THE LIBRARY 
 
 OF 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 RIVERSIDE
 
 THE POLITICAL THOUGHT 
 
 OF 
 
 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE
 
 THE POLITICAL THOUGHT 
 
 OF 
 
 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 BY 
 
 -Ay v v 
 Hf wr cf DAVIS M.A. 
 
 FELLOW OF BALLIOL COLLEGE, OXFORD 
 SOMETIME FELLOW OF ALL SOULS' COLLEGE 
 
 "Fas est et ab hoste doceri." 
 
 LONDON 
 
 CONSTABLE AND COMPANY LTD. 
 1914
 
 TC233
 
 PREFACE 
 
 THIS book which is mainly composed of selections from 
 the work of Treitschke has not been put together with 
 a controversial purpose, but in the belief that English- 
 men may find it worth their while to understand the 
 political philosophy which is now the vogue in Germany. 
 Though I have sometimes criticised, criticism has not 
 been my main object. I have attempted to explain 
 how the thought of Treitschke was influenced by the 
 events of his own lifetime, and how his famous lectures 
 upon Politik grew out of the polemical essays which he 
 wrote between 1860 and 1878. These essays referred 
 directly or indirectly to current questions of German politics ; 
 what abstract thought they contain is coloured by contro- 
 versial considerations and partisan sympathies. But the 
 Politik is little more than a symmetrical and co-ordinated 
 restatement of the positions which he had defended in the 
 essays. For this reason, that it reflected the views which 
 had gained the upper hand in German controversies, the 
 Politik has been enthusiastically applauded by German 
 readers ; but for the same reason the book seems inexplic- 
 ably one-sided to a foreign reader until he has retraced the 
 process by which the author formed his ideas. It has been
 
 vi HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 no part of my scheme to estimate the worth of Treitschke 
 as a historian. But it may be useful for English students 
 to have before them, in an English form, some of the principal 
 passages from the History of Germany in the Nineteenth 
 Century, which explain why the author believed, and taught 
 his pupils to believe, that England was a decadent State, 
 relying for her preservation upon a tortuous and immoral 
 foreign policy. A collection of these passages will be found 
 in the tenth chapter. 
 
 My thanks are due to Miss Winifred Ray for the skill 
 with which she has made the necessary translations under 
 my supervision. 
 
 H. W. CARLESS DAVIS.
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 PREFACE v 
 
 EDITIONS CITED . ix 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 EARLY LIFE (1834-1857) i 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 DIE FREIHEIT (1861) . . . . . . . 9 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 TREITSCHKE AND BISMARCK (1861-1866) . . . . 19 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 THE MOVEMENT FOR GERMAN UNITY (1848-1866) . . 35 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 THE NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION AND THE FOUNDING 
 
 OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE (1866-1871) ... 82 
 
 J 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR (1870) . . . . .107
 
 viii HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 PACK 
 
 DIE POLITIK (I.) THE NATURE OF THE STATE . . . 117 
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 DIE POLITIK (II.) THE RELATIONS OF STATE WITH STATE 148 
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 DIE POLITIK (III.) CONSTITUTIONS 180 
 
 CHAPTER X 
 
 TREITSCHKE ON ENGLISH HISTORY IN THE NINETEENTH 
 
 CENTURY . . . . . . . . .227
 
 EDITIONS CITED 
 
 Heinrich von Treitschke's Briefe. Herausgegeben von Max Cornicelius. 
 
 2 vols. Leipzig, 1912-1913. 
 Historische und politische Aufsatze von Heinrich von Treitschke. 
 
 Vol. II. Die Einheitsbestrebungen zertheilter Volker. Fourth 
 
 Edition. Leipzig, 1871. Vol. III. Freiheit und Konigthum. 
 
 Fourth Edition. Leipzig, 1871. 
 
 Zehn Jahre Deutscher Kampfe. 2 vols. Third Edition. Berlin, 1897. 
 Deutsche Geschichte im Neunzehnten Jahrhundert von Heinrich von 
 
 Treitschke. Vol. I. Seventh Edition. Leipzig, 1904. Vol. II. 
 
 Fifth Edition. Leipzig, 1897. Vol. III. Fifth Edition. Leipzig. 
 
 1903. Vol. IV. Fourth Edition. Leipzig, 1897. Vol. V. Fourth 
 
 Edition. Leipzig, 1899. 
 Politik : Vorlesungen von Heinrich von Treitschke. Herausgegeben von 
 
 Max Cornicelius. 2 vols. Second Edition. Leipzig, 1899-1900.
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 EARLY LIFE, 1834-1857 
 
 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE was born at Dresden on Septem- 
 ber 15, 1834. His father was a distinguished Saxon officer, 
 of Czech descent, who had first seen military service in the 
 War of Liberation against Napoleon ; his maternal grand- 
 father had fought under George Washington in the American 
 War of Independence. ( Such family traditions help us 
 to understand the enthusiasm with which Heinrich von 
 Treitschke writes of war, as the mother of States, the 
 noblest activity of the citizen, the school of the deepest and 
 truest patriotism./ The Slavonic strain in his blood is also 
 worth remembering ; it may afford an explanation of the 
 fiery temperament which made him a political crusader from 
 his school-days upwards. Otherwise his antecedents and 
 his early upbringing had no very obvious influence upon 
 the formation of his mind. In after years he wrote to a 
 fellow-historian : 
 
 " I was brought up in the atmosphere of the Court of 
 Dresden, in circles whose one political idea was hatred of 
 Prussia. If therefore I think highly of Prussia, this con- 
 viction is at least the fruit of independent study." 1 
 
 His father was a typical Saxon in politics and character ; 
 by no means uncultivated, for he had read widely in the 
 literature of several European languages, and had written 
 
 1 Briefe, ii. No. 428. 
 
 i B
 
 2 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 sedulously, if indifferently, both in prose and verse ; but 
 full of an old-fashioned loyalty to the Saxon royal house, 
 which prevented him from sympathising with any proposal 
 to establish a national constitution at the expense of the 
 ruling dynasties. He encouraged his son in literary pur- 
 suits, but on political and religious questions they drifted 
 so far apart that General von Treitschke once spoke of his 
 son's opinions as the second sore trial of his old age. The 
 General was a staunch Protestant, while his son parted 
 company with all dogma before he had finished his university 
 career. In a sense Heinrich von Treitschke was always 
 a Protestant. He believed in the rights of the individual 
 conscience ; and he said that Kant's Categorical Imperative 
 pleased him more than any form of Utilitarianism, not 
 because it was more capable of proof, but because it gave 
 him a greater sense of repose.-l He was also a sworn foe to 
 Roman Catholicism, both as a moral and as a political force.) 
 But neither those convictions nor this antipathy sufficed to 
 make him orthodox in his father's sight. With his mother 
 he had more in common. She was impatient of Klein- 
 staaterei, and showed some appreciation of the political 
 opinions in which her son grew only the more obstinate 
 under the stress of his father's criticism. 
 
 Almost from childhood the future historian was keenly 
 interested in the political questions which filled the minds 
 of his most inspiring teachers. His school-days were spent 
 at Dresden in a critical period of Saxon and of German 
 history. At the age of fourteen he was the spectator of an 
 abortive revolution which was signalised by some hard 
 fighting in the Dresden streets. One of the masters of his 
 gymnasium became a revolutionary leader ; and the young 
 Treitschke was in sympathy a Liberal. He expresses his 
 disgust at the refusal of King Frederick Augustus to accept 
 the Frankfort Constitution and this at a time when his 
 father was in command of royal troops. The Rector of the 
 gymnasium did his best to divert his pupils from political 
 controversies ; but they nevertheless found their way into
 
 EARLY LIFE 3 
 
 the curriculum. We hear of an oration, delivered at a 
 school prize-giving, in which Treitschke vindicated the 
 services of Prussia to the cause of German unity. At 
 Dresden he acquired a sound acquaintance with the classical 
 languages, and a taste for Greek literature, which never 
 wholly deserted him. In after years he used to inveigh 
 against the modern craze for cramming boys with mis- 
 cellaneous information, until they became " two-legged 
 encyclopaedias." The old humanistic course, he said, had 
 produced not only more exact habits of thought, but also 
 a wider range of intellectual interests than he found among 
 the auditors of his Berlin lectures. Still, when at the age of 
 sixteen, he entered upon his university course, he turned 
 his attention from the classics to the study of political 
 economy, political science, and history, not so much from 
 any definite views concerning his future career as from a 
 desire to form his judgment on political questions. 
 
 After the fashion of the time he roamed from one uni- 
 versity to another, in search of teachers who could best 
 satisfy the needs of the moment or of a library which con- 
 tained the necessary literature. Bonn pleased him best. 
 Here in 1851 he fell under the influence of Dahlmann, 
 eminent as a historian, but still more remarkable as a political 
 theorist, who was in a sense the founder of the Prussian School 
 of history ; an advocate of constitutional monarchy who 
 hoped for the union of Germany under a liberal constitution 
 and the leadership of Prussia. Next, at Leipzig in 1852, 
 Treitschke sat under the famous economist Roscher, and 
 listened to the course of lectures which was afterwards 
 published under the title Die Grundlagen von National- 
 okonomie. Though Treitschke never displayed any great 
 enthusiasm for political economy, he was impressed by 
 Roscher's leading thoughts. He welcomed the revolt against 
 the abstractions and deductive reasoning of Ricardo. He 
 realised the national importance of the economic revival 
 which Germany had witnessed after the establishment of 
 the Zollverein, seeing in it, besides the hope of national
 
 4 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 wealth, a school of practical capacity and of the virtues 
 which make self-government both possible and useful. We 
 recognise the influence of Roscher when the young student 
 exults, in 1854, that Prussia has obtained a harbour on the 
 North : " Yet another attempt to remove the old humilia- 
 tion which has for so long made the first seafaring nation 
 of the world a stranger to the sea." 1 
 
 For a time, indeed, the ideas of these great teachers lay 
 undeveloped in his mind. Some years elapsed before he 
 found out the line of study best suited to his aptitudes and 
 interests. He dabbled in the theory of aesthetics, he was 
 tempted towards journalism, he had serious thoughts of 
 devoting himself to poetry. But his political views were 
 forming themselves more rapidly and decidedly than he was 
 himself aware. It is significant that his first volume of 
 poetry, V aterlandische Gedichte (1856), was inspired by his 
 discontent with the state of German politics, and was in- 
 tended to show that Germany still suffered from the same 
 evils as in the Middle Ages. " There are many bitter words 
 in this little book ; they only express the sensations which 
 every thinking man has experienced in the last few years." 2 
 In the last resort his poetry was inspired by political con- 
 victions, and by a wide, though unsystematic course of 
 historical reading. He discovered his true vocation when 
 he began, as a young doctor, to give occasional courses of 
 lectures. It was easy for him to express his views with 
 method and with vigour in a spoken discourse. He also 
 realised, as many other teachers have realised, that his own 
 studies were helped by personal contact with an audience, 
 that his mind worked more freely and his conclusions 
 shaped themselves more clearly when he was lecturing. 
 This experience, and financial considerations which he could 
 not disregard, turned the scale against poetry and in favour 
 of an academic career. He settled down, though not with- 
 out a struggle, to the systematic study of political science. 
 Thus in 1855 and 1856 we find him busy with the Politics 
 
 1 Briefe, i. No. 97. z Ibid. No. 147.
 
 EARLY LIFE 5 
 
 of Aristotle and the Prince of Machiavelli. Any reader of 
 his lectures upon Politik will recognise the extent of his debt 
 to these two books. One is led to suspect that these lectures, 
 in their original form, must have followed rather closely the 
 headings of the Politics. However this may be, the course, 
 as we have it, is based upon the leading ideas of Aristotle 
 and Machiavelli. 'Treitschke was delighted with the Greek 
 conception of the State as an end in itself, as an ideal com- 
 munity for which the individual is bound to sacrifice his 
 private interests and desires, as the cradle of all morality and 
 all civilisation.) He sympathised with the lofty idealism of 
 the antique world, with its contempt for mere economic 
 development and for the mechanical existence of men ab- 
 sorbed in the pursuit of wealth. 1 Machiavelli he accepted 
 with more reserve ; but he finally came to the conclusion 
 that here he had found a thinker who was, like Goethe, born 
 to be the " physician of an iron age." Of Machiavelli he 
 wrote to a friend : 
 
 "fee is indeed a practical statesman, more fitted than 
 any other to destroy the illusion that one can reform the 
 world with cannon loaded only with ideas of Right and 
 Truth.) But even the political science of this much-decried 
 champion of brute force seems to me moral by comparison 
 with the Prussia of to-day. Machiavelli sacrifices Right 
 and Virtue to a great idea, the might and unity of his 
 people ; this one cannot say of the party which now rules in 
 Prussia. (This underlying thought of the book, its glowing 
 patriotism, and the conviction that the most oppressive 
 despotism must be welcome if it ensures might and unity for 
 his mother country-J-these are the ideas which have recon- 
 ciled men to the numerous reprehensible and lawless theories 
 of the great Florentine." 2 
 
 ( Discontent with the political state of Germany was 
 driving him to accept one-half of Machiavelli's teaching, to 
 
 1 Briefe, i. No. 136. 2 Ibid., No. 146.
 
 6 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 believe that whatever else the State may be or may aim at, 
 it must be armed with irresistible force to shatter opposition 
 and to cow the mutinous] On the other hand, he owed to 
 Aristotle a profounder understanding of the nature of the 
 State than Machiavelli ever reached. I For Treitschke the 
 State had the right to be omnipotent over the individual 
 because the individual could never develop or live a worthy 
 life without the State's protection and guidance ; because 
 the State was the supreme moralising and humanising agency 
 in human life. On these grounds he held that the first duty 
 of the statesman was to consider what things the State in its 
 own interest ought to do ; the second duty was to consider 
 the means by which these things could be done. The moral 
 law, commonly so called, was only a law for the individual 
 citizens of the State. For the State no moral law existed 
 but that of maintaining its existence and developing its 
 potentialities} So Treitschke passed from Aristotle and 
 Machiavelli to the study of Realpolltik, of which he found a 
 congenial exposition in Rochau's Grundzuge der Realpolitik, 
 an essay which he found in the Heidelberg library ; no author 
 he said, destroyed preconceptions and illusions with more 
 trenchant logic. 1 
 
 The cult of the State was less fashionable then in German 
 universities than it has since become. Many German 
 teachers were turning their attention from politics, the 
 science of the State, to sociology, the new science of society 
 in its non-political aspects. The assumption of the sociolo- 
 gists was that economic relations, scientific progress, and 
 intellectual movements do more to mould the individual 
 than can ever be done by state-authority. A society is a 
 living organism ; the State is a mechanical structure which 
 exists to protect society. Society has unbounded claims 
 upon the allegiance of the individual ; but the State is only 
 
 1 Briefe, No. 152. A. L. von Rochau (1810-1873) published his Real- 
 politik in 1853. The main idea of the book was Der Staat ist Macht. It 
 contained a prophecy that Germany would only be united by force, by one 
 state which was capable of coercing the rest. Treitschke gives an account 
 of Rochau in Aufsdtze, vol. iv. pp. 189-196.
 
 EARLY LIFE 7 
 
 needed for definite and circumscribed objects, and has only 
 to be obeyed in so far as the interests of society demand such 
 obedience, j Against this doctrine Treitschke hurled himself 
 with characteristic vehemence. He attacked it in a disser- 
 tation which he presented to the University of Leipzig in 
 1857. The main idea of his essay was already in the air ; 
 he discovered, when he had nearly completed the work, that 
 it had been anticipated by Ihering in his Geist des romischen 
 Rechts. But, as it became the inspiration of all Treitschke's 
 later work as a historian and a publicist, it deserves to be 
 stated here. ( As Roscher had argued that every State must 
 have its own system of political economy, so Ihering and 
 Treitschke argued that every nation must have its own 
 peculiar form of State. A State is the product of the legal 
 and moral ideas and of the economic conditions of a people. 
 In other words, it is produced by what Treitschke's opponents 
 called sociological conditions. A society generates a State, 
 and the two things remain inseparable. Neither can be 
 studied in isolation from the other ; neither should be ex- 
 alted at the expense of the other. Further, no form of State 
 is either good or bad in itself. There is no such thing as 
 an ideally best State. A constitution is to be judged with 
 reference to the social conditions of the people who have 
 made it and who live under it. 1 ] 
 
 The immediate result of this essay was that Treitschke 
 obtained the right to lecture in Leipzig. A more important 
 consequence, and the logical corollary of his theory of the 
 State was that he began to study modern history, and 
 especially German constitutional history. His lectures on 
 German history attracted great attention ; and within a 
 short time he began the studies upon which his greatest 
 historical work was to be founded. His first intention was 
 to write a history, which should also be an indictment, of the 
 German Bund ; and he did not propose to go beyond the 
 printed sources for his facts. But the work grew on his 
 hands. As his outfit of historical scholarship increased he 
 
 1 Briefe, i. No. 193.
 
 8 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 realised that an adequate treatment, even of constitutional 
 history, would only be possible when the archives of the 
 principal German states had been examined ; and his 
 researches only confirmed his theoretical conclusion that a 
 constitution, however academic and futile it may seem, 
 cannot be judged in isolation from other aspects of national 
 life :- 
 
 " The kernel of the subject is not to be found in the 
 Congresses and the negotiations of Estates, but in the truly 
 marvellous development of public opinion, or of the soul of 
 the people or whatever else you like to call it." 1 
 
 ' But for a long time his preliminary studies were diversi- 
 fied with other occupations. He was fiercely interested in 
 politics, especially in Prussian politics ; for he was every 
 day more convinced that national salvation depended on the 
 growth of a Greater Prussia.) He became a prolific publicist ; 
 he wrote literary and historical essays on the most various 
 subjects ; and, if he had died before 1879, he would have left 
 behind him neither a great history nor a systematic treatise 
 on politics. There was, however, more method in his multi- 
 farious activities than appeared upon the surface. His 
 literary and historical essays were studies preliminary to the 
 Deutsche Geschichte ; his political essays were similarly useful 
 as material for the Politik ; and there was always a close 
 connexion between his historical studies and the progress of 
 his political ideas. His essay on the United Netherlands 
 was suggested by his interest in federal forms of government 
 that on Bonapartism by his desire to prove the superior- 
 ity of constitutional monarchy to the most enlightened 
 Caesarism. 
 
 1 Briefe, ii. No. 332.
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 " DIE FREIHEIT," l86l 
 
 WE are chiefly concerned with the political essays ; and of 
 these Die Freiheit is the first which claims attention. It was 
 written in 1861, at an early stage of Treitschke's political 
 evolution, and it shows us a Treitschke in some respects very 
 unlike the Treitschke of the later and maturer Politik. Die 
 Freiheit is a review of Mill's Essay on Liberty, a review which 
 attacks the fundamental assumptions of Utilitarianism, 
 which puts the case for a strong State, and for a State that 
 is more than the means of realising individual happiness. 
 This we should naturally expect. But when Treitschke 
 passes from negation to affirmation, it is surprising how 
 much of humanism and of Liberalism he has retained in his 
 revolt from the lines of thought then fashionable in the 
 smaller German States. 
 
 " How lifeless, how sterile are the supporters of absolut- 
 ism in their opposition to the demands of the nations for 
 liberty ! It is not a case of two mighty streams of thought 
 rushing in mighty billows one against the other, until out 
 of the whirlpool a single new stream emerges to flow 
 along a middle course. No ! there is one stream which 
 surges against a rigid dam, making for itself a way 
 through thousands of fissures. Everything new which the 
 nineteenth century has created is the work of Liberalism. 
 The enemies of liberty can only persist in negation, or 
 waken to the semblance of new life the ideas of days 
 which have long since been submerged. On the tribunes 
 
 9
 
 to HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 of our Chambers, through a free press which they owe to 
 the Liberals, with catchwords which they have picked up 
 from their opponents, they champion principles which, if 
 carried into execution, would destroy all freedom of the 
 press and all parliamentary life." 
 
 No doubt, to a German writing in the year 1861, political 
 Liberalism meant first and foremost the idea of a united 
 Germany for which German Liberals had contended in 1848. 
 ^And already, hi Treitschke's mind, the national State was 
 enthroned as the idol of his dreams.) But the Liberals had 
 proved themselves singularly incapable of establishing a 
 national German State. When Treitschke desires to illus- 
 trate the victory of Liberal principles, he selects one of the 
 propositions laid down in the American Declaration of 
 Independence : " The just powers of government are derived 
 from the consent of the governed." When he wishes to 
 define liberty in the political sense, he contends that it means 
 " ruling and being ruled at the same time." The State of 
 his dreams is therefore to be so organised as to satisfy 
 Liberal aspirations. Its claim upon the loyalty of the 
 citizens is to be absolute because its government is their 
 government. Only he contends and here he differs from 
 the extreme German Liberals that such freedom may be 
 realised under a monarchy no less than under a republic. 
 Thoroughly Liberal again is the prophecy that a free and 
 great German State will come into existence as a natural 
 development from the internal freedom of trade which the 
 Zollverein had secured. This prophecy deserves quotation 
 if only to show how radically, in the next few years, Treit- 
 schke revised his estimate of the ways and means most 
 calculated to produce German unity. The nation, he sug- 
 gests, must be left, as far as possible, to work out its own 
 destiny. Even if a popular government should by some 
 miracle be called into existence, it ought to leave the free 
 forces of society to take their natural course and produce their 
 appointed fruit :
 
 " DIE FREIHEIT " n 
 
 '\Yet a State, ruled by a Government elected by a 
 majority of the people, with a Parliament, with inde- 
 pendent laws, with self-governing departments and muni- 
 cipalities, is for all that not yet free.) It must set a limit 
 to its activity, it must recognise that there are private 
 possessions, so high and inviolable that the State can never 
 subject them to itself. / The fundamental laws of modern 
 constitutions should not be ridiculed too lightly. In the 
 midst of their phrases and their foolishness they do contain 
 the Magna Charta of individual freedom, which the modern 
 world will never again surrender. Freedom of belief and 
 of knowledge, of trade and of traffic, is the battle-cry of 
 the time. It is in this sphere that the achievements of 
 the age have been greatest ; this notion of social freedom 
 constitutes for the great majority of men the summary of 
 all their political ambitions. It may be asserted that, when- 
 ever the State has made up its mind to allow any branch 
 of social activity to develop itself without restriction, this 
 toleration has been richly rewarded, and all the prophecies 
 of nervous pessimists have been proved false. We have 
 become another people since we have been drawn into the 
 world of daring and aspiration of a universal commerce. 
 Two centuries ago Ludwig Vincke, in the capacity of a care- 
 ful president, explained to his Westphalians how it was 
 possible to construct a highway by means of a share- 
 holding company, in accordance with the English fashion. 
 ^To-day a close net of independent companies of every kind 
 is spread over the whole of Germany ; at any rate, through 
 their traders, the German people will share in the noble 
 destiny of our race, that they shall enrich the whole 
 earthy And even at the present day it is no empty dream, 
 that out of this world-commerce there will be evolved 
 at some future date a political science, in whose world- 
 embracing vision all the activities of the great powers 
 of the present day will appear like the miserably insigni- 
 ficant operations of small States. So immeasurably rich 
 and various is the nature of freedom. Therein lies the
 
 12 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 consoling certainty that at no age is it impossible for the 
 triumph of freedom to be effected. (For though from time 
 to time a government may succeed in undermining the 
 partnership of the people in its legislation, only the 
 more ardently will the passion for liberty of the modern 
 man apply itself to domestic or intellectual productive- 
 ness, and success in the one sphere will be followed up 
 sooner or later by success in the other. Let us leave to 
 boys and to those nations who always remain children 
 that passionate and impetuous pursuit of freedom, as of 
 a phantom which melts away in the hands of its pursuers. 
 A fully developed nation loves liberty as its lawful wife : 
 she lives and works among us, and delights us every day 
 with fresh charms." *f 
 
 Another Liberal trait of the essay, and a trait which sur- 
 vived in Treitschke's mind when most of his Liberalism had 
 disappeared, is the faith in the virtues of free thought and 
 free discussion. It is characteristic that this faith had in it 
 nothing of the fatalism so common among the Liberals of the 
 sixties, which supposed that truth could be left to fight her 
 own battles, that falsehood, however strongly intrenched, 
 would always be routed by the native power of a right idea : 
 
 " Is it true, then, that free investigation has ever power- 
 fully disturbed the tranquillity of society ? No, whenever 
 men have torn each other to pieces for the sake of opinions 
 it has been a case of minds long the victims of oppression 
 breaking off the ancient yoke with passionate ferocity. Let 
 us not cradle ourselves in the false security of the theory so 
 constantly reiterated that a supreme power dwells in Truth 
 which will always ensure victory in spite of all persecu- 
 tion. This is, stated in such general terms, a dangerous 
 error. To be sure, Socrates, Huss, Hutten, and the other 
 great martyrs were not in error when they proclaimed with 
 their last breath the immortality of truth. For a wonderful 
 
 1 Aufsdtze, iii. pp. 12-13.
 
 " DIE FREIHEIT " 13 
 
 elevation of spirit may be attained, from which it is vouch- 
 safed to mortals to gaze with a smile on their lips beyond 
 the limits of time. Certainly, a truth, which to-day for the 
 first time thrills a lonely and despised thinker in his closet 
 with a holy joy, will somewhere and at some time be 
 preached from the house-tops, even though he carry it un- 
 uttered to his grave. To deny this is to question the divine 
 nature of humanity. But we who are living at the present~\ 
 time must earnestly probe the true signification of that 
 ambiguous assertion that every people does actually in the / 
 end satisfy its spiritual and material needs. This really 
 means no more than to say : of the imperishable human 
 possessions Freedom, Truth, Beauty, Love, each nation 
 acquires just so much as it can obtain and preserve by its 
 own strength. For whole centuries whole nations came and 
 went, who discovered great and fruitful truths, but they 
 were not able to preserve them through the hard struggle 
 with the powers of indolence and lying. Have we not still 
 among us that House of Hapsburg whose whole history is a 
 never-to-be-forgotten record of the power which a crude 
 despotism may have to establish a lordship over the spirit ? 
 Therefore we must watch and struggle to the end that 
 Truth, which is only imperishable for the whole of humanity, 
 may win recognition and freedom here and now in this span 
 of time and among this handful of men which we call our 
 own." l 
 
 Die Freiheit, in fact, although it is inspired with a poet's 
 enthusiasm for the humanest of political ideals, is also a 
 battle-cry. In the first lines of the essay the author declares 
 war upon the cosmopolitanism, the Weltburger-Sinn, on which 
 the cultivated Germans of the smaller States were inclined 
 to pride themselves. (.The hope of the future, Treitschke 
 holds, must be looked for in the national State based upon 
 an intense pride of nationality and scrupulous reverence for 
 all national idiosyncrasies :4- 
 
 1 Aufs&tze, iii. p. 31.
 
 I 4 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 " When will they ever become extinct, those anxious 
 souls, who feel an obligation to aggravate life's burden 
 by troubles born of their imagination, to whom every 
 progress of the human soul is only one more sign of the 
 decay of our race and of the approach of the day of 
 judgment ? The great majority at the present day are 
 beginning God be thanked !-t-to feel once again a firm 
 and strenuous belief in themselves i (but we are still all 
 too weak, at any rate if we are to judge by the gloomy 
 , forebodings of those pessimistic souls. The notion that a 
 universally -extended culture will finally displace national 
 customs by customs for all mankind, and turn the world 
 into a cosmopolitan primitive hash has become a common- 
 
 ce./ Yet the same law holds good with nations as with 
 individuals that their differences appear less in child- 
 hood than in riper years. ^.If a nation has the power 
 to preserve itself and its nationality through the merciless 
 race-struggle of history, then every progress in civilisa- 
 tion will only develop more strikingly its deeper national 
 peculiarities. } We Germans acquiesce in Paris fashions ; 
 we are bound to neighbouring nations by a thousand in- 
 terests ; yet our feelings and ideas are undoubtedly at 
 the present day more independent of the intellectual 
 world of the French and the British than they were seven 
 hundred years ago, when the peasant all over Europe lived 
 in the bondage of primitive custom, when the priest- 
 hood in all countries drew its knowledge from the same 
 source, and the nobility of Latin civilisation shaped for 
 itself beneath the walls of Jerusalem a new code of honour 
 and of morals. (_ Moreover, the active exchange of ideas be- 
 tween the nations of which the present day justly boasts 
 has never been a mere give and take." 
 
 Here, he admits, he reaches controversial ground. But 
 it is the controversial conclusion which he most desires to 
 drive home. j^If Liberalism stands for the free Government 
 
 1 Aufsatze, iii. p. i.
 
 " DIE FREIHEIT " 15 
 
 of a free people, and for the development of all the latent 
 capabilities in the people, then the ultimate consequence 
 of Liberalism is to foster nationalism^) And this is what he 
 desires that Liberalism should work for. Nationalism is 
 the final and the crowning stage of political evolution : j 
 
 '(jf the moral conscience of the nation does really 
 form the just and ultimate groundwork of the State ; 
 if the nation is really governed in accordance with its 
 own will and with a view to its own happiness, then there 
 arises automatically the desire for a nationally exclusive 
 State. For where the living and indubitable consciousness 
 of unity pervades all the members of the State, there and 
 there only is the State what its nature requires that it should 
 be, a nation possessing organic unity. JfHence the impulse 
 to amputate alien elements of the population, and hence the 
 instinct of divided nations to break up the smaller of their 
 two ' mother countries.' | It is not our intention to describe 
 the numerous limitations and qualifications to which this 
 political liberty must of necessity be subject. Enough that 
 there does exist everywhere the demand for the government 
 of nations in accordance with the national will. The de- 
 mand is now raised more generally and more uniformly than 
 at any previous time in history. (^ That it will ultimately 
 be satisfied is as certain as that the being of a nation is 
 more permanent, more justified, and more robust than the 
 lives of the rulers who are its enemies." x ) 
 
 There is indeed a wide gulf fixed between Treitschke in his 
 most Liberal mood and such a Liberal as Mill, or as Wilhelm 
 von Humboldt, from whom Mill derived the idealism with 
 which he adorned and dignified the individualism of Jeremy 
 Bentham. The difference becomes most apparent when 
 Treitschke seems to be following most closely in Mill's foot- 
 steps. Nothing in Mill's Essay on Liberty appealed so 
 forcibly to Treitschke as the statement that popular govern- 
 
 1 Aufsatze, iii. pp. 8-9.
 
 i6 
 
 ment may coexist with social intolerance, that the spiritual 
 despotism of the majority may be more deadening than the 
 rule of a Louis XIV. or a Napoleon. \~But Treitschke takes 
 the opportunity to introduce, as a foil to his picture of 
 German middle-class mediocrity, his conception of the men 
 who are needed to act as the spiritual saviours of society. J 
 Mill, one may say without much injustice, had put in a plea 
 for the faddist ; Treitschke asks liberty for the political 
 fanatic : 
 
 '{All highly-developed morality is based on a genuine 
 self-knowledge, but just as we find stunted bodies, so do 
 we find souls in which one organ or another is entirely 
 absent.) ^Let us be grateful to every man who can humbly 
 admit this, to all those strong one-sided natures, who 
 willingly sacrifice breadth of culture for a thousandfold 
 gain in strength and depth. These men ask imperiously 
 for either hate or love. Though their understanding be 
 finally closed against many of the great blessings of 
 humanity, their character is none the less harmonious, for 
 it shows an exquisite adjustment between strength and 
 ambition.) How high they tower above those detestable 
 mediocrities, who are becoming so terribly numerous at the 
 present day, men who will offer you now a remark about 
 the Sistine Madonna, now an opinion on Bonapartism, 
 now an observation on the steam-engine seldom anything 
 absolutely stupid, but even more seldom anything shrewd, 
 and absolutely never one of those strong original sayings 
 at which the friend of humanity laughs in his heart, and 
 the hearer exclaims in silent exultation : ' That was the 
 man himself. None but he could have said it just so.' The 
 present age boasts and with justice that never before 
 have culture and well-being been distributed over such a 
 large proportion of humanity. L On the other hand, we find 
 in the society of the present day a strong impulse to tolerate 
 nothing which surpasses a certain standard certainly a 
 liberal standard of thought and sentiment, ]and of the
 
 " DIE FREIHEIT " 17 
 
 great teaching of Humboldt to preserve only the husk the 
 many-sidedness of culture, but not the kernel of his teaching 
 namely the individuality of culture and of talent. ( If 
 there was once a time when the unrestricted freedom of will 
 and of action of individuals endangered the existence of 
 society, and a later age offered the gay and animated 
 spectacle of varied class-customs, the danger at the present 
 day on the contrary is that, by a slow irresistible pressure, 
 the customs and notions of one particular class of society will 
 suffocate all individual and personal inclinations and ideas." y 
 
 Still, when all deductions have been made, this peculiar 
 Liberalism of Treitschke has undeniable nobility. ^ He desires 
 a strong government for Germany, but a government which is 
 based on popular consent, and in which the ordinary elector 
 has the opportunity to play an active and even an important 
 part. In later years he was accustomed to argue that, at the 
 best, the average citizen could only exercise a negligible 
 influence, and to argue that every government is free if it 
 rules under rational laws which the people approve and obey 
 of their own accord. ) At the age of twenty-seven he was 
 more sanguine. He hoped for a German State in which not 
 only would local government be left in the hands of officials 
 elected by popular suffrage, but the central executive also 
 would be brought under popular control by an efficient 
 parliamentary system. There must, he said, be self- 
 government in every branch of the administration from the 
 highest to the lowest. (Not until he became a professor 
 of Berlin did he throw overboard this early constitution- 
 alism and argue that even the subjects of the Great Elector 
 had been free in the truest sense of the word ; that a vote 
 means nothing, and that local self-government must become 
 government by a local aristocracy. \ It is cheering to believe 
 that his earlier ideal has still some advocates in Germany ; 
 that Die Freiheit is still read and admired by those who 
 have before them the maturer, less amiable doctrine of the 
 
 1 Aufsatze, iii. pp. 33-4.
 
 i8 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 Politik. (Die Freiheit preaches the gospel of the State ; but 
 of such a State as we can gladly serve and reverence :-v- 
 
 " Though we continue at the present day to quote 
 cheerfully the words of Humboldt with reference to the 
 all-round development of the human being as a cultivated 
 and energetic individuality, we must realise that the old 
 doctrine has another significance at the present day. For 
 this age is a new age ; it does not exist merely on the 
 wisdom of the ancients. That inward freedom which 
 turned away without either joy or sorrow from the 
 necessary evil of an unemancipated State no longer suffices 
 us. (We want to have free men in a free State. But the 
 liberty of the individual which we have in view can only 
 flourish under the protection of political liberty ; and 
 the all-round cultivation of the individual for which we 
 are striving is only really possible when the spontaneous 
 performance of various civic duties enlarges and ennobles 
 the human mind. Thus every consideration of moral 
 questions brings us into the province of the State] Ever 
 since the lamentable condition of this country has con- 
 trasted so ludicrously with the advanced ideas of its 
 inhabitants, ever since noble hearts have been seen to 
 break under the intolerable burden of the people's suffer- 
 ing, something of the patriotism of the ancients has 
 entered into the hearts of the best of the German people. 
 (The thought of the Fatherland brings us warning and 
 guidance in the midst of our most private affairs. If there 
 is any thought at the present day which can admonish 
 a true German to moral courage more powerfully than 
 the sense of an obligation common to all humanity, it is 
 this thought : Whatever you can do to become more 
 pure and manly and free is done for your nation." * \ 
 
 * Aufs&tze, iii. pp. 41-2.
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 TREITSCHKE AND BISMARCK (l86l-l866) 
 
 FROM the moment when Treitschke began to lecture at 
 Leipzig, his popularity as an academic teacher was assured. 
 He devoted himself to the exposition of recent German 
 history, and worked unremittingly to make good his defects 
 of equipment. Until 1861 his best work was given to his 
 Leipzig courses. Of these he writes to Max Duncker (Febru- 
 ary 24, 1861) : 
 
 " I have been able to do absolutely no work for myself. 
 My lectures have, in fact, become fashionable. I have 
 an audience of more than two hundred, and you will 
 realise that this has compelled me to raise my own de- 
 mands for my eloquence. The question of remuneration 
 has not been neglected. The Minister and the President 
 have not judged it unbecoming to appeal to me on my 
 mortal side : that is to say, they have seriously alarmed 
 my father by murmured hints of the " Apostle of Prussia." 
 I shall probably not go back to Leipzig again. I can 
 work more freely and with less distraction from personal 
 concerns in any other place. But where ? As yet I have 
 no idea. Never was my future more obscure. To begin 
 with, I shall work at Munich ; and, if it is at all possible, 
 I shall not forget the Almanac." 1 
 
 In April 1861, having obtained leave of absence from 
 Leipzig, he settled down for some months at Munich to 
 
 1 Briefe, ii. No. 288. 
 19
 
 20 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 work systematically on a history of the German Confedera- 
 tion. The point of view from which that history would be 
 written was already clear to him. f When he made himself 
 at Leipzig the " Apostle of Prussia " he was already con- 
 vinced that the only hope for Germany lay in a complete 
 breach with the ideas which had animated the founders of 
 the Confederation.) He desired the overthrow of the Con- 
 federation and the establishment of a Prussian supremacy 
 over the smaller States. But he knew that it would be a 
 long and arduous business to convert public opinion outside 
 Prussia. And he was determined to serve as a missionary ; 
 to demonstrate from the history of the years 1815-48 
 the defects of the Confederation and the impossibility of 
 \uniting Germany in any real sense of the word by means of a 
 constitution so weak and so capable of being abused ;/ and 
 incidentally to prove that, however great might have been 
 the mistakes of Prussian policy in the last fifty years, Prussia 
 alone possessed the material resources and the traditions of 
 policy which were essential for the successful leadership 
 of a united Germany. ^The vindication of Prussia could be 
 best effected by bringing to the knowledge of the German 
 , public the elementary facts of Prussian history! in such 
 -^essays as Das deutsche Ordensland Preussen 1 which he wrote 
 ' in 1862. That essay, he said, was bound to be useful 
 because he lately discovered that, in a society of Saxon 
 professors, no one but himself had ever heard of Marienburg, 
 the capital from which the Teutonic knights had governed 
 Prussia. The indictment of ^he Confederation was, he knew, 
 a harder task ; though he characteristically imagined at the 
 commencement of the work that he would be able to finish 
 it in two or three years. On reaching Munich he sketched 
 his plan of work in a letter addressed to Ludwig Aegidi, a 
 friend of his student days : 
 
 " I intend (you need not let this go any further) to 
 write a history of the Confederation and of the small 
 
 1 Aufsdtze, ii. pp. 1-76.
 
 TREITSCHKE AND BISMARCK 21 
 
 states from 1815 to 1848 ; not of course a work based on 
 the study of original sources, which would be impossible, 
 but a conscientious and, above all, a thoroughly uncom- 
 prising presentation of the facts contained in scattered 
 narratives ; perhaps in the style of Rochau's French History, 
 but j better than that work, wherever possible. That is to 
 say, I propose to trace out particularly the changes in the 
 spirit of the nation, which at the present day, even in our 
 stubborn people, take place with such amazing rapidity. 
 I want the book to produce an effect. I want to show 
 palpably to the indifferent and the thoughtless in what 
 miserable triviality, and in what sinful dissipation, this great 
 people is wasting its most precious forces. Naturally, I 
 am prepared for the possibility that, at the end of three 
 years, by which time I hope to have mastered the enormous 
 mass of material, the book will have become superfluous, 
 and the German Confederation will have been gathered to 
 its fathers. I am not trying to investigate unfamiliar 
 sources, but if any such should happen to come under 
 your notice, I earnestly implore you to inform me of them. 
 Apart from this, I shall, in the course of the work, be 
 frequently obliged to come to you for advice. 
 
 ' You will ask how I came of my own accord to form 
 this scheme. I think that such a book as this is needed 
 by our people, who set such a high value on books. A 
 gloomy discontent is spreading at an alarming rate. 
 Gradually we shall find ourselves in the right mood to think 
 better of ourselves and of our recent shame. I should 
 like to help this on as much as I can, because most 
 historians recoil affrighted from the repulsive task. The 
 jurists, to be sure, understand a portion of the matter 
 better than I, but not the whole." 1 
 
 The work grew on his hands, and he was sometimes 
 appalled at the mass of literature with which he had to deal. 
 When he returned to Leipzig from Munich (January 1862) 
 
 1 Briefe, ii. No. 294.
 
 22 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 he had only made a beginning. Henceforth the Bund was 
 the main subject of his lectures ; and in the intervals of 
 lecturing and political controversy he continued his re- 
 searches. That in academic eyes he was still rather a pub- 
 licist than a historian is shown by the invitation, which he 
 received in 1863 from the University of Freiburg, to become 
 a Professor of Political Science and Public Finance. The 
 authorities at Freiburg needed a man who would equip 
 embryo administrators with an outfit of general ideas. 
 After some hesitation he accepted the offer : 
 
 " My sphere of action is wider here than in F[reiburg]. 
 My material situation would there be seriously changed for 
 the worse. Finally, I lecture here on historical subjects, 
 which harmonise with my inclination and with my own 
 educational development ; while there I should be en- 
 gaged in occupations much more remote from my own 
 interests. In spite of this, I have, in the meantime, 
 declared myself ready to undertake it ; for, when it is a 
 case of a first post, one must not be too exacting, and 
 it would be a great joy to me to live at last under a decent 
 administration. Had they simply required a professor 
 of public finance, I should immediately have declined 
 the post, as my knowledge of political science is entirely 
 historical and political. Instead of this, they have made 
 me an offer, which seems to me not quite clear and 
 in fact contradictory. They want particularly not to 
 have a technical expert, but a political scientist, who 
 shall instruct future officials of finance concerning the 
 political and social significance of the chief branches of 
 their calling, and also cover in lectures a wide ground in 
 political science, the history of political theories, and so forth. 
 For the last task, I think I do possess the qualifications ; 
 for public finance itself my inclination and my preparation 
 are far less. But I know of no teacher who could fill both 
 these widely different requirements." 1 
 
 1 Bricfe, ii. No. 369.
 
 The years spent at Freiburg (1863-6) were by no means 
 wasted. Treitschke found his duties as a teacher of political 
 science thoroughly congenial ; and he now laid the founda- 
 tions of the famous course on Politik which he was after- 
 wards to deliver at Berlin. As a publicist he achieved the 
 height of his reputation by his lengthy attack on the gospel 
 of Bonapartism which was in a form a review of the Life 
 of Julius Caesar by Napoleon III. and by the essay on^ 
 " Federalism and Centralisation " (Bundesstaat und Einheits- / 
 staat] which has been judged not only the finest of his"\ 
 political writings, but the most weighty utterance of all that \ 
 school of German publicists who fought the battle of German ..'^ 
 unity in the middle years of the nineteenth century. 
 
 This essay appeared in 1864. It was an invitation to / 
 Prussia to attack the smaller States and incorporate them 
 with herself. It is a more powerful production than Die 
 Freiheit, more closely reasoned, more obviously founded 
 upon historical study and practical experience. But it also 
 shows that Treitschke was travelling fast and far from that * 
 idealism of his student days which throws a golden haze 
 over the pages of Die Freiheit. We are not surprised that 
 old General von Treitschke should now begin to denounce 
 the " Jesuitical " morality of his son ; for the assumption of 
 Bundesstaat und Einheitsstaat is that, for the statesman, the 
 end j ustifies the means. It is more surprising that Treitschke 
 should be growing reconciled to Prussian methods of domestic 
 government which, at their best, were a long way from 
 corresponding to those of his ideal free State. 
 
 Perhaps the most interesting feature of his mental 
 development in these years was the alternation of fits of 
 revolt against the principles of Prussian Junkerdom with 
 other fits of conviction that, even though the Prussian idol 
 had feet of clay, there was no other possible centre of German 
 national unity. His feelings swayed in the one direction or 
 the other according as he was for the moment concerned 
 with the actual policy of Prussia, which he disliked, or with 
 her historical development, which he could not admire too
 
 24 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 highly. What he had thought of Prussian politics in the 
 years 1861-3 may be seen from the following utterances to 
 private friends : 
 
 '^1 realise that for Germany there is only one hope 
 of salvation, namely, a united and indivisible monarchy.) 
 Any suggestion of a federation of monarchies seems to me 
 a contradiction in terms ; any hope of a republic is folly, 
 as long as there is nothing which corresponds with these 
 ideas in the life of our nation. C Prussia, then, has no choice. 
 She must triumph with the help of the German people. 1 } And 
 for this very reason the crisis in Prussia must finally cul- 
 minate in a healthy ebullition. I hope the nation will do 
 its duty, and elect as democratic a Chamber as possible. 
 Then the course will be clear, as befits a valiant people. 
 But only try the effect of a Junker ministry or a coup d'etat : 
 it is no time for such madness. The situation is ripe for a 
 final decisive break with Junkerdom ; for it is Junkerdom 
 which is the Achilles' heel of the North, just as Ultra- 
 montanism is that of the South. The North German 
 nobility has not felt, as that of South Germany felt after the 
 collapse of the spiritual estates in 1803-6, the mighty 
 hand of a new great era ; it lives in a fashion which would 
 be intolerable to any moderately healthy nation. By a 
 bold step like this, Prussia will have covered half the distance 
 to the German crown. For the consciousness of our shame 
 is too universal, f Only one thing hinders the great majority 
 of the German people from saying frankly : ' We want to 
 be incorporated with Prussia ' ; and that is the consciousness 
 i that, in the questions of the nobility and (closely connected 
 \with it) of the military caste, Prussia is unfortunately even 
 lore abject than most of the German States.'*} 1 
 
 " To the question, How is Prussia ruled at the present 
 day ? I find in cold blood only one answer : On the side of 
 the ministers, with a frivolity which weighs a sworn oath as 
 lightly as a feather ; on the side of the king, with an infatua- 
 
 1 Briefe, ii. No. 295 (April 22, 1861).
 
 TREITSCHKE AND BISMARCK 25 
 
 tion which allows audacious sophists to declare black to be 
 white and beautiful to be ugly, an infatuation which reason- 
 able men can no longer consider sane or accountable. It is 
 horrible that the State, to which I am as devotedly attached 
 as yourself, should find itself in such a situation, but I am 
 convinced that it is so. And even if this judgment were 
 too severe, my opinion is that, after the constitution has 
 been shattered, those who are attached to it ought not to 
 speak of the well-meant intentions of the subverters of the 
 law of the land ; they ought to say nothing which would 
 tend to diminish the just, but unfortunately all too feeble 
 indignation of the country." J 
 
 On the other hand, his letters also contain passages in 
 which he expresses a supreme confidence in Prussia and even 
 admits that Bismarck, whom he regarded as, in domestic 
 government, the protagonist of the worst form of Junkerdom, 
 was at all events fighting the battles of Prussia and of 
 Germany against Austria and the forces, of particularism : 
 
 "It is actually a fact that every square foot of earth 
 which has been conquered for Germany during the last 
 200 years, has been conquered by Prussia. Believe me, 
 the history of such a State cannot end in despicable folly. 
 It will only really begin when all the envious nonentities 
 and amateur politicians surrounding those who have 
 always invariably been the sole promoters of our welfare 
 have been indiscriminately polished off. I have aged 
 rapidly during this winter, which has afforded such a 
 terrible revelation of the immaturity of our public 
 opinion. I am no longer so presumptuous in my hopes, 
 and I shall be happy if, in my grey old age, I see a 
 Prussian Germany ; but that a happier generation will 
 attain this end I do not for a moment doubt." 2 
 
 ^If I had to choose between such parties, I should 
 place myself on the side of Bismarck; for he fights for 
 
 1 Briefe, ii. No. 376 (July 17, 1863). * Ibid. No. 406 (May 19, 1864).
 
 26 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 the might of Prussia^ for our legitimate position on the 
 North Sea and on the Baltic. I would rather support 
 the Gerlach ministry than join myself with the traitors 
 to my country,' like Dr. Frehse, and help the enemies of 
 Prussia to hatch plots against our State. \I am not and 
 never shall be an admirer of Bismarck,^ although accord- 
 ing to Roggenbach's certainly not very flattering account 
 I have a greater respect for him and his Keudell than you 
 seem to have.) I look upon it as a duty to support his 
 foreign policy, f 'Some of the methods it employs are 
 detestable, but if it fails, we shall have a second Olmiitz, 
 the triumph of all the enemies of the Fatherland." 1 
 
 (\]p to the outbreak of war between Austria and Prussia the 
 attitude of Treitschke towards Bismarck's government was 
 still one of qualified respect. Treitschke could not forgive 
 Bismarck for his press laws or for his contempt of Prussian 
 parliamentary institutions.! On these points he remained 
 obdurate, though he approved enthusiastically of Bismarck's 
 conduct in the Schleswig-Holstein question, which to many 
 people then and since has seemed far less defensible, In 
 this matter (i.e. Schleswig-Holstein) positive law is irre- 
 concilable with the vital interests of our country. We must 
 \set aside positive law and compensate those who may be 
 injured in consequence. This view may be erroneous ; it 
 is not immoral. ] Every step in historical progress is thus 
 achieved . . (^positive law when injurious to the common 
 \ good must be swept away.'] 2 ? The upshot was that, in 
 public, he defended Bismarck as far as he could, but in 
 private refused any alliance which would make him morally-, 
 
 1 Briefe, ii. No. 474 (Oct. i, 1865). Ernst Ludwig von Gerlach was one 
 of the reactionary counsellors of Frederick William IV. of Prussia, and a 
 leader of the Kreuzzeitung party. Franz von Roggenbach was one of the 
 Liberal counsellors of the Grand Duke Frederick of Baden. Robert von 
 Keudell was a confidant of Bismarck. At the Conference of Olmiitz in 
 1850 Frederick William IV. had yielded to Austria in the question of the 
 Electorate of Hesse, thereby recognising Austria's pretensions to be re- 
 garded as the leading State in the German Confederation. 
 
 2 Briefe, ii. No. 459 (May 22, 1865).
 
 TREITSCHKE AND BISMARCK 27 
 
 an accomplice with Bismarck in the denial of constitutional 
 liberty to Prussia./ 
 
 " I subscribe," he writes in October 1865, " I subscribe 
 to all that Freytag says about the dishonesty of Prussian 
 policy. But when I look at the opposition party and see 
 there the Rheinbund intriguers of the courts of Dresden and 
 Munich and the conscienceless demagogues, who are corrupt- 
 ing an honest people at the bidding of the Augustenburg 
 claimant . . . then I understand that by comparison with 
 such enemies Bismarck is pursuing not only a clever, but 
 even a moral policy. (^He will do what we need, he will 
 advance another step towards the lofty goal of German 
 unity ; those who are men are bound to help him. To 
 misuse those great words Law and Self -Government has 
 always been the trick of knaves. Let them continue their 
 unconscionable and stupid vituperation. U The good cause 
 will triumplm: the heirs of Frederick the Great will reign 
 in Schleswigfcolstein ; and in a short time the nation will 
 be ashamed emits own stupidity.'*/ 1 
 
 Bismarck wl&not slow to appreciate the value of such a 
 supporter as the\ Author of Bundesstaat und Einheitsstaat. 
 An opportunity of showing goodwill to Treitschke occurred 
 in December 1865, when the latter wrote asking for per- 
 mission to use the Prussian archives in the preparation of 
 his history. Bismarck promptly replied in an autograph 
 letter, assenting to the request with an " unheard-of liber- 
 ality " which was profoundly gratifying to Treitschke. The 
 historian still expressed his intention to avoid any lasting 
 connexion with Bismarck ; and the intention was not 
 altered by a personal interview in which the statesman 
 evidently did his utmost to be conciliatory : 
 
 " Personally Bismarck has made a very favourable 
 impression on me ; politically, a much worse impression. 
 
 1 Brief e, ii. No. 476.
 
 28 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 He talked much of his plans for reforming the Confedera- 
 tion, till I could hardly contain myself for astonishment at 
 these fantastic follies. Muddled as he is, I do not on that 
 account despair about the Schleswig-Holstein business. 
 About the war 1 Bismarck spoke very moderately and 
 rationally ; he does not desire it, but thinks he can carry it 
 through, if need be, and quite realises that annexation is now 
 a point of honour for Prussia after all that has happened." 2 
 
 Had Treitschke been privileged to attend the Prussian 
 Council of War which met on February 28, 1866, nearly a 
 month before this interview, he would have been better 
 able to commend the views of Bismarck, who had then 
 cast his vote for war with Austria, not only as a means 
 of securing Schleswig-Holstein for Prussia, but with the 
 further intention of preparing by the war for a closer union 
 of the German States. As it was, Treitschke did not feel 
 sufficient faith in the success of Bismarck's German policy 
 to forgive all his sins against the Prussian constitution. 
 While he warned his Liberal friends that, for the sake of the 
 permanent interests of Germany, they ought to forget their 
 resentment against Bismarck, and support Prussia in the 
 coming war with Austria, he declined point-blank to take 
 service under Bismarck. LEarly in June, before the war broke 
 out, he was asked by Bismarck to place his pen at the service 
 of the Prussian government, and was offered as a reward 
 a professorship at Berlin./ Treitschke had already decided to 
 throw up his appointment at Freiburg, if, as seemed certain, 
 the Grand Duchy of Baden declared for Austria ; and, 
 since he was meditating matrimony, Bismarck's offer must 
 have offered no ordinary temptations. His refusal under 
 these circumstances is a convincing proof of his disinterested 
 integrity. He wrote to Bismarck on June 7, 1866 : 
 
 " The formal scruples which stand in the way of my 
 migration to Berlin are not insuperable. Were I indeed 
 
 1 With Austria. * Brief e, ii. No. 504 (March 25, 1866).
 
 TREITSCHKE AND BISMARCK 29 
 
 convinced that my presence at Berlin would be not 
 altogether unprofitable, I should hold myself bound to 
 give up my professorship, even in a somewhat tumultuary 
 fashion. It is another matter when the question is one of 
 principle. The course which the Royal government has 
 adopted up to the present has not induced me to hope 
 that I could offer it my services, and I have not yet been 
 able to feel any great confidence in the probable success 
 of the reform of the German Confederation. How the 
 situation presents itself to me, and whether my views are 
 at all in agreement with those of His Majesty's Govern- 
 ment, Your Excellency will best be able to gather from 
 an article in the Prussian Almanac which I send you 
 herewith. The aim of the essay was to win over a few 
 not yet incurably infatuated Liberals to a reconciliation 
 with the Government ; and therefore I had to speak indulg- 
 ently of the progressive party, and to conceal the limitless 
 contempt which I feel for the fanatics of this party. 
 Apart from this, the essay expresses my opinion exactly. 
 The absolute recognition of the right of the deputies to 
 control the Budget seems to me an indispensable neces- 
 sity. No art in the world will ever persuade a Prussian 
 Diet to renounce this right. 
 
 " Will Your Excellency permit me to point out that this 
 question of right and freedom may very possibly become 
 a vital question for Prussia ? The Berlin Cabinet will be 
 enlightened with regard to the worthless character of several 
 of the South German courts. What prevents these courts 
 from going over, with flags flying, to the Austrian camp, is 
 only the characteristic distaste of the small States for action, 
 and an uncertainty as to the disposition of the; people, 
 which just now is wavering between its hatred of Prussia 
 and its vague yearning towards Parliament. If it should 
 happen as I do not anticipate but as is not impossible 
 that the result of the first battle should be unfavourable 
 to us, and if then the conflict in Prussia has not yet been 
 adjusted, the malice of the small courts, as well as of the
 
 30 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 red radicals and of the Austrian party in the South, will 
 probably be more powerful than the opposing efforts of 
 well-meaning patriots, and the South will join itself with 
 Austria. 
 
 " It seems to me terrible, that the most distinguished 
 foreign minister whom Prussia has had for centuries, should 
 be at the same time the most hated man in Germany ; and 
 it seems to me even sadder that the finest schemes for the 
 reform of the Confederation that a Prussian Government 
 has ever put forward, should have been received by the 
 nation with such shameful indifference. But this fanaticism 
 in the outlook of the Liberal party does exist. It is a 
 power, and it has to be reckoned with. The restoration of 
 the right to control the Budget and the overwhelming force 
 of the war these are in my opinion the only means which 
 will bring misguided public opinion back to its senses. Even 
 after a victory for our arms, if the internal conflict has not 
 been settled, the unconquerable mistrust of the Liberals will 
 prepare the greatest difficulties in the way of the plans for 
 the reform of the Confederation. Your Excellency has, by 
 the grace of Heaven, been preserved to our nation almost 
 miraculously. May you also succeed in restoring that 
 internal peace, which is essential for the success of your 
 magnificently conceived national plans. 
 
 " So long as I live outside Prussia, my task as a political 
 writer is easy. If, however, I were to enter into any con- 
 nexion with the Royal government, I should be obliged to 
 accept my share of the responsibility for its home policy ; 
 and this would be impossible to me, so long as the legal 
 basis of the constitution had not been restored. 
 
 " I beg Your Excellency to accept my most cordial wishes 
 for the opening of the great struggle now at length about 
 to begin, and the assurance of my sincere admiration." 1 
 
 Before the end of the month, Baden had joined Austria. 
 Treitschke at once resigned his chair. " I cannot," he 
 
 1 Brief e, ii. No. 513.
 
 TREITSCHKE AND BISMARCK 31 
 
 wrote, " remain the servant of a State which is included 
 in the Rhine Confederation, a body which as a patriot I am 
 bound to injure to the best of my ability." Released from 
 his academic position, he threw himself into the fray of 
 pamphlet controversy with zeal and bitterness, publishing 
 on July 30, four days after Austria had signed the pre- ' 
 liminary peace with Prussia, his notorious essay on " The 
 Future of the North German Middle States." It was a 
 demand that Prussia should crown her victory by annexing^, 
 Hanover, electoral Hesse, and Saxony, the three North t 
 German States which had declared for Austria. So far as 
 Hanover and Hesse were concerned, this programme was 
 carried out in the Treaty of Prague (August 23, 1866), which 
 assigned those two states to Prussia " by the law of nations "; 
 Saxony was only saved by the obstinate stand which 
 Austria made on behalf of her old ally. 
 
 V,Treitschke had prophesied the rise of Prussia to pre- 
 eminence. His prophecies had contributed in no small " 
 degree to preparing Prussia's triumph. He had insisted so 
 long and so eloquently upon the advantages which Germany 
 would reap from any and every aggrandisement of Prussia, 
 that few German Nationalists were prepared to judge 
 Prussia's conduct by the standards which they would have * 
 applied to any other State. For the sake of a national ideal \ 
 he had helped to debase the political morality of his country- 
 men. But, as we have seen, he was at least free from any 
 taint of interested motives. He had fought Bismarck's 
 battles as an independent and unpaid ally ; he would have 
 scorned to reap advantage from his exertions on behalf of 
 the national idea/ 
 
 Singularly enough he was still half a Liberal, still wedded 
 to the doctrines of constitutional Government which he had 
 learned in his student days from Dahlmann. More singular 
 still he remained a believer in Kant's categorical imperative, 
 and spoke with a high seriousness of religious matters. In 
 the new gospel of Force, which was exemplified by Prussia's 
 policy, he saw nothing inconsistent with the moral code
 
 32 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 which he had learned from his Protestant father. It pained 
 him that his father should speak of him as not a Christian, 
 as a political Jesuit : 
 
 " Your question, how I stand with regard to religion, 
 surprised me. It grieves me, my dear Father, that you 
 should worry yourself about this, and it grieves me all 
 the more, because I know that it is unnecessary. If it 
 were possible to discuss exhaustively such a great subject 
 in a few words, I am sure that we should find ourselves 
 in complete agreement. I am unable to conceive 
 any great man without a profound religious sense. 
 But as to the form which this religious belief may take 
 hi the heart of the individual, it seems to me that there 
 ought to be absolute freedom. A man must experience 
 and build up his own faith. That seems to me the 
 supremely important thingA\Jhe universe is so im- 
 measurably large, and we men are so insignificant, that 
 a man must be satisfied if, by some road or other, he can 
 come a little nearer to the understanding of God. I can 
 best seek to accomplish this by seeking to fathom the 
 eternal reason which governs human hi story. 11 This way 
 suits best with my disposition ; and it thrills me with 
 a deeper devotion than I have ever felt in reading theo- 
 logical works. I think that, in these secret things of the 
 soul's experience, every one must leave others to go their 
 way, and must hold to the conviction that the re- 
 ligion of a man is best discerned in his morality and his 
 tolerance. I do not admit that those who base their belief 
 strictly on the Bible are justified in holding themselves to 
 be the only true Christians. In the last two thousand 
 years Christianity has changed its shape over and over 
 again ; but its eternal value has not been lost, and never 
 will be lost. If Luther thought it necessary to hold fast to 
 the letter of the Scripture, we have since his time grown 
 older by 300 years, and we have the right to go further 
 than the reformers. I have a sincere and humble conscious-
 
 TREITSCHKE AND BISMARCK 33 
 
 ness of my own sinfulness and weakness ; but I know that 
 it is not the form of my creed which is to blame for my 
 shortcoming." l 
 
 General von Treitschke no doubt approached the question 
 of religion in a narrow and sectarian spirit. But he saw 
 life steadily and as a whole. He saw that the political 
 principles of his son were incompatible with Christian religion^ 
 and morality. And his son's reply shows, by its very 
 sincerity, the inconsequence and incoherence which so 
 often develop in the mind of one who has concentrated all 
 his intellectual energies upon one special field of thought. , 
 Heinrich von Treitschke was so entirely absorbed in historical 
 and political studies that his opinions on other subjects 
 had become prematurely stereotyped. On religion and 
 morals, for instance, he thought at the age of thirty-two . 
 very much as he had thought at the age of eighteen. He 
 lacked the inclination and the energy to reconsider his 
 intellectual position in all its bearings. Therefore his con- v 
 victions were full of inconsistencies. Even his political \ 
 
 principles had ceased to square entirely with his political, . 
 
 programme. In politics he was a partially converted SC. 
 Liberal of 1848, preaching with fire and fury the half truths 
 which he had learned by the experience of the intervening 
 eighteen years, and only half conscious of the old stock of 
 Liberal opinions which still formed a large part of his mental 
 furniture. 
 
 To the end of his life he remained a Protestant hi politics ; 
 and a leaven of sturdy Protestant prejudice shows itself, 
 sometimes rather unexpectedly, in his writings. He detested , ; 
 the hierarchical system of the Roman Catholic Church ; he 
 detested " Jesuit " ethics also, in spite of his father's belief 
 to the contrary. In a sense his nature was profoundly 
 religious, as was also that of Bismarck. But towards 
 dogma he was contemptuously indifferent. Religion for 
 him was not so much an intellectual belief as an optimism 
 
 1 Briefe, ii. No. 407 (May 19, 1864).
 
 34 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 for which he acknowledged that he could give no reason, 
 and a noble scorn for material objects of ambition. His 
 faith seems to be summed in the two following sentences : 
 
 " The true good fortune of life must only be sought in an 
 end which is common to all men and attainable by all ; not 
 in the possession of wealth, or in political power, or in art 
 and science, but in the world of feeling, in a clear conscience, 
 hi the strength of love, and above all in the power of faith. '.I 1 
 
 " I have thankfully experienced the might of Providence 
 in the great fortunes of my people and the small experiences 
 of my family life ; and I feel more strongly than ever the 
 need to bow myself submissively before God." 2 
 
 1 Deutsche Kdrnpfe, ii. p. 145. 
 1 Quoted by Petersdorff in Allgemeine Deutsche Biographic, Iv. pp. 301-2.
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 THE MOVEMENT FOR GERMAN UNITY, 1848-1866 
 
 OUTSIDE his own country Treitschke is known either as the 
 most brilliant historian of the Prussian School, or as a 
 German Machiavelli, the most outspoken advocate of 
 Realpolitik in the Bismarckian period. But in Germany 
 itself he is also remembered as one of the makers of the 
 German Empire ; (as a publicist who taught his countrymen 
 to expect with confidence the realisation of national unity, 
 and to base large hopes upon the consequences political 
 and social, moral and intellectual which were to follow 
 upon their union in a single State .j He was the last and 
 greatest in the succession of professor-prophets which began 
 with Dahlmann. Treitschke's most brilliant prophecies 
 were uttered in the sixties. They did not all come true ; 
 but many of his countrymen still hold that the German 
 Empire would be better than it is, if Treitschke's dream of 
 a centralised monarchy had been realised in 1871. It is 
 to the political programme which he advocated in the 
 sixties that we must now turn our attention. Our readers 
 will understand it goes without saying4=that few parts of 
 this programme were the product of his own unaided 
 thought. ) i He was the spokesman of a large and influential 
 school of thought ; and for this reason, rather than because 
 of any striking originality, he at once secured an enthusiastic 
 hearing.) No one else, however, expressed the ideas of 
 Prussian policy so pointedly ; and not even Droysen or 
 Sybel used the weapon of historical argument with such 
 
 35
 
 36 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 remarkable success. (JThe effectiveness of his arguments was 
 partly due to the fact that he based them upon facts which 
 
 I were still within the range of living memory .1 Droysen 
 wrote panegyrics of the early Hohenzollerns and elevated 
 the Great Elector to the rank of a national hero. Sybel 
 used the history of the French Revolution to prove the 
 immense superiority of Prussian conservatism over the 
 gospel of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. But Treitschke 
 
 , turned to the age of the German Confederation for his 
 instances ; and the ghost of the Confederation still walked 
 the stage of German politics when he was writing. \JThe 
 
 > moral of his story was drawn from the failure of constitutional 
 experiments, for which men still prominent upon the stage 
 had been prepared to shed their blood.) 
 
 Three alternative forms of union were under the con- 
 sideration of patriotic Germans at the time when Treitschke 
 wrote his essay, Bundesstaat und Einheitsstaat. First of all 
 there was the form which had been tried in 1815 the 
 Staatenbund or mere Confederation ; a permanent alliance 
 of German States for mutual defence, which in effect left 
 the sovereignty of the single States untouched, and which 
 possessed no central institutions except a congress of 
 ambassadors (Bundesversammlung). The second possibility 
 was a Federal State (Bundesstaat), analogous to the United 
 States of America. In the Bundesstaat there would be a 
 central executive, a central legislature, and a central judica- 
 ture, which for certain purposes came into contact with the 
 individual citizen. The powers of the central government 
 would be denned by a rigid constitution. But within its 
 own sphere the central government would be superior to the 
 governments of the constituent States ; and it would not be 
 dependent upon the pleasure of the State-governments, for 
 the enforcement of its laws, its judgments, and its admini- 
 strative orders. This is the ideal which was realised in the 
 constitution of the German Empire, though it was an ideal 
 which Treitschke, both on historical and on a priori grounds, 
 pronounced impracticable. Lastly, there was the possibility
 
 THE MOVEMENT FOR GERMAN UNITY 37 
 
 of annihilating the governments of the smaller German 
 States and of establishing a Unitary State (Einheitsstaat) , 
 which should be simply an expanded Prussia. This was the 
 alternative which Treitschke preferred ; and when his hopes 
 were disappointed he comforted himself by arguing that the 
 Empire, though in form a Bundesstaat , owed its efficiency to 
 the fact that it was indeed an Einheitsstaat skilfully 
 disguised. 
 
 In the following passages, taken from the Politik, 
 Treitschke discusses the true nature of the Confederation 
 (Staatenbund) and of the Federal State (Bundesstaat} with 
 admirable historical illustrations : 
 
 " A Confederation of States (Staatenbund) differs from a 
 mere international alliance, first of all by its duration. I It 
 is seriously planned to endure for eternity as we men conceive 
 eternity. It has for its basis a living consciousness of 
 a common nationality, or of common historical memories. 
 The federated States feel that they could not dispense with 
 one another's support in fighting for common objects, and 
 they express this in a permanent political form, j Switzerland, 
 which is a genuine example of a Confederation, was formed 
 in this way. (The joint obligation is not only that of uniting 
 against a foreign enemy, but also of settling internal dis- 
 sensions by dint of good will or of legislation.) This arrange- 
 ment may give rise to a number of other permanent 
 institutions, but the sovereignty of the individual States 
 is always preserved.) Hence the liberum veto of the members 
 of the Federation follows naturally. Since a sovereign 
 cannot obey, the individual States must have a right of 
 protest against the final resolutions of the majority of the 
 States.) So it was in the Netherlands, in old Switzerland, 
 and also in the German Confederation. In the case of every 
 alteration in the Act of Confederation (Bundesacte) , in the 
 case of all the so-called " organic " decrees (to which every 
 one attached a different meaning) , unanimity was essential ; 
 and the practical result was that, in important matters,
 
 38 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 the Federal Council was incapable of coming to a conclusion. 
 It was a permanent Board of Incompetence. 
 
