 
 l^he menionj is controlled by two laws, either — 
 
 1. /)// the SIMILARITY of ideas, or 
 
 L'. /.'// their SIMLLTAXKITY. 
 
 If now we compare thought and memory with respect to 
 tlu^se factors that underlie their processes, we see that both 
 mental activities have one factor, namely, the similarity of 
 ideas, in common. In the one case this common factor 
 causes a production of new material through the process of 
 abstraction and conception ; in the other case, on the con- 
 trary, it results in a reproduction of tlie old. We may 
 formulate this fact briefly as follows : — 
 
 Tin; LAW OF THOUGHT IS LIKEWISE ONE OF THE TWO 
 LAWS OF MEMORY. 
 
 It will, undoubtedly, have occurred to the reader already, 
 that this psychological trutli must be of most immense im- 
 ])ortance in the work of teaching and education. This will 
 show itself still more exactly if we examine the relation 
 between thought and memory to see in how far these two 
 mental activities re-enforce and serve each other. 
 
 In what way does memory act as the servant of thought ? 
 
 This question has already been answered in the second 
 chapter. The memory is, together with the activity of 
 j>('r<-eption, the furnisher of the material of thought. But 
 in tliis service it makes_ a very great difference whether 
 the material is furnished according to the one or the other
 
 IMAGINATION. 83 
 
 law of ineniory. By tho first law of memory similar ideas 
 are sup})lieil, and therefore a material wliieh immediately, 
 without further selection, may be turned to account in 
 thought. IJy the second law, in so far as it alone controls, 
 the memory furnishes, on the contrary, only material that 
 is not immediately usable in thought. How important this 
 difference is in the work of teaching will be more fully dis- 
 cussed in the following chapter. 
 
 Keversing the question, we may now ask. How does 
 thought re-enforce memory ? 
 
 The narrow worslii[)i)ers of memory may well wonder at 
 this question, particularly since many of them think that 
 the early training of thought is a hindrance to memory. 
 We shall have to leave them in their wonderment for the 
 present ; but since, as Plato says, wonder is the mother of 
 philosophy, this astonishment may have the good result 
 of teaching one to think more favorably of thought — even 
 from the standpoint of the narrow partisan of memory. 
 The foregoing question is answered by the important fact 
 above established. If the law of thought is also one of the 
 two laws of memory, it follows that the icork of thlnhing 
 viust at the same thne accomplish a considerable part of the 
 work of memory. This volunteer service of thought to 
 memory may be of twofold character. On the one hand, 
 wherever thought takes place, its help to the memory 
 is spontaneous and unsolicited ; on the other hand, in in- 
 struction it may be employed intentionally as a means of 
 memory. This point will likewise receive further consid- 
 eration in the following chapter. 
 
 At the close of some of the foregoing sections we have 
 taken advantage of the opportunity offered to clear up our
 
 84 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 ideas of certain psychological plienomena, which, though 
 not belonging strictly to our theme, stand in close relation 
 to it. In this way have been treated the sensations, the 
 rise of perceptions out of sensations, and of complex ideas 
 out of simple ones. The present seems to be the pro^jer 
 place for some remarks on the phantasy, or imagination. 
 For, since the imagination has something in common with 
 memory on the one hand, and with thought on the other 
 hand, opportunity is here afforded to define more sharply 
 the meaning of memory and of thought in this respect. 
 
 We first may ask wherein tlie peculiarity of imagination 
 consists. New sense ideas are not furnished by the imagi- 
 nation, but only by the senses; nor does it furnish new 
 abstract ideas, for this is the Avork of the understanding 
 alone. Tlie imagination, therefore, operates with the store 
 of ideas already at hand, and is, hence, nothing but a pecul- 
 iar kind of reproduction of ideas. In ordinary recollection, 
 the ideas come back into consciousness in just the form in 
 which they were originally apprehended ; in the case of 
 imagination, on the contrary, the ideas are rearranged, 
 wherefore we may speak of the activity of imagination as 
 a modified reproduction. But now, since the simple or 
 elementary ideas are in their nature unchangeable, it fol- 
 lows tliat this modification and rearrangement can relate 
 only to tlie composition and sequence of the complex ideas. 
 Tliis modification of a complex idea may take place in 
 three ways. This is as true of the intentional as of the 
 iniintentional use of the imagination ; but, us the reader 
 knows, we always have uppermost in mind the involuntary 
 and spontaneous processes. 
 
 The first modification consists in leaving out single ele- 
 ments in the reproduced group of ideas, — as when, for
 
 IDEALIZATION AND ITS OPPOSITE. 85 
 
 instance, anyone tries to recall the face of an absent ac- 
 quaintance, but finds that he does not succeed completely, 
 because single features have dropped out of his memory. 
 This is plainly only an instance of inexact, unfaithful rec- 
 ollection. Kevertlioless, it may happen that a complex 
 idea so changed will thus receive a character noticeably 
 different from the original, and therefore produce a dif- 
 ferent effect. For, if in such a case the lost elements 
 happen not to be beautiful, the remainder will appear more 
 beautiful, and therefore this modification will be in its 
 effect what we call idealization. Take an example from 
 every-day experience. If one imagines one's self in a situa- 
 tion long since passed, for instance in one's childhood, that 
 period, with its events, conditions, and persons, as a rule, 
 will appear to him in a more beautiful light than it did at 
 the time when he actually lived through it. The ideas of 
 the manifold disagreeable inconveniences, which were not 
 wanting in tluit early time, are now partly forgotten ; 
 moreover, the feelings connected Avith those ideas which 
 are not forgotten, have weakened more or less ; since a 
 pain, after it is overcome, no longer hurts as it did when 
 it was actually felt. Kow, this must naturally result in 
 the remaining features of this picture assuming a more 
 friendly character. Thus the recollection has been invol- 
 untarily and unwittingly idealized. On the contrar}-, dis- 
 trust, envy, hate, in short, all sorts of ill-nature may so 
 work upon the recollection that, in the picture left in mem- 
 ory of tlie events, conditions, and persons in question, the 
 gentler and kindlier features disappear, thus resulting in a 
 disfigurement of memory, the exact opposite of idealiza^ 
 tion. AVhat we have been considering in all these cases is, 
 as the reader sees, in its genesis and its nature, nothing
 
 86 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 more than an Inexact rccoUcetion; but still, in order to indi- 
 cate that tliis cliange has given a noticeably different char- 
 acter to the ideas, such modifying reproduction is said to 
 be imaginative. The justification for this particular name 
 is more plainly to be seen, when one remembers that this 
 modification may also take place purposely. This first 
 mode of the modifying reproduction, in Avhich the change 
 consists in the omission of certain elements, is called the 
 select 'mg imagin at ion} 
 
 Secondly, the work of imagination may consist in adding 
 new elements to the complex idea, thus reversing the fore- 
 going mode. It is an instance of intentional imagination 
 of this kind, when, for instance, an artist, in order to rep- 
 resent an angel, imagines wings on the human form. But, 
 even in daily experience, we find it occurs unintentionally 
 likewise. Thus, for instance, when anyone hears or reads 
 an account of an event and wants to get a very clear pic- 
 ture of the occurrence, he will picture it to himself, with 
 all details. For, since language uses only general terms, 
 the hearer must make these more or less concrete by filling 
 out the further characteristics, — thus, for example, he 
 must think of the persons mentioned as of a definite 
 stature and size, in a particular dress, circumstances, etc. 
 Because the reproduced idea is here further filled out and 
 therel)y more exactly determined, this second kind is called 
 the determining imagination. 
 
 1 This process of abstraction in tlie field of phantasy must not be con- 
 fused with tliat which takes place in the process of thinking. In the 
 first case, tlie abstraction takes place on a single complex idea; in the 
 seconr] case, on the contrary, after a comparison of at least two. If, in 
 the former, tl>e given complex idea was concrete, the result of abstrac- 
 tion remains likewise a concrete idea; in the latter, on the other hand, 
 the result is always an abstract idea or concept.
 
 FltEEI)0:sr OF TIIK IMArjINATIOX. 87 
 
 Only seldom will this second kind of modified reproduc- 
 tion occur iiloiir; both modes are usually united, particu- 
 larly when the imagination has much play — for example, 
 involuntarily in dreams, or voluntarily in art productions. 
 This is, then, the third kind, and is called the combininfj 
 imagination. 
 
 The phantasy is usually thought of as completely free 
 and unbound by law. If this is not a comjjlete error, one 
 must at least define the word freedom and explain in how 
 far the phantasy is unbound, that is, in what respect it is 
 free, and furthermore in what respects it never can be free. 
 The involuntary imagination is free in no respect, but is 
 bound just as much by natural laws as are the processes of 
 physical nature. First, it is bound by the store of ideas 
 already at hand, as a general preliminary condition ; for a 
 man blind from birth cannot imagine color, nor a deaf man 
 imagine sound. Secondly, being a reproduction, it is bound 
 by the two laws of reproduction of ideas (simultaneity and 
 similarity) ; for there is no third way in which one idea 
 can recall another into consciousness. Thirdly, it depends 
 on how the older ideas were gained, on the relation in 
 which they stand to one another, and in general on their 
 ease of reproduction ; for whatever here is well or badly 
 done or left undone is sure to show itself in the reproduc- 
 tion, either as retentiveness or forgetfulness. These are 
 the rules by which the phantasy is bound. The apparent 
 lawlessness of its productions is only seemingly so. How- 
 ever singular, for example, the images of a dream may look, 
 and however singularly they may succeed each other, they 
 have, nevertheless, come into consciousness exactly as 
 under the circumstances they had to come. 
 
 The voluntary imagination is likewise bound by the
 
 bS THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 above named tliree kinds of conditions. But, since the will 
 comes in as a new factor here, the imagination receives 
 thereby a freer scope in two respects. In tlie first place 
 the will, according to its purpose, may direct the mind 
 from step to step in a definite direction, or to a particular 
 point, — all the time, however, dependent on those three 
 conditions as to what ideas come into consciousness. 
 Secondly, the will may now select and retain, according 
 to its purpose, certain ones of those ideas which were actu- 
 ally called up. There is no freedom for the imagination 
 in any other sense. An important rule for the cultivation 
 of the imagination follows from what has just been said. 
 We must above all direct our attention to that on which 
 the imagination as a species of reproduction natural] 3* de- 
 pends. In other words, the (/reciter the j^ower of introduc- 
 tion of the ideas the better. But the same advice applies 
 to the cultivation of the intelligence in general, as we shall 
 see in the following chapter. 
 
 In its genesis, therefore, the imagination is to be distin- 
 guished from the memory, since each is a species of repro- 
 duction. On the other hand, it must not be confounded 
 with the understanding, although both produce new ideas. 
 
 The imagination has still many other interesting aspects. 
 It is of great importance not only in artistic creation, but 
 no less in the discoveries and inventions of science, and, 
 besides, in many practical walks in life, for example, for 
 the soldier, the judge, the teacher, etc. From all of which 
 it follows that in the school its cultivation must not be 
 neglected. But to discuss all of this would require a sepa- 
 rate monograph.
 
 CHAITFJ; TV. 
 
 APPLICATION TO PEDAGOGY. 
 
 It remains to apply in pedagogical practice the entire 
 results of our foregoing psychological investigation. 
 
 Since this practical consideration appears in a psycholo- 
 gical monograph only as a sort of appendix, it will natu- 
 rally have to be restricted in many ways. In the first 
 place, it will be restricted to the intellect only ; for if the 
 feelings and the character were likewise to be considered; 
 this would have had to be preceded by a psychological in- 
 vestimtion into the activities of feeling and will. Beside 
 this limitation of aim, there, is then, a second in respect of 
 the two meanfi to be employed, thought and memory ; for 
 their conjunction here means, that the one as well as the 
 other activity is to be discussed only in so far as is neces- 
 sary to make plain how they can and should work tofjether 
 in the building up of knowledge. Inside of this narrow 
 field we must, moreover, be satisfied with but a few in- 
 structive examples from one or another of the subjects of 
 study. 
 
 To commit to memory means to make the ideas in ques- 
 tion capable of reproduction and, as far as possible, of 
 faithful, rapid, and many-sided reproduction. It is to be 
 noticed here that the purpose of committing to- memory is 
 not stated to be the retention of ideas, but rather the pover 
 of reproiJurinti them ; for whether they are retained or 
 not will show itself in whether they can bo reproduced or 
 not. Ideas incapable of reproduction have no more mean 
 
 89
 
 90 THOUGHT AND MEMOKY. 
 
 ing than dead capital or possessions in tlie moon ; and, as 
 long us they remain incapable of reproduction, so long are 
 they — together with the pains spent in learning and com- 
 mitting to memory — lost to the mind.^ 
 
 If. now, thought results in a production of new ideas, and 
 memory embraces the whole of the previously acquired 
 ideas, thought and memory in their service to knowledge 
 bear the same relation to each other as do earning and 
 saving in daily life to the acquirement of a competency. 
 
 In school instruction, therefore, both activities necessa- 
 rily belong together, — as necessarily as in domestic life 
 industry and economy, or, as in walking, one leg and the 
 other, or, as in politics, the progressive and conservative 
 parties. And if they helontj together, they must also hold 
 together, as faithfully and inviolably as in the home and 
 family man and wife do. 
 
 First of all, we must find the places where the memory 
 must render assistance to thought and to the learning of 
 new ideas in general. For this purpose we must recall to 
 mind the different stages or steps in the acquirement of 
 new ideas. 
 
 All knowledge in any subject must begin with the appre- 
 hension of concrete material, or, as we usually say, with 
 ohscn'dtitm (I.). 
 
 With the perceptions so acquired as a basis, the second 
 step in learning follows, namely, the production of abstract 
 ideas or conception, in short, tlioufjht (II.). 
 
 ' If the reader thinks tliis is too strong language^ lie may console 
 liiinself with tho story of the cabin-boy, who came to the cajjtaiu one day 
 and said pitoously : " Sir, is a thing lost when you know where it is ? " 
 " You crazy fellow," cried tlie captain, " why, how can it then be lost?" 
 " I am glad to liearyou say that," replied the boy; " I have just dropped 
 your silver mug into the sea, while rinsing it."
 
 STEPS IN ACQUIUlXd KNOWLEDGK. 91 
 
 But in scliijol instruction ihis cannot be regarded as the 
 completion ul the act of learning. In several different 
 ways one is led to conclude that there must be a third part 
 to the process. In the first place, the newly produced 
 concept is, as a rule, still incomplete — in its extent as well 
 as in its content. In its extent," because it has resulted 
 from but a few, perhaps only two, observed examples, and 
 therefore embraces but very few concrete ideas ; in its con- 
 tent, because the characteristics of which it consists are 
 seldom so sharply and distinctly apprehended as they 
 ought to be. In the second place a concept developed from 
 but few examples increases only the ability to knoxv, not 
 the ability to do ; that is to say, since this thought-process 
 has taken i)lace but once, it has not yet acquired readiness 
 and skill in practice. And thirdly, outside of those ideas 
 from whii'h the concept was accpiired. there may be still 
 others in the mind belonging to this concept. If, now, the 
 process of conception stops short with those fevv' exam})les, 
 then all the rest of the related perceptions have lost the 
 advantage of their association ; they renuiin as nothing 
 more than raw nuxterial of intelligence, not yet having been 
 changed into higher pr.oducts of knowledge to become in- 
 struments of thought, or organs of apperception, as our 
 friends the Herbartians would say. This shows us that 
 intelligence resulting only from the above named two 
 activities (observation and thought as a single act luire- 
 peated), would be faulty in nuiu}" ways, and therefore 
 something must be done to supply this lack. This third 
 and concluding part of the process consists in the applica- 
 tion of the ac(piired concept (III.). 
 
 In school instruction this third step will usiuilly consist 
 in presenting to the pupil a number of new concrete exam-
 
 92 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 l)les one al'tor the otlier, for liiin to see ^vliether they like- 
 wise beloiiiT i:iuUm- tlie new concept. What takes place in 
 tlie mind of the pupil in this case is, in the main, evidently 
 notliini,' else than the repeated production of the same con- 
 cept. We are. nevertheless, justified in giving this mental 
 process a special name. For, in the first place, new material 
 is now used in the process. And secondly, the pupil must 
 now proceed with the work of thhil-lnij hulependently of 
 the tenrlii'i' ; besides, the task may be still further increased 
 by re(piiring the pupil himself to hunt for new examples. 
 Thirdly, thought proceeded the first time from the percepts 
 to the concepts ; now the concept is ready to be applied to 
 new j)erceptions. Therefore the difference between the 
 first act of conception and this act of application is usually 
 denoted by saying that in the former, the movement of 
 thought is from the part icula)- to the general ; in the latter, 
 on the contrary, from tlie (jcnerdl to tlie imrticidor. A 
 well-known instance of such application is furnished by 
 tlie examples in arithmetic, which are to be worked by the 
 jiui)il independently. 
 
 All true intelligence — that is, all information, that has 
 at the same time become organized knowledge, and there- 
 fore able to develop power — requires the united action of 
 those three i)roductive activities of learning : observing, 
 thhihing, and oj'plging. If anything is left undone in one 
 of these respects, the loss cannot Ije made good again. 
 What is thus true on the whole and in all branches of knowl- 
 edge, is also true of every single topic, every " method- 
 unit,'' i.e., every portion of concrete material from which 
 one general notion or concept is to be developed. Every 
 sudi topic must be Avorked over in this threefold manner 
 — by observation, by thought, by application.
 
 MEMORY IN APPERCEPTION. 93 
 
 These are the threi' chief acts or formal steps in the pro- 
 cess of acquiring knowledge,^ 
 
 We have now to inquire wliat part the nu-niory sliould 
 play in connection with tliese three acts. It was alieady 
 shown that tlie h-arniiig of new ideas and their conmiitnient 
 to memory sliould go hand in hand. It follows from this 
 that, in a lesson, every productive operation of the mind 
 should be folhnved by committing the result to memory. 
 Thus the results of observation (I.) must be at once im- 
 pressed on the memory ; the result of the thouglit-})roc('ss 
 (II.) must l)e immediately committed to memory. Only in 
 the third step may special attention to mem9ry be omitted, 
 because in the process of application the act of thought is 
 repeated on and on, and. therefore of itself accomplishes 
 the work of memory. The place, therefore, of the omitted 
 memory -drill may be taken, if one wishes, by final repro- 
 duction of the whole lesson as a test — either orally or in 
 writing, and in the latter case perhaps in the form of an 
 independent essay. 
 
 The question may now be asked, Wh}-, then, must the 
 
 1 In tlio secoml of tlicso steps we may, as before sliown, distiiiguish 
 two acts, judgment and conception. Furthermore, tlie first stei) re(iaires 
 a preliminary act, to connect the new knowledge with the related old, 
 thus resulting in two suh-acts here likewise, the introductory preparation 
 and the presentation of the new matter. Hence, if we count these four 
 sub-acts in place of those two chief ones, we shall have five fornnil 
 steps. Cont. Rein, Outlines of Pedagogics, trans, by Van JJew, p. Ho. 
 It is taken for granted that the reader has the good sense to see the limi- 
 tations and countless modifications of these steps in practical school 
 woi-k. They are but a resumd or generalization of exercises used and 
 recommended by all good teachei-s for centuries, and are in no way 
 intended to restrict or fetter the fn^cst activity of the j)upi]. To di.scuiis 
 all of these points would, however, require too much of a digression 
 here. It is hoiied that a special monograph on tliis subject will soon bo 
 published, treating of the psychology of the recitation.
 
 94 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 operations of learnin;^' and coiuniitling to memory go 
 strictly parallel with each other ? — or, iu other words, Why 
 may not the intentional commitment to memory be post- 
 poned until all three acts of learning are ended ? The an- 
 swer is very simple. If the concrete perceptions are not 
 impressed on the mind and made easy of recall, the thoiujht- 
 pron-ss will take place indifferently, or perhaps not at all ; 
 and if the resulting thouglit product is not likewise stamped 
 on the memory, it will he hindered in its ajjprication to 
 other examples. Another reason still deserves considera- 
 tion. Everything should be impressed on the memory as 
 soon as possible after it is first learned ; for the longer one 
 waits the more one loses of what was learned.^ Dr. Mager 
 used to say, '^IJlioi the repetition is necessanj, it comes too 
 late.'* 
 
 Another point in regard to how far the observation 
 material should be comndtted to memory needs some 
 explanation. Since, in any single lesson, in historj^, for 
 instance, this material is not thoroughly worked over in all 
 its parts, but only some few ethical thoughts are developed 
 from it, perhaps even only a single one, the question arises, 
 Why, tlien, must the memory nevertheless be burdened with 
 all this concrete material in its details ? In answer it may 
 be said, that whatever of the observation material was not 
 used on this occasion may be made use of later in another 
 lesson — either as an example for comparison in the case 
 of the formation of concepts, or as an example for applica- 
 tion. If the work is properly planned, this will undoubt- 
 edly actually be done with a considerable part of the 
 concrete material remaining over. For, later on, where are 
 
 PP 
 
 1 Compare Ehhingliaus's experiments showing curve of forgetting, 
 . ri'>-120 of this book.
 
 WAYS AND MKANS OF COMMITTING TO MEMOItY. 05 
 
 tlie cxaini)l('s for comparison and application to l)e oljtained, 
 if not in the main from the concrete material of the pre- 
 vious lessons ? These concrete ideas must, therefore, ever 
 be ready at hand and as easy of access as possible. What- 
 ever is left over after the school years are past may still he 
 turned to account in later life. Facts of observation are, to 
 be sure, only raw material, but, in case they are retained in 
 memory, they may be continually turned to account in ever 
 new uses — just like a tree that bears fruit unceasingly, 
 needing only somebody to pick it off. To allow the obser- 
 vation material to be forgotten would be like cutting down 
 a fruit tree after it has borne one crop. 
 
