a 
 
 UC-NRLF 
 
SEXTUS EMPIBICUS 
 
 AND 
 
 GREEK SCEPTICISM 
 
 A Dissertation for the Degree of Doctor of 
 Philosophy in the University of Bern 
 
 MARY MILLS PATRICK 
 
 CAMBRIDGE 
 
 DEIGHTON BELL & CO. 
 1899 
 
fr~ 
 
PREFACE 
 
 THE following treatise on Sextus Empiricus and 
 Greek Scepticism has been prepared to supply 
 a need much felt in the English language by 
 students of Greek philosophy. For, while other 
 schools of Greek philosophy have been exhaust- 
 ively and critically discussed by English scholars, 
 there are few sources of information available to 
 the student who wishes to make himself familiar 
 with the teachings of Pyrrhonism. The aim has 
 been, accordingly, to give a concise presentation 
 of Pyrrhonism in relation to its historical develop- 
 ment and the scepticism of the Academy, with 
 critical references to the French and German 
 works existing on the subject. The time and 
 manner of the connection of Sextus Empiricus 
 with the Pyrrhonean School has also been dis- 
 cussed. 
 
 In the study of the works of Sextus, the Greek 
 text of Immanuel Bekker, Berlin, 1842, has been 
 used, with frequent consultation of the text of 
 J. A. Fabricius, 1718, which was taken directly 
 from the existing manuscripts of the works of 
 
vi PREFACE. 
 
 Sextus. Eeferences to Diogenes Laertius and 
 other ancient works have been carefully verified. 
 The principal modern authors consulted are 
 the following: 
 
 Ritter, Oeschichte der Philosophic, 11 Auf., Hamburg, 
 
 183638. 
 Zeller, Philosophic der Gi^iechen, 111 Auf., Leipzig, 
 
 187989. 
 
 Lewes, History of Philosophy, Vol. I., London, 1866. 
 Ueberweg, History of Philosophy, IV. ed., tran.sl 
 
 by Morris, 1871. 
 
 Brochard, Les Sceptiques Grecs, Paris, 1877. 
 Brochard, PyrrJion et le Scepticism Primitive, No. 5, 
 
 Ribot's Revue Phil., Pai i 
 Saisset, Le Scepticism Aentsidfait-Pascal-Kant, Paris, 
 
 1867. 
 Chaignet, Histoire de la Psychologic des Grecs, Paris, 
 
 188790. 
 
 Haas, Leben des Sextus Empiricus, Burghausen, 1882. 
 Natorp, Forschungen zur d'^llckte des Erkenntnis- 
 
 problems bei den Alien, Berlin, 1884. 
 Hirzel, Untersuchungen zu Cicero's philos< / 
 
 Schriften, Leipzig, 188793. 
 Pappenheim, Erlduterung zu des Scxtu* Empiricus 
 
 Pyrrhoneischen Grundzugen, 11 il< MX i-. 1882. 
 Pappenheim, Die Tropen der Qreichiach* filter, 
 
 Berlin, IcSS.V 
 Pappenheim, LebensverhdU'n i*se des Sextus Empw*icus, 
 
 Berlin, 1887. 
 Pappenheim, Der angcblichc Heraclitismus des Skep- 
 
 tikers Ainesidemos, Berlin, 1887. 
 
PREFACE. vii 
 
 Pappenheim, Der Sitz der Schule der Griechischen 
 Skeptiker, Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophic, 
 1, 1. S. 47, 1887. 
 
 Maccoll, The Greek Sceptics from Pyrrho to Sextus, 
 London, 1869. 
 
 My grateful acknowledgments are due to 
 Professor Dr. Ludwig Stein, Professor of Philo- 
 sophy in the University of Bern, for valuable 
 assistance in relation to the plan of the work, 
 advice in respect to the best authorities to be 
 consulted, and for its final revision. 
 
 BERN, November 5, 1897. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PAOB 
 
 THE HISTORICAL RELATIONS OF SEXTUS EMPIRICUS. . . 1 
 His profession. The time when he lived. The place 
 where he taught. The character of his writings. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE POSITION AND AIM OF PYERHONIC SCEPTICISM . . 88 
 Its origin. Its nomenclature. The criterion of Pyr- 
 rhonism. ^rrox'n and arupa^la. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE TROPES OF PYRRHONIC SCEPTICISM 31 
 
 The ten Tropes of ^rox^. The five Tropes of Agrippa. 
 The two Tropes. The eight Tropes against aetiology. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 AENESIDEMUS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF HERACLITUS . . 63 
 
 The statement of the problem. The principal theories on 
 the subject. Critical examination of the subject. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 AN ANALYSIS OF PYRRHONIC SCEPTICISM 81 
 
 Pyrrhonism and Pyrrho. Pyrrhonism and the Academy. 
 The strength and weakness of Pyrrhonism. 
 
CHAPTER I. 
 
 The Historical Relations of Sextus Empiricus. 
 
 Interest has revived in the works of Sextus Empiri- 
 cus in recent times, especially, one may say, since the 
 date of Herbart. There is much in the writings of 
 Sextus that finds a parallel in the methods of modern 
 philosophy. There is a common starting-point in the 
 study of the power and limitations of human thought. 
 There is a common desire to investigate the phenomena 
 of sense-perception, and the genetic relations of man to 
 the lower animals, and a common interest in the theory 
 of human knowledge. 
 
 While, however, some of the pages of Sextus' works 
 would form a possible introduction to certain lines of 
 modern philosophical thought, we cannot carry the 
 analogy farther, for Pyrrhonism as a whole lacked the 
 essential element of all philosophical progress, which is 
 a belief in the possibility of finding and establishing 
 the truth in the subjects investigated. 
 
 Before beginning a critical study of the writings of 
 Sextus Empiricus, and the light which they throw on 
 the development of Greek Scepticism, it is necessary to 
 make ourselves somewhat familiar with the environ- 
 ment in which he lived and wrote. We shall thus be 
 able to comprehend more fully the standpoint from 
 which he regarded philosophical questions. 
 
 Let us accordingly attempt to give some details of 
 his life, including his profession, the time when he lived, 
 
 1 
 
'2 Sextua Empiricus and Oreek Scepticism. 
 
 tin- place of liis birth, tin- country in which he taught, 
 ;in<l ' ral aim and character of 1. .s. Here, 
 
 however, we encount* difficulties, for although 
 
 we possess most of tin- writings of Sextus well pre- 
 . idonce whicli tiny provide on the points 
 mentioned is very slight. He does not give us bio- 
 graphical d tails in regard to himself, nor does he refer 
 to liis contemporaries in a way to afford any exact 
 knowledge of them. His name even furnishes us with 
 a problem impossible of solution. If tiled Je^ro? 6 
 
 by Diogenes Lacrtius 1 : 'HpoSoTov Se Sujrcovce 
 
 CfjiTreiplKOS, OV K(U Tt\ SefCd TO)V 
 
 KOI a\\a tcd\\icTTa' S*!~TOV Sc &nJKOv<T 
 KvBfjvas, epTreipiKos KOI auro?. Although in this passage 
 
 ifl the second huut the 
 
 surname, w- c.-innot uii<lcrstaiul t 1 .ing other 
 
 than tliat Di >--. -!i > c. msidered Sextus a physician of the 
 Empirical Sclioul. ()tli.-r evidence also is not war 
 
 that Sextos bore this surname I-'. '-ius, in his edition 
 
 of the works of Sextus, quotes from the Tabetta de 
 
 >rum of Lambecius the statement that 
 
 US was called Kmpl, 16 of his pO>'. 
 
 in nu.'dicine. 2 
 
 Pseudo-Galen also refers to him as one of the 
 directors of the Empirical School, and calls him Se^ro^ 
 6 e/jLTreipifcos. 3 His name is often found in the manu- 
 scripts written with the surname, as for example at the 
 end of Loyic II. 4 In other places it is found written 
 
 1 Diog. Laert. ix. 12, 116. 
 
 2 Fabricius Testimonia, p. 2. 
 
 3 Pseudo-Galen Isag. 4 ; Fabriciua Testimonia, p. 2. 
 
 4 Bekker J/aM. vin. 481. 
 
Historical Relations of Sextus Empiricus. 3 
 
 without the surname, as Fabricius testifies, where 
 Sextus is mentioned as a Sceptic in connection with 
 Pyrrho. 
 
 The Sceptical School was long closely connected 
 with the Empirical School of medicine, and the later 
 Pyrrhoneans, when they were physicians, as was often 
 the case, belonged for the most part to this school. 
 Menedotus of Nicomedia is the first Sceptic, however, 
 who is formally spoken of as an Empirical physician, 1 
 and his contemporary Theodas of Laodicea was also 
 an Empirical physician. The date of Menedotus and 
 Theodas is difficult to fix, but Brochard and Hass 
 agree that it was about 150 A.D. 2 After the time of 
 these two physicians, who were also each in turn at 
 the head of the Sceptical School, 3 there seems to 
 have been a definite alliance between Pyrrhonism and 
 Empiricism in medicine, and we have every reason to 
 believe that this alliance existed until the time of 
 Sextus. 
 
 The difficulty in regard to the name arises from 
 Sextus' own testimony. In the first book of the Hy- 
 potyposes he takes strong ground against the identity 
 of Pyrrhonism and Empiricism in medicine. Although 
 he introduces his objections with the admission that 
 " some say that they are the same," in recognition of 
 the close union that had existed between them, he goes 
 on to say that " Empiricism is neither Scepticism itself, 
 nor would it suit the Sceptic to take that sect upon 
 himself, 4 for the reason that Empiricism maintains dog- 
 M matically the impossibility of knowledge, but he would 
 
 1 Diog. ix. 12, 115. 3 Diog. ix. 12, 116. 
 
 2 Brochard Op. cit. Livre iv. p. 311. 4 Hyp. I. 236. 
 
4 Sextus Empiricu8 and Greek >m 
 
 prefer io IM-I..II- t. tin- M<-tho.i'. 
 
 only medical scliool worthy of the Sceptic. "For this 
 
 alone of all tin medical sects, does not proceed ra>hly 
 
 it seems to me, in regard to unknown things, and 
 
 not presume to say whether they are comprehensible 
 
 or not, but it is guided by phenomena. 1 It will thus 
 
 hat (In- Methodical School of medicine has a 
 
 in relationship to Scepticism which is closer than 
 
 that of tin- oilier inediral 91 ' 
 
 W. know from th uony of Sextus himself 
 
 that li- wa.- a physician. In one case he uses the first 
 person for himself as a physician, 3 and in another he 
 sp.-aks of Asclepius as "the founder of our science/' 4 
 and all his illustrations >how a bn-adth and variety of 
 medical kno\. iiat only a physician could possess. 
 
 He published a im-dical work which he refers to once 
 as la-Tpiica v7ro/jLvyjfj,aTaf and again as efnreipiKa vTro/jLvq- 
 yLtara. Thrs.- paaBBgei probably refer to the same 
 work, 7 which, unfortunately for the solution of the diffi- 
 cult question that we have in hand, is lost, and nothing 
 is known of its contents. 
 
 In apparent contradiction to his statement in II j- 
 potyposes I., that Scepticism and Empiricism are 
 opposed to each other, in that Empiricism denies the 
 possibility of knowledge, and Scepticism makes no 
 dogmatic statements of any kind, Sextus classes the 
 Sceptics and Empiricists together in another instance, 
 as regarding knowledge as impossible 8 a\\' ol pev <f)ao-iv 
 
 1 Hyp. i. 237. 5 Adv. Math. vn. 202. 
 
 2 Hyp. i. 241. 6 Adv. Math. A. 61. 
 
 3 Hyp. ii. 238. : Zcller Up. cit. in. 43. 
 
 4 Adv. Math. A. 260. 8 ^ rfr . ^aM. vin. 191. 
 
Historical Relations of Sextus Empiricus. 5 
 
 CLVTO, fjirj Kara\a/jL/3dvo-0ai,, &cr7rep ol CLTTO rfjs 
 larpol /cal ol CLTTO 7779 o-/cei|rea)5 (j)i\6do^)OL. In another 
 case, on the contrary, he contrasts the Sceptics sharply 
 with the Empiricists in regard to the aTroSe^?. 1 ol Se 
 ep,7reipiKol avaipovo~iv, ol Se or/ceTrriKol eV eVo%^ Tavrrjv 
 
 Pappenheim thinks that Sextus belonged to the 
 Methodical School, both from his strong expression in 
 favor of that school in Hyp. I. 236, as above, and also 
 because many of his medical opinions, as found in 
 his works, agree with the teachings of the Methodical 
 School, more nearly than with those of the Empiricists. 
 Pappenheim also claims that we find no inconsistency 
 with this view in the passage given where Sextus 
 classes the Sceptics with the Empiricists, but considers 
 that statement an instance of carelessness in expressing 
 himself, on the part of Sextus. 2 
 
 The position of Pappenheim is assailable for the 
 reason that in dealing with any problem regarding an 
 author on the basis of internal evidence, we have no 
 right to consider one of his statements worthy of 
 weight, and another one unworthy, on the supposition 
 that he expressed himself carelessly in the second 
 instance. Rather must we attempt to find his true 
 standpoint by fairly meeting all the difficulties offered 
 in apparently conflicting passages. This has been 
 attempted by Zeller, Brochard, Natorp and others, with 
 the general result that all things considered they think 
 without doubt that Sextus belonged to the Empirical 
 
 1 Adv. Math. vm. 328. 
 
 2 Lebensverhdltnisse des Sex. Em. 36. 
 
6 Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism. 
 
 School. 1 His other references are too strong to allow 
 his fidelity to it to be doubted. He is called one of 
 the leaders of Empiricism by Pseudo-Galen, and his 
 only medical work bore the title ejjLireipiKa vTro^vri^a-ra. 
 The o]inion of the writers above referred to is ih.v 
 
 ge which we hav<- quoted from the HypOtypQUQ 
 does not necessarily mean that Sextus was no* 
 Kmpirieist, hut as he was more of a Sceptic than a 
 physician, he gave preference to those doctrines that 
 were most c<; with Scepticism, and accordingly 
 
 claimed that it was not absolutely necessary th 
 Sceptic phy-ician .should bean Empiricist. Natorp con- 
 siders that the different standpoint from which Sextus 
 judges the Empirical and M il Schools in his 
 
 dif'teient wo) ! Bunted f,,r on the supposition that 
 
 he was an Empiricist, but disagreed with that school 
 on the one point only." Natorp points out that Sextus 
 does not speak more favourably of the medical sUii 
 the Methodical School, but only compares the way in 
 which both schools regarded the question of the possi- 
 bility of knowledge, and thinks that S.-xtus could have 
 been an Empiricist as a physician notwithstanding his 
 condemnation of the attitude of the Empirical School 
 in relation to the theory of knowledge. This difference 
 between the two schools was a small one, and on a 
 subtle and unimportant point; in fact, a difference in 
 philosophical theory, and not in medical pra<" 
 
 While we would agree with the authors above 
 referred to, that Sextus very probably recognized the 
 
 1 Brochard Op. cit. Litre iv. 317 ; Zeller Op. cit. in. 15 ; Natorp Op. 
 cit. p. 155. 
 
 2 Natorp Op. cit. 157. 
 
Historical Relations of Sextus Empiricus. 7 
 
 bond between the Empirical School of medicine and 
 Pyrrhonism, yet to make his possible connection with 
 that school the explanation of his name, gives him 
 more prominence as a physician than is consistent with 
 what we know of his career. The long continued union 
 of Empiricism and Scepticism would naturally support 
 the view that Sextus was, at least during the earlier 
 part of his life, a physician of that school, and yet it 
 may be that he was not named Empiricus for that 
 reason. There is one instance in ancient writiugs where 
 Empiricus is known as a simple proper name. 1 It may 
 have been a proper name in Sextus' case, or there are 
 many other ways in which it could have originated, as 
 those who have studied the origin of names will readily 
 grant, perhaps indeed, from the title of the above-named 
 work, /j,7reipifca vivo JJLVT) para. The chief argument for 
 this view of the case is that there were other leaders of 
 the Sceptical School, for whom we can claim far greater 
 influence as Empiricists than for Sextus, and for whom 
 the surname Empiricus would have been more appro- 
 priate, if it was given in consequence of prominence in 
 the Empirical School. Sextus is known to the world 
 as a Sceptic, and not as a physician. He was classed in 
 later times with Pyrrho, and his philosophical works 
 survived, while his medical writings did not, but are 
 chiefly known from his own mention of them. More- 
 over, the passage which we have quoted from the 
 Hypotyposes is too strong to allow us easily to believe 
 that Sextus remained all his life a member of the 
 Empirical School. He could hardly have said, "Nor 
 
 1 Pappenbeim Leb. Ver. Sex. Em. 6. 
 
8 Sextus Eri>i >m. 
 
 \\MiiId it Miit tin- Sc.-ptic !, it sect upon liitn- 
 
 ine belonged to it. His other 
 
 s to the Empirical School, of a more favorable 
 
 r, can be easily ex on the ground of the 
 
 long coiitinm --I connection which had existed between 
 
 tin- two schools. It i .{ii it.- possible to suppose that 
 
 us was an Empiricist a part of his life, and 
 wards found the Methodical School more to his liking, 
 .in 1 such a change would not in any way have affected 
 his stand as a physician. 
 
 In regard to the exact time when Sextus Empiri 
 I'm .!, we gain very little knowledge from internal 
 dence, and outside sources of information are eq 
 UIK < Ttain. Diogenes Laertius must have been a gene- 
 ration younger than Sextus, as he mention -ciple 
 ot'S. ' 'iriiinus, as an Empii ^i. 1 Tlic 
 tini.' of Diog usually i first half 
 of the third century A.D., 2 therefore Sextus cannot be 
 brought forward later than the beginning of the century. 
 
 is, liowever, directs his writings entirely against the 
 Dogmatics, by whom he distinctly states that he means 
 
 the Stoics,' and the influence of the Stoics began to 
 decline in the beginning of the third century A.D. A 
 fact often used as a help in fixing the date of Sext 
 his mention of Basilidcs the Stoic, 4 d\\a /cal oi OTGH*OI, 
 ax? oi Trepl 7ov Bd(ri\iS7]v. This Basil supposed 
 
 to be identical with one of the teachers of Marcus 
 Aurelius. 5 This is accepted by Zeller in the second 
 edition of his Histwy of Philosophy, but not in the 
 
 1 Diog. ix. 12, 116. 4 Adv. Math. vin. 258. 
 
 Ueberweg Hist, of Phil. p. 21. 5 Fabriciua Vita Sexti. 
 
 s Hyp. i. 65. 
 
Historical Relations of Sextus Empiricus. 9 
 
 third, for the reason that Sextus, in all the work from 
 which this reference is taken, i.e. Math. vn. XL, men- 
 tions no one besides Aenesidemus, who lived later than 
 the middle of the last century B.C. 1 The Basilides- 
 referred to by Sextus may be one mentioned in a list 
 of twenty Stoics, in a fragment of Diogenes Laertius, 
 recently published in Berlin by Val Rose. 2 Too much 
 importance has, however, been given to the relation of 
 the mention of Basilides the Stoic to the question of 
 the date of Sextus. Even if the Basilides referred to 
 by Sextus is granted to have been the teacher of Marcus 
 Aurelius, it only serves to show that Sextus lived either 
 at the same time with Marcus Aurelius or after him, 
 which is a conclusion that we must in any case reach 
 for other reasons. 
 
 The fact that has caused the greatest uncertainty in 
 regard to the date of Sextus is that Claudius Galen in 
 his works mentions several Sceptics who were also 
 physicians of the Empirical School, 3 and often speaks 
 of Herodotus, supposed to be identical with the teacher 
 of Sextus given by Diogenes Laertius, 4 but makes no 
 reference whatever to Sextus. As Galen's time passes 
 the limit of the second century A.D., we must either 
 infer that Sextus was not the well-known physician 
 that he was stated to be by Pseudo-Galen, and con- 
 sequently not known to Galen, or that Galen wrote 
 before Sextus became prominent as a Sceptic. This 
 silence on the part of Galen in regard to Sextus 
 increases the doubt, caused by Sextus 7 own criticism 
 of the Empirical School of medicine, as to his having 
 
 1 Zeller Op. cit. in. 8. 3 Zeller, in. 7. 
 
 2 Brochard Op. cit. iv. 315. 4 Diog. xi. 12, 116. 
 
Jo SeXttu Kinjf'trlcua and Greek Scepticism. 
 
 an KmpiriciM. The <iji' made more com- 
 
 plicated, as it is diflienlt to fix the identity of the 
 Herodotus so often referred to by Galen. 1 As Galen 
 died ;il)niit -joo A.I), at the age of seventy, 2 we should 
 fix tin- date <>i' Bextaa early iii tip; third century, and 
 that of Diogenes perhaps a little Inter than the middle, 
 were it not that early in tin- third century the Stoics 
 
 M to decline in influence, and could hardly have 
 vxcitr.l tin- w.-umth of ai displayed by Se 
 
 We must then suppose that Sextus wrote at the very 
 i o{ tin- second a and either that Galen 
 
 did not know him, or that Galen's books were pub- 
 li>hed before Sextus became prominent either as a 
 physician or as a Sceptic. The fact that he may 
 heen better known as the latter than as the former does 
 iifliciently account for (Jal.-n's >il-nce, as other 
 
 tiofl are i 1 hy him of less importance than 
 
 . nd the latter, even if not as great a phy> 
 den asserts, was certainly both a Sc 
 and a phy>irian, and must have belonged to one of the 
 schools so thorou _ y Galen 
 
 either the Knipiriral i the Methudic-al. Therefore, if 
 Sextua were a contemporary of Galen, he was so far 
 removed i'roin the eircle of Galen's acquaintances 
 hare made DO impression upon him, rith- i Coptic 
 
 01 a physician, a supposition that is very improbable 
 We must then fix the date of Sextus late in the second 
 century, and conclude that the climax of his public 
 Career was ivaehed after Galen had finished those of his 
 writings which are still extant. 
 