 " The self-contradictoriness of this system is obvious, 
 and lies in the fact that unequals are considered as equals. 
 Save for certain honorific privileges, all the partners in the 
 Confederacy are made equal. Hence the weak States have 
 an unjust advantage over the strong. It was a citizen 
 of the State of Holland Spinoza who declared that to 
 insist on equality among unequals is to insist on an absurdity. 
 I In the Diet of the German Confederation, Austria, Prussia, 
 ' Bavaria, Wiirtemburg, and Hanover might all be out-voted 
 by the small States. That was an utter absurdity, and 
 could not possibly be continued in practice. The large States 
 were compelled to bring to bear privately the weapon of 
 their power, in order to secure for themselves a party. 
 
 " Thus in Confederations a hegemony may be formed, 
 either in fact or in law, for the sake of introducing a para- 
 mount factor into this chaos of conflicting sovereign wills. 
 That was what occurred in the Republic of the Netherlands. 
 The conditions of the Confederation were in this case ex- 
 tremely lax in themselves ; for, as we know, the strict prin- 
 ciple of the liberum veto required the unanimity not only 
 of the States-General of the Seven Provinces, but also 
 the Provincial States, from which they were sent. In 
 theory that was about as abnormal a state of affairs as 
 could well be imagined ; but, in practice, it was equalised by 
 two powerful centralising forces in the Federation. Of the 
 Seven Provinces, Holland by herself was so strong as to com- 
 prise two-thirds of the entire population, and about seven- 
 eighths of the national wealth. The material centre of gravity 
 of the whole Union, therefore, lay in Holland, in towns 
 like Amsterdam, Haarlem, The Hague, and Leyden ; and 
 the Republic of the Netherlands was commonly referred to 
 by the name of this one Province, which seemed identical 
 with the whole. Further, the maritime interests, which 
 were especially considered in Holland and Zealand, became 
 much more important than the internal affairs of the little
 
 THE MOVEMENT FOR GERMAN UNITY 39 
 
 inland provinces. It was truly said : ' Hoch von Muth, 
 klein von Gut, ein Schwert in der Hand, das ist das Wappen 
 von Gelderland.' * But how small was the actual significance 
 of this little Guelderland by the side of the world-power of 
 Holland. By this time, too, the Republic had been for- 
 mally so organised that the will of Holland should invari- 
 ably prevail. Both the States-General of the Union and 
 the Provincial States of Holland sat in council together at 
 the Hague, in the same building, the Binnenhof. If the 
 Union had to deal with an important question, first there 
 was a meeting of the Provincial States to deliberate before- 
 hand on the proposals to be put before the Union. Their 
 resolution was then, as a rule, adopted by the other 
 States. 
 
 " Thus, through the actual predominance of Holland, a 
 certain unifying force was introduced despite the liberum veto. 
 The living bond between the chief Province and the Union 
 was the remarkable office of the Grand Pensionary, which 
 has furnished our constitution with a model for the office 
 of Imperial Chancellor. It must be remembered here that 
 Bismarck was in his youth a friend of Motley, the talented 
 American historian. Motley wrote a book on the United 
 Netherlands, and from this Bismarck acquired a theoretical 
 knowledge of Federalism. The combination by which the 
 chief official of the dominant State was at the same time the 
 most powerful official of the Union was, in the case of 
 the Netherlands, very ingeniously contrived. It avoided 
 the necessity of openly displaying the hegemony of the 
 Republic produced by this means. The Pensionary sat 
 bareheaded at the lower end of the table, at which the 
 high and powerful lords of the States-General took counsel, 
 as sovereigns, with covered heads. He had not even a vote. 
 But he was minister for foreign affairs ; he conducted the 
 business of the Union ; it was with him that every foreign 
 country had to negotiate. If the proposition be true that 
 
 1 High in courage, small in wealth, a sword in hand. That is thecoat- 
 of-arms of Guelderland.
 
 40 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 whoever negotiates and is responsible also rules, then he was 
 the man who actually ruled. 
 
 "To this hegemony of the one province was added a second 
 centripetal element, the House of Orange, with its hereditary 
 military office, which constituted a force at once democratic 
 and monarchical ; and which, as the representative of a 
 vigorous continental policy, though it often came into 
 conflict with the Republic of Holland, at the same time had 
 for its aim the establishment of a solid central government. 
 Through the eighty years of the struggle for liberation the 
 House of Orange provided the commander-in-chief of the 
 Army ; and, even afterwards, in the midst of continuous 
 wars, its representatives held together both the Union and 
 their Army. 
 
 " So, by dint of these two institutions, which are nowhere 
 laid down in writing, the centrifugal force of the Seven 
 Provinces was restricted. But anarchical weapons were 
 employed without compunction against the liber um veto of 
 the Provincial States. Either threats were used ; or else 
 a so-called ' deputation of notables,' of stadtholders and 
 influential members of the States-General, was sent to the 
 Provinces of the minority. It journeyed to the people of 
 Friesland or Guelderland, in order to melt their hard hearts 
 by a personal appeal, a feat which was seldom accomplished 
 without the aid of a full purse." 1 
 
 "If we consider the distinction between a Federal State 
 (Bundesstaat) and a Confederation [taatenbund) of States, 
 we see clearly that it does not consist, as many theorists 
 have affirmed, in the extent of the powers of the central 
 administration. The weak central administration of the 
 German Confederation none the less possessed in many 
 respects greater power than the modern German Empire. 
 It intervened in local matters, which our Empire allows to 
 be administered locally by its members. The difference 
 between the two forms of federalism cannot, then, be found 
 here ; nor in the fact that, in a Confederation, the decrees 
 
 1 Politik, ii. pp. 310-3.
 
 THE MOVEMENT FOR GERMAN UNITY 41 
 
 of the central administration are executed by the individual 
 States, while, in a Federal State, the Central Administration 
 itself executes its own decrees, and forms its own adminis- 
 trative departments. 
 
 " This theory, which, as we shall see, is not in accordance 
 with facts, originated in America. In the dark days of the 
 war against England, when the Union of the thirteen 
 sovereign States of the starry banner had fallen so low that 
 it could not even pay oft its war-debt to France and Holland, 
 and had suffered a universal loss of prestige, then the chief 
 patriots took their courage in their hands ; they assembled 
 the Congress of Philadelphia, 1 and behind closed doors they 
 accomplished what had become a necessity the overthrow 
 of the sovereignty of the several States. For that was 
 really the important thing ; and, though the American 
 statesmen did not make this clear in theory, in practice 
 they handled the situation with genius. Lit is practical' 
 genius that has always been the strength of the Anglo- 
 Saxon people.} Alexander Hamilton, the great American 
 statesman of that time, founded a periodical, the Federal- 
 ist, with the aim of winning in the first place the approval of 
 the sovereign people of New York. This stroke of diplomacy 
 suffices to show that matters were not conducted quite dis- 
 ingenuously ; but, in addition to this, the uncertainty of the 
 whole age with regard to the theoretical nature of sovereignty 
 is revealed in the credit which was given to the theory of 
 division des pouvoirs. This produced the theory of the 
 Federal State (Bundesstaatstheorie) , according to which the 
 sovereign members of the Confederation should remain 
 sovereign, but should cede a portion of their sovereignty to 
 the Union, so that certain branches of the administration 
 for instance, the Army, the Customs, the Post Office, and the 
 Coinage should be excluded from the functions of the 
 individual States. The Union should have the sole control 
 
 1 In 1787 it met " for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles 
 of Confederation," and to " render the Federal Constitution adequate to 
 the exigencies of Government and the preservation of the Union."
 
 42 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 of certain branches of the activities of the central State, the 
 constituent States should control other branches ; and each, 
 therefore, should be equally sovereign in its own way. 
 
 " That was the new doctrine. In practice it effected an 
 infinite amount of good ; because, by the dissimulation of 
 the true state of the case, the population of New York was 
 won over. The Swiss, too, believed in it ; and, in Germany, 
 all the professors of constitutional law were filled with the 
 desire to make use of these precepts of the Federalists, in 
 order to avoid the necessity of saying to the German princes, 
 in so many words : ' It is our firm intention to abolish your 
 sovereignty, and to utterly destroy the work of our arch- 
 enemy, Napoleon.' No one dared to say this openly ; and 
 so there was an attempt to utilise the American theory 
 of the division of powers as a way out of the difficulty. (^But, 
 examined more closely, the very idea of a division of sover- 
 eignty is seen to be utterly untenable, because it is evidently 
 absurd to speak of an upper supreme and a lower supreme 
 authority.] And, if we examine impartially the text and 
 the spirit of the new Federal Constitution of America, as it 
 emerged from the conferences, and as it has continued down 
 to the present day^jwe see that there can be no doubt who 
 is actually the sovereign of the Union. It is the totality 
 of the population of the United States. It is the nation 
 that wields the supreme power. Its members have simply 
 to obey.) This becomes much more evident if we consider 
 further that the careful division of the activities of the 
 State, which was laid down in theory, is actually neither 
 possible nor necessary in a Federal State. It rests entirely 
 with the American Congress to decide whether it will execute 
 its decrees through its own officials, or will order the con- 
 stituent States to execute them through their officials. If 
 Switzerland desires to construct a road in the Alps, she 
 manages the affair according to the special circumstances. 
 Either its construction is undertaken by the Confederation, 
 or else one canton is ordered to construct the road, in accord- 
 ance with the plans submitted.
 
 THE MOVEMENT FOR GERMAN UNITY 43 
 
 " Here again, then, we see that it is a case not of division 
 but of centralisation of the supreme power. Of course, the 
 notion of sovereignty is elastic, as are all political notions 
 which come within the domain of the will, but we have seen 
 that it must none the less have a solid kernel. ( There must 
 be an ultimate criterion, by which the nature of the 
 sovereignty can be recognised. The solid and absolutely 
 indispensable kernel of all sovereignty, without which no 
 State can properly be called a State, is the right to control 
 the army, and the power of itself deciding the limits of its 
 own prerogatives. A State which has no right to control 
 the army is, in fact, a State no longer. It is of the essence 
 of the State that it should be able to enforce its will by 
 physical force. If it cannot claim the right to arm, if it 
 allows itself to be protected by the might of arms of a higher 
 power, then it is a subject of the higher power ,1 The first 
 decisive step taken by America at the Congress of Phila- 
 delphia was the decision that henceforth a common army 
 under the control of the Union should be established ; and 
 this step was imitated in Switzerland. 
 
 '\Jt is clear, in view of the fact that the individual so- 
 called States of the Union are no longer States at all, that 
 this name is only a convenience.^ Lincoln expressed the 
 truth well and briefly in the last war, 1 when he said : ' The 
 States have their status in the Union, and they have no other 
 status.' So it is in reality ; they are subjects, and, when the 
 South rose up in opposition to the common will, its States 
 were rebels. \They were named ' rebel States,' properly a 
 contradiction in terms ; for only subjects, not States, can 
 properly rebel.) But, after all, names prove very little in 
 politics. Considerations of piety and prudence often lead 
 to the preservation of titles which have lost their true signi- 
 ficance. This is especially noticeable in Federations, where 
 the vanity of former sovereigns has to be humoured. When 
 the American countries had separated themselves from the 
 English mother-country, they could no longer designate 
 
 1 In the American Civil War, 1861-5.
 
 44 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 themselves ' colonies.' It became a matter of earnest 
 deliberation what name they should adopt in the future. 
 Finally, since the individual districts, in the anarchy of the 
 Civil War, had snatched the supremacy to themselves, they 
 were given the name of ' States.' This designation was 
 retained unthinkingly, even when, under the Confederation, 
 the former States had ceased to be States any longer. On 
 the other hand, consider the Seven Provinces of the United 
 Netherlands. They had been provinces of the Greater 
 Netherlands, which had rendered obedience to the King of 
 Spain as their common sovereign. When they broke away, 
 and each Province acquired a sovereignty for itself, they 
 still preserved the name ' Provinces ' ; but it would be folly 
 to deduce from this name that they were not sovereign." 1 
 
 Of the three alternative forms Staatenbund , Bundesstaat, 
 Einheitstaat that which Treitschke preferred was that which 
 entailed the completest breach with the traditions of the 
 past. To understand his attitude a strange one, as it 
 may seem, for a historian to take we must realise the 
 inefficiency of the German Confederation and the failure of 
 the attempts which had been made, between 1815 and 1865, 
 to convert this permanent alliance of States into a single 
 State of the federal type. 
 
 Never had a political system been more plainly fore- 
 doomed to failure, from the moment of its birth, than the 
 Confederation. It came into being (1815) as a compromise 
 between contending parties, at a time when any compromise 
 seemed better than a prolongation of the anarchy which 
 had for so long been endemic on German soil. It had not 
 existed for a generation before every German patriot was 
 convinced that a revolution would be a cheap price to pay 
 for its destruction or complete reconstruction. It was a 
 compromise founded upon two jealousies : upon the jealousy 
 between Austria and Prussia, which dated back to the 
 Silesian wars of Frederic the Great ; and upon the jealousy 
 
 1 Politik, ii. pp. 319-323.
 
 THE MOVEMENT FOR GERMAN UNITY 45 
 
 with which the smaller German States regarded these two l 
 powerful and ambitious neighbours. Far from extinguishing 
 these jealousies, the Confederation inflamed them ; the 
 Diet of the Confederation only formed a new battle-ground 
 for the three contending parties which held the future of 
 Germany in their hands. The Confederation was a com- 
 promise which would hardly have been accepted at all but 
 for the pressure of the non-German Powers ; when these 
 Powers ceased to be solicitous for its maintenance, it survived 
 chiefly as an instrument by which other and more effective 
 schemes of national organisation could be brought to nothing. 
 
 It would be an endless business to enumerate all the 
 absurdities of this constitution. The boundaries of the 
 Confederations intersected those of three half German 
 Powers. The Duchy of Holstein belonged to the Con- 
 federation ; but that of Schleswig, though indissolubly 
 united to Holstein, was not included. Neither was Den- 
 mark, although the sovereignty of Holstein (and of Schleswig) 
 was vested in the King of Denmark. Similarly the Con- 
 federation included the German lands of Prussia and Austria, 
 but excluded the non-German dominions of these Powers. 
 The Confederation was thus an absolute anomaly in the eyes 
 of international law, and it was practically impotent in the 
 councils of European diplomacy. Prussia and Austria 
 ranked among the great Powers ; the Confederation had tioJ. 
 ambassadors and no foreign policy. Most absurd of all, it 
 was, or rather professed to be, a State, while it lacked 
 an executive, and possessed only a phantom legislature, 
 whose powers were undefined and whose activity could be 
 suspended by the liberum veto of any single German ruler. 
 
 The fact was that the Congress of Vienna had drawn the 
 rough outline of a German constitution, and the outline had 
 never been filled in. The Federal Act of June 18, 1815, 
 defined the Confederation as a permanent alliance for the j 
 maintenance of the national security against foes without \ 
 and disturbers of the public peace at home. The allies were 
 to defend one another in the possession of all the lands
 
 46 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 included in the Union to defend the hereditary dominions 
 of the Hapsburgs, but not Hungary ; to defend the Electorate 
 of Brandenburg, but not the Prussian or the Polish provinces 
 of the Hohenzollern. The only organ of government created 
 by the Federal Act was the Diet, a congress of ambassadors 
 who could not vote on any subject without instructions 
 from their governments. The Diet had power to make 
 " fundamental laws " and " organic institutions " ; but the 
 liberum veto was a sufficient guarantee that these laws and 
 institutions would be few and insignificant ; and they could 
 only be enforced, if they were enforced at all, by the govern- 
 ments of the constituent States. There was an attempt to 
 raise a Federal Army composed of quotas from the States ; 
 but sixteen years elapsed before the quotas were defined, 
 and the army never assembled. There was another attempt 
 to enact that representative institutions of a moderate and 
 antiquated sort (Assemblies of Provincial Estates) should be 
 introduced in every State. But it was held that the Diet 
 had no power to enforce this law ; it remained " a prophecy 
 rather than a command." 
 
 For one short period in its history the Confederation 
 pursued a consistent policy. Between 1819 and 1833 the 
 Diet was made by Metternich the passive instrument of 
 Austria, and of the dynasties which looked to Austria for 
 support, in suppressing German Liberalism. The Carlsbad 
 Decrees of 1819 and the Vienna Resolutions of 1820 were 
 drawn up for this end by the reactionary sovereigns and 
 were meekly endorsed by the Diet. The Confederation set 
 itself to destroy the freedom of the Press, to gag the Univer- 
 sities, to break up political societies, to extirpate the 
 monstrous heresy of " responsible government," and to 
 support all princes of the Confederation against their re- 
 bellious subjects. The system of Metternich was rendered 
 more feasible by the existence of the Confederation ; it had 
 become an alliance of the governments against the governed. 
 Most absurd of all an alliance which ostensibly existed to 
 ; defend the indefeasible rights of hereditary sovereigns,
 
 THE MOVEMENT FOR GERMAN UNITY 47 
 
 now undertook to coerce any of the weaker sovereigns * 
 who yielded spontaneously to the liberal aspirations of 
 their subjects. 
 
 This vicious polity was maintained chiefly by an alliance 
 between Austria and Prussia. The two Powers whose 
 jealousy had made the union of Germany, in any real sense, 
 impossible now united to prevent the smaller States from 
 bringing their constitutions into harmony with the prevailing \ 
 idea of liberty. They had kept Germany divided ; and they 
 wished to keep the German people enslaved. 
 
 What was the remedy for this intolerable situation ?. As 
 early as 1820 the smaller States had been urged by Liberal 
 thinkers to form a new Confederation from which both 
 Austria and Prussia should be excluded! But this was 
 clearly a Utopian scheme, a league of the mice to bell the cat. 
 Material force was on the side of the absolutist governments ; 
 they had the support of Russia ; and they had also at their 
 disposal the best statesmanship which the German nation 
 could produce. The small States were weak, and they were 
 politically uneducated. And, at the best, if they held 
 together what was the ideal which they had in view ? It 
 was that the majority of the German people should continue 
 to live in small States, which would be governed liberally 
 or illiberally at the pleasure of hereditary princes. On the ' 
 moral and political weaknesses of the system of small States ' 
 Treitschke is particularly outspoken. He may have been 
 partially blinded by his prejudice in favour of Prussia. But 
 his testimony is the more striking because he wrote his 
 indictment at Freiburg, in the Grand Duchy of Baden, 
 which was one of the most liberal States of Germany. He had 
 at all events seen the small State at its best. The first 
 section of Bundesstaat und Einheitsstaat is entitled " The 
 Fairy-tale World of Particularism." Here he takes up 
 one by one the usual arguments in favour of Particularism. 
 The following passages are typical of his dialectic : 
 
 " If the question of German unity were one of those
 
 48 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 disputes that are won on the ground of argument but lost 
 by reputation, the case of German Particularism, as it 
 stands to-day, would indeed be desperate. Nothing is so 
 unreasonable that some argument cannot be found in 
 support of it. Thus, the calculations of those who desire to 
 perpetuate the weakness of Germany and that German 
 contentment which can transform the unendurable into 
 something endurable have, with an amazing sentimentality 
 and zeal, created a world of myths calculated to prove that 
 Germany was destined to disintegration from the outset. 
 But the consoling arguments of Particularism will cease 
 to console ; its black prognostications will cease to affright ; 
 and if, with shameless brow, it ,still maintains the historic 
 /necessity of the German Kleinttaaterei, we will refuse to 
 allow the most precious thing in life, the human will, to be 
 argued out of history. That which a later generation names 
 a historic necessity was always only a possibility, until, by 
 the will and energy of the nations, it was made a reality ; 
 it was nothing more than a combination of political circum- 
 stances, in which the destinies of the protagonists might 
 aid or obstruct, but never alone decide. With almost the 
 same arguments that to-day are brought forward to prove 
 the, necessity for the disintegration of Germany, it will one 
 day be explained to a happier generation that this land 
 was from the beginning destined to unity. If we make a 
 rapid survey of the fairy-tale world of Particularism, it 
 becomes clear that any moderately intelligent person could 
 sweep it away with a few words, and it is indispensable 
 that this undergrowth should be swept away if we are to 
 clear the ground for an understanding. 
 
 " It is vain to try to defend the reality of the German 
 Confederation behind the shield of legitimacy. There are 
 truly no legitimate considerations which can hinder the 
 German nation from setting aside the Federal Diet, since 
 the latter has been unlawfully revived. 1 The advocates 
 of a stupid conservatism would have done well to have 
 
 1 By Austria in 1850, in opposition to the new Prussian Federal Union.
 
 THE MOVEMENT FOR GERMAN UNITY 49 
 
 looked for a less discredited catchword. ' Les rois s'en 
 vont,' is a fool's saying, if it means that our continent, 
 with its monarchical traditions, is to emulate republican 
 methods ; but it is profoundly true if it means that the 
 childish belief in the divine right of the ruling families has 
 vanished from the world for ever. In every country 
 constitutional law is struggling towards the dawn of a 
 new and more human epoch. [ Even in a monarchy, thel 
 truth will be recognised of the great and fundamental , 
 principle of public rights, that every right must entail a i 
 corresponding obligation ; that, in matters of the State, no 1 
 right ought to exist for the sake of an individual, but only J 
 for the sake of the State. J Does any one suppose that 
 these ideas, which the modern world can never now abandon, 
 would come to a halt at the German frontier ? The only 
 question is whether the German nation will have the 
 strength to embody these ideas in her constitution, or 
 whether, as at the beginning of our century, the office of 
 judge will be assigned to a foreigner. 
 
 " It has ceased to alarm us when the Particularists 
 shout at the advocates of unity : ' You want a revolu- 
 tion ! ' No one wants a revolution. Our nation has 
 had a sufficiently painful experience of what a revolution 
 means. But the persistence of a state of things which 
 has no right to persist constitutes an evil which is growing 
 before our eyes ; so that finally nothing less than a bold 
 revolutionary decision will suffice to secure law and order 
 in this constitutionless country. All high and noble hearts 
 extol the Italians, and their conspiracy in the broad light 
 of day which laid the foundations of a united Italy ; and 
 they extol the statesmen of Prussia for that ' Revolution in 
 the good sense,' directed straight towards the great goal of 
 the ennoblement of humanity, by which the human worth 
 of our Fourth Estate was recognised. Not all the unctuous 
 talk of juridical theologians will prevent our nation from 
 wishing to make a similar decision for the sake of securing 
 her unity, as soon as she possesses the necessary power. 
 
 E
 
 50 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 And even the ghost of Caesarism, with which some delight 
 to threaten her, will excite no alarm. The very character 
 of our nation renders government by the sword impossible 
 as a lasting form of rule. As a transition stage, it is a 
 painful but not an unendurable affliction, if it establishes 
 the unity of our State. 
 
 " More rarely (for Particularism has gradually borrowed 
 from its opponents some slight sense of shame) somewhat 
 more rarely, we are warned that a German State would 
 threaten the peace and the balance of power in Europe. 
 So, out of a tender regard for foreign nations, this nation 
 is to disregard a sacred duty, to renounce its political 
 existence. Johannes Miiller x and Heeren 2 were able with 
 impunity to offer the German nation such soothing argu- 
 ments as these. To-day even the most modest German 
 citizen begins to see the beggarliness of such sentiments. 
 Is it true, as the pacificists assert, that the German Con- 
 federation has preserved the peace of Europe ? Much 
 more was it the peace of Europe that preserved the 
 Confederation. There can be no doubt, that, at the out- 
 break of the first general war, its constitution would have 
 collapsed hopelessly. ( Our continent will not enjoy any 
 permanent tranquillity, until Central Europe has become 
 sufficiently strong to cry halt to the greedy ambitions of its 
 neighbours. When once she is restored to herself, Germany 
 will never pursue a policy of conquest. It is true that 
 neighbouring nations, misled by a short-sighted calculation 
 incapable of seeing beyond the present, refuse to recognise 
 this. But that cannot hinder a great nation from availing 
 herself of the first favourable opportunity in order to fulfil 
 her national duty. When the transformation is completed, 
 the world will do, as it always does when some necessary 
 thing has been accomplished ; it will admit the great and 
 beneficial truth that the interests of the nations are one. | 
 
 1 Born 1752, died 1809. A Swiss historian, and a strong individualist. 
 1 Born 1760, died 1842. A professor at Gottingen ; wrote an Ancient 
 JJistory, and also, in 1800, The Political System of Europe and its Colonies.
 
 THE MOVEMENT FOR GERMAN UNITY 51 
 
 " Another pacificatory argument has proved equally in- 
 effectual ; an argument especially affected by men of high 
 culture in the days of the old romantic school \ namely, 
 that the affairs of Germany must be left to develop V 
 spontaneously and organically. We have come to realise 
 that, whenever this unhappy word ' organic ' finds its 
 way into politics, all thought disappears. 3 But the cradle 
 song of indolence, which has rocked the German world in 
 comfortable slumber only too long, can no longer delude us. 
 Look back a hundred years at the Confederations of the 
 Netherlands and Switzerland, and then look at our own 
 Holy Roman Empire. Those indeed were States that 
 developed organically, until at last a foreign power trampled 
 disdainfully on the decaying fragments that remained of 
 them. ( We may be absolutely certain that a reforming and, 
 if necessary, an energetically revolutionary will is essential 
 to every State ; otherwise the very reason of the State 
 will gradually become void of significance.) 
 
 " But the Particularist remarks soothingly : ' All the 
 prosperity of the State depends ultimately on the moral 
 character of its citizens. It must be possible to keep the 
 sons of a nation united, even if the State itself is not united. 
 Besides, power is far too unequally distributed among the 
 members of the German Confederation, so that in every 
 decisive question the superior influence of the larger Federal 
 States will always control the issue.' We know that unity 
 very well. It did not hinder the Rhine Confederation ; it 
 has even armed German against German, under the protec- 
 tion of the Confederation." 1 
 
 " We are coming now to the most precious and sacred 
 notion of the Particularists ; they guard this notion like a 
 jewel and flash its rays in all directions. It is as follows : 
 ' We live in the promised land of Decentralisation ; and, 
 even if such a lot be fraught with some ills, it is a thousand 
 times better than if we were to descend to the tedious 
 monotony of soul-destroying receptiveness which marks the 
 
 1 Historische und politische Aufsatze, ii. pp. 81-4.
 
 52 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 centralised States.' This pronouncement is put forward as 
 something quite indisputable, and it has already engendered 
 a wealth of phrases. But I maintain that no more blatant 
 untruth has ever been uttered than this statement that 
 Germany is the land of decentralisation. The truth is 
 rather that our States are suffering from most of the evils 
 attendant on centralisation, without a single one of its 
 benefits. We cannot, for instance, as France can, make 
 a bold decision to concentrate rapidly the best forces of the 
 Fatherland on one particular point that has been threatened. 
 And yet our government is not national, as the Swiss 
 government is. The local government of our communes 
 still stands aloof and disconnected from the monarchical 
 Civil Service. The government of the nation is directed 
 from thirty different and arbitrarily selected small centres ; 
 and it is conducted with a paternal and interfering officious- 
 ness which, for instance, in many of the small States forbids 
 any innkeeper on the frontier to hold a shooting match, 
 before he has received the blessing of the government on 
 the proceeding. So much for the vaunted decentralisation 
 of Germany. L The aim of national liberalism is to do away 
 7 with these thirty small centres, and to focus the administra- 
 tion of our country and the work of legislation at one point, 
 at the same time introducing the principle of local govern- 
 ment into the districts and provinces. In this way Germany, 
 like England, would enjoy simultaneously the advantages 
 centralisation and of decentralisation,) whereas now we 
 are experiencing little but the dark side of both./ The 
 natural defects of great States may be mitigated by a care- 
 fully planned administration ; the defects of Kleinstaaterei 
 are irremediable.? 
 
 " Even more foolish than the fear of an excessive 
 centralisation of the German State is the fear that a united 
 \Germany would do away with that wonderfully uniform 
 distribution of the national culturej^for which the world 
 justly envies us.] But does any one seriously imagine that 
 the results of a thousand years of progressive culture could
 
 THE MOVEMENT FOR GERMAN UNITY 53 
 
 be wiped out by one political change ? *sThe centralisation 
 of the French State did certainly bring about the intellectual 
 impoverishment of the provinces) but this was not the 
 work of the first Consul, nor yet of Richelieu ; for more 
 than five hundred years, since the days of Philip the Fair, 
 it has been helped on by all the successive rulers of France 
 with a remarkable consistency. But what six hundred 
 years of labour on the part of a powerful government have 
 brought about in a Romance nation, to the satisfaction of 
 the huge majority of the French, could this conceivably 
 happen to a Germanic nation which, like ourselves, has 
 lived through those six hundred years in a state of political 
 disintegration-^-to us Germans, with our unconquerable 
 enthusiasm for independence and for the culture of the 
 individual ? No one has been able to say of Germany that 
 her culture has suffered through the loss of her political 
 independence." 1 J 
 
 " They cry out to us : Have we not to thank the 
 disintegration of Germany for the beautiful diversity of 
 our political life ? As Heeren said : ' If the German 
 sees in his Fatherland republics side by side with monarchies, 
 let him rejoice ; it will preserve him from the narrowness 
 of political prejudice.' In point of fact, that narrowness 
 which Heeren condemns is only the necessary and whole- 
 some preoccupation which belongs to every energetic man. 
 It is an absolute impossibility at the same time to will 
 and not to will anything, although, as a matter of fact, the 
 Germans have greatly distinguished themselves by that 
 breadth of outlook, which is a barrier in the way of 
 resolute action. A man who is fighting for a parliamentary 
 monarchy cannot at the same time fight for a republic 
 and for absolutism. Is this then to be the destiny of our 
 great Fatherland ? to serve as a valuable collection of 
 instructive illustrations and examples ? When such 
 opinions were first expressed half a century ago, they were 
 merely an evidence of the innocent ingenuousness of the 
 
 1 Hist, und pol. Aufsdtze, ii. pp. 87-8.
 
 54 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 time ; but any one who gives vent to them to-day is 
 guilty of a frivolous disrespect towards his country. / It is 
 certain that, out of that wealth of political and social 
 contrasts which Germany comprises, a very rich and varied 
 political life may some day be evolved, if only these 
 contrasts are first consolidated into one empire, and if, as 
 
 ^formerly, in the German Parliament A they can be finally 
 reconciled and can meet and supplement one another upon 
 a common platform. (At the present day, since these 
 contrasts stand side by side, without any political connec- 
 tion, they engender nothing but a crowd of narrow local 
 prejudices : in the interior, that feeble inland policy which 
 gives no thought to the great historic might of the sea^ 
 
 \m the seaports, that vagrant cosmopolitanism which refuses 
 to take any interest in the development of the national 
 industries. A great opportunity has once more arisen for 
 the union of the human race in one brotherhood. The 
 dream of Columbus, to unite the primitive civilisation of 
 Further Asia with European civilisation, is being realised 
 before our eyes. It has been said proudly that the South 
 Sea is beginning to awaken. And, as at the beginning of 
 a new age, there are other mightier, united nations, who are 
 opening new paths for the world's commerce ; yet we 
 Germans are only permitted to follow humbly from a 
 distance the footsteps of the foreigner.^ More than this, 
 millions of our countrymen, even of the highly-educated 
 classes, listen in stupid amazement, if any one deplores 
 the shame and misfortune of a situation which, in all the 
 most important questions of modern political science, con- 
 demns the Germans to the role of menials or victims] 
 And yet of such a nation, a nation the great majority 
 of whom are so lamentably steeped in inland notions, 
 of such a nation Particularism presumes to boast that 
 it is characterised by the breadth of its political 
 outlook." 2 
 
 1 In the Frankfort Parliament, 1848-49. See pp. 61 et seqq. 
 1 Hist, und pol. Aufsdtzc, ii. pp. 92-3.
 
 55 
 
 He comes to the conclusion that nothing has maintained 
 the small States, but the vested interests of the dynasties 
 and their hangers-on, and the indolence and irresolution of 
 the German nation. 1 
 
 Next he proceeds to analyse the moral diseases which 
 had been engendered by the system. Since the Confedera- 
 tion is a sham, and its laws are only obeyed by those who 
 find it convenient to obey them, Germany is plunged into a 
 state of anarchy which had never been surpassed in the 
 worst days of the medieval Empire. Practical statesmanship 
 finds no field for its energies except within the narrow 
 bounds of the single State ; the result is a general narrowness 
 of mind among the political classes. { Those who have any 
 patriotism left console themselves with catchwords and 
 sentimental ideals of a Greater Germany united by nothing 
 more concrete than national sympathies and national 
 traditions :-j- 
 
 " We boast that in questions of knowledge and belief, 
 mere words are powerless to deceive the simple honesty 
 of the German conscience. Yet in the hazy politics of 
 the Confederation, in a matter that actually concerns our 
 country, the most trivial catchword is able to gain an 
 ascendency. The one word Pangerman (Grossdeutsch) , 
 invented by a clever demagogue and exploited with 
 systematic zeal by all the devotees of the existing dis- 
 order, has attracted thousands into the Austrian camp ; 
 it sounds so terribly unpatriotic to be a Little German 
 (Kleindeutscher) ![ Only in the stern school of State affairs t 
 can a nation be cured of this childish susceptibility to \ 
 political phrases and abstractions J Hence it is that in the 
 confederate States, thanks to the educative influences of 
 our Chambers, we do find clearly differentiated parties, 
 which know what they want. (_ But, since the nation is not\ 
 allowed to participate in the affairs of the Confederation, \ 
 German politics are still nourished on that empty so-called ' 
 
 1 Hist, und pol. Aufsdtze, ii. p. 95.
 
 56 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 , imperial patriotism, with its talk of German unity and 
 German loyalty,/ which has already been used at the 
 Regensburg Reichstag to cloak the lack of any clearly- 
 conceived ideas and of any earnest spirit of self-sacrifice ; 
 and which has filled energetic patriots, a great Elector, a 
 Frederick II., with bitter loathing. / This vocabulary of 
 imperial patriotism has devolved upon us like some dubious 
 inheritance, and has since been supplemented by another 
 generation of new-fashioned catchwords! 
 
 ^The fact that to-day we do feel ourselves with pride 
 to be one nation, we owe above all to the great age of 
 our literature.] ( In most other countries national pride has 
 sprung from a full consciousness of the greatness of the 
 State ; in this new Germany of ours, out of the conscious- 
 ness that we are members of one nation, there has sprung 
 up the desire for an energetic consolidation of the power 
 of the German State.) \Yet, though we welcome this develop- 
 ment from within outwards as the surest sign of the inborn 
 nobility of the German nature), we are still suffering from 
 the evil consequences of sucn a very tortuous progress. 
 it was necessary, indeed, that Klopstock and the poets 
 of the War of Independence should extol the glory of the 
 German name in thrilling dithyrambs. It needed a great 
 aesthetic stimulus to stir the hearts of the obedient subjects 
 of the German minor princes, until they should embrace 
 their whole nation in a noble-hearted love. But when 
 to-day we still hear the vague catchwords of that old time 
 introduced into political debates, when it is imagined that a 
 profoundly important question of power can be settled by 
 the verse soweit die deutsche Zunge klingt, 1 or by sentimental 
 claptrap about our good German brothers in Austria, then 
 we realise with a deep sense of shame, the power of phrases 
 
 Mn German politics." 2 
 
 L But it is impossible to expect political sense in a nation 
 
 1 *.., " As far as German speech is heard." 
 1 Hist, und pol. Aufsdtze, ii. pp. 100-101.
 
 THE MOVEMENT FOR GERMAN UNITY 57 
 
 which is excluded from any effective participation in German 
 politics. To this exclusion must be attributed that abnormal 
 apd suicidal patience which tolerates intolerable evils. 
 Patience comes naturally to the German temperament ; it 
 "lias some affinity with admirable virtues of the German 
 character. But until patience of this kind has been reformed 
 away, there is no hope of political reformation. One result 
 of this patience is that political liberty is nowhere secure : -) 
 
 "It is not merely in these ungracious features of the 
 German national character that the results of our state of 
 disintegration are reflected ; political freedom is not assured 
 in any constituent State, so long as the German Confedera- 
 tion persists in its present condition. Even their opponents 
 do not think any worse of the Ultramontanes and the 
 Junkers for their hatred of any notion of German reform. 
 But there is one of the German parties which is absolutely 
 absurd and unjustified, and that is the party of the Par- 
 ticularist. Liberals. And in fact, what has been^'cirEieved 
 by the Chambers of the constituent States, the Chambers 
 which that party extols as the corner-stone of German 
 liberty ? 'they have checked many evils ; they have made 
 some improvements ; they have been a school of self-control 
 for the German people ; but they have fostered a par- 
 ticularist self-sufficiency, and, even at the present day/ 
 in no German State does a constitutional government 
 possess any other security than the goodwill of the prince. > 
 Honour those whose purposes are still so noble ; but only 
 let a ruling prince assert himself in any German State 
 with the brutal energy of an Ernest Augustus, 1 let him 
 disregard the clamour of the Press and all kinds of personal 
 discomfort, which an unpopular prince cannot escape, and, 
 with the support of his army and the German Confederation, 
 he will as certainly shatter the constitution of his state, as 
 happened in the case of that young King of Hanover. 
 
 1 King of Hanover, 1837-51 ; son of George III. and Duke of Cumber- 
 land.
 
 58 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 .Therein lies the security of German liberty ! It is an 
 absolute impossibility to compel a dynasty to an everlasting 
 parliamentarism, if it finds a support already prepared for 
 it in an oligarchy of princes.) Since the histories of most 
 of the German States exhibit a long series of ' concessions ' 
 (Oktroyirungeri) , this melancholy truth is hardly likely now 
 to meet with any vigorous contradiction. And at the 
 present day is it possible for any one to follow with any 
 feeling of satisfaction the proceedings in the Chambers of 
 our smaller States ? That dissipation of noble energies 
 in the performance of tasks which could only be accom- 
 plished satisfactorily by a national legislature, or else in the 
 drafting of legislative proposals, all originating solely from 
 the petty ambition to possess institutions different from 
 those of neighbouring States ? Those military debates, in 
 which the statement upon which everything depends, the 
 statement ' Our State is powerless/ is on the tip of every 
 tongue, and yet is never openly expressed ? Those ex- 
 tremely personal conferences concerning the organisation 
 of the Civil Service, in which any one could point with 
 his finger to the individuals who are characterised under 
 the head of ' superfluous offices ' ? Those debates on the 
 budget in which again no one dares to express a decisive 
 opinion, or to admit that ' the vast apparatus of a State- 
 constitution is superfluous in a country which can scarcely 
 claim to be a province ' ? That thankless attempt to 
 remodel the two-Chamber system in States which do not 
 possess a ruling aristocracy ? (And, in conclusion, what 
 magician will secure once again for the Chambers of the 
 small States that eager participation of the people which 
 is the necessary foundation of constitutional life ? ) How 
 warmly and enthusiastically the people participated in the 
 diets before the German Revolution ; yet all that has 
 completely vanished since we have seen the German 
 Parliament. Baron von Blittersdorff * once described the 
 
 1 A minister of the Grand Duchy of Baden ; prominent in 1847-48 as 
 an opponent of Liberalism.
 
 THE MOVEMENT FOR GERMAN UNITY 59 
 
 animated debates in the Chambers of the small States 
 as a storm in a teacup ; and in the 'forties those words 
 roused a general indignation. Now they express the 
 general opinion." 1 
 
 Under such conditions, he continues, the sense of citizen- ; 
 ship is atrophied ; the worst enemies of state-authority are j 
 invincible. The system of small States has left the Ultra- 
 montanes supreme in the South, the Junkers supreme in the 
 North. Even the Hanseatic cities, which boast of their! 
 republican freedom, and which as municipalities within a ; 
 German State would be the glory of the nation, show in 
 their policy a deplorable pettiness. Against a system which 
 breeds these evils the growing intelligence of the nation 
 will certainly rebel, and that within a short time. 
 
 " The stark immobility of our public law becomes much 
 more dangerous every year, since political ideas are now 
 transformed with such unprecedented rapidity. .Any one 
 who looks upon the State not as a mechanical organisation, 
 but as the living embodiment of the spirit of the nation, 
 discerns the inevitable approach of a complete transforma- 
 tion of the existing order. Democratic notions are being 
 propagated in an ever- widening circle. Only mark the tone 
 adopted in the most popular of the middle-class newspapers, 
 when speaking of crowned heads ! The belief in the justice 
 of universal suffrage is already cherished by hundreds of 
 thousands. In addition, the immense development in means 
 of locomotion brings German closer to German every day ; 
 and even the most stay-at-home citizen now makes light of 
 the frontiers which are so quickly crossed. And into the 
 very midst of this age of fermentation there streams the 
 intoxicating theory of the right of nationality. Can any one 
 deny that we Germans had no need of this new-fashioned 
 theory ? { Our inalienable right to a national State is rooted 
 in something deeper than abstractions or vague notions of 
 
 1 Hist, und pol, Aufsdtze, ii. pp. 104-6.
 
 60 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 a common descent. It is founded in that political union, 
 which has bound together our successive generations from 
 time immemorial, and which only once, during the eight 
 years of Napoleonic anarchy, was completely dissolved. 
 None the less, a large number of the half-educated class 
 have accepted this new theory as an inspired revelation, and 
 have thus arrived by a different road at the same demands 
 as have been made by thinking people long since. It often 
 seems as if there dwelt in our country, side by side, two 
 different generations, separated from one another by two 
 centuries. In the one we find an ineradicable and deeply 
 inculcated submissiveness, an indolent endurance, and a 
 genuinely patriarchal gratitude for the least word of kind- 
 ness from those above them ; and by their side a young 
 ' generation talking a new language with noisy assurance, as 
 if the old world were long since done away with, and a 
 democratic centralised German State had actually been 
 realised among us. Behind these high words there lurks a 
 great deception. "/Just as surely as the rivers flow to the 
 sea will our quarter of the globe absorb the true essence of 
 the democratic and national ideas of the present time into 
 its system ; { for these ideas are like the conceptions of 
 ecclesiastical reform in the sixteenth century the pre- 
 dominating and characteristic force of their age.] The 
 question is whether our nation will co-operate spontane- 
 ously in this great movement ; whether, as happened three 
 hundred years ago, it will rest satisfied with a half success ; 
 or whether it will simply supply the cement for the splendid 
 edifices of foreign powers. The confident talk of our Radi- 
 cals is a sign of political immaturity, but it is likewise a 
 consequence of the mediatisation of our nation ; for if the 
 v nation took any part in German politics, even the most 
 \ short-sighted would realise how long the road really is, that 
 to the hopeful seems so short." 1 
 
 .1 But something more was needed than intellectual 
 
 1 Hist, und pol. Aufsdtze, ii. pp. 107*8.
 
 THE MOVEMENT FOR GERMAN UNITY 61 
 
 progress. The history of the years 1848-49 was enough 
 to show that German unity could never be effected until 
 one of the greater states, Prussia or Austria, should place , 
 
 *-> * ...wj A ^\ 
 
 its military resources at the service of the national party. 
 The German Liberals had undertaken in 1848 to reform 
 simultaneously the Confederation and its constituent States. 
 They had supposed that this could be done by a strong 
 appeal to the conscience of the German nation, by preaching 
 the gospel of representative institutions. And up to a point 
 their efforts had been crowned with success. The majority 
 of the governments had been induced to permit the election of 
 a representative German Parliament. This Parliament had 
 met at Frankfort (October 1848) and had remained in being 
 for six months. It included among its members the flower 
 of German Liberalism. It secured the services of an Austrian 
 Archduke as the head of the federal executive ; and it 
 proceeded to draw up a code of fundamental laws. Un- 
 fortunately these fundamental laws, excellent as they were 
 in principle, awakened the profound mistrust of the greater 
 German powers. One law provided that in every German 
 State there should be " responsible " government, by 
 ministers answerable to a representative assembly. Another 
 forbade the fusion of any German lands with lands which 
 lay outside the boundaries of the Confederation ; Hungary 
 might not be united with Austria under one constitution ; 
 nor might Prussia be united with the more westerly posses- 
 sions of the Hohenzollerns. Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, and 
 Hanover refused to recognise the fundamental laws ; and 
 Prussia helped the King of Saxony to suppress a revolution 
 raised by the constitutional party in that kingdom. The 
 Frankfort Parliament, after long wranglings, decided that 
 they must offer the imperial crown to Prussia ; when 
 Frederick William IV. evaded giving a definite answer, the 
 new Federal Constitution fell to the ground like a pack of 
 cards. The local revolutions which had been expected to 
 reform the governments of the Absolutist States, and to 
 propagate the cult of national unity, proved everywhere a
 
 62 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 dismal failure. The Frankfort Parliament melted away in 
 1849 '> a Rump, composed of about 100 stalwarts, removed 
 to Stuttgart, but was suppressed by the government of 
 Wurtemberg. 
 
 Many reasons might be given for this fiasco. The pro- 
 ceedings of 1848 often served Treitschke as a text for attacks 
 upon German doctrinaires. The Frankfort Parliament 
 had made the mistake of transplanting English constitution- 
 alism to German soil, not perceiving that the English party 
 system was the product of local and peculiar circumstances. 
 From the first the representatives at Frankfort had been 
 divided into a large number of unstable groups and cliques. 
 Further, they had underrated the strength of monarchical 
 feeling in the German States. In Prussia, for instance, the 
 Hohenzollerns were the one great national institution ; and 
 the sort of constitutionalism which the Liberals desired was 
 avowedly intended to make the hereditary sovereign a 
 cipher, a marionette whose wires would be pulled by a party 
 Cabinet. Not only had Frederick William IV. revolted 
 against the Liberal schemes for reorganising his dominions ; 
 he had refused the Imperial Crown on the ground that he 
 was asked to become the servant of a written constitution 
 and a popular assembly. Despite his many blunders, he 
 represented on this subject the national sentiment ; the 
 Liberals had outraged the traditions of the strongest States 
 in Germany. But above all they had not realised the 
 importance of material force. They should have begun by 
 securing the help of Prussia ; and then they should have 
 framed a constitution which Prussia would accept, a con- 
 stitution making her interests identical with those of the 
 federation. 
 
 But such a constitution would not have been a federa- 
 tion at all. So, at least, Treitschke argued. Prussia could 
 never consent to be merely a member of a Bundesstaat. Such 
 a constitution is only possible, he said, when the contracting 
 States are on a level of equality ; only durable when they 
 are all democracies, as in Switzerland or Holland or the
 
 THE MOVEMENT FOR GERMAN UNITY 63 
 
 United States. \ It is not to be expected that sovereign 
 princes will show themselves accommodating, will descend 
 to compromises, in questions which affect their own pre- 
 rogatives. VBut a Federation must be governed by com- 
 mittees and councils ; and compromise is of the essence of 
 such forms of government. 1 ) Besides, how can it be expected 
 that a monarch will surrender the control of his army to a 
 federal government, or submit in disputes with his own 
 subjects to the arbitration of a federal court. 2 
 
 " And what rights do the supporters of the Frankfort 
 imperial constitution suppose that the German princes will 
 resign of their own free will and without indemnification ? 
 Even in the most modest^ the most loosely united form 
 
 of federal State the central administration must possess ? 
 
 exclusive authority in two matters : the conduct of foreign / 
 
 affairs, and at any rate in time of war the command of I 
 
 the federal army.] It is often said in jest : ' The federal 
 princes do not possess even now the right to declare war 
 on their own initiative ; and if we desire to abolish that 
 military sovereignty which they possess in time of peace, 
 what difference will it make ? And how futile is the in- 
 dependent administration of foreign affairs by the small 
 States ; its only result is that a dozen loafers the more 
 haunt the antechambers of the European courts.' I reply : 
 this is merely a judgment of the subject class upon these 
 questions ; but it is a question here of the opinion of the 
 governing class ; and it must be apparent to any one that 
 rulers esteem these two privileges very highly. It is a 
 prevailing opinion in the majority of our courts that the 
 army is the natural support of the throne. A very intimate 
 and personal tie exists between the war-lord and his army ; 
 most of the German princes consider themselves officers, 
 and always appear in military uniform ; and even a Prince 
 of Reuss of the younger line would feel that he had been 
 expelled from the family of European sovereigns, if he no 
 
 1 Hist, und pol. Aufsdtze, ii. p. 134. a Ibid. ii. pp. 137-8.
 
 64 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 longer maintained at any rate a charge d'affaires at Vienna. 
 Their diplomacy, and their armies bound to do service for 
 the war-lord alone, make it possible for our princes not by 
 right, but in fact to call in the aid of the foreigner in time 
 of need. Surely rights which have such consequences as 
 these ought not to be called insignificant. And if we 
 remember that, only a few months ago, German patriots 
 seriously projected a new Rhine Confederation for the 
 salvation of the German nation, we cannot look upon it as 
 impossible that, in a case of great distress, the German 
 princes might form a similar plan for the salvation of 
 their dynasties. Only a few years ago, Count von Borries 1 
 declared that Hanover would rather call in the aid of France 
 than sacrifice a portion of her sovereignty for the benefit 
 of a Prussian central government. Nay more : under the 
 constitutional system which prevails in the German States, 
 foreign and military questions are the only important affairs 
 of State upon which the sovereign decides without the 
 intervention of the Estates. Would you take by storm this 
 last and most precious bulwark of absolutism ? Consider 
 that, in matters of the Civil Service, a prince, where he is not 
 actually restricted, is at any rate hampered and criticised by 
 his Estates, and is above all under an obligation, indis- 
 pensable in a Federal State, to submit every serious dispute 
 with his Estates to the judgment of a Federal Supreme 
 Court ! If, in addition to this, he is to be entirely deprived 
 of the conduct of foreign affairs, and almost entirely of the 
 control of the army, such a prince is certainly in a far from 
 enviable position. He has not even the power, mistakenly 
 ascribed by Hegel to the constitutional monarch, of adding 
 the dot to the ' i.' It is no use to say that the establish- 
 ment of the constitutional system was also a hard blow to 
 the monarchs, and yet they consented to it. This is a futile 
 comparison. ( In a Constitutional State it is an inviolable 
 i principle that nothing should be done contrary to the will 
 
 1 A Hanoverian Minister, one of the leaders of the German Particularists 
 in the years 1860-66.
 
 THE MOVEMENT FOR GERMAN UNITY 65 
 
 of the crown. ] In a Federal State, on the other hand, foreign 
 policy must very often be directed contrary to the will of, 
 or at any rate without the consent of the federal princes. 
 No ! It is a heavy and unprecedented sacrifice which the-; 
 Federal State party asks from the German princes. Is it 
 likely that hereditary and irresponsible sovereigns, who 
 cannot be removed from their position, should voluntarily 
 give way to such a demand, and console themselves with the 
 proud consciousness of having performed this act of re- 
 nunciation for the honour of the German name ? Is there 
 anything in the history of the higher nobility of the German 
 nation to justify us in expecting such a resolution ? " 1 
 
 In this passage Treitschke is not simply speculating as 
 to the probable attitude of the lesser princes. He is explain- 
 ing the failure of an experiment which the unlucky Frederick 
 William IV. had made in the years 1849-50 ; the experi- 
 ment of founding a new Federal Union from which Austria 
 should be excluded and of which the King of Prussia should 
 be the president. The scheme had been wrecked by the 
 jealousy of the other German princes, and had ended with 
 the humiliation of Prussia at the Conference of Olmiitz 
 (1850), when she was compelled to purchase peace with., 
 Austria by renouncing the new Federal Union and consenting 
 that the old Confederation should be restored. This sur- 
 render was under the circumstances a wise one ; Bismarck 
 had approved of it, for Prussia in 1850 was no match foj 
 Austria in military strength. But the obvious moral was 
 that German unity could only be effected by force of arms. 
 There was no possibility of a peaceful evolution by which 
 the Confederation would be transformed into a true Federal- 
 State. There must be a revolution ; and this could only 
 be brought about by Prussia. Austria desired to perpetuate- 
 the disunion of Germany ; and the smaller States would 
 never combine of their own accord to crush Austria. Only 
 Prussia could free them ; and it would be absurd if Prussia, 
 
 1 Hist, und pol. Aufsdtze, ii. pp. 137-8.
 
 66 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 having borne the burden and heat of the contest, should be 
 required to accept a position, in united Germany, of no 
 greater consequence than was accorded to her prote'ge's. 
 She could not possibly accept such a situation. 1 On the 
 other hand, if she openly made herself supreme, the situation 
 would be equally precarious. The Federal State so formed 
 would not be founded on the essential conditions which had 
 made federal government a success in Switzerland and the 
 United States : 
 
 ([' We cannot but realise that there is very little ground 
 for hoping that the German Federal State can be founded 
 peacefully, by an opportune and generous decision of the 
 dynasties. As far as the human mind can estimate, the 
 ideal of our Federalists can only be realised, if the Prussian 
 State, with the support of a strong popular movement or a 
 strong foreign alliance, uses its power at the right moment. 
 But a Federal State that has been founded on violence bears 
 within itself, as Waitz admitted, the seed of its own decay 
 a loyal federal spirit would scarcely be likely to thrive in it.) 
 And it is even more doubtful if the Prussian State or the 
 German nation, when once their forces had been roused to 
 action in a moment of supreme excitement, would be satisfied 
 with a Federal State. Once already in stormy days 2 has 
 the German people stayed its hand before the thrones : 
 the reward for this moderation was the restoration of the 
 Federal Diet. Once already has Prussia sacrificed the 
 blood of her sons to strengthen anew the tottering thrones 
 of the petty German princes ; 8 Prussia's reward for this 
 friendly, federal help was the enmity of those whom she had 
 saved. Such experiences are not easily forgotten. The 
 pitiless law of ingratitude is predominant in history ; and, 
 in virtue of it, every political power, when once it has 
 performed its office and become superfluous, is infallibly 
 swept aside without any consideration for its former services. 
 
 1 Hist, und pol. Aufsdtze, ii. p. 156. 2 In 1848. 
 
 3 By lending her support to Saxony and Baden in 1849, to suppress the 
 Liberal movement.
 
 THE MOVEMENT FOR GERMAN UNITY 67 
 
 In virtue of this law, colonies break away from the mother- 
 country that has fostered them so carefully. It is in accord- 
 ance with this law that our monarchical bureaucracy, which 
 educated the German citizen for the State, and which gave 
 the peasant his freedom, must retire step by step before the 
 self-government of local communities and constitutional 
 reforms. In accordance with this law the petty German 
 principalities will be abolished, whether by the nation or by 
 a foreign power, as soon as they are no longer in a position 
 to contribute anything towards the civilisation of the nations. 
 Yet even supposing that the Federal State of the Frankfort 
 Parliament were, either peacefully or by force, introduced 
 into Germany ; that it were purged of the crude contradic- 
 tions and ultra-democratic sentiments embodied in the 
 Frankfort project ; that it carried to the logical conclusion 
 the principle of the Constitution of the United States, that 
 the central administration should execute its own decrees 
 without the interference of the constituent States ; even 
 then it will always be open to question whether the Federal 
 State contains within itself any guarantee of permanency. 
 I feel bound to contest it. Robert von Mohl, 1 in his excellent 
 history of Political Science, expresses his astonishment that 
 the democracy of the United States should have tolerated 
 for so long such a subtle and complex form of government 
 as that of a Federal State. For my own part, all that I find 
 astonishing is that it should ever have been possible to 
 found such a constitution ; to persuade the whole collective 
 human understanding of a democratic people to adopt such 
 an elaborate form of government. But the work was 
 accomplished in those great days when the American people 
 still tolerated the leadership of a natural aristocracy, of a 
 small number of noble and gifted statesmen. It does 
 not seem to me in the least remarkable that, when once the 
 Federal State had been founded in America, it should have 
 
 1 A Heidelberg professor, prominent in the Frankfort Parliament, and 
 one of the federal ministers appointed under the Constitution of 1848 to 
 assist the Imperial Vicar.
 
 68 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 retained its vigour. Its constitution is planned with rare 
 sagacity to suit the peculiarities of democratic political life. 
 In the United States the self-government of every com- 
 munity has been the predominant political principle since 
 the foundation of the Colonies. If this democratic principle 
 were to persist unimpaired, the Federal State was the only 
 possible form of administration. For there is only one 
 rational argument which can persuade a nation, in making 
 for itself a constitution, to prefer the complexities of the 
 Federal State to the simplicity of the centralised State. 
 It is the argument that the Federal State secures at once a 
 measure of unity sufficient for the conduct of the external 
 affairs of the States as a whole, and a freedom of action in the 
 
 individual States such as could not be guaranteed to the 
 
 / 
 same extent in a centralised State; Montesquieu and 
 
 Sismondi had this peculiarity of the Federal State in mind 
 when they said quite incorrectly that it combined the 
 advantages of a monarchy with those of a republic. It is 
 evident, however, that this advantage of the Federal State 
 is only realised in the case of a democratic Federal State." 1 
 
 ( Treitschke proceeds to explain in more detail the reasons 
 why, in his opinion, any federal system is unsuited to the 
 German nation. A federation of monarchical States must, 
 he thinks, be an infinitely more complex system than a 
 federation of democracies so complex that it will never 
 work in practice. Further, a federal government is only 
 tolerated when it interferes comparatively little with the 
 life of the citizens ) but the German tendency is to demand 
 almost unlimited State-interference, and this means a strong 
 bureaucracy, which again means sooner or later the estab- 
 lishment of a highly centralised State. ( Again, the chief 
 reason why the Germans desire union is that they may 
 assert their rightful position among the great Powers. 
 Germany needs a vigorous foreign policy and a formidable 
 army.) Experience seems to show that a federal State is 
 
 1 Hist, und pol. Aufsdtze, ii. pp. 142-4.
 
 THE MOVEMENT FOR GERMAN UNITY 69 
 
 incapable of a vigorous foreign policy, and it is certain that 
 the German dynasties will not willingly permit the formation 
 of an army. ^Finally, he argues that the smaller States are no 
 longer capable of doing the work which is expected of them. 
 They are bound to be ruined by the financial burden of modern 
 armaments ; they cannot fulfil the tasks imposed by modern 
 culture.) Of these tasks he gives a remarkable instance : 
 
 " Schleswig Hoist ein . . . cannot hold in obedience 
 100,000 subjects of alien speech and gently habituate 
 them to the blessing of German manners ; she cannot 
 construct at immense cost a canal, of which the necessity 
 for Germany is as obvious as its financial remunerativeness 
 is doubtful. The Duchy can only do all this, if she 
 borrows for the purpose the resources of Prussia ; that is 
 to say, if she confesses her incapacity to maintain an in- 
 dependent existence." l 
 
 Such States have not even the good sense to recognise 
 their own futility. They will always be governed by second- 
 rate statesmen ; for the German dynasties are shy of employ- 
 ing eminent ability. The only way of dealing with them 
 is to place them under the protectorate of such a great 
 Power as Prussia. 
 
 A whole section of the essay is devoted to the defence of 
 Prussia against her detractors. Prussia, he admits, has a 
 less glorious past than Prussian patriotism will allow. 
 The ideals of Prussia may be represented by the views of 
 a Stein or a Humboldt ; the actuality falls far below the 
 ideal. " Yet this State with all her sins has performed 
 every great achievement that has been accomplished in 
 German politics since the Treaty of Westphalia ; Prussia 
 herself is the greatest political achievement of our nation." 
 The sins of Prussia, in the period of the French Revolution 
 and in the First Schleswig-Holstein War (1849-50), only 
 show how indispensable Prussia is to Germany. If Prussia 
 is badly ruled the whole German nation suffers. 
 
 1 Hist, und pol. Aufsdtze, ii. p. 153.
 
 70 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 (( He then proceeds to show, from Prussian history, what 
 is the nature of Prussia's appointed task in the world. She 
 has risen to greatness by absorbing smaller States and 
 communities ^into herself. No other German State has 
 shown so much assimilative power ; whatever communities 
 she has absorbed she inspires with her own gruff national 
 pride. What Prussia has once conquered becomes a part 
 of herself. Further, Prussia has always gone her own way, 
 and made her own institutions to suit her own needs. Her 
 constitution is of native growth, and therefore possesses a 
 marvellous vitality/ The surrender of Frederick William IV. 
 to the constitutional movement (1848) did not prove, so 
 Treitschke audaciously argues, that the dynasty had become 
 weak ; rather it proved that Prussia had become a united 
 nation, and was able even in the teeth of a strong monarchy 
 to carry constitutional development to its natural conclusion. 
 He admits that constitutional reform is still far from com- 
 plete in Prussia ; that the powers of the Prussian Parliament 
 are insufficient, that the very existence of parliamentary 
 institutions in Prussia is not yet secure, that both the great 
 Prussian parties are open to severe criticism. But even so, 
 he argues, there is more healthy political life in Prussia than 
 in any other German State. From the political, as from 
 the economic point of view, the history of Prussia in the 
 nineteenth century has been one of steady growth. 
 
 ( As Prussia has begun, so in the nature of things she will 
 continue to develop. She has thriven by conquest in the 
 past ; and her highest interests will compel her to make new 
 conquests in the future the annexation of Hanover and of 
 Electoral Hesse is indispensable to her safety. ( Other great 
 Powers find a vent for their ambitions in other continents, 
 but it is only in Germany that Prussia can satisfy her 
 legitimate ambition (wohlberechtigte Ehrgeiss). Her policy 
 towards other German States has been governed not only 
 by the perception of her own interest, but also by a sense of 
 her duty to the German Fatherland./ Frederic the Great 
 may have been only half conscious of this duty ; but the
 
 THE MOVEMENT FOR GERMAN UNITY 71 
 
 sense of it has influenced Prussian policy ever since the Wars 
 of Liberation. 
 
 ^It may be objected, says Treitschke, that the legitimate 
 ambitions of Prussia would only lead to a partition of x 
 Germany between herself and Austria. He repudiates the 
 idea that Prussian ambitions are so limited. Some Prussian 
 ministers may have thought of making the Main the southern 
 frontier of their State ; but 'that was a departure from the 
 old Prussian tradition. The nearer Prussia approaches to 
 the Main, the less is she likely to allow the South German 
 States the right of standing outside the German kingdom of - 
 the future. The more completely she rounds off her frontiers, 
 the more she is compelled to bear in mind the higher duty 
 of uniting Germany.) In the nature of things she must play 
 in Germany the part which the kingdom of Piedmont has 
 played in Italy. (If the German National Party does not 
 wish to stray blindly among political Utopias it must think 
 of Prussia as the nucleus of the German State of the future ; 
 it must become far more Prussian than it has been hitherto. / 
 
 " We must wait for the favour of fortune, for ' the fulfill- 
 ing of the time,' as Florestan Pepe 1 said to the Italian\ 
 patriots. And yet all valiant spirits will prefer to take for| 
 their motto the arrogant retort with which the fiery Guglielmo 
 Pepe answered his brother : ' Men make their own times.' 
 Let the particularists continue to advertise their ingenious 
 fables ; let the most high and privileged Capuchins of both 
 orders continue to take the name of God in vain and to extol 
 the weakness of our country as a special favour of God's 
 providence ; let indolence, creeping in the dust, forget, in its 
 getting and spending, the shame of our nation. ( Even so, 
 whoever is worthy to be called a man, will not cease to toil 
 for the unity of Germany. ) A heart aglow with a great 
 passion, a brain cold and clear, a thoughtful consideration 
 of the strength of the respective States, that is the fitting 
 
 1 A Neapolitan constitutionalist who took part in the Liberal revolution 
 of 1820 ; brother of Guglielmo Pepe, who was the leader of the movement. 
 It was suppressed with the help of Austrian troops.
 
 72 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 mood for a patriot in a nation which is struggling for exist- 
 ence. ( Germany still suffers from that faded sentimentality 
 which an over-intellectual age has handed down to us. Men 
 still cherish a certain lukewarm enthusiasm for the Father- 
 land; and the ardour which can find no place in jaded 
 hearts takes refuge in their brains, where it broods over the 
 fantastic whims of a purely sentimental theory of politics. 
 "*yA. lengthy task of political education lies still before us. 
 The nation must learn to oppose to the clearness and resolu- 
 tion of the particularists an equally resolute will, fighting 
 for unity and for nothing else. Our hearts must become 
 warmer, our brains cooler ;\ the aims of our patriots must 
 rise to the height of a personal passion ; and the under- 
 standing of the whole nation must be armed with the calm 
 realisation that it is only the power of the greatest of our 
 German States which can force the minor courts to submit 
 themselves to a national, central government. We shall 
 never even secure a federal State (which is the very least we 
 are justified in demanding), unless the nation has the courage 
 to take a further bold step in case of need, and to secure that 
 centralised State which Germany's greatest patriot, Carl 
 vom Stein, dreamed of for his country at the dawn of the 
 War of Independence." 1 
 
 Such is the argument of this most interesting essay. In 
 a sense it was falsified by the events of the next seven years. 
 The smaller States did assent, under Bismarck's influence, 
 to the formation of a Bundesstaat ; the Federal State so 
 formed proved to be a practicable constitution, although, as 
 Treitschke had prophesied, it was difficult to make it work 
 smoothly. And yet in a sense Treitschke was justified. 
 The Federal Empire has been less efficient than a Unitary 
 State for the purposes which German patriots hoped that a 
 united Germany would serve. The Empire has been held 
 together by the predominance of Prussia ; and there is no 
 doubt that, so long as the Empire prospers, the tendency is 
 
 1 Hist, und pol. Aufsdtze, ii. pp. 240-41.
 
 THE MOVEMENT FOR GERMAN UNITY 73 
 
 for the power of Prussia to encroach upon the sphere which 
 the original constitution reserved to the State governments. 
 The essay is long and discursive. It is difficult in a resume 
 to do justice to its peculiar merits. The conclusions at 
 which Treitschke arrives are often dubious. But there can 
 be no doubt of the skill with which he marshals his historical 
 arguments. An excellent example is afforded by the 
 lengthy but closely reasoned passage in which he holds up 
 Italy as an example to Germany, and discusses the question 
 whether it is possible for Prussia to imitate the example 
 of Piedmont a passage which is all the more impressive 
 because it dwells chiefly upon the difficulties to be overcome 
 before Prussia can succeed as Piedmont has succeeded : 
 
 " The national movement in Italy was directed towards 
 the goal of a centralised State more rapidly and more resol- 
 utely than is possible in Germany ; for Italy was even less 
 hampered than ourselves by such legitimate dynasties as 
 call for respectful consideration. It was in that great age 
 of the Italian Renaissance, which the modern world has to 
 thank for a considerable portion of its civilisation, that the 
 name ' State ' first originated. Lo stato was originally 
 used to designate merely the person of the ruler and his per- 
 sonal retinue. In fact, the interests of the rulers were the 
 foremost consideration in these modern Italian States, which 
 had been erected on the ruins of a medieval theocracy. 
 Condottieri, bankers, daring sons of fortune, wiped out old 
 States and created new States, aided by their sword, their 
 money, their luck, and their immense ambition. The native 
 despots finally succumbed to foreign conquerors ; the 
 legitimate Republics of Genoa and Venice were abolished ; 
 and the high-sounding word ' legitimacy ' could only be 
 applied, with any semblance of justification, to Piedmont 
 and to the States of the Church. Under such circumstances 
 as these, when right was exclusively an attribute of might, 
 Machiavellism became indispensable as a national philosophy. 
 That virtu, that resolute conscious energy, which advances
 
 74 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 towards its goal, without troubling to consider the honesty 
 of the means, was recognised as the supreme political virtue. 
 
 " In this chaos of purely materialistic States federalist 
 ambitions had for centuries ceased to have any power worth 
 mentioning. It is true that the peninsula was always bound 
 together by a certain community of political development. 
 All Italy feasted on the great memory of the avita grandezza 
 of Rome's world empire. Every part of the country had 
 been affected by the feudal system and by the struggle 
 between the Empire and the Papacy. In all alike had been 
 witnessed the rise of powerful municipal communes. At the 
 close of the Middle Ages the whole of Italy was under the 
 influence of the mercenary troops, the bankers, and the 
 despots of the cities, until there was established that system 
 of equilibrium between the more important States which 
 supplied a model for Europe to imitate. Finally, in modern 
 history, the whole of Italy was suffering under an alien yoke, 
 whether Spanish, French, or Austrian ; and this community 
 of political fortunes and misfortunes contributed at least as 
 much to strengthening the desire for unity as did the com- 
 munity of language and civilisation. Yet the peninsula 
 was never held together by the bond of federalism. The 
 moment when a league of the towns might have developed 
 out of the Lombard League 1 was allowed to pass ; and all 
 the various plans and endeavours of Arnold of Brescia 2 and 
 Rienzi, 3 Dante and Machiavelli, the Visconti 4 and the 
 Medici, Venice and a few great Popes, for securing the unity 
 of their country, had only the effect of preventing the idea of 
 unity from becoming entirely extinct in the unhappy nation. 
 
