THE LIBRARY 
 
 OF 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 IN MEMORY OF 
 
 PROFESSOR 
 EUGENE I. McCORMAC 
 
ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 
 
 BY 
 
 CLIFTON R. HALL, PH.D. 
 
 ASSISTANT PROFESSOR IN HISTORY AND 
 POLITICS IN PRINCETON UNIVERSITY 
 
 PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS 
 PRINCETON 
 
 LONDON: HUMPHREY MILFORD 
 
 OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 
 
 1916 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 DAVIS 
 
Copyright 1916, by 
 PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS 
 
 Published October, 1916 
 
PREFACE 
 
 This book, as its title implies, is an attempt to trace the per 
 sonality of Andrew Johnson through the years 1862-1865, when 
 the burden of military government and reconstruction in 
 Tennessee rested principally upon his shoulders. With this 
 purpose in mind, I have refrained from going into several temp 
 ting by-paths of the subject. The military administration in 
 West Tennessee, for example, for which not Johnson, but the 
 generals of the regular army stationed at Memphis were primarily 
 responsible, has been scarcely touched upon ; so, too, the working 
 of the Federal trade regulations in Tennessee, a subject on which 
 a separate monograph might be written. Nor have I carried 
 my account beyond the spring of 1865, when Johnson left 
 Tennessee for Washington. The subsequent details of recon 
 struction in the state may be found in J. W. Fertig's "The 
 Secession and Reconstruction of Tennessee," which also treats 
 of the period of the war, but which was written before the 
 Johnson papers in the Library of Congress were available for 
 study. 
 
 As is apparent from the footnotes, I have based my account 
 largely upon the Johnson papers, the Official Records of the 
 Union and Confederate Armies, and the contemporary news 
 papers. Of these last, the Nashville Union is a source of the 
 highest importance. It is, of course, polemical and violently 
 partisan, but it contains a surprising amount of detailed news of 
 any local occurrence of interest and notices and discusses 
 all references to Tennessee affairs which it discovers in ex 
 changes .; and its assertions can usually be checked from other 
 sources. I have made little use of Brownlow's Knoxville Whig, 
 a file of which is in the Yale University library, or of "Parson 
 Brownlow's Book," for the obvious reason that, in this period 
 of his career, the choleric parson was consciously blinking facts 
 and coining political capital out of superlatives, 
 
 I am conscious of my failure adequately to present the Con- 
 
iv PREFACE 
 
 federate side of many controverted points. There is a most 
 regrettable dearth of material for this purpose, even the anti- 
 administration newspapers of Memphis, such as the Argus and the 
 Avalanche existing, unless I am mistaken, only in files so broken 
 as to be practically of no value to the historian. Fortunately, for 
 an investigation directed to Johnson's own career, this kind of 
 material is not essential. 
 
 It is hardly necessary for me to add, in explanation of my 
 method of treating my subject, that I have desired to show 
 how the lessons learned by Johnson in reconstructing his own 
 state constituted a training for the work to which he was so 
 suddenly and unexpectedly called in a national capacity. It 
 will be seen, I think, that his attitude, as president, toward the 
 problems of reconstruction, was, in most respects, a natural 
 consequence of his experience as military governor of Tennessee. 
 
 I am happy to express my gratitude to Professor Robert M. 
 McElroy and Professor William Starr Myers of Princeton 
 for their kindly interest and assistance in my work, and to 
 Dr. Gaillard Hunt, of the Library of Congress, for many 
 courtesies shown me. 
 
 CLIFTON R. HALL. 
 
 Princton, N. J. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER I. SECESSION i 
 
 CHAPTER II. ANDREW JOHNSON 20 
 
 CHAPTER III. INAUGURATION OF MILITARY GOV 
 ERNMENT 32 
 
 CHAPTER IV. THE DEFENSE OF NASHVILLE .... 50 
 CHAPTER V. REPRESSION UNDER ROSECRANS.. 71 
 
 CHAPTER VI. MILITARY AND POLITICAL RE 
 VERSES 1863 87 
 
 CHAPTER VII. PROGRESS OF REORGANIZATION, .no 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 
 
 1864 139 
 
 CHAPTER IX. REORGANIZATION ACCOM 
 PLISHED 157 
 
 CHAPTER X. A GOVERNOR-OF-ALL-WORK 176 
 
 CHAPTER XL CONCLUSION ..210 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 SECESSION 
 
 The early mutterings of the secession storm awakened but 
 little response in Tennessee. The state was a stronghold of 
 the conservative Whig party, devoted from its inception to 
 the maintenance of the Union as the summum bonum of the 
 national life, for the preservation of which slavery and every 
 other minor issue must compromise or give way. While the 
 Democrats had carried every gubernatorial election since 1853, 
 they had invariably been compelled to struggle desperately for 
 victory over the Whigs, and this at a time when the power of 
 that party was crumbling to pieces in other parts of the country. 1 
 The border states, with vital interests and intimate associations 
 both North and South, had contributed many redoubtable Whig 
 champions, and the political leader of Tennessee in 1860 was 
 the Whig, John Bell, to whom, as the exponent of "the Con 
 stitution, the Union, and the enforcement of the laws," his 
 state had given a plurality of 4,565 votes over Breckenridge in 
 the presidential election of that year. 2 Allied with the same 
 party were Thomas A. R. Nelson, Horace Maynard, William 
 G. Brownlow, W. B. Campbell and Robert L. Caruthers, whose 
 careers make up so large a part of Tennessee history during the 
 war. 
 
 Tennessee's loyalty, however as circumstances were to prove 
 and as keen observers appreciated even in 1860 was subject 
 to conditions. Socially and economically she was, except in 
 her eastern district, identified with the South. The inhabitants 
 of the slopes of her great middle division and the alluvial 
 plains of the west were largely engaged in growing and shipping 
 cotton. The plantation system and slavery were in full opera- 
 
 1 Miller's Manual of Tennessee, p. 170. 
 
 2 Annual Cyclopedia, 1861, p. 676. "The full Whig strength went to 
 Bell and Everett, and the majority of the democratic votes to Brecken 
 ridge, while Douglas was supported iby about 10,000 conservative Demo 
 crats." Caldwell, Studies in the Constitutional History of Tennessee, 
 p. 266. There was no Lincoln ticket in the state. 
 
2 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 tion. These were her most precious interests. As a border 
 state, situated between North and South and deriving profit 
 and advantage from both, she perceived in the Union her best 
 prospects for prosperity; and had the Union been peaceably 
 dissolved in such a way as not to interfere with her "peculiar 
 institutions" and her channels of communication with the slave 
 states, it is possible though, indeed, not probable that her con 
 servative antecedents might have combined with considerations 
 of her own advantage to hold her true to her old allegiance. 
 The attitude of acquiescence by most of her leaders, her news 
 papers and the great majority of her citizens in the election of 
 Lincoln showed at least that they had no sympathy with any 
 project to disrupt the Union before the infringement of Southern 
 rights by overt acts of the Federal government 3 
 
 The belligerent pro-slavery minority, however, were for im 
 mediate action, and the initiation of secession by the legislatures 
 of South Carolina and Georgia aroused popular excitement 
 and encouraged them in this course. Their guiding spirit was 
 the governor, Isham G. Harris, who, in constant communication 
 with the secession leaders in the other states and alert for 
 the auspicious moment to perfect his designs, waited only for 
 assurance of decisive action by his neighbors to convene the 
 legislature in secret session on the /th of January, 1861 "to 
 consider the present condition of the country." In his message, 
 he advised that the question of calling a convention be sub 
 mitted forthwith to the people; but suggested, as the safest 
 and wisest procedure, that amendments to the Federal Con 
 stitution, designed permanently to tie the hands of the Northern 
 majority such as the restoration of a compromise line and its 
 extension to the Pacific, modifications of the fugitive-slave 
 law as concessions to Northern sentiment, and a provision against 
 the repeal of these measures except by the unanimous consent 
 of the slave-holding states be insisted on. Harris' opinion of 
 the actual worth of his own pacific proposals was shown in 
 the observation : "Before your adjournment, in all human prob 
 ability, the only practical question for the state to determine 
 
 'Memphis Bulletin, Nov. 12, 1860; Nashville Banner, Nov. 13, 1860, 
 etc. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 3 
 
 will be whether or not she will unite her fortunes with a North-- 
 ern or Southern Confederacy ; upon which question, when pre 
 sented, I am certain there can be little or no division in senti 
 ment, identified as we are in every respect with the South." 4 
 
 Immediately upon this message, as if part of a prearranged 
 plan, followed the news of the secession of Mississippi, Florida, 
 Alabama and Georgia and the repulse of the Star of the West 
 in Charleston harbor. The state seethed with excitement. 
 Secession meetings were held everywhere and the legislature, 
 strongly pro-Southern in sympathy from the beginning, hastened 
 to provide (January 19) for a popular vote on the question 
 of assembling a convention "to adopt such measures for vindicat 
 ing the sovereignty of the state and the protection of its in 
 stitutions as shall appear to them to be demanded," with high 
 hopes of stampeding Tennessee for their views. With the 
 wise intent of avoiding the appearance of precipitation or 
 illegality, it was declared that no action of the convention 
 favoring secession should be valid until submitted to the people 
 and carried by a vote equal to the majority vote in the guber 
 natorial election of 1859. At the same time, the people were to 
 choose delegates to attend the convention, in case one should 
 be held. 5 
 
 The legislature then proceeded to adopt significant resolu 
 tions asking the president of the United States and the au 
 thorities of the Southern states to "reciprocally communicate 
 assurances" of their peaceable designs, regretting the action of 
 the New York legislature in tendering men and money for the 
 coercion of sovereign states, and directing the governors to in 
 form the executive of New York "that it is the opinion of this 
 General Assembly that whenever the authorities of that state 
 shall send armed forces to the South for the purpose indicated 
 . . . the people of Tennessee, uniting with their brethren of 
 the South, will, as one man, resist such invasion of the soil of 
 
 * Senate Journal 3jd Tenn. General Assembly, ist exixra session, 1861, 
 pp. 6 seq. ; Caldwell, "Studies in the Constitutional History of Tennessee," 
 pp. 268 seq. 
 
 5 Acts, 3$d Tenn. General Assembly, ist extra session, 1861, p. 15. 
 
4 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 the South at any hazard and to the last extremity." 6 That in 
 these resolutions the legislators exactly expressed the sentiments 
 of the vast majority of their constituents there is no reason 
 to doubt. Like Virginia and North Carolina, though more 
 ardently, they clung to the old Union with which their affections 
 and interests were so closely identified; but they believed firmly 
 in state sovereignty and the constitutional exemption of their 
 "rights" from invasion by the Federal government, and, perceiving 
 that their institutions and those of the Southern states were 
 the same, they looked upon any forcible assault upon "Southern 
 liberties" as directed also against their own. An appeal to 
 arms would undermine the neutral ground on which they hoped 
 to stand and, forced to take sides, they could not hesitate. The 
 prayers of all Union-lovers were for the success of the peace 
 convention about to meet in Washington. 
 
 In these sentiments the people of East Tennessee had no 
 share. This region had been settled largely by Scotch-Irish 
 from Virginia and North Carolina. Geographically it consists 
 of mountains and narrow valleys, affording, for the most part, 
 profitable returns in grain and live stock to industrious, provident 
 white inhabitants, but utterly unsuited to a system of slave labor. 7 
 The farms were small and the man of wealth was the distinct 
 exception conditions contributing to the development of a 
 rough, vigorous and aggressive democracy, of which Andrew 
 Johnson, the tailor-politican was the type and leader. In the 
 cities, notably Knoxville, was a small, hut powerful coterie 
 of conservative professional men, Whigs, like T. A. R. Nelson 
 and Maynard. To such men the perpetuation of slavery was 
 of little moment, and the extension of it of no moment at all. 
 Their Union predilections encountered no contrary impulse. To 
 the argument that the freeing of the slaves would humiliate the 
 white laborer and bring him into competition with the black, 
 they replied that it would also destroy the unjust ascendency 
 of the rich aristocratic proprietor, created by the slave system, 
 
 6 House Journal, 33<1 Tenn. General Assembly, 1st extra session, 1861, 
 pp. 66, 76, et passim. 
 
 7 The ratio of slaves to whites was about one to twelve. Census of 1860, 
 quoted by Fertig, The Secession and Reconstruction of Tennessee, p. 28. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 5 
 
 which cheapened the value of labor and closed the avenues of 
 industry, and would throw all men,, white and black, into a 
 fair competition, in which the ambitious Scotchman, born and 
 bred to intelligent self-dependence, had no reason to fear the 
 result. 
 
 Thus, with a powerful leaven of loyalty to the Union uncon 
 ditional on the part of the East Tennesseeans ; sustained, in the 
 case of the Whigs of Middle and West Tennessee, by the hope 
 that the use of force might be averted and Tennessee become 
 the mediator to reconcile the contending sections and save the 
 Union the people voted, on the 9th of February, on the proposi 
 tion submitted to them by the legislature. The peace conference 
 was still in session. The result was 57,798 in favor of a con 
 vention; 69,675 against it. East Tennessee voted five to one 
 in the negative; Middle Tennessee followed suit by a majority 
 of 1,382; West Tennessee gave a 15,118 majority for the 
 affirmative. The vote for Union delegates to the convention 
 was 88,803 ; f r disunion delegates, 24,749. Thus the people 
 declared that they did not wish even to discuss the question of 
 secession. Tennessee was still emphatically loyal and the South 
 ern cause had sustained a severe reverse. 
 
 "The election of February was a division along party lines. 
 Its result was simply an indication that the Whig party of 
 Tennessee was still opposed to the doctrine of secession." 9 All 
 this was changed by the outbreak of actual hostilities in April. 
 Enough has been said to indicate that coercion was the rock on 
 which the Union party in Tennessee would split. Secession 
 at once became popular and irrisistible. To President Lincoln's 
 call for troops, Governor Harris replied (April 18) : "Tennessee 
 will not furnish a single man for coercion, but fifty thousand, 
 if necessary, for the defence of our rights and those of our 
 Southern brothers." 10 
 
 Still the Whig leaders, whose political religion was love and 
 service of the Union, could not bring themselves to believe that 
 the noble structure for which Clay and Webster had labored so 
 
 8 Annual Cyclopedia, 1861, p. 677. 
 
 9 Neal, Disunion and Restoration in Tennessee, p. 14. 
 ia Goodspeed, History of Tennessee, pp. 513-519. 
 
6 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 passionately was tumbling to pieces before their eyes, while 
 they stood powerless to prevent the ruin. On the very day 
 when Governor Harris sent his defiant reply to the president, 
 Neil S. Brown, Russell Houston, E. H. Ewing, John Bell, R. J. 
 Meigs and other prominent Whigs appealed to the Tennesseeans 
 in an impassioned address, "The agitation of the slavery ques 
 tion, combined with party spirit and sectional animosity," they 
 said, "has at length produced the legitimate fruit." They de 
 nounced and deplored the coercive policy of the president "as 
 calculated to dissolve the Union forever and to dissolve it in 
 the blood of our fellow-citizens," and approved the governor's 
 refusal to contribute to that end, but, they continued, they did 
 not think it Tennessee's duty, "considering her position in the 
 Union, and in view of the great question of the peace of our 
 distracted country, to take sides against the government." To 
 do so would be to "terminate her grand mission of peace-maker 
 between the states of the South and the general government. 
 Nay, more; the almost inevitable result would be the transfer 
 of the war within her own borders the defeat of all hopes of 
 reconciliation, and the deluging of the state with the blood of 
 her own people." (This was to speak with the oracular tongue 
 of fate.) "The present duty of Tennessee is to maintain a 
 position of independence taking sides with the Union and the 
 peace of the country against all assailants, whether from the 
 North or South. Her position should be to maintain the sanctity 
 of her soil from the hostile tread of any party. . . . But should 
 a purpose be developed by the government of overrunning and 
 subjugating our brethren of the seceded states, we say un 
 equivocally, that it will be the duty of the state to resist at all 
 hazards, at any cost, and by arms, any such purpose or attempt." 
 Therefore let the authorities of the state proceed at once to 
 arm her for all emergencies, but "in the meantime let her, 
 as speedily as she can, hold a conference with her sister slave- 
 holding states yet in the Union, for the purpose of devising 
 plans for the preservation of the peace of the land. . . . The 
 border slave states may prevent this civil war; and why shall 
 they not do it?" 11 
 
 u Moore, Rebellion Record, vol. i, p. 71 ; Greeley, American Conflict, 
 vol. i, p. 481. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 7 
 
 In all this there is nothing new. It is the last despairing, 
 hopeless struggle of the Whigs to maintain their old position of 
 peace, compromise and Union. Hardly had they spoken when 
 the tide of secession swept them irresistibly with it into the 
 disaster they so clearly foresaw. Four days later, Bell declared 
 for the South, and most of his friends followed his lead. Except 
 in East Tennessee, the Union sympathizers were frightened into 
 silence. By the 24th of April, Gideon J. Pillow could write 
 from Nashville to L. P. Walker, the Confederate secretary of 
 war: "We are now united in Middle and West Tennessee, and 
 we think East Tennessee will soon be so, or nearly so. Ethe- 
 ridge attempted to make a speech at Paris yesterday, but was 
 prevented by the people after a short conflict with pistols, 
 in which four were wounded and one killed. Johnson has at 
 last returned to East Tennessee, and had his nose pulled on the 
 way; was hissed and hooted at all along on his route. . . . His 
 power is gone, and henceforth there will be nothing left but the 
 stench of the traitor." 12 
 
 Fort Sumter and President Lincoln had restored the prestige 
 of Governor Harris, and he hastened to utilize it. The legis 
 lature, in full sympathy with him, reassembled at his call on the 
 25th of April and went into secret session, the members being 
 pledged to reveal nothing that transpired during their delibera 
 tions. Harris' message asserted that the president had "wantonly 
 inaugurated an internecine war between the people of the slave 
 and non-slave-holding states," urged the passage of ordinances 
 of secession and union with the Confederacy "in such manner 
 as shall involve the highest exercise of sovereign authority by 
 the people of the state," and, to that end, asked that opportunity 
 be given for "a fair and full expression of the popular will on 
 each of these propositions separately." 13 His motives in thus 
 
 12 Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, series i, voL 
 lii, part ii, p. 69. (This publication will hereafter be referred to as 
 
 "O. R."). 
 
 13 Acts, 33d Tenn. General Assembly, 2d extra session, 1861, p. I. 
 "Under existing circumstances I can see no propriety in encumbering the 
 people of the state with the election of delegates, to do that which is in 
 our power to enable them to do directly for themselves. The most direct 
 as well as the highest act of sovereignty, according to our theory, is 
 
8 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 apparently clogging the wheels of the secession chariot for the 
 sake of popular sovereignty and strict legality were, however, 
 perhaps not as disinterested as they appeared on their face. "The 
 object of the governor in recommending separate ordinances," 
 wrote Henry W. Hilliard, the Confederate agent on the ground, 
 to Secretary Toombs, "is to secure beyond all possibility of 
 doubt the speedy secession of Tennessee from the government 
 of the United States. . . . The first proposition will be ratified 
 by an overwhelming popular vote. As to the second, which 
 provides for the admission of Tennessee as a member of the 
 Confederate States, there will be decided opposition, for many 
 desire to establish a middle confederacy, formed of the border 
 states, as they are termed. You will readily comprehend that 
 personal considerations influence opinion to some extent in re 
 gard to this measure. ... A great change has taken place in 
 public sentiment here within a few days, and the feeling in 
 favor of our government rises into enthusiasm. ... By exist 
 ing laws the governor has no authority to send troops beyond 
 the limits of the state, but the legislature will authorize him 
 to order them to any point, and in anticipation of this, or under 
 the pressure of affairs, Governor Harris is now sending troops 
 into Virginia. . . . Our Constitution is highly approved, and 
 the conduct of our government inspires respect and admiration." 14 
 Governor Harris had further recommended that the state be 
 placed at once upon a war footing. 15 In response, the assembly 
 authorized him (April 26) to order the immediate organization 
 of all the regiments and companies tendered to him. 16 On the 
 6th of May, it placed in his hands the raising, organization, and 
 equipment of 55,000 volunteers, the charge of the troops and 
 the direction of the defence of the state, and gave him, with the 
 
 that by which the people vote, not merely for men, but for measures sub 
 mitted for their approval or rejection. Since it is only the voice of the 
 people that is to be heard, there is no reason why they may not be readily 
 and effectively express themselves upon an ordinance framed and sub 
 mitted to them by the legislature as if submitted by a convention." 
 
 " O. R., series i, vol. Hi, part ii, p. 76. 
 
 15 Senate Journal, 33d Tenn. General Assembly, 2d extra session, 1861, 
 p. ii. 
 
 "Ibid, p 17. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 9 
 
 concurrence of the military and financial board, the control of 
 the military fund and the authority to make contracts for military 
 purposes. 17 
 
 Meanwhile, the Confederate commissioner, Milliard, had 
 been in conference with Harris and was introduced by him to 
 the legislature, which he addressed, by invitation, on the 3Oth 
 of April, urging the prompt union of Tennessee with the 
 Southern republic. 18 A joint resolution of the ist of May au 
 thorized the governor to appoint three commissioners to enter 
 into a military league with the Montgomery government. This 
 league, consummated on the 7th, looked to "a speedy admission 
 into the Confederacy" and placed the military force of the 
 state under the coritrol and direction of President Davis. 19 
 The legislature ratified it the same day and invited the Con 
 federacy to make Nashville its capital. 20 
 
 Not until, by these remarkable proceedings, the Southern 
 sympathizers had delivered the state bound into the hands 
 of the Confederacy and destroyed all possibility of a free ex 
 pression of the popular will, did they seek to throw the cloak 
 of legality over their acts by introducing the fiat of the "ultimate 
 sovereign." By an act passed on the 6th of May, embodying 
 the recommendations of Harris' message, the people were called 
 to vote, on the 8th of June, on two distinct ordinances : ( I ) a 
 declaration of independence and separation from the Federal 
 Union; (2) the adoption of the constitution of the provisional 
 government of the Confederacy. 21 
 
 "The spirit of secession appears to have reached its culminat 
 ing point in Tennessee," said the Louisville Journal of May 
 13. "Certainly the fell spirit has, as yet, reached no higher 
 point of outrageous tyranny. The whole of the late proceed 
 ings in Tennessee has been as gross an outrage as ever was 
 perpetrated by the worst tyrant of all the earth. The whole 
 secession movement, on the part of the legislature of that 
 
 17 Acts, 33d Tenn. General Assembly, 2d extra session, 1861, p. 21. 
 
 18 Senate Journal, 33d Tenn. General Assembly, 2d extra, session, 1861, 
 p. 30. 
 
 19 Acts, 33d Tenn. General Assembly, 2d extra session, 1861 p. 19. 
 "Ibid. 
 
 11 Ibid., p. 13. 
 
io ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 state, has been lawless, violent and tumultuous. The pretense 
 of submitting the ordinance of secession to the vote of the 
 people of the state, after placing her military power and re 
 sources at the disposal and under the command of the Con 
 federate States without any authority from the people, is as 
 bitter and insolent a mockery of popular rights as the human 
 mind could invent." 
 
 Allowing for undue violence of language, this is a statement 
 of fact. Under the circumstances, the election was bound to 
 be a farce. Before the 8th of June, Governor Harris had 
 raised most of the troops authorized by the legislature and the 
 state was full of soldiers. The sentiment of the people was 
 now overwhelmingly for the Confederacy and, between soldiers 
 and sentiment, he was a brave Union man who ventured to 
 speak his mind at the polls. That the state would have gone 
 heavily for the South under the fairest possible system of election 
 is certain; that a fair election would have increased the Union 
 vote seems equally so. But a mere victory would not content 
 the secessionists ; for moral effect, they required the nearest 
 possible approach to unanimity. 
 
 Tennessee declared its independence by a majority of over 
 61,000 in a total vote of nearly 156,000, and its desire to join 
 the Confederacy by a majority of 60,000. Middle Tennessee 
 was for the South, 58,000 to 8,000; West Tennessee, 29,000 
 to 6,000. East Tennessee clung defiantly to its loyalty, 33,000 
 to 14,500. The military camps, comprising over 6,000 soldiers, 
 went unanimously for separation and the Confederacy. Nearly 
 20,000 more votes were cast than at previous elections, which 
 gave some color to charges of corruption and illegal voting 
 by Confederate soldiers from other states. Governor Harris 
 thereupon (June 24) proclaimed the state out of the Union 
 and a part of the Confederacy. 22 
 
 These proceedings, from first to last, were palpably irregular, 
 and, by any construction, all except the secession by vote of 
 the people were unconstitutional. It was sought to justify 
 
 23 Moore, Rebellion Record, vol. ii, do'C. 37. McPherson, Political 
 History of the United States during the Great Rebellion, p. 5, For the 
 vote, see Nashville Dispatch, Jan. n, 1865. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE n 
 
 this final act under the pronouncement in the preamble of the 
 state constitution "that all power is inherent in the people, and 
 all free governments are founded on their authority, and in 
 stituted for their peace, safety, and happiness," that "for the 
 advancement of those ends they have at all times, an inalienable 
 and indefeasible right to alter, reform, or abolish the govern 
 ment in such manner as they may think proper," and "that 
 government being instituted for the common benefit, the doc 
 trine of non-resistance against arbitrary power and oppression 
 is absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good and happiness of 
 mankind." 23 That is, the action of the people must be validated, 
 if at all, by an appeal to the reserved, extra-constitutional 
 rights inhering in sovereignty. The constitution provided for 
 its amendment by a slow process requiring at least two years, 
 which, granting the existence of "arbitrary power and oppres 
 sion," might imperil the "peace, safety and happiness" of the 
 people, for the advancement of which the government could 
 at any time be altered or abolished ; if so, irregular measures 
 were defensible. These reflections will be of value when we 
 come to consider the reconstruction of 1865. 
 
 But, although it be conceded that the "sovereign people" 
 had the right to decide their destiny by any means they chose 
 to adopt, the military ordinance and the league with the Con 
 federacy, put through before the sovereign had spoken, are 
 indefensible from any legal standpoint, and throw suspicion 
 upon the final vote itself. The governor and legislature, holding 
 office under the state constitution of 1834, had taken oath to 
 support the Constitution of the United States, and were obliged 
 to do so until their state constitution was altered. 24 If the 
 people, by the exercise of the "reserve" of sovereignty, could 
 release them, they were bound at least until some sovereign 
 act transpired. The practical effect of their proceedings was 
 to precipitate revolution. The terms temporary league and 
 loan of military forces to the Confederacy were but blinds 
 behind which they deliberately violated strict moral and con 
 stitutional obligations. 
 
 23 Tennessee State Constitution of 1834. Art, i, sec. i-n, Miller's Man 
 ual of Tennessee, p. 81. 
 34 Ibid., art x. sec. i. 
 
12 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 From the beginning, the loyal people of East Tennessee fully 
 comprehended the significance of the transactions at the capital, 
 and viewed the course of events with apprehension and dismay. 
 The illegal ordinances of early May confirmed their worst fears, 
 and their leaders, Whig and Democrat, united in a call to a 
 convention at Knoxville on the 3Oth of that month. 25 This 
 assembly, designated by the Memphis Appeal as "the little batch 
 of disaffected traitors who hover around the noxious atmosphere 
 of Andrew Johnson's home/' adopted resolutions condemning 
 the doctrine of secession, declaring the ordinances of the legis 
 lature to be acts of usurpation, urging the policy of Kentucky as 
 the true policy for Tennessee and all the border states, and 
 appealing to the people, "while it is yet in their power, to 
 come up in the majesty of their strength and restore Tennessee 
 to her true position." 26 Following the election of June 8, 
 in which East Tennessee stood staunchly by the Union, the 
 convention reassembled at Greenville (June 17-20) at the call 
 of its president and promulgated the following striking declara 
 tion: 
 
 "So far as we can learn, the election held in this state on 
 the eighth day of the present month was free, with few ex 
 ceptions, in no part of the state other than East Tennessee. 
 In the large parts of Middle and West Tennessee no speeches 
 or discussions in favor of the Union were permitted. Union 
 papers were not allowed to circulate. Measures were taken 
 in some parts of West Tennessee, in defiance of the Constitu 
 tion and laws, which allow folded tickets to have the ballot 
 numbered in such manner as to mark and expose the Union 
 votes. . . . Disunionists in many places had charge of the 
 polls, and Union men, when voting, were denounced as Lincoln- 
 ites and abolitionists. The unanimity of the votes in many 
 large counties where but a few weeks ago the Union sentiment 
 was so strong proves beyond doubt that Union men were over 
 awed by the tyranny of the military power, and the still greater 
 tyranny of a corrupt and subsidized press. . . . For these and 
 other causes we do not regard the result of the election as 
 
 *O. R., series i, vol. lii, part i, p. 148. 
 " Ibid. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 13 
 
 expressive of the will of a majority of the freemen of Tennessee. 
 . . . But if this view is erroneous, we have the same, and as 
 we think a much better right to remain in the government of 
 the United States than the other divisions of Tennessee have 
 to secede from it. We prefer to remain attached to the gov 
 ernment of our fathers. . . . We believe there is no cause for 
 rebellion or secession on the part of the people of Tennessee." 
 Wishing, therefore, "to avert a conflict with our brethren in 
 other parts of the state, and desiring that every constitutional 
 means shall be resorted to for the preservation of peace," the 
 convention appointed a committee to ask the consent of the 
 general assembly that the counties of East Tennessee and those 
 of Middle Tennessee so desiring might form a separate state. 27 
 This was "peaceable secession" in a new aspect. The conven 
 tion then adjourned, subject to the call of its president whenever 
 another meeting should be deemed desirable. Two years were 
 to elapse before it reassembled. 
 
 A petition embodying these resolutions was presented to the 
 general assembly on the 2Oth of June and referred to a joint 
 committee, but no action was ever taken on it. Its only result 
 was to mark the section for the immediate attention of the Con 
 federacy. The people of East Tennessee were not blind to the 
 danger of the course they were pursuing, but their courage re 
 mained unshaken. The first Thursday in August was the regular 
 date for the choice of representatives to the Federal Congress, 
 and Governor Harris, by proclamation, ordered that the election 
 take place as usual, the delegates chosen to sit in the Congress 
 of the Confederacy. In each of the four districts of East Ten 
 nessee, the Confederate nominees were opposed by Unionists, 
 and all of the latter (Thomas A. R. Nelson, Horace Maynard, 
 Andrew J. Clements, and George W. Bridges) were elected at the 
 polls. The vote for Nelson and Maynard was so overwhelming 
 that their opponents were compelled to acknowledge defeat. The 
 other two beaten candidates were seated. Bridges and Nelson 
 were arrested by Confederate troops on their way to Washington, 
 Bridges finally escaping from prison and being admitted 
 to the House near the close of the session. Nelson consented 
 
 "Ibid., p. 168. 
 
14 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 to take an oath of neutrality, which bound him to inaction during 
 the war. 28 
 
 The attention of statesmen and military men both North and 
 South was now directed to East Tennessee. The district was of 
 great strategic importance. Its occupation meant the control of 
 the railroad communication between the Mississippi valley and 
 eastern Virginia. Politically it afforded a prop to the Union 
 sentiment in western Virginia and North Carolina. As early 
 as May, the leading East Tennesseeans in Washington, Senator 
 Andrew Johnson and Representative Horace Maynard, were be 
 sieging the president for prompt aid for the Union cause, and 
 some arms and supplies were sent, 29 but the action of the Con 
 federates was more effective. In August, General Felix K. 
 Zollicoffer, himself an East Tennesseean, was designated to re 
 claim the district for the Confederacy, and promptly overran it. 
 
 Then followed a reign of terror which, making all allowance 
 for exaggeration and hysteria in the contemporary reports, fully 
 entitles the East Tennessee loyalists to the name of martyrs. Much 
 that has been written of Confederate brutality and outrages is 
 doubtless false. Accounts like Brownlow's have been con 
 troverted by Southern writers. The Richmond Enquirer after 
 wards asserted that the policy of the Confederate government 
 towards the district had been "generous to weakness." "The 
 Union men of East Tennessee," it affirmed, "never have been 
 subjected to restraint, punishment, or violence, on account of 
 their being Union men. . . . No Union man who has not 
 acted treason to the Confederate States, who has not in some 
 form, been in open, factious rebellion against its laws and 
 authority, has been subjected to the slightest inconvenience 
 on account of his sentiments." 30 This may be approximately 
 true; still, it is certain that the Confederates were determined, 
 by fair means or foul, to control the district. The Enquirer 
 
 ^Fertig, The Secession and Reconstruction of Tennessee, p. 31, cites 
 Report of contested election cases, pp. 466 et seq. and Congressional Globe, 
 Feb. 23, 1863. 
 
 "General Beauregard wrote to President Davis (June 27) that 
 Johnson had sent 10,000 muskets from Washington to East Tennessee. 
 O. R., series i, vol. lii part ii, p. 115. 
 
 * Quoted by Nashville Union, Aug. 10, 1862. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 15 
 
 called it "the keystone of the Southern arch/' Not only did 
 its passes afford avenues for the manoeuvres of armies and its 
 principal railroad a great artery of communication and supply; 
 it was also an apparently inexhaustible storehouse of salt and 
 bacon, those scarce and precious necessaries of the soldier's life. 
 During the first two years of the war, it became a great com 
 missariat of the Southern army. Its tremendous value justified 
 almost any measure calculated to secure it. When the con 
 ciliatory policy of Zollicoffer failed, more stringent methods 
 were adopted. Many of the troops employed for the purpose 
 of subjugation were themselves Tennesseeans, their bitterness 
 intensified by the political struggle within the state, and keenly 
 realizing that, unless the South prevailed, they had to expect 
 the penalty of treason at the hands of vindictive local enemies. 
 As the war progressed, East Tennessee became one of its battle 
 grounds. Union and Confederate armies marched and counter 
 marched across it, leaving inevitable destruction in their wake. 
 The Confederates, insisting that Tennessee had lawfully exer 
 cised her right of secession and that all her citizens were bound 
 thereby, their Union convictions to the contrary notwithstanding, 
 put their conscription law in full operation in the state and 
 gave the people the option of submitting to it or meeting the 
 fate of traitors. Many were torn from their homes for un 
 willing service in the ranks of the enemy. When such an 
 alternative confronted the Union man who might otherwise 
 have been disposed to consider his security before his patriotism 
 (and it was alleged that the conscription searched out with 
 especial care those whose fidelity to the Confederacy was open 
 to suspicion), acquiescence in Southern domination could bring 
 but cold comfort. 31 
 
 Meanwhile the crops were confiscated and sent south, and as 
 was natural, the friends of the Union were the first to be 
 stripped and left without hope of remuneration. Detached bands 
 of horsemen, whom the regular Confederate commanders had 
 no means of controlling, labored for their cause in their own 
 
 31 For detailed accounts of East Tennessee before and during the 
 war, see Parson Brownloirfs Book; O. P. Temple, East Tennessee in the 
 Civil War; Humes, The Loyal Mountaineers of Tennessee. 
 
16 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 way, burning barns and houses, destroying stores, driving off 
 cattle, and spreading terror among the inhabitants. Hosts of 
 refugees fled for safety to Camp Dick Robinson and other Fed 
 eral military posts in Kentucky or further north, leaving their 
 property in the hands of their foes. The Confederate com 
 mander of the post at Knoxville himself declared: "Marauding 
 bands of armed men go through the country, representing 
 themselves to be the authorized agents of the state or Con 
 federate Government; they 'impress' into 'service' horses and 
 men; they plunder the helpless, and especially the quondam 
 supporters of Johnson, Maynard, and Brownlow; they force 
 men to enlist by the representation that otherwise they will 
 be incarcerated at Tuscaloosa; they force the people to feed 
 and care for themselves and horses without compensation." 32 
 
 The people of East Tennessee did not tamely submit to the 
 domination of a superior military force. They would not be 
 lieve that the government for which they had struggled and 
 suffered would desert them in their time of need. A Southern 
 sympathizer wrote (November 12) to Jefferson Davis: they 
 "look for the re-establishment of the Federal authority with 
 as much confidence as the Jews look for the coming of the 
 Messiah, and I feel quite sure when I assert that no event 
 or circumstance can change or modify their hope." 33 While 
 their leaders implored the president for aid, they formed secret 
 military organizations, whose activity aroused the apprehension 
 of Zollicoffer, but which, for lack of arms, were of little value. 
 Many took to "bushwhacking," shooting Confederates from 
 ambush and destroying their property tactics which did the 
 Unionists more harm than good, for they maddened the Con 
 federates and provoked them to savage retaliation. More effec 
 tive was the burning of railroad bridges. This began in 
 November and seriously impeded the operations of the Con 
 federate forces. Secretary Benjamin ordered the execution 
 of convicted bridge-burners, after summary trial by drum-head 
 court-martial, "on the spot in the vicinity of the burned bridges," 
 and the imprisonment at Tuscaloosa of all other active Union 
 
 32 Nicolay & Hay, Life of Lincoln, vol. v, ch. 4. 
 * Goodspeed, History of Tennessee, p. 486. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 17 
 
 sympathizers, and directed that in no case should a man once in 
 arms against the government be released on any pledge or oath 
 of allegiance. 34 The military authorities sought by mingled 
 craft and violence to secure the leaders of the resistance and 
 crush it in the bud. Brownlow was lured from his hiding- 
 place in the mountains by the promise of a pass into Kentucky, 
 and promptly arrested and imprisoned. 35 
 
 Meanwhile the Federal government was moving with dis 
 astrous slowness. In October, the president had pressed on 
 the war department the advantage of occupying a point on the 
 railroad near Cumberland Gap, the outlet into Virginia and Ken 
 tucky. He was supported by the emphatic opinion of General 
 Thomas at Camp Dick Robinson. When General McClellan 
 became commander-in-chief in November, he assigned his per 
 sonal friend, General Buell, to the command in Kentucky 
 and urged him to advance promptly into East Tennessee, cut 
 the Confederate communications, and succor the Union sym 
 pathizers there. Johnson and Maynard telegraphed Buell: "Our 
 people are oppressed and pursued as beasts of the forest; the 
 government must come to their relief/' 36 The general replied: 
 ''I assure you I recognize no more imperative duty, and crave 
 no higher honor, than that of rescuing our loyal friends in 
 Tennessee;" 37 but he failed to suit the action to the word. The 
 fact was that he had set his heart upon striking directly at the 
 centre of the Confederate power at Nashville. With this end 
 in view, he remained inactive, maturing his own plans, and meet 
 ing the importunities of Lincoln and McClellan with evasive 
 replies, until the Confederate domination of East Tennessee 
 was complete and only a laborious campaign could dislodge 
 them. Finally a peremptory telegram from Lincoln (January 
 4) forced him to confess that he had not acted in sympathy 
 with his superiors and that his opportunity had been lost. His 
 report met with a sharp reproof from McClellan and an ex 
 pression of acute disappointment and distress from Lincoln, 
 
 34 Ibid., pp. 483-490. 
 
 35 Ibid., p. 490. 
 
 88 O. R., series i, vol. vii, p. 480. 
 37 Ibid., p. 483- 
 
i8 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 who was keenly alive to the political value of East Tennessee 
 to the Union, while Buell viewed the situation exclusively from 
 a military standpoint. 38 
 
 The devoted district had yet almost two years of extremest 
 suffering to undergo before its deliverance. Brownlow and 
 Oliver P. Temple have related in detail the pathetic history of 
 those terrible times. Neither Lincoln at Washington nor John 
 son at Nashville, in agony over the fate of his friends and 
 neighbors, to whose confidence and support he owed everything, 
 could provide the needed aid. On the 8th of April, 1862, Presi 
 dent Davis placed East Tennessee under martial law. 39 On the 
 23d, Colonel Churchwell, the Confederate provost-marshal at 
 Knoxville, warned all who had fled to the enemy to return within 
 thirty days. Those who did so were offered amnesty and pro 
 tection; those who failed to comply would have their families 
 sent to Kentucky or beyond the Confederate lines at their own 
 expense. "The women and children must be taken care of 
 by husbands and fathers, either in East Tennessee or in the 
 Lincoln government/' 40 On the 24th, Johnson's invalid wife, 
 with her family, was ordered to pass beyond the Confederate 
 states line within thirty-six hours. Though this order was not 
 fully enforced at once, she was driven from her house and, after 
 distressing experiences, sent North in September at her own 
 request. 41 The families of Brownlow and Maynard were sim 
 ilarly served. Their property was confiscated. 
 
 While East Tennessee was firmly in the grip of the Con 
 federacy, the situation in the central and western parts of the 
 
 "I present, in general, the administration view. The wisdom of Buell's 
 plan is still a moot point. Writers have contended that his design to 
 strike the enemy's main force was better calculated than that of Lincoln and 
 McClellan both to further the campaign and to free East Tennessee. 
 Whatever the merits of the case, the lack of candor in Buell's dispatches 
 put him in bad odor with the administration. 
 
 39 Moore, Rebellion Record, vol. iv, p. 502. 
 
 *McPherson, Political History of the United States during the Great 
 Rebellion, p. 121. 
 
 "Johnson, Papers, vol. xviii, 4104 a, 4104 d, 4104 e. This collection of 
 manuscripts is in the Library of Congress at Washington. It will here 
 after be referred to as "J. P.". 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 19 
 
 state was transformed by the victories of Grant. The fall of 
 Fort Henry (February 6) and Fort Donelson (February 16) 
 turned the Confederate line of defence extending from these 
 strongholds to Bowling Green in Kentucky. The army of 
 General Johnston at once abandoned Bowling Green and fell 
 back through Nashville, followed by things of panic-stricken 
 secessionists. Buell, pressing on in pursuit, reached the capital 
 on the 25th. The state government fled to Memphis and, on 
 the 2Oth of March, adjourned sine die. Governor Harris took 
 refuge in Mississippi. On the 22d of February, Grant pro 
 claimed martial law in West Tennessee. No courts were to 
 be held under state authority. All cases coming within reach 
 of the military arm were to be adjudicated by the authorities 
 established by the government of the United States. Whenever 
 a sufficient number of citizens returned to their allegiance to 
 maintain law and order, the military restriction would be 
 removed. 42 
 
 On the 3d of March, President Lincoln appointed Andrew 
 Johnson military governor of Tennessee, with the rank of 
 brigadier-general of volunteers. 
 
 "Annual Cyclopedia, 1862, p. 763. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 Andrew Johnson, 1 to whose discretion the president confided 
 a task appalling in its difficulties, demanding in the highest de 
 gree, keen instinct, fine discrimination, and sound judgment, 
 was a remarkable personality, a character calculated to inspire 
 admiration, hatred, enthusiasm, contempt, but never indifference. 
 The record of his life is the history of the victory of an in 
 domitable will over countless obstacles. Born in 1808, the 
 son of a "poor white" of Raleigh, North Carolina, and raised 
 in miserable poverty, he received not even the most ordinary 
 education, and, at the age of ten, was apprenticed to a tailor of 
 Greenville, Tennessee, to aid in the support of his widowed 
 mother. Realizing his ignorance and fired with the most ardent 
 desire to improve his condition, he employed the hours after 
 his day's work was done in learning to read, and, after his 
 marriage in 1827, his wife helped him to acquire the arts of 
 writing and arithmetic. His greatest assets were a brilliant, 
 incisive mind and an insatiable ambition; these proved decisive 
 of his career. Breadth of view he never attained. 
 
 Conscious of his superior ability, and impeded at every turn, 
 in his efforts to secure the preferments he felt his worth de 
 manded, by lack of wealth and social standing, the monopolies 
 of the plantation-owning, slave-holding aristocrats in his state, 
 he early developed an intense bitterness against the artificial 
 distinctions of society. Far from diminishing, this feeling grew 
 upon him with years, poisoned his whole life, and impaired his 
 character. At the outset it made him the champion of oppressed 
 democracy and tempted him to employ the devices of the 
 demagogue. To such a man East Tennessee offered a fertile 
 
 1 John Savage, The Life and Public Service of Andrew Johnson (New 
 York, 1866) is the best biography for Johnson's early years, although an 
 unscholarly, adulatory, and often indiscriminatingly partisan work. Pro 
 fessor St. George L. Sioussat is at work upon a life of Johnson which 
 is expected to appear shortly. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 21 
 
 field. The tailor's shop became a meeting-place for the poor 
 laborers of the town. There their grievances were discussed, 
 and among them Johnson was first in ability and influence. He 
 urged upon them the importance of asserting their right to a 
 voice in the town councils, from which their interests had long 
 received scant consideration, and, as their avowed representa 
 tive, he made his political debut as alderman of Greenville in 
 1828. In 1830 he was chosen mayor. His aggressive labors 
 for his constituents and his vicious, fearless attacks upon the 
 aristocracy soon made him the idol of the democracy of East 
 Tennessee. In 1835 he was sent to the state House of Repre 
 sentatives. His opposition to a popular scheme of internal im 
 provements, as designed to get fraudulent profits for capitalists 
 at the expense of the state, brought about his defeat at the 
 next election; but the results bore out his predictions and he 
 was returned in 1839. Henceforth his career was a succession 
 of triumphs. State senator in 1841, East Tennessee sent him 
 in 1843 to represent her in the national House, where he re 
 mained uninterruptedly for ten years. In 1853 he lost his 
 seat, owing to the "gerrymandering" of the state under Whig 
 auspices, which placed him in a strong Whig district. With 
 characteristically irrepressible fighting spirit, he promptly present 
 ed himself as candidate for governor in opposition to the brilliant 
 and popular Gustavus A. Henry, "the eagle orator," whom he be 
 lieved to be the chief agent in his discomfiture, and defeated him 
 in an exciting campaign. In 1855 he was re-ekcted over Meredith 
 P. Gentry, a Know-Nothing Whig. In both these campaigns the 
 rival candidates appeared in joint debate throughout the state. 
 Contemporary evidence records that, while Henry and Gentry 
 scrupulously observed the amenities of debate and refused to be 
 badgered into compromising their reputation as dignified states 
 men, Johnson's speeches were tissues of misstatement, misrepre 
 sentation, and insulting personalities, directed to the passions and 
 unreasoning impulses of the ignorant voter. Assaults upon aris 
 tocrats combined with vaunting of his own low origin and the 
 dignity of manual labor. 
 
 Johnson was now the undisputed Democratic leader of the 
 state. As such, he entered the national Senate at the expiration 
 
22 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 of his gubernatorial term in 1857, and remained there, an in 
 creasingly isolated and significant figure, until 1862. 
 
 The political course of Johnson in these early years of his public 
 service concerns us here only as it throws light upon his relation 
 to the great events of 1860 and 1861. Through every public act 
 of his runs one consistent, unifying thread of purpose the ad 
 vancement of the power, prosperity and liberty of the masses at 
 the expense of intrenched privilege. The slave-holding aristocracy 
 he hated with a bitter, enduring hatred born of envy and ambition. 
 ."If Johnson were a snake," said his rival, the well-born Isham 
 G. Harris, "he would lie in the grass to bite the heels of rich men's 
 children/' 2 The very thought of an aristocrat caused him to emit 
 venom and lash about him with fury. He repeatedly declared 
 that the aristocrats were an association of secret conspirators, 
 seeking to subvert the government and the Constitution in the in 
 terest of their class. "What do you mean by the laboring classes ?" 
 asked Jefferson Davis in the Senate. "Those who earn their bread 
 by the sweat of their face, and not by fatiguing their ingenuity," 
 Johnson replied. 3 
 
 Though himself a slaveholder, he early demonstrated his con 
 sistency by extending his principle to embrace the eventual eman 
 cipation of the negro bondman. In a speech in 1845 on the 
 proposed annexation of Texas, he favored that measure as calcu 
 lated to improve the present condition of the slaves and, in the 
 end, perhaps, to be "the gateway out of which the sable sons of 
 Africa are to pass from bondage to freedom, where they can 
 become merged in a population congenial with themselves, who 
 know and feel no distinction in consequence of the various hues 
 of skin or crosses of blood." 4 He denounced a high tariff policy 
 as redounding to the advantage of the few at the expense of the 
 many, and opposed national control of internal improvements not 
 in their character national, as weakening the authority and self- 
 reliance of the states. The measure most intimately associated 
 with his name as senator was the Homestead bill to grant to 
 
 3 Harriot S. Turner, Recollections of Andrew Johnson., Harper's Maga 
 zine, vol. 1 20, p. 170. 
 
 "Frank Moore, Speeches of Andrew Johnson, p. xii. 
 
 * Savage, The Life and Public Service of Andrew Johnson, p. 32. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 23 
 
 every laborer making application for himself and family a home 
 stead of 1 60 acres out of the public domain, on condition of occu 
 pation and cultivation within a specified time a project calculated 
 to increase the dignity and resources of labor, the chief asset of 
 the state. You transplant the laborer, he said, "from a position 
 where he is making hardly anything, and consequently buying but 
 little," and "by bringing his labor in contact with the productive 
 soil, you increase his ability to buy a great deal." The treasury is 
 benefited through his demand for imports and the government is 
 strengthened by giving him a stake in its welfare and stability. 5 
 Johnson's ardor for the bill was not diminished by the fact that 
 most of the Southern senators opposed it as a menace to Southern 
 institutions, and when, after several defeats, it was carried through 
 Congress in 1860, only to fall before Buchanan's veto, the presi 
 dent's subserviency to Southern interests was assigned as the 
 motive of his action. 
 
 We come now to Johnson's pronouncements on the status of 
 slavery in the Union, the right of secession, and the right of the 
 Federal government to coerce a recalcitrant state the burning 
 questions of the period immediately preceding the war. 6 
 
 As regards slavery, while Johnson hoped for the eventual 
 disappearance of the institution, as at variance with his favorite 
 principles of democracy and equality of opportunity for all men, 
 he recognized that, in fact, it was so deeply rooted in the life 
 of the nation that, in justice to vested rights lawfully acquired 
 and for the sake of social stability, it ought not to be molested, 
 so long as it, in turn, remained in strict subordination to and 
 in harmony with the government. 7 The government, the best 
 and freest on earth, the one great stronghold of democracy, the 
 hope of the humble and downtrodden of all the world, became 
 the object of his most passionate attachment, its preservation, with 
 
 5 Ibid., p. 53- 
 
 'Moore, Speeches of Andrew Johnson, passim. 
 
 7 In 1842, Johnson introduced in the Tennessee legislature a resolution 
 "that the basis to be observed in laying the state off into congressional 
 districts shall be the voting population, without any regard to the three- 
 fifths of the negro population." Savage, The Life and Public Services of 
 Andrew Johnson, p. 140. 
 
24 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 power and vitality unimpaired, the principal article of his politi 
 cal creed, moulding decisively his opinions on all other questions 
 of state. His every speech and every action as a public man 
 reiterated the slogan of Andrew Jackson, the idol of his boyhood 
 and the inspiration of his whole career : "Our Union ! it must be 
 preserved !" Of its overthrow he could not conceive. 
 
 Bred in the school of states'-rights democracy, Johnson nat 
 urally took the position that the Federal government could not 
 coerce a state. But even more strongly did he maintain that the 
 government was a compact for eternity, and no temporary alli 
 ance, revocable at the will of any party to it. Release from its 
 obligations could come only by consent of all the states, or by the 
 violent, extra-constitutional means of revolution, morally justi 
 fiable only after "a long train of abuses," for which no remedy 
 through constitutional means appeared. Thus denouncing the 
 so-called right of secession, he undermined also his own anti- 
 coercion doctrine by asserting that, while the government cannot 
 coerce a state, it is under a constitutional obligation to guar 
 antee to every state a republican form of government, and, 
 from the standpoint of the Constitution, the state consists of 
 loyal citizens, be they one or many; that, in the enforcement of 
 this guarantee, the government may coerce a disloyal majority 
 ay individuals in revolt against the true citizens of the state. 
 
 It is apparent that Johnson's convictions, as above outlined, 
 would incline him, in the theoretical controversies over slavery 
 between 1853 and 1860, to adopt the popular-sovereignty doc 
 trine of Douglas. This, indeed, was his preference, and Douglas 
 afterwards expressed his regret that Johnson had not come 
 strongly to the support of himself and Crittenden early in 1860, 
 in their struggle against sectionalism and the extremists North 
 and South. 8 His hesitation at this time is probably explained 
 by the fact that the safety of the Union demanded the preservation 
 of the Democratic party as a national organization. The Southern 
 leaders had broken irrevocably with Douglas, and the triumph 
 of himself or his policy in the party was certain to split it along 
 sectional lines. Could it be held together and carry the Novem 
 ber election, civil war would be averted, or, at worst, indefinitely 
 
 8 S. S. Cox, Three Decades of Federal Legislation, p. 71. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 25 
 
 postponed. With this great end so close to his heart, Johnson 
 supported Breckenridge at the Charleston convention and labored 
 for his election. 
 
 The vote of the people on the 6th of November, 1860, destroyed 
 Johnson's hopes. The South declared that the Republican success 
 committed the government to a policy of sectionalism fatal to the 
 vital institutions for the preservation of which they had entered 
 the Union; they were, therefore, released from their compact. 
 The secession of South Carolina was followed by that of the 
 other cotton states. President Lincoln asserted the determination 
 of the government to perform its constitutional functions in the 
 rebellious states, and they prepared to resist invasion of their 
 sovereignty by force. 
 
 In this juncture, Senator Johnson at once elected the only 
 course consistent with the habits and convictions of a lifetime. 
 With him the preservation of the Union overshadowed every 
 other consideration, human or divine. While it seemed to him 
 that this end would be best subserved by the triumph of the 
 Southern Democracy, he gave it his earnest support. Now his 
 beloved Union was crashing down about his ears, and the South 
 ern Democracy had, in his view, assumed the role of destroyer. 
 Without hesitation, and with all the ardor and fury of a desperate 
 champion in a sacred cause, he tore off the colors which had 
 now become to him the badge of treason and struck with all his 
 might for the cause he would gladly have died to save. This 
 explanation of his so-called "change of front" is so obvious and 
 convincing as to obviate the necessity of casting about for subtle 
 reasons for his action. 9 
 
 As late as the I3th of December, 1860, Johnson made a last 
 hopeless effort for peace by introducing in the Senate a proposal 
 for amending the Constitution in such a way as to prevent the 
 permanent monopoly of the Federal executive and judiciary by 
 any section. Beginning with 1864, the president was to be 
 chosen alternately from a slave-holding and a free state ; senators 
 were to be elected by popular vote ; all Federal courts were to be 
 
 'Oliver P. Temple (Notable Men of Tennessee from 1833 to 1875} 
 expresses his opinion that Johnson was actuated chiefly by selfish political 
 motives. 
 
26 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 composed of judges, one-third of whom should be elected every 
 fourth year for a twelve year term, and all vacancies must be 
 filled half from the free and half from the slave states. Slavery 
 was to be permitted south and prohibited north of a fixed line. 
 In his speech supporting these amendments, he said: "I think 
 that this battle ought to be fought not outside but inside of the 
 Union, and upon the battlements of the Constitution itself. . . . 
 Those who have violated the Constitution either in the passage 
 of what are denominated personal-liberty bills, or by their refusal 
 to execute the fugitive-slave law . . . must go out, and not we. 
 If we violate the Constitution by going out ourselves, I do not 
 think we can go before the country with the same force of posi 
 tion that we shall if we stand inside of the Constitution, de 
 manding a compliance with its provisions and its guarantees ; or, 
 if need be, as I think it is, demanding additional securities. We 
 should make that demand inside of the Constitution, and in the 
 manner and mode pointed out by the instrument itself. Then 
 we keep ourselves in the right; we put our adversary in the 
 wrong; and though it may take a little longer, we take the right 
 means to accomplish an end that is right in itself. ... If the 
 states have the right to secede at will and pleasure, for real or 
 imaginary evils or oppressions . . . this government is at an end ; 
 it is not stronger than a rope of sand ; its own weight will crumble 
 it to pieces, and it cannot exist" 10 
 
 Johnson was the only senator from a seceding state to retain 
 his seat after his state withdrew from the Union. This fact alone 
 thrust him at once into national prominence. Moreover, he pos 
 sessed by nature the ideal equipment for a popular champion in 
 such a crisis. His almost fanatical love of the Union and his hor 
 ror of its destroyers, combined witih a life-long hatred of the aris 
 tocratic Southern leaders and of the social and economic system 
 upon which they proposed to build their government to goad him 
 almost to frenzy. Unbridled in speech, indomitable in spirit, relent 
 less in purpose, denouncing his enemies as animated by the basest, 
 most despicable of motives, and threatening them with the direst 
 penalties of treason, he embodied the unrestrained passions of the 
 
 10 Congressional Globe, 36th Congress, 2d session, p. 82 et seq. ; Moore, 
 Speeches of Andrew Johnson, p. 80. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 27 
 
 hour. From the platform in Tennessee and neighboring states 
 and from the floor of the Senate, he heaped maledictions upon 
 the Confederacy and sounded a stirring call to save the Union. 
 He was utterly without fear. The crowd groaned and hissed 
 him as he passed through Lynchburg. At Liberty he drove back 
 at the point of his pistol a mob that attacked his car. He was 
 hanged and shot in effigy at Knoxville, Nashville, and Memphis. 
 
 Two of Johnson's fiery speeches for the Union in the Senate 
 made especially strong impressions upon his contemporaries. One 
 was delivered on the 2d of March, 1861, in the heat of the famous 
 debate on the right of secession, in which he broke lances with 
 Davis, Benjamin, and Lane of Oregon. It enunciates no new 
 doctrines, but is notable for the violence of its language, the 
 bitterness of its personalities, and its extraordinary success in the 
 very purpose for which it was contrived to sway the crowded 
 galleries to demonstrations of approval of the speaker's words. 
 The episode was, says Temple, the most remarkable and the most 
 intensely dramatic that ever occurred in the Senate. Several 
 times, as the orator arraigned the "rebels" and "traitors," the 
 applause became so loud that the president threatened to clear 
 the galleries, and, at the climacteric outburst : "I would have them 
 arrested ; and, if convicted, within the meaning and scope of the 
 Constitution, by the eternal God, I would execute them: Sir, 
 treason must be punished ; its enormity and the extent and depth 
 of the offence must be made known!" 11 the spectators stood 
 upon their seats, swung their hats in the air, and cheered wildly. 
 
 A far more creditable and justly meritorious effort followed the 
 introduction into the Senate by Johnson (July 27) of Crittenden's 
 famous resolution, "that this war is not prosecuted upon our 
 part in any spirit of oppression, nor for the purpose of conquest 
 or subjugation, nor for the purpose of overthrowing or inter 
 fering with the rights or established institutions of these states, 
 but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution 
 and all laws made in pursuance thereof, and to preserve the 
 Union, with all the dignity, equality, and rights of the several 
 
 11 Congressional Globe, 36th Congress, 2d session, p. 1354 ; Moore, 
 Speeches of Andrew Johnson, p. 204; O. P. Temple, Notable Men of 
 Tennessee, p. 397. 
 
28 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 states unimpaired." The resolution, said the senator, truly exr 
 pressed the sentiment of every lover of the Union. "The problem 
 now being solved before the nations of the earth and before the 
 people of the United States is ... whether we can succeed . . . 
 in establishing the great fact that we have a government with 
 sufficient strength to maintain its existence against whatever com 
 bination may be presented in opposition to it. ... Traitors and 
 rebels are standing with arms in their hands, and it is said that 
 we must go forward and compromise with them. They are in 
 the wrong ; they are making war upon the government ; they are 
 trying to upturn and destroy our free institutions. . . . All the 
 compromise I have to make is the compromise of the Constitution 
 of the United States." The secessionists aim to establish an aris 
 tocracy, according to the South Carolina idea, based on property 
 slave property and to devote their government to the interests 
 of slavery. It has been said that the president of the United States 
 is violating the Constitution by his so-called war measures. "Are 
 not violations of the Constitution necessary for its protection and 
 vindication more tolerable than violations of that sacred instru 
 ment aimed at the overthrow and destruction of the government? 
 ... I say it is the paramount duty of this government to protect 
 those states, or the loyal citizens of those states, in the enjoyment 
 of a republican form of government." 
 
 Then, lifted out of himself by the sublimity of the cause for 
 which he was pleading, the speaker rose to heights of oratory that 
 thrilled the hearers to whom he now revealed the essence of 
 nobility in his strange and discordant nature. "I say, let the 
 battle go on it is Freedom's cause until the Stars and Stripes 
 .... shall again be unfurled upon every cross-road and from 
 every house-top throughout the Confederacy, North and South. 
 Let the Union be reinstated ; let the law be enforced ; Jet the 
 Constitution be supreme. . . . There will be an uprising. Do not 
 talk about Republicans now; do not talk about Democrats now; 
 do not talk about Whigs or Americans now; talk about your 
 country and the Constitution and the Union. Save that ; pre 
 serve the integrity of the government; once more place it 
 erect among the nations of the earth; and then, if we want to 
 divide about questions that may arise in our midst, we have a 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 29 
 
 government to divide in. ... Let the energies of the government 
 be redoubled, and let it go on with the war, . . . not a war upon 
 sections, not a war upon peculiar institutions anywhere ; but let the 
 Constitution and the Union be inscribed on our banners, and the 
 supremacy and enforcement of the laws be its watchword. Then 
 it can, it will, go on triumphantly. We must succeed. This gov 
 ernment must not, cannot fail. Though your flag may have trailed 
 in the dust ; though a retrograde movement may have been made ; 
 though the banner of our country may have been sullied, let it still 
 be borne onward; and if, for the prosecution of this war in 
 behalf of the government and the Constitution, it is necessary to 
 cleanse and purify that banner, I say let it be baptized in fire 
 from the sun and bathed in a nation's blood! The nation must 
 be redeemed; it must be triumphant. The Constitution which 
 is based upon principles immutable and upon which rest the 
 rights of man and the hopes and expectations of those who love 
 freedom throughout the civilized world must be maintained." 12 
 
 This speech particularly the emphatic assertion that the war 
 was waged for the Constitution and the Union, and not against 
 any section or institution made a profound impression and helped 
 secure supporters for the Union where friends were then most 
 needed, in the doubtful border states. Only the conviction that 
 high principles, not sectional prejudices, were the issues at stake, 
 could prevail on them to endure the suffering and devastation 
 which the next three years were to bring to them; and to 
 drive this conviction home, no other man in public life was so 
 advantageously posted as Johnson. Alexander H. Stephens fully 
 understood the importance of Johnson's service to the Union cause. 
 "This speech," he writes, "was one of the most notable, as it cer 
 tainly was one of the most effective ever delivered by any man 
 on any occasion. I know of no instance in history when one 
 speech effected such results, immediate and remote, as this one 
 did. The resolution referred to and this speech especially, gave 
 the war a vigor and real life it had not before, and never would 
 
 12 Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 1st session, pp. 288-297; Moore, 
 Speeches of Andrew Johnson, pp. 329 et seq. ; Moore, Rebellion Record, 
 vol. i, p. 415; E. G. Scott, Reconstruction during the Civil War, p. 245; 
 Nicholay and Hay, Life of Lincoln, vol. iv, p. 379. 
 
