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EDUCATION DEPT. 
 
Books by 
 PROF. RAYMOND MACDONALD ALDEN 
 
 o/ Leland Stanford Junior University 
 
 The Art of Debate 
 
 xv+279 pp. i2mo. $1.12 net. 
 
 A practical manual of argumentation and debating, sufficient- 
 ly systematic to be serviceable as a text-book. Legal argument 
 is talcen as a means of approach to the treatment of such 
 matters as burden of proof and evidence; and the classification 
 of methods of proof is based on the exigencies of actual debate. 
 
 Prof. E. N. Scctt, University 0/ Michigan : " It is a fresh 
 and interesting treatment of the subject, packed with ideas 
 expressed in a most delightful and taking away. 
 
 English Verse 
 
 With Specimens illustrating its Principles and History 
 xiv+459 pp. i2mo. $1.25 net. 
 
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 fully planned and admirably compact handbook. I know of 
 no treatise on versification which is so well adapted for 
 practical use in the classroom.'* 
 
 Introduction to Poetry 
 
 xvi+371 pp. i2mo. $1.25 *t^i' 
 
 A discussion of the theory of poetry, treating the various 
 classes of poems separately, problems of the inner nature of 
 poetry and the technical metric subdivisions. 
 
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 Nbw York Chicago 
 
THE ART OF DEBATE 
 
 ■T 
 
 RAYMOND MACDONALD ALDEN, Ph.D. 
 
 ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR IN LELAND STANFORD 
 JUNIOR UNIVERSITY 
 
 ,'. \ \\vr\V]\\\ : /. 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
 HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY 
 
Copyright, i9oe» 
 
 BV 
 
 HENRY HOLT & Ca 
 
 WfiOA;^XQfi..mPT-i'': 
 
 
TO 
 
 5amc0 patRer f)aU 
 
 AND 
 
 5o0cpb parftcr TRIlarren, 
 
 BOTH 
 
 EX-PRESIDENTS OF THE "HARVARD UNION, 
 ADMIRABLE DEBATERS, 
 
 AND 
 
 PEERLESS FRIENDS. 
 
 ^2-19520 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 
 in 2008 with funding from 
 
 IVIicrosoft Corporation 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/artofdebateOOalderich 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 A LARGE part of the contents of this book is 
 based on material originally prepared for students 
 of argumentation at Harvard College and the Uni- 
 versity of Pennsylvania. The interest lately de- 
 veloped in the practice of formal debate, together 
 with the interest in general debate which is always 
 found in democratic communities, has suggested 
 that the discussion of such a subject, revised so as 
 to meet the needs of others besides college stu- 
 dents, may be of service to various kinds of readers. 
 In its present form, then, the book is designed to 
 be helpful to those interested in any form of de- 
 bate. 
 
 If any consideration may be claimed for the 
 particular manner in which the subject is treated, 
 at a time when of the making of many books of 
 rhetoric there is no end, it is hoped it may be for 
 its practical character. The great part of the con- 
 tents has been drawn directly from the writer's ex- 
 perience as a participant in and an observer of de- 
 bates. In the arrangement of material, where 
 there is any difference between the order of theory 
 
VI PREFACE, 
 
 and the order suggested by common practice, the 
 latter has been preferred. The temptation to be 
 highly systematic, at the expense of every other 
 consideration, besets the writer of anything like a 
 text-book. It is so fascinating to discover that 
 figures of speech may be classified under twenty- 
 nine heads, that methods of proof may be reduced 
 to a table of seventeen divisions and sub-divisions, 
 and that gestures- — analyzed to the utmost — are 
 just forty-five in number, that no little self-control 
 is required to abstain from inflicting such classifi- 
 cations on one's students or readers. The subject 
 of argumentation, being related to the science of 
 logic, is peculiarly susceptible of artificial treat- 
 ment. But the aim of the present writer has been, 
 while placing stress on systematic presentation, tc 
 look at the whole subject less from the standpoint 
 of the theorist than from that of the practical de- 
 bater. 
 
 It is for just this reason that legal argument 
 has been largely taken as the basis for the 
 general subject of debate. It is in the pro- 
 fession of the law that the art of debate has 
 for a long time achieved a highly practical 
 development, and in that profession only. Phi- 
 losophers have seldom been successful debaters, 
 just as rhetoricians are seldom distinguished writ- 
 ers, and professional elocutionists seldom orators. 
 But in the law public debate has been forced to 
 
PREFACE, Vll 
 
 cut a straight path toward success, and we may 
 look to it for guidance — while not necessarily try- 
 ing to master its artificial system — whenever our 
 object is to convince and persuade practical men. 
 On the other hand, the law has much to learn from 
 logic and rhetoric. Many who are proficient in its 
 subject-matter are quite unfamiliar with the art of 
 using their knowledge effectively. " The time will 
 soon come," said a distinguished lawyer recently, 
 " when our law schools will have to teach their stu- 
 dents not only the law, but also the art of selecting 
 and arranging their arguments, and of presenting 
 them with convincing efifect." 
 
 There is a sense in which a hand-book of any 
 art is either inadequate or superfluous. Good de- 
 baters, like most good folk, are not to be made to 
 order. It may be said of them as in the famous 
 recipe for cooking hare: Urst catch your man. It is 
 vain to write rules for one who has neither a knack 
 at reasoning or a gift of expression. But the ex- 
 perience of schools and colleges where regular 
 courses in debate have been established indicates 
 that rudimentary endowments, both of reason and 
 expression, may be so developed under intelligent 
 training as to produce unexpectedly happy results. 
 It must, however, be understood that for every pre- 
 cept there must be a dozen, or a hundred, oppor- 
 tunities for practice. 
 
 Readers familiar with the literature of this 
 
Vlli PREFACE. 
 
 subject will not need to be told of my in- 
 debtedness to " The Principles of Argumentation," 
 by Professor George P. Baker, who was the 
 first, so far as I am aware, to develop a practi- 
 cal system of instruction in argumentation. Espe- 
 cially in the treatment of analysis and allied mat- 
 ters, in the chapter on " Preliminary Work," I have 
 made use of Professor Baker's presentation of the 
 same subject. Other books which have been found 
 helpful are Professor Sidgwick's " Process of Argu- 
 ment," Professor Thayer's '' Preliminary Treatise 
 on Evidence at the Common Law," the Rhetorics 
 of Professors A. S. Hill and J. F. Genung, and Pro- 
 fessor Wendell's " English Composition." I may 
 also recommend to those interested in the subject 
 Holyoake's " Public Speaking and Debate" (Ginn 
 &: Company), Sheppard's "Before an Audience; 
 or, the Use of the Will in Public Speaking " (Funk 
 & Wagnalls), and Buckley's " Extemporaneous 
 Oratory for Professional and Amateur Speakers" 
 (Eaton & Mains), — all suggestive and thoroughly 
 readable books. Thanks are also to be recorded 
 for most friendly and helpful advice received from 
 Dean William Draper Lewis, and Professor George 
 Wharton Pepper, of the Law School of the Univer- 
 sity of Pennsylvania. 
 
 It will be found helpful to use a manual like this 
 in connection with a good collection of specimens 
 of argument, such as Baker's " Specimens of Argu- 
 
PREFACE, IX 
 
 mentation/' Wagner's " Modern Political Ora- 
 tions " (Henry Holt & Co.), or Johnston's " Rep- 
 resentative American Orations " (Putnam's). But 
 the chief point is constant practice under com- 
 petent criticism 
 
 R. M. A. 
 
 Philadelphia, March, 1900. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 CHArTBR PACK 
 
 I. Nature of Debate i 
 
 What Debate is i 
 
 The Basis of Debate i 
 
 What Debate Involves 3 
 
 Conviction and Persuasion 4 
 
 The Power of Persuasion 5 
 
 Danger of Conviction or Persuasion alone 6 
 
 Science and Art Distinguished 8 
 
 II. Subjects of Debate 10 
 
 Propositions as Subjects for Debate 10 
 
 Subjects to be Avoided 11 
 
 Qualities of Good Subjects 18 
 
 The Wording of the Proposition 18 
 
 Affirmative Form 18 
 
 Brevity and Exactness 19 
 
 Fairness and Impartiality 21 
 
 Formal Debates 22 
 
 Legal Debate ^ 23 
 
 Qasses of Legal Arguments 26 
 
 General Debate 27 
 
 Debate Looking toward Action 29 
 
 III. Preliminary Work 31 
 
 Importance of Analysis 31 
 
 Defining the Question 32 
 
 Conditions of the Question 33 
 
 Narrowing the Question 34 
 
 Analysis of Jury Question 35 
 
 Analysis of Copyright Question 36 
 
 xi 
 
xil TABLE OF CONTENTS, 
 
 CHAPTER PACK 
 
 111. Preliminary Work — Continued. 
 
 Analysis of Silver Question 36 
 
 Analysis of Legal Questions 38 
 
 Analysis of Venezuelan Question 40 
 
 Results of Analysis 41 
 
 Study of Both Sides 42 
 
 Gathering of Material 44 
 
 Facts and Opinions 45 
 
 Arguments of Others 47 
 
 Tabulation of Material 48 
 
 The Outline or Brief 50 
 
 Form of Outline 52 
 
 Outline on Woman's Suffrage 53 
 
 Legal Briefs 58 
 
 IV Burden of Proof 61 
 
 Burden of Proof Defined 61 
 
 Legal Definition 62 
 
 Burden of Proof and Presumption 63 
 
 Term used in Two Senses 65 
 
 Burden of Proof in Formal Debate 66 
 
 How the Burden may Shift 67 
 
 Burden of Proof in General Debate ,. 68 
 
 Methods of Shifting the Burden 69 
 
 Presumption in Expansion Question 71 
 
 Presumption in Suffrage Question 72 
 
 Relation of Affirmative and Negative 74 
 
 V Methods of Proof -^y 
 
 All Proof Inference from Experience yy 
 
 Establishing of Facts 79 
 
 Credibility of Witnesses 80 
 
 Use of Testimony in Debate 82 
 
 Expert Testimony and Authority 83 
 
 Limitations of Authority 84 
 
 Use of Argument from Authority ,.. 85 
 
 Processes of Reasoning 86 
 
 A priori Evidence 87 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS, xiil 
 
 CHAPTER PAGB 
 
 V. Methods of Proof — Coniiimed. 
 
 Value of Proof of Antecedent Probability 88 
 
 Antecedent Probability in General Debate 90 
 
 Analogy or Example 90 
 
 Abuse of Analogy 92 
 
 A posteriori Evidence 94 
 
 Limitations of Circumstantial Evidence 95 
 
 Processes of Reasoning 97 
 
 Proof in Questions of Policy 98 
 
 Typical Schemes of Proof iod 
 
 Honesty 105 
 
 VI. Methods of Refutation 106 
 
 What is to be done with the Opposite Side? 106 
 
 Questionmg of Facts 107 
 
 Attacking Testimony 108 
 
 Refutation of Authority no 
 
 Refutation of a priori Evidence ill 
 
 Refutation of Example 113 
 
 Refutation of a posteriori Evidence „ 114 
 
 Causes and Effects 115 
 
 Fallacies or Gaps 117 
 
 Begging the Question 118 
 
 Ignoring the Question 120 
 
 Reductio ad Absurdum 122 
 
 The Dilemma 126 
 
 Facts in Refutation 127 
 
 Methods of Refutation Summarized 128 
 
 The Principle of Refutation 130 
 
 Distinction between Opposing Arguments 131 
 
 Knowledge of the Other Side 133 
 
 Attitude toward Opponent 134 
 
 Persuasive Refutation 136 
 
 VII. Structure and Style 137 
 
 Matter and Form 137 
 
 The OutHne the Basis of Structure 137 
 
 The Introduction 138 
 
xiv TABLE Of CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER tAOB 
 
 VII. Structure and Style — Continued. 
 
 Two Methods of Approach 139 
 
 Order of Proof ^ , 141 
 
 Exigencies of Debate 142 
 
 Inverted Refutation 143 
 
 The Conclusion 145 
 
 Summaries 146 
 
 Persuasiveness in the Conclusion 147 
 
 Different Kinds of Conclusions 148 
 
 Relation of Structure and Style 151 
 
 Paragraph Structure 152 
 
 Transitions 154 
 
 Development of Finished Argument Illustrated.. 155 
 
 The Compact Style 156 
 
 The Diffuse Style 158 
 
 The Compromise i6o 
 
 The Laws of Style in Argument 164 
 
 Clearness 165 
 
 Economy of Time 166 
 
 Art of Condensation 167 
 
 Citation of Authorities 168 
 
 Time Required for Condensation 172 
 
 Force 173 
 
 Sources of Force 174 
 
 Concreteness 174 
 
 Figures of Speech 176 
 
 Use of Illustrations 177 
 
 Legitimate and Illegitimate Illustrations 180 
 
 Elegance 182 
 
 Persuasiveness ; 182 
 
 Artistic Qualities 184 
 
 Great Ideas 184 
 
 VIII. The Spoken Debate 187 
 
 Relation of Written and Spoken Speech 187 
 
 Advantages of Writing 188 
 
 Preparation fo^ Delivery , 189 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. xv 
 
 CMArrBB PACK 
 
 VIII. The Spoken Debate— Cow/imk^c/. 
 
 Use of Notes 192 
 
 Degree of Extemporization 192 
 
 Danger of Memorization 194 
 
 Fluency 195 
 
 Expansion of Speech 197 
 
 Preparation for Rebuttal 197 
 
 Armed with Material 198 
 
 Extemporaneous Refutation 199 
 
 Rapidity of Thought 202 
 
 Place of Delivery 203 
 
 Qualities of Delivery 205 
 
 Clearness 205 
 
 Enunciation 206 
 
 Purity of Tone 207 
 
 Force 209 
 
 Vigor and Variety 210 
 
 Pitch 211 
 
 Elegance 212 
 
 Posture 213 
 
 Gesture 213 
 
 Training for Delivery 214 
 
 Relation of Speaker to Audience 215 
 
 Appendix 217 
 
 Arguments. 221 
 
 Expansion in the Eastern Hemisphere 221 
 
 The Retirement of the Greenbacks 230 
 
 The Venezuelan Message 2:ilS 
 
 Briefs 243 
 
 Brief of a Legal Argument 243 
 
 Brief of Macaulay's Speech on Copyright 249 
 
 Brief on the Retirement of the Greenbacks 253 
 
 Brief on the Restriction of Trusts 257 
 
 Propositions for Debate... 267 
 
THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 I. 
 
 NATURE OF DEBATE. 
 
 If argumentation is the art of convincing others 
 of the truth or falsity of a disputed matter, debate 
 may be said to be the art of doing this what 
 under conditions such that both sides of ^«^»*«i«' 
 the case can be heard and that the advocates of 
 each side can reply directly to those of the other. 
 It is clear that, while such debate can be carried on 
 through written arguments, it is best adapted to 
 the conditions of public speech; and it is to such 
 conditions that the word is commonly applied. 
 
 In its simplest form debate is universally prac- 
 ticed; for its use depends only on the fact that dif- 
 ferent men look at many matters from The Basis 
 different points of view, while neverthe- °^^®^**8' 
 less it is always assumed that they can reach the 
 truth by precisely similar processes. If I should 
 differ with a friend on a point the truth of which 
 is beyond human attainment, it would be useless 
 for us to debate it; and in the same way if the 
 
^ • * „ . L. . ^j ;_ u Jh «> 
 
 a r//£ /^/?r Of DEBATE, 
 
 truth were believed to be attainable, and yet if my 
 friend and I were so differently constituted that we 
 could never arrive at truth by the same path, ar- 
 gument would be equally out of place. But as a 
 matter of fact, experience shows that, while from a 
 superficial point of view there are a thousand dif- 
 ferent methods of forming opinions, yet all men 
 reason by what are fundamentally the same pro- 
 cesses. If, then, I have discovered the truth for 
 myself, I may with confidence undertake to lead 
 my friend along the path which I followed in 
 search of it. Once granted that the path is a clear 
 one, and that we are both perfectly reasonable be- 
 ings, and we cannot fail to arrive at the same point 
 in the end. 
 
 But while, from this point of view, argumenta- 
 tion is so simple and so universal a process, from 
 another it is an art of some difficulty and complica- 
 tion. Real men are never perfectly reasonable be- 
 ings: their reasoning processes are modified by in- 
 heritance, education, or personal interest. And few 
 disputed matters are so easily determinable that 
 one who does not understand something of the 
 laws of argument will be able to convince another 
 who sees them in a different light from himself. 
 When we add to this the problem of convincing 
 whole groups of men, and the further problem of 
 meeting attacks on one's opinion at the very mo- 
 ment when they are made, the matter becomes a 
 
NATURE OF DEBATE. 3 
 
 large one. So it happens that in every period and 
 in every community there are but a few skillful de- 
 baters, and that they are likely to be among the 
 most useful and the most prominent members of 
 society. They are especially notable in self-gov- 
 erning communities, where large bodies of people 
 have not only to decide questions but to act as a 
 unit upon their decision; here the orator and the 
 debater become leaders of men. 
 
 The mental habits which go to make a good de- 
 bater are of the highest type, and are usually de- 
 veloped only by considerable training. ^^■•* 
 They involve: the ability to find out as involves, 
 well as to defend the truth, the ability to analyze 
 keenly and sift the essential from the trivial, the 
 willingness to consider questions apart from the 
 prejudices with which one is tempted to view them, 
 and finally, the power of expression. To these must 
 be added, for one who will be successful in active 
 debate, the ability to decide quickly which of two 
 or three possible lines of attack shall be chosen, 
 and the power of rapidly arranging one's thoughts 
 in a way to make them seem reasonable to others. 
 These are not every-day qualities. It is sometimes 
 distressing to reflect how few of one's acquaint- 
 ances are in the habit of forming their opinions 
 apart from personal interests, inherited tastes, 
 popular opinion, or other forms of prejudice. Not 
 one man in ten or twenty does anything of the 
 
4 THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 kind. It is one of the highest aims of education 
 to bring about conditions under which opinions 
 will be held because they have been legitimately 
 earned, not lazily inherited or borrowed. This 
 judicial habit of mind is the deadliest foe to popular 
 fallacy, eloquent sophistry, and the like — to all 
 doctrines which, on analysis, prove to be logical 
 tramps, without visible means of support. Again, 
 the judicial habit of mind is frequently found with- \ 
 out the accompanying gift of expression. We are 
 all acquainted with people who can reason fairly 
 well but are perfectly incapable of imparting their 
 reasons to any one else. They cannot so much as 
 give clear directions for finding a given street and 
 number, without resorting to diagrams or gestures 
 to atone for inadequate statement. Clever people 
 make up for deficiency in this respect by various 
 devices, — by wit and humor, it may be, pr perhaps 
 by bluster and bravado; in such ways they may 
 make a good impression, but without the ability to 
 express processes of reasoning they cannot produce 
 permanent results. The good debater, then, must 
 be able both to find reasons and to give them. 
 
 When we look a little more closely at the work 
 of the debater, we see that it consists in something 
 Oonwjtdon more than the expression of a train of 
 
 and Persua- . ^ 
 
 sion. reasoning, or even the ability to make 
 
 others admit that one's reasoning is correct. One 
 may wish to induce his hearers not only to agree 
 
N/lfURE OF DEBATE, 5 
 
 to his doctrine but to act upon it; and experience 
 shows that action does not by any means always 
 follow conviction. But further, even when no 
 action is desired, it is not enough merely to force 
 admissions; for, as the familiar saying has it, one 
 who is convinced against his will is (fundamentally) 
 " of the same opinion still." From these consid- 
 erations it has become common to say that the two 
 great divisions of argument are Conviction and 
 Persuasion. The first has to do with the ability to 
 show that one's reasoning is right; the second with 
 tlie power to dispose one's hearers to accept the 
 reasoning as their own, and — if need be — to act 
 u^n it. It may be that this conquest of the dispo- 
 sition will come after the conquest of the intellect, 
 ov it may be that it must come first in order to make 
 the conquest of an obstinate intellect possible. 
 
 Let us. take an example. A citizen of a western 
 State, we will suppose, who has been educated to 
 believe in a silver basis for our national ^he Power 
 finance, goes to hear a speaker defend the of Persua- 
 gold standard. The arguments advanced 
 are so powerful, standing by themselves at least, 
 that it is impossible for the listener to avoid the 
 conviction that his position has been overthrown. 
 This, however, is not enough. If the speaker treats 
 the advocates of silver with such scorn that the 
 man in the audience feels himself personally ill- 
 treated, or if the interests of the class or section 
 
6 THE ART OF DEBATE, 
 
 which he represents are entirely neglected in the 
 argument, our hearer will go away with much the 
 same feeling that he would have if he had been 
 knocked down by a stronger man in a controversy. 
 He will feel incapable, perhaps, of self-defense, but 
 will still be utterly without sympathy for the posi- 
 tion of his opponent. If, on the other hand, the 
 speaker should exhibit such sympathy with his 
 opponents as to create the impression that all 
 classes of citizens are equally his friends, and if he 
 should show a conciliating appreciation of the way 
 in which the advocates of a silver standard come to 
 take the position that they do, his hearer might not 
 only be forced to admit himself in the wrong, but: 
 actually be well disposed to submit himself to th>« 
 guidance of the other's mind. It should never bn 
 forgotten that such weapons as scorn and sarcasm, 
 while they may relieve the feelings of one who 
 knows himself beaten, or serve to entertain the 
 friends of one who is certain of victory, cannot be 
 safely used against those whom one wishes to win 
 over to his own side. 
 
 These two elements, then, the power of reaching 
 the reason, and the power of winning the disposi- 
 Dangerof tiou and moviug the will, belong side by 
 wPwsul^ side in all successful debate. It is not 
 sion alone, that ouc part of a speech is to be given up 
 to the one, and another part to the other; but that 
 the whole, both in matter and manner, is to be 
 
NATURE OF DEBATE. > 7 
 
 made to serve the ends of each. With either neg- 
 lected the full effect cannot be secured. What has 
 already been said has perhaps indicated sufificiently 
 the danger of mere conviction without persuasion. 
 The opposite fault is even more serious. Many de- 
 baters who feel forcibly the necessity of winning 
 the sympathy of their audience, depend too en- 
 tirely — especially if they are gifted in promoting 
 good-nature or arousing passion — upon this side of 
 their work. Debate that is purely persuasive will 
 leave results uncertain, temporary, and unjust: 
 uncertain, because emotions are of themselves 
 much more variable than the processes of reason; 
 temporary, because when the emotion aroused by 
 eloquence has passed away, if there be no deposit 
 of rational conviction, no reliance can be placed 
 upon the future attitude of those addressed; and 
 unjust, because a gifted speaker can make appeals 
 both alluring and deluding, on behalf of the most 
 unrighteous cause, and lead the careless hearer, 
 who fails to perceive the absence of real argument, 
 into humiliatingly untenable positions. The temp- 
 tation to substitute the mere auxiliaries of debate 
 for its solid matter — the great temptation of the 
 campaign orator and the demagogue of every 
 class — will be carefully shunned by the keen and 
 honest thinker. In the case of popular audiences 
 it may win temporary success; but before trained 
 hearers, such as judges in courts of law or any 
 
B THE ART OF DEBATE, 
 
 highly intelligent bodies, it is perilous from iirst to 
 last. Individuals differ greatly among themselves 
 as to the element of debate on which they are likely 
 to lay most stress. One v^ill be disposed to pursue j 
 the rigid 'essentials of a discussion, v^ithout appre- ' 
 ciating the chance of making it attractive. Another 
 will seize upon the elements susceptible of emo- 
 tional or rhetorical treatment, and slight the essen-- 
 tials. Each should guard against his particular ^ 
 temptation, and strive after a finished whole. 
 
 It must be evident from all this why we speak of 
 the art, not the science, of debate. It is true that 
 o . , reasoninsr must proceed on scientifically 
 
 Science and ox- j 
 
 ArtDis- accurate lines, and that there is a science 
 ngnis e . (^gg^ling with the laws of its procedure, 
 called Logic. But to state and classify these laws 
 is an after-thought. Logic looks back over the 
 paths which every one's mind has trod, and de- 
 scribes them, not so much to furnish guides for 
 future travelers as from scientific curiosity. Its 
 processes must be rigidly followed, but they can 
 usually be assumed to be familiar, without regard 
 to knowledge of their Latin names. The mediaeval 
 theologians and philosophers believed that they 
 could demonstrate all truth by the processes of for- 
 mal logic, but their works are read to-day only for 
 historical reasons. Their formal processes have 
 never proved practically fruitful. In every age men 
 are obliged to attack freshly the doubtful matters 
 
NATURE OF DEBATE. 9 
 
 that arise before their minds, and to reason them 
 out according to the circumstances in which they 
 find themselves. In every age those v^ho would 
 change and direct the opinions of others have to 
 go about it from the human point of view; that is to 
 say, they have to apply the universal processes of 
 reasoning to the particular people with whom they 
 have to deal, and adapt them to constantly chang- 
 ing conditions. So it is that debate is an art, and 
 cannot be mastered by the aid of mere rules, but 
 admits of almost infinite variation and develop- 
 ment. In this respect it is like music and poetry 
 and painting; but on the other hand, just as any ot 
 these can be studied and analyzed and practiced, so 
 in debate it will not be useless to take up the sub- 
 ject in a systematic way. 
 
 These, then, are the problems we have to con- 
 sider: — the use of the universal laws of reasoning, 
 the development of the habit of analysis and of un- 
 prejudiced methods of investigation, the secret of 
 clear and rapid expression of intellectual processes, 
 and the art of adapting one's material to his hearers 
 so as to win their favor and affect their conduct. 
 Clearly the art that involves all this is of no mean 
 order. It goes further than those which reach only 
 the intellect or the emotions, and aims to move the 
 will. Its masters have the power that makes leaders 
 of men. 
 
II. 
 
 SUBJECTS OF DEBATE. 
 
 Debate differs from other forms of discourse in 
 
 presupposing two sides for the subject discussed, 
 
 both of them capable of fair presentation. 
 
 Propositions ^ . . . - 
 
 as Subjects It has an antagonist constantly m mmd. 
 for Debate. ^^^ subjcct fof debate, then, must be 
 such that it can be reduced to the form of a propo- 
 sition; for a proposition is the only form of words 
 which has two distinct sides, an affirmative and a 
 negative. All matters which men discuss argu- 
 mentatively, whether in courts of law, deliberative 
 bodies, or private life, can in fact be reduced to 
 such a proposition; and to so reduce them often 
 clears the ground of discussion very serviceably. 
 The principal verb of the proposition will state the 
 affirmative; if a negative word is added, it will state 
 the negative. If the question is one of pure fact, 
 the verb will commonly be the verb to^^_be; if it is 
 one of theory or policy, the verb will frequently be 
 ought or some similar auxiliary. It is clear that if 
 there is to be rational debate on the proposition, 
 it must state something sufficiently distinct and 
 reasonable to be capable of fair presentation, 
 whether it be read affirmatively or reversed so as to 
 
 10 
 
SUBJECTS OF DEBATE. II 
 
 State the matter negatively. This is of course a 
 very different thing from saying that both sides 
 must be capable of positive proof. 
 
 Much debate is carried on, even in matters of 
 public importance, with no form of words in mind 
 as a proposition, to which disputants are rigidly 
 held. Yet where accuracy is demanded, or where 
 a decision of any sort is to be rendered for one 
 side or the other, such a form of words is almost 
 necessary. So in courts of law we find indictments, 
 motions, pleas, and the like, the wording of which 
 is scrutinized with the utmost care, and to the 
 exact discussion of which the disputants are re- 
 stricted. In like manner we have motions, bills, 
 and resolutions in deliberative bodies, which are 
 intended to represent accurately the real question 
 to be discussed. In all these cases the quality of 
 debate is at its best, it need hardly be observed, 
 when the form of words discussed represents most 
 perfectly the real question at issue. 
 
 In real life questions at issue arise from circum- 
 stances usually beyond the control of the dis- 
 putants, and the only problem is to state 
 them and analyze them as clearly as may ^g^^^^oiJ'e^. 
 be. But where debate is engaged in for 
 practice, as in literary organizations, intercollegiate 
 contests, and the like, the subjects debated are 
 chosen, broadly speaking, by those who are to dis- 
 cuss them. With such cases in mind, a few sugges- 
 
It THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 y.. 4 
 
 tions may be made regarding debatable subjects. 
 Let us put these in the form of warnings against 
 certain sorts of topics which are to be avoided for 
 formal debate. 
 
 1. Obvious propositions. As a matter of practice 
 it may sometimes be instructive to demonstrate a 
 generally accepted truth, as in the case of a geo- 
 metrical theorem. But it is clear that an intelli- 
 gent debate cannot be held on the question, ''Re- 
 solved, That the sum of the three angles of a triangle 
 is always equal to two right angles." Neither can 
 one debate successfully the statement that tem- 
 perance is a useful virtue, or that the cruelties of 
 the Turks are reprehensible, or that Shakespere 
 was a great poet. Yet it is not uncommon to hear 
 debates on propositions whose obviousness is con- 
 cealed only by verbal ingenuity. It is not incon- 
 sistent with this to say that an obvious truth may 
 be the foundation for the argument on one side or 
 another of a disputed matter, so that it may be nec- 
 essary to give some time to its exposition at the 
 outset. But this is only preliminary to the argu- 
 ment proper. 
 
 2. Propositions the truth of which depends wholly 
 on the meaning of some ambiguous word or zvords. In 
 such cases the meaning of the word may be a legit- 
 imate subject for discussion, but the proposition 
 involving the word cannot really be debated until 
 the doubtful meaning has been settled; and the 
 
SUBJECTS OF DEBATE. X3 
 
 proposition will then have been shown to be true 
 or false by the very act of definition. There is 
 nothing more unprofitable than a debate in which 
 much time is spent in wrangling over the inter- 
 pretation of some ambiguous term. Thus the ques- 
 tion, ^^ Resolved, That the Monroe Doctrine should 
 receive the support of every American," would de- 
 pend wholly on the interpretation of the phrase 
 " Monroe Doctrine," upon which there is by no 
 means general agreement. In a debate the two 
 sides would be likely to disagree utterly in their ex- 
 pHDsition of the question; while they might find 
 themselves without cause for dispute if they could 
 agree on a definition. The question, "Resolved, 
 That Mr. Cleveland's interpretation of the Monroe 
 Doctrine in the Venezuelan boundary question 
 should receive the support of every American," 
 would be more easily handled. 
 
 3. Propositions the truth or error of which is prac- 
 tically incapable of demonstration. By this it is not 
 meant to include questions dealing with matters 
 where evidence is difficult to obtain and final proof 
 usually admitted to be only approximate, such, for 
 example, as the question of the immortality of the 
 soul. Such matters need to be discussed with great 
 caution, their limitations being frankly admitted, 
 but there is no reason why they may not be well 
 argued on both sides. On the other hand, ques- 
 tions whose wording is such as to give neither side 
 
X4 THE ART OF DEBATE, 
 
 reasonable hope of refuting the position of the 
 other, are unsuitable for debate. / An example is 
 the old question, ''Resolved, That the pulpit affords 
 more opportunity for eloquence than the bar." 
 The natural course of events in a debate on such a 
 proposition would be for the afBrmative to heap 
 up examples of ecclesiastical eloquence, and the 
 negative to rejoin with accounts of forensic oratory. 
 Each side might also adduce certain disadvantages 
 in the opposing profession; but there could be no 
 adequate proof or adequate refutation. The prop- 
 osition makes a comparison, but no standard of 
 comparison could be found by which to make any 
 definite demonstration; and the only consolation 
 for the audience would be that the question is one 
 of no real moment to any human being. In like 
 manner, vague questions of taste, such as the com- 
 parative value of the work of certain poets, and the 
 like, while they may be interesting topics for gen- 
 eral discussion, are unsuited to formal debate. 
 
 4. Propositions involving more than one main 
 issue. Such questions cannot always be avoided in 
 real life, but when one has a choice of subjects they 
 are to be shunned. The difficulty is sufficiently 
 obvious. They need to be treated as motions are 
 frequently treated in deliberative bodies, — ^that is, 
 divided on the demand of some member who per- 
 ceives the difficulty of debating more than one 
 thing at a time. A proposition for debate, then. 
 
SUBJECTS OF DEBATE, i5 
 
 should not be a compound sentence, nor a complex 
 sentence whose subordinate clause contains any- 
 thing not necessary for the explanation of the prin- 
 cipal clause. An example of the first sort of error 
 would be: ''Resolved, That the United States should 
 annex Cuba and establish therein a colonial form 
 of government." Of the second sort: ''Resolved, 
 That the supporters of the Populist party have sub- 
 stantial grievances which their movement is likely 
 to relieve." Questions of this kind are not impos- 
 sible for debate, but they become dangerously con- 
 fusing, especially when it is desired to win a deci- 
 sion on the merits of the argument. A question 
 may even be, on its face, a simple statement, and 
 yet involve more than can well be treated in one 
 discussion; nay, it may include matters incon- 
 sistent with one another from the point of view of 
 argument. An interesting example of this occurred 
 in 1895, when two college societies agreed to hold 
 a joint debate on the question: "Resolved, That the 
 foreign policy of President Cleveland should be ap- 
 proved." The debaters chosen felt some diffi- 
 culty, from the first, owing to the fact that a for- 
 eign policy Is not a single, concrete affair, but must 
 be judged from a number of isolated acts. In this 
 case there were involved the matter of our rela- 
 tions with the provisional government of Hawaii, 
 the Behring Sea difficulties, the non-recognition of 
 the Cuban republic, the dispute between Great 
 
l6 THE ART OF DEBATE, 
 
 Britain and Nicaragua, and the attitude of our g-ov- 
 ernment toward the disorders in Turkey. If all of 
 these things could be unified by showing them to 
 be consistent elements of a single line of con- 
 duct, the question might be intelligently discussed 
 in a single debate. It seemed that most of them 
 could be so unified. In most, if not all, of these 
 cases, the attitude of the administration had been 
 essentially conservative, avoiding all interference 
 or international entanglements. The affirmative 
 therefore made preparations to defend such conser- 
 vatism, and the negative to demand a more vigor- 
 ous and aggressive policy. Even then the ques- 
 tion was a large one. But a few weeks before the 
 debate .was to take place. President Cleveland is- 
 sued his Venezuelan message, and confusion was 
 worse confounded. This was an act hard to recon- 
 cile with the generally conservative administration 
 of our foreign relations, and if the debaters were 
 to pursue their original plans they must either 
 ignore this event which had aroused universal in- 
 terest, or must pass lightly over the previous acts 
 of the administration. The dilemma was so serious 
 that the debate was abandoned altogether. It is 
 clear, then, that if it is necessary to debate a propo- 
 sition involving more than one essential issue, it 
 must first be determined whether the different mat- 
 ters involved are capable of being grouped under 
 one general principle; and, if they are not, it must 
 
SUBJECTS OF DEBATE, 17 
 
 be determined which is to have precedence in de- 
 ciding the issue. 
 
 5. Propositions devoid of interest to the audience 
 addressed. Ta warn against such themes may seem 
 superfluous, but experience shows that the warn- 
 ing is not needless. The root of the difficulty is in 
 thinking of debate as an ingenious exercise rather 
 than a practical means to an end. Any trace of the 
 former feeling will result in formality and arti- 
 ficiality, the great enemies of good speaking. No 
 question is fitted for public discussion which is 
 merely theoretical. The proposition should have 
 arisen in reality, and the debaters should be able to 
 make clear how it arose and why it should claim at- 
 tention. Not long ago two societies held a joint 
 debate on the question, ^^ Resolved, That Ambition 
 is productive of more good than evil." The 
 speakers were eloquent and ingenious, but there 
 hung a dead weight on the whole proceeding from 
 the fact that no one in the world was seriously dis- 
 cussing such a problem, or would care how it might 
 be decided. Observe, too, that the question vio- 
 lated two of our previous rules. Its solution de- 
 pended absolutely on the meaning of the vague 
 word " ambition," and it was incapable of demon- 
 stration for lack of any practical measure of com- 
 parison. Both sides fired harmless shots past their 
 enemy's lines, and made little effort to hit each 
 other. 
 
i8 THE ART OF DEBATE, 
 
 Subjects for debate, then, wjren they are matter 
 fliiti f ^^^ choice, should be single, unambigu- 
 goodSub- ous propositions, capable of approximate 
 ^*^*'' proof or disproof, and of some genuine in- 
 
 terest to those concerned. 
 
 Let us now briefly consider the wording of the 
 proposition, when its general nature has already 
 The Word- ^^^^ determined. A few suggestions 
 ingofthe may be added to those implied in what 
 roposi ion. ^^^ already been said. The subject for de- 
 bate should usually be stated affirmatively, except 
 in a case where the negative bears the burden of 
 proof, — 'that is, where the negative has, on the face 
 of it, the duty of presenting proof before the affir- 
 Affirmative i^^tive is bound to reply. Reasonable 
 Form. economy of time demands that the first 
 
 speaker should not be obliged to defend what is 
 assumed to be true until proved otherwise. For 
 this reason the resolution discussed a moment ago 
 might better have been worded: ''Resolved, That 
 Mr. Cleveland's foreign policy should be con- 
 demned." It was embarrassing for the affirmative 
 to defend that which had not yet been attacked. 
 A college debate on the question, "Resolved, That 
 it is inexpedient for the United States to enter into 
 a treaty of alliance with Great Britain," was a fail- 
 ure because neither side — owing to the negative 
 wording of the proposition — felt obliged to open 
 up the question and propose some particular sort of 
 
SUBJECTS OF DEBATE. 19 
 
 treaty for adoption. On the other hand, a success- 
 ful intercollegiate debate was held on the question: 
 ''Resolved, That the interests of the United States 
 are opposed to the permanent control of any por- 
 tion of the Eastern Hemisphere." Although the 
 proposition seemed to be phrased negatively, yet 
 the affirmative had something, definite to prove, 
 and accepted the responsibility. It was not simply 
 the negative of the statement, " Interests favor per- 
 manent control; " it was a declaration of a policy. 
 Propositions, then, should be so stated that definite 
 progress will have been made at the end of the first 
 speech. 
 
 Beyond this, the most important rule for -the 
 wording of the question is that it shall be as brief 
 as exactness will permit. There is always Bre^ty and 
 a struggle between the requirement that Exactness, 
 everything essential shall be included, and the re- 
 quirement that the phrasing shall not be so over- 
 loaded as to fail of conveying a distinct idea at a 
 single stroke. It is surprising what difificulty is fre- 
 quently found in expressing what seems to be a 
 perfectly clear idea. The chief danger is that, all 
 unexpectedly to those who state the question, the 
 main emphasis of the discussion may fall upon what 
 was intended to be no part of the subject, or at 
 most a minor one. Every one has heard debates 
 that have taken this unforeseen and embarrassing 
 turn. Sometimes much time is wasted in quibbling 
 
20 THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 over the meaning of an important word in the 
 proposition. Whenever it is possible to do so, de- 
 baters on both sides should come to a preliminary 
 agreement as to the real meaning of the question; 
 for, while different interpretations may give rise to 
 ingenious fencing, they will only hinder genuine 
 argument. Reasonable persons do not debate 
 words, but ideas. When a debate is to be held for 
 purposes of practice, or whenever it is possible to 
 limit the terms of the question under discussion, it 
 is well to exclude side issues from consideration, 
 and fix the argument upon what seems the central 
 issue. Thus, when an intercollegiate debate was to 
 be held on the question of the annexation of Ha- 
 waii, it was feared that the discussion might be 
 made scattering by the introduction of such mat- 
 ters as the benevolent attitude of our people toward 
 the Hawaiians, or the difficulty of ascertaining the 
 real wishes of the Hawaiians on the subject. These 
 matters were therefore ruled out by the addition of 
 certain words to the proposition, so that it read, 
 not, " The United States should annex the Ha- 
 waiian Islands," but, " It would be for the best in- 
 terests of the United States to annex the Hawaiian 
 Islands, granted the free consent of their inhabit- 
 ants." Obviously the question before the people 
 of the country was the original and wider one, and 
 could not be limited in any such way; but for a 
 brief and formal debate it was wise to limit discus- 
 
SUBJECTS OF DEBATE, 21 
 
 »ion to the most important phase. In such cases 
 the wording of the proposition should make clear 
 whether the question is one of fact or of policy; if 
 of policy, whether abstract grounds of justice or 
 grounds of expediency are chiefly to be considered; 
 and if expediency, whose interests are to have pre- 
 cedence. Otherwise the debaters on respective 
 sides may argue what are really different proposi- 
 tions. 
 
 The last rule to be laid down relative to the 
 wording of the proposition is that all " begging of 
 the question " is to be avoided. In its ^ , 
 
 ^ ^ Fairness 
 
 narrowest sense this means that no word andimpar- 
 must be admitted into the proposition * ^' 
 which of itself constitutes an argument for or 
 against the proposition. Such a question would 
 be: *^ Resolved, That the inhuman treatment of the 
 Armenians by Turkey is reprehensible." Here the 
 word " inhuman " renders all argument superflu- 
 ous. In a wider sense the rule means that every- 
 thing should be avoided in the statement of the 
 question which indicates the attitude of the per- 
 son stating it, by throwing the slightest commen- 
 dation or slur upon either side. The necessity for 
 this rule is perfectly obvious in a formal debate: 
 no question can be tolerated which gives either side 
 an evident advantage. But it should also be ob- 
 served in arguments where any speaker has the 
 right to state the question for himself. If he 
 
22 THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 wishes to be fair he should assume that there is a 
 real question of difference to be considered, and 
 that it will be to the advantage of every one to have 
 that difference stated in terms acceptable to both 
 sides. If, in his statement of it, he betrays either 
 enthusiasm or contempt, he will be suspected of 
 inabihty to do it full justice. Appearance of preju- 
 dice always discounts argument. 
 
 Briefly to summarize the foregoing suggestions: 
 propositions for debate should be worded so that 
 the affirmative will be under the first responsibility 
 of proof, should be as brief as may be consistent 
 with exactness, should make the issues involved as 
 distinct as possible, and should avoid every appear- 
 ance of partiality. 
 
 All this, while not without significance for de- 
 bate of a general character, has had chief reference 
 Formal ^^ formal debates where a chosen ques- 
 Debates. tion is discusscd and a decision is ren- 
 dered on the merits of the argument. It has al- 
 ready been suggested that (with the exception 
 that the subject of debate may well be sim- 
 plified for the sake of brevity and clearness) such 
 debates will be most satisfactory when so con- 
 ducted as to approach most closely the discussions 
 of real Hfe. In all contests of this character there 
 is an artificial element — especially when a strong 
 desire for victory is involved — which is in danger 
 of detracting from their usefulness. In real life 
 
SUBJECTS OF DEBATE, 23 
 
 questions arise out of practical emergencies; they 
 cannot always be reduced to exact forms of words; 
 and they are not decided by a discussion between 
 three men on one side and three on another, in 
 which the issues are closely watched to see which 
 has the best of it. If, then, in formal debating, 
 stress is laid on those matters which are peculiar 
 to formal debating, — quibbling over the wording 
 of the question, rapid repartee, and the mere tri- 
 umph of one speech over another, — the practice 
 will be a questionable preparation for real life and 
 its contests. If, however, under these artificial con- 
 ditions, the stress is still laid on the merits of the 
 question, so presented as to convince — if possible 
 — persons really interested in its settlement, the 
 value of the practice is very great. The difference 
 may be compared to that between the gymnastics 
 which are studied under professional training for 
 purposes of exhibition, and the exercise which goes 
 to make muscle for every-day use. 
 
 In legal debate, while the conditions are not so 
 artificial as in formal debating contests, they are 
 still much more artificial than in the gen- ^ j 
 eral discussion of public affairs. The law Debate. 
 of English-speaking countries is a growth of long 
 development, and its practice is hedged in by what 
 seem at first sight to be merely traditional rules 
 and regulations. These rules had their origin in 
 attempts to serve the practical ends of justice, and 
 
24 ^THE ART OF DEBATE, 
 
 most of them are still useful to the same end; but 
 to common observers they frequently seem to offer 
 hindrances to the simple search for truth. Thus 
 many things which are good evidence for the ordi- 
 nary man as he investigates an alleged crime, are 
 ruled out absolutely from the consideration of 
 juries. Lawyers are forbidden to make statements 
 in court which the newspapers make, and by which 
 public opinion is greatly influenced. Legal '* pre- 
 sumptions," so called, are established, which de- 
 clare the age at which a person may be presumed 
 capable of crime, the length of time which he may 
 be presumed to remain alive after disappearing 
 from common knowledge, and so on, with small 
 respect for the means which private citizens use in 
 forming judgments on the same points. In courts 
 of law such grave interests are at stake that it is 
 necessary to lay down these rigid rules and apply 
 them — sometimes — even in the face of common 
 sense. This has a marked effect on legal argument. 
 A lawyer in striving to win his case will make use 
 — and, according to common opinion, will be jus- 
 tified in making use — of all possible technicalities 
 in his favor. If he can find a flaw in the indictment 
 brought against his client, he will not trouble to 
 prove him innocent. If he can overthrow the point 
 on which his opponent has based his plea to the 
 court, he will be content not to go into the real 
 issue back of it; and the court, in deciding the plea. 
 
