THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA RIVERSIDE GIFT OF Dr. Kate Gordon Moore MODERN EGYPT ^ ts2>A €. r MODERN EGYPT BY THE EARL OF CROMER In his first intewieiv tvitJi the Go'vernor of St. Helena, Napoleon said emphatically : '■^ Egypt is the most important country in the ivorlJ." Rose, Life of Napoleon, vol. i. p. 356. Earum proprie rerum sit historia, quibus rebus gerendis interfuerit is qui narret. Gellius, Noctes Atticae, v. 18. Ttt S ipya. Twv irpa'^devTMV kv rw TroXejuo oi'/c (k Tou TTapaTvxovTos Trvvdavofievos ^y^toxra ypdcjieLv, ov8' ws ijiol eSoKd, aX\ ots Te ai'rbs Traprjv, kul Trapa Tuiv akXcov 6(rov Svvaroi' aKpLfSeia irepl iKaa-rov iire^eXdMV. Thucydides, i. 22. TWO VOLUMES IN ONE VOL. I THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 1916 ./ill righti reser-veJ /O^' Copyright, 1908, By the MACMILLAN COMPANY. Set up and electrotyped. Published March, 1908. Reprinted April, May, August, 1908 ; January, 1909; March, 1916. Torino otr ^ress J. S. Gushing Co. — Berwick & Smith Co. Norwood, Mass., U.S.A. PKEFACE I AM wholly responsible for the contents of this book. It has no official character what- soever. London, December 31, 1907. CROMER. EXPLANATORY NOTE P.T. 1 (Piastre Tariff) J&£. 1 (Egyptian pound) 1 kantar . I ardeb 1 feddan . = 2ld. = 26 centimes. = PT. 100 = £1 : : 6 = 25-9 ft. = 99-05 lbs. = about 45 kilog. = about 5^ bushels = 198 litres. = 1038 acres = about '42 hectare. (A feddan and an acre are so nearly equal that in this work the two measures have been considered equivalent. ) Vll CONTENTS CHAPTER T Introductory PAOI Objects of this book — The narrative portion — The effects on Egypt of the British occupation — Chief point of interest in Egyptian reform — Difficulty of ascertaining Eastern opinion . , 1 PART I ISMAIL PASHA 1863-1879 CHAPTER H The Goschen Mission November 1876 Financial position in 1863 — And in 1876 — Suspension of payment of Treasury BiUs — Creation of the Commission of the Public Debt — Decree of May 7, 1876 — The Goschen Mission— Decree of November 18, 1876 — Appointment of Controllers-General — Sir Louis Mallet — I am appointed Commissioner of the Public Debt — Ismail's predecessors — Crisis in the career of Ismail Pasha — Accounts Department . . . . . U CHAPTER HI The Commission of Inquiry November 1876-April 1878 Condition of Egypt — The law of the Moukabala — Petty taxes — The Egyptian public service — The fiscal system — Floating debt — ix MODERN EGYPT PAoa Efforts to pay interest on the funded debt — Famine — The coupon of Maj' 1, 1878— The Coniniissioners of the Debt— The Commission of Inquiry — The Khedive proposes a partial in- quiry— The Commissioners decline to take part in it — The Khedive accepts a full inquiry . . . • • 29 CHAPTER IV The Nubar-Wilson Ministry April 1878-No\ ember 1878 Difficulty of the task assigned to the Commission of Inquiry — Cherif Pasha declines to appear as a witness — Defec-ts in the system of administration — The floating debt — The Rouznameh Loan— Loans from the Wakf and Beit-el-Mal Administrations — Ultimate reforms proposed by the Commissioners — Imme- diate reforms necessary — Enforcement of Ministerial responsi- bility — The Khedive's Civil List— Cession to the State of the Khedivial properties — The Khedive accepts the proposals of the Commissioners — Nubar Pasha forms a Ministry — Sir Rivers Wilson and M. de Blignieres named Ministers — Loan authorised on the security of the Khedivial estates . , , . 46 CHAPTER V^ The Fall of Nubar Pasha November 1878-Febkuary 1879 Difficult position of the new Ministry— Support of the British and French Governments— The Khedive declines all responsibihty — Convocation of the Chamber of Notables— The principle of Ministerial responsibility — Contest between the Khedive and Nubar Pasha — The Khedive intrigues against the Ministry — Mutiny of the officers — It is quelled by the Khedive — Nubar Pasha resigns — Immediate consequences — Remote conse- quences — State of discipline of the army — The Khedive's •responsibility for the mutiny . . • . . 64 CHAPTER VI The Coup d'Etat April 1879 Triumph achieved by Ismail Pasha — His parliamentary projects — Necessity of maintaining the reformed adniiiiislmtion — CONTENTS . xi Attempts to reinstate Nubar Pasha — Relations between the Khedive and the new Ministry — Position of the British and French Governments — Common policy— Different methods of executing the policy — Dissensions at Cairo — Position of Prince Tewfik — Mistaken principles of the new Ministry — The pay- ment of the coupon on the 1864- loan — The Khedive prepares a separate financial scheme — Dismissal of the Ministers — Pro- posal to revive the Control — Letter of the Khedive to Cherif Pasha — Character of the new Ministers — Cimimcnts on the Khedive's proceedings ...... 82 CHAPTER VII The Report of the Commission April 1879 Declaration of bankruptcy — Principles of the settlement — The Khedive's Civil List — The Ouchouri land-tax — The Rouznameh loan — The law of the Mouktibala — Reductions of taxation — Composition with the creditors — Comments on the report — The Commissioners resign — The Khedive's counter -proposals — Revival of the practices of the old regime — The Connnissioners of the Debt institute legal proceedings against the Egyptian Government — My departure from Egypt . . .110 CHAPTER VIII The Fall of Ismail Pasha April-June 1879 Embarrassment of the European Powers — Turkey — England — France — Italy — Russia — Germany and Austria — The French and British Governments demand the reinstatement of the European Ministers — The Khedive declines to reinstate them — Question of re - establishing the Control — The German Government protest against the proceedings of the Khedive — The British and French Governments advise abdication —The Khedive appeals to the Sultan — The Sultan deposes the Khedive — Inauguration of Prince Tewfik — Ismail Pasha leaves Egypt — Remarks on his reign • , . . . 128 xii MODERN EGYPT PART II THE ARABI REVOLT August 1879-August 1883 CHAPTER IX The Inauguration of Tewfik August-November 1879 PAoa State of the country — Cherif Pasha's Ministry — The Khedive assumes the Presidency of the Council — Ministry of Riaz Pasha — Relations between the Khedive and his Ministers — The Sultan cancels the Firman of 1873 — Objections of France and England — The Mohammedan law of succession — The right to make Commercial Conventions, and to contract loans — The Army — The Khedive's investiture — Appointment of Controllers — Relations between the Government and the Controllers — Division of work between the Controllers— The Commission of Liquidation ....... 149 CHAPTER X The Dual Control November 1879-December 1880 Working of the Control — Relations between the two Controllers — And between the Controllers and the Egyptian Government — Delay in paying the Tribute — Interest on the Unified Debt paid at 4 per cent — Financial scheme proposed by the Con- trollers — The Budget for 1880 — Reforms in the fiscal system — Confidence inspired by the Control — Reports on the state of the country — The Law of Liquidation — The military danger . 164 CHAPTER XI The Mutiny of the Egyptian Army January-September 1881 Discontent amongst the officers — They petition Riaz Pasha — Mutiny of February 1 — Dismissal of the Minister of War — Imprudent conduct of the Khedive — Conduct of the French Consul-General — Increase of discontent in the army — Mutiny of September 9 — Sir Auckland Colvin — Demands of the muti- CONTENTS xiii PAOK neers — Dismissal of the Ministers — Reluctance of Ch^rif Pasha to accept office — Nomination of the Cherif Ministry — Ch^rif Pasha supports the European Control — Arabi is the real ruler of Egypt — His conduct due to fear — Situation created by the mutiny •.....•> 175 CHAPTER XII The Cherif Ministry September-December 1881 The Porte wishes to interfere — Objections of France and England — Despatch of Turkish Commissioners to Cairo — Effect of their mission— British and French ships sent to Alexandria — Ardbi leaves Cairo with his regiment — Remarks on Turkish inter- ference — Divergent views of France and England — Despond- ency of the Khedive — Cherif Pasha's policy — Sir Auckland Colvin's views — Arabi's policy — Insubordination in the army — Violence of the local press — Attitude of the civil population — Summary of the situation at the end of 1881 ... 194 CHAPTER XIII The Joint Note January 1882 Proposal to establish an Anglo-French Military Control — Change of Ministry in France — M. Gambetta proposes joint action — Lord Granville agrees — Sir Edward Malet consulted — Sir Auckland Colvin's recommendations — M, Gambetta prepares a draft note — Lord Granville agrees — Instructions sent to Cairo — Proposed increase in the army — Reorganisation of the Chamber of Notables — Effect produced by the Note — Remarks on the Note ........ 214 CHAPTER XIV The Effects of the Joint Notb January-February 1882 The British Government wish to explain the Joint Note — The French Government object — The Chamber of Notables claims the right to vote the Budget — Proposals of the British Govern- ment — Objections of the French Government — The Consuls- General instructed to oppose the Chamber — The Chamber xiv MODERN EGYPT TAom demands a change of Ministry — Appointment of a National Ministry— The French Government press for an Anglo-French occupation — The British Government favour a Turkish occupa- tion—Resignation of M. Gambetta— Remarks on his poUcy . 236 CHAPTER XV The ArAbi Ministry February-May 1882 Proposal to revise the Organic Law— Mr. Wilfrid Blunt— M. de Blignieres resigns — Concessions made to the army — Disor- ganisation in the provinces— The Porte protests against the Joint Note— The Powers are invited to an exchange of views — M. de Freycinet wishes to depose the Khedive — Lord Granville proposes to send Financial Commissioners to Egypt— Alleged conspiracy to murder Arabi — The Ministers resign, but resume oflBce— M. de Freycinet assents to Turkish intervention — Arabi requested to leave Egypt— He refuses to do so— The Ministers again resign — The Khedive reinstates Arabi — And asks for a Turkish Commissioner ...... 254 Appendix. — Note on the relations between Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Wilfrid Blunt 279 CHAPTER XVI The Bombardment of Alexandria May- July 1882 State of the country— Vacillation of the Porte — A Conference pro- posed — Dervish Pasha and Essad Effendi sent to Egypt — The Alexandria massacres — Failure of Dervish Pasha's Mission — Panic in Egypt— The Conference meets— The Ragheb Ministry — The British Admiral demands that the construction of batteries at Alexandria shall cease — The French decline to co-operate — The bombardment of Alexandria — The town abandoned and burnt ...... 281 CHAPTER XVH Tel-el-Kebir July-September 1882 State of the country— British policy — Vote of credit — Negotiations with France — Fall of the Freycinet Ministry — France declines to co-operate- Negotiations with Italy — Italy declines to CONTENTS XV PAQE co-operate— Negotiations with Turkey — Tel-el-Kebir — General remarks ........ 300 CHAPTER XVIII The Dufferin Mission September 1882-August 1883 British policy — Trial of Arabi — Resignation of Riaz Pasha — Exile of political prisoners — Courts-martial — The Alexandria Indem- nities — The abohtion of the Dual Control — Rupture of the Anglo-French understanding — Lord Dufferin's Report — My arrival in Egypt .....*. 331 PART III THE SOUDAN 1882-1907 CHAPTER XIX The Hicks Expedition January-November 1883 Extent of Egyptian territory — Misgovernment in the Soudan — Slave-hunting — Said Pasha's views — Colonel Stewart's Report — The Mahdi — Military and financial situation — Interference from Cairo — Attitude of the Bi'itish Government — Destruction of General Hicks's army ...... 349 CHAPTER XX The Abandonment of the Soudan November 1883-January 1884 My position — I press the British Government to depart from a passive attitude — ^ Lord Granville's reply — The Egyptian Government decide to hold Khartoum — Colonel Coetlogon recommends a retreat on Berber — Opinions of the military authorities at Cairo — The Egyptian Government wish to invoke the aid of the Sultan — The British Government recommend withdrawal from the Soudan — The Eg}'ptian Ministers resign — Nubar Pasha takes office — Observations on the policy of withdrawal from the Soudan . . . 37 1 xvi MODERN EGYPT CHAPTER XXI The Rebellion in the Eastern Soudan August 1883-March 1884 PAOI Prevailing discontent — Annihilation of a force sent to Sinkat — And of one sent to Tokar — Defeat of the Egjptians at Tamanieb — It is decided to send the Gendarmerie and some black troops under Zobeir Pasha to Suakin — Instructions to General Baker — He arrives at Suakin — His instructions are modified — Zobeir Pasha retained at Cairo — General Baker advances to Tokar — His defeat — Fall of Sinkat — It is decided to send a British force to Tokar — FaU of Tokar — General Graham advances — Action at El Teb— The British troops return to Suakin— Battle of Tamai — Results of the operations . . . . • 396 CHAPTER XXn The Gordon Mission December 1883-January 1884 The situation in Egypt — Sir Frederick Stephenson — General Earle — Sir Edgar Vincent — Sir Evelyn Wood — Foreign Ofi&ce support — First and second proposals to send General Gordon — They are rejected — Third proposal to send General Gordon — It is accepted — No British officer should have been sent to Khartoum — General Gordon should not in any case have been chosen— The responsibility of the British press — And of the British Government — General Gordon's optimism — My regret at having assented to the Gordon Mission . . ,417 CHAPTER XXm Gordon at Cairo January 24-26, 1884 General Gordon wishes to go to Suakin — He goes to Cairo — Con- sequences which resulted from the change of route — General Gordon's views as to the Soudan — His London instructions —Instructions issued at Cairo — General Gordon appointed Governor-General of the Soudan — And furnished with certain Proclamations — Reasons why General Gordon's instructions were changed — The Darfour Sultan — General Gordon proposes that Zobeir Paslia should accompany him — Interview between General Gordon and Zobeir Pasha — It is decided not to employ Zobeir Pasha — General Gordon leaves Cairo . • . 440 CONTENTS xvii CHAPTER XXIV Gordon's Journey to Khartoum January 26-Febbuary 18, 1884 FAOC Contradictory nature of General Gordon's proposals — The Darfour Sultan — General Gordon proposes to visit the Mahdi — Or to retire to the Equator — He issues a Proclamation announcing the independence of the Soudan — The Slavery Proclamation — General Gordon arrives at Khartoum — He is sanguine of success — Colonel Stewart's warning . . , .461 CHAPTER XXV ZoBEiR Pasha • February 18-March 16, 1884 The turning-point of General Gordon's Mission — General Gordon's Memorandum of February S^Change in General Gordon's views — He asks for Zobeir Pasha— I advise that Zobeir Pasha should be General Gordon's successor — The Government reject this proposal — General Gordon proposes to "smash up" the Mahdi — Conflicting policies advocated by General Gordon — His Proclamation stating that British troops were coming to Khartoum — General Gordon's neglect of his instructions — I again urge the employment of Zobeir Pasha — Difficulty of under- standing General Gordon's telegrams — Colonel Stewart recom- mends that Zobeir Pasha should be sent^I support this view — General Gordon recommends that the Berber-Suakin route should be opened — The Government object to the employ- ment of Zobeir Pasha — I again urge the employment of Zobeir Pasha — General Gordon's communications to the Times correspondent — The tribes round Khartoum waver — The Government reject the Zobeir proposal — I instruct General Gordon to hold on to Khartoum — I again urge on the Government the necessity of employing Zobeir Pasha — The proposal is rejected — I remonstrate — Final rejection of the Zobeir proposal — Were the Government right in their decision ? 479 CHAPTER XXVI The Proposed Dash to Berber March 16-April 21, 1884 Sir Gerald Graham proposes to move on Sinkat — Lord GranviUe approves — The proposed movement on Wadi Haifa— Proposal xviii MODERN EGYPT rAOB to send a British expedition to Berber— It is rejected— The order to move on Sinkat is cancelled — Remarks on this decision — Proposal to despatch a force to Wadi Haifa — General Gordon recommends the employment of a Turkish force — The Government reject the proposal — Necessity of preparing for a Relief Expedition ....... 635 CHAPTER XXVII The Relief Expedition April 21-Ootober 5, 1884 General Gordon's motives — Spirit in which the question should be approached — Did General Gordon try to carry out the policy of the Government? — The situation at Berber — Messages to General Gordon and his replies — Sir Frederick Stephenson in- structed to report on the Relief Expedition — The Suakin-Berber Railway— The fall of Berber— The vote of credit— Lord Wolseley appointed to command the Nile expedition — He arrives at Wadi Haifa — Remarks on the above narrative . . . 559 Appendix. — Note on the Khedive's telegram to General Gordon of September 14, 1884 593 Portrait of the Author after a PHorocnArH hy G. C. Beresford . . . . ' . . Frontispteee Map or the Soudaw . . . . At the end of Volums CHAPTER I INTRODUCTORY Objects of this book — The narrative portion — The effects on Egypt of the British occupation — Chief point of interest in Egyptian refonn — Difficulty of ascertaining Eastern opinion. My object in writing this book is twofold. In the first place, I wish to place on record an accurate narrative of some of the principal events which have occurred in Egypt and in the Soudan since the year 1876.^ In the second place, I wish to explain the results which have accrued to Egypt from the British occupation of the country in 1882. The accidents of my public life have afforded me special opportunities for compiling certain chapters of Egyptian history. From March 1877 to June 1880, and again from September 1883 up to the present time (1907), I have been behind the scenes of Egyptian affairs. Besides those sources of information which are open to all the world, I have had access to all the documents in the archives of the Foreign Offices of both London and Cairo, and I have been in close communication with, I think, almost every one who has taken a leading ^ I have dealt fully and unreservedly with the whole of the principal historical events which occurred in E}i;'ypt from 1876 up to the time of Tewfik Pasha's death (January 7, 1892) ; also with Soudan history up to the end of 1907. It would, in my opinion, he premature to deal similarly with events in Egypt suhsequeut to the accession of the present Khedive. VOL. II B 2 MODERN EGYPT ch. part in Egyptian affairs during the period the history of which I have attempted to write. Thus, I think I may fairly lay claim to be in a position of exceptional advantage in so far as the attainment of accuracy is concerned. Now, accuracy of statement is a great merit. Sir Arthur Helps once said that half the evils of the world come from inaccuracy. My personal experience would lead me rather to agree with him. I cannot say that what I have seen and known of contemporaneous events, with which I have been well acquainted, has inspired me with any great degree of confidence in the accuracy of historical writing. The public, indeed, generally end, though sometimes not till after a considerable lapse of time, in getting a correct idea of the general course of events, and of the cause or effect of any special political incident. But, speaking more particularly of the British public, it may be doubted whether even this result is fully achieved, save in respect to questions of internal policy. In such matters, a number of competent and well- informed persons take part in the discussions which arise in Parliament and in the press. Inaccuracy of statement is speedily corrected. Fallacies are exposed. In the heat of party warfare the truth may for a time be obscured, but in the end the public will generally lay hold of a tolerably correct appreciation of the facts. In dealing with the affairs of a foreign country, more especially if that country be in a semi-civilised condition, these safeguards to historical truth exist in a relatively less degree. English opinion has in such cases to deal with a condition of society with which it is unfamiliar. It is disposed to apply arguments drawn from English, or, it may be, from European experience to a state of things which does not admit of any such arguments being applied I INTRODUCTORY 3 without great qualifications. The number of persons who possess sufficiently accurate informa- tion to instruct the public is limited, and amongst those persons it not unfrequently happens that many have some particular cause to advance, or some favourite political theory to defend. Those who are most qualified to speak often occupy some official position, which, for the time being, imposes silence upon them. There is, therefore, no certain guarantee that inaccuracies of statement will be corrected, or that fallacies will be adequately ex- posed. Thus, even if the general conclusion be correct, there is a risk that an erroneous apprecia- tion in respect to important matters of detail will float down the tide of history. The public often seize on some incident which strikes the popular imagina- tion, or idealise the character of some individual whose action excites sympathy or admiration. It would appear, indeed, that democracy tends to develop rather than to discourage hero-worship. The first stage on the road to historical in- accuracy is that some half-truth is stated, and, in spite of contradiction, obtains a certain amount of credence. It may be, indeed, that the error is corrected ; but it sometimes happens that, as time goes on, the measure of fiction increases, whilst that of fact tends to evaporate. A series of myths cluster round the original idea or statement. In India, as Sir Alfred Lyall has shown, the hero passes by easy stages of transition into a demi-god.^ In sceptical Europe, the process is different. All that happens is that an incorrect fact or a faulty conclusion is graven into the tablets from which future historians must draw their sources of in- formation. Turning to the second point to which allusion is made above, I wish to explain the results which * Asiatic Studies. 4 MODERN EGYPT ca accrued to Egypt from the British occupation of the country in 1882. On March 23, 1876, Mr. Stephen Cave, who had been sent to Cairo to re])ort on the financial condition of Egypt, expressed himself in the follow- ing terms : — Egypt may be said to be in a transition state, and she suffers from the defects of the system out of which she is passing, as well as from those of the system into which she is attempting to enter. She suffers from the ignorance, dis- honesty, waste, and extravagance of the East, such as have brought her suzerain to the verge of ruin, and at the same time from the vast expense caused by hasty and inconsiderate endeavours to adopt the civilisation of the West. An attempt will be made in the following pages to give some account of the measures adopted since Mr. Cave wrote his report, to arrest, and, as I hope and would fain believe, to remedy the disease, whose main features are described with accuracy in the passage quoted above. I trust that such an account will not be devoid of interest to the general reader, and that it will be of some special interest to those of my fellow- countrymen who are, or who at some future time may be engaged in Oriental administration. It is to this latter class that I would more especially address myself, for they can appreciate the nature of the problems which have presented themselves for solution, and the difficulty of solving them, more fully than those who are devoid of special administrative experience in the East. I would at the outset state where, as I venture to think, the chief point of interest lies. Egypt is not the only country which has been brought to the verge of ruin by a persistent neglect of economic laws and by a reckless administration of the finances of the State. Neither is it the only country in which undue privileges have been I INTRODUCTORY 5 acquired by the influential classes to the detriment of the mass of the population. Nor is it the only country in whose administration the most element- ary principles of law and justice have been ignored. Although the details may differ, there is a great similarity in the general character of the abuses which spring up under Eastern Governments where- soever they may be situated. So also, although the remedies to be applied must vary according to local circumstances and according to the character, institutions, and habits of thought of the European nation under whose auspices reforms are initiated, the broad lines which those reforms must take are traced out by the commonplace requirements of European civilisation, and must of necessity present some identity of character, whether the scene of action be India, Algiers, Egypt, Tunis, or Bosnia. The history of reform in Egypt, therefore, does not present any striking feature to which some analogy might not perhaps be found in other countries where European civilisation has, in a greater or less degree, been grafted on a backward Eastern Government and society. But, so far as I am aware, no counterpart can be found to the special circumstances which have attended the work of Egyptian reform. Those circumstances have, in truth, been very peculiar. In the first place, one alien race, the English, have had to control and guide a second alien race, the Turks, by whom they are disliked, in the government of a third race, the Egyptians. To these latter, both the paramount races are to a certain extent unsympathetic. In the case of the Turks, the want of sympathy has been mitigated by habit, by a common religion, and by the use of a common language.^ In the case of the English, it has been mitigated by the respect * All the Egyptian officials of Turkisli origin now speak Arabic. 6 MODERN EGYPT ca due to superior talents, and by the benefits which have accrued to the population from British interference. In the second place, it is to be observed that for diplomatic and other reasons, on which it is unnecessary for the moment to dwell, the Egyptian administration had to be reformed without any organic changes being effected in the conditions under which the government had been conducted prior to the British occupation. Those conditions were of an exceptionally complicated character. A variety of ingenious and elaborate checks had been invented with a view to preventing a bad Government from moving in a vicious direction. These checks, when brought into action under a wholly different condition of affairs, were at times applied, under the baneful impulse of international jealousy, to hamper the movements of an improved Government in the direction of reform. " Je suis sans credit," said the "plumitif " in Voltaire's IngmUy " pour faire du bien ; mon pouvoir se borne a faire du mal quelquefois.'* The phrase may rightly be applied to the working of international government in Egypt since 1882. It is, indeed, certain that whatever success has attended the efforts of reformers in Egypt has been attained, not in virtue of the system, but in spite of it. Those who hold, with the English poet, that " Whate'er is best administered is best," may perhaps find some corroboration of their theory in the recent history of Egypt. An experiment under some- what novel conditions has, in fact, been made in Eastern administration, and, in spite of many shortcomings, this experiment has been crowned with a certain degree of success. It is this which gives to Egyptian reform its chief claim to the interest of the })()litical student. I have lived too long in the East not to be I INTRODUCTORY 7 aware that it is difficult for any European to arrive at a true estimate of Oriental wishes, aspira- tions, and opinions. Those who have been in the East and have tried to mingle with the native population know well how utterly impossible it is for the European to look at the world with the same eyes as the Oriental. For a while, indeed, the European may fancy that he and the Oriental understand one another, but sooner or later a time comes when he is suddenly awakened from his dream, and finds himself in the presence of a mind which is as strange to him as would be the mind of an inhabitant of Saturn.^ I was for some while in Egypt before I fully realised how little I understood my subject ; and I found, to the last day of my residence in the country, that I was constantly learning something new. No casual visitor can hope to obtain much real insight into the true state of native opinion. Divergence of religion and habits of thought; in my own case ignorance of the vernacular language ; ' the reticence of Orientals when speaking to any one in authority ; their tendency to agree with any one to whom they may be talking ; the want of mental symmetry and precision, which is the chief dis- tinguishing feature between the illogical and picturesque East and the logical West, and which lends such peculiar interest to the study of Eastern life and politics ; the fact that religion enters to a greater extent than in Europe into the social life and laws and customs of the people ; and the further fact that the European and the Oriental, reasoning from the same premises, will often arrive at diametrically opposite conclusions, — all these circumstances place the European at a great dis- advantage when he attempts to gauge Eastern * Professor Sayce, The Higher Criticism and the Monuments, p. 558. • I have a fair acquaintance with Turkish, but I do not speak Arabic 8 MODERN EGYPT ch.i opinion. Nevertheless, the difficulty of arriving at a true idea of the undercurrents of native opinion is probably less considerable in Egypt than in India. Notably, the absence of the caste system, and the fact that the social and rehgious fabric of Islamism is more readily comprehensible to the European mind than the comparatively subtle and mystical bases of Hinduism, diminish the gulf which in India separates the European from the native, and which, by placing a check on social inter- course, becomes a fertile source of mutual mis- understanding. On the whole, though I should not like to dogmatise on the subject, I am inclined to think that by constantly seeing people of all classes, and by checking the information received from different sources, a fair idea of native opinion in Egypt may in time be formed. I would add that it is not possible to live so long as I have lived in Egypt without acquiring a deep sympathy for the Egyptian people. The cause of Egyptian reform is one in which I take the warmest personal interest. A residence of half a lifetime in Eastern countries has made me realise the force of Rudyard Kipling's lines — If you've heard the East a'calling. You won't ever heed aught else. PART I ISMAIL PASHA 1863-1879 It were good that men in their Innovations would Jbllow the example of Tim£ itself, which, indeed, innovateth greatly, hut quietly, and by degrees scarce to be perceived. . . . It is good also not to try experivietds in States except the necessity be urgent, or the utility evident ; and well to beware that it be the reformation that draweth on the change, and not the desire of change that pretendeth the reformation. Bacon, On Innovations. It is singidar how long the rotten inll hold together pro- vided you do not handle it roughly . . . so loth are men to quit their old ways ; and conquering indolence and inertia, venture on new. . . . Rash enthusiast of change, beivare ! Hast thou well considered all that Habit does in this life of ours? Carlyle, French Revolution. CHAPTER II THE GOSCHEN MISSION November 1876 Financial position in 1863 — And in 1876 — Suspension of payment of Treasury Bills — Creation of the Commission of tlie Public Debt — Decree of May 7, 1876 — The Goschen Mission — Decree of November 18, 1876 — Appointment of Controllers-General — Sir Louis Mallet — I am appointed Commissioner of the Public Debt — Ismail's predecessors — Crisis in the career of Ismail Pasha — Accounts Department. The origin of the Egyptian Question in its present phase was financial. In 1863, when Said Pasha died, the public debt of Egypt amounted to £3,293,000. Said Pasha was succeeded by Ismail Pasha, the son of the celebrated Ibrahim Pasha, and the grandson of the still more celebrated Mehemet Ali. In 1876, the funded debt of Egypt, including the Daira loans, amounted to £68,110,000. In addition to this, there was a floating debt of about £26,000,000. Roughly speaking, it may be said that Ismail Pasha added, on an average, about £7,000,000 a year for thirteen years to the debt of Egypt. For all practical purposes it may be said that the whole of the borrowed money, except £16,000,000 spent on the Suez Canal, was squandered.^ ^ Mr. Cave, after making out a balance-sheet for the years from 1864 to 1875, adds : '' Two striking features stand out in this balance- sheet, namely, that the sum raised by revenue, £94,281,401, is little 11 12 MODERN EGYPT ft. i For some while prior to the general breakdown, it had been apparent that Ismail Pasha's reckless administration of the finances of the country must, sooner or later, bring about a financial collapse. Towards the latter part of 1875 and the beginning of 1876, money was raised at ruinous rates of in- terest by the issue of Treasury bills. On April 8, 1876, the crash came. The Khedive suspended payment of his Treasury bills. Previous to the suspension of payment, some discussion had taken place with reference to the creation of an Egyptian National Bank, which was to be under the control of three European Com- missioners. France and Italy each agreed to select a Commissioner, but Lord Derby, who then pre- sided at the Foreign Office, was unwilling to interfere in the internal affairs of Egypt, and declined to nominate a British Commissioner. The project, therefore, dropped, but was shortly afterwards revived in a different form. On JMay 2, 1876, a Khedivial Decree was issued instituting a Commission of the Public Debt. Certain specific duties were assigned to the Commissioners, who were to act generally as representatives of the bondholders. On ^lay 7, a further Decree was issued consolidating the debt of Egypt, which then amounted to £91,000,000. M. de Blignieres, Herr von Kremer, a dis- tinguished Orientalist, and M. Baravelli were nominated to be Commissioners of the Debt at the instance, respectively, of the French, Austrian, and Italian Governments. The British Govern- ment declined to select a Commissioner. less than that spent on administration, tribute to the Porte, works of unquestionable utility, and certain expenses of questionable utility or policy, in all amountins^ to £97,240,966, and tliat for the present large amount of indebtedness there is absolutely nothing to show but the Suez Canal, the whole jjroceeds of the loans and floating debt having been absorbed in payment of interest and ^inking funds, with the exception of the sum debited to that great worlv." can THE GOSCHEN MISSION 13 The financial arrangements embodied in the Decree of May 7, 1876, caused much dissatisfac- tion, especially in England, with the result that Mr. (subsequently Lord) Goschen undertook a mission to Egypt with a view to obtaining some modifications which the bondholders considered necessary. Lord Goschen, with whom M. Joubert was associated to represent French interests, arrived in Egypt in October 1876. The arrangement negotiated by Messrs. Goschen and Joubert was embodied in a Decree, dated November 18, 1876. The chief financial features of this arrangement were as follows : — The loans of 1864, 1865, and 1867, which had been contracted before the financial position of the Khedive had become seriously embarrassed, and the capital of which amounted in all to about £4,293,000, were taken out of the Unified Debt, into which they had been incorporated under the Decree of May 7, and formed the subject of a special arrangement. A 5 per cent Preference Stock, intended to attract bona- fide investors, w^as created, with a capital of £17,000,000. The Daira debts, amounting to about £8,815,000, which had, under the Decree of INIay 7, been mcluded in the Unified Debt, were again deducted, and ultimately formed the subject of a separate arrangement. The capital of the Unified Debt was thus reduced to £59,000,000. The rate of interest was fixed at 6 per cent, to which a sinking fund of 1 per cent was added. So far as the effect produced on the future of Egypt was concerned, the purely financial arrange- ments negotiated by Lord Goschen were less productive of result than the changes which, under 14 MODERN EGYPT pt.i his advice, the Khedive introduced into the administration of the country. It was clear that, however rational any Egyptian financial combina- tion might be, it would present but little hope of stability unless the fiscal administration of the country was improved. It was, therefore, decided to appoint two Controllers-General, one of whom was to supervise the revenue, and the other the expenditure. The railways and the port of Alexandria, the revenues of which were to be applied to the payment of interest on the Preference Stock, were to be administered by a Board composed of two Englishmen, a Frenchman, and two Egyptians. Mr. Romaine was appointed Controller-General of the Revenue and the Baron de Malaret Controller - General of Expenditure. General Marriott was appointed President of the Railway Board. Lord Derby instructed Lord Vivian, who was at this time British representative in Egypt, to inform the Khedive that " Her Majesty's Government could not accept any responsibility for these appointments, to which, however, they had no objection to offer." About the same time, the Khedive applied to Lord Goschen to nominate an English Commis- sioner of the Public Debt, the British Government having again declined to assume the responsibility of nomination. In May 1876, I returned from India, where I had for four years occupied the post of Private Secretary to the Viceroy, Lord Northbrook. I had, in connection with Indian affairs, been brought much in contact with the late Sir Louis Mallet, who was then Under-Secretary of State at the India Office. I cannot pass by the mention of Sir Louis Mallet's name without paying a tribute of respect cH.n THE GOSCHEN MISSION 15 to his memory. To myself his death was an irreparable loss. Whenever I visited England during the last few years of his life, I always discussed with him the difficulties of the situation in which I was placed in Egypt, 'i'hey were at one time very great. Sir Louis Mallet was not personally acquainted with the details of Egyptian affairs, but, besides the intimate knowledge which he possessed of economic science, of which he had made a special study, his high-minded attachment to principle and his keen insight into the forces in motion in the political world rendered his advice of the utmost value. He was the best type of the English civil servant ; a keen poli- tician but not a political partisan, a trained official without a trace of the bureaucratic element in him, and a man of really liberal aspirations without being carried away by the catchwords which sometimes attach themselves to what, from a party point of view, is called liberal policy in England. Lord Goschen consulted Sir Louis Mallet as to whom he should nominate as Commissioner of the Debt in Egypt. Sir Louis Mallet re- commended me. Lord Goschen offered me the post, which I accepted. I arrived in Egypt on March 2, 1877. I would here pause in order to make some observations which are suggested by these appoint- ments. This period constituted the turning-point of Ismail Pasha's career. The system of government which existed in Egypt during the pre-reforming days was very defective, but it possessed some barbaric virtues, and was perhaps more suited to the country than Europeans, judging from their own standpoint, are often disposed to admit. Tlie manufacturers of myths have, of course. 16 MODERN EGYPT pt.i been at work at IMehemet Ali's career. They often credit him with ideas and intentions which were absolutely foreign to his nature. Nevertheless, the Egyptians are right to venerate the memory of this rough man of genius, if only for the reason that to him belonos the credit of having amputated their country from the decaying body of the Ottoman Empire, thus giving it a separate administrative existence. INIoreover, there was much in JMehemet Ali's character which was really worthy of admiration. He was a brave and capable soldier. He had some statesmanlike instincts, and, though his lights were rude, never- theless he used them to the best of his ability in furthering the interests of his adopted country, as he understood those interests. He proceeded tenta- tively along the path of reform. He summoned to Egypt a few Europeans, mostly Frenchmen, of high professional merit.^ He founded the Poly- technic School, the School of Medicine, and some other similar institutions. Under the direction of JNI. Jumel, the cotton plant was introduced into the country. Sir John Bowring, in a report addressed to Lord Palmerston in 1840, said : — ^ ^ One of the predominating ideas in Mehemet Ali's mind was to use French as a counterpoise to British influence in Egypt, not because he had any particular love for the French or dislike of the English^ but because, with the instinct of a true statesman, he foresaw that the force of circumstances might, and probably would drive England into an aggressive policy against Egypt. Mr. Cameron {Rfn/pt in the Nineteenth Century, p. 105) says that when the celebrated traveller, Burckhardt, visited Egypt in 1814, Mehemet Ali "asked him about England and our plans in the East. He dreaded lest Wellington should invade Egypt with the Peninsular Army. 'The great fish swallow the small,' he said ; ' 1 am afraid of the English, and hope they will not attack Egypt in my absence. . . . England must some day take Egypt as her share of the spoil of the Turkish Empire.'" 2 The whole of this report, which is but little known, is well worthy of perusal by any one who takes an interest in Egyptian affairs. The history of the early part of Mehemet Alls reign has been written by a contemporary, Sheikh Abdul-llahman ol-Jabarti. The Sheikh wrote from a strongly Egyptian, that is to say anti-'I'urkish point of view. OH. II THE GOSCHEN MISSION 17 Egypt has, indeed, received immense benefit from the presence of Europeans. They have not onlv rendered direct services by the knowledge they have communicated, but the circumstance of their having been so much associated with all the improvements which have been introduced has diffused a great respect for their superior acquirements, and a toleration for their opinions, whose influence has been spreading widely among the people. But, although Mehemet Ali dallied with European civilisation in a manner which was by no means unintelligent and was far less hurtful to his country than that adopted by Said and Ismail, his methods of government were, in reality, wholly Oriental. Those methods may be illustrated by the following anecdote, which I give on the authority of Nubar Pasha. At the beginning of the war which Mehemet Ali waged against the Porte, the Admiral in command of the Turkish Fleet in Egyptian waters, who was a man of noted courage and ability, was summoned to Constantinople. He probably had more to gain than to lose by deserting the Egyptian cause. He decided, however, to throw in liis lot with Mehemet Ali. His decision contributed materially to the eventual victory of Egypt. After the war was over, the Admiral was again summoned to Constantinople. To have obeyed at that time would have meant certain death. The Admiral, therefore, remained at Cairo, and, for four years, enjoyed Mehemet Ali's protection, which he had so well deserved. At the end of that period — whether it was that Mehemet Ali wished to ingratiate himself with the Sultan, who continued to press his request, or whether he had for other He does justice to Mehemet Ali's military qualities, but he gives an unfavourable account of the condition of the country and of the system of government adopted during Mehemet Ali's time. See also St. John's Egypt under Mohammed All, published in 1834, and Cameron's Egypt in the Nineteenth Century, 1898. VOL. I C 18 MODERN EGYPT pt. i reasons become estranged from the Admiral — he determined to withdraw his protection. He sent one of his confidential agents to visit the Admiral. A short conversation, which it would be difficult to rival in pathos and dramatic effect, ensued. The agent, after the usual Oriental compliments, merely said, ' Life, O Admiral, is uncertain. We must all be prepared to meet our death at any moment." The Admiral at once took the hint. He knew what those fatal words meant. The tenets of his religion had taught him not to resist the decrees of fate. Like many a Stoic philosoplier of Ancient Rome, he had probably at times reflected that a self-inflicted death was, as a last resource, a sure refuge from earthly tyranny and injustice, however galling. He merely asked for time to say his prayers, and, when these were completed, drank, without complaint or remonstrance, the poisoned cup of coffee which was offered to him. On the following day, it was announced that he had died suddenly of apoplexy. Ibrahim, the son and successor of JVIehemet Ali, was a distinguished soldier, and a man of great personal courage. It must be added that he was a half-lunatic savage. He it was who commanded the expedition sent to Nejd against the Wahabis. A number of orthodox JNIollahs accompanied the expedition. When the military operations had been terminated by the success of the Egyptian arms, Ibrahim arranged that his INIollahs and the religious leaders of the Wahabi sect should meet and discuss the dogmatic and ceremonial points of difference which separated them. After the lapse of three days, Ibrahim inquired what had been the result of their discussions. He was informed that neither party had been able to convert the other to its special views. Ibrahim then said that under the circumstances, although he was no theologian, he OH. II THE GOSCHEN MISSION 19 must decide the matter for himself. He ordered all the religious leaders of the Wahabi sect to be killed.^ Nubar Pasha once related to me an episode in his relations with Ibrahim, which did great credit to his own remarkable conversational powers. He and others were on board a steamer, which was conveying Ibrahim and his suite from Constan- tinople to Egypt. On nearing Alexandria, Nubar learnt that Ibrahim had suddenly decided that the members of his suite, including Nubar himself, should be thrown overboard. Thereupon, Nubar went to Ibrahim's cabin, entirely ignored the fate which awaited himself and his comrades, and began to talk to Ibrahim of his campaigns. Ibrahim was so much pleased at the flattery which was abundantly administered to him, and also so much interested in all that Nubar said, that for the moment he forgot his recent decision. The conversation continued until the ship arrived at Alexandria. Thus, Nubar and his companions were saved. Ibrahim died, very shortly after his accession, of pneumonia, brought on, it is said, by drinking two bottles of highly iced champagne at a draught when he was very hot.^ Abbas, the next Khedive, was an Oriental despot of the worst type. The stories of his revolting cruelty are endless. There does not appear, as in the case of his predecessors, to have been ' Palgrave, Central and Easte7~n Arabia, vol. ii. p. 68. 2 Mr. Pickthall, writing of Ibrahim Pasha's adminisiration of Syria, says : **The radicalism of Ibrahim made his rule offensive to the con- servative notables of Syria. Still, he was the kind of tyrant to appeal most strongly to Orientals, heavy-handed but humorous, knowing how to impart to his decisions that quaint proverbial savour which dwells in the mind of the people, and makes good stories ; and his fame among the fellaheen is that of a second Solomon." — Folk-Lore of the Holy Land, Preface, p. xvi. My earliest connection with Egyptian affairs was, as a child, being one of a large crowd waiting in St. tJames's Park to see Ibraliim Pasha Eass. This must have been in 184:6 or 1847. The Londoners called im "Abraham Parker." 20 MODERN EGYPT ft. i any redeeming feature in his character. It was altogether odious. The main defects of Said Pasha, who succeeded Abbas, were excessive vanity and hopeless in- capacity in the art of government. His follies were duly chronicled by Mr. Senior, who visited Egypt during his reign. Although less ferocious than his immediate predecessor, he occasionally committed acts which would be considered extremely cruel, had their iniquity not been out- rivalled by the deeds of Abbas. I hesitate to relate the numerous stories which have been handed down to posterity about Abbas and Said. At this distance of time, it is almost impossible to say how far they are true, and inasmuch as most of them bring out the characters of both of these princes in a highly unpleasant light, it is merely an act of posthumous justice to their memories not to relate them, unless their truth can be substantiated by absolutely trust- worthy evidence. The following, however, sup- posing it to be true— and it is not at all im- probable — is relatively innocuous, and, moreover, is so highly illustrative of the manner in which Oriental despots occasionally jump from an extreme of injustice to a prodigality of generous munificence that I need not refrain from relating it. On one occasion. Said was coming in a steamer from the Barrage to Cairo. The Nile was low, and the steamer stuck in the mud. Said ordered the i'eis (steersman) to receive a hundred blows Avith the courbash. These were administered. The steamer was got off the mud, and proceeded on her journey. Shortly afterwards, she stuck again. Said roared out: "Give him two hundred," whereupon the unfortunate rels made a rush, and jumped over- board. A boat was put off, and he was brought back to the steamer. Said asked him why he had OH. II THE GOSCHEN MISSION 21 jumped overboard. The man explained that he preferred to run the risk of death by drowning to the agony caused by another flogging. " Fool," exclaimed Said, "when I said two hundred, I did not mean lashes, but sovereigns." And, accord- ingly, the man received a bag containing that amount of money. Eastern history abounds with episodes of this sort. Moreover, the minds of Orientals are so peculiarly constituted that many of them would probably be far more struck with the generosity of the gift than with the cruelty and injustice of the flogging. Said occasionally indulged in the most insane freaks. Thus, in order to prove his courage, which had been called in question by the European press, it is said that he caused a kilometre of road to be strewn a foot deep with gunpowder. He then walked solemnly along the road smoking a pipe, and accompanied by a numerous suite, all of whom were ordered to smoke, — severe penalties being threatened against any one whose pipe was not found alight at the end of the promenade. It was Said who first invited European adven- turers to prey on Egypt. Nubar Pasha, who could speak with authority on this subject, used to say : "C'est au temps de Said qie le commencement de la debacle a eu lieu." Intelligent observers on the spot were already able to foretell the storm which was eventually to burst over Egypt. In 1855, Mr. Walne, the British Consul at Cairo, said to Mr. Senior: — Said Pasha is rash and flighty and conceited, and is spoilt by the flattery of the foreigners who surround him. They tell him, and he believes them, that he is a universal genius. He undoes everything, does very Httle, and, I fear, is pre- paring for us some great catastrophe.^ * Senior's Conversations and Journals in Egypt, vol. i. p. 181. An account of Egypt under Said F-isha is given in Dr. Stacquey's work published in 1865, and entitled L'Egypte, La Basse Nubie et le iinai 22 MODERN EGYPT pt. i These, and many other similar anecdotes which might be related, serve to illustrate the methods of government which prevailed in Egypt im- mediately prior to the accession of Ismail Pasha. The drastic nature of those methods, and more especially of the punishments which the rulers of Egypt were in the habit of awarding during the first half of the last century, and even at a later period, did not, indeed, differ very materially from those of their Pharaonic predecessors. Herodotus says : — King Amasis . . . established the law that every Egyptian should appear once a year before the governor of his canton, and show his means of living ; or, failing to do so, and to prove that he got an honest livelihood, should be put to death. ^ If the general principles adopted by Mehemet Ali had continued to be applied, and especially if recourse had not been made to European credit, it is just possible that the Egyptian system of administration would have been gradually reformed in a manner suitable to the requirements of the country. But it is one of the commonplaces of political science that the most dangerous period for a radically bad system of government is the moment when some reformer, himself inexperi- enced in the art of government, has laid a rash hand on the old fabric, and has shaken it to such an extent as to make it totter to its fall, but when sufficient time has not yet elapsed to admit of an improved system of government taking root. In the endeavours, possibly well-intentioned, * Book ii. p. 177. After remarking that Solon the Athenian borrowed this law from the Egyptians and imposed it on his country- men — a statement which, according to a note given by llawlinson, is incorrect — Herodotus naively adds, **It is indeed an excellent custom." CH.II THE GOSCHEN MISSION 23 but certainly misdirected, that Ismail Pasha made to introduce European civilisation at a rapid rate into Egypt, he was necessarily obliged to have recourse to European assistance. The only chance of introducing the new wine of European ideas into the old bottles of Eastern conservatism, with- out producing a dangerous fermentation, lay in proceeding with caution, and notably in selecting with the utmost care the European agents through whose instrumentality the changes might gradually have been effected. Unfortunately, no such care was taken. The Europeans into whose hands Ismail Pasha threw himself, were but too often drawn from the very class which he should most of all have avoided.^ Many were adventurers of the type represented in fiction by M. Alphonse Daudet's ** Nabab," ^ whose sole object was to enrich them- selves at the expense of the country. Moreover, few of those who exercised any influence in matters connected with the government of Egypt possessed sufficient experience of the East to enable them to apply wisely the knowledge, which they had acquired elsewhere, to the new conditions under which they were called upon to work. The result was that Europeans acquired a bad name in Egypt, from which, after years of patient labour and instructive example on the part of the many high-minded Europeans of divers nationalities who were subsequently engaged in Egyptian work, they only gradually recovered. It was, moreover, impossible that constant association with the classes to which allusion is made above should not have produced a marked effect on the views of an astute, ^ A hifi^hly qualified authority, who wrote under the pseudonym of "Odysseus," saj^s : " From tlieir first appearance, the Turks displayed a strange power of collecting togetlier apostates, renegades, and people who had more ability than moral qualities." — Turkey in Europe, p. 02. 2 It is well known tliat the character of the Nabab was drawn from an individual who existed in Egjpt not many jears ago. 24 MODERN EGYPT ft. i but superficial cynic such as Ismail Pasha. He has often been credited with having systematically based his conduct on the assumption that no man living was honest,^ and, looking at the personal experience through which he passed, it cannot be a matter for surprise that he should have entertained such an opinion. The result of Lord Goschen's mission was that Ismail Pasha had, for the first time, to deal with a small body of European officials, who were not only invested with more ample powers than any which had previously been conferred on European function- aries in Egypt, but who were also of a different type from those Europeans with whom he had heretofore been generally brought in contact. I do not claim for the European officials who, at or about this time, came to Egypt any special qualities which are not to be found in abundance amongst other members of the civil services of France and England. We displayed, I conceive, the ordinary variety of capacity and character which was to be anticipated from our previous training, and from the manner in which we had been selected. But we all possessed some characteristics in common. We were all honest. We were all capable of forming and of expressing independent opinions, and we were all determined to do our duty to the best of our abilities in the discharge of the functions which were respectively assigned to us. In one respect, the position of the British differed from that of the French officials. The latter had been selected, and were more or less avowedly supported by their Government. The British officials could 1 Macaulay says of Charles II. : " According- to him, every person was to he hought ; hut some people haggled more about their price than others ; and when this haggling was very obstinate and very skilful, it was called by some fine name. The chief trick by which clever men kept up the price of their abilities was called 'integrity'" (Work.'i, vol. i. p. 132). Tiiis passage probaldy describes Ismail Pasha's habit of thought with tolerable accuracy. CH.II THE GOSCHEN MISSION 25 not count on any such support. But the distinction was of less practical importance than might at first sight appear. It was well understood that, if the British officials found that their advice was system- atically neglected, and that they could not, with a proper sense of what was due to their own self- respect, carry on their duties in a fairly satisfactory manner, they would resign their appointments, a course which would not only have caused a good deal of embarrassment, but would also have strengthened the hostile public opinion then clamouring against the existing regime in Egypt in terms which were daily becoming more menacing. Ismail Pasha failed to recognise the importance of the changes to which he had assented. Had he succeeded in acquiring the confidence of this small body of European officials, and in enlisting their services on his side, it is not only possible, but even probable, that he would have remained Khedive of Egypt till the day of his death. But, for a variety of reasons, which will appear more fully in the sequel of this narrative, he failed to do so. Perhaps the difficulties of tlie situation were sucli that it was impossible for him to do so. The result was that the officials in question were necessarily thrown into an attitude of hostility. And the further result was that a series of events took place which in the end led to the downfall of the Khedive. In fact, an opportunity, such as sometimes presents itself in politics, then occurred, which, had it been skil- fully used with a true insight into the main facts of the situation and into the direction to which affairs were drifting, might not impossibly have turned the current of Egy})tian history into anotlier channel, and might have saved the Khedive from the disaster which was impending over him. Such opportunities, if they are not grasped at the uK^ncnt, rarely recur. As it was, the causes which were 26 MODERN EGYPT rr. i tending: towards the downfall of the Khedive con- tinned to operate unchecked, and the new European element introduced into the administration, far from impeding, hastened the advent of the crisis. One of the appointments made at this time, namely, that of Sir Gerald Fitzgerald to the head of the Accounts Department, calls for some special remarks. It is possible for the finances of a country to be badly administered, whilst, at the same time, the accounts may be in good order. On the other hand, it is impossible for the statesman or the financier to commence the work of fiscal and administrative reform seriously until, by the organ- isation of a proper Department of Accounts, he is placed in possession of the true facts connected with the resources at his disposal and the State expenditure. In 1876, the Egyptian accounts were in a state of the utmost confusion. The main reason why the financial settlement made in 1876 broke down was that the materials out of which to construct any stable financial edifice were wanting. The Finance Minister, Ismail Pasha Sadik, who was exiled in November 1876, and who, shortly after- wards, met with a tragic death,^ boasted that in one year he had extracted £15,000,000 from the people of Egypt. The revenue collected in 1875 is said to have amounted to £10,800,000. The financial combination of November 18, 1876, was based on the collection of a revenue amounting to £10,500,000. There can be no doubt that this estimate was excessive. Twenty years later, after a long period of honest and careful administra- tion, the Egyptian revenue was only about £11,000,000. * There can be no doubt that Ismail Paaha Sadik was murdered in a boat whilst proceeding up the Nile. CH. II THE GOSCHEN MISSION 27 In 1876, it was, indeed, impossible to arrive at a true estimate of the revenue. The inquiries of Messrs. Goschen and Joubert, Lord Vivian reported, " soon disclosed false accounts, glaring discrepancies, and evident suppressions of sources of revenue." It was this which, more than anything else, hampered Lord Goschen's proceedings. He saw that until more light was thrown on the facts connected with Egyptian finance, any arrangement which could be made would have to be of a provisional character. I give one instance of the difficulties which at that time had to be encountered in arrivhig at a true estimate of the Egyptian revenue. Relying on the only figures which were at the time avail- able, Lord Goschen took the net railway receipts at £900,000 a year. Some time afterwards, it was dis- covered that, to the extent of £300,000 a year, these receipts were fictitious. In the first place, a con- siderable sum was paid every year for the movement of troops, an item which, under a well-regulated system of accounts, would have been shown as an inter - departmental transaction. In the second place, it was discovered that any of the Khedivial family or the friends and boon companions of the Khedive who wished to travel by rail, rarely went by the ordinary trains. They frequently ordered special trains, for which they paid nothing, merely signing a document, termed a " ragaa," intimating that the train had been ordered by the Khedive, and that its cost was to be charged to him. Tiie money was, of course, never paid to the Railway Administration. Nevertheless, these book entries were treated as real receipts in the figures furnished to Lord Goschen. It was obvious that, under such circumstances as these, the first elementary requirement, which would have to precede any attempt to reform the fiscal 28 MODERN EGYPT it. i system, was to introduce order into the Accounts Department. Tliis work was undertaken by Sir Gerald Fitzgerald, who, by dint of untiring industry and perseverance, overcame all the very formidable obstacles which he had to encounter. The Egyptian Accounts Department is now thoroughly well organised. It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of this achievement. Of the many Englishmen who, by steady and unostentatious work, have rendered good service to the cause of Egyp- tian reform, there is no one to whom greater merit can be assigned than Sir Gerald Fitziierald. He did not take any personal part in the reforms them- selves, but he performed work which was indis- pensable to others if the reforms were to be carried out. The kind of work which Sir Gerald Fitzgerald and his successors performed in Egypt does not attract much public attention, but those who have themselves filled responsible positions will appre- ciate its value. CHAPTER III THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY November 1876-April 1878 Condition of Egypt — The law of the Moukabala— Petty taxes — The Egyptian public service — The fiscal system — Floating debt — Efforts to pay interest on the funded debt — Famine — The coupon of May 1, 1878 — The Commissioners of the Debt— The Commis- sion of Inquiry — The Khedive proposes a partial inquiry — The Commissioners decline to take part in it — The Khedive accepts a full inquiry. The state of Egypt at this time was deplorable. Estates, representing about one-fifth of the arable lands of the country, had passed into tlie hands of the Khedive ; and these estates, instead of being farmed out to the dispossessed proprietors, were administered direct by the Khedive and cultivated to a great extent by forced labour. No single measure contributed more than this to render the existing regime as intolerable to the people of Egypt as it was rapidly becoming to the foreign creditors.^ In 1872, the law of the Moukabala had been passed. By this law, all landowners could redeem one-half of the land-tax to which they were liable by payment of six years' tax, eitlier in one sum or ' '' It is certain, so many overthrown estates, so many votes for troubles. Lucan noteth w ell the state of Rome before the Civil War : Hinc usura vorax, rapidumque in tempore foenus, Hinc concussa tides, et multis utile bellum." Bacon's E.s.sai/x, " Of Seditious and Troubles." •29 30 MODERN EGYPT ft. i in instalments spread over a period of twelve years. '* The operation of the law of the Moukabala," Mr. Cave said, "is perhaps the most striking instance of the reckless manner in wliich the means of the future have been sacrificed to meet the pressing needs of the present." This is quite true, but the explanation is also very simple. There was never the least intention to adhere to the engagements taken towards the land- owners. When the proper time arrived, it was intended to find means for re-imposing taxation in some other form, and thus recoup the loss to the Treasury incurred by the partial redemption of the land-tax. Besides the land - tax, which was the main resource of the country, a number of petty taxes of the most harassing nature were levied. I gave Lord Vivian a list of thirty-seven of such taxes, and I doubt if the list was complete. The evil consequences, which would in any case have resulted from a defective fiscal system, were enhanced by the character of the agents through whose instrumentality the taxes were collected. It can be no matter for surprise that they were corrupt and oppressive, and scarcely, indeed, a matter for just blame; for the treatment, which they received at the hands of the Government whom they served, was such as to be almost pro- hibitive of integrity in the performance of official duties. The picture, which Mr. Cave gave of the position held by the Egyptian officials at this time, was certainly not overdrawn. " One of the causes," he said, " which operates most against the honesty and efficiency of native officers is the precarious tenure of office. From the Pasha downwards, every office is a tenancy at will, and experience shows that while dishonesty goes wholly or par- tially unpunished, independence of thought and CH.III COMMISSION OF INQUIRY 31 action, resolution to do one's duty and to resist the peculation and neglect which pervade every department, give rise to intrigues which, sooner or later, bring about the downfall of honest officials; consequently, those who begin with a desire to do their duty give way before the obstructiveness which paralyses every effort.^ The public servant of Egypt, like the Roman Proconsul, too often tries to make as much as he can out of his office while it lasts ; and the scandal takes place of the retirement, in a few years with a large fortune, of a man whose salary is perhaps £40 a month, and who has plundered the Treasury on the one hand, and the peasant on the other." In fact, the fiscal system of Egypt at this time violated at every point and in a flagrant degree the four well-known general principles laid down by Adam Smith and adopted by subsequent econo- mists,^ as those on which a sound fiscal policy should be based. Glaring inequalities existed in the incidence of taxation. The sums demanded from the taxpayers were arbitrarily fixed and were ^ I can give a remarkable illustration, the facts of which are within my personal knowledge, in support of Mr. Cave's statement. Shortly after the Commission of the Debt was established in 1876, it was noticed that the Custom-House receipts at Suez, which were applied to the service of the debt, fell off in a most unaccountable manner ; also, that a new local director had been appointed. Under the iJecree signed by the Khedive on November 18, 1876, the whole of the Custom-House revenue was to be paid direct to the Commissioners of the Debt. No other receipt than that signed by one of the Commissioners was legally valid. The suspicions of the Commissioners were aroused, lliey asked why the director had been changed. They received evasive and very unsatis- factory answers. They insisted, therefore, on the dismissed official being produced, dead or alive. A somewhat acrimonious correspondence took place, with the result that after a delay of several months the official in question made his appearance at the office of the Commissioners of the Debt. It then appeared that he had received an order from the Khedive to pay the Suez Custom-House receipts direct to His Highness. He demurred, on the very legitimate ground that he would thus be com- mitting an illegal act. He was at once arrested and sent to one of the most remote parts of the Soudan, whence he would certainly never hava returned, had it not been that the Commissioners took up his case. * Adam Smith, Wealth oj' Nations, bk. v. chap. ii. 32 INIODERN EGYPT ft. i uncertain in amount. Tlie taxes were levied with- out any reference to tlie time and manner in which it was most convenient for the contributor to pay, and the system of collection, so far from being " contrived so as to keep out of the pockets of the people as little as possible over and above what the tax brings into tlie public treasury," was sucli as to ensure results of a diametrically opposite descrip- tion. Under such circumstances, financial policy, instead of being used as a powerful engine of political and social improvement, had become merely a means for first extorting the maximum amount of revenue from unwilling contributors, and then spending tlie money on objects from which the contributors themselves derived little or no benefit. A system such as that described above would at any time have been oppressive. At the particular moment of which this history treats, it weighed on the people of Egypt with exceptional severity. The interest on the funded debt, heavy as it was, was not the only extraordinary charge which the Khedive had to meet. Large sums of money were due to contractors and others for goods supplied to the Egyptian Government. In default of payment, " orders h;id been given by all foreign houses trading with Egypt to refuse to furnish the Government with any supplies except for payment in cash on delivery." The claims themselves were *' being hawked about for sale at a depreciation of 50 per cent." In August 1877, Lord Vivian warned the Egyptian Government that the creditors "would certainly fall back upon their indisputable right to attack the Government before the Tribunals." "The Government," he added, "will thus find themselves confronted with a mass of legal sentences against them, which they must either OH. Ill COMMISSION OF INQUIRY 33 satisfy in full and at once, or it must inevitably attract the serious attention of the Powers who contributed to establish the Courts of the Reform." But the Egyptian Government had no money with which to settle the claims ; neither, in the then exhausted state of their credit, could money be borrowed. Lord Vivian prophesied correctly. The creditors had recourse to the law-courts. Many of them obtained judgments against the Government, and the non-execution of the judgments led to the interference of the Powers under whose auspices the Mixed Courts had but recently been estab- lished. Notably, the German Government ** con- sidered that the Khedive was acting in a manner which should not be allowed in refusing to pay claims when required to do so by the Courts of Law." The German Ambassador in London in- formed Lord Derby that *' Prince Bismarck wished for united action on the subject by all the Powers, if only to avoid the possibility of separate action on the part of some of them." In the meanwhile, everything was being sacri- ficed in the attempt to pay the interest and sinking fund on the funded debt. A sum of £1,579,000 was, in 1877, devoted to the extinction of debt. The nominal capital paid off amounted to £3,110,000, but, as both Lord Vivian and the Commissioners of the Debt pointed out, the operation of the sink- ing fund was of a delusive character, for a debt, at least equal in amount to that which was ex- tinguished, was being created by the non-payment of the employes and the other creditors, whose claims had not been funded. On January 6, 1877, Lord Vivian wrote: "The Government em- ployes are many months in arrears of pay, so much so that the cashiers of the Caisse are actually being paid out of the private means of the Commissioners (although their own salaries have not been paid), VOL. I D 34 MODERN EGYPT pt. i in order not to expose tliem to the temptation of handling large sums of money whilst actually with- out the means of subsistence." While, on the one hand, the employes were unpaid, on the other hand, the taxes were being collected with merciless severity. Lord Vivian, whose despatches throughout this period do credit alike to his humanity and his foresight, felt keenly on this subject. *'I hear," he wrote, "reports that the peasantry are cruelly treated to extract the taxes from them, the fact probably being, partly that the taxes are being collected in advance, and partly that, as the date of the coupon falls so soon after the harvest, insufRcient time is given to the peasantry to realise fair prices for their grain, and that they are unwilling to make the ruinous sacri- fice of forced sales." The Khedive, in conversation with Lord Vivian, " admitted that, in order to pay the coupon, the taxes were being collected for nine months, and in some places for a year in advance." In spite of the rigour used in collecting taxes, the non-payment of the Goverimient employes, and the neglect of the judgment creditors, it was with the utmost difficulty that sufficient money could be obtained to pay the interest on the funded debt. During the year ending on July 15, 1877, the revenue pledged to the service of the Unified Debt, which had been estimated to yield £4,800,000, only yielded £3,328,000. It is well-nigh certain that the financial arrange- ment made in 1876 would, in any case, have broken down. As it was, an exceptionally bad Nile, the Russo-Turkish War with its attendant expenditure, and the depression of trade, hastened the crisis. Bad as was the state of affairs in 1877, it was worse in 1878, for the full effect of the low Nile of 1877 was only felt in the following year. In Upper Egypt there was a famine. Sir Alexander OH. Ill COMMISSION OF INQUIRY 35 Baird, who had been a frequent visitor to Egypt during the winter months, was asked by the Government to assist in the rehef of the popula- tion. In the report which he subsequently addressed to the Minister of Finance, he said : — It is almost incredible the distances travelled by women and children, begging from village to village. ... It is not possible to state how many died from actual starvation, for in no instance does the death -register show a death by starvation, but I am satisfied that the excessive mortality during the period of scarcity was caused by dysentery and other diseases brought on by insufficient and unwholesome food. The poor were in some instances reduced to such extremities of hunger that they were driven to satisfy their cravings with the refuse and garbage of the streets. The nadir both of financial chaos and of popular misery was reached in the summer and autumn of 1878. On May 1, 1878, a sum of about £2,000,000 was due for interest on the Unified Debt. On March 31, only about £500,000 was in the hands of the Commissioners of the Debt. The balance, amounting to about £1,500,000, had, therefore, to be collected in the space of one month. The Commissioners of the Debt were of opinion that it would have been better not to pay this coupon. We should have preferred to allow the financial collapse, which was manifestly inevitable, to come at once as a preliminary to the establish- ment of a better order of things. We were aware that the money could not be paid without taking the taxes in advance, a course to which we were opposed as being oppressive to the peasantry, and also contrary to the true interests of the bondholders. Not only, therefore, did we abstain from putting any pressure on the Khedive to pay, but we even dis- cussed the desirability of protesting against payment. Unfortunately, the French Government did not share this view. French public opinion held that 86 MODERN EGYPT pt. i the Khedive could pay his debts if he chose to do so, that the distress alleged to exist in Egypt was fictitious, and that the arguments based on the impoverishment of the country were fabricated in order to throw dust in the eyes of the public and to excite humanitarian sympathy where no sym- pathy was deserved. An opinion was also enter- tained by a large body of the French public that the Khedive had hidden stores of wealth on which he could draw if he thought fit to do so. Subse- quent events showed that this story had no founda- tion in fact. But there were at the time some reasonable grounds for believing it to be true. On December 8, 1876, Lord Vivian reported that "it was impossible to account for the disposal of the very large sums of money over which the Egyptian Government have had control during the last year ; £4,000,000 for the Suez Canal shares, £5,000,000 advance from the French, and nearly a year's revenue have disappeared, while the payment of the coupon of the Unified Debt has been deferred, all the public employes are in arrears of pay, and heavy debts remain unsettled." The same idea was developed more fully in a petition presented by the French colony of Alexandria to M. Waddington, who was then Minister for Foreign Affairs. What, they asked, had become of the money which had been of late years poured into Egypt? The Custom -House statistics showed that a great part of it had remained in the country. Comment alors parler de la detresse du pays, et de rimpuissance de payer ses charges ? Que le Gouvernement explique ce qu'est devenu tout cet or ! II est done bien evident que le Gouvernement Egyptien est inexcusable de ne pas remplir les engagements qu'il a pris solennellement k la face de TEurope, et c'est sur lui que retombe la lourde responsabilite des ruines qu'il accumule en Egypte et qui frappent pour la plus grande partie la colonic Europeenne. CH.III COMMISSION OF INQUIRY 37 The cause of the bondholders was warmly espoused by the French diplomatic representative at Cairo, Baron des Michels, who turned a deaf ear to all arguments based either on the necessities of the Khedive or the misery of the Egyptian people. The result was that, on April 16, 1878, the French Government, through their Ambassador in London, informed Lord Salisbury, who, on April 2, 1878, succeeded Lord Derby at the Foreign OfRce, that there was " every reason to believe that the Khedive could pay the coupon, which falls due in May, if he chose to do so." M. Waddington expressed a hope that the British Government would join the French Government in pressing for payment. Lord Vivian was accordingly instructed to act in concert with Baron des Michels on this subject. The British Government thus became in a certain degree responsible for the oppression which necessarily accompanied the collection of the taxes. JNIoreover, the step taken at this moment involved a departure both from the local Egyptian policy, which the British Government had hitherto pursued, and also from their general policy in such matters. As regards local policy, the British had never espoused the cause of the bondholders so warmly as the French Government. On the contrary, a just consideration for the interests of the Egyptian people had always tempered any support given to the foreign creditors. As regards general policy, it had for years been the tradition of the London Foreign Office that British subjects, who invested their money in a foreign country, must do so at their own risk. They could not rely on any energetic support in the enforcement of their claims. There was evidently some special reason for so brusque a departure from the principles heretofore adopted. The reason is not far to seek. The Berlin Congress was then about to sit to 88 MODERN EGYPT ft. i regulate the situation arising from the recent Russo- Turkish war. Egyptian interests had to give way to broader diplomatic considerations. It was necessary to conciliate the French. The French initiative was, therefore, followed. Steps were taken to collect the money necessary to pay the coupon. Two of the most iron-fisted Pashas who could be found were sent into the provinces. They were accompanied by a staff of money-lenders who were prepared to buy in advance the crops of the cultivators. Thus, the low Nile having diminished the quantity of the crop, the peasantry of Egypt were deprived of such benefits as some of them, at all events, might have derived from the higJi prices consequent on the scarcity. "In some cases," Sir Alexander Baird wrote, "perfectly authenticated, corn was sold to the merchants for 50 piastres an ardeb, which was delivered in one month's time when it was worth 120 piastres an ardeb." The money was, however, obtained. The last instalment was paid to the Commissioners of the Debt a few hours before the coupon fell due. The great diversity of currency, and the fact that many of the coins were strung together to be used as ornaments, bore testimony to the pressure which had been used in the collection of the taxes. The only result of paying this coupon was that the crisis was delayed for a short time. The sufferings of the peo])le of Egypt were increased, whilst the position of the foreign creditors, so far from being improved, was rendered rather worse than it was before. Amidst this clash of conflicting interests, the main question which presented itself was, what could be done to place the finances of Egypt on a sound footin^j. It was clear that the arran<]i;ements made in 1870 would have to be modified, but, to cH. Ill COMMISSION OF INQUIRY 39 what extent were they to be modified ? By what procedure were the modifications to be introduced ? What guarantees could be obtained that any new arrangement would acquire a greater degree of stability than those which had gone before ? The discussion of these questions necessitates some observations on the relations between the Egyptian Government and the Commissioners of the Debt, upon which the main interest of Egyptian affairs centred at this moment. The position of the Commissioners was one of great difficulty. They were the representatives of the bondholders. An obligation, therefore, rested on them to support the just claims of the bond- holders by every legitimate means in their power. Apart, however, from the fact that it was impossible for any one of ordinary humanity and common sense to ignore the pitiable condition in which the people of Egypt were then placed, it was clear that the interests of the bondholders and of the Egyptian taxpayers, if properly understood, were far from being divergent. On the contrary, they were in a great measure identical. Both were interested in being relieved from a system of government which was ruinous to the interests of one class and in the highest degree oppressive to the other. Would it not be possible to use the bondholding interest as a lever to improve the Egyptian administration, and thus both relieve the lot of the peasantry and, at the same time, afford some substantial guarantee to the foreign creditors that whatever fresh financial obligations were taken would be respected ? That was the important question of the moment. In view of the relatively large political and financial interests of France and Great Britain in Egypt, it was natural that tlie French and British representatives should take the lead in the 40 MODERN EGYPT ft. i proceedings of the Commission of the Debt. I was fortunate in being associated with a French colleafjue who took a broad view of the situation. M. de Blignieres was a French official, and the tendencies of most French officials are somewhat more bureaucratic than those of their counterparts in England ; but he was a French official of the best type, loyal, straightforward, intelligent, and endowed with a high degree of moral courage. On all essential points, we worked in complete harmony. We were both determined that the petty inter- national rivalries, which had been the bane of Egypt, and which were skilfully used by Ismail Pasha to avert the possibility of common action on the part of France and England, should not be allowed to separate us. That we succeeded in sinking any minor differences of opinion in the pursuit of a common object, was sufficiently proved by the fact that each of us was at times blamed for sacrificing the interests of his own country to tliat of the other. In later days, when the relations between France and England became unfortunately embittered, I often looked back with regret to the time when I was able to co-operate heartily with a French colleague, such as M. de Blignieres, for whom I entertained a sincere respect and a warm personal friendship.