 1 Pappenheim Lebetis. Ver. Sex. Em. 30. 
 Zfllcr Urundriss der Get. der Phil. p. 260. 
 
Historical Relations of Sextus Empiricus. 11 
 
 Sextus has a Latin name, but he was a Greek ; we 
 know this from his own statement. 1 We also know that 
 lie must have been a Greek from the beauty and facility 
 of his style, and from his acquaintance with Greek 
 dialects. The place of his birth can only, however, be 
 conjectured, from arguments indirectly derived from his 
 writings. His constant references throughout his works 
 to the minute customs of different nations ought to 
 .give us a clue to the solution of this question, but 
 strange to say they do not give us a decided one. Of 
 these references a large number, however, relate to the 
 customs of Libya, showing a minute knowledge in 
 regard to the political and religious customs of this 
 land that he displays in regard to no other country 
 except Egypt. 2 Fabricius thinks Libya was not his 
 birth place because of a reference which he makes to it 
 in the Hypotyposes 0patc)v Se KOI TairovXwv (Aifivnv 
 e edvos roOro). 3 This conclusion is, however, entirely 
 unfounded, as the explanation of Sextus simply shows 
 that the people whom he was then addressing were not 
 familiar with the nations of Libya. Suidas speaks of 
 two men called Sextus, one from Chseronea and one 
 from Libya, both of whom he calls Sceptics, and to one 
 of whom he attributes Sextus' books. All authorities 
 -agree in asserting that great confusion exists in the 
 works of Suidas ; and Fabricius, Zeller, and Pappenheim 
 place no weight upon this testimony of Suidas. 4 Haas, 
 
 1 Adv. Math. A. 246; Hyp. i. 152; Hyp. in. 211, 214. 
 
 2 Haas Op. cit. p. 10. 
 
 3 Hyp. in. 213. 
 
 4 Pappenheim Lebens. Ver. Sex. Em. 5, 22 ; Zeller Op. cit. in. 39 ; 
 JFabricius Vita de Sextus. 
 
12 Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism. 
 
 however, contends 1 that it is unreasonable to suppose 
 tli;it tliis confusion could go as far as to attribute the 
 writings of Sextus Kmpiricus to Sextus of Chaeronea, 
 and also ni.iki the latt'-r a Sceptic, and he considers it 
 f,n more reasonable to accept the testimony of Suidas, 
 coincides so well with the internal evidence of 
 Se\tu.>' writings in regard to his native land. ! 
 in v< -rtheless evident, from his familiarity with the 
 customs, language, and laws of Athens, Alexandria and 
 Rome, that he must have resided at some time in each 
 of these cities. 
 
 Of all the problems connected with the historical 
 Is of the life of Sextus, the one that is the most 
 difficult <>l' solution, and also the most important for our 
 iit purpose of making a critical study of his teach- 
 ing, is to fix of tin- Sceptical School during the 
 time that he was in charge of it. The Hypotyposes are 
 lectures delivered in public in that period of his life. 
 Where then were they delivered ? "NV that the 
 Sceptical School must have had a long continued exis- 
 tence as a definite philosophical movement, although 
 some have contended otherwise. The fact of its exis- 
 tence as an organized direction of thought, is demon- 
 strated by its formulated teachings, and the list L 
 by Diogenes Laertius of its principal leaders, 2 and 
 by references from the writings of Sextus. In the 
 first book of Hypotyposes he refers to Scepticism as 
 a distinct system of philosophy, /cat Trjv Sidtcpio-iv r^ 
 (T/eev/rea)? CLTTO TMV irapaKei^evayv avrfj <f)i\o(ro(f)ia)v. 3 He 
 speaks also of the older Sceptics, 4 and the later Sceptics. 5 
 
 i Haas Op. cit. p. 6. Diog. XT. 12, 115, 116. s Hyp. i. 5. 
 4 Hyp. I. 36. 5 Hyp. i. 164. 
 
Historical Relations of Sextus Empiricus. 13 
 
 Pyrrho, the founder of the school, taught in Elis, his 
 native village ; but even as early as the time of Timon, 
 his immediate follower, his teachings were somewhat 
 known in Alexandria, where Timon for a while resided. 1 
 The immediate disciples of Timon, as given by Diogenes, 
 were not men known in Greece or mentioned in Greek 
 writings. Then we have the well-known testimony of 
 Aristocles the Peripatetic in regard to Aenesidemus, that 
 he taught Pyrrhonism in Alexandria 2 e^#e? teal irp^v 
 ev 'A\eavSpla TTJ tear' Alyvirrov Aivr)o-iSr]/j,6s TLS ava- 
 p)7rvpelv fip^aro TOV vd\ov TOVTOV. 
 
 This was after the dogmatic tendency of the Academy 
 under Antiochus and his followers had driven Pyrrhon- 
 ism from the partial union with the Academy, which it 
 had experienced after the breaking up of the school under 
 the immediate successors of Timon. Aenesidemus taught 
 about the time of our era in Alexandria, and established 
 the school there anew ; and his followers are spoken of 
 in a way that presupposes their continuing in the same 
 place. There is every reason to think that the connec- 
 tion of Sextus with Alexandria was an intimate one, 
 not only because Alexandria had been for so long a 
 time the seat of Pyrrhonism, but also from internal 
 evidence from his writings and their subsequent his- 
 torical influence; and yet the Hypotyposes could not 
 have been delivered in Alexandria, as he often refers to 
 that place in comparison with the place where he was 
 then speaking. He says, furthermore, that he teaches 
 in the same place where his master taught. 3 
 
 1 Chaignet Op. cit. 45. 
 
 2 Aristocles of Euseb. Praep. Ev. xiv. E. 446. 
 
 3 Hyp. m. 120. 
 
14 Seoctus Empiricua and Greek Scepticism. 
 
 re on evOa 6 v(f>rjyrjrij<; 6 6/10? SieXeyero, evravda eye* vvv 
 SiaXeyofjiai. Therefore the school nn been re- 
 
 moved from Alexandria, in or before tin- time of the 
 xtus, to some otl re The Hypoty- 
 
 poses are from beginning to end a direct attack on the 
 Dogmatics; therefore must have taught ei 
 
 in some city where th itic philosophy was strong, 
 
 or in some rival philosophical cent! Ihipotyposes 
 
 show also that the writer had access to some large 
 library. Al >; an dri a. Rome and Athens are the three 
 plaoefl the most probable for selection for such a 
 purpose. For whatever reason the seat of the school 
 was removed from Alexandria by the master of Sextus, 
 or by himselt, IK. in the place \ had so long been 
 
 united with the Knipirical School of medicine, Athens 
 AvoiiM B6( OMMri suitable city mntinu 
 
 in the land where Pyrrhonism first had its birth. 
 Sextus, however, in one instance, in referring to things 
 invisible because of their outward relations, says in 
 illustration, "as the city of Athens is invisible to us at 
 present." 1 In other p lao he contrasts the Athen- 
 
 ians with the people whom he is addressing, equally 
 with the Alexaiulrians, thus puttm- At liens as well as 
 Alexandria out of the question. 
 
 Of the ditiVivnt writers on Sextus Empiricus, those 
 who have treated this part of the subject most critically 
 are Haas and Pappenheim. We will therefore consider, 
 somewhat at length, the results presented by the.s 
 authors. Haas thinks that the Hypotyposes were 
 delivered in Rome for the following reasons. Sextus" 
 
 1 Hyp. ii. 98. 
 
Historical Relations of Sextus Empiricus. 15 
 
 lectures must have been given in some centre of philo- 
 sophical schools and of learning. He never opposes- 
 Roman relations to those of the place where he is 
 speaking, as he does in regard to Athens and Alexan- 
 dria. He uses the name "Romans" only three times, 1 
 once comparing them to the Rhodians, once to the 
 Persians, and once in general to other nations. 2 In the 
 first two of these references, the expression " among the 
 Romans" in the first part of the antithesis is followed 
 by the expression, "among us," in the. second part, 
 which Haas understands to be synonymous. The third 
 reference is in regard to a Roman law, and the use of 
 the word ' Roman ' does not at all show that Sextus was 
 not then in Rome. The character of the laws referred 
 to by Sextus as Trap' t]^lv shows that they were always 
 Roman laws, and his definition of law 3 is especially a 
 definition of Roman law. This argument might, it 
 would seem, apply to any part of the Roman Empire,, 
 but Haas claims that the whole relation of law to 
 custom as treated of by Sextus, and all his statements 
 of customs forbidden at that time by law, point to 
 Rome as the place of his residence. Further, Haas 
 considers the Herodotus mentioned by Galen 4 as a pro- 
 minent physician in Rome, to have been the predecessor 
 and master of Sextus, in whose place Sextus says that 
 he is teaching. 5 Haas also thinks that Sextus' refuta- 
 tion of the identity of Pyrrhonism with Empiricism 
 evidently refers to a paragraph in Galen's Subfiguraiio 
 
 1 Haas Op. cit. p. 15. 
 
 2 Hyp. i. 149, 152; m. 211. 
 
 3 Hyp. i. 146. 
 
 4 Galen depuls. iv. 11 ; Bd. ym. 751. 5 Hyp. in. 120. 
 
16 Sextus Empiricus a/nd <> ism. 
 
 Empirl<:<i, 1 which would be natural ii' th- 
 
 shortly after Galenas Sub. Em., and in the 
 
 place. Further, Hippolytus, \\li wrote in or near 
 
 Rome very soon after the time of S upan-ntly 
 
 the J/ t '/]>f t 'jp08e8, which would be more natural if 
 
 rote in the same place. According to Haas, every 
 
 thing in internal e and outward testimony, 
 
 points to Rome as having been the city where S 
 
 occupied his p.Mi ion as the head of the Sceptical School. 
 
 Com in. 4 nuw to the position of Pappenheim on this 
 
 subject, we find that he takes very decided ground 
 
 at of the Sceptical School h, jn in 
 
 Rome, even for a short time, in his latest publication 
 
 ling it. 2 This opinion is the xesult of late Bi 
 on the part of Pappenhe-im, for in his work on the 
 Lcbensvcrhaltnisse des Sextus Empiiwus Berlin 1875, 
 he says, "Dass Herodotus in Rom lebte sagt Galen. 
 Vermuthlich auch Sextus." His reasons given in the 
 later article for not connecting the Sceptical School at 
 all with Rome are as follows. He finds no proof of the 
 influence of Scepticism in Rome, as Cicero remarks that 
 Pyrrhonism is extinct, 3 and he also gives weight to the 
 well-known sarcastic saying of Seneca, Qc'ts est qui 
 Iradat praecepta l\/rrhoni# ! 4 While Haas claims 
 that Sextus would naturally seek one of the centres of 
 dogmatism, in order most effectively to combat it, 
 Pappenheim, on the contrary, contends that it would 
 have been foolishness on the part of Sextus to think of 
 
 1 Galen Sub. Em. 123 B 126 D. (Basileae, 1542). 
 
 2 Pappenheim Sitz der Skeptischen Schule. Archiv fiir Getchichte der 
 Phil. 1888. 
 
 3 Cicero De Oral. in. 17, 62. 4 Seneca nat. qu. vn. 32. 
 
Historical Relations of Sextus Empiricus. 17 
 
 starting the Sceptical School in Rome, where Stoicism 
 was the favored philosophy of the Roman Emperors; 
 and when either for the possible reason of strife between 
 the Empirical and Methodical Schools, or for some other 
 cause, the Pyrrhonean School was removed from Alex- 
 andria, Pappenheim claims that all testimony points to 
 the conclusion that it was founded in some city of the 
 East. The name of Sextus is never known in Roman 
 literature, but in the East, on the contrary, literature 
 speaks for centuries of Sextus and Pyrrho. The Hy- 
 poty poses, especially, were well-known in the East, and 
 references to Sextus are found there in philosophical 
 and religious dogmatic writings. The Emperor Julian 
 makes use of the works of Sextus, and he is frequently 
 quoted by the Church Fathers of the Eastern Church. 1 
 Pappenheim accordingly concludes that the seat of 
 Pyrrhonism after the school was removed from Alex- 
 andria, was in some unknown city of the East. 
 
 In estimating the weight of these arguments, we 
 must accept with Pappenheim the close connection of 
 Pyrrhonism with Alexandria, and the subsequent influ- 
 ence which it exerted upon the literature of the East. 
 All historical relations tend to fix the permanent seat 
 of Pyrrhonism, after its separation from the Academy, in 
 Alexandria. There is nothing to point to its removal 
 from Alexandria before the time of Menodotus, who is 
 the teacher of Herodotus, 2 and for many reasons to be 
 considered the real teacher of Sextus. It was Menodo- 
 tus who perfected the Empirical doctrines, and who 
 brought about an official union between Scepticism and 
 
 1 Fabricius de Sexto Empirico Testimonia. 
 
 2 Diog. ix. 12, 116. 
 
1^ Sextus Empiincux and (Ireck Scepticism. 
 
 Kmpiricism, arid who gave Pyrrhonism in -^reat measure, 
 tlie f'dii.t that it enjoyed in Alexandria, and who 
 appears to have been the most powerful influen- 
 the school, from the time of Aenesidemus to that of 
 Sextus. Furthermore, Sextus' familiaiity with Al- 
 drian customs bears the imprint of original knowledge, 
 and he cannot, as Zcller implies, be accepted as simply 
 quoting. One could hardly agree with Zoller, 1 
 the familiarity sliown by Sextus with the customs of 
 both Alexandria and Rome in the Hypotyposes does 
 not necessarily show that he ever lived in either of 
 those places, because a lar^v part of his works are com- 
 pilations from other books; but on the contrary, the 
 careful reader of Sextus' works must find in all of them 
 much evidence <>f per-onal knowledge of Alexandria, 
 Athens and Rom,-. 
 
 A part of Sextus' books also may have been \vri 
 in Alexandria. Tlpbs <f>v(riKovs could have been written 
 in Alexandria- If the<e w. re also lectures. th< 
 taught in Alexandria as well as elsewhere. The history of 
 1 1 ure for the centuries immediately folio w- 
 iiiLT the time of Sextus, showing as it does in so many 
 instances the influence of Pyrrhonism, and a knowledge 
 of the HypotypOB68, furnishes us with an incontestable 
 proof that the school could not have been for a long 
 time removed from the East, and the absence of such 
 knowledge in Roman literature is also a strong argu- 
 ment against its long continuance in that city. It 
 would seem, however, from all the data at command. 
 
 1 Zcller Op. cit. in. p. 39. 
 
 2 Pappenheim Sitz dcr Skeptischen Schule ; Archiv fiir Geschichte der 
 Mil., 1888; Adv. Math. x. 15, 95. 
 
Historical Relations of Sextus Empiricus. 19 
 
 that during the years that the Sceptical School was 
 removed from Alexandria, its head- quarters were 
 in Rome, and that the Pyrrhonean Hypotyposes were 
 delivered in Rome. Let us briefly consider the argu- 
 ments in favour of such a hypothesis. Scepticism was 
 not unknown in Rome. Pappenheim quotes the remark 
 of Cicero that Pyrrhonism was long since dead, and the 
 sarcasm of Seneca, Quis est qui tradat praecepta 
 Pyrrhonis? as an argument against the knowledge 
 of Pyrrhonism in Rome. We must remember, however, 
 that in Cicero's time Aenesidemus had not yet separated 
 himself from the Academy; or if we consider the 
 Lucius Tubero to whom Aenesidemus dedicated his 
 works, as the same Lucius Tubero who was the friend 
 of Cicero in his youth, and accordingly fix the date of 
 Aenesidemus about 50 B.C., 1 even then Aenesidemus' 
 work in Alexandria was too late to have necessarily been 
 known to Cicero, whose remark must have been referred 
 to the old school of Scepticism. Should we grant, how- 
 ever, that the statements of Cicero and Seneca prove 
 that in their time Pyrrhonism was extinct in Rome, 
 they certainly do not show that after their death it 
 could not have again revived, for the Hypotyposes 
 were delivered more than a century after the death of 
 Seneca. There are very few writers in Aenesidemus' 
 own time who showed any influence of his teachings. 2 
 This influence was felt later, as Pyrrhonism became 
 better known. That Pyrrhonism received some atten- 
 tion in Rome before the time of Sextus is nevertheless 
 demonstrated by the teachings of Favorinus there. 
 
 1 Zeller Op. cit. in. 10. 2 Zeller Op. cit. p. 63. 
 
ShnpfoicuB and Gh <$m. 
 
 Altliui. iinus was known as an Academic 
 
 the title oi his principal work was ruv^ (f>i\oao<})oufjLevov<; 
 avT(Z TOW \6ya)v, &v apicfroi ol IIvpp(t)veioi. } Suidas 
 calls Favorinus a great author and learned in all science 
 and philosophy, 1 aud Favorinus made Rome the centre 
 of his teaching and writin-. j 1 '. -d by Zeller 
 
 at MO- !.")<) A.D., therefore Pyrrhonism was known in 
 Rome shortly before the time of Sextus. 
 
 The whole tone of the Hypotyposes, with the 
 constant references to the Stoics as living present 
 opponents, shows thai tin >< ir.-tures must have been 
 delivered in one of the centres of Stoic !ex- 
 
 andria and Athens are out of the question, all testimony 
 points to Rome as having been the seat of the Pyrrho- 
 IH an School, for at least a part of the time that Sextus 
 was at its head. We would then accept the teacher of 
 Sextus, in v ace he says he taught, as the Hero- 
 
 dotus so often referred to by Galen 3 who lived in Rome. 
 <[uent references to Asdepiades, whom he 
 mentions ten different times by name in his \\-orl. 
 speak in favour of Rome in the matter under discussion, 
 as Asdepiades made that city one of the centres of 
 medical culture. On the other hand, the fact that 
 there is no trace of the Hypotyposes in later Roman 
 literature, with the one exception of the works of Hip- 
 polytus, as opposed to the wide-spread knowledge of 
 them shown in the East for centuries, is incontestable 
 historical proof that the Sceptical School could not long 
 have had its seat at Rome. From the two passages 
 given above from Sextus' work against physics, he must 
 
 1 Zellor Op. cit. p. 67. 3 Galen vm. 751. 
 
 2 Brochard Op. cit. 329. 4 Bekker Index. 
 
Historical Relations of Sextus Empiricus. 21 
 
 either have written that book in Alexandria, it would 
 seem, or have quoted those passages from some other 
 work. May we not then conclude, that Sextus was at 
 the head of the school in Home for a short time, where 
 it may have been removed temporarily, on account of 
 the difficulty with the Empiricists, implied in Hyp. I. 
 236-241, or in order to be better able to attack the 
 Stoics, but that he also taught in Alexandria, where the 
 real home of the school was certainly found ? There it 
 probably came to an end about fifty years after the time 
 of Sextus, and from that centre the Sceptical works of 
 Sextus had their wide-spread influence in the East. 
 
 The books of Sextus Empiricus furnish us with the 
 best and fullest presentation of ancient Scepticism 
 which has been preserved to modern times, and give 
 Sextus the position of one of the greatest men of the 
 Sceptical School. His works which are still extant are 
 the Pyrrhonean Hypotyposes in three volumes, and the 
 two works comprising eleven books which have been 
 united in later times under the title of ?rpo9 ^aOri^an- 
 KOVS, one of which is directed against the sciences in 
 general, and the other against the dogmatic philoso- 
 phers. The six books composing the first of these are 
 written respectively against grammarians, rhetoricians, 
 geometricians, arithmeticians, astronomers and music- 
 ians. The five books of the latter consist of two 
 against the logicians, two against physics, and one 
 against systems of morals. If the last short work of 
 the first book directed against the arithmeticians is com- 
 bined with the one preceding against the geometricians, 
 as it well could be, the two works together would be 
 divided into ten different parts; there is evidence to 
 
-- Sextua Empiincua and Greek Scepticism. 
 
 show that in ancient times such a division was in 
 There were two other works of Sextus which are now 
 lost, tin- medical work before referred to, and a book 
 entitled Trepl yfrvxns. The character of the extant 
 works of Sextus is similar, as they are all directed 
 either against science or against the dogmatics, and 
 they all present the negative side of Pyrrhonism. The 
 
 nay of arguments comprising the subject-matter, 
 often repeated in the same and different forms, are 
 vidcntly taken largely from the Sceptical works which 
 Sextus had resource to, and are, in fact, a summing up 
 of all the wisdom of the S School. The style of 
 
 books is fluent, and the Greek reminds one of 
 Plutarch and Thucyd'uh's, and although Scxtus does 
 not claim originality, l, u t j, n -< -nts in all cases the ; 
 inents of the Sceptic, yet the illustrations and the 
 form in which the argument* are presented, often bear 
 the marks of his own thought, and are char 
 
 and there by a wealth of humor that has not been 
 sufficiently noticed in the critical works on Sextus. Of 
 all the anthers who have reviewed Sextus, Brochard is 
 the only one who seems to have understood and appre- 
 ciated his humorous side. 
 