SUBJECTS OF DEBATE. 25 
 
 will often expressly ignore what seems to the lay- 
 man the important point of the case. Such cir- 
 cumstances as these seem to be unavoidable in legal 
 procedure, where uniform rules of practice have to 
 be adopted for all possible cases, even if the inter- 
 ests of justice are thereby sometimes jeopardized. 
 But in spite of all this, those lawyers appear to be 
 most largely successful who are not given to fight- 
 ing on technicalities, but who give the impression 
 that the fundamental merits of the case are their 
 chief concern. A jury will listen with suspicion to 
 an argument which seems to shirk the real issue; 
 and even a judge, educated to weigh the very dust 
 in the balance, will give more consideration to a 
 motion made by an attorney known to be careful 
 of the interests of justice, than to one made by a 
 lover of technicalities. The great arguments of 
 great lawyers — like Mr. Carter and Mr. Choate, 
 for example, in our own time — are marked by an 
 appearance of enthusiasm for justice, of considera- 
 tion for the important issues at stake, which affect 
 not only the courts addressed, but all within hear- 
 ing. The most important elements of legal debate, 
 then, are not different from those of general de- 
 bate.* 
 
 * In support of this I am very glad to be able to cite a dis- 
 tinguished legal authority, Professor James B. Thayer, who 
 in his " Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common 
 Law " observes: 
 
 " Let it be distinctly set down, then, that the whole process^ 
 
26 THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 Legal argument is roughly divisible into three 
 
 great classes. The first class is that dealing with 
 
 the proving of facts, and is chiefly prac- 
 
 Ui&SSBS 01 •<<<• 1 ' 
 
 Legal ticed in the calling and cross-examina- 
 
 Aiguments. ^j^^ ^£ witnesses. The handling of testi- 
 mony, as well as of other sorts of evidence, is gen- 
 erally recognized as one of the most important 
 tasks of the lawyer. The second class is that deal- 
 ing with the establishment of legal principles by 
 the citation of authority. Since law is in itself so 
 much a matter of tradition and precedent, and since 
 it is desired to maintain the utmost uniformity in 
 the administration of justice, our courts give the 
 greatest possible weight to the opinions of other 
 courts having a bearing on questions brought be^ 
 fore them. This indicates the second great task of 
 the lawyer, — the finding and applying of authorita- 
 tive precedents. The third class of legal arguments 
 is harder to define; it consists in the application of 
 processes of reasoning to the facts and the authority 
 presented, so that jury or court may be convinced 
 of the inference which the lawyer wishes to draw 
 from his material. All these forms of argument 
 are familiar even to those knowing little of courts 
 and law. In criminal cases, for example, every one 
 
 of legal argumentation, and the rules for it, essential as these 
 are, and forever pressing upon the attention, are mainly an 
 affair of logic and general experience, not of legal precept." 
 (p. 271.) 
 
SUBJECTS OF DEBATE. 27 
 
 knows that the chief matter is commonly the prov- 
 ing of facts by evidence. In cases brought before 
 higher courts on appeal, it is not usually disputed 
 facts, but questions of legal principle, which are 
 discussed; the only witnesses cited, therefore, are 
 the records of other courts and the mental proc- 
 esses of the judges. 
 
 When we turn from both formal debating con- 
 tests and legal argument to the debate of delibera- 
 tive bodies and of the people as they dis- (General 
 cuss public affairs, what sort of questions Debate. 
 do we find? The difference is almost entirely one 
 of proportion. We find people disputing questions 
 of fact, as is done in the courts; but they commonly 
 investigate these questions with less accuracy and 
 thoroughness than the courts, and they use all pos- 
 isible sorts of evidence, — hearsay, newspaper re- 
 ports, and the opinions of their friends, — in ascer- 
 taining the facts. The matters of precedent and 
 authority, which we found looming so large in the 
 courts, take small space in the public mind. The 
 opinions of private citizens, and of deliberative 
 bodies for that matter, are little bound by prece- 
 dent; and the private citizen is likely to think 
 that no authority on earth can greatly affect him 
 in a matter of opinion. Nevertheless, the argu- 
 ment from authority, as we shall see hereafter, has 
 ^ place in ordinary debate. And of course the 
 sort of argunient that is based on processes of rea- 
 
2B THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 soning is found in all debate. In deliberative bodies 
 men debate questions of parliamentary law, argu- 
 ment on which closely resembles, in its general na- 
 ture, the discussions of courts on constitutional law. 
 Debate on all manner of public questions, — the 
 tariff, finance, foreign policy, and the like, — in- 
 volves delicate reasoning on cause and effect, 
 human nature and natural law, as well as on prin- 
 ciples of abstract justice. It is questions requir- 
 ing action, and dependent upon disputed points 
 either of moral principle or of self-interest, that 
 assume in general argument a place altogether out 
 of proportion to that which they occupy in legal 
 debate. These questions of policy or expediency 
 may be said to take the place, with the people at 
 large, of the legal arguments based on authority. 
 The public debater in a moral community appeals 
 to the conscience of his hearers as the highest au- 
 thority. He also appeals to their self-interest, as 
 a matter having great weight, though not to be 
 so loudly spoken of. If the two are agreed, and he 
 can say, '' First, this is right; and secondly, it is to 
 your advantage," he has a very strong case. But 
 neither the one argument nor the other would be 
 safe in a court of law. Thus a Mormon might argue 
 in favor of polygamy on the ground that it is theo- 
 retically justifiable, and that it would be beneficial 
 to the community. If he were on trial in a court 
 neither argument would be admissible; however 
 
SUBJECTS OF DEBATE. 29 
 
 much the judge might agree with them, he must 
 say, " To the law and the testimony." Before a 
 popular audience, however, the Mormon might 
 present his case from the side of abstract justice, he 
 might give facts drawn from polygamous com- 
 munities, and he might argue from those facts that 
 polygamy is beneficial to society; if the audi- 
 ence were of his own people, he might also cite the 
 authority of religious books. So through all sorts 
 of questions these different types of argument ap- 
 pear. 
 
 A final difference between legal argument and 
 that of a more general character, which has already 
 been sucfeested by the mention of ques- 
 
 . ,. . \ , , ,. , , Debate look- 
 
 tions of policy, is that the public debater ing toward 
 discusses questions which appeal to the ^^^^°"' 
 will. A judge or jury has only to decide the ab- 
 stract merits of the case presented, and to record 
 the decision; no further action is expected on the 
 part of either, and the rendering of the decision 
 does not usually affect the interests of either. But 
 when one seeks to move his hearers to vote for a 
 pending bill or resolution, to support a certain can- 
 didate, to pursue a particular line of conduct in 
 business, or to give money to a favorite cause, his 
 arguments must strike at deeper springs than those 
 of pure reason. Such questions demand the best 
 powers of the orator, — powers which may be 
 
30 THE ART OF DEBATE, 
 
 almost out of place in a court-room, but which will 
 shake the will of the crowd. 
 
 It has been impossible to classify debatable 
 questions in any thoroughly systematic way. What- 
 ever classification one chooses, one group will in- 
 determinately melt into another. But it is hoped 
 that this examination of some of the elements of 
 legal as contrasted with general argument, may 
 serve to make clear the points of likeness and of 
 difference in all forms of debate. It may have 
 shown why one must adapt himself to the particu- 
 lar question under discussion, as well as to the par- 
 ticular audience addressed, and why some debaters 
 will always be at their best on certain topics, and 
 others successful along different lines. The prob- 
 lem, however, is always the same at bottom: given 
 a real difference of opinion, caused either by dif- 
 ferent beliefs as to the facts, or by different infer- 
 ences from the facts, to produce agreement of 
 opinion by making your hearer believe the facts 
 that you believe, and draw the same inferences from 
 them. 
 
III. 
 
 PRELIMINARY WORK. 
 
 Thus far we have reached the point where the 
 subject for debate has been stated as accurately as 
 possible. We turn now to look at it from the op- 
 posite direction, and ask such questions as: Just 
 what does the proposition maintain ? and Just 
 what lines of proof are necessary to its demonstra- 
 tion? 
 
 The importance of this preliminary analysis of 
 the question cannot be emphasized too strongly. It 
 would not be too much to say that if one 
 has but an hour to spend in preparation J^l^^jyX 
 for debate, half of it should be spent in 
 considering just what the question means and what 
 are the essential points to be proved. Much of the 
 difference between poor debaters and those who are 
 successful is found just here. Too often one can 
 see that a speaker has seized thoughtlessly upon 
 one or two points connected with the question, 
 either because he has been most familiar with them 
 or because they afiford best opportunity for elo- 
 quence; while his opponent may be able to show 
 that, however true all that the first speaker has said, 
 it is not of first-rate importance for the purpose in 
 
 31 
 
3* THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 hand. No hearer will listen with patience when it 
 appears that the speaker has not grasped the essen- 
 tials of his question. And it is not uncommon, 
 when the facts in the case are undisputed, to find a 
 debate resting largely upon the ability of one side 
 or the other to analyze it keenly. 
 
 The first element, then, is to make clear the pre- 
 cise meaning of the question. This, as was sug- 
 Definingthe gested in the preceding chapter, may go 
 Queation. very far toward clearing up the argument. 
 It was there said that no subject should be debated, 
 when it can well be avoided, whose significance 
 depends largely upon the meaning of certain am- 
 biguous words. It may happen, however, that one 
 side will find it necessary to show at some length 
 that the fallacy of the opposition rests on some false 
 definition. This might be the case, for example, 
 where such phrases as " republican form of govern- 
 ment," " Monroe Doctrine," " personal liberty," 
 and the like, were involved. One would then have 
 to turn his introductory line of argument into an 
 exposition of the doubtful phrase. 
 
 With reference to debates where particular words 
 or phrases play an important part in the statement 
 of the question, a word of caution must be spoken 
 as to the use of dictionary definitions. Without 
 disrespect to dictionaries, it may be said that they 
 seldom furnish definitions likely to be serviceable 
 for argumentative purposes. Dictionaries admit 
 
PRELIMINARY IVORK. 33 
 
 all meanings of words which are sanctioned by any 
 reputable usage, — many of them quite divergent 
 in character. In other words, the dictionary can- 
 not answer what is usually the important question: 
 Which, of two or more possible meanings, is the 
 reasonable one for present purposes? It is of no 
 use, then, for a speaker to flourish a dictionary, 
 exulting because it gives the definition he desires 
 to use; his opponent can doubtless do the same. 
 
 If, then, we are not to seek definite authority for 
 our interpretation of the question, how shall it 
 be determined? Generally in the sources. Conditions of 
 surroundings, and present conditions of tion. ^*"' 
 the subject discussed. The interpretation must 
 above all be reasonable if it is to be a basis of argu- 
 ment. It must seem to the persons addressed to 
 be a fair statement of what the question means to 
 them. It must exhibit no appearance of having 
 been laboriously searched for in order to conform 
 to the point that the speaker wishes to prove. 
 The etymology or history of any word involved 
 in the question is a minor matter; the pres- 
 ent meaning of the word is the important thing. 
 All really debatable questions arise, as has 
 been said, from real differences of opinion. It is 
 these real differences, and not questions of phras- 
 ing, which should be discussed. A recent inter- 
 collegiate debate was lost because the side defeated 
 declined to accept the meaning of the question as 
 
34 THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 interpreted by their opponents, and spent practi- 
 cally their whole time in defending a different one. 
 Similarly, when the question of an arbitration 
 treaty between the United States and Great Britain 
 was being discussed, much time was consumed in 
 theoretical interpretations of the words " per- 
 manent court of arbitration," although it was one 
 particular plan that was before the people of the 
 country for consideration. All this does not ignore 
 the fact that in discussions where particular forms 
 of words are involved, as in set debates and in 
 legal controversies dependent on the interpretation 
 of certain documents, it is an essential duty of the 
 debater to interpret the form of words and be ready 
 to defend his interpretation if it be questioned. 
 The point is simply that a form of words should 
 never be allowed to obscure the real question, and 
 that definitions should have reference not to theo- 
 retical meanings, but to the meaning of the words 
 under the circumstances. Words are to be the 
 servants of the debate, not the debate a slave to 
 words. 
 
 When the meaning of the question has been deter- 
 mined, the next step is to inquire what is the essen- 
 Hwpowing tial thing to be proved. Very few propo- 
 th^QuMtion. gitions are so simple that they can be 
 proved by applying the evidence directly to the 
 whole question, without the use of intermediate 
 steps; and very few are so clearly understood that 
 
PRELIMINARY WORK. ^5 
 
 popular talk about them does not include number- 
 less matters not essential to their proof. There will 
 usually be one point, or at most two or three, which 
 analysis will show to be of supreme importance. 
 Such a point may be called the main issue. The 
 main issue is that which it is chiefly necessary to 
 prove, in order to prove the whole proposition. It 
 is found by discarding all minor matters connected 
 with the question, and fixing the attention upon 
 that which properly forms the central portion of 
 the argument. 
 
 Some examples will make this more clear. Take 
 the question : " Resolved, That three- fourths of a 
 jury should be competent to render a verdict in 
 all criminal cases." It will appear on analysis that 
 both sides admit that absolute justice AMiyrisof 
 cannot be expected in jury trials; the aim, JuryOTieB- 
 therefore, is to secure the most perfect 
 justice consistent with a uniform system. There 
 arc two sorts of interests involved: the interest of 
 every accused person, that he shall suffer the least 
 possible chance of conviction if innocent, and the 
 interest of the people as a whole, that accused per- 
 sons shall have the least chance of escape when 
 guilty. The existing law seems to express largely 
 the first sort of interest, which has always received 
 great stress among Anglo-Saxon races. The main 
 issue may then be said to be: Will the proposed 
 change increase the chances that public justice will 
 
36 THE ART OF DEBATE, 
 
 be done, witliout disproportionately lessening the 
 chances that innocent individuals will escape un- 
 just conviction? 
 
 A similar sort of analysis, in a different kind of 
 
 question, occurs in Macaulay's speech on the pro- 
 
 posed Copyright law of 1841. Macaulay 
 
 Copyright showed that a copyright law of any kind 
 
 QneBtion. -^ ^ ^^^ ^^ ^^^ public in the interest of 
 
 authors. Since, however, the interests of authors 
 are those of literature, the public should be willing 
 to pay the tax. The main issue, then, in the pend- 
 ing discussion was this: Would the proposed exten- 
 sion of the copyright period result in advantages 
 to authors sufficiently great to compensate for the 
 disadvantages to readers? Macaulay showed that 
 the disadvantages to readers would be greatly in- 
 creased, while the advantages to authors would be 
 but little greater than under the existing law. 
 
 Many questions depend for their analysis upon 
 proposed remedies for admitted evils. Thus the 
 proposition to establish the free coinage of silver 
 . , ^ , in the United States is larg^ely based on 
 
 Analyslfl of . . . . 
 
 Silver QnoB- certam inconveniences which certain por- 
 °"' tions of the people are said to feel as 
 
 grievances. There is a sense in which these incon- 
 veniences are admitted on all sides. While the 
 question could be analyzed from a number of dif- 
 ferent points of view, perhaps the main issue might 
 best be stated as a double one, after this fashion: 
 
PRELIMINARY IVORK. 37 
 
 Would the free coinage of silver relieve (i) the 
 government of the United States, and (2) the 
 people at large, from present financial incon- 
 veniences? Another method of analysis might be 
 drawn from the position of those opposing the 
 proposition. It is claimed that the proposed policy 
 would result in disaster to the business interests 
 of the country, because gold would be driven out 
 to such an extent as to interfere with its use in in- 
 ternational exchange, while the monetary value of 
 silver would tend to fall to its commercial ratio of 
 something like 32 to i. The main issue, then, 
 might again be stated as a double one: Would the 
 estabhshment of free coinage result in (i) the ex- 
 portation of gold to a degree that would interfere 
 with its use in international trade, and (2) in the 
 fall of the exchange value of coined silver to a 
 ratio of 32 to i? This is a subject whose compli- 
 cations make it peculiarly difficult to analyze satis- 
 factorily. One may hear a dozen speeches devoted 
 to it, in political campaigns, and be unable to re- 
 duce the various arguments to any clear system. 
 It is safe to say that most of the debates on the 
 silver question would be more satisfactory if the 
 participants held themselves rigidly to some such 
 method of analysis as has just been suggested. 
 
 Let us now take an example from the analysis of 
 a legal question. In cases depending upon ques- 
 tions of fact the process of analysis is comparatively 
 
33 THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 simple. Thus in a criminal case the main issue 
 may be simply the question of the credi- 
 Legai QueB- bility of one of the witnesses, upon whose 
 *^°"*' testimony the prosecution chiefly re- 
 
 lies. Or the main issue may be a matter of infer- 
 ence from testimony; — such a question, for ex- 
 ample, as whether the presence of the accused per- 
 son at the time and place where the crime was 
 committed warrants the belief that he was con- 
 cerned in the committing of it. In all such cases, 
 then, as in general debate, there is usually one main 
 issue upon which the decision must chiefly rest. 
 But it is in more complicated matters than ques- 
 tions of fact that such analysis is most necessary. 
 Of these the celebrated Income Tax cases of 
 1894-95 form a good example. Congress passed 
 a law levying a tax of two per cent, upon all in- 
 comes of citizens or residents of the United States 
 exceeding $4000. The question arose whether this 
 law was constitutional. The process of analysis was 
 briefly as follows. The Constitution requires that di- 
 rect taxes be apportioned among the States accord- 
 ing to population, whereas duties, imposts, and ex- 
 cises must be uniform throughout the United States. 
 Taxes on land have always been understood to be 
 direct taxes, but there has never been an adequate 
 decision as to just what other taxes might also be 
 regarded as direct. Economists usually regard any 
 tax as direct which is collected from the very per- 
 
^ • , . PRELIMINARY IVORK, S9 
 
 sons who are expected to bear the burden of it, — 
 as distinguished, for example, from duties on im- 
 ported goods, which are intended to fall not upon 
 the importers but upon buyers. The courts, on the 
 other hand, have shown a disposition to limit the 
 term " direct tax '' to capitation taxes and (as has 
 been said) taxes on land. The questions in dispute, 
 therefore, were chiefly these: First, is a tax on the 
 income of personal property direct, and so required 
 to be apportioned among the States? If so, the tax 
 of 1894 is unconstitutional. Second, since it is ad- 
 mitted that a tax on real estate is direct, is a tax on 
 the income derived from real estate, by rents or 
 otherwise, also direct, and so required to be ap- 
 portioned among the States ? If so, again, the tax 
 of 1894 is unconstitutional. Third, if any part of 
 the tax is held not to be direct, but of the nature of 
 an impost, is the exemption of incomes under 
 $4000, and of certain specified kinds of business, 
 in violation of the requirement that duties, im- 
 posts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the 
 United States? In this case also the tax of 1894 
 is unconstitutional. On these three questions the 
 complicated Income Tax cases largely rested.* 
 
 * It was that part of the tax covered by the second of the 
 three questions which was declared void by the Supreme 
 Court (in the case of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 
 157 U. S., p. 429), the Justices who heard argument in the 
 case being equally divided on the other two. For the sake 
 of simplifying the analysis I have omitted mention of that 
 
40 THE ART OF DEBATE, 
 
 One more illustration. In the winter of 1895-6 
 many debates were held on the question: ''Resolved, 
 . , . , That President Cleveland's Venezuelan 
 
 Analysis of , , , • , r i 
 
 Venezuelan message should receive the support of the 
 Question. people." The circumstances will be easily 
 recalled. A long-standing dispute between Vene- 
 zuela and Great Britain had reached a critical point, 
 at which arbitration was desired by Venezuela but 
 declined by England. President Cleveland ad- 
 dressed a message to Congress, expressing fear lest 
 Venezuela was being unjustly pressed into submis- 
 sion, and arguing that it was the duty of the United 
 States to investigate the matter, and to insist on 
 justice being done. The message aroused vigorous 
 and protracted debate. Historians and geog- 
 raphers took up the matter of the boundary-line, 
 and discussed its proper survey. Certain portions 
 of the President's message were based on argu- 
 ments drawn from the historic " Monroe Doc- 
 trine," and there was much discussion as to whether 
 that Doctrine had any proper bearing on the Vene- 
 zuelan controversy. Above all, certain expres- 
 sions in the message had suggested the possibility 
 of serious differences between the United States 
 and Great Britain, and those who looked upon a 
 war with England either with complacency or with 
 horror entered into clamorous debate over the 
 
 part of the tax levied on incomes derived from municipal 
 bonds, which was also declared void. 
 
PRELIMINARY IVORK. ' 4i 
 
 prospect. Yet for the purposes of definite argu- 
 ment all these matters were of minor importance, 
 and had even to be set aside as tending to obscure 
 the main issue. Mr. Cleveland had not attempted 
 to decide the merits of the boundary dispute, but 
 only to ask for a commission which might do so. 
 He had not based his entire message upon the 
 Monroe Doctrine, but had used it as an auxiliary 
 argument. And clearly the matter of a war with 
 England was not the main issue, for if the position 
 of the administration was right, every one would 
 agree to support it whatever might happen, 
 whereas if it was wrong it should be condemned 
 even if there were no danger of war. This was the 
 line of analysis by which minor matters might be 
 set aside. The main issue would seem to have been : 
 Is the Venezuelan controversy sufficiently connecte^l 
 ■with (i) the interests or (2) the duty of the United 
 States to warrant our government in intervening? 
 
 These illustrations have been given in such num- 
 ber and detail, because of the great importance of 
 indicating what is meant by analysis, and Eeeuitsof 
 of showing how questions of various sorts -^a^y^S' 
 can be reduced to one or two issues upon which 
 their settlement largely depends. This preliminary 
 analysis ought, of course, as far as possible, to be 
 acceptable to debaters on both sides. If both sides 
 are agreed as to what constitutes the main issue, 
 the debate will already have made substantial prog- 
 
ip^ THE j4RT of debate. 
 
 ress. It Is, however, impossible to expect the dis- 
 putants always to agree thus far. In such cases 
 the one who speaks first should present an analysis 
 which will appear just and impartial even to those 
 of the audience who are disposed to favor the op- 
 posite side; and the opponent speaking next will 
 have to begin by attacking the analysis. It will 
 never be safe to decline altogether to discuss any 
 issue raised by an opponent, as though one were 
 afraid of it; but it will be perfectly reasonable to 
 try to show that it is not an essential issue. 
 
 The work of analysis clearly presupposes a full 
 understanding of the question on both sides. The 
 study of one's opponent's case is too often 
 Both^Sides neglected. Its importance cannot be 
 stated too emphatically. It is told of a 
 great lawyer that he remarked: " If I have time 
 to study only one side of a question, I study that of 
 my adversary." He must have had in mind the fact 
 that one does not really understand his own side 
 until he knows what is to be said against it. Some 
 questions cannot even be subjected to preliminary 
 analysis until this has been accomplished. Take 
 for example this proposition: The surplus silver 
 bullion in the United States Treasury should be 
 coined and used to defray the current expenses of 
 the government. The outline of obvious direct 
 proof is simple enough: the bullion is lying' idle, 
 the receipts of the government arc falling behind 
 
PRELIMINARY ^ORK. 43 
 
 the expenditures; why not apply the supply to the 
 need? The trouble is that any one listening to such 
 a line of argument says instantly to himself: '* If 
 this bullion is not being coined in the manner pro- 
 posed, there must be some reason in the minds of 
 the authorities why it is better as it is; I can 
 therefore form no opinion on the question until I 
 know what that reason is, and what is alleged in its 
 favor. If the advocate of the change does not know 
 why it is opposed, he knows very little about his 
 subject; if he knows, and yet keeps still about it, 
 he is not honest/' So a question may be dangerous 
 from the very fact of appearing to be all on one's 
 own side; and even the opening speaker in a debate 
 cannot afford to be ignorant, or to seem to be igno- 
 rant, of the attitude of his opponent. 
 
 Analysis, then, may be said more broadly to 
 include not only the questions, Just what does the 
 proposition maintain? and. What must chiefly be 
 shown in order to prove the truth of it? but also. 
 What objections are made to it? and, How far 
 are the objections significant? One can then de- 
 termine what objections can easily be thrown aside 
 and shown to be of small importance, and which 
 ones must be set up to be disproved as thoroughly 
 as one's positive position is to be proved. If there 
 are any objections whose relation to the question 
 does not at first seem clear, there should be no rest 
 until that relation has been settled satisfactorily. 
 
44 THE ART OF DEBATE, 
 
 If there are any which cannot either be shown to 
 be unimportant or be directly disproved, something 
 is wrong with one's case. To sum up, one never 
 knows what must be proved until he knows what is 
 to be disproved. 
 
 The preliminary study of the question will in- 
 volve, in most cases, a good deal of search for 
 fathering of i^iatcrial; and something is to be said as 
 Material. to the method of such search. The 
 amount of reading necessary will of course depend 
 on the nature of the subject in hand. In any case 
 care should be taken that the reading is not made 
 a substitute for thinking. It is well to make a 
 temporary analysis of the question as it presents 
 itself to one's mind, before looking up any material 
 in books; then, as one reads, the material will ar- 
 range itself according to what seemed at first to 
 be the principal heads and sub-heads, at the same 
 time very likely suggesting an improved method 
 of analysis. It is as though one should divide a 
 box into a number of pigeon-holes, with a view to 
 assorting all his papers. As the papers were ex- 
 amined they would fall into one or another of the 
 groups for which places had been prepared, but 
 at the same time they would be likely to suggest 
 that either more or fewer pigeon-holes would give 
 a better classification; so the partitions could be 
 moved about to suit the change. In like manner 
 one's reading on any subject should fit into a pror 
 
PRELIMINARY IVORK. 45 
 
 visional scheme of analysis, while the scheme should 
 be allowed to grow and change as new ideas may 
 indicate. 
 
 In reading that is intended as a preparation for 
 debate, three classes of material will ordinarily be 
 found. The first is that of simple facts. Here are 
 included such matters as undisputed statistics, his- 
 torical statements, and scientific truths, which are 
 of such indubitable validity that no special author- 
 ity need be cited in support of them. The second 
 class includes facts not to be accepted on their face, 
 but depending for their value upon their source; — 
 such as the testimony of a traveler as to things seen 
 in a foreign land, or the decision of a judge on a 
 doubtful point of law. Here the source of the fact 
 constitutes a part of the argument itself. The 
 third class of material includes the arguments of 
 others, the worth of which has nothing to do with 
 their source. If the source of material is named 
 in this case, it will be as a matter of courtesy or 
 simple honesty, not as an element in the proof. 
 
 The distinction between these classes of material 
 is not an artificial one, but has practical bearings. 
 The three sorts of material should be very p^^^g ^^^ 
 differently used. The class of undisputed Opinions, 
 facts is the most simple; to discover them is the 
 first object of the preliminary reading, and to set 
 them forth distinctly will be the first duty of the 
 debater. They are introductory to the arguments 
 
46 THE ART OF DEBATE, 
 
 based upon them. The material of the second class 
 we shall have to consider later under the head of 
 Testimony and the argument from Authority. It 
 may be said here, however, that material of this 
 class should be selected with great care. Since its 
 value depends wholly upon its source, the value of 
 the source will determine its use. Debaters some- 
 times exhibit a ludicrous lack of appreciation of 
 the relative value of sources. If they have lighted 
 upon any quotation favoring their side of the case, 
 they will bring it with them into the debate, wave 
 it triumphantly in the face of their opponents, and 
 exclaim: " Does not the morning paper make the 
 following statement? " or, " I came across this 
 paragraph to-day, in some magazine whose name 
 I have forgotten, which is in itself a sufficient ref- 
 utation of the position of my opponents.'' One 
 cannot too carefully remember that no hearer is 
 bound to accept a quoted statement as of any more 
 value than his own opinion, unless the high char- 
 acter of the source be distinctly shown. More than 
 this, even if the character of the source be very 
 high, it is of small value in a case of mere opinion 
 on a disputed matter. If the question is really de- 
 batable it is to be presumed that wise men will be 
 found on each side; so that to quote even the Presi- 
 dent or the Chief Justice in such a case will show 
 that there is something on one's side worth con- 
 
PRELIMINARY tVORK. 47 
 
 sidering, but nothing more. Quotation-marks are 
 no sign of plenary inspiration. 
 
 The material of the third class includes actual 
 arguments on both sides of the question. Briefly 
 stated, the proper use of this material is to Arguments 
 enable the reader to set in order all the o^^*^®"- 
 opposing arguments as matter to be refuted, and 
 to make the favorable arguments his own. What 
 is it to make the argument of another one's own? 
 It is so to appreciate its value that it will take its 
 place in one's mind as a part of one's own view of 
 truth, apart from everything peculiar in the way 
 it was first expressed. It can then be re-expressed 
 in one's own fashion. There is no copyright on a 
 process of reasoning. It is only the method of ex- 
 pression that can be said to be borrowed or stolen; 
 and cases will be very rare in which it will not be 
 more effective to use an original method of expres- 
 sion, than to quote the words of another. Every 
 one who reads knows how the ideas discovered are 
 assimilated in his own mind, so that he forgets the 
 source while keeping the substance. In this way 
 the Congressional Record and the North American 
 Review may reappear in debate under a new form, 
 just as last week's meat and vegetables reappear 
 this week in bone and blood and muscle. This is 
 the fruitful method of reading for all purposes, and 
 particularly for debate. 
 
 Some system will be found necessary for the 
 
48 THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 orderly tabulation of. the material found in prelimi- 
 nary reading and study. If the question is one of 
 Tabulation Ordinary interest, the investigator will at 
 of Material, first be appalled by the amount of material 
 which will come to hand. The daily press, Poole's 
 Index, and the Congressional Record will frighten 
 him by the abundance of their stores. In all this 
 matter there will be some more authoritative and 
 more concisely stated than the rest, and this should 
 be selected as soon as possible. This being done, 
 it will very soon appear that the contents of other 
 articles will group themselves easily under heads 
 already set down, and the great body of useful 
 material will soon have been gathered in. But how 
 shall the heads be tabulated and grouped? Most 
 of us have found that it is never prudent to do 
 serious reading without a pencil at hand. The best 
 sort of note-book for such purposes as we are con- 
 sidering is simply an abundant collection of cards 
 or slips of paper, on which separate points may be 
 jotted down as they present themselves. These can 
 then be easily assorted and reduced to a small num- 
 ber of groups. Repetition will in this way be read- 
 ily discovered; the main headings of the argu- 
 ment will loom up after a little; and by judicious 
 shuffling one may be sure that he has included 
 everything he has gathered together, and has got 
 it into intelligible shape. I have seen a friend who 
 is a zealous and successful debater literally sur- 
 
PRELIMINARY fVORK. 49 
 
 rounded by piles of these little slips or cards, em- 
 bracing all the facts of the case to be debated, the 
 main lines of proof, and the possible points of the 
 opposition. It was little wonder, after this had 
 been done, that in his finished argument every 
 separate bit of material fell into its place as neatly 
 as though he had been able to think out everything 
 in the first place in its logical order. 
 
 A plan practically identical with what has just 
 been suggested is described by Professor Wendell, 
 in his " English Composition," * as a means for 
 securing the best order in any composition. 
 
 " On separate bits of paper " (he says) " I write 
 down the separate headings that occur to me, in what 
 seems to me the natural order. Then, when my little 
 pack of cards is complete, — in other words, when I 
 have a card for every heading I think of, — I study 
 them and sort them almost as deliberately as I should 
 sort a hand at whist; and it has very rarely been my 
 experience to find that a shift of arrangement will not 
 decidedly improve the original order. Ideas that really 
 stand in the relation of proof to proposition, frequently 
 present themselves as co-ordinate. The same idea will 
 sometimes phrase itself in two or three distinct ways, 
 whose superficial diflferences for the moment conceal 
 their identity; and more frequendy still, the compar- 
 ative strength and importance, and the mutual rela- 
 tions, of really distinct idjpas will in the first act of com- 
 position curiously conceal themselves from the writer. 
 
 * Page 165. 
 
50 THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 A few minutes* shuffling of these little cards has often 
 revealed to me more than I should have learned by 
 hours of unaided pondering." 
 
 Obviously all that is here said of the suggested 
 method, v^ith general composition in view, is 
 doubly applicable to preparation for debate. 
 
 The analysis of the subject and the tabulation of 
 material ought to combine to produce an outline 
 The Outline ^^ ^^^ argument which is to be made, 
 or Brief. Such an Outline really completes the con- 
 structive work of debate, up to the point where 
 such matters as illustration, persuasion, and rhetori- 
 cal form come in; and it is the almost indispensa- 
 ble prerequisite to orderly debate. There are at 
 least three reasons why a careful outline is so im- 
 portant. In the first place, no ordinary person can 
 carry in his mind a complete view of the material 
 for an argument, if he has it only in the large form 
 in which it has come to him and in which he wishes 
 to present it to others. The ground covered must 
 be viewed, as it were, in miniature, in order to be 
 understood in its structure and relations, just as 
 a thousand miles of territory cannot be understood 
 as a whole, even by one who has traveled over them, 
 without the aid of a small map which will show the 
 shape of the country at a glance. The reason why 
 so many speakers seem to go a great distance with- 
 out coming to any destination, is because they start 
 out seeing the road only from one hill to another. 
 
PRELIMINARY IVORK. 51 
 
 and have obtained no map for the entire trip. An 
 outline for a speech, then, may be said to be a map, 
 on a large scale, of the country to be covered. 
 
 Again, such an outline is important because when 
 the time comes for putting the argument into its 
 final form, whether it is to be first written or spoken 
 directly from the outline, the author should have 
 all his faculties free for the perfecting of phrase- 
 ology* — the attainment of perfect clearness, ele- 
 gance, and force. The work of construction should 
 have been completed in advance. Any one accus- 
 tomed to public speaking can rise and speak ex- 
 temporaneously, if he has had sufficient time to 
 determine the outline of what he wishes to say; 
 the fluency and force gained by experience will do 
 the rest. But without a plan in mind he will be 
 Hkely to say very little, though he may be a good 
 while in doing it. 
 
 Finally, an outline is necessary in order that the 
 structure of the argument may be made clear to the 
 audience. The speaker's mind may be so soundly 
 logical that one point will develop from another in 
 the best order, without preliminary care being 
 taken to secure this end; but it is not likely that 
 many minds in the audience will be as able. They 
 must be helped by being let into the secret of the 
 structure, — by an occasional " first," " secondly," 
 and " thirdly," as the circumstances may require, 
 or by less formal hints; and the speaker cannot 
 
52 THE ART OF DEBATE, 
 
 give this help if he has not prepared an outline for 
 himself. 
 
 The outline, then, will put into visible form the 
 results of analysis. Analysis will have determined 
 Form of ^^^ ^^^ ^^ ^^^ principal points to be 
 Outline. proved; these points will form the main 
 headings of the outline. The material gathered 
 will have grouped itself under a number of dif- 
 ferent methods of proof; these groups will be put 
 under the appropriate headings. Certain matter 
 will have been found to be not so much actual proof 
 as matter for introductory or concluding comment; 
 it will be given its place before or after the body 
 of the argument. The outline, moreover, should 
 make clear not only the order of the parts, but 
 their relation one to another. Every statement 
 should be so set down that it will be evident 
 whether it is a main heading, — that is, something 
 which goes to prove the proposition directly,— or 
 a subordinate heading, removed by one or more 
 steps from the main question. To put the matter 
 in a slightly different way: any two parts of an 
 outline for argument are either co-ordinate, — that 
 is, intended to perform precisely similar functions, 
 — or of different orders, — that is, intended for dif- 
 ferent purposes. The problem is to show at a 
 glance which are co-ordinate, main headings, prov- 
 ing the proposition directly, and which are sub- 
 ordinate, leading to the proposition indirectly. The 
 
' ' PREUMINARY IVORK, 53 
 
 simplest solution is merely to have all co-ordinate 
 parts of the outline occupy the same position on 
 the page. The main headings may begin at the 
 extreme left of the paper; headings of the next 
 order a half inch to the right of the main headings ; 
 and so on, as far as may be necessary. Such an ar- 
 rangement presents to the eye, at a glance, the 
 relations of the different parts of the argument. It 
 is of course merely an extension of the paragraph 
 idea, upon which we depend in all reading to in- 
 dicate the places where the structure of the com- 
 position changes. In an extended composition it 
 would be confusing to have paragraph indentations 
 of different degrees, because the eye could not fol- 
 low them at a glance; but in a miniature outline 
 it is quite practicable to use a separate degree of 
 indentation for every sort of subdivision of the 
 thought. 
 
 Let us take an example illustrating the growth 
 and arrangement of an outline for debate. Sup- 
 pose that a speaker is to argue in favor 
 of woman's suffrage in the United States. Woman's 
 After doing some reading and thinking '^ ^®' 
 on the subject, and jotting down the points dis- 
 covered in the order in which they have occurred 
 to him, his notes run somewhat as follows: 
 
 1. Importance of the question. 
 
 2. Idea of woman's suffrage has made rapid prog- 
 ress. 
 
54 THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 3. Suffrage is a natural right. 
 
 4. Americans believe that taxation implies repre- 
 sentation. 
 
 5. Woman is more moral than man. 
 
 6. The only other disfranchised classes are idiots, 
 criminals and children. 
 
 7. Women would produce a good effect on politics. 
 
 8. Objection: Women cannot do military service. 
 
 9. Women interested in education of children. 
 
 10. Objection: Home interests would be injured. 
 
 11. Disfranchisement of woman a mere tradition. 
 
 12. In America practically all citizens vote. 
 
 13. Objection: Women are represented by men. 
 
 14. Experience in Colorado, Wyoming, etc. 
 
 15. Very many women now in business. 
 
 16. Women much interested in reforms. 
 
 17. The present a favorable time for trying the ex- 
 periment. 
 
 18. Laws still exist unfavorable to the interests of 
 women. 
 
 19. Unmarried women have not even partial repre- 
 sentation. 
 
 20. Women need the ballot to protect their real in- 
 terests. 
 
 21. According to the Declaration of Independence, 
 all persons are born free and equal. 
 
 Here, clearly, is a good deal of useful material, 
 but in a quite unserviceable form. The different 
 statements bear very different relations to one an- 
 other. Numbers i, 2, 11, and 17 are of slight value 
 
PRELIMINARY IVORK. 55 
 
 as proof, but are interesting for preliminary con- 
 sideration or concluding appeal. Numbers 4, 6, 
 and 12 seem to belong together, under some head- 
 ing having to do with the theory of the franchise in 
 the United States. In the same way 3, 9, 15, 18, 
 and 20 have to do with the question of the interests 
 of women; while 5, 7, and 16 have to do with the 
 interests of the country at large. Aside from the 
 matter of arrangement, the headings are seen not 
 to be co-ordinate in their functions as proof. Thus 
 5 and 16 are proofs of 7, if they have any value, and 
 should evidently come together under 7. 21 seems 
 to be an attempt at proof of 3. Numbers 9, 15, and 
 18 are proofs of 20; under this head, also, belongs 
 the objection stated in 13, to which 19 is a partial 
 answer. In the same way 14 may well be used as 
 an answer to the objection stated in 10; while 6 is 
 really a form of answer to an objection not stated, 
 coming under the idea expressed in 12. 
 
 Arranging the headings according to this anal- 
 ysis, and filling in certain gaps in order to indi- 
 cate the full connection of the various ideas, we 
 have an outline something like this: 
 
 Women should have the right of suffrage in the 
 United States. 
 
 Introductory. 
 
 The problem of suffrage of grave importance in 
 America. 
 
$6 THE ART OF DEBATE, 
 
 Originally the right to take part in government was 
 based on physical force. 
 
 In the United States, however, it is supposed to be 
 based on principle, not tradition. 
 
 I. To deny women this right is unreasonable according 
 to the principles of government in America. 
 Here suffrage is called " universal." 
 
 (It is no objection to say that suffrage is denied 
 to certain classes by law, for 
 
 This denial is largely based on assumed 
 incapacity, as in the case of idiots, crim- 
 inals, and minors.) 
 (Neither is it sufficient to say that women are 
 excepted because of incapacity for military 
 service, for 
 
 Men are not disfranchised when incapaci- 
 tated by age or infirmity.) 
 Here the principle is accepted that taxation im- 
 plies representation; and women are taxed. 
 II. To deny it is unjust. 
 
 Suffrage is a natural right of citizens, for 
 It is the means by which they are to protect 
 and exercise the freedom and equality 
 guaranteed them by the Declaration of In- 
 dependence. 
 Women need the suffrage to protect their inter- 
 ests. 
 
 Many of them have business interests. 
 Many are interested in the education of chil- 
 dren. 
 
PRELIMINARY IVORK, 57 
 
 Many still suffer from laws unfavorable to 
 their personal rights (as in the case of hold- 
 ing property, guardianship of children, 
 etc.) 
 
 (It cannot be said that they are represented 
 in these matters by men, for 
 In the nature of the case a man cannot 
 represent the interests of a woman ; and 
 Unmarried women are not even pro- 
 fessedly represented.) 
 III. To deny it is contrary to the interests of the 
 nation. 
 
 The influence of women in politics would be 
 beneficial. 
 
 Women are, broadly speaking, more moral 
 
 than men. 
 Women are more interested in reforms. 
 (It cannot be urged that the interests of the 
 home would be injured, for 
 This is contrary to the nature of women; 
 
 and 
 Experience in Colorado, Wyoming, and 
 elsewhere, proves the contrary.) 
 Conclusion. 
 
 This movement has grown beyond all expectation, 
 
 and has been successful in many localities. 
 The present is an opportune plan for trying it in the 
 United States. 
 
 This outline is of course by no means complete; 
 detailed evidence is not indicated, and only a few 
 
58 • THE ART OF DEBATE, 
 
 of many objections are refuted; but it is at least 
 arranged in an orderly manner, so that the argu- 
 ment based on it should have a structure easily ap- 
 preciable, and one using it should be able to tell 
 at any particular point just how much had been 
 proved. It will have been noticed how the system 
 of marginal indentation makes clear the relations 
 of the various statements in the outhne. Those be- 
 ginning at the extreme left (numbered I., II., and 
 III.) are the main headings which go directly to 
 prove the proposition. Those beginning an em 
 to the right are proofs of the main headings under 
 which they stand; and those still further indented 
 are proofs one step further removed. Objections 
 are stated and refuted under the headings to which 
 objection is supposed to be made. Thus an outline 
 map is formed for the entire process of argument.* 
 It is such an outline as this, adapted to legal 
 argument and developed so as to indicate not only 
 the plan but the substance of proof, that 
 ega e s. j^^^y^j.^ ^g^j| ^ a i^i-j^f " Legal bricfs, then, 
 
 are much fuller than would be found useful for 
 general debate, since their purpose is not so much 
 
 * This, as was suggested, is the simplest form of outline 
 or brief. Where the outline is to be subjected to criticism 
 or discussion, or where it is to serve any other purpose than 
 that of a preliminary sketch for the use of the individual 
 speaker, it will be found useful to employ a more elaborate 
 system of correlation. The best system of this kind is ex- 
 plained in Baker's " Specimens of Argumentation " (Holt & 
 
PRELIMINARY fVORfC. 59 
 
 to aid the speaker in his argument as to give the 
 court, and the attorney for the other side, the sub- 
 stance of the writer's case. Not infrequently, in- 
 deed, cases are submitted to court on the briefs 
 alone, without oral argument. This requires a full 
 written statement of the facts in the case, and a 
 definite record of all the evidence necessary to give 
 ground for a decision. Yet the best legal briefs are 
 as clear in structure as though they were mere 
 skeleton plans. By conciseness of statement, the 
 numbering of the main divisions of the proof, and 
 careful paragraphing, they still serve, in a sense, as 
 maps of the country to be traversed. Those who 
 have had much to do with the briefs of inexperi- 
 enced lawyers complain that they are often lament- 
 ably deficient in clearness and order. The secret of 
 the defect has already been indicated: it Hes chiefly 
 in careless analysis of the question and the proof. 
 Too much stress cannot be laid on the fact that, 
 whether in a court of law or in a general assem- 
 bly, the debater who has constructed a strong plan 
 for his argument has gone a good way toward win- 
 ning his case. 
 
 The preliminary work of the debater may now 
 be assumed to be complete. We have of course 
 passed over, for the time being, the consideration 
 
 Co.), and "Principles of Argumentation" (Ginn & Co.); 
 and is illustrated by the brief on the Trust question, in the 
 Appendix. 
 
6o THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 of the particular kinds of proof which will have been 
 determined and brought together before even the 
 outline of debate was prepared. But we have ex- 
 amined in detail the process of analysis, the prob- 
 lem of preliminary reading and study, and the 
 method of constructing an outline. Another use- 
 ful preliminary process, it may be observed, is that 
 of conversation. A prospective debater should 
 have no hesitation in becoming a bore to his friends, 
 in order to make sure that no ideas relating to his 
 subject shall escape him. Those friends are most 
 useful who take the opposite side from his own, 
 and who will attack every position he occupies. 
 After some hours' friendly discussion of this sort, 
 it is not likely that either participant will have con- 
 vinced the other of error, but that will not matter; 
 new light will certainly have been struck out by 
 the clash of opposing minds. 
 
 When all this has been done, the debater should 
 go before his audience so full of his subject, so 
 ready for whatever may be said about it, that his 
 only thought — the sole thing about which he will 
 have any doubt or fear — will be to crowd what he 
 has to say into the appointed time, and to drive 
 it home with the utmost possible effectiveness. 
 
IV. 
 
 BURDEN OF PROOF. 
 
 We now approach the central problem of argu- 
 mentation, the nature and use of proof. Through 
 all the preliminary work this has been the object 
 in view, and the point has been to ascertain just 
 what sort of proof was needed and where it might 
 be found. In the consideration of the " outline " 
 we assumed for the time being that the proof had 
 already been collected. We now turn to examine 
 its nature more closely. 
 
 At the outset of this subject we meet the ques- 
 tion of the so-called " Burden of Proof," a topic 
 of great importance for all sorts of debate, yet one 
 concerning which few persons seem to be clearly 
 informed. The principle is in reality a very simple 
 one; the confusion is simply in the use of terms. 
 
 The Burden of Proof is defined most .simply as 
 " the obligation resting upon one or other of the 
 parties to a controversy to establish by 
 proofs a given proposition, before being Proof de- 
 entitled to receive an answer from the ^^®^' 
 other side." To put it in another way, the burden 
 of proof is the chief responsibility in the argument; 
 or, in still another way, it rests upon the side which 
 
 61 
 
6a THE ART OF DEBATE, 
 
 would be assumed to be defeated if no progress at 
 all were made in the consideration of the case. 
 