^ The position of INI. de Blignieres was in some respects more difficult than my own. I had not been ap])ointed by the British Government, and was, therefore, free to act according to the dictates of my own conscience and to the best of my own 1 M. de Blif^nieres died iu 1900. He was a brilliant aud also very voluble conversationalist. In 1879, I accompanied him on a visit to Lord Salisbury, who was then residing at Dieppe. In 1887, Lord Salisbury wrote to me : "The other day the gentleman who described himself at my house at Dieppe as a ' pemonnage viuet' — M. de Blignieres — called on me. He had not aciiuired any fresh claim to that designa- tion. But he was very agreeable, and more friendly than I had been led to expect." CH. Ill COMMISSION OF INQUIRY 41 judgment. The tendencies and traditions of the British Government, moreover, ran counter to any endeavour to enforce the claims of the foreign creditors at whatsoever cost to the population of Egypt. The personal influence of Lord Vivian was exerted on the side of justice and moderation. The British bondholders were also, as a body, perfectly reasonable. They naturally objected to any arbitral }■ infringement of their legal rights, but there could be little doubt that if a statement of facts and figures could be put before them, the accuracy of which could be guaranteed by their own trustees, there would not be any insuperable difficulty in obtaining their acquiescence to an equitable settlement of all pending questions. Moreover, the influence of the bondholders in England was limited. A strong body of public opinion existed which was hostile to their presumed interests, and which, in its anxiety to do justice to the people of Egypt, was inclined sometimes even to err on the side of doing less than justice to the foreign creditors. Those who represented this aspect of British public opinion criticised, more frequently than not in a hostile spirit, the action of the European officials who were at that time employed in prominent positions in Egypt. A good deal of this criticism was based on an erroneous appreciation of the facts of the case, but I never regarded it as really hostile. On the contrary, I esteemed it an ad- vantage to be able to strengthen my position in case of need by an appeal to a body of general opinion which, even when misled on points of detail, was pursuing praiseworthy and very legiti- mate objects. M. de Blignieres, on the other hand, was nominated by the French Government, ai d the French Government were greatly under the in- fluence of the bondliclding interest. The French 42 MODERN EGYPT pt. i bondliolders were inclined to be far less reasonable than the English, neither did there apparently exist any body of public opinion in France, which could act as a check on any extreme views advanced by the foreign creditors of Egypt. Both M. de Blignieres and myself saw from an early date that the financial arrangements of 1876 would have to be modified, but we also held that an arbitrary reduction in the rate of interest would be unjust to the bondholders and of doubtful benefit to the taxpayers. Before we could ap- prove of any fresh financial combination, it was evident that more liffht would have to be thrown on the situation. Under these circumstances, the idea of holding a General Inquiry into the financial condition of the country, which was originated about this time, took root, and obtained some support amongst the more moderate of those who were interested in the solvency of the Egyptian Government. "But," Lord Vivian reported, "the bondholders ask that any inquiry into the financial position should be impartial and exhaustive, leav- ing nothing behind it uninvestigated in the shape of debt, nor any pretext for further resettlement. On these conditions, they are prepared to make such a fair sacrifice of interest as may be found absolutely necessary." It would have been wise on the part of the Khedive if, at this moment, he had on his own initiative invited a full inquiry into the financial situation of Egypt. But he was not disposed to do so. He hoped to obtain an arbitrary reduction in the rate of interest on the debt without any inquiry. Eventually, the Commissioners of the Debt took the initiative. In a letter addressed to the Minister of Finance on January 9, 1878, they dwelt on the gravity of the situation and suggested an inquiry. The Khedive replied at length, declin- OH. Ill COMMISSION OF INQUIRY 43 ing to institute a general inquiry into the financial situation, but stating that he was willing to appoint a Commission whose sole duty it would be to ascertain the true amount of the Egyptian revenue. The Commissioners of the Debt were invited to take part in this inquiry. A partial inquiry of this sort would have been worse than useless. The Commissioners of the Debt, therefore, addressed a further letter to the Egyptian Government, in which they again urged the necessity of a full inquiry, and declined to take part in any inquiry of a partial nature. No attention was paid to this remonstrance, and, on January 27, 1878, a Khedivial Decree was issued instituting a Commission of Inquiry into the revenue only. A further Decree was to be issued nominating the Commissioners. The issue of this Decree caused an explosion of European public opinion in Egypt, A meeting was held at Alexandria at which the more extreme of those who advocated the claims of the foreign creditors expressed themselves in terms condemna- tory of any inquiry, as they considered that the Egyptian Government could meet all its engage- ments. A petition was sent to the representatives of the Powers, but it was couched in language so insulting to the Egyptian Government that Lord Vivian refused to notice it. The Khedive did not, however, immediately abandon the idea of instituting a partial inquiry. The main difficulty was to find any qualified persons to conduct it. General (then Colonel) Gordon was at that time returning from the Soudan. The idea occurred to the Khedive that his services might be utilised. His high character, the weight that his name carried with the British public, and his known sympathy with the sufferings of the Egyptian people, all pointed him out as 44 MODERN EGYPT pt. i a useful instrument ; whilst his inexperience in financial questions would, it was thought, lead him to accept the accuracy of any facts and figures which were laid before him by the Egyptian Government. T^ord Vivian pointed out that " Colonel Gordon, with all his eminent qualities and abilities, had no experience in finance." The Khedive, however, held to his idea. General Gordon was invited to conduct a financial inquiry, and was at first inclined to accept the invitation. M. de Lesseps was also asked to serve on the proposed Commission, and intimated his willingness to do so. The negotiation with General Gordon, however, soon broke down, and he left Egypt. ^ It is unnecessary to describe in detail the tedious negotiations which then ensued. The British Government consistently supported "a full and complete inquiry " into the financial situation as the only possible solution of existing difficulties. The German, Austrian, and Italian Governments also supported the proposal. So also did the French Government, although as it became daily more and more clear that the result of any impartial inquiry must be that the rate ot interest on the debt would be reduced, their support was rather lukewarm. After long and wearisome discussions over the scope of the inquiry and the persons to whom it should be entrusted, the Khedive eventually yielded. On March 15, I was able to write to Lord Goschen : " At last T really think that, after five months of incessant labour, the inquiry is settled." On ^ These proceeding's have formed the subject of much misrepre- sentation. Tlie account of tliein iriven in Sir William Butler's Charles George Gordon (pp. 138-139) is incorrect llie sole reason why the negotiation broke down was that it was evident to every one concerned, including General Gordon himself, that lie was not fitted to conduct any financial inquiry. He wrote at the ti ne that he felt sure that he "was only to be a figurehead." — Colonel Gordon in Central Africa, p. 310. CH. Ill COMMISSION OF INQUIRY 45 April 4, 1878, a Khedivial Decree was issued appointing a Commission with the most extended powers of inquiry. M. Ferdinand de I^esseps lent the weight of his name to the Commission. He was appointed President, but did not take any active part in the proceedings, and left Egypt on May 9. Sir Rivers Wilson and Riaz Pasha were named Vice-Presidents. The four Commissioners of the Debt were appointed members. A capable Frenchman, M. Liron d'AiroUes, was chosen to act as Secretary. Some opposition had been offered, especially by the French, to the nomination of any Egyptian to be a member of the Commission. It was feared, with some reason, that no Egyptian would be sufficiently independent to express views which might be displeasing to the Khedive. These fears proved groundless. At a time when any show of independent opinion on the part of an Egyptian was accompanied with a good deal of personal risk, Riaz Pasha displayed a high degree of moral courage. His presence on the Commission was of material help to his colleagues, whose confidence he fully deserved and obtained. CHAPTER IV THE NUBAR-WILSON MINISTRY April 1878-November 1878 Difficulty of the task assigned to the Commission of Inquiry — Cherif Pasha declines to appear as a witness — Defects in the system of administration — The floating debt — The Rouznanieh Loan — Loans from the W'akf and Beit-el-Mal Administrations — Ultimate reforms proposed by the Commissioners — Immediate reforms necessary — Enforcement of Ministerial responsibility — The Khedive's Civil List — Cession to the State of the Khedivial properties — The Khedive accepts the proposals of the Commissioners — Nubar Pasha forms a Ministry — Sir Ki\ ers A\'^ilson and M. de Blignieres named Ministers — Loan authorised on the security of the Khedivial estates. The Egyptian Verres^ was at last, therefore, obliged to render an account of his stewardship to a body of men who were determined to arrive at the truth. The Commissioners, however, soon found that, in the confusion which then existed, the mere discovery of the accurate facts of the situation was a task which presented no inconsider- able difficulties, whilst the abuses which had grown up in the Egyptian administrative system were so general and so deep-rooted as to defy the application of any remedy which would be effectual ^ There is certainly a somewhat close analogy between Verres and Ismail Pasha ; e.g. " Hoc piaetore Siculi neque suas leges, neque nostra senatuscousulta, neque com munia jura tenuerunt . . . Nulla res . . . nisi ad nutum istius judicata est ; nulla res tarn patria cujusquam atqr.e avita fuit quae non ab eo imperio istius abjudicaretur. Innumerabiles pecuniae ex aratorum bonis novo nefarioque instituto coactae," etc. — Cicero, In C. Verrcm, Actio I'rima, iv. et v. 46 OH. IV NUBAR-WIl.SON MINISTRY r and at the same time speedy. We had to deal not with a patient suffering from a single specific malady, but with one whose constitution was shattered and whose every organ was diseased. "II s'agit, en effet," we said, "de creer tout un systeme fiscal, et cela avec un personnel tr^s restreint ; a present presque rien n'existe de ce qui doit exister." At the outset of the inquiry, a preliminary diffi- culty of a somewhat serious nature occurred. Cherif Pasha was at that time, next to the Khedive, the leading man in Egypt. No one thought that he was in any degree responsible for the confusion which then existed, but, inasmuch as he was Minister of Justice, it was to him that the Com- missioners were obliged to turn for information as to the working of the judicial system in so far as^ fiscal matters were concerned. Under the Decree instituting the Commission, all Egyptian officials were bound to furnish such information as might be demanded of them. Cherif Pasha, on receiving a summons to attend before the Commission, offered to answer questions in writing, but his proud nature resented — and not unnaturally resented — the idea of appearing in person before the Commissioners. On the other hand, had the latter yielded, all chance of extracting the truth from other witnesses would have been shipwrecked at the outset of the inquiry. The Commissioners, therefore, insisted on Cherif Pasha appearing in person. Under these circumstances, Cherif Pasha could only yield or resign. He chose the latter course. The first step taken by the Commissioners was to provide for the payment of the arrears due to the Government employes and pensioners. They then set to work to examine into the system of administration of the country, more especially 48 MODERN EGYPT pt. i into the fiscal system. It is unnecessary to give the results of their inquiries at any length. It was found that public rumour had not exaggerated the nature of the prevailing abuses. Certain laws and regulations existed on paper, but no one ever thought of obeying them. The principal officials concerned were, indeed, often ignorant of their existence. New taxes were levied, old taxes were increased, and changes introduced without any formal authority. The vilkge Sheikh executed the orders of the JNIoudir, the latter those of the In- spector-General, who, again, acted under " superior order." This "superior order," in fact, constituted the law. The officials obeyed it, even though it were only communicated verbally ; and no tax- payer ever dreamt of challenging it or of protesting against it. The Inspector-General of Upper Egypt, on being asked to whom the taxpayer could address himself if he had any complaint to make, answered, with a naivete arising without doubt from long- familiarity with a system which he considered both just and natural, " Pour les impots, le fellah ne pent se plaindre ; il salt qu'on agit par 'ordre superieur.' C'est le Gouvernement lui-meme qui les reclame ; a qui voulez-vous qu'il se plaigne?"^ The In- spector-General unconsciously indicated the main difficulty in the path of the Egyptian reformer. On the one hand, the people had from time immemorial been accustomed to yield implicit obedience to tlie Government. On the other hand, inasmuch as the Government were themselves the chief cause of all the mischief in the country, the * This answer is alive with the spirit of the ancient Oriental despot- isms. 'VhiiA \^uck\e (Histon/ of Ciri/i.sadon, vol. i. p. 80) records that the Institutes of Menu laid down that any native of India helonging to the Sudra caste must always remain a slave for ever, altliough his master granted him his freedom. " For," said the lawgiver, " of a state whic'u is natural to him, by whom can he be divested.'*" Paterson (The Nemesis of Nations , p. 60) also alludes to the same point. CH.IV NUBAR-WILSON MINISTRY 40 direction reform had necessarily to take was that of putting some restraint on the exercise of arbitrary power. How were abuses to be reformed without shaking the props which had so far held Egyptian sjciety together, and on which the whole edifice rested ? That was a question which, at a later period, gave cause for much anxiety. Another characteristic answer was given by a high Egyptian official who was examined before the Commission. A professional tax was at that time levied in Egypt. Nothing, in fact, can be fairer than that, in an agricultural country such as Egypt, the non -agricultural classes should bear their share of taxation. It was, however, perhaps going rather far to levy the tax on the humblest of the artisan class. But the Government went much farther. Agricultural labourers paid the tax ; in fact, it had become a poll-tax, which was paid by all the poorer classes, whether or not they exer- cised anything w^hich could be called a profession. The witness in question was asked whether he did not think it rather hard that a man who exercised no profession should be called upon to pay a pro- fessional tax. He expressed great and, without doubt, genuine astonishment. Was it, he said, the fault of the Government that the man did not exercise any profession ? He could engage in any profession he chose. The Government did not prevent him from doing so. But, of course, if he chose not to engage in any profession, he must none the less pay the tax ; otherwise an injustice would be done to those who were engaged in pro- fessions ! Of the many specious arguments which have been from time to time advanced in Egypt to make the worse appear the better cause, this is certainly one of the most remarkable. The Commissioners did not confine their re- searches to the methods adopted for the collection voi>. I E 50 MODERN EGYPT fp. i of the revenue. The corvee, they found, was a *' fruitful source of extortion and injustice." It was ascertained, notwithstanding positive official asser- tions to the contrary, that the Khedive's private estates were cultivated by means of forced labour. The recruitment for the army was managed in an irregular and very cruel manner.^ It often happened that a recruit first paid a heavy sum to obtain exemp- tion from military service, and was after all obliged to serve without the money being refunded to him. In the vital question of the distribution of water for purposes of irrigation, the interests of the poorer cultivators were sacrificed to those of the rich proprietors. No courts of justice, worthy of the name, existed. Herr von Kremer and myself were delegated by our colleagues to inquire into the outstanding claims against the Egyptian Government. JNlany a weary hour did we pass in the broiling heat of an Egyptian summer afternoon in endeavouring to unravel the tangled meshes of some of the most astounding financial operations in which any Government in the world has ever been engaged. The waste had been fearful. The head of the Ordnance Depart- ment, if he heard that some new description of * One of the Inspectors of the Antiquities Department (Mr. Howard Carter), in the course of some excavations made at Dendera in the month of August 1904, came across tlie corpse of a man who had been tortured and put to death by Daoud Pasha, a former notorious Moudir of the Province^ for trying to evade conscription for the army. Mr. Carter reported : " The corpse presented a ghastly sight ; the liead was turned towards the left, the chin resting on the shoulder, the features distorted in agony, and the tongue between the teeth. The body was in a contorted position, with the legs bent and widely open. The hands were held at the wrists in rough wooden .stocks, made apparently out of two rowlocks from a native boat, fixed together, extremely tight, by means of two large iron native nails, wliich pierced the wrists, and were clamped below. Tied round the arms, high up near the arm-pits, was a lialter, which had evidently been used to drag the man along, either dead or alive, the back show- ing distinct signs of laceration. It was even possible to detect that the hands had l)een much swollen from the pressure of the stocks." — Egypt, No. 1 of 190o, p. 104. CH.IV NUBAR-WILSON MINISTRY 51 cannon had been invented, would order, not one as an experiment, but a couple of dozen, on the ground, as was explained to us, that Egypt " could not remain behind other nations in miUtary matters." Names familiar throughout Europe during the Napoleonic era turned up as recipients of the Khedivial largesse. The accounts also showed that the eulogies poured at one time on Ismail Pasha by a portion of the European press were not altogether due to dis- interested motives. Money was due to contractors and tradesmen of all sorts. An Egyptian princess had run up an account of £150,000 with a French dressmaker. Large sums had been spent at Con- stantinople, as to which it was stated " on n'a pas pu rendre compte." One financial operation was of so complicated a nature that it almost defied the ingenuity of man to get to the bottom of it. It appeared, however, that the Khedive had been engaged with his late Finance Minister in an operation on the Stock Exchange, the basis of which was that he was to " bear " his own stock. In some cases, extravagant sums had been paid for work done or for goods furnished. Thus, the harbour works at Alexandria cost over £2,500,000. According to a trustworthy estimate, they should have cost about £1,400,000. In this case, how- ever, the work was one of real utility, and it was well executed, although at a high price. In a number of other cases, large sums were owing without the Egyptian Government having any- thing to show for their money. Interest at exorbitant rates, bonuses on the renewal of bills, differences between the real and nominal value of securities, and other financial juggleries, consti- tuted almost the whole of the claim. There was one series of operations, termed " operations d'extourne," which are worth describ- ing in some detail. The operation was after this 52 MODERN EGYPT pt. i fashion. The Egyptian Government, being in want of ready money, sold to some Levantine firm a quantity of grain wliich they did not possess, and vvhicli, for the most part, they were never Hkely to possess. The purchase money was paid at once ; the grain had to be dehvered to the pur- chasers a few months later. When the time for its delivery arrived, a certain amount was in some cases delivered, as it was then the practice of the Egyptian Government to collect a portion of the taxes in kind. The remainder was bought back by the Government at a price of 25 per cent above that which had been paid by the original purchasers. In other cases, the Government never delivered any grain, neither was any money repaid at the time. The Government, however, still went through the form of repurchase, and the original purchasers received Treasury bills, bear- ing interest at the rate of 18 or 20 per cent, not for the amount which they had in the first instance advanced, but for the far larger sum for which the Government eventually effected the nominal re- purchase of the grain. It is impossible to say what rate of interest the Egyptian Government really paid in the end for money advanced under this system. It must have been something enormous. Instances might, in fact, be multiplied to show the ruinous nature of the financial operations to which the Government were at that time reduced in order to obtain money. In one case, which may be cited by way of example, the Govern- ment, in part payment of a debt due to a local bank, handed over £230,000 worth of Unified Stoak at a price of 31 1 ; in other words, in order to pay £72,000, the Government saddled the country permanently with a debt of £230,000, bearhig interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum. CH. IV NUBAR- WILSON MINISTRY 53 We also found, in the course of our researches, that in 1874 a forced loan, entitled the "Empruiit Rouznameh," had been raised in the provinces. Subscriptions had been invited for a loan of £5,000,000 bearing interest at the rate of 9 per cent. About £1,800,000 was actually paid into tlie Treasury. We obtained from some of the villages a list of the subscribers to the loan ; each list was accompanied by a declaration signed by tlie Notables of the village stating that the subscriptions were "perfectly voluntary." They were, of course, in no sense voluntary. No bonds were ever delivered to the subscribers and, up to the date of our in- quiry, one instalment of interest only had been paid to a few favoured individuals. We further discovered that the Government had laid their hands upon the money belonging to the Wakfs, that is to say, the Department which deals with Mohammedan religious endowments. There was also at that time in Egypt an institu- tion termed the Beit-el-Mal,^ which administered the estates of orphans and minors. The duty of the director of this establishment was to invest the money of which he was trustee in the manner best suited to the interests of the cestuis-que trust. " En vertu d'ordre superieur," the Director-General lent tlie money to the Government at 10 per cent interest, but he was never repaid the capital, neither did he receive any interest. The Director- General, on being asked whether the Minister of Finance gave him any security for the trust money which he lent to the Government, replied that, inasmuch as the Khedive had given an order, no security was necessary. " La garantie, c'est Tordre du Khedive." "Dans le cours de nos recherches," we said, " nous avons ete frappes de I'usage pres- qu'universel qui semble regner chez les fonction- » Ut. "The House of Property." 54 MODERN EGYPT ft. i naires du Gouvernement Egyptien, et qui consiste dans I'affectation des fonds particuliers qui passent par leurs mains aux besoins du service gouverne- mental. Las faits que nous avons racontes a propos de Tadrninistration du Wakf, du Beit-el- Mal, de la Caisse des Orphelius, et des Ecoles Nationales, peuvent servir d'exemple du syst^me. Nous pourrions en citer d'autres." Besides the sums due to bankers and contractors, we found that there were numerous claims from such humble individuals as camel-drivers, barbers, donkey-boys, etc., all of which had to be included in the floating debt. It is a pity that these claims could not have been submitted to a court of arbitration with full powers to deal with them. The result would probably have been that a few would have been admitted in full ; others would have been re- duced in various proportions, some very largely ; whilst some would perhaps have been rejected altogether. Unfortunately, the Commissioners had no such powers. We could only decide what claims were admissible from a strictly legal point of view, leaving any doubtful cases to be decided by the law-courts. When the list came to be made out, it was found that the outstanding claims amounted to £0,276,000. The deficit for 1878 was estimated at £2,587,000,^ and that of 1879 at £381,000. In all, therefore, a new floating debt, amounting to £9,244,000, had accrued, wliich in one form or another had to be added to the funded debt of the country. It was easy to frame a crushing indictment rtgainst the system of government under which Egypt had of late years been administered. It was more difficult to indicate what measures could 1 Tliis was an under-estimate. The actual deficit amounted to £3,440,000. CH.IV NUBAR- WILSON MINISTRY 55 be taken to ensure any speedy improvement in the system. The Commissioners, however, pointed out the general directions which reforms should take. No tax should be levied save in virtue of a law which should be officially published. The collection of taxes should be really, as well as nominally, under the JNIinister of Finance. The Accounts Department should be reformed, and a system of annual budgets adopted. A Reserve Fund should be instituted to provide for any extraordinary expenses incurred whenever the Nile was exceptionally high or low. The taxes should no longer be taken in advance. A judicial system should be organised which would protect the people against an arbitrary abuse of authority. A number of small and vexatious taxes should be suppressed. A cadastral survey should be made. Reforms should be introduced into the methods of collecting the salt and tobacco duties. Proper regulations should be made for the distribu- tion of water and the execution of public works. Forced labour should only be employed on public works of acknowledged utility. The terms of military service should be defined and limited, whilst at the same time some equitable system should be adopted for obtaining recruits for the army. These proposed reforms were excellent in their way. But they all required time to inaugurate ; eapable administrators to give effect to them ; ex- perience to show in what particular form portions of the European system of government could, with advantage, be transplanted to an Eastern country ; and above all, a gradual change in the habits of thought, both of the Egyptian officials and of the people themselves, which would enable them in some degree to assimilate a system of administra- tion, based on principles which, since the days of the Pharaohs, had been unfamiliar to the people of Egypt. 56 MODERN EGYPT ft. i In the meamvlnle, the pressing questions were. What could be done at once to enable the machine of the State to work, however inefficiently ? What was to be the first step towards the inauguration of an improved system of government ? How were the claims which had on all sides surged up against the Egyptian Treasury to be met ? There was but little difficulty in stating the main defect of the existing system, or in indicating in general terms the nature of the remedy which ought to be applied. " On ne saurait meconnaitre," the Commissioners said, "que le Chef de I'Etat dispose d'une autorite sans limites." Manifestly, that was the main blot. The celebrated maxim attributed to Louis XIV. has never been more thoroughly carried out in practice than in Egypt under the reign of Ismail Paslia. He, in his own person, was the State. He disposed of the lives and properties of all his subjects. He constituted the sole and final court of appeal in all affairs, great or small. He administered in person every Department of the State. His will was law. His subordinates obeyed his every word impHcitly. Ancient tradition and personal interest alike for- bade an Egyptian official to question the wisdom of a decision emanating from a ruler, wlio could at pleasure dispose of the life and make or mar the fortune of any one of his subjects. All inde- pendence of thought and action was crushed out. Moreover, Ismail Pasha did more than rule. He afforded in his own person a striking example of what may result from concentrating in the hands of the ruler of the State functions which may more advantageously be left to private enterprise. He was the largest landed proprietor in Egypt. He was the only sugar manufacturer. He was a large shipowner. In fact, he was omnipresent. The task whicli lie bad undertaken would have taxed CH. IV NUBAR-WILSON MINISTRY 57 administrative abilities of the highest order. Ismail Pasha was a man of some natural ability, but he possessed neither the knowledge, nor the experience, nor the power of application necessary to govern successfully on his own principles.^ The result was that a state of affairs was pro- duced such as that described in the report of the Commissioners. At the time they wrote, the whole machine of government was in danger of collapsing. It was useless to elaborate any minor reforms on paper, until steps had been taken to remedy the main defect of the system. It was clearly necessary to place some check on the arbitrary power of the Khedive. The principle of ministerial responsibility had to be enforced. Another fundamental reform was also necessary before the foundations of an improved system of administration could be laid. So long as the revenues of the country remained at the disposal of a despotic and spendthrift ruler, no trustworthy forecast could be made of the liabilities of the State, and no reliance could be felt that revenues, which were intended by the Finance Minister to defray certain expenses, might not suddenly escape his grasp and be devoted to some wholly different object. Neglect to distinguish between the public revenues of the State and the private income of the Sovereign is a rock on which the Governments of ^ Compare Taine, Ancien Regime, p. 101. Speakiug of the duties imposed on the King, he says : " En efFet, par sa complication, son irregularite, et sa grandeur, la machine echappe a ses prises. Uu Frederic II., leve a quatre heures du matin, un Napoleon qui dicte une partie de la nuit dans sou bain et travaille dix-huit heures par jour, y suffiraient a peine. Un tel re'gime ne va point sans une attention toujours tendue, saus une euergie infatigable, sans un discernement iufaillible, sans une seve'rite' niilitaire, sans un genie superieur ; a ces conditions seulement on pent clianger vingt-cinq millions d'hommes en automates, et substituer sa volonte partout lucide, partout coherente, partout presente, a leurs volontes que Ton abolit." What Louis XVI. was expected to do on a large scale in Fraiice, Ismail Pasha attempted to do on a small scale iu Egypt. He naturally failed. 58 JSIODERN EGYPT pt. i other countries have foundered before the days of Ismail Pasha. Such a system must, in fact, lead to confusion in any country. Under a primitive and semi-barbarous Government, however, it may con- tinue for a long while without producing a collapse of the whole machinery of the State. Unless resort be had to credit, a certain limit is of necessity imposed on the harm which can be inflicted by the most capricious despot. He can- not spend more money than he can obtain, and if he is unable to obtain more than the annual revenue which his country yields, with })erhaps a certain limited amount taken in advance, the harm which can be done is not irremediable. Agriculture is the principal and, indeed, almost the only resource of most Asiatic States. Neither the devastation caused by war nor the evils result- inoj from the most gross forms of mis<>overnment can altogether ruin the agriculture of any country.^ The vis medicatrix naturae soon repairs the harm which has been done, and leaves a fair field open for the future labours of some more intelligent ruler. But the maximum amount of harm is probably done when an Oriental ruler is for the first time brought in contact with the European system of credit. He then finds that he can obtain large sums of money with the utmost apparent facility. His personal wishes can thus be easily gratified. He is dazzled by the ingenious and often fallacious schemes for developing his country which European adventurers will not fail to lay before him in the most attractive light. He is too wanting in foresight to appreciate the nature of the future difficulties which he is creating for himself. The temptation to avail himself to the ^ See Mill's well-known remarks as to why agricultural countries recover so quickly from the effects of war {Political Economy, vol. i. p. 94). CH. IV NUBAR- WILSON MINISTRY 59 full of the benefits, which a reckless use of credit seems to offer to him, are too strong to be resisted. He will rush into the gulf which lies open before him, and inflict an injury on his country from which not only his contemporaries but future generations will suffer. This is what Ismail Pasha did. During the early years of his rule, Egypt must have been an earthly paradise for all who had money to lend at usurious rates of interest, or third-rate goods of which they wished to dispose at first-rate prices. I was not acquainted with Egyptian affairs in those halcyon days. I only arrived in Egypt at the moment when the second and inevitable stage on the road to ruin had been reached, and when it was no longer a question of spending money, but of repaying the money already borrowed and spent. Manifestly, the first step to avert further disaster was to prevent more wanton expenditure being incurred, and to obviate fresh abuses accruing from a system which had already inflicted such terrible injury on both the present and future generations of Egyptians. Egypt, it would appear, was to be civilised on a European model. So far, it had assimilated but too often those portions of the European system which were least suitable to an Oriental community, and least worthy of being copied.^ It was now necessary that at least one cardinal principle of sound European administration should be enforced. The Khedive must accept a Civil List.^ It should be fixed at a liberal rate, * Mr. Stanley Lane-Poole says with truth, " The Eastern mind has an unequalled aptitude for*assimilating the bad and rejecting the good in any system it meets." — Studies in a Mosque, p. 106. 2 The acceptance of a Civil List by tlie Ruler of a misgoverned Oriental State is the first preliminary condition which must precede all other reforms. It would be difficult to insist too strongly on this point. In this connection, I may mention that Sir Edward Malet {Shifting Scenes, p. 95) states that, when he was in charge of the Hritish Embassy at Constantinople in 1879, the Sultan liad some idea of appointing an Englislnnan to be his Minister of Finance. Sir Edward 60 MODERN EGYPT pt. i such as would harmonise with the pomp and hixury with which custom has surrounded Oriental rulers ; but, when once fixed, it should be unalterable. The residue of the State revenues must for the future be applied by responsible ministers to objects in which the State, as distinguished from the ruler, possessed an evident interest. As a necessary consequence of the adoption of this system, the estates which had accumulated in the hands of the Khedive had to be handed over to the State. It was an abuse of words to call them private property. They had been bought with public money. It was impossible that any one individual could administer them efficiently. By ceding them, an asset would be obtained to satisfy the outstanding claims of creditors, whilst by the adoption of a system under which the estates could be gradually sold or farmed, great benefit would ultimately accrue to the country. The Khedive and his family possessed 916,000 acres of land in Egypt. Of these, 485,000 acres were already mortgaged to the Daira creditors. The Khedive, anticipating the demand which was to be made on him, took the initiative during the course of the inquiry, and offered to cede to the State 289,000 acres of the 431,000 which remained to him. The estimated revenue of the lands which he proposed to cede amounted to £167,000 Malet communicated with me. He states, quite accurately, that I sent ''a conditional acceptance, which enabled him to go so far as to submit my name to the ISultan." 1 may now add that the principal of my conditions was that the Sultan should accept a Civil List. I did not for one moment think that this condition would be accepted. My anticipations were realised. 1 never heard anything more of tlie matter. Scarcely less important than the acceptance of a Civil List is the withdrawal of the Crown Domains from the personal administration of a despotic ruler. No one with any knowledge of the government of backward States could have imagined that the system adopted by King Leopold in connection with the administration of the Congo, would succeed. All the world now knows the results which that system has produced. CH.IV NUBAR- WILSON MINISTRY 61 a year. That of the 142,000 acres which he pro- posed to retain amounted to £224,000 a year. The best lands would therefore, under this arrange- ment, have remained in the hands of the Khedivial family. The Commissioners were not satisfied with this proposal. They demanded the cession of the whole of the property, rural as well as urban, belonging to the Khedivial family, of which the estimated net revenue was about £423,000 a year. Such, therefore, were the conclusions to which four months of laborious inquiry had led. The con- fusion existing in the State accounts was so great, and the system of taxation so irregular, that it was as yet impossible to estimate accurately the resources of Egypt. Neither, indeed, could any general financial arrangement be proposed with advantage until the preliminary questions of prin- ciple, to which allusion is made above, were satis- factorily settled. These were, first, the enforce- ment of the principle of ministerial responsibility ; and secondly, the acceptance by the Khedive of a fixed Civil List in lieu of the revenues derived from the properties which, it was demanded, should be yielded to the State. The Commissioners sent in their report early in August. The Khedive was in doubt as to the line of conduct he should adopt. He was pressed by Nubar Pasha to accept the conclusions of the Commission. After a sliort period of hesitation, the Khedive yielded. In a speech addressed to Sir Rivers Wilson on August 23, he expressed himself in the following terms : ** Quant aux conclusions auxquelles vous etes arrive, je les accepte ; c est tout naturel que je le fasse ; c'est moi qui ai desire ce travail pour le bien de mon pays. II s'agit actuellement pour moi d'appliquer ces conclusions. Je suis resolu de la 62 MODERN EGYPT pt. i faire s^rieusement, soyez-en convain^u. INIoti pays n'est ])lus en Afrique ; nous faisons partie de 1 Europe actuellement. II est done naturel pour nous dabandonner les errements anciens pour adopter un systeme nouveau adapte a notre etat social. Je crois que dans un avenir pen eloign^ vous verrez des changements considerables. lis seront amenes plus facilement qu'on ne le croit. Ce n'est au fond qu'une simple question de legalite, de respect a la loi. II faut surtout ne pas se payer de mots, et pour moi je suis decide a chercher la rdalit^ des choses. Pour commencer et pour montrer a quel point je suis decide, j'ai charge Nubar Pacha de me former un Ministere. Cette innovation pent paraitre de pen d'importance ; mais de cette innovation, serieusement con^ue, vous verrez sortir I'independance ministdrielle, et ce n'est pas pen ; car cette innovation est le point de depart d'un changement de systeme, et, d'apres moi, la meilleure assurance que je puisse donner du serieux de mes intentions relativement a I'applica- tion de vos conclusions." ^ A few days later (August 28), the Khedive addressed a letter to Nubar Pasha authorising him to form a Ministry. In this letter, the principle of Ministerial responsibility was reaffirmed. "Dor^- navant," the Khedive said, "je veux gouverner avec et par mon Conseil des JNIinistres. . . . Les membres du Conseil des Ministres devront etre tons solidaires les uns des autres ; ce point est essentiel." The voice of the majority was to decide upon any question brought before the Council. The chief officials of the State were to be named by the Khedive acting on the advice of his Council of Ministers. Nubar Pasha undertook the direction of the * This speech had, of course, been prepared by Nubar Pasha for the Khedive. CH.1V NUBAR- WILSON MINISTRY 63 Departments of Foreign Affairs and of Justice. Riaz Pasha was named Minister of the Interior. It was, at the same time, decided to introduce an important change into the form in which Euro- pean agency should be employed in the direction of Egyptian affairs. Only very limited executive functions had been vested in the two Controllers. It was now decided to appoint European INIinisters. Thus, the European element was brought into direct contact with the population of the country, instead of acting, as heretofore, through the agency of Egyptian Ministers. Sir Rivers Wilson was named Minister of Finance, and M. de Blignieres Minister of Public Works. On October 29, a Khedivial Decree was issued ceding to the State most of the properties which had heretofore belonged to the Khedivial family, and authorising a loan of £8,500,000 to be raised on the security of those properties. They were to be administered by a Commission composed of an Egyptian, an Englishman, and a Frenchman. Tiie two latter were to be selected by the British and French Governments respectively. The negotiations which were undertaken with Messrs. Rothschild with a view to tlie issue of tlie new loan, delayed the arrival of Sir Rivers Wilson and M. de Blignieres in Egypt. It was not till towards the close of November 1878 that they took up their duties. CHAPTER V THE FALL OF NUBAR PASHA November 1878-February 1879 Difficult position of the new Ministry — Support of the British and French Governments — The Khedive declines all responsibility — ■ Convocation of the Chamber of Notables — The principle of Ministerial responsibility — Contest between the Khedive and Nubar Pasha — The Khedive intrigues against the Ministry — Mutiny of the officers — It is quelled by the Khedive — Nubar Pasha resigns — Immediate consequences — Remote consequences — State of discipline of the army — The Khedive's responsibility for the mutiny. The new Ministers had undertaken a heavy task. They had to deal not only with difficulties arising from a long course of niisgovernment, but also with those due to the special circumstances of the moment. These latter were of a serious nature. The country was staggering under a load of debt which would, under normal circumstances, have taxed its resources to the utmost. Unfortvmately, at this particular moment its resources fell below the normal level. The usual Nile flood had failed, and the failure produced the maximum amount of evil consequences, for the system of irrigation was conducted on unscientific principles; neither, although a contingency of this sort was of period- ical recurrence, had any preparations been made to meet it. Moreover, the country had been exhausted by the endeavours made to pay the interest on the debt in the previous spring. 64 CH. V FALL OF NUBAR PASHA 65 Further heavy payments were about to fall due. On October 15, 1878, the interest on the Preference Stock, amounting to £443,000, and on November 1, the interest of the Unified Debt, amounting to nearly £2,000,000, had to be paid. To meet these engagements there was, at the end of August, only £442,000 in the hands of the Commissioners of the Debt. The revenue of the first eight months of the year fell short of the receipts during the corresponding period of 1877 by £1,143,000. The sinking fund of the Unified Debt was, with the consent of the Commissioners of the Debt, temporarily suspended. The relief afforded by this measure was, however, but slight. A sum of £1,260,000 had to be taken from the proceeds of the loan recently negotiated with Messrs. Rothschild in order to pay the interest on the Unified Debt. No sooner had the November coupon been paid, than attention w^as attracted to the difficulties of meeting the engagements falling due in the following spring. In fact, at this time the Egyptian Government lived from coupon to coupon. Large sums on account of land revenue are generally collected in Egypt during the months of November and December ; yet by the end of the year, only £302,000 was in hand to meet a payment of nearly £2,000,000 fall- ing due on May 1, 1879. To meet the coupon on the Preference Stock due on April 15, 1879, and amounting to £443,000, only £117,000 was received from the Railway Administration duiing the last two and a half months of 1878, although this period embraced the season which was usually the most productive of revenue. AA^ell might Lord Vivian write : " These gloomy returns speak for themselves ; they show that the financial posi- tion of the country is as bad as it can well be." From one point of view, however, the new VOL. I F 66 MODERN EGYPT pt. i Ministry began work under auspices which augured well for its success. It was warmly supported by both the British and French Governments. Nevertheless, two points were, from the first, clear. The first was that the new administra- tion could not hope to work successfully unless it were cordially supported by the Khedive. The second was that the Khedive had reluctantly assented to the new order of things, and was inclined to afford a very lukewarm support to, his JNIinisters. It was essential to do all that was possible to ensure his hearty co-operation. The following instructions were, therefore, addressed by Lord Salisbury to Lord Vivian : " In the opinion of Her Majesty's Government a very grave responsibility will rest with His Highness the Khedive for the success or failure of the new regime, especially as regards the collection of taxes. Rumours have already reached Her Majesty's Government which, if well founded, might cause them to apprehend that, under cover of the inter- ference of foreign Governments, attempts will be made in high quarters to throw off all responsi- bility, a state of things that would soon be under- stood throughout the country generally. . . . "Her Majesty's Government have full confi- dence in the resources of the country, and enter- tain no doubts as to the result of the new system, if it is only allowed to have a fair trial. But if it be opposed by those in power, or should they even show a disposition to throw discredit upon it, the difficulties of Nubar Pasha and his advisers will be enormously increased, and the responsibility for their failure will involve its promoters in the disastrous consequences that must result." M. Godeaux, who had taken Baron des Michels' place in Egypt, gave a similar warning to the Khedive on behalf of the Frencii Government. CH. Y FALL OF NUBAR PASHA 67 When these messages were delivered to the Khedive, he "showed evident signs of great annoyance, and regretted that Her Majesty's Government sliould have thought it necessary to hold language to him which he thought was undeserved and unjust." The responsibility which it was sought to throw on him was, the Khedive thought, neither just nor logical. What was his position in Egypt ? He had deliberately accepted the position of a constitutional ruler. A respons- ible Ministry had been formed to advise him. '* If he rightly understood the first principles of constitutional government, it was that Ministers, and not the chief of the State, were made respons- ible." He must decline to meddle with the functions of his Ministers. His advice or opinion was at their disposal if they chose to ask him for it, but he could not thrust it upon them unasked. If the Ministers were not responsible for their own acts, what was the meaning of a responsible Ministry ? Responsibility, he thought, would only attach to him if he attempted to interfere in the government of the country. Otherwise, he must disclaim it. To all this sophistry Lord Vivian replied, with obvious good sense, that "His Highness must remember that, although he had surrendered his personal power, and a constitutional regime was established in Egypt, the new order of things was in its infancy, and it was rather too early for the strict application of the doctrines of constitutional government as understood in Europe. His High- ness had still all the prestige and influence of the chief of an Eastern State, combined with greater knowledge and experience of Egypt than those of any other person. What Her JNIajesty's Govern- ment desired was that, instead of showing indiffer- ence, coldness, or even dislike to the new order of 68 MODERN EGYPT pt. i things, he should place all his knowledge, influence, and experience at the disposal of his Ministers, and loyally and cordially co-operate with tliem within the proper sphere of his prerogative, A moral responsibility devolved on him for any hostile action that might tend to thwart the new Ministry." The Khedive's words were ominous. They gave the keynote of what was to follow. The British and French Governments had wished for constitutional government in Egypt. He had complied with their wishes. He would now stand aside whilst the game of constitutional government was being played out. It would soon be found that, without his powerful aid, the country could not be governed at all. If, however, constitu- tional government was to be tried, he would be thoroughly constitutional. He would leave his Ministers to their own devices, but he could not consent to the imposition of any fresh taxes with- out ascertaining the will of the people. In 18G6, a Chamber of Notables had been created, mainly with a view to throwing dust in the eyes of Europe. The Khedive was fully alive to the fact that, in the then existing condition of affairs in Egypt, the mediaeval Italian })roverb — chi dice par- lamento, dice guastamento — applied with full force. He had, therefore, maintained the Chamber in a condition of perfect subserviency to himself At the time about which I am writing, it had fallen into complete obscurity. It was now to be convoked with a view to the consideration of certain financial proposals, notably the increase in the Ouchouri land-tax,^ "by which the richer class of proprietors are assessed at rates below the present value of their lands, which have been * The Ouchouri landowners answered, to a great extent, to the Indian jaghirdars. They held fiefs at low rents. CH. V FALL OF NUBAR PASHA 69 much improved by cultivation." This was con- stitutionalism with a vengeance, for the Ouchouri landov/ners were strongly represented in the Chamber, and they would not fail to throw on the new Ministry the odium resulting from an increase of taxation, which would fall on the class to which they mainly belonged. Neither would they be pleased by a measure then under discussion and subsequently adopted, under which cultivators residing on Ouchouri lands would no longer, as heretofore, be exempted from their share of the corvee. As has been already explained, the principle of ministerial responsibility had been accepted by the Khedive. There were, however, two different methods of giving effect to that principle. One was to exclude the Khedive altogether from the meetings of the Council of Ministers, to treat him as a cipher, and to endeavour to govern the country, not only without his co-operation, but often in a manner which was diametrically opposed to his personal wishes and opinions. This system, which involved pushing the principle of ministerial responsibility to its extreme logical limit, was advocated by Nubar Pasha, who was supported by Sir Rivers Wilson. Arguments not wanting in weight could be advanced in its favour. The presence of the Khedive at the Council of Ministers was, it was maintained, incompatible with free discussion, which often turned either upon questions affecting His Highness personally, o:- upon the errors and abuses of the past, for which he was principally responsible. Even the appearance of restoring to him any part of the power of which he had been shorn would, it was argued, have a bad effect in the country, and induce the Egyptians to think that he was still all-powerful. 70 MODERN EGYPT pt. i This position was perfectly logical ; neither, in explaining the causes of Nubar Pasha's attitude, is it necessary to assume that personal ambition and love of power were the motives which prompted him. Without doubt, in attempting to put the Khedive altogether aside, Nubar Pasha thought that he was rendering a real service to his adopted country. Nubar Pasha, altliough some- what of a doctrinaire, was an earnest reformer. Moreover, his versatile intellect was capable of grasping a principle. In this case, he had got hold of a principle which was unquestionably sound. His French education, which tended to engender in his mind a somewhat uncompromising attitude on matters of theory, coupled with a certain inapti- tude to seize the springs of action which move individuals as well as Governments, conspired to convince him that the principle should be driven home to its logical conclusion. Loyalty to a colleague, personal friendship, respect for Nubar Pasha's abilities, consideration for his superior local knowledge, and a vivid realisation of the harm done by Ismail Pasha's abuse of personal power, all rendered it natural that Sir Rivers Wilson should follow in the same track. The alternative system, which was supported by Lord Vivian, was less theoretically perfect, but was in a greater degree based on the actual circumstances then existing in Egypt. Lord Vivian thought that Nubar Pasha had overrated his own strength and underrated the power of the Khedive. That power was still an important factor in the government of a country which he and his predecessors had ruled for so long and in so absolute a fashion. The Khedive was the only authority recognised and obeyed by all classes in the land. There was no middle course between deposing him or counting with his power. The CH.V FALL OF NUBAR PASHA 71 only system which presented a chance of success was not to put the Khedive on one side altogether, but to invite his co-operation, whilst at the same time the exercise of his authority would be controlled. My own views were expressed on February 17, 1879, — the day before the mutiny of the officers to which allusion will presently be made, — in the following terms : " The transition from a purely personal government by the Khedive to a govern- ment by an executive council, whose leading members are aliens and Christians, has been too rapid. For some time to come, it will be impossible not to take into account the personal authority of the Khedive as an element in the government of the country ; he will always possess a large influence, which, if it be not used for good, will almost certainly be used for bad ; I therefore think it desirable to consider the best method of giving the Khedive some practical share in the govern- ment of the country." Whatever defects, however, may have existed in the methods of giving effect to a policy of reform, it was certain that the Ministry of Nubar Pasha represented the cause of progress and civilisa- tion. The ultimate consequences of its fall might, and probably would be serious in so far as the Khedive was personally concerned. But the Khedive, true to the traditions of his previous life, took little heed of ultimate consequences. In the meanwhile, the immediate issue of the struggle between the Khedive and Nubar Pasha could scarcely be do.ibtful. Nubar Pasha was at a great dis- advantage. On the one side, was a ruler who was feared and obeyed, who disposed absolutely of the lives and fortunes of his subjects, and who could readily divert the rising tide of popular discontent from his own person and turn it against 72 MODERN EGYPT pt.i his Ministers. On the other side, was a Minister who was not only a Christian and associated with other European Christians, but who also belonged to a nationality against which the Mohammedan population of the Ottoman Empire is greatly prejudiced. " When an Armenian rules," says the Turkish proverb, " tlie State decays." ^ Nubar Pasha carried but little weight with the Egyptian population, with whom, moreover, owing to his ignorance of Arabic, he was unable to communi- cate in their own language. He could only rely on persuasion and on the support of two foreign Govern- ments. This support, although heartily accorded,^ did him in some respects more harm than good. Under these circumstances, his eventual fall from power was almost a foregone conclusion. The crisis did not, however, arise at once. For a few months, the new machine of government worked, although with great friction. The Khedive frequently complained that the anomalous position in whicli it was sought to place him was daily becoming more and more intolerable, and that, whilst he was not consulted about the measures of his Ministers, at the same time the British and French Governments held him responsible for their result. On the other hand, Nubar Pasha was "evidently discouraged and dissatisfied." " Nous tournons," he said, " dans un cercle vicieux. Nous ne marchons pas." In the meanwhile, there was good reason for believing that the Khedive was actively intriguing against his Ministers. "There is," Lord Vivian ' Ermeni vizir, devlet dilsher. Some of the more superstitious followers of Islam are said to derive a certain amount of consolatiou from the fact that Armenians have occasion;illy occupied high posts in the service of tiieir hereditary enemy, Russia. 2 It has been occasionally stated that if Lord Vivian had supported Nubar Pasha more cordially, he might have l)een maintained in power. Such is not my o])inion. Lord Vivian's instructions were clear, and be acted loyally upon them. CH.V FALL OF NUBAR PASHA 73 wrote on January 11, **a certain amount of fermentation in the country as evidenced by the arrival of large deputations of Sheikhs from the provinces to protest against any pressure for the payment of taxes at this moment, and I am told that there is a probability of opposition in the Chamber of Delegates to the proposition that is to be submitted to them by the Government for an increase of the Ouchouri tax, which falls especially upon the richer class of proprietors. If this fermentation were natural, it would not be an unhealthy symptom, but I have good reason to suspect that it has been secretly fomented by agents, probably employed by the Khedive ; and I hear from a reliable source that the leading men of the Chamber of Notables have been secretly convoked and told that the Khedive would not be displeased to see them oppose the measures of an administration which was imposed upon him, and which was entirely in the hands of Europeans. "Thus, in addition to their serious financial diffi- culties, and to the task of attempting to create order out of chaos, the new Ministry have to struggle, not only with open enemies, but with internal treachery of the most dangerous description, carried on in spite of serious warning." Under circumstances such as these, it only required the occurrence of some adventitious incident to bring about a crisis. No long delay intervened before such an incident occurred. It was, however, unfortunate that it happened in that branch of the State administration which, perhaps less than any other, can be infected with disease without producing after-effects of a serious nature. Hitherto, Egypt had suffered mainly from fiscal misgovernment. The only sound ])art of the system was that public tranquillity had been 74 MODERN EGYPT pt. i preserved, and, whatever may be thought of the methods by which it had been preserved, every one but a devotee of the sacred right of revolution would prefer order of some sort to complete anarchy. The security, which had so far reigned, was now to be disturbed. The financial embarrass- ments of Egypt were great. To these was now to be superadded the disquietude produced by a mutinous army. Great discontent had been produced amongst the officers of the army owing to the non-payment of their salaries. The new Ministry decided to pay a portion of the arrears due. At the same time, a large number of officers were placed on half- pay. This measure would, under any cir- cumstances, have been considered harsh, however necessary it might have been in view of the straitened condition of the Egyptian Treasury. It was, however, especially harsh and impolitic to dismiss so large a body of officers without, in the first place, fully liquidating the arrears of pay due to them. The result was that many officers and their families were reduced to a state of complete destitution. When this measure was adopted, there were about 500 officers in Cairo ; but at this moment, Lord Vivian reported, " by an unparalleled act of folly, the Minister of War summoned the remaining 2000 ofKcers up to Cairo from various parts of the country to receive a portion of their arrears of pay and to deposit their arms wi+h the authorities. He thus grouped together a seething mass of 2500 discontented officers, the garrison of Cairo con- sisting only of 2600 troops, a large proportion of whom had undoubted sym[)athy with the grievances of the mutineers." On the morning of February 18, as Nubar Pasha and Sir Kivers Wilson were driving to their CH.V FALL OF NUBAR PASHA 75 offices, they were mobbed by a crowd of officers armed with swords, and taken out of their carriages. After being subjected to some rough treatment, they were dragged to the JNIinistry of Finance, which was close to the scene of the outrage, where they were shut in by the mutineers, who cut the telegraph wires. Means were, however, found to communicate with Lord Vivian, who at once had an interview with the Khedive. What followed may best be related in Lord Vivian's words. " The Khedive," he reported, " drove with me to the Ministry of Finance, which we found besieged by a large crowd, who, however, made way res])ectfully for the Khedive's carriage, and cheered him. In a room on the upper floor, surrounded by the rioters, we found Nubar Pasha, Sir Rivers Wilson, and Riaz Pasha, none of them really hurt, although the two former had received very rough treatment while they were being forced from the street into the building. The Khedive, having assured him- self of their safety, turned to the rioters and ordered them to leave the building on his promise that their just demands should be satisfied. 'If,' he said, *you are my officers, you are bound by your oath to obey me ; if you refuse, I will have you swept away.' They obeyed him, although reluctantly and with some murmuring, begging him to leave them to settle their accounts in their own way. There were also cries of ' Death to the dogs of Christians.' His Highness got them down the stairs and into and beyond the courtyard, where they fell back on the larger body who were besieging the gates. The Khedive commanded all of them to disperse and go to their homes, and on their refusal to do so, he ordered up tlie troops. They fired in the air, but a few soldiers were wounded by the mutineers' revolvers, and a few of the rioters received bayonet wounds. The 76 MODERN EGYPT pt. i Khedive's chamberlain was wounded while at His Highness's side by a sabre -cut from one of the mutineers, and the Khedive himself ran consider- able risk. The whole affair lasted about half-an- hour, and the Khedive, after providing for the safe escort of the Ministers, returned to the Palace. Sir Rivers Wilson behaved well throughout the affair, which he might have avoided had he net gone to Nubar Pasha's assistance, when he saw him surrounded by the mob." On the following morning (February 19), a meeting took place at Lord Vivian's house, at which JNI. Godeaux, Sir Rivers Wilson, ]M. de Blignieres, and myself were present. Lord Vivian stated that the Khedive had on the previous day made a declaration to the Consular body to the effect that his position must be changed, and his proper share of power restored to him, or he would not be answerable for the maintenance of public order. It was decided to ask the Khedive to state in what respects he wished his position to be modified. We then drove to the Palace. Nubar Pasha, Sir Rivers Wilson, M. de Blignieres, and myself remained in a room on the ground floor, while Lord Vivian and M. Godeaux had an interview with the Khedive upstairs. In a short while, they reappeared and communicated the Khedive's reply. His Highness stated " unequivocally that he would not be responsible for public tranquillity unless he were given his proper share in the government of the country, and was allowed either to preside at the Council of Ministers himself, or to select a President in whom he could have confidence. He further required, as a sine qua non condition, that Nubar Pasha, whom he accused of sapping and undermining his authority, should immediately retire from the Ministry." Nubar Pasha was asked OH. V FALL OF NUBAR PASHA 77 whether, in the event of the Consuls -General msisting on his remaining in office, he would guarantee the public safety. He naturally declined to give any such guarantee. " The only course," he said, " left open to him under the circumstances was to tender his resignation, which he begged Lord Vivian and M. Godeaux as a favour to place in the Khedive's hands, with a request that he should be allowed to live unmolested as a private individual in Egypt." To this request, the Khedive consented, " on the condition that Nubar Pasha did not intrigue or meddle in politics." Thus the struggle between the Khedive and Nubar Pasha was brought to a close. The attempt to govern Egypt whilst Ismail Pasha was Khedive, without allowing him any participation in the government of the country, had signally failed. Tried in the manner which has been described above, the failure of the experiment was certain. Indeed, looking back on the events of that time after an interval of many years, my principal feeling is one of surprise that any one should for a moment have thought that, under these condi- tions, the experiment could possibly have succeeded. Nubar Pasha's fall from power was inevitable. The circumstances narrated in this chapter produced important changes, some immediate and others more remote. The immediate consequence was that the posi- tion of the European Ministers was shaken, and that before long they were dismissed from office. The remote consequences were of even greater importance. The officers of the army had, in the first instance, been unjustly treated. They were not paid the money which was due to them. So long as their complaints were put forward in a manner to which no exception could be taken, they remained unheeded. At last, they mutinied. 78 MODERN EGYPT pt. i They then obtained what they wanted.^ A public apology was tendered to Sir Rivers Wilson by Prince Hassan, the Kliedive's son and the Com- mander-in-Chief of the Egyptian army, for the insults and ill - treatment to which he had been subjected. But, although the ringleaders of the mutiny were arrested, and some inquiry into their conduct was instituted, they were speedily released. Indeed, under the circum- stances which til en existed, it would have been difficult to have subjected them to any punish- ment without incurring serious risks. It is impossible to treat any armed body of men after this fashion with impunity. The discipline of the Egyptian army was profoundly shaken. The most humble private soldier discovered, for the first time, probably to his own exceeding astonish- ment, that he and his comrades were masters of the situation, if, with muskets in their hands, they exerted themselves to coerce the civil elements of society. History affords abundant proofs of the ease with which this lesson is learnt. It was not to be unlearnt until a stronger race of soldiers appeared on Egyptian soil. The mutiny of 1879 was the direct precursor of the Arabi revolt. It would be going too far to say that from this moment a foreign occupation of Egypt became inevitable, but it is certainly a fact that the mutiny which led to the * At the time of tlie mutiny, the Treasury chest was empty. It was imperative to pay the officers, who then held the town of Cairo at tlieir mercy, but cousideral)le difficulty was experienced in obtaining the money. I remember being present at an interview between Sir Rivers Wilson and the representative of a local bank, who offered to advance money at an exorbitant rate of interest. Sir Rivers Wilson showed a moral courage after the riot as conspicuous as the physical courage he had displayed whilst the riot was taking place. He declined to accept tlie offer wliich was made to him, and he also refused to revert to tlie pernicious system of taking the taxes in advance, although the adoption of this measure was pressed upon him. Eventually, Messrs. Rothschild advanced £400,000^ which was repaid from the loan fund% and the officers were paid. CH.V FALL OF NUBAR PASHA 79 downfall of Nubar Pasha greatly increased the difficulties of governing the country, and brought the pros})ects of foreign intervention of a decisive nature appreciably nearer. There is one further point which calls for remark before leaving the history of this period. An opinion was at the time generally entertained that Ismail Pasha was privy to the mutiny of the officers, and, in fact, that the whole affair was an intrigue got up by the Khedive himself It is a dangerous thing for a despotic ruler, who depends wholly on force for the maintenance of his power, to encourage a mutiny in his own army, even although he may himself sympathise with the objects of the mutineers. The spirit of mutiny, when once raised, may not improbably turn against the individual who raised it. Nevertheless, unwise though a policy of this sort would have been, there is no inherent improbability in such a dangerous agency as a mutinous soldiery being used by an Eastern ruler, who, in spite of an acute and subtle intellect, was singularly lacking in foresight, who was smarting under the humiliation of a loss of power, and who had unbounded confidence in his ability to rule, by his own drastic methods, the generally docile races who inhabit the valley of the Nile. Any opinion, however, of the degree to which Ismail Pasha was privy to the mutiny must be little more than conjecture. It is impossible to adduce positive ' proof that he knew anything precise of the intended outrage on Nubar Pasha and Sir Rivers Wilson. The alarm he displayed at the spirit of disorder which had been evoked was perhaps genuine. It is, indeed, more than probable that, when the officers assembled near the Ministry of Finance on the morning of February 18, they had not devised amongst themselves any very definite plan of action. Nevertheless, it 80 MODERN EGYPT pt. i would in any case be incorrect to say that the responsibility for the outrage does not rest on Ismail Pasha. On the contrary, he was, without doubt, morally responsible for it.^ It does not require either a very vivid imagination or any great acquaintance with Eastern politics to form a fairly accurate idea of what must have taken place. I can best describe my own conjecture on the subject by an analogy drawn from a well- known incident in English history. When Henry II. wished to get rid of Thomas a Becket he said, in the presence of his court, " Will no one rid me of this turbulent priest ? " and forth- with four knights were found who possibly went beyond their master's wishes, and rid him of the Archbishop in the rude but effectual manner of the twelfth century. Ismail Pasha's language and intentions were, without doubt, more in conformity with the civilised age in which we live than those of Henry II., but his procedure was based on the same principles as those of the English king. He spoke openly of the dislike which he entertained towards Nubar Pasha and his Euro])ean Ministers. He represented his position as intolerable. In an Eastern country, this was enough to focus on the Ministry the responsibility for all the evils which then afflicted Egypt. The officers of the army were discontented. They attributed the miserable condition in which they were placed to the action of Nubar Pasha and his colleagues, who were aliens and Christians. They learnt that their ruler, who was of their own race and faith, and to whom they had been accustomed to yield implicit obedience, was as hostile as they were to the new ^ It has been stated on good authority that a few days before the mutiny, Shahin Pasha spoke to the Khedive about the grievances of the officers, and that the latter replied: 'Tourquoi les officiers restent-ils tranquilles?" If this be true, it is quite sufficient to account for the outbreak. CH. V FALL OF NUBAR PASHA 81 Ministry, and would be pleased if means could be found to bring about its downfall. That was enough. They naturally mutinied, and in doing so they, without doubt, thought that they were not only furthering their own interests, but also that they were acting in a manner which would obtain the commendation of their Sovereign. This is a sufficient and highly probable explana- tion of the causes which led to the mutiny. It is scarcely worth while to seek for any other. VOL. 1 CHAPTER VI THE COUP d'j^TAT April 1879 Triumph achieved by Ismail Pasha — His parliamentary projects — Necessity of maintaining the reformed administration — Attempts to reinstate Nuhar Pasha — Relations between the Khedive and the new Ministry — Position of the British and French Governments — Common policy — Different methods of executing the policy — Dissensions at Cairo — Position of Prince Tevvfik — Mistaken principles of the new Ministry — The payment of the coupon on the 18(34: loan — The Khedive prepares a separate financial scheme — Dismissal of the Ministers — Proposal to revive the Control — Letter of the Khedive to Cherif Pasha — Character of the new Ministers — Comments on the Khedive's proceedings. The Khedive had obtained a considerable triumph. He had got rid of a JNIinister who was distasteful to him, although the latter had been supported by two powerful foreign Governments. He had shown all the world that, without his co-operation, Egypt could not be governed. The theory of ministerial res})onsibility might be sound, but the personal power of a despotic ruler in an Oriental State was a practical fact, which had to be taken into account in the application of the best of theories. If Ismail Pasha had been content with what he had achieved, and had from this time forth worked loyally with his European Ministers, he might possibly have died Khedive of Egypt. But it was one of the characteristics of this singular man that, although he had a quick perce])tion in dealing with points of minor importance, he erred at almost every 82 cH. VI THE COUP D'ETAT 83 important crisis of his career. He was unable to frame a correct estimate of the main factors in a general political situation. He was wanting in the power described by the Duke of Wellington, as "guessing at what is going on on the other side of the hill." His political forecasts were singularly faulty. He would frequently show great acuteness in deciding on some matter of detail, but would generally make a mistake on a broad question of principle. Lord Palmerston once said that if a little learning was a dangerous thing, no learning at all was much more dangerous, and so, without doubt, it generally is. But Ismail Pasha was a living proof that there is a good deal of truth in the words of the English poet. He would probably have fared better if he had never made any attempt either to understand European politics or to gauge European public opinion. As it was, he had just sufficient knowledge of these subjects to lead him astray. He knew that Europeans laid much stress on the will of the people. They had large talking assemblies, termed Parliaments, to whose will Kings and Emperors were obliged to conform. Such in- stitutions were, of course, wholly unsuitable to Egypt. Nevertheless, would it not be possible to hoist these Franks with their own petard ? It was, indeed, difficult to deal with the French. They scarcely made a pretence of caring for anything but the interests of the French creditors. It was true that, but a short time previously, he had declared that the country was bankrupt, but circumstances altered cases. Egypt had vast resources. Huge sums had before now been screwed out of the unfortunate peasantry. Let him regain his personal power, and ado])t his own rude methods for collect- ing the revenue. A few extra blows of the courbash would produce financial equilibrium. Thus would he conjure French opposition. 84 MODERN EGYPT pi. i The case of the Enghsh was different. They cared, or at all events they pretended to care for the welfare of the fellaheen. They disliked to hear of oppression even in the cause of the bondholders. Lectures on this subject had been frequently delivered to him by meddling Consuls- General and by the misguided humanitarian press of England. 13 ut the English were an essentially gullible race. They had, at a recent period of their history, got embroiled with the half of Europe because they sympathised with oppressed nationalities, and believed that parliamentary insti- tutions, trial by jury, and the like, were certain remedies for all the maladies with which States, in whatsoever part of the world, were afflicted.^ They were easily carried away by phrases such as the popular will, constitutional government, and so on. Moreover, the English were a stiff-necked people who would not easily be led by officials. On the contrary, they as often as not thought that, when they had paid their officials high salaries for looking after their interests in a foreign country, they had done enough. They were under no obligation to accept as correct what their representatives said. Indeed, they were at that time rather inclined to disbelieve their officials because they were officials, and, therefore, presumably devoid of popular sympathies.^ With a ])eople such as this, a great deal mioht be done. Mi^ht not an acute ruler so o o * " Lord Palmerston, in the most insolent manner, told the Greek Minister that he might tell the King of Greece that he never should have a moment's peace or quiet until he gave his subjects a constitu- tion ; that he, Lord I'almerston, would tiike care that neither he nor any other Sovereign who governed witliout a constitution should have any peace ; tliat all people so governed had a right to ' insurger,' and he took good care to let them know that such was his opinion " (Sir Robert Peel's Mentoirs, vol. ii. p. 1 ?!'')• "'® passage is contained in a letter written in IB-'JIJ by "a, lady unnamed in the VVhig camp." 2 It must be l)orne in mind that 1 am speaking of a period before the birth of modern Imperialism, Since 1557'), the general tone ol British public opinion has undergone many notable changes. CH. VI THE COUP D'ETAT 85 adapt his language as to suit a foreign public, whilst his acts would be in strict conformity witli his own wishes and personal interests ? The British Govern- ment must not be openly defied. That would be a proceeding both clumsy and attended with some risk. Belial was a wiser councillor than Moloch, But surely if a scheme were devised which would present matters to the British Government and jniblic in a form to which they were accustomed, if their most cherished institutions were apparently copied in Egypt, if the Egyptian people were to express their own views through their own repre- sentatives, then the bait would take. An Egyptian Parliament should, therefore, be assembled. The re- presentatives of tlie Egyptian people should express their devotion to the Khedive, and their satisfaction with his system of government. They would reject as insulting the imputation that the country was bankrupt. They would demur to the changes in the system of taxation proposed by the European advisers of their Sovereign. Those changes were unjust, and, moreover, it was an incidental point of some importance that, under the European proposals, the fresh taxation would fall on the re- presentatives themselves rather than on the people whom, by a bold flight of the imagination, they were presumed to represent. But they would devise another system which would be more equitable. The representatives of the people, who were rich, should preserve their former privileges, but tliey would make large sacrifices in order to enable Egypt to meet its financial engagements. It was true that those sacrifices would fall, not on themselves, but on their fellow-countrymen in more humble classes of society. But the result would be the same. The interest of the debt would be paid. The members of the Egyptian Parliament must be left to devise their own scheme. That was essential. 86 MODERN EGYPT ft. i Otherwise, constitutional government would be a mere farce. Their patriotism would revolt at the idea of any foreign interference. For the future, it must cease. The European Ministers must be dismissed. When all this was done, it would not be necessary to talk any more of Parliaments or of popular representation. The necessity for their existence would have passed away. An intelligent despot ruling over a docile people would easily find some means for preventing parliamentary institutions from taking any solid root in the country. The personal rule of the Khedive would be restored. The people, who had before been scourged with rods, would in future be scourged with scorpions. The bondliolders would be paid, and no one would be able to complain. Thus Ismail Pasha pondered over things which were never destined to be accomplished. The idea was ingenious, but the circumstances under which the experiment was tried were un- favourable to success. Ismail Pasha was too well known in Europe to play the part of an ultra- constitutional monarch. The most ardent partisan of parliamentary institutions, however ill-informed about Eastern politics, whilst yielding a ready assent to the principles involved, would not be able to refrain from some scepticism as regards the inten- tions of the principal character in the piece. Moreover, there were at the time in Cairo a number of European officials of inconveniently in- dependent characters, who had some knowledge of the country, and who would certainly make tlieir voices heard. They, at least, would be thrown into strong op])osition. They knew too much to be taken in by this flimsy travesty of free institutions. Indeed, had not the interests involved, both Euro- pean and Egyptian, been so serious, they would CH. VI THE COUP D'ETAT 87 almost certainly have regarded the w^hole proceed- ing not merely as a comedy, but as a screaming farce. Further, the whole project was tainted by one irremediable defect. It was based on the assumption that money would be forthcoming to satisfy the claims of the foreign creditors. Now, in supposing that, by whatsoever means, he could meet all his financial engagements, Ismail Pasha erred. He forgot to make sure of his foundations before erecting his superstructure. When Nubar Pasha was forced to resign. Lord Vivian pointed out that "the incident would become still more serious if it were to shake the experiment of reformed government in Egypt, which should certainly be maintained, only with far more consideration than has been shown for the feelings, rights, and prejudices of the natives." Lord Vivian had indicated the main danger of the moment. The reformed administration must be supported. Lord Vivian was, therefore, in- structed " to state to the Khedive that the French and British Governments were determined to act in concert in all that concerned Egypt, and that they could not lend themselves to any modification in principle of the political and financial arrange- ments recently sanctioned by His Highness. It was to be clearly understood that the resignation of Nubar Pasha had, in the eyes of both Govern- ments, only importance so far as the question of persons was concerned, but that it could not imply a change of system." Similar instructions were sent by the French Government to their repre- seniative in Cairo. On the Khedive behig informed of the tenor of these instructions, he replied " that he would pledge himself to maintain intact the engagements he had taken in August last, and which constituted the charter of the new scheme of administrative 88 MODERN EGYPT ft. i reform.* With respect to his financial engage- ments, he could assure the two Consuls-General of his sincere desire to observe them, but he could not prejudice tl e decisions of his Council of Ministers on this point." Nothing could be fairer or more constitutional. The principles of the reformed administration were to be maintained. As regards the financial engage- ments, the Khedive could obviously give no promise. All the world, in fact, knew by this time that the arrangements made in November 1876 would have to be modified. A month previously. Lord Vivian liad reported that "frequent meetings were being held between Sir Rivers Wilson, M. de Blignieres, and Sir Evelyn Baring, with the object of arriving at some joint conclusions as to the basis upon which a general and equitable arrangement, amounting to a composition of the present financial difiiculties of the Egyptian Government, was possible." Two important questions then had to be decided. The first was, who was to be the new Prime Minister. The second was the nature of the rela- tions between the Khedive and his new INIinistry. Sir Rivers Wilson pressed for the reinstatement of Nubar Pasha. He was su])ported by the British Government. " Her Majesty's Government," Lord Salisbury said, " are of opinion that the position of Sir Rivers Wilson will be extremely difficult, if not impossible to maintain, unless Nubar Pasha is readmitted to the Cabinet in some form or other." Lord Vivian, however, did not concur in this opinion. " I desire," he wrote, " to place on record my strong conviction that Nubar Pasha's idea of maintaining two distinct and probably antagonistic powers in the State (the Kliedive and the Council of Ministers) will prove im})racticable as long as ' ri(/e ante, pp. (51 -(53. CH n THE COUP D'ETAT 89 the present Khedive remains in power. . . . Any proposal for the re-entry of Nubar Pasha into the Cabniet, after what has happened, would be, I fear, in every respect a serious mistake that might lead to difficulties and complications, which Her Majesty's Government would wish to avoid." When the Khedive was addressed on the subject, he said that "he could not do otherwise than bow to the will of the English and French Governments, which he had no power to resist, if they persisted in their demand for the re-entry of Nubar Pasha ; but he felt bound to warn them beforehand of the consequences, so that they might not blame him hereafter if the new order of things should break down, or if disturbances should again arise." It was clear that, if Nubar Pasha were forced upon the Khedive, another and perhaps more seri- ous breakdown would ensue. The French Govern- ment, therefore, suggested that it might not be advisable to insist on his readmission. The British Government assented, but they "accompanied the concession with a warning to the Khedive that they considered His Highness responsible for the recent difficulties in Egypt, and that if similar difficulties should occur again, the consequences would be very serious to him." Concurrently with the discussion of the question of Nubar Pasha's readmission to the Cabinet, the relations which were to subsist between the Khedive and his JNIinisters were considered afresh. The Khedive made certain proposals. The Euro- pean Ministers made counter-proposals. Eventually, the British and French Governments decided on the following programme : — (1) The Khedive was not in any case to be present at Cabinet Councils. (2) Prince Tewfik, the heir - apparent to the Khedivate, who had been proposed by the Khedi\e 90 MODERN EGYPT ft. i himself, was to be appointed President of the Council. (3) The English and French members of the Cabinet were to have a rioht of veto over o any proposed measure. On these proposals being laid before the Khedive, he said that " he unreservedly subscribed to all the conditions imposed by the Governments of England and France, more especially as they had listened to his objections against the re-entry of Nubar Pasha into the Cabhiet, for which he expressed his gratitude. He fully acknowledged the very serious responsibility that now devolved upon him for the success of the new order of things and for the pre- vention of disorder, and he pledged his cordial and loyal support to his JNlinisters if, as he hoped, they would meet him in the same conciliatory spirit." It appeared, therefore, that the difficulties in the way of the formation of a new JNIinistry were at an end. On March 10, Prince Tewfik was nomi- nated President of the Council. When, however, the question arose of filling up the remaining places in the Cabinet, fresh dissensions broke out between the Khedive and his European Ministers. Under the JNIinistry of Nubar Pasha, Riaz Pasha had been in charge of the Departinent of the Interior. The Khedive now wished to transfer Riaz Pasha to the JNIinistry of Foreign Affairs and of Justice. The European JNlinisters objected to this transfer, on the ground that the Khedive's object was to regain his hold over tlie provinces, which would be impossible so long as a man of such independent character as Riaz Pasha was JNIinister of the Interior. Lord Vivian and JNI. Godeaux, on tlie other hand, con- sidered that it would be inconsistent Avith the personal responsibility thrown on the Kliedive to dictate to him the choice of his Ministers and the posts they should occupy. The British CH. VI THE COUP D'ETAT 91 and French Governments, however, more especially the former, supported the views of Sir Rivers Wilson and M. de Blignieres. The Khedive was pressed to maintain Riaz Pasha at the JNIinistry of the Interior. He at first declined to do so, but eventually gave a reluctant assent. On March 22, after the country had remained for a month without a Ministry, Riaz Pasha was named Minister of the Interior and of Justice. The remaining places in the Cabinet were easily filled up, At the same time, a letter was addressed by the Khedive to Prince Tewfik, embodying the principles which were to regulate the relations between the Khedive and his Ministers. " J'espere," the Khedive added, "que ces nouveaux arrangements assure- ront la marche de la nou\elle organisation, dont la reussite doit amener un grand bien pour I'Egypte. Le Cabinet pent etre assure qu'en toutes circon- stances il pent compter de ma part sur le concours le plus complet et le plus loyal, comme je compte moi-meme sur son devouement a I'oeuvre que nous poursuivons en commun." During these discussions, the British and French Governments had been in a difficult position. The general political interest of England was clear. England did not want to possess Egypt, but it was essential to British interests that the country should not fall into the hands of any other European Power. British policy in respect to Egypt had for years past been based on this principle. In 1857, the Emperor Napoleon III. made overtures to the British Government with a view to the partition of the northern portions of Africa. Morocco was to fall to France, Tunis to Sardinia, and Egypt to England.