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^ V 
 
 Critical Study ol Geman Tactics 
 
 AND OF 
 
 Tlie New German Regulations 
 
 BY MAJOR DE PARDIEU. 
 
 Authorized Translation 
 
 By CAPTAIN CHARLES F. MARTIN 
 
 Third U. S. Cavalry 
 
 • -» »»•»■»•< 
 
 UNITED STATES CAVALRY ASSOCIATION, 
 
 Port Leavenworth, Kansas. 
 
 1912 
 

 COPYRIGHT, 1912, 
 BY CAPTAIN CHARLES F. MARTIN. 
 
 / ... .- 
 
 
 PRC:SS OF KETCHESON PRINTING CO. 
 LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS, U. S. A. 
 
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. 
 
 This study of German Tactics by Major Pardieu, 
 Chief of Staff of the Military Governor of Dunquerque, 
 was immediately after its publication in France trans- 
 lated into German and into Russian ; it would not have 
 received this prompt attention by the Germans and the 
 Russians had it not been a work of unusual importance. 
 
 The translator ventures to hope that it will be of 
 special value to officers of our service, not only because 
 it presents a comprehensive resume of the German tacti- 
 cal creeds, but also, and more especially, because it con- 
 stantly compares the German and the French tactical 
 methods. It shows the essential difference between the 
 tactics of the two great miHtary nations. 
 
 "A Russian, " says the author, "is different from a 
 Japanese, a Turk from an Italian. " So a Frenchman 
 is different from a German, and an American is not like 
 either. It is well not to lose sight of the principle, often 
 enunciated by Major Pardieu, that no given system 
 of tactics can be applied in the same manner to men of 
 different temperaments. The psychology of the soldier 
 must be studied and the system adapted thereto. 
 
 It seems to the translator that it is because of this 
 necessity of studying the psychology of the soldier that 
 we should find valuable the work of Major Pardieu, 
 who points out where and why the greatest military 
 thinkers of France and Germany differ in their methods 
 of application of the fundamental principles of tactics. 
 
 Charles F. Martin, 
 
 Captain Third Cavalry. 
 Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 
 
 September 30. 1912. 
 
 259822 
 
FOREWORD. 
 
 The Germans followed with the keenest interest the 
 war in Manchuria, in which were engaged their pupils 
 in tactics — the Japanese. It was with just pride that 
 they learned of the successful application by the Nip- 
 ponese of the principles of tactics which they had taught 
 them. 
 
 This war in Manchuria had a considerable influence 
 upon German military opinions. Its teachings were 
 passionately discussed; and often, upon information 
 shown by subsequent investigation to have been false 
 and exaggerated, systems were built up and theories 
 expounded. 
 
 For many years, thinking men had already been 
 debating the regulation principles in force ; von Scherff , 
 Balck and Boguslawski on one side and von der Goltz, 
 Loringhoven and Schlichting on the other were arguing 
 over the questions of forms of combat, the initiative 
 to be left to subordinates, methods of instruction, etc. 
 
 After the experience of the battles in the Far East, 
 it appeared necessary to revise the existing regulations, 
 which dated from the period between 1888 and 1895. 
 The work of revising the German Regulations, which 
 
 The following abbreviations are used in the course of this work: 
 I. R. — Infantry Regulations; A. R. — Artillery Regulations; H. A. 
 R. — Heavy Artillery Regulations; C. R. — Cavalry Regulations; 
 M. G. R. — Machine Gun Regulations; F. S. R. — Field Service 
 Regulation. 
 
 The numbers, usually in parentheses, indicate the paragraphs 
 of these various regulations. 
 
[6] 
 
 was commenced in 1906, has just been terminated. All 
 of them have been revised and made to agree. 
 
 They bear the following dates : 
 
 Infantry Regulations: May 29, 1906. 
 Artillery Regulations: June 25, 1907. 
 Field Service: March 22, 1908. 
 Heavy Artillery: November 10, 1908. 
 Cavalry Regulations: April 3, 1909. 
 Firing Regulations: October 1, 1909. 
 
 The study of these regulations is most interesting 
 and most useful; we glean from them the general and 
 special principles of the German tactics. 
 
 It seems now to be opportune to make a resume of 
 them in a work treating of them as a whole, and to dis- 
 cuss their various precepts. 
 
 But the study of its regulations is not sufficient to 
 gain a knowledge of an army from a tactical point of 
 view. One must know first its habits, its traditions, 
 its morale; its doctrines must be studied in the book 
 of its authors of repute who represent the thought of the 
 staff and of the different arms. 
 
 ''When regulations are conceived in a spirit as 
 broad as that of the present regulations," says very 
 judiciously La Revue Militaire des Arniees Etrangeres 
 (No. 982, p. 251), "not even a very careful analysis of 
 the texts can suffice to fix definite and undebatable in- 
 terpretations of the principles, set forth in them. 
 
 "Regulations are of value only through the spirit 
 in which they are applied; it is only in the long run 
 then that their influence can be exercised, especially in 
 ;an army in which the force of tradition is as strong as it 
 is in the German Army." 
 
[7] 
 
 Likewise it must not be forgotten that the tactical 
 methods of an army must conform to the physical and 
 moral characteristics of the soldiers that compose it. 
 The great strategical or tactical principles of war are 
 the same for all armies; but the details of execution, 
 the procedure must vary according to the morale, the 
 temperament and the mentality of the men to whom 
 they are applied. A Russian is different from a Jap- 
 anese, a Turk from an Italian. It is, therefore, natural 
 that regulations should differ from one army to another. 
 
 The great difficulty in the adaptation of the regula- 
 tions to the tactical necessities imposed by the armament 
 and to the special character of the army for which they 
 are made. 
 
 Before studying the regulations of an army, it is 
 necessary in order well to understand the spirit of them 
 to be acquainted with the special aptitudes as well as 
 with the character of the nation. 
 
 The German army is sufficiently well known for us 
 not to have to speak of it. It is known what a good 
 material for war, as we may term it, the German soldier 
 is. He is thoroughly disciplined, he is vigorous, he is 
 brave. Moreover, at the last large maneuvers he showed 
 admirable endurance. 
 
 What he lacks most is the spirit of initiative, quick 
 intelligence, the faculty of getting out of difficulty. 
 
 Excellent when supported and when under a chief, 
 whom he blindly obeys, he is lost as soon as he is alone 
 or when he no longer feels himself to be led. His morale 
 weakens, he is incapable of making resistance or of 
 taking the initative. 
 
 The German soldier is heavy physically and morally. 
 He has less fiber than the French soldier. He allows 
 
[8] 
 
 himself to be discouraged less easily, but when he has 
 lost his moral force he is incapable of again getting 
 himself in hand like the latter. After Jena and Auer- 
 stadt Prussia no longer made the slightest resistance. 
 
 As will be ascertained in the course of the present 
 study, the new tactics imposed by the armaments favor 
 the French soldier and appear prejudicial to our neigh- 
 bors on the other side of the Rhine. 
 
 German authors confess it themselves. We borrow 
 from the famous book, A Summer Night's Dream, (by 
 an old infantryman), which made such a stir in military 
 circles twenty years ago, the following estimate, which 
 is still accurate: 
 
 "The German soldier, accustomed in time of peace 
 to strict discipline, rigid attitudes and absolute obedi- 
 ence, is, in action, disconcerted by disorder, and thrown 
 into confusion by the absence of his leaders. He has 
 need in the hour of danger of the presence of an officer. 
 Under the influence of his officers he will do anything 
 that duty and discipline demand; he will follow his 
 leader to certain death with calm and dignified enthusi- 
 asm, but left in a crowd he will quickly lose his head and 
 forget what his education in time of peace will have 
 taught him. 
 
 "It is not so with the soldier of a Latin race, who has 
 a strong tendency to act for himself and in whom in- 
 dividual qualifications stand out to a very marked 
 degree." 
 
 In the pages that follow, has been sketched a study 
 of the principal points of German tactics as they are 
 deduced from the new regulations and from the discus- 
 sions to which they have given rise. 
 
[9] 
 
 An effort has been made to find the spirit and the 
 tendency in the letter of the regulations, and to make 
 an estimate of their value according to the German 
 character and temperament. We have passed through 
 the sieve of criticism (which has been made as impartial 
 as possible) the "regulation" precepts and the tactical 
 ideas of our powerful neighbors. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 Page 
 
 Translator's Preface 3 
 
 Author's Preface 5 
 
 PART I 
 
 DETAILS PERTAINING TO THE THREE ARMS; 
 Infantry, Artillery, Cavalry. 
 
 Infantry 
 
 Squad leaders 15 
 
 Chiefs of platoons 17 
 
 Deployment 18 
 
 Marching under fire. 18 
 
 Bayonet action 21 
 
 Use of ground 22 
 
 Artillery 
 
 Reasons for German Artillery increase 25 
 
 Protection of the artillery 29 
 
 Fire 32 
 
 Reconnaissance 33 
 
 Communication 35 
 
 Mission of the howitzers 37 
 
 Heavy howitzers, 38 
 
 Curved fire 39 
 
 Value of the German howitzers 41 
 
 Material and moral effects of fire 43 
 
 Moral effect 48 
 
 Cavalry 
 
 Cavalry combat 51 
 
 Cavalry screen 55 
 
 Dismounted action 57 
 
[12] 
 
 PART II 
 THE BATTLE. 
 
 Preliminary Remarks page 
 
 Spirit of the offensive 64 
 
 Development of initiative 65 
 
 Necessity of communication 67 
 
 The united attack 68 
 
 The Offensive 
 
 Information 70 
 
 Attacking the hostile cavalry 71 
 
 Cavalry patrols 71 
 
 Large corps of advance cavalry 73 
 
 Cavalry and the cyclist corps 76 
 
 Advance Guards; Marching to the Attack 
 
 Mission of the advance guard 79 
 
 Organization and formation of the advance guard 81 
 
 Marching to the attack 82 
 
 Deployment from column 82 
 
 Directions to be assigned to columns 84 
 
 Meeting Engagements 
 
 Preliminary combat 86 
 
 Artillery, The 
 
 Deployment 86 
 
 Opening fire 87 
 
 Critical discussion of the use of artillery 90 
 
 Infantry, The 
 
 Deployment 93 
 
 Fronts 95 
 
 Fire 99 
 
 Assault, the 102 
 
 Preparation of the assault by the artillery 104 
 
 Infantry batteries 105 
 
 Advance of the reserves 106 
 
 Pursuit 107 
 
 Retreat 109 
 
 Breaking off the action 110 
 
 Attacking the Enemy When He is in a Fortified 
 Position 
 
 Enemy on the defensive 112 
 
 Attack of a fortified field position 115 
 
[13] 
 
 GENERAL TACTICS. 
 
 Critical Study of the German Offensive pagb 
 
 1. The Advance Guard 119 
 
 Generalities 119 
 
 The offensive advance guard 120 
 
 Secutity and Information 124 
 
 Tactical rdle of the German advance guard 126 
 
 2. General Reserve 128 
 
 3. The Enveloping Movement 130 
 
 The Decisive Attack 130 
 
 4. Inviolability of Fronts^-. 132 
 
 5. General Criticism 134 
 
 THE DEFENSIVE. 
 
 German Defensive Combat 
 
 Criticism thereof 144 
 
 Occupation of a Defensive Position 
 
 Preparation of the position 144 
 
 Infantry and artillery 145 
 
 Single postition to be defended 148 
 
 Combat 
 
 Counter attack 155 
 
 The general reserve 157 
 
 Strategical Synopsis 159 
 
A Critical Study of German Tactics 
 
 AND OF 
 
 The New German Regulations. 
 
 PART I. 
 
 Details Concerning the three Arms, 
 Infantry, Artillery, Cavalry. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 INFANTRY. 
 
 The Infantry Regulations of May 29th, 1906, are 
 the oldest of the new regulations. They have been the 
 basis of the tactical development effected within the 
 last few years in Germany. They are not confined 
 merely to the precepts pertaining especially to the In- 
 fantry, but contain as well certain rules of tactics for 
 the three arms. These latter will not be considered 
 until the discussion of the subject of the battle. 
 
 In this chapter we shall take a glance at the part 
 that especially concerns the Infantry, and consider the 
 points of difference from the French Regulations. 
 
 group leaders. 
 The question (which we have already referred to) 
 of the character of the German soldier, i. e., that of his 
 
K.^^>-v [16] 
 
 slow wittedness and his lack of initiative, has been a 
 cause of uneasiness to those commissioned to revise the 
 regulations. 
 
 The extended order, absolutely imposed by the 
 conditions of modem combat, is not favorable to the 
 German infantry. Hence, the regulations, while recog- 
 nizing the necessity of extended formations, have sought 
 to preserve at least a certain arrangement of groups 
 under the authority of a leader. There has been con- 
 stituted what is called a group or squad, that is to say 
 an assemblage of four files. This little group is to 
 maintain its cohesion as far as possible; it has a re- 
 sponsible leader. 
 
 This leader directs the march in open order ; he re- 
 peats the orders of the chiefs of section or takes the 
 initiative as to orders in case of necessity; he urges on 
 his men in the advance. According to the orders of the 
 chief of section, the squad leader regulates the fire; he 
 causes it to begin or to cease, according to circumstances. 
 "He takes part in the firing only when his duties per- 
 mit him to do so." (I. R. 165.) 
 
 Thus is seen the attention given in the regulations 
 to the matter of never abandonning the soldier to him- 
 self and of keeping upon him as much as possible the 
 yoke of authority to which he is accustomed. Even in 
 the most extended formations the soldier finds near him 
 an active authority and a vigilant surveillance. 
 
 We have nothing similar to this in France; we do 
 not need it. Our corporal, it is true, directs his squad 
 when it is isolated or separated ; but in firing, in action, 
 the corporal is no more than a private. He takes part 
 in the firing Hke the other soldiers; he no longer com- 
 mands ; let us hope only that he will set an example. 
 
[17] 
 
 CHIEFS OF PLATOONS. 
 
 The subaltern officer finds his role broadening more 
 and more in modem warfare; he must be a brain, he 
 must be a leader, he must be an example. 
 
 Even more in Germany than in France has the 
 role of the platoon leader become of the greatest im- 
 portance; the German regulations give him initiative 
 but also responsibility ; his duties are the same as those 
 prescribed in France. The regulations insist upon the 
 necessity of his getting his men back in hand as soon as 
 circumstances permit; one feels that our neighbors 
 always fear that the men on the firing line may escape 
 from the authority of a leader. 
 
 The Germans count absolutely upon the bravery 
 and the devotion to duty of their officers; they are 
 right. More and more will warfare of the present age 
 become a war of leaders, more and more will it be 
 necessary to have sterling officers in whom can be placed 
 absolute confidence. 
 
 In his very interesting observations, Captain Solo- 
 view, after returning from Manchuria, wrote: "From 
 the first rifle shot the center of gravity is found in the 
 officer, and then is made manifest his true rdle, the 
 enormous responsiblity that rests upon him. In action, 
 the officer must be more than ever a leader, and the 
 discipline must be of iron. * * * Unfortunate are 
 the troops that are not in time of peace imbued to the 
 core with the principles of discipline!" 
 
 The Germans are imbued with these principles. In 
 time of peace their officers are surrounded with prestige, 
 under conditions that to us may seem exaggerated but 
 which correspond well to the roles of these officers on 
 the battlefield. 
 
[18] 
 
 The discipline is indeed of iron in a country where 
 discipline is found in the customs and manners; nat- 
 urally it is there all the more necessary that troops shall 
 advance only upon the condition of being led. 
 
 A few remarks as to details: In Germany, the 
 officer, who is posted ten paces in front of his squad 
 leaders, is accompanied on the battle field by a bugler 
 and by two estimators of distance. These estimators, in 
 addition to their special duties, have that of observing 
 the enemy and the neighboring units; the bugler has 
 that of keeping in touch with the captain. Thus is 
 manifested in the very smallest units, the anxiety con- 
 cerning the maintaining of connection, now so import- 
 ant. 
 
 If the Germans require the oflficer to set an example 
 in time of danger, they have also been careful not to 
 mark him out to the enemy's blows ; they have clothed 
 him so that in combat he is difficult to distinguish from 
 the soldier.* 
 
 DEPLOYMENT AND MARCHING UNDER FIRE. 
 
 The deployments and marchings are executed after 
 the same general principles as in France. The regula- 
 tions recommend throwing out at the beginning a dense 
 line of skirmishers in order to acquire at once the su- 
 
 *An order from the headquarters of the Emperor's government 
 under date of February 23, 1910, directed that all officers have a field 
 uniform absolutely similar to that of the troops. 
 
 In France, an officer can be recognized at the greatest distance 
 in the midst of his troops, thanks to his dissimilar unform; by the 
 aiguilletes (as conspicuous as they are useless), which ornament his 
 breast, a staff officer can be distinguished from a troop officer; like- 
 wise a general officer is recognizable, his uniform differing sufficiently 
 from that of other officers. Radical measures should be taken to 
 correct this. 
 
[19] 
 
 periority of fire. To this end a company will deploy, 
 usually, not more than one or two platoons; for, "upon 
 the offensive, the company in the battalion can scarcely 
 deploy more than two platoons on the front it has at its 
 disposal." (I. R. 463). But the battalion commander 
 will put in the first line the number of companies neces- 
 sary for the object to be attained. 
 
 The Germans fear greatly the mixing up of units, 
 and seek by every means to avoid it. Hence, they al- 
 ways recommend fighting with units distributed in 
 depth. The principle is entirely correct; but in a par- 
 ticular case, for the deployment of a company, it might 
 be debated. If a very dense firing line is desired, there 
 must be deployed at the beginning a great number of 
 platoons. As we shall see farther on, the fronts are be- 
 coming more and more considerable in modem battles; 
 the battalion has therefore ample room for the deploy- 
 ment of four, five or six platoons. If one or two platoons 
 in each company are deployed, the four captains re- 
 main with a support of from two to one platoons which, 
 independently of one another, they throw into action 
 when they judge it proper. These little successive re- 
 inforcements do not bring to the firing line a very strong 
 impulsion, certainly not an impulsion that will be suffi- 
 cient to carry forward the firing line or, because of the 
 suddenness of the support given, to gain the superiority 
 of fire. It seems preferable to put into the first line one 
 or two companies at full strength; the battalion sup- 
 ports to be formed by the other companies. The bat- 
 talion commander will then cause the reinforcement to 
 be made by entire companies. Such a reinforcement 
 
[20] 
 
 produces an appreciable effect which should be im- 
 mediately turned into a tangible result.* 
 
 Captain Soloview sees this matter in exactly the 
 same light; "The deployment on the firing line," he 
 says, "should be made by entire companies. There is 
 DO reason for company supports; they suffer losses, they 
 do not permit the immediate deployment of the power- 
 ful fire necessary from the beginning. " 
 
 The advance under fire is made as a rule, in Ger- 
 many, by rushes, or advances of entire platoons, the 
 fire of one platoon supporting the advance of the neigh- 
 boring platoon. The chief of a fraction has, in France, 
 full liberty to take the measures that to him appear 
 best to insure movement to the front. 
 
 Up to the present time, it does not seem that the 
 Germans have taken sufficient account of the effects 
 of infantry and artillery fire. In their last large ma- 
 neuvers we still saw skirmish lines that were too large 
 advancing imprudently on open ground, by rushes of 
 50 to 80 meters. Within the fighting ranges, between 
 800 and 400 meters, skirmishers, on open ground, 
 can advance only by infiltration, or at least by small, 
 widely spaced fractions running or crawling. The ad- 
 vance can no longer be made other wise: the engage- 
 ments in Manchuria have proved this. The Russians 
 and the Japanese are agreed on this point; it no longer 
 permits argument. 
 
 Hence the methods of advance still employed by 
 the Germans appear to be very hazardous. 
 
 *It should be remembered that the foreign company consists of 
 over 200 rifles; as a rule company supports are considered. We as 
 a rule do not contemplate them. — Translator. 
 
[21] 
 
 BAYONET ACTION. 
 
 "To attack," say the regulations, "is to carry a 
 firing line as near as possible to the enemy. The assault 
 with the arme blanche definitively seals his defeat." 
 (I. R.) 
 
 For a long time the Germans believed in the all- 
 powerfulness of fire action; the assault was only the 
 manifestation of the victory won by fire action. The 
 old Infantry Regulations said indeed : "In the majority 
 of cases the firing will produce such an effect that the 
 assaulting troops will find nothing more than a position 
 feebly defended or even abandoned by the enemy. " 
 
 The general staff wrote in its "Conclusions from 
 the War of the Transvaal": "The assault, the final 
 shock will merely cause a ripe fruit to fall. " 
 
 Today the Germans recognize bayonet action; the 
 War of Manchuria gave striking proof of the necessity 
 for and the importance of this action. 
 
 It has been established, of course, that the con- 
 centrated fire of the infantry and of the artillery is 
 necessary to prepare the attack, but that however vio- 
 lent they may be they rarely succeed in dislodging the 
 adversary. 
 
 "Never," says Captain Soloview, "were our posi- 
 tions taken, especially fortified positions, by fire action 
 alone. If we abandoned any to the enemy before actual 
 contact with him, it was by order and was not compelled 
 by the adversary. " 
 
 If by day a combat of fire action is sealed by the 
 hand-to-hand struggle, at night a fight is not made, so to 
 speak, except with the bayonet. 
 
 The losses experienced in Manchuria from side 
 arms amounted to eight per cent. ; that is, they were 
 
[22] 
 
 almost equal to those caused by artillery fire. These 
 figures have an eloquence that needs no discussion. 
 
 The bayonet has maintained, therefore, a prepon- 
 derant role ; the Germans have recognized that fact. 
 
 Their regulations give no definite instructions as to 
 the manner in which contact is to be produced and ac- 
 complished ; they are not at all precise as to the method 
 by which it is to be attained; we shall speak of this 
 again. 
 
 The Germans do not like fighting with the bayonet, 
 to which the French are so well adapted. It is a method 
 of fighting that requires suppleness, initiative, a trans- 
 port of enthusiasm, an impetuous fury. In all times 
 the French have excelled in hand-to-hand combat ; the 
 jurie jrangaise has been traditional for centuries. 
 
 THE USE OF GROUND. 
 
 "Ground can be utilized judiciously only when a 
 reconnaissance of it has been made in advance." (I. 
 R. 305). 
 
 The commanders of the different echelons must not 
 hesitate, before the fire has been opened, to precede 
 their troops for the purpose of reconnoitering the ground 
 over which the approach to a position is to be made. 
 
 The advance of the troops must be adapted to the 
 terrain, but from the time the firing is begun the care 
 devoted to this must not retard the forward movement, 
 nor, above all, oblige any of the fractions to remain in 
 rear. Art. 306. 
 
 It must be remarked that this use of ground is 
 limited, in the German regulations, to the preserving 
 of the direction. Hence under no pretext may a unit 
 leave the zone that has been assigned to it. The Ger- 
 
[23] 
 
 man regulations differ in this respect from our French 
 regulations. 
 
 "Whereas the French regulations," says the Revue 
 Militaire de VEtr anger, ''accord a predonderant in- 
 fluence to the utilization of the terrain, the German 
 regulations subordinate it pitilessly to the matter of 
 maintaining the direction. Each tactical unit, bat- 
 talion, regiment or brigade, must, within the marching 
 zone assigned to it, utilize to the best advantage the 
 accidents of the ground but Jt has not the right to en- 
 croach upon the zone of its neighbor ; it must not hesi- 
 tate, it if has at its disposition nothing but open ground, 
 to carry on the fight over it to the end." 
 
 These precepts are to be remembered, we shall 
 consider them again; they are pregnant with conse- 
 quences. 
 
 Exposed ground, then, is to be utilized for the ad- 
 vance of an attacking force ; but the distances are to be 
 increased and every precaution taken to avoid losses. 
 
 The regulations recognize that for the offensive 
 open ground is unfavorable, but if some is found in the 
 sector of an assaulting force it must be occupied and 
 utilized as advantageously as possible. 
 
 The riflemen are taught to make use of the shelter 
 they find on the ground. In the sector reserved to a 
 platoon, the men may move as they will to take ad- 
 vantage of shelter. It is forbidden to the chief of a 
 platoon to halt his men in a place where they would be 
 unable to use their weapons in the prone position. This 
 last prescription should be in the French regulations; 
 it is inadmissible that the skirmishers should be obliged, 
 in order to fire, to uncover themselves by taking a kneel- 
 ing or a standing position. 
 
[24] 
 
 The employment of hand entrenching tools is es- 
 pecially recommended for the defensive, and from the 
 examples of the Turks, the Boers and the Russians, it is 
 quite certain that in future wars a considerable use will 
 be made of field fortifications. 
 
 The Germans authorize these protective works 
 only on the defensive. 
 
 "On the offensive," say the Infantry Regulations 
 (Par. 313), "the tools may be used momentarily in 
 places where it is desirable merely to hold a position 
 taken. It must not, however, be forgotten that the 
 time of every halt is more profitable to the defenders 
 than to the assailants. If to this disadvantage there is 
 added the tremendous difficulty of getting a force of 
 infantry out of the shelter which it has painfully dug 
 for itself, to throw it under a violent fire of the enemy, 
 particular prudence will be exercised in using the spade 
 in the course of an attack." 
 
 These remarks are completely justified, and, as a 
 rule, the Germans never, in their maneuvers at least, 
 make use of their spades in offensive movements. It 
 seems that they are quite right. 
 
[25] 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 ARTILLERY. 
 
 For some years Germany has been considerably 
 
 increasing her armament ; she has equipped each army 
 
 corps with powerful artillery strength, which consists 
 
 at present of: 
 
 Guns, 
 
 21 batteries of field guns, six pieces per battery 126 
 
 3 batteries of six pieces of light howitzers, 10.5 cm. 18 
 
 Total 144 
 
 Eventually : 
 1 battalion of foot artillery of 4 companies of 4 
 
 heavy howitzers each, 15 cm J^ 
 
 160 
 
 Certain army corps intended to operate in the 
 zone of the hostile barrier forts will receive a supple- 
 mentary assignment of two batteries of mortars of 21 
 cm. 
 
 This considerable increase of artillery has just been 
 completed; the last army corps received in 1909 its 
 complement of armament. 
 
 France has had to follow the lead of Germany; 
 she has recently decided that her army corps shall 
 have 120 guns of 7.5 cm. In spite of this fact, the 
 French artillery will remain sensibly inferior in numbers 
 to that of the Germans. 
 
 REASONS FOR THE ARTILLERY INCREASE. 
 
 It is of interest to seek the reasons that induced our 
 neighbors to make the large increase in their artillery. 
 
[26] 
 
 It has been seen that the exigencies of modem tactics 
 in compelHng extended order in infantry action were 
 very unfavorable to the Germans; their infantry had 
 certainly lost some of its strength. The Germans them- 
 selves admitted that they were inferior to the Latins 
 in a mode of action in which individualism and initiative 
 played the principle roles. The German authorities 
 hav.e sought by acquiring numerical superiority in artil- 
 lery to counterbalance the undeniable loss of power 
 suffered by their infantry. 
 
 Napoleon made the statement: "Mediocre in- 
 fantry needs a great deal of artillery." In fact he 
 greatly increased his artillery in 1813 when youthful 
 infantrymen replaced those he had lost in Russia and 
 in Spain. 
 
 Assuredly, the German infantry is not mediocre, 
 we have recognized that fact ; but it has lost some of its 
 power. No longer being able to give close mutual sup- 
 port in the ranks and to maintain in the close thrall of 
 discipline an infantry command scattered about over a 
 battle-field, Germany has sought to frame it in solidly 
 with cannon and to keep it in hand by a never ending 
 support of shrapnel. She has hoped to be able to give 
 it satisfactory support by causing it to be accompanied 
 everywhere by artillery fire. 
 