 We shall now proceed to the consideration of the 
 general position and aim of Pyrrhonism. 
 
 1 Diog. ix. 12, lie. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 The Position and Aim of Pyrrhonism. 
 
 The first volume of the Pyrrhonean Hypotyposes 
 gives the most complete statement found in any of the 
 works of Sextus Empiricus of the teachings of Pyrrho- 
 nism and its relation to other schools of philosophy. 
 The chief source of the subject-matter presented is a 
 work of the same name by Aenesidemus, 1 either directly 
 used by Sextus, or ^through the writings of those who 
 followed Aenesidemus. The comprehensive title Hvppdt- 
 veioi vTTOTVTrdcKjeis was very probably used in general to 
 designate courses of lectures given by the leaders of the 
 Sceptical School. 
 
 In the opening chapters of the Hypotyposes Sextus 
 undertakes to define the position and aim of Pyrrho- 
 nism. 2 In introducing his subject he treats briefly of 
 the differences between philosophical schools, dividing 
 them into three classes ; those which claim that they 
 have found the truth, like the schools of Aristotle and 
 Epicurus and the Stoics; those which deny the possibility 
 of finding it, like that of the Academicians ; and those 
 that still seek it, like the Sceptical School. The accu- 
 sation against the Academicians, that they denied the 
 possibility of finding the truth, was one that the Sceptics 
 were very fond of making. We shall discuss the justice 
 of it later, simply remarking here, that to affirm the 
 
 1 Diog. ix. 11, 78. 2 Hyp. i. 3, 4. 
 
h'iit,iricw* tmd Gh 
 
 
 incomprehensibility <>{ the uukn ..as a form of 
 
 expression that, tin- Pyrrhonists them- 
 
 tiinc.^ 1" into, notwithstanding their ca. 
 
 avoidance of dogmatic itatementfc 1 
 
 After defining tin- three kind* ul' philosophy as 
 KiatiCj ill*- Academic ami the Sceptic, Sextu 
 minds his hearers tliat he does not speak dogmatically 
 in anything that he says, but that he intends simply to 
 Sceptical arguments historically, and as 
 th -y appear to him. He characterizes his treatment of 
 'ihject as general rather than critical, including a 
 statt niriit of the character of Scepticism, its idea, its 
 principles, its manner of iva its criterion and 
 
 aim, and a piv.M-ntation of thu Tropes, or aspects of 
 doubt, and the Sceptical formulae and the distinction 
 bet\\. schools of philo- 
 
 sophy. 2 
 
 The result of all the gradual changes which I 
 development of thought had brought about in the out- 
 ward relations of the Sceptical School, was to increase 
 the earnestness of the claim of the Sceptics to be simply 
 followers of Pyrrho, the great founder of the movement. 
 in discussing the names given to the Sceptics, Sex t us 
 precedence very decidedly to the title " Pyrrho- 
 nean," because Pyrrho appears the best representative 
 of Scepticism, aud more prominent than all who before 
 him occupied themselves with it. 3 
 
 It was a question much discussed among philoso- 
 phers in ancient times, whether Pyrrhonism should be 
 considered a philosophical sect or not. Thus we find 
 
 1 Adv. Math. viii. 191. 3 Hyp. i. 5, 6. 3 Eyp. i. 7. 
 
The Position and Aim of Pyrrhonism. 25 
 
 that Hippobotus in his work entitled Trepl aipevewv, 
 written shortly before our era, does not include Pyrrho- 
 nism among the other sects. 1 Diogenes himself, after 
 some hesitation remarking that many do not consider 
 it a sect, finally decides to call it so. 2 
 
 Sextus in discussing this subject calls Scepticism an 
 aycoyrj, or a movement, rather than a a2p<rt?, saying 
 that Scepticism is not a sect, if that word implies a 
 systematic arrangement of dogmas, for the Sceptic has 
 no dogmas. If, however, a sect may mean simply the 
 following of a certain system of reasoning according to 
 what appears to be true, then Scepticism is a sect. 3 
 From a quotation given later on by Sextus from 
 Aenesidemus, we know that the latter used the term 
 dya)<yij* Sextus gives also the other titles, so well known 
 as having been applied to Scepticism, namely, fyrrjTLfcij, 
 <f)KTiici]j and aTroprjriKr]? The Svvajjus 6 of Scepticism 
 is to oppose the things of sense and intellect in every 
 possible way to each other, and through the equal 
 weight of things opposed, or laoaOiveiaj to reach first 
 the state of suspension of judgement, and afterwards 
 ataraxia, or " repose and tranquillity of soul." 7 The pur- 
 pose of Scepticism is then the hope of ataraxia, and its 
 origin was in the troubled state of mind induced by the 
 inequality of things, and uncertainty in regard to the 
 truth. Therefore, says Sextus, men of the greatest 
 talent began the Sceptical system by placing in opposi- 
 tion to every argument an equal one, thus leading to a 
 
 1 Diog. Pro. 19. 5 Hyp. i. 7; Diog. ix. 11, 70. 
 
 2 Diog. Pro. 20. 6 Hyp. i. 8. 
 
 3 Hyp. i. 16, 17. 7 Hyp. i. 10. 
 
 4 Hyp. i. 210. 
 
iW Sextus Kn>i>'ricu8 and Greek Scepticism. 
 
 philosophical system without a do^ma, for tic 
 
 Haims that h- has no dogma. 1 The Scept 
 supposed to state a decided opinion, but only to say 
 what appears to him. Even the Sceptical formulae, 
 such as "Nothing more/' 2 or "I decide nothing/' 3 or 
 ""All is false," include themselves with other things. 
 The only statements that the Sceptic can make, are in 
 regard to his own sensations. He cannot deny that he 
 is warm or cold or hungry. 
 
 ;tas n -plies to the charge that the Sceptics deny 
 phenomena by refuting it. 4 Tli ic does not deny 
 
 phenomena. beo*CI86 they are the only criteria by which 
 he < an regulate his actions. "We call the criterion of 
 the Sceptical Seh<>ol tli ]henomenon, meaning by this 
 name tlie idea of it." 5 Phenoir, the only things 
 
 which the Sceptic does not deny, and he guides his ] 
 by them. They are, however, subjective. Sextus di>- 
 tinctly affirms that sensations are the phenomena,* and 
 that they lie in susceptibility and voluntary feeling, 
 and that they constitute the appearances of obje< 
 We see from this that Sextus makes the only reality to 
 consist in subjective experience, but he does not follow 
 this to its logical conclusion, and doubt the existence of 
 anything outside of mind. He rather takes for granted 
 that there is a something unknown outside, about which 
 the Sceptic can make no assertions. Phenomena are 
 the criteria according to which the Sceptic orders his 
 daily life, as he cannot be entirely inactive, and they 
 
 1 Hyp. i. 12. 5 Hyp. i. 19. 
 
 2 Hyp. i. 14. 6 Hyp. i. 22; Diog. ix. 11, 105. 
 
 * Hyp. i. 14. ' Hyp. i. 22. 
 
 * Hyp. i. 19. 
 
The Position and Aim of Pyrrhonism. 27 
 
 affect life in four different ways. They constitute the 
 guidance of nature, the impulse of feeling; they give 
 rise to the traditions of customs and laws, and make 
 the teaching of the arts important. 1 According to the 
 tradition of laws and customs, piety is a good in daily 
 life, but it is not in itself an abstract good. The Sceptic 
 of Sextus' time also inculcated the teaching of the arts, 
 as indeed must be the case with professing physicians, 
 as most of the leading Sceptics were. Sextus says, 
 "" We are not without energy in the arts which we 
 undertake." 2 This was a positive tendency which no 
 philosophy, however negative, could escape, and the 
 Sceptic tried to avoid inconsistency in this respect, by 
 separating his philosophy from his theory of life. His 
 philosophy controlled his opinions, and his life was 
 governed by phenomena. 
 
 The aim of Pyrrhonism was ataraxia in those things 
 which pertain to opinion, and moderation in the things 
 which life imposes. 3 In other words, we find here the 
 same natural desire of the human being to rise above 
 and beyond the limitations which pain and passion 
 impose, which is expressed in other forms, and under 
 other names, in other schools of philosophy. The 
 method, however, by which ataraxia or peace of mind 
 could be reached, was peculiar to the Sceptic. It is a 
 state of psychological equilibrium, which results from 
 the equality of the weight of different arguments that 
 are opposed to each other, and the consequent impossi- 
 bility of affirming in regard to either one, that it is 
 correct. 4 The discovery of ataraxia was, in the first 
 
 1 Hyp. i. 23. 2 Hyp. i. 24. 3 Hyp. i. 25. 4 Hyp. i. 26. 
 
28 Sextus Empiricua and Greek & ],f'irlfim. 
 
 instance, apparently accidental, for while the So 
 withhold his opinion, unable to decide what things were 
 true, and what things were false, ataraxia fortunately 
 followed. 1 After he had begun to philosophize, with a 
 < to discriminate in regard to ideas, and to separate 
 the true from the false 2 during the time of eVo;^;, or 
 suspension of judgement, ataraxia followed as if by 
 chance, as the shadow follows the body. 3 
 
 The Sceptic in seeking ataraxia in the things of 
 opinion, does not entirely escape from suffering from 
 n-ations. He is not wholly undisturbed, for h is 
 sometimes cold and hungry, and so on. 4 He claims, 
 nevertheless:, that he suffers less than the dogmatist,, 
 who is beset with two kinds of suffering, one from the 
 feelings themselves, and also from the conviction that 
 they are by nature an evil." To the Sceptic nothing is 
 in itself either an evil or a good, and so he thinks that 
 "he escapes from difficult r." 6 For instance, he 
 
 who considers riches a good in themselves, is unhappy 
 in the loss of them, and in possession of thom is in fear 
 of losing them, while the Sceptic, remembering the 
 Sceptical saying " No more," is untroubled in whatever 
 condition he may be found, as the loss of riches is no 
 more an evil than the possession of them is a good. 7 
 For he who considers anything good or bad by nature 
 is always troubled, and when that which seemed good is 
 not present with him, he thinks that he is tortured by 
 that which is by nature bad, and follows after what he 
 
 1 Hyp. i. 26. Hyp. i. 30. 
 
 2 Diog. ix. 11, 107. 5 Hyp. i. 30. 
 
 3 Hyp. i. 29. Hpy. i. 30 ; Diog. ix. 11, 61. 
 
 7 Adv. Math. xi. 146160. 
 
The Position and Aim of Pyrrhonism. 29 
 
 thinks to be good. Having acquired it, however, he is 
 not at rest, for his reason tells him that a sudden change 
 may deprive him of this thing that he considers a good. 1 
 The Sceptic, however, endeavours neither to avoid nor 
 seek anything eagerly. 2 
 
 Ataraxia came to the Sceptic as success in painting 
 the foam on a horse's mouth came to Apelles the painter. 
 After many attempts to do this, and many failures, he 
 gave up in despair, and threw the sponge at the picture 
 that he had used to wipe the colors from the painting 
 with. As soon as it touched 'the picture it produced a 
 representation of the foam. 3 Thus the Sceptics were 
 never able to attain to ataraxia by examining the 
 anomaly between the phenomena and the things of 
 thought, but it came to them of its own accord just 
 when they despaired of finding it. 
 
 The intellectual preparation for producing ataraxia, 
 consists in placing arguments in opposition to each 
 other, both in regard to phenomena, and to things of the 
 intellect. By placing the phenomenal in opposition to 
 the phenomenal, the intellectual to the intellectual, and 
 the phenomenal to the intellectual, and vice versa, the 
 present to the present, past, and future, one will find 
 that no argument exists that is incontrovertible. It is 
 not necessary to accept any statement whatever as true, 
 and consequently a state of eVo^r; may always be main- 
 tained. 4 Although ataraxia concerns things of the 
 opinion, and must be preceded by the intellectual pro- 
 cess described above, it is not itself a function of the 
 intellect, or any subtle kind of reasoning, but seems to 
 
 1 Hyp. i. 27. 2 Hyp. i. 28. 3 Hyp. i. 28, 29. * Hyp. i. 3235. 
 
30 Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism. 
 
 !) rather a unique form of moral perfection, leading to 
 happiness, or is itse If happiness. 
 
 It was the aim of Scepticism to know nothing, and 
 to assert nothing in regard to any subject, but at the 
 same time not to affirm that knowledge on all subjects 
 is impossible, and consequently to have the attitude of 
 still seeking. The standpoint of Pyrrhonism was ma- 
 n nalistic. We find from the teachings of Sextus that 
 he affirmed the non-existence of the soul, 1 or the ego, 
 and denied absolute < tt altogether. 2 The intro- 
 
 ductory statements of Diogenes regarding Pyrrhonism 
 \\ould ai^ree with this standpo 
 
 There is no criterion of truth in Scepticism. We 
 cannot prove that the phenomena represent objects, or 
 find out what the relation of phenomena to objects is. 
 Tin -re is no criterion to tell us which one is true of all 
 the different representations of the same object, and of 
 all tL ties of sensation that arise through the 
 
 many phases of relativity of the conditions which con- 
 trol the character uf the phenomena. 
 
 iy effort to find the truth can deal only with 
 phenomena, and absolute reality can never be known. 
 
 1 .I'lr. Math. \ ,;>. ii. 32. * Adv. Math. xi. 140. 
 
 3 Diog. ix. 11,61. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 The Sceptical Tropes. 
 
 The exposition of the Tropes of Pyrrhonism consti- 
 tutes historically and philosophically the most important 
 part of the writings of Sextus Empiricus. These Tropes 
 represent the sum total of the wisdom of the older 
 Sceptical School, and were held in high respect for 
 centuries, not only by the Pyrrhoneans, but also by many 
 outside the narrow limits of that School. In the first 
 book of the Hypotyposes Sextus gives two classes of 
 Tropes, those of eVo^ and the eight Tropes of Aeneside- 
 mus against Aetiology. 
 
 The Tropes of eVo^ are arranged in groups of ten, 
 five and two, according to the period of the Sceptical 
 School to which they belong ; the first of these groups 
 is historically the most important, or the Ten Tropes of 
 67ro%?;, as these are far more closely connected with the 
 general development of Scepticism, than the later ones. 
 By the name T^OTTO? or Trope, the Sceptic understood a 
 manner of thought, or form of argument, or standpoint 
 of judgement. It was a term common in Greek philo- 
 sophy, used in this sense, from the time of Aristotle. 1 
 The Stoics, however, used the word with a different 
 meaning from that attributed to it by the Sceptics.' 2 
 Stephanus and Fabricius translate it by the Latin word 
 modus, 3 and rpovro? also is often used interchangeably 
 
 1 Pappenheim Erlauterung Pyrrh. Grundzugen, p. 35. 
 
 2 Diog. i. 76 ; Adv. Math. vm. 227. 3 Fabricius, Cap. xiv. 7. 
 
32 Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism. 
 
 with the word \6yos by Sextus, ]) Laertius, ;in<l 
 
 others; sometimes also as synonymous with TOTTO?/ 
 and TUTro? is found in the oldest edition of Sextus. 2 
 Diogenes defines the word as the standpoint, or manner 
 of argument, by which the Sceptics arrived at the 
 condition of doubt, in consequence of the equality of 
 probabilities, ami lie calls the Tropes, the ten Tropes of 
 doubt. 3 All writers on Pyrrhonism after the time of 
 Aenesidenius give the Tropes the principal place in 
 their treatment of the subject. Sextus occupies two 
 thirds of the first book of the Hypotyposes in stating 
 and disciisMni;- tin-in ; and about one fourth of his pre- 
 sentation of Scepticism is devoted to the Tropes by 
 Diogenes. In addition to these two authors, Aristocles 
 the Peripatetic refers to them in his attack on Sceptic- 
 i.Mii. 4 Favorinus wrote a book entitled Pyrrhonean 
 Tropes, and Plutarch one called The Ten (TQTOL) 
 Topes of P/y/'/Ao/' Both of these latter works are lost. 
 All authorities unite in attributing to Aenesidemus 
 the work of systematizing and presenting to the world 
 the ten Tropes of eVo^- He was the first to conceive 
 the project of opposing an organized philosophical 
 system of Pyrrhonism to the dogmatism of his contem- 
 poraries. 6 Moreover, the fact that Diogenes introduces 
 the Tropes into his life of Pyrrho, does not necessarily 
 imply that he considered Pyrrho their author, for 
 
 * Hyp. i. 36. 
 
 2 Fabricius on Hyp. i. 36 ; Cap. xiv. G. 
 
 3 Diog. ix. 11, 79108. 
 
 * Aristocles Etueb. praep. et\ x. 14, 18. 
 
 * Fabricius on Hyp. i. 36. 
 
 6 Compare Saisset Op. tit. p. 78. 
 
The Sceptical Tropes. 33 
 
 Diogenes invariably combines the teachings of the follow- 
 ers of a movement with those of the founders themselves ; 
 he gives these Tropes after speaking of Aenesidemus' 
 work entitled Pyrrhonean Hypotyposes, and appar- 
 ently quotes from this book, in giving at least a part 
 of his presentation of Pyrrhonism, either directly or 
 through the works of others. Nietzsche proposes a 
 correction of the text of Diogenes IX. II., 79, which 
 would make him quote the Tropes from a book by 
 Theodosius, 1 author of a commentary on the works of 
 Theodas. No writer of antiquity claims for the Tropes 
 an older source than the books of Aenesidemus, to 
 whom Aristocles also attributes them. 2 They are not 
 mentioned in Diogenes' life of Timon, the immediate 
 disciple of Pyrrho. Cicero has no knowledge of them, 
 and does not refer to them in his discussion of Scepticism. 
 Aenesidemus was undoubtedly the first to formulate 
 these Tropes, but many things tend to show that they 
 resulted, in reality, from the gradual classification of 
 the results of the teachings of Pyrrho, in the subsequent 
 development of thought from his own time to that of 
 Aenesidemus. The ideas contained in the Tropes were 
 not original with Aenesidemus, but are more closely 
 connected with the thought of earlier times. The 
 decidedly empirical character of the Tropes proves this 
 connection, for the eight Tropes of Aetiology, which 
 were original with Aenesidemus, bear a far stronger 
 dialectic stamp, thus showing a more decided dialectic 
 influence of the Academy than is found in the Tropes 
 Many of the illustrations given of the Tropes 
 
 1 Brochard Op. cit. 254, Note 4. 
 
 2 Aristocles Eus. praep. ev. xiv. 18. 8. 
 
'/"> Empi/ricus "ud Greek Scepticism. 
 
 also, ratify to ;i time of greater antiquity than tliat of 
 A .us. The name Trope was well known in 
 
 ancient thins, and the number ten reminds us of the 
 ten opfH^m-j; principles of Pythagoras, and the ten 
 IGS of Aristotle, the fourth of which was the same 
 
 Tii- eighth Trope. The terminology, however, with 
 very few exceptions, points to a later period than t 
 of Pyrrho. Zeller points out a number of expressions 
 in both Diogenes' and Sextus' exposition of the Tropes, 
 which could not date back farther than the time of 
 Aen> i i nuis. 1 One of the most striking features of 
 tin- \\hole presentation of the Tropes, especially as given 
 by Sextus, is their mosaic character, stamping them not 
 as th \\ork of one person, but as a growth, and also an 
 agglutinous growth, lacking very decidedly the sym- 
 iii -try of thought that the work of one mind would ha 
 shown. 
 