^ On this proposal being ' The accuracy of this statement is confirmed by M. Eniile Ollivier, who speaks with authority on the subject. See his L'Enipire Liberal, vol. iii. p. 418. 92 MODERN EGYPT pt. i submitted to Lord Palmerston, he stated his views in a letter to Lord Clarendon. " It is very possible," he said, "that many parts of the world would be better governed by France, England, and Sardinia than they are now. . . . We do not want to have Egypt. What we wish about Egypt is that it should continue to be attached to the Turkish Empire, which is a security against its belonging to any European Power. We want to trade with Egypt, and to travel through Egypt, but we do not want the burthen of governing Egypt. . . . Let us try to improve all those countries by the general influence of our commerce, but let us abstain from a crusade of conquest which would call down upon us the condemnation of all other civilised nations." ^ The general aims of British policy in 1879 were much the same as they had been when Lord Palmerston wrote these lines twenty - two years previously ; but, with a change of circumstances, the method of giving effect to the policy had necessarily to be modified. It was no longer possible to stand aside and neglect the internal affairs of Egypt. The only European Power which was likely to obtain a footing in Egypt was France. The attempt liad already been made once, and the misgovernment of Egypt might well lead to its being renewed, more especially as large French financial interests, to which the French Govern- ment were prepared to afford support, were con- cerned. Even admitting, as was without doubt ' Ashley's Life of Lord Palmerston, vol. ii. p. 125. I cannot refrain from adding the following characteristic passage: "On one occasion to Lord Cowley, he (Lord Palmerston) used a very homely but apt illustration. * VVe do not want Egypt,' he said, *or wish it for our- selves, any more than any rational man with an estate in the north of England and a residence in the south would liave wished to possess the inns on the north road. All he could want would have been tliat the inns should he well-kept, always accessible, and furnishing him, when he came, with mutton-chups and jio.-t-liorses.' " CH. VI THE COUP D ETAT 93 the case, that the French Government had at that time no designs involving the annexation of Egypt, the pressure of public opinion was so great that it would liave been scarcely possible for France to have adopted a policy of complete non-intervention. If the British Government would not act with them, the French Government would have been obliged to act alone. French policy in respect to Egypt was, in most essential points, the counterpart of the policy of the British Government, It was impossible to adopt a policy of annexation, even had there been any disposition in that direction, without incurring the risk, amounting almost to a certainty, of a serious quarrel with England. But France regarded the exclusive action of England in Egypt with the same jealousy as that with which England would have regarded exclusively French action. Any extension of Turkish influence ran counter to the traditional policy of France. It was clearly in the interests of botli Governments to prevent the affairs of Egypt from becoming a cause of serious dissension between them. Both had equal interests in the maintenance of the peace of Europe. It was obviously undesirable that the misgovernment of an Oriental state should threaten a disturbance of the peace. The best way to pre- vent any risk of dissension was for both Govern- ments to co-operate in Egypt with a view to the establisliment in that country of a system of administration, which, although possibly de- fective, would be sufficient to check the worst of the existing abuses, and thus, by obviating the necessity for further interference, prevent the Egyptian Question from becoming European rather than local. In the execution of this policy, occasional dis- agreements occurred. The French Government 94 MODERN EGYPT 't. i dwelt strongly on the interests of the foreign creditors. The British Government leant to the cause of the Egyptian peasantry. But in spite of some differences of opinion, the principle of common action was maintained. Moreover, the harmony which existed between London and Paris was re- produced in Cairo. In spite of occasional jars, the local representatives of the two Governments, as also their countrymen who were employed in the Egyptian service, worked fairly well together. Every one recognised that the anarchical condi- tion of affairs then existing in Egypt was due to the misgovernment of one individual, the Khedive Ismail Pasha. Of that, there could not be any doubt. But, as has been already pointed out, there were two methods of checking the continuance of misgovernment. One was to place Ismail Pasha under such stringent control as to reduce him almost to a cipher. The other was to impose on him a modified form of control, to recognise the impossibility of governing the country without his co-operation so long as he remained Khedive of Egypt, and to endeavour to guide him in the path of reform rather than to exercise extreme compul- sion in forcing him along it. It was a most unfortunate circumstance that at this moment the principal Europeans concerned in the administration of Egypt were not agreed as to which of these two systems should be adopted. The official world was divided into two opposing camps, each honestly believing that its own system was the best. Lord Vivian supported the system which involved counting with Ismail Pasha's per- sonal power. Sir Rivers Wilson supported the rival system, which involved the reduction of the Khedive to a political nullity. Neither Lord Vivian nor Sir Rivers Wilson had had any previous experience in dealing with Eastern DH. VI THE COUP D'ETAT 95 affairs. Sir Rivers Wilson had passed his life in the service of the English Treasury, where he had acquired a sound financial training, which, added to much natural quickness and ability, proved of great service to him in dealing with the technical portions of the Egyptian financial situation.^ In some respects, however, this training was a dis- advantage to him. The fiscal system in an Eastern country differs widely from that which exists in England ; neither does the technically sound but somewhat narrow school of the English Treasury afford an ideal training for an Englishman who has to deal with Eastern affairs. It often en- genders a somewhat inelastic frame of mind, and a tendency to ignore political considerations which no European financier in the East can afford to neglect. Lord Vivian, on the other hand, had had no experience in dealing with financial affairs. This was a disadvantage to him at a time when the pecuniary embarrassments of the country, in which he was the Britisli representative, had become the chief subject for diplomatic action. On the other hand, he had been dealing with foreign affairs all his life. He had had a sound diplomatic training. He possessed a calm judgment, great moral courage, and a clear insight into the political forces at work around him. I was a spectator of these unfortunate dissensions, and was thus in a position to hear both sides of the question. My belief is that, in view of Ismail Pasha's personal character, neither the adoption of the system advocated by Lord Vivian, nor the adoption of that of which Sir Rivers Wilson was the leading representative, would have materially * Sir Rivers Wilson was employed in Egypt for a couple of months in 1876, and had thus learnt something of the local financial situation, but the period was too short to enable him to acquire any real experi- ence of Orientals or of Eastern forms of government. 96 MODERN EGYPT ft. i altered the course of Egyptian history. No con- fidence could be placed in Ismail Pasha's promises Whatever he might say, he was determined to re- main the absolute ruler of Egypt. He might appear to yield for the moment, but he trusted to his resource and to his remarkable power of intrigue to nullify any concessions which might be extorted from him, and thus ultimately regain his previous position. This, however, is mere conjecture. It is possible that I may be doing an injustice to Ismail Pasha, though I do not think that I am. What is more certain is that the system advocated by Lord Vivian gave him a fair chance if he wislied to act up to the engagements which he had taken. It presented some hope of success. Sir Rivers Wilson's policy, on the other hand, was fore- doomed to failure. It was based on an incorrect appreciation of what was and what was not pos- sible under the political circumstances then existing in Egypt. In the meantime, the British Government were bewildered by the conflicting accounts \\ hich they received from Egypt. One point, however, was clear. The disagreements between Lord Vivian and Sir Rivers Wilson were doing a great deal of harm. Ismail Pasha would gladly play the con- genial pai-t of a tertius gaudeiis. He would not be slow to turn the position to his own advantage. On March 15, therefore. Lord ^''ivian was sum- moned to London. On INIarch 20, Sir Frank Lascelles arrived to take over Lord Vivian's duties. He was instructed "to give his cordial support to Sir Rivers Wilson in his dealings with the Khedive." Prince Tewfik, at the time of his assuming the presidency of the Egyptian Council in 1879, was twenty-seven years of age. He was desirous to do all in his power to help in the crisis which then CH.VI THE COUP D'ETAT 97 existed in* Egyptian affairs. On March 24, he had an interview with Sir Frank Lascelles. The mutinous officers, he said, had been paid. " Tout rentrera dans le calme." The Khedive was deter- mined to act in harmony with his JNIinisters. " There were, no doubt, great difficulties to be overcome, but with the cordial co-operation of all parties, they might be surmounted." Nevertheless, the experiment which was made at this time failed. The Khedive had, indeed, got rid of Nubar Pasha, but the principle that he was himself to be reduced to the condition of a political nullity had not undergone any serious modifications. The terms imposed upon him were so onerous and humiliating that, even had he been animated with better intentions than those with which, I fear, he must be credited, it would have been difficult to make the machine of government work smoothly. It was especially a mistake to insist on giving precision in detail to the relations which were to subsist between the Khedive and his Ministers. A man like Ismail Pasha was not to be bound by these ropes of diplomatic sand. Either he meant to act loyally with his European Ministers, or he had no such intention. Either they could acquire a personal influence over him, or they would be unable to do so. In the one case, the machine could have been worked without any very precise definition of the relations which were to exist between the Khedive and his Ministers. In the other case, those definitions were insufficient to prevent a collapse of the system. Under the exist- ing circumstances, personal influence was of greater importance than any powers based on the text of a Khedivial letter or Decree. Scarcely had the new Ministry been formed, when an incident occurred which gave a correct indication of what was to follow. The interest on VOL. I H 98 MODERN EGYPT pt. i the loan of 1864, which was secure'd on the JNIoukabala tax, fell due on April 1, 1879. It amounted to £240,000. On March 28, the amount of money in the hands of the Commissioners of the Debt fell short of this sum by £196,000. The Commission of Inquiry was at that time preparing a project for a settlement of the financial situation. It was known that the Commissioners contemplated the repeal of the law of the JNIoukabala. This pro- posal was unpopular amongst the wealthier classes in Egypt. The Ministers, acting in concert with the Commissioners of Inquiry, considered that the best plan would be to postpone the payment of the coupon due on April 1 to Alay 1. A draft Decree giving effect to this proposal was submitted to the Kliedive by Sir Rivers Wilson. The Khedive at first refused to simi it. It was, he said, nothing less than a declaration of bankruptcy. He did not consider that the country was bankrupt. He believed that all the financial engagements of the Egyptian Government could be met. He could not sign such a Decree in the face of the political and financial engagements imposed on him by the British and French Governments. Ultimately, some changes were made in the wording of the preamble, and the Khedive was induced to sign. Inasmuch as the Khedive had for a long time past been insisting on his inability to meet all his financial engagements, it was evident that some stron sold for no less than £600,000. VOL. I I 114 MODERN EGYPT ft. i decided. The first was whether the tax on the Ouchouri lands should be increased. The second was whether the Rouznameh loan was to be in- cluded amongst the debts of the State. The third was how to deal with the law of the Moukabala. The financial future of the country depended more especially on whether any satisfactory solution could be found to the third of these questions. Without going into any lengthy description of the system of land-tenure existing in Egypt, it will be sufficient for the purposes of the present arscument to state that the land was at that time divided into two main categories, Ouchouri and Kharadji.^ Ouchouri lands, as their name implies, are supposed to pay a tithe to the State. They were originally, for the most part, fiefs granted by the ruler of the country to his followers. The assessment on the Kharadji was much higher than in the case of the Ouchouri lands, and moreover it was, in theory at all events, variable at the will of the Government. At the time the Com- mission of Inquiry sat, 1,823,000 acres of land were held under Ouchouri, and 3,487,000 acres under Kharadji tenure. In 1877, the total amount of land-tax paid on Kharadji lands amounted to £E.3,143,000, as against £E.333,000 paid by the Ouchouri landowners. In Lower Egypt, the Kharadji lands were assessed at from P.T. 120 to 170 an acre. In exceptional cases, the tax was as much as, and occasionally even in excess of P.T. 200. The average rate paid on Kharadji lands throughout Egypt was P.T. 116-2. Tlie maximum rate payable on Ouchouri lands was P.T. 83-5 an acre. In many cases, they paid a mere quit-rent. The average rate throughout 1 "Ouchouri" is derived from the Arabic word "Ushr," meaning the tenth part. " Kharaj " was the word orii;:iiially applied to the tribute paid, for the most part, by tlio inliabitauts of uoQ-Moslem countries to their Moslem coiitiuerors. -^H. VII REPORT OF COMMISSION 115 Egypt was P.T. 30*30 an acre. The quality of the Oiichouri lands varied greatly. They included some of the best and also some of the worst land in the country. The best qualities of land were largely held by the Khedivial family. All the Ouchouri lands were in the possession of persons of wealth and importance. Before the first report of the Commission of Inquiry was sent in, tlie Khedive had ex{)ressed his willingness to raise the tax on the Ouchouri lands. The Commissioners had now to consider in what manner effect should be given to this proposal. They recommended that a cadastral survey should be made with the least possible delay, and that, on reassessing the land-tax, the distinction between Ouchouri and Kharadji lands should disappear. As, however, a cadastral survey would take a long time, they proposed that the Ouchouri land-tax should be at once increased by £E. 150,000 a year, to be distributed ratably. Turning to the question of the Rouznameh loan, the Commissioners pointed out that the Govern- ment had considered it as a tax, and that there was manifestly never any intention of paying in- terest, and still less of repaying the capital to the subscribers. Of the truth of these statenients there could be no manner of doubt. In 1877, the Chamber of Notables agreed to a proposal that the payment of interest on the loan should be suspended. At the same time, " il fut ordonne qu'aussitot que I'integralitd de la Moukabala aurait cte perdue, on devrait proceder a la perception des £3,000,000, solde des £5,000,000 originairement fixees connne le montant total de Temprunt Rouznameh." Tliis decision threw a strong light on the complete subserviency of the Chamber of Notables, as also on the manner in which the Egyptian Govern- ment regarded their engagements both towards the 116 MODERN EGYPT ft. i Rouznameh bondholders and towards those who had paid the Moukabala. There could, of course, be no question of collecting any further sums on account of the Rouznameh loan. The only point to be decided was what was to be done as regards the money already collected. After full consideration, the Commissioners embodied their recommendations in the following words : " Nous croyons devoir proposer, conform^ment aux intentions primitives du Gouvernement Egyptien, de considerer comme un impot la somme per9ue a valoir sur I'emprunt Rouznameh et de la rayer du montant des dettes de I'Etat." This proposal of the Commissioners was based on two grounds. In tlie first place, it was thought that the non- recognition by the State of the Rouznameh loan was a fiiir sacrifice to demand of the debtors, more especially as, in connection with other matters, the Commissioners proposed measures which would afford a sensible relief to the taxpayers of Egypt. In the second place, if the loan had been recognised as a State debt, great practical diffi- culties would have arisen in giving effect to the decision. It was clear that no one could be recog- nised as a State creditor unless he could afford proof of having lent money to the Government. It would have been necessary to insist on this point. Otherwise, fictitious claims would have cropped up on all sides. In the majority of cases, no proofs would have been forthcoming. No bonds or scrip were ever delivered to the sub- scribers to the loan. Even simple receipts for the money paid into the Treasury had only been given to a few favoured individuals. Under these circumstances, it would have been practically impossible to do justice to all the subscribers, more CH. VII REPORT OF COMMISSION 117 especially to those in the humblest classes of society who were most deserving of sympathy. Considering the financial situation which then existed, the decision of the Commissioners on this subject was perfectly justifiable. The most difficult question of all, however, was how to deal with the Moukabala. It is unneces- sary to dwell any further on the ruinous nature of this transaction in so far as the State was con- cerned. The only procedure which, from a fiscal point of view, could in any way have justified it, would have been to have applied the whole of the money paid in virtue of the law of the Mouka- bala either to the extinction of debt, or to the execution of public works which would have yielded a direct revenue to the State. Un- fortunately, nothing of this sort was done. The financial arrangements of November 1876 did, indeed, contemplate the application of a portion of the Moukabala funds to the extinction of debt, but before that period the money had been applied to current expenditure, and even after November 1876 the greater portion of the Moukabala money was devoted to the payment of interest on the debt. It was certain that the Egyptian Government never had any intention of respecting the engage- ments which they had taken towards those who had paid the Moukabala. It was discovered in the course of the inquiries made by the Commissioners that the draft of a law had been prepared, under instructions received from the Egyptian Govern- ment, in virtue of which an "impot sur la pro- priety " was to be imposed on the expiration of the law of the Moukabala. It was estimated that :his new tax would yield £900,000 a year. The inten- tions, as also the bad faith of the Government were, therefore, sufficiently clear. It was equally certain that the optional character 118 MODERN EGYPT ft. i of the Moukabala payments was delusive. "On ne pent pas douter," the Commissioners said, "que le caractere facultatif de cette taxe n'existait pas en reahte. Les contribuables I'ont toujours consid^ree comme aussi obligatoire que toutes les autres taxes. Le fait qua peine la nouvelle administration ^tablie, ils refusent de tous les cotes de continuer le paiement de la Moukabala, en se referant a son caractere facultatif, prouve I'exacti- tude de cette assertion." It was clear that, if the reformed administration continued to collect the Moukabala, they would have to do so in a very different spirit from that which had heretofore animated the Egyptian Government. The engagements taken towards the landowners would have to be respected. When once the Moukabala payments had ceased, the land- tax would have to be reduced to one-half of its original amount. No violation of the law or evasion of its spirit could be permitted. But, the Commissioners asked, "la nouvelle administration peut-elle remplir les engagements pris par ses predecesseurs ?" There could be but one answer to this question. "Nous n'avons pas," the Commissioners said, "la moindre hesitation a affirmer que, quel que puisse etre le desir du Gouvernement actuel de remplir les engagement pris par ses predecesseurs, les necessites imperieuses de la situation ne lui per- mettront pas de le faire." Obviously, the only honest course was to state the truth boldly. The Commissioners held that the new INIinistry should not render itself re- sponsible for the continuance of a system which was " radicalement vicieux et d'une ap])lication impossible." They therefore reconnnended that no further collections should be made on account of the Muukabala. cfl.vii REPORT OF COMMISSION 119 It remained to be determined what should be done as regards those persons who had ah'eady paid the Moukabala in whole or in part. It appeared from the accounts furnished by the Egyptian Government that about £16,000,000 had already been paid on account of Moukabala, but when the figures came to be examined, it was found that the Government had not in reality received nearly so large a sum as this. In the first place, considerable sums had been paid in "ragaas " ; that is to say, certificates acknow- ledging a debt due by the Government to the tax- payer. " On ne pent guere douter," the Commis- sioners said, " que I'acceptation de ces ' ragaas ' par le Tresor n'ait donne lieu a de nombreux abus ; car, par suite de ce systeme quelques proprietaires puissants ont pu arriver au degrevement dune moitie de leur impot foncier sans rien payer en especes." The procedure, in fact, was after this fashion. Some favoured person obtained from the Finance Ministry an acknowledgment of a fictitious debt due to him by the Government. This docu- ment was paid into the Treasury in discharge of the sum due by the same person on account of Mouka- bala. His land-tax was then reduced by one-half, without his having expended a farthing. It was impossible to state with precision the extent to which this practice had been carried on, but there could be no doubt that it had occasioned a heavy loss to the Treasury. Another point had to be considered. Many of the payments made, even in money, on account of the Moukabala were fictitious. They had only been possible because sums due on account of other taxes were allowed to remain unpaid. A single example will suffice to show how the system worked in practice. The amount of land-tax due by four villages, chosen at hazard in the province of 120 MODERN EGYPT pt i Galioubieh, was £1640. The amount due on account of Moukabala in these vilhiges was £1472. The total amount due was, therefore, £3112. In the year 1878, £2251 was collected in these four villages. Of this amount, £1472, that is to say the total sum due, was credited to JNloukabala, leaving only £779 available for ordinary land -lax. The latter, therefore, remained unpaid to the extent of £861. When, however, all the deductions based on the above facts were made, there still remained a large sum due by the Government to those persons who had really paid the Moukabala. The most equit- able course to have pursued would have been to have raised a loan and to have repaid this money ; but in the then exhausted state of Egyptian credit, the adoption of this course was impossible. It may be convenient if, passing over the recom- mendations made by the Commissioners of Inquiry, the course eventually pursued as regards those persons who had really paid the Moukabala is here stated. It was found that, when all legitimate deductions had been made, the sum really due was £9,500,000. Under the law of Liquidation of July 17, 1880, an annual sum of £150,000 was allotted for fifty years to those who had ])aid the Mouka- bala. They are thus now receiving interest at the rate of about 1^ per cent on the capital sums which they paid. In 1876, the Egyptian Government estimated the annual receipts from the Moukabala at £1,650,000. The amount paid in 1877 was £1,337,000, and in 1878, £1,000,000. For the future, the country was, of course, relieved of these payments. On the other hand, the land-tax was raised by £1,130,000. The results of this change affected the Ouchouri and Kharadji proprietors in different proportions. en. VII REPORT OF COMMISSION 121 Out of 3,487,000 acres of Kharadji land, only 240,000 acres had paid the Moukabala in full. For the most part, therefore, the Kharadji landowners were slightly relieved of taxation. The case of the Ouchouri landowners was different. There were 1,323,000 acres of Ouchouri land in Egypt. On about 480,000 acres, the Moukabala had been paid in full, but most of the payments had been made in "ragaas," and were, therefore, fictitious. The changes in the law fell most severely on this class. Not only did they have to pay the amount of land-tax, as it stood previous to the enactment of the law of the Moukabala, but they also had to bear their share of the increase of £150,000 which was placed on the Ouchouri lands. Even, then, however, they paid much less than the Kharadji landowners. The Moukabala had been paid in part on 725,000 acres of Ouchouri land. On these lands, tlie immediate increase of taxation, if any, was slight. Finally, no Moukabala payments had been made on 118,000 acres of Ouchouri land. The owners of these lands were not, of course, affected by the repeal of the law of the Moukabala, but they had to pay their share of the £150,000 increase on all Ouchouri lands. In order to compensate for the withdrawal of the privileges accorded by the law of the Moukd- bala, the Commissioners proposed several measures, from the adoption of which great benefits, it was rightly thought, would accrue to the population. The arrears due for land-tax prior to January 1, 1876, and amounting to about £30,000, were to be remitted. All agriculturists were to be relieved from payment of the professional tax. It was estimated that the adoption of this measure would involve a relief of taxation amounting to £80,000 122 JMODERN EGYPT pt. i a year. The poll-tax, yielding £205,000 a year, was to be abolished ; so also were the octroi dues in the villages, yielding £21,000 a year ; tlie " droits de voirie" in the vilhiges, yielding £8000 a year; the market dues in the villages, yielding £10,000 a year ; the weighing dues in the villages, yielding £17,000 a year; the dues on stamping mats and tissues, yielding £23,000 a year ; the dues on the sale of cattle, yielding £1500 a year ; and some other minor taxes. In all, a remission of taxation to the extent of about £400,000 a year was proposed.^ On the whole, although it is, in my opinion, to be regretted that no higher rate of interest was allowed to those to whom money was really due on account of Moukabala, it may be said that the proposals of the Commissioners were as just to the people of Egypt as the very difficult circumstances of the case admitted. It is unnecessary to dwell at any length on the proposals made by the Commissioners in respect to the creditors of the Egyptian Govern- ment. Those proposals underwent considerable modifications before a final settlement was eventu- ally made in July 1880. It will be sufficient to say that the general principle on which the Commissioners based their recommendations was that the special security held by each class of creditor was to be respected as far as possible. No change was* proposed in the position of the Preference bondholders. The Commissioners were of opinion that for the moment it was impossible to state definitely what should be the rate of interest on the Unified Stock. They proposed, therefore, that the rate should be temporarily * The relief was in reality much greater, for it cannot be doubted that far larger sums were collected than were paid into the Goverumeut Treasury. CH. VII REPORT OF COMMISSION 123 reduced from 6 to 5 per cent. The rate of interest on the Daira Sanieh and Daira Khassa loans was also reduced to 5 per cent. As regards the creditors who held no special securities, a sum of about £6,301,000 was available to liquidate claims amounting to about £8,210,000. After discharging certain debts which had to be paid in full, tiie Commissioners recommended that the balance left over should be distributed ratably amongst the creditors. It was estimated that sufficient money would be available to pay the creditors 52 per cent of their claims. Finally, the Commissioners prepared a Budget for the year 1879. The revenue was estimated at £'.),067,000, and the expenditure at £8,803,000, thus leaving a surplus of £204,000. A sum of £3, 130,000 was included in the estimates for administrative expenditure. Such, therefore, were the general conclusions at which the Commissioners arrived. Fifteen months were to elapse before their recommendations, in a modified shape, took the form of law. Subse- quently, important political events ensued. The work of fiscal reform had to be recommenced under different auspices from those which existed in 1879. Many years were to pass before the crisis in Egyptian financial affairs could be said to ha^e terminated. Some errors were, without doubt, made by the Commissioners. Nevertheless, the work performed by the Commission of Inquiry has stood the test of time as well as could be expected, looking to the difficult circumstances of the situation with which they had to deal. It afforded a sound starting-point for further reforms. For the first time, an earnest effort had been made to grapple with the difficulties of the Egyptian financial situation. Tlie inquiries of the Commis- sioners threw a flood of lii»ht on the extent of 124 MODERN EGYPT n. x Egy})tian liabilities, the resources available to meet those liabilities, and the system under which the Government had heretofore been conducted. Ad consilium de republicd dandum, caput est, tiosse rempublicam. This elementary truth had been too much forgotten in dealing with Egyptian affairs. Now that the true facts of the situation were more accurately known, although mistakes might be made in subsidiary matters, it was no longer pos- sible to draw erroneous conclusions as to tlie main questions at issue. The Egyptian Treasury was insolvent. The system of government had been as bad as possible. Both the people of Egypt and the creditors of the Egyptian Government were alike interested in the adoption of an improved system. It was futile to attempt to impose fresh burthens on the country. On the contrary, certain taxes should be abolished. Even if the Connnissioners had done nothing more than bring home the main facts of the situa- tion to all concerned, they would have deserved well both of the Egyptian people and of all who were interested in the prosperity of Egypt. The report of the Commission of Inquiry was signed on April 8. On the previous day, the Khedive dismissed his European Ministers, and charged Chdrif Pasha with the formation of a new Ministry. The situation was thus completely changed. All hopes of introducing a reformed system of administration had for the time to be abandoned ; and, without reforms, the scheme pro- posed by the Commission of Inquiry was incapable of execution. The Commissioners, therefore, tendered their resignations to the Khedive. They were, of course, accepted. The counter project which ^ was prepared by the Khedive in concert with the Chamber of Notables > Vide ante, p. 102. OH. VII REPORT OF COMMISSION 125 was published on April 23. Little need be said of this plan. It was open to the most serious objections. In the first place, it was impossible of execution. The revenue for 1879 was estimated at £9,837,000. This was nearly £800,000 in excess of the estimate made by the Commissioners of Inquiry, which was £9,067,000. Even this latter estimate erred on the side of optimism, and it was certain that the collec- tion of such a sum as that named in the scheme of the Chamber of Notables was impossible without resorting to the oppressive methods of the past, and without again sacrificing the future to the present. In the second place, although both the Khedive and his advisers had rejected the idea of national bankruptcy as dishonourable, the settlement which they proposed did, as a matter of fact, constitute an act of bankruptcy. The interest on the Unified Debt was to be reduced from 6 to 5 per cent, although hopes were held out that payment of interest at a higher rate would be resumed at some later period. In fact, as the Commissioners of Inquiry pointed out in a letter addressed to the Khedive, the scheme "protestait contra toute declaration de faillite, mais en consacrait la realite." These objections would alone have been fatal to the scheme. Moreover, there was one very significant omission in the project. There could be no hope for reforms in Egypt unless a fixed sum were assigned for the private expenditure of the Khedive and his family. The scheme of the Chamber of Notables made no mention of any Civil List. In fact, the basis of the plan was that the Khedive should regain his personal power, and that the upper classes should preserve their privileges intact. The effect of the change of policy inaugurated 126 MODERN EGYPT ft. i by the Khedive made itself immediately felt. On April 19, Sir Frank Lascelles reported that " Shahin Paslia, the Minister of War, had gone to Behera, probably for the purpose of collecting money; his former position as Insjjector-General in Lower Egypt having secured for him an unenviable notoriety as one of the harshest and most successful tax-gatherers in the country." A few days later, the British Vice- Consul at Zagazig wrote : " You ask how is the new regime working ? Worse than before. Three-fourths of the taxes and one-half of the Moukabala are now exacted by means of the usual oppressions. The fellah, having no crop of cotton or grain to realise, is obliged to have recourse to usurers for money, which he gets at some 4 to 5 per cent per month. He has no alternative if he would avoid the * courbash.' The * Zawats ' (aristocracy), mean- while, only pay the ' Mai ' (land-tax proper) at their pleasure, and, therefore, see everything couleur de rose. . . . Omar Pasha Lutfi, Inspector- General of Lower Egy})t, has been here of late, and has given stringent orders for the collection of money by all possible means." In a word, all the abuses of the old regime returned immediately the new Mmistry came into power. In the meanwhile, the Commissioners of the Debt were considering what action they should take. Under the changed circumstances of the situation, there was but one course left for them to pursue. They commenced a lawsuit against the Government in the Mixed Tribunals. For some while previous to these events, I had been wishing to leave Egypt. I had, however, become interested in the work. So long as there appeared any hope of placing Egyptian financial affairs on a sound footing, I hesitated whether to CH.VII REPORT OF COMMISSION 127 go or to remain. All hopes of this sort seemed, however, to be dashed to the ground. Under the circumstances, I did not care to remain any longer in the country. I therefore resigned my appoint- ment and left Egypt on May 24, 1879. From that date until I returned as Controller-General after the abdication of Ismail Pasha, I cannot speak from personal experience of what occurred in Egypt. Sir Auckland Colvin was appointed to be Commissioner of the Debt in my place. CHAPTER VIII THE FALL OF ISMAIL PASHA April-June 1879 Embarrassment of the European Powers — Turkey — England — France — Italy — Russia — Germany and Austria — The French and British Governments demand the leinstatement of the European Min- isters — The Khedive declines to reinstate them — Question of re- establishing the Control — The German Government protest against the proceedings of the Khedive — The British and French Govern- ments advise abdication — The Khedive appeals to the Sultan — The Sultan deposes the Khedive — Inauguration of Prince Tewfik — Ismail Pasha leaves Egypt — Remarks on his reign. The action taken by the Khedive in dismissing his European Ministers embarrassed the various Powers who were interested in the affairs of Egypt. More- over, all the most important Governments in Europe claimed a right to make their voices heard in any general settlement of Egyptian questions. The local difficulties of the situation were great. They were rendered greater by the fact that no serious step could be taken without producing a clash of conflicting international interests. The Sultan was concerned lest his suzerain rights should be endangered. Turkish policy was, as usual, vacillating and inconsistent. Should not the Khedive be deposed ? Nay, did not an oppor- tunity now present itself to realise the pernicious dream which had haunted the minds of Turkish statesmen since the days when Mehemet Ali won by the power of the sword a quasi-independent 128 CH. VIII FALL OF ISMAIL PASHA 129 position for himself and his dynasty ? His de- scendant had shamefully abused his power. The people of Egypt were groaning under his yoke. Europe was dissatisfied with him. Could not all this be rectified by cancelling the Firmans and by the despatch of a Turkish Governor, with a few sturdy Ottoman battalions at his back, to rule the country ? Truly, whispered interested diplomacy in the garb of a candid friend, but is not all this European interference somewhat dangerous ? Might not the principle of deposition by reason of misgovernment be applied elsewhere ? Was it not possible that public opinion, which was now so powerful, might apply the Horatian maxim and contend that many of those things, which in- quisitive Commissioners of Inquiry had said of Egypt, might, with a change of name, be applied to other parts of the Ottoman dominions ? This argument was not without its weight. From this point of view, perhaps it would be better to con- gratulate the Khedive on his defiant attitude, and to encourage him in his opposition to the appoint- ment of European JNIinisters. But then came rival diplomatic mutterings. What would be the position of the Sultan if the two Western Powers, with a mere appearance of consultation with Con- stantinople, deposed the Khedive on their own initiative ? If that were to happen, the world would see that Turkish suzerainty over Egypt was nothing more than a mere diplomatic expression. Would it not, therefore, be better to act at once so as to prevent others from taking action ? Under all these circumstances, perhaps the best plan of all for a bewildered ruler, who was, perforce, obliged to speak the language of civilisation, but whose prin- ciples of civil government were very similar to those of his warlike ancestors, when they planted their horse-tails on the banks of the Bosphorus, was to VOL. I K 130 MODERN EGYPT rr. i foil back on the reflection that the times were out of joint, to await events, and to take no decisive action of any kind. The difhculties of the British Government were also great. Their pohtical interests in Egypt were of a nature which precluded total inaction. Indeed, there was manifestly a danger that a policy would be forced upon them which it had always been one of the objects of British statesmanship to avoid. " The Enghshman," a man of literary genius had said some thirty years previously, " straining far over to hold his loved India, will plant a firm foot on the banks of the Nile and sit in the seats of the faithful."^ Unless care were taken, the prophecy might be on the point of fulfilment, and the Anglo- Saxon race, in addition to responsibilities which were already world-wide, would have thrust upon it the burthen of governing Egypt. British diplomacy, which may at times have been mistaken, but which was certainly honest, did its best to throw off the Egyptian burden. But circumstances were too strong to be arrested by diplomatic action. Egypt was to fall to Kinglake's Englishman. Moreover, it was to fall to him, although some were opposed to his going there, others were indifferent as to whether he went or not, none much wished him to go, and, not only did he not want to go there himself, but he struggled strenuously and honestly not to be obliged to go. The Moslem eventually accepted the accomplished fact, and muttered " Kismet " ; but the European, blinded by international jealousy, not unfrequently attributed the whole affair to a dee})-laid })lot, and found in British policy as regards Egypt another convincing proof of the perfidy of Albion. French diplomacy, on the other hand, was mainly interested in preventing the Englishman 1 King-lake's EoUien, p. 286. OH. VIII FALL OF ISMAIL PASHA l31 from planting his foot firmly on the banks oi the Nile, and was, moreover, hampered by the financial necessities of "Great Paris Syndicates," and the like. A Turkish occupation was undesirable, the remedy being, in French opinion, worse than the disease, whilst the French Government of the day had the wisdom to see that a joint Anglo-French occupation would probably become a fertile source of disagreement between France and England. Had not Prince Bismarck been credited with the blunt epigrammatic saying that Egypt would be to France and England even as Schleswig-Holstein to Prussia and Austria ? Italy hovered around, clamorous to satisfy the restless ambition, which might perhaps have better been employed in improving the lot of the Tuscan or Neapolitan peasant, by obtaining some share of government on the cosmopolitan soil of Egypt. Russia had no local interests to serve, and stood aloof. Possibly, however, as events developed, something might occur which could be turned to the advantage of INIuscovite interests. It was to be observed, moreover, that the shipwreck of a Mohammedan Government afforded an additional proof that Orientals could not manage their own affairs. It behoved, therefore, any one who claimed to be heir -apparent to any part of the Ottoman dominions to be on the watch. In the meanwhile, perhaps a little diplomatic capital might be made out of the affair by posing as the protector of Turkey against foreign encroachments. " Nous avons," said a well - known Russian diplomatist, "tellement ^corchd ces pauvres Turcs au nord, c'est bien le moins que nous pourrons faire de les protdger un peu au sud." Germany, which connoted Austria, had so far interfered but little in, Egyptian affairs. Never- 132 MODERN EGYPT pt. i theless, the co-operation of France and England in the execution of a common policy was perliaps regarded with no very friendly eye at Berlin. There were, moreover, certain German creditors of the Egyptian Government who had obtained judgments in the INIixed Courts. Were they not to be paid ? Prince Bismarck would shortly ask that question, and when the master of many legions asked a question, it was understood that he expected some satisfactory reply. The responsibility of taking the initiative de- volved on the British and French Governments. It was evidently desirable, if possible, to avoid the extreme step of deposing Ismail Pasha, Supposing he refused to abdicate, it might become necessary to use force. In that case, both Govern- ments might be obliged to adopt the policy which each honestly wished to avoid. INIoreover, the summary dismissal of the European Ministers, though an unwise act, and one which constituted a grave discourtesy to both the British and French Governments, was not a violation of any positive engagement taken by the Khedive. On every ground, therefore, it was desirable to see what could be done by remonstrance before resorting to extreme measures. After the matter had been discussed in London and Paris, the two Govern- ments agreed on a common line of action. In a despatch addressed to Sir Frank Lascelles on April 25, Lord Salisbury expressed himself in the following terms : — " The Khedive is well aware that the con- siderations which compel Her Majesty's Govern- ment to take an hiterest in the destinies of Egypt have led them to pursue no other policy than that of developing the resources and securing the good government of the country. They have hitherto considered the independence of the Khedive cii.viii FALL OF ISMAIL PASHA 133 and the maintenance of his dynasty as important conditions for the attainment of these ends ; and the same sentiments have, they are Avell assured, animated the Government of France. . . . We would rather assume that the decision thus hastily taken by His Highness, both with respect to the future conduct of the reform and the attitude he proposes to maintain towards the two Governments, is not final. We prefer to look to his future action for a favourable interpretation of the conduct he has lately pursued. But if he continues to ignore the obligations imposed upon him by his past acts and assurances, and persists in declining the assistance of European Ministers whom the two Powers may place at his disposal, we must conclude that the disregard of engagements which has marked his recent action was the result of a settled plan, and that he deliberately renounces all pre- tension to their friendship. In such a case, it will only remain for the two Cabinets to reserve to themselves an entire liberty of appreciation and action in defending their interests in Egypt, and in seeking the arrangements best calculated to secure the good government and prosperity of the country." When the Khedive dismissed his European Ministers, he was well aware of the serious nature of the step which he had taken. His first intention was to adopt a defiant attitude. An oath was administered to the superior officers of the army pledging them "to bear true allegiance to the Khedive, and to resist all the enemies of the country, of himself, and of his family." The strength of the army was at the same time increased. A few days, however, sufficed to show that the Khedive could not count on the loyalty of his own troops. Writing on April 26, Sir Frank Lascelles, after dwelling on the misery and discontent caused 134 MODERN EGYPT pt. i by the harsh measures of the new Ministry, added: "The discontent caused by such a state of things exists, I am informed, to a large extent in the army, and has given rise to a feehng of hostility against the Khedive, not only among the private soldiers, who are recruited from among the suffer- ing classes of the population, but also among the officers, who, although they may be strongly opposed to European interference, regard the Khedive as being responsible for the disasters that have fallen upon the country." When the British and French Consuls-General communicated to the Khedive the views expressed in Lord Salisbury's despatch of April 25, he depre- cated any idea that he should have been guilty of intentional discourtesy towards the British and French Governments, but he declined to reinstate the European Ministers. It was, indeed, obvious to every one in Egypt that their reinstatement was undesirable, even if it had been possible. Some discussion then took place as to the form in which Europeans should be associated with the government of Egypt. There could be but little hope that the revival of the Control would lead to any satisfactory results. With whatever nominal authority the Controllers might have been invested, they would have had no real power. They would not have been supported by any external force, or by the willing assistance of the Khedive, or by the sympathy of the peo})le. They would have been associated with Ministers belonging to the retro- grade Turkish ])arty, with whose ideas they would have been unable to sympathise. Under such cir- cumstances, their control would have been illusory, whilst, had they been nominated, the Governments of England and France would, at least in ap})ear- ance, have assumed some responsibility for the financial catastrophe which was evidently impending. CH. VIII FALL OF ISMAIL PASHA 135 The idea of reviving the Control was, therefore, wisely set aside. In truth, every day it was becoming more apparent that no satisfactory solution of Egyptian difficulties was possible so long as Ismail Pasha remained at the head of affairs. The action of the German Government hastened the decision which would probably in any case have been taken, though perhaps somewhat later. The German Consul-General in Cairo was instructed to declare to the Khedive "that the Imperial Government looks upon the Decree of April 22, by which the Egyptian Government at their own will regulate the matters relating to the debt, thereby abolishing existing and recognised rights, as an open and direct violation of the international enoaorements contracted at the institution of the judicial reform ; that it must declare the Decree to be devoid of any legally binding effect in regard to the com- petency of the JNIixed Courts of Justice and the rights of the subjects of the Empire, and must hold the Viceroy responsible for all the consequences of his unlawful proceedings." The other Great Powers of Europe joined in this protest, although the form of communication to the Khedive under- went some modifications. The end was evidently approaching. On June 19, Sir Frank Lascelles, acting under Lord Salisbury's instructions, made the following communication to the Khedive : — "The French and English Governments are agreed to advise your Highness officially^ to abdicate and to leave Egypt. Should Your Highness follow this advice, our Governments will act in concert in order that a suitable Civil List should be assigned to you, and that the order ' A private communication to the same effect had been made some days previously. 136 MODERN EGYPT pt. i of succession, in virtue of which Prince Tewfik will succeed Your Highness, should not be disturbed. We must not conceal from Your Highness that if you refuse to abdicate, and if you compel the Cabinets of London and Paris to address them- selves directly to the Sultan, you will not be able to count either upon obtaining the Civil List or upon the maintenance of the succession in favour of Prince Tewfik." It was necessary to give a warning as to the possibility of the succession passing away from Prince Tewfik. According to Mohammedan law, Prince Abdul Halim was the rightful heir, but the Firman of June 8, 1873, laid down that the succession was to proceed by right of primogeniture. The Khedive had obtained this concession from the Sultan by the expenditure of large sums of money. There was now some danger that his efforts to keep the succession for his children would have been made in vain. It was known that the candidature of Prince Halim found favour at Constantinople. Simultaneously with the transmission of orders to Sir Frank Lascelles that he should, in con- junction with his French colleague, advise the Khedive to abdicate, a despatch was written by Lord Salisbury stating the reasons why the British Government had been led to take this decision. " It is not possible," Lord Salisbury said, " to review the events which ended in the dismissal of the European Ministers without the conviction that the Khedive never sincerely accepted the limitations of his power proposed by the Com- mission, and was quite resolved to resume his full prerogative as soon as the immediate pur- poses of his a})p;uent concession should have been answered. "Tlie two Powers have given to His Higlmess ample time to recall any luisty step, and to re- CH.VIII FALL OF ISMAIL PASHA 137 enter, if he had been willing to do so, upon the path of reform marked out by the International Commission. He has refused to avail himself of any such opportunity, and has only employed the interval of delay in renewing the extortion and cruelty by which his Treasury had formerly been filled. It therefore remains for the two Govern- ments, in accordance with the warning addressed to His Highness by them in their despatches of the 25th of April, to consider the course which is necessary for defending their interests in Egypt, and securing the good government of the country. " It is evident that the remedies for misgovern- ment hitherto proposed have been tried and have wholly failed. . . . Any further attempt on the part of the Powers to assist the Khedive in avert- ing the consequences of his own misgovernment can have no other effect than to make them responsible for it in the future. His power to frustrate all projects of reform, and his resolve to use it, have been sufficiently demonstrated by events. *' If Egypt were a country in whose past history the Powers had no share, and to whose future destiny it was possible for them to be indifferent, their wisest course would be to renounce at this point all further concern with the relations between the Egyptian Ruler and his subjects. But, to England at least, this policy is impossible. The geographical situation of Egypt, as well as the responsibility which the English Government have in past times incurred for the actual conditions under which it exists as a State, make it impossible to leave it to its fate. They are bound, both by duty and interest, to do all that lies in their power to arrest misgovernment, before it results in the material ruin and almost hicurable disorder to which it is evident by other Oriental examples that such misgovernment will necessarily lead. 138 MODERN EGYPT pt. i "In tlie case of Egypt, the evil has not yet gone so far but that it may be arrested by changes of small scope and immediate operation. The sole obstacle to reform appears to lie in the character of its Ruler. His financial embarrassments lead almost inevitably to oppression, and his bad faith frustrates all friendly efforts to apply a remedy. There seems to be no doubt that a change of policy can only be obtained by a change of Ruler. "It may be the duty of the Western Powers to submit these considerations to the Sultan, to whose Firman the Khedive owes his power. But before taking a step so grave, and which, in its results, may possibly be disastrous not only to the Khedive but to his family, it is right, in the first instance, to intimate to the Khedive the conclusion at which the two Powers have arrived, and to give him the opportunity of withdrawing, under favourable and honourable conditions, from a position which his character and his past career have unfitted him to fill." When the British and French Consuls-General communicated to the Khedive the views enter- tained by their Governments, he asked that time should be given to him to consider the matter. On June 21, he informed them that he had referred the question to the Sultan. There was, in fact, some hope of support from Constantinople. The Khedive had sent a special agent to the Sultan. Money had been spent in bribes. Moreover, the jealousy of the Sultan had been excited by repre- sentations that the two Western Powers intended to disregard his sovereign rights. The Khedive, therefore, felt confident of su]>port, and for a moment it appeared probable that support would be accorded to him. The European Powers were, however, now all combined. Germany, Austria, Russia, and finally Italy, advised the Khedive to CHviii FALL OF ISMAIL PASHA 139 abdicate. Italian adhesion was, however, some- what tardily given. Italy had throughout shown some disposition to support Ismail Pasha. It required some strong remonstrances on the part of the Ambassadors at Constantinople to prevent encouragement being given to the Khedive by the Sultan. If, however, the Khedive were to be deposed, the Sultan preferred that the act of deposition should emanate from himself, rather than that it should result from any independent action taken by the two ^Vestern Powers. On the night of June 24, M. Tricou, the French Consul -General, received information from Con- stantinople to the effect that the Porte had de- cided upon the deposition of the Khedive and the appointment of Halim Pasha as his suc- cessor. Although it was past midnight, Sir Frank Lascelles, M. Tricou, and Baron de Saurma, the German Consul- General, went at once to the Khedive's palace. *' I have been informed," Sir Frank Lascelles wrote, " that when it was known in the harem that the Europeans demanded to see the Khedive at that hour of the night, there was a scene of indescribable confusion. The Princess Mother, fearing the existence of a plot to assas- sinate her son, implored His Highness not to receive us, but on hearing that the Europeans con- sisted of the representatives of Germany, France, and England, and were accompanied by Clierif Pasha, the Khedive himself pointed out that there could be no danger for his life, and consented to receive us. His Highness, who was evidently in a state of great excitement, gave me the impression of scarcely knowing what was passing. He, how- ever, remained perfectly firm in his intention not to abdicate." On the morrow, June 25, there was a last flicker of resistance. A Khedivial Decree was 140 MODERN EGYPT pt. i prepared under which the army was to be increased to 150,000 men. Some wild proposals, having for their object the inundation of the country round Alexandria, were also discussed. But the Khedive was conscious that the game was played out. Many of his valuables had already been embarked on board his yacht at Alexandria. In the meanwhile, the diplomatic pressure brought to bear at Constantinople had produced its effect. The Powers of Europe were evidently determined that Prince Tewfik, and not Prince Halim, should be Khedive of Egypt. On June 26, the Sultan sent a telegram to Cairo addressed " to the ex-Khedive Ismail Pasha," in which the follow- ing passage occurred : — *' II est prouve que votre maintien au poste de Khedive ne pouvait avoir d'autre resultat que de multiplier et d'aggraver les difficultes pr^sentes. Par consequent, Sa JNIajest^ Imperiale le Sultan, a la suite de la decision de son Conseil des INIinistres, a decide de nommer au poste de Khedive Son Excel- lence Mehemet Tewfik Pacha, et ITrad^ Imperial concernant ce sujet vient d'etre promulgud Cette haute decision est communiquee a Son Excellence par une autre depeche, et je vous invite a vous retirer des affaires gouvernementales, conforme- ment a I'ordre de sa Majesty Imperiale le Sultan." At the same time, another telegram was sent to Prince Tewfik nominating him Khedive of Egypt. It was clear that further resistance was useless. The last hope of support had disappeared. The Khedive sent for Prince Tewfik, and, in the pre- sence of his JNlinisters, made over his power to him. The scene is said to have been affecting. Both father and son showed signs of emotion. It was desirable that there should be no delay CH. VIII FALL OF ISMAIL PASHA 141 in the inauguration of the new Khedive. It took place at once. At 6.30 p.m., on .June 26, 1879, Sir Frank Lascelles telegraphed to Lord Salisbury : — "A royal salute on Prince Tevvfik's accession was fired this evening from the citadel, where His Highness held an official reception, which was attended by the whole diplomatic and consular corps, the Ministers, and Government officials, and a large number of people." A crowd had collected in the streets of Cairo, but the whole transaction had been so expeditiously concluded that the mass of the population were unaware of the deposition of Ismail Pasha until they heard the guns of the citadel thundering in honour of his successor. One further scene remained to be enacted. It was undesirable that the ex-Khedive should remain in Egypt. There was some question of his going to Constantinople, and also to Smyrna. He even- tually decided to seek an asylum at Naples, where the King of Italy had placed a residence at his disposal.^ At 11.30 a.m. on June 30, Ismail Pasha left Cairo for Alexandria. He gave it to be understood that he did not wish any official notice to be taken of his departure. None of the foreign representatives were, therefore, present at the railway station. A large crowd, how- ever, assembled to witness his departure. The ladies of the liarem, dressed in black, were present in carriages outside the station and were loud in their lamentations. Before enterinff his carriage, Ismail Pasha addressed a few words to the people who were present, telling them that on leav- ing Egypt he confided his son, the Khedive, to their care. The latter then took leave of his father and of his brothers, who accompanied Ismail Pasha. * At a later period^ Ismail Pasha went to Constantinople. He died oa March 2, 1895. 142 MODERN EGYPT pt. i An eye-witness stated that "the scene was so affect- ing that there were few among the spectators who were able to refrain from tears." On arrival at Alexandria, Ismail Pasha embarked on board his yacht, the Maliroussa. JNIr. Calvert, the British V^ice-Consul at Alexandria, reported that "the deck of the Mahroussa was crowded with officials and European residents who had come to take leave of Ismail Pasha. His High- ness met everywhere, both on shore and on board, with marked respect and consideration. Though his features bore the traces of strong recent emo- tion, he bore up manfully, and was quite cheerful, addressing a pleasant word and thanks to every one who took leave of him, and shaking hands." If Ismail Pasha's rule had been bad, his fall was at least dignified. His worst enemies must have pitied a man in the hour of his distress who had stood so high and who had fallen so low. " Who," says Bacon, " can see worse days than he that, yet living, doth follow at the funeral of his own repu- tation?" Any chance moralist who may have watched the Mahroussa steaming out of Alexandria harbour on that summer afternoon must perforce have heaved a sigh over one of the most striking instances that the world has ever known of golden opportunities lost. It may be that the events of Ismail Pasha's reign in Egypt are too recent for an impartial verdict to be passed upon them. Neither perhaps do I possess all tlie qualifications necessary to strict impartiality. At the same time, I am quite unconscious of any bias in the matter. In the course of this narrative, I have criticised Ismail Pasha's conduct, but I never felt any personal dislike to the man. My feelings throughout all these struggles were inspired by pity rather than CH. VIII FALL OF ISMAIL PASHA li3 by anger. I always felt that if Ismail Pasha had fallen into better hands in the early part of his career, the recent history of Egypt might have been changed. Probably few individuals ever experienced more fully than Ismail what has aptly been termed "the lonely friendlessness of selfish power." ^ The conduct of those who flattered him, and then preyed upon him, cannot be too strongly condemned. But as regards himself, however severe may be the censure inflicted on him, it must be admitted that there are some extenuating circumstances. He wished to intro- duce European civilisation into Egypt at a rapid rate, but he had little idea of how to set about the work. He had neither the knowledge nor the experience necessary to carry out the task. It should be remarked that Ismail was utterly uneducated. When JNIr. Nassau Senior was returning to Europe in 1855, he found that an English coachman, who had been in Ismail's service, was his fellow - passenger. The man's account of Ismail's private life is worth quoting. There can be little doubt of its accuracy. " Ismail," he said, " and his brother Mustapha, when they were in Paris, used to buy whatever they saw ; they were like children, nothing was fine enough for them ; they bought carriages and horses like those of Queen Victoria or the Emperor, and let them spoil for want of shelter and cleaning. . . . The people he liked best to talk to were his servants, the lads who brought him his pipes and stood before him with their arms crossed. He sometimes sat on his sofa and smoked, and talked to them for hours, all about women and such things. ... I have known him sometimes try to read a French novel, but he would be two hours getting through a page. 1 Dill's Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius, p. 379. 144 MODERN EGYPT pt. i Once or twice, I saw him attempt to write. His letters were half an inch high, like those of a child's copybook. I don't think that he ever finished a sentence." ^ JNIy personal relations with Ismail Pasha were of a friendly nature, a fact which redounds to his credit, for if there was one person in Egypt against whom he had a right to bear a grudge, it was myself. I took a prominent part in the events which brought about his deposition, and especially in the nomination of the Com- mission of Inquiry, a blow from which he never recovered. Ismail Pasha was not a man who bore malice. Whenever and by whomsoever the verdict on his rule in Egypt is passed, it can scarcely be anything but unfavourable. Few people have enjoyed a more enviable position than that of Ismail Pasha when he became Khedive of Egypt. He was absolute ruler over a docile people, inhabiting one of the most fertile spots in the world. He had power, rank, and a degree of wealth such as has been given to few individuals. With reasonable prudence he could have satisfied every legitimate ambition, and left a name which posterity would have revered. All this he threw away. He fell a victim to {//S/^i?, the insolent abuse of power. A great Nemesis fell upon the Egyptian Crcesus. He squandered his wealth, and when, finally, he was deposed at the behests of the Powers of Europe, there were not a dozen of his own countrymen, albeit they disliked the interference of the foreigner, who did not think that he had merited his fate. It is frequently the habit of deposed Sovereigns to think that their former subjects long for their return to power. I do not know if Ismail Pasha * Conversations, etc., vol. ii. p. 228. CH.VIII FALL OF ISMAIL PASHA 145 ever cherished thoughts of tiiis description. If so, he was wrong. From the date of his deposition, he was politically defunct, and his former subjects would now regard his rei<]^n as a bad dream were it not that they still suffer, and that their children's children must continue to suffer, from the effects of his misrule. The centenary of Mehemet Ali's birth has recently been celebrated in Egypt. National fetes are reasonable enough when they call to mind the occurrence of some event for which the gratitude of posterity is due. Thus, it is not unnatural that the French, forgetful of the horrors which accompanied the fall of the Bastille, should recognise that event as symbolical of the dawn of a new era, and should, therefore, have raised the date on which it occurred to the dignity of a national anniversary. It is also perfectly natural that the Egyptians should commemorate the birth of the remarkable man who gave their country a separate administrative existence. Nevertheless, another very suitable anniversary for the modern Egyptians to celebrate would be the day on which Ismail Pasha, under pressure from the Powers of Europe, abdicated. That day marked the advent of a new era. It should be borne in grateful remembrance by the present and future generations of Egyptians. Ismail Pasha's abdica- tion sounded the death-knell of arbitrary personal rule in Egypt. It may be hoped and believed that that rule can never be revived ; but in spite of the strongest guarantees which can be recorded on paper, there would unquestionably be a con- siderable risk of its revival in some form or another if tlie British occupation of the country were allowed to terminate prematurely. When it is quite clear that this risk has ceased to exist, the question of the cessation of the occupation VOL. I L U6 MODERN EGYPT pt. i will assume a new aspect. In the minds of all well-informed and calm observers it seems, how- ever, probable that some long while must elapse before they can feel assured that this political transformation has really taken place. PART II THE AKABI revolt August 1879-August 1883 The daughter of Egypt shall he confoiinded ; she shall be delivered into the hands of the people of the north. Jeeemiah xlvi. 24. U7 CHAPTER IX THE INAUGURATION OF TEWFIK August-November 1879 State of the country — Cherif Pasha's Ministry — The Khedive assumes the Presidency of the Council — Ministry of Riaz Pasha — Relations between the Kliedive and his Ministers — The Sultan cancels the Firman of 1873 — Objections of France and England — The Mohammedan law of succession — The right to make Commercial Conventions, and to contract loans — 'Hie Army — The Khedive's investiture — Appointment of Controllers — Relations between the Government and the Controllers — Division of work between the Controllers — The Commission of Liquidation. With the deposition of Ismail Pasha, the main obstacle which had heretofore stood in the way of Egyptian reform was removed. His sinister in- fluence was, however, felt for long after his abdica- tion. He had, indeed, left a damnosa hereditas to his successor. The Treasury was bankrupt. The discipline of the army had been shaken. Every class of Egyptian society was discontented ; the poor by reason of the oppressive measures of their ruler ; the rich because the privileges which they enjoyed were threatened ; the Europeans because the money owing to them was not paid, and because, in the general confusion which existed, trade was natin-ally depressed. The Powers of Europe had, for a while, combined in the presence of a common danger, but the ceaseless jar of petty international rivalries was sure to make itself felt whenever any question of local interest 149 150 MODERN EGYPT pt. ii was discussed. The Arab hated and mistrusted the Turk. The Turk hated and mistrusted the European. European assistance was necessary, but it was difficult to decide in what form it should be iriven. Reforms dictated in the best interests of the country would be misunderstood and misrejire- sented. It was well-nigh impossible that they should bear immediate fruit, whilst any temporary unpopularity which might arise from their adoption would of necessity devolve mainly on the alien and Christian elements in the Government. Time would have to elapse before the sorely-tried people of Egypt would begin to see dimly, through a thick mist of ignorance and misrepresentation, that some material benefits might accrue to them from foreign interference. At the head of affairs was a young Prince animated with the best intentions, but wanting in experience. His own predisposi- tion, as well as the censures which his father's oppressive system of government had evoked, alike led him to favour a reign of law and order. But the proper administration of justice was impossible until law-courts had been established and qualified judges appointed. The period of transition from an arbitrary to a legal system of government was to be not only painful but dangerous. The minds of the people had been unsettled by frequent dis- cussions about organic changes. " It is unwise," said one of England's greatest political thinkers, " to make the extreme medicine of the constitution its daily bread." ^ The habits of obedience, which the Egyptians had inherited from their forefathers, had been rudely shaken. All this ferment was not to settle do^vn at once. A more serious collapse of the State machinery than any which had yet taken ])lace was to occur before the calm waters of peaceful progress could be reached. A well-known * Burke, Ileflections on the French Revolution, cH. IX INAUGURATION OF TEWl IK 151 Conservative statesman in conversation with me once gave utterance to an opinion which involves the ne plus ultra of anti-conservative principles. " The East," he said, " is languishing for want of a Revolution." This statement is true ; for the violent changes from one Amurath to another, which Oriental history has frequently recorded, have generally been the result, not of revolution, but of palace intrigue. The Egyptians were now to try whether their lot could be improved by a move- ment, whose leading feature was that it combined some vague national aspirations, which were in- capable of realisation, with the time-honoured tactics of a mutinous preetorian guard. In the meanwhile, the machine of State worked laboriously, but apparently with some fair prospect of success. It was not till the Egyptian Sisyphus had got his stone some little way up the hill that it escaped from his grasp and rolled back again into the slough of anarchy. Then all the work had to be begun again, but under new conditions which augured better for the final result. Before the new State machine could be got to work, the various parts of the machinery had to be adjusted. A Ministry had to be formed. The degree to which the Khedive was to take an active part in the administration had to be settled. The relations between the Sultan and the Khedive had to be regulated. The form in which Europeans should be associated with the government of the country had to be decided. It was also essential to adopt measures which should place the new relations between the Egyptian Government and their creditors on a legal footing. The Khedive charged Cherif Pasha with the formation of a Ministry. He at once submitted to the Khedive a project for a constitution of which His Highness disapproved. On August 18, 152 MODERN EGYPT pt. ii therefore, he tendered his resignation, which was accepted. The Khedive resolved to retain the Presidency of the Council of INIinisters in his own hands for the present. His Highness explained to Sir Frank Lascelles the reasons why he had dis- approved of Cherif Pasha's proposals. " He was aware," Sir Frank Lascelles wrote, " that it would be said that his action was an attempt to return to the old system of personal government. He could assure me that he had no wish to do so ; but that at present liberal institutions were utterly un suited to the country, and the constitution which had been submitted to him was nothing more than a decor de theatre. . . . He was himself responsible for the government of the country, and had deter- mined to take his share of the labour, and not to shelter himself behind an unreal and illusory con- stitution." Cherif Pasha, on the other hand, told Sir Frank Lascelles that, though he was personally glad to be relieved of his duties, " as an Egyptian, he regretted the return to personal power. There were many persons both in and outside the palace who would be glad, for their own ends, to see the absolute powder of the Khedive re-established, but it was a real misfortune for the country if it should again fall under the rule of an absolute Sovereign." There can be little doubt that the Khedive acted wisely in declining the proposals submitted to him by Cherif Pasha. Any Egyptian constitution must of necessity at that time have been a mere decor de thedti'e} The only form of government suitable to • The methods of government which found favour about this time amouf^st many of those who favoured, or pretended to favour constitu- tional government, may be judged from a statement made in 1903 by Sheikh Moliammed AI)dou to Mr. Wilfrid Bhnit {Secret llufforij, etc., p. 493). Sultan Pasha, tlie Sheikh said, "had promised to bring petitions from every Notable in Kgypt in favour of the Constitution. This was true, for all the Omdehs were angry with Riaz for having put down their habit of employing forced labour." In other words, Riaz I'asha, who was supposed to be a somewhnt extreme representative of persona] CH. IX INAUGURATION OF TEWFIK 153 Egypt was a despotism, but it would have to be a benevolent despotism, which would be under some effective control. The control was to be sought more in the careful selection of the individuals to whom power was confided than in any endeavour to copy European institutions, which were uncongenial to the manners and customs of the people and to the condition of society which then existed in Egypt. Nevertheless, the attitude assumed at this moment by Cherif Pasha merits a word of sympathy. He was a perfectly honest man. He was convinced of the harm done by the absolute rule of the eX'Khedive. He was slow to believe that, with a change of despot, the character of the despotism would undergo any material alteration. Although, therefore, his views as to the best system of govern- ing the country appear to have been unsuited to the circumstances of the time, both his proposals and his resignation did him credit personally. The arrangement under which the Khedive was to be his own Prime Minister was of doubtful wisdom. Fortunately, it did not last long. Riaz Pasha was summoned to Egypt, and on September 22 was charged with the formation of a Ministry. The principles of Ismail Pasha's Rescript of August 28, 1878, were maintained. Riaz Pasha was named President of the Council, but the Khedive reserved to himself the right to preside at the meetings of the Council whenever he thought it desirable to do so. The duration of the new Ministry was much longer than that of its predecessors. One of the reasons why it acquired a certain character of stability was that the relations between the Khedive and his Mhiisters were at last placed on a foothig government, was endeavouring to abolish the iniquitous corvee system, wliilst the constitutionalists hoped that, through the introduction of free institutions, it would be found possible to ensure its continuance. 154 MODERN EGYPT pt. ii which was adapted to the actual requirements of the country. A compromise was effected between the system of exckiding the Khedive altogether from the exercise of any real power and that under which his authority would be absolute. It was essential to associate the Khedive with the govern- ment of the country. This was secured by accord- ing to him the right to preside at the Council whenever he thought fit to do so. On the other hand, it was undesirable that the Khedive should be his own Prime Minister. Apart from the risk of a return to the old regime, which the adoption of this system would have involved, there was the further objection that the ruler of the State would have become personally responsible for every act of the administration. The natural remedy for any serious defect in the government of a State is a change of Ministry. If the Khedive had become his own Prime Minister, this safety-valve would have been removed. A case might have arisen in which a change of policy would have been well- nigh impossible without a change of Khedive. Of course, much depended upon the spirit in which the compromise was to be worked. Had the Khedive meant to evade the spirit of the Rescript of August 1878 he might have done so. On the contrary, however, he loyally accepted the principle of ministerial responsibility. The system worked well, and although many difficulties of a different nature were in store for Egypt, the question of the part which Tewfik Pasha was to take in the govern- ment of the country was finally set at rest by the arrangement made in September 1879. The settlement of the relations between Turkey and Egypt gave rise to considerable difficulties, which were only arranged after a somewhat stormy diplomatic negotiation. The Porte made a deter- mmed effort to tighten its hold on Egypt. OH. IX INAUGURATION OF TEWFIK 155 Simultaneously with the issue of the order deposing Ismail Pasha, an Imperial Irade was signed repealing the Firman of 1873. The issue of a new Firman was necessary in consequence of this action of the Sultan. The Porte showed great disinclination to submit the terms of the Firman before issue to the British and French Govern- ments. The result was that peremptory orders had to be sent to the Ambassadors at Constan- tinople. The Sultan and his advisers were made to understand that, in their endeavour to tighten their hold on Egypt, they ran a risk that the country would escape from their grasp altogether. They therefore yielded. The principle that the terms of the Firman must be discussed with the French and British Governments was accepted. A discussion then commenced as to the stipula- tions which were to be incorporated into the new Firman. In 1873, Ismail Pasha, in return for large sums of money lavished at Constantinople, had obtained four concessions from the Sultan. In the first place, the Mohammedan law of succession was set aside. Primogeniture was for the future to be the principle under which succession to the Khedivate was to be regulated. In the second place, the right to conclude Commercial Conventions with other Powers was conceded to Egypt. In the third place, full power was given to the Khedive to contract foreign loans. In the fourth place, the Khedive obtained the right to fix the strength of the Egyptian army at any figure he might consider necessary without reference to Constantinople. The Sultan now wished to cancel these con- cessions. The views entertained by the British and French Governments upon the points at issue were not altogether identical. The traditional policy of 156 MODERN EGYPT ft. n France favoured, if not an independent Egypt, at all events the relaxation of the bonds which united the suzerain and his feudatory. The French Government were, therefore, opposed to the re- strictive measures which the Sultan wished to ado})t. jNIore especially M. Fournier, who was then French Ambassador at Constantinople, insisted strongly upon opposition being offered to them. Successive British Governments, on the other hand, had for a long time past been averse to any measures which tended towards the dis- memberment of the Ottoman Empire. Except in the matter of the succession, Lord Salisbury did not consider the proposals made by the Sultan as open to any great objections on their own merits. Moreover, the spokesman of the British Government at Constantinople was Sir Austen Layard, a strong Turcophile. On the question of the succession, however, the two Governments were agreed. Under the Mohammedan law of succession the eldest member of the family is Heir -Apparent. This practice has, during the whole course of Ottoman history, been a fertile source of intrigue, and has often led to much bloodshed. The maxim of Bajazet I. — " Better the death of a Prince than the loss of a province " — is still inscribed over one of the inner gates of the old Imperial Palace at Constantinople. The slaughter of collateral branches of the family is, in fact, a means of protection against conspiracy which the rulers of Oriental States have not unfrequently adopted.^ * It cannot be doulited tliat the practice of murdering or keeping in confinement the heir to the throne, more especially if he showed any signs of ability, has been one of the many causes of Ottoman decay. For instance, Sultan Ibrahim (l(!40-48) was the sole surviving brother of Amurath IV., the remainder having ])eeii ]>ut to death at the time of the latter's succession. On his deathbed, Amnrath ordered Ibrahim, who had Ijeen kept for elglit years in inivon. to In- killed, Ijut the ordef CH. IX INAUGURATION OF TEWFIK 157 The British and French Governments, therefore, insisted that the principle of primogeniture should be ratified in the new Firman. On this point, the Porte yielded. "With regard," Lord Salisbury wrote, "to the limit to be assigned to the military and naval forces which the Khedive may maintain, and his power to negotiate Commercial Conventions, Her Majesty's Government will not object." The French Government, on the other hand, attached great importance to the question of the right to make Commercial Conventions, with the result that the Porte yielded. The new Firman was on this point substantially a reproduction of the Firman of 1873. The Porte, however, gained its point as regards the restrictions which it wished to place on the strength of the Egyptian army. The new Firman laid down that in time of peace the army was not to exceed 18,000 men. As regards the power of borrowing money, Lord Salisbury wrote : " The power to contract loans has been so grievously abused, and with such disastrous results to the prosperity of Egypt, that it might advantageously be withdrawn altogether, for it is quite clear that the country can bear no further attempts to bolster up its credit by such means." The Frencli Government would have been glad to preserve the Firman of 1873 intact, but seeing that the British Government were lukewarm on the subject, and that they had already achieved a diplomatic victory on the two was not executed. When Amurath died. Creasy says {Ottoman Turks, p. 259), "Ibrahim came forth and mounted the Turkish throne, which received in him a selfish voluptuary, in whom long' imprisonment and protracted terror had debased whatever spirit nature mif^ht have origin- ally bestowed, and who was as rapacious and bloodthirsty as he was cowardly and mean." The practice is of very ancient date. Jehu, on obtaining possession of the throne, killed the seventy sous of Ahab. — 2 Kings x. 1-11. 