 It is a fundamental principle now recognized that 
 infantry in modern combat needs artillery to succeed 
 in an attack of any importance. Simultaneous and 
 co-operative action of the two arms is a necessity. 
 
 In order to obtain this co-operation, it is neces- 
 sary always that the artillery be able with its fire to 
 strengthen that of the infantry. There are, therefore, 
 needed guns that are freed from all the strain of the 
 
[27] 
 
 artillery duel and are able to devote themselves solely 
 to the infantry struggle. 
 
 This result can be attained only by acquiring the 
 superiority of artillery fire. The French field piece is 
 unquestionably superior to the German. To obtain in 
 spite of that fact, a superiority on the battle field our 
 neighbors have insisted upon acquiring a numerical 
 superiority; they have created a formidable field artil- 
 lery. 
 
 Since artillery protected by shields is scarcely vul- 
 nerable to the projectiles habitually used in field pieces, 
 they have supplied their armies with howitzers capable 
 of destroying opposing artillery, even though it is de- 
 filaded, and of reaching sheltered objectives. 
 
 Still another reason has incited the Germans to 
 provide many of their army corps with heavy howitzers. 
 At the time when -their investigations looking to the 
 reconstruction of the materiel of their artillery were 
 being made, the Russo-Japanese War had just ended. 
 In that war almost all the battles had been seen to de- 
 velop about fortified positions; it had been observed, 
 as was shown at Plevna, what little effect the ordinary 
 projectile had against field fortifications and what diffi- 
 culty was experienced in approaching a position that 
 had been put in condition for defense. It had been 
 also proven how difficult it is with the field projectile to 
 destroy opposing artillery especially when it is defiladed. 
 
 These observations have led the Germans to create 
 batteries of very powerful guns using curved fire, able 
 to destroy fortifications, to reach the personnel and the 
 materiel when sheltered, and to destroy artillery with 
 shields. Plevna had caused the construction of Hght 
 howitzers; Mukden produced the heavy howitzers. 
 
[28] 
 
 Germany hopes that with numerical superiority^ 
 with the power of her light howitzers and eventually 
 that of her heavy howitzers, she will be assured abso- 
 lutely of the superiority of fire, the primary object of 
 her efforts. 
 
 Furthermore, the formidable increase of the Ger- 
 man artillery has been induced by some other reasons of 
 a tactical nature. Battles in future will be fought over 
 very large fronts. The Germans, as we shall see farther 
 on are strong partisans of enveloping action; they are 
 always extolling a frontal attack combined with a move- 
 ment overlapping a wing. In order to effect these 
 overlapping movements, if you are not superior in num- 
 bers, you must occupy the enemy and hold him on the 
 front. The enveloping movement might become dan- 
 gerous if the line in front should happen to be broken. 
 A numerous artillery facilitates the German tactics. 
 The front can be widened ; the gaps in open ground can 
 be guarded by the artillery and the machine guns. 
 
 Finally, a strong artillery is very useful in turning 
 movements ; it permits, with its converging fire, of ob- 
 taining a crushing effect upon the points of attack of the 
 outer flank of the enemy. 
 
 The motives which have led the Germans to in- 
 crease their artillery thus clearly appear. They arise 
 from moral considerations, from studies upon the effect 
 of fire, from experiences in the Manchurian war, and 
 finally from the necessities imposed by their fighting 
 tactics. 
 
129] 
 Some Technical Questions. 
 
 PROTECTION OF THE ARTILLERY. 
 
 One of the first questions pertaining to artillery 
 that it is interesting to study in the German documents 
 and books is that of the protection of the guns. 
 
 Artillery is protected by the shield, by entrench- 
 ments, and by means of defilading. What use is made 
 by the Germans of these means of protection ? 
 
 We know that the German gun shield protects the 
 gunner better than the French shield ; it is larger. That 
 is a slight advantage. 
 
 The German artilleryman takes great care to give 
 himself additional protection by means of entrench- 
 ments. * ' The batteries are protected by earth embank- 
 ments on the front and on the flanks." (A. R.) 
 
 "Embankments for protection against the enemy's 
 fire may be employed everywhere, even on the offen- 
 sive." (A. R. 372). 
 
 That is a wise measure when defiladed from the 
 view of the enemy, but it is a question as to whether it 
 may be possible for batteries using direct laying when 
 facing a vigilant hostile artillery. 
 
 The question of defilading has been most widely 
 discussed in Germany. After having been greatly in 
 favor, the complete defilade has been vigorously at- 
 tacked; and the regulations while recognizing its ad- 
 vantages point out its defects. They do not recommend 
 it on the offensive, and formally forbid it to the in- 
 fantry batteries.* *'In order to make the infantry 
 
 ♦Batteries designated to devote their entire attention to the 
 support of infantry in action. — Translator, 
 
[30] 
 
 action decisive," say the Artillery Regulations (Par. 
 367), "the field artillery should, renouncing the ad- 
 vantages of a masked position, fire almost always from 
 a position which is only half masked or uncovered." 
 
 Then (in Par. 467), ''The artillery should utilize 
 even in the attack the advantages of the masked posi- 
 tion, but it will have to choose half masked or uncovered 
 positions when the conditions of the action require 
 rapidity in the opening of fire and the changing of ob- 
 jective." 
 
 On the defensive, the regulations recommend the 
 defilade for the batteries to be used against the adver- 
 sary's artillery but not for the infantry batteries. In 
 Par. 504, they say: *'A masked position will offer ad- 
 vantages. * * * The position will thus not be disclosed 
 prematurely, maneuvering can be done under shelter of 
 the mask * * * ; but on the other hand, the necessity 
 of turning an effective fire upon the live targets of the 
 infantry attack demands the abandonment at the proper 
 time of the masked position." 
 
 The ideas at present prevailing in Germany seem 
 to be unfavorable to the defilade. General von Rohne, 
 the principal exponent of the new ideas, wrote in 1907 : 
 "We reach this conclusion, that as a rule positions should 
 be chosen so that a piece can at least aim directly * * * ; 
 let the masked positions be left to the howitzers. My 
 deductions are directed merely against the tendency to 
 lay down as a rule the employment of masked positions; 
 * * * the field guns possess in the shield quite sufficient 
 protection; we may ask of the artillery that it raise 
 high that old maxim of artillerymen, 'Efficiency before 
 protection,'" (From Officers' Manual, Field Artillery 
 Tactics.) 
 
[31] 
 
 These words from a general officer who is chief of 
 the German artillery fully show the trend of present 
 German thought. 
 
 Hence the Germans look for protection to their 
 shields and to earthworks much more than to defilading, 
 which appears to them to have very unsatisfactory 
 features. 
 
 In France, on the contrary, we strive after com- 
 plete defilade (defilading even the gun flashes, if possi- 
 ble) for all the artillery not intended for use as infan- 
 try batteries. 
 
 The Germans recommend for most cases the half- 
 masked position, which is a little more than the de- 
 filading of the materiel — ^it is placing the sights, ele- 
 vated by means of an extension leaf, on the line of de- 
 filade. 
 
 This half -masked position is intrepid ; it is far from 
 prudent when opposed to defiladed artillery which 
 knows how to utilize its fire as does the French artillery. 
 
 When it is a question of supporting the infantry, 
 tactical considerations come first. 
 
 The infantry batteries stay in the decisive phase 
 of an action without respite or cessation; they must see 
 and act in accordance with the fluctuations of the in- 
 fantry combat; they must be able to keep under fire 
 every part of the ground in front of them. 
 
 If in order to see what is going on, the captain has 
 to leave his battery, the transmission of orders will be 
 imperfect ; the indirect fire which German batteries are 
 obliged to use when defiladed will be delivered under 
 poor conditions, and if the captain should disappear 
 the fire will be interrupted. In the infantry batteries 
 there is not the comparative calmness that exists in the 
 
[32] 
 
 counter-batteries ; it is like being is a furnace, coolness 
 is partly lost, friction is more severe. 
 
 The French regulations wisely prescribe that the 
 infantry batteries shall place themselves in such posi- 
 tions as will enable them to accomplish their mission 
 without considering defilade, and this prescription is still 
 more strictly imposed upon the German artillery which 
 has not the same sighting facilities. 
 
 FIRING. 
 
 The questions of fire properly speaking are tech- 
 nical questions which do not have to be treated here. 
 We may observe merely that the German artillery has 
 been handling rapid fire guns for only a short time; it 
 is not yet thoroughly accustomed to their use, and has 
 not yet completely established firing methods for them. 
 
 The artilleryman's instrument of the present day 
 requires a delicate manipulation; the workmen must 
 have real dexterity and much experience. The Ger- 
 man cannoneer is far from having attained perfection. 
 Despite great progress accomplished in the past year 
 the battery commanders have not yet acquired the 
 mastery which must be attained. The German reports 
 admit it. 
 
 General von Rohne writes: "It will take several 
 years for our artillery to learn how to get the best results 
 with its perfected materiel.'' 
 
 France in incontestably more advanced. Her 7.5 
 cm. guns are well understood, the methods of fire are 
 carefully worked out, the officers and non-commissioned 
 officers have acquired a technical facility which the 
 inspectors general have unanimously recognized. 
 
 By this advance France acquires an undeniable 
 
[33] 
 
 superiority which would be strikingly manifested on the 
 battlefield. 
 
 How true, especially with the present materiel, is 
 the reflection of General Francfort: **It can not be 
 too often repeated that the quality of batteries, the 
 quality which is that of their commanders, is of incom- 
 parably greater importance than their quantity." 
 
 Hence it may be frankly proclaimed that the 120 
 guns of 7.5 cm. of the French Army Corps could con- 
 tend without disadvantage gainst the 144 or even 160 
 guns of the German Army Corps. 
 
 RECONNAISSANCE. 
 
 The reconnaissance question has assumed a pecu- 
 liar importance in the German regulations. 
 
 The reconnaissance of positions is to be made with 
 the greatest care; the squad leaders, the battery com- 
 manders have in this respect the same duties as in 
 France. The instructions relative to reconnaissance 
 before opening fire should be noticed: *'A reconnais- 
 sance made in the required time and pushed through," 
 say the regulations, "is the fundamental condition of 
 success. The time necessary to accomplish it must be 
 taken." 
 
 And here the regulations are not speaking of recon- 
 naissance of positions but of reconnaissance of the 
 enemy in general, and of the hostile artillery in particu- 
 lar. 
 
 "The reconnaissance," it is explained, "is com- 
 menced by rapidly sending out officers' patrols and 
 scouts. They may be sent with the cavalry. Their mis- 
 sion is to discover the strength, manner of deployment and 
 the position of the hostile artillery. The information 
 
[34] 
 
 gained by the reconnaissance of the other arms, which 
 it is important for the artillery to know, is sent to it by 
 the commander of the forces. " (A. R.) 
 
 These instructions would seem astonishing if we 
 did not know that the Germans have a tactical concep- 
 tion different from ours in regard to the manner of 
 engaging combat. 
 
 We do not admit, in France, that before an engage- 
 ment we can decide upon very much as being certain 
 concerning the enemy, other than the apparent outline of 
 his position or of his marching zones. It takes fighting, 
 we believe, to penetrate the protecting curtains of the 
 enemy and read his hand. In Germany they aspire to 
 reading it, in part at least, before engaging in combat; 
 they hope that a well organized system of secret service 
 and the cavalry will provide the means for so doing. 
 In conformity with this theory the regulations of the 
 German artillery prescribe that it shall not, as a rule, 
 become engaged until there is sufficient information in 
 regard to the hostile artillery. 
 
 This theory is undoubtedly based upon what 
 occurred on the Japanese side during the Manchurian 
 war. Almost al\^ays the Japanese knew the positions 
 of the Russian batteries at the time when the engage- 
 ment was commenced. But it must be observed that 
 the Russians constantly remained on the defensive; 
 their artillery was often placed in advance in their posi- 
 tions for action. Moreover, the Japanese had a marvel- 
 ously organized system of espionnage, thanks to the 
 combination of exceptional circumstances. 
 
 Those conditions cannot appear in a European 
 war ; the examples of the Russo-Japanese war do not in 
 any way justify the German ''regulation" requirement. 
 
[35] 
 
 We shall consider this subject again, but we con- 
 fess at once that we do not understand how artillery 
 can aspire to know, before engaging, by simple recon- 
 naissance, *'the strength, the dispositions and the posi- 
 tions of the hostile artillery. " ( A. R. ) . That knowledge 
 can be acquired before the combat only in case the 
 enemy is immobile, fixed in an absolutely defensive posi- 
 tion, deployed before the beginning of any attack. 
 
 General von Rohne does not seem to approve these 
 reconnaissances prescribed by the regulations. ''The 
 sending by the artillery," he says, "of officers' patrols on 
 reconnaissance is an innovation . I do no t share the hope 
 that they have induced any new aspects. In any case 
 too many must not be sent; for it is problematical 
 whether they will bring in soon enough to be useful 
 any information of much importance. It is certain on 
 the other hand that the officers will be absent when the 
 firing is going on, and certainly it is to fire and not to 
 give information that artillerymen have been created.'* 
 
 It is not possible to speak more sensibly. 
 
 LINES OF INFORMATION. 
 
 The regulations insist upon the importance of as- 
 suring lines of information between the different eche- 
 lons of the command. They prescribe the most fre- 
 quent use possible of the telephone and of signals. 
 "These two methods of transmission are the most prac- 
 ticable in combat; horsemen, runners and relay posts 
 will be employed under fire in exceptional cases only." 
 (A. R.) 
 
 One can but approve these instructions. In 
 France we are behindhand with respect to communica- 
 tions, we still have a marked preference for communica- 
 
[36] 
 
 tions by mounted men. Telephonic communication, 
 and, failing that, communication by signals, ought to 
 be the rule, and to emphasize it it would be well to use 
 them exclusively at the maneuvers. 
 
 In Germany the communications of the "infantry 
 artillery" with that infantry is kept up by means of 
 officers. These officers connected with the artillery by 
 telephone or by the optical apparatus, take positions 
 in rear of the infantry and observe its movements ; they 
 inform their artillery of everything that takes place and 
 direct its fire according to the needs of the infantry. 
 
 This system has not been adopted in France; it 
 offers several disadvantages. In order to perform sat- 
 isfactorily his mission, the officer of communications, 
 detached in the vicinity of the infantry, must be well 
 posted on the tactics and on all needs of that infantry ; 
 he must have very extended general military informa- 
 tion; these are conditions not to be found among all 
 young artillery officers, and officers of the higher grades 
 have more important things to do than to be communica- 
 tion officers. Moreover, whatever be the knowledge of 
 that officer he can not divine the thoughts and the in- 
 tentions of the infantry commander; he is, therefore, 
 unable to direct the artillery fire according to the present 
 and future needs of that infantry. 
 
 It is much better that the officer or the agent of 
 communications be with the infantry commander, as 
 has been recommended in France by the Artillery Com- 
 mittee. This communication agent ought to be always 
 connected with his artillery by telephone and by signal 
 men and ought not to return to it except when he is 
 unable to communicate with it by other means. 
 
[37] 
 
 HOWITZERS. 
 
 MISSION OF THE HOWITZER. 
 
 The French military authorities assume that the 
 7.5 cm. gun can do all the work required by combat in 
 fiat open country. France has no howitzers in the 
 army corps. The 15.5 R. guns are theoretically re- 
 served for armies. The Germans created after Plevna 
 their light howitzers ; then finding that these pieces did 
 not have sufficient power, they provided a battalion of 
 heavy howitzers for each army corps. 
 
 We shall not discuss here the value of these how- 
 itzers from the point of view of ballistics. We shall 
 merely have a glance at their tactical employment, 
 which has been presented in regulations according to 
 the hopes founded upon their firing. 
 
 The missions which are incumbent upon the how- 
 itzers are principally : 
 
 1 . To reach and destroy artillery that is recogniz- 
 able, defiladed or behind earth works sheltered from 
 direct fire. 
 
 2. To reach infantry hidden in the trenches or 
 behind obstacles. 
 
 3. To crush the shelter of the enemy and, at the 
 moment of assault, to render untenable his points of 
 support. 
 
 The field gun, the Germans say, can not accomplish 
 any of these roles ; it is indispensable that the army 
 corps be endowed with the means necessary to obtain 
 these objects. 
 
 The howitzers can fire from a greater distance than 
 the guns. They will be placed back of the latter and 
 often even behind, care being taken to defilade them 
 
[38J 
 
 well so long as superiority of fire shall not have been 
 required. If they are protected, the howitzers will be 
 able to regulate their fire almost as if on the maneuver 
 terrain ; if they have a good system of orientation they 
 can be sure of having their fire well regulated and of 
 obtaining effects that will assure to them an incontesta- 
 ble superiority of fire over the opposing artillery. Such 
 is, summed up, the theory of the partisans of the how- 
 itzer. 
 
 HEAVY HOWITZERS. 
 
 With respect to what concerns especially the heavy 
 howitzer, the regulations of November 18, 1908, have 
 appeared to regulate the employment of them and to 
 mark their place. It is interesting to glance through 
 these regulations to find developed there the theory of 
 the duties assigned to the heavy artillery just men- 
 tioned. 
 
 In a general way the heavy artillery must ''Act as a 
 first line to put out of action the arms of the enemy, 
 then to destroy the enemy's shelter and the obstacles 
 which hinder the advance of its own troops; finally to 
 prepare the assault." (H. H. R. 387.) 
 
 This is its general role in four lines. 
 
 "It is not to be engaged," say the regulations, 
 *' until after a thorough reconnaissance has been made 
 and light has been obtained upon the situation." Here 
 is again the same attention to reconnaissance as for the 
 field guns, but to a higher degree. 
 
 The regulations mention that "The action of the 
 heavy artillery is decisive against artillery that is recog- 
 nizable (not necessarily visible), against infantry in or 
 behind shelter and especially against strongly con- 
 ;structed shelter." (H. H. R. 358). 
 
[39] 
 
 They speak then of the importance of lines of infor- 
 mation and of the system of auxiliary observing stations. 
 They recommend in this respect the widest possible use 
 of the telephone, of signal men on bicycles, and couriers. 
 "The howitzers will be defiladed; they will often be 
 placed behind the field artillery." (363.) "It is de- 
 sirable that, during an offensive action, all the duties 
 with which the heavy field artillery may be charged can 
 be affected by the occupation of a single position; this 
 position should therefore be as near the enemy as ques- 
 tions of fire efficiency and battery protection will per- 
 mit. ' ' In this way long and difficult changes in position 
 will be avoided. The prescriptions of the regulations 
 are summed up in these few lines. 
 
 HOWITZERS IN CURVED FIRE. 
 
 Will the curved fire of the howitzers produce any 
 considerable effect? Can much be expected of their 
 fire? It is worth while to devote a little attention to 
 the question. We have shown above the missions that 
 devolve upon the curved fire of the howitzers; what will 
 be the result of it ? 
 
 Against a line of intrenched infantry, against an 
 objective, troops or artillery defiladed from direct fire, 
 the howitzer will be able to render some service. The 
 principal requisite in order to reach these objectives will 
 be to be perfectly informed as to their emplacements; 
 it is a primary difficulty. Imperfectly regulated fire 
 will produce nothing. 
 
 In order to have the hope of getting some pro- 
 jectiles on the target it will be necessary to fire a great 
 deal, even with accurate firing; whence a great con- 
 sumption of projectiles, the replenishing of which is 
 difficult. 
 
[40] 
 
 If after the reconnaissance or during the firing the 
 objective changes position the results will be annulled. 
 As soon as this change of position becomes known the 
 fire will have to be modified ; that will be long and diffi- 
 cult. If, finally, the emplacement is only approxi- 
 mately known, it will be necessary, in order to have any 
 chances of striking it, to use progressive fire ; and what 
 expenditure of ammunition will then be entailed! 
 
 We believe with General von Halten, "One or 
 several happy shots will cause only minimum losses to 
 the defenders, and that after a tremendous consumption 
 of ammunition." 
 
 In every case where a mobile objective, even though 
 masked, can be reached by direct fire, the fire of the 
 field guns will produce a great deal more effect than the 
 curved fire of the howitzer. 
 
 If the objectives are obstacles, shelters or fortifi- 
 cations, these, being stable and permitting the use of 
 auxiliary points of aim will be much more easily struck 
 by curved fire. The shells that strike the target will 
 produce thoroughly destructive effects, though quite 
 localized. 
 
 However, it must be acknowledged that curved 
 fire alone will be capable of handling fortifications and 
 points of support which the enemy has had time to pre- 
 pare and to make strong enough to afford protection 
 against direct fire from less powerful projectiles. 
 
 Numerous German authorities appear to be scep- 
 tical as to the results to be expected from curved fire. 
 Firing of this class seems to be absolutely necessary only 
 against semi-permanent fortifications. 
 
 Major Ruprecht who has very thoroughly studied 
 this question of curved fire of howitzers sums up his 
 
[41] 
 
 discussion of the subject of the fire against troops or 
 artillery by saying: ''We cannot accord any special 
 efficiency to the howitzer against a masked objective 
 * * * ; against half masked batteries these pieces will 
 not give brilliant results; against mobile objectives 
 they can do nothing.'' 
 
 One example among a hundred drawn from the 
 Manchurian war goes to prove the accuracy of ths as- 
 sertion. A Russian artillery officer, a participant in 
 the battle of Si-Ho-Ian, of June 18, 1904, writes in 
 speaking of the artillery duel > ' ' However the Japanese, 
 not satisfied with the incessant fire of shrapnel which 
 they were delivering with feverish intensity, passed 
 shortly after the opening of fire by one of our newly 
 arrived batteries to fire with lyddite shells directed par- 
 ticularly against that battery; but, to our astonish- 
 ment, notwithstanding the superiority of position of 
 the Japanese batteries, from which they must have 
 clearly distinguished the Russian batteries, and not- 
 withstanding the infernal intensity of their fire, the 
 Russian batteries stiffered relatively little and continued 
 their fire.'' 
 
 APPRECIATION OF THE GERMAN HOWITZER. 
 
 The light howitzer, it must not be forgotten, uses 
 direct fire like the field guns; it will therefore utilize 
 curved fire only when that is absolutely necessary. It 
 is a piece with a double purpose capable of struggling 
 everywhere with the field gun ; it fires less rapidly, but 
 it sends a projectile twice as powerful. Its ratio of 
 efficiency against troops is certainly inferior to that of 
 the field piece; but against shelters or obstacles it can 
 by its power render service superior to that of the latter. 
 
[42] 
 
 Finally it must not be forgotten that these large caliber 
 pieces, whose projectiles are charged with high power 
 explosives produce very considerable moral effects. 
 This must be borne in mind. 
 
 The best German authors generally extoU their 
 qualities and are strong advocates of them. 
 
 In our opinion the light howitzer is a useful weapon, 
 which will be able to render great service, but its effi- 
 ciency in the majority of cases is not sufficient. 
 
 As to the heavy howitzer, it has a great many de- 
 tractors. It has been strongly criticised in Germany 
 by a certain school (Generals von Halten, Rohne, etc.) 
 It appears to be a piece adopted hastily as a result o 
 reports that were primitive and without complete infor- 
 mation upon the battles in Manchuria. 
 
 (a) This howitzer presents numerous disadvant- 
 ages. It makes considerably heavier the column of the 
 army corps in which it marches. It lengthens the 
 column and is not easily disengaged from it. 
 
 (b) It can move but slowly and only over very 
 solid roads and ground; bad roads and, still more so, 
 fields are not possible for it. It has therefore, no 
 mobility. 
 
 (c) As is indicated in article 397 of the regulations 
 the heavy artillery will have to accomplish all its 
 firing missions from a single position as near as possible 
 to the enemy. A change of position demands so much 
 time and offers so many difficulties that it is to be 
 avoided. One wonders, therefore, how this artillery 
 will be able to follow the fluctuations of a battle: if 
 the infantry advances appreciably, it will have to change 
 position, consequently losing a great deal of time; if 
 
[43] 
 
 the infantry withdraws, it risks falling into the hands 
 of the enemy or at least under his fire. 
 
 (d) Not being protected by a shield, the heavy 
 howitzer can be silenced by an ordinary French gun of 
 7.5 cm. which might happen from flank or cross position 
 be able to fire upon it. 
 
 (e) It has a ratio of efficiency sensibly smaller 
 than the light howitzer against all objectives of field 
 warfare, for the reason that having a projectile two 
 times as heavy for an equal amount of destructive 
 matter it has two times less a chance of striking the 
 target, and one of its projectiles does not produce the 
 effect of two projectiles of the light howitzer. 
 
 (/) Finally, the heavy howitzer does not fire 
 shrapnel, it depends for results upon accurately aimed 
 fire. 
 
 MATERIAL AND MORAL EFFECT OF ARTILLERY. 
 
 In order to discuss battle field tactics reckoning 
 must be made of the material and of the moral effects 
 of artillery fire. 
 
 The first news that arrived from the war of Man- 
 churia, where for the first time two nations armed with 
 modem artillery were engaged in combat, appeared to 
 give to the cannon a considerable preponderance in 
 battles. The big voice of the artillery made itself 
 heard afar; it dominated all other noises. The effects 
 of the projectiles with explosive powder, especially 
 those of the heavy artillery, produced emotional effects 
 that impressed the witnesses of the struggle. The 
 soldiers who had been in the furnace of combat told of 
 the profound impression made upon them by those 
 projectiles, and their imagination attributed terrific 
 
[44] 
 
 effects to them. People talked with awe of the chimose 
 projectiles of the Japanese howitzers, which they said 
 had obtained the victory by laying in ruins from top 
 to bottom the defenses piled up by the Russians at Liao- 
 Yan, Mukden, etc. 
 
 Under the impression of these reports it was 
 imagined that the importance of the artillery was to 
 increase considerably and that it was necessary to pro- 
 vide modern armies with a considerable number of 
 guns largely composed of these howitzers with the 
 formidable projectiles, which were producing sucl\eff ects 
 in Manchuria. 
 
 Thus was formed the point of departure for dis- 
 cussions which led to the creation of the heavy howitzers 
 which we have just been discussing. 
 
 Later, when everybody was calmer and the- results 
 of the battles in Manchuria could be verified, we had to 
 yield to the evidence. The artillery had not produced 
 any greater effect in this war than in preceding wars, 
 rather the contrary. The most reHable statistics prove 
 that the percentage of losses attributable to artillery 
 often remained at seven or eight per cent, and never 
 surpassed fifteen per cent. 
 
 The many accounts of officers worthy of credit, 
 participants in these battles, generally agree as to the 
 very variable effects of the artillery depending upon 
 circumstances. 
 
 Artillery struggling against artillery in its front 
 produced but little material effect, and yet neither the 
 Russians nor the Japanese had shields on their guns; 
 they even fought sometimes without having been able 
 to create shelter for themselves. 
 
[45] 
 
 We read in a letter of a Japanese officer the follow- 
 ing account of an artillery combat : 
 
 "The 1st of August in the army of General Kuroki 
 our batteries (two) had hardly had the time to entrench 
 and to open fire when they were attacked by the hostile 
 artillery. The Russians fired remarkably well and their 
 fire was perfectly regulated ; our batteries were covered 
 with projectiles. I took photographic proofs of the 
 bursting of ten or twelve shrapnel falling one after 
 the other. In a short time gur batteries were silenced. 
 
 ' ' I thought it was for good ; but soon they recom- 
 menced their fire and developed it to its maximum in- 
 tensity. That kept up till 8 o'clock in the evening. 
 When I saw that the fire of the artillery had at last 
 ceased, I went to those two batteries convinced that I 
 should find their personnel sorely afflicted and their 
 materiel badly demolished. 
 
 "The two batteries had in all one officer and four 
 men killed, one officer and thirteen men wounded ; one 
 piece had a broken wheel." 
 