30 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 have had without them, on the Northern side. . . . This speech, 
 throughout, was characterized by extraordinary fervor and elo 
 quence, and, in my judgment, did more to strengthen and arouse 
 the war passions of the people at the North than everything else 
 combined/' It "had a special power and influence springing from 
 the very source from which it emanated. The author stood soli 
 tary and alone isolated from every public man throughout the 
 Southern states, and from nearly every public man throughout 
 the Northern states attached to the same political party to which 
 he belonged, upon the questions involved." 13 
 
 In December, 1861, Johnson became one of the seven members 
 of the famous Joint Committee of Congress on the Conduct of 
 the War, appointed after the disaster of Ball's Bluff, which served 
 as the legislative whip and spur to the executive and the army. 
 It assumed to speak for the loyal people and made its judgments 
 feared by the most powerful officials. Prejudice and hasty con 
 clusions could often be charged to it, but its zeal won it support 
 in and out of Congress and brought it a prestige of which it was 
 fully conscious and which it exploited to the utmost. 
 
 The qualities of loyalty, fearlessness, aggressiveness, self-reli 
 ance, willingness to accept responsibilities, and resource in carry 
 ing out his plans, together with an intimate knowledge of the 
 political factors, public men, and peculiar conditions in his state, 
 designated Johnson as preeminently the man to take the initiative 
 in reconstructing Tennessee. 1 * True to his reputation, he did not 
 
 13 War between the States, vol. ii, pp. 458-462. 
 
 34 On the other hand, it was contended that the choice of Johnson 
 practically foredoomed the government's experiment in Tennessee to 
 failure. Assistant Secretary of War Thomas A. Scott wrote from 
 Nashville to Stanton (March 4, 1862) : "The public here have long 
 known Mr. Johnson as a decided out and out Union man, and one 
 politically opposed to everything concerning the Southern Confederacy, 
 which, so far as Mr. Johnson is concerned, is all right and proper, but 
 it will prevent him from bringing back into the ranks people who have 
 taken active part against him, and many would fear that he would 
 choose to be somewhat vindictive and thus persecute them knowing well 
 that they in days past did sadly persecute him. His appointment would at 
 onc be used by the rebels as the means of organizing their party against 
 anything he might attempt, and would undoubtedly prevent many men 
 (thro' false pride) from joining the Union cause. Mr. Johnson has, in 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 31 
 
 hesitate to leave the comfort and security of Washington at the 
 president's call and go to a post of danger and difficulty, where, 
 for the next three years, the war clouds lowered around him, but 
 parted at length to reveal him unshaken and triumphant, the leader 
 of his party before the country. 
 
 times past, controlled a large share of the masses of Tennessee, but many 
 of the influential men connected with those classes which he controlled 
 are now numbered among his enemies. . . . Many people here think that 
 neither Mr. Johnson nor any other prominent politician should be placed 
 in charge of affairs in this state, as it would only serve to draw party 
 lines and create fresh troubles which would not arise if some reliable 
 man such as General Campbell was selected for the position. It has 
 been intimated to me that the feeling against Mr. Johnson if he were in 
 power is so bitter that attempts might be made to destroy his life, for 
 the purpose of creating fresh troubles and gratifying revenge against him 
 for his past course in opposition to the Southern Confederacy. . . This 
 being the first state to be organized by the general government, great care 
 should be used: the people of the South, as you know, are very sensi 
 tive upon the subject of state rights and your organization should be put 
 in such shape as to enable the friends of the Union to satisfy the people 
 that the government was using every precaution to provide them with 
 a safe and prudent government, until such time as they the Union 
 people could organize and elect their rules under the constitutions 
 of the several states. Any other course might lead to serious rebellion 
 against the state organizations and drive many men into support of the 
 Southern Confederacy who would otherwise never be found there. This 
 would undoubtedly be the effect if they had cause to believe that the 
 establishing of a military government was placed in hands that would 
 rule them with despotic power." Stanton Papers, March 4, 1862, Library 
 of Congress. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 INAUGURATION OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT 
 
 The task assumed by Governor Johnson was one of extreme 
 difficulty. Had he come as an alien conqueror, or as temporary 
 occupant of territory shortly to be annexed with the acquiescence 
 of its inhabitants, the history of his own country would have 
 furnished a precedent and international law would have supplied 
 the principles on which to base his action. A conqueror holds the 
 country firmly in his grip, his word is its only law, he brings 
 pressure and punishment to bear with unsparing hand. No con 
 sideration binds him 'except how to fasten himself most inevitably, 
 most completely upon his conquest. The military occupier has to 
 deal only with problems of administrative detail, to preserve the 
 status quo until the civil government of the new sovereign assumes 
 its sway. 1 Johnson's problem, on the other hand, involved unique 
 complications, demanding the utmost firmness, tact, dispassionate 
 calmness, and invincible courage. His path had not been blazed 
 for him ; the outcome no man could foresee. 
 
 "You are hereby appointed," reads his commission, "military 
 governor of the state of Tennessee, with authority to exercise 
 and perform, within the limits of that state, all and singular the 
 powers, duties and functions pertaining to the office of military 
 governor (including the power to establish all necessary offices 
 and tribunals and suspend the writ of habeas corpus) during the 
 pleasure of the president, or until the loyal inhabitants of that 
 state shall organize a civil government in conformity with the 
 Constitution of the United States." 2 The accompanying instruc 
 tions add: "It is obvious to you that the great purpose of your 
 appointment is to re-establish the authority of the Federal govern 
 ment in the state of Tennessee, and provide the means of maintain 
 ing peace and security to the loyal inhabitants of that state until 
 
 *W. E. Birkhimer, Military Government and Martial Law, pp. 104-111. 
 *O. R., series i, vol. ix, p. 396; J. P. vol. xvi, 3688; Stanton Papers, 
 March 4, 1862, Library of Congress. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 33 
 
 they shall be able to establish a civil government. Upon your 
 wisdom and energetic action much will depend in accomplishing 
 the result. It is not deemed necessary to give any specific instruc 
 tions, but rather to confide in your sound discretion to adopt such 
 measures as circumstances may demand. Specific instructions will 
 be given when requested. You may rely upon the perfect confi 
 dence and full support of the department in the performance of 
 your duties." 3 The commission as brigadier-general was added, 
 of course, to confer dignity upon the governor in his dealings 
 with the officers of the army and to enable him to perform military 
 functions and command military subordinates. 
 
 This plenary power and plenary discretion were to be applied 
 to subjects of no uniform political status. The people of Ten 
 nessee might, at this time, have been divided into at least three 
 classes, and with each class a different course must be followed. 
 To those whose loyalty to the Union remained unshaken, it was 
 the duty of the governor, as the agent of the Federal executive, 
 to secure the constitutional guaranty of a republican form of gov 
 ernment, to protect them in their persons and property, to restore 
 to them the rights and privileges appertaining to loyal citizenship 
 under the Constitution, and to cooperate with them in devising 
 means to these ends. The active secessionists, on the other hand, 
 were to be disarmed and brought into subjection to the Federal 
 government, Constitution and laws not, however, to be held as 
 subjugated enemies, but with a view to their eventual voluntary 
 acquiescence in the reestablishment of the old order and to their 
 resumption of their duties as citizens. The third class consisted 
 of those who were either honestly neutral or, at least, betrayed 
 their leanings by no overt acts. These must be impressed with 
 the ability and determination of the government to maintain itself 
 against its enemies and finally to reassert its authority, while, at 
 the same time, care must be taken not to excite their hostility or 
 apprehension by unnecessarily harsh or illegal acts, violation of 
 their constitutional prejudices, or threatened interference with 
 rights or institutions to which they were devoted. 
 
 To compass all this without shipwreck required no ordinary 
 mind. There must be added the fact that, within the territory to 
 
 * O. R., series i, vol. ix, p. 396. See also O. R., series iii, vol. ii, p. 106. 
 
34 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 be administered by Governor Johnson, the armies of Halleck and 
 Buell were operating in the face of the enemy. These generals, 
 under the necessity of making everything bend to the success of 
 their military plans, and accustomed by training and precedent to 
 autocratic sway within the field of their commands, were little 
 likely to defer to indeed, were certain to view with impatience 
 and intolerance the projects of a civil officer whose position they 
 regarded as at once an anomaly and an annoyance. A disquieting 
 portent of trouble appeared at the very outset. On the 6th of 
 March, Buell telegraphed from Nashville to General McClellan: 
 "I have been concerned to hear that it is proposed to organize a 
 provincial government for Tennessee. I think it would be inju 
 dicious at this time. It may not be necessary at all." 4 
 
 Not only administrative difficulties confronted the new gov 
 ernor. The constitutional validity of his position was seri 
 ously questioned. Its sponsors rested their case upon the fourth 
 section of the fourth article of the Constitution, which provides 
 that "the United States shall guarantee to every state in this 
 Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each 
 of them against invasion." The Confederacy, they maintained, 
 aimed to subvert the true republican form in favor of a dominant 
 slave-holding aristocracy. The state, in the meaning of the Con 
 stitution, was, they said, its loyal citizens, regardless of their 
 number. They could call upon the government to make good the 
 guaranty, and the government was bound to respond. If they 
 desired to remain in the Union, any who sought to force them 
 out of it were invaders of their rights and privileges. 
 
 Thaddeus Stevens, in a celebrated debate 5 in the Federal House 
 of Representatives, developing his doctrine that the seceded states 
 were, for all practical purposes, out of the Union, declared that, 
 ipso facto, the Constitution could not extend to them; they were 
 enemies to be conquered; the authority of a military governor 
 could be derived from no clause of the Constitution, but existed 
 only by the fiat of the military commander-in-chief. "If the 
 Constitution still operates in those portions of the country, if it 
 is not a question of military power," he queried, "I want to know 
 
 *O. R., series i, vol. x, part ii, p. n. 
 
 a Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 3d session, pp. 239-244, 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 35 
 
 by what authority the president appoints military governors, di 
 rects what kind of men shall be elevated to office in the states, 
 and surrounds the ballot-box with troops." If the authority is 
 the article cited above, "then, if the president happens to think 
 that there is not a republican form of government in Tennessee, 
 although nine out of ten of her people form a constitution, and 
 pass laws under it, he has a right to place a governor there and 
 supersede the government of the people." 
 
 A third view was advanced by Representative Olin of New 
 York, who repudiated Stevens' general thesis that the Constitu 
 tion did not extend to the seceded states, but agreed that the 
 appointment of military governors was justified not by the guar 
 anty clause, but by military necessity. "It is the exercise of 
 authority by the commanding general. . . . He had undoubtedly 
 a right, where military and where judicial authority was to be 
 exercised, to delegate a judge, or to delegate a major-general 
 for the exercise of that power. ... Of that necessity the presi 
 dent is alone the judge, as the commander-in-chief of the army." 
 
 This would seem to be the sound view. Stevens' objection to 
 a sweeping interpretation of the guaranty clause is cogent. As 
 he points out, the opinion of the president as to the existence of 
 a republican form of government in a state is, by that construc 
 tion, made decisive in every case and under all circumstances, 
 even in time of peace and with an all but unanimous conviction 
 of its citizens to the contrary. But, under his paramount obliga 
 tion to maintain the Union, the president may, in case of un 
 doubted rebellion and attempted dissolution of the Federal bond, 
 and by virtue of his military power as commander-in-chief of 
 the army, and for the purpose of protecting the loyal citizens 
 and the Union interests in a state and restoring them to their 
 rights under the Constitution not for the purpose of regulating 
 a peaceable state government in accordance with his questionable 
 conceptions of republicanism utilize any machinery, not con 
 trary to the usages of war, to accomplish his end. 
 
 This explanation, too, is perhaps the only one that will serve 
 to answer the strictures of Jefferson Davis upon the military 
 government in Tennessee. The government of the United States, 
 he says, "with a powerful military force, planted itself at Nash- 
 
36 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 ville, the state capital. It refused to recognize the state govern 
 ment, or any organization under it, as having any existence, or 
 to recognize the people otherwise than as a hostile community. 
 It said to them, in effect: 'I am the sovereign and you are the 
 subjects. If you are stronger than I am, then drive me out of 
 the state; if I am stronger than you are, then I demand an un 
 conditional surrender to my sovereignty.' It is evident that the 
 government of the United States was not there by the consent 
 of those who were to be governed. It had not, therefore, any 
 'just powers' of government within the state of Tennessee. . . . 
 It is further evident that, by this action, the government of the 
 United States denied the fundamental principle of popular liberty 
 that the people are the source of all political power. In this 
 instance, it not only subverted the state government, but carried 
 that subversion to the extent of annihilation. It, therefore, pro 
 ceeded to establish a new order of affairs, founded, not on the 
 principle of sovereignty of the people, which was wholly rejected, 
 but on the assumption of sovereignty in the United States gov 
 ernment. It appointed its military governor to be the head of 
 the new order, and recognized no civil or political existence in 
 any man, except some of its notorious adherents, until, betraying 
 the state, he had taken an oath of allegiance to the sovereignty 
 of the government of the United States." 6 
 
 It is no part of this treatise to debate the eternal question 
 whether the "sovereignty of the people" on which the Constitution 
 rested was the sovereignty of "the people of the United States" 
 as a whole or of the people of the states separately considered. 
 If, however, as is now practically if not morally established, the 
 former is the correct view, the argument of Davis may be para 
 phrased into a statement of the case for the president. Charged 
 with the mandate of the people of the United States to preserve 
 the Union, he was bound to regard any state organization at 
 tempting to overthrow the Union by means at variance with both 
 Federal and state law as having no existence, and all persons in 
 arms against the government as hostile. Armed with the "just 
 powers" derived from the consent of the majority of the sover 
 eign people at the election of 1860, he came into Tennessee, by 
 
 'Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, vol. ii, pp. 455-458. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 37 
 
 his agent, to vindicate by arms the only means adequate to the 
 magnitude of the resistance "the fundamental principle of pop 
 ular liberty" that the people of the nation "are the source of all 
 political power," and to reestablish, as soon as might be, the old 
 order "founded on the principle of the sovereignty of the people." 
 He "recognized no civil or political existence" in any except the 
 adherents of the government, because others had voluntarily re 
 nounced their rights and duties under the government and set 
 about destroying it, and therefore could only be treated as rebels 
 and enemies until, by an "oath of allegiance," they expressed 
 their readiness to subject themselves again to the Constitution 
 and laws. 
 
 ' To Johnson, a return to his own state as the agent of a gov 
 ernment repudiated and hated by a vast majority of the people 
 must have promised difficulties which could have been overborne 
 in his mind only by a lofty spirit of patriotism and the belief that 
 he, better than any other man, could shorten and ameliorate the 
 period of suffering for his former fellow-citizens, or by an al 
 most inhuman desire to revenge himself upon those who had 
 wronged him and to gloat over their misfortunes. There was 
 no lack of those who suggested the latter as the true motive, but, 
 though rancor may have led him to look on the distress of the 
 aristocrats with a certain satisfaction, love of his state and of 
 the Union were deeper elements in his nature and he was incapa 
 ble of prostituting them to any low impulse of revenge. 7 
 
 It was but natural that the fury of Tennessee secessionists 
 should be concentrated upon the "traitor" from their midst who 
 had become the instrument of their subjugation. Plots were 
 formed against his life, guerilla bands hoped to intercept his train 
 and take him South to answer for his "crimes," his mail was 
 filled with warnings and insults. "Go it Andy this is your day, 
 But while you are going so high, you must not for get that evry 
 dog has his day And the day is not far advanse when you will 
 have your Just day, and that day cannot ever come untill 
 you are tared and fethered and burnt. We are preparind a knise 
 
 7 Oration of George W. Jones at the unveiling of the Johnson monu 
 ment at Greenville (pamphlet), p. 13. 
 
38 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 coat of feathers for that orcation, so when we have the chanse 
 We will turn your black skin read, and then andy your black 
 friends will not know you," threatened an anonymous corres 
 pondent. 8 A Confederate soldier wrote to his wife that men in 
 the army had vowed to take the governor's life and would do so 
 if they were allowed to leave their commands. 9 At least one 
 elaborate plan, sanctioned by General Bragg, to kidnap him by 
 an organized force is reported. 10 
 
 A letter from Buell which reached Johnson at Louisville on his 
 way to the capital advised him what to expect. "The mass," 
 the general wrote, "are either inimical or overawed by the tyranny 
 of opinion and power that has prevailed, or are waiting to 
 see how matters turn out. They will acquiesce when they see 
 that there is to be stability. You must not expect to be received 
 with enthusiasm, but rather the reverse, and I would suggest to 
 you to enter without any display." 11 
 
 The governor inaugurated his administration with a proclama 
 tion later published as an "Address to the People" explaining 
 his position and indicating his policy 12 He referred to the happi 
 ness and prosperity of the people of Tennessee while in the 
 Federal bond. "They felt their government only in the con 
 scious enjoyment of the benefits it conferred and the blessings it 
 bestowed." He stated the purpose of the war in the conciliatory 
 words of the Crittenden resolution and asserted the duty of the 
 president to protect and defend the Constitution and laws and 
 to suppress insurrection. The present condition of the state was 
 next reviewed. The state government had disappeared and the 
 state was in ruin and disorder. "The executive has abdicated, 
 the legislature has dissolved, the judiciary is in abeyance. . . . 
 The archives have been desecrated; the public property stolen 
 
 8 J. P., vol. li, 1023. 
 
 9 Ibid., vol. xvii, 3810. 
 
 10 Annals of the Army of Tennessee, vol. i, p. 312. 
 
 11 O. R., series i, vol. x, part ii, p. 612. 
 
 13 J. P., vol. xvi, 3725 a, 3777 et seq. ; Savage, The Life and Public 
 Services of Andrew Johnson, pp. 250-253. This proclamation follows, in 
 general, suggestions submitted to Johnson at his request by R. J. Meigs, 
 a prominent Tennesseean, then clerk of the United States court in the 
 District of Columbia. J. P., vol. xvi, 3764, 3765. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 39 
 
 and destroyed; the vaults of the state bank violated and its 
 treasuries robbed, including the funds carefully gathered and 
 consecrated for all time to the instruction of our children. In 
 such a lamentable crisis, the government of the United States 
 could not be unmindful of its high constitutional obligation to 
 guarantee to every state in this Union a republican form of gov 
 ernment." This obligation it is now attempting to discharge. 
 "I have been appointed in the absence of the regular and estab 
 lished state authorities, as military governor for the time being, 
 to preserve the public property of the state, to give the protection 
 of law actively enforced to her citizens, and as speedily as may be 
 to restore her government to the same condition as before the 
 existing rebellion." He invited all persons in sympathy with his 
 purpose to cooperate with him in the work. 
 
 Immediately to begin the restoration of order necessitated some 
 irregularities in procedure. "I find most, if not all of the offices, 
 both state and Federal, vacated either by actual abandonment, 
 or by the action of the incumbents in attempting to subordinate 
 their functions to a power in hostility to the fundamental law 
 of the state, and subversive of her national allegiance. These 
 offices must be filled temporarily, until the state shall be restored 
 so far to its accustomed quiet, that the people can peaceably 
 assemble at the ballot-box and select agents of their own choice. 
 Otherwise anarchy would prevail, and no man's life or property 
 would be safe from the desperate and unprincipled. ... 
 
 "To the people themselves the protection of the government 
 is extended. All their rights will be duly respected and their 
 wrongs redressed when made known. Those who through the 
 dark and weary nights of the rebellion have retained their alle 
 giance to the Federal government will be honored. The erring 
 and misguided will be welcomed on their return. And while it 
 may become necessary in vindicating the violated majesty of the 
 law and reasserting its imperial sway to punish intelligent and 
 conscious treason in high places, no merely retaliatory or vin 
 dictive policy will be adopted. To those especially who in private, 
 unofficial capacity have assumed an attitude of hostility to the 
 government, a full and complete amnesty for all past acts and 
 declarations is offered, upon the one condition of their again 
 
40 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 yielding themselves peaceful citizens to the just supremacy of 
 the laws. This I advise them to do for their own good, and 
 for the peace and welfare of our beloved state." 
 
 This proclamation is striking in its conciliatory tone. The sole 
 purpose of the military government is to aid in the prompt re 
 storation of the state to its former place in the Union. 13 If the 
 people, though hitherto disloyal, will now consent to further that 
 purpose, no unnecessary obstacles will be placed in their way. 
 By implication, also, none of their institutions will be interfered 
 with ; the Federal government will neither dictate terms nor im 
 pose humiliating requirements of probation or atonement. The sole 
 condition prescribed is submission to the Constitution and laws 
 of the United States. A complete amnesty is especially offered 
 to all private citizens who renounce their disloyalty and return 
 to their allegiance. 
 
 The spirit of the proclamation was in harmony not only with 
 the well-known humane views of the president, but also with 
 those of many prominent Union men in Tennessee, whose ob 
 servations had convinced them that the great mass of the people 
 were either indifferent to the issues of the war and acquiesced 
 in the proceedings of the active and dominant secessionists only 
 to save themselves and their property from molestation, or were 
 ignorant and led astray by misrepresentation of the purpose of 
 
 13 "It (the proclamation) shows that at the time of his appointment as 
 governor the restoration of the ancient government was still the object 
 of President Lincoln's exertion, and that Johnson's military character 
 was the use of the military power merely as an instrument to attain this 
 end. That his appointment was made with the consent of the Senate 
 first being had, proves conclusively that President Lincoln, as late as the 
 spring of 1862, had not reached the point of appropriating to his sole 
 use the powers involved in the work of reconstruction. Indeed, the 
 natural inference is that no 'Presidential Plan' of reconstruction was yet 
 present in the mind of the President, that 'restoration' of the old state 
 governments was still the primary object of Federal endeavor, and that 
 the part of the executive branch of the government was merely to perform 
 such duties as would enable the restored sections to send senators and 
 representatives to Washington, where the rest of restoration would be 
 effected or denied by Congress, according to its decision upon the ad 
 mission or rejection of these members to their respective houses." Eben 
 Greenough Scott, Reconstruction during the Civil War, p. 319. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 41 
 
 the Federal government; that these would willingly submit to 
 a Union that proved itself able to restore order and protect its 
 citizens and animated by no lawless designs on their institutions, 
 persons, or property. 14 This was General Buell's opinion and 
 controlled his policy while he retained command. Colonel Marc 
 Mundy, whose military administration at Pulaski and elsewhere 
 was highly successful, drew similar conclusions from his experi 
 ence. "In my intercourse with the people," he testifies, "I found 
 the masses had been largely duped by the leaders in being led 
 to believe that our purpose in coming into Tennessee was to 
 take away all their civil rights and destroy their domestic re 
 lations. . . . While they were generally rebels, they had been 
 made so by falsehood. The policy I pursued made a practical 
 contradiction to what had been taught them by their leaders, 
 and the result in a short time was that they gained confidence 
 in my course of procedure, and they themselves proposed that 
 we should have what they called a county meeting, in order 
 that all the people might hear my, policy from my own lips. . . . 
 A great many of the younger portion of the community in private 
 conversation with me explained how they had been led away by 
 the rebels assuring them that we were not only come there to 
 take away their property, but to ravish their wives and daughters 
 and do everything else that could be suggested that was bad. . . . 
 I found the masses of the people of Tennessee were exceed 
 ingly ignorant, and depended entirely for their information upon 
 their public speakers, the stump speakers, as they are called, 
 which accounts for their gullibility by their leaders. . . . They 
 expressed a great anxiety to return to their loyalty, . . . but 
 expressed fears that some leading men in the community who 
 were bitter secessionists would mark them and have them pun 
 ished by the Southern Confederacy. . . . We cannot expect any 
 demonstrations of loyalty from the people there unless we can 
 assure- them of protection against the rebel armies and guerillas. 
 ... If they were to incautiously develop the Union sentiment, 
 and they had no protection from our forces and our government, 
 it would be to seal their doom !" 15 
 
 14 J. P., vol. xx, 4615 et passim. 
 
 18 O. R, series i, vol. xvi, part i, p. 633. 
 
42 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 For the actual execution of Governor Johnson's restoration 
 measures, the United States army furnished the motive power. 
 His instructions from the war department advised him that the 
 military commanders operating in Tennessee were directed to 
 aid him in the performance of his duty and to detail an adequate 
 force for the special purpose of a "governor's guard," to act 
 under his orders. 16 In response to his request for more detailed 
 information on this point, Secretary Stanton communicated to 
 him the substance of an order to General Halleck to provide the 
 necessary force, adding: "Important results are hoped from 
 the measure, and it is important that the officer in command 
 should be a discreet person, who would act efficiently and har 
 moniously with Governor Johnson." 17 Johnson also addressed 
 a similar inquiry to Buell, who replied that the officers exercis 
 ing separate commands under him in Tennessee would be ordered 
 to honor within their respective limits any requisition made on 
 them by the military governor to enforce his authority as such, 
 and that, for Nashville, his orders sent directly to the provost- 
 marshal would be executed by him without further reference. 
 "Any requisitions which would involve the movement of troops," 
 the general concludes, "must of course be dependent on the plan 
 of military operations against the enemy. 18 
 
 The governor's first concern was to select his lieutenants. 
 Edward H. East was appointed secretary of state, Joseph S. 
 Fowler, comptroller, Horace Maynard, attorney-general, and 
 Edmund Cooper, private secretary and confidential agent. 19 
 
 Since the influence of the secession leaders and the fear inspired 
 by them were, in Johnson's opinion, the chief hindrance of the de 
 velopment of outspoken Unionism among the people, he proceeded 
 directly to deal with such of them as remained within his reach. 
 His purpose was to have no one in authority or eminent position 
 who was not an avowed friend of the Union. The oath of 
 allegiance was accordingly tendered (March 25) to the mayor, 
 Richard B. Cheatham, and the city council of Nashville. They 
 
 w lbid., vol. ix, p. 396. 
 
 17 Ibid., vol. x, part ii, pp. 56-58. 
 
 18 Ibid., p. 47; J. P., vol. xvii, 3814. 
 14 Nashville Union, April 27, 1862. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 43 
 
 refused it on the ground that the oath required by the state 
 constitution applied only to state and county, not to corporation 
 officers. The governor promptly declared their offices vacant 
 and filled them himself by appointment, pending an election. The 
 new city council imposed the oath on all municipal officers, in 
 cluding the board of education and the school-teachers. On the 
 29th, ex-Mayor Cheatham was arrested for disloyalty and utter 
 ing treasonable and seditious language against the government 
 of the United States, giving counsel, aid and comfort to its 
 enemies, proposing to invite Jefferson Davis to make Nashville 
 his official residence, and other offenses, and was imprisoned 
 in the penitentiary. Other prominent secessionists were similarly 
 served, the arrests being made by the provost-marshal on the 
 warrant of the governor. Among the victims were ex-Governor 
 Neil S. Brown, Judge Guild of the chancery court, and the 
 president and cashier of the Union Bank of Nashville. 20 Warrants 
 were also sent to the military commanders of various posts in 
 the state, the use of them being sometimes left to their dis 
 cretion. Colonel Mundy reported that, for Lebanon and 
 vicinity, he favored leaving as many cases as possible until 
 the civil courts^ were restored, to allay any apprehension of 
 undue exercise of the military power. 21 
 
 Then came the turn of the press. Military supervision was 
 extended over it. The Daily Times and the Banner were sup 
 pressed in April and the editor of the latter imprisoned. The 
 same month, S. C. Mercer, a vehement Kentucky Unionist, 
 started an administration paper, the Daily Union, which received 
 the support of the government patronage. The plants of the 
 Gazette and Patriot and the Methodist and Baptist publishing 
 houses were also seized and closed for propagating disloyalty. 22 
 
 Johnson next laid his hand upon the clergy. On the I7th 
 of June, six ministers, who were accused of preaching treason 
 from their pulpits, were summoned before him and requested 
 to take the oath. After consideration, time for which was 
 allowed them at their request, all refused. Five of them were 
 
 "J. P., vol. xvii, 3848 et passim; Annual Cyclopedia, 1862, pp. 597, 764. 
 
 *J. P., vol. xviii, 4091-4094. 
 
 * Annual Cyclopedia, 1862, p. 766. 
 
44 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 promptly thrust into prison, the governor ordering that no 
 visitors be admitted to comfort or lionize them and that no special 
 favors be granted them. Shortly afterwards, they were sent 
 south, beyond the Federal lines. The sixth, who was in feeble 
 health, was paroled- 23 "These assumed ministers of Christ," 
 Jo'hnsori wrote, "have done more to poison and corrupt the 
 female mind of this community than all others, in fact changing 
 their entire character from that of women and ladies to fanatics 
 and fiends. One of these very ministers, in leaving here for 
 Louisville, told those who were collected to see him off: 'Don't 
 forget your God, Jeff Davis, and the Southern Confederacy.' 
 This is a specimen of the 'blameless course' pursued by these 
 traitors and hypocrites, who, in the language of Pollock, are 
 'wearing the livery of heaven to serve the devil in.' " 2 * In October, 
 several of the ministers were admitted to parole. 
 
 The restoration of the civil law was among the most important 
 of the military governor's duties, and he took immediate steps 
 to this end, although but the slightest progress was possible in 
 1862. In the spring of that year, the Federal lines extended 
 scarcely further south than the Cumberland river, from Nash 
 ville to Clarksville, and even this territory they held by pre 
 carious tenure. Nashville and the district to the north of it 
 were comparatively quiet, but soon again to be thrown into 
 disorder by Bragg's dash into Kentucky. The capture of 
 Memphis by the river fleet on the 7th of June and the presence 
 of a powerful Federal garrison there extended the Union con 
 trol down the Mississippi to that city, but the surrounding 
 county was the scene of turbulence and guerilla raids and de 
 veloped no considerable loyalty until the end of the war. The 
 Confederates retained their hold upon East Tennessee until 
 September, 1863, and, even after that, the Union occupation 
 afforded little security beyond the vicinity of the post garrisons. 
 Southern Middle Tennessee was the battlefield of the great 
 armies of the west in every year of the war, and Nashville 
 itself was in a state of siege during the entire summer of 1862, 
 and threatened by Hood as late as the winter of 1864. Under 
 
 23 Nashville Union, July 5; New York Tribune, July 4. 
 "*J. P., vol. xxiv, 5281; vol. xxvi, 5705, et passim. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 45 
 
 such conditions, there was slight encouragement to attempt any 
 thing in the way of judicial reorganization. 
 
 In early April, 1862, the county and circuit courts opened for 
 business at various points in Middle Tennessee under the pro 
 tection of the army. To avoid all unnecessary annoyance and 
 delay and to win for them all the popular support possible, 
 Johnson did not require the officers to take the oath of allegiance. 25 
 On the 1 3th of May, the United States circuit court sat at Nash 
 ville. Judge Catron, in his charge to the grand jury, admonished 
 them to ferret out and indict all persons guilty of aiding and 
 abetting the marauders who infested the state. 26 
 
 Besides the constant menace of the enemy, the civil courts 
 were subjected to the discomfort of being crowded cheek by 
 jowl with the military tribunals under direct control of the 
 generals of the army. Two rival systems of law attempted to 
 operate side by side and under the most trying conditions. Fric 
 tion was inevitable, and increased to an alarming degree until, 
 in March, 1863, the war department felt compelled to take up 
 the matter and prescribe detailed rules for the guidance of 
 General Rosecrans, then commanding the department of the 
 Cumberland, in his relations with the civil authorities, 27 As 
 these instructions may be regarded as expressing the official at 
 titude of the government on the subjects of which they treat, 
 it may be well to anticipate by considering them here. 
 
 To the provisional state government, writes General Halleck, 
 must be left "the trial and adjudication of all civil and criminal 
 cases cognizable under the laws of the state, and to the courts 
 of the United States, reestablished there, must be left all cases 
 which belong to their jurisdiction, under the laws of the United 
 States. But military offenses, that is, offenses under the Rules 
 and Articles of War and under the 'common law and usages of 
 war,' are not, as a general rule, cognizable by the civil courts, 
 but must be tried and punished by military tribunals. It is 
 not always easy to accurately define the dividing line between 
 these two classes of jurisdictions the civil and military for 
 
 "Ibid., vol. xvii, 3905, 3906. 
 
 * Annual Cyclopaedia, 1862, p. 765. 
 
 37 O. R., series iii, vol. iii p. 77. 
 
46 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 in a country militarily occupied, or in which war is actually 
 waged, this line may vafy according to the peculiar circumstances 
 of the case. Thus, robbery, theft, arson, murder, etc, are or 
 dinarily offenses cognizable by military tribunals. It is a well- 
 established principle that a non-combatant inhabitant of a country 
 militarily occupied, who robs military stores and munitions, burns 
 store-houses, bridges, etc., used for military purposes, or, as 
 military insurgent, bears arms and takes life, may be tried and 
 punished by a military court." Again, where there are no civil 
 courts in operation, the military must take cognizance of all classes 
 of cases. Courts-martial, it is true, are restricted to cases aris 
 ing under the Rules and Articles of War, but military commis 
 sions "courts of general military jurisdiction under the common 
 law of war" may be created to deal with other offenses. 
 
 This letter, the most explicit the government could give its 
 agents, has been considered at length for the purpose of suggest 
 ing how much remained, after everything possible had been said, 
 to perplex a conscientious official. As the writer says, the 
 line between the two jurisdictions might vary according to 
 circumstances, and in Tennessee new circumstances were de 
 veloped almost daily. The military commanders were determined 
 to maintain the prestige of their authority and, should a case 
 arise cognizable apparently under either civil or martial law, 
 though the moral and political advantage of exalting the civil 
 jurisdiction might be apparent, the general would be loth to let 
 the offender out of his clutches. Halleck's letter did not unravel 
 the legal snarl at Nashville. Elsewhere, until 1864, there were 
 few courts and these intermittent and of little value to citizens. 
 In Memphis, from the spring of 1863, the civil and criminal 
 law was administered by commissions of citizens, created by 
 the commanding general. 
 
 At Shiloh, on the 7th of April, 1862, Grant drove Beauregard's 
 army across the Tennessee river, and the entire state, except 
 East Tennessee, was freed from any considerable Confederate 
 force. This victory gave a tremendous impetus to Union senti 
 ment and severely shook the faith of the secessionists. By the 
 ist of May, the disorder caused by the advance of the Federal 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 47' 
 
 army and the panic in Nashville had largely subsided. The 
 circuit, chancery, and magistrates' courts were in daily session at 
 the capital. Business had been brought to a standstill by the 
 military operations, the closing of regular channels of trade, the 
 carrying off of the bank funds, the depreciation of the Tennessee 
 bank bills, and the collapse of public confidence; but here also 
 conditions were improving. Northern cotton-buyers and specu 
 lators followed the army and United States money soon became 
 plentiful. Cotton rose from sixteen and seventeen cents in specie 
 or United States treasury notes in April to from nineteen to 
 twenty-one cents before the middle of May, and, as the price 
 of necessaries was high and the cotton-growers needed money, 
 their reluctance to sell was soon overcome. The shipment of 
 cotton from Tennessee from the opening of trade on the nth 
 of March until the loth of May was roughly estimated at over 
 3,600 bales; 700 bales during the first ten days of May. The 
 Nashville Union figured that the season's shipment would reach 
 18,000 bales, and that the figures would have been larger but 
 for the burning of several thousand bales by Confederate troops 
 and marauding parties with the design of breaking up the trade. 
 The trains on the Louisville-Nashville railroad made daily trips. 
 The houses and stores deserted in the panic-stricken evacuation of 
 February rapidly filled ; real estate commanded good prices ; state 
 currency and bank notes began to appreciate in value. In a 
 word, the uninterrupted success of the Federal arms and the 
 probability that the expulsion of the Confederates was final con 
 tributed to secure acquiescence in an accomplished fact and a 
 return to normal conditions. 28 
 
 Politically, the prevalence of this feeling was evinced by a 
 series of mass meetings arranged by Union sympathizers through 
 out Middle Tennessee, with the support of the government. The 
 most important of these 29 assembled at Nashville on the I2th of 
 May, pursuant to a call issued by prominent Union men of the 
 city to their fellow-citizens of the state who favored "the restora 
 tion of the former relations of this state to the Federal Union.", 
 Ex-Governor William B. Campbell, the chairman of the meet- 
 
 * Nashville Union, May i, May 10, 1862. 
 
 "Ibid., May 13; Moore, Rebellion Record, vol. v, doc. 335. 
 
48 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 ing, made an earnest, conciliatory speech, appealing to all to re 
 turn to their old allegiance. "We wish," he said, "to welcome 
 back all our deluded fellow-citizens cordially. The government 
 intends no sweeping confiscation, nor wild turning loose of 
 slaves against the revolted states. It designs no infringement 
 on the rights of property. . . . We bear no malice toward any 
 one, but deep sympathy for the deluded. ... The Federal gov 
 ernment will pursue a kind, liberal, and benevolent policy to 
 ward the people of the South, to bring them to the Union." 
 The meeting authorized t!he chairman to appoint a "state central 
 Union committee" to communicate with the friends of the Union 
 in various parts of the state, and a committee to consider the 
 condition of Tennessee prisoners and arrange terms for their 
 release and return to their allegiance; resolved that "the social, 
 political, and material interests of the people of Tennessee and 
 the safety and welfare of our friends and relatives now in the 
 Confederate army imperiously demand the restoration of the state 
 to her former relations with the Federal Union" ; and approved 
 Governor Johnson's proclamation of the i8th of March and his 
 subsequent policy. Johnson himself addressed the meeting. There 
 can be no doubt that it was inspired by him and that Campbell's 
 speech was a statement of his official policy at that time. Other 
 meetings revealed the same guiding spirit and indorsed the 
 Nashville resolutions. 
 
 These popular expressions of generous and active loyalty were, 
 in part, spontaneous, but in part, also, they may have been art 
 fully contrived to set the stage for the first act of the govern 
 or's reconstruction drama. As a test of public opinion, an 
 election was held on the 22d of May for judge of the state 
 circuit court in the district containing Nashville. The experi 
 ment ended disastrously in the election of the anti-administration 
 candidate, Turner S. Foster, a man with a record of open dis 
 loyalty, by a majority of nearly 200 votes, though the Union 
 vote of 1,000 compared favorably with the 300 recorded against 
 separation in 1861. The postlude was farcical. The governor, 
 assuming to comply with the forms of law, gave Foster his com 
 mission, and the same day had him arrested and imprisoned 
 as disloyal and delegated his defeated opponent to perform the 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 49 
 
 duties of the office. 30 The administration had miscalculated the 
 temper of the people and had sustained a decided check, and 
 all reconstruction measures were, for the time, abandoned. This 
 was the more necessary as the attention of the governor was 
 now fully occupied with military matters. His labors during 
 these first three months had resulted only in restoring order 
 and intimidating disloyalists in Nashville by force. 
 
 30 Nashville Union, September 20, 1863. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 THE DEFENSE OF NASHVILLE 
 
 The concentration of the Union and Confederate armies on 
 the Tennessee river for the great battle at Shiloh early in 
 April stripped Middle Tennessee of any considerable bodies of 
 troops. Only small garrisons remained to hold the principal 
 towns for the Union. 
 
 No sooner had General Buell's army moved westward to join 
 Grant, than a new phase of warfare, of the utmost importance 
 in the military history of the state, developed. Detached bodies 
 of horsemen, splendidly mounted, suddenly infested the country, 
 spreading terror and ruin everywhere, burning houses, barns 
 and cotton, appropriating stores, cutting off supplies, tearing 
 up railroad tracks, destroying telegraph wires, conscripting men 
 and horses, and visiting summary punishment upon Union 
 adherents. The success of their operations and the enforcement 
 by them of the conscription law brought them plenty of recruits, 
 and, as the possibilities of this kind of warfare for holding the 
 border states for the Confederacy became apparent, the various 
 bands, at first acting independently, were combined and directed 
 harmoniously under brilliant, capable leaders like Forrest and 
 Morgan. So utilized, they became in the highest degree formi 
 dable. They descended suddenly upon Federal garrisons, cap 
 tured them, and dashed away before the pursuit could be 
 organized. The Union cavalry was fully occupied in covering 
 the army and protectmg the supply trains in a hostile country, 
 and could not be spared for operations of this sort, and the 
 active Confederates eluded with ridiculous ease the slow-moving 
 infantry sent after them. Whole regiments were cut off and 
 captured and immense quantities of property destroyed- 
 
 Much warmth of denunciation and defense has been expended 
 on the "guerillas" and their leaders. Without attempting to 
 treat the subject here, it may be said that they constituted the 
 most effective weapon the South could possibly have contrived 
 for use in the border states, and a legitimate one, so long as 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 51 
 
 they operated in accordance with the laws of war. The Federal 
 government was forced, in opposition to its original theory, 
 to treat the Confederate armies as belligerents, and, upon the 
 same necessity, a regularly organized force like that of Forrest, 
 though acting independently, would seem entitled to similar 
 recognition; for both Forrest and Morgan held commissions 
 from the Confederate war department and, generally speaking, 
 kept their men well in hand. The worst outrages and there 
 appear to have been many may be charged to the small ir 
 regular bands of undisciplined freebooters, of intermittent exist 
 ence, that assembled to rob and maltreat peaceable citizens and 
 destroy property from motives of revenge, and dissolved at 
 the approach of danger. For these, the real guerillas, in the strict 
 sense of the term, little excuse can be offered. Whatever their 
 merits and crimes, the "guerillas" were by far the greatest 
 obstacle to Johnson's success in Tennessee. 1 
 
 Buell's departure left only a few scattered Union regiments 
 in Middle Tennessee. The garrison at Nashville was small. 
 Only the strategic points could be held; everywhere else the 
 "guerillas" ran riot. The capital was exposed to attack from 
 the south and east, and Johnson felt grave apprehension for its 
 safety. He telegraphed Stanton that it had been left almost 
 defenseless. At least one more complete brigade was needed. 
 The regiments stationed at Camp Chase, Ohio, and Lexington, 
 Kentucky, should be sent to Nashville immediately. This, too, 
 was the opinion of General Dumont, the commander of the 
 garrison. 2 The force of this appeal impressed Stanton. "You 
 can appreciate," he wired Halleck at St. Louis, "the consequence 
 of any disaster at Nashville, and are requested to take im 
 mediate measures to secure it against all danger." 3 Buell, 
 replying to Halleck's inquiries, scouted the idea that the enemy 
 would attack Nashville in great force; but a dash with fifteen 
 thousand men he thought it well to guard against. 4 
 
 1 There are many accounts of the exploits of the Confederate cavalry 
 in Tennessee e.g. Wyeth, Life of Forest; Duke, History of Morgan's 
 Cavalry; Bennett H. Young, Confederate Wizards of the Saddle. See 
 also Annual Cyclopedia, 1862, pp. 767 et seq. 
 
 a O. R., series i, vol. x, part ii, p. 76. 
 
 *Ibid., p. 79; J. P., vol. xvii, 3846. 
 
 *O. R., series i, vol. x, part ii, p. 79. 
 
52 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 The months of April and May, after the battle of Shiloh, 
 were consumed by a slow and cautious advance of Halleck's 
 entire army on Corinth. 5 The capture of that post meant the 
 control of the railroad connecting Memphis and the west with 
 Richmond and Charleston. A division of Buell's army, under 
 General Mitchel, had previously been detached to operate in 
 southern Middle Tennessee, and, instead of accompanying the 
 main force to Shiloh, had moved by way of Murfreesboro and 
 Shelbyville into northern Alabama and struck the Memphis- 
 Charleston railroad at Tuscumbia. The plan was for Buell, 
 after the fall of Corinth, to follow the railroad eastward from 
 that point, join Mitchel at Tuscumbia, and thus clear Middle 
 Tennessee of Confederates. Long before this could be accom 
 plished, however, the Confederate pressure upon Mitchel be 
 came insupportable. He was in an advanced and exposed posi 
 tion, his communications were threatened, and, to enable him 
 to maintain his ground, every available regiment left in 
 Tennessee had to be sent forward to him. One went from 
 Nashville, and Lebanon and Murfreesboro were also stripped. 
 
 This threw Johnson into an agony of alarm. Not only did 
 Nashville seem exposed a prey to any chance attack, but, 
 politically, the withdrawal of the troops reacted disastrously 
 upon the Union movement which had promised so well. It 
 amounted, Johnson wrote to Maynard at Washington, substan 
 tially to surrendering the country to the rebels. "My under 
 standing was that I was sent here to accomplish a certain purpose. 
 If the means are withheld, it is better to desist from any further 
 efforts. . . . The effect of removing the troops is visible in the 
 face of every secessionist." 6 On the same day, he sent vehement 
 dispatches to Stanton and Buell, expressing his fears and begging 
 for soldiers. 7 Buell replied reassuringly that his intention was 
 only to defend Nashville and Middle Tennessee in a more 
 advanced position and that the regiments withdrawn would be 
 replaced by new ones. 8 
 
 5 For Halleck's original plan of campaign, see letter of Assistant Sec 
 retary of War Thomas A. Scott to Stanton, Stanton Papers, February 17, 
 1862. (Library of Congress). 
 
 "O. R., series i, vol x, part ii, pp. 126 180; J. P., vol. xix, 4346. 
 
 7 J. P., vol. xviii, 4110. 
 
 "Ibid., 4112. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 53 
 
 The promise, however, could not be kept. Mitchel was in 
 dire straits at Tuscumbia. A constantly augmenting Confederate 
 force at Chattanooga was preparing to turn his left and strike 
 at Nashville. Nearly half the rations sent him by Halleck had 
 been destroyed to save them from the enemy. On the 24th, 
 he began his retreat, and the relief regiment at Nashville was 
 hurried to his aid. On the 26th, Johnson telegraphed a bitter 
 protest directly to the president, complaining of "petty 
 jealousies and contests between generals wholly incompetent to 
 discharge the duties assigned them/' He insinuated that Buell's 
 military dispositions were unnecessary. 9 His strictures were 
 communicated by Stanton through Halleck to Buell, who became 
 incensed in his turn. "The disposition I have made of troops 
 in Middle Tennessee," he replied to Halleck, "is absolutely 
 necessary for its defense and to support Mitchel. I consider 
 this a matter of far greater moment than the gratification of 
 Governor Johnson, whose views upon the matter are absurd." 10 
 
 On the whole, the facts seem to vindicate the judgment of 
 Halleck and Buell. The failure of his political designs was a 
 bitter disappointment to Johnson and his imperious will chafed 
 at any interference with his plans and closed his eyes to the 
 considerations which animated the generals. That the em 
 barrassments of the government impeded reconstruction is cer 
 tain, but it is unlikely that much could have been accomplished 
 at this time, under even the most favorable circumstances. 
 However that may be, Mitchel's necessities were imperative, 
 and the army in the west was facing the crucial Corinth cam 
 paign, the issue of which was considered dubious. "Troops 
 cannot be detached from here on the eve of a great battle," 
 Halleck apprised Stanton. "We are now at the enemy's throat, 
 and cannot release our great grasp to pare his toe-nails." 11 
 When his two generals agreed as to the course to be pursued, 
 Lincoln was not disposed to interfere. "General Halleck under 
 stands better than we can here, and he must be allowed to 
 control in that quarter," he answered Johnson, at the same 
 
 9 O. R., series i, vol. x, part ii, p. 129; J. P., vol. xviii, 4131. 
 
 10 O. R., series i, vol. x, part ii, p. 129. 
 
 11 Ibid., p. 128. 
 
54 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 time urging him to communicate fully and freely with Halleck. 12 
 That Lincoln and Stanton should have devoted so much atten 
 tion to the views of a civil official and should have troubled 
 the generals to justify their contrary policy is striking evidence 
 of their respect for Johnson's opinion and of the president's 
 longing for the political restoration of the border states. 
 
 The Confederates abandoned Corinth on the 2Qth of May. 
 On the loth of June, Buell began his long delayed advance 
 along the line of the Memphis-Charleston railroad, with 
 Chattanooga, the junction of that line with the roads from 
 Louisville by way of Nashville to Montgomery, Charleston, 
 and Savannah, as his objective point. Halleck's plan probably 
 contemplated driving the Confederates from East Tennessee 
 by the simultaneous movements of Buell northward from 
 Chattanooga and of General George Morgan southward from 
 Cumberland Gap. Johnson had urged this in a letter to Halleck 
 on the 5th of June, and the latter had replied : "East Tennessee 
 will very soon be attended to. We drive off the main body 
 of the enemy before we can attack his other corps. . . . Every 
 thing is working well and in a few weeks I hope there will be 
 no armed rebel in Tennessee. 13 
 
 The plan was thwarted by the prompt action of the Con 
 federate General Bragg, who hastened northward with an army 
 that had been forming in Mississippi, seized Chattanooga before 
 Buell could establish himself there, and developed a strong 
 line of defense extending to Knoxville. Buell faced him at 
 Battle Creek, Huntsville, and McMinnville. 
 
 The advance of the Union army had been impeded at every 
 turn by the enemy's cavalry and, during the remainder of the 
 summer, they distracted the Federal authorities in the state 
 and disheartened all friends of the Union by a constant suc 
 cession of the most daring and successful operations, directed 
 particularly at the lines of communication and railroad depots 
 of the Union army. On the 5th of July, Lebanon was taken; 
 on the 1 3th, Forrest captured Murfreesboro with its entire 
 garrison. John Morgan swept the whole interior of the state 
 
 13 J. P., vol. xviii, 4151; Lincoln's Complete Works, vol. vii, p. 150. 
 13 J. P., vol. xx, 4615, 4622. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 55 
 
 and surrounded Nashville. Toward the end of the month, the 
 communication of the capital with the North by railroad and 
 telegraph was completely cut off. The citizens were almost in a 
 panic. Some of the streets were barricaded on the night of 
 the 2 ist, at the rumor of an immediate attack by Forrest. 
 The fortifying of the city was pushed with the utmost vigor. 
 A thousand slaves of secessionist owners were impressed for 
 the work, and their masters were required to provide them 
 with tools. The arrival of reinforcements temporarily relieved 
 the situation, but, by the middle of August, the Confederate 
 net was again drawn around the city. Supplies could not 
 be secured and the price of necessaries rose to an unprecedented 
 degree/l On the 22d, Morgan swooped down on Gallatin, 
 an important post on the Louisville-Nashville railroad, the 
 capital's channel of communication with the North, captured 
 General R. W. Johnson, in command there, killed or captured 
 more than half his eight hundred soldiers, and tore up the 
 rails. The whole line of the Memphis-Chattanooga railroad 
 in Buell's rear was threatened. In the west, guerillas swarmed 
 along the banks of the Mississippi river and attacked the 
 shipping, firing from the shore with musketry and light field 
 artillery. On the 25th of September, General Sherman, com 
 manding at Memphis, burned the town of Randolph in re 
 taliation for an attack on a steamer at that point, and ordered 
 that, whenever a boat was fired on, ten disloyal families should 
 be expelled from Memphis. 15 
 
 In this crisis of affairs, Governor Johnson's personality 
 loomed large. All his native vigor, courage, and pugnacity 
 were aroused. The fate of his state, he believed, was now in 
 the balance, and every nerve must be strained to save her. 
 Convinced of the proper course to be followed and intolerant 
 of opposition or delay, he speedily involved himself in a suc 
 cession of violent controversies with Halleck, Buell, the post 
 commanders at Nashville, and their subordinates. While Nash 
 ville was not immediately beleaguered, tolerable harmony had 
 been maintained between the civil and military authorities, but 
 
 i4 O. R., series i, vol. x, part ii, p. 147. 
 * Annual Cyclopedia, 1862, p. 767. 
 
56 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 the actual rubbing of elbows in cramped quarters revealed all 
 the defects of divided responsibility. The generals regarded the 
 governor's meddling with ill-concealed anger, in which an ele 
 ment of contempt was mingled, and had no thought of yielding 
 an inch to his imperious will. He, in turn, did not hesitate to 
 assert their incompetence, question their bravery, impugn their 
 motives, and hint at secret collusion with the enemy. 
 
 As early as the I7th of June, Johnson had addressed a com 
 plaining letter to Halleck. 16 He had been assured by the presi 
 dent and secretary of war, he said, that he would be sustained 
 in his efforts to restore Tennessee to its former position in 
 the Union, and had been authorized to call on General Halleck 
 for an adequate force to carry out all measures he might devise 
 to that end. So far, he had not done so, for fear of appearing 
 importunate or unduly disposed to exercise power. Now, how 
 ever, he felt bound to say that the military policy pursued in the 
 state had kept alive a rebellious spirit that might otherwise 
 have been crushed. All efforts to secure a sound reaction of 
 public sentiment had been thwarted by the constant disputes 
 of military officials. Buell's assistant adjutant-general, for ex 
 ample, had assumed more power than Buell himself would 
 pretend to, and the provost-marshal at Nashville was "in direct 
 complicity with the secessionists of this city and a sympathizer 
 with the master-spirits engaged in this rebellion." "The demon- 
 trations which have been made upon lower East Tennessee, 
 causing the people to manifest their Union feelings and senti 
 ments and then to be abandoned, have been crushing, ruinous 
 to thousands. I trust in God that when another advance is 
 made upoq that section of the state, our position may be 
 maintained, at least until arms can be placed in the hands of 
 the people to defend themselves against their relentless 
 oppressors." 
 
 The marauding of the guerillas enraged and alarmed John 
 son, and he besought Stanton for cavalry to disperse them. 
 Stanton had none to spare, but he authorized the governor to 
 raise two regiments and he set about it with vigor. 17 Early in 
 
 "O. R., series i, vol, xvi, part i, p. 36; J. P., vol. xxi, 4753. 
 17 O. R., series i, vol. xvi, part ii, p. 47. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 57 
 
 July, he received word from General Boyle at Louisville that 
 two thousand Confederate cavalry had entered Kentucky to 
 strike the Louisville-Nashville railroad, and that help must come 
 from Tennessee. 18 The safety of Nashville and Middle 
 Tennessee was involved in the maintenance of this line. Johnson 
 bent every energy to reinforce Boyle, but his demands upon 
 Captain Greene, the assistant adjutant-general, met with a re 
 pulse. His anger blazed in a letter to the president, demanding 
 that he be sustained. Greene, he said, had not only refused to 
 cooperate with him, but, despite the dispatches from Louisville, 
 had ordered some troops elsewhere and located others contrary 
 to his wishes. He was probably in connivance with the traders, 
 and Johnson proposed to arrest him and send him out of the 
 reach of bad influences. 19 The never-failing tact and considera 
 tion with which Lincoln treated his subordinates in delicate 
 situations graces his reply. "Do you not, my good friend, per 
 ceive that what you ask is simply to put you in command in 
 the West? I do not suppose you desire this. You only wish to 
 control in your own localities ; but this you must know may 
 derange all other posts." 29 He urged upon both Johnson and 
 Halleck a free exchange of views. "The governor is a true 
 and valuable man indispensable to us in Tennessee," he wrote 
 to Halleck. 21 
 
 The fall of Murfreesboro on the I3th of July brought the 
 danger to the doors of Nashville. An attack was expected at 
 any hour. If one is. made, Johnson wired Halleck, "we will 
 give them as warm a reception as we know how, and, if forced to 
 yield, will leave them a site.' 22 The garrison was considerably 
 depleted and rations were low. On the 2ist, Forrest penetrated 
 to within six miles of the city. General Nelson, in charge of 
 the defense, had no cavalry and could only remain behind his 
 fortifications while the enemy overran the surrounding country. 
 With cavalry, he reported to Buell on the 29th, he could have 
 
 18 Ibid., p. 118. 
 
 19 Ibid. 
 
 20 Ibid., p. 122. 
 
 21 Ibid. 
 
 a Ibid. p. 142. 
 
58 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 attacked and destroyed Morgan and Forrest separately at any 
 time within the past five days, but their junction would give 
 them a picked army of four thousand. The disorder and con 
 flict of authority had produced chaos. "You ordered me to 
 assume the command. I desire to know of whom, of what, 
 for nobody obeys. The result will be the utter destruction of our 
 commands/' 28 Brownlow wrote from Philadelphia: "The in 
 dications are that the rebels will have Tennessee and Kentucky. 
 I told a crowd of gentlemen here that, if I were Governor John 
 son, I would resign on the ground of not being backed up 
 by the government. The administration seems to look only to 
 Richmond, and neglects every other point. I am out of patience, 
 and feel like breaking out upon the government." 24 The feeling 
 was general that Buell had lost his grip on the situation. He 
 seemed bewildered by the overthrow of his original plans 
 and the activity of the enemy. The slowness of his 
 movements and the inefficiency of his dispositions to check 
 Morgan and Forrest were cited against him at Washington, 
 and Halleck was asked (August) to suggest some one to suc 
 ceed him. 25 Johnson himself denounced Buell as incompetent 
 and urged that General George H. Thomas be appointed in his 
 place to undertake the redemption of East Tennessee. 26 Thomas, 
 however, begged that his name be not considered, and assigned 
 reasons for his reluctance to assume the command which, 
 whether intentionally or not, contained a covert reproof for the 
 governor. "We have never yet had a commander of any ex 
 pedition," he wrote to Johnson, "who has been allowed to work 
 out his own policy, and it is utterly impossible for the most 
 able general in the world to conduct a campaign with success, 
 when his hands are tied, as it were, by the constant apprehension 
 that his plans may be interfered with at any moment either 
 by higher authority directly or through the influence of others 
 who may have other plans and other motives of policy." 27 
 
 39 Ibid., p. 226. 
 
 34 J. P., vol. xxii, 5048. 
 
 36 O. R , series i, vol. xvi, part ii, p. 314. 
 
 36 J. P., vol. xxiv, 5448. 
 
 27 Ibid. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 59 
 
 Major W. H. Sidell, who succeeded Greene as assistant 
 adjutant-general at "Nashville, gives the substance of a con 
 versation with Johnson at about this time, which is the best 
 of evidence of the governor's keenness of insight in accurately 
 gauging the political and military situation. 28 He expressed 
 himself as convinced that the Confederates would soon make an 
 attempt to regain Tennessee and that, in their project, the pos 
 session of the capital was a necessary incident. Their success 
 would injure the Union cause both materially and morally. They 
 could count on the support not only of avowed adherents, but 
 also of many secret sympathizers in the state, particularly if such 
 support entailed no very considerable risks; but the probability 
 of sacrifices would deter most of these lukewarm friends. The 
 best policy for the government, then, was to convince them that 
 there was to be no easy Confederate triumph. This could be 
 done .by manifesting a determination to resist to the last extrem 
 ity. During the last siege of Nashville, a secret committee of 
 citizens had sent an appeal to their friends in the attacking army 
 to abandon the assault, as the defenders had resolved to destroy 
 the city rather than surrender. Therefore, the governor urged, let 
 the fortifications be completed and extended by contraband labor, 
 and the enemy would shrink before the magnitude of the task 
 confronting them. 
 
 Finally, on the 2ist of August, Bragg sprang the surprise he 
 had been preparing for Buell. Issuing suddenly from Chatta 
 nooga, he marched around the left flank of his adversary into 
 Kentucky, and, amusing Buell with a powerful demonstration in 
 the direction of McMinnville to deceive the latter into thinking 
 that his objective was Nashville, he struck the Louisville-Nash 
 ville railroad, Buell's line of communication and supply, at Mun- 
 fordsville, the principal station between those two cities, and 
 captured it with its entire defending force of about forty-five 
 hundred men (September 14) , 29 At the same time, General 
 
 28 Ibid., vol. xxv, 5475 ; O. R., series i, vol. xvi, part ii, p. 242. 
 
 ""Thus sacrificing precious time which should have been devoted to 
 more important ends." Nathaniel S. Shaler, The Kentucky Campaign of 
 1862, in Campaigns in Kentucky and Tennessee, 1862-1864. Papers of the 
 Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, vol. vii, p. 212. "General 
 
60 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 Kirby Smith, from Knoxville, flanked General G. H. Morgan 
 by a similar manoeuvre and marched westward to join Bragg for 
 a joint attack on Louisville. 30 At first Buell was perplexed as 
 to the purpose of the enemy. He moved his army in an arc, 
 attempting to cover Nashville and the railroad. Convinced, at 
 last, that Bragg's destination was Louisville, he followed hotly 
 in pursuit along the line of the railroad, and when Bragg, ap 
 parently wishing to avoid a battle until his junction with Smith, 
 turned off eastward, threw himself into the city. 31 
 
 The apparent failure of Buell's strategy and the consequent 
 retrograde movement of his army from Huntsville to Louisville 
 precipitated the long impending rupture between him and Johnson. 
 On the 3Oth of August, he had sent the governor a dispatch, 
 explaining and defending his course. His army, he said, was 
 reduced by detailing garrisons and forces to protect his communi 
 cations and by other causes to twenty or thirty thousand men. 
 Bragg had from forty to sixty thousand. By falling back along 
 his line of communications, the conditions would be exactly re 
 versed: he would pick up additional troops, which, with rein 
 forcements coming from Corinth, would swell his force to fifty 
 thousand, while Bragg must constantly lose strength as he 
 
 Buell's command was in Southern Tennessee, and he had to apprehend 
 that it might move to the northeast into Central Kentucky. By moving 
 towards Nashville he probably thought to secure a chance to beat Buell's 
 force in detail before that general had concentrated his army. Moreover, 
 by moving in that direction, he could the more quickly obtain possession 
 of the Louisville-Nashville railway which was Buell's most valuable 
 line of communication with the north. He appears to have had some 
 hopes of capturing Nashville, a success which would have enabled him 
 at once to replace the Confederate government of Tennessee in its capital 
 and to secure a strongly fortified post which would serve to protect his 
 rear during his efforts in Kentucky." Ibid., p. 211. 
 