158 MODERN EGYPT pt. ii important questions of the succession and the right to make Commercial Conventions, they agreed to the withdrawal from the Khedive of the right to contract loans. It is difficult to prophesy, especially in politics. No one could foresee that, a few years later, the British Government would find the work of reform in Egypt to some extent hindered by the re- strictions which, in 1879, were considered un- objectionable and even beneficial. That, however, is what actually happened. French diplomacy had, in fact, unconsciously worked to facilitate the future task of the British Government, whilst the latter, with equal unconsciousness, had used their influence to place obstacles in their own path. On August 14, the ceremony of reading the Firman of Investiture took place in Cairo. The next question which had to be decided was the form in which Europeans should be associated with the government of Egypt. Immediately after the Khedive's accession, a letter was addressed by Cherif Pasha to the representatives of England and France in Egypt, expressing a hope that, if Controllers were nominated under the Decree of November 18, 1876, their functions would be limited to investigation and verification, and that they would not be invested with any administrative or executive powers. In reply to this communica- tion, the Consuls-General were authorised to state that "the two Governments accepted in principle His Highness's offer to re-establish the ofBce of Con- trollers-General, and that the details respecting their powers and functions would form the subject of a further communication." Three questions had then to be decided. In the first place, who were to be the Controllers ? In the second place, what were to be the relations between them and the Egyptian Government ? In CH. IX INAUGURATION OF TEWFIK 159 the third place, how was the work to be divided between them ? Perhaps the first of these questions was the most important of the three. More depended on the character and personal influence of the in- dividuals who were chosen than on the special functions which might be assigned to them by a Khedivial Decree. The situation of the European advisers of the Khedive would, necessarily, be one of great difficulty. They would have to guide with as little appearance of guiding as possible. They could not hope to succeed unless two conditions were fulfilled. The first was that they should be to some extent in sympathy with the Egyptian Government. The second was that they should be in sympathy with each other. If the more dis- tasteful aspects of European interference were constantly being presented to the Egyptian Ministers without any compensatory advantages being derived from European assistance in the defence of Egy})tian interests, another breakdown was sure to ensue before long. Further, the selection of a Gallophobe Englishman, or of an Anglophobe Frenchman, would have ensured the failure of the experiment which was about to be made. The choice of the French Government fell on M. de Blignieres. Lord Salisbury offered the post of English Controller to me. After some hesita- tion,^ I accepted the offer. As regards the relations which were to exist between the Egyptian Government and the Con- * My intention at this time had been to stand for East Norfolk at the next General Election. The acceptance of Lord Salisbury's offer made me abandon the idea of entering Parliament. I think that it was in 1880 tliat, happening- to meet Mr. Gladstone at Sandringham, I spoke to him on this subject. He told me that he thought I was quite right not to enter Parliament as all the principal questions which interested Liberals had been solved. Very shortly afterwards, tba Home Rule project was launched on an astonished world. 160 MODERN EGYPT pt. u trollers, there was no difficulty in meeting the Khedive's wishes. INI. de Bhgnieres and myself, who were consulted on the subject, were of opinion that the system of direct govermnent by Europeans was unsuitable to the circumstances which then existed in Egypt, and that it would be preferable to give us general powers of supervision and inspection, trusting to the exercise of personal influence to do the rest. The Decree, which was eventually issued, laid down that the most ample powers of investigation were to be conferred on the Controllers, but that they were not to be in- vested with any administrative functions. They could only make suggestions. They were to have seats in the Council of Ministers, with voix con- sultatives ; that is to say, they might give their opinions, but they had no right to vote. It was further provided that the Controllers could not be dismissed without the consent of their respective Governments. When, three years later, Egypt was occupied by British troops, a dis- cussion took place as to whether the Liberal or the Conservative Government was res})onsible for the events which led up to the occupation. The point is now one of purely historical interest, and at no time was it of much interest save to party politicians. It may, however, be observed that, in the discussions which took place in 1882, the politicians on the Liberal side of the House of Commons maintained that the necessity for British interference was mainly due to tlie fact tliat in 1879 the Control, which was formerly financial, became political. Mr. Gladstone, speaking on July 27, 1 882, said : *' What is a political control ? I assert that this was not a political control then {i.e. prior to 1879) because the Government were not con- cerned in it. The fact that the Egyptians chose to establish foreign Controllers, an arrangement CH. IX INAUGURATION OF TEWFIK 161 attended with great benefits to the people of Eng- land ( ? Egypt), was not necessarily an arrangement entailing foreign interference, because they retained the right to dismiss the Controllers, but in the year 1879, in depriving them of that right, you brought foreimi intervention into the heart of the country, and established, in the strictest sense of the phrase, a 'political control.'" There is some force in this argument. Nevertheless, as will appear at a later portion of this narrative, the main responsibility for the British occupation, in so far as it was due to events which were in any way capable of control, would appear to lie with the Government of Mr. Gladstone rather than with that of Lord Salisbury which preceded him. A further question, which had to be decided, was how the work was to be divided between the two Controllers. Under the Decree of November 18, 1876, the Englishman was Controller- General of Receipts, and the Frenchman Controller-General of Expen- diture. Subsequently, when European Ministers were appointed, the Englishman was placed in charge of the Ministry of Finance, and the French- man of the Ministry of Public Works. Under both these arrangements, the preponderating influ- ence was in the hands of the Englishman. The French chafed at their position of inferiority, and it appeared both unwise and unnecessary to insist upon a position of marked superiority being given to the Englishman. Either ^1. de Blignieres and 1 could, or could not work together. If we could do so, any distinction between us was unnecessary, and would only serve to wound the amour propre of the French without producing any useful result. If we could not do so, the collapse of the system was inevitable, and could not be averted by any definition of our respective functions. V^arious VOL. I M 162 MODERN EGYPT pt. n proposals were made with a view to precise defini- tion, such as that one Controller should deal with Upper and the other with Lower Egypt. But in the end it was wisely decided to leave the matter to the discretion of the Controllers them- selves. The last point which had to be settled was the method under which legal effect should be given to the relations about to be established between the Egyptian Government and their creditors. In other words, the bankruptcy of Egypt had to be sanctioned by law. The two reports of the Com- mission of Inquiry had prepared the way for a settlement, but it was essential that it should be made binding on all the parties concerned. On April 2, 1880, after some long and tedious dis- cussions, a Khedivial Decree was issued instituting a Commission of Liquidation with full powers to regulate the financial situation. The Great Powers bound themselves by anticipation to accept the conclusions at which the Commissioners might arrive. Sir Rivers Wilson was named President of the Commission. The four Commissioners of the Debt were named members. An additional French member (M. Liron d'AiroUes) was named so as to give France the same degree of representa- tion as England. Germany was represented by M. de Trescow. The new Commission of Liquida- tion was, in fact, the old Commission of Inquiry " writ large " — that is to say, with extended powers and with the addition of a German representa- tive. The Controllers were not appointed members of the Commission. The interests of the creditors were strongly represented, and it was thought both just and politic that the Controllers should stand outside and represent the interests of the Egyptian Government and people, rather than those of the creditors. Without European assistance, the OH. IX INAUGURATION OF TEWFIK 163 Egyptian Ministers would scarcely be able to resist the pressure which the Commission was almost certain to bring to bear on them in the bondholding interest. The various essential parts of the State machine were thus adjusted. A new Khedive ruled. The relations between the Khedive and his JNlinisters were placed on a satisfactory footing. A Prime Minister had been nominated who had taken an active part in opposing the abuses prevalent during the reign of Ismail Pasha. The relations between the Sultan and the Khedive had been regulated in such a way as to ensure the latter against any excessive degree of Turkish interference. The system which had been devised for associating Europeans with the Government held out good promise of success, inasmuch as it was in accordance with the Khedive's own views. Lastly, an Inter- national Commission had been created with full powers to arrange matters between the Egyptian Government and their creditors. It now remained to be seen how the machine would work. There were great difficulties still to be overcome, but on the whole the prospect was brighter than at any previous moment during recent times. CHAPTER X THE DUAL CONTROL November 1879-December 1880 Working of the Control — Relations between the two Controllers — And between the Controllers and the Egyptian Government — Delay in paying the Tribute — Interest on the Unified Debt paid at 4 per cent — Financial scbeme proposed by the Controllers — The Budget for 1880 — Reforms in the fiscal system — Confidence inspired by the Control — Reports on the state of the country — The Law of Liquida- tion — The military danger. On November 30, 1879, I wrote to Sir Edward Malet, who had been appointed Consul -General in Egypt : " On the whole, I think the start has been favourable. If we can only sit tight for six months, I believe we may pull the thing through. But I devoutly hope that there will be no change of INIinistry, or any unexpected event, such as often happens in the East, to upset every- thing and to oblige a new beginning to be made." Time, and a stable political situation, — these were the two principal conditions which were essential to success. Only the first of these conditions was, to a very limited extent, fulfilled. The Ministry of Riaz Pasha lasted for nearly two years, and an acute observer wlio was on the spot subsequently wrote that "with all its faults it was the best administration which Egypt has enjoyed before or since." ^ * Khedives and Pashas, p. 134. Tliis was written in 1884, that is to Bay, before the i*eforms introduced subsequent to the Rritish occupation bad produced much result. 164 CH. X THE DUAL CONTROL 165 The main reasons why the machine of Govern- ment worked fairly well for a time were twofold. In the first place, the best relations existed between the two Controllers. In the second place, a modus Vivendi was found between the Controllers and the Egyptian Government. It has been mentioned in the previous chapter that before the Controllers-General were appointed, some discussion took place as to how the work should be divided between them. Eventually, M. de Blignieres and I were left to settle the matter between ourselves. The solution which we adopted was a simple one. We never attempted to solve the question at all. We were in constant communication with each other, and we worked in common. Any precise definition of our respective functions would have been difficult, and was quite unnecessary. It was a more difficult matter to establish friendly relations with the Egyptian Government. Riaz Pasha was thoroughly honest and well-inten- tioned, but he was incapable of dealing unaided with the perplexing financial questions which at that time presented themselves for solution. He saw the necessity for European assistance, but, at the same time, in whatever form it was given, it v\'as distaste- ful to him. He was himself a reformer, and had courageously protested against the abuses of Ismail Pasha's time, but he was slow to accept the inevit- able conclusion that no reforms were possible without European guidance and assistance. Qui veut la fin veut les moyeus, formed no part of Riaz Pasha's politic3,l creed. It was clear that, under these circumstances, the best hope of success lay in the Controllers submitting themselves to a self- denying ordinance. They would have to pull the strings behind the scenes, but appear on the stage as little as possible. 166 MODERN EGYPT pt. n Another essential requisite to success was tliat both the Egyptian Ministers and the Egyptian people should see that the Controllers were of some use to them. Duty and justice alike pointed to the necessity of standing as a buffer between the Egyptian Government and their creditors. The Ministers had neither the strength to oppose the pressure which, in European interests, was brought to bear on them, nor the knowledge requisite to resist it with effect. The policy adopted by M. de Blignieres and myself was to associate ourselves, as much as possible, with the Egyptian Govern- ment, and to defend them against any excessive demands and encroachments on their rights. By adopting this line of conduct, we hoped soon to inspire confidence, and gradually to disabuse the minds both of the Ministers and of the Egyptian people of the prejudices which were entertained against ICuropeans. If once we could inspire con- fidence, our advice, we thought, would generally be followed, and our influence could be used to the benefit both of the country and of the creditors. Opportunities for giving effect to these prin- ciples were not slow to present themselves. Heavy instalments of the Tribute, as also the half-yearly interest on the Unified Debt, had to be paid. Money was not forthcoming to meet these en- gagements. M. de Blignieres and I had not yet arrived in Egypt. Our advice was requested by telegraph. The Egyptian Government flinched at the responsibility of committing an act of insolvency. They asked us whether they ought to borrow money in order to meet their engage- ments. The reply could not be doubtful. If the Tribute could not be paid, so much the worse for the Tribute. The same was to be said as regards the interest on the Unified Debt. The main thing was, once and for all, to abandon the ruinous CH.X THE DUAL CONTROL 167 expedients of the past. The employes of the Government must, m the first instance, be paid ; then the Tribute, whenever there was money enough to pay it. As for the Unified Debt, the taxes should on no account be taken in advance. If, when the interest fell due, the revenues pledged to the service of the debt were insufficient to meet the whole charge, a dividend should be distributed. The letter which we wrote from Paris on this subject was published. One result of our advice was that the Tribute due to the Porte remained unpaid for some little while. A further result was that the full interest on the Unified Debt was never paid. The amount due on November 1 was £1,989,000. The rate of interest fixed by the Decree of November 18, 1876, viz. 6 per cent, had not as yet been legally changed. When the 1st of November arrived, only £1,147,000 was in the hands of the Commissioners of the Debt. Interest at the rate of 4 per cent was distributed to the bondholders. Directly after we arrived in Egypt, another step of importance was taken. Difficulties were being encountered in arranging for a Commission of Liquidation to make a final settlement of Egyptian financial affairs. In the meanwhile, both the country and the creditors were suffering. We therefore recommended the Egyptian Government to cut the diplomatic knot by preparing their own scheme, which could be submitted to the Com- mission of Liquidation, if one were appointed, and which could be put into operation without the sanction of any law, in the event of no agreement being arrived at as regards a Commission. The suggestion was accepted, and, in concert with the Egyptian authorities, we proceeded to prepare a scheme. On January 1, 1880, we submitted our report 108 MODERN EGYPT pt. ii to the Khedive. " Experience," we said, " has shown tb.'it the main detect of all former attempts to regulate the Egyptian financial situation has been that they have been too optimistic." It was essential to steer clear of that danger. The Com- mission of Inquiry had recommended that the interest on the Unified Debt should be fixed at 5 per cent. INI. de Blignieres and I thought that rate too high. We recommended that only 4 per cent interest should be guaranteed. The public had become accustomed to the idea that the rate of interest would have to be reduced to 4 per cent. When our proposals were made known, so far from producing a bad effect, Unified Stock rose from 51 to 56. A sum of £l, 084,000 was due to the bond- holders for back interest on coupons which had only been partially paid. " We cannot," we said, *' hold out the least hope that these sums will ever be paid." The next thinsf was to frame a Budo^et for the year 1880. The Commission of Inquiry had estimated the Egyptian revenue at £9,067,000. We considered this estimate too high. We reduced it to £8,562,000. A sum of £4,323,000 was required to pay the Tribute and to carry on the administration of the country, thus leaving £4,239,000 available for the creditors of the Egyptian Government. The reforms proposed by the Commission of Inquiry were at the same time taken in hand. On January 6, 1880, the law of the JMoukabala was repealed. On the 18th, an additional tax of £E. 150,000 a year was placed on the Ouchouri lands. On January 17, the poll-tax was abolished. It yielded a revenue of £205,000 a year. Persons whose sole employment was agriculture were, at the same time, relieved from the payment of the professional tax. Octroi duties, highway. CH.X THE DUAL CONTROL 169 market, and weighing dues were suppressed in the villages, while in the towns, octroi duties were abolished on 105 articles, mostly agricultural pro- duce. Twenty -four petty taxes of a vexatious nature were abolished by a stroke of the pen. An important reform was also made in the method of levying the salt tax. Under a law passed in 1873, every individual in Egypt was supposed to consume a certain amount of salt a year. The population of each village was roughly calculated at the time the law was passed, and the tax divided amongst the villagers. The salt tax had, in fact, become a poll-tax, which was paid equally by those who consumed a great deal of salt, and by those who consumed little or none. No account was taken of changes, which might have occurred since 1873, in the population of each village. The defects of this system were obvious. It was abolished, and, in substitution for it, salt was constituted a Government monopoly. The system of paying the land-tax in kind, which had hitherto existed in some parts of Upper Egypt, had given rise to numerous abuses. It was suppressed. For the future, only payment in money was allowed. The dates at which the instalments of land-tax were to fall due were fixed in a manner which was convenient to the cultivators. At the same time, the names of the taxpayers belonging to each village were inscribed in one register. An extract from this register was given to each taxpayer, showing the total of the sums which were due from him under the several heads of account, and the dates on which he would be called upon to pay. Of all the reforms which were introduced, this was perhaps the most important and the most beneficial. It was not so much the amount of the land-tax which had heretofore weighed 170 MODERN EGYPT pt. n heavily on the country, as the fact that the dates of collection had been regulated without any reference to the convenience of the taxpayers. Further, inasmuch as none of the taxpayers knew with any degree of certainty how much they had to pay, a wide door was opened for extortion and illegal taxation. At the same time, an improved system was in- troduced for the payment of the village accountants. Hitherto they had received no fixed salaries, but were allowed to retain a certain proportion of the sums which they collected. The main reason why these and other reforms w^ere carried into execution was that the Con- trollers and the Egyptian Ministers worked cordially together. The Control had, in fact, inspired confidence. I remember one incident which contributed in no small degree to the establishment of this con- fidence. A British syndicate, on the list of which some influential names figured, was formed with a view to the purchase of the Egyptian Railways. The representatives of the syndicate laid their proposals before the Egyptian Government. The Ministers were anxious as to the attitude which the Controllers, and particularly the British Con- troller, would take up on this subject. It scarcely occurred to them that any foreigner would do otherwise than push the presumed interests of his own countrymen. Great, therefore, was their sur- prise when, directly the question was mooted in the Council, I said that I considered that it was for the Ministers to decide whether they would entertain any proposal to purchase the railways; that if they wished to reject the offer which had been made to them, I had no wish to press them to accept it ; but that if, on the other liand, they chose to accept the princi})le, I was ready to go into CH. X THE DUAL CONTROL 171 the details and see that they obtained reasonable terms. They at once decided not to sell the railways. I had anticipated this decision. From that time forth, I never had any serious difficulty in getting my advice accepted. Shortly after the occurrence of this incident, I was asked to see if terms could be arranged with INIessrs. Green- field, the contractors for the construction of the harbour works at Alexandria, to whom a large sum of money was due. The subject was full of difficulties. However, in forty-eight hours I had made an arrangement which seemed reasonable. The contract had to be signed by Riaz Pasha. It was prepared by about three o'clock one afternoon. Messrs. Greenfield's representatives wished to leave Cairo by a train at five o'clock the same afternoon in order to catch a steamer at Alexandria. I thought this difficult, as Riaz Pasha had not yet had the matter explained to him. But I said that I would do my best. I took the contract to Riaz Pasha and explained its provisions to him. He said that if I was satisfied he was ready to accept my conclusions, and accordingly signed the contract without reading it. On April 30, Sir Edward INIalet wrote to the Foreign Office that the Controllers had never been obliged to apply for diplomatic support. In the course of the summer of 1880, Sir Edward Malet asked the British Consular officers in Egypt to report on the condition of the country. All the Consuls told the same tale. A "general feeling of satisfaction " prevailed. The taxes were being regularly collected. The rate of interest charged by the village money-lenders had fallen by 50 per cent. The value of land had risen, in some cases as much as 100 per cent. The use of the courbash was greatly diminished. Whilst these reforms were in progress, the 172 MODERN EGYPT pt. ii difficulties connected with the appointment of a Commission of Liquidation had been overcome. After discussions which histed some three montlis, the Commissioners agreed on a law which was submitted to the Khedive and signed by him on July 17, 1880. The Commissioners never sent in any report explanatory of the provisions of the law. In a letter addressed by Sir Rivers Wilson to Lord Granville, w^ho succeeded Lord Salisbury at the Foreign Office on April 28, 1880, it was stated that there "was an apprehension lest the divergencies of opinion which manifested them- selves on certain points among the Commissioners should render impossible a unanimous report, and lead to reservations or even protests detracting from the authority of the official decisions of the Commission." It is unnecessary to allude at any length to these differences of opinion. It w^ill be sufficient to say that some members of the Commission, who were supported by the Controllers, were in favour of a cautious estimate of revenue, and an estimate of administrative expenditure which would have left a mari^in to be applied to the benefit of the country, whilst others took a more optimistic view of the revenue and endeavoured, in the bondholding interest, to keep the administrative expenditure down to the lowest possible figure. Eventually, a compromise was effected. The revenue was taken at £E.8,362,000 for 1880 and 1881, and at £E.8,41 2,000 for subsequent years. The adminis- trative expenditure was fixed at £E.4,520,000. Tiie rate of interest on the Unified Debt was fixed at 4 per cent. The outstanding portions of the short loans were absorbed into the Unified Debt. A fresh issue of Preference Stock to the extent of £E.5,600,000 was made in order to assist in paying the Floating Debt. The Floating CH.X THE DUAL CONTROL 173 Debt ci editors were divided into three categories, viz. privileged creditors, creditors holding special securities, and ordinary creditors. The privileged creditors were paid in full. Special arrangements were made with the creditors holding special securities. Their claims were reduced by about 7|- per cent. The ordinary creditors received 30 per cent in cash and 70 per cent in Preference Stock. At the price then current, they lost 8^ per cent on the capital of their claims. On the whole, it may be said that the arrangement was a fair one. Its main defect was that too large a proportion of revenue (66 per cent) was mortgaged to the bondholders, whilst the balance left at the disposal of the Government was insufficient. Thus, matters were improving in Egypt. Several beneficial reforms had been carried out. Some of the worst features of the old oppressive system of government had disappeared. The rela- tions between the Government and their creditors were established on a legal basis, and the charge on account of debt, although still very heavy, had been brought more into conformity than heretofore with the resources of the country. There were, however, some dark specks on the horizon. For instance, a petition was circulated amongst the officers of the army, couched in language which was intended to incite the Moslem population against the European Control. It concluded with a threat that the petitioners might have recourse to the sword to attain their ends. In June 1880, I was appointed Financial Mem- ber of the Governor- General's Council in India. Sir Auckland Colvin succeeded me as Controller- General in Egypt. In December 1880, I visited Cairo on my way to India. At tliat time, it was manifest that the only serious danger which threatened Egypt arose 174 MODERN EGYPT pt. n from the ftict that the ciiscipHne of the army had betii profoundly shaken by the events of 1878. 1 warned Riaz Pasha of this danger, and urged liini to remedy any grievances of which the army could justly complain, but at the same time to treat severely any signs of insubordination. Riaz Pasha said that my warning was unnecessary, for that not the smallest danger was to be apprehended from the army. For the moment, therefore, it appeared that Egy])t had at last fairly entered the path of reform, and that all that was required was time to complete the superstructure of which the foundations had been so laboriously laid. CHAPTER XI THE MUTINY OF THE EGYPTIAN ARMY January-September 1881 Discontent amongst the officers — They petition Riaz Pasha — Mutiny of February 1 — Dismissal of the Minister of VV^ar— Imprudent con- duct of the Khedive — Conduct of the French Consul-General — Increase of discontent in the army — Mutiny of September 9 — Sir Auckland Colvin — Demands of the mutineers — Dismissal of the Ministers — Reluctance of Cherif Pasha to accept office — Nomination of the Cherif Ministry — Cherif Pasha supports the European Control — Arabi is the real ruler of Egypt — His conduct due to fear — Situation created by the mutiny. Sir John Bowring wrote in 1840: "The situa- tion of the Osmanlis in Egypt is remarkable ; they exercise an extraordinary influence, possess most of the high offices of state, and, indeed, are the depositories of power throughout the country. . . . They are few, but they tyrannise ; the Arabs are many, but obey." After Sir John Bowring wrote these lines, the Egyptians, properly so called, gradually acquired a greater share in the administration of the country, but in 1881, as in 1840, the Turks were the " para- mount rulers." In the army, however, the number and influence of the Turks sensibly diminished as time went on. During the reigns of Abbas, Said, and Ismail, the Egyptian element amongst the officers had increased to such an extent as to jeopardise the little that remained of the still dominant Turco-Circassian element. 176 176 MODERN EGYPT ft. ii The large number of officers who were placed on half- pay in 1878 were, for the most part, Egyptians. The discontent due to this cause was hicreased by the fact that, whilst great and in some degree successful efforts were made to improve the civil administration of the country, nothing was done to improve the condition of the army. The prevailing discontent eventually found expression in a petition addressed by certahi officers of the army to lliaz Pasha on January 15, 1881. Ahmed Arabi, an Egyptian of fellah origin, who was colonel of the 4th Regiment, soon took the lead in the movement which was thus begun. But the prime mover in the preparation of the petition was Colonel Ali Bey Fehmi, who com- manded the 1st Regiment. His regiment had been the object of special attention on the part of the Khedive. It guarded the palace. For some time previously, however, there had been a marked cessation of friendly relations between the Khedive and Ali Bey Fehmi. In the East, to be in disgrace is to be in danger. Ali Bey Fehmi determined to strengthen his position by showing that the Egyptian portion of the army could no longer be treated with neglect, and that he himself could not with impunity be dismissed or exiled. The petition set forth that the INlinister of War, Osman Pasha Rifki, had treated the Egyptian officers of the army unjustly in the matter of promotions. He had behaved " as if they were his enemies, or as if God had sent him to venge His wrath on the Egyptians." Officers had been dis- missed from the service without any legal inquiry. The petitioners, therefore, made two demands. The first was that the Minister of War should be removed, "as he was incompetent to hold such a high position." The second was that an inquiry should be held into the qualifications of those who CH. XI MUTINY OF THE ARMY 177 had been promoted. "Nothing," it was said, "but merit and knowledge should entitle an officer to promotion, and in these respects we are far superior to those who have been promoted." This petition was presented by the two Colonels in person to Riaz Pasha. Riaz Pasha was ignorant of military affairs, and had never interfered with the administration of the army, which he con- sidered to be a prerogative of the Khedive. He endeavoured unsuccessfully to induce the Colonels to withdraw their petition, promising at the same time that inquiry should be made into their griev- ances. A fortnight was allowed to elapse, during which time further unsuccessful efforts were made in the same direction. In the meanwhile, the Colonels had learnt that their petition was viewed with disfavour by the Khedive and his Turkish surroundings. Riaz Pasha received a hint from the palace that the dilatory manner in which he was treating the question was calculated to throw some doubts on his loyalty. He determined, therefore, to provoke an immediate decision. The matter was discussed at a meeting of the Council of Ministers held under the presidency of the Khedive on January 30, from which Sir Auckland Colvin and M. de Blignieres were most unwisely excluded. All idea of compromise was rejected. It was resolved to arrest the Colonels, and to try them by Court-martial. Subsequently, an inquiry would be made into their grievances. An order was drawn up and countersigned by the Khedive, summoning the Colonels to the Ministry of War on February 1. One peculiarity of Egyptian official life is that no secrets are ever kept. The Colonels were im- mediately informed of tlie decision at which the Council of Ministers had arrived. Everything was, therefore, arranged for the action which followed. It was settled that, in the event of the VOL. 1 N 178 MODERN EGYPT pt ii Colonels not returning in two hours, the officers and men of their regiments should go to the INIinistry of War and deliver them if they were under arrest. At the same time, a message was sent to Toura, about ten miles distant from Cairo, with a view to securing concerted action on the part of the regiment quartered there. This pro- gramme was faithfully executed. The Colonels were summoned to the JNlinistry of War on the pretext that certain arrangements had to be made for a procession which was to accompany one of the princesses on the occasion of her marriage. They obeyed the summons. On their arrival at the Ministry of War, they were arrested and placed on their trial. Whilst the trial was pro- ceeding, the officers and men of their regiments arrived, and broke into the room where the Court was sitting. They treated the INIinister of War roughly, destroyed the furniture, and delivered the Colonels, who then marched with their troops to the Khedive's palace, and demanded the dis- missal of the Minister of War. The Ministers and other high functionaries soon gathered round the Khedive. Some counselled resistance, but the practical difficulty presented itself that no force was available with which to resist. The only sign of fidelity given by any of the troops belonging to the Cairo garrison was that the regiment quartered at Abbassieh, two miles distant from the town, refused to join the mutineers, but the most their Turkish officers could do was to keep them where they were. They would not have defended the Khedive against the mutinous regiments. The regiment stationed at Toura marched to Cairo, according to previous arrangement, and insisted on continuing its march, although messengers were sent to dissuade the men from advancing after the obnoxious Minister had been dismissed. CH. XI MUTINY OF THE ARMY 179 Under these circumstances, resistance was im- possible. After some hesitation, tiie Khedive sent for the Colonels and informed them that Osman Pasha Rifki was dismissed and Mahmoud Pasha Baroudi^ named Minister of War in his place. This announcement was received with cheers. The troops dispersed and tranquillity was for the time being restored. The mutinous Colonels were allowed to remain in command of their regiments. They waited on the Khedive, asked his pardon for their past misconduct, and gave assurances of unalterable fidelity and loyalty to his person. This was the second mutiny of the Egyptian Army. It had followed the same course as the first. It originated with legitimate grievances to which no attention was paid. The next stage was mutiny. The final result was complete submission to the will of the mutineers. The whole affair was mismanaged, and for this mismanagement tlie Khedive appears to have been largely responsible. Two courses were from the first open to the Khedive. Either he should have endeavoured to rally to his side a sufficient force to crush the mutineers, or, if that was impossible, he should have made terms with the officers before discontent developed into mutiny. Unfortunately, he adopted neither of these courses. The attempt to decoy the Colonels away from their troops and to punish them without any trustworthy force behind him to ensure effect being given to the decisions of the Court-martial, was probably the most unwise course which could have been adopted. Sir Edward JMalet expressed his opinion tliat the officers were treated **in the way best calculated to destroy all con- fidence in the Khedive and his Government, ' Baroudi was the family name. He was also frequently called Mahmoud Pasha Sami. 180 MODERN EGYPT pt. ii although it was in harmony with the traditions of Oriental statesmanship." The Egyptian officers and soldiers now learnt for the second time that they had only to assert themselves in order to obtain all they required. With this encouragement, they would not be slow to mutiny a third time, should the necessity for doing so arise. For the moment, however, a truce was estab- lished between the Khedive and his mutinous officers ; but suspicions and fears were rife on both sides. The Khedive and his Ministers were afraid to disband the disaffected regiments, or even to remove them from Cairo. The officers, on the other hand, although their victory had been com- plete, were fearful of the consequences of their own action. They mistrusted the Khedive and thought that, should an opportunity occur, the reluctant pardon which they had received would be cancelled, and that they would be visited with condign punishment. They felt even greater re- sentment against Riaz Pasha than against the Khedive, and began a series of intrigues with a view to bringing about a change of Ministry. These intrigues were encouraged by Baron de Ring, the French Consul-General, who had fre- quent interviews with the mutinous Colonels, The action of Baron de Ring increased the diffi- culties of the situation. If, in addition to financial embarrassments, defective administration, and a mutinous army, there was to be superadded hostile intrigue on the part of the representative of the French Government, the position of the Egyptian Ministry would clearly become untenable. Riaz Pasha wished to resign, but was dissuaded from doing so. The Khedive eventually wrote to the President of the French Republic to complain of Baron de Ring's conduct. The result was that CH.XI MUTINY OF THE ARMY 181 he was recalled. He left Egypt on February 28. The Khedive then summoned the prmcipal officers of the army to the palace, and expressed the confidence he entertained in Riaz Pasha, of whom he spoke in eulogistic terms. Ah-eady the pay of the unemployed Egyptian officers had been increased, and a public declaration had been made by the Khedive to the effisct that for the future every class of officer, wliether Turk, Circassian, or Egyptian, would be treated on the same footing. These measures somewhat improved the position of the Ministry. When Sir Edward Malet left in May on a short leave, he "had reason to believe that confidence was being restored ; that the officers had, in fact, nothing to fear from in- trigue ; that they were gradually relaxing measures for their own protection, and beginning to feel that the Khedive and the Ministers no longer aimed at their lives." It is unnecessary to give the detailed history of the next few months. The officers still entertained a deep-rooted mistrust of the intentions of the Khedive and his Ministers. "The traditions of the days of Ismail Pasha," Sir Edward Malet wrote, " stalked like spectres across tlieir paths." They thought that their lives were in danger. In- subordination increased daily. A Commission was appointed to inquire into the grievances of the army. Arabi Bey was one of its members. His language to the INIinister of War was very dis- respectful. In the month of July, an artilleryman was run over by a cart and killed in the streets of Alexandria. His comrades bore his dead body to the palace, and forced an entrance in defiance of the orders of their officers. They were tried and the ringleaders condemned to punishment. About the same time, nineteen officers brought charges against their Colonel (Abdul-Al). These charges 182 MODERN EGYPT pt. ii formed the subject of inquiry. They were found to be groundless. The officers were in consequence dismissed from the active hst of the army, but were shortly afterwards restored to their former positions by the Khedive. The Colonels were greatly offended. They believed that the Khedive's action had been taken with the intention of en- couraging the insubordination of their junior officers towards them. About the same time, JNIahmoud Pasha Baroudi, the INIhiister of War, who sympathised with the officers concerned in the mutiny of February 1, was dismissed, and the Khedive's brother-in-law, Daoud Pasha, was appointed in his place. This measure also caused great dissatisfaction. W^ithin the Ministerial circle, a good deal of dissension reigned. The relations between Riaz Pasha and M. de Blignieres became strained. The Khedive's confidence in Riaz Pasha was impaired. It was whispered that His Highness favoured the return to power of Cherif Pasha. It was clear that another crisis was not far off, but at the moment it was about to occur, the Government were hopeful that their main difficulties had been overcome. " At no period," Sir Edward Malet wrote, "since February 1 had the confi- dence of the Khedive and his Government been so complete as immediately before the outbreak of September 9. On the very eve, and on the morning itself of that day, Riaz Pasha assured those with whom he conversed that the Govern- ment were masters of the situation, and that the danger of a military movement had passed away. But, in fact, all the terrors of the Colonels for their personal safety had been again aroused. A story had got abroad that the Khedive had obtained a secret Fetwa, or decree from the Sheikh-ul-Islam, condemning them to death for high treason. There cH.xi MUTINY OF THE ARMY 183 was absolutely no foundation for this story, but it is currently believed, and at this moment the position of the Sheikh-ul-Islam is precarious in consequence of it. Spies were continually hovering about the residences of the Colonels, and on the night of the 8th September a man presented him- self at the house of Arabi Bey, was refused admit- tance, and was afterwards followed and seen to return to the Prefecture of Police. There was no doubt in the mind of Arabi Bey that he was to be murdered; he left his house and went to that of the other Colonels, to whom a similar incident had just occurred. It is my belief that then only were measures taken for immediate action, that it was concerted and planned that night, as it was executed on the following day." On September 9, the 3rd Regiment of Infantry, which was stationed at Cairo, was ordered to Alexandria. This order produced a mutiny. Arabi Bey, with 2500 men and 18 guns, marched to the square in front of the Abdin Palace. The Khedive was at the Ismailia Palace, distant about a quarter of a mile from Abdin. He did the wisest thing possible under the circumstances. He sent for Sir Auckland Colvin. Sir Auckland Colvin was a member of the Indian Civil Service. In the hour of trial he did not belie the proud motto. Mens aequa in arduis, inscribed under the picture of Warren Hastings which hangs in the Calcutta Council Chamber. It is one which might fitly apply to the whole of that splendid body of Englishmen who compose the Indian Civil Service. The spirit of the English- man rose high in the presence of danger. It was not the first time he had heard of mutiny. He knew how his own countrymen had met dangers of this sort. The example of Lawrence and Outram, of Nicholson and Edwards, pointed the w^ay to the 184 MODERN EGYPT pt.ii Indian Civilian. His duty was clear. He must endeavour at the risk of his own life to impart to the Khedive some portion of the spirit which aiiimated his own imperial race. He spoke in no uncertain terms. "The \"iceroy," he subsequently wrote, " asked my opinion on what should be done. I advised him to take the initiative. Two regi- ments in Cairo were said by Riaz Pasha to be faithful. I advised him to summon them to the Abdin Square, with all the military police avail- able, to put himself at their head, and, when Arabi Bey arrived, personally to arrest him. He replied that Arabi Bey had with him the artillery and cavalry, and that they might fire. I said that they would not dare to, and that if he had the courage to take the initiative, and to expose himself person- ally, he might succeed in overcoming the mutineers. Otherwise, he was lost. Stone Pasha ^ warmly supported me. . . . While his carriage was coming Sir Charles Cookson ^ arrived, expressed to the Viceroy his concurrence in my views, and returned to the Agency to telegraph to his Government." What followed may best be told in Sir Auckland Colvin's words. " I accompanied the Viceroy," he wrote, " in a separate carriage ; the Ministers also, and some five or six native officers of rank, with Stone Pasha. We went first to the Abdin barracks, where the regiment of the guard turned out, and with the warmest protestations swore loyalty. Thence we drove to the Citadel, where the same occurred ; but we learnt that this regiment, pre- vious to our arrival, had been signalHug to the regiment (Arabi Bey's) in the Abbassieh barrack. The Viceroy then announced his intention of going to the Abbassieh barrack. It was already 3.30 ; I ' An American officer in the Egyptian army. ' Sir Charles Cookson was acting as Consul-General during the temporary absence of Sir Edward Malet. CH. XI MUTINY OF THE AKMY 185 urged him to return to the Abdin Square taking with him the Citadel Regiment, and when he arrived at the square to put himself at the head of that regiment, the regiment of the guard and the mihtary pohce. He drove off, however, to Abbassieh. It was a long drive, and when we got there about 4 (the Ministers having left us at the Citadel and returned direct) we found Arabi Bey had marched with the regiment to Cairo. We followed, and on entering the town the Viceroy took a long detou7\ and arrived at the Abdin Palace by a side door. I jumped out of my carriage, and urged him on no account to remain in the palace, but to come into the square. He agreed at once, and we went together, followed at a considerable distance by four or five of his native officers. Stone Pasha, and one or two other Euro- pean officers. The square was entirely occupied by soldiers drawn up round it, and keeping all spectators at a distance. The Viceroy advanced firmly into the square towards a little group of officers and men (some mounted) in the centre. I said to him, 'When Arabi Bey presents himself, tell him to give you his sword, and to give them the order to disperse. Then go the round of the square and address each regiment separately, and give them the order to disperse.' Arabi Bey approached on horse- back ; the Viceroy called out to him to dismount. He did so, and came forward on foot, with several otliers and a guard with fixed bayonets, and saluted. I said to the Viceroy, 'Now is your moment.' He replied, 'We are between four fires.' I said, * Have courage.' He took counsel of a native officer on his left, and repeated to me : ' What can I do ? We are between four fires. We shall be killed.' He then told Arabi Bey to sheathe his sword. The order was obeyed ; and he then asked Arabi Bey what all this meant ; Arabi Bey replied 186 MODERN EGYPT pt. ii by enumerating three points, adding; tliat the army- had come there on the part of the Egyptian people to enforce them, and would not retire till they were conceded. The Viceroy turned to me and said, 'You hear what he says.' I replied that it was not fitting for the Viceroy to discuss questions of this kind with Colonels, and suggested to him to retire into the Palace of Abdin, leaving me to speak to the Colonels. He did so, and I remained for about an hour till the arrival of Sir Charles Cookson, explaining to them the gravity of the situation for themselves, and urging them to retire the troops while there was yet time." The three points to which Sir Auckland Colvin alluded as constituting the demands of Arabi were : (1) that all the Ministers should be dismissed ; (2) that a Parliament should be convoked ; and, (3), that the strength of the army should be raised to 18,000 men. Sir Charles Cookson then entered into negotia- tions with the mutineers. The Khedive consented to dismiss his Ministers on the understanding that the other points demanded by the officers should be left in suspense until reference could be made to the Porte. Arabi agreed to these terms. The question then arose of who should be President of the Council. One or two names were put forward by the Khedive, and rejected by Arabi and his followers. The Khedive then intimated that he would be prepared to nominate Cherif Pasha. This announcement "was received with loud and universal shouts of ' Long live the Khedive ! ' . . . Arabi Bey then asked to be allowed to see the Khedive and make his sub- mission. This favour was granted to him and the other Colonels, and then the troops were drawn off in perfect quietness to their respective barracks." Some difficulty was encountered in inducing CH. XI MUTINY OF THE ARMY 187 Chdrif Pasha to accept office. He objected to becomincjc Prime JNIinister as the nominee of a mutinous army. Sir Charles Cookson, M. Sien- kievvicz (the P'rench Consul -General), and Sir Auckland Colvin endeavoured to overcome this reluctance, which was in no degree feigned. They so far succeeded that Cherif Pasha consented to enter into negotiations with the leaders of the military movement. At first, there appeared but little prospect of an arrangement. Cherif Pasha asked that, on condition of his undertaking the government, and guaranteeing the personal safety of the leaders of the movement, the mutinous regiments should withdraw to the posts assigned to them. The more violent amongst the officers had, however, got the upper hand. They did not fear Turkish intervention, the probability of which now began to be discussed. Indeed, there was some reason to suppose that the mutineers had received encouragement from Constantinople. Cherif Pasha's terms were rejected, and he de- clared that he would not undertake to form a Ministry. Under these circumstances, the Khedive intimated that he was " ready to yield everything in order to save public security." Suddenly, however, on September 13, things took a turn for the better. The relief came from an un- expected quarter. Arabi had summoned to Cairo the members of the Chamber of Notables. When they arrived, "they proved more capable of appreciating the true situation than their military allies. Informed of the negotiations going on with Cherif Pasha, they in a body went to him, and entreated him to agree to form a Ministry, offering him their personal guarantee that, if he consented, the army should engage to absolute submission to his orders. The military leaders seem to have been 188 MODERN EGVrT n. n more struck by this conduct than by all the previous representations made to them." Seeing that public opinion was not altogetlier witli them, Arabi and his followers moditied their tone. They tendeitd their "absolute submission to the autliority of Cherif Paslia as the Khedive's Mhiister." They only made two conditions. One was that Mahmoud Pasha Sami should be reinstated in office. The second was that the INIilitary Law recommended by the Commission, which had been recently sitting, should be put into immediate execution. "To both of these demands," Sir Charles Cookson wrote, " Cherif Pasha, most reluctantly, was compelled to yield, but as to the latter, he expressly reserved to himself the liberty of omitting the most important article, which proposed to raise the army to 18,000 men." This incident was significant. It showed that there were two parties in opposition to the Khedive. These were, first, a mutinous army half-mad with fear of punishment, and secondly, a party, the offspring of Ismail Pasha's dalliance with con- stitutionalism, who had some vague national aspirations, and who, as representing the civil elements of society, shunned the idea of absolute military government. Under statesmanlike guid- ance, this tendency to separation between the two parties might perhaps have been turned to account. The main thing was to prevent amalgamation. If the national party were once made to believe that the only hope of realising its aspirations lay in seeking the aid of the soldiers, not only would the authority of the Khedive disappear altogether, but all hope of establishing a regime under which the army would be subordinate to the civil Government would have to be abandoned. One of the many political apophthegms attributed to Prince Bismarck is the following: OH. XI MUTINY OF THE ARMY 189 '*La politique est I'art de s'aceommoder aux circon- stances et de tirer parti de tout, meme de ce qui deplait." It would have been wise for the Khedive at this moment to have acted on the principle set forth in this maxim. The military party and the national j^arty were alike distasteful to him. The interests both of his dynasty and of his country pointed, however, to the necessity of conciliating the latter in order to keep in check the former of these two parties. Unfortunately, the Khedive did not possess sufficient political insight to grasp whatever opportunities the situation offered to him. The new Ministry was nominated on September 14. Cherif Pasha was assured of the support of the British and French Governments. At his own request, he was further assured that " in case the army should show itself submissive and obedient, the Governments of England and France would interpose their good offices with the Sublime Porte in order to avert from Egypt an occupation bv an Ottoman army." The usual exchange of letters took place between the Khedive and his Prime Minister setting forth the principles which were to guide the new Ministry. These letters contained only one remark which is noteworthy. Cherif Pasha was no friend to European interference in Egypt. But he had learnt that it might be productive of some good. His letter to the Khedive, therefore, contained the following passage: "The institution of the Control, at first criticised from different points of view, has greatly assisted towards the re -establishment of the finances, at the same time that it has been a real support for the Government of Your Highness. In this twofold capacity, it is important to main- tain it as instituted by the Decree of November 15, 1879." To this, the Khedive rephed as 190 MODERN EGYPT pt. n follows : ** A perfect understanding between the Control and my Government is necessary ; it must be maintained and strengthened." • The new jMinistry, therefore, began work with such props from without as were possible under the circumstances. But for all tliat, it was clear that the real masters of the situation were the leaders of the mutinous army. Arabi had already treated on equal terms with the representatives of the Powers. He had issued a Circular on Sep- tember 9 signed " Colonel Ahmed Arabi, repre- senting the Egyptian army," in which he assured the Consuls-General that he and those actiu"; in concert with him " would continue to protect the interests of all the subjects of friendly Powers." There could be no mistakins: this lano-uao'e. It was that of a ruler who disposed of power to assert his will, and who intended to use his power with that object. Yet, whilst Arabi was heading a mutiny against his Sovereign, and employing language which could only lawfully proceed from the Khedive or from one of his Ministers, there can be little doubt that his conduct was mainly guided by fear of the Khedive's resentment and vengeance. Sir Charles Cookson thought that the officers had " exclusively regarded their own safety and interest throughout the ao-itation." Sir Edward INIalet entertained a similar opinion. Every word and deed of the mutineers showed, indeed, that fear was the pre- dominating infiuence at work amongst them. In the Circular which Arabi addressed to the repre- sentatives of the Powers, he said : *' Since the Khedive's returti to Cairo, intrigues have been on the hicrease, while we have been threatened both o])enly and secretly ; and they have culminated in an attempt to create disunion among the military, in order to facilitate the object in view, namely, cH. XI MUTINY OF THE ARMY 191 to destroy and avenge themselves upon us. In this state of things, we consider it our duty to protect our lives and interests." Sir Edward Malet was informed by "a Musulman gentleman, who had had long and frequent conversations " with Arabi, that the latter thought that action had become absolutely necessary in self-defence. At a later period, Arabi said that he believed that a party of Circassians agreed together to kill him, as well as every native Egyptian holding a high appoint- ment, on October 1, 1881. "We heard," he said, "that three iron boxes had been prepared into which to put us, so that we might be dropped into the Nile."^ ]Men in this frame of mind would probably not, at an early stage of the proceedings, have been uncontrollable. But, in order to control them, one condition was essential. They might have been treated with severity, or, if that was impossible or undesirable, with leniency, but in either case it was essential that they should be treated in a manner which would leave no doubt in their minds as to the good faith of their rulers. Moreover, the practices which until a recent period had existed in Egypt, notably the fate of Ismail Pasha's Finance Minister,^ the natu- rally suspicious character of Orientals, and their belief, which is often 'well founded, that some intrigue lies at the bottom of every action of the Government, should have rendered it clear to the Khedive that the slightest whisper imputing bad faith would be fatal to his reputation for loyalty. The utmost caution was, in fact, necessary. A bold, straightforward conduct, and a stern repres- sion of all palace intrigues, might perhaps have quieted the fears of the officers. Riaz Pasha, although he may not have grasped the whole * " Instructions to my Counsel," Nineteenth Century, December 1882. 2 Vide ante, p. 26. 192 MODERN EGYPT vr. ii situation, liad sufficiently statesmanlike instincts to appreciate the true nature of the danger. He warned the Kliedive frequently not to do or say anything which could give rise to the least sus- picion as to his intentions. It is improbable tliat the Khedive had any deliberate plan for wreaking vengeance on the mutineers. It is certain that his humane nature would have revolted at any idea of assassination, such as was attributed to him. At the same time, if he had considered himself suffi- ciently powerful to act, he would not improbably have made his dis])leasure felt in one form or another, in spite of the pardon which had been reluctantly wrung from him. Like Macbeth, he would not play false, but yet would wrongly win. It would be in harmony with the inconsistency even of an honest Oriental to pardon fully, and at the same time to make a mental reserve, which would enable him at some future time to act as though the pardon had only been partial. He allowed his surroundings, which almost always exercise a baneful influence in an Oriental court, to intrigue and to talk in a manner which was calculated to excite the fears and suspicions of the mutineers. Arabi, in his Circular to the Consuls- General, made special allusion to the intrigues of Yousuf Pasha Kemal, the Khedive's agent, and Ibrahim Aga, the Khedive's Tutunji (Pipe-bearer), who, he said, " had been sowing discord." National proclivities and foreign intrigue may, therefore, have had something to do with the mutiny of September 9, but there can be little doubt that the main cause was truly stated by Arabi. It was fear. This was the third mutiny of the Egyptian army. On each occasion, the mutineers gained confidence in tlieir strength. On each occasion, the submission of the Government was more complete CH.XI MUTINY OF THE ARMY 193 than previously. The first mutiny was quelled by the sacrifice of an unpopular Minister (Nubar Pasha), whom the ruling Khedive did not wish to maintain in office. On the second occasion, the War Minister (Osman Pasha Rifki) was offered up to appease the mutineers. On the third occasion, the mutineers dictated their own terms attlie point of the bayonet ; they did not rest satisfied without a complete change of Ministry. " Things bad begun make strong themselves by ill." No rem- nant of military discipline was now left. The Khedive was shorn of all real authority. Tiie smallest incident would suffice to show that tlie Ministers only held office on sufferance from the mutineers. No long time was to elapse before such an incident occurred. VOL. I CHAPTER XII THE CHERIF MINISTRY September-December 1881 The Porte wishes to interfere — Objections of France and England- Despatch of Turkish Commissioners to Cairo — Effect of their mission — British and French ships sent to Alexandria — Arabi leaves Cairo with his regiment — Remarks on Turkish interference — Divergent views of Finance and England — Despondency of the Khedive — Che'rif Pasha's policy — Sir Auckland Colvin's views — Arabi's policy — Insubordination in the army — Violence of the local press — Attitude of the civil population — Summary of the situation at the end of 1881. One of the first results of the events related in the last chapter was to stimulate the ambition of the Sultan, who saw, in the confusion with whicli Egypt was threatened, another opportunity for reasserting Turkish supremacy over the country. There was, indeed, a good deal to cause anxiety to a ruler whose o^vn tenure of power was so far precarious in that it was, and still is mainly based on the jealousies of the different heirs to his succession. Arabi had sent a petition to Con- stantinople stating that Egypt was falling into the hands of foreigners and being Christianised, and tliat, unless the Sultan intervened, the country would soon share the fate of Tunis. From the Sultan's point of view, it was not desirable to discourage Arabi too much, and accordingly some slight encouragement was given to him. But, whilst running with the hare, it was also necessary 194 cH. XII THE CHERIF MINISTRY 195 to hunt with the hounds. Heterodox political views were in the air. There was some vague talk of an Egyptian constitution. Now, the Sultan objected strongly to the introduction of constitu- tional government into any part of the Ottoman dominions. Then, again, tliere had been whispers of a secret movement which was on foot with a view to the establishment of an Arab kingdom in Egypt and Syria. If this were done, what would become of the homogeneity of the Ottoman Empire, and, indeed, of the House of Osman itself? From the days when Sobieski repulsed the Turks from the walls of Vienna, the Ottoman Empire had been steadily declining. One province after another had been torn from its flank. For the moment, the onward march of European civilisation took no very militant form ; but it was probable that the combat, which had been going on for a couple of centuries or more, would sooner or later be renewed, and, if it were renewed, it might well be that, although the Christian Powers might quarrel over the heritage, the fate of the rightful heir would be sealed. The House of Osman might have to abandon its European possessions. In that case, the only refuge left would be to establish the Khalifate somewhere on the other side of the Bosphorus, notably at Baghdad, which, according to ancient tradition, was to be the Dar-el-Selam (the House of Peace) of the dynasty of Osman. The establishment of an Arab kingdom, more especially if it was to be encumbered with new- fangled ideas of constitutions and the like, would materially interfere with the execution of a policy of this sort. Any such proposal was, therefore, to be resisted as strongly as possible. The first idea of the Sultan was to occupy the country with Turkish troops. Early in September 1881, preparations were made to transport an 196 MODERN EGYPT ft. ii Ottoman force to Egypt. The French Govern- ment, liowever, true to their traditional policy, entertained strong objections to any Turkish inter- ference in Egypt. The British Government were also of opinion that " it would not be desirable that any active measures of repression should be taken by the Sultan until, at all events, the necessity for them had been clearly demonstrated, and the method to be adopted had been discussed and agreed upon. But they saw no objection to the Sultan, if His Majesty should be so disposed, sending, with the consent of England and France, a Turkish General to Egypt to support the Khedive's authority, and aid His Highness with his advice." The French Government, however, thought that " even the despatch of a Turkish General to Egypt might lead to further steps, resulting, perhaps, in a permanent occupation of the country by Turkish troops." The British Government yielded to the French representations on this subject, and on September 18, Lord Dufferin, who was at the time Ambassador at Constantinople, was instructed, in the event of the Sultan pro- posing to send a Turkish General to Cairo, "to endeavour to dissuade His Majesty from adopting this course." The French Ambassador at Con- stantinople had already received instructions "to protest against any sort of intervention on the part of Turkey in Egyptian affairs." If, however, Turkish troops could not be sent to Egypt ; if the deposition of Tewfik Pasha in favour of Halim Pasha, which was also con- templated, was ini})ossible by reason of British opposition ; if, moreover, the idea of despatching a Turkish General to Egypt had to be abandoned, at all events a sort of shadowy supremacy would be asserted if a Turkish official were sent in some kind of capacity to Egypt, even although neither CH. XII THE CHERIF MINISTRY 197 the envoy nor the Sultan had any very clear idea of what functions he would perform on arrival. The Sultan, therefore, informed the French Ambassador "that he considered, in view of Turkey's enormous interests both in Egypt and the Hedjaz, that he had a perfect right to despatch an emissary with his compliments and advice to the Khedive, and this he intended to do, though the person would not have the character of a Commissioner." Ali Fuad Bey and Ali Nizami Pasha were, therefore, sent to Egypt, and arrived at Alexandria on October 6. The effect of the despatch of these envoys was instantaneous on all the parties concerned. Every one recognised that the Sultan had S(ime sort of technical right to interfere. Some recognised that, in an extreme case, his interference would be the least of many evils. Others were anxious to play with Turkish suzerain rights in order to subserve their own interests. But there was one point on which Lord Granville,^ M. Barthelemy St. Hilaire, Cherif Pasha, Arabi, the Egyptian military party, the Egyptian national party, the bondholding interest, and the public opinion of Europe, appeared to be agreed. It was that Turkish interference in Egypt would do a great deal of harm, and was to be avoided if possible. The British and French Governments informed the Sultan that they had "learnt with surprise and regret " of the decision to send envoys. Sir Edward Malet and M. Sienkiewicz were instructed "to receive the Turkish envoys with all the honours due to their rank, but to firmly oppose any inter- ference on their part in the internal administration of Egypt." Moreover, both the British and French Governments suddenly found out that, "with a ^ Lord Granville assumed charge of the Foreiffn Office on April 28, 1880. 198 MODERN EGYPT pt.ii view to diminishing the danger of a panic amongst tlie foreign popuhition in Cairo and Alexandria, which tlie absence of a phice of refuge might occasion amongst them in the event of disturb- ances," it would be desirable to send a couple of ships to Alexandria, a measure which gave con- siderable umbrage at Constantinople. It was calculated, the Sultan thought, " to cause agitation and disturbance among the whole Arab population, and it was not improbable that it might lead to a general revolution." To the Khedive, the intelligence that two Turkish envoys were to come to Cairo was " altogether un- expected," and he asked Sir Edward Malet and ]M. Sienkiewicz whether they "could throw any light upon it"; to which question, Sir Edward Malet reported, *' we replied in the negative." As regards Cherif Pasha, he was of opinion that, as two Turkish envoys were to come, the main thing was to get rid of them as soon as possible. Accordingly, at the request of the Egyptian Government, the British and French Ambassadors at Constantinople were instructed to " urge upon the Porte that they should shorten as much as possible the stay of the Turkish envoys in Egypt." A considerable effect was also produced on Arabi. He was willing enough to strengthen his own cause against Circassians and Europeans by an appeal to the Sultan, but he never intended that the appeal should be taken seriously. There was, indeed, something strangely inconsistent, not to say comical, m asking the Sultan to countenance a movement which was avowedly directed against Turkish supremacy in Egypt. Arabi, therefore, made no further difficulties about moving his mutinous regiment from Cairo to Suez. " He had always said," Sir Edward Malet reported, " that he was ready to go, but no date liad been fixed for CH.XII THE CHERIF MINISTRY 199 his departure, and he himself had spoken about leaving perhaps in three weeks, but I have little doubt that there would have been considerable difficulty in inducing him to fix a day had it not been for the unexpected announcement of the advent of the envoys." Under all these circumstances, it was clear that the Turkish mission could not be productive of much practical result. As a matter of fact, all that the Turkish envoys did was to inspect the troops at Cairo. After the inspection, Ali Nizami l^asha harangued the officers. He reminded them that the Khedive was the representative of the Sultan, and that therefore disobedience to the Khedive wan disobedience to the Sultan. After that, nothing- more was done. The pressure exerted from all sides on the Turkish envoys with a view to getting them out of the country was too great to be resisted. The question, however, arose as to which were to leave first, the British and French ships, or the Turkish envoys. Musurus Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador in London, told Lord Granville "that it would be im- possible for the Sultan to withdraw his mission until after the departure of the ships." Lord Granville, on the other hand, said that the ships had already left Malta for Alexandria, but would not arrive till October 19, "by Mhich time it was to be presumed that the Turkish Commis- sioners would be taking their departure." Lord Dufferin was instructed to tell the Sultan that the ships would leave on the same day that the Turkish Commissioners embarked. M. Barthelemy St. Hilaire also told Lord Lyons that when once the Turkish envoys had gone, both ships might (juit Alexandria without delay, and simultaneously. Both Governments were of opinion that, after the departure of the envoys, there was no longer any 200 MODERN EGYPT pt. n necessity to provide a place of refuge for Europeans in the event of disturbance. The result of all this diplomatic skirmishing was that H.M.S. Invincible arrived at Alexandria on October 19. Twenty- four hours before her arrival, the Turkish envoys had left Cairo for Alexandria with a view to embarkation at that port, and twenty-four hours after her arrival both the British and French ships left Alexandria harbour. This episode has been narrated at some length, because an important principle was involved in the discussion connected with the mission of the Turkish envoys. Who, as a last resort, was to be responsible for the maintenance of order in Egypt ? It is a most unfortunate thing that at no stage of the Egyptian Question has it been possible to make any suggestion against which valid objec- tions might not be urged. Turkish intervention in Egypt was open to obvious objections; but could any alternative and less objectionable policy be suggested ? The British Government thought not; they, therefore, from the first leant towards the idea that, as a last resort, the Sultan should be used as the Deus ex machina^ who should restore order. They were, however, so hampered by their partnership with the French as to be unable to give effect to their own views. Both the British and French Governments were honestly desirous of acting together. M. Barthelemy St. Hilaire said that "his policy with reference to Egypt was well known, and never varied ; it was summed up in the absolute necessity, as in the past, so in the future, of perfect frank- ness between the two Governments, and joint action on every occasion." There cannot be the least doubt that these words honestly represented the views of the French Government at this time, and that the desire to co-operate was as honestly cH.xii THE CHERIF MINISTRY 201 reciprocated by the British Government. Un- fortunately, the views of the British and French Governments were divergent on one impoitant point of j)rinciple. The French Government regarded Turkish intervention in Egypt as the worst possible solution of the Egyptian Question. M. Bartlielemy St. Hilaire told the British Charge d' Affaires that he would prefer an Anglo-French to a Turkish occupation of Egypt. Moreover, the French Government feared tliat, if Turkish inter- vention were allowed, the pretensions of the Sultan would be raised and his prestige increased amongst the Mohammedan population of Northern Africa. Thus, a spirit of fanaticism might be aroused in Tunis. The objections of the British Government to Turkish intervention, on the other hand, were far less strong than those of the French. This was evidenced by their willingness to allow the Sultan to send a Turkish General to Egypt, although, at the instance of the French Government, they ultimately withdrew their su})port to this measure. If any armed occupation became necessary, the British Government preferred that it should be Turkish rather than Anglo - French. But they allowed French diplomacy to take the lead, and the main end of French diplomacy was to prevent any Turkish interference in Egypt. When the Egyptian Question was subsequently (July 24, 1882) discussed in Parliament, Lord Salisbury said : " There were two modes of going to work with the Government of Egypt. You might have used moral force as you have made use of material force. ^ Your only mode of acting by moral force is by means of the hearty co-operation of the Sultan of Turkey. But you took the best * This was in allusion to the bombardment of Alexandria^ which, when Lord Salisbury spoke, had recently taken place. 202 MODERN EGYPT pt. ii means of alienating that hearty co-operation. If you had gone to him from the first, taken him into your counsels, and made him the instrument of what you desired, and indicated from the first that you wished to take no steps without his concurrence and co-operation, there might iiave been objections to such a plan ; but, at least, you would have had him heartily with you." Lord Salisbury then indi- cated various steps which had been taken, and which, in his opinion, must "in themselves have resulted in setting any Sultan of Turkey in opposition." There was much force in Lord Salisbury's criti- cism. In October 1881, the necessity for armed foreign intervention of any kind had not yet arisen. Lord Granville was, witlu)ut doubt, acting wisely in deprecating measures of repression on the part of the Sultan until their necessity had been clearly demon- strated. On the other hand, it was apparent that Egypt was threatened with a degree of confusion against which moral force, persuasion, or even threats would be employed in A^ain. It was, there- fore, necessary at the outset to have a clear idea as to the method by which physical force was to be employed in case of need. There were but two alternative courses possible. One was an Anglo- French occupation, for at that time no one thought of an occupation by France or by England alone. The other was a Turkish occupation. The French preferred an Anglo - French occupation as the lesser evil of the two. Their views were ])erfectly logical and consistent, and, for a time at all events, the French Government acted upon them. Whether the policy they advocated was the best in the true interests of France or England is a matter of opinion. The British Government, on the other hand, contemplated the possibility of a 'J'urkish occupa- cH. XII THE CHERIF MINISTRY 203 tion, and preferred this solution to any other. In a despatch addressed to Sir Edward JNJalet on November 4, 1881, Lord Granville laid down the general lines of British policy in connection with Egyptian affairs. He deprecated the idea that either the French or the British Government entertained any " self - aggrandising designs " as regards Egypt. " The Khedive and his Ministers," he added, " may feel secure that Her Majesty's Government contemplate no such deviation from the policy which they have traced for themselves." He set forth the British view of the Turkish con- nection with Egypt. It was that the status quo should be maintained. The tie with Turkey should not be severed. At the same time, Lord Granville pointed out that the British Government " desired to maintain Egypt in the enjoyment of the measure of administrative independence which has been secured to her by the Sultan's Firmans. The Government of England would run counter to the most cherished traditions of national history were it to entertain a desire to diminish that liberty or tamper with the institutions to which it has given birth." Lord Granville then went on to say that "the only circumstance which would force Her Majesty's Government to depart from the course of conduct which he had mentioned would be the occurrence in Egypt of a state of anarchy." These were wise words. They indicated that Turkish intervention was undesirable, but that, if material force had to be employed, a Turkish was to be preferred to an Anglo-French occupation. Unfortunately, while the British Government contemplated using the Turk, with all his obvious defects, as the instrument by which order was as a last resort to be maintained in Egypt, they allowed themselves to be led away by the objections which could be urged against Turkish intervention 204 MODERN EGYPT it. ii considered exclusively on its own merits. They fol- lowed the French Government in a line of conduct which irritated and discouraged the Sultan. As the Sultan's military forces might eventually have to be used for the preservation of order, it would have been wise to have encouraged the exercise of his authority by viewing with a friendly eye the despatch of a Turkish mission to Egypt, in spite of the objections urged from Cairo in deprecation of the mission. But this was not done. The Sultan was discouraged and opposed in the exercise of his authority. The British Government thus entered a groove hostile to Turkish intervention, with the result that British intervention became eventually a necessity. It is, of course, true that this subject presents another aspect. So far as the welfare of the Egyptian people and of all Europeans interested in the affairs of Egypt is concerned, European inter- vention, whether British, French, or Anglo-French, was to be preferred to Turkish intervention. But, on the assumption that it was desirable to avoid the occupation of Egypt by British or French troops, it would appear that Turkish intervention, in spite of its acknowledged drawbacks, should, from the first, have been less totally discouraged. It is curious, in reading over the correspond- ence after a lapse of many years, to observe how heartily the French Government worked to bring about the solution which eventually occurred, and which was probably more distasteful to them than any other, namely, a British occupation of Egyp:. The British Government, on the other hand, acted throughout on the principle of J'^ideo meliora, pro- boque, deteriora sequor. They saw the objections to any European occupation. They preferred a Turkish occupation. Yet, although they appear to have shown greater political foresight than the CH.XII THE CHERIF MINISTRY 205 French, they failed to act in a manner which would have enabled effect to be given to their own principles. The more unreasonable amongst the French eventually said that England, with her habitual perfidy, was merely playing a part with a view ultimately to bring about a British occupation. They were quite wrong. The British Govern- ment acted, as they always act, with perfect honesty, but, at the same time, with so little consistency in the pursuit of political aims, that it can be no matter for surprise that their motives should have been subsequently misrepresented. Their vacilla- tion was, without doubt, due to a desire to ensure French co-operation, and also probably in part to an excessive deference to English public opinion. The idea of handing over Egypt, even temporarily, to the rule of the Sultan would unquestionably have met with much hostile criticism in England, probably from the same classes who were eventu- ally most strongly opposed to a British occupation. But it can scarcely be held that this argument constituted a sufficient plea for discarding the policy. No one would have been able to pro- pose any alternative policy which would have been preferable. The duty of a Government is to take the lead, especially as regards foreign affairs, and to stand criticism even, when matters of the first importance are concerned, at the risk of bringing about its own downfall. Shortly after the mutiny of September 9, Sir Edward Malet reported that the "general tone of the Khedive with regard to the future was despondent. His Highness said that he could no longer believe in any professions of fidelity made by the officers of the army." These observations gave the keynote to the Khedive's conduct during the next few months. He resented the humilia- tion to which he had been subjected by the 206 MODERN EGYPT pt. ii mutinous conduct of his officers. It rankled in his mind, and led him to nurture schemes for revenge. He constantly expressed his opinion that there could be no tranquillity in the country until the army was mastered. It can be no matter for surprise that the Khedive entertained views of this description, but it would have been wiser and more statesmanlike if he had sunk all personal feelings of resentment against the army. As it was, the breach between the Khedive on the one hand, and the army and the national party on the other hand, continued to widen every day. Cherif Pasha took a broader view of the situa- tion. He appreciated the desirability of separating the national party from the army. He told Sir Edward Malet on September 21 "that it was his intention later on to convoke the Chamber of Notables, which he hoped would by degrees become the legitimate exponent of the internal wants of the country, and by this means deprive the army of the character which it had arrogated to itself in the late movement. . . . The Notables would be a representative body on which the Khedive and his Government would be able to lean for popular support against military dictation." On October 8, a Decree was issued convoking the Chamber of Notables for December 23. The functions and composition of the Chamber were regulated by Ismail Pasha's law of 1866. Arabi pressed for the adoption of a law giving greater power to the Chamber, but eventually yielded. Sir Edward JNIalet reported on October 2 that Arabi once more "professed confidence in Cht^rif Pasha, and stated his intention of leaving the matter entirely in his hands." The situation at this time was well described in a Memorandum written by Sir Auckland Colvin on September 19. "As to the position," he said, CH.XII THE CHERIF MINISTRY 207 *' my view of it is that it is essentially an armistice. The arrangement we have been able to come to gives us a little breathing-time, during which we can take count of the forces that are at work around us, and endeavour to guide or repress them. There should be no illusions on this point. That we are entering on a fresh period of order and regularity, there seem to be no grounds for believ- ing. The army is elated by what it has achieved, and its leaders are penetrated with the conviction that their mission is to give Egypt liberty. The Notables, who are now in large numbers in Cairo, though they have taken into their own hands the right to ask for an extension of civil liberties, and deny the officers any right of petition or of inter- ference in the matter, are at one with them in the desire to obtain some solid concessions. All is being done in an orderly and everj exemplary manner : but the chance of any final settlement depends : — "(1) On the army dispersing to the several quarters assigned to it. " (2) On the moderation shown by the Notables in their demands. *' (3) On the tact and firmness of the Ministers in dealing with the army and the Notables. . . . *' I do not think it is at all my duty to oppose myself to the popular movement, but to try rather to guide and to give it definite shape. So long as the financial position of the country, or the influ- ence of the Control, is not likely to be affected by concessions made to the Notables, I believe I should be very foolish to express any hostility to their wishes. It is in this sense that I propose to act, and to advise Cherif Pasha when the matter is ripe for discussion. It is, to sum up, by advis- ing promptness in carrying out the necessary measures with the army, and, in the second place, 208 MODERN EGYPT pt. ii by reasonable discussion of any petitions presented by the Notables, that we can alone hope to assist in converting the armistice into a peace." Sir Auckland Colvin rightly judged the situation. Cherif Pasha was the nominal Prime JNIinister but Arabi, as Sir Edward Malet said, was the "arbiter of the destinies of the country." A local newspaper, Kl Hedjaz, which was the organ of the Arabist party, spoke of " the illustrious and magnanimous Emir, His Excellency Ahmed Bey Arabi." When Arabi received orders to leave Cairo with his regiment, he did not take his departure as a simple Colonel in command of a battalion. He made a sort of royal progress through the streets of Cairo, which were crowded with spectators on the occasion. He was received with enthusiasm, and, on arrival at the railway station, he harangued the troops. " Une ere nouvelle," he said, " vient de s'ouvrir pour I'Egypte, et grace aux hommes places a la tete des aftaires, en qui nous devons avoir toute confiance, I'heure du developpe- ment et de la prosperite vient de sonner pour nous. Kendons hommage aux qualites et merites qui distinguent les membres du nouveau Cabinet ; et en })articulier a Mahmoud Pacha Sami, notre JNIinistre de la Guerre . . . Je voudrais que vous puissiez comprendre tons, quelle giorieuse mission est reservee a une armee bien unie, bien com- mandee, bien disciplinee, et ne marchant que vers un but unique, le bien de la patrie. Vous avez une force entre les mains, et tons reunis vous en representez une invincible."