 At the time of the separation of Pyrrhonism from the 
 A'-adriny, no other force was as strong in giving life to 
 the school as the systematic treatment by Aenesidemus 
 of the Ten Tropes of eVo^r?. The reason of this is 
 evident. It was not that the ideas of the Sceptical 
 Trop - wore original with Aenesidemus, but because a 
 > 1 . ti 1 1 n . >r atement of belief is always a far more powerful 
 influence than principles which are vaguely understood 
 and accepted. There is always, however, the danger to 
 the Sceptic, in making a statement even of the prin- 
 ciples of Scepticism, that the psychological result would 
 be a dogmatic tendency of mind, as we shall see later 
 the case, even with Aenesidemus himself. That 
 
 1 Zeller Op. tit. p. I 
 
The Sceptical Tropes. 35 
 
 the Sceptical School could not escape the accusation of 
 dogmatizing, from the Dogmatics, even in stating the 
 grounds of their Scepticism, we know from Diogenes. 1 
 To avoid this dogmatic tendency of the ten Tropes, 
 Sextus makes the frequent assertion that he does not 
 affirm things to be absolutely true, but states them as 
 they appear to him, and that they may be otherwise 
 from what he has said. 2 
 
 Sextus tells us that " Certain Tropes, ten in number, 
 for producing the state of eVo^r; have been handed 
 down from the older Sceptics." 3 He refers to them in 
 another work as the "Tropes of Aenesidemus." 4 There 
 is no evidence that the substance of these Tropes was 
 changed after the time of Aenesidemus, although many 
 of the illustrations given by Sextus must have been of 
 a later date, added during the two centuries that elapsed 
 between the time of Aenesidemus and Sextus. In 
 giving these Tropes Sextus does not claim to offer a 
 systematic methodical classification, and closes his list 
 of them, in their original concise form, with the remark, 
 " We make this order ourselves." 5 The order is given 
 differently by Diogenes, and also by Favorinus. 6 The 
 Trope which Sextus gives as the tenth is the fifth 
 given by Diogenes, the seventh by Sextus is the eighth 
 given by Diogenes, the fifth by Sextus, the seventh 
 by Diogenes, the tenth by Diogenes, the eighth by 
 Sextus. Diogenes says that the one he gives as the 
 ninth Favorinus calls the eighth, and Sextus and 
 Aenesidemus the tenth. This statement does not 
 
 1 Diog. ix. 11, 102. 4 Adv. Math. vn. 345. 
 
 2 Hyp. i. 4, 24. 5 Hyp. i. 38. 
 
 3 Hyp. 1.36. * Diog. ix. 11. 87. 
 
36 Sextiw Empiricus and QreA N //' 
 
 correspond with the list of the Tropes which Sextus 
 gives, proving that Diogenes took some other text 
 that of Sextus as his authority. 1 The difference in the 
 order of the Tropes shows, also, that the order was not 
 considered a matter of gn-at importance. Then 
 marked contrast in the spirit of the two presentations 
 of the Tropes given by Sextus and Diogenes. The 
 former gives them not only as an orator, but as one who 
 feels that he is defending his own cause, and the school 
 of which he is th- against mortal enemies, while 
 
 Diogenes relates them as an historian. 
 
 Pappenht im tries to pro ve 2 that Aenesidem us origin- 
 ally gave only nine Tropes in his Pyrrhonean Hypoty- 
 poses, as Aristocles mentions only nine in referring to 
 the Tropes of Aenesidemus, and that the tenth was 
 added later. Had this been the case, however, the fact 
 would surely have been mentioned either by Diogenes 
 or Sextus, who both refer to the ten Tropes of Aene- 
 sidcinus. 
 
 The Tropes claim to prove that the character of 
 phenomena is so relative and changeable, that certain 
 knowledge cannot be based upon them, and as we have 
 shown, there is no other criterion of knowledge for the 
 So-ptir than phenomena. 3 All of the Tropes, except 
 the tenth, are connected with sense-perception, and re- 
 late to the difference of the results obtained through 
 tin senses under different circumstances. They may 
 be divided into two classes, i.e., those based upon differ- 
 ences of our physical organism, and those based upon 
 
 1 Diog. ix. 11, 87. 
 
 2 Pappenhcim, Die Tropen der Griechen, p. 23. 
 s Hyp. i. 22. 
 
The Sceptical Tropes. 37 
 
 external differences. To the first class belong the first, 
 second, third and fourth ; to the second class, th'e fifth, 
 sixth, seventh and eighth, and also the ninth. The 
 eighth, or that of relation, is applied objectively both 
 by Sextus and Diogenes in their treatment of the Tropes, 
 and is not used for objects of thought alone, but princi- 
 pally to show the relation of outward objects to each 
 other. The tenth is the only one which has a moral 
 significance, and it has also a higher subjective value 
 than the others ; it takes its arguments from an entirely 
 different sphere of thought, and deals with metaphysical 
 and religious contradictions in opinion, and with the 
 question of good and evil. That this Trope is one of 
 the oldest, we know from its distinct mention in connec- 
 tion with the foundation theories of Pyrrho, by Dio- 
 genes. 1 In treating of the subjective reasons for doubt 
 as to the character of external reality, the Sceptics were 
 very near the denial of all outward reality, a point, how- 
 ever, which they never quite reached. 
 
 There is evidently much of Sextus' own thought mixed 
 with the illustrations of the Tropes, but it is impossible 
 to separate the original parts from the material that 
 was the common property of the Sceptical School. 
 Many of these illustrations show, however, perfect famil- 
 iarity with the scientific and medical teachings of the 
 time. Before entering upon his exposition of the Tropes, 
 Sextus gives them in the short concise form in which 
 they must first have existed 2 
 
 (i) Based upon the variety of animals, 
 (ii) Based upon the differences between men. 
 
 1 Diog. ix. 11, 61. 2 Hyp. i. 3638. 
 
38 Sextua Empiricus and Greek Scepticism. 
 
 (iii) Based upon differences in the constitution of 
 the sense organs. 
 
 (iv) Based upon circumstances. 
 (v) Based upon position, distance and place. 
 
 (vi) Based upon mixtures. 
 
 (vii) Based upon the quantities and constitutions 
 of objects. 
 
 (viii) Relation. 
 
 (ix) Based upon frequency or rarity of occurences. 
 (x) Based upon systems, customs and laws, 
 mythical beliefs, and dogmatic opinions. 
 
 Although Sextus is careful not to dogmatise regard- 
 ing the arrangement of the Tropes, yet there is in his 
 clu-silication of them a regular gradation, from the argu- 
 ments based upon differences in animals to those in 
 man, first considering the latter in relation to the phy>i- 
 cal constitution, and then to circumstances outside of 
 us, and finally the treatment of metaphysical and moral 
 differences. 
 
 The First Trope. 1 That the same mental repre- 
 sentations are not found in different animals, may be 
 inferred from their differences in constitution resulting 
 from their different origins, and from the variety in 
 their organs of sense. Sextus takes up the five senses 
 in order, giving illustrations to prove the relative results 
 of the mental representations in all of them, as for 
 example the subjectivity of color 2 and sound. 3 All 
 knowledge of objects through the senses is relative an.l 
 not absolute. Sextus does not, accordingly, confine the 
 impossibility of certain knowledge to the qualities that 
 
 1 Hyp. I. 4061. 2 Hyp. i. 4446. 3 Hyp. i. 50. 
 
The Sceptical Tropes. 39 
 
 Locke regards as secondary, but includes also the prim- 
 ary ones in this statement. 1 The form and shape of 
 objects as they appear to us may be changed by pressure 
 on the eyeball. Furthermore, the character of reflect- 
 
 v ions in mirrors depend entirely on their shape, as the 
 images in concave mirrors are very different from those 
 in convex ones; and so in the same way as the eyes 
 of animals are of different shapes, and supplied with 
 
 y different fluids, the ideas of dogs, fishes, men and grass- 
 hoppers must be very different. 2 
 
 In discussing the mental representations of animals 
 of different grades of intelligence, Sextus shows a very 
 good comprehension of the philogenetic development of 
 the organs of sense, and draws the final conclusion that 
 external objects are regarded differently by animals, 
 according to their difference in constitution. 3 These 
 differences in the ideas which different animals have of 
 the same objects are demonstrated by their different 
 tastes, as the things desired by some are fatal to others. 4 
 The practical illustrations given of this result show a 
 familiarity with natural history, and cognizance of the 
 tastes and habits of many animals, 5 but were probably 
 few of them original with Sextus, unless perhaps in 
 their application ; that this train of reasoning was the 
 common property of the Sceptic School, we know from 
 the fact that Diogenes begins his exposition of the first 
 Trope in a way similar to that of Sextus. 6 His illustra- 
 tions are, however, few and meagre compared with those , 
 of Sextus, and the scientific facts used by both of them 
 
 1 Hyp. i. 47. 4 Hyp. T. 55. 
 
 2 Hyp. i. 49. 6 Hyp. i. 5559. 
 
 3 Hyp. i. 54. 6 Diog. ix. 11, 7980. 
 
40 Sextu8 Empiricus and Greek Scepticism. 
 
 may mostly be found in other authors of anti^' 
 milar way. 1 Tin,- logical result of tin- r 
 to explain the first Trope, is that we cannot com- 
 bhe i<leas of the animals with each other, nor with 
 our .\vn ; nor can we prove that our ideas are more t 
 worthy than those of the animals. 2 As therefore an 
 examination of ideas is impossible, any decided opinion 
 about their trustworthiness is also impossible, and this 
 Trope leads to the suspension of judgment regarding 
 external objects, or to eVo 
 
 After reaching this conclusion, Sextus introduces a 
 long chapter to prove that animals can reason. There 
 is no reference to this in Diogenes, but there is other 
 uony to show that it was a favourite line of argu- 
 ment \\itli the Sceptics. 4 Sextus, however, says that 
 his course of reasoning is different from that of 
 of the Sceptics on the subject, 6 as they usually applied 
 their arguments to all animals, while he selected only 
 on. namely the dog. 6 This chapter is full of sar 
 attacks on the Dogmatics, and contains the special 
 allusion to the Stoics as the greatest opponents of the 
 Sceptics, which has been before referred to. 7 
 
 Sextus claims with a greater freedom of diction than 
 in some apparently less original chapters, and with a 
 wealth of special illustrations, that the dog is superior 
 to man in acuteness of perception, 8 that he has the 
 power of choice, and possesses an art, that of hunting, 9 
 
 1 Pappenheira Erlauterung Pyrr. Grundz&ge Par. 41. 
 
 3 Hyp. i. 69. 6 Hyp. i. 6263. 
 
 3 Hyp. i. 61. ' Hyp. i. 65. 
 
 4 Hyp. i. 238. 8 Hyp. I. 64. 
 
 5 Compare Brochard Op. tit. 256. 9 Hyp. i. 66. 
 
The Sceptical Tropes. 41 
 
 and, also, is not deprived of virtue, 1 as the true nature of 
 virtue is to show justice to all, which the dog does by 
 guarding loyally those who are kind to him, and keep- 
 ing off those who do evil. 2 The reasoning power of this 
 animal is proved by the story taken from Chrysippus, of 
 the dog that came to a meeting of three roads in follow- 
 ing a scent. After seeking the scent in vain in two 
 of the roads, he takes the third road without scenting 
 it, as a result of a quick process of thought, which proves 
 that he shares in the famous dialectic of Chrysippus, 3 
 the five forms of avair^iKToi \6yoi, of which the dog 
 chooses the fifth. Either A or B or (7, not A or B, 
 therefore C. 
 
 The dog and other irrational animals may also 
 possess spoken language, as the only proof that we have 
 to the contrary, is the fact that we cannot understand 
 the sounds that they make. 4 We have an example in 
 this chapter of the humor of Sextus, who after enlarging 
 on the perfect character of the dog, remarks, "For which 
 reason it seems to me some philosophers have honoured 
 themselves with the name of this animal," 5 thus making 
 a sarcastic allusion to the Cynics, especially Antisthenes. 6 
 
 The Second Trope. Passing on to the second Trope, 
 Sextus aims to prove that even if we leave the differen- 
 ces of the mental images of animals out of the discussion, 
 there is not a sufficient unanimity in the mental images 
 of human beings to allow us to base any assertions upon 
 them in regard to the character of external objects. 7 
 
 1 Hyp. i. 67. 5 Hyp. i. 72. 
 
 2 Hyp. i. 67. 6 Diog. vi. 1, 13. 
 
 3 Hyp. i. 69 ; Hyp. n. 156 ; Diog. vn. 1, 79. ? Hyp. i. 79. 
 
 4 Hyp. i. 74. 
 
42 Sextua Empiricus and Greek Scepticism. 
 
 He had previously announced that hu intended to 
 oppose the phenomenal to the intellectual " in any way 
 whatever," 1 so he begins here by referring to the two 
 parts of which man is said to be composed, the soul and 
 the body, and proceeds to diacuaa the differences among 
 men in sense-perception and in opinion. 2 Most of the 
 illustrations given of differences in sense-perception are 
 medical ones; of the more general of these I will note 
 the only two which are also given by Diogenes in his ex- 
 position of this Trope, 3 viz., Demophon, Alexander's table 
 waiter, who shivered in the sun, and Andron the Argive, 
 who was so free from thirst that he travelled through 
 the desert of Libya without seeking a drink. Some 
 have reasoned from the presence of the first of these 
 illustrations in the exposition of the Tropes, that a part 
 of this material at least goes back to the time of Pyrrbo, 
 as Pyrrho from his intimacy with Alexander, when he 
 accompanied him to India, had abundant opportunities 
 to observe the peculiarities of his servant Demophon. 4 
 The illustration of Andron the Argive is taken from 
 Aristotle, according to Diogenes. 5 
 
 Passing on to differences of opinion, we have another 
 example of the sarcastic humor of Sextus, as he rei< 
 the <f>v(Tt,oyva)/Jiovi,K7J croQia? as the authority for believing 
 that the body is a type of the soul. As the bodies of 
 men differ, so the souls also probably differ. The differ- 
 ences of mind among men is not referred to by Diogenes, 
 except in the general statement that they choose 
 
 1 Hyp. i. 8. 2 Hyp. i. 80. 3 Diog. ix. 11, 8081. 
 
 4 Compare Pyrrhon et le Scepticism primitive. Revue phil., Paris 1885, 
 No. 5; Victor Brochard, p. 521. 
 
 5 Diog. ix. 11, 81. 6 Hyp. i. 85. 
 
The Sceptical Tropes. 43 
 
 different professions ; while Sextus elaborates this point, 
 speaking of the great differences in opposing schools of 
 philosophy, and in the objects of choice and avoidance, 
 and sources of pleasure for different men. 1 The poets 
 well understand this marked difference in human 
 desires, as Homer says, 
 
 " One man enjoys this, another enjoys that." 
 Sextus also quotes the beautiful lines of Pindar, 2 
 
 " One delights in getting honours and crowns through stormfooted 
 
 horses, 
 
 Others in passing life in rooms rich in gold, 
 
 Another safe travelling enjoys, in a swift ship, on a wave of the 
 sea." 
 
 The Third Trope. The third Trope limits the argu- 
 ment to the sense-perceptions of one man, a Dogmatic, if 
 preferred, or to one whom the Dogmatics consider wise, 3 
 and states that as the ideas given by the different sense 
 organs differ radically in a way that does not admit of 
 their being compared with each other, they furnish no 
 reliable testimony regarding the nature of objects. 4 
 " Each of the phenomena perceived by us seems to pre- 
 sent itself in many forms, as the apple, smooth, fragrant 
 brown and sweet." The apple was evidently the ordin- 
 ary example given for this Trope, for Diogenes uses the 
 same, but in a much more condensed form, and not with 
 equal understanding of the results to be deduced from 
 it. 5 The consequence of the incompatibility of the men- 
 tal representations produced through the several sense 
 
 1 Hyp. i. 8789. * Hyp. i. 86. 3 Hyp. i. 90. 
 
 4 Hyp. i. 94. 5 Diog. ix. 11, 81. 
 
44 Sextua Empiricua and Greek Scepticism. 
 
 US by the apple, may be the acceptance of either of 
 the three following propositions: (i) That only those 
 quail* t in the apple which we perceive, (ii) 
 
 Th;it more than these exist, (iii) That even those per- 
 ceived d<> not exist. 1 Accordingly, any experience which 
 can give rise to such different views regarding outward 
 objects, cannot be relied upon as a testimony concerning 
 them. 
 
 The non-homogeneous nature of the mental images 
 connected with the different sense organs, as presented 
 by Si-xtus, reminds us of the discussion of the same 
 subject by Berkeley in his 7heoi*y of Vi#< 
 
 Sextus says that a man born with less than the usual 
 number of senses, would form altogether different ideas 
 of the external world than those who have the usual 
 number, and as our ideas of objects depend on our 
 mental images, a greater number of sense organs would 
 give us still different ideas of outward reality. 2 The 
 strong argument of the Stoics against such reasoning as 
 this, was their doctrine of pre-established harmony be- 
 twren nature and the soul, so that when a representation 
 is produced in us of a real object, a KaraXijTmicrj 
 fyavraa-ia? by this representation the soul grasps a real 
 existence. There is a \6yos in us which is of the same 
 kind, o-vyyevos, or in relation to all nature. This argu- 
 ment of pre-established harmony between the faculties 
 of the soul and the objects of nature, is the one that 
 has been used in all ages to combat philosophical teach- 
 ing that denies that we apprehend the external world 
 as it is. It was used against Kant by his opponents, 
 
 1 Hyp. i. 99. - Hyp. i. 9697. 3 Adv. Math. vn. 93. 
 
The Sceptical Tropes. 45 
 
 who thought in this way to refute his teachings. 1 The 
 Sceptics could not, of course, accept a theory of nature 
 that included the soul and the external world in one 
 harmonious whole, but Sextus in his discussion of the 
 third Trope does not refute this argument as fully as he 
 does later in his work against logic. 2 He simply states 
 here that philosophers themselves cannot agree as to 
 what nature is, and furthermore, that a philosopher 
 himself is a part of the discord, and to be judged, rather 
 than being capable of judging, and that no conclusion 
 can be reached by those who are themselves an element 
 of the uncertainty. 3 
 
 The Fourth Trope. This Trope limits the argu- 
 ment to each separate sense, and the effect is considered 
 of the condition of body and mind upon sense-perception 
 in relation to the several sense-organs. 4 The physical 
 states which modify sense-perception are health and 
 illness, sleeping and waking, youth and age, hunger and 
 satiety, drunkenness and sobriety. All of these condi- 
 tions of the body entirely change the character of the 
 mental images, producing different judgments of the 
 color, taste, and temperature of objects, and of the cha- 
 racter of sounds. A man who is asleep is in a different 
 world from one awake, the existence of both worlds 
 being relative to the condition of waking and sleeping. 5 
 
 The subjective states which Sextus mentions here 
 as modifying the character of the mental representations 
 are hating or loving, courage or fear, sorrow or joy, and 
 sanity or insanity. 6 No man is ever twice in exactly 
 
 1 Ueberweg Op. cit. 195. * Hyp. i. 100. 
 
 2 Adv. Math. vii. 354. 5 Hyp. i. 104. 
 
 3 Hyp. i. 9899. Hyp. i. 100. 
 
4f> Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism. 
 
 urn- condition of body or mind, and never abl to 
 v tin- diii ronces of his ideas as a sum total, for 
 those of the present moment only are subject to careful 
 inspection. 1 Furthermore, no one is free from tin/ in- 
 fluence of all conditions of body or mind, so that he can 
 be unbiassed to judge his ideas, and no criterion can be 
 established that can be shown to be true, but on the 
 ((.ntiary, whatever course is pursued on the subject, 
 both the criterion and the proof will be thrown into the 
 circulus in probando, for the truth of each rests on 
 the other. 2 
 
 Diogenes gives in part the same illustrations of this 
 Trope, but in a much more condensed form. The marked 
 characteristic of this train of reasoning is the attempt 
 to prove that abnormal conditions are also natural. In 
 referring at first to the opposing states of body and 
 mind, which so change the character of sense-perception, 
 Sextus classifies them according to the popular usage 
 as Kara <f>vcriv and irapa (frvaiv. This distinction was an 
 important one, even with Aristotle, and was especially 
 developed by the Stoics 3 in a broader sense than 
 referring merely to health and sickness. The Stoics, 
 however, considered only normal conditions as being 
 according to nature. Srxtus, on the contrary, declares 
 that abnormal states are also conditions according to 
 nature, 4 and just as those who are in health are in a 
 state that is natural to those who are in health, so also 
 those not in health are in a state that is natural to 
 those not in health, and in some respects according to 
 nature. Existence, then, and non-existence are not 
 
 * Hyp. i. 112. * Hyp. 1.117. 3 Diog. vn. 1, 86. 4 Hyp. i. 103. 
 
The Sceptical Tropes. 47 
 
 absolute, but relative, and the world of sleep as really 
 exists for those who are asleep as the things that exist 
 in waking exist, although they do not exist in sleep. 1 
 One mental representation, therefore, cannot be judged 
 by another, which is also in a state of relation to exist- 
 ing physical and mental conditions. Diogenes states 
 this principle even more decidedly in his exposition of 
 this Trope. "The insane are not in a condition opposed 
 to nature ; why they more than we ? For we also see 
 the sun as if it were stationary." 2 Furthermore, in 
 different periods of life ideas differ. Children are fond 
 of balls and hoops, while those in their prime prefer 
 other things, and the aged still others. 3 The wisdom 
 contained in this Trope in reference to the relative 
 value of the things most sought after is not original 
 with Sextus, but is found in the more earnest ethical 
 teachings of older writers. Sextus does not, however, 
 draw any moral conclusions from this reasoning, but 
 only uses it as an argument for ITTO^TJ. 
 