 M Kirby Smith designed, perhaps, to guard the main column of Bragg's 
 army. Ibid. 
 
 81 "He conceived his errand in Kentucky to be partly of a political nature 
 ... to place the long wandering Confederate government of the state in 
 office at Frankfort. He expected also a support from the people of the 
 commonwealth and waited for them to flock to his standard." Ibid., p. 214. 
 Colonel Henry Stone, in an article on The Operations of Buell in 
 Kentucky and Tennessee, 1862-1864, in the same publication, 'also holds 
 this view. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 6f 
 
 ventured further from his base. 32 Johnson's reply made little 
 effort to conceal the contempt he felt for Buell and his defensive 
 policy. Bragg's force could not exceed twenty-five thousand men, 
 he declared. Fifty thousand could not subsist in the country 
 through which the Confederates were moving. His own opinion 
 was that Bragg had not half of twenty-five thousand. He would 
 not attack Nashville unless Buell retreated. 33 
 
 The next day, overwrought by disappointment, the governor 
 sent a long, bitter, almost despairing letter to Lincoln. 34 "On 
 two occasions," he said, "I have stated to the president that 
 General Buell would never enter and redeem the eastern portion 
 of this state. I do not believe he ever intended to, notwithstand 
 ing his fair promises to the president and others that he would. 
 ... In my opinion," he "could meet Bragg and whip him with 
 the greatest ease, entering lower Tennessee, and turn the rear 
 of the force said to be now before General Morgan at Cumber 
 land Gap, leaving Morgan to march into East Tennessee and take 
 possession of the railroad, at once segregating and destroying 
 the unity of their territory, and that too, in the midst of a 
 population that is loyal and will stand by the government. . . . 
 Instead of meeting and whipping Bragg where he is, it is his 
 intention to occupy a defensive position, and (he) is noiw, 
 according to the best evidence I can obtain, concentrating all his 
 forces upon Nashville, giving up all the country which we have 
 had possession of south and east of this place, leaving the Union 
 sentiment and Union men who took a stand for the government 
 to be crushed out and utterly ruined by the rebels, who will all 
 be in arms upon the retreat of our army. It seems to me that 
 General Buell fears his own personal safety, and has concluded 
 to gather the whole army at this point as a kind of body-guard 
 to protect and defend him, without reference to the Union men 
 who have been induced to speak out, believing that the govern 
 ment will defend them. General Buell is very popular with the 
 rebels, and the impression is that he is more partial to them 
 than to Union men, and that he favors the establishment of a 
 
 30 O. R., series i, vol. xvi, part ii, p. 451 ; J. P., vol. xxv, 5579- 
 
 33 O. R., series i, vol. xvi, part ii, p. 461 ; J. P., vol. xxv, 5581. 
 
 34 New York Tribune, November 18, 1862. 
 
62 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 Southern confederacy." Without going as far as that, the gov 
 ernor's opinion is "that if he had designed to do so, he could not 
 have laid down or pursued a policy that would have been more 
 successful in the accomplishment of both these objects. . . . 
 East Tennessee seems doomed. There is scarcely a hope left of 
 her redemption ; if ever, no one now can tell. May God save my 
 country from some of the generals that have been conducting this 
 war/' 
 
 As Buell moved northward in pursuit of Bragg, he furnished 
 the governor a fresh cause for distraction. He continued to 
 overestimate the force of the enemy and, believing himself out 
 numbered and desiring to get every available soldier into the field, 
 he considered the expediency of abandoning Nashville. No 
 sooner had his army left the vicinity of that city than Forrest 
 and Morgan closed in upon it. Between the middle of September 
 and the middle of November, it was cut off from the outside 
 world. A large garrison, which Buell was anxious to have at 
 the front, was required for its defense. The Confederates con 
 stantly intercepted foraging parties and immense quantities of 
 supplies fell into their hands. The defense of the line of the 
 railroad on which the city depended required more men than 
 Buell could spare, intent as he was upon devoting every resource 
 to the defeat and capture of Bragg's army. To Johnson, on the 
 other hand, the retention of the capital seemed of the utmost 
 importance for the mission on which he had been sent. Politi 
 cally, its loss would be a catastrophe. The ridicule which, since 
 February, the Unionists had heaped on the homeless, itinerant 
 government of Harris, would return to mock them. All the 
 governor's prestige would fly northward with him, all the ground 
 so painfully won would be lost. Believing, too, as he did, that 
 Buell was already far stronger than Bragg, so tremendous a 
 sacrifice for no sound reason whatever seemed to him criminally 
 absurd. Buell appeared in his eyes an imbecile or worse. Rather 
 than see the Confederates exulting in the possession of Nashville, 
 he declared, it should be destroyed. Buell retorted that it should 
 be left as he found it. Despite Johnson's demand that Thomas 
 be left at the capital, Buell ordered him to join the army, but a 
 force under General John M. Palmer was sent to take his place. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 63 
 
 In fact, the city was well garrisoned and, though closely belea 
 guered for two months, seems never to have been in serious danger 
 of capture. 35 
 
 Buell's real designs regarding Nashville have been a perman 
 ent source of controversy between his friends and opponents, and, 
 with all his operations in the campaign of 1862, were made the 
 subject of a court of inquiry into his conduct which sat from 
 November of that year until the following April. Johnson de 
 posed for this investigation that the rumor that Nashville would 
 be surrendered was current among Unionists and Confederates, 
 and many prominent secessionists, former residents of the city, re 
 turned with Bragg's army in the confident expectation of regain 
 ing their homes. He had obtained an interview with Buell and 
 earnestly urged the political considerations involved, begging that 
 the city be held at all hazards, or, if absolutely necessary, de 
 stroyed, but never surrendered. The general had replied im 
 patiently that he should conduct his campaign in accordance with 
 his own judgment, regardless of criticism. Upon military prin 
 ciples, he was convinced, Nashville should have been abandoned 
 three months before. But Johnson's representations finally 
 opened his eyes to the broader aspects of the situation and, in 
 a later interview, he informed him that he had concluded to 
 defend the capital "not so much from military as from political 
 considerations which had been pressed with so much earnestness 
 upon him." 36 
 
 Buell, in his own statement before the commission, tells a 
 different story and openly denounces Johnson's testimony as 
 false. He declares that he himself was fully alive to the political 
 advantages of holding the capital and that he made his own 
 decision. No interviews on the subject were held with the gov 
 ernor. "I had not," he remarks pithily, "that confidence in his 
 judgment or that distrust of my own which would have induced 
 me to seek his counsel." 37 
 
 The commission, in its finding, accepted Johnson's account 
 rather than Buell's. "He takes and uses up Governor John 
 son's opinion," it declared, "when he says that the place should 
 
 33 O. R., series i, vol. xvi, part ii, p. 490; part i, p. 713. 
 86 Ibid., part i, p. 697. 
 m Ibid., p. 59. 
 
64 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 be preserved on account of its political importance. . . . He 
 was hesitating . . . when Governor Johnson . . . pressed this 
 political view on him." Even so, his action was half-hearted and 
 inefficient; in falling back, he still failed to close the road by 
 which Nashville could be attacked. The credit for the saving 
 of the capital is accorded to Johnson. 38 
 
 Whatever doubts as to his proper course may have clouded 
 the judgment of the general, the governor was disturbed by 
 none. He was possessed by an unshakable resolve to hold Nash 
 ville to the last gasp. He became the soul of the defense. During 
 the last two weeks of September, Buell was far away in Ken 
 tucky and the enemy was at the gates. The commander of the 
 post, General Negley, did not act with sufficient energy to suit 
 Johnson and the latter lost no time in demanding his removal. 39 
 An order putting him personally in command would, one surmises, 
 have been grateful to him. "I am no military man," he is 
 reported to have said, "but any one who talks of surrendering 
 I will shoot." 40 
 
 To this time belongs Lincoln's story, which merits reproduc 
 tion as affording one of the very few intimate personal views 
 of Johnson in these early days. Lincoln had it from Colonel 
 Moody, the righting Methodist parson, a character in the army, 
 who was in Nashville the day it was rumored that Buell would 
 evacuate the city. In Moody's words, as Lincoln reports them: 
 
 " 'I went in search of Johnson at the close of the evening and 
 found him at his office closeted with two gentlemen, who were 
 walking the floor with him, one on each side. As I entered 
 they retired, leaving me alone with Johnson, who came up 
 to me manifesting intense feeling and said : 'Moody, we are sold 
 out! Buell is a traitor! He is going to evacuate the city, 
 and in forty-eight hours we shall be in the hands of the rebels/ 
 Then he commenced pacing the floor again, twisting his hands 
 and chafing like a caged tiger, utterly insensible to his friend's 
 entreaties to become calm. Suddenly he turned and said: 
 'Moody, can you pray?' 'That is my business, sir, as a minister 
 
 "Ibid., pp. 17-18. 
 
 " Ibid., p. 583- 
 
 * Peterson & Brothers, Life, Speeches, and Services of Andrew Johnson. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 65 
 
 of the Gospel,' returned the colonel. 'Well, Moody, I wish 
 you would pray,' said Johnson; and instantly both went down 
 upon their knees at opposite sides of the room. As the prayer 
 became fervent, Johnson began to respond in true Methodist 
 style. Presently he crawled over on his hands and knees to 
 Moody's side, and put his arm over him, manifesting the deepest 
 emotion. Closing the prayer with a hearty 'Amen!' from each, 
 they arose. Johnson took a long breath, and said with em 
 phasis: 'Moody, I feel better!' Shortly afterward he asked: 
 'Will you stand by meT 'Certainly, I will," was the answer. 
 'Well, Moody, I can depend upon you ; you are one in a hundred 
 thousand!' He then commenced pacing the floor again. Sud 
 denly he wheeled, the current of his thought having changed, 
 and said : 'Oh ! Moody, I don't want you to think I have become 
 a religious man because I asked you to pray. I am sorry 
 to say it, but I am not, and have never pretended to be, religious. 
 No one knows this better than you; but, Moody, there is 
 one thing about it I do believe in Almighty God ! And I be 
 lieve in the Bible, and I say I'll be damned if Nashville shall be 
 surrendered !' And Nashville was not surrendered." 41 
 
 Buell's pursuit of Bragg from Louisville, the battle of Perry- 
 ville, and the retirement of the Confederate army into East 
 Tennessee during the month of October are important for this 
 sketch only from the fact that they relieved the pressure on 
 Nashville. Dissatisfaction with Buell had constantly increased 
 at Washington. It was felt that he had been outgeneralled in 
 August and that he should have crushed or seriously crippled 
 Bragg in Kentucky in October. 42 As early as the 2Qth of Sep- 
 
 41 Savage, The Life and Public Services of Andrew Johnson, p. 272. 
 
 "The campaign of Buell against Bragg is one of the persistent polemi 
 cal heritages of the war. Buell himself, a pathetic figure, devoted bitter 
 years to a disheartening attempt to secure the vindication which has now 
 been accorded him in the highly eulogistic tributes of the principal authori 
 ties on military history. General Grant said: "I think Buell had genius 
 enough for the highest commands." J. R. Young, Around the World with 
 General Grant, vol. ii, p. 289, quoted by Rhodes, History of the United 
 States, vol. iv, p. 184, note. 'See also the estimates of Ropes, Story of 
 the Civil War; Fry, The Army under Buell; and J. D. Cox in The Nation, 
 October 2, 1884. Citations in Rhodes, History of the United States, vol. 
 
66 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 tember, an order relieving him from command in favor of 
 Thomas had been delivered to him, 43 but withdrawn five days 
 later, owing to his successful arrival in Louisville and the 
 generous representations of Thomas that Buell's obstacles had 
 been great and that his preparations to move against the enemy 
 were then completed, while Thomas himself had not the in- 
 
 iv pp. 173-184. Colonel (Henry Stone, in Papers of the Military Histori 
 cal Society of Massachusetts, vol. vii (1908), pp. 257 et seq., completely 
 exonerates Buell, ascribes the misfortunes of the Union army to the 
 weakness and dilatoriness of Halleck, and characterizes the proceedings 
 of the Buell commission a3 without "regard for law or justice" and 
 "founded on misconception and ignorance." He quotes the Confederate 
 general Basil Duke as saying: "It can be demonstrated, I think, that 
 upon no effort which the Confederacy made . . . did more depend than 
 on the success or failure of Bragg's well-considered but futile attempt to 
 transfer the combat to fields where victories might be of some value and 
 give hope of final triumph. . . . The promise of substantial and perma 
 nent benefit to the Southern cause which a successful consummation of 
 this campaign in Kentucky offered was larger and more certain, I am 
 persuaded, than at Manassas or Gettysburg." Colonel Stone concludes : 
 "Buell's pursuit of his enemy into and out of Kentucky in September 
 and October, 1862, evinced far greater courage, energy, skill, and all the 
 higher military virtues than were shown by the commander of the Potomac 
 army in June and July, 1863." "In reviewing the operations of Buell from 
 the beginning of his retreat to the battle of Perryville there appears to be 
 nothing to be criticized. His concentration was skilfully and speedily 
 effected and his northward march so ordered as to bring his army in 
 good condition into Louisville. It was there reorganized with admirable 
 celerity, the plan of campaign was well contrived, and but for the curious 
 accident at Perryville might have led to a very successful issue. . . . The 
 failure properly to explore the country in his front is the only serious 
 omission which can be charged to General Buell's account. It was the 
 common blunder of our Federal commanders during the first two years 
 of our Civil War. At no time in this conflict was our cavalry service 
 adequate to the needs. . . . When Buell marched from Louisville to try 
 the issue of battle with Bragg every reasonable critic would have been 
 willing to compromise for the results which were won by the Perryville 
 engagement. . . . We cannot resist the conclusion that, so far as Buell's 
 work is concerned, the campaign was one of the best conducted of our 
 Civil War." N. S. Shaler, The Kentucky Campaign of 1862, Papers of 
 the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, vol. vii, pp. 205 et seq. 
 Captain Ephraim A. Otis' article in the same publication, p. 277, is un 
 favorable to Buell, but unconvincing. 
 48 O. iR. series i, vol. xvi, part ii, pp. 538, 554. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 67 
 
 formation necessary for such a crisis. 44 The fine honor of 
 Thomas' character held him always scrupulously loyal to his 
 chief. To Johnson, who was urging him for Buell's place, he 
 had written in August: "I believe that the relief of East 
 Tennessee has been entrusted to an able commander, and that 
 he will eventually give it sure and permanent relief." 45 Senator 
 Crittenden and others protested against Buell's removal, asserting 
 that the army confided in and loved him. 46 But his enemies, 
 chief among whom was Johnson, were implacable. 47 The suc 
 cessful escape of Bragg sealed his doom. Johnson was impor 
 tuning the war department to embrace the opportunity to re 
 deem East Tennessee and Halleck himself sent Buell an urgent 
 order to occupy that district during the fall. Buell hesitated 
 to comply. He declared that Bragg had sixty thousand men to 
 oppose him and that Nashville should first be cleared of the 
 enemy and made a safe base of supplies. 48 In fact, his position 
 was intolerable. Realizing that he had lost the confidence of 
 the president and Stanton, his own confidence was also gone, 
 and he must have welcomed the order (October 24) relieving 
 him and placing General Rosecrans in command. As the latter, 
 with reinforcements, advanced to Nashville, the Confederates 
 abandoned hope of capturing the city and withdrew. By No 
 vember the peril had passed. 
 
 Although Johnson's authority extended nominally over the 
 whole of Tennessee, the field of its practical exercise was re 
 stricted, during the year 1862, to the immediate vicinity of 
 Nashville. The rest of the state was the scene of the marching and 
 
 "Ibid., p. 555- 
 
 *J. P., vol. xxiv, 5448. 
 
 46 O. R., series i, vol. xvi, part ii, p. 558. 
 
 47 It seems certain that Buell was sacrificed to the impatience for im 
 mediate, decisive victories which was chronic in the North early in the 
 war. His difficulties were not appreciated at Washington and he seems 
 to have lacked the art of making friends and to have drawn too much 
 into himself, even to the point of appearing uncandid. Besides Johnson, 
 Governors Morton of Indiana, Yates of Illinois, and Tod of Ohio urged 
 his removal. Rhodes, History of the United States, vol. iv, pp. 182, 183. 
 
 48 O. R., series i, vol. xvi, part ii, pp. 642, 636. 
 
68 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 countermarching of armies, great battles, raids, and depredations 
 by the guerillas. Even within the city itself, his freedom of action 
 was almost destroyed by the presence of that immediate military 
 necessity which subjected everything to the arbitrary will of 
 the commanding general. Under such circumstances, there 
 seemed to be no room for the governor. Obviously he could 
 make no progress in his mission of peaceful reconstruction. 
 His only importance lay in the fact that he was a brigadier- 
 general, whose place in the system was doubtful. A man of 
 less self-assertiveness and force of character would have sunk 
 into temporary obscurity, while the army cleared the stage for 
 him to perform his part. But to Johnson no such course was 
 possible. Unable to exercise his civil functions and equally 
 unable to remain passive, he proceeded to make himself felt, 
 often painfully, in a military capacity. The record of his office 
 during this period is one of alternate cooperation and conflict 
 with Buell and his subordinates. 
 
 Besides an indomitable will, relentless persistence, and un- 
 scrupulousness, Johnson possessed, in the confidence of the 
 president, the greatest possible asset for gaining his ends. 
 Lincoln was promptly drawn by natural sympathy to a per 
 sonality in many respects resembling his own. He appreciated 
 and admired Johnson's early struggles, his self-reliance, his 
 physical and moral courage, and his impressions were confirmed 
 by his independent loyalty in 1861, his readiness to assume the 
 lead where many hesitated to follow, his quick grasp of the 
 essential issues of the war, and his prophetic insight into con 
 ditions in the border states. The assurance and efficiency with 
 which he administered the difficult office of military governor de 
 lighted the president. While he had had many troublesome ques 
 tions to settle from other governors and officers, he told Schuyler 
 Coif ax in the summer of 1862, "Andy Johnson had never em 
 barrassed him in the slightest degree." 49 Stanton shared the 
 president's view. Their conviction of his unique value to the 
 Union cause in Tennessee induced them to lend a ready ear to 
 his complaints and to give him his way whenever possible. 
 The military officers who, believing in their superior importance, 
 
 49 J. P., vol. xxi, 4944. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 69 
 
 chose to ignore or antagonize him, discovered in the end the 
 unwisdom of such a course. 
 
 The quarrel between Johnson and Buell over the general 
 military policy in Tennessee and its outcome have been treated 
 already. The governor's relations with most of the lesser officers 
 with whom he came in contact were no less strained. The fact 
 is, he was self-willed, uncompromising and dictatorial, and, once 
 his mind was made up, intolerant of opposition or even of 
 honest opinion in conflict with his own. Impatient and rough 
 in speech, abrupt and belligerent in manner, his attitude repelled 
 any calm discussion and adjustment of difficulties with officers 
 accustomed to military etiquette and jealous of the dignity of 
 their positions. Controversies with Generals Nelson and Negley, 
 commanders of the post at Nashville, resulted in demands by 
 Johnson for the removal of these officers and, whether or not 
 in consequence of the demand, the desired changes were made. 
 Colonel Matthews, the provost-marshal, also felt the force of 
 the governor's hostility and, even after his departure, Johnson's 
 animosity pursued him and prevented his promotion in the 
 army. 50 
 
 The governor's pet antipathy, perhaps, was Captain Greene, 
 the assistant adjutant-general. He first alienated Johnson by 
 dispatching to the front troops that the latter considered necessary 
 for service in Nashville. A more direct ground of contention 
 was an order issued by Buell that all officers assigned to the 
 command of troops live in camp with their soldiers, and not 
 in houses in Nashville. In Greene's absence, Johnson had taken 
 possession of certain houses by virtue of his authority as military 
 governor and allotted them as residences to officers of his guard 
 and their families. Greene, who seems to have acted always 
 in good faith as a responsible subordinate, reported the facts 
 to Buell's chief -of -staff for instructions and received reply that 
 the order admitted of no exceptions. Thereupon he directed the 
 provost-marshal, Colonel Campbell, to eject one of the families 
 instated by Johnson. Campbell, prompted in advance, refused, 
 and Greene placed him under arrest. The governor was now 
 thoroughly aroused. He brought his influence to bear and, 
 
 00 Ibid., 4758, 4759- 
 
70 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 within two days, had secured a disavowal of the order from 
 Buell, the restoration of the house, the release of Campbell, 
 the transfer of Greene from Nashville, and authority himself 
 to appoint a provost-marshal in sympathy with him and under 
 his orders. "The president hopes this will be satisfactory to 
 you," telegraphed Stanton, "and that you will use efforts to 
 prevent any disputes or collision of authority between your 
 subordinates and those of General Buell." 51 This incident, un 
 important in itself, illustrates vividly the disposition of the 
 Federal executive to hold up the governor's hands. 
 
 Johnson took care that the military commanders should not be 
 in the dark as to the scope of his powers. To every general 
 newly arrived in the department he sent a copy of his com 
 mission and instructions, sometimes with his own explanatory 
 comment. General Negley, who gave signs of a disposition 
 to repeat the errors of Buell and Greene, received a pointed note 
 to the effect that, if Buell had formerly appointed provost- 
 marshals, he had done so at the suggestion and by the consent 
 of the governor, to whom the actual authority belonged. 52 
 
 Not military men alone felt Johnson's imperious disfavor. He 
 fell into a violent altercation with John Lellyett, the postmaster 
 of Nashville, a cultured gentleman of high character, to whose 
 appointment, as a sop to the conservative loyal element, he 
 had reluctantly consented. Lellyett clung to a liberal and pacific 
 policy toward the secessionists, demanding that return to the 
 Union "as it was" be the only condition imposed upon them. 
 He positively refused to follow Johnson's lead and probably 
 showed some disdain in his treatment of him. He himself 
 says that the opposition of his friends to Johnson's candidate 
 for postmaster directed the governor's hostility to him. Both 
 communicated their grievances to Washington, Lellyett request 
 ing that his successor be appointed "in case it is esteemed, as it 
 seems to be assumed by Governor Johnson, that I hold my office 
 merely at his pleasure." Such apparently was the fact, for the 
 postmaster was soon numbered among the victims of Johnson's 
 animosity. 53 
 
 m O. R., series i. vol. x, part ii, pp. 629, 631 ; vol. xvi, part i, pp. 
 119, 122, 135, 175; J. P., vol. xxi, 4990, 5024, 5026. 
 
 52 J. P., vol. xxvi, 5776. 
 
 53 Ibid., vol. xix, 4438, 4451, 4453. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 REPRESSION UNDER ROSECRANS 
 
 In his initial proclamation, Johnson had announced a mild and 
 liberal policy of pacification, for the purpose of winning back 
 the state to its allegiance with the least possible friction and 
 avoiding all unnecessary hardship to the citizens. Buell devoted 
 himself to the same end. In fact, his known border-state con 
 nections and sympathies were regarded as peculiarly fitting him 
 for the work in hand. The belief was general at Washington 
 that Tennessee was only half-hearted in the rebellion and could 
 be converted by kindness. Citizens not actively in opposition to 
 the government received the protection of the army and every 
 effort was made to keep all property in statu quo in the hope that 
 gratitude would draw the owners towards the Union. 1 
 
 Before long, however, it became difficult to avoid the conclu 
 sion that the hearts of the Southern sympathizers were hardened 
 and that no appreciable number would declare loyal sentiments 
 while reasonable 'prospects of Confederate success remained. 
 Fear stopped the mouths of many. The secessionists fully under 
 stood the importance of Tennessee to the Confederacy; they 
 instituted a systematic persecution of Union men, and any avowal 
 of loyalty to the Federal government invited prompt retribution, 
 as agents of which the guerillas were unsurpassed. Everywhere, 
 except in portions of East Tennessee, a Unionist was boycotted 
 by his neighbors and his life was in danger. "I passed a squad 
 of my used-to-be friends," wrote a Davidson county man to John 
 son, "and one of them asked me how I liked the Federals. I 
 told him I liked them pretty well. He said, 'You don't, do you?' 
 and I said, 'Yes.' He then said, 'Very well, old fellow, we will 
 jerk you off the ground when they go away from here.' And 
 there are men going to and returning from the rebel army 
 all the time, at least, they say they have been there and seen 
 the iboys and they tell the people to keep in good spirits, 
 
 Nashville Union, August 3, 1862. 
 
72 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 that the rebel army will be back here by the first of June next." 2 
 The policy of conciliation was generally regarded as not only 
 futile, but positively disastrous. The rebels, testified Parson 
 Brownlow before the Buell commission, "attribute our forbear 
 ance toward them to cowardice and think that we are afraid of 
 them. It disheartens and discourages the Unionists. I heard 
 them complain at Nashville even of Governor Johnson's for 
 bearing and conciliatory policy toward the rebels." The latter, 
 he affirmed, gained by pursuing the opposite course. 3 
 
 Under such circumstances, Johnson, in whose nature charity 
 was not an essential element, did not long hesitate to adapt 
 himself to actualities. His first step in the direction of greater 
 stringency was a proclamation, 4 on the Qth of May, aimed to 
 prevent the maltreating and plundering of Union citizens. 
 Whenever a Union man was misused, five or more of the most 
 prominent "rebels" of the immediate neighborhood should be 
 "arrested, imprisoned, and otherwise dealt with as the nature 
 of the case may require," and whenever the property of loyalists 
 was taken or destroyed, remuneration should be made to^ them 
 out of the property of those in the vicinity who had given 
 "aid, comfort, information or encouragement" to the offenders. 
 "This order," concludes the proclamation, "will be executed 
 in letter and spirit. All citizens are hereby warned, under 
 heavy penalties, from entertaining, receiving, or encouraging 
 such persons so banded together, or in any wise connected 
 therewith." That this was -no idle threat was shown the follow 
 ing month, when the mayor and aldermen of Pulaski, despite 
 
 2 J. P., vol. xviii, 4156. 
 
 8 O. R., series i, vol. xvi, part i, p. 674. Testimony to the contrary is, 
 however, not lacking. Lieutenant Holloway, a cavalry officer, captured by 
 the Confederates and later paroled declared: "I talked with many of 
 Breckenridge's staff. ... I think a lenient course would soon win Ten 
 nessee back. General Buell's course was productive of much good. He 
 has made a number of good Union men all through the South. General 
 Breckenridge told me that General Buell hurt the South more than the 
 armies of the United States by his lenient policy. The people in Ten 
 nessee had written to their sons to desert and come home; that General 
 Buell would not incarcerate them in prison, as they supposed." O. R., 
 series i, vol. xx, part ii, p. 25. 
 
 * Nashville Union, July 5 ; Moore, Rebellion Record, vol. v, doc. 123. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 73 
 
 their vigorous protests, were forced to provide compensation 
 to Union men for their property seized or damaged by Morgan's 
 raiders, who, according to the testimony before a board of 
 inquiry, entered the town with the welcome of many of its 
 citizens and were permitted to plunder withoult protest by the 
 municipal officers." 5 "It is well known," commented the governor 
 tartly, in affirming the judgment of the board, "that such bands 
 only go and remain in places where they have sympathizers. 
 ... Such disloyal citizens have brought about and are now, 
 by acts of disloyalty, contributing to the organization and support 
 of these bands." 6 
 
 Secession sympathizers who, by open or covert threats, falling 
 short of actual violence, intimidated Union men and prevented 
 the free expression of loyalty, next occupied the governor's at 
 tention. Early in June, he ordered that all persons guilty of 
 uttering disloyal sentiments, who refused to take the oath and 
 give bonds for their future good behavior, be sent south and 
 treated as spies if they ventured back during the war. 7 The 
 application of this order in specific instances has already 
 been described. To Colonel Mundy, who executed it at Pulaski, 
 he wrote that a few of the most important cases should be 
 selected first, and subsequent action taken according to the 
 effect produced on the public mind. 8 At the same time, he asked 
 and obtained the consent of Lincoln to arrest seventy "vile 
 secessionists" and offer them in exchange for an equal number 
 of prominent loyal East Tennesseeans imprisoned at Mobile. 
 If exchange was refused, he proposed to send his prisoners 
 south at their own expense and forbid their return. 9 
 
 The operations of the Union army, too, were seriously handi 
 capped by the disloyalty of the Tennesseeans. Buell declared 
 that he could learn nothing from the people, while every detail 
 of his movements was immediately communicated to the enemy. 
 Almost no supplies could be obtained and the army was COITH 
 
 5 J. P., vol. xix, 4424, 4460; vol. xx, 4523. 
 
 "Ibid., vol. xx, 4525. 
 
 ''Annual Cyclopedia, 1862, p. 766. 
 
 8 J. P., vol. xx, 4646; vol. xxi, 4693. 
 
 'Ibid., vol. xx, 4609, 4638; Lincoln's Complete Works, vol. vii, p. 215. 
 
74 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 pelled to move slowly and protect its long line of communica 
 tions, but "wherever Forrest stopped he found prepared food 
 and forage in ample quantities." 10 In August, General William 
 Sooy Smith, guarding the railroad between Nashville and 
 Stevenson, complained to Johnson that the enemy were able 
 to capture his detachments through information furnished them 
 by citizens and that all Union families were being driven into 
 camps of refuge. Either the government should change its 
 mild policy or he should be released from a service so in 
 tolerable. "Let all disloyal persons," he urged, "be driven at 
 once across the lines to the rebels where they belong" and "let 
 the loyal patriotic citizens of the land be organized, armed and 
 equipped for their own home defense and the protection of 
 our lines of communication." 11 
 
 Johnson was by this time thoroughly committed to the doc 
 trine that the foes of the government "must be made to feel 
 the burden of their own deeds and to bear everything which 
 the necessities of the situation require should be imposed on 
 them." 12 On the 26th of June, he urged upon Stanton that the 
 army be subsisted on the enemy. This, he maintained, would 
 bring rebels to their senses. They "must be made to feel the 
 weight and ravages of the war they have brought upon the 
 country. Treason must be made odious and traitors impover 
 ished. We are raising forces here- infantry and cavalry 
 and in obtaining horses and supplies the secretary of war need 
 not be surprised if we make rebels meet the demand. 13 He in 
 structed General Negley, at Columbia, fully to compensate 
 plundered Union men out of the property of disloyalists and 
 to make all arrests required by the public interests, "let them 
 be many or few." 14 Only the fear of the army and relentless 
 repression by Johnson kept the secessionists subdued, wrote the 
 correspondent of the New York Tribune. "Should he loosen 
 his hold in the least, they would at once resume their treason- 
 
 10 O. R., series i, vol. x, part ii, p. 85. 
 11 J. P., vol. xxiii, 5249. 
 
 12 O. R., series i, vol. xvi, part ii, p. 242; J. P., vol. xxv, 54/5. 
 
 13 O. R., series i, vol. xvi, part <i, p. 216. 
 
 14 J. P., vol. xxiv, 5337- 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 75 
 
 able practices, and so he keeps the screws tight down upon 
 their thumbs." 15 
 
 The appointment of Rosecrans to the command of the depart 
 ment of the Cumberland in November gave the governor an 
 ally heartily disposed to lend the full support of the army to 
 the program of repression. Establishing his headquarters at 
 Nashville, he promulgated orders indicative of the course he 
 proposed to follow. All peaceable inhabitants were promised 
 immunity from interference, other than necessary surveillance, 
 but outspoken rebels need expect no other protection than that 
 dictated by the laws of war and humanity. Citizens guilty of 
 acts of hostility or belonging to partisan corps not under proper 
 military control were to be treated as pirates and robbers. Sol 
 diers were forbidden to enter private grounds or houses with 
 out written permission or order from a commissioned officer, 
 who was held- responsible for their acts. Provost-marshals 
 were to avoid unjust and unnecessary arrests of private persons. 
 Trade in necessaries in towns and cities within the lines of 
 the army was restricted to resident traders. 16 
 
 The policy of the government, henceforth to be enforced by 
 both the civil and the military arms was, as the Nashville Union 
 concisely stated it, "to draw a line between its friends and its 
 enemies, and give protection where it finds allegiance." 17 To 
 establish this distinction, Rosecrans and Johnson introduced a 
 certificate or guarantee of protection, which was issued to per 
 sons of well-known loyalty, and to such other persons as gave 
 bond to "keep the peace, and afford neither aid nor comfort 
 to the enemies of the government of the United States," to be 
 "true and steadfast" citizens of the United States, and not to 
 "go beyond the lines of the Federal armies, nor into any section 
 of the country in possession of the enemy, without permission 
 of the authorities of the United States." This was called the 
 non-combatant parole. The certificate pledged to its holder 
 the protection of the United States, commanded all persons, 
 military and civil, to respect him in the enjoyment of his property, 
 
 16 New York Tribune, September i, 1862. 
 Annual Cyclopaedia, 1862, p. 598. 
 
 17 Nashville Union, November 30. ' 
 
76 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 and forbade foraging upon his premises except for the actual 
 necessities of the army, and then only with the utmost care 
 and in return for a receipt entitling the owner to compensation 
 from the government. At Rosecrans' request and to relieve the 
 regular army officers of the task of administering the oath of 
 allegiance and taking the bonds with the non-combatant parole, 
 Johnson appointed commissioners in the various counties, so 
 far as practicable, and also one to accompany Rosecrans' army 
 for the same purpose. 18 
 
 The ousting of Buell in favor of Rosecrans had highly grati 
 fied Johnson. "I feel in strong hopes," he wrote to Lincoln, 
 "that things will go well in a few days, as we have a man at 
 the head of this army who will fight." 19 It soon appeared, how 
 ever, that the harmony would be short-lived. The fact was that 
 the dual system of government devised by Lincoln and Stanton 
 could not run smoothly under the unfavorable conditions with 
 which it had to contend. Had the Union army succeeded in 
 promptly driving the Confederate forces out of the state and 
 in handing over to the governor a territory cleared of enemies 
 for political reconstruction, while the army operated on the 
 borders of the state or beyond them, it is conceivable, even 
 probable, that the two authorities, with plenty of room for 
 their movements, might have performed their respective parts 
 without disturbing each other. Instead of this, the failure of 
 Buell threw the army back upon the capital, and civil and 
 military officers were crowded together into the northern part 
 of the state, while Nashville, the seat and source of the civil 
 power, became also, as a strategic centre, the military head 
 quarters; and Rosecrans, in whose aggressive qualities John 
 son had gloried, proved quite as disposed to overrule a governor 
 who interfered with his plans as to attack an enemy in the field. 
 
 A glance at the jumble of offices and authorities in Nashville 
 during the winter of 1862-63 clearly shows the hopelessness 
 of the situation. General Rosecrans had established there his 
 office as commander of the department, and the other depart 
 ment functionaries the chief quartermaster, chief commissary, 
 
 15 Ibid., November 29; J. P., vol. xxvii, 6070. 
 19 O. R., series i, vol. xx, part ii, p. 70. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 77 
 
 provost-marshal general, and medical director had each fiis 
 separate establishment. There also were the headquarters of 
 the post commander, General Mitchell, and the offices of his 
 five assistant quartermasters. When Rosecrans was not in the 
 city, there was an office for the district, presided over by an 
 assistant adjutant-general, and the provost-marshal general gave 
 place to a provost-marshal responsible both to the district com 
 mander and to Governor Johnson. Side by side with the military 
 existed the civil administration of the state (the governor and 
 his council), the officers of Davidson county, and the mayor, 
 aldermen, common council, and minor officers of the city of Nash 
 ville. The county, circuit, criminal, and chancery courts held ses 
 sions in the city, also the municipal court of the recorder. Military 
 commissions and tribunals administered martial law. There 
 were the county sheriff, the city marshals, and the provost- 
 marshal; the county constables, the municipal police, and the 
 provost-marshal's guard. To these was soon added the secret 
 detective police of the army. The contemplation of such a 
 list gives an impression of confusion worse confounded. That 
 utter chaos did not, in fact, result is a tribute to the good sense 
 and forbearance of both Rosecrans and Johnson. 
 
 In such a situation, the general of the army, as the visible 
 source of power, was certain to predominate. Even as resolute 
 a civil officer as Johnson suffered severely in prestige. Every 
 new military commander, said the Nashville Press, trespassed 
 upon his province and each had a different system from hix 
 predecessor. The Press paid a tribute to the governor's modera 
 tion and unselfish labors for harmony. Although empowered 
 to countermand any military order touching civil affairs, he 
 refrained from exerting his authority in opposition to the 
 military, which was thus encouraged in its usurpations. So the 
 people were led to think that the general was the real force 
 to be reckoned with. 20 The prevailing view is well expressed 
 by a contemporary writer: "Honorable Andrew Johnson, the 
 military governor of Tennessee, appeared, to the eyes of super 
 ficial observers, to be busy enough, but it was difficult to define 
 his functions. His authority could not extend beyond the military 
 
 20 Nashville Press, June 8. 
 
78 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 lines, which were then rather contracted. The civil and military 
 administration of Tennessee . . . were so intimately blended 
 that it was quite impossible to separate them, so that the re 
 sponsibility of civil government really devolved on General 
 Rosecrans. Rebels who had business with the government de 
 clined generally to hold intercourse witih the governor, and 
 loyal men sought the attention of the military chief. Excepting 
 the issuance of commissions to officers of Tennessee volunteers, 
 and to a magistrate now and then; the collection and distribu 
 tion of taxes levied upon wealthy rebels for charitable purposes ; 
 and correspondence with the state department at Washington, 
 there was really nothing else for the governor to do. Honorable 
 Hugh Smith was mayor of Nashville, but his office was almost 
 a sinecure, the municipal government being reduced to petty 
 police business and the hebdomadal meetings of aldermen."- 1 
 The principal bone of contention between Johnson and 
 Rosecrans was the new police system introduced by the latter 
 in December for the purpose of maintaining order, ferreting 
 out hidden treason, and detecting violations of the trade regu 
 lations in his department. The initial step was the detailing 
 of a provost guard to act in conjunction with the local police, 
 an arrangement which at first worked very successfully. A 
 provost court was also erected for the trial of cases under 
 military law, and this was supplemented by the army detective 
 police under Colonel Truesdail, a capable, but apparently 
 arbitrary, tactless and unscrupulous officer, a confidant of Rose 
 crans. The wide and secret ramifications of this organization, 
 its assumptions of authority, its interference with the daily 
 life of the people soon aroused both animosity and apprehension 
 in the community. The correspondent of the New York Times 
 reported that Truesdail appropriated all the Confederate money 
 
 21 Nashville Union, June 17. "He daily thundered incoherent invectives 
 against the 'Hell-hounds of the hell-born and hell-bound Confederacy', 
 when he was capable of articulate utterance, or could find so much as an 
 audience of one to listen. This, and sending false and misleading tele 
 grams to Washington, was the extent to which he exercised the mixed 
 functions of his anomalous position as brigadier-general and military 
 governor." Colonel Henry Stone, Papers of the Military Historical So 
 ciety of Massachusetts, vol. vii (1908), p. 275. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 79 
 
 in the banks and exchange offices at Nashville, seized and con 
 fiscated property without show of justice or regard for Union 
 interests, made arbitrary arrests on charges of treason, tried the 
 accused in his own court and convicted them on insufficient 
 evidence, and exercised for his own profit the exclusive privileges 
 of granting passes through the lines, carrying the mails, and 
 transporting soldiers, while Rosecrans winded at these out 
 rageous proceedings. 22 "It became a by-word that this person 
 was commander-in-chief." The Nashville Union, whose state 
 ments are, however, always to be regarded with suspicion, 
 charged that Truesdail had proposed to Rosecrans and Johnson 
 that they establish a "military triumvirate," proclaim martial 
 law throughout the state, and enter upon a career of "indis 
 criminate confiscation, exile, imprisonment, and execution" as 
 the shortest road to reconstruction. To this was added the 
 accusation that he and his satellites were not beyond the reach 
 of corrupt influences in granting favors and administering the 
 trade regulations. 23 
 
 By the middle of January, the encroachments of Truesdail's 
 police had become so pronounced and public protest so general 
 that Johnson felt constrained to complain to Rosecrans. This 
 he did reluctantly, as the general's satisfaction with his new 
 engine of repression was well known. "A detective police, prop 
 erly organized and conducted upon correct principles," he 
 conceded, "might do some good in connection with the interests 
 and movements of the army, but I am compelled to say that 
 the provost court and detective police here, by the extensive 
 jurisdiction assumed, and the summary manner in which they 
 undertake to dispose of the persons and property of citizens, 
 have not only excited a feeling of indignation among the more 
 conservative portion of the community, but have greatly im 
 paired the confidence of the loyal men, that class to whom we 
 look for active support, in the correct intentions of the govern 
 ment, it being held responsible for the unjust acts of its reputed 
 agents." He pointed out that, within the district restored 
 to Federal control, already existed all the machinery necessary 
 
 22 Nashville Union, October 29. 
 
 23 Ibid., October 31. 
 
8o ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 for enforcing both civil and military law. If, however, the 
 general was convinced of the necessity of this additional agent, 
 let it, for the sake of the public good, be confined solely to 
 military affairs and the execution of military law. 24 In reply, 
 Rosecrans acknowledged that some complaints had reached him, 
 but he thought they came from smugglers and Jews whose 
 contraband trade had been broken up. He assured the gov 
 ernor that justice should be done in every specific case reported 
 to him. 25 
 
 Meanwhile, Johnson had not failed to lay his grievances be 
 fore his friends in Washington, on whose decisive support he 
 could, with certainty, rely, as Rosecrans might have learned by 
 contemplating his predecessor's history. Promptly came from 
 Halleck a detailed, unequivocal letter, 26 designed to convince 
 Rosecrans that the authority of the governor was a potent 
 reality and pointedly prescribing the bounds which the military 
 should not pass. The office held by Johnson was created, Halleck 
 explains, to mitigate the evils of a purely military government, 
 and to restore the civil machinery as promptly and thoroughly 
 as possible, and the civil authorities thus restored are entitled 
 to as much respect as those of Kentucky, Missouri, or any other 
 state that happens to be a theatre of war. "In other words, 
 the military forces of the United States will not interfere with 
 the authority and jurisdiction of the loyal officers of the state 
 government, except in case of urgent and pressing necessity." 
 After attempting to distinguish between civil and military juris 
 diction, Halleck observes that the provost-marshals must confine 
 /their activities to matters purely and indubitably military, 
 leaving everything else to the local police. To insure harmony, 
 it might be well to put Johnson, as a brigadier-general, in 
 command of the troops in Nashville. 
 
 Either Rosecrans failed to recognize the veiled warning, or 
 his discretion, clouded by anger, led him into the wrong course. 
 He acknowledged Halleck's letter in a rather abrupt telegram, 27 
 
 *J. P., vol. xxix, 6326. 
 
 36 Ibid., 6353. 
 
 * O. iR., series iii, vol. Hi, p. 77. 
 
 " lbid ; , series i, vol. xxiii, part ii, p. 174. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 81 
 
 denying any knowledge of a conflict of authority. Nashville, 
 he said, was too important a post to entrust to Johnson, but if 
 the latter would report to him, he would place him in command 
 at Gallatin. Respect for Rosecrans' intelligence forces one to 
 the conclusion that he deliberately and wilfully misinterpreted 
 his instructions. If so, he was not long in discovering that he 
 had made a false step. Halleck's stinging reply brought the 
 aspiring officer to heel without ado and showed him plainly 
 that his business was to cooperate with the governor, not to 
 dominate him. Johnson, he was told, was no ordinary brigadier- 
 general, but the governor of a state, with the full powers ap 
 pertaining to that office, and Rosecrans' suggestion that he 
 should report to him for a command "was in direct opposition 
 to the wishes of the government" as communicated in Halleck's 
 letter, and "was received by the war department with marked 
 dissatisfaction." 28 
 
 Rosecrans learned his lesson. "I assure you," he hastened 
 to answer Halleck, "I have done all I possibly could, con 
 sistently with military safety, to build up and sustain the civil 
 authority wherever I have had command, especially in Ten 
 nessee. No one appreciates the sacrifice and the delicate and 
 trying position of Governor Johnson more than I do. . . . But 
 Nashville is an enclosed garrison, and my grand depot. It is 
 full of traitors and spies, and to it go all the rascals and 
 speculators that follow an army. I am, therefore, obliged to 
 have it commanded by an able and experienced officer, and 
 to exercise a rigid military policy ; but am not aware of, nor do I 
 believe there has been, any material departure from the letter 
 and spirit of your instructions of the 2Oth, and my reply to it, 
 though brief, was not to treat the suggestion about putting 
 the governor in military command with disrespect, but to say, 
 if done, that, in my opinion, would (not?) be best for thfe 
 country." He reiterates his utter ignorance of any conflict 
 of authority, and requests that all complaints be forwarded to 
 him. "I will either show they are unfounded, remedy them, 
 or prove that it cannot be done without injury to the country." 29 
 
 28 Ibid., p. 191. 
 
 29 Ibid, p. 208. 
 
82 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 At the same time, he sent to Stanton a similar open letter for 
 Johnson, which elicited from the latter the response: "There 
 has been nothing, there will be nothing desired by me but har 
 mony and concert of action to put down the rebellion and restore 
 to the people of Tennessee all their legal and constitutional 
 rights; of this you know I have given assurance both in action 
 and words." 30 
 
 Good resolutions, however honest, were of slight avail against 
 impossible conditions. Truesdail and his policy still remained a 
 vexation. In the discharge of his duty to prevent infringements 
 of the treasury regulations, he came into contact with the cotton 
 traders and proved susceptible to their blandishments. Soon it 
 was widely rumored that he and those who had his favor were 
 enjoying a practical monopoly of the cotton trade, and suspicion 
 attached even to Rosecrans, whose vigorous support of Trues 
 dail, it was hinted, might be explained by his personal interest 
 in the cotton speculation. Finally it came to the general's ears 
 that Johnson himself had reported the scandal. He at once dis 
 patched him a hotly indignant letter, 31 condemning the rumor 
 as utterly false and calling upon him "as a man of, standing and 
 honor and one whom I believe to be my friend" to furnish him 
 with all the information he possessed and to vindicate him in the 
 fullest manner. Only after an ungracious silence of nearly two 
 months did Johnson reply that he had no information affecting 
 Rosecrans' character as a citizen or soldier. His response to the 
 appeal for vindication, though rendered less grateful by the irri 
 tating delay, was sufficiently hearty. "You state in your tele 
 gram," he wrote, "that you consider me your friend. You are 
 right in this, and no one will go further than I in vindication of 
 your character. I have never believed, and do not now believe, 
 that you have fully understood the character and extent of the 
 proceedings under Truesdail's direction. ... I fear that some 
 designing persons have been trying to make an impression in 
 tended to disturb that good feeling which was understood to 
 exist between us while you were here. If so, it will all be 
 dispersed." 32 
 
 w Ibid., p. 220. 
 
 31 J. P., vol. xxx, 6731. 
 
 "O. R, series i, vol. xxiii, part ii, p. 380. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 83 
 
 The gravity of the charges against Truesdail and the publicity 
 given the matter constrained Stanton to order the appointment 
 of a mixed commission of officers and civilians to investigate the 
 entire police administration of Nashville since its occupation by the 
 army and the effect on the public interests and individual rights 
 of the operations of both military and civil police. Truesdail's 
 skirts were generally believed to be smirched, and it was after 
 wards alleged that Rosecrans' support of him was one of the 
 causes of that general's removal in October. 33 Johnson himself 
 denied any complicity in the matter, but condemned Truesdail 
 unsparingly as "a base and unmitigated Jesuitical parasite," 34 
 and declared that he had rejected applications for the release of 
 fifty convicts in the state prison who were better men than he. 35 
 
 Rosecrans' experience had taught him caution, but he could 
 .not conceal his displeasure when, on the 3d of May, Johnson 
 obtained the transfer of the first Tennessee infantry regiment 
 from the general service to the governor's personal command, 
 as a nucleus for the guard he was then forming. He would, he 
 said, give the requisite orders, but he could ill spare the regi 
 ment, and, what was more important, a force located within 
 the garrison of Nashville, but not subject to the orders of the 
 garrison commander, would do little but breed discord. 36 His 
 observations were only good common-sense, but the transfer 
 was made, notwithstanding. 
 
 The utter impossibility of developing any considerable Union 
 sentiment in Tennessee under the conditions then existing was 
 emphasized by the bitterness which the new repressive policy 
 engendered. Buell had been too mild ; Rosecrans was too severe. 
 "No wonder the national cause has made such slight headway 
 in Tennessee," remarked the Louisville Journal. "Many of those 
 who have it in charge appear especially to study how little they 
 can make it look like the cause of restoration and how much like 
 the cause of subjugation. The restoration of the Union under 
 
 33 Quoted by Nashville Union, October 29. 
 
 34 Unscrupulous enemies of Rosecrans made much of the fact that" he 
 was a Catholic. 
 
 85 J. P., vol. xxxvi, 7877. 
 
 39 O. R., series i, vol. xxiii, part ii, p. 308. 
 
84 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 such auspices is uphill work." 37 On this point, however, Rose- 
 crans and Johnson were in full accord and acted with unhesi 
 tating efficiency. Their resolution was strengthened by detailed 
 instructions 38 from Halleck in March, prescribing the correct 
 treatment for the various classes of inhabitants in the state. 
 
 The so-called neutrals, said Halleck, have no proper standing 
 in a civil war. Non-combatants must therefore be considered as 
 rebel sympathizers. As such, they must not be molested or 
 deprived of their property, except through military necessity, so 
 long as they attend quietly to their own affairs, but they are 
 subject to forced loans and military requisitions and their houses 
 may be taken for soldiers' quarters or other temporary military 
 uses. With these exceptions, they are to be protected. But 
 should they at any time resort to arms or give aid or information 
 to the enemy, they become "rebels or military traitors," to be 
 punished with death; if captured, they will next be regarded as 
 prisoners of war and their property is subject to confiscation. 
 Hitherto, such persons have been treated altogether too leniently. 
 Another class comprises those who, though not in arms against 
 the United States, are avowedly hostile to the occupying army. 
 These are under all the disabilities of non-combatants and, in 
 addition, are liable to be arrested and confined as prisoners 
 of war or expelled from the country as enemies. Halleck' s 
 opinion is that they should not be permitted to go at large 
 within the Federal lines. There are also obvious disadvantages 
 in sending them south to swell the force of the enemy and in 
 imprisoning them and weakening the army by detailing guards 
 for them. The course to be followed in each case is left to 
 the discretion of the general, with the injunction Ithat the 
 laws of war must be more strictly enforced than heretofore 
 against all open and secret foes of the government. The 
 people of Tennessee were to be brought by sad experience to 
 appreciate the importance of reestablishing the exclusive sway 
 of the civil law, which alone is no respecter of persons. To 
 this end the army was to provide the propulsive force and the 
 governor the machinery. 
 
 37 Nashville Union, February 28, 1863. 
 88 Ibid, March 21. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 85 
 
 A beginning had already been made, as we have seen. In 
 February, the military arm had fallen upon the defiant Nash 
 ville Gas Light Company, which had refused to transfer shares 
 sold to Northern purchasers on the ground that the rights of 
 Northern persons to Southern property were forfeited under 
 the Confederate sequestration act. Post-commander Mitchell 
 immediately ordered that any attempt of individuals or cor 
 porations to avail themselves of or obey any law of the Con 
 federate Congress or any disloyal state legislature should work 
 forfeiture of all their property under the Federal confiscation 
 act, and that individuals so acting for themselves or for cor 
 porations should be sent south of the lines of the United States 
 army. 39 On the 2Oth, Johnson, in accordance with the con 
 fiscation act, had warned all persons not to pay profits or rents 
 to secessionists or their agents, but to retain them until a 
 United States officer should be appointed to receive them; 40 
 and, at the governor's request, General Mitchell ordered the 
 seizure of the goods of delinquents in the contribution assessed 
 for the support of destitute women and children. 41 On the 
 1 6th of March, a commission composed of three citizens and 
 two officers of the army was established by Rosecrans to pass 
 on claims for damages sustained by the citizens of Nashville 
 and vicinity from the occupation by the army; 42 and a month 
 later (April 14), a board of claims was constituted which, 
 in its hearings, was to accord preference to those who declared 
 themselves true and faithful citizens of the United States. 43 
 This last measure was a shrewdly practical inducement for 
 avowed Unionism, and many whom benevolence had failed to 
 win now consulted their material interests and openly renewed 
 their allegiance. While every favor was extended to confessed 
 penitents, the lot of the recalcitrants became constantly harder. 
 As if to point the contrast, Rosecrans, on the very day the 
 board of claims was established, directed the arrest of a large 
 
 ""Ibid., February 28. 
 40 Ibid., February 21. 
 fl Ibid., February 27. 
 42 Ibid., March 18. 
 *Tbid., August 14. 
 
86 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 number of citizens of Nashville whose secessionist propensities 
 were well known. 44 The last loophole for Nashville secessionists 
 was closed on the 2ist by General Mitchell's uncompromising 
 order that all white persons over eighteen years of age residing 
 within the lines of his command, who had not already taken 
 the oath of allegiance and the non-combatants' parole and after 
 wards faithfully observed them, do so and give the required 
 bond within ten days, or go south of the lines of the army. 45 
 Disability, in whatever form, was no longer to be coddled. 
 On the 3d of May, a number of persons who had acted or 
 spoken in hostility to the government were directed to remove 
 north of the Ohio river, where their influence would be in 
 nocuous, and to remain there until the close of the war, under 
 penalty of arrest and trial as spies, if they returned to 
 Tennessee. 46 On the 23d of June, the confiscation act went 
 into full effect in Nashville and Davidson county through the 
 appointment of a commissioner (Charles Davis) to take posses 
 sion of and collect the rents on the property of Confederates, 
 rent or lease it at his discretion, subject to Johnson's approval, 
 and hold the receipts to the order of the United States gov 
 ernment, as represented by the governor. 47 No longer could 
 it be said, as in Buell's day, that rebels were protected and 
 loyal men left to suffer without redress. 
 
 **Ibid., April 15. 
 
 48 Ibid., April 22. 
 
 *J. P., vol. lv 1906. 
 
 * T lIbid., vol. xxxii, 7039. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 MILITARY AND POLITICAL REVERSES OF 1863 
 
 In the history of the restoration of civil institutions in 
 Tennessee, the exciting summer months of 1862 are only an un 
 eventful interlude. No progress was possible , while the rival 
 armies wrestled desperately on her soil, her cities were turned 
 into military camps or beleaguered strongholds, and raiding 
 cavalry scoured the country. On only one section of the state, 
 the west, was the hold of the Union army secure, as the result 
 of Grant's victories .in the spring, and that section, unfortunately 
 for the progress of the Union cause, was overwhelmingly for 
 the Confederacy. 
 
 Despite the hostile public sentiment, an attempt was made 
 to hold an election for municipal officers in Memphis on the 
 26th of June, under the protection of the military. The Union 
 ticket was the only one in the field, and only about seven 
 hundred votes were cast. Fear kept many from the polls. The 
 voters were required to take the oath of allegiance to the 
 United States, which excluded many more. At a liberal esti 
 mate, not more than a third of the citizens then in the city 
 voted. 1 John Park was re-elected mayor. The result could not 
 be considered encouraging from a Union standpoint. The mass 
 of the people declined actively to participate in the restoration 
 of a civil government bearing the stamp of loyalty, heavily as 
 they felt the burden of military rule. 2 
 
 The Union men of the western counties, however, whose 
 yearning for a government of laws did no violence to their 
 political convictions, urged the governor to new efforts. He 
 was deluged with petitions importuning him to hold the regular 
 elections for members of the Federal Congress in the 9th and 
 loth districts. County meetings pressed this course on him in 
 resolutions. 3 
 
 1 Memphis' vote in peace times was nearly 5,000. 
 3 New York Tribune, July 4, 1862. 
 3 J. P., vol. xxvi passim. 
 
88 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 Lincoln's anxiety for signs of political regeneration in the 
 border states was almost painful in its intensity. He watched 
 eagerly for an excuse to push forward the boundaries within 
 which the people themselves acknowledged the sovereignty of 
 the United States. To this end, notwithstanding the precarious 
 situation of the army, he sent, in October, commissioners to 
 Tennessee, Louisiana, and Arkansas, states in which the Union 
 army had established itself, to stimulate popular sentiment favor 
 able to holding congressional and state elections and securing 
 representation of the state in the Federal Senate. The gover 
 nors were requested to lend their heartiest cooperation to this 
 movement. "In all available ways," ran the instructions, "give 
 the people a chance to express their wishes at these elections. 
 Follow forms of law as far as convenient, but at all events 
 get the expression of the largest number of the people possible. 
 All see how such action will connect with and affect the proc 
 lamation of September 22. Of course the men elected should 
 be gentlemen of character, willing to swear support to the 
 Constitution, as of old, and known to be above reasonable 
 suspicion of duplicity/' 4 
 
 The proclamation of the 22d of September (1862) referred 
 to by the president, was, of course, the famous one declaring 
 the purpose of the war to be the restoration of the constitutional 
 relations between the United States and the seceded states, 
 asserting the purpose of the president to recommend com 
 pensation for the slaves in all states not in rebellion that 
 should voluntarily free their bondmen, and announcing eman 
 cipation by the executive, on the ist of January, 1863, of all 
 slaves in the states still in arms against the government. 5 By 
 promptly taking steps to reinstate herself as a member of the 
 Union, Tennessee would therefore share in any financial relief 
 afforded by Congress to loyal slave states and her own con 
 gressmen would have a hand in the measures adopted. The 
 effect of the proclamation upon the slaveholders was immediate, 
 but hardly such as to please or encourage Lincoln. Slaves 
 
 4 O. R., series iii, vol. ii, p. 675. 
 
 5 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. vi, p. 96. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 89 
 
 were gathered up and carried south as expeditiously as passible. 
 Whole plantations were depopulated. 6 
 
 Although but cold comfort had been derived from his previous 
 experiments with popular sentiment, Johnson resolved on one 
 more attempt to gratify the president. On the 8th of December, 
 he issued a proclamation 7 for elections on the 29th for mem 
 bers of Congress in the 9th and loth districts, where the 
 activity and the petitions of the Unionists encouraged some 
 faint hopes of success. Pursuant to the policy of committing the 
 restoration of the state to its conspicuously loyal citizens, the 
 governor added to the legal requirements for electors that of 
 loyalty established to the satisfaction of the judges of elections, 
 who, on their part, were to take oath to exclude all persons 
 whose devotion to the Union they suspected. 
 
 The proclamation had announced the belief that a majority 
 of the voters of these districts had given evidence of their 
 allegiance to the Constitution and laws of the United States. 
 The grounds for any such inference are not apparent. The 
 districts, which lay along the Mississippi boundary and in 
 cluded Memphis, were in the cotton-growing section, devoted to 
 slavery, and had been secessionist from the start. The citizens 
 had acquiesced, perforce, in the military occupation, but, with 
 few exceptions, expressions in favor of the Union were of the 
 perfunctory, time-serving variety. The comment of a corre 
 spondent of the Indianapolis Sentinel regarding the "Unionism" 
 of Nashville at this time, applies with even greater force to 
 West Tennessee. A citizen with whom he has conversed, he 
 says, is in favor of the Union "provided the government will 
 agree to redeem the Confederate bonds with Lincoln greens. 
 He thinks that all rebels should be pardoned in full, and* 
 Southern war expenses, including the cotton burnt, farms, rail 
 roads and bridges destroyed by both parties, and the general 
 expenses should be assumed by the Washington government, 
 and then the Constitution should be amended so as to guarantee 
 a veto power at least to the Southern states. . . , He assured 
 me there was no other 'kind of Unionism' in this country, 
 
 8 Nashville Union, November 27. 
 7 Ibid., December Q. 
 
90 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 except a few fanatics of the Andy Johnson school, who could 
 not muster a corporal's guard in all Tennessee. I guess the 
 man is more than half right." 8 
 
 That this hardly overstated the attitude of the people, the 
 governor must have appreciated after reading the resolutions' 
 adopted by a mass meeting of representatives of Hardeman, 
 Hay wood, and Fayette counties on the I5th of December to 
 nominate a candidate for the loth district. Starting with the 
 observation that the time had come when Tennessee should be 
 represented in Congress, on the principle that participation in 
 governing one's self is preferable to being governed by others, 
 and declaring for "an honorable and speedy peace and a re 
 construction of the Union on the old terms of the Constitution," 
 the paper closed with instructions to the prospective represen 
 tative of the district "to oppose the emancipation proclamation 
 of President Lincoln and to endeavor to procure the passage 
 of some law which will enable masters to recover their fugitive 
 slaves and which will enable loyal citizens to receive full pay 
 ment for all losses inflicted on them by the Federal army, 
 including the loss of slaves." This was arrant copperheadism. 
 General Brayman, who commanded the post at Bolivar, reported 
 the proceedings of the meeting to Johnson with the remark 
 that resolutions so lacking in the patriotism demanded by the 
 occasion could hardly aid the purpose of the government. 10 
 Perhaps it was as well for the prestige of the president and 
 the governor that a well-timed raid by Forrest on the day set 
 for the elections prevented the opening of the polls and the 
 registering of an insignificant vote or the choice of anti-ad 
 ministration congressmen. 11 
 
 Indeed, the political situation depended entirely upon the 
 success or failure of the army, and so far the army had done 
 nothing decisive. Bragg and the guerillas remained in full 
 force in the state. To eject them was now a part of the great 
 
 "Ibid., December 14. 
 'J. P., vol. xxviii, 6149. 
 " Ibid., 6148. 
 