 General Hamilton relates that at the battle of 
 Liao-Yan, he saw the artillery of the Japanese Guard 
 concentrate its fire on an uncovered Russian battery — 
 under that fire he saw the Russians take the exposed 
 gtms, by hand, in rear of the crest behind the trenches. 
 
 General Samsonov relates that on October 12 th 
 at Peu-Si-Hon, one of his batteries, which was firing 
 from behind intrenchments, stood the well aimed fire 
 from the Japanese artillery during a whole morning 
 without experiencing any loss. The men were able to 
 withdraw it by hand under a violent fire. 
 
 Other very numerous examples prove that the fire 
 of artillery against artillery that is only slightly visible 
 
[46] 
 
 and is entrenched is materially almost negligible; the 
 fire against artillery uncovered and not entrenched 
 forces it rapidly to cease firing and causes it sometimes 
 serious losses of materiel. 
 
 A battery in movement which falls under the fire 
 of the adversary is destroyed or at least very rapidly 
 placed out of action. These assertions are based on 
 what took place in Manchuria. 
 
 Among other accounts we borrow from the official 
 account of the engagement of Dachi-Ichao (July 24, 
 1904) by Lieut. Col. Pacht-Cheuko, the following obser- 
 vations : 
 
 The Russian batteries, very inferior in number, 
 managed to struggle advantageously against the Jap- 
 anese batteries. This was because : 
 
 1. They were completely defiladed from view, 
 500 meters in rear of a crest which formed a covering 
 mass 24 meters high and which therefore absolutely 
 hid the flashes of their guns. 
 
 2. During the day not a movement of carriages 
 disclosed their presence to the hostile observers. 
 
 3. The pieces were separated by intervals which 
 rendered them less vulnerable. 
 
 While these batteries hardly suffered from the fire 
 of the Japanese artillery, the latter was sorely afflicted 
 while seeking to move over exposed ground. "Twice, " 
 says the Lieutenant Colonel, ''the Japanese batteries 
 tried to change position to the west of San-Stsia-Tsi ; 
 their limbers came out from behind the wood near the 
 village; but both times they received our fire whose 
 effect was terrific ; the horses ran away and the limbers 
 disappeared far to the rear. These two batteries were 
 
[47] 
 
 soon unable to operate; the other Japanese batteries 
 did not thereafter try to move forward." 
 
 In regard to what concerns results of artillery fire 
 against infantry, the observations made in Manchuria 
 confirm absolutely the French opinions. Shrapnel 
 from the field guns can hardly do anything against in- 
 fantry sheltered in trenches. 
 
 The Germans however are seeking to obtain better 
 results with the shrapnel from their light howitzers. 
 They claim to be able, by means of carefully planning 
 the bursting of their shells, to reach with a portion of 
 the fragments the objectives placed in trenches. They 
 succeed in this on the target range, but on the field of 
 battle the results would be more than uncertain; suc- 
 cessful accomplishment demands such exact ranging 
 that it would cost them a prohibitive number of pro- 
 jectiles. 
 
 Shrapnel fire is much superior to the curved fire of 
 the howitzers, even with the big lyddite projectiles, 
 against infantry that is not sheltered or that exposes 
 itself behind fortifications. 
 
 In the beginning of the Manchurian war shrapnel 
 was spoken of as having failed ; but a return to the truth 
 has been compelled. Shrapnel is the projectile par 
 excellence against infantry. It has produced terrific 
 effects upon troops in dense formations, and it is as 
 effective as possible against lines of unprotected skir- 
 mishers. 
 
 Finally, with regard to the effects of bursting shells 
 small or big,we must agree with the opinion of the Rus- 
 sian officer, a witness of many battles, who says : ' ' The 
 bursting shells produce a mighty spectacle to the eye 
 and a great moral impression; they dig vast funnels 
 
[48] 
 
 and when they burst throw up huge columns of dirt 
 and smoke. But their real effect is entirely insignificant. 
 
 "In flat open country their effect is especially 
 moral ; their radius of destructive action is very small : 
 25 to 30 meters for the missies of the light howitzers. 
 
 * ' Within closed places the effects are terrible. Houses 
 are untenable and are quickly destroyed. If a shell 
 bursts exactly in a shelter or over a trench its ravaging 
 effect is complete. In timber the moral effect is in- 
 creased ten fold; the material effect is augmented by 
 that produced by the branches being flung in every 
 direction." 
 
 MORAL EFFECT. 
 
 The moral effect of the artillery is one of its most 
 important factors, which it is essential to know how to 
 make use of; the object of a battle is not to kill a vast 
 number of the enemy but to produce fear in the ad- 
 versary, to make him believe in his own inferiority and 
 to make him decide upon flight. 
 
 The artillery projectile because of the noise it makes 
 in bursting, the smoke it spreads, the dust it raises, 
 finally because of the wounds, frequently gaping and hor- 
 rible, which it produces, has a considerable moral effect. 
 
 When it is recommended to use zone firing it is not 
 merely to profit by an advantageous opportunity but also 
 to produce a sudden intense effect ; an effect often more 
 moral than material from which it is well to know how 
 to profit, from a tactical point of view. 
 
 The bursting shell, of which we have shown the in- 
 feriority in open country from the view point of wounds 
 produced, acquires an incontestable superiority from the 
 moral point of view. The shells, particularly those 
 
[49] 
 
 of large caliber, are absolutely terrifying to those not 
 accustomed to them. 
 
 It was the great moral effects that impressed the 
 witnesses of the Manchurian war when, at the beginning, 
 they believed that the explosive shell was to replace 
 shrapnel, but the Russians became accustomed to the 
 theatrical effect of the explosive projectile upon ascer- 
 taining its slight material effect. 
 
 "Action that is solely moral is soon spent, " says 
 Ardant du Picq. 
 
 According to their regulations the Germans must 
 use their howitzers from the commencement of the battle. 
 From the moral point of view that seems to be a defect. 
 The nerves of the adversaries may become accustomed 
 to these bugbears which at the time of the final onset 
 will therefore not produce the desired effect. 
 
 It would seem wise not to consume this moral 
 action too quickly, and therefore to use the big howitzers 
 only to produce a great effect at a given moment at a 
 given point. That is the French doctrine for the use of 
 its 15.5 R. ; we believe it is the correct one. 
 
 But on the other hand it is certain that upon our 
 young soldiers with the impressionable French temper- 
 ament the effects of the German howitzers may be disas- 
 trous in the first large battle. Our young soldiers may 
 not have time to get used to them. Now, it is quite prob- 
 able that the first large battles may decide the war. 
 
 The Manchurian war permitted ascertaining facts 
 worthy of notice; not only did the loud noise and the 
 terrible visual effects of these explosive shells scare the 
 opponent and depress his morale, but they had the fur- 
 ther result of stimulating in an astounding manner the 
 morals of the young soldiers whom they were supporting. 
 
[50] 
 
 When the Japanese perceived the Russian trenches, 
 before which they had been using up their troops for so 
 many hours, bombarded in a terrifying manner by the 
 combination of the field artillery and the heavy artillery ; 
 when they saw before them thick clouds of smoke and 
 dust interspersed by the flashes of the shells which were 
 bursting above the trenches; when they heard the 
 thunder of these shells covering the whole field of battle, 
 their enthusiasm no longer knew any bounds; they 
 dashed forward to death or glory with savage fury. 
 
[51] 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 CAVALRY. 
 
 The regulations on field service and those of April 3, 
 1909, for the German cavalry fix the province of that 
 arm and its employment in war. Let us rapidly ex- 
 amine the principal points of the cavalry regulations 
 with regard to what especially concerns its operation 
 and action beyond its co-operation with the infantry. 
 
 The Germans rely a great- deal upon the cavalry to 
 get information ; hence they want it strong, well armed, 
 capable of piercing the protecting screens. 
 
 We shall see later on, upon studying the prelimi- 
 naries of the battle, the method of employment which 
 they lay down for reconnaissance and security. 
 
 CAVALRY ACTION. 
 
 The cavalry division was formerly the strongest 
 cavalry unit placed under a single commander. The 
 new regulations contemplate the formation of a great 
 corps of cavalry formed of several divisions. **The as- 
 sembling of several divisions into cavalry corps may be 
 necessary as well during the operations as upon the field 
 of battle. " (C. R.) We shall return later to this ques- 
 tion. 
 
 Each division marches as a rule upon one road. 
 
 As soon as the proximity of the enemy makes it 
 necessary, there is taken up a formation in column of 
 platoons or in double column to reduce the depth of the 
 division ; this is the Entf altung (development) ; then it 
 passes to the deployed formation of line of columns: 
 this is the Entwikelung ; finally it forms into line before 
 the impact ; this is the Aufmarsch. 
 
[52] 
 
 As soon as the division commander wishes to take 
 a semi-deployed formation — Entfaltung or Entwike- 
 lung — he gives his orders to the brigade commanders. 
 "There is no prescribed formation for the division; the 
 commanding general breaks up the column into march 
 units according to the object to be attained." (C.R.213.) 
 
 This prescription marks a profound difference be- 
 tween the old and the new regulations. There are no 
 normal formations, the general does as he thinks best and 
 breaks up his division in the manner he deems expedient. 
 Complete initiative is left to the brigade commanders; 
 they march abreast or in echelons according to the orders 
 received, but they choose their route and their forma- 
 tions, keeping connection with the base fraction. They 
 look out for their own flank protection. **As soon as a 
 division commander has decided to attack, he indicates 
 their missions to the artillery and the machine guns ; he 
 gives the order to attack to the brigades, indicating if 
 necessary the direction to the base brigade, and desig- 
 nates a reserve." (C. R. 223.) 
 
 With respect to everything that concerns the action 
 of cavalry against cavalry, the precepts of the new reg- 
 ulations do not essentially differ from the French. 
 After experiments, our neighbors have adopted almost 
 the combat method of the French cavalry — action in 
 compact line of regiments with supports in rear and 
 echelons on the side.* The regulations no longer pre- 
 scribe the deployment of nearly all the forces on a 
 single line. 
 
 "It is essential to engage at the beginning as many 
 
 *It should be remembered that this discussion refers to large 
 bodies; the echelons may be units of considerable size moving at an 
 appreciable distance to the rear or to the front. — Translator. 
 
[53] 
 
 troops as are needed, but no more. No escadron must 
 fall opposite a gap in the enemy's line." (C. R. 430.) 
 
 The formation in echelons is becoming the rule in 
 France. "The suppleness of the order in echelons per- 
 mits, in proportion as the situation is cleared up, of 
 grouping the forces in the most favorable manner for 
 passing to the attack." (C. R. 425.) It is the appli- 
 cation of the precepts laid down by Moltke in 1869 and 
 lost sight of by the Germans: '*To deploy all one's 
 forces in the first line is bad, eyen for small bodies. The 
 large units will rarely find the necessary ground. The 
 success of cavalry action will often depend upon the 
 dispositions that will have been taken to protect its own 
 flanks and to surprise those of the enemy's. " 
 
 The echeloning can be done to the rear to protect 
 the flanks ; but when that is possible it will be preferable 
 to make it to the front. Let us hear what General von 
 Bemhardi, the great cavalry leader says on the subject 
 of echelons : 
 
 "There is generally understood by the order in 
 echelons a disposition with the wings refused to the 
 rear and it is believed that it is only by such echeloning 
 that the protection of the flanks can be assured. In my 
 opinion, there are other ways of operating. Against an 
 enveloping attack of cavalry the refused echelons offer 
 indeed the best protection; but, against a threatened 
 hostile fire upon the wing, the result is in no way attained. 
 Against an attack by fire action or in all cases if on 
 covered ground, it is to the front that the echelon should 
 be thrown to clear things up in the direction of danger. 
 
 "The use of defensive echelons moreover does not 
 correspond in any way to the offensive spirit that cav- 
 alry ought to have. The best protection of the flanks 
 
[54] 
 
 is assured by attacking the hostile flank, and this attack, 
 like all enveloping attacks, will be better prepared by- 
 echeloning to the front one wing or both." 
 
 The regulations do not seem to be so assertive as 
 General von Bemhardi. 
 
 ''The echeloning will vary with the end to be at- 
 tained and with the situation * * * ^ An echelon- 
 ing to the front may result from the situation of the 
 advance guard." (425.) 
 
 This echeloning to the front, to attack the hostile 
 flank, is quite in conformity with German tactical ideas ; 
 we find it again in the infantry action. It can not be 
 successful in cavalry action except upon the condition 
 that the enemy be deceived and does not notice the move- 
 ment ; otherwise one would be playing a game that seems 
 very dangerous. 
 
 It is admitted however that one will sometimes be 
 able to go to the combat according to the old principles. 
 *'If the situation of the enemy is sufficiently clear, the 
 chief of the cavalry can at the beginning arrange his 
 forces abreast and direct them upon the points upon 
 which he has determined to make the attack ' ' (426. ) 
 
 The regulations recommend always supporting the 
 flanks either upon an obstacle, or artillery or machine 
 guns, or finally upon dismounted troops. It expressly 
 recommends making use of dismounted action to support 
 the cavalry combat. "The fire of a well sheltered 
 fraction on foot may have a decisive effect." 
 
 These prescriptions of the new regulations, upon 
 the majority of points, accord remarkably with our cav- 
 .alry regulations. They appear moreover to be abso- 
 lutely justified. 
 
 We shall not study farther the question of cavalry 
 
[55] 
 
 combat, which is outside the scope imposed upon this 
 work. We shall pause only over two rdles that are new, 
 or at least organized in a new way, with which the re- 
 gulations have vested the cavalry arm : the role of the 
 defensive screen, called Verchleierung, a word recently 
 introduced into the field service, and the role of mounted 
 infantry which takes more and more importance in 
 German tactical procedure. 
 
 VERCHLEIERUNG. (Cavalry Screen.) 
 
 This new military expression, introduced into the 
 field service regulations, does not indicate something 
 absolutely new. The Verchleierung is the curtain or 
 screen which is to conceal a movement, an assembly, 
 or a position. The cavalry is to form this screen ; but 
 to it is attached often some detachments of infantry, 
 cyclists and machine guns. The Verchleierung can be 
 offensive or defensive. 
 
 Offensive to mask a movement : * * On all the roads 
 are pushed forward strong cavalry patrols as well as 
 cyclists detachments, having for mission to attack 
 and to drive back the hostile patrols" (F. S. R. 195) : 
 and the movement or position is surrounded on every 
 dangerous side by a strong cavalry screen. 
 
 Defensive : The Verchleierung is ' ' more efficacious 
 if there can be utilized a natural obstacle of the terrain 
 eaving available for the hostile reconnaissance only a 
 small number of roads." ''These roads are then ob- 
 structed by barricades which the cavalry defends with 
 its fire; there are attached to it if possible some 
 machine guns sections. 
 
 "In rear are held cavalry detachments of greater 
 strength. * * * Scouting detachments are pushed 
 
[56] 
 
 in advance." (F. S. R. 196.) The infantry aids in 
 forming this curtain, depending upon circumstances. 
 
 The employment of the Verchleierung will, in many 
 cases, offer many advantages. Every time that a force 
 wishes to change position without being seen, it will 
 employ a system of Verchleierung, more or less complete. 
 When it is desired to create a zone into which the 
 enemy's reconnasisance must not penetrate, there will 
 be established a close system of Verchleierung. It is 
 prescribed that hostile reconnoitering parties that have 
 succeeded in penetrating it shall be pursued to the 
 uttermost. It is of course of the greatest importance 
 that they do not carry away any information for which 
 there is the greatest reason for secrecy. 
 
 Accurately speaking, this defensive curtain which 
 the Germans designate by a new term is in no way ab- 
 solutely new, but the word expresses an ensemble of 
 dispositions which it would be useless to recall when 
 giving orders. The word will be sufficient; everybody 
 will understand it. 
 
 These screens may be very useful before a timid 
 enemy and may succeed in stopping detachments or 
 advance guards which have neither spirit in their move- 
 ments nor notions of what there may be in front of 
 them. 
 
 As we shall see, a German advance guard has for its 
 duty to be prudent; a system of Verchleierung very 
 solidly established might be able to intimidate it or per- 
 haps to deceive it. As to the French advance guards, 
 which are distinctly offensive, they will easily pierce 
 the curtain and certainly will not be stopped. 
 
[57] 
 
 ACTION ON FOOT. 
 
 The considerable importance which the regulations 
 give to dismounted cavalry action is also one of the new 
 features of these regulations. The German cavalry 
 must be able to transform itself into mounted infantry 
 and consequently to fight on foot absolutely like infan- 
 try. * ' Mounted action is the principal method of fight- 
 ing for cavalry,' say the regulations (Art. 389); but 
 they add, * ' The cavalry is also, thanks to its rifle, able to 
 fight on foot. It is in a position, especially if it is sup- 
 ported by artillery and by machine guns, to resist de- 
 tachments of all arms or to cause them to suffer con- 
 siderable losses by surprising them with fire. It does 
 not fear to attack wherever the situation requires it to 
 do so. 
 
 "The cavalry will often find itself in the position of 
 being forced to open a road for itself by attacking on 
 foot in order to be able to continue to fulfill its mission. " 
 
 The German trooper must therefore know how to 
 fight on foot, not only to defend himself but also to 
 attack. 
 
 "We shall have," says General von Bemhardi, "in 
 the future to take the offensive into consideration in 
 dismounted action, and even a decisive offensive which 
 means to attain its end, whatever happens, by engaging 
 strong forces." 
 
 Article 465 of the regulations prescribes distinctly 
 that this offensive shall be pushed through to the end. 
 The paragraph of the Infantry Regulations is repeated : 
 
 "The attack has for its object to carry forward the 
 line of fire up to the enemy, by advancing, if necessary, 
 by very short distances. It is completed by the assault^ 
 which seals the defeat of the enemy. " 
 
[58] 
 
 The regulations recommend that dismounted action 
 be engaged in ''only after mature reflection, " but once 
 decided upon to engage in it with all one's forces and to 
 the limit. 
 
 So the Germans consider that their cavalry di- 
 visions, upon certain occasions of which we shall speak 
 later, will be led into fighting on foot with all their forces ; 
 into fighting which will have to be pushed to a decision 
 and include the assault. 
 
 In order to give every possible advantage to their 
 cavalry and to deceive the enemy, the Germans have 
 just taken various measures. They have given their 
 trooper a uniform quite similar* to that of the infantry 
 so that the enemy in a fight will not be able to deter- 
 mine whether he is fighting with cavalry or infantry, t 
 This is important from the moral point of view. 
 
 They have likewise just transformed the cavalry 
 carbine so that the range of this weapon, which was 1200 
 meters, attains 2000 meters. The cavalrymen use the 
 same cartridge as the infantrymen and have like them 
 a bayonet. 
 
 The cavalry divisions have been supplied with guns 
 and machine guns. Being well equipped with tools 
 these divisions can fulfill all the missions with which 
 they are charged and are fitted for all kinds of struggles. 
 
 The rules for the combat on foot of the cavalry 
 
 *The order from the Emperor's office of February 23, 1910, haa 
 also just given the gray blouse to the cuirassiers and to the mounted 
 chasseurs, in place of the KoUer (blouse of special form.) 
 
 tThis measure would be eminently wise for France. All our 
 uniforms are dissimilar. The enemy immediately recognizes in a 
 combat whether he has to deal with cavalry. How can a hussar 
 or|a dragoon be mistaken, even at 1,000 meters, for an infantry- 
 man? 
 
[59] 
 
 are the same as those for infantry combat. It is more 
 particularly recommended that the order in depth be 
 used so as to avoid mixing units — something more in- 
 convenient for cavalry than for infantry. The return 
 to the horses can not indeed be made in good order unless 
 there has been no mixing of units. 
 
 This offensive to the uttermost for cavalry dis- 
 mounted seems to us very dangerous. 
 
 General von Kleist said: ''Reflect once before 
 attacking when mounted; reflect three time before at- 
 tacking on foot." 
 
 One will do well to reflect a long time. 
 
 It seems to me that very rarely will there be occa- 
 sion for throwing cavalry divisions on foot to launch them 
 into an offensive action to be pushed to the assault. 
 Cavalry divisions are precious instruments in any army. 
 How can one conceive an occasion where the hopes of 
 success on foot is worth the risk of their loss. A di- 
 vision of cavalry can hardly put more than 1000 rifles in 
 line, on foot it is equal only to a poor battalion* ; while 
 mounted it is not replaceable. That cavalry shall fight 
 on foot on the defensive, on numerous occasions, is be- 
 coming more and more necessary, and the opportunities 
 for this kind of action are more and more frequent. But 
 it still appears imprudent to us, to engage a whole 
 division of cavalry, or even a large party, in a defensive 
 action on foot. As to throwing a division of cavalry 
 into an attack on foot against a position defended by 
 infantry in sufficient strength — that appears to us in- 
 comparable presumption. Can one imagine a German 
 cavalry division, i. e., equal in value to a thousand com- 
 
 *It is to be remembered that this refers to European organiza* 
 tion. . — Translator. 
 
[60] 
 
 batants — not very expert be it remembered — throwing- 
 itself on foot into an assault on a position of our frontier 
 defended by one of our covering detachments ? That is 
 however what would happen most certainly in case the 
 spirit of the regulations is adopted by the spirit of the 
 responsible cavalry leaders. 
 
 To believe that from cavalrymen can be obtained 
 good foot soldiers to push an attack to a decision 
 against real infantry is a Utopian dream that must be 
 left to the Germans. 
 
 The cavalryman will never leave his horse other- 
 wise than regretfully; he will be thinking only of get- 
 ting back to him. He will never be able to sustain a 
 very long combat ; he will not have enough ammunition, 
 his supply is restricted. If he approaches very near the 
 enemy he will never be able to get back on his horse 
 except after victory; a retreat would be a defeat. 
 Finally, for cavalry dismounted the horses become the 
 danger point. A band of hostile cavalry or infantry 
 that could get near them would be sufficient to carry 
 them away or to destroy them; that would mean dis- 
 aster. 
 
 The old Gernam regulations said: ''Cavalry is not 
 in a position to carry on a dismounted combat of long 
 duration; * * * j^ most cases dismounted action 
 will be a defensive action; it will not fight thus on the 
 offensive except when its mission can not be accom- 
 plished otherwise." That regulation was wise. Why 
 have the Germans departed from these reasonable doc- 
 trines to adopt in certain circumstances the offensive 
 action dismoimted on the largest scale ? 
 
 We believe that that has been brought about in a 
 large measure, by the examples which they found in 
 
[61] 
 
 the Russo-Japanese war. The tactical lessons of that 
 war seem to have made a strong impression in Germany 
 (we shall verify it under various circumstances in the 
 course of this book) ; but it does not seem that the Ger- 
 mans have drawn from these lessons conclusions that 
 are entirely exact. 
 
 The Russian cavalry formed especially of Cossacks 
 from the Transbaikalia, fought very often, it is true, on 
 foot ; it rendered thus some great service but it acted 
 very little like cavalry, why ? 
 
 General MischtschenkO tells us why: 
 
 'The Transbaikalian Cossacks are mostly himters 
 by profession, remarkably good shots and wood crafts- 
 men ; but they are not cavalrymen; the officer himself is not 
 a true cavalryman * * *. Moreover, their horses 
 are small, not gaited, though they are robust and possess 
 good endurance. * * * These horses march well 
 in mountains but are heavy and untractable." 
 
 With these Cossacks the Russians had an excellent 
 mounted infantry but not cavalry. General Misch- 
 tschenko knew how to use this so-called cavalry accord- 
 ing to its capabilities, i. e., by making it fight almost 
 constantly on foot. 
 
 Besides these motives proceeding from the con- 
 clusions drawn from the Russo-Japanese war, certain 
 principles have led the Germans to their doctrine of 
 the attack dismounted; they hold in effect as a principle 
 that the cavalry should be in condition to pierce the 
 screens of the infantry and be able by its offensive 
 action to rend the veils covering the collecting of troops 
 or hostile columns. 
 
 The introduction into our military organization of 
 bicycle battalions has also certainly contributed to the 
 
[62] 
 
 birth of the prescriptions of the German regulations; 
 our neighbors did not want their cavalry divisions to be 
 stopped by our bicycle infantry; they are teaching it 
 to attack it and to hammer it. 
 
 The new regulations of April 3, 1909, the applica- 
 tion of which was tried for the first time in the last 
 grand maneuvers (1909), did not appear to have had 
 a very happy influence. 
 
 The cavalry presented a poor appearance. It did 
 not succeed in getting information for, or in enlighten- 
 ing properly its corps. Its service of security was in- 
 sufficient to such a degree that on the 14th of Septem- 
 ber a division of cavalry was surprised in its canton- 
 ments by a detachment of infantry. 
 
 But it was in action that the German cavalry 
 seems to have been the weakest. It forgot that it is 
 especially through motion that it is redoubtable and 
 that its mode of action in combat should be the power- 
 ful moral effect obtained by mass, by swiftness, and by 
 the effect of surprise. 
 
 Dismounted action, so much extolled by the regu- 
 lations, had become the rule of the German cavalry. 
 
 As soon as a force of cavalry met the enemy its 
 first care was to throw forward a screen of dismounted 
 cavalrymen, then to maneuver behind it, not like cavalry 
 but like mounted infantry. 
 
 The cavalry in this maneuver forgot its role. It 
 never sought to annihilate the hostile cavalry in order 
 to assure itself the liberty of maneuvering. The two 
 opposing cavalry forces although opposite each other 
 from the evening of the 15th of September did not seek 
 out each other with the desire to fight. On September 
 15th the two cavalry forces mutually surprised each 
 
[63] 
 
 other. They were not well informed as to each other 
 and had not prepared for battle; so the encounter was 
 nothing but a confused series of surprises of regiments 
 or escadrons;* it degenerated into an inextricable 
 melange of dismounted action. 
 
 The red force, which was much the weaker in 
 numbers, was declared beaten and fell back. The 
 Blue cavalry did not profit by its partial success, it 
 thereafter avoided the Red cavalry and fulfilled none 
 of the very important roles with which it might have 
 been vested. It hung on thfe flank of the Blue army 
 without serving any great purpose. 
 
 Its superiority had offered it the opportunity to 
 play a most important role in the deHcate mission at- 
 tributed to the general commanding the force. 
 
 Although no stable conclusions can be drawn from 
 a single experiment, it appears nevertheless that the 
 result of the new regulations has been to change com- 
 pletely the cavalry spirit. 
 
 The great anxiety of the German cavalry corps 
 appears to be at present to protect itself by cavalry- 
 men dismounted, and to use fire action, artillery, 
 machine guns, carbines. 
 
 If this result is attained we can only congratulate 
 ourselves over it. 
 
 *An escadron corresponds somewhat to our troop; it is com- 
 manded by a captain, but has more sabers (150). — Translator. 
 
PART II 
 
 THE BATTLE. 
 
 Preliminary remarks on the subject of the 
 
 prescriptions relating to the combat 
 
 in the new regulations. 
 
 When one studies the prescriptions of the new 
 German regulations he is struck by a certain number 
 of points upon which the regulations lay particular 
 stress. 
 
 These points mark the exact characteristics of the 
 spirit in which the regulations were conceived. They 
 are particularly conspicuous in the three regulations 
 (Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery), and they deserve special 
 mention. 
 
 There are four of these characteristics : 
 
 The spirit of the offensive. 
 
 The development of initiative. 
 
 The necessity of communications. 
 
 The united attack. 
 
 1. THE SPIRIT OF THE OFFENSIVE. 
 
 The spirit of the offensive is the first principle of 
 the new regulations. It is foimd on every page. More 
 than ever do the Germans want to inculcate it deeply 
 into all the members of the army, into the brains of the 
 leaders as well as into the temperament of the soldiers. 
 
 No army, other than the French and the German 
 armies, has in its regulations such clear-cut principles 
 for the offensive. 
 