 The Fifth Trope. This Trope leaves the discussion 
 of the dependence of the ideas upon the physical nature, 
 and takes up the influence of the environment upon 
 them. It makes the difference in ideas depend upon the 
 position, distance, and place of objects, thus taking 
 apparently their real existence for granted. Things 
 change their form and shape according to the distance 
 from which they are observed, and the position in which 
 they stand. 4 
 
 The same light or tone alters decidedly in different 
 surroundings. Perspective in paintings depends on the 
 
 1 H#p. i. 104. 2 Diog. ix. 11, 82. 3 Hyp. 1. 106. * Hyp. i. 118. 
 
48 Sextus Empimcus and Greek Scepticism. 
 
 angle at which the picture is suspended. 1 With Dio- 
 genes this Trope is the seventh, 2 and his exposition of 
 it is similar, but as usual, shorter. Both Sextus and 
 Diogenes give the illustration 3 of the neck of the dove 
 differing in color in different degrees of inclination, an 
 illustration used by Protagoras also to prove the rela- 
 tivity of perception by the senses. "The black neck 
 of the dove in the shade appears black, but in the light 
 sunny and purple/' 4 Since, then, all phenomena are 
 regarded in a certain place, and from a certain distance, 
 and according to a certain position, each of which rela- 
 tions makes a great difference with the mental images, 
 we shall be obliged also by this Trope to come to the 
 reserving of the opinion. 5 
 
 The Sixth Trope. This Trope leads to eVo^/; re- 
 garding the nature of objects, because no object can 
 ever be presented to the organs of sense directly, but 
 must always be perceived through some medium, or in 
 some mixture. 6 This mixture may be an outward one, 
 connected with the temperature, or the rarity of the 
 air, or the water 7 surrounding an object, or it may be a 
 mixture resulting from the different humors of the 
 sense-organs. 8 A man with the jaundice, for example, 
 sees colors differently from one who is in health. The 
 illustration of the jaundice is a favorite one with the 
 Sceptics. Diogenes uses it several times in his pre- 
 sentation of Scepticism, and it occurs in Sextus' writings 
 
 ^ Hyp. i. 120. - Diog. ix. 11, 85. 
 
 s Hyp. i. 120; Diog. ix. 11, 56. 
 
 4 SchoL zu Arist. 60, 18, ed. Brandis ; Pappen. Er. Pyrr. Grundziige, 
 p. 54. 
 
 6 Hyp. i. 121. * Hyp. i. 124. 7 Hyp. i. 125. 8 Hyp. i. 126. 
 
The Sceptical Tropes. 49 
 
 in all, as an illustration, in eight different places. 1 The 
 condition of the organ of the rjyejAovucov, or the ruling 
 faculty, may also cause mixtures. Pappenheim thinks 
 that we have here Kant's idea of a priori, only on a 
 materialistic foundation. 2 A careful consideration of 
 the passage, however, shows us that Sextus' thought 
 is more in harmony with the discoveries of modern 
 psychiatry than with the philosophy of Kant. If the 
 sentence, I'cro)? Se /cal avrrj (f) Stdvoia) eV^tu^/az; TLVCL 
 IS lav TTOielrai, TT/DO? TO, VTTO rwv alcrOrjo'ecov dva<yye\- 
 \b[jLva? stood alone, without further explanation, it 
 might well refer to a priori laws of thought, but the 
 explanation which follows beginning with " because " 
 makes that impossible. 4 " Because in each of the places 
 where the Dogmatics think that the ruling faculty is, 
 we see present certain humors, which are the cause of 
 mixtures." Sextus does not advance any opinion as to 
 the place of the ruling faculty in the body, which is, 
 according to the Stoics, the principal part of the soul, 
 where ideas, desires, and reasoning originate, 5 but 
 simply refers to the two theories of the Dogmatics, 
 which claim on the one hand that it is in the brain, 
 and on the other that it is in the heart. 6 This subject 
 he deals with more fully in his woik against logic. 7 As, 
 however, he bases his argument, in discussing possible 
 intellectual mixtures in illustration of the sixth Trope, 
 entirely on the condition of the organ of the intellect, it 
 is evident that his theory of the soul was a materialistic 
 one. 
 
 1 See Index to Bekker's edition of Sextus. 
 
 2 Papp. Er. Pyr. Gr. p. 55. 5 Diog. vn. 1, 159. 
 
 3 Hyp. i. 128. 6 Hyp. i. 128. 
 
 4 Hyp. i. 128. 7 Adv. Math. vn. 313. 
 
 4 
 
r>o Sextua Empiricua and Greek Scepticism. 
 
 The Seventh Trope. This Trope, based upon tin- 
 quantities and compositions of objects, is illustrated by 
 examples of different kinds of food, drink, and medicine, 
 showing the different effects according to the quantity 
 taken, as the harmfulness and the usefulness of i 
 things depend on their quantity. Things act differently 
 upon the senses if applied in small or large quant 
 as filings of metal or horn, and separate grains of sand, 
 have a different color and touch from the same taken 
 in the form of a solid. 1 The result is that ideas vary 
 according to the composition of the object, and this 
 Trope also brings to confusion the existence of outward 
 objects, and leads us to reserve our opinion in regard 
 to them. 2 This Trope is illustrated by Diogenes with 
 iig brevity. 3 
 
 The Elyhth Trope. The Trope based upon relation 
 contain- afl Sextus rightly remarks, the substance of 
 the other nine, 4 for the general statement of the rela- 
 tivity of knowledge includes the other statements made. 
 Thr prominence which Sextus gave this Trope in his 
 introduction to the ten Tropes leads one to expect here 
 new illustrations and added 5 arguments for eVo^. We 
 find, however, neither of these, but simply a statement 
 that all things are in relation in one of two ways, either 
 directly, or as being a part of a difference. These two 
 kinds of relation are given by Protagoras, and might 
 have been used to good purpose in the introduction to 
 the Tropes, or at the end, to prove that all the others 
 were really subordinate to the eighth. The reasoning 
 
 1 Hyp. i. 129131. * Hyp. i. 39. 
 
 2 Hyp. i. 134. 5 Hyp. i. 135140. 
 
 3 Diog. ix. 11, 86. 
 
The Sceptical Tropes. 51 
 
 is, however, simply applied to the relation of objects to 
 each other, and nothing is added that is not found else- 
 where as an argument for eVo^. 1 This Trope is the 
 tenth by Diogenes, and he strengthens his reasoning 
 in regard to it, by a statement that Sextus does not 
 directly make, i.e., that everything is in relation to the 
 understanding. 2 
 
 The Ninth Trope. This is based upon the frequency 
 and rarity of events, and refers to some of the phenomena 
 of nature, such as the rising of the sun, and the sea, as 
 no longer a source of astonishment, while a comet or an 
 earthquake are wonders to those not accustomed to 
 them. 3 The value of objects also depends on their 
 rarity, as for example the value of gold. 4 Furthermore, 
 things may be valuable at one time, and at another not 
 so, according to the frequency and rarity of the occur- 
 rence. 5 Therefore this Trope also leads to eVo%^. Dio- 
 genes gives only two illustrations to this Trope, that of 
 the sun and the earthquake. 6 
 
 The Tenth Trope. We have already remarked on 
 the difference in the character of the tenth Trope, deal- 
 ing as it does, not with the ideas of objects, like the 
 other nine Tropes, but with philosophical and religious 
 opinions, and questions of right and wrong. It was the 
 well-known aim of the Sceptics to submit to the laws 
 and customs of the land where they were found, and 
 to conform to certain moral teachings and religious 
 ceremonies; this they .did without either affirming or 
 
 1 Hyp. i. 135140. 4 Hyp. i. 143. 
 
 3 Diog. ix. 11, 88. s Hy pt T . 144. 
 
 p. i. 141142. Diog. ix. 11, 87. 
 
."I' Sextus Empiricu8 and Greek Scepticism. 
 
 denying the truth of the principles upon which these 
 teu< -1 lin^s were based, 1 and also without any passion or 
 strong feeling in regard to them,- as nothing in it 
 can be proved to be good or evil. The tenth Trope, 
 accordingly, brings forward contradictions in customs, 
 laws, and the beliefs of different lands, to show that ih.-y 
 are also changeable and relative, and not of absolute 
 worth. The foundation-thought of this Trope is gi 
 twice by Diogenes, once as we have before stated in his 
 introduction to the life of Pyrrlio, and also as on< 
 the Trope.- it is apparently one of the oldest of 
 
 the Tropes, it would naturally be much used in 
 in- with the Stoics, whose philosophy had such a \v 
 ethical significance, and must also have held an imj> 
 ant place in the &c< -)iii -il School in all metaphysical 
 and philosophical discussions. The definition 5 in the 
 beumnini; of Sextus' exposition of this Trope Fabri< 
 thinks waa taken from Aristotle, of schools, In ins, 
 
 mythical lx li> t> and dogmatic opinions, 6 and the defini- 
 tion which Diogenes gives of law in his life of Plat< 
 similar. Pappenheim, however, thinks they were taken 
 from i: ), perhape irom Chrysippus. 8 The argu- 
 
 ( ment is based upon the ditterences in development of 
 J thought, as affecting the nit of judgment in 
 
 I philosophy, in morals, and religion, the results of which 
 \ we find in the widely opposing schools of philosophy, in 
 I the variety in religious belief, and in the laws and cus- 
 toms of different countries. Therefore the decisions 
 
 '.;?. 1.24. 5 llyp.i. 113-147. 
 
 Hyp. in. 235. 6 Fabricius, Cap. iv. H. 
 
 3 Diog. ix. 11, 61. ' Diog. in. 86. 
 
 4 Diog. ix. 11, 83. & Pappenheim Gr. Pyrr. Grundzilge, p. 50. 
 
The Sceptical Tropes. 53 
 
 reached in the world of thought leave us equally -m\ 
 doubt regarding the absolute value of any standards,/ 
 with those obtained through sense-perception, and the\ 
 universal conflict of opinion regarding all questions of '' 
 philosophy and ethics leads us also according to this 
 Trope to the reserving of the opinion. 1 This Trope is ; 
 the fifth as given by Diogenes, who placed it directly 
 after the first four which relate more especially to human 
 development, 2 while Sextus uses it as the final one, 
 perhaps thinking that an argument based upon the 
 higher powers of man deserves the last place, or is the 
 summation of the other arguments. 
 
 Following the exposition of the ten Tropes of the 
 older Sceptics, Sextus gives the five Tropes which he 
 attributes to the " later Sceptics." 3 Sextus nowhere 
 mentions the author of these Tropes. Diogenes, how- 
 ever, attributes them to Agrippa, a man of whom we 
 know nothing except his mention of him. He was 
 evidently one of the followers of Aenesidemus, and a 
 scholar of influence in the Sceptical School, who must 
 have himself had disciples, as Diogenes says, ol rrrepl 
 'AypiTTTrav* add to these tropes other five tropes, using 
 the plural verb. Another Sceptic, also mentioned by 
 Diogenes, and a man unknown from other sources, 
 named some of his books after Agrippa. 5 Agrippa is not 
 given by Diogenes in the list of the leaders of the 
 Sceptical School, but 6 his influence in the development 
 of the thought of the School must have been great, as 
 the transition from the ten Tropes of the "older 
 
 1 Hij2). I. 163. 4 Diog. ix. 11, 88. 
 
 2 Diog. ix. 11. 83. 5 Diog. ix. 11, 106. 
 
 3 Hyp. i. 164. 6 Diog. ix. 12, 115116. 
 
54 Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism. 
 
 Sceptics " to the five attributed to Agrippa is a marked 
 one, and shows the entrance into the school of a logical 
 power before unknown in it. The latter are not a re- 
 duction of the Tropes of Aenesidemus, but are written 
 from an entirely different standpoint. The ten Tropes 
 are empirical, and aim to furnish objective proofs of the 
 foundation theories of Pyrrhonism, while the five are 
 
 /I "~ - ~ _!-- 
 
 I rather rules of thought leading to logical proof, and are 
 
 dialectic in their character. \Y<- find this distinction 
 illustrated by the different way in which the Trope of 
 relativity is treated in the two groups. In the first it 
 points to an objective relativity, but with Agrippa to a 
 general subjective logical principle. The originality of 
 the Tropes of Agrippa does not lie in their substance 
 matter, but in their formulation and use in the Sceptical 
 School. These methods of proof were, of course, not new, 
 but were well known to Aristotle, and were used by 
 the Sceptical Academy, and probably also by Timon, 1 
 while the TT/HK TI goes back at least to Protagoras. 
 The five Tropes are as follows. 
 
 (i) The one based upon discord. 
 
 (ii) The regressus in infinit 
 
 (iii) Relation. 
 
 (iv) The hypothetical, 
 (v) The circulus in probando. 
 
 Two of these are taken from the old list, the first 
 and the third, and Sextus says that the five Tropes are 
 intended to supplement the ten Tropes, and to show 
 the audacity of the Dogmatics in a variety of ways. 2 
 The order of these Tropes is the same with Diogenes as 
 
 Compare Natorp. Op. cit. p. 302. 
 * Hyp. i. 177. 
 
 I 
 
The Sceptical Tropes. 55 
 
 with Sextus, but the definitions of them differ sufficiently 
 to show that the two authors took their material from 
 different sources. According to the first one everything 
 in question is either sensible or intellectual, and in at- 
 tempting to judge it either in life, practically, or " among 
 philosophers," a position is developed from which it is 
 impossible to reach a conclusion. 1 According to the 
 second, every proof requires another proof, and so on to 
 * infinity, and there is no standpoint from which to begin 
 the reasoning. 2 According to the third, all perceptions 
 are relative, as the object is colored by the condition of 
 the judge, and the influence of other things around it. 3 
 According to the fourth, it is impossible to escape from 
 the regressus in infinitum by making a hypothesis the 
 starting point, as the Dogmatics attempt to do. 4 And 
 the fifth, or the circulus in probando, arises when that 
 which should be the proof needs to be sustained by the 
 thing to be proved. 
 
 Sextus claims that all things can be included in 
 these Tropes, whether sensible or intellectual. 5 For 
 whether, as some say, only the things of sense are true, 
 or as others claim, only those of the understanding, or 
 as still others contend, some things both of sense and 
 understanding are true, a discord must arise that is 
 impossible to be judged, for it cannot be judged by the 
 sensible, nor by the intellectual, for the things of the 
 intellect themselves require a proof; accordingly, the 
 result of all reasoning must be either hypothetical, or 
 fall into the regressus in infinitum or the circulus in 
 
 1 Hyp. i. 165. 4 Hyp. i. 168. 
 
 2 Hyp. i. 166. 5 Hyp. i. 169. 
 
 3 Hyp. i. 167. 
 
Sextus l^i" i>> I'icus and Greek Scepticism. 
 
 The reference above to some who B 
 only tip tilings of sense are true, is to E] and 
 
 Pr< ; to some that only the things of thoi; 
 
 true, toDemocritusainl Plato; and to those that clain 
 some of both to be true,to the Stoics arid thePeripateti 
 The tin- < IK \\ Tropes added by Agrippa have notlr 
 to do with sense-perception, but bear entirely upon 
 
 ; possibility of reasoning, as demanded by the science of 
 lo.i^ic, in contrast to the earlier ones which related almost 
 
 / entin-ly, with the exception of the tenth, to mat- 
 objects. Sextus claims that these five Tropes also 1 
 to the on of judgment, 3 but their logical result 
 
 iie dogmatic denial of all possibility of know- 
 ledge. showing as Hirzel has well demonstrated, 
 more the influence of the New Academy than the spirit 
 
 . of the Sceptical School. 4 It was the standpoint of the 
 older Sceptics, that although the search for the truth 
 had not yet succeeded, yet they were still seekers, and 
 
 to be faithful to this old aim of 
 Pynhoni-ts. He calls himself a seeker, 5 and in re- 
 proaching the New Academy for affirming that know- 
 ledge is impossible, Sextus says, " Moreover, we say that 
 our ideas are equal as regards trustworthiness and un- 
 trust\vorthiness." G The ten Tropes claim to establish 
 doubt only in regard to a knowledge of the truth, but 
 the five J]rjapej_oX_Agrippa aim to logically prove the 
 impossibility of knowledge. It is very strange that 
 Sextus does not see this decided contrast in the attitude 
 
 1 Hyp. i. 170171. 
 
 2 Adv. Math. vin. 185186; vm. 56; vn. 369. 
 *lfyp.i. 177. 5 Eyp. i. 3, 7. 
 4 Hirzel Op. cit. p. 131. Hyp. i. - 
 
The Sceptical Tropes. 57 
 
 of the two s'ets of Tropes, and expresses his approval of 
 those of Agrippa, and makes more frequent use of the 
 fifth of these, 6 &<zXX7?Xo9, in his subsequent reasoning 
 than of any other argument. 1 
 
 We find here in the Sceptical School, shortly after 
 the time of Aenesidemus, the same tendency to dogmatic 
 teaching, that so far as the dim and shadowy history of 
 the last years of the New Academy can be unravelled, 
 and the separation of Pyrrhonism can be understood, at 
 the time that the Academy passed over into eclecticism 
 was one of the causes of that separation. 
 
 It is true that the Tropes of Agrippa show great 
 progress in the development of thought. They furnish 
 an organisation of the School far superior to what went 
 before, placing the reasoning on the firm basis of the 
 laws of logic, and simplifying the amount of material to 
 be used. In a certain sense Saisset is correct in saying 
 that Agrippa contributed more than any other in com- 
 pleting the organisation of Scepticism, 2 but it is not 
 correct when we consider the true spirit of Scepticism 
 with which the Tropes of Agrippa were not in harmony. 
 It was through the very progress shown in the pro- 
 duction of these Tropes that the school finally lost the 
 strength of its position. 
 
 Not content with having reduced the number of the 
 Tropes from ten to five, others tried to limit the number 
 still further to two. 3 Sextus gives us no hint of the 
 authorship of the two Tropes. Hitter attributes them 
 to Menodotus and his followers, and Zeller agrees with 
 
 1 See Index of Bekker's edition of Sextus' works. 
 
 2 Saisset Op. cit. p. 237. 3 Hyp. i. 178. 
 
58 Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism. 
 
 that opinion, 1 while Saisset thinks that Agrippa was 
 the author of these, 2 which ifl a strange theory to 
 propound, as some of the material of the five is repeated 
 in the two, and the same man could certainly not appear 
 as an advocate of five, and at the same time of T 
 Tropes. 
 
 The two Tropes are founded on the principle that 
 anything must be known through itself or through 
 something else. It cannot be known througl 
 because of the discord existing between all things of 
 senses and intellect, nor can it be known through soi 
 thing else, as then cither the regressus in infinitum or 
 the cl realm in probando follow. 8 Diogenes Laertius 
 j does not refer to these two Tropes. 
 
 In regard to all these Tropes of the suspension of 
 judgment, SexttUi has well remarked in his introduction 
 to them, that they are included in the eighth, or that 
 of relation. 4 
 
 The Tropes of Aetiology. The eight Tropes against 
 causality belong chronologically before the live Tropes 
 of Agrippa, in the history of the development of scepti- 
 cal thought. They have a much closer connection with 
 the spirit of Scepticism than the Tropes of Agrippa, 
 including, as they do, the fundamental thought of 
 Pyrrhonism, i.e., that the phenomena do not reveal the 
 unknown. 
 
 The Sceptics did not deny the phenomena, but they 
 
 ' denied that the phenomena are signs capable of being 
 
 / interpreted, or of revealing the reality of causes. It is 
 
 1 Zeller m. 38 ; Hitter iv. 277. 3 Uyp. I. 178 -179. 
 
 2 Saisset Op. eit. p. 231. * Hyp. i. 39. 
 
The Sceptical Tropes. 59 
 
 impossible by a research of the signs to find out the 
 unknown, or the explanation of things, as the Stoics 
 and Epicureans claim. The theory of Aenesidemus 
 which lies at the foundation of his eight Tropes against 
 aetiology, is given to us by Photius as follows i 1 " There 
 are no visible signs of the unknown, and those who be- 
 lieve in its existence are the victims of a vain illusion." 
 This statement of Aenesidemus is confirmed by a fuller 
 explanation of it given later on by Sextus. 2 If pheno- 
 mena are not signs of the unknown there is no causality, 
 and a refutation of causality is a proof of the impossi- 
 bility of science, as all science is the science of causes, 
 the power of studying causes from effects, or as Sextus 
 calls them, phenomena. 
 
 It is very noticeable to any one who reads the refu- 
 tation of causality by Aenesidemus, as given by Sextus, 3 
 that there is no reference to the strongest argument of 
 modern Scepticism, since the time of Hume, against 
 causality, namely that the origin of the idea of causality 
 cannot be so accounted for as to justify our relying upon 
 it as a form of cognition. 4 
 
 The eight Tropes are directed against the possibility 
 of knowledge of nature, which Aenesidemus contested 
 against in all his Tropes, the ten as well as the eight. 5 
 They are written from a materialistic standpoint. 
 These Tropes are given with illustrations by Fabricius 
 as follows : 
 
 I. Since aetiology in general refers to things that are 
 unseen, it does not give testimony that is incontestable 
 
 1 Myriob. 170 B. 12. 4 Ueberweg Op. cit. p. 217. 
 
 2 Adv. Math. vin. 207. 5 Hyp. I. 98. 
 a Hyp. i. 180186. 
 
<50 Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism. 
 
 :anl to phenomena. For example, tin; Pythagor- 
 eans explain tin- distance of the planets by a musical 
 proportion. 
 
 II. From many equally plausible reasons which 
 might be given for tin- same thing, one only is arbitrarily 
 chosen, afl some explain the inundation of the Nile by 
 a fall of snow at its source, while there could be other 
 
 s. afl rain, or wind, or the action of the sun. 
 
 III. Things take place in an orderly manner, but 
 the causes presented do not show any order, as for ex- 
 ample, the motion of the stars is explained by 
 mutual pressure, which does not take into account the 
 order th is among them. 
 
 IV. The unseen things are supposed to take place 
 in the same way as phenomena, as vision is exp! 
 
 in the same way as the appearance of images in a dark 
 room. 
 