 Having thus determined whereabouts in each lesson the 
 memory is specially to be exercised, it still remains to indi- 
 cate the sort of exercise. 
 
 This is the point that makes our subject of such great 
 practical importance in teaching, because the old psychol- 
 ogy has nourished didactical errors in this regard, which are 
 not only among the very worst that there are in the whole 
 field of teaching, but, besides, they have made themselves 
 particularly dangerous by being surrounded with a sort of 
 sacred halo. The foregoing psychological investigation 
 will put us into a position to recognize the right method 
 of committing to memory, and to see the mistakes on the 
 right and on the left in the proper light. 
 
 We turn noAV to the icat/s cmd means of committing to 
 memory. To avoid going astray, we must keep iirmly in 
 mind the above definition of memory. To commit to mem- 
 ory is, namely, to make the acquired ideas as capable as 
 possible of reproduction, and not only that they may be 
 faithfully and miickly reproduced, but also that they may 
 be reached from many sides, i.e., through many different
 
 96 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 ideas. In this dofiuition three points are to be noticed. 
 First, that which is here assigned as the purpose of com- 
 mitting to memory, namely, the power to recall the ideas. 
 Hence, everything that has any influence at all in making 
 the ideas capable of recall will come under the head of 
 ways and means of committing to memory. Secondly, it 
 is to be noticed that not only a one-sided, but a many- 
 sided })()\ver of recall is demanded. Hence it follows, that 
 if one means of committing to memory results in a more- 
 suh'd power of recollection, it deserves higher estimation 
 than another which secures only one-sided reproduction. 
 Thirdly, mention is here made only of the purpose of com- 
 mitting to memory, and nothing is said about any particu- 
 lar method, or about the kind of ideas remembered. For, 
 since there are different ways of committing to memory, 
 the definition can contain only what is common to them 
 all. and that is merely their purpose. Hence, if any one 
 included in his meaning of memory a particular means of 
 committing to memory, e.g., by repetition, all the other 
 means would remain unused ; and if particular kinds of 
 ideas were included, all other kinds would be omitted from 
 the benefits of memory. The above definition will, there- 
 fore, serve as a sure guide, and prove its value even at the 
 very beginning of our survey. 
 
 Keeping in mind, then, that the reproduction of an idea 
 is the purpose of committing it to memory, we must at 
 once recur to the two main forms of memory, to which all 
 others are subordinate. Corresponding to the two laws of 
 inemor}- ^similarity and simultaneity), are the two entirely 
 different ways of committing to memory: the one asso- 
 ciates the ideas by their content, and the other associates 
 the ideas by the accidental factor of contiguity in time.
 
 K()|;MS of memoklzing. 97 
 
 As early us Kiiiit, tlies(> two fumlaiuciilal kinds were dis- 
 tinguished, the first as the judicious^ or tkuikiiKj mcinonj, 
 and the second as the viechanlcal memonj. 
 
 The fact that these are the two essential forms, means 
 that every activity of memory, whether intentional or unin- 
 tentional, takes one or other of these two ways, and associ- 
 ates the ideas in question either thinkingly or mechanically. 
 If, therefore, repetition is made use of intentionally, it is 
 not limited to either particular method of association, for 
 it can take place in one way as well as in the other. 
 Hence it follows that repetition is likewise of two kinds, 
 either thoughtful or mechanical. If we add, further, that 
 the commitment to memory may also take place invclun- 
 tarily or spontaneously, and that here, likewise, either a 
 thoughtful or else a mechanical association is formed, we 
 shall have before us in full the fundamental forms as well 
 as the secondary forms of the memory.- Thus we see the 
 distinction between the two methods of association extends 
 through the entire field of memory. It will, therefore, be 
 advisable to examine this difference somewhat more closely 
 before we take up the other differences between intentional 
 and unintentional remembering. 
 
 AVhat is the relative value of the two methods of asso- 
 
 '^Yxnxw judicium, meaning judgment, deliberation, intuition. Hence 
 this sort of memory is also called the "deliberative," the "reflective," 
 tlio " rational," or the " logical " memory. 
 
 Fundamental Forms. Secondary Forms. 
 
 Thoughtful • r Intentional, 
 
 (by law of similarity), j ^^. Spont.aneous. 
 
 2 Commitment 
 to memory 
 may be either 
 
 or >[cchanical f Intentional, 
 
 (by law of simultaneity), j ^^ Spontaneous.
 
 98 TllorOIlT AND MEMORY. 
 
 elation with rospot't to the strengtli of the association, or 
 of the power to recall the idea into consciousness ? First 
 ami foremost, we must inquire this relative value at the 
 time of the first association, and without regard to any 
 latiT repetition. The following may serve as concrete ex- 
 amples of the two cases. Of mechanical association: An 
 object and its name, or a fact in history and its date, or a 
 foreign word and one in the mother tongue, or several 
 sounds composing a melody, or several words forming a 
 sentence, etc. Xow, on the contrary, in case the associa- 
 tion is through thought, the similarity or relation of the 
 ideas must have been recognized before, and hence it must 
 liave been preceded by an act of thought, although, per- 
 Imps, only a spontaneous process of conception. Suppose, 
 for example, associated in this way, the square and the 
 rectangle through the concept parallelogram, or the pine 
 and the spruce through the concept conifer, or the ascent 
 of a balloon and the fall of any other body through the con- 
 cept gravity, or two historical events through the fact that 
 one is recognized as the necessary consequence of the 
 other, etc. 
 
 Let us now compare the results in the two cases. The 
 value of the association may be measured in three respects : 
 by the Infensiti/ol its strength, by the exteyit of its influence, 
 and whether the power of recall is one-sided or many-sided. 
 How much strength there is, or rather let us say, how little 
 strength there is in mechanical association, when the ideas 
 meet in consciousness but once, the reader may attempt to 
 estimate approxim;iteIy for himself. On the other hand, in 
 the case of association by thought, when two similar ideas 
 are present in the mind, if one comes into consciousness, it 
 may reproduce the other without any previous act of con-
 
 SUI'KKIOKITV OK .Mi:Mr)i;V i;v SI M I LA 1:IT\-. 'J'J 
 
 ception having taken place (see page 44). Hence it fol- 
 lows that these ideas, even before the particular act of 
 thought which unites them, are by their very existence as 
 closely bound together as the mechanically associated ideas. 
 Whatever strength the act of thought adds is, therefore, 
 entirely in excess. This superiority in strength is owing 
 to the recognition of the likeness in the two ideas, which is 
 then expressed in the resulting concej^t. The concept is a 
 band, as it were, or clamp to hold the ideas firmly together. 
 I say a band '• as it were," for that which here binds to- 
 gether is not something external, something outside of the 
 ideas, as was the case in mechanical association, but ol)jec- 
 tively it is nothing but the similar content of the ideas, 
 and therefore belongs to their very nature ; subjectively, 
 it is nothing but the recognition, the becoming conscious 
 of this content. Hence it follows that this association by 
 thought lasts just so long as the concept lasts, and the con- 
 cept lasts so long as the ideas as such exist at all, that is, 
 so long as their content is not lost. In a word, in case the 
 concrete ideas are clearly apprehended and their similarity 
 distinctly recognized, the association is so strong that it 
 cannot be any stronger, and hence no repetition would be 
 necessary to strengthen it; for, if one did undertake to 
 repeat, this would only be for tlie j^urpose of making the 
 contents of the concrete ideas wherein the concept is in- 
 cluded, plainer and thereby stronger. The strengthening 
 of the association results then of itself. Association by 
 thought, therefore, possesses already in its very natuie as 
 much strength intensively as the mechanical association 
 can reach even after in a in/ rejjefitions. But still further. 
 In the act of thought the concrete ideas together witli the 
 concept have been siniultaiieousli/ in consciousness. Hence
 
 100 THOUGHT AND MEMOKY. 
 
 it follows that they have likewise been associated mechan- 
 ically, and therefore in this point are once more as strong 
 as ideas associated by simultaneity alone. In comparison 
 with the exceeding strength which the thoughtful associa- 
 tion already possesses in itself, this small addition of a sin- 
 gle mechanical association, need hardly be counted ; we 
 have mentioned it only in order to show clearly and with 
 comi)leteness the great difference between the two associa- 
 tions. The excess, as one sees, on the side of thoughtful 
 association is truly enormous. 
 
 Turning our attention now to the extent of the associa- 
 tion with respect to other ideas, we see that in mechanical 
 association without repetition the power of reproduction, as 
 a rule, does not extend beyond a sequence of three or four 
 ideas ; to gain command of a greater number requires sev- 
 eral repetitions. On the other hand, the thought association 
 embraces, to begin with, as many concrete ideas together 
 with their concept, as have been compared in thought; it 
 may have been two, three, four, or more. But the repro- 
 ductive power extends still further. For, after the concept 
 lias once arisen, its light and power extend to all the other 
 related ideas present in the mind ; they also become, ac- 
 cording to the degree of their relationship, more ready of 
 reproduction, and belong accordingly to the sphere of 
 recollection in the centre of which the concept lies. It is 
 easy to see that this is the case from the fact, for example, 
 that the pupils, after the concept has been formed, are able 
 to hunt new examples for themselves. The power of the 
 concept will affect even those related ideas which do not 
 come into the mind till later ; as soon as these are born, 
 they likewise belong at once to this sphere of reproduction, 
 and therefore share its stren.orth. In this case thou'dit has
 
 MAN V-SI DEDN lii^l W, l^^^^f^(^\] ( \QX}1 
 
 performed the work of memory in advance, as it were. It 
 is i)kiin to see that the thinking memory has a far gi-eater 
 extent of influence than the meclianical. 
 
 Lastly we inquire into the direction in which the power 
 of recollection is exerted, whether it is, namely, one-sided 
 or vianij-sided. In the mechanical association there are 
 always only two members in each case so strongly united, 
 that they can mutually reproduce each other, and even 
 with these few the reproduction backAvard is not as easy as 
 forward. If the series extends beyond two or three mem- 
 bers, then only a one-sided reproduction is possible, namel}', 
 forward. In the sphere of ideas associated by thought, 
 however extended it may be, the connections of memory 
 are, on the contrary, many-sided, or rather all-sided. For, 
 in the first place, the whole of the concrete ideas belonging 
 together can reproduce one another mutually ; and, secondly, 
 these ideas and their concept are likewise mutually asso- 
 ciated.' In a word, in this region the roads for the com- 
 merce of ideas are laid out from the centre to all points in 
 the boundary, and again, all the points in the boundary are 
 connected with each other, — in brief, every idea can reach 
 any other idea. Suppose we represent these connections 
 between the ideas by connecting lines in a diagram. In 
 the first figure on the following page, a, b, c, d, e, f, symbo- 
 lize six ideas associated mechanically in a series. In the 
 second figure are six ideas similarly symbolized, but asso- 
 ciated by the many-sidedness of thought. They are held in 
 the grip t)f the concept x, and by the similarity of their 
 content any one is capable of reproducing any other one. 
 The relative number of connecting paths in the two figures 
 
 1 A concrete idea can, moreover, call up its concept more easily than 
 vice versa ; the reason for this the reader may hunt for himself.
 
 102 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 will serve as a basis of comparing the availability of ideas 
 associated by the two methods. 
 
 The result of the foregoing comparison may be briefly 
 sunnued up as follows : the power of the thinking mem- 
 ory is — 
 
 1. Intensively much stronger than the mechanical 
 memory, 
 
 2. Extensively greater, and 
 
 3. In direction all-sided, whereas the mechanical memory 
 reproduces in series only, and is, in case there are more than 
 two or three members in the series, only one-sided.^ 
 
 We return now to the distinction between intentional 
 and involuntary, or spontaneous memorizing (p. 97). 
 
 In the very process of learning new ideas they are spon- 
 taneously impressed on the memory. This takes place, as 
 we shall see, in all the three steps in learning new ideas. 
 
 1 Further on we shall note still other weak points in the mechanical 
 memory, such, namely, as show themselves wlion the memory seeks help 
 by rfpf'tition. The influence of the emotions may, to be sure, upset any 
 sucli calculations as that in the text; and yet I think the feelings too will 
 usually be found strongest in association with thought rather than with 
 mechanical reproduction. The ]>r('S(^nt monograph, however, concerns 
 itstdf with tlie int(dlect only, and therefore may make the facts appear 
 simpliT than they really are.
 
 OUSKIIVATIO.N OF TIIK CONCRETE. 103 
 
 (I.) OhscriHitloii has f(jr its pur]io.s(' the apprehension of 
 concrete ideas. Now, in so fur as these ideas succeed each 
 other in series, each two, and therefore also the whole 
 series, become united by mechanical association. ]>ut also 
 so far as there are ideas in the series that are related with 
 one another, or with earlier ideas, in so far do we find also 
 the precoii(liti()u for the association by thought. The 
 working of mechanical memory is here plain to see; the 
 other kind is, on the contrary, hidden, because it appears 
 only in the form of the precondition. Thus the activity 
 of observation performs in and with its own proper task of 
 acquiring new perceptions, likewise a portion of the work 
 of memory in both its forms. Now, one might think that, 
 although this was right in theory, yet this first beginning 
 could probably have but little importance, since the me- 
 chanical association takes place only once, and therefore is 
 very weak, and the association by thought occurs only in 
 the form of the precondition. But that would be a great 
 mistake — just as great as if one thought that education 
 could not and should not begin until the pupil is already 
 quite grown up. What is true of education in general, is 
 also true of memory : it is just this first committing to 
 memory in and with the work of observation that is of 
 predominant importance. To understand this, it is only 
 necessary for one to consider why observation is of so great 
 consequence for the succeeding work of (II.) thought and 
 (III.) application. For the success of these two processes 
 of thought-elaboration depends essentially on the Avay in 
 which the concrete ideas were originally formed : whether 
 they were vivid, strong, and distinct, or, on the contrary,- 
 faint, weak, and obscure. And tliis again depends on 
 whether they were apprehended with interest, and hence
 
 ItU THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 also witli attention, or, on the other hand, indifferently, 
 and therefore inattentively. To enumerate all that goes 
 to arouse a lively interest in the work of observation, and, 
 with its help, to secure further a vivid, strong, and distinct 
 apprehension, would exceed the lindts of this book. One 
 point only will I call attention to, and that is the great 
 difference it makes, whether, for example, in history, the 
 matter is presented in general outlines, as in a compendium, 
 and hence not concretely, or, on the contrary, is given with 
 full and complete detail, and hence concretely and vividly. 
 Just in proportion as the concrete ideas are originally 
 strongly and distinctly apprehended, so are they also 
 strongly and distinctly retained and firmly associated. 
 Hence it follows, that Avhatever value the work of observa- 
 tion has for tlie succeeding processes of thought, exactly 
 the same value attaches to the spontaneous memorizing of 
 it for its reproduction in these later processes. A discus- 
 sion of memory which underestimated the importance of 
 this unintentional memorizing in the work of observation, 
 would therefore betray as gross ignorance as a discussion 
 of the process of learning in which the importance of the 
 woi-k of observation for the succeeding elaboration in 
 thought failed to be recognized. The success of the work 
 of observation depends, however, as we have seen, on the 
 choice of the right method of teaching. 
 
 To this right method in the work of observation belongs, 
 liowcvcr, one other point which was only incidentally men- 
 tioned al)0ve in speaking of the formal stejjs. In the work 
 of observation, namely, the presentation of new matter 
 must Ite ]jreceded by a- preliminary act, the so-called 2^'^'fiV- 
 (ir'Hinti dn- introduction, or ''analysis" as Herbart says), in 
 ordr-r that the new may be associated with the old. I want
 
 SECOND AND THIIID STAGES. 105 
 
 to point out tlie connection between tliis preliminary act 
 and the memorizing of the new ideas. In two respects it 
 helps to strengthen the association. First, by awakening 
 a more lively interest for the new matter. The prepara- 
 tory step seeks, namely, to recall to mind related ideas 
 from the child's personal experience in and akrnt his home. 
 Now, since the child has more interest in what he has him- 
 self experienced than in what he otherwise learns at school, 
 the new ideas associated with these experiences gain like- 
 wise a more lively interest. How this increase of interest 
 helps the memory was already shown before. The second 
 way in which the memory is strengthened is as follows. - 
 The scenes of one's childhood and early experience, on 
 account of their frequent repetition and their close connec- 
 tion with the feelings, are the best remembered. Ideas 
 connected with these are therefore the most lasting that 
 the mind can have. Just think, for example, of homesick- 
 ness, or call to mind how, in advanced age, when the mem- 
 ory begins to weaken, youthful reminiscences still remain 
 vivid as ever. If the new ideas are associated with such 
 strong old ideas, the former will thereby gain a powerful 
 support, — just as when a weak young sapling is tied to a 
 stout pole firmly planted. It is, moreover, not to be over- 
 looked that this association, being with related ideas, takes 
 place through thought, and is on this account also already 
 very strong. 
 
 In how far the (TI.) tliouglit-jyrocess in and with every 
 conception at the same time performs the work of memory 
 has already been fully exitlained in coniuK-tion with the 
 comparison of the thinking and the mechanical associa- 
 tions. Hence, the more thoroughly the concrete matter is 
 elaborated in thought, the more abundant and many-sided
 
 106 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 will bo the assistance it will gain in reprodnction. Since 
 the association by thought is so strong, the act of concep- 
 tion has but slight need of repetition. The need occurs 
 in greater degree only when the result of thought is ex- 
 pressed in a rule, maxim, sentence, proverb, or verse, which 
 is therefore to be learned word for word and hence must 
 be memorized mechanically. 
 
 In the work of (HI.) application, the process of memoriz- 
 ing is apparent, for with every new example for application 
 the process of conception is repeated. What would other- 
 wise have to take place by intentional repetition in order 
 to make the concept distinct and ready of use, takes place 
 of itself now in and Avith the application to the new cases. 
 Hence, we find here spontaneous memorizing in the form 
 of repetition, but not of the mechanical kind. 
 
 Thus we see that the process of learning serves of itself 
 to irajjress its acquisitions on the mind. This is true of 
 all its three main steps, in the first of which the service is 
 partly by the law of similarity, and partly by the law of 
 simultaneity, but in the last two stages it is exclusively by 
 the law of similarity of ideas. Such a memorizing, not 
 undertaken for its own sake nor purposely, bu.t being 
 carried out along with the process of learning, is called 
 immanent, because inherent in the latter process. Since 
 it, therefore, costs neither time nor pains, it is plain that it 
 has a much higher worth than voluntary memorizing. 
 Hence we may say: the more the course of study and 
 the method of teaching are so planned as to allow of the 
 greatest possilile amount of immanent memorizing, the 
 more complete will they be. For, the more an uninten- 
 tional memorizing finds place, the less time will be re- 
 ([uin-fl ff)r ail intentional one, thus leaving more time free
 
 IMMANENT MEMOIIIZING. 107 
 
 to leiini new tilings. Thus the aiiiount of iinnumont mem- 
 orizing furnishes an excellent means of testing whether the 
 cori'ect method of teaching is followed. 
 
 Two sulgects in tlie course of study are particularly 
 adapted to furnisli such opportunities in the form of ex- 
 amples for practice. These two are, namely, arithmetic 
 and language, particularly foreign languages; but drawing 
 may well be counted with them if it is rightly taught. 
 Thus, for example, in the instruction in foreign languages 
 the double translation is a contimial repetition by applica- 
 tion of what was thus far learned from grammar and lexi- 
 con. The same is true of the exercises for application in 
 arithmetic and drawing. Why it is that in these subjects 
 this kind of immanent memorizing has so much room, is 
 not difficult to find. Leaving out of account whatever is 
 peculiarly favorable in each of these subjects, and also 
 aside from the fact that the practical purpose of all of 
 these siibjects is a ready ability to do or, more exactly, to 
 f'pplij what is learned, the remaining reason is that here 
 the exercises for application can easily be arranged as 
 silent or busy work, namely, so that the teacher does not 
 have to be continually at hand to help. A\'e may infer 
 from this what would have to be done in order for the 
 other subjects of instruction likewise to gain as far as 
 possible the advantages of immanent memorizing. The 
 exercises for application would have to be as extended as 
 practicable and as far as possible in the form of silent 
 luisy-work. ^foreover. immanent memorizing may be fa- 
 vored by a correct arrangement of the coiirse of study, 
 namely, by the correlative association of the various sub- 
 jects in the curriculum.^ 
 
 1 A good example of this is funiislieil in M'ilbur S. Jackmuu's dum- 
 ber Work in Nature Study.
 
 108 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 Intentional or voluntary memorizing makes help of 
 repetition. \Vliat is the nature of this means, and how 
 does it help in making the ideas easy to recall ? Has it 
 only to do with the mechanical memory ? And what is its 
 effect ? In no text-book of pedagogy will the reader prob- 
 ably be able to find an exact discussion of these questions, 
 and particularly of the first in regard to the exact meaning 
 of repetition, nor will the psychologies probably contain 
 any reference to them either. Everywhere such a discus- 
 sion seems to be regarded as superfluous. Ah, if there 
 were only innate ideas! But it is often just the sim- 
 plest, most elementary relations that are the latest to 
 be completely apprehended, because every one mistakenly 
 thinks he has already mastered them. As a matter of 
 fact, the usual ideas in regard to these questions are in 
 many respects obscure and faulty, and Voltaire's expres- 
 sion: Le superflu — chose si necessaire is nowheres more 
 applicable than here. We shall, therefore, at once take up 
 this apparently superfluous and yet so necessary task, and 
 seek first of all to define repetition; the rest will then 
 follow of itself.^ 
 
 Of course every one knows what the word " repeat " in 
 general means, namely, to do anything over again. But 
 
 1 How very lacking many of the text-l)Ooks in pedagogy, even those 
 oflicially recognized as such, are in many matters needing most necessary 
 ex])lanation, is all the more apparent, when we remember in contrast 
 how much tliey contain that is superfluous. It is usual, for example, to 
 enumerate a long list of so-called methods of teaching, of course under 
 some strange tongue-twisting name (" acroamatic," etc.), all of which is 
 hut vain and useless waste of words and pedantic cling-clang, whereas 
 the indispensably necessary chief divisions of the teaching process, the 
 three rrs]i. five formal steps, are not even mentioned. And then, as a re- 
 sult, pedagogy must .submit to official scorn on account of its " Elusiniau 
 mysteries"!
 