 "An immense impetus was given to the national idea when 
 the nation which had been despised by the world so long 
 gave birth to a ruler, and the Prince of Machiavelli became 
 
 1 Which opposed the Emperors Frederic I. and Frederic II. in the 
 twelfth and thirteenth centuries. 
 
 a Disciple of Abelard, and leader of the citizens of Rome against the 
 Papacy ; executed in 1155. 
 
 8 Who became Tribune of a Roman Republic in 1347, and ruled in 
 Rome for seven months. 
 
 4 Despots of Milan in the fifteenth century.
 
 THE MOVEMENT FOR GERMAN UNITY 75 
 
 incarnate in the person of Napoleon. The name of Italy 
 was introduced into public law ; and in the kingdom of 
 Italy 1 hostile neighbours learnt to make up their differences 
 and to feel themselves associates in one State. Yet even 
 then a Federal Union was not ventured upon ; and, after 
 the Vienna treaties, any such scheme became absolutely 
 impossible. The statesmen of the Vienna Congress, Metter- 
 nich and Castlereagh, declared drily that Italy's national 
 existence must be sacrificed to the peace of the Continent. 
 A league with Austria was justly rejected by Count Vallaise, 
 in the name of Piedmont, as ' a condition of perpetual 
 slavery/ a league without the imperial city of Rome, which 
 men had been toiling for in the forties, could never count on 
 the co-operation of dynasties under an Austrian influence. 
 And how difficult, or even impossible, was an enduring league 
 with the Papacy, which had always, even in secular politics, 
 made unscrupulous use of its right to bind and to loose ! 
 Even the proposed Customs Union of the reformed States 
 never came to anything. Finally, after the battle of Novara, 2 
 attempts at Federation lost all the ground they had gained, 
 since a deadly hatred separated constitutional Piedmont 
 from the despotic dynasties. The middle parties, the leaders 
 of which, Gioberti and Rossi, strove in the year 1848 for a 
 monarchical Confederation, were now visited with a severe 
 persecution from the courts. In such a desperate situation, 
 at the time of the peace of Villafranca, 3 practical political 
 science progressed more quickly than the literary movement. 
 Men's thoughts reverted to the idea of a centralised State, 
 which had already been put forward in the year 1814 by a 
 few daring intellects ; for the country was faced with this 
 alternative : either renunciation of a national policy, or 
 annexation and a centralised State. Thus the open hostility 
 of the dynasties and the great stress of the time saved the 
 
 1 Revived by Napoleon in 1 805 ; he himself was crowned King of Italy 
 in that year. 
 
 2 In 1849, when Charles Albert, King of Piedmont, was defeated by the 
 Austrians under Radetzky. 
 
 8 In 1859, imposed by Austria and Napoleon III. upon Piedmont.
 
 76 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 Italians from that chaos of federative and unitary ambitions, 
 which, in the case of Germany, impedes any resolute progress 
 towards the unity of the nation. Manin 1 summarily 
 described an alliance of monarchies as ' an alliance of princes 
 against nations/ and this was indisputably true as applied 
 to Italy, though only partly true as applied to Germany. 
 
 " Moreover, Piedmont was driven towards the goal of a 
 national policy by far more strong and compelling motives 
 than Prussia. Prussia had long been an independent power, 
 while Piedmont was in the position of a shuttlecock thrown 
 backwards and forwards between powerful nations, a power 
 of the third rank ; even, if we look more deeply, weighed 
 down by the very importance that it had enjoyed centuries 
 ago. The illusion that a State can be self-centred is 
 defended in Prussia with a passable show of reason ; but 
 in Piedmont it was impossible for any length of time. 
 ' Risk the crown of Piedmont for the crown of Italy/ said 
 Pallavicino 2 to the House of Savoy ; for since the dynasty 
 of the counts of Maurienne was of foreign origin, like all the 
 other Italian dynasties, and had not yet been recognised by 
 the radicals as a naturalised Italian family, it could only 
 rise to power by devoting itself unreservedly to a national 
 policy. If the House of Savoy failed to respond to the call 
 of the nation, the national party would have been obliged 
 to unchain those republican elements, which in Italy are 
 incomparably stronger and more energetic and more deeply 
 rooted in national history than they are with us ; and it 
 would perforce have proceeded to the demolition of Piedmont. 
 Without the aid of a great and persevering national ambition, 
 Piedmont would have been powerless, cursed as she was with 
 the absurd consequences which that crude and premature 
 attempt made in 1820 to create an Italian kingdom drew 
 down upon the head of Charles Albert of Carignan. And it 
 had to be demanded of a State in such a desperate condition 
 as this, that it should, in the full sense of the word, be merged 
 
 1 The founder of the Venetian Republic of 1848. 
 
 z The Marchese Giorgio di Pallavicino-Trivulzio who brought about the 
 union of Naples with the Kingdom of Italy in 1860.
 
 THE MOVEMENT FOR GERMAN UNITY 77 
 
 in Italy. It must use every means to assist a national 
 policy. Cesare Balbo's noble motto, L' Italia fara da se, 
 was at once revealed by the inspired moderation of Cavour 
 to be an impracticable idealism. In Germany such a radical 
 policy is not possible. Our movement for unity began more 
 tranquilly than the Italian, and it will take longer to reach 
 its goal. \ The Prussian State is too precious a possession of 
 the German nation for us to be able to cry to its king : 
 ' Risk the crown of Prussia for the German crown ! ' A 
 great State is more slow to resort to revolutionary measures, 
 because it has greater things at stake. / The kingdom of 
 Italy at the present day pursues a more cautious policy than 
 was adopted formerly by the kingdom of Sardinia. Also 
 our position with regard to other countries is more difficult. 
 (We can neither rely on the moral approval of foreign nations 
 (for they all regard our country either with scorn or with 
 indifference), nor yet on the armed assistance of foreign 
 sovereigns. A State like Prussia can never submit to the 
 decrees of foreign nations,) as Piedmont was obliged to 
 submit ; nor yet can it purchase their approval at the price 
 of humiliating conditions. 
 
 " Italy had yet another circumstance in her favour. 
 Particularism was of course more deeply rooted in Italy than 
 it is with us, and the individual States made war on one 
 another with an envious hostility which recalls the Hellenic 
 world. But for the most part, in Italy, particularism took 
 the form of an arrogant municipal spirit. The Genoese had 
 long since been compelled to accustom themselves to the 
 foreign yoke of Piedmont, and the Bolognese to their union 
 with the hated States of the Church ; the bureaucratic 
 centralisation of modern States had stifled a municipal self- 
 reliance, and every one must realise now that it is impossible, 
 in this age of country states, that city states should be 
 founded on the antique model. When once, however, 
 men had learnt to renounce municipal ambitions, the way 
 was cleared for a centralised State ; for that territorial 
 particularism, which was nourished in Germany by the
 
 78 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 bureaucracy, did not exist in middle and upper Italy. The 
 keener wits of the extreme particularists clearly foresaw 
 that a bureaucracy, which suppressed the municipal spirit 
 without creating a provincial spirit in its place, was assisting 
 the progress towards a centralised State. 
 
 [" We see, then, that a long series of historical facts, which 
 did not exist in Germany, smoothed the path of the Italians 
 towards the centralised State. But we must not forget the 
 most important factor of all, the political and moral rejuven- 
 escence of the national spirit) What a change of heart since 
 Machiavelli, on the threshold of the modern world, indicated 
 the direction of the political development of his country 
 with the great words ' ad ognuno puzza questo barbaro 
 dominio ! ' A nation which had been disdained for its 
 cowardice, and which had confirmed the unfavourable 
 opinion of the world by its revolution of 1820, finds the 
 courage for a heroic struggle ; the nation which had invented 
 the name of dilettantism, acquires the energy for persevering 
 and devoted political labour ; in the land of political murder 
 there ensues a revolution conspicuous for its moral purity, 
 and indeed, when we consider the atrocities of the dynasties, 
 astonishing in its moderation ; finally in the classic land of 
 sectarianism, of mistrust, of irreconcilable feuds, the noble 
 elements of bitterly antagonistic parties are seen uniting to 
 work for a common end. So this memorable movement 
 went forward with the certainty of a natural force ; and, 
 as it slowly advanced, it shifted its camp from the undis- 
 ciplined provinces of the South to the regions of the North, 
 the regions of a maturer political culture. Gradually 
 it became divested of its party character, and, in the place 
 of the colours of the Carbonari, it hoisted the national 
 tricolour. Strong in her purpose, Piedmont advanced into 
 Italy ; she began to adopt the language and the customs of 
 the great mother-country ; and whereas, sixty years ago, 
 Italy still ' ended at the Garigliano,' now, even in the most 
 forsaken districts of the South, all noble hearts are kindled 
 by the national idea." 1 
 
 1 Hist, und pol. A ufsdtze, ii. pp. 226-30.
 
 THE MOVEMENT FOR GERMAN UNITY 79 
 
 In conclusion, before leaving this masterpiece of political 
 advocacy, we may instructively contrast it with the Prince 
 of Machiavelli, a work which both repelled and fascinated 
 Treitschke. Germany in the early nineteenth century, like 
 Italy in the early sixteenth, was partitioned between a 
 number of weak and mutually suspicious governments. In 
 both countries there was need of a strong military power to 
 overawe the vested interests which opposed the creation of a 
 national State. I Both writers are agreed that the interest of 
 the nation must be set above the ordinary obligations of law 
 and of morality. Both would welcome the violent overthrow 
 of the smaller States by a patriotic prince.) But Machiavelli 
 sees no hope in any established dynasty. He looks for a 
 Prince who will begin at the beginning, who will first make 
 such a state as Caesar Borgia had made in the Romagna, 
 and will then proceed to reduce all other States. Machiavelli 
 pinned his hopes upon the craft and resolution of an in- 
 dividual adventurer. Treitschke finds his country in a less 
 desperate situation. \ He sees already in existence a monarchy 
 which is, or which soon may be, strong enough to do the work 
 tha^is required. 1 All that is needed is that Prussia and the 
 Hohenzollerns snould live up to their past traditions of 
 conquest and of devotion to the national ideal.! But there 
 is not only a difference in the conditions with which the two 
 writers have to deal. There is also a difference in their con- 
 ceptions of the State. To Machiavelli the State is a cunningly 
 compacted mechanism ; ( to Treitschke the State is an organ- 
 ism, which is strong not only by virtue of the ruler's person- 
 ality, but still more through, the spirit which animates and 
 unites the citizens in devotion to a common ideal. This 
 spirit, he holds, is fostered by the long-maintained habit of 
 obedience to a well-ordered government and of participation 
 in political life. It is, in his view, the Prussian spirit, rather y 
 than any technical excellence of the Prussian government or 
 the Prussian military system, which marks out the Prussian 
 kingdom as the predestined saviour of German nationality. 
 Prussia is to reform the political state of Germany by a
 
 8o HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 m 
 
 oral victory over the forces of particularism ; by imposing 
 her own ideals upon the citizens of other German States) 
 ( For Treitschke, as for Machiavelli, der Staat ist Macht. But 
 to the German thinker Macht means something more than 
 brute force and cunning. It means the momentum of a 
 / people inspired with the ideal of national service and trained 
 to sacrifice themselves in the service of the ideal. ) 
 
 Unfortunately the effect of continual controversy on 
 Treitschke's mind was that the Liberal element in his con- 
 ception of the National State tended to fall into the back- 
 ground. He found it difficult to admit that the opponents 
 of Prussia had any right on their side or deserved the slightest 
 consideration. ( Every act of resistance to the onward 
 march of Prussia was in his eyes a crime against Germany. 
 fHe assumed that argument was futile, that the last word lay 
 iwith force and not with reason. He rej oiced at every success- 
 ful stroke of force which brought Prussia nearer to supremacy; 
 he no longer cared to inquire whether Prussia was likely 
 to realise his ideal of the free constitutional State, or whether 
 her policy was calculated to win the confidence and esteem of 
 the German people) We see him at his worst in the pamphlet 
 on " The Future of the North German Middle States " to 
 which we referred in the last chapter. It is a violent im- 
 r-peachment of Hanover, Saxony and Electoral Hesse. Their 
 offence was that they had united with Austria to uphold the 
 German Confederation, with the ultimate object of saving 
 themselves from Prussian hegemony. That they should suffer 
 for the failure of Austria to protect them was natural enough. 
 But Treitschke demands their extinction, as though they had 
 been guilty of the worst of crimes. He hardly condescends to 
 argue ; the pamphlet is a sustained invective on the text : 
 
 " These dynasties are ripe and over-ripe for the annihila- 
 tion which they deserve. Their restoration would imperil 
 the safety of the new German Confederation, a sin against 
 national morality." l 
 
 1 Deutsche Kdmpfe, i. p. 128.
 
 THE MOVEMENT FOR GERMAN UNITY 81 
 
 The brutality of the course which he advocates is only 
 aggravated by the contention that the Saxons and the Hano- 
 verians will benefit,! materially and morally alike, by incor- 
 poration with Prussia. ) " As Prussian citizens they will 
 soon discover, if they have not already learned in this war, 
 from the elevating spectacle of Prussian patriotism, that the 
 human heart is richer and better when it has a fatherland, 
 a real and true fatherland, for which we live and give our 
 service, not a fatherland in the clouds, to which at dinner- 
 time we dedicate the brimming cup J Especially for Saxony, 
 entrance into the Prussian State would be nothing less than 
 the first beginning of public life." 1 It is an additional offence 
 of the Saxon and Hanoverian dynasties that they have not 
 made themselves unpopular. " Would God the middle 
 States were ruled by a bloody despotism which might 
 arouse all noble passions to a stout resistance ! The tyranny 
 of the small German princes is more easy-going than this 
 and therefore more pernicious for our drowsy nation ; it 
 insinuates itself by stealth and knows how to crush out all 
 character without disturbance." 2 
 
 Before he had finished writing, he received the news that 
 Saxony was to be spared, though Hesse and Hanover were 
 to be treated as he recommended, 
 mingled triumph and resignation, 
 processes of history it is the first step that counts. The 
 ball is set rolling, no god will stay its course. . . . The 
 costly harvest which we are fated to reap from the blood- 
 stained fields of Bohemia must not be curtailed by that 
 Albertine dynasty, which even at this hour implores 
 the help of foreign courts against Germany. The fate of 
 Saxony will not be finally settled by the conclusion of the 
 peace." 3 
 
 1 Deutsche Kdmpfe, i. p. 133. z Ibid. i. p. 143. 
 
 3 Ibid. i. p. 145.
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 THE NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION AND THE FOUNDING 
 OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE, 1866-187! 
 
 THOUGH Treitschke had refused the summons of Bismarck 
 to Berlin, he accepted, shortly after the conclusion of the 
 peace with Austria, a professorship at Kiel (October 1866). 
 
 f Here for twelve months he preached the gospel of Prussian 
 supremacy to the HolsteinersJ" a people of colossal sloth 
 and gluttony, of a stupid conceit the like of which I never 
 saw in any people," who were so far from being grateful for 
 annexation that they still spoke and thought of the Germans 
 as foreigners.]' In October 1867 he gladly left Kiel for 
 Heidelberg, to fill the chair of history which had been 
 vacated by the death of Ludwig Haiisser, the historian of 
 the War of Liberation. Here he remained till 1874. It was 
 the happiest period of his life, spent among congenial col- 
 leagues and enthusiastic audiences. Much of his time was 
 given to historical studies. He wrote here his studies of 
 " Bonapartism," " Cavour," and " The United Netherlands." 
 But his political essays of this time, collected in the two 
 volumes of Deutsche Kampfe, show that his interest in 
 contemporary German politics never flagged. 
 
 One of these essays was devoted to the constitution of 
 the North German Confederation, which was the work of 
 Bismarck. This new league, if considered as a step in the 
 direction of German unity, laboured under one obvious 
 disadvantage. It was smaller in extent than the old Con- 
 
 f federation which had been destroyed by the war of 1866 ; 
 
 2
 
 NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION 83 
 
 Austria stood outside it as a matter of course, and so also did 
 Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria. On the other hand, the 
 bungling diplomacy of Napoleon III. had compelled the 
 last three of these states to conclude alliances with Prussia, 
 for mutual defence, while the North German Confederation 
 was still in the making (1866) ; and their economic depend- 
 ence upon Prussia was already bringing them to acquiesce 
 in Bismarck's schemes for their inclusion in a wider Zollverein 
 (1867). Further, the new Confederation was stronger than 
 the old in two essential points. First, the supremacy of 
 Prussia was assured. The King of Prussia was ex officio the 
 President of the League, supreme in military and foreign 
 affairs. The chief minister of the new Confederation, the 
 Chancellor, was chosen by the King of Prussia ; and Prussia 
 possessed votes enough in the Federal Council (Bundesmth) 
 to block any resolution of which she disapproved. Secondly, 
 the new Confederation was no mere league (Staatenbund) / 
 but a federal state (Bundesstaat] ; and the supremacy of the 
 federal government over those of the constituent states 
 was justified by the formation of a federal representative 
 (Reichstag) which voiced the popular will. Events were to 
 prove that Prussia could dominate the Reichstag as effect- 
 ively as the Bundesrath. 
 
 This was far from being the Einheitsstaat which Treitschke 
 had desired. He accepted it with a better grace than might 
 have been expected, even prophesying that it would be 
 the basis of German political life for a generation. But 
 it is characteristic of his temper that he then proceeded to 
 tear away the veil of forms and conventions with which 
 Bismarck had disguised the real inferiority of Prussia's 
 eighteen allies. " A secession of the Confederates," he said, 
 " is made practically impossible by their own impotence 
 as well as by the constitution of the Confederation." 1 " The 
 comfortable existence of the small states is swept away once 
 and for all ; only their taxes and their ridiculousness remain. 
 . . . When the inhabitants of Thuringia and Saxony dis- 
 
 1 Deutsche Kdmpfe, i. p. 213.
 
 84 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 cover that, thanks to their useless courts and their equally 
 useless hordes of officials, they are more heavily burdened 
 than the Prussian people . . . then will the desire for 
 unitary government become a power in the nation." l He 
 points out that foreigners have already begun to speak of the 
 North German Confederation as a kingdom. And, in fact, 
 he continues, it is Prussia which, with the approval of the 
 nation (he gives this title to the peoples of the North German 
 States), has drawn up the Federal constitution. This con- 
 stitution, imperfect as it may seem, contains in itself the 
 germs of growth ; for both the King of Prussia and the 
 Federal Parliament have strong reasons to desire that the 
 Federal government shall be strengthened at the expense 
 of the State governments. There is every reason to hope 
 that the military forces of the States will soon be brought 
 more completely under Prussian control, and that the 
 State governments will be prevented from holding any direct 
 communications with foreign courts. 2 
 
 The grand defect of the constitution, in Treitschke's eyes, 
 / was the Federal Council (Bundesrath) . His criticisms of this 
 body which acted as a ministry, but was in effect a congress 
 of ambassadors are the more worth reproducing because 
 the Bundesrath survives to this day in the constitution of 
 the German Empire : 
 
 " Another institution, the Federal Council (Bundesrath), 
 which also reveals very weak points to the critic, is even 
 more difficult to reform. This remarkable institution com- 
 bines the functions of a ministry, a council of State, a Senate 
 of States (Staatenhaus) , a general Customs Conference ; 
 and at the same time it represents the collective sovereignty. 
 The several States are represented by delegates, who are 
 .bound by instructions ; and the nation will find by experi- 
 ence, as it has already found at Regensburg and Frankfort, 
 that particularist egotism is expressed with far less reserve 
 through the mouth of such representatives as these than it 
 
 1 Deutsche Kampfe, i. p. 213. * Ibid. pp. 318-22.
 
 NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION 85 
 
 is through the mouths of ministers who are personally 
 responsible for their words. This is very unsatisfactory, but 
 it is inevitable. If it is essential to preserve the form of a 
 Confederation of States (Staatenbund) , we might at least 
 effect the complete transference of the supremacy in military 
 affairs and foreign relations to the crown of Prussia (an end 
 which seems to us, as we have said before, at the present 
 day both attainable and desirable) ; but such a Confederation 
 would be incompatible with an independent administration 
 set above the individual States. For this reason, the execu- 
 tive cannot hold the same position of responsibility as a 
 constitutional ministry. A delegate instructed by his cabinet 
 is not responsible for the purport of his commission, but only 
 for its faithful execution. 
 
 "It is not surprising that even moderate men in the 
 Reichstag longed for a really constitutional government. This 
 was no doctrinarianism, as was alleged by the governmental 
 press. After the experiences of the Electorate of Hesse in 
 the thirties and the forties, thoughtful Liberals know well 
 that the legal responsibility of ministers signifies in practice 
 very little, even when the whole apparatus of laws and 
 boards prescribed by the constitutional theory is present 
 in its entirety. It becomes only the more difficult for 
 parliament and public opinion to insist on political responsi- 
 bility. ( The political morality of the government as well 
 as of the governed is impaired, if the nation does not know 
 to whom to award praise or blame for the conduct of the 
 State.] Germany has already had some painful experience 
 of this : on the occasion of any unpopular Federal resolution, 
 the mandatories of the States washed their hands of all 
 responsibility ; I the lesser cabinets took shelter behind the 
 Federal Diet ;( and, as a result of this general hide-and-seek, 
 party-life was poisoned and perverted.] A repetition of 
 this false situation is inconceivable in the North German 
 Confederation, in spite of the similarity in the legal condi- 
 tions. The President of the Confederation is represented in 
 all seven committees of the Federal Council, two of which
 
 86 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 he nominates on his sole authority ; and he has a veto in 
 military and naval matters. The predominance of Prussia 
 is so great that the committees will in fact be Prussian 
 commissions, assisted in their operations by a few provincial 
 officials. No momentous step in Federal policy can be taken 
 without the consent of Prussia. If the Prussian ministers 
 (as the government has admitted unreservedly) are responsible 
 to the Prussian Representative Assembly (Volksvertretung) 
 for their conduct in the Federal Council ; this is as much as 
 to say that it is they who are above all responsible for the 
 policy of the Confederation. The rights of the national 
 assembly in relation to the executive remain the same as 
 hitherto, and it will depend on the course of political develop- 
 ment in Prussia whether the ministers will be subjected to 
 that legal responsibility promised by the constitution, in 
 addition to the political responsibility to which they have 
 long been subject." 1 
 
 It is clear from this passage that the effect of the new 
 system would be to give a certain control over the Federal 
 executive, not to the Federal parliament, but to that of 
 Prussia. So far as the minor States were concerned, the 
 government of the Confederation would not be a constitu- 
 tional government. This is a point which Treitschke does 
 not meet. His attitude towards the Federal parliament is 
 the reverse of sympathetic. In one passage he suggests 
 that the individual needs to be protected against the possible 
 tyranny of this body, as well as against the possible tyranny 
 of the executive. 2 CHe thinks that the control of the purse 
 is the most important and most useful power for a parlia- 
 ment ; but he does not wish that it should have the power 
 of increasing or diminishing the army at its pleasure./ 
 
 These remarks upon the Federal parliament bring us to 
 questions of political theory which were much in Treitschke's 
 mind between 1866 and 1871. ( He desired a strong execu- 
 tive, headed by a hereditary monarch. He did not desire 
 
 1 Deutsche Kampfe, i. pp. 222-3. * Ibid. p. 229.
 
 NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION 87 
 
 a despotism. The State for which he demanded an absolute 
 loyalty was to be governed by a king and parliament.) 
 What were the grounds of this preference ? and what measure 
 of control did he wish the German parliament to exercise ? 
 His answers to these questions are indicated in the essays 
 on the Second French Empire (1871) and on Constitutional 
 Monarchy in Germany (1869-71). 
 
 In spite of his dislike for Bonapartism, which he regarded 
 as Greek tyranny brought up to date, he was impressed by 
 the fact that the system of Napoleon III. had lasted longer 
 than any other French constitution of the nineteenth 
 century. Plainly it offered a provisional solution of problems 
 which had proved too hard for the restored Bourbons, for 
 the Orleanist monarchy, and for the Republic of 1848. 
 It was a bad form of government, but it had probably been 
 the best for which the French people were fitted when 
 Napoleon III. established himself by the coup d'etat. One at 
 least of the objects with which Treitschke began the essay on 
 Bonapartism was to prove that it would be entirely out of 
 place in Germany ; he wrote the first draft in 1868, when 
 Napoleon III. and his system was still invested with the 
 glamour of success. At that time it was natural enough 
 that some Prussian patriots should desire the Hohenzollerns 
 to turn Bonapartists. In Germany, as in France, there was 
 a strong monarchical tradition as old as the nation itself, 
 and a weak constitutional tradition of comparatively modern 
 growth. A German politician who believed in the import- 
 ance of defending old historical traditions might very well 
 denounce constitutionalism as a quack remedy, the invention 
 of latter-day doctrinaires. 
 
 ( Treitschke, however, pointed out that France, unlike 
 Germany, was destitute of any dynasty with historical claims; 
 to the allegiance of the nation. The French constitution 
 was monarchical ; but the prize of the monarchy was 
 within the grasp of every political adventurer. /(The Bona- 
 partist despotism was founded upon a plebiscite, which 
 gave to Napoleon III. the only title to sovereignty that
 
 88 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 France would acknowledge as legitimate ; and the fact 
 that he had been elected by a plebiscite made it possible for 
 him to arrogate unlimited powers, refusing any real share 
 in the government to the representative assembly. I What 
 thinking Frenchmen had desired was a constitutional king ; 
 and they only tolerated the absolutism of Napoleon III. 
 because they despaired of establishing something better, 
 and because any form of monarchy was preferable to the 
 anarchy with which they had been threatened in 1848. 
 
 But the desperate situation of 1848, and the long-suffering 
 of French public opinion after the coup d'etat, were due to 
 the special history of the French nation. They were due to 
 the disintegration of French political parties, which had 
 become incurable since 1815 ; to a centralised system of 
 local government, which gave the French elector no oppor- 
 tunity of a political education, and which had destroyed the 
 old local communities with their power of corporate resistance ; 
 last, but not least, to the feud between the propertied classes 
 and the labouring classes, which had grown up under the 
 Orleanist monarchy, and had culminated in 1848 during the 
 Socialist experiments of Louis Blanc. The propertied classes 
 accepted Louis Napoleon as President because they needed 
 a strong man to make headway against Socialist Republican- 
 ism, with its schemes for the redistribution of wealth. He 
 was in their eyes a bulwark against the tyranny of the Fourth 
 Estate. But he actually owed his power to the Fourth 
 Estate, who hoped that he would govern entirely in their 
 interest. There could be no doubt that, in the long-run, he 
 was bound to favour the labouring classes and to treat the 
 upper classes with contempt. The support of the working- 
 man was essential to him ; that of the upper classes was 
 useful but not essential.( There was the possibility that 
 Germany might, in the future, be compelled to accept Bona- 
 partism under the compulsion of the vote of the Fourth 
 Estate. ( But, as Treitschke pointed out, the middle class had 
 still the upper hand in Germany ; while this state of things 
 1. continued, Bonapartism was neither necessary nor desirable.
 
 NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION 89 
 
 "It is difficult between such an excess of praise on the 
 one hand and condemnation on the other to draw the hard, 
 clear line of historic judgment ; it is all the more difficult 
 because that inner self-contradictoriness of Bonapartism, 
 that diabolic half-truth which we have so often signalised 
 as the characteristic feature of revolutionary despotism, 
 exhibited itself in the second Empire, with suicidal force. 
 The third Napoleon scarcely made a single statement to 
 which he did not himself give the lie by some contradiction, 
 either of word or action. Personally he was perhaps more 
 free from the dangerous passions which are the curse of 
 modern France than any notable man among his French 
 contemporaries ; yet that necessity for self-preservation 
 which was the very essence of his system incessantly impelled 
 him to goad on these passions ; and on himself and his house 
 was fulfilled the Nemesis which was bound sooner or later 
 to overtake the frivolous arrogance of the whole nation. 
 
 " The greatest difficulty of all in the way of arriving at an 
 accurate political judgment springs from the social founda- 
 tions of the new French State. Class-selfishness has at all 
 times been the inalienable characteristic of all ruling classes ; 
 but, in the eyes of posterity, it never appears more odious 
 than when it has become a second nature, and so reveals 
 itself simply and unconsciously. The literature of antiquity 
 reveals unmistakably the intellectual arrogance of that huge 
 aristocracy which took as little account of the poorer free 
 men and the slaves as if they had been empty air. Very 
 few suspect to what a degree we ourselves are steeped with 
 the same sentiments. f The middle classes, who rule public 
 opinion in Germany at the present day, regard freedom of 
 competition as being of the essence of social freedom, and 
 freedom of discussion as the first and indispensable condition 
 of political freedom ; and, after a series of memorable 
 struggles, they have outgrown their unquestioning faith in, 
 the Church. To this frame of mind we owe the emancipation 
 of the peasantry ; it has made our educated classes the freest 
 and fairest of all the ruling classes of history. Yet a strenuous
 
 90 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 self-examination reveals to us that, even while we are 
 working for these pure political ideals, our thoughts are still 
 in bondage. A haughty nobleman of the eighteenth century 
 could better understand the ideas of the rising civic popula- 
 tion than we could enter into the thoughts of our Fourth 
 Estate.) 
 
 " The disposition of the working classes has been charac- 
 terised by Aristotle in the classic expression : ^alpova-iv 
 av rt? ea 77/305 rot? ISioi? a-%o\d%i,v ', a statement which, 
 in these more emancipated modern days may be qualified, 
 but can never become entirely false. \ For these classes of 
 society, private life and the toil and burden of domestic 
 cares are the very core of their existence ; but while, for 
 that reason, they are fully justified in trying to gain some 
 control of the conduct of the State, they are not in a position 
 to perform any continuous and regular service for the 
 State. They are seldom enthusiastic for that lively, in- 
 tellectual war of mind with mind which to the cultured man 
 is the bread of life ; and they are prone to sacrifice freedom 
 of thought for a benevolent administration which will exert 
 itself to promote the well-being of the people at large. Of 
 all the spiritual forces it is always the Church which exercises 
 the strongest sway over a mind of this type, f This is the 
 reason why it is difficult for the scholar to give an accurate 
 judgment on the latest stage in the development of Bona- 
 partism. The importance of this Fourth Estate has never 
 been so great in the modern world as under the Second 
 Empire. In the days of the Convention, the Paris mob 
 controlled the government of the State, and they derived 
 a portion of their power from the smoothly-running ad- 
 ministrative machine. Under Napoleon III. they stood 
 outside the Government, and yet the Fourth Estate was 
 still the most important class in the State. Continuous 
 attention to the happiness of the multitude was the leading 
 principle of the new Bonapartism. Even to-day, under the 
 so-called Republic, the future of the realm lies undoubtedly 
 in the hands of the peasantry and the working classes.
 
 NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION 91 
 
 But, wherever the Fourth Estate predominates, its material 
 conception of life will also predominate. Indeed, in modern 
 France, this moral crudity, this disregard of all ideal good, 
 appears so revolting, that we are led instinctively to a con- 
 jecture, which, it must be confessed, cannot actually be 
 substantiated by historic proof. It appears, that is to say, 
 as if the nobler Romance and Germanic elements of this 
 mixed nationality had been entirely skimmed off, and the 
 foul dregs of Celticism were bubbling up again. In order 
 to discern, amid all its hypocrisy and immorality, the merit 
 of such a system based upon the Fourth Estate, the man of 
 culture must forcibly repress many of the dearest and most 
 noble instincts of his class. 
 
 " The Second Empire fell within the two decades of modern 
 times, which were, politically speaking, most fruitful ; and, 
 if we consider how rapidly, in a series of frantic leaps, the 
 judgment of the world has changed with regard to the third 
 Napoleon, we realise very forcibly how much older we have 
 grown in a short time. As the incarnate contradiction of 
 an ineffectual republicanism, the new Bonapartism wrought 
 a deeper and more violent transformation in the social 
 circumstances of the country than any other government 
 of modern times. With the boldness of an absolute authority, 
 it ventured on many deep and far-reaching reforms, such as 
 a Parliament would have lacked either the courage or the 
 impartiality to accomplish. But the precipitous downfall 
 of this energetic system is only another confirmation of the 
 rule that the existence of a government is the less secure in 
 proportion as its activity is extended more widely." l 
 
 That Bonapartism was capable of producing good results 
 was proved by the good work which Napoleon III. had done, 
 both in his foreign policy and in home government, during 
 the middle years of his reign. More especially Treitschke 
 praises the record of the Second Empire in the years 1858- 
 1860, when it helped Italy to achieve national unity, estab- 
 
 1 Aufsdtze, iii. pp. 290-2.
 
 92 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 lished a moral supremacy over the Romance States of the 
 Mediterranean, and embarked on a policy of free-trade 
 which was expected to make the whole of Western Europe 
 a single open market. But after 1860 the Empire degener- 
 ated, very largely through the weaknesses which were 
 inherent in its structure. However earnestly Napoleon III. 
 may have desired to stand above the feuds of parties and 
 classes, he could never afford to forget that his power was 
 
 j derived from a Fourth Estate which could only be led 
 by indulgence, by deceit, and by systematically suppress- 
 
 \ing free discussion. Treitschke gives him the credit due 
 to good intentions and clear insight ; but suggests that his 
 personal merits only make more apparent the weakness of 
 the system to the maintenance of which they contributed. 
 
 ( It is interesting to notice what Treitschke regards as the 
 chief sins of the Second Empire against individual liberty. 
 His catalogue reveals by implication some features of the 
 ideal monarchy which he expected the Hohenzollerns to 
 provide for Germany. He censures the Emperor for re- 
 stricting the right of petition. Petitions might not be pre- 
 sented to the Legislative Chamber, which was the representa- 
 tive element in the constitution, but only to the Senate, 
 which had the power to disregard them, and which, being 
 composed of life-members, was not responsible to the nation. 
 He notices again that the right of public meeting was practic- 
 ally destroyed ; that the newspaper press was subject to 
 a rigid censorship ; that the elections to the Legislative 
 Chamber were managed by the Government ; that the 
 proceedings of the Chamber were controlled by a nominated 
 president ; that the control which the Chamber was supposed 
 to exercise over the budget was altogether illusory. The 
 effect of all these restrictions was that, while the educated 
 classes might discuss politics in the privacy of a salon or a 
 learned society, the masses were prevented from forming 
 or expressing an independent opinion upon political subjects, 
 and their representatives were rendered impotent for good 
 or evil. The edifice of the imperial constitution was most
 
 NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION 93 
 
 ingeniously constructed ; it was buttressed by great vested 
 interests. But there was no assurance that the Government 
 would act in accordance with the will of the masses, though 
 in the last resort it depended on the masses .) It was in fact 
 a Byzantine despotism which existed by perpetuating the 
 divisions of the country : j 
 
 " At a first glance the consequence of this form of State 
 appears inevitable. The pyramid of the old Napoleonic 
 Government, created by a despotism for a despotism, based 
 on the theory of the omnipotence of the State, found its 
 natural apex in the elective autocrat, who uses his authority 
 for the benefit of the masses, and, if the worst comes to the 
 worst, is prepared for a revolution. The Council of State, 
 too, had its numbers considerably strengthened, and, under 
 the first Emperor, it formed once again the leading feature 
 and the training school of the executive. It protected 
 officials from legal prosecution, and its discussions on 
 legislative projects were so precise and circumstantial that 
 any further deliberation in a parliament seemed superfluous 
 to the vast majority. The Civil Service was attached to 
 the system by the immense increase of the number of official 
 positions, and by the raising of salaries ; and the removal 
 of troublesome characters without any scandal was facilitated 
 by the newly established cadres de non-activite. Moreover, 
 the independence of the judicature scarcely yet appeared 
 as a bulwark against absolutism. Promotion to the Bench 
 was invariably a reward for devotion to the dynasty. The 
 choice of members of the Bench to serve on judicial com- 
 missions was no longer controlled, as formerly, by the pre- 
 siding judge and the older councillors, but by the President 
 and the Procurator General. By the side of this hierarchy 
 of authority we find, as a prudent concession to the ideas of 
 past days, the systeme consultatif, described by Persigny as 
 the hierarchy of freedom the legislative bodies known as 
 the General, Departmental, and Communal Councils 
 which did not actually take part in the administration, but
 
 94 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 were entitled to offer occasional advice to the bureaucracy 
 in the name of the propertied classes. If the army could 
 now be kept in a good temper by a short and successful war, 
 and the masses by amusements and public works ; and if 
 the educated classes could be completely imbued with the 
 toilsome and servile spirit of fonctionnomanie and the lust 
 for gold ; then would ensue a commonwealth, without any 
 moral purpose, it is true, but quite capable of maintaining 
 order and industry at home, and the authority of the State 
 in foreign affairs a modern counterpart of the Byzantine 
 empire. At Byzantium, as in France, an Emperor, once 
 acknowledged by the factions of the Circus, could count on a 
 tolerably tranquil government ; a rigid bureaucracy attracted 
 all talent to itself, and secured for the State a thousand 
 years of existence, for society an energetic commerce ; an 
 army which was technically first-rate achieved through the 
 centuries a series of triumphs over the East Goths and the 
 Vandals, the Cretans and the Syrians, the Armenians and 
 the Bulgars. If we are to believe Carlyle and other powerful 
 intellects of modern times, the ideals of freedom of our 
 century are to be regarded on the whole merely as a kind of 
 skin-disease of the present age." l 
 
 What was needed to make the system tolerable ? The 
 Liberal Opposition, after 1863, had striven for the English 
 parliamentary system ; but the conditions necessary for 
 the success of parliamentarism were absent. France had 
 no such stable and well-organised parties as were to be found 
 in England ; and the prospect of parliamentary govern- 
 ment did not appeal to the French proletariate. What was 
 needed, Treitschke thinks, was a reform of the administration 
 which would give the people some share in local government. 
 He had studied the views of Gneist and of Tocqueville on the 
 ( English Constitution ; from these writers he had learned that 
 , the secret of English liberty was to be found in the self-govern- 
 ment of the English shire and the English municipality :-j- 
 
 1 Aufsdtze, iii. pp. 309-10.
 
 NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION 95 
 
 '\It is true that the healing of a sick State may be begunx 
 either from above or below, either by the administration ory' 
 by the constitution. In France every conceivable experi- 
 ment with the constitution had been tried long ago. The 
 hope for a new revolution, which was expressed in the current 
 phrase, ' France has pawned away her freedom,' was a 
 childish consolation. The reform of the administration was~~t 
 the only way still open to political freedom. So long as 
 local communities do not show any independence in their 
 relations with the bureaucracy, the freedom of the press and 
 of association leads inevitably to anarchy ; and the exten- 
 sion of the rights of the national assembly leads to party 
 despotism. \ Only by giving a greater freedom to the com- 
 munes to the extent, at least, that their mayors should 
 no longer be arbitrarily selected for them might the well- 
 to-do classes possibly have been induced to regard an honor- 
 ary local office as an honour. | Only the active participation 
 of the educated classes in the work of administration might 
 some day have compelled the bureaucracy to cease from 
 despising the advice of the press as the presumption of hommes 
 sans mandat. And, above all, nothing but energetic partici- 
 pation in local government could possibly, in the midst of 
 the storms of party-conflict, have revived the almost extinct 
 virtues of political discipline and devotion to duty, and have 
 done something to weaken the habit of unthinking and 
 mechanical routine which governed the whole nation." l 
 
 But Napoleon III. was not entirely to blame for refusing 
 to grant freedom of local government. The social situation, 
 in France made such a reform almost impossible. Free local 
 government is hard to establish and harder to maintain; 
 when the Fourth Estate is sovereign, f Free local govern- 
 ment means, in the last resort, government by a local aristo- . 
 cracy, it may be of birth, it may be of wealth. The masses 
 prefer to be ruled by paid officials, who stand above and 
 outside class-quarrels. Free local government throws heavy 
 
 1 Aufsdtze, iii. pp. 326-7.
 
 96 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 responsibilities upon the propertied classes, which only 
 pressure from above will compel them to undertake./ 
 Prussia was successful in establishing the system in 1808 ; 
 but the Prussian people had been long trained in the habit 
 of obedience such obedience as cannot be looked for under 
 a democratic despotism. 
 
 In the essay on " Constitutional Monarchy in Germany " 
 Treitschke pursues the same vein of thought. He holds 
 that the English party system of government is no more 
 v applicable to Germany than to France. | In Germany, and 
 more particularly in Prussia, the traditional prestige of the 
 monarchy is such that no ministry could impose its wishes 
 upon a legitimate king. The King of a German State must 
 be left to choose his ministers as he thinks best. It is un- 
 avoidable that his ministry should have a partisan com- 
 plexion and depend to some extent on partisan support. 
 But the constitutional king will see to it that his ministers 
 subordinate party considerations to the interest of the State.] 
 He may make a mistake in his choice. Parliament should 
 then be able to compel the retirement of the unpopular 
 minister. It should not have the power to designate his 
 successor. The ideal ministry is represented pretty well 
 by the Bismarck ministry in the years 1866-71, when it 
 had ceased to be a party cabinet : 
 
 I " The system of party-government has not proved 
 successful in any of the great monarchies of the continent. ) 
 The frivolous conduct of those jealous coteries which, under 
 Louis Philippe, reduced all government to a game of grab, 
 terminated with a disgraceful bankruptcy. Even Cavour's 
 government only confirms the rule. That gifted statesman 
 succeeded for a few years in completely dominating the 
 Sub-Alpine parliament and in silencing trivial party differ- 
 ences by the great idea of Italian unity ; but immediately 
 after his death there ensued such a confused and disorderly 
 party administration as no one could hold up as a model to 
 our State. England alone, up to the present, has presented '
 
 NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION 97 
 
 those conditions which make possible a healthy development 
 of parliamentary party government a degraded crown, 
 which has renounced its own freedom of will ; a magnificent 
 and highly developed form of local self-government, pro- 
 tected by legal restrictions, a self-government which renders 
 absolutely impossible the despotic interference of party- 
 governments in local administration or in the management 
 of the churches and the schools ; a ruling class which fills 
 the offices in this system of self-government, and alone bears 
 the greater part of the burden of taxation ; a subordinate 
 Civil Service which is subject to the aristocracy in social as 
 well as in political life ; a parliament which unites within 
 itself almost all the practical political talent of the nation ; 
 a Lower House, the majority of the members of which belong 
 to the aristocracy, are elected by the overwhelming influence 
 of the aristocracy, and are therefore at once susceptible to 
 and independent of public opinion ; an Upper House made 
 up of the heads of the aristocracy ruling in the House of 
 Commons ; two great aristocratic parties, firmly bound 
 together both by tradition and by family relationship, and 
 united on all important questions relating to the constitu- 
 tion ; respected party leaders, who govern these parties with 
 dictatorial authority ; finally, a nation, who regard the 
 government with a vigilant open-mindedness, but cherish 
 a sincere confidence in the political skill of their nobility. 
 Let one of these pillars be struck down, and the whole mighty 
 and ingenious structure of English parliamentarism will 
 tremble to its foundations." 1 
 
 I One of the reasons why the system could never thrive in 
 Germany is that the parliamentary career will never be the 
 only career open to the German politician. The_bureaucracy, 
 whose existence is rendered inevitable by the many-sided 
 activity of the German State, will always absorb a consider- 
 able proportion of political energy and political knowledge ; 
 and this bureaucracy will always demand to be represented 
 
 1 Aufsatze, iii. pp. 561-2. 
 
 H
 
 g8 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 in a German ministry. 1 ] It is improbable that German 
 general elections will produce those large and stable majori- 
 ties which are postulated by party government. Treitschke 
 thought that, even in England, there was no security for the 
 regular production of such majorities in the future ; in the 
 past, he maintained, they had only been ensured by the 
 existence of pocket boroughs and treasury boroughs. And, 
 he asked, how could the system possibly succeed in the 
 German Empire which started with a popular franchise, and 
 which could not restrict the franchise with any safety ? 
 
 ( But in arguing against the party system, Treitschke is not 
 arguing that the King's ministers should be responsible to the 
 King alone. He wishes them to be responsible in law for every 
 |act done against the law. He holds that this legal responsi- 
 bility must be expressly enunciated and denned by legisla- 
 tion ; otherwise there is no hope that a German bureaucracy 
 will respect the constitution.) Such a special law is unneces- 
 sary in England, but in Germany, he would have us under- 
 stand, there is a real danger that power may fall into the 
 hands of a Strafford. 2 
 
 \Legal responsibility is in itself no guarantee that a minister 
 will give effect in his policy to the wishes of the nation. 
 But Treitschke argues that a non-party cabinet will always 
 be compelled to defer to the popular will, as expressed by the 
 representative chamber./ For it will not command a ready- 
 made majority ; it must purchase support for its own 
 measures by a certain degree of complaisance. Even Bis- 
 marck was obliged at times to rid himself of reactionary 
 colleagues, certainly not from any love of liberal doctrines. 
 Treitschke is not prepared to make the ministry dependent 
 upon parliament by giving to the latter the full " power of 
 the purse." He remarks that even in England it has been 
 found necessary to restrict, in practice, this old and much- 
 belauded privilege of the Lower House : 
 
 " It sounds incontrovertible, but is as a matter of fact 
 
 1 Aufsdtze, p. 562. 2 Ibid. p. 567.
 
 NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION 99 
 
 only an empty quibble to assert that, out of the right to vote! 
 individual taxes there follows automatically the right to\ 
 refuse them altogether. The right of voting taxes is entrusted 
 to the Lower House, in order to safeguard the interests of 
 the tax-payers, and to exercise an effective supervision over 
 the State-revenues ; and not in order to subvert the State, 
 nor yet in order to subject the Crown to the Lower House. 
 The resolution simply to refuse taxes is always an insincerity ; 
 it does not mean what it says. It cannot mean that the 
 payment of taxes should cease, and that the State should be 
 abolished ; what it does mean is, by a powerful threat, to 
 attain some other end, for instance, the overthrow of a 
 minister. But to threaten with an impossibility is always 
 futile. A parliament which is strong enough to overthrow 
 a ministry by a vote of want-of-confidence has no need to 
 refuse taxes. A parliament which does not possess this 
 power will be even less in a position to exercise the very 
 much more oppressive right of starving the State into 
 surrender. It is the old amusing story of the boy who found 
 himself unable to roll away a big stone, and so looked for 
 a heavy lever. No doubt the lever would have been able 
 to move the stone, but the boy could not move the lever." l 
 
 He is thinking, naturally, of the deadlock which occurred 
 in Prussia between 1862 and 1866, when the House of Repre- 
 sentatives had rejected the budget to express their dis- 
 approval of a new and severer rule of military service. It 
 is significant of the change in Treitschke's opinions that,^ 
 whereas in those years he had blamed Bismarck for the dead- 
 lock, in 1871 it is now the House of Representatives which 
 he censures : 
 
 " It was inevitable that such an absurd right of budget- 
 control, in the case of a nation with a strong sense of justice, 
 should entail a violent struggle. Weak parliaments are 
 always inclined to make an indiscriminate use of their rights ; 
 
 1 Aufsdtze, iii. p. 570.
 
 ioo HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 and while, in fact, the passing of the budget does always 
 essentially depend on the Lower House, the Prussian House 
 of Representatives, as a result of the absurd regulations of 
 the constitution, could not feel the full measure of this heavy 
 responsibility. The House washed its hands of the matter, 
 and declared emphatically during the conflict : ' It is not 
 we who have rejected the budget.' This was so in appear- 
 ance, though not in fact ; for the House of Representatives 
 gave the Budget a form, which, as every one knew, could 
 not be accepted by the two other factors. The conflict is 
 forgotten, but the unfortunate regulations of the Prussian 
 constitution have unhappily, with some trivial alterations, 
 been adopted in the constitution of the North German Bund. 
 The German Reichstag has, indeed, an indirect right of grant- 
 ing taxes, since it fixes the amount of the quotas which are 
 to be paid by the States. But the Commander-in-Chief 
 of the Federal Army receives under any circumstances 
 definite sums for the maintenance of the present peace- 
 strength of the Army ; so that, as a matter of fact, he dis- 
 poses of the greater part of the Federal revenues." 1 
 
 ' ' " 
 
 The subject of financial control is one which causes 
 
 Llreitschke considerable embarrassment. He rejects as im- 
 practicable a proposal to distinguish between ordinary and 
 extraordinary taxes, to make the ordinary taxes unchange- 
 able over a considerable period of time, and to earmark them 
 as the source of supply for the permanent needs of the States, 
 only leaving the Parliament free to reject proposals for 
 new expenditure of a less essential kind. To draw a dividing 
 line between essential and non-essential expenditure he 
 thinks extremely difficult. In England the standing Army 
 is voted afresh in each year as though it were non-essential ; 
 a Prussian Parliament might take this view of the Prussian 
 Army, and if it did so would at once come into conflict with 
 the Prussian monarchy. He comes to the conclusion that 
 there is no legislative expedient by which quarrels over 
 
 1 Aufsatze, iii. p. 573.
 
 NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION 101 
 
 expenditure can be prevented, and no unobjectionable 
 definition of the financial control which should belong to 
 the legislature. He merely hopes that, as the influence and 
 the self-restraint of German parliaments increase, they 
 will be able to exercise a salutary and effective control. 
 Such a control would not be a source of weakness to a wise 
 and moderate constitutional monarchy. 
 
 I For Germany, however, it should be an easy matter to 
 elaborate the much more efficient check upon the central 
 government which is supplied by a scheme of local self- 
 government. / Prussia, he points out, has already taken some 
 notable steps in this direction. Her municipalities enjoy 
 a remarkable degree of self-government ; her Circles and 
 Communes play an important part in financial and military 
 administration. In the development of such tendencies lies 
 the strongest safeguard against the encroachments of a 
 bureaucracy which makes new laws under the pretext of 
 interpreting those enacted by the legislature, and goes on 
 the principle that everything is permitted to it which is not 
 expressly forbidden by the law. An unfettered bureaucracy 
 was necessary to a State like Prussia, when her whole energies 
 were required for the reduction and absorption of the small 
 States by which she was surrounded. (^ But now the time has 
 come for returning to the older Germanic tradition of free 
 local government. He pleads for a sweeping reform of Prus- 
 sian local government which shall start from this first prin- 
 ciple. Self-government must be introduced into the Pro- 
 vinces, into the Circles which make up the Province, into the 
 Communes which make up the Circle. 1 He is particularly 
 anxious that the independence of the Provincial government 
 should be assured, and that its sphere should be enlarged. 
 For example, he would give each Province some control over 
 education. Greatly as he admires the centralised State, he 
 is still enough of a Liberal to feel that it would be disastrous 
 if the education of every citizen in the State should be 
 conducted on uniform lines, and those the lines laid down 
 
 1 Aufsdtze, pp. 585-6. 
 
 RIVERSIDE
 
 102 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 by a single Minister of Education. Local self-government 
 is a potent method of training the political opinion of the 
 country, and of giving it a real weight. But free education 
 is even more important as a safeguard of political liberty ; 
 a free nation requires an intellectual aristocracy which 
 can never be reared under the paralysing uniformity of a 
 centralised educational system, j 
 
 The constitutional position of Treitschke is then a middle 
 position. He says himself that he will be criticised as a 
 fanatical supporter of centralisation, who at the same time 
 desires to curb the central power by Liberal checks and 
 balances. He holds a middle position between the agitators 
 - of 1848 and the Prussian school of Bismarck. The patriot 
 statesman of his dreams is a statesman like Cavour, who is 
 not afraid of resisting revolutionary idealists when they 
 attack the old institutions and traditions of his country. 
 Treitschke holds that the radical democrats of Germany 
 have always been, and must remain, the enemies of national 
 unity. But the monarchical state which he desires is to be 
 more Liberal in spirit than any Prussian government had 
 been since the time of Stein and Hardenberg. It was not 
 [to be the slave of public opinion ; but it was to be limited 
 J by law and always in close touch with the intelligent and 
 \ reasonable aspirations of the educated classes.) This is an 
 intelligible and indeed an imposing ideal. But it involves 
 certain dangers to political liberty, which are more evident 
 now than they were when Treitschke wrote. (^His constitu- 
 tional monarchy might fail to represent the true wishes of 
 the nation ; it might be, it probably would be, supported by 
 the bureaucracy and the military hierarchy. Under such 
 circumstances a parliament, invested with the limited powers 
 which Treitschke would allow to it, is unlikely to assert the 
 national will with effect ; and it will be left for the masses 
 or the organs of local self-government to resist the adminis- 
 tration by revolutionary methods. Such methods are 
 nearly always tried too late, and inevitably produce evils 
 as serious as those which they are intended to remedy.)
 
 NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION 103 
 
 But to all such doubts and questionings Treitschke would 
 probably have replied that, if we have to choose between a: 
 strong government and a free government, we must take the\ 
 first alternative. VAt all events he was clear that, for Germany, 
 the question of liberty was much less urgent than the ques- 
 tion of making and maintaining a strong government :-) 
 
 " Great political passion is a precious treasure. The 
 jaded hearts of the majority of mankind afford it very little 
 space, f Happy the generation on whom a stern necessity 
 enjoins a sublime political ideal, a great and simple and 
 universally comprehensible ideal, which forces every other 
 idea of the age into its service ! And such an ideal exists 
 among us to-day the unity of Germany ! Whoever fails 
 to serve this ideal is not living the life of his nation. Our 
 life is spent in camp. At any moment an order from the 
 Commander-in-Chief may summon us to arms again. It 
 is not for us to pursue the myriad glittering hopes of freedom 
 which flutter through this age of revolution, to let our eyes 
 be blinded by desire. It is for us to stand shoulder to 
 shoulder, disciplined and self-controlled, and to guard 
 loyally that treasure of our unity, the German monarchy, 
 that we may hand it down to our sons, who perhaps 
 more free from care, but not more happy than their fathers 
 have been all through the hard struggle shall some day 
 increase the glory of the German State. To fight for the 
 unity of Germany is to defend freedom of thought against a 
 Roman lust for power ; the achievement of German unity will 
 mean the restoring to itself of a young and moral nation, 
 as yet only in the second quarter of its wonderful history. 
 If we fulfil this duty, then a proud future is assured for the 
 ideal of parliamentary liberty on German soil." 1 j 
 
 In conclusion, we may quote a passage from the Politik, 
 which can hardly have been acceptable to his non-Prussian 
 auditors ; which, at the time when it was written, hardly 
 
 1 Aufsdtze, iii. p. 625.
 
 104 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 represented the exact nature of the Empire ; but which is 
 instructive as showing what, in the eyes of an uncompro- 
 mising Prussian, would be the logical process of Germany's 
 political evolution! Treitschke proclaims that, in spite of all 
 appearances, Germany has become an Einheitsstaat : 
 
 " There are features which are common to the Empire 
 and to the two republican Confederations, and most authori- 
 ties on Constitutional Law leave the matter there. But we 
 historians must consider the historical foundations and the 
 living spirit of the politics of the Empire ; and, when we 
 do this, it becomes perfectly clear that, if the Empire is 
 compared with these Confederations, it is seen to rest on 
 an entirely opposite principle. \ While a Confederation must 
 endeavour to obviate as much as possible any inequality 
 among its members, the German Empire, on the contrary, 
 is based on such an inequality, that is to say, on the fact 
 that there is one dominant State, which links and subordin- 
 ates the other States to itself by means of a Confederation. 
 What would become of Germany, if the Prussian State 
 ceased to be ? The German Empire could no longer continue 
 to exist. | (From this follows the to most people dis- 
 agreeable truth, which, however, really implies nothing at 
 all injurious to a non-Prussian, that, in this German Empire, 
 only one of the former States, namely Prussia, has preserved 
 her sovereignty. Prussia has not) lost her right of arms ; 
 nor does she need to allow her own prerogatives to be limited 
 by others. The German Emperor is at the same time the 
 King of Prussia. He directs the arms of the nation ; and 
 it would be indulging in unprofitable quibbling to imagine 
 cases in which the German Emperor and the King of Prussia 
 should come into conflict with one another. It is nothing 
 else but a feeble jest to say, ' I would not advise the German 
 Emperor to start a quarrel with the King of Prussia.' Talk 
 about a ' War-Lordship in time of peace,' of which our minor 
 kings could also boast, is the privilege of theorising German 
 professors ; and it is the laughing-stock of foreigners. In its
 
 NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION 105 
 
 outward forms the change has been effected with the very 
 utmost consideration. Even the Prince of Reuss can boast 
 on paper that he has an army, and courtly mythology refers 
 to this battalion as the Reuss army. This complaisance has, 
 in fact, been carried too far ; but it does not alter the fact 
 that, in reality, in spite of political reservations, the King 
 of Bavaria is, just as little as the King of Saxony, in a posi- 
 tion to mobilise a single soldier for purposes of war. \ In 
 war, the German Emperor is War Lord. The right of arms 
 has been transferred to the Empire, and it is in the same 
 hands as the State of Prussia^ 
 
 \. Further, of all the German States, only Prussia is able to 
 maintain her prerogatives undiminished./ After the founda- 
 tion of the Empire, suggestions for altering the constitution 
 were rejected if there were 14 votes against them in the 
 Federal Council, and hence Prussia's 17 votes were alone 
 sufficient to prevent any legal restriction of her prerogatives. 
 But, in the third place and, strangely enough, this is a point 
 which is generally passed over in silence the obedience of 
 the constituent states is insisted on in the Empire, as in any 
 other State. So we find in the Imperial Law, as an extreme 
 remedy, ' execution,' a shining sword, which has never yet 
 been actually drawn, only rattled once or twice in its scab- 
 bard. [ Fortunately, the sense of loyalty among the constitu- 
 ent parts of the Empire is so strong that this means has not 
 yet been employed. But it is there ; the rebellious State 
 may, by means of an ' execution,' be compelled to obey the 
 laws of the Empire. It is the Emperor, however, who per- 
 forms this ' execution ' ; and the Emperor is not likely to 
 inflict it on the King of Prussia. The possibility of any one 
 giving himself a box on the ear need not be seriously con- 
 sidered.j 
 
 (" The whole Empire is based historically and politically 
 on the fact that it is (as Emperor William once said to Bis- 
 marck) ' an extended Prussia,' that Prussia is the dominant 
 factor, both in fact and in formula. What is our German
 
 io6 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 Imperial Army P^ Unquestionably it is the Prussian Army, 
 which, by the Army Bill of 1814, was developed into a nation 
 in arms, extending over the whole Empire. The German 
 Imperial Post, the Telegraph system, the Imperial Bank 
 (Reichsbank) are old Prussian institutions, extended to 
 the Empire. In all this there is no cause for complaint. 
 \Every Prussian must feel it to be quite right that the best 
 political institutions should be extended to the rest of 
 Germany ; and every reasonable non-Prussian must find 
 cause for rejoicing that Prussia has brought the name of 
 Germany into honour once again. The conditions are such 
 that the will of the Empire can in the last instance be 
 nothing else than the will of the Prussian State." 1 ) 
 
 1 Politik, ii. pp. 343-6.
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR 
 
 CONCERNING international politics Treitschke had little to 
 say before the year 1870. (One reason which moved him 
 to champion the cause of German unity was a conviction 
 that the German nation would never develop to its full 
 stature until it could play a leading part among the great 
 powers, and use its power for the furtherance of foreign 
 trade and colonisation. ) Long before 1870 he was accustomed 
 to think of war as a sharp medicine for national disunion 
 and waning patriotism. J The Franco-German War, however, 
 led him to think more intently of the rights of the German 
 nation as a member of the European state-system. ) 
 
 Needless to say that he rejoiced over the outbreak of the 
 war. " Who is so blind," he wrote, 1 shortly after the 
 outbreak of hostilities 'f Who is so blind that he cannot see 
 in the marvellous events of these latest days the divine 
 wisdom which constrains us Germans to become a nation ? " ] 
 The war, he said, had kindled a spirit of patriotism in the 
 North German Confederation which would do more for 
 national unity than a decennium of peaceful evolution. 
 The call to arms had dashed all parties into fragments. The 
 idea of nationality had proved stronger than those who 
 believed in it had ever dared to hope. The war had lifted 
 up the hearts of all patriots ; they felt that they were 
 engaged in a holy war, a war for the liberation of the world.) 
 
 1 Deutsche Kdmpfe, i. pp. 307 ff. (Die Feuerprobe des norddeutschen 
 Bundes). 
 
 107
 
 io8 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 It had also forced even South German princes to recognise 
 the King of Prussia as the head of the nation. (For Germany 
 the war was indeed a blessed necessity ; it was ordained 
 to consummate the work of unificatipn which had been half 
 accomplished by the war of 1866. H The war was not only 
 beneficial to Germany ; it was also a blessing to the world. 
 In this iron age it was necessary for the civilisation of the 
 |vorld that one nation should emphasise the ideal significance 
 pf war ; that Germany should show how a righteous war 
 should be waged. France had embarked on a career of 
 plunder with the over-confidence of a bully. England had 
 degenerated into a shameful cowardice. There would have 
 been an end to European state-law and European liberty if 
 Germany had not come forward as a nation under arms, 
 ready for peace but also ready for war. Germany would 
 never complain that she had been left to fight the battle 
 of Europe single-handed.^ 
 
 I Nevertheless Treitschke complains bitterly that England 
 has neglected her duty to Europe in deciding to stand neutral, 
 when she ought to be fighting for European liberty : ) 
 
 " Where once was England there now gapes an immense 
 void in the life of the nations. We had hoped as who 
 would not that had any heart for freedom that this native 
 land of parliamentary life would be preserved from the 
 fate of all commercial nations. We had thought that the 
 great memories of a glorious past, the wisdom of a statesman- 
 like aristocracy, and the righteousness of a free people, 
 would have raised a solid dam against the invading flood 
 of that Manchester theory which threatens to sweep away 
 all faith in the moral values of life. That hope seems now 
 to have been proved deceptive ; the descent of the island 
 kingdom, down that precipitous path that was once the path 
 of Carthage and of Holland, seems already to have begun. 
 The plans which are now harboured in the Tuileries can never 
 be accepted by Germany or Europe ; for with the German 
 left bank of the Rhine, Belgium, too, would be irrevocably
 
 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR 109 
 
 lost. Is there not one among the British statesmen who can 
 perceive what a scornful contempt for England was implied 
 in the fact that the descendant of Napoleon even ventured 
 to embark on such a war a marauding expedition, such 
 as even the light-heartedness of a Palmerston would never 
 have tolerated ? They perceive it quite well, but the lust 
 of mammon has stifled every feeling of honour, every feeling 
 of right and wrong ; cowardice and sensuality take shelter 
 behind that unctuous theological rhetoric which, to us free 
 German heretics, is the most repulsive of all the defects in 
 the English character. We seem to hear that reverend 
 snuffle, when we see the English press turn up pious eyes 
 full of indignation against the unchristian and warlike 
 nations of the continent. As if almighty God, in whose 
 name Cromwell's Ironsides once fought, would enjoin upon 
 us Germans that we should allow the enemies of our country 
 to march unmolested upon Berlin. Oh hypocrisy ! Oh 
 cant, cant, cant ! To all appearances, the fight will go on 
 to its finish, without England once brandishing her trident. 
 The correspondents of the Times will rouse their readers to 
 pious indignation, as they describe, with sublime tranquillity 
 of soul, the memorable duel of the two big brawlers. The 
 London Benevolent Society will conscientiously send so 
 many pounds and shillings to Berlin, and exactly the same 
 number of pounds and shillings to Paris. The English 
 traders will, like the Mynheers of Amsterdam on a previous 
 occasion, sell powder, coal, and horses to France ; and, as 
 a compensation to ourselves, the officers in the military 
 clubs will stake large sums on the victory of the German 
 arms. When peace does at length ensue, the weight of 
 the wide world's contempt will lie like a mountain on 
 England's shoulders ; and a sympathetic European Congress 
 may perchance assemble which will pronounce the island 
 kingdom to be neutral like Belgium and Holland, and will 
 enable the mistress of the seas to sell her war-fleet, like 
 a discarded plaything, to the highest bidder." 1 
 
 1 Deutsche Kdmpfe, i. pp. 316-17.
 
 no HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 At the end of August 1870, after the battle of Gravelotte 
 and before the crowning mercy of Sedan, Treitschke 
 published a second essay discussing the terms of peace 
 which in his opinion Germany was entitled to demand. 1 
 
 ,i/His main object was to insist that the annexation of Alsace- 
 Lorraine was both legitimate and necessary ; and the 
 arguments by which he proves his point are interesting, 
 because they reveal his conception of the rights and duties 
 of a national State. The State has a right to " natural 
 
 ' frontiers " ; and he suggests that Germany has on this 
 ground a right to annex not only Alsace-Lorraine, but also 
 Russian Poland as far as the Vistula. " This armed nation 
 of ours is not in a position to send forth its sons at any 
 moment to hunt down greedy neighbours. Our military 
 organisation is meaningless without defensible frontiers. . . . 
 We owe it to the continent of Europe to provide a permanent 
 guarantee for the peace of nations.'^ 
 
 He then turns to consider the objection that the popula- 
 tions of Alsace and Lorraine have no desire to be reunited 
 with Germany : 
 
 " Who, in the face of this our duty to secure the peace 
 of the world, still dares to raise the objection that the people 
 of Alsace and Lorraine have no wish to belong to Germany ? 
 ( Before the sacred obligation of these great days, the theory 
 of the right to self-government pf every branch of the 
 German race that seductive battle - cry of expatriated 
 demagogues will be ignominiously routed. \These pro- 
 vinces are ours by the right of the sword ; and we will rule 
 them in virtue of a higher right, in virtue of the right of the 
 German nation to prevent the permanent estrangement 
 from the German Empire of her lost children. We Germans, 
 who know both Germany and France, know better what is 
 for the good of the Alsatians than do those unhappy people 
 themselves, who, in the perverse conditions of a French 
 
 1 " Was fordern wir von Frankreich ? " in Deutsche Kdmpfe, i. pp. 
 321 ff.
 