^ A little later, a fete was given iit Zagazig in honour of Arabi. About 1000 pe()})le were ])resent, "all patriots" having been invited to attend. Arabi was received with ' This speech was, of course, delivered in Arabic. Hie French translation, quoted above, was subsequently published in the local newspapers. CH.XII THE CHERIF MINISTRY 209 enthusiasm. He made a speech in which he insisted on the necessity of reforms, inveighed against the employment of Europeans in Egypt, and said that he had three regiments in Cairo on whom he could rely to carry out his behests. Whilst, however, in public Arabi incited hatred to Europeans, in private he used a different language. On November 1, Arabi, Ali Bey Fehmi, and Toulba Bey Ismet had an intervicAv with Sir Auckland Colvin. Arabi "described the Govern- ment of the Mamelukes and that of the present dynasty as being equally oppressive to the Arab population. His point was to show that up to the present the Egyptians have had no security for life or property. They were imprisoned, exiled, strangled, thrown into the Nile, starved, and robbed accord- ing to the will of their masters. A liberated slave was a freer man than a freeborn Arab. The most ignorant Turk was preferred and honoured before the best of the Egyptians. He illustrated his statement by the case of the Mufettish.^ He then went on at great lengtli to explain that men came of one common stock and had equal rights of personal liberty and security. The development of this theme took some considerable time, and was curious in its naive treatment, but it evidently was the general outcome of the speaker's laboured thoughts, and was the expression, not of rhetorical periods, but of conviction. Passing on to the bearing of his reasoning on facts, he said that on the 1st February the Circassian rule (by which he meant the arbitrary Turkish regime) had fallen in Egypt ; on the 9th September, the necessity of substituting for it the era of law and justice had been recognised and established. It was for law and justice that he and the army contended. He disclaimed in the plainest words the desire to get ' Ismail Pasha's Fiuauce Minister, who was assassinated in 187G. VOL. I P 210 MODERN EGYPT ft. ii rid of Europeans, whether as employes or residents ; he spoke of them as the necessary instructors of the people. He himself and the two officers (pointing to them) had never been to school. Intercourse with Europeans had been their school. He and all felt the need of it ; they had no wish to question the need of Europeans in the adminis- tration ; on the contrary, if more were required let them come. . . . The impression left on my mind was that Arabi, who spoke with great moderation, calmness, and conciliation, is sincere and resolute, but is not a practical man. The exposition, not the execution of ideas, is his strength. The other two Colonels are clearly more practical men, and act, I should say, as a sedative on Arabi, when his views excite and stimulate him too dangerously." Whilst the leading officers of the army were thus assuming the role of demagogues, the dis- cipline of the men became daily more and more shaken. Early in November, a couple of soldiers, who had been arrested by the police for brawling, were forcibly released by their comrades from the guard-house to which they had been conveyed. A little later, the Government decided to change the Colonel of the artillery quartered in Cairo, but the soldiers of the regiment opposed the change, and declared that they would not obey any new Colonel who might be appointed. Their opposition was overcome, but not without considerable con- cessions having been made to them. About the same time, the band of a regiment quartered at Cairo refused to obey an order to play at the theatre. The troops at Suez also showed signs of insubordination, due to a soldier having been murdered by an Italian. These symptoms were sufficient to indicate that there was no public force in Egypt on whom reliance could be placed to maintain order. OH. XII THE CHElilF MINISTRY 211 In the meanwhile, the minds of the civil popula- tion were excited by the vernacular press, whicli attacked Europeans and their systems of govern- ment with virulence and appealed to JNloham- medan fanaticism. " We are the prey," wrote one of these newspapers, "of two lions, England and France, who are watching for the favourable moment to realise their designs, hidden under a deceptive policy. . . . One day we hope to see our administrations cleared of all Europeans, and on that day we can say tliat England and France have rendered us a great service, for which we shall really thank them." " Some people," another news- paper wrote, *' pretend tliat fanaticism is ruinous to progress, yet our best days were tliose in which we conquered the Universe by devotion to our faith. To-day we have neglected it, and we and our country are in the hands of strangers, but our mis- fortunes are a just punishment for our sins. O ye Ulema of El-Azhar! wliose sacred duty it should be to combat this religious decadence, what will be your answer at the Day of Judg- ment to Flim who can read the secrets of your hearts ? " Writings of this sort naturally led to retorts from the local European press. A French paper, U f^'gijpte, described Osman, the third of the Khalifs, as " le fanatique heritier d'un faux pro- phete." The editor's life was threatened, and he left the country. His newspaper was suppressed, as also was El Hedjaz, a newspaper which had specially distinguished itself by the violence of its language in support of Pan-Islamic views. "The suppression of this newspaper," Sir Edward JNlalet wrote, "especially while Arabi Bey was still at Cairo, was regarded as a sign of returning authority to the Government ; and consequently had the effect of, to some degree, restoring confidence." 212 MODERN EGYPT ft. ii In spite of all this inflammatory literature, the mass of the people remained for some time in- different to all that was passing. Eventually, however, the insubordination, whicli had shown itself in the army, began to spread to the civil population. This it was sure to do, for the reason given by Sir Auckland Colvin in a JNIemorandum dated September 24. " What," he said, " gives a show of justification to the recent conduct of the army and gives them support among great numbers of the respectable Egyptians, is that there is a great deal of truth in their complaints. They are sure of sympathy when they ask for justice, and protest against acts of arbitrary violence. The only way in which the Government can deprive them of the influence which they acquire by their appeal is by taking the game out of their hands." When the year 1881 closed, therefore, the con- dition of affairs was as follows. The Khedive was brooding over the humiliation inflicted on him by his mutinous army, and was desirous of an oppor- tunity to reassert his authority. Cherif Pasha was inspired by some statesmanlike principles, and was endeavouring to regain the legitimate authority of the Government, but he was wanting in the energy and strength of character necessary to control the turbulent elements which had been let loose. He was ably seconded by Sir Edward Malet and by Sir Auckland Colvin. Arabi was the real ruler of the country. He had the army at his back. Early in January 1882, he was appointed Under - Secretary of State for War, as " it was thought better that he should belong to the Government than be outside it." The popula- tion of Egypt was discontented, but the junction between the national party and the mutinous army was not complete. The civil element still looked askance at the soldiers. The native press was CH. XII THE CHERIF MINISTRY 213 appealing to Mohammedan fanaticism, and inciting hatred against Europeans. Under circumstances such as these, the utmost care was necessary. In the general ferment which then existed, a false step would be fatal. The British and French Governments were about to take a step which was to be well-nigh destructive of all hope of guiding the movement, and was to render foreign interference of some sort, whether Turkish or European, an almost unavoidable necessity. CHAPTER XIII THE JOINT NOTE January 1882 Proposal to establish an Anglo-French Military Control — Change of Ministry in France — M. Gambetta proposes joint action — Lord Granville agrees — Sir Edward Malet consulted — Sir Auckland Colvin's recommendations — M. Gambetta prepares a draft note — Lord Granville agrees — Instructions sent to Cairo — Proposed increase in the army — Reorganisation of the Chamber of Notables — Eifect produced by the Note — Remarks on the Note. Immediately after the mutiny of September 9, M. Barthelemy St. Hilaire proposed to Lord Granville that a joint Military Control should be established in Egypt. A British and a French General were to be sent to Cairo. These officers, the French Minister thought, "would be able to introduce order and discipline into the Egyptian army." The British Government asked " what consequences would ensue supposing these Generals were set at nought by the Egyptian army." To this question, " INI. Barthelemy St. Hilaire answered that in such a case it might be necessary to make it unmistakably manifest that the Generals had the support of England and France. He spoke in very general terms of a naval demonstration, of the despatch of English and French ships of war to Alexandria, but he did not make any definite pro- posal or suggestion on the subject." The proposal was referred to Cairo, where it was scouted by 214 CH. XIII THE JOINT NOTE 215 Cherif Pasha and by Sir Auckland Colvin. The fact that it should have been made showed how little the French Government realised the true nature of the local situation. At a moment when every endeavour was being made to incite the population against European interference of any kind, it was absurd to suppose that two European Generals could, by mere force of character, have obtained any control over the mutinous army. The only result of sending them would have been to cause another and probably more serious mutiny. This proposal was, therefore, allowed to drop. No further proposal for joint action on the part of England and France was put forward until the middle of December, by which time a change of Ministry had taken place in France. M. Gambetta assumed the direction of affairs. His masterful spirit soon imparted a fresh impulse to Egyptian policy, in which he took a lively personal interest. On December 15, M. Gambetta told Lord Lyons that "he considered it to be extremely important to strengthen the authority of Tewfik Pasha. On the one hand, every endeavour should be made to inspire Tewfik himself with confidence in the support of France and England, and to infuse into him firmness and energy. On the other hand, the enemies of the present system, the adherents of Ismail Pasha and Halim Pasha, and the Egyptians generally should be made to understand that France and England, by whose influence Tewfik has been placed on the throne, would not acquiesce in his being deposed from it. . . , Any interposition on the part of the Porte, M. Gambetta declared emphatically to be, in his opinion, wholly inadmissible. . . . He thought the time was come when the two Govern- ments should consider the matter in common m 216 MODERN EGYPT pt. ii order to be prepared for united and immediate action in case of need." To this communication, Lord Granville replied on December 19 : *' Her JNIajesty's Government quite agree in thinking that the time has come when the two Governments should consider what course had better be adopted by both Governments. Her Majesty's Government also think that it is desirable that some evidence should be given of their cordial understanding ; but that it requires careful consideration what steps should be taken in case of disorder again reappearing." To any one who can read between the lines, this correspondence is instructive. It gives a correct indication of what was to follow. Both Governments were in a frame of mind which is dangerous in politics. They both thought that, in ordinary conversational language, "something must be done." The action of the French Government was directed by a fiery and energetic Minister who could not brook inaction. M. Gam- betta thoroughly understood what he wanted. He wished to bring Egypt under Anglo-French control without an armed occupation, if that were possible ; but if it were impossible, then he would accept the occupation as the best solution of the question. On the other side of the Channel, affairs were directed by a Minister with a far calmer judgment than M. Gambetta, but who was wanting in initiative. It is a dangerous thing in politics for a responsible INlinister to accept vaguely the prin- ci])le that "something must be done," when he has not a clear idea of what should be done. The acceptation of the principle will not improbably lead liim into doing things which he will sub- sequently wish had been left undone. At a later period, Lord Granville was to see that, though there " were objections to every possible course," cH.xin THE JOINT NOTE 217 at the same time, the main question was, "which of them offered the least inconvenience." But he discovered this too late. For the moment, he allowed his headstrong French associate to drag him in a direction opposed to that which, as a choice of evils, he most approved, namely, a Turkish occupation. He was eventually to drift into a solution to which he was much opposed, namely, a British occupation, and it was only by the accident of a change of INIinistry in France that he was prevented from drifting into what was probably the worst solution possible, namely, an Anglo-French occupation. On December 24, M. Gambetta developed some- what more fully the nature of the steps which he thought might advantageously be taken by the British and French Governments. The Chamber of Notables was about to assemble at Cairo. Their meeting would, M. Gambetta thought, "produce a considerable change in the political situation of Egypt." He proposed, therefore, that " the two Governments should instruct their representatives at Cairo to convey collectively to Tewfik Pasha assurances of the sympathy and support of France and England, and to encourage His Highness to maintain and assert his proper authority. . . . This seemed to him a simple and practical measure, to be adopted without delay, and the two Govern- ments might make it a starting-point for consider- ing in concert what further steps they should be ready to take in case of need." Lord Granville communicated M. Gambetta's proposal to Sir Edward Malet, and, on December 26, asked him whether he saw any objection to it. On the following day. Sir Edward Malet replied : " I see no objection to M. Gambetta's ])roposal. The support that the Khedive is most likely to require is towards the maintenance of the independence of 218 JMODERN EGYPT pt. ii the Chamber against the jealousies and suspicions of the Porte." Thereupon, Lord Granville in- structed Lord Lyons to inform JNI. Gambetta that the British Government agreed to his proposal. AA'hen this message was communicated to M. Gambetta, he said that he would prepare a draft of an instruction to the British and French repre- sentatives at Cairo for submission to the British Government. On December 30, Sir Edward Malet tele- graphed to Lord Granville stating that it would be desirable to await the arrival of a despatch then on its way from Cairo before deciding on the terms of the communication which was to be addressed to the Egyptian Government. "It would be unadvisable," Sir Edward Malet added, "that the Khedive should be encouraged to hope that we would support him in maintaining an attitude of reserve towards the Chamber. It has been con- voked with the full approval of Cherif Pasha, who looks to it for success and support. To discoun- tenance it would be to play into the hands of the Porte, increase the influence of the military, and diminish that which we are now obtaining as befriending moderate reform. The reply of the Chamber to the Khedive's speech is stated to be extremely moderate and satisfactory." The despatch to which Sir Edward INIalet alluded in this telegram was dated December 26. It enclosed a remarkable INIemorandum prepared by Sir Auckland Colvin, who wrote as follows : — "The events of the last three months, and the movement still going on in Egypt, must necessarily make itself felt in the relations of Egypt with the two Powers. It will be well to describe briefly what the present movement seems to be, and in what direction it threatens to encroach on the ground held by England and France. CH. XIII THE JOINT NOTE 219 "In its origin, the movement is, I tliink, miquestioiiably an Egyptian movement against Turkish arbitrary rule. The rebound I'rom Ismail Pasha's tyranny, the growing emancipa- tion of the Egyptian mind owing to its close contact with Europeans, and the opportunity given by the anomalous position in which Egypt finds herself in relation severally to Turkey and the two Powers, have immediately led to the events we are now witnessing. Cherif Pasha, having been placed at the head of the movement, partly from conviction but more by weakness, is allowing himself to be carried forward on it, and will, I think, be eventually swept away by it. He is quite incompetent to control, and little able to guide it. " The movement, though in its origin anti-Turk, is in itself an Egyptian national movement. For the moment, it is careful in its attitude towards Europeans because it has need of them in its duel with its immediate opponents, but it cannot look on them with favour, or be animated, aufond^ by any other desire than that of eventually getting rid of them." " So much for the nature of the movement; next, as to the direction in which it threatens to encroach upon the ground now occupied by England and France, *' There will be, I think, a twofold danger : first, a disposition to ignore or modify the engagements by which Egypt is bound ; secondly, to get rid of foreign interference in branches of the administra- tion in regard to which there exists no direct engagement. " With regard to the first point, ... if the right of voting the Budget, in otlier words, control over the finances, is given to the Chamber, the ])osition of the Anglo-French Control will be profoundly 220 MODERN EGYPT pt. ii modified. At present, it is effective because the Council gcverns the country, and in the Council the Control has a seat and an effective voice, whilst it is in constant and intimate relations with the different individuals composing the Cabinet. But it can have no relations, except of the most indirect character, with the Chamber, nor any confidence in the decisions of that irresponsible and ill-histructed body. How, if the Chamber is to vote the Budget, can the Control exercise any useful check on the finances ? The Chamber, doubtless, in voting the Budget, can only do so within the conditions allowed by the Law of Liquidation ; but those conditions are sufiiciently elastic to allow of the finances being misapplied in a degree which would endanger financial equilibrium. " We have caused this to be pointed out to Cherif Pasha, who is said to be prepared to modify his projects in accordance with our views. But whether the Chamber will accept his modification is another matter." As regards the second point, that is to say, the desire to get rid of foreign interference in those branches ojf the administration in respect to which the Egyptian Government were under no distinct international engagement, Sir Auckland Colvin said that "successful attacks on one or more of those administrations would sap the moral influence of the Control, as well as destroy, proportionately as such attacks are successful, the material hold acquired by the Powers in the country." Under these circumstances. Sir Auckland Colvin thouglit that for the guidance of himself and tlie other high British and French officials in Egypt, the " wishes of the two Cabinets should be expressed as to the attitude that they were to assume." He then proceeded to lay the following recom- CH.XIII THE JOINT NOTE 221 mendations before the British Government. "The liberal movement," he said, " now going on should, I think, in no wise be discouraged. It lias many enemies, no less among Europeans than amongst Turks. But I believe it is essentially the growth of tlie popular spirit, and is directed to the good of the country, and that it would be most impolitic to thwart it. But precisely because I wish it to succeed, it seems to me essential that it should learn from the first within what limits it must confine itself. Otherwise, expectations may be formed and hopes raised, the failure of which may lead to its entire discomfiture. In all that is doing or to be done, neither the Government nor the Chamber should be allowed to forget that the Powers have assumed a direct financial control over the country and intend to maintain it. The Powers should not, in my opinion, accept any proposed measures which jeopardise this control, which is essential at present to the well-being of the country, and is, therefore, the main safeguard against the recurrence of an * Egyptian Question.' All that is guaranteed by the Law of Liquidation and preceding Decrees should also be authoritatively placed beyond the pale of discussion. All that is designed to transfer the centre of financial authority from the Control to the Chamber should be especi- ally discountenanced and, if need be, negatived, as neutralising and nullifying the agency through which the Powers assure themselves of the efficient conduct of financial affairs, for which they have made themselves responsible in Egypt. '* At the same time, I should give Cherif Pasha, oi whoever may represent the Government, to understand that he is expected to discourage and oppose popular attacks on European administra- tions, and that the Powers will by no means look with indifference on the success of any such 222 MODERN EGYPT pt. ii attacks. Each of these administrations is in itself, though doubtless with many iin})eifections, a centre of reform. They are the spokes of the wheel representing the Control. . . . The line, it will be thus seen, that I advocate, is the open and firm recognition by the Powers, through their diplomatic agents, at this critical juncture when Egypt is remoulding her internal reorganisation, of the material interest they possess and intend to maintain in the administration, leaving full liberty to the Egyptians to frame what measures they please for their internal government, so far as they are not inconsistent with the status acquired by the Powers. In fact, the Egyptian administration is a partnership of three. Unless the Powers are prepared to modify their share, they must secure and strengthen it, now that the Egyptians are in a state of movement and change. They cannot look on with indifference, and allow matters to be discussed and settled here without some intimation of their views. If a clear understanding is not imposed from the first, much misunderstanding will arise, embittering more, as I think, the relations between us and the Egyptians than would the authoritative declara- tion, now when the Chamber is about to meet, of the intentions of the Powers." Sir Auckland Colvin's INIemorandum has been quoted at length because it is important to ascer- tain what information as regards the situation in Egypt was before the Britisli Government when it was decided to agree to M. Gambetta's proposal. The JNIemorandum was received at the Foreimi Office on January 2. On the same day, the draft note prepared by M. Gambetta, which was to be sent to the British and French Consuls-General at Cairo, readied London. It was couched in the following terms : — CH. XIII THE JOINT NOTE 223 "You have already been instructed on several occasions to inform the Khedive and his Govern- ment of the determination of England and France to afford them support against the difficulties of various kinds which might interfere with the course of public affairs in Egypt. The two Powers are entirely agreed on this subject, and recent circumstances, especially the meeting of the Chamber of Notables convoked by the Khedive, have given them the opportunity for a further exchange of views. I have accordingly to instruct you to declare to the Khedive that the English and French Governments consider the maintenance of His Highness on the tlirone, on the terms laid down by the Sultan's Firmans, and officially recognised by the two Governments, as alone able to guarantee, for the present and future, the good order and development of general prosperity in Egypt, in which France and Great Britain are equally interested. The two Governments being closely associated in the resolve to guard by their united efforts against all cause of complication, internal or external, which might menace the order of things established in Egypt, do not doubt that tlie assurance publicly given of their formal intentions in this respect will tend to avert the dangers to which the Government of the Khedive might be exposed, and which would certainly find England and France united to oppose them. They are convinced that His Highness will draw from this assurance the confidence and strength which he requires to direct the destinies of Egypt and his people." On January 6, the Britisli Government agreed to M. Gambetta's draft, with the reservation "that they must not be considered as committing themselves thereby to any particular mode of action, if action should be found necessary." On 224 MODERN EGYPT ft. ii January 7, M. Gambetta wrote to Lord Lyons : "We observe with pleasure that the only reservation of the Government of the Queen is as to the mode of action to be employed by the two countries when action is considered necessary ; and this is a reservation in which we participate." It was, therefore, four days after the arrival in London of Sir Auckland Colvin's Memorandum, which is quoted above, that the British Govern- ment intimated their acceptance of M. Gambetta's proposals. On January 6, the instructions were telegraphed to Sir Edward Malet. Identic in- structions were at the same time sent by the French Government to M. Sienkiewicz. When these instructions reached Cairo, the local situation was as follows. The Chamber of Notables had been opened by the Khedive on December 26. Sultan Pasha, the President of the Chamber, and Suleiman Pasha Abaza, one of the leading members, replied to the Khedive's opening address in terms expressive of their loyalty and devotion to the public interests. On January 2, Sir Edward Malet reported : " At an interview which I had with the Khedive on the 31st ultimo I found His Highness, for the first time since my return in September, cheerful in mood and taking a hopeful view of the situation. He spoke with much satisfaction of the apparently moderate tendencies of the Delegates, and he expressed his belief that the country would now progress. The change was very noticeable, because His High- ness had, up to the time of the opening of the Chamber, been full of misgiving, and I feared that this feeling was prompted not only by a mistrust of what the Delegates might do, but also by a dislike of the Chamber as an institution." Two difficulties, however, lay aliead. In the first place, the military party wished tlie army cH. XIII THE JOINT NOTE 225 to be increased to 18,000 men, the maximum figure allowed by the Firman of 1879. The Controllers were prepared to grant a certain increase, but they declined, on financial grounds, to give all that the military party desired, and in this matter they were supported by the British Government. Cherif Pasha was at first inclined to go farther than the Controllers approved in the direction of increasing the army. At last, however, " he sided entirely with the Control, and was equally resolved not to give way." On the eve of the meeting of the Chamber, it was decided to fix the Military Budget for 1882 at £E.522,000, an increase of £E. 154,000 over the Budget for the previous year. The Minister of War, however, was not satisfied. He wished for a further increase of about £E. 126,000, which would have enabled the army to be brought up to 18,000 men. The other difficulty was of a different character. The Chamber was convoked under Ismail Pasha's law of 1866. It was known that, when the Chamber met, it would demand larger powers than those conferred by this law. In anticij)ation of such demands, the Egyptian Ministry had prepared new regulations, which were submitted to the Chamber on January 2. In sending these proposals to Lord Granville, Sir Edward JNIalet remarked : " Your Lordship will observe that guarantees are given in these regulations for the observance of the duties of Egypt towards foreign Powers. With the exception of these restrictions, the constitution of the Chamber is extremely liberal, and there is little doubt that, as time goes on, further changes in a liberal direction will be made." It remained to be seen whether the Chamber \vould be satisfied with the proposals of the Government. VOL. I Q 226 MODERN EGYPT pt. n The situation was evidently critical. Still, there was hope that, with very careful guidance, the difficulties of the moment might be overcome, and a complete upset of the State machinery obviated. One main point should surely have been borne in mind before the Joint Note was delivered. It was that a National Party existed in Egypt. On this subject, the British Government appear to have been under a delusion from the first. They thought that the movement was wholly military, and, therefore, undeserving of sympathy. At a later period (July 22, 1882), when British military intervention had become necessary, ]Mr. Gladstone, speaking in the House of Commons, said : "There have been periods in this history at which it has been charitably believed, even in this country, that the military party was the popular party, and was struggling for the liberties of Egypt. There is not the smallest rag or shred of evi- dence to support that contention. . . . Military violence and the regimen established by mili- tary violence are absolutely incompatible with the growth and the existence of freedom. . . . The reign of Cromwell was a great reign, but it did nothinoj for Eng-lish freedom. . . . The reitjn of Napoleon was a splendid reign, but, founded on military power, it did nothing for freedom in France." However true these general principles may be, nothing can be more certain than that at that time there existed in Egypt a national party who were working more or less in co-operation with the military party. Cherif Pasha, who was, as Sir Auckland Colvin said, an Egyptian gi^and seigneur^ and who was one of the dominant race, recognised its existence, and wisely recom- mended a policy which would encourage the CH. XIII THE JOINT NOTE 227 development of the national, at the expense of the military elements in the movement. Sir Edward JNIalet also ^ had distinctly warned the Government of the unwisdom of taking any step which would be construed as one of hostility to the national movement. One of the most able Europeans in Egypt at that time was Sir Auckland Colvin. He was a trained Anglo- Indian official, and was certainly not carried away by any Utopian ideas as to the possibility or desirability of rapidly developing free institutions amongst a backward Oriental people. His official position obliged him to look after the interests of the Egyptian Treasury, but his political insight was too keen to allow of his being deceived as to the true nature of the movement which was in course of progress. He had warned the British Government that "the liberal movement then going on should in no wise be discouraged. Though in its origin anti-Turk, it was in itself an Egyptian national movement." Such, therefore, was the situation in Egypt when the British and French Governments com- municated the Joint Note to their diplomatic representatives in Cairo. The instructions were received at Cairo on the night of January 6. At 5.30 p.m. on the 8th Sir Edward Malet telegraphed to Lord Granville : "My French colleague and I communicated the dual note to the Khedive to-day." " His High- ness," he added, "requested us to express to our respective Governments his sincere gratitude for the solicitude which it showed for his own welfare and that of his people." In an article written by Mr. John Morley in the Fortnightly Review (July 1882), the effect of the Note is described in the following words : " At ' Vide aiifc, |>, -Ul. 228 MODERN EGYPT pt. ii Cairo, the Note fell like a bombshell. Nobody had expected such a declaration, and nobody there was aware of any reason why it should have been launched. What was felt was that so serious a step on such delicate ground could not have been taken without deliberate calculation nor without some grave intention. The Note was, therefore, taken to mean that the Sultan was to be thrust still farther in the background ; that the Khedive was to become more plainly the puppet of England and France ; and that Egypt would, sooner or later, in some shape or other, be made to share the disastrous fate of Tunis. The general effect was, therefore, mischievous in the highest degree. The Khedive was encouraged in his opposition to the sentiments of the Chamber. The military, national, or popular party was alarmed. The Sultan was irritated. The other European Powers were made uneasy. Every element of disturbance was roused into activity." Cherif Pasha called on Sir Edward Malet and M. Sienkiewicz on .Tanuary 10, and said that the "message was regarded, first, as encouraging the Khedive to place himself in antagonism to reform ; secondly, that the wording which connected, as it were, the events of September with tlie opening of the Chamber, showed a spirit unfavourable to the latter ; thirdly, that it indicated a desire to loosen the tie to the Porte ; fourthly, that it contained a menace of intervention, which nothing in the state of the country at ])resent justified." Sir Edward Malet's personal testimony was no less conclusive. On January 9, he telegraphed to Lord Granville: "The communication has, at all events temporarily, alienated from us all confidence. Everything was progressing ca])itally, and England was looked on as the sincere wellwisher and pro- tector of the country. Now, it is considered that cH. XIII THE JOINT NOTE 229 England has definitely thrown in her lot with France, and that France, from motives in connec- tion with her Tunisian campaign, is determined ultimately to intervene here.' "It is too soon," Sir Edward jNIalet wrote on January 10, "to judge at present of the ultimate result of what has taken place ; but for the moment it has had the effect to cause a more complete union of the national party, the military, and the Chamber, to unite these three in a common bond of opposition to England and France, and to make them feel more forcibly than they did before that the tie which unites Egypt to the Ottoman Empire is a guarantee to which they must strongly adhere to save themselves from aggression. The military, who had fallen into the background on the convocation of the Chamber, are again in everybody's mouth, and Arabi Bey is said to be foremost in protesting against what he is represented to consider as unjust interference." The greatest General, it has been said, is he who makes the fewest mistakes. The same may be said of politicians and diplomatists. A remark made to me in this connection many years ago by Sir F'rancis Baring, the first Lord Northbrook, has sunk into my memory. I was staying at his country-house in 1864, having just returned from America, where I had been present as a spectator with the Northern army. I discussed the prospects of the war which was then going on, and expressed my opinions with all the confidence of youth. After listening for a while. Sir Francis said to me : " Now that you are a young man, you should write down not what has hajjpened but what you think is going to happen. You will be surprised to find how wrong you are." Nearly half a cen- tury of official life, during which time I have been behind the scenes wliilst events of some 230 MODERN EGYPT ft. u interest and importance were passing, has con- vinced me of the justice of the remark made by my shrewd old relative. I have myself made too many erroneous political forecasts to be inclined to criticise severely the mistakes of others. It must, however, be admitted tluit, in agreeing to the Joint Note, Lord Granville made a serious mistake. It is clear that the British and French Governments were aiming at different objects. The French Government, whilst admitting the partnership with England as an unavoidable, though perhaps unpleasant, necessity, wished to tighten the hold of France over Egypt. The British Govern- ment, on the other hand, wished above all things to avoid the necessity of serious interference in Egypt. When, on January 6, Lord Granville made a reservation in agreeing to the Joint Note to the effect that he was not committed " to any particular mode of action," and when, on January 7, M. Gambetta replied "c'est une reserve qui nous est commune," they were in reality far from being agreed. Each interpreted his reservation in a differ- ent manner. Lord Granville meant that, as a last resource, he would fall back on Turkish armed intervention. JNI. Gambetta, on the other hand, was "emphatically of opinion that any interven- tion of the Porte was wholly inadmissible." On January 14, the llepithlique Franx/aise, which was the recognised organ of JM. Gambetta, declared that " it would be a grave error to imagine that the two Powers were not firmly resolved to follow up their })latonic demonstration in a suitable manner if order should be disturbed, or if the authority of the Khedive should again be placed in jeopardy." In other words, M. Gambetta contemplated an Anglo- French occupation. Another consideration should have made Lord Granville pause. Before he agreed to the Joint OH. XIII THE JOINT NOTE 231 Note, he was in possession of Sir Auckland Colvin's Memorandum of December 26. Sir Edward JNIalet drew his special attention to this memorandum, and urged that it should be considered before any decision was taken. It is an extremely able paper. It gave a very clear description of the local situa- tion. Sir Auckland Colvin pointed out that it would be most "impolitic to thwart" the move- ment then going on in Egypt, the national char- acter of which he fully recognised. His principal business, however, was to look after the finances of Egypt. He was aware that without European assistance it was hopeless to expect that the finances could be brought into good order. He deprecated anything which would jeopardise the financial control exerted by France and England. He advocated "the open and firm recognition by the Powers ... of the material interest they possess and intend to maintain in the administration." In point of fact, the Egyptian administration was " a partnership of three," and he advocated the prin- ciple that no change could be made in the terms of association without the consent of all the partners. All this was perfectly true. Moreover, it was natural that, holding the position which he held. Sir Auckland Colvin should have advocated views of this nature. They were views to which the French Government would readily have assented, for French p6licy in Egypt had, for a long time past, been guided to a great extent by the interests of indi- vidual Frenchmen in the solvency of the Egyptian Treasury. But the case of the British Govern- ment was somewhat different. They had, indeed, agreed to the appointment of Controllers. They had been parties to the Law of Liquidation. But it was going a distinct step farther to giv^e a solemn pledge that they would interfere seriously if any complication arose, whether "internal or external, 232 MODERN EGYPT it. ii which miixht menace the order of things established in Egypt." If this pledge meant anything, it meant that the British Government would give materia! support to the Controllers ; and, indeed, when the matter came to be discussed at a later period in Parliament, the case of the Government rested upon the alleged obligation to sup})ort the Control. An obligation, indeed, existed, but it did not extend nearly so far as the French Government, with the liritish Government following in their train, implied. The British Government might perfectly well have accepted as correct Sir Auckland Colvin's descrip- tion of the facts of the situation, without adopting to the full his recommendations. They were in a position to take a more unbiassed view than Sir Auckland Colvin of the extent to which it was wise to go in the direction of interference in Egypt on purely financial grounds. There was no reason why, at this moment, the Controllers should not have been informed that they could rely on nothing but moral support, and that they must do the best they could, in the difficult circumstances in which they were ])laced, by persuasion and force of char- acter. At the same time, the Egyptian Government and the Arabists might have been told that the British and French Governments had no wish to check any reasonable development of the national movement. The Kliedive might have been en- couraged to come to terms with his people rather than to resist their wislies. Attention might have been drawn to the views of the Controllers, on the ground that their financial knowledge and experi- ence would be of great use to tlie Egyptian people, and that, in tlie event of their advice being system- atically neglected, financial disorder would almost inevitably ensue. At the same time, it might have been hinted that no armed intervention was to be feared in respect to a mere financial question, CH. XIII THE JOINT NOTE 233 however much the two Governments might regret to see financial disorder prevail. Armed interven- tion would be reserved for the time when life and property were no longer secure. It cannot, indeed, be stated with any degree of confidence that, if hmguage of this sort had been held, the occupa- tion of Egypt by foreign troops would have been avoided. The financial interests concerned were so great, and the risk that financial disorder would eventually have led to anarchy was so considerable, that it may well be that armed intervention of some sort would ultimately have become an un- avoidable necessity. This, however, is mere con- jecture. What is more certain is that, by following M. Gambetta's lead, the British Government pledged themselves to a greater degree of inter- ference in Egyptian internal affairs, and especially financial affairs, than the actual circumstances of the case appear to have necessitated. There can be little doubt that Lord Granville associated himself with M. Gambetta's Note because he failed to appreciate the effect which the Note would produce. In the debate which subsequently took place in the House of Lords, Lord Granville alluded to his despatch of November 4, 1881, which set forth the policy of the British Government.^ That despatch, he said, " had the singular good fortune of being generally approved both at home and abroad." This statement was quite correct. When the despatch in question was communicated to Cherif Pasha by Sir Edward Malet, he " expressed great satisfaction at it, and stated that he should have it translated for hisertion in the local press, as it ought to have an excellent effect." Lord Granville then went on to say : " .^Vt the end of December, M. Gambetta proposed that we should join with France in a Dual Note on the same lines * Vide ante, p. 203. 234 MODERN EGYPT pt. n as my despatch of November, but possibly accentu- ated as to its terms by the fact of its being drafted by a more eloquent pen." There was, however, a wide difference between both the tone and the sub- stance of Lord Granville's despatch of November 4, and the Joint Note of January 8. The former was friendly and sympathetic. The latter was menacing. The former indicated that nothing but "the occur- rence in Egypt of a state of anarchy" would be likely to lead to foreign intervention of a serious description in Egypt. The latter stated in some- what harsh terms that the British and French Governments were determined to maintain "the order of things established in Egypt," an expression which might be held to cover a very wide field. Moreover, it was to be inferred from the despatch of November 4 that, if any foreign intervention were found necessary, the military forces of the Sultan would be employed. The British and French Governments deprecated the idea that they entertained "any self-aggrandising designs." On the other hand, the studied silence of the Joint Note in respect to the contingency of Turkish intervention naturally led to the suppo- sition that, in an extreme case, Anglo-French and not Turkish intervention was contemplated. Neither, in so far as M. Gambetta was concerned, was the inference incorrect. When carburetted hydrogen and air in certain proportions exist in a mine, no great harm is done so long as they are left alone. But if a miner enters with a lighted candle, an explosion at once takes place. This is what the French and British Governments did in Egypt when they issued the Joint Note. Previous to the issue of the Note, the National Party and the Military Party existed side by side. Cherif Pasha, aided by Sir Edward Malet and Sir Auckland Colvin,was laboriously and wisely caxiii THE JOINT NOTE 235 endeavouring to keep the two parties separate. There was some hope that their united efforts would be successful, and that the National Party, which constituted the more healthy of the two elements, would eventually predominate over the Military Party, which constituted an element of obvious danger. At this moment, the British and French Governments appeared, without any suffi- cient reason, on the scene. They applied a lighted candle to the inflammable material. In an instant, the two elements combined with an explosion. The French Government possibly wished for an explo- sion. They were, at all events, callous as to whether an explosion occurred or not. But Lord Granville's action can only be explained on the assumption, either that, in his desire to act with the French Government, he momentarily forgot the safety- lamp of diplomatic prudence and reserve, or else that he did not sufficiently appreciate the fact that the mine was full of fire-damp.^ From the moment the Johit Note was issued, foreign intervention became an almost unavoidable necessity. ' It has been occasionally stated, — apparently on the authority of Mr. Wilfrid Blunt {Secret History, etc., pp. 159 and 182),— that, in following the French lead during these neg-otiations, the British Government were influenced by their desire to conclude a Commercial Treaty with France. I believe this statement to be wholly devoid of foundation. Sir Charles Dilke, who was at the time Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, and whose evidence on this point seems to me conclusive, wrote, on June 27, 1907, to the Manchester Guardian : ** At no time was the Egyptian policy of either Cabinet allowed to have a bearing upon the commercial relations of the Powers." Whilst the proofs of this work were passing through the press, a second edition of Mr. Blunt's book was published. In the Appendix, a correspondence is given between Sir Charles Dilke and Mr. Wilfrid Blunt, which is confirmatory of the opinion that there was no connec- tion whatever between the policy set forth in the Joint Note and the commercial relations between France and England. CHAPTER XIV THE EFFECTS OF THE JOINT NOTE January-February 1882 The British Government wish to explain the Joint Note — The French Government oiiject — The Chamber of Notables claims the right to vote the Budget — Proposals of the British Government — Objections of the French Government — The Consuls-General instructed to oppose the Chamber — The Chamber demands a change of Ministry — Appointment < ' a National Ministry — The French Government press for an Anglo-French occupation — The British Government favour a Turkish occupation — Resignation of M. Gambetta — Remarks on his policy. When Lord Granville agreed to the Joint Note he possibly thought that the best method to obviate the necessity of armed intervention in Egypt, whether Turkish or Anglo-French, was to threaten to intervene. The Note itself, indeed, almost expressed this view in plain words. It appeared, however, that tlie Note had produced an effect opposite to that which was intended. It had increased the chances that armed intervention would be necessary. Lord Granville recognised that he had made a mistake. He accordingly applied himself to the task of rectifying his error, liis French partner, on the other hand, was far from being convinced that any mistake had been made. On the contrary, he adhered strongly to the ])olicy indicated in the .loint Note. On January 10, Cherif Pasha expressed a hope that the two Powers would make some further 236 CH. XIV EFFECTS OF JOINT NOTE 237 communication which would tend to remove the bad impression caused by the Joint Note. On the same day, Lord Granville instructed Lord Lyons to consult the French Government on the desira- bility of sending " an explanatory telegram to Sir Edward INIalet to the effect that the character of the dual communication had been misunderstood." On January 11, Lord Lyons reported the result of his consultation with M. Gambetta. M. Gam- betta " was, of course, ready to study attentively any proposal of Her Majesty's Government, but he was himself decidedly of opinion that it might be extremely unadvisable to send any explanation at all of the dual communication." Cherif Pasha further suggested that the Khedive might reply to the Note in a sense which would perhaps mitigate its bad effects. Sir Edward Malet (January 11) "did not see any particular objection " to this proposal, but his French colleague would not hear of it. He thought that the Egyptian Government " had only to listen to the advice of the two Powers and be silent." In the meanwhile, the immediate effect of the Joint Note was to bring to a head the quarrel between the Ministry, backed up by the Controllers, and the Chamber of Notables. The Egyptian Budget was at that time divided into two parts. The first part dealt with the revenues which were assigned to the payment of the interest on the Debt. The second part dealt with tlie remainder of the revenues, which was left at the disposal of the Government. The Chamber of Notables claimed the right of voting the second part of the Budget. The Controllers and Cherif Pasha ob- jected to this })roposal, on the ground that, if the right claimed by the Chamber were accordetl to them, the Council of Ministers and, therefore, the Controllers, would lose their hold over the finances 238 MODERN EGYPT ft. ii of tlie country. " There was a chance," Sir Edward Malet telegraphed on January 10, "of arriving at an understanding, but this is apparently now passed. The Chamber may exercise its right with modera- tion and good sense, but it is a sanguine presumption. On tlie other hand, it is impossible now to suppress the Chamber except by intervention, which 1 earnestly deprecate. In fact, intervention could only be justified on the violation of the Law of Liquidation, not on the apprehension of its viola- tion, and it is right to say that as yet 1 have heard of no nitention on the part of any one to infringe it." When this message reached Lord Granville, he made an effort to release himself from French guidance. As an English Liberal, he could not do otherwise than sympathise to some extent with the development of free institutions in Egypt. He appears also to have seen that he was being hurried rapidly along the road which led to increased inter- vention in the internal affjiirs of Egypt. Moreover, the somewhat overbearing conduct of the French was distasteful to the more fair-minded English statesman, whose character and training alike led him to favour compromise and to reject extreme measures. Lord Granville, therefore, telegraphed to Sir Edward Malet : " Her Majesty's Government do not wish to commit themselves to a total or per- manent exclusion of the Chamber of Notables from handling the Budget. Caution, however, will be required in dealing with it, regard being had to the pecuniary interests on behalf of which Her JNIajesty's Government have been acting." The French Goverimient, however, speedily placed a check on any idea of making concessions to the Chamber. Lord Lyons reported that M. Gam- betta " expressed a very strong objection to any interference at all by the Egyptian Chamber with the Bud:et without infrino'iu'jj tlie Decrees establishinoj the Control, and that an innovation of the nature proposed by the Chamber could not be introduced without the assent of the English and French Governments." In order, however, not to close the door to a possible understanding, the two Consuls- General added that "if the Government of the Khedive deemed fit to open negotiations on the subject, they were prepared to transmit its proposals to their respective Governments, but they considered that such a negotiation should be on the understanding that the Government and the Chamber were agreed with regard to the rest of the proposed Organic Law," When Cherif Pasha received this connnunication, he wrote (February 1) to tlie Chamber explaining the situa- CH. XIV EFFECTS OF JOINT NOTE 243 tion, and requesting them "to formulate a basis of negotiation with the Powers." This conununication brouglit matters to a head. On February 2, a deputation from the Cliamber waited on the Khedive and requested him to change his Ministers. " His Highness asked on what law of the Chamber they founded their right to make the request. This they could not answer, but insisted on a change. They also pre- sented a copy of the draft Organic Law of the Chamber, and requested His Highness to sign, saying that the right to \ote the Budget was not one for discussion with foreign Powers. His Highness dismissed them, saying that he would consider their request." It was clear that a change of Ministry was inevitable. The Kliedive was obliged to yield because, as he told Sir Edward Malet, " he had no force to resist." Later on the same day, the Khedive received the deputation again and asked them to "name the persons whom they desired as Ministers. This they at first declined to do on the ground that the selection was the prerogative of His Highness." On the following day, how- ever, a further deputation from the Chamber waited on the Khedive, and stated that they wanted Mahmoud Pasha Sami, who was then Minister of War, to be appointed President of the Council. He was accordingly appointed on February 5. Arabi Bey was, at the same time, named Minister of War. The other members of tlie Cabinet, except Mustapha Pasha Fehmi, wlio assumed the direction of Foreign Affairs, were members of the National or Military parties, terms which had now become wholly synonymous. The effect produced by tlie change of Ministry on the views of the Khedivial party in Egypt Avas marked. Until then, Chdrif Pasha had entertained 2U MODERN EGYPT pt. u hopes of guiding the movement, and had stood out against any idea of armed Turkish intervention. He now informed Sir Edward Malet that "the only issue froin the situation was the immediate despatch to Egypt of a Commissioner from tlie Porte, to be followed as soon as possible by a Turkish force. . . . He thought that by acting with tact, and accepting any Ministry the Chamber asked for, the moment could be tided over without public disturbance; but he was of opinion that, as the army had again exercised dictatorship, there was no hope for the future unless it were rendered powerless by force." The Khedive shared Cherif Pasha's views. As events developed, it became more and more clear that M. Gambetta wished to force on an Anglo-French occupation of Egypt. On January 25, Lord Granville wrote to Lord Lyons in the following terms : — "The French Ambassador told me yesterday eveninfj that M. Gambetta had written to* him expressing his opinion that it was desirable, in view of the probable crisis in Egypt, that the English and French Governments should come to an understanding as to the course which they should pursue. M. Gambetta, it appeared, had not in his letter given his opinion as to what steps should be taken, but he was desirous to know the views of Her Majesty's Government. Any Turkish intervention was, in ]\L Gambetta's opinion, the worst possible solution. M. Gambetta's attention had been called to a plan, which had appeared in the press, of calling in the co-operation of Europe. M. Gambetta remarked tliat the position of England in Egypt, in consequence of her Indian Dossessions, was unique. That of France, owing to her being a great African Power, and to other circumstances, was of tlie greatest importance. CH XIV EFFECTS OF JOINT NOTE 245 Besides this normal position of the two Powers, arrangements had been entered into by Egypt, which had been acquiesced in by the European Powers generally. It would, in JNI. Gambetta's opinion, be most disadvantageous to Egypt and to the two Powers that these arrangements should be in any way weakened." When I^ord Granville received this communica- tion, it was impossible to ignore any longer the radical difference of opinion which existed between the British and French Governments. In a despatcli to Lord Lyons, dated January 30, he laid down the policy of tlie British Government : " Her Majesty's Government," he said, "desire to main- tain the rights of the sovereign and vassal as now established between the Sultan and the Khedive, to secure the fulfilment of international engage- ments, and to protect the development of institu- tions within this limit. They believe that the French Government share these views. The question remains — If in Egypt a state of disorder should occur which would be incompatible with this policy, what measures should be taken to meet the difficulty ? . . . It is to be regretted, but it appears to Her Majesty's Government apparent, that if such a contingency unfortunatelv occurred, there are objections to every possible course. The question remains — which of them offers the least inconvenience ? . . . Her Majesty's Government have a strong objection to the occupa- tion by themselves of Egypt. It would create opposition in Egypt and in Turkey ; it would excite the suspicion and jealousy of other European Powers, who would. Her Majesty's Government have reason to believe, make counter-demonstra- tions on their own part, which might possibly lead to very serious complications, and it would throw upon them the responsibility of governing a 246 MODERN EGYPT pt. n country inhabited by Orientals under very adverse circumstances. "They beUeve that such an occupation would be as distasteful to the French nation as the sole occupation of Egypt by the French would be to this country. "They have carefully considered the question of a joint occupation by England and France, and they have come to the conclusion that, although some of the objections above stated might be lessened, others would be very seriously aggravated by such a course. " With regard to Turkish occupation. Her Majesty's Government agree that it would be a great evil, but thev are not convinced that it would entail political dangers so great as those attending the other alternatives which have been mentioned above. . . . The most important point is that the union of the two countries should be both real and apparent. "M. Gambetta entertains objections to any further admission of the other European Powers to interference in Egyptian aflairs. Her JNIajesty's Government agree that England and France have an exceptional position in that country owing to actual circumstances and to international agree- ments, and they also believe that inconvenience might arise from many Powers being called u})on to join in any administrative functions ; but they would submit for the consideration of the French Government whether it would not be desirable to enter into some communication with the other Powers as to the most desirable mode of dealing with a state of things which ap})ears likely to interfere with the Firmans of the Sultan and the international engagements of Egypt." Tiie day after this despatch was written (January 31), M. Ciambetta resigned office. He was sue- CH. XIV EFFECTS OF JOINT NOTE 247 ceeded by ^I. de Freycinet, under whose auspices a complete change took place in the Egyptian policy of the French Government. During; the short time M. Gambetta was in office, he exercised a decisive and permanent in- fluence on the future course of Egyptian history. Lord Granville, M. de Freycinet, and others might do their best to put back the hands of the clock, but it was impossible that they should ever restore the status quo ante Gambetta. When he assumed office, the Egyptians entertained con- fidence in the intentions of England and France, especially in those of England. The amalgamation of the military and national parties in Egypt was not complete. The Egyptian movement was not altogether beyond control. When he left office, England and France were alike mistrusted by the Egyptians. The ascendency of the military over the national party was complete. Any hope of controlling the Egyptian movement, save by the exercise of material force, had well-nigh disappeared. Possibly, the movement was incapable of being controlled, but an ex post facto conjecture of this sort hardly appears a sufficient answer to the plea that, before reverting to extreme measures, every possible endeavour should have been made to control it. In the opinion of many competent autiiorities, M. Gambetta adopted a mistaken policy. But there are always at least two sides to every ques- tion. It will be as well, therefore, to examine the case from JNI. Gambettas point of view. It was stated by his friend and political su]:>porter, M. Joseph Keinach, in an article, published in the Nineteenth Century of December 1882. One portion of M. Reinach's argument may be very briefly treated. He complained that there was 248 MODERN EGYPT pt. ii a want of "sincerity and cordiality" in the dealings of the British Foreign Office with France. Also he thought that public opinion in England "ex- perienced the influence of certain Tories, who believed that it would be best to slacken pro- ceedings as much as possible, in the hope of find- ing some opportunity for entering the Nile valley without France." As to this argument, all I have to say is that I believe I have seen every official document, whether published or unpublished, which is in the possession of the British Foreign Office, bearing upon the questions now under discussion. I have also had ample opportunities of ascertaining, by personal and verbal communications, the views of the principal actors on the scene. These events are now matters of past history. Many of the principal persons concerned are dead. Had there been any design of outwitting France, such as M. Reinach insinuated, I certainly should not be de- terred by any false spirit of patriotism from stating the true facts of the case. I am, however, able to state with the utmost confidence that the insinua- tions of M. Reinach • are without a shadow of foundation. The policy of the British Government at the time may or may not have been mistaken, but it was certainly sincere. When Lord Gran- ville deprecated a British or Anglo-French armed intervention in Egypt, there can be no doubt that he meant what he said, and, moreover, that he had behind him the preponderating weight of British public opinion. Leaving aside this collateral issue, I proceed to state M. Reinach's main argument. He thought that "grave mistakes" were committed by the British Government. The British Foreign Office failed to understand how dangerous the situation in Egypt had become when the Chamber of Notables met. Neither Mr. Gladstone nor Lord CH. XIV EFFECTS OF JOINT NOTE 249 Granville saw that "the Chamber of Notables vs^as a sham assembly, Ariibi an ambitious intriguer, encouraged and suborned by the fanatic Council of Constantinople, and the national party a ludi- crous invention of some badly informed or too well paid journalist." M. Gambetta, on the other hand, "siuiply made use of his eyes and ears." He saw all these things plainly enough. "The hesitation of the English Government," M. Reinach con- tinued, "to suppress the first acts of the insurrec- tion plotted by the military camarilla at Cairo was much more than a lack of cordiality towards us (the French) and our alliance ; it was, as far as Egyptian matters are concerned, pernicious and deplorable to the highest degree. It encouraged the spirit of rebellion among Arabi's partisans. It helped to kindle and rouse a fire, which a bucket of water shed at the proper time would have extinguished, into a conflagration where lives and treasures have been uselessly destroyed." In other words, to put the matter plainly. M. Gambetta was convinced, as early as December 1881, that armed intervention of some sort in Egypt would, sooner or later, becon e necessary. Therefore, he did not hesitate to take steps which he knew might and probably would precipitate the final and, as he thought, inevitable conclusion. It is impossible to prove that JNI. Gambetta was wrong. It is equally impossible to prove that he was right. There can be no doubt that the Artibi movement was in some respects a boiiajide national movement. There can be equally little doubt that, if Arabi and his followers had been left at the head of affairs without any control, a state of the utmost confusion would have been produced in Egypt, and that eventually armed foreign intervention of some sort might have become necessary. In December 1881, however, the only practical question was, 250 MODERN EGYPT pt. n would it be possible to control and guide the movement ? It is not certain that it would have been impossible to do so. A few able Europeans, like Sir Auckland Colvin, by the exercise of tact and judgment, by encouraging the civil elements of Egyptian society, and by the exhibition of some sympathy with reasonable native aspirations, might' possibly in time have acquired a sufficient degree of moral control over the movement to have obviated the necessity for armed intervention. In any case, on the assumption that armed interven- tion was a solution to be avoided, save as a last resource, the experiment was worth trying. It is impossible, however, to read the correspondence on this subject without seeing that M. Gambetta did not regard armed intervention, provided it was Anglo-French and not Turkish intervention, in this light. On the contrary, he wished to brhig about a state of things which would render it necessary. Obviously, therefore, from his point of view, the experiment was not worth trying. But his conclusion cannot command assent unless his premises be accepted, and there are strong grounds for holding that his premises were wrong. Tlie essential point, at all events from the British point of view, was to avoid any armed intervention. Mr. John Morley summed up the case in the following words, which appear to be correct. " It is impossible," he said, "to conceive a situation that more imperatively called for caution, circum- spection, and deference to the knowledge of observers on the scene, or one that was actually handled with greater rashness and hurry. INI. Gambetta had made u]) his mind that the military movement was leading to the abyss, and that it must be peremptorily arrested. It may be that he was right in supposing that the army, which had first found its power in the time of Ismail, would OH. XIV EFFECTS OF JOINT NOTE 251 go from bad to worse. But everything turned upon the possibihty of pulling up the army, without arousinff other elements more dangerous still. M. Gainbetta's impatient policy was worked out in his own head without reference to the conditions on the scene, and the result was what might have been expected." ^ It may be conceded to M. Reinach that at this time " grave mistakes " were committed by the British Government in respect to Egypt. An Englishman who holds, as Lord Granville held, that a British or Anglo-French occupation of Egypt was above all things to be avoided, may with perfect con- sistency indicate those mistakes. But a Frenchman, more especially a partisan of M. Gambetta, has no right to criticise them. His mouth should be closed, for "the hesitations, indecisions, perplexities, half- measures, and delays which characterised English tactics," and of which M. Reinaeli complained, were due to the strong desire of the British Government to co-operate witli the French. Lord Granville honestly wished to avoid any armed intervention in Egypt, and as honestly wished, if any intervention eventually became necessary, that the arms em- ployed should be those of the legitimate Suzerain of Egypt, and not those of France or England. Had he been left from the first to act according to the dictates of his own judgment, it is possible that no foreign occupation would have been necessary, and it is more than probable that no British occupation would have taken place. But he allowed himself to be hifluenced by his French colleague, whose strong will and rash policy dragged him to such an extent along a road which he had no wish to follow, that eventually retreat became impossible. Englishmen may criticise Lord Granville for yield- ing too much to France. French criticism can only 1 Fortnightly Review, July 1882. 252 MODERN EGYPT pt. ii be based either on the assumption that JNI. Gam- betta's action was best calculated to prevent a foreign occupation, or on the allegation that an Anglo- French occupation of Egypt was in itself to be desired as a preventive against evils which might arise, rather than as a cure for evils which liad already arisen. The verdict of subsequent events has disproved the assumption. The allegation is a matter of opinion. M. Gambetta and M. lleinach held one opinion on this point. Lord Granville held another, and, as I venture to think, a wiser opinion. During the parliamentary discussions which took place in England, a great deal of ingenious special pleading was devoted to showing that the occupation of Egypt was due, not to any action taken in 1881 and 1882, but to the appointment of European Controllers in 1879.^ The facts con- nected with this subject may be explained by a metaphor. Suppose a man to be suffering from a severe but not necessarily fatal disease. He calls in a doctor who prescribes some mild remedies, and warns him that, unless he be careful, the disease will increase in virulence. He fails to profit by the advice which he has received, and in conse- quence gets worse. He then calls in another doctor, who abandons the mild treatment of his predecessor, and ajjplies some more drastic remedy. The remedy, far from producing any good effect, aggravates the disease, and the patient dies. Under these circumstances, the friends of the patient, pro- vided they be impartially minded, will not inquire carefully into the suitability or otherwise of the remedies applied by the first doctor. They will hold with reason that the patient's death was hastened, if indeed it was not caused, by the heroic but mistaken treatment of the second medical » Vide ante, p. 160. CH.XIV EFFECTS OF JOINT NOTE 253 adviser. In the case of Egypt, Lord Salisbury stood in the place of the first doctor. Lord Granville, acting under the advice of his impetuous French colleague, stood in the place of the second. Similarly, in France the mistakes made by M. Gambetta were forgotten, and the British occu- pation of Egypt was subsequently attributed by M. Joseph Reinach and other Gambettists to the fact that "the demeanour of the Freycinet ]\!inis':ry was unworthy of France and of the Republic." Whether this accusation is true or the reverse is a matter for Frenchmen to decide. To an English- man it would appear that the fact of JVI. de Freycinet's having been opposed to an Anglo- French occupation of Egypt does not relieve M. Gambetta from the responsibility of having largely contributed to create a situation from which it was well-nigh impossible to escape except by means of armed intervention of one sort or another. The atmosphere of party politics, whether in France or England, is not congenial to the formation of an impartial judgment. A Minister, who is in the thick of a tough parliamentary struggle, must use whatever arguments he can to defend his cause without inquiring too closely whether they are good, bad, or indifferent. How- ever good they may be, they will probably not convince his political opponents, and they can scarcely be so bad as not to carry some sort of conviction to the minds of those who are pre- disposed to support him. Politicians who are not bound by any strong party ties can weigh the arguments in a somewhat more judicial spirit. The conclusions stated in this chapter will, it is hoped, commend themselves to those who stand outside the immediate sphere of political partisanship. CHAPTER XV THE ARXbI ministry February-May 1882 Proposal to revise the Org;tnic Law — Mr. ^^'^ilfrid Blunt — M. de Blignieres resigns — Concessions made to the army — Disorganisa- tion in the provinces — The Porte protests against the Joint Note — The Powers are invited to an exchange of views — M. de Freycinet wishes to depose the Khedive — Lord Granville proposes to send Financial Commissioners to Egypt — Alleged conspiracy to murder Arabi — The Ministers resign, but resume office — M. de Freycinet assents to Turkish intervention — Arabi requested to leave Egypt — He refuses to do so — The Ministers again resign— The Khedive reinstates Arab! — And asks for a Turkish Com- missioner. The official transactions of the next four months are recorded in several ponderous volumes, but the main facts admit of being very briefly stated. The Chamber of Notables, whose powers were at once increased by the new Ministry, was, Sir Auckland Colvin wrote on February 13, "wholly under the influence of a mutinous and successful army." Some well-meaning proposals were put forward by tlie British Government with a view to revising the Organic Law in a sense which would be liberal but, at the same time, would not give excessive powers to the Chamber. A few months earlier, a suii:i>:estion of this sort miijlit perliaps have led to some useful resiflt. But the propitious moment had been allowed to pass, and it was now too late to stem the Egyptian Revolution, for such it really was, by redrafting 254 ctt XV THE ARABI ministry 255 an article in a Khedivial Decree. "It would be childish," M. de Freycinet thought (April 20), "to be discussing the pattern of a carpet when the house in which it was laid down was in flames." Sir Auckland Colvin's opinion was no less decisive and his metaphor no less apt. "The house," he said, "is tumbling about our ears, and the moment is not propitious for debating whether we would like another storey added to it. Until civil authority is reassured and the military despotism destroyed, discussion of the Organic Law seems premature and useless." The civil elements of the national party still made some slight show of independence, but the tendencies which were at work to ensure the pre- dominance of the mutinous army were too strong to be resisted. Not only did Arabi receive en- couragement from the Sultan, but the advice of English sympathisers with the nationalist cause tended to consolidate the union between the military and civil elements of the movement. Of these sympathisers, the most prominent was Mr. Wilfrid Blunt. Mr. Blunt had hved a good deal with Mohammedans, and took a warm interest in all that related to themselves and their relio-ion. He appears to have believed in the possibility of a regeneration of Islam on Islamic principles. It chanced that he was in Egypt during the winter of 1881-82. He threw himself, with all the en- thusiasm of a poetic nature, into the Arabist cause, and became the guide, philosopher, and friend of Arabi and his coadjutors. Mr. Blunt saw that he had to do with a movement which was in some degree unquestionably national. He failed to appreciate sufficiently the fact that the pre- dominance of the military party would be fatal to the national character of the movement. At one period of the proceedings, his services 256 MODERN EGYPT pt. ii were utilised as an intermediary between Sir Edward JNIalet and the nationalists. The selec- tion was unfortunate, for it is abundantly clear from the account which Mr. Blunt has given of his own proceedings^ that, with tiie exception of some knowledge of the Arabic language, he possessed none of the qualifications necessary to ensure success in the execution of so difficult and delicate a mission. He advised the nationalists to hold to the army or they would be "annexed to Europe."^ The advice was, without doubt, well- meant, but it was certainly inopportune and mis- chievous. Whatever danger of "annexation to Europe " existed lay rather in the direction of the consolidation of the national and -military parties than in that of their separation. A trained politician would have seen this. INIr. Blunt had had no political training of any value. He was an enthusiast who dreamt dreams of an Arab Utopia. He, therefore, failed to see what Cherif Pasha and others on the spot saw. He worked earnestly and to the best of his abilities to prevent a foreign occupation of Egypt. But the impartial historian must perforce record his name amongst those who, by ill-advised action at a critical moment, unwittingly contributed to bring about the solution which they most of all deplored. Terrorised by a mutinous army on the one side, urged, on the other side, by their English advisers, whose weight with the British public they greatly ' Blunt's Secret Hisfoiy of the British Occupiition of Egypt. ^ A letter from Dr. Schweinfurth, tlie well-known botanist, was published in the Times of June 21, 18<52. He related an interview he had had with some members of the Chamber. lie commended their moderation and good sense, and then went on to say : " From England they expect more for their cause than from France. They imagine that in England you are all of the same complexion as Mr. Blunt, or at least, as Sir William (Jregory. At Ghirgeh, they showed me with much satisfaction Mr. lilunt's telegram addressed to all the members of the Egyptian Chamber: *Si vous allez vous de'sunir de I'arme'e, I'Europe vous amiexera.' " See also Secret Jliatory, etc., p. 271. CH.XV THE ARABI ministry 257 overrated,^ to seek salvation in submitting to military dictation, it can be no matter for sur- prise that the ignorant and inexperienced men who feebly represented genuine constitutionalism sank into insignificance and ranged themselves on the side of the mutineers. The power of the Controllers disappeared. Sir Edward JNlalet wrote to Lord Granville (February 20) that he thought it had "become a question whether the Control should be maintained, now that it existed only in name." M. de Blignieres resigned his appointment. Mahmoud Pasha Sami, the new President of the Egyptian Council, shared the usual fate of revolutionary leaders. He was violently attacked because he failed to carry out his engagement that all Europeans should be turned out of Egyptian employment. Arabi, Sir Auckland Colvin wrote (February 27), warned him that "he was like a man trying to balance himself on a plank." Every effort was made to keep the army in a good humour. Fresh battalions were raised. The pay of the officers and men was increased without reference to the sufficiency of the revenue to meet the fresh expenditure thus incurred. Hundreds of officers were promoted. The Khedive pointed out that "the law required the previous examination of officers under the rank of full Colonel," but Arabi was ready with an explanation. The officers, he said, "were of such well-known capacity that examination was unnecessary. Moreover" — and this was perhaps more to the point — " they refused to be examined, and were supported in their refusal by the rest of the army." The Khedive was obliged to yield. Clearly, as Sir Ciiarles Cookson wrote, "all the pretended aspirations for legality and constitutional liberty had ended in substituting ^ See Appendix to this chapter. VOL. I S 258 MODERN EGYPT pt. ii tlie indisputable will of the army for all lawful authority." In the provinces, complete disorganisation pre- vailed. The INIoudirs had lost all authority. At JNIansourah and elsewliere, JNIr. Ilowsell, the English administrator of the State Domains, found that " all power was paralysed." In the neighbourhood of Zagazig, the British Vice - Consul reported, ** armed bands continue to attack and pillage villages." An active trade was carried on in fire- arms. At Damietta, the black soldiers of Abdul- Al's regiment robbed and ill-treated the inhabitants with impunity. An unwise attempt was made by the Government to deprive the- Bedouins of the privileges which they had enjoyed since the days of Mehemet Ali, but the heads of the various tribes met on April 8, and declared that they would allow no interference in their affairs. Tlie banks would no longer lend large sums of money ; petty usurers asked as much as 6 per cent monthly interest on small loans. Land was everywhere losing in value. Sir Edward INIalet quoted one example of land, bought a few months ])reviously for £G(), being sold at £28 an acre. An officer of the army told the peasants at Zagazig that the acres belong- ing to their landlords " were theirs by right." In a word, all the usual symptoms of revolution were prevalent in Egypt. The moderate men became alarmed. " The disorganised and uneasy state of the provinces," Sir Charles Cookson wrote, "has caused many of the Notables and others who have a stake in the country to draw back from the hastily formed alliance with the military party, and seek for other means of escaping from its domination." It is now time to return to the history of diplo- matic action. The Porte protested against the Joint Note. The answer of the four Powers CH.XV THE ARABI MINISTRY 259 (Russia, Austria, Germany, and Italy) was to the effect that they "desired the maintenance of the status quo in Egypt on the basis of the European arrangements and of the Sultan's Firmans, and tliat they were of opinion that this status quo could not be modified except by an understanding between the Great Powers and the Suzerain Power." This reply did not answer the expectations of the Sultan. He was irritated by the use of the word "Suzerain" instead of " Sovereign."^ Moreover, his design of acquiring a more absolute control over Egyptian affairs was in no way advanced by the opinion expressed by the Powers that any change in the Egyptian status quo was a matter of general Euro- pean interest. The protest of the Porte, however, stimulated the British and French Governments to place themselves in communication with the other Powers. The British Government took the initi- ative. The French Government were invited to join Her Majesty's Government in addressing the Powers. M. de Freycinet agreed " with the reser- vation that it be well understood that the French Government reserve their adhesion to any miHtary intervention in Egypt, and that they will examine that question when the necessity for any interven- tion shall have arisen." Accordingly, on February 11, a Circular was addressed by the British and French Governments to the Cabinets of Berlin, Vienna, Rome, and St. Petersburg, asking them whether they would be prepared to enter into an exchange of views on the affairs of Egypt. " The ^ The Sultan is Suzerain of Bulgaria. Article 1 of the Berlin Treaty says : " Bulgaria is constituted an autonomous and tributary Princi- pality under the Suzerainty of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan." In so far as Egypt is concerned^ the word "Sovereign" is technically more correct. The Firman of 1841 granted to Mehemet All uses the expression " Ma connaissance Souveraine." llie Sukan cannot depose the Prince of Bulgaria. Technically speaking, he can depose the Khedive, and, in fact, in 1879 he .ieposed Ismail Pasha. 2G0 INIODERN EGYPT pt. ii Governments of England and France," it was said, *' do not consider that a case for discussing tlie expediency of an intervention has at present arisen. . . . But, should the case arise, they would wijih that any such eventual intervention should represent the united action and authority of Europe. In that event, it would also, in their opinion, be riglit that the Sultan should be a party to any proceeding or discussion that might ensue." The proposal to treat Egyptian affairs as an international, rather than as an exclusively Anglo- French question, was well received. All the Powers expressed their willingness to enter into an exchange of views. No progress had, however, so far been made as to the nature of the views which were to be exchanged. Until the British and French Governments could agree as to the proposals they were to submit to the other Powers, it was hopeless to expect any general agreement. Both Governments were, however, daily becom- ing more convinced that some action was necessary. " The Egyptian question," M. de Freycinet said to Lord Lyons (April 8), "was like a bill of exchange. The exact day at which the bill would be presented for payment was not known, but it was quite certain that the presentation would not be long delayed, and it would be only prudent to provide means of meeting the liability before the constable was upon us." The remedy he proposed was to depose the Khedive, and to substitute Hahm Pasha in his place. The authority of the Sultan would, without doubt, have to be brought into play, but M. de Freycinet thought that '*the great object was to ward off a military intervention of what- ever kind it might be, and he would rather the Sultan should depose twenty Khedives than send one soldier to Egypt." T^ord Granville rejected this proposal. He did not see that it would dc CH.XV THE ARABI ministry 261 any good, and, moreover, he pointed out *' that after the declarations of support so recently given to the Khedive, in the name of the British and French Governments, it would be an act question- able in point of good faith if we were now not only to abandon him, but to combine for his removal without any new or more apparent cause than can at present be shown to exist." The Khedive also found a warm defender in Sir Edward Malet, who expressed himself in the following terms : " When I hear him (the Khedive) abused for lack of energy and capacity, I doubt whether there be many men who would have been able to extricate themselves from the difficulties in which he has been involved." In the place of so drastic a remedy as the deposition of the Khedive, Lord Granville put forward a characteristic proposal of his own. The idea of sending special Commissioners to report on the situation in Egypt appears, during a considerable period, to have presented some strong attractions to the British Government. Lord Granville now fell back on a proposal of this sort. He suggested to the French Govtiiunent that "the British and French Representatives at Cairo might each for the moment be advantageously supported by having at their side an adviser possessed of the necessary technical experience, who had been in the habit of considering economical reforms, and to whom they might have recourse for an independent and im- partial opinion upon any points which seemed to them doubtful or complicated." Lord Granville wished this proposal to be considered by the French Government, but he " had no wish to press the suggestion if M. de P'reycinet saw decided objec- tions to it." M. de Freycinet saw some obvious objections to the proposal ; amongst others, it would, he thought, " be difficult to prevent the 262 MODERN EGYPT pt. ii Controllers from supposing that it was with a view to controlling them that the agents were to be furnished with special Financial Advisers. They would, in fact, suppose that they would sink from the position of ' Controleurs ' into that of ' Con- troles.'" This proposal was, therefore, allowed to drop. A more strange idea than that of sending two gentlemen, " who had been in the habit of considering economical reforms," in order to control a mutinous army certainly never entered into the head of a responsible statesman.