 TWO FORMS OF REPETITION. 109 
 
 what is its special meaning here, in the field of psychologi- 
 cal i)eilagogy ? Here Ave have to limit tlie meaning by tell- 
 ing wliat it is that is tlone over again. Terhaps, then, some 
 one will say : To repeat means to call liaek once more into 
 conscionsness acquired ideas. This definition is, however, 
 too narrow ; for tliere are not only ideas to be repeated, but 
 also feelings, acts of will, etc. But even in the field of in- 
 tellect, that definition would be insutiicient, because it is 
 obsciire in one point. A couple of examples will show 
 what I mean. Wlien a concept is to be repeated, the 
 teacher may, perhaps, give its definition again, or, it may 
 be, only the name of the concept. This will evidently 
 call the ideas in question back into consciousness ; but is 
 the effect the same as if the ovlylnal 2^1'ocess of conception 
 were once more performed? And if ideas of sense are to 
 be repeated, is it the same, whether they are simply re- 
 called into consciousness from memory, or whether they 
 are again produced by ohseroation ? ^ There are, as one 
 sees, two forms of repetition, the one stricter and more 
 complete, the other less effective ; one carries out again 
 the original act of production of the ideas in question and 
 their association, the other, on the contrary, brings up only 
 the more or less faded result of this act. Of course it is 
 neither necessary nor, as a matter of time, practicable to 
 undertake repetition exclusively, or even mostly, in that 
 stricter form ; but it is necessary that the teacher should 
 know tluxt there are two forms, so that he will not be 
 applying the incomplete form where of right the better 
 
 1 This difference shows still more plainly in an example taken from 
 the feelings. Suppose an emotion is to be repeated ; does it amount 
 to the same thing whether the acual emotion is again called forth, or 
 only its name, and hence only the mental idea of this emotion?
 
 110 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 one should be used. When repeating for the first time, 
 particuh^rly in the lower and middle grades, he will cer- 
 tainly have to recur, as a rule, to the original process. 
 Thus, for example, a history lesson will not be reviewed 
 the first time from memory only, but will be presented 
 again in class, or read in the text-book. Repetition in the 
 stricter form is, consequently, nothing else than once more 
 going through the given operation of learning (the work of 
 observation, or that of thinking). To sum iip in one defi- 
 nition, we may say : To repeat means (in the field of intel- 
 lect) to call again into consciousness the ideas in question 
 — either prod net ivehj or rep roducti veil/. 
 
 The relation of repetition to the two natural forms of 
 memorizing, the thinking and the mechanical, may be eas- 
 ily stated. It is a means of help, offering its assistance 
 wherever needed, to the thinking association as Avell as to 
 the mechanical. Wherever its service is accepted, it as- 
 sumes the same character as the particular form of memo- 
 rizing, ju.st as a servant wears the livery of his master. 
 In the one case the repetition is called thoughtful, in the 
 other mechanical, although in itself it is entirely neutral in 
 this respect. Hence when, as often happens, the word 
 repetition is limited in meaning to mechanical memorizing, 
 this is simply an error, showing that the relation between 
 repetition and memorizing has not been made clear in such 
 case. llepetition is a means, memorizing is its purpose, 
 and the final purpose of memorizing is the reproduction of 
 the ideas. 
 
 So far as the effect of repetition on the memory is con- 
 cerned, the following is to be noticed. That which is 
 strengthened is, in the first place, each of the ideas in 
 themselves ; and, secondly, their connection, no matter
 
 TREATMENT OF IlEVIEWS. Ill 
 
 whctlun- tliis cnniicctioii is in lliouglit or only mechanical. 
 In the case of mechanical x-epetition it is, liowever, not to 
 be overlooked that the resulting strengthening of the ideas 
 makes them more capable, likewise, for reproduction in 
 thought, in case oppm-tunity offers later. The amount of 
 help afforded by repetition may also be pretty accurately 
 expressed, at least in the case of the completer form of 
 repetition. If the mental process of repetition is not dif- 
 ferent from the original act of learning, the aid to memory 
 is essentially just as great in the one case as in the other, 
 no matter whether it is a thinking or a mechanical associa- 
 tion. I say '' essentially " just as great ; for there is, to be 
 sure, a slight weakening, owing to the absence of the stim- 
 ulus of novelty. Of course, too, this weakening Avill increase 
 with every successive repetition. How much is to be de- 
 ducted in case the repetition takes place in the shorter 
 form of simply recalling the result of the previous act, the 
 reader may estimate for himself. This question deserves 
 particular attention in the case of historical subjects. If 
 the stricter form of review has already accomplished its 
 purpose, or if, from any cause, it may be assumed that the 
 ideas are, for the present, sufficiently secure, then the re- 
 productive form possesses certain advantages over the 
 other. For, in the first place, the self-activity of the pupils 
 will be called into play more strongly noAv ; secondly, the 
 change of form affords a new stimulus ; and finally, in case 
 the review takes place by questions, there may be even a 
 third advantage, of which we shall speak later on, but 
 which the reader will have no difficulty in already guess- 
 ing. It all depends, as one sees, on using the two forms 
 of repetition each in its right place ; and in deciding 
 which is the right form, one must consider also the nature 
 of the subject-matter to be reviewed.
 
 112 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 In regard to tlio practical treatment of reviews, one 
 point deserves special mention on account of its weight 
 and general importance. Nothing prevents making an 
 easy, quick, and lasting impression on the memory more 
 than to offer it too much at once. Professor Ebbinghaus 
 found he could remember seven nonsense syllables after a 
 single reading. It took, however, sixteen readings to re- 
 member twelve syllables, thirty readings to remember six- 
 teen, forty-four readings to remember twenty-four, and 
 fifty-five readings to remember thirty-six syllables. The 
 psychological reason for this is closely connected with the 
 so-called limit of consciousness. This fact leads to the 
 familiar rule, if a series of ideas to be committed to mem- 
 ory is too long, to divide them into smaller portions or 
 groups and then memorize the groups, thus building up the 
 whole series gradually. This is what Ratich expressed 
 three hundred years ago, when he said everything must be 
 learned "p/ece??/." This rule of practice applies to both 
 kinds of memorizing, but in particular, of course, to the 
 mechanical. The reason for this is easy to see. For, the 
 mechanical association is of itself very weak extensively ; 
 and besides, its full force extends to only two successive 
 ideas at a time, so that the connection beyond the third or 
 fourth member of the series can only be very small. Ac- 
 cordingly we divide a story, for example, into smaller sec- 
 tions ; a list of names to be learned in order, into small 
 groups (e.g., the kings of England we divide by their fami- 
 lies into Normans, Plantagenets, Yorkists, Lancastrians, 
 Tudors, etc.) ; a stanza in a song or melody is memorized 
 line by line, etc. 
 
 In our previous comparison of the strength of association 
 by similarity, with that of association by simultaneity, we
 
 THOrflllTFUL AND MKCHAXfCAL MEMORY. 113 
 
 found lluit, tlie former possesses important advantages over 
 tlio latter : its strength is intensively mueli stronger, ex- 
 tensively greater, and besides, many-sided. The compari- 
 son, however, took no account of the help to be gained by 
 repetition. Now that we have discussed this means of 
 help as to its nature, its forms, and its usefulness, we shall 
 have to ask, how it stands with the relative strength of 
 those two methods of association, after repetition has taken 
 place. 
 
 So far as the three advantages possessed by the think- 
 ing association are concerned, it is evident that they re- 
 main as before, — of course, provided, that repetition takes 
 place in equal measure in both cases. How would it be 
 possible for the mechanical association to gain anything in 
 its favor beyond the other, since the additional factor on 
 both sides is one and the same ? If the two terms of a 
 ratio be multiplied by the same number, the products will, 
 of course, be in the same ratio. The relative situation is, 
 therefore, as clear and definite as an example in arithmetic. 
 
 One of the three advantages possessed by the thinking 
 memory, namely, its intensive strength, receives, moreover, 
 new light in this connection that deserves mention. In the 
 previous comparison the fact was already alluded to, that, 
 in every case of association in thought, there was likewise 
 an inherent or immanent mechanical association. Before, 
 we did not care to take account of this comparatively small 
 additional factor. But this addition is multiplied by repe- 
 tition until it now deserves to be counted ; for, by equal 
 repetition in both eases, it already alone amounts to 
 exactly as much as the entire strength in the case of mer.e 
 mechanical association. The association by thought equals 
 its rival already, therefore, merely by its immanent median-
 
 114 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 ical Strength, so that all its own peculiar power and natural 
 strength are altogether in excess. This comparison, how- 
 ever, "the reader must remember, relates to only one of the 
 three advantages, the intensive strength of the association. 
 Both the other advantages — greater extent and many- 
 sidedness — remain forever denied to the mechanical mem- 
 ory, even after the most diligent repetition.^ 
 
 From this comparison several practical inferences may 
 be drawn in regard to the use of reviews. The tirst is, 
 that, in the case of thoughtful memorizing, but little repeti- 
 tion is needed to secure the result desired, namely, cer- 
 tainty and facility in reproduction. The second is, that, in 
 mechanical memorizing very much repetition is necessary, 
 to reach the same result. 
 
 This diligent repetition, which in the case of mechanical 
 association is necessary in order to gain any result at all, 
 has furthermore connected with it several noticeable effects, 
 — such as, though not intended, follow of themselves. One 
 is of an advantageous kind ; the rest are unwelcome disad- 
 vantages, but which, willingly or unwillingly, must be taken 
 in the bargain. 
 
 The advantageous result consists in the acquirement of a 
 high degree of facility in reproduction — a facility which 
 may even exceed the proverbial monkey-like or parrot-like 
 
 1 This fact will also explain the ori<!;in of the mistaken notion above 
 n-ferred to. of snjiposing th.at repetition must necessarily mean mec/iamcaZ 
 memorizing. Since in mechanical memorizing, as a matter of fact, repeti- 
 tion is the more necessary, aiid it therefore occurs more frequently in the 
 ineclianiciil form, many persons have allowed this appearance to deceive 
 them into forgetting that repetition must and does take place in the 
 thoughtful association likewise. Tliis has also led them to overlook 
 the fact that the mechanical factor does not lie in the repetition as such, 
 but in the iiHchaiiical association.
 
 MECHANICAL RKPETITION. 115 
 
 rapidity, and wiiicli is, therefore, riglitly or wronfrly, called 
 mavh'mi'-likc. One need only recall, for instance, the 
 quickness with which, in speaking a piece, the word-ideas 
 succeed one another, or in singing a melody the sound- 
 ideas, etc., in wliich cases, however, the trains of ideas 
 could pass much faster still, if the bodily organs concerned 
 in their production could keep up with them. It would, 
 however, be wrong to think that this facility is favored 
 by tlie nature of this particular manner of association, so 
 as to merit the name mechanical.^ Because, the reason 
 of the facility lies rather in the act of repetition alone, 
 or more exactly in diligent repetition. Even the thinking 
 association may reach a machine-like facility, if desired, 
 by sufficient repetition. This result may here be reached 
 even more easily, because the association by thought 
 possesses in itself a far greater intensive power than the 
 mechanical, and hence needs a much smaller measure of 
 repetition to produce the same effect. Ordinarily, however, 
 one limits the association by thought to only so much repe- 
 tition as is necessary to gain complete certainty in repro- 
 duction. Whether this is well, whether one should not 
 rather aim at complete dexterity in both cases, the reader 
 must decide for himself. Hence we see, machine-like facil- 
 ity of reproduction is not a peculiarity of the mechanical 
 memory, but is only accidentally more prominent there, 
 since in the other case repetition is somewhat neglected, 
 whereas in the former we dare not omit it, if the needful 
 certainty of reproduction is to be reached. 
 
 Now let us consider the disadvantageous effects which 
 
 1 The expression "mechanical " liere means only that the a.ssociation 
 is determined by an external, accidental, subjective factor (simultaneity), 
 and not by the internal meaning of the ideas.
 
 116 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 the mechanical repetition, when it is diligently practised, 
 brings with it. 
 
 1. The first disadvantage consists of a considerable 
 amount of tediousness, resulting from two sources. The 
 first lies in the act of repetition as such, as soon as the 
 stimulus of novelty is lost. That which in its origin 
 seemed to begin only as a lack of enlivening stimulus, soon 
 makes itself felt as a positive depression, or actual tedium, 
 on account of the continued repetition demanded by the 
 mechanical association. In so far as tedium results from 
 this first source, it must affect likewise the repetition of 
 logical associations as well. The other source lies in the 
 nature of the mechanical association, determined as it is 
 by an external and accidental quality which is, therefore, 
 devoid of interest. With this second source of tedium, 
 logical associations have fortunately nothing to do. Now, 
 counting the effects of both sources together, and remem- 
 bering that the result is not merely the sum but approxi- 
 mately the product of these factors, it will be clear that 
 mechanical repetition must suffer strongly from tediousness, 
 and all the more so, the more diligently it is practised. 
 
 2. The second evil is not of a general nature, but occurs 
 only in the repetition of language work, and here only in 
 case the passage is to be memorized word for word, and is 
 of considerable length. As soon, namely, as a machine- 
 like facility is reached in the reproduction of the words the 
 sei)arate thoughts in this complex become thereby less 
 viohile for further use in thinking. This is entirely as we 
 should expect. For, since the words are confined to a defi- 
 nite sequence, and the thoughts are bound to the language 
 forms, the latter likewise share in the confinement of the 
 former. Thus, then, the w^hole is, in the end, securely
 
 THOUGHTLESS MECHANICAL UEPETITHJN. 117 
 
 memorized, and can also be reproduced easily in the given 
 sequence, but just as the separate sentences stand wedged 
 in in this series, so are likewise the separate thoughts. If 
 one of tlie niithlle members of the series is wanted, all the 
 preceding nu'iubers have to pass in review first. Tims, a 
 certain friend of mine, although able to repeat a speech or 
 sermon on hearing it once, is nevertheless unable to pick out 
 a thought in the middle of the sermon, without beginning 
 at the start and repeating down to the part wanted. The 
 same is tnie of most of us, when Ave have committed a 
 poem to memory and wish to quote a particular verse. In 
 the case of a short sentence expressing only a single 
 thouglit, literal memorizing may not in any way injure the 
 further utilization of that thought in any other connection; 
 on the contrary, its definite expression in language and the 
 facility in the use of such expression render the thought 
 all the more handy and serviceable. The fact that, in 
 learning long selections by heart, the thought becomes stiff 
 and dull, particularly when the selection is of an abstract 
 nature, every one will recognize in his ow^n experience. 
 But the teacher meets it only too often in the class-room, 
 and especially in the still worse form, where already such 
 a selection has been previoiisly learned by heart merely as 
 so many words, leaving the thoughtful understanding of it 
 to follow later. 
 
 3. The third evil occurs likewise in the case of verbal 
 memorizing, and, although not a necessary evil, is, however 
 frequent ent)ugh in childhood. For, when a child repeats 
 such pieces by heart, he thinks only of the words, but not 
 at all, or very superficially, of their meaning — indeed he 
 may not give his attention to the words even. Thus the 
 most ridiculous blunders may occur, for example, the
 
 118 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 craziest (nonsensical or perverted) words may be mixed in, 
 or the speaker, without noticing it, may switch off into 
 another piece of similar sound. A mother reports she 
 overheard the other day, her little girl solemnly and ear- 
 nestly conning over the following prayer, which she was 
 learning to recite in Sunday-school : " I hardly think I 
 ha\e any father, I hardly think I have any father." After 
 considerable inquiry she found that the dear little soul had 
 mistaken the words for "I heartily thank thee, heavenly 
 Father." In the worst cases of this kind the process has 
 then become almost as mechanical as when any one at his 
 work, or in meditation, hums a tune to himself, without 
 thinking of the separate sounds, or even perhaps being 
 conscious of the act. It is easy to see how this evil result 
 comes about. In the case of language two kinds of ideas 
 must be apperceived, the word-ideas and the ideas of 
 the things. That which is memorized is first of all only 
 the words. AVhether their meaning is every time thought 
 of with them is questionable. When the learner spends 
 time and pains on a word or a single sentence, it may be 
 that, as a rule, the meaning is also thought of. But in the 
 way in which children are accustomed to commit to mem- 
 ory, the words usually follow quickly on one another ; con- 
 sciousness is carried along by main force with the train of 
 words. It is, therefore, only too easy each time to think 
 of the contained meaning only fleetingly and superficially. 
 ])Ut whenever this takes place it cannot but result in the 
 formation of a habit of irrational and thoughtless repeti- 
 tion. Is it any wonder, then, that this habit later shows 
 its power when the cliild attempts to speak the piece ? 
 Hence, even when the teacher is present, uidess he knows 
 of some means to force the pupil to think of the meaning
 
 PROPER USE OF MECHANICAL MEMORY. 110 
 
 of words, this evil of thoughtlessness will continue to 
 exist. 
 
 So much for the present about mechanical repetition. 
 Further on we shall speak of the means to overcome these 
 evils (see illustrations, p}). 128ff.). 
 
 Mechanical association is, as we saw before, far inferior 
 in reproductive power to the thinking or logical associa- 
 tion ; and mechanical repetition, as we have just seen, re- 
 sults in many evils just in proportion as it is sedulously 
 practised. lUit are we, on this account, to despise the aid 
 thus afforded to memory ? In social science we learn that 
 every workman is worthy of his hire, and that every work 
 that is indispensable in its place, has a really inestimable 
 value, however mechanical and subaltern it may be. Cer- 
 tainly the common soldier cannot perform the work of a 
 field marshal; but woe to the field marshal that has no 
 soldiers behind him ! These reflections may likewise be 
 applied to the estimation of the mechanical compared with 
 the rational memory. For the common purpose, the devel- 
 opment of the mind, the mechanical memory may in its 
 place indeed render indispensable service, and hence de- 
 serves corresponding estimation. When, therefore, fault 
 is found with the mechanical memory, this must be because 
 it has not been put in the rifjlit j)/ace, or has not been cor- 
 rectly employed. Thus it cannot be regarded as a fault if 
 mechanical repetition produces a machine-like facility in 
 reproduction; on the contrary, this facility is a virtue 
 to be highly prized ; for the more surely and easily the 
 lower mental activities perform their work, the freer will 
 the higher ones be, and the more can they accomplish in- 
 their higher tasks. If, however, this facility has been pur- 
 chased at the cost of too much pains and distress, and if
 
 120 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 tlie further use of these ideas in thought has been hindered 
 thereby, and thoughtlessness has been cultivated, these are 
 sure sigus that Pedagogy has not learned her lesson of 
 Psychology properly. Hence, if mechanical memorizing is 
 to find its proper use, Ave must first know where its proper 
 place is, i.e., where its service is indispensable; and sec- 
 ondly, how it must be used in order to avoid the evils, and 
 render the best possible service to the higher activities. 
 
 We may distinguish three cases in which its service is 
 indispensable. The first consists of instances where, in 
 the interest of mental development, ideas must be associ- 
 ated that are not capable of any other than the mechanical, 
 or external, association. This is plainly the chief field of 
 operation for the mechanical memory. Here belong, for 
 example, the association of thing-idea and word-idea, like- 
 wise of foreign words with those of one's mother tongue ; 
 whence it follows that the learning of a language, impor- 
 tant as it is for the mental development, has its foundation 
 in mechanical memorizing. Here belong further the asso- 
 ciation of thing-idea and number-idea (e.g., in history, in 
 geography, etc.) ; furthermore, the association of sound- 
 ideas in music, likewise of the sound-ideas with word-ideas 
 in singing; and finally, although it is usually not thought 
 of, the association of the simple ideas (the parts and char- 
 acteristics of an object) into a complex or composite idea. 
 Thus we see that not even the simple perception of an 
 object can take place without the aid of the mechanical 
 memory.* Instances of the second kind are to be found 
 
 1 A.s before mentioned, both laws of association work together in the 
 pro<luctioii of ixTCL'ption, since the repeated observation of an object 
 RtrenRthens, on tlie one liand, eaoli simple or partial idea in itsplf (law of 
 Hiinilarity), and on tlie other baud their association into a complex jiicture 
 (law of simultaneity).
 
 RECAPITULATK^N. llil 
 
 Avlierevor ideas to bo committed to memory in a delinite 
 order are capable but partially of association iu thought, 
 ami in part must be associated mechanically. Here be- 
 longs, for example, the word-for-word memorizing of liter- 
 ary selections. The mechanical memory must in such 
 case, at all events, assist. The whole' piece, to be sure, if 
 one wanted, could be committed to memory in an exclu- 
 sively mechanical manner ; but the proper way is to com- 
 bine both methods in practice. Examples of the third 
 kind are longer lists of logically associated ideas ; for ex- 
 ample, the eight branches of the animal kingdom, or the 
 classes under each of these, etc. Here we might devote 
 our efforts entirely to rational memorizing. But, in so far 
 as a certain facility in reproduction is desirable, it will be 
 better, on account of the length of the list, to call in the 
 help of the mechanical repetition in conclusion. 
 