 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR in 
 
 life, have been denied any true knowledge of modern Ger- 
 many. We desire, even against their will, to restore them 
 to themselves. Through the enormous changes which have 
 been accomplished in these times, we have discerned so 
 often, with glad astonishment, the undying influence of 
 moral forces in history, that it would be impossible for us 
 to believe in the absolute worth of a referendum. The 
 spirit of a nation embraces successive as well as contemporary 
 generations. Against the misguided wills of those who are 
 living now we invoke the wills of those who lived before 
 them. We call to witness all those strong German men, 
 who once impressed the stamp of our spirit on the speech, 
 the customs, the art, and the social life of the Upper Rhine ; 
 and, before the nineteenth century is ended, the world will 
 recognise that the souls of Erwin von Steinbach and Sebastian 
 Brandt are living yet, and,(that in disregarding the wills of 
 the Alsatians of to-day, we are only fulfilling an injunction 
 imposed by our national honour. ] 
 
 "^For two centuries, ever since the rise of the Prussian 
 State, we have been striving to free our lost German territory 
 from a foreign yoke. It is not the task of this national 
 policy to include within our new Empire every clod of German 
 soil which we surrendered in the days of our weakness) We 
 gladly suffer that the portion of our nationality contained 
 in Switzerland should develop in peace and freedom, inde- 
 pendently of the German State ; we are not counting upon 
 the decay of Austria ; nor do we desire to disturb the 
 separate existence of that German stock which has con- 
 stituted itself into an independent little nation in the 
 Netherlands. ( But we cannot suffer German nationality 
 to be systematically ravaged before our eyes and even sol 
 far degraded as to offer willing service against Germany. "^ 
 
 ( The Alsatians and the Lorrainers must be forced to be 
 free, both for the security of the German nation, and to 
 
 1 Deutsche Kdmpfe, L pp. 326-7.
 
 H2 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 vindicate the natural rights of every German stock to 
 maintain and develop its own racial characteristics. J {' The 
 rule of Frenchmen over a German stock was at all times a 
 vicious state of things ; to-day it is a crime against the 
 intelligence which directs human history, a subjection of free 
 men to half-civilised barbarians. Sooner or later the hour 
 was bound to strike when the growing German State would 
 be compelled to demand securities from France for the 
 maintenance of the German nationality in Alsace."/ 
 
 ( Lastly, the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine will give new 
 strength to the centripetal tendencies of the German State : 
 
 [' If, by our united efforts, we win for the German State 
 this seriously endangered outwork, the nation will indeed 
 have dedicated its soul to the thought of unity. The 
 recalcitrant new province will strengthen the unitary trend 
 of our politics, and will compel all thoughtful men to flock 
 in loyal discipline about the crown of Prussia ; and this 
 gain weighs all the heavier, (since it is always a possibility 
 that a new republican outbreak in Paris may attract the 
 admiring gaze of German radicals towards the West.y(.The 
 horizon of German politics becomes freer and wider from 
 year to year ; if the nation once feels that the vital interests 
 of the German State already extend into the Slav, the 
 Scandinavian, and the Romance countries, that we are in 
 the very midst of the greatest and sternest revolution of the 
 century ; then our parties, too, will learn to rise above the 
 disputatiousness of faction, above the pettiness of a doctrin- 
 aire programme, to a great, strenuous, and positive conduct 
 of the affairs of the State." ^ 
 
 L Finally, the possession of Alsace is necessary if Germany 
 is to develop her economic resources as befits a great 
 power :-4- 
 
 " There is also an important economic aspect of the 
 
 1 Deutsche Kampfe, i. p. 328. a Ibid. i. pp. 329-30.
 
 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR 113 
 
 question. Enthusiastic descriptions of Germany's rich and 
 favoured fields form an inevitable chapter in our patriotic 
 catechism, and will be found in every German school-book. 
 They are touching as a sign of loyal devotion to the land 
 of our fathers, but they are by no means true. [On the 
 contrary, a sober judgment will not deny that Nature has 
 been a hard stepmother to our country. The strikingly 
 diminutive proportions of our short North Sea coast, the 
 direction of most of the German rivers and mountains are 
 as unfavourable to political unity as they are to a world- " 
 commerce. Only a few tracts of German country can 
 compare in natural productiveness with fertile Normandy, 
 with England's luxuriant plains, or with the fat cornlands 
 of inland Russia. But here, in Alsace, we actually find a\ 
 German district, the soil of which, under a genial sky, oozes ; 
 with a fertility equalled only in a few favoured spots, 
 in the Palatinate beyond the Rhine, and in the uplands of 
 Baden. An unusually favourable conformation of the 
 ground has here made it possible to conduct canals from the 
 Rhine to the basins of the Seine and the Rhone through 
 two gaps in the mountain ranges magnificent waterways, 
 such as the German soil very seldom renders possible. We 
 are by no means rich enough to renounce so precious a 
 possession." 1 I 
 
 Finally, it is not enough that Germany should take from 
 France those French provinces which are inhabited by 
 men of German descent. Though Belfort and Metz are 
 thoroughly French cities^ it is for military reasons essential 
 that they should be annexed.j The general rule that political 
 and racial frontiers ought to coincide must not be pushed 
 too far ; that would be doctrinairism. " Justice and, 
 common sense approve our claims as moderate, if we onlyl 
 demand the German lands of France, and so much Romance\ 
 land as is necessary for their security."^ A Frenchman 
 might answer that, by such arguments, the original French 
 
 1 Deutsche Kdmpfe, i. pp. 330-1. 
 
 I
 
 H4 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, which Treitschke denounced 
 as mere robbery, could equally be justified.^ 
 
 The best that can be said of this reasoning is that it leads 
 Treitschke to much more moderate conclusions than his 
 disciples have reached from the same premises. He regarded 
 the independence of Belgium and Holland as necessary for 
 the sake of European peace. 1 He admitted that some of 
 the German lands which France had conquered in the 
 distant past no longer showed any trace of German speech 
 or German manners. He said that the historical claim of 
 Germany to the Rhone valley could no longer be seriously 
 entertained. He deprecated the idea of restoring the 
 German Weltreich of the Middle ! Ages. ( The German State 
 must be founded on the idea of German nationality. The 
 safe rule was to annex only those lands in which the 
 peasantry were still Germans at heart ; for in the end the 
 national sympathies of the peasant would ultimately 
 determine those of the higher social classes. J '^Every nation 
 is rejuvenated and renewed from below ; from the healthy 
 peasant class at the bottom of society are continually 
 welling up new springs of energy| while city populations 
 change rapidly and upper-class families either degenerate or 
 stray away into foreign countries. This is what we Germans 
 continually experience in the colonies of East Germany. 
 Wherever we succeed in Germanising the peasantry our 
 nationality stands unimpaired ; wherever the peasantry 
 remained un-German, our German civilisation still fights 
 for existence." 2 j 
 
 Treitschke has then a good, or at least a practicable, 
 working rule on which to base his policy of annexations. 
 But on the subject of international relations, the rights and 
 duties of nations inter se, his ideas are as chaotic and as 
 unhistorical as those of the Jacobins whom he so cordially 
 detested. ( At one moment he talks in the language of old- 
 fashioned statesmanship, appealing to international law, 
 denouncing the robberies of France, calling on his country- 
 
 1 Deutsche Kampfe, p. 333. * Ibid. i. pp. 333-4.
 
 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR 1 15 
 
 men and on Europe to vindicate the legal rights of Germany. 
 At another he appeals to principles such as " the right to 
 defensible frontiers," or " the right to unimpeded economic 
 development," which neither have nor can have any place 
 in public law. ) His desire to dismember France, so far as to 
 make her incapable of mischief, is perfectly intelligible ; it 
 may be even justified on the ground that he honestly believed 
 France to be the aggressor in the war of 1870. But, in 
 arguing that Germany has a right and a duty to take Alsace- 
 Lorraine, he commits himself to anarchical and inconsistent 
 doctrines. { These provinces are to be annexed in the name 
 of German nationality ; and yet he admits that their 
 civilisation is French. / Their inhabitants are to be liberated, 
 even though they have no desire to shake off French rule. 
 They are to be annexed because they were German in the 
 past ; and yet he admits that the Rhone valley, which stands 
 in the same case, ought not to be annexed. He would 
 annex in the interests of civilisation ; but it is a sufficient 
 excuse for annexation if the lower and less civilised classes 
 are prepared to welcome German rule. The opinion of the 
 educated classes is not worth taking into account ; they 
 must accept that form of culture which their uncultivated 
 inferiors would prefer.") After reading arguments of this 
 kind we shall not be surprised by the naked doctrine that 
 (Might is the sole test of Right which meets us in the more 
 formal and abstract discussions of the Politik. ) It is on the 
 side of international relations that Treitschke's political 
 philosophy is least considered and also most repellent} His 
 idea of public law was based upon a study of the two wars 
 of aggression by which Bismarck founded the German 
 Empire. For European history, as Ranke and the historians 
 of his school had conceived it, Treitschke had no liking. The 
 relations of States with one another filled him with tedium 
 or disgust, unless the fortunes of Germany were involved. 
 He was as " insular " as it is possible for a native of Central 
 Europe to be. In 1854 he had told his father :
 
 n6 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 " These affairs of German politics interest me now a 
 thousand times more than the great European question. 
 This half-decayed Turkey ; .' . . this timid and perfidious 
 policy of France and England ; . . . this Tsar Nicholas to 
 whom, though he is as I believe most flagrantly in the 
 wrong, one cannot refuse a certain reluctant admiration . . . 
 there you have indeed a mixture of impotence and brute 
 force than which nothing can be more tiresome." 1 
 
 A youth who could write this, when the Crimean War 
 was in sight and the whole future of South-Eastern Europe 
 seemed to hang in the balance, was not likely to follow the 
 international complications of the next twelve years with 
 close attention, or to gain much insight into the true nature 
 of international relations. We need not be surprised to 
 find that the least satisfactory pages of the Politik are those 
 which deal with the subject of treaties and of public law. 
 
 1 Briefe, i. No. 97.
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 " DIE POLITIK " (l) THE NATURE OF THE STATE 
 
 i. Origin of the " Politik " 
 
 lNli874 Treitschke quitted Heidelberg to take up a pro- 
 fessorship of history in the University of Berlin ; and at 
 Berlin he remained until his death in 1896. On the new 
 stage he did not cease to play an active part in politics. He 
 had entered the Reichstag in 1871, and he continued to sit 
 for the same constituency until 1884, first as a member of 
 the National Liberal party, afterwards as an independent 
 critic, but usually in agreement with Bismarck. In spite of 
 his deafness he attended the debates with regularity, learned 
 what was going on by looking over the shoulder of some 
 reporter, and not infrequently delivered a weighty speech. 
 As a pamphleteer and journalist he wrote much on current 
 topics, such as Socialism (of which he was a staunch op-- 
 ponent), the Labour Question, and Universal Suffrage. But 
 the most important fruits of his work at Berlin are the twd 
 volumes of lectures on Politik^ and the five volumes on\ 
 Deutsche Geschichte im 19 Jahrhundert. 
 
 It is with the Politik that we are specially concerned in this 
 and the two following chapters. The book is a compilation 
 from the note-books of pupils who heard him lecture at Berlin. 
 The lectures were delivered from fragmentary notes, and 
 consequently we have no right to expect a rigid precision of 
 language or absolute consistency at every point of the course. 
 But there was no course to which Treitschke devoted more
 
 n8 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 labour, or with which he was better satisfied. He delivered 
 it annually, and regarded it as his chief opportunity for 
 instilling his political views into the minds of successive 
 generations of students. And it was far from being a series 
 of random effusions. It was founded upon a course which 
 he had delivered in his youth at Leipzig and Freiburg, and 
 which he had repeated at Heidelberg. Into it he wove 
 the best of the political ideas which he had elaborated in 
 his essays, from Die Freiheit onwards. These ideas did not 
 always benefit by transplantation from their original context 
 into an academic oration. Half-truths, which are salutary 
 I correctives to the equally one-sided views of a political 
 \ opponent, may become monstrous paradoxes when the 
 \original debate is forgotten. Not infrequently we must 
 refer back from the Politik to the essays in order to grasp 
 x Treitschke's meaning, or to understand how he arrived at 
 such a debatable conclusion. These lectures have the faults 
 which are common to all abridgments ; in particular they 
 are excessively dogmatic whenever they deal with the 
 ultimate problems of political science. Obviously they were 
 C swallowed as a gospel, not so much because they furnished 
 /reasoned proofs as because the lecturer voiced with extra- 
 / ordinary aptness the views which were fashionable with 
 young Germany between 1874 and 1895 ; because they were 
 an eloquent defence of Prussia, of Bismarck, of the wars 
 against Austria and France ; because they expressed the 
 new ambitions of Germany for " a place in the sun," for sea- 
 power, for foreign trade, for a colonial empire. Germany 
 was strong in those days, and thought herself stronger than 
 was actually the case. Treitschke taught her that the 
 \ strong have the right to take what they desire by any means 
 they can.) 
 
 He was travelling far from the Liberalism of his youth, 
 and he might well write to his friend Overbeck, who twitted 
 him with repeating lectures of the Leipzig days : " You would 
 hardly recognise one stone in the old building." He was 
 becoming conservative, partly because he did not sympathise
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 119 
 
 with modern social movements, which he regarded as the 
 offspring of sentimentalism and as a menace to the true 
 strength of the State. (Though he had reconciled himself 
 to universal suffrage as an unavoidable necessity, he was 
 now more insistent than ever that the constitution of the 
 State and of society itself must be aristocratic.) " The^ 
 masses must toil at the plough, at the forge, at the carpenter's 1 
 bench so that a few thousands may be students or painters J 
 and poets." 1 He even went further, and maintained that the . 
 social aristocracy must be in the main a hereditary caste : / 
 fortes creantur fortibus et bonis. The State was bound to 
 interfere, by means of factory legislation and similar measures, 
 to prevent Capital from abusing its power over Labour. 
 But the Socialist was as great a danger to the State as the 
 Individualist of the Manchester School had been in the past. 2 
 He grew conservative because he held that the policy of 
 \Bismarck had not only been justified by success in the 
 immediate past, but offered the best hopes of promoting 
 national greatness in the future.) 
 
 2. Method of the " Politik " 
 
 At the same time, like many other conservatives, he re- 
 garded himself as an original and even a revolutionary thinker. 
 He believed that, in his lectures on Politik, he was laying 
 the foundations of a new political science. His admiration 
 for Aristotle was unbounded, and to a certain extent his 
 course was modelled on the Politics ; Machiavelli he revered 
 as the first modern writer to understand the true nature of 
 the State, and Rochau as the writer who had made Machia- 
 velli's ideas the starting-point of practical statesmanship. 
 But he maintained that hardly any one before himself had 
 thought clearly about the definition of Liberty, the con- 
 ception of private property, and the relation of politics to 
 
 1 Politik, i. pp. 50-2. 
 
 1 " Der Socialismus und seine Conner (1874) " in Deutsche Kdmpfe, ii. 
 pp. 112-222.
 
 120 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 ethics. It is needless to say that his obligations to earlier 
 writers were more extensive than he admitted. (He owed 
 much to Savigny, to Herder and to Schleiermacher on the 
 philosophical side, to Gneist and Dahlmann as critics of 
 particular forms of government.^ His contempt for his 
 predecessors was often due to ignorance. He had paid 
 little attention to English political theory from Hobbes to 
 Austin ; he quotes Bentham and Mill, but shows no thorough 
 knowledge of their writings. His criticism of Rousseau is 
 perfunctory ; and though he admires certain aspects of the 
 political theory of Kant, he had not grasped it as a whole ; 
 the ideal human community, as Kant conceived it, was for 
 Treitschke a meaningless abstraction. 
 
 His claims to originality are stated in the introduction 
 to the first volume of the Politik ; and there is no part 
 of the book which shows more clearly his limitations as a 
 political thinker. 
 
 /[ First,(he proposes to bring his pupils back to the antique 
 / conception of the State, as a being which is infinitely superior 
 to the individual, which exists to realise an ideal beyond 
 and above that of individual happiness. But he desires to 
 limit the authority of State in one respect. It must never 
 interfere with the conscience of the individual .) " Man cannot 
 be a mere member of the State." He has an immortal 
 personality ; he has the right to think freely about God and 
 divine things. 
 
 " Just as art and science recovered truth and greatness 
 by dipping in the youth-giving springs of classical antiquity, 
 we too at the present day must abandon the standpoint 
 I of modern society, in order to understand, as antiquity 
 understood it, the importance and sublimity of the State. 
 (Any one who wishes to acquire a true political sense must 
 bathe in the invigorating waters of that classical antiquity 
 which produced the great masterpiece of political philosophy 
 the Politics o^Aristotle4-in the light of which we all seem 
 mere bunglers. We must start again from the ancient
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 121 
 
 conception of the State. In doing this we run no danger 
 of falling into the mistake of the ancients, that of over- 
 estimating the importance of political life./* We are secured 
 against that by the changed ^conditions of our lives, above 
 all by the recognition (which we owe to Christianity) that 
 a man cannot be a mere member of the State, the recogni- 
 tion of the immortal and individual soul in every man, and 
 of man's right to think freely concerning God and divine 
 things. We need not be afraid then that we shall sink back 
 altogether into the ancient mode of thought, and look upon 
 men as only so many citizens ; but we have so much the 
 more to learn from the purely political standpoint adopted 
 by the ancients, which led them in political questions to 
 consider in the first place the matter as a whole, and only 
 in the second place the interests of the individual. 
 
 " Political science in the old sense is the science of the 
 State pure and simple, its subject-matter being classified 
 under the headings of national economy and constitutional 
 law. The task of political science is a threefold one. In 
 the first place, it must endeavour, from a consideration of 
 actually-existing states, to discover the fundamental con- 
 ceptions underlying the State. It must then examine 
 historically the political aims, activities, and achievements 
 of the various nations, as well as the reason why they have 
 achieved what they have achieved ; and in the course of 
 this it will accomplish the third part of its task, namely, 
 the discovery of certain historical laws and the establish- 
 ment of certain moral imperatives. Considered in this way, 
 Political Science is applied History, and this fact sufficiently 
 explains why it lags so far behind other sciences at the 
 present day. On the one hand, the descriptive historian 
 shows little inclination to set up a system, and, on the 
 other hand, among jurists and philosophers the historical 
 sense has penetrated very slowly. It is for this reason that 
 any such exposition of Political Science as would in some 
 measure correspond to the demands of the historian, is 
 absolutely lacking at the present day. The best of those
 
 122 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 that do exist is Dahlmann's Politik, which, however, is 
 more than fifty years out of date. But the proper syste- 
 matic study of Political Science, such as was perhaps 
 contemplated by Bluntschli, is still hampered by the 
 consequences of the old doctrine of natural right." 1 
 
 In other words the Aristotelean doctrine of the State 
 must be tempered with the root idea of Protestantism. 
 But how in practice are Greek and Protestant ideas to be 
 reconciled ? Who is to define the proper sphere of religion ? 
 The problem was one which Treitschke had encountered in 
 practical politics. He himself had written in defence of the 
 May Laws, by which Bismarck regulated the education of 
 Roman Catholic priests, and deprived them of the power 
 to inspect elementary schools. But Treitschke's solution 
 of the problem is superficial and contains a glaring 
 inconsistency. He proposes to define religion in the 
 Protestant sense, as a personal relation of the soul with 
 God. He admits that to most minds religion means 
 membership of an organised Church, founded upon prin- 
 ciples radically different from those of the State. He 
 sees the impossibility of a complete and lasting concord 
 between Church and State. He agrees that both are vitally 
 interested in such questions as the law of marriage and 
 the national system of education. None the less he contends 
 that the Church is bound to obey unreservedly the laws 
 which the State sees fit to make. (^Further, he is of opinion 
 that, while the State may tolerate such religious differences 
 as those which separate one Christian confession from 
 another^the unity of the State is impossible when its sub- 
 jects are divided between radically different religions.) Spain 
 could not have remained a single state if Moors and Christians 
 had lived side by side all over the peninsula. (The State is 
 purely secular ; but it has the right to enforce a certain 
 measure of religious unity. 
 
 1 Politik, i. pp. 1-3.
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 123 
 
 " There never has been a nation without a religion, and 
 there never will be. We are a Christian nation ; for the 
 Jewish element in our population is too small to be of 
 importance. ^Without community of religion the conscious- 
 ness of national unity is impossible, (for religious feeling is 
 one of the primitive instincts of human nature.) It was 
 Jewish presumption which first undermined this truth, when 
 by a conjuring trick it displaced religion by denomination. 
 Denominational differences may, of course, be tolerated by 
 a great nation, though not without considerable difficulty. 
 (How much blood have they cost us in Germany !) On the 
 other hand, the coexistence within one nation of several 
 religions, involving totally opposed conceptions of the 
 universe, becomes unendurable for any length of time ; 
 and can only occur in a stage of transition. Spain was not 
 a nation until Christianity had triumphed and had thrust 
 the followers of the other faith into the background. (_ Our 
 State is the State of a Christian people, and therefore in 
 its civil administration it assumes the Christian religion to 
 be the national religion.) 
 
 "(In spite of this, however, we must not talk of a Christian 
 State. The State is by its nature a secular institution^ It 
 must administer justice to its subjects without consideration 
 for religion or denomination. There is no longer any ques- 
 tion of an established State religion, and for good reason. 
 If there were a State religion, if the State were to assume 
 a spiritual responsibility, it could not be just towards 
 adherents of other religious denominations. The designa- 
 tion, ' Christian State,' can only cause confusion, since it 
 gives rise to the mistaken idea that the State is founded on 
 the Church ; and it is rendered further inapplicable by the 
 fact that there is no longer a universal Christianity, but 
 only Christian denominations, i It would therefore be 
 necessary to go further still, and to demand that the 
 State should set up one particular denomination as the 
 State religion.) 
 
 " And yet the State and the Church are most intimately
 
 124 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 connected, since both, after all, are educational establish- 
 ments for the human race. Our whole moral culture in 
 [Germany is based on a threefold inheritance of thought : 
 first of all, the early Hebrew-Christian ideas, the essence of 
 which was self-denial ; secondly, the ancient conception of 
 morality, which embodied the idea of self - control ; and, 
 finally, the old Germanic conception, which contained, in 
 addition to the idea of self-control, a very delicate sense 
 of honour.) We cannot take away any of these elements 
 without ceasing to be the Germans that we are." l 
 
 s* (^But, if this is so, can Treitschke seriously maintain that 
 the State will still be in the position of recognising the 
 sovereign claims of the individual conscience 1f\ The ultimate 
 obligation of the State becomes a bare duty not to enquire 
 about the faith of the individual so long as he refrains from 
 expressing his faith in action* ] As soon as individuals form 
 an organisation, worship in public, teach and preach, they 
 become subject to State censorship. 
 
 Secondly, Treitschke proposes to reconstruct political 
 science upon historical principles. 2 The historical method 
 starts from observation of the States which exist or have 
 existed in the world ; in classifying States, in formulating the 
 ideal of each several type, in judging the worth of a constitu- 
 tion or a principle of legislation, it is guided by experience, 
 not by a priori reasoning. But the historical method is 
 more than this, [it starts from the assumption that every 
 nation must make for itself a special code of morality and a 
 special form of government } both the one and the other 
 inust be a natural development of the national character./ 
 /fiThere is no such thing as a universal moral law or an ideally 
 ^best constitution. These conceptions are founded on the 
 doctrine that all States and all human beings must conform 
 
 *-* 
 
 ^U to the Law of Nature (Naturrechtslehre) . 
 
 1 Politik, i. pp. 326-8. 
 
 2 In his Deutsche Geschichte, Bk. iv. 7, Treitschke gives Dahlmann, 
 his old master, the credit of being the pioneer of this method, but says that 
 he did not carry it out systematically.
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 125 
 
 This doctrine of nationalism is not peculiar to Treitschke ; 
 it is much older than his time. It was the product of 
 Romanticism and it had been developed on the ethical side 
 by Herder, on the political side by Savigny. Further, it is 
 a doctrine which calls for careful exposition. (There is no 
 form of State which would be the best for every nation \ That 
 is a truth of which Aristotle was perfectly aware, and which 
 no political thinker of the first rank has disputed since the 
 time of Aristotle. (But there are general principles of politi- 
 cal morality to which every State must conform if it wishes 
 to preserve its existence and prosperity ] Naturrecht, in this 
 sense, is presupposed by every treatise on political science. 
 Without such a Naturrecht(ihere would be no possibility of 
 making any general judgment on a particular constitution 
 we could not even say that it was well or ill adapted for its 
 purpose, unless we had some general principles by which 
 to test it. In the same way, so long as nations have a com- 
 mon human nature, they must have in common a large stock 
 of moral principles. For morality is founded upon the 
 common characteristics of human nature ; it is a set of rules 
 for the right development of the potentialities which exist 
 in human beings as such. When we say that every nation 
 has its own type of moral excellence, we do not mean that 
 it has virtues which no other nation possesses, or that it 
 approves of conduct which every other nation reprobates. 
 IWe only mean that some of the common virtues of humanity 
 are more highly prized in one nation than another ; that 
 certain types of human activity are more useful in this place 
 than in that.") The scientific mind is more highly valued 
 in Germany than it is in England ; this does not mean that 
 the Englishman regards the scientist as useless or per- 
 nicious. The French value courtesy more highly than we 
 do ; but still we regard courtesy as a good quality. 
 
 Treitschke finds that the nationalist theory involves 
 him in considerable difficulties when he turns to discuss the 
 nature of progress. In what sense is it true that a nation, 
 or a society of nations, progresses ? This progress must
 
 126 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 be relative to some ideal standard of political or ethical 
 development. If there is no such standard, then we ought 
 to speak not of progress but of change. Early in his career 
 he had been converted by Gervinus to the view that there 
 is a visible progress in European society. But in the Politik 
 he hardly knows how to justify his conviction. He confesses 
 that he has no intellectual proof of progress : 
 
 " The theoretical morality of the human race becomes 
 more refined in the course of history. We condemn at the 
 present day much that was formerly held to be permissible ; 
 but this abstract recognition does not help to bring about 
 any practical advance, any subjective improvement in the 
 individual. (^For men are governed not by their intelligence, 
 but by their will, to which the intelligence is subservient.) 
 (Jt is impossible therefore to take the intelligence as a 
 measure of man's moral progress.) Moreover, other spiritual 
 faculties in addition to the moral faculties for instance, the 
 imagination and the memory, very important factors in- 
 directly connected with the intellect are actually weakened 
 by civilisation, (jt is true of the life of nations as it is true of 
 human nature, that no new strength can be added to it with- 
 out a compensating loss on some other side.^ Plato himself 
 said that the discovery of the art of writing was a misfortune 
 to the human race, that the imagination and the memory had 
 suffered seriously in consequence. This is clearly true. 
 And this misfortune has still further been augmented by the 
 discovery of the art of printing and other similar discoveries, 
 which we superficially regard as blessings. For certain 
 faculties of the human soul there is a ne plus ultra which has 
 in many cases already been reached. The art of sculpture 
 reached its ne plus ultra in the days of Phidias. Human 
 history progresses not in a straight line but in a spiral. 
 Great advantages are purchased at the cost of great losses. 
 
 But the notion that progress consists in an increase in the 
 comfort of man's material existence is such a base and vulgar 
 error that it is hardly necessary to refute it. The validity
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 127 
 
 of any conception of human progress is not capable of proof 
 by a process of abstract reasoning ; any more than the 
 existence of God or the validity of an optimistic or a pessi- 
 mistic conception of the universe can be proved by abstract 
 reasoning. Here conscience has the last word. The craving 
 of the individual conscience for individual perfection leads 
 to the conviction that humanity as a whole experiences the 
 same craving for perfection. And this proof, arrived at by 
 practical reasoning, is the only one of any importance." 1 
 
 3. Definition, Aims, and Structure of the State 
 
 Treitschke defines the State in the first instance as aV 
 People (Volk) united by legal ties to form an independent 
 power ; and defines (like Aristotle) the Volk as a group of X 
 families who are permanently united together. (Far from 
 being artificial, the State is a form of community which exists 
 from the earliest days of human history. The conception of 
 the State comes naturally to the human mind, while the 
 conception of Humanity arises comparatively late : ) 
 
 " The supposition that the human race at its origin had 
 the sense of being one whole is the opposite of the truth. 
 The human race at its origin cannot be conceived of otherwise 
 than as divided into separate little groups, that is to say, 
 into small States of a primitive type. In the days of 
 classical antiquity every people looked upon itself as the 
 chosen people. The notion of the unity of the whole human 
 race was Conceived only by a few solitary thinkers ; and it 
 was not until the appearance of Christianity that it became 
 general. Even at the present day it is acquired only as a 
 result of instruction and education. (There is no doubt that 
 at the present day a man thinks of himself in the first place 
 as a German or a Frenchman, or whatever his nationality 
 may be, and only in the second place as a member of the 
 whole human race. ") History demonstrates this on every 
 
 1 Politik, i. pp. lo-u.
 
 128 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 page. \lt is therefore untrue both physiologically and his- 
 torically that human beings came into existence in the first 
 place merely as members of the human race, and subse- 
 quently became members of a particular nation.) It was 
 only through the teaching of Christianity that it was brought 
 home to the individual that he must look upon all his fellow- 
 men as brothers. Vln the same way men differ from each 
 other from the beginning as regards their physical peculiari- 
 ties ; they resemble one another only in so far as they are 
 all human beings and all made in the image of God. They 
 are entirely different from one another as regards the material 
 conditions of their lives. ) This becomes apparent if we 
 consider that one individual human being is a different 
 person at different stages of his life. A grown man thinks 
 differently and takes up a different point of view from a boy. 
 If we pursue this thought further, it acts exactly like a 
 rat-poison on the theories of the radicals, who talk of a 
 \natural equality among all human beings. (^Rather the sup- 
 bosition of the essential inequality of all human beings forms 
 [the foundation of all political reasoning. Only in this 
 'way can we explain the fact that some groups are found in 
 subordination to other groups. 'O 1 
 
 It is of the -essence of the State that it should be a per- 
 manent institution ; for it is by reason of its permanence 
 that the State commands the loyalty of the individual. 
 No one would fight for the State, no one would sacrifice him- 
 self for the State, unless he thought of it as more enduring 
 than himself : 
 
 \1 Modern wars are not waged for the sake of goods and 
 chattels. What is at stake is the sublime moral good of 
 national honour, which has something in the nature of 
 unconditional sanctity, and compels the individual to 
 sacrifice himself for it. j This is a good beyond all price, 
 and cannot be valued in thalers and groschen. Kant says : 
 
 1 Politik, i. 18-19.
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 129 
 
 ' If a thing has a price, something else can be substituted 
 as an equivalent for it ; what is above all price, that for 
 which no equivalent is admissible, that has moral worth.' 
 (JThe sense of participating in the activity of the State, oT 
 standing upon the achievements of our forefathers, of 
 transmitting these achievements to our posterity, that is, 
 what is meant by a living consciousness of citizenship^' * 
 
 Treitschke is prepared to think of the State as a person, 
 in the moral as well as in the legal sense. In his eyes, 
 history is a great drama, and States are the actors in it. 
 (States, like individuals, have permanent characteristics, have, 
 in fact, a character] For example, from time immemorial 
 the German nation has been remarkable for exuberant 
 individualism and insubordination ; such characteristics 
 called for a strong central power, a power armed to the teeth ; 
 and the German Empire would cease to be what it is and has 
 been if it laid down its arms. The State is a person ; but 
 we are not to think of it as an organism. The analogy of 
 the organism is scientifically inexact, and it leads to a 
 fatalistic view of politics which is most dangerous. " Prattle 
 about the organic development of the State has often enough 
 served as a bed of idleness. Those who are unwilling to 
 have a will of their own content themselves with the phrase : 
 ' All that must be left to develop organically.' " 2 
 
 If a State is a person, it follows that the existence of any 
 one State implies the existence of other States with which 
 it entertains relations. For no person can exist, or come 
 into existence, in a state of isolation. This is as true of 
 corporate persons as it is of individuals. LA State attains to 
 self-realisation by friendly intercourse, and also by conflict 
 with its fellows. )f Hence the ideal of a World-State, embracing 
 all humanity, is not a true ideal ; such a State would be 
 repulsive and unnatural. " It would be impossible to 
 realise all that is meant by civilisation in any single State.] 
 . . .(The rays of divine light reveal themselves in a broken 
 
 1 Politik, i. pp. 24-5. 2 Ibid. p. 28. 
 
 K
 
 
 130 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 form in different peoples, each of whom manifests a new 
 shape and a new conception of the Godhead."^ 
 
 This is the classical apology for a system of national 
 States ; and it constitutes a strong argument in favour of 
 any evolution which helps a " nation " to achieve political 
 unity and political independence. But the ordinary advo- 
 cate of nationalism supposes that, in a system of truly 
 national States, wars would become less frequent ; that 
 friendly competition and friendly co-operation in the further- 
 ance of common ideals would take the place of the old 
 immoral strife between armed States. (Treitschke, however, 
 regards warfare as a necessary and beneficial activity of the 
 State ; and he utterly rejects the teaching of Aristotle, that 
 war is but a necessary evil, a means to an end. Not content 
 with affirming that 'f every nation must fight to keep what it 
 possesses," that the struggle for existence is a permanent 
 feature of civilised life, he goes on to say : 
 
 "In this eternal conflict of separate States lies the beauty 
 of History ; the wish to do away with this rivalry is simply 
 unintelligent.') 2 
 
 We postpone for the moment the consideration of the 
 grounds on which he glorifies war. The assumption that 
 war is an essential function of the State leads him on to a 
 new definition : ^The State is the public power for defen- 
 sive and offensive purposes." 3 This does not seem altogether 
 consistent with his original definition of the State as anj 
 organised People. \lt now appears that the State is the 
 organised power which holds the People together and defends 
 it. ) The State is not to concern itself with every department 
 of social activity ; it will not, for example, interfere with 
 private opinions in any direct and inquisitorial fashion. 
 vOften the State will assume, in the eyes of the individual, 
 the character of an organisation external to himself, with 
 
 a will which contradicts and overrides his will, j {Though 
 
 -*V 
 
 1 Politik, i. p. 29. 2 Ibid. p. 30, 8 ibid. p. 32.
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 
 
 spontaneous obedience, based upon reasoned approval of 
 the law, is what the State most desires, the State can exist 
 when the obedience which it receives is merely rendered under 
 compulsion. ) ^STor does the State express the whole of the 
 volonte generate. Its interests are narrower than those of 
 the society over which it rules, and there are limits to its 
 power as a moralising agency.) This point is brought out 
 sharply in the first of the following extracts. In the second, 
 which relates to the theory of punishment, it will be 
 seen that he regards the act of punishment as a moral act, 
 but repudiates the idea that the State should be guided, in 
 its punishments, by the desire to reform the criminal : 
 
 " We shall not, as Hegel did, declare the State to repre- 
 sent the national life pure and simple. Hegel looks upon 
 the State as the embodiment of a moral idea, capable of 
 achieving whatever it may desire. (_But the State, as we 
 have seen, does not stand for the whole life of the nation. 
 ~~- Its function is merely protective and administrative.) In the 
 days when Hegel's philosophy enjoyed its highest repute, 
 a number of ingenious men endeavoured to prove that the 
 State must ultimately swallow up everything, like the Levi- 
 athan. At the present day a man would need to hoodwink 
 himself into believing this. No Christian can live for the 
 State alone, because he cannot abandon his divine vocation. 
 The theory developed by Richard Rothes, in his study of the 
 origins of the Christian Church, that the State will at some 
 future date take over altogether the civilising functions of 
 the Church and in the end become entirely merged in the 
 Church, was a mere folly of youth. That cannot and will 
 not ever come to pass, and no one can seriously wish that 
 it should. / The State can only influence by external com* 
 pulsion ; it only represents the nation from the point of \ 
 view of power. ^JEven that implies a great deal. For in the 
 State it is not only the great primitive forces of human 
 nature that come into play ; the State is the basis of all 
 national life.) /Briefly it may be affirmed that a State which
 
 132 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 is not capable of forming and maintaining an external 
 organisation of its civilising activities deserves to perish. V 1 
 
 "If we consider in the first place the nature of punish- 
 ment, we see that punishment ought not to be looked upon 
 as a revenge. The criminal is not punished in order that 
 he may suffer ; he must suffer in order that he may be 
 punished. The transgressions of a single individual cannot 
 disturb the majesty of the State, and it cannot therefore 
 be a question of the State taking revenge. This theory has, 
 in fact, been entirely abandoned at the present day, on 
 account of its utter absurdity. Another school of senti- 
 mentalists, who apply to the State the Christian theory that 
 it is wrong to do an injury to one's neighbour, even to a 
 malicious neighbour, are brought to the conclusion that 
 punishment is self-defence on the part of the State against 
 attacks on human society. From this weak-kneed theory 
 was developed our modern criminal law, notably at the 
 instigation of Lasker, who set forth this point of view with 
 an eloquence worthy of a better cause. Yet the absurdity 
 of this theory is at once apparent. What is self-defence ? 
 The need for self-defence arises when some outside oppression 
 compels its victim to commit for the sake of his own preserva- 
 tion an action in itself reprehensible. What an idea ! As 
 if the majesty of the State could be conceived as so embar- 
 rassed by the criminal as to be obliged in self-defence to do 
 him an injustice, for instance to cut off his head, without 
 any absolute right to do this. What a confusion of ideas ! 
 All the majesty and all the moral earnestness of the adminis- 
 tration of justice is here lost sight of. This is what happens 
 to philanthropy when it gets its head in the clouds. Such 
 a theory as this does not allow of serious discussion. 
 
 " There is not much to be said for two other theories, 
 
 which likewise flatter the sentimentality and the mistaken 
 
 philanthropy of the present age. The notion of punishment 
 
 by the State rests fundamentally on the obligation of the 
 
 |State to protect civil society. But what aim has the State 
 
 1 Politik, i. pp. 62-3.
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 133 
 
 in view in its punishment of individual cases ? Many reply, 
 with Holtzendorff : the reformation of the criminal. As 
 if the State were a shepherd of souls, and must search the 
 hearts of its citizens ! ^It is in the very nature of the State 
 that it only protects the external order of human society. 
 (_Jhe State is satisfied to have the external obedience of its 
 subjects ; it is under no compulsion to inquire in what 
 spirit this obedience is rendered.) This being so, we cannot 
 ascribe to the State a general obligation to reform its black 
 sheep. Besides, it is obvious that a number of punishments 
 cannot have the effect of reforming the victims certainty 
 not capital punishment. How can the notion that the aim 
 of punishment is reformation be reconciled with capital 
 punishment ? That the State should utilise its houses of 
 correction to endeavour, through the ministers of the Church, 
 to make an impression upon the hardened hearts of the 
 criminals, that is only natural and in accordance with the 
 Christian ideal ; but it is foolish to try to make out that refor- 
 mation, which at the most can only be sometimes a secondary 
 end of punishment, is the true end of all punishment. 
 
 " There is more to be said in support of the theory which 
 declares intimidation to be the true end of punishment, 
 but whether punishment will actually produce this effect 
 is always a matter of uncertainty. We all know that there 
 are men who are not deterred from crime by the fear of 
 punishment, men who come before the judge for committing 
 crimes which have been punished in others ; but who can 
 tell how many thousands have strangled an impulse to 
 crime merely through fear of the house of correction ? It 
 is very certain that there are numbers of men who are so 
 bestial that only the terrifying prospect of the house of 
 correction can have any effect on them. This intimidating 
 effect of punishment does then undeniably exist ; but, 
 since it is uncertain in its workings, it cannot be the true 
 end of punishment. Even in cases in which the State 
 knows quite well that a punishment will not have a deterrent 
 effect, it must inflict it just the same.
 
 134 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 " This brings us to the conclusion that the absolute theory 
 of punishment, regarded with such supreme contempt by 
 all the enlightened people of to-day, is in reality the only 
 just theory. In regard to this, Hegel hit the nail on 
 the head. Our very German language, which makes it 
 possible for the ordinary man to say, ' Punishment has to 
 be ' (Strafe muss sein), has long ago accepted this as a fact. 
 The necessity for punishment follows directly from the 
 fact that-jQrder is essential to the nature of the State ; and, 
 'If'the State is under an obligation to preserve order in the 
 nation, it must keep crime within limits, and any disturbance 
 to the order of the State must be compensated and atoned 
 for by punishment. The criminal must be compelled, even 
 against his will, to recognise the moral majesty of the State. 
 Ihering pronounces this view of the nature of punishment 
 to be a learned whim. But is not the doctrine of intimida- 
 tion a mere theory, whereas the idea, ' Punishment has to 
 be,' is deeply implanted in the conscience of every man ? 
 Punishment contains its purpose in itself, namely, atone- 
 ment for a breach of the law. It may at the same time 
 serve the end of reform and of intimidation, and, if it does, 
 so much the better for the State ; but this does not happen, 
 and ought not to happen, by any means invariably." l 
 
 might seem from these quotations that the State of 
 Treitschke exists for nothing but police work and military 
 work, that it is bare force applied to the simplest and most 
 obvious of political objects.) It would however be strange 
 if so earnest an admirer of Aristotle entirely ignored the 
 moralising functions of the State, and Treitschke is not 
 open to this reproach, fit is true that, like Thomas Hobbes, 
 he lived in a time and a country where strength seemed to 
 be the attribute most needed by a government. Only a 
 powerful State could disregard the grumblings of that 
 provincial patriotism which was still so deeply rooted in the 
 German character, or could face with equanimity the 
 
 1 Politik, ii. pp. 421-4.
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 135 
 
 international situation created by Bismarck's policy of 
 blood and iron. ^(Whatever else the German State might 
 choose to be and to do, it must store up reserves of force, 
 if it was not to be crushed by external enemies or disinte- 
 grated by domestic feuds. )(jBut, in Treitschke's mind, the 
 police state (Rechtstaat) was only a half-way house on the 
 road to the Culturstaat which he hoped to see in Germany.") \ 
 In discussing the ultimate aim of the State he suggests 
 a new definition which is thoroughly in accord with Aristotle's 
 teaching : 
 
 State is a moral community ; it is called upon to 
 make positive efforts for the education of the human race, 
 and its final aim is that a people may shape for themselves 
 a real character in it, and by means of it.'l * 
 
 He is perhaps too cursory in his description of the CuUur- 
 staat. (jBut he has a satisfactory excuse. No state, in trA 
 past or in his own time, had taken on itself the mission of\ 
 fostering culture for a long period of time or with greaj 
 thoroughness. JAnd he had made it his rule to treat his\ 
 subject historically, to describe what had been done, not to V 
 speculate as to what might be possible. (^He contents himseU 
 therefore with enumerating certain tasks of a civilising\ 
 kind which one State or another has actually undertaken 
 with some success : works of charity, elementary education, 
 the patronage of the fine arts. In general, he says, there is a 
 tendency in States to widen their sphere of influence as 
 civilisation progresses. But at the same time they exert 
 their influence more and more indirectly, as by controlling 
 education, and with more and more consideration for 
 individual liberty. The modern State gives opportunities^ 
 for self-development without endeavouring to enlighten 
 man by force ; where it feels obliged to influence opinion 
 it does so by a gentle pressure which is hardly felt. 2 j 
 
 Finally, he is in some respects an obstinate individualist. 
 
 1 Politik, i. p. 81. 2 Ibid. pp. 81-6.
 
 136 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 He did not expect the State to create a national commerce 
 or a new intellectual movement. ^Its business is to 
 organise the exuberant activities of a free people, to repress 
 harmful tendencies, to encourage those which are salutary ; 
 ^t> foster, as he puts it, " the really vital energies of the 
 people." 1 It can regulate such energies, he said ; it is not 
 so likely to succeed in producing them. The best things in 
 the world are the result of free activity among the citizens 
 of a free sj:ate. ) 
 
 /On the whole, then, he concludes, it is better to enquire 
 wheat are the absolutely essential and unavoidable duties of 
 the State, by resigning which it would cease to be a State. 
 ^ These are the maintenance of military power and the 
 administration of justice./ Der Staat ist Mackt. lit may 
 be more than this ; but this at least it must be. The firsts 
 aim of the political theorist must be to discover how the J 
 State may be made strong.') 
 
 (,Some of his dicta concerning the sources of national 
 strength call for no remark. There must be among the 
 citizens a habit of loyal obedience to the State ; their 
 energies and thoughts must not be wholly absorbed in such 
 social activities as trade or intellectual studies. 2 The State 
 must have sufficient material resources for self-defence. It 
 must also have an absolute sovereign, who defines his own 
 powers without contradiction. I Treitschke is on more debat- 
 able ground when he attacks small States, not simply because 
 they are unable to protect their subjects against external 
 enemies, but also on the assumption that they do not 
 produce true patriotism or national pride, and that they 
 are generally (though not invariably) incapable of " culture 
 in great dimensions." All that he has to say on this subject 
 is coloured by his detestation of the German Kleinstaat. 
 True, Weimar produced a Goethe and a Schiller ; but, he 
 argues, they would have been greater still had they been 
 citizens of a German national State. 3 ^Finally, he goes out of 
 his way to court opposition by contending that the states- 
 
 1 Politik, i. p. 57. * Ibid. p. 59. 8 Ibid. pp. 48-9.
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 137 
 
 man must accept the aristocratic principle as a law ofv 
 nature i-^ 
 
 " If -we now study more closely this complex system of 
 mutual interdependencies which is termed a civil community, 
 it becomes apparent that (every society, by its very nature, 
 produces an aristocracy ^ The Social Democrats betray the 
 absurdity of their aspirations by their very name. Just as 
 there is implied in a State a distinction between ruler and 
 subject, a distinction which can never be abolished, so there 
 4s implied in the very nature of society, once and for all, 
 a difference in the social position and circumstances of its 
 members.} (To put it briefly, every civil community is a 
 system 01 classes. A wise legislation can ensure that this 
 class-system does not become oppressive, and that the 
 transit from a lower to a higher class or vice versa is made 
 as easy as possible j; but no power in the world will ever be 
 able to bring about the substitution of a new artificial class- 
 system for the natural division into social groups. 
 
 " On a closer examination, we see that it is a radical *" 
 necessity grounded in human nature itself that an immense 
 proportion of the energies of our race should be expended 
 in acquiring the primitive necessities of life. In the case 
 of savages the struggle for a bare existence is the chief 
 occupation of their lives. And so fragile and necessitous 
 is this human race of ours that, even in the better-educated 
 classes, the great majority must always give up their exist- 
 ence to worldly anxieties and toil ; or to use a trite expres- 
 sion : The masses will always remain the masses. There 
 can be no culture without its servants. It is self-evident 
 that/'if there were no men to perform the menial tasks of 
 life, it would be impossible for the higher culture to exist) 
 (We come then to realise that millions toil at the plough, 
 the forge, and the carpenter's bench in order that a few 
 thousands may be students or painters or poets. J 
 
 t^This sounds brutal, but it is true, and it will remain 
 true for all time, i It will not be altered by any groaning
 
 138 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 or complaining. Such complaining indeed springs, not from 
 any real human sympathy, but from the materialism and 
 intellectual conceit of the age. (It is absolutely wrong to 
 
 ' look upon intellectual development as the important thing 
 in history and above all to look upon it as the chief founda- 
 tion of human happiness.) What a monstrous assumption, 
 to maintain that women are less happy than men ! Does 
 the scholar merely by virtue of his scholarship rank above 
 the labourer ? I for my own part feel none of this learned 
 arrogance, and truly great men have never felt it. / 1 have 
 always felt a deep respect for the homely virtues of the 
 poor. (^Happiness in this life is not to be attained by cultiva- 
 tion of the mind ; it springs from those faculties of the 
 
 v heart which are within the reach of all alike in the power 
 of love and in a quiet conscience .1 These are bestowed on 
 small and great alike. As Goethe often asserted : It is by 
 his moral faculties that man is distinguished from other 
 living creatures : 
 
 Edel sei der Mensch, 
 Hilfreich und gut ! 
 Denn das allein 
 Unterscheidet ihn 
 Von alien Wesen, 
 Die wir kennen ; * 
 
 and on another occasion he remarks tersely : ' The important 
 % thing is not that we should have grand ideas.' 
 
 "It is just in these class-distinctions that I can best 
 illustrate the moral wealth of the human race. In addition 
 to the virtues of the rich, there are the virtues of the poor, 
 with which we should not and cannot dispense, and which 
 by their rough strength and sincerity put to shame the man 
 of higher refinement who shows such a tendency to become 
 blase. There is, moreover, a healthy joy in sheer existence 
 which is only possible in the simple and natural conditions 
 of human society. Here we see a compensating advantage 
 
 1 Let a man be noble and charitable and good, for that alone dis- 
 tinguishes him from all other creatures that we know of.
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 139 
 
 in what appears such a ruthless class-system. The notion 
 of poverty is relative. (It is the duty of the State to keep 
 poverty within limits and to make it endurable ; but to 
 expel it from the universe altogether is neither possible nor 
 desirable.) The niggardliness of nature has imposed certain 
 definite limits on the human race, and yet so great is man's 
 joy in existence that, if there be only space for more human 
 beings, in a healthy nation those human beings will certainly 
 be born." l 
 
 It might be supposed that he is here referring more 
 particularly to the economic structure of society, (and 
 vindicating the social utility of a class endowed with capital, 
 and therefore with the opportunities of assimilating culture. 
 But he is also an advocate of aristocratic government. ) He 
 finds the secret of the greatness of England in the complete 
 control of local government and of parliament by the great 
 landowning families. (^He rejoices that in Germany also 
 there is an aristocracy which interests itself in politics. 
 Such an aristocracy ought to be constantly recruited from 
 below ; but it ought also to be a hereditary order :-}- 
 
 " If we look nearer home, we see that in Germany also 
 the upper ranks of the nobility are in the highest degree 
 political. In a certain sense it may be said that no nation 
 in the world has such an illustrious nobility as Germany. 
 Since we have been an empire, the German princes have 
 naturally become only a higher rank of the nobility. Such 
 a nobility as this need fear no comparisons. The lower 
 ranks of the nobility, in so far as they count for anything 
 at all, are monarchical. It is for this reason that the 
 Prussian nobility has such a high moral standing. The 
 despised Prussian Junkers contribute, as a matter of fact, 
 the finest elements of the German nobility, as any one knows 
 who is a native of the small German States. In Prussia the 
 Junkers had to learn long ago to be subjects, whose chief 
 
 1 Politik, i. pp. 50-2.
 
 140 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 glory was to serve the crown. They had first to be humili- 
 ated by the monarchy ; but subsequently they became 
 reconciled to it. The minor nobility of Saxony and Bavaria, 
 on the contrary, have always had something parasitic in 
 their nature ; their ambition is to raise themselves up by 
 means of the court, like the aristocracy of the French 
 court." * 
 
 " The old families of the lower nobility of the present 
 day are almost exclusively descended from an un-free class ; 
 for the original German nobility has either died out or else 
 risen into the ranks of the higher nobility. The ancestors 
 of the minor nobility have been almost exclusively serfs 
 (M inisterialeri) , who by their political activity have raised 
 themselves above the ranks of the ordinary freemen, until 
 they have gradually acquired a greater nobility and distinc- 
 tion than the rest of their class. Many of the good 
 aristocratic surnames, like Butler, Truchsess (Steward), 
 Schenk (Cup-bearer), bear witness to this origin. We are 
 constantly coming across a similar phenomenon at the 
 present day. Our modern aristocracy is recruited by 
 additions from middle-class families who have distinguished 
 themselves in the service of the State. That is a natural 
 process, and there is nothing to find fault with in it, provided 
 that it does not give rise to arrogance and folly. Out of the 
 nobility there rises up that vague notion of what we call 
 a ruling class. An order of aristocrats arises ; the members 
 of it habitually devote themselves to the civil and adminis- 
 tration of the State. We are a nation with monarchical 
 traditions. Our titles and decorations are very expressive 
 of this. With us the important thing is to occupy a position 
 in the State, whether it be real or only apparent. If a man 
 cannot be a councillor of State, he will at least aim at being 
 a member of a Chamber of Commerce. In England we find 
 a purely aristocratic ambition ; I in Germany, an ambition 
 to serve the monarchy as a State official. ^ In any case 
 tradition must have an influence on the government of the 
 
 1 Politik, i. pp. 309-10.
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 141 
 
 State. Our ruling classes must spring from the great 
 families, who have handed down to their children certain 
 notions of honour and shame.^ The government has a great 
 inherited wealth of traditional notions of honour and morality. 
 The essential thing in governing is not knowledge, but the 
 power to rule, a power connected with self-control, a power 
 which, through education, may become a second nature." J 
 
 All this comes naturally enough from a professor in the 
 University of Berlin. But one cannot help remembering 
 how, in the outer darkness of Freiburg, Treitschke had 
 vituperated the Prussian Junkers, of whom he became the 
 apologist in his old age. [ It is not surprising that his new 
 predilection for a ruling class should lead him to desire a 
 well-drilled population for his State, and a set of statesmen 
 who are more distinguished by strength of will than by - 
 flexibility of intellect : 
 
 '/The State declares : ' It is quite indifferent to me what 
 your feelings may be in the matter, but obey you must.) 
 That is the reason why fragile natures find it so difficult 
 to understand political life ; of women it may be said that 
 generally speaking they only get what understanding they 
 have of law and politics from their husbands, in the same 
 way as the normal man has no instinctive comprehension 
 of the details of domestic life. ( That is perfectly natural, 
 for the theory of Power, in which the first and highest 
 obligation is push forward with one's purpose completely 
 and unconditionally, is a hard one. Hence the great 
 nations are not those who are specially endowed with 
 genius, but those whose strength lies in their character. The 
 history of the world in this respect reveals to the thoughtful 
 student a terrible justice. ) The sentimentalist may shed 
 tears, but the earnest thinker will recognise that it was 
 inevitable that the highly cultured Athenians should have 
 been in subjection to the Spartans, the Hellenes to the 
 
 1 Politih, i. pp. 310-11.
 
 142 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 Romans, and in the same way that Florence for all her 
 refinement and culture could not hold her own in the struggle 
 with Venice. In all this there lies an inward necessity. \ The 
 State is no academy of the Fine Arts, (if the State neglects 
 its own essential power in favour of the ideal aspirations 
 of humanity, it is false to its own nature and brings about 
 its own downfall^ Such a renunciation of its own power 
 is on the part of the State nothing less than the sin against 
 the Holy Ghost ;) to attach itself to a foreign State out of 
 sheer sentimentality, as we Germans have often attached 
 ourselves to England, is really a deadly sin. 
 
 '( We see therefore that the influence of ideas in the State 
 is of only limited importance. The influence of ideas is very 
 great, but ideas alone do not promote political progress. 
 An idea must have some important practical bearing on 
 the everyday life of the nation, if it is to play an important 
 part in political life] It was not the ideas of the French 
 philosophers which overturned the Ancien Regime, but the 
 fact that they did actually describe existing class-condi- 
 tions. The result was that the old social structure was 
 destroyed, and there came into existence a middle class, 
 with the consequent disappearance of the old class-distinc- 
 tions ; and in bringing this about the notions of equality 
 of the philosophers did certainly play a part. \There is no 
 doubt that the true founders of the German Empire were 
 the Emperor William and Bismarck, and not Fichte, Paul 
 Pfizer, or any other pioneers. The great political thinkers 
 have their share of glory ; but it is the men of action, not 
 they, who are the true heroes of history. In order to exert 
 an influence on political life the prime necessity is strength 
 of will. I And so a large proportion of the men who have 
 founded States have not possessed remarkable genius. ( The 
 greatest gift of the Emperor William was not his genius, but 
 his calm strength of will a gift which is far more rare than 
 people commonly realise. This force of character was his 
 great strength." 1 ) 
 
 1 Politik, i. pp. 33-5.
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 143 
 
 Treitschke was preaching this doctrine to a Germany which 
 had become familiar with the idea of universal suffrage ; but 
 he was clear that, (so far as the effects of universal suffrage 
 were predictable, they would be injurious to. sound govern- 
 ment. )( Where all men have the vote, the demagogue finds 
 his opportunity and the natural leaders of society are likely 
 to retire from a degrading competition for popular favour.) 
 The best that can be said of universal suffrage is that it 
 need not be wholly incompatible with an aristocratic 
 government. (For good or for evil the masses are prone to 
 accept the guidance of the classes : j 
 
 " The democratic character of our century has given 
 rise to the theory that the active right to vote is a universal 
 human right. /As a matter of fact, the right to vote is not 
 an individual right, but rather a civic obligation, to be 
 exercised for the good of the community and the welfare 
 of the State] and consequently the question( Who is to vote ? 
 must be a matter to be decided by the State.) ^The indis- 
 criminate extension of this right is an absurdity J it is a sin 
 against the primary truth expressed by Aristotle, that it is 
 the greatest injustice to try to make unequal things equal. 
 (it has, in fact, only one advantage : that it is calculated 
 to cure the political madness of the extreme radicals by a 
 kind of homoeopathy.) It would be possible now to reply 
 to the most insensate radicalism : ' Very well, then, Vote ! 
 all of you, without discrimination, and get together a 
 majority if you can ! ' 
 
 " This, however, is the only useful characteristic of 
 universal suffrage. (Apart from this, its results have been 
 that the powers of stupidity, superstition, malice, and lying, 
 the powers of vulgar selfish interests and of turbid human 
 passions, play a disproportionate part in the life of the 
 State, and consequently infuse into it an element of un- 
 certainty./ ^ For it is manifestly false to assume that universal 
 suffrage will always work in the direction of radicalism. It 
 would be more correct to say that its effects are incalcul-
 
 144 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 able. It depends entirely on the social conditions of a 
 province which social power benefits by universal suffrage .1 
 The suffrage will benefit the Roman Catholic Church, or the 
 great landowners, or the manufacturers, according to which 
 of these is really the most powerful, (in our eastern pro- 
 vinces, where there is an important landowning class, the 
 suffrage operates on the lines of ancient feudalism. It goes 
 without saying that the peasants vote in the same way as 
 their lord.J The lord leads hundreds of his labourers to the 
 ballot-box, and gives them the word of command. This 
 must inevitably happen, because it corresponds with the 
 actual distribution of power, tin manufacturing districts, 
 on the other hand, where a great rancour against the land- 
 owners has been fostered, no such social influence will come 
 into play. In these districts the most frenzied radicalism 
 will be let loose. f(j Any one, however, who imagines that the 
 external mechanism of the vote is capable of producing any 
 genuine freedom is a radical theorist | (On the contrary, 
 it must be clear that it conduces to the weakening of 
 parliament. In this chaos of ecclesiastical, economic, 
 and political groups it is impossible for any one group to 
 retain a majority and to exercise a decisive influence on the 
 Government.! 
 
 " A certain superficial consolation for the poor and the 
 oppressed may result from universal suffrage ; and, in any 
 case, when once it has been granted, it is almost impossible 
 to take it back. To do so would be to rouse such feelings 
 of mortification and indignation among the masses that the 
 disadvantages of the present state of things seem trifling in 
 comparison. The indiscriminate extension of the suffrage 
 is fatal in its effects, less as regards the immediate result of 
 the vote than as regards the whole character of political 
 life. IKVhere the masses vote, powerful lungs will play an 
 important part, and the peculiarly violent tone, the vulgar- 
 ising and brutalising of public life, which has become 
 prevalent at the present day, can no longer be disregarded./ 
 That is a necessary consequence ; but, unfortunately, it
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 145 
 
 reacts on the whole life of the people. If the elections have 
 accustomed men to violent abuse and lying, this will be. 
 reflected in their everyday life. ( Moreover, the danger is 
 growing that the upper classes, the really cultured classes, 
 will gradually withdraw themselves from a political life 
 which is assuming such forms. '1 1 
 
 4. The Individual and the State 
 
 Like every political thinker, Treitschke finds himself 
 involved in difficulties when he raises the question : ( Is 
 resistance to the State ever justifiable ? He states cate- 
 gorically that a revolution, and a forcible revolution, is 
 justifiable when the institutions of the State no longer 
 correspond to the grouping of social forces, and when it is 
 impossible to effect the necessary changes by peaceful 
 legislation. When the strongest party in the State is not 
 allowed to assert itself under the existing constitution, it 
 is entitled to overthrow that constitution.^ In a sense 
 every revolution is evil since it disturbs public order ; 
 but it may be the smaller of two alternative evils./ This 
 situation may arise in any State ; and so revolutions are part 
 of the natural order of things. ^They are justified or con- 
 demned by their ultimate results ; in themselves they are 
 neither good nor evil. 2 ) On the other hand, when he 
 discusses, (1 in a later section, the rights of the individual 
 citizen, he concludes that there is no right of resisting the 
 executive, even when it seems to be exceeding its lawful 
 powers : ) 
 
 " There can be no question of a positive right of resistance, 
 and it is not to be found in any modern constitution. Not 
 even the Norwegians and the Roumanians have adopted 
 this position, f Yet some limitations must be imposed upon 
 the freewill of those in authority, and so we get the doctrine 
 of so-called constitutional obedience, of which we can say 
 
 1 Politik, ii. pp. 179-81. 2 Ibid. i. pp. 131-6. 
 
 L
 
 146 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 that it is so firmly implanted in the average Liberal of the 
 present day that he would be amazed to hear it questioned. 
 The doctrine is as follows : If the government issues a decree 
 which is contrary to the constitution, that is to be considered 
 as an act of tyranny ; and must therefore be resisted by 
 every subjectJlMost people accept this doctrine without 
 questioning. I did so myself when I was a young professor. 
 In the days of the German Confederation we were all 
 Radicals, and at that time I believed like the rest that 
 resistance to unconstitutional measures on the part of the 
 government was an understood thing.) Then I went one 
 day to see the friend who was almost a father to me, Albrecht, 
 the Professor of Jurisprudence in Leipzig. He was one of 
 the Seven Professors of Gottingen, 1 and had forfeited his 
 income and made great sacrifices ; but when I frankly told 
 him my views, he said, ' Oh ! my dear young friend, if you 
 will only consider the matter, you will see that your argument 
 is nothing but a petitio principii.' And yet he had himself 
 exercised this right in practice. 
 
 " Nevertheless, I had to confess to myself that he 
 rejected this theory on good grounds. (The major principle 
 of the argument is of course correct, namely, that if a 
 government issues an unconstitutional decree it has com- 
 mitted an act of despotism ; but to conclude from this that 
 every individual ought to resist such a decree is evidently 
 inadmissible, for it does not follo-yy logically. The middle 
 term of the argument is missing. \ Who., then, is to decide 
 whether a decree is constitutional or not"? If this doctrine 
 of the right of resistance is admitted, it follows from it, 
 both theoretically and practically, that the conscience of 
 every single subject is set in authority over the government. 
 This is to turn the pyramid of the State upside down, and 
 to place the subject in the position of ruler.) 
 
 " It is clear, then, that this doctrine is radically unsound ; 
 
 1 Who lost their professorships because they made a protest when 
 King Ernest Augustus annulled the Hanoverian Constitution (1837). The 
 seven were Dahlmann, Jacob, W. Grimm, Gervinus, Ewald, W. Weber, 
 C. Albrecht.
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 147 
 
 and this has been recognised in all the practical legislation 
 of the nineteenth century. Ever since the fatal experience 
 of its effects in France, men have ceased to admit a positive 
 right of resistance. ( The constitution of the National Con- 
 vention includes the following clause : ' If the government 
 should infringe the rights of the people rebellion is a most 
 sacred right and a most binding duty incumbent on the 
 whole nation and on every member of the nation.' Thus 
 every single individual of thirty millions of Frenchmen had 
 assigned to him the function of judging whether the govern- 
 ment had violated the rights of the people. This 
 constitution, however, only lasted three weeks, and then 
 came the practical lesson of the civil war, the war of all 
 against all.'^ 1 
 
 /It is hard to see how this can be reconciled with the 
 doctrine that revolutions are admissible. For, if the indi- 
 vidual never resisted the executive, there could be no 
 revolutions. Treitschke attempts to mediate between the 
 two apparently incompatible positions. " The power of the 
 rulers is based upon the consent of the ruled " ; when the 
 rule of a government is permanently hostile to the welfare of 
 the people, then we must apply the rule Solus populi suprema 
 lex. The greatness of Germany has been achieved through 
 the perception of this rule. There are considerations which 
 take precedence even of the duty of maintaining public 
 order. Only it is never possible to justify rebellion upon 
 legal grounds, though it may be justified historically, by its 
 results. The upshot seems to be that it is right for the 
 majority, or at all events for the stronger party, to do what 
 it is wrong for the individual to attempt./ Treitschke 
 speaks with confidence ; but he does not solve a riddle 
 which has vexed clearer intellects than his. 
 
 1 Politik, i. pp. 195-7.
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 " DIE POLITIK " (II.) THE RELATIONS OF STATE WITH 
 
 STATE 
 
 i. War 
 
 THE English view of war has, on the whole, been that which 
 is expressed by Carlyle in a memorable passage of his 
 Frederick the Great : 
 
 " Wars are not memorable, however big they may have 
 been, whatever rages and miseries they may have occasioned, 
 or however many hundreds of thousands they have been 
 the death of, except when they have something of World- 
 History in them withal. If they are found to have been 
 the travail-throes of great or considerable changes, which 
 continue permanent in the world, men of some curiosity 
 cannot but enquire into them, keep memory of them. But 
 if they were travail-throes that had no birth, who of mortals 
 would remember them ? Unless, perhaps, the feats of 
 prowess, virtue, valour and endurance they might accident- 
 ally give rise to, were very great indeed. . . . Wars, other- 
 wise, are mere futile transitory dust-whirlwinds stilled in 
 blood ; extensive fits of human insanity, such as we know 
 are too apt to break out." l 
 
 The praise of war for its own sake, as a school of patriot- 
 ism, and as a test of national ideals, is seldom to be found 
 
 1 Frederick the Great, Bk. XII. c. xi. 
 148
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 149 
 
 in English literature. Tennyson, it is true, found in the 
 Crimean War the occasion for some stirring lines : 
 
 And hail once more to the banner of battle unroll'd ! 
 Tho' many a light shall darken, and many shall weep 
 For those that are crushed in the clash of jarring claims, 
 Yet God's just wrath shall be wreak'd on a giant liar ; 
 And many a darkness into the light shall leap, 
 And shine in the sudden making of splendid names, 
 And noble thought be freer under the sun, 
 And the heart of a people beat with one desire. 1 
 
 But Tennyson believed that the war from which he 
 expected so much was to be waged in the cause of a moral 
 principle ; and it is wars of this kind that he approves as 
 a moral medicine. 
 
 Very different is the attitude of Treitschke towards war. 
 | He is inclined to welcome war, so long as it is waged to 
 secure some national interest, to treat it as essentially a 
 wholesome and elevating occupation^ Needless to say, 
 he only expressed, on this subject, theories which were 
 already fashionable among his countrymen, and which had 
 dominated Prussian policy for a hundred years before his 
 time) His personal character was one to which the idea of 
 life as warfare was thoroughly congenial. He was by nature 
 combative, and felt convinced, from his own experience, 
 that opposition and contradiction are needed to call forth 
 the moral and intellectual energies of mankind. He came, 
 too, of a soldier-stock on both sides of his family, and his 
 political career had brought him into close relations with 
 the Prussian military caste. V But his conversion to militafX 
 ism is typical of the change which came over the academic ) 
 world of Germany after the victories of 1866 and 1870^ 
 Men who would have been Liberals at any time between 
 1815 and 1848 were now carried off their feet by the splendid 
 success, in tangible results, of the very different ideal for 
 which Bismarck stood.^ German professors now began to 
 learn a new theory of politics, which started from the 
 teaching of theJPrussian Clanse.witz. War, said Clausewitz, 
 
 1 Maud : a Monodrama, Part II. vi. 4.
 
 150 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 far from being a recrudescence of barbarous instincts, is 
 the necessary instrument of statesmanship ; { war means the 
 execution of a given policy by f orce-V-^ gewaltsame Fortset- 
 zung der Politik. 1 
 
 Treitschke, when he first approaches the subject of war, 
 handles it with more moderation than he afterwards displays. 
 ( It is one of the two indispensable functions of the State, 
 not necessarily the highest. He does not suggest that every 
 policy must terminate in war.) (He is clear, however, that 
 war, when it comes, is good. It is always a means, though 
 not the only means, of training citizens to be true patriots :J 
 
 " War is political science par excellence. [Over and over 
 again has it been proved that it is only in war a people 
 becomes in very deed a people. It is only in the common 
 performance of heroic deeds for the sake of the Fatherland 
 that a nation becomes truly and spiritually united. But 
 what the drastic remedy of war can effect from time to time, 
 is effected in everyday life by a free political constitution ; 
 and it is a striking fact that, for the maintenance of this 
 equilibrium of political and social activity, self-government 
 is more important than parliamentary activity. As a 
 result of self-government, the better-class citizens are 
 enlisted in the every-day service of the State. In so far as 
 this is the case, self-government is absolutely invaluable. 
 A system of self-governing communities and self-governing 
 departments unites society, which would otherwise have 
 been consumed by the selfishness of the social round, in 
 common political service. 'J 2 
 
 He then proceeds to show that wars are necessary for 
 several reasons. ( It is through war that new States (he is 
 thinking of Germany) are created. War alone can settle 
 the quarrels which must arise between independent States 
 
 1 Politik, i. p. ^2. An adaptation of Clausewitz's own definition, which 
 is die fortgesetzte Staatspolitik mit andern Mitteln. 
 
 2 Ibid. i. pp. 60-1.
 
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 151 
 
 when their aims disagree. War is the sovereign specific 
 against national disunion. War is the school of the manlier 
 virtues :-)- 
 
 "(The second important function of the State is warfare^ 
 That men have so long refused to recognise this fact proves 
 how emasculated political science has become in the hands 
 of civilians. This sentimental conception vanished in the 
 nineteenth century, after Clausewitz ; but in its place there 
 arose a narrow materialism which, in the fashion of the 
 Manchester School, regarded man as a biped, whose chief 
 vocation was to buy cheap and sell dear. That this point 
 of view is also very much opposed to war is obvious. It is 
 only after the experiences of the last war that we find men 
 beginning to take a sound view of the State and its military 
 strength, (if it had not been for war, there would be no 
 States. It is to war that all the States that we know of owe 
 their existence. The protection of its citizens by strength 
 of arms is the first and foremost duty of the State. There- 
 fore wars must continue to the end of history as long as there 
 is a plurality of States.) Neither logic nor human nature 
 reveal any probability that it could ever be otherwise, nor 
 indeed is it at all desirable that it should be otherwise. ( The 
 blind votaries of perpetual peace fall into the error of either 
 mentally isolating the individual State, or else of imagining 
 a World -State, which we have already shown to be an 
 absurdity.] 
 