[65] 
 
 Heading the Cavalry Regulations is found the old 
 Frederickan precept relative to the initiative in attack- 
 ing: "No escadron should wait till it is attacked; it 
 should always attack first." 
 
 The Infantry Regulations, in the instructions for 
 the combat, are just as much for the offensive. 
 
 "The infantry should cultivate its natural pro- 
 pensity for the offensive. All its actions must be domi- 
 nated by this one thought: Forward, upon the enemy 
 cost what it may! This role requires of the force a high 
 moral standard. One of the first duties of the officer 
 is to develop this standard." (I. R. 264-265.) 
 
 The battle must be offensive. When at certain 
 points defensive combat must be resorted to, this de- 
 fensive action should always be combined with another 
 offensive action. 
 
 2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF INITIATIVE. 
 
 The new regulations prescribe the leaving of initi- 
 ative to all grades of military rank. The "first quality 
 of a leader should be a hking for responsibility," say 
 the Artillery Regulations. The Infantry Regulations 
 insist: "The maneuvers in time of peace should tend 
 to develop the initiative of the leaders and of all the 
 participants, including the rifleman." (I. R. 251.) 
 
 "For the combat there are required leaders who 
 are accustomed to thinking and who are trained in 
 initiative, and riflemen who know how to act by them- 
 selves." (I. R.) 
 
 * ' In each case the commander must make decisions 
 that meet the situation and not change them thereafter 
 without strong reasons." It is forbidden to the higher 
 commanders to meddle with details, "the subordi- 
 
nate leaders should have the choice of means." (I. R. 
 272.) 
 
 "All leaders should always be imbued with the 
 principle that inaction and negligence are more serious 
 faults than an error in the choice of means." (I. R. 
 304.) 
 
 The Cavalry Regulations sound the same note: 
 ** Initiative is the first virtue of a leader." (C. R. 407.) 
 "The leader," adds this paragraph, "must never wait 
 for orders and should seize responsibility with joy. 
 In doubtful cases, let him act upon this principle." — 
 "The boldest resolution is oftenest the best." (C. R. 
 399.) 
 
 As can be seen, the regulations recommend the 
 greatest initiative, but on the condition however, that 
 it does not degenerate into license. "The initiative 
 is the source of the great successes in war," say the In- 
 fantry Regulations; "but it will bear fruit only if kept 
 within proper limits." 
 
 In order to leave to everyone his proper share of 
 initiative, to allow everyone the privilege of acting 
 according to the circumstances, according to his judg- 
 ment, the regulations carefully avoid all ironclad rules 
 and prescribe independence and responsibility for the 
 subordinate in the choice of means. 
 
 "The subject of combat does not admit of exact 
 rules.'' 
 
 It is very remarkable that in this German army 
 which is so given to order, regularity and method, we 
 find it recommended that initiative and independence 
 be left to all grades of the military organization. 
 
[67] 
 
 3. THE NECESSITY OF COMMUNICATION. 
 
 We have already had occasion to call attention to 
 the care which the Germans bestow upon their lines of 
 information not only in the matter of communication 
 between the different grades of rank but also between 
 the different arms. We shall see hereafter, in the dis- 
 cussion of the service of reconnaissance, with what 
 care they establish the Hnes of information of that 
 service. 
 
 In all three arms the different echelons of command 
 are formally enjoined to keep in close touch with one 
 another. 
 
 "All leaders must direct their attention to * * ♦ 
 the lines of information." (I. R. 283.) 
 
 "The telephone is usefully employed to keep the 
 different echelons in touch with one another." (I. R. 
 281.) 
 
 Communication among the arms is prescribed in 
 the most explicit manner : ' 'the artillery especially must 
 keep in constant and uninterrupted communication with 
 the arm that it has to support." "The artillery must 
 always keep in communication with the portion of the 
 line of battle that has been assigned to it. " (A. R. 376.) 
 
 "Infantry always fights in co-operation with the 
 other arms; its action cannot be separated from that 
 of the artillery." 
 
 The new Artillery Regulations no longer consider 
 the artillery duel as the prelude of the battle, they 
 assert that the artillery owes all its support to the in- 
 fantry and fights only to open the road for it. 
 
[68] 
 
 4. THE UNITED ATTACK. 
 
 The Germans do not concede that combat should 
 be accepted unless all the means of action have been 
 gathered together. When a force, separated from its 
 main body, encounters the enemy it attacks only in 
 case it is obviously superior; otherwise it stops, en- 
 trenches, even falls back if necessary, and awaits the 
 arrival of the main body. When, then, a force having 
 an offensive mission finds itself facing the enemy, it is 
 first to concentrate then to advance to the attack with 
 all its forces acting in concert. It is necessary at the 
 very start to gain the superiority over the enemy and 
 crush him by the weight of numbers. 
 
 "Cavalry must operate in large masses.'' (C. R. 
 393.) 
 
 "Artillery should enter into action almost like one 
 blow, in masses.'' (A. R.) 
 
 "The infantry of the main body should simul- 
 taneously make a united attack." (I. R. 359.) 
 
 Everywhere we find this idea of a powerful attack, 
 to be made brutally with all available forces. 
 
 The German regulations lay down very different 
 rules depending upon whether they are treating of the 
 battle from the point of view of the offensive or from 
 the point of view of the defensive. 
 
 In them are examined successively the different 
 forms of the offensive, as it is manifested in a meeting 
 engagement; against an enemy in a defensive position; 
 against an enemy in a fortified position. 
 
[69] 
 
 We shall study particularly the German ideas con- 
 cerning meeting engagements which will be the usual 
 type in future struggles. Thereafter we shall study the 
 other forms of combat, considering only the peculi- 
 arities that they offer. 
 
[70] 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE OFFENSIVE. 
 Reconnaissance (Information.) 
 
 "The service of reconnaissance has for its object," 
 say the Field Service Regulations, ''to find the enemy, 
 to determine his position and his strength." 
 
 The Germans rely absolutely upon their secret 
 service and their service of cavalry reconnaissance for 
 all necessary general information concerning the enemy. 
 They expect to obtain by these two means sufficient 
 data to engage intelligently in combat. 
 
 They do not wait moreover to get precise and de- 
 tailed information, which can only be obtained by 
 fighting. As soon as their two services of information 
 have indicated the general position of the hostile 
 centers, as soon as they believe themselves sufficiently 
 oriented not to engage wrongly, they attack and aspire, 
 by a ferocious offensive, to impose their will and their 
 strength without needing to see very thoroughly into 
 the dispositions of the adversary. 
 
 They have therefore very carefully organized their 
 two means of investigation. Naturally their regula- 
 tions and their military writings speak only of the ser- 
 vice of reconnaissance. 
 
 ATTACKING THE ADVERSE CAVALRY. 
 
 As a rule, the service of reconnaissance is per- 
 formed only by cavalry, but to be able to accomplish 
 it easily it must not be hindered by the adverse cavalry. 
 To perform its own duty of exploration and to prevent 
 
[71] 
 
 the hostile cavalry from performing its duty are the 
 first two missions of the cavalry. 
 
 ATTACKING THE HOSTILE CAVALRY. 
 
 Therefore, the regulations say : " It is of the highest 
 importance to sweep away as quickly as possible the 
 opposing cavalry and to establish an incontestable 
 superiority over it. All detachments and patrols 
 should consequently attack the hostile cavalry wherever 
 it is seen. In this way the service of information is 
 hastened and the service of security considerably facili- 
 tated." 
 
 Hence, to put it clearly — ^first attack the hostile 
 cavalry, defeat it, then fall upon hostile cavalrymen 
 everywhere ! 
 
 The Germans do not conceal the fact that they 
 rely absolutely upon their numerical superiority in 
 cavalry rapidly to defeat ours (*). 
 
 Their principle of seeking from the very outset 
 the main body of hostile cavalry in order to defeat it, is 
 excellent. The offensive from the very beginning is 
 what they extol; we can but approve it. 
 
 CAVALRY PATROLS. 
 
 The service of reconnaissance is carried out prin- 
 cipally by patrols ; patrols operating at a distance, and 
 patrols operating near to their main body. The Ger- 
 man instructions for these patrols are similar to those 
 of the French regulations; we shall not dwell upon 
 them. Let us observe only that their regulations pre- 
 
 *The Germans mobilize twelve divisions of cavalry; France, 
 eight. The Germans have, therefore, a crushing superiority in 
 numbers; they claim also to have technical superiority. 
 
[72] 
 
 scribe a substitute for the patrol leader, an extremely 
 wise measure which we would do well to imitate in 
 France. 
 
 When the patrols are pushed out too far to be able 
 easily to communicate with the main body of the cav- 
 alry, supporting escadrons are sent out, serving as 
 rallying centers and as centers for transmitting in- 
 formation. These escadrons are separated by not more 
 than 15 or 20 kilometers. 
 
 The important question of the rapid transmission 
 of information has been studied. The regulations give 
 only general instructions ; but in practice the Germans 
 make intelligent use of all means that science has put 
 in their hands. 
 
 The patrols send their reports to the escadrons by 
 courier; this is the only possible means, but at the 
 same time the most uncertain means of transmission. 
 Not only must the courier escape the enemy, but he 
 must find the escadron. An unintelligent trooper, alone 
 and without a map, has a great deal of trouble in find- 
 ing his way over unfamiliar ground. 
 
 The escadron can not remain stationary; it leaves 
 transmitting stations, previously designated, at fixed 
 points. 
 
 From these stations run telephone lines or, failing 
 these, lines of automobilists or cyclists which converge 
 toward a central point — the central information station 
 of the independent cavalry. At this point there is an 
 officer who gathers together all the information and 
 co-ordinates it. He communicates it by automobiles 
 or couriers to the general commanding the cavalry, 
 who is often some distance away. 
 
 As to the communication with the general com- 
 
[73] 
 
 manding the army, it would take too long if it had to 
 be effected by the same means. That general is indeed 
 two or three days' march in rear. The officer at the 
 information center must be provided with wireless 
 equipment ; he communicates the information by wire- 
 less. 
 
 The system of commimication thus organized 
 seems perfect and is worth imitating. 
 
 The service of reconnaissance is kept up until the 
 two opposing armies come in contact; the cavalry 
 divisions then withdraw to the flanks, and the service 
 of information is maintained by the divisional cavalry. 
 To this end, ''the two bodies of divisional cavalry 
 of an army corps may be advantageously united, leav- 
 ing an escadron to each division." 
 
 THE LARGE INDEPENDENT CAVALRY CORPS. 
 
 It is thus that has been organized, with it visual 
 antenna, the network of the service of reconnaissance. 
 
 This system will be able in most cases to give only 
 the apparent outline of the positions or of the Hnes of 
 march of the enemy. It will always afford the possi- 
 bility of indicating the location of the hostile front and 
 wings, but rarely will it permit of penetrating far 
 enough to describe the hostile dispositions. Its eyes 
 will be veiled by the enemy's screen. Now it is import- 
 ant to break that screen and see behind it ; and this is 
 one of the essential missions of the cavalry divisions. 
 The regulations indicate that "in order to accomplish 
 this mission, divisions may be united into a single com- 
 mand." 
 
 From everything that we know, it is certain that 
 at the beginning of war there will be formed in Ger- 
 
[74] 
 
 many large cavalry corps composed of three or four 
 divisions, and perhaps more; each of these divisions 
 will be armed with twelve machine guns and with 
 twelve field pieces. 
 
 These large corps will throw out their network of 
 exploration and seek the enemy's cavalry with a view 
 to defeat it and to put it out of action. If victorious, 
 they will advance to meet the hostile army with the 
 clearly defined mission of getting in contact with it in 
 order to reconnoiter it. 
 
 This victorious cavalry will then have to drive 
 back the mixed corps that the enemy will perhaps have 
 thrown to the front, to pierce the infantry screens, to 
 bore through the outposts, defeat the flank guards, etc. 
 It is for these combats, before which the German cav- 
 alry is not to hestitate, that it has been taught, as we 
 have seen, to fight on foot on the offensive and to push 
 the action to a decision. 
 
 The Germans believe that their large cavalry corps, 
 well armed with machine guns and field guns, will be 
 able to repulse all the mixed detachments with which the 
 enemy can surround himself, and to push through to 
 the infantry columns and reconnoiter them, harass 
 and delay them. 
 
 The role of these corps is to become more and 
 more important ; it has been foreseen and anticipated. 
 
 *'The larger the armies are," writes General von 
 Bemhardi, *'the longer is the time required to execute 
 their movements and the more is it essential that the 
 command be oriented in advance with respect to the 
 enemy, if it is to co-ordinate and execute its movements 
 to the best advantage. As a necessary consequence 
 the cavalry must be pushed a great deal farther ahead 
 
[75] 
 
 in the direction of the enemy. It is clear that its 
 movements can not be made to conform to those of an 
 infantry support if one be assigned to it. Even im- 
 portant cycHst detachments, being more or less re- 
 stricted to roads, would only imperfectly procure for 
 the cavalry the independence that it needs. 
 
 "We shall have, then, in the future to trust to 
 fighting on foot, even to fighting on the defensive and 
 pushing it to a decision whatever happens, even by 
 engaging large forces * * * . 
 
 ''Already (in the war of 1870-71) has defensive 
 action on foot been found to be the exception * * * , 
 It is inconsistent to want to tie down the cavalry, the 
 offensive arm par excellence, to a defensive attitude at 
 the time when it should make use of its carbines." 
 
 Before the large corps of the German cavalry what 
 will be done by an adversary, like the French, very 
 inferior in cavalry strength ? 
 
 The time when each field army was provided with 
 a single division of independent cavalry acting for its 
 own army, no longer exists. These isolated divisions 
 would be powerless before the most meager screen, 
 and opposed to a combination of German divisions 
 they would get themselves successively destroyed. 
 
 Combinations must be opposed by combinations. 
 In cavalry tactics we come back to the true principle: 
 "Concentrate to fight." There will be formed in 
 France, as in Germany, large cavalry corps. It must 
 be observed that these corps can not be enlarged indefi- 
 nitely; beyond a certain limit they would lose the 
 necessary mobility and suppleness; the difficulties of 
 supply and subsistence would become insurmountable; 
 
[761 
 
 one serious repulse might imperil, for the entire cam- 
 paign one of the most essential organs of the army. 
 
 We claim that it is Utopian to imagine, as some 
 authors have recently done, that in the next war Ger- 
 many will make a lump of the majority of her cavalry 
 divisions by establishing a corps of eight or ten divisions. 
 
 How can one believe that Germany would engage 
 at a single point the greater part of her independent 
 forces of cavalry? Admitting even that such a mass 
 could exist and be satisfactorily commanded, what 
 consequences would ensue if it should fall into a trap, 
 if an order, an unfortunate chance should bring about 
 its destruction? 
 
 There is certainly a limit to this concentration of 
 cavalry; we do not presume to fix the limit, but three 
 or four divisions seem to be a large maximum; and 
 further what general is capable of leading such an army 
 and maneuvering it properly on a cavalry battle field? 
 
 It can well be presumed that these cavalry corps 
 might undergo some severe lessons in a war, when in 
 time of peace they have never been tested. 
 
 THE CAVALRY AND THE CYCLIST CORPS. 
 
 In any case in France, though we have a notorious 
 inferiority in cavalry, we must remember that in this 
 arm especially numbers alone do not give victory; 
 leadership and individual bravery are the arbiters of 
 cavalry combat. 
 
 In the zone of operations, which we ought to choose, 
 we shall be able to oppose any German cavalry corps 
 with an equivalent corps quite capable of stopping it 
 and of repulsing it. We can also form a corps of three 
 or even four divisions, armed like that of our prospec- 
 
[77] 
 
 tive adversaries, with field pieces and machine guns and 
 in addition, supported by bodies of cyclists. 
 
 In the ruling military spheres, the Germans are 
 not advocates of cyclist corps; they claim that these 
 corps attached to cavalry are an impediment and not 
 an auxiliary; they are afraid that they will injure its 
 mobility and its independence of movement. The new 
 Cavalry Regulations say indeed: "To the supporting 
 detachments (cyclists, infantry in wagons, etc.), belongs 
 principally the duty of strengthening the resistance of 
 the cavalry in localities and of breaking a similar resist- 
 ance on the part of the enemy." But these detach- 
 ments seem to be meant for particular cases, as for hold- 
 ing or attacking a given point of great importance 
 (defile, bridge, etc.), and not to accompany the cavalry 
 to support it in time of danger. 
 
 In the large maneuvers of 1907 and 1908, cyclist 
 detachments were formed in Germany; little use was 
 made of them; the commanding authority has lost 
 interest in them. These detachments were formed of 
 elements from different corps. In the maneuvers of 
 1909 no cyclist unit was formed. 
 
 Our neighbors have no established cyclist units. 
 They well appreciate cyclists as agents of communica- 
 tion and as messengers; they make extensive use of 
 them, but appear unwilling to use them, except in 
 special cases, to form fighting units. 
 
 In France, in spite of great opposition, the cyclist 
 battalions have received appreciation in the large 
 maneuvers and have rendered efficient service. In 
 the localities where we may be called upon to encoimter 
 the German army, there is a compact network of roads; 
 the cyclists would be able to get about everywhere and 
 
[78] 
 
 consequently to follow the cavalry divisions and to sup- 
 port them when necessary. Two or three cycHst bat- 
 talions operating with the large corps of French cavalry 
 would permit it to cope successfully with a German 
 cavalry force even superior in numbers. The practical 
 study of the employment of these battalions in large 
 cavalry maneuvers would be extremely interesting. 
 
[79] 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 ADVANCE GUARD; MARCHING TO THE ATTACK. 
 The Advance Guard. 
 
 MISSION OF THE ADVANCE GUARD. 
 
 The Field Service Regulations define the r61e of the 
 advance guard (Par. 164): "The advance guard's 
 mission is to ensure to the rnain body an uninterrupted 
 march and to protect the column from unexpected at- 
 tacks. In case the enemy is encountered, it must pro- 
 vide for the main body the time and the space neces- 
 sary to deploy for action, taking care not to let itself 
 be drawn into an engagement against the will of the 
 commanding officer." Hence the advance guard in 
 Germany is expected only to protect the main body 
 against surprise and, by its resistance in case of attack, 
 to permit it to deploy. 
 
 It is a shield and not an offensive weapon. 
 
 The advance guard must not engage in an offensive 
 action except when it foresees certain success. From 
 the information that will have been gathered and from 
 what is developed in the first engagements of the ad- 
 vance guard an approximate estimate of the situation 
 can be made. 
 
 ''Uncertainty and lack of information are the rule 
 in war. In a war of operations, the two adversaries will 
 often not have their information until after coming in 
 contact." (I. R. 352.) 
 
 This paragraph is exactly correct. It is the French 
 theory. It does not seem to be in accord with what 
 
[80] 
 
 has been said elsewhere as to results to be obtained by 
 the cavalry. 
 
 If it can be judged from the first brushes of the 
 advance guard that one has the advantage in deploy- 
 ment and in numbers, one will not hesitate to follow up 
 the first successes by supporting the advance guard 
 with successive arrivals of the troops of the main body. 
 But if one is uncertain it is recommended to remain 
 *'in expectation," to wait until all the artillery has been 
 assembled and the main body of the infantry "can 
 make a united attack." 
 
 "The leader will then no longer have to subordinate 
 his decisions to new and lengthy reconnaissances. He 
 must reflect that the adversary is in exactly the same 
 predicament as himself." (I. R. 356.) 
 
 "The advantage, in a chance engagement (meet- 
 ing engagement), lies with the one who knows how to 
 make the most quickly his preparations for action, 
 thus obtaining freedom in maneuvering." (A. R. 476.) 
 
 If, then, it seems that one is strong enough and 
 is as well prepared for action as his adversary, "it is 
 the general situation that determines whether the 
 offensive must be taken. If the offensive is to be as- 
 sumed, rapid action is necessary." (I. R. 355.) 
 
 If, on the contrary, the enemy seems to be superior 
 or to have the advantage as to deployment, "it is 
 necessary to act with prudence. * * * The 
 leader will avoid becoming engaged before having as- 
 sembled sufficient forces, for fear of being compelled to 
 fight constantly with inferior forces against a superior 
 enemy. 
 
 "It may even be prudent to cause the advance 
 guard to withdraw in order to save it a bloody combat 
 
[81] 
 
 and to expedite the arrival and the co-operation of the 
 main body." (I. R. 360.) 
 
 The Germans seek to hit hard at the very begin- 
 ning. If the advance guard has the advantage, it is 
 vigorously supported; the artillery is pushed forward, 
 engages without hesitation, then the infantry engages 
 as fast as it comes up. 
 
 But if the German advance guard is not certain of 
 gaining the superiority at the outset, it halts, it keeps 
 up a delaying fight until the artillery has been able to 
 come up and the main body of the infantry is near 
 enough to support it. When everything is ready, a 
 heavy fire breaks out suddenly along the whole front 
 and a powerful offensive is unmasked. It is necessary 
 to hit hard, as hard as possible. 
 
 Finally, if the advance guard finds itself opposed by 
 forces that are superior or better prepared for a fight, 
 the Germans do not hesitate to withdraw; they will 
 even, if necessary, go so far as to break off the action, 
 notwithstanding their violent prejudices against such 
 a procedure. They fall back in such a way as to lead 
 the enemy to run against the line of the main body, 
 deployed in rear, and ready to enfold him in cross fire 
 and to crush him if possible, by a vigorous counter- 
 offensive. 
 
 FORMATION OF THE ADVANCE GUARD. 
 
 The German advance guard, according to the regu- 
 lations, should have a strength equal to from one-third 
 to one-sixth of the total strength. 
 
 According to the practice at the last maneuvers, 
 there were assigned to it in each army corps the two 
 regiments of divisional cavalry, leaving one escadron 
 
[82] 
 
 to each division. This has become an habitual dis- 
 position. This cavalry fulfills the same role as the 
 brigade of cavalry of the French corps; we shall not 
 dwell upon it. 
 
 In rear of this cavalry, the advance guard is com- 
 posed in Germany as it is in France, and is subdivided 
 into the same number of echelons. 
 
 The regulations indicate two distances for the 
 echelons of the advance guard proper. The advance 
 party marches at 400 or 500 meters in front of the sup- 
 port, and the support at from 1,000 to 1,500 meters in 
 front of the reserve of the advance guard. 
 
 The distance of the main body from the reserve o^ 
 the advance guard is not indicated, but this distance 
 is generally conceded to be about 3,000 meters. 
 
 The sum of the distances gives a space of about 
 five kilometers from the point to the head of the main 
 body. The latter is therefore practically insured 
 against surprise from the artillery of the enemy. 
 
 In our opinion, there should be no fear about taking 
 very great distances between the different echelons 
 of the advance guard; the resisting power of the units 
 has been considerably increased by the modern arma- 
 ment in use, the reconnaissance of the enemy now takes 
 a longer time and is more difficult. 
 
 THE ADVANCE TO AN ENGAGEMENT. DEPLOYMENT 
 OF COLUMNS. 
 
 Paragraph 315 of the German Infantry Regula- 
 tions says: "When the enemy is approached, disposi- 
 tions for action are made. They consist in the doubling 
 of the colimm (forming double column or coltimn of 
 platoons), the Aufmarsch; the deployed formation of 
 
[83] 
 
 line of columns (the Entfaltung), and the forming into 
 line before the impact (Entwikelung) . 
 
 We find thus three phases : 
 
 (a) Passing from route formation to a compact 
 formation of less depth and greater width, or an assem- 
 bling if a halt is made ; 
 
 (6) Passing from the compact marching forma- 
 tion or the assembled formation to an open formation. 
 The march is continued or taken up in small separated 
 columns across country; it is the French "march to an 
 engagement;" 
 
 (c) Deployment as skirmishers of the first lines. 
 
 "When it can be foreseen that it is necessary to 
 enter immediately into action, the formation into 
 double column (the Aufmarsch) is omitted, because it 
 most often involves a loss of time and useless fatigue; 
 one passes directly to the formation of the Entfaltung, 
 the march to the engagement." (I. R.) 
 
 This last restriction is a wise one ; it is indeed uot 
 easy to understand what a colimm on the march can 
 gain by forming itself into a double column, in a wide 
 formation, or by assembling once it is on the march in 
 any column whatever. It always means loss of time 
 and useless fatigue. To begin the march in a dense 
 formation when it is known that the road to he traversed 
 permits of retaining that formation everywhere, may be 
 exceedingly useful; thus can be diminished the depth 
 of the column and, consequently, the time necessary 
 for deployment, but to take this formation while on 
 the march or to stop to assemble is almost always a 
 mistake. 
 
 The assembling of a column previous to any en- 
 
[84] 
 
 gagement whatever was for a long time an established 
 principle. Instead of going directly to their places on 
 the battle field, the troops would go and collect in 
 masses. In addition to the disadvantages already- 
 pointed out, these assemblies would in these days, in 
 front of modern artillery, be exposed to serious danger. 
 A battery of German howitzers can, at a distance of 
 five or six kilometers, produce very marked material 
 effects and still greater moral effects by unexpected fire 
 upon an assembly that has been observed. 
 
 These assemblies are no longer made except in 
 very open formation. 
 
 There is no reason for them except when the com- 
 mander does not know just when he will have to engage 
 his forces nor in what direction. 
 
 THE IMPORTANCE OF TAKING THE RIGHT DIRECTION. 
 
 The Germans consider as highly important the 
 attention devoted to assigning proper directions to the 
 different columns. It is essential, they say indeed, that 
 these colimms be started in the right directions. If there 
 are errors in direction considerable delays are caused; 
 there is a risk of throwing some of the troops against 
 empty air, of getting some wedged in, or having gaps 
 produced. 
 
 The German method of making an united attack 
 without having collected all needed information, can 
 indeed bring about serious errors as to directions; 
 certain units may strike empty air, others be led away 
 by screening troops in divergent directions. 
 
 The role frequently assigned in France to an ad- 
 vance guard, to a contact detachment or to a rear guard 
 is precisely that of drawing the enemy in a false dire 
 
[85] 
 
 tion. The German regulations particularly recommend 
 to the commanders of large units that they start their 
 forces exactly toward the objective selected or desig- 
 nated; but before hand it is essential that the objective 
 shall have been carefully reconnoitered and the direc- 
 tion thoroughly studied. 
 
 Indeed, the German Infantry Regulations (Par. 
 286) say: "The difficulty of getting units engaged in 
 the first line to change direction increases with their 
 size. The direction in which a force is to fight is de- 
 termined before engaging it. Tf during the advance it is 
 observed that the direction is faulty, it is rare that more 
 can be done in the case of large bodies than to send 
 new troops forward in the proper direction." 
 
[86] 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 MEETING ENGAGEMENTS. 
 
 The Germans recognize only one form of offensive 
 action; they do not differentiate, like the French, be- 
 tween the preliminary or demonstrative attack and the 
 decisive attack. For them there is but one method of 
 fighting offensively. 
 
 PREPARATORY COMBAT. 
 
 1. ARTILLERY DEPLOYMENT. 
 
 The advance guard deployed over a wide front has 
 for its principal duty the protection of the deployment 
 of the artillery ; while fighting, it must occupy as needed 
 the important points of the terrain. (I. R.) 
 
 The artillery is pushed forward so as to establish 
 as rapidly as possible "an impenetrable wall * * *". 
 
 As soon as it has been decided to give battle, the 
 general commanding the army corps must call up all 
 his artillery, i. e., that of his two divisions. This artil- 
 lery, during the march to the engagement (the Ent- 
 faltung), is to be pushed forward over the main roads 
 while the infantry is coming up over smaller roads or 
 across country. Its arrival at the positions indicated 
 by the corps commander must not be delayed. 
 
 If the advance guard has been able to gain the 
 advantage and is found to be acting on the offensive, 
 ■**the commander of the troops will unhesitatingly 
 throw into action the fractions of the artillery as fast 
 as they come up in order to keep or to make the most 
 
[87] 
 
 of an advantage won by the advance guard." (A. R. 
 