^ Whilst these barren diplomatic negotiations were going on in Europe, another incident occurred in Cairo of a nature to precipitate the crisis, which had now become inevitable. A large number of Egyptian officers had, as has been already men- tioned, been promoted. This caused great dis- content amongst the Turkish and Circassian officers who had been passed over. Arabi and his colleagues feared their resentment. A story was, therefore, got up that the leaders of the military and nationalist party were to be murdered. On April 12, nineteen officers and soldiers were arrested on a charge of conspiracy to murder Arabi. By April 22, as many as forty-eight persons had been arrested. Amongst these, was Osman Pasha Rifki, the late Minister of War. They were tried by a Court-martial, whose proceedings were secret. They were undefended by counsel. Forty officers, including Osman Pasha Rifki, were condemned to exile for life to the farthest limits of the Soudan. Arabi's account of this affair is given in a docu- ment entitled " Instructions to my Counsel," which was subsequently published. " A Mameluke slave ^ This proposal, tlioiig'h in a somewhat different form, appears to liave emanated from Mr. Wilfrid Blunt. On March 20, 1882, he wrote to Lord Granville sufr^estin'j' that ''sometliing in the nature of a commission of inquiry" should he sent to Egypt. — Secret Uintory, etc., p. 232. CII.XV THE ARABI ministry 263 of the Khedive's," he said, " and a Circassian, made a plot to administer arsenic to Abdul-Al Pasha at the Koubbeh school. The Circassian succeeded in putting some of the poison into the Pasha's milk, which he took nightly, but fortunately the servant found it out in time to save his life. . . . This plan having failed, another was set on foot to get rid of me. A party of Circassians agreed together to kill me as well as every native Egyptian holding high appointments." There does not, however, appear to have been a shadow of trust- worthy evidence to show that the charge of con- spiracy was true. The verdict of the Court-martial is a wild rambling document, bearing the character of a political manifesto rather than that of a judicial decision. Like most ignorant men, Arabi was very suspicious. The conspiracy to murder him merely existed in his own imagination. The Khedive was now placed in a position of ^reat difficulty. The sentence of the Court- anartial was manifestly unjust, but it was question- able whether he would be able to resist the pressure brought to bear on him by his Ministers, who were, of course, in favour of its being confirmed. Tlie Porte interfered. Osman Pasha Rifki bore the title of Ferik, or General, which was conferred by the Sultan and could only be taken away by His Imperial Majesty. The Sultan, therefore, desired that the matter should be referred to him. The Khedive answered that he would comply with this request. By doing so, he threw himself into the arms of the Porte, and assumed an attitude of direct hostility to his Ministers, but he explained to Sir Edward Malet (May 6) that he thought it better that Egypt should lose some of its privileges at the hands of the Porte, and that proper authority should be re-established, ratiier than that the existing misgovernment should 264 INIODERN EGYPT pt. ii continue. The INIinisters were much incensed. The President of the Council told Sir Edward JMalet " that if the Porte should send an order to cancel the sentence of the Court-martial on the Circassian prisoners, the order would not be obeyed, and that if the Porte sent Commissioners, they would not be allowed to land, but would be re- pulsed by force, if necessary." The defiant attitude adopted by the Egyptian Ministers towards the Porte was, without doubt, in a measure due to the belief that, in resisting Turkish interference, they could count on French support. As a matter of fact, directly it was suggested that, by reason of Osman Pasha Rifki's rank, Turkish interference was necessary, M. de Freycinet stated that " he was strongly of opinion that the Khedive should himself grant the pardon immediately by virtue of his own prerogative without waiting for action on the part of the Porte." Lord Granville agreed. Identic instruc- tions to advise the Khedive in this sense were, therefore, sent to the British and French repre- sentatives at Cairo. The Khedive acted on this advice. On May 9, he signed a Decree commuting the sentence of the Court-martial on the forty officers into exile from Egypt, but not to the Soudan. The commutation of this sentence widened the breach between the Khedive and his JNIinisters. On May 18, Sir Edward Malet reported that "relations had been broken off between the Khedive and his Ministers," and that "the situation had become most serious." The representatives of the great Powers, with uncon- scious humour, requested the President of the Council "to describe the situation." The latter replied that, as the Khedive and his Ministers could not agree, the Chamber had been convoked without the authority of the Khedive having been CH. XV THE ARABI MINISTRY ^65 requested. "The complaint against His Highness was that he had acted in a way to diminish the autonomy of Egypt, and on many occasions without consulting his Ministers." There appears to be little doubt that the intention of the military party at this time was to depose the Khedive, to exile the family of Mehemet Ali, and to appoint Mahmoud Pasha Sami Governor-General by the national will. By this time, the civil elements in the national movement had again become alive to the folly of their conduct in allying themselves with the mutineers. Sultan Pasha, the President of the Chamber, told Sir Edward Malet that "in overthrowing Cherif Pasha the Chamber had acted under pressure from Arabi, and that the very deputies who had then insisted on the course taken, finding that they had been deceived, were now anxious to overthrow the Ministry." On May 13, Sir Edward Malet wrote: "The President of the Chamber and the deputies ostensibly take the part of the Khedive, but they have requested His Highness to pardon and to be reconciled with his Ministers. The Khedive has refused. His Highness remains firm, and will not be reconciled to a Ministry which has defied him openly, threatened himself and his family, and, by the convocation of the Chamber without his sanction, has violated the law. At Cairo, there is considerable uneasiness, and many persons are leaving." The President of the Council then tendered his resignation to the Khedive. The British and French Consuls-General proposed that Mustapha Pasha Fehmi should be appointed President. "We agree," Sir Edward Malet said, "to the nomination of any one, except Arabi Pasha." The leaders of the military party had stated that, if the Ministry were changed, they would not be 266 MODERN EGYPT ft ii responsible for the maintenance of order. The British and French Governments, however, would not accept this denial of responsibility. Their representatives in Cairo were authorised "to send for Arabi and inform him that if there is a disturb- ance of order, he will find Europe and Turkey, as well as England and France, against him, and will be held responsible." When Mustapha Pasha Fehmi was offered the Presidency of the Council, he declined to accept the ])ost. The Ministers also said that "they would only resign if the Chamber of Notables desired it." The President of the Chamber "declared that it would be impossible to change the Ministry so long as the military power continued to be vested in Arabi Pasha." Under these circumstances, the British and French Consuls - General informed the Khedive that "personal questions must be set aside." As His Highness was unable to form a new Ministry, he was "requested to enter into relations with the present one." It was by this time evident that some decisive intervention in Egypt was inevitable, but the question of whether that intervention should be Turkish or Anglo-French still remained undecided. On May 21, however, INI. de Freycinet took a great step in advance. He recognised the possibility of Turkish armed intervention. The following proposals were submitted to the British Govern- ment : — 1. An Anglo-French squadron was to be sent to Alexandria. 2. The British and French Governments were to "request the Porte to abstain for the present from all intervention or interference in Egy))t." 3. The Cabinets of Germany, Austria, Russia, and Italy were to be informed of the despatch of CH. XV THE ARABI MINISTRY 267 an Anglo-French squadron to Alexandria, and they were to be asked to send to their representatives at Constantinople similar instructions to those sent to the British and French Ambassadors. 4. The French Government agreed to abandon the idea of deposing the Khedive, "a plan which, if adopted in time, might, in their opinion, have prevented serious complications." 5. As regards the important question of Turkish intervention, M. de Freycinet expressed himself in the following terms : " The French Government continue to be opposed to Turkish intervention, but they would not regard as intervention a case in which Turkish forces were summoned to Egypt by England and France, and operated there under English and French control, for an object, and on conditions which France and England should have themselves defined. If, after the arrival of their ships at Alexandria, the French and English Governments should consider it advisable that troops should be landed, they should have recourse neither to English nor to French troops, but should call for Turkish troops, on the conditions above specified." 6. The Consuls -General were to be instructed '*to recognise as legal no other authority than that of Tewfik Pasha, and not to enter into relations with any other de facto Government, except for the purpose of securing the safety of their countrymen." Lord Granville at once acceded to these pro- posals. He thought, however, that in requesting the Sultan to abstain for the present from all interference in Egypt, it would be "desirable to intimate in guarded language that it was not improbable that further propositions might be made hereafter to the Porte." Moreover, Lord Granville suggested "in view of the very large 268 MODERN EGYPT n. ii force which it is ]>roposed should be despatched to Alexandria by England and France, that it might be as well, if not inconsistent with the other objects which M. de Freycinet has in view, that the other Powers, including Turkey, should be invited to have their flags represented." In other words, the British Government wished for Turkish executive action under international sanction. Both the Turkish action and the international sanction were, on the other hand, distasteful to the French. M. de Freycinet, however, agreed to Lord Granville's first proposal so far as to instruct the French Ambassador at Constantinople that he might "hint to the Sultan, in very moderate terms, that it was not improbable that further proposals might be made to the Porte hereafter." As regards the international sanction, M. de Freycinet would make no concession. " I am not of opinion," he said, "that we should at present invite the other Powers to send ships by the side of ours. It is not, in my judgment, for our own interest that we should in this way take an initiative which would deprive the Anglo- French action of the directive character, which Europe herself assigns to it, and appears desirous to leave to it in Egypt." When M. de Freycinet's reply was communicated to Lord Granville, he **told the French Ambassador that Mr. Gladstone agreed with him in regretting that the other Powers had not been invited to co-operate. Her Majesty's Government tho'ight this a mistake, but as the French Government had gone so far to meet the views of Her Majesty's Government, they have concurred in the course taken." The weak part of this scheme was that the intention to invite Turkish co-operation was not })ublicly announced. Sir Edward Malet at once saw the danger. On May 14, he telegraphed to OH. XV THE ARABI MINISTRY 269 Lord Granville : " Knowing the feeling here (i.e. at Cairo) I fear that if the Sultan's implied co- operation is not secured and made known, and if he does not give his countenance at the beginning to the action of the Powers, there is a risk that the Chamber and the army may again coalesce and offer resistance, which would otherwise, I think, be impossible." The Khedive was no less anxious to obtain the moral support of the Sultan. On May 20, he asked Sir Edward Malet "to beg the English Government to induce the Porte to send him a telegram approving of his entering into negotiations with us for the restoration of his authority, and the maintenance of the status quo. He wished for it as a lever to act on the deputies, and dissipate the idea, which was then taking root with them and the military, that the Sultan opposed the action of the Powers." A frank explanation of the intentions of the Powers might perhaps, even at this late hour, have ensured the cordial co-opera- tion of the Sultan. As it was, lie was irritated by the action taken by the British and French Governments, more especially by the despatch of an Anglo-Frjnch squadron to Alexandria. The Turkish Ambassadors at Paris and London were instructed to protest. The despatch of the squadron also gave offence to the other Powers, who thought that they should have been previously consulted on the subject, and, therefore, declined to join in the Anglo-French recommendation to the Sultan that he should abstain from all inter- ference in Egypt. The dislike of the French Government to Turkish intervention was, however, such as to render it injpossible to obtain the full advantage which might otherwise possibly have been derived from the co-operation of the Sultan. On May 19, M. de Freycinet told Lord Lyons that "there were very 270 MODERN EGYPT pt. ii strong objections to speaking openly at that moment either at Constantinople or elsewhere of the agree- ment to call in Turkish troops, in case military in- tervention in Egypt should be unavoidable." On JNIay 22, therefore, Lord Granville telegraphed to Sir Edward JMalet : " The French Government are nervous lest the conditional consent they have given to Turkish intervention may be publicly announced at Cairo or Constantinople, and produce an explosion of public feeling at Paris." Under these circumstances, all that could be done was to send a somewhat vague explanatory telegram to the British and French representatives at Berlin, Rome, St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Constantinople. " It was never proposed," Lord Granville said, " to land troops or to resort to a military occupation of the country. Her Majesty's Government intend, when once calm has been restored, and the future secured, to leave Egypt to herself, and to recall their squadron. If, contrary to their expectations, a pacific solution cannot be obtained, they will concert with the Powers and with Turkey on the measures, which shall have appeared to them and to the French Government to be the best." At the same time (JNIay 23), Lord Dujfferin told the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Constantinople that if " instead of helping to terminate the crisis in the desired manner, the I*orte complicates the situation by falsifying facts and rumiing counter to our advice, we shall double the number of our ships at Alexandria, and their stay will be indefiinitely prolonged." Lord Dufferin " had already hinted to Said Pasha confidentially that if the Ottoman Government acted in a loyal and reasonable manner, the first-fruits of their moderation might be the countermanding of the additional ships of war which were under orders to join the squadron." In the meanwhile (May 19), the British and CH. XV THE ARABI ministry 271 French Consuls -General had been instructed "to advise the Khedive to take advantage of a favourable moment, such, for instance, as the arrival of the fleets, to dismiss the present JNIinistry and to form a new Cabinet under Cherif Pasha, or any other person inspiring the same confidence." Sir Edward Malet replied (May 20) that he and M. Sienkiewicz had considered these instructions. " Until the supremacy of the military party is broken," he added, "the Khedive is powerless to form a new Ministry. No one will accept the task until this is effected," He, therefore, proposed to enter into negotiations with Arabi and his three principal coadjutors with a view to inducing them to leave the country. Sultan Pasha, the President of the Chamber of Deputies, consented to act as intermediary. He questioned the Consuls-General as to " whether there was any infringement of the Porte's sovereign rights in the action of England and France." Sir Edward Malet replied that "the intention of the two Governments was to respect those rights and in no way to infringe them." The negotiation failed. Arabi positively refused " either to retire from his position or from the country." An Egyptian Colonel said, in the presence of a member of the French Consular service, that " the officers would hew Arabi in pieces if he deserted them." A Cabinet Council was held at which it was decided that the Government should re})ly "to any official demands made upon them that they did not admit the right of the English and French Govern- ments to interfere, and that they recognised no ultimate authority but that of the Sultan." At the same time, the President of the Chamber informed the French Consul - General that " he could no longer rely upon the deputies, on account of the feeling against the intervention of the two Powers which was gaining ground." It was, in 272 MODERN EGYPT pi. n fact, clear that tlie fears vvliich Sir Edward JNIalet had expressed on JMay 14 had been realised. The rehic Lance of the French Government to appeal to the authority of the Sultan had cast suspicion on tlie intentions of tlie AVestern Powers, and had again united the civil and military elements of the Egyptian movement. JNIore than this, the jealousy shown by the French of Turkish intervention had resulted in strengthening the unnatural alUance between Arabi and the Sultan. Essad Effendi, a confidential agent of the Sultan, arrived at Cairo. It was certain that the defiant attitude adopted by the Egyptian Ministers was in a great measure due to the messages brought by this individual from Constantinople. Meanwhile, in anticipation of the failure of the negotiations with Arabi, Sir Edward Malet and ^I. Sienkiewicz had, on Mny 21, suggested to their respective Governments that they should be authorised to make an official demand that Arabi and his principal coadjutors should leave the country. When, however, they saw the decided attitude taken up by the leaders of the military party, they hesitated to adopt so strong a measure on their own authority. On May 23, Sir Edward Malet telegraphed to Lord Granville in the following terms : " M. Sienkiewicz and I hesitate to make an official demand to the INIinisters, which we know beforehand will be met with refusal, until we are in a position to declare what would be the consequences of such a refusal, and I accordingly venture to beg Your Lordship to favour me with further instructions. The present situation has been brought about by the JNIinisters and the people persisting in a belief that the two Powers will not despatch troops, and tliat the opposition of France renders a Turkish intervention impossible. In the meanwhile, military preparations are being OH. XV THE ARABI ministry 273 carried on, and a fanatical feeling against foreigners is sedulously fostered. I am still of opinion that if the Sultan declares himself at once, and if it be known that troops are ready to be despatched, we may succeed without the necessity for landing them." On receipt of this message, Lord Granville telegraphed (May 24) to Lord Lyons in the follow- ing terms : " Tell M. de Freycinet that the news from Cairo is disquieting. Time is all important. Propose to him that the two Governments should telegraph a Circular to the Powers, requesting them to join in asking the Sultan to have troops ready to send to Egypt under strict conditions." No immediate answer was sent to Sir Edward Malet's telegram, but the two Governments authorised their Consuls-General to take whatever steps they considered possible to ensure the de- parture from Egypt of Arabi and his principal partisans, and the nomination of Cherif Pasha to be President of the Council. When this telegram reached Cairo, a document was being circulated amongst the officers and soldiers of the army in which it was stated that the British and French Governments insisted on the following points : All the Ministers were to be exiled ; all the officers on the Army List were to leave Egypt ; the entire army was to be dis- banded ; Egypt was to be occupied by foreign troops ; the Chamber was to be dissolved. " The French representative and I," Sir Edward JNIalet telegraphed on May 2.5, " persuaded that the situa- tion would become still further complicated, and even dangerous to the lives of foreigners, if these conditions were believed to be true ones, determined upon the official step from whicli we had hitherto shrunk." They handed an official Note to the President of the Council, in which the following demands were set forth : — vol.. I 274 ISrODERN EGYPT pt. n "1. The temporary retirement from Egypt of Arabi Pasha, witli tlie mamtenance of his rank and pay. 2. The retirement into the interior of Egypt of Ali Pasha Fehmi and Abdul- Al Pasha, who will also retain their rank and pay. 3. The resignation of the present INIinistry." The Note added that "the intervention of the two Powers, being divested of all character of vengeance and reprisal, they will use their good offices to obtain from the Khedive a general amnesty, and will watch over its strict observance." In consequence of the delivery of this Note, the Ministers resigned on INIay 26. At the same time, they addressed a letter to the Khedive stating that as His Highness had accepted the conditions proposed by the two Powers, he had acquiesced in foreio-n intervention in contradiction to the terms of the Firmans. The Khedive replied that he accepted the resignation of the Ministry because it was the will of the nation, and that, as regards the rest, it ^\as a matter between him and the Sultan, whose rights he would always respect. For a moment, there appeared some hope that the crisis was over. Sir Edward Malet reported (May 27) that the Ministers " perceived that, were they to reject the conditions which the Khedive had accepted, they would be in overt, instead of covert rebellion, a position from which they shrank. The retirement of the Ministry was, therefore, due to the decisive and firm attitude assumed by His Highness." The French Government were elated. They now answered the proposal made by Lord Granville on May 24, to the effect that the Powers should be addressed with a view to Turkish troops being held in readiness to proceed to Egypt. M. Tissot, the French representative in London, wrote to Lord Granville in the following terms : *' M. de Freycinet telegraphs to me that the Council of CH.XV THE ARABl MINISTRY 275 Ministers, to whom he has submitted your proposal, have been unanimous in thinking that notliing in the present situation of affairs would justify an appeal to Turkish troops. A Note was delivered by our Consuls-General on the 25th instant ; the Ministry has just tendered its resignation, the elements of resistance are manifestly in process of disorganisation ; there is, tlierefore, every motive for awaiting the course of events. It appears impossible to M. de Freycinet that you should not be struck with the justice of these considerations, and that, taking into account the recent events which have taken place at Cairo, you should not, yourself, my dear Lord, recognise the uselessness of the step which you at first proposed to him." This elation was short-lived. On INIay 27, Sir Edward JNIalet telegraphed that Cherif Pasha had been asked to form a JNlinistry, but had refused to do so, "on the ground that no Government was possible so long as the military chiefs remained in the country." The Khedive, Sir Edward Malet added, "will now endeavour to form another Ministry, altiiough he has faint hope of being able to get an efficient one, if he can form one at all." Sir Edward Malet urged that the Sultan should be called upon to exercise his authority, and especially that he should despatch an officer to Egypt with as little delay as possible. The Khedive also thought that " a Turkish Commissioner could make himself heard and restore tranquillity." Toulba Pasha, one of Arabi's principal associates, had an interview with the Khedive, at which " he stated that the army absolutely rejected the Joint Note and awaited the decision of the Porte, which was the only authority they recognised." There was, in fact, little doubt that the JNlinisters were acting in collusion with the Porte. On May 28, the Grand Vizier telegraphed to 276 MODERN EGYPT pt. n the Khedive statmg that a Turkish Commissioner would be sent if an official request to that effect were made. The Khedive asked the British and French Consuls-General what he was to do. His position was, indeed, one of the utmost difficulty. The officers of the regiments and of the Police force stationed at Alexandria had telegraphed to him on the previous day (INIay 27) that "they would not accept the resignation of Arabi Paslia, and tliat they allowed twelve hours to His Highness to consider, after which delay they would no longer be responsible for public tranquillity." Moreover, Sultan Pasha and other deputies told the Khedive in the presence of the British and French Consuls -General, that "unless he agreed to reinstate Arabi as Minister of War, his life was not safe." Nevertheless, Sir Edward Malet reported, " His Highness refused." As regards the request for a Turkish Commissioner, Sir Edward Malet telegraphed: "I stated that, if His Highness's life were in danger, I could not give any advdce against the step he proposed, if it appeared to be the only chance of safety. JNI. Sienkiewicz limited himself to saying *that he would request instructions from the French Government,' and we left without giving any further answer, although the Khedive urged the necessity of immediately making some reply to the Grand Vizier." Well might Sir Edward INIalet say: "The position of the Khedive is a most painful one. Threatened with death, prevented by us from going to Alexandria while there was yet time,^ and not allowed to appeal to the only quarter from which effectual assistance can come, he must feel bitterly the ap})arent result at present of following our * The Khedive had, a short while previously, wished to go to Alexandria, l)ut he was urged by the British aud Freuch Goverumentfl to remain at Cairo. CH. XV THE ARABI ministry 277 advice and relying upon our support." The necessity for action was, indeed, so a]) parent that Lord Granville, without waiting to consult the French Government, telegraphed both to I^ord DufFerin at Constantinople and to the Ambassadors at the other courts of Europe that " Her INIajesty's Government considered it most desirable that no time should be lost by the Sultan, who should send an order to support the Khedive, to reject the accusation of the fallen Ministry with regard to His Highness, and to order the three military chiefs, and perhaps also the ex-President of the Council, to come and explain their conduct at Constantinople." M. de Freycinet, when he was informed of what had been done, sent similar instructions to the French representatives abroad, but he evidently did so with reluctance. In the meanwhile, Cairo and Egypt generally remained in the hands of the military party. On May 29, Admiral Sir Beauchamp Seymour (after- wards liOrd Alcester), who commanded the British fleet, which had by this time arrived at Alex- andria, telegraphed : " Alexandria is apparently con- trolled this morning by the military ])arty." It was clear that, in the absence of any effective help from without, the Khedive would be obliged to yield to the wishes of the mutinous army. On May 28, Sir Edward Malet telegraphed to Lord Granville in the following terms : " This afternoon, the Chiefs of religion, including the Patriarch, and the Chief Rabbi, all the deputies, Ulema and others, waited on the Khedive, and asked him to reinstate Arabi as Minister of War. He refused ; but they besought him, saying that, though he might be ready to sacrifice his own life, he ought not to sacrifice theirs, and that Arabi had threatened them all with death if they did not obtain his consent. The Colonel of the Khedive's Guard stated that 278 MODERN EGYPT pt. ii the guard of the Palace had been doubled, that orders had been given to them to prevent his leaving the Palace for his usual drive, and to fire if he attempted to force his way. Under these circumstances, the Khedive yielded, not to save himself, but to preserve the town from bloodshed." At the same time, the Khedive made a formal demand to the Sultan that a Commissioner should be sent to Egypt. The situation at the end of May was, therefore, as follows : An attempt had been made to free the Khedive from the dictatorship of the military party. In spite of the support accorded by the British and French Governments, the attempt had completely failed. Arabi and his associates had again triumphed. British diplomacy, although somewhat more free in action than previous to the accession to power of M. de Freycinet, was still hampered by its association with France. No frank appeal could be made to the Sultan that he should exercise his authority, although both Lord Granville and Sir Edward Malet saw that in such an appeal lay the only chance of avoiding military intervention of some sort. M. de Freycinet was almost as much opposed as his predecessor to Turkish intervention. The result of all this vacillation was that the policy of England and France was suspected on all sides, — by the Sultan, who was greatly irritated ; by the other Powers ; and by the Egyptians. The Khedive, in the meanwhile, had so far found that Anglo- French support was a weak reed on which to lean in time of necessity. The end, however, was not far off. It was daily becoming more clear that Arabi could be suppressed by nothing but force. If no one else would use the requisite force, the task would necessarily devolve on England. CH.XV THE ARABI JNlINISTllY 279 APPENDIX Note on the relations between Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Wilfrid Blunt. The overestimate of Mr. Wilfrid Blunt's influence was in no small degree due to the fact that he was known to be in communication with Mr. Gladstone. As Mr. Blunt in his Secret History has narrated at length his dealings with Mr. Gladstone, who, he says (p. 369), was, in his opinion, " capable of any treachery and any crime," I think that, in justice to the memory of that distinguished statesman, I should furnish whatever evidence is in my possession as to the manner in which he regarded the question of his rela- tions with Mr. Blunt. At a later period of Egyptian history (October 23, 1883), Lord Granville wrote to me privately, forwarding a letter addressed by Mr. Blunt to Sir Edward Hamilton, Mr. Gladstone's Private Secretary, with the following remarks : Gladstone sent me this letter, condemning Blunt, but suggest- ing that I miglit send it on to you. I declined, and expressed a hope that Hamilton would not answer him at all ; that there was no knowing what use he might make of the fact of his being in correspondence with any one in Downing Street. But as Gladstone returns to the charge, I forward it to you privately. He writes : " There are certain parts of Blunt's letter which, indifferently as I think of him, I certainly should have wished Baring to see. My rule has always been to look in the declarations of even the extremest opponents for anything which either may have some small percentage of truth in it, or ought not to be let pass without contradiction (private in this case). I know not how it is that he writes to Hamilton, but you see it is personal and tuluyant, not official." Gladstone's principle is plausible, but I fancy it often gets h m into unnecessary difficulties. \ ou have seen Blunt, and heard all he had to say. 1 replied on November 5, in the following terms : I would just as soon that Mr. Blunt was not in corre- spondence with any one connected with the Government; if it were known, it might be misinterpreted. 280 MODERN EGYPT pt. n The principle of not neglecting criticisms which come from an opponent is a very sound one, and I always endeavour to follow it. But, in this case, we may have the advantage of knowing what Blunt has to say without corresponding with him. He will not hide his light under a bushel. You may feel sure tliat before long it will burn brightly in the pages of some magazine. I also, for Mr. Gladstone's information, replied at some length to Mr. Blunfs criticisms, but neither his letter, nor my reply, are of sufficient importance or interest to warrant their reproduction. CHAPTER XVI THE BOMBARDMENT OF ALEXANDRIA May-July 1882 State of the country — Vacillation of the Porte — A Conference pro- posed — Dervish Pasha and Essad Effendi sent to Egypt — The Alexandria massacres — Failure of Dervish Pasha's Mission — Panic in Egypt — The Conference meets — Tlie Ragheb Ministry — The British Admiral demands that the construction of batteries at Alexandria shall cease — The French decline to co-operate — The bombardment of Alexandria — The town abandoned and burnt. Arabi's reinstatement was *' looked upon by the natives as a sign that the Christians were going to be expelled from Egypt, that they were to recover the land bought by Europeans or mortgaged to them, and that the National Debt would be can- celled." Great numbers of Christians left the interior. The British residents at Alexandria called upon their Government to provide means for the protection of their lives. " Every day's delay," Sir Charles Cookson telegraphed on May 30, *' increases the dangerous temper of the soldiery, and their growing defiance of discipline." The officers of the army were "obtaining by threats signatures to a petition praying for the deposition of the Khedive." The President of the Chamber re- quested the deputies to go to their homes " in order to save them from being compelled to sign the petition." Official business, except at the Ministry of War, was at a standstill. Tiie whole country was in a state of panic. Sir Edward Malet warned the 281 282 MODERN EGYPT pt. ii British Government (May 31) that "a collision might at any moment occur between the INIoslems and the Christians." It was abundantly clear by this time that the question of protecting European financial interests in Egypt had fallen completely into the back- ground. It was also clear that the national move- ment was entirely under the control of the military party. Foreign intervention of some sort had become necessary. For years past, the Ottoman Government had been longing to regain their hold over Egypt. The chanceries of Europe were filled with notes and protests embodying the querulous complaints made by the Porte against the intervention of the European Powers in Egyptian affiiirs, and against the insufficient recognition accorded to the sovereign rights of the Sultan. The Turkish opportunity had at last come. The force of circumstances had fought in favour of Turkish pretensions. The Khedive and the two Western Powers had en- deavoured to settle the affairs of Egypt indepen- dently of the Sultan. They had signally failed in the attempt. All the Powers of Europe, with the exception of France, were in favour of employing the authority of the Sultan as the executive arm by which order should be restored in Egypt. Even French opposition was much modified. The Re- publique Fra7ifaise, indeed, which was inspired by M. Gambetta, strongly opposed any idea of Turkish intervention. " II faut niaintenir," it said on May 31, " Tiudependance de I'Egypte, en interdire I'ap- proche aux Commissaires aussi bien qu'aux troupes du Sultan." But M. Gambetta was no longer in office. "Je ne m'expliquerai point a la tribune," M. de Freycinet said in the French Chamber on June 1, "sur les divers moyens auxquels on pour- rait etre conduit, mais il y a un moyen que j'exclus; CH. XVI THE BOMBARDMENT 283 ce moyen c'est une intervention militaire Fran^'aise en Egypte." This declaration, which produced an explosion of indignation from M. Gambetta, was almost tantamount to publicly admitting the possibility of Turkish intervention. It is one of the peculiarities of the vacillating and tortuous policy invariably pursued by the Porte that Turkish statesmen are rarely able to seize the favourable moment for action in support of their most cherished views. The Khedive had asked for the despatch of a Turkish Commissioner to Egypt. The British and French Governments viewed the proposal more or less favourably. It might reason- ably have been supposed that the Sultan would seize with avidity the opportunity for asserting his sovereign rights which was thus afforded him. He did nothing of the kind. He was inclined to show his resentment at the way in which he had been enjoined not to intervene at the commencement of the Egyptian troubles, by refusing to act at the instance of England and France when they were favourably disposed towards his intervention. A suggestion was ostentatiously promulgated that the withdrawal of the allied fleet from Alexandria must be a preliminary condition to the despatch of a Turkish Commissioner. The Sultan had yet to learn that his assistance, though desirable, was not indispensable. In the meanwhile, M. de Freycinet, under the p]:essure of circumstances, had in some degree over- come his objections to international action. On May 30, he telegraphed to M. Tissot that " there could no longer be any reasonable hope of a pacific solution through the moral influence of the French and English squadrons, and the good offices of the two agents at Cairo." He therefore proposed to Lord Granville that a Conference should be sum- moned. Lord Granville at once intimated his 284 MODERN EGYPT pt. n concurrence in this proposal, which was well received by the other Powers. Prince Bismarck thought the idea of a Conference "a very good expedient for covering the change of policy on the part of the French Government in regard to the admissi- bility of Turkish intervention." The Sultan was pressed to join the Conference. " I expressed my hope," Lord Granville wrote on June 2, " that Musurus Pasha would represent to his Government the expediency of acting in cordial co-operation with England. I remarked that if the Sultan were to make difficulties and raise obstacles, it would be difficult to find arguments to meet the pressure that would be put upon us to take immediate and independent action in consideration of the pressing nature of the circumstances and engagements under which we lay." The idea of assembling a Conference was distaste- ful to the Sultan, and the proposal was sufficient to overcome his hesitation about the despatch of a Turkish Commissioner to Egypt. Dervish Pasha left Constantinople for Alexandria on June 4. The Porte " confidently hoped that the mission of Dervish Pasha would suffice to restore the normal situation in Egypt to the general satisfaction," and Musurus Pasha was instructed to express to Lord Granville a hope that the project of the Con- ference would be abandoned. He was told in reply that if it were found that there were good hopes of a settlement being speedily attained by the un- assisted efforts of Dervish Pasha, there would be no objection to the Conference adjourning for a short time in order that the result of his mission might be watched. Any beneficial results, which might possibly have accrued from the despatch of the Turkish mission to Egypt, were frustrated by the conditions under which it was sent. It would have been CH. XVI THE BOMBARDMENT 285 contrary to the traditions and to the existing practice of Turkish diplomacy to have selected one capable Commissioner, in whom confidence might be re- posed, and to have traced clear and straightforward instructions for his guidance. Whilst Dervish Pasha was to act on lines friendly to the Khedive and hostile to Arabi, his colleague, Essad EfFendi, was to be guided by diametrically opposite prin- ciples. He was to hold out the hand of fellowship to the mutineers. Moreover, in order to guard against the possibility of common action on the part of the two Commissioners, each of them was to communicate independently with the Sultan. The end to be obtained by each of the Commissioners was, indeed, identical, though the method of attain- ing it was more explicitly set forth in Dervish Pasha's instructions than in those of Essad EfFendi. The latter was merely told that the principal object he should bear in mind was to " faire echouer les entre- prises et intrigues pernicieuses des etrangers." Dervish Pasha, on the other hand, was told that *' in order to create a rivalry amongst the Consuls, he was to attach himself to the Consuls of Ger- many, Austria, and Italy, by pretending to invite them to decisive deliberations, and to promise to take their advice." Save in respect to this point of principle, the instructions given to each of the two Commissioners differed widely.^ Dervish Pasha was ordered, if necessary, to arrest Arabi and his principal fol- lowers and to send them to Constantinople^ to abolish the Chamber of Notables, to curtail the powers of the Khedive, to extend those of the Sultan, and, lastly, to call for troops if necessary. ' The instructions to each Commissioner were, of course, secret. But there can be no doubt of the accuracy of the facts here stated in connection with them. See also the testimony of Mr. AVilfrid Blunt, who was probably well-informed on the point under discussion. — Secret History, etc., p. 305. 286 MODERN EGYPT ft. u Essad Eifendi, on the other hand, was instructed to^ thank the " Notables et hommes de marque de I'Egypte pour le devouement dont ils ont fait preuve," and to assure every one that the Sultan had no intention of curtaihng the powers granted to the Khedive by the Firmans. " Quant a I'envoi d'une force arm^e," it was added, " ce n'est qu'une invention pernicieuse et malveillante." It was, in fact, certain that the Sultan was reluctant to bring his troops into collision with the population of Egypt. He preferred to pose as their defender against European aggression. Under these circum- stances, it is not surprising that the bewildered Essad Effendi should, shortly after his arrival at Cairo, have reported that the policy of Dervish Pasha was in entire contradiction to the instruc- tions he had himself received. He asked, but asked in vain, for some clear indication of what he was to do. Dervish Pasha, however, lost no time in acting on his instructions. He resolved to assert his authority. On June 10, he received a deputation from the Ulema of Cairo. " One of them," Sir Edward Malet reported, "well known as a follower of Artibi, proceeded to deliver a speech, extolling the course pursued by the army in having pre- served the country from falling into the hands of infidels. Upon this, the Commissioner rose from his seat, and, in forcible language, reminded those present that he had come to issue orders and not to listen to preaching. The ofiending Alim was thereupon seized and forced to retire by an attendant of colossal stature who appears always at hand." It was, to say the least, a curious coincidence that at the moment when it appeared possible that the rulership of Egypt would slip from the hands of the military clique, wliich then exercised cH. XVI THE BOMBARDMENT 287 supreme power, an incident should have occurred which showed that without the aid of Arabi and his colleagues public tranquillity could not be pre- served. For some while past, the population of Alexandria had shown unusual signs of efferves- cence. Europeans had been hustled and spat upon in the streets. A Sheikh liad been crying aloud in the public thoroughfares, "O INIoslems, come and help me to kill the Christians!" On June 9, a Greek was warned by an Egyptian to " take care, as the Arabs were going to kill the Christians either that day or the day following." On the 10th, some low-class Moslems went about the streets calling out that "the last day for the Christians was drawing nigh."^ On June 11, the storm burst. It is needless to give the details of the riot which took place on that day. It will be sufficient to say that disturbances broke out simultaneously in three places. Some fifty Europeans were slaughtered in cold blood under circumstances of the utmost brutality. INI any others, amongst whom was Sir Charles Cook son, the British Consul, were severely wounded and narrowly escaped with their lives. "Whenever a European appeared in sight, the mob cried out * O Moslems I Kill him I Kill the Christian I ' " Both the Khedive and Arabi have at times been accused of having instigated the Alexandria massacres.^ So calm and impartial an observer * Royle's Egyptian Campaigns o/"1882 to 1885^ vol. i. p. 88. 2 Mr. Wilfrid Blunt (Secret Hintory, pp. 497-534) gives at great length the evidence on which he relies to incriminate the Khedive. After a careful examination of all the facts, I have come to the con- clusion that this evidence is altogether valueless. It is unnecessary that I should give my reasons at length. Lord Randolph Churchill made himself the principal mouthpiece in Parliament of the cliarges against the Khedive. Papers on the subject were laid before I' rliament (see Egypt, No. 4, 1884). They were forwarded to Sir Edward Malet on August 6, 1883, by Lord Granville with the following remarks : " A full examination of the papers and arguments adduced by Lord Randolph Churchill leads to the couclusiou 288 ISIODERN EGYPT pt. ii as Sir Edward INIalet, however, held that both accusations were devoid of foundation, and that the massacres were the natural outcome of the political effervescence of the time. There can be little doubt that this view of the question is correct. A considerable moral responsibility, how- ever, rested on Arabi and his colleagues for tne blood which was shed. For a long time past, they had done their best to arouse the race hatred and fanaticism of the cowardly mob at Alexandria.^ The natural result ensued. The effect of the riot was instantaneous. Sir Edward JNIalet reported to I^ord Granville, on June 13, that Dervish Pasha's mission had alto- gether failed in its object. The Sultan's Com- missioner was obliged to bow to the authority of Arabi. He informed the representatives of the Powers that " under the urgent circumstances of the case, he would assume joint responsibility with Arabi Pasha for the execution of the orders of the Khedive." Dervish Pasha distributed decorations alike to the Arabists and to the Khedivial party, but his influence was gone. None of the officers of the army went to see him. It was only by " a remnant of politeness" that Arabi answered the letters which Dervish Pasha addressed to him. It was r.bout this moment that the Sultan informed Lord Dufferin that "Arabi Pasha had made a complete submission, and tliat the status quo was about to be established." Musurus Pasha also told Lord Granville that the Sultan had conferred on Arabi the Grand Cordon of the that no prima facie evidence (either legal or moral) exists in support of the charges which liave been preferred against His Highness Tewfik Pasha." As regards Arabi, Sir Charles Wilson, who watched his trial, expressed tlie opinion that '' there was no evidence to connect Arabi with the mass;icre at Alexandria on June 11." ' Al)unilant evidence in supjjort of tliis statement was adduced at Arabi's trial. CH. XVI THE BOMBARDMENT 289 Medjidieh, and that Arabi " had expressed his gratitude and had reiterated his assurances of fideUty and devotion to the Sultan." His JNIajesty thought that there was " no longer occasion for anxiety." The alarm which had prevailed had been due to insubordination on the part of the military, but these acts of submission and the restoration of tranquillity " removed all difficulties and rendered any measures of rigour useless." The extent of Arabi's submission may be gathered from the fact that, on July 5, Arabi " intimated to Dervish Pasha that he had better quit Egypt," and tliat when, on July 8, he was summoned, through Essad EfFendi, to proceed to Constan- tinople "he refused to comply with the invitation of His Majesty." Then, at last. Lord DufFerin extorted from the unwilling Minister for Foreign Afiairs at the Porte the admission that " Arabi had taken the bit in his teeth and that it was evident something must be done." Manifestly something had to be done, for the whole framework of society in Egypt was on the point of collapsing. By June 17, 14,000 Christians had left the country, and some 6000 more were anxiously awaiting the arrival of ships to take them away. On June 26, ten Greeks and three Jews were murdered by a fanatical mob at Ben ha. Anibi, following perhaps unconsciously the ex- ample of the French Jacobins, proposed to the Council that the property of all Egyptians leaving the country should be confiscated.^ On June 29, Mr. Cartwright, Sir Edward JNIalet's locum teiiens,^ ^ It is possible that Arabi designedly copied the proceedings of the Jacobins. 1 have been informed on good autliority that at this period he devoted a good deal of attention to the literature of the French Revolution. 2 Ill-health obliged Sir Edward Malet to leave Egypt at this time. He subse(iuently came to the conclusion that the sudden illness by wbicli he was prostrated was the result of a plot to poison him. — See his letter in the Times of October 12, 1907. vox.. 1 u 290 MODERN EGYPT ft. n reported to Lord Granville : '* The exodus of Europeans and the preparations for flight continue with vigour. ... It is impossible to conceive the collapse and ruin which have so suddenly overtaken the country. . . . The natives, even the religious Sheikhs, are now raising their voices against the military party, and a large number of respectable Arabs are leaving the country. The departure of Turkish families is taking large proportions." The effect of the massacre at Alexandria was to quicken the slow pace of European diplomacy. M. de Freycinet thought it "more than ever imperative that the Conference should be con- stituted without the least delay." On June 13, the British and French Governments instructed their representatives at the various courts of Europe to propose that " the Sultan, as Sovereign, shall, in case of necessity, be jointly invited by the Powers united in Conference to be prepared to lend to the Khedive a sufficient force to enable His Highness to maintain his authority ; the Sultan to be requested to give a positive assurance that these troops should only be used for the mainten- ance of the status quo, and that there should be no interference with the liberties of Egypt secured by the previous Firmans of the Sultan, or with existing European agreements ; the troops not to remain in Egypt for a longer period than a month, except at the request of the Khedive, and with the consent of the Great Powers, or of the Western Powers as representing Europe ; the reasonable expenses of the expedition to be borne by the Egyptian Government." This was quickly followed by a proposal that the Conference should meet immediately " with or without Turkey." The Sultan declined to join the Conference. He thought it unnecessary, as "Dervish Pasha was succeeding in his efforts to fulfil his mission in CH. XVI THE BOMBARDMENT 291 Egypt." The result was that, after some diplomatic skirmishing, the Conference met at Constantinople on June 23 without the Porte being represented. It is unnecessary to dwell at length on the tedious proceedings of the Conference. It was clear, as Lord Salisbury said in the House of Lords on July 24, that the " European concert was rather a phantasm." On the one side, was the British Government, represented at the Conference by one of the most able diplomatists of the day. Lord Granville and Lord DufFerin thoroughly understood what they wanted. They wished for order to be maintained in Egypt, and they were alive to the fact that, without the employment of material force, order could not be maintained. European public opinion had been irritated by the " tortuous and occult devices " of the Sultan. If the Sultan refused to send troops, it would be necessary to "resort to an armed occupation of Egypt other than through the instrumentality of Turkey." On the other side, were the various Powers of Europe, watchful of their own interests, but unwilling to incur any responsibility. On June 30, Lord Dufferin reported that so far the Conference had "done absolutely nothing," and that, unless something could speedily be settled, "the prolongation of its existence would seem useless." By July 2, the Conference had only got so far as to consider "the object to be attained by the armed Turkish intervention in Egypt," and the united Ambassadors had come to the sage but somewhat impotent conclusion that, if the Porte refused an invitation to send troops, "the Con- ference reserved the right to express an opinion as to what should be done at the opportune moment." In the meanwhile, the bewildered ruler, whose battalions it was proposed to use in order to keep the peace, held aloof from the Council Chamber, 292 MODERN EGYPT pt.ii being at times willing and at times unwilling to act. He wished to know what Lord Granville meant when he referred to "the safe improve - ment of the internal administration of Egypt." He was anxious to have some explanations on this point, for his suspicions had been excited by the fact that the Conference had been invited to con- sider how "the prudent development of Egyptian institutions " might best be effected. " What," Lord Dufferin reported, " has excited His Majesty's mistrust, is evidently the allusion to Parliamentary Government, which he imagines to be shadowed forth in the word ' institutions.' " Eventually, on July 6, the Conference got so far as to invite the Sultan to send troops under certain conditions, which were specified in general terms, and which, in the event of the invitation being accepted, were to be embodied in a subse- quent agreement between the six Powers and Turkey. Whilst these discussions were taking place, matters had been going from bad to worse in Egypt. On June 26, Mr. Cartwright wrote : "The exclusive hifluence of Arabi Pasha is best shown by the unbroken ascendancy, the intolerable pretensions, and the threatening attitude of the army." A mock inquiry was instituted into the massacres of June 11, but the English member of the Commission soon withdrew from the proceed- ings, and the Minister of War told the Khedive's private secretary that " he would not allow any Arab to be executed, unless for every Arab, a European was hung." No one dared to give evi- dence which might be distasteful to the military party. The Austrian and German representatives in Egypt urged the formation of a INIinistry approved by the military party. l*rince Bismarck thought CH. XVI THE BOMBARDMENT 293 that Arabi had become a power "avec lequel il fallait compter." The German and Austrian proposals were not viewed with disfavour in Paris. M. de Freycinet spoke about "the possibihty of patching up the Egyptian question by making terms with Arabi," but was at once met with the decisive statement that, in the opinion of the British Government, no '* satisfactory or durable arrangement was possible without the overthrow of Arabi Pasha and the military party in Egypt." Under the pressure exerted by the Austrian and German Consuls -General, the Khedive, on June 7, nominated Ragheb Pasha, an effete old man, to be President of the Council, with Arabi as his JNlinister of War. The result was what might have been expected. On June 28, Mr. Cartwright reported to Lord Granville : ** Ragheb Pasha meets with great difficulties in his endeavour to control the military element in his Ministry. I hear that His Excellency is greatly disheartened at his want of success, and finds the officers too much occupied with warlike designs and preparations to pay any serious attention to reassuring measures, or to the need of serious steps with a view to the establishment of order and a more normal state of affairs." For some while past, both British public opinion and the British Government had shown a dis- position to break through the diplomatic cobwebs which were hindering all effective action and allow- ing Arabi to defy Europe. The opportunity for doing so now presented itself. So early as June 3, the Admiralty was informed that batteries were being raised at Alexandria with the intention of using them against the British fleet. The Sultan gave orders that the construction of these batteries should cease, and for the time being his order 294 MODERN EGYPT ft. n was obeyed. A month later, the works were recommenced. The garrison of Alexandria was reinforced. Arabi urged upon his colleagues the desirability of a Icvce en masse. On July 5, Mr. Cartwright reported : " At a Council of INIinisters held yesterday, Arabi Pasha made a very violent speech against the S ultan. He has, moreover, ordered the officers of the Egyptian army to discontinue all communication with Dervish Pasha, who is to be told that his mission in Egypt is terminated." On July 3, Lord Alcester was instructed to prevent the continuance of work on the fortifica- tions. If not immediately disconthiued, he was to " destrov the earthworks and silence the batteries if they opened fire." The French Government were informed of the issue of these instructions and invited to co-operate. The other Powers of Europe were also informed. On July 5, JNI. de Freycinet told Lord Lyons that ** the French Government could not instruct Admiral Ccnrad to associate himself with the English Admiral in stopping by force the erection of batteries or the placing of guns at Alexandria. The French Government considered that this would be an act of offensive hostility against Egypt, in which they could not take part without violating the con- stitution, which prohibits their making war without the consent of the Chamber." On July 6, INI. de Freycinet, in answer to a question addressed to him by INI. Lockroy in the Chamber of Deputies, " repeated emphatically the assurance that the arms of France would not be used without the express consent of the Chamber." On July 6, Lord Alcester sent a note to the commandant of the garrison demanding that the work of fortifi- cation and the erection of earthworks should be discontinued. He was informed in reply that no guns had recently been added to the forts, or CH.XVI THE BOMBARDMENT 295 military preparations made. The truth of this statement was confirmed by Dervish Pasha. On the 9th, however, work on the fortifications recom- menced. Guns were mounted on Fort Silsileh. At daybreak on July 10, Lord Alcester gave notice to the Consuls resident at Alexandria that he would *' commence action twenty-four hours after, unless the forts on the isthmus and those commanding the entrance to the harbour were surrendered." The different Cabinets of Europe were informed of this step. The views of the Austrian Government on a matter of this sort are of special importance, on account of the interest possessed by Austria in any step which menaces the integrity of the Otto- man Empire. When Sir Henry Elliot, the British Ambassador at Vienna, informed Count Kalnoky of the measures about to be taken by the British Admiral, " His Excellency replied without hesita- tion that he thought Her Majesty's Govern- ment perfectly right in the step that was being taken, and nothing could be more complete and cordial than the manner in which he declared the action to be perfectly legitimate, as it was impossible for us to permit the threatening pre- parations to be carried on without interference." The bewilderment of the Sultan was at this moment extreme. Baron de Ring, who had been formerly French Consul -General in Egypt and whose Arabist sympathies were well known, was at Constantinople, and had given the Sultan to understand that France would be glad to see some compromise effected with Arabics party. Under these circumstances, the Sultan was inclined to join the Conference. Indeed, on July 10, he informed the German Charge d'AfFaires at Constantinople that "a Turkish Commissioner would join the Con- ference the next day but one." It was, however, 296 MODERN EGYPT pt. n clear that the work of restoring order in Egypt was about to be taken out of the hands of the Conference. When, on July 10, the Sultan was informed of the intended bombardment of Alexandria, he told Lord Dufferin that he " would send a categorical answer to his communication by five o'clock to-morrow (July 11)." In the mean- while, he asked that the bombardment should be delayed, and he appointed a new Prime Minister, who at once called on Lord Dufferin and said that "to-morrow (the 12th) he would be able to propose a satisfactory solution of the Egyptian question." Lord Dufferin forwarded the Sultan's request to London and to Alexandria, but he "held out no hope that the line of action determined upon would be modified." He also pointed out "the folly, when such great interests were at stake, of postponing diplomatic action till it became materially impossible to interfere with the course of events." The Sultan was, as usual, too late. The patience both of the British Government and of the British public was exhausted. For the last year and a half, every one had been agreed that something should be done, but no one could agree as to what should be done. At last, something effectual was done. "At 7 a.m., on the 11th," Lord Alcester stated in his report on the bombardment, "I signalled from the Invincible to the Alexandra to fire a shell into the recently armed earthworks termed the Hospital Battery, and followed this by a general signal to the fleet 'Attack the enemy's batteries,' when immediate action ensued between all the ships in the positions assigned to them, and the whole of the forts commanding the entrance to the harbour of Alexandria." By 5.30 p.m., the batteries were silenced. On the afternoon of the following day, the Egyptian garrison retreated, OH. XVI THE BOMBARDMENT 297 having first set fire to the town, which was pillaged by the mob. Several Europeans were murdered. On the evening of the 13th, 150 marines, with a Gatlino- ouii, were landed from the fleet, but re- embarked after remaining on shore for about half an hour. On the morning of the 14th, a further force was landed. In the course of the next day or two, reinforcements having arrived, effective possession was taken of the town and something- like order restored. On July 18, Europeans and Egyptians began to return to Alexandria. It has been frequently stated by critics hostile to England that Alexandria was set on fire by the shells from the British fleet. For this statement there is not a shadow of foundation.^ There is no * Mr. Wilfrid Blunt's testimony on Egyptian affairs generally ia of very little value, but it may perhaps be quoted on this special point. His first impressions are recorded in the following words (Secret History, etc., p. 872): "^'July 14th. Went to see Gregory. He is frightened at Alexandria's being burnt, and will have it that Arabi did not order it. I say he ordered it, and was right to do so. This is the policy of the Russians at Moscow, and squai-es with all I know of their intentions." Somewhat later, Mr. Blunt wrote (pp. 390-91) : " With regard to the burning of Alexandria, I have never been able to make up my mind exactly what part, if any, the Egyptian army took in it. Arabi has always persistently denied having or(lered it, and an act of such great energy stands so completely at variance with the rest of his ail-too supine conduct of the war that I think it may be fairly dismissed as improbable. . . . Ninet, who was present at the whole affair, attributes the conflagration primarily to Seymour's shells, and this is probably a correct account. ... I do not consider the question of any great importance as affecting the moral aspect of the case, it being clearly a military measure. . . . Historically, how- ever, it is of importance, and I therefore say that on a balance of evidence I am of opinion that the retreating army had its share in it, not in consequence of any order, but as an act of disorder." Mr. Broadley, who defended Ar/ibi at his trial, evidently had strong suspicions that the burning of Alexandria was his handiwork. On November 27, 1882, he wrote to Mr. Blunt: "Nothing presents difficulties but the burning of Alexandria. As regards this, 1 believe the proof will fail as to Arabi's orders, but many ugly facts remain, viz. : (1) No efforts to stop conflagration and loot. (2) Continued intimacy with Suliman Sami afterwards. (8) No punishment of offenders. (4) Large purchases of petroleum. (5) Systematic manner of incendi- arism by soldiers. This is the rub. Could Arabi have not stopped the whole thing .^ Besides, some of his speeches have a very burning appearance." — Secret History, etc., p. 468. 298 MODERN EGYPT pt. ii doubt that the conflagration was the deliberate work of incendiaries. At the time, the British Government were severely blamed for not taking prompt measures immediately after the bombardment to stop the conflagration and to restore order in the to^\^l. So early as July 7, the Khedive pointed out that the bombardment should be immediately followed by the landing of a military force. The War Office and the Admiralty were desirous to land troops, but their advice was overruled by the Cabinet on political grounds. Mr. Gladstone stated in the House of Commons that the landing of a force was objectionable, because it would have in- volved *'the assumption of authority upon the Egyptian question," and would have been *' grossly disloyal in the face of Europe and the Conference." It is difficult to conceive the frame of mind of any one who considers that firing several thousand shot and shell into Egyptian forts did not involve an '* assumption of authority," whereas landing some men to prevent a populous city from being burnt to the ground did involve such an assumption. These technicalities, which are only worthy of a special pleader, were the bane of the British Government in dealing with the Egyptian ques- tion during Mr. Gladstone's JNIinistry. No foreign Power would have had any reasonable ground for complaint if, immediately after the bombardment, a force sufficient to preserve order had been landed at Alexandria. The question remains whether, apart from the details in the execution, the bombardment was justifiable. There can be no doubt tliat it was perfectly justifiable, not merely on the narrow ground taken up by the British INIinistry, namely, that it was necessary as a means of self-defence, but because it was clear that, in tlie absence of CH.XVI THE BOMBARDMENT 299 effectual Turkish or international action, the duty of crushing Arabi devolved on England.^ * The bombardment of Alexandria led to the retirement from Mr. Gladstone's Cabinet of Mr. Brig^lit, " the colleague who in fundamentals stood closest to him of them all" (Morley's Life of Gladstone, iii. p. 83). The arguments by which Mr. Gladstone defended the action taken at Alexandria are given in a letter addressed at the time to Mr. Bright (p. 84). Save to those who hold that, under no circumstances is the use of force justifiable, they would appear to be conclusive. CHAPTER XVII TEL-EL-KEBIR July-September 1882 State of the country — British policy — Vote of credit — Negotiations with France — Fall of the Freycinet Ministry — France declines to co-operate — Negotiations with Italy — Italy declines to co-operate — Negotiations with Turkey— Tel-el-Kebir — General remarks. After the bombardment of the forts, Arabi retired to Kafr-Dawar, a few miles distant from Alex- andria, whence he issued a Proclamation stating that "irreconcilable war existed between the Egyptians and the English, and all those who proved traitors to their country would not only be subjected to the severest punishment in accordance with martial law, but would be for ever accursed in the future world." On July 22, the Khedive formally dismissed Arabi from the post of Minister of War, but it was not till August 27, that a new Ministry under the presidency of Cherif Pasha, with Riaz Pasha as INIinister of the Interior, was formed at Alexandria. In the meanwhile, the condition of the provinces was one of complete anarchy. The towns of Tanta, Damanhour, and INIehalla were plundered, and the European in- habitants massacred. The history of the next two months may be summarised in a single sentence. England stepped in, and with one rapid and well -delivered blow crushed the rebellion. But it will be interesting 300 CH. XVII TEL-EL-KEBIR 301 to the student of diplomatic history to know in somewhat greater detail how it was that the British Government were left to act alone in the matter. After the bombardment of Alexandria, British public opinion was thoroughly roused. On July 22, Mr. Gladstone stated the policy of the British Government in the House of Commons. " We feel," he said, " that we should not fully discharge our duty if we did not endeavour to convert the present interior state of Egypt from anarchy and conflict to peace and order. We shall look during the time that remains to us to the co-operation of the Powers of civilised Europe, if it be in any case open to us." But, INIr. Gladstone added, amidst the cheers of the House, " if every chance of obtaining co-operation is exhausted, the work will be undertaken by the single power of England." Parliament granted, by a majority of 275 to 19, the money (£2,300,000) for which the Government asked. 15,000 men were ordered to Malta and Cyprus. A force of 5000 men was ordered to be sent to Egypt from India. Sir Garnet (afterwards Lord) Wolseley was placed in chief command. He was to go to Egypt " in support of the authority of His Highness the Khedive, as established by the Firmans of the Sultan and existing international engagements, to suppress a military revolt in that country." Simultaneously with the military preparations, diplomatic negotiations were actively carried on. The French Government were " firmly resolved to separate the question of protecting the Suez Canal from that of intervention properly so - called." They would "abstain from any operation in the interior of Egypt except for the purpose of re- pelling direct acts of aggression. If, therefore, the English troops thought fit to undertake such operations, they must not count on French 302 MODERN EGYPT pt. ii co-operation." Amongst other reasons for adopting this course, it was stated that the Ministers of War and Marine considered that the season was most unfavourable, and that at least half the troops would perish from sickness, if operations were undertaken before November. At the same time, the French Chargd d' Affaires in London told Lord Granville "that it was certain that M. de Freycinet wished it to be understood that the French Government had no objection to our {i.e. the British) advance if we decided to make it." M. de Freycinet, however, was not unwilling to take action in common with England for the defence of the Canal. On July 19, the French Chamber granted to the Government, by a majority of 421 to 61, the navy credits for which they asked, amounting to about £313,000. In the course of the debates on this vote, it became clear that much difference of opinion existed in the Chamber. M. Gambetta denounced in the stronejest terms the despatch of Turkish troops to Egypt, and spoke eloquently in support of the Anglo- French alliance. " Au prix des plus grands sacri- fices," he said, "ne rompez jamais Talliance Anglaise. Et precisement — je livre toute ma pensee, car je n'ai rien a cacher — precisement ce qui me soUicite a I'alliance Anglaise, a la co-opera- tion Anglaise, dans le bassin de la Mediterranee, et en Egypte, et ce que je redoute le plus, entendez- le bien, outre cette rupture ndfaste, c'est que vous ne livriez a I'Angleterre et pour toujours, des territoires, des fleuves, et des passages ou votre droit de vivre et de trafiquer est dgal au sien."' 1 To a limited extent, M. Gambetta was a true prophet, although time alone can show how far he was rij^ht in usiiij^^ the words pour toujours: lu the meanwhile, it may he remarked that the " right to live and to trade" in Egypt has been as fully, indeed, j)erhaps some- what more fully assured to the French since the British oecujjation than was the case before the occurrence of that event. According to a CH. XVII TEL-EL-KEEIR 303 M. Clemenceau, on the other hand, was animated with a very different spirit. He congratuhited the Government on not having taken part in the bombardment of the forts at Alexandria, he approved of the Conference, and he deprecated any active French interference in Egypt. Speaking with a manifest suspicion of the poUcy and inten- tions of Germany, he said that it appeared to him that endeavours were being made to get the French forces scattered over Africa, and that, as Austria had been pushed into Bosnia and Herzegovina, so France had been pushed into Tunis, and was now being pushed into Egypt. Active preparations were now made in the French dockyards. The French Admiral at Port Said was instructed to concert measures with Rear- Ad miral Hoskins for the protection of the Suez Canal. But both the French Government and the French Chamber were haunted by the idea that France would be isolated in Europe. M. de Freycinet wished to have a distinct mandate from the Conference deputing England and France to watch over the Canal. The British and French Ambassadors at Constantinople were, therefore, instructed to propose to their colleagues that the Conference should designate the Powers who, failing any effective action on the part of Turkey, should be charged in case of need to take whatever measures were necessary for the protection of the Canal. It soon became apparent that it would be impossible to obtain a mandate from the Powers. Prince Bismarck " was afraid of giving the question greater proportions by such a step, and of convert- ing it into a war between the Christian Powers of Europe and the Mohammedan countries." Count statement published in the Journal Offidel in 1903, French capitiil to the extent of over 67 millions sterliuir was at that time invested io Effypt. I do not doubt that this amount has now been exceeded. 