 '{ Since, moreover, it is impossible, as we have seen already, \ 
 to imagine a higher judge set above the States, which by ! 
 their very nature are supreme, it is impossible that the j 
 necessity for war should be driven out of the world by forcej 
 of argument.] It is a besetting fashion of our time" to 
 represent England as specially in favour of peace. But 
 England, as a matter of fact, is always making war. There 
 is scarcely a moment in modern history at which England 
 has not been at war somewhere^ It is only by the swor<i 
 that mankind's achievements in civilisation can be mainA
 
 152 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 tained in the face of the hostile forces of barbarism and 
 unreason.^ ( And, even among civilised nations, war is still 
 the only form of lawsuit by which the claims of States can 
 be asserted.) The evidence which is brought forward in 
 these fearful international lawsuits is more convincing than 
 the evidence in any civil lawsuit. How often have we 
 endeavoured to prove theoretically to the smaller States 
 that Prussia must take the command in Germany ; but the 
 really convincing evidence had to be furnished on the battle- 
 fields of Bohemia and the banks of the Main. *War acts 
 ,on the nations as a uniting as well as a dividing principle.) 
 lit not only brings the nations together in a hostile sense, 
 but through war the nations learn to understand and to 
 respect each other's special characteristics.! 
 
 " In considering war, we must of course realise that it 
 is not always an ordeal in which God decides the issue. 
 There may be temporary triumphs of this nature, but the 
 lives of nations are counted in centuries. VThe final judgment 
 upon them can only be discovered by the survey of vast 
 epochs. I A State like the Prussian State, the inhabitants 
 of which are by nature more independent and reasonable^ 
 (than the French, might, as a result of temporary enervation, 
 incur the danger of extinction ; but even then it might rally 
 its native virtue and assert its pre-eminence. It must be 
 affirmed emphatically that war is the only cure for a sick 
 nation. | The moment that the State proclaims : ' Your 
 State and the existence of your State are now at stake,' 
 /selfishness disappears and party-hatred is silenced.^ The 
 individual must forget the claims of his own ego, and feel 
 himself a member of the whole ; he must recognise how 
 trifling is his life compared with the welfare of the State. 
 In that consists the grandeur of war, that trivial things are 
 entirely lost sight of in the great idea of the State. The 
 power of self-sacrifice for the sake of another is never revealed 
 more splendidly than in war. / In such times the chaff is 
 separated from the wheat. Every one who experienced 
 1870, will understand what Niebuhr said of 1813, that it
 
 11 DIE POLITIK " 153 
 
 was then he felt ' the joy of sharing an emotion with his 
 fellow-citizens, learned and ignorant alike. Any one who 
 had that great experience will remember to the end of his 
 days the wonderful emotion of love and friendliness and 
 strength which filled his heart.' 
 
 "\It is political idealism that demands war, and it is 
 materialism that rejects war./ Is it not a perverted morality 
 that aims at eradicating the heroic spirit from the human 
 race ? The heroes of a nation are the figures that delight 
 and inspire the hearts of youth. In our boyhood and youth 
 we admire most of all those writers whose words sound like 
 the blast of a trumpet. Any one who does not feel this joy 
 in heroism is too cowardly to bear arms for his country. 
 Any reference to Christianity is here out of place. The 
 Bible says expressly that the rulers shall bear the sword, 
 and it says also : ' Greater love hath no man than this, that 
 he lay down his life for his friend.' (Those who propound the 
 foolish notion of a universal peace show their ignorance of 
 the international life of the Aryan race. The Aryan nations 
 are above all things brave. They have always been men 
 enough to defend with the sword what they have won with 
 the spirit.) (As Goethe once said: 'The North Germans 
 have always been more civilised than the South Germans.) l 
 Yes, indeed, for only consider the history of the princes of 
 Lower Saxony. They have always fought and defended 
 themselves, and that is the chief thing in history. Goethe's 
 statement is of course prejudiced, but it contains a kernel 
 of truth. (Our ancient Empire was great under the Saxon 
 dynasty ; under the Salian and the Swabian dynasties 
 it fell into decay. Thus the heroic spirit, the maintenance 
 of physical strength and moral courage, is essential to a 
 great nation. | 2 
 
 In any case even if wars were to become infrequent 
 it would still be wise for a State to maintain a citizen-army ; 
 
 1 Unterhaltungen mit dem Kanzler von Mutter. 
 2 Politik, vol. i. pp. 72-5.
 
 154 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 ifor the army is a school of character,) and character is the 
 foundation of national greatness. In any case the hope of uni- 
 versal peace is chimerical, and the maintenance of a military 
 force is dictated by the instinct of self-preservation : 
 
 "It is an advantage to a nation to have a strong and 
 efficient Army, because the Army is not only designed to 
 serve as an instrument of Foreign Policy. I A noble nation 
 with a glorious past may long continue to employ it as a 
 resting weapon, and it forms, too, a training-school for the 
 true manly virtues of a nation, virtues so apt to decay in 
 an age given up to the getting and spending of wealth./ 
 True, there are some sensitive and highly-strung artistic 
 natures, which cannot endure a military discipline ; and 
 these people frequently give currency to a perverted view 
 of universal service ; but, in these important questions, we 
 must judge not by exceptional natures, but rather by the 
 old rule : mens sana in corpore sano. Physical force is 
 especially important in times like ours. It is a defect of 
 English civilisation that it does not include universal service. 
 The defect is to some extent compensated by the strength 
 of the Fleet ; and, further, the continuous minor wars in the 
 numerous English colonies keep the virile energies of the 
 nation occupied and alert. Indeed, the fact that a high 
 degree of physical robustness does still persist in England 
 is in part the result of this continuous state of warfare in 
 her colonies. The unchivalrousness of the English character, 
 contrasting so remarkably with the simple loyalty of the 
 German, is connected with the fact that in England physical 
 culture is sought not in the exercise of noble arms, but in 
 sports like boxing, swimming, and rowing, sports which 
 have undoubtedly their value, but which obviously tend 
 to encourage a brutal and purely athletic point of view, 
 and the single and superficial ambition of getting a first 
 prize. 
 
 4{' The State is Power, and it is normal and reasonable 
 t a great nation should, by its physical force, embody
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 155 
 
 and perfect this Power in a well-organised Army^ Moreover, 
 we have lived in a war-like age, and the over-fastidious and 
 philanthropic view of this question has receded into the 
 background, so that once more, like Clausewitz, (we look 
 upon war as the fulfilment of policy by force.) No amount 
 of smoking pipes of peace will bring it about that all the 
 political powers will find themselves of one mind ; and, if 
 they are not of one mind, it is only the sword that can 
 decide. Just where, to the superficial observer, war appears 
 as something brutal and inhuman, we have learnt to discern 
 its moral force. That, for the sake of their Fatherland, 
 men should stifle their natural human feelings, that they 
 should murder one another, men who have done each other 
 no wrong, who perhaps even respect one another as gallant 
 enemies at first sight this seems the revolting side of war ; 
 and yet herein consists its grandeur. [ A man must sacrifice 
 not only his life, but also the profoundly just and natural 
 impulses of the human soul. He must renounce his whole- ] 
 ego for the sake of a great patriotic idea. Therein lies the^ 
 moral sublimity of war. If we pursue this thought further, 
 we recognise that war, for all its harshness and brutality, 
 is able to form ties of affection between men, and that, in 
 the face of death, all men are brothers.) Any one with a 
 knowledge of history realises that to expel war from the 
 universe would be to mutilate human nature. ( There can 
 be no freedom, unless there be a warlike force, prepared to 
 sacrifice itself for freedom.V>We must repeat that scholars, 
 in considering this question, are apt to argue from the quiet i 
 assumption that the State is merely intended to be an 
 Academy of the Fine Arts and the Sciences. That is one of 
 its functions, but not the most important. \ If a State 1 
 neglects its physical in favour of its intellectual energies, 
 it falls into decay. 
 
 " Above all,^we recognise that greatness, as it is seen in\ 
 history, depends far more on character than on education) \ 
 and that the driving forces in history are to be sought in the ' 
 field where character is formed. Only valiant nations have
 
 156 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 any true history. In a nation's hour of trial, the war-like 
 virtues are seen to decide the issue. An old saying justly 
 described war as the examen rigorosum of States. ( It is in 
 war that nations reveal their true strength, not only their 
 physical strength, but also their moral, and, to a certain 
 extent also, their intellectual strength.) There is a kernel 
 of truth in the trite and familiar saying that it was the 
 Prussian schoolmaster who won the victory at Koniggratz. 
 ( The strength that a nation has amassed in peace is revealed 
 in war.) It is not necessary for an army to be always 
 fighting ; the silent work of preparation is continued in time 
 of peace. All that the government of Frederick William I. 
 meant for Prussia was not realised until the days of Frederick 
 the Great, when, all at once, the enormous force which had 
 been accumulating was revealed to the world. The same is 
 true of the year 1866." * 
 
 When he wrote this passage Treitschke must have 
 forgotten the weighty saying of Aristotle that success in 
 war merely proves that a nation possesses military virtue ; 
 and he might well have asked himself whether the modern 
 militarist State might not be open to the criticism which 
 the Greek thinker passed upon the Spartans when he said 
 that " war was their salvation and peace was their undoing, 
 because they did not know how to employ their leisure." 
 ( It is not easy for a State which is permeated with the 
 military ideal, as Treitschke describes it, to become the 
 Culturstaat which he considered the highest form of political 
 development. J He seems to think that the struggle for 
 existence and for elbow-room between independent nations 
 must always be so fierce as to be the dominant preoccupation 
 of the statesman ; that the citizens will have no other choice 
 but to sacrifice all other concerns and the practice of every 
 other virtue to military efficiency-}-^ propter vitam vivendi 
 perdere causas. 
 
 if we adopt his ideal view of war and his extremely 
 
 1 Politik, vol. ii. pp. 360-63.
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 157 
 
 crude view of international relations, it is obvious that the 
 army must be the first consideration of the State, the most 
 important of political institutions^ Warfare and military 
 organisation will become subjects of primary interest to the 
 political theorist. Treitschke presses this point and blames 
 his predecessors for regarding war as a rare and abnormal 
 contingency, which need not be seriously considered in 
 dealing with the details of the State's constitution. ( In his 
 eyes the army is not only the most essential, it may also be 
 the most civilising institution in such a State as the German 
 Empire. He is thinking, of course, of the citizen army based x 
 on universal military service : 1 
 
 T Old-fashioned Political Science made the mistake of 
 considering the Army as only an instrument of diplomacy J 
 and assigning to it a subordinate position in the system of 
 the State, under the heading of Foreign Policy. The Army 
 was, in fact, considered merely as an instrument of Foreign 
 Policy. Such a theory can no longer be maintained in this 
 generation of universal military service, i At the present day, 
 it is universally felt that the Army is not merely an instru- 
 ment for purposes of diplomacy, but that the constitution 
 of a State is based on the distribution of arms among the 
 peopled] (For the State is upheld by the organised physical 
 force of the people, which is nothing else than the Army. 
 If the essence of a State is Power Power both at home 
 and abroad then the organisation of the Army must be one 
 of the most important questions in regard to the constitution 
 of any State. Whether the State decides to have universal 
 military service, or a feudal militia (Lehensmiliz) , or con- 
 scription with exemption by substitution, determines its 
 inmost character.? 
 
 ' |) From this fact, namely that the Army is the collective 
 physical Power of a nation, it follows further that the Army 
 is very intimately connected with the idea of the unity of 
 the State. ) It may, in fact, be said that there is no institution 
 which brings home so directly to the ordinary man the
 
 158 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 notion of the unity of the State and of his membership in it, 
 as an Army organised in accordance with the actual status 
 of the nation.! Trade, Art, and Science are cosmopolitan ; 
 they pass beyond the limits of the nation. The common 
 participation in the exercise of the vote, or in service in the 
 unpaid magistracies, or on a jury, strengthens the feeling of 
 community in the State ; \ but parliamentary life has not 
 only the effect of uniting the citizens in a common political 
 work, it also has the effect of splitting them into factions, 
 and of rousing an inevitable hostility between the different 
 parties.^ ' Of all political institutions, a really national and 
 organised army is the only one which brings citizens together 
 as citizens. It is only in the Army that they are conscious 
 of being all united as sons of the Fatherland.! After the 
 experience that we have had in our modern German Empire, 
 there is not likely to be much more dispute on this head. 
 It has undoubtedly been the German Army that has been 
 the most real and effective bond of national unity, and, most 
 assuredly not, as was once hoped, the German Reichstag. 
 The effect of the latter was rather to rouse once again a 
 mutual hatred and abuse. The Army, on the other hand, 
 has educated us in the direction of national unity." l 
 
 s^' 
 -*( Finally, there is no danger so Treitschke thinks that 
 
 a nation in which every able-bodied citizen must be a soldier 
 will ever disturb the peace of other nations by schemes of 
 wanton conquest. This generalisation, which is not alto- 
 gether confirmed by the experience of to-day, he considers 
 abundantly proved from the facts of French history. When 
 the French army was professional, France was a Chauvinist 
 nation ; now all Frenchmen serve, and France is relatively 
 pacific :-j- 
 
 " In Carnot we see the organisateur de la victoire, who 
 did for France what King William and Roon were to do 
 later for Prussia. Before his time the French Army was 
 
 1 Politik, ii. pp. 355-6.
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 159 
 
 composed of two elements : in the first place, the utterly 
 demoralised regiments of the old royal army wearing the 
 white coat of the House of Bourbon ; and, secondly, the 
 new National Guard of the Revolution. Carnot recognised 
 that these two elements must be blended into one ; and out 
 of their combination he formed a body of demi-brigades 
 which was the embryo of the popular army ; a democratic 
 army, founded on the principle that any member of it 
 might, with luck, rise to occupy the highest commands ; 
 and thus men of talent, like Hoche, did actually rise from 
 the ranks. Afterwards, under the Directory, the main 
 features of the new Army were stereotyped ; and the manner 
 in which the idea of universal service was now restricted and 
 perverted had an important significance for the French 
 bourgeoisie. The new Conscription Law declared that 
 every Frenchman should be liable for military service, but 
 that a man might purchase exemption from this obligation, 
 on condition of furnishing a substitute (remplacant) . This 
 gave rise among the oriental section of the citizen-body to 
 the noble profession of " soul-sellers " (as they were called 
 in our Alsace), who conducted this traffic in human flesh. 
 
 " Such an immoral system was bound to re-act upon the 
 character of the Army and of the whole nation, but no system 
 could be better adapted to serve a policy of pure conquest. 
 When Napoleon became a Dictator, he recognised that no 
 army could be more convenient for his purpose. A national 
 army of this type cannot be overthrown, because its losses 
 can always be made good. On the other hand, such an army 
 must lack almost entirely the moral force of a genuine national 
 army, founded on a system of genuine universal service. 
 The mass of the French Army was drawn from the lower 
 classes of the population. The more substantial men could 
 purchase exemption from military service; and the social 
 class which could influence public opinion through the 
 newspapers was only represented in the Army by the officers. 
 Hence, in the Napoleonic era, among the educated classes in 
 France, Chauvinism grew to be an obsession ; the enthusiasm
 
 160 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 for war and the arrogance of the Parisians passed all 
 bounds. What could be more agreeable than to hear over 
 and over again how those poor devils over the frontiers 
 were getting themselves killed for the sake of the Parisians 
 and for the increase of their glory ? Now and then Paris 
 enjoyed a spectacle like one of those triumphal processions 
 of ancient Rome ; the long ranks of prisoners of war were 
 led past the column of the Place Vendome. No wonder 
 that the Parisians continued to exhibit such an eagerness 
 for war ! War was not considered as part of a matured 
 policy, but as an end in itself. Already at the present day, 
 we can clearly see the change which a genuine system of 
 military service has produced in the French point of view. 
 In words they are just as vainglorious as before, but their 
 boasting is no longer followed up by any action. Their 
 remarkable enthusiasm for war has really entirely vanished, 
 and for the simple reason that every Frenchman has only 
 one son, and that he trembles for the safety of this ewe-lamb 
 in the event of a war. But when it was permitted to hire a 
 substitute, Napoleon could be confident that public opinion 
 would not stand in the way of his lust for conquest." 1 
 
 It is Prussia, he continues, which, in the face of much 
 ridicule, has familiarised Europe with the system of universal 
 service. Prussia has solved the military problem which all 
 States have to face. Her system has produced soldiers at 
 least as good as those of France ; and it has educated 
 the nation. One great merit of the Prussian system is 
 that it implies political freedom and serves as a guarantee of 
 the continuance of that freedom.' 
 
 " The example of the German national Army has had an 
 irresistible influence on the rest of Europe. All the ridicule 
 formerly lavished on it has been proved in the wrong. It 
 was quite usual for foreigners to refer to the Prussian 
 Landwehr and the Prussian Kinderheer with a contemptuous 
 
 1 Politik, ii. pp. 392-3.
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 161 
 
 shrug of the shoulders. What a difference now ! It has 
 been clearly proved that, in war, moral factors count for 
 more than technical training ; and it has also been proved 
 that the greater degree of technical experience acquired in 
 the barracks is invariably accompanied by a moral brutalisa- 
 tion. The old French sergeants did not, as the French had 
 anticipated, prove themselves superior to the German 
 troops. It must now be admitted that the problem of 
 educating and really turning to account the forces of the 
 nation for military purposes has been seriously taken in 
 hand for the first time by Germany. (^ We possess in our 
 Army a characteristic and necessary sequel to school educa- 
 tion^ For many, it is the very best form of education^ 
 The drill, the enforced cleanliness, and the discipline are 
 absolutely invaluable to these men in an age like ours, which 
 unchains all the spirits of evil.) Carlyle prophesied that the 
 Prussian theory of military service would convert the world. 
 And, in fact, since the Prussian military organisation 
 emerged so triumphantly from the test of 1866 and 1870, 
 almost all the other great States on the Continent have 
 tried to imitate it. 
 
 "Yet, because the V Prussian army -system is actually 
 the nation in arms, and therefore gives expression to the 
 peculiar distinctions and subtleties of the national character,) 
 foreigners do not find this imitation as easy as they had 
 anticipated, fine organisation of this system demands in 
 the first place, as its very foundation, that the nation should 
 have a certain measure of political freedom ; it demands a 
 state of satisfaction with the existing government ; and it 
 demands a free system of local administration. Yet another 
 essential is that natural respect for higher culture without 
 which the institution of the one-year volunteers could not 
 have been thought of. ](This institution makes service with 
 the Army morally and economically possible for the more 
 highly cultured classes. \ In France, this volunteer system 
 is restricted by the demand for a superficial ' Egalite ' ; 
 and therefore, in France, the system has proved a failure. 
 
 M
 
 162 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 In Germany, however, it is almost indispensable. Quite 
 apart from the consideration that the number of our regular 
 officers is not nearly sufficient to meet the demands of a war, 
 these young men of high culture who, after their one-year 
 voluntary service, become officers in the Reserve and the 
 Landwehr, and who in many respects are nearer to the people 
 than the corps of regular officers, form the natural connecting 
 link between the latter and the men in the ranks." x 
 
 2. International Law ; Treaties ; Foreign Policy 
 
 \The State is subject to no human superior ; if it loses 
 independence it ceases to be a State. MHence there is no law 
 to which a State is subject ; for laws are made by a sovereign 
 who can enforce them. There is then no such thing as 
 international law. /(True that States make treaties which 
 are analogous to contracts. But treaties last only so long 
 as it suits the contracting States to observe them. No 
 efficient tribunal has been or can be devised to adjudicate 
 between independent States. The only law which binds 
 them is the law of their own interest.) 
 
 '{ Every State will for its own sake limit its sovereignty 
 to a certain extent by means of treaties. When States 
 conclude agreements with one another, they do to some 
 extent restrict their powers. But this does not really alter 
 the case, for every treaty is a voluntary self-limitation of 
 an individual power, and all international treaties contain 
 the proviso : rebus sic stantibufy \ One State cannot hamper 
 the exercise of its free will in the future by an obligation to 
 another State. The State has no supreme judge placed 
 above itself, and therefore it concludes all its treaties with 
 that mental reservation.) This is confirmed by the fact that, 
 so long as there is an International Law, the moment that war 
 is declared all treaties between the belligerent nations are 
 cancelled. \ Now every sovereign State has the unquestion- 
 
 1 Politik, vol. ii. pp. 403-4.
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 163 
 
 able right to declare war when it so desires ; and therefore 
 it is possible for every State to cancel its treaties. ) The 
 progress of history is bound up with this continual modifica- 
 tion of treaties ; every State must see to it that its treaties 
 retain their vital energy and do not become out of date ; or 
 else it will be forcibly awakened to the fact by a declaration 
 of war from another Power. For treaties which have out- 
 lived their purpose must be discarded ; and new treaties 
 corresponding to the new conditions must take their place. 
 "fHence it is evident that the limitations which inter- 
 national treaties impose upon the free exercise of the will of 
 a nation are not absolute limitations, but voluntary and 
 self-imposed limitations.] 1 From this it follows directly that 
 the establishment of an international court of arbitration 
 as a permanent institution is incompatible with the nature 
 of the State ; at the most the State could only submit to 
 such a court of arbitration in questions of secondary or 
 tertiary importance. In questions of supreme and vital 
 importance there can be no unbiassed alien power. If, 
 for instance, we were foolish enough to treat the Alsatian 
 problem as an open question, and to submit it to an arbitrator, 
 does any one seriously imagine that such an arbitrator 
 could be entirely without bias ? { Besides, it is a matter of 
 honour for a State to settle such a question for itself. ) Thus 
 a final international tribunal is an impossibility. ) Inter- 
 national treaties may become more frequent, but to the end 
 of time the right of arms will endure, and therein lies the 
 sacredness of war." l 
 
 Obviously this account of treaties contains a truth which 
 is too often overlooked. A State cannot be expected to 
 remain bound by a treaty which has become, by the lapse 
 of time, injurious to its vital interests. But Treitschke's 
 disciples have used his doctrine, that treaties hold good only 
 rebus sic stantibus, in a sense which he does not seem to have 
 intended. There is nothing to show that he recommended 
 
 1 Politik, i. pp. 37-9.
 
 164 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 a policy of pretending to respect treaties until the opportune 
 moment for violating them should arise. A treaty may 
 fairly be denounced ; but ought it not to be denounced at 
 such a time and in such a manner that the other contracting 
 party has fair notice of the treatment which it may expect 
 in the future ? 
 
 This question is not actually discussed by Treitschke.(j He 
 does, however, discuss the wider question, which embraces 
 this, how far a nation is bound to observe the ordinary rules 
 of morality. He rejects, as a matter of course, the mediaeval 
 doctrine of a Law of Nature, a universal moral code which 
 claims th$ allegiance of the State no less than of the in- 
 dividual. \ But he criticises Machiavelli for supposing that 
 the State was exempt from any sort of moral obligation to 
 exercise a certain self-restraint. He concludes that, on 
 purely utilitarian grounds, it is unsafe to override ordinary 
 conceptions of honesty and justice. A State which does so 
 makes itself an outlaw, a caput lupinum :- 
 
 i 
 
 '[ In the first place, it is very obvious that, as a great 
 institution for the education of the human race, the State 
 must come under the moral law. j It is foolish to assert un- 
 conditionally that gratitude and generosity are not political 
 virtues. Think of that insolent and frivolous prince, Felix 
 Schwarzenberg. When Russia had again placed Hungary 
 under the feet of the Hapsburgs, 1 this brutal man said 
 mockingly : ' The world will some day marvel at our in- 
 gratitude.' This utterance was held up to admiration. 
 What was the result ? When soon after, in the Crimean war, 
 Austria proved the truth of the prophecy, and was actually 
 foolish enough to ally herself with France and England, 
 Russia was seized with a passionate hatred against Austria, 
 and has ever since opposed her everywhere with deadly 
 enmity. No State at the end of a brilliant campaign has 
 ever concluded a more generous peace than that of 1866. 
 We did not take a single village from Austria, although our 
 
 1 In 1849.
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 165 
 
 Silesian countrymen wanted at least to have the road- junction 
 of Cracow. And yet has not this treaty proved wise from the 
 point of view of policy ? In case at some future date a union 
 between the powers should ever be effected, it would not 
 have been wise to add fresh mortifications to the defeats on 
 the battlefield. This was a foresight which went hand in 
 hand with generosity. Or if we consider the foundation 
 of the Zollverein, the confidence of the small States in 
 the upright dealing of Frederick William III. was a very 
 important political asset for Prussia. Looking at the matter 
 as a whole, then, we see that it is by no means true that the 
 decision of diplomatic questions is a matter of cunning. 
 (On the contrary, a sincere and honest policy builds up a\ 
 national reputation which is a power in itself ; for neigh- \ 
 bouring States come to feel that they can depend on the \ 
 government of such a State, and the State acquires a certain J 
 moral authority.) 
 
 " Journalistic phrasemongers, to be sure, talk about 
 great statesmen as if they were a disreputable class of men, 
 and as if lying were inseparable from diplomacy. Just the 
 opposite is the truth. ( The really great statesmen have 
 always been distinguished for their candour. 1 Frederick 
 the Great, before every one of his wars, explained with the 
 utmost decision just what he wanted to accomplish^ He 
 did not scorn to use the weapon of cunning, but, on the 
 whole, truthfulness was a predominant trait in his character. 
 And how remarkable too, on the whole, was the massive 
 sincerity of Bismarck, for all his craftiness in single instances. 
 And for Bismarck candour was a most effective weapon, 
 for when he spoke out his intentions frankly, the inferior 
 diplomats always imagined that he intended to do just the 
 opposite. If we examine the various human professions, 
 in which of them shall we find the most lying ? Evidently 
 in the world of commerce, and so it has always been. In 
 trade-advertisements lying is a regular system. Contrasted 
 with it, diplomacy seems as innocent as the dove. And 
 between the two there is this vast difference. If an un-
 
 166 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 principled speculator lies on the Stock Exchange, he does 
 it out of regard for his own purse ; (but if, in a political 
 negotiation, a diplomat is guilty of a misrepresentation of 
 facts, he has done it out of regard for his country} As 
 historians, then, whose task is to examine the whole of 
 human life, we must admit that the diplomatic profession 
 is a very much more moral profession than that of the 
 tradesman. (The greatest moral danger for the diplomat is 
 not lying, but the intellectual shallowness of an elegant 
 drawing-room life. ) 
 
 "(The claim that politics must submit to the universally 
 accepted moral law is also recognised in practice. Injustice 
 and crime are not as a rule practised openly ; men try to 
 find excuses for their actions, and thereby indirectly recog- 
 nise the authority of the moral law.y In politics we seldom 
 find a case of a frank admission of a criminal action.] It is 
 the French who have particularly excelled in this barefaced 
 cynicism. When Napoleon III. received his generals soon 
 after he had effected his coup d'Etat, a marshal uttered these 
 significant words : ' Sire, the army is dull. When can we 
 strike the first blow ? ' But such an insolence and shame- 
 lessness as this is rare in political life. When Philip II. 
 expelled the Moriscos, in that ghastly persecution of the 
 Moors, he delivered assurances to all the courts that he had 
 employed only mild and humane methods for converting 
 the Moriscos." l 
 
 I None the less it remains true, for Treitschke, that self- 
 preservation is the first duty of the State ; not merely its 
 most elementary duty, as every one would agree, but actually 
 x its highest duty. The State has no moral right to immolate 
 itself upon the altar of an ideal :-4- 
 
 ' If we apply the standards of a deeper Christian morality 
 to the State, and if we bear in mind that the essence of this 
 great collective individuality is power, we realise that the 
 
 1 Politik, i. pp. 95-7.
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 167 
 
 highest moral duty of a State is to maintain its power.j t The 
 individual must be sacrificed for the sake of a higher com- 
 munity of which he is a member. But the State is the 
 supreme human community ; therefore, in the case of the 
 State, there can be no duty of self-sacrifice. The Christian 
 obligation of self-sacrifice does not exist for the State./ In 
 the whole history of the world there has never been any 
 authority set above the State, and it is therefore impossible 
 for the State to make sacrifices for the sake of any power 
 higher than itself. We applaud a State for perishing sword 
 in hand, when it finds itself faced with disaster. For one 
 State to sacrifice itself in the interests of another would 
 be not only immoral, it would be contrary to that principle 
 of self-preservation which is the highest duty of a State.) 
 
 " We see, then, that a distinction must be made between 
 public and private morals. (The relative importance of 
 various obligations must be quite different in the case of the 
 State from what it is in the case of private individuals.] A 
 great number of the duties incumbent upon private in- 
 dividuals could not possibly be held to be incumbent upon 
 the State. [The highest duty of the State is self-preservation. 
 Self-preservation is for the State an absolute moral obliga- 
 tion. And therefore it must be made clear that of all politi- 
 cal sins, that of weakness is the most heinous and despicable.) 
 The sin of weakness in politics is the sin against the Holy 
 Ghost. | In private life there may be excuses for moral 
 weakness. In the State there can be no question of any 
 excuse. The State is Power, and if it is false to its own 
 nature, no punishment can be too severe for it. Think of 
 the government of Frederick William IV. We have seen 
 that generosity and gratitude may be virtues in politics as 
 well as in private life, but they are only virtues in politics 
 if they do not militate against the main object of politics 
 the maintenance of the power of the State. In the year 1849 
 all the minor German princes were trembling on their 
 thrones. Frederick William IV. adopted a course praise- 
 worthy in itself. He marched Prussian troops into Saxony
 
 168 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 and Bavaria, and restored order in these States. But now 
 we come to the heinous sin. Were these Prussians to shed 
 their blood for the kings of Saxony or Bavaria ? The 
 question was, how to secure a permanent gain for Prussia. 
 And here Prussia had these States in the palm of her hand. 
 All that remained to be done was to let the Prussian troops 
 stay there until the princes of Saxony and Bavaria had 
 become accustomed to the new German Empire. Instead of 
 this, the king simply let the troops march off again ; and 
 you may be sure that the Saxons and Bavarians made a long 
 nose after them when they saw them go. That was weak 
 and senseless. The blood of the Prussian people was sacri- 
 ficed for nothing." l 
 
 ( Since the law of prudence only enjoins that the State 
 should respect the moral standards which its neighbours 
 hold in honour, it follows that a State which finds itself in 
 contact with relatively barbarous or unscrupulous peoples 
 may prudently and justifiably come down to their level. 
 Brutality may be met with brutality, and fraud countered 
 by fraud. In fact it would be folly for a statesman to 
 adopt any other rule of conduct in dealing with such 
 enemies : ( 
 
 4' We have already seen that the power of sincerity and 
 candour in political life is much greater than is commonly 
 maintained. The modern theory is that there is no such 
 thing as an instinctive human craving for truth ; that 
 truthfulness is a conventional obligation imposed on men for 
 the purposes of the law. No ! humanity has an instinctive 
 craving for truth, which varies only at different epochs and 
 in different nations. Even among oriental nations, who 
 excel in mendacity, we find this craving for truth. The 
 elder brother of Wellington acquired an immense power in 
 India just because the Nabobs knew that he was a man who 
 always said what he thought.^ On the whole, however, it 
 
 1 Politik, i. pp. 100-1.
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 169 
 
 is obvious that the political measures employed in dealing 
 with nations on a lower level of civilisation must be adapted 
 to their intellectual and emotional capacities. ) Any historian 
 would be a fool if he were to judge European statecraft in 
 Africa and the East by the same rule as in Europe^ In 
 dealing with uncivilised nations any one who cannot inspire 
 terror is lost./ At the time of the Indian Mutiny, the English 
 bound Hindus in front of the mouths of their cannon and 
 blew them to pieces, so that their bodies were scattered to 
 all the winds of heaven, and, as death was instantaneous, 
 we cannot blame the English for doing so. The necessity of 
 employing means of intimidation is obvious in a case like 
 this ; and, if we accept the assurance of the English that their 
 rule in India is moral and necessary, we cannot disapprove 
 this means of enforcing it. 
 
 " Thus the principle of relativity applies to place as well 
 as to time, (it must be considered that States very fre- 
 quently maintain through many decades a state of veiled 
 warfare ; and it is obvious that much diplomatic cunning is 
 justified by the very fact of this state of latent war. | Con- 
 sider, for instance, the negotiations between Bismarck and 
 Benedetti. Bismarck still hoped that a great war might 
 be avoided. Then came Benedetti with his unblushing 
 demands. Was it not morally legitimate for Bismarck to 
 put him off with half-promises and to imply that Germany 
 might possibly concede his demands ? Similarly with the 
 employment of bribery as a weapon against another nation 
 under such conditions of veiled hostility. It is absurd to 
 bluster about its immorality, and to expect that a State 
 in a case like this should do nothing without consulting the 
 Catechism. Before the outbreak of the Seven Years' War, 
 Frederick had a suspicion that a storm was gathering over 
 his little State. He therefore bribed two Saxon-Polish 
 secretaries in Dresden and Warsaw, and obtained from them 
 information, which happily turned out to be exaggerated. 
 Could it be expected of King Frederick, when the question 
 in his mind was, how could he save his noble Prussians from
 
 170 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 destruction, that he should respect the official system of 
 the Electorate of Saxony ? It is tacitly recognised among 
 States that there is no State in the world which has not, at 
 some time or other, made use of rogues for the purposes 
 of spying. But the importance of such methods must not 
 be exaggerated. They play only a minor role. But that 
 the Foreign Office of a nation is justified in employing them 
 as a weapon against other States is obvious." l 
 
 ( It may be objected that a resolute determination in the 
 State to behave no better than its neighbours will certainly 
 prevent any amelioration of international ethics, jf (it is 
 difficult again to see how any State can claim the right to 
 act as a missionary of civilisation, to subdue less cultivated 
 communities for their ultimate good, if it starts with the 
 intention of adopting their standards of conduct. 1| And this 
 second objection is the more cogent since Treitschke holds 
 that colonisation, besides being an economic necessity, is 
 also the outcome of a moral impulse, in so far as it means 
 the subjugation of the coloured races. 1 It is worth noticing 
 that he considers the tropical form of colony more advantage- 
 ous than the colonies of European population upon which 
 the mother-country cannot hope to impress her influence 
 for an indefinite period of time. 
 
 f His treatment of the question of colonies has an important 
 bearing upon international relations. He values colonies 
 because he holds that they, in various ways, enable the 
 mother-State to express her individuality and to save her 
 surplus population from being dissipated among other 
 / States. He arrives at the conclusion that colonies are a 
 positive necessity, because self-preservation means self- 
 expression and the boundless accumulation of power. From 
 this belief it is only a short step to the further proposition 
 that the need of such a State as Germany for colonies is 
 " a necessity which knows no law. J Treitschke does not 
 take the step ; but he distinctly indicates the moral which 
 
 1 Politih, i. pp. 106-9.
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 171 
 
 his pupils have deduced from his premises. In the face of 
 such a necessity the State which has secured the most desir- 
 able sites for colonisation is the arch-enemy. 
 
 The two following passages illustrate his views as to 
 colonial policy : 
 
 " All the great nations in history, when they have become 
 powerful, have felt an impulse to stamp their character on 
 savage nations. At the present day we see the European 
 nations engaged in establishing a vast aristocracy of the 
 white race all over the surface of the globe. (Any nation 
 that does not take part in this mighty contest will, at some 
 future time, find itself forced to play a very pitiful role.) 
 For nations at the present day it is a matter of life and death 
 to press on with their colonising activity.^ The Phoenicians 
 were the first nation in history to reap the glory of a world- 
 trade, and they too were great colonisers. Then followed 
 the colonisation of the Greeks on the easterly and westerly 
 shores of the Mediterranean ; then came the Romans ; 
 then, in the Middle Ages, the Germans, the Spanish, and the 
 Portuguese ; and, finally, Holland and England, after the 
 Germans had for a long time been entirely wiped out from 
 the number of maritime powers. 
 
 " It is the agricultural colonies that are undoubtedly 
 the most profitable to a nation. In regions, the climate 
 of which more or less resembles our own, and which permit 
 of a vast emigration from the mother-country, there may, 
 under favourable circumstances, ensue such a feverish 
 increase of population, as occurred for instance in America. 
 Yet with such colonies there is always the possible danger 
 that they will turn against the mother-country, and try to 
 shake off her yoke." l 
 
 " We realise now what we have missed. The results of 
 the last half-century have been appalling ; it was during 
 this period that England conquered the world. The con- 
 tinental nations, themselves devastated by perpetual warfare, 
 
 1 Politik, i. pp. 12 1 -2.
 
 172 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 had no leisure to glance across the ocean, where England was 
 seizing everything for herself. The Germans could only 
 let it go on and shut their eyes, because their neighbours 
 and their own internal dissensions were keeping them fully 
 occupied. There can be no doubt that a great colonial 
 expansion is an advantage to a nation. The opponents of 
 colonisation in our own country show their short-sightedness 
 in failing to grasp that this is so. (And yet the whole destiny 
 of Germany hangs upon the answer to the question : How 
 many millions of German-speaking men will the future 
 have to show ?i 
 
 " It is nonsense to assert that the emigration from Ger- 
 many to America is of any advantage to us. What gain 
 can it have been for Germany that thousands of the flower 
 of her manhood, because they could not earn a livelihood 
 in the Fatherland, have turned their backs upon her ? They 
 are lost to Germany for ever. Even if the emigrant himself 
 is bound to the homeland by certain natural ties, as a general 
 rule his children, and in any case his grandchildren, are 
 Germans no longer. For the German learns only too easily 
 to discard his nationality. Besides, German emigrants to 
 America are not in a position to preserve their nationality 
 for any length of time. When the Huguenots immigrated 
 to the March of Brandenburg, though on the whole more 
 civilised than the Brandenburgers, they inevitably lost 
 their nationality, on account of the superior numbers of 
 their hosts. The same is true of the Germans in America. 
 Almost a third of the North-American population is of 
 German origin. How much precious strength have we lost 
 through this emigration, and how much are we losing every 
 day, without gaining the smallest compensation in return ! 
 Both the working power and the capital of these emigrants 
 is entirely lost to Germany. Yet, if they went out as colon- 
 ists, what immeasurable financial gains these men would 
 procure for this nation." 1 
 
 1 Politik, i. pp. 123-4.
 
 " DIE POLITIK 
 
 173 
 
 So far Treitschke has not described International Law 
 except by negatives, nor has he explained the nature of the 
 society of nations. We might derive a false impression from 
 his picture of the Volk in Waff en ; we might suppose that he 
 rejoiced in the prospect of a ceaseless war of all against all. 
 This impression, however, must be corrected by reference to 
 the more systematic discussion of International Law which 
 he gives at the end of the second volume of the Politik. 
 (Here he describes International Law as a set of rules framed 
 by the enlightened self-interest of nations, and predicts 
 that these rules will steadily obtain more and more respect.) 
 There are still some features in his developed theory which 
 call for criticism : ( as, for instance, the arrogant refusal to 
 admit that minor States or neutral States have a claim to 
 share in drafting these rules ; and again the assertion that 
 national honour cannot be too jealously upheld. His doctrine 
 of the nature of treaties still leaves a dangerous loophole 
 to the unscrupulous. I But, in the light of this passage, it 
 would be grossly unfair to tax him with an absolute contempt 
 for International Law, though it is fair to say that his 
 knowledge of the history of that law, and his appreciation of 
 its value, leave something to be desired : 
 
 " It is essential, then, to go to work historically, and to 
 consider the State as what it is as physical force, though 
 at the same time as an institution intended to assist the 
 education of the human race. ( In so far as it is physical 
 force, the State will have a natural inclination to snatch for 
 itself such earthly possessions as it desires for its own 
 advantage. It is by its very nature grasping. Every State 
 will, however, of its own accord, show a certain consideration 
 for neighbouring States. As a result of reasoned calculation, 
 as well as from a mutual sense of their own advantage, the 
 States will exhibit an increasing respect for justice. The 
 State comes to realise that it is bound up with the common 
 life of the States among which it is situated. Every State 
 will, as a matter of course, observe certain restraints in its
 
 174 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 dealings with neighbouring States. From reasoned calcula- 
 tion, from a reciprocal recognition of self-interest, a more 
 definite sense of justice will develop with the course of time./ 
 'The formal part of International Law for instance, the 
 theory of the inviolability of ambassadors, with all its 
 accompanying ceremonial developed comparatively early 
 and securely. In modern Europe the privileges of Am- 
 bassadors, with all that this entails, are absolutely secure] 
 It is safe to say that the formal side of International Law 
 is much more firmly established and is much less frequently 
 transgressed than are the rules of municipal justice in most 
 States. ( Nevertheless, since there is placed above the States 
 no higher power which can decide between them, the 
 existence of International Law is always precarious. $ It 
 always must remain a lex imperfecta. Everything depends 
 upon reciprocity ; and, since there is no supreme authority 
 capable of exercising compulsion, the influence of science, 
 and, above all, of public opinion, will play an important 
 part.) Savigny declared International Law to be no strictum 
 jus, but a law in constant process of evolution. This, how- 
 ever, by no means implies that International Law is void of 
 meaning. (This evolving law has indeed a palpable effective- 
 ness,! the consequences of which we can trace in their de- 
 velopments up to the present day. , There can be no doubt 
 that the development of modern International Law was very 
 materially influenced by Christianity.) Christianity created 
 a spirit of cosmopolitanism, in the noblest sense of the word ; 
 and it was therefore only reasonable and logical that, for 
 centuries, the Porte should not have come within the pro- 
 vince of European International Law. The Porte was not 
 in a position to profit fully by the benefits of European 
 International Law, so long as it was exclusively swayed by 
 Mohammedan ideas of morality. It is only in recent times, 
 since Christianity has become so strong in the Balkan 
 Peninsula as to thrust Mohammedanism comparatively into 
 the background, that the Porte has been invited to par- 
 ticipate in international negotiations.
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 175 
 
 " History shows us that great States are continually 
 developing out of small States which have outlived their 
 vitality. (The great States must finally attain such a measure 
 of power that they can stand on their own feet, that they are 
 self-sufficing. | Such a State must desire that peace should 
 be maintained, for the sake of its existence and for that of the 
 treasures of civilisation which it has under its care. So, 
 out of this common sense of justice, there ensues an organised 
 society of States, a so-called political system j Such a system 
 is, however, impossible, apart from a certain at least 
 approximate equilibrium between the Powers. } The idea 
 of a balance of power in Europe was at first, as we have 
 seen, conceived very literally ; but it does contain a germ of 
 truth. We must not think of it as a trutina gentium, with 
 both scales on the same level ; | but an organised political 
 system presupposes that no one State shall be so powerful 
 as to be able to do just as it pleases without danger to itself. 
 Here we see very clearly the superiority of the European 
 system over the crude state-system of America. In America 
 the United States can do just as they please. It is only 
 because their ties with the small South American Republics 
 are still very slight that the latter have not yet suffered any 
 direct interference on the part of their great neighbour. 
 
 " Gortschakoff remarked with justice that the advent 
 of the last International Conference will not be promoted 
 either by the nations who are always fearing an attack, nor 
 yet by the nations who always feel themselves in a position 
 to make an attack. This was a remarkable statement, and 
 it has been illustrated by concrete examples. It is very 
 unfortunate for the science of International Law that coun- 
 tries like Belgium and Holland should so long have been its 
 home. These countries, because they are in constant fear 
 of being attacked, take a sentimental view of the subject, 
 and tend to make claims on the victor in the name of 
 humanity, claims which are unnatural and unreasonable 
 and contrary to the power of the State. The treaties of 
 Nimeguen and Ryswick remind us that, in the seventeenth
 
 176 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 century, Holland was looked upon as the proper scene for 
 the drama of la haute politique. Switzerland, at a later 
 date, enjoyed the same reputation. And, at the present 
 day, few people trouble to think how absurd it is that 
 Belgium should fondly conceive herself to be the centre of 
 International Jurisprudence. As certainly as that public law 
 is founded on practice, it follows that a State which occupies 
 an abnormal position will form an abnormal conception of 
 International Law. \ Belgium is neutral ; it is by its nature 
 an emasculated State. Is such a State likely to develop 
 a healthy notion of International Law ?j I beg you to keep 
 this consideration firmly in your minds hereafter, when you 
 are confronted with the mass of Belgian literature on this 
 subject. On the other hand, there exists to-day another State, 
 which fancies itself in the position of being able to make 
 an attack at any moment, and which is consequently the 
 stronghold of barbarism in International Law. It is the fault 
 of England alone that the provisions of International Law 
 which relate to maritime warfare still sanction the practice 
 of privileged piracy. (So we are brought to realise that, 
 since reciprocity is the very basis of International Law, it is 
 of no use to hold up vague phrases and doctrines of humanity 
 as the rule of conduct for States to follow ; all theory must 
 be founded on practice J only then does an understanding 
 become genuinely reciprocal. That is a true balance of the 
 Powers. I 
 
 I i 
 
 I If we are to avoid misconception concerning the 
 significance of International Law, we must bear in mind that 
 all the International Law in the world cannot alter the 
 essential nature of the State. No State can reasonably be 
 called upon to agree to something which would amount to 
 suicidej Even in the State-system, every individual State 
 must still preserve its own sovereignty ; even in its inter- 
 course with other States, the preservation of this sovereignty 
 is still its highest duty. I The enduring provisions of Inter- 
 national Law are those which do not affect sovereignty, that 
 is to say, those concerned with ceremonial and with inter-
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 177 
 
 national private law. In time of peace it is hardly probable 
 that these rights will be infringed ; / if they are, such in- 
 fringements will be immediately expiated, (j Any one who, 
 even superficially, attacks the honour of a State, challenges 
 by his action the very nature of the State. To reproach a 
 State for having a too irritable sense of honour is to fail to 
 appreciate the moral laws of politics. A State must have 
 a very highly-developed sense of honour, if it is not to be 
 disloyal to its own nature.^ Jhe State is not a violet bloom- 
 ing in the shade. | Its power must stand forth proud and 
 refulgent, and it must not allow this power to be dis- 
 puted, even in matters of forms and symbols. y If the flag 
 of the State is insulted, it is the duty of the State to demand 
 satisfaction, and, if satisfaction is not forthcoming, to 
 declare war, however trivial the occasion may appear ; / for 
 the State must strain every nerve to preserve for itself 
 that respect which it enjoys in the State-system.! 
 
 "^From this it also follows that the limitations which 
 States impose upon themselves by means of treaties are 
 voluntary self -limitations,/ and that all treaties are concluded 
 with the mental reservation rebus sic stantibus. There never 
 has been a State, and there never will be a State, which, in 
 concluding a treaty, seriously intended to keep it for ever. 
 No State is in a position to conclude a treaty (which neces- 
 sarily implies a certain limitation of its sovereignty) for all 
 time to come. ( The State always has in mind the possibility 
 of annulling the treaty at some future date ; and indeed the 
 treaty is only valid so long as the conditions under which it 
 was made have not entirely altered./ This idea has been 
 declared inhuman, but actually it is humane. Only if the 
 State knows that all its treaties have only a conditional 
 validity, will it make its treaties wisely. History is not 
 meant to be considered from the standpoint of a judge 
 presiding over a civil lawsuit. From this point of view 
 Prussia, since she had signed the Tilsit treaty, ought not to 
 have attacked Napoleon in 1813. But this treaty, too, was 
 concluded rebus sic stantibus ; and the circumstances (thank 
 
 N
 
 178 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 God !) had fundamentally changed even in those few years. 
 A noble nation was given the opportunity of freeing itself 
 from an insupportable slavery ; and, as soon as a nation 
 perceives such an opportunity, it is justified in daring to 
 take advantage of it. 
 
 f We must never lose sight in politics of the free moral 
 forces of national life. No State in the world is to renounce 
 that egotism which belongs to its sovereignty. If conditions 
 are imposed on a State which would degrade it, to which 
 it could not adhere, these conditions will be ' more honoured 
 in the breach than in the observance.'] History reveals one 
 very beautiful fact : that a State recovers more easily from 
 material losses than from attacks upon its honour. The loss 
 of a province may be endured as a necessity imposed by 
 prudence ; but to endure under compulsion a state of slavery 
 is an ever-open wound to a noble people. Napoleon I., by 
 the constant presence of his troops on Prussian soil, infused 
 a glowing hatred into the veins of the most long-suffering. 
 When a State is conscious that its honour has been insulted, 
 the renunciation of a treaty is only a question of time. 
 England and France experienced this in 1870, after the 
 Crimean War, when they had arrogantly imposed upon ex- 
 hausted Russia the condition that Russian warships should 
 no longer be allowed in the Black Sea ; and, when Russia took 
 advantage of the good opportunity afforded by the Franco- 
 German War to renounce this treaty, with the tacit support 
 of Germany, she was doing no more than was morally 
 justifiable. 
 
 Y When a State realises that existing treaties no longer 
 express the actual relations between the Powers, then, if it 
 cannot bring the other contracting State to acquiescence by 
 friendly negotiations, there is nothing for it but the inter- 
 national lawsuit War) ( Under such circumstances, a State 
 declares war with the consciousness of fulfilling an absolute 
 duty. } No motives of personal gain are involved. / The 
 protagonists have simply perceived that existing treaties no 
 longer correspond with their actual relations, and, since the
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 179 
 
 matter cannot be decided peaceably, it must be decided by 
 the great international lawsuit War. The justice of war 
 depends simply on the consciousness of a moral necessity .j 
 ince there cannot be, and ought not to be, any arbitrary 
 power placed above the great personalities which we call 
 nations, and since history must be in an eternal flux, war is 
 justified. War must be conceived as an institution ordained 
 of God./ A State may, of course, form a mistaken judgment 
 concerning the inevitability of war. Niebuhr says truly : 
 ' War does not establish any right that did not already 
 exist.' Individual acts of violence are expiated in the very 
 moment that they are performed. It was thus that the 
 unity of Germany and of Italy were achieved. On the 
 other hand, not every war has an inevitable result, and the 
 historian must therefore preserve an open mind ; he must 
 remember that the lives of States are counted in centuries. 
 The proud saying of the vanquished Piedmontese ' We 
 begin again ' will always have its place in the history of 
 noble nations. 
 
 " War will never be expelled from the world by inter- 
 national courts of arbitration, jt In any great question which 
 concerns a nation's life it is simply impossible for the other 
 members of the State-system to remain impartial. 1{ They 
 must be partial, because they are members of a living 
 community, mutually bound together or held apart by a 
 diversity of interests. / Supposing that such a foolish thing 
 were possible as that Germany should allow the question of 
 Alsace-Lorraine to be decided by a court of arbitration, which 
 of the European nations would be capable of viewing the 
 question impartially ? Such a thing is not to be dreamed of. 
 Hence the well-known fact that International Congresses 
 are able to formulate the results of a war, and to decide upon 
 it juridically, but that they are powerless to avert a war that 
 is threatening, fit is only in questions of the third rank 
 that* a foreign State can possibly be impartial. f 1 
 
 1 Politik, ii. pp. 546-53.
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 " DIE POLITIK " (ill.) CONSTITUTIONS 
 
 I. Standards of Judgment 
 
 FAITHFUL to the rule that every constitution must be judged 
 with reference to the people for which it is intended, Treitschke 
 never attempts to describe, even in outline, the ideal State. 
 He contents himself with mentioning one or two general prin- 
 ciples which any State, under whatever conditions it exists, 
 must observe, and one or two tests by which the historian 
 may measure praise or blame. 
 
 <Thus he tells us that, " since Staat ist Macht, the State 
 which unites all power in a single hand and asserts its own 
 independence " corresponds most nearly to the ideal.) 
 Montesquieu's doctrine, that the best State is one in which 
 the legislature, executive and judicature are independent of 
 each other, is altogether false, judged by the test of un- 
 divided sovereignty, a theocracy (such as we find in Asiatic 
 States) is at once ruled out of the catalogue of civilised 
 constitutions : 
 
 "It is clearly impossible to arrange the three forms of 
 State 1 in order of moral rank. But one thing can be 
 affirmed, namely, that a theocracy implies a bondage to a 
 primitive moral code, which could not be tolerated in any 
 free and progressive nation. Only where the assump- 
 tion reigns that the gospel is in itself a power for coercion, 
 only in such a dark confusion of religious and political 
 
 1 Theocracy, Monarchy, Democracy. 
 180
 
 "DIE POLITIK" 181 
 
 ideas, can a theocracy flourish. Therefore a theocracy 
 must be looked upon as the most immature form of State. 
 This becomes evident if an attempt is made to set it up in 
 an emancipated nation. Then it is seen to be in the highest 
 degree grotesque. The history of the Papacy affords ex- 
 cellent proof of this. On the other hand, we must refrain 
 from making a moral comparison between a republican and 
 a monarchical system of government. The historian must 
 be content to ask, ' Which form of state and of law was best 
 suited to a particular nation at a particular time ? ' (.He will 
 thus admit a republic to be moral, where it corresponds with 
 the moral conditions of a nation. With reference to the best 
 form of State, all that the historian can assert without pre- 
 sumption is that, since the State is primarily power, the form 
 of State which will take the government into its own hands 
 and make itself independent best fulfils this idea. ) With 
 reference to the constitution of the Church, on the other 
 hand, it may be asserted with equal confidence that the ideal 
 form is a republic. { The power of the Church is based on the 
 consciences of all its members. Therefore, a constitution 
 which encourages the exercise of the individual conscience, 
 and which establishes the Church as the living expression 
 of the faith that is to say, a republican constitution 
 best corresponds with the intrinsic nature of the Church. By 
 the same reasoning, a monarchically constituted Church is 
 furthest removed from the ideal." l 
 
 (I Again, a State which sets before itself a practicable ideal 
 is superior to those which pursue the unattainable. Judged 
 by this test a democracy must be held inferior to a monarchy 
 or an aristocracy./ For a democracy is founded upon the 
 assumption that men are by nature equal, whereas they are 
 fundamentally unequal : / 
 
 " However unpopular it may sound to-day, in this age 
 of democratic culture, it is none the less true that the same 
 
 1 Politik, ii. pp. 10-11.
 
 182 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 applies to a democracy. For the very word ' democracy ' 
 contains a contradiction in terms. The notion of ruling 
 implies the existence of a class that is ruled ; but if all are to 
 rule, where is this class to be found ? (A genuine democracy, 
 logically carried out, aims at a goal which, like that of a 
 theocracy, is impossible. 1 ; Both have in common the con- 
 vulsive effort to attain an idea which by its nature is un- 
 attainable. We see this in all radical democracies. All 
 natural human differences must be forcibly set aside, until 
 finally we come to the notion that distinctions of race also 
 must be swept away. (For the sake of a principle the up- 
 holders of democracy would bludgeon out of existence every 
 single distinction between members of the human race."] 1 
 
 ( But if equality is impossible, liberty of a truer kind can 
 be obtained ; and we have already seen that Treitschke 
 finds the distinctive characteristic of a civilised State in its 
 ever-growing respect for individual liberty.) It is worth 
 while to collect the passages of the Politik which bear upon 
 the definition of liberty : 
 
 (" Liberty is based upon reasonable laws, and their observ- 
 ance ; accordingly the authority of the laws is an indispens- 
 able condition of liberty." z 
 
 " Liberty consists in reasonable laws, which the individual 
 can obey with the approbation of his moral conscience, and 
 in the observance of these laws." 3 
 
 " It is a false conception of liberty to seek for liberty not 
 in the State, but from the State. '? 4 
 
 " Concerning the nature of liberty Aristotle has expressed 
 a profound truth, which holds good for all time : One prin- 
 ciple of liberty is for all to rule and be ruled in turn. Another 
 is that a man should live as he likes. 6 To translate the first 
 proposition in a more general form, one part of liberty is 
 
 1 Politik, ii. p. 15. * Ibid. i. p. 150. 
 
 8 Ibid. p. 156. * Ibid. p. 157. 
 
 5 Aristotle, Politics, 13x7 b 4\evdeplas S 2v p.lv rb iv /xfy &pxeff6ai Kal
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 183 
 
 the participation of the citizen, in any kind of way, in the 
 management of the State, and this is political liberty ; 
 the other part is that the individual should be restricted 
 as little as possible in the activities of private life. This 
 antithesis between political and personal liberty runs 
 through the whole of history. ... In antiquity the political 
 conception was so predominant that one is surprised to find 
 Aristotle, a man of the antique world, describing personal 
 liberty at all. The modern world, on the other hand, pays 
 attention, in the first place, to private liberty . . . the 
 modern man desires, first and foremost, free scope and pro- 
 tection for his economic activity." J 
 
 "It is a fashionable political folly of the present age to 
 seek for political liberty in a particular form of constitution, 
 in constitutional monarchy, for example, or in a republic. . . . 
 Why should we stigmatise as unfree such a powerful military 
 State as that of Philip of Macedon ? There you have a 
 voluntary obedience. Or are we to call the State of the 
 Great Elector unfree ? . . / If we look for a law that can 
 be verified from history, we can only say that wealth and 
 education, the two attributes on which the capacity for par- 
 ticipating in government are really based, diffuse themselves 
 with the development of civilisation over wider and wider 
 areas ; and therefore we can perceive that the constitution 
 of the State tends to become democratic.) The qualification 
 for an active part in politics is extended over wider and 
 wider areas. If this extension is confined within reason- 
 able limits, every historian must regard it as justifiable." 2 
 
 'I The exercise of the franchise is not in itself a political 
 education ; political liberty depends much less upon the 
 right to vote than upon a serious and conscientious partici- 
 pation in administrative work.V 3 
 
 "fThe rule of the majority, which must exist in a demo- 
 cracy, gives no secure guarantee for political liberty. In form 
 every one is permitted to participate in framing decisive 
 
 1 Politik, i. p. 158. 2 Ibid. pp. 159-60. 
 
 3 Ibid. p. 161.
 
 184 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 resolutions ; but if he is not hi the majority, he must obey 
 against his will.') 1 
 
 " Further, it is a peculiar fact that, while democracy pre- 
 serves absolute freedom of competition in its economic life, 
 spiritually-minded demagogues meddle most recklessly with 
 private morals and family life. What a contrast between 
 the unlimited political liberty and the monstrous temperance 
 laws of many states in the American Union ! " 2 
 
 ( When we piece these and some other utterances together, 
 it is evident that this liberty, which Treitschke regards as 
 the highest good that can be realised within the State, is only 
 possible in a few forms of State./t It will not be found where 
 the majority exercise an absolute sway./ It will not be found 
 in an enlightened despotism, such as that of the third 
 Napoleon. ( It implies, in its highest form, a wide diffusion 
 of culture and material prosperity.) I It implies free local 
 government, and a central government which is susceptible to 
 public opinion, though not subservient to it. Treitschke, in 
 fact, has gone further in building up a positive ideal of the 
 best State than he is himself aware. 
 
 Besides stating his own ideal, he criticises those of others. 
 In his own time there were two influential schools of German 
 politicians who offered two easy nostrums for the cure of all 
 political diseases, both in Germany and in every other 
 European State. The one school held that all would go well 
 if the State became a National State in the fullest sense of 
 the word ; the other sang the praises of Parliamentary 
 Government coupled with the English Party system. 
 
 2. The Nostrum of Nationalism 
 
 It will be observed that Treitschke's definition of the State 
 does not contain any reference to the national principle. ^ His 
 definition is based upon the facts of history '{ and historical 
 experience has proved that a strong State may be formed out 
 
 1 Politik, i. p. 255. 2 Ibid. ii. p. 270.
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 185 
 
 of a fraction of a nationality, and even out of fragments of 
 several nationalities. But, apart from history, he was not 
 prepared to make the national principle his guiding-star. 
 He held that a State which is exactly coextensive with a 
 nationality is the stronger on that account. ( But he attached 
 more importance to community of interests and to a central- 
 ised government than to the sentimental ties of common 
 descent and a common mother-tongue.) He preferred the 
 North German Confederation to the Greater Germany of the 
 Confederation of 1815, because a Bundesstaat was politically 
 more centralised than a Staatenbund. He dismissed as 
 chimerical all plans for the incorporation of Belgium and 
 Holland in Germany ; the fact that many of the Belgians 
 and all the Dutch were of German origin seemed to him a 
 consideration which ought not to influence German policy : 
 
 " Our century is thus filled with national antagonisms ; 
 and it is not surprising, therefore, that there has been talk of 
 setting up a principle of nationality. Yet, if we refuse to 
 allow ourselves to be taken in by these Napoleonic phrases, 
 we see that as a matter of fact there are two strong forces 
 working in history : 1 firstly, the tendency of every State to 
 amalgamate its population, in speech and manners, into one 
 single unity ; and, secondly, the impulse of every vigorous 
 nationality to construct a State of its own.] It is apparent 
 that these are two different forces, which for the most part 
 oppose and resist one another. The question is to discover 
 how a settlement may be arrived at. The natural tendency 
 is that the conceptions ' Nation ' and ' State ' should co- 
 incide with one another. That is the instinct of all great 
 nations, but history shows us how remote this has been from 
 actuality. The pre-eminence of western culture is due to 
 the fact that Western Europe has larger compact and uniform 
 ethnological masses, while the East is the classical land of the 
 fragments of nations. Thence it follows directly, apart from 
 other causes, that the oriental State can hardly be a moral 
 unit. It must be content with an administration that is
 
 186 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 only surface-deep ; the ruling nationality will only insist on 
 tribute and external submission. Russia and Austria are in 
 this respect in a stage of transition from western to eastern 
 nations. Already we see in them a preponderance of 
 oriental over European population, and this affects the 
 whole life of the State. 
 
 " Hence it appears, in the life of nations, there are two 
 great forces, which may act either in opposition to or in 
 union with one another. It is clear, moreover, that the 
 idea of nationality is the more active, and that it influences 
 
 i 
 
 the whole course of history. ^Almighty God did not put 
 the various nationalities into separate glass cases, like a 
 collection of biological specimens ; and we can see for our- 
 selves what transformations have been effected among them 
 in the course of history. Nationality is not a settled and 
 permanent thing.} There are examples of great nations 
 whose original character and native genius have never quite 
 been lost, but we see how these may become alloyed. The 
 Greeks and the Germans were instances of two primitive 
 peoples whose idiosyncrasy could never be subdued. The 
 iron strength of the Roman Empire was powerless over them. 
 Military colonies might be established on German soil, but 
 to Romanise the Germans was an impossibility. When, 
 however, our ancestors marched as conquerors into the 
 Roman Empire, there was a reversal of the ethnographical 
 process ; the superior civilisation revenged itself on its 
 conquerors. The Lombards retained their German speech 
 for a comparatively lengthy period ; the Ostrogoths pre- 
 served it always, but their kingdom was of shorter duration. 
 In far the greater number of the other Germanic States 
 which were founded on Roman soil, we see the conqueror 
 fairly soon adopting the language and customs of the more 
 highly civilised race of the conquered. The Visigoths 
 become Spaniards. The Burgundians become Gauls." 1 
 
 ^ The State, he argues, is a work of art ; and the statesman 
 
 1 Politik, i. pp. 270-72.
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 187 
 
 may succeed in fusing together the most intractable nation- 
 alities to form a new community with distinctive character- 
 istics, s Racial differences are harder to overcome than 
 those of nationalities j; this is illustrated by the case of India, 
 and of the southern States in the American Union. { Where 
 such differences exist a free State cannot be founded ; there 
 must be a ruling race if there is to be a State at all.? It is 
 otherwise when the differences are national not racial. In 
 fact the conception of nationality is elastic ; it is hard to say 
 what is the essence of a nationality. The case of the Irish 
 proves that a nationality may persist when it has lost its 
 language ; the case of the Swiss that national feeling may 
 become extinct where the national language still remains in 
 use. f A nationality is always in a state of flux, always 
 changing in character ; and it is quite possible for a dominant 
 nationality to absorb the minor nationalities over which it 
 rules.} We must, however, bear in mind here Treitschke 
 returns for a moment to the ideals of his youth, the ideals of 
 the Romanticists that the greatest things in literature and 
 politics are the product of national sentiment. Except for 
 this one qualification, the following passage forms a striking 
 contrast to those parts of Die Freiheit which glorify the 
 national principle and insist upon the fundamental character 
 of the differences between one nation and another : 
 
 " It is then impossible to arrange the facts of history 
 genealogically in a kind of family tree. On the contrary, 
 it must be recognised that even nationalities are subject to 
 the flux of history ; and it is equally instructive and diffi- 
 cult for the historian to trace out these ethnographical 
 processes. Frequently he encounters what appears to be a 
 miracle. Think of England, and how, out of the Anglo- 
 Saxons and the Normans, after a violent struggle, there 
 emerged one nation. We can see the completed process, 
 and we can imagine, from our observation of individual 
 instances, how this fusion of races takes place. The normal 
 fact, however, is that the unity of the State should be based
 
 i88 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 on nationality. The legal bond must at the same time be 
 felt to be a natural bond of blood-relationship either real 
 or imaginary blood-relationship (for on this point nations 
 labour under the most extraordinary delusions). Almost 
 all great nations, like the Athenians, label themselves 
 autochthonous, and boast (almost invariably without founda- 
 tion) of the purity of their blood. Yet it is just the state- 
 forming nations, like the Romans and the English, who are 
 of strikingly mixed race. The Arabs and the Indians are of 
 very pure blood, but no one can say that either of these races 
 has been a successful state-founder. Their strength lies in 
 quite other spheres. 
 
 " If we consider the map of Germany, the inhabitants of 
 large portions of Hesse, of Hanoverian Lower Saxony, as 
 well as East Friesland, Westphalia, and (possibly also) 
 Northern Thuringia, are of quite unmixed Germanic blood. 
 In the regions farther west and south there is a strong 
 admixture of Roman blood. This can be discerned even at 
 the present day. Wherever the women carry their burdens 
 on their heads, we may be mathematically certain that at 
 some time there have been Romans. Wherever burdens are 
 carried on the back or in the hands, there have never been 
 Romans. But no one would venture to maintain that it 
 was in these unmixed Germanic stocks that the creative 
 political forces of Germany originated. The great upholders 
 and pioneers of civilisation in Germany have been, in the 
 Middle Ages, the South Germans, who are partly Celtic, and, 
 in modern times, the North Germans, who are partly Slav. 
 The same is true of Piedmont in Italy. In France pure 
 Celtic blood is only to be found in Brittany. The Bretons 
 have always been a sturdy little people ; they contribute its 
 best soldiers to the French army, since the loss of Alsace. 
 But it is a region of bigotry. The people lead a peaceful 
 idyllic life, but the aptitude for state-building could never 
 be ascribed to them. ' In the great process of attrition which 
 a nation undergoes when it is mixed with other nations the 
 gentler virtues perish, but the power of the will is strengthened. ]
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 189 t 
 
 (So it is ; and it must be added that there is no such thing 
 as a purely national history. Life as it is recorded in history 
 is mostly a process of give-and-take and of cosmopolitan 
 forces.] | On the other hand, all true heroism, whether in 
 literature or in politics, must be national ; otherwise it will 
 be without moral effectiveness.) Taking these two great 
 contradictions together, it becomes obvious that nothing 
 is to be gained from barren talk about a right of nationality. 
 lEvery State must have the right to merge into one the nation- 
 "alities contained within itself ; and, on the other hand, the 
 impulse will exist in every nationality to make itself politic- 
 ally independent."! 1 
 
 3. The Nostrum of Parliamentarism 
 
 The Parliamentary system (Parlamentarismus] meant, 
 in German politics, a literal copy of the English party 
 system. It meant the control of the executive by a Cabinet, 
 all chosen from one party, and that the dominant party in 
 the Lower House ; it meant the collective responsibility (in a 
 political sense) of the Cabinet to the Lower House in all 
 questions of policy. Finally, it meant the reduction of the 
 monarchy to a mere shadow, to a symbol of national unity. 
 This had been the ideal of many Liberals in 1848 ; and some 
 leading politicians had desired to endow the North German 
 Confederation, and the German Empire itself, with this sort 
 of Parliamentary government. 
 
 We have already seen some of the objections which 
 Treitschke offered when Parlamentarismus was in the field 
 as a programme of practical reform. In the Politik he 
 restates his objections in a more general and a more compact 
 form. 
 