 481.) 
 
 But if the advance guard is obliged to observe 
 prudence, believing itself before an opposing force that 
 is larger and better prepared for battle, it is advised to 
 wait; "The commander will then avoid undertaking 
 any serious combat until he has at his disposition 
 enough artillery. ' ' (A. R. 482.) 
 
 These sentences from the regulations show that 
 battle may be entered into in different ways. "There 
 is no reason for formulating*a fixed rule," says General 
 von Rohne. "It is important to have the advance 
 guard strong in artillery because beyond doubt it is 
 called upon to play a very important role; it enables 
 the commander-in-chief to overcome many difficulties. 
 It is desirable to maintain under all circumstances the 
 possibility of giving prompt support to the advance 
 guard by the artillery of the main body, and one should 
 not fear to separate from his infantry the artillery of 
 the last division and push it forward in the column." 
 These passages from the work of General von Rohne, 
 the great chief of artillery, thoroughly indicate the 
 German opinion on the rapid deployment of the mass 
 of artillery in rear of the advance guard. 
 
 OPENING FIRE. 
 
 "One should try to have the artillery of the main 
 body open fire simultaneously." (A. R. 481.) 
 
 "It is of the greatest importance to put out of 
 action the opposing artillery before passing to the at- 
 tack * * * 
 
 "The artillery should endeavor to open fire by 
 surprise, within effective range. For that purpose it 
 
[88] 
 
 approaches as near as circumstances permit to the 
 hostile position." (A. R. 466.) 
 
 The Germans consider that one cannot think of 
 an assault before having, if not destroyed, at least put 
 out of action the hostile artillery, and for that reason it 
 is necessary to get the superiority of fire as soon as 
 possible. The best way is to open fire by surprise at 
 close range. 
 
 General von Rohne wisely says : 
 
 "The farther away the first position is from the 
 enemy, the sooner will be felt the necessity for changing 
 position. Outside of the loss of time that that will 
 entail, it is likely that there will be much less chance to 
 act by surprise in the new position." 
 
 Contrary to the principles taught by the regula- 
 tions of 1899, the new Infantry Regulations recommend 
 that the batteries wait to open fire until the infantry 
 shall have commenced its movement. ''In order to 
 leave the adversary in uncertainty, it is important not 
 to engage the artillery until the infantry is advancing." 
 (A. R. 361.) 
 
 The' preliminary duel before the infantry combat 
 is no longer recognized in Germany. 
 
 * ' The artillery duel and the infantry attack are not 
 two separate acts of a battle," says further General 
 von Rohne, "it will be necessary henceforth to engage 
 with the hostile artillery during the advance of the in- 
 fantry. Only the closest co-operation of the two arms 
 permits getting results." 
 
 The regulations finally lay down this principle: 
 "As soon as the friendly infantry approaches the zone 
 beaten by the fire of the hostile infantry, the artillery 
 while continuing to fire upon the opposing artillery 
 
[89] 
 
 must direct the greater part of its fire upon the enemy*s 
 infantry in order to facilitate the advance of its own." 
 (A. R. 369.) 
 
 That paragraph is very important, for it points out 
 to the German artillery a method of operation different 
 from that to which it has been accustomed. There- 
 fore according to the new regulations, whatever be the 
 condition of the artillery combat the infantry combat 
 takes the first place in importance and the artillery 
 must support its infantry with the major part of its 
 strength. ''Notwithstanding that necessity," says 
 General von Rohne, '*no fraction of the enmey's 
 artillery must be left unoccupied. The batteries which 
 keep up the artillery duel will have to divide up among 
 themselves the hostile batteries. 
 
 ' 'The fire must be so apportioned that no fraction of 
 the opposing line can keep up the action with impunity 
 * * * . The best results may be expected from 
 combined front and flank firing. Even when you 
 haven't numerical superiority, you must try to obtain 
 it temporarily upon certain points, by concentrating the 
 fire." (A. R. 437.) 
 
 The Germans expect that from the beginning of 
 the artillery struggle the howitzers will render the most 
 useful service. The light howitzers enter into action 
 at the same time as the field guns, but the heavy artil- 
 lery will often be late getting into operation; we have 
 seen that there are various precautions to be taken 
 before it engages. 
 
 In any case "these howitzers will have to silence 
 all hostile artillery whose position can be determined 
 and then facilitate by the greater part of their fire the 
 advance of their infantry." (H. A. R. 409-10.) 
 
[90] 
 
 Placed in carefully defiladed positions, the how- 
 itzers will be able, as we have already seen, to damage 
 the opposing artillery, provided it be recognizable. 
 
 It is nevertheless certain that they will never be 
 able to destroy the adversary's artillery. "It can 
 hardly be expected that the visible artillery can be 
 completely destroyed. Formerly it needed only a few 
 salvos to silence a battery. That can no longer be ex- 
 pected. It is only by fire with percussion shells that 
 such a result can be obtained; on the other hand, the 
 fire of the artillery can greatly decrease the battery's 
 efficiency , interrupt its operation * * * ." (General 
 von Rohne.) 
 
 AN EXAMINATION OF THE USE OF ARTILLERY. 
 
 On the whole, as soon as a battle is seen to be im- 
 minent, the artillery is pushed forward so as to get into 
 action as quickly as possible. This is an excellent 
 principle; it is likewise recommended in the French 
 regulations. Our neighbors apply it with remarkable 
 regularity. 
 
 As has been stated, very rare will be the cases when 
 the German advance guard will boldly take the offen- 
 sive, and, consequently, when the fractions of artillery 
 will be engaged successively according to the order of 
 their arrival or the hazard of circumstances. 
 
 Our neighbors, being prudent and methodical, 
 make use of their advance guard as a protecting curtain, 
 behind which they deploy as much artillery as possible. 
 When they believe themselves to be ready to engage 
 all their forces they let loose suddenly and by surprise 
 the whole mechanism of a powerful offensive. 
 
[91] 
 
 The artillery thus enters into action — "as a 
 bunch." Upon whom? Upon what? 
 
 In case of a fight between the Germans and the 
 French, it can be foreseen that the German artillery 
 will have been able to perceive at that time only a few 
 French batteries of the advance guard which will have 
 been on the offensive. These batteries which, it is to 
 be hoped, will have deployed as quickly as the German 
 artillery, will be in positions of observation along the 
 whole front. 
 
 If the Germans open fire with all their artillery 
 '4n a bunch," the French artillery will immediately 
 have precise information as to the emplacement and as 
 to the strength of the German artillery ; all the more so 
 since, as we have stated, the latter will be for the most 
 part masked but not defiladed. We shall then be able 
 to reply to it very advantageously. The batteries of 
 the French advance guard will obviously have to suffer; 
 but if they have been prudent, if they know what to 
 expect, the}^ can be presumed to have taken precautions. 
 Well spaced and defiladed, they will be undoubtedly 
 forced to suspend their fire for some time, making up 
 for it by resuming fire when they shall have the op- 
 portunity. 
 
 The German method of starting the artillery fight 
 appears to be rather crude; it rests upon mere brute 
 force. It conforms to the German ideas, but the pro- 
 cedure seems somewhat barbarous compared to the 
 French methods which are so perfected and rational. 
 
 It is nevertheless true that the sudden unloosening 
 of the fire of the combined artillery will produce a 
 profound impression upon the young French troops; 
 
[92] 
 
 therefore they should be warned beforehand so as not 
 to be surprised. 
 
 The Germans have thoroughly grasped the fact 
 that the infantry combat will become the predominent 
 factor of the struggle; their regulations prescribe de- 
 voting the major part of the artillery to the infantry 
 fight. Until the moment for the asssault, the remainder 
 of the available guns, with the support of the greater 
 part of the howitzers, is to keep up the artillery duel. 
 
 This prescription of the regulations can but be 
 approved. 
 
 The importance of the infantry combat is appreci- 
 ated in the same manner by the French Chiefs of Artil- 
 lery. General Percin, the Inspector General of Artil- 
 lery says: "On the offensive, it is the battery sup- 
 porting the infantry that plays the principal role, the 
 batteries that oppose the hostile artillery (the counter 
 batteries) are there solely to give the infantry batteries 
 freedom of action. The efficiency of the artillery can 
 therefore be measured by the proportion of the bat- 
 teries susceptible of giving effective support to the at- 
 tacks of the infantry. Of what importance is the result 
 of the artillery duel? When the infantry goes, every- 
 thing goes!" 
 
 The Germans recommend (I. R. 331) that some 
 batteries accompany the infantry up to the very shortest 
 ranges. They hardly sanction defiladed positions for 
 the light artillery batteries; they do not authorize, 
 under any circumstances, defilading for the batteries 
 designated to support the infantry; these must fight 
 without cover from half masked positions in order to 
 take advantage of favorable opportunities. 
 
 Since it is^practically impossible for artillery that is 
 
[93] 
 
 visible to change its position under fire of the enemy, 
 the result will be that the German artillery designated 
 to support the infantry — and this will mean the greater 
 part of their field artillery — will have to go in battery 
 at the beginning in a definite position from which it will 
 not be able to budge. 
 
 This uncovered condition of the artillery, before 
 the enemy's batteries are dominated or at least partly 
 put out of action, appears to us to be terribly dangerous, 
 especially facing a well defiladed artillery that is vigilant 
 and active like that of the French. 
 
 At the large maneuvers of 1909 the French wit- 
 nesses were particularly struck by the imprudence of 
 the German batteries. 
 
 2. INFANTRY DEPLOYMENT. 
 
 The deployment of troops is made by our neigh- 
 bors almost as in France ; there is the same preoccupa- 
 tion about getting under cover, the same care in pre- 
 serving the proper direction. 
 
 There is, however, a characteristic difference. 
 Whereas the French regulations accord a preponderant 
 influence to the utilization of the ground, the Germans 
 pitilessly subordinate the question of the utilization of 
 the ground to that of maintaining the direction. 
 
 It is the duty of each unit to utilize to the best ad- 
 vantage accidents of the ground, but it is not allowed to 
 encroach upon the neighboring zone ; it will have to, 
 without hesitation, if it has at its disposition only open 
 ground, engage boldly thereupon and keep up the fight 
 on it to the end. 
 
[94] 
 
 Whereas in France an objective is indicated to the 
 leader of a unit, and he is left free to use the ground to 
 the best possible advantage, by inclining more or less 
 to one direction or the other; by sharing passages 
 through which will slip several units having contiguous 
 but different objectives; by closing up behind certain 
 shelters which may serve as protection to various units, — 
 in Germany there is assigned to each unit a zone from 
 which it has not the right to stray. The Germans fear 
 the crowding and mixing of units in sheltered passages. 
 Their well ordered and methodical minds dread dis- 
 order and confusion above everything else; they trace 
 out absolute lines of demarcation between the zones for 
 the advance of the different units. They remember 
 the extraordinary obstruction that took place in the 
 ravine de la Mance on August 18th, 1870; the memory 
 of this famous episode, which might have been so dis- 
 astrous for them, has certainly had an influence upon 
 the prescriptions of the regulations. Many able Ger- 
 man minds do not agree as to this point with the regu- 
 lations. In 1898 General von Schlichting wrote: '*It 
 must be laid down as a fact that open level surfaces, 
 beaten by the enemy's fire, are henceforth impossible 
 to skirmish lines and to their supports, whatever may 
 be the formations adopted." 
 
 As a result of the prescriptions of the regulations, 
 the German lines are perfectly seen during their advance 
 even under the fire of the enemy. That could be ob- 
 served at their last large maneuvers. 
 
 The gaps in the battle field, which sometimes struck 
 the observers of the Russo-Japanese war, can not 
 occur with the Germans. In France we claim, that 
 by seeking cover, an effort should be made in the 
 
[95] 
 
 maneuvers, as in actual war, to give to the enemy so far 
 as possible the impression of these gaps, which are so 
 troublesome for the adversary. We believe this to be 
 approximating a condition which will be a reality im- 
 posed in war. 
 
 On the German battle field such a gap can not 
 exist, since the exposed positions of the zones of attack 
 are occupied. Moreover, the reserves follow exactly 
 the first lines. 
 
 One will then be certain^ over any zone whatever, 
 to see, if the terrain permits, the first line advancing, 
 followed successively by the different lines of reserve. 
 Instead of marching as in France, generally grouped in 
 small columns utilizing the passage ways of the terrain, 
 these reserves are obliged to advance over the zones as- 
 signed to them, whether these zones be favorable or not 
 for defilading them. Over the exposed zones they march 
 like the first line, in large deployed chains. 
 
 It was of importance to show up these methods of 
 marching of the German infantry. They seem to us 
 subject to criticism, but it cannot be said that they are 
 not in conformity with the spirit of regularity and order 
 that prevails in Germany. 
 
 FRONTS. 
 
 The German regulations abstain from giving any 
 data as to the extent of the fronts; they leave complete 
 initiative as to this matter. 
 
 ''The initial development of the front will depend 
 upon the strength and intentions of the force and upon 
 the development of the hostile front." (I. R. 288.) 
 In the case of a definite offensive against an enemy 
 deployed in a defensive position, the regulations fix as 
 
[96] 
 
 the front not to be exceeded 500 meters for a company 
 and 1,500 meters for a brigade. 
 
 These are the only figures found in the regulations 
 pertaining to the subject of fronts. 
 
 It is evident that the fronts can not be fixed : they 
 are preeminently variable depending upon the circum- 
 stances and the terrain. The perfecting of the arma- 
 ment, the increase in the range of the weapons allow 
 their width to be considerably augmented. A line, 
 even though thoroughly defended, will surely have 
 empty sections in it. 
 
 The supporting points of the position will be oc- 
 cupied; exposed passages that can be swept by cross 
 fire will be left without troops. The assailants will 
 move upon these supporting points avoiding the de- 
 nuded passages. 
 
 The line of battle will no longer form a continuous 
 line of defenders or of assailants, but a succession of 
 positions over which the combats will take place. 
 
 It will often be very advantageous to use forces 
 economically over one part of the line in order to be 
 able to use more of them elsewhere. 
 
 In Germany, as in France, the distribution of the 
 forces will be essentially variable. There will be 
 sectors very feebly occupied, while others will be very 
 strongly occupied. It rests with the supreme com- 
 mander to make the distribution according to his inten- 
 tions. 
 
 The gaps were numerous on the Russo-Japanese 
 battle fields. These gaps, when left so intentionally 
 with their defense provided for, offer no danger; we 
 have already spoken of them. 
 
[97] 
 
 One of the most conclusive examples of the im- 
 possibility of the enemy's penetrating them, when they 
 are swept by the fire of the artillery and the machine 
 guns, was seen at the battle of Liao-Yan. Colonel 
 Danilow relates that in this battle, in one of the sectors 
 of the right of their position the Russians left an interval 
 of three versts (3,200 meters) protected by artillery 
 fire. The Japanese conceived a desire to cross it, but 
 their attempt did not succeed, and the cross fire re- 
 pulsed them with such losses^ that they did not dare to 
 renew the attempt. 
 
 The combat fronts in the Russo-Japanese war 
 were extremely variable and it can be observed that 
 they were very extended. 
 
 On the Japanese side, a division, acting with others, 
 had a front varying from five to ten kilometers; in an 
 exceptional case it occupied only 2.6 kilometers for the 
 center and left in the battle of Liao-Yan, where the 
 Japanese moreover suffered great losses in their at- 
 tacks. The average front for the division, during the 
 entire war was 6 kilometers. 
 
 On the Russian side, the width of the combat front 
 of the division was much less; the general average 
 was three kilometers, that is, half of the Japanese 
 fighting front. But it must be added that the Russians 
 by their passivity permitted every imprudence. 
 
 The Japanese fronts were often wide beyond 
 bounds. Moreover in extending their front indefinitely, 
 they were often, in various battles led into creating 
 veritable breaks, unforeseen, not commanded by the 
 fire of an3rthing, openings through which the Russians 
 could have broken up their line of battle. Their ex- 
 ample is not to be followed. 
 
[98] 
 
 However that may be, the Russo-Japanese war 
 demonstrated that the fronts in future battles will con- 
 siderably exceed what could be considered reasonable 
 a short time ago. 
 
 In their last large maneuvers, the Germans used 
 some very wide fronts. They imitated the Japanese. 
 
 On September 15th, the Third Division of the Red 
 force took the defensive and covered a front of seven- 
 teen kilometers. 
 
 On September 16th, the three Red Army Corps 
 (the Third, the Twentieth and the Fourteenth), accord- 
 ing to the orders for operation, engaged in action over 
 a front forming a concave line with a development of 
 twenty-seven kilometers. 
 
 On September 17th, the two Blue Army Corps 
 occupied a defensive position behind the Tauber with 
 an extent of seventeen kilometers; there were but 
 three divisions on the front, twelve battalions having 
 been massed as a reserve in rear of the left wing. 
 
 During these three days the two forces, when they 
 engaged, did so in long lines with insignificant reserves. 
 
 On the 15th, the Red force had no reserve at all; 
 it hastily constituted one during the course of the opera- 
 tion. 
 
 On the 16th, the battle anticipated by the Red 
 force did not take place ; the enemy sHpped away, but 
 the order of battle showed no provisions for any 
 general reserve. 
 
 On the 17th, the reserve of the Blue force, consist- 
 ing of twelve battalions, was placed behind the left 
 flank. 
 
 These methods of the Germans, imitations of the 
 
[99] 
 
 Japanese warfare, are to be understood and remembered 
 by us Frenchmen. 
 
 FIRING. 
 
 The German regulations, like those of France pre- 
 scribe marching toward the enemy the longest time 
 possible without opening fire. 
 
 "Distances at which fire should be opened cannot 
 be fixed in advance; but, over flat and open ground, 
 good infantry ought not to^open fire before having 
 reached medium ranges ( 1 , 200 to 800 meters ) . " (I. R. ) 
 
 ''Beginning at two kilometers," says Captain 
 Soloview, "The losses caused by infantry fire com- 
 mence to be sensibly felt; at a distance of one kilo- 
 meter this fire becomes very effective." 
 
 Colonel Neznamow confirms this statement: 
 
 "The present rifle," he writes, "Permits, by ex- 
 pending a great many cartridges, the infliction upon an 
 adversary of serious harm beginning at two kilometers, 
 provided the objective offers considerable dimensions. 
 
 "Between 1,800 and 1,400 meters, fire gives good 
 results especially from the moral point of view. At 
 1,100 meters the fire by the deployed firing line is 
 generally begun. " 
 
 It can then be admitted that firing will commence, 
 on an average, over flat and open ground, at from 1,000 
 to 1,200 meters. This necessity for an early opening of 
 the fire is imposed more and more by the improvement 
 of the weapons. A force cannot be led very long under 
 the effective fire of the enemy without being permitted 
 to return the fire. 
 
 The Germans seek to gain the superiority of fire 
 
[100] 
 
 at the beginning : hence, as we have shown, they deploy 
 at the beginning a dense firing line. 
 
 As soon as it is believed, say the German Regula- 
 tions, that the superiority of fire has been obtained, it 
 is the duty of every fraction to profit by it to gain 
 ground. The march is made by rushes, the fraction 
 which is advancing being supported by the fire of the 
 neighboring units. Progress is thus made from position 
 to position. 
 
 When at one of these positions the fire of the ad- 
 versary stops the movement, the firing line is rein- 
 forced in order to try to regain the superiority of fire, 
 which will permit a new rush to the front. 
 
 The local reserves, therefore, melt little by little 
 into the firing line as that becomes necessary. 
 
 "In order that the attack shall be well conducted 
 the firing line ought to be kept as strong as possible by 
 successive reinforcements. The question of reinforce- 
 ment must be the constant care of the leader." (I. R. 
 341.) 
 
 The arrival of the reinforcements is not in Germany 
 the signal for the rush forward, but for the resumption 
 of an intense fire in which the new arrivals take part. 
 
 The regulations indicate that the Germans do not 
 think that a permanent superiority of fire can be easily 
 obtained. This superiority being acquired at a par- 
 ticular moment, a more advanced position will be gained 
 from which the struggle will have to be recommenced. 
 
 "From the moment when fire is opened, up to the 
 point from which the assault is to be made, the combat 
 will be developed with alternating success or lack of 
 success, with a stubbornness and nevertheless a slow- 
 
[101] ■■".--.:: :■■■'.• ■^■.■■- 
 
 ness that will sooner or later wear out one of the con- 
 tending parties." (M. G. R.) 
 
 Infantry regulations in Germany, as in France, 
 recommend that the platoon leaders keep control of 
 the fire as long as possible; but they admit that at some 
 particular moment this control will be completely lost. 
 
 In the combat of the present, control of fire is very 
 difficult. From each position the infantrymen have a 
 tendency to open the fire as soon as they are prone, 
 without awaiting orders. A man in face of danger has 
 an instinctive need of distracting his mind and of stifling 
 the feeling of fear by keeping up his activity. 
 
 " It is impossible to regulate the fire when the men 
 have not received solid instructions and when they are 
 not controlled by the severest discipline," wrote Captain 
 Solo view. 
 
 At the short ranges, starting with about 400 meters 
 it is no longer a question of regulating the fire; the men 
 lose all their calmness. 
 
 "The distance once reduced to 400 meters," writes 
 Colonel Neznamow, "it becomes difficult to aim; the 
 bullets fly over the heads and fall far to the rear." 
 
 It is a phenomenon that has been known for a 
 long time. At these short ranges the farther one ad- 
 vances the fewer losses he has. 
 
 "At these distances," said Colonel Ardant du Picq, 
 as far back as 1869, "the men no longer take aim; it 
 cannot even be said that they fire : they make a noise to 
 distract their minds." 
 
 By their very careful instruction in firing, by their 
 very severe discipline, and by the aid of the squad 
 leaders who second the section leaders, as we have 
 shown, the Germans hope to preserve for the greatest 
 
'■■ «' --'s [102] 
 
 possible time the fire discipline and to acquire thus the 
 superiority over an enemy '*of a more nervous disposi- 
 tion, less disciplined and less densely supported in line." 
 
 THE ASSAULT. 
 
 "To attack," say the regulations, "is to carry a 
 line of fire as near as possible to the enemy. The assault 
 with the arme blanche definitely seals his defeat." 
 
 Before the Russo-Japanese war the Germans used 
 to believe that fire action would be sufiicient to over- 
 come the resistance of the enemy; the assault was to 
 take place only to crown a victory already acquired. 
 War has shown that if fire action is necessary in prepara- 
 tion, the attack can nevertheless be made successful 
 only by a hand to hand combat. The bayonet has re- 
 taken the very important place which had been refused 
 to it. 
 
 The Germans have taken this into consideration; 
 we have said that the French should rejoice because of 
 it. 
 
 "When the first line gets the impression that the 
 moment for the decisive attack has arrived, it should 
 not hesitate to deliver the assault. It warns the frac- 
 tions in rear by means of signals. These fractions 
 immediately assemble and dash forward without heed- 
 ing the losses they suffer." (I. R. 345.) 
 
 The signal for the assault may be given by the 
 subaltern leaders further in rear. "This signal is that 
 of the rattling of the bayonets on the gun barrels." 
 {L R. 147.) 
 
 The assault is deHvered when one has reached a 
 distance of about 100 meters and when one feels the 
 enemy to be sufficiently shaken. Note that the dis- 
 
[103] 
 
 tance for the assault, fixed in the regulations as about 
 150 meters, has just been reduced to about 100 meters 
 by instructions from headquarters. (Amendments to 
 the Infantry Regulations in October, 1909.) 
 
 It must be observed indeed that the assaults started 
 too far back in the war in Manchuria nearly all failed. 
 It often happened that the adversaries could not or 
 dared not hurl themselves upon a position until they had 
 arrived within distances much below 100 meters. 
 
 The artillery has the duty of preparing the assault. 
 
 "As soon as the commander of the force has indi- 
 cated to the artillery commander the point upon which 
 he will make the decisive attack, the artillery must 
 concentrate upon that point an overwhelming fire by 
 occupying enveloping positions so far as possible. It 
 is at this moment at the latest that the artillery frac- 
 tions which have been held in reserve are thrown into 
 action." (A.R.470.) 
 
 "The infantry batteries must accompany that in- 
 fantry to support it at short ranges. 
 
 "The howitzers and principally the heavy artillery, 
 must crush by their plunging fire the supporting points 
 of the defense, and destroy all the obstacles." (H. A. 
 R.) 
 
 Such are in effect, the prescriptions relative to the 
 assault. They are the paragraphs which appear to us 
 to be the least clear ; they are even conflicting. 
 
 It is possible that the regulations were intentionally 
 left very vague on the subject of the assatdt. 
 
 The regulations appear to lay down as a general 
 rule that the signal for the assault is given by the firing 
 line. In certain cases, however, they admit that this 
 signal may be given by the commander. 
 
[104] 
 
 The Germans claim that the cases will be very rare 
 when the commander will have exact knowledge of the 
 situation of the firing line, and of its possibilities to 
 deliver the assault. It is, therefore, they say, for the 
 subaltern leaders who direct the firing line to under- 
 stand when the time is propitious and to give at the 
 proper moment a signal which is to determine the dash 
 to the front. 
 
 THE PREPARATION OF THE ASSAULT BY THE ARTILLERY. 
 
 If generally the troops of the first line are to give 
 the signal for the assault on the point which they be- 
 lieve they are able to carry, it may be wondered how 
 the artillery can prepare in advance the road for the 
 infantry. It would seem by simply reading the regu- 
 lations that, except in the particular cases where the 
 commander gives the signal for the assault, it can never 
 be foreseen at what point the efforts of the first line 
 will be crowned by success. Consequently the prescrip- 
 tions of the artillery regulations relative to the prepara- 
 tion of the assault appear to be an artifice. 
 
 In order thoroughly to understand the regulations 
 it is necessary to be well posted in the general tactics 
 of the Germans. 
 
 They do not understand the decisive attack as we 
 comprehend it in France; they attack along the whole 
 front with the fewest men possible and bring about the 
 decisive event on one of the adversary's flanks. This 
 attack which must be decisive is conducted with the 
 same methods as a frontal combat, but with more 
 violence and a greater concentration of means. 
 
 When the regulations prescribe that the general-in- 
 chief shall indicate to the artillery commander the points 
 
[105] 
 
 upon which the decisive attack will be made, they mean 
 that the former will have to indicate the points of the 
 enemy's flank which must be enveloped if possible. On 
 the attacking wing the Germans will concentrate a great 
 mass of artillery; they will use there all the artillery 
 kept in reserve and still available. 
 
 THE ACCOMPANYING BATTERIES. 
 
 The regulations prescribe that certain batteries will 
 accompany the troops making the assault. This seems 
 to us still more difficult in tlie German army than in the 
 French army. How can it be conceived that batteries 
 uncovered, or barely masked, as the German batteries 
 are, can at the most decisive moment of the battle, 
 bring up their limbers, expose their teams and follow 
 their infantry? 
 
 In France, General Percin recommends taking for 
 this work of accompanying the infantry, batteries that 
 are to be kept out of the duel, and which are to follow 
 sheltered routes. It will not always be easy to find 
 these routes. These batteries appear to us to be terribly 
 exposed if they advance too far or if they uncover 
 themselves ; but after all it will be admitted that bat- 
 teries that are well defiladed, as will be a great many 
 such batteries, can get in motion without being seen 
 and without being obliterated; but how can this be 
 claimed for German batteries? And yet by consulting 
 the most serious works of our neighbors on this subject 
 it is seen that they speak glibly of changes of position 
 for the artillery engaged in action. In regard to the 
 accompanying batteries here is what General von Rohne 
 says: 
 
[106] 
 
 "There is no doubt that it will hereafter be difficult 
 for the artillery to accompany the infantry attack 
 * * *. If the new position is situated in the zone of 
 action of the enemy's infantry fire, and if the position 
 cannot be occupied out of sight of the enemy, the dash 
 to the front may be terminated by the complete de- 
 struction of the battery, and the object aimed at will 
 be completely missed." 
 