 V. Most philosophers present theories of aetiology 
 which agree with their own individual hypotheses about 
 the elements, but not with common and accepted ideas, 
 as to explain the world by atoms like Epicurus, by 
 homoeomeriae like Anaxagoras, or by matter and form 
 like Aristotle. 
 
 VI. Theories are accepted which agree with indi- 
 vidual hypotheses, and others equally probable are 
 passed by, as Aristotle's explanation of comets, that 
 they are a collection of vapors near the earth, because 
 that coincided with his theory of the universe. 
 
 VII. Theories of aetiology are presented which 
 conflict not only with individual hypotheses, but also 
 
The Sceptical Tropes. 61 
 
 with phenomena, as to admit like Epicurus an inclina- 
 tion or desire of the soul, which was incompatible with 
 the necessity which he advocated. 
 
 VIII. The inscrutable is explained by things 
 equally inscrutable, as the rising of sap in plants is ex- 
 plained by the attraction of a sponge for water, a fact 
 contested by some. 1 
 
 Diogenes does not mention these Tropes in this 
 form, but he gives a resumtf of the general arguments 
 of the Sceptics against aetiology, 2 which has less in 
 common with the eight Tropes of Aenesidemus, than 
 with the presentation of the subject by Sextus later, 3 
 when he multiplies his proofs exceedingly to show 
 jjLTjSev elvai CLITIOV. Although the Tropes of Aeneside- 
 mus have a dialectic rather than an objective character, 
 it would not seem that he made the distinction, which is 
 so prominent with Sextus,between the signs vTro/jLvrjo-Ti/cd 
 arid evSeiKTiicd* especially as Diogenes sums up his argu- 
 ment on the subject with the general assertion, ^r^fjuelov 
 OVK elvai? and proceeds to introduce the logical con- 
 sequence of the denial of aetiology. The summing up 
 of the Tropes of Aenesidemus is given as follows, in the 
 Hypoty poses, by Sextus : " A cause in harmony with all 
 the sects of philosophy, and with Scepticism, and with 
 phenomena, is perhaps not possible, for the phenomena 
 and the unknown altogether disagree." 6 
 
 It is interesting to remark in connection with the 
 seventh of these Tropes, that Aenesidemus asserts that 
 
 1 Hyp. i. 180186; Fabricius, Cap. xvn. 180 z. 
 
 2 Diog. ix. 11, 9698. Adv. Math. vm. 151. 
 
 3 Hyp. in. 2428. 5 Diog. ix. 11, 96. 
 
 6 Hyp. i. 185. 
 
62 Sextua Empiricus and Greek Scepticism. 
 
 causality has only a subjective value, which from his 
 
 / materialistic standpoint was an argument against its 
 
 ) real existence, and the same argument is used by Kant 
 
 to prove that causality is a necessary condition of 
 
 thought. 1 
 
 Chaignet characterises the Tropes of Aenesidemus as 
 false and sophistical, 2 but as Maccoll has well said, they 
 are remarkable for their judicious and strong criticism, 
 and are directed against the false method of observing 
 facts through the light of preconceived opinion. 3 They 
 have, however, a stronger critical side than sceptical, 
 and show the positive tendency of the thought of 
 Aenesidemus. 
 
 1 Compare Maccoll Op. cit. p. 77. 2 Chaignet Op. cit. 507. 
 
 3 Maccoll Op. cit. p. 88. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Aenesidemus and the Philosophy of Heraditus. 
 
 A paragraph in the First Book of the Hypotyposes 
 which has given rise to much speculation and many 
 different theories, is the comparison which Sextus makes 
 of Scepticism with the philosophy of Heraclitus. 1 In 
 this paragraph the statement is made that Aenesidemus 
 and his followers, ol irepl TOV Aiinjo-tSrjfiov, said that 
 Scepticism is the path to the philosophy of Heraclitus, 
 because the doctrine that contradictory predicates 
 appear to be applicable to the same thing, leads the 
 way to the one that contradictory predicates are in 
 reality applicable to the same thing. 2 ol irepl rbv 
 AlvrjaiSrjfjLOV \eyov 6$bv elvai, rrjv (7K67m/crjv dycojrjp 
 7rl TTJV ^HpaKKeireiov faXoo-ocfrlaVj &<m TrpoyyetTai rov 
 rdvavrla irepl TO avTo VTrdp^eiv TO rdvavria Trepl TO 
 avrb tyalveadai,. As the Sceptics say that contradictory 
 predicates appear to be applicable to the same thing, 
 the Heraclitans come from this to the more positive 
 doctrine that they are in reality so. 3 
 
 This connection which Aenesidemus is said to have 
 affirmed between Scepticism and the philosophy of 
 Heraclitus is earnestly combated by Sextus, who de- 
 clares that the fact that contradictory predicates appear 
 to be applicable to the same thing is not a dogma of 
 the Sceptics, but a fact which presents itself to all men, 
 and not to the Sceptics only. No one for instance, 
 
 1 Hyp. i. 210. 2 Hyp. i. 210. 3 gyp. i. 210. 
 
64 Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism. 
 
 whether be be a Sceptic or not, would dare to suy th 
 honey does nut et to those in health, and bir 
 
 to those who liave the jaundice, so that Hei 
 begins from a preconception common to all men, as to 
 us also, and perhaps to the other schools of philosophy 
 as well. 1 As the st concerning the appearance 
 
 of contradictory predicates in regard to the same th: 
 ifl not an exclusively >c-ptical one, then Sc. i is 
 
 n< more a path to tip- philosophy of Heraclitus th 
 to other schools of philosophy, or to life, as all use 
 common subject matter. " But we are afraid that the 
 Sceptical School not only does not help towards the 
 knowledge of the philosophy of Heraclitus, but even 
 hinders that result. Since the Sceptic accuses Heraclitus 
 of having ra>ldy dogmatised, presenting on the one 
 hand the doe-trine of ' conflagration ' and on the other 
 that 'contradictory predicates are in reality applicable 
 to the same thing.' " 2 " It is absurd, then, to say that 
 this conflicting school is a path to the sect with which it 
 conflicts. It is therefore absurd to say that the Scepti 
 School is a path to the philosophy of Heraclitus." 3 
 
 This is not the only place in the writings of Sextus 
 which states that Aenesidemus at some time of his life 
 was an advocate of the doctrines of Heraclitus. In no 
 instance, however, where Sextus refers to this remark- 
 able fact, does he offer any explanation of it, or express 
 any bitterness against Aenesidemus, whom he always 
 speaks of with respect as a leader of the Sceptical 
 School. We are thus furnished with one of the most 
 difficult problems of ancient Scepticism, the problem 
 
 1 Hyp. i. 211. a Hyp. i. 212. 3 Hyp. i. 212. 
 
\Aenesidemus and the Philosophy of Heraclitus. 65 
 
 of reconciling the apparent advocacy of Aenesidemus 
 of the teachings of Heraclitus with his position in the 
 Sceptical School. 
 
 A comparison with eadh other of the references 
 made by Sextus and other writers to the teachings of 
 Aenesidemus, and a consideration of the result, gives us 
 two pictures of Aenesidemus which conflict most de- 
 cidedly with each other. We have on the one hand, 
 the man who was the first to give Pyrrhonism a position 
 as an influential school, and the first to collect and pre- 
 sent to the world the results of preceding Sceptical 
 thought. He was the compiler of the ten Tropes of 
 eVo^, and perhaps in part their author, and the author 
 of the eight Tropes against aetiology. 1 He develops his 
 Scepticism from the standpoint that neither the senses 
 nor the intellect can give us any certain knowledge of 
 reality. 2 He denied the possibility of studying pheno- 
 mena as signs of the unknown. 3 He denied all possi- 
 bility of truth, and the reality of motion, origin and 
 decay. There was according to his teaching no plea- 
 sure or happiness, and no wisdom or supreme good. 
 He denied the possibility of finding out the nature of 
 things, or of proving the existence of the gods, and 
 finally he declared that no ethical aim is possible. 
 
 The picture on the other hand, presented to us by 
 Sextus and Tertullian, is that of a man with a system of 
 beliefs and dogmas, which lead, he says, to the philosophy 
 of Heraclitus. In strange contradiction to his assertion of 
 the impossibility of all knowledge, he advocates a theory 
 
 1 Hyp. i. 180. 2 Photius 170, B. 12. 
 
 * Adv. Math. via. 40. 
 
(ii; Sextns Empiricus and Greek Scepticism. 
 
 that, the original substance is air, 1 which is most 
 tainly a dogma, although indeed a deviation from the 
 teachings of Heraclitus, of which Sex t us seemed uncon- 
 scious, as he says, TO re ov Kara -rov 'HpdicKeiTov arjp 
 ecrriV) co? (fryvlv 6 Aivfjfft&fjfAOV, Aenesidemu 
 
 i also regarding number and time and unity of 
 the ori<_rinal world-^tuff. 2 He fteemfl to have d<> 
 further about motion, 3 and about the soul. 4 
 
 It S xtus' language is taken according to it> a 
 meal find ourselves here in tl -nee of a 
 
 which would be naturally held by a 
 follower of the Stoic-Heraclitan physics, 6 and absol 
 inexplicable from the nan who advocated 
 
 ! a Scepticism as Aenesidemus. Sextus in thf 
 
 irition 
 
 against the Idea that Scepticism could form th- path to 
 the j)hilo>o|)hy of ir-r;clitus, but he does not ex} 
 surprise or indignation against Aenesidemus persoi 
 or orVer any explanation of the apparent contradic 1 
 and while his wrr -und in references to him as a 
 
 ted leader of tlte Sceptical School, he sometimes 
 srenis to include him with the Dogmatic-, n, 
 him with the Soypart/cwv (piXocrofav. 7 In fact, the task 
 of presenting any consistent hi>try of the develop] 
 of thought through which Aenesidemus }> 
 a puzzling one, that Brochard brilliantly remarks that 
 
 ly the best attitud. towards it would be 
 
 to follow the advice of Aenesidemus himself -pend 
 
 1 Adv. Math. x. 233. 6 Compare Zellor Op. cit. in. p. 33. 
 
 Vath. ix. 337; x. 216. 6 Hyp. I. 210 J 
 3 Adv. Mitti. x. 38. V. Math. vm. 8; x. 215. 
 
 * Atlr. Math. vn. 349. 
 
Aenesidemus and the Philosophy of Heraclitus. 67 
 
 one's judgment altogether regarding it. Is it possible 
 to suppose that so sharp and subtle a thinker as Aene- 
 sidemus held at the same time such opposing opinions ? 
 
 The conjecture that he was first a Heraclitan Stoic, 
 and later a Sceptic, which might be possible, does not 
 offer any explanation of Sextus' statement, that he 
 regarded Scepticism as a path to the philosophy of 
 Heraclitus. Nor would it be logical to think that after 
 establishing the Sceptical School in renewed influence 
 arid power, he reverted to the Heraclitan theories as 
 they were modified by the Stoics. These same theories 
 were the cause of his separation from the Academy, for 
 his chief accusation against the Academy was that it 
 was adopting the dogmatism of the Stoics. 1 The matter 
 is complicated by the fact that Tertullian also attributes 
 to Aenesidemus anthropological and physical teachings 
 that agree with the Stoical Heraclitan doctrines. It is 
 not strange that in view of these contradictory assertions 
 in regard to the same man, some have suggested the 
 possibility that they referred to two different men of 
 the same name, a supposition, however, that no one has 
 been able to authoritatively vindicate. 
 
 Let us consider briefly some of the explanations 
 which have been attempted of the apparent heresy of 
 Aenesidemus towards the Sceptical School. We will 
 begin with the most ingenious, that of Pappenheim. 2 
 
 Pappenheim claims that Sextus was not referring 
 to Aenesidemus himself in these statements which he 
 joins with his name. In the most important of these, 
 
 1 Compare Zeller Op. cit. in. p. 16. 
 
 2 Die angebliche Heraclitismus des Skeptikers Ainesidemos, Berlin 1889. 
 
68 Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism. 
 
 the one quoted from the Hypotyposes, 1 which repr 
 AeneademtUI as daimin^ that Scepticism is the path to 
 the philosophy of Hcraclitus, the expression used is 
 ol Trepl -rov Alvrjo'io'rj/jLov, and in many of the other places 
 where Sextus refers to the dogmatic statements of 
 Aenesidemus, the expression is either ol Trepl rov Alirq- 
 aiSrjfjLov, or Alvrja-iSrjfjLo^ tca0' *H pdfc\en ov, while when 
 
 us quotes Aenesidemus to sustain Scepticism, he 
 his nairn- alone. 
 
 Pappenhrim thinks that S -onflict was not 
 
 with the dead Aenesi<h>nm<, who had lived two cen- 
 turies before him, but with his own contempor 
 He also seeks to prove that Sextus could not have gained 
 his knowledge of these sayings of Aenesidemus from any 
 of AeiHsidi mus' own writings, as neither by the ancients, 
 nor by later writers, was any book spoken of which could 
 well have contained them. Neither Aristocles nor Dio- 
 genes mentions any such book. 
 
 Papponheim also makes much of the arinmu-nt that 
 Sextus in no instance seems conscious of inconsistency 
 on the part of Aenesidemus, even when most earnestly 
 combating his alleged teachings, but in referring to 
 him personally he always speaks of him with great 
 respect. 
 
 Pappenheim suggests, accordingly, that the polemic 
 of Sext us was against contemporaries, those who accepted 
 the philosophy of Heraclitus in consequence of, or in 
 some connection with, the teachings of Aenesidemus. 
 He entirely ignores the fact that there is no trace of 
 any such school or sect in history, calling themselves 
 
 Hyp. i. 210212. 
 
Aenesidemus and the Philosophy of Heraclitus. 69 
 
 followers of " Aenesidemus according to Heraclitus," but 
 still thinks it possible that such a movement existed in 
 Alexandria at the time of Sextus, where so many dif- 
 ferent sects were found. Sextus uses Aenesidemus' 
 name in four different ways: alone, ol irepl TOP Aive<riSrj- 
 fAoV) Aiwrjo-iSq/jLos Kaff 'HpdfcXeirov, and in one instance 
 ol 7Tpl TOV Alvrj(riSi]fjLov fcad' ( Hpdic\eiTOV. 1 
 
 Pappenheim advances the theory that some of these 
 contemporaries against whom Sextus directed his argu- 
 ments had written a book entitled Awfi<ri&THMK Kaff 
 'Hpd/cXeirov, to prove the harmony between Aenesi- 
 demus and Heraclitus, and that it was from this book 
 that Sextus quoted the dogmatic statements which he 
 introduced with that formula. He claims, further, that 
 the passage quoted from Hypotyposes I. even, is directed 
 against contemporaries, who founded their system of 
 proofs of the harmony between Aenesidemus and Herac- 
 litus on the connection of the celebrated formula which 
 was such a favourite with the Sceptics: "Contrary 
 predicates appear to apply to the same thing," with the 
 apparent deduction from this, that " Contrary predicates 
 in reality apply to the same thing." Sextus wishes, ac- 
 cording to Pappenheim, to prove to these contemporaries 
 that they had misunderstood Aenesidemus, and Sextus 
 does not report Aenesidemus to be a Dogmatic, nor to 
 have taught the doctrines of Heraclitus; neither has 
 he misunderstood Aenesidemus, nor consequently mis- 
 represented him ; but on the contrary, these dogmatic 
 quotations have nothing to do with Aenesidemus, but 
 refer altogether to contemporaries who pretended to be 
 
 1 Adv. Math. vm. 8. 
 
70 xra. 
 
 Sceptics while tl: pted the tenrhinirs t>i H 
 
 BeztUl naturally warmly combats this tendency, 
 as he \vishe< to preserve Pyrrhonism pure. 
 
 Brochard advocates a change of opinion on f 
 of Aenesidemus as an explanation of tlie difficulty in 
 'ion. 1 He starts from the Disposition, the reason- 
 ableness of which we shall consider later, that Aene- 
 sidemus had pa.-srd through one change of opinion 
 already when he severed his connection with the New 
 Academy; and to the two phases of hit life, which such 
 a ( hange has already made us familiar with, he adds a 
 third. Aenesidemus would not be the first who has 
 accepted different !> -li< -f> at different periods of his life, 
 and Hrnrhard claims that such a development in the 
 opinions of Aenesidemus is logical. He does not accuse 
 Aenesidemus of having, as might seem from the pern>al 
 of Sextus, suddenly changed his basis, but rather of 
 having gradually come to accept much in the teachings 
 of Heraclitns. Aenesidemus modifies his Scepticism 
 only to the extent of pretending to know something 
 of absolute reality. The Sceptic says, "Contradi 
 predicates are apparently applicable to the same ti 
 and Aenesidemus accepts the Heraclitan result " Con- 
 tradictory predicates are in reality applicable to the 
 same thing." From Sextus' report, Aenesidemus would 
 seem to have renounced his position as a Sceptic in 
 saying that Scepticism is the path to the philosophy of 
 Heraclitus. He does not, however, renounce Sceptici>m, 
 but he finds it incomplete. In deliberating concerning 
 the appearance of contradictory predicate! in regard to 
 
 1 Hrochard Op. cit. 272. 
 
Aenesidemus and the Philosophy of Heraclitus. 71 
 
 the same object, he would naturally ask, " Whence come 
 these contradictory appearances ? " After having doubted 
 all things, he wished to know wherefore he doubts. The 
 system of Heraclitus offers a solution, and he accepts it. 
 Contradictory predicates produce equilibrium in the 
 soul because they are an expression of reality. 
 
 As a Sceptic he claims that knowledge is impossible, 
 and he does not find that the statement of Heraclitus 
 disproves this, but rather that it supports his theory. 
 He had denied the existence of science. He still does 
 so, but now he knows why he denies it. Brochard asks 
 why it is any more impossible that Aenesidemus should 
 have been a follower of Heraclitus than that Protagoras 
 was so, as Protagoras was after all a Sceptic. In con- 
 clusion, Brochard claims that the dogmatic theories 
 attributed to Aenesidemus relate to the doctrine of the 
 truth of contradictory predicates, which seemed to him 
 a logical explanation of the foundation theories of 
 Scepticism. It is right to call him a Sceptic, for he 
 was so, and that sincerely ; and he deserves his rank 
 as one of the chiefs of the Sceptical School. 
 
 Coming now to the opinion of Zeller, 1 we find that 
 he advocates a misconception of Aenesidemus on the 
 part of Sextus. The whole difficulty is removed, Zeller 
 thinks, by the simple fact that Sextus had not under- 
 stood Aenesidemus ; and as Tertullian and Sextus agree 
 in this misconception of the views of Aenesidemus, they 
 must have been misled by consulting a common author 
 in regard to Aenesidemus, who confused what Aene- 
 sidemus said of Heraclitus with his own opinion. Zeller 
 
 1 Zeller Op. cit. Ill, pp. 31 35; Grundriss der Geschichteder Griechis- 
 chen Phil. p. 263. 
 
7 '2 tieztux Empiricus and Greek Scepticism. 
 
 maintains that the expression so often repeated by 
 Suxtus Aivr)(rib7)iJLOS naff 'HpatcKeirov shows that 
 some one of Aenesidemus' books contained a report of 
 Heraclitus 1 doctrines, as Aenesidemus was in the habit 
 of quoting as many authorities as possible to sustain 
 his Scepticism. To justify his quotations from Herac- 
 litus, he had possibly given a short abstract of Heraclitus' 
 teachings ; and the misconception advocated by Zeller, 
 and found both in Tertullian and Sextus, refers rather 
 to the spirit than to the words quoted from Aeneside- 
 ii) ns. and is a misconception due to some earlier author, 
 who had given a false impression of the meaning of 
 Aenesidemus in quoting what Aenesidemus wrote about 
 Heraclitus. That is to say, Heraclitus was classed by 
 Aenesidemua only among those who prepared th- 
 for Scepticism, just as Diogenes 1 mentions many philo- 
 sophers in that way ; and that Soranus 2 and Sextus both 
 ha.l the same misunderstanding can only be explained 
 by a mistake on the part of the authority whom they 
 consulted. 
 
 This explanation, however, makes Sextus a very 
 stupid man. Aenesidemus' books were well known, 
 and Sextus would most certainly take the trouble to 
 read them. His reputation as an historian would not 
 sustain such an accusation, as Diogenes calls his books 
 TO, Setca TWV cnceTTTiicwv KOI a\\a tcd\\i<TTa* Further- 
 more, that Sextus used Aenesidemus' own books we 
 know from the direct quotation from them in regard to 
 Plato, 4 which he combines with the ideas of Menodotus 5 
 and his own. 
 
 1 Diog. Laert. ix. 11, 7174. - Tertullian. 3 Diog. ix. 12, 116. 
 Hyp. i. 222. 5 Following the Greek of Bekker. 
 
Aenesidemus and the Philosophy of Heraclitus. 73 
 
 Sextus' references to Aenesidemus in connection 
 with Heraclitus are very numerous, and it is absurd 
 to suppose that he would have trusted entirely to some 
 one who reported him for authority on such a subject. 
 Even were it possible that Sextus did not refer directly 
 to the works of Aenesidemus, which we do not admit, 
 even then, there had been many writers in the Sceptical 
 School since the time of Aenesidemus, and they certainly 
 could not all have misrepresented him. We must re- 
 member that Sextus was at the head of the School, and 
 had access to all of its literature. His honor would not 
 allow of such a mistake, and if he had indeed made it, 
 his contemporaries must surely have discovered it before 
 Diogenes characterised his books as K<i\\icrTa. Whatever 
 may be said against the accuracy of Sextus as a general 
 historian of philosophy, especially in regard to the older 
 schools, he cannot certainly be accused of ignorance 
 respecting the school of which he was at that time 
 the head. 
 