 First he objects to the very principle of party : 
 
 " As the sand on the dunes blows to and fro, so new 
 parties form themselves. They are the ephemeral products 
 of free political life, the outcome of antagonism of a social, 
 
 1 Politik, i. pp. 278-80.
 
 190 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 a national, or a religious character. They are necessary in a 
 free people, to shape an average will out of many individual 
 wills ; but to overvalue them is a proof of spiritual barren- 
 ness. To devote oneself entirely to a party means a conscious 
 narrowing of the self ; natures which are really free have 
 always a certain distaste for the one-sidedness of party spirit. 
 Of every kind of party one may say that, under certain 
 conditions, it is a destructive force. Social parties may lead 
 to civil war, since they are guided by the basest passions. 
 National antagonisms may secretly lead to the complete 
 disintegration of the State. . . . How religious parties may 
 destroy the civic sentiment is proved by the grisly annals 
 of the Thirty Years' War. Social interests are always the 
 first incentives to the formation of a party. But many other 
 antagonisms co-operate in the work ; and one can only say 
 in this place that strong disruptive forces in a nation have 
 the right and the duty to express themselves in the form of 
 parties." 1 
 
 A party system is necessary and natural when it repre- 
 sents actual interests within the nation. It is intolerable 
 when the parties live on reminiscences of feuds which are now 
 absolute, f But parties always need to be kept in check by a 
 moderating power which is above them J 
 
 " From this follows logically the old dogma that it is the 
 duty of a government to stand above party, and also, as 
 Bismarck said, to find the resultant of the various party 
 forces. If the State is an organisation for administering 
 justice, it must be un-partisan in nature. Herein lies the 
 superiority of a well-ordered monarchy over a Republic, that 
 in a monarchy the supreme power rests on its right, and, 
 even if it is not always impartial in practice, is capable of 
 being so. In Republics, on the contrary, the members of 
 some party will always have charge of the helm of the State, 
 and hence it will be much more difficult to secure an impartial 
 
 1 Politik, i. pp. 153-4.
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 191 
 
 administration than it is in the case of a monarchy. Out of 
 all this for and against and in and out of parties there 
 emerges what we are accustomed to describe as public 
 opinion. What public opinion demands from the State and 
 from the government is freedom. What is meant by this ? 
 It is merely an empty word. We must ask : Freedom from 
 what ? The answer can only be : Freedom from unreason- 
 able compulsion. Freedom, as we know already, is secured 
 by reasonable laws, which individuals can obey with a sense 
 of moral approbation, and by the upholding of these laws. 
 The notions of legal authority and legal freedom are not 
 opposed but correlated to one another. A freedom which is 
 not assured, which is not expressed in common obedience 
 to the laws, cannot be lasting. And so in great nations the 
 idea of service service of the fatherland is always held in 
 honour." 1 
 
 " If, in a monarchy, the supreme power is vested by right 
 in the person of the monarch, it follows that the King will 
 elect his own advisers, and that these will execute his will. 
 Only in this way will the monarchy fulfil its vocation, which is 
 to stand above parties. It has been asserted, in opposition 
 to this, that the Ministers must be independent of the King, 
 because, otherwise, they could not be held responsible before 
 the Chambers, for no one can be answerable for things which 
 he has not done by his own initiative ; but that, as a matter 
 of fact, very frequently there occurs a discrepancy between 
 the will of the Chambers and that of the King. Mohl, in par- 
 ticular, has developed this theory. If we consider the 
 developments which occur in all monarchies, which are more 
 than monarchies in name, we shall answer that such a 
 discrepancy does certainly exist ; it is not to be denied that 
 the will of the King is frequently at variance with that of 
 the representatives of such diversified interests. But the 
 existence of our State demands that this discrepancy shall 
 be reconciled, however inconvenient this may be for the 
 Ministers concerned. The theorists who simply propose 
 
 1 Politik, i. p. 156.
 
 192 -HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 to decree this discrepancy out of existence overlook the fact 
 that the Ministers are not only responsible to the Chambers, 
 but also to the King. 
 
 "If we consider the matter impartially, we are forced 
 to recognise that here is a question involving the very 
 existence of the monarchy. If it belongs to the nature of 
 monarchy that the supreme power should be vested in the 
 monarch, it becomes evident that this nature is belied if 
 the King is placed under the obligation of choosing his 
 advisers in accordance with the will of the Parliament. 
 Therefore the statement that the ultimate ideal of a con- 
 stitutional monarchy is a pure Parliamentarism on the 
 English pattern, a government by the party which has a 
 majority in the House at the moment, is in contradiction to 
 the idea of the monarchical state. And where is it written 
 that Germany, with her glorious history, shall be obliged to 
 follow the example of an island state, concerning which it 
 may be asserted on the whole that, wherever it finds a source 
 of strength, we find a source of weakness, and vice versa ? " 1 
 
 | It may be objected that, in England, the party system 
 has worn a more ideal character, that English parties stand 
 for principles of permanent value which are not so much 
 antagonistic as complementary the one to the other. But 
 history shows that English parties, successful as they un- 
 doubtedly have been, have represented conflicting interests 
 in the English aristocracy. Now that these interests are 
 broken, the virtue has gone out of the English party 
 system :-f- 
 
 " The struggle between the two great English political 
 parties has never been, as Macaulay maintained, a dispute 
 over principles. It has always turned on the question, 
 who should control the government of the State ? Both 
 Whigs and Tories were aristocratic parties, and always 
 voted for or against everything, according as they were 
 
 1 Polilik, ii. pp. 150-1.
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 193 
 
 in or out of power. The great changes in English political 
 life have for the most part been brought about by the 
 Tories. It is in no sense true, then, that these two 
 aristocratic parties, both of which were in favour of the 
 control of Parliament over the Crown, were divided in any 
 deep matters of principle. It is the struggle for power which 
 produces parties. Tories and Whigs were originally sup- 
 porters of the Stuarts in the one case and of the Guelph 
 usurpers in the other case. This cause of dispute gradually 
 disappeared, but there remained the hereditary factions of 
 the great families of the land. 
 
 "It is only in aristocratic States that it is possible for 
 parties to endure so long. There arises a narrowness of party 
 feeling against which the liberal-minded average man rebels. 
 When Wellington was chief Minister, he perceived that 
 Catholic emancipation was a necessity ; but when he resolved 
 to take this step, it was regarded by the members of his 
 party as a deadly offence. A German would consider it 
 deserving of admiration that a man should sacrifice a tradi- 
 tional party prejudice for the good of his country. The 
 English, however, say : ' It may perhaps have been necessary, 
 but it was a severe blow to the ethics of party.' Here the 
 word ' ethics ' is used in the same absurd sense as with us 
 in Germany at the present day. This is what happens to a 
 nation in which party feeling has entered into the very 
 blood of the people. Both parties completely approved of 
 the principles of the new constitution ; both were capable 
 of governing ; and yet when the English crown, as a result 
 of the ' glorious revolution ' and the wholly illegitimate 
 summoning of the Guelphs to the throne, had been reduced 
 to a cipher, parliamentary party government was found 
 necessary. 
 
 " The English Parliament in its great days was a worthy 
 counterpart of the Roman Senate. England was then an 
 aristocratic republic in the grand style. The crown played 
 only the part of ' a costly, but on the whole harmless capitol 
 to the pillar of the State.' In conjunction with this must be 
 
 o
 
 194 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 taken the hereditary intellectual nullity of the four Georges. 
 The necessity for an aristocratic party government was 
 based on the whole history of the State. And this party 
 government accomplished great things. It raised England to 
 the position of the leading commercial power ; but it could 
 only endure so long as the aristocracy was really the first 
 class in the land, and was recognised as such. Now, after the 
 beginning of the nineteenth century, this state of things began 
 gradually to change. In 1832 came the first Reform Bill, 
 which enlarged the numbers of the parliamentary electorate. 
 From this time onward a quarter of the members were really 
 elected. Before this time every great landowner had his 
 member in his pocket. At the present day all this has been 
 altered ; a portion of the House of Commons does really 
 represent the people ; and the new interests of the middle 
 classes are beginning to penetrate into the House of Commons. 
 The suffrage was subjected to several further reforms, and 
 now the terms ' Tory ' and ' Whig ' are rarely heard. 
 There are now no longer two parties, but six or eight (they 
 change even more quickly than with us) . Since this approxi- 
 mation of the House of Commons to a national representative 
 assembly, England has no longer only one aristocratic 
 governing body. It presents the same variegated system 
 that we see on the Continent, except that for all these 
 parties there are only two leaders, and the members of 
 the various parties support the one or the other of these, 
 according to circumstances. It is obvious that such a 
 division into two traditional parties would be impossible 
 for us. We lack the pre-requisite conditions for it. And 
 above all, it is contrary to the German nature. We are 
 distinguished from other nations by an uprightness and 
 sincerity, which makes it essential for us to speak out 
 our convictions, and this disposition is entirely opposed to 
 a stereotyped partisanship. We decline with thanks ' the 
 holy bonds of friendship,' which have kept the English 
 parties together. We desire that offices of State should 
 be distributed according to deserts. That is exceedingly
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 195 
 
 difficult, but it is the ideal which hovers before the mind of 
 every German." * 
 
 In the second place, Treitschke argues that Parlament- 
 arismus is a plant of English growth, which has been fostered 
 by the peculiar social conditions of England. Admirably 
 suited to the England of the eighteenth century, it is for 
 that very reason unsuitable for transplantation. In par- 
 ticular it is unsuited to Germany. He explains his reasons in 
 the following passage, which, though it is little more than 
 an expansion of a shorter statement which we have quoted 
 above (Chap. V.), deserves to be translated in full : 
 
 "If we extract the sum of all these circumstances in 
 connexion with England, it becomes conceivable, as Montes- 
 quieu might have said, that the ruling idea in a constitutional 
 monarchy must be mistrust ; a horrible doctrine, which would 
 presume to base a noble State on one of the meanest instincts 
 of mankind. But, even at the present day, this is actually a 
 dogma with all Radical parties, though they may not venture 
 to express it in so many words. Even my own dear teacher, 
 Dahlmann, observed that, possibly, in constitutional govern- 
 ments, political freedom ran less danger from the mediocre 
 kings than from a king of genius. Thus a noble and gifted 
 man could speak as if genius, which is never anything but a 
 heaven-sent blessing, were to be regarded as a public danger. 
 
 " It would obviously be undesirable, even if it were 
 possible, that a monarchical system like the English, which is 
 the product of peculiar historical circumstances, should be 
 adopted in its entirety by other States. Common sense 
 tells us that the best political institutions are those which 
 are most effective in the ablest hands. To assert, then, 
 that the kingly office must be so constituted as to preclude its 
 being held by any one of more than average distinction, at 
 the best, is to turn the world upside down. It is true that 
 the whole education of the English princes has been based 
 
 1 Politik, i. pp. 150-3.
 
 196 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 on this assumption, and that it has been remarkably success- 
 ful in ensuring the continuance of the hereditary insignifi- 
 cance of the members of the House of Guelph. Not one of 
 those princes who has any hopes of succeeding to the throne 
 is a soldier in the full sense of the word. And without being 
 prophets, we are justified now in asserting that the hereditary 
 characteristic of the Guelphs will be preserved in the next 
 two generations of the House of Coburg. This accords with 
 the character of the English State ; but we Germans have no 
 intention of forsaking our simple common sense, or of sug- 
 gesting to our nation that it should have a sound limb 
 amputated for the sake of receiving in its place a cunningly 
 wrought but artificial member. We have learnt by experi- 
 ence that our constitutional monarchy is so constructed as 
 to be most effectual in the hands of a great monarch ; and 
 our constitution has no intention of depriving the kingly 
 office of all significance. Rather it aims at preserving the 
 life and vigour of the monarchy, and that in a nation of very 
 high political development. With us, kingship is almost the 
 only strong political tradition which links our present with 
 the past. Could we desire to exchange our glorious House 
 of Hohenzollern for the English Georges ? The annals of 
 our dynasty are such a food for pride that a Prussian might 
 well say, ' The best monarch is quite good enough for us.' 
 According to our constitution, the monarch is the sole and 
 supreme head of the State ; and any one who asserts the 
 contrary is forced to base his argument on alien and peculiar 
 historical circumstances. 
 
 " Thus a feeble and illegitimate royal family is the most 
 striking feature of the English State. The second point to 
 be noted is the existence of a nobility possessing great power 
 and great political ability. The English peasant class was 
 completely bought out in the sixteenth century. Conditions 
 similar to those found with us in Mecklenburg and in parts 
 of Hither Pomerania, are the rule in England, even at the 
 present day. In the agricultural districts the population is 
 in a state of serfdom. We find the great landowners living
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 197 
 
 in their beautiful country houses ; under them, and to a large 
 extent dependent on them, the farmers ; and, finally, the 
 labourers, who are dependent for their whole existence on 
 the landowner. In England, that peasant class, which is 
 the great strength of Germany, has been swallowed up by the 
 aristocracy, and consequently the parliamentary system 
 has developed in the direction of an entirely aristocratic 
 government. Although, since the days of the elder Pitt, the 
 great debates have always taken place in the House of 
 Commons, it would be quite incorrect to assume that the 
 House of Lords has been powerless since that date. Who 
 elected the members of the House of Commons ? No one 
 else but the Lords. The House of Commons was composed 
 in the first place of the younger sons, cousins and nephews 
 of the peers (who themselves represented the elite of the 
 State in the House of Lords) , and, in the second place, of the 
 mere creatures of the peers, who were elected according to 
 the orders of the great landowners. Every lord had in 
 his pocket a number of electoral districts, the members for 
 which he himself selected. 
 
 " Hence it was inconceivable that there should be a dis- 
 agreement on any matter of principle between the Upper and 
 the Lower House, and such a disagreement never actually 
 occurred in the eighteenth century. Hence this powerful 
 nobility, which so outshone the court that the latter no 
 longer was nor is the central point of good society, deter- 
 mined, by its party organisation, the whole development of 
 the State. The two great parties of the Tories and the 
 Whigs were fundamentally agreed as to the principles of 
 government. The only cause of contention was the applica- 
 tion of these principles in a particular case. The important 
 thing was the struggle for power for its own sake. The 
 party struggle was therefore comparatively mild ; often, 
 in fact, it seemed absolutely meaningless ; but it was just 
 this fact that prevented it from ever threatening the existence 
 of the State. The fact that these party contentions did not 
 disturb the peace of the administration and the maintenance
 
 198 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 of justice and order in the State was also connected with the 
 old English system of local government. The great land- 
 lords, in the capacity of justices of the peace, managed the 
 whole everyday local administration in the country districts 
 in a clumsy, unskilful manner, but as free men. It was a 
 point of honour for a young man of good family, when he had 
 completed his travels and his studies, to have his name 
 enrolled on the lists of justices of the peace ; and this 
 privilege was never denied to a landowner. These justices 
 of the peace were drawn from both parties ; and, as their 
 authority extended over the whole country, they were 
 able to exercise a restraining and moderating influence 
 on one another. They occupied at the same time such an 
 independent position, that a change in the ministry did not 
 affect them at all. So matters took their course slowly, 
 but without perversion of justice. 
 
 " Set above this aristocratic local administration we 
 find a small number of parliamentary ministers about 
 sixty-four. These were the heads of the various government 
 departments, and they forfeited their position with every 
 change in the ministry. Yet their position was such as to 
 satisfy the most exalted ambition. Below them we find a 
 Government Civil Service, the members of which are desig- 
 nated ' clerks.' These clerks have absolutely no scope for 
 the exercise of their own will, but are simply there to execute 
 the orders of the parliamentary officials ; and they are 
 precluded by their office from entering Parliament. Now 
 it has been proved by experience that, in any class of which 
 the members are precluded from pursuing their highest 
 ambition, there will be a certain loss of social and political 
 status. If we formed such a notion of our staff of officers 
 as necessitated that the generals should be selected from 
 another class, everything would be changed. But that is how 
 the case actually stands in England. The clerks of the Civil 
 Service are excluded from the highest offices, and are thus 
 subordinates in the most literal sense of the word, about as 
 subordinate as the Councillors of our German Chancery
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 199 
 
 (Kanzleirdthe) . They know, too, that they can never 
 participate in the real work of government ; that they will 
 never be anything but tools. Such a class is made up of 
 other social elements than those which compose the ruling 
 class. This affords a very striking illustration of the aristo- 
 cratic character of the English State. In every govern- 
 ment, no less than in every army, a distinction must be 
 drawn between the subordinates and those actually in com- 
 mand ; but the level at which this distinction is drawn is a 
 most important point. In Germany it is drawn much lower, 
 with the result that our whole social life has a much more 
 democratic character than the English. 
 
 "To crown this singular and wonderful English State- 
 machine, there now took shape, little by little, a genuine and 
 actual government the Cabinet made up of the King's 
 official advisers. These became also the advisers of the 
 Parliament, and so there came into being a Cabinet Govern- 
 ment, which, even at the present day, is not so much as 
 alluded to in the law of the land. The law recognises Her 
 Majesty's Privy Council, to which the members of the 
 Cabinet properly belong ; but nowhere is it laid down that 
 this Council should be the supreme governing body. This 
 Cabinet is composed of the leaders of the parliamentary 
 majority. It may be described, in fact, as a committee of 
 this majority. Its office, therefore, is not simply to represent 
 the Government. The government is in the hands of the 
 Parliament. The ministers sit, as peers or as commoners, 
 on the front bench of one of the two Houses. Those of 
 them who are peers must only speak in the Upper House ; 
 those of them who are commoners must only speak in the 
 Lower House. 
 
 " What a complete contrast to the state of things with 
 us ! Only try to imagine Prince Bismarck precluded from 
 ever speaking in the House of Representatives because he 
 was a member of the Upper House. In England, however, 
 no one may speak in the House of Commons, except he be 
 a member of the House. Such an institution as that of our
 
 200 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 Government representatives (Regierungscommissare) would 
 thus be impossible in England. This shows very clearly 
 the entirely different relation of the Civil Service to the 
 Parliament in England and Germany respectively. In 
 Germany the Civil Service is an independent administrative 
 body composed of servants of the King, who come before 
 Parliament and speak in the name of the Government. In 
 England the Civil Service is subordinate to Parliament. 
 Any civil servant may be summoned before the bar of the 
 Upper or the Lower House. 
 
 " All this does indeed show a marvellous form of State, 
 but one as little democratic as the House of Commons is a 
 democratic national assembly. One is always astonished 
 to hear the English House of Commons described as a 
 national assembly. Up to 1832 not a single member of it 
 owed his seat to the free choice of the people. Not only 
 had every great peer a number of constituencies, of which 
 he disposed as he liked. Even in the large towns, in which 
 the corporations made up their numbers by co-optation 
 (just as in Germany in the eighteenth century), only a small 
 number of the town councillors had the full parliamentary 
 vote. Thus, in Portsmouth, which before the first Reform 
 Bill was already a town of nearly a hundred thousand 
 inhabitants, there were about sixteen parliamentary voters. 
 
 " It is absurd to regard such a Lower House as a national 
 assembly. The merits that it possessed were of quite 
 another nature. The purely aristocratic character of the 
 House rendered it possible for the nobility to introduce its 
 younger members to parliamentary life at an early age ; and 
 this made it possible for the younger Pitt to become Prime 
 Minister at the age of twenty-three. Thus the ruling 
 aristocracy were able themselves to educate their political 
 posterity. So does the Prussian Civil Service educate its 
 posterity by getting them appointed as Referendars. But 
 with us it is the Civil Service which undertakes this political 
 education of youth ; in England it is the Parliament. It 
 stands to reason that, in England, no one can hope to main-
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 201 
 
 tain his influence in the Government for any length of time, 
 unless he have a majority in his favour in both Houses. 
 And yet, in such an eminently aristocratic State as this, the 
 Continent has been able to find a sort of hash of democracy, 
 aristocracy, and monarchy. The truth is that there is not 
 a trace of democracy, only the shadow of monarchy, and, 
 in fact, nothing but a well - ordered and powerful aristo- 
 cracy. 
 
 " Of course, if we look more closely at these political 
 conditions, it would not do to apply the standards of a 
 moral censor. Such a peculiarly aristocratic Parliament 
 could only be persuaded by two means, and both were often 
 employed simultaneously by the same Cabinet. Either a 
 man had to establish an intellectual supremacy over Parlia- 
 ment (hence the enormous power of the great orators of 
 the House of Commons) ; or else, as Robert Walpole said, 
 he had ' to grease the wheels of the parliamentary machine.' 
 Enormous bribes were necessary in order to secure the 
 maintenance of a majority, and this practice was regularly 
 incorporated into the parliamentary system ; so that, even 
 at the present day, one of the Secretaries of the Treasury 
 bears the picturesque title of Patronage Secretary. If it 
 had not been possible to rely on this method of milking the 
 cow of the State, such an aristocratic regime could not 
 possibly have continued, and few people know how calmly 
 the English themselves allude to it. There is a character- 
 istic English verse, the gist of which is : Other States govern 
 by the stern force of the law ; but with us the State is 
 held together by the gentle bonds of friendship. To live 
 under such conditions may be very pleasant ; but it is absurd 
 to hold it up as an example to the stern justice of the German 
 State. Moreover, in Germany, we fill up subordinate 
 positions with retired non-commissioned officers (Unter- 
 offizieren] , that is to say, with men who have already rendered 
 their modest service to the State. Surely, this is acting 
 more justly than the English, who allow such positions to 
 be given to the lackeys and servants of the peerage.
 
 202 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 " So the old English State, with its marvellous internal 
 mechanism, moved on its way ; not a wheel could be re- 
 moved from the machine, without bringing it to a standstill. 
 But, gradually, after the close of the eighteenth century, 
 we begin to see the rise of the middle classes. We see the 
 development of the great industries, with their new social 
 classes and their entirely new interests. Finally, these begin 
 to knock at the gates of Parliament. The younger Pitt 
 perceived very early the importance of these new social 
 developments. At the beginning of the French revolution 
 he was on the point of making such a reform in the suffrage 
 as would bring about that at least a portion of the House of 
 Commons should consist of national representatives. Then 
 came the great struggle against France, which taxed all the 
 forces of England ; and Pitt had to postpone his plans for 
 Reform. So long years went by. The old order persisted, 
 until finally, at the time of the July Revolution, the social 
 movement had become so strong that a change was inevit- 
 able. The democratic forces had become so powerful that 
 they necessarily asked for a few representatives in Parlia- 
 ment. In the year 1832 the first Reform Bill was carried, 
 and it has since been followed by three others. The number 
 of the voters was doubled, and in about half the electoral 
 districts the casting vote lay with the middle classes." * 
 
 \ When we compare this English parliamentary system 
 with the constitution of the German Empire it is obvious 
 that English party government would be impossible in 
 Germany : | 
 
 "If we consider our Reichstag as it exists to-day, how 
 absurd it seems to think of setting up in Germany a system 
 of party government ! In the first place, it is in contradic- 
 tion with the whole imperial constitution. Our Imperial 
 Chancellor, the sole responsible official, has only to execute 
 the decrees of the Federal Council (Bundesrath) , the members 
 
 1 Politik, ii. pp. 135-43.
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 203 
 
 of which are the representatives of the twenty-five govern- 
 ments. He is thus obliged to support opinions with which 
 he may be sometimes entirely out of sympathy. These 
 opinions from the twenty-five Crowns are put before the 
 Reichstag. The imperial constitution further provides that 
 no member of the Federal Council may be a member of the 
 Reichstag. On the other hand, the heads of all the great 
 departments of the imperial administration are, ipso jure, 
 members of the Federal Council. / Hence the nature of the 
 constitution renders a parliamentary government impossible. 
 I hope that you will meditate over these things a little in 
 silence, so that you may convince yourselves that there is 
 an absolute contradiction in the idea of wishing to mould 
 German conditions to an English pattern .|(| We have all 
 reason to congratulate ourselves that we do possess a vigorous 
 monarchical Civil Service, which, in virtue of its own services, 
 of its social position and also of the authority of the Crown, 
 has a real and absolute importance. L We have no ground 
 whatever for wishing that it should be otherwise." l 
 
 4. Monarchy 
 
 We have already, in a previous chapter (Chap. V.), found 
 Treitschke contending that a constitutional monarchy is 
 the form of State best suited to Prussia, f In the Politik he 
 goes further and, forgetting his own doctrine of the relativity 
 of constitutions, argues that such a monarchy is the ideal 
 form of constitution! Not even content with this, he 
 maintains that the monarch, as being " legitimate," a ruler 
 by hereditary right, is and ought to be irresponsible for the 
 exercise of his very considerable powers :} 
 
 'f\ On the other hand, the idea of a monarchy is opposed 
 to tnat of a Republic. While in a Republic the will of the 
 State is an expression of the will of the people, in a monarchy 
 the will of the State is an expression of the will of one man') 
 
 1 Politik, ii. pp. 162-3.
 
 204 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 who, by virtue of the historic right of a certain family, 
 wears the crown, and with whom, though he may have 
 advisers possessing a greater or less degree of authority, the 
 [ultimate decision always restsjl It would be idle here to 
 trifle with illustrations. (The essence of monarchy is the 
 idea that nothing can be done contrary to the will of the 
 monarch. That is the minimum of monarchical power. 
 \We find ourselves, then, confronted with the contrast 
 between unity and plurality] (and that the monarchy 
 excels any other form of government as a visible expression 
 of the political power and unity of a nation is proved by 
 long experience. \ It is for this reason that monarchy seems 
 so natural, and that it makes such an appeal to the popular 
 understanding. We Germans had an experience of this 
 in the first years of our new empire. \ How wonderfully the 
 idea of a united fatherland was embodied for us in the 
 person of the venerable Emperor I 1 ] I How much it meant 
 to us that we could feel once more : This man is Germany ; 
 there is no gainsaying it ! ) 
 
 '( A second important feature of a monarchy is that the 
 will of the State is represented by one single individual. 
 What is more important, this authority is not transmitted, 
 but rests on its own right.)! (To borrow a scholastic expres- 
 sion, we may speak of the self-dependence of the monarchical 
 authority. The power of a monarchy is inherent in itself, 
 and it is due to this fact that a monarchy can and does 
 exercise a higher social justice than any republican form of 
 government, jftlt is much more difficult for a republic to 
 be just ; because in a republic there is always party govern- 
 ment. We actually see in history that monarchies have 
 always shown more justice than republics. ( It is not hatred 
 of the monarchy, but hatred of a higher social class which 
 unites the masses in social revolutions!) It is indeed to the 
 monarch that the masses will appeal to restrict the power 
 of individuals. A king who is a king indeed stands so high 
 above all private concerns that he can look down, as from 
 a high altitude, upon the various classes and parties.) The
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 205 
 
 French who, in their great days, had a very deep and earnest 
 conception of the monarchy, had the legal rule that, at the 
 moment that he ascended the throne, the king incurred a 
 loss of status in the eyes of private law. His private estate 
 fell in to the Crown." 1 
 
 (A monarch, Treitschke says, is the best head of a State ; 
 because under him all power is concentrated in the hands 
 of one person, and that person is above all parties. J The 
 monarch is normally supported by the aristocracy, because 
 he represents the hereditary principle ; and at the same 
 time he normally becomes the protector of the masses.) His 
 exalted position gives him a wider mental horizon than that 
 of ordinary men. He will understand foreign politics 
 better than any republican cabinet ; and he will also be 
 more far-sighted, j " The policy of Prussia before 1866 
 could only have been carried through by a great king and a 
 great minister. We were a small house, in Freiburg there 
 were five of us, who held by Bismarck in those days. That 
 is the public opinion which is supposed to have supported 
 Bismarck." 2 1^. dynasty has political traditions which are 
 in the blood ; and so its policy will be consistent from 
 generation to generation./ There are special dangers in 
 the hereditary principle ; but it is a mere superstition that 
 election finds out better rulers. American Presidents, on 
 the average, are no more remarkable than the Hohenzollern 
 Kings of Prussia. (| And the parvenu, however able, has no 
 political traditions to steady him. Monarchy gives us the 
 best chance of seeing a great individuality at the head of 
 the State : ) 
 
 9 
 
 't Throughout history the essential thing in a monarchy 
 is the living power of personality. Monarchy is based on 
 the profound theory, ridiculed by all the Liberal word- 
 mongers of the present day, that men make history./ Any 
 one, then, who imagines that perpetual motion, which 
 
 1 Politik, ii. pp. 52-4. Ibid. p. 56.
 
 206 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 is inconceivable in the physical world, can exist in the 
 spiritual world, will have republican instincts, and will 
 imagine that things have been brought about automatically. 
 Any one, on the contrary, who starts with the assumption 
 that it is strength of will and strength of personality which 
 impel history forwards, will be in favour of a monarchical 
 form of government. Gervinus is the chief representative 
 of the idea that public opinion or universal conditions 
 evolved themselves without assistance, and that these 
 alone moved events forwards. Some even pushed this 
 folly so far as to maintain that it was a sign of the strength 
 of a movement, if it originated from the people, and if no 
 distinguished individual had taken part in it. 1 This was, 
 on the contrary, the very reason why nothing came of it. 
 TThe more deeply we study history the more firmly shall we 
 become convinced that it is an academic abstraction to 
 speak of an evolution of circumstances. The power of 
 personality must be involved.| We must not try to construct 
 history. What is described by subsequent generations as 
 a historic necessity was a combination of favourable and 
 unfavourable circumstances ; ^ but there must always have 
 been first the men who could take the thing in hand.) I 
 should be very far from wishing to depreciate the efforts of 
 economic history, but they only take into consideration one 
 side of history. And if the impression is conveyed that 
 events take place of themselves, the historian is led astray. 
 ^ The monarchical State is based on the idea that it is 
 the conscious will of individuals which makes history, and 
 not the mysterious brainless power of public opinion. ^ fThe 
 significance of personality of that incalculable force, 
 which cannot be subdued by any human art is greater in 
 monarchical history than in any other form of State.] 
 Frederick the Great said : ' A monarchy is the best or worst 
 of all forms of State, according to the personality of the 
 monarch.' That is exaggerated, but it contains a profound 
 truth. \ Infinitely much depends on the personality of the 
 
 1 Cf. Deutsche Geschichte, v. 340.
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 207 
 
 ruler. Less depends on the possession by the ruler of some 
 exceptional talent. That is always a good fortune, but it 
 is not absolutely necessary. The important thing is the 
 capacity to take a just view of things." *) 
 
 | Finally, the existence of a monarchy is useful, because 
 it puts the highest positions of authority out of the reach 
 of adventurers ; and because no one is jealous of the King's 
 supremacy ; it is no stigma to serve, in the army or elsewhere, 
 as the subordinate of a hereditary ruler} 
 
 1 Still Treitschke admits that such a monarchy, admirable 
 as it is, could not flourish in every State./ If it is to succeed 
 there must be public confidence in the dynasty, and in the 
 monarchical form of government ; the dynasty also must 
 be capable of discharging its high responsibilities with credit. 
 There must be a sound parliamentary system, but parlia- 
 ment must not be so strong that it can prevent the monarch 
 from exercising his veto upon legislation, from choosing his 
 ministers without regard to party considerations, and from 
 shaping the policy of the State. 2 I 
 
 Of despotisms based upon the popular suffrage Treitschke 
 says little in the Politik which he had not already said in the 
 essay upon Bonapartism. But he makes the generalisation 
 that such a despotism is always a mere half-way house to 
 a more constitutional form of government, if it is established 
 in a progressive country : 
 
 .j" For suppose an absolute monarchy of a good kind, 
 an enlightened despotism ; suppose that the man at the 
 head of it, with his extraordinary powers, is there only to 
 promote the welfare of the people with greater energy even 
 so the necessity will soon appear of governing not only for 
 the people, but through the people, of allowing the popula- 
 tion some sort of share in the government of the State. The 
 golden age of absolutism i$ therefore short. This we can 
 see in the case of Prussia." ^ 
 
 1 Politik, ii. pp. 59-60. 2 Ibid. pp. 160-67. * Ibid. pp. 107-8.
 
 208 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 He points out that the older absolutist monarchies, such 
 as that of France under Louis XIV. or of Prussia under 
 Frederick the Great, were much weaker in fact than a modern 
 constitutional State, for instance in the point of ability to 
 impose taxation. And the whole weight of opposition to 
 such a government is directed against the person of the 
 ruler. Even a Bonaparte could only maintain his prestige 
 by great feats in war and an imposing domestic policy. In 
 the Bonapartist State the ruler depends in the last resort 
 on his good luck ; Loyalty and Law count for nothing. 1 
 Sooner or later the Bonapartist system must give way to a 
 republic. 
 
 5. Democracy and Popular Liberties 
 
 What Treitschke has to say about democracy mainly 
 takes the form of a destructive criticism. { In his eyes the 
 typical democracy is that which revolutionary France 
 extolled as the ideal constitution ; a democracy founded on 
 the dogma of Equality, in which there is manhood suffrage, 
 and the policy of the government veers and shifts with the 
 whims of the majority. | Such a constitution makes a strong 
 appeal to the imagination of the average man, but is wholly 
 unpractical : 
 
 " Just as a theocracy is the most torpid, a monarchy the 
 most many-sided, and an aristocracy the most systematised 
 of the various forms of government, democracy is the most 
 popular and the most universally comprehensible. The 
 fundamental conception on which it rests is the idea of the 
 natural equality of all creatures wearing the likeness of man. 
 This idea has a certain sublimity, and it is not surprising 
 that it often exercises such an intoxicating effect. We know 
 very well that it is only half true ; that it can never quite 
 be realised ; yet it is rooted deep in human nature. ( That 
 the idea of inequality is just as true, that, though we are 
 all equal when regarded as human beings, we are all unequal 
 
 J Politik, ii. pp. 202-6.
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 209 
 
 when regarded as individuals, is not intelligible to the 
 vulgar understanding. ) The vulgar understanding conceives 
 an absolute equality. At a certain stage of national civilisa- 
 tion a democracy may assist the progress of culture. Suffi- 
 ciently well carried out, it is the most popular form of State, 
 and, in countries where it prevails, will be taken so much 
 as a matter of course that any other form of govern- 
 ment will be regarded as an absurdity or else as a brutal 
 despotism. But however different the character it may 
 assume under varying social conditions, it must, by its 
 very nature, always retain one feature, namely, that its 
 ideal is the 77/409 /ioz/a/r^o?. fThe people must be the 
 absolute monarch, and the rights of the people must be 
 extended, until finally an absolute equality is reached, at 
 any rate on paper. That is the goal of democracy. '\ 1 
 
 \ It goes without saying that this extreme democracy is 
 foredoomed to failure. The outward forms of it may be 
 kept for a considerable time, but only when they serve as a 
 disguise for the rule of an aristocracy or a plutocracy : \ 
 
 " Artificial democracies are comparatively frequent as 
 compared with artificial monarchies and aristocracies. A 
 nobility cannot be manufactured if it does not exist already, 
 and it is equally impossible to call into existence a dynasty 
 at will. On the other hand, it is quite possible that an 
 over-precipitate revolution may introduce democratic forms, 
 where they can have no natural basis in the national customs 
 nor in the prevailing inequality of social relations. And 
 these democratic forms may continue, because they are very 
 elastic, and because they are quite compatible with an 
 aristocratic element. This is what we see at the present 
 day in Berne. I Or consider present-day France. Under 
 a purely democratic constitution, we find, in point of fact, 
 a consummate plutocracy, the oligarchic power of a few 
 great banking-houses, which quietly avail themselves of 
 
 1 Politik, ii. pp. 249-50. 
 
 p
 
 210 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 democratic institutions, in order to exploit them for their 
 own purposes." 1 \ 
 
 He admits that there are exceptional cases in which an 
 extreme democracy shows some vitality : small city-states 
 like ancient Athens and medieval Florence ; modern county- 
 states, like Switzerland before the age of railways, in which 
 there are no great contrasts of wealth and poverty. A 
 democracy may be relatively stable if the citizens have a 
 profound respect for the law, or if they are by nature 
 conservative ; ( and democracies naturally incline to con- 
 servatism : f 
 
 " The reproach of an excessive instability is by no means 
 invariably applicable to a democracy. ( {lt may happen that 
 an urban democracy is characterised by a certain restlessness, 
 both because it lacks a strong public service, and because 
 a class of professional politicians, with inherited political 
 traditions, is formed with difficulty in a democracy./ And 
 where these elements are missing, the incalculable caprice 
 of accident or fortune may, of course, produce an excessive 
 instability. On the whole, however, the remark of a French 
 historian has always proved true : that there is nothing 
 less liberal than the people. The people is peculiarly 
 susceptible to every kind of direct and unsophisticated 
 emotion, both good and bad. It may be carried away by 
 clever demagogues, but, as a rule, it clings to the old things 
 from sheer force of habit. We are not justified in speaking 
 unreservedly of the restless instability of a democracy. [ In 
 genuine democracies there are very apt to spring up party- 
 antagonisms, which are handed down from generation to 
 generation ; and, owing to the indifferent education of 
 the electors, certain catchwords may acquire a magic 
 effect, and may continue to operate through generations.] 
 Switzerland may be described as the most conservative as 
 well as the most parsimonious country in Eujope. If we 
 
 * Politik, ii. pp. 251-2.
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 211 
 
 consider the seven cantons of the Federation, we are 
 astonished when we realise that it was here that the Borro- 
 maus League was concluded in 1586, for the glory of the 
 Catholic Church. Nor could it be said of the Americans 
 that they are radical in their politics, though they are 
 radical in their social life. On the other hand, certain 
 democratic principles are guarded with a reverence, which 
 would be impossible in the more turbulent civilisation of 
 the Old World. Such ideas as that of the infallibility of the 
 voice of the people persist with a vigorous tenacity. But 
 the populace in New York is arch-reactionary, and a barrier 
 in the way of all far-reaching reform. It concluded with 
 the Tammany ring a compact of reciprocal connivance, for it 
 feels perfectly happy under the thumb of the brothel-keeper. 
 " In spite of the conservative disposition of the people 
 at large, it cannot be denied that the influence of political 
 demagogues, who know how to flatter the mob and work 
 on its feelings, may be a great danger in a democracy. The 
 average demagogue, too, stands on a lower moral plane than 
 the court - flatterer. A man who lavishes extravagant 
 praise on the virtues of a prince, may actually believe in 
 those virtues ; but a demagogue, when he flatters the 
 populace, knows that the real intelligence of the people 
 resides in their horny fists ; and he lies knowingly. That is 
 why demagogues are among the most repulsive figures 
 in political history. Especially contemptible is their 
 hypocrisy. In fact, the most endurable are the brutal 
 blusterers like Danton, whose bloodthirsty vociferations at 
 least smacked of nature. He is himself a beast, and there- 
 fore strives to wake the beast in others. On the other 
 hand, what hypocrisy we find in Robespierre ! Yet he was 
 extremely popular. Every woman of the market-halls was 
 prepared to take her oath that he was a paragon of all the 
 virtues. Such natures have the power to utterly confuse the 
 course of statesmanship ; and their influence on the nerves of 
 an excitable people may give rise to. incalculable decisions." 1 
 
 1 Politik, ii. pp. 264-5.
 
 212 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 \But these conservative democracies only prove how 
 easily men may be misled by catchwords. They arise 
 because the citizens are under the delusion that equality 
 means true liberty, and that there is something divine in 
 the opinion of the majority. They are only able to survive 
 while they can dispense with a large standing army an 
 army is always monarchical with an efficient Civil Service, 
 and with centralised government : I 
 
 " The organisation of the Civil Service and the army 
 presents peculiar difficulties in a Republic. The United 
 States, for instance, are not in a position to set up a good 
 and responsible Civil Service, because the very name of 
 politics has with them acquired an evil significance, 
 just as at one time in Germany the word ' political ' 
 (politisch) implied much the same as ' Machiavellian.' 
 In the United States, therefore, the State cannot assume 
 as many responsibilities as it can in Germany. Great 
 social legislation is impossible, because the best elements of 
 society move outside the sphere of the State. As a result, 
 the service of the State loses its halo and its dignity ; and 
 this fact alone accounts for the difficulty experienced in the 
 matter of the supreme power. | In connection with this, there 
 is a further question, a terribly difficult question in every 
 Republic, namely, how the supreme power is to be 
 organised. A single man, elected by the popular vote, like 
 Louis Napoleon in France in 1848, has such an enormous 
 power that republican institutions can scarcely offer any 
 resistance to it. Napoleon could truthfully say to the 
 National Assembly : ' I alone have more votes behind me 
 than all of you together.' What anxious deliberation was 
 given to the question of founding the presidentship of the 
 modern French Republic. It was felt that there must be 
 one man at the head, but that he must not be too powerful. 
 He must, therefore, be chosen, not by the all-powerful people, 
 but by the Parliament, that is to say, by a matter of 
 a few hundred votes. And then was added the amusing
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 213 
 
 inconsistency to which I have already referred, namely, 
 that this President was not himself held responsible for his 
 actions as President, with the single exceptions of a coup 
 d'etat or a breach of the constitution ; but he was to govern 
 through the medium of responsible ministers. 
 
 " In the United States, where the Republic has been 
 taken very seriously, the President is at the same time 
 an official, who must accept responsibility for the actions 
 of himself and his ministers. Advisers cannot, there- 
 fore, be forced on him against his will, as they can be 
 under certain circumstances on a monarch, who is not 
 responsible. Government by parliament, therefore, is 
 rendered quite impossible. The American President, just 
 because he is responsible, is a far more powerful man than 
 a King of England. It must be remembered in this con- 
 nection that the first colonists in New England had a very 
 long monarchical past behind them. Thence originated 
 the custom of placing a single official a governor at the 
 head of every colony. This governor became later on a 
 mere official of the Republic. Thus the occupation of the 
 highest positions by one man became the rule, and, as a 
 logical consequence, one President was placed at the head 
 of the whole Union. The danger of his great power is 
 diminished, in the first place by the fact that he is placed 
 over a Federal State, and, in the second place, by the fact 
 that the sphere of his activity is very much restricted. 
 Foreign policy, the coinage, and the Post Office constitute 
 the whole extent of his activities. Therefore, in spite of 
 this apparent power, he cannot really become a danger to 
 the Democracy. The powers of the Governors are also 
 very limited, because the individual State has very little 
 governing power, and its life is in fact more like that of a 
 free community. 
 
 " Under different circumstances, however for instance, 
 in a centralised State like France the power of a single 
 ruler may present a serious danger to the democratic republic. 
 On the other hand, the appointment of a Committee at the
 
 214 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 head of a Democracy involves the danger that the Govern- 
 ment itself may be split up into parties, which will be at war 
 with one another. An instructive instance of a Government 
 by Committee is presented in the Directory of the French 
 Revolution days, which came to an end with the i8th 
 Brumaire. Such a despicable Government as this Directory 
 has seldom been seen in history. The ancient customs of 
 the State also count for a great deal in this question. In 
 Switzerland, for instance, ever since she has been a Confedera- 
 tion, government by Council has been the rule ; and many 
 party differences have here been quietly overcome for the 
 sake of peace." l 
 
 Treitschke notices, however, that in a Federal State 
 democracy seems to be comparatively efficient, and that it 
 makes the smooth working of the Federal government an 
 easier matter to secure. Switzerland and the United States 
 have been the most successful of Federal States just because 
 they are composed of democratic communities ; whereas in 
 a monarchical federation, like the German Empire, the 
 monarchies of the constituent States feel that their dignity 
 and power are impaired by the union. 
 
 | These observations do not carry us very far towards 
 solving the question : What is the right amount of influence 
 to give the people in a well-ordered State ? Roughly, 
 Treitschke accepts the rule of Aristotle, that the people 
 should be allowed to criticise, but not to originate measures) 
 No laws should be made without their approval (expressed 
 through a representative body), and they should have the 
 power of arraigning the heads of executive departments for 
 illegality though, in a monarchy, this power should not 
 be applicable to the King, but only to his Ministers. /|fBut, 
 like Burke, Treitschke holds that good government is only 
 possible when the people leave a considerable discretion 
 to their representatives ; and he uses the word representa- 
 tives in a wide sense, to cover both a constitutional king and 
 
 1 Politik, ii. pp. 276-8.
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 215 
 
 a permanent official. j (He thinks that it would be disastrous 
 if the people or the popular assembly should push the right 
 of criticism to the point of obstructing the executive in its 
 daily work (as, for instance, by refusing supplies). The 
 people should have patience ; they should give a fair trial 
 to a policy which it is their first inclination to reject. 
 
 He does not attach importance to the old specifics by 
 which political theorists had imagined that the liberties of 
 the subject could be guaranteed. He values trial by jury, 
 for instance, simply as an institution which, if reformed, 
 might lead to the better execution of criminal justice : 1 
 
 " Trial by jury has greatly developed in England since 
 the thirteenth century. It is closely interwoven with the 
 customs of the nation, and is looked upon as a corner-stone 
 of English freedom. Two important factors have contri- 
 buted to this end : in the first place, the peculiarly exalted 
 social and economic position of the English Bench. There 
 are only a handful of judges, but they enjoy a princely 
 esteem. They travel about the country and hold trials by 
 jury, and the legal instruction which they impart to the 
 jury has an immense influence. The extent of their power 
 is very great. The presiding judge can send back the jury 
 to the consultation-chamber without ceremony, if they have 
 found a verdict which he considers absurd. On the other 
 hand, the presiding judge is in England compelled to 
 practise the self-restraint which befits the dignity of his office ; 
 whereas in France the judge attacks the accused as if he 
 were an enemy, and uses every endeavour to extort from 
 him a confession of guilt, a proceeding wholly inconsistent 
 with the disinterestedness proper to a judge. 
 
 " That unanimity is required of the jury in England is 
 due first and foremost to this far-reaching authority of the 
 judge, whereas in France, though the English trial by jury 
 was adopted there after the Revolution, verdicts were 
 admitted which had been carried by a majority only. 
 Here it is quite certain that the English practice is
 
 216 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 the only just one. The verdict of a majority is just as little 
 conclusive in a question of the guilt or innocence of a prisoner 
 as it would be in the case of a religious or a scientific problem. 
 The question : ' Did A murder B ? ' cannot be decided by 
 the vote of a majority. The demand for unanimity, despite 
 its rigour, is on the whole fully justified. It may afford an 
 illustration of the dynamic influence of character. How 
 often it happens that a single juryman decides those who 
 are wavering, because he is inwardly convinced of the justice 
 of his opinion ! The English have clung to this principle 
 up to the present day, with an energy which does them 
 honour. \In Germany, on the contrary, we have far too 
 much regard for the moral cowardice which plays such an 
 important part in the system of trial by jury. / Many men 
 are only too pleased to let themselves be out-voted. Such 
 natures are to be found everywhere, and especially among 
 the class of people who call themselves liberal-minded. 
 With us, these liberal-minded individuals are just the type 
 of men who will let themselves be out-voted. The juryman 
 is particularly exposed to this moral temptation to say ' No ! ' 
 in the silent hope of being out-voted. Hence the rigorous 
 English practice of unanimity is entirely to be commended. 
 
 ("It has been these two considerations the powerful 
 influence of a highly esteemed Bench of Judges on the lay 
 assessors, and the principle of unanimity, which have 
 ensured the traditional respect enjoyed by the English trial 
 by jury.) We Germans, unfortunately, have not adopted 
 this institution directly from England, but only a distorted 
 copy of it through France. We have endeavoured to adapt 
 it to some extent to our own conditions ; and we are beginning 
 to forsake the French model, and to work out a procedure 
 for ourselves in criminal cases, which will be more in accord- 
 ance with English methods. (We have also come to realise 
 that it is not a matter of political freedom that we have to 
 do with here. \ Honest men can only remember with shame 
 that the old-fashioned German Liberalism even adjudged to 
 the jury a right to suspend the law.
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 217 
 
 " The only question is whether the co-operation of the 
 layman is necessary or dangerous to the course of justice. 
 The arguments in support of co-operation are at once 
 apparent. The opinion of the average man is that, if laymen 
 co-operate in a judicial decision, the verdict is more likely 
 to be a fair one ; and, further, that the finding of a verdict 
 necessitates a certain practical experience of life, which a 
 judge is very apt to lose. That is undeniably a bright side 
 of the system. But it has another and a very dark side. 
 In the first place, the jury are over-susceptible to the prompt- 
 ings of the emotions ; and, in the second place, there is the 
 danger of insufficient knowledge. / As far as the first point is 
 concerned, it is not correct to assert that jurymen are on the 
 whole more inclined to give an acquittal than a learned 
 judge. In the majority of cases this is true, but there will 
 always be some cases in which the jury are too severe in 
 their judgments, because they feel themselves threatened 
 in their social relations. The Social Democrats are, in 
 particular, likely to be the victims of this tendency. Think 
 of the famous Socialist case of 1870. In this case, the 
 Social Democrats were condemned without any real proof. 
 This would scarcely have been done by a learned body of 
 judges ; but laymen, confronted with such a party, and 
 trembling for their own purses, feel their own party 
 prejudices rise up." 1 
 
 " On the whole, we are brought to the conclusion that 
 the present form of co-operation of the jury in criminal 
 justice is not very satisfactory. In one respect, too much 
 power is given them, and in another too little. The jury 
 alone decide the nature of the offence and the prisoner's 
 guilt or innocence ; but, in the apportioning of the punish- 
 ment, they have no voice. /This must be fixed by the learned 
 judge. So what ought to be one process is divided into 
 two. In practice, an attempt is made to compensate for 
 this by giving the Judge very far-reaching powers of in- 
 structing the jury concerning the law, so that in this way 
 
 1 Politik, ii. pp. 437-40.
 
 218 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 he has some power to influence the verdict on the nature of 
 the offence and the prisoner's guilt or innocence. 1 The fact 
 remains that the co-operation of the jury extends at once 
 too far and not far enough, and, on the whole, it is obvious 
 that our present mode of procedure in criminal cases is quite 
 unsound ; that in every way it is only a provisional arrange- 
 ment without any guiding principle. This question first 
 came up when the regulations were made which are still 
 in force. They are the result of various parliamentary 
 compromises. We have but to recollect the part played 
 by Lasker's proposals. It is only serious offences that are 
 tried with the co-operation of a jury. The majority of 
 minor offences are judged by the Provincial Court (Land- 
 gericht), by a purely learned Bench, without any lay 
 co-operation. Again, in the case of quite small transgres- 
 sions, we have a single Justice, and in addition, to avoid 
 the establishment of a despotism, a number of unpaid 
 assessors. That is a purely provisional arrangement. There 
 is no reason why the majority of offences of the middle class 
 should be judged without, and the heavy and light offences 
 with, the co-operation of the layman. 
 
 " We shall finally adopt everywhere a form of trial by 
 judge and jury, in which the practical experience of the 
 judge shall co-operate in the decision on the nature of the 
 offence and the guilt or innocence of the accused. But, on 
 the other hand, the laymen shall have a voice in the appor- 
 tioning of the punishment. There is no fear that these lay 
 assessors will allow themselves to be browbeaten by the 
 judge. Experience has shown that the opposite is generally 
 the case, and that they exhibit a very healthy and stubborn 
 (sometimes too stubborn) self-reliance. But, if these 
 lay assessors unite in consultation with the judges, 
 their activity will be kept within the normal. In their 
 deliberations they will associate with the judges on an equal 
 footing ; not as one authority pitted against another. This 
 may lead to a mutual interchange of benefits ; the judge 
 contributing his learning and his knowledge of law, and
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 219 
 
 the layman his knowledge of the world and his practical 
 experience ; and in this way the layman will co-operate 
 in the apportioning of the punishment. The superiority 
 of technical knowledge will, however, undoubtedly show 
 itself in the consultation chamber, even if in these courts 
 the number of laymen slightly exceeds that of the Judges." l 
 
 ( His own pet safeguard of liberty is, as we have already 
 seen (Chap. V.), a system of local self-government./ But 
 in the Politik, which represents his final attitude on this 
 subject, we find that this self-government is not to give the 
 average man much scope for educating himself in practical 
 politics, or for shaping the destinies of his own neighbour- 
 hood. Local government, we are told, must be either 
 aristocratic or bureaucratic ; and in some respects a bureau- 
 cratic system will more nearly correspond to the ideal 
 which the average citizen has before his eyes : f 
 
 'f It is only natural that all local government should be 
 aristocratic in character. It is impossible to entrust to the 
 masses as such those official functions which are performed 
 by the citizen and the landowner./ It is quite natural 
 that these functions should be entrusted to the more powerful 
 and influential citizens. )To be sure, the border-line with 
 us is always placed very low ; but local government must 
 always by its very nature be aristocratic. That is why the 
 extreme Radical parties have very little taste for it. It is 
 also apparent from this fact that universal suffrage is absurd 
 in the case of municipal elections. ^The result of universal 
 suffrage would be that the classes which now control the 
 administration would be completely thrust into the back- 
 ground. If, however, such a system is irrational in the case 
 of a municipality, it cannot be good for the State. tyThe 
 immense advantage of all local government is that, by its 
 means, the sense of personal responsibility, and a certain 
 
 1 Poliiik, ii. pp. 443-5.
 
 220 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 measure (if only a small measure) of practical knowledge of 
 politics is propagated over a widening circle.) Where, as in 
 France, there is no true local government, the citizen only 
 confronts the State as a critic. Honest peasants and citizens, 
 by collaborating in local administration, are able to realise 
 something of the difficulty of governing and of the responsi- 
 bility of those whose task it is to govern. ^In fact, a man 
 who is not a government official can, as a rule, only acquire 
 a practical knowledge of politics in this practical school of 
 local government. ] 
 
 "{The dark side of local government is that it appeals 
 to the social selfishness of the ruling classes. The danger of 
 social injustice arises ; the danger that the special interests 
 of the class which controls the local government will be 
 too exclusively favoured. The average government official 
 will often err through ignorance of the facts of a situation. 
 But, on the other hand, he has no class interests to serve in 
 his relations to the great social powers. He will preserve 
 the authority of the government ; he feels himself a part 
 of it ; and, moreover, our German Civil Service is composed 
 of elements so various in class and culture that we may 
 safely predict that, in the generality of cases, this monarchical 
 Civil Service will avoid a social injustice. Why should a 
 civil servant in Germany prefer a nobleman before a 
 labourer ? j Local Government, however, is controlled by 
 the influential, land-owning classes. Hence it is natural 
 that the ordinary man should place his trust in a Police 
 Superintendent (Amtsvorsteher) rather than in a royal Sub- 
 Prefect (Landrath).) This is the danger of all local govern- 
 ment. It is this that has caused the downfall of the proud 
 English institution of Justices of the Peace. It had become 
 too exclusively aristocratic. The ordinary man felt that 
 he could no longer get justice against any one of exalted 
 position from these aristocratic Justices of the Peace. So 
 at the present day this institution scarcely exists, more than 
 in name, in England. 
 
 \" A second defect of local government is the danger of
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 221 
 
 dilettantism. We may count on a government civil service 
 having at least a theoretical knowledge of its business ; but 
 in local government there is always the danger of amateurish- 
 ness and of a crude naturalism. That is the reason why 
 the people, who invariably consider the material side of 
 things, are so prejudiced against local government.} The 
 genuine Manchester man, who believes that we are all solely 
 destined to buy cheap and sell dear, argues quite correctly 
 from this hypothesis that the government civil service 
 would manage the affairs of local administration much 
 better than these local government officials ; and, technically, 
 there is much to be said for this point of view. It cannot be 
 denied that such a bureaucrat as Baron Haussman under 
 Napoleon III. may technically render very important 
 services, and that this energetic man's organisation of the 
 Paris streets was executed with a skill and a rapidity which 
 would have been impossible to a wrangling Municipal 
 Council. ^ But the most important question at issue here 
 a question at once moral and political is the political 
 education of the nation. ) There can be no doubt that the 
 habitual administration of everyday business has had a 
 very educative effect on the German people. For the 
 exercise of parliamentary activity a certain theoretical 
 knowledge is especially needed ; but, with us, the great 
 political force of the nation has been found in those men 
 who, in the towns and in the country, have acquired a real 
 acquaintance with practical conditions." 1 
 
 In 1888 the English Parliament sanctioned a new type 
 of local self-government, of which the characteristic organ 
 was the County Council elected by the ratepayers. This 
 was an attempt to do what Treitschke had pronounced 
 impossible, to make local government really democratic. 
 But he would not admit that the problem had been solved ; 
 these local parliaments did none of the work of administra- 
 tion, which was left to paid officials. The County Council 
 
 1 Politik, ii. pp. 493-5.
 
 222 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 only served to conceal another step in the direction of 
 bureaucracy : 
 
 " Such a council has no real and vital authority. We 
 have here the beginning of a new and far more democratic, 
 but at the same time far more unemancipated period of 
 English administration. An administration which does not 
 actively administer is indeed one only in name. England, 
 then, in spite of her brilliant national history, may ultimately 
 find herself endowed with a bureaucracy comparable to that 
 of France. Experiences are still too recent to enable us to 
 dogmatise on this point, but one thing we can assert : that the 
 democratisation of England, which began with the Reform 
 Bill of 1832, was enormously accelerated by the institution 
 of the County Councils ; and, in view of the very limited 
 outlook of English Radicalism, it is impossible to say what 
 the future may not bring. Appearances are not favourable, 
 but they are very instructive, for they prove that democracy 
 and freedom are not identical, but very often antitheses. 
 
 "It is manifestly the example of the French that has 
 influenced England in this matter. Otherwise, English 
 history is thoroughly insular ; though, since the middle of 
 this century, it has developed in ways which point to a 
 continental and especially a French influence. It is as 
 certain as that the Reform Bill would never have been 
 passed without the July Revolution that certain bureau- 
 cratic notions, which have found their way into England, had 
 their origin in France. France has a system of local govern- 
 ment which, judged by our German notions, is wholly 
 unworthy of the name. We may illustrate the position 
 by pointing out that here Germany, as so often happens, 
 occupies a middle place between France and England. 
 In England some time ago the Civil Service was entirely 
 excluded from all but the most important offices ; France 
 has its bureaucracy, with a semblance of local government ; 
 Germany, on the other hand, has a combination of state 
 civil servants and of local self-government, which is in
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 223 
 
 conformity with our actual conditions, and the value of 
 which had been proved in practice." 1 
 
 (But the system which he preferred, the system of the 
 Prussian municipality, bears a strong resemblance in 
 principle to the English scheme of 1888. In both there is a 
 representative element and an expert element ; the main 
 difference seems to be that the Prussian system leaves the 
 municipality a large sphere of action over which the central 
 government has little or no control : ) 
 
 \It is Germany's pride that no other country has 
 attacked the problem of local government with such intel- 
 ligence as herself. In the Middle Ages the civic freedom 
 of the towns developed to extravagant proportions. Some 
 of our towns were subject to the Emperor alone, which 
 meant that they exercised all the functions of an independent 
 executive. This led to a period of remarkable prosperity 
 for the German towns ; and it may be seriously questioned 
 whether the magnificent development of the municipal 
 police at the end of the Middle Ages is to be considered as 
 the supreme achievement of the old communal life or as the 
 beginning of the modern State. Either view is in a certain 
 sense justified. The authorities in these little autonomous 
 communities began to exhibit in all directions a consciousness 
 of their educational responsibilities, and to display such a 
 many-sided activity as had never before entered into the 
 natural economy of the State. Then came the reaction. 
 The old French saying, which had already been proved true 
 in France at the time when it originated, proved true in 
 the case of the imperial towns. By striving for too great a 
 freedom we fall into too base a slavery. The new strength 
 of the modern State could not tolerate the existence of 
 such autonomous communities. So there began a time 
 of oppression ; and in the eighteenth century we see the 
 once flourishing German towns become completely torpid 
 
 1 Politik, ii. pp. 500-502.
 
 224 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 and paralysed. The wretched conditions of our decaying 
 imperial towns in Germany, the geniessenden Familien of 
 Nuremberg, only find a counterpart in England. Then 
 Frederick William I. laid in Prussia the foundations of such 
 a new freedom as he himself neither dreamed of nor desired. 
 Nothing lay further from his thoughts than the intention of 
 giving greater freedom to the Prussian towns. His first 
 object was to establish order. He sent his royal function- 
 aries to make a thorough investigation of municipal 
 affairs and to do away with nepotism ; and it was these 
 reorganised municipalities which afterwards showed the 
 greatest readiness to come under the new laws for municipal 
 government, because in these towns, at any rate, an external 
 order and justice had been restored. 
 
 " These new Prussian municipal statutes were the work 
 of that great man, of whom my teacher, Dahlmann, remarked 
 that he was, in a deeper sense than King Henry the Fowler, 
 the builder of German cities Baron vom Stein. The 
 magnificent prosperity of the German municipalities in 
 the nineteenth century is beyond dispute. (^This striking 
 development is essentially the result of freedom, of a genuine 
 self-government under a monarchical control?\ The sureness 
 of intuition by which Baron vom Stein discovered the point 
 at which pressure must be applied is only another evidence 
 of his practical genius. It was impossible at that time 
 to begin by reorganising the rural communes (Land- 
 gemeinden) and circles (Kreise), because the emancipation 
 of the peasantry had then only just begun ; and these newly 
 emancipated serfs still regarded their former lords so mis- 
 trustfully, that any co-operation on their part was practically 
 out of the question. In the towns there were not the same 
 harsh social contrasts ; but, even in the towns, it needed the 
 hard apprenticeship of the War of Independence before the 
 collaboration of the citizens in the administration became 
 fully practical. During the War of Independence in whole 
 districts not a single Government official was to be found ; 
 all were fighting with the colours ; and therefore the munici-
 
 " DIE POLITIK " 225 
 
 palities had to look after their own administration. On the 
 whole, it may be said that Stein's plan was the right one, 
 since either directly or indirectly it has ultimately been 
 adopted by all the German municipalities. Before 1848 
 there was a regular cult of local government. In the thirties, 
 municipal government was called Prussia's political bible ; 
 and the great towns vied with one another in the noble 
 ambition to have the best government. 
 
 " Stein was entirely original in his work. He had only 
 a few experiences in his County of Mark to work from. 
 
 '\The principles of these municipal statutes of 1808 are 
 the simplest conceivable. They start from the assumption 
 that the town should have an absolute control over the 
 administration of its own revenues, as well as over its 
 police force for the purpose of public safety ; and that these 
 functions should be discharged through a co-operation 
 of the magistrature with representatives of the town.} 
 The Town Council (Stadtrath] and the representatives partici- 
 pated directly in the administration by a system of com- 
 mittees and boards (Korporationen) , and were not merely 
 intended to be a court of appeal beside a Burgomaster. 
 In organising the magistrature a very happy notion was 
 hit upon the combination of unpaid and paid officials. 
 This combination has proved thoroughly workable. The 
 conditions of the larger municipalities are so complex that 
 they necessitate the employment of a regular staff of expert 
 officials. One result followed, indeed, which the legislator 
 had never anticipated. As a result of the ease of modern 
 locomotion and of the constant traffic from one district to 
 another, there developed inevitably a kind of vagrant 
 municipal bureaucracy, such as Stein could never have 
 foreseen. Consider our municipal notabilities : Herr von 
 Forckenbeck was mayor of Elbing, then of Breslau, then 
 of Berlin. That has become a common occurrence. If, 
 however, we look at the actual results, we see that the 
 existence of this vagrant municipal bureaucracy has not 
 impaired that healthy spirit of citizenship which the exercise
 
 226 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 of municipal administration has aroused in our nation. 
 Every municipality has an individuality of its own, even 
 though it may include a number of men who did not originally 
 belong to it." l 
 
 This Prussian system has been highly praised by com- 
 petent observers ; it may well serve as a training in practical 
 politics, and as a field for the political ambitions of the 
 ordinary man. Treitschke, however, does not seem to ask 
 himself the very natural question whether it will always be 
 possible to base the two halves of government on radically 
 different principles ; to make self-government the rule in 
 local politics, and paternal government the rule in national 
 affairs. This contradiction existed in the Prussia that he 
 knew. Did it follow that the contradiction would always 
 be accepted as natural and necessary ? True he would 
 tolerate free criticism of the central government, and only 
 objected to giving the critics a weapon by which they could 
 compel the Government to justify itself or else to yield. In 
 this way he hoped to secure stability for the State. A less 
 optimistic theorist might be inclined to ask whether such a 
 system would not lead directly and inevitably to revolutions. 
 f A paternal government becomes too confident of its own 
 wisdom ; a populace which is tired of merely airing its 
 grievances becomes bitterly hostile to the Government. ) 
 
 1 Politik, ii. pp. 509-12.
 
 CHAPTER X 
 
 TREITSCHKE ON ENGLISH HISTORY IN THE NINETEENTH 
 
 CENTURY 
 
 TREITSCHKE'S Deutsche Geschichte im Neunzehnten Jahr- 
 hundert only extends to the year 1848, and covers the dullest 
 period of German history in the century. None the less 
 it is probably the best known, among German readers, of all 
 the great histories written by German historians. It has 
 taken, in Germany, the rank which forty years ago was held 
 by Macaulay's History in England. There is no doubt that 
 it has done a great deal towards shaping the current German 
 view of the nineteenth century. It is therefore not uninter- 
 esting to put together some of the chief passages of the book 
 which are devoted to English institutions and to English 
 policy. They are the more significant because they were 
 written before England and Germany had become open 
 rivals for sea -power and colonies. They show that the 
 policy pursued by Germany in the last fourteen years is the 
 natural outcome of ambitions and resentments which were 
 simmering in the minds of Prussian politicians as early as 
 1879, when Treitschke published his first volume. For the 
 outlines of the German case against England are clearly 
 sketched there. More striking still is the firm conviction 
 that England had been decadent since 1832 a conviction 
 which nothing ever seems to have shaken, though he admits 
 that British power had grown enormously in the course of 
 the nineteenth century. To the extracts from the Geschichte 
 are added ( 14) three from political essays of 1876-77 ; 
 
 227
 
 228 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 these extracts deal principally with the question of Turkey, 
 but incidentally with England's position as a world-power. 
 
 i. The Congress of Chdtillon-sur-Seine, February 1814. 
 
 This Congress was held at a moment when the Allies 
 believed that the way to Paris was open, and that they had 
 only to decide what terms of peace should be imposed upon 
 Napoleon. The Emperor was represented by Caulaincourt ; 
 the principal powers with whom France had to deal were 
 Austria, Prussia, Russia, and England. Napoleon found the 
 terms of the Allies too hard and broke off the negotiations. 
 But the Conference had the effect of bringing the Allies more 
 closely together ; it was followed by the Treaty of Chaumont 
 (March 9, 1814), in which they bound themselves not to treat 
 separately with Napoleon : 
 
 "\ 
 
 " At the very beginning of the Congress of Chatillon, N 
 
 England took advantage of the pecuniary embarrassments 
 of her allies to effect a master-stroke of commercial policy. 
 If there was any one of Napoleon's plans which was justi- 
 fied, it was certainly his struggle for the freedom of the sea. 
 That balance of the powers, craved for by an exhausted world, 
 was not secure, so long as one single State governed all the 
 seas according to its own whim and fancy, and naval war- 
 fare, to the shame of humanity, still bore the character of 
 a privileged piracy. Prussia and Russia, ever since the 
 league of armed neutrality, 1 had always stood for the prin- 
 ciples of a humane maritime law, which should not hamper 
 the trade of the neutral countries. They hoped now to see 
 these theories of Frederick and Catherine recognised by the 
 unanimous decision of all Europe. England, however, felt 
 
 1 The First Armed Neutrality was an alliance formed (Feb. 1780) 
 between Russia (under Catherine II.), Sweden, and Denmark to maintain 
 the rights of neutral vessels in time of war ; it was subsequently joined by 
 Frederick the Great of Prussia. The Second Armed Neutrality, a league 
 between Russia, Prussia, Sweden, and Denmark, was formed in 1800 with 
 the same object.
 
 ON ENGLISH HISTORY 229 
 
 that this would threaten the very foundations of her power. 
 Lord Cathcart 1 declared frankly : ' If we had ever admitted 
 the principles of the Armed Neutrality, French trade would 
 never have been overthrown, and Napoleon would be 
 ruling over the world at the present day ' ; Great Britain 
 would never admit any other law in regard to the sea than 
 the general rules of international law. As it happened, 
 other and very much more urgent questions were claiming 
 the attention of the three continental powers just then ; 
 moreover, all without exception lacked fresh supplies of 
 money for the war ; and their rich ally was prepared to pay 
 another five million pounds sterling. Thus England insisted 
 in the first sitting, on the 5th of February, that there should be 
 no debate on the question of maritime law. Caulaincourt 2 
 did not protest ; he had more pressing cares. Hence it was 
 that, through all the long peace negotiations at Chatillon, 
 Paris and Vienna, nothing was done to remove the foulest 
 stain on modern international law ; and public opinion, 
 blindly enthusiastic as it was for glorious Albion, found in 
 this no cause for vexation. 
 