 So far as the right way of handling mechanical repeti- 
 tion is concerned, it must suffice to eniphasize a few of the 
 most important measures. And first of all we must recur 
 to the advice above referred to, which, although given by 
 Ratich nearly three hundred years ago, still continues 
 to deserve reiteration, particularly as it applies equally to 
 the understanding of the new as well as to the memorizing 
 of it. The rule is to learn everything " piecely," i.e., in 
 conveniently-sized portions. The second and most impor- 
 tant rule is, wherever the metliod of rational memory can 
 be combined with the mechanical, always to use it, and iu 
 such case, in accordance Avith its higher worth, always to 
 give it the precedence. As a third rule for the cultivation 
 of the judgment, and the prevention of thoughtlessness", 
 it is recommended to have the entire lesson reproduced in 
 conclusion, and, particidarly in tlie case of memorized se-
 
 122 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 lections, always to insist on a logical analysis by topics. 
 The practical carrying out of these rules will be shown in 
 the next chapter by some examples taken from the differ- 
 ent subjects of the curriculum. 
 
 As this ends the general discussion ot the subject of 
 memorizing, we will recapitulate briefly its various forms. 
 
 Unintentional or immanent memorizing takes place of 
 itself in every lesson in and with the act of acquisition and 
 in ever)' one of the three formal steps in learning, but most 
 extensively in the applications to practice. By the proper 
 arrangement of the course to favor the correlation of 
 studies, this sort of memorizing may be considerably in- 
 creased. It has three great advantages over voluntary 
 memorizing ; first, it takes no extra time ; secondly, it is 
 favored by the stimulus of novelty ; and, thirdly, it de- 
 pends, for the most part, although not exclusively, on 
 rational association by thought. How much it therefore 
 deserves to be increased by the proper interrelation of 
 studies, is obvious. 
 
 Intentional memorizing, taking place by the help of repe- 
 tition, divides, according to the two natural laws of associa- 
 tion, into rational and mechanical. The mechanical method 
 should never be employed alone on such matters or on such 
 occasions as allow of thoughtful repetition. 
 
 "When the ideas are not in themselves capable of rational 
 association, it is customary in certain cases to belp the 
 mechanical memory by inventing an artificial rational asso- 
 ciation. This means Avas already known and practised by 
 the ancient Greeks. An example will show how such 
 crutches for the memory are manufactured. Suppose, in 
 history, it is to be remembered that the Roman emperor 
 Theodosius, divided the empire between his two sons, Ho-
 
 MNEMONICS. 1'23 
 
 noriiis ami Arcadius, giving to llie fonucr tlio wt-stcni, aii<l 
 to the latter the eastern portion. I lure it is eviib-nt that 
 the pupils can easily become confused when trying to recol- 
 lect wliich was emperor in the east and wliich in the west. 
 To avoid tliis an artificial association is attempted in one 
 case between the personal and geograi)hical name. In case 
 the pupils already know the ancient Clreck prcjvince of 
 Arcadia, this association may take place between the sound 
 of the name Arcadius and that of the province Arcadia ; 
 this lay in the eastern portion of the empire, and it was 
 this portion that fell to Arcadius. If the pupils have not 
 heard of that (h-eek province, the artilicial association could 
 be made as follows : the name Arcadius begins with the 
 first letter of the alphabet ; in the ea«t the sun rises first ; 
 thus the one 'first' recalls the other 'first.' This method 
 of association, as distinguished from the genuinely rational 
 association, is called mnemonic (from the Greek word ixin'ifxrj, 
 recollection). It was named by Kant the ingenious memory, 
 i.e., cunningly devised. We call it also artificial memory. 
 Mnemonics is, in certain cases, particularly for the reten- 
 tion of dates and other nximbers, as little to be despised as 
 crutches and artificial limbs are when the natural limbs are 
 wanting. In its application to nund)ers this art has in 
 later times been reduced to definite rules, which are easily 
 learned, and in such vocations as require many numbers to 
 be learned it will no doubt pay to drill one's self in the use 
 of these rules. But it is quite another question whether 
 educative instruction should make use of a system of 
 mnemonics in drilling on historical dates and geographical 
 numbers. It might be asked in rei)ly whether one should 
 systematically accustom sound limbs to the use of crutches ? 
 That which no gymnastics for the body would permit, may
 
 124 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 not be allowed -for the mind either. This fact, however, 
 should not prevent the mechanical memory from receiving 
 artificial aid in certain individual cases ; for example, to 
 prevent confounding similar ideas — if for no other reason, 
 to call the pupils' attention to the fact that such aid is 
 possible. In our opinion the school should not require any- 
 more numbers to be learned than can be mastered by the 
 natural means of memory. If, therefore, a prescribed 
 course of study requires the learning of so many numbers 
 that the natural means of memory are insufficient, this is 
 a sign, not that a system of mnemonics is necessary, but 
 that the list of numbers must be shortened. The method 
 of mnemonics has often been counted as a third kind of 
 memorizing, co-ordinate with the rational and the me- 
 chanical methods. With reference, however, to the matter 
 in the association, the mnemonic method is a subspecies 
 of the mechanical memory; with reference to the kind of 
 association, it is a subspecies of the rational. 
 
 That sometimes our most prominent educators fall into a dispar- 
 agement of memory, hy veanon of restrictbig it to the mechanical 
 form, is shown hy tlie following sentence from Dr. Harris's preface 
 to Kay's Memory in the International Education Series: "When we 
 can see each iunnediate fact in the perspective of its genesis or his- 
 tory, we have no use for memory, which preserves for us facts and 
 events isolated from their producing and deducing causes." This 
 whole hook is a protest against such a restriction in the meaning of 
 memory. To see " each fact in the perspective of its genesis or 
 history" is the hest way of memorizing it. Nearly all the special 
 books on Memory restrict themselves to the cultivation of the me- 
 chanical memory, or else advocate some artificial system of mne- 
 monics. Tliis is true of Kay's hook ahove mentioned, and even of 
 Dr. Pick's Memory and the Rational Means of Itirproving It. 
 
 For an account of different systems of mnemonics, see article 
 "Mnemonics," Encyclopoidia Britannica, and article "Memory"
 
 LEARNING AND FOIlGETTING. 
 
 125 
 
 in Chambers^ s Kncyclojxedia. A very interesting l)Ook, c.ilculated 
 to cure any one of unbounded faith in any system of mnemonics, 
 is "ioi.sf/k" Exposed, by (J. S. Fellows, \ew York. It contains a 
 full bibliography. 
 
 Dr. Ebbinghaus of Berlin investigated on himself some of the 
 laws of mechanical memory, and has published his results in a book, 
 Ueber dus Gediiclitnis, Leipzig, 1885. As this work has never been 
 translated, 1 I take the liberty of presenting three of his results 
 which seem to have nuist direct bearing on school work. 
 
 CLKVK OF LEARNING. 
 
 7 12 16 24 36 
 
 in order to learn x syllables. 
 
 To loam 7 nonsense syllables. Dr. Ebbinghaus found that for him 
 it required but once going over; when this number was increased to 
 12 syllables it took 17 repetitions to learn the list, 16 syllables required 
 
 1 See, however, a very good summary of the book by Dr. Burnliani.in 
 tlie American Journal of Vsycholotpi, vol. ii., pp. .">s7-(;o;5. The curve 
 given on p. VH\ of this book is not taken from Ebbiughaus, but is con- 
 structed from bis tables.
 
 126 
 
 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 30 repetitions, and so on. The curve is extremely steep, and sliows 
 in a very graphic way the difficulty the memory has of mastering 
 long lists. It should be added that when lists were chosen in which 
 the syllables had a mkanixg, and could be thus asfiociuled, it was 
 found the work of learning was reduced to one-tenth. 
 
 By committing lists of nonsense syllables so that they could just 
 be reproduced, it was found that after the lapse of only 20 minutes 
 58^ as much work was required to recommit as to commit an en- 
 tirely new list ; or, in other words, 42 % of the original work was 
 lost by forgetting. After one hour this loss amounted to 56% of 
 the whole. But it was also found that the loss after this was very 
 gradual, so that after 6 days there still remained 25^, and after 
 
 31 days there was still a saving of 21% in the work of relearning. 
 
 CUKVE OF FOBGETTING, 
 
 100% 
 
 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 20.0 
 
 after lapse of a; hours 
 
 Witli six 16-syllable lists, Dr. Ebbinghaus found the time saved in 
 relearning, after an interval of 24 hours, was directly proportional 
 to the number of repetitions (up to 64 repetitions) on the preceding 
 day. But this saving amounted to only one-third as much time as 
 the original learning required. Hence we see the bad economy of 
 attempting to learn things lie/ore they can be used, under the plea 
 that they will be of use later. One great waste of memory in school- 
 work comes from learning things before they are needed, inasmuch 
 an they have to he relearned each time that they are really employed. 
 
 James P. Downs of New York has published a series of six
 
 HERBARTIAX BIIJLIOOKAPHY. 127 
 
 manuals on The Mnnonj. They aro, 1, T/ie Mastery of Memorizing ; 
 2, Quickiifnx of Pcrccjition ; 8, Ei/e and Kitr Memory ; 4, The Study 
 of Luit'juatjes ; 5, Memory and Thowj/it; (i, The Memory-Traininij 
 of the Youmj. The titles, however, lead one to expect a great ileal 
 more of lielpfiil suggestiveness from these books than they actually 
 contain. They have some good points, but are not worlii llieir 
 cost {^')). 
 
 For the English literature of the Herbartian School the reader is 
 referred particularly to Kein's Outlines of Pedui/oyica, translated by 
 C. C. and Ida J. Van Liew, Syracuse, N.Y. ; C. W. Bardeen, 1893. 
 This is a Ijook of nearly 200 pages, but as thorough as anytliing on the 
 sul)ject yet pul)lished in Englisli. It contains a full bibliograjdiy to 
 date of works in English on Herbartian Pedagogy. Of these 1 should 
 name as chief: De Garmo, E.stie)itiulti of Method, and Uerbart and the 
 Herbartians ; Ufer's Introduction to the Pedayoyy of Hcrbart, trans- 
 lated by J. C. Zinser; Ilerbart's Science of Education, translated by 
 Henry M. and Emmie Felkin; Lange's Apperception, edited by De 
 Garmo; Charles A. McMurry's General Method. The First Tear- 
 Book of the Uerbart Society for the Scientific Study of Teaching 
 contains valuable papers on Correlation, Concentration, and Culture 
 Epochs. In these works the reader will find a fuller accoimt of 
 " Method-uuils," or " Method-wholes," " Formal Steps," etc. All 
 of these presuppose on the teacher's part a sympathetic acquaint- 
 ance with the facts of child development and a good stock of sound 
 common-sense in the correct application of these ideas.
 
 CHAPTEK T- 
 
 Wk :. ? Taken 
 
 fiom il. ~ , ^ - iiit*'^'^ 
 
 tional memorizmg lational vepetitioiL maj be made to help 
 the mechanical, cur even in certain cases entiiely take its 
 place. The wodk of memory is here alone to be consideied, 
 and forchennore only that portion that takes pLauee in 
 schooL Aii tie prfiimimKirjf procKsses of aeymsifkiH trill be 
 prtsmpposxd. In those subjects nsually classed as thGughtr- 
 stmdifs in contrast to expiession-stndies, it is, of course, the 
 cc: Terial, and hence the first formal step, \rhich 
 
 re^ ; most diilL Of the following examples, there- 
 f cse, all those taken from thooght-stadies refer exclusively 
 to the material of observation. 
 
 First Exjlmplk — faiem jfrom history. 
 
 Tae sioiy may be any one the reader chooses, provided 
 it is a metiioid-Trhole. We will suppose that the oral pre- 
 sentation of the matter by the teacher,' including the inter- 
 woven explanatory discussion, has been finished, and the 
 i^:x.' ^r has now the duty of seein? that the same is ade- 
 impressed on the memory. 
 
 ' .ii will be the method pursued by a teaeler who 
 :__i:c5 use of the mechanical memory exclusively ? 
 
 We must, however, first come to an understanding of 
 what is exactly meant by the expression mechanical mem- 
 
 12S
 
 METHOD OF MECHANICAL DKILL. 129 
 
 ory, or, in otlior words, how nnu-h place there is liere for 
 mechanical association. In liist(Jiy and literature the very 
 words used have, to be sure, a certain value ; but we will, 
 nevertheless, assume that the teacher has no intention of 
 requiring a literal commitment to memory, but agrees with 
 us in thinking that the pupils should use their own words 
 in rehearsing the facts of historyJ Thus, then, the me- 
 chanical memory of the words used is excluded. Hence 
 we have to do only with the material facts of history. 
 These form objectively a definite sequence in the story as 
 related, and yet not an accidental sequence, but one that is 
 determined by the causal connection of the events. Now 
 in so far as the pupils have understood this connection at 
 the first hearing, the ideas have already become associated 
 once rationally ; but in so far as this connection has not 
 been conceived, the ideas have been associated only me- 
 chanically. The fact, as a rule, will be that a portion of 
 the ideas have found a rational, and the other portion only 
 a mechanical, association. But suppose the most favorable 
 case, namely, that in this first immanent impression on the 
 memory the number of merely mechanical associations has 
 been very small. How will it be now in case of repetition ? 
 In so far as the pupils have not the logical connection in 
 mind, this connection will likewise fail of repetition. And 
 hence, if the teacher does nothing to freshen up the 
 rational association, it will indeed happen that only a 
 portion of these rational associations are repeated, thus 
 
 1 " I shall force my daujrliter to marry according to her inclination," 
 said Madame DeStael, taught probaljly hy her own sad exporience. This 
 maxim may bo applied to recitations in the thought-studies. The pupils 
 sliould not only be alUwed, but even strongly encourapeil, to use their 
 own words in recitation. Of course this encouraging must not dcgeue- 
 rate into command, for then freedom would bo lost again.
 
 130 THOUGHT AXD IVIEMORY. 
 
 increasing tlie nuiuber of mechanical associations in the 
 same degree. This will be especially true with the weaker 
 pupils. "With this preliminary explanation, it will now be 
 possible to say how the expression '< mechanical repeti- 
 tion " is to be understood. It means that in such case the 
 teacher does nothing to renew and deepen the concejjtion of 
 the connection of the ideas, but restricts himself to a mere 
 drill of the concrete ideas in the given sequence. 
 
 Eeturning now to the above question, we shall follow 
 the method of mechanical memory in detail. 
 
 To begin with, the teacher, of course, will mentally 
 divide the story into smaller divisions. But this is done 
 only in the mechanical sense, and therefore not for the sake 
 of disposing the subject-matter logically, but for the sole 
 purpose of giving the pupils conveniently small portions. 
 Accordingly, then, these divisions will not be provided with 
 special headings. For this method does not require the 
 pupils to think of these divisions as members, but only as 
 pieces, and, of course, broken bits need no names. Hence 
 in the division of the subject-matter these pupils take no 
 part. 
 
 And now the memorizing begins, namely, with the first 
 paragraph. The teacher presents the matter once more, 
 either orally or by having the pupils read ; in case it 
 seems necessary, this may also be repeated a second time 
 perhaps. 
 
 Then he calls upon one of the abler pupils to repeat 
 independently, and corrects, or allows the other pupils to 
 correct, whatever is in need of improvement ; thereupon he 
 calls on one of the mediocre pupils to repeat, and finally 
 on one of the weakest. Thus reproduction and correction 
 are continued so long as is necessary to enable most of the
 
 LOGICAL DlSPqsmON BY TOPICS. lol 
 
 pupils, and, if })ossible, even the weajter ones; Tfc^ac<^(4ln- 
 plish what is desired. 
 
 After this the second paragraph is taken in its turn, in 
 the self-same way. But this time, in reciting, the pu^jil is 
 required to say both paragraphs together. The same takes 
 place with every succeeding paragraph, until finally the 
 majority of the pupils are able to reproduce the entire story 
 Avith certainty, and even a certain amount of facility.' 
 
 That would be just about the method pursued in the 
 mechanical memorizing of history. It is characterized, as 
 one sees, by the fact that rational association in thought 
 is nowhere made use of. Compare with this the other 
 method, which, in contrast, depends directly on the rational 
 association. 
 
 The first place in which thought here comes to the as- 
 sistance of memory is in dividing the story into smaller 
 sections. This division of the subject takes place at the 
 first presentation for greater ease in the acquisition ; also, 
 with the same purpose in view, the separate sections are 
 
 1 Rector Dorpteld records, in a footnote, how he felt, when at the time 
 of tlio Regulatives (1872) he first came upon the practice of the last- 
 named regulation in regard to repetition. He found the students in a 
 Normal School trained to teach in this way. He had supposed it was 
 impossible after the introduction of Normal Schools, to find such per- 
 verted ideas of teaching. He wrote at that time in the Evangelical 
 School Journal : — 
 
 " Does it not seem as if one had already seen this sort of smart work 
 elsewhere, and in other connection before? Is not this manner of com- 
 mitting to memory precisely like that old way of learning the spelling 
 lesson, in whirli with every successive syllable of a word the preceding 
 syllables had to be again projionnced, after the manner of the ' house that 
 Jack built'? Thus it would go: te — e = te; de— i = dT, tedl .: 
 o_n_es = ofls, te'dlofls ; en —e — double Cs. ni^ss, te'dloflsness. What 
 is here done with tlie syllables is just as regularly done there with the 
 sentences and paragraphs of history."
 
 132 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 provided with a general heading, or topic. Thus we see 
 the difference of the two methods even in the very first 
 step; for the topical headings prevent the matter from 
 being cut up into arbitrary pieces, and substitute instead 
 the logical disposition of the subject. Thus the sections 
 become actual members of an organic whole, instead of 
 merely loose pieces. Every heading is to be, as much as 
 possible, in the form of a catchword. For a very good 
 instance of such logical disposition compare the topical 
 analysis by Dr. Hill in Fiske's School History of the 
 United States. Here, for example, the period of the Rev- 
 olution is divided into three chapters: I. Causes and Be- 
 ginnings, 1763-1776; II. The Winning of Independence, 
 1776-1783; III. The Critical Period, 1783-1789. Under 
 I. are the topics and sub-topics as follows : — 
 
 a. Causes of III FecVuuj bettoeen England and her Colonies. 
 
 1. What was the European idea of a colony, and its object ? 
 
 2. \\niat erroneous notions about trade existed ? 
 
 3. What was the main object of the laws regulating trade ? 
 
 etc. 
 
 b. The Need of a Federal Union. 
 
 1. One great difficulty in carrying on the French wars. 
 
 2. An account of Franklin. 
 .3. Franklin's plan of union. 
 
 etc. 
 
 c. The ,':>tanip Act Paused and Repealed. 
 
 1. The kind of government needed by the colonies. 
 
 2. How Parliament sought to establish such a government. 
 
 3. The nature of a stamp tax. 
 
 etc. 
 
 Fi7\<it Stage in 3femorizing. If the first step in acquisi- 
 tion (the concrete presentation) has thus prepared the way.
 
 THE LIST OF HEADINGS. 133 
 
 the work of memorizing will now begin as follows. The 
 first stage consists in committing well the logical disposi- 
 tion, that is to say, the list of hmdings. This is done by 
 repetition, not, however, mechanically, but thoughtfully. 
 The teacher, accordingly, in the simplest possible manner, 
 calls attention to the fact that the members of this series 
 are not accidental but causal in their connection. He 
 shows that the Causes (I.) of the Ilovolutiou led to the 
 Winning of Independence (11.), and this was then followed 
 by the Critical Period (III.), lasting until a stable govern- 
 ment could be established again (IV.). After in this way 
 the list has been gone through, ouce forward and once 
 backward, it nuiy be thoroughly stamped on the memory 
 by the following exercise, in which the teacher questions 
 and cross-questions thus, — e.g., What was the cause of the 
 Critical Period ? What led up to Independence ? What 
 followed on the Winning of Independence ? etc. But in 
 all of this the pupils must be allowed opportunity for quiet 
 deliberation ; for the aim is not to get the answer as 
 quickly as possible, but to get it by thinklmj. If this 
 exercise is continued awhile, all the pupils will soon be 
 able to say the list both forwards and backwards, perhaps 
 with facility already, and, at all events, with certainty. 
 
 This shows, in the first stage of the process, how thought 
 may re-enforce memory through a logical arrangement of 
 topics. The help that the memory receives is easy to see, 
 on the one hand from the arrangement, and on the other 
 hand from the repetition. The contents of each section is 
 held together by its separate heading, and the story is con- 
 nected, as a whole, by the entire list of headings ; this is 
 in both cases a thought-connection. The repetition then 
 strengthens both of these bands, but always retains its
 
 134 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 logical character, and hence this thinking seems to the 
 pupils like new acquisition. 
 