304 MODERN EGYPT ft. u Minister, however, assured Lord Granville that, in the event of the British Government taking action on their own initiative, they would receive the moral support of Germany, although Prince Bismarck \vas not prepared to go to the length of a formal mandate. The Austrian Government shared the views set forth by Germany. In the meanwhile, the feeling in France against any intervention in Egypt grew apace. The parti- sans of non-intervention and those of intervention united against the Suez Canal Credit Bill. The opposition was increased by a communication made by the German Ambassador in Paris to M. de Freycinet, which favoured Turkish intervention as the best means for safeguarding the Canal. This communication was regarded as one of many steps said to have been recently taken by Prince Bismarck with a view to keeping M. de Freycinet in office. Resentment at the interference in their internal affiiirs implied, as the French conceived, in the undisguised su])port Prince Bismarck was sup})osed to give to INI. de Freycinet, had been ranklino; for some while in French minds. The suspicions entertained of Germany found expres- sion in a report made by the Committee of the Chamber. Some members of the Committee thought " que Tinteret de la France ^tait de ne pas intervenir en Egypte et de ne point immo- biliser dans une expedition lointaine une partie de nos forces militaires. Sans meconnaitre que la politique de non-intervention avait ses perils, ils ont expose que la politique d'intervention leur paraissait plus dangereuse encore dans la situation actuelle de I'Europe." M. Clemenceau, in the final debate on the Bill, expressed himself as follows : " JNIessieurs, la conclusion de ce qui se passe en ce moment est celle-ci : L'Europe est couverte de soldats, tout le monde attend, toutes CH. XVII TEL-EL-KEBIR 305 les Puissances se reservent leur liberte pour I'avenir ; reservez la liberte d'actioii de la France." A division took place on July 29, with the result that the Government were defeated by a large majorily, the numbers being 416 to 75. This vote brought about the ftiU of the Freycinet Ministry, and finally settled the question of French inter- vention in Egypt. A new Government was formed under the presidency of M. Duclerc, who, on August 8, informed the Chamber that "le Gouvernement s'inspirera de la pensee qui est dictee par ce vote et y conformera sa politique." For the time being, the attitude of the French Government and people was dignified and friendly to England. There was, indeed, no reason for the display of any unfriendly feeling. Whether it was or was not wise that France should intervene actively in the affairs of Egypt, might be an open question. But one point was clear. The British Government had done all in their power to ensure French co-operation; their want of success in obtaining it was due to the action of the French Government and of the French people, speaking through their constitutional representatives. When, a little later, British military preparations were in a more advanced stage, M. Grevy, the President of the French Republic, told the British Chargd d' Affaires at Paris "that it was not only out of goodwill to England that he hoped for the prompt success of our arms, it was also in the interest of France. Pan-Islamism was a factor of great weight in the future ; and he considered it of the highest importance that there should be no doubt, even for a moment, that Musulman or Arab troops could not resist Europeans in the field. The action of the Chamber had prevented the French Govern- ment from giving practical proof of their desire for our success, but he could assure me (in spite of VOL. I X 306 MODERN EGYPT pt. ii what some few might say to the contrary) that France wished well to England in this matter, and would sincerely rejoice at the success of her arms." The Temps, which was supposed to be the organ of the French Government, pointed out that, even if England established herself in Egypt, as France had done in Tunis, " la France y gagnerait autant qu'elle." The main point was to keep out the Turk. "Nous avons," the same newspaper said, " des interets de diverses sortes en Egypte : la liberte du Canal, le paiement de nos creanciers, la securite de ceux de nos nationaux qui habitent le pays — autant d'interets que ne menace aucunement I'Angleterre, mais nous avons, sur le Nil, un interet infiniment superieur a ceux-la ; c'est que le Turc ne change pas sa domination nominale contre un pouvoir reel, c'est que la puissance Ottomane, au lieu d'y remporter un avantage, y re^oive un echec." Immediately after the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs congratu- lated the British Government on the victory, and "expressed his sincere hope for the prompt and complete success of the British forces in Egypt." "There was," M. Duclerc said a day or two later (September 15), "no doubt in France a certain general spirit of Chauvinism (which personally he did not share) which must have an outburst when fighting is going on anywhere without France being in it, and which was inclined to flare up at any moment. He trusted, however, that Her JNIajesty's Government knew the right value to attach to the outpourings of some portion of the Paris press. The sober good sense of France felt that the success of England against Arabi was also a solid gain to the rulers of Algeria." In spite, however, of all this apparent cordiality, it was evident that there were rocks ahead The CH. XVII TEL-EL-KEBIR 307 force of circumstances had unfortunately severed the entente cordiale between Enghxnd and France. Internal dissension and mistrust of Germany had paralysed French action at a critical moment. But, whatever may have been the causes, the fact that the French had lost their former footing of equality in Egypt was not calculated to make them easier to deal with when the final arrangements to be adopted in the valley of the Nile came to be discussed. Signs of the coming estrangement were, indeed, already visible to observers behind the scenes. Foiled in their endeavours to obtain the co- operation of the French, the British Government turned to Italy. Italian jealousy had been set ablaze at the prospect of British, and still more of Anglo-French, intervention in Egypt. The policy of England was attacked with virulence by the Itahan press. The Anglo-French Control had, it was said, brought about the ruin of Egypt. A sedative was evidently required. On July 24, Sir Augustus Paget, the British Ambassador at Rome, was authorised " to join with his French colleague in the application to be made to the Italian Government to co-operate with England and France in the steps to be taken for the protection of the Suez Canal ; and he was at the same time to express the great satisfaction of Her INIajesty's Government should Italy agree to be associated with Enghuid in this important work." This was immediately (July 25) followed by a further instruction to Sir Augustus Paget to invite the co-operation of Italy without waiting for action on the part of tlie French Ambassador. On July 26, the British Government went still farther. They no longer limited their invitation to co-operation in order to secure the safety of the Canal. Lord Granville 308 MODERN EGYPT pt. u informed the Italian Ambassador in London that " Her JNIajesty's Government would also welcome the co-operation of Italy in a movement in the interior, which they were of opinion could no longer be delayed, and for which they were making active preparations." Lord DufFerin was also instructed to state to the Conference that "while reserving to themselves the liberty of action which the pressure of events might render expedient and necessary. Her JNIajesty's Government would be glad to receive the co-operation of any Powers who were ready to afford it." At this moment, the Sultan, after much vacilla- tion, had signified his readiness to send Turkish troops to Egypt. On July 29, General Menabrea informed Lord Granville that " under these circum- stances, the Italian Government would be open to a charge of contradiction if they were to negotiate with a view to the intervention of any other Power, and that it only remained for them, there- fore, to express their thanks to the British Cabinet for having entertained the idea that the friendship of Italy for England might take the form of an active co-operation." Although, therefore, these negotiations produced no practical result, they had the effect of calminij Italian irritation. Hence- forward, Italian policy in Egypt was conducted on lines which were consistently friendly to England. In view of the restless ambition displayed at times by the Italian Government and their desire, which has frequently been manifested, to extend their influence in the Mediterranean, the refusal of Italy to co-operate with the British Government in Egypt appears at first sight strange. It is not pro) able that M. Mancini, who was then in power, could have attached much importance to Turkish promises, or that he could have believed to any great extent in the efficacy of Turkish assistance. CH. xvn TEL-EL-KEBIR 309 The real reasons for Italian inaction must be sought elsewhere than in a desire to spare the susceptibilities of the Porte. Something may, without doubt, be attributed to a reluctance on the part of Italy to separate herself from the European concert. Something was also due to the fact that, from a naval and military point of view, the Italian Government was not ready to take prompt action. But the main reason was to be sought in the mistrust of France, which then existed in Italy, and in fear of ultimate collision with the French, which engendered a reluctance to co-operate with them. Whatever may have been the reasons, the decision of the Italian Govern- ment was unquestionably a wise one. It relieved Italy from a heavy responsibility. It removed the risk of complications whether with France or England. It left the care of Italian interests in Egypt in the hands of a Power traditionally and necessarily friendly to Italy, and it enabled the Italian Government to devote themselves to the study of internal questions. Turning from Paris and Rome to Constanti- nople, it will not be wholly unprofitable to trace in some detail the tortuous windings of Turkish diplomacy. Immediately after the bombardment of Alex- andria, the Sultan again brought forward his favourite solution of the Egyptian question. Tewfik Pasha should be deposed, and Halim Pasha should be installed in his place. The latter would be "an excellent ruler," His nomination would "prevent the effusion of blood and satisfy everybody." This proposal was summarily rejected by the British Government, and the Sultan was told that "he was only wasting time by putting forward such suggestions." Pressure was brought to bear on the Porte to 310 JMODERN EGYPT pt. n join tlie Conference, with tlie result that on July 20, Said Pasha and Assim Pasha were named to be the Turkish representativ^es. After much hesitation, the Sultan consented to send troops to Egypt under conditions which were generally of a nature to keep Turkish intervention under the control of the Powers of Euroj)e. On July 26, Said Pasha informed the Conference that troops were on the point of starting. At the same time, he " expressed a hope that the military intervention of the foreign Powers in Egypt would no longer be necessary." In reply, Lord Granville stated that " Her JNIajesty's Government would accept the arrival and co-operation of Turkish forces in Egypt, provided the character in which they came was satisfactorily defined and cleared from all ambiguity by previous declarations of the Sultan." It was evident that the conditions under which Turkish co-operation was promised were far from being free from ambiguity. Moreover, the Sultan would not issue any Proclamation against Arabi. The Grand Vizier told Lord Dufferin that he " did not think it would be advisable to issue a Proclamation until after the troops were landed." Lord Dufferin replied that "if the Sultan desired to co-operate with Her INIajesty's Government it was necessary he should first clearly define the attitude he intended to assume towards Arabi and the rebellious faction." Whilst the Sultan, acting apparently under the erroneous impression that his assistance was in- dispensable, was thus endeavouring to intervene without the restraints imposed upon him by the Powers, the reluctance to call in Turkish aid in any shape was increasing, notably in Egypt. On July 31, the Khedive told Sir Auckland Colvin that he " was very apprehensive of Turkish CH. XVII TEL-EL-KEIUR 311 intrigue, and trusted that the Turks would be closely controlled." Preparations were now made for the despatch of 5000 Turkish troops to Egypt, and on August 2, Said Pasha undertook to submit to the Confer- ence a draft Proclamation, denouncing Arabi as a rebel. Besides the Proclamation, which was necessary as a guarantee of the Sultan's intentions, it was essential that, before Turkish troops landed in Egypt, a JNIilitary Convention should be framed indicating the manner in which they were to be employed. On August 5, therefore. Lord DufFerin informed Said and Assim Pashas, " that unless the Sultan would issue a Proclamation of a satisfactory character, and unless the Turkish Government would consent to enter into a Military Convention with Her Majesty's Government, the Ottoman troops would not be allowed to land." At the same time, the British Admiral was instructed, in the event of any vessel with Turkish troops appear- ing at an Egyptian port, to inform the officer in command, "with the utmost courtesy, that the despatch of Turkish troops must be premature and due to some misunderstanding, and that his orders were to request the officer commanding to proceed to Crete or elsewhere, and to apply to the Turkish Government for further instructions, as he was precluded from inviting them to land in Egypt." The Admiral was, at the same time, instructed " to prevent their landing if they declined to comply with his advice." The result of adopting this firm attitude was that, at a meeting of the Conference held on August 7, the Ottoman Delegates made the following declaration : " The Sublime Porte accepts the invitation for military intervention in Egypt made to it by the Identic Note of July 15, as well as the clauses and conditions contained therein." At the same time, 312 MODERN EGYPT pt.ii a promise was made to Lord Dufferin that a Proclamation declaring Arabi to be a rebel should be at once drawn up and communicated to him. On August 9, the Proclamation was sent to Lord Duft'erin. On the 10th, the text of the Proclamation was accepted by the British Government with some slight modifications. In the never-ceasing jar of Palace intrigue, which always goes on at Constantinople, the party which was in favour of an understanding with England appeared for the moment to have got the upper hand. The question of the Proclamation having been apparently settled, negotiations were set on foot with a view to the arrangement of a Military Convention between England and Turkey. A draft Convention was communicated by Musurus Pasha to Lord Granville on August 10. It pro- vided that the British troops should not pass beyond the zone which they then occupied in Alexandria and its neighbourhood, that they should not remain more than three months, that all persons arrested should be handed over to the Khedive's authorities, and that all further details should be settled between the Ottoman Commis- sioners and the British Commander-in-Chief on the spot. It was obvious that these terms were unacceptable. The Sultan now made an effort to get the Military Convention before the Conference, instead of treating separately with the British Government. This attempt, however, failed. It had, indeed, now become clear to everybody, except the Sultan, that it was useless to prolong the sittings of the Conference. At a meeting held on August 14 "the Representatives of the Powers unanimously expressed their opinion that the moment had come to suspend the labours of the Conference." The Sultan, however, who but a short time previously had resisted the meeting of OH. XVII TEL-EL-KEBIR 313 the Conference, and who had only been persuaded with difficulty to allow an Ottoman representative to attend its meetings, now gave a further instance of the perversity which appears always to attend Turkish diplomacy. He was anxious that the Conference should continue to sit, thinking, with- out doubt, that there would be a greater chance of dissension amongst the l^owers if the Conference were sitting, than would be the case if it suspended its labours. The Ottoinan delegates were, there- fore, instructed to say that "they did not share the opinions of the Representatives of the Powers." They reserved the right of fixing a date for the next meeting of the Conference. The date was, however, not fixed. The Conference was never formally closed. It died a natural death. Foiled in his attempt to bring the Military Convention before the Conference, the Sultan fell back on negotiations with the British Government. On August 18, Lord Dufferin spent five hours in discussing the matter with Said and Assim Pashas, with the result that the Turkish delegates agreed to a Convention subject to the approval of the Sultan. On the following day, the Sultan rejected the draft Convention, and made counter proposals which Lord Dufferin declined to discuss. At the same time, the Ottoman Government refused per- mission for the embarkation at Smyrna of some mules purchased for the use of the British troops in Egypt. The action was characterised by Lord Granville as " most unfriendly." In view of all these circumstances. Lord Dufferin wrote to Said Pasha and begged him "to consider as void and non avenues whatever friendly assurances and ex- pressions of confidence in relation to the Egyptian question he might have addressed to him outside the Conference." After tlie lapse of a few days, the negotiations 314 INIODERN EGYPT pt.ii were renewed. IMunir Bey, an officer of the Sultan's household, was sent to I^ord Duffiirin to assure him "that it was from no unfriendly feeling towards England that the ])rohibition against the export of mules had been insisted upon, and that, in order to show his friendly feelings. His JNIajesty had ordered it to be removed." Lord DufFerin " took the opportunity of again repeating to Munir Bey some very earnest words of warning as to the gravity of the situation." On the same day (August 23), Lord Dufferin, at the request of Said Pasha, paid him a visit and discussed the question of the Convention again with him and Assim Pasha. The result of this discussion was that the Turkish delegates agreed to all the clauses of the Military Conven- tion proposed by the British Government, except that the latter wished the Turkish troops to disembark at Aboukir, Rosetta, and Damietta, whilst the Sultan attached great importance to the disembarkation taking place at Alexandria. Lord Dufferin then alluded to the Proclamation against Arabi, which, although the text had been arranged between the two Governments, had not yet been issued. What followed had best be related in Lord Duffer in's words. *' Said Pasha," Lord Dufferin telegraphed, "then began with much hesitation, and evidently against his will, to suggest to me, in a roundabout manner, that the Proclamation agreed upon should not be issued at all in the first instance, but that another Proclamation of a different character, containing a final appeal to Arabi's sense of loyalty, should precede it. This im]nident repudiation of his former engagements made me so angry that I got up and left the room, simply saying that it was impossible to negotiate either a Convention or anything else under such circumstances. On OH. XVII TEL-EL-KEBIR 315 this, the two Pashas followed me downstairs and into the street, accompanied by their secretaries and dependants, calling to me that they withdrew every word of what they had said, that I must consider it altogether as non avenu, and that they would never again allude to the proposal. On concluding' our interview in a more amicable mood, I told them that I could not sign any Convention until the Proclamation had been officially communicated to me in French and Arabic, and that not a single Turkish soldier would be allowed to land until it had been pro- claimed in Egypt. The two Pashas seemed heartily ashamed of themselves, and admitted that they had been compelled to make the proposal very much against their will." On this interview being reported to London, Lord Granville telegraphed to Lord Dufferin that "Her INIajesty's Government were unable to make any further changes in the provisions of the proposed Military Convention." Lord Dufferin was, at the same time, instructed to intimate to the Porte that, " under the present pressure of circumstances, it would not be well for the dignity of either England or Turkey that the negotiations should be indefinitely prolonged." On August 24, Said and Assim Pashas paid a further visit to Lord Dufferin, and endeavoured to obtain some modifications in the draft Con- vention. On the 25th, an incident occurred which showed how little in earnest the Sultan was in the friendly assurances given to the British Government. Lord Dufferin telegraphed to Lord Granville : " I regret to have to inform your Lordship that although the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister had actually written a letter ordering the release of the shepherds and muleteers engaged by the contractors to proceed to Egypt 316 MODERN EGYPT pt. i: ill charge of the live stock which had been shipped at Odessa and Smyrna for the use of our army, a subsequent order from the Palace annulled their decision. A further order from the Palace has threatened with imprisonment the artificers who have undertaken to supply the contractors with the six hundred pack-saddles we require." The time during which Turkish co-operation would have been useful, was now rapidly passing away. On August 25, Sir Edward JNIalet tele- graphed to Lord Granville : " The action of the Sultan has been such as to prevent the possibility of the rebels believing that the Sultan is really anxious to assist us ; and thus the moral support, which an alliance with Turkey might have given us, cannot any longer be attained. Both Ch^rif Pasha and Riaz Pasha have expressed confidentially their extreme anxiety to obviate the difficulties which the arrival of Turkish troops would entail, and they are especially apprehensive of the com- plications which may ensue hereafter from their presence in the country." On August 27, tlie Turkish delegates again waited on Lord Dufferin and informed him that they would unconditionally acce])t the Convention in the terms to which the British Government had agreed. Directly the Convention was signed, the Proclamation denouncing Arabi as a rebel would be published in Egypt and communicated officially to the British Ambassador. It was known that the Austrian Government was anxious that England and Turkey should come to terms. It was more in deference to the views of that Government than for any other reason, that, on August 28, Lord Granville telegraphed to Lord Dufferin authorising him to agree to the Conven- tion on the following conditions : That the animals, supplies, and persons for the British CH. XVII TEL-EL-KEBIR 317 expedition should be immediately released, and that a promise should be given by the Porte to assist in forwarding the same to Egypt ; that an assurance should be given that no furtlier impedi- ments would be offered hereafter ; that the Proclamation declaring Arabi a rebel should be issued immediately ; and that British officers, who should be sent either to Crete (where the Turkish force was then collected) or to Constantinople, as the Porte might prefer, should concert with Turkish officers as to the military operations to be undertaken. The matter appeared now at last to be settled. On August 31, Lord Granville telegraphed to this effect to Sir Edward Malet. On the same day, Said Pasha made an earnest appeal to Lord Dufferin that the British Govern- ment should " allow the disembarkation of Turkish troops to take place at Alexandria, on condition that the troops should merely file through the town, and march at once to Aboukir." The Sultan, Lord Dufferin said, was "on his knees." " I would venture," Lord Dufferin added, '* most earnestly to urge Her Majesty's Government to acquiesce in His Majesty's prayers." In spite of the little faith Lord Dufferin had in Turkish sincerity, he thought that a real chance of establishing good relations with the Porte had now presented itself. " The Sultan promised to do everything Her Majesty's Govermnent desired in regard to the Proclamation, and to ensure an altered tone in the press." On September 1, Lord Granville telegraphed to Lord Dufferin that his recent message "altered the situation," but that the British Government could not agree to dis- embarkation at Alexandria. They " would prefer that the landing should take place in the Suez Canal." On September 2, I^ord Dufferin was able to telegraph the final text of the Convention 318 MODERN EGYPT vi. ii to Lord Granville, and to state that it was ready for signature. On September 3, Lord Dufferin saw the Sultan. "His Majesty confirmed, in a perfectly explicit manner, all the propositions made by Said Pasha." The Proclamation, the Sultan said, was being translated into Arabic and would be communicated to Lord Dufferin immediately. On September 4, Lord Dufferin was authorised to sign the JNLilitary Convention as soon as the Proclamation against Arabi was published. Strong representations were again made by the Khedive and Cherif Pasha against the landing of Turkish troops in Egypt. Nevertheless, Lord Granville decided to adhere to his arrangement with the Sultan. This was all the more loyal on the part of the British Government, inasmuch as evidence was forthcoming to show that even at this late hour the Sultan contemplated treating with Arabi behind the backs both of the British Government and the Khedive. By September 6, the Proclamation was ready and was published in the newspapers before being communicated to Lord Dufferin. It was found that the text did not tally with the draft to which the British Government had agreed. Lord Dufferin thereupon telegraphed to Lord Granville : *' I at once stated to the Minister of Foreign Affairs that, in presence of such an inconceivable act of bad faith as the publication without warning of a different document from that which had been formally agreed upon between the two Govern- ments, I must decline signing the Convention ; that I should report what had happened to my Government ; and that I should not be surprised if it declined to continue negotiations. Said Pasha fully admitted that he had been guilty of an act of what he called 'heedlessness,' but he en. XVII TEL-El KEBIR 319 said that the fault had been cominitted through an excess of zeal, as the denunciation of Anibi in the new Proclamation was still stronger than in the old. He undertook . . . that an official correction of what had been published in the Vakit should be inserted in that paper. He begged me to do my best to mitigate the indigna- tion, which I led him to understand this intolerable mode of procedure would arouse in the mind of the British Government." On September 10, Lord Granville telegraphed to Lord Dufferin accepting some of the changes made in the Pro- clamation, but objecting to others. Sir Edward Malet was, at the same time, informed that, in consequence of the difficulties which had been raised about the Proclamation, the signature of the Military Convention had been deferred. On the same day (September 10), the Turkish Pleni- potentiaries met Lord Dufferin, bringing with them copies of a draft Convention and of a new Proclamation. Even at this late hour, however, further difficulties were raised. Said Pasha explained to Lord Dufferin " with much earnestness " that it was most desirable that the words " se rendront a Port Said," which had been struck out of the Convention, should be maintained. After much discussion, it was settled that the words should only be interpreted in the following sense, viz. that the Turkish ships should "direct their course to Port Said, in order to enter the Canal." Lord Granville was asked by telegraph to agree to this modification. At the moment when the Porte was pressing for the signature of the Convention, another act was committed which showed how little confidence could be placed in the assurances of the Sultan. A number of porters, who had been engaged at Lord Wolseley's request for service with the 820 IMODERN EGYPT pt. u army in Eoypt, were imprisoned by order of the Porte. They were only released after I^ord Dufferin had made a strong representation on the subject. Indeed, Lord Dufferin was at one time authorised to break off all diplomatic relations with the Porte. On the afternoon of September 13, Lord Granville telegraphed to Lord Dufferin that he might sign the })roposed Military Convention. On the morning of the same day, however, the battle of Tel-el- Kebir was fought. The French Govern- ment, who had always looked upon the presence of the Turks in Egypt with great disfiivour, were the first to suggest that a Military Convention with the Porte was now no longer necessary. The Khedive also told Sir Edward Malet that "if anything could enhance the value of the victory, it was that it removed all pretext for the signature of a Convention with Turkey. He said that he looked back with dismay at the danger which Egypt would have incurred, if the Sultan, through the presence of his troops, had obtained a footing in the couiitry." Under these circumstances, Lord Granville telegraphed to Lord Dufferin that he "presumed that the emergency having passed, His INIajesty the Sultan would not now consider it necessary to send troops to Egypt." Before this message could arrive, the Sultan sent for Lord Dufferin and kept him eleven hours at the Palace discussing a variety of further changes, which he wished to have made both in the Con- vention and the Proclamation. Finally, matters were brought to a close on September 18 by the despatch of the following telegram from Lord Granville to Lord Dufferin: "Her Majesty's Government greatly appreciate the fact that a sub- stantial accord exists between the Government of CH. xvn TEL-EL-KEBIR 321 the Sultan and that of Her Majesty on the Egyptian Question, and especially as to tlie rebellion of Arabi Pasha and the position of His Highness the Khedive. The occasion of the proposed Mili- tary Convention between this country and Turkey having now passed away, Her Majesty's Govern- ment rejoice that it is no longer necessary to dis- cuss the difficulties which have been raised by His Majesty. Your Excellency is, therefore, authorised to convey to the Sultan, in the most courteous terms, the permission given you to drop the negotia- tions on this question." In summing up the history of these events. Lord DufFerin said : "I can only reiterate that, from first to last, I have used every means at my disposal to induce the Turkish Government to move quickly, and to settle the matter out of hand. . . . Their conduct was so obviously contrary to their interests, that Europe had begun to mis- judge the situation. While ruining my reputation as an honest man, they were enhancing it as a diplomatist, for it had begun to be believed that the delay in signing the Convention could not possibly result from their own incomprehensible shortsightedness, but must have been artificially created by the Machiavellian astuteness of the English Ambassador." Lord Granville also summed up the Egyptian negotiations in a despatch to Lord Duffer in, dated October 5, 1882, which concluded with the follow- ing words : " This summary of events will show that the isolated action which has been forced upon Her Majesty's Government was not of their seek- ing. From the first moment when it became apparent that order could not be re-established in Egypt without the exercise of external force, they maintained that that force should be supplied by the Sultan as Sovereign of Egypt. They proposed VOL. I Y 322 MODERN EGYPT ft. n this solution to the Conference, and Your Excel- lency lost no opportunity of urging it upon His Majesty and his advisers. Our efforts to induce them to intervene in Egypt, under conditions which would satisfy Europe, proved unavailing, and when it became necessary to make immediate provision for the safety of the Suez Canal, we prepared to undertake this duty jointly with France, with the co-operation of any other Powers who might be prepared to join us. We addressed a special invita- tion to Italy to take part in the arrangements. The progress of the rebellion having destroyed the authority of the Khedive, and reduced Egypt to a state of anarchy, we invited France and Italy to act with us in suppressing it ; and when those Powers declined to do so, we still urged the Porte to send troops, insisting only on such conditions as were indispensable to secure unity of action. But, before the Turkish Government carried out its agreement to sign the Military Convention, the success of our arms had put an end to the insur- rection." The details of these negotiations have been stated at some length because they afford an admirable instance of the diplomatic procedure ordinarily adopted by the Ottoman Government. The Turks, as a nation, possess many fine, though perhaps somewhat barbaric qualities. But a species of paralysis appears to affect most Turks in high positions. The duplicity and shortsightedness of the Ottoman Government come out strongly in every incident of these negotiations. It is unnecessary to give a detailed account of the military operations by wliicli the insurrection in Egypt was crushed. They have been described in a book published by the British War Office, and in other works. It will be sufficient to say that Lord Wolseley arrived at Alexandria on CH. XVII TEL-EL-KEBIR 323 August 13. Previous to this, some desultory operations had taken place in the neighbourhood of Alexandria. Lord Wolseley decided to move on Cairo by way of Ismailia.^ The Canal was seized in spite of the querulous cries of M. de Lesseps. On September 13, the Egyptian army was totally routed at Tel-el-Kebir.^ A small force of cavahy was at once pushed on to Cairo, which was captured without a blow being struck. Kinglake's prophecy had been fulfilled. "The Englishman" — in the person of Major Watson, R.E., with two squadrons of the 4th Dragoon Guards and a detachment of Mounted Infantry, who occupied the Citadel on the evening of September 14 — "planted a firm foot on the banks of the Nile, and sat in the seats of the faithful." Arabi and his associates, who throughout the whole affair do not appear to have displayed a single quality worthy of respect or admiration, surrendered.^ It is always a somew^hat unprofitable proceeding to speculate on what might have been in politics, but I cannot close this portion of the narrative without hazarding a conjecture as to whether any foreign occupation of Egypt could have been avoided. Mistakes were, without doubt, com- mitted. The true nature of the Arabi revolt was ' Arabi was warned by Mr. Wilfrid Blunt that he would probably be attacked from the side of Ismailia. " I believe," Mr. Bluut writes {Secret History, p. 228), " that it was in consequence of this hint that the lines of Tel-el-Kebir were be^un to be traced by Arabi." '^ At this time, I was in India. On Aujjust 22, Lord Wolseley wrote to me from Ismailia: "I hope to hit Arabi very hard about tlie 10th or 12th of September at latest." Lord W^olseley was only twenty-four hours out in his prediction. 3 Mr. Wilfrid Blunt, in spite of his sympathy with Arabi, says, in .speaking of the fact that he did not attempt to handle the Ko-yp+ian troops in the field : " His abstention on this head has been attributed by liis detractors to physical cowardice, and it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that there was some truth in this." — Secret History, etc., p. 385. 324 I\[0DI:RN EGYPT pt.ii misunderstood.^ It was more than a mere military mutiny. It partook in some degree of the nature of a bona fide national movement. It was not solely, or, indeed, mainly directed against Euro- peans and European interference in Egyptian affairs, although anti-European prejudice exercised a considerable influence on the minds of the leaders of the movement. It was, in a great degree, a movement of the Egyptians against Turkish rule. Although previous to the issue of the Joint Note some hope might have been entertained of guiding the movement, and although I am distinctly of opinion that an effort to guide it should have been made, it must be admitted that the chances of failure predominated over those of success. Leaving out of account questions of detail, and speaking with some knowledge of the various classes of Egyptian society, I ask myself, where were the elements for the formation of any stable government to have been found when, in pursuance of the policy of " Egypt for the Egyptians," there had been elimi- nated, as would probably have been the case, first, the Europeans, with all their intelligence, wealth, and governing power ; secondly, the Khedive in whose place some illiterate Egyptian, of the type of Arabi or ISIahmoud Sami, would have been appointed ; thirdly, the Syrians and Armenians, with all their industry and capacity for sedentary employment ; fourthly, the nativ^e aristocracy, largely composed of Turks, who were at that time the ])rincipal large landowners in the country, and amongst whom, in spite of many defects, the habits and traditions of a governing class still * Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace, who accompanied Lord Dufferiu to rVypt and who had exceptionally ffood opportunities for forming an opinion on this subject, says : " 'I'liere can be no longer any reasonable doubt that the English Government totally misconceived the real nature of the Egyptian revolutionary movement." — Eyypt and thi Eijiiptian Question, p. 3Go. CM. XVII TEL-EL-KEBIR 325 lingered ; when, in fact, the nationalists and muti- neers had got rid of all the classes, who then governed, and who for several centuries had governed the country ? The residue would have consisted, first, of the mass of the fellaheen population, who were sunk in the deepest ignorance, who cared little by whom they were governed provided they were not overtaxed, and whose main idea throughout the Arabi movement was to tear up the bonds of the Greek or Syrian usurer ; secondly, of a certain number of small proprietors, village Sheikhs, Omdehs, etc., who constituted the squirearchy of the country, and who, in point of knowledge and governing capacity, were but little removed from the fellaheen ; thirdly, of the Copts, whose religion would certainly, sooner or later, have prevented them from acting in complete harmony with the Arabists, and who, even if tolerated by the Mohammedan population, could neither have ob- tained any influence over the Mohammedans, nor, even if that influence had been obtained, could have used it to the general advantage of the country ; fourthly, of the hierarchy, consisting prin- cipally of the Ulema of the El-Azhar Mosque. The latter, though numerically the smallest, was by far the most important and influential of the four classes to which allusion is made above. The spirit which animated them would, in the first instance at all events, have been infused into the masses below. They would have been the Jacobins of the movement, which, whether nationalist or military, would certainly have been reactionary in so far as it would have tended to destroy whatever germs of civilisation had been implanted into Egypt. Like their prototypes in France, they would, had no strong hand intervened, have maintained their supremacy until, possibly after an acute and disas- trous period of tidnsition, their incapacity for 326 MODERN EGYPT pt. ii government had been clearly demonstrated. The corruption, misgovernment, and oppression, which would have prevailed, if the influence of this class had become predominant, would probably have been greater than any to which Egypt had been exposed at previous periods. An attempt would have been made to regulate, not only the govern- ment, but also the social life of the country upon those principles of the Mohammedan faith which are most antiquated, obsolete, and opposed to the commonplace ideas of modern civilisation. Egypt may now almost be said to form part of Europe. It is on the high road to the far East. It can never cease to be an object of interest to all the Powers of Europe, and especially to England. A numerous and intelligent body of Europeans and of non-Egyptian Orientals have made Egypt their home. European capital to a large extent has been sunk in the country. The rights and privileges of Europeans are jealously guarded, and, moreover, give rise to complicated questions, which it requires no small amount of ingenuity and technical know- ledge to solve. Exotic institutions have sprung up and have taken root in the country. The Capitulations impair those rights of internal sovereignty which are enjoyed by the rulers or legislatures of most States. The population is heterogeneous and cosmopolitan to a degree almost unknown elsewhere. Although the prevailing faith is that of Islam, in no country in the world is a greater variety of religious creeds to be found amongst important sections of the community. In addition to these peculiarities, which are of a normal character, it has to be borne in mind that in 1882 the army was in a state of mutiny; the Treasury was bankrupt ; every branch of the administration had been dislocated ; the ancient and arbitrary method, under which the country CH. XVII TEL-EL-KEBIR 327 had for centuries been governed, had received a severe blow, whilst, at the same time, no more orderly and law-abiding form of government had been inaugurated to take its place. Is it probable that a Government composed of the rude elements described above, and led by men of such poor ability as Arabi and his co- adjutors, would have been able to control a com- plicated machine of this nature ? Were the Sheikhs of the El-Azhar Mosque likely to succeed where Tewfik Pasha and his Ministers, who were men of comparative education and enlightenment, acting under the guidance and inspiration of a first-class European Power, only met with a modified success after years of patient labour ? There can be but one answer to these questions. Sentimental politicians may consider that the quasi-national character of Arabi's move- ment gives it a claim to their sympathies, but others who are not carried away by sentiment may reasonably maintain that the fact of its having been a quasi-national movement w^as one of the reasons which foredoomed it to failure ; for, in order to justify its national character, it had to run counter, not only to the European, but also to the foreign Eastern elements of Egyptian govern- ment and society. Neither is it in the nature of things that any similar movement should, under the present conditions of Egyptian society, meet with any better success. The full and immediate execution of a policy of " Egypt for the Egyptians," as it was conceived by the Arabists in 1882, was, and still is impossible. History, indeed, records some very radical changes in the forms of government to which a State has been subjected w ithout its interests being absolutely and permanently shipwrecked. But it may be doubted whether any instance can be 328 INIODERN EGYPT pt. n quoted of a sudden tmnsfer of power in any civilised or semi-civilised community to a class so ignorant as the pure Egyptians, such as they were in the year 1882. These latter have, for centuries past, been a subject race. Persians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs from Arabia and Baghdad, Cir- cassians, and finally, Ottoman Turks, have suc- cessively ruled over Egypt, but we have to go back to the doubtful and obscure precedents of Pharaonic times to find an epoch when, possibly, Egypt was ruled by Egyptians. Neither, for the present, do they appear to possess the qualities which would render it desirable, either in their own interests, or in those of the civilised world in general, to raise them at a bound to the category of autonomous rulers with full rights of internal sovereignty. If, however, a foreign occupation was inevitable, or nearly inevitable, it remains to be considered whether a British occupation was preferable to any other. From the purely Egyptian point of view, the answer to this question cannot be doubtful. The intervention of any European Power was preferable to that of Turkey. The intervention of one European Power was pre- ferable to international intervention. The special aptitude shown by Englishmen in the government of Oriental races pointed to England as the most effective and beneficent instrument for the gradual introduction of European civilisation into Egypt. An Anglo-French or an Anglo-Italian occupation, from both of which we narrowly and also acci- dentally escaped, would have been detrimental to Egyptian interests and would ultimately have caused friction, if not serious dissension, between England on the one side and France or Italy on the other. The only thing to be said in favour of Turkish C11.XVII TEL-EL-KEBIR 329 ■nlerveiition is that it would have reheved England from the responsibiUty of intervening. It has been shown in tlie course of this narrative that, hi the early stages of the proceedings, the policy of the two Western Powers, which was guided by the anti-Turkish sentiments prevalent in France, was not of a nature to invite or encourage Turkish co-operation. At a later period, the shortsighted- ness of the Sultan was such as to cause the Porte to commit political suicide in so far as decisive Turkish action was concerned. Perhaps it was well that it did so, for it is highly probable that armed Turkish intervention in Egypt, accompanied, as it might well have been, by misgovernment, paltry intrigue, corruption, and administrative and financial confusion, would only have been the prelude to further, and possibly more serious inter- national complications. By a process of exhausting all other expedients, we arrive at the conclusion that armed British intervention was, under the special circumstances of the case, the only possible solution of the diffi- culties which existed in 1882. Probably also it was the best solution. The arguments against British intervention, indeed, were sufficiently obvious. It was easy to foresee that, with a British garrison in Egypt, it would be difficult that the relations of England either with France or Turkey should be cordial. With France especially, there would be a danger that our relations might become seriously strained. Moreover, we lost the advantages of our insular position. The occupation of Egypt necessarily dragged England to a certain extent within the arena of Continental politics. In the event of war, the presence of a British garrison in Egypt would possibly be a source of weakness rather than of strength. Our position in Egypt placed us in a disadvantageous diplomatic 330 MODERN EGYPT pt. u position, for any Power, witli whom we had a difference of opinion about some non- Egyptian question, was at one time able to retaliate by opposing our Egyptian policy. The complicated rights and privileges possessed by the various Powers of Europe in Egypt facilitated action of this nature. There can be no doubt of the force of these arguments. The answer to them is that it was impossible for Great Britain to allow the troops of any other European Power to occupy Egypt. When it became apparent that some foreign occu- pation was necessary, that the Sultan would not act save under conditions which were impossible of acceptance, and that neither French nor Italian co-operation could be secured, the British Govern- ment acted with promptitude and vigour. A great nation cannot throw off the responsibilities which its past history and its position in the world have imposed upon it. English history affords other examples of the Government and people of England drifting by accident into doing what was not only right but was also most in accordance with British mterests. Ael 8e o-KOTrelv fiev Kol irpdrreLv ael ra hiKaia, av/xTrapaTijpelv 8' oVti)? a/xa zeal (TUficpepovTa earai ravra} Such was the advice Demosthenes gave to his fellow-countrymen. In spite of some mistakes of detail, it was on this sound principle that, broadly speaking, the British Government acted in dealing with E^j-yptian affairs in 1882. * Oration For the Megalopolitan$. CHAPTER XVIll THE DUFFERIN MISSION September 1882-August 1883 British policy — Trial of Arabi — Resig'nation of Riaz Pasha — Exile of political prisouers — Courts-martial — The Alexandria Indemnities — The abolition of the Dual Control — Rupture of the Anglo- French understanding — Lord Dutferin's Report — My arrival in Egypt Kinglake's prophecy was that the Enghshman would phmt his foot firmly in the valley of the Nile. It had so far been fulfilled that the English- man had planted his foot, but he had not planted it firmly. Hardly, indeed, had his foot been planted when, fearful of what he had done, he struggled to withdraw it. A few hours after the battle of Tel-el-Kebir had been fought. Sir Edward INIalet was instructed to send to London "as soon as possible, suggestions as to army, finance, and administration for the future." Lord Dufferin was, at the same time, informed that " Her Majesty's Government contemplated shortly com- mencing the withdrawal of the British troops from Egypt." The British Government were, at a subsequent period, blamed for not having at once proclaimed a Protectorate. A petition signed by 2(i00 Euro- peans residing at Alexandria was presented to Lord Dufferin in favour of a permanent British occupation of Egypt. The Egyptians generally 331 832 MODERN EGYPT pt. ii also viewed British intervention with unmixed satisfaction. It cannot be doubted that if the position of the British Government had been more strongly asserted directly after the occupation, many of the obstacles which have stood in the path of the reformer would have been swept away. On the other hand, the adoption of a policy of this sort would have constituted a breach of faith with Europe. It is extremely doubtful whether it would have met with adequate support in England. It may be said, therefore, that the execution of this policy was, for all practical purposes, both un- desirable and impossible. Moreover, it is to be observed that the mere proclamation of a Protectorate would not in any degree have impaired the rights and privileges of Europeans resident in Egypt,^ and it was these which so much hampered the progress of reform in the early days of the occupation. In order to ensure this result, annexation, either permanent or temporary, would have been necessary. At the same time, it must be admitted that the situation in Egypt was misunderstood both by the British Government and by British public opinion of ^ The French Government established a Protectorate over Tunis in 1884, but subsequent ne^otintions with the Powers were necessary before the re'^ime of the Capitulations could be modified. The diffi- culties whicli the existence of the Capitulations threw in the way of the French administration of Tunis have been described by a very competent authority, who wrote under the pseudonym of P. H.X., in the following terms: — "Les difficulte's que devait faire cesser I'organi- sation de la reforme financiere et de notre controle sont relativement peu de chose aupres des complications inextricables et des abus que la multiplicite comme la toute-puissance des juridictions Europeennes en Tunisie avaient fait naitre. Sous pre'texte de proteger les Europe'ens contre I'arbitraire et le desordre du Gouvernement Beylical, les Capitu- lations leur assuraient des privileges qui s'etaient etendus demesure- ment a mesure que I'autorite locale s'atfaiblissait ; ce qui n'etait a I'origine qu'uiie exception etait devenue plus fort que la regie, en sorta que I'administration indigene, eut-elle ete animee des meilleures inten- tions du monde, s'etait trouvee peu a peu completement paralyse'e" {La Politique Franfuiae en Tunisie, p. 360). OH. XVIII THE DUFFERIN MISSION 333 the time. Moreover, party politics cast their baneful spell over the Ell^■lish proceedings, and obscured the real issues at stake. Two alternative policies were open to the British GovernmenL These were, first, the policy of speedy evacuation ; and, secondly, the policy of reform. It was not sufficiently understood that the adoption of one of these policies was wholly destructive of the other. The withdrawal of the British troops connoted severity in the treatment of the rebels, the establishment of some rough prsetorian guard composed of foreigners, who would have quelled all disturbance with a high hand, the re-establishment of an arbitrary rule, and the abandonment of all attempts to introduce the various reforms which follow in the train of European civilisation. On the other hand, the adoption of a policy of reform connoted an indefinite prolongation of the British occupation, and an increase of European interference, without which no progress was possible. It was natural and praiseworthy that public opinion in England should have been opposed to handing the Egyptians over to the uncontrolled rule of the Turkish Pashas, but it was character- istic of the want of consistency, which so often distinguishes English politics, that the same people who cried out most loudly for control over the Pashas, were also those who most strenuously opposed the adoption of the only method by which Pashas could be effectively controlled. They wished to withdraw the British troops, and, at the same time, to secure all those advantages which could only be obtained by their continued presence in the country. Party politicians had not failed to dwell constantly and in condemnatory terms on the number of Europeans employed in Egypt. It was a good ad captandum cry, for at the time the British public did not appreciate the extent 334 MODERN EGYPT ft. n to which European agency was necessary if a policy of reform was to be adopted. The attempt to attain two objects, which were irrecon- cihible one with the other, naturally rendered the policy of the British Government vacillating and uncertain. This vacillation showed itself immediately after the occupation in the treatment accorded to Arabi and the other leaders of the rebellion. There could be no doubt that, as a subject of the Khedive, Arabi had been guilty of treason and rebellion, and that, as an officer of the army, he had been guilty of mutiny. Had he been tried by Court- martial and shot directly after he was taken prisoner, no injustice would have been done. On the other hand, he was regarded by some few Englishmen as a hero, and, from a purely political point of view, it was more than questionable whether it was wise to elevate him to the rank of a martyr. INIoreover, it is not easy, as a matter of public morality, to state precisely at what point the sacred right of revolu- tion begins or ends, or to say at what stage a disturber of the peace passes from a common rioter, who is an enemy to society, to the rank of a leader in a political movement set on foot for the attainment of ends wliich command at least a certain degree of sympathy. The commonplace standard of success is not a bad test by which to decide this question. It is difficult to justify unsuccessful rebellion, or to maintain that those who have been instrumental in brinffing it about should not suffer the extreme consequences of their own conduct. Even from this point of view, however, it was not easy to decide on Arabi's fate. Had he been left alone, there cannot be a doubt that he would have been successful. His want of success was due to British interference. The British Goverinnent had, tliercfore, a perfect right CH. XVIII THE DUFFERIN MISSION 3'So to decide on his fate. Their decision could not be doubtful. British public opinion condemned the execution of prisoners for political offences, and the British Government would naturally follow public opinion on a point of this sort. " Her Majesty's Government," Lord Granville wrote, " were disposed to recommend to the Khedive to adopt the more humane practice of modern times, and to exercise his prerogative of mercy," if it were found that Arabi could not be charged with any other crimes than those of treason and rebellion.^ It was, from the first, doubtful whether any *' crime which, according to the practice of civilised nations, called for the extreme penalty of the law" could be brought home to Arabi, and it was certainly not worth while to prolong the proceedings, and thus keep the country in a ferment, whilst a lengthy inquiry into this point was going on. The best plan would have been for the British Government to have decided at once that Arabi and his principal associates should be exiled. Unfortunately, this was not done. The fiction was maintained that the fate of the prisoners depended, not on the strong Government which had suppressed the revolt, but on the weak Government which had proved itself powerless to suppress it. Arabi and his fellow -prisoners were made over to the Khedive. There miaht have been some slight justification for the adoption of this course if the cession had been real, and if, in view of the early withdrawal of the British troops which was then contemplated, the British ^ The following statement, for which, of course, there is not the smallest foundation, is one amongst very numerous illustrations which might be given of the little value to be attached to Mr. AVilfrid Blunt's testimony on Egyptian affairs. He writes {Secret History, p. 44;^) tbat "Gladstone had made up his mind that Arabi should be executed no less than had the Foreign Office." 336 MODERN EGYPT ft. n Government had stood aside whilst, under the protection of British bayonets, the Turkish party wreaked its vengeance on the Arabists, and struck te. ror hito the hearts of future revolutionists. But this was obviously both undesirable and im- possible. The cession was, therefore, made unreal. The Khedive was to have the appearance of dealinir with Ariibi, but he was not to move a step without the consent of the British Govern- ment. JNIore than this, when the Egyptian Government established a court to try Arabi, it was thought, and, without doubt, rightly thought, that the trial would be a mockery. Hence arose an unseemly wrangle, in which the Egyptian Government endeavoured to create a condition of things which would increase the cliances of Arabi being condemned to death, whilst the British Government insisted on a fair trial conducted in public, and with European counsel to defend the prisoners. The Egyptian Government were, of course, obliged to yield. After long discussions, the conditions under which the trial was to be conducted were settled. On November 7, Lord Dufferin, who had been deputed on a special mission to Egypt, arrived in Cairo. He saw at a glance that it was essential to bring tlie Arabi proceedings to a close. A preliminary in(juiry had rendered it clear that no charge, except that of rebellion, could be established against Arabi. Lord DufFerin, therefore, arranged that Arabi should plead guilty to the charge of rebellion, that he should be sentenced to death, and that, inunediately after the sentence was pronounced, it should be connnuted into perpetual exile. This arrangement was carried out. Several places were suggested to which Arabi might be sent. It was finally settled that he should go to Ceylon. A special ship was chartered, and he CH. XVIII THE DUFFERIN MISSION 337 and his six principal associates left Suez on December 26.^ In the meanwhile, Riaz Pasha resigned his position in the Ministry, ostensibly on the ground of ill- health. It was, however, well known that the real reason for his resignation was that he could not reconcile himself to the idea of Arabi having escaped capital punishment. Neither would it be fair to ascribe this attitude to vindictive feelings. Without doubt, Riaz Pasha thought that the execution of Arabi was not merely an act of justice but a State necessity. In a report addressed to Lord Granville on December 12, Lord Dufferin described the effect produced in Egypt by the commutation of the capital sentence on Arabi and his principal followers. The Europeans and the Pashas condemned the leniency with which they had been treated. On the other hand, the mass of the people approved of the commutation of the sentences. In addition to the leaders of the rebellion, about 150 persons were condemned, some to exile from Egypt, and some to residence in the provinces under police supervision for various terms. On January 1, 1883, a Decree was issued granting an amnesty to all other prisoners charged with political offences. "The debris of the late rebellion having thus been cleared away," Lord Dufferin expressed a hope that "the stage was cleared for reconstruc- tion." Unfortunately, however, some months were yet to elapse before the whole of these debris were fully cleared away. The prisons were crowded with persons who were charged with murder, pillage, and arson. At Tanta, from seventy to eighty Christians, mostly Greeks and Syrians, had been massacred, on July 13, by a mob of Moslem ' lu 1901, Arabi was allowed to return to Egypt. VOL. I Z 338 MODERN EGYPT pt. n fanatics under circumstances of great brutality. On the same day, eight Italians had been killed at Mehallet-Kebir, and, on July 14, fourteen Christians and one Jew had been killed at Damanhour and its neighbourhood. In all these places, the houses and shops of the Christians had been pillaged. It was impossible to allow crimes of this nature to remain unpunished. Commissions were, therefore, appointed to make preliminary inquiries and to send accused persons, against whom a prima facie case had been established, for trial before a Court-martial. There was little risk of injustice being committed. " The persons dealt with by the Commissioners," Lord Dufferin pertinently remarked, "and by the Court-martial were Musulman Egyptians accused of murdering and pillaging Christians, principally European Christians. My experience of the East has long since convinced me that an Oriental court of justice may be safely trusted not to strain either law or evidence when the cause lies between a Musulman culprit and his Christian victim. During all the time I was in Egypt, Major MacDonald ^ was principally preoccupied in noting the tendency of the Court to unduly favour the prisoners ; and Your Lordship may rest assured that whatever miscarriages of justice may have occurred have been occasioned by the escape of the guilty, and not by the condemnation of any innocent persons." These were wise words, but the advice of the im- partial and experienced diplomatist was unheeded by party politicians in England, who saw in the Egyptian trials an opportunity for attacking the Government of the day. The fate of Suleiman Sami, a miscreant who was largely responsible for the burning of Alexandria and who was deservedly 1 Major (subsequently Sir Claude) MacDonald was Lord Dufferiu's Military Attache'. He was charged with the duty of watching the proceedings of the Court-martial. CH. XVIII THE DUFFERIN MISSION 339 hanged, attracted a special degree of fictitious sympathy, and was characterised by Lord Randolph Churchill in the House of Commons as " the grossest and vilest judicial murder that has ever stained the ainials of Oriental justice." Both the British Government and the authorities in Egypt, however, stood firm in the face of these attacks. In a few cases, capital punishment was inflicted. Others were condemned to various terms of penal servitude and imprisonment. A large number of accused persons were released after a preliminary inquiry. Eventually, on October 9, 1883, a Decree was issued abolishing the Special Commissions and the Court-martial. The punishment of the principal offenders was not the only burning question which the rebellion left in its wake. A large amount of valuable property had been destroyed at Alexandria. After some lengthy negotiations, a Decree appointing an International Commission to assess the claims was issued on January 13, 1883. The delay hi the settlement of this question caused great irritation and discontent. The final rupture of the Anglo-French entente, which followed immediately after the occupa- tion, increased the difficulties of the situation. On September 20, M. Duclerc told the British Charge d'Affaires in Paris, "that he thought it would be in the interest of England to give at an early date some notion of what her future intentions were with regard to Egypt." It was impossible at that moment to state, save in the most general terms, what were the intentions of England as regards Egypt, and it soon became apparent that the only ])()int to which for the moment the French Govenunent attached any real imp(irtance, was the contiiuiance of the Anglo- French Control, as it existed previous to the 340 MODERN EGYPT pt.ii occupation. The Egyptian Government, m the other hand, wished tlie institution to be abolished on the ground that its dual nature and semi- political character had caused great inconvenience. Public opinion in England pronounced strongly in favour of its abolition. In spite of considerable pressure exerted by France, the British Govern- ment wisely stood firm and declined to accede to the French wishes on this point. The presidency of the Commission of the Debt was offered to France, but was declined on the ground that it was not " consistent with the dignity of France to accept as an equivalent for the abolition of the Control, a position which was simply that of cashier." Eventually, after some sharp diplomatic skirmishing, the negotiations were dropped, and the French Government "resumed its liberty of action in Egypt." From that moment, until the signature of the Anglo-French Agreement in 1904, French action in Egypt was more or less per- sistently hostile to England. On January 3, 1883, Lord Granville addressed a circular to the Powers in which he expressed himself in the following terms : "Although for the present a British force remains in Egypt for the preservation of public tranquillity, Her JNIajesty's Government are desirous of witlidrawino; it as soon as the state of the country and the organisation of proper means for the maintenance of the Kliedive's authority will admit of it. In the meanwhile, the position in which Her Majesty's Government are placed towards His Highness imposes upon them the duty of giving advice with the object of securing that the order of thhigs to be established shall be of a satisfactory character, and ))ossess the elements of stability and progress." Lord Dufferin was sent to Egypt to report u})on the measures which were necessary in order that "the adniinis- CH. XVIII THE DUFFERIN MISSION 341 tration of affairs should be reconstructed on a basis which would afford satisfactory guarantees for the maintenance of peace, order, and prosperity in Egypt, for the stability of the Khedive's authority, for the judicious development of self- government, and for the fulfilment of obligations towards the Powers." It is unnecessary to dwell on Lord Duflferin's detailed proposals. A few remarks on the main framework of his plan will suffice. It was not the first time that an endeavour had been made on the banks of the Nile to make bricks without straw. The task, which Lord Dufferin was called upon to perform, was, in fact, impossible of execution. He was asked to devise a plan for the complete rehabilitation of the country, and, at the same time, one which would not be inconsistent with the policy of speedily withdrawing the British garrison. It can be no matter for surprise that, in spite of the qualities of statesmanship, political foresight, and literary skill, all of which Lord Dufferin possessed in an eminent degree, he should have failed to accomplish the impossible. It is, moreover, difficult to read Lord Dufferin's report without entertaining a suspicion that he was aware that the policy of the British Government was incapable of execution. There was only one practicable method by which the Egyptian administration could be reformed. That was to place the government more or less under British guidance. Lord Dufferin's statesmanlike eye saw this clearly enough. His remarks on this point form, indeed, the most valuable portion of his report. "I cannot," he said, "conceive any- thing which would be more fatal to the prosperity and good administration of the country than the hasty and inconsiderate extrusion of any large proportion of the Europeans in the service of the 342 MODERN EGYPT pt.ii Government, in deference to the somewhat un- reasonable clamour which has been raised against them. For some time to come, European assist- ance in the various Departments of Egyptian administration will be absolutely necessary. . . . It is frightful to contemplate the misery and misfortune which would be entailed on the popula- tion, were the Financial, the Public Works, and analogous Departments to be left unorganised by a few high-minded European officials. The Egyptian Government would quickly become a prey to dishonest speculators, ruinous contracts, and delusive engineering operations, from which they are now^ protected by the intelligent and capable men who are at hand to advise them in reference to these subjects. This is especially true in regard to financial matters. The main- tenance of Egypt's financial equilibrium is the guarantee of her independence." Without doubt. Lord Dufferin was right. But in what manner was the ascendency of European influence to be secured ? It could only be secured by the prolongation of the British occupation. Lord Dufferin's instructions, however, forbade him to state in clear and positive terms the inevitable inference to be drawn from his own proposals. In the meanwhile, in deference, to a great extent, to British public opinion, a certain develop- ment of free institutions was proposed. But Lord Dufferin appears to have liad little con- fidence that he would succeed in "creating a vitalised and self -existent organism, instinct with evolutionary force." "A paper constitution," he said, "is proverbially an unsatisfactory device. Few institutions have succeeded that have not been the outcome of slow growth, and gradual development; but in the East, even the germs of constitutional freedom are non-existent. Despotism CH. xvm THE DUFFERIN MISSION 343 not only destroys the seeds of liberty, but renders the soil, on which it has trampled, incapable of growing the plant. A long- enslaved nation in- stinctively craves for the strong hand of a master, rather than for a lax constitutional regime. A mild ruler is more likely to provoke contempt and insubordination than to inspire gratitude." It was, without doubt, desirable to make some beginning in the way of founding liberal institu- tions, but no one with any knowledge of tlie East could for one moment suppose that the Legis- lative Council and Assembly, founded under Lord DufFerin's auspices, could at once become either important factors in the government of the country, or efficient instruments to help in adminis- trative and fiscal reform. Where Order deigns to come. Her sister. Liberty, cannot be far.* What Egypt most of all required was order and good government. Perhaps, longo intervallo, liberty would follow afterwards. No one but a dreamy theorist could imagine that the natural order of things could be reversed, and that liberty could first be accorded to the poor ignorant re- presentatives of the Egy]itian people, and that the latter would then be able to evolve order out of chaos. In the early days of the struggles which eventually led to Italian unity, Manzoni said that "his country must be morally healed before she could be politically regenerated.*' ^ The remark applied in a far greater degree to Egypt in 1882 than it did to Italy in 1827. Lord DufFerin was certainly under no delusion as to the realities of the situation. In the concluding portion of his report, he said that one of the main points to * Akenside, Pleasures of the Imagination. • Bolton King, History of Italian Unity, vol. i. p. 112. 344 MODERN EGYPT rx. ii consider was "how far we can depend upon the continued, steady, and frictionless operation of the machinery we shall have set up. A great part of what we are about to inaugurate will be of necessity tentative and experimental. . . . Before a guarantee of Egypt's independence can be said to exist, the administrative system of which it is the leading characteristic must have time to consolidate, in order to resist disintegrating in- fluences from within and without, and to acquire the use and knowledge of its own capacities. . , . With such an accunmlation of difficulties, native statesmanship, even though supplemented by the new-born institutions, will hardly be able to co))e, unless assisted for a time by our sympathy and guidance. Under these circumstances, I would venture to submit that we can hardly con- sider the work of reorganisation complete, or the responsibilities imposed upon us by circumstances adequately discharged, until we have seen Egypt shake herself free from the initial embarrassments which I have enumerated above." In other words, Lord Dufferin, without absolutely stating that the British occupation must be indefinitely prolonged, clearly indicated the maintenance of the para- mount influence of the British Government for an indefinite period as an essential condition to the execution of the policy of reform. Lord Dufferin threw out another important hint. " If," he said, " I had been commissioned to place affairs in Egypt on the footing of an Indian subject State, the outlook would have been different. The masterful hand of a Kesident would have quickly bent everything to his will." After de- tailing the advantao;es to be derived from this system of government, Lord Dufferin added : "The Egyptians would have justly considered these advantages as dearly purchased at the CH. XVIII THE DUFFERIN MISSION 345 expense of their domestic independence. INIoreover, Her Majesty's Government and the public opinion of England have pronounced against any such alternative." Public opinion in England, however, had not pronounced strongly against this alter- native. On the contrary, many people were of opinion that the course indicated by Lord Dufferin was the best to adopt. It is, moreover, possible, in spite of the forced condemnation which he pronounced, that Lord Dufferin was of a some- what similar opinion. It was, indeed, clear that for some long while to come, the representative of the British Government in Egypt would of necessity be more than an ordinary diplomatic agent. "The title-deeds of all political authority," it has been truly said, "are elastic."^ Their elas- ticity was about to be put to the test in Egypt. The question of who should be the man then arose. I was at that time in India. Sir Edward Malet was promoted to be Minister at Brussels. The British Government did me the honour of inviting me to become his successor. I accepted the invitation and arrived in Cairo on September 11, 1883. * Oliver's Alexander Hamilton, p. 169. PART III THE SOUDAN 1882-1907 The difficulties of the case have passed entirely beyond the limits oj" stich political and military difficulties as I have knmvn m the course of an experience of half a century. Mr. Gladstone, Speech iyi tJie House of Commons on Soudan affairs, Febricary 23, 1885. 847 CHAPTER XIX THE HICKS EXPEDITION January-November 1883 Extent of Egyptian territory — Misgovernment in the Soudan — Slave^ hunting — Said Pasha's views — Colonel Stewart's Report — The Mahdi — Military and financial situation — Interference from Cairo — Attitude of the British Government — Destruction of General Hicks's army. The affairs of the Soudan exercised a very im- portant influence on the course of events in Egypt, more especially during the years which immediately followed the British occupation of the country. They will, therefore, be treated separately. At the time when this narrative commences, the nominal authority of the Khedive extended over an area stretching from Wadi Haifa on the nortli to the Equator on the south, a distance of about 1300 miles, and from JNlassowah on the east to the western limit of the Darfour province on the west, a distance of about 1300 miles — that is to say, he ruled, or attempted to rule, over a territory twice as big as France and Germany together. The worst forms of misgovernment existed over this vast tract of country. Sir Samuel Baker, on the occasion of his second visit to the Soudan in 1870, wrote : " I observed with dismay a frightful change in the features of the country between Berber and the capital since my former visit. The rich soil on the banks of the river, which had a few years since been highly cultivated, was abandoned. 349 350 MODERN EGYPT ft. m . . . There was not a dog to howl for a lost master. Industry had vanished ; oppression had driven tlie inhabitants from the soil."^ The taxes, which were excessive in amount, were collected by Basil i- Bozouks. These agents were described by Colonel Stewart, who was sent to the Soudan in the winter of 1882-83 to report on the state of the country, as "swaggering bullies, robbing, plundering, and ill- treating the people with impunity." In addition, moreover, to the evils attendant on a thoroughly bad and oppressive system of government, tlie Soudan suffered from a scourge peculiar to itself. It was the happy hunting-ground of the Arab slave-dealer. "The entire country," Sir Samuel Baker wrote, "was leased out to piratical slave- hunters, under the name of traders, by the Khartoum Government." Even assuming that Ismail Pasha was sincere in his desire to suppress slavery and to govern the Soudan well, nothing is more certain than that he was powerless to do so. Qui t?^op embi'asse^ mat etreint. In extending his dominions to the centre of Africa, the Khedive had under- taken a task which was far beyond the military and financial resources, as well as the adminis- trative capacity of the Egyptian Government. His predecessor, Said Pasha, saw this, although during his time the area, over which the Khedive of Egypt was supposed to exercise authority, was far smaller than in 1883. In 1850, Said Pasha visited Khartoum. "After due considera- tion he had almost decided to abandon the country, and was only restrained from doing so by the Sheikhs and Notables pointing out the inevitable anarchy that would result from such a measure." Twenty- seven years later. Colonel Stewart saw that the only hope of improvement lay in abandon- ^ Ismailia, p. 11. cH. XIX THE HICKS EXPEDITION 351 ing some of the outlying provinces of the Soudan, and thus bringing the ambitious task, which the Egyptian Government had set itself to perform, within comparatively manageable limits. " It is generally acknowledged," he wrote, " that the Soudan is, and has for many years been, a source of loss to the Egyptian Government. . . . Putting, however, the financial view of the question aside, I am firmly convinced that the Egyptians are quite unfit in every way to undertake such a trust as the government of so vast a country with a view to its welfare, and that both for their own sake and that of the people they try to rule, it would be advisable to abandon large portions of it. The fact of their incompetence to rule is so generally acknowledged that it is unnecessary to discuss the question." There is a tradition in the Mohammedan world that, at some future time, a Mahdi ^ will appear on earth, upon whose coming the world will be con- verted to the Mohammedan religion. A variety of unauthorised rumours are current amono-st the o lower orders of Mohammedans as to the appearance and qualities of the true Mahdi, such as, for instance, that he will have very long hands ; but these are discarded by the more learned classes. A work written at Mecca in 1883 by a Sherif of that place, and entitled 21ie Conquests of Islam, contains what may be considered as an authorised version of the conditions which the true Mahdi must fulfil. " The greatest of the signs," it is said, " shall be that he shall be of the line of Fatma {i.e. a Sherif, or descendant of the Prophet) ; that he shall be proclaimed Mahdi against his will, not seeking such proclamation for himself, and not causing strife amongst tiie Faithful to obtain it, nor even yielding to it till threatened with death by them. ' The literal meaning of the word " Mahdi " is one who is " con- ducted in the right path." 352 MODERN EGYPT pt. iii He shall be proclaimed in the Mosque of Mecca, not elsewhere ; he shall not appear save when there is strife after the death of a Khalifa ; he shall neither come nor be proclaimed until such time as there is no Khalifa over the Moslems. His advent shall coincide with that of Anti-Christ, after whom Jesus will descend and join himself to the Mahdi. These are the great signs of his coming. The others are imaginary or disput?d, and whosoever shall, of his own will, declare himself to be Mahdi and try to assert himself by force, is a pretender, such as have already appeared many times." In August 1881, a man named Mohammed Ahmed proclaimed himself to be the Mahdi in the Soudan.^ He was born in 1843 in the province of Dongola. As a young man he was apprenticed to his uncle, a boatbuilder in Sennar, but the tendency which, from liis earliest child- hood, he had shown towards religious studies, led him to abandon trade, and to enter a religious school at Khartoum. His mission, as ex])lained in his various Proclamations, was to gain over the Soudan to his cause, then to march on Egypt, overthrow the heretical Turks, and convert the whole world. All who opposed his mission were to be destroyed, whether Christians, Mohammedans, or Pagans. Mohammed Ahmed was at once branded by * Many persons had appeared in Earypt prior to 1881 claiming to be the Mahdi. See, for instance, Colonel Burj^oyne's History, etc., 1798 to 1801, f. 13. In Ismail I'asha's time, a .Mahdi appeared in I^pper Kg-ypt. He and his followers were put to death (see l>ady Duff Gordon's Letters from Egypt, p. 342). In the l\oran, no allusion is made to the cominj^ of tlie Alahdi. 'ilie belief in a future Ma'r.ti is l)ased on a Haditli, tliat is to say, one of tlie traditiunary sayiiijjs of tlie I'lopliet, which were recorded hy Al)u Hekr and others. It is confined to the Sunnis. According? to the Sliiaiis, the Mahdi lias already apj)eared in the person of Mohammed Al)u el Kasim, the twelftli Imam, wlio is believed to he concealed in some secret place until the day of his manifestation before the end of the world. — Hughes s Dictionary of Islam, p. 305. cH. XIX THE HICKS EXPEDITION 353 orthodox INIohainmedans in Egypt and elsewhere as a False INIahdi (Mutemahdi). Neither, in spite of the credulity and ignorance of the population of the Soudan, is it probable that he would have met with any success even in that province, had not the prevailing discontent predisposed the inhabitants against the Egy])tian Government. It was, however, Colonel Stewart wrote, *' a melancholy fact that the Government was almost universally hated and abhorred." The people, therefore, flocked to the standard of the Mahdi, whose prestige was increased by some successes gained over the Egyptian troops in the early days of the insurrectionary movement. It soon became apparent that the Egyptian Government had to deal, not with any petty disturbance which must sooner or later succumb to superior force, but with a formidable rebellion, the suppression of which would tax to the utmost their military and financial resources. What, therefore, was the nature of those resources ? The army was in a deplorable condition. " The troops in garrison here (at Khartoum)," Colonel Stewart wrote on January 5, 1883, "are working at elementary drill and tactics, and are making some progress. It is, however, very uphill work ; the officers are so ignorant and so incapable of grasping the meaning of the simplest movement. Quite one -third of the troops are also ignorant of the use of the rifle, and they would be more formidable as adversaries were they simply armed with sticks. Many have also superstitious ideas of the power of the Mahdi." A little later (February 27), Colonel Stewart wrote : " It is impossible for me to criticise too severely the conduct of the Egyptian troops, both officers and men, towards the natives. Their general conduct and overbearing manner is almost sufficient to cause VOL. I 2 A 354 MODERN EGYPT pi. iii a rebellion. When to this conduct cowardice is added, it is impossible for me to avoid expressing my contempt and disgust.' Moreover, the soldiers were imbued with Arabist sympathies ; their loyalty to the Khedive was doubtful. "The question," Colonel Stewart wrote on February 16, "is whether they will remain faithful, or whether their cowardice may not induce them to desert, knowing, as they will, that the JNIahdi will not harm them. . . . At one or two of the late skirmishes, they were heard exclaiming, ' Oh, Effendina Arabi ! If you only knew the position Tewfik has placed us in ! ' " The financial position was as bad as the military. The Soudan revenue for 1882 was estimated at £E.507,000, and the expenditure at £E. 610,000, thus leaving a deficit of £E. 103,000. There is little use in endeavouring to ascertain what the real revenue of the Soudan was at this time. No trustworthy accounts were kept. It is certain, however, that it had for years been the practice to overestimate the revenue, and it was obvious in the then condition of affairs that little or no revenue of any kind was to be expected. *' There can be no doubt," Colonel Stewart wrote, " that the deficits of many provinces are very far in excess of those stated. Probably, no revenue whatever has been collected in the province of Kordofan. INIuch the same can also be said of Dara and Fashoda. Sennar, with perhaps Darfour, must also be in pretty much the same plight." Several British officers, chief amongst whom was General Hicks, were appointed to the staff of the Soudan army in the spring of 1883. Shortly after his arrival at Khartoum in ^larch 1883, General Hicks made an appeal to Cairo for help. Those who have followed the account which CH.XIX THE HICKS EXPEDITION 355 has already been given of the financial situation in Egypt at that time, will be able to judge of the degree of pecuniary assistance which it was possible for the exhausted Treasury at Cairo to afford to General Hicks. Nevertheless, an effort was made to provide funds for the Soudan. General Hicks was told that up to the end of the year 1883 the Egyptian Government would provide him with £E. 147,000. The pecuniary aid thus afforded, though sufficient to cause embarrassment to the Egyptian Treasury, was wholly inadequate to meet General Hicks's wants. It only amounted to enough to provide for the pay of the men to the end of the current year. " Tlie native Bashi- Bozouks," (icneral Hicks pointed out, " are still months in arrears of pay. The men on the Blue Nile are in some cases two years in arrear." The position, therefore, in the spring of 1883 was as follows : — The Treasury was exhausted ; the army was unpaid, undisciplined, untrained, partially disloyal, and, therefore, worthless as a fighting machine. Under such conditions, the Egyptian Govern- ment had to face a formidable rebellion, which drew its strength from two potent forces, namely : first, the religious fervour of a credulous, fanatical, but courageous population ; secondly, the well- merited hatred engendered by a long course of misgovernment. The difficulty of the task was enhanced by the fact that the scene of the rebellion was remote from the headquarters of the Govern- ment, and that the physical difficulties of communi- cation with the base of operations were very great. It was a task which would have taxed the resources of a civilised Government whose affairs were con- ducted by men of the utmost energy and intelli- gence. It was altogether beyond the strength of the inexperienced Cairene administrators, who had 356 IMODERN EGYPT pt. m themselves only just emerged from an internal revolution which, but for foreign aid, would have been successful. The Horatian maxim Versate diu, quid fen e recusent, quid vahant humeri, holds good of politics as well as of poetry. The first thing which the Egyptian Government ought to have done was to have considered whether their strength was pro- portionate to the task which they had undertaken. The main question to be decided was whether the Egyptian Government should, for the time being at all events, abandon the more remote parts of the Soudan and stand on the defensive at Khartoum, or whether an expedition should be sent into Kordofan, which had become the chief centre of rebellion, in the hope of dealing a crushing blow to the rising power of the Mahdi. The importance of the decision in this matter was realised by the British authorities on the spot, more especially by Colonel Stewart, who could speak with high authority on Soudan affairs. On December 27, 1882, that is to say, whilst El Obeid, the capital of the Kor- dofan province, was still besieged and Abdul-Kader Pasha, who was Governor-General of the Soudan, was preparing an ex])edition for its relief. Colonel Stewart wrote : '* I would beg to point out how very important it is that the present expedition should prove a success. A failure would probably entail the total loss, if not of the Soudan, of at any rate many provinces. This truth can hardly be brought home with too much force to the Egyptian Government." At that time. Colonel Stewart thought that "Abdul-Kader had every right to expect a success." A little later (January 9), when Colonel Stewart had seen more of the Egyptian troops and had become strongly convinced of their hiefficiency, he s])()ke less hoj)cfully. Alluding to various small engagements in wliich the Egyptian CH. XIX THE HICKS EXPEDITION 357 troops had behaved badly, he wrote : '* It is very evident that the matter will become exceedingly serious should the troops continue to exhibit such pusillanimity. It will be quite hopeless to expect to cope successfully with the rebellion, and it will only remain with the Egyptian Government to make the best terms they can with the Mahdi." On January 16, he recurred to the same subject. "This move of Abdul-Kader," he wrote to Sir Edward Malet, " is a critical one, for, should he meet with any reverse, it will probably be a decisive one, as far as Egyptian authority in this country is concerned." On February 16, when the fall of El Obeid was imminent, Colonel Stewart wrote : " The question now arises, ' What should be done in this crisis ? ' I think the first thing the Government will have to decide on will be whether the Kordofan expedition should leave or not. My own opinion, from what I am told and know of the Egyptian soldiers, is that to send it would be to run a very great risk, and if the expedition were defeated, the probability is that the Soudan would be lost. Should it be decided to give up the expedition, I wo ild then suggest that orders should be at once sent to Slatin Bey, the Governor of Darfour, to destroy all his stores and retreat as best he can on the Bahr-el-Ghazal Province. There is, of course, a chance that Khartoum may be beleaguered, but I can hardly fancy that even 10,000 Egyptian soldiers, if they remain faithful, and are commanded by some energetic officers, will allow themselves to be shut up." Two days later (February 18), the news of the fall of El Obeid reached Khartoum. On February 20, Colonel Stewart wrote : " I am strongly of opinion that to advance now on Kor- dofan would be exceedingly injudicious, and that the alternative policy of remaining on the defensive. 358 IMODERN EGYPT pt. in vigorously putting down any attempted rising on this bank of the Nile, and waiting to see what will happen, is the true one. To advance now with our miserable troops against an enemy flushed with recent success, well supplied with arms, and worked up to a pitch of fanaticism, would be but to risk a disaster with no corresponding advantage now that Obeid has fallen. A serious disaster or, indeed, a check, would also very probably involve the loss of the whole of the Soudan." Speaking of the '* utter worthlessness of the Egyptian infantry," Colonel Stewart added : " It is almost impossible for me to convey an idea of the contempt with which all classes of people here regard them. The negro troops will not associate with them, nor will, curiously enough, the Egyptian officers in com- mand of those troops." ^ It was unfortunate that Colonel Stewart's advice was not followed. Both Lord DufFerin and Sir Edward Malet shared his views. On April 2, 1888, Lord Dufferin had an interview with Ibrahim Bey, the head of the Soudan Department at Cairo, in which he said that " if the Egyptian Government were wise, it would confine its present efforts to the re-establishment of its authority in Sermar, and would not seek to extend its dominion beyond that province and the bordering river banks." In his general report on Egypt, Lord Dufferin, whilst deprecating the abandonment of the whole of the Soudan, no necessity having as yet arisen for so heroic a remedy, added : " I apprehend, however, 1 In a letter dated September 1, 1883, Mr. Power, the British Con- sular A^ent at Khartoum, wrote : " In three days, we march on a canipaij^n tli;it even the most sanfruine look forward to with the f;reatest jrloom. We have liere i)000 intaiitry that titty fjood men would rout in ten minutes, and 1000 cavalry (Hasiii-liozouks) tliat have never leaiiit even to ride, and these, with a few Nordent'elt fiuns, are to heat tiie 60,000 men whom the Mahdi has ^rot tof^ether. . . . Tiiat Kj^-yptian officers and men are not worth the ammunition they throw away, is well known." — Power's Letters from Khartoum, p. 20. CH.XIX THE HICKS EXPEDITION 359 that it would be wise on the part of Egypt to abandon Darfour and perhaps part of Kordofan, and to be content with maintaining her jurisdiction in the provinces of Khartoum and Sennar." On June 5, when General Hicks was urging the Egyptian Government, through Sir Edward Malet, to give him more men and more money, the latter telegraphed to Lord Granville : " Your Lordship is aware that it is already impossible for the Egyptian Government to supply the funds de- manded for the Soudan, and the proposed operations will run a considerable risk of failure unless they are conducted on a large scale, and unless the army is well supplied in every respect. Under these circumstances, a question arises as to whether General Hicks should be instructed to confine himself to maintaining the present supre- macy of the Khedive in the region between the Blue and White Niles." Sir Edward Malet added that he "had furnished Cherif Pasha with a copy of General Hicks's telegram, as requested, but without comment or expression of opinion upon its contents." What, however, was the opinion of General Hicks, the officer who was to command the expedi- tion about to be sent against the INIahdi ? General Hicks's position was one of great difficulty. The Government at Cairo had not learnt the elementary lesson that, in dealing with a state of affiiirs such as that which then existed in the Soudan, the first essential and preliminary condition to success was to entrust the supreme command to one individual and to support him cordially. Ala-el -Din Pasha was sent to Khartoum to supersede Abdul-Kader Pasha, of whom Colonel Stewart thought highly ; but when he arrived (February 1883) he did not, in the first instance, declare his mission. "Although," Colonel Stewart wrote, "nominally 360 MODERN EGYPT pt. iii he has no official position, his presence is sufficient to neutralise the influence of Abdul-Kader, with the result that practically no one is in command." It is easy to believe that the position of the Governor-General at Khartoum was tlius rendered extremely difficult. Suleiman Pasha Niazi, who is described by Colonel Stewart as "a miserable-look- ing old man of seventy-four or seventy-five," was sent up in nominal command of the troops, with the understanding "that he was to defer in all things to his subordinate (General Hicks), who was held responsible for the direction of all prepara- tions and operations." In addition to the confusion caused by these arrangements, much harm resulted from the inveterate habit, which was at that time common to many high Egyptian authorities, of giving orders direct to subordinate officials over the lieads of their superiors. After mentioning a flagrant instance of this sort, Colonel Stewart added (January 26) : " I need hardly point out how deplorable is this independent action of the Khedive's. Should it continue, we shall not alone have all the authorities here quarrelling with each other, but it will be also quite impossible to carry out any concerted plan. The Khedive must entrust some one here with supreme authority (Dictator) and then leave him alone. To telegraph what he should do or not do, or to correspond with his subordinates over his head, is only to make his position quite untenable, and to insure a disastrous termination to the campaign." Colonel StcAvart's letters written at this time, are full of complaints of the "backstairs influence" exerted at Cairo, and of the " unbusinesslike interference of the Cairo Government in Soudan affairs." "Until matters," he wrote on February 27, "are conducted in a businesslike, straightforward, and honest w^ay, it is hopeless to expect any amelioration in the Soudan." CH.XIX THE HICKS EXPEDITION 361 The difficulties of a British officer suddenly thrust into the middle of these paltry intrigues can easily be imagined. General Hicks soon found his position intolerable. Suleiman Pasha in no way considered his own office as a sinecure. On the contrary, he paid no attention to the opinions expressed by General Hicks. At last, after making a series of complaints to which little attention was paid. General Hicks telegraphed, on July 16, to Sir Edward Malet : " My orders and arrangements here are quite disregarded ; promises are made that they shall be carried out, but nothing whatever is done. Suleiman Pasha disregards them altogether. It is useless to keep me here under these condi- tions, and it is a position which I cannot hold. I beg you will have me recalled." This telegram brought matters to a crisis. General Hicks was appointed Commander-in-Chief in the Soudan with the rank of General of Division. Suleiman Pasha was recalled from Khartoum, but any good effect, which might otherwise have been produced by this measure, was marred owing to his being at once named Governor of the Eastern Soudan. His new appointment. General Hicks telegraphed, was " looked upon as promotion." In view of the intrigues which surrounded General Hicks, of the wretched material of which his army was composed, and of the fact that the Egyptian Government could not comply with his requests for men and money, it is scarcely conceiv- able that he should have been confident of success. But he seems to have underrated the difficulties of the task which lay before him. He was perhaps unduly elated at some, trifiing successes gained during the early stages of the rebellion over the forces of the Mahdi. He thought (June 23) that as he advanced, the tribes, though "afraid of commencing hostilities against the Mahdi, 362 MODERN EGYPT pt. m would join him as camp-followers.*' It does not appear that at any time General Hicks was definitely asked by the Egyptian Govern- ment to state his views as to the wisdom of undertaking the expedition, though it might have been supposed that ordinary prudence would have dictated the necessity of obtaining, in official form, a very distinct expression of his opinion on this momentous question. But on June 18, that is to say about three months before he started into the Kordofan desert, he telegraphed to General Valentine Baker, who was at the time at the head of the Egyptian Police : " In my telegram of the 3rd of June to Malet, I pointed out what I thought was necessary to ensure success in Kordofan and guard against all possible eventualities.