 Let us look first at this matter from the legal 
 point of view. Here are the words of Lord Jus- 
 tice Bowen: 
 
 "In every lawsuit somebody must go on with it; 
 the plaintiff is the first to begin, and if he does nothing 
 Legal he fails. If he makes a prima facie case, and 
 
 Definition. nothing is done by the other side to answer 
 it, the defendant fails. The test, therefore, as to the 
 burden of proof is simply to consider which party 
 would be successful if no evidence at all was given, or 
 if no more evidence was given than is given at this 
 particular point of the case." * 
 
 "The plaintiff is the first to begin," or — in a 
 criminal case — the prosecutor, because it is he that 
 brings the charge or complaint. He creates the 
 case by making a statement, and " he who affirms 
 must prove." The. question then arises: does the 
 burden of proof rest on this same party through- 
 out the argument, or may it be shifted upon his 
 opponent? In one sense, it may certainly be 
 shifted. To continue the quotation from Lord Jus- 
 tice Bowen: 
 
 " It is not a burden which rests forever on the per- 
 son on whom it is first cast, but as soon as he, in his 
 turn, finds evidence which, prima facie, rebuts the 
 evidence against which he is contending, the burden 
 
 • Case of Ahrath v. No.E. Ry. Co. 
 
BURDEN OF PROOF. 63 
 
 shifts until again there is evidence which satisfies the 
 demand. Now, that being so, the question as to onus 
 of proof is only a rule for deciding on whom the obli- 
 gation rests of going further, if he wishes to win." 
 
 To the same effect is the language of Stephen in 
 his work on Evidence: 
 
 " The burden of proof in any proceeding lies at first 
 on that party against whom the judgtnent of the court 
 would be given if no evidence at all were produced on 
 either side. ... As the proceeding goes on, the 
 burden of proof may be shifted from the party on 
 whom it rested at first by proving facts which raise a 
 presumption in his favor." 
 
 We can now see the relation of this term " bur- 
 den of proof " to the closely related term " pre- 
 sumption." A presumption is " that 
 which may be logically assumed to be Proof and 
 true until disproved." So if the burden ^^««^°^p*^°^' 
 of proof is on the plaintiff, the presumption favors 
 the defendant; but if the plaintiff makes what the 
 jurists call a " prima facie case," he raises a pre- 
 sumption against the defendant. Examples of this 
 are perfectly familiar. Thus every man is pre- 
 sumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty; 
 but if, in a trial for murder, the accused person 
 were shown to have been alone with the murdered 
 man at the time when the crime was known to 
 have been committed, the prosecution would have 
 
64 THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 made a prima facie case, and the burden would be 
 upon the accused to overthrow the presumptive 
 evidence against him. Or, in a civil case, a man 
 is presumed to have a right to occupy the house he 
 Hves in; but if his landlord attempts to evict him, 
 and shows a document purporting to give him the 
 right to do so, signed by the tenant, then the bur- 
 den shifts upon the defendant, and he must either 
 show that the signature to the document is not his, 
 or that the document is invalid for some other rea- 
 son. 
 
 "The rules on the doctrine of legal presumptions 
 . . . may, in many cases, be referred to the four fol- 
 lowing maxims: ist. That no one shall, in the first in- 
 stance, be called on to prove a negative, or be put on 
 his defence, without sufficient evidence against him 
 having been offered, which, if not contradicted or ex- 
 plained, would be conclusive. 2d. That the affirmative 
 of the issue must be proved; otherwise men might be 
 called upon by a stranger to prove the title to their 
 property, which they might often be unable to do, 
 though the title was in fact good. 3d. That possession 
 is prima facie evidence of property. . . . 4th. What- 
 ever any thing or person appears or professes to be, is 
 considered to be the fact, until the contrary is proved." 
 (From an article on " Presumptions of Law " in the 
 Law Magazine, reprinted in Prof. Thayer's " Prelimi- 
 nary Treatise on Evidence.") 
 
 From one point of view, then, the burden of 
 
BURDEN OF PROOF, 65 
 
 proof may be shifted from one side to the other by 
 the raising of presumptions. But from 
 another point of view it ahvays rests on in Two 
 the side whose duty it is to prove the ^^^' 
 main proposition. Thus Chief Justice Church said, 
 in deciding the case of Caldwell vs. N. J. Co.: 
 " The burden of maintaining the affirmative of the 
 issue, and, properly speaking, the burden of proof, 
 remained upon the plaintiff throughout the trial." 
 And, broadly speaking, in a trial for murder the 
 duty is upon the prosecution, from the beginning 
 of the trial to the end, to prove its whole case; or, 
 in a case dealing with the seizure of property, the 
 party laying claim against the apparent owner can- 
 not get rid of the responsibility of proving the claim 
 laid down at the outset. From this point of view 
 " the burden of proof " really means something 
 different from what it meant in the cases previously 
 cited. Professor Thayer states the distinction 
 clearly: 
 
 " In legal discussion, this phrase, * the burden of 
 proof,* is used in several ways. It marks (i) The pe- 
 culiar duty of him who has the risk of any given 
 proposition on which parties are at issue, — who will 
 lose the case if he does not make that proposition out, 
 when all has been said and done. ... (2) It stands 
 for the duty . . of going forward in argument or in 
 producing evidence; whether at the beginning of a 
 case or at any later moment throughout the trial or the 
 
66 THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 discussion. (3) There is an undiscriminated use of the 
 phrase, perhaps more common than either of the other 
 two, in which it may mean either or both of the 
 others." * 
 
 It would not have been reasonable to spend so 
 much time in the exposition of these legal ques- 
 Burden of tions, if they were technical matters pecul- 
 Fomi^ iar to the practice of courts. As a matter 
 Debate. of fact, the principles just considered are 
 perfectly applicable, from beginning to end, to the 
 question of the " burden of proof " in the debate 
 of ordinary life; and if they were understood with 
 precision many absurd arguments, or interruptions 
 of arguments, would be avoided. In ordinary de- 
 bate, then, a proposition is laid down, and the dis- 
 putant having the duty of proving it is said to bear 
 the burden of proof. One may, of course, lay down 
 a statement of such a character that reason requires 
 us to believe it until someone else has taken the re- 
 sponsibility of proving it untrue; but such a state- 
 ment is hardly suitable for debate. We have seen 
 that in formal debates it is always unfortunate to 
 have the question so worded that the first speaker 
 must spend his time in supporting a proposition 
 presumptively true. The first speaker, like the at- 
 torney for plaintiff or for prosecution in court, 
 should have the presumption against him: he 
 should oppose existing conditions, propose some 
 new or untried policy, or at least lay down a state- 
 * Law of Evidence, p. 355. 
 
^ ^ BURDEN OF PROOF. 67 
 
 ment which a portion of his audience is not pre- 
 pared to accept. He will have to make definite 
 progress in his proof; he will be under the obliga- 
 tion, from the beginning to the end of the debate, 
 of making good his proposition; and it will be 
 enough for his opponent, who has the negative, 
 ftierely to prevent him from doing so successfully. 
 If he makes no positive case, or if the negative does 
 nothing more than destroy what he builds up, he 
 must be judged to have lost the debate. If he 
 proves any single point which establishes his case, 
 and the negative cannot overthrow it, he must be 
 judged to have won. 
 
 Thus, in one sense of the term, the disputant on 
 whom rests the burden of proof must cheerfully ac- 
 cept it, and never forget or attempt to 
 evade the responsibility. On the other Burden 
 hand, as in law, there is a sense in which °^*^ ^^^' 
 the burden of proof may shift back and forth. The 
 first speaker may show in his first speech that, al- 
 though he has the burden of opposing existing 
 conditions, yet the real presumption is against ex- 
 isting conditions. If he has to defend a new and 
 untried measure, he may yet show that experience 
 90 leads up to this measure as to shift the presump- 
 tion in its favor. At the close of his argument, 
 then, a prima facie case will have been made for 
 his side, and the burden will be upon the negative 
 to show why his claim cannot be maintained. If 
 they do not attack his argument directly, but set 
 
6B THE y4RT OF DEBATE, 
 
 Up a counter-case of their own, the burden Is still 
 on them to establish that counter-case and to show 
 that it evades the points made by the affirmative. 
 If they do so successfully, the presumption is again 
 in their favor, and the affirmative must go on to 
 further proof or meet defeat. 
 
 Thus far we have looked at this matter from a 
 somewhat rigidly technical point of view, — ^the 
 Bm-denof point of vicw of the judge, whether in a 
 Genwd court or in a matched debate. The same 
 Debate. principle, as has been said, applies to ar- 
 gument in general, but it must be applied in a 
 broader way. It is not enough, when addressing 
 a general audience, to try to win one's case on 
 technicalities. A debater who does so always 
 runs the risk of finding his victory a sort of defeat 
 in disguise. A lawyer may save his client from 
 punishment by discovering a flaw in the indict- 
 ment, or by merely throwing such doubt over the 
 evidence that the jury feels the guilt has not been 
 proved " beyond a reasonable doubt." But if the 
 accused is to free himself from suspicion in the eyes 
 of the community, much more than this must be 
 done. He must show that the ground of accusa- 
 tion was absolutely mistaken; he must, if he can, 
 not only prove himself not had, but prove himself 
 good. This is the sort of proof that is demanded 
 for general debate. One may be defending some 
 President, or Senator, or Mayor; one may be seek- 
 
BURDEN OF PROOF. 69 
 
 ing support for some law, or taking the part of 
 some society or party against which wrong mo- 
 tives have been charged. In all such cases there 
 will be a technical presumption of innocence, but 
 this will count for comparatively little in the pubUc 
 mind. It is not a question of whether the Senator 
 has done anything which might send him to prison, 
 but whether he is a good Senator. It is not a ques- 
 tion of whether the proposed law can be shown to 
 meet the particular points where its opponents at- 
 tctck it, but whether on the whole it will be a good 
 law. So the, general debater must win his case in 
 a broader fashion than would be required of him 
 in a court of law. And the burden of proof which 
 he will try to shift will not be the technical burden 
 of proof, but the real burden of doubt upon the 
 minds of his hearers. He will not strive after in- 
 genuity in juggHng with presumptions that depend 
 upon forms of words, but after success in dealing 
 with the question: Where, according to the feel- 
 ing of my hearers, does the true presumption He at 
 this point in the argument? 
 
 In a sense, of course, any proof offered by the 
 affirmative at the opening of debate, is a means of 
 shifting: the burden of proof: but very 
 
 Metnods of 
 
 commonly the most convenient method Shifting 
 of doing so is to establish a presumption ^^^^^^e^- 
 in favor of the proposition by showing that it is 
 more reasonable, on the face of it, than its oppo- 
 
TO THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 nents have supposed. Some illustrations may make 
 this clear. In a criminal trial the attempt of the 
 prosecution to show the general bad character of 
 the accused, in order to establish the antecedent 
 reasonableness of his guilt, is a case in point. Some 
 time ago a debating society discussed the question: 
 *' Resolved, That in the United States the strength 
 of the Federal government should be gradually in- 
 creased, as compared with that of the separate 
 States." The first speaker on the affirmative spent 
 most of his time in showing that the resolution fa- 
 vored just such a process as had in fact been going 
 on from the adoption of the Constitution up to the 
 present time. Having done this, he explained his 
 object somewhat as follows: 
 
 " Why have we taken so much time in a mere review 
 of a past tendency, when we are to consider the pres- 
 ent and future? In order to show that it is really our 
 opponents, and not we, who have the heaviest re- 
 sponsibility of proof, since it is their business to argue 
 against an established course of events, and ours to 
 defend it. A second reason for doing so is because we 
 have thus answered in advance the chief possible ob- 
 jections to this tendency. They cannot tell us that it 
 threatens individual liberty; for we all know that free- 
 dom is now more fully developed than when Wash- 
 ington laid the corner-stone of the Capitol. They can- 
 not urge that such a tendency will tend toward an im- 
 
BURDEN OF PROOF, 7^ 
 
 proper increase in the functions of government, for we 
 know that to-day we let our citizens mind their own 
 business in a way that has scarcely been seen before. 
 They cannot say that such growth is a violation of the 
 contract made at the adoption of the Constitution, 
 unless they would show that we have steadily violated 
 that contract for more than one hundred years, and 
 have never discovered it. They must not complain of 
 the possible destruction of the individual State, or the 
 loss of its local authority, for in the face of all this his- 
 tory there is no single State to-day that fears for one 
 moment its dissolution or absorption. In short, the 
 nation has not by this tendency moved away from any 
 of the great ideas of the Constitution, but has by means 
 of it crowded through all difficulties, and breathes very 
 freely to-day." 
 
 A similar example is to be found in the case of 
 debates on " expansion," or various proposed an- 
 nexations of territory. In these cases the _ ^ 
 
 •^ rresnmption 
 
 affirmative has borne a heavy burden of in Expansion 
 proof, and the negative has made the ^^^^^^^' 
 most of the fact by emphasizing the novelty of such 
 propositions, the extent to which they form de- 
 partures from the usual policy of the country, and 
 the new dangers likely to be involved. The affir- 
 mative has met this by the claim that the proposed 
 expansion of interests is in line with certain natural 
 developments, that it has been anticipated and ex- 
 
72 THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 pected by many of our public men, and that it 
 would not, therefore, properly interpreted, be a 
 departure from an historic policy. This line of ar- 
 gument was used in connection with the annexa- 
 tion of Hawaii, and again, more recently, in con- 
 nection with the territories won from Spain. " We 
 have in fact annexed attractive territory," it has 
 been said, " whenever we have had opportunity; 
 and our economic and political development has 
 been such as to lead logically to what is now pro- 
 posed. Nay, we may even claim that it is for us to 
 demand, when an attractive opportunity for expan- 
 sion is offered, that those opposing it should show 
 why it is not to be used." In other words, the 
 affirmative has sought to relieve itself of the real 
 burden of proof, and to establish a preliminary pre- 
 sumption in its own favor. 
 
 One additional example will suffice. A debater 
 
 had to argue in behalf of woman's suffrage. He 
 
 had what mieht be called a triple burden 
 
 Presnmption . . ^ 
 
 in Snffi-age resting on him : that belonging naturally 
 Qnestion. ^^ ^^^ affirmative, the fact that he favored 
 a change from familiar conditions, and the strong 
 popular opinion against him. He tried to relieve 
 him.self of this in an interesting way. He showed 
 how the idea of popular government, as held in 
 America, is that all citizens having an interest in 
 the operations of government, and capable of ex- 
 
BURDEN OF PROOF. 73' 
 
 pressing an intelligent opinion on its operations, 
 should have the right to do so through the fran- 
 chise. He pointed out the several reasons why, 
 under this rule, minors, idiots, and criminals are 
 disfranchised. Women, he said, constitute a fourth 
 class, but evidently not from a similar reason. They 
 are excluded, in fact, from causes now obsolete and 
 merely traditional; the custom goes back to the 
 period when physical force was the basis of gov- 
 ernment, and when woman had no public interests 
 such as have arisen in the evolution of society. Her 
 social, intellectual, and business privileges have 
 changed; her political privileges still lag behind. 
 If an intelligent traveler from another planet could 
 be imagined as coming to visit our country and 
 study its institutions, he would be likely to say: 
 " One thing I do not understand. You have one 
 large class of persons, possessing those qualities 
 which you say are the prerequisites of citizenship, 
 and involved in nearly all the interests which citi- 
 zenship seems intended to protect; and yet they 
 are excluded from the chief function of citizen- 
 ship." It is for those who are able to do so (the ar- 
 gument concluded) to show why such an inconsis- 
 tent condition of things should persist. In other 
 words, the attempt was to throw back the logical 
 burden of proof upon the negative, and establish a 
 presumption for the proposed change. 
 
74 THE ART OF DEBATE, 
 
 Opinions will of course differ as to the value of 
 these different lines of argument; but the point of 
 Relation of illustration is simply the general method 
 aad™ega^* pursued, which was essentially the same 
 tive- in all of them. In the first case the affir- 
 
 mative tried to establish the presumption by show- 
 ing that its own side was really that of existing 
 conditions. In the second case the attempt was 
 to do the same thing by establishing a line of 
 tendency made up of analogous conditions. In 
 the third case the attempt was to show the in- 
 trinsic reasonableness of the proposition. In all 
 the cases the object was to secure a favorable atti- 
 tude, on the part of those addressed, toward the 
 side which technically had the presumption against 
 it. Such methods are of no little value in the hands 
 of those who find themselves called upon to defend 
 radical or unpopular measures. They should never, 
 however, be used to the exclusion of direct proof, 
 nor be made an excuse for shirking that permanent 
 burden of proof which we have seen always remains 
 on one side of the controversy. When the propo- 
 sition laid down is a general one, the afBrmative 
 must be ready to show particular cases in which it 
 is true, and explain any particular cases cited in 
 opposition. When a plan is proposed in somewhat 
 vague terms, they must accept the responsibility of 
 showing particular ways in which it could be car- 
 ried out. Thus if the question favor a court 
 
BURDEN OF PROOF. 75 
 
 of arbitration, they must describe at least one sort 
 of court which they will prove practicable. On 
 the other hand, they have their choice of the par- 
 ticular instance best suited to their purpose, — be 
 it one out of a hundred; and when that instance 
 has been set up, the burden is upon the negative 
 to attack that. If we reverse the question, and find 
 the affirmative laying down the proposition that 
 a court of arbitration is inadvisable, then the bur- 
 den rests upon them to prove this true for all pos- 
 sible courts of arbitration; they are under no obli- 
 gation to bring instances, but upon the negative 
 rests the responsibility of adducing at least one in- 
 stance which WiW overthrow che general presumption 
 established by the affirmative. Thus in every case 
 the affirmative has always its original proposition 
 to prove. No jugglery of words, as has already been 
 sai4, should be allowed to enter into this matter. 
 A good debater will rarely need to use the words 
 " burden of proof " in his argument, or to tell his 
 audience that he has been trying to shift the bur- 
 den upon his opponent; he will shift not the name 
 but the reality, by making his case so clear and 
 strong that the audience will be carried with him. 
 Then his opponent will see for himself that he is 
 under the obligation to recapture his ground. 
 
 Briefly to recapitulate: The burden of proof is, 
 in the first place, the obligation resting upon the 
 affirmative to prove the proposition it lays down at 
 
7^ THE ART OF DEBATE, 
 
 the outset, — an obligation which it never escapeu; 
 and, in the second place, the obligation of either 
 disputant to produce proof at any moment when, 
 in the absence of such proof, the other side would 
 be judged to be in the right. In a word, it is simply 
 the demand of the audience: Show your proof, if we 
 are to believe! 
 
METHODS OF PROOF. 
 
 The attempt to classify processes of proof has 
 always been the bugbear of students of argumen- 
 tation. A dozen different systems of classification 
 have been thought out by those who have analyzed 
 the operations of the reasoning faculties from dif- 
 ferent points of view. Too often the matter has 
 been approached merely from the standpoint of 
 theory, or of the principles of logic, rather than 
 from that of the practical debater. 
 
 It is natural for one with an orderly mind to 
 seek to analyze and classify all the processes that 
 he makes use of, and to be disturbed if he cannot 
 make this analysis consistent and inclu- au Proof 
 sive. As soon, however, as one makes &^"^°* _ 
 the attempt with methods of proof, and rience. 
 begins to apply his system to the various examples 
 that occur to him, a hundred difficulties arise. One 
 sort of proof seems to run into another; a piece of 
 reasoning seems to be inductive from one point of 
 view, and deductive from another; and the use of 
 the simplest sort of evidence appears, when one 
 considers it closely, to involve processes of reason- 
 ing which are commonly thought of as belonging 
 to complicated arguments. 
 
 77 
 
7S THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 The difficulty is a real one. The various names 
 and systems which have been invented for 
 these things are in fact only superficial, and 
 often obscure the inner likeness of all meth- 
 ods of proof. Reduced to its lowest terms, all 
 our processes of reasoning, great and small, are 
 simply inferences based on experience. Sometimes 
 the inferences are so rapid that we do not realize 
 that the process has taken place, as when we hear 
 a voice and infer that a man speaking is the cause 
 of the sound; whereas sometimes they are labored 
 and prolonged. Sometimes, again, the experience 
 on which the inference is based is limited, and the 
 inference therefore uncertain, as when we infer that 
 a man will tell a lie because we knew him to tell one 
 before; while at other times the experience is broad 
 and prolonged, as when we infer from innumerable 
 instances that all men are mortal. All testimony, 
 when used as proof, is based on the inference, from 
 experience of greater or less value, that the witness 
 is able and willing to tell the truth; all argument 
 from authority is based on inference of a similar 
 kind; while of course such argument as is called 
 " proof by Example " or " by Analogy " is infer- 
 ence from experience of past instances similar to 
 the one in question. Even the distinction between 
 inductive and deductive reasoning, which forms 
 a basis for the study of logic, is only a matter of 
 the point of view taken, and cannot be applied thor- 
 
METHODS OF PROOR 79 
 
 oughly in comparing various practical processes of 
 proof. In making inductions we are constantly 
 using deductions, and in making deductions are 
 using inductions. Indeed the great fallacy of in- 
 ductive argument (mistaking an accompanying or 
 preceding fact for a cause) is a form of the so-called 
 fallacy of " post hoc ergo propter hoc,'' which is 
 treated in deductive logic as closely connected with 
 the fallacy of " Begging the Question." * 
 
 Let us, then, put aside for our present purpose 
 any attempt to arrange our methods of proof ac- 
 cording to a perfectly consistent system, by which 
 they may be pigeon-holed in mutually exclusive 
 groups. On the other hand, we will examine all 
 these methods from the standpoint of their use in 
 practical debate. 
 
 We have already seen something of the classes 
 into which various arguments naturally fall, in the 
 discussion of debatable subjects in courts Establishing 
 of law as compared with general debate o^i'aots. 
 (see Chapter II). The first of the classes was that 
 of the simple establishing of facts. This is what the 
 lawyer does at the opening of his case, and he does 
 it largely by the calling of witnesses. So the hand- 
 ling of testimony is in a sense the first problem of 
 all debate where the facts are disputed, or where 
 they need to be clearly brought out as a basis for 
 
 • For a clear discussian of this whole question, see the ad- 
 mirable little book by Sidgwick, " The Process of Argument." 
 
So THE ART OF DEBATE, 
 
 argument. The witnesses in general debate may 
 be called from all quarters of the globe, and may be 
 private citizens, public men, newspapers, or merely 
 common rumor. They may, of course, differ very 
 greatly in the degree to which their testimony can 
 be relied upon, and the great point in the use of 
 their testimony will be to make its credibility clear. 
 
 This credibility will depend, first, upon the abil- 
 ity, and secondly, upon the wilHngness of the wit- 
 Oredibiuty ^^^s to give an accurate account of the 
 of Witnesses, matter under consideration. It will make 
 no little difference whether the matter is one con- 
 cerning which any reasonable person could speak 
 with certainty, or whether it is one requiring the 
 skill of a trained observer; whether — to put the 
 same thought in other words — it involves one of 
 those rapid inferences which we are always making 
 in commonplace matters, or one of those more com- 
 plicated inferences (such as a chemist or a physician 
 makes in analysis or diagnosis) where a mistake is 
 easily possible. 
 
 Again, it will make a difference whether the wit- 
 ness has any imaginable interest in the establish- 
 ment of the fact to which he testifies. Experience 
 shows that the most honest of men are likely to see 
 events through glasses colored by their prejudices 
 and interests, and that one who investigates a mat- 
 ter in the hope of finding certain facts which he 
 wishes to make known, is altogether likely to see 
 
METHODS OF PROOF, Si 
 
 what he went to see. So if an admirer of the 
 Cubans goes to Cuba on a trip, and is followed by 
 one who has no liking for the island or its inhabi- 
 tants, we may expect that on their return they will 
 present quite different reports, even on matters of 
 fact. Even if they have seen just the same things 
 (and it is not probable that they have, not having 
 been looking for them), their inferences have been 
 different. The conflicting reports of the two com- 
 missions — the Spanish and the American — that 
 investigated the destruction of the battleship Maine, 
 both having the same facts before them, present 
 a striking example of this tendency. So it hap- 
 pens that if a witness is known to be wholly with- 
 out interest in the matter to which he testifies, — as 
 when a scientist, traveling with his eyes open only 
 to scientific truth, describes what he sees in Cuba 
 or the Philippine Islands, — the testimony has 
 special value. And further, if a witness gives 
 merely incidental testimony, with no thought as 
 to its bearing on any disputed matter, or if he gives 
 merely negative testimony, — not mentioning a 
 matter which he would naturally mention if it were 
 known to him, or if he testifies to a fact which is 
 opposed to his prejudice or his interests, the testi- 
 mony has double value from such circumstances. 
 The principle is simply that testimony is strength- 
 ened by whatever gives us reason to infer that the 
 
«a THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 fact as stated is an accurate representation of the 
 fact as existent. 
 
 These are some of the rules governing the value 
 of testimony, which are the result simply of our 
 -- , common experience with witnesses of all 
 
 Testimony kinds. In the procedure of courts of 
 ^ ® "■ *' law these, and many others, have been re- 
 duced to a great system of rules — rules which, like 
 all rules of law, have their basis in common judg- 
 ment but have been crystallized into an artificial 
 code of practice. In speaking of the use of evi- 
 dence in general debate, the only point requiring 
 emphasis is that the value of testimony, as deter- 
 mined by means of common judgment, shall be 
 clearly brought out in the course of argument. A 
 lawyer has ample opportunity to do this in con- 
 nection with the giving of the testimony; by ex- 
 amination and cross-examination he brings out all 
 the points necessary to the establishing of the credi- 
 bility of his witness. But a debater in general argu- 
 ment has no such opportunity; he cannot summon 
 witnesses in person, but must quote from their pub- 
 lished utterances, and he usually has much less time 
 than the attorney in which to present his evidence. 
 He must seek, then, in the very moment of giving 
 his testimony, to show in a dozen words why it 
 is to be believed, to point out the difference be- 
 tween testimony of a flimsy character, based on 
 mere rumor or newspaper gossip, and that derived 
 
METHODS OF PROOF, 83 
 
 from witnesses of capable judgment and disinter- 
 ested state of mind. If the facts of the case are in 
 dispute, or if their presentation is essential to the 
 proving of one's proposition, this clear setting forth 
 of one's testimony may be the critical point in the 
 argument. Some debaters make the grave error 
 of falling back upon general assertions, instead of 
 being prepared to mass their witnesses when a 
 statement is questioned by the other side. But 
 mere assertion will count for very little when a 
 fact is really in dispute. 
 
 Expert testimony, so-called, and argument from 
 authority, are clearly distinguished in legal proof; 
 the one dealing with matters concerning j, ^»pg,_ 
 which testimony is being taken, the other timony and 
 with matters of legal interpretation which ^ ° y* 
 have been judicially decided. In general debate, 
 however, the two are very similar. We have al- 
 ready seen something, in Chapter II., of the nature 
 of the argument from authority. In this case the 
 proof consists in the inference that the authority 
 cited is competent to speak decisively on the point 
 in question. Such authority is, then, a kind of 
 testimony. We are more likely, however, to call 
 it " expert testimony " when it concerns a disputed 
 fact, — as when we give the opinion of a scientist or 
 a business man concerning events which he is sup- 
 posed from his position to understand with accuracy, 
 ^-and " authority " when it concerns inferences 
 
84 THE ART OF DEBATE, 
 
 of a more abstruse character, or principles on whicH 
 only certain authorities have the rig-ht to speak. A 
 court, then, constitutes an authority on points of 
 law; a church constitutes an authority on ecclesi- 
 astical matters; a book universally accepted as the 
 source of information on matters within its province 
 constitutes an authority within that province — like 
 the United States Pharmacopeia, for example, in 
 matters of drugs. All such authorities, evidently, 
 to be useful for purposes of proof, must be recog- 
 nized as authoritative by those for whom the dis- 
 puted point is to be proved. A Spanish court will 
 exercise no authority over the judgments of 
 American lawyers; a Roman Catholic prelate can- 
 not affect the judgments of Protestants on points of 
 religion. The authority must be respected, or its 
 authority, in matters of opinion, does not exist. 
 
 It was remarked in an earlier chapter that the use 
 of the argument from authority is much slighter 
 
 in general debate than in legal discus- 
 ?f AntSy. s^o^s- There are, in fact, few disputed 
 
 matters on which an authority can be 
 found, recognized by all whom one wishes to con- 
 vince. In the matter of religion and theology, for 
 example, there is no general authority recognized 
 as existing on earth, outside the particular organs 
 and ofBcers of particular churches. The right of 
 private judgment in religion, and the right of indi- 
 vidual application of the principles of religion to 
 
METHODS OF PROOF. 85 
 
 practical conduct, has become triumphant in 
 modern civiHzation. If, then, one is debating a 
 moral question, he is forced — except for a general 
 appeal to certain fundamental principles of Christi- 
 anity or ethics, such as he believes his audience 
 accepts — -to bring proofs bearing on the particular 
 case in dispute and appealing to the private judg- 
 ments of those addressed. He not only can no 
 longer appeal to the church to declare that the sun 
 goes round the earth, but he cannof appeal to it 
 to tell certainly what is right and wrong. Men 
 will decide according to their own consciences. 
 And this is only one illustration of the decay of the 
 argument from authority in modern debate. 
 
 On the other hand, wherever the question in dis- 
 pute concerns matters in a particular sphere or 
 organization, and there is in that sphere „ ^, 
 
 ^ , ^ Use of Argxi- 
 
 or organization an authority which those mentfrom 
 engaged in the dispute are bound to ^* °" ^' 
 recognize, the argument from authority still has 
 an important place. Examples are to be found 
 in the decisions of the Supreme Court of the 
 United States, on points relating to our constitu- 
 tional law (though even here the private citizen 
 does not hesitate to take issue with the court, if 
 he is sufficiently venturesome); in the rules of order 
 or by-laws governing various parliamentary bodies ; 
 and in the doctrines and practices governing par- 
 ticular religious sects. Where the authority, then, 
 
86 THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 is definitely recognized, the task of the debater is 
 to make clear just what the authority declares, 
 that it may be shown to have the effect of proof 
 on the matter in hand. It is here in good part that 
 the question of individual skill comes in. *' In legal 
 argument," says a distinguished lawyer, " where 
 so much depends upon the marshalling of pre- 
 cedents, it is particularly important that the debater 
 should make such a statement of his authorities as 
 will bring out with clearness tJie phases of them 
 which it is to his interest to emphasised And it is 
 no less important, when authorities are involved, 
 in general debate. As in the case of testimony, the 
 debater usually has less time than the lawyer in 
 which to develop his authority. To quote exten- 
 sively will not only waste time, but to the average 
 audience will be obscure and uninteresting. Much 
 depends, therefore, on the rapid bringing out of the 
 points of authority which are essential to the mat- 
 ter in dispute. When these points can be obtained, 
 they are among the debater's most powerful 
 weapons. 
 
 The third class of proof into which we divided 
 legal argument was that of processes of reasoning 
 Processes of applied to the facts obtained. This sort of 
 Eeaaoning. proof is no morc truly a matter of in- 
 ference than the direct use of testimony or author- 
 ity, but it involves inferences of a more elaborate 
 and appreciable character. Let us consider these 
 
^ METHODS OF PROOF. 87 
 
 processes according as they are based on matters 
 before the fact in dispute, or on matters after the 
 fact. 
 
 By matters before the fact in dispute are meant 
 those circumstances leading up to the point under 
 discussion, which, when the time of the a priori 
 disputed event is past, are examined as Evidence, 
 throwing some light upon that event. Of these the 
 most important are those which may have been the 
 causes of the disputed fact. Argument based on 
 these has commonly been called argument from 
 " Antecedent ProbabiHty," since the method of its 
 use is to show that the event was possible or prob- 
 able, on the ground that there was sufficient cause 
 to produce it. The great example of this method 
 of proof is found in the proof of motive in criminal 
 cases. If B has been murdered, and A is accused 
 of the crime, the first effort of the prosecution is 
 to show that A had some motive in committing the 
 crime. If it can be shown that he bore an old 
 grudge against B, that B was aware of secrets 
 which it was to A*s interest not to have revealed, 
 or that A would profit by the property of B at his 
 "death, then an aspect of probability is thrown about 
 the charge. The object of the argument is to carry 
 the minds of the jury to the moment immediately 
 preceding the crime, and make them see that at 
 that moment it was not unlikely that it would be 
 committed by the accused person, if it was to be 
 
SB THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 committed at all. In like manner, after an acci- 
 dent to a railroad bridge, the attempt might be 
 made to prove that the bridge was imperfectly con- 
 sftructed, not only from the fact of the accident, but 
 from facts previous to the completion of the struc- 
 ture which would indicate such negHgence on the 
 part of the builders as to lead to faulty construc- 
 tion. 
 
 It will be noticed that the value of this sort of 
 proof is wholly of a preparatory and corroborative 
 Value of character. Standing by itself, the proof 
 fecelnt^" ^^ antecedent probability is absolutely 
 Probability, worthless. No matter how many circum- 
 stances combine to make it probable that A will 
 murder B, no one will bring A to trial if there is 
 no evidence that B has been murdered. Nor will 
 any one sue a builder on the ground of negHgence, 
 if there is no proof of actual fault in his work. 
 Such proof is also worthless if there is a single 
 piece of strong evidence on the other side. If A 
 is shown to have been absent from the town where 
 the murder was committed, at the time of its oc- 
 currence, no amount of proof of motive will have 
 any weig^ht against him. But on the other hand, 
 it is to be noticed that proof of antecedent proba- 
 bility is a very valuable accessory to other sorts of 
 proof, when the other proof is of a doubtful charac- 
 ter. Without the most positive evidence against 
 him, it is difficult to convict a man of a serious 
 
METHODS OF PROOF. 89 
 
 crime if no motive for it can be shown. Such 
 proof is valuable, too, not only as being corrobora- 
 tive of direct evidence, but as preparing- the way 
 for such evidence in the mind. Predisposed opin- 
 ions have such weight that it is difficult to persuade 
 men to believe even direct evidence, if they are con- 
 vinced of its antecedent improbabiHty. A striking 
 example of this is the general disbelief in miracles 
 and other alleged supernatural events. Most 
 people do not take the trouble even to investigate 
 such events when reports of them are circulated, 
 and do not credit even what seems to be the evi- 
 dence of their own eyes, because they are so firmly 
 convinced of the improbability of supernatural oc- 
 currences. If they could once be convinced that 
 such things were antecedently reasonable, that 
 there was adequate cause for them in the constitu- 
 tion of the universe or the peculiar circumstances 
 preceding their manifestation, it would be much 
 easier to persuade them that the evidence was good. 
 Advertisers of proprietary medicines make use of 
 the same principle. Before presenting testimonies 
 of cures, they make it plain why their particular 
 remedy may be expected to cure such and such 
 diseases, from the nature of both disease and rem- 
 edy; after the reasonableness of cure has been indi- 
 cated, testimony of cure is more readily received. 
 This suggests a somewhat wider use of the argu- 
 
90 THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 ment from antecedent probability than the proof 
 Antecedent which IS based simpIy on an adequate 
 fn GeS c^^se for an alleged effect. The method 
 Debate. may be used in general, to show that what 
 one wishes to prove true is theoretically possible 
 or probable, that it conforms to known laws, that 
 it is likely to be true. Such proof is widely service- 
 able. In debating economic problems, for exam- 
 ple, one may show that the alleged fact, if it can 
 be proved to exist, will be in conformity with some 
 recognized economic law. Or in proving a politi- 
 cal proposition one may use the doctrines of 
 authorities on political science to show that the 
 proposition is likely to be true, and thus — in a sense 
 — make the argument from authority a proof of 
 antecedent probability. Proof of some hypotheses, 
 indeed, like that of the immortality of the soul, is 
 based almost entirely on this method- of demonstra- 
 tion, and never reaches beyond the point of show- 
 ing that the matter in question is likely to be true. 
 
 Another sort of proof dependent on reasoning 
 from matters before the fact in dispute, is that from 
 Analogy or analogy or example. In a certain sense 
 Example. t^ig method of proof runs through all the 
 methods we have discussed or can discuss; for 
 since all proof is a matter of inference based on 
 experience, we must base our proofs on the resem- 
 blance between the disputed matter and similar 
 matters which have come within the range of our 
 
METHODS OF PROOF, 91 
 
 experience. Thus the inference that a voice in- 
 dicates a person speaking, or that a smoke indicates 
 fire, is based on a number of examples running 
 through all our past experience, so numerous 
 and orderly as to amount to actual demonstration. 
 If the proof is based on only one or two examples, 
 or on a resemblance so slight as to deserve no better 
 name than analogy, we then say that the existing re- 
 semblance indicates a certain likelihood or proba- 
 bility that the fact in dispute will correspond to the 
 similar fact of experience. Thus if a man has acted 
 in a particular way under certain circumstances, we 
 may argue that under similar circumstances he 
 will act in a similar way. If the circumstances of 
 a murder are similar to those of another murder 
 occurring some time before, we may argue that 
 the guilty person may be discovered in a man- 
 ner similar to that previously employed. If the 
 condition of a country, economic or political, 
 closely resembles that of another country in a 
 period known to historians, we may use the history 
 of the other country to prove what we wish about 
 the modern condition, — that is, as Patrick Henry 
 said, we may judge of the future by the lamp of 
 the past. In all these cases we infer from similar 
 conditions that similar causes are or have been at 
 work, and will be likely to produce, or to have pro- 
 duced, similar results. 
 
 The weakest form of this argument, the argu- 
 
92 THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 ment from analogy, is frequently abused. Many 
 Abuse of debaters in fact mistake a mere illustra- 
 Anaiogy. ^[on for a proof. That this mistake is a 
 very old one is shown by some remarks of Sir Philip 
 Sidney in his " Defense of Poesy ": 
 
 " The force of a similitude," he said, " not being to 
 prove anything to a contrary disputer, but only to ex- 
 plain to a willing hearer, the rest is a most tedious prat- 
 tling: rather over-swaying the memory from the pur- 
 pose whereto they were applied, than any whit inform- 
 ing the judgment, already either satisfied or by simili- 
 tudes not to be satisfied." 
 
 The same thought was suggested by George 
 Eliot, in connection with Mr. Stelling's '' favorite 
 metaphor, that the classics and geometry consti- 
 tuted that culture of the mind which prepared it for 
 the reception of any subsequent crop." 
 
 " It is astonishing," she observed, " what a different 
 result one gets by changing the metaphor! Once call 
 the brain an intellectual stomach, and one's ingenious 
 conception of the classics and geometry as plows and 
 harrows seems to settle nothing„ But then it is open 
 to some one else to follow great authorities, and call 
 the mind a sheet of white paper or a mirror, in which 
 case one's knowledge of the digestive process becomes 
 quite irrelevant. It was doubtless an ingenious idea 
 to call the camel the ship of the desert, but it would 
 hardly lead one far in training that useful beast." 
 
 Resemblances, then, may illuminate an argument 
 
METHODS OF PROOF. 93 
 
 when they admittedly indicate that similar princi" 
 pies are involved; otherwise they are mere rhetori- 
 cal embellishments. In a debate on the prohibition 
 of the liquor traffic the advocate of prohibition 
 compared the liquor traffic to a deadly upas-tree, 
 and urged that the only thing to do with such a 
 tree was, not to trim it or fence it, but to cut it 
 down; this indicated the method of prohibition. 
 His opponent replied that, while it might be a 
 good plan to cut down the tree, a great tree cannot 
 be felled at a stroke, but that one must chop a little 
 on one side, then a little on the other, and that 
 a long period of maneuvering is necessary be- 
 fore the fall of the tree can be accomplished. 
 The impression produced was that the second 
 speaker had the best of the argument. He had in 
 fact made use of a rhetorical opportunity, such as 
 hastily chosen illustrations will commonly afford; 
 but neither speaker had done anything by way of 
 proof. The first one had illustrated the principle 
 that an admitted evil is to be destroyed if possible; 
 the second had illustrated the principle that evils 
 cannot always be destroyed at a single blow. Both 
 principles were perfectly obvious; the question as 
 to which of them applied to the Hquor traffic in 
 the particular community concerned, was still un- 
 touched. 
 
 These are some of the methods of argument 
 based on matters before the fact in dispute. They 
 
94 THE ART OF DEBATE, 
 
 are often valuable as introductory to more direct 
 proof, in order to prepare one's hearers for such 
 proof and to indicate that one's proposition is rea- 
 sonable and probable; they are rarely of value 
 standing by themselves. We now turn to proof 
 based on matters after the fact in dispute. 
 
 Corresponding to the argument from antecedent 
 probability, which attempts to show the probability 
 A posteriori ^f an event by pointing out causes likely 
 Evidence. to producc it, is the argument which 
 points out effects likely to have been produced by 
 the event in question. This is a safer method of 
 proof than the former, since it is easier to see the 
 cause of an effect than to predict an effect from a 
 cause. If a man has been shot we know that some- 
 one shot him, but if a man has fired a shot we can- 
 not say certainly that it took effect. Or, if an act 
 has been accomplished we know there was a motive 
 back of it, but we cannot be so sure that a motive 
 will be completed in action. Proofs arising from 
 facts appearing after the disputed event, indicating 
 the disputed event as their cause, are therefore 
 among the most highly valued methods of argu- 
 ment. They are frequently called arguments from 
 " Sign," the effect being regarded as the sign of 
 the cause. 
 
 Thus in a trial for murder, all the facts relating 
 to the accused person after the occurrence of the 
 crime belong to proofs of this class. The fact that 
 
METHODS OF PROOF, 95 
 
 the accused was found with a smoking pistol in 
 his hand, that there was blood upon his garments, 
 that footprints near the place of the murder cor- 
 respond with the shape of his shoe, that he hid 
 himself and showed consciousness of guilt, — all 
 these are effects indicating his guilt as the cause. 
 Or, in a suit based on criminal negligence in a rail- 
 road accident, evidence drawn from the condition 
 of the track where the accident occurred, or from 
 the condition of the signals in a switching-tower, 
 would be effects indicating criminal negligence as 
 their cause. The same sort of proof is common in 
 all kinds of debate. The use of statistics furnishes 
 a familiar example. In order to prove that a cer- 
 tain tariff or monetary system has been beneficial 
 to the country, statistics are quoted showing in- 
 creased prosperity in the years following the time 
 when the system in question took effect. Such 
 facts indicate the beneficial operation of the law 
 as the cause of the increased prosperity. 
 
 But this method of proof, while it is more to be 
 relied upon than proof from antecedent probability, 
 yet has marked limitations. It will al- Limitationa 
 ready have occurred to the reader that the ^'I^^f^™" 
 examples just given belong to that sort of ETidenoe. 
 proof which is called " circumstantial evidence; " 
 and the danger of relying too impHcitly on such 
 evidence has passed into a proverb. Much hesita- 
 tion is felt in convicting a man of a crime on cir- 
 
96 THE ART OF DEBATE, 
 
 cumstantial evidence alone. Some striking works 
 of fiction, such as Miss Green's *' Leavenworth 
 Case " and Miss Woolson's " Anne," have been 
 written to illustrate the danger of such judgments. 
 The source of the danger is evident on a moment's 
 thought. This method of proof is based on two as- 
 sumptions: first, that the alleged fact was of itself 
 sufficient to be a cause of the known fact; and 
 second, that there was no other fact, existent at the 
 same time, which may have been sufficient cau;->e 
 of the known fact. These assumptions, espe- 
 cially the second, are difficult of certain proof. 
 Men have therefore been convicted of crime cm 
 the ground that known facts could be accounted 
 for only by their guilt, and other facts have after- 
 ward been discovered which were ample to account 
 for the facts first known, without the assumption 
 of guilt. The difficulty is to prove so large a nega- 
 tive as the statement that there are no other possible 
 causes than the one alleged. The same difficulty is 
 strongly felt in general debate. It forms the chief 
 hindrance to the use of statistics in such arguments 
 as those indicated a moment ago. If one is to prove 
 that the prosperity of a given year was due to a 
 certain tariff law passed the year previous, he must, 
 theoretically, be prepared to show that there was 
 no other cause operating to produce the prosper- 
 ity, as well as that the law in question was com- 
 petent to produce it. But in public affairs all man- 
 
METHODS OF PROOF, 97 
 
 ner of causes and effects are almost inextricably 
 interwoven, so that it is a serious task to trace out 
 any one event or force to its own particular conse- 
 quences. Students of natural science, in order to 
 study cause and effect, arrange materials so as to 
 isolate the particular event under investigation 
 from all concomitant circumstances, and perform 
 original experiments in order to test their theories. 
 But students of economic and political laws cannot 
 ordinarily do anything of this kind. Such diffi- 
 culties are so well recognized that many economists 
 confine their proofs almost entirely to the range 
 of theory, — that is, of antecedent probability, — de- 
 clining to give evidence drawn from concrete facts. 
 l^his, however, of course imperils the convincing- 
 ness of their arguments. It is usually dangerous 
 to let either the argument from cause or that from 
 effect go without the support of the other. If 
 antecedent probability and sign agree, one's case 
 will be strong. 
 
 Thus far we have been considering methods of 
 proof most clearly applicable to questions of dis- 
 puted fact; questions, that is, in which 
 inferences are to be drawn from one ^^^^^^^ 
 fact to another. Beyond these are 
 the more complicated problems of interpreta- 
 tion and application. Such problems, however, 
 when analyzed, are found to depend upon 
 such simple processes as we have already consid- 
 
98 THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 ered. If one can establish the general principles 
 on which one's case must be decided, and if one can 
 then search out and establish the essential facts 
 that belong to it, the rest is simply that application 
 of facts to principles which any normal mind can be 
 trusted to make. This is the sort of reasoning that 
 is expressed in the syllogism. When one says that 
 all men are mortal and that A is a man, it only 
 requires that the two facts shall be set forth so as 
 to be readily compared, in order to have it believed 
 that A is mortal. In like manner, if one shows from 
 the Constitution that an ex post facto law is for- 
 bidden, and then, from an analysis of its text, that 
 a given law is an ex post facto law, the conclusion 
 is plain. The third term of the syllogism never 
 needs to be proved. The great task of the debater, 
 then, is to set forth the principles and the facts at 
 issue in such a manner that their relations are per- 
 fectly clear and that the minds of those addressed 
 will proceed naturally to the conclusion. 
 