 General von Rohne concerns himself very justly 
 with the danger incident to the occupation of the position, 
 but he says nothing of the danger, which is just as great, 
 of the starting of and of the march in accompanying the 
 attack. 
 
 If these batteries were able sometimes to accomplish 
 their mission in certain battles of 1870, in the present 
 day with the perfected artillery they appear to us to be 
 consecrated to a very rapid destruction if they are not 
 very prudent and if peculiar circumstances do not pro- 
 tect them. 
 
 "In the Far East," says Major Meunier in his work 
 on the Russo-Japanese war', "no accompanying of the 
 attack took place either on the Russian or on the Jap- 
 anese side, because it was thought that it meant expos- 
 ing the artillery to certain destruction. Many authors 
 share this idea and recommend charging the machine 
 guns with this duty because they have no need of teams 
 in carrying it out." 
 
 THE MARCH OF THE RESERVES. 
 
 The regulations say that at the signal for the assault 
 "the troops in rear of the firing line assemble immedi- 
 ately and dash forward by the shortest road without 
 heeding the losses they suffer." 
 
[107] 
 
 The regulations do not say how this assembly will 
 be made. If the assembling is done in small columns, 
 that will be perfect ; but if this assembly is executed by 
 rather considerable masses, battalions or even com- 
 panies, they are marching to destruction. 
 
 If the scattered troops assemble, those which are 
 assembled must a fortiori move forward "as quickly as 
 possible without heeding losses." If then, for example, 
 a reserve battalion is massed behind a shelter, it will 
 have to move en masse to the front. 
 
 All this part of the regulations pertaining to the 
 assault appears to have a general lack of preciseness 
 which makes it obscure. 
 
 The few precise sentences pertaining to the accom- 
 panying batteries and to the march of the reserve 
 seem to us to be susceptible of a terribly dangerous 
 interpretation. 
 
 Finally, it is remarkable that the German Regula- 
 tions should be silent concerning the counter attack 
 which menaces the assailant, and concerning the means 
 for parrying it. 
 
 ' THE PURSUIT AND THE RETREAT. 
 
 All the German regulations insist most particu- 
 larly that the pursuit shall be pushed to the limit. 
 Very wisely they give the clearest and most vigorous 
 instructions that no halt shall be made under any 
 considerations. 
 
 "If one is contented with defeating the enemy, 
 one wins only half a victory. The victory becomes 
 complete only through the pursuit, which has for its 
 object the wiping out of the enemy." (I. R. 421.) 
 
[108] 
 
 Every effort must tend toward the complete de- 
 struction of the hostile forces. 
 
 The heavy artillery profits by its long range to 
 fire upon the columns in retreat as long as possible. 
 
 The field artillery batteries in position continue 
 to fire as long as they possibly can; the infantry bat- 
 teries quickly occupy the position and execute in bat- 
 tery, no matter how; it's a question of firing as quickly 
 and as rapidly as it can be done. 
 
 The batteries that have retained their mobility 
 and that have been able to get a fresh supply of am- 
 munition pursue the enemy with the co-operation of 
 the infantry troops that are the least exhausted. (A. 
 R.) 
 
 The pursuit must be kept up to the limit by every 
 possible means. It is essential to push the enemy hard, 
 to get him at your mercy by means of shrapnel, shell 
 and rifle bullets, by running him through with bayonets 
 if necessary. 
 
 ''The cavalry must all have moved forward as soon 
 as it perceived that the fight was nearing a decision." 
 (C. R. 514.) 
 
 ''The cavalry and the infantry on the wings 
 endeavor to outfiank the enemy in order to fall upon 
 his flanks or to cut off his retreat." (I. R. 423.) 
 
 The cavalry, by covering great distances must 
 keep harassing the enemy's flanks and not leave him a 
 moment's respite. 
 
 The regulations of the three arms agree in speci- 
 fying that to obtain the result sought after, the leaders 
 must keep up their energy to the last extremity and 
 must demand, with severity if necessary, more than is 
 possible of their men. ' ' Those who fall will stay down. ' ' 
 
[109] 
 
 (A saying that has become a proverb.) "There is no 
 consideration whatever that should stop the pursuit 
 by day or by night, without relaxation, until the enemy 
 is completely annihilated." (I. R. 424; C. R. 515.) 
 
 These prescriptions conform thoroughly to sane 
 reasoning. The Germans have realized how fruitless 
 would be a dearly bought victory if it did not result in 
 the annihilation of the hostile army. 
 
 The Japanese triumphed painfully over the Rus- 
 sians; they never knew how to, and were never able to 
 exploit their success. 
 
 The exhaustion of their troops, the lack of reserves, 
 and especially their great inferiority in cavalry were the 
 causes of that. The few batteries which made an at- 
 tempt at the pursuit with fire action were obliged to 
 stop almost immediately from lack of ammunition. 
 The Russians withdrew without being pursued, and they 
 were always able to reorganize their forces. 
 
 The Japanese Army won some brilliant victories 
 over the Russian Army, but never conquered it. 
 
 THE RETREAT. * 
 
 If the fight turns out unfavorably, a retreat must 
 be made to a position that is easily defendable. (I. R. 
 426.) It is absolutely prohibited to keep a reserve to 
 protect the retreat; the intervention of the reserve 
 might assure the victory. The movement to the rear 
 should be made in several columns perpendicularly to 
 the front. The infantry gets away as soon as possible, 
 protected by the artillery and the cavalry. (I. R. 428.) 
 
 The artillery sacrifices itself so far as that is neces- 
 sary for the escape of the infantry. It fires solely on 
 
[110] 
 
 the hostile infantry in order to try to stop it. (A. R. 
 474; I. R. 428.) 
 
 "The cavalry should sacrifice itself to permit the 
 infantry to get disengaged; it charges the adversary, 
 especially upon the flanks." (C. R.) 
 
 As soon as the position selected in the rear has 
 been reached it is occupied mainly by the artillery, 
 the machine guns and the cavalry. 
 
 All these prescriptions are natural. The infantry 
 is the arm that must be got free at any cost. The artil- 
 lery and the cavalry can withdraw rapidly and conse- 
 quently gain in speed over the pursuer. 
 
 It is astonishing that the Germans, who have very 
 carefully studied the subject of combat by night and 
 admit so frequently its usefullness, have not spoken 
 of the facilities for retreat offered by the darkness. 
 To fall back in broad daylight when closely engaged, 
 or after an unsuccessful assault, is to deliver one's self 
 up to great losses. 
 
 BREAKING OFF THE COMBAT. 
 
 When a retreat is compelled, the best means to 
 effect it without too many losses is to cling tight to the 
 earth and wait for night in order to get away. The Jap- 
 anese when obliged to recoil followed this method every 
 time they could. A retreat in broad daylight is easily 
 changed into a rout ; the enemy regains self control, his 
 firing gets to be well directed and produces terrible 
 effects. The morale of the soldier that is falling back 
 is depressed. The least incident may produce a brain- 
 storm. 
 
 Breaking off an action, the regulations say, is 
 more easily done after success. They might well have 
 
[Ill] 
 
 added, as do the French regulations, that this breaking 
 off should always be preceded by violent action on the 
 offensive. "The farther the combat has advanced, the 
 more difficult, it will be to break it off," add the German 
 regulations. (I. R. 433.) 
 
 The evidence bears out this statement; but it is 
 under such circumstances that one should wait for night 
 to get disengaged and to break off the combat. 
 
 Colonel Madridow, in April, 1904, was in command 
 of a detachment ; he threw his advance guard against 
 the city of Andjou ; the fight having been commenced, he 
 re-inforced the advance guard. He found himself com- 
 pletely involved when he realized that his attempt had 
 failed. He preferred, notwithstanding the danger of 
 the sudden arrival of a Japanese detachment, to 
 remain the whole day before Andjou rather than risk 
 a difficult withdrawal. He sustained his line of fire, 
 kept up a delaying action and waited for night. He was 
 then able to withdraw without losses. 
 
 This is a good example to follow. Breaking off the 
 combat is always difficult in daylight; if one is deeply 
 involved disaster is risked. 
 
 **A voluntary breaking off of combat in broad day- 
 light, " says Major Dickhut, "can be conceived of only 
 in the case where for some motive or other the adversary 
 also wishes to break it off (the fight at Nouart, August 
 29, 1870), or if by reason of the lack of valor of his 
 leaders one can act without taking them into considera- 
 tion. In all other circumstances the enemy will very 
 quickly transform a voluntary departure at the begin- 
 ning into a retreat engendering all the horrors of defeat." 
 
[112] 
 
 ATTACKING THE ENEMY WHEN HE IS ON THE DEFENSIVE 
 OR IN A FORTIFIED POSITION. 
 
 For the attack of a defensive position, even if it is 
 fortified, the regulations give the same general rules as 
 for a meeting engagement. The prescriptions pertain- 
 ing to these attacks offer material for only a few re- 
 marks. 
 
 It will be noted that the regulations speak only of a 
 frontal attack against these defensive positions. They 
 do not even point out that the simplest means of mak- 
 ing them fall is to turn them and to proceed to cut their 
 line of communications. 
 
 The regulations remain always within the narrow 
 limits of the subject studied, without showing any 
 tendency, purposely no doubt, to discuss tactics in 
 general. 
 
 1st. Enemy on the defensive: 
 
 If the enemy remains upon the defensive, he re- 
 nounces all liberty of action and gives it to his adversary. 
 
 As soon as information has been obtained that the 
 enemy is established in a defensive position, and the 
 advance guard has verified the fact, the German regu- 
 lations prescribe that the advance guard shall halt and 
 shall not engage in action. The detailed reconnaiss- 
 ance of the position must first be executed with minute 
 care by officers of all arms and by strong patrols. The 
 reconnaissance permits the commander to determine 
 how the attack shall be advanced and what will be the 
 direction of the attack. If the approach to the position 
 is too difficult to be done by day it will be done during 
 the night. 
 
[113] 
 
 Troops are distributed in sectors. They start 
 from perfectly sheltered positions situated at least 
 three kilometers from the enemy. (I. R. 367.) 
 
 One unit is chosen as the base unit for direction 
 The march is made by rushes from zone to zone, from 
 one break or one obstacle to another. 
 
 Having reached the zone of attack, infantry 
 should open fire along the whole line, so far as possible 
 at the same time. 
 
 The artillery, utilizing tfee information gained by 
 reconnaissance, will occupy defiladed positions and 
 commence the struggle as soon as it is ready, without 
 waiting for the infantry. (A. R. 485-487.) 
 
 The prudence of the Germans should be noted; 
 they do not enter into action against a defensive posi- 
 tion till after the most minute reconnaissance, which 
 they believe will give them sufficiently exact informa- 
 tion concerning the situation and strength of the enemy. 
 Now we shall repeat what we have already said several 
 times: reconnaissance before a defensive position 
 and consequently before an enemy that is hidden and 
 motionless will hardly give any certain results; it can 
 only indicate the outline of the position occupied by 
 the enemy. In war when you want to see and to know, 
 you attack. 
 
 In applying the prescriptions of their regulations 
 the Germans always run the risk of striking empty 
 space. An advanced line or, better, some advanced 
 posts of the defenders, will succeed in throwing them 
 off the scent. 
 
 The regulations make no provision for the case of 
 an advanced line of defense formed by a mere screen 
 and nevertheless capable of resisting patrols and at- 
 
[114] 
 
 tacks by cavalry on foot. One must seek in the cotirses 
 on general tactics of the German schools for prescrip- 
 tions supplementing those of the regulations. 
 
 Gen V. Rohne sums up these prescriptions: 
 
 ''The reconnaissance of the hostile position is very 
 difficult and often will give no results, even from an 
 elevated point, because the large mass of the batteries 
 will be defiladed in waiting positions. 
 
 ''There will often be left nothing to do but to 
 follow the advice of Napoleon : You attack everywhere; 
 then you see. 
 
 "The infantry moves forward into the zone of 
 action of the hostile guns in order to force the artillery 
 of the enemy to show its hand and to occupy its combat 
 positions. 
 
 "There must be likewise engaged, with a similar 
 object, a few isolated batteries which the French call 
 ' ' primer batteries*" (decoy batteries) . 
 
 "It is moreover very important to knovu what is in 
 front of one, and whether one is before the principal 
 position of the enemy, or whether the latter has con- 
 tented himself with occupying a few advanced posts 
 situated in front of the principal positions. The French 
 have a great predilection for these positions and hope 
 thus to induce the enemy to disclose his strength pre- 
 maturely. 
 
 "But if the assailant perceive the subterfuge, he 
 can in certain cases win a great success by an envelop- 
 ing attack either by cutting off the retreat of the troops 
 
 ♦Batteries placed with guns a considerable distance apart with 
 no special effort to conceal them; they seek to lead the enemy's 
 artillery to fire upon them thereby disclosing its positions. — Trans- 
 lator. 
 
[115] 
 
 which occupy these advanced points or by hurling 
 them back in disorder on the principal position and 
 penetrating with them into the position." 
 
 These prescriptions in the book which is in every- 
 body's hands show that outside of the regulations 
 there is a current of ideas which complete them. Gen- 
 eral V. Rohne reproduces almost exactly the principles 
 of French tactics. 
 
 We have seen (p. 113) that the German Regulations 
 prescribe, in a case of attack^ on an enemy on the de- 
 fensive, to open fire with all the artillery as soon as the 
 latter is ready, before the engagement of the infantry. 
 Let us note in regard to this point the difference from 
 the prescriptions studied under meeting engagements. 
 
 If- the defenders have not unmasked their position, 
 and that will be very probable since they will not have 
 been attacked, upon what then will the German artil- 
 lery fire? It seems to us that there is here a gross 
 error which did not escape General v. Rohne. 
 
 The measures of precaution laid down by the regu- 
 lations for the prudent and well ordered march of the 
 infantry appear natural. It is wise to regulate very 
 minutely the dispositions for the attack of a position 
 that has been prepared for defense. 
 
 2. The attack of fortified field position: 
 
 In considering the case of this kind of attack, the 
 regulations recognize that the defenders will occupy an 
 advanced position ; they recommend pushing them back 
 on the principal position before executing the indis- 
 pensable minute reconnaissance. (I. R. 376.) 
 
 The attack will be advanced usually at night. 
 
 **A position can not usually be reconnoitered until 
 the enemy has been forced to occupy it. For that 
 
[116] 
 
 reason it is necessary even during the day for infantry 
 detachments to feel the enemy's position along differ- 
 ent points and to try to entrench in the vicinity thereof. 
 They are reinforced little by little." (I. R. 376.) 
 (Amendment of October, 1909 to Infantry Regulations.) 
 
 The artillery will get into defiladed positions; all 
 possible protective works will have to be constructed 
 and fire will not be opened until one is well acquainted 
 with the necessary data. 
 
 "In the most usual case one will not be able to 
 shake the enemy until after the artillery of the defense 
 has been weakened; it will be necessary to concentrate 
 a violent fire upon the parts of the positions which ap- 
 pear to be most important with reference to the form 
 of the terrain and the intentions of the commander. 
 It must not be forgotten that the enemy will probably 
 not yet have occupied the position, or that he has caused 
 it to be occupied only with unimportant forces, so long 
 as the attack has not been fully undertaken ; the bom- 
 bardment of a position will be justified only when it has 
 been learned that it is occupied." (A. R. 493.) 
 
 "The supporting points are hammered by the 
 howitzers * * * . As soon as the defenders show 
 themselves they are overwhelmed by the fire of shrapnel 
 * * * . It is important to put out of operation the 
 adversary's machine guns. (A. R. 495.) 
 
 "The combat will usually last several days. In- 
 fantry will keep under cover during the day and will 
 be able to make progress only at night. 
 
 "At the break of day the fire of the infantry and 
 the machine guns in concert with that of the artillery 
 will oblige the enemy to burrow in his trenches. One 
 
[117] 
 
 will thus be able to proceed with the destruction of the 
 obstacles and to deliver the assault." (I. R. 383.) 
 
 Such are the principal prescriptions of this very 
 special form of combat, which resembles much more a 
 siege operation than a field operation. 
 
 The German prescriptions seem to be normal and 
 well arranged. We have no observation to present. 
 
 In a war between France and Germany we do not 
 anticipate a battle of such nature. The fortified places 
 are already quite numerous, and an army that would 
 shut itself up in a permanent defensive position would 
 be inviting destruction. 
 
 The defense will always be only temporary and 
 consequently will be made on a position hastily estab- 
 lished, which the enemy will have to take quickly 
 otherwise the motives which imposed a temporary de- 
 fense will have soon ceased and the force on the defen- 
 sive will pass to the offensive. 
 
 Battles in entrenched camps as occured at Plevna 
 or Mukden will never take place in a war with the 
 French army. 
 
[118] 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 TACTICS IN GENERAL. 
 
 The German ideas on general tactics differ on 
 certain points from the French tactics. They are only 
 the more interesting to study; if they do not appear 
 very clear in a study of the regulations, they are to be 
 found formally exposed in the courses in tactics and in 
 the military works of their most renowned authors. 
 Moreover, at their large maneuvers it is easy to observe 
 the application of them. 
 
 GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE. 
 
 After the rapid examination that we have just 
 made of the prescriptions of the German Regulations 
 relative to the offensive, let us pass to the discussion 
 of the ideas of general tactics which have served as a 
 basis for the elaboration of those regulations. 
 
 The general synthesis of the battle, as it is conceived 
 by the Germans can be summed up thus : 
 
 As soon as you meet the enemy, attack him if you 
 are the stronger; but attack him immediately, without 
 delay and without hesitation; don't give him a chance 
 to get his bearings or to prepare for defense. 
 
 If you are not the stronger at the time, temporize, 
 delay getting into contact with him, wait until you have 
 assembled all your forces ; then when the proper moment 
 has come take the offensive, suddenly, by surprise, with 
 .all available means, by engaging your whole strength. 
 
 Make the principal effort against the wing of the 
 adversary, which you should overlap, turn, and crush 
 under an irresistible concentric attack. 
 
[119] 
 
 Such is in its simplest form the conception our 
 neighbors have of the battle. 
 
 Let us study with impartial criticism the principal 
 elements of this conception. 
 
 1. THE ADVANCE GUARD. 
 
 (a) Generalities. 
 
 The question of the advance guard is one that has 
 been considerably discussed in recent times. 
 
 A great evolution is being effected in France in 
 regard to this subject. We- would not speak of it if the 
 Germans were not the direct cause of this evolution. 
 The teachings of the ^cole sup&ieurede guerre, which have 
 furnished the strategical and tactical doctrine of the 
 French, were based upon the principles of the advance 
 guard in vogue in the Napoleonic wars. Up to the pres- 
 ent times these principles have been regarded as impera- 
 tive and absolute. 
 
 General Bonnal has written: **The conception 
 of an advance guard which is applicable to a detach- 
 ment, to an army, yes, to a group of armies, dominates 
 all other questions relative to the conduct of war. It 
 is so true that an officer facing a strategical or a tactical 
 situation will avoid any grave faults of procedure if he 
 thinks first of all of the advance guard." 
 
 Such was in effect the French doctrine; from the 
 strategical point of view this doctrine has been modified. 
 Since Napoleon's time conditions of war have changed 
 absolutely and are changing slowly every day; it is 
 natural that there should be an evolution of ideas, as a 
 consequence. The Germans have always been hostile 
 to the idea of the strategic advance guard; this idea 
 
[120] 
 
 has likewise been abandoned in the new military centers 
 of the French. 
 
 The reciprocal situations of the armies at the be- 
 ginning of the war being given, a strategic advance 
 guard would have no raison d'etre; it would be the same 
 in most wars between European powers of the present 
 day, at least at the beginning of the operations. 
 
 An absolute condemnation of the strategic advance 
 guard would seem to us to be an error. Such an ad- 
 vance guard might be necessary when one does not 
 exactly know the zones of mobilization of the enemy, 
 when one is separated from the adversary by a con- 
 siderable distance, etc. 
 
 Everything in warfare is a matter of common 
 sense ; nothing is absolute. 
 
 We shall not dwell upon the question of strategy, 
 which would lead us outside the limits of our program, 
 and we shall return to the German tactics. 
 
 {h) The Offensive Advance Guard. 
 
 In France the advance guard has, as in Germany, 
 the duty of affording protection ; but it must in addition 
 serve to gather information concerning the strength 
 and the disposition of the adversary. Except in par- 
 ticular cases the advance guard has a distinctly offensive 
 mission: '*It must engage vigorously to oblige the 
 enemy to disclose his strength. ' ' (French Regulations.) 
 
 What are the objections that the Germans make 
 to an offensive role for the advance guard ? 
 
 They fear, as happened several times in 1870, that 
 the advance guard will drag the main body into battle 
 against the will of the commander-in-chief. Now, in 
 the regulations, they prescribe very justly that the 
 
[121] 
 
 general-in-chief shall be with his advance guard. 
 The latter has, therefore, this advance guard under his 
 immediate authority and can regulate its movements 
 at will; if he doesn't want it to engage, he halts it. 
 We do not thoroughly understand the fear shown by 
 the German authors. 
 
 Our neighbors do not wish to engage completely 
 their advance guard because, they say, if it strikes an 
 enemy that is deployed, it will be repulsed, turned, 
 enveloped before the main body has been able to inter- 
 vene. 
 
 This seems to be a very chimerical fear. An ad- 
 vance guard does not march with its eyes shut; the 
 cavalry, the contact detachments, will have already 
 reconnoitered the enemy; one will know at least his 
 apparent contour, that is to say his front and his flank 
 as they appear ; one will know almost where and how he 
 is going to be met. The offensive advance guard has 
 for its mission to tear away the curtains which have not 
 yet been pierced and to force the enemy to a premature 
 deployment, which appears to be such a cherished idea 
 with the Germans. 
 
 When this advance guard will have reconnoitered 
 the general position of the adversary, when it will 
 have led the latter to deploy and by that fact to expose 
 his strength and his resources, it will have fulfilled its 
 role. If it runs against an enemy that is already de- 
 ployed it will reconnoiter him more easily, for it will 
 have quickly arrived on the principal line where it will 
 be halted. Will it then risk being annihilated ? 
 
 The French advance guard is composed of a force 
 equal to about one-fourth of the total strength of the 
 troops; it must be admitted that the adversary will 
 
[122] 
 
 not have a force greatly superior. Now in the present 
 day conditions of combat, when you are one against 
 four or five you can resist long enough before being 
 obliged to retreat for the arrival of not far distant 
 succor. When everybody is recognizing that combats 
 are becoming longer and longer, how would an advance 
 guard be overwhelmed so quickly that the main body 
 would not have time to interfere? 
 
 To recall the combat at Wissenbourg, the Douai 
 Division struggled for six hours against the whole Army 
 of the German Crown Prince. If, instead of being 
 isolated, this division had been the advance guard of 
 MacMahon's Army, that army even eight or ten kilo- 
 meters away from its advance guard would have con- 
 siderably intervened in time to support General Douai 
 and to maneuver to good advantage against the army 
 of the Crown Prince which was entirely engaged against 
 that unfortunate division. . 
 
 It will be recalled that the Douai Division, having 
 been attacked at 8 : 00 o'clock in the morning was still 
 in perfect order and holding Wissenbourg at 11 : 30. 
 What would have happened if MacMahon's Army 
 could have debouched about 11 : 30 into the theater of 
 the struggle? 
 
 The Germans claim that by occupying a much 
 wider front than the hostile advance guard, they will 
 be able if they have a sufficiently open formation to get 
 that advance guard under a covering fire, with which 
 they expect to annihilate it quickly. This hope could 
 evidently have a serious base if the advance guard would 
 present itself as a package, or in column, or in close for- 
 mation; but that would be admitting a complete sur- 
 
[123] 
 
 prise of that advance guard and a denial of any tactical 
 knowledge on the part of its leader. 
 
 We have just said that the advance guard should 
 be kept informed and enlightened by the cavalry 
 which precedes it; it ought to know in a general way 
 whether it is going to meet the enemy in motion or 
 established on a defensive Hne. It ought then, in time, 
 to spread out, to distribute its artillery and to protect 
 carefully its flanks. If this advance guard is important, 
 it will be marching in several columns composed of 
 different arms; it will be protected on its flanks by 
 more or less powerful contact detachments which it will 
 not be afraid to space properly. 
 
 When this advance guard meets the enemy it will 
 present itself to him under the form of numerous points 
 occupying a very considerable front. 
 
 How will the Germans be able to get a converging 
 fire on all that front? All the little columns will be 
 advancing moreover under cover so far as possible; 
 they will vigorously assault all the screens that they 
 encounter and will arrive at the line of resistance with- 
 out offering a good target either to the fire of the artillery 
 or to that of the infantry. The artillery of that advance 
 guard, distributed in widely spaced groups, will vig- 
 orously support the march of its infantry. It will 
 probably be at first out of artillery range of the main 
 hostile position; then, if the adversary has not ad- 
 vanced, it will get into co-operation, remain at a great 
 distance on well defiladed emplacements, seeking either 
 to support the progressive march of its infantry, or, 
 by firing upon the hostile artillery that can be recog- 
 nized, to provoke in the latter what we call in French 
 the "igniting current." In this latter case, the bat- 
 
[124] 
 
 teries of the advance guard will play the role of fuses 
 to primers. If the hostile artillery wants to try to 
 crush these batteries by taking advantage of its super- 
 iority and of its deployment, it will commit according 
 to our opinion a grave mistake. It will disclose its 
 positions, permit them to be marked out, and will not 
 produce a great effect by its fire. We have previously 
 seen what slight effect artillery fire had against covered 
 and protected batteries. The fire of the hostile artillery 
 at long range against the French advance guard bat- 
 teries will undoubtedly force these into temporary 
 silence, but will not disable them. 
 
 We do not believe there is any danger of being anni- 
 hilated for an advance guard that is actively offensive, 
 provided it be well maneuvered and properly com- 
 manded. The German ideas on the subject of the 
 advance guard do not to us seem accurate. 
 
 (c) Security and Information. 
 
 We have seen that the Germans are fundamentally 
 opposed to offensive action on the part of the advance 
 guard. They expect to get their information solely 
 through their cavalry, and the role of their advance 
 guard is merely one of protection. 
 
 We have seen how the Germans have entire con- 
 fidence that their cavalry corps can pierce the screens 
 and get information right up to the very columns or 
 cantonments of the enemy. They expect that their 
 cavalry will be able to carry through all the combats on 
 foot that become necessary, and they consider it useless 
 and even dangerous to reinforce it with cyclist battalions. 
 
 They do not recognize the mixed contact detach- 
 ments which appear to us capable of rendering such 
 great service outside the columns of the advance guard. 
 
[125] 
 
 "The idea of throwing in front of the army strong 
 mixed detachments," writes General von SchHchting, 
 "is far from being justified in every case; on the other 
 hand, we must unreservedly accept that of distributing 
 in front of the march powerful cavalry masses which 
 will clear things up a great distance ahead and whose 
 mission will be to furnish the foundations for the deci- 
 sion to be taken." 
 
 We repeat what we have already said — the masses 
 of cavalry will be able to penetrate the screens ; but as 
 soon as they find themselves in contact with the ad- 
 vance guard, and with the covering detachments, they 
 will be completely unable to pierce or even to drive 
 back these first bodies of infantry. They can hope, 
 upon entering into a strongly constituted protective 
 net, to break a few meshes, but they run great risks of 
 finding themselves entangled in meshes of infantry 
 bodies from which they will be able to escape only by 
 leaving behind a part of their strength. 
 