 11 Contested Election Cases, House of Representatives, 3?th Congress, 
 3?d session, no. 46. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 91 
 
 project conceived by the war department, involving the con 
 quest of the southwestern states by a simultaneous eastward 
 advance of all the Federal forces from Tennessee on the north 
 to Louisiana and Texas on the south, and the crowding back of 
 the rebellion upon the Atlantic seaboard. In pursuance of this 
 plan, Rosecrans took the offensive against Bragg, and, on the 
 2d of January, 1863, defeated him at Stone River 12 and pushed 
 him south to Tullahoma, thus almost recovering the position 
 out of which Buell had been manoeuvred in August. The 
 victory, so Johnson wrote to Lincoln, greatly rejoiced the friends 
 of the Union and discouraged the Confederates, but increased 
 their bitterness; still, not enough had been done. Nothing 
 could accomplish so much to win back Tennessee as the eviction 
 of the enemy from East Tennessee and the resulting conviction 
 of the people that the government was succeeding in reestablish 
 ing its sway throughout the state. 13 
 
 At this most critical juncture, the president's emancipation 
 proclamation appeared. From its operation Tennessee, alone 
 of the seceding states, was excepted, and thus placed in a 
 conspicuous and unique relation to the Federal government. 
 The exception was made at Johnson's request. 14 Tenacious of 
 his pet theory that the states had never been out of the Union 
 and that the loyal citizens of Tennessee retained in full vigor 
 all their personal and property rights, he most earnestly desired 
 them, in their sovereign capacity, to do away with the institution 
 of slavery by their own voluntary act. Originally a slave-holder 
 and a defender of slavery as based upon vested rights which 
 the government was bound to respect, he had been impelled by 
 the logic of events to the view that the institution was in 
 compatible with a free government and that one or the other 
 must fall. This idea once grasped, his choice was made. The 
 preservation of the "best government under Heaven" was his 
 consuming passion. His stand was already taken early in 1862. 
 
 13 Popularly known as the Battle of Murf reesboro. The battle itself was 
 hardly more than a draw, but the results favored the Union army. 
 
 18 O. R. } series i, vol. xx, part ii, p. 317. 
 
 14 J. G. Elaine, Twenty Years of Congress, vol. i, p. 446. I can find no 
 categorical confirmation of this statement, but it seems to have been gen 
 erally believed that Johnson was behind the measure. 
 
92 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 At a gathering in Nashville on the 4th of July, he had said: 
 "I am for this government above all earthly possessions, and 
 if it perish, I do not want to survive it. I am for it, though 
 slavery should be struck from existence and Africa swept from 
 the balance of the world. I believe, indeed, that the Union is 
 the only protection of slavery its sole guarantee; but if you 
 persist in forcing this issue of slavery against the government, 
 I say, in the face of Heaven, give me my government and let 
 the negro go!" 15 His devotion to the poor white laborers from 
 whom he sprang and whose representative he was, and his 
 enthusiasm for democracy and equality of opportunity made it 
 easy for him to break with slavery as the source of privilege. 
 "I am for a government based on and ruled by industrious, 
 free white citizens, and conducted in conformity with their 
 wants, and not a slave aristocracy," he asserted. 16 The excep 
 tion of Tennessee from the proclamation, he told the president, 
 had disappointed and disarmed many enemies of the govern 
 ment in the state. The important thing was to have the people 
 understand it. 17 
 
 Already in December, the Nashville Union, in close sympathy 
 with Johnson, had come out definitely in favor of emancipation. 
 Slavery, it mantained, had fallen as the direct result of the 
 war. It could not exist under current conditions. The slave 
 owners were ruined. Their slaves were of no value to them, 
 but rather a source of expense and further impoverishment. 
 "Instead of adding their former reputed value to the wealth 
 of the South, we have better reason to double the sum of 
 their estimated value, and subtract it from our aggregate 
 wealth." 18 R. J. Meigs, a former attorney-general of the state 
 and a lawyer of distinction, urged not only that the slaves of 
 rebels be seized as constituting part of their resources for 
 continuing the war, but also that the right to hold them be 
 annulled in order "to obtain security against a repetition of 
 the wrong in the future." 19 Late in February, Johnson himself 
 
 19 Savage, The Life and Public Services of Andrew Johnson, p. 269. 
 
 16 Nashville Union, August 25. 
 
 11 O. R., series i, vol. xx, part ii, p. 317. 
 
 18 Nashville Union, December 3. 
 
 "Ibid., June 27. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 93 
 
 started on a speech-making tour through Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
 New Jersey and New York, and at Nashville, his point of 
 departure, he delivered, on the 26th, an address, 20 the substance 
 of which he repeated to the audiences all along his route. As 
 always, his great theme was the preservation of the Union. 
 "The time has come and is now open us," he reiterated, "to 
 teach the South and North that institutions are not to exist 
 here that are more powerful than the government itself. If 
 it is banks, put it down ; if it is aristocracy, put it down ; if it is 
 slavery, put it down. . . . Has slavery a right to agitate 
 the government and shake it to its center, and then deny to 
 the government the privilege to agitate slavery? . . . Never 
 ground your arms until the Constitution is enforced and the 
 enemies put down. ... I say you dishonor yourselves and the 
 graves of your offspring, if you let them sleep there upon the 
 confines of a Confederacy established upon the remains of this 
 government." 
 
 On the 2jd of April, great interest and excitement were 
 aroused by the publication of a declaration of principles 21 by 
 the Nashville Union Club, "one of the largest and most intelligent 
 associations which were ever organized in Tennessee." 22 The 
 members proclaimed their loyalty to the Constitution and the 
 Union. Union leagues were to be formed throughout the 
 state to assist in the work of restoration and to furnish the 
 civil and military authorities with reliable information. The 
 war must be continued until the rebellion was crushed, and 
 all disloyal men must be deprived of their property and ex 
 cluded from participation in the government and enjoyment of 
 the franchise during a period of probation at least as long as 
 that required of "unbiased and unprejudiced foreigners." The 
 lovers of freedom of every land were invited to settle in Ten 
 nessee in place of the traitorous aristocrats. Finally, an im 
 pressive and radical position was taken on the question of 
 slavery. "We do most solemnly affirm, as the result of our 
 life-long acquaintance, and of our intimate familiarity with all 
 
 20 Ibid., March 3, 1863. 
 
 21 Ibid., April 23. 
 
 22 Ibid. 
 
94 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 its workings, that the institution of slavery tends to dishonor 
 labor and smother enterprise; is incompatible with an intelligent 
 public policy, sound morality, the safety and permanency of 
 the Republic, the development of the resources of the state; 
 that it roots out the industrious, and has the effect of lessening 
 the free population of the country." On these grounds its 
 abolition was demanded at the earliest practicable time consistent 
 with "safety to the slaves and justice to loyal masters." 
 
 The considerate treatment of Tennessee by the president on 
 the slavery issue clearly helped the Union cause; but a far 
 more invigorating tonic was the success of the Northern armies. 
 Their hold on the western part of the state constantly strength 
 ened, while Bragg had been driven almost off its soil. Were he 
 again defeated by Rosecrans, only a precipitate retreat would 
 save Buckner in East Tennessee. The Confederates were dis 
 couraged. The magnitude to which the war had grown utterly 
 surpassed anything they had dreamed of a year before. Their 
 state was almost destroyed already. "They have," said the 
 Union, "awakened at last to a realization of the fact that the 
 civil war is involving them in a ruin which if prolonged a few 
 months, will be remediless, so far as they personally are con 
 cerned, while a future of unknown horrors will await their 
 innocent children." 23 Real love for the Union had made no 
 perceptible progress. The great majority would doubtless still 
 have rejoiced at the expulsion of the Union army from the* 
 state, but this, it became more and more apparent, was im 
 possible. Their slaves ran away or were carried off and the 
 owners left destitute. Foraging parties stripped the farms. 
 The citizens themselves were conscripted by the Confederates, 
 particularly the poorer classes, who began to realize that they 
 were fighting and suffering for a cause the success of which 
 would bring them nothing better than they had had in peace 
 under the old government. Abstract theories of states' rights 
 and sovereignty had little place in hearts torn with anguish 
 for the death of loved ones and the loss of all earthly posses 
 sions. Many who had sought the dissolution of the Union 
 
 83 Ibid., January 27. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 95 
 
 were now eager, from utter exhaustion and misery, to give up 
 the struggle and accept any settlement that would bring peace. 
 
 The month of June witnessed the final episode in the political 
 history of the Confederacy in Tennessee. According to the 
 state constitution, the regular congressional elections fell in 
 August of the current year, and the Union party hoped for 
 a victory by Rosecrans in time to stimulate the movement for 
 peace and restoration and afford assurances against a repetition 
 of the fiasco of the previous December. That the secessionists, 
 whose hold in the state was restricted practically to East Ten 
 nessee, indubitably hostile to them, would also attempt an election, 
 could hardly have been anticipated. However, in May, a procr 
 lamation by Governor Harris and an unsigned call published 
 in the Chattanooga Rebel of May 23d announced a convention 
 to be held at Winchester, in Franklin county, on the I7th of 
 June, to select candidates for governor and a general congres 
 sional ticket. "It is more important," declared the call, "that 
 this duty should be performed now than at any other previous 
 period in our history. We must exhibit to the enemy our 
 unalterable firmness of purpose and determination to preserve 
 and perpetuate our free institutions." As the Union armies 
 dominated the state, no regular method of naming the delegates 
 was possible. Both the citizens and the Tennessee regiments 
 in the Confederate service were requested to send representatives 
 chosen by public meetings "or such other mode as they may 
 deem best," and exiles and representatives from counties within 
 the enemy's lines were invited to attend for their counties. 
 
 The convention which assembled in response to this call was, 
 of course, in no legal sense representative. It decided to regard 
 "all loyal citizens of the state" present as delegates for their 
 respective counties, many of which were within the lines of 
 the Union army. Resolutions of endorsement and thanks to 
 Governor Harris were adopted and Harris himself addressed 
 the meeting. Judge Robert L. Caruthers was nominated for 
 governor on the third ballot and a full congressional ticket was 
 also drawn up. 24 
 
 *Ibid., May 30, June 28; Nashville Dispatch, June 27. 
 
96 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 Meanwhile, the Union leaders had not been blind to the 
 advantages of an election in August under the sanction of the 
 state constitution and the control of the army. Their call, 
 signed by Maynard, Brownlow and others, appeared on the 
 2oth of June and, in purposely vague terms, summoned "those 
 who desire to maintain the state government in connection with 
 the Federal Union as it stood prior to the rebellion and the war" 
 to meet at the capitol in Nashville on the ist of July. 25 Irregu 
 larities characterized this convention 26 as well as its Confederate 
 predecessor at Winchester. Refugees from East Tennessee and 
 other sections, where no delegates could be chosen, and soldiers 
 from Tennessee regiments were admitted to seats. Forty counties 
 were represented and each county was, by resolution of the 
 convention, allowed one vote for every five thousand white 
 inhabitants. 
 
 Those who hoped for a complete harmony of thought and 
 action among the Unionists were promptly disappointed by the 
 appearance of dissension on several points of high importance. 
 First, the delegates disagreed vigorously as to the purpose and 
 powers of the convention. The radicals wished it to nominate 
 candidates for Congress and the state legislature. Many favored 
 the nomination of a civil governor and all the other state officers, 
 to be elected at the same time as the legislature. To omit 
 these from the ticket, they held, was to depart unnecessarily 
 from the constitution, which required the election of all the 
 officers in August. Moreover, to have a military governor, who 
 was not responsible to the people of the state, to deal with an 
 elected legislature, would produce a hopeless jumble of authority. 
 A resolution, championed by J. B. Bingham of Memphis, pro 
 posed that the convention itself constitute Governor Johnson 
 provisional governor of the state thus, in the view of its pro 
 jectors, fortifying him with the sanction of the people whom 
 the delegates professed to represent and request him to issue 
 writs of election and appoint the necessary agents to enable the 
 people to elect all the state officers provided for in the con 
 stitution on the day fixed by that instrument. Another resolu- 
 
 * Nashville Union, June 23. 
 
 38 Ibid., July 2-8, July 18; Nashville Dispatch, July 3. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 97 
 
 tion contemplated the election by the convention of a governor's 
 council of three members, to consult with and advise Johnson 
 in the interests of the people until the full civil government 
 could be restored. 
 
 On the other hand, it was pointed out that the convention 
 was in no proper sense a representative body, but at best only an 
 irregular assembly of loyal citizens, for the purpose of taking 
 counsel with and advising the governor. It was ridiculous to 
 assume that such a body could do what the president of the 
 United States himself could not do make Johnson a provisional 
 governor. The president could only make him military governor 
 by virtue of the war power. No civil functions could be ex 
 ercised in Tennessee except in accordance with the state con 
 stitution or through the action of the sovereign people. Since 
 the constitution had been thrown out of gear by the rebellion, 
 the people must act, and their first action could not be along 
 the lines prescribed by the constitution, but must be an irregular 
 action to restore regularity, and the military governor was 
 in Tennessee for the express purpose of starting and directing 
 the movement of the people. His power was not derived from 
 the disordered state constitution nor from the people of Ten 
 nessee at all, but from the president. Power so derived was 
 plenary for the purpose contemplated. A civil governor and 
 other state executive officers represented the people of the state 
 as a whole. They could not properly be chosen until the state 
 was entirely clear of the enemy. This position was stoutly 
 maintained by the East Tennesseeans. Their section, they said, 
 was the most loyal part of the state, but it was at present in 
 the grip of the Confederacy, and to elect a governor now would 
 be to commit his choice to the less loyal districts of Middle 
 and West Tennessee. To "carry the ballot-box" to the East 
 Tennesseeans in the army, as had been proposed, was no ade 
 quate remedy for this grievance. Thousands of East Tennessee 
 loyalists were refugees or held down by terrorism and were 
 not in the army at all. The legislature, on the contrary, was 
 chosen not for the state as a whole, but for districts. There 
 was, therefore, no reason why all districts protected by the 
 Union army should not elect legislators in August. The legis- 
 
98 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 lature could assemble on the day fixed by law and adjourn 
 from day to day until, by the freeing of more districts and 
 the election of members from them, a quorum should be ob 
 tained. It could then proceed to redistrict the state and make 
 provision for future congressional and legislative elections, the. 
 machinery for which could be put in motion by the military 
 governor, who had full power to appoint sheriffs, judges of 
 elections, and other necessary officials, while, at the same time, 
 his military resources would protect the ballot-box from attack. 
 
 The latter view finally prevailed. The resolutions adopted 
 declared all laws, resolutions, and ordinances passed by the 
 legislature of Tennessee since April 12, 1861, the work of 
 usurpation and void, approved the action of the president in 
 appointing a military governor, indorsed Governor Johnson's 
 administration, emphasized the importance of electing a state leg 
 islature, and requested the military governor to issue writs and 
 appoint agents for such an election, to be held on the first 
 Thursday in August, or as soon thereafter as might be ex 
 pedient. The convention also named a Union state executive 
 committee, consisting of Horace Maynard, W- G. Brownlow 
 and John A. Campbell for East Tennessee ; M. M. Brien, William 
 P. Jones and Horace H. Harrison for Middle Tennessee; and 
 J. B. Bingham, J. M. Tomeny, and J. Leftrick for West Ten 
 nessee a sort of standing committee, to keep an eye on the 
 political situation and call another convention whenever they 
 deemed it desirable. 
 
 The convention had been held under cover of the renewed 
 activity of the army. Since his victory at Stone River in 
 January, Rosecrans had remained near Murfreesboro, facing 
 Bragg, who had taken position north of Tullahoma. The Union 
 general's purpose was not to fight a pitched battle at once, but 
 to prevent Bragg from cooperating with Johnston in Mississippi 
 until Grant disposed of the latter, after which the armies of 
 the Tennessee and the Cumberland would be far too strong for 
 any force that could be brought against them, and Bragg 
 would be compelled to flee southward, with the possibility of 
 being demoralized and routed on the way. In June, however, 
 information reached the war department that Bragg, while 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 99 
 
 amusing Rosecrans, was sending off reinforcements to both 
 Johnston and Lee. To prevent this, an immediate attack was 
 determined upon. While Rosecrans struck directly at Bragg, 
 Burnside, with the army of the Ohio, was to invade East 
 Tennessee, clear that district, and press southward toward 
 Chattanooga to cooperate with Rosecrans, in case Bragg should 
 turn on him. On the 24th, Rosecrans, by a flanking march 
 through Hoover's and Liberty Gaps to Manchester, succeeded 
 in turning Bragg's position at Tullahoma. The Confederates 
 were forced to abandon their whole line and fall back to 
 Chattanooga, which they strongly fortified. This reverse was 
 demoralizing to them, and even more so to their interests in 
 Tennessee. Though Burnside was delayed and did not enter 
 East Tennessee until the end of August, the rest of the state 
 was held by the Federal armies in July. 
 
 The regular election day was, nevertheless, allowed to pass 
 without any official action by the governor. He still adhered 
 to his oft expressed conviction, strengthened by sad experience, 
 that no adequate Union strength could be developed in the 
 state while the guerillas remained to menace the inhabitants and 
 East Tennessee was unredeemed. That this was the wise and 
 proper course, anyone who cared to review the history of past 
 failures must have conceded, but insinuations were not lacking 
 that Johnson was neglecting opportunities to perform his clear 
 duty, for the purpose of perpetuating his power, further per 
 secuting the aristocracy, and having his own way. 
 
 The Confederates, it seems, held some sort of an election on 
 the 4th of August, for Judge Caruthers was declared governor 
 and Tennessee representatives were admitted to the Richmond 
 Congress. The vote, except by Tennesseeans in the Confederate 
 army, must have been infinitesimal, and the whole proceeding 
 was but an empty formality, so far as any effect in Tennessee 
 was concerned. 27 
 
 Far more annoying to the administration was an, election held 
 on the same date by the conservative Union party in the state, 
 opposed to Johnson, for the purpose of ousting him from 
 power. This party was headed by Emerson Etheridge, who had 
 
 87 Miller's Manual of Tennessee, p. 46. 
 
ioo ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 been one of the most prominent and outspoken Union leaders 
 in East Tennessee during the secession period. An impressive, 
 bold speaker, of imposing presence and much fascination of 
 manner, he drew after him a considerable personal following. 
 Passionate in his attachment to the Union, he had broken with 
 the radicals on the slavery issue and violently opposed the 
 president's emancipation policy. He also assailed Johnson as 
 half-hearted in his efforts to restore order in the state, and 
 intimated that his devotion was rather to the cause of the 
 negro than to the cause of peace. His enemies retorted with 
 the cry of "Copperhead!" and explained his assaults on Johnson 
 as the bitter fruit of a disappointed ambition for the governor's 
 place. 
 
 The scheme devised by Etheridge and his friends was to get 
 out a vote for governor on the day fixed by the state constitution, 
 whether an election was ordered by Johnson or not; indeed, 
 they much preferred that the latter should remain quiescent, 
 for, in that case, their candidate seemed certain of a majority 
 of the vote cast and, under the constitution, would be the 
 legal governor by action of the people. This project was, in 
 part, actually carried out. By whatever means, some sort of 
 an election was held in Shelby, Bedford, and perhaps one 
 other county, and at least 2,500 votes were cast. The only 
 authority for such a proceeding was the clause in the state 
 constitution concerning elections, and all the legally prescribed 
 preliminaries of a regular election were wanting. Nobody had 
 proclaimed one except Governor Harris. Johnson had remained 
 entirely passive. There were no county officers to appoint judges 
 of elections. It was difficult to see how any governor could 
 maintain himself in the state except by the support of the 
 bayonets of the army. Yet the Etheridge party declared that 
 their candidate, General W. B. Campbell, had received all the 
 votes cast and was legally chosen civil governor, and Etheridge 
 himself went to Washington, and urged the president to rec 
 ognize and instate Campbell. His failure in this mission was 
 a foregone conclusion. Campbell's position was, indeed, ridicu 
 lous ; and the Nashville Union even asserted that another man, 
 friendly to the administration, had actually received several 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 101 
 
 hundred more votes than Campbell at the abortive election. 
 Probably there was no way of proving or disproving any state 
 ment that either party cared to make. For practical purposes, 
 the episode only furnished unfortunate evidence of the division 
 in the ranks of the Unionists and so tended to encourage the 
 "neutral" pro-slavery people and embarrass the government. 28 
 
 By the middle of August, Rosecrans had established a de 
 pendable line of communications by repairing the railroad from 
 Nashville, his depot, to Stevenson, Alabama, and was ready to 
 undertake the difficult movement from the latter point against 
 Chattanooga. His army proceeded cautiously over and between 
 the mountain ridges which covered the city and, by the first 
 of September, his right wing had reached Lookout Mountain 
 and threatened to cut Bragg's communications with the South. 
 Simultaneously, Burnside made his way over the mountains from 
 Kentucky into East Tennessee, the Confederates under Buckner 
 retiring before him. The loyal East Tennesseeans, who, since 
 the beginning of the war, had been left to the mercy of the 
 enemy and had paicl for their devotion to the Union with their 
 property and frequently with the risk of their lives, received 
 their liberators with transports of joy and lavished upon officers 
 and soldiers food and clothing from their scanty store. On the 
 ist of September, Burnside occupied Knoxville, and, on the 
 9th, General Shackelford captured the entire Confederate force 
 at Cumberland Gap, with its artillery and supplies. The army 
 then advanced rapidly southward to cooperate with Rosecrans 
 and attack Chattanooga from the north. Already, on the 8th, 
 however, Bragg had realized his predicament and had fallen 
 back into Georgia, while Rosecrans followed him closely through 
 the dangerous mountain passes. 
 
 These successes filled Johnson with joy. At last, it seemed, 
 the nerve-racking alternation of bright hopes and sickening dis 
 appointments was to end in the redemption of his state. Bragg 
 had been driven over the border; for the first time East Ten 
 nessee was free. The armies of the Confederacy were apparently 
 in full retreat : it remained only to attend to the guerillas ; then, 
 
 28 Nashville Union, October I, October 4; Memphis Argus, September 
 4; J. P., vol. xxxiii, 7279. 
 
102 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 in security and confidence, the Union men would answer the 
 summons to the polls and restoration would be an accomplished 
 fact. The secessionists were crushed by the disasters that had 
 befallen their arms and the feeling gained ground among them 
 that their only possible course was to make the best of an in 
 evitable situation. Moderate Unionists throughout the state 
 implored the government to take advantage of this reaction to 
 enlist as many Tennesseeans as possible in the work of recon 
 struction. As early as the 4th of August, the Nashville Press 
 had pointed out that, if only invariable loyalists were allowed 
 to participate, probably not one-tenth of the former citizens 
 could qualify, and urged the inclusion of "all who are now 
 ready to act with us, regardless of antecedents." Otherwise, it 
 observed, the Union party would remain in a hopeless minority 
 for twenty years. 
 
 Johnson himself was disposed to smooth the path for the return 
 of the rank and file of the disaffected to their old allegiance. 
 Weight of numbers, he knew, was of the utmost importance in 
 sustaining the new structure he proposed to erect. Toward the 
 secession leaders, on the contrary, he was implacable. "Many 
 humble men," he said, "the peasantry and yeomanry of the 
 South, who have been decoyed, or perhaps driven into the re 
 bellion, may look forward with reasonable hope for an amnesty. 
 But the intelligent and influential leaders must suffer. The tall 
 poppies must be struck down/' 29 To moral reprobation of con 
 scious, deliberate treason was added the fear that the secessionist 
 chiefs, if admitted to pardon and allowed to recover the rights 
 of citizens, would, once the army was withdrawn, regain their 
 ascendency with the people and use it to depose the Union 
 leaders and visit them with retribution. "We wonder," re 
 marked the Nashville Union, "how many of the Union men of 
 Nashville would have received an amnesty, and how many se 
 questrated Northern debts would have been paid, had this plot 
 succeeded. ... If treason be not a crime, then strike the word 
 crime from the, lexicon ; if a traitor be not the greatest of all 
 criminals, and the southern rebel leaders the greatest of all 
 traitors, then let felons be honored with an apotheosis, and let 
 
 28 Nashville Union, August 25. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 103 
 
 us canonize the names enrolled on the Newgate calendar." 30 
 On the 5th, the Union published an "officially authorized" 
 statement of the governor's own policy. "Governor Johnson," 
 it declared, "proposes issuing writs of election for a legislature, 
 at the very earliest practicable day; that is, when the progress 
 of our military operations is such that loyal citizens can go 
 to the polls in safety, and when sympathizers of the rebellion 
 will no longer dare, backed by the presence of Confederate 
 troops and by guerilla terrorism, to control the policy of the 
 state. Regard will also be had to the disposition manifested 
 by the people to resume their former privileges in the Federal 
 Union. They must indicate in some way a desire to vote for 
 their officers, as loyal citizens. Elections will not be forced upon 
 them against their will. . . . The delay in issuing writs of 
 election hitherto has been, as all intelligent observers must have 
 seen, not a matter of choice, but of inexorable and painful 
 necessity. Practically, it has been impossible to hold Union 
 meetings of the people, or go through the form of election in 
 one-fifth of the counties of Tennessee. We doubt whether any 
 one of those who have been most urgent for holding elections 
 and restoring civil government would at any time within the 
 past twelve months have run the risk of making speeches for 
 the Union and against the rebel government at any precinct ten 
 miles from a Federal encampment. Throughout the state at 
 large the loyal people are unorganized, while the ramifications 
 of rebel organization extend everywhere, in the shape of cavalry 
 bands, or guerilla troops, organized for pillage and murder, or 
 such lodges as Knights of the Golden Circle. . . . Why issue a 
 writ of election for a county, when a guerilla band of from 
 twenty to fifty might visit every precinct in the county on the 
 day of election? We must bear in mind that the people, es 
 pecially all the loyal people, have been disarmed and can't defend 
 themselves. ... To invite the people to vote for loyal can 
 didates under these circumstances, before the overthrow and 
 complete expulsion of the rebel military power, would be to 
 invite both people and candidates to destruction. ... It is the 
 ardent desire of the government that Tennessee shall also be 
 
 80 Ibid., August 26. 
 
104 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 represented in the national councils, as soon as practicable, and 
 writs of election will be issued for the purpose of electing con 
 gressmen. It is the intention also to appoint judges for the 
 county and circuit courts, to hold office pro tempore, until their 
 successors can be regularly elected. In brief, it is designed to 
 restore all the branches of the state government, in some cases 
 by temporary appointment, and in all cases by elections so 
 soon as the condition of the state will admit of such a step." 
 
 Economic reasons were not lacking to reinforce the political 
 arguments for reconstruction. Save in Nashville, Memphis, 
 and a few other points relieved by the disbursements of the 
 occupying army, the people of Tennessee were in very real dis 
 tress. The country had been stripped almost bare by the con 
 tending forces. Millions of dollars beyond the production of 
 the last two years would, in the opinion of the Nashville Press, 
 be required to save the people from starvation and nakedness. 
 Since the products of the state had dwindled into insignificance, 
 purchasers of supplies had been compelled to draw on their 
 reserve of capital and to pay from it at the advanced prices 
 resulting from the inflation of the currency and other conditions 
 brought on by the war. The average advance in prices in two 
 years was estimated at one hundred per cent. The only possible 
 alleviation would come, thought the Press, through a return to 
 loyalty. Tennessee would then become the basis of supply for 
 the Union army. As such, her agriculture and industries would 
 be most carefully protected and "instead of being harried and 
 stripped as she has been and still is by Federal armies that 
 won't pay rebels and by Confederates that can't pay anybody," 
 her products would command high prices in good money. 31 
 
 On the nth of August, General Hurlbut, the Federal com 
 mander at Memphis, expressed to Lincoln his belief that Ten 
 nessee was prepared to adopt a fair system of gradual emanci 
 pation and return to the Union. As soon as East Tennessee 
 should be liberated and able to participate in the work, he advised 
 that a legislature be elected, which, in turn, should call a 
 convention, and restoration could be accomplished in sixty days. 
 "Then," he comments with sober naivete, "we can use upon the 
 
 31 Nashville Press, August 7. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 105 
 
 Tennessee troops in Southern service the same tremendous lever 
 of state pride and state authority which forced them into hostile 
 ranks." 32 Hurlbut did not disclose the source of his information 
 as to this remarkable prospective face-about by the West Ten- 
 nesseeans. He seems to have shut his eyes to the fact that 
 the real levers which forced them into the Southern army 
 personal conviction and an all but unanimous public sentiment 
 would not be available to force them out again, even if a 
 handful of citizens should succeed in going through the forms of 
 a loyal election. 
 
 Coincidently with the advance of Rosecrans and Burnside, 
 Charles A. Dana, the assistant secretary of war, visited Tennessee 
 to observe the operations of the armies and their effect on 
 political conditions in the border states, and, on the 8th of 
 September, he had a most interesting interview with Johnson. 33 
 The governor was greatly cheered by the aspect of affairs, and 
 particularly by the realization of his hopes for East Tennessee. 
 There was now, he thought, every prospect of a successful re 
 construction, and the work was to be pushed. He proposed 
 promptly to appoint the judges and set the courts in operation, 
 and to follow this up by proclaiming a general election in the 
 first week in December for a governor and other state officers, 
 a legislature, and members of Congress. Care would be taken 
 that only loyal citizens voted or were candidates for office. 
 When the legislature assembled, he would urge on it immediate, 
 unconditional emancipation, both as a moral obligation and as 
 an indispensable inducement to the immigration of the free labor 
 necessary to repeople the state and develop its resources. In 
 his opinion, slavery was, in fact, already dead in Tennessee, 
 but it was desirable to abolish it legally, and he expressed no 
 doubt that the legislature would do so, though immediate eman 
 cipation was not certain. The great majority of the people now 
 favored freeing the negro, but were in doubt regarding his status 
 after he was freed. The movements of the army, the governor 
 complained, were much too slow ; months of precious time had 
 been wasted in constructing useless fortifications. Rosecrans 
 
 83 O. R., series, i, vol. xxiv, part iii, p. 588. 
 93 Ibid., vol. xxx, part i, p. 182. 
 
106 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 was a patriot at heart, but he had fallen under bad influences. 
 Truesdail was holding up the whole army while he and his 
 friends fattened on contracts. 
 
 For some months, Johnson had 'been in correspondence with 
 the president regarding the proper time and method for restoring 
 the state. He had visited Washington in the spring and sub 
 mitted to Lincoln a complete proposition embodying his views 
 and the results of his experience, which the latter had approved. 34 
 Thus all was in readiness for immediate action as soon as a 
 decisive victory by Rosecrans and Burnside should furnish as 
 surance that the Union occupation of the state was to be per 
 manent. The events of early September were to Lincoln the 
 turning of the tide, so long and painfully awaited. On receiving 
 the news of Bragg's evacuation of Chattanooga, he telegraphed 
 to Johnson : "All Tennessee is now clear of armed insurrec 
 tionists. You need not be reminded that it is the nick of time 
 for reinaugu rating a loyal state government. Not a moment 
 should be lost. You and the cooperating friends there can better 
 judge of the way and means than can be judged by any here. 
 I only offer a few suggestions. The reinauguration must not be 
 such as to give control of the state and its representation in 
 Congress to the enemies of the Union, driving its friends there 
 into political exile. The whole struggle for Tennessee will have 
 been profitless to both state and nation if it so ends that Gov 
 ernor Johnson is put down and Governor Harris is put up. 
 It must not be so. You must have it otherwise. Let the recon 
 struction be the work of such men only as can be trusted for 
 the Union. Exclude all others ; and trust that your govern 
 ment so organized will be recognized here as being the one of 
 republican form to be guaranteed to the state, and to be pro 
 tected against invasion and domestic violence. It is something 
 on the question of time to remember that it cannot be known 
 who is next to occupy the position I now hold nor what he will 
 do. I see that you have declared in favor of emancipation in 
 Tennessee, for which may God bless you. Get emancipation 
 into your new state government constitution and there will be 
 no such word as fail for your case." 35 
 
 34 Ibid., series iii, vol. iii, p. 819 ; J. P. vol. xxxiv, 7447. 
 
 38 O. R., series iii, vol. iii, p. 789; Lincoln's Complete Works, vol. ix, p. 116. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 107 
 
 These injunctions of Lincoln have been quoted at length, be 
 cause they are the very best answer to some of the severest 
 criticisms on Johnson's acts in 1864. Johnson was in complete 
 accord with the president, but, appreciating the gravity of the 
 step he was about to take, he requested a delegation of authority 
 directly from Lincoln, under the clause of the Federal Con 
 stitution securing to each state a republican form of government, 
 to exercise all powers necessary for that purpose. 36 This he 
 promptly received, substantially in the terms he suggested, but 
 with two modifications which the president designed to remove 
 every impediment to his freedom of action. Instead of being 
 authorized himself to carry out the constitutional guarantee, 
 he was empowered so to act as to require the government to 
 do so; and a clause in his original draft committing him to 
 the ante-bellum constitution of Tennessee was dropped by Lincoln, 
 lest it embarrass a movement to frame an entirely new con 
 stitution. 37 
 
 The machinery of agitation was at once put in motion to 
 create interest in the coming event. Mass meetings were held 
 in all parts of the state. Johnson himself was a frequent and 
 forceful speaker. His efforts were chiefly directed to showing 
 that the process of reconstruction was a natural and painless 
 one and would bring only good to the people like the restora 
 tion of the human body from sickness to health. "Here lies 
 your state," he said, "a sick man in his bed, emancipated and 
 exhausted, paralyzed in all his powers, and unable to walk 
 alone. The physician conies. . . . The United States sends an 
 agent, or a military governor, whichever you please to call him, 
 to aid you in restoring your government." He outlined the 
 method the administration proposed to adopt, and declared that 
 only the obstinacy of the citizens prevented the immediate and 
 thorough cure of their sick state. 38 
 
 Without warning, all these high hopes were dashed and the 
 Unionists crushed back in despair for again the army failed. 
 Rosecrans, believing that Bragg's reverses had completely de- 
 
 38 O. R., series Hi, vol. iii, p. 823. 
 
 3(7 Ibid., p. 825. 
 
 38 Frank Moore, Speeches of Andrew Johnson, p. xxix. 
 
io8 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 moralized him, eager, if possible, to destroy his force, and 
 stung, perhaps, by complaints of his former sluggishness, pur 
 sued the Confederates hotly through the mountains, dividing 
 his army to expedite his progress. Bragg, however, was in no 
 such straits as Rosecrans supposed. He had his men in hand 
 and, what was far more important, he had received Longstreet's 
 entire corps from Lee's army as a reinforcement. Suddenly 
 he turned upon the pursuing foe before they could emerge from 
 the mountains. Rosecrans was taken aback and his confidence 
 gave place to alarm. By desperate efforts he succeeded in ex 
 tricating his army from the immediate danger of being destroyed 
 piecemeal and, by a retrograde movement, concentrated it near 
 Chickamauga Creek, but he had been shaken and unnerved, the 
 elan of the advance was gone and, when Bragg pressed the 
 attack, he seemed bewildered. A vaguely worded order opened a 
 gap in the Union line, into which the enemy thrust themselves, 
 smashing Rosecrans' whole right and centre and scattering them 
 in confusion. Only the heroic stand of General Thomas with 
 the left averted a rout, and allowed the broken troops to recover 
 and make good their retreat to Chattanooga. 39 This victory 
 enabled Bragg to detach Longstreet to operate against Burn- 
 side and, by the middle of November, the army of the Ohio 
 had been driven out of all the southern part of East Tennessee 
 and was shut up in Knoxville, short of supplies and in the 
 gravest danger. Most of what had been gained by the laborious 
 efforts of the summer was lost again, and the president and 
 governor could but resume their weary vigil and abandon any 
 idea of reconstructing Tennessee during the immediate future. 
 Nothing daunted by these disasters, the Federal government 
 projected a fall and winter campaign on a grander scale than 
 before. Rosecrans was relieved and Thomas succeeded him 
 in the department of the Cumberland. The three departments 
 of Tennessee, Cumberland, and Ohio, were placed under the 
 command of General Grant, and with this splendid army he 
 proceeded to retrieve the Union cause by an uninterrupted 
 
 "* Chickamauga still provides material for debate and recrimination. 
 The latest work on the subject is A. Grade's The Truth about Chicka 
 mauga. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 109 
 
 series of decisive victories. The battles of Lookout Mountain 
 (November 24) and Missionary Ridge (November 25) at 
 last shattered Bragg and drove him in confusion into Georgia; 
 and Sherman, hastening to the relief of Burnside at Knoxville, 
 compelled Longstreet, after a last desperate attempt to take the 
 city by storm, to retreat precipitately into Virginia (December). 
 The danger of a permanent Confederate occupation of Tennessee 
 had finally disappeared. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 PROGRESS OF REORGANIZATION 
 
 From the outbreak of the war until the first of December, 
 1863, the most important factor in Tennessee history had been 
 the army. Governor Johnson was obliged to accept a subor 
 dinate role, defer to the military policy of the generals, and 
 steer his course in accordance with their successes and failures. 
 But, after that date, the positions were reversed. The victories 
 of Grant carried the Union flag forward to other fields; the 
 process of reconstruction holds the centre of the stage and 
 suffers but one serious interruption from the invasion of Hood 
 in November, 1864. 
 
 The campaigns of 1863 had at last brought to the front 
 generals, Grant, Sherman, and Thomas, to whom the president 
 was convinced he could safely entrust the destruction of the 
 now tottering Confederacy, while he devoted himself to the 
 grateful task of restoring the Union and leading a reunited nation 
 to bury in oblivion the bitterness engendered by civil strife. To 
 this he bent his energy "with malice toward none, with charity 
 for all," and his magnanimous nature found a happy relief in 
 turning from the contriving of ruin to a labor of love. 
 
 Lincoln's policy is embodied in his proclamation of amnesty 
 and reconstruction 1 of the 8th of December, 1863. This familiar 
 document has been the subject of such detailed examination 
 and discussion that only the barest summary of its provisions 
 need be given here. By virtue of the Constitution and the acts 
 of Congress, the president offered a full pardon to all persons, 
 with the exception of certain specified classes, who had par 
 ticipated in the rebellion, and proposed to restore to them all 
 their property rights, except as to slaves and in cases where 
 rights of third parties had intervened, on condition of their 
 taking a solemn oath henceforth faithfully to "support, protect 
 and defend the Constitution of the United States and the 
 Union of the states thereunder" and all acts of Congress and 
 
 1 Annual Cyclopedia, 1863, p. 781. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE in 
 
 proclamations of the president relating to slaves passed during 
 the war, so far as these were not modified by the proper legal au 
 thorities. Whenever, in any state, a number of persons, qualified 
 as voters in that state under the election laws in force previous 
 to the act of secession and equal to one-tenth of those voting 
 in the state at the presidential election of 1860, should, after 
 taking the amnesty oath, reestablish a state government, republi 
 can in character and not in contravention of that oath, such 
 government should be recognized as the true government of the 
 state, entitled to all the guarantees and protection promised by 
 the Constitution. 
 
 So far as Tennessee was concerned, there was every reason 
 to expect that a far greater proportion than the required one- 
 tenth would participate in the work of restoration. The mani 
 fest weakening of the Confederacy and the inducements to loyalty 
 held out in the conciliatory messages and speeches of Lincoln 
 and Johnson had produced among the despairing, war-weary 
 population a sort of latent Unionism or rather, perhaps, a dis 
 position to acquiesce in any honorable settlement that would 
 bring peace which only awaited the absolute assurance that 
 the rebellion was crushed in order to declare itself. The pro 
 nounced Unionists were pushing actively for reconstruction, 
 which meant for them political plums as well as personal security. 
 The Nashville council of the Union League an organization 
 claiming to represent sixty thousand voters, with branches 
 throughout the state, formed to protect Union men and further 
 the Union cause presented resolutions to Johnson in November, 
 which were indorsed by several of the allied councils. 2 These 
 begged the governor to declare null and void all elections and 
 appointments that had occurred in Tennessee, pronounce all civil 
 offices vacant, and fill them himself with unquestioned, uncon 
 ditional Union men. The officers of Davidson county, they 
 pointed out, were chosen under the rule of the Confederacy. 
 The common council of Nashville contained former well-known 
 rebel sympathizers, and two-thirds of their appointees were of 
 doubtful loyalty. Such men could not be trusted to protect 
 the property of the government and its adherents. No election 
 
 2 J. P., vol. xxxviii, 8429. 
 
ii2 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 should be held until East Tennessee was free from rebel domina 
 tion. A final resolution laid down the "broad platform of Our 
 Country, let Our Country be right or wrong." The council 
 of the German members of the league went even further. They 
 indicted slavery as "contrary to reason and repulsive to hu 
 manity," "based on compromise and by no means on divine or 
 human right," and degrading to labor, declared that its abolition 
 would bring prosperity and happiness to the South, and favored 
 the continuation of Johnson's government until the people had 
 given ample proof of their loyalty and were ready to incorporate 
 a prohibition of slavery in their constitution. 3 
 
 On the other hand, a mass meeting at Memphis, on the 26th 
 of December, petitioned for the speedy establishment of civil 
 government in accordance with Lincoln's proclamation. On 
 those terms, they believed, two-thirds of the remaining resi 
 dents of Memphis and half those of the rural sections of the 
 same congressional district would favor restoration. They sug 
 gested that the administering of the oath, the registration of 
 those taking it, and the election of delegates to a convention 
 should all occur simultaneously, and if the total vote reached 
 the necessary tenth, the convention could assemble without 
 delay. 4 From Knoxville came requests for the institution of a 
 Federal court to try political offences an"d violations of the 
 treasury regulations and compensate Unionist creditors out of 
 enemies' property still available for that purpose, but being 
 rapidly destroyed or carried away. 5 Thomas, from Chattanooga, 
 assured the governor that the revival of civil authority would 
 restore confidence and reinforce the Unionists by many who 
 still delayed, uncertain of the intentions of the government. 6 
 About the middle of January, 1864, Lincoln sent to Tennessee, 
 as he already had to other states, an agent with blanks and 
 instructions to enroll citizens who would take the oatE. 7 
 
 Two difficulties in connection with the oath arose to perplex 
 
 3 Ibid., vol. xxxvii, 8160. 
 
 *Ibid., vol. xxxviii, 8296. 
 
 6 IbicT, 8455, 8499. 
 
 * O. R., series i, vol. xxxii, part ii, p. 64. 
 
 7 Nicholay and Hay, Life of Lincoln, vol. v5ii, p. 443. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 113 
 
 Johnson. The first, as to the proper officers to administer it, 
 was promptly resolved by the president's explanation that this 
 might be done by the military governor, the commander of the 
 department, and "all persons designated by them for that pur 
 pose." 8 A second complication was far more serious. A decided 
 objection to taking the oath at all developed among those who 
 had been unswerving Unionists from the beginning, on the 
 ground that such a requirement implied a doubt as to their 
 notorious loyalty and placed them in the same category with 
 repentant rebels. 9 Lincoln, however, was explicit that the oath 
 should be taken by loyal as well as disloyal. "It does not hurt 
 them," he said, "clears all question as to the right to vote, and 
 swells the aggregate number who take it, which is an important 
 object." 10 From this statement it appears that Lincoln originally 
 intended subscription to his oath to carry with it the franchise. 
 Such was certainly the general view at the time, and, on that 
 assumption, General S. P. Carter had suggested that the de 
 mands of the "notorious Unionists" for a sharp distinction be 
 tween them and the disloyalists who had recovered the ballot 
 with amnesty be met by dividing the oath-takers into two 
 separate lists a loyal men's record and a disloyal men's record 
 the former to constitute a roll of honor from which the names of 
 those against whom any defection from allegiance could be 
 shown should be excluded. 11 
 
 With Johnson, vindictive by nature and worn out and aggra 
 vated by two years of constant futile attempts to make some 
 impression upon the stubborn inertia of a population always 
 disloyal at heart, the magnanimous views of Lincoln found little 
 sympathy. Before the middle of January, in a letter to Horace 
 Maynard intended for the president's eye, he had expressed his 
 opinion that the voters "should be put to the severest test." 12 
 His contention, as stated by the Nashville Union, was that the 
 
 8 O. R., series iii, vol. iv, pp. 31, 46; J. P., vol. xxxix, 8521. 
 
 9 Nicholay and Hay, Life of Lincoln, vol. viii, p. 444; Nashville Union, 
 January 2, 1864. 
 
 10 O. R., series iii, vol. iv % p. 46. 
 
 11 Nashville Union, February 16. 
 13 O. R., series iii, vol. iv, p. 31. 
 
ii4 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 amnesty oath should be regarded simply as securing a pardon for 
 traitors who desired it; "one who takes it sets himself right 
 again with lawful authority." 13 By no means all who were ad 
 mitted to it should, by that act alone, gain the ballot. The 
 clamor of the loyalists against -being classed indiscriminately 
 with newly returned prodigals afforded him a chance to advance 
 a new proposition in accord with his own ideas that a second 
 and more stringent oath be required of voters, which should 
 at once distinguish them from those who, though not whole 
 heartedly regenerate, had gained amnesty, and should bind them 
 unequivocally and actively 'to the Union party. 
 
 Once determined upon the course to be pursued, he lost no 
 time in setting to work. Presumably at his instigation, a mass 
 meeting assembled at the capitol in Nashville on the 2ist of 
 January, to give the initial impulse to the reconstruction move 
 ment. It was addressed by the governor in a speech 14 which, 
 though alleged to be extemporaneous, gives every evidence of 
 being most carefully prepared to measure up to a great occasion, 
 of the momentous importance of which the author was fully 
 aware. In any case, it is the ablest, most elaborate, and most 
 impressive effort made by him during his entire term as gov 
 ernor, presenting a complete epitome of his political principles, 
 motives, and projects, and indicating to the people the proper 
 path to be followed for the redemption of the state. 
 
 He begins with a reiteration of his favorite theory that 
 Tennessee has never been out of the Union. Its functions 
 "have only been paralyzed its powers are only remaining in 
 active." The president, "in the exercise of his constitutional 
 obligations, may appear in the state of Tennessee in the person 
 of an agent" and restore to the people a republican form of 
 government. Since the functions of the government are sus 
 pended, the president's agent "supplies the vacuum." "Is there 
 anything outside of the principles of the Constitution in that? 
 Is there any usurpation in it? There must be a beginning 
 
 M Nashville Union, January 2. 
 
 14 Speech of Governor Andrew Johnson on the Restoration of State 
 Government, pamphlet, Library of Congress. For the sake of clearness, 
 I have slightly changed the order of sentences. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 115 
 
 somewhere. In the absence of government there must be steps 
 taken, though they may be irregular, for the purpose of bring 
 ing back order. . . . In turning to the laws and Constitution of 
 the state we find that when vacancies occur by death, resigna 
 tion, or otherwise, the executive shall make lemporary appoint 
 ments, and these appointees shall hold their places until their 
 successors are elected and qualified. Then we see how easy 
 the process is. Begin at the foundation, elect the lower officers, 
 and, step by step, put the government in motion. ... If it 
 is done in a half dozen counties, it is so much done, and that 
 much done we can do more." 
 
 Turning to the vexed question of the proper persons to 
 participate in the active work of reconstruction, the governor 
 prefaces his discussion with the assumption that every individual 
 engaged in the rebellion "has been, by his own act, expatriated." 
 "Shall we lay down a rule which prohibits all restoration? . . . 
 It is easy to talk that rebels shall not vote and Union men 
 may, but it is difficult to practice this thing. . . . We want 
 some standard by which we can put him that has been a traitor 
 to the test, though he has repented. . . . We are told upon 
 pretty high authority that sinners sometimes repent; and we 
 are told that in this repentance there should be works meet 
 for repentance there should be some evidence of it ... I 
 know it has been said by some Union men that we should not 
 be placed in the attitude of culprits of men asking for par 
 don. . . . But in the election of officers who are to take charge 
 of the government we want some test, at least, that the men 
 who vote are loyal and will act with Union men. . . . We 
 want a hard oath a tight oath as a qualification for every 
 body that votes. . . . On the other hand, if there is anybody 
 in this large assembly of voters who needs or desires a pardon 
 or amnesty, whether he seeks it in good faith or for the purpose 
 of saving a little negro or any other property, I would say to 
 him, 'Go over there; there is an altar for you. There is Presi 
 dent Lincoln's altar, if you want pardon or amnesty if petition 
 ing to the president for executive clemency. If you want to es 
 cape the penalties you have incurred by violations of law and 
 the Constitution, go over there and get your pardon. We are 
 
n6 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 not in need of it; we wish not to take that oath; that is the 
 oath for him who has committed crime.' '' 
 
 After the local machinery in the counties shall have been 
 put in operation, the governor continues, the people have to 
 consider the best means for reestablishing the central govern 
 ment of the state. Here also he has no doubt as to the proper 
 course. "To carry out the spirit and letter of the Constitution, 
 as the people are the rightful source of political power, I 
 should say the executive would have the right to invite the 
 people to have a convention to restore government to the peo 
 ple. . . . We find in the constitution of this state that you 
 can amend the constitution by the legislature, but it takes six 
 years to amend it in that way. But when we recur to the bill 
 of rights, which is a paramount part of our state constitution, 
 we find that the sovereign people have the right to alter, amend, 
 or abolish their form of government whenever they think proper, 
 and in their own way. This is perfectly consonant to the Con 
 stitution of the United States, and admits tHe 'great principle 
 that all political power is inherent in the people. ... In other 
 words, let us have the sovereign present in the shape of dele 
 gates. . . . Some that have been nominally Union men, and 
 some that have been rebels . . , turn to the constitution as 
 it now stands and say, let us get the legislature back here ; 
 let us patch up things and have no fuss. They think 61 that 
 little clause in our constitution which provides that the legis 
 lature shall not emancipate slaves without the consent of their 
 owners. Don't you see? Then if they get the legislature Back 
 under the constitution as it is, they think they can hold on to 
 the little remnant of negroes that is left the disturbing element 
 that has produced all this war. . . . Let us have the people 
 here, and when they assemble in convention, when the sovereign 
 is present, he can do all that the legislature can, and he can 
 do a great deal more. . . . Let the people come forward and 
 speak, and in speaking upon the negro question, my honest 
 convictions are that they will settle it, and settle it finally. . . , 
 
 "The rebels commenced the destruction of the government 
 for the preservation of slavery, and the government is putting 
 down the rebellion, and in the preservation of its own existence 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 117 
 
 has put slavery down, justly and rightfully, and upon correct 
 principles. . . .1 have had some come to me and say, 'Governor 
 Johnson, are you in favor of immediate emancipation?' I tell 
 them yes. 'Do you want to turn the negroes all loose upon 
 the country? What will we do with them?' Why, sir, I reply, 
 as far as emancipation is concerned, that has already taken 
 place. Where are your negroes? They answer, 'They are run 
 ning about somewhere/ I ask, what do you call that? They 
 seem to be already turned loose. The institution of slavery 
 is turned into a traveling institution, and goes just where it 
 pleases. It is said that the negroes are not qualified to be free; 
 because they have been slaves so long, they are unfitted to be 
 freemen, and shall not be permitted to enjoy the privileges of 
 freemen; but by way of making them competent, it is proposed 
 to keep them in slavery nineteen or twenty years longer. In 
 the first place, it would not do to have them free, because they 
 have been slaves, and, in the next place, they should be kept in 
 slavery to qualify them for freemen. ... In fact, negroes are 
 emancipated in Tennessee to-day, and the only remaining ques 
 tion for us to settle, as prudent and wise men, is in assigning the 
 negro his new relation. Now, what will that be? ... The 
 negro will be thrown upon society, governed by the same laws 
 that govern communities, and be compelled to fall back upon 
 his own resources, as all other human beings are. . . . Political 
 freedom means liberty to work, and at the same time enjoy 
 the product of one's labor. ... If he can rise by his own 
 energies, in the name of God let him rise. In saying this, I do 
 not argue that the negro race is equal to the Anglo-Saxon. . . . 
 If the negro is better fitted for the inferior condition of society, 
 the laws of nature will assign him there. ... If there are any 
 here who have lived in the county of Davidson, you know 
 many men have been afraid and alarmed even to speak upon 
 the negro question when the large slave-holders were about. 
 Some of you Have been deprived of your manhood so long 
 upon this question, that when you begin to talk about it now, 
 you look around to see if you are not overheard by some of 
 your old masters. . . . 
 
 "There are men owning slaves themselves that will be emanci- 
 
n8 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 pa ted by this operation. It is not my devotion to the black 
 man alone, but a greater devotion to the white men and the 
 amelioration of their condition. ... If you cut up these large 
 cotton farms into small-sized farms, each man with his little 
 family getting hold of part of it, on good land will raise his 
 own hogs, his own sheep, beef-cattle, his own grain, and a 
 few bales of cotton, better handled and a much better article 
 than we have ever had heretofore. With a greater number of 
 individuals, each making a few bales, we will have more bales 
 than ever were made before." 
 
 The meeting, completely in the hands of the governor, passed 
 resolutions in full accord with his desires and requested him to 
 call a constitutional convention whenever, in his judgment, the 
 state might be represented from all its parts. Declaring that the 
 rebellion had laid waste the state, prostrated its civil institutions, 
 and brought death, anarchy, crime, and ruin upon the people, 
 and that slavery was the cause of all this evil, "an unmitigated 
 evil in itself/' and already "dead by the acts of its own friends," 
 it pledged itself to labor for the election of delegates to the 
 convention who favored "immediate and universal emancipation 
 now and forever." 15 Messages from other parts of the state 
 reached Johnson, praising his speech and the sentiment of the 
 meeting and urging him to act promptly in accord with his 
 opinions. 
 
 Thus encouraged, the governor proceeded to inaugurate the 
 process he had outlined. On the 26th of January, he issued a 
 proclamation 16 for an election on the 'first Saturday in March 
 for county officers justices of the peace, sheriffs, constables, 
 trustees, circuit and county court clerks, registers and tax- 
 collectors. Inasmuch as this election is to be held in a state 
 of the Union under the Federal Constitution, the proclamation 
 asserts, "it is not expected that the enemies of the United States 
 will propose to vote, nor is it intended that they be permitted to 
 vote, or hold office." 17 Therefore, to be entitled to the franchise, 
 
 13 Moore, Rebellion Record, vol. viii, doc. 358. 
 
 1(5 Ibid., doc. 340; J. P., vol. xxxix, 8655. 
 
 17 "Thus to invoke the Constitution was like Satan quoting Scripture." 
 Jefferson Davis, Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, vol ii, 
 p. 287. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 119 
 
 the would-be voter must, besides satisfying the requirements of 
 the constitution and laws of the state in force previous to the 
 act of secession, subscribe to the following stringent oath: 
 "I solemnly swear that I will henceforth support the Con 
 stitution of the United States and defend it against the assaults 
 of all its enemies; that I will henceforth be and conduct my 
 self as a true and faithful citizen of the United States, freely 
 and voluntarily claiming to be subject to all the duties and 
 obligations, and entitled to all the rights and privileges of 
 such citizenship; that I ardently desire the suppression of the 
 present insurrection and rebellion against the government of 
 the United States, the success of its armies and the defeat 
 of all those who oppose them, and that the Constitution of the 
 United States, and all laws and proclamations made in pur 
 suance thereof, may be speedily and permanently established 
 and enforced over all the people, states, and territories thereof ; 
 and further, that I will hereafter aid and assist all loyal people 
 in the accomplishment of all these results. So help me God." 18 
 
 All judges and officers holding the elections were to take still 
 another oath 19 to permit none to vote who had not satisfied 
 the requirements of the proclamation. The elections were to 
 be conducted under the code of Tennessee, which provided 
 that the inspectors and judges of elections should be appointed 
 by the county court. If the court did not or could not perform 
 that duty, it might be done by the sheriff, with the advice of 
 three justices of the peace; or, failing them, by any justice of 
 the peace; or, failing him, by any three freeholders. Since, 
 in many counties, no loyal county officers existed, the governor 
 affirmed that he would designate citizens to appoint the inspectors 
 and judges in those counties. 
 
 The exaction of such an oath served notice on the former 
 secessionists that only by a complete change of heart or by 
 false swearing could they obtain a voice in the counsels of 
 the government. Assurances of future loyalty and acquiescence 
 in, the accomplished results of the war the only conditions in 
 Lincoln's wise and generous offer were now by no means 
 
 18 Moore, Rebellion Record, vol. viii, doc. .340; J. P., vol. xxxix, 8655. 
 " Ibid. 
 
120 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 enough. The restored citizen must "ardently desire" and ac 
 tually assist in the suppression of his former secessionist kins 
 men and friends and the reestablishment over them of the Con 
 stitution and laws they hated, against which they had taken 
 arms, and for the overthrow of which they were still contending. 
 In February, Maynard, the attorney-general, threw another 
 bomb among the amnestied disloyalists by deciding that since 
 citizenship, forfeited by rebellion, could be regained only by 
 subscribing to the amnesty oath, and the state constitution, under 
 which the election was to be held, restricted the ballot to those 
 who had been citizens for six months, no person who had 
 ever been guilty of a disloyal act could vote until six months 
 after taking the oath. 20 
 
 Subjected to these tests, the ardor for reconstruction cooled. 
 To many judicious Union men it seemed that Johnson was 
 going too far and, by unnecessary severity, was defeating his 
 own purpose. The president was besieged with protests against 
 the new oath, but his confidence in Johnson's ability and under 
 standing of the peculiar conditions to be dealt with in Ten 
 nessee decided him, as always, to allow the governor loose 
 rein. He must, Lincoln told Maynard, who had expressed to 
 him apprehensions, be permitted to proceed in accordance with 
 his own judgment, but he need not be expected to deviate to 
 any ruinous extent from the president's plan, and a hasty 
 perusal of his program had revealed no such deviation. 21 
 Ruinous the deviation, as it proved, was not; but that it was 
 a deviation of the most radical character, the president could 
 hardly have pretended to deny. Obviously, however, those who 
 had hoped that a mortifying rebuke and the overruling of his 
 arbitrary action were in store for Johnson were to be disappointed. 
 To an inquiry as to whether the election officers could dispense 
 with the governor's oath and administer only the amnesty oath 
 to voters, 22 Lincoln replied: "In county elections you had better 
 stand by Governor Johnson's plan ; otherwise you will have 
 conflict and confusion." 23 In a later and more detailed commu- 
 
 20 Nashville, Dispatch, February 12. 
 
 21 Nicholay and Hay, Life of Lincoln, vol. viii, p. /m. 
 
 22 J. P., vol. xl, 8894; Annual Cyclopedia, 1864, p. 763. 
 
 23 J. P., vol. xl, 8893- 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 121 
 
 nication to Secretary East, he declared that no conflict existed 
 between the two oaths, and that no person who had taken one 
 to secure a pardon should object to taking the other as a test 
 of loyalty. "I have seen and examined Governor Johnson's 
 proclamation/' he said, "and am entirely satisfied with his plan; 
 which is to restore the state government and place it under 
 the control of citizens truly loyal to the government of the 
 United States." 24 
 
 If Lincoln was not disposed to place obstacles in the gov 
 ernor's way, the people of Tennessee were. His overbearing 
 egotism, inability to conciliate, and determination to carry out his 
 own ideas without variation or concession aroused against him 
 a powerful, resolute opposition, which drew support from many 
 sources. Many who were diplomatically silent in public, worked 
 secretly to undermine him and destroy his influence. A call 
 was circulated in Memphis (February) for a meeting of con 
 servative Unionists, at which it was planned formally to condemn 
 the oath as exceeding the governor's authority and out of har 
 mony with the president's policy, but the Johnson party suspected 
 its purpose, attended in a body, and succeeded in substituting 
 resolutions indorsing his course. 25 Others, who shrank from 
 actually denouncing the oath, busied themselves with devices 
 for getting around it. A favorite line of reasoning was that 
 the governor had no right to prescribe any oath to the people; 
 therefore the whole proceeding was void, and a person might 
 take the oath, which had no legal sanction, without actually 
 swearing at all. The Nashville Press, which had once warmly 
 supported Johnson, but had become disgusted and alienated by 
 his arbitrary methods, advocated this subterfuge. "If this course 
 of reasoning should be generally adopted and acted out," it 
 commented cynically, "we don't see how the governor can manage 
 to checkmate the move. He may construct a new or additional 
 oath he may even require folks to swear that they love him 
 for his candor and humanity and disinterested patriotism, and 
 'ardently desire' that he shall be perpetual dictator of Ten 
 nessee they can still take it in the same sense they offer to 
 
 M Ibid, vol. xli, 8956; O. R., series iii, vol. iv, p. 141. 
 2(1 J. P., vol. xl, 8847. 
 
122 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 the other the sense of void nothingless." 26 Even the Confederate 
 cavalry leader, Richardson, advised his friends to "take any 
 oath that the Federals may prescribe, but to see to it and 
 control the election at all hazards." 27 That these suggestions 
 were largely followed was the conviction of the Nashville Union, 
 which, during the following summer, alleged that hundreds who 
 had taken both oaths were clandestinely corresponding with men 
 in the Confederate army and sending them information and sup 
 plies. 28 Similar arguments were brought to bear to induce the 
 Union soldiers to desert, on the ground that their enlistments 
 were no longer binding, since the war was now carried on not 
 for the Union, as they had been told, but for the emancipation 
 of the slaves. 29 
 
 More irregularities followed in various parts of the state. 
 In fact, the sole animating purpose of the administration party 
 seemed to be to prevent, by hook or crook, the election scheduled 
 for the 5th of March from degenerating into a humiliating fiasco, 
 For example, a rally was held in Nashville on the 3d, to ratify 
 nominations for county officers made by certain "unconditional 
 Union men" the previous evening. This done, the meeting, by 
 what authority does not appear, appointed a committee to ascer 
 tain who were entitled to vote at the coming election and to 
 "instruct the judges accordingly." The committee reported that 
 quartermasters and their clerks and all soldiers and government 
 employees who had been residents of the county for six months 
 were voters according to the provisions of the constitution, en 
 tirely ignoring a decision of the supreme court of the state 
 which construed the six months requirement to mean a fixed, 
 permanent residence extending over that period. The Union 
 pertinently asked: "Did ever 'a vigilance committee assume more 
 authority than this meeting?" 30 It is safe to assume that the 
 situation in other parts of the state was, to say the least, no 
 better than at Nashville. 
 
 * Nashville Press, February 28, 1864. 
 