 Second Stage of Memorlziny. Kow, then, can follow the 
 repetition of the separate sections. As the reader will 
 remember, we described above (p. 109) two forms of repe- 
 tition, — the one a strict repetition of the original act of 
 learning, and the other a reproduction in memory of its re- 
 sidts only. In this case the first or productive repetition 
 must take place, inasmuch as the matter is to be re-pre- 
 sented exactly, and without weakening in its effect. In the 
 lower grades, therefore, the teacher has no other way than 
 to relate the sections in question once more orally, but now, 
 of course, in a somewhat briefer form. In the middle and 
 upper grades such a repetition would be tedious to the 
 pupils ; besides, they are justified in washing to take a 
 larger part in the work themselves. Fortunately, there is 
 a way of securing all of these advantages, and not losing 
 any of those obtained by oral repetition. The teacher has 
 only to let his pupils read the story for themselves in their 
 books. For, first, the matter is thus presented again just 
 as exactly as before; secondly, opportunity is given the 
 pupils for self -activity, and tedium is avoided ; and thirdly, 
 their facility in reading is also increased. It would, there- 
 fore, be simply folly not to accept these advantages when 
 they thus offer. That any one should think it unnecessary 
 at all to refresh the memory thus exactly in the one way 
 or the other, I shall leave out of consideration entirely. 
 In this manner, then, the first section is read. 
 
 This is the place to call attention to an important point. 
 The advantages to be gained by this reading, and in partic- 
 ular its memorizing effect, may be very noticeably increased 
 by the introduction into it of a thought element. This
 
 TMK USK OF QU KSTIOKS. 135 
 
 may be done by making use of questions, i.e., by putting 
 analytical questions, whose answer can be reatl from the 
 book, thus converting the monotonous reading into a viva- 
 cious dialogue, as it were. Of course the teacher must not 
 spare himself the pains of preparing such questions before- 
 hand, because they cannot be made up on the spur of the 
 moment in just the fitting form. As already indicated, the 
 main object of this is to introduce a logical element into 
 the reailing ; for the question that precedes places the con- 
 tent of the answer under a particular point of view. But 
 it accomplishes still more. Every question is, as it were, 
 a finger-post, pointing to a definite place, and hence causing 
 a sharper apprehension. Besides this the preceding ques- 
 tion leads the pupil of himself into the correct emphasis. 
 Counting all of these results together — thought element, 
 sharper apprehension, vivacity, right emphasis — it is 
 manifest that the resulting power of memory is by this 
 means very considerably strengthened. Whoever has once 
 tried the plan of letting his pupils read in answer to 
 questions will not want to give up the method, even if 
 its only advantage were the increased vivacity. 
 
 Third Sfiif/e of Blemoriziny. — Thus, then, after the first 
 section has been reviewed in the stricter form, namely, by 
 repeating exactly and completely the original process, tbis 
 may be followed by the reproductive repetition. V>\\t this 
 must not be done by simply calling for a recitation of the 
 whole section, and depending entirely on the monotonous 
 repetition of this command and the equally monotonous 
 repetition of the same matter until gradually even the 
 Aveaker pupils have gained a certain facility. To do so in 
 this final stage of memorizing, where of right quiet delib- 
 eration, freedom, and alertness should be the rule as much
 
 136 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 as in the two preceding stages, would be to cultivate tedious- 
 ness systematically ; it would mean the renunciation of the 
 increased attention, stimulus, and vivacity resulting from 
 the use of questions ; it would mean, in short, to imitate 
 the purely mechanical method before described. The cor- 
 rect way is for the teacher to proceed again with analytical 
 questions, i.e., to have the reproduction come in answer to 
 questions, just as before in the case of reading. Accord- 
 ingly these questions for reproduction will cover the same 
 ground as those questions for reading, or at least they may 
 do so. The particular forms of expression may be changed 
 as much as practicable, in the upper grades, perhaps, by 
 using language that is somewhat more difficult and techni- 
 cal. One may see from what has been said that only such 
 questions are intended as require a rather long answer; 
 they should analyze the section, but not pick the separate 
 sentences to pieces. Questions that concern merely one 
 l)ortion of a sentence, or a single word, do not belong here 
 at all. The reasons for tlie use of questions in reproduc- 
 tion are the same as for their use in reading, and hence we 
 need not repeat them. There is, however, in the case 
 before us one new reason, namely, that this method is 
 ensii.'r. This carries with it the further advantage that 
 the duller pupils, perhaps even the dullest, can answer 
 independently at the very first, thus relieving the teacher 
 of the tedious necessity of requiring these slower ones to 
 repeat after the brighter ones. If this Avere its only advan- 
 tage, the questioning would, even on this account alone, be 
 fully justified ; but with all the other numerous advantages 
 added, it becomes completely inconceivable how there can 
 bo any teachers wlio will give up this way, and prefer to 
 torture themselves and their pupils with their monotonous
 
 LONG TItAINS OF THOUGHT. 137 
 
 mechanical memorizing.' After the iirst section has been 
 repeated in this way in answer to questions, topically, it 
 will of course be recited once more connectedly, — but again 
 not at a mere word of command, l)ut in answer to the topi- 
 cal question contained in the heading. The brighter pupils 
 need not be required to give this final repetition, but only 
 the duller ones, as we may take for granted that the others 
 are able to do it after the preceding exercise. 
 
 In this way the first section is gone through. The suo- 
 ceeding sections are then repeated in the same way, first by 
 reading and then by reproduction from memory. There 
 is, moreover, in my opinion, nothing to prevent the pu- 
 pils from reading the entire lesson at once, and proceed- 
 ing by sections only when they come to reproduce from 
 memory. This is, perhaps, on some accounts, the more 
 desirable method, seeing that the whole selection has been 
 ])resented in its entirety, and the logical disposition has 
 likewise been memorized. 
 
 The question now remains, whether, in this method of 
 repetition by sections, some special means does not have to 
 be taken to enable the pupils to recite the whole story con- 
 nectedly. There is no doubt at all that school instruction 
 should include this in its object, and should aim to enable 
 the pupils to command lonrj trains of tlioiKjht and to recite 
 independently. If this demand is understood, a.<? it is here 
 meant it should be, to apply to only a single recitation and 
 
 1 It may bo mentioned, in passing, that this form o{ questioning en- 
 ables tlie teuclier to make use sometimes of tlio methf.'l of " repeating 
 after" in quite a different and really slhnulatin^ manner. The teaelitr 
 may, namely, now and then, when it .seems desirable, liave one of tlie 
 duller pupils repeat the question as put to him. or to one of the l>rii:hter 
 ones.
 
 138 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 for the time being, and not for all future time, the task is 
 certainly not too difficult. But much time will be need- 
 lessly lost and the teacher will be sorely tempted to recur 
 to the mechanical routine, if he knows that the final exam- 
 ination will likewise demand such ability of reproduction. 
 The mechanical method accomplishes this end, as Ave have 
 before seen, in its own peculiar way, by repeating the first 
 section along with the second, and in this manner with 
 every succeeding section reciting all the preceding over 
 again. That this means secures the end, particularly when 
 the mediocre and duller pupils are required to repeat after, 
 admits of no doubt. But there is likewise no doubt at all 
 that this procedure is most exceedingly tiresome for all 
 concerned, but especially for the brighter pupils. There is 
 a second evil which must not be overlooked. By the con- 
 tinued precedence of the brighter pupils, all the others in 
 the class are forced into their particular mode of expres- 
 sion, and thus the repeating after can no longer be called 
 an independent recitation. If the former used their own 
 words freely, the others imitate their mistakes as well. 
 The three evils are, therefore, much tediousness, restric- 
 tion of free reproduction for the majority of the pupils, 
 and the copying of a model unfit to be imitated. There is, 
 hoAvever, fortunately another Avay, Avhich, though safe and 
 faultless, seems to suffer only from not being known to the 
 advocates of memory -cram. In the main, it consists in 
 Avhat neither costs time nor makes the least trouble, be- 
 cause all the while this work has already been done in the 
 foregoing exercises of rational memory, as they have been 
 descriljed. In a word, it consists chiefly in the fact that 
 these exercises from beginning to end have made use of the 
 thhikiiifj mi-nioi'if. The considerably greater intensive power
 
 HOMK WORK. 130 
 
 of memory h}* rational association, together with tlie vari- 
 ous other advantages (avoidance of tediuusness, increase of 
 interest, vivacity, etc.), bring it about that at this stage in 
 the i)r()cess that command of the wliole thought is in the 
 main already obtained. Tlie small residue that must yet 
 be done will consist in the pupils' reading the lesson over 
 at home, preferably aloud, — of course, by questions again 
 and with regard for the logical disposition. This final 
 review of the lesson is, in respect to the ground covered, 
 exact and complete ; in respect to its character, since it 
 takes place by questions, it is thoughtful ; and it takes up 
 none of the time in school. This one review at the close of 
 the lesson is the only work of memorizing that should be 
 left for the pupils to do at home, so far as the concrete ma- 
 terial is concerned. The practice thereby gained in read- 
 ing is sufficient reason for requiring this work to be done. 
 
 Assuming that the foregoing exercises of the thinking 
 memory have done their full duty — that is to say: that, 
 first of all, the immanent memorizing has not been want- 
 ing which comes fron^ the thorough, concrete, oral presen- 
 tation ; that, secondly, each separate section has been read 
 over as well as recited from memory, and that both have 
 been done in the thoughtful way ; that, thirdly, these 
 sections are firndy connected in mind by the logical dispo- 
 sition ; and, lastly, that the pupils have read them over 
 thoughtfully once more at home — if this has been done, 
 I say, there can be no doubt that pujnls of all grades of 
 ability will have at least as much command in the con- 
 nected recital of the story as the mechanical memorizing 
 can accomplish in the same time, in spite of its special 
 exercises for this express purpose. Those in authority, 
 unfortunatelv, have too often been willing to overlook the
 
 140 THOUGHT AND IVIEMORY. 
 
 deficiency in power to think and the resnlting lack of in- 
 terest in the subject, if only the required per cent was 
 obtained in examination. 
 
 If, after all tliat has been said, any one still has doubts 
 whether this particular object, viz., the ability to recite 
 connectedly the whole story, can be reached in the way 
 described, it nevertheless certainly does not follow that 
 we are forced at last to return to the tedious mechanical 
 method. For what is there to prevent, if need be, the repe- 
 tition of any of these exercises, whether of the reading 
 or of the recitation from memory ? There is, however, to 
 be sure, a still better means, which on the one hand is new 
 in form, and on the other hand affords a desirable help to 
 the weaker pupils. It consists in assigning to the brighter 
 and mediocre pupils the presentation of the story in writ- 
 ing, while the teacher in the inean time reviews one of the 
 preceding oral exercises with the duller pupils. In brief, 
 my theory of memorizing does not prescribe how frequent 
 the repetition should be made, but it does demand that 
 the repetition shall not be mechanical and, above all, shall 
 not be tedious or tiresome, but should always make use of 
 thought by means of logical disposition, and well-directed 
 questions. 
 
 This is now the place for a brief summar}- of the char- 
 acter and advantages of this mode of memorizing in the 
 case of historical subjects. 
 
 So far as their character is concerned, the repetition ex- 
 ercises above described are by no means a combination of 
 the rational and mechanical modes — as my introductory 
 remark might have led one to believe — but on the con- 
 trary tlioy are, from beginning to end, exclusively thought- 
 ful in their nature. For the mechanical association is
 
 NATURAL SCIENCE. 141 
 
 never intentionally used, and tlie connected recitation of 
 the matter without questions occurs not as an exercise 
 in repetition, but only as a final reproduction in the form 
 of a test. 
 
 The advantages are as follows : — 
 
 1. The association in thought nuikes the power of mem- 
 ory in the.se repetition exercises intensiveli/ stro7if/er, thus 
 saving time, — to say nothing of the fact that this power 
 is extended to a much greater number of associated ideas, 
 thus becoming many-sided in the reproduction. 
 
 2. Whatever strength the mechanical association has in 
 each repetition belongs each time, as a matter of course, 
 to these thought exercises — as a free gift. 
 
 3. The pupils must be constantly deliberating, and are 
 therefore forced to keep their thoughts on the subject, and 
 pay attention to content and expression. 
 
 4. Tlie tediousness of mechanical memorizing is not 
 present. 
 
 5. The language work receives a considerable advance- 
 ment in facility of reading, which, moreover, returns to 
 re-enforce the further learning of history. The brighter 
 pupils have besides an exercise in written composition. 
 
 G. Inasmuch as fewer repetition exercises are necessary, 
 and since those that are used are considerably more stimu- 
 lating and lively, and therefore more interesting, the dis- 
 gxist and dislike for the subject which is so prominent a 
 weakness of the mechanical routine is, so far as possible, 
 avoided. 
 
 Second Example — taken from the natural sciences. 
 The subject matter in the natural sciences is essentially
 
 142 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 different from that in tlie historical subjects, in so far as 
 in the former the new ideas arise as direct sense-percep- 
 tions, while in the latter they must be produced by means 
 of language on a basis of imagination. In this immediate 
 apprehension through the senses, the natural sciences 
 have a great advantage to begin with. But this advan- 
 tage extends also to tlie memorizing in several ways. In 
 the first place, the ideas of sense are stronger than those 
 produced by the imagination. Secondly, a natural object, 
 in case it is a body or a physical process that is being 
 studied, is conthmousJ y before the eyes for observation, so 
 that in this way the separate characteristics, so far as they 
 are apprehended at all, have already experienced frequent 
 repetition. Both circumstances combined must have the 
 result of taking less time and trouble for the voluntary 
 commitment to memory than are required for lessons in 
 history. But there is still a further advantage. As we 
 saw in the first example, the different errors and mistakes 
 in memorizing historical matter are connected with the 
 fact that here the ideas must be conveyed by language. 
 The agency of language easily misleads into mechanical 
 repetition, and, moreover, to make use of book-learning in 
 the wrong place. In the case of natural science subjects 
 the teacher is not so liable to be led into these mistakes. 
 For the logical disposition (1st stage) almost forces itself 
 on him ; to refresh the ideas (2d stage), he is warned by 
 the very nature of the subject to have recourse to observa- 
 tion again ; and in the succeeding recitation from memory 
 (.3d stage) the preceding logical disposition suggests to 
 him the desirability of judicious topical questions. It will, 
 therefore, not be necessary to describe any particular les- 
 son in natural science, especially since there are so many
 
 NATURAL SCIENCE. 143 
 
 branches, clioiuistry, physics, botany, zoology, meteorohigy, 
 geology, physical geography, and astronomy, that the differ- 
 ences in the subject matti-r lead to many differences also in 
 the method of teacliing and in the appliances used. An 
 example taken from only one of these branches would, 
 therefore, not quite tit any other, and hence could easily 
 lead to misunderstandings. I shall therefore mention only 
 such measures as either apply to all the branches, or at least 
 show plainly to what particular ones they do belong. The 
 remarks will naturally be connected with the three stages 
 of memorizing above noted. In the first stage, as we 
 know, the logical disposition, which the pupils have already 
 sketched in the work of observation, is to be committed to 
 memory. In describing a plant or animal the logical dis- 
 position, to be exact, must be branched into main divisions 
 and subordinate sections, instead of being a uniform se- 
 quence. But such a branched sequence may be just as 
 easily retained as one that is uniform, provided it is well 
 understood, — indeed it may even be easier, since, in the 
 form of the plant or animal, everything is present to the 
 eyes at the same time.' 
 
 In the second stage, where the memorizing of the sep- 
 arate sections begins, the repetition, in order completely to 
 refresh the ideas, must fall back on immediate observation. 
 ^Vhen the most important points have been reviewed in this 
 manner, the section may then be read for completeness. 
 
 1 Of course it is to be understood that such descriptions in the lower 
 and middle grades must be thorou-hly simple in their nature. Even in 
 the upper grad.s they should not lose themselves in minute details, but- 
 ou^ht constantly to have reference to such characteristics as are of espe- 
 cial importance either for the life of the livini^ thing, or for its resthetioal 
 bearings, or as a means of recognition.
 
 144 THOUGHT AITD MEMORY 
 
 provided tlie matter is appropriate to such an exercise, 
 lu this case the reading forms the transition to the recita- 
 tion. The reading is. however, not necessary so far as its 
 object is merely to impress the matter on the mind; for 
 natui-al science has an immense advantage in the fact that 
 its ideas are obtained by direct observation. But the read- 
 ing is, nevertheless, useful ; first, because of the repetition 
 in a new and different form ; but secondly, and mainly, 
 because the pupils are thereby better prepared for later 
 self-instruction, since a written description is always more 
 difficult to understand than a free oral explanation. The 
 final decision, however, whether in the natural sciences the 
 lessons should be read so far as the subject matter admits, 
 does not belong here in a work on the memory, but rather 
 to the subject of the correlation of studies. It may, in 
 certain cases, be much better to assign such reading to the 
 langiiage lesson than to that in natural science. 
 
 In the second stage of memorizing the drawing of natu- 
 ral objects has special value, being indeed indispensable as 
 a means of exact apprehension and retention. It may per- 
 form good service even in the history lesson. This work, 
 however, must not be confounded with the proper and 
 regular instruction in drawing. 
 
 The third stage of memorizing is the recitation from 
 memory. This will, of course, be oral usually, but a writ- 
 ten exercise at this stage is recommended, whenever the 
 teacher has to give his attention separately to the weaker 
 pupils, and also now and then as a home exercise for the 
 entire class. It need hardly be remarked that such repe- 
 tition must be thoughtful and not mechanical. Hence, 
 wherever the logical disposition is insufficient, the teacher 
 will find it serviceable to make use of judicious sub-ques-
 
 MEMORIZING CHOICK SELFX'TIONS. 14o 
 
 tions. If, for <'xuiii[»lo, a })luiit loaf \vas to Ije described, 
 there could be distinguished first the petiole and the blade, 
 and in respect to the latter whetlier simple or compound, 
 etc. Practise in connected recitation is not excluded by 
 this exercise. 
 
 For the written reproduction, whether a connected de- 
 scription is intended or not, as well as for the review at 
 libme, printed questions for review are desirable. This 
 is particularly necessary in order to render the home re- 
 view an exercise in thought, and prevent it from degener- 
 ating into book-learning, that is always half mechanical, 
 and, in the case of a dry outline, is in addition as tedious 
 as it is unfruitful. In physical science these review ques- 
 tions can be and must be, for the most part, genuine 
 exercises for application. 
 
 From both of the above examples the reader will be able 
 to conclude that, in our opinion, the work of memorizing 
 should be done in the school, exclusively so in the first and 
 second stages, and for much the greater part in the third 
 stage of the process also. This applies equally to all the 
 subjects of instruction. Only a small and easily accom- 
 plished residuum of work should be left to the private in- 
 dustry of the pupil at home. In this way not only is 
 every over-burdening prevented, but the proper means 
 will thus be taken to insure zest in the work of memo- 
 rizing. 
 
 TlIIUl) EXAMI'LK. 
 
 Such studies are here included as, in comparison with 
 the foregoing examples, contain a new element, in that, 
 besides the thoughts expressed, also the form of expression 
 is to be learned, — such selections, therefore, as are to be
 
 146 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 committed to memory word for word. Of course occasion 
 for such selections may occur in almost any of the subjects 
 of study : in literature, in history, in singing, etc. 
 
 In such a case, before the pupils begin to memorize the 
 work, the thought content of the selection should first be 
 worked out by the regular method, i.e., according to the 
 formal steps of apperception, viz., observation, thought, 
 application. This will insure not only the understanding 
 of the general thought, but also include the proper expla- 
 nation of unfamiliar words and phrases. Short pieces to 
 be committed to memory, as, for example, a proverb or 
 a stanza of poetry, which occur as accompaniments of a 
 history lesson, of course receive the explanation in that 
 connection. 
 
 The memorizing of words, apart from any help derived 
 from their meaning, must depend, of course, on the law of 
 simultaneity. Memorizing is, therefore, in such case me- 
 chanical. Since the purpose of such memorizing, just as 
 in learning a song, consists in reaching the greatest pos- 
 sible certainty and ease in reproduction, and since in this 
 case the facility, and in part also the certainty of memory 
 depends chiefly on the mechanical association of ideas, the 
 drill in repetition, of course, must not be given up until 
 this result is reached. Taking thus much for granted, we 
 may now enquire whether, in this case also, rational asso- 
 ciation may not be called in to the assistance of mechanical 
 memorizing. This can most certainly be done, and its ad- 
 vantages are most plainly manifest just where the mechan- 
 ical method gives the most trouble, namely, in selections 
 of greater length. What the teacher can do in this direc- 
 tion may be told in a few words, after what has been said 
 iu the previous examples.
 
 MEM0KIZ1N(; CHOICE SELECTIONS. 117 
 
 First Sfii/jc. JCveii the nu'cluinical inetliod rccjuircs the 
 selection to be divided up into snudler sections. For the 
 sake of rational association this requirement is so far mod- 
 ified that the sections must be not mere fragments, l)ut 
 actual members; in short that this division of the subject 
 into parts must be a logical disposition by topics. The 
 work of memorizing begins, then, by committing this logi- 
 cal disposition with considerable thoroughness. 
 
 Second and Third Stages. In the middle and lower grjules, 
 each separate section will now be read and re-read. This is 
 essential, if for no other reason, to gain the correct intona- 
 tion and whatever else is necessary to a good delivery. 
 The other exercises that go along with this — such as trial 
 recitations from memory by the brighter pupils, home re- 
 hearsals, etc., — need no detailed description here. The 
 one feature of the work which, from our point of view, is 
 the most important, is that in all of this reading and reci- 
 tation the logical analysis must ever he 2^>'esent in mind ; 
 for without this the help to be gained by rational associa- 
 tion is lost. Whenever a section is read or recited, the 
 topical heading should be given every time, — whether by 
 the teacher, or by the pupil reciting, or by one of the other 
 pupils, depends upon circumstances. The same, of course, 
 is to be observed when several sections or the entire piece 
 are read or recited. In a word, reading and recitation 
 should come constantly in answer to questions, — which 
 implies that in the case of longer sections sub-topics should 
 be inserted also. In this way the association in thought 
 keeps pace, hand in hand, with the mechanical process. 
 