 General Langlois said several years ago: "The 
 cavalry can not perform the duty of reconnaissance 
 reserved for the advance guard; if it is scattered, a 
 feeble infantry screen will stop it; if it is massed into 
 divisions it will perhaps pierce that screen, but in a 
 single point ; it will soon collide with an advance guard. 
 In short it will have seen very little at the price of very 
 great sacrifices. 
 
 "For serious reconnaissance, cavalry needs the 
 co-operation of forces capable of piercing the screen and 
 of seeing what they hide ; in a word, of mixed detach- 
 ments." 
 
 For the large units, it appears that these detach- 
 
[126] 
 
 merits are to be the rule in France; but in Germany 
 they have only, up to the present, been the exception. 
 
 We can only disapprove the German tactics, 
 which risks compromising in hazardous dismounted 
 combats organs so important as the cavalry division. 
 
 On the whole, notwithstanding their secret service 
 system, notwithstanding the audacity and the temerity 
 of a well equipped and powerfiil cavalry, the Germans 
 before an adversary forewarned and well covered, will 
 be able to know exactly only the apparent outline of the 
 troops which are opposed to them. They will go into 
 battle with an inaccurate idea of the forces and of the 
 position of the enemy. 
 
 As to the role of security, the German advance 
 guard ought to be able to accomplish it thoroughly. 
 The measures prescribed by the regulations, the customs 
 which have been so long followed in the German Army 
 prove how well the troops will know how to take care of 
 themselves and to protect themselves against surprise 
 in the field. 
 
 (d) Tactical RSles of the German Advance Guard, 
 
 We have said that the German advance guard will 
 not seriously undertake the offensive unless it has an 
 incontestable superiority or in case it becomes necessary 
 to acquire some important point at any price. 
 
 The quick and immediate attack by a force that 
 knows itself to be superior is excellent tactics. An ad- 
 vance guard should never trifle with detachments which 
 it can destroy or at least repulse. 
 
 It will often happen that the German advance 
 guard upon meeting with resistance will not know that 
 it has an assured superiority; in that case it will stop. 
 
[127] 
 
 If this German advance guard should encounter a 
 contact detachment, like those recommended in France, 
 its role would be to struggle with it ; but can it be certain 
 that the detachment is weak or that it is isolated ? If 
 that detachment knows how to spread itself out, to 
 give the appearance of having a long line of artillery, 
 having really only a few guns ; to amplify its forces by 
 its skill and its maneuvering, it will be able to deceive 
 the adversary completely and to induce him to under- 
 take faulty maneuvers. 
 
 As a general rule the German advance guard will 
 be very prudent. Prudent, because the regulations 
 prescribe it when superiority is not assured; prudent, 
 because the German character does not take to adven- 
 tures and to hazardous risks ; prudent, finally, because 
 the mind of the leader will be given to order and method, 
 and the German method is to attack only when one has 
 all his forces under his hand. 
 
 The Germans will gain contact slowly. While 
 their advance guard is feeling the enemy or resisting 
 from a defensive position the attacks of an aggressive 
 enemy, the main body of the forces, preceded by the artil- 
 lery, will be massing in rear. The advance guard will 
 be carrying on a delaying action by every means and 
 if necessary, will fall back step by step so as to avoid 
 getting too thoroughly engaged before the arrival of the 
 principal mass. 
 
 During all this period of feeling the enemy and 
 of preparation, the Germans will disclose only as much 
 as is absolutely necessary of their artillery, they will 
 remain prudently on the defensive, will appear timid and 
 irresolute. Then we have seen, suddenly, when they be- 
 
[128] 
 
 lieve themselves to be ready, they will launch their 
 offensive by a sudden, violent and general action. 
 
 The battle will be begun, but the battle will have 
 been engaged with a premature deployment and before 
 positive information shall have been obtained as to the 
 strength, the position and the intentions of the enemy. 
 
 There is in these methods of engaging a real 
 danger, to the consideration of which we will return. 
 
 2. THE GENERAL RESERVE. 
 
 Properly speaking, there is no general reserve in 
 the German battles. 
 
 The forces of an army are divided into two frac- 
 tions; one is assigned to the frontal combat, for a cov- 
 ering or a holding action (called by the French, "the 
 wear and tear action"); the other improperly called 
 the general reserve, is massed toward one wing. It is 
 intended either, on the offensive, to deliver the decisive 
 blow by envelopment, or, on the defensive, to parry 
 any turning movement on the flank. The troops of 
 this last fraction are maneuvering troops following a 
 preconceived plan, but are in no way what is called a 
 general reserve at the disposition of the commander- 
 in-chief and susceptible of intervening at such or such 
 a point where it might be conveniently used, depending 
 upon the incidents of the battle. 
 
 In rear of the front, in each sector, are found partial 
 reserves, very carefully graduated. These reserves are 
 intended solely to feed the firing line on the front and to 
 hold the enemy while, upon one of the wings, is exe- 
 cuted the movement prepared from the beginning, the 
 movement which is to bring about a decision. These 
 
[129] 
 
 sector reserves are then only reserves for tactical support 
 and not maneuvering reserves. 
 
 One hardly finds in the various German regulations, 
 any ideas concerning a general reserve properly so 
 called. The infantry regulations do not speak of it; 
 only the artillery and the machine gun regulations 
 speak of a contingent general reserve composed of guns 
 and machine guns. 
 
 "In the large units, the commander may reserve at 
 the first a portion of his artillery. " (A. R. 365.) 
 
 **The machine guns after the first engagement, are 
 to be withdrawn. They form at the disposition of the 
 commander-in-chief a reserve which may be employed 
 to support quickly points that are threatened, to op- 
 erate on the flanks of the adversary, to support the 
 decisive attack." (M. G. R. 242-243.) 
 
 Therefore as a matter of general reserve, the regu- 
 lations anticipate only a reserve of artillery and of 
 machine guns which will serve in case of need. In 
 practice, it is not, however, seen that the Germans 
 abstain completely from using general infantry reserves. 
 
 In the great maneuvers of the last few years, it 
 has been seen that the commanders-in-chief preserved 
 as a general reserve a few troops under their immediate 
 authority. The strength of these troops has been, in 
 certain cases, one eighth of the total effectives; but 
 usually one- tenth. Under these conditions, that re- 
 serve, being incapable of producing a decisive effect by 
 itself, can be used only to fill up a gap which might have 
 occurred in the front or to bind the frontal attack to 
 the attack on the flank, or for another useful purpose 
 that can be considered as secondary. 
 
[130] 
 
 3. THE ENVELOPING MOVEMENT. 
 THE DECISIVE ATTACK. 
 
 The general principle of German maneuvers in 
 combat is the following: 
 
 Hold the enemy on his front, turn him, and crush 
 him on the wing. 
 
 This very simple maneuver is the one with which 
 the Germans constantly succeeded in 1870; it is the one 
 which they taught to the Japanese and which the latter 
 have employed with so much success. Hence, now, 
 the Germans accept no different maneuver either in 
 strategy or in tactics. 
 
 It is felt that the strategy used at Sadowa is the one 
 that they admire the most : March upon the enemy with 
 an army intended for the attack on the front, while 
 another army, assembled at the proper time as an offen- 
 sive hook, falls upon his flank to determine the victory- 
 
 When, their preparations for concentration are 
 studied it can be understood that it is a maneuver of 
 the same kind that they have the intention of renewing 
 against us upon the next occasion. The railroads per- 
 mit them to carry out their plan more easily and on 
 a different scale than in 1870. 
 
 But let us leave strategy and remain in the limits 
 of general tactics. 
 
 All the German authors extol the same method of 
 combat : As soon as he approaches the enemy to within 
 a distance varying according to the importance of the 
 force (twenty-four hours at least for an army), the com- 
 mander-in-chief "designates that part of his troops 
 which will perform the demonstration or remain upon 
 the defensive, and that which will take the offensive." 
 (General von Scherff.) 
 
[131] 
 
 "He will divide his forces into a principal attack 
 and a secondary attack, assigning to the secondary the 
 smallest possible number of troops." (Griepenkerl.) 
 
 The frontal attack, which is the secondary attack, 
 is however, made with all possible energy. "To make 
 the envelopment successful," say the infantry regula- 
 tions, (Par. 392), "the enemy must as a preliminary 
 have been held on his front. The best means for that 
 is to attack him vigorously." 
 
 "If the forces are insufficient to make a vigorous 
 frontal attack, or if, for som^ reason or other, this at- 
 tack must be given up, a skillful leader will be able to 
 make the envelopment possible by means of a delaying 
 action or by simply threatening an attack." 
 
 Let it not be forgotten that the attack on the flank 
 is worked out according to the information collected be- 
 fore the engagement has cleared up the situation, 
 
 "The simplest envelopment," say the infantry 
 regulations, (Par. 394), " consists in bringing the troops 
 that are farthest away upon a wing of the enemy by 
 simply giving them the proper direction on the march. 
 
 "The envelopment becomes more difficult if it is 
 not begun until the moment of deployment or if it is 
 done by reserves held in rear." 
 
 The fraction of the forces charged with the frontal 
 attack advances in shallow columns widely spaced and 
 enters vigorously into action. The cavalry leaves the 
 column toward the side where the principal attack is to 
 be made. Along the whole front there is only a rather 
 deep line, quite solidly organized but, as we have seen, 
 without a general reserve, without a maneuvering 
 force at the disposition of the general-in-chief . 
 
 "The massed enveloping force is advancing at a 
 
[132] 
 
 certain distance on the flank so that its interior wing will 
 not get wedged with the neighboring wing of the forces 
 engaged." (I. R.) 
 
 When the proper moment appears to have arrived, 
 the general-in-chief sends it an order to attack. 
 
 Such is, on the whole, according to the official 
 documents, the attack which our neighbors consider as 
 decisive. This attack, for the force that executes it, 
 seems to be a frontal attack, and the procedure in 
 matters of combat are identical with those which we 
 have studied. 
 
 4. INVIOLABILITY OF THE FRONT. 
 
 The Germans do not believe in the possibility of 
 piercing the front of a line of battle, nor in winning a 
 victory by breaking through the hostile lines. 
 
 Their theory on this subject is as follows : 
 
 Any force which would advance in the form of a 
 wedge into the hostile front would be immediately 
 crushed by the converging fire and repulsed by the inter- 
 vention of the adjacent sector reserves. 
 
 Napoleon was able to win brilliant victories by 
 breaking the enemy's front; but in his time firearms 
 had little effectiveness and were of very short range. 
 Troops located on the flanks of a break made in the 
 line were unable to interfere to a sufficient degree. 
 
 Nowadays not only would the infantry fire from 
 the neighboring sectors enfilade the whole invading lines, 
 but the cannons placed upon the flanks, in positions de- 
 filaded from the fire from the adverse front, would 
 shower a crossed fire upon the venturesome invaders. 
 One can indeed carry a point along the line of the front 
 
[133] 
 
 and hold it, that will be a partial success such as will 
 often occur for one side or the other, but it will be ex- 
 plicitly forbidden to throw upon a given sector a mass 
 intended to break through and gain a victory. This 
 mass, whatever formation may have been given it, 
 would always form an objective or a series of very 
 vulnerable objectives; it would be rapidly crushed by 
 the covering fire to which it would be subjected as soon 
 as it had passed the first line of the hostile front. 
 
 The convictions of the Germans on this point are 
 explicit. (See in regard to this the fourth ntimber of 
 the 1906 Quarterly Militaiy Review of the German 
 Vierteljahrshefte fiir Truppenfiihrung.) 
 
 It is to be noted that no where do the German 
 Regulations speak of the inviolability of the fronts; 
 they let it be thought that one can attack everywhere 
 with success. This is prudent and wise. 
 
 But the German conviction on this point appears 
 in the writings of their best authors and especially in 
 their actions. In 1870 they never won a victory by a 
 decisive frontal attack. The Russo-Japanese War has 
 still more confirmed them in their belief. And indeed 
 for ten years, in their great maneuvers, the German gen- 
 erals have never attempted a decisive frontal attack ; the 
 decisive attack is always made on a wing or upon the 
 two wings at once. 
 
 The Germans consider that the troops on the front 
 will always be able to keep up a holding action until the 
 decisive wing attack can be delivered to decide the 
 battle. We know that along the front, in rear of their 
 infantry, they claim that they have placed an impassable 
 wall, represented by their formidable artillery. 
 
 The theory of the inviolability of the front, as it is 
 
[134] 
 
 upheld by our neighbors, appears seductive, but it does 
 not correspond to what is demonstrated by the practice 
 of war. We have shown, by relating on page 98 the 
 German method of operating at their last great maneu- 
 vers, that they had no fear for their very extended fronts 
 and did not preserve any general reserves in rear to 
 parry a victorious attack on their front. Thus on the 
 16th of September, three army corps were to engage 
 simultaneously on a front of twenty-seven kilometers 
 with no force at the disposition of the General com- 
 manding the army. 
 
 It was almost the same on the other days. Thie 
 commanders of the armies were, however, two of the 
 best generals of the German Army. 
 
 The principle of the inviolability is then perfectly 
 accepted and applied by our neighbors. We should 
 know this and remember it. 
 
 5. GENERAL CRITICISMS. 
 
 Hence the general idea of the battle is based 
 among the Germans on four elementary principles: 
 
 Prudence of the Advance Guard; 
 
 Inutility of a General Reserve ; 
 
 Inviolability of the Front; 
 
 Decisive Attack by Envelopment. 
 
 We cannot choose as a defender of these ideas any 
 one better than Colonel Kuhl of the great General Staff. 
 In 1904 he wrote in the German Quarterly Review: 
 
 "To hold the enemy everywhere and to seek the 
 (decision by massed reserves acting under the orders of 
 the General-in-chief in the zones selected by him — such 
 jxiethods have become impracticable." 
 
[135] 
 
 It is the Napoleonic method, it is the French tactics 
 which is condemned. 
 
 And further on he adds: "The question arises 
 even of knowing whether in the great battles of to- 
 morrow it will be possible to seek the decision by the 
 action of a reserve. The reserve could intervene only 
 where the conditions were ripe for it; but, from the 
 point where the general-in-chief will be, will he be able 
 to discern the favorable point ? If so, will the reserve 
 have time to get there with the enormous extension of 
 the present front ?" 
 
 The author seems to confound the general strategic 
 reserves with the tactical reserves. It is certain that 
 the reserves of a large army or of a group of armies can- 
 not be led unexpectedly against a given point. No- 
 body argues it. In strategy a plan must be foreseen 
 and fixed upon in advance, depending upon the condi- 
 tions. 
 
 The contingencies of a battle cannot completely 
 alter a strategic plan, at the most they can bring to it 
 certain modifications. Here we are speaking only of 
 tactics, hence of a tactical general reserve. Now, if the 
 combat fronts have been considerably increased, the 
 capacity for resistance of a force has grown enormously. 
 A battle will last several days. A general reserve may 
 be ten, twenty or thirty kilometers from the point 
 where it is to make its attack and get there on time. 
 The General-in-chief, when he has engaged everywhere 
 and has seen does not wait until the conditions are en- 
 tirely right to cause his reserves to approach the point 
 where he wants to deliver his effort. 
 
 Colonel Kuhl adds: ''Even if the moment was 
 propitious there would be reason for wondering whether 
 
[136] 
 
 the intervention of a general reserve would be useful. 
 It would not be if the preparation by fire action had been 
 completely accomplished; for then the intervention of 
 the partial reserves in echelons in rear, assigned to the 
 same sector of the field of battle would be quite sufficient 
 to give to the first line the moral support it would need 
 to throw itself into the assault. And if, on the contrary, 
 conditions are not right, the reserves by reason of piling 
 up so would be running into certain catastrophe." 
 
 We will not dwell on this reasoning which, carried 
 out to the extreme, would seem to say that the more 
 reserves there are to support an assault the more 
 chances there are of failure ; let us remember only that 
 affirmation that large reserves that pile up run into a 
 certain catastrophe. Nobody disputes it. 
 
 But if the enemy is spent, if the attack by fresh 
 troops is made by surprise, as it is understood in France, 
 one can not seriously say that the partial reserves of 
 the enemy will be sufficient. It must be admitted that 
 on both sides the wear and tear will have occurred on 
 the troops of the first line ; the partial reserves will have 
 been engaged, the greater part of them at least. To 
 suppose that the reserves of a sector will be sufficient 
 not only to carry a given point, but to break completely 
 a hostile line and to assure victory, is to suppose that the 
 adversary is incapable of struggling seriously or that 
 he has engaged without partial reserves; in that case 
 tactics has nothing more to do with it, nothing remains 
 to be done but to march to the front. 
 
 To suppose that sector reserves will be sufficient to 
 carry a position defended by forces approximately 
 equal seems inadmissible. One cannot argue on such 
 hypotheses. 
 
[137] 
 
 No, in a struggle between two adversaries approxi- 
 mately equivalent, it must be admitted that if one of 
 them has engaged all his forces in a given sector he has 
 forced his adversary to employ almost all of his. At 
 the end of a certain time in a holding engagement, the 
 exhaustion is general; one can do no more, one doesn't 
 want anymore. Only a few reserves can be considered 
 as still available. 
 
 But, if at this moment there appears a fresh force, 
 strong and supported by a formidable artillery, how can 
 it be claimed that this attack will not succeed and that 
 the feeble reserves will be siitecient to repel it? The 
 adjacent artillery will be held fast by the superior at- 
 tacking artillery and will be incapable of producing the 
 effects of convergence that the Germans talk about. 
 However, the attack by these troops of general reserve 
 should be made in wide formations and with the neces- 
 sary precautions for the flanks. 
 
 General Kuhl, as well as the other German authors, 
 always argues on the question as if a decisive French 
 attack would be made against fresh troops supported 
 by artillery in possession of all its capabilities. 
 
 There lies the error. 
 
 The method of always hunting the hostile flank to 
 win the decision by envelopment does not present 
 merely those advantages which are so vaunted by the 
 Germans; it has also some very great disadvantages 
 which it is well to point out. 
 
 It is of course understood that, according to the 
 German method, there is assigned to the combat along 
 the front as few troops as possible in order that the at- 
 tack which is to produce the decision may be well rein- 
 forced; now in looking for the enemy's flanks, by ex- 
 
[138] 
 
 tending one's front with that object in view, one may 
 succeed in extending his Hnes to an inordinate degree. 
 
 If the troops for the combat on the front are not 
 strongly organized, if they are not carefully connected 
 one with another, if unusual gaps happen to occur due 
 to errors or to weakness, what will become then of all 
 that German theory concerning the so-called inviola- 
 bility of the front? It is almost impossible to affirm, 
 in view of the preconceived plan accepted by the Ger- 
 mans that the troops that will be assigned to the combats 
 along the front will be sufficient and that they will not 
 have to be extended more than they should. Let it be 
 remembered what was on August 18, 1870, the surprise 
 of the Germans upon learning that the French front 
 extended as far as St. Privat. 
 
 In the recent war in Manchuria, in the battle of 
 Mukden, to cite only that one, the Russians would have 
 had a safe opportunity to pierce the Japanese front. 
 That front which was immoderately extended presented 
 many weak points. The counter attacks failed because 
 they were not strong enough, not properly prepared, 
 not accompanied by artillery. The adjacent forces 
 seemed to be disinterested in the counter attacks, in- 
 stead of supporting them by redoubling their activity. 
 
 If General Kuropatkin, being posted as to the 
 enemy's deployment, had thrown the First Siberian 
 Corps or the Sixteenth Corps, which he had as a general 
 reserve, upon one of those numerous weak points in 
 the enemy's front, it is quite probable that the issue of 
 the struggle would have been totally modified. If, for 
 example, he had thrown his counter-attack in the direc- 
 tion of Goutoulin, where there was a complete opening 
 in the Japanese line, he would have completely sepa- 
 
[1B9] 
 
 rated Kuroki's army from that of Nodzu and could 
 have, without meeting other than a few battahons, 
 fallen upon the rear of General Nodzu. 
 
 Who would dare to say that the Japanese front was 
 inviolable. 
 
 The moment the Germans accept the impossibility 
 of a decisive attack against the front of the enemy 
 and consider that the sector reserves are sufficient to 
 insure the inviolability of the front, they are quite 
 naturally led to place their general reserve on a wing. 
 Here is what Colonel Kuhl says : * ' In the middle of the 
 front, this reserve would be used only for an offensive 
 attack. Now, that form of attack has become much 
 more difficult and unpromising since the great range of 
 the arms permit concentrating strong fire upon the as- 
 sailant who forms a wedge. 
 
 ''If one has decided, on the contrary, to employ 
 that reserve upon a wing it will be difficult to engage it 
 at the desired time and place by causing it to make 
 changes of position toward the side in rear of the front ; 
 the employment of the reserve appearing to be more 
 convenient upon a wing, it is there that it will preferably 
 be placed. But, why not put it there before hand, 
 especially since it will then be already there to envelop 
 the enemy? One can make as many objections as one 
 may wish to the mania for envelopment; nobody will 
 dispute, however, that the envelopment is the most 
 effective form of attack, because it offers the only sure 
 means of deploying a superior number of guns and 
 rifles for concentric fire ; from the point of view of pro- 
 cedure it is the one which promises the best results by 
 permitting action upon the flank and the rear of the 
 enemy." 
 
[140J 
 
 Thus it is that in the German Army the general 
 reserve is no longer a reserve properly so-called, because, 
 being placed beforehand upon a wing for a definite 
 mission, it is no longer at the disposal of the general-in- 
 chief. 
 
 Is the attack of a wing more advantageous than 
 the attack of the front ? 
 
 Yes, certainly, if one is dealing with an enemy 
 who has not anticipated it, or who has not taken the 
 measures necessary to prevent its success. But when 
 one finds oneself in front of a prudent enemy who is 
 skilled in maneuvering, the wing attack will not be 
 found to offer a priori any better conditions than the 
 frontal attack. 
 
 If the enemy has supported his two wings, either on 
 a fortified position or upon an impassable obstacle, 
 how would the flank attack be possible? Now, a sup- 
 porting point will be sought more and more, if not for 
 both wings at least for one of them. In case one or 
 both flanks cannot be sheltered, artificial supporting 
 points will be created, which will of course not be impas- 
 sable but which will strongly support the threatened 
 flank. 
 
 The great disadvantage of the flank attack is that 
 it can almost always be anticipated. A frontal attack, 
 on the contrary, cannot be divined beforehand, or at 
 least it can be foreseen only a few moments before its 
 execution, that is to say often too late to be able to 
 parry it. 
 
 For a flank attack to succeed one of the essential 
 conditions is that this attack be made against what is 
 really the wing of the adversary. Can one be certain 
 
[141] 
 
 in making an attack that he has found the real wing of 
 the principal line of the enemy ? 
 
 If one makes a mistake one risks disaster. The 
 active protection of the threatened flank will be made, 
 in reality, by a force echeloned in rear which it will be 
 very difficult to reconnoiter. These echelons will have 
 in front of them mixed detachments, and occasionally 
 cavalry supports, which will be able to deceive abso- 
 lutely the adversary as to the extent of the front really 
 occupied. When the assailant seeks the wing which he 
 has in advance resolved to attack, he will be obliged 
 to extend, undoubtedly beyond all his expectations in 
 order to find the last detachment and the last echelon. 
 
 If the flank attack is launched before the disposi- 
 tion and the forces of the enemy have been thoroughly 
 reconnoitered, there is a risk, when dealing with an 
 enemy skilled in maneuvers, of finding oneself taken in 
 the flank at a critical moment by a reserve of the ad- 
 versary which will have been previously placed in over- 
 lapping echelons far to the rear. 
 
 The Germans are mistaken when they claim that 
 the wing attack is always preferable to a frontal attack. 
 
 The decisive attack will be profitable only if it is 
 made by surprise; the flank attack can hardly be by 
 surprise. 
 
 If the frontal attack appears to offer a disadvantage 
 through taking the form of a wedge into the hostile line 
 and through seeming to permit the concentration of the 
 converging fire of the adversary, the flank attacks 
 will almost always offer just as great a difficulty because 
 of the impossibility of attacking the forces at the ex- 
 treme limit of the enemy's disposition. 
 
 The frontal attack, or at least an attack not pre- 
 
[142] 
 
 viously designated, presents moreover the opportunity 
 of using the facihties that the ground will offer for its 
 preparation. 
 
 This attack has the advantage of not being thrown 
 against a position that will be strongly defended by 
 fortifications constructed to resist it. The adversary 
 not being able to foresee it will not be able to establish 
 beforehand, as he would be in the case of the exposed 
 flank, important defenses at the point where it will take 
 place. 
 
 And what can be said of the initial disposition for 
 battle to which the preconceived plan of the Germans 
 will lead? The force intended to make the envelop- 
 ment is placed in advance on a wing in overlapping 
 echelons even before the enemy's front has been attacked 
 and before the disposition of his troops have been de- 
 termined. But what will happen if one makes a mis- 
 take ? We will let Colonel Kuhl answer : 
 
 "That this manner of giving battle presents certain 
 inconveniences" confesses the Colonel, "nobody dis- 
 putes; as the battle has been prepared, so it will have 
 to be developed ; for thereafter the commander will not 
 be able to make any further essential changes in the 
 distribution of the forces * * * . If the effort does 
 not succeed at once, it will fail." 
 
 The German colonel is certainly right; he might 
 have added : "If the enemy is not very inferior and is 
 not willing to allow himself to be done up, the effort will 
 very often fail." 
 
 How can any leader dare to take fixed and im- 
 changeable dispositions for a fight on the mere informa- 
 tion obtained by cavalry and spies? A front will be 
 pointed out to him, but has no mistake been made? 
 
[143] 
 
 As we have already said, the cavalry, for many reasons, 
 is unable to tear away the veil from the real front of a 
 disposition. 
 
 Without going back to the examples of the wars of 
 1870 or 1878, which show the errors which can be com- 
 mitted by cavalry, we will point out merely what took 
 place in the great German maneuvers in 1895. General 
 von Eichhom commanding the Eighteenth Corps made 
 his plans on September the 8th to envelop the left wing 
 of the Eighth Corps. Misled by erroneous information 
 his maneuvers failed completely. 
 
 If one is deceived at the maneuvers, what will one 
 be in a war ? 
 
 In an organism like an army, the general-in-chief 
 must make his plans at least tweny-four hours in ad- 
 vance. 
 
 What is there to prove that the front tomorrow will 
 be the one that was reconnoitered today? That some 
 important force echeloned in rear will not stop short the 
 enveloping movement at a time and place which will 
 not have been anticipated? That fortuitous circum- 
 stances will not modify the data concerning the enemy 
 and all the expectations of the commander-in-chief? 
 For an attack that has been prepared in advance to 
 succeed, it must be carried on with unfailing exactness 
 with reference both to time and to space. 
 
[144] 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 THE DEFENSIVE. 
 
 THE GERMAN DEFENSIVE COMBAT — CRITICISM THEREOF. 
 
 The general discussion we have just made of the 
 German offensive combat is applicable in part to their 
 defensive combat. We shall not make a separate dis- 
 cussion of the defensive combat, which would bring 
 about repetitions ; we shall examine the regulation pre- 
 scriptions and the German doctrine for the defensive 
 combat as the opportunity arises in the general dis- 
 cussion of the defensive. 
 
 1. OCCUPATION OF A DEFENSIVE POSITION. 
 
 Preparation of the Position. 
 
 ' ' The principal conditions that should be fulfilled 
 in a defensive position are: to present a clear field of 
 fire, to permit of free movements, under cover, within 
 and to the rear of the position ; to have at least one of 
 its flanks solidly supported." (I. R. 392.) 
 
 "The works are usually not arranged in a continu- 
 ous line, but in groups. The intervals between the 
 groups offer no danger if they are commanded by the 
 fire from the trenches." (I. R. 408.) 
 
 We have nothing special to point out in the regula- 
 tions relative to the establishment of the defensive posi- 
 tion ; these prescriptions appear to be excellent, and they 
 conform to those of the French regulations. 
 