 " Once having started, Lord Castlereagh 3 attempted im- 
 mediately to realise a second favourite ambition of British 
 politics, and to secure for the Netherlands a sufficient com- 
 plement of territory. No one protested, although it had 
 already been resolved that all claims for indemnification were 
 to be postponed until the conclusion of peace ; for no one 
 could afford to quarrel with the great moneyed power ; and 
 all were agreed concerning the European necessity of a united 
 Netherland State. On the I5th of February, at the head- 
 quarters at Troyes, a draft of an agreement was put forward, 
 providing that the old Dutch republic should be placed 
 under the hereditary rule of the House of Orange and should 
 be expanded to include Belgium, as well as a portion of the 
 German bank of the Rhine with Cologne and Aix. Even 
 
 1 British representative. 
 
 2 The French representative at Chatillon. 
 
 3 British representative at Chatillon.
 
 230 HEINRICH VON TRE1TSCHKE 
 
 Hardenberg * agreed to this in principle, only making a 
 reservation in favour of the German north-west frontier ; 
 even he was unwilling that the Dutch should encroach quite 
 so far upon purely German territory." 2 
 
 2. The Character of Wellington 
 
 The following character-sketch occurs in Treitschke's 
 chapter on Waterloo, or, as he calls the battle, La Belle 
 Alliance. Incidentally Treitsckhe appraises the strong and 
 the weak points of the British " mercenary " army : 
 
 " Wellington is one of those rare instances of men who, 
 without creative power, almost without genius, have risen 
 to the heights of historic fame merely through force of 
 character, through power of will and self-control. Who 
 would have prophesised a world-wide fame for this slow- 
 witted boy, who was never really young, and whose brothers, 
 Richard 3 and Henry, 4 far outshone him in talent ? A son of 
 one of those High Church Tory families, who had settled down 
 as conquerors in Ireland, and, in the midst of the hostile 
 Celts, preserved only the more inflexibly the pride of race 
 and class, the manners and want of manners of the English 
 mother-country he had, in accordance with the old English 
 aristocratic custom, rapidly passed through subordinate 
 positions in the army by dint of money and influence, and, 
 at the age of twenty-five, was in command of a regiment 
 in the Revolutionary War. Next he learnt the art of govern- 
 ing in India, under the supervision of his brother Richard 
 Wellesley, that gifted man who established the position of 
 Great Britain as a great power in the East. Exacting with 
 
 1 Prussian representative at Chatillon. 
 a Deutsche Geschichte, i. pp. 547-8. 
 
 3 Richard Colley Wellesley, Marquis Wellesley (1760-1842). He was 
 appointed Governor-General of India in 1797, and held this office until 
 1805. In 1809-1812 he was Minister for foreign affairs. In the years 1820- 
 1828 he was Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland. 
 
 4 Henry Wellesley, Baron Cowley, was the British Ambassador in Spain 
 (1811-1822), at Vienna (1823-1831), and at Paris (1841-1846).
 
 ON ENGLISH HISTORY 231 
 
 himself and with others, unswervingly obedient and devoted 
 to duty, just and honourable, always cold, steadfast and 
 intelligent, Arthur Wellesley proved himself completely 
 equal to all the difficult military and political tasks imposed 
 upon a military commander in India. With what boldness 
 this prudent man, who carefully weighed every contingency 
 in advance, could seize his luck at the right moment, was 
 evidenced in the brilliant victory at Assaye * over a sixfold 
 superior force of Hindus, and by the bold charge into the 
 mountains of the Mahrattas. Returned to Europe, he took 
 part in the notorious marauding expedition to Copenhagen, 
 valiant and capable as ever, but also completely indifferent 
 to the sad fate of the feeble opponent who had been so 
 wantonly attacked. For never was a son of Britain so 
 completely impregnated with the old-fashioned national idea : 
 ' My country, right or wrong.' Subsequently he assumed 
 the chief command in Portugal ; filled from the outset with 
 the calm confidence of victory, he remarked drily : ' I 
 will hold my own.' The theatrical magnificence and pomp 
 of the new French warfare made no impression on this cool 
 intelligence. He never entertained any doubt concerning 
 the ultimate downfall of Napoleon. During the six years 
 of the Peninsular War he trained his mercenaries to a con- 
 summate skill in all the arts of old-fashioned warfare. 
 
 " He paid no attention to innovations and far-reaching 
 reforms ; he never rewarded a service ; he never favoured 
 a promotion from the ranks. He disliked self-reliant and 
 active-minded generals, and, while his large-hearted brother 
 Richard allowed an unrestricted freedom of action to gifted 
 subordinates, Arthur employed merely reliable and efficient 
 tools and showed a keen intuition in discovering them. His 
 adjutants were for the most part young peers, who, mounted 
 on the best horses in the world, punctually executed the 
 orders of their commander, and obediently renounced any 
 opinions of their own. He knew his own worth ; he said 
 
 1 On September 23, 1803 ; a victory over the Mahrattas, not over 
 Hindus.
 
 232 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 frankly to his friends in the Tory Cabinet : ' You have no 
 one but myself ' ; he demanded an extraordinary and 
 unrestricted authority, which he never abused, and which 
 enabled him to suspend any officer and send him home 
 without further ceremony. During a battle his generals 
 had to do what they judged best in the positions assigned to 
 them ; but to deal with the opponents immediately in front 
 of them was the limit of their authority, and to exceed it 
 was to incur the penalties of martial law. The officers had 
 little affection for this stern figure, who never thawed into 
 any friendly geniality, or betrayed a trace of good nature 
 or generosity, even when this would not have been detri- 
 mental to the service. The penetrating gaze of the cold eyes, 
 the proud features with the aquiline nose and the tightly- 
 closed, inflexible mouth, the stern commanding ring of the 
 voice, forbade any familiar intercourse. But all obeyed, 
 and all felt a pride in satisfying one so hard to satisfy. His 
 officers never ventured, even in friendly conversation, to 
 blame or even to criticise the orders of their commander. 
 They followed his commands blindfold, like inscrutable 
 decrees of fate ; on rare occasions he condescended to address 
 them, and then his exposition of his plans was slow, ponder- 
 ous and inelegant, but resolute and clear. 
 
 " Such an absolute independence was only possible in the 
 small armies of the old days. Wellington was, in fact, 
 happiest when, like the mercenary leaders of the sixteenth 
 century, the Frundsbergs, Emsers, and Leyvas, he himself 
 stood in person at the centre of his army, and had his regi- 
 ments assembled about him in serried ranks, so that he could 
 almost survey them with his own eyes. Placed far below 
 the highly aristocratic officers, who obtained their com- 
 missions by purchase, and separated from them by an im- 
 passable gulf, was the crude mass of the common soldiers 
 the dregs of the English people, as Wellington said himself. 
 Generous pay and good food, with an adequate amount of 
 flogging, held these hirelings together. These men of 
 athletic physique, with their old English pugilistic training,
 
 ON ENGLISH HISTORY 233 
 
 their muscular strength and their endurance, could accom- 
 plish marvels, after the drill sergeant had had them in hand 
 for a few years ; the bayonet attacks of the gigantic guards- 
 men, or the weighty impact of the heavy cavalry mounted 
 on their magnificent chargers, was irresistible. But woe to 
 any town, which, like unhappy Badajoz, 1 had the misfortune 
 to be stormed by these troops ! In the intoxication of 
 victory the cat-o'-nine-tails lost its terror ; the bonds of 
 discipline were relaxed, and the lust of murder, robbery and 
 every bestial craving raged unchecked. The army, then, 
 was like a great mechanical apparatus, working with extreme 
 accuracy ; and at the same time it was more than a machine ; 
 for the officers' corps still preserved that chivalrous bearing 
 and national pride of the English nobility ; and even the 
 brutal common soldier, after so many brilliant victories, 
 was entirely devoted to the commander who had never 
 known defeat, and gazed with pride on his glorious flag. 
 
 " Wellington had husbanded his little army in Spain 
 with a thoughtful prudence, only at times, when everything 
 pointed to success, venturing a bold attack, but never hazard- 
 ing the existence of his army. The Emperor himself he had 
 never yet encountered on the battle-field ; and the grandeur 
 of Napoleonic warfare, the huge mass-attacks which com- 
 pelled victory at a single onslaught, remained unknown to 
 him. Perfectly unmoved, he still maintained that old- 
 fashioned method of warfare which had procured him so great 
 a success under the exceptional conditions of the Spanish 
 campaign to be the only right one. He looked down on 
 the national armies with the immense contempt of the pro- 
 fessional soldier ; they seemed to him without exception no 
 better than the Spanish guerillas, who had so often proved 
 their uselessness on the battle-field ; and he always refused 
 to admit that the success of the Peninsular War would have 
 been impossible without the fanaticism of those undisciplined 
 bands, who harassed and weakened the enemy in the rear 
 
 1 Taken in the Peninsular War (1812) after an investment of nineteen 
 days.
 
 234 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 by the terror of petty warfare. ' Enthusiasm,' he wrote 
 in his awkward style to Castlereagh, ' never as a matter of 
 fact helped to accomplish anything, and is only an excuse 
 for the disorder with which everything is done, and for the 
 want of discipline and obedience in armies.' These mili- 
 tary views express at the same time the anti-revolutionary 
 temper of the high Tories. In his later years, when his 
 more expert military judgment recognised the absolute 
 necessity for reform, Wellington several times had the 
 courage to separate himself from his political friends, and, 
 heedless of the fury of his party, himself carried through 
 with a firm hand what he had hitherto resisted as a dangerous 
 innovation. 1 In his old age, crowned as he was with glory, 
 he stood high enough to face all alone, to follow alone the 
 bidding of his pure patriotism : ' I would willingly give my 
 life,' he said once, ' if I could thereby save my country from 
 one month of civil war.' In the year 1815 he was still a 
 staunch adherent of the extreme conservative party ; and 
 the world-war of those days seemed to him merely a contest 
 of legitimate authority against revolution. 
 
 " The national passions which surged in the nations of 
 the continent he regarded half with suspicion and half with 
 contempt. The greater part of his life had been spent 
 among the Irish, the Hindus, the Spanish, and the Portuguese; 
 and these experiences had bred in him the firm conviction 
 that there was no other nation which could even distantly 
 compare with Great Britain. The old English vice of 
 depreciating foreign nations was exhibited in this dry, un- 
 amiable hero in such a cold, offensive, and arrogant manner 
 that even the Spanish, who had so much to thank him for, 
 hated him from the depths of their hearts. Like his 
 friend Castlereagh, he held to the opinion that parliamentary 
 freedom was an exclusive possession of the favoured English 
 race, and that it was unsuited to the less civilised nations 
 of the continent. As he had already combined political with 
 military activity in India and Spain, he acted as ambassador, 
 
 1 Especially Catholic Emancipation in 1829.
 
 ON ENGLISH HISTORY 235 
 
 after the conclusion of peace, at Paris and at Vienna ; and 
 he enjoyed so completely the confidence of the ministers, 
 that he was regarded as practically a member of the Cabinet. 
 He shared the Tory mistrust of the rising powers of Prussia 
 and Russia, was far more deeply conversant with Cabinet 
 secrets than were the Headquarters Staff of Bliicher, and he 
 took over the command with a firm and clearly-thought-out 
 political plan to restore the legitimate king to the throne of 
 his fathers." * 
 
 3. The Turning-Point at Waterloo, June 18, 1815 
 
 This passage gives the ordinary German version of the 
 effect produced by Bliicher's arrival on the field of battle : 
 
 " Silent, unmoved, with marvellous self-control, Welling- 
 ton surveyed this vast confusion. Not only was his army 
 utterly exhausted, but its whole tactical formation was 
 entirely broken. As a result of the long struggle, the 
 divisions of the troops were all at sixes and sevens ; out of the 
 remnants of the two magnificent cavalry brigades those 
 of Ponsonby 8 and of Somerset 3 all that could be collected 
 was two squadrons. It was out of the question to risk a 
 decisive battle with such troops. The Duke knew well that 
 only the advent of the Prussians had saved him from a certain 
 defeat ; his repeated and urgent appeals to Bliicher place 
 this beyond doubt. Yet he owed one last satisfaction to the 
 military honour of his brave troops ; and he foresaw with a 
 statesmanlike intuition that, when the time came for peace 
 negotiations, the word of England must weigh very much 
 heavier in the scale if it could be made to appear that the battle 
 had practically been decided by British troops alone. There- 
 fore, when he saw that the French right wing had succumbed 
 to the Prussian attack, he ordered all the available fragments 
 
 1 Deutsche Geschichte, i. pp. 729-33. 
 
 2 The Union Brigade (Royal Scots Greys and Inniskillings). 
 3 The Horse Guards and Life Guards.
 
 236 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 of his army to make a slight advance. In this last advance 
 the Hanoverian Colonel Halkett drove before him two 
 several squares of the Imperial Guard which were still hold- 
 ing together, and took General Cambronne prisoner with his 
 own hands. But the energies of the exhausted troops soon 
 gave out ; they only got a little way beyond Belle Alliance ; 
 and Wellington, having saved appearances, abandoned all 
 further pursuit to the Prussians, 1 who were at close grips with 
 the enemy." * 
 
 4. Great Britain and the Holy Alliance, 1815 
 
 It is characteristic of Treitschke that he contrives, in the 
 following passage, both to represent the Tsar Alexander I., 
 who was the originator of the Grand Alliance, as a crafty 
 hypocrite, and at the same time to reflect on the British 
 Government for refusing to join the Alliance. The latest 
 English historian of the Holy Alliance sees no reason for 
 doubting the Tsar's sincerity ; he defines the object of Castle- 
 reagh as a concert of the powers " which was to be directed 
 solely to guaranteeing rights defined by treaty " ; he objected 
 to " a union with vague and indefinite ends." 3 Treitschke 
 says : 
 
 " That mysterious providence which contrived that 
 these emotional outbursts of Alexander should always take 
 
 1 Wellington's official report admits the decisive effect of Bliicher's 
 appearance, but does not admit that the final English charge was in- 
 effective. " I should not do justice to my own feelings, or to Marshal 
 Bliicher and the Prussian army, if I did not attribute the successful result 
 of this arduous day to the cordial and timely assistance I received from 
 them. The operation of General Billow upon the enemy's flank was a 
 most decisive one ; and, even if I had not found myself in a situation to 
 make the attack which produced the final result, it would have forced the 
 enemy to have retired if his attacks should have failed, and would have 
 prevented him from taking advantage of them if they should have unfortun- 
 ately succeeded." 
 
 * Deutsche Geschichte, i. pp. 760-61. 
 
 3 W. Alison Phillips, The Confederation of Europe (London, 1914), pp. 
 148-56.
 
 ON ENGLISH HISTORY 237 
 
 the direction of his own advantage, presided, too, over 
 this outpouring of his most sacred inspirations. All the 
 powers of Europe might accept this brotherly invitation, 
 with the exception of those two who were regarded as the 
 irreconcilable enemies of the Russian policy of old times. 
 The Pope must stand aside, because the representative of 
 Christ must only admit over the civitas dei the rulership of the 
 crowned priest. Finally, the infidel Sultan was, as the Tsar 
 openly declared, for ever excluded from the great confra- 
 ternity of Europe. To the sensible mind of Frederick 
 William these oracular sentences, which the Tsar propounded 
 to him with a solemn earnestness, appeared very strange, but 
 why refuse to an old friend a courtesy which, after all, laid 
 the Prussian State under no obligation whatever ? The King 
 obligingly copied the official document with his own hands, 
 as his friend requested, on the 26th of September. The 
 Emperor Francis was not so easily persuaded ; he foresaw 
 how painfully this Holy Alliance would affect his faithful 
 friend in Constantinople ; but when Metternich smilingly 
 characterised the pious document as empty prattle, Austria, 
 too, assented on the same day. Then by degrees all the 
 European States joined the Holy Alliance, most of them in 
 order to please the Tsar, but a few of them because these 
 pious utterances from a paternal and royalist government 
 corresponded with the ultra-Conservative tendencies of the 
 dawning age of restoration. 
 
 " Only three held back : Russia's two old enemies 
 and England. The Prince Regent, as ruler of Hanover, 
 signed without demur, but Castlereagh declared in a caustic 
 speech that Parliament consisted of practical statesmen, and 
 could therefore subscribe to a political contract, but not to 
 a declaration of principles which would plunge back the 
 English State into the days of Cromwell and the Roundheads. 
 The true motive of the high Tories, however, was not any 
 regard for Parliament, which they already knew how to 
 outwit, but mistrust of Russia, and concern for the Sultan, 
 who was in fact seriously perturbed by the conclusion of the
 
 238 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 Holy Alliance. This extraordinary episode is not without 
 a certain interest in the history of civilisation, since it 
 reflects the romantic temper of the age, and its real senti- 
 ment of European unity. A political significance the Holy 
 Alliance never had, though such a significance was imputed 
 to it by the opposition press of all the nations ; these journal- 
 ists soon contracted the habit of referring to ' the system 
 of the Holy Alliance ' and directed their complaints against 
 the politics of the Eastern powers to this imaginary address." 1 
 
 5. Character and Policy of Canning 
 
 In the following passage Treitschke explains the foreign 
 policy which Canning put in action, as Secretary for Foreign 
 Affairs, in the years 1822-27 : 
 
 " At this fateful moment a momentous catastrophe 
 occurred at the English court. Shortly before the meeting 
 of the Congress of Verona, on the i3th of August, the 
 Earl of Londonderry 2 committed suicide in an attack of 
 melancholy ; and it was with sincere distress that Metternich 
 mourned for his irreplaceable ' other self.' Lord Liverpool 
 had long been feeling that the deplorable mediocrity of his 
 Cabinet needed the infusion of new life, and that the obdur- 
 ateness of the extreme Tories called for some mitigation. 
 He resolved therefore to nominate, in Londonderry's place, 
 George Canning, who possessed the most brilliant and 
 original intellect of all the Tory party, and was suspected 
 both by King George and by the court of Vienna. So, at 
 length, while all the other great powers could only oppose 
 to the doctrines of the Revolution an equally barren Con- 
 servative doctrinism, a determined representative of English 
 interests and English commercial policy entered once more 
 the halls of Downing Street. From his youth Canning had 
 lived for the one idea of increasing the might of old England. 
 Already, in the war against revolutionary France, he had 
 
 1 Deutsche Geschichte, i. pp. 790-1. . * Castlereagh.
 
 ON ENGLISH HISTORY 239 
 
 failed to discern, as Burke did, a war for principles, and saw 
 only a struggle for the British command of the sea ; it was 
 only as a means to an end, that, in the columns of the 
 Anti- Jacobin newspaper, he expended his dazzling wit in 
 ridiculing the ideas of the Revolution. Without any scruple, 
 he subsequently, as member of the Portland ministry, ordered 
 in the midst of peace the marauding expedition against 
 Copenhagen, 1 because the interests of English trade de- 
 manded this act of violence ; and just as unscrupulously 
 he promised the Spanish Juntas his support against Napoleon. 
 As a result of unfortunate misunderstandings and of private 
 incidents, he had been thrust out of the Cabinet 2 at the 
 very moment when his ambition was passionately craving 
 for power, and forced to look on resentfully while men less 
 able than himself reaped the fruits of his energetic policy 
 and Castlereagh represented victorious England at the 
 Peace Congress. Now at last, after long years of tedious 
 waiting, fortune gave Canning the satisfaction of restoring 
 the half-lost independence of English politics, of scattering 
 the stubborn league of the great powers, and of bringing his 
 political career to a glorious close with five years of brilliant 
 success. 
 
 " In his home policy he always remained a Conservative, 
 for, although he saw far beyond the prejudices of the rigid 
 extreme Tories, although half Irish himself, he worked 
 energetically for the emancipation of the Catholics, and also 
 supported the modification of the existing harsh Customs 
 laws, he none the less rejected absolutely the new doctrine 
 which was beginning to form a fresh rallying-point for the 
 Whig party the doctrine of parliamentary reform. Nothing 
 seemed to him more calculated to jeopardise the striking 
 force of British policy than a genuine popular representation 
 in the lower House. But, for every other nation as well as 
 for England, he claimed the right to live in accordance with 
 
 1 In 1807, to forestall the plan of Napoleon and the Tsar for seizing the 
 Danish fleet and using it against England. 
 
 * In 1809, owing to his differences with Castlereagh.
 
 240 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 its own individuality, provided only that this did not inter- 
 fere with English trade. And the prosperity of this trade 
 was best assured, if peace were never established on the 
 Continent, if the economic forces of the continental nations 
 were exhausted by civil wars. With so much the greater 
 freedom could the fortunate island extend that command of 
 the sea, which she regarded as her natural right. To the 
 cosmopolitan doctrine of a legitimate royal prerogative, 
 Canning opposed with firmness and decision the calm state- 
 ment, that the harmony of the political world is as little dis- 
 turbed by a variety in the forms of States as the harmony 
 of the physical world is by the diverse dimensions of the 
 planets. Towards the Spanish he observed the principle 
 which Londonderry had expressed in a posthumous note : 
 that England must never allow the court of Paris the right 
 of entry into Spain, or a permanent influence in the Iberian 
 Peninsula. But how'much more favourable was England's 
 position now than it had been a year ago. 
 
 " At Troppau and Laibach 1 Castlereagh had fought alone, 
 with his left arm, since he himself was strongly in favour 
 of the intervention of Austria in Italian affairs, and only dis- 
 approved the doctrinaire manifestoes of the Eastern powers. 
 In regard to the Spanish question, 2 on the other hand, 
 Canning could pronounce a cold and unconditional negative ; 
 and he was all the more firmly resolved on this point, since 
 he judged the great European alliance with complete open- 
 mindedness. Londonderry never had the courage to formally 
 break away from the great Alliance. His successor regarded 
 it as a fetter on England, especially as England, departing 
 from her original purpose, was only as yet concerning 
 
 1 At the Conference of Troppau (1820) Austria, Prussia, and Russia 
 combined together, ignoring England and France, to prevent revolutions 
 in the minor European States from becoming a menace to the stability of 
 other States. At Laibach (1821) the debates of Troppau were continued ; 
 the three Eastern powers hoped to obtain for Austria a mandate to deal 
 with the Neapolitan revolution. Castlereagh (then Lord Stewart) resisted 
 the Eastern powers at both conferences. 
 
 4 A military revolt had broken out in Spain in 1820, under General 
 Quiroga. The rebels demanded the restoration of the Constitution of 1812.
 
 ON ENGLISH HISTORY 241 
 
 herself with the police supervision of Europe. While his 
 predecessor had looked up to Metternich with a friendly awe, 
 Canning was the first statesman of his age to penetrate the 
 triviality of the great magician of Vienna. After he had 
 followed the sinuosities of Metternich's policy for a little 
 time, he roundly declared him to be the greatest liar and 
 knave on the Continent ; and henceforth he set aside with a 
 dry jest all the unctuous moral dissertations on politics from 
 the Imperial Palace. He fully realised that England's 
 little army could scarcely risk an armed encounter with the 
 French in Spain. Therefore he kept another weapon at 
 hand, with which he could severely chastise England's 
 neighbours, in case they hazarded an entry : If England were 
 the first to express formally that recognition of the inde- 
 pendence of South America, which was in fact already 
 partially ratified, the British flag would win the lead in the 
 newly opened market, 1 and might possibly secure for herself 
 in the West another greater Portugal and the commercial 
 and political exploitation of a vast territory. 
 
 " Just as thoroughly English was Canning's judgment on 
 the Eastern complications. As a student he had been dis- 
 tinguished for his rich classical learning, and years ago he 
 had even written Philhellenic poems ; so that now he did not 
 refuse the Greek rebels his human sympathy. But, for all 
 that, he had no intention whatever of mitigating the oppres- 
 sive despotism, which his England exercised over the Hellenes 
 of the Ionian Isles. 2 Like the vast majority of his com- 
 patriots, he looked upon the preservation of the Turkish 
 Empire as a European that is to say, an English necessity, 
 because the economic helplessness of the slumbering Balkan 
 
 1 In 1824 Canning recognised the independence of the Spanish South 
 American colonies ; France and Spain had suggested that their future 
 should be settled by an international congress. Canning feared, at this 
 time, that Spain would become a dependency of France. But the colonies 
 were at least as effectually helped by the promulgation of the Monroe 
 Doctrine (1823). 
 
 8 The British Protectorate was recognised by the Convention of Paris 
 in 1815. In 1864 the Ionian Isles were surrendered to the kingdom of 
 Greece. 
 
 R
 
 242 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 peoples offered such a convenient market to the British 
 merchant. In order not to weaken these most faithful sup- 
 porters of old England, he desired never to grant the Greeks 
 more than those prerogatives of a partially independent vassal 
 State which Servia already enjoyed. Canning regarded the 
 struggle against Russia's eastern policy as incomparably 
 more important than the future of the Hellenes. In his 
 mistrust of the Court of St. Petersburg he was at one with 
 Londonderry and the extreme Tories, except that he wished 
 to oppose the Russian designs by deeds, and not merely, 
 like Metternich, by postponements and delays. 
 
 " It was indeed a blessing that the clear ray of an energetic 
 national policy once again streamed into the nebulous world 
 of European reaction. And Canning advanced with the 
 times. He perceived some of the new forces which were 
 forcing their way into the life of nations, and he recognised 
 their justice ; the ideas of his policy of British supremacy, 
 took the direction, even if it was only by chance, of many 
 of the deepest wishes of the Liberals of the Continent. He 
 knew how to make masterly use of this advantage. Just 
 as the two Pitts had made eloquent use of a great phrase 
 the Balance of Power to disguise the selfish policy of 
 English maritime supremacy, their successor now employed 
 a new catchword the freedom of nations which later 
 passed into the vocabulary of Lord Palmerston, as a seasoned 
 heirloom. The Liberal world listened entranced, while this 
 handsome man, with his ardent sparkling eyes and his broad 
 bald forehead, delivered one of his fiery and closely-reasoned 
 speeches ; in which he always selected the right moment 
 for interrupting his sagacious disquisition on the advantages 
 to English trade with a well -calculated attack on the 
 hated Holy Alliance, or a solemn appeal to the principle of 
 nationality, or some classical quotation redolent of liberty. 
 Since, moreover, the feeling of veneration for free England 
 still lingered on from Napoleonic times, the curious situation 
 arose that this thoroughly insular aristocrat passed for a 
 hero of cosmopolitan liberalism ; and this island nation,
 
 ON ENGLISH HISTORY 243 
 
 which surpasses all the nations in the world for deep-rooted 
 national egotism, was extolled as the valiant defender of the 
 freedom of all the nations. For Metternich Canning repre- 
 sented a formidable enemy. The court of Vienna knew how 
 to deal with the ideologues of the Revolution ; but this man, 
 with his marvellous combination of fire and frost, of ardour 
 and sobriety, who, supported by the economic force of the 
 greatest financial power in the world, defended the cold 
 calculations of his commercial policy with a mighty pathos 
 of patriotic eloquence, and enlisted the public opinion of 
 Europe into the service of English maritime supremacy 
 this man was to the statesmen of Vienna an enigma. He 
 was only in office for a few weeks ; then he was overwhelmed 
 with such a torrent of abuse from the Austrian diplomats as 
 clearly betrayed their secret apprehension." 1 
 
 6. The Congress of Verona, 1822 
 
 The Congress of Verona was intended to continue the 
 campaign against revolutionary outbreaks which had been 
 opened at Troppau (1820) and Laibach (1821). The pleni- 
 potentiaries met at Verona on October 20 ; Great Britain 
 was represented by the Duke of Wellington, and his action 
 was inspired by Canning, who followed the line marked 
 out by Castlereagh. Russia, Austria, and Prussia decided 
 (October 30) that France should have a free hand to deal 
 with the Spanish revolution. Wellington dissociated him- 
 self from this decision. Great Britain feared that France 
 would secure control of Spain and of the Spanish colonies ; 
 this fear, and the necessity of providing for the safety of 
 British trade in South America, explain Wellington's 
 attitude on the South American question. Treitschke calls 
 attention, quite justifiably, to the second of these motives. 
 But his explanation of Great Britain's efforts to secure the 
 abolition of the slave-trade is grotesquely unfair : 
 
 1 Deutsche Geschichte, iii. pp. 263-6.
 
 244 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 " How dearly Russia had to pay for this success ! On 
 the iQth and 2Oth of November, Wellington declared in two 
 memoirs, that England could not participate in the last 
 measures taken by the Powers, and, on the whole, would only 
 intervene in the internal situation of the other States, if her 
 own interests were threatened. That was Canning's refusal of 
 the great Alliance. On the 24th of November, Wellington 
 drew the sharp sword, which England held in readiness, half 
 out of its sheath, as he broached the subject of the inde- 
 pendence of South America. His minister 1 had written to 
 him with fervent zeal : ' American questions are at present 
 far more important for us than European. If we do not take 
 hold of them and turn them to our own advantage, we run 
 the risk of losing an opportunity which can never never be 
 recovered.' Of the freedom of the new world, of the 
 awakening of nascent nationalities, not a syllable transpired 
 in the course of these cool expositions of a commercial 
 policy ; Canning kept his fine phrases for his parliamentary 
 speeches. In fact, the British flag found itself hard pressed 
 in the American seas ; it could with difficulty defend itself 
 against pirates, as long as it could not rely on the protec- 
 tion of the new authorities in the maritime States. Already 
 in March, President Monroe had formally recognised several 
 of the new Republics 2 in the name of the North American 
 Union ; and Henry Clay, in a powerful speech, declared 
 that to be America's answer to the impious conspiracy 
 of the despots. Even now British battleships found 
 themselves under the necessity of forcing the blockade 
 before Puerto Cabello, in order to secure the entrance of 
 merchantmen. England, who had herself experienced so 
 many violent changes of her rulers, and in her penal 
 laws expressly provided for obedience to the existing 
 government, 8 could not possibly carry her regard for the 
 legitimate rights of the Spanish court so far as to allow 
 
 1 Canning. 
 
 2 Colombia, Chile, Buenos Aires, Mexico ; in March 1822. 
 
 8 By a statute of Henry VII. (1495) no person assisting the king de 
 facto was to be liable to impeachment or attainder.
 
 ON ENGLISH HISTORY 245 
 
 the fertile markets of Venezuela and Peru to be lost 
 meanwhile to her North American rivals. 
 
 " In the dry tone of a business intimation, Wellington 
 gave a notification to the Powers that England must combine 
 with the colonial authorities to check this piracy, and this 
 collaboration would inevitably involve a recognition of the 
 actual existence of these revolutionary governments. All 
 the other Powers protested vigorously. The Emperor 
 Francis declared roundly that he would never recognise the 
 independence of the Colonies, so long as their legitimate 
 king had not done so himself. Bernstorft, 1 too, expressed 
 the vigorous disapproval of his monarch, and found that the 
 moment for this declaration had at any rate been badly chosen, 
 since the decrees of Verona might possibly restore order in 
 Spain, and make possible an understanding of the Colonies 
 with the mother-country. The Tsar wished first to await the 
 result of a great plan of reconciliation, which he had con- 
 certed with King Ferdinand. Finally, France expressed 
 the wish that the Alliance should ' at some future date ' 
 agree to a joint action, so that the precipitate action of an 
 individual Power might not excite the commercial rivalry 
 of the rest. This legitimist circumspection, which so pains- 
 takingly avoided the acknowledgment of actual facts, was 
 of no service to the pressing interests of British trade. 
 Wellington did not hesitate to express himself in the matter 
 very emphatically, in his cool way ; and, at the close of the 
 Congress, Bernstorff regarded it as certain that England 
 would very soon, without consulting the Allies, come to a 
 complete understanding with the rebel States of South 
 America. 
 
 " It was with just as little concern for the opinions of the 
 other Powers that Wellington represented another important 
 interest of the English commercial policy the abolition 
 of the slave-trade. With what joy had the civilised world 
 once welcomed this benevolent idea, when it was first urged 
 by the noble and pious Wilberforce. Since that time, the 
 
 1 The representative of Prussia.
 
 246 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 pious zeal of the Continent had long grown cool, because 
 English statesmen at all the Congresses had urged the reform 
 with a too conspicuous zeal, and even the British commercial 
 world voiced its opposition to the slave-traders with an 
 almost fanatical violence. The wicked world could not 
 forbear to ask itself why all the traders from London to 
 Liverpool, usually not at all remarkable for philanthropy, 
 should suddenly evince such a tender concern for the negroes. 
 The trade lists supplied the answer. Of the whole coffee 
 importation of that time scarcely a twentieth part came 
 from the English colonies, of the sugar importation about 
 a fourth. The whole British colonial Empire comprised 
 only a few plantations suitable for negro-labour, and these 
 had long been over-supplied with blacks ; the abolition of 
 the slave-trade could here do very little harm, whereas, in 
 the case of the colonies of the other Sea-Powers, it was bound 
 to produce serious economic disturbances. Thus, these fine 
 professions of Christian charity served to cloak another 
 and less Christian ambition namely, to inflict serious 
 injury on England's rivals. Canning himself could not 
 deny that this mistrust existed, especially in France, 
 though he naturally refused to admit that it had any 
 justification." 1 
 
 7. The Significance of (a] the Catholic Emancipation Act 
 (/<?2p) and, (b] the Reform Bill {1832) 
 
 The two following passages illustrate Treitschke's interest 
 in the development of the English parliamentary system ; 
 and they show how differently from German Liberals he 
 interpreted the spirit of the English constitution. Here, 
 as in his political essays, he takes the view that the English 
 system of government before 1832 was based not upon 
 principles but upon the vested interests of the land-owning 
 aristocracy. In the reforms of 1832 and later years he, like 
 Gneist, saw mainly the overthrow of an old order, and 
 
 1 Deutsche Geschichte, iii. pp. 276-8.
 
 ON ENGLISH HISTORY 247 
 
 imagined that the stability of the British State had been 
 fatally impaired. But he admitted the usefulness of some 
 of the social reforms which followed upon the reconstitution 
 of the House of Commons : 
 
 (a) " Since Canning had broken away from the alliance with 
 the Eastern Powers, English parliamentary life had taken on 
 a new vigour ; Huskisson secured some modification of the 
 harsh Customs laws, 1 and Canning himself, shortly before his 
 death, was becoming more drawn towards the rising party of 
 the Whigs. Public opinion was directed once more to those 
 plans for reform, which Pitt had projected in his early 
 optimistic years, but had been obliged to postpone in the 
 troubled days of the war. During the long years, when the 
 States of the Continent had been fashioned anew by an 
 enlightened absolutism or by the Revolution, England had 
 been expending her best energies in founding her colonial 
 empire, and her internal legislation had been almost entirely 
 disregarded. Now at length the nation realised how much 
 had been neglected, and the need for reform obtruded 
 itself with such insistence that several of the most daring 
 innovations of the next decade were the work of strongly 
 conservative statesmen ; for instance, the first measure, 
 Catholic emancipation, was the work of Wellington and Peel 
 (1829). Even these Tories felt that any longer delay 
 might involve civil war, and possibly the revolt of a shame- 
 fully misgoverned Ireland ; and that the old animosity of 
 the Catholic Celts, which had just been powerfully stirred 
 by O'Connell's flaming speeches, must be appeased by an act 
 of justice. 
 
 " This moderate reform only achieved what Germany had 
 accomplished long ago, and the other Continental States in 
 or after the Napoleonic era. The power of the English aristo- 
 cracy was, however, closely interwoven with the privileges 
 
 1 Huskisson became President of the Board of Trade in 1823 ; in 1827, 
 after Canning's death, he became Secretary for War and the Colonies ; he 
 resigned office in 1828. He was one of the pioneers of free-trade policy.
 
 248 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 of the national Church. Just as in the twelfth century, the 
 struggle with the Roman Church first weakened the supremacy 
 of the Norman kings, and prepared the way for the struggle 
 of the Papacy and Empire in the following century, so the 
 first blow to the Anglican Church at once threatened the 
 supremacy of the parliamentary aristocracy, and opened a 
 door for the entrance of a democratic age. Louder and 
 louder sounded the demand for the reform of Parliament. 
 Once again, though in an entirely different fashion, there was 
 revealed that contrast between the regions of the South-East 
 and the North- West which had proved so momentous in the 
 history of England. Often in earlier centuries had the 
 powers of progress pitched their camp in the plains of the 
 South-East ; but since that date the mountainous country 
 of the North- West had emerged from seclusion. Here lay 
 the mines and the manufacturing towns of modern England. 
 Here an entire transformation of the old social relations was 
 in progress. For the country-people continued to stream 
 into the towns ; and these large and prosperous industrial 
 centres were imperiously demanding parliamentary repre- 
 sentation, while the wretched boroughs of the South- West 
 were falling more and more into decay." J 
 
 (b) " What wonder that this peaceful reform was extolled 
 by the moderate Liberals of the Continent as a fresh proof 
 of English hereditary wisdom ; even Dahlmann saw in the 
 reform only a wholesome reformation of the existing con- 
 stitutional authorities, since he, like his master Montesquieu, 
 looked upon the Lower House as a democratic counterpoise 
 to the Upper House. It was only a few clear-sighted Con- 
 servatives who appreciated the importance of this great and 
 far-reaching change. In a brilliant article in a Prussian 
 official newspaper, Hegel 2 prophesied that this reform would 
 shake the power of the old parliamentary aristocracy to 
 its very foundations ; and the sequel proved him correct. 
 
 1 Deutsche Geschichte, iv. pp. 21-2. 
 
 3 This essay, " Ueber die englische Reform-Bill," is reprinted in Hegel's 
 Werke, vol. xvii. (Berlin, 1835), pp. 425 el seq. It was contributed to the 
 Allgemeine preussische Staatszeilung in 1831.
 
 ON ENGLISH HISTORY 249 
 
 Until this date, only a fourth of the members of the House 
 of Commons were chosen freely ; the others all owed their 
 seats to the favour of the landowners and of the Cabinet. 
 From this time, in half the constituencies it was the middle 
 classes who held the casting-vote ; and although even now 
 the nobility exercised their usual arts of controlling the 
 elections in forms adapted to the time and with great success, 
 yet the House of Commons did become gradually what it 
 had never been under the Georges a national assembly. 
 The power of the Upper House, however, declined irresistibly; 
 for the Lords had hitherto quietly exercised a great part of 
 their influence in controlling the elections as well as the 
 votes of the Lower House. The old House of Commons 
 depended on the rotten boroughs for the successive genera- 
 tions of its young statesmen ; henceforth their entry to the 
 House was not so easy. The scarcity of talent and the 
 decline of eloquence soon showed that the great days of 
 English parliamentarism had come to an end. In addition 
 to the old-fashioned names of ' Whig ' and ' Tory,' the vague 
 continental terms ' Liberal ' and ' Conservative ' had already 
 come into use ; for the two old hereditary aristocratic parties 
 soon became split up, after the French fashion, into half-a- 
 dozen fractions, small groups representing particular opinions 
 and interests, which were only with difficulty gathered into 
 one camp. The leader of the new House of Commons no 
 longer, as the two Pitts had done, ruled with the authority 
 of a commander-in-chief over an unbroken phalanx of 
 friends and connexions of his own class ; he was obliged to 
 win over by flattery the new gentry made up of merchants 
 and manufacturers, bank directors and railway directors, 
 who were now jostling the old landed aristocracy ; he must 
 promise satisfaction of every domestic, ecclesiastical, or local 
 claim, he must promise fulfilment for every wish ; he must 
 now let himself be led, and now, under an appearance of 
 submissiveness, he must himself take the lead. If the 
 House of Commons in the past had often alienated the 
 nation by its social arrogance, now the portals were unbarred
 
 250 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 to admit every caprice and whim of public opinion ; the 
 anonymous and self-appointed statesmen of the newspapers, 
 especially those of the Times, acquired an enormous power, 
 and it happened not infrequently that the commoners, 
 intimidated by the uproar of the Press, voted for measures 
 of which they disapproved. Legislation which before had 
 been so tardy, now worked rapidly, often wantonly. In 
 rapid succession, the Civil List of the Crown was separated 
 from the public expenditure, the trade monopoly of the East 
 India Company was terminated, slavery was abolished in 
 the Colonies ; the University of London was incorporated 
 and took its place beside the two ancient aristocratic uni- 
 versities ; the decayed municipal corporations were trans- 
 formed by a Liberal but ill-considered Municipal Government 
 Act. And so strong was the democratic tendency of the 
 time that even this House, which was still made up almost 
 exclusively of the rich and aristocratic classes, had to turn 
 its attention to the much-abused masses of the people. In 
 the year 1833 appeared the first and very unassuming Act 
 for the regulation of the factories ; further, a small State- 
 subsidy was granted for elementary education, which had 
 been so shamefully neglected." l 
 
 8. Character and Policy of Lord Palmerston, 1830 
 
 l.The following sketch is a good example of Treitschke's 
 skill in portraiture. It is also interesting because he saw 
 in Palmerston the incarnation of English diplomacy. He 
 held that England always had pursued a narrow policy based 
 on her commercial interests, and had always disguised her 
 selfishness beneath a cloak of general principles. In Palmer- 
 ston's case the cloak was unusually transparent, and he makes 
 Palmerston the type of the British hypocrite : 
 
 " The inmost nature of this time of transition was ex- 
 hibited in the Talleyrand of parliamentarism, that very 
 
 1 Deutsche Geschichte, iv. pp. 24-5.
 
 ON ENGLISH HISTORY 251 
 
 skilful statesman, who, an aristocrat by birth and inclina- 
 tion, from this time guided the foreign policy of England 
 in the manner of a masterly demagogue. Lord Palmerston 
 sprang from a very old Anglo-Saxon family, which had been 
 famous long before the Norman Conquest ; in modern times 
 the house of Temple had always been an ornament of the 
 Whig party. Young Viscount Henry, however, went over 
 to the Tories without any compunction, because the Whigs, 
 in those Napoleonic days, could not hope for power. At the 
 age of two-and-twenty he was Lord of the Admiralty, 1 two 
 years later Secretary at War ; a and, by his ardent though 
 irregular industry, he acquired such a thorough knowledge 
 of State affairs that he could no longer fail to get an official 
 position. He was the most permanent of all the English 
 ministers : of the fifty-eight years of life which remained to 
 him after his entry into office, he spent forty-eight on the 
 ministerial benches. In the years when he helped to equip 
 the army against Napoleon, he soon accumulated a rich 
 store of diplomatic experience, and, in his first great parlia- 
 mentary speeches, he boldly announced the leading idea of 
 his political life. He justified the expedition of the fleet 
 against Copenhagen with the simple words : ' In this case, 
 the law of nature is stronger than the law of nations.' 
 Consequently England, in time of peace and for the sake of 
 her own preservation, was to make a marauding attack on 
 a small neighbouring State. The momentary advantage, the 
 ' expediency,' as he liked to call it, excused the breach of 
 faith and law. A politician through and through, without 
 any feeling for art or for the ideal forces in human life, but 
 free from self-conceit and sentimentality, he always followed 
 his inborn practical instincts ; principles and theories 
 hampered him as little as conscientious scruples. He knew 
 that he would make his way, if only he could continue in 
 the saddle ; he quietly declined a high office for which he 
 felt himself not yet equal, and afterwards, without grumbling, 
 
 1 In the Portland administration, formed in March 1807. 
 a In the Percival administration, formed in October 1809.
 
 252 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 he contented himself with a position of the second rank, 
 although he had by this time expected something more 
 important. 
 
 " But success was bound to come to him in the end ; from 
 early days he was a favourite of the drawing-rooms ; business 
 did not hinder him from cheerfully living and letting live, 
 or from taking part enthusiastically in every pastime of dis- 
 tinguished society. He ridiculed the sanctimonious bearing 
 of his companions, and he confessed with a refreshing sin- 
 cerity how much pleasure he derived from female society 
 and from all the joys of this world ; even in his old age, he 
 enjoyed hearing himself called by his old pet name ' Lord 
 Cupid.' When, after a long sitting in the House of Commons, 
 he made his way home at a late hour of the night, walking 
 with elastic stride, always with a flower in his mouth or in 
 his button-hole, shouldering his umbrella, his tall hat shoved 
 far back on his head, his countrymen rejoiced at this 
 picture of old English exuberance. His whole being exhaled 
 a cheerful ease. The strong, square Anglo-Saxon head, 
 with the roguish eyes set far apart, suggested at once the 
 strength of the dog and the cunning of the fox. To his 
 tenants he was a good-natured landlord ; his cousins and 
 friends he provided with fat sinecures, in accordance with the 
 English aristocratic custom, but he never intentionally 
 entrusted an important office to an incompetent. If an 
 opponent thwarted his purpose, he never failed, sooner or 
 later, to secure his revenge ; but, after that, all was forgotten ; 
 lasting animosity was incompatible with this easy-going 
 nature. He lacked the greatness and the depth of a really 
 original and powerful thinker. His strength lay in that 
 subtle sagacity which enabled him to scent in advance 
 every change of public feeling ; and the longer he remained 
 in power, the more perfectly he and his fellow-countrymen 
 learnt to understand one another, until finally he seemed to 
 them the perfect embodiment of the national spirit. 
 
 " He had no acquaintance with foreign nations, and he 
 did not desire their acquaintance ; it was only for Italy,
 
 ON ENGLISH HISTORY 253 
 
 where he had spent a few years of his youth, and for the gay 
 life of the Paris salons, that he cherished a certain predilec- 
 tion. He judged the Germans as Canning's envenomed and 
 insulting poem in the Anti-Jacobin Review had taught all 
 the Tories to judge them ; he saw in them a servile nation, 
 composed of infantile politicians, of undisciplined free- 
 thinkers, and of learned fools. So, in his parliamentary 
 speeches, he had no hesitation in striking the seductive note 
 of national self-glorification ; and he soon learnt that this 
 sort of demagogic flattery can hardly be made too gross for 
 a British audience. In the summer of 1813, when the people 
 of Prussia were in arms, Palmerston extolled the incom- 
 parable advantages of the English mercenary army, and 
 declared to delighted crowds that the Commander-in-chief 
 can rely more confidently on such an army of paid volunteers 
 than on a ' band of slaves ' who are dragged from their houses 
 by force. Subsequently, he even glorified the cat-o'-nine- 
 tails as a jewel of British freedom ; as a matter of fact the 
 whole difference between the English and the continental 
 armies consisted in the fact that, in the case of the latter, 
 floggings were administered without examination, while in 
 old England they were administered after a sentence under 
 martial law. 
 
 " The reactionary doctrines of the Austrian court could 
 not appeal to this realist, though he took care that this fact 
 should not occasion a breach with Lord Castlereagh. He 
 attached himself to Canning with sincere delight, because 
 the latter brought back into honour the old English policy 
 of self-interest. He soon retired from the Wellington 
 ministry * with the other Canningites. He felt that this 
 Cabinet must be ' wrecked on the rocks of public opinion,' 
 and he was not mistaken with regard to the approaching 
 collapse of the Bourbon dynasty. 2 For two years he con- 
 tinued in the ranks of the opposition, and by enlightened 
 commonplaces prepared the way for the bold change of 
 
 1 In May 1828. 
 a By the July Revolution of 1830.
 
 254 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 front which was to transfer him to the Whigs. ' In Nature,' 
 he announced, ' there is only one motive force the spirit ; 
 in human affairs this force takes the form of opinion ; in 
 political affairs it takes the form of public opinion ; and 
 those statesmen who understand how to master the passions, 
 the interests, and the opinions of men acquire a dispro- 
 portionate power.' Whether a statesman is not also under 
 an obligation to instruct public opinion when it is at fault, 
 and to defy with angry brow the prejudices of the national 
 assembly, was a question which he never put to himself. 
 When, after the July Revolution, he entered the Reform 
 Cabinet of the Whigs, and took over the Foreign Office from 
 the nervous hands of Lord Aberdeen, 1 he immediately took 
 the path of Canning's commercial policy. He could not en- 
 rapture the House, like the two Pitts, by an ardour of spiritual 
 exaltation, nor, like Canning, by the sustained pathos of a 
 skilled eloquence ; the new parliamentarism called for an 
 apostle of mediocrity. Palmerston relied on the infallible 
 method of national self-praise, on little dialectic conjuring 
 tricks, on journalistic phrases, which were intelligible to all 
 and saved the trouble of reflection. He attacked his 
 opponents with an insulting wit, and, on occasion, with a 
 well -calculated coarseness, which, to the unsuspecting, 
 rang like the involuntary emotional outburst of an honest 
 man, and always left his hearers with the impression that 
 they had gazed deep into the recesses of his loyal heart. 
 
 " When still in opposition, he had already expressed 
 with a prophetic smile the flattering conviction that every 
 member of the House of Commons would be able to form 
 an expert opinion on foreign policy, if only this were con- 
 ducted honestly and openly. Accordingly, as a minister, he 
 was zealous in preparing elaborate Blue-books, which gave 
 a little information about everything, but no information 
 at all about essentials ; so that every reader of The Times 
 could now boast that he knew the European policy of this 
 
 1 He entered the Grey Cabinet (November 1830) as Secretary of State 
 for Foreign Affairs.
 
 ON ENGLISH HISTORY 255 
 
 popular statesman from beginning to end. Like Canning, 
 Palmerston wished to preserve the peace of the world, in 
 order not to injure British trade ; but, like his master, he 
 desired with equal intensity that the Continent should 
 always be threatened with a simmering danger of war, in 
 order that England might have a free hand for extending 
 her colonial Empire and for securing the markets of the 
 whole world. Above all, it was important to keep apart 
 those two very dangerous rivals, France and Russia ; and 
 the business sense of the converted Tory immediately per- 
 ceived how easily this end might be attained by a skilful 
 exploitation of the political passions of the day. Judiciously 
 employed, the Liberal phrase ' for old England ' might 
 become a no less useful and at the same time less costly 
 article of export than coal, iron, and cotton. If England 
 attached herself to the new French ruler, 1 in such a way 
 as to support him and at the same time to hold him in 
 check, if this entente cordiale of the western powers in the 
 midst of these unsettled times were persistently extolled 
 as a league of freedom against despotism, of light against 
 darkness, then an honourable understanding between France 
 and the conservative powers of the East was rendered 
 impossible." z 
 
 9. The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, 
 
 Our next passage relates to the policy which Palmerston 
 pursued, as Foreign Secretary, in the second Melbourne 
 Administration. Palmerston's main preoccupation at this 
 time was the question of the Ottoman Empire, which he 
 desired to maintain against the designs of Russia. For this 
 purpose it was necessary that Great Britain and the other 
 European powers should intervene to save the Sultan from 
 the attacks of Mehemet Ali, the ruler of Egypt and the most 
 ambitious of Turkish vassals. The reward which Palmerston 
 
 3 Louis Philippe, proclaimed " King of the French " on August 9, 1830. 
 8 Deutsche Geschichte, iv. pp. 26-9.
 
 256 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 obtained from the Sultan was the closing of the Dardanelles 
 and the Bosporus to ships of war. Prussia acted with 
 Great Britain in the Turkish question, and Treitschke felt 
 that his country had been made a catspaw. In 1841 the 
 Melbourne administration went out of office; Palmerston 
 was succeeded by the pacific Aberdeen : 
 
 " Thus there reigned once more on the Continent that 
 condition of veiled dissension which England needed for her 
 plans, and never had the old truth that the trader's policy 
 is the most immoral of all policies been so clearly demon- 
 strated as in these years. While the great powers were 
 taken up with their wranglings, Palmerston would be able, 
 unmolested, in his own unchivalrous fashion, to vent British 
 insolence on the weak. He started a dispute with Naples 
 over the Sicilian sulphur trade, with Portugal over the 
 sacrifices of the last civil war, a war which England her- 
 self had diligently fostered. With Servia he concluded a 
 commercial treaty, and immediately endeavoured to compel 
 Prince Milosch to dissolve the constitution. The rock of 
 Aden, the key to the Red Sea, the Gibraltar of the East, 
 was stolen * in 1839, in the midst of peace. Soon after began 
 the Opium War, 2 the most detestable war ever waged by a 
 Christian nation ; the Chinese were compelled to tolerate 
 the smuggling of opium from the East Indies ; and England, 
 while she poisoned their bodies, sought to save their souls 
 by the evangelical sermons of her missionaries. Against 
 more powerful opponents Palmerston only dared to employ 
 the weapon of cunning. Every one suspected that England 
 was secretly supporting the Circassians in their struggle 
 against Russia ; though the secret only became notorious 
 when the Russians seized the ship Vixen, freighted with arms, 
 
 1 From Arab tribesmen, who had plundered a shipwrecked East India- 
 man and maltreated the crew and passengers (1837). 
 
 3 In 1840-42. The war was provoked by the sudden and arbitrary 
 interference of China with the opium trade. It resulted in the cession of 
 Hong-Kong to Great Britain, and the opening of five Treaty Ports to 
 European trade.
 
 ON ENGLISH HISTORY 257 
 
 on the Caucasian coast. Even more acute distress was 
 roused at the London court by the occupation of Algeria, 
 the last and best legacy of the French Bourbons. According 
 to the English point of view, the whole of Africa was the 
 legitimate possession of Great Britain. Even the peaceably 
 disposed Lord Aberdeen declared arrogantly to the Prussian 
 Ambassador : ' The French have united Algiers to France 
 " for all time." That phrase ' for all time ' signifies until 
 war is declared, until the first English battleship appears 
 in the harbour of Algiers ! 1 Every British heart was filled 
 with the ambition to lay waste this fair and promising settle- 
 ment of the French ; therefore that dangerous enemy of 
 France, the heroic Abdul Kadir, 2 could count at any time on 
 England's secret assistance. 
 
 " In the face of such an absolutely unscrupulous com- 
 mercial policy, a policy which was penetrating into and 
 making mischief in every part of the world, all the other 
 civilised nations seemed like natural allies. England was 
 the stronghold of barbarism in international law. England 
 alone was to blame for the fact that naval warfare, to the 
 shame of humanity, was still an organised form of piracy. 
 It was the common task of all nations to establish on the sea 
 that balance of power that had long existed on land, that 
 healthy equilibrium which should make it impossible for any 
 State to do just as it pleased, and should secure for all alike 
 the protection of a humane system of international law. The 
 cause of human civilisation demanded that the diversified 
 splendour of the world's history, which had begun with the 
 dominion of the monosyllabic Chinese, should not develop 
 in a vicious circle towards a final supremacy of the mono- 
 syllabic Britons. As soon as the Eastern question again 
 came under discussion, it was essential that some attempt 
 should be made, by a far-seeing statesmanship, at least to 
 
 1 The English government asserted in 1833, and on later occasions, 
 that France ought to evacuate Algeria because Polignac, the minister of 
 Charles X., had given pledges to that effect in 1829. 
 
 a The leader of Algerian resistance to the French in the years 1832-37, 
 and again in 1839. 
 
 S
 
 258 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 mitigate that oppressive alien despotism which the English 
 fleet exercised in radiating circles from Gibraltar, Malta, and 
 Corfu, and to restore the Mediterranean Sea to the Mediter- 
 ranean nations. The Prussian State, however, did not as yet 
 possess a fleet ; it could not and dared not rise to such a free 
 vision of those far-distant operations, since it could itself 
 barely afford the necessary protection for the scattered 
 German peoples, and Italy had not yet risen to the status 
 of a Great Power." 1 
 
 10. The "Entente Cordiale" of Great Britain and Prussia, 184.1 
 
 The following passages relate to comparatively un- 
 important affairs. But they are entertaining, as giving us a 
 continental estimate of Queen Victoria, of the Prince Consort, 
 and of their well-meant attempts to cultivate friendly 
 relations with the German courts. Frederick William IV. of 
 Prussia responded cordially to their overtures. He joined 
 with Great Britain in 1841 to found a Protestant bishopric 
 at Jerusalem. In 1842 he visited London and conceived 
 a strong admiration for the English parliamentary system. 
 He was represented at the Court of St. James by Bunsen, 
 whom Treitschke abuses for Anglophile tendencies : 
 
 (a) " In November 1841 the first evangelical Bishop of 
 Jerusalem was consecrated by the Archbishop of Canter- 
 bury ; he was a Jew of Breslau, who had received in baptism 
 the name of Alexander, and he filled his difficult office very 
 respectably. The ordination sermon celebrated the episcopal 
 see at Zion as the first-fruits of the union of all Protestants. 
 So Prussia presented to the new Anglican diocese not only 
 one-half of the cost of maintenance, but also the person of 
 the Bishop. Bunsen was in an ecstasy ; he fancied that 
 he had once again achieved a great diplomatic victory by 
 persuading the British to accept this gift from Prussia ; and 
 he heard with rapture how his pious friend, Lord Ashley, had 
 
 1 Deutsche Geschichte, v. pp. 63-4.
 
 ON ENGLISH HISTORY 259 
 
 extolled Prussia's Christian monarch as the best and noblest 
 king of this world. It was not without a certain malicious 
 pleasure that he noticed with what suspicious eyes all the 
 other Great Powers without exception regarded this Pro- 
 testant bishopric. Russia and France, since the Dardanelles 
 Treaty, 1 had been jealously competing for the favour of 
 England, and naturally had no wish to be outbid by 
 Prussia; while Metternich vaguely apprehended a danger 
 to the Catholic Church in this friendship of the two Pro- 
 testant Great Powers, and said anxiously to his faithful 
 Newman in London : ' Bunsen is trying to found a new 
 Schmalkald League. . . .' " 2 
 
 " Looked upon as a political treaty, this agreement 
 with Bunsen was a monstrosity, because England alone de- 
 rived all the advantages from it and gave nothing in return, 
 and experienced diplomats surmised that now at last the 
 proceedings of this theological busybody would be put an 
 end to. Frederick William thought otherwise. He had not 
 been prosecuting any political plans in these negotiations, 
 and he continued to repeat the modest exhortation : ' Let 
 us efface ourselves.' Since he now perceived the con- 
 summation of that work of Christian piety, which was all 
 that his heart desired, he decided to bestow a handsome re- 
 ward on the man through whose agency it had been accom- 
 plished. In the autumn of 1841 he began to carry out the 
 long-projected changes in the diplomatic corps. Werther 
 received an important office at court, and his place was taken 
 by Count Maltzan, hitherto ambassador at Vienna. Bulow, 
 whose talents the King valued very highly, was recompensed 
 by a transfer to Frankfort, in order that he might infuse new 
 life into the politics of the German Confederation. In 
 naming his successor Frederick William exhibited a chival- 
 rous delicacy of feeling without precedent in the history of 
 diplomacy ; he allowed the young Queen herself the choice 
 between three names Count Arnim, Count Donhoff, and 
 
 1 Of July 1841, by which the Dardanelles were closed to ships of war. 
 * The League of Schmalkald was formed in 1530 by the Protestant 
 Princes of Germany to resist the religious policy of Charles V.
 
 260 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 Bunsen. The answer could hardly be in doubt, since Bunsen 
 during the recent negotiations had yielded so compliantly 
 to all the English demands. After a conference with the 
 Queen, Lord Aberdeen replied : ' We cannot do better than 
 keep what we have,' that is, Bunsen ; ' we do not know the 
 other two gentlemen.' 
 
 " From the point of view of England the choice could not 
 have been better ; from the point of view of Prussia it could 
 not have been worse. The weakest of the Great Powers 
 needed for its representatives men of strong Prussian pride, 
 men who would uncompromisingly insist on the independ- 
 ence of their State, which had not yet been fully recognised by 
 the older Great Powers. In this respect Bulow had been 
 sometimes at fault, since, in the course of years, he had 
 accustomed himself to the English point of view to the verge 
 of forgetting his own. But Bunsen, at the time that he took 
 up his office, as a result of the influence of his British wife, 
 was already half transformed into a pseudo-Englishman ; 
 several of his children adopted their mother's nationality ; 
 that cosmopolitan indeterminateness, which has been the 
 misfortune of so many diplomatic families, had fallen like 
 a blight upon his household. It was gratifying for this self- 
 satisfied man, so soon after his failures at Rome, to find 
 himself transferred from the quiet country house on the 
 Hubel near Berne to the stately Prussia House in Carlton 
 Terrace. There he found himself in close proximity to 
 Buckingham Palace, the Houses of Parliament, the Foreign 
 Office in Downing Street, and the ancient groves of St. 
 James' Park ; on all sides he saw the monuments of a great 
 history. The fire of his easily aroused enthusiasm was 
 kindled into flame ; the State and the Church, the country 
 and the people of the prosperous Island took on a rose- 
 coloured light. He regarded his own office as the most 
 important post in the Prussian diplomatic service, and he 
 was made very happy by the consciousness that he had been 
 selected to seal more firmly the historic alliance of the two 
 kindred nations. This ' historic alliance ' had been a pet
 
 ON ENGLISH HISTORY 261 
 
 phrase of Prussian diplomacy ever since the change of 
 dynasty. No one asked what the Prussian State hacj ever 
 gained by the friendship of England, and whether Prussia 
 was not now strong enough to dispense with it. 
 
 " As blissfully hopeful now as he had been at Rome, 
 Bunsen regarded any personal friendliness shown to him in 
 London as a political victory, and seriously believed that the 
 least genial of all nations could be won over by geniality ; 
 he innocently hoped that the British would not put any 
 obstacle in the way of an extension of the Zollverein, and 
 that in case Germany acquired any colonies, Great Britain 
 would affectionately protect them with her fleet. The 
 English regarded their ardent admirer with a quiet irony, and 
 lost no time in turning to account his unrequited love. 
 ' Ritter Bunsen/ as he was called at court, was soon a lion 
 of London society and a special favourite of the newspaper 
 reporters. In addition to the enormous mass of his de- 
 spatches and memoirs, which were invariably witty and 
 invariably unpractical, he contrived to win a place in the 
 world's history for his book on Egypt, and to continue his 
 liturgical studies. Thus he was equally intimate with the 
 diplomatic, the learned, and the ecclesiastical circles of 
 London, and was always ready to relate with a just pride 
 how he had been the only foreigner present at a banquet of 
 the Lord Mayor or the Archbishop of Canterbury ; or how 
 his speech delivered in faultless English had been enthusi- 
 astically received by some assembly ; or how the University 
 of Oxford, more grateful than the German Universities, 
 had honoured him with a doctor's degree. He made use of 
 this brilliant social position to found numerous societies 
 for the benefit of the German residents in London, and also 
 to give a helping hand to the young German scholars who 
 assisted him in his labours. In the opinion of the public 
 at large, it was to the advantage of the Prussian State that, 
 throughout the vast metropolis, the Prussian Minister 
 should form a constant topic of conversation. In point of 
 fact, his political activity in London, as before in Rome,
 
 262 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 was wholly injurious to his native country. It was im- 
 possible that an enthusiast, who was so easily satisfied with 
 fair words, should gain any influence over the cold English 
 business-men. At the Prussian Court, however, Bunsen's 
 sanguine reports were the cause of totally false conceptions 
 of England's German policy, and of fatal mistakes, which 
 were to meet with a severe punishment later, when the fate 
 of Schleswig-Holstein was at stake." l 
 
 (b) " Such a spectacle of internal peace naturally filled 
 German moderate Liberals with admiration ; disillusioned 
 by the intrigues of the July monarchy, they began to reject 
 the French ideas of freedom which had been fashionable 
 in the 'thirties, and now found an embodiment of their 
 constitutional ideal in the State of Queen Victoria. Only 
 a few observed how the aristocratic substructure of the old 
 English parliamentarism had crumbled since the Reform 
 Bill ; how the decisions in the Lower House had gradually 
 come into the hands of the Scots and the Irish ; and what 
 new democratic transformations were thus preparing. At 
 this time Great Britain was rejoicing in an unexampled 
 economic prosperity. Her industrial activity had developed 
 to such an extent that she felt herself in a position to control 
 all the markets of the world, and she therefore raised the 
 banner of Free Trade. A vast emigration secured the 
 conquest of extensive colonies ; and, even if these were 
 perhaps at some future date to shake off the political 
 dominion of the mother-country, still they preserved their 
 British civilisation, and thus secured a great advantage for 
 the Anglo-Saxon over the Teuton race ; it was not long before, 
 in every corner of the globe, there might be found some 
 province which bore the auspicious names of Victoria and 
 Albert. Occupied in their party struggles and in their 
 rivalries with their neighbours, the continental nations 
 scarcely noticed how the greatest Empire in the world's 
 history was thus growing up perfectly unmolested. Among 
 the German Anglomaniacs England was commonly extolled 
 
 1 Deutsche Geschichte, v. pp. 122-6.
 
 ON ENGLISH HISTORY 263 
 
 as the model of a peace-loving Power, who confided innocently 
 in the adequacy of her small hired army. Yet, as a matter 
 of fact, this new Carthage was the only State in Europe which 
 was continually more frequently even than Russia waging 
 wars wars, to be sure, in which gold counted for more than 
 iron. 
 
 " At the side of the mistress of this world-empire stood 
 a German princeling, who found himself in the same situa- 
 tion as that of a princess married to a foreigner ; he could not 
 keep his nationality. Prince Albert soon became a thorough 
 Englishman, though in the family circle he generally spoke 
 German, and his devoted consort, to the horror of all pious 
 British hearts, even allowed him to use a silver knife for 
 eating fish. When a few years after his marriage he once 
 more visited Germany, he took pains to display his British 
 ways, and held a review of the garrison of Mainz in a grey 
 summer overcoat ; so that the Prussian generals demanded 
 wrathfully whether this young sprig of the House of Wettin 
 had altogether forgotten that German princes paid honour 
 to the flag of their country in military uniform. In the cold 
 joylessness of English life he lost that genial cheerfulness 
 which characterises the cultivated German ; he became 
 stiff, pedantic, and harsh and uncharitable in his judgments, 
 so that even the task of training his children, which he 
 entered into with great zeal, was only successful in the case 
 of some of his daughters, and was wholly unsuccessful in 
 the case of the heir to the throne. His self-assurance was 
 very much enhanced by the calculated flattery of the British 
 party-leaders, and by the innocent encomiums of continental 
 constitutionalists. He looked down with arrogance on his 
 illustrious fellow-princes in Germany ; he imagined that he 
 understood German politics better than they did, although, 
 as a result of his long absence, he had long since lost touch 
 with the affairs of his native country ; and he did not realise 
 that he was giving any cause for offence by constantly and 
 pedantically exhorting the German princes to follow the lead 
 of England. The Queen took up the same attitude. She
 
 264 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 loved her consort so deeply that she folded his country as 
 well as himself to her heart, and with true womanliness 
 believed herself called upon to watch over its welfare. She 
 imagined that, like her predecessors who had been Kings of 
 Hanover, so she, in the character of Duchess of Saxe-Coburg, 
 was a member of the German Confederation ; and the Ger- 
 man courts offered a far less ungrateful soil for the delicate 
 arts of feminine policy than did the English Parliament. 
 