 The advantages of this manner of treatment have already 
 been spoken of. But since the help of rational association 
 is doubly necessary in such cases as that just mentioned,
 
 148 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 whereas in practice it is but seldom employed here, it may 
 be well to recount at least some of those advantages. In 
 the first place, the mechanical repetition in this way gains 
 in vivacity and interest, and so becomes less tedious. 
 Secondly, it becomes easier, and the retention is likewise 
 strengthened, since two bands hold stronger than one alone. 
 In the third place, the ideas are made more capable of 
 reproduction for a further elaboration in thought at some 
 future time; which fact is here all the more important, 
 because the continued drill of mechanical repetition con- 
 fines them so firmly in its one-sided association that they 
 are on this account all the stiffer and less fruitful for other 
 combinations of thought. Fourthly, the pupils are neces- 
 sitated to keep their thoughts constantly on the subject, 
 both as to meaning and form of expression. 
 
 Fourth Example — tali-en from arithmetic. 
 
 This study is fortunate in allowing of diligent memoriz- 
 ing without the need of mechanical repetition. But there 
 used to be one place in arithmetic that was heartily de- 
 tested by the pupils on account of its tiresome mechanical 
 memorizing ; and there are probably many schools still 
 where, in this matter, the acquisition is more irksome than 
 is necessary. This part of arithmetic to which I have ref- 
 erence is the multiplication table. We will conclude by a 
 consideration of this subject, in order to call to mind how 
 these two antipodean methods of memorizing appear in 
 the field of number. 
 
 1. Wliat is the mechanical mode of drill, for example, 
 on tlic nuiiilxT 2 in the multiplication table? 
 
 As a sensil)le person, the teacher of course would not let
 
 ATUTHMETIC. 14U 
 
 anything be committed to memory that was not under- 
 stood. Accordingly, the numbers from 1 to 20 have been 
 learned previously, we will suppose, on a basis of concrete 
 observation. Besides this, exercises in addition and sul> 
 traction have already been practised within this range. 
 Now, a new chapter in the difficult science of number is to 
 be learned, namely, multiplication. Therefore the teaclier 
 will, of course, provide for the necessary concrete under- 
 standing of the process. For this purpose he draws two 
 chalk marks on the board, and then again two more, thus 
 II + II; the pupils count them up correctly, = 4 marks; 
 then he draws three times 2, then four times 2 marks; 
 the pupils add again of themselves, = 6, = 8 marks. When 
 this has been continued to ten times 2, and this addition 
 has been repeated several times, it might be supposed that 
 the subject was clear to the pupils. The next step is to 
 introduce the new expression "times," and so translate 
 the exercises in addition into multiplication. Thus much 
 being accomplished, and therefore all the requirements of 
 concrete instruction having been fulfilled, the work of com- 
 mitting the columns of the multiplication table could now 
 begin. The mechanical way in which the children jierform 
 this part of the work is only too well known. 
 
 2. Now contrast with this the mode of i)rocedure tliat 
 makes use of the rational memory. 
 
 The purpose of what follows is not so much to show how 
 to teach the multiplication table, for most teachers think 
 they know that already, but rather to call attention to a 
 certain peculiarity in the rational association of numbers, 
 and to the pedagogical results of this in practice. The 
 purpose is, therefore, more psychological than pedagogical. 
 That which everyone thinks he know.s is not usually
 
 150 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 taught, and even the text-books on psychology are wont 
 to pass over the subject in silence. 
 
 The concept of number is, as was incidently remarked 
 before, a concept of relation. That is to say, in the case 
 of a number we are concerned Avith a characteristic of rela- 
 tion, and that not only in its conception but also in its 
 perception, viz., with the relation between unity and plural- 
 ity ; for example, the perception tliat the number 5 is five 
 times as great as 1. Now, since the characteristic denoted 
 by the name of the luunber is one of relation, its concrete 
 apprehension presupposes always a previous comparison — 
 just as the pitch cannot be distinguished in a single sound 
 by itself, but only when two sounds of different pitch are 
 compared together. This presupposed comparison is one 
 reason why the concrete apprehension of a number is not 
 so easy as is generally thought. But there is a second diffi- 
 culty. As a characteristic of relation, enumeration is not 
 a material quality of a number, but something entirely for- 
 mal ; in order to grasp this formal characteristic there must 
 be, therefore, first an abstraction of the material character- 
 istics. Thus the concrete apprehension contains impliedly 
 both the mental processes of comparison and abstraction, 
 which otherwise only occur in conception. As a matter of 
 fact, in arithmetic the formation of the concept, i.e., the 
 transition from denominate to indenominate numbers does 
 not give children the most trouble, but just this process of 
 perception. 
 
 This explains why it is that, among savages, adults fre- 
 quently cannot count beyond ten, sometimes not beyond 
 five. The concept of pure number is, however, always 
 present even with these people, at least in its spontan- 
 eous form, as soon as they can count to two ; that is, as
 
 HOW CHIILUUEN COUNT. l";! 
 
 soou as they are in possession of two perceptions of number. 
 So, too, with our own children ; nearly every parent is at 
 first probably so astonished at the arithmetical stuj)idity 
 of his first-born as to have serious doubts whether the child 
 will ever grow up to count to a hundred. Preyer's child at 
 twenty-nine months, although he could talk well enough, 
 and say over the numbers up to ten, could not apj)ly even 
 " two " and '' three " correctly. At this period, however, 
 he was taking his own method of learning, — a very sug- 
 gestive method, by the way, — and was counting every- 
 thing by ones. He would put up a ninepin, and say 
 " one," then another, and say "■ one more," then a third, 
 "one more," and a fourth, aud so on, each time counting 
 " one more," although not naming the sums. A little girl 
 of two and one-half years that I know uses similarly the 
 expression "more ball" for each additional ball in counting 
 by ones. 1 tried in vain, by the use of objects, to teach a 
 little niece of mine, when she was two and one-fourth years 
 old, to distinguish " one " and " two." She was bright 
 and eager enough, but she could not get it right half the 
 time. Another little girl of three and one-fourth years, 
 who can entertain you with stories and talk by the hour, 
 can say the numbers up to twelve in order without trouble, 
 but cannot yet discriminate in the use of " three " and 
 <' four." In the case of weak-minded children this is more 
 apparent still. Ireland reports a boy ten years old, at 
 the Larbert Institution, who knew all the colors, and 
 was learning the alphabet. He formed an estimate of 
 the character of those around him, and had some notion 
 of moral relations. He talked volubly on childish sub-' 
 jects, but was so deficient in arithmetical power that 
 he seemed "at nine years of age to have no conception
 
 152 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 even of a unit. He would say that he had three heads, 
 touehiug his head several times with his fingers." The 
 following year he mastered the idea of two, and could 
 count cautiously up to three. Verily, there is a great deal 
 more than mere memory involved in learning the multipli- 
 cation table. 
 
 The perception of a plurality, for example, of the num- 
 ber 6, is not completed by a comparison with unity alone ; 
 in order to be entirely clear and perspicuous, the comparison 
 must be made with all the intervening numbers also. Full 
 perspicuity is, however, not secured even by this. Side by 
 side with the building up or synthesis of a number, its 
 analysis must likewise be perceived ; and, in the former 
 case, its composition by multiplication as well as by addi- 
 tion, in the latter case its decomposition by division as well 
 as by subtraction. The division must appear likewise in 
 both the form of finding the number of equal parts, and 
 that of finding the size of the equal parts into which a 
 quantity may be divided. Now, to be sure, what the pupil 
 actually perceives in the synthesis of a number by addition, 
 and in the analysis into the same parts of the same number 
 by subtraction, is exactly the same in the two cases ; but 
 each operation has a different result and, moreover, a dif- 
 ferent way of expression in language. It is, however, just 
 this difference in the way of expressing the process that 
 makes the second operation seem like a new one to the 
 pupils, and hence causes the difficulty in understanding. 
 The same is true of the other corresponding operations. 
 
 Now what conclusions can we draw from all this regard- 
 ing the proper method in arithmetic, so far as concerns 
 numerical relations only ? 
 
 First, of course, this, that every number must be com-
 
 CONCLUSIONS AS TO I'KOl'Hk Ml IT HOD. 153 
 
 ])arefl not only with unity, but with all i)receding numbers, 
 and that this cuniparisou must be by all four rcsp. five 
 fundamental operations. 
 
 Secondly, this, — and here we return to the question of 
 the right mode of memorizing, — that if the pupils are to 
 learn arithmetic in the easiest, quickest, and most fruitful 
 way, thou they must everywhere uiemorize by thought, and 
 never mechanically. This, of course, is just as true of 
 addition and subtraction as it is of multiplication. That is 
 to say: we sliould never attempt, by means of mechanical 
 association, to have the pupils impress on their minds the 
 result of a problem ; for the full value of arithmetical exer- 
 cises does not lie in the quick retention of their answers, 
 but in always solving the problems by thinkinfj, i.e., by 
 clear, self-confident perception. For the perspicuity thus 
 gained in the perception of numbers involves everything 
 else, knowledge of them as well as skill and facility in their 
 use. The retention of results in any other way than by 
 thought is force-work, resulting in precocity of facility at 
 the cost of genuine knowledge, and in the end the learning 
 of arithmetic will be made difficult and slow. 
 
 Still a third monition follows from the discussion aliove. 
 If the pupil has perceived the synthesis of a number by 
 the addition of all the various combinations of its constitu- 
 ent numbers, there is properly nothing more left for him 
 to understand about this number. For he will be able at 
 once to solve all problems in the other fundamental opera- 
 tions with this number, provided they are presented to him 
 in known terms, that is, objectively. What he has to learn 
 new is, in reality, only the new expressions for these dif- 
 ferent operations. Of course this includes the practice 
 also which is necessary for fiu-ility in operating with these
 
 154 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 expressions. This being so, it follows in teaching that 
 every succeeding comparison of this number with its com- 
 ponent numbers in subtraction, multiplication, etc., at first 
 must be expressed in terms already familiar to the pupils, 
 to insure facility of perception when the new expression 
 shall be given. They should not be allowed to get the 
 idea that decomposition of a number by subtraction, etc., 
 is anything new to be learned. If this mistaken idea is 
 once allowed to form, they become confused by the new 
 expressions, and in this way the subject is unnecessarily 
 made twofold more difficult. 
 
 As a fourth inference, this is to be mentioned. The ap- 
 prehension of numbers by perception is so important and 
 critical alike for their understanding and for facility in 
 their use, that so soon as the numbers in the short range 
 ^rom 1 to 20 are altogether really clear through and 
 through in all their relations, the chief work for the entire 
 range of numbers is already accomplished, both as to abil- 
 ity to understand as well as for facility in their use. Let 
 the teacher stoj) and just think for a moment ivhat that 
 imjAles. 
 
 "We proceed now to describe the method of teaching the 
 multiplication table by the use of the rational memory. 
 For the sake of comparison with the mechanical method 
 we will suppose that, as before, addition and subtraction 
 have been carried through the whole range of numbers to 
 twenty before multiplication and division are taken up. 
 By rights, of course, as before remarked, each number 
 should be carried through all four operations from the 
 beginning. 
 
 Tlie difference between the two methods shows itself at 
 the first step, in the objectivation of multiplication by the
 
 COMPARISON or THE TWO WAYS. 155 
 
 addition of like quantities. This difference appears in two 
 ways. Tlie objectivation oeeiirs, of (•f)urse, in botli ( ases ; 
 but, whereas the meehanieal teaelier goes over at once to 
 new expressions for multiplication, and leaves the drill of 
 repetition till later to be cai-ried out in this new form, the 
 more thoughtful teacher would begin this drill immediately 
 in the form of addition. And also, whereas the former 
 in his succeeding " exercises aims at impressing on the 
 mind only the answers (products), the latter gives his at- 
 tention constantly to the repetition of the act of thought 
 (perception), knowing as he does that the results will come 
 of themselves. Accordingly he asks, always in the forms 
 of addition, how much is2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 2?2 + 2 + 2? 
 etc., at random, and not in the order of the table. He is 
 not so much concerned to have the pupils answer as quickly 
 as possible, as he is to have them keep pace with him and 
 give the sum correctly, while he slowly gives out the quan- 
 tities to be added. For the activity on the part of the 
 pupil should be nothing but a repeated act of thought ; and 
 in order to secure this, and prevent the so-called " learning 
 by heart," the teacher departs from the regular order in 
 his questions, and by speaking slowly allows the pupils 
 time for deliberation. This thoughtful r(>petiti<m is con- 
 tinued, orally and in writing, until a certain amount of fa- 
 cility is acquired. It is not necessary to increase this 
 facility to dexterity, because these exercises will occur 
 again in many different forms; besides, to continue too 
 long in one and the same form would also become tedious. 
 The next modification is with the use of expressions for 
 subtraction. The teacher asks. How many are left, if one 
 takes away 2 marks from 4 nnirks? if one takes away from 
 6 marks 2 marks, and then 2 marks more? etc. After
 
 156 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 this subtraction has been continued in the sequence indi- 
 cated as well as at random for awhile, the third form is 
 introduced with expressions indicating multiplication. I 
 say " indicating multiplication " because the children ought 
 not to regard multiplication as a new mode of reckoning, 
 but only as another form of expression for an already 
 known thing, viz., the addition of equal quantities. Much 
 depends on this, because one should seek to make a new 
 work easier for them, rather than more difficult. The 
 only thing new at present is the expression " times," and 
 this gives no trouble. The teacher asks: II + II -f- 1 1 are 
 how many times 2 marks ? and so on with other similar 
 examples. Thereupon, the already familiar exercise may 
 be taken up, using the new exj)?-esslo7i : How much is 3 
 times 2 ? 4 times 2 ? etc. 
 
 After this form also has been practised awhile in ascend- 
 ing and descending order, and at random, always being 
 careful to ffive time for thought, the transition to division 
 may be made by using the expression *' times " first for 
 the already familiar decomposition by subtraction ; for ex- 
 ample, how much is left if you take away from 8 once 2, 
 two times 2, three times 2 ? etc. 
 
 Finally, the same exercise appears in the fourth form, 
 with expressions for division (but only in the sense of be- 
 ing contained, not in the sense of dividing into parts). 
 Ask : 6 is how many times 2 ? 8 is how many times 2 ? 
 etc. Further, in order to introduce the new expression 
 " is contained," use this form of question : If you have 6 
 apples in your pocket, how many times are 2 apples con- 
 tained therein (i.e., in your pocket)? Again: how many 
 two-cent pieces must one take in order to have ten cents ? 
 etc. This should be carried out with still other forms of 
 expression.
 
 ALL FOUR OPERATIONS. 1^7 
 
 'Now, if the processes of aiithiuetic involved in learning' 
 the nuiltiplieation table have been repeated thoughtfully in 
 this fourfold form, there can be no doubt at all that the 
 products will be better committed to memory than would 
 be possible through learning them by heart mechanically. 
 And not only is this purpose fultilled, but all tediousness 
 is avoided, since the pupils are constantly kept thinkiivg 
 and therefore interested. Besides, this work has given 
 the pupils but little trouble ; and finally, what is more im- 
 portant than all the rest, the numbers from 1 to 20 — so 
 far as concerns their composition and decomposition l)y 
 the nundjer 2 — have become thoroughly clear to them 
 in thought, including therefore facility in practice. 
 
 One more point requires attention. For the sake of com- 
 parison we have presupposed that addition and subtraction 
 were learned throughout the whole range of numbers l)e- 
 fore multiplication and division began. This, however, 
 brought us to the difficulty of not being able to complete 
 the subject fully. For while we could take up the case of 
 one number containing another, the division of a quantity 
 into equal parts could not be treated until the pupils could 
 use " times " 3, 4, etf., up to 10. This difficulty, therefore, 
 shows us that this presupposed restriction to axldition and 
 subtraction would be a mistake. A second mistake is also 
 shown in the fact that multiplication and division were 
 treated of even numbers only, which restriction, however, 
 ■was not at all necessary. As already indicated, tlie theo- 
 retically right way would be to treat all four fundamental 
 operations at every step; or, more exactly expressed, to 
 compare every number with the lower numbers in all four 
 rrsj>. five fundamental ways. By leaving multiplication 
 and division until addition and subtraction have been
 
 158 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 finished throughout the table, the difficulty of thought is 
 increased both in understanding and in memorizing the 
 new processes. The restriction to addition and subtraction 
 may, nevertheless, have a certain amount of justification 
 in so far as it is made to apply to the very first numbers 
 — say from 1 to 6. But in the case of 6 or 8 the two neg- 
 lected operations must certainly be made up immediately, 
 and with every succeeding number all four operations 
 should be treated together.
 
 CHAPTER YI. 
 
 SUMMAKY AND CONCLUSION. 
 
 Aftkr the foregoing psychological and pedagogical in- 
 vestigations, we may now stop and look back over the field 
 and see clearly how thought and memory are related to 
 each other in the work of instruction — as well in regard 
 to the peculiar significance of each for the development of 
 the mind, as in regard to their interrelation and mutual 
 re-enforcement. 
 
 Thought is necessary, along with observation and imagi- 
 nation, in the acquisition of knowledge ; and its particu- 
 lar office here, in distinction from that of observation and 
 imagination, is the production of hi<jlier forms of knowl- 
 edge. 
 
 The office of memory is to retain the ideas thus acquired, 
 or, more exactly, to make them easy of reproduction, i.e., 
 to furnish thought the material from which, along with 
 new perceptions, it can create new and higher products of 
 knowledge — including the carrying out of these ideas in 
 practice. 
 
 The two activities, accordingly, bear the same relation 
 to each other in their importance as do earning and saving, 
 or gaining and preserving. But since this preservation is 
 not a purpose in itself, but is only for the sake of mak- 
 ing possible the enrichment and practical utilization of 
 one's i)Ossessions, we may also say : tlunight and memory 
 bear the same relation to each other as do end and means, 
 
 159
 
 160 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 or as do master and servant. This comparison will also 
 define their relative rank in the work of culture and 
 education. 
 
 The same consideration will likewise serve to determine, 
 as regards their mutual service one to the other, what 
 assistance the memory should render to thought. The 
 memory has, indeed, notlibuj else at all in the wide world to 
 do hut to he of service to thought. But, on the other hand, 
 thought cannot make any progress unless the servant mem- 
 ory is continually at hand. Memory must, therefore, follow 
 constantly at the heels of the master, and not lag behind, 
 leaving the master to proceed alone. 
 
 It has frequently happened, in the history of education, 
 that this relative rank of thought over memory has misled 
 into a serious error with regard to their relation in service 
 to each other. Thus, when many teachers esteem thought 
 higher than memory, they are, of course, entirely right, in 
 case this is meant merely as the relative rank of the two 
 processes ; but if in practice they neglect the memory, they 
 are terribly foolish, — just as foolish as one who thinks he 
 will gain his purpose without attending to the means of 
 accomplishing it, or as a master who lets his servant starve, 
 and still believes he will, nevertheless, receive good ser- 
 vice. This error Avas long ago recognized, as indicated in 
 tlie Jesuit maxim, " repetitio mater studiorum est.'' This 
 statement expresses a truth, but is very far from express- 
 ing the whole truth. Hence it does not seldom happen 
 that those who like so much to quote this maxim fall into 
 more numerous and worse errors in regard to thought and 
 memory than the others do to whom these are so willing 
 to give advice. These mistakes made by the partisans of 
 memory will be plainly recognized if we now reverse the
 
 SUMMAIIY AND CONCLUSION. 101 
 
 relation, and considur the ht'lp alfurdud to memory by 
 thought. 
 
 First ill iini)Ovtauce comes immain'iit meiuoriziiij; (p. luG; 
 — as distinguished from the intentional. Its sui»eriority 
 is owing on the one hand to the faet that this form makes 
 use almost entirely of rational association, and on the other 
 hand that it costs no time. The work of immanent memo- 
 rizing is, indeed, accomplished by the industrious master 
 '< thought" — even in those cases in which it depends on 
 an appropriate arrangement of the course of stud). The 
 servant, memory, does not need to move a finger, and yet 
 afterward enjoys the fame with ignorant people of having 
 done this fine piece of work itself. 
 
 Intentional memorizing is accomplished by repetition. 
 Thought may here also, in case it is called upon, render 
 important assistance by bringing under one conceptional 
 view the ideas which otherwise would be associated only 
 mechanically by repetition. This breathes into repetition 
 the breath of life in the form of rational association. In 
 what measure this is possible depends, of course, on the 
 nature of the subject. Wherever the subject does not ne- 
 cessarily require a mechanical association, as for example 
 in lessons for thought fjettiug as opposed to lessons for 
 thought expression, repetition may be made entirely ra- 
 tional. r>ut even in the many instances where verbal com- 
 mitment to memory is necessary, ami where, therefore, 
 mechanical association is unavoidable, the rational means 
 of memorizing through logical disposition and questions 
 may afford very desirable assistance. Nothing much re- 
 mains, therefore, exclusively for the mechanical memory 
 but the instruction in singing, if we except the occasional 
 learning of names and nuiul.)ers in the other subjects.
 