 27 J. P., vol. xl, 8847. 
 
 28 Nashville Union, August 14 
 Ibid. 
 
 * Ibid., March 3. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 123 
 
 Under such conditions, the election of the 5th could only be 
 "a serious farce." 31 The total vote was perhaps between forty 
 and fifty thousand. Accuracy is impossible, because the officers 
 of some counties simply forwarded certificates of election, with 
 out giving the number of votes cast. The omission is unim 
 portant, however, for, considering the character of the electorate, 
 precise results have no significance. In some districts, no polls 
 were opened at all. 32 Four days before the election, Colonel 
 J. B. Dorr reported that he could not find a citizen of Humphries 
 county with manhood enough to accept an appointment to hold 
 an election there. 33 In Shelby county, the scandal was so great 
 that the governor felt compelled to declare the election void for 
 most of the offices and order another on the i6th of June. 34 
 Many Union citizens throughout the state refused to vote, on 
 the ground that the proceedings were fully as irregular as those 
 of the secessionists in 1861, and that they would not "compliment 
 the devil by adopting his programme." 35 The ultra-loyalists of 
 East Tennessee withheld their support, insisting that they should 
 not be required to take any kind of oath. The tendency of 
 the soldiers was to vote in cliques, under manipulation. It was 
 estimated that, had the amnesty oath been the only test, the 
 vote would have been nearly doubled. 36 The practical result of 
 the election was to provide officers for about two-thirds of the 
 counties of the state, but the whole affair brought no credit to 
 its instigators and placed the government in a weak and equivocal 
 position before the people. 87 Johnson himself suffered particularly 
 in his personal prestige. The Memphis Argus asserted that the 
 failure of reconstruction in Tennessee was chargeable not to the 
 people, but to the governor and his radical adherents, who de 
 manded an exact compliance "with their own ideas and isms." 
 The Argus urged the people to disregard Johnson and take up 
 the work themselves. As long as they allowed him to have 
 
 31 Ibid. 
 
 32 Ibid., March 8. 
 38 Ibid., March 23. 
 
 *J. P., vol. xli, 8986. 
 
 36 Nashville Union, March 10. 
 
 36 Ibid., March 8. 
 
 37 Ibid., March n, March 23; Knoxville Whig, March 12. 
 
124 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 his own way, so long would he "thwart every effort at reorganiza 
 tion which did not originate with him." 38 
 
 The storm of abuse to which he was subjected only steeled 
 Johnson's resolution. His dispatches to Lincoln express neither 
 disappointment nor uncertainty; on the contrary, he asserts his 
 determination to carry on the work of restoration exactly in 
 accordance with the plan already outlined by him forcing a 
 convention and immediate emancipation, if necessary, down the 
 very throats of the protesting conservatives. His organ, the 
 Times, denounced his opponents who were pressing for speedy 
 reconstruction by a legislature as aiming, while posing as cham 
 pions of constitutionality, to save slavery by avoiding a con 
 vention of the people; the governor, on the other hand, was 
 intent on applying directly to the people to kill and bury the 
 institution, which he maintained they would surely do. "There 
 is but one rope left unsevered which fastens Tennessee to-day to 
 the pirate-ship of rebellion. That rope is slavery, and it must 
 be cut instantly." 39 
 
 The serious discord which had developed in East Tennessee 
 during the March elections impelled Johnson to concentrate his 
 efforts upon that stronghold of Union sentiment, for the purpose 
 of lining up a solid loyal party in support of his policy. The 
 district was again in the extremities of distress. The armies 
 of Buckner, Burnside, Longstreet, and Sherman had lived off 
 it during the preceding fall and winter, and the little they had 
 left had been gobbled up by Morgan and Wheeler. Considerably 
 more than half the loyal voting population had either fled north 
 or was in the Union army. It was estimated that less than 
 five per cent, of the usual breadth of wheat could be sown in 
 the spring of 1864. Fences were down, barns destroyed, the live 
 stock had largely disappeared. Contributions from the North 
 were inadequate to meet the necessities of the people. Under 
 stress of three years of suffering and neighbor-warfare, a feeling 
 of fierce hatred had sprung up between loyalists and secessionists, 
 which had no counterpart in 1861. The old Union leaders, whose 
 conciliatory spirit had colored the resolutions of the Greenville 
 
 38 Quoted by Nashville Union, April 6. 
 
 39 Nashville Times and Union, March 24, April 26. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 125 
 
 convention, had now to deal with a party of relentlessly vindictive 
 young men Union soldiers, partisan fighters, and refugees who 
 had felt the mercilessness of the war in their persons, their 
 families, and their property, and were determined that their 
 enemies should have their full meed of retribution. This party 
 naturally attached itself to Johnson and took its stand upon the 
 principle no concessions to traitors. 
 
 It will be remembered that the Greenville convention, on 
 its adjournment in May, 1861, had authorized its president to 
 reassemble it whenever conditions required further action. John 
 son had thus a machine ready at hand to inaugurate his project 
 and affording him the opportunity grateful, doubtless, in view 
 of the hostility which his recent measures had engendered 
 to remain at first in the background, to watch its workings, 
 and to intrude himself only in case friction developed. Accord 
 ingly, at his suggestion, 40 the president, T. A. R. Nelson, assembled 
 the convention at Knoxville on the I2th of April. 
 
 Hardly had its deliberations begun, when it gave unmistakable 
 evidences that it was no suitable vehicle for the governor's 
 purposes. Its old leaders still adhered to the conservative prin 
 ciples which had always animated them, and, since they were 
 the convention officers, they were able to constitute com 
 mittees in sympathy with themselves. The radical interest was, 
 however, strong among the members, despite the fact that many 
 former delegates who favored that party were absent on service 
 with the army. The committee on resolutions, made up with a 
 conservative majority, could not agree upon a report, and finally 
 presented two, the majority favoring compromise with the South 
 along the lines of the Crittenden proposition, the minority sup 
 porting Johnson's plan, including emancipation. Neither of these 
 carried the convention. A movement to detach East Tennessee 
 as a separate state showed some vitality for a time, but suddenly 
 collapsed before the determined opposition of the governor him 
 self. The debate became acrimonious and, as no accommodation 
 could be reached and every hour increased the bitterness of the 
 contestants, an adjournment without further action was agreed 
 to on the I5th, to preserve any remaining shreds of harmony. 
 
 * Temple, Notable Men of Tennessee, p. 408. 
 
126 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 That the motion to adjourn obtained almost a two-thirds vote and 
 was the only important proposition that did not arouse hostility 
 is proof enough that the conservatives were anxious only- to 
 avoid committing themselves to anything. 41 
 
 But the Johnson party, disappointed in their hope that the 
 convention would surrender to their views, had no notion of 
 contenting themselves with a drawn battle. The day after the 
 adjournment, they held a mass meeting of their own, 42 on the 
 pretence that the officers of the convention had prevented a fair 
 expression of opinion by manipulating the committees. Oliver 
 P. Temple, an active participant in the proceedings of this 
 meeting, gives a highly interesting account 43 of the secret in 
 fluences which really determined its action. Resolutions un 
 qualifiedly indorsing the program and principles of the governor, 
 as embodied in his speech and the resolutions of the 2ist of 
 January, were drawn up in advance by Johnson himself, and 
 Brownlow was requested to offer them as his own. The latter, 
 though willing to do so, was incapacitated from reading them 
 to the meeting by the partial loss of his voice, and he suggested 
 Temple for that office. Johnson at once grasped at this proposal. 
 By connecting the names of two Whig leaders with his plan, 
 he would, he said, gain the friends of both, who together con 
 stituted a majority of the loyalists. Temple accordingly pre 
 sented the resolutions as Brownlow's, and Johnson referred to 
 them approvingly in his subsequent speech, as if he had never 
 before heard of them and was highly gratified by an unsought 
 and unexpected tribute to himself. As such, they passed the 
 meeting. Johnson had emerged with the least possible discredit 
 from a very bad situation. 
 
 Another illusive hope was held out to the tottering Unionists 
 by the approach of the National Union convention at Baltimore 
 for the nomination of a presidential candidate. The participation 
 of the Tennessee delegates in the proceedings would impart a 
 certain dignity to the party in the state, which would thus be 
 recognized as readmitted, for party purposes at least, to its ante- 
 
 41 Nashville Times and Union, April 16 ;Nashville Union, April 17, 19, 30. 
 
 43 Nashville Times and Union, April 27. 
 
 43 Temple, Notable Men of Tennessee, p. 408. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 127 
 
 bellum privileges. With this aim, the permanent executive com 
 mittee published, on the 3d of May, a call to unconditional 
 Union men to meet in the respective divisions of the state on 
 the 3Oth, to elect the delegates. Expressing their confidence that, 
 by the time of the November election, the people would be able 
 to vote in peace and security, they explained the interest of 
 Tennessee in the Baltimore convention and asserted her right 
 to be represented. Tennessee being entitled to ten delegates, 
 they suggested that East Tennessee send four, and the other 
 two divisions three each. 44 
 
 Regularity in choosing the delegates was clearly not to be 
 expected. Even with the best of intentions, the authorities could 
 do little, and they were disinclined to go to any unnecessary 
 trouble. The easiest way was best, when any way was illegal. 
 An unsigned notice, dated May 26, published in the Nashville 
 papers, convoked the loyal citizens of Middle Tennessee on the 
 2/th "to consult as to who shall represent them in the 
 Baltimore convention." This meeting, harking back, doubtless, 
 to the convenient generality of popular sovereignty, voted that the 
 citizens of the state, in mass convention at the state-house on 
 the 3Oth, should elect delegates for the state at large, and, on 
 the same day, the citizens of Middle Tennessee, at the same 
 place, should appoint the delegates for that section. 45 
 
 The newspaper accounts of the proceedings on the 3Oth 46 are 
 so confused that it is impossible to get at exactly what was done. 
 The meeting at Nashville, which was attended by delegates 
 chosen by gatherings of "unconditional Union men" from other 
 counties of the district, as well as by citizens of Nashville, elected 
 two delegates at large one from East and one from Middle 
 Tennessee and the three delegates of Middle Tennessee. It 
 also drew up resolutions similar to those of January 21 and 
 April 12, declaring for a constitutional convention to be called 
 by Governor Johnson, when the state could be fully represented, 
 favoring immediate emancipation, and asserting that "the gov 
 ernment of the United States and the governments of the states 
 
 44 Nashville Union, May 3 ; Nashville Times and Union, May 26. 
 
 48 Nashville Union, May 29. 
 
 46 Ibid., June i ; Nashville Times and Union, May 31. 
 
128 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 erected under the Constitution thereof are the governments of 
 the free white man, to be controlled and administered by him, 
 and the negro must assume that status to which the laws of an 
 enlightened, moral and high-toned civilization shall assign him." 
 The administration and war policy of the president were en 
 dorsed and his renomination recommended. Governor Johnson, 
 who, "by his unflinching courage and patriotism" had "endeared 
 himself to all American patriots, and by his long public services, 
 especially by the administration of affairs" during his term as 
 military governor, had "gained the entire confidence of all the 
 loyal people of Tennessee/' was named for the vice-presidency, 
 In East Tennessee, two separate meetings seem to have been held, 
 one at Chattanooga and one at Knoxville, at each of which two 
 of the four delegates alloted to that section were chosen. 47 The 
 West Tennessee convention was called together by the executive 
 committee of that section and the delegates of four counties, 
 chosen at mass meetings, were admitted to seats. Shelby county 
 was allowed ten votes and the other three counties five each, 
 and the three delegates to the Baltimore convention were elected 
 on that basis. 48 Both the East and West Tennessee meetings 
 declared for Lincoln and Johnson as the party nominees. 
 
 The hopes of the Unionists were realized when the Baltimore 
 convention admitted the Tennesseeans. To do so was to indorse 
 the Johnson doctrine that the state had not, because of the 
 action of a majority of her people, lost her place in the Union, 
 but all the old rights and privileges still appertained to her 
 loyal citizens, who now constituted the state. This view was 
 put forcibly before the convention by "Parson" Brownlow. His 
 picturesque personality and romantic history had won him an 
 enthusiastic invitation to address the meeting, and he took ad 
 vantage of this opportunity to protest against the rejection of 
 the Tennessee delegates. "I hope you will pause, gentlemen," 
 he said, "before you commit so rash an act as that, and thereby 
 recognize secession. We don't recognize it in Tennessee. We 
 deny that we are out. We deny that we ever have been out. 
 We maintain the minority first voted us out, and then a majority 
 
 47 Nashville Union, June 4. 
 
 48 Memphis Bulletin, May 31. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 129 
 
 whipped the minority out of the state with bayonets and drove 
 over a portion of our men to their ranks." 49 The principle was 
 affirmed beyond doubt or question when the convention nominated 
 Governor Johnson for the vice-presidency. Only a citizen of 
 a state could hold that office, and the selection of Johnson 
 placed the party stamp of disapproval on the contention of 
 Sumner that "a state pretending to secede from the Union" 
 must be regarded as a rebel state subject to military occupation 
 until readmitted to the Union by the vote of both houses of 
 Congress. 50 
 
 The summer months of 1864 provide a hiatus in the history 
 of reconstruction in Tennessee. The results of the efforts in 
 that direction had tended to discourage Union men and shake 
 their confidence in their ability to carry the state with them. 
 While some blamed the narrow policy of Johnson, others insisted 
 that rigor was the only possible remedy for the situation; that 
 the fact was, the bulk of the people were hostile to the Union 
 and determined to remain so, despite threats or blandishments. 
 The amnesty proclamation, it was felt, had done little good. Its 
 principles were admitted to be excellent, but correct principles 
 were naturally not comprehensible to rebels. By many it was 
 regarded as an indication of timidity on the part of the presi 
 dent, a disposition to trim to the wind. The Nashville Press 
 declared that Lincoln knew when he issued it that the Supreme 
 Court was bound to nullify the laws and proclamations to which 
 it referred, and that therefore, in offering secessionists amnesty 
 upon conditions which had no legal validity, he was, in fact, 
 proposing to receive them back unconditionally. On this ground, 
 it urged everybody to take and abide by the oath, which bound 
 them to nothing to which they could possibly object; then "the 
 Johnsonians" would "have no means of ultimately preventing 
 the recognition of the state upon a constitutional basis except 
 that of direct and open military coercion. 51 So generally was 
 this advice adopted that, the Times alleged, the session of the 
 
 "Ibid., June n. 
 
 60 Ibid. 
 
 61 Nashville Times and Union, May 26. 
 
130 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 Federal court in Nashville was made a mockery by former 
 leaders of the rebellion, who presented themselves and obtained 
 free pardons by taking the oath. "Till the rebellion shall be 
 fully put down, its armies effectually destroyed, and its leaders 
 tried and punished for treason, the policy of making citizens 
 out of rebels will be pernicious to the government." 52 Aggravated 
 by repeated evidences of the persistent and contemptuous dis 
 loyalty of men who complied with the formalities prescribed by 
 the government in order to receive trading privileges, protection, 
 and other advantages at its hands, while taking no part in any 
 open Union movement, remaining away from the polls, and 
 continuing unregenerate at heart, the unconditional Unionists, 
 both within and without the state, used every means to force the 
 administration to abandon lenity for coercion. A petition of 
 "Many Many very Many voters of Upper Tennessee" de 
 manded that the regiments engaged in protecting rebel property in 
 Middle Tennessee be sent back to restore order and security at 
 home. If this was not done, they said, Johnson's vote in No 
 vember would suffer, and the fact that he had deserted his old 
 neighbors in their distress would be published to the country. 53 
 J. B. Bingham wrote from Memphis that no more elections 
 should be held in the state until military commanders could be 
 had who would not show more favor to rebels than to uncon 
 ditional Union men. 54 From distant New York, Eli Thayer 
 importuned Johnson to confiscate the lands of rebels and fill 
 them with loyal settlers, thus enabling the state to dispense 
 with a standing army after the war. He believed that Lincoln, 
 by opposing confiscation, had prolonged the war eighteen months 
 and cost the country a million men and many millions of dollars. 
 A blow at the landed property of the rebels would kill slavery, 
 the root of the rebellion, and, if the plantations were divided 
 among the rank and file of the Confederate army, they would 
 take the oath of allegiance and have a permanent incentive to 
 keep it in good faith. "It is not enough to offer them starva 
 tion, as Lincoln does in his miserable amnesty proclamation," 
 
 60 Ibid. 
 
 83 J. P., vol xliv, 9532. 
 
 w Ibid., vol xlii, 9249. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 131 
 
 he said. "They went into the rebel service to escape that, and it is 
 folly to expect they will come out to secure it." 55 Johnson him 
 self wrote to Lincoln in May that he was satisfied the amnesty 
 would be seriously detrimental in reorganizing the state govern 
 ment, and asked that Tennessee be excepted from it. All possible 
 benefit to be derived from it, so far as the army was concerned, 
 had been already gained. It would be far better if, for the 
 future, each Tennesseean desiring pardon should be required to 
 apply directly to the president. He would thus be impressed 
 with his personal obligation to the government. "As it now 
 operates, its main tendency is to keep alive the rebel spirit, 
 in fact reconciling none. This is the opinion of every real Union 
 man here." 56 
 
 While the movement for a convention was permitted, for the 
 time, to hang fire, the governor busied himself with the long 
 delayed task of restoring the courts. In May, Judge Trigg 
 opened the United States circuit court for the district of East 
 Tennessee at Knoxville. 57 A chancellor, judge, and attorney- 
 general for the fourth judicial district of the state were appointed 
 in June; 58 and, the same month, Judge Brien issued notice that 
 the circuit court of the 9th district would sit in Williamson 
 county in July and in Davidson county in September. 59 The 
 county court of Marion county was organized early in July, 
 though Johnson was warned that its chairman and another mem 
 ber were rebel sympathizers, elected by rebels in expectation 
 of protection and favors in return, and that not a single lawyer 
 practicing in the court was certainly a loyal man. 60 In July, 
 the chancellors, judges, and district attorneys for the 3d, 4th, 
 6th, and 9th districts received their commissions. 61 
 
 Particularly interesting was the condition of the judiciary 
 at Memphis. That city had been virtually under military rule 
 since its capture in June, 1862, although the city government, 
 
 56 Ibid., vol xliii, 9438, 9440. 
 
 69 Ibid., 9372. 
 
 87 Nashville Union, May 26. 
 
 68 Nas'hville Times and Union, June 27. 
 
 69 Nashville Union, June 30. 
 "J. P., vol. xlv, 9968. 
 
 61 Nashville Times and Union, July 28. 
 
132 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 including the police court, was allowed to exist by suffrance 
 of the commanding general. This officer regulated the trade 
 and communication with the surrounding country and controlled 
 the rental of real estate belonging to secessionists. By his 
 orders, provost-marshals, with their guard, maintained order 
 and supervised the city police force. 62 In October, a military 
 commission was constituted to deal with offences against the 
 laws of war not cognizable by court-martial, 63 and in January, 
 1863, another commission was organized to try all criminal 
 cases laid before it by department, district, or post commanders, 
 the provost-marshal general, or district provost-marshals, and 
 empowered to punish by fine, imprisonment, or transportation 
 beyond the lines. Its decisions were subject to review by the 
 department commander. 6 * Similar provisions for the handling 
 of civil cases were not introduced at that time, perhaps on 
 account of the argument frequently advanced that there was a 
 manifest hardship in allowing a loyalist in New York to collect 
 his debt from a loyalist in Memphis, while the latter was estopped 
 by force of circumstances from recovering from a loyalist in 
 Mississippi. 65 
 
 In April, 1863, however, General Veatch, commander of the 
 post, appointed a civil commission of three citizens, "to hear 
 and determine all complaints and suits instituted by loyal citizens 
 of the United States for the collection of debts, the enforce 
 ment of contracts, the prevention of frauds, the recovery of the 
 possession of property, real or personal, and generally to perform 
 such duties and exercise such powers as can be done by a 
 court deriving its powers from military authority.'"' 66 This 
 commission continued throughout the war and offered to the 
 citizens of Memphis their sole opportunity to enjoy the ad 
 vantages of the civil law. It became the object of violent 
 attack and equally ardent defence by the opposing factions. On 
 the one hand, it was contended that two of the three com- 
 
 ** Birkhimer, Military Government and Martial Law, pp. 143-147. 
 63 O. R., series i, vol. xvii, part ii, p. 294. 
 **Ibid., vol. xxiv, part iii, p. 1067. 
 * J. P., vol. xxix, 6459. 
 *" Ibid., vol. xxxiv, 7447. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 133 
 
 missioners were not residents of the state and directed their 
 attention to perquisites and personal advancement, regardless 
 of the interests of the citizens; that the assessment of costs 
 was exorbitant and the people were systematically robbed. J. M. 
 Tomeny, a prominent radical Unionist, stated that in one typical 
 case, involving $38, the costs amounted to $40, and the net 
 profits of the commissioners from the fees collected during the 
 first three months of the session totalled $4500. The decisions 
 were said to be so vacillating, so inconsistent with established 
 precedents, that the commission had fallen into contempt with the 
 ablest members of the bar. No appeals were allowed and no 
 plea to the jurisdiction, and the stay laws of the state were 
 not regarded. Personal property was levied upon and sold in 
 three days after execution issued. Though the commission had 
 no authority to sell real estate, rents and profits were subject 
 to sequestration at its order. 87 J. B. Bingham charged that one 
 of the commissioners was courting rebel sympathizers with a 
 view to settling in Memphis as a "copperhead lawyer" and had 
 nearly driven every Union lawyer out of court. As a remedy, 
 the commission was declared to be worse than the disease it was 
 intended to cure. 68 
 
 On the other hand, it was alleged that the commission 
 answered all the requirements of the people and possessed their 
 confidence, that a change was inadvisable under existing con 
 ditions and was advocated only by office seekers and interested 
 politicians. 69 There seems to have been something in this claim ; 
 but a body of this sort was naturally not under the same salu 
 tary restraints as a regular court, and its champions entirely 
 overshot the mark when they went on to say that Governor 
 Johnson had no authority to establish courts in Tennessee at 
 all, since the constitution and laws of neither the United States 
 nor the state conferred such power on the governor, and it 
 could exist only as a war power, to be exercised by the officer 
 having the paramount military command in the city. 70 The 
 
 91 Ibid. 
 
 "Ibid., vol. xlv, 9833. 
 
 Mbid., 9908; Memphis Argus quoted by Nashville Times and Union, 
 July 21. 
 
 7 *J. P., vol. xlv, 9908. 
 
i 3 4 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 obvious reply was that any war power belonging to the presi-; 
 dent as commander-in-chief of the army and navy could be 
 delegated by him to any agent he might select ; and that Johnson 
 was not a civil governor at all, but Lincoln's military agent, 
 of military rank and detailed expressly to perform, among 
 other tasks, the special work of restoring the courts. 
 
 This work, not only for Memphis, but for the greater part of the 
 state, could, however, proceed but slowly. As the autumn of 1864 
 came on, the disorder increased. The Confederate cavalry took 
 advantage of Sherman's descent upon Georgia to spread havoc 
 in his rear and to harrass almost to distraction the Union forces 
 remaining in Tennessee. On the 24th of August, Forrest made 
 his famous dash into Memphis, nearly capturing Generals 
 Hurlbut and Washburn. Wheeler terrorized East and Middle 
 Tennessee, penetrated almost to Nashville, and cut the railroad 
 between that city and Murfreesboro. The brilliant and rapid 
 strokes of the partisan leaders utterly bewildered the Federal 
 commanders and, when they failed to check the raiders, judges 
 and sheriffs had little prospect of enforcing the law. Mean 
 while Thomas, from Sherman's army, did not cease to press 
 Johnson to get the courts speedily into full operation throughout 
 the state. This, he explained, would enable him to dissolve the 
 military commission which assessed damages upon rebel sym 
 pathizers for the acts of the guerillas in their neighborhood, 
 and would offer the loyal citizens a legal remedy through the 
 regular tribunals. 71 The unintentional irony of such a suggestion 
 must have struck the governor, but he answered in excellent 
 spirit, recognizing the desirability of carrying out Thomas' 
 recommendation, assuring him that the work was being pushed 
 as rapidly as possible, and indicating the difficulties in the way. 72 
 West Tennessee regained its equilibrium more quickly than 
 the rest of the state. Forrest was compelled to draw off east 
 ward, and, in October, the civil commission finally went out 
 of business and the criminal, common law and chancery courts 
 convened. 73 But the bickerings were not quieted. The pro- 
 
 n Ibid., vol. xlix, 701. 
 
 72 ibid., 738. 
 
 " Miller's Manual of Tennessee, pp. 179-187. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 135 
 
 ceedings of the courts promptly fell foul of General Dana's 
 orders regarding the militia. The judges complained to John 
 son that the business of the court took all the time of the court 
 officers, but the general had commanded that all, not exempt 
 from militia service, who failed to perform it, be arrested, fined 
 and imprisoned, and had told them that if militia duty conflicted 
 with civil duty, the courts must "bust up." 74 This, they assumed, 
 applied not only to judges, clerks, and other court officers, but 
 also to jurymen and witnesses. Judge Smith, of the common 
 law and chancery court, wrote in December that no quarterly 
 term could be held in January, because Dana refused to grant 
 passes to the justices outside the lines to come in, on the 
 ground that he did not believe loyal justices could live outside 
 the lines. 75 Dana's reply to Johnson's protest gives the whole 
 affair the aspect of a tempest in a tea-pot. His only purpose, 
 he said, was to have the enrollment of the militia complete and 
 every man assigned to his place in case of attack. After this 
 was done, the judge and other indispensable officers of the court 
 would be excused from active duty. "No effort will be spared 
 on my part," he assured Johnson, "to cooperate with you in 
 your work of reorganizing the loyal element." 76 Warm letters 
 in defence of Dana asserted that he was laboring "with an eye 
 single to the promotion of his country's cause" and that, be 
 cause he dared to "face the corruptions of the commercial 
 combinations" in Memphis, he was denounced by men inspired 
 by motives "less patriotic than mercenary." 77 Bingham and his 
 friends, who were acting as the mouthpiece of the governor 
 and dispensing political favors in Memphis, had, it was declared, 
 neither the respect nor the confidence of the community, and 
 Johnson was making a mistake in allying himself with them. 78 
 At the other extremity of the state, dissatisfaction was equally 
 great. Brownlow wrote, in November, that the Federal court 
 at Knoxville was "a complete farce," the worst rebels and 
 
 7 *J. P., vol. Hv, 1670. 
 
 TO Ibid., 1710. 
 
 w Ibid., 1816. 
 
 ^Ibid., vol. Ivi, 2106. 
 
 "Ibid., vol. li, 1021; vol. Ivi, 2106. 
 
136 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 traitors against whom indictments were found escaping with 
 only the payment of costs on taking the amnesty oath. 79 Con 
 sidering, however, the obstacles he had had to surmount, John 
 son had reason to be gratified at the progress made. By the 
 end of 1864, the circuit courts were open in the 4th, 6th, 
 8th, 9th, and I5th circuits, besides the criminal courts 
 of Davidson and Shelby counties. The 1st and 2d circuits 
 followed in January, 1865, an< ^ tne others were not far behind. 80 
 
 In tracing the restoration of the courts to a conclusion, it has 
 been necessary to defer the account of a serious reverse sus 
 tained by the administration in July, 1864, in the subversion 
 of the city government of Memphis. 81 From the outbreak of 
 the war, the metropolis of West Tennessee had been the dis 
 affected core of the most disaffected region of the state. Its 
 importance as a commercial entrepot particularly for the cotton 
 trade and its strategic situation on the Mississippi river and 
 the great railroad arteries of the Confederacy had made it the 
 constant centre of military operations and had caused it to be con 
 trolled primarily in the interests of the army. The details of 
 local administration, however, were left in the hands of an elected 
 government. Throughout the war, John Park had served unin 
 terruptedly as mayor. During the agitation in 1861, he had 
 embraced the extreme secession view and vehemently denounced 
 the Union ; but he had acquiesced in the occupation of Memphis 
 by the Federal army, had taken the oath of allegiance, and had 
 been allowed to hold his office. The unconditional Unionists 
 never ceased to shower denunciation on him and his board of 
 aldermen as traitors at heart, ready to betray the government 
 at the first opportunity. It was charged that they had obtained 
 their places by fraud at the last election, when six hundred 
 votes were polled in wards containing only three hundred voters 
 and men openly admitted having voted four times in each ward 
 in the city; that they used their right of appointing the judges 
 of election to name those who would look after their interests ; 
 that they represented the result as an anti-administration 
 
 Ibid., vol. liii, 1463. 
 
 79 Ibid., vol. liii, 1463. 
 
 80 Miller's Manual of Tennessee, pp. 182-184. 
 81 J. P., vol. xxxvi, 7897; vol. xlii. 9249. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 137 
 
 triumph, although they had made no such issue in the cam 
 paign. Bingham averred that General Hurlbut had resolved to 
 set the election aside altogether, but finally agreed with the 
 Union leaders that such a proceeding would appear to be a 
 backward step in the attempted progress toward civil govern 
 ment, and would be misrepresented at Washington. 
 
 While the strictures of the radical malcontents must be taken 
 with grave suspicion, it is certain that the Memphis government 
 was not according an enthusiastic support to the Union cause, and 
 was particularly at odds with the emancipation policy. In 
 October, 1863, the aldermen passed and the mayor approved a 
 set of ordinances for the regulation of the negroes in the city, 
 which contained certain rigorous provisions, including punish 
 ment by whipping. These "black laws," so called, became the 
 most formidable weapon of attack upon their f ramers. Also, the 
 cry of fraud was kept up, and that of corruption in office was 
 added. The Park party was said to control the entire Irish 
 element and to entertain high hopes of success at the ensuing 
 June elections. In apprehension of this, Bingham urged Johnson 
 to prevent the election and fill the offices by appointment. 
 
 If the undeniably loyal administration men had been able to 
 act in harmony, they would have had a fighting chance of suc 
 cess, but, as usual, dissensions shattered their organization. 
 Park himself had no idea of appearing before the public as a 
 suspicious character, and he participated in the National Union 
 convention on the 3Oth of May and asserted his complete loyalty 
 over his signature in the press. The National Unionists' original 
 candidate for mayor, Samuel T. Morgan, represented the con 
 servative element of the party and might possibly have held 
 the vote opposed to Park, had not some of the nominees on 
 the slate with him committed the tactical blunder of accepting 
 also nomination on the Park ticket. The radicals seized the 
 pretext thus offered to throw over the whole Morgan ticket and 
 present one of their own, styled ''unconditional Union," with 
 Dr. G. D. Johnson for mayor. At least two other minor can 
 didates were in the field. 
 
 This potpourri practically insured the victory of Park. The 
 only cloud on his horizon was a persistent rumor that, if he 
 
138 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 should be elected, General Washburn would depose him and take 
 the city government into his own hands. Park accordingly 
 wrote to the general, requesting an official statement, and re 
 ceived a chilling confirmation of his fears. The government, said 
 Washburn, had been both disloyal and inefficient and could no 
 longer be trusted to the present incumbents of office. 82 
 
 Despite this damaging blow, the chaos among the loyalists 
 was so great that Park carried the election on June 30 with 
 ease; and, true to his word, Washburn issued an order on the 
 2d of July, forbidding any of the elected officers to qualify and 
 appointing an acting mayor, recorder, treasurer, comptroller, 
 tax collector, tax-collector on privileges, chief of police, and 
 wharfmaster, who together were to form a board for the 
 government of the city, their resolutions and ordinances being 
 subject to revocation by the commanding general of the district 
 of West Tennessee or by a superior military authority. In justi 
 fication of this action, it was alleged that the municipal govern 
 ment had failed utterly during the past two years to discharge 
 its proper functions, and had shown disloyalty and lack of 
 sympathy with the government of. the United States and an 
 indisposition to co-operate with the military. "They have grown 
 from bad to worse, until a further toleration of them will not 
 comport with the sense of duty of the commanding general." 83 
 A second order, on the i6th, supplanted the board created 
 on the 2d by a new one to be known as "the provisional mayor 
 and council of the city of Memphis," with all the powers of the 
 old board of mayor and aldermen. 84 In fact, West Tennessee 
 remained under the wing of the army until the close of the war. 
 
 82 Moore's Rebellion Record, vol. xi, doc. 591 
 
 83 Digest of the Charters, etc. of Memphis; Standard History of Mem 
 phis (J. P. Young, editor), p. 135. 
 
 84 Standard History of Memphis (J. P. Young, editor), p. 136. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1864 
 
 As the time for the presidential election approached, the 
 Union men of Tennessee had to face the necessity of taking 
 positive action. After securing the participation of Tennessee 
 in the Baltimore convention, as if she were an active state in the 
 Union, and aiding in the nomination of one of their own num 
 ber as vice-president, they could not, with honor, permit the 
 election day to find them in an inglorious paralysis, content 
 tamely to relinquish the right for which they had so loudly 
 contended, or hesitating to support their leader at the polls. 
 On the other hand, the prospect of an election at this time gave 
 them pause. In no part of the state could a pronounced ad 
 ministration victory be promised. From West Tennessee came 
 the warning that an overwhelming defeat was more than 
 probable in that section; allegations were not lacking that the 
 vaunted loyalty of East Tennessee had undergone corruption; 
 and Middle Tennessee, always an uncertain factor, was cowed 
 by Confederate cavalry and guerillas. 
 
 Even more formidable than the secessionist sympathizers, 
 whose exclusion from the polls could be readily justified, was 
 the Union peace party, powerful throughout the state and es 
 pecially so in West Tennessee, and drawing numerous recruits 
 from those who had broken with the government on the eman 
 cipation issue. These men stood upon their loyalty and their 
 rights under the Constitution, denounced the proclamations and 
 laws regarding slavery as unconstitutional, attacked the president 
 and governor for continuing the war, when the end for which 
 it was inaugurated could now be obtained by giving up emanci 
 pation, declared for "the Union as it was and the Constitution 
 as it is," and seemed doubly fortified by the very legality of 
 their position. 
 
 To meet this crisis, hold an election, and insure an administra 
 tion victory, a course of procedure was now instituted which, 
 
 139 
 
i 4 o ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 while direct evidence of detailed prearrangement among the 
 president, the governor, and the radical leaders is lacking, was 
 carried forward so smoothly and so undeviatingly to a successful 
 conclusion, that all the participants seemed to be playing parts 
 especially assigned to them and carefully conned from the 
 beginning. 
 
 On the 2d of August, a meeting of "the citizens of Tennessee" 
 at Nashville requested the state executive committee to call a 
 convention of loyal men to discuss the various problems facing 
 the people. 1 The call, 2 which appeared on the 4th, named the 
 first Monday in September as the date for the convention, and 
 stated the questions there to be discussed as three: the general 
 condition of the country; the means of reorganizing civil gov 
 ernment and restoring law and order ; and the expediency of 
 holding a presidential election in the state in November, any 
 necessary preliminaries for which the convention was to arrange. 
 
 The convention 3 assembled at Nashville on the 5th of Sep 
 tember. Comment was aroused by the scarcity of financial and 
 business men among the delegates. More than forty counties 
 were represented, but most of the delegates had not been reg 
 ularly chosen nor, indeed, chosen at all but came on their own 
 responsibility, as Union men. 4 Soldiers, who could be depended 
 upon to support radical measures, were numerous among them. 
 Wheeler's activity in the eastern and southern parts of the 
 state kept away many from those sections. 5 Indeed, the dis 
 turbances throughout Tennessee, the interruption of railroad 
 communications, and the wretched condition of the roads, to 
 gether with the caution or indifference of the Unionists, resulted 
 in so meagre an attendance that a postponement was at first 
 talked of. 6 
 
 The complete ascendency of the radicals and their determina 
 tion to tolerate no interference with their already matured plans 
 
 1 Nashville Union, August 4; Nashville Times and Union, August n. 
 
 2 Nashville Union, August 4. 
 
 3 The 'best account of the convention is in the Nashville Dispatch, Sep 
 tember 6-9. 
 
 4 Nashville Union and Nashville Times and Union, September 8-9. 
 
 5 Annual Cyclopedia, 1864, p. 764. 
 9 Nashville Dispatch, September 6. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 141 
 
 were immediately apparent. Samuel R. Milligan was chosen 
 president and the committees on credentials, organization, and 
 business, that together held the helm of the convention and 
 determined its course, were made up with radical majorities. On 
 the last and most important, composed of one member from 
 each congressional district, were such powerful and uncompromis 
 ing personalities as Horace Maynard, G. W. Bridges, J. S. Fowler, 
 J. B. Bingham, and L. C. Houk. In accordance with the recom 
 mendation of its committee, the convention voted to admit to 
 the floor not only "all delegates regularly appointed by loyal 
 primary county conventions," but also "all unconditional Union 
 men" of the state "who are for all the measures of the govern 
 ment looking to put down the rebellion." 7 
 
 By this time, the conservative element in the convention, 
 lured to Nashville by the broadly worded call of the state com 
 mittee, which had given them grounds for hope that all shades 
 of loyal opinion would be reflected in a liberal, non-partisan 
 arrangement for the rehabilitation of the state, had been rudely 
 awakened to the true condition of affairs. The majority were 
 carrying things with a high hand, and it was apparent that 
 they were bent on using the convention to push through a far- 
 reaching plan, sweep aside all inconvenient constitutional im 
 pediments, and deliver Tennessee, for better or worse, into the 
 hands of Johnson and his party. Outnumbered and outvoted by 
 the administration men, and placed, if they remained in the 
 convention, in an intolerable position as accessories to the rigid 
 policy of the governor, to which they could in no way subscribe, 
 the conservatives determined on the only possible course open 
 to them a dignified protest against any and all arbitrary or 
 extra-legal measures of reconstruction; which failing, it only 
 remained for them to withdraw. 
 
 Accordingly, on the first day of the session, T. B. Thomas, 
 of McMinn county, offered the pointed resolution that, as 
 "written constitutions are the only guarantee of stability in 
 elective governments, the only safeguards which the public have 
 against irresponsible violence on the one hand and official usur 
 pation on the other," and as "the horrors of civil war, which now 
 
 7 Ibid. ; Annual Cyclopedia, 1864, p. 764. 
 
142 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 surround us, were introduced chiefly by conventions of men 
 claiming authority from the people, yet proceeding in plain 
 violation of constitutions which the people had established for 
 the restraint of all their servants," the convention be guided and 
 governed by the constitutions of the United States and of the 
 state of Tennessee. 8 
 
 Instantaneously a fierce storm of radical abuse broke upon 
 Thomas' devoted head. Colonel R. C. Crawford exclaimed that, 
 in every convention of Unionists, some members were sure to 
 show the cloven foot. Men like Thomas, he intimated, were 
 secessionists at heart. The latter replied that he was proposing 
 a peace-offering to his fellow-citizens, but Colonel Houk de 
 manded that the resolution be laid on the table, or, better still, 
 thrown under the table. To the accompaniment of "tremendous 
 applause, shouts, and whooping," he declared that he loved and 
 venerated the Constitution of the United States, but denounced 
 the constitution of Tennessee, which consigned men to dungeons 
 for speaking against slavery. It was, in his opinion, nothing 
 more nor less than a league with that institution. "Show me 
 a stickler for constitutions," he concluded, "and I'll show you 
 a man none too good a Union man." 9 A delegate inquired if 
 any constitution-advocate had ever been seen with a musket on 
 his shoulder. Amid angry demonstrations, Thomas' resolution 
 was buried by referring it to the business committee. 
 
 The next day (September 6) the radical onslaught continued, 
 with Crawford and Houk again to the fore. The former moved 
 that the president, through the governor, be requested to appoint 
 a provost-marshal and deputy provost-marshals to enroll the 
 militia and to make a list of all voters of each county in 1861, 
 and ascertain the loyalty of each voter so enrolled, for the 
 purpose of putting the elections into the hands of loyal men. 10 
 Houk urged the convention to declare itself unalterably opposed 
 to disunion, as well as to any armistice with the Confederates, 
 as "treason of the darkest character," the sponsors for which 
 were "enemies of free institutions and our admirable form of 
 
 8 Nashville Dispatch, September 6. 
 
 ' Ibid. 
 
 "Ibid., September /. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 143 
 
 government, whose appreciation of freedom has been ruthlessly 
 destroyed by thirst for office and political power" ; and to indorse 
 the National Union party as "the only party having the patriotism 
 and determination to preserve the Union by whipping the rebels." 
 Some other device than test oaths must be adopted, he insisted, 
 if disloyalists were to be kept from the polls; the ballot-box 
 was too important to them at this time for oaths and conscientious 
 scruples to influence their conduct. He believed that, even if all 
 the copperheads and traitors were to take an oath to vote for 
 Lincoln and Johnson, McClellan would still beat them. 11 
 
 Perhaps to secure a formal expression of the already obvious 
 temper of the convention, James Ramsay, a Bedford county 
 conservative, and Colonel Houk now offered their resignations 
 from the business committee. Ramsay's was promptly accepted 
 and Houk's refused. Resolutions condemnatory of the platform 
 and attitude of the Democrats followed one another in rapid 
 succession, one asserting that "this howl of violated constitutions 
 comes with a bad grace from those who, by peace communications 
 and resolutions, are affording substantial aid and comfort to 
 the rebels." 12 
 
 When the tempest of violence and recrimination had some 
 what abated, Thomas, who seems to have kept his head and his 
 temper throughout the melee, calmly and emphatically presented 
 the conservative ultimatum in two resolutions 13 which crystallized 
 his party's demands : 
 
 "That the convention has met for the reorganization of the 
 state government, and not as a meeting for the ratification of 
 presidential candidates. 
 
 "That, relying upon a just cause and the guidance of a good 
 Providence, we are all willing to submit the presidential vote to 
 the wisdom of the people, giving all truly loyal men an oppor 
 tunity to vote as they may see proper." 
 
 This was a sharp home-thrust at the program of the admin- 
 istrationists, and their fury exceeded all bounds of parliamentary 
 courtesy or decorum. Thomas was even refused permission to 
 
 11 Ibid. 
 
 12 Ibid. 
 
 13 Ibid. 
 
144 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 explain his resolutions. In vain did he assert with dignity that 
 he and his friends had only come as loyal men, at the call of 
 the state committee, to aid in restoring the civil government, 
 not to attend a ratification meeting; that, if they were mistaken 
 as to the purpose of the convention, they were ready and begged 
 leave to retire. Copperheads, said Captain Driver, should be 
 invited out, not granted leave to go. "Kick them out!" shouted 
 Colonel Byrd ; "point them out, and, by God, I'll lead the charge !" 
 The conservatives withdrew amid maledictions and the parting 
 shot from Byrd that there could be but two parties in the Country, 
 those of Abe Lincoln and Jeff Davis. Thomas' resolutions were 
 laid on the table. 14 
 
 The convention was now wholly in the hands of the Johnson 
 party. Even a suggestion by Colonel R. M. Edwards of Bradley 
 county that the electors of the state legislature comprise "the 
 genuine Union men of the state, in connection with those qualified 
 to vote under amnesty proclamation of President Lincoln" 15 
 was so violently denounced as aiming to send friends of slavery 
 to Congress and to "choke off the poor man" that its author 
 asked permission to withdraw it. 
 
 All was now in readiness for the resolutions of the business 
 committee, 16 which were adopted unanimously on the 7th. An 
 election for president and vice-president was to be held in 
 Tennessee in November by those "who are now and have been 
 attached to the National Union." To qualify as an elector, a 
 man must meet the requirements of the state constitution for 
 that privilege, and, in addition, must either have voluntarily 
 borne arms in the service of the United States during the war 
 (such service being still continued, or terminated by an honorable 
 discharge), or must be a known active friend of the government 
 of the United States. He must also register with an election 
 agent at least fifteen days before the election, the registration 
 being open to public inspection, and the election officers being 
 empowered to examine applicants on oath touching matters of 
 fact and to reject anyone on proof of disloyalty. As a -final 
 
 14 Ibid. 
 
 15 Ibid., September 8. 
 
 Annual Cyclopedia, 1864, p. 765. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 145 
 
 test, he must, before depositing his vote, subscribe to the following 
 oath, which merits careful comparison with the one required 
 of county electors the preceding March : 
 
 "I solemnly swear that I will henceforth support the 
 Constitution of the United States and defend it against the 
 assaults of all its enemies; that I am an active friend of 
 the government of the United States; that I sincerely rejoice 
 in the triumph of its armies and navies and in the defeat 
 and overthrow of the armies, navies, and all armed combina 
 tions in the interest of the so-called Confederate States; 
 that I will cordially oppose all armistices or negotiations 
 for peace with rebels in arms, until the Constitution of the 
 United States and all laws and proclamations made in pur 
 suance thereof shall be established over all the people of 
 every state and territory embraced within the National 
 Union ; and that I will heartily aid and assist the loyal people 
 in whatever measures may be adopted for the attainment 
 of these ends; and further, that I take this oath freely and 
 voluntarily and without mental reservation. So help me 
 God." 17 
 
 Even this oath was to be but prima facie evidence of loyalty, 
 subject to disproof. 
 
 Continuing, the resolutions provided for the opening of polls 
 at the county seat or some other suitable place in each county, 
 and also, for the convenience of the soldiers, at places accessible 
 to them and guarded so as to secure a free and fair election. 
 Only unfaltering Union men could hold office, and all doubt 
 ful incumbents were to be removed. Lincoln and Johnson 
 electors were nominated and an executive committee, consist 
 ing of five from each division of the state, was appointed, with 
 authority to fill vacancies occurring in the ticket. The candi 
 dates and action of the Baltimore convention were endorsed, 
 the course of Johnson as governor in Tennessee approved, and 
 the immediate abolition of slavery and "its prohibition in the 
 future by all suitable and proper amendments" demanded. 
 Governor Johnson was requested to execute the resolutions "in 
 
 17 Ibid. 
 
146 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 such manner as he may think will best subserve the interests 
 of the government." 
 
 The convention purported to speak for the loyal sovereign 
 people of Tennessee. The powerful support of the military 
 government was pledged in a significant proclamation 18 issued 
 opportunely on the 7th, while the convention was yet in session. 
 The governor begins with his familiar statement of the reasons 
 for his appointment and the constitutional basis of his authority, 
 and enumerates the powers conferred upon him. By virtue 
 of these powers, civil government will be reestablished in parts 
 of the state, wherever and whenever the people evince a wish 
 for it and a disposition to sustain the officers appointed; and 
 appointments will be superseded by elections in accordance with 
 the laws and constitution of the state previous to the rebellion 
 or with new regulations prescribed by a popular convention, 
 when elections are desired. All officers will follow, as the 
 rule of their action, the old laws familiar to the people, when 
 these are applicable, and will take the oath prescribed in the 
 proclamation of January 26. "All cases, civil and criminal, 
 coming before the judicial tribunals of this state, involving the 
 rights of colored persons, shall be adjudicated, and be disposed 
 of as free persons of color." The strong arm of the govern 
 ment will (be employed to protect loyal men and their property 
 in unregenerate districts. 
 
 In conclusion, the governor makes it clear that the days of 
 grace for obstinate recalcitrants are about to end, and that no 
 mercy will be shown in future. "I will once more make an 
 appeal to the whole people of Tennessee to come forward 
 promptly and willingly and aid me in the important work of 
 restoring the government. Ample time has transpired for re 
 flection, return of loyalty and reason. Amnesty (has been?) 
 kindly offered for your protection, and surely bitter experi 
 ence has demonstrated the folly of longer persisting in wanton 
 opposition to the power and authority of the national govern 
 ment. I invoke you, therefore, again to return to your alle 
 giance, and aid in the protection of yourselves against lawless 
 bands of marauding pirates and robbers, and thereby save your 
 
 18 J. P. vol. xlviii, 459; Nashville Times and Union, September 13. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 147 
 
 property, persons and firesides from outrages hitherto unknown to 
 civilization. Longer resistance to law and order will not be 
 tolerated. There must be an end to the criminal opposition 
 so long and wickedly waged against the laws and Constitution 
 of the United States, and those who still continue to adhere 
 to traitors and treason can no longer expect the protection 
 of the government they daily revile and seek to destroy. They 
 must yield their opposition (male and female) or they will be 
 removed beyond the reach of harm to the government and 
 authority of the United States." 
 
 On the 3Oth, Johnson, in a second proclamation, 19 professing 
 his desire to cooperate with the "laudable efforts" of the con 
 vention of "a respectable portion of the loyal people of Ten 
 nessee, representing a large number of the counties of the 
 state, and supposed to reflect the will of the Union men in their 
 respective counties," ordered an election on the 8th of Novem 
 ber for president and vice-president under the convention's 
 plan. Voters must take the oath exactly as worded in the reso 
 lutions. The governor would designate superintendents and 
 registers of elections, and, in cases where no inspectors, judges, 
 or sheriffs were regularly appointed, the registering agents were 
 to act in their stead. Officers of the army and surgeons in 
 charge of hospitals were to hold elections for the soldiers. Ow 
 ing to the short time remaining before the election, persons of 
 "known and established loyalty" might vote, though they had 
 not registered. 
 
 That the convention should have ventured to prescribe the 
 governor's course for him and that he should have acquiesced 
 without remark in its instructions and embodied them verbatim 
 in his proclamation makes it all but certain that he either drew 
 up the resolutions himself or approved them before they were 
 voted upon. From the work of the convention he derived the 
 advantage of appearing not to insist on any settled plan of 
 his own, but simply to carry out the expressed will of the sov 
 ereign people. This pose, however, actually deceived nobody. 
 The proclamation was a transparent attempt to save some 
 
 19 Nashville Times and Union, October 3 ; Edward McPherson, Politi 
 cal History of the UnitecT States during the Great Rebellion, p. 436. 
 
148 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 remnants of Johnson's popularity, if any there were, and at 
 the same time to present an ostensibly united front of Unionists 
 for the new policy, by distributing the responsibility for it as 
 widely as possible. Indeed, the radicals needed all the strength 
 to be derived from common action, for, as the full purport 
 of the cunningly contrived oath came to be grasped, a storm 
 of protest and denunciation burst upon them, and especially 
 upon Johnson himself, whose dominating influence everyone 
 recognized. 
 
 The first clauses of the oath clearly disfranchised Confederate 
 sympathizers. This was, of course, necessary and occasioned 
 no comment. But more lay behind. The national Democratic 
 convention, which had met at Chicago in August, while pro 
 nouncing unequivocally for the Union, had bitterly deplored 
 the war and demanded immediate efforts for a cessation of 
 hostilities and the restoration of peace on the simple basis of 
 the Union ; and its presidential candidate, McClellan, had an 
 nounced his conviction that, whenever it appeared probable that 
 the Confederates would consent to these terms, "all the re 
 sources of statesmanship practised by civilized nations and 
 taught by the traditions of the American people, consistent with 
 the honor and interests of the country", should be enlisted to 
 secure an agreement. The adherents of this party in Tennessee 
 decided to contest the election with the "unconditional," and, 
 in September, placed an electoral ticket in the field. It was this 
 manoeuvre which the Johnsonians had anticipated and fortified 
 against by the clause of their oath pledging the voter to "oppose 
 all armistices or negotiations for peace with rebels in arms," 
 until the restoration of the Constitution and the laws and proc 
 lamations made in pursuance of them over all the states and 
 territories. This clause and the succeeding one, committing 
 the voter to "whatever measures may be adopted for the attain 
 ment of these ends," were a mortal blow at the pro-slavery 
 Unionists and a guarantee that every man who cast his ballot 
 in November would be either an "unconditional" or a perjurer. 
 
 The outraged feelings of the peace Democrats crystallized 
 in a deputation of the McClellan electors to Washington to 
 present to the president their vehement protest against the ar- 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 149 
 
 bitrary proceedings of the radicals. The signatures appended 
 to this comprehensive and able document, 20 including those of 
 Thomas A. R. Nelson, the president of the old Knoxville-Green- 
 ville convention, William B. Campbell, ex-governor of the state 
 and a general in the Union army, Emerson Etheridge, one of 
 the foremost champions of the Union in 1861, and John 
 Lellyert, formerly postmaster of Nashville and a man of sterling 
 character, show how conditions had changed since the beginning 
 of the war and how impossible it was for many devoted, high- 
 minded loyalists to keep up with the course of the military 
 governor. That such men combined to condemn the narrow 
 ness and intolerance of Johnson's policy is a heavy indictment, 
 which can be met only by the contention that, in this turbulent, 
 disaffected state, the most extreme precautions were necessary 
 to weather the crisis. 
 
 Alluding but briefly to the departures made by the proclama 
 tion from the constitutional requirements for elections, the 
 protestants concentrate their attack upon the oath. The obliga 
 tion to support and defend the Constitution of the United States 
 they are, they declare, ready to renew daily, but they revolt 
 from the required expression of gratification at "scenes of 
 blood and wounds, of anguish and death." They are committed 
 to the prolongation of the war by no considerations of pleasure, 
 profit, or honor, while their feelings "as Christians, as patriots, 
 and as civilized men," as well as the oaths they have taken, 
 impel them to peace. They cannot consent "to swear at the 
 ballot a war of extermination against their countrymen and 
 kindred, or to prolong by their opposition for a single day 
 after it can be brought to an honorable and lawful conclusion, 
 a contest the most sanguinary and ruinous that has scourged 
 mankind." The president himself, in his famous note to Horace 
 Greeley at the time of the Niagara Falls conference in July, 
 had proposed to treat with rebels in arms. "Are we now to 
 understand," they inquire, "by this proclamation of one acting 
 under your authority, and himself a candidate with you for the 
 second office, that even the above proposition is withdrawn, 
 
 30 Edward McRherson, Political History of the United States during 
 the Great Rebellion, p. 438. 
 
ISO ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 that you will henceforth have no negotiations upon any terms 
 but unrelenting war to the bitter end? Or are we to under 
 stand that while you hold this proposition open, or yourself 
 free to act as your judgment may dictate, we, the citizens of 
 Tennessee, shall swear to oppose your negotiations?" 
 
 A climax of indignation is reached in discussing the pledge 
 to support whatever measures may be adopted by the govern 
 ment in attaining its ends. "We cannot comment upon the 
 absurdity of the obligation here imposed without danger of 
 departing from the respectable propriety of language which 
 we desire to observe in addressing the chief magistrate of the 
 American people." 
 
 The memorialists epitomize their argument by a direct denial 
 of the authority of the governor or president to alter or annul 
 any law of Tennessee. They continue: "We demand that Ten 
 nessee be allowed to appoint her electors as expressly provided 
 by the Federal Constitution which you (Lincoln) have sworn 
 to support, protect, and defend, in the manner which the legis 
 lature thereof has prescribed. And to that end we respectfully 
 demand of you, as the principal under whose authority this 
 order has been issued, that the same shall be revoked. We 
 ask that all military interference shall be withdrawn so far as 
 to allow the loyal men of Tennessee a full and free election. 
 By the loyal men of Tennessee we mean those who have not 
 participated in the rebellion, or given it aid and comfort; or 
 who may have compiled with such terms of amnesty as have 
 been offered them under your authority." Should the presi 
 dent, however, believe that the critical military situation re 
 quires additional precautions, the petitioners, while denying his 
 legal right to exact it, will feel no hardship in taking a simple 
 oath of loyalty ; but they insist that Johnson's oath be disallowed 
 as "irrelevant, unreasonable, and not in any sense a test of 
 loyalty" and as "calculated to keep legal and rightful voters 
 from the polls." The paper concludes by denominating the 
 September convention "a mere partisan meeting, having no 
 authority, and not representing the loyal men of Tennessee in 
 any sense," and intimating that, in the disturbed condition of 
 the country, the Democratic ticket would not have been put 
 in the field at all, but for the action of the radicals. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 151 
 
 The Democratic delegation saw the president on the I5th of 
 October and Lellyett read the protest to him. "May I inquire," 
 asked Lincoln, "how long it took you and the New York poli 
 ticians to concoct that paper?" When Lellyett said that none 
 but Tennesseeans had had a hand in it, the president retorted: 
 "I expect to let the friends of George B. McClellan manage 
 their side of this contest in their own way, and I will manage 
 my side of it in my way"; and closed the interview abruptly 
 with an intimation that he might make some further answer 
 in writing. 21 This he did on the 22d. 22 He denied having had 
 any communication with Johnson regarding the subjects treated 
 in the protest. The movement in Tennessee/he said, did not 
 emanate from him, and could properly be considered only "as an 
 independent movement of at least a portion of the loyal people 
 of Tennessee." He proposed to have nothing to do with it, 
 either to sustain it or to modify it. He had no power under the 
 Constitution and laws to interfere in a presidential election in a 
 state, except, by virtue of his military authority, to give protec 
 tion against violence; and for this he saw no necessity. "Gover 
 nor Johnson, like any other loyal citizen of Tennessee," the 
 president observes, "has the right to favor any political plan he 
 chooses ; and, as military governor, it is his duty to keep the peace 
 among and for the loyal people of the state. I cannot discern 
 that by this plan he proposes any more. But you object to the 
 plan. Leaving it alone will be your perfect security against it. 
 It is not proposed to force you into it. Do as you please, on 
 your own account, peaceably and loyally, and Governor Johnson 
 will not molest you, but will protect you against violence as far 
 as in his power." Presumably an election strictly under the old 
 system is not now possible. In any event, the validity of the 
 vote will be determined neither by the president nor by the gover 
 nor, but by Congress. 
 
 The incident was closed by the rejoinder of three of the dele 
 gates, Campbell, Lellyett, and Bailie Peyton, on the 29th. 23 "The 
 idea that the president himself can make, or repeal, or modify a 
 
 21 Ibid., p. 439; Savage, The Life and Public Services of Andrew John 
 son, p. 313. 
 
 22 McPherson, p. 425 ; Annual Cyclopedia, 1864, p. 766. 
 36 McPherson, p. 440. 
 
152 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 law of the land, state or national, constitutional or statutory, 
 though freely practiced upon by yourself, is," they say, "a doc 
 trine of despotism in 'irrepressible conflict' with the principles of 
 public liberty. And when these things are done by subordinates, 
 the evil becomes intolerably oppressive, and calls for the firmest 
 and most active lawful resistance which a people deserving to be 
 free can offer." The plan of Governor Johnson, an agent, does, 
 in reality, emanate from the president as principal, who, unless 
 he disavows it, becomes responsible for it. The present "inde 
 pendent movement" in Tennessee, contrary to all lawful author 
 ity, finds its parallel in the independent movement of the seces 
 sionists in 1861, and the government is bound to oppose both. 
 Then "there was no menace of coercion or violence toward any 
 who should consent to see the Constitution violated and the 'po 
 litical plan' carried out without opposition. But the bayonet was 
 kept in view, as it is in this case. Public meetings were menaced, 
 and perhaps broken up by armed force. And so it is now. Those 
 opposed to the 'independent movement' were denounced as 
 traitors, and so they are now. We had vigilance committees and 
 mob violence then. We have now secret leagues, and are liable 
 at any time to arbitrary arrest, as well as to mob violence which 
 is now used in our midst. . . . 'Governor Johnson/ you say, 'like 
 any other loyal citizen, has a right to favor any political plan he 
 chooses.' We do not so read the duty of a citizen. Some of the 
 political plans of our day are devised to overturn the Constitu 
 tion and government of the United States and this is one of 
 them. The Southern rebellion is another. Neither the citizen 
 nor Governor Johnson has a right to favor such plans, unless it 
 be upon the principle advanced by you as a member of Congress, 
 that 'any people, anywhere, being inclined and having the power, 
 have the right' to revolutionize their government; that 'this is 
 a most valuable, a most sacred right.' We shall despair of the 
 republic if these principles of anarchy, as embodied in you, shall 
 be adopted by the people in your reelection." Any assurance of 
 protection for persons holding a separate election in Tennessee 
 at variance with Governor Johnson's plan is but a cruel mockery ; 
 to attempt such an election would be to jeopardize the lives of 
 the voters, as anti-administration citizens already know too well 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 153 
 
 from experience. Therefore, since the military power is in the 
 ascendant, the laws disregarded, and the president deaf to ap 
 peals for justice, the McClellan ticket is withdrawn. "There will 
 be no election for president in Tennessee in 1864. You and 
 Governor Johnson may 'manage your side of it in your own 
 way' ; but it will be no election." 
 
 Examination of the oath which engendered so much passion 
 and excitement points to the conclusion that, considering the 
 supreme importance of the election, the peculiar situation of 
 Tennessee, the passive disloyalty of the great majority of the 
 people, and the impossibility, under the circumstances, of con 
 ducting an election in strictly legal fashion, the obligation im 
 posed on voters was none too strict, if we except the clauses 
 aimed at the loyal Democrats. It was of the utmost importance, 
 from the standpoint of the government, to place the restoration 
 of the state in the hands of those who could be depended upon 
 as whole-hearted for the Union, and any so disposed could hardly 
 object to "the suppression of the rebellion" or the triumph of 
 the armies and navies of the United States. Former citizens, 
 who had sought to sever their connection with the Union, could 
 not expect to be received back without earnests of complete al 
 legiance on their part. If, as was generally admitted, the am 
 nesty oath was a failure in Tennessee, and bushwhackers and 
 marauders were frequently captured with certificates of amnesty 
 in their pockets, 24 a more stringent test was imperatively required. 
 
 On the other hand, without going into the question of whether 
 the peace Democrats throughout the Union were justified in their 
 policy of attacking and opposing the government, it is fair to ob 
 serve that the practical considerations which allowed them to 
 vote in the other states should have secured them the same privi 
 lege in Tennessee, if Tennessee was permitted to vote at all. 
 There was a manifest inconsistency in assuming that Tennessee 
 retained all her rights and privileges in the Union, while denying 
 the franchise to loyal men who would have been allowed to 
 exercise it in other states. If, notwithstanding her continued 
 membership in the Union, she was, by force of circumstances, 
 prevented from acting with the same freedom as her sisters, she 
 
 24 Nashville Union, September 22. 
 
154 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 should not have been forced into a compromising position as a 
 prop of the National Union party, at the expense of the unques 
 tioned rights of loyal citizens; action should have been deferred 
 for a few weeks and then all Union men united in the labor of 
 reorganization, without reference to the national issues which 
 divided them. Finally, it is difficult to deny that the clause pledg 
 ing the voter to assist in "whatever measures may be adopted" 
 for the reestablishment of the Union was, as the Democratic 
 delegates declared, absurd an insult to the intelligence of the 
 citizens. 
 