 The Germans are particularly careful in regard to 
 their lines of information, especially upon the defensive. 
 They recommend that communication by telegraph 
 
1145] 
 
 and by telephone be established with the greatest care. 
 One remark in passing. It is stated (I. R. 406) 
 that field works lose much of their value when they 
 facilitate the enemy's reconnaissance. That is abso- 
 lutely correct. To dig a trench which is visible to the 
 enemy is to give him a reference point to show him 
 where to strike. Not enough care is taken, as a rule, in 
 concealing the defensive works. 
 
 INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY. 
 
 The position, the regulations wisely say, should be 
 divided into sectors among which are distributed the 
 troops assigned to the defense of the front ; each sector 
 is provided with its own special reserve, the reserve 
 being smaller as the ground is more covered. 
 
 "The first thing to think of is the use to be made of 
 the artillery." (A. R. 502.) 
 
 The employment of the infantry is just as important 
 as that of the artillery ; but the Germans have a marked 
 predilection for the artillery on the defensive; they 
 seem to expect the most protection from it. 
 
 ' ' The infantry should be about 600 meters in front 
 of the artillery." (I. R. 401, A. R. 502.) 
 
 This prescription seems astonishing. The regu- 
 lations (Par. 144) do say why this distance should not 
 be less, but not why it should not be greater. 
 
 When they have no cover, the infantry supports 
 should be at least 300 meters from the firing line, say 
 the Germans; in France, we say at least 400 meters. 
 In rear the reserves are placed at a distance varying 
 from 300 to 500 meters. For the artillery to be able 
 on level ground, to fire with safety over the infantry, 
 it must be at least 300 meters in rear of it. 
 
[146j 
 
 According to these figures, it may be wondered 
 where the Germans will place their sector reserves. 
 Furthermore, if the infantry line of fire is only 600 meters 
 from the batteries, the artillery will find itself compro- 
 mised in case the said line wavers in any pronounced 
 degree toward the rear. 
 
 The indicated distance of 600 meters seems to us 
 to be remarkably insufficient, it could only be given as 
 a minimum to be allowed only in certain especially 
 favorable conditions. 
 
 "Careful attention must be given to the estab- 
 lishment of the artillery on the position in echeloned 
 groups, assuring the possibility of concentrating the 
 fire of these groups; provision will also be made for 
 firing toward the flanks and for the use of crossed fire." 
 (A. R. 504.) 
 
 The formation of the artillery into groups, the 
 echeloning of these groups and of the batteries in the 
 groups are wise and prudent measures. 
 
 The flanking or enfilading fire of batteries masked 
 in the passageways of the position can produce extra- 
 ordinary effects at a decisive moment. The German 
 regulations therefore, very wisely prescribe that such a 
 use of the batteries shall be provided for at the begin- 
 ning. It seems absolutely necessary that artillery 
 established in position, for this purpose, in advance be 
 used to avoid having to execute possibly disastrous 
 movements at a critical moment. The German regula- 
 tions are silent concerning the distribution of these 
 batteries and the emplacements to be aSvSigned to them. 
 Their very special purpose permits departure from the 
 principles accepted for the offensive. The fixed posi- 
 tions for the defensive permit determining the ground 
 
[147] 
 
 over which the struggle will take place and permit fore- 
 seeing the probable needs of the infantry. Common 
 sense will have to be exercised in accordance with the 
 circumstances. General Percin says, with the high 
 authority due him: ''There is reason for inquiring 
 whether the local defense should not be provided for 
 with a small number of batteries, of sections and even 
 of pieces, sheltered so far as possible, intended to act 
 only at the last moment." 
 
 With regard to the positions to be taken by the 
 artillery, the regulations prescribe: ''It will be ad- 
 vantageous to occupy defiladed positions. From such 
 positions the artillery can fire upon the enemy while he 
 is advancing his attack and during his deployment, 
 without betraying before the proper time its positions 
 and its strength. These positions will permit carrying 
 on the duel with a superior artillery strength, and will 
 favor lateral changes of position. On the other hand, 
 the artillery must be able to leave them when necessary 
 in order to fight when it can effectively do so, from the 
 very beginning, the mobile infantry targets. If provi- 
 sions can not be made for changing position with safety 
 during the action, a certain number of batteries should 
 be designated to fire upon the infantry." (A. R. 504.) 
 
 As we have seen in the study of their offensive 
 combat, the Germans recognize the use of defiladed 
 positions for batteries that are to fire upon fixed targets, 
 such as the hostile artillery, but never for firing upon 
 mobile targets. On the defensive they recommend de- 
 filading the counter-batteries. The counter-batteries 
 have greater need for defilade when on the defensive 
 than when on the offensive; for they should be able to 
 change their objectives, to fire in all directions, and 
 
[148] 
 
 even to change position, things they could not do if 
 they were without cover under fire. 
 
 General von Rohne says that the batteries that 
 are to be used to support the infantry fire do not need 
 to be in their position beforehand, that they can remain 
 waiting limbered up. He believes that these batteries 
 will be able to move under fire to their positions? If 
 these positions can be taken by a simple movement by 
 hand in front of a crest, that is possible; but if they 
 have to cross exposed ground with their teams under 
 the adversary's fire, it seems to us to be absolutely im- 
 possible. 
 
 Let us remember that when the reconnaissance 
 shows that the attack is imminent, and indicates the 
 direction from which it will come, the artillery intended 
 to support the infantry is put in position on uncovered 
 or half masked emplacements, which are strengthened 
 by embankments of earth. 
 
 A SINGLE POSITION FOR THE DEFENSE. 
 
 The defense must occupy only one position accord- 
 ing to the regulations. 
 
 The Germans condemn the theory of advanced 
 lines. They authorize them only upon the condition 
 that these advanced lines shall fall back as soon as the 
 enemy deploys to attack them. Thus on September 
 11, 1905, at their great army maneuvers, the Fifth 
 German Corps pushed an advanced line to within a 
 few kilometers of the enemy's advanced posts ; the ad- 
 vanced line did not even make an attempt at resistance, 
 if fell back as soon as it saw that the enemy was com- 
 mencing his deployment. 
 
 "No advanced positions," said the regulations for 
 
. [149] 
 
 the infantry maneuvers of May 29, 1906; "they inter- 
 fere with the fire of the defenders of the main position 
 and one gets himself beaten in detail. If it is necessary 
 to gain time, trenches can be constructed in advance of 
 the true position to lead the enemy into error; but they 
 will be very weakly held and will be evacuated as soon 
 as the enemy has deployed." 
 
 It is certain that advanced lines are often dangerous. 
 As has been said by General Langlois, who has made a 
 thorough study of them, "they should be used only 
 under exceptional conditions." 
 
 The same is not true of what we call covering de- 
 tachments, which consist of very mobile troops occupy- 
 ing only certain selected points in front of a line of 
 defense. 
 
 These detachments seem to us to be indispensable. 
 They ascertain the direction of the lines of march of the 
 hostile columns, the strength of the hostile advance 
 guard, etc. They serve as contingent supports for the 
 cavalry and enable it to complete its information; 
 finally, they very often succeed in deceiving the enemy, 
 in making him deploy prematurely, in any case in 
 making him lose time. 
 
 We can see what happens at the large maneuvers, 
 where the march is made moreover very quickly with- 
 out considering the blows received; we note the diffi- 
 culty experienced by an advance guard that has been 
 halted by a hostile detachment in making an accurate 
 and prompt estimation of the situation and of the 
 strength of the troops opposed to it. 
 
 In 1870, General von Werder sent out from the 
 Lisaine several detachments in front of his line of de- 
 fense; von Debschitz to Delle, von Bredow to Ar9ay, 
 
[150] 
 
 von Willisen to Lure. Everybody knows how success- 
 ful their mission was. 
 
 General von Rohne admits that "the adoption of 
 smokeless powder and the increased range of modern 
 weapons considerably augment the importance of these 
 advanced posts. These two improvements make re- 
 connaissance more difficult and diminish the danger 
 for these advanced troops of getting cut off from the 
 principal position. 
 
 "On the other hand," adds the general, "the fact 
 must not be concealed that the conduct of these detach- 
 ments still remains a very delicate matter. The diffi- 
 culty lies in seizing the proper moment to break off the 
 action and to fall back in good order." 
 
 The Boers, however, without any study of the 
 subject, frequently used detachments of this sort with 
 the greatest success. We believe that the danger of 
 not being able to get away in time is exaggerated in the 
 minds of the Germans. One only needs to have light 
 troops and a leader that knows his business. 
 
 We know that the Germans claim that their cav- 
 alry can sufficiently perform the duty that we assign 
 to these advanced detachments, and that the more 
 satisfactorily since it can get away more easily. 
 
 We have said what we think about it, we shall not 
 pursue the matter further. 
 
 2. THE COMBAT. 
 
 When they have received their information from 
 their cavalry, the Germans occupy their positions in 
 accordance with the circumstances existing at the time ; 
 not too soon, in order not to betray their positions ; not 
 too late to be able to take advantage, if the occasion 
 
[151] 
 
 should offer itself, of the extreme range of their weapons. 
 It is moreover, not necessary to occupy the whole posi- 
 tion at the same time. (I. R. 411, 412.) 
 
 It is habitually the commander-in-chief who gives 
 the orders for occupying the positions, and usually 
 he will give the orders for the opening of fire (by 
 the artillery) (A. R. 509, 510). The artillery opens 
 fire with all its batteries at the same time and by surprise. 
 It directs its fire at first upon the hostile artillery, unless 
 the assailant shows big columns of infantry. (A. R. 
 510.) 
 
 ''There have been for a long time," says General 
 von Rohne, ''discussions ^s to whether the artillery of 
 the defense, which will probably be numerically the 
 weaker, should not begin the duel with the artillery of 
 the attackers. If the assailant does not act with a 
 great deal of prudence, if he doesn't know enough to 
 wait until all his artillery has arrived before having 
 his batteries take their positions and open fire, the de- 
 fenders may hope to have numerical superiority, at 
 least temporarily. ' ' 
 
 It may be that the defenders may have for some 
 time a numerical superiority, but that is not sufficient. 
 We do not share the General's opinion; we have already 
 said, and repeated, that the assailants can very well 
 engage only a few batteries as "decoys," without run- 
 ning great danger, and if the defenders open fire with 
 all their artillery, before the assailants have shown a 
 large proportion of theirs, they are committing a great 
 mistake, they are betraying their positions prematurely. 
 
 "When the fire has been opened along the whole 
 front," says further General von Rohne, "they (the 
 defenders) must not hesitate to engage their whole 
 
[152] 
 
 strength. To keep a priori a reserve for the later phases 
 of the battle would be giving all the trumps to the ad- 
 versary." 
 
 To engage all one's batteries, if it is necessary, to 
 gain the superiority of fire, yes, that is fighting the game 
 well ; but if it is not necessary in order to gain the superi- 
 ority of fire, no ; it is harmful and dangerous. The bat- 
 teries not engaged should remain available for the in- 
 fantry combat or for any other need that may arise. 
 
 "When the infantry advances, the artillery should 
 abandon if necessary all defiladed positions in order 
 to fire to better advantage upon the infantry; but it 
 should in the meantime keep the enemy's batteries 
 under fire." (A. R. 511.) 
 
 "The howitzers will keep up the duel with the 
 artillery." 
 
 The field artillery is then to act at this stage of the 
 battle as it does upon the offensive ; we shall not repeat 
 what we have already said upon this subject. 
 
 The artillery regulations say further, (Par. 5 12): 
 "If, even before the beginning of the infantry attack, 
 the enemy's artillery shows such a superiority that 
 nothing can be hoped for from the artillery duel, the com- 
 mander-in-chief may order that the batteries be re- 
 moved temporarily from the fire of the enemy." 
 
 Here is a strange prescription which scarcely agrees 
 with the prescriptions of the French regulations. At a 
 given time, then, the artillery of the defenders, its in- 
 feriority having been demonstrated,, is to keep silent 
 and to leave free play to the attackers' artillery ? What 
 will the defenders' artillery be doing during this time? 
 
 The regulations are ambiguous. 
 
 General von Rohne's manual will enlighten us: 
 
[153] 
 
 *'It remains to be seen whether the batteries should 
 withdraw into positions that have been prepared, 
 sheltered from fire in order to get reorganized, or 
 whether they should remain in their (first) positions 
 and have the men get under cover. The solution to be 
 adopted depends upon circumstances." 
 
 It seems then in Germany to be fitting for the artil- 
 lery to forsake the infantry in its struggle and to with- 
 draw for the purpose of going and getting under shelter ! 
 
 Outside of the tremendous support that this with- 
 drawal takes away from the infantry, it ought to pro- 
 duce a disastrous moral effect. Besides, how can these 
 batteries withdraw? In %heir positions they are so 
 vulnerable that they give up the contest ; what disasters 
 will not be theirs if they bring up their limbers? We 
 see once more how easily the Germans accept the possi- 
 bility of moving their artillery under fire. To remain 
 in their places and let the men get under cover would 
 seem to us the only possible solution. 
 
 Again, the regulations add: "As soon as the hos- 
 tile infantry advances for the assault, the artillery 
 should turn upon it the fire of all the guns without 
 waiting for orders." 
 
 General von Rohne estimates that at that moment 
 the batteries will have to go into action in positions 
 different from those previously occupied by them. 
 As, in order to fire upon the assaulting infantry, the 
 German artillery is supposed to go into exposed posi- 
 tions, one wonders how these movements of going and 
 coming before a superior hostile artillery can be con- 
 sidered as possible by serious authors. 
 
 The General adds, very justly: "The regulations 
 prescribe that all the batteries shall have but a single 
 
[154] 
 
 objective, the infantry. In view of the shortness of 
 time left at one's disposition, it is only by the concentra- 
 tion of all one's strength upon the most important 
 target that a turn of the tide can be hoped for." 
 
 The heavy artillery will be able to render very valu- 
 able service to the Germans on the defensive. Whereas, 
 upon the offensive, this artillery may have to change 
 position, which is extremely difficult for it to do, and 
 may run short of ammunition, it is, upon the defensive, 
 assured of complete stability and can be kept well 
 supplied with ammunition. It is true on the other 
 hand, that it will have the disadvantage of having for 
 the most part only mobile targets among the assailing 
 forces. 
 
 By its long range fire, this artillery will be able to 
 cause hostile columns to halt at great distances, especi- 
 ally if they have defiles to pass through. During the 
 artillery duel, it must seek to crush the hostile batteries, 
 and the Germans hope that it will be able to destroy 
 the batteries whose positions can be recognized. 
 (H. A. R. 613, 615.) This heavy artillery will, at the 
 moment of the assault, produce, by means of its fire 
 concentrated upon the points where the assault is being 
 made, a considerable moral and material effect. We 
 have already discussed this matter, and will not return 
 to it. 
 
 "The infantry and the machine guns will open 
 fire as soon as the enemy presents tangible targets." 
 (I. R. 413.) 
 
 It is recommended that the machine guns seek 
 elevated positions from which they can sweep with their 
 fire till the last, without danger, the intervals between 
 
[155] 
 
 the occupied points. (M. G. R., 412 and 338, as 
 amended.) 
 
 On the defensive, therefore, it is prescribed to fire 
 at long ranges and to fire a great deal ; it will be neces- 
 sary to have a vast supply of ammunition. 
 
 We have no remark to make concerning the conduct 
 of the infantry and the machine guns upon the defen- 
 sive. 
 
 The Germans accord a great importance to the 
 machine guns. The new amendments to the regula- 
 tions further accentuate the importance attached to 
 this weapon. The Germans believe that the machine 
 guns are destined to render the most valuable service, 
 by frontal fire, as well as by flanking fire on the line 
 of defense and by the enfilading fire that they may be 
 able to deliver unexpectedly. 
 
 THE COUNTER ATTACK. 
 
 The counter-attack and the counter-offensive are 
 essential acts of the defensive. 
 
 However, beyond the counter-attack to be made by 
 the general reserve of the defensive to bring about a 
 decisive effect, the German regulations speak only in- 
 cidentally of these means of repulsing an attack and of 
 taking the offensive. In the infantry regulations, we 
 can hardly find anything more than the following pas- 
 sage bearing upon the matter : ' ' The defenders will not 
 pass to the offensive until after they have repulsed the 
 attack. They may attack in order to drive out an 
 enemy entrenched in front of the position. A prema- 
 ture counter-attack runs the risk of bringing about 
 the loss of the position." (I. R. 414.) 
 
 The defenders who before the later phases of the 
 
[156] 
 
 struggle, allowed themselves to be drawn out from 
 under cover under the pretext of taking the offensive 
 would commit a great mistake. It is one of the ruses 
 of an assailant to draw the defenders out of their 
 trenches and covers in order to be able to crush them 
 to better advantage. 
 
 The counter-attack should be delivered at the last 
 moment, when the enemy is getting ready for the assault 
 or while he is making it. 
 
 The counter-attack often gained the very best 
 results in Manchuria, at times when the assailants 
 seemed to be certain of success. 
 
 It frequently happened that the Russians, seeing 
 that their fire at close range did not succeed in stopping 
 the enemy, rushed out in a counter-attack. This un- 
 expected menace of the bayonet would succeed in re- 
 pulsing an attack which seemed bound to be victorious. 
 
 There is found here a curious and remarkable fact 
 which shows the predominance of the moral factors in 
 warfare. A force going into an attack marches bravely 
 ahead under the violent fire of the adversaries, which 
 causes it to siiffer serious losses; but before the mere 
 threat of a hand to hand struggle, it recoils and runs 
 away. 
 
 This moral effect has been manifested many times 
 in all wars, but never so strikingly as in the Russo- 
 Japanese war where, moreover, the firearms were more 
 powerful than ever. This fact should be remembered, 
 and it clearly shows how the counter-attack should be 
 made. 
 
 It is curious that the German regulations show no 
 lessons drawn from the last war on the subject of this 
 method of defense. 
 
[157] 
 
 As to what concerns the counter-offensive, the 
 German regulations are almost mute. They speak of 
 it only under the subject of night attacks. "The re- 
 serves of the defenders must be ready to eject the enemy 
 with the bayonet in case he succeeds in carrying the 
 position." (I. R. 416.) 
 
 Although the Germans do not believe in the pierc- 
 ing of the line of defense, and expect no definite success 
 from the combat on the front, it is nevertheless strange 
 that the regulations fail to speak of one of the essential 
 defensive actions. 
 
 Of course, in practice, the Germans will make 
 counter-attacks and offensive ripostes which conform to 
 their general rules for combat ; it is nevertheless aston- 
 ishing that in their regulations there should be this 
 omission which we can not explain. 
 
 THE GENERAL RESERVE. 
 
 As in the case for the offensive, the general reserve 
 of the German defensive is the maneuvering force in- 
 tended to win victory by an enveloping attack. This 
 general reserve is placed beforehand in rear of the 
 threatened flank. It is intended to make a counter- 
 attack against an enemy's force that is trying to make 
 an envelopment, or to overlap itself the enemy's flank 
 if it can to advantage precede the enemy in making a 
 decisive attack. 
 
 To place a strong echeloned reserve in rear of and 
 overlapping the unsupported flank of a defensive posi- 
 tion, is in conformity with the elementary principles 
 of tactics, but to place there all, or nearly aU of the de- 
 fenders' reserve appears to be a very debatable idea. 
 
 In any case, as has been well said by General von 
 
[158] 
 
 Schlichting, this reserve should not be placed behind 
 the wing of the defensive position; it could only form 
 there a defensive hook and, consequently, would pro- 
 duce a diverging effect. It should be placed well to the 
 rear and beyond the wing, so as to take the enveloping 
 attack of the enemy in the flank, or to overlap freely the 
 assailants' wing in order to fall upon it in such a way as 
 to obtain always a converging effect. 
 
 The general reserve should not make its offensive 
 effort too soon. ' ' It will make its start when the frontal 
 combat is in full swing." (I. R., 414.) 
 
 ' * It will be accompanied by and protected upon its 
 flankby all the cavalry available." (C. R.) 
 
 The observations suggested by the use of the gen- 
 eral reserve on the defensive are the same as those we 
 have offered for the offensive; it is maneuvered in a 
 manner similar to that employed by the reserve in the 
 offensive: it maneuvers, according to a preconceived 
 plan, upon a wing ; it maneuvers upon the outer lines to 
 produce a converging attack upon a flank. 
 
 The Germans defend themselves with a precon- 
 ceived plan which they can' not change; they can 
 neither break through the front, nor parry a blow that 
 might happen to break through the front, nor can they 
 take advantage of a fortunate circumstance that might 
 occur on the line of combat. 
 
 But, if the placing in advance of the general reserve 
 upon the unprotected wing is accepted, it must be 
 recognized that the regulation prescriptions and the 
 tactical ideas relative to the use of that reserve for mak- 
 ing counter-attacks are most judicious and worthy of 
 all approbation. 
 
[159] 
 
 A STRATEGICAL SYNOPSIS. 
 
 It was said at the beginning of this work that to 
 understand thoroughly the tactics of an army, a study 
 of its regulations is not sufficient; it should above all 
 be known in what manner they are applied. 
 
 We have tried to show, in the discussions of these 
 few pages the German doctrine from the tactical point 
 of view. That doctrine has been slowly modified in 
 the past ten years ; it will perforce be further modified, 
 for there is ceaseless progress in the utilization of the 
 forces of nature and there is continual evolution in the 
 thought, the morale and tEe organization of the races. 
 
 To complete the study of this doctrine and to 
 understand thoroughly its spirit and meaning, the Ger- 
 man strategy must be studied. We shall at a later 
 time undertake that study. 
 
 But in concluding these considerations of the tactics 
 of the German army, we believe that we have shown it 
 under its true light by outlining the general sense of the 
 strategical ideas on the battle which are current in that 
 army. 
 
 The great combat principles, which we have studied 
 while speaking of the subject of general tactics, are 
 directly connected with the strategical principles that 
 guide the armies in their application of them. 
 
 The Germans have continued to believe firmly in 
 concentrating their armies in the form of a carpenter's 
 square* as recommended by General de Moltke. 
 
 *Their armies at the three corners | ^^ 
 
 of the square. — Translator. j ^4 X 
 
[160] 
 
 They will offer, during the period of concentration, a 
 "relatively weak'' front (General von Bemhardi), facing 
 the hostile frontiers, and one or several masses at right 
 angles ready to fall upon the flank of the enemy if he 
 takes the offensive. The front of their masses will 
 generally be supported by a fortified zone behind which 
 the concentration will take place, out of which the 
 attack will come "Hke a thunderbolt from the clouds." 
 (General von Bemhardi.) 
 
 Prudence will dominate the strategical preparation 
 of the Germans. Our neighbors do not appear to be 
 inclined to take the offensive before having assembled 
 all their means. There is in their strategy the same 
 principle of prudence that we have found in their 
 tactics : not to attack until they are ready with all their 
 forces collected. 
 
 The concentration at the beginning of war is the 
 prelude of the dispositions to be taken by the directing 
 authority in view of preconceived maneuvers. It is 
 the first act of a studied plan of which the second act 
 will depend upon the enemy, the circumstances and the 
 conception as to the offensive held by the general-in- 
 chief. 
 
 When the concentration has been completed, Bem- 
 hardi, like de Moltke, advises a rapid offensive in order 
 to arrive, at the earHest, at the decisive act, the battle. 
 The shock of the two opposing fronts will produce that 
 battle. Thanks to the concentration in form of a car- 
 penter's square, thanks to the strategic marches with 
 overlapping echelons to the front, or finally thanks to 
 the means that permit rapid concentrations upon the 
 theater of the struggle, the directing German authority 
 hopes to win a decision by making use of an independent 
 
[161] 
 
 mass maneuvered with exactness at the time chosen, on 
 a chosen zone. 
 
 The duration of the frontal combats, the rapidity 
 of movement that can be obtained by the utilization of 
 the present means of transportation, will permit move- 
 ments of masses under time and space conditions here- 
 tofore absolutely unknown. 
 
 "Nothing," writes General von der Goltz, "could 
 give to the inventive mind of the general-in-chief a 
 bolder flight than the liberty of action assured to him 
 by the railroads, and military art of the future will 
 certainly reveal to us mightier conceptions than history 
 has shown us up to the present. * * * Since de- 
 tours are almost without importance on account of 
 the rapidity of conveyances, one will have always to 
 count upon the contingent possibilities of sudden move- 
 ments of large masses of troops by rail." 
 
 Nothing could be learned from the Manchurian 
 war concerning the strategic utilization of railroads. In 
 an European war, especially in a theater like that over 
 which would take place a Franco-German war, the 
 density of the railway lines would permit movements 
 on a scale and with a rapidity hitherto unexampled. 
 
 The multiplicity of the railroads, the employment 
 of automobiles, the utilization of balloons and of aero- 
 planes now present to the general-in-chief new resources, 
 out of which a superior mind will be able to evolve 
 methods of warfare that will revolutionize those now in 
 use. The Russo-Japanese war might easily be the last 
 great war carried out by means and methods of the 
 nineteenth century. 
 
 We should appreciate the fact that the new tools put 
 at the disposal of armies are studied with the greatest 
 
[162] 
 
 care and with a remarkable initiative by the responsible 
 authorities of the German army. 
 
 The strategic preparation for a battle, or rather 
 for battles, will require a settled management, unyield- 
 ing in its aims, a methodical preparation, an ordered 
 and rapid execution. 
 
 The qualities of the German general staff, estab- 
 lished by de Moltke, are a guarantee of a wise and ex- 
 tremely careful strategic preparation. 
 
 Such- a preparation, however, can not give good 
 results unless the chief is endowed with a mind imbued 
 with the idea of the offensive and possessed of an un- 
 wavering will; now, if the Germans are all for the offen- 
 sive in their tactics, they are so moreover to the extreme 
 in their strategy. They hold essentially to the idea of 
 a%ays getting the start of the adversary and of imposing 
 their will upon him. 
 
 If they permit the defensive, it is over a secondary 
 theater of operations, it is in order to gain time at some 
 point ; but their offensive spirit can not accept the idea 
 of letting the adversary take the lead in the principal 
 attack. 
 
 They will march upon the enemy with all their 
 forces, not assembled together, but available, and able 
 to reach him at the proper time. The first corps to 
 encounter the adversary will attack promptly, as we 
 have learned from our studies. The front of the enemy 
 is thus entirely invested without delay, with all possible 
 Tigor; time must not be left for the enemy to get his 
 bearings, to take the initiative or to acquire any priority 
 whatever. While the direct offensive of one or of 
 several units will hold him fast in a fierce frontal strug- 
 
 1 
 
 I 
 
[163] 
 
 gle, other units will debouch at the proper time upon a 
 flank and gain the decision. 
 
 The Germans claim that it is superfluous, useless 
 and bad to seek before the attack to clear up completely 
 the general situation; if one waits for complete infor- 
 mation to act, in strategy as in tactics^ one will temporize, 
 hesitate and lose the supremacy of priority in the offen- 
 sive. 
 
 The secret of victory, they say, rests above all in a 
 firm will, keeping ahead of that of the enemy, executed 
 with lightning like swiftness and an indomitable energy. 
 
 It is not the situation which should regulate the 
 maneuvers, it is the rapid and unexpected offensive 
 that should create the situation, which the maneuver- 
 ing will exploit to advantage. 
 
 ''This will to act in accordance with a preconceived 
 plan should be pushed to such a point that the adver- 
 sary, notwithstanding all the plans that he may have 
 made, will be subjected unreservedly to the law of our 
 initiative. ' ' (General von Bemhardi.) 
 
 We can but admire ruch bold and sound ideas. 
 
 We have thought it useful to bring to mind these 
 high strategic ideas. They give a better appreciation of 
 the manner in which our redoubtable neighbors expect 
 to conduct their warfare, and a better understanding 
 of their general tactics. 
 
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