 162 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 If we reckon together all the assistance rendered to 
 memory by thought : — 
 
 1. the immanent memorizing — in the operations of 
 
 thinking, 
 
 2. the exclusively rational repetition — in the study of 
 
 facts, in arithmetic, etc., 
 
 3. the assistance of rational association — in the case of 
 
 verbal commitment to memory, 
 we find the surprising result that by far the greatest part 
 of the work of memorizing is accomplished by thought, 
 when the right method of instruction is followed. That 
 implies, therefore, that memorizing, which in the mechani- 
 cal form would be a subordinate piece of service, is thus 
 changed into a noble and inspiring work, and thus brings 
 with it all the other advantages before mentioned. 
 
 The mistakes in method, resulting from a perverted con- 
 ception of memory and of its relation to thought, may be 
 now clearly summarized. 
 
 1. The first mistake is in not being acquainted with im- 
 manent memorizing, or in not making sufficient use of it. 
 This mistake occurs Avherever the three rcsj). five formal 
 steps in the acquisition of knowledge are not consciously 
 or unconsciously followed, and wherever the principle of 
 the correlation of studies is not recognized. 
 
 2. The second erroi-, generally associated with the first, 
 consists in ignoring the help afforded by thought in the 
 case of intentional memorizing, or in not sufficiently making 
 use of the former, — whether by neglecting the logical dis- 
 position, or the secondary questions, or the appropriate use 
 of reading, or finally by committing all three mistakes at 
 once, — in a word, by restricting one's self more or less to 
 mechanical repetition.
 
 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. 103 
 
 3. A third mistake is one tliat those iu authority liave 
 contributed to spread. It is the view tliat restricts the 
 idea of memorizing to mean tlie eommitment to memory 
 of words only. In sueh case it seems not to be known, or 
 else to be totally ignored, that first and foremost the ideas 
 themselves, concrete and abstract, for which the words 
 stand, must be memorized. It is furthermore not known, 
 or else ignored, that not only ideas, but also feelings and 
 acts of the will, yes, even actions, must be memorized 
 chiefly through repetition. In the case of actions tliis 
 memorizing is generally called habit. Neglect in this mat- 
 ter has esijecially serious consequences for the formation 
 of character, but for the present we will restrict ourselves 
 to the intellect only. The falsity of the view referred to 
 appears not only in the material memorized, but as well 
 in regard to the method of memorizing. For the confine- 
 ment of the attention to the form of expression, to the ex- 
 clusion of the material ideas, prevents of itself the proper 
 appreciation of immanent memorizing. Nor is there much 
 likelihood that sueh a one-sided view will make appropriate 
 use of the means for rational association in repetition, but 
 it will rather, on the contrary, prefer the mechanical way. 
 
 Both the first-named errors above alluded to characterize 
 the work of momorif-cnnn, wherever found. It neglects 
 the iise of immanent repetition, and ignores the means of 
 rational association ; or, in one word, it makes ex(dusive 
 use of the mechanical memory. The third and last-named 
 error, of restricting the idea of memorizing to mean the 
 commitment to memory of a particular form of language, 
 is not necessarily involved in cramming; but when the two 
 are associated together, the resulting method is doubly 
 bad.
 
 164 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 
 
 A mistake of another kind is still to be mentioned here, 
 which, however, is fortunately fast dying out. May we 
 hasten the day of its burial ! Wherever it is still alive it 
 makes its presence known by special " exercises for mem- 
 ory," separate •• memory lessons," and similarly separate 
 '' thought exercises," and tliirdly, what is still very com- 
 mon, separate ^' object lessons." Indeed, all of these exer- 
 cises, in many instances, have been incorporated into the 
 coiu'se of study as if they were so many separate subjects 
 of study. The origin of this mistaken notion is undoubt- 
 edly the false idea taught so industriously by the old 
 psychology, according to which each class of mental phe- 
 nomena or activities was ascribed to a separate faculty or 
 power of the mind. Of course this is as smart as it would 
 be in botany, for instance, to talk about a root-force, a tuber- 
 forming force, a branching force, a tendril-forming force, a 
 tliorn-forming force, a leaf-forming force, a flower-forming 
 force, etc., etc. It is, in fact, just what the old heathen 
 mythology did, when it ascribed every different kind of 
 phenomena in nature to a special and independent divinity. 
 The psychological mistake of supposing there were inde- 
 pendent mental faculties led naturally to the pedagogical 
 one of supi)osi]ig that, by exercising any of these faculties 
 on one particular subject matter, they would be trained 
 for use on everi/ occasion, just as a knife may be sharpened 
 by rulj])ing on one particular body, and yet may be used to 
 cut any other substance as well. That this theory is a 
 pure superstition might be seen without help of the new 
 psychology, because it was well known and could not be 
 doubted that an understanding of mineralogy did not pro- 
 duce an understanding of botany nor an understanding of 
 zoology; that a mathematical understanding was far from
 
 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIOX. 1G5 
 
 being a musical miderstanding as well ; tliat tlie understand- 
 ing of theology did not bring with it an understanding of 
 pedagogy, etc. But false opinions grown old are difficult 
 to eradicate, and the presence of the "object lesson " in 
 many courses of study and works on pedagogy is a speak- 
 ing proof of this fact. 
 
 In conclusion, tlie doctrine of this book may be thus 
 summarized : — 
 
 I. In school Inst met ion tlie memoky is fundamental in 
 its importance ; but, 
 
 II. Thought is tlie sole purj)ose, and at the same time 
 the very best means, of do in j the work of mem art/.
 
 REFERENCE LIST 
 
 Giving full titles, publishers, and dates of all books referred to in the 
 foregoing pages. 
 
 Bain, Alexander: Mental and Moral Science. Part First: Psychology 
 and History of Philosophy, pp. 42S+ Appendix pp. 101. London: 
 Longmans, Green, & Co., 1884. 
 
 The Se/ises and the Intellect. 3d edition. London : Longmans, 
 
 Green, & Co. 
 
 Baldwin, James Mark: Handbook of Psychology. Senses and Intel- 
 lect. 2d edition, revised, pp. 343. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 
 1S90. 
 
 Mental Development in the Child and the Race. Methods and 
 
 Processes, pp.496. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895. 
 
 BuowN, H. "W. : Some Records of the Thoughts and Reasonings of Chil- 
 dren. From the Collection of Observations at the State Normal 
 School at Worcester, Mass. In Pedagogical Seminary, Vol. II., 
 pp. 358-3<)6. 
 
 BuRNHAM, William H. : Memory, Historically and Experimentally Con- 
 sidered. In American Journal of Psychology, Vol. II. The follow- 
 ing are the topics: 
 I. Historical Sketch of the Old Conceptions of Memory, pp. 
 39-90. 
 II. Modern Conceptions of Memory, pp. 225-270. 
 
 III. Paramnesia, pp. 431-464. 
 
 IV. Recent Theories and Experimental Studies, pp. 568-622. 
 Appendix and Bibliography. 
 
 T>F. Garmo, Charles: Herbart and the Herbartlans. pp. 268. In the 
 
 Great Educators Series. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1895. 
 The Essentials of Method. A Discussion of the Essential Form of 
 
 Kight Methods in Teaching. Revised Edition. i)p. 133. Boston: 
 
 D. C. Hcatli &Co., 1893. 
 Dewey, J ou:^: Psychology, pp.427. New York: Harper & Bros., 1890. 
 Dow.vs, Jamks p.: The Memory. A series of six Manuals, containing 
 
 about 100 pages each. (1) The Mastery of Memorizmg ; (2) Quick- 
 166
 
 IiEFEUEN(;K LIST. I'm 
 
 ncss of Pcrcoption ; (.i) Eyo and Ear Moiiiorj" ; (I) Tlic Study of 
 Lan<;uu{;es ; (">) Memory and Tli<iu;;ht; (ti) Tlio Mfinory 'J'raiiiing 
 of the Young. New York: James 1'. Downs, IH'Jl. 
 
 Fellows, G. S. : " Loisctte" Efjmscd, togetliur witli Loisette's coin- 
 I)lete system of Physiological Memory. Iiibliograi>hy of Memouics, 
 1325-1888. pp.224. New York: G. S. Fellows & Co., 1888. 
 
 FxsKE, John: A Ilistoinj of (he United States for Schools, pp. 474. 
 Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, & Co., 18'.H. 
 
 Fitch, J. G. : Art of i^aestionbvj . In Vol. 9. " The Teacher's Mentt>r," 
 of The Standard Teachers' Library. Syracu.so, N. Y.: C. W. Bar- 
 deen, 18i>4. Also, as separate pampliet (Ljc.) by E. L. Kellogg & Co., 
 New York City. 
 
 Lectures on Tcachinfj, delivered in the University of Cambridge, 
 
 1880. pp. :?<«. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1889. 
 
 FuLLERTON, Georgk S. : On Sameness and Idrntit;/. In Publications 
 of the University of Pennsylvania. Piiilosojdiical Series, No. 1, 
 April, 18<.»0. Philadelphia: University I'ress, 1890. 
 
 Galton, Francis: Inquiries into Human Faculty and its Development. 
 pp. 387. London: Macmillan & Co., 188.3. 
 
 Harris, Wm. T. : Introduction to the Study of Philosophy. Selected 
 and arranged by Marietta Kics. pp. 287. New Y'ork: D. Appleton 
 & Co., 1889. 
 
 Herbart, Johaxn Frif.drich: A Text-Book in Psychology. An at- 
 tempt to found the Science of Psychology on Experience, Meta- 
 physics, and Mathematics. Translated by M. K. Smith, pp. 2(X). 
 Vol. 18 of International Education Series. New York: D. Appleton 
 & Co., 1891. 
 
 The Science of Education; its general principles deduced from 
 
 its aim, and The ^Esthetic Rerelation of the World. Translated by 
 Henry M. and Emmie Felkin. pp. 208. Boston: D. C. Heatli& Co., 
 1893. ' 
 
 Hering, Ewald: On ifemory as a General Function of Orrianiztd Mut- 
 ter. Nos. () and 7 of The Open Court, Chicago, and in Butler's 
 Unconscious Memory, chapter vi. Also separately in Religion of 
 Science Library, published by T/ie Open Court, Chicago, 189.'). 
 
 Hoffhing, HAROLn: Outlines of Psychology. Translated by Mary E. 
 Lowndes, pp. .■«;."). London .ind New York: Macmillan & Co., 189L 
 
 Jaokman, Wilrdr S. : yutnber Work in Xature Study. Part I. pp. 
 198. Published by the Author, Cook Co. Normal School, Chicago, 
 1893. 
 
 y
 
 1G8 REFERENCE LIST. 
 
 Jambs, William: The Principles of Psychology. Vol. I., pp. 689. 
 Vol. II., pp. 70i. American Science Series. New York: Henry- 
 Holt & Co., 181)0. 
 
 Kay, David: Meino7'y, ichat it is and how to improve it. Vol. 8 of In- 
 ternational Education Scries, jip. 334. New York: D. Appleton & 
 Co., 1888. 
 
 Ladd, CiEORGE T. : Elements of Physiological Psychology. A Treatise 
 of the Activities and Nature of tlie Mind from the physical and 
 experimental point of view. pp. G96. New York: Charles Scrib- 
 ner's Sons, 1892. 
 
 Psychology, descriptive and explanatory. A Treatise of the 
 
 Pheuomena, Laws, and Develojjment of Human Mental Life. pp. 
 G7G. New Y^ork: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1894. 
 
 Lange, Karl : Apperception. A JNlonograph on Psychology and Peda- 
 gogy. Translated by the Herbart Club and edited by Charles 
 DeGarmo. pj). 279. Boston: D. C. Heath & Co., 1894. 
 
 LiNDN'ER, GusTAV ADOLF : Manuul of Empirical Psychology. Trans, 
 by Charles De Garmo. pp. 274. Boston: D. C. Heath & Co., 1890. 
 
 McMuuRY, Charles A. : The Elements of General Method. Based on the 
 principles of Herbart. 2d edition, iip. 201. Bloomington, 111. : Pub- 
 lic-School Publishing Co., 1893. 
 
 The First Year-Book of the Herbart Society for Scientific Study of 
 
 Teaching. Prepared for discussion at the Denver Meeting (1895) of 
 the National Educational Association. Edited by Charles A. Mc- 
 Murry, Secretary of the Society, pp. 139. Bloomington, 111. : Public- 
 School Publishing Co., 1895. [It contains four papers: (1) Most 
 Pressing Problems concerning the Elementary Course of Study, by 
 President Charles De Garmo; (2) Concentration, by Dr. Frank M. 
 McMurry; (3) The Educational Tlieory of the Culture Epochs, 
 viewed historically and critically, by Dr. C. C. Van Liew; (4) Plan 
 of Concentration for the first four years, by Mrs. Lida B. McMixrry.] 
 
 Mill, James: Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind. Edition 
 by Jolin Stuart Mill. Vol. I., pp. 453. Vol. II., pp. 403. 2d edition. 
 London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1878. 
 
 Mnkmojjics: in Encyclopaedia Britannica, and Memory in Chambers's 
 Encyclopaedia. 
 
 MiJLLKR, Max: Lectures on the Science of Language delivered at the 
 Royal Institution of Great Britain in 18r)l-.3. Fifth edition. Vol. I., 
 I)p. 4.")9. Vol. TI., pp. 000. London : Longmans, Green, & Co., 1864-6. 
 
 I'k'K, Edward: On Memory and the Rational Means of Improving it. 
 Loiulon: 18(;2.
 
 REFERENCE LIST. lOH 
 
 I'reyku, "NV.: Mental Devclopninit in (he Child. Trans. l>y Jl. NV. 
 Brown, pp. 170. Vol. 24 of Intornalionul Etlucatioii Series. New 
 York: D. Appletou & Co., LSiW. 
 
 The Mind of the Child. Part II. Tlio Develo[»ment of tlie Intel- 
 lect. Ob.servatibns concerning tlio mental development of the Imniiiii 
 being in the first years of life. Trans, by H. AV. iSrown. Vol. of 
 International Education Series, pp. 317. New York: D. Appleton 
 & Co., 18'.t;!. 
 
 R.VDKSTocK, Paul: llnbit and Its Importance in Education. An Es.say 
 
 in l*edag<igical I'.sycbology. Translated from tbe CJermau of Dr. 
 
 Paul Uadestock by F. A. Caspari ; with an Introduction by G. Stanley 
 
 Hall. pp. 117. Boston; D. C. Heath & Co., l.SHy. 
 Rein, W. : Outlines of Ptdagogivs. Trans, with additional notes by 
 
 C. C. and Ida J. Van Liew. pp. 19'.t. London: Swan Sonnenscheiu 
 
 & Co. ; Syracuse, N. Y. : C. "SV. Bardeen, 18i);>. 
 RiBOT, Th. : German Psijcholorpj of To-dnij. Trans, by James Mark 
 
 Baldwin, with a preface by James McCosh. pp. ;i07. New York: 
 
 Charles Scribncr's Sous, 18.S(j. 
 Dii^eases of Memory : an essay in the positive psychology. Trans. 
 
 by "W. II. Smith, pp. 20'J. Vol. 41 of International Scientific Series. 
 
 New York: D. Appletou & Co., 1893. 
 The Diseases of the Will. Trans, by M. M. Snell. jip. l.;4. 
 
 Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1894. 
 The Psijchology of Attention, pp. 121. Chicago: The Open 
 
 Court Publishing Co., 1890. 
 Spencer, Herbkrt: The Principles of Psycholof/ij. Vol. I., pp. (VJO. 
 
 Vol. II., pp. G48. London: Williams and Norgate, 18S1. 
 Stout, G. F. : The Ilcrharlian Psychology. In " Mind," Nos. 51 and 52, 
 
 Vol. XIII. London: Williams and Norgate, 1888. 
 Sui.r.T, James: Outlines of P.<yrhoh>gy, with special reference to the 
 
 Theory of Education, pp. 711. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1892. 
 The Human Mind. A Te.\t-book of Psychology. 2 vols., pp. .">()1 
 
 and .393. New York : D. Appleton & Co., 1892. 
 Uker, Chr. : Intrvdurtiiin to the Pedagogy of Ilerbart. Authorized 
 
 translation from the fifth German Edition, under the auspices of the 
 
 Herbart Club, by J. C. Zinser. Edited by Charles De Garmo. pp. 
 
 123. Boston: D. C. Heath & Co., IS'M. 
 Ziehen, Theodor: Introduction to Physiological Psychology. Trans. 
 
 by C. C. Van Liew and Otto Beyer, pp. 2.*<4. London: Swau 
 
 Sonnenschcin & Co.. 1892.
 
 Education, 
 
 For descriptions uf forthcoming books on Education, see announcements at end of 
 this catalogue. 
 
 II7OR American Schools and American Scholarship there is no 
 more healthful sign than the newly-awakened interest of teach- 
 ers in all that pertains to successful work and personal culture. At 
 the outset of this great and wide-spread movement in favor of better 
 methods and worthier results, it was but natural that the practical side 
 01 education should be treated out of all proportion, while its theoreti- 
 cal and historical aspects should be somewhat overlooked. But if 
 education is to become a science and teaching to be practised as an 
 art, one means to this end is to gather and examine what has been 
 done by those who have been engaged therein, and whose position and 
 success have given them a right to be heard. Another and not less 
 potent means is, to gain a clear comprehension of the psychological 
 basis of the teacher's work, and a familiar acquaintance with the 
 methods which rest upon correct psychological principles. As con- 
 tributions of inestimable value to the history, the philosophy, and the 
 practice of education, we take pleasure in calling the attention of 
 teachers to our books on Education, mentioned in the following pages. 
 It is our purpose to add from time to time such books as have con- 
 tributed or may contribute so much toward the solution of educational 
 probleins as to make them indispensable to every true teacher's library. 
 
 The following good fronts, and also the opinions quotetl 
 undrr the sereraf ro/unirs, are an earnest of' tlu- ajtjtre- 
 ciation in trhirh the enterprise is held : — 
 
 Dr. Wm. T. Harris, Concord, Mass. : 
 I do not think ih.it you have ever printed 
 a book on education ihat is not worthy 
 '.o go on any teacher's reading-list, and 
 the best list. (AfarcA 26, 1886.) 
 
 J. "W. Steams, Pro/, of the Science 
 and Alt of Teaching, Cniv. of Wis.: 
 Allow me to say that the list of books 
 ivhich you are publishing for -uc use of 
 
 113 
 
 teachers seems to me of exceptional ex- 
 cellence. I have watched the growth of 
 the list with increasing pleasure, and I 
 feel that you have done a service of great 
 value to teachers. \May 26, 1886.) 
 
 N. M. Butler, Pres. of Nnv York 
 City Coll. for I'tiiining of Tfiu/iers : I 
 am greatly interested in your series of 
 pedagogical publications.
 
 EDUCATION. 117 
 
 Apperception. 
 
 A Mono^aph on Psychology and Pedagogy. By Dr. Karl Lange. Trans, 
 lated by'the following named members of the Herbart Club: Elmer E. Brown, 
 Charles De Garmo, Mrs. Eudora Hailmann, Florence Hall, George F. James, 
 L. R. Klemm, Ossian 11. Lang, Herman T. Lukens, Charles A. McMurry, 
 Frank McMurry, Theo. B. Noss, Levi L. Seeley, Margaret K. Smith, and edited 
 by Charles De Garmo, President of Swarthmore College. Cloth. 279 pages. 
 Retail price, gi.oo. 
 
 THIS is perhaps the most popular scientific monograph on education 
 that has appeared in Germany in recent times. It has the rare 
 merit of being at once thoroughly scientific and intensely interesting 
 and concrete. Not a little of its value arises from the fact that it 
 approaches the problems of education along the highway that teachers 
 must actually pass in order to solve them. Its standpoint is, in brief, 
 the living, developing mind of the child itself. Apperception is a 
 single word comprehending the whole complex of processes known as 
 mental assimilation. It is here considered in its original nature, and 
 in its application to instruction and moral training, both as regards the 
 developing child, its interests, powers, and mental stores, on the one 
 hand, and the selection, arrangement, and methodical treatment of 
 the subject-matter of instruction, on the other. The scientific value 
 of the volume is enhanced by a somewhat extended chapter on the 
 history of the term Apperception, found at the close of the book. 
 The prediction is not unwarranted that this unpretentious monograph 
 will awaken more universal interest and stimulate more educational 
 thoughts than any other single work that has been issued in the 
 United States during the last quarter of a century, for it ushers in a 
 new epoch in the popular study of education in this country, that of 
 scientific treatment enriched by a vast wealth of concrete, interesting 
 material. In it science has become popular treatment, and popular 
 treatment scientific exposition. 
 
 Edw^ard T. Pierce- Prin. of Nor- 
 mal School, Los Angeles, Cal.: I am 
 more than pleased with the book. It is a 
 fascinating book to a teacher who is 
 sear:hing after truth. I shall not only 
 recommend it to teachers, but urge them 
 to get the book. {Nov. 25, 1893.) 
 
 L. B. Klemm, of the Bureau of Edu- 
 
 cation, Washington, D. C: There are few 
 educational books on the American mar- 
 ket that come up to this in usefulness. 
 It has qualities which will make it a 
 favorite text-book in Normal Schools and 
 other pedagogical institutions. The little 
 book will be hailed with delight, and justly 
 so, by the great number of teachers. 
 
 {Aug. 23, 1893.)
 
 ii8 EDUCATION. 
 
 Manual of Empirical Psychology. 
 