 The petitioners, in their rejoinder to the president, referred to 
 the breaking up by an armed force of a McClellan meeting on 
 the 2 ist of October. They insisted that they were proceeding 
 peaceably and legally and that provost-guards were present at 
 their request to insure order, when the soldiers of a Tennessee 
 regiment suddenly rushed into the hall with guns and pistols, 
 extinguished the lights, ordered the "rebels and traitors" to dis 
 perse, and drove them out. These soldiers later published over 
 their signatures a card in the Nashville Times, 25 affirming that 
 they acted entirely on their own initiative and that neither Gov 
 ernor Johnson nor anyone else, not an active participant, knew 
 anything of their intentions. 
 
 Lincoln and Johnson meetings were hardly less exciting. The 
 night of October 24 was a wild one in Nashville. A negro torch 
 light procession was held and "shots were freely fired." John 
 son addressed the crowd at the capitol in a speech of which we 
 have several highly colored and garbled reports, the most favor 
 able of which does him no credit as a statesman. He seems, 
 rather, to have resorted to the devices of the demagogue to sway 
 the ignorant and excited blacks, and his extravagances of ex 
 pression suggest his too constant friend, the whiskey bottle, as 
 the inspiration of his unfortunate diatribe. 
 
 It is impossible to get at exactly what Johnson said. The 
 principal loyal paper in Nashville, the Union, does not report 
 his address at all. The most complete record is an apocryphal 
 one from a more than questionable source, and attributes to the 
 governor words which it seems impossible he could have used; 
 
 25 McBherson, p. 440. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 155 
 
 but, as the speech created too much of a stir to be disregarded 
 altogether, recourse may be had to this account as the only de 
 tailed one available, due allowance being made for its manifest 
 inaccuracy. 26 
 
 The estates of the aristocracy, Johnson declared, should be 
 divided among free farmers. The great planters sneer at negro 
 equality, while, about their dwellings, one may see mulatto chil 
 dren bearing unmistakable resemblance to their masters, the 
 product of "a concubinage, compared to which polygamy is a 
 virtue." Tennessee's destiny must be controlled by loyal men 
 and "rebels must be dumb." "Let them gather their treasonable 
 conclaves elsewhere among their friends in the Confederacy." 
 
 The climax is reached in an outburst of absurdity which al 
 most destroys faith in even the approximate accuracy of the nar 
 rative. The governor had, he said, a proclamation of his own 
 to make. Without reference to the president or any other person, 
 he proclaimed full, broad, and unconditional freedom to every 
 man in Tennessee. Looking upon the persecuted and despised 
 people before him, he was almost induced to wish that, as of 
 old, a Moses might arise, to lead them from the land of bondage 
 to the promised land of freedom. "You are our Moses !" shouted 
 the crowd. "Well, then," Johnson assented, "humble and un 
 worthy as I am, if no better shall be found, I will indeed be 
 your Moses, and lead you through the Red Sea of war and 
 bondage to a fairer future of liberty and peace." If these were 
 indeed the governor's words, they brought him only personal dis 
 credit as an unscrupulous agitator: politically they were of little 
 significance, and legally of none at all. 
 
 The election on the 8th of November was, for Tennessee, a 
 mere form, with the outcome predetermined. The only question 
 was as to the size of the vote, and in this respect the result was 
 disappointing. It had become apparent that the Confederates 
 would take advantage of Sherman's absence in Georgia to make 
 one more desperate attempt for Tennessee, and, while their 
 forces were gathering, nobody who had not already committed 
 himself irrevocably was disposed to take a stand on either side. 
 Already the advance of Breckenridge into East Tennessee had 
 
 29 Moore, Speeches of Andrew Johnson, p. xxxv, quoting a corres 
 pondent of the Cincinnati Gazette. 
 
156 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 caused consternation there. Partisan cavalry swarmed in the 
 state, south and west, in anticipation of Hood's movement against 
 Nashville. In West Tennessee, a Colonel Yansil had been de 
 clared provisional governor of the state by the Confederates and, 
 with the cooperation of Forrest, had ordered an organization of 
 the militia, to include all citizens between sixteen and eighteen 
 and between forty-five and fifty, the remainder being subject to 
 conscription. 27 Requisitions for pork and grain were made on the 
 people and any pro-Union activity was forbidden under penalty 
 of death. In many counties, and generally in the rural districts, 
 voting was impossible. 
 
 The returns are untrustworthy. 28 Only a few scattering votes 
 went for McClellan and Pendleton. Nashville gave them 25 
 out of 1342. Shelby county, including Memphis, went for Lin 
 coln and Johnson, 1579 to 24, but, on an "unconditional Union" 
 estimate of 3500 to 4500 possible voters and 2400 enrolled militia 
 men, the showing was poor. 29 Bingham wrote from Memphis 
 that the poor laborers and small dealers showed their loyalty by 
 coming to the polls, but the wealthy and influential citizens 
 worked actively to keep down the vote. 30 The Tennessee soldiers 
 in the regiments and hospitals swelled the Lincoln majority by 
 over 85oo. 31 
 
 Congress, by joint resolution, rejected the electoral vote of 
 Tennessee on the ground that the state had "rebelled against the 
 government of the United States, and was in such condition on 
 the 8th day of November,, 1864, that no valid election for electors 
 of president and vice-president of the United States, according to 
 the Constitution and laws thereof, was held on said day" ; 32 and 
 the president acquiesced in this decision. 
 
 27 J. P., vol. xlix, 665. 
 
 28 Ibid., vol. Hi, 1172; also the Nashville newspapers. 
 
 29 J. P., vol. Hi, 1189. 
 
 30 Ibid. 
 
 * I bid., 1172. 
 
 50 Congressional Globe, 38th Congress, 2d session, pp. 522, 533, 534, 548, 
 574, 590, 608, 711. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 REORGANIZATION ACCOMPLISHED 
 
 As soon as the national election was out of the way, it was 
 designed to push forward the work of state reconstruction in 
 accordance with the governor's proclamation. This time the 
 initiative came from the East Tennessee Union executive com 
 mittee. They prefix their call, 1 dated the I2th of November, 
 1864, by the naive assertion that the heavy vote cast in Tennessee 
 shows the disposition of the people to put down the rebellion and 
 restore the state; therefore, a preliminary state convention will 
 be held at Nashville on the igth of December, "to form a ticket 
 to be run for a constitutional convention" by the loyal men of 
 the state. (The wording of this call subsequently becomes of 
 high importance.) The pro-Union citizens of East Tennessee 
 are summoned to Knoxville on the 6th of December, to appoint 
 their delegates to this nominating convention. 
 
 By the irony of fate, this call, which seemed to promise the 
 speedy realization of the long deferred hopes of the Unionists, 
 was but the harbinger of a period of distress and anxiety for 
 them, which, though brief, was fully as acute as any to which 
 they had been subjected during the war. On the I3th of No 
 vember, Breckenridge surprised General Gillem's force of the 
 "governor's guard" in East Tennessee and drove it in confusion 
 to Knoxville, followed by a terror-stricken stampede of loyalists, 
 who abandoned their property to the vengeance of the enemy 
 and fled for their lives. The Chattanooga Gazette reported that, 
 during the week following Gillem's defeat, 3401 refugees (596 
 men, 1115 women, and 1690 children) arrived at Chattanooga 
 without food, in the most terrible weather, with the mud knee- 
 deep. Those who could not be sent on to Nashville were gather 
 ed into a camp around the already overcrowded refugee house. 2 
 
 1 Nashville Union, November 18, 1864; House of Representatives, Mis 
 cellaneous Documents, 39th Congress, ist session, no. 55, p. 5. 
 
 2 Nashville Union, November 25. 
 
158 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 "It is sickening to the heart," Brownlow wrote from Knoxville, 
 "to stand here and look at one thousand men, women, and chil 
 dren coming in through the mud and rain, leading their stock, 
 ... to save what they can. ... I have no houses, no shanties, 
 no anything to give them shelter. The picture is worse than 
 I make it." 3 
 
 Notwithstanding these discouragements, the preparations for 
 the convention went on. Since a fairly proportioned representa 
 tion of all parts of the state by regularly chosen delegates was 
 impossible, the Union leaders determined to make the meeting 
 a sort of informal assembly of Tennessee loyalists, who could 
 take at least the preliminary steps in reorganization and bring the 
 work up to the point where its consummation could be speedily 
 effected when a more auspicious occasion offered. To this end, 
 it was decided to open the doors as widely as possible and to 
 encourage all who were for the Union to come and join the 
 movement; in other words, to make the convention a meeting 
 not of representatives, but of Unionists. Thus, the call of the 
 executive committee of Middle Tennessee, issued on the 2Qth of 
 November, while suggesting the election of delegates, declared: 
 "The people meet to take such steps as wisdom may direct to 
 restore the state of Tennessee to its once honored status in the 
 great National Union. ... If you cannot meet in your counties, 
 come upon your own personal responsibility. It is the assembling 
 of Union men for the restoration of their own commonwealth to 
 life and a career of success." 4 Commenting on this call, the 
 Nashville Union of the 3Oth said: "Every loyal man, who feels 
 any interest in the reorganization of the state and a change in 
 our organic law, so as to conform it to the exigencies of the times, 
 has a right to attend and be heard." 
 
 Meanwhile, Hood advanced from Georgia into Middle Ten 
 nessee, for the purpose of striking the lines of communication of 
 Sherman's army in Georgia and compelling it to retire from that 
 state. General George H. Thomas had been detached by Sher 
 man to watch and deal with Hood, and he now fell back before 
 him to draw him into a battle with the concentrated Union army, 
 
 3 J. P., vol. Hi 1357- 
 
 * House Miscellaneous Documents, 39th Congress, ist session, no. 55. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 159 
 
 as far as possible from his base. The strategic significance of 
 Thomas' retreat was lost on the mass of the people, who saw 
 only a retrograde movement, spelling disaster to the Federals; 
 and everywhere throughout the state the secession sympathizers 
 raised their heads. 
 
 On the 3Oth of November, Schofield, with a part of Thomas' 
 army, checked Hood at Franklin on the Harpeth river, but the 
 Confederates pressed on again until confronted by Thomas him 
 self, with his whole force, at bay three miles from Nashville. 
 The capital was in an uproar. Swarms of citizens and laborers 
 were enlisted for defence. The suspense was prolonged by a 
 period of terrible weather, with storms of sleet and ice, making 
 military operations impossible, during which the two armies 
 watched each other. The apprehension extended to Washington 
 and to Grant's headquarters at City Point. The war department 
 did not fully comprehend the difficulties that embarrassed 
 Thomas. What it did appreciate was that another Confederate 
 army, apparently caught at a disadvantage, seemed likely to make 
 good its escape, as others had done before, from another over 
 cautious Federal general. Grant goaded and scolded Thomas, 
 but the latter was determined not to move until conditions were 
 more favorable. Finally the commander-in-chief set out for 
 Nashville to supplant Thomas by Logan; but on the I5th of De 
 cember, before he arrived, the weather changed. Thomas at once 
 made the long delayed attack and, on the I5th and i6th, utterly 
 crushed Hood's army and drove the scattered fragments into 
 Alabama. The Confederate force in Tennessee, as an effective 
 instrument of invasion, was destroyed. Here, at last, was the 
 decisive victory for which the Union men had yearned and 
 prayed. The last hope of the secessionists that the state might 
 yet be won for the Confederacy was gone, and, for the first time, 
 Southern sympathizers were compelled to realize that the only 
 course open to them was to make the best possible terms for 
 their submission. 
 
 The Confederate invasion had, of course, made it impossible to 
 hold the Union convention on the iQth of December, as origi 
 nally announced. On that day, the executive committee of Mid 
 dle Tennessee published a card 5 postponing it until the 8th of 
 
 8 Nashville newspapers, December 19. 
 
160 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 January, the anniversary of the battle of New Orleans, and call 
 ing upon the eastern and western committees to cooperate in 
 their sections. There was now no excuse for further delay, for 
 the battle of Nashville had taken the heart out of the secession 
 ists and silenced the peace Democrats, while the chaotic condition 
 of the state called for immediate remedy. In West Tennessee, 
 business was almost at a standstill on account of the disorder and 
 the prohibitive trade regulations. The army officials were un 
 popular and friction between them and the civilian leaders was 
 constant. They were charged with susceptibility to bribes and 
 with bestowing favors regardless of the records and merits of 
 claimants. 6 The boards of claims, acting under military author 
 ity, were denounced as capricious and not above political proselyt 
 ing in making their awards. 7 The state was still infested with 
 marauders, who were fast reducing it to utter desolation and 
 whom the army, directing all its energies to the destruction of 
 the enemy's main forces, had neither time nor men to suppress. 
 The advantages to the citizens of taking their government into 
 their own hands became more and more apparent. General 
 Thomas, too, for military reasons, desired them to do so, that 
 he might withdraw his garrisons for service at the front. He 
 urged this consideration on Johnson in a dispatch 8 of the 3Oth 
 of December, and received the latter's assurances that no effort 
 to that end would be spared on his part. 9 
 
 No further military vicissitudes interfered with the great final 
 act toward which all loyal energies were now directed. The 
 convention 10 met at Nashville on the 9th of January the 8th, 
 the day named in the call, falling on a Sunday. The same ir 
 regularities which had characterized previous conventions ap 
 peared again in this one. With delegates chosen by mass meet 
 ings, more or less representative, mingled citizens who repre 
 sented their friends or only themselves, and soldiers sent by 
 their regiments. The opinion seems to have prevailed at first that 
 the meeting was but a preliminary one, to take steps for assem- 
 
 J. P., vol. Hi, 1303. 
 
 7 Ibid. ; vol. liii, 1463 ; vol. liv, 1654. 
 
 8 O. R., series i, vol. xlv, part ii, p. 421. 
 'Ibid., p. 471. 
 
 10 The best account of the convention is in the Nashville Dispatch, Jan 
 uary 10-16, 1865. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 161 
 
 bling a more regular convention, and consequently that it was 
 hardly worth while to insist upon annoying formalities. This 
 view was certainly justified by the wording of the original call 
 and was assumed by Colonel S. R. Rodgers, the president of the 
 convention, in his opening speech. 11 
 
 The only difficulty, therefore, concerning the admission of 
 delegates, turned on the degree of loyalty to be required. The 
 original report 12 of the committee on credentials recommended 
 that all "who give an active support to the Union cause and who 
 have never voluntarily borne arms against the government" be 
 seated, but the majority were uncompromising in their determi 
 nation to exclude the non-belligerent secessionists whose secret 
 cooperation had wrought so much damage in the state and em 
 barrassed the Federal armies; and, on motion of Colonel Houk 
 of East Tennessee the same who loomed large in the September 
 convention another clause was added, barring those who had 
 ever "voluntarily given aid and comfort to the enemy." 13 The 
 delegates of each county were directed to select a chairman who 
 should furnish the secretary of the convention with the list of 
 eligibles present from his county and distribute tickets of ad 
 mission to them. All soldiers who came as delegates were 
 admitted. 14 
 
 The next question was on the basis of voting in the convention. 
 A resolution, 15 offered by R. R. Butler of Johnson county, to give 
 each county at least one vote, with one additional for every hun 
 dred votes cast by it against "separation and representation" in 
 1861, was at first adopted, but encountered the fierce opposition 
 of the Middle and West Tennesseeans, who claimed that the elec 
 tions in their sections had been interfered with by force and 
 fraud and did not fairly show their Union strength, and threat 
 ened to withdraw from the convention unless their delegates 
 were accorded individual recognition. 16 To preserve harmony, 
 Mr. Butler's resolutions were reconsidered and withdrawn 17 and 
 
 11 Nashville Dispatch, January 10. 
 
 12 Ibid. 
 
 13 Ibid. 
 
 14 Ibid. 
 
 15 Ibid., January n. 
 " Ibid. 
 
 "Ibid., January 12. 
 
1 62 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 the "one man, one vote" method substituted, 18 but not before the 
 charges and counter-charges of disloyalty had led the debate away 
 from the subject immediately under consideration and revealed 
 the divergent views of the delegates as to the proper policy of 
 reconstruction. Colonel Houk, speaking for East Tennessee, ad 
 vocated the exclusion of every former citizen who had voted for 
 "separation and representation" in 1861 or had afterwards volun 
 tarily aided- the rebellion from voting in state elections, testi 
 fying in court against loyal men, practicing law in the state, or 
 serving on a jury for five years after the declaration of peace, 
 and then only on filing a petition in the Federal court of the 
 circuit or district where he resided, with the allegation, supported 
 by the sworn evidence of two citizens, whose unbroken loyalty 
 antedated the war, that he had been actively loyal during the 
 five years of probation. 19 A. J. Clements, of Macon county, 
 wished to divide all former citizens into three classes: first, 
 qualified voters, who must take oath, backed by the oaths of two 
 loyal persons, either that they had voted against separation in 
 1861 and had never willingly aided the rebellion nor wished it 
 success, but had warmly desired the triumph of the Federal gov 
 ernment ; or that they had acted loyally during the twelve months 
 last past, hoped for the defeat of the Confederacy, and would do 
 all they could to accomplish it; second, passive non-combatant 
 subjects comprising those who would agree to do nothing in 
 support of the rebellion entitled to protection, but excluded 
 from voting and holding office; and, third, all others, who were 
 not to enjoy the protection of the laws or the right of action in 
 the courts, whose oath would not be taken against either of the 
 other classes, and who were subject to expulsion on three months' 
 notice. 20 D. P. Gass of Sevier county proposed the disfranchise- 
 ment for ninety-nine years of all who had voted for separation 
 or had voluntarily born arms against the Union and was for 
 .precluding the legislature from reinstating any for at least ten 
 years after the war. Mr. Carper, a narrow-minded, keen-witted, 
 implacable delegate from Davidson county, declared, in a rous- 
 
 18 Ibid. The newspaper accounts are not clear on this point, but, on all 
 subsequent ballots, each delegate apparently cast an independent vote. 
 
 19 Nashville Dispatch, January 12. 
 29 Ibid. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 163 
 
 ing speech, that the rebels had not repented, but had held out as 
 long as possible in their efforts to destroy the government, and 
 were now coming back to get office. "The only right they have," 
 he said, "is to be hung. You cannot make a good citizen of a 
 rebel. You may paint a crow white or red, but that won't pre 
 vent him from stealing your corn. If the rebels are allowed to 
 come back, the few Union men of Tennessee will have to leave 
 the state." 21 The applause with which Mr. Carper's remarks 
 were greeted showed that many in the convention were of the 
 same opinion. 
 
 From the first day of the session, it was apparent that the 
 radical delegates, who were probably the most numerous and 
 certainly the most determined and united party, and who had 
 gained control of the business committee, consisting of three 
 members from each section of the state, which was to frame the 
 resolutions for discussion, had become, after the example of their 
 friends of the September convention, disciples of irregularity. 
 They were now bent upon disregarding the plain meaning of the 
 call of the I2th of November, dispensing altogether with a second 
 convention, and themselves drawing up immediately constitu 
 tional amendments and other regulations embodying their plan 
 for reconstruction, to be submitted directly to the people for their 
 approval. The conservatives, on the contrary, were opposed to 
 any doubtful measures which would admit of pertinent compari 
 sons with the much denounced acts of the secessionists in 
 1 86 1, and were insistent that expedition be sacrificed to regular 
 ity and to as close an approximation to absolute legality as was 
 possible under the circumstances. 
 
 Their program was outlined in resolutions 22 offered by Judge 
 Trewett of Hamilton county, which the radicals succeeded in 
 referring to the business committee without debate. They sub 
 mitted "that this convention, being a primary assemblage of the 
 people, has no constitutional powers to resolve itself into a con 
 vention of delegates, and in that capacity revise or amend our 
 state constitution; that the true policy which should govern this 
 convention is to set forth a declaration of principles for the con 
 sideration of the people, and prepare a general ticket for dele- 
 
 "Ibid. 
 
 22 Ibid., January n. 
 
1 64 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 gates, who shall be appointed and elected according to the Union 
 strength in the three grand divisions of the state; that the best 
 interests of the state demand that we yet continue a military 
 government until the rebellion shall cease to have an army in the 
 field ; that an election be holden for delegates to a state convention 
 on the first day of February, 1865, in the same way and manner 
 that members to the general assembly were elected immediately 
 preceding the rebellion, who shall meet at Nashville on the 5th 
 of February, 1865, revise the state constitution, and submit the 
 ratification of the same to the people of Tennessee on the 4th 
 of March, 1865 ; and at the same time members to the legislature 
 of the state and to Congress shall be elected, in such mode and 
 manner as the revised or amended constitution may prescribe 
 . . . ; that the convention of delegates, in the amended consti 
 tution, should, upon the basis of the Union vote, fix the number 
 of representatives in Congress, and in each branch of the state 
 legislature, to which the people of the state shall be entitled in 
 the first session, and redistrict the state accordingly." It was 
 further proposed that the coming convention declare for the un 
 conditional abolition of slavery, and that none who voluntarily 
 sided with the rebellion be eligible as delegate to the convention 
 or as voter in the elections. 
 
 The radicals fell back upon the fundamental right of the sover 
 eign people, for their own salvation in a crisis of their fate, to 
 transcend the bounds set by themselves to their normal action. 
 The report 23 of the majority of the business committee, read to 
 the convention on the nth, proposed this preamble to their 
 resolutions: "The first article and the first section of the decla 
 ration of rights in the constitution of the state of Tennessee de 
 clares : 'That all power is inherent in the people, and all govern 
 ments are founded on their authority, and instituted for their 
 peace, safety, and happiness; and for the advancement of these 
 ends they have at all times an inalienable and indefeasible right 
 to alter, reform, or abolish the government in such manner as 
 they may think proper.' Therefore a portion of the citizens of 
 the state of Tennessee and of the United States of America, in 
 convention assembled, do propound the following alterations and 
 
 23 Ibid., January 12. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 165 
 
 amendments to the constitution, which, when ratified by the 
 sovereign loyal people, shall be and constitute a part of the per 
 manent constitution of the state of Tennessee." 
 
 The amendments to be submitted were four in number. The 
 first abolished slavery and involuntary servitude in the words of 
 the thirteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution, then pend 
 ing before the country; the second forbade the legislature to 
 make any law "recognizing the right of property in man''; the 
 third substituted for popular election of the judges of the state 
 supreme court, attorney-general, and reporter, appointment by 
 the governor, with the advice and consent of the senate; the 
 fourth admitted to the suffrage all citizens of Tennessee who had 
 voluntarily borne arms in the service of the United States (thus 
 giving the vote to the negro soldiers), declared that color should 
 not disfranchise any person who, by state law, should be a 
 competent witness in the courts against a white man, and per 
 manently denied the ballot to holders of civil, judicial, and other 
 offices in the state who had given aid and comfort to the Con 
 federates, unless they could establish their loyalty beyond a 
 doubt, and also to all officers in the Confederate army above the 
 rank of lieutenant-colonel, leaving to the legislature, however, the 
 power to reenfranchise such persons, well disposed toward the 
 government of the United States, as, in their judgment, merited 
 the privilege. Appended was a schedule invalidating the acts of 
 the secession government and elaborating the details for state 
 reconstruction. 
 
 The first two amendments were certain to command the almost 
 unanimous support of the convention, for the pro-slavery loyal 
 ists had been alienated from the "unconditional" by the quar 
 rels of the past autumn. The third and fourth embodied the 
 views of the radicals, with modifications calculated to render 
 them palatable to delegates inclined to leniency. Thus a loophole 
 through which to escape permanent disfranchisement was pro 
 vided in the discretion accorded to the legislature. Delegates 
 were not lacking who urged the granting of the suffrage to all 
 loyal negroes, and a petition 24 from the "colored citizens" of 
 Nashville was read in the convention, asking this boon and the 
 
 * Ibid. 
 
i66 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 still more precious one of admission of negro testimony on oath 
 in court in cases where white persons were concerned. The 
 majority were not disposed to go so far, but they proposed to 
 enfranchise the negro soldiers, and conceded, as regards the rest 
 of the blacks, that, whenever the legislature chose to extend the 
 right to testify in the courts, the vote should go with it. 
 
 J. R. Hood of Hamilton county, the editor of the Chattanooga 
 Gazette, made a minority report, 25 vigorously denying the author 
 ity of the convention to offer amendments to the people. The 
 call under which it had assembled, he observed, specifically stated 
 its object to be to take council and to plan for a second "duly 
 elected and qualified body of delegates, clothed with full power 
 to make all necessary amendments." Many of the present "dele 
 gates," on their own testimony, possessed no representative char 
 acter at all, but came as individual members of the Union party 
 of the state. There was danger in following, "even by implica 
 tion," in the footsteps of the secessionists, whose revolutionary, 
 lawless acts had been so freely condemned. Hood's proposition 
 was that the convention request the military governor to issue 
 writs for an election by general ticket on the 22d of February 
 of one hundred delegates, who should meet at Nashville on the 
 4th of March, "to take into consideration such measures as will 
 make the organic law of the state homogeneous with the liberal 
 policy of the government of the United States," and that the 
 people vote on the measures recommended on the 2Oth of April. 
 
 Not only the assumed authority of the convention to propose 
 amendments at all, but also specific points in the majority plan 
 and particularly the third and fourth amendments came in for 
 severe strictures. Speakers inveighed against the extension of 
 the franchise to the negro soldiers, the proposal to discontinue 
 popular election of judges, the strict disfranchising clauses. 
 Lincoln's amnesty proclamation was an inducement to the rebels 
 to return home and receive all their old rights, argued Judge 
 Gaunt of Bradley county, and the convention could not depart 
 from the president's policy. A man could not be deprived of his 
 rights and, nevertheless, be made a good citizen. 26 Colonel Byrd, 
 of Roane county, revived an old ghost, once laid by Governor 
 
 25 Ibid. 
 
 36 Ibid., January 13. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 167 
 
 Johnson, when he urged that the convention plan be discarded 
 and a legislature elected to propose amendments in a constitu 
 tional way. 27 
 
 Gradually, however, realizing the necessity of cooperation, if 
 they were to make any headway against the determined radicals, 
 the moderates rallied around Hood and his hundred-delegate 
 idea. Hood himself led the attack in a blunt, defiant speech 28 on 
 the 1 2th, in which he directly impunged the motives of the radical 
 leaders and accused them of attempting to browbeat their oppo 
 nents by questioning their loyalty. The action advocated by 
 the majority, he contended, would be a fraud on the people. 
 "The disinterested masses can trace the ruin of the country to the 
 insolent demands of party tacticians. What accounts for the 
 surprising phase affairs have presented in this convention? . . . 
 It is the party lash. I tell gentlemen to beware. They cannot 
 whip the loyalists of Tennessee into the traces. They have been 
 fighting arrogance and insolence too long to succumb to the en 
 croachments of those who may have personal ends to accom 
 plish." The "would-be managers of the people" are trying to 
 trick them by combining good and bad measures in one propo 
 sition and thus leading them to commit themselves to the bad 
 "to sanction the act of this mob" for the sake of securing the 
 good. One admirable measure they propose is the enfranchise 
 ment of the negro soldiers. "Loyal black soldiers are better than 
 white rebels." 
 
 Hood and the moderates might have saved their breath. The 
 radicals were holding in reserve their final thunderbolt, waiting 
 for the decisive moment to launch it. Governor Johnson had 
 thus far taken no active part in the proceedings, but the intensity 
 with which he followed every move in this final act of the drama, 
 in which his was the principal part, may be imagined. Now it 
 was proposed and voted that he be invited to address the con 
 vention on the evening of the I2th. This brought him forward 
 just after Hood's telling speech. The stage was set for him, 
 and before he had finished, he seemed to be the only actor upon it. 
 
 With solid practical argument and trenchant directness, he 
 struck straight at the foundation of the" moderate position. 
 
 37 Ibid. 
 
 28 Ibid., January 15. 
 
i68 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 "Suppose you do violate law," he said; "if by so doing you restore 
 the law and the constitution, your consciences will approve your 
 course, and all the people will say, amen ! You are without law 
 and without a constitution, and it is your duty to get it back for 
 the people. ... If you do boldly what the hour demands, 
 you . . . may hold up your hands when the struggle is 
 ended and swear that you have saved your state and the repub 
 lic. . . . This is the most favorable opportunity that has pre 
 sented itself. . . . Why not agree upon two or three simple 
 propositions, and get back your state government?" Were the 
 matter in his hands, he declared, he would simply propose to the 
 people that slavery be abolished and its resurrection forever pro 
 hibited. This great monopoly, essentially "contrary to the gen 
 ius of a free state," is the foe now engaged in a war to the death 
 with the government. Crush it in Tennessee, and its death- 
 knell will be sounded throughout the land. It matters not how 
 the movement is started, so long as the sovereign people finally 
 acquiesce in it. "Any man can draw up a few 'whereases,' sub 
 mit them to his friends, and they recommend them to the people 
 of the state; and if the people ratify them, the subject-matter be 
 comes law, it is constitutional, and the procedure consonant 
 with the spirit of popular government. If you call a convention, 
 involving expense, delay, and vexation, their action must, after 
 all, go to the people to be sanctioned by them before it can become 
 a part of the constitution." Then let the people act. The im 
 portant thing is to restore the civil government at once, 
 free from the encumbrances that brought on the rebellion. Ac 
 cordingly, it is unwise to waste time now over minor defects 
 that can be attended to as well later for example, the matters 
 treated in the proposed third and fourth amendments. As for 
 the elective franchise, get a legislature first and let it attend to 
 that. Make no more amendments than are necessary to insure 
 a free government. 29 
 
 It would be hardly an overstatement to say that never did a 
 political speech bring more decisive results. Before it, the op 
 position that, the same afternoon, had seemed so powerful, im 
 mediately dissolved and disappeared and the radical plan, with 
 the modifications suggested by the governor, was put through 
 "Ibid., January 14. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 169 
 
 with little further deliberation. As a partial explanation of this 
 remarkable occurrence, it must be remembered that it was not 
 all shades of loyal opinion in the state that Johnson succeeded 
 so signally in blending into a harmonious background for his 
 policy. The convention consisted only of "unconditionals," 
 ostensibly administration men; all others had been eliminated 
 from participation in the work of reorganization by a gradual 
 process culminating in the iron-clad oath of September, 1864, 
 and the rigid requirements for delegates which the convention 
 itself prescribed. All the members were in reality radical, in the 
 sense that they were the foes of slavery and of the old system of 
 government in the state. With hardly an exception, all were in 
 favor of restoration by the convention method. The agitation 
 for committing the task to a legislature, so vigorous in the pre 
 ceding summer, had dwindled to a few voices, to whom little 
 heed w!as now given. No irreconcilable differences existed 
 among the delegates as to the form the new government should 
 take. Indeed, the Hood party might more properly be called 
 legalists or constitutionalists than moderates. Their only de 
 termined attack was made upon the representative character and 
 constitutional status of the convention, and to meet this John 
 son directed all his powers of persuasion. To make it the single 
 issue, he cleverly avoided disputes on vexed questions, not im 
 mediately essential, proposed in the third and fourth amend 
 ments, by suggesting their postponement. For the legality of 
 the convention's action he practically assumed personal respon 
 sibility by his speech, thus lifting a load from the shoulders of 
 scrupulous delegates ; and by emphasizing his favorite doctrine 
 of paramount popular sovereignty, exercised to restore rather 
 than to destroy the government, he sought to contradistinguish 
 this action from that of the secessionists in 1861. 
 
 After this speech, the result was certain. Many delegates de 
 parted for their homes, realizing that the remaining proceedings 
 would be merely perfunctory. The next day, the business com 
 mittee withdrew its report and returned it with the third and 
 fourth amendments stricken out. 30 The last attempt of the 
 moderates to gain recognition for their views a resolution 31 by 
 
 30 Ibid., January 15. 
 
 31 Ibid. 
 
170 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 Colonel Butler that the convention would exceed its powers by 
 acting in accordance with the report failed by a vote of 113 
 to 161, all that remained of the original five hundred odd dele 
 gates. The report was then adopted. 32 
 
 Two constitutional amendments, therefore, were to be sub 
 mitted to the people, providing for the abolition of slavery and 
 prohibiting the legislature from reviving it. The radical 
 schedule, 33 also approved, abrogated a section of the state consti 
 tution in conflict with the new amendments, declared unconsti 
 tutional and void the declaration of independence and ordinance 
 of separation of May 6 and the convention and military league 
 with the Confederacy of May 7, 1861, as well as all laws of the 
 secessionist legislature and acts done in pursuance of them, in 
 cluding the issue of state bonds, notes of the Bank of Tennessee 
 and its branches, and all debts created in the name of the state 
 by their authority ; forbade any subsequent legislature to author 
 ize the payment of such debts or the redemption of such notes ; 
 suspended the statute of limitations from May 6, 1861, until 
 the legislature should restore it ; authorized attachments of prop 
 erty and collection of judgments in suits for torts or upon con 
 tracts, without personal service of process upon the defendant, 
 until the legislature should make other regulations; ratified all 
 civil and military appointments of Governor Johnson and pro 
 vided for their continuance until the election or appointment of 
 their successors under the laws and constitution of the state and 
 of the United States. "The people" were to be summoned to 
 vote on both the amendments and the schedule on the ensuing 
 22d of February and, if they approved them, an election for 
 governor and members of the legislature was to follow on the 
 4th of March, the legislature to be voted for by general ticket 
 upon practically the old basis of representation. The officers 
 thus chosen were to serve until legally supplanted at the regular 
 biennial election in 1867. Changes in the laws regulating the 
 qualifications for voters and other modifications of the elective 
 franchise, at first proposed for incorporation in the constitution, 
 were left to the general assembly. 
 
 32 Ibid. 
 
 33 Ibid. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 171 
 
 It remained to provide the machinery for launching the new 
 system. This was done in a series of resolutions 34 passed by 
 the convention. The defences which had safeguarded the admin 
 istration party in November were again erected around the ballot- 
 box for both the vote on the amendments and the first election 
 in March. The voters in each case, except those known to the 
 judges of the election as unconditional Union men, were required 
 to take the governor's iron-clad oath. The name of each voter 
 must be written on the back of his ticket, and the tickets filed 
 with the clerks of the county courts for future reference. Thus, 
 any man who ventured to oppose the dominant party must count 
 on being known and reaping the consequences of implied dis 
 loyalty. Qualified voters might cast their ballots in any county 
 of the state, or, if in the military service, wherever they might 
 happen to be on election day ; and, for the soldiers, military com 
 manders and superintendents of hospitals were empowered to 
 hold elections. Returns were to be made to the secretary of 
 state and the result declared by proclamation of the governor. 
 
 The convention then voted to nominate a candidate for gov 
 ernor and to commit the naming of candidates for the legislature 
 and officers of elections to the delegates, for their respective dis 
 tricts. If, however, the "Union people" of any district preferred 
 another candidate, they were to be free to substitute him for 
 the one selected by the delegates. The state executive committee 
 was authorized to fill all vacancies in the list of nominees. 35 
 
 The nomination of the gubernatorial candidate was the last 
 exciting episode of a dramatic event. For months the administra 
 tion and its supporting newspapers had made no secret of their 
 preference -for Brownlow, "the fighting parson," a popular hero 
 and, even more than Johnson, the most striking individual figure 
 in the state. Of qualifications for the office he had almost none, 
 save his intense, unswerving, self-sacrificing loyalty to the Union. 
 As editor of the Knoxville Whig, the organ of ultra-anti-secession 
 radicalism, he had brought down upon himself and his family 
 the vengeance of the Confederates. Something of the sanctified 
 celebrity of the martyr clung about him and glows with a shade 
 
 34 Nashville Times and Union, January 16. 
 85 Ibid. 
 
172 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 too vivid of complacency in the pages of " Parson Brownlow's 
 Book," in which he recounts his sufferings and draws a highly 
 colored picture of Confederate atrocities. Intense, bitter, utterly 
 narrow-minded as he was, extravagance in action and expression 
 was a necessary outlet for his fierce passions, and his picturesque 
 personality and violent diatribes were the most effective drawing- 
 cards at all Union meetings in Tennessee. He never failed to 
 excite and to amuse; in him the arts of the demagogue were 
 astonishingly mingled with the purest, sincerest, most intolerable 
 fanaticism. 
 
 No opposition to Brownlow appeared, and he was chosen by 
 acclamation. In his brief speech of acceptance 38 he promised 
 an administration of "deeds and acts," and concluded: "God 
 being my helper, if you will send up a legislature to reorganize 
 the militia and pass other necessary laws, I will put an end to 
 this infernal system of guerilla fighting in the state, in East, Mid 
 dle and Western Tennessee, if we have to shoot and hang every 
 man concerned." The convention then wound up its business 
 with resolutions 37 requesting the president to appoint Brownlow 
 a brigadier-general and assign him to duty as military governor 
 for the period between Governor Johnson's retirement and the 
 March election, urging the governor and the department com 
 manders to send Tennessee troops to guard the ballot-box during 
 the approaching canvass and election and protect the loyal people 
 after the election, and providing for the appointment by the presi 
 dent of the convention of a committee of three from the three 
 divisions of the state to proclaim Tennessee no longer in insur 
 rection against the national government. 
 
 "Thank God that the tyrant's rod has been broken," exclaimed 
 Johnson, in his dispatch of the I3th, announcing the result to 
 Lincoln. "Without some reverse of arms, the state will be re 
 deemed and the foul blot of slavery erased from her escutcheon. 
 I hope that Tennessee will not be included in the bill now before 
 Congress and be made an exception if the bill passes. All is 
 now working well, and if Tennessee is now left alone, (she) 
 
 36 Proceedings of the Liberty and Union Convention in Nashville, Ten 
 nessee, on the 9th of January, 1865 (pamphlet, 'Library of Congress). 
 91 Nashville Dispatch, January 15. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 173 
 
 will soon resume all the functions of a state according to the 
 genius and theory of the government." 38 
 
 The result of the popular vote, under the elaborate restrictions 
 imposed, was insured from the beginning. On the 22d of Feb 
 ruary, the amendments and schedule proposed by the convention 
 were ratified by a vote of 25,293 to 48. 39 More than 3,000 votes 
 were by soldiers. Only twenty-seven counties in the state sent in 
 returns, and Shelby county was the sole participant from West 
 Tennessee. The feeling in that section was influenced unfavor 
 ably by the friction which had attended the enrollment of the 
 militia and probably also by the enforcement of General Canby's 
 order for a draft of one man in seven on the i5th. 40 An unsuc 
 cessful effort had been made by those apprehensive of the effect 
 of the draft to have it postponed until after the election. A 
 meeting called at Memphis to ratify the proceedings of the con 
 stitutional convention had, to the consternation of its sponsors, 
 fallen under the domination of the "copperheads," who carried 
 resolution's denouncing the convention's proceedings and setting 
 aside its nominations, requiring a subsequent radical meeting 
 to undo its work. 41 The guerillas were still showing intermittent 
 activity in East Tennessee and frightened many citizens into re 
 maining away from the polls. 
 
 Although the result was far from an unqualified success, the 
 president's ten per cent, requirement was more than complied 
 with. At last, after three years of incessant effort, Johnson's 
 work in Tennessee was done. In a few days he was to leave the 
 state to take up his new duties in Washington, and his procla 
 mation 42 of the 25th, announcing the people's verdict on his 
 plan for his it essentially was and declaring the amendments 
 a part of the constitution, is of the nature of a valedictory. 
 
 "For nearly three years," he said, "in the midst of dangers and 
 difficulties the most complicated and perplexing, I have earnestly 
 labored to restore the state to its former proud position in the 
 
 88 O. R., series iii, vol. iv, p. 1050. 
 138 Annual Cyclopedia, 1864, p. 769. 
 
 40 J. P., vol. Ivi, 2167, 2193; Ivii, 2302; Nashville Times and Union, 
 February 16. 
 
 *J. P., vol. Ivii, 2302. 
 
 ^Nashville Times and Union, February 17. 
 
174 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 Union. My constant effort has been to save it, not to destroy it ; 
 but the rebellious sentiment of the people often interposed ob 
 stacles which had to be overcome by military power. The task 
 was painful, but the duty has been performed, and the result 
 has passed into history. Time, I am happy to say, has greatly 
 calmed the passions of the people, and experience restored them 
 to reason. The folly of destroying their government and sacri 
 ficing their sons to gratify the mad ambition of political leaders 
 needs no longer to be told to the laboring masses. The wasted 
 estates, ruined and dilapidated farms, vacant seats around the 
 hearthstone, prostrate business, and even life itself, everywhere 
 proclaim it in language not to be misunderstood. 
 
 "But all is not lost. A new era dawns upon the people of 
 Tennessee. They enter upon a career guided by reason, law, 
 order, and reverence. The reign of brute force and personal 
 violence has passed away forever. By their own solemn act at 
 the iballot-box, the shackles have been formally stricken from the 
 limbs of more than 275,000 slaves in the state. The unjust dis 
 tinctions in society, fostered by an arrogant aristocracy, based 
 upon human bondage, have been overthrown, and our whole 
 social system reconstructed on the basis of honest industry and 
 personal worth. Labor shall now receive its merited reward, and 
 honesty, energy, and enterprise their just appreciation. Capital, 
 heretofore timid and distrustful of success, may now confidently 
 seek remunerative and profitable investments in the state. Public 
 schools and colleges begin anew their work of instruction upon a 
 broader and more enduring basis. The foundations of society, 
 under the change in the constitution, are in harmony with the 
 principles of free government and the National Union ; and if 
 the people are true to themselves, true to the state, and loyal to 
 the Federal government, they will rapidly overcome the calami 
 ties of the war, and raise the state to a power and grandeur not 
 heretofore even anticipated. Many of its vast resources lie un 
 discovered, and it requires intelligent enterprise and free labor 
 alone to develop them and clothe the state with a richness and 
 beauty surpassed by none of her sisters." 
 
 The state election followed on the 4th of March. The vote 
 was even smaller than that on the amendments, Brownlow and 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 175 
 
 the convention ticket receiving 23,352 against 35 scattering. 43 On 
 the 3d of April, the legislature met at Nashville, and, on the 5th, 
 it ratified the thirteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution 
 and proceeded to reorganize the state government and elect 
 United States senators. 44 But these events and the subsequent 
 troubled history of Tennessee are beyond the scope of this ac 
 count, for Governor Johnson had already resigned his office and 
 left the state. The president had not bestowed his mantle on 
 Brownlow, as the convention had requested, but permitted Secre 
 tary of State East to perform the gubernatorial functions until 
 the new civil officers were qualified. 
 
 43 Annual Cyclopedia, 1864, pp, 767-769. 
 41 Ibid. 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 A GOVERNOR-OF-ALL-WORK 
 
 A connected account of the reconstruction of Tennessee the 
 work for which Johnson's office was originally created and to 
 which all his diversified activities were incidental has postponed 
 until now the treatment of several subsidiary matters which oc 
 cupied his attention in the meantime. 
 
 Among the many functions of the governor requiring immedi 
 ate exercise, the military were by far the most important. Real 
 izing this, the president had conferred upon him the rank of 
 brigadier-general, authorized him to call upon the military com 
 manders for assistance in carrying out his orders, and provided 
 for a "governor's guard" to be under his own immediate and 
 exclusive command. 1 
 
 At first, as has already been observed, the respective authority 
 of the governor and the generals was not clearly understood, and 
 led to serious complications under Buell and Rosecrans. That 
 
 1 Johnson's instructions, accompanying his commission, were as fol 
 lows : "Sir : The commission you have received expresses on its face 
 the nature and extent of the duties and power devolved on you by the 
 appointment as military governor of Tennessee. Instructions have been 
 
 given to Major-General to aid you in the performance of your 
 
 duty and the extent of your authority. He has also been instructed to 
 detail an adequate military force for the special purpose of a governor's 
 guard and to act under your directions. It is obvious to you that the 
 great purpose of your appointment is to reestablish the authority of the 
 Federal government in the state of Tennessee and provide the means 
 of maintaining peace and security to the loyal inhabitants of that state 
 until they shall be able to establish a civil government. Upon your 
 wisdom and energetic action much will depend in accomplishing the 
 result. It is not deemed necessary to give any specific instructions, but 
 rather to confide in your sound discretion to adopt such measures as 
 circumstances may demand. Specific instructions will be given when 
 requested. You may rely upon the perfect confidence and full support 
 of the department in the performance of your duties." J. P., vol. xvi, 
 3688; O. R., series i, vol. ix, p. 396; ibid., series iii, vol. ii, p. 106. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 177 
 
 there was less trouble afterwards is doubtless to be explained 
 not so much by the absence of causes of dissension as by the 
 character of the officers appointed and the lesson they had drawn 
 from the experience of their predecessors, that the governor was 
 a power to be reckoned with and conciliated. Thomas, who suc 
 ceeded Rosecrans, had promptly won Johnson's enthusiastic ad 
 miration and confidence by his ability, pure patriotism, and 
 single-minded devotion to duty, and had been earnestly recom 
 mended by him for the command to which he was finally as 
 signed. He, like Johnson, was a Southern loyalist; his views on 
 reconstruction were much the same; and his equable temper and 
 indisposition to quarrel or trespass on another's province stood 
 him in good stead in Tennessee. The post commanders at Nash 
 ville also took on wisdom. As for the subordinate military offi 
 cers, the principal source of friction was removed when John 
 son was authorized to dictate the appointment of the provost- 
 marshal at Nashville, and those who rememibered the fate of 
 Matthews, Greene and Truesdail trod warily under the gover 
 nor's eye. Whatever embarrassments he experienced in the late 
 years of the war came from distant sections, like Memphis, where 
 the civil government existed only sporadically, under military 
 regulations of the general; and such incidents were few and 
 comparatively unimportant and were speedily remedied or ex 
 plained away when he complained of them. 
 
 Another important duty imposed upon Johnson was the raising 
 of Tennessee troops for the Federal army 2 and for the defence 
 
 2 Under the act of July 22, 1861, authorizing the governors of states 
 furnishing volunteers to "commission the field staff and company officers 
 requisite for said volunteers" Where, in Southern states, the proper 
 authorities "fail or refuse" to commission the officers, the president is 
 authorized to do so. More detailed regulations were provided in the 
 form of general orders from the war department, viz. : 
 
 General Order No. 18, 1862 : Breaking up all independent organizations 
 and ordering their members to report to the governors of their states 
 for commissions. 
 
 General Order No. 75, 1862: Providing that all volunteer regiments 
 shall be under the exclusive control of the governors of their states until 
 their muster rolls are complete, when they shall be mustered into the 
 service of the United States. 
 
 General Order No. 48, 1863: Providing that no volunteer officer shall 
 
178 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 of the state. The supporters of the Union in Tennessee were 
 comparatively few, but among them the task was rendered easy 
 by the fact that, in the existing condition of the country, Union 
 men were actually safer in the army than at home, where those 
 not caught in the wide-flung Confederate conscription net fell 
 to the tender mercies of the guerillas. 
 
 The governor brought with him authority from Stanton to 
 draw on the treasury to the amount of $10,000 for funds to or 
 ganize a "home guard" for service in Tennessee, 3 and, by the 
 23d of April, he could report two regiments complete and four 
 others nearly so. 4 Volunteers were plentiful enough, but many 
 insisted on organizing as cavalry, to clear the state of guerillas 
 and protect their homes and families a business for which in 
 fantry was practically worthless. The infantry regiments, conse 
 quently, did not fill rapidly. This would have been well enough, 
 but for the great difficulty of getting horses. The Confederates 
 had taken almost every animal of value for military purposes. 
 Johnson finally resorted to pressing horses from secession sympa 
 thizers, but the supply never came near equalling the demand, 
 and some troops attempted for a time to use mares, an experi 
 ment which worked badly and was abandoned. 5 The regiment, 
 originally infantry, commanded by the governor's son, Robert, 
 was transferred to the cavalry service, and Colonel Robert's cor 
 respondence with his father is the history of a long struggle to 
 secure proper horses and equipment. 
 
 On the 28th of June, 1862, Johnson subscribed the invitation 
 of the loyal governors to the president to call upon their states 
 for all the men necessary to fill up the ranks of the army in the 
 field, provide garrisons for captured posts, and speedily crush 
 the rebellion, 6 and proceeded promptly to raise the two regiments 
 asked for as part of Tennessee's quota. By the first of July, the 
 unrestrained career of Forrest and Morgan and the cutting of 
 
 be mustered into the service of the United States until he shall exhibit a 
 commission from the governor of the state to which the organization 
 into which he desires to be mustered belongs. J. P., vol. xxx, 6764. 
 
 J J. P., vol. xvi, 3967. 
 
 *O. R., series i, vol. x, part ii, p. in. 
 
 a j. P., vol. xxiv, 5268. 
 
 a O. R., series iii, vol. ii, pp. 180, 187, 208. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 179 
 
 the railroad communications threatened Nashville with complete 
 isolation. Johnson was thoroughly alarmed, and set himself with 
 characteristic energy to help organize the defence. On the I4th, 
 the rumor gained currency that the Confederates were marching 
 on the city. A Union meeting was hurriedly announced and 
 Johnson delivered a stirring speech, calling on the citizens to 
 enroll and promising them arms, while those who should serve a 
 month were to receive regular pay. In similar crises throughout 
 the year, it was the governor who spurred the flagging zeal of 
 others with his restless energy. 
 
 Meanwhile, Halleck in the west and Morgan in East Tennessee 
 were begging for cavalry. Johnson's response was prompt. His 
 demands on Washington brought him, on the 1st of August, 
 full authority to raise any amount of cavalry and infantry needed 
 for service in Tennessee. 7 The appointment of the officers, too, 
 was practically in his hands. Operations within the state, he 
 constantly urged, should be, as far as possible, in charge of 
 Tennessee officers ; and he did not hesitate to request the substi 
 tution of ex-Governor Campbell for General Buell as commander 
 of the relief expedition into East Tennessee. 8 
 
 In military matters, as in every other respect, the tendency of 
 the president was to avail himself more and more of Johnson's 
 proved energy and efficiency. On the 28th of March, 1863, he 
 was empowered to raise and muster into the service of the 
 United States, for three years or during the war, ten regiments 
 of infantry, ten of cavalry, and ten batteries of artillery, the 
 officers to be appointed by him and commissioned by the war 
 department. Quartermasters and commissaries were instructed 
 to issue supplies to these troops upon the governor's requisition. 9 
 The same order contained also the specific authority for raising 
 the governor's guard which had been promised a year before, 
 for the purpose of strengthening his authority and performing 
 service around Nashville. This force, which might not exceed 
 a brigade, was placed under his exclusive command and could 
 not be employed without his consent. On April 22d, a regiment 
 
 7 Annual Cyclopedia 1862, p. 598; Nashville Union, July 15, 1862; O. R., 
 series iii, vol. ii, p. 208. 
 
 8 O. R., series iii, vol. ii, p. 290. 
 'Ibid., series i, vol. xvi, part ii, p. 118. 
 
i8o ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 of Tennessee infantry was detached from the regular army, 
 against the protest of General Rosecrans, to form a nucleus for 
 the guard. 10 Henceforth, it was apparent, the governor need 
 not depend upon others for carrying out his behests. 
 
 Though laboring faithfully to obtain recruits for Rosecrans, 
 Johnson's more immediate concern was for the succor of the 
 loyal people of Tennessee, exposed to the vengeance of the enemy, 
 who were sweeping the country in the rear of the Union army. 
 To this end he wearied the government with complaints and 
 prayers for aid and finally (April) won the consent of the war 
 department recruits from Tennessee now coming in but slowly 
 to enlist men from other states to complete the number he 
 required. 11 The work was begun at once, but led to serious 
 complications and friction between recruiting officers and gover 
 nors, and the order permitting it was revoked in June. 12 
 
 In the autumn of 1863, the need for more soldiers became 
 acute. Rosecrans was concentrating every available man at the 
 front for the projected winter campaign against Bragg. Even 
 prisoners were released on condition of taking service in the 
 army. The Confederate cavalry and guerillas were everywhere 
 and a large force for guard and garrison duty was essential. 
 The places of the veterans withdrawn from this service had 
 promptly to be filled by new troops, and in this work the co 
 operation of the governor was highly important. Lincoln tele 
 graphed him on the 8th of September: "Let me urge that you 
 do your utmost to get every man you can, black and white, under 
 arms at the very earliest moment, to guard roads, bridges, and 
 trains, allowing all the better trained soldiers to go forward to 
 Rosecrans. Of course I mean for you to act in cooperation with, 
 and not independently of, the military authorities." 13 Authority 
 was sent him to raise both troops for the regular army and 
 companies of "Union guards" to be organized under Tennessee 
 law for twelve months' service in the state only, and controlled 
 directly by the governor. 14 A similar organization had already 
 
 30 J. P., vol. xxx, 6756. 
 
 11 Ibid., vol. xliii, 9412; O. R., series i, vol. xxiii, part ii, p. 308. 
 
 12 J. P., vol. xxix, 6348 ; vol. xxxi, 6754. 
 
 13 O. R., series iii, vol. iii, p. 823. 
 U J. P., vol. xxxiv, 7598. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 181 
 
 been effected by General Hurlbut in West Tennessee. 15 By the 
 middle of October, Johnson was able to report good success in 
 his undertaking. The men obtained, he said, were well adapted 
 for service against the guerillas, as they came from the country 
 where they were numerous and knew how to meet them. 16 Still, 
 the scheme was not without its imperfections. Officers engaged 
 in recruiting regular three-year regiments complained that the 
 opportunity offered for shorter service drew many men away 
 from them. It was contended that the "home guards," though 
 possibly suited to warfare with small bands of Indians, were 
 useless against the strong and capably led forces of Forrest and 
 Morgan. Arms furnished them would only be captured and sent 
 South, and their feeble efforts would bring a worse vengeance 
 upon the country. They themselves were insubordinate and dis 
 posed to commit outrages on the people they were supposed to 
 defend, and, in general, might be expected to do far more harm 
 than good. 17 Much of this criticism was just, but the protection 
 furnished by the "home guards" was all that could be afforded 
 the citizens during the critical winter of 1863-64, and doubtless 
 saved them from a worse fate than actually befell them. And 
 much more important and valuable were their services in guard 
 ing the lines of communication of the army. 
 
 In his telegram of the 8th of September, 18 Lincoln had urged 
 the arming of black as well as white soldiers. This suggestion, 
 of course, was only in consonance with his general plan of utiliz 
 ing the slaves to increase the resources of the North, but, in 
 Tennessee and the other border states, this policy was attended 
 by peculiar difficulties. The same considerations which sug 
 gested the exemption of Tennessee from the emancipation proc 
 lamation counselled a tender regard for the feelings and property 
 of loyal and qua'si-loyal slave-owners in the state. The military 
 crisis, however, was decisive in the matter, and determined the 
 president to organize the blacks, with proper safeguards for 
 Union men. As early as the 26th of March, he had written to 
 Johnson : "I am told that you have at least thought of raising 
 
 15 Nashville Union, September 26. 
 
 M O. R., series i, vol. xxx, part iv, p. 308. 
 
 17 J. P., vol. xxxiv, 7582 ; vol. li, -1074. 
 
 18 O. R., series iii, vol. iii, p. 823. 
 
182 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 a negro military force. In my opinion the country now needs 
 no specific thing so much as some man of your ability and posi 
 tion to go to this work. When I speak of your position, I mean 
 that of an eminent citizen of a slave state and himself a slave 
 holder. The colored population is the great available, and yet 
 unavailed of, force for restoring the Union. The bare sight of 
 50,000 armed and drilled black soldiers upon the banks of the 
 Mississippi would end the rebellion at once. And who doubts 
 that we can present that sight if we but take hold in earnest? 
 If you have been thinking of it, please do not dismiss the 
 thought." 19 
 
 To facilitate this work, the war department, in September, 
 commissioned Major George L. Stearns assistant adjutant-general 
 and sent him to Tennessee to report to Rosecrans and Johnson 
 and take charge of the organization of colored troops. He was 
 empowered to enlist all free negroes and slaves of disloyal 
 masters. Slaves of loyal citizens might be taken with their 
 masters' consent, in which case the owners were to be given 
 descriptive lists of their negroes enlisted, entitling them to com 
 pensation "not to exceed the sum authorized by law as bounties 
 for volunteer service/' All negroes entering the army were to 
 be free at the expiration of their term of enlistment. 20 
 
 No sooner had Major Stearns reached Nashville, than he ex 
 cited the hostility of both Johnson and other "influential loyal 
 Tennesseeans" opposed to making soldiers of the negroes. The 
 governor's animosity apparently arose from a mistaken notion 
 of Stearns' mission, which he assumed was to take the control 
 of the enlistments out of his hands. He remonstrated to Stanton 
 that the major's plans seriously interfered with his own. He 
 had proposed first to employ the newly organized negroes on the 
 government works, "indispensable to sustain the rear of General 
 Rosecrans' army," and later to convert them into soldiers, while 
 Stearns wished to place them at once in military camps. "All 
 the negroes," he observed, "will quit work when they can go 
 into camp and do nothing." Persons from other states were 
 anxious to raise colored regiments simply for the sake of getting 
 
 " Ibid, p. 103. 
 w Ibid., p. 816. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 183 
 
 commands in them : they neither knew nor cared anything about 
 the condition of the negro or the effect their action would have 
 on public opinion and the restoration of the Union in Tennessee. 
 "It is exceedingly important," he concluded, "for this question 
 to be handled in such a way as will do the least injury in forming 
 a correct public judgment at this time. We hope, therefore, that 
 the organization of negro regiments in Tennessee will be left 
 to the general commanding the department and the military 
 governor." 21 
 
 Stanton was prompt with reassurances. Major Stearns came 
 to Tennessee, he said, as the subordinate of Rosecrans and 
 Johnson, to aid them and to act under their directions, and 
 might be relieved of his office by them at any time. "Upon your 
 judgment in matters relating to the state of which you are gover 
 nor," he assured Johnson, "the department relies in respect to 
 whatever relates to the people, whether white or black, bond or 
 free." No officers of colored troops would be appointed except 
 in accordance with the governor's views. 22 Stearns was instructed 
 to leave Nashville rather than become involved in dissension with 
 Johnson ; 23 but he was a tactful and efficient officer, and succeeded 
 in dispelling misunderstandings, gained the latter's confidence, 
 and cooperated harmoniously with him thereafter. 
 
 Military commanders who presumed to trench on the gover 
 nor's preserves got nothing but censure from Washington. To 
 a complaint from Captain Dickson, the assistant adjutant-general 
 at Nashville, the reply came : "It is not perceived what right the 
 military authorities have to interfere with those questions which 
 properly belong to the jurisdiction of General Johnson," and the 
 secretary of war "directs you and all others in the military service 
 to abstain from interfering with these questions without specific 
 authority from this department, and to leave them entirely to the 
 adjudication of Governor Johnson, whose authority to dispose 
 of them is ample, and in whose discretion and judgment the de 
 partment has full confidence." 24 
 
 The recruiting of the colored regiments went forward with 
 
 21 Ibid., p. 819; J. P., vol. xxxiv, 7475. 
 
 22 O, IR., series iii, vol. iii, p. 822; J. P., vql. xxxiv, 7481. 
 28 O. R., series iii, vol. iii, p. 823; J. P., vol. xxxiv, 7486. 
 84 O. R., series i, vol. xxx, part iii, p. 701. 
 
184 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 decided success. Since the outbreak of the war, the condition 
 of the negroes in Tennessee had been anything but an enviable 
 one. 25 The devastation of the plantations and the flight of their 
 masters had turned great numbers of them loose with little re 
 straint and less prospect of supporting themselves by labor, and 
 they became gradually more destitute and miserable. Many had 
 been rounded up by the government to labor on the fortifications 
 and other public works, but such employment was irregular and 
 open to abuses. Officers, with no authority to do so, impressed 
 them for military and other service, kept them under strict sur 
 veillance to prevent desertion, often treated them harshly, and 
 paid them nothing. The opportunity to change to a regular or 
 ganization, affording them protection, consideration, pay and 
 sustenance could not but appeal to them. Agents, white and 
 colored, were sent through the state to work upon them through 
 public meetings and personal interviews. To overcome the op 
 position of loyal slave owners, Johnson urged on the president 
 (September 23) that they be given $300. in addition to the 
 bounty for each slave enlisted, the slave to receive all other pay. 
 "If a white man pays his $300. for a substitute," he said, "he need 
 not care whether he is white or black." 26 
 
 Complete rules covering negro enlistments in Maryland, Mis 
 souri, and Tennessee were promulgated as general orders by the 
 war department on the 3d of October. 27 Slaves were to be 
 classified and treated according to the loyalty of their owners, as 
 in Major Stearns' original instructions. For every slave enlisted 
 with the consent of his owner, the latter received a certificate 
 entitling him to compensation, not exceeding $300., for the slave's 
 services, upon proving his title and filing a valid deed of manu 
 mission and release. Any loyal owner who claimed upon oath 
 that his slave had been enlisted without his consent could inspect 
 the enlisted men for the purpose of identifying his property, 
 and, if necessity required the retention of the slave, the owner 
 was to receive compensation. For Tennessee, Johnson was em 
 powered to modify these orders "by such regulations as he may 
 establish to promote enlistments, subject to the approval of the 
 
 23 Stearns' report to Stan-ton, O. R., series iii, vol. iii, p. 840. 
 
 2(5 Ibid., p. 837; J. P., vol. xxxiv, 7524. 
 