 Something should be said of methods of proof 
 in questions of policy, beyond what was suggested 
 Proofin regarding them in the chapter on De- 
 Questions of batable Questions. Such questions dif- 
 °^°^' fer from those involving legal discussion, 
 because they are directed not to the past or present, 
 but to the future. If one argues for the adoption 
 of a certain law, the election of a certain can- 
 didate, or the acceptance of a certain line of 
 
METHODS OF PROOF. 99 
 
 conduct, he is dealing with issues not yet reached, 
 and to which the rules of evidence applicable to past 
 events cannot be directly applied. Yet the proof of 
 facts is almost always involved. The choice of 
 the candidate will depend on proof as to his 
 career in the past; the passage of the tariff law will 
 depend in part upon what can be shown of the ef- 
 fect of previous tariff laws; the adoption of a line 
 of conduct will depend on the fact that others have 
 prospered by its adoption. These questions of 
 policy, as was hinted in the former chapter, com- 
 monly depend first upon principle, secondly upon 
 interest. The task is to show that a given proposi- 
 tion is theoretically just or reasonable, and then 
 that it will be practically useful. This may be com- 
 pared with the method of proof based on matters 
 before the fact and that based on matters after the 
 fact. In other words, one will seek first to show 
 the antecedent reasonableness of the policy, before 
 giving evidence of its probable success. The rea- 
 sons for doing this will be the same that lead one 
 to use the argument from antecedent probability 
 on questions of disputed fact. The effort is really 
 to raise, at the outset, a presumption in favor of 
 one's case. We may recall the examples suggested, 
 in the last chapter, of arguments in which such an 
 effort was made. Thus in the argument on 
 woman's suffrage the effort was to show, in the 
 first place, that the adoption of woman's suffrage 
 
xoo THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 would be on the face of it reasonable and natural, 
 in consideration of the theories of government held 
 in a republic like our own; then, in the second 
 place, to show that the evidence of experience fav- 
 ored the plan, as beneficial to the state and its in- 
 terests. This general method of proof, two-fold 
 in its form, is applicable to all sorts of debatable 
 questions. The general development of the argu- 
 ment will be, (i) The proposition is likely to be true; 
 (2) It is true as shown by the facts in the particular 
 case examined; and we may add, (3) It will be true 
 in all corresponding cases. 
 
 Let us further illustrate these various methods 
 Typical qI proof by a number of typical outlines, 
 
 Bohemesof ... , r , 
 
 Proof. suggestive of the general manner of set- 
 
 ting about the preparation of argument. 
 
 (I.) 
 A is guilty of crime. 
 
 I. He committed the act charged. 
 
 1. It was antecedently probable that he 
 should do so. 
 
 a) Facts that were competent causes, 
 h) Facts drawn from similar cases. 
 
 2. He is shown to have done so. 
 a) Direct testimony. 
 
 h) Facts that are effects. 
 
 II. The law makes this act a crime. 
 
 1. There is every reason why it should (moral 
 reasons). 
 
 2. Such and such a statute makes it a crime. 
 
METHODS OF PROQF ; ' , ' \i<>% ' 
 
 d) It makes " x" a crime. 
 h) This act is " x." 
 
 i. Authority in similar cases. 
 
 (II.) 
 
 The proposed plan should he adopted. 
 
 I. It is antecedently reasonable. 
 
 1. It is in accordance with precedent. 
 
 2. It is just (i.e., in accordance with prin- 
 ciple). 
 
 3. It is favored by A, B and C 
 
 II. It is expedient. 
 
 1. It meets existing needs. 
 
 a) X is needed. 
 
 a') It will supply x. 
 
 b) y is needed. 
 
 b') It will supply y. 
 
 2. It has worked well elsewhere, 
 o) Testimony. 
 
 3. The effects will be good 
 
 a) upon the interests oi x; 
 
 b) upon the interests of y. 
 
 III. There is no better plan. 
 
 1. .«• is not better. 
 
 2. y is not better. 
 
 Such outhnes as (I.) and (II.) evidently involve 
 the syllogistic type of argument for the establish- 
 ment of certain of their parts. Particular types of 
 proof in syllogistic form are as. follows: 
 
**S' THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 (III.) 
 
 A is commendable. 
 
 1. ;r is commendable, and 
 i'. ;r is characteristic of A. 
 
 2. y is commendable, and 
 2'. y is characteristic of A. 
 
 etc. 
 
 (IV.) 
 Evils exist. 
 
 1. X exists. 
 
 2. X is an evil. 
 
 etc. 
 (V.) 
 
 A is a case coming under the law x, 
 
 1. The law x covers 0, />, and q. 
 
 2. A involves (p, or q). 
 
 Again, we may invert any of these types for thtf 
 purpose of proving a negative. Thus (II.) inverted 
 would become 
 
 (VI.) 
 X should not be adopted. 
 
 I. It is unreasonable. 
 
 1. Contrary to precedent. 
 
 2. Contrary to principle. 
 
 3. In disfavor. 
 
 II. It is inexpedient. 
 
 1. Meets no existing needs. 
 
 a) It seems to be intended to meet a, 
 
 b) But a is not needed. 
 
 2. Has proved unsuccessful. 
 a) Testimony. 
 
METHODS OF PROOF, 103 
 
 3. Effects would be evil 
 o) upon the interests of A; 
 h) upon the interests of B. 
 III. There is a better plan. 
 I. 3; is better. 
 Finally, we may arrange the proof in such a way 
 that all parts of it relating to general conditions 
 may be treated together, as introductory, and all 
 parts relating to the particular case in dispute in 
 a second division. By such a method the full na- 
 ture of the proof, perhaps of the proposition itself, 
 is reserved with a sort of cumulative effect. Such 
 a plan might take t'he form of 
 
 (VII.) 
 
 I. In a case like the present the true proposition 
 must 
 
 1. Conform to the principle x. 
 
 2. Be consistent with precedent. 
 
 3. Meet existing needs, such as a, b and c, 
 
 4. Have proved successful where tried. 
 
 5. Satisfy the interests of A, B and C. 
 
 6. Explain all the facts in the case. 
 
 II. The proposition in question 
 
 1. Violates the principle x. 
 
 2. Is inconsistent with precedent. 
 
 3. Does not meet needs such as fl, b and c. 
 
 4. Has proved unsuccessful where tried. 
 
 5. Is opposed to the interests of A, B and C. 
 
 6. Fails to explain facts x, y and 2. 
 
 It is of course quite impracticable to suggest in 
 this way all possible types of choice and arrange- 
 
I04 THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 ment of proof. It is sufficient to show how a few 
 such outlines indicate the general methods which 
 may most conveniently be followed in the demon- 
 stration of ordinary propositions. The particular 
 case must always determine how the methods are 
 to be chosen and combined. The analysis of the 
 question will show just what must be proved; one 
 may then apply the means of proof described in 
 this chapter to the thing to be proved and the 
 audience to be addressed. To do this successfully 
 one may ask himself these questions: What facts 
 must I estabHsh? By w'hat witnesses can I estab- 
 lish them? Can I cite any accepted authority in 
 my behalf? How can I show the antecedent rea- 
 sonableness of my proposition? What evidence 
 can I adduce that can be explained in no other way 
 than by the truth of my proposition? And — if the 
 question be one of policy, — how can I show that 
 the proposition conforms to the principles in which 
 my hearers believe, and to the interests which most 
 concern them? 
 
 These, then, are the common methods of proof. 
 But a word of caution must be said against the 
 assumption that when one has found a method of 
 proof he has really proved his case. Processes of 
 reasoning, keenly devised, are all very well; but 
 they must ultimately rest upon facts. To have 
 these facts at his command is the business of the 
 debater. No mistake is more common, among 
 
METHODS OF PROOF. 105 
 
 young debaters, than the habit of making many as- 
 sertions which, if true, would no doubt prove their 
 case, but which are not backed up by evidence. 
 Many a speech which seems to contain a good deal 
 of material can really be reduced to a series of 
 statements of the speaker's opinions about the sub- 
 ject. But the very fact that the subject is debated 
 indicates, of course, that something more than 
 opinions must be shown. 
 
 It will pay, then, to be honest with one's self, 
 and consider carefully what can be proved conclu- 
 sively for one's case, what can be proved 
 only to a certain degree of probability, and °^®"y' 
 what cannot be proved at all. One need not con- 
 fess all the weaknesses of his case to his hear- 
 ers; but when one is speaking from conviction, it 
 may be well to remember that other people's con- 
 victions ought naturally to be established on no 
 better and no worse foundations than one's own. 
 The proof that is sufficient for an honest speaker 
 ought to suffice for an honest hearer. There is no 
 need of asserting roundly what is after all only a 
 probability or a guess. It gives one's opponent 
 fine opportunity to trip one up. It is true that all 
 proof is in a sense only an approximation to cer- 
 tainty; but if the certainty of the hearer can be 
 made equal to the honest certainty of the speaker, 
 and brought to the point of the desired action, that 
 is enough. 
 
VI. 
 
 METHODS OF REFUTATION. 
 
 Thus far we have considered the subject of proof 
 almost entirely on its positive side: given a propo- 
 Whatisto sition, how to demonstrate the truth of 
 
 the^^o'Ste ^^^ ^^^ ^^ ^^^ ^^^^ ^^ ^ debatable sub- 
 Side? ject there must always be in mind the 
 other side of one's task: namely, how to demon- 
 strate the error of the opposite proposition. When 
 one has the negative side, indeed, — the opposite 
 side from that on which the burden of proof chiefly 
 rests, — refutation constitutes the great part of 
 one's work. And it has already been remarked, 
 in the chapter on Preliminary Work, that the study 
 of both sides of the question, and of what is nec- 
 essary to be said on one side in refutation of the 
 other, is an indispensable part of the preliminary 
 analysis. Before entering upon debate, there- 
 fore, the well-prepared disputant will have deter- 
 mined just what position he will take regarding 
 every probable argument of his opponent, quite as 
 definitely as he will have determined what direct 
 proof he will offer for himself. 
 
 The outline of various methods of proof, as given 
 
 in the preceding chapter, has already indicated, by 
 
 xo6 
 
METHODS OF REFUTATION. 107 
 
 implication, the methods which are naturally to be 
 employed in refutation. To refute an argument 
 one must simply understand its weak points and 
 aim at them. If no weak points can be found, it 
 must be shown that the argument — though per- 
 haps good in itself — is insufficient to prove the 
 main proposition in dispute. The place and order 
 in which this refutation will be undertaken are mat- 
 ters that we must consider a little later. For the 
 present it will be well briefly to reconsider the vari- 
 ous methods of proof, having in mind the manner 
 in which they are open to attack. 
 
 The first division of proof was that relating to 
 the simple establishing of the facts in the case, and 
 this was seen to be done largely by the Questioning 
 ofifering of testimony. In considering the of Facts, 
 facts set forth by an opponent, one must first of 
 all decide whether they may be admitted as true 
 or whether they must be disputed. There is a 
 choice, then, of three methods of refutation. One 
 may say, The alleged facts are not true; or. The 
 facts were correctly stated, but wrong inferences 
 were drawn from them; or. The facts alleged are 
 not true, and even if they were, the inferences 
 would be unwarranted. If one can follow the sec- 
 ond method with safety, time will of course be 
 saved, and the opponent who has occupied himself 
 in establishing the admitted facts may be regarded 
 as having done quite as much for one side as for 
 
Io8 THE ART OF DEBATE, 
 
 the other. If, on the other hand, the alleged facts 
 cannot properly be admitted, their incorrectness 
 must be clearly pointed out. The simplest way of 
 doing this is to show that they are on the face of 
 them incredible: that they contradict each other, 
 for example, or that they are inconsistent with facts 
 generally known. Thus Mr. Lincoln is said to have 
 refuted testimony regarding events alleged to have 
 occurred on a moonlight night, simply by intro- 
 ducing an almanac and showing that there could 
 have been no moonlight at the time in question. 
 It may be that one can indicate the incredibility of 
 alleged facts simply by proving the contrary facts. 
 Yet if testimony has been ofifered by the other side, 
 it will ordinarily not be safe to ignore it. If no 
 witnesses have been produced, testimony may 
 simply be demanded; but if apparently good wit- 
 nesses have testified, one must show distinctly why 
 they are not to be believed. 
 
 All testimony, as was indicated in the last chap- 
 ter, is based on the assumption that the witness is 
 Attacking capable of knowing the truth about the 
 Testimony, point in question, and that he is willing 
 to tell it. If the witness can be shown to be preju- 
 diced, then suspicion will be justly aroused. If 
 statistics are offered by one side, and it can be 
 shown by the other side that they were compiled 
 expressly for the purpose of proving the disputed 
 fact, by persons interested to prove it, a presump- 
 
METHODS OF REFUTATION, 109 
 
 tion will have been raised against them. If the 
 witness is distinctly a witness for the disputant on 
 one side of the question, — if he has been sought out 
 by that disputant, questioned so as to bring out 
 what the disputant desires to show, and perhaps 
 even prompted or coached in advance of giving 
 testimony, — his testimony will in so far be open to 
 question. And on the other hand, if the witness 
 can be shown to be of incompetent judgment, so 
 as not to be trusted in dealing with the particular 
 matters in question, the effect is of course the 
 same. Thus a color-blind person, or a deaf person, 
 would be incompetent to testify on matters requir- 
 ing the use of the senses; and there are many mat- 
 ters, involving elements of art, or mechanics, or 
 practical business, on which witnesses must speak 
 according to their education or experience along 
 particular lines. If testimony can be shown to be 
 worthless in no other way, one may attack the gen- 
 eral character of the witness so as to destroy belief 
 in his truthfulness.* All these methods are well 
 recognized in courts of law, and skilled lawyers 
 
 * A classic example of skillful handling of an opponent's 
 evidence is Lord Erskine's great speech in defense of Lord 
 George Gordon, February 5, 1781. A great part of the de- 
 fense consisted in the analysis of the testimony presented by 
 the Crown, either the character of the witnesses or the con- 
 sistency of their testimony being attacked. See the reprint 
 of the speech in Baker's " Specimens of Argumentation," 
 especially pp. 111-131. 
 
no THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 Spend much time in refuting the testimony offered 
 by the other side, by means of cross-examination 
 of witnesses and the like. In general debate one is 
 forced to refute testimony in a more rapid and more 
 indirect fashion. The debater must emphasize 
 clearly the points about the testimony or the wit- 
 ness which are open to attack, so as to destroy 
 belief in the alleged facts in the minds of those who 
 have heard them stated. 
 
 Closely connected with the handling of testi- 
 mony, as we have seen, is the use of the argument 
 Refutation of ^^^^ authority. Argument of this sort 
 Authority. ^i^y of coursc be rcfutcd by showing that 
 the authority cited is really not competent to 
 speak authoritatively on the matter in dispute; — 
 that the matter is one, it may be, on which any in- 
 dividual is at liberty to form his own judgments, so 
 that there can be no ex cathedra judgment set up 
 to which reverence must be paid. This is the privi- 
 lege of any debater, for example, when an authority 
 is quoted on matters of religion or morals; he 
 may appeal from the alleged authority to the in- 
 dividual conscience. Or, one may quote a dissent- 
 ing opinion from an authority at least as good as 
 that quoted by one's opponent, and thus raise a 
 presumption that one's own position has at least 
 as good standing as the opposite; a lawyer, for 
 example, may quote the judgment of a highly re- 
 spected court, Hke that of the Supreme Court of 
 
METHODS OF REFUTATION, Xil 
 
 Massachusetts, against that of another court less 
 widely and favorably known. It may be said, how- 
 ever, that in a very large number of cases it is not 
 worth while to attempt to refute directly the argu- 
 ment from authority. In most debates such an ar- 
 gument is at best merely corroborative, — proof, in 
 a sense, of antecedent probability; and if the au- 
 thority cited by an opponent is recognized and re- 
 spected by one's audience, it may arouse prejudice 
 to attack it in an obvious way. It will commonly 
 be wiser to treat the authority courteously, but to 
 heap up so much proof on the other side as to show 
 great likelihood either that it was mistaken or that 
 it was misinterpreted. Those who reverence any 
 book or body of men may be led to forsake their 
 authority unaware, when they would only be 
 roused to defend it if it were directly attacked. 
 
 We come now to proof based on inference from 
 matters before the fact. Proof based on a cause 
 which it is argued was sufficient to pro- ^ ^ , ,. 
 
 . . .. . Refutation 
 
 duce the disputed fact, as in the case of of a priori 
 proof of motive, may be refuted in one of ■^^^®^*'®* 
 two ways: by showing that the fact alleged as 
 cause did not exist, or that, while admittedly exist- 
 ing, it was not sufficient to produce the disputed 
 event. Thus in a case where it should be argued 
 that an accident was due to defective construction 
 on the part of the builders, on the ground that 
 they had been observed to do their work in a neg- 
 
112 THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 ligent manner, opposing proof might be directed 
 to show that there had been no neghgence, or — 
 that being impossible — to show that no amount of 
 negligence, in the particular form charged, could 
 have resulted in the accident whose cause was in 
 dispute. In general, however, the argument from 
 antecedent probability is not susceptible of satis- 
 factory direct refutation. The same causes which 
 make it a weak form of proof, standing by itself, 
 make it difficult to overthrow it definitely. Thus 
 in the case of proof of motive, it is usually impos- 
 sible to prove that the motive was insufBcient to 
 account for the act alleged; and in general one 
 cannot do much in proving what an alleged cause 
 could not produce. The safest method of refuting 
 this sort of proof is usually to set up a proof of an- 
 tecedent probability on the other side; to show 
 that if one's opponent's case is reasonable on the 
 face of it, one's own is equally so; and hence to raise 
 the presumption that the a priori argument of the 
 other side counts for very little. If reasons have 
 been set forth why A would be likely to have done 
 a certain act, and one can in reply show good rea- 
 sons why he was unlikely to do it, it cannot be said 
 that the first argument has been definitely an- 
 swered; but its effect has been largely destroyed. 
 
 The argument from Example, so called, is also 
 likely to be of so slight a character as to require 
 small attention from the opposing debater; it is 
 
METHODS OF REFUTATION. 113 
 
 of course to be refuted, when necessary, by 
 showing that the example cited differs in Refutation 
 some essential particular from the case in of Example, 
 dispute. When this can be done, the force of the 
 example is destroyed. Thus it is common for law- 
 yers, when the judgment of a court has been cited 
 against them by the opposing counsel, to point 
 out by way of refutation that while the case cited 
 resembles the pending case in superficial features, 
 there is a difiference in one important particular, 
 and that on that difference the decision of the court 
 must turn. Or, when a debater cites the relations 
 of England with her colonies as precedent for pro- 
 posed policies in the case of the United States and 
 dependent territory, it may be rejoined that there 
 are essential differences between the conditions of 
 government in England and the United States, 
 which practically nullify the comparison. In a de- 
 bate in favor of an international court of arbitra- 
 tion, it was argued by the affirmative that, just as 
 tribes had grown out of families and nations out 
 of tribes, so the establishment of international re- 
 lations was a natural step in advance, — ^a step 
 toward " the parliament of man, the federation of 
 the world." It was rejoined by the negative, how- 
 ever, that there is an important difference between 
 the growth of government in the development of 
 nations and federations, and that proposed in a 
 mere treaty of arbitration: in the former case, all 
 
114 THE ART OF DEBATE, 
 
 departments of government have grown and been 
 magnified together, — executive, judicial, and leg- 
 islative; whereas it is now proposed to unite two 
 nations in certain judicial arrangements, yet with- 
 out any united legislative body for the promulga- 
 tion of laws, and without any executive arm to 
 carry the decisions of the international tribunal 
 into effect. The refutation was ingenious and ef- 
 fective. 
 
 We must next consider the refutation of proof 
 by inferences drawn from matters after the fact, — 
 E fat ti f ^^^^ proof as that by " sign " or cir- 
 a posteriori cumstantial evidence. Our examination 
 71 ence. ^^ ^j^j^ method of proof, in the preceding 
 chapter, must have made clear the points at which 
 it is open to refutation. This proof rests, we saw, 
 on the assumption that the known fact can be ac- 
 counted for only by presuming the disputed fact as 
 its cause. If, therefore, it can be shown either that 
 the disputed fact, if it existed, would have been in- 
 sufficient to produce the known fact, or that there 
 are other facts equally well known which might 
 have produced it, the proof is overthrown. Thus 
 in a trial for murder, if the case against the accused 
 person rested on the fact that he was found near 
 the scene of the murder with blood on his cloth- 
 ing, the defense would undertake to account for 
 his presence and for the blood-stains, in such a 
 way as to destroy the necessity of assuming that 
 
METHODS OF REFUTATION. 115 
 
 his guilt was the only possible cause. Or, in the 
 use of statistics, which we saw to be a common 
 case of circumstantial evidence, when certain 
 figures are offered as proof that a given law was 
 beneficial, the opposing side must show that the 
 figures can be accounted for on a different assump- 
 tion. If they can go further than to show that 
 they could be so accounted for, and show definitely 
 that the cause may be known to be different from 
 that alleged, the proof by " sign " is completely 
 overthrown. An interesting case of this kind oc- 
 curred in a debate on the so-called Norwegian or 
 " dispensary " system of regulating the liquor 
 traffic. The affirmative attempted to prove the 
 benefits of the system by showing that after its 
 adoption the arrests for drunkenness in the affected 
 territory had greatly decreased in number. The 
 other side, however, was able to make it appear 
 that certain changes in the police regulations, oc- 
 curring at just the time in question, were sufficient 
 to account for the smaller number of arrests with- 
 out indicating any diminution in the amount of 
 liquor consumed. 
 
 This sort of refutation is one of the most im- 
 portant weapons of the debater. It deals with one 
 of the most difficult duties of the rea- oauaeaand 
 son, — that relating to causes and effects. Effects. 
 The same reasons which make it hard to determine, 
 when one has recovered from a disease, whether 
 
Ii6 THE ART OF DEBATE, 
 
 the recovery is due to the medicine taken or to 
 other causes, make it hard to decide on the results 
 of particular laws and on many questions of public 
 policy. When there is a defect in the argument 
 from cause and effect, it is commonly due to the 
 fallacy called by logicians the fallacy of *' Post 
 hoc ergo propter hoc'' — that is, the fallacy which 
 assumes that because one event is observed to suc- 
 ceed another, it must be the effect of the latter. To 
 refute this fallacy successfully requires, above all 
 things, a mind well stored with facts pertinent to 
 the subject in hand. 
 
 A good illustration of refutation under this head 
 is quoted by Fowler, in his " Inductive Logic," 
 from Professor Rogers's *' Manual of Political 
 Economy." 
 
 " There is not a shadow of evidence," says Rogers, 
 " in support of the statement that inferior lands have 
 been occupied and cultivated as population increases. 
 The increase of population has not preceded but fol- 
 lowed this occupation and cultivation. It is not the 
 pressure of population on the means of subsistence 
 which has led men to cultivate inferior soils, but the 
 fact that, these soils being cultivated in another way, 
 or taken into cultivation, an increased population be- 
 came possible. How could an increased population 
 have stimulated greater labour in agriculture, when 
 agriculture must have supplied the means on which 
 that increased population could have existed? To 
 make increased population the cause of improved agri- 
 
METHODS OF REFUTATION, ill 
 
 culture is to commit the absurd blunder of confound- 
 ing cause and effect." * 
 
 A fallacy may be called a gap in a process of rea- 
 soning, and it may be said in a sense that all refu- 
 the arguments of one's opponents. If paiiacies 
 tation consists in pointing out gaps in or Gaps. 
 there is one such gap in an argument, sufficient to 
 expose the whole case to attack from without, it 
 matters little how^ strong the rest of the case may 
 be; just as it matters little how large a break in the 
 wall of a fort may be, if it is sufficient to admit the 
 forces of the enemy. The task of the refuting de- 
 bater, therefore, is to keep his attack concentrated 
 on these weak points. 
 
 Let us examine some common classes of these 
 gaps or fallacies. There may be, in the first place, 
 a mere lack of evidence. The opponent may have 
 
 * Dr. Fowler adds the remark that this argument " appears 
 to ignore the fact that a population may have an insufficient 
 supply of food, though what it does possess may be just 
 competent to sustain life." The whole question indicates the 
 difficulty of arguing accurately about economic conditions. 
 The entire chapter on " Fallacies Incident to Induction," in 
 Fowler's " Logic," is full of suggestions to students of argu- 
 ment. See, for example, the quotation from Sir G. C. Lewis 
 (p. 323), in which it is pointed out that even when we have 
 reduced our facts to those which are actually related as cause 
 and effect, the different facts may act and react upon each 
 other, so that each, in turn, is both cause and effect. So with 
 industry and wealth, intelligence and good government, 
 drunkenness and poverty, national character and environ- 
 ment, and the like. 
 
Il8 THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 made assumptions which he was bound to prove. 
 Beffffingthe '^^^^ involvcs the so-called fallacy of 
 Question. " Petitio Principii," or *' Begging the 
 Question." In its simplest sense, to beg the ques- 
 tion, or to assume what one is bound to prove, is 
 merely to make statements which appear to be con- 
 vincing but which are really unsupported by evi- 
 dence. In a larger sense this fallacy is involved in 
 many inferences of a complicated sort. Thus one 
 is said to beg the question when he uses a word at 
 one time in one sense, and at another time in a 
 different sense, and yet draws a conclusion depend- 
 ing on the assumption that the two words are the. 
 same. Many arguments involving the use of sucli 
 words as " socialist," '* democrat," *' free trade," 
 " expansion," and the like, really involve this fal- 
 lacy. Thus the phrase " question-begging epithet," 
 first used by Jeremy Bentham, has come to be 
 commonly applied to any term applied for the 
 very purpose of discrediting the person or thing 
 in question. " It makes no little difference," says 
 one writer, " whether we call a man a progressive 
 or a revolutionist, a conservative or a reactionary." 
 The term '' Jingo " is a term of recent origin which 
 well illustrates this sort of fallacy. A '* Jingo " is, 
 in the popular sense, a citizen over-noisy or head- 
 strong in his patriotism; to say that a certain opin- 
 ion, therefore, indicates ''Jingoism," is to call it 
 over-no'isy or unreasonably patriotic, which is no 
 
METHODS OF REFUTATION, 119 
 
 doubt the very matter in dispute. Such instances 
 of begging the question are to be refuted by caUing 
 attention to the fact that the term used has two 
 meanings, a colorless one and a prejudicial one, 
 and that to apply them in the prejudicial sense is 
 simply to assume what one must prove. 
 
 In a recent debate on a question relating to the 
 extension of the suffrage, it was argued on one 
 side that citizens have no inherent right to vote, 
 since the state always decides just which citizens 
 shall constitute voters. It was replied that such 
 an argument really begged the question, since the 
 very point at issue was: who constitute the state? 
 and have a right to exercise authority in its name? 
 To say, therefore, that the state sets limits to citi- 
 zenship and suffrage is merely equivalent to say- 
 ing that those who enjoy such privileges usually 
 have a certain power to keep others from getting 
 them; and nothing as to natural right is proved. 
 This somewhat ingenious argument illustrates how 
 the fallacy of begging the question appears in de- 
 bate in all manner of forms. Similar examples are 
 to be found in many discussions of monetary prob- 
 lems. Speakers often refer to an increase or 
 diminution in the amount of currency in circula- 
 tion, as though it meant an increase or diminution 
 in the fortunes of individual citizens. " We are 
 told," said a speaker in a recent political campaign, 
 " that if this measure is adopted we shall have too 
 
I20 THE ART OF DEBATE, 
 
 much currency. I do not know how you feel about 
 it, but I have never yet seen the time when I had 
 too much money, and I have never met any one 
 else who complained that he had too much." A 
 more question-begging argument could not be 
 imagined. Whenever one has to consider the pos- 
 sibility of more money being brought into the 
 country, whether by one means or another, he must 
 ask himself: Will this money be the property of the 
 government? Will it be in the hands of a few in- 
 dividual citizens? or Will it come into the general 
 circulation? To assume that any one of these con- 
 ditions is the same as any other, is to assume what 
 must be proved. 
 
 A particular form of this fallacy is sometimes 
 called " Ignoratio Elenchi," or " Ignoring the 
 Ignoring the Qucstiou." This is a gap between the 
 Qnestion. proof offered and the main question un- 
 der debate. It appears when the debater really 
 shifts his argument from one issue to another, and 
 seems to have proved the matter in dispute when 
 he can be shown to have proved something quite 
 different. Such cases may arise from the use of 
 ambiguous terms in two different senses, such as 
 we discussed a moment ago. Or they may appear 
 when the argument is shifted from the general prin- 
 ciple under discussion to some one instance, and 
 that instance is made to take the place of the whole 
 question. Many debaters show marvelous skill in 
 
METHODS OF REFUTATION. 121 
 
 gliding almost imperceptibly from one proposition 
 to another, and it requires corresponding skill to 
 make them hold their ground. Thus even lawyers, 
 who are held within bounds more than most de- 
 baters, will — when their case is weak on the side 
 of evidence — attempt to win juries by much talk 
 about vague matters of justice and righteousness. 
 In debates where the question is stated to be one 
 of the interests of the nation or individuals con- 
 cerned, one often hears argument relating solely 
 to matters of theoretical right and justice, not in- 
 volved in the question of interest at all. Whenever 
 a debater indulges largely in vague talk about per- 
 sonal liberty, public justice, freedom and independ- 
 ence, and similar phrases, one may have a suspi- 
 cion that he feels that his actual proof is weak, and 
 is attempting to " ignore the question " without 
 being discovered. This is the opportunity for ef- 
 fective refutation. In all such cases it is one's privi- 
 lege to admit everything that has been said on the 
 side issue, and then show with rigid distinctness 
 just what the question involves, and how this has 
 been neglected for other things. 
 
 It will be seen that these various fallacies, so- 
 called, cannot be perfectly distinguished from one 
 another, and applied as exact names to particular 
 arguments. Their boundaries intermingle and 
 are easily lost. In a sense most flaws in proof may 
 be called instances of " non sequitur," — that is, 
 
122 THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 mistaken inferences where we say, " It does not fol- 
 low "; in a sense nearly all may be called instances 
 of " begging the question." It is of little import- 
 ance to name them. The point is to recognize 
 where there is a gap in the proof which invalidates 
 the argument, and to make this so clear that the 
 effect of the fallacious argument will be swept 
 away. 
 
 A particular method of refutation which is widely 
 used, and of which a word should be said at this 
 Reduotlo ad point, is that called the " Reductio ad 
 Absurdum. AbsurdtimJ' This is a term borrowed 
 from geometrical demonstration, where the pro- 
 cess is very familiar. If we wish to show the im- 
 possibility of constructing a triangle of which one 
 side shall be longer than the sum of the other two, 
 we draw a triangle and declare — for the moment — 
 that one of its sides is longer than the sum of the 
 other two; then we show to what absurd conclu- 
 sions this immediately leads us. The process in 
 general argument is precisely similar. We assume 
 that the proposition we wish to refute is true, and 
 then point out to what absurd results it leads. This 
 method may of course be applied to the main ques- 
 tion against which we are debating, or to any par- 
 ticular proposition which has been raised by an 
 opponent. When well done it is among the most 
 effective means of refutation. A particular form of 
 it is called the Dilemma, when one can show that 
 
METHODS OF REFUTATION. X23 
 
 an opponent's position must lead to one of two al- 
 ternate results, and can then show the falsity of 
 each of these. 
 
 A story is told of Mr. Lincoln, in the early years 
 of his career as a lawyer, that he had to defend a 
 man accused of murdering another by striking 
 him down with a shovel in the village store. The 
 witnesses for the prosecution all agreed as to the 
 places where the murdered man and the murderer 
 were standing at the moment of the crime. Mr. 
 Lincoln measured ofif in the court-room distances 
 corresponding to those indicated by the testimony, 
 himself took a shovel in his hand, and then showed 
 that — although he was considerably taller than 
 his client — it was quite impossible for him to 
 reach as far as from the point where the ac- 
 cused was said to have stood to the place where 
 the murdered man fell. The testimony for the 
 prosecution was thus, in a sense, reduced to an 
 absurdity. In a sense, too, this is done wherever 
 witnesses can be shown either to contradict them- 
 selves so strikingly, or to agree with such sus- 
 picious exactness, as to make it absurd to credit 
 the statements to which they testified. 
 
 A familiar example of the rediictio ad ahsurdum 
 occurs in Macaulay's Copyright speech of 1841.* 
 He was arguing that any copyright is open to cer- 
 
 * See the speech, in Baker's " Specimens of Argumenta- 
 tion," and the Brief in the Appendix to this book. 
 
1^4 THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 tain objections on the ground that it is a monopoly, 
 and that monopoly always makes things dear. 
 
 " If, as my honorable and learned friend seems to 
 think, the whole world is in the wrong on this point, 
 if the real effect of monopoly is to make articles good 
 and cheap, why does he stop short in his career of 
 change? Why does he limit the operation of so salu- 
 tary a principle to sixty years ? Why does he consent 
 to anything short of perpetuity? He told us that in con- 
 senting to anything short of perpetuity he was making 
 a compromise between extreme right and expediency. 
 But if his opinion about monopoly be correct, extreme 
 right and expediency would coincide. Or rather why 
 should we not restore the monopoly of the East India 
 trade to the East India Company? Why should we 
 not revive all those old monopolies which, in Eliza- 
 beth's reign, galled our fathers so severely that, mad- 
 dened by intolerable wrong, they opposed to their 
 sovereign a resistance before which her haughty spirit 
 quailed for the first and for the last time? Was it the 
 cheapness and excellence of commodities that then so 
 violently stirred the indignation of the EngHsh people? 
 I believe, Sir, that I may safely take it for granted that 
 the effect of monopoly generally is to make articles 
 scarce, to make them dear, and to make them bad." 
 
 The same method is used in the speech on Mr. 
 Cleveland's Venezuelan Message, quoted in the 
 Appendix. In reply to the objection that the Presi- 
 dent had adopted an unduly warlike tone in his 
 
METHODS OF REFUTATION. 125 
 
 reference to our relations with Great Britain, the 
 speaker said: 
 
 " Doubtless he should have said that, although he 
 believed the American people support his position, yet 
 if Great Britain should object we would of course sub- 
 mit; and that no serious consequences could possibly 
 occur, since no consideration of our own rights could 
 compare with the evil of having to fight for them. 
 We are not in the habit, however, of electing Presi- 
 dents who talk that way." 
 
 Sometimes this method appears when there is an 
 opportunity to show the weakness of an opponent's 
 position simply by stating it in another form. Thus 
 Senator Hoar, in a recent debate in the United 
 States Senate, referred in this way to Senator Bev- 
 eridge's claim that to establish good colonial gov- 
 ernments in distant islands would stimulate good 
 government at home: 
 
 " If I understood him correctly, he said also that he 
 thought it was not necessary to wait until we could get 
 the very best of government here, but if we established 
 it abroad under some commissioners to be appointed 
 by some executive authority, they would govern so 
 well that they would furnish a good example for us at 
 home, and we should improve. I suppose, though he 
 did not say it, that he thinks also we had better not 
 have free speech here in the United States Senate until 
 they have got it out among the Filipinos, to see whe- 
 ther it works there, and then it may come back to us 
 
126 THE yiRT OF DEBATE, 
 
 in a way which gradually would permit us to use it 
 here, in a sort of diluted form." * 
 
 The form of the method of Dilemma is equaUy 
 familiar. A single example will sufifice, taken from 
 The Di- Lord Mansfield's great speech in the case 
 lemma. q{ Evans, before the House of Lords in 
 1767. His claim was that to be a Dissenter from 
 the Established Church was no longer recognized 
 by law as in any sense a crime. 
 
 " If it is a crime not to take the sacrament at church, 
 it must be a crime by some law; which must be either 
 common or statute law, the canon law enforcing it being 
 dependent wholly upon the statute law. Now the 
 statute law is repealed as to persons capable of plead- 
 ing that they are so and so qualified ; and therefore the 
 canon law is repealed with regard to those persons. 
 
 " If it is a crime by common law, it must be so either 
 by usage or principle. But there is no usage or custom, 
 independent of positive law, which makes nonconform- 
 ity a crime. The eternal principles of natural religion 
 are part of the common law. The essential principles 
 of revealed religion are part of the common law; so 
 that any person reviling, subverting, or ridiculing them 
 may be prosecuted at common law. But it cannot be 
 shown, from the principles of natural or revealed re- 
 ligion, that, independent of positive law, temporal 
 punishments ought to be inflicted for mere opinions 
 with respect to particular modes of worship. 
 
 * Congressional Record, Jan. 9, 1900. 
 
METHODS OF REFUTATIOU. 127 
 
 " Persecution for a sincere though erroneous con- 
 science is not to be deduced from reason or the fitness 
 of things. It can only stand upon positive law." * 
 
 Such forms of refutation as these depend upon 
 the ability of the debater quickly to analyze and 
 test the reasoning processes of his oppon- Paotsin 
 ent. Skill of this sort is of the greatest Befatation. 
 service; but an equally important element in suc- 
 cessful refutation is, as has already been indicated, 
 an ample knowledge of all the facts in the case in 
 dispute. It is, after all, mastery of incontrovertible 
 facts rather than ingenious reasoning v^hich is likely 
 to be most convincing; and if in the progress of an 
 argument a debater is able to bring forward facts 
 which have been neglected by the other side, the 
 effect is most important. This is to show a great 
 gap in the structure of one's opponent; if he has 
 built up his argument regardless of essential mat- 
 ters, he has built it — no matter how finely — in 
 vain. Many striking examples of this will occur 
 to those who have listened to well-fought debates. 
 Not long ago a public official was attacked by one 
 who was a candidate to succeed him in office. The 
 official was a prosecuting attorney. It was proved 
 that he had left untried several hundred criminal 
 cases that were awaiting attention, that many of 
 
 • See the whole speech, in Baker's " Specimens of Argu- 
 mentation." 
 
laS THE ART OF DEBATE, 
 
 these had remained on the docket for months and 
 years, that several of them were cases involving 
 serious charges, three being based on indictments 
 for murder. When the attorney appeared in per- 
 son to reply it seemed that the evidence was over- 
 whelmingly against him. He showed, however, 
 that he had tried as many cases as the courts would 
 give him time for; that of the hundreds remaining 
 on the docket most related to trivial charges of 
 assault or breach of the peace; that in the case of 
 many of these the parties making the complaint 
 had themselves requested the withdrawal of pro- 
 cess; and that of the three oersons not yet tried 
 for murder, two had committed suicide, and tlie 
 third had run away! It was a striking instance of 
 the way in which an apparently strong case may 
 be overthrown by the presentation of facts which 
 the other side has ignored. 
 
 Let us now briefly summarize the methods of 
 refutation we have been considering, so as to indi- 
 cate roughly the various possible types of argument 
 one would be likely to adopt, in attacking the proof 
 of another. 
 
 In general, one may refute the argument of an 
 opponent either (-i) by showing that the facts in 
 „ . , i, the case are not true as alleged; or (2) 
 
 Methods of ... o ' v / 
 
 Eefatation that, the facts bcmg admittedly as alleged, 
 umma ize . ^|^^ inferences drawn from them are in- 
 correct; or (3) that the alleged facts are not true, 
 
METHODS OF REFUTATION, 129 
 
 and that even if they were true, the inferences are 
 unwarranted. It is important that there shall be 
 no doubt, in the mind either of the debater or of 
 his audience, as to which of these positions he 
 wishes to occupy. 
 
 In particular, one may refute opposing argu- 
 ments — 
 
 (i) By showing that the witnesses cited are 
 either (a) prejudiced, {jS) of incompetent judgment, 
 or (c) morally untrustworthy. 
 
 (2) By showing that the evidence alleged is in- 
 credible because (a) inconsistent with known facts, 
 or (^) self-contradictory. 
 
 (3) By showing that the fact alleged as sufficient 
 cause of the disputed fact either (a) did not exist, 
 or (6) was insufficient to act as cause in the manner 
 alleged. 
 
 (4) By showing that the fact alleged as the re- 
 sult of the disputed fact (a) did not exist, or (&) is 
 not evidently a sign of the disputed fact, or (c) 
 that there were other acting causes. 
 
 (5) By showing that examples cited are differ- 
 ent, in essential points, from the case in dispute. 
 
 (6) By showing that the opposite side has as- 
 sumed something which it was under obligation to 
 prove. 
 
 (7) By showing that the proof offered does not 
 bear directly on the matter in dispute. 
 
130 THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 (8) By showing that statements made lead to ad- 
 mittedly absurd conclusions. 
 
 (9) By showing that the opposite side has ig- 
 nored essential facts. 
 
 It remains only to add a few suggestions regard- 
 ing the general character and use of refutation. 
 _^ . In the first place, regarding the need for 
 pieofRefa- such direct refutation as we have just 
 
 *' been considering. It may be thought that 
 
 it is enough to prove one's own case directly, with- 
 out disproving that of one's opponent. But where 
 the question in dispute is genuinely debatable, this 
 is never safe. If one side of a proposition is proved 
 directly, and then the other appears to be proved 
 equally well, the result is confusion. The audience 
 finds difficulty in judging between the two argu- 
 ments, and may be left to base its judgment on 
 mere trivialities, not being able to decide on the 
 merits of the case. Where a debater contents him- 
 self with proving his own case, finely scorning the 
 arguments of his opponent, he has his hearers at 
 his mercy for the time being; but if his opponent 
 has the last word, he will leave no permanent ef- 
 fect. It should not be forgotten that persons can- 
 not be soundly convinced of the truth of a dis- 
 puted proposition, until they have not only been 
 shown the arguments in its favor, but the defects 
 in the arguments brought against it. More than 
 this, the refutation of opposing arguments should, 
 
METHODS OF REFUTATION. ^Sl 
 
 if possible, show not only that they are false, but 
 why they are false. The effort should be to lead 
 one's audience to see just how one's opponents 
 came to mistake the truth of the question, and to 
 be led into the sort of proof they offer. If one 
 shows only the fact that a statement is to be dis- 
 believed,- — that something is wrong with it, — it may 
 still crop up again and be believed in a different 
 form; but if one can make clear its fundamental 
 error, he has destroyed its chances of effectiveness 
 in the minds of his hearers. 
 
 Yet while refutation should be so thorough, from 
 this point of view, in another sense there is need 
 for a word of warning against carrying Distinction 
 the attempt at complete refutation too ^^^^X^' 
 far. Many debaters make the mistake of gnments. 
 attacking everything said by their opponents, so 
 long as there is the slightest chance of attacking 
 it, with little regard for its importance in the argu- 
 ment. Statements/ made by one's opponents in de- 
 bate may be roughly divided as follows: first, those 
 which one may admit to be true without com- 
 promising one's case; secondly, those which are 
 open to attack, but which have no bearing on the 
 argument, — mere errors of memory or the like; 
 thirdly, those which may be questioned and which 
 have some connection with the argument, but 
 which evidently make no great impression on the 
 audience addressed; fourthly, those which must be 
 
13* THE yfRT OF DEBATE, 
 
 overthrown in order to destroy the impression that 
 they are strong proofs on the opposite side. These 
 four classes of statements require very different 
 treatment. The first class should be admitted to 
 be true, in order to clear up the ground of argu- 
 ment so far. The second class should be ignored 
 altogether. The third class should be lightly 
 touched upon, and briefly refuted if there is suffi- 
 cient time. The fourth class should receive the 
 brunt of the refutation. A watchful debater can 
 easily tell which portions of the opposing argument 
 have made an impression on the hearers, so that 
 they must be overthrown if his own case is to make 
 a good showing. Yet one often sees much time 
 wasted in the refutation of statements which have 
 made no special impression, merely because they 
 can be refuted. The typically clumsy debater may 
 be easily known in what he calls his rebuttal argu- 
 ment; he has noted down on a slip of paper a long 
 list of " points " made by his opponent, which he 
 rehearses for the purpose of attacking them; some 
 of Ihem are mere illustrations, passing thrusts, 
 perhaps mere misquotations or shps of the tongue. 
 His refutation is a long series of short dabs at all 
 parts of his enemy's armor, without a single sweep- 
 ing stroke at a vital part. Choice and emphasis 
 are as important qualities in refutation as in all 
 other sorts of discourse. ^ ^^ 
 
 All this goes to show, what was pointed out in 
 
METHODS OF REFUTy4TION. I33 
 
 the chapter on Preliminary Work, that one must 
 make as careful a study of the case of his j^o^jg^-g 
 opponent as of his own. One must know of the other 
 
 f . < • J Sidei 
 
 its Strong pomts and its weak points, and 
 show the audience that one understands it and ap- 
 preciates its material. Oftentimes one of the most 
 useful methods of refutation is simply to state the 
 case of the opposite side better than it has been 
 stated by its adherents, and then to analyze it so as 
 to exhibit its flaws. If they have stated it in the 
 form of abstract principles, one may put it in con- 
 crete form, and perhaps make the absurdity of the 
 principle clear by a practical illustration; or, if it 
 has been stated in a specific form, one may restate 
 it in the form of the general principle involved, and 
 show the unreasonableness of that. Oftentimes the 
 most important element in refutation is to show 
 that the opposite side has really misunderstood or 
 misrepresented one's position, and to relieve it 
 from the error that has gathered about it. One 
 needs constantly to avoid letting the discussion be 
 led o^ to side issues, by turning back at every step 
 to the real issue under consideration. Many ob- 
 jections raised by opponents are quibbles about 
 words, and the simplest way to dispose of them is 
 to recall the minds of the audience to the real situa- 
 tion. " If you will turn back," said a debater on 
 one occasion, " from the imaginary cases which 
 my opponent has presented for our solution, to the 
 
134 THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 question with which we started, it will be clear that 
 the difficulties raised do not exist in actual condi- 
 tions, but are only theoretical and imaginary." But 
 in all these cases equally, it is clear that not to un- 
 derstand the position of the opposite side will be 
 to run every risk of defeat. 
 