 An authorized translation from the German of Dr. G. A. Lindner, by Charlei 
 De Garmo, PhD., Professor of Modem Languages in Stale Normal I'mvep 
 sity, 111. Cloth. 274 pages. Price by mail, gi. 10. Introduction price, ?i. jo. 
 
 nPHIS is the best Manual of Psychology ever prepared from the 
 -*■ Herbartian standpoint, which, briefly characterized, is the 
 standpoint of pedagogics. No other school of psychologists ha-; 
 thrown so much light upon the solution of the problems arising in tht 
 instruction and training of youth ; and no other author of this school 
 has been so successful as Lindner in compact yet comprehensive and 
 intelligible statement of psychological facts and principles. The book 
 is what its name indicates, a psychology arising from the given data 
 of experience; yet there is no psychology in English which does so 
 much toward arousing an intelligent interest in the advanced depart- 
 ments of rational psychology and philosophy in general. 
 
 That an effective educational psychology must be based upon ? 
 concrete experience, rather than upon the a priori forms of mind is 
 reasonably evident, but Lindner is more than a mere recorder of ex 
 perience. He unfolds his subject as a true inductive science, never 
 losing sight of the organic development of mental life. This gives 
 him a great pedagogical significance. Again, he is always interesting. 
 His explanations are lucid, pointed, and self-consistent, while every 
 department of science and of experience has yielded its choicest facts 
 to enrich the contents of the book. 
 
 The work is especially recommended for normal schools, reading 
 circles, and higher institutions of learning. 
 
 G. Stanley Hall, Pns. of Clark 
 Univ., I V'orcesUr, A/itss. : The practical 
 applicability of this stand-point and book 
 makes its merits. 
 
 G. Williamson Smith, Pres. of 
 Trinity Coll., l/ttrtfjni, Conn. : It is an 
 original work, on well conceived principles 
 and carried on by methods of induction 
 approved by all. 
 
 F. Louis Soldan, Prin. St. Louis 
 Normal ami hi:;h School: Lindner's 
 Psychology is one of the best works, if not 
 the best, of the vigorous school to which 
 he belongs. Tlie translation is an im- 
 provement on the originaL 
 
 W. H. Councill, Prin. State Nor- 
 mal ami Industrial School, Ala. : The 
 work possesses every merit necessary to 
 give it a permanent place among thehigb* 
 est order of te.xt books. 
 
 G. S. Albee, Pres. State Normal 
 School, Oshkosh, \ Vis. : Only the most 
 original and realistic t&nchers have been 
 able to obtain results in class work which 
 lifted the study of psycholog>' above con- 
 tempt. This key-note of the best and 
 most definitely tnie teaching appears upon 
 nearly every page of Lindner. The author 
 may congratulaie himself th.^t his .Vmeri* 
 can editor was a dear-minded psychologist
 
 EDUCATION. 
 
 119 
 
 TJic Essentials of MetJiod. 
 
 Revised Edition. A discussion of the essential forms of right method in teach- 
 ing by Charles De Garmo, Ph. D., President of Swarthmore College. Cloth. 
 133 pages, Retail price, 65 cents. Special price for class use. 
 
 THIS little volume is an initial work in the science of methods, no 
 attempt of its kind having previously been made in English. It 
 assumes, therefore, an importance and significance which are not 
 measured by its .size or price. 
 
 It comprises three parts: i. The psychological basis. This con- 
 sists mostly of a discussion of the nature of the individual and the 
 general notion, and of the true nature of mental assimilation, or ap- 
 prehension ; 2. The necessary stages of rational methods as deter- 
 mined by the psychological basis. We have here an exposition of the 
 functions of observation, of generalization and of the application of 
 generalizations m fixing and utilizing knowledge ; 3. Practical illustra- 
 tions, showing how the teacher may consciously observe these stages in 
 his dail v work in the school-room . The Revised Edition gives both a pop- 
 ular and a scientific explanation of the modern doctrine of Apperception. 
 
 Experience shows that the book is admirably adapted to training- 
 classes in normal schools, and to city or village reading circles, 
 while no live teacher can afford to remain partially or wholly uncon- 
 cious of what it reveals. 
 
 J. W. Stearns, I>h.T>.,Prof. of Pe- 
 dai;cgy, in [Visconsin State Univ. : It is 
 the first real step toward the development 
 of a science of methods in this country. 
 
 B. A. Hinsdale, Prof, of Pedagogy, 
 
 niv. of Michigan, Ann Arbor: A very 
 good book indeed for students of educa- 
 tional science. I show my opinion of it 
 by putting it on a short list of buoks that 
 I recommend to teachers. 
 
 T. H. Balliet, Suft. of Schools, 
 Springfield, Mass.: 1 think it has as 
 much sound thought to the square inch as 
 anything I know of in pedagogics. 
 
 Geo. Morris Philips, Ph.D., Prin. 
 State Normal School, West Chester, Pa.: 
 An unusually excellent little book ; there 
 can be no question of its merit. 
 
 J. C. Greenough, Prin. of West- 
 field Normal School, Mass. : A small 
 book but a great work. One of the best 
 pedagogical books ever published in the 
 English language. 
 
 M. L. Seymour, Prof, in State Nor' 
 vial School, Cliico, Cal. : It is a book 
 without a peer or rival in the discussion 
 of the underlying principles of methods in 
 teaching. It shoidd be the daily compan- 
 ion of every teacher t<ntil fully assimif 
 lated. 
 
 R. G. Boone, Prof, of Pedagogy^ 
 Univ. of Ind.: It seems to me very sug- 
 gestive and along right lines as counteract- 
 ing the wide-spread tendency to adopt de- 
 vice and formula. It promises teachers a 
 rich return for the most careful peruaaL
 
 EDUCATIOX. 
 
 The Science of Education. 
 
 Translated from the Gernmn of Hkriiart by Mr. and Mrs. Fki.kin. With an 
 introduction by Oscar Drowning. 26S pages. Clotli. Retail price, ?i. 00. 
 
 HERi;.\kT began the study of education and of the human mind ;is 
 a private tutor of boys of gentle birtli and nurture intended to 
 receive the higher education. His experiences, tliereforc — and with 
 him theory and practice always went hand in hand — are of especial 
 value to teachers in public schools. 
 
 " Mr. and Mrs. Felkin deserve the thanks of all who are interested 
 in education by making these writings of Hcrl>art accessible to English 
 readers. They have accomplished their work with the greatest care 
 and self-denying zeal. The tran.slation is as readable as is consistent 
 with an exact rendering of the original. If it is carefully studied, as it 
 ought to be, tlierc will be no difficulty in understanding it. Their in- 
 troduction is probably the best account of Herbart which has appeared 
 in our tongue." — J'roiii Mr. Brow/u'itifs Iittrodmtioii. 
 
 L. B. Klemm, of the Bureau of 
 Education, Washington, D. C: It is with 
 pardonable admiration for your " pluck " 
 that 1 lay down Ilerbart's .Science of edu- 
 cation after a thorough examination. I 
 say " pluck," because it certainly needs a 
 good deal of aggressive courage to offer 
 the teachers of America such a work for 
 professional study. The book is happily 
 introduced by t!ie chapter on the life of 
 Herbart, his pliilosophy and principles of 
 education, and the two analyses by the 
 transl.-itors. They offer a very convenient 
 key to the treasures of Herbart's book. 
 I like the transl.ilion ; have compared 
 whole pages with the original, and am 
 well pleased. It is a very creditable work. 
 As a member of the profession of teachers, 
 I offer you my gratitude for this publica- 
 tion. {.Sept. 25, 1S93.) 
 
 S. G. Williams. Professor of Phi- 
 losophy, Cornell University, Ithaca, 
 N.Y.: I have read the book carefully and 
 compared portions with the original, and 
 I feel that you deserve the thanks of 
 English speaking teachers for placing 
 
 within their reach the work of this leader of 
 modern German pedagogic thouglit. The 
 translation is so nc.-it and so true to the 
 original that it not infrequently makes 
 the concise and somewhat poetic diction 
 of the author more readily comprehensible 
 than the original. {Oct. 16, 1893.) 
 
 Educational Courant, Louisville, 
 Ky.: It is a work that no educator can 
 afford not to read and study. The volume 
 will influence our theory and practice for 
 years to come, and he who remains ig- 
 norant of its contents can justly be ac- 
 cused of wilful ignorance of what most 
 I intimately concerns him. 
 
 ' Science, Neu< York: Following the 
 entertaining sketch of Ilerbart's life the 
 translators have given a review of Her- 
 bart's philosophy, together with a synop- 
 
 I sis of the two works which follow and 
 form the ])rincipal portion of the book. 
 The review has cvidentlybeen written from 
 a tliorou'^li acquaintance with Ilerbart's 
 writings and is an additional aid to our un- 
 derstanding of his principles.
 
 EDUCATION. 123 
 
 TJic Educational Ideal ; 
 
 An outline of its growth in modern times. By James P. Munroe. Cloth. 268 
 pages. Retail price, 5*1.00. 
 
 THIS work is prepared to meet the demand for a book which shall, 
 in brief compass, present a concise and well proportioned view of 
 the historical development of the educational principles which underlie 
 the aims and methods of modern teaching. 
 
 The book deals with the successive leaders in thought, beginning 
 with the Renaissance, who have most strongly directed the educational 
 aim towards its highest modern development. The chapters are 
 biographical only as far as is necessary to give to these leaders a 
 human interest, the object being to deal with the broad principles 
 upon which the development of the educational ideal has rested, rather 
 than with specific pedagogic methods. By means of the material 
 furnished in the book it will be easy for anyone interested in educa- 
 tional questions to pursue an extended study of the whole or of a par- 
 ticular part of the historical period which the volume covers. 
 
 CONTENTS. Chap. 1, Introduction; II, Rabelais. — The Revolt against Medise- 
 valism ; 111, Francis Bacon. — The Revolt against Classicism ; IV, Comenius. — The 
 Revolt against Feudalism; V, Montaigne and Locke. — The Child has Senses to be 
 trained; VI, The Jansenists and Fenelon. — The Child has a Heart to be developed ; 
 \'II, Rousseau. — The Child has a Soul to be kept pure; VIII, Pestalozzi and 
 Froebel. — Senses, Heart, and Soul must be educated together ; IX, Women in Educa- 
 tion — Education leads to and from the Family ; the Home is its Unit ; X, Sum- 
 mary. Bibliography. Index. 
 
 Introduction to the Pedagogy of Herbart. 
 
 By Charles Ufer, authorized translation, under the auspices of the Herbart 
 Club, by J. C. Zinser ; edited by Charles DeGarmo, President of Swarthmore 
 College. Cloth. 131 pages. Retail price 90 cts. 
 
 THfl Herbart Club heartily recommends this little volume as a clear 
 and useful introduction to Herbart's system of pedagogy. It 
 gives a bird's-eye view of the whole field of pedagogy as based upon 
 psychology and ethics. It discusses with considerable fulness such 
 topics as the following: The Development of Interest, the Choice of 
 Studies, the Culture Epochs and Concentration, Methods of Teaching 
 — The Formal Steps, and Moral Training. 
 
 In part IV the author gives us some extended illustrations of the 
 manner in which History, Language, Geography, Nature Study, Arith- 
 metic, Geometry, and Drawing can be unified by concentration.
 
 128 EDUCATION. 
 
 The Stiiiienfs Froebcl. 
 
 By William II. llERroRD, late member of the Universities of Bonn, Berlin, 
 and Zurich. Cloth. 128 pages. Retail price, 75 cents. 
 
 THE purpose of this little book, as stated by the editor in his preface, 
 is to [jivc young people, who are seriously preparin;^ themselves 
 to become teachers, a brief yet full account of Frocbel's Theory of 
 Education ; his practice or jilans of method is reserved for a second 
 part. This book is adapted from Froebel's Education of Humanity 
 {Die Erzieltuiii^ dcr Mcnschheit), published in 1826. The editor has 
 tried to give what is Froebel's own in English as close as possible t. 
 the very words of his author. The book, in addition to an Introdm 
 tion treating of the subject in general, has chapters on The Xursling. 
 The Child, The Boy, and The School, and summaries of the teachings. 
 
 The Psychology of Childhood. 
 
 By Frederick Tracy, Fellow in Clark University, with Introduction by Presi- 
 dent G. Stanley Hall. Cloth. 183 pages. Retail price, 00 cents. 
 
 THE aullior has in this work undertaken to present as concisely, yet 
 as completely, as possible, the results of the systematic study of 
 children, and has included everything of importance that can be found. 
 Some of its special features are thus summarized : — ( i) It is the first 
 general treatise, covering the whole field of child psychology. (2) 1 
 aims to contain a complete summary, up to date, of all work done in 
 this field. (3) The work contains a large amount of material, the re- 
 sults of the author's own observations on children as well as those of 
 perhaps a score of very reliable observers. (4) The subject of child- 
 language has been gone into with especial thoroughness, from an en- 
 tirely new and original standpoint, and with very gratifying result> 
 (S) A very exhaustive bibliography, containing, it is believed, ever} 
 thing of value that has ever been written on this .subject, is appcnde<; 
 
 Earl Barnes, Department of Edu- 
 cation, LeliinJ Stanford Jr. University, 
 Cat. : No book has come from the press 
 
 J. Clark Murray, Prof, of Philo- 
 sophy, M\GHl University, A/ontrea/, Ca- 
 nada: In linglisli we have certainly no 
 original work on the psychology of child 
 hood to compare with it, and even among 
 translations from Oernian and French there 
 is none which shows such a mastery of tlie 
 whole subject. (JVor. 14, 1893.) 
 
 during the past year which I have been 
 so glad to see as this one. For ill of us 
 who are carrying on courses in the psychol- 
 ogy of children it will prove an invaluable 
 aid. (Nai: 23, 1893.)
 
 EDUCATION. 
 
 T 
 
 A Labo ygfory Course in Physiological Psy- 
 
 Jiolo'-y. By Edmund C. Sanford, Assistant Professor of Psychology, Clark 
 
 University, "Worcester, Mass. Part I. 1S7 pages. Cloth. Introduction price, 
 
 90 cents. By mail, i^ 1. 00. 
 
 HE use of the lal)oratory in teaching psychology is indorsed by 
 the experience of the other sciences, by the approval of the best 
 teachers, and by the psychological laboratories recently opened in 
 leading colleges and universities in this country and in Europe. The 
 need of some definite schedule of experiments for such work in the 
 practice course in the laboratory of Clark University gave occasion for 
 the first collection of the experiments here published in a form which 
 it is hoped will make them useful to others. The aim has been to 
 introduce the student to the most important facts and chief methods 
 of experimental psychology so far as they are adapted to the handling 
 of college men and within a moderate expense for apparatus. The 
 course includes experiments upon the Dermal Senses, Static and 
 Kinitsthetic Senses, Taste, Smell, Hearing, Vision, Psycho-physic. 
 
 \^Pc7rt 11 in Press. 
 
 The Connection of Thought and Memory. • 
 
 A contribution ro pedagogical psychology. By Herman T. Lukens. Honorary 
 Fellow in Psychology in Clark University. Based on F. \V. Dorpfeld's Mono- 
 graph, " Denken unci Gedachtnis." Published under the auspices of the Herbart 
 Club, with an Introduction by Dr. G. Stanley Hall, President of Clark Univer- 
 sity. Cloth. 000 pages. Retail price, ocoo. 
 
 HIS is a Herbartian book, showing how the interdependence of 
 thought and memory should be realized in practice, followed by 
 illustrations taken from History, Natural Science, Literature, and 
 Arithmetic. It is an application of the theory of Apperception, and is 
 intended for teachers' reading-circles, normal schools, and private 
 reading. Being based on the work of Dorpfeld, which grew out of 
 round-table conferences with teachers, it may be said to have already 
 proved its helpfulness for teachers in Germany; and the adaptation to 
 American ideas and conditions, while modifying the original in many 
 respects, keeps true to its ideal. 
 
 Although in the main following Herbartian principles, the book does 
 not ignore the suggestions of psychological work that has been done 
 in the last fifty years, but it is in touch with the latest approved ideas 
 of the present day. {/n Press, ready soon. 
 
 T
 
 HISTORY. 
 
 Sheldon's United States History, rdr^-mmmar schools. Follows the " seminary " 
 or laboratory plan. " By it the tliild is not robbed of the right to do his own think 
 ing." Half leather, fi.25. 
 
 Teacher's Manual to Sheldon's United States History. .\ key to the above 
 
 system 60 cts. 
 
 Sheldon's General History. For high school and college. The only general hUtory 
 following the " seniin.iry " or laboratory plan now advocated by leading teachers. 
 Half leather, fi.75. 
 
 Sheldon's Greek and Roman History. Contains the first 250 pages of the above 
 book. #1.00. 
 
 Teacher's Manual to Sheldon's History. Puts into the instructor's hand the /•o' 
 
 to the above system. 85 cts. 
 
 Sheldon's Aids to the Teaching of General History. Gives also list of most 
 
 css'.nti.il hooks fur a n-f' ri'iUL- libr.iry. 10 cts. 
 
 Thomas's History of the United States. For schools, academies, and the general 
 reader. \ narrative history witli copious references to sources and authorities. Fully 
 illustrated. 532 pages. Half leather, fi.25. 
 
 Shumway's A Day in Ancient Rome. With sg illustrations, should find a place 
 as a supplftiteitiary reader in every high-school class studying Cicero, Horace, Taci- 
 tus, etc. 75 cts. 
 
 Old South Leaflets. Reproductions of important political and historical papers, ac- 
 comp;\nicil by useful uutes. Each, 5 cts. and 6 cts. For lilies sec separate lists. Per 
 hundred, ?3 fK>. 
 
 Allen's History Topics. Covers Ancient, Modem, and American historj-, and gives an 
 excellent list of books of reference. 121 pages. Paper. 30 cts. 
 
 Fisher's Select Bibliography of Ecclesiastical History. An annotated list of 
 
 the most esseiitiiil books lor a theological student's library. 15 cts. 
 
 Hall's Method of Teaching History. "its excellence and helpfulness ought to 
 
 s^cun: it many re.iiicrs." — The X.itioii. 51.50. 
 
 Phillips' History and Literature in Grammar Grades. \ paper read before the 
 
 Dcpariment of Superintendence, .It I'.i ioklyii, N.Y. I'.iper. 15 cts. 
 
 See also our /is/ oj OUi Soutk fyn/Uts. 
 
 D. C. HEATH & CO.. PUBLISHERS, 
 
 BOSTON. NEW YORK. CHICAGO
 
 EDUCATION. 
 
 Compayr^'s History of Pedagogy. " The best and most comprehensive history of 
 
 Kducation in English." — Dr. G. S. Hall. 51.75. 
 C0mpayr6'S Lectures on Teaching. " The best book in existence on the theory and 
 
 practice of education." — Supt. M acAlister, Philadelphia. $1.75. 
 
 Compayr^'s Psychology Applied to Education. A clear and concise statement 
 
 of doctrine and application on the science and art of teaching. 90 cts. 
 De Garmo's Essentials of Method. A practical exposition of methods with illustra- 
 
 live outlines of common school studies. 65 cts. 
 De Garmo's Lindner's Psychology. The best Manual ever prepared from the 
 
 Herbartian standjioint. Ji.oo. 
 Gill's Systems of Education. " it treats ably of the I,ancaster and Bell movement 
 
 in education, — a rv/-j' important phase." —Dr. \V. T. Harris. JS1.2S. 
 
 Hall's Bibliography of Pedagogical Literature. Covers every department of 
 
 education. Interleaved, *f2. 00. ^1.50. 
 Herford'S Student's Froebel. The purpose of this little book is to give young people 
 preparing to teach a brief ytt full account of Froebel's Theory of Education. 75 cts. 
 
 Malleson's Early Training of Children. "The best book for mothers I ever 
 
 read." — Elizabeth P. Peabodv. 75 cts. 
 
 Marwedel's Conscious Motherhood. The unfolding of the child's mind in the 
 
 cradle, nursery and Kindergarten, f 2.00. 
 NeWSholme'S School Hygiene. Already in use in the leading training colleges in 
 England. 75 cts. 
 
 Peabody's Home, Kindergarten, and Primary School. "The best book out- 
 side of the Bible that I ever read." —A Leading Teacher. Ji.oo. 
 PestalOZZi'S Leonard Jind Gertrude, "if we except 'Emile' only, no more im- 
 
 RadestOCk'3 Habit in Education. " it will prove a rare ' find' to teachers who are 
 s-ekins to ground themselves in the philosophy of their art." — E. H. Russell, Worces- 
 ter Normal School. 75 cts. 
 
 Richter's Levana ; or. The Doctrine of Education. "A spirited and scholarly 
 
 book." — Prof. W. H. Payne. ?i.4o. 
 ROSmini'S Method in Education. " The most important pedagogical work ever 
 
 written." — Thomas Davidson, f 1.50. 
 Rousseau's Emile. " Perhaps the most influential book ever written on the subject of 
 
 K.iiicaii<jn." — K. H. Quick. 90 cts. 
 
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 of teaching German and French, by i>rominent instructors. 90 cts. 
 
 Sanford's Laboratory Course in Physiological Psychology. The course 
 
 includes experiments upon the Dermal Senses, Static and Kinscsthetic Senses, Taste, 
 Smtll, Hearing, Vision, Psychophysic. In Press. 
 
 Lange's Apperception : A monograph on Psychology and Pedagogy. Trans- 
 lated by the members of the Herbart Club, under the direction of President Charles 
 DeGarmo, of Swarthmore College, gi.oo. 
 
 Herbart'S Science of Education. Translated by Mr. and Mrs. Felken with a pref- 
 ace by Oscar Browning, fi.oo. 
 
 Tracy's Psychology of Childhood. This is the first ^,f«irrai' treatise covering in a 
 scientific manner the whole field of child psychology. Octavo. Paper. 75 cts. 
 Soil l>v inall, postpaid, on receipt of price. 
 
 D. C. HEATH &~CO^PUBLISHERS, 
 
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