 * O. R., series iii, vol. iii, p. 860. For Lincoln's views see ibid., p. 856. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 185 
 
 war department." 28 These orders had a good effect. Many 
 slave-owners, it was officially stated, came to Stearns' office and 
 declared themselves in favor of emancipation. 29 Colonel R. D. 
 Mussey, in his report to the war department in October, 1864, 
 declared that a revolution in public opinion had taken place and 
 he then knew of no prominent loyal Tennesseean who opposed 
 the enlistment of negroes. 30 
 
 On the 2 ist of October, Johnson and Stearns were authorized 
 to appoint any persons they deemed suitable for "raising, organ 
 izing, and commanding colored troops" in Tennessee, whether 
 they had complied with the regular formalities or not. 31 Such 
 appointments had previously required the sanction of Rosecrans, 
 but the confusion, the interruption of communications, and the 
 pressing demands on the general, following the defeat at Chick- 
 amauga, prevented him from attending promptly to business of 
 this sort. 32 
 
 The result of Stearns' labors was six regular negro regiments 
 and two garrison and hospital regiments. 33 "The general senti 
 ments of the people and those of the army with whom these 
 regiments have been brought in contact is favorable to them," 
 reports Colonel Mussey, the chief superintendent of contrabands. 
 "The material has been found plastic to a degree, the men all 
 appear eager to learn and willing to do their duty, and, as a 
 rule, the officers have been good. . . . My experience in this 
 work convinces me that these regiments can be made for many 
 duties superior to white regiments. As guards they are remark 
 ably faithful. , . . For raiders in the enemy's country these 
 colored troops will prove superior. They are good riders, have 
 quicker eyes at night than white, and know all the byways." 34 
 This was undoubtedly the general opinion, at least among Union 
 men. The good conduct and efficiency of the negro soldiers 
 rapidly moderated the prejudice against them. The Union con- 
 
 28 Ibid., p. 896; J. P., vol. xxxiv, 7617. 
 
 29 O. R., series iii, vol. iv, pp. 762-774. 
 
 30 Ibid. 
 
 31 Ibid., vol. iii, p. 908. 
 
 32 Ibid., vol. iv, p. 764; J. P., vol. xxxv, 7766. 
 83 O. R., series, iii, vol. iv, pp. 762-774. 
 
 31 Ibid. 
 
1 86 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 vention of September, 1864, called black as well as white militia 
 to the defence of the state. 
 
 During the summer of 1864, East Tennessee demanded John 
 son's particular attention. After Longstreet's retreat into Vir 
 ginia in the spring, the bands of Wheeler and Morgan continued 
 to operate there. From Knoxville a strong appeal, 35 signed by 
 Brownlow and other citizens, reached Johnson in July. The 
 rebels, they said, were rapidly repairing the railroad, preparing 
 to carry South all the grain and live-stock, and murdering the 
 Union men. A force must be sent at once to save them. "If 
 this is not done before the rebels have run off their supplies, then 
 we ask, in mercy to the citizens, that no troops of ours come 
 afterwards, to eat out what little may be left." 
 
 This was a project with which Johnson was in full sympathy. 
 Having shared the early sufferings of his neighbors, he had since 
 experienced scarcely less anguish from his inability to avert 
 their later disasters. Now he determined to dispatch the "gover 
 nor's guard" to their relief. That body had developed into a 
 considerable force under the command of General Alvin C. 
 Gillem, Johnson's protege and trusted friend. On the first of 
 August, he received orders 36 to kill or drive out all marauders in 
 East Tennessee, pursuing them, if necessary, beyond the limits of 
 the state, and then to direct his efforts to aiding the civil authori 
 ties in restoring law and order, according to instructions from 
 the governor's office. He was given command also of all the 
 organized regiments being raised in East Tennessee to serve a 
 year or longer, and empowered to raise others if he needed them. 
 
 Although Johnson's motives in undertaking such a movement 
 were unexceptionable, his judgment deserved criticism. A com 
 paratively small expedition, operating in an exposed position 
 and from a distant base, required for its success at least the 
 prompt and hearty support of the regular army in East Ten 
 nessee and, indeed, should have been under the same command 
 as that army and working to the same purpose. Johnson himself 
 was not wholly blind to so evident a fact. Though unwilling to 
 waive a project, of the utility of which he was convinced, to 
 suit the plans of another, he did appreciate the necessity of mutual 
 
 *J. P., vol xlv, -4. 
 
 36 W. A. Goodspeed, History of Tennessee, p. 494. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 187 
 
 understanding and harmony, and, to this end, he urged on the 
 war department (August 27) the transfer of East Tennessee, 
 then a part of the department of the Ohio under Schofield, to the 
 department of the Cumberland under Thomas, with whom his 
 relations had been especially congenial and for whose ability he 
 had a profound respect. 37 The change was not made, because, as 
 General Sherman explained, both Thomas and Schofield were 
 then actively campaigning and had no time to attend to the 
 details. 38 
 
 At first, Gillem met with considerable success, penetrating 
 northward to Bull's Gap, scattering the Confederate bands, and 
 taking many prisoners. His most notable achievement was on 
 the 4th of September, when the force of the famous John 
 Morgan than whom only Forrest inspired more terror in the 
 state was surprised and routed, Morgan himself being among 
 the slain. 
 
 By the middle of October, however, it was apparent that this 
 career 'of easy victories was soon to end. The plan of the Con 
 federates for their last attempt to overrun the state contemplated 
 the invasion of East Tennessee by Breckenridge. Schofield, who 
 was with Thomas, watching Hood in the south, expected this and 
 saw the danger of divided councils. To avert it, he directed 
 General Ammen, who commanded the regular troops at Knox- 
 ville, to assume command of Gillem's force. He sought to win 
 Johnson's assent to this arrangement by urging that the present 
 emergency demanded concerted action, and that an order from 
 the governor, withdrawing his guard from Ammen, would be 
 respected at any time. 39 Johnson would have none of such an 
 explanation and the guard was again detached. Schofield com 
 plained to Thomas that he could learn nothing of the governor's 
 intentions and was perplexed about assigning troops to East 
 Tennessee, because he did not know how long it was proposed 
 to leave Gillem there. 40 
 
 The result was obvious. Ammen was probably irritated by 
 the conflicting orders and affronted by Gillem's refusal to serve 
 
 87 O. .R., series i, vol. xxxix, part ii, p. 307. 
 
 88 Ibid., vol. xxxviii, part ii, p. 717. 
 39 J. P., vol. Ii, -958. 
 
 "O. R., series i, vol. xlv, part i, p. 884; J. P., vol. Hi, -1235. 
 
1 88 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 under him, and, from that time, showed him but scant consider 
 ation. Recrimination broke out between them, and continued 
 after Breckenridge entered the state. Reluctant to surrender the 
 advantages he had gained and trusting to reinforcements, Gillem 
 delayed too long in the face of a vastly superior force. When he 
 finally realized that the enemy was gaining his rear, he began a 
 rapid retreat on Knoxville, meanwhile sending frantic appeals to 
 Ammen for assistance; but, for whatever reason, assistance did 
 not come. On the I3th of November, his brigade ran into the 
 Confederate ambush that was set for it between Russellville and 
 Morristown and was utterly routed and driven in confusion to 
 Knoxville. 41 As Thomas observed, another disaster was to be 
 attributed to want of cooperation. 42 Gillem reorganized his 
 guard, but it accomplished nothing of particular importance 
 thereafter. 
 
 Sherman's march from Atlanta to the sea was the signal for a 
 renewed outbreak of cavalry and guerilla activity in Tennessee, 
 calculated to impede and embarrass him and, at the best, cut his 
 communications and compel him to retreat. Deprived of almost 
 all the regular troops, who were needed at the front, the governor 
 and the military commanders remaining in Tennessee were com 
 pelled to develop other instruments of defence. For this pur 
 pose it was determined to enroll the state militia. The idea was 
 not a new one. In the preceding November, at Memphis, Sher 
 man, then commanding the department of the Tennessee, had di 
 rected the impressment of a sufficient number of men to fill the 
 existing regiments and batteries to their maximum, such men to 
 receive regular pay if they enlisted for three years or the war; 
 otherwise, to be provided simply with food and rations and a cer 
 tificate of service entitling them to a compensation to be de 
 termined later, when the need for them was past. 43 On various 
 occasions, the citizens of Nashville and other places had been 
 summoned to defend their homes when an attack seemed im 
 minent. As early as July, Bingham, of Memphis, had urged the 
 enrollment of the militia throughout the state. 44 Johnson him- 
 
 41 J. P., vol. Hi, ^1254, 1260, -1210. 
 
 42 O. R., series i, vol. xxxix, part ii, p. 886. 
 
 43 Ibid., vol. xxxi, part iii, p. 160. 
 M J. P., vol. xlv, 9833- 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 189 
 
 self appreciated the advantages of such a plan and, in August, 
 had drawn up a proclamation putting it in effect, but apparently 
 preferred not to publish it without some previous popular sanc 
 tion. 45 The September convention at Nashville, which served 
 as the vehicle for his will in other respects, gratified him in this 
 also. A resolution, 46 adopted on the 7th, declared for the en 
 rollment and drill of the militia "to protect the citizens from law 
 less violence, pillage and bloodshed." The proclamation 47 
 followed the next day. "Whereas the militia of the state con 
 stitutes the military power, which must, when necessary, sustain 
 the civil in the suppression of crime and punishment of evil 
 doers," all able-bodied males, white and colored, between eighteen 
 and fifty years of age, except those afterwards exempted, are to 
 be enrolled. The magistrates in the rural districts and wards are 
 to act as commissioners for this purpose. Any justice of the 
 peace who refuses or fails to perform this duty and offers no 
 satisfactory excuse for his delinquency is to be sent out of the 
 state. 
 
 The announcement of the new policy aroused immense excite 
 ment. It was realized at once that its effect would be to force 
 the thousands of non-combatants, who had heretofore remained 
 in non-committal security and inaction, to declare themselves 
 openly for one side or the other. Even the punishment which 
 the proclamation held over the heads of reluctant magistrates 
 proved insufficient to drive them to face the general resentment. 
 Everywhere threats were made that whoever attempted to ex 
 ecute the proclamation would be killed. Many justices of the 
 peace declared that they preferred deportation to death. 48 Peti 
 tioners from Macon county begged Johnson to appoint an army 
 officer for the work, as he would be known already as an enemy 
 by the guerillas, and so would incur no additional risk. 49 General 
 Milroy wrote from Tullahoma that he was experiencing the ut 
 most difficulty in ten counties. In districts where there were no 
 
 45 Ibid., vol. xlvii, -307 ; vol. xlviii, -475,-477. 
 
 48 Nashville Dispatch, September 8. 
 
 47 Nashville Union, September 8; Nashville Times and Union, Septem 
 ber 13. 
 
 48 J. P., vol. 1, -840 et passim.; O. R., series i, vol. xxxi, part iii, 
 p. 508. 
 
 49 J. P., vol. 1, -923- 
 
icjo ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 enrolling officers, he had ordered the county clerks to appoint 
 the most active secessionists, who were thus left to choose be 
 tween risking the vengeance of the guerillas and being sent in irons 
 to Johnson. 50 The difficulties were enhanced by the mistaken im 
 pression which prevailed that the enrollment was really a conscrip 
 tion or draft to secure men for the regular Union army, and the 
 secessionists bestirred themselves to foster this idea. The people 
 were told that it had now come to a choice of serving with the 
 Confederates or with the "Yanks/' 51 Many recruits were thus 
 gained for Forrest and Wheeler, but, as General Thomas ob 
 served, the system had the positive merit of distinguishing friends 
 from enemies. 52 Meanwhile, the Federal officers were striving 
 to convince the people that the proclamation was but a necessary 
 measure for protection and order. 
 
 The total number of militia enrolled to the middle of Janu 
 ary, 1865, according to the report of the assistant adjutant- 
 general of the state, was 18,625 (14,888 white and 3,737 col 
 ored). 53 As the only available resource of the government 
 against the guerillas and partisan cavalry, their embodiment was 
 a necessary measure, but, compelled into the service as they were, 
 their loyalty was, of course, open to grave suspicion, and little 
 reliance could be placed on them. Certainly their devotion to 
 Johnson and reconstruction was slight, if the election of Novem 
 ber, 1864, at Memphis may be taken as a criterion. With an 
 enrollment of 2400, the total vote was less than i6oo. 54 Hints 
 were common, especially in West Tennessee, that the system was 
 not fairly administered by the officers in charge, who sometimes 
 exempted rich anti-Union men from service, but pressed hard 
 upon poor loyal laborers. 55 As the war in Tennessee was so soon 
 ended, the militia received no serious test. From a Northern 
 standpoint, this was doubtless fortunate. 
 
 Besides these important military matters with which Johnson 
 had to deal, his responsibility for the raising, organization, and 
 
 50 Ibid., vol. li, -1085. 
 
 81 Ibid. 
 
 M O. R., series i, vol. xxxix, part ii, p. 382. 
 
 86 Nashville Times, January 16. 
 
 M J. P., vol. Hi, -i 189. 
 
 "E.g., J. P., vol. liii, -1409; vol. liv, -1654. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 191 
 
 general oversight of the Tennessee troops involved him in count 
 less problems of a more petty, but equally perplexing nature. 
 Complaints of officers against the government and against one 
 another, and of soldiers against their officers were constant. 
 Generals and colonels presented their grievances, demanded in 
 creased rank or additions to their commands, requested special 
 authority, or assumed it in advance and applied to Johnson to 
 validate it. From the Union armies east, west, and south came 
 appeals for reinforcements and for cavalry to check the guerillas. 
 Horses and arms for Tennessee cavalry were lacking, and the 
 governor was looked to to supply them. Soldiers whose pay 
 was in arrears expected him to prod the paymaster-general at 
 Washington. The East Tennessee troops with Sherman in 
 Georgia complained that they were under Northern officers who 
 cared nothing for them and were sacrificing them in every en 
 gagement, and begged to be allowed to return and protect their 
 homes. 56 The post commander at Nashville asked for instruc 
 tions as to the treatment of destitute wives of soldiers. The 
 executive office was flooded with protests against the insubordi 
 nation and the outrages committed by the "governor's guard." 57 
 And every act of authority by the governor, however justifiable, 
 was regarded 'by the military commanders with a critical and 
 jealous eye. 
 
 As a general in the volunteer service, Johnson was required to 
 make monthly returns to the adjutant-general's office and account 
 for all supplies and equipment to the quartermaster-general at 
 Washington. All vouchers given by his subordinates had to be 
 indorsed by him. 58 To expedite the securing of supplies for 
 the Tennessee regiments, he was authorized in October, 1863, to 
 make all requisitions directly on the ordinance officers and quar 
 termasters at Nashville, 59 but this led to perplexities and conflicts 
 with the orders of General Grant and, the following January, he 
 was directed to apply to the ordinance department at Washing 
 ton. 60 This, too, proved to be inconvenient, and a second modi- 
 
 M ,Ibid., vol. xlv, 9758. 
 
 07 O. R., series i, vol. xxxix, part ii, pp. 438 et passim. 
 
 58 J. P., vol. 1, passim. 
 
 69 Ibid., vol. xxxv, 7658. 
 
 68 Ibid., vol. xxxix, 8507. 
 
192 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 fication, in February, permitted the officers of companies, bat 
 talions and regiments, with the governor's approval, to draw on 
 the Nashville depot, on presenting a certificate that the number 
 of men for whom stores were required had been mustered into 
 the service of the United States. "The point which the depart 
 ment wishes to urge," it was explained, "is that you will use every 
 effort to avoid the issue of stores to state officers or troops that 
 have not been duly mustered into the service of the United 
 States, and at the same time afford every facility in equipping the 
 new organizations." 61 Throughout the war, Johnson had to en 
 counter the greatest reluctance of the ordinance authorities to 
 fill his requisitions for the Tennessee troops. It was freely as 
 serted that his regiments were worthless and that supplies issued 
 to them were thrown away. Worse than this, it was said, their 
 disorderly, plundering habits made arming them contrary to the 
 dictates of humanity. 
 
 According to the official records, Tennessee furnished to the 
 Union army on her quota during the war, 31,092 white soldiers. 
 To these must be added 20,133 colored troops not credited upon 
 the quota, but recruited under direct authority from the general 
 government. Prdba'bly 7,000 Tennesseeans enlisted in Kentucky 
 regiments and were credited to that state. Tennessee's contribu 
 tion to the Confederate army is estimated at nearly 100,000. 
 When it is reflected that 140,000 was regarded as a good vote in 
 the state just previous to the war, these figures speak volumes 
 for the devoted heroism of her sons. A large proportion of the 
 white Union soldiers came from a division of the state with a 
 male population, between twenty and fifty years of age of only 
 45,000. The Union recruits were organized into eight regiments 
 of infantry, eight of mounted infantry, twelve of cavalry, and 
 five battalions of light artillery. 62 
 
 Partly military, partly civil in its nature, and particularly im 
 portant in its bearing upon his reconstruction policy, was John 
 son's authority to control the disposal of Tennessee prisoners. 
 
 61 Ibid., vol. xli, 8918-8923. 
 
 *" O. R., series iii, vol. iv, pp. 73, 1270; Goodspeed, History of 
 Tennessee, pp. 477, 497. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 193 
 
 The Confederate conscript law had borne with great severity on 
 Tennessee. Many who preferred the Union were compelled to 
 join the Southern army against their will, and not a few deserted 
 and found their way within the Federal lines. Others enlisted 
 to avoid persecution at home, but were lukewarm or indifferent in 
 the service and, when convinced that Tennessee was lost to the 
 Confederacy, were anxious to return to their families and their 
 old allegiance. These men would be of value in restoring the 
 state, and it was obviously to the advantage of the government 
 to deal leniently with them. The difficulty lay, of course, in dis 
 tinguishing sincere penitents from those who simply desired to 
 escape the hardships of prison life, while remaining disloyal at 
 heart; but many even of these might eventually be won by con 
 siderate treatment. 
 
 From the outset, Johnson's mail was filled with petitions from 
 prisoners, confined mostly at Camp Chase, Ohio, Camp Douglas, 
 Illinois, and Camp Morton, Indiana, and from their relatives and 
 friends, asking either for permission to take the oath of allegiance 
 and return home or for release on parole. Increasingly, as the 
 war progressed and the lot of the Confederate soldier became 
 harder, the petitioners begged not to be exchanged and sent South, 
 but to be retained in confinement until the government prescribed 
 terms of pardon for them. A letter from several hundred pris 
 oners at Camp Morton is characteristic. 63 They realize, they say, 
 that the war is now for the independence of the cotton states, not 
 for Tennessee, which the Confederacy has no chance of recover 
 ing. They had entered the struggle under the false impression, 
 inspired by their leaders, that the North, possessed by "a mad 
 fanaticism," was bent on destroying the "peculiar institution" 
 which belonged to Tennessee and the cotton states alike and 
 united them in a common interest. They are now convinced, 
 however, from conversations with Northern citizens and soldiers 
 and from reading Northern newspapers, that a large portion of 
 the Northern people are conservative, and never really intended 
 to interfere with their institutions at all. And, as loyal Tennes- 
 seeans, they wish to follow their state back into the Union. "We 
 believe," they conclude, "it is our duty to return to our allegiance 
 
 40 J. P., vol. xxi, 4830; vol. xvii, 3826, 3837 et passim. 
 
194 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 to the Federal government, and be contented to go home and 
 remain peaceable citizens, and aid in restoring peace and quiet 
 to our distracted state once more, and in removing, as far as we 
 can, the false views of our fellow citizens we left behind us." 
 
 Late in March, 1862, Johnson sent C. F. Trigg to Camp Chase 
 to confer with the prisoners, as a preliminary to interceding with 
 the government for them. Trigg found many anxious to take 
 the oath, though the majority held that their honor was involved 
 in a previous oath to the Confederacy and asked to be paroled, 
 pending a possible exchange. These latter, Trigg thought, had 
 -best remain harmless in prison, since they had experienced no 
 change of heart. 64 
 
 Johnson's active interest in the matter led Lincoln (June 4) 
 to ask him directly whether he wished to control the whole busi 
 ness of releasing Tennessee prisoners. 65 The governor responded 
 promptly in the affirmative. I believe, he said, that "we can 
 prescribe such terms of release and so dispose of the question as 
 to exert a powerful influence throughout the state in our favor 
 and to a great extent make secessionists dependent upon Union 
 influence." 66 The desired control was not immediately granted, 
 because, as Stanton explained, conditions were not yet ripe for 
 the exercise of clemency; but, on the 4th of August, the gover 
 nor was empowered to appoint commissioners to examine the 
 prisoners to determine the merits of each case and the terms on 
 which releases ought to be granted. 67 Those who expressed an 
 anxious desire to return to their allegiance, took the oath, and 
 gave bond for its faithful observance might be set free. 68 John 
 son named General (ex-Governor) W. B. Campbell as commis 
 sioner, and many releases were arranged for. 
 
 On the 'ioth of July, 1863, the secretary of war directed that 
 Confederate prisoners who had been impressed into the service 
 and desired to join the Union army in good faith might be per 
 mitted to do so, on taking the oath of allegiance. 69 At first each 
 
 ** Ibid., vol. xvii, 3883. 
 
 65 Lincoln's Complete Works, vol. vii, p. 212. 
 
 68 J. P., vol. xx, 4607. 
 
 Tbid., 4638; vol. xxiv, 5330. 
 
 "Nashville Union, August 10. 
 
 99 O. R., series iii, vol. iii, p. 482 ; J. P., vol. xxxii, 7148. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 195 
 
 case was referred separately to Washington, but, on the repre 
 sentation of Rosecrans that this elaborate process interfered with 
 the enlistments, particularly of the prisoners taken at Vicksburg, 
 that formality was dispensed with, and the work confided to the 
 discretion of Rosecrans and Johnson, with the simple require 
 ments that care be taken so to distribute such recruits as to keep 
 them under "Union forces and sentiment" and that descriptive 
 lists of them be filed at Rosecrans' headquarters. 70 
 
 From the summer of 1863 until almost the end of the war, 
 exchange of prisoners was, with few exceptions, discontinued. 
 Johnson was thereby somewhat relieved from a heavy responsi 
 bility, though he still made recommendations for discharges, 
 which were placed on file, pending a possible change of policy. 
 
 The unexpected prolongation and hardships of the war and 
 the ill success of the Confederate forces in Tennessee brought an 
 increasing number of desertions from their ranks to the Union 
 army. Rosecrans and Johnson, on authority from Stanton, 
 adopted the practice of enlisting deserters in the Tennessee regi 
 ments. Thomas, who succeeded to the command in October, 
 1863, reversed this policy. His opinion, confirmed by representa 
 tions from his subordinates, was that such men were not depend 
 able and that the enemy were taking advantage of this easy 
 means of slipping spies into his army. By his direction, all 
 deserters were thereafter to be sent north of the Ohio river, to 
 remain during the war. 71 
 
 This order caused serious hardship. In January, 1864, the 
 provost-marshal at Jeffersonville, Indiana, wrote to Johnson 72 that 
 hundreds of Tennesseeans had been driven to that place, with no 
 money and no prospect of getting work. Their condition he de 
 scribed as "truly forlorn and pitiable." At other points north of 
 the Ohio it was as bad. Many of these men deserved the deepest 
 sympathy as sincere loyalists forced into the enemy's ranks wholly 
 against their will. The situation became acute when Hood in 
 vaded the state in November, conscripting all men available as 
 soldiers. Large numbers of them deserted at the first oppor 
 tunity and were captured in the very act of doing so. Johnson's 
 
 70 O. R., series iii, vol. iii, p. 735; series i, vol. xxx, part in, p. 230. 
 71 J. P., vol. xxxvi, 7998. 
 
 71 Ibid., vol. xxxviii, 8434. 
 
196 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 interest was enlisted in their favor, and he succeeded in secur 
 ing Thomas' consent to the -release of those known to be heartily 
 loyal and aiding the enemy only under compulsion. 73 Finally, 
 on the 5th of January, 1865, after the rout of Hood had removed 
 all apprehension in his department, Thomas revoked his onerous 
 order. Confederate deserters, residents of Kentucky and Ten 
 nessee, who could furnish satisfactory evidence of their intention 
 to 'become peaceable citizens, were permitted to go to their homes, 
 after reporting to the provost-marshal general at Nashville and 
 taking the amnesty oath. 74 
 
 Not only Confederate, but also Union deserters, had reason to 
 be grateful for the governor's good offices. During the summer 
 of 1864, refugees from East Tennessee, enlisted in regiments as 
 signed to service elsewhere, hearing of the depredations of the 
 guerillas in the neighborhood of their houses and in despair for 
 the safety of their families and property, escaped and returned 
 to protect them. For them, too, Johnson appealed to Thomas. 75 
 They had not realized the magnitude of their offence, he said, and 
 had intended to go back to duty, but fear of being court-martialed 
 now kept them away. In deference to his request, Thomas con 
 sented to receive back the offenders without trial or punishment, 
 if they reported within twenty days. 76 
 
 The operations of the Union army, particularly in the early 
 years of the war, were seriously impeded by the lack of any 
 adequate transportation facilities in the state. In 1862, the only 
 railroads in running order which could be utilized to advantage 
 were the Memphis, Clarksville, and Louisville and the Louisville, 
 Nashville, and Chattanooga. The former was in serious financial 
 difficulties and, after it had failed twice in the payment of the 
 interest on its bonds, the governor took it over in the name of the 
 state. 77 The Louisville-Nashville road was of far more impor 
 tance, as the channel of communication with the North for the 
 Federal armies operating against Georgia and with the South for 
 
 '**O. R., series i, vol. xlv, part ii, pp. 308, 319. 
 
 7 * Nashville Dispatch, January 12, 1865. 
 
 TO J. P., vol. xlvii, -240. 
 
 Ibid, -283. 
 
 77 Ibid., vol. xxi, 4822. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 197 
 
 the Confederate armies operating against Kentucky. On it the 
 forces and supplies of Buell and Rosecrans, Albert Sidney John 
 son and Bragg were transported. It was, however, utterly inade 
 quate for the demands upon it. Its length made it extremely dif 
 ficult to defend, and the large number of trestles, bridges and 
 tunnels, which could be destroyed easily in a short time, enabled 
 cavalry to keep it almost constantly crippled. Thus, without 
 warning, a Union army, far from its base, might, at any time, be 
 placed in a dangerous predicament. 
 
 This difficulty demanded a prompt solution. The most feasible 
 one lay in the completion of the already projected Nashville and 
 Northwestern road, designed to connect the capital with Hick- 
 man, Kentucky, on the Mississippi river, a hundred and fifty 
 miles distant, and to strike the Tennessee river at Reynoldsburg. 
 It was proposed to complete this line as far as Reynoldsburg, a 
 distance of seventy-five miles, all but eight miles of which were 
 already graded. 78 Being little more than a third as long as the 
 Louisville road, it would greatly expedite communication and the 
 task of guarding it would be comparatively simple. But five short 
 bridges would be necessary, no accident to which could long 
 delay traffic. The road intersected the Memphis, Clarksville, 
 and Louisville line, thus opening up connections west and north, 
 and, at its terminus at Reynoldsburg, the river was of sufficient 
 depth to afford easy navigation for freight-boats and gunboats, 
 which could be utilized to land supplies at that point. 
 
 From the outbreak of the war, Johnson had urged this project 
 upon the war department and the generals. The successes of the 
 Confederate cavalry in 1863 brought its desirability sharply home 
 to Rosecrans. On the 27th of August, he replied to the gover 
 nor's solicitations with ,a proposal 79 to place the work in his hands. 
 One responsibility more added to the many which already weighed 
 upon him was no deterrent to Johnson ; he accepted with alacrity. 
 The requisite authority came from Stanton on the 22d of Oc 
 tober. 80 The governor was given full power to secure the neces 
 sary material, employ engineers and other officers and laborers, 
 the contracts being subject to the approval of the quartermaster- 
 
 78 Nashville Union, September 20, 1863. 
 
 79 O. R., series i, vol. xxx, part iii, p. 184. See also pp. 67, 74. 
 
 80 Ibid., vol. xxxi, part iii, p. 14; J. P., vol. xxxv, 7769. 
 
198 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 general. Certificates for rations and supplies from the quarter 
 master's department, indorsed by the governor and the engineer 
 in charge, were to be honored. The road was to remain under 
 Johnson's control until its completion, then to be turned over to 
 the general manager of government railroads. 
 
 General Grant was directed to supply a force to protect the 
 work, 81 but he was too much occupied with other matters to give 
 adequate attention to this, and the task of maintaining the guard 
 fell largely on Johnson. New companies were raised for this 
 purpose and placed under the command of General Gillem. Later 
 the place of the white guards was taken by negroes. 
 
 From the persistent cavalry raids, the Louisville-Nashville road 
 was more and more ruined, its rolling-stock deteriorated, and it 
 became practically useless. For the operations in the southern 
 part of the state in 1864, the new line was of the utmost im 
 portance and the war department had reason to be grateful to 
 Johnson for his foresight. Gillem wrote to him in March : "Gen 
 erals Grant and Thomas look upon it as an absolute necessity 
 in fact it would be impossible to subsist both Thomas' and Scho- 
 field's armies .without the aid of this road. At last the com 
 mander of the department sees what you saw two years since." 82 
 
 Pushed forward with Johnson's characteristic energy, the road 
 was sufficiently advanced in May, 1864, for cars to run regularly 
 to the Tennessee river. General Webster, Sherman's chief of 
 staff at Nashville, thereupon directed Anderson, the general su 
 perintendent, to take it over for the army. 83 Johnson was not 
 consulted in the matter, and he lost no time in bringing the over 
 sight to Webster's attention. 84 The road could be used to its 
 full capacity for military purposes, he wrote, but until it was 
 completed and turned over by him to the war department, he ex 
 pected to retain the control given him by his instructions. 
 
 On the I3th of June, Sherman requested Johnson to relinquish 
 the management of the road to Anderson and the guarding of it 
 to General Rosecrans, "to simplify matters and insure the respon 
 sibility of agents," 85 but the formal transfer did not take place 
 
 81 Ibid. 
 
 83 J. P., vol. xli, 9062. 
 
 83 Ibid., vol. xliii, 9376, 9469. 
 
 94 Ibid. 
 
 86 O. R., series i, vol. xxxviii, part iv, p. 466. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 199 
 
 until the 6th of August, by an order 86 from Stanton based on 
 Sherman's representation that it was necessary for the success 
 of his operations. For all purposes of transportation, it had al 
 ready been under his management since June, though Johnson 
 still directed the work of construction. 87 The latter keenly re 
 sented the haste to be rid of his authority and he intimated to 
 Sherman that it did not spring from wholly disinterested motives. 
 "This state is largely interested in this road," he wrote, "inno 
 cent persons beyond its limits holding the bonds issued for its 
 construction. An effort was made by certain parties some time 
 since to take charge of the road before it was even in running 
 order. It is hardly necessary for me to state that there might be 
 parties interested in various ways in having the immediate and 
 direct supervision of the road a little farther removed for other 
 than military purposes." The government would do well, he sug 
 gested to take over the Louisville-Nashville road also. Large 
 sums paid for its use had gone into the pockets of traitors. 88 
 
 The Northwestern road continued to be an important resource 
 of Sherman and Thomas throughout the war. Though tempo 
 rarily wrecked during Hood's advance on Nashville, it was 
 promptly repaired. To Johnson is due the largest share of the 
 credit for the advantages it brought to the Federal armies. 
 
 An obvious result of the victorious Union advance into Ten 
 nessee in the spring of 1862 was utter chaos in the state finances. 
 The state government, fleeing first from Nashville and then from 
 Memphis, took with it for the use of the Confederacy every 
 portable asset on which It could lay its hands. When Johnson 
 assumed his office at the capitol, specie had practically disap 
 peared, the banks were in distress, -business was at a standstill, 
 and the state in a condition of panic-fear which augured ill for 
 the immediate future. The situation was further complicated by 
 the fact that the great bulk of the population, especially the 
 wealthier classes, were ardently for the Confederacy and pre 
 pared to endure unnecessary, hardships and even want if by so 
 doing they could embarrass and weaken the military government. 
 
 86 Ibid., part v, pp. 367, 391 ; J. P., vol. xlv, -126. 
 
 87 O. R., series i, xxxviii, part iv, p. 411; J. P., vol. xlv, -134. 
 " Ibid. 
 
200 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 General Sherman, in command at Memphis, promptly grasped 
 the essential factors of the problem there. It was true, he wrote 
 to Johnson in August, 1862, that the Memphis bankers had lost 
 their specie, but their notes were secured by property in Tennes 
 see which could be proceeded against. Furthermore, the Con 
 federates who took away the bank funds possessed assets in the 
 state, subject to confiscation for the unlawful acts of the owners- 
 The most substantial obstacles in the way of a just settlement 
 were the disloyal proclivities of the bankers themselves or timid 
 reluctance to commit themselves one way or the other, so long as 
 the issue of the war remained in doubt. "They must be true to 
 their trust, declare boldly and openly against the parties who 
 robbed them and at once begin to realize on assets," he declared, 
 " . . . else I have no alternative but to conclude that they are in 
 complicity with our enemies, and treat them as such. . . . This 
 by-play is more dangerous than open, bold rebellion." 89 
 
 Similar conditions, of course, obtained throughout the state. 
 In localities where any funds remained in the banks, the military 
 government was called upon to bestir itself to secure them against 
 disloyal bank officials and Confederate cavalry. As early as 
 April, for example, Johnson had instructed General Negley at 
 Columbia to assume custody of the bank and its contents when 
 ever his judgment prompted such a course. 90 To Colonel Mason 
 at Clarksville he wrote (June) that whoever pleaded garnishment 
 by the Confederacy as an excuse for non-payment of debts would 
 be promptly arrested and held in custody until he satisfied the 
 authorities in respect to the debt and took the oath of allegiance. 91 
 
 The fiscal problem in Nashville 92 was particularly acute, and 
 reached a crisis in the summer of 1863, when, as a result of the 
 leaguer of 1862, the vicissitudes of Buell's army, the general 
 ruin of the surrounding country, and the regulations of the Fed 
 eral government, trade was in a state of almost utter paralysis, 
 while prices soared exorbitantly. As regards the staple, cotton, 
 the right to purchase was limited to agents of the government 
 
 89 J. P., vol. xxiv, 5369. 
 99 Ibid., vol. xxi, 4993. 
 91 Ibid., 4745. 
 
 ea Nashville Dispatch, October 15, 1863; Nashville Union, October 17, 
 18, 21, 22, 1863. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 201 
 
 and payment could be made only in Federal treasury notes. The 
 consequence was the immediate decline of state paper money. 
 
 Other more potent causes contributed to the same end. Specie 
 had vanished by the same processes as in Memphis, and the banks, 
 with no assets immediately available, were tottering. By the state 
 bank code of 1857-58, bank notes "current and passing at par" 
 in Tennessee were receivable in payment of taxes and other debts 
 to the state. The Harris government, by an act passed on July 
 I, 1861, had modified this provision by legalizing the acceptance 
 for such dues of ''the circulation of the banks of this state which 
 conform to the bank code of Tennessee and the acts amen 
 datory thereof." 93 By this provision, depreciated notes, of what 
 ever value in general circulation, could be thrust upon the gov 
 ernment at par. 
 
 The resulting embarrassments were great. The bank paper, 
 notwithstanding all attempts to bolster it up, declined at an alarm 
 ing rate and the income of the government was correspondingly 
 diminished. Concern was expressed lest a new and burdensome 
 tax would have to be imposed to make up the loss. Protests 
 poured in upon Johnson and the newspapers of Nashville began 
 a violent controversy among themselves on the issues. The 
 Press assigned, as one of the principal causes of the decline of 
 the paper, the policy of the Federal government "to absorb the 
 entire credit of the country and by the introduction of treasury 
 notes to exclude the local currency." Tennessee merchants, it 
 observed, were forced to convert Tennessee money into United 
 States money in order to buy goods ; and, to avoid, as far as 
 possible, loss in exchange, they were naturally indisposed to re 
 ceive the former from their customers. This, said the Press, had 
 produced a run on the brokers for greenbacks which had shaken 
 confidence in the Tennessee banks and depreciated the local 
 notes. 94 
 
 The remedy for this state of affairs, which the Press insisted 
 was purely artificial and unwarranted by actual conditions, lay, 
 in its opinion, in a resolute determination on the part of the people 
 to resist all impulses to panic and to force their currency back to 
 
 * Acts 33d Tenn. General Assembly, 2d extra session, 1861 (July i). 
 ** Nashville Press, August 17, 1863. 
 
202 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 its intrinsic value, which, it maintained, was equal to or greater 
 than that of the Federal greenbacks. The latter represented no 
 gold actually deposited to protect them and carried no guarantee 
 of their redemption; whereas the charter of the Bank of Ten 
 nessee pledged the credit of the state for the redemption of its 
 notes, the issues of the Union and Planters' banks were amply 
 secured, and, in the case of all the banks, the property of their 
 officers was available for the purpose of reimbursing depositors 
 whose money had been carried off by the Confederates. "Let 
 every man resolve," urged the Press, "that he will not sell his 
 Tennessee money unless he is obliged to. This will diminish the 
 demand for greenbacks to an extent that will cause an instant 
 rise in Tennessee money. . . . Again, let the people buy nothing 
 but what they are compelled to have, and the merchants, rather 
 than sacrifice their own currency, sell what surplus produce and 
 stock they have, and with the proceeds of such sales make their 
 necessary purchases, and if the proceeds of the sales exceed their 
 immediate wants, lend to their neighbors. ... If any man thinks 
 his debt at all doubtful, he will certainly be willing to receive 
 Tennessee money ; and the ,banks are compelled to receive it. ... 
 As soon as the restrictions upon trade are removed, Tennessee 
 money will rise not only to par, but will advance to a premium." 95 
 
 Other suggestions were forthcoming in the greatest variety. 
 A proposal that the Union and Planters' banks restore confidence 
 in their notes by redeeming them in greenbacks was punctured 
 by the objection that the state bank was prohibited by law from 
 doing likewise and that, therefore, the fall in the value of its 
 issues under such an arrangement would more than offset the 
 advantages gained by the rise in those of its rivals. If, on the 
 other hand, redemption in gold was attempted, and if the initial 
 problem of getting the gold could be surmounted, there was the 
 difficulty that the bulk of the notes were in the hands of brokers, 
 who would promptly cash them, and, in many cases, would carry 
 the specie again out of the state. 96 
 
 The real root of the imbroglio was, of course, far too deep to 
 be reached by any such superficial measures as these. The trouble 
 
 96 Ibid., August 21. 
 "Ibid., August 17. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 203 
 
 was in the instability and doubtful status of the state itself and 
 all institutions existing under both the old laws and the new mili 
 tary regulations. No one could tell how long either would be valid. 
 There was neither a regular state government nor any immediate 
 prospect of one to set credit on its feet and make either banks 
 or private debtors meet their obligations; and nobody who had 
 property in or wished to remain a citizen of Tennessee and con 
 ceived the remotest possibility of the eventual restoration of 
 Confederate rule would dream of calling upon the military gov 
 ernment to support him in proceeding against securities whose 
 misfortunes were the result of their loyalty to the Southern 
 cause. Every man who looked beyond the immediate future saw 
 nothing but impenetrable haze, and, in such an atmosphere, the 
 wary appreciated the wisdom of doing nothing and avoiding risks. 
 
 Failing the specie requisite to bolster up the local paper, the 
 state was also almost destitute of the only other resource which 
 could have availed it in the crisis stable products, especially 
 cotton. The demand for this commodity was great both at home 
 and abroad and it brought very high prices in the market, but, of 
 all parts of the country, Tennessee was least in condition to 
 take advantage of such opportunities. Her plantations were in 
 ruins; the negro laborers had abandoned them and departed in 
 all directions, many of them making their way to the cities to 
 become a burden on the community; and a good proportion of 
 the cotton which, notwithstanding these difficulties, was baled, 
 fell into the hands of the Confederate bands that constantly 
 scoured the country. The remainder depended for a market on 
 the military authorities, who too often, as in the case of Truesdail, 
 showed scant sympathy for the planters and diverted the lion's 
 share of the profits to their own pockets. Cotton, as a medium of 
 exchange, was negligible, and hardly enough of other products 
 was available to meet the bare necessities of the people. 
 
 The governor was therefore called upon to deal with the prob 
 lem of a paper currency practically unsecured and worth, in 
 October, 1863, but half its face value, but, according to the law 
 of 1861, receivable at par for all obligations to the government, 
 and to confront the probability of a still further decline which 
 would bring the receipts so far below the current expenses as to 
 
204 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 necessitate new impositions upon the people which they were 
 in <no condition to bear and the means, short of actual confisca 
 tion, available for which were not apparent. His decision was 
 announced (October) in an order 97 to the clerk of the county 
 court and the tax collectors of Davidson county, which included 
 Nashville, to receive, besides specie, only the legal tender notes 
 of the United States in payment of moneys due the state. So 
 radical an inference with the relations of creditors and debtors 
 exposed him at once to the most bitter attacks, but his obvious 
 and sufficient defence was that the order was compelled by 
 actualities; and pleas of subversion of legal rights had little 
 weight with Johnson, when those rights had been freshly created 
 by a secessionist legislature in the interest of the Confederacy. 
 The governor's order, his friends pointed out, was but a rever 
 sion to the law of 1857-58, which was in fact the only valid 
 one. They took pains to insist that his policy was in no sense 
 a denial or avoidance of the ultimate obligation of the state to 
 redeem the notes of the state bank, but simply a measure de 
 signed to meet a temporary emergency in the affairs of the 
 government. 
 
 On the other hand, the governor was urged to use the military 
 power to assist the banks to collect their debts and to force them 
 to redeem their paper, and some voices loudly charged him to 
 solve the entire problem by a confiscation of Confederate prop 
 erty, 98 but this he steadfastly refused to do. Under the circum 
 stances, his course was eminently wise. Whatever moral justi 
 fication there might have been in seizing the possessions of the 
 converters of the specie to relieve the distress of their victims, 
 the spoil available could not have come near remedying the evil 
 done and the political effect of such a policy would have been 
 disastrous. Nothing could permanently revive the decrepit local 
 paper except the determination of the war and the restoration 
 of confidence. It was only as the scene of military operations 
 shifted to the southward and the collapse of the Confederacy 
 became assured that the state finances began to approach stability. 
 
 ." Nashville Dispatch, October 15. 
 98 E.g., Nashville Union, October 18. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 205 
 
 By the winter of 1862-63, the immediate pressure of the 
 Confederate army on Nashville was sufficiently relieved to enable 
 Johnson to turn his attention from the military problems which 
 had almost monopolized it to the business of civil administration. 
 Hitherto, he had found time only to suppress open disloyalty. 
 
 The scope of his civil authority, with directions for its exer 
 cise, was prescribed in two sets of instructions" issued from the 
 war department in April, 1863. The governor was to impose 
 taxes for the support of the poor, for police purposes, and, in 
 general, for the maintenance of his government. He might levy 
 exactions upon disloyal persons especially upon any who had 
 contributed money, property, or slaves to the enemy for the 
 subsistence of the wives and children of refugees and Confed 
 erate soldiers, or for other purposes, and take possession of the 
 property and collect the rents for lands, buildings, and slaves of 
 persons within the Confederate lines. Public buildings belong 
 ing to the state of Tennessee and all other public property in 
 Nashville were to be taken over and assigned, so far as required, 
 to the purposes of the civil government, all under the control of 
 the governor, subject only to military occupation as the order of 
 the commanding general. Vacant or abandoned property belong 
 ing to Confederates was also at his disposal. Lands and planta 
 tions so acquired were to be leased for cultivation on terms fixed 
 by him, and records of the transactions sent to the war depart 
 ment. Upon him also was placed the responsibility of providing 
 for the employment and subsistence of the slaves of Confeder 
 ates, under the regulations of Congress. Lists and descriptions 
 of them were to be compiled for the war department. The able- 
 bodied men might be employed on the public works, the others at 
 tasks for which they were suited. Their payment was in John 
 son's hands. He had also to provide medical attendance for the 
 sick and food and clothing for the poor and destitute and to keep 
 careful accounts of all expenditures for these purposes. 
 
 All these functions and many more be actively exercised. 
 The destitution of the people, caused by the war, was perhaps 
 his most important immediate concern. As early as August, 
 1862, he had taken steps for their relief by dispatching letters 100 
 
 99 O. R., series iii, vol. iii, pp. 122, 115; J. P., vol. xxx, 6758. 
 
 100 Nashville Union, August 20, 1862. 
 
206 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 to a number of the most wealthy avowed secessionists of Nash 
 ville, requiring them to contribute a stated sum for the support 
 of women and children deprived of means of subsistence by the 
 absence of their husbands and fathers with the Confederate 
 army, and whose necessities, as he said, "have become so mani 
 fest and their demands for the necessaries of life so urgent, that 
 the laws of justice and humanity would be violated unless some 
 thing was done to relieve their suffering and destitute condition." 
 A second tax for the same purpose was imposed in December, 101 
 causing "high-toned grief/' it was said, among distinguished 
 citizens. 102 
 
 Not only distressed families of Confederates, but hordes of 
 loyal refugees flocked to 'Nashville, as to every other Union 
 stronghold in the state. The supplies in the capital, scant even 
 for the citizens, threatened to give out entirely before such an 
 influx of hungry human beings, and even the troops had to be 
 put on half rations in the fall of i862. 103 No adequate shelter 
 was available. Another crisis was faced in the hard winter of 
 1663-64. Fuel, especially, was in great demand. Johnson gave 
 free transportation over the Northwestern railroad for wood pro 
 cured by the mayor and aldermen to relieve this want. 104 During 
 the summer of 1864 so General Miller reported the refugee 
 house at Nashville could not accommodate half the applicants 
 for shelter. Vacant houses in the city and surrounding towns 
 were assigned to them and Johnson's quartermaster provided 
 tents for the remainder. 105 Union relief associations were formed 
 to expend to the best advantage the money raised for the poor. 
 
 The pressure upon the civil authorities was increased by the 
 practice adopted by the military commanders of sending disaf 
 fected citizens to the rear as the army advanced southward. A 
 great part of the remaining population of the state was thus 
 threatening to engulf Nashville and the country north of it, re 
 quiring to be lodged and fed, though by what means was not 
 
 101 Moore, Speeches of Andrew Johnson, p. xxviii ; Savage, Life and 
 Public Services of Andrew Johnson, p. 274. 
 
 102 New York Tribune, December 15, 1862. 
 
 103 Annual Cyclopedia, 1862, p. 598. 
 ** J. P., vol. xxxi, 7800. 
 ""Ibid., vol. xlv, -52. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 207 
 
 apparent. Instead of this, Johnson wrote to Thomas in July, 
 1864, they should be pressed back upon the enemy, to devour his 
 resources. Let the Southerners "hear the cries of suffering and 
 supply their stomachs and backs with food and raiment. . . . 
 By sending them here they add to the rebel or copperhead senti 
 ment and increase opposition to the government. . . . They 
 would rather go anywhere else than South, and it would create 
 more terror than sending them North." 108 Thomas replied that 
 General Sherman concurred in Johnson's view and intended to 
 adopt it after the campaign was over; but to do so while the 
 army was advancing would involve the troublesome process of 
 passing large numbers through the lines under flag of truce. 107 
 
 The interposition of the governor was also required to save the 
 people from wrong at the hands of harsh or careless military 
 officials. Often even the property of loyal citizens was con 
 fiscated, horses seized, and negroes carried off upon insufficient 
 pretexts and without adequate compensation, sometimes with no 
 apparent authority. Houses were occupied for military purposes 
 and the families turned into the streets with no provision for 
 their accommodation. Workmen complained of ill-treatment or 
 violation of the contracts made with them. Outrages were com 
 mitted under pretext of foraging. "If it had not been for the 
 incessant exertions of Governor Johnson, who has never failed 
 to bring these petty military usurpations, depredations, and 
 swindling before the commander of the post, an appalling amount 
 of villainy and robbery would have been witnessed here," com 
 mented the Nashville Union in November, 1862. 
 
 A considerable part of Stanton's instructions to Johnson for 
 the civil administration of the state had to do with the manage 
 ment of the negro "contrabands" who were not available for 
 military service or labor on the public works. In elaboration of 
 this subject, Stanton wrote: "They had better be set to digging 
 their subsistence out of the ground. If there are plantations near 
 you on either side of the river, which are abandoned by their 
 owners, first put as many contrabands on such as they will hold, 
 that is, as can draw subsistence from them. If some still remain, 
 
 " Ibid., -16. 
 m Ibid., -32. 
 
208 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 get loyal men of character to take them temporarily on wages to 
 be paid to the contrabands themselves such men obliging them 
 selves to not let the contrabands be kidnapped or forcibly carried 
 away. Of course if any contrabands voluntarily make arrange 
 ments to work for their living you will not hinder them. It is 
 thought best to leave details to your discretion subject to the 
 provisions of the acts of Congress and the orders of the war 
 department." 108 
 
 The problem of dealing with this incoherent mass of humanity 
 which, by the summer of 1863, had flooded Nashville, was in 
 deed one oif the most perplexing which the governor was called 
 upon to face. Released from their accustomed bonds and filled 
 with a pleasing, if vague, sense of uncontrolled freedom, they 
 flocked to the cities, with little hope of obtaining remunerative 
 work and little inclination to avail themselves of it if it came. 
 Wagon-loads of them were brought in from the country by the 
 soldiers and dumped down to shift for themselves. As was to be 
 expected, they became, before long, a distressing burden on the 
 citizens. The food and fuel available for them was in no pro 
 portion to their want. Hunger and cold came, and with them 
 suffering and crime. Huddled together in ruined old buildings, 
 sheds, and cellars, they presented a picture of abject wretched 
 ness. Many of the young women formed illicit relations with the 
 soldiers, "to the literal demoralization of both and the military 
 demoralization of the latter." Filth and disease prevailed. 109 
 
 In the country, the negroes 'wandered about unrestrained. 
 Many had arms obtained from the soldiers; some were bent on 
 mischief. The white families, particularly those of Southern 
 sympathizers, who had been generally disarmed, were in constant 
 alarm. Many laborers belonging to loyal masters definitely as 
 serted their right to work for themselves, while drawing on their 
 owners for food and lodging. One general sought to remedy this 
 by hiring slaves to their masters by printed contracts. The 
 negroes drove off horses and mules from the farms and commit 
 ted waste with impunity. 
 
 The efforts of both the governor and the military authorities 
 
 108 Ibid., vol. xxx, 6762. 
 
 109 Ibid., vol. xxxvi, 7891; O. R., series i, vol. xxxii, part ii, p. 267. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 209 
 
 to deal with this situation during 1863 were only partially suc 
 cessful. The task was far, too great for officials already over 
 whelmed with other duties ; a separate and special organization 
 to execute it was clearly demanded. This was finally supplied 
 by an order 110 of the war department, dated February 4, 1864. 
 A contraband camp was established at Nashville, under command 
 of an officer detailed for the purpose. The quartermaster's de 
 partment furnished the supplies. From this camp any loyal 
 civilian might hire negroes for labor at fixed wages. Land oh 
 which to work them could be leased from the district commander. 
 Any negroes not so hired were to be set to work for wages on 
 abandoned plantations. Those who were able to do so were to 
 pay for the supplies furnished them, thus making the camp as 
 nearly self-supporting as possible. 
 
 Beginning in 1863, steps were taken unofficially to provide edu 
 cation for the negro children of the state. In February, 1865, 
 Colonel Mussey, the chief superintendent of contrabands for East 
 and Middle Tennessee, reported four negro schools at Nashville 
 and one each at Murfreesboro, Stevenson, Huntsville, Gallatin, 
 Clarksville, Edgefield, Knoxville, and Chattanooga, with about 
 two thousand pupils, sustained largely by benevolent societies, be 
 sides a number of small pay-schools conducted by the negroes 
 themselves, and a school in each colored regiment in charge of 
 the chaplain. 111 ' 
 
 110 Nashville Union, February n, 1864. 
 111 J. P., vol. Ivii, -2315. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 Having followed, step by step, the progress of reorganization 
 in Tennessee, it remains to condemn or to justify the means by 
 which the desired end was attained. And the conclusion reached 
 will ;be also a condemnation or justification of Johnson's career 
 as governor ; for one cannot read the records of these three criti 
 cal years without realizing that the essential features of the work 
 were peculiarly his own. Contemporaries fully appreciated this ; 
 it was at the governor personally that their attacks were directed. 
 Only recently, a distinguished participant in those stirring events, 
 Mr. Oliver P. Temple, in an unsparing criticism, has thrust upon 
 his shoulders a heavy 'burden of blame and reproach. 1 
 
 The first serious charge laid at Johnson's door is that he pur 
 posely delayed reconstruction. This accusation was freely circu 
 lated at the time. Mr. Temple says : "The work of reorganizing 
 the state and of revising the constitution might have been and 
 should have been accomplished in a regular, decent way one year, 
 and possibly two, earlier than it was, and the state admitted back 
 into the U,ttion. The last of the Confederate armies was driven 
 out of Middle and Western Tennessee in the summer of 1863, and 
 out of the greater part of East Tennessee in September of the 
 same year." 
 
 Only with the greatest diffidence may the conclusions of one so 
 intimately identified as Mr. Temple with the episodes of which 
 he treats be called in question; but my study of the records, 
 without the advantage of the personal viewpoint of Mr. Temple 
 and others who have expressed opinions similar to his, has 
 forced me to (believe that they have been hardly just to Johnson. 
 If my account of the war in Tennessee establishes anything, it 
 is that at no time previous to the end of December, 1864, was a 
 fair, dignified, and representative election possible. 
 
 1 Oliver P. Temple, Notable M,?n of Tennessee, pp. 416 et seq. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 211 
 
 It is true that the successes of June and July, 1863, placed most 
 of the state temporarily in the control of the government. John 
 son promptly pronounced for an election in October, if condi 
 tions continued favorable. But nothing really decisive had oc 
 curred ; neither of the Confederate armies in Tennessee had been 
 beaten in a pitched 'battle ; Rosecrans' advance was attended with 
 serious difficulties and might be checked at any time. The Union 
 army had been just as favorably situated a year previously, only 
 to be manoeuvred out of all its advantages, and those who had 
 ventured to celebrate its triumphs had reason to regret their pre 
 mature enthusiasm. The people were not disposed again to rally 
 around the administration, until they received substantial assur 
 ances that the Union domination was permanent. From every 
 point of view, it was desirable that a victory over Bragg should 
 stimulate popular confidence, and there is every reason to believe 
 that Johnson only awaited this to clear the way for the restoration 
 of a civil government with the prestige of victory behind it. 
 
 All such hopes were dispelled by the disaster at Chickamauga 
 (September 20). Now, more than ever before, before even a 
 beginning in reorganization could foe made, it was absolutely 
 necessary that the army recover its shattered prestige. The fall 
 and early winter had passed before this was done. More im 
 portant still, East Tennessee, the citadel of Unionism, was in 
 the grip of Longstreet, whose army hung on desperately in the 
 northeast, even after the siege of Knoxville was raised. 
 
 Until January, then, there was no reasonable pretext for an 
 appeal to the distracted people. On the contrary, many Union 
 men begged Johnson to spare himself and them the mortification 
 of certain failure in an impossible task. Nevertheless, before the 
 end of the month, he had returned to the work, provided the 
 public with a comp 1 ete program for restoring the state, and ar 
 ranged for county elections in March, allowing for the "decent" 
 interval which Mr. Temple says was desirable. That reconstruc 
 tion in the counties should precede the action of the state as a 
 whole was a wise and provident decision. It would supply the 
 judicial and other machinery most essential for immediate local 
 needs, and, at the same time, would furnish a criterion of the 
 popular attitude toward the government in the various sections, 
 
212 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 by which the result of a general election could be accurately 
 foretold. 
 
 The outcome of the March elections was eminently discourag 
 ing. They were commonly designated as farcical, and Johnson's 
 most trusted supporters advised against again inviting so pain 
 ful a humiliation. In fact, whether the Unionists or the Con 
 federates happened to be at any time temporarily dominant in 
 the state was beside the point. Nothing worth while could be 
 done while the army of the Cumberland had a resolute, efficient 
 enemy in its front and cavalry and guerillas operating in its rear. 
 This situation appertained throughout the summer and fall of 
 1864. The people of Tennessee awaited the certainty of the per 
 manent control of their state by one side or the other. While the 
 issue was doubtful, their only hope of security lay in judicious 
 inaction; so much, experience had soundly taught them. 
 
 During all this period, Johnson appears ready and willing to 
 take forward steps in reconstruction upon even slight encourage 
 ment, while it is the bulk of the Union party who hang back. The 
 East Tennessee convention displays the most extreme anxiety to 
 adjourn without action. The May convention at Nashville de 
 clares for an election only when the state can be represented from 
 all its parts. Johnson's correspondence teems with letters urging 
 waiting and watching. From West Tennessee comes the assur 
 ance that no vote can be taken there. In July, the municipal 
 government of Memphis is suspended. In August, Forrest enters 
 Memphis. In September, Gillem is routed in East Tennessee. 
 Everywhere guerillas abound and refugees flee before them. 
 
 One is constrained to believe that Johnson was dealing only 
 with unimpeachable facts when he declared that, under such con 
 ditions, an election was impossible. 2 Nevertheless, he never 
 ceased to assert that, whenever a considerable number of citizens 
 manifested their desire to reconstruct the government, he was 
 ready actively to cooperate with them. Indeed, he seems to have 
 driven rather than followed the convention of the 5th of Septem- 
 
 2 However, General Thomas and General S. P. Carter, the provost- 
 marshal general at Nashville, declared in January, 1864, that civil author 
 ity could and should be restored then. O. R., series i, vol. xxxii, part 
 ii, p. 64; Nashville Union, Febraury 16, 1864. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 213 
 
 her; all its recommendations were promptly embodied in his 
 proclamations, and every assistance given to forward its de 
 signs. Never do we find the governor opposing a restoration 
 movement by the people; on the contrary, his energies are al 
 ways devoted to encouraging them. The election of November, 
 held under his auspices, was another fiasco; but he lent his sanc 
 tion to the call for a convention in December. The work would 
 have been accomplished then, but the invasion of Hood and 
 Breckenridge intervened and the convention could not assemble. 
 At last, on the i6th of December, the battle of Nashville created 
 the situation for which he had yearned so long. The Confederate 
 army was not only beaten, but crushed. Tennessee was positively 
 won for the Union. Never before could this have been said. 
 For the first time, the administration could hope for an unre 
 strained expression of whatever Union feeling existed in the 
 state. The governor acted with the utmost possible energy. The 
 reconstruction convention met on the gth of January, and he was 
 its guiding spirit. The whole weight of his influence was exerted 
 in favor of immediate, decisive measures. Obstructionists were 
 overruled, slow methods of procedure were discountenanced, and 
 in two months the work was done. 
 
 Mr. Temple asks : was not this long delay in calling a conven 
 tion due to Johnson's desire to hold his position of military gov 
 ernor until he could step into a higher place in March? "His 
 ambition was to carry to Washington his own state as a recon 
 structed member of the Union, and present it as a rich jewel to 
 the nation. It would give him new prestige and eclat. Hence 
 his sudden haste just at the close of his service as military 
 governor." 
 
 In response, it may be inquired what advantage could possibly 
 come to Johnson from reconstruction in March, 1865, which 
 would not have been greatly enhanced by reconstruction in June, 
 1864, when he was a candidate for national preferment and men 
 tioned by many for the first place on the ticket ; or by reconstruc 
 tion in November, 1864, when he was seeking the vote of the 
 people. In either case, his advancement would have been helped 
 immeasurably, and the prestige thus gained would surely have 
 lasted until March. But neither in June nor in November was 
 
214 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 reconstruction practicable. As it was, he was compelled, much 
 against his will, to leave the work unfinished and come to Wash 
 ington without the perfect "jewel" with which he might have 
 courted favors for himself. 
 
 If we absolve Johnson from blame for unnecessary delay in the 
 performance of his duty, there remains the charge that the 
 method he adopted was arbitrary, unconstitutional, and perma 
 nently injurious in its results. Two other feasible plans were 
 suggested. A legislature might be chosen by popular vote and 
 might inaugurate the desired amendments in the manner pre 
 scribed by the constitution itself; or the people might be called 
 upon to elect a second convention for the express purpose of 
 changing the fundamental law. The first alternative, however, 
 was open to the objection that a strict compliance with the con 
 stitutional provision for amendment would require a period of 
 several years, which, in such a crisis, was not to be thought of. 
 Another practical argument against committing reconstruction to 
 a legislature was that, in the unsettled condition of the country, 
 no legislature could be chosen to represent all the counties of the 
 state, except on a general ticket, and such representation was 
 manifestly imperfect, not at all the sort contemplated by the 
 constitution. 
 
 The second suggestion was at once weaker and stronger than 
 the first. Its weakness was that it was no more constitutional 
 than Johnson's plan. To this, however, it was replied that none 
 of the three plans was, in reality, constitutional. No legislature 
 was in existence, nor the machinery prescribed by the constitu 
 tion for electing one. From a Union viewpoint, the revolutionary 
 acts of the secessionists had thrown the constitution out of gear 
 and there was no regular way of putting it again in operation. 
 This was generally admitted by all Union men, but the most con 
 servative pressed for the nearest possible approximation to con 
 stitutional forms, while others ridiculed the idea of sacrificing 
 every practical consideration to a pretended legality which was, in 
 truth, no legality at all. 
 
 If reconstruction by means of the legislature should be aban 
 doned on practical grounds, the question remained, should the ori 
 ginal convention complete the work or a second one be elected 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 215 
 
 especially for that purpose, The advocates of the latter view took 
 the position that the existing body was in no just sense representa 
 tive. Few, if any, of the delegates had been chosen in a regular 
 manner, and the wording of the call was positive proof that the 
 people could have had no idea that they were creating a body to 
 formulate constitutional amendments. Here again, however, the 
 objections had more apparent than real weight. If the amend 
 ments were not to be proposed in the manner provided for in the 
 constitution, it mattered little in what manner they were pro 
 posed. They could not become law until accepted by the sover 
 eign people, and the same people would vote on them in either 
 case. There could be little doubt that an election for a second 
 convention would bring together almost precisely the same indi 
 viduals as were already deliberating; and, if the people disap 
 proved of the actions of these "self-constituted" leaders, their 
 dbvious course was to refuse them their sanction at the polls and 
 thus make a second convention necessary. If, on the other hand, 
 they favored the amendments, time and money would be saved 
 and nothing important lost. In support of this view, there was 
 the impressive precedent of the irregular proceedings resorted to 
 in framing and adopting the Federal Constitution of 1789. As 
 Johnson himself clearly pointed out, the convention method de 
 liberately disregarded prescribed forms and depended for its 
 justification upon the inherent sovereignty of the people. What 
 they established received thereby the highest possible sanction. 
 The only necessity, then, was to get the expression of the will 
 of the sovereign; and, whether the first or a second convention 
 submitted proposals, the decisive expression would come from 
 the votes of the same persons at the polls. 
 