 This leads us to a final thought, regarding the 
 general attitude of the debater toward his oppon- 
 Attatude ent, during the process of refutation. 
 Opponent. Should he treat his adversary as an 
 enemy, or as a friend who has gone astray? 
 Should he pour forth scorn upon the arguments he 
 has to answer, or treat them, when he can, as. de- 
 serving of respectful consideration? The former 
 method is undoubtedly in frequent use, but the lat- 
 ter is undoubtedly the more intelligent and safe. 
 It is the clumsy debater who begins his reply by 
 saying that he has really heard nothing worthy of 
 being answered, and that he has been astonished 
 to see how much breath has been wasted in the 
 absence of real argument. Besides being a boorish 
 and discourteous method of retort, this style of re- 
 buttal does small credit to the case one is discuss- 
 ing. If there is really nothing requiring one's pow- 
 ers of refutation, small skill is needed in one's re- 
 ply. But if the adversary has really made out a 
 strong case, and one is ready to admit it, the task 
 of rebuttal is seen to be worthy of one's best 
 powers. It happens, therefore, that those debaters 
 
METHODS OF REFUTATION, 135 
 
 usually win the greatest respect and show most 
 real argumentative power, who recognize from the 
 first that there is something to be said on both sides 
 of the question, that something has been said on 
 the opposite side from their own, and that the ar- 
 guments of their opponents — at the point where 
 they cannot be admitted as valid — deserve respect- 
 ful treatment and serious reply. 
 
 It must of course be admitted that something de- 
 pends on the character of one's opponent. Occa- 
 sionally it seems to be necessary to answer a fool 
 according to his folly, and a boor according to his 
 rudeness. Something, too, depends upon the au- 
 dience. If one has been unfairly treated in debate, 
 if one's opponent has persistently misrepresented 
 one's position, or indulged in the rudeness of per- 
 sonal attack, then one may well leave the mild man- 
 ner in which he would have preferred to speak — 
 not, indeed, in order to return the misrepresenta- 
 tion and abuse in kind, but in order to strike back 
 with genuine indignation and reproach. If the au- 
 dience has perceived the unfairness, it will be ready 
 to join in the indignation of the reply. But one 
 must not anticipate his audience too far, and show 
 much more feeling than they can easily share. 
 
 The sympathy of the audience is, indeed, the 
 great end of the wise debater. If he can carry them 
 with him, his success is assured. The audience may 
 be a single man, such as a judge in a court of law, 
 
13^ THE /^/?T OF DEBATE, 
 
 it may be a half dozen judges, or a crowded popu- 
 Persuasive ^^^ assembly. If it is desired not merely 
 Refutation, to show one's skill in argument, but to 
 carry the hearers along in the train of one's argu- 
 ment, to bring them to see from one's own point 
 of view, then the manner of attack must be friendly. 
 If they hold some of the opinions which one is en- 
 gaged in refuting, they will not listen if those opin- 
 ions are treated with scorn. They must be ap- 
 proached as friends. It must be assumed that they 
 are anxious to know the truth, and will eagerly re- 
 ceive it if they can be made to see it aright. The 
 debater, then, should seek not only to destroy the 
 error he is refuting, but — if possible — at the very 
 moment of doing so, to build up the corresponding 
 truth."^ His refutation should be keen, unflinching, 
 thorough, but at the same time respectful, friendly, 
 and not merely destructive but constructive as well. 
 
 * A good illustration of this method will be found in the 
 speech on the Retirement of the Greenbacks, quoted in the 
 Appendix, where the argument of the negative, though in 
 form refutation, is largely built upon the advocacy of a better 
 proposition than that offered by the affirmative. 
 
VII. 
 
 STRUCTURE AND STYLE. 
 
 We have now reached the point where the work 
 of the debater is to be put into its final form. The 
 question has been analyzed; the outline Matter and 
 of. proof has been determined upon; the ^<'™' 
 ntethods of proof and the evidence have been 
 dhosen; and the arguments of the opposite side 
 have been examined, so far as possible, with a view 
 to refutation. For some debaters the hard part of 
 tlie work has been completed; for others it has just 
 begun. Some, that is to say, will find that when 
 tliey have gathered and arranged their material, 
 tlie matter of verbal form goes far toward looking 
 OHit for itself; while others enjoy the more exacting 
 task of prepapation, but find themselves awkward 
 when it comes to clothing their material in pleasing 
 form. 
 
 The outhne or brief, prepared as the result of the 
 
 preliminary work of the debater, should form the 
 
 basis of his finished argument. Its order „^ ^^^^ 
 
 and divisions will, in a general way, indi- the basis oi 
 
 cate the order and divisions of his speech, "^^^^®" 
 
 — subject, of course, to such changes as the laws of 
 
 rhetoric or the exigencies of the debate may sug- 
 
 137 
 
138 THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 gest. Certainly his outline will provide for the 
 three general divisions of his argument, the Intro- 
 duction, the body of proof, and the Conclusion. 
 Let us briefly consider these divisions. 
 
 The object of an Introduction is twofold. In 
 the first place it serves to furnish the basis for 
 iTjjg debate, in an adequate statement of the 
 
 Introduction, question in dispute and the reasons for 
 considering it. In the second place, to use the 
 familiar saying of Cicero, it aims to render the 
 audience " benevolos, attentos, dociles," — well- 
 disposed toward the speaker's personality, atten- 
 tive to his speech, and ready to be instructed by 
 his arguments. These results are secured largely 
 by a combination of the qualities of clearness and 
 persuasiveness. The opening of a speech in de- 
 bate, unless it is to be immediately connected with 
 a speech which has just preceded it (when practi- 
 cally no introduction may be required), should 
 state in unmistakable terms the nature of the ques- 
 tion under consideration, and its origin — that is to 
 say, the reason why it deserves attention from the 
 audience. It should also state very briefly (or refer 
 to them if they are perfectly well known) the funda- 
 mental facts in the case, in so far as they are agreed 
 upon by both sides. If the burden of proof rests 
 upon the speaker, he may do well to admit the fact 
 frankly, and at the same time in a way that will 
 lead up to his intended attempt to shift the burden 
 upon the other side. If the presumption is in hii 
 
STRUCTURE AND STYLE. 139 
 
 favor, he >vill do well to point this out in a manner 
 that will not arouse prejudice by its arrogance. He 
 will then make clear what he feels to be those 
 elements in the subject which should especially 
 interest the audience, and upon which the case 
 must chiefly rest. All this — unless the circum- 
 stances are unusual — should be done in a manner 
 indicating respect for the opposite side in the de- 
 bate, and showing that the speaker forgets him- 
 self and his personal interests in his desire to pre- 
 sent his subject to the audience. Statements cal- 
 culated to arouse the opposition of persons hold- 
 ing views different from the speaker's will, for the 
 time being, be avoided. The effect will be that, 
 at the end of the Introduction, the audience will 
 know precisely what the debate is to be about, and 
 precisely what the present speaker takes to be the 
 main issue; they will also beUeve that he is capable 
 of presenting his side of the case in a calm and fair 
 frame of mind. 
 
 In a sense, of course, the debater has choice of 
 more than one method in constructing his Intro- 
 duction. He may state definitely not only TwoMeth- 
 the side of the case which he wishes to proach. 
 support, but the sort of proof which he intends 
 to offer in supporting it. He may take the audi- 
 ence into his confidence, and tell them just what 
 the plan of his speech is to be, in order that they 
 may follow it as he proceeds and see that he does 
 just what he proposed to do. Under ordinary cir- 
 
I40 THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 cumstances, this method has great advantages. 
 Thus it is common for lawyers, before presenting 
 their proof in detail, to state to the court or jury 
 precisely the points on which they wish to offer 
 evidence, and just how they expect to show that 
 those points establish their case. The court may 
 then decide whether these " offers," as they are 
 called, are admissible in view of the nature of the 
 case. An audience in general debate enjoys being 
 taken into the speaker's confidence in a similar 
 way. Yet there may be cases where a different 
 plan is advisable. When the cause to be defended 
 is an extremely unpopular one, when the audience 
 must be won — if at all — by slow and careful de- 
 grees, or when the proof to be presented is of 
 such a nature as not to be appreciated until all 
 the evidence is in, then the debater may adopt a 
 more wary course. He may not explain the nature 
 of his argument at the outset, perhaps not even 
 admit which side he intends to establish; but may 
 open up the question as though he had little inter- 
 est in deciding it in either one way or the other, 
 and then lead his hearers on by paths that they 
 have not foreseen, until he brings them, unex- 
 pectedly perhaps, to the point which he wished 
 them to reach. Such a plan requires skill, but is 
 occasionally of no little value. The Introduction, 
 then, either may or may not conclude with a clear 
 statement of the plan of the speaker's argument. 
 
STRUCTURE AND STYLE, 141 
 
 Regarding the structure of the main body of 
 proof, very little can be said that is applicable in 
 a general way. The nature of the proof orderof 
 must determine the best order for its ^^°°^' 
 presentation. In general, however, it will of course 
 be well to present at the outset the argument from 
 antecedent probability, — proof that the proposition 
 is likely to be true, or at least that there is no 
 valid presumption against it, — since it is the object 
 of this argument to prepare the minds of skeptical 
 hearers for the stronger proof that is to follow. 
 There are perhaps very few cases in which it is not 
 well for the debater, immediately following his intro- 
 duction, to show in a general way the antecedent 
 reasonableness of his proposition, before stating 
 direct evidence in its behalf. Such proof leads up 
 gradually and persuasively from the introductory 
 matter to the central portion of the argument. 
 Examples of this sort of procedure have already 
 been given in considering the burden of proof and 
 methods of proof. Following the argument for 
 antecedent probability naturally comes such proof 
 as circumstantial evidence. In the case of ques- 
 tions of policy, proof relating to the principle in- 
 volved would naturally be followed 'by that re- 
 lating to the interests involved. These are the 
 general rules of order which suggest themselves to 
 any intelligent debater. 
 
 Sometimes it is necessary to consider what the 
 
I4« THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 or4er of arguments shall be, viewed from the 
 standpoint of their relative strength. Shall one 
 proceed gradually from the weaker sort of proof 
 to the stronger? Certainly this would be better 
 than the reverse order. Rhetoricians generally 
 agree, however, that the beginning and the end of 
 discourses and parts of discourses are the places of 
 greatest emphasis; one's best material, therefore, 
 should naturally come here. The weaker proof may 
 then be brought in in a position protected by what 
 has preceded and what is to follow; there will 
 thus be a chance that its weakness may escape ob- 
 servation. Sometimes it is necessary to place one's 
 very best proof at the beginning of the argument, 
 in order to overcome prejudice or to overthrow 
 the effect of a speech just made on the other side. 
 Genung remarks — what is undoubtedly true — that 
 in such a case this strong proof should be briefly 
 repeated at the end of the argument, in order to 
 secure the benefit of its force in that emphatic posi- 
 tion. 
 
 In general it is to be said that all rules regarding 
 the ordering of material are to be regarded as 
 merely provisional, when it comes to the 
 ^f Debate* exigencies of actual debate. This is par- 
 ticularly true in the cause of refutation. 
 One may and should plan the order of his refu- 
 tation according to a consistent scheme, so that 
 it will take its place easily and clearly in 
 
STRUCTURE AND STYLE. 143 
 
 connection with the direct proof. He should 
 make up his mind wher-e it will probably be 
 best to take up the main points of his oppo- 
 nent's argument, and where it will be best to 
 return to the matters wherein his opponent may 
 have attacked his arguments as first advanced. But 
 the circumstances of the debate may, and often 
 will, make it necessary for him to throw this plan 
 overboard, and spring at once to the point where 
 it has become evident that the main contest is going 
 on. It is not the order in which ideas ought theo- 
 retically to have precedence, but the order in which 
 ideas present themselves to his hearers, that he 
 must consider; and if he insists on proceeding ac- 
 cording to his original plan, when the audience is 
 impatient to hear what he has to say upon some 
 matter that has become prominent in the discus- 
 sion, he will be likely to lose his case. 
 
 In the concluding arguments made before the 
 Supreme Court of the United States in the famous 
 *' income tax " cases, occurred an interest- inverted 
 ing example of what we may call inverted Sefatation. 
 refutation, — refutation, that is to say, where the 
 point last made by an opponent was the first to 
 be taken up by the debater in reply. This argu- 
 ment was carried on by two of the most dis- 
 tinguished American lawyers, Mr. Carter for the 
 government, and Mr. Choate for the opponents of 
 the income tax. In his concluding speech Mr. 
 
144 THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 Carter, having finished his positive constitutional 
 argument, made a final appeal urging the court to 
 abstain from interfering, on technical grounds, with 
 the will of the people. The present subject, he 
 said, was one calculated to arouse the interests, 
 even the passions, of the people, and to array class 
 against class. '' Noithing could be more unwise 
 and dangerous than an attempt to baffle and defeat 
 a popular determination by a judgment in a law- 
 suit. When the opposing forces of sixty millions 
 of people have become arrayed in hostile political 
 ranks upon a question which all men feel is not a 
 question of law, but of legislation, the only path of 
 safety is to accept the voice of the majority as 
 final." Mr. Carter even hinted that previous at- 
 tempts on the part of the Supreme Court to thwart 
 the popular will had been swept away by the power 
 of public opinion. When Mr. Choate rose to reply 
 he referred facetiously to Mr. Carter's eloquent 
 warnings, and continued: "It never would hav€ 
 occurred to me to present either as an opening or 
 closing argument, to this great and learned court, 
 that if, in their wisdom, they found it necessary to 
 protect a suitor who sought here to cling to the 
 Ark of the Covenant, and invoke the protection of 
 the Constitution, that possibly the popular wrath 
 might sweep the court away. I have had some 
 surprises this morning. I thought until to-day 
 that there was a Constitution of the United 
 
STRUCTURE AND STYLE. 145 
 
 States, and that this court was created for the 
 purpose of maintaining the Constitution as against 
 unlawful conduct on the part of Congress.'* 
 In this way Mr. Choate swept away whatever 
 effect had been produced by the peroration of 
 Mr. Carter. One need not suppose, of course, 
 that either passage had any important effect on the 
 court or the case. They were the mere by-play of 
 giants in controversy; but they illustrated the 
 method of skilled debaters. In particular, the 
 incident showed how it may sometimes be well, at 
 the opening of one's argument, to sweep away an 
 effect just produced by an opponent, before pro- 
 ceeding with one's own case. 
 
 This brings us to the matter of the Conclusion. 
 The Conclusion should be the point at which the 
 skill of the debater is most in evidence, TheOon- 
 and where he masses all his forces for diision. 
 final attack and victory. Almost invariably the 
 nature of the Conclusion should be decided on in 
 advance. One may not know how he is to open 
 his speech, nor just what line of argument will be 
 most advisable, until he has heard all that his op- 
 ponent has to say; but one can usually know be- 
 forehand how he wishes to conclude, — what great 
 thought or feeling he wishes to leave finally ring- 
 ing in the ears of his audience. Unforeseen cir- 
 cumstances may, of course, upset one's plans, and 
 make the proposed conclusion inappropriate; but 
 
146 THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 in nine cases out of ten there is little danger of 
 this. When the speaker, therefore, observes that 
 his time is about to expire, he should rapidly bring 
 to a point the particular matter on which he is 
 speaking, and should then pass over — even if much 
 that he wished to say must be omitted — ^to that 
 with which he wished to end. Otherwise his speech 
 may be left hanging in the air. 
 
 The first object of a Conclusion should be to 
 leave the hearers with a full understanding of what 
 the line of argument has been, and how 
 it has established one's case. This may 
 require a brief summary of the entire line of proof, 
 if the proof has been somewhat long and compli- 
 cated; or it may require only an emphatic restate- 
 ment of the strongest arguments already advanced 
 — those on which the speaker conceives his suc- 
 cess chiefly to depend. The method and extent of 
 these concluding restatements or summaries must 
 depend on the exigencies of the particular debate. 
 They are of small value as mere formalities, so 
 that one need not take time at the close of a de- 
 bate to say, " Let me now briefly summarize the 
 ground over which we have gone," merely for the 
 sake of appearing systematic. The point is, to re- 
 hearse and emphasize those arguments which the 
 audience needs to have left ringing in their ears; 
 And a watchful speaker can judge, in any particular 
 case, which these arguments are. 
 
STRUCTURE AND STYLE. 147 
 
 One wishes not only to leave the audience 
 clearly possessed of the conclusion of one's argu- 
 ment, but also in a proper state of mind, persuaiiTe- 
 — well-disposed toward the whole side nesamthe 
 
 P ^, , 1 • 1 Conolusion. 
 
 of the controversy which one repre- 
 sents, and willing to act upon the conclusions 
 reached, if action is required. Something like an 
 application of one's case to the immediate audience, 
 then, will naturally follow the restatement of proof. 
 But whether this application shall be direct and 
 unimpassioned, — a simple effort to reach the will 
 of the hearers through their reason, — or more 
 elaborate and impassioned, — an effort to reach the 
 will through the feelings, — must be decided for 
 each particular debate. The character of the audi- 
 ence and the nature of the subject will determine 
 how far any appeal to the emotions will be appro- 
 priate. A judge in a court of law will be likely 
 to determine questions according to pure reason; 
 a jury will be more likely to be moved by their 
 feelings. In general, the more intellectual an audi- 
 ence the more suspicious it is likely to be of merely 
 emotional appeals. And there is quite as much dif- 
 ference in subjects as in audiences. To attempt any 
 considerable appeal to the emotions on a subject 
 relating to the tariff or the currency, will be likely 
 to be absurd; while other subjects, such as those 
 relating to wars for liberty, are of course highly 
 susceptible of emotional treatment. The safeguard 
 
148 THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 of the speaker must be to avoid going any further 
 than he can be sure of carrying his audience with 
 him. 
 
 Some illustrations of different methods of stating 
 a concluding application or appeal may make these 
 Diff t suggestions somewhat more clear. The 
 kinds of great speech of Lord Mansfield in the 
 case of Kvans, delivered m the House of 
 Lords in 1767, is an example of a dispassionate, dis- 
 tinctly intellectual conclusion to an argument. The 
 summary of the main points of the argument is 
 merged with the parliamentary motion to afBrm 
 the judgment which Lord Mansfield had been de- 
 fending. 
 
 " In the case before your Lordships, the defendant 
 was by law incapable at the time of his pretended elec- 
 tion; and it is my firm persuasion that he was chosen 
 because he was incapable. If he had been capable, he 
 had not been chosen, for they did not want him to 
 serve the office. They chose him because, without a 
 breach of the law, and a usurpation on the Crown, 
 he could not serve the office. They chose him, that he 
 might fall under the penalty of their by-law, made to 
 serve a particular purpose; in opposition to which, and 
 to avoid the fine thereby imposed, he hath pleaded a 
 legal disability, grounded on two acts of Parliament. 
 As I am of opinion that his plea is good, I conclude 
 with moving your Lordships, That the judgment be 
 affirmed." 
 
 A still more striking case of this sort of con- 
 
STRUCTURE AND STYLE. 149 
 
 elusion is found in Daniel Webster's defense of the 
 Kennistons. Here, although addressing the jury, 
 the great lawyer was content to conclude his argu- 
 ment with a summary of his proofs and a direct ap- 
 pHcation of them to the duty of the jury. 
 
 " From the time of the robbery to the arrest, five or 
 six weeks, the defendants were engaged in their usual 
 occupations. They are not found to have passed a 
 dollar of money to anybody. They continued their 
 ordinary habits of labor. No man saw money about 
 them, nor any circumstance that might lead to a sus- 
 picion that they had money. Nothing occurred tend- 
 ing in any degree to excite suspicion against them. 
 When arrested, and when all this array of evidence 
 was brought against them, and when they could hope 
 in nothing but their innocence, immunity was offered 
 them again if they would confess. They were pressed, 
 and urged, and allured, by every motive which could 
 be set before them, to acknowledge their participation 
 in the offence, and to bring out their accomplices. 
 They steadily protested that they could confess nothing 
 because they knew nothing. In defiance of all the dis- 
 coveries made in their house, they have trusted to 
 their innocence. On that, and on the candor and dis- 
 cernment of an enlightened jury, they still rely. 
 
 " If the jury are satisfied that there is the highest 
 improbability that these persons could have had any 
 previous knowledge of Goodridge, or been concerned 
 in any previous concert to rob him; if their conduct 
 that evening and the next day was marked by no cir- 
 cumstances of suspicion; if from that moment until 
 
ISO THE ART OF DEBATE, 
 
 their arrest nothing appeared against them; if they 
 neither passed money, nor are found to have had 
 money; if the manner of the search of their house, 
 and the circumstances attending it, excite strong sus- 
 picions of unfair and fraudulent practises; if, in the 
 hour of their utmost peril, no promises of safety could 
 draw from the defendants any confession affecting 
 themselves or others, it will be for the jury ta say 
 whether they can pronounce them guilty." 
 
 Turn now to a conclusion of another sort, when 
 Lord Chatham was addressing the House of Lords 
 in his splendid protest against the inhumanities of 
 some of the early British efforts to suppress -the" 
 American Revolution. Here the appeal is not to 
 a court, nor on a legal question, but to the House 
 of Lords in its representative capacity and on a 
 question of colonial policy tand public justice. 
 
 " I call upon that right reverend bench, those holy 
 ministers of the Gospel, and pious pastors of our 
 Church — I conjure them to join in the holy work, and 
 vindicate the religion of their God. I appeal to the 
 wisdom and law of this learned bench, to defend and 
 support the justice of their country. I call upon the 
 Bishops to interpose the unsullied sanctity of their 
 lawn; upon the learned Judges, to interpose the purity 
 of their ermine, to save us from this pollution. I call 
 upon the honor of your Lordships, to reverence the 
 dignity of your ancestors and to maintain your own. 
 I call upon the spirit and humanity of my country, to 
 vindicate the national character. I invoke the genius 
 
STRUCTURE AND STYLE, ^S' 
 
 of the Constitution. From the tapestry that adorns 
 these walls the immortal ancestor of this noble Lord 
 frowns with indignation at the disgrace of his coun- 
 try. . . 
 
 " I again call upon your Lordships, and the united 
 powers of the state, to examine it thoroughly and de- 
 cisively, and to stamp upon it an indelible stigma of the 
 public abhorrence. And I again implore those holy 
 prelates of our religion to do away these iniquities 
 from among us ! Let them perform a lustration ; let 
 them purify this House, and this country, from this 
 sin. 
 
 " My Lords, I am old and weak, and at present un- 
 able to say more; but my feelings and indignation 
 were too strong to have said less. I could not have 
 slept this night in my bed, nor reposed my head on my 
 pillow, without giving vent to my eternal abhorrence 
 of such preposterous and enormous principles." 
 
 We have now considered briefly the general 
 structure of the finished argument as a whole. The 
 detailed inner structure of the various ^ , ^, . 
 
 Relation of 
 
 main divisions is of no less importance, Structure 
 but it is difficult to do more than call at- *^ ^ *' 
 tention to the problem as one to be solved accord- 
 ing to the general laws of rhetoric. The problem 
 of structure in an argument is one of peculiar im- 
 portance, and, in a sense, of peculiar difficulty. The 
 various parts, and their relation to one another, are 
 to be made perfectly clear to the audience, and yet 
 this is to be done without such an appearance of 
 
IS* THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 formality and baldness as to make the argument 
 seem like a mathematical demonstration. In a 
 word, structure must be emphasized, and yet not 
 to the sacrifice of literary form. The skeleton must 
 be discernible, but it must be clothed in flesh. The 
 difficulty here is a real one. In most arguments the 
 structure is not clear enough, and the audience has 
 no definite idea, at any particular moment, just 
 what progress has been made. But when debaters 
 realize this, study the subject of structure, and draw 
 careful outlines or briefs of what they wish to say, 
 they are very likely to go to the other extreme, 
 and make a speech that is full of firsts, secondlies 
 and thirdlies, of formal phrases like " Thus it will 
 be seen," '' I now proceed to another point," and 
 the like, which destroy all artistic effect. Mathe- 
 matics and art are, in fact, if not enemies, neigh- 
 bors of such incompatible temperaments that it 
 requires some skill to make them live together in 
 peace. 
 
 It has already been said that the structure of 
 the brief should be the basis of the structure of 
 Paragraph the finished argument. Ordinarily, too. 
 Structure. ^\^^ paragraph structure of the brief will 
 suggest the paragraph structure of the finished 
 argument; and upon the paragraph structure of 
 the latter a great part of its clearness and force will 
 depend. If the paragraphs, then, follow one an- 
 other according to the arrangement of the headings 
 
STRUCTURE AND STYLE. 153 
 
 in the outline or brief, the general orderliness of 
 the argument is insured. But these paragraphs are 
 of course not to be numbered or lettered as in a 
 brief. They cannot even be made visible to the 
 persons addressed; for it is of spoken, not of writ- 
 ten argument that we are thinking, and a slight 
 pause for the taking of breath, with perhaps a 
 change of the pitch of the voice and a still slighter 
 change of bodily posture, is all the speaker can 
 provide to indicate transition in the argument. He 
 can, however, by a careful use of the connective 
 tissue of language, help to make his structure clear. 
 He must not omit a single step in his line of argu- 
 ment, and expect the audience to supply it for 
 tliemselves. He must not even omit the conjunc- 
 tions, '' hence," and " therefore," and '' because," 
 and all the rest, which serve to show just how two 
 statements are related to each other. And if he 
 wishes to be pleasing as well as clear, he must do 
 this with variety, not marshalling his sentences in 
 monotonous array like the statements in a brief, 
 but letting them — so far as their mere verbal form 
 is concerned— trip about in constantly changing 
 ifashion like the sentences of ordinary speech. The 
 result, if he is successful, will be that one can listen 
 to his argument as easily as to the conversation of 
 a friend, and at the same time can follow its struc- 
 ture as easily as the demonstrations in a geometri- 
 cal text-book. 
 
154 THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 The study of the paragraph is a whole subject in 
 itself, and there is little time in this connection in 
 which to take it up. But it is perhaps of even 
 greater importance in argumentative work than in 
 ordinary composition. The paragraphs in a speech, 
 as in an essay, should each be a unit, the expression 
 of one central idea; and it is even more important 
 in a speech than in an essay that this central idea 
 should be instantly and clearly understood. A 
 reader may go back and read the paragraph over 
 again, if he is not sure of its purpose on first read- 
 ing, but a hearer cannot do this; he must catch 
 the thought at once or never. For the accomplish- 
 ment of this the beginning and the end of the para- 
 graph are of chief importance; and two rules re* 
 lating to these parts will be found, while not uni- 
 versally useful, of very wide significance. First, 
 Let the opening sentence of the paragraph indicate 
 what its general subject is to he, and, if possible, what 
 is its connection with the paragraph that has preceded. 
 Secondly, Let the last sentence of the paragraph state 
 in a summary form the main thought which the para- 
 graph is intended to express. 
 
 The effect of these rules in a speech is as marked 
 
 as in a written discourse. In the latter the opening 
 
 and closing sentences of the paragraph 
 
 are especially emphatic because they are 
 
 conspicuous to the eye. In speech they must be 
 
 made emphatic by the speaker's voice, and by the 
 
STRUCTURE AHD STYLE, I55 
 
 pause which precedes and follows the paragraph. 
 In other words, at each transition point in the argu- 
 ment the speaker will indicate by a change of tone 
 and a pause that the point is one of transition; and 
 the first sentence of the new division will indicate 
 clearly what point the speaker wishes now to bring 
 before the audience. At the end of the period he 
 will restate the main thought of the division in a 
 short, emphatic, summarizing sentence, which will 
 leave no shadow of a doubt as to what it is that he 
 has just been trying to declare. 
 
 In order to illustrate the ways in which a portion 
 of an argument may develop from a group Development 
 of headines in an outline, let us consider o/^^^^^®^ 
 
 » ' _ Argument 
 
 what might be done in developing a sec- illustrated. 
 tion of a brief on the subject of a law restricting 
 immigration into this country. 
 
 In the decision of this question, all interests save those of 
 the United States are to he rejected. 
 
 1. For if our interests and those of aliens are identi- 
 
 cal, the latter need not be considered. 
 And if our interests and theirs conflict. Congress 
 must prefer ours. 
 
 2. The government, like an individual, has the pri- 
 
 mary duty of self-preservation; and this meas- 
 ure is for that end. 
 
 3. The fact that America has a mission to perform 
 
 on behalf of the races of the world can have no 
 bearing on the action of Congress; for 
 
iS^ THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 Congress is not empowered to take action of 
 a purely altruistic nature, even when such 
 action would be consistent with home in- 
 terests; how much less, therefore, when it 
 is inconsistent with our own interests ? 
 
 Moreover, the duty of the United States 
 toward the world cannot be accomplished 
 if the fundamental character of its institu- 
 tions deteriorates; and it is for the pre- 
 vention of such deterioration that the pres • 
 ent bill is framed. 
 
 With this section of an outline as a basis for th<i 
 corresponding part of the finished argument, ;i 
 speaker might pursue one of two or 4:hree 
 Mctst^e. different methods. He might, in the first 
 place, follow the form of his outline as 
 closely as possible. The result v^ould perhaps be 
 somewhat as follows: 
 
 "It is true that all Interests save those of the United 
 States are to be thrown aside in the consideration of 
 this question. This is so for three reasons. First: 
 either our interests and those of aliens are identical, in 
 matters affecting immigration, or they are not. If they 
 are identical, the interests of aliens certainly need not 
 be considered. If they conflict, Congress must cer- 
 tainly choose our interests to those of outsiders, re- 
 membering that it is. the sworn duty of every legislator 
 to represent his own country first of all. Secondly, 
 the government, like individuals, has a certain right of 
 self-preservation that takes precedence of everything 
 
STRUCTURE AND STYLE, 157 
 
 else; and it has already been shown that the restric- 
 tion of immigration is an act which would operate in 
 the interest of such self-preservation. Thirdly, it can- 
 not be said that our country has certain duties to per- 
 form toward other races, duties which have been laid 
 upon us by the special traits and special privileges 
 which we possess; for Congress has no constitutional 
 right to undertake measures of a purely altruistic char- 
 acter, for missionary purposes, even if they are not in- 
 consistent with the interests of our own people. How 
 much less, then, can it either pass laws or neglect to 
 pass laws for the sake of profiting alien races, con- 
 trary to the pressing interests of the United States? 
 Such interests are to be wholly rejected by a legislative 
 body that exists for a particular purpose, namely, to 
 fulfill the demands of its constituents. But suppose 
 we do admit that the mission of the United States 
 among the peoples of the world is to be taken into 
 consideration, this mission cannot be performed if the 
 fundamental character of our government or our cit- 
 izenship deteriorates. In order, therefore, to carry out 
 this very purpose of altruism, the integrity of our cit- 
 izenship and form of government must be preserved ; 
 and our claim is, once more, that this cannot be done 
 without the further restriction of immigration. Hence 
 we see, since Congress must prefer American interests 
 to those of aliens, since the government, like an in- 
 dividual, has the duty of self-preservation, and since 
 the beneficent mission of America to the world is not 
 a matter for our legislators to take into consideration, 
 
15^ THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 that in the decision of this question all interests save 
 those of the United States are to be rejected." 
 
 This is a very close transcription of the state- 
 ments in the outline, and in a sense is entirely clear 
 and orderly. Regarded, however, as a part of a 
 speech in actual debate, it is a very poor produc- 
 tion. It states the case baldly, and is utterly with- 
 out elements aiming at persuasion or at the forcible 
 pointing- of arguments. Moreover, the phraseology 
 is too compact and abstract — in other words, too far 
 removed from the colloquial style — to be quickly 
 understood by any audience. It would require 
 thoughtful reading to bring out its real content. 
 
 One can imagine a speech which should have 
 nearly all the merits which are wanting in the one 
 The DiffttBi j^st Considered, and yet none of the merits 
 Style. which this one illustrated. The corres- 
 
 ponding passage might run somewhat as follows: 
 
 " We are charged with thinking only of the selfish 
 interests of the United States. And whose interests, 
 let me ask, are we supposed to consider, when we are 
 talking about a law that is being debated in the Con- 
 gress of the United States? The interests of the Hot- 
 tentot? of Patagonia? or of Spain, it may be! I tell 
 you, sir, if the people of the United States do not con- 
 sider their own interests for a while, and put a stop to 
 the incoming elements that are cutting away the very 
 foundations of our historic government and our demo- 
 cratic citizenship, there will be nobody so low as to 
 
STRUCTURE AND STYLE. 159 
 
 care to appeal to us to take an interest in him! It is 
 very fine to talk of altruism, of the interests of others, 
 but self-preservation is the first law of existence; al- 
 truism comes afterward. If Congress has to choose 
 between the interests of a pack of Italians, or a ship- 
 load of filthy Chinamen, and those of her own citizens, 
 do you suppose they are going to hesitate, and, before 
 they take action, make up their minds that they are 
 not doing anything to hurt those refugees and fortune- 
 hunters? Our opponents tell us that we have a mis- 
 sion to the whole world. I have been reading the 
 newspapers a good many years, and I never heard of 
 Congress passing a law entitled, ' An act to carry the 
 blessings of free government to foreign peoples/ I 
 never heard of their defeating a bill on the ground that 
 it would injure the missionary interests of America. 
 I hope they will not begin now. No, sir! if this bill 
 for the restriction of immigration is defeated, let the 
 gentlemen who vote against it, when they remember 
 how the Chinaman in the West, and the Italians and 
 Bohemians in the East, and the French-Canadians in 
 the North, are cheapening wages and taking work 
 from hungry American citizens, — let them pass a law 
 for the encouragement of alien immigration, and let 
 them entitle it, in Scripture language, ' An act to take 
 the children's bread and give it to the dogs '! ** 
 
 This is a type of debate which is well worth 
 study. Anyone who has heard much public debate 
 IS familiar with the sort of speaker who has the gift 
 of putting things in a vigorous and interesting way, 
 even if it be at some expense of dignity and method. 
 
i6o THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 The imaginary passage just cited really contained 
 all, or nearly all, the arguments included in the 
 one previously quoted. They were scattered about, 
 however, without order or clearly progressive 
 thought; so that upon a serious and intelligent 
 hearer they would make little impression. On the 
 other hand, this second passage was twice as inter- 
 esting and forcible as the preceding one. The first 
 speaker would probably have put his audience to 
 sleep, in spite of his methodical style; the second 
 would have sat down amid a burst of applause. The 
 popular style of debate, therefore, is not to be 
 despised, but should be studied in order to see if 
 its merits can be imitated by one who avoids its 
 defects. 
 
 Let us attempt to imagine a passage embody- 
 The Com- '^^^y "'Ot perfectly but approximately, the 
 pronuse. merits of both the styles already illus- 
 trated. 
 
 " We are charged with thinking only of the selfish 
 interests of the United States. But is it altogether 
 selfish and unreasonable to confine the discussion of 
 this particular measure to a particular class of inter- 
 ests? It is not that the interests of others are always to 
 be neglected. It is simply a question as to whether, 
 when this bill for the restriction of immigration comes 
 before our Congress, that body is justified In resting 
 its decision solely on American interests. We believe 
 It is. 
 
 " It will clear up the matter, perhaps, if we consider 
 
STRUCTURE AND STYLE, i6l 
 
 that different interests must either harmonize or not 
 harmonize. Now if the interests of Americans regard- 
 ing the immigration question are identical with those 
 of the Chinese, for example, or the Italians, there is 
 surely no trouble. To satisfy our needs will satisfy 
 theirs. If, on the other hand, our interests clash with 
 theirs on this question, and there is presented to Con- 
 gress the definite choice between passing a law which 
 would benefit Americans, or of not passing it because 
 it is opposed to the interests of aliens, what can Con- 
 gress do? Its members cannot go home and say to 
 their constituents. The law would have been to your 
 advantage, but lo! the poor Chinaman! As a repre- 
 sentative body. Congress can regard no interests as 
 paramount to those of America. American interests 
 alone, then, must determine the issue. 
 
 " But more than this. While governments, like in- 
 dividuals, may have other duties than purely selfish 
 ones, they have also, like individuals,, a primary right 
 of self-protection and self-preservation. They have it, 
 indeed, much more than individuals; for a man may 
 think it his duty to sacrifice his life in the interests of 
 others, but a government has no right to expose itself 
 to disease or other danger, being itself the protectOi 
 of thousands of individuals. If, therefore, a measure 
 is urged as one of protection to the government, will 
 you stay legislation, saying, 'Wait! Before taking 
 action on this, before protecting our people from in- 
 vasions of armies perilous to our safety, — though they 
 do not come with sword and spear, — pause and con- 
 sider whether to do so will be for the best interests of 
 alien peoples ! ' America will reply by drawing the 
 
z6a THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 protecting folds of her garments more closely about 
 her, and saying proudly, My own children first ! 
 
 " We must go a step further, to make our position 
 perfectly clear. We have heard no little talk about the 
 mission of America to other peoples, and the pity of 
 interfering with this by Congressional legislation. It 
 is true that America has, in a sense, a mission to other 
 peoples. Yet the Constitution does not recognize it; 
 the law does not recognize it; Congress could not 
 recognize it to the extent of appropriating public 
 money, for example, for spreading the blessings of 
 liberty throughout the world. They could not do it 
 even if to do so would be entirely consistent with 
 American interests, simply because it is not the busi- 
 ness of Congress to do that sort of thing. How much* 
 less, then, can Congress seek to give aid to aliens at 
 the expense of our own people? 
 
 " But it is not necessary to remain on this purely 
 selfish ground. From the very fact that America has 
 a mission to the world, the pending bill should be 
 passed. The fulfillment of such a mission is absolutely 
 dependent upon the preservation, in all their purity, 
 of those elements which make America a vision of 
 Liberty enlightening the world. Destroy our pure 
 democracy, shake the least of the pillars of self-govern- 
 ment, make law less sacred, and liberty a more noisy 
 but less certain thing, — and America's mission is over. 
 If her own banner is torn and her own garments 
 stained, no need for her going on a crusade to enlighten 
 the world. To speak more definitely, if the purity of our 
 politics is destroyed, and the security of life, property, 
 
( 
 
 STKUCTUKh AND STYLE. 163 
 
 education, citizenship, or family in our great cities is 
 made uncertain, there is small use in bothering our- 
 selves about setting an example for others. For the 
 very end, then, of preserving that example which our 
 fathers set up, we must protect our own borders, pre- 
 serve our own citizenship, defend our own flag! 
 
 " We reaffirm, then, with no fear of laying ourselves 
 open to the charge of narrowness or selfishness, that 
 this measure is to be considered solely in the light of 
 American interests. We do this first, because if there 
 is a conflict between our interests and those of aliens. 
 Congress has no choice but to give ours the right of 
 way ; secondly, because the measure is one looking to 
 the protection of the republic, and that must always be 
 of paramount interest to our law-makers ; and thirdly, 
 because even for the sake of other peoples, and the per- 
 petuity of our mission and example, the purity of our 
 citizenship and our institutions must be preserved." 
 
 This imaginary passage is in no sense offered as 
 a general model for debaters. It may be questioned 
 whether the particular line of proof involved would 
 require any such careful demonstration before an 
 ordinary American audience. A somewhat obvious 
 proposition was chosen, in order that attention 
 might be fixed on the form, not the substance, of 
 the argument. The passage is intended to illus- 
 trate one point only: the development of the fin- 
 ished argument from the outline. The third pas- 
 sage, like the first, follows the structure of the 
 outline closely and clearly; but it also, like the 
 
1^4 THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 second, adopts the style of the platform and at- 
 tempts to be sufficiently vigorous and interesting" 
 to hold the attention. The increased length of this 
 third passage, when compared with the other two, 
 seems to require comment. It illustrates the fact, 
 which will be brought out more clearly a little 
 later, that the language of spoken discourse must 
 be more diffuse and less compact than that of writ- 
 ten discourse. The passage just cited was revised 
 with the most scrupulous care, in order to reduce its 
 length if possible; but it seemed that not a sentence 
 could be safely omitted, if all the proof suggested 
 by the outline on page 155 were to be made both 
 clear and interesting to those addressed. It takes 
 time to develop a line of proof before an audience 
 so as to make the structure clear and the substance 
 impressive. 
 
 It must by this time be evident how important, 
 in the make-up of a finished argument, are the gen- 
 ^ , , eral laws of style. It is common for 
 Style in rhetoricians to classify the qualities of a 
 Argument, ^qq^ g^yj^ under the three heads of Clear- 
 ness, Force, and Elegance. All these qualities are 
 to be sought by the debater, and the classification 
 will serve as well as any for the few further remarks 
 that can now be made on the subject of style in 
 debate. 
 
 It requires no comment to show that clearness is 
 in every sense the first requisite of an argument. If 
 
STRUCTURE AND STYLE. 165 
 
 the line of proof is not made clear, it is impossible 
 to secure conviction. The best aid to- 
 ward clearness in the finished argument, 
 namely, the construction of it on the basis of an 
 outline or brief previously prepared, has already 
 been fully considered. It has been remarked, too, 
 that the style of the oral debater must be even more 
 painstakingly clear than that of the writer, since the 
 audience has no chance to study his sentences at 
 their leisure. The debater must keep in mind, 
 then, the peculiarities of spoken discourse. He 
 must remember that a sentence of some length and 
 intricacy, with a half dozen modifying clauses, while 
 it might be perfectly intelligible in print, will be 
 hard to follow by the ear. Short, simply con- 
 structed sentences are great aids to clearness. So 
 also are short summaries, compact restatements 
 of what has just been said, — restatements such as 
 we have seen are especially useful at the ends of 
 paragraphs and of main divisions of the argument. 
 It may be set down as a general law that it is not 
 only necessary to state facts with especial clearness, 
 in addressing an audience in oral debate, but also 
 necessary to state the facts over and over again. So 
 it happens that a discourse which would be intoler- 
 ably wordy in print, and which could be easily re- 
 duced to two-thirds its size for publication, will be 
 well adapted to a popular audience. It is related of 
 Patrick Henry that in trying a celebrated case be- 
 
i66 THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 fore a jury, he repeated his closing argument, in 
 slightly varying form, twelve times over, — once, 
 he said, for every man on the jury. Any speaker 
 of experience knows that when he has simply stated 
 a thought to his audience, even though it be ex- 
 pressed with perfect clearness, not a third of the 
 audience has, as we say, " taken it in." He must 
 enlarge upon it, and, in effect, repeat it perhaps a 
 half dozen times. 
 
 The debater, then, for the sake of clearness, must 
 keep to a certain diffuseness of style which belongs 
 Economy of to spokcn discoursc, as contrasted with 
 Time. ^he more compact style of written dis- 
 
 course. But a difificulty arises at this point. Not 
 only must one be constantly on guard against let- 
 ting this diffuseness become intolerably tiresome, 
 but one has to consider the matter of economy of 
 time. Most debaters find themselves obliged to 
 speak within definite Hmits of time; and even if 
 their speeches are not cut off in their prime by the 
 gavel of a presiding officer, they are bound by 
 limits of courtesy and of prudence. How, then, 
 shall one be diffuse for the sake of clearness, and 
 compact for the sake of brevity? It is the paradox 
 of all public speakers, and how few there are that 
 find the solution! In particular, many debates are 
 lost simply for lack of time. The debater begins 
 a ten or fifteen minutes' speech as though he had 
 an evening before him, and is just getting well on 
 
STRUCTURE AND STYLE. 167 
 
 in his introduction when he is warned that he has 
 but a minute more. If he could only bid time stand 
 still, like Joshua at Ajalon, all would be well. As 
 it is, the body of his argument is never heard. 
 
 The debater, then, must have a definite under- 
 standing of the amount of time before him, and 
 must order the divisions of his speech accordingly. 
 He must beware of providing an introduction suit- 
 able for an hour's speech, when his whole time is 
 fifteen minutes. He must in all cases be watchful 
 that the introduction does not occupy dispropor- 
 tionate space. He must see that the critical points 
 in the proof have the right of way in the matter 
 of time, so that if anything is left out it will be mat- 
 ters of less significance. And if he discovers that 
 his time is too short for his material, he must study 
 how to put the latter into the briefest effective form. 
 There is such a thing as a style that is rapid and 
 condensed, and yet is suited to hold the attention 
 of an audience. And it is possible to strike out 
 many sentences from the first draft of an argument, 
 and yet not lose what is essential to the purpose in 
 hand. 
 
 To pack one's materials into small space, for 
 presentation in a brief but effective speech, is a 
 matter involving no little skill. Many fine ArtofOon- 
 debaters owe their reputation to their Sensation, 
 ability in this single direction. It is possible to 
 state one's evidence in great detail, giving all the 
 
'I<^8 THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 words of witnesses and all the minutiae of the facts 
 involved; and it is also possible to select just the 
 points essential to the proof, and state nothing be- 
 side. One may tell a story at length, so that it 
 becomes a sort of digression from the body of one's 
 speech; or one may seize upon the phrase that will 
 give the point of it and yet occupy very little time.* 
 The first method is that of the speaker with 
 abundant time at his disposal; the second is that 
 of the speaker who must do a great deal in a short 
 speech. 
 
 This matter has been referred to in an earlier 
 chapter, in connection with the citation of authori- 
 Oitationof ^i^^; and it is in such citation that the 
 Authorities, ability to condense is especially important. 
 A speaker in recent debate took nearly half the 
 time allowed for one of his speeches, in reading 
 an extended quotation from a law-book. The audi- 
 ence was not interested in the details of the opinion 
 cited, and it would have been possible to put 
 
 * Compare, for example, the incident related on page 179, 
 below. Told in a leisurely manner, it would open: *' A gen- 
 tleman who was traveling from B to A offered a 
 
 ticket reading ' From A to B .' It was refused by the 
 
 conductor, and the passengtr, declining to pay his fare, was 
 put off the train. He brought suit for damages," etc. Since, 
 however, it is desired to present the central matter of the 
 anecdote as quickly as possible, it serves the purpose quite 
 s^s wJl, or better, to begin rapidly: "There was a suit for 
 ^lamages brought against a railroad company which had 
 
 refused a ticket reading ' From A to B ,' because the 
 
 passenger was traveling from B to A ." 
 
STRUCTURE AND STYLE, 169 
 
 the gist of it in two sentences. Often, indeed, one 
 may find a single sentence in the passage to be cited 
 which will convey compactly the import of the 
 whole. Debaters who have occasion, therefore, to 
 make use of such authorities as the decisions of 
 courts, should study the problem of summarizing 
 such decisions rapidly. A sense of proportion must 
 govern the extent to which the summarizing proc- 
 ess will be carried. If a debater has an hour in 
 which to speak on a constitutional question, he 
 may think it well to read verbatim the passages in 
 the Constitution bearing on the pending question, 
 jind may also quote at some length from the text 
 of Acts of Congress and judicial decisions. But if 
 he has but ten or fifteen minutes, his time must be 
 largely saved for argument, and the fundamental 
 itacts must be stated only in outline. Thus, in a 
 (Hscussion of the constitutionality of an income tax, 
 a speaker stated the law in the case as follows: 
 
 " When we look at the Constitution, as literally set 
 down and as interpreted by the highest judicial au- 
 thority, in order to discover what sort of a tax an in- 
 come tax may be, and how it can be levied by Con- 
 gress, we find the matter is not so difficult as some 
 expressions of our opponents would lead us to sup- 
 j)Ose. 
 