 The opinion of Hitter on this subject is that Aene- 
 sidemus must have been a Dogmatic. 1 Saisset contends 2 
 that Aenesidemus really passed from the philosophy of 
 Heraclitus to that of Pyrrho, and made the statement 
 that Scepticism is the path to the philosophy of Heracli- 
 tus to defend his change of view, although in his case 
 the change had been just the opposite to the one he 
 defends. Saisset propounds as a law in the history of 
 philosophy a fact which he claims to be true, that 
 Scepticism always follows sensationalism, for which he 
 gives two examples, Pyrrho, who was first a disciple of 
 
 1 Hitter, Op, cit. p. 280. Book IV. 2 Saisset, Op. cit. p. 206. 
 
74 
 
 Democritns, an. I 1 1 nine, who <f Locke. 
 
 It is not necessary to discuss the absurdity of such a 
 law, which someon*- has well remarked would invoi i 
 a priori construction of history. There is no apparent 
 
 ;i for Saiss.-t's conjecture in regard to Aene.>id -mus, 
 for it is exactly the opposite of what Sextus has reported. 
 Strange to say, Saisset him.-elf remarks in another place 
 that we owe religious respect to any text, and tl 
 should he tin- first Irnv of criticism to render this. 1 Such 
 
 't to the text of Sextus, as he him<-lt' fcdvo 
 puts Saisset's explanation of the subject under dis- 
 cussion out of the question. 
 
 Hirzel and Natorp do not find such a marked 
 contradiction in the two views presented of the theories 
 of Aenesidemus, nor do they think that Sextus has 
 misrepresented them* They rather maintain, that in 
 declaring the coexistence of contradictory predicates 
 regarding the same object, Aenesidemus does not cease 
 to be a Sceptic, for he did not believe that the predicates 
 are applicable in a dogmatic sense of the word, but are 
 only applicable in appearance, that is, applicable to 
 phenomena. The Heraclitism of Aenesidemus would 
 be then only in appearance, as he understood the 
 statement, that " Contradictory predicates are in reality 
 applicable to the same thing," only in the phenomenal 
 sense. 2 Hirzel says in addition, that contradictory 
 predicates are in reality applicable to those phenomena 
 which are the same for all, and consequently true, for 
 Aenesidemus considered those phenomena true that 
 are the same for all:' 1 As Protagoras, the disciple of 
 
 1 Saisset Op. cit. p. 206. * Natorp Op. cit. 115. 122. 
 
 3 Adv. Math. vin. 8 ; Hirzel Op. cit. p. 96. 
 
Aenesidemus and the Philosophy of Heraclitus. 75 
 
 Heraclitus, declared the relative character of sensations, 
 that things exist only for us, and that their nature 
 depends on our perception of them ; so, in the pheno- 
 menal sense, Aenesidemus accepts the apparent fact 
 that contradictory predicates in reality apply to the 
 same thing. 
 
 This explanation entirely overlooks the fact that we 
 have to do with the word vTrdpxew, in the statement 
 that contradictory predicates in reality apply to the same 
 thing ; while in the passage quoted where Aenesidemus 
 declares common phenomena to be true ones, we have 
 the word aXrjdrj, so that this explanation of the diffi- 
 culty would advocate a very strange use of the word 
 
 All of these different views of the possible solution 
 of this perplexing problem are worthy of respect, as the 
 opinion of men who have given much thought to this 
 and other closely related subjects. While we may not 
 altogether agree with any one of them, they neverthe- 
 less furnish many suggestions, which are very valuable 
 in helping to construct a theory on the subject that 
 shall satisfactorily explain the difficulties, and present a 
 consistent view of the attitude of Aenesidemus. 
 
 First, in regard to the Greek expression ol irepl in 
 connection with proper names, upon which Pappenheim 
 bases so much of his argument. All Greek scholars 
 would agree that the expression does not apply usually 
 only to the disciples of any teacher, but ol irepl rbv 
 AlvrjatSTj/juov, for instance, includes Aenesidemus with his 
 followers, and is literally translated, "Aenesidemus and 
 his followers." It is noticeable, however, in the writings 
 of Sextus that he uses the expression ol irepl often for 
 
7(> Sextm Empiricus and Greek Scepticism. 
 
 the name of the founder of a school alone, as Pappen- 
 heim himself admits. 1 We find examples of this in th- 
 mention of Plato and Democritus and Arcesilaus, as 
 01 Trepl TOV TIXaTtova Kai A^jjuoKpiTov 2 and ol Trepl TOP 
 'Apx<ri\aw* and accordingly we have no right to infer 
 that his use of the name Aenesidemus in this way has 
 an exceptional Muniiicance. It may mean Aenesidemus 
 alone, or it mav Minify Aenesidemus in connection with 
 his followers. 
 
 In reply to Zeller's position, that Sextus and Ter- 
 tullian have misunderstood Aenesidemus, and quote 
 from some common author who misrepi him, 
 
 we would admit that such a misunderstanding miuht 
 be possible where Sextus gives long explanations of 
 Hnaclitus' teachings, beginning witli quoting Aene- 
 sidemus, and eontinuing in such a way that it is not 
 always possible to distinguish just the part that is 
 attributed to Aenesidemus; but such a misunderstand- 
 ing certainly cannot be asserted in regard to the direct 
 statement that Aenesidemus regarded Scepticism as the 
 path to the philosophy of Heraclitus, for tho reasons 
 previously given. Neither would we agree with 
 Brochard, whose solution of the difficulty is on the 
 whole the most logical, i.e., that Aenesidemus had neces- 
 sarily already passed through two phases of philosophical 
 belief. It is possible to admit a gradual evolution of 
 thought in Aenesidemus without supposing in either 
 case a change of basis. His withdrawal from the 
 Academy is an argument against, rather than in favor 
 
 1 Pappenheirn Op. cit. p. 21. - Adv. Math. vm. 6. 
 
 3 Adv. Math. vn. 150. 
 
Aenesidemus and the Philosophy of Heraclitus. 77 
 
 of, a change on his part, and was caused by the well- 
 known change in the attitude of the Academy. 
 
 Many of the teachings of the Sceptical School were 
 taken directly from the Academy, belonging to those 
 doctrines advocated in the Academy before the eclectic 
 dogmatic tendency introduced by Antiochus. In fact, 
 Sextus himself claims a close relation between the 
 Middle Academy and Pyrrhonism. 1 Aenesidemus, 
 although he was a Sceptic, belonged to the Academy, 
 and on leaving it became, as it were, a pioneer in 
 Pyrrhonism, and cannot be judged in the same way 
 as we should judge a Sceptic of Sextus' time. 
 
 It seems a self-evident fact that during the two 
 centuries which elapsed between the time of Aeneside- 
 mus and Sextus, the standpoint of judgment in the 
 Sceptical School had greatly changed. An example 
 illustrating this change we find in a comparison of the 
 presentation of Scepticism by Diogenes with that of 
 Sextus. The author whom Diogenes follows, probably 
 one of the Sceptical writers, considers Xenophanes, Zeno, 
 and Democritus, Sceptics, and also Plato, 2 while Sextus, 
 in regard to all of these men, opposes the idea t"hat they 
 were Sceptics. 3 Diogenes also calls Heraclitus a Sceptic, 
 and even Homer, 4 and quotes sceptical sayings from 
 the Seven Wise Men ; 5 he includes in the list of Scep- 
 tics, Archilochus, Euripides, Empedocles, and Hippoc- 
 rates/ and, furthermore, says that Theodosius, probably 
 one of the younger Sceptics, objected to the name 
 
 1 Hyp. i. 232. * Diog. ix. 11, 71. 
 
 Diog. ix. 11, 1772. * Diog. ix. 11, 71. 
 
 3 Hyp. i. 213214; i. 223225. 6 Diog. ix. 11, 7173. 
 
78 Sextua Empii'icua and Greek Scepticism. 
 
 ' Pyrrhonean ' on the ground that Pyrrho was not the 
 first Sceptic. 1 
 
 We have given the testimony from ninny sources, 
 to the effect that before the time of Sextus the Empiri- 
 cal School of Medicine was considered identical with 
 Scepticism, although not so by Sextus himself. From 
 all of these things we may infer a narrowing of the limits 
 of Pyrrhonism in the time of Sextus. 
 
 Let us accept with Brochard tin development of 
 thought seen in Aenesidemus from the beginning to 
 tin- (nd of his career, without agreeing with him that 
 Aeneaidemus ever consciously changed his basis. He 
 in the Academy. He left the Academy 
 on that account, and he n mained a Sceptic to the end, 
 in so far U a man ran be a Sceptic, and take the 
 positive .-land that Aenrsidrnius did. 
 
 Two things might account for his apparent dog- 
 matism 
 
 (i) The eclectic spirit of his time. 
 
 (ii) The psychological effect upon himself of this 
 careful systemisation of the Sceptical teachings. 
 
 Let us consider the first of these causes. Aeneside- 
 mus, although not the first of the later Sceptics, was. 
 apparently the first to separate himself from the 
 A on demy. He was the founder of a new movement, 
 the attempt to revive the older Scepticism as taught by 
 Pyrrho and Timon, and separate it from the dogmatic 
 teachings of the Stoics which were so greatly affecting 
 the Scepticism of the New Academy. It wa> the spirit 
 of his time to seek to sustain all philosophical teaching 
 
 1 Diog. ix. n. TO. 
 
Aenesidemus and the Philosophy of Heraclitus. 79 
 
 by the authority of as many as possible of the older 
 philosophers, and he could hardly escape the tendency 
 which his training in the Academy had unconsciously 
 given him. Therefore we find him trying to prove that 
 the philosophy of Heraclitus follows from Scepticism. It 
 is not necessary either to explain the matter, as both 
 Hirzel and Natorp so ingeniously attempt to do, by 
 claiming that the truth of contradictory predicates which 
 Aenesidemus accepted from Heraclitus referred only to 
 phenomena. The history of philosophy gives us abun- 
 dant proof of the impossibility of absolute Scepticism, 
 and Aenesidemus furnishes us with one example of many 
 of this impossibility, and of the dogmatism that must 
 exist in connection with all thought. In the case of 
 Aenesidemus, who evidently gave the best efforts of his 
 life to establish the Sceptical School, the dogmatism was 
 probably unconscious. That he remained to the end 
 a Sceptic is shown by the fact that he was known as 
 such to posterity. Nowhere do we find a change of 
 basis referred to in regard to him, and Sextus, in 
 refuting the mistakes which he attributes to Aene- 
 sidemus, does it, as it were, to point out something of 
 which Aenesidemus had been unconscious. 
 
 Let us consider here the second cause of Aeneside- 
 mus' Dogmatism, the psychological effect upon himself 
 of formulating Sceptical beliefs. The work that he did 
 for the Sceptical School was a positive one. It occupied 
 years of his life, and stamped itself upon his mental 
 development. In formulating Scepticism, and in ad- 
 vocating it against the many enemies of the School, 
 and amidst all the excitement of the disruption from 
 the Academy, and of establishing a new School, it was 
 
so Seotfus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism. 
 
 inevitable that, liis mind .should take a dogmatic 
 denry. He remained a Sceptic as IK.' had always been, 
 but must liave grown dogmatic in his attitude tov. 
 the Sceptical formulae, and was thus able to adopt some 
 <>!' the teachings of Ileraclitus, unconscious of their 
 inconsistency. 
 
 Where should we find a modern writer who is c 
 
 it in all his statements? Could we read the works 
 of Aenesidemus, we might better understand the con- 
 nection between the apparently contradictory ideas in 
 his teaching, but the incn: Q statement i 
 
 probably remain. It is necessary to remember the 
 position of Aenesidemus in breaking away from the 
 Academy and in founding a new school, the full 
 ficance of which he could not foresee. There must 
 iarily be some crudenen in pioneer \v some 
 
 failure to see the bearing of all its parts, and a compiler 
 like Sextus could point out the inconsistencies which 
 the two centuries since the time of Aenesidemu- 
 made plain. Aenesidemus was too positive a char 
 
 dmit of absolute Sceptical consistency. He was 
 nevertheless the greatest thinker the Sceptical School 
 had known since the age of Pyrrho, its founder. In 
 claiming a union between Pyrrhonism and the philo- 
 sophy of Heraclitus, he recognised also the pre-Socnatic 
 tendency of the Sceptical School. The name of Soc 
 was all powerful in the Academy, but Aenesidemus com- 
 prehended the fact that the true spirit of Pyrrhonism 
 was of earlier origin than the Academic Scepsis. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 Critical Examination of Pyrrhonism. 
 
 The distinct philosophical movement of which Pyrrho 
 was the author bore his name for five centuries after his 
 death. It had an acknowledged existence as a philo- 
 sophical tendency, if indeed not a sect, for a great part 
 of that time. Yet, when we carefully analyse the 
 relation of Pyrrhonism, as presented to us by Sextus, 
 to the teachings of Pyrrho himself, in so far as they 
 can be known, we find many things in Pyrrhonism for 
 which Pyrrho was not responsible. 
 
 The foundation elements of the movement, the spirit 
 of Empirical doubt that lay underneath and caused its 
 development in certain directions rather than others, 
 are due to Pyrrho. The methods of the school, however, 
 were very foreign to anything found in the life or teach- 
 ings of Pyriho. Pyrrho was eminently a moralist. He 
 was also to a great degree an ascetic, and he lived his 
 philosophy, giving it thus a positive side wanting in the 
 Pyrrhonism presented to us by Sextus. Timon represents 
 him as desiring to escape from the tedious philosophical 
 discussions of his time 
 
 & yepov & Ilvppwv, TTW? r) Trb6ev etcSvcnv evpes 
 Bo^&v re /cepo^poavvrj^ re O- 
 
M* Sextua Empiricus and Greek Scepticism. 
 
 ,'ind a^ain be of his modest and tranquil life 
 
 TOVTO pot,, (!) TIvppwv, ipelperai rj-rop dfcovcrac 
 7TW9 TTOT' avrjp eV ayets Travra f 
 fjiovvo? SavQptoTTOicri deov rpojrov rj 
 
 alel a<f>povTio-Ta)<; fcal iutivfaw* Kara ravra 
 i]Sv\6jov 
 
 Pyri-li.) wished more than anything rl>: to live in 
 peace, and his dislike of the Sophists 2 may well hav/ 
 made him try to avoid dialectic; while, on the contrary, 
 in tli<- Pyrrhonean School of InU-r timrs discussion was 
 one of the principal ni-thuds of contest, at I 
 the time of Agrippa. Pyrrhonism seems to have been 
 nriiiinally a theory of life, like the philosophy of Socrates, 
 to whom Pyrrho is often compared;' and Pyrrho, like 
 ites, lived his philosophy. Our knowledge of 
 Pyrrho is gained from Aristocles, Sextus Empiricus, 
 and Diogeoes, and from the Academic traditions L: 
 1)\ ( iioera Diogenes gives us details of his lite which 
 he attributes to Antigonus of Carystius, who lived about 
 tin- time of Pyrrho. 4 Pyrrho was a disciple and adi 
 of Democritus, 5 some of whose teachings bore a lasting 
 influence over the subsequent development of Pyrrho- 
 nism. He accompanied Alexander the Great to India, 
 where he remained as a member of his suite for 
 time, and the philosophical ideas of India were not 
 without influence on his teachings. Oriental philosophy 
 
 1 Diog. ix. 11, 65. Given from Mullach's edition of Timon by 
 
 m primitive, p. .52"). 
 
 Diog. ix. 11, 69. * Diog. ix. 11, 02. 
 
 3 Lewes Op. cit. p. 460. Diog. ix. 11. 
 
Critical Examination of Pyrrhonism. 83 
 
 was not unknown in Greece long before the time of 
 Pyrrho, but his personal contact with the Magi and the 
 Gymnosophists of the far East, apparently impressed 
 upon his mind teachings for which he was not unpre- 
 pared by his previous study and natural disposition. 
 In his indifference to worldly goods we find a strong 
 trace of the Buddhistic teaching regarding the vanity 
 of human life. He showed also a similar hopelessness 
 in regard to the possibility of finding a satisfactory 
 philosophy, or absolute truth. He evidently returned 
 from India with the conviction that truth was not to 
 be attained. 1 
 
 After the death of Alexander and Pyrrho's return 
 to Greece, he lived quietly with his sister at Elis, and 
 Diogenes says that he was consistent in his life, asserting 
 and denying nothing, but in everything withholding his 
 opinion, as nothing in itself is good or shameful, just or 
 unjust. 2 He was not a victim of false pride, but sold 
 animals in the market place, and, if necessary, washed 
 the utensils himself. 3 He lived in equality of spirit, 
 and practised his teachings with serenity. If one went 
 out while he was talking he paid no attention, but went 
 calmly on with his remarks. 4 He liked to live alone, 
 and to travel alone, and on one occasion, being knocked 
 about in a vessel by a storm at sea, he did not lose his 
 imperturbability, but pointed to a swine calmly eating 
 on board, and said that the wise man should have as 
 much calmness of soul as that. He endured difficult 
 surgical operations with indifference, 5 and when his 
 
 1 Compare Maccoll Op. cit. 4 Diog. ix. 11, 63. 
 
 2 Diog. ix. 11, 61, 62. 5 Diog. ix. 11, 67. 
 
 3 Diog. ix. 11, 66 
 
84 Sextua Empiricus and Greek Scepticism. 
 
 friend Anaxarchus was once unfortunate enough to fall 
 into a morass, he went calmly by without stopping to 
 help him, for which consistency of conduct Anaxarchus 
 afterwards praised him. There are two instances given 
 by Diogenes when he lost control of himself; once in 
 getting angry with his sister, and once in trying to save 
 himself when chased by a dog. When accused of incon- 
 sistency, he said it was difficult to entirely give up one's 
 Imm.'inity. 1 He was greatly venerated by the people 
 among whom he lived, who made him high priest, and 
 on his account exempted all philosophers from taxation, 2 
 and after his death erected a statue to his memory. 
 These facts testify to his moral character, and also to 
 fulfil the functions of high priest a certain amount of 
 dogmatism must liav. been necessary. 
 
 According to Diogenes, " We cannot know," said Pyr- 
 l rho, " what things are in themselves, either by sensation 
 1 or by judgment, and, as we cannot distinguish the true 
 / from the false, therefore we should live impassively, and 
 without an opinion/' The term eVo^?;, so characteristic 
 / of Pyrrhonism, goes back, according to Diogenes, to the 
 I time of Pyrrho. 3 Nothing is, in itself, one thing more 
 than another, but all experience is related to pheno- 
 mena, and no knowledge is possible through the senses. 4 
 Pyrrho's aim was arapagta and his life furnished a 
 marked example of the spirit of indifference, for which 
 the expression cnrdOeia is better suited than the later 
 one, arapa^ia. The description of his life with his sister 
 confirms this, where the term aSiafopla is used to 
 
 1 Diog. ix. 11, 66. 3 Diog. ix. 11, 61. 
 
 2 Diog. ix. 11, 64. Diog. ix. 11, 6162. 
 
Critical Examination of Pyrrhonism. 85 
 
 describe his conduct. 1 He founded his Scepticism on 
 the equivalence of opposing arguments. 2 
 
 The picture given of Pyrrho by Cicero is entirely 
 different from that of Diogenes, and contrasts decidedly 
 with it. 3 Cicero knows Pyrrho as a severe moralist, not 
 as a Sceptic. Both authors attribute to Pyrrho the 
 doctrine of indifference and apathy, but, according to 
 Cicero, Pyrrho taught of virtue, honesty, and the 
 summum bonum, while Diogenes plainly tells us that 
 he considered nothing as good in itself, "and of all things 
 nothing as true." 4 Cicero does not once allude to Pyrrho- 
 nean doubt. We see on the one hand, in Cicero's idea 
 of Pyrrho, the influence of the Academy, perhaps even 
 of Antiochus himself, 5 which probably colored the 
 representations given of Pyrrho ; but, on the other hand, 
 there is much in Diogenes' account of Pyrrho's life and 
 teachings, and in the writings of Timon, which shows us 
 the positive side of Pyrrho. Pyrrho, in denying the 
 possibility of all knowledge, made that rather a motive 
 for indifference in the relations of life, than the founda- 
 tion thought of a philosophical system. His teaching 
 has a decided ethical side, showing in that respect the 
 strong influence of Democritus over him, who, like 
 Pyrrho, made happiness to consist in a state of feeling. 6 
 The one motive of all of Pyrrho's teaching is a positive 
 one, the desire for happiness. 
 