 " Between London, Brussels, Wiesbaden, and Coburg 
 there was established a chain of couriers, who maintained 
 regular communications among the trusted intimates of the 
 House of Coburg ; and there were side-lines to Paris and 
 Lisbon. Though the English press, in its blind hatred of 
 the foreigner, protested against the alleged ' German in- 
 fluence ' at the London court, Germany might, with more 
 reason, have complained of an English and Coburg influence. 
 The elder brother of the Prince Consort, Duke Ernest of 
 Coburg, who was entirely German in his sympathies, felt 
 this very strongly. Soon after he had mounted his little 
 throne, he wrote to his Uncle Leopold : ' We must become 
 loyal Germans again, for hitherto we have as a rule appeared 
 as mere relations of the great courts of the West ; hence 
 Coburg is looked upon as a nest of un-German intrigues 
 and ultra-Liberal ideas.' But unfortunately nothing was 
 achieved beyond noble resolutions. To prudent calculators 
 like Leopold and Albert, the great West-European interests 
 of their cosmopolitan dynasty naturally seemed more im- 
 portant than their little German native province ; and the 
 advice of the Coburgs continued to be frequently detrimental 
 to the interests of the German nation, all the more detri- 
 mental since this House, in every way favoured by Provi- 
 dence, had also the rare good fortune to be extolled in litera- 
 ture, not by the common flatterers of the courts but by loyal 
 and distinguished writers. All the honest German scholars, 
 who enjoyed the patronage of Bunsen and Stockmar in 
 London, became the apostles of this legend of the Coburgs. 
 They recounted in good faith to their countrymen at home,
 
 ON ENGLISH HISTORY 265 
 
 how wonderfully the Prince Consort had contrived at the 
 same time to become a thorough Briton and to remain a 
 thorough German." 1 
 
 (c) " The Foreign Ministry continued for a long time to 
 send the British Cabinet unrequited professions of affection, 
 especially since Billow had stepped into the office of Count 
 Maltzan, who had been smitten with an incurable disease 
 after only a few months. As Minister, Billow remained what 
 he had been as Ambassador, such an unreserved admirer of 
 England that Stockmar contentedly declared him to be 
 the most capable of all the Prussian diplomats. On receiving 
 the intelligence of the new Asiatic successes of the English, he 
 expressed the congratulations of his Court through Bunsen, 
 and added, in the fervour of his own enthusiasm : ' Bound 
 to Great Britain by the ties of a long alliance and of a deep 
 and enduring friendship, we are accustomed to look upon 
 everything which promotes the glory and well-being of the 
 British Empire, almost as if it had happened to ourselves.' 2 
 With such disinterestedness did these sentimental politicians, 
 in the honoured name of the German State, assume a part 
 of the responsibility for England's shameful opium war ! 
 Certainly, Berlin was badly informed with regard to oriental 
 affairs, since Bunsen believed everything that his British 
 friends told him, and sent home indignant reports that his 
 dear England had been shamefully calumniated in the matter 
 of the ppium trade. 3 
 
 " It was impossible that this Anglomania, which after 
 all only represented the personal sentiments of the King 
 and his intimates, could continue very long. There was 
 absolutely no motive for a political alliance of the two 
 Powers ; even their economic interests lay at this moment 
 in widely different directions. No sooner did Prussia raise 
 her duties a little than Peel expressed deep indignation, as 
 if the rights of England, whose own duties stood far higher, 
 
 1 Geschickte, v. pp. 129-31. 
 
 2 Biilow, Instruction to Bunsen, November 5, 1842. 
 8 Bunsen's Report, December 10, 1842.
 
 266 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 had thereby been infringed ; and though Bunsen soothingly 
 replied, ' The Zollverein is still the best customer of your 
 industry/ his royal master could not be unaware that it 
 was essential that German industrial activity should outgrow 
 this dependence. 1 How little importance the English nation 
 attached to the German alliance was demonstrated at this 
 time by Macaulay's essay on Frederick the Great. Even 
 the French, who still held in esteem the philosophers of Sans 
 Souci, had never expressed their opinions of Prussia with 
 such a brutal arrogance and lack of understanding, and here, 
 as elsewhere, the brilliant essayist was only expressing the 
 average opinion of his educated countrymen. Frederick 
 William's cultivated and artistic friend, Count Raczynski, 
 also had some experience of British self-complacency. When, 
 after a friendly reception at court, he ventured to ask 
 whether German artists should not be invited to introduce 
 painting in fresco into England, where it was almost un- 
 known, the English painters protested with great heat, 2 
 and Sir Morton Shee replied proudly : ' Our school is recog- 
 nised as the first in the world.' " 3 
 
 n. Sir Robert Peel and the Free Trade Movement, 1842-4.6 
 
 It is needless to say that Treitschke caricatures the views 
 of Richard Cobden and the Free Trade school. But his 
 account of the anti-Corn Law movement, and his analysis 
 of the character of Sir Robert Peel, show him at his best. 
 It is curious that Treitschke should date from 1846 the growth 
 of materialism among the English upper classes. A closer 
 acquaintance with the manners of English society in the 
 eighteenth century would have shown him that the unpleas- 
 ing traits which he regards as new were in reality very old ; 
 though neither then nor in 1846 was it fair to represent 
 English society as entirely wanting in ideals. The reader 
 
 1 Bunsen's Reports, July 25, 1842, et seqq. 
 8 Bunsen's Report, May 6, 1842. 
 3 Deutsche Geschichte, v. pp. 133-4.
 
 ON ENGLISH HISTORY 267 
 
 will notice that the decay of duelling is, in Treitschke's eyes, 
 a crowning proof of " the triumph of vulgarity " : 
 
 " From the immediate future the disappointed German 
 protectionist party could on the whole expect very little. 
 The whole tendency of the age was unfavourable to them. 
 The first trading power of the world, which had grown 
 strong under the protection of her customs and navigation 
 laws, was just returning to the path of free trade. England's 
 political economy, as List l said bitterly, had now risen to 
 such a height that she could boldly break away the ladders 
 which had aided her ascent. The doctrine of the greatest 
 happiness of the greatest number, which had first been 
 expounded by the father of English radicalism, Jeremy 
 Bentham, gained an increasing hold over the British nation ; 
 from this doctrine arose the desire for free trade and cheap 
 consumption. The middle classes, who had forced their 
 way into parliament as a result of the Reform Bill, directed 
 their attacks in the first place against the corn duties, because 
 they felt that such power as remained to the old nobility 
 was partly due to the corn laws. The great multitude of the 
 working classes, on the other hand, regarded with suspicion 
 a movement which was political as well as economic ; 
 they trusted the middle classes even less than the land- 
 owners, and they feared that the repeal of the corn laws 
 would bring about a lower rate of wages, which was indeed 
 the secret hope of many opponents of the corn laws. From 
 the year 1839 the Anti-Corn-Law League, founded by 
 Richard Cobden, carried on a campaign among the middle 
 classes by means of meetings, newspapers, pamphlets, by 
 itinerant speakers and mass petitions, by processions and 
 industrial exhibitions, the manufacturers providing the 
 League with abundant pecuniary resources. After six 
 years of tireless agitation, the League had won over the great 
 majority of the middle classes, especially in Manchester and 
 
 1 Friedrich List, best known as the author of Das National System der 
 Politischer Oekonomie (1844).
 
 268 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 the industrial districts of the North- West ; and the demand 
 for free trade resounded far and wide throughout the country. 
 " In the writings of the new Manchester School there 
 came to life once again that old theory of natural rights 
 which had never yet been systematically refuted in England, 
 and the tenets of which, like all lifeless abstractions, could 
 be turned to equally good account by a dull materialism or 
 by an extravagant idealism. Thus it was possible for John 
 Stuart Mill to be enthusiastic at the same time for Wilhelm 
 Humboldt and for English radicalism. 1 Agreeing with the 
 formulas of Humboldt, and yet in the sharpest conceivable 
 contradiction to him, Cobden regarded the State as an 
 insurance society, founded by the free will of individuals, 
 and intended solely to protect commerce and labour from 
 violent disturbances, and to exact the lowest possible 
 premiums from its clients. The accumulation of wealth 
 was for him the sole object of human life ; rapid means of 
 locomotion for commercial travellers and the cheap produc- 
 tion of cotton were the highest aims of civilisation. He 
 declared in perfect seriousness that Stephenson and Watt 
 had been incomparably more important in the history of 
 the world than Caesar or Napoleon. If only now, for the 
 first time, trade and commerce were allowed their natural 
 freedom, then every nation would infallibly devote itself 
 to those branches of industry which it could pursue with 
 the greatest profit ; thus each nation would play into the 
 hands of all the others by an exportation which should 
 always correspond exactly with its importation ; a harmony 
 of interests would be automatically established ; the sinful 
 luxury of a standing army would cease ; swords would be 
 beaten into ploughshares, in fulfilment of the predictions 
 of the old prophets, and eternal peace would dawn upon 
 the world. Cobden had a sincere love for the working 
 classes ; he wished to benefit them by a reduction in the 
 price of bread. He even defended compulsory school- 
 
 1 The reference is to Mill's Essay on Liberty, reviewed by Treitschke in 
 Die Freiheit.
 
 ON ENGLISH HISTORY 269 
 
 attendance, because it was necessary that the intelligence 
 of the factory hands should be tolerably enlightened in order 
 that their labour might produce the greatest material 
 results ; factory-laws, on the contrary, he condemned as an 
 encroachment on the liberty of the individual. 
 
 " Such a gospel of mammon- worship threatened to 
 mutilate the human race ; it threatened to extinguish all 
 the heroism, all the beauty and sublimity, all the idealism 
 of the human soul ; yet this doctrine of voluntarism, of an 
 unrestricted social competition replacing any kind of State 
 compulsion, was characterised by a certain daring self- 
 assurance which was bound to attract men of energy and 
 enterprise. Yet that great intellectual development which 
 marked the age of the Revolution had wholly vanished in 
 this struggle for the freedom of the individual against the 
 control of the State. Even Cobden felt an almost senti- 
 mental enthusiasm for the sober idea of improvement, of 
 material progress ; he looked upon himself as the chosen 
 apostle of the well-being of the nations at large. To be sure 
 his cosmopolitan doctrine, originated by a self-complacent 
 and insular nation, which looked with contempt upon all 
 foreigners, could not be altogether free from certain crafty 
 and unexpressed commercial motives. He himself showed 
 more appreciation than most of his countrymen for foreign 
 peoples ; he admired the Prussians ; even the unity of 
 Germany and of Italy did not appal him. Nevertheless, at 
 the very beginning of his public activity, he said openly : 
 ' Our only goal is the lawful interests of England, without 
 regard to the ambitions of other nations.' His doctrine of 
 a universal free exchange of commodities was based on the 
 tacit assumption that England was to control the wholesale 
 industries of the whole world, and that only the primary 
 industries, and a few others which would be difficult to 
 transplant, should be left to the other nations. Just as 
 Canning and Palmerston had relied on the phrase ' con- 
 stitutional,' so now Cobden relied on the phrase ' free 
 trade ' as a profitable article of export, which should make
 
 270 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 the tour of the globe, and enlist all the nations in the interests 
 of British trade-supremacy. As soon as the shrewd manu- 
 facturers perceived this hidden purpose of the free trade 
 doctrine, the movement strengthened irresistibly, until the 
 leading statesman of the moment, Robert Peel, could no 
 longer restrain it. 
 
 " Although Peel, as the son of a rich cotton-spinner who 
 had risen by his industry and sagacity, himself belonged 
 to the middle classes, he did not in the least share Cobden's 
 view of life. Like his father, to whom the working classes 
 always remained grateful for countless proofs of practical 
 humanity, he always stood high above the class-selfishness 
 of the manufacturers. He grew up in the convictions of 
 the Tory party, of the High Church, of the old-fashioned 
 solid classical education, and he saw in Pitt the ideal states- 
 man ; this calm, deliberate, cautious man seemed a born 
 conservative. Yet fate assigned to him the role of a 
 reformer. The rapidly changing times forced him again 
 and again to examine carefully the views of his party ; and 
 as soon as he saw that they were no longer adapted to the 
 welfare of the country, he stood up constantly, with high 
 moral courage, for what he had recognised as a new truth, 
 regardless of the disapproval of his old friends, regardless 
 of that narrow party-convention known as ' ethics of party.' 
 Rarely has a statesman changed his opinion so often on 
 great political questions, without ever being untrue to 
 himself. Even as a young man, Peel ventured in Parliament 
 to contradict his own father, the authority by whom he had 
 always been guided, and to support the resumption of 
 cash -payments by the Bank of England. Then, like 
 Wellington, he recognised the necessity for the emancipation 
 of the Catholics, hitherto contested by all the Tories ; and 
 he defended this reform, which opened the way for all the 
 democratic innovations of the next decade. The Reform 
 Bill, however, he opposed obstinately to the very end ; but, 
 when the decision came that the middle classes were to be 
 admitted into the House of Commons, he could no longer
 
 ON ENGLISH HISTORY 271 
 
 disguise from himself that the centre of gravity of the old 
 aristocratic edifice of the State had been shifted. Now, as 
 a minister, he resolved to yield to the irresistible agitation for 
 free trade, and thus to continue the policy of the Reform 
 Bill. 
 
 " The majority of his Tory friends disowned him. In 
 league with his old opponents, the Whigs and the Radicals, 
 he went on his way, amid the cheers and plaudits of the 
 middle classes, a statesman who did not rule his age by 
 force of original and creative ideas, but rather conscientiously 
 learnt the lesson of his age, and as an orator, if not brilliant, 
 was at least powerful by his honesty and frankness and his 
 courage in accepting the inevitable. The proud lords of 
 the old Tory nobility cursed the cotton-spinner who, in 
 spite of his princely wealth, had always remained a plebeian, 
 and had infamously betrayed his party; and Benjamin 
 Disraeli, the young Hotspur of the Tories, said, ' Such a 
 conservative government is nothing but a huge imposture.' 
 But already the working classes were beginning to turn 
 their attention to the socialistic theories of Chartism, and 
 they besieged Parliament with gigantic petitions for the 
 extension of the rights of the people. The dull resentment 
 of the masses, and the critical condition of trade in the 
 North- West, compelled the Government to take action. 
 
 " In the year 1842, almost two- thirds of all the customs 
 rates of the old tariff were either cancelled or reduced. 
 Other reductions in the customs rates soon followed. Then 
 in the year 1845 a serious failure of crops brought unspeak- 
 able misery over the island kingdom, and especially over 
 Ireland. It was apparent to every one that Great Britain 
 had become an industrial country. Her native agricultural 
 industry no longer sufficed to feed the enormously increased 
 urban population. After these experiences Peel risked a 
 decisive step. In [May 1846 the corn duties were repealed. 
 The Lords gave their assent, because Wellington, the Iron 
 Duke, warned them that if they did not agree now of their 
 own free will, the Upper House would at a later day be
 
 272 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 either coerced or else abolished. So hopeless already was 
 seen to be any resistance to the rising middle classes. A few 
 weeks later Peel was obliged to resign. His old opponents 
 had helped him to victory ; now his vanquished friends 
 took their revenge. If he dissolved Parliament, he would 
 be sure of securing a large majority, but so he said to 
 Bunsen only with the support of the Radicals, and ' I 
 will not go with the Radicals.' 1 So he retired, a victim 
 of party-spirit ; and for a long time the middle classes 
 continued to extol him as the most popular of all the British 
 statesmen. He knew that, in the same spirit that had 
 animated his noble father, he had secured a great benefit 
 for the working classes, but that he had in addition 
 strengthened the commercial power of his country ; for an 
 uncompromising national self-assertion was as sacred to him 
 as to all his countrymen. For the purposes of a commercial 
 policy he did not disdain to resort to the trivial artifice of 
 empty deception ; he said once to the Prussian ambassador : 
 ' It is essential for you to come to an understanding with 
 us over the customs question, for otherwise it might easily 
 happen that a Franco -American naval alliance would 
 threaten the economic and political independence of the 
 Continent.' 
 
 " His inheritance was taken over by the Whigs, who 
 were from this time frequently obliged to join forces with 
 the Radicals, although their own leaders, almost without 
 exception, belonged to the proudest and most distinguished 
 families of the aristocracy. Lord Palmerston, who was 
 again installed in the Foreign Office, was able now to pursue 
 with redoubled energy his old policy of secretly disturbing 
 the peace of the world ; he taught the bears on the Continent 
 to dance now to the tune of Liberalism, now to the tune 
 of Free Trade. The victors revelled in a boundless self- 
 adulation. Cobden cried, in the intoxication of his delight, 
 ' Free trade is the international law of the Almighty ; not 
 only England but the whole world is now and for all time 
 
 1 Bunsen's Report, July 10, 1846.
 
 ON ENGLISH HISTORY 273 
 
 concerned in the struggle of the Corn League.' His disciples 
 compared the year 1846 with the Revolution of 1688. And 
 of course the repeal of the Corn Laws had a profound influ- 
 ence on all social relations ; it democratised society, as the 
 Reform Bill had already democratised the State. 
 
 " Though Cobden had always assured the landowners 
 that they would not suffer by the repeal, this attempt at 
 conciliation was at once proved to be either an error or 
 else an intentional deception. Agricultural rents sank 
 considerably ; and as the English nobility always knew 
 how to adapt themselves to the times, they realised very 
 soon that the only way in which they could possibly maintain 
 their authority over the middle classes was by the powerful 
 aid of the middle classes themselves. Since landed property 
 was no longer sufficiently remunerative, they began to 
 concern themselves in railways, banks, and industrial 
 enterprises of every description. It was not long before 
 the son of the Duke of Argyll, without causing any scandal, 
 was carrying on a profitable trade in wine. Old notions of 
 honour and old class prejudices vanished before the omni- 
 potence of money, whereas the German nobility were still 
 poor, but still chivalrous. A commercial spirit pervaded 
 the whole life of the nation. That last indispensable 
 bulwark against the brutalisation of society the duel 
 went out of fashion, and soon disappeared completely ; 
 the riding-whip supplanted the sword and the pistol ; and 
 this triumph of vulgarity was celebrated as a triumph of 
 enlightenment. The newspapers, in their accounts of 
 aristocratic weddings, recorded in exact detail how much 
 each wedding-guest had contributed in the form of presents 
 or in cash ; even the youth of the nation turned their sport 
 into a business, and contended for valuable prizes, whereas 
 the German students wrought havoc on their countenances 
 for^the sake of a real or imaginary honour. The gulf between 
 German and British manners widened more and more. 
 Such traces as remained of the puritans of Shakespeare's 
 merry old England were completely submerged in the prose 
 
 T
 
 274 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 of commercial life. Therefore the attitude adopted by 
 the island kingdom towards the other States of the world 
 was more than ever determined by the calculations of a 
 commercial policy." 1 
 
 12. Great Britain and the Schleswig-Holstein Question, 1846 
 
 In 1846 Christian VIII. of Denmark issued an ordinance 
 or " Open Letter " declaring that the Danish State (including 
 the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein) was indivisible, and 
 that it could pass by inheritance to females. This decree 
 was resented by the German population in the duchies who 
 had hoped that, by the extinction of the male line of the 
 Danish dynasty, Schleswig and Holstein would be separated 
 from Denmark, and that they would then be ruled by a 
 German prince. Treitschke suggests that Great Britain 
 opposed the wishes of the majority of the population in the 
 duchies, and did so in order to keep Kiel out of the hands 
 of Prussia : 
 
 " The Great Powers thought quite otherwise. They all 
 adhered to the inflexible dogma that the integrity of the 
 Danish monarchy was necessary for the maintenance of the 
 balance of power in Europe. Innocent folk might well 
 ask in astonishment why the balance of power in Europe 
 would be shaken, if the little State on the Sound and the 
 Belt were reduced from two and a half to one and a half 
 millions ? Any one who looked deeper, however, could 
 not fail to recognise that there were serious grounds for the 
 view of the larger courts ; it was rooted not only in the 
 peacefulness of the time, but also in the general anxiety 
 occasioned by the rise of Germany. No one doubted that 
 the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, having broken away 
 from Denmark, would attach themselves firmly to Germany ; 
 that they would summon Prussian troops to protect them, 
 and that they might even concede to the Prussian fleet, the 
 
 1 Deutsche Geschichte, v. pp. 475-480,
 
 ON ENGLISH HISTORY 275 
 
 first ship of which had just been launched, the finest harbour 
 on the Baltic. A German naval port at Kiel ! This thought 
 alone was sufficient to rouse indignation in every English 
 heart. Moved by their hatred of Germany, Denmark's 
 hereditary enemies, the British, now appeared as friendly 
 patrons of the court at Copenhagen. Immediately after 
 the appearance of the ' Open Letter,' the Times then 
 still the powerful organ of national opinion wrote : ' The 
 Prussian statesmen cannot be acquitted of the reproach of 
 having actively supported a feverish agitation, an agitation 
 detrimental to the peace of a neighbouring country, because 
 it occurred to them that it would provide an agreeable 
 amusement for the German nation, and also, possibly, 
 because they wished to distract the attention of the German 
 nation from other questions far more practical and far 
 nearer home.' Then Germany was warned against that 
 greed of territory which had already proved dangerous in the 
 New World, and which would be fatal in the heart of Europe. 
 With such hypocrisy as this, a nation, which had year after 
 year been appropriating to itself new colonies, dared to 
 abuse the Germans, because they humbly wished to preserve 
 the heritage of their fathers ! The Government still held 
 back : it desired first of all merely that the integrity of the 
 Danish State should be preserved, no matter under which 
 dynasty ; for it regarded this State, strangely enough, as a 
 bulwark against Russia ! " l 
 
 13. The Foreign Policy of Lord Palmerston, 184.7-4.8 
 
 In the following passages Treitschke apparently attributes 
 to Palmerston more craft than that distinguished statesman 
 ever showed. Lord Minto's mission to Italy " to found in 
 Italy a Whig party, a sort of Brooks' Club at Florence," was 
 as well intentioned as it was resultless. It was probably the 
 idea of Palmerston's chief, Lord John Russell, the most 
 
 1 Deutsche Geschichte, v. pp. 580-1.
 
 276 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 amiable of Whig doctrinaires. In the Swiss question the 
 feud between the Protestant cantons and the Catholic 
 Sonderbund Palmerston's chief anxiety was to prevent 
 either France or Austria from intervening by force of arms ; 
 he defended the neutrality of Switzerland against the 
 designs of Guizot and Metternich. The Spanish marriage 
 question, which is mentioned in our second extract, had 
 arisen in 1846 ; it was a dispute between England and 
 France over the marriages of Queen Isabella and her sister. 
 In all these transactions the worst that can be said of 
 Palmerston is that he systematically watched and foiled 
 the diplomacy of Metternich and of Guizot. 
 
 (a) " So Palmerston was able to come forward boastfully 
 as the generous protector of Italy. Also he was applied 
 to for advice by the helpless Pius, and the great Catholic 
 pulpit orator of London, Bishop Wiseman, through whom 
 the appeal was transmitted, hinted that the Pope could 
 not wholly trust either the Vienna or the Paris court. Lord 
 Palmerston immediately sent his eccentric Radical friend, 
 Charles Minto, as ambassador to Turin, and then with 
 secret instructions to Rome, where Great Britain dared 
 not, in view of her ancient laws, allow herself to be officially 
 represented ; and he said scornfully to Bunsen : ' That will 
 not please Metternich, but an English fleet in the Adriatic 
 will please him even less.' * Minto's suite comprised a whole 
 crowd of young men out of office, who with astounding 
 insolence proclaimed on all sides at the courts the approaching 
 revolution. Nothing lay further from the minds of these 
 distinguished demagogues than an honest sympathy with 
 Italy's misfortune ; they merely wished to thwart Palmer- 
 ston's enemies, Metternich and Guizot, and to foster that 
 dissension on the Continent, which was so advantageous 
 to England's commercial policy. Bunsen, to be sure, for 
 whom no English cunning was too flagrant, allowed himself 
 to be deceived once more, and wrote enthusiastically : ' The 
 fight in the cause of the constitutions is becoming " a question 
 
 1 Bunsen's Report September 28, 1847.
 
 ON ENGLISH HISTORY 277 
 
 of political religion, in which England fills the office of High 
 Priest." ' * Palmerston as a High Priest ! this amusing 
 notion could certainly have only originated in the brain of 
 the Prussian ambassador, filled as it was with enthusiasm 
 for his foreign brothers ; and Canitz refused to believe that 
 in a nation, which hitherto had boasted of its sound practical 
 intelligence, ' political fanaticism should have been estab- 
 lished as a permanent institution.' z His king, however, 
 declared, when he became acquainted with the intolerable 
 squabbling of the diplomats of the western powers : ' The 
 English ambassadors at Piedmont and Greece seem to me, 
 with all due deference, to be ripe for the madhouse over- 
 ripe.' 3 Metternich had good reason to complain that 
 Lord Firebrand was resuming the old ' Aeolus policy of 
 Canning ' ; the statesman who protested most vigorously 
 against a policy of intervention is himself intervening 
 everywhere ; he is le plus intervenant de tous. And whatever 
 the English court could do to kindle fresh sparks in this 
 universal firebrand, it did with all its might." 4 
 
 (b) " What a splendid opportunity for Palmerston to 
 take at last his revenge for the Spanish marriages ! He only 
 needed the diplomatic verdict (which would in any case 
 involve a considerable delay owing to the great distance 
 which separated the five courts), to be able to hold out a 
 little longer, until the Sonderbund was demolished by the 
 weapon of the twelve majority. As early as September, 
 his faithful Lord Minto, on his journey to Turin, had con- 
 ferred with Ochsenbein and had learnt with delight that 
 the leaders of the Radical insurgents had resolved to make 
 a prompt attack. 5 The Prussian ambassador, too, judged 
 the situation rightly ; he wrote home in his report : ' Every 
 day of delay is hastening the collapse of the Sonderbund.' 
 When at length the Duke de Broglie presented Guizot's 
 
 1 Bunsen to Canitz, April 16, 1847. 
 
 2 Canitz to Bunsen, September 25, 1847. 
 
 3 King Frederick William to Bunsen, October 8, 1847. 
 
 4 Deutsche Geschichte, v. pp. 721-2. 
 
 6 Bunsen's Report, September 28, 1847.
 
 278 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 draft memorandum, Palmerston was for the moment 
 scarcely able to contain his malicious joy, and in a scornful 
 note he replied that he admired the wording of the document, 
 that he saw very well that it was a question of a second 
 edition of the Cracow affair, 1 and that he could never lend 
 his hand to assist in making Switzerland another Poland. 
 Thereupon general indignation at the great courts ; King 
 Frederick William wrote to Bunsen : ' This witticism of 
 your Whig friend smacks of over-addiction to oysters and 
 champagne. It is the child of the Guizot-Metternich 
 hatred, that is to say, of the vilest apparition on the diplo- 
 matic horizon since the July days.' 2 Meantime Palmerston 
 artfully made an appearance of giving way, and declared 
 himself prepared to discuss a general memorandum. Thence 
 another delay of several days, during which the English 
 ambassador in Switzerland, the young son of Robert Peel 
 and a personal friend of Ochsenbein, contrived that General 
 Dufour 3 should be privately urged to open the attack as 
 quickly as possible. Again there was high indignation at the 
 great courts when this new breach of faith was made public. 
 Frederick William refused to believe that this ' rascally 
 young Peel " could be the son of the man who had the soul 
 of a duke and the heart of a commoner. 4 But had Austria 
 and France behaved any more honourably when they 
 supported the Sonderbund with money and arms ? Once 
 again was revealed the utter falseness of the old system of 
 advisory congresses. The European States were bound to 
 one another by too many and diverse interests ; the high 
 court of justice of the Five Powers could never deal quite 
 impartially with any serious matter of dispute. 5 . . . How 
 absurd appeared now, after the issue had long been decided, 
 
 1 The free city of Cracow had been annexed by Austria in November 
 1846. 
 
 * Count Arnim's Report, November 22 ; King Frederick William to 
 Bunsen, December 8, 1847. 
 
 8 The General of the Protestant cantons. 
 
 * King Frederick William to Bunsen, December 4, 1847, 
 5 Deutsche Geschichte, v. pp. 730-31.
 
 ON ENGLISH HISTORY 279 
 
 the mediatory note (V ' ermittlungsnote) which the Great 
 Powers at length agreed to transmit, on December 7. 
 Palmerston had attained his purpose, and now indulged in 
 one more of his malicious jokes. The great Elchi of Pera, 
 Lord Stratford Canning, had in the meantime appeared in 
 Switzerland as plenipotentiary extraordinary, and exerted 
 himself, with English modesty, on the one hand, to coax 
 the ambassadors of the Great Powers into a better humour, 
 and, on the other hand, to warn the Diet against the propa- 
 ganda of European Radicalism. He had received secret 
 instructions not to present the mediatory note (V ermittlungs- 
 note}, which had been countersigned by Palmerston, in case 
 the Sonderbund had in the meantime been overthrown. 
 Thus England stood aloof ; and Palmerston was filled with 
 delight when the four other Powers alone were apprised, in 
 a curt note of refusal from the Diet, that any mediation 
 was superfluous, as the two parties of the Confederation 
 no longer existed. This snub to the Great Powers was 
 everywhere received by the Liberals with loud derision ; 
 their party feeling had reached such a pitch that the over- 
 throw of the Sonderbund seemed to them like a defeat of 
 the old European order. Thiers said in the Chamber that 
 the conduct of Guizot was a counter-revolution in itself. 
 The Diet received congratulatory addresses from France, 
 from South Germany, and from Saxony ; even Jacoby, with 
 his Konigsbergers, solemnly expressed his thanks to the 
 Swiss ; and Freiligrath sang : 
 
 Im Hochland fiel der erste Schuss, 
 Im Hochland wieder die Pfaffen, 
 Da kam, die fallen wird und muss, 
 Ja die Lawine kam in Schuss, 
 Drei Lander in den Waffen ! 
 Die Freiheit dort, die Freiheit hier, 
 Die Freiheit jetzt und fur und fur, 
 Die Freiheit rings auf Erden ! 
 
 " The Swiss negotiations brought down scorn and
 
 280 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 mockery on all the Continental Powers, and to the King 
 of Prussia they brought in addition a severe personal and 
 political mortification. Frederick William was too proud 
 and too honourable to take part in the secret despatch of 
 arms and money. But only the more earnestly did he 
 desire the open intervention of the whole of Europe on 
 behalf of the threatened Federal right of the Confederation. 
 Swiss Radicalism, which at bottom was very little attracted 
 towards the projects of the cosmopolitan propaganda, 
 seemed to him like a disastrous hotbed of European anarchy. 
 As early as the summer of 1846 he wrote to London : ' It 
 is absolutely necessary that Prussia, for the sake of Neuchatel, 
 should preserve the canton's sovereignty intact, in accordance 
 with existing agreements.' When, therefore, the double- 
 tongued polic^ of England was revealed, he cried out bitterly 
 that Great Britain had abandoned Prussia, her best and 
 most powerful ally ; and Canitz complained : ' The guiding 
 principle of the British Cabinet is partly a passionate hatred 
 against Guizot and Metternich, partly a deep-seated interest 
 in every struggle against the existing order, under the 
 pretext of progress ; its firm is bankrupt of legitimacy.' 
 Wonderful how this ingenious king slapped his own face. 
 In Vienna and Frankfort he honourably represented the 
 reform of the German Bund, and in Switzerland he fought 
 passionately against political ideas which after all were 
 directed towards the same end. How often had his father 
 valiantly resisted every attempt at interference by the 
 western Powers in German Federal politics ; although the 
 chief article in the constitution of the German Confederation 
 also figured in the Act of the Vienna Congress. Now 
 his son was desiring that the Great Powers should join 
 together to fight for the unrestricted sovereignty of Uri, 
 Schwyz, and Unterwalden ! Even General Gerlach, who 
 already considered the Germano-maniac plans of Federal 
 reform of his royal master much too bold, could not repress 
 the obvious question : ' With what show of reason can we 
 keep the western Powers from interfering in German Federal
 
 ON ENGLISH HISTORY 281 
 
 reform, if we ourselves summon them to intervene in the 
 affairs of the Swiss Confederation ? ' " l 
 
 14. Great Britain and Turkey, 1876-77 
 
 The following extracts are taken from two essays which 
 relate primarily to the Eastern Question. The two first 
 occur in>an essay on "Turkey and the Great Powers," 
 which is dated June 20, 1876 a few weeks after the 
 Bulgarian atrocities, and while it was still uncertain 
 what steps would be taken by Europe to end the Turkish 
 scandal. Russia was anxious to embark single-handed 
 on the reform or the destruction of the Ottoman Empire ; 
 Great Britain, under the guidance of Disraeli, desired to 
 reform the Ottoman government through a conference of 
 the great Powers. The other essay is entitled " The 
 European Situation at the End of 1877." It is dated 
 December 10, 1877 about a month before Russia was 
 unwillingly compelled, by threats of British intervention, 
 to conclude the armistice which ended the Russo-Turkish 
 War and saved Constantinople from her grasp. Treitschke 
 makes England's conduct in 1876 and 1877 the text for a 
 general attack upon her diplomacy. It is interesting to 
 notice that Treitschke was in favour of destroying the 
 Turkish power altogether : 
 
 (a) " To compare present-day England with eighteenth- 
 century Holland is to go too far ; in the vast machinery of 
 its social life the nation still shows a mighty energy ; and 
 it may very well happen that, if England believes that the 
 vital interests of her trade have been injured, she may once 
 again astonish the world by some act of resolute daring. 
 But certainly the intellectual horizon of her statesmen is 
 quite as narrow, and her view of life is quite as antiquated 
 in its narrow-mindedness and quite as obdurately conserva- 
 tive, as was once the policy of the declining Netherlands. 
 
 1 Deutsche Geschichte, v. pp. 732-4.
 
 282 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 Over-rich and over-satiated, vulnerable at a hundred points 
 of their widely scattered dominions, the British feel that 
 they have nothing more in the wide world to wish for, and 
 that, to the young and developing forces of the century, 
 they need still only oppose the mighty weapon of a 
 vanquished age. Therefore they obstinately resist any 
 changes in the international system, no matter how bene- 
 ficial these might be. England is at the present day the 
 unblushing representative of barbarism hi international 
 law. It is England who is to blame if naval warfare, to the 
 shame of humanity, still bears the character of privileged 
 robbery. It was England who, at the Brussels Conference, 1 
 opposed and frustrated the attempt of Germany and Russia 
 to set some limits to the devastation of land warfare. Apart 
 from the feeble and utterly unprofitable sympathy which 
 the English press professed for the unity of Italy, the British 
 nation has, during the last two decades, shown towards 
 every rising nation confident in its own future, nothing 
 but a malicious hostility. England was terribly distressed 
 at the wickedness of the North American slave-dealers ; 
 she was the shrieking but (God be thanked !) cowardly 
 advocate of an alien Danish rule in Schleswig-Holstein ; 
 she venerated the Federal Diet and the Guelph dynasty ; 
 she allowed the French to attack united Germany, though 
 she could have prevented it, and she prolonged the war by 
 her trade in arms. When Monsieur de Lesseps conceived 
 the brilliant idea of the Suez Canal, 2 which the ruler of 
 India ought to have welcomed with open arms, Great 
 Britain buried her head in the sand like the ostrich, in order 
 that she might not see this blissful, but at the moment 
 inconvenient, necessity ; the great work was sneered and 
 scoffed at until it was completed, and then England at- 
 tempted to exploit for her own advantage an innovation 
 which had been accomplished against her will. And, after 
 all these accumulated proofs of the incapacity and the 
 
 1 In 1865. 
 
 2 He obtained his first concession in 1854 ; the canal was opened in 1869.
 
 ON ENGLISH HISTORY 283 
 
 narrow prejudices of British statesmanship, can we Germans 
 be expected to admire this State as the great-hearted 
 defender of international freedom and of the European 
 Balance of Power ? Only too audible are the echoes of those 
 high-sounding words, with which England is pleased to 
 cloak her Eastern policy ; that old alarmist cry : ' It is the 
 Ganges that we are defending on the Bosporus.' And why 
 should we break England's head on behalf of the Indian 
 Imperial Crown ? " 1 
 
 (&) " But England cannot wait. A policy which, like that 
 of Metternich, merely strives to preserve existing conditions 
 because they exist, lives from hand to mouth ; it needs from 
 time to time some noisy and theatrical demonstration, in 
 order to prove to the world that it still lives, and is prepared 
 to protect Europe from the imaginary dangers that beset 
 her. Four notions in particular seem to animate this paltry 
 statesmanship. In their blissful seclusion, the inhabitants of 
 this rich island have preserved an antiquated notion of a 
 European Balance of Power, and they torment their brains 
 with horrid visions which, since the Revolutions in 
 Italy and Germany, have lost any justification. They 
 are terribly alarmed for their Mediterranean bases, and 
 fail to see that England's incomparable mercantile marine 
 is bound to give her the upper hand in the Mediterranean, 
 even if these positions were restored to their natural 
 owners an eventuality immeasurably far from realisa- 
 tion at present. Great Britain desires at any price to 
 preserve the existence of the Ottoman Empire, because the 
 ridiculous commercial policy of the Turks has opened a 
 vast hunting-ground to the English trader. To be sure, 
 it only requires a little foresight to perceive that, if tolerable 
 political conditions were established in the Balkan Penisula, 
 the commerce of these countries would necessarily be stimu- 
 lated, and the greatest trading nation in the world would 
 therefore reap an advantage ; but these monopolists have 
 at all times preferred a small sale with a large margin of 
 
 1 Deutsche Kdmpfe, ii. pp. 361-3.
 
 284 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 profit to modest profits from a larger sale. Rejoicing in the 
 momentary advantage, they continue to swear by the words 
 of Palmerston : ' I will not enter into discussion with any 
 statesman who does not recognise the existence of Turkey 
 as a European necessity ' ; and they forget that this same 
 Palmerston said in his last years : ' We will not a second 
 time draw the sword on behalf of a corpse.' Just as once, 
 when it deemed the acquisition of the Ionian Isles to be 
 expedient, this commercial policy delivered over the unfor- 
 tunate town of Parga 1 to the savage cruelty of Ali Pasha, 
 now at the present day it is providing the Turks with money 
 and weapons for the massacre of the Christians of Bosnia. 
 Finally and most important of all, England is trembling for 
 her Indian possessions ; the new imperial crown and the 
 utterly disastrous visit of the Prince of Wales 2 show how 
 heavily this anxiety weighs upon her. 
 
 "It is feared in London that Russia might control the 
 Suez Canal from Stamboul ; and therefore, by overtures to 
 the Caliph, Great Britain has tried to keep the Mussulmans 
 of Hindustan in a good humour and to guard them from 
 Muscovite cunning. Any one who regards the victorious 
 progress of the Russians through Central Asia, not with the 
 pessimism of a Vambery, but with an open mind, will ask 
 indeed what cause England can find for alarm. The idea 
 that Russia may casually put in her pocket the two hundred 
 million souls of the Anglo-Indian Empire is in truth nothing 
 but a bad joke ; and if it finds a few supporters in Europe, 
 it is merely because the vast distances in Asia appear so 
 insignificant on our maps. Rather both States have reason 
 to fear in the East a common enemy the fanaticism of 
 Islam and, by dint of a little good-will on both sides, an 
 
 1 In 1814 the inhabitants of Parga (a Greek town in Epirus) placed 
 themselves under British protection to escape from their impending sub- 
 jection to Ali Pasha of Janina. But in 1817 the British Government 
 handed Parga over to Ali Pasha in recognition of his past services against 
 the French. The inhabitants were offered an asylum in the Ionian 
 Isles. 
 
 a In the winter of 1875-76 ; this visit was the occasion for Queen 
 Victoria's assumption of the title Empress of India.
 
 ON ENGLISH HISTORY 285 
 
 understanding with regard to the demarcation of their 
 respective spheres of supremacy might have been possible 
 fifteen years ago. At the present day it is scarcely possible. 
 It lay with England to invite this understanding ; for her 
 position as an Asiatic Power was far more seriously threatened 
 than were Russia's new possessions. What did a defeat 
 in this barbarous country matter to Russia ? She lost a few 
 hundred miles, and won them back, from the fastnesses of 
 the interior, a few years later. For England, on the other 
 hand, a successful insurrection in India might have terrible 
 consequences. It would not, to be sure, shatter altogther 
 the force of old England the power of the queen of the sea 
 would even then remain very great but it would give that 
 power a severe shock, and would result in a terrible loss 
 for human civilisation, since the provinces of India would 
 be abandoned to a vast civil war. The task of governing 
 hundreds of millions of natives by a few hundred Europeans 
 is immeasurably difficult. All the most important interests 
 of England demanded that she should fearlessly make an 
 attempt to establish good relations with her troublesome 
 neighbour in the North ; but, haunted by the fixed idea of a 
 Russian world-empire, England's statesmen and her people 
 zealously obstructed this understanding. Every fresh con- 
 quest of the Russians was greeted by the English press with 
 hostile bitterness. If England sent an agent to Kashgar, 
 where he certainly had no business to be, that was quite 
 in order ; but if Russia sent an agent to Khiva, where he had 
 equally no right to be, all England cried out at the wicked- 
 ness of the Muscovites. Not merely the irresponsible press, 
 but even influential circles, gave vent to such cries of distress 
 as accorded little with the ancient manliness of the English 
 character. The famous book of General Rawlinson, 1 which 
 could scarcely have appeared without the tacit approval of 
 the highest authorities in India, practises freely the art of 
 
 1 The well-known Assyriologist, Sir Henry Rawlinson, published in 
 1875 a book on England and Russia in the East, which produced a sensation 
 at the time.
 
 286 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 talking of the devil till his imps appear. Thus, by constantly 
 proclaiming to the world that the Russians were to be feared 
 as enemies, Great Britain aggravated the dangers of the 
 situation. England's rule in India is based fundamentally 
 on her moral reputation ; as soon as the natives of India 
 begin to suspect that a formidable enemy of their British 
 rulers is advancing in overwhelming strength towards the 
 Indus, the ties of obedience may very well be relaxed. It 
 was this openly expressed fear of Russia which drove the 
 Court of St. Petersburg to an unfriendly and sometimes 
 perfidious policy. It went unconcernedly on its way, and 
 from time to time consoled the uneasiness of its British neigh- 
 bours with insincere professions of affection. Without 
 indulging unreasonable suspicion, we might at the present 
 day hazard the conjecture that these Asiatic conquests 
 constitute for the Russian Government not merely an end 
 in themselves, but also a means towards the realisation of 
 another purpose : Russia intends to prepare difficulties for 
 the English in India, in case the downfall of the Turkish 
 Empire should be followed by a world-war. 
 
 "Thus English statesmen waver to and fro between 
 old-fashioned prejudices and nervous apprehensions ; their 
 own interests and a feeling of inward elective affinity enable 
 them to pose before the Turks as their only true friends. 
 Their most recent feat the dethronement of the Sultan, 1 
 was a very skilful move, and nothing more ; it only proved 
 that England thoroughly intends to assert her influence on 
 the Bosporus ; for who could seriously give credence to the 
 edifying fairy-tale that the Tsar Alexander wished to break 
 up the League of the Three Emperors, and was only prevented 
 by England's watchfulness from conquering Byzantium. 
 But in vain shall we look for any creative idea in a Tory 
 government. The Tories scarcely trouble to ask whether 
 
 1 Abd-ul-Aziz was murdered, or committed suicide, in June 1876, after 
 he had been deposed, on the ground of incapacity, to make way for the 
 still more incapable Murad V. It is highly improbable that Great Britain 
 inspired this revolution ; and Treitschke was not in a position to know the 
 facts.
 
 ON ENGLISH HISTORY 287 
 
 the existing order is worth preserving or even capable of 
 being preserved ; they feel with shame how greatly England's 
 reputation has declined during the last decade, and they 
 endeavour, by dint of noisy demonstrations, to cry halt to 
 the world's history. Can such a barren policy as this hope 
 to find allies among the great Powers ? " 1 
 
 (c) " The Koran says : ' The Mussulmans alone are men ; 
 despise all other nations : they are impure.' For a State 
 which lives and must live in conformity with such laws as 
 these, there is no longer any room in Europe. The expulsion 
 of the Asiatic peoples from the ground of Western culture 
 is a duty, which, up to the present, one century after another 
 has left unfulfilled ; and even now, so it would seem, the 
 great task will be but half accomplished. Yet even this 
 half -success is a gain for civilisation, and it is all the more to 
 be prized, since it is preparing a well-merited humiliation 
 for the policy of England. The fallacious security of insular 
 life has bred in the English State and people an arrogant 
 disregard for the feelings of foreign nations, such as no 
 continental nation would venture to indulge. The tone of 
 the English press, in discussing foreign affairs, exhibits a 
 sinister similarity to those arrogant utterances which marked 
 the newspapers of the declining republic of the Netherlands 
 at the beginning of the eighteenth century ; in each case the 
 nation attempts to console itself for a loss of power by a 
 morbidly exaggerated self-confidence. It seems altogether 
 to escape the observation of these serenely self-satisfied 
 islanders, that giadually their fundamental contempt for all 
 progress in international law, and the professional bias of 
 the British authorities against all foreign ships, are working 
 upon the public opinion of the whole of Europe, and that by 
 degrees an immense hatred and disdain for England has 
 accumulated on the Continent. Of the sense of justice of 
 the British people one more edifying example has just been 
 afforded in the annexation of the Transvaal Republic, an 
 absolutely flippant proceeding, which had not the excuse 
 
 1 Deutsche Kdmpfe, ii. pp. 396-9.
 
 288 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 of any sort of reasonable motive. Towards the weak John 
 Bull still shows invariably that same disposition which once 
 prompted the bombardment of Copenhagen ; before the 
 strong he humbles himself, and sighs dolefully with his 
 minister, Card well ; x ' The English alliance has little value 
 for other nations, since we have nothing to offer them save 
 our sincere love of peace ! ' 
 
 1 Lord Cardwell was successively Secretary of State for Ireland, the 
 Colonies, and War in the years 1859-74. 
 a Deutsche Kdmpfe, ii. pp. 464-5.
 
 INDEX 
 
 Abd-ul-Aziz, Sultan, 286 and note 
 
 Abdul Kadir, 257 
 
 Aberdeen, Lord, 254, 256, 257, 
 260 
 
 Aden, 256 
 
 Aegidi, Ludwig, 20 
 
 Africa, British claims in, 257 
 
 Aix, 229 
 
 Albert, H.R.H., Prince Consort, 263- 
 265 
 
 Albrecht, C., 146 and note 
 
 Alexander I., Tsar, 236, 237, 286 
 
 Algeria, occupation of, 257 
 
 Ali Pasha, 284 and note 
 
 Alsace-Lorraine, 110-14, 179 
 
 America, 174. See also United 
 States of America 
 
 America, South, 241, 243-5 
 
 Amsterdam, 109 
 
 Anti-Corn-Law League, 267 
 
 Arbitration, Courts of, 179 
 
 Argyll, Duke of, 273 
 
 Aristotle, 5, 90, 120, 125, 127, 130, 
 156, 182-3 
 
 Armed neutrality, 227-8 
 
 Army, the, 43, 153-62 ; English, 
 232-3 ; French, 158-60 ; Ger- 
 man, 100, 104-6, 158, 160-62 
 
 Army Bill of 1814, 106 
 
 Arnim, Count, 259 
 
 Ashley, Lord, 258 
 
 Assaye, victory of, 231 
 
 Austria, war with Prussia (1866), 
 26, 28-31, 164 ; and the move- 
 ment for German unity, 46, 61, 
 65 ; alliance with Prussia, 47 ; 
 and Italy, 75 ; and the North 
 German Confederation, 83 ; 
 nationalism in, 186 ; and the 
 
 Holy Alliance, 236 ; and the 
 Congress of Verona, 243 
 
 Badajoz, 233 
 
 Baden, Grand Duchy of, union 
 with Austria, 28, 30 ; and the 
 North German Confederation, 
 
 85 
 
 Balance of Power, 175 
 
 Balbo, Cesare, 77 
 
 Bavaria, 61, 83, 105, 140, 168 
 
 Belfort, 113 
 
 Belgium, 107, 108, 114, 175-6, 185, 
 229 
 
 Belle Alliance, La, 230, 236 
 
 Benedetti, negotiations with Bis- 
 marck, 169 
 
 Bentham, Jeremy, 15, 120, 267 
 
 Berne, 209 
 
 Bernstorff, 245 
 
 Bismarck, Prince Otto von, 33, 65, 
 72, 82, 99, 105, 115, 149, 190, 
 199, 205 ; Treitschke's opinion 
 of, 25-8, 117, 118, 119, 122, 142, 
 165 ; letter to, 30-32 ; friendship 
 with Motley, 39 ; and the North 
 German Confederation, 82, 83 ; 
 and Benedetti, 169 
 
 Blanc, Louis, 8 
 
 Blittersdorff, Baron von, 58 and note 
 
 Bliicher, Marshal G. L. von, 235, 
 236 note 
 
 Bluntschli, J. K., 122 
 
 Bonapartism, 8, 23, 82, 87-94, 207 
 
 Borries, Count von, 64 and note 
 
 Borromaus League (1586), 211 
 
 Bosnia, massacre of Christians in, 
 284 
 
 Brandenburg, 46, 172 
 
 289 U
 
 290 
 
 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 Brandt, Sebastian, in 
 Brescia, Arnold of, 74 and note 
 Briefe : quoted, i, 5-7, 8, 19-33, II6 
 Brittany, 188 
 Broglie, Duke de, 277 
 Brussels Conference (1865), 282 
 Budget, right of control of, 29, 30, 
 
 100 
 
 Biilow, General, 236 note 
 Billow, H. von, 259, 260, 265 
 Bundesrath. See Federal Council 
 Bundesstaat. See State, Federal 
 Bundesstaat und Einheitsstaat, 23, 
 
 27. 36-47 
 Bunsen, Baron von, 258, 259, 260- 
 
 266, 272, 276, 278 
 Byzantium, 94 
 
 Cabinet Government, 199 
 Cambronne, General, 236 
 Canitz, Baron F. von, 277, 280 
 Canning, George, 246, 247, 253, 254, 
 
 269 ; character and policy, 238- 
 
 243 ; and the Congress of Verona, 
 
 243. 247 
 
 Canning, Lord Stratford, 279 
 Cardwell, Lord, 288 and note 
 Carlsbad Decrees (1819), 46 
 Carlyle, Thomas, 94, 148, 161 
 Carnot, L. N. M., 158 
 Castlereagh, Lord (Earl of London- 
 derry), 234, 239 and note, 253 ; 
 
 and the Vienna Congress, 75 ; at 
 
 the Congress of Chatillon, 229 ; 
 
 and the Holy Alliance, 236 ; 
 
 suicide of, 238 ; at Troppau and 
 
 Laibach, 240 and note 
 Catholic Emancipation Act (1829), 
 
 247-8 
 
 Caulaincourt, 229 
 
 Cavour, 77, 96, 102 ; essay on, 82 
 Charles Albert of Carignan, 76 
 Chatillon sur Seine, Congress of, 
 
 228-30 
 
 China, and the Opium War, 256 
 Christian VIII. of Denmark, 274 
 Church, the, relation to the State, 
 
 122-4, 131-3 ; constitution of, 
 
 181 
 
 Clausewitz, 149, 155 
 Clay, Henry, 244 
 Cobden, Richard, 267-73 
 
 Cologne, 229 
 
 Colonies, 170-72 
 
 Confederation of States. See States, 
 
 confederation of 
 Constitutions, 180-226 
 Copenhagen expedition, 231, 239, 
 
 251 
 
 Corn-duties, 266-73 
 Cracow, 165, 278 and note 
 Criminal law, 132-4 
 Culturstaat, 135, 156 
 Customs Union. See Zollverein 
 
 Dahlmann, F. C., 3, 31, 35, 120, 122, 
 
 146 note, 195, 224, 248 
 Dante, 74 
 Dan ton, 211 
 
 Dardanelles Treaty, 259 and note 
 Democracies, 181-4, 208-15 
 Denmark, 45 ; and Schleswig- 
 
 Holstein, 274-5 
 Deutsche Geschichte im ig Jahr- 
 
 hundert, 8, 117, 227 ; quoted, 
 
 206, 229-81 
 Deutsche Kampfe, quoted (i.), 80- 
 
 86, 107-14 ; (ii.), 34, 281-8 
 Deutsche Ordensland Preussen, Das, 
 
 20 
 
 Disraeli, Benjamin, 271, 281 
 Donhoff, Count, 259 
 Droysen, 35 
 Duelling, 273 
 Dufour, General, 278 
 Duncker, Max, 19 
 
 Edward VII., visit to India as 
 
 Prince of Wales, 284 
 Einheitsstaat. See State, Unitary 
 England, 116, 140, 151, 178, 227-8 ; 
 government and constitution, 94, 
 96-8, 189, 192-203, 246-50 ; and 
 the Franco-German War, 108- 
 109 ; aristocracy of, 196-201 ; 
 rule in India, 169 ; colonies of, 
 171-2 ; and international law, 
 176, 257, 282 ; nationality of, 
 187 ; royal family, 193-4, Z 95" 
 196 ; Civil Service, 198, 199 ; 
 trial by jury, 215-19 ; army, 
 232-3 ; and the Holy Alliance, 
 236-8 ; and the abolition of the 
 slave-trade, 245-6 ; newspaper
 
 INDEX 
 
 291 
 
 press, 250, 257 ; and Africa, 257 ; 
 and the Opium War, 256, 265 ; 
 entente with Prussia (1841), 258- 
 266 ; and the Free Trade move- 
 ment, 266-74 ' an d the Schleswig- 
 Holstein question, 274-5 ; and 
 Turkey (1876-77), 281-8 ; fear 
 of Russia, 284-6 
 
 English character, commercialism 
 of, 273-4 
 
 Ernest, Duke of Saxe-Coburg Gotha, 
 264 
 
 Ernest Augustus, King of Hanover, 
 57 and note, 146 note 
 
 Ewald, 146 note 
 
 Federal Act (June 18, 1815), 45 
 
 Federal Council (Bundesrath), 38, 
 83-6, 105, 202 
 
 Federal State. See State, Federal 
 
 Federalist (periodical), 41 
 
 Ferdinand, King, 245 
 
 Fichte, 142 
 
 Forckenbeck, Herr von, 225 
 
 Foreign policy, 169-70 
 
 Fourth Estate, the, 88, 90-92, 95 
 
 France, 52, 53, 147, 178, 205, 209, 
 212, 213-14, 215 ; under 
 Napoleon III., 87-96 ; army, 
 158-60 ; nationality, 188 ; at 
 the Congress of Verona, 243, 
 245 ; and Algeria, 257. See also 
 Franco-German War 
 
 Francis, Emperor of Austria, 237, 
 
 245 
 
 Franco-German War, the, 107-16 
 Frankfort Parliament, 2, 54 note, 
 
 61-3, 67, 84 
 Frederick the Great, 56, 70, 165, 
 
 169, 206, 208 
 Frederick Augustus II., King of 
 
 Saxony, 2 
 
 Frederick William I., 156 
 Frederick William III., 165 
 Frederick William IV., 26 note, 61, 
 
 62, 65, 70, 167, 266, 277-8, 280; 
 
 and the Protestant bishopric at 
 
 Jerusalem, 258-9 ; and the Holy 
 
 Alliance, 237 
 Free Trade movement (1842-64), 
 
 266-74 
 Frehse, Dr., 26 
 
 Freiheit, Die, 9-18 
 Freiligrath, 279 
 
 Genoa, 73, 77 
 
 Gerlach, Ernst Ludwig von, 26 and 
 note 
 
 Gerlach, General, 280 
 
 German Emperor, 105 
 
 German Empire, founding of, 82- 
 106 
 
 German literature, influence of, 56 
 
 German princes, 63-5 
 
 Germany, Liberalism in, 10, 61-2 ; 
 movement for unity of (1848-66), 
 28-9, 35-81 ; army, 100, 104- 
 106, 158, 160-62 ; in the Franco- 
 German War, 107-16 ; national 
 characteristics of, 129, 186, 188, 
 194 ; nobility, 139-41 ; need of 
 colonies, 170-72 ; government 
 and constitution, 189, 198-203 ; 
 Civil Service, 200, 203, 220 ; 
 local government, 223-6 ; and 
 Schleswig-Holstein, 274-5 
 
 Gervinus, 126, 146 note, 206 
 
 Gioberti, 75 
 
 Gneist, 94, 120, 246 
 
 Goethe, 5, 138, 153 
 
 Gortschakoff, 175 
 
 Gottingen, Seven Professors of, 146 
 
 Great Britain. See England 
 
 Greeks, the, 186, 241-2 
 
 Grimm, W., 146 note 
 
 Guelderland, 39 
 
 Guizot, 276-80 
 
 Haarlem, 38 
 
 Hague, The, 38 
 
 Halkett, Colonel, 236 
 
 Hamilton, Alexander, 41 
 
 Hanover, 31, 61, 64, 71, 80, 81 
 
 Hanseatic Cities, 59 
 
 Hapsburg, House of, 13 
 
 Hardenberg, 230 
 
 Hausser, Ludwig, 82 
 
 Heeren, 50 and note, 53 
 
 Hegel, 64, 131, 134, 248 
 
 Herder, 120, 125 
 
 Hesse, 31, 70, 80, 81, 85 
 
 Historische und politische Aufsdtze, 
 
 quoted (ii.) 20, 47-60, 63-9, 71-8 ; 
 
 (iii.) 1 1-8, 89-91, 93-103
 
 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 Hobbes, Thomas, 134 
 
 Hoche, 159 
 
 Hohenzollern, House of, 79, 196 
 
 Holland, 38-40, 114, 175, 185 
 
 Holstein, 45, 82 
 
 Holtzendorff, 133 
 
 Holy Alliance (1815), 236-8 
 
 Huguenots, the, 172 
 
 Humboldt, Wilhelm von, 15, 17, 18, 
 
 69, 268 
 Huskisson, 246 and note 
 
 Ihering, 134 ; Geist des romischen 
 
 Rechts, 7 
 India, 169, 284-6 
 International Law, 114-16, 162-4, 
 
 173-9. 257, 282 
 
 Ionian Isles, 241 and note, 284 
 Italy, 49, 73-9, 91, 275-7 
 
 Jacob, 146 note 
 
 Jacoby, 279 
 
 Jerusalem, Protestant bishopric at, 
 
 258-9 
 
 Junkers, 23-6, 57, 59, 139, 141 
 Justices of the Peace, 198, 220 
 
 Kant, 2, 35, 120, 128 
 
 Kashgar, 285 
 
 Keudell, Robert von, 26 and note 
 
 Khiva, 285 
 
 Kiel, 274-5 
 
 Kleinstaaterei, 48, 52 
 
 Klopstock, 56 
 
 Laibach, 240 and note, 243 
 
 Leopold I. of Belgium, 264 
 
 Lesseps, F. de, 282 
 
 Liberalism, 9, 10, 12-17 
 
 Liberty, 182-3 ; (Die Freiheit) 9-18 
 
 Liberum veto, 36-40 
 
 Lincoln, Abraham, 43 
 
 Liverpool, Lord, 238 
 
 Local government, 17, 94-7, 101- 
 
 102, 150, 219-26 
 Lombard League, 74 and note 
 London Benevolent Society, 109 
 Londonderry, Earl of. See Castle- 
 
 reagh 
 
 Lorraine. See Alsace-Lorraine 
 Louis XIV., 208 
 
 Louis Napoleon, 212 
 
 Louis Philippe, 96, 255 and note 
 
 Macaulay, 192, 266 
 Machiavelli, 5, 6, 74, 78-80, 119, 164 
 Maltzan, Count, 259, 265 
 Manchester School, the, 108, 119, 
 
 151, 221, 268 
 Manin, 76 and note 
 Marienburg, 20 
 Maurienne, Counts of, 76 
 Medici, the, 74 
 Mehemet Ali, 255 
 Metternich, 46, 75, 237, 238, 241-3, 
 
 259, 276-8, 280, 283 
 Metz, 113 
 
 Mill, John Stuart, 9, 15, 16, 120, 268 
 Milosch, Prince, 256 
 Minto, Lord Charles, 275-8 
 Mohl, Robert von, 67 and note, 191 
 Monarchy, 191-2, 195-6, 203-8 
 Monroe, President, 244 
 Montesquieu, 68, 180 
 Motley, 39 
 
 Miiller, Johannes, 50 and note 
 Murad V., 286 note 
 
 Naples, 256 
 
 Napoleon I., 75 and note, 159-60, 
 
 177, 228 
 
 Napoleon III., 83, 87-93, 95, 166 
 Nationalism, 124-6, 184-9 
 Nature, Law of (Naturrechtslehre), 
 
 125, 164 
 Netherlands, 8, 37-40, 44, 51, 82, 
 
 in, 229 
 
 New York, 41, 42, 211 
 Newman, 259 
 Nicholas, Tsar, 116 
 Niebuhr, 152, 179 
 Nimeguen, treaty of, 175 
 North German Confederation, 82- 
 
 106 
 
 Novara, battle of, 75 and note 
 Nuremberg, 224 
 
 Ochsenbein, 277, 278 
 
 Olmiitz, Conference of, 26 and note, 
 
 65 
 
 Opium War, 256, 265 
 Orange, House of, 40 
 Over beck, 118
 
 INDEX 
 
 293 
 
 Pallavicino-Trivulzio, Marchese di, 
 
 76 and note 
 Palmerston, Lord, 109, 242, 269, 
 
 284 ; character and policy, 250- 
 
 255 ; foreign policy, 255-8, 272, 
 
 275-81 
 
 Pangermanism, 55 
 Papacy, the, 74-5 
 Parga, 284 and note 
 Parliamentarism, 189-203 
 Particularism, 47-51, 54, 72, 77 
 Particularist Liberals, 57 
 Party Government, 96-9, 189-90, 
 
 192-5 
 
 Peel, Sir Robert, 265, 278 ; and 
 Catholic Emancipation, 247 ; and 
 the Free Trade movement, 266-72 
 
 Peninsular War, the, 231-3 
 
 Pepe, Florestan, 71 and note 
 
 Pepe, Guglielmo, 71 and note 
 
 Persigny, 93 
 
 Petersdorff, Allgemeine Deutsche 
 Biographic, quoted, 34 
 
 Pfizer, Paul, 142 
 
 Philadelphia, Congress of, 41 and 
 note, 43 
 
 Philip II. of Spain, 166 
 
 Philips, W. Alison, The Confedera- 
 tion of Europe, quoted, 236 
 
 Phoenicians, the, 171 
 
 Piedmont, kingdom of, 71, 73-8, 
 179, 188 
 
 Pitt, William, 200, 202, 247 
 
 Pius IX., Pope, 276 
 
 Polignac, 237 note 
 
 Politik, Die : origin of, 5, 8, 23, 
 117-19 ; method of, 119-27 ; 
 definition of the State, 127-45 ; 
 the individual and the State, 
 145 - 7 ; war, 148-62 ; inter- 
 national law, treaties, foreign 
 policy, 162-79 ; standards of 
 judgment of constitutions, 180- 
 184 ; the Nostrum of National- 
 ism, 184 - 9 ; Parliamentarism, 
 189 - 203 ; monarchy, 203 - 8 ; 
 Democracy and popular liberties, 
 208-26; quoted: (i.) 119-42,1145- 
 147, 150-72, 182-4, 185-95 ; 
 (ii.) 37-44, 105-6, 143-5, 173-182, 
 184, 191-2, 195, 226 
 
 Popular Liberties, 214-26 
 
 Porte, the, 174 
 
 Portsmouth, 200 
 
 Portugal, 256 
 
 Prague, treaty of (1866), 31 
 
 Prussia, i, 3, 4, 5, 152, 177, 207 ; 
 and Austria, 45, 47 ; necessity 
 for predominance of, in the Con- 
 federation, 8, 20, 23-31, 79-81, 
 83-6, 104-6 ; constitution, 100- 
 102, 200 ; king of, 108 ; nobility 
 of, 139-41 ; municipal statutes, 
 224-5 ; army, 160-61 ; at Water- 
 loo, 235-6 ; at the Congress of 
 Verona, 243 ; entente with Eng- 
 land (1841), 258-66 
 
 Puerto Cabello, 244 
 
 Quiroga, General, 240 note 
 
 Raczynski, Count, 266 
 Rawlinson, Sir Henry : England 
 
 and Prussia in the East, 285 and 
 
 note 
 
 Reform Bill of 1832, 246-50 
 Regensburg Reichstag, 56, 84 
 Reichstag, 83, 100, 202 
 Republics, 190 
 Reuss, Prince of, 63, 105 
 Rhine Confederation (Rheinbund), 
 
 27, 31, 51, 64 
 Rienzi, 74 and note 
 Robespierre, 211 
 Rochau, A. L. von (1810-73), 21, 
 
 119; Grundzuge der Realpolitik, 
 
 6 and note 
 
 Roggenbach, Franz von, 26 and note 
 Rome, 74 
 Roon, 158 
 Roscher, 3, 4, 7 
 Rossi, 75 
 
 Rothes, Richard, 131 
 Russell, Lord John, 275 
 Russia, 164, 178, 186, 242, 243, 281, 
 
 284-6 
 
 Russo-Turkish War, 281 
 Ryswick, Treaty of, 175 
 
 Sardinia, 77 
 Savigny, 120, 125, 174 
 Savoy, House of, 76 
 Saxony, 80-1, 83, 140, 153, 167 ; 
 king of, 61, 105
 
 294 
 
 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 
 
 Schleiermacher, 120 
 
 Schleswig, Duchy of, 45 
 
 Schleswig-Holstein, 26-8, 69, 274-5 
 
 Schmalkald, League of, 259 and 
 note 
 
 Schwarzenberg, Felix, 164 
 
 Self-government. See Local Gov- 
 ernment 
 
 Servia, 256 
 
 Shee, Sir Morton, 266 
 
 Sismondi, 68 
 
 Slave-trade, abolition of, 245-6 
 
 Social Democrats, 137, 217 
 
 Socialism, 117, 119 
 
 Sonderbund, 276-80 
 
 Spain, and the Congress of Verona, 
 243-6 
 
 Spanish marriage question, 276, 277 
 
 Spinoza, 38 
 
 Staatenbund. See States, Confedera- 
 tion of 
 
 State, the, 5-18, 72-4, 79-80, 117-47 ; 
 relation with other States, 148- 
 r 79 I types of constitutions, 180- 
 226 
 
 State, Federal (Bundesstaaf) , 36-7, 
 40-4, 62-78, 83 
 
 State, Unitary (Einheitsstaat) , 37, 
 
 44. 83 
 
 States, Confederation of (Staaten- 
 bund), 36-7, 40-4, 83 
 
 States, small, 47, 55, 58-9, 69, 83, 136 
 
 States of the Church, 73, 77 
 
 Stein, Baron vom, 69, 72, 224-5 
 
 Steinbach, Erwin von, in 
 
 Stockmar, 264 
 
 Stuttgart, Parliament, 62 
 
 Suez Canal, 282, 284 
 
 Switzerland, 37, 42, 43, 51, 62, in, 
 176, 210, 214 ; and the Sonder- 
 bund, 276, 277-81 
 
 Sybel, 35, 36 
 
 Tennyson, Maud, 149 
 Theocracy, 180-1 
 Thiers, 279 
 Thuringia, 83 
 Tilsit, treaty of, 177 
 Times, 109, 250, 275 
 Tocqueville, 94 
 Transvaal Republic, 287 
 Treaties, 162-4, 176-8 
 
 Treitschke, General von, 1-2, 23, 
 
 32-3 
 
 Treitschke, Heinrich von, birth and 
 parentage, 1-2 ; religion, 2, 31-4 ; 
 education, 2-6 ; at Leipzig, 19-20; 
 projected history of the German 
 Confederation, 7-8, 19-22 ; at 
 Munich, 19-20 ; return to Leip- 
 zig, 21 ; professorship at Frei- 
 burg, 22-3 ; and Bismarck, 5- 
 31 ; offer of professorship at 
 Berlin, 28-9 ; article in the 
 Prussian Almanac, 33 ; leaves 
 Freiburg, 31 ; pamphlet on " The 
 Future of the North German 
 Middle States," 31, 80 ; pro- 
 fessorship at Kiel, 82 ; professor- 
 ship at Heidelberg, 82 ; political 
 essays by, 82, 87, 96 ; political 
 ideals, 102-3 ; professorship at 
 Berlin, 117; enters Reichstag, 
 117 ; obligations to earlier 
 writers, 120 ; views on : Alsace- 
 Lorraine, Army, Bonapartism, 
 Colonies, Democracy, England, 
 Machiavelli, Manchester School, 
 Party Government, Universal 
 Suffrage, War, Waterloo, Well- 
 ington, etc., etc. See those titles 
 Works : See Briefe, Bundes- 
 staat und Einheitsstaat, Deutsche 
 Kdmpfe, Deutsche Geschichte im 
 ig. Jahrhundert, Deutsche Ordens- 
 land Preussen, Historische und 
 politische Aufsdtze, Die Freiheit, 
 Politik, Vaterlandische Gedichte 
 Trial by jury, 215-19 
 Troppau, 240 and note, 243 
 Turkey, 116, 241, 281-8 
 
 Ultramontanes, 24, 57, 59 
 
 United States of America, 41-4, 67- 
 
 68, 184, 211-13 
 Universal Suffrage, 117, 119, 143- 
 
 45, 219 
 
 Vallaise, Count, 75 
 
 Vambery, 284 
 
 Vaterlandische Gedichte (1856), 4 
 
 Venice, 73, 74 
 
 Verona, Congress of, 243-6 
 
 Victoria, Queen, 259, 262-3, 284 note
 
 INDEX 
 
 295 
 
 Vienna, Congress of, 45, 46, 75 
 Villafranca, Peace of, 75 and note 
 Vincke, Ludwig, n 
 Visconti, the, 74 and note 
 
 Waitz, 66 
 
 Walpole, Robert, 201 
 
 War, 107, 130, 148-62, 178-9 
 
 Waterloo, 230, 235-6 
 
 Weber, W., 146 note 
 
 Wellesley, Henry Baron Cowley, 
 
 230 and note 
 Wellesley, Richard C., Marquis 
 
 Wellesley, 168, 230 and note 
 
 Wellington, Duke of, 193, 271 ; 
 character of, 230-5 ; at Water- 
 loo, 235-6 ; at the Congress of 
 Verona, 243-4 ; and the slave- 
 trade, 245 ; and Catholic Emanci- 
 pation, 247 
 
 Werther, 259 
 
 Wilberforce, William, 245 
 
 William I., Emperor, 105, 142, 
 158 
 
 Wiseman, Bishop, 276 
 
 Wiirtemberg, 62, 83 
 
 Zollverein, 3, 10, 83, 165, 266 
 
 THE END 
 
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 1972 
 
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