 " The provisions of the Constitution relating to tax- 
 ation by the Federal government, stated in a word, are 
 these: Direct taxes (whatever they are), are to be ap- 
 
I70 THE ART OF DEBATE. " 'l 
 
 portioned — like Representatives in Congress — among 
 the States according to population as indicated by the 
 census. Other taxes (presumably indirect), called 
 ' duties, imposts, and excises,' shall be uniform 
 throughout the United States, but may, of course, be 
 levied by Congress directly. 
 
 "These provisions of the Constitution have come 
 before the Supreme Court for interpretation almost 
 from the time of the adoption of the Constitution to 
 the present; and while the Court has always avoided 
 the necessity of clearly defining what is meant by 
 * direct ' taxes and taxes of the contrasted class, its de- 
 cisions have all been practically based on one assump- 
 tion. That assumption is that * direct taxes ' are lim- 
 ited to capitation taxes and taxes on land. This wa* 
 first suggested in the decision of 1796, in the case of 
 Hilton V. U. S., when a tax on carriages, levied directly 
 by Congress, was sustained on the ground that it was 
 not a direct tax. Later the question recurred in the 
 case of Veazie Bank v. Fenno. In this case the chief 
 question was the right of Congress to tax the notes 
 of State banks; incidentally it was held that such a 
 tax, being allowed, is not direct, and certain expres- 
 sions of the Chief Justice indicate that it was the dis- 
 position of the Court to reserve the term ' direct tax * 
 to the two classes already mentioned. 
 
 " In like manner, in the case of the Pacific Insurance 
 Co. V. Souky it was held that a tax on the incomes of 
 insurance companies is not a direct tax; and again, in 
 1874, in Scholey v. Rew, a tax on succession to real es- 
 tate was held not to be direct. In all these cases th« 
 
STRUCTURE AND STYLE. 171 
 
 C'ourt, while avoiding — as I have said — expHcit defini- 
 tion, referred with apparent agreement to the dicta of 
 the earher decisions. Thus the term ' direct tax ' has 
 been limited by the Court, through a process of exclu- 
 sion, to mean land taxes and capitation taxes, — in other 
 words, to taxes such as have never yet been levied by 
 the Federal government. And the final touch was 
 given to this process of exclusion by the decision in 
 the case of Springer v. U. S., in which the income tax 
 of 1864, levied directly upon incomes of citizens of the 
 United States, — including, of course, even the incomes 
 derived from land, — was held to be indirect. Thus a 
 consistent line of interpretative decisions has made 
 clear the meaning of phrases which, outside the Con- 
 stitution, might be as darkly ambiguous as the other 
 side would have us believe." 
 
 This passage is not given as an illustration of 
 argument, but simply to illustrate the process of 
 compression as applied to the citation of authori- 
 ties. Hundreds of pages of Supreme Court de- 
 cisions were read, and the gist of them packed into 
 less than four hundred words, so as to serve the 
 purpose of the speaker. That purpose was to sup- 
 port the Income Tax of 1894. If it had been dif- 
 ferent, — if he had wished to attack the constitu- 
 tionality of the law, — he would doubtless have 
 selected and condensed his material in a different 
 fashion. 
 
 Such condensation, then, is nearly always pos- 
 sible. But to save time in this way while speaking 
 
tj2 THE ART OF DEBATE, 
 
 requires the spending of time in preparation. It 
 Timers- takes longer to prepare a short speech 
 Oondensa- ^^^^ ^^ prepare a long one, on almost any 
 tion. subject. The man who knows his subject 
 
 from top to bottom can glance through it and seize 
 the essentials for rapid presentation, " striking,'' 
 as John Bright once said of his own method as a 
 debater, " from headland to headland." 
 
 A striking example of the relative values of long 
 and short arguments is given by the following in- 
 cident that occurred in a Philadelphia court. A 
 complicated case regarding the tenure of land was 
 pending, and was suddenly called up for trial, some 
 weeks before the counsel on one side had expected 
 it. This side was represented by two lawyers, oi1>e 
 of whom had gathered most of the material for 
 argument, the other of whom was to make the prin- 
 cipal argument in court. The latter said to his 
 colleague, the junior counsel, who was a brilliant 
 and unusually ready speaker: "The case is called 
 for this afternoon. I cannot be ready to speak until 
 to-morrow. If you can occupy the time till court 
 adjourns to-day, I will be on hand at nine in the 
 morning." The young lawyer went into court and 
 began to speak. He brought with him hundreds 
 of pages of records relating to the case, and read 
 them as leisurely as the court would allow. It 
 seemed to him that time had never passed so slowly, 
 but he talked on and on, perceiving, — as he told 
 
STRUCTURE AND STYLE, i73 
 
 his friends afterward, — that everyone in the court- 
 room was growing more and more impatient of 
 him and his case. The judge tried to hurry him, 
 but he declined to be hurried. At length the time 
 for adjournment came, and he announced that his 
 colleague would finish the argument in the morn- 
 ing. So far as his afternoon's speech was con- 
 cerned, not an inch of progress had been made in 
 winning the case. Meantime his colleague, one of 
 the most distinguished members of the bar, went 
 home after a hard day's work, prepared his argu- 
 ment in the pending case during six hours of the 
 night, went into court next morning, and in twenty 
 minutes made the speech that 'he had been six hours 
 preparing. That speech won the case. 
 
 We come now from the quality of Clearness to 
 that of Force. Many persons who would other- 
 wise be successful debaters make a failure 
 at just this point. They gather and ar- 
 range their material with skill, but they fail to make 
 it interesting or to drive it home. The general 
 judgment of those who have heard many debates, — 
 whether in debating societies, conventions of citi- 
 zens, legislative bodies, or courts of law, — is that, 
 where there is no unusual excitement present, the 
 debating is abominably dull. And this is not the 
 fault of the subjects discussed, for everyone knows 
 that certain speakers are always listened to with 
 interest and even entertainment, whether they 
 
174 THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 speak on popular themes or on the most technical 
 matters in the world. There are a half dozen men 
 in the United States Senate who are sure of hav- 
 ing- crowded galleries to hear them, even if they 
 speak on some abstruse question of tariff or cur- 
 rency, or on some private pension bill. Such men 
 should be carefully studied by all who wish to be- 
 come successful debaters. They have the quality 
 of forcefulness, which carries what they have to 
 say into the ears of their audience, and even draws 
 hearers to them, eager to listen. 
 
 A certain degree of force is secured by the mere 
 quality of clearness, combined with earnestness. If 
 Sources of ^ Statement is made in a manner to be 
 Porce. at once understood, and if it is made in 
 
 a manner that shows the speaker thoroughly be- 
 lieves it and is eager to give it to others, there must 
 be a responsive spark struck off in the mind of the 
 hearer. To develop an enthusiasm for one's sub- 
 ject, then, an intense desire to convince and per- 
 suade others of the proposition in hand, will usu- 
 ally result in a forcible style. One's sentences will 
 be short and vigorous, and will be driven home by 
 the earnestness that is behind them. 
 
 Apart from this, perhaps the element of style 
 that contributes most to the quality of force is that 
 Concrete- ^^ concreteness. It is a curious fact that 
 "»»*• a statement couched in general terms will 
 
 almost never be as effective as when stated in terms 
 
STRUCTURE AND STYLE. 175 
 
 of a specific, concrete case. One who talks wholly 
 of general laws will soon make any audience 
 drowsy; while concrete cases will at least keep 
 them awake. The debater should study his case 
 with this in mind, and decide before he makes his 
 speech what specific cases he can make use of, to 
 add force to his theories. It may be only a ques- 
 tion of the choice of words, — the substitution of a 
 particular term for a more general one, or a figura- 
 tive for a literal statement. Orators, instead of 
 saying that the British empire extends over all 
 quarters of the globe, are in the habit of saying — 
 for greater forcefulness, — that the sun never sets 
 on the English flag. Instead of speaking of alien 
 races, a wise debater will say " Chinese and 
 Italians '* when he can. Instead of talking of 
 agricultural conditions in general, he will mention 
 potatoes and pigs, — the homelier the concrete cases 
 may be, the better, for they will bring distinct and 
 lively images to the hearer^s mind. It is particu- 
 larly interesting to see what a difference this con- 
 crete method makes in the citation of statistics. 
 Statistics in debate are in danger of forming a per- 
 fect desert of dullness. Yet they need not do so 
 in skilled hands. In large numbers they cannot 
 be made to appeal to the ear, but must be seen in 
 the form of tables. " Statistics," said a witty pro- 
 fessor, " are like children: they should be seen and 
 not heard." In debate, therefore, one should never 
 
17^ THE /iRT OF DEBATE. 
 
 read a whole table of figures, but should select the 
 point essential to the argument, and put that in a 
 brief and interesting- form. There is all the dif- 
 ference in the world between this statement: '' The 
 exportations of the United States to France in 1898 
 amounted to $25,542,673; while the exportations 
 of France to America amounted to $12,476,316 " — 
 and this: " For every dollar that went over seas to 
 France last year, two dollars came back." In 
 dealing with statistics in general debate one should 
 nearly always discard small numbers and fractions; 
 they blur the picture, which is to be made as vivid 
 as possible. Rhetorically speaking, ten thousand 
 dollars is a larger sum than $10,142.67. In Hke 
 manner, images of individuals loom up larger in 
 the imagination than those of classes. A speaker 
 during the time of the Chicago riots of 1894 mov^id 
 his audience to enthusiasm by declaring: "If neces- 
 sary, every regiment in the United States army 
 must be called out, that the letter dropped by the 
 girl Jenny, at some country post-office back in 
 Maine, may go on its way to her lover in San 
 Francisco, without a finger being raised to stop its 
 passage!" 
 
 In the same way any departure from common- 
 place forms of speech, if it is not obviously intro- 
 Figures of duced for artificial effect, will add to the 
 Speech. force of argument. A bit of irony, if not 
 
 too malicious or savage in style, wiU wake an audi 
 
STRUCTURE AND STYLE, 177 
 
 ence to fresher appreciation. The form of an- 
 tithesis, in which opposing ideas are set over 
 against each other by way of more vivid contrast, 
 will do the same. A recent debater, borrowing a 
 hint from a remark of Macaulay's, introduced the 
 following passage into a political attack on the 
 administration: 
 
 " Macaulay says somewhere, in speaking of King 
 Charles the First: * We charge him with having 
 broken his coronation oath; and we are told that he 
 kept his marriage vow! We accuse him of having 
 given up his people to merciless inflictions; and the 
 defence is, that he took his little son on his knee and 
 kissed him! We censure him for having violated the 
 articles of the Petition of Right; and we are informed 
 that he was accustomed to hear prayers at six o'clock 
 in the morning!' So we may say in regard to the de- 
 fenders of the President. When we charge that he has 
 used his high office for poHtical ends, debauched the 
 civil service, discarded the very reforms pledged by the 
 platform on which he was elected, and given over the 
 army to the plundering of corruptionists, what is the 
 answer? that he is a man of charming disposition in 
 the family circle, that his Thanksgiving proclamations 
 breathe forth piety in every line, and that he scrupul- 
 ously avoids traveling on the Sabbath day!" 
 
 This brings us to the matter of the use of illustra- 
 tions in debate. We have seen, in the uae of niui- 
 chapter on Proof, that illustrations are trationa. 
 not arguments, and should never be used as if they 
 
178 THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 were. They may, however, make argument clear, 
 interesting, and forcible. Their quality of con- 
 creteness serves, as it always does, to keep the 
 audience awake, and to arouse distinct images in 
 the mind. If there is anything of wit about them, 
 and it is felt to be appropriate and not irrelevant, 
 the effect is all the better. Thus even an amusing 
 story may be introduced into debate with good re- 
 sults. But concerning this much caution must be 
 urged. To introduce a story merely because it is 
 funny, to take precious time in the telling of it when 
 every moment is needed for argument, or to make 
 a far-fetched attempt to apply it to the immediate 
 controversy when it is not to the point, — any of 
 these things will produce an effect of weakness 
 which one cannot afford to risk. Only when it is 
 clearly illustrative of the matter in hand, — and not 
 then if it will take long in the telling, — is an anec- 
 dote to be introduced into debate. 
 
 Two or three examples of successful illustrations 
 in debate may make these principles more clear. 
 When an unjust bill was introduced into the House 
 of Commons in 1741, and was defended on the 
 ground that it was the only remedy proposed for 
 existing evils, Mr. Pitt replied to its sponsors in 
 this fashion: 
 
 "The honorable gentlemen say no other remedy 
 has been proposed. . . Suppose no other remedy 
 should be offered; to tell us we must take this, be- 
 
STRUCTURE AND STYLE. 179 
 
 cause no other remedy can be thought of, is the same 
 with a physician's telHng his patient, ' Sir, there is no 
 known remedy for your distemper, therefore you shall 
 take poison — I'll cram it down your throat.' I do not 
 know how the nation may treat its physicians; but I 
 am sure if my physician told me so, I should order my 
 servants to turn him out of doors." 
 
 Again, in an American court a suit for damages 
 was brought against a railroad company which had 
 
 refused a ticket reading '' From A to B ," 
 
 on the ground that the passenger was traveling 
 from B to A . The attorney for the rail- 
 road argued that the passenger was really claiming 
 a different service from that he had paid for. '^ He 
 
 paid for passage from A to B ," he said, 
 
 " and yet demands passage from B to A . 
 
 He might as well buy a barrel of potatoes at a 
 grocery, and then sue the grocer on the ground that 
 he did not deliver apples instead." When the 
 attorney for the plaintiff had opportunity to reply, 
 he said: "The illustration drawn from the barrel 
 of apples and the barrel of potatoes seems to be an 
 unfortunate one for my friend on the other side. 
 The present case would be better illustrated by a 
 grocer who, having sold a customer a barrel of ap- 
 ples, should insist that he should begin at the top 
 and eat down, whereas the customer had a pref- 
 erence for beginning at the bottom and eating up! " 
 Here the illustration was an admirable one, for 
 
i8o THE ART OF DEBATE, 
 
 it not only turned the laugh against the speaker's 
 opponent, but served at the same time to make dear 
 the very point of the argument which was being 
 developed. 
 
 A similar example is found in the fable at the 
 
 opening of the speech on the Venezuelan Message 
 
 of President Cleveland, quoted in the Appendix. 
 
 In this case the fable was of course constructed for 
 
 Mie purpose of illustrating the case in dis- 
 
 and iikgiti- P^^^' ^^^ ^^^^ ^^^ ^^^^ ^^ Carefully that 
 matenius- every phrase in the story had its signi- 
 ficance for the Venezuelan question, the 
 remarks of the thief being intended to cover the 
 most important arguments on the opposite side of 
 the debate. So the story, while told in the most 
 condensed manner possible, did not even take 
 from the time of argument the time required in its 
 telling; for it was developing the argument at the 
 very time that it was interesting the audience and 
 preparing them for the more weighty material that 
 followed. Such illustrations are serviceable in more 
 than one way. But what shall be said of a speaker 
 in an important debate, who took nearly half his 
 time in telling the story (amusing in itself) of a 
 man who was left hanging in the air through an 
 accident that occurred while he was climbing a 
 tree, — the point being that the opponents of the 
 speaker had been left in a similar position by their 
 unsuccessful arguments? Such a story may well 
 
STRUCTURE AND STYLE. i8l 
 
 be called question-begging. It depended for its 
 effectiveness on the possibility that the audience 
 were all convinced that the speaker had triumphed 
 over his opponents in argument; and it contri- 
 buted nothing to the argument save a discourteous 
 side-thrust at the previous speaker. Debaters who 
 use illustrations after this manner deserve nothing 
 better than defeat. 
 
 The forcible debater, then, is one who is deter- 
 mined that his audience shall listen to him, and 
 ibat his arguments shall be driven home. He will 
 not go out of his way to search for wit, for oppor- 
 tune repartee, for illustration or anecdote, but he 
 will use all such aids if they come appropriately to 
 his hand. He will have such earnestness that his 
 audience cannot help feeling the contagion of it. He 
 will reach out after the most homely facts that be- 
 long to his subject, in order to bring images of 
 concrete things before the minds of his hearers. 
 He will select the great essentials of his argument, 
 and emphasize them so that no one can go away 
 forgetting them. He will make use of climax as 
 he has opportunity, and see that the ends of his 
 paragraphs, of his main divisions, and of his speech 
 as a whole, are the strongest parts of all. 
 
 We come now, finally, to the quality of Elegance. 
 The word is an unsatisfactory one, for it suggests 
 to many persons a quality which many arguments 
 would do quite as well without. As rhetoricians 
 
l82 THE ART OF DEBATE, 
 
 understand it, however, it means nothing inconsis- 
 tent with simplicity, directness, or force. 
 It implies the choice of the right word 
 in the right place, the observance of the laws 
 of unity and proportion, and the almost indefinable 
 atmosphere of good taste and dignity which should 
 characterize every form of discourse. Since it is 
 related to debate, for the most part, in no peculiar 
 way, we need give it only very brief consideration 
 here. 
 
 It is perhaps as an aid to persuasiveness that the 
 quality of elegance is chiefly useful in argument. 
 Persuaaive- One may Convince another even while 
 MSB. giving an impression of violence or vul- 
 
 garity, but in order to persuade some personal sym- 
 pathy should be established, and the qualities of 
 dignity, good taste, and ease have much to do with 
 this. Persuasiveness depends, too, on the adapta- 
 bility of the speaker to the circumstances of the 
 debate and the audience addressed. The manner 
 and method suited to one sort of hearers will be 
 quite out of place with those of another. Enough 
 has already been said to indicate that the attitude 
 of friendliness on the part of the debater, toward 
 those he is addressing, is one of the first essentials 
 to success. He must say nothing without his audience 
 in mind. He must try to enter into their feelings, 
 and mingle his with theirs. If they are unfriendly, 
 he must seek a common ground from which 
 
STRUCTURE /4ND STYLE. 183 
 
 they and he can make a start toward investiga- 
 tion of the question in hand. If they show any 
 disposition to go with him, he must be ready to 
 meet them half way. Yet some speakers, if one 
 might judge from their style and manner, direct 
 their remarks into the air, or would be as well con- 
 tent to deliver them as a monologue within their 
 own room. What wonder that they cannot per- 
 suade? The secret of persuasive power seems to 
 lie, first, in getting a personal hold on one's audi- 
 ence, and then in finding out by what motive they 
 may be moved. If it be nothing better than self- 
 interest, well. If it be — as it almost always will — 
 through their higher selves, their principles, aspira- 
 tions, loves and venerations, better still. All this 
 will have its effect on the style of the adaptable 
 debater. His language will be appropriate to him- 
 self, to his subject, to the circumstances of the 
 discussion, and to the audience. It will have power 
 over the audience, to hold them rigidly to pro- 
 cesses of reason, w^hen the speaker wills, and to 
 arouse their feelings and move their passions, when 
 it is that that he wills. Used in this way, human 
 speech has almost magic powers. It not only 
 guides the reason, but awakens memories, starts 
 floods of old associations, stirs the passions, and 
 moves the will. 
 
 This brings us to a concluding thought, — the 
 artistic quality which may properly pervade an 
 
i84 THE ART OF DEBATE, 
 
 argument, as well as any other form of discourse. 
 The debater should strive to make his speech a 
 Artistic work of art in its own sphere. A work of 
 Qualities. ^rt must havc, first of all, unity; and no 
 argument is satisfying without a dominant idea. 
 It must have, in the second place, proportion; and 
 we have seen how this quality is important in de- 
 bate as a regulating principle in the selection and 
 emphasis of one's material. In the third place, a 
 work of art must have continuity and coherence; 
 this quality will preserve the argument from the 
 scrappy, scattering effect which so many debates 
 produce. In the fourth place, it must have some 
 element of general truth, — something beyond 
 merely temporary or local interest, — ^which will 
 dignify it, elevate the thought of those studying it, 
 and give it a certain permanent significance. A 
 speech embodying these qualities, if it is preserved 
 by some chance beyond the time when first de- 
 livered, will still have the charm which the work 
 of all great orators holds, after the original cir- 
 cumstances of its utterance have been forgotten. 
 
 Now it may be admitted that, whereas every 
 argument may and should be characterized by the 
 first three of these qualities of a work of 
 art, it is too much to ask that the fourth 
 quality shall be present in every debate. There are 
 some subjects, we have seen, dealing with matters 
 of a slight or temporary character, and without 
 
STRUCTURE AND STYLE. I^S 
 
 appeal to any high principles or deep feelings, in 
 the discussion of which it would be absurd to try to 
 introduce the element of permanent significance or 
 broad general truth. Yet these subjects are, on 
 the whole, rare in the experience of debaters. It is 
 not often that a disputed subject is without con- 
 nection with some principle, some general truth, 
 some high thought or deep feeling, which will — if 
 one only looks for it — illuminate the dry details of 
 tlie discussion. Great debaters love to lead their 
 audiences to these elevated points of view. Said a 
 dvibater of experience and success: " I never like 
 to close a speech on a question of any importance 
 without showing, if I can, some deeper significance 
 ill the question than lies on the surface, and mak- 
 ing the audience see that the discussion has been 
 worth while wholly apart from the temporary cir- 
 ctimstances that gave rise to it." This is why 
 speakers have a fondness for concluding an address 
 with a bit of poetry or other imaginative literature; 
 for it is precisely the quality of poetry to illuminate 
 small things by showing the elements of general 
 truth and permanent significance that lie behind 
 them. In unskillful hands such attempts are in 
 danger of being absurd. An impassioned perora- 
 tion, or a sudden flight of poetry, tacked on to a 
 commonplace speech as though one felt the neces- 
 sity of adding something of the sort before sitting 
 down, is of course nothing less than ridiculous. If 
 
i86 THE ART OF DEBATE, 
 
 there is any high thought or deep feeling in the 
 subject, the speaker must lead his hearers to it 
 gradually, and not affect any feeling which they 
 cannot be prepared to share. It may not be possi- 
 ble to introduce any element of feeling whatever. 
 But one can nearly always ask himself, What, after 
 all, makes my argument worth while? What 
 thought or purpose animates it which I should be 
 glad to have handed down in my name to another 
 generation? For while subjects change superficially 
 from year to year, Demosthenes, Cicero, Pitt, 
 Patrick Henry, Wendell Phillips, and Victor Hugo 
 really spoke on the same themes, — the same great 
 ideas, — and the torch of the debater is passed on 
 from hand to hand. 
 
VIII. 
 
 THE SPOKEN DEBATE. 
 
 We have now followed the progress of the de- 
 bater's work up to the point of the actual making 
 of his speech or speeches. He has decided just 
 what he wants to say, and just how he wants to say 
 it, in so far as this can be done before the actual 
 exigencies of debate are upon him. Some of his 
 most important problems are still to be solved. 
 
 One of these problems we have temporarily 
 ignored or avoided, in what has been said in the 
 preceding chapter. We have assumed, Relation of 
 i'or the sake of convenience, that the gp^tel^*^ 
 speech could be written down in advance Speech, 
 of its delivery, and that the choice and arrange- 
 ment of words could be made at that time and ac- 
 curately followed in the spoken debate. As a mat- 
 ter of fact, however, we know that this cannot be 
 done. Whatever we may think of public speaking 
 of other sorts, it is absolutely destructive of debate 
 to be bound by what has been prepared. And apart 
 from the fact that one must be ready for all sorts 
 of unforeseen emergencies, one cannot be sure of 
 saying just what he has decided upon in advance. 
 The peculiarities of a speaker's own mind and 
 
 187 
 
i88 THE ART OF DEBATE, 
 
 memory are quite as uncertain, oftentimes, as the 
 exigencies of debate. 
 
 This brings us at once to the problem of the re- 
 lation of written to spoken language, of the speech 
 prepared to the speech delivered, and of the use of 
 notes in public speaking. In all these matters so 
 much depends upon the ability and experience of 
 the particular speaker, that it is impossible to say 
 anything by way of guidance beyond the mc^st 
 general suggestions. It may be agreed at once, 
 however, that a written speech, read from the 
 manuscript, is generally unsuited to the uses of de- 
 bate. There is but one sort of speech less deserv- 
 ing of success, and that is one written in advance 
 and delivered from memory, word for word. Per- 
 haps not one speaker in a hundred can deliver a 
 memorized speech with perfect naturalness of man- 
 ner, or can memorize a speech from beginning to 
 end and yet hold himself ready to make such 
 changes as occasion may demand. For most per- 
 sons it will be better to read from manuscript 
 directly, and lay it aside when necessary, than to 
 seek to conceal the want of extemporaneousness 
 by the transparent device of mem.orization. 
 
 Such being the case, shall one give up all idea 
 of writing out in advance his arguments for public 
 idTantages debate? By no means. There are many 
 of Writing, reasons why a speech should be written 
 down at the outset, even if the manuscript is never 
 
THE SPOKEN DEBATE. 189 
 
 used at all. One never knows just what he has to 
 say until it is written down. Ideas often seem to 
 flow from the point of the pen, and arrange them- 
 selves on paper as they would never do in one's 
 rrtind. Certainly one never knows how much he 
 has to say until it is written down, and for a de- 
 bater this is an important point. Again, all those 
 matters relating to style, which we were consider- 
 ing in the last chapter, can be considered and 
 worked out at one's leisure, with pen and paper at 
 hand, and not left to the haste and excitement of 
 the public assembly. It does not follow that the 
 work of deciding them will be wasted because the 
 written speech is not delivered without change. 
 Finally, the writing out of material is a great aid 
 to the memory, as all students know who have 
 taken lecture notes or made written analyses of 
 material for examinations; and the ideas of the 
 speaker will be much more likely to occur to him 
 in the orderly fashion in which he has planned 
 them, if he has wTitten them down in that order. 
 To write a thing, word for word and letter by 
 letter,, is to wear a path in one's brain which it is 
 not easy to efface. 
 
 What shall be done, then, with this argument 
 when once carefully written out? This the indi- 
 vidual debater must answer for himself. Preparation 
 Perhaps he may destroy it, and feel that ^o^^^ii^e^y- 
 the mere act of writing it has prepared him for his 
 
19© THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 public speech. Perhaps he will read it over once 
 or twice, in order to see how it sounds and how 
 much time it takes, and let it go at that. Perhaps, 
 again, he will study it over and over again, until 
 he has almost memorized it by familiarity, though 
 not by rote. All this will depend, of course, upon 
 the degree to which the speaker trusts himself to 
 say what he wants to say when on his feet, and the 
 extent to which he feels that he must leave the pre- 
 cise character of his remarks to be determined by 
 the state of the discussion at the time he enters it. 
 There is always a conflict here between accuracy 
 and exactness, on the one hand, and freedom and 
 fluency on the other. There are debates in which 
 every word must be measured and weighed before 
 it is uttered, and others in which the enthusiasm 
 and the rapid thinking belonging to the heat of 
 the discussion can be trusted to take care of the 
 words. In the one case, the debater should bring 
 his material as nearly as possible to the point of 
 exact preparation, without mechanical memoriza- 
 tion; in the other he will take with him to the plat- 
 form or bar nothing but a knowledge of his plan, 
 and his material in the rough. 
 
 The following plan proves useful to many de- 
 baters. They first write out their argument in full, 
 on the basis of the preliminary outline. This ar- 
 gument is carefully timed, and must then usually 
 be condensed in order to bring it within the re- 
 
THE SPOKEN DEBATE, 19* 
 
 quired limits. All matters of phrasing and illus- 
 tration are as carefully corrected and polished as 
 though the speech were to be read from the manu- 
 script. Then a new outline is made, drawn from 
 the full argument as written. This outline will dif- 
 fer somewhat from the original, for new material 
 or improved arrangement will have been suggested 
 in the writing out of the argument. If the debater 
 is sure of his memory, he is now ready for his pub- 
 lic speech. If, however, he fears that he will not 
 be able to say just what he has decided upon say- 
 ing, he will give some further study to his manu- 
 script, reading over the full argument until it is 
 entirely familiar, and then studying his outHne to 
 see whether its headings suggest to him what he 
 wishes to say under each one. The last step will 
 be to make sure that he is familiar with the out- 
 line itself, so that he will not lose himself between 
 one division of his speech and the next. Unless he 
 is confident through experience, he will do well 
 to prepare a condensed copy of his outline on a 
 card, and carry it in his pocket to the place of de- 
 bate. He should not expect to use it, or even to 
 hold it in his hand as an advertisement of his in- 
 security to the audience; but it will be a comfort 
 to know that it is at hand in case of need. 
 
 The principle governing the question of the use 
 of notes is simply that nothing must interfere with 
 the natural relations of speaker and audience. It 
 
192 *' THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 is natural for one man to talk to another; but it is 
 not natural for one either to read or recite 
 his own thoughts to another. On the 
 other hand, it is quite natural to read aloud the 
 thoughts of another writer; and in debate, when 
 a quotation of any length is to be introduced, such 
 as the citation of an authority or the written testi- 
 mony of a witness, it is more natural and reasonable 
 to read directly from book or paper than to at- 
 tempt to quote from memory. In such cases, the 
 very presence of book or document is an element 
 of strength; but the ideas of the speaker himself 
 are to derive their strength from his presence and 
 utterance. 
 
 It may be asked whether the careful study of a 
 
 written argument and of an outline, as here sug- 
 
 2:ested, is not in a sense a violation of 
 
 Degree of 
 
 Extempori- the idea of extemporization? In a sense, 
 of course, it may be so regarded; but the 
 point is that the study of the written argument 
 should never reach the point of mechanical mem- 
 orization. It may reach the point where the 
 speaker knows just how many paragraphs his 
 speech will contain, and what the general order of 
 sentences may be in each paragraph; or, when 
 certain ideas have to be expressed very accurately 
 or pointedly, he may even be practically certain as 
 to what words he will use in particular places. But 
 he will use the same words that he wrote down not 
 
THE SPOKEN DEBATE. 193 
 
 because he has learned them so thoroughly as to 
 be able to recite them, but because, having spent 
 no little thought on the best method of expressing 
 certain ideas, when those ideas recur to his mind the 
 chosen words will recur also as the best form in which 
 to utter them. 
 
 The practical character of this' sort of prepara- 
 tion is illustrated by an incident that Mr. Holyoake 
 tells in his book on '* Public Speaking and De- 
 bate": 
 
 " John Arthur Roebuck was the most mathematical 
 speaker in Parliament in his time. He knew that the 
 shortest distance between one point and another was 
 a straight line, and he took it. Sitting at his table one 
 day, he told me what he was going to say at Salisbury, 
 where, at the Bishop's request, he was to deliver prizes 
 to students. A fortnight later I read a report of his 
 speech in the Times, which, so far as I remembered, 
 was word for word what he had said to me. The 
 reason was that the words of a perfect statement are 
 not changeable. If any term can be changed for the 
 better it means that a wrong word has been used. 
 Thus, to a trained mind, understanding is in place of 
 memory. The chosen words recur to the speaker be- 
 cause they are inevitable ; none others will express the 
 sense intended." 
 
 The debater who has prepared himself in this 
 way will never be bound to the words previously 
 chosen, so as to feel embarrassed if different ones 
 
194 THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 fall from his tongue ; nor will his speech move on in 
 Dwigerof a predetermined flow of language, with- 
 tion. ' out adapting itself spontaneously to the 
 need of the particular moment. Up to this point 
 the careful preparation of a speech may be ad- 
 vantageous, especially if the speaker is inexpe- 
 rienced, or if his argument is to come at the open- 
 ing of debate, when he can determine in advance 
 what should be said, or if he must be sure of oc- 
 cupying a definitely limited period of time. But 
 the debater, no matter how timid and inexpe- 
 rienced, should guard carefully against becoming 
 a slave to the speech that he has written down, or 
 even to the outline that he has brought with him 
 as a safeguard. He can never gain fluency and 
 confidence without trusting himself. It is better 
 to make a dozen failures in the attempt to be gen- 
 uinely extemporaneous, than to educate one's self 
 to the use of crutches. The dangers of extempore 
 speaking, imposing as they are, are not so great 
 as those of memoriter speaking. As soon as a 
 speech is finally committed to memory, one loses 
 the power of ut'ering it spontaneously. The mind, 
 too, is liable to play strange tricks, and run off on 
 a line of thought by itself, trusting to the memory 
 to carry on the speaking. Then, if the memory 
 suddenly weakens in its mechanical performance 
 of duty, everything is lost, and there is small chance 
 of recovery. The way to avoid this — to put the 
 
THE SPOKEN DEBATE, 195 
 
 matter in terms of psychology — is, never to learn 
 a speech so thoroughly as to turn it over to the 
 lower centers of nervous action, the centers which 
 act of themselves without high cerebral command. 
 So long as the speaker is choosing for himself at 
 each moment just what words to use at that mo- 
 ment, his speech will affect the audience as a fresh, 
 real and spontaneous utterance. 
 
 The precise words to be used in debate, then, 
 must usually be left to the moment of speaking, 
 not only in order to be easily changed 
 at the will of the speaker, but in order to ^*"°^' 
 give an easy and natural style. The assurance that 
 the right word will be at hand when needed is of 
 course a matter of experience. To acquire fluency 
 a speaker should try always to use the best word 
 for his purpose, even in common conversation or 
 when talking to himself. He should read the 
 works of great writers and speakers, and when he 
 meets a new word, if it seems a good one, should 
 store it away for the first opportunity he may have 
 of putting it to service. He should talk as much 
 as his conscience will permit, not only in company 
 but alone, not being frightened by the common 
 opinion that to talk to one's self is a symptom of 
 insanity. Perhaps the most effective single sort 
 of practice in fluency is that already suggested in 
 connection with the preparation of a speech: to 
 stand up as though to speak to an imaginary au- 
 
igS THE y4RT OF DEBATE, 
 
 dience, and attempt to reproduce the substance of 
 what has been written down, in words fitted to the 
 purpose but extemporaneously chosen. When one 
 conies to a point where a fitting word does not 
 suggest itself, one may say something — anything, 
 for the time being, as one would do before an au- 
 dience in such a case; but afterward the point 
 should be taken up again and the right word de- 
 termined. It is surprising, when one has once 
 determined upon the right words and phrases for 
 a certain number of occasions, how many purposes 
 they will seem to serve. Gradually, then, one*s 
 ready vocabulary will grow; and the time may 
 come when it may be said of the speaker, in small 
 measure, what Mr. Holyoake says of Gladstone: 
 
 " With Mr. Gladstone it is as though he took upon 
 the platform with him vast piles of the English lan- 
 guage, from which he takes, with a swift hand, what- 
 ever he requires for the purpose of the moment; words 
 of strength, or beauty, or brightness — of light, or 
 shade, or force, until each passage is perfect. When a 
 sentence is begun, you cannot always foresee how Mr. 
 Gladstone will end it. But the great artist never fails. 
 His eye sees all the while the fitting word lying by his 
 side, and he dashes it in with the spontaneity of a 
 master." 
 
 One final word as to the relation of the written 
 and spoken speech. We have seen that the style 
 of written discourse is more compact and less dif- 
 
THE SPOKE'N DEBATE, 197 
 
 fuse than that of spoken language. Unless, there- 
 fore, the debater writes with unusual and Expansion 
 unnecessary diffuseness, his written wok 0^ Speech, 
 will naturally expand as it becomes freer and more 
 conversational in oral utterance. For this reason, 
 as well as from the fact that space must be left for 
 material suggested at the moment of speaking, the 
 prepared argument should never be so long as to 
 occupy, in its written form, the full time allowed 
 for speaking. Otherwise the end of it may never 
 be heard. 
 
 What, it may be asked at this point, of prepara- 
 tion for rapid rebuttal in debate? This, again, is 
 so much a matter of individual ability preparation 
 that it is impossible to offer anything forEebuttai. 
 more than general suggestions. The ability to an- 
 alyze, recapitulate, and refute the arguments of an 
 opponent rapidly, when there is little time for re- 
 flection, may be regarded as a sort of inspiration, 
 which it is almost useless to try either to analyze 
 or teach. Nevertheless, granted some natural apti- 
 tude for it, it may be remarkably strengthened by 
 practice. To those with little of such natural apti- 
 tude for rapid thinking on their feet, this conso- 
 lation may be offered: that good rebuttal in debate 
 is not by any means so largely a matter of rapid, 
 extempore thinking, as is very commonly sup- 
 posed. Observation shows that, even when the 
 debater on one side must follow his opponent with- 
 
198 THE yIRT OF DEBATE. 
 
 out opportunity for reflection on the arguments of 
 the latter, the occasions are rare on which the op- 
 ponent will be found to have introduced any mate- 
 rial which could not reasonably have been antici- 
 pated. Most debatable questions are discussed 
 pretty thoroughly in an informal way, before they 
 are ever brought to the point of formal debate; and 
 it is a very unusual debater (except, of course, on 
 occasions when some new piece of evidence has 
 been discovered) who can devise a method of proof 
 which a careful opponent will find surprising or 
 unexpected. Usually the most that will be unex- 
 pected will be the general arrangement of proof, or 
 the form in which it is stated. 
 
 To prepare for extemporaneous refutation, then, 
 is simply to do what we have considered in former 
 Armed with chapters: to analyze the question from 
 Material. |-]^g point of view of the opponent as well 
 as from one's own, to become acquainted with all 
 probable or possible arguments on the opposite 
 side, and to be provided with abundant evidence 
 for overthrowing them. What is often thought to 
 be great brilliancy is really only careful prepara- 
 tion. To have at one's hand the evidence that is 
 needed is worth more than great eloquence. In 
 a recent intercollegiate debate the speakers on one 
 side quoted in support of their position from an ar- 
 ticle written by a professor in the opposing insti- 
 tution. It was at the opposing institution that the 
 
THE SPOKEN DEBATE. 199 
 
 debate was being held, and the quotation of course 
 made no little impression on the audience. It was, 
 in fact, merely a half-quotation, misrepresenting 
 the general tenor of the article by selecting some 
 sentences and carefully omitting others. The pro- 
 fessor who had written the article was present in 
 the audience, was of course profoundly annoyed 
 by the use made of his statements, but could not 
 rise and interrupt the debate to explain the true 
 state of affairs. Unfortunately none of the debaters 
 representing the institution where the debate was 
 held had brought the article to the platform, nor 
 was any of them sufficiently familiar with its con- 
 tents to give a true account of it. There was noth- 
 ing to do, therefore, but to ignore it. If one of 
 them had been able to rise and read two or three 
 sentences in the context of what had been quoted, 
 throwing back upon his opponents the charge of 
 garbling the evidence, the effect would have been 
 most striking. The incident illustrates the im- 
 portance of being prepared with all sorts of ijiate- 
 rial on the subject in hand, expected and unex- 
 pected, before actually entering upon debate. 
 
 What must be done extemporaneously, then, in 
 the matter of refutation, is, first of all, to decide 
 which of the material prepared for the „ , 
 
 ^ ^ Eitempora- 
 
 purpose is to be used, and which may be neons Refu- 
 
 discarded. One need not answer what 
 
 has not been charged ; one must emphasize in refu- 
 
200 THE y4RT OF DEBATE, 
 
 tation what has been emphasized in direct proof. 
 In the second place, one must arrange the material 
 of refutation in a connected and pleasingly coher- 
 ent fashion, avoiding — as has been suggested in 
 other connections — the use of separate, scrappy- 
 pieces of rebuttal. Usually this arrangement need 
 not be wholly a matter of extemporaneous decis- 
 ion; for, except when the debate takes an unex- 
 pected turn, one can decide in advance in what 
 connections it will be best to take up particular ar- 
 guments of the opposite side. In the third place, 
 the form of expression in rebuttal, as in most of the 
 argument, must be left to the judgment of the 
 moment. It will depend on what has been said, 
 and on the way in which it has been said. A court- 
 eous opponent needs one sort of reply; a pug- 
 nacious adversary another. Sometimes the argu- 
 ments to be attacked may be treated with con- 
 tempt; usually they must be respectfully answered. 
 The very phrase of an opponent will often furnish 
 a skillful debater with a phrase for replying to him; 
 the emphasis which he lays upon a word will give 
 one an emphasis for one's own case. Thus Pitt, in 
 a debate in the House of Commons in 1741, when 
 he was called to order in a passion by Mr. Wynn- 
 ington, said, in resuming his speech: 
 
 " Sir, if this be to preserve order, there is no danger 
 of indecency from the most licentious tongues. . • 
 
THE SPOKEN DEBATE. 201 
 
 Order may sometimes be broken by passion or inad- 
 vertency, but will hardly be re-established by a moni- 
 tor like this, who cannot govern his own passions while 
 he is restraining the impetuosity of others. . . That 
 I may return in some degree the favor he intends me, 
 I will advise him never hereafter to exert himself on 
 the subject of order; but whenever he feels inclined 
 to speak on such occasions, to remember how he has 
 now succeeded, and condemn in silence what his cen- 
 sure will never amend." * 
 
 Thus Macaulay, too, when the poverty of Mil- 
 ton's granddaughter w^as urged as an argument 
 for a long term of copyright, was able to retort in 
 this fashion: 
 
 " If, Sir, I wished to find a strong and perfect illus- 
 tration of the effects which I anticipate from long copy- 
 right, I should select, — my honorable and learned 
 friend will be surprised, — I should select the case of 
 Milton's granddaughter! As often as this bill has been 
 under discussion, the fate of Milton's granddaughter 
 has been brought forward by the advocates of monop- 
 oly. My honorable and learned friend has repeatedly 
 told the story with great eloquence and effect. . . 
 Why, he asks, instead of obtaining a pittance from 
 charity, did she not live in comfort and luxury on the 
 proceeds of the sale of her ancestor's works? But, 
 
 * These are not, in fact, the words of Pitt himself, but arc 
 taken from the report written down afterward by Dr. John- 
 son. Th'cy doubtless contain the substance of Pitt's retort, 
 but are in the characteristically heavier style of Johnson. 
 
2oa THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 Sir, will my honorable and learned friend tell me that 
 this event, which he has so often and so pathetically 
 described, was caused by the shortness of the term of 
 copyright? Why, at that time, the duration of copy- 
 right was longer than even he, at present, proposes to 
 make it. The monopoly lasted not sixty years, but 
 forever. At the time at which Milton's granddaughter 
 asked charity, Milton's works were the exclusive prop- 
 erty of a bookseller . . Milton's works are under 
 a monopoly. Milton's granddaughter is starving. The 
 reader is pillaged, but the writer's family is not en« 
 riched." 
 
 To pass to a very recent example: in a debate 
 on the colonial policy of the United States, the 
 debaters on one side repeatedly quoted statistics 
 relative to Dutch Guiana, as proving certain laws 
 of trade relative to colonies and their mother- 
 countries. In reply, the opposing debater adduced 
 contradictory statistics from a number of colonies 
 of great size and importance, and concluded with 
 the remark: " Ladies and gentlemen, there are 
 more things in heaven and earth than Dutch Gui- 
 ana!" 
 
 Such skillful retorts as these just quoted come, 
 as has already been suggested, by a sort of inspira- 
 Bapidityof ^^on, and all that a debater can do is to 
 Thought.' pray that, when the needful moment 
 comes, the inspiration may be his. To cultivate 
 rapidity of thought while on one's feet is possible, 
 
THE SPOKEN DEBATE. 203 
 
 but not easily reducible to rules. One must speak 
 as often as he can without making himself a pub- 
 lic bore. One may well be watchful, in conversa- 
 tion, of opportunities for keen rebuttal of weak ar- 
 guments and empty sayings, though he need not 
 make himself unpopular by putting his thoughts 
 into words. Above all, one must be earnest in his 
 thinking and in his investigation of doubtful ques- 
 tions; for earnestness is the mother of fluency. To 
 such an one, if he be naturally fitted for a speaker, 
 the act of rising to speak, the presence of an audi- 
 ence, the feeling that the occasion is a pressing 
 one — that everything depends upon him, will act 
 not as embarrassments, but as stimulants. His 
 nerves will tingle, his blood flow quickly, his brain 
 work like an engine. Ideas will come pouring upon 
 him, from the very time and place. Words will fol- 
 low suit, in such numbers as to need repression 
 father than stimulus. There is only one thing bet- 
 ter than to hear a debater at such a moment, and 
 that is to be the debater one's self ! 
 
 We come now to the final problem of the de- 
 bater, that of delivery. It is a troublesome mat- 
 ter, as being an essential to success, and piaceof 
 yet a subordinate one. As a means to Delivery. 
 an end it is of great importance; in itself it is to be 
 forgotten as soon as possible. To the speaker 
 absorbed in his subject, and eager to convince his 
 audience, it is a bore to be obliged to give attention 
 
204 THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 to the use of his voice, the position of his feet, or 
 the motions of his arms. He rightly says that he 
 is interested in more important matters. It is no 
 doubt true that if one must choose between sub- 
 ject-matter and deUvery, subject-matter should be 
 chosen without a moment's hesitation; that a 
 speaker with fine voice and presence, but with 
 nothing to say, is far worse off than one with fine 
 brains but poor elocution. And it would be a corn- 
 fort to be able to add that, if one will only attend 
 to the matter of his speech and the earnestness of 
 his purpose, the delivery will take care of itself, or 
 at least not make much difference. Unfortunately, 
 however, experience forbids our saying so. We all 
 know learned, even brilliant men, whose writings, 
 whose conversation perhaps, are of the very fir^t 
 rank, and yet whom no one cares to hear make a 
 public address. It may be from the simple fact 
 that they cannot be heard; or it may be that they 
 speak audibly, yet with so little vigor or variety 
 that it is impossible for any one to listen to them 
 for any length of time, remaining wide awake, 
 without great power of concentration. On the 
 other hand, we know men with comparatively few 
 original ideas, whose speeches when printed and 
 read prove to be vastly inferior to those of the 
 former class, yet who can always command an au- 
 dience and move an audience, through nothing else 
 than their ability as speakers. These are the actual 
 
THE SPOKEN DEBATE, 205 
 
 conditions. And it follows that a debater without 
 a good delivery is a soldier but half armed. He 
 may know what he wants to aim at, but he cannot 
 be sure of hitting it. 
 