 The chief advantage of the one-convention plan was in the 
 saving of time. Was there any occasion for haste, aside from 
 the gratification of Johnson's desire for "eclat," which justified 
 the sacrificing of dignity to speed? As has been shown, the call 
 for the convention, issued in November, 1864, contemplated leav 
 ing the work of revision to a second body, more formally chosen, 
 and to this arrangement Johnson had offered no objection. But, 
 in the fall and winter, the administration party in Congress had 
 struck rough ground in developing its reconstruction projects. 
 
2i6 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 An especially strong opposition developed to the proposed thir 
 teenth amendment. For some time its success seemed doubtful, 
 for all the formidable "copperhead" strength was arrayed un 
 compromisingly against it. Under date of January 14, 1865, 
 there is, in the Johnson correspondence, a letter 3 from one W. 
 Bilbo, a prominent Tennessee banker, then in Washington, in 
 forming the governor that the amendment is held up for lack of 
 two more votes in its support. The writer continues: "Can't 
 you come to our assistance with the ten congressional votes of 
 Tennessee ? Let the convention at once repeal the secession ordi 
 nance, emancipate the slaves, appoint a day within the next four 
 teen to elect members of Congress, elect them, send them on here 
 so they can help us pass the amendment ?" It is at least a plausi 
 ble surmise that other messages of similar purport came to John 
 son. Devoted as he was to the principle of the amendment and, 
 now prominently identified with the administration, he would 
 recognize the importance of avoiding a reverse on this cardinal 
 point of its program and of coming promptly to its aid with every 
 available resource. The congressional vote of Tennessee, he was 
 told, would be decisive of the result. He was about to leave the 
 state, but if, during the few weeks that remained to him as gov 
 ernor and while his hand still held the helm, Tennessee could be 
 launched on her course and her congressional candidates placed 
 before the people, his influence was powerful enough to direct 
 her in accordance with the views of the administration. Once he 
 was distant in Washington, however, events in his state would be 
 beyond his control, and the dissensions among the Unionists, all 
 too strongly evinced on many previous occasions, made him ap 
 prehensive of the outcome. May not this be the explanation of 
 his impatience to accomplish everything possible in the short 
 time available between the defeat of Hood in December and his 
 departure in February? 
 
 Another charge against Johnson remains to be treated: that, 
 by the unnecessarily rigid requirements of his "iron-clad" oath, 
 he excluded many unquestionably loyal men from participation in 
 reconstruction, thus destroying their interest in the work, humil 
 iating and aggrieving them, and losing their counsel, influence, 
 and cooperation, beside depriving the new constitution and gov- 
 
 J. P., vol. LV, -1878. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 217 
 
 ernment of a substantial, impressive indorsement at the polls, for 
 the sole purpose of forcing his own views and his own men upon 
 the state. 
 
 It will, no doubt, be generally agreed that the only parties shut 
 out by the oath who had any just claim to be admitted were the 
 pro-slavery loyalists and the "peace Democrats." I have already 
 expressed my opinion that, whatever censure they may have de 
 served for their violent strictures upon the government in a crisis 
 of the nation's fate, they should not have been discriminated 
 against in Tennessee, while their counterparts in the Northern 
 states received toleration. All were equally to be justified or 
 condemned. On this ground, as it seems to me, Johnson's policy 
 may be fairly censured. On the other hand, it must be remem 
 bered that the conditions in Tennessee were peculiar. The various 
 loyal factions were of uncertain and shifting strength. The 
 state had been excepted from the emancipation proclamation for 
 the express purpose of bringing prestige and impulse to the 
 progam of the national administration by herself taking the 
 initiative in freeing her own slaves. With whatever advantages 
 the government expected from this action, the discredit of a 
 defeat would be commensurate. Finally, Lincoln, with his sensi 
 tive finger upon the nation's pulse, approved Johnson's course. 
 Usually magnanimous and generous almost to a fault, he gave 
 way, as regards Tennessee, to the latter's representations; and 
 it is safe to say that he did so only after thoroughly diagnosing 
 the situation and satisfying himself that no more lenient policy 
 was feasible. Tennessee seemed always on the point of breaking 
 away from his control, and he could not afford to relax the reins 
 on so intractable a steed. The Union cause required to be in the 
 hands of active, determined men, who, however they might blun 
 der, would not falter. To such Johnson committed it. His three 
 years in office had been one long struggle with timidity and irreso 
 lution. It is not to be wondered at that he embraced the brief 
 opportunity offered him to finish the battle himself with few, but 
 dependable and single-hearted fighters at his back. 
 
 Biographers of most men who have attained national promi 
 nence are able to lighten their narrative with many personal anec 
 dotes, interesting in themselves and helpful in explaining the 
 
2i8 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 characters and careers of their subjects. Such advantages must 
 be largely foregone by one who writes of Johnson, at least for 
 the period of the war, when his activities were confined to 
 Tennessee. This is to be explained partly by Johnson's own 
 personality, partly by the impossible circumstances in which he 
 was placed. During these three years, he occupied a position 
 which would have been insupportable by any man less self-suffi 
 cient, grim, impervious one is tempted to say, less fanatical 
 than he. Never popular with the leaders in his state, his return 
 among his fellow-citizens as the voluntary instrument of the 
 Federal government for their repression aroused against him a 
 hatred that expressed itself on every possible occasion and in 
 every possible form of vituperation and insult. And surely no 
 man ever was less qualified than Johnson to overcome prejudice 
 by virtue of his personality. Neither graciousness of address, 
 charm of manner, nor suavity of disposition won or mollified his 
 enemies. He possessed none of the appealing gentleness, broad 
 sympathy, and deep understanding of and love for humanity, 
 none of the saving humor which made up so much of the great 
 ness and power of Lincoln. His mind was narrow, bigoted, un 
 compromising, suspicious; his nature solitary and reticent; his 
 demeanor coldly repellant or violently combative. Fessenden's 
 remark of him as president, that he had no friends, applied to 
 him equally as governor. His harsh, domineering intolerance 
 drove from him those who admired his impeccable honesty and 
 patriotism and his brilliant abilities, or, at least, held them only 
 by bonds of esteem rather than devotion. He remained always 
 a solitary man, yielding his full confidence to none. 
 
 Of personal letters, to which the biographer looks for the softer 
 tones of a portrait, Johnson received comparatively few and 
 wrote fewer. He was never able to supply the lack of a good 
 elementary education. His pen was not his friend; his spelling 
 and grammar were always faulty. He complains to his wife that 
 the difficulty he experiences in writing often impels him to put 
 the letter aside unfinished. 
 
 The studied contempt with which the pro-Southern citizens of 
 Nashville treated him stung his pride, caused him to draw further 
 back within himself, and made him still more resentful. Deputed 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 219 
 
 to extend the protecting aegis of law and orderly government over 
 the state, his utter lack of finesse made him appear to be brandish 
 ing a club to frighten the people into subjection, and their ani 
 mosity centred upon him. The hostility to the Federal govern 
 ment and troops, wrote General Nelson to Buell in July, 1862, 
 "seems settled into a fierce hatred to Governor Johnson, to him 
 personally more than officially, for in questioning many people 
 they cannot point to an act that he has not been warranted in 
 doing by their own showing ; but still, either in manner of doing 
 it, or that it should be done by him, or from some indefinable cause 
 touching him their resentment is fierce and vindictive, and this 
 country, from being neutral at least, as you left it, is now hostile 
 and in arms." 4 
 
 Johnson returned hatred 'with all the violent intensity of his 
 nature. As the storm of abuse beat upon him, he became more 
 and more bitter. With him, an affront took on something of the 
 character of the feud, familiar, one may imagine, to his not too 
 remote forbears ; the debt must be repaid in full. He developed 
 an almost savage determination to humiliate the "aristocrats," 
 the scorners of free labor, and to make them pay the price of the 
 ruin of the war. More than any other idea, this permeates his 
 public and private utterances. It was by the constantly reiterated 
 expression, "Treason must be made odious, traitors punished 
 and impoverished," that he became most widely known through 
 out the country. 
 
 The habit of indulging in intoxicants, afterwards reputed as 
 Johnson's most conspicuous personal failing as president, had, of 
 course, been formed long before. There is no evidence that it 
 interfered seriously with the performance of his duties, but it 
 occasionally betrayed him into extravagances of action and ex 
 pression which did him no credit. Charles A. Dana, who, as 
 assistant secretary of war, paid him an official visit in Nashville 
 in 1863, reports that the governor opened their first interview by 
 producing a whiskey-bottle, and, in his opinion, was addicted to 
 taking "more than most gentlemen would have done." 5 
 
 Carl Schurz gives one of the few interesting personal impres- 
 
 *O. R., series r, vol. xvi, part i, p. 816. 
 
 'Charles A. Dana, Recollections of the Civil War, p. 106. 
 
220 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 sions of Johnson, 6 as he saw him in 1863. "His appearance," he 
 says, "was not prepossessing, at least not to me. His countenance 
 was of a distinctly plebeian cast, somewhat like that of the late 
 Senator Douglas, but it had nothing of Douglas' force and 
 vivacity in it. There was no genial sunlight in it; rather some 
 thing sullen, something betokening a strong will inspired by bit 
 ter feelings. I could well imagine him leading with vindictive 
 energy an uprising of a lower order of society against an aristoc 
 racy from whose lordly self-assertion he had suffered, and whose 
 pride he was bent upon humiliating. . . . Judging from his con 
 versation, his mind moved in a narrow circle of ideas as well as 
 of phrases. ... I could not rid myself of the impression that 
 beneath his staid and sober exterior there were still some wild 
 fires burning which occasionally might burst to the surface. 
 This impression was strengthened by a singular experience. It 
 happened twice or three times that, when I called upon him, I 
 was told by the attendant that the governor was sick and could 
 not see anybody; then, after the lapse of four or five days, he 
 would send for me, and I would find him uncommonly natty 
 in his attire and generally groomed with especial care. He would 
 also wave off any inquiry about his health. When I mentioned 
 this circumstance to one of the most prominent Union men of 
 Nashville, he smiled, and said that the governor had 'his infirmi 
 ties/ but was 'all right' on the whole. 
 
 "My conversation with him always turned upon political sub 
 jects. He was a demonstratively fierce Union man not upon 
 anti-slavery grounds, but from constitutional reasons, and from 
 hatred of the slave-holding aristocracy, the oppressors and mis- 
 leaders of the common people, who had resolved to destroy the 
 Republic if they were not permitted to rule it. The constant 
 burden of his speech was that this rebellion against the govern 
 ment of the Union was treason, and that treason was a crime that 
 must be made odious by visiting condign punishment upon the 
 traitors. To hear him expatiate upon this, his favorite theme, 
 one would have thought that if this man ever came into power, 
 the face of the country would soon bristle with gibbets, and 
 foreign lands swarm with fugitives from the avenging sword of 
 
 "Carl Schurz, Reminiscences, vol. Hi, p. 95. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 221 
 
 the Republic. And such sentiments he uttered not in a tone 
 betraying the slightest excitement, but with the calmness of long 
 standing and unquestionable conviction." 
 
 John M. Palmer, in his Personal Recollections, thus estimates 
 Johnson: "He possessed great natural capacity, but his knowl 
 edge of the science of government was superficial. He was sin 
 cere and earnest in his opinions, but his prejudices were violent 
 and often unjust. His personal dislikes were never concealed. 
 Bailie Peyton said of him that 'he hated a gentleman by instinct.' 
 After listening to him one day, I said: 'Governor, the anti- 
 slavery men of the North oppose slavery because it is unjust, and 
 hope by abolishing it to make free citizens of those human chat 
 tels.' He answered: 'D n the negroes; I am righting these 
 traitorous aristocrats, their masters !' " 7 
 
 Almost all the defects of Johnson's character noted by his con 
 temporaries may be explained by the hardships, limitations, and 
 narrowness of his early environment and by the prejudices en 
 gendered in a man conscious of natural superiority, but held down 
 by institutions and conventions. The lack of broad, comprehen 
 sive interests had, however, a compensating element, it enabled 
 him to concentrate all the strength of his extraordinarily forceful 
 nature upon the few essentials which he clearly comprehended, 
 and to move to them with overwhelming energy. He had three 
 invaluable assets for the work to which he was called singleness 
 of mind, tenacity of purpose, indomitable persistency. In the 
 darkest days for the Union, in the spring of 1863, he wrote to 
 his wife : "I feel sometimes like giving all up in dispare ; but this 
 will not do we must hold out to the end, this rebelion is wrong 
 and must be put down let cost what it may in the life and treasure. 
 I intend to appropriate the remainder of my life to the redemp 
 tion of my adopted home East Tennessee and you and Mary 8 
 must not be weary, it is our fate and we should be willing to 
 bear it cheerfully. Impatience and dissatisfaction will not better 
 it or shorten the time of our suffering." 9 The whole letter reveals 
 a tortured mind and an exhausted body, sustained by an unflag 
 ging spirit. With his property confiscated, his family for a time 
 
 7 John M. Palmer, Personal Recollections, p. 127. 
 
 8 Johnson's daughter. 
 J. P., vol. xxx, 6689. 
 
222 ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 in danger and distress, hated and insulted by his neighbors, 
 maligned by rivals and enemies, often defeated, mortified, and 
 seemingly almost discredited in his labors to reorganize his state, 
 his devotion and patriotism never faltered, but soared higher and 
 surer with every reverse of fortune. When the loyalists of Ten 
 nessee were perplexed and almost demoralized, he stood firmly 
 and saw clearly, and by these merits won the confidence of Lin 
 coln and Stanton and was thus able to hold the leadership, over 
 come all opposition, and command the course of events. 
 
 Johnson's weaknesses were those of temperament and training. 
 His claims to honor are based upon loyalty, self-sacrifice, and 
 a steadfast devotion to the cause he believed to be right, which, 
 considering all that he had at stake, can only be described as 
 heroic. The issue joined, he stepped unhesitatingly forward into 
 the front rank for service, regardless of his own comfort and 
 safety, and gave himself unsparingly to saving the state. He 
 worked, says a perhaps too fulsome panegyrist, "with an industry 
 and energy that never grew weary or asked repose." 10 His re 
 ward came in the esteem of those who could best comprehend 
 the value of his services and in elevation to a high post of national 
 distinction. His record as governor is epitomized in Stanton's 
 letter, 11 accepting his resignation of the office, in March, 1865. 
 The secretary of war concludes : "Permit me on this occasion to 
 render to you the thanks of this department for your patriotic 
 and a'ble services during the eventful period through which you 
 have exercised the high trusts committed to your charge. In one 
 of the darkest hours of the great struggle for national existence 
 against rebellious foes the government called you from the Senate 
 and from the comparatively safe and easy duties of civil life 
 to place you in the front of the enemy and in a position of per 
 sonal toil and danger, perhaps more hazardous than was en 
 countered by any other citizen or military officer of the United 
 States. With patriotic promptness you assumed the post, and 
 maintained it under circumstances of unparalleled trials, until 
 recent events have brought safety and deliverance to your state, 
 and to the integrity of that constitutional Union for which you 
 
 10 Nashville Times, January 7, 1865, quoting Atdhinson (Kansas) 
 Champion. 
 " O. R., series iii, vol. iv, p. 1221 ; J. P., vol. Ivii, -2426. 
 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 223 
 
 so long and so gallantly periled all that is dear to man on earth. 
 That you may be spared to enjoy the new honors and perform the 
 high duties to which you have been called by the people of the 
 United States is the sincere wish of one who in every official and 
 personal relation has found you worthy of the confidence of the 
 government and the honor and esteem of your fellow-citizens." 
 
INDEX 
 
 Ammen, Gen. Jacob, Governor's 
 guard assigned to command of, 
 187; then withdrawn from, 187; 
 fails to support Gillem, 188 
 
 Amnesty, See oath 
 
 Anderson, Adna, Government super 
 intendent of railroads, 198 
 
 Banks in Tennessee, 200-204. 
 
 Bell, John, Presidential candidate, i ; 
 signs Whig appeal to people of 
 Tennessee, 6; declares for South, 7 
 
 Benjamin, Judah, P., Orders repres 
 sion of Tenn. Unionists, 16; men 
 tioned, 27 
 
 Bingham J. B., Urges appointment 
 of Johnson as provisional govern 
 or, 96; member of Union executive 
 committee, 98; complains of treat 
 ment of Union men, 130; denounces 
 Memphis civil commission, 133 ; de 
 nounced, 135; urges enrollment of 
 militia, 188; mentioned, 141, 156 
 
 Boyle, Gen. Jeremiah T., Begs John 
 son for cavalry, 57 
 
 Bragg, Gen. Braxton, Sanctions plan 
 to kidnap Johnson, 38; occupies 
 Chattanooga, 54; invades Kentucky, 
 59, 60 and notes ; defeated at Stone 
 River, 91 ; abandons Tullahoma, 
 99 ; retreats into Georgia, 101 ; vic 
 tor at Chickamauga, 108; driven 
 from Tenn., 108; mentioned, 44, 61, 
 98 
 
 Brayman, Gen. Mason, Report of, to 
 Johnson, 90 
 
 Brecken ridge, Gen. John C., Esti 
 mates Buell's conciliatory policy, 
 72 note; invades East Tenn., 155, 
 187; routs Gillem's guard, 157, 188; 
 mentioned, 25, 213 
 
 Brien, M. M., Mentioned, 98, 131. 
 
 Bridges, George W., Elected to Con 
 gress, 13; arrested by Confeder 
 ates, 13; escapes, 13; mentioned, 
 141 
 
 Brownlow, William G., Imprisoned, 
 17; denounces the administration, 
 58; opposes lenient treatment of 
 Tenn. secessionists, 72; member of 
 
 Union executive committee, 98; at 
 Knoxville convention, 126 ; speech 
 of, at Baltimore convention, 128; 
 denounces Federal court at Knox 
 ville, 135 ; on condition of refugees, 
 158; nominated for governor of 
 Tenn., 171; states his policy, 172; 
 elected, 174 ; appeals for protection 
 for East Tenn., 186; mentioned, I, 
 14, 16, 18, 96, 175 
 
 Buchanan, James, Mentioned, 23. 
 
 Buckner, Gen. Simon B., Retreats in 
 East Tenn., 101 ; mentioned, 94 
 
 Buell, Gen. Don Carlos, Appointed to 
 command, 17; policy of, regarding 
 Tenn., 17; rebuked by Lincoln and 
 McClellan, 17; wisdom of plan of, 
 18 and note ; occupies Nashville, 
 19; opposes provincial government 
 for Tenn., 34; advises Johnson of 
 popular temper in Nashville, 38; 
 reinforces Grant at Shiloh, 50; on 
 the defence of Nashville, 51, 53, 
 62, 63 ; friction beteen Johnson and, 
 53; advances on Chattanooga, 54; 
 checked by Bragg, 54; removal of, 
 urged, 58; campaign of, against 
 Bragg, 59, 60, 65 ; rupture between 
 Johnson and, 60 et seq.; Johnson 
 complains of, to Lincoln, 61 ; court 
 of inquiry into conduct of, 63 ; dis 
 satisfaction with, 65 ; intolerable 
 position of, 65-67; succeeded by 
 Rosecrans, 67 ; estimates of, 65 
 note; conciliatory policy of, 71, 72 
 note; complains of disloyalty of 
 Tenn., 74; mentioned, 52, 55, 69, 
 70, 76, 86, 176, 179 
 
 Burnside Gen. Ambrose E., Invades 
 East Tenn., 99; occupies Knoxville, 
 ipi ; retreats and defends Knox 
 ville, 108; mentioned, 106, 109 
 
 Butler, R. R., .Resolutions of, 161, 
 170 
 
 Byrd, Col., Mentioned, 144, 166. 
 
 Campbell, John A., Member of Union 
 executive committee, 98 
 
 Campbell, William B., Suggested as 
 military governor of Tenn., 31 
 
 225 
 
226 
 
 INDEX 
 
 note; chairman of Unionist mass 
 meeting, 47; speech of, 48; con 
 servative Unionist candidate for 
 governor, 100; signs protest against 
 Johnson's policy, 149; proposed by 
 Johnson as commander of relief 
 expedition to East Tenn., 179; 
 commissioner for release of prison 
 ers, 194; mentioned, i, 151 
 
 Canby, Gem. Edward R.S., Orders 
 draft, 173 
 
 Carper, John, Speech of, in recon 
 struction convention, 162 
 
 Carter, Gen. Samuel P., Urges dis 
 tinction between degrees of loyalty, 
 11.3 ; mentioned, 212 note 
 
 Caruthers, Robert L., Nominated for 
 governor of Tenn., 95; declared 
 elected, 99; mentioned, I 
 
 Catron, Judge, Charge of, to. grand 
 jury, 45 
 
 Cavalry, Confederate, 50, See also 
 Forrest, John H. Morgan, Wheeler. 
 
 Chattanooga, Buell advances on, 54; 
 Bragg retreats to, 99; Bragg aban 
 dons 101 ; delegates to National 
 Union convention elected at, 128; 
 Union refugees at, 157; mentioned, 
 59 
 
 Cheatham, Richard B., Mayor of 
 Nashville, removed from office and 
 imprisoned, 42, 43 
 
 Chickamauga, Battle of, 108; men 
 tioned, 211 
 
 Churchwell, Col. W. M., Confederate 
 provost-marshal; orders of, con 
 cerning Union refugees, 18 
 
 Citizens of Tenn., Relation of, to 
 military government, 33; consti 
 tutional meaning of citizenship, 34; 
 Johnson's proclamation for protec 
 tion of loyal, 72; Halleck's orders 
 concerning treatment of, 84; ar 
 rest of secessionist, 85 ; defined by 
 Attorney-General Maynard, 120 ; 
 propositions to discriminate be 
 tween classes of, on basis of 
 loyalty, 162 
 
 Clements, Andrew J., Elected to 
 Congress, 13; suggestions of, for 
 reconstruction, 162 
 
 Clergy, Anti-Unionist, of Nashville, 
 suppressed by Johnson, 43 
 
 Commissions in Tenn., See courts 
 
 Convention, Gov. Harris suggests 
 submitting question of secession 
 
 to, 2; Tenn. legislature provides 
 for popular vote on, 3; Tenn. de- 
 cares against, 5; Knoxville-Green- 
 ville Union, 12; Confederate nomi 
 nating, June, 1863, 95; Union, 
 July, 1863, 96-98 ; second Knoxville, 
 125 et seq.; Union, to elect dele 
 gates to National Union conven 
 tion, 127; National Union, at Bal 
 timore, 128; call for, to discuss 
 state problems, 140; Union, Sept. 
 1864, 140-147, 189 (membership, 
 140; radical domination, 140; con 
 servative position, 141 ; conserva 
 tive resolutions, 141, 143; conser 
 vatives forced out, 144; resolutions 
 adopted, 144; relation of Johnson 
 to, 147) ; call for preliminary re 
 construction, 157; reconstruction, 
 Jan., 1865, 158-172 (call for, 158; 
 informal nature of, 158; delayed 
 by Hood's invasion, 159; meets, 
 160; admission of delegates, 161 ; 
 basis of voting, 161 ; radical policy, 
 163; conservative policy, 163; 
 amendments to state constitution 
 proposed by radicals, 165; author 
 ity of, to amend constitution denied, 
 166; radical amendments opposed, 
 166; Johnson's speech, 167; results 
 achieved, 170; provisions for state 
 elections and nomination of can 
 didates, 171) ; discussion of, system 
 of reconstruction, 214 
 
 Cooper, Edmund, Appointed John 
 son's private secretary and confi 
 dential agent, 42 
 
 Corinth, Halleck advances on, 52; 
 abandoned by Confederates, 54 
 
 Courts in Tenn., Reopened in parts 
 of state, 45 ; friction between civil 
 and military, 45; war department's 
 rules regarding, 45; judicial com 
 missions in Memphis, 46; provost, 
 in Nashville, 78; requested for 
 Knoxville, 112; reopened, 131; 
 civil and military, at Memphis, 131- 
 133; in West Tenn., 134; in Knox 
 ville denounced 135; opened, 136; 
 rights of colored persons in, 146 
 
 Crawford, Col. R. C, Mentioned, 142 
 
 Crittenden, John J., Johnson's speech 
 on compromise proposition of, 27; 
 protests against removal of Buell, 
 67; mentioned, 24, 125 
 
 Currency in Tenn., 199-204 
 
INDEX 
 
 227 
 
 Dana, Charles A., Interviews John 
 son, 105, 219 
 
 Dana, Gen. Napoleon J. T., Friction 
 between, and judges, etc. in West 
 Tenn., 135 
 
 Davis, Charles, Federal commissioner 
 to administer Confederate prop 
 erty, 86 
 
 Davis, Jefferson, Proclaims martial 
 law in East Tenn., 18; Johnson's 
 retort to, 22; strictures of, on mili 
 tary government in Tenn., 35 ; re 
 mark of, on Johnson's proclama 
 tion, 118 note; mentioned, 9, 14 
 note, 16, 43, 44 
 
 Deserters, Confederate, enlisted by 
 Rosecrans and Johnson, 195; en 
 listment of Confederate, forbidden 
 by Thomas, 195; Confederate, sent 
 north of Ohio river, 195 ; loyal, 
 from Confederate army, 195; 
 Union, 196 
 
 Dickson Capt. J. Bates, Rebuked for 
 interfering with Johnson, 183 
 
 Dorr, Col. Joseph B., Reports con 
 ditions in Humphries county, 123 
 
 Douglas, Stephen A., vote for, in 
 Tenn., 1860, i note; reasons for 
 Johnson's failure to support, 24; 
 Johnson compared to, 220 
 
 Driver, Capt., Mentioned, 144 
 
 Dumont, Gen. Ebenezer, Approves 
 reinforcements for Nashville, 51 
 
 East, Edward H., Appointed secre 
 tary of state, 42; governor pro 
 tern., 175 
 
 East Tennessee, Conditions and sen 
 timent in, before war, 4; votes 
 against convention, 5 ; votes against 
 secession, 10; Union convention in, 
 12 ; congressional election in, 13 ; 
 importance of, 14; Confederates 
 overrun, 14; Confederate policy in, 
 14-17; loyalty of, 16; Buell fails 
 to succor, 17; persecution of loy 
 alists in, 18; Burnside invades, 99, 
 101 ; conditions in (1864), 124, 186; 
 Knoxville convention in 125 et seq.; 
 proposition to make separate state 
 of, 125; Union nominating conven 
 tions in, 128; Gillem's operations 
 in, 186-188; complaints of, troops, 
 191 ; mentioned, 7, 44, 46, 56, 58, 
 67, 73, 91, 99, 104, 131, 139, 211 
 
 Edwards, Col. Richard M., Sugges 
 tion of, regarding electors, 144 
 
 Elections in Tenn., Congressional, 
 Aug., 1861, 13 ; municipal, in Mem 
 phis, June, 1862, 87; congressional, 
 attempted, Dec., 1862, 89-90; Con 
 federate, Aug., 1863, 99J conser 
 vative Union, Aug., 1863, 99-100; 
 Johnson proclaims county, Jan., 
 1864, 118; irregularities preceding 
 county, 122; county Mar., 1864, 123; 
 attempted, Dec., 1862, 89-90; Con 
 vention, May, 1864, 127; presiden 
 tial, 1864 (provided for, 144; or 
 dered by Johnson, 147; held, 156; 
 declared invalid by Congress, 156) ; 
 state, Mar., 1865 (provided for, 170, 
 machinery for, 171 ; nomination of 
 Union candidates for, 171 ; held, 
 
 174) 
 
 Emancipation, See Johnson, Lincoln, 
 slavery, Tennessee 
 
 Etheridge, Emerson, Heads conserva 
 tive Union party, 09; urges recog 
 nition of Campbell as governor, 
 100; signs protest against Johnson's 
 policy, 149; mentioned, 7 
 
 Ewing, E. H., Mentioned, 6 
 
 Finances of Tenn., 199-204 (condi 
 tion of banks, 200; decline of bank 
 paper, 201 ; remedies proposed, 201 ; 
 instability of state institutions, 203 ; 
 industrial chaos, 203; Johnson's 
 policy, 204) 
 
 Forrest, Gen. Nathan B., Captures 
 Murf reesboro, 54 ; approaches 
 Nashville, 57, 62; prevents Union 
 elections, 90; enters Memphis, 134; 
 cooperates in organizing Confed 
 erate militia, 156; mentioned, 50, 
 51, 58, 74, 190, 212 
 
 Foster, Turner S., Elected circuit 
 judge, 48; imprisoned by Johnson, 
 48 
 
 Fowler, Joseph S., Appointed comp 
 troller of Tenn., 42; mentioned, 
 141 
 
 Franklin, Battle of, 159 
 
 Gass, D. P., Proposes disfranchise- 
 ment of secessionists, 162 
 
 Gaunt, Judge, Views of. on amnesty, 
 166 
 
 Gentry, Meredith P., Johnson de 
 feats, for governor of Tenn., i#55, 
 21 
 
 Gillem, Gen. Alvin C., Commands 
 governor's guard, 186; expedition to 
 East Tenn., 187-188; guards Nash- 
 
228 
 
 INDEX 
 
 ville-tNorthwestern irailroad, 198 ; 
 mentioned, 157, 211 
 
 Governor's guard, Provision for, 42 ; 
 ist Term, regiment transferred to, 
 83; authority for, 176 note, 179; 
 operations of, in East Tenn., 186- 
 188; friction between Johnson and 
 army officers over, 187 
 
 Grant, Gen. Ulysses S., Captures 
 Forts Henry and Donelson, 19; 
 proclaims martial law in West 
 Tenn., 19; victor at Shiloh, 46; 
 commands departments of Cumber 
 land, Tennessee, and Ohio, 108; 
 drives Bragg from Tenn., 109; dis 
 satisfied with Thomas, 159; direct 
 ed to guard Nashville-Northwest 
 ern railroad, 198; mentioned, no, 
 191 
 
 Greeley, Horace, Mentioned, 149 
 
 Greene, Capt. Oliver D., Johnson's 
 quarrels with, 57, 69, 70; men 
 tioned, 177 
 
 Greenville, Union convention at, 12, 
 13 ; mentioned, 20 
 
 Guerillas, 15, 44, 50, 52 et passim 
 
 Halleck, Gen. Henry W., Directed to 
 provide troops for Johnson, 42; 
 instructions of, regarding relation 
 of military and civil courts, 45 ; 
 ordered to protect Nashville, 51; 
 advances on Corinth, 52; explains 
 failure to send troops to Nashville, 
 53; plan of, to clear East Tenn., 
 54; asked to suggest successor to 
 Buell, 58; orders Buell to occupy 
 East Tenn., 67; explains relation 
 of civil to military government, 
 8p; rebukes Rosecrans, 81 ; instruc 
 tions by, regarding treatment of 
 inhabitants, 84; mentioned, 46, 55, 
 179 
 
 Harris, Isham G., Convenes Tenn. 
 legislature, 2 ; message of, 2 ; re 
 fuses Lincoln's demand for troops, 
 5 ; urges secession and union with 
 Confederacy, 7; motives of, 8; 
 authorized to raise and direct 
 Tenn. troops, etc., 8; proclaims 
 congressional elections, 13; flees to 
 Miss., 19; remark of, concerning 
 Johnson, 22; proclaims Confeder 
 ate nominating convention, 95 ; ad 
 ministration of, indorsed, 95 ; men 
 tioned, 6, 9, 10, 62, TOO, 106 
 
 Harrison, Horace H., Member of 
 Union executive committee, 98 
 
 Henry, Gustavus A., Johnson defeats, 
 for governor of Tenn., 21 
 
 Hilliard, Henry W., Reports to 
 Toombs on conditions in Tenn., 8; 
 addresses Tenn. legislature, 9 
 
 Holloway, Lieut. Junius B., On 
 Buell's conciliatory policy, 72 note 
 
 Homestead bill, Championed by John 
 son, 22; vetoed by Buchanan, 23 
 
 Hood, James R., Moderate leader in 
 reconstruction convention ; minor 
 ity report of, 166 ; attacks the radi 
 cals, 167 ; mentioned, 169 
 
 Hood, Gen. John B., Invades Tenn., 
 158; checked at Franklin, 159; 
 routed before Nashville, 159; men 
 tioned, 44, no, 199, 213 
 
 Houk, Col. L. C., Activities of, in 
 reconstruction conventions, 141, 
 142, 143, 161, 162 
 
 Houston, Russell, Mentioned, 6 
 
 Hurlbut, Gen. Stephen A., Declares 
 Tennessee ready for reconstruction, 
 104; misgivings of, regarding 
 Memphis election, 137; mentioned, 
 
 134 
 
 Johnson, Andrew, Begs aid for Tenn. 
 Unionists, 14, 17; sends muskets 
 to East Tenn., 14 note ; appointed 
 military governor, 19; youth of, 
 20; early political career of, 21; 
 political principles of, 22 ; views of, 
 on slavery, secession, coercion, 23 ; 
 relations of, with Douglas, 24; sup 
 ports Breckenridge, 25; reasons for 
 devotion of, to Union, 25; com 
 promise proposal of, 25; attacked, 
 27 ; speeches of, for Union, 27 ; 
 member of joint committee on 
 conduct of war, 30; objections 
 to appointment of, 30 note; com 
 mission of, 32 ; instructions to, 
 32, 176 note; problems of, 32- 
 38; plots and threats against, 37; 
 address of, to the people, 38 ; states 
 purpose of military government, 
 39; conciliatory attitude of, 39; re 
 lation of, to army, 42 ; vacates and 
 refills offices in Nashville, 42; sup 
 presses anti-Union press, 43 ; and 
 clergy, 43; facilitates reopening of 
 courts, 45 ; at Union mass meeting, 
 48; dealings of, with Turner S. 
 Foster, 48; asks reinforcements for 
 .Nashville 51-53; criticizes Buell, 
 53; quarrels with Federal officers, 
 55; complains of lack of support, 
 
INDEX 
 
 229 
 
 56; authorized to raise cavalry, 56; 
 quarrels with Capt. Greene, 57, 69; 
 plan of, for defence of Nashville, 
 59; rupture between Buell and, 60 
 et seq.; deposition of, at trial of 
 Buell, 63 ; gains credit for saving 
 Nashville, 64; demands removal of 
 Negley, 64; Lincoln's story of, 64; 
 embarrassing position of, 67; Lin 
 coln's confidence in, 68 ; quarrels 
 with military authorities in Nash 
 ville, 69 ; secures authority to ap 
 point provost-marshal, 70; friction 
 between John Lellyett and, 70; 
 policy of, for protection of Tenn. 
 Unionists, 72, 73; mulcts Pulaski, 
 72; banishes disloyalists, 73; adopts 
 repressive policy, 74; appoints com 
 missioners to administer oath of 
 allegiance, etc., 76; authority of, 
 eclipsed by military, 77 ; controver 
 sy between Rosecrans and, over 
 Truesdail and cotton scandals, 79- 
 83; forbids payments of rents, etc. 
 to secessionists, 85 ; controls admin 
 istration of Confederate property, 
 86; proclaims congressional elec 
 tion, 89; secures exception of Tenn. 
 from emancipation proclamation, 
 91 ; speech of, on slavery in Tenn., 
 92; speech of, at Nashville 93; 
 administration of, indorsed, 98; 
 accused of delaying reconstruction, 
 99, 100; implacable toward seces 
 sionist leaders, 102; policy of re 
 construction of, 103; on conditions 
 in Tenn., 105; submits plan of 
 reconstruction to Lincoln, 106; re 
 ceives authority for reconstruction 
 of Tenn., 107 ; speech of, on 
 reconstruction, 107; attitude of, re 
 garding amnesty oath, 113; speech 
 of, on reconstruction, 114-117; 
 proclaims county elections, 118; im 
 poses stringent oath, 119; support 
 ed by Lincoln, 120 ; blamed for 
 failure of county elections, 123 ; for 
 immediate emancipation, 124; at 
 Knoxville convention, 126; nom 
 inated for vice-presidency by Tenn. 
 Union convention, 128; and by Na 
 tional Union convention, 129; re 
 quests exception of Tenn. from 
 amnesty proclamation, 131 ; power 
 of, to establish courts denied, 133 ; 
 Union convention indorses admin 
 
 istration of, 145; proclamation of, 
 regarding reconstruction, 146; ap 
 peals for aid and threatens dis 
 loyalists, 146; orders presidential 
 election in Tenn., 147; explana 
 tion of course, in convention, 
 J 47 '> policy of, condemned by 
 peace Democrats, 148-153; campaign 
 speech of, to negroes, 154; speech 
 of, in reconstruction convention, 
 167; policy of, triumphant, 168; 
 valedictory of, 173; Stanton's in 
 structions to, 176 note; relations 
 between Thomas and, 177; orders 
 governor's guard to East Tenn., 
 186; friction between Schofield and, 
 187; scope of civil authority of, 
 205; relief of destitute adminis 
 tered by, 205, 206; urges that dis 
 loyal citizens be sent south, 207; 
 protects citizens from military 
 officials, 207; reconstruction policy 
 of, criticized and defended, 210- 
 217; personal estimate of, 217-223. 
 See also deserters, finances, mili 
 tary government, militia, negro, 
 prisoners, railroads, reconstruction, 
 troops 
 
 Johnson, Mrs. Andrew, Treatment 
 of, by Confederates, 18 
 
 Johnson, Dr. G. D., Candidate for 
 mayor of Memphis, 137 
 
 Johnson, Gen. Richard W., Captured 
 by Morgan, 55 
 
 Johnson, Col. Robert, Mentioned, 
 178 
 
 Johnston, Gen. Joseph E., Abandons 
 Nashville, 19; mentioned, 98, 99 
 
 Jones, William P., Member of Union 
 executive committee, 98 
 
 Kentucky, Tenn. refugees in, 16; 
 Bragg's raid into, 59-60 
 
 Knoxville, Union conventions at, 12, 
 125; ocupied by Burnside, 101 ; 
 siege of, 108, 109; Federal court 
 for, urged, 112; election at, for 
 delegates to National Union con 
 vention, 128; refugees at, 157, 158; 
 mentioned, 16, 18, 27, 157 
 
 Lee, Gen. Robert E., Mentioned, 99 
 
 Leftrick, J., Member of Union execu 
 tive committee, 98 
 
 Legislature of Tenn., Convened by 
 Harris, 2; passes resolutions 
 against coercion, 3 ; submits ques 
 tion of convention to people, 3; 
 
23 
 
 INDEX 
 
 approves league with Confederacy, 
 9; provides for popular vote on 
 secession and union with Confed 
 eracy, 9; adjourns sine die, 19; 
 meets for reconstruction, 175 
 
 Lellyett, John, Friction between John 
 son and, 70; spokesman for Mc- 
 Clellan supporters' protest to Lin 
 coln against Johnson's policy, 151 
 
 Lincoln, Abraham, Rebukes Buell, 
 17; appoints Johnson military gov 
 ernor, 19; placates Johnson, 57; 
 story of Johnson by, 64; confidence 
 of, in Johnson, 68; anxious for 
 reconstruction of border states, 88; 
 isends agents to promote recon 
 struction, 88; emancipation procla 
 mation of, 88, 91 ; suggestions of, 
 regarding reconstruction of Tenn., 
 106; empowers Johnson to recon 
 struct Tenn., 107; proclamation of 
 amnesty and reconstruction by, 
 no; sends agent to Tenn., 112; 
 position of, regarding amnesty 
 oath, 113; supports Johnson's plan 
 of reconstruction, 120, 217; nomi 
 nated by Tenn. Union conventions, 
 128; amnesty proclamation of, de 
 nounced and derided in Tenn., 129, 
 130 ; administration of, indorsed by 
 Tenn. Union convention, 145; con 
 troversy between, and McClellan 
 supporters in Tenn., 148-153; wins 
 Tenn. election, 156; urges Johnson 
 to raise troops, 180 ; urges raising 
 of colored troops, 181 ; mentioned, 
 i note, 2, 5, 7, 17, 18 and note, 
 25, 53, 54, 61, 119, 222 
 
 Logan, Gen. John A., Mentioned, 
 
 159 
 
 Longstreet, Gen. James, Reinforces 
 Bragg, 108; operates against JBurn- 
 side, 108, 109; mentioned, 211 
 
 Lookout Mountain, Battle of, 109 
 
 McClellan, Gen. George B., Assigns 
 Buell to command, 17; policy of, 
 regarding East Tenn., 17; censures 
 Buell, 17; views of, as presidential 
 candidate, 148; supporters of, pro 
 test to Lincoln against administra 
 tion policy in Tenn., 148-153; ticket 
 withdrawn in Tenn., 153; vote for, 
 in Tenn., 156; mentioned, 18 note, 
 34, 143 
 
 Matthews, Col. Stanley, Johnson's 
 animosity toward, 69; mentioned, 
 177 
 
 Maynard, Horace, Elected to Con 
 gress, 13 ; begs government for 
 arms for East Tenn., 14, 17; at 
 torney-general of Tenn., 42 ; mem 
 ber of Union executive committee, 
 98; decision of, regarding status 
 of amnestied citizens, 120; men 
 tioned, i, 4, 1 6, 18, 96, 141 
 
 Meigs, R. J., Suggestions of, to 
 Johnson, regarding policy as mili 
 tary governor, 38 note; urges con 
 fiscation of slaves of Confederates, 
 92; mentioned, 6 
 
 Memphis, Confederate state govern 
 ment in, 19; captured by Federals, 
 44; legal commissions in, 46; muni 
 cipal election in, 87; mass meet 
 ing in, urges reconstruction, 112; 
 meeting of conservative Unionists 
 in, 121 ; courts and commissions 
 at, 131-133; Forrest enters, 134; 
 municipal affairs in, 136-138; gov 
 ernment of, subverted, 138; presi 
 dential vote in, 1864, 156, 190; cop 
 perhead activity in, 173 ; mentioned, 
 27, 52, 55, 89, 212 
 
 Mercer, S. C, Founds Nashville 
 Daily Union, 43 
 
 Middle Tennessee, Votes against 
 convention, 5; for secession, 10; 
 military operations in, 1862, 52; 
 Buell explains disposition of troops 
 in, 53 ; Union nominating conven 
 tion in, 127; mentioned, 12, 13, 44, 
 5o, 51, 130, 139. See also Nash 
 ville. 
 
 Military government, Problems con 
 nected with, 32; relation of, to 
 citizens, 33; constitutional status 
 of, 34-37; Jefferson Davis on, 35; 
 purpose of, stated by Johnson, 38- 
 40; relation of, to army, 42, 176, 
 183; and courts, 45-46; repressive 
 measures of, under Johnson and 
 Rosecrans, 72 et seq.; confusion of 
 civil and military authority under, 
 76; scope of civil authority of, 
 205 ; miscellaneous functions of : 
 raising troops (home guards, 178; 
 cavalry, 56, 178; infantry, cavalry, 
 artillery, 179; governor's guard, 
 179, 186-188; recruits from other 
 states, 180; colored troops, 180- 
 185 ; militia, 188-190 ; supplies, 191 ; 
 summary, 192) ; investigation, dis 
 charge, and recruiting of prisoners, 
 192-195; deserters, 195; construe- 
 
INDEX 
 
 231 
 
 tion and guarding of railroads, 196- 
 199; regulation of finances, 199- 
 204; relief of destitute, 205-207; 
 protection of citizens, 207; over 
 sight of negroes, 207-209 
 Military operations in Tenn., Corinth 
 campaign, 52; campaign to clear 
 East Tenn., 1862, 54; Bragg's in 
 vasion of Ky., 59 et seq., Federal 
 plans for 1863, 91 ; Rosecrans' 
 campaign, 1863, 91, 98, 99, 101, 107, 
 108; Grant's campaign against 
 Bragg, 108; Hood's invasion, 158, 
 
 159 
 
 Militia of Tenn., Enrollment of (in 
 West Tenn, 135; urged, 188; Nash 
 ville convention declares for, 189; 
 Johnson's proclamation for, 189; 
 difficulties in, 189) ; summary of, 
 190; minor problems connected 
 with, 191 
 
 Milligan, Samuel R., President of 
 Union convention, 141 
 
 Milroy, Gen. Robert H., Difficulties 
 of, in enrolling militia, 189 
 
 Missionary Ridge, Battle of, 109 
 
 Mitchel, Gen. Ormsby M., Advances 
 to Tuscumbia, 52; Confederate 
 pressure on, 52; retreats, 53 
 
 Mitchell, Gen. Robert B., Enforces 
 confiscation act, 85; orders seizure 
 of goods of delinquents, 85 ; exacts 
 oath of allegiance, 86 
 
 Morgan, Gen. George H., At Cum 
 berland Gap, 54; outflanked iby 
 Kirby Smith, 60; mentioned, 61, 
 179 
 
 Morgan, Gen. John H., Menaces 
 Nashville, 54; captures Gallatin, 
 55 ; closes in on Nashville, 62 ; en 
 ters Pulaski, 73; death of, 187; 
 mentioned, 50, 51, 58, 72, 186 
 
 Morgan, Samuel T., Candidate for 
 mayor of Memphis, 137 
 
 Mundy, Col. Marc, Urges advantages 
 of conciliatory policy, 41 ; reluctant 
 to try civilians in military courts, 
 43; mentioned, 73 
 
 Murfreesboro, Captured by Forrest, 
 54; battle of (or Stone River), 91 ; 
 mentioned, 57 
 
 Mussey, Col. Reuben D., Estimate 
 of negro troops by, 185; reports 
 on negro schools, 209 
 
 Nashville, Offered as Confederate 
 capitol, 9; Buell plans to strike at, 
 17; abandoned by Confederates, 
 
 19 ; occupied by Buell, 19 ; municipal 
 officers of, deposed by Johnson, 
 42; disloyal press and clergy of, 
 suppressed, 43; courts reopened at, 
 45 ', Union mass meeting at, May, 
 1862, 47; in danger, 51; Buell's 
 plans regarding, 52, 62, 63; be 
 sieged, 55-63; Johnson the soul of 
 defence of, 64, 179; Rosecrans re 
 lieves, 67 ; complaints against John 
 son in, 72; jumble of offices at, 76; 
 confiscation act in, 86; Union sen 
 timent in, 89; Johnson's speech 
 against slavery at, 93; Union con 
 vention at, July, 1863, 96; loyalty 
 of municipal officers of, impugned, 
 in; Union mass meeting at, Jan., 
 1864, 114; Union rally at, Mar., 
 1864, 122; election at, for delegates 
 to National Union convention, 127 ; 
 Union meeting at, Aug., 1864, pro 
 poses convention, 140; Union con 
 vention at, Sept., 1864, 140 et seq.; 
 presidential campaign in, 154; 
 presidential vote of, 156; battle 
 of, 159; reconstruction convention, 
 Jan., 1865, at, 160 et seq., legisla 
 ture meets at, 175 ; fiscal difficulties 
 at, 200; refugees in, 206; negroes 
 in, 208; mentioned, 7, 17, 18, 27, 
 34, 44, 46, 47, 48, 49, 53, 54, 
 59, 65, 69, 70, 74, 75, 78, 79, 81, 
 83, 85, 92, 101, 134, 157, 177, 179, 
 182, 183, 188, 189, 191, 192, 196, 
 197, 198, 199, 201, 205, 209, 212, 
 213, 218, 219 
 
 Nashville Union Club, Declaration 
 of principles of, 93 
 
 Negley, Gen. James S., Johnson de 
 mands removal of, 64, 69; instruct 
 ed to compensate Unionists out of 
 property of disloyalists, 74; in 
 structed to assume custody of bank 
 at Columbia, 200; mentioned, 70 
 
 Negro, Population (Stanton's instruc 
 tions regarding, 207 ; wretched con 
 dition of, 208; relief measures for, 
 209 ; education of, 209) ; troops 
 (Lincoln urges enlistment of, 180, 
 181 ; enlistment of, 182 ; compensa 
 tion to former loyal owners of, 
 184; conditions of enlistment of, 
 184 ; efficiency of, 185 ; public senti 
 ment regarding, 185) 
 
 Nelson, Thomas, A. R., Elected to 
 Congress, 13; imprisoned by Con 
 federates, 13; takes oath of neu- 
 
232 
 
 INDEX 
 
 trality, 13; calls second Knoxville 
 convention, 125 ; signs protest 
 against Johnson's policy, 149; 
 mentioned, i, 4 
 
 Nelson, Gen. William, Defends 
 Nashville, 58; Johnson secures 
 removal of, 69 
 
 Newspaper press, Nashville, sup 
 pressed by Johnson, 43 
 
 Oath, Of allegiance (amnesty offered 
 in return for, 40; Nashville offi 
 cials, clergy, etc. required to take, 
 42; penalties for refusal to take, 
 73; commissioners to administer, 
 appointed, 76; exacted by Gen. 
 Mitchell, 86); amnesty (no; Lin 
 coln's plan for reconstruction based 
 on, in; suggestions regarding, 
 112; difficulties regarding, 112-113; 
 Johnson opposes, as qualification 
 for franchise, 114; derided, 129; 
 abuses under, 130; mentioned, 
 120) ; Union test (advocated by 
 Johnson, 115; text of, 119; signifi 
 cance of, 119; condemnation of, 
 120-122; Lincoln supports, 120); 
 "unconditional" or "iron-clad" 
 (text of, 145; required of voters, 
 147; reasons for, 148; objected to 
 by peace Democrats, 149; injustice 
 of, 217) 
 
 Olin, Abraham B., Views on status 
 of seceded states and constitutional 
 basis of military government, 35 
 
 Palmer, Gen. John M., Commands 
 Nashville garrison, 62; estimate of 
 Johnson by, 221 
 
 Park, John, Elected mayor of Mem 
 phis, 87; denounced as disloyal 
 136; asserts his loyalty, 137; re- 
 elected, 138; deposed by Washburn, 
 138 
 
 Parole, Non-combatant, Required of 
 citizens of Nashville, 86 
 
 Peace Democrats, Platform of, 148; 
 contest elections in Tenn., 148; pol 
 icy of "unconditionals" in opposi 
 tion to, 148; controversy of Tenn., 
 with Lincoln, 148-153; ticket of, 
 withdrawn, 152; discrimination 
 against, in Tenn. censurable, 153. 
 
 Peyton, Bailie, Mentioned, 151, 221 
 
 Pillow, Gen. Gideon J., Report of, 
 on conditions in Tenn., 7 
 
 Police, In Nashville, 78 ; army de 
 tective police, 78 
 
 Prisoners, Release of Tenn., sought 
 
 toy Union mass meeting, 48; at 
 titude of Confederate, 193; peti 
 tions from Confederate, 193; C F. 
 Trigg investigates, 194; authority 
 of Johnson regarding, 194; W. B. 
 Campbell commissioner for release 
 of, 194; Confederate, permitted to 
 join Union army, 194; authority 
 to recruit, assigned to Rosecrans 
 and Johnson, 195 ; discharge of, dis 
 continued, 195 
 
 Pulaski, Mulcted by Johnson, 72 
 Railroads, Louisville, Nashville and 
 Chattanooga (cut by Bragg, 59; 
 importance of, 197; difficulty in 
 defending, 197) ; Memphis, Clarks- 
 ville and Louisville (threatened, 
 55; Johnson assumes control of, 
 196) ; Nashville and Northwestern 
 (importance of completing, 197; 
 Johnson urges completion of, 197; 
 Johnson authorized to complete, 
 197; guarding of, 198; turned over 
 to war department, 198; controver 
 sies over, 198-199) 
 Ramsay, James, Mentioned, 143 
 Reconstruction in Tenn., Urged by 
 Union mass meeting, May, 1862, 48; 
 Lincoln sends agent to promote, 88 ; 
 discussed by Union convention, 
 July, 186 3, 96-98; Johnson accused 
 of delaying, 99; Johnson's policy 
 of, 103; Johnson submits plan for, 
 to Lincoln, 106 ; Lincoln's sugges 
 tions for, 106; Johnson receives 
 full authority for, 107; Lincoln's 
 proclamation regarding, 1 10 ; 
 speedy, deprecated by Union 
 League, LI i ; urged by Memphis 
 meeting and by Gen. Thomas, 112; 
 Johnson's plan for, 113 et seq.; 
 Johnson urges stringent oath for 
 participants in, 114-117; test oath 
 required of voters in, 118, 120; 
 Johnson blamed for failure of, 123 ; 
 Union convention of, Sept., 1864, 
 takes steps toward, 140-145; John 
 son's proclamation regarding, 146; 
 Johnson appeals for aid in, 146; 
 call for preliminary convention for, 
 I 57j final convention for, 160-171; 
 accomplished, 173-175; Johnson's 
 policy of, criticized, 210; and de 
 fended, 211-217; possible explana 
 tion of Johnson's haste in, 215. See 
 also convention, elections, Johnson, 
 Lincoln, military government, oath. 
 
INDEX 
 
 233 
 
 Rodgers, S. R., President of Tenn. 
 reconstruction convention; speech 
 of, 161 
 
 Rosecrans, Gen. William S., Instruc 
 tions to, regarding relation of mili 
 tary to civil courts, 45 ; assigned to 
 command department of Cumber 
 land, 67; adopts repressive policy, 
 75; controversy between Johnson 
 and, over Truesdail, 79 et seq.; re 
 buked by Halleck, 81 ; accused of 
 complicity in cotton scandals, 82; 
 correspondence of, with Johnson, 
 82; objects to transfer of regiment 
 to governor's guard, 83 ; repressive 
 policy of, criticized, 83 ; creates 
 board of claims for Nashville, 85; 
 directs arrest of secessionists, 85; 
 advances against Bragg, 91 ; victor 
 at Stone River, 91 ; drives Bragg 
 from Tullahoma, 99; pursues 
 Bragg into Georgia, 101 ; defeated 
 at 'Chickamauga, 108; relieved of 
 command, 108; authorized to re 
 cruit prisoners, 195 ; enlists Con 
 federate deserters, 195; proposes 
 that Johnson complete Northwest 
 ern railroad, 197 
 
 Schofield, Gen. John M., 'Checks 
 Hood at Franklin, 159; Johnson 
 urges substitution of Thomas for, 
 in East Tenn., 187; troubles of, 
 over governor's guard, 187 
 
 Schurz, Carl, Recollections of John 
 son by, 219 
 
 Scott, Thomas A., Report of, un 
 favorable to appointment of John 
 son, 30 note 
 
 Secession in Tenn., See convention, 
 Harris, legislature, Tennessee 
 
 Shackelford, Gen. James M., Cap 
 tures Confederate force at 'Cum 
 berland Gap, 101 
 
 Sherman, Gen. William T., Burns 
 Randolph, 55; relieves Knoxville, 
 109; secures control of Nashville- 
 Northwestern railroad, 198, 199 ; on 
 financial situation in West Tenn., 
 200 ; approves of sending secession 
 ists south, 207 ; mentioned, 1 10, 
 134, 155, 158, 187, 188, 191 
 
 Shiloh, Battle of, 46 
 
 Sidell, Maj. W. H., Account of 
 Johnson's plan for defence of 
 Nashville by, 59 
 
 Slavery in Tenn., Johnson's views 
 on, 23; effect of emancipation 
 
 proclamation in Tenn., 88; Tenn. 
 excepted from emancipation proc 
 lamation, 91 ; Johnson's speech on, 
 92; Nashville Union on, 92; de 
 nounced by Nashville Union Club, 
 93; Johnson on, 105; Lincoln 
 presses for emancipation clause in 
 Tenn. constitution, 106; Johnson 
 on, 116-118; condemned by Union 
 meeting, 118; Johnson for imme 
 diate emancipation, 124; Johnson's 
 opponent, denounced as seeking to 
 save, 124; abolition of, in Tenn. 
 demanded by Union convention, 
 145; Johnson declares end of, 155; 
 emancipation amendment to con 
 stitution proposed in reconstruction 
 convention, 165; proposed amend 
 ment regarding negro suffrage, 165 ; 
 abolition urged by Johnson, 168; 
 abolition amendment approved by 
 reconstruction convention, 170; 
 abolished, 173 
 
 Smith, Gen. E. Kirby, Cooperates 
 with Bragg, 60 and note 
 
 Smith, Hugh, Mentioned, 78 
 
 Smith, Gen. William Sooy, Complains 
 of lenient policy of government, 74 
 
 Stanton, Edwin M., Orders Halleck 
 to provide troops for Johnson, 42; 
 orders Halleck to protect Nashville, 
 51 ; Johnson complains to, of weak 
 defence of Nashville, 52; confidence 
 of, in Johnson, 54, 68; authorizes 
 Johnson to raise cavalry, 56; in 
 structions of, to Johnson, 176 
 note ; authorizes Johnson to raise 
 funds for home guard, to raise 
 troops, etc., 178, 179, 180; corre 
 spondence of, with Johnson regard 
 ing organization of colored troops, 
 182, 183; orders of, regarding negro 
 enlistments, 184, 185 ; authorizes 
 Johnson to examine and report on 
 prisoners and to enlist prisoners 
 and deserters, 198, 199; transfers 
 management of Nashville-North 
 western railroad to Anderson, 198; 
 orders of, concerning support of 
 negroes, 207; enlogizes Johnson, 
 222; mentioned, 74, 82 
 
 Stearns, Maj. George L., Authorized 
 to enlist negroes, 182; friction be 
 tween Johnson and, 182 
 
 Stephens, Alexander H., Estimate of 
 Johnson's speech on the Crittenden 
 compromise by, 29 
 
234 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Stevens, Thaddeus, Views on status 
 of seceded states and on constitu 
 tional basis of military government, 
 
 34 
 
 Stone River, Battle of, 91 
 
 Temple, Oliver P., Account of John 
 son's speech for Union by, 27; ac 
 count of Knoxville convention by, 
 126; criticizes Johnson's reconstruc 
 tion policy, 210-213; mentioned, 18 
 
 Tennessee, Conditions in, before war, 
 i; legislature of, convened, 2; se 
 cession agitation in, 3; sentiment 
 in, 4; repudiates secession, Feb., 
 1861, 5 ; forms military league with 
 Confederacy, 9; secedes and joins 
 Confederacy, 10; military govern 
 ment established in, 19; economic 
 conditions in, 1862, 47; conciliatory 
 policy of Johnson and Buell in, 
 71 ; disloyalty of, 73 ; reconstruc 
 tion of, urged by Lincoln, 88; ab 
 sence of Union enthusiasm in, 90; 
 excepted from emancipation proc 
 lamation, 91 ; Confederate dis 
 couragement over, 94; economic 
 conditions in, 1863, 104; political 
 conditions in, 1863, 105; 1864, 139; 
 troops, 177-192; finances, 199-204. 
 See also East Tenn., Middle Tenn., 
 West Tenn., convention, courts, 
 elections, legislature, military gov 
 ernment, military operations, mil 
 itia, railroads, reconstruction, slav 
 ery 
 
 Thayer, Eli, Urges confiscation of 
 lands of Confederates, 130 
 
 Thomas, Gen. George H., Favors 
 occupying point near Cumberland 
 Gap, 17; proposed as successor to 
 Buell, 58; speaks in Buell's favor, 
 66; at Chickamauga, 107; assigned 
 to command department of Cum 
 berland, 107; urges speedy recon 
 struction, 112; urges reorganiza 
 tion of courts, 134; retreats before 
 Hood, 158; war department and 
 'Grant dissatisfied with, 159; 
 crushes Hood, 159; urges recon 
 struction, 160; Johnson urges, for 
 command in East Tenn., 187; or 
 ders of, regarding deserters, 195- 
 196; favors sending secessionists 
 south, 207; view of, regarding re 
 construction, 212 note ; mentioned, 
 62, no, 188, 190, 198, 199 
 
 Thomas, T. B., Delegate to Union 
 
 convention; resolutions by, 141, 
 143; resolutions of, laid on table, 
 144 
 
 Tomeny, J. M., Member of Union 
 executive committee, 98; testifies 
 against civil commission at Mem 
 phis, 133 
 
 Toombs, Robert, Mentioned, 8 
 
 Trewett, Judge, Resolutions of, 163 
 
 Trigg, C. F., Opens circuit court at 
 Knoxville, 131 ; investigates prison 
 ers, 194 
 
 Troops, Tenn., See military govern 
 ment 
 
 Truesdail, William, Chief of army 
 detective police, 78; alleged cor 
 ruption of, 78 et seq.; Johnson 
 complains of, ^79; implicated in 
 cotton scandals, 82; administration 
 of, investigated, 83; denounced by 
 Johnson, 83; mentioned, 106, 177, 
 203 
 
 Union League, Deprecates speedy 
 reconstruction, in 
 
 Veatch, Gen. James C., Appoints civil 
 commission at Memphis, 132 
 
 Walker, Leroy P., Mentioned, 7 
 
 Washburn, Gen. Cadwallader C., 
 Subverts government of Memphis, 
 138; mentioned, 134 
 
 Webster, Gen. Joseph D., Mentioned, 
 198 
 
 West Tennessee, Votes for conven 
 tion, 5; votes for secession, 10; 
 martial law in, 19; military opera 
 tions in, 52; Union sentiment in, 
 89, 105; Union nominating con 
 vention in, 128; courts in, 134; 
 enrollment of militia in, 135; ad 
 ministration defeat in, predicted, 
 139; Confederate activity in, 156; 
 deplorable conditions in, 160; 
 small vote for reconstruction in, 
 173; discontent in, 190. See also 
 Memphis 
 
 Wheeler, Gen. Joseph, Operations of, 
 134; activity of, diminishes Union 
 vote, 140; mentioned, 186, 190 
 
 Whigs in Tenn., Strength of, before 
 war, i ; vote of, 1860, i note ; ap 
 peal of, to people, 6; disappearance 
 of, 7 
 
 Yansil, Col., Confederate provisional 
 governor of Tenn., 156 
 
 Zollicoffer, Gen. Felix K., Com 
 mands Confederates in East Tenn., 
 14; mentioned, 15, 16 
 
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 Andrew Johnson, H3 
 military governor 
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