 The essence of Pyrrhonism as given by Tiruon is as 
 follows : 7 Man desires to be happy. To realise his 
 
 1 Diog. ix. 11. 66. 5 Compare Natorp Op. cit. p. 71. 
 
 2 Diog. IJL. 11. 106. 6 Zeller Grundriss der Griechischen Phil. p. 70. 
 
 3 De oral. Ill, 62. 7 Aristocles ap. Eusebium Praep. Ev. xiv. 18. 
 4 Diog. ix. 11, 61. 
 
S(i SeoctUB tiiHi/n'icua and Greek Scepticism. 
 
 desire he must consider three things: 
 (i) What is the nature of thing 
 (ii) How should man conduct himself in relation to 
 them? 
 
 (iii) What is the result to him of this relation ? 
 
 The nature of things is unknown. Our relation to 
 them must be one of suspension of judgment, without 
 activity, desire, or belief, that is, an entirely negative 
 relation. The result is that state of having no opi; 
 called tVo^//, which is followed in turn by arapagia. 
 
 lr fhe problem of philosophy is here proposed very 
 nearly in the terms of Kant, but not with the positive 
 motive, like that of the great philosopher of Germany, 
 of evolving a system to present the truth. Yet the im- 
 portance of these questions shows the originality of 
 Pyrrho. The earnestness of Pyrrho is further >ho\vn by 
 an example given by Diogenes. Once on being found 
 talking to himself alone, he said, when asked the reason, 
 that he was meditating how to become a good man 
 (XPT/O-TO?), 2 thus showing an entirely different spirit 
 from anything found in Sextus' books. The explanation 
 of his life and teachings is to be found largely in his 
 own disposition. Such an attitude of indifference must 
 belong to a placid nature, and cannot be entirely the 
 result of a philosophical system, and, while it can be 
 aimed at, it can never be perfectly imitated. One of 
 his disciples recognised this, and said that it was neces- 
 sary to have the disposition of Pyrrho in order to hold his 
 doctrines. 3 Diogenes tells us that he was the first to 
 advance any formulae of Scepticism, 4 but they must 
 
 1 Compare Maccoll Op.cit. p. 21. 3 Diog. ix. 11, 70, 64. 
 
 2 Diog. ix. 11, 64. 4 Dio-. ix. 11, 69; ix. 11, 61. 
 
Critical Examination of Pyrrhonism. 87 
 
 have been very elementary, as Pyrrho himself wrote 
 nothing. We find no trace of formulated Tropes in 
 Pyrrho's teachings, yet it is probable that he indicated 
 some of the contradictions in sensation, and possibly the 
 Tropes in some rudimentary form. Of the large number 
 of sceptical formulae, or (fxovai, the three which seem to 
 have the oldest connection with Scepticism are the avri- 
 \o7/a, the ovBev dp/a>, and the ov pa\\ov. 1 We know 
 from Diogenes that Protagoras is the authority for saying 
 that in regard to everything there are two opposing 
 arguments. 2 The saying " to determine nothing " is 
 quoted from Timon's Python by Diogenes, 3 and the 
 other two mentioned are also attributed to him by 
 Aristocles. 4 We have also in the ov paXkov a direct 
 connection with Democritus, although the difference in 
 the meaning which he attributed to it is shown by 
 Sextus. 5 So while the expression is the same, the 
 explanation of it given by Pyrrho must have been 
 different. It would seem probable that Pyrrho used 
 all of these three sayings, from the account of Diogenes, 
 and that even then they gave rise to the accusation of 
 the Dogmatics, that simply by possessing such sayings 
 the Sceptics dogmatised, 6 for the refutation of this used 
 by Sextus occurs in the old account of the sayings, 
 namely, that these formulae include also themselves 
 in the meaning, as a cathartic removes itself together 
 with other harmful objects. 7 
 
 In comparing the later Pyrrhonism with the teach- 
 ings of Pyrrho, we would sharply contrast the moral 
 
 1 Hyp. i. 202 ; Diog. ix. 8, 51 ; Photius Bekker's ed. 280 H. 
 
 2 Photius Bekker's ed. 280 H. 3 Hyp. i. 197; Diog. ix. 11. 76. 
 4 Aristocles ap. Eusebium, Praep. Ev. xiv.18. 5 Hyp. i. 213. 
 
 6 Diog. ix. 11, 6876. 7 Diog. ix. 11, 76; Hyp. i. 206. 
 
88 Sextua Empii-icus and Greek Scepticism. 
 
 attitude of the two. With Pyrrho equilibrium of soul 
 a means to be applied to his positive theory of life; 
 with tin- later Pyrrhoneans it was the end to be attained. 
 We would attribute, however, the empirical tendency 
 shown during the whole history of Pyrrhonism to Pyrrho 
 M ita "rininator. He WfU) an empirical philosopher, and 
 the result of his influence in this respect, as seen in the 
 subsequent development of the school, stands in m;i 
 contrast to tin- dialrti<- spirit of the Academic Scepsis. 
 The empirieism of the school is shown in its scientific 
 lore, in the fact that so many of the Sceptics were 
 physicians, and in the character of the ten Tropes of 
 eVo^?;. We may safely affirm that tin- foundation 
 principles of Pyrrhonism are due to Pyrrho, and the 
 originality which gave the school its power. The 
 elaborated arguments, however, and the details of its 
 formulae belong to later times. 
 
 Con ii n_; now to the relation of Pyrrhonism to the 
 Academy, the connection between the two is difficult 
 to exactly determine, between the time of Pyrrho and 
 that of Aenesidemus. Scepticism in the Academy 
 however, never absolutely identical with Pyrrhonism, 
 although at certain periods of the history of the Aca- 
 demy the difference was slight. We can trace throughout 
 the evolution of doubt, as shown to us in Pyrrhonism., 
 and in Academic Scepticism, the different results which 
 followed the difference in origin of the two movements, 
 and these differences followed according to general laws 
 of development of thought. Arcesilaus, who introduced 
 doubt into the Academy, claimed to return to the dia- 
 lectic of Socrates, and suppressing the lectures, 1 which 
 1 Compare Maccoll Op. tit. p. 36. 
 
Critical Examination of Pyrrhonism. 89 
 
 were the method of teaching in the later schools of 
 philosophy, introduced discussions instead, as being 
 more decidedly a Socratic method. Although, accord- 
 ing to Sextus, he was the one leader of the Academy 
 whose Scepticism most nearly approached that of 
 -^Pyrrhonism, 1 yet underneath his whole teaching lay 
 that dialectic principle so thoroughly in opposition to 
 the empiricism of Pyrrho. The belief of Socrates and 
 Plato in the existence of absolute truth never entirely 
 lost its influence over the Academy, but was like a 
 hidden germ, destined to reappear after Scepticism had 
 passed away. It finally led the Academy back to Dog- 
 matism, and prepared the way for the Eclecticism with 
 which it disappeared from history. 
 
 The history of Pyrrhonism and that of Academic 
 Scepticism were for a time contemporaneous. The im- 
 mediate follower of Pyrrho, Timon, called by Sextus the 
 " prophet of Pyrrho," 2 was a contemporary of Arcesilaus. 
 That he did not consider the Scepticism of the Academy 
 identical with Pyrrhonism is proved from the fact that 
 he did not himself join the Academy, but was, on the 
 contrary, far from doing so. That he regarded Arcesilaus 
 as a Dogmatic is evident from his writings. 3 One day, 
 on seeing the chief of the Academy approaching, he 
 cried out, " What are you doing here among us who are 
 free?" 4 After the death of Timon, the Pyrrhonean 
 School had no representative till the time of Ptolemy 
 of Gyrene, 5 and Greek Scepticism was represented by 
 the Academy. That Pyrrho had a strong influence 
 over Arcesilaus, the founder of the Middle Academy, 
 
 1 Hyp. i. 232. 2 Adv. Math. I. 53. 3 Diog. iv. 6, 33, 34. 
 4 Diog. ix. 12, 114. 5 Diog. ix. 12, 115. 
 
DO >^<tu8 Empirics and Greek Scepticism. 
 
 is evident 1 ; but there was also never a time when the 
 Academy entirely broke away from all the teachings of 
 Plato, even in their deepest doubt. 2 It is true that 
 Arcesilaus removed, nominally as well as in spirit, some 
 of the dialogues of Plato from the Academy, but only 
 those that bore a dogmatic character, while those that 
 presented a more dvide<l mode of questioning, 
 
 without reaching any decided result, men regarded as 
 authority for Scepticism. 
 
 Sextus docs not deny that Arce.silaus was almost a 
 Pyrrhonean, but he claims that his Pyrrhonism was 
 only apparent, and not real, and was used as a cloak to 
 hide his loyalty to the teachings of Plato. 3 As Ariston 
 said of him, 4 "Plato before, Pyrrho behind, Diodorus in 
 the middle." Sextus also characterises the method of 
 Arcesilaus as dialectic, 5 and we know from Cicero that 
 it was his pride to pretend to return to the dialectic of 
 Socrates. 
 
 It is interesting to note that Sextus, in his refuta- 
 tion of the position that the Academy is the same as 
 Pyrrhonism, takes up the entire development of Aca- 
 demic thought from the time of Plato till that of 
 Antiochus, and does not limit the argument to Scep- 
 ticism under Arcesilaus. The claim made by some 
 that the two schools were the same, is stated by him, 6 
 and the word 'some' probably refers to members of 
 both schools at different periods of their history. Sextus 
 recognises three Academies, although he remarks that 
 some make even a further division, calling that of Philo 
 
 1 Diog. iv. 6, 33. 4 Diog. iv. 6, 33. 
 
 2 Diog. iv. 6, 32. 5 Hyp. I. 234. 
 
 3 Hyp. i. 234. 6 Hyp. I. 220. 
 
Critical Examination of Pyrrhonism. 91 
 
 and Charmides, the fourth, and that of Antiochus and 
 his followers, the fifth. 
 
 That many in the Academy, and even outside of it, 
 regarded Plato as a Sceptic, and an authority for sub- 
 sequent Scepticism, we find both from Sextus and 
 Diogenes. 1 As Lewes justly remarks, one could well 
 find authority for Scepticism in the works of Plato, as 
 indeed the Academicians did, but not when the sum 
 total of his teachings was considered. The spirit of 
 Plato's teachings was dogmatic, as Sextus most de- 
 cidedly recognises, and as Aenesidemus and Menodotus 2 
 recognised before him. 3 Sextus himself shows us that 
 Plato's idealism and ethical teachings can have nothing 
 in common with Scepticism, for if he accepts the 
 desirability of the virtuous life, and the existence of 
 Providence, he dogmatises; and if he even regards 
 them as probable, he gives preference to one set of 
 ideas over another, and departs from the sceptical 
 character. Sextus characterises the sceptical side of 
 Plato's writings as mental gymnastics, 4 which do not 
 authorise his being called a Sceptic, and affirms that 
 Plato is not a Sceptic, since he prefers some unknown 
 things to others in trustworthiness. The ethical differ- 
 ence underlying the teachings of the Academy and 
 Pyrrhonism, Sextus was very quick to see, and although 
 it is very probable that the part of the Hypotyposes 
 which defines the difference between the Academy and 
 Pyrrhonism may be largely quoted from the introduc- 
 tion to Aenesidemus' works, yefc Sextus certainly gives 
 these statements the strong stamp of his approval. He 
 
 1 Hyp. i. 221 ; Diog. ix. 11, 72. 3 Hyp. i. 222. 
 
 2 Bekker's edition of Hyp. i. 222. 4 Hyp. i. 223. 
 
!):! >SV./-///..s EmpirlcuH and Greek Scepticism. 
 
 coi idem us the Academy because of the theory that good 
 and evil exist, or if this cannot be decidedlv proved, yet 
 that it is more probable that what is railed good < 
 than the contrary. 1 
 
 The whole Academic teaching of probabilities con- 
 tradicted the standpoint of the Sceptics that our ideas 
 are equal as regards trustworthiness and untrustworthi- 
 ness, 2 for the Academicians declared that some ideas 
 are probable and some improbable, and they make a 
 difference even in those ideas that they call probable. 
 
 Sextus claims that there are three fundamental 
 grounds of difference between Pyrrhonism and the 
 Academy. The first is the doctrine of probability 
 which the Academicians accept in regard to the supe- 
 rior trust worth in- me ideas over others. 8 The 
 second is the different way in which the two schools 
 follow their teachers. The Pyrrhoneans follow without 
 striving or strong effort, or even strong inclination, as a 
 child follows his teacher, while the Academicians follow 
 with sympathy and assent, as Carneades and Clito- 
 machus affirm. 4 The third difference is in the aim, for 
 the Academicians follow what is probable in life. The 
 Sceptics follow nothing, but live according to laws, 
 customs, and natural feelings undogmatu -ally. 5 
 
 The difference between the later teaching of the 
 Academy and Pyrrhonism is evident, and Sextus treats 
 of it briefly, as not requiring discussion, 6 as Philo taught 
 that the nature of facts is incomprehensible, and Antio- 
 chus transferred the Stoa to the Academy. It is therefore 
 
 1 Hyp. i. 226. * Hyp. i. 230. 
 
 2 Hyp. i. 227. 5 Hyp. i. 231. 
 
 3 Hyp. i. 229. Hyp. i. 235. 
 
Critical Examination of Pyrrhonism. 93 
 
 evident, from the comparison which we have made, 
 that we do not find in the Academy, with which Scep- 
 ticism after the death of Timon was so long united, the 
 exact continuance of Pyrrhonism. The philosophical 
 enmity of the two contemporaries, Timon and Arcesilaus, 
 the Academician who had most in common with Pyr- 
 rhonism, is an expression of the fundamental incom- 
 patibility between the two schools. 
 
 During all the chequered history of the Academy 
 the dormant idealism was there, underlying the outward 
 development. Although during the time of Arcesilaus 
 and Carneades the difference was so slight as to seem 
 a mere matter of form of expression, yet the different 
 foundations on which the two schools stood was always 
 recognisable. On the one hand there was the germ of 
 idealism which was destined to awake to a new life, 
 and on the other, the attempt at absolute negation 
 which was to result in the final extinction of Pyrrho- 
 nism. We find in both, it is true, especially in the 
 time of Arcesilaus, the aim of eVo^. 1 Both placed 
 great weight on IcroaOeveia^ or the equal value of 
 opposing arguments. 2 The foundation of the GTro^rj 
 was, however, different in the two cases. Arcesilaus 
 founded his on dialectic, while Pyrrho's was empirical. 
 
 The Pyrrhonean believed that ideas give us no 
 knowledge of the outer world ; the Academic Sceptic 
 believed that we cannot distinguish between true and 
 false ideas, so such knowledge is impossible. The 
 Pyrrhonean denied that truth could exist in ideas 
 because of their contradictory nature, and consequently 
 
 1 Hyp. i. 232. 2 Diog. ix. 73; Hyp. n. 130; in, 65. 
 
91 Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism. 
 
 the existence of all truth, fjirj&ev elvat, rfj aXr^Bela eVl 
 TrdvTcav^sThe Academic Sceptic granted that the 
 _truth was possibly contained in ideas, but affirn 
 _that it could never be known to us. The Pyrrhonean__ 
 prided themselves on still being seekers for although^ 
 ordinary ideas are too contradictory knowle 
 
 of the outer world, they did not deny that >ueh know- 
 ledge might be possible, but simply susp-nd-d the 
 j i \ dgment regarding it. To the Pyrrhonean the re- 
 correspond <-<l to tin- method. All ideas thus tar known 
 revealed nothing of the truth, therefore he still 
 Tii- A( i i( mician tried logically to prove that the truth 
 is impossible to find. It is the relation of the dialec- 
 tician to the empiricist, and the two varieties of 
 
 xplained by their difference in ori;_ 
 ' In Pyrrhonism there was no con>ti uctive element. In 
 the Academic Scepsis such an element was found 
 throughout all its hi.Mory in tin- theory of Probability. 
 Arcesilaus himself laid great stress upon this doctrine, 
 ich Sextus caret ull\ !y inconsist- 
 
 ent with Pyrrhonism. Arcesilaus plainly teaches that, 
 having suspended one's judgment in regard to m;r 
 of knowledge, one should control his choices, his refu 
 and his actions by the probable. 3 
 
 After Antiochus introduced Eclecticism into the 
 Academy, Pyrrhonism was the only representative of 
 (Jreek Scepticism, and it flourished for over two cen- 
 turies after our era, and then also disappeared, no more 
 ;lar philosophical school. 
 
 1 Diog. ix. 11, 61. -Hyp. 1.229. 
 
 - Ma, , 
 
Critical Examination of Pyrrhonism. 95 
 
 Having considered at length the essence of Pyrrho- 
 nism as presented by Sextus Empiricus, it now remains 
 to briefly note the characteristics that formed its strength 
 and weakness, and the causes of its final downfall. 
 Herbart says that every philosopher is a Sceptic in the 
 beginning, bat every Sceptic remains always in the 
 beginning. This remark may well be applied to Pyr- 
 rhonism. We find in its teachings many fundamental 
 philosophical truths which might have formed the be- 
 ginning of great philosophical progress, but wh^ch^were 
 never developed to any positive results. The teachings 
 of Pyrrhonism were some of them well fitted to prepare 
 the way to idealism. The great idea of the relativity of 
 Vorstellungen is made very prominent by the ten Tropes 
 of eVo^r/. Aenesidemus, in his eight Tropes against 
 aetiology, shows the absurdity of the doctrine of causality 
 when upheld on materialistic grounds. That was to him 
 final, errel OVK ecrrai ainov. He could not divine that 
 although the result which he presented was logical, it 
 only led to a higher truth. It was reserved for the 
 greatest of modern philosophers to reveal to the world 
 that causality is a condition, and a necessary condition, 
 of thought. When Aenesidemus proved by his seventh 
 Trope that causality is subjective, he regarded it as fatal 
 to the doctrine ; yet this conclusion was a marked step 
 in advance in critical philosophy, although Aesesidemus- 
 could not himself see it in all its bearings. The great 
 difference between Aenesidemus and Kant is the differ- 
 ence between the materialist and the believer in sub- 
 jective reality. Both agreed in the unknown nature of 
 the Ding an sich, but this was to the Pyrrhonist the end 
 of all his philosophy ; to Kant, however, the beginning. 
 
!H> Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism. 
 
 Pyrrhonism has rendered, notwithstandii . ats 
 
 of fatal weakness, marked service to the world in science, 
 philosophy, ethics, and religion. It quickened scientific 
 thought by emphasising empirical methods of invc 
 % gation, and 1>\ all results i'ound'-d without 
 
 sufficient data upon false hypotheses. If, instea 
 denying the possibility of all sciei of the 
 
 .want of a criterion of the truth of phenomena, the" 
 Fyrrhonists had comprehended the possibility of a 
 science of phenomena, they mi^ht have l.-d the world"" 
 in scientific progress. 1 
 jn th IS to thought that t: 
 
 y j)n dogmatic beliefs occasioned. Pyrrhonism brought 
 together all the must prominent theories of the old 
 schools of philosophy to test tin 
 
 their contradictious, and this very process of critici-m 
 often d< uioii.xti -ated the power oTthe truth which they 
 stained. 
 
 Sextus Empiricus was often charged by the Church 
 Fathers with corrupting religious belief, and yet the 
 st service which Pyrrhonism has rendered the 
 world was in religious and ethical lines. This sen 
 did not, naturally, consist in destroying belief in al. 
 lute truth, as the Sceptic professed to do, but in preparing 
 the way to find it. The bold attacks of Scepticism on 
 all truth led men to investigate ethical and religious 
 teachings, to examine the grounds of their belief, and 
 to put in practical use the right of reason and free 
 discussion. 
 
 Scepticism was the antecedent of freedom of con- 
 science and rational criticism, 2 and the absolute right of 
 
 1 Compare Lewes Op. cit. p. 463. 2 Compare Cbaignet Op. cit. p. 460. 
 

 
 Critical Examination of Pyrrhonism. 97 
 
 scientific thought. The Sceptics, however, reaped none 
 of the benefits of their own system. They remained, as 
 it were, always on the threshold of possible progress. 
 With the keys to great discoveries in their hands, the 
 doors of philosophical and scientific advancement were 
 for ever closed to them by the limitations of their own 
 system. The inherent weakness of Pyrrhonism lay in its . ; 
 psychological inconsistency and in its negative character. 
 I think that weTmay safely say that Pyrrhonism was the 
 most consistent system of Scepticism ever offered to the 
 world, and yet it proves most decidedly that complete 
 Scepticism is psychologically impossible. A man may 
 give up his belief in one set of ideas, and, if they are 
 ideas that are popularly accepted, he will be called a 
 Sceptic, as was the case with Hume. He must, however, 
 replace these ideas by others equally positive, and then 
 he is no longer a Sceptic, but a Dogmatic, for he believes 
 in something. 
 
 We have shown that the greatest thinkers of Pyrrho- 
 nism, Pyrrho, Aenesidemus, and Agrippa, were not 
 examples of absolute Scepticism, and although Sextus 
 Empiricus realised what consistency demanded in this 
 respect, and affirmed on almost every page that he was 
 asserting nothing, yet there is not a paragraph of his 
 books in which he does not, after all, dogmatise on some 
 subject. Complete Scepticism is contrary to the funda- 
 mental laws of language, as all use of verbs involves 
 some affirmation. The Pyrrhonists realised this, and 
 therefore some of them wrote nothing, like Pyrrho, 
 their leader, and others advocated afyacria 1 as one of 
 the doctrines of their system. 
 
 1 Hyp. i. 192. 
 
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