 The characteristics of a good delivery may be 
 stated in the same words as the qualities of a good 
 style: clearness, force, and elegance. And Qualities of 
 the general laws of delivery are very Delivery. 
 closely related to the laws of style. Both are means 
 for expressing what one thinks in a way that will 
 make it the property of others. In both cases the 
 aim is to make ideas intelligible, to drive them 
 home, and to put them in pleasing and effective 
 form. 
 
 The quality of clearness, then, provides that the 
 speaker shall be heard. Whole books have been 
 written, and will continue to be written, 
 on the use of the voice in public speak- 
 ing; it would be unreasonable, therefore, to at- 
 tempt here anything more than the slightest help 
 in the way of practical suggestion. So much de- 
 pends, too, upon the natural voice of any particu- 
 lar speaker, that each person must find his own 
 critics and learn his own lessons. It may be said 
 in general that making one's self heard is not by 
 any means altogether a matter of loudness. Many 
 speakers, used to immense audience rooms or to 
 open-air meetings, speak too loud to be heard when 
 they are in a small room. To bellow before a small 
 
2o6 THE ART OF DEBATE, 
 
 audience is ridiculous as well as wearisome. To 
 speak with apparent ease and with quietness, and 
 yet distinctly, is best of all. It is true that a cer- 
 tain amount of loudness is necessary in a large 
 room. Usually a speaker can judge what this 
 should be by fixing his mind upon the part of the 
 room most distant from him, and directing his 
 voice with such force that he will realize that he is 
 reaching at least that distance. If the room is a 
 large one, he may at first be content with making 
 himself just audible, and no more, to his most dis- 
 tant hearers; the force of his voice will then 
 naturally increase as he proceeds. 
 
 But apart from the matter of strength of tone, 
 the elements of clear speaking requiring no little 
 attention from most persons are clearness 
 of enunciation and purity of tone. Ability 
 to make one's self heard in large assemblies is often 
 simply a matter of distinct enunciation. There are 
 usually three points to be noticed here. The first 
 is not to swallow the tone, but to keep the mouth 
 well open and let the vowel sounds have a good 
 chance to go straight from the place where they 
 are made to the ears of the audience. It is aston- 
 ishing how averse some speakers are to opening 
 their mouths when they talk. " Dr. Blank may say 
 a great many fine things," said one college profes- 
 sor in speaking of another in the same Faculty, 
 '' but one seldom realizes it, because he says them 
 
THE SPOKEN DEBATE. 207 
 
 inside his throat and a good part of them never 
 gets out." The second element of distinctness is 
 to utter one's consonants neatly and fully, and not 
 to let them constantly slip away into nothingness. 
 Failure to pay sufficient respect to the consonants 
 of the language is a cause of much unintelligible 
 public speaking. Even if it does not interfere with 
 clearness, it produces a most slovenly and inelegant 
 style of speech. The third element of distinctness 
 is to keep up the force of utterance to the very end 
 of each sentence, and not let the conclusion dis- 
 appear into the speaker's throat. Many speakers 
 seem to tire of their sentences before they are 
 through uttering them; their minds no doubt are 
 running on ahead to prepare for what is to be said 
 next; the result is that a hearer must fall back on 
 his knowledge of the subject or of the language to 
 know how their sentences probably end. As a mat- 
 ter of fact, we have seen that the end of a sentence 
 or paragraph is usually its most important part. It 
 should therefore be brought out with special dis- 
 tinctness, and serve to clinch the thought which 
 has just been uttered. 
 
 The element of purity of tone is even more dif- 
 ficult to treat apart from individual cases. It is a 
 matter which few persons understand, p^tyof 
 though all appreciate it in the sound of Tone, 
 different voices. Impure tones are caused by the 
 presence of inharmonious " over-tones," as they 
 
2o8 THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 are called, which sound in conjunction with the 
 principal pitch at which one speaks. Any one can 
 appreciate this by speaking in a deliberately harsh 
 tone of voice, and listening for the discordant over- 
 tones which can be heard in the throat. Singers 
 spend many weary hours of practice in order to rid 
 themselves of these impure tones. Speakers can do 
 the same thing, if they will. Indeed the quality of 
 the voice can usually be improved at will, by fix- 
 ing the mind on it, and deliberately relieving it of 
 the poor qualities of sound which one uses in com- 
 mon speech. A poor quality of tone is often due 
 to the same cause which produces a weak or indis- 
 tinctly enunciated manner of utterance, — namely, 
 the failure to fix one's thought on the audience 
 addressed, and to force out the tone in their direc- 
 tion. If one speaks in a sort of soliloquy, not let- 
 ting the voice really escape from one's own throat, 
 the resulting tones will be Hkely to be impure and 
 unpleasant. If one opens his mouth and speaks 
 straight out of it at a definite distant object, the 
 quality will be improved. But all these matters 
 relating to the use of the voice must be worked out 
 by every speaker for himself. Deep breathing must 
 be cultivated, in order not to tire the throat and 
 the upper part of the chest by too great depend- 
 ence upon them. An open throat must be culti- 
 vated, free from that constriction which so often 
 tires speakers' voices when they do not know what 
 
THE SPOKEN DEBATE. 209 
 
 IS the matter. Oftentimes catarrhal affections, or 
 other enemies of the general health, must be dis- 
 posed of if the voice is to be at its best. Constant 
 criticism must be sought from those who are able 
 and willing to tell one the truth about his voice 
 and delivery. In this way, by the firm and con- 
 stant use of the will, a weak and harsh voice may 
 become comparatively strong and pure. 
 
 The quality of force, in delivery, is of almost 
 equal importance with that of clearness. It has, in- 
 deed, already been touched upon, since 
 the two are very closely connected. The 
 object of force in delivery is the same as that of 
 force in style, — to make people not only hear but 
 listen, and to drive home into their consciousness 
 what the speaker is saying. Here is where we all 
 realize that many speakers fail. Those in the habit 
 of speaking to audiences that feel obliged to listen 
 whether they want to or not, such as college pro- 
 fessors, are very likely to make no effort to do any- 
 thing more than simply say what they have to say, 
 as though they were laying the matter on the table, 
 or talking it into a phonograph, knowing that any 
 one who should come by might take it up and get 
 the benefit of it, or might not. But a debater must 
 not be content with any such sort of speaking. He 
 must make sure that his important ideas are heard 
 because the very tone in which he speaks them is 
 so insistent that the audience cannot choose but 
 
«lo THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 hear him. He must bring out clearly, by changes 
 in his voice, every change in his line of thought, 
 so that it will be more certain of being understood. 
 He must establish so close a connection between 
 himself and his hearers, that from the moment he 
 begins to speak until he sits down, it will be as 
 though there were a current of electricity running 
 on a wire between him and each one of them. A 
 good speaker knows when this is the case, and in- 
 sists on making and keeping up this — as it were — 
 magnetic connection. 
 
 Vigor and variety, then, may be said to be the 
 main elements of force in delivery. The important 
 Vigor and ideas of one's speech must be emphasized. 
 Variety. must be driven home, as though one were 
 giving each of them a blow with a hammer. But 
 if there is a constant hammering at the same de- 
 gree of force, its effectiveness will soon vanish. 
 Some speakers make the mistake of beginning at 
 full speed, full heat, and full force. They are them- 
 selves excited at the very moment of commencing, 
 and do not realize that the audience is not yet ready 
 to sympathize with their state of mind. When a 
 speaker begins in a heat, and the audience is cool, 
 they are likely to laugh at his waste of energy, and 
 be entirely unmoved or even repelled. Or, if he 
 begins violently and continues violently, as some 
 loud-voiced speakers do, the audience may soon go 
 to sleep, as they would do under the influence of 
 
THE SPOKEN DEBATE. 211 
 
 any other sort of monotony, when they have be- 
 come used to the noise. The wise debater, then, 
 will begin with something of the same sort of cool- 
 ness and deliberation which his audience may be 
 supposed to feel; he may then gradually warm to 
 his subject, and carry the audience with him to 
 greater degrees of force and higher planes of feel- 
 ing. He will never pursue one manner of speak- 
 ing too long at a time, remembering that force is 
 always gained by change and contrast. A dropping 
 of the voice, when one has been speaking loudly, 
 is as impressive as a sudden raising of it when one 
 has been speaking quietly. If both vigor and 
 variety are used, the audience will be pretty cer- 
 tain to Hsten if the speaker has anything at all to 
 say. 
 
 Variety of pitch, as well as of force, is an ele- 
 ment of good speaking which many persons find 
 very hard to attain. Not only is any- 
 
 ,,. ,. , -^ -^ Pitch. 
 
 thmg approachmg a monotone sure to 
 produce the effect which we rightly call '* monot- 
 ony," but it is quite impossible to bring out all 
 the shades of meaning that any speech contains, 
 without constant variety of pitch. We have, in 
 fact, in our common speech, a vast number of 
 little Umcs which express the relations of ideas 
 quite as accurately as words. Everyone under- 
 stands these tunes, but not everyone has the 
 flexibility of voice to produce them easily. The 
 
21* THE AKT of debate. 
 
 habit of singing, in which the pitch of the 
 voice is of course constantly changing, is per- 
 haps the most natural means of acquiring this 
 flexibiHty; it also helps in the gaining of strength 
 and good quality of tone. Not every speaker can 
 hope to sing for the pleasure of others; but every 
 speaker can and should sing a good deal for the 
 good of his speaking voice. 
 
 Regarding the third great quality of delivery, 
 elegance, very little need be said. It means, first 
 of all, that a speaker shall rid himself so 
 far as possible of those particular temp- 
 tations to awkwardness or uncouthness which es- 
 pecially beset him. To do this he must have 
 friendly critics, who will not spare to tell him what 
 absurd things he does when he is in the excite- 
 ment of speaking. He must exercise his will-power 
 until he is sure that he is master of himself. Ele- 
 gance means, too, the same sort of dignity and per- 
 suasiveness in speaking that it means in style. 
 The speaker must respect himself and his cause, 
 but not be thinking of himself or talking of him- 
 self as though he were the theme of all his speeches. 
 This is the prescription for true dignity of manner. 
 He must respect his audience, too, and address 
 them with the courtesy with which he would ad- 
 dress any individual among them who might be 
 his guest. This is the prescription for persuasive- 
 ness of manner. If these qualities abound, the 
 
THE SPOKEN DEBATE, 213 
 
 Speaker will be pardoned much want of elegance 
 in the placing of his feet or the movement of his 
 hands. 
 
 The mention of hands and feet suggests the 
 question: what can we say of posture and gesture, 
 that shall be useful to the debater in a 
 general way? Almost nothing at all. 
 Erect posture is a matter of habit and of a self- 
 respecting state of mind. The speaker who 
 slouches, or stands in a hang-dog fashion, has 
 either acquired inelegant and unhygienic habits 
 \«hich gymnastic practice must correct, or else he 
 h not on the proper terms with himself, his sul> 
 jcct, and his audience. The self-controlled speaker, 
 who feels that he is master of the occasion, will be 
 likely to take a position of self-control. Even then, 
 however, he may need friendly caution as to shuf- 
 lling his feet, carrying his hands in his pockets, or 
 indulging in bodily contortions when he is carried 
 away by enthusiasm. 
 
 As to gesture, very little of it is needed in de- 
 bate. What there is should be the outcome of the 
 natural feeUng of the speaker. A gesture 
 prescribed and provided for a particular ^^^^' 
 place is one of the most lamentable pieces of gym- 
 nastics in the world. On the other hand, a gesture 
 that comes from the spontaneous enthusiasm of the 
 s])eaker will have good chance of being effective, 
 even if it violate all the commandments of Delsarte. 
 
214 THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 Critkism of gesture, then, must b'e largely indi- 
 vidual and corrective. If a speaker has formed the 
 bad habit of waving his arms or beating his fore- 
 finger all through his address, he should be told of 
 it and led to restrain himself. " Faithful are the 
 wounds of a friend." On the other hand, if he 
 makes almost no gestures at all it is because there 
 is too little freedom and force in his general man- 
 ner, because he is embarrassed or constrained, or 
 has too little warmth of feeling; in such a case the 
 cause must be corrected, not the effect. There are, 
 indeed, laws of gesture, as there are laws of style, 
 though it seems to be impossible to write a treatise 
 on them and keep within the bounds of sanity. It 
 will do a debater no harm to learn something of 
 these laws, — may even in the long run do hinJ. 
 good, but only when they have been absorbed into 
 his general make-up. The entire nature and use o^ 
 gesture, rightly looked at, are from within. 
 
 How much training In mere delivery is advisable 
 for an inexperienced speaker? All that he can get, 
 Training for Provided it is training of a general char- 
 Delivery, acter, and not for a particular speech. 
 Much practice on a particular speech is likely to 
 destroy its spontaneous quality. But training of a 
 general kind, with competent criticism and a rigid 
 use of the will for the purpose of correcting faults 
 and gaining force and elegance, can scarcely be 
 overdone. The ambitious speaker should sing and 
 
THE SPOKEN DEBATE. 21 5 
 
 shout all he can, to make his vocal cords strong 
 and flexible, and should practice gymnastics in or- 
 der to strengthen his lungs and improve his 
 muscular self-control. He should deliver many 
 speeches to the walls of his own room, and should 
 watch his expression and gestures in a good-sized 
 mirror. It is only by speaking privately to a mir- 
 ror that one can discover the mistakes of facial or 
 bodily expression which one's friends will never 
 dare point out; and such a discovery, made in pri- 
 vate, is without the bitterness of publicity. To do 
 all these things with a particular occasion in mind 
 would be to incur the danger that, when the occa- 
 sion had arrived, one should think not of the 
 duty of the moment, but of posture, gestures, or 
 quality of tone. But to do it frequently by way of 
 general practice ought to wear tracks in the brain 
 and along the nerves, such that, when an occasion 
 demands all one's power, nerves and brain will re- 
 act as they have been trained to do, and leave the 
 attention to look after higher things. 
 
 All these matters of delivery can, from one point 
 of view, be reduced to a single principle. The suc- 
 cessful speaker is one who is able to reach j^gj^^Qj^^f 
 and move his audience. To do this he Speaker to 
 must not speak as though talking to him- 
 self, or into the air, but must talk to them. He must 
 reach out after them, must touch them by his 
 speech, must enter into their sympathies so as to 
 
2i6 THE ART OF DEBATE. 
 
 move their feelings and wills. Two great facts 
 must be in his mind: his subject and his audience. 
 To bring these two together, as he sees them, is 
 the whole end of his work. Himself he must for 
 the time being forget. If this principle is operat- 
 ing in an ideal way, the brain will act logically, the 
 style will move in orderly and fluent lines, and the 
 whole physical man, as well as the man of thought 
 and feeling, will be at its best. The debater with 
 even moderate attainments of this kind will be in a 
 fair way to become what it was said at the very 
 opening of this book that a great debater always 
 is: a leader of men. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 INTRODUCTORY NOTE. 
 
 The material in the Appendix is added for con- 
 "venience of illustration and reference. The editor is 
 tinder many obligations to those whose courtesy has 
 aided in making possible the use of it for the present 
 purpose. 
 
 The speeches are from recent discussions on real 
 iflsues, and so, while perhaps not such trustworthy 
 n\odels of style as those of orators whose work has be- 
 come historic, illustrate methods of debate which are 
 genuinely susceptible of imitation. It was intended 
 ti> include also a specimen of Congressional debate; 
 but the conditions of discussion in our legislative 
 bodies are such as to make it difficult to choose 
 speeches which are at once careful, brief, and — stand- 
 ing by themselves — intelligible. Any student of argu- 
 mentation will, of course, do well to seek in the Con- 
 gressional Record for suggestions relative to debating 
 in deliberative assemblies. 
 
 The speech of Mr. Meade is given as an example 
 of refutation in extemporaneous debate. In this case 
 the subject was such that the affirmative side had not 
 only to prove its proposition but, from the very begin- 
 
 ai7 
 
2i8 APPENDIX. 
 
 ning, to attack the arguments of the opposite side; and 
 the present argument is an unusually skillful piece of 
 solid rebuttal. 
 
 The speech of Mr. Warren is an example of clear 
 analysis and clear presentation of a subject unusually 
 difficult to treat before a popular audience. Reference 
 was made to it, in the text of the book, as an instance 
 of constructive refutation, a definite plan being offered 
 in place of the proposition of the affirmative. Its com- 
 pactness of style is also worthy of study. 
 
 The speech on the Venezuelan Message is given 
 primarily as an example of persuasion in debate. Tha 
 decision in this case was to be rendered not by judges, 
 but by a general vote of the audience, which consisted 
 largely of members of the club supporting the nega- 
 tive side. The object of the speaker, therefore, was 
 to choose the arguments most likely to appeal to those 
 present, to state them in popular form, and — while 
 making clear the moderate position of his own side — 
 to attack the negative arguments which were most 
 influential in the community represented. 
 
 The briefs which follow the speeches are of course 
 designed to illustrate different methods of building up 
 an argument for debate, and of arranging one's 
 material in outline. In some the method is compara- 
 tively free and simple; while such an instance as the 
 brief on the Restriction of Trusts illustrates the most 
 thorough and rigidly formal type of outline. 
 
 The legal brief is included for the purpose of illus- 
 trating the peculiar methods of legal argument, on a 
 question of purely technical, rather than popular, in- 
 terest, where matters of both fact and law are involved. 
 
APPENDIX, 219 
 
 In this case considerable condensation was necessary, 
 since, as was pointed out in Chapter III, legal briefs 
 usually involve not only an outline, but a fairly full 
 statement, of proof. The material is given in sufficient 
 fullness to indicate the method of handling legal pre- 
 cedent and authority; the handUng of the evidence 
 could not so well be brought out in a limited space. 
 Complete legal briefs, illustrating the handling of evi- 
 dence, are of course easily accessible. 
 
 The brief from Macaulay's speech on Copyright is 
 included as illustrating the way in which the clear- 
 ness of structure of an argument may be brought out 
 by drawing an outline from the finished speech. The 
 brief on the Retirement of the Greenbacks is of course 
 an outline of a single speech in a university debate ; that 
 on the Restriction of Trusts, on the other hand, is an 
 outline of the whole case of the negative in such a 
 debate — detailed evidence excepted. Circumstances 
 must of course always indicate how full and how 
 formal an outline is advisable for any particular pur- 
 pose. The student of argument should err, if it at 
 all, on the side of fullness and formality, for the sake 
 of good practice in the analysis and construction of 
 material. 
 
 Of course no originality is claimed for the list of 
 one hundred Propositions for Debate which make up 
 the third division of the Appendix. They have been 
 gathered from many sources, and most of them have 
 been actually tested in debate. It is believed that there 
 is not one question on the list which is not genuinely 
 debatable. Many of them, however, in order to avoid 
 the limitations of particular times and places, have 
 
220 APPENDIX, 
 
 been stated in a form more general and more in- 
 clusive than would be found serviceable in practice. 
 Such a list can, at best, be only suggestive. When 
 formal debates are held fney should be on subjects 
 chosen so far as possible from present conditions of 
 living interest; and general subjects should be made 
 as specific as may be, by applying them to particular 
 times and places. Thus any of the subjects in the 
 present Ust referring to " the States " in general, 
 should be altered to read " Massachusetts," or " New 
 York," or " Pennsylvania," according to the place and 
 conditions of the proposed debate. 
 
 Subjects relating to art, literature, pure ethics, 
 philosophy, and the like, have been purposely omitted, 
 as experience indicates that they are unlikely to be 
 profitable for formal oral debate. They are often 
 valuable for discussion of a more informal character, 
 and may, of course, where a live issue is clearly drawn 
 and generally understood, be debated with profit. The 
 one necessary quality of a debatable subject is that 
 it shall be one on which living opinion is genuinely 
 divided. 
 
I. ARGUMENTS. 
 
 EXPANSION IN THE EASTERN 
 HEMISPHERE. 
 
 (Speech delivered by Mr. Edward Sherwood Meade, of 
 the University of Pennsylvania, in the CornellrPennsylvania 
 Debate of February, 1899. Pennsylvania had the affirmative 
 of the subject: "Resolved, That the interests of the United 
 States are opposed to the permanent acquisition of territory 
 in the Eastern Hemisphere, except so much as may be needed 
 for naval stations.") 
 
 The affirmative in this debate has taken strong 
 ground in favor of expansion. We are expansionists 
 in the broadest interpretation of that term. We are 
 in favor of the largest possible extension of American 
 trade and American enterprise. But in advocating 
 expansion we have not lost our balance. We have 
 been careful to base our advocacy of the American 
 theory of expansion on the American practice of ex- 
 pansion, which is expansion on our own continent, 
 and within the Western Hemisphere. 
 
 The first speaker on the affirmative made such a 
 convincing plea in favor of this western expansion 
 that he has won over to our view of the matter not 
 only you, ladies and gentlemen, who have come here 
 with open minds and unbiased judgments, but even 
 
 . • 221 
 
a22 APPENDIX, \ 
 
 his opponents, who may reasonably be supposed to 
 have inbibed a prejudice in favor of expansion in the 
 East instead of in the West. The arguments of my 
 colleague were, indeed, so conclusive, that the negative 
 speaker who followed him so far departed from what 
 we may suppose was his original intention, as to sup- 
 plement and support my colleague's argument, show- 
 ing in great detail the nature of our expansion in the 
 past one hundred years, and filling in with nice ex- 
 actness the broader outlines of the picture of national 
 greatness which my colleague had so ably drawn. For 
 this we thank him. We had hoped to convince the 
 audience; we had not dared to hope that we should 
 convince our opponents. 
 
 The second speaker on the affirmative has followed 
 up this advantage by showing not only that western 
 expansion is to our greatest economic advantage, but 
 that eastern expansion, which means of course the 
 permanent retention of the Philippine Islands, will be 
 attended with grave political dangers; — dangers of 
 war, dangers of political centralization, dangers to na- 
 tional character and national ideals. By this time the 
 negative had recovered themselves sufhciently to take 
 up the original thread of their argument, from which 
 their first speaker had departed in his desire to sup- 
 port the argument of my colleague; and the gentle- 
 man who preceded me has given you a glowing 
 prophecy of the advantages to the United States of 
 trade with China. He has told you that we must have 
 markets, that those markets lie in the East, and that 
 permanent retention of the Philippine Islands will not 
 only introduce us to those markets, but will furnish 
 
ARGUMENTS, 223 
 
 US with a trading base from which we may capture 
 the trade of China, of enormous extent and far 
 greater promise. This is his argument for eastern ex- 
 pansion. And he does well to base his contention 
 on the ground of economic advantage, where we are 
 only too glad to follow him. 
 
 The American people are thrifty and enterprising. 
 They dislike to make investments in losing enter- 
 prises. No matter what expansionists may say aboui 
 " our duty to civilization," it is our interests, rather 
 than our so-called " duty," that will determine our 
 course of action. Now what are the commercial ad- 
 vantages of annexation? 
 
 In the first place, it is plain that the trade advan- 
 tages of annexation do not lie in the Philippine Is- 
 lands. No matter what the United States may do 
 with the islands, — whether we give them inde- 
 pendence, or hand them over to a foreign power, — 
 our government can provide in the transfer that equal 
 rights with all other nations be given to our mer- 
 chants. We can secure no more than this by annexa- 
 tion, for, by declaration of the President and by our 
 manifest self-interest in the friendship of England, we 
 shall maintain the policy of the open door in the East, 
 and under this policy all nations will have an equal 
 chance in the Philippine trade. Sixty-five per cent, 
 of the imports of these islands come from the British 
 Empire; from the United States practically nothing. 
 We have no special advantages in producing the cheap 
 implements and materials which are mainly demanded 
 by the natives, and it is unlikely that, unless favored 
 by tariff discrimination, we could capture from other 
 
ai4 APPENDIX. 
 
 nations the trade which they now control. Then, too, 
 the imports of the island* are only ten and a half mil ' 
 lions of dollars, and all of this would be insufficient 
 compensation for the burdens of annexation. 
 
 Expansionists in general are quite ready to concede 
 this. But they claim that possession of the islands 
 will give us a foothold for trade with the East; and 
 on this ground they justify their policy. 
 
 The political and financial burdens of annexation, 
 as shown by my colleague, are very serious. At home 
 we are secure from attack, and therefore free from 
 war taxation. Our government is thoroughly demo- 
 cratic; our people become more homogeneous twtr^ 
 year. A policy of colonial empire weakens our mili- 
 tary position, increases the burdens of taxation, intro** 
 duces the one-man power into our government, an(\ 
 transforms the United States of America into th<i 
 United States of America and the Colonial Depen^ 
 dencies Thereof. 
 
 In return for these sacrifices the expansionists ofifer 
 the possibilities of exports to the continent of Asia.. 
 Surely this trade must be great, and surely annexa- 
 tion of the Philippine Islands must greatly aid us to 
 secure it, if the account is to be balanced. But if the 
 trade of Asia is small, and if, in addition, the posses- 
 sion of the Philippines will not help the United States 
 to secure that trade, the expansionist has lost his 
 case. 
 
 What is the trade of the continent of Asia, and what 
 chance have we to secure it? We may take India 
 and China as representing approximately the entire 
 amount. The total imports of China and India in 
 
ARGUMENTS, aaS 
 
 1897 amounted to $440,000,000 to 620,000,000 of 
 people, or seventy cents per capita. In the same year 
 six European states imported goods to the value of 
 six billion dollars to 253,000,000 of people, or twenty- 
 four dollars per capita. The importance of this Asiatic 
 trade, it is plain, has been greatly exaggerated. 
 
 Not only is the trade small in amount, but the 
 United States is at a disadvantage in the East, and 
 therefore has but a small share in the eastern trade. 
 In Asia we must compete with Great Britain, and in 
 this competition we are handicapped by distance. Our 
 Atlantic ports are 3,000 miles further from Hong Kong 
 than is Great Britain, and it is in the States of the East 
 and the middle West that we produce the greater part 
 of our exports. Even after the Nicaragua Canal is 
 built, Liverpool is 1,300 miles closer to Hong Kong 
 than is New York. Distance means coal, and more 
 coal means higher freights to the American than to 
 the English exporters. . . . Again, Japan and China 
 are now absorbing the cotton trade of China, and cot- 
 ton gHDods make up China's largest import. The 
 United States is too far away to compete with English 
 capital in these countries. 
 
 . . . The opportunities of the United States do not 
 lie on the continent of Asia, but in Europe and 
 America. In 1898 $980,000,000 of our exports went 
 to Europe, — more than doubled since 1888; $184,- 
 000,000 to the American continent — an increase of 75 
 per cent, in eleven years; to the continent of* Asia, in 
 the same period, after fifty years of uninterrupted 
 trade, $26,000,000. What more conclusive answer 
 could be given to the claim that the trade of the East 
 
ta6 APPENDIX. 
 
 is sufficient to compensate us for the dangers, the diffi- 
 culties, and the enormous cost of expansion? 
 
 But, says the expansionist, this trade will grow; 
 China will develop. Well and good; but will not the 
 trade with Europe grow? Will not the trade of the 
 American continent grow even faster? Will not the 
 same causes operate in the future as have operated in 
 the past, to direct the current of American exports 
 away from the farther East? And when we look to 
 the future, we see even stronger ground for our posi- 
 tion. . . . America is more and more devoting herself 
 to the higher forms of industry, whose products satisfy 
 the wants of civilization, especially along the lines 
 where the mechanical excellence of her people gives 
 them the greatest advantage. We seek a market for 
 these goods among the people who wear shoes of 
 leather, not of wood; who ride on railways, not in 
 bullock carts; who use improved machinery, and not 
 the tools of antiquity; who have something to buy 
 with, and who are not engaged in a constant struggle 
 for bare subsistence. For consuming purposes, one 
 American is equivalent to thirteen Asiatics; one 
 European equals thirty-four Chinamen and Hindoos. 
 In short, we look to Europe and America to buy our 
 manufactures, and we realize that the poverty-stricken 
 myriads of the East have little for us. 
 
 The negative must therefore admit that the trade of 
 Asia promises Httle for the present; and they must 
 also admit that in the future the same causes which 
 have directed our trade to Europe and America will 
 continue to operate. They claim, however, that if we 
 will but acquire territory in the Eastern Hemisphere, 
 
ARGUMENTS. 227 
 
 the result will be a great expansion of our eastern 
 trade. The only territory which it is proposed to ac- 
 quire is the Philippine Islands. If they will not serve 
 as a trading base, and if a better trading base already 
 exists, the entire commercial argument of annexation 
 falls to the ground. If we disprove this claim, im- 
 perialism has not a leg to stand on. Unless the 
 Philippines can assist us to the trade of China, no one 
 will advocate their retention. 
 
 A trading base is a place near the desired market, 
 where commercial agencies and branch houses can be 
 established, from which more exact knowledge of the 
 wants of the customer can be gained, and which will 
 act as agents between the consumer and the distant 
 producer. We are famihar with the practice in the 
 United States. Many American branches are to be 
 found in Europe and the West Indies. Every facility 
 for establishing these connections with China should 
 be given our merchants. It is argued that the Philip- 
 pines furnish such facilities, and that they can serve 
 as a trading base for China. Let us examine this 
 claim. 
 
 Manila is but 600 miles from Hong Kong, but is far 
 oflf the direct line from the United States to Asia. The 
 short line from North America to Asia is direct to the 
 Sandwich Islands, thence to Yokohama, and from 
 there to China. But to go from Japan to China 
 by way of the Philippines is the same as to go 
 from New York to Liverpool by way of Havana. 
 It is more than a thousand miles out of the way 
 to go to Hong Kong by way of Manila. It would 
 be a heavy expense for steamers to add this extra 
 
«aS APPENDIX, 
 
 cost to the freights which they charge our ex- 
 porters. 
 
 Again, the commercial agency must be near the 
 market in which it is to operate. But a branch house 
 in Manila for the China trade is in the wrong place. 
 It must operate at long range by telegraph or mail 
 service, and the American manufacturer in the United 
 States could carry on his China business from his own 
 office with as much facility as through a Manila agent. 
 Evidently Manila is a poor trading base. If we wish to 
 trade with China, let us by all means trade with China 
 directly, and not from a post distant from six to fifteen 
 hundred miles from the principal Chinese ports. Let 
 us establish our China agencies where they will do 
 the most good, in Hong Kong and Shanghai, in China 
 itself. Twenty-three ports in China are open to our 
 merchants. Here Americans can establish, and do 
 establish, as many agents as they desire, free from 
 restriction, with all their rights guaranteed. If any 
 combination of powers desires to shut those ports, 
 they must meet another combination, the combined 
 sea power of the United States and the British Em- 
 pire. 
 
 Consider for a moment an analogous situation. The 
 Canary Islands, off the coast of Africa, bear almost 
 the same geographical relation to Europe that the 
 Philippines bear to Asia. If the Philippines can serve 
 as a trading base for China, it would have been ex- 
 pedient to acquire the Canaries as a base for the 
 European trade, which is of incomparably greater ex- 
 tent and promise. But what answer would an Ameri- 
 can merchant make to a proposition that he establish 
 
ARGUMENTS, 229 
 
 a branch in the Canaries for trade with Liverpool? He 
 would say that he was a sensible man, and preferred 
 to put his agency where it would do more good, in 
 Liverpool itself. 
 
 The trading-base argument therefore falls to the 
 ground, and carries with it all the alleged commercial 
 advantages of annexation. The commercial oppor- 
 tunities in the East are of small extent. The United 
 States will have great difficulty in taking advantage 
 of them, and annexation of the Philippine Islands will 
 not assist her. Since eastern expansion, then, would 
 cause great evils, — military and naval burdens, politi- 
 cal centralization, international complications, and 
 dangers of war, — and since eastern expansion is justi- 
 fied neither by industrial nor commercial advantage, 
 we conclude that the acquisition of territory in the 
 Eastern Hemisphere is opposed to the interests of the 
 United States. 
 
THE RETIREMENT OF THE GREENBACKS. 
 
 (Speech delivered by Mr. Joseph Parker Warren, of 
 Harvard University, in the Harvard-Princeton Debate of 
 March, 1896. Harvard had the negative of the subject: 
 " Resolved, That Congress should take immediate steps 
 towards the retirement of all the legal-tender notes.") 
 
 My colleague pointed out that we of the negative 
 stand for the maintenance of a Hmited volume of goV' 
 ernment notes always convertible into gold; and he 
 showed that we have the sanction ' of the highest 
 authorities, and can point to the daily experience of 
 three of the soundest financial systems in the world, 
 those of England, Germany, and Canada. Then he 
 showed that the gentlemen on the affirmative propose 
 an indiscriminate treatment for our financial ills that 
 does not square with the symptoms. He showed that,, 
 with the exception of silver inflation, the only trouble 
 is the unfortunate connection between the revenue and 
 issue departments of the Treasury, the vicious feature 
 of which is the mandatory provision for the reissue 
 of the redeemed legal tender notes. This mandatory 
 provision makes the redeemed notes part of the gen- 
 eral cash of the Treasury; and by their reissue they 
 prevent the automatic contraction of the currency that 
 would take place if they were only held. So they keep 
 
 230 
 
ARGUMENTS. 231 
 
 going the endless chain that has carried ofif so much 
 of the gold reserve. 
 
 These facts point unmistakably to the simple change 
 that is necessary to make the retention of a limited 
 quantity of convertible government notes not only 
 safe, but positively advantageous. This reform is, 
 first, to estabHsh an adequate gold reserve; secondly, 
 to separate the revenue department from the issue 
 department; and, lastly and most important, to with- 
 hold the redeemed legal tenders from reissue except 
 in exchange for gold. 
 
 These changes were recommended by the Secretary 
 of the Treasury in 1880, by Hon. Thomas B. Reed in 
 February, 1895, ^^^ ^Y Senator Sherman in his speech 
 of January 3d of the present year. The establishment 
 of a separate issue department is simply an adaptation 
 of the English system to our conditions. These re- 
 forms will restore the convertible legal tenders per- 
 manently to the conditions that they enjoyed by acci- 
 dent between 1879 and 1890. During that time, when 
 the existence of a surplus in the revenue rendered the 
 reissue of redeemed notes unnecessary, the converti- 
 ble legal tenders were admittedly the best money we 
 have ever had. 
 
 Furthermore, as soon as the simple changes I have 
 indicated are carried out, the convertible legal tenders 
 will become in all their workings exactly like specie, 
 except that they are much more convenient. In fact, 
 they are very much like specie now. They serve 
 along with gold in bank reserves. They pass with 
 the banks and money-changers of Europe. In the 
 panic of 1893, they actually went to a premium and 
 
»3* APPENDIX, 
 
 were hoarded like gold. When the redeemed notes 
 are held and reissued only in exchange for gold, the 
 convertible legal tenders will become precisely like 
 specie, and will obey the laws of specie in every par- 
 ticular. 
 
 As soon as we grasp clearly the idea that the con- 
 vertible legal tenders act just like specie, we see that 
 the arguments against them are deprived of their ef- 
 fect. For instance, our opponents have said that an 
 arbitrary sum of government notes is now held in cir- 
 culation, causing a redundancy in the currency. But 
 suppose the currency consisted entirely of specie: 
 what would be the natural remedy for redundancy? 
 Clearly, the flow of gold out of the country. Pre- 
 cisely the same thing will happen when the currency 
 consists partly of gold and partly of convertible legal 
 tenders; only first there will be a movement of legal 
 tenders into the redemption department of the Treas- 
 ury, releasing an equal amount of gold. This gold 
 will go abroad, and, as soon as the redundancy is re- 
 moved, the flow of legal tenders into the Treasury will 
 stop. 
 
 Another objection, urged by the first speaker on the 
 affirmative, was that a legal-tender currency is in- 
 elastic; that it does not respond to expansions and 
 contractions of business, as a bank-note currency 
 should do. Very true; it does not. But here again we 
 must look at convertible legal tenders as if they were 
 specie. They take the place of just so much gold in 
 circulation and in bank reserves. It is not in this foun- 
 dation for business that we expect elasticity, but in 
 the superstructure of bank notes and bank credit built 
 
ARGUMENTS. «33 
 
 Upon it. Do the gentlemen on the affirmative expect 
 specie to vanish, like bank notes when they are re- 
 deemed and bank checks when they are cashed? It 
 is just as unreasonable to expect such behavior from 
 convertible government notes. They are not bank 
 notes ; they are not mercantile credit ; they are per- 
 manent currency. It is true that we lack flexibility in 
 our money system ; but that is the fault of the national 
 bank system, which must be reformed in any event, 
 before we can have an elastic currency. 
 
 But the argument which the last speaker urged as 
 a decisive objection to convertible government notes 
 •ii that the government has no power to protect its re- 
 serve against exporters of gold by raising the rate of 
 discount. The banks, being in the business of lending 
 •money, can always use this device to protect their re- 
 nerves, and so he urges that all paper money be issued 
 by the banks. 
 
 Now of course the government does not use the rate 
 of discount; but I shall show that when the simple 
 thanges we propose have been introduced, the banks 
 m protecting their own reserves will also protect the 
 government reserve. Why do they not protect the 
 government reserve now? Because of the redundancy. 
 When there is too much money in circulation it flows 
 into the banks; their reserves become excessive, and 
 they have no motive for raising the rate of discount, 
 — that is, increasing the charge for loans. Their ten- 
 dency is just the opposite. They try to lend all they 
 can at as cheap rates as bring any profit. The result 
 is that legal tenders, which form over half of the 
 money in bank reserves, are freely paid out, and are 
 
234 APPENDIX, 
 
 used by gold exporters to deplete the Treasury; and 
 then — this is the great vice in the present system, which 
 we propose to remove — the Treasury pays them out 
 again, thereby preventing the export of gold from re- 
 ducing the redundancy. So they find their way back 
 to the banks, and are used over and over to repeat the 
 depletion. 
 
 Now, what changes will the necessary reform in- 
 troduce? In the first place, the notes redeemed at 
 the Treasury will be held and not reissued. This will 
 soon carry off the redundancy. When the redundancy 
 is gone, the bank reserves will soon come down to the 
 lawful minimum which must be kept up if the banks 
 would continue sound. So the rate of discount must 
 go up, and when the rate of discount goes up it will 
 protect that part of the bank reserve that consists of 
 legal tenders just as surely as that part which consists 
 of gold. In 'Other words, the banks, in protecting their 
 own reserves, will hold back the convertible legal ten- 
 ders, which are the only means of depleting the gov- 
 ernment's reserve. The rest of the legal tenders are 
 in the pockets of Jones and Smith, all over the coun- 
 try. They are doing business as usual, and not expKDrt- 
 ing specie. Furthermore, when the rate of discount 
 has gone up, the whole train of results from a rise in 
 the price of gold will be set in motion, — the level of 
 prices will fall, exports will be stimulated, gold will 
 flow our way, and the very motive for a drain on the 
 Treasury will be done away. 
 
 Now what have we accomplished so far in this de- 
 bate? We have argued for certain simple changes. 
 We have shown that, if these changes are but made, 
 
ARGUMENTS. 235 
 
 the convertible legal tenders will become in all respects 
 like specie. What reasons have we heard for sweeping 
 all the notes away? Our opponents have said much 
 against badly managed legal tenders : can they dis- 
 credit convertible legal tenders in themselves ? On the 
 contrary, they cannot refute the reasoning of Ricardo. 
 They cannot ignore the examples of England, Ger- 
 many, and Canada. They cannot deny that from 1879 to 
 1890 the legal tenders were the best money the people 
 ever hand. They cannot deny that simple changes 
 would restore them to that position, and make them 
 everywhere as good as gold. They cannot deny that 
 the banks would guard the government reserves as 
 •zealously as their own financial soundness. Unless 
 ihey meet and overthrow these arguments, I claim that 
 Their case for the retirement of the notes cannot be 
 made out. 
 
THE VENEZUELAN MESSAGE. 
 
 (A speech delivered in a debate between the Harvard 
 Union and the Trinity Club of Boston, February, 1896, on 
 the affirmative of the question: "Resolved, That we endorse 
 President Qeveland's message relating to the Venezuelan 
 boundary.") 
 
 A PEACEABLE d'tizen once saw a man apparently 
 breaking into his neighbor's house. On observing- 
 that the premises were sufficiently guarded, he sum- 
 moned assistance, and himself demanded of the in- 
 truder that he either stop his advance or show his 
 right to the entrance. " But," said the thief, " this h 
 not your house." " Very true," replied the citizein, 
 " but you might break into my house to-morrow, iif 
 successful in this adventure to-day." " But," urged 
 the thief further, " this man owes me some money." 
 " It may be so," said the citizen, " but the justice of 
 your claim will not justify the injustice of your 
 method." " Who are you? " said the thief, then, " to 
 interfere with the actions of another as good as you? " 
 "I am my neighbor's neighbor," said the citizen, "and 
 the security of this highway is a part of my respon- 
 sibility." " Do you not know," asked the thief finally, 
 " that if you persist in this outcry you may stir up 
 violence, and blood may be spilled between us, who 
 are in fact brothers, speaking the same language ? " 
 
 236 
 
ARGUMENTS, 237 
 
 ** I know," said the citizen, " that my blood is not yet 
 
 so thin as to save itself at the expense of my duty." 
 But before the dialogue proceeded further, the patrol 
 wagon appeared, and bloodshed was averted by the 
 officers of justice. 
 
 No illustration really illustrates more than one or 
 two jxDints, and I want every one saved the trouble 
 of showing that this little fable is not a complete alle- 
 gory of the Venezuelan dispute. It is intended, how- 
 ever, to illustrate three things. First, that there are 
 wider interests than those of a given moment. Second, 
 that if justice and public interest reside in a given law 
 or principle, they are at stake in every instance coming 
 under that principle; — ^in other words, if burglary in 
 the state is contrary to the public weal, every burglary 
 is contrary to the public weal, no matter how insignifi- 
 cant the premises entered nor how respectable the 
 robber. Third, that what is the interest of one to-day 
 may be that of another to-morrow. 
 
 It will be seen that I am chiefly directing myself 
 against the claim that the Venezuelan boundary is 
 not a matter which legitimately concerns the United 
 States. It is claimed that it is not enough to show 
 that our government has acted the part of a strong 
 friend to a weaker republic; individuals, it is said, 
 may be bound by some ties of solidarity to their neigh- 
 bors, but governments exist solely for the promotion 
 of the interests of their own people. There might be 
 some doubt about this, in this year of our Lord 1896; 
 but we are content to rest the question on that basis. 
 We are not content, however, to have it demanded 
 that we must show that the actual territory under 
 
«3^ APPENDIX, 
 
 dispute in Venezuela is directly connected with the 
 material interests of the United States. Even if this 
 were a just demand, we might recall that the disputed 
 territory includes the mouth of the Orinoco River, a 
 point of no little commercial and strategic importance 
 for the whole hemisphere, and that it also has a near 
 relation to the proposed site of the interoceanic canal. 
 But all this seems so trivial, compared with the larger 
 interests at stake, that we do not feel that our time 
 should be spent upon it. 
 
 The larger principles may be briefly stated thus: it 
 is contrary to the interests of the United States that 
 the territory of either American continent should be 
 subject to the imperial advances of European powers; 
 that advantage should be taken of points weak in self- 
 defence for the territorial aggrandizement of those 
 powers; or that questions of dispute between Ameri- 
 can and European powers should be settled by the 
 assertion of authority and physical force. I cannot 
 see how any thoughtful man can object to this 
 statement of the large interests of the United States as 
 the power chiefly concerned in the Western Hemi- 
 sphere. And if these are our large interests, it does 
 not matter whether it is the mouth of the Orinoco or 
 a puddle on the Patagonian coast that is the object of 
 the imperial grab. 
 
 The present case comes directly under these prin- 
 ciples. England has demanded certain territory on 
 the American continent; she has proposed to enforce 
 her claim against a weak American republic; and has 
 declined to submit the whole question, as it stands be- 
 tween the strong and the weak, to impartial arbitration. 
 
ARGUMBUTS. 839 
 
 Let it not be understood that we raise any frantic cry 
 of warning against Great Britain, as though this en- 
 croachment were the beginning of a general attack on 
 the Western Hemisphere. It is quite unHkely that any 
 wider purpose is in the minds of British officials than 
 the peaceable occupation of a convenient and com- 
 manding piece of territory, under color of a boundary 
 dispute; — peaceable y be it understood, only because of 
 the superior strength of the aggressor. 
 
 But, it is said, how can we assume that England 
 is doing more than maintaining a just boundary claim? 
 We reply, we can not assume that England is in the 
 wrong on the merits of the dispute; the merits are 
 in doubt, and it is the object of the President's mes- 
 sage to find them out. Much breath has been wasted 
 on the ground that Mr. Cleveland has declared war 
 on a question which he had decided with insufficient 
 evidence. There are but two difficulties with that : Mr. 
 Qeveland has made no attempt to declare war, and 
 he has not claimed to settle the original question on 
 any evidence whatever. If the proposed Commission 
 should sustain the claims of England, I do not know 
 that any one should be better pleased than he. In 
 such a case the British government would have been 
 shown to have uselessly maintained a proper claim by 
 improper methods; our government would simply 
 have insisted that the whole truth should be known. 
 
 So far as the boundary matter is concerned, it is 
 to be admitted that when a greater power, bordering 
 upon a lesser, extends its boundary four times in 
 eighty years, and by so doing increases its colony nine- 
 fold without addition by war, purchase, or treaty— sim- 
 
240 APPENDIX, 
 
 ply by pushing along the boundary, like a movable 
 fence; when it is known to have a keen appetite for 
 western territory; and when the lesser power submits 
 its claim to the judgment of the world, but the greater 
 to its own judgment alone; — in such a case, I say, 
 an impartial observer is not unwarranted in suspecting 
 that something more or less than abstract justice is at 
 the bottom of the claims of the stronger power. If 
 those claims are just, we have a right to know it; if 
 they are unjust, the dignity of Venezuela herself is but 
 little more attacked than ours. 
 
 This seems the place to refer to the late lamented 
 Monroe Doctrine, which on yesterday we supposed 
 to be one of our national pillars, but which to-day, 
 having been subjected to the scrutiny of some, is dis- 
 covered to be a mere apparition. I cannot feel that 
 the detailed discussion of this Doctrine is of value 
 for OUT present purpose. We admit that it has no 
 standing in international law, any more than the 
 Declaration of Independence. Both have just as much 
 value as we wish to give them and are able to main- 
 tain. Nor does the President's message depend for 
 vindication upon this doctrine ; for we have shown that 
 the issue may be decided upon our present interests 
 alone. The fact is, the Monroe Doctrine is largely a 
 traditional name for our principle of national leader- 
 ship among the republics of this hemisphere. What 
 President Monroe applied it to may be historically in- 
 teresting, but is not of great importance. The signifi- 
 cant thing about it was its declaration that the United 
 States had an interest in the condition of American ter- 
 ritory, and would maintain that interest. The Holy 
 
ARGUMENTS, 241 
 
 Alliance, in the face of which it was first enunciated, 
 is gone forever; efforts to plant new colonies on 
 American soil are as obsolete as slavery or piracy; the 
 original occasion of the Doctrine cannot recur; but 
 its significant principle — American rights on Ameri- 
 can territory — ^is alive to-day if never before. . . . 
 
 I cannot close without a reference to the loud talk 
 of war which has been strangely aroused by this mes- 
 sage of the President. At its appearance the news- 
 papers seized upon a single phrase, and transmuted it 
 — after their ingenious manner — into headlines of 
 starthng import ; and ever since we have been hearing 
 martial music from Kentucky and other belligerent 
 districts, and on the other hand the protests of the 
 lovers of peace. What did the President say in his 
 closing paragraph? That if his position on the matter 
 of the Venezuelan dispute is correct, we should be 
 ready to stand by it to the limit of our abilities; that 
 he is not ignorant that, if England is as much in 
 earnest as we, serious differences might result; but 
 that even our friendly relations with Great Britain are 
 not so important as self-respect and justice. Doubt- 
 less he should have said that, although he bdieved 
 the American people support his position, yet if Great 
 Britain should object we would of course submit; and 
 that no serious consequences could possibly occur, 
 since no consideration of our own rights could com- 
 pare with the evil of having to fight for them. We 
 are not in the habit, however, of electing Presidents 
 who talk in that way. 
 
 To speak more seriously, the closing paragraphs 
 of the message depend for their defensibility upon all 
 
t4a APPENDIX. 
 
 that precedes. If the general position of our govern- 
 ment is wrong, we should naturally be disturbed at 
 any prospect of its becoming a disturber of interna- 
 tional peace. If it is right, while we should all deplore 
 any interruption of peace, we should not consider that 
 peace is to be secured by retraction. As a matter of 
 fact, — and on this I want to lay the greatest possible 
 emphasis, — Mr. Cleveland's message represents him 
 as the firmest friend for peace. What is the great 
 modern enemy of war but Arbitration? Between the 
 two methods choice must constantly be made. Eng- 
 land has sought to avoid either; our government de- 
 mands the method for which all that is best in modern 
 civilization stands. The President can say in all seri- 
 ousness that he loves peace so well that he is willing 
 to fight for it. He has re-announced the leadership of 
 the United States in the American continents; he has 
 brought that doctrine to the support of the rights of 
 the weak and of our own interests; he has taken a 
 signal stand for the only just and peaceable method of 
 adjudging international disputes, — and we will stand 
 by him. 
 
II. BRIEFS. 
 
 BRIEF OF A LEGAL ARGUMENT.* 
 
 (Outline of the Brief of Argument for Plaintiff, in the 
 case of Phoebe W. Hoffman (Plaintiff) vs. The Delaware 
 Coal Co., and The Philadelphia & Reading Coal and Iron 
 Co. (Defendants). In the Court of Common Pleas No. 4 
 for the County of Philadelphia. In this case suit was 
 brought to secure the payment of a royalty on coal mined 
 from a certain tract of land, which had been leased with 
 the provision that the rent should take the form of such 
 royalty.) 
 
 OUTLINE OF FACTS. 
 
 Analysis of the Lease. The lease of Dec. 12, 1876, 
 granted to the defendants the exclusive right and 
 privilege of mining anthracite coal from all the veins 
 in and under certain tracts of land. 
 
 There was a covenant by the lessee to pay 20 cents 
 per ton for all coal mined from the tract, as rent for 
 the same. The lessees further covenanted to mine at 
 least 25,000 tons of coal a year until Dec. 31, 1878, 
 
 * An abstract of a brief used by courtesy of Mr. George 
 Wharton Pepper. A sufficient part is given to indicate the 
 analysis of the case and the structure of the argument. 
 
 343 
 
244 APPENDIX. 
 
 unless prevented from doing so by accidents or occur- 
 rences beyond their control, and after that date to 
 mine at least 50,000 tons per year, unless prevented as 
 above. 
 
 The Defendants' Breach. The Reading Company 
 conducted limited operations in the shafts until the 
 end of 1884, and in the seven years thus elapsing they 
 mined 58,900 tons of coal — about one-fourteenth of 
 the minimum quantity covenanted for. Then they 
 stopped work. 
 
 The question in this case therefore is : Has the Phila- 
 delphia & Reading Coal and Iron Co. the right to sus- 
 pend operations, and, in violation of its covenant, to cease 
 paying rent until such time as it sees fit to resume f 
 
 The Defendants' Answer. The covenant to mine 
 50,000 tons a year being absolute, the defendants are 
 driven to the contention that their suspension was due 
 to " accidents and occurrences beyond their control." 
 Their answer alleges that faults were encountered in 
 mining which entailed so great an expense in obtain- 
 ing the small amount of merchantable coal contained 
 in the veins, that it became impracticable and impossible 
 to mine therefrom the minimum annual tonnage. 
 " All the available coal was mined out." These, the 
 defendants aver, were accidents and occurrences 
 wholly beyond their control, which excused perform- 
 ance of the covenant. 
 
 The Plaintiff*s Propositions. The plaintiffs accord- 
 ingly advance the following propositions, which they 
 will maintain by principle and precedent : 
 
 I. The evidence shows that it was at all times 
 and is now physically possible to mine 50,000 
 
BRIEFS. «45 
 
 tons of coal annually from the Delaware tract. 
 
 II. The possibility of mining the minimum 
 quantity being established, it is no defence to this 
 suit to allege that it is impracticable or unprofitable 
 to mine that amount. 
 
 III. Moreover, the evidence shows that it was 
 at all times, and is now, practicable to mine that 
 amount, and that the coal can be obtained profit- 
 ably and advantageously. 
 
 IV. Faults in veins and a disturbed condition 
 of strata are not " accidents and occurrences " 
 within the meaning of the lease. 
 
 I. The possibility of mining the minimum quan- 
 tity of co^l has 
 
 A. Been proved by testimony of plaintiff's 
 witnesses. (Testimony cited.) 
 
 B. Been proved by admissions of defendants' 
 witnesses. (Testimony cited.) 
 
 C. Not been denied in the defendants' answer. 
 
 II. The possibility being estabHshed, "imprac- 
 ticability " is no defence. 
 
 A. The fact that a mine is not " workable to 
 profit " is no defence to an action for rent. 
 
 Judge Hare, in his work on contracts, ob- 
 serves that as the tenant under a lease 
 "will reap the benefit, should the bar- 
 gain prove advantageous, so he should 
 bear the loss if his expectations are dis- 
 appointed by the event." 
 
 In Haywood vs. Cope, where a leased col- 
 liery turned out to be worthless. Lord 
 Romilly delivered an opinion decreeing 
 
24^ APPENDIX. 
 
 specific performance, pointing out that 
 the lease of a mine " is always, in some 
 degree, a speculation ; . . . and it is well 
 known that leases and sales are always 
 made with reference to this circum- 
 stance." 
 
 To the same efifect is the decision of the 
 House of Lords in Gowan vs. Christie. 
 B. When rent is reserved by way of royalty, the 
 same principles apply. 
 
 In The Marquis of Bute vs. Thompson, it 
 was held that the efifect of the lease was 
 to make the sum payable, in spite of the 
 fact that the mine was exhausted. 
 
 The same is the rule in equity. Ridgway 
 vs. Sneyd; Jervis vs. Tomkinson; Bam^ 
 ford vs. Lehigh Zinc Co.; McDowell vs. 
 Hendrix. 
 
 The case in hand differs from Marquis of 
 Bute vs. Thompson, inasmuch as no fixed 
 rent is reserved, but only a royalty rent 
 with a covenant to mine a certain mini- 
 mum amount. The result is that the 
 parties will be taken to have contracted 
 upon the assumption that enough coal to 
 yield 50,000 tons per annum exists under 
 the tract. //, therefore, that amount of 
 coal does not exist, the lessee is excused 
 from paying the rent; but not otherwise. 
 
 In GUmore vs. Ontario Iron Co., where a 
 lease reserved a royalty rent, the court 
 held that the defendant was bound to 
 
BRIEFS, 147 
 
 pay the minimum royalty as long as 
 there was the corresponding quantity of 
 ore in the land. 
 fn Walker vs. Tucker, where a lease con- 
 tained an undertaking on the part of the 
 lessee to mine at least 30,000 tons a year 
 and to pay a fixed royalty, and where 
 the plea alleged that the mines became 
 " incapable of yielding, when worked in 
 a good and workmanlike manner, . . . 
 sufficient coal to pay for working said 
 mines," the court held that the plea was 
 insufficient ; " there is nothing in this 
 instrument," it was said, " which author- 
 izes a suspension or abandonment of 
 mining because it has become unprofit- 
 able." 
 III. The evidence shows that it was and is prac- 
 ticable to mine the minimum amount, and that the 
 coal can be obtained profitably and advantageously. 
 This is shown by 
 
 A. The plaintiff's evidence in chief. (Testimony 
 cited.) 
 
 B. The defendants' cross-examination of plain- 
 tiff's witnesses. (Testimony cited.) 
 
 C. The defendants' evidence. (Testimony 
 cited.) 
 
 It will be borne in mind, however, that in dis- 
 cussing this subject we are doing so much in ex- 
 cess of our strict duty ; for strictly, the plaintiff is 
 entitled to a decree upon the basis of the first, 
 second, and fourth propositions. 
 
«48 APPENDIX. 
 
 IV. Faults in veins and a disturbed condition of 
 the strata are not " accidents and occurrences " 
 within the meaning of the lease. 
 
 The truth of this proposition is admitted by the 
 
 defendants' principal witness. 
 It is well settled that such a term as " act of 
 God," or inevitable, unavoidable accident, 
 does not extend to ordinary risks. 
 
 In Oakley vs. Packet Co., " head winds " 
 were held not to fall within an exception 
 of this kind. 
 Lord Romilly has already been cited to 
 the effect that a mine is always in some 
 degree a speculation, and that " leases 
 and sales are always made with reference 
 to this circumstance." 
 In Morris vs. Smith the meaning of the 
 term " accident beyond control " was de- 
 termined once for all. Mines were un- 
 expectedly flooded, so that they could 
 only be mined at a loss; yet Lord Mans- 
 field held that the lessee was bound by 
 his covenant on the ground that unavoid- 
 able meant physically unavoidable. 
 
BRIEF OF MACAULAY^S SPEECH ON 
 COPYRIGHT. 
 
 (This speech was delivered in the House of Commons, 
 February 5, 1841, in opposition to a bill extending the term 
 of copyright to sixty years from the death of the writer. 
 The speech may be found in Baker's " Specimens of Argu- 
 mentation," pp. 181-203.) 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 I. It is painful to take a course which may be 
 thought unfriendly to literature; but it is a duty to 
 oppose the pending- bill. 
 
 II. It must first be decided whether the question 
 is one of natural right, or one of expediency on which 
 the House is free to legislate. 
 
 III. It is purely a matter of expediency. 
 
 Property is the creature of law. 
 Even if it is a natural right, it cannot sur- 
 vive the original proprietor. 
 
 This is shown by the various modes of 
 succession which are provided for by 
 law. 
 
 IV. Since the existing law, then, gives an author 
 copyright during his natural life, the only point at 
 issue is, how long after his death the state shall recog- 
 nize a copyright for his heirs. 
 
 S49 
 
250 APPENDIX, 
 
 ARGUMENT. 
 
 I. The system of copyright should be an arrangement 
 such as to effect a compromise between the ad- 
 vantages and the disadvantages of such a law. 
 For copyright has essential advantages. 
 
 We cannot have a supply of good books unless 
 
 men of letters are liberally remunerated, since 
 
 Works of great merit can be expected only 
 
 from persons who make literature the 
 
 business of their lives. 
 
 And copyright is the least objectionable way of 
 
 remunerating them, since 
 
 They can be remunerated only by patron- 
 age or copyright; and 
 Patronage as a system is fatal to the in- 
 tegrity and independence of literary men. 
 Copyright has, nevertheless, marked disadvan- 
 tages. 
 It is monopoly, and 
 Monopoly always makes things dear. 
 
 (The claim that the real effect is to make 
 things cheap is absurd, for 
 
 If this were so, there would be no 
 need to limit the period of monop- 
 oly; there would be no compromise 
 between principle and expediency; 
 and all the old unpopular monopo- 
 lies should be revived.) 
 n. The proposed law is further from the point of just 
 compromise between advantages and disadvan- 
 tages than the existing law. 
 
BRIEFS. 951 
 
 The evil effects of monopoly are proportioned to 
 its duration, for 
 
 They continue indefinitely to affect purchas- 
 ers. 
 But the advantages of a posthumous monopoly are 
 not so proportioned, for 
 
 Distant advantages affect men but faintly 
 (Example of Dr. Johnson's copyright in 
 the hands of a modern bookseller). 
 The proposed law really multiplies the tax on 
 
 readers without additional bounty to authors. 
 The plea made for the claim of the descendants 
 of great writers is not valid; 
 
 For it is highly improbable that a copyright 
 will descend for many years from parent 
 to child. 
 
 No one proposes to entail it. 
 It will in all probability be sold by heirs 
 to booksellers. 
 In case of sale the family would not be paid 
 in proportion to the term of copyright, 
 since 
 
 Distant advantages have slight present 
 value. 
 Literary fashions change so rapidly 
 that no one can predict future sales. 
 The case of Milton's granddaughter, cited by 
 the other side, is quite in point ; for when 
 she was in need, Milton's copyright had al- 
 ready passed into the hands of a book- 
 seller. 
 Moreover, the proposed law would probably 
 
as* APPENDIX, 
 
 lead to the suppression or mutilation of 
 many valuable works. 
 
 Conscientious scruples, family pride, or 
 bigotry, would lead the inheritors of 
 copyright to withhold books which 
 they might not approve 
 
 (Examples from the works of Rich- 
 ardson, Boswell, Wesley). 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 The effects of the proposed law would altogether be 
 so evil that they would be evaded by piracy, and 
 this would lose its disreputable character through 
 popular approval. 
 
 All copyright would become unpopular, through the 
 lack of discrimination between just and unjust 
 forms. 
 
 As the bill cannot be satisfactorily amended, let it be 
 laid aside. 
 
BRIEF ON THE RETIREMENT OF THE 
 GREENBACKS. 
 
 (Brief of the speech of Mr. J. P. Warren, reproduced on 
 pp. 230-235. In this case the argument is supposed to be 
 attached directly to those of the preceding speakers, and the 
 first main heading is not developed, but is merely a recapitu- 
 lation of the material of the first speech on the negative.) 
 
 Congress should take immediate steps towards the 
 retirement of all the legal tender notes. 
 
 NEGATIVE. 
 
 The maintenance of a limited number of notes converti- 
 ble into gold is, under proper conditions, a safe and con- 
 venient policy. 
 
 I. Such a policy is approved by good economic 
 authority, and is suggested by the example of three 
 of the soundest financial systems of the world : 
 
 England, 
 
 Germany, 
 
 Canada. 
 
 II. Elxisting evils in our present system can be met 
 in other ways than by the retirement of the legal 
 tenders. 
 
 They are due chiefly to the mandatory provision 
 for the reissue of redeemed legal tenders. 
 
 253 
 
«54 APPENDIX, 
 
 They can be removed by 
 
 a) establishing an adequate gold reserve; 
 
 b) separating the revenue and issue depart' 
 ments of the Treasury; 
 
 c) holding redeemed legal tenders in the 
 Treasury, except in exchange for gold. 
 
 These changes have been recommended by 
 
 the Secretary of the Treasury, by Hon, 
 
 Thomas B. Reed, and by Senator Sher 
 
 man. 
 
 They did not exist, it is admitted, between 1879 
 
 and 1890, when the existence of a surplus in the 
 
 revenue rendered the reissue of redeemed notes 
 
 unnecessary. 
 
 III. With these changes accomplished, legal tenders 
 will be exactly like specie. 
 
 They are already very Hke specie : 
 They serve in bank reserves ; 
 They pass with European bankers ; 
 They went to a premium in the panic of 1893. 
 
 When they are reissued only in exchange for 
 gold, the only existing difference will disap- 
 pear. 
 
 IV. When legal tenders are seen to act Hke specie, the 
 objections made against them lose their effect. 
 
 The objection that they cause redundancy in the 
 currency is met ; for 
 
 Just as redundancy of specie is relieved by 
 the export of gold, so redundancy of legal 
 tenders, when these have been redeemed at 
 the Treasury, will be relieved by the export 
 of an equal amount of gold. 
 
BRIEFS, 255 
 
 The objection to the inelasticity of legal tender 
 currency is no more applicable to it than to 
 specie. 
 Like specie, legal tenders cannot be expected 
 
 absolutely to disappear. 
 The inelasticity of the currency is due simply 
 to the lack of flexibility in our general 
 monetary system. 
 The objection that the government has no power 
 to protect its reserve against the export of gold 
 by raising the rate of discount, ignores the fact 
 that the banks, in protecting their own reserve, 
 will protect that of the government. 
 
 They do not do so now only because of the 
 system of reissue, which, by maintaining 
 redundancy, takes away from the banks 
 any motive for raising the rate of discount. 
 When the redundancy disappears, bank re- 
 serves will fall to the lawful minimum, and 
 the rate of discount will be raised. 
 At the same time prices will fall, gold will 
 be reimported, and the motive for drain- 
 ing the Treasury will disappear. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 The remedy is not to do away with legal tenders, 
 but to institute the proposed reforms, by which legal 
 tenders will become precisely like specie. 
 
 Objections raised against legal tenders are only to 
 badly managed legal tenders. 
 
256 APPENDIX, 
 
 The doctrines of economists, the experience of 
 other countries, our own experience in 1879-1890, all 
 indicate that under right conditions legal tenders are 
 money of the first order. 
 
BRIEF ON THE RESTRICTION OF 
 TRUSTS.* 
 
 Question: Resolved, That the formation of trusts should 
 be opposed by legislation. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 I. A trust is a combination of business interests to 
 control or regulate the production or distribution 
 of articles of commerce. 
 
 II. The recent history of combination. 
 
 A. Ante-bellum period characterized by 
 
 1. Free and unlimited competition generally. 
 
 2. Combination of capital rare ; but existing in 
 
 a) Railroads; 
 
 b) Telegraph ; 
 
 c) Coal mining. 
 
 B. Period between the war and the crisis of 1873 
 one of business revival, characterized by 
 
 1. Enormous increase in production. 
 
 2. Overproduction, culminating in the crisis of 
 
 1873. 
 
 *The work of Mr. Stanley Folz, of the University of 
 Pennsylvania, Class of 1900, to whom I am indebted for the 
 use of it.— R. M. A. 
 
 257 
 
158 APPENDIX. 
 
 C. Period between crisis of 1 873-1 877 and the pres- 
 ent time, one of combination. 
 
 1. Unrestricted combination to 1889. 
 
 a) Formation of " trusts," in which stock 
 was surrendered to a central board of trus- 
 tees, who in turn issued certificates and 
 collected and distributed dividends. 
 
 b) Investigations of Trusts by 
 
 U. S. House of Rep., authorized Jan. 25, 
 
 ^88; 
 N. Y. Senate, authorized Feb. 16, '88; 
 (Canadian House of Commons, Feb. 29, 
 
 '88.) 
 
 2. Restricted combination, 1889 to date, char- 
 
 acterized by 
 
 a) Alteration of trust form; central board 
 of trustees abolished, certificates ex- 
 changed for stock, and new trusts organ- 
 ized by purchase of old concerns, in conse- 
 quence of 
 
 Anti-Trust laws of 1889, 1890, etc. ; 
 Judicial decisions, in Sugar Trust case, 
 etc. 
 
 b) Crisis of 1893. 
 
 c) Increase in number of combinations: 
 by end of 1898, 200; 
 
 by end of Feb., 1899, 353. 
 III. Trie trust question commands attention, because 
 
 A. Enormous capital is already invested in combi- 
 nations. 
 
 B. Combination is apparently supplanting competi- 
 tion. 
 
BRIEFS, 259 
 
 The formation of trusts should not he opposed by 
 legislation. 
 
 ARGUMENT. 
 
 I. Combination of industry and capital is an economic 
 
 development. 
 
 A. Free competition led to certain evils : 
 
 1. Overproduction. 
 
 a) Industrial plants were multiplied during 
 periods of prosperity without reference to the 
 demand; e.g., whiskey distilleries. 
 
 b) Capacity of old plants was increased in a 
 similar fashion. 
 
 2. Periodical depression of business, caused by 
 low prices, resulting from overproduction and 
 the cheapening of products. 
 
 3. Annihilation of weaker competitors by the 
 stronger, due to the ability of strong concerns 
 to undersell weak ones. 
 
 (Cf. testimony of Spreckels and Havemcyer 
 before Senate Committee; and von Halle 
 on Trusts, pp. 61, 62.) 
 
 B. Capital combined to protect itself against the 
 evils of free competition. 
 
 I. By combination it is designed to avoid the 
 evils just enumerated. 
 
 II. Combination of capital is productive of good. 
 A. It cheapens production. 
 
 1. Great economy is possible in the purchase and 
 use of raw materials. 
 
 2. Improved methods of production are used. 
 
9to APPENDIX, 
 
 a) An improved system used in one plant 
 inures to the benefit of all. 
 
 b) Patented machinery owned by one plant is 
 extended to the use of all. 
 
 c) Experimental stations are maintained, where 
 better methods are being constantly sought ; 
 
 e.g., Whiskey Trust and Cotton Oil Trust. 
 
 3. Trusts manufacture casing and packing, and 
 material used in process of production ; 
 
 e.g., Standard Oil Trust saves upwards of 
 $6,000,000 annually by making its own 
 barrels and tin-cans. 
 
 4. By-products are utilized; 
 
 e.g., Standard Oil Trust manufactures over 
 300 by-products. 
 
 5. Trusts produce in bulk, thus reducing cost of 
 production per unit of capital. 
 
 B. It lessens waste. 
 
 1. It prevents unnecessary duplication. 
 
 2. It prevents unnecessary advertising, for 
 
 a) Advertising does not so much increase the 
 total volume of business as it shifts it from 
 one concern to another. 
 
 3. It reduces the number of traveling salesmen. 
 
 C. It facilitates distribution. 
 
 I. The market is supplied from the nearest plant. 
 
 D. It regulates the supply according to the demand. 
 I. Overproduction is prevented. 
 
 Thus 68 out of 80 distilleries in the Trust for a 
 time supplied the entire market. 
 ±. Provision is made for keeping the supply 
 equal to the demand. 
 
BRIEFS. 261 
 
 Thus the Sugar Trust has built a refinery to 
 serve as a safeguard in case of breakdown or 
 of increased demand. 
 E. It secures the necessary outlet for our vast pro- 
 ducing capacity. 
 
 1. The producing capacity of our manufactures 
 is $150,000,000, while our consuming power is 
 but $75,000,000 (testimony of T. B. Thurber 
 before U. S. Industrial Commission). 
 
 2. Trusts are enlarging our foreign commerce, 
 keeping " capital and labor continuously and 
 remuneratively employed by preserving our 
 home market and reaching out for a place to 
 dispose of our surplus." (See E. W. Bemis on 
 The Trust Problem, Forum, Dec. 1899.) 
 
 III. The reasons urged for the opposing of trusts by 
 legislation are insufficient. 
 A. The claim that trusts maintain excessive prices 
 is insufficient. 
 I. The maintenance of excessive prices would 
 lead of itself to the destruction of the trust or 
 the reduction of prices. 
 
 a) To keep prices at a level higher than the 
 market will bear leads to underconsump- 
 tion ; and 
 
 b) Underconsumption leads to the fall of the 
 trust. 
 
 Thus the French Copper Trust, in 1888, 
 having raised the price of copper from 
 40 to 80 pounds, was unable to obtain 
 a market, and failed. (Quarterly Jour^ 
 nal of Econ., 1889, p. 508.) 
 
a62 APPENDIX, 
 
 c) Excessive profits attract capital into the 
 industry concerned, thus leading to com- 
 petition and a decline in prices; — the fac- 
 tor known as " potential competition." 
 Thus- 
 Capital has formed several companies as 
 
 rivals to the Sugar Trust. 
 When steel rail manufacturers in Eng- 
 land combined and raised prices, 
 American manufacturers for the first 
 time sold rails in Canada. (See An- 
 drew Carnegie in North Amer. Rev., 
 148: 141.) 
 In 1894, when the Standard and Rus- 
 sian Oil Companies met to divide the 
 world between them, it was found that 
 the Standard Oil Company could not 
 guarantee the absolute control of the 
 American market, owing to the stand- 
 ing of the Columbia Oil Company. 
 (See von Halle on Trusts, pp. 74 f.) 
 2. Present high prices in many industries can be 
 otherwise accounted for. 
 
 a. Supply cannot meet the demand. 
 
 x) No surplus accumulated during the 
 period of depression after 1893, with 
 which to supply the demand that fol- 
 lowed the revival of business. 
 
 b. Raw material is high owing to the in- 
 creased demand for it. 
 
 c. High prices immediately after the forma- 
 tion of a trust are often merely the return 
 
BRIEFS, 263 
 
 to a fair level, the margin of profits having 
 been wholly or nearly wiped out before 
 combination occurred. 
 
 B. The claim that trusts as such reduce the price of 
 
 raw materials is insufficient. 
 
 1. The ability to purchase raw material at the 
 lowest possible prices is not confined to combi- 
 nations. 
 
 a. In ordinary competition the largest pur- 
 chaser obtains the best rates. 
 
 2. Where trusts do purchase the raw material 
 more cheaply than before combination, the 
 producer suffers no hardship. 
 
 a. Though the percentage of profits is 
 smaller, the net profits are larger, owing 
 to the great bulk of the purchases. 
 
 3. It is not the tendency of all trusts to reduce 
 the price of raw materials ; e.g., 
 
 The Tin Plate Trust pays increased prices for 
 
 tin and steel. 
 The Cotton Oil Trust pays increased prices 
 
 for cotton seed. (See von Halle on Trusts, 
 
 p. 71.) 
 
 C. The claim that the trust prevents the old form 
 
 of competition is insufficient. 
 
 1. The trusts are the result of reckless and cut- 
 throat competition. 
 
 2. Trusts raise the level of competition. 
 
 a. Competition between trusts is possible; 
 e.g., 
 Sugar wars between the Trust, Arbuckle, 
 and Doescher. 
 
2^4 APPENDIX, 
 
 Standard and Columbia Oil Companies, as 
 noted above. 
 
 3. By analogous reasoning steam and machinery 
 should never have been permitted to compete 
 with hand labor. 
 
 a. Competition between combinations is on a 
 high level, like that between machine- 
 made products. 
 
 4. Free and unrestricted competition is an evil. 
 (See I. above.) 
 
 D. The claim that trusts crush the middle class of 
 
 producers is insufficient. 
 
 1. Under a trust the small producer becomes a 
 manager. 
 
 a. Trusts endeavor to include all producers 
 or manufacturers in their own line of busi- 
 ness. 
 
 2. A trust is often formed to prevent the crush- 
 ing of the small producer by competition ; 
 
 e.g., the Whiskey Trust. 
 
 3. The trust is economically superior to the small 
 producer. (See II. above.) 
 
 E. The claim that trusts are oppressive to labor is 
 
 insufficient. 
 
 1. Labor was never before in such great demand. 
 (See report of Factory Inspector of Pennsyl- 
 vania for 1899, in which it is said that in Penn- 
 sylvania alone 181,000 more factory hands are 
 employed than in the preceding year.) 
 
 2. Organized labor is not opposed to the combi- 
 nation of capital. 
 
BRIEFS, 265 
 
 a. It can make long-term agreements with 
 trusts. 
 
 b. It secures steady wages from trusts. 
 (See testimony before the Industrial Com- 
 mission of President Gompers of the Fed- 
 eration of Labor.) 
 
 IV. The defects of the trust system can be remedied 
 by legislation corrective rather than prohibitive. 
 
 A. The prohibition of discrimination in prices 
 
 would be such a remedy. 
 I. A trust could not then undersell a competitor 
 in one locality, while reimbursing itself for 
 losses thus sustained by raising prices else- 
 where. 
 
 B. The requirement of increased publicity in man- 
 
 agement, and of responsibility on the part of di- 
 rectors, would be such a remedy. 
 
 1. The public would then know the true worth of 
 a plant. 
 
 2. Directors could be held liable for losses. 
 
 C. The permitting of associated railroad action 
 
 would be such a remedy. 
 I. A trust could not then force one railroad to 
 give it advantageous rates of transportation, on 
 the threat of withdrawing its trade. 
 
 D. Increased care in the imposition of high import 
 
 duties would be such a remedy. 
 I. Foreign competition would then remove the 
 possibility of the maintenance of excessive 
 prices by a few trusts. 
 
366 APPENDIX, 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 I. Trusts are a natural economic growth. 
 II. They are capable of working much benefit for the 
 
 community. 
 III. The institution should therefore be preserved, its 
 defects being remedied by corrective, not pro- 
 hibitive, legislation. 
 
III. PROPOSITIONS FOR DEBATE 
 
 POLITICAL. 
 
 1. United States Senators should be elected by di- 
 rect vote of the people. 
 
 2. The President should be elected by the direct 
 vote of the people of the United States. 
 
 3. The policy of excluding the Chinese from all ter- 
 ritory over which the United States may exercise 
 jurisdiction, should be rigidly maintained. 
 
 4. The white citizens of the Southern States are jus- 
 tified in taking all peaceable measures to insure theif 
 poHtical supremacy. 
 
 5. Ex-Presidents of the United States should have 
 seats for life in the Senate. 
 
 6. The members of the President's cabinet should 
 be members of the House of Representatives. 
 
 7. The legislative referendum should be introduced 
 by our State governments. 
 
 8. The United States army should be permanently 
 enlarged. 
 
 9. The United States should reaffirm and maintain 
 the doctrine that governments derive their just powers 
 from the consent of the governed. 
 
 10. The " Record system " of nomination should 
 
 267 
 
a68 APPENDIX, 
 
 be adopted by our State and municipal governments. 
 
 11. Proportional representation should be intro- 
 duced by our State governments. 
 
 12. The United States should institute a system of 
 responsible cabinet government. 
 
 13. The States should limit the right of suffrage to 
 persons who can read and write. 
 
 14. National party lines should be discarded in 
 municipal elections. 
 
 15. The President of the United States should be 
 elected for a term of six years, and be ineligible to re- 
 election. 
 
 16. Women who pay taxes should have the right to 
 vote at municipal elections. 
 
 17. The Prohibitionists, Populists, and similar agi- 
 tators, are justified in forming new parties for the pro- 
 motion of reforms. 
 
 18. Compulsory voting should be introduced by the 
 various State governments. 
 
 19. The present powers of the Speaker of the House 
 of Representatives are dangerously great. 
 
 20. Independent political action is preferable to 
 party loyalty, as a means of securing reform. 
 
 21. A nation advanced in civilization is justified, in 
 the interests of humanity at large, in enforcing its au- 
 thority upon an inferior people. 
 
 22. The United States government is unsuited to 
 the administration of colonial dependencies. 
 
 23. The Indian Agency system of the Federal gov- 
 ernment, as carried on since its establishment, is de- 
 serving of condemnation. 
 
 24. Municipal offices should be largely appointive. 
 
PROPOSITIONS FOR DEBATE 269 
 
 as in Germany, instead of elective, as usually in the 
 United States. 
 
 25. The membership of the national House of Rep- 
 resentatives should be considerably reduced in size. 
 
 26. The United States government is justified in 
 continuing the practice of choosing untrained private 
 citizens for the diplomatic and consular service. 
 
 27. Any further centralization of power in the Fed- 
 eral government of the United States should be op- 
 posed by all citizens. 
 
 FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL. 
 
 28. The disarmament of the European powers, to 
 the minimum strength necessary for the maintenance 
 of domestic police, is desirable. 
 
 29. A formal alHance between the United States 
 and Great Britain, for the protection and advancement 
 of their common interests, would be expedient. 
 
 30. England's aggressions in Africa are justifiable. 
 
 31. The United States government should exert it- 
 self to maintain the integrity of the Chinese Empire. 
 
 32. England should retain control of Egypt. 
 
 33. The treaty signed at The Hague gives promise 
 of practical promotion of international peace. 
 
 34. The United States should insist on the absolute 
 ownership of the proposed inter-oceanic canal. 
 
 ECONOMIC. 
 
 35. The United States should maintain a system of 
 bounties and subsidies for the protection of the Ameri- 
 can merchant marine. 
 
«70 APPENDIX. 
 
 36. The United States should establish commercial 
 reciprocity with Canada. 
 
 37. Legislation directed against trusts is unwise. 
 
 38. The United States should continue to attempt 
 the promotion of international bimetallism. 
 
 39. The tariff on goods imported into the United 
 States should be fixed by a bi-partisan commission. 
 
 40. The United States should adopt the " Baltimore 
 plan " of bank-note circulation. 
 
 41. The tax on the issues of State banks should be 
 repealed. 
 
 42. It is economically disadvantageous to the 
 United States to own territory in the tropics. 
 
 43. Granted that it is constitutional, the United 
 States should impose a tariff on its tropical and semi- 
 tropical dependencies. 
 
 44. The time has now come when the purely pro- 
 tective tariff should be withdrawn from goods the 
 manufacture of which has been established in the 
 United States. 
 
 45. The single-tax system would have advantages 
 over the present systems of taxation. 
 
 46. The United States government should promptly 
 retire all the outstanding legal tender notes. 
 
 47. Foreign-built ships, owned by American citi- 
 zens, should be granted American register. 
 
 48. Reciprocity is a wise and practicable measure 
 for encouraging American trade. 
 
 49. The growth of large fortunes should be checked 
 by a graduated income tax and an inheritance tax. 
 
PROPOSITIONS FOR DEBATE, 2^1 
 
 SOCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL. 
 
 50. Department stores have proved a benefit to 
 municipal communities. 
 
 51. Employers are justified in refusing recognition 
 to Labor Unions. 
 
 52. The United States government should take 
 steps looking toward the purchase and control of all 
 inter-State railways. 
 
 53. American cities should own and operate all sur- 
 face-car lines within their limits. 
 
 54. State boards of arbitration, with compulsory 
 powers, should be appointed to settle disputes between 
 employers and employees. 
 
 55. Congress should prohibit the immigration into 
 the United States of all persons who cannot read and 
 write some language, dependents on qualified immi- 
 grants being excepted. 
 
 56. The elimination of private profits offers the best 
 solution of the problem of the liquor traffic. 
 
 57. The States should prohibit the sale of all in- 
 toxicating liquors to be drunk on the premises, except 
 with meals at boiva fide hotels. 
 
 58. The United States government should grant 
 uniform pensions to all citizens of the age of sixty and 
 over. 
 
 59. Interference with strikes by judicial injunction 
 is a menace to the liberties of the working classes. 
 
 60. State laws prohibiting all secular employment 
 on Sunday should be repealed. 
 
 61. Permanent copyright should be granted by the 
 United States. 
 
272 APPENDIX. 
 
 62. Municipalities should own and operate public 
 plants for the furnishing of light. 
 
 63. Vivisection should be prohibited. 
 
 64. Railway pooling should be permitted in the 
 United States. 
 
 65. In times of depression either States or munici- 
 palities should furnish employment to the unem- 
 ployed. 
 
 66. The boycott is a legitimate means of securing 
 concessions from employers. 
 
 67. The prohibition of the liquor traffic is preferable 
 to any system of Hcense, wherever pubHc opinion will 
 sanction the passage of such a law. 
 
 68. Social entertainments given by individuals, in- 
 volving lavish expense, are unjustifiable. 
 
 69. Profit-sharing, and cooperative methods gen- 
 erally, afford the most promising solution of the labor 
 problem. 
 
 70. Public libraries, museums, and art galleries 
 should be open on Sunday. 
 
 71. The prison system in the United States should 
 be revised so as to be largely reformatory rather than 
 punitive. 
 
 LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL. 
 
 y2. Three-fourths of a jury should be competent to 
 render a verdict in all criminal cases. 
 
 73. Congress should submit a Constitutional 
 amendment providing for uniform Federal legislation 
 regarding marriage and divorce. 
 
 74. All the guarantees and restrictions of the Con- 
 
PROPOSITIONS FOR DEBATE, a 73 
 
 stitution apply to all territory which may be perma- 
 nently controlled by the United States. 
 
 75. The annexation of territory to the United 
 States by Joint Resolution of Congress, without a 
 treaty, is unconstitutional. 
 
 76. The Supreme Court should reverse its decision 
 of 1895, declaring an unapportioned direct tax on the 
 income derived from real estate to be unconstitutional. 
 
 y/. A seat should be granted to any Senator ap- 
 pointed by the Governor of a State, when the Legis- 
 lature adjourned without filling the vacancy. 
 
 78. Legislation should be adopted looking toward 
 greater difficulty in the invalidation of wills, and 
 greater security in bequests. 
 
 79. An easier method of amending the Constitution 
 of the United States should be proposed by Congress 
 and adopted by the States. 
 
 80. The Constitution should be so amended as to 
 grant Congress the general power to regulate manu- 
 factures and industry. 
 
 81. Life imprisonment, with a restricted power of 
 pardon on the part of the executive, should be substi- 
 tuted for capital punishment. 
 
 82. The law governing judicial process should be so 
 amended as to provide for the more speedy conduct 
 of criminal cases, and fewer opportunities for delay in 
 the execution of sentences imposed. 
 
 83. All judges of State courts, like those of the Fed- 
 eral courts, should be appointed by the executive, and 
 hold office during life or good behavior. 
 
 84. The Constitution should be so amended as to 
 permit the trial in the courts of contested election 
 
a 74 APPENDIX. 
 
 cases involving membership in the United States Sen- 
 ate or House of Representatives. 
 
 EDUCATIONAL. 
 
 85. Women should be admitted to all American 
 universities on equal terms with men. 
 
 86. The fully elective system of studies should be 
 introduced into all our colleges. 
 
 87. Compulsory manual training should be intro- 
 duced into all grammar and high schools. 
 
 88. A city is the best location for a college. 
 
 89. The college course, leading to the degree of 
 Bachelor of Arts, should be reduced to three years. 
 
 90. The reading of the Bible in the public schools 
 should be prohibited. 
 
 91. Athletics have been excessively developed in 
 American universities. 
 
 92. The regular college course should be further 
 modified in the interest of those desiring to fit them- 
 selves for practical business careers. 
 
 93. A national University should be established at 
 Washington. 
 
 94. The " honor system " should prevail in all col- 
 lege examinations. 
 
 95. Roman Catholics, and members of other relig- 
 ious sects, are justified in establishing parochial 
 schools in opposition to those maintained by the State. 
 
 96. Freshmen should be excluded from all univer- 
 sity athletic teams. 
 
 97. The education of the American negro should be 
 industrial rather than liberal. 
 
PROPOSITIONS FOR DEBATE, 275 
 
 98. Education should be compulsory to the age of 
 sixteen. 
 
 99. Military tactics should be taught in the public 
 schools. 
 
 100. Religious denominations are justified in estab- 
 lishing colleges in the vicinity of State universities. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Afl&rmative, duty of, 74 
 Analogy, argument from, 90 
 Analysis of debatable questions, 
 
 Antecedent probability, argument 
 
 from, 70 ff., 87 
 A posteriori evidence, 94 
 
 refutation of, 114 
 A priori evidence, 87 
 
 refutation of. III 
 
 Arbitration question, 113 
 Artistic qualities in debate, 184 
 Audience, relation of speaker to, 
 
 135, 182, 210, 215 
 Authority, argument from, 46, 83, 
 
 no 
 Authority, legal, 26, 27 
 
 Begging the question, 21, 79, 118, 
 
 181 
 Bentham, J., 118 
 Bowen, Justice, quoted, 62 
 Briefs, 50 ff. 
 
 legal, 58 
 
 specimen, 243 ff. 
 
 Bright, J., quoted, 172 
 Burden of proof, 61 ff. 
 
 Carter, J. C, quoted, 144 
 Cause and effect, proof from, 96, 
 
 "5 
 Chatham, Lord, quoted, 150 
 Choate, J. H., quoted, 144 
 Church, C. J., quoted, 65 
 Cicero, cited, 138 
 Clearness, in delivery, 205 
 in s^le, 165 
 
 Climax, 181 
 Conclusions, 145 
 Concreteness of style, 174 
 Condensation, art of, 167 
 
 limitations of, 164 
 
 Conviction and persuasion, 4 
 Copyright question, 36 
 Currency question, 36, 119, 136 n. 
 
 argument on, 230 
 
 brief on, 253 
 
 Debate, nature of, i ff. 
 Deduction and induction, 77 
 Defining questions, 32 ff. 
 Delivery, preparation for, 189 
 
 problems of, 203 ff. 
 
 training for, 214 
 
 Dilemma, the, 122, 126 
 
 Elegance, in delivery, 212 
 
 in style, 18 1 
 
 Eliot, George, quoted, 92 
 Enunciation, 206 
 Erskine, Lord, cited, 109 n. 
 Evidence, circumstantial, 95, 114 
 
 a posteriori^ 94, 114 
 
 a priori^ 87, in 
 
 Example, argument from, 90 
 Expansion question, 71 
 
 argument on, 221 
 
 Extemporaneous refutation, 197 
 Extemporization, how far safe, 192 
 
 Facts, attacking, 107 
 
 establishing of, 79 
 
 mastery of, 127, 198 
 
 Fallacies, 117 ff. 
 
 27;^ 
 
278 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Federal government, centraliza- 
 tion in, 70 
 Figurative language, 176 
 Fluency, cultivation of, 195, 203 
 Folz, S., brief of, 257 
 Force, in delivery, 209 
 
 in style, 173 
 
 Formal debates, 22 
 Fowler, T., cited, 117 n. 
 
 Gesture, 213 
 Gladstone, W. E., 196 
 
 Hoar, G. F., quoted, 125 
 Holyoake, G. J., quoted, 193, 196 
 Honesty in proof, 105 
 
 "Ignoring the Question," 120 
 Illustrations, use of, 177 
 Income-tax question, 38, 143, 169 
 Induction and deduction, 77 
 Inference, proof a matter of, 78 
 Introductions, 138 
 
 Jury question, 35 
 
 Legal argument, 23 fF. 
 Legal brief, 243 
 Legal questions, analysis of, 38 
 Lincoln, A., 108, 123 
 Liquor question, 93, 115 
 Logic and argumentation, 8 
 
 Macaulay on copyright, 36, 123 
 
 brief of, 249 
 
 Macaulay, T. B., quoted, 124, 
 
 177, 201 
 Mansfield, Lord, quoted, 126, 148 
 Meade, E. S., speech of, 221 
 Memorized speeches, dangers of, 
 
 194 
 
 Negative, duty of, 75 
 JVon sequitur, 12 1 
 
 Opponent, attitude toward an, 134 
 
 Outline of argument, 50 ff. 
 
 as basis of finished structure, 
 
 137 
 
 Paragraphs, use in structure of 
 
 argument, 152 
 Persuasiveness, 4 ff., 182, 212 
 
 in peroration, 147 
 
 in refutation, 136 
 
 Petitio prindpii, 1 1 8 
 Pitt, W., quoted, 178, 200 
 Policy, questions of, 29, 98 
 Post hoc ergo propter hoc, 79, 116 
 Posture, 213 
 
 Preliminary work of debater, 31 ff. 
 Presumptions, 63 
 Proof, methods of, 77 ff. 
 
 order of, 141 
 
 schemes of, 100 
 
 Propositions as subjects of debat»e, 
 
 10 
 
 "Question-begging epithets," 118 
 Questions, debatable, 10 ff. 
 
 Reductio ad absurdum, 122 
 Refutation, extemporaneous, 197 
 
 inverted, 143 
 
 methods of, 106 ff., 128 
 
 principle of, 130 
 
 Roebuck, J. A., 116 
 Rogers, quoted, 116 
 
 Sidgwick, H., cited, 79 r. 
 Sidney, Sir P., quoted, 92 
 "Sign," argument from, 94 
 Spoken discourse, characteristic* 
 
 of, 165, 187 
 Statistics, use of, 115, 175 
 Stephen, quoted, 63 
 Structure of argument, 137 ff. 
 Style, laws of, in argument, i64ff. 
 
 relation to structure, 151 
 
 Subjects for debate, 10 ff. 
 list of, 267 
 
INDEX. 
 
 279 
 
 Suffrage question, 53, 7a, 119 
 Summaries, use of, 146 
 Syllogistic reasoning, 98 
 
 Testimony, 79 ff. 
 
 how attacked, 108 
 
 Thayer, J. B., quoted, 25 n., 65 
 Time, economy of, 166 
 Transitions in argument, 154 
 Trust question, brief on, 257 
 
 Venezuelan question, 40, 125 
 
 argument on, 236 
 
 Voice, use of, 205, 211 
 
 Warren, J. P., speech of, 230 
 Webster, D., quoted, 149 
 Wendell, B., quoted, 49 
 Witnesses, credibility of, 80, 108 
 Wording of propositions for de- 
 bate, 18 flf. 
 Written speeches, use of, 187 
 
Alden's SPECIMENS OF ENGLISH VERSE. 
 
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