^ At the same time I am prepared to undertake the campaign with the force available ; the risks are, as I have said, in case of a mishap, but I think this is not at all probable. Khartoum ought to be safe from outside under any circumstances." Looking to the terms of this telegram, it is not difficult to judge of General Hicks's frame of mind. In view of the fact that the expeditionary force, as it eventually started, was below the strength which he recommended, and that the material of which the army was composed was of the worst possible description, it can scarcely be conceived that he felt sanguine of success. It * The telegram to which allusion is here made runs as follows : *'Tlie force we have is not nearly sufficient to undertake the Kordofan campaign. ... It should be 10^000 men. What number of men will it be possible for the (iovernment to send me in augmentation .'' When we consider that a defeat miglit mean not only the loss of Darfour and Kordofan, but also of Sennar, and possibly Kliartoum, I think no risk should be run." It was this telegram which elicited the opinion expressed by Sir Edward Malet {ade ante, p. 359) that General Hicka should confine his operations to the country lying between the Blue and ^Vhite Niles. But the telegram was sent on to Chcrif Pasha " with- out comment or expression of opinion." The natural result ensued. General Hicks's weighty opinions were never properly considered. CH.XIX THE HICKS EXPEDITION 363 may be surmised that his qualified expression of willingness to undertake the campaign was in- spired, not so much by any heartfelt confidence of success based on a full consideration of the whole of the facts, as by the reluctance naturally felt by a gallant soldier to appear to shrink from a dangerous undertaking. The truth is that the decision in this matter should not have been left to General Hicks. It was from no fault of their own that the Govern- ment which then existed at Cairo were power- less to provide the resources, whether in men or money, which were necessary in order to suppress the rebellion. The helplessness of the Khedive's Government was the result of the misgovernment of the Khedive's predecessor. But it behoved the Egyptian Ministers to look the facts with which they had to deal fairly in the face, and to bring the objects, which they sought to attain, into harmony with the means which they possessed for attaining them. They did nothing of the sort. They drifted on, until at last they brought on their heads a catastrophe, which involved the collapse of Egyp- tian authority over the whole of the Soudan. There was only one method by which the realities of the situation might have been brought home to the minds of the Khedive and his Ministers. The British Government should have insisted on the adoption of a rational and practicable policy. Unfortunately, they abstained from all interference. They appear, indeed, to have seen that the wisest plan for the Egyptian Government would have been to stand on the defensive at Khartoum. But they did nothing to enforce this view. The British Government had, in fact, been led much against their will into the occupation of Egypt. They were now fearful that they might 364 MODERN EGYPT pt. m unconsciously drift into military intervention in the Soudan. Lord Granville was determined to guard against this danger. He refused to have anything to say to Soudan matters. The fact that General Hicks's telegrams were sent to the various Egyptian authorities through Sir Edward Malet roused him to a sense of danger. He thought that the British representative, by allowing himself to become the medium of communication between Cairo and Khartoum, might involve his Govern- ment in some degree of responsibility. On May 7, Lord Granville, therefore, telegraphed to Mr. Cartwright, who temporarily occupied Sir Edward Malet's place: "Her Majesty's Government are in no w^ay responsible for the operations in the Soudan, which have been undertaken under the authority of the Egyptian Government, or for the appointment or actions of General Hicks." This disclaimer of responsibility was repeated in a letter addressed by Sir Edward Malet to Cherif Pasha on May 22, when forwarding another telegram addressed by General Hicks to Lord Dufferin. "In this particular instance," Sir Edward said, "I desire to guard against any supposition on the part of Your Excellency that my sending a copy of the telegram to Your Excellency indicates any expression of opinion with regard to the recom- mendations contained in it." A little later, Lord Granville was again alarmed at the continuance of communication between Sir Edward Malet and General Hicks. On August 8, he wrote to Sir Edward Malet: "It appears that General Hicks continues to communicate with you respecting the financial difficulties which he meets with in the Soudan, under the impression that you will exert your influence with the Egyptian Government to induce them to give favourable consideration to his wishes. I need not remind CH.XIX THE HICKS EXPEDITION 365 you that Her JNIajesty's Government assume no responsibility whatever in regard to the conduct of affairs in the Soudan, and it is desirable that General Hicks should understand that, although they are glad to receive information as to the progress of the campaign, it is their policy to abstain as much as possible from interference with the action of the Egyptian Government in that quarter." Sir Edward Malet informed Lord Granville that his action had been in strict con- formity with the instructions he had received on this subject. He took steps, also, to render the position clear to General Hicks. On August 18, he telegraphed to General Hicks : " I congratulate you on your appointment as Commander-in-Chief and General of Division. The act is spontaneous on the part of the Egyptian Government, for although I am ready to transmit to them tele- grams that come from you, I am debarred by my instructions from giving advice with regard to action on them, the policy of Her Majesty's Government being to abstain as much as possible from interference with the action of the Egyptian Government in the Soudan." The objections to British military intervention were obvious, neither was the danger against which Lord Granville sought to guard imaginary. It might well have happened that, almost before the Government were aware of it, they might have found themselves in a situation which would have obliged them to assert their authority by force of arms in the Soudan. The history of the rise of Uiitish power in the East served as a warning that one forward step in the direction of territorial extension often leads to another, until at last a goal is reached far more distant than any which was originally contemplated. IVIoreover, when once a question, such as the state of the Soudan, 366 MODERN EGYPT pt. iii becomes a matter for public discussion in England, there are not wanting many who, partly from the love of adventure natural to most Englishmen, partly from a keen sense of the benefits which would be conferred locally by British interference, and partly from a great, perhaps an exaggerated idea of England's mission as a civilising agent in the world, are prone to push on the Government to action without sufficient consideration of the ultimate consequences of their proposals. Under these circumstances, it behoved a wise statesman to move cautiously. Nevertheless, looking back over the course of events as we now know them, it must be admitted that the line of action which Lord Granville adopted was very unfortunate. It is to be regretted that he did not by timely interference save the Egyptian Government from the conse- quences of their own want of foresight. Had he, acting on the views expressed by the various British authorities in Egypt, stepped in and for- bidden the desi)atch of the Hicks expedition to Kordofan, not only would thousands of lives and the large sums of money, which were subsequently squandered, have been saved, but he would have deserved the gratitude of the Egyptian people, and would have saved his own country from that inter- ference which he so much dreaded, and which was eventually precipitated by the negative policy adopted in the early stage of the ])roceedings. Lord Granville appears to have thought that he effectually threw off all responsibility by declaring that he was not responsible. There could not have been a greater error. The responsibility of the British Government for the general conduct of aflairs in Egypt did not depend on a few phrases thrown into a des])atch and subsequently published in a parliamentary paper. It was based on the facts that the British Government were in military CH.X1X THE HICKS EXPEDITION 367 occupation of the country, that the weakness and inefficiency of the native rulers were notorious, and tluit the civiHsed world fixed on England a respon- sibility which it was impossible to shake off so long as the occupation lasted. "Those," Lord Salisbury said in the House of Lords (February 12, 1884), " who have the absolute power of preventing lamentable events, and knowing what is taking place, refuse to exercise that power, are responsible for what happens." Lord Granville failed to see this. Instead of recognising the facts of the situation, he took shelter behind an illusory abnegation of responsibility, which was a mere phantasm of the diplomatic and parliamentary mind. The result was that the facts asserted themselves in defiance of diplomacy and parlia- mentary convenience. It may, however, be urged in defence of the policy adopted by Lord Granville that he does not appear to have received sufficient warning of the possible, and, indeed, probable consequences of inaction. What was most of all required was that an alarm-bell should be rung to rouse the British Government from its lethargy, and show that the consequences of inaction might be more serious than those of action.^ But no sufficient warning appears to have been given. The result was that the Egyptian Governm,ent blundered on headlong to their own destruction, and that the British Government, like the frail beauty of Byron's poem, whilst vowing that they would ne'er consent to a policy of intervention in the Soudan, consented but a short time afterwards to a degree • " I am not of the opiiiiou of those gentlemen who are against disturbing the public repose ; I like a clamour when there is an aliuse. The fire-bell at midnight disturbs your sleep, but it keeps you from being burned in your bed. The liue-and-cry ahirnis the country, but it preserves all the property of the province." — Burke's Speech on the Prosecution for Libels. 368 MODERN EGYPT ft. iii of intervention far greater than would have been necessary had the true facts of the situation been hi the first instance recognised. On Septen.ber 8, 1883, that is to say, three days before my arrival in Egypt, General Hicks started on the expedition, which was to terminate in so disastrous a manner. At Cairo, news from the Soudan was anxiously awaited, but no one con- templated the possibility of the disaster which shortly ensued. I remember speaking to Cherif Pasha as to the desirability of giving up the outlying provinces of the Soudan. He was not disinclined to give up Darfour ; on the other hand, he held strongly to Kordofan. But, he added, with the light-heartedness characteristic of a Galli- cised Egyptian, " Nous en causerons plus tard ; d'abord nous allons donner une bonne raclee a ce monsieur " {i.e. the INlahdi).^ Cherif Pasha was soon undeceived. On No- vember 22, news reached Cairo that on the 5th General Hicks's army had been totally destroyed. '* Hardly anythmg was known of the country into which the army was venturing, beyond the fact that it was the driest in the Soudan." The last communication received from General Hicks spoke of the want of water and of the intense heat. The final catastrophe is described by Colonel Colville in the following words : " On advancing to Kasghil, the army was led astray by the guides, who were Mahdi's men, and who, when they were sure that it was thoroughly lost in the bush, deserted it. After wandering three days and 1 On January 4, 1884, Sir Charles W. Wilson wrote: "When Hicks Pasha left Cairo, it was not intended that he should do more than clear Senuar of rebel bauds, a work he accomplished with ease, and protect Khartoum. It is useless to inquire what madness made the Egyptian Government order Hicks Pasha to attempt the reconquest of K()i(iof;in ; it was a hazardous operation, and with the troops employed, of whom Colonel Stewart has given a faithful picture, disaster was an almost foregone conclusion." CH. XIX THE HICKS EXPEDITION 369 nights without water, they came upon a force of the enemy near Kasghil. But many hundreds had already died from thirst, and the remainder were too feeble to olier any determined resistance, and were soon despatched by the enemy. A brilliant charge was made by Hicks Pasha and his staff, who all died fighting like men." ^ It was not until twenty- two years later that the site of the Hicks disaster was visited by any European. Sir Reginald Wingate went over the ground in the course of a tour through Kordofan during the winter of 1905-6. He recorded his impressions in the following words : — I visited the battlefield where the late General Hicks Pasha and his force were almost entirely annihilated by the Dervish hordes in 1883, despite the fact that within a mile of the spot where the thirst-stricken troops were overwhelmed was a large pool of water, of which they were apparently in complete ignorance. The locality is in the depths of a huge forest some thirty miles south of El Obeid, and I have no hesitation in hazarding the opinion that, had the efforts to relieve El Obeid been conducted by a far more numerous and efficient force, the result would have been the same. It is abundantly evident that the Government of that period neither realised the situation nor appreciated the enormous difficulties attendant on the movement of a large force through such country ; the dispatch of the expedition, under the circumstances, can only be characterised as an act of extreme folly. Thus, the whole edifice of territorial aggrandise- ment in Africa, which Ismail Pasha and ids pre- decessors, in an evil moment for their country, had planned, toppled to the ground. It was built on no sure foundation. The power gained by semi- civilised skill over the wild tribes of the Soudan had been grossly misused. Slave-hunting Pashas, and corrupt and extortionate tax-collectors, had * History of the Soudan Campaign , p. 16. VOL. I 2 B 370 MODERN EGYPT pt. m rendered the name of Egypt hateful to tlie people. A despotism, which is neither strong nor beneficent, must perforce fall directly it is exposed to serious attack. The bubble Government established by Ismail Pasha and his predecessors in the Soudan collapsed directly it was pricked by the religious im])ostor who was now to rule the country, neither amongst the population whose fate was at stake in the combat was a voice raised or a sword drawn to avert its downfall. CHAPTER XX THE ABANDONMENT OF THE SOUDAN November 1883-January 1884 My position — I press the British Goveiument to depart from a passive attitude — Lord Granville's reply — The Egyptian Government decide to hold Khartoum — Colonel Coetlogon recommends a retreat on Berber — Opinions of the military authorities at Cairo — The Egyptian Government wish to invoke the aid of the Sultan — The British Government recommend withdrawal from tlie Soudan — The Egyptian Ministers resign — Nubar Pasha takes office — Observations on the policy of withdrawal from the Soudan. I HAVE SO far been dealing with a period of Egyptian history during which I either played a subordinate part, or was in no way connected with Egypt. I have occasionally criticised tlie acts of those who were responsible for the conduct of Egyptian affairs at this time. I now reach another period. It would be false modesty not to recognise that from this time forward I was myself one of the principal actors on the Egyptian stage, not, of course, to the extent of being re- sponsible for the general policy of the Britisli Government, but rather to the extent of being mainly responsible for the management of local affairs in Egypt. This latter responsibility 1 accept, only begging that it should be borne in mind that my action had of necessity to conform itself to the lines of general policy adopted in London. Durhig the period when I represented the 371 372 JNIODERN EGYPT pt. m British Government in Egypt, Egyptian affiiirs frequently formed the subject of pubUc discussion. jNIy own conduct was at times sharply criticised. Any 3ne engaged in English public life must expect at times to receive some hard knocks. I believe I know, perhaps better than any one else, the mistakes which I committed, and I shaU use my best endeavours to deal with them at least as unsparingly as I have dealt with what appear to me to be the mistakes of others. Se judice^ nemo nocens absolvitur. The first step of any importance taken in connection with Soudan affairs after my arrival in Egypt was on November 19, 1883, on which day I sent the following telegram to Lord Granville: "The position of affairs in the Soudan is becoming very serious. . . . Nothing definite has been heard of Hicks since September 27. He only had provisions for two months. The Egyptian Government are very anxious, and evi- dently anticipate bad news. Giegler Pasha, who was with Gordon in the Soudan, and whom I saw to-day, says that if Hicks is beaten, Khartoum will probably fall. In fact, the Egyptian Govern- ment have no money, and excepting Wood's and Baker's forces,^ they have sent almost their last available man to the Soudan. If Hicks's army is destroyed, I have little doubt that, unless they get assistance from outside, they will lose the whole of the Soudan. Neither, if once they begin to fall back, is it easy to say where along the valley of the Nile they could arrest the rebel movement. From some observations which Cherif Pasha let dro]) to me this morning, I think it not at all im])r<)l)able that before long he will ask for the assistance of English or Indian troops. He said • Sir Evelyn Wood commanded the Egyptian ai*my then in course of tonnation. General Valentine Baker commanded the Gendarmerie. CH. XX THE SOUDAN 373 to me, *I suppose Her Majesty's Government would not like to see Turks intervene in the Soudan?' Shall I be right in telling him, if the occasion arises, that under no circumstances must he look for the assistance of British or Indian troops in the Soudan ? As regards Turkish assistance, I should be glad to receive instructions as to the attitude I am to adopt. It is a question which course the Egyptian Government would dislike most — to call in the Turks, or to abandon the Soudan. My own opinion is that, if Hicks be beaten, the wisest course for the Egyptian Govern- ment to adopt is to accept defeat and fall back on whatever point on the Nile they can hold with confidence, although the adoption of this course would certainly give a great impulse to the Slave Trade. But it will not be easy to persuade them of this. Turkish intervention would, I think, be most undesirable. ... I may now, at any moment, be forced to discuss these Soudan affairs with Cherif Pasha, and it is, therefore, desirable that I should receive some indications of Your Lordship's views. It will be very difficult, under the circum- stances, to maintain a purely passive attitude, and to give no advice whatsoever." To this telegram Lord Granville replied, on November 20, in the following words : " We cannot lend English or Indian troops. ... It would not be for the advantage of Egypt to invite Turkish troops into the Soudan. If consulted, recommend the abandonment of the Soudan within certain limits." The principal object which I had in view in sending my telegram of November 19 was to draw the British Government out of the passive attitude which they had hitherto adopted. A short residence in the country had been sufficient to convince me that it was neither possible nor 374 JMODERN EGYPT pt. iii desirable to leave the Egyptian Government to manage Soudan affairs without any advice or assistance.^ My object had been attained. It is true that I was instructed only to give advice " if consulted," but as I was sure to be consulted, the reserve placed on my action did not practically hamper me. I had obtained a definite expression of opinion as to the Soudan ])olicy which commended itself to the British Government in the event of a disaster happening to General Hicks's army. They would not afford military aid to reconquer the Soudan ; they were also averse to the employment of Turkish troops. Under these circumstances, the only possible course to pursue would be to abandon the Soudan within certain limits. This is the policy which, as has been already mentioned, commended itself to Lord Dufferin, Sir Edward ]\'alet, and Colonel Stewart ; but the telegram which I sent on November 19, was, so far as I am aware, the first occasion upon which the British Government were strongly pressed to express a decided opinion on the subject. I consider myself, therefore, largely respon- sible for initiating the policy of withdrawal from the Soudan. On 5lr. Gladstone's Government rests the responsibility of approving that policy. So early as November 18, a report reached Cairo that General Hicks's army was surrounded and in want of provisions. But it was not till * On November 22, I wrote privately to Lord Granville : " I fully understand the policy of the Government, which is not to be drawn into affairs in the Soudan. I see no reason why this policy should not be carried out. On the other hand, it is quite impossible to separate the Egyptian question from the Soudan question altogether." In anotlier letter, dated December 23, I said : " The separation of tlie Soudan question from the question of Egypt proper was always well- nigh impossible on financial grounds. Now, it has become quite impossible. 1 think tlie policy of complete abandonment is, on the whole, the be*t of wliich the circumstances admit ; but I am not sure if the extreme difficulty of carrying it out, or the consequences to which it must almost inevitably lead, are fully appreciated at home." cH.xx THE SOUDAN 375 the 22nd that intelligence was received of the destruction of the army. I did not at once press any advice on the Egyptian Government. In the first place, contra- dictory reports continued to be received regarding the fate of General Hicks's army, and, indeed, some weeks elapsed before all doubts as to the occur- rence of the disaster were removed. In the second place, it was necessary to consult the military authorities, who naturally required time to study the facts of the case before expressing any opinion as to the course to be adopted. In the third place, I wished to give the Egyptian Govern- ment time in order to see whether they would be able to devise any practicable policy of their own. The first decision at which the Egyptian Government arrived was "to try and hold Khar- toum, and to reopen the route between Suakin and Berber." In reporting this decision to Lord Granville, on November 23, I said that "accord- ing to several telegrams received from Khartoum, there appeared to be a general opinion on the spot that it would be impossible to hold the town, and that it would be necessary to fall back on Berber." On November 26, Colonel Coetlogon, an officer of General Hicks's army who had remained at Khartoum, telegraphed to Sir Evelyn Wood in the following terms: "I think it right to let you know the situation. Khartoum and Sennar cannot be held. In two months' time, there will be no food. All supplies are cut off. To save what remains of the army in the Soudan, a retreat on Berber should be made at once, and, by a combined movement from Berber and Suakin, that route should be opened. Reinforcements arriving could not reach Khartoum except by land, and for that a very large force is necessary. . . . The troops that are left are the refuse of the army, mostly old and 376 MODERN EGYPT pt. m blind. Again I say, the only way of saving what remains is to attempt a general retreat on Berber, This is the real state of affairs here, and 1 beg of you to impress it on His Highness the Kliedive." By December 3, I had obtained the views of the principal British military authorities in Cairo, and I was able to report to Lord Granville on the situation. *' The most important question for the moment," I said, "is to know whether the Egyptian Government will be able to maintain themselves at Khartoum. I have had the advan- tage of fully discussing this question with General Stephenson, Sir Evelyn Wood, and General Baker.^ All these high military authorities are of one opinion. They consider that, if the INIahdi advances, it will be impossible for the Egyptian Government to hold Khartoum, I mean, of course, with any forces of which they now dispose, or are likely to dispose. I leave out of account the con- tingency of despatching forces to Khartoum belonging either to Her JNlajesty the Queen or His Imperial JNlajesty the Sultan. Your Lordship has informed me that Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to send English or Indian troops to the Soudan. I will not now attempt to discuss * Sir Frederick Stephenson then commanded the British army of occupation. General Baker left for Suakin durine^ the course of these discussions. He did not see my despatch before he left Cairo. I, therefore, wrote to him with a view to ascertaininj? whetlier I had riijhtly interpreted the opinions whicli he liad expressed to me verbally. He replied on January 7, 1884, in tlie following terms: " 1. I did not believe tliat, witliout the aid of e.xterior power, Egypt could reconquer or hold tlie Soudan. 2. 1 believed tliat tlie loss of tlie Soudan would be a disastrous blow to Egypt, and that the e.xpenditure necessary for the defence of Egypt proper would be ruinous to her financially in the future, and far in excess of the sum which tlie Soudan liad cost in the past. 3. I tliouglit it necessary that both England and Egypt should immediately adopt a definite policy, and that the latter should prepare to witlidraw from tlie Soudan, unless England could afl'ord such aid ag would enable her to recover it and hold it." This, of course, really meant that General Baker wished the British Government to undertake the recouquest of the Soudan, CH.XX THE SOUDAN 377 the possible contingency of troops belonging to His Imperial Majesty the Sultan being sent to the Soudan. The adoption of this last-named measure involves serious political considerations, which I must leave to the appreciation of Her Majesty's Government. "The reasons which have led General Stephen- son, Sir Evelyn Wood, and General Baker to tlie conclusions that, if the Mahdi advances, it will be impossible for the Egyptian Government to hold Khartoum are that the garrison is demoralised, that they have little or no confidence in the fight- ing qualities of the soldiers, tliat the Egyptian Government have no adequate reinforcements to send, and that the difficulty of provisioning the place, whether from the north or the south, is very great, as are also the difficulties of maintaining a line of communications. It is also very doubtful whether General Baker will be able by force to open up the Suakin-Berber route.^ . . . General Stephenson and Sir Evelyn Wood are of opinion that if the Egyptian Government be left to rely exclusively on their own resources, and the Mahdi advances, Khartoum must fall. They think that an endeavour should be made to open out tiie Berber-Suakin route, not because the mere estab- lishment of communication between those two points will enable the Egyptian Government, with the forces at their disposal, to hold Khartoum, but because the success of General Baker's undertaking; will afford the best hope of retreat to the garrisons of Khartoum and the immediate neighbourhood. *' If Khartoum is abandoned, they think that the whole valley of the Nile down to Wadi Haifa or thereabouts will probably be lost to the Egyptian Government. ^ General Baker's expedition to Suakin will be described in a subsequent chapter. 378 JMODERN EGYPT pt. m "I have dwelt especially on the opinions of General Stephenson and Sir Evelyn Wood, because, as they have seen this despatch, I am confident that I am riglitly interpreting their views. I may, however, add that I have gathered, in communication with Baker Pasha, that his views on the military situation do not differ materially from those of General Stephenson and Sir Evelyn Wood. "My own views on the points which I have so far discussed are, relatively speaking, of little value. But I should wish to say that, in view of the facts with which we have to deal, it appears to me scarcely possible to arrive at any other conclusions than those of General Stephenson and Sir Evelyn W^ood. Their views are also shared by Mr. Clifford Lloyd,^ who has been present at many of our discussions. " I need hardly say that these views are, not unnaturally, very unpalatable to the Egyptian Government. I hardly think that Ch^rif Pasha believes that he will be able to hold Khartoum if the Mahdi advances, but neither he nor his colleagues can make up their minds to aban- doning it." Whilst this despatch was on its way to London, daily discussions took place in Cairo about the policy which was to be pursued. It became clearer every day that, if the Egyptian Government were left to themselves, they would never decide upon any definite and practicable policy. On December 10, I sent the followiug private telegram to Lord Gran- ville : *' I have not telegraphed for fresh instructions as I thought it useless to do so until events had de- veloped somewhat, and I had something definite to recommend. But it is quite clear to me that more * Mr. Clifford Lloyd had been sent to Egypt to reorganise the Department of the Interior. OH. XX THE SOUDAN 379 definite instructions must shortly be sent as to the attitude of Her Majesty's Government and as to the advice to be given to the Egyptian Govern- ment. At present, they are drifting on without any very definite or practical plan of action, and will continue to do so unless they are told what course to pursue." This was followed, on December 12, by an official telegram in which I informed Lord Granville that Cherif Pasha had called upon me and informed me that " the Khedive had held a Council of Ministers and that they had resolved to place themselves absolutely in the hands of Her Majesty's Government." The Egyptian Government thought that the best solution of the question was to invite the aid of the Sultan. They wished the British Govenmient to arrange the con- ditions under which Turkish aid would be afforded, the principal of these conditions being that the Sultan's troops should leave the country when their presence was no longer required. Clierif Pasha pointed out that as the rebellion in the Soudan was a religious movement, it would prob- ably gather strength if British or Indian troops were employed. On December 13, I^ord Granville replied in the following terms : " Her Majesty's Government have no intention of employing British or Indian troops in the Soudan. Her Majesty's Government have no objection to offer to the employment of Turkish troops, provided they are paid by the Turkish Government, and that such employment be restricted exclusively to the Soudan, with their base at Suakin. Excepting for securing the safe retreat of the garrisons still holding positions in the Soudan, Her Majesty's Government cannot agree to increasing the burden on the Egyptian revenues by expenditure for operations which, even if successful, and this is not probable, would be 380 MODERN EGYPT pt. iii of doubtful advantage to Egypt. Her INIajesty's Goveriiiiieiit recommend the Ministers of the Khedive to come to an early decision to abandon all territory south of xissouan, or, at least, of Wadi Haifa. They will be prepared to assist in main- taining order in Egypt proper, and in defending it, as well as the ports of the Red Sea." On December 16, I informed Lord Granville that I had communicated to Cherif Pasha the leading features of the policy of the British Govern- ment in respect to Soudan affairs. Cherif Pasha told me that he saw considerable objections to the abandonment of the territory south of Wadi Haifa. He promised that he would communicate to me a written Memorandum on the subject. On December 22, Cherif Pasha gave me this Memo- randum. The Egyptian Government, it was said, " cannot agree to the abandonment of territories which they consider absolutely necessary for tlie security, and even for the existence, of Egypt itself." Cherif Pasha reiterated his proposal that Turkish troops should be sent under conditions to be negotiated in concert with the British Govern- ment. The impression left on my mind during the course of these discussions was that the Egyptian Government were only half in earnest in tlieir desire to invoke Turkish aid. My belief at the time was that they wished to use the suggestion about the employment of Turkish troops as an instrument by which to force the hand of the British Govern- ment, and oblige the latter to employ British troops. Moreover, the condition laid down by the British Government to the effect that the Ottoman Treasury should bear the cost of the expedition, was practically prohibitive. In tele- graphing the substance of Cherif Pasha's note to Lord Granville, I, therefore, added the following cH. XX THE SOUDAN 381 remarks : " If negotiations are commenced with tlie Porte on the basis of tlie latter paying, they are, I conceive, ahiiost certain to fail. I believe that the policy recommended by Her Majesty's Government is, on the whole, the best of which the very difficult circumstances admit. . . . No amount of argument or persuasion will make the present Ministry adopt the policy of abandonment. The only way in which it can be carried out is for me to inform the Khedive that Her Majesty's Government insist on its adoption, and that if the present Ministers will not carry it out, he must name others who will do so. Further, I am not sure that any Egyptian Ministers can be found who will be willing to carry out the policy, and capable of doing so. If, therefore, it is forced on the Egyptian Government, Her Majesty's Government must be prepared to face the possible contingency of appointing English Ministers temporarily." Some delay ensued before any answer was sent to this telegram. In the interval, Cherif Pasha presented me, on January 2, 1884, with a further Note. In this Note, it was stated that the Egyptian Government proposed to apply to the Porte for 10,000 men. In the event of their request being refused, they wished to restore the Eastern Soudan and the ports of the Red Sea to the Sultan, and to endeavour with their own resources to hold the valley of the Nile up to Khartoum. In forwarding this proposal to Lord Granville, I said : " I can only say that I entirely disbelieve that any Egyptian force, which can be got together, will be capable of defending the whole length of the valley of the Nile from Khartoum downwards." On January 4, I received Lord Granville's reply. It was to the effect that the British Government had no objection to the Sultan being asked to send troops to Suakin provided that there 382 MODERN EGYPT pt. ni was no increase of Egyptian expenditure, and pro- vided also that the decision to be taken by the Egyptian Government as regards its ovm move- ments was not retarded. Her Majesty's Govern- ment concurred in the proposal tliat, in the event of the Sultan declining to send troops, the ad- ministration of the shores of the Red Sea and of the Eastern Soudan should be given back to the Porte. As regards the suggestion that, with the frontiers thus reduced, the Egyptian Government should endeavour to hold the Nile up to Khartoum, Her Majesty's Government, it was said, "do not believe it to be possible for Egypt to defend Khartoum, and whilst recommending the concen- tration of the Egyptian troops, they desire that those forces should be withdrawn from Khartoum itself, as well as from the interior of the Soudan, and you will so inform Cherif Pasha." Simultaneously with this telegram, a further confidential message was sent to me for use should occasion require. It was to the following effect : ** It is essential that in important questions affect- ing the administration and safety of Egypt, the advice of Her JNIajesty's Government should be followed, as long as the priwisional occupation continues. Ministers and Governors must carry out this advice or forfeit their offices. The appoint- ment of English INIiuisters would be most objec- tionable, but it will no doubt be possible to find Egyptians who will execute the Khedive's orders under English advice. The Cabinet will give you full support." On communicatino; the views of the British Government to Cherif Pasha, I found, as I had anticipated, a strong determination to reject the policy of withdrawal from Khartoum. I was, therefore, obliged to make use of the instructions contained in Lord Granville's confidential tele- CH. XX THE SOUDAN 383 gram.^ The result was that, on January 7, Cherif Pasha tendered his resignation to the Khedive. My position at this moment was one of consider- able difficulty. The policy of withdrawal from the Soudan was very unpopular in Egypt. Riaz Pasha was asked to form a Ministry, but declined to accept the task. A rumour reached me that I should be told that no JNlinistry could be formed to carry out the policy of withdrawal from the Soudan ; thus, it was hoped, the hand of the British Govern- ment would be forced, and Cherif Pasha would of necessity have returned to office to carry out his own policy. I had warned the British Govern- ment that they might have to face the possibility of nominating English Ministers. This, however, they were unwilling to do. JNIy instructions were to get an Egyptian Ministry appointed. If, how- ever, no Egyptian Ministry could be formed to carry out the policy recommended by the British Government, I intended to take the government temporarily into my own hands, and then telegraph to London for instructions. The Egyptians had, I know, some inkling of what was likely to happen, as, without making any official or private communication to the Ministers, I purposely allowed my intention to be known. The Khedive became alarmed at the prospect of my pro- gramme being carried into execution. He, there- fore, decided to yield. On the night of January 7, he sent for me and informed me that he had accepted the resignation of his Ministers, and had sent for Nubar Pasha. He added that he *' accepted cordially the policy of abandoning tlie whole of the Soudan, which, on mature reflection, he believed to be the best in the interests of the ^ Although I was unable to agree with Cherif Pasha about Soudan affairs, my personal relations with him during all this period were excellent. On the day following his resignation, he dined at my house, to the great astonishment of all the gossips of Cairo. 384 MODERN EGYPT pt. iii country." On January 8, I was able to telegraph to Lord Granville that Nubar Pasha had consented to form a Ministry, and that "he entirely con- curred in the wisdom of abandoning the Soudan, retaining possession of Suakin." Thus the general policy, which was to be pursued, was definitely settled. It was, indeed, high time to come to some decision. Mr. Power telegraphed from Khartoum on December 30 : "The state of affairs here is very desperate." On January 7, Colonel Coetlogon telegraphed to the Khedive : " I would strongly urge on Your High- ness the great necessity for an immediate order for retreat being given. Were we twice as strong as we are, we could not hold Khartoum against the whole country, which, without a doubt, are one and all a":ainst us." "O" Few measures have formed the subject of more severe criticism than the policy adopted by Mr. Gladstone's Government in 1883-84 in connection with the Soudan. On February 12, 1884, a vote of censure on the Government was moved by Lord Salisbury in the House of Lords and by Sir Stafford Northcote in the House of Commons. It was couched in the following terms : " That this House ... is of opinion that the recent lamentable events in the Soudan are due in a great measure to the vacillating and inconsistent policy pursued by Her Majesty's Government." Care was evidently taken not to base the attack on the Government upon any specific objections to the policy of withdrawal from the Soudan. Lord SaUsbury, indeed, said ; " We may think it was a right policy to maintain the Soudan, or we may think it was a riglit policy to abandon it; but we must, whatever opinion we hold, condemn the policy of the Government." Looking back on CH.XX THE SOUDAN 885 what occurred, and making allowance for the fact that the necessities of party warfare often involve an expression of condemnation or of approval in somewhat exaggerated terms, it must be admitted that the censure, which the leading Conservative statesmen wished to pass on the Government, though severe, was not altogether undeserved. Unquestionably, the state of affairs, which then existed in the Soudan, was in some measure due to the policy of the British Government. But if we inquire in what measure it was due to that pohcy, the answer is clear. The British Govern- ment could have used their paramount influence in Egypt to stop the departure of General Hicks's expedition, and they did not do so. Had they done so, it is not only possible but also probable that the advance of the Mahdi would have been arrested at Khartoum. Putting aside points of detail, that is the sum total of the charge which can be brought against Mr. Gladstone's Government. I do not know of any answer to this charge save that which is contained in the commonplace, but extremely true remark that it is easy to be wise after the event. ^ Turning to the criticisms made, not so much by responsible party leaders as by the general public, it is to be observed that the view which was at the time freely expressed, and which has to some extent floated down the tide of history, was that the British Government were responsible for the relapse of the Soudan into barbarism, and that not only might that country have been preserved to Egypt, but that it would have been so preserved had the Egyptian Government been allowed to follow their own de- vices. General Gordon did a good deal to propagate 1 Mr. Morley {Life of Gladstone, vol. iii. p. 72) very appropriately prefaces his chapter on Ei^-ypt by the following characteristic i-emark made by the Duke of >Vellington ; " 1 find many very ready to say what I ought to have done wlien a battle is over ; but I wish some of these persons would come and tell me what to do before the battle." VOL. I 2 c 386 MODERN EGYPT pt in this idea. His Journal abounds with statements fixing the responsibility for the abandonment of the Soudan on the British Government. I maintain that this view is entirely erroneous. Save in respect to one sin of omission, that is to say, that no veto was imposed on the Hicks expedition, the British Government were in no way responsible for the loss of the Soudan. They were responsible for obliging the Egyptian Government to look the facts fairly in the face. Now the main fact was this, — that after the defeat of General Hicks's army, the Soudan was lost to Egypt beyond any hope of recovery, unless some external aid could be obtained to effect its reconquest. That external aid could only come from two countries, England or Turkey. The British Government decided that the troops of Great Britain should not be used to reconquer the Soudan. This decision was ratified by British public opinion, neither am I aware that any one, who could speak with real authority on the subject, was at the time found to challenge its wisdom. It must be borne in mind that, if British troops had been sent to the Soudan in 1883, they would have been obliged to stay there in considerable lumibers. The Egyptian Government could not, with their own resources, have held the country even after the forces of the iNIahdi had been defeated. The conditions of the problem which awaited solution were, therefore, essentially different from those which obtained some thirteen years later when the reconquest of the Soudan was taken in hand. Turning to the other alternative, it may be said that, although the proposal to utilise the Sultan's services gave occasion to some diplomatic trifling, no one seriously wished Turkish troops to be em])loyed. Every one felt that the remedy would be worse than the disease. 'I'he Egyptian Govern- ment, as in the days of Anibi, were afraid that if OH XX THE SOUDAN 387 Turkish troops once came into the country, they would not leave it again. The British Government gave a half-hearted assent to the employment of a Turkish force, but coupled their assent with con- ditions which were impossible of execution. Even supposing that the Sultan would have been able to reconquer the country, which is a bold assumption, it was notorious that the misgovernment of Turkish Pashas had caused the rebellion, and it might be safely predicted that, whatever temporary success might be gained, no permanent settlement could be hoped for if Turkish authority were re-established. It must also be remembered that to take so important a step as that of immediately sending troops to the Soudan would have been quite inconsistent with the character of the Sultan. It is highly improbable that he would have consented to render any prompt and effective assistance. For all these reasons, it cannot be doubted that the decision not to call in Turkish aid was wise.^ ^ About four years later, the question of handing over Suakiu to the Turks was again raised. I did not like the proposal, but the difficulties of the whole Egyptian situation were at that time so great, that I was rather disposed to support it, as a choice of evils. Lord Salisbury, however — very wisely, I think — rejected the idea, and, as subsequent events proved, it was fortunnte that he did so. His opinion was conveyed to me in the following very characteristic letter, dated December 22, 1888 : " At first, your proposal to hand over Suakin to the Turk seemed to me very alluring. It would be such a blessing to be rid of it, both for Egypt and for us ; and in the light of that hope, the conditions which it would be necessary to obtain from the Turks did not seem insuperable obstacles, but only difficulties to be overcome. But as time went on — and especially after we had been able to watch the impression caused by Grenfell's easy success — we felt the task was not so easy. It is as material that we should look at the matter from an English, as that you should look at it from an Egyptian point of view. Unluckily, the English point of view is not only in practice the most important, but it is also the most difficult to understand. The misfortune — the root- difficulty — we have iu dealing with questions like those which beset Egypt is that public opinion in its largest sense takes no note of them. Unless some startling question appealing to their humanity arises, the constituencies are quite indifferent. The result is that the Members of the House of Commons are each like a ship without an anchor. They drift as any chance current may drive them. Yet the combined resultant oi 388 MODERN EGYPT pt. m If, therefore, neither British nor Turkish troops were to be employed, withdrawal from the Soudan was imposed on the Egyptian Government as an unavoidable although unpleasant necessity. This, in fact, was the conclusion to which all the responsible authorities on the spot arrived at different stages of the proceedings. I have already given the opinions expressed by Lord Dufferin, their many drifting wills is omnipotent and without appeal. If they vote wrong on an Irish question, a hint from their electoral supporters will bring them right. If they vote wrong on an Egyptian question, there is no such appeal. The result is that we are at the mercy of any fortuitous concurrence of fanaticisms or fads that chance may direct against us. This preamble is necessary to enable you to understand the importance 1 attach to the next remark : if we withdrew our own and tlie Egyptian troops from Suakin in favour of Turkey, we should be assailed by three separate feelings — the Turcophobists, still very strong ; the military or jingo feeling, which simply desires to annex, and objects to evacuating in all cases ; and the curious collection of fanatics who believe that by some magic wave of the diplomatic wand the Soudan can be turned into a second India. The superficial philanthropy of the day runs in this channel, and by its side, as is often the case, a current of decided roguery. There are promoters, and financiers, and contractors of various kinds, who know perfectly well that there is as much chance of colonising the Sahara as the Soudan, but who see a prospect of sweeping a shoal of guile- less shareholders into their net, and are longing to take advantage of the prevailing delusion. All these people would grumble fiercely if we gave Suakin to the Turks ; but if we could have done with it, the riddance would be well worth a few grumbles. But the Turks would commit every po-^sible blunder. Tliey would oppress the Arabs, destroy all possibility of any trade, except the Slave Trade, to which they would give every facility ; and, having caused the hostility of the natives to the utmost by taxation and misgovernment, would allow the garrison of Suakin to fall into so weak a state in regard to command, numbers, and equipment, that some fine day a lieutenant of the Khalifa would rush the fortresses. If such a thing happened, the combined forces to which I have referred would have their opportunity. They would dominate the House of Commons. The political air would be rent with tales of the inefficiency and the brutality of the Turks, and with praises of the virtues of the Soudanese, only requiring Home Rule under the aegis of Great IJritain to develop them into an equatorial Arcadia. The whole evil would je attributed to the evacuation, which must be immediately reversed. 1 need not go any farther. There would be endless complications with foreign Powers, and a great deal of waste of blood and money with no result. It might go much I'arther still, for there is a good deal of loose powder about on the shores of the Red Sea. On these grounds alone, we have come to the conclusion that a Turkish occupation presents more dangers than advantages." CH.XX THE SOUDAN 389 Sir Edward Malet, and Colonel Stewart prior to the occurrence of the Hicks disaster, and those of Sir Frederick Stephenson, Sir Evelyn Wood, General Baker, and myself expressed subsequent to that event. Sir Auckland Colvin, who knew Egypt well, wrote to me from India, in December 1883, advocating the policy of abandoning the Soudan. Mr. Power, also, put the matter in homely and forcible language. Writing to his mother on February 9, 1884, he said : " Holdhig Khartoum is bosh. . . . This is, indeed, a * land of desolation,' as Baker called it. We must give it up." I would now speak of the opinions of General Gordon. Colonel Stewart was, I think, a better authority on Soudan affairs, as they then existed, than General Gordon ; but the public attached great weight to General Gordon's opinions. What, therefore, were those opinions ? General Gordon so frequently expressed at short intervals opinions which were opposed to each other, that it is not easy to answer this question with confidence. In a pamphlet issued by the Pall Mall Gazette in 1885 and entitled Too Late, it was stated that General Gordon's " personal views as to the impolicy of abandoning Khartoum were notorious " ; and in the Pall Mall Gazette of January 11, 1884, an account is given of an interview between General Gordon and a representative of that news- paper. General Gordon is alleged to have con- demned the policy of evacuation. "You must either," he said, "surrender absolutely to the Mahdi or defend Khartoum at all hazards." I do not call in question the fact that General Gordon used language of this sort, but it was certainly op])osed both to what he wrote about the same time officially, and to what he said when he was on the point of starting for Khartoum. On January 22, 1884, whilst on his way to Egypt, 390 MODERN EGYPT pt. n General Gordon wrote a INIemorandum which he sent to Lord Granville, and in which the following passage occurs : " The Soudan is a useless posses- sion, ever was so, and ever will be so. ... 1 think Her Majesty's Government are fully justified in recommending the evacuation, inasmuch as the sacrifices necessary towards securing a good govern- ment would be far too onerous to admit of such an attempt being made." Colonel Stewart, after reading General Gordon's INIemorandum, wrote as follows : " I have carefully read over General Gordon's observations and cordially agree wit what he states. ... I quite agree with Genera Gordon that the Soudan is an expensive and use- less possession. No one who has visited it can escape the reflection : ' What a useless possession and what a huge encumbrance on Egypt.' " Further evidence can be produced, which is even more conclusive as regards General Gordon's views. When he arrived in Cairo in January 1884, I had to prepare certain instructions for him. One passage of those instructions ran as follows : "You will bear in mind that the main end to be pursued is the evacuation of the Soudan. This policy was adopted after very full discussion by the Egyptian Government on the advice of Her Majesty's Government. I understand, also, that you entirely concur in the desirability of adopting this policy." When I went through the draft instructions with General Gordon, I well remember stopping at this passage and asking him whether I was right in saying that he agreed in the policy adopted by the Egyptian Government on the advice of the British Government. Without the smallest hesi- tation. General Gordon expressed in the strongest terms his entire concurrence in that policy. In- deed, he insisted that a phrase should be added stating that in his opinion the policy, which had cfl. XX THE SOUDAN 391 been adopted, "should on no account be changed." This was accordingly done. It seems to me that this evidence is conclusive. I think that I have every right to assume that when General Gordon, at a momentous period of his life, gave his opinion deliberately in official form, and with a due sense of the responsibility he was taking, what he then said must be regarded as his true opinion, and that it cannot be gainsaid by any obiter dicta let fall in conversation at other times. Mere appeal to authority is, however, a weak argument. Reason, it has been truly said, and not authority, should determine the judgment. I maintain that, judged by the standard of reason, the arguments in favour of the policy adopted at the time are irrefragable. I am, of course, merely speaking of the general policy, not of the details of its execution, in respect to which, as I shall subsequently show, many errors were committed. The only practical question was, not whether it was or was not desirable to hold Khartoum, but whether it was possible to hold Khartoum. To this question there could only be one answer. The Egyptian Government, with the resources of which they disposed, were unable to hold Khar- toum. No one, therefore, has a right to criticise the policy which was actually adopted, unless he is prepared to advocate that the reconquest of the Soudan should have been effected by British, British -Indian, or Turkish troops. For my own part, I may say that, although during the period 1 represented the British Government in Egypt I may have made many mistakes, there is one episode to which I look back without the least sense of personal regret. Time and reflection have only served to convince me more strongly than ever that I acted rightly in advocating 392 MODERN EGYPT ft. in withdrawal from the Soudan in 1883-84. It was the adoption of that policy which allowed the Egyptian and British Governments, after a painful period of transition, to devote themselves to the work of reorganisation and reform in Egypt proper, a work which could not have been undertaken at tliat time with any prospect of success so long as the Soudan hung like a dead -weight round the necks of Egyptian reformers. Whatever else may be said against the Egyptian policy of Mr. Gladstone's Government, my conviction is that they deserve the eternal gratitude of the Egyptian people for coming down with a heavy hand on all the vacillations of the Cairene administrators, and obliging the Egyptian Government to look the facts of the case fairly in the face.^ There is, however, another criticism which was directed against the conduct of the British Govern- ment at this time and to which some allusion should be made. It was stated that, even suppos- ^ In a private letter to me, dated December 28, 1883, Lord Granville stated the case in characteristic lang'uage. " It tal. I 417 2 E 418 MODERN EGYPT pt. m that was a strong constitution. Without that, I should certainly have broken down altogether. Without entering into any detail, I will describe the broad features of the Egyptian situation, as it then existed. The Egyptian question alone, by which I mean the work of reorganisation in Egypt proper, pre- sented difficulties of no common order. On to this was now grafted the Soudan question, which by itself was one of the utmost importance, and which for the time being exercised a paramount, though indirect influence on the solution of all other Egyptian questions. The Gov^ernment Treasury was well-nigh bimkrupt. It seemed at the time as though a whole or partial re})udiation of the Egyptian debt was imminent, and, if this had happened, very troublesome international com- plications would have ensued. The Europeans were discontented because trade was depressed, and because the indemnities due to them for their losses during and after the Alexandria bombard- ment had not yet been paid. The Pashas were in a morose and sullen condition because their privileges were threatened. The people were dis- contented because they had not as yet reaped the benefits which they had expected from the British occupation. The old arbitrary system of govern- ment by the courbash had been abolished, but nothing had as yet been instituted to take its place. The Anibist , rebellion had profoundly shaken the authority of the ruling classes. The reorganisation of the army and of the police had only just been commenced. A large force of Gendarmerie had been withdrawn for service at Suakin, whence such of them as did not leave their bones to whiten on the sands of Trinkitat were to return discomfited and demoralised. The Anglo -Egyptian officials were for the most part CH. XXII THE GORDON MISSION 419 new to their work. With some rare exceptions, the Egyptian officials were not only nseless but often obstructive. A severe epidemic of cholera had but recently sw^ept over the country, leaving behind it a variety of troublesome quarantine questions, the settlement of which involved con- siderable diplomatic difficulties. Every man's hand was against the British Government. French hostility was never more active. The other Powers of Europe, with the exception of Italy, were animated with no very friendly sentiments tow^ards England. Prince Bismarck disliked the Liberal Government in England ; moreover, he was at this time making an effort, which ended in failure, to conciliate France, a policy which naturally led Germany to adopt a hostile attitude towards England in Egypt. The Sultan again came for- ward with his favourite idea of deposing Tewfik Paslia and substituting Halim in his place, an idea which was, as on former occasions, at once nipped in the bud by the British Government. Nubar Pasha was unpopular in the country. The attitude which he assumed on matters connected with in- ternal reform, increased the difficulties of the situa- tion. His main object at this time was to get rid of Mr. Clifford Lloyd, who was endeavouring to reorganise the Department of the Interior. An international question of considerable import- ance had also to be dealt with during this period. The powers of the Mixed Courts had expired, and the conditions under which they were to be renewed had to be discussed. This subject afforded a wide field for petty international intrigue. In England, the Government were exposed to con- stant attacks from party politicians. The incidents of this party warfare necessitated frequent re- ference to Cairo for information, the collection of which often caused great trouble and waste of 420 MODERN EGYPT ft. in valuable time,^ which I grudged all the more be- cause I was aware that, when the information had been collected, it wotdd be of little real utility and that, in fact, it was only demanded with a view to affording a handle to Parliamentary attack or defence. The Government themselves did not know their own mind. Every British official in Egypt turned to me for advice and guidance about the affairs of his Department, and in each Depart- ment numerous troublesome questions of detail were constantly cropping up for settlement. I was myself new to the work and had not had sufficient time to take stock of the situation, which was greatly changed since T left the country in 1880, or to fully understand the characters of the principal people with whom I had to deal. Look- ing at the situation as a whole, it seemed as if Isaiah's prophecy had been fulfilled. " The Lord hath mingled a perverse spirit in the midst thereof, and they have caused Egypt to err in every work thereof, as a drunken man staggereth in his vomit." There were, however, some redeeming features in the situation. In the fu'st place, the presence of a British army in the country afforded a solid guarantee that, in spite of administrative disorder and foreign intrigue, nothing could occur of a nature calculated to en- danger seriously the stability of the Khedive's rule. The behaviour and discipline of the British troops were alike excellent. Moreover, they were commanded by an officer (Sir Frederick Stephen- son) who combined in a high degree all the qualities necessary to fill with advantage to his country a post of such exceptional difficulty as the conmiand ^ On this subject, and, indeed, on all others, 1 received the utmost personal consideration from Lord Granville. On February 8, 1884, he wrote to me: "I keep over tlie references to you as much as possible, and I hope you fully understand that questions do not mean complaints." CH. XXII THE GORDON MISSION 421 of an army of occupation in a foreign country. The French residents in Egypt resented the presence of a British army in their midst. They were in a state of nervous irritabihty, which rendered them prompt to take offence at the smallest real or imaginary provocation. At any moment, some paltry squabble might have occurred between the officers and soldiers of the army of occupation on the one hand, and the population on the other hand, which, if any Frenchman had been concerned, might have caused much trouble. The General Officer in command of the troops was thus called upon to exercise great tact, firmness, patience and judgment. These qualities Sir Frederick Stephenson possessed in a high degree ; it was largely due to him that such difficulties as arose never assumed proportions which it was beyond the resources of local diplomacy to settle satis- factorily. Sir Frederick Stephenson won for him- self the admiration even of those who were most hostile to the British occupation. General Earle occupied at Alexandria much the same position as that held by Sir Frederick Stephenson at Cairo. A first-rate soldier, a clear- headed and vigorous man of business, endowed with exceptional tact, good manners, and judgment, he was respected and liked by the whole population of Alexandria. A statue, now standing in the principal square of the town, was erected by public subscription to his memory, and bears witness to the honour in which he was universally held. The Dervish bullet, which subsequently cut short this promising career, deprived the Queen and the country of a servant of the higliest merit. Another bright spot on the otherwise dark horizon was that, in s])ite of occasional jars, reli- ance could always be placed on the loyalty and devotion of the British officials in the service of 422 MODERN EGYPT ft. m the Egyptian Government. Of the services ot those officials, I shall have to speak more fully at a later period. For the present, I need only allude to the work performed by Sir Edgar A^incent and by Sir Evelyn ^Vood. The former was using all the resources of a mind endowed with singular fertility of resource to strui^o-le with a financial situation which appeared well-nigh desperate. Sir Evelyn Wood was reconstructing the Egy]:)tian army out of materials which appeared at the time to be very unpromising. Moreover, his advice on the military aspects of the Soudan question, on which the policy of the Government mainly depended, was of great value. He loyally sup])orted me in enforcing a course of action, which, although obviously dictated by reason, was at the time extremely unpo})ular with almost all classes whether in England or in There was yet a third consideration from which I derived a certain amount of consolation during this stormy and difficult period. It has often been my fate to disagree with the Government which I was serving, but I have seen somethino; of the relations between foreign Governments and their representatives abroad. So far as is possible foi any one \\ho has never sat in the House of Com- mons, I think I can appreciate the difficulties of Parliamentary life,— dilHculties which, owing to a variety of circumstances, have increased in magni- tude during the last few years. Looking to the whole of the facts, my experience leads me to the conclusion that British Ministers, whether Liberal or Conservative, are good masters to serve. Of course, the exigencies of Parliamentary war- fare are sometimes too much even for the most loyal of Ministers. They are occasionally obliged to trim their sails to a Parliamentary breeze ; during the Soudan discussions, indeed, the breeze CH. XXII THE GORDON MISSION 423 rose almost to the force of a hurricane ; and, when this happens, the character and reputation of their representative abroad may suffer. But even then, it will probably only suffer for a time if he has a fairly good case to show. Not only British Ministers, but British public opinion are fair and just in the long run, although both the fairness and the justice are at times obscured in the midst of a sharp party conflict. I often disagreed with Lord Granville during his tenure of office ; but I always felt that, if I got into any real difficulty, he would support me to the best of his ability. On December 1, 1883, I received the following telegram from Lord Granville : " If General Charles Gordon were willing to go to Egypt, could he be of any use to you or to the Egyptian Government, and, if so, in what capacity ? " ^ I did not at that time know General Gordon well, but I had seen a little of him, and I had, of course, heard much of him. INIy first impression was decidedly adverse to his employ- ment in the Soudan. Moreover, when I spoke to Cherif Pasha on the subject, I found that he enter- tained strong objections to the proposal. I was unwilling to put forward my own objections, which were in some degree based on General Gordon's personal unfitness to undertake the work in hand. In replying to Lord Granville, therefore, I only dwelt on the objections entertained by the Egyptian Government, which were reasonable, and, I thought, calculated to produce an impression in London, without bringing in the awkward question of per- sonal fitness. It was with these feelings uppermost in my mind that, on December 2, I telegraphed to * Sir Henry Gordon {Events, etc., p. 322) says that if General Gordon had gone to Khartoum six weeks earlier the result of his mission "would most likely have been a complete success.' This conclusion is, of course, a Tnere conjecture and is incapable of proof. I see no reason to believe that the despatch of General Gordon to Khartoum early in December would have materially altered the course of events. 424 MODERX EGYPT pt. m Lord Granville : " The Egyptian Government are very much averse to employing General Gordon, mainly on the ground that, the moveuient in the Soudan being religious, the appointment of a Christian in high command would probably alienate the tribes who remain faithful. I think it wise not to press them on the subject." ^ The idea of sending General Gordon to the Soudan was then allowed to drop for a while, but his employment continued to be warmly advocated by the press in England, more especially by the Pall Mdll Gazette, a newspaper which took a lead- ing part in the discussion of Egyptian affairs at that time. On December 22, I sent to Lord Granville a telegram advising that the British Government should insist on the withdrawal of the Egyptian troops from the Soudan." I indicated that Cherif Pasha would probably resign, and I added : "Also, it will be necessary to send an officer of high authority to Khartoum with full powers to with- draw the garrisons and to make the best ments he can for the future of the country." On January 7, the Ministry of Cherif Pasha resi<>'ned, and a new JNIinistrv was formed under the presidency of Nubar Pasha. On January 10, Lord Granville telegraphed to me : "Could General Charles Gordon or Sir Charles AVilson be of assist- ance under altered circumstances in Egypt ? " I had had further time to think over this proposal since sending my telegram of December 22. The more I thought of it, the less was I inclined to send General Gordon, or, indeed, any Englishman to Khartoum. I discussed the matter with Nubar * Tliere was reason in the objection taken by the Ejryptian Govern- ment. On March 4, 18B4, General Gordon telej^raphed from Kiiar- toum : " My weakness is that of being foreign and Chi'istian, and peaceful." * Vide ante, p. 881. CH.XXII THE GOllDON MISSION 425 Pasha, and we both came to the conclusion that the best plan would be to send Abdul- Kader Pasha. He had been a former Governor-General of the Soudan. He had been highly sj)oken of by Colonel Stewart. He had the reputation of being a courageous and ca])able soldier. It was under these circumstances that, on January 11, I telegraphed to Lord Gran- ville : " I have consulted with Nubar Pasha, and I do not think that the services of General Gordon or Sir Charles Wilson can be utilised at present." I had thus twice rejected the proposal to send General Gordon to Khartoum. Would that I had done so a third time ! On January 14, Lord Granville telegraphed to me : " Can you give further information as to prospects of retreat for army and residents at Khartoum, and measures taken ? " On the follow- ing day (January 15), Lord Granville telegraphed to me privately : " I hear indirectly that Gordon is ready to go straight to Suakin without passing through Cairo on the following rather vague terms. His mission to be to report to Her JNIajesty's Government on the military situation of the Soudan, and to return without any further engage- ment towards him. He would be under you for instructions and will send letters through you under flying seal. You and Nubar Pasha to give him all assistance and facilities as to telegraph- ing, etc. Egyptian Government to send Ibraliim Bey Fauzi to meet him at Suez, with a writer to attend on him. He might be of use in informhig you and us of the situation. It would be popular at home, but there may be countervailing objec- tions. Tell me your real opinion with or without Nubar Pasha." ^ * Mr. Morley {Life of Gladstone, vol. iii. p. 140) says that, on January 14, Lord Granville wrote to Mr. Gladstone as follows : " It Gordon says he believes he could, by his personal inliuence, excite the tribes to 426 MODERN EGYPT ft. in On January 16, I sent two telegrams to Lord Granville, one ofTicial, and the other private. The official telegram was as follows : " I hope soon to be able to telegraph fully, as the subject of the withdrawal from Khartoum is now being discussed. There can be no doubt, however, that very great difficulties will be encountered. It was intended to despatch Abdul- Kader, the new Minister of War, to Khartoum ; he at first accepted, but now declines to go. The Egyptian Government would feel greatly obliged if Her INIajesty's Government would select a well-qualified British officer to go to Khartoum instead of the War Minister. He would be given full powers, both civil and military, to conduct the retreat." At the same time, I sent the following private telegram : "My official telegram of to-day, and your private telegram of yesterday. Gordon would be the best man if he will pledge himself to carry out the policy of with- drawing from the Soudan as quickly as is possible consistently with saving life. He must also fully understand that he must take his instructions from the British representative in Egypt and report to him.^ He was at Brussels early this month and is now believed to be in England. If so, please see him. I would rather have him than any one else, provided there is a perfectly clear understanding with him as to what his position is to be and what line of policy he is to carry out. Otherwise, not. Failing him, consider Stewart. Whoever goes escort the Khartoum garrisou and inhabitants to Suakin, a little pressure on Baring might he advisable." Mr. Gladstone replied by telegraph that he agreed. Hence, the telegram from Lord Granville to me given above. 1 have been told on good authority that Mr. Gladstone was, in the first instance, much opposed to the despatcli of General Gordon to Khar- toum, and tliat he only yielded witli great reluctance to the pressure wliiili was brought to bear on him by some of his colleagues. ^ Tlie reason why 1 said this was that I knew something of General Gordon's erratic character, and I tliought that the only chanos of keeping him to his task was to appeal to his sense of discipline. CH. XXII THE GORDON MISSION 427 should be distinctly warned that he will undertake a service of great difficulty and danger." On January 18, Lord Granville informed me by telegraph that General Gordon and Colonel Stewart would leave London that evening for Egypt. On the same day, Lord Granville wrote privately to me : " 1 was glad to get your approval of Gordon. He may possibly be of great use, and the appointment will be popular with many classes in this country. He praises you very highly and expressed a wish to be placed entirely under you." General Gordon's own account of how he came to go to the Soudan is as follows: " At noon he, Wolseley, came to me and took me to the Ministers. He went in and talked to the Ministers, and came back and said : ' Her INIajesty's Government want you to undertake this. Government are deter- mined to evacuate the Soudan, for they will not guarantee future government. Will you go and do it ? ' I said : *Yes.' He said : 'Go in.' I went in and saw them. They said : 'Did Wolseley tell you your orders ?' I said : ' Yes.' I said : ' You will not guarantee future government of the Soudan, and you wish me to go up and evacuate now.' They said : ' Yes,' and it was over, and I left at 8 P.M. for Calais." ^ General Gordon's appointment, the Pall 3Iall Gazette said, with perfect truth, " w as applauded enthusiastically by the press all over the country without distinction of party." I was reproached for having too " tardily discovered that Gordon was the best man," and the Government were sharply criticised for not having utilised his services at an earlier date. Mr. Gladstone's Government made two jrreat dealing with Soudan affj * Letters to the Rev. J. Barnes, 1885. mistakes in dealing with Soudan affairs in their 428 MODERN EGYPT pt. m early stages. Of these one was a sin of omission, and the otiier a sin of commission. The sin of omission was that the Government did nothing to stop the departure of the Hicks expedition. The sin of commission was the despatch of General Gordon to Khartoum. Looking back at what occurred after a space of many years, two points are to my mind clear. The first is tliat no Englishman should have been sent to Khartoum. The second is that, if any one had to be sent, General Gordon was not the right man to send. The reasons why no Englishman should have been sent are now sufficiently obvious. If he were beleaguered at Khartoum, which was possible and even probable, the British Government might be obliged to send an expedition to relieve him. The main object of British policy was to avoid behig drawn into military operations in the Soudan. The employment of a British official at Khartoum involved a serious risk that it would be no longer possible to adhere to this ])olicy, and the risk was materially increased when the individual chosen to go to the Soudan was one who had attracted to himself a greater degree of popular sympathy than almost any Englishman of modern times. General Gordon, Lord Cairns said (February 14) amidst the cheers of the House of Lords, " is one of our national treasures," and, although possibly party politicians used the popular sympathy with General Gordon as a card in the political game. Lord Cairns's expression faithfully represented the general tone of British public opinion at that time. The Government scarcely realised the gravity of the decision at which they had arrived. I believe I am correct in stating that the question was not discussed at a Cabinet Council. Some years afterwards. Sir Charles Dilke, who was then a member of the Government, gave me the follow- CH.XXII THE GORDON MISSION 429 ing extract from his Journal: "January 18, 1884. — Meeting at War Office. Ld. G., Hartington, Northbrook, and self. Decided to send Colonel (Jordon to Suakin to report on the Soudan."^ I think I may say that I saw the danger more clearly than the Ministers in England, and it was on that account that I wished to send an Egyptian official to Khartoum, but I did not realise it so fully as I should have done. If, however, it was a mistake to send any Englishman to Khartoum, it was a still greater mistake to choose General Gordon as the man to send. It happens to most men engaged in public life that their conduct gives rise to some differences of opinion. General Gordon's actions were rarely subjected to this healthy form of criticism. A wave of Gordon cidtus passed over England in 1884. His personal character, which was in many respects noble, the circumstances connected with his mission to the Soudan, the perilous position in which he was placed at Khartoum, his heroic defence of the town, and his tragic death, all appealed powerfully to the imagination of a people, who are often supposed to be pre-eminently cold * On January 18, Lord Northbrook wrote privately to me as follows : " I ^ot a summons to-day to the W. O. to meet C'hiiiese Gordon with Granville, Hartington, and Dilke. The upsliotof the meeting was that he leaves by to-niglit's mail for Suakin to report on the best way of withdrawing the garrisons, settling the country, and to perform such other duties as may be entrusted to him by the Kliedive's Government through you. He will be under you, and wishes it. He has no doubt of being able to get on with you. He was very ]io])eful as to the state of affairs, does not believe in the great powers of the Mahdi, does not think the tribes will go much beyond their own confines, and does not see why the garrisons should not get off. He did not soem at all anxious to retain the Soudan, and agreed lieartily to accept tlie policy of withdrawal." The following entry occurs in Sir Mountstuart Grant Duff's Notes from a Diary 1896-1901, vol. ii. p. 75 : *' Nortiibrook said that, if he had previously read Gordon's book, nothing would have induced him to couseut to his going anj'where. It was the book of a maduiau !" 430 MODERN EGYPT ft. in and practical, but who in reality are perhaps more led by their emotions than any other nation in Europe.^ During this stage of national excite- ment, any one who had attempted to judge General Gordon's conduct by the canons of criticism which are ordinarily applied to human action, would have failed to obtain a hearing. His melancholy death also silenced the voice of criticism. Five years after its occurrence, a critic, who was disposed to be hostile to General Gordon (Colonel Chaill^ Long), wrote to Mr. Gladstone, with a view to eliciting an expression of his opinion on General Gordon's conduct. INIr. Gladstone, with the mag- nanimity of a true statesman and the delicate feelings of a gentleman, declined to enter into any discussion on the subject.^ The public enthusiasm which General Gordon's name evoked led to some disastrous consequences, yet I cannot bring myself to condemn it. It was, in fact, eminently creditable to the British public. There was nothii)<>: mean or self-seekino' about it. It was a genuine and generous tribute to moral worth, and it showed that, even in this material age, moral worth has a hold on the public opinion of at least one great civilised country. It may be that the Gordon of real life did not always act quite up to the standard of the idealised hero who was present to the public mind, but, after all, this is merely to say that he was human and fallible. More than this, whatever may have been General Gordon's defects, the main lines of his character were really worthy of admiration. I do not speak so much of his high courage and fertility in mili- ^ It was, I think, Lord Beacoiisfield who said that the Eiij,''lish were the most emotional i)eople in Europe, and Lortl IJeaconsfield was a keen observer of human nature. Lord Salisbury once wrote to me: " It is easier to combat with the rinderpest or the cholera than with a popular sentiment." 2 BelJ'ord'n Ahiijazlne, SepLeniber 1890, p. 549. CH.XXII THE GORDON MISSION 431 tary resource, though in these respects he was remarkable, but of his moral qualities. His reli- gious convictions, though eccentric, were sincere. No one could doubt the remarkable purity of his private life, or his lofty disinterestedness as regards objects, such as money and rank, which usually excite the ambition of mankind. His aims in life were unquestionably high and noble. Besides his moral qualities, there was another point in General Gordon's character, which was eminently calculated to attract tlie sympathy of the British public. He was thoroughly uncon- ventional. He chafed under disci})line, and was never tired of pouring forth the vials of his wrath on the official classes.^ Mistrust of Government officials is engrained in tlie Eno-lish character, and I may add that I hope the dislike of being over - governed will ever continue to exist in England. It is dangerous when either an individual or a nation allow their imagination to predominate ovei" their reason, and this is what the British nation did under the spell of General Gordon's name. But it is perhaps better that the national imagina- tion should even run riot at times in a o-ood cause rather than that a dull level of practical utility should invariably be maintained, and that the imaginative qualities should be discarded alto- gether. Enthusiasts are troublesome to politicians and diplomatists, but the world would be dull without them. The enthusiastic and emotional classes found, or thought they had found their * General Gordon, who had a keen sense of humour, was fully aware of his own unfitness for official employment. " I own," he wrote in his Journal (p. 59), "to luivino; l)een very insubordinate to Her Majesty's Ciovernment and its officials, but it is my nature, and I cannot help it. I tear I have not even tried to play battledore and shuttlecock with them. I know if 1 was chief I would never employ m;/,\e/J', for I am incorris^ible. To meu like Dilke, who weigh every word, I must be perfect poison." 432 MODERN EGYPT pt. in ideal type in General Gordon, and accordingly they bestowed on him extreme, sometimes ex- travagant eulogy.^ General Gordon was no friend to the particular official class to which I belonged. " I must say," he wrote, " I hate our diplomatists. I think, with few exceptions, they are arrant humbugs ; and I expect they know it." Acting on this general principle, General Gordon in his Journal which, when it was first published, was probably read by almost every educated man in England, held up Mr. (subsequently. Sir Edwin) Egerton,^ myself and others to odium and ridicule. To all this, acting on Mr. Gladstone's principle, I shall not attempt to reply, more especially as I feel sure that, had he lived, no one would have regretted what he wrote more than General Gordon himself But I must, for the elucidation of this narrative, 1 Unquestionably, officialism and enthusiasm — notably undisciplined enthusiasm— we se murient pas, as the French would say. At the same time, strang-e as it may appear to some sections of the public, it is quite possible to have a genuine sympathy for suffering humanity without constantly mouthing- the catchpenny phrases which form to so large an extent the stock-in-trade of the professional "friends of humanity." These latter are usually not over-cliaritable to those who cannot accept, and at once carry into execution, the whole of their idealist programmes. There appears to be much truth in Mr. John Morley's remark {Robespierre, p. 59), that " the most ostentatious faith in humanity in general seems always to beget the sharpest mistrust of all human beings in particular." 1 should term most of the leading British officials in Egypt humanitarians under any reasonable inter- pretation of that term, but the responsible nature of their position naturally obliges them to look at the questions with which they have to deal from many, and not merely from one point of view. 2 Mr. Egerton acted as my locum tenens when I was temporarily absent from Cairo in 1884. I saw (Jeneral Gordon's Journal in manuscript before it was printed. I know that I am correct in saying that the Government would have pre- ferred that the Journal should liave been published without any omissions. At the instance, lutwever, of (Jeneral Gordon's friends and family, a good deal of violent and very foolish abuse of I>ord Granville — and, if I remember rightly, of others — was omitted. It is, in my opinion, to be regretted that this was done. The publication of the Journal, as it was originally written, would have enabled the public to judge more accu- rately of the value of General Gordon's criticisms, than was possible when only an expurgated edition was issued. OH. XXII THE GORDON MISSION 433 state why I think it was a mistake to send General Gordon to Khartoum. " It is impossible," I wrote privately to Lord Granville on January 28, 1884, "not to be charmed by the simplicity and honesty of Gordon's character." " My only fear," I added, " is that he is terribly flighty and changes his opinions very rapidly. I am glad that Stewart, who impressed me favour- ably, is going with him, but I do not think Gordon much likes it himself. He said to me : ' They sent him (Stewart) with me to be my wet-nurse.'"^ Impulsive flightiness was, in fact, the main defect of General Gordon's character, and it was one which, in my opinion, rendered him unfit to carry out a work which pre-eminently required a cool and steady head. I used to receive some twenty or thirty telegrams from General Gordon in the course of the day when he was at Khartoum, those in the evening often giving opinions which it was impossible to reconcile with others despatched the same morning. Scarcely, indeed, had General Gordon started on his mission, when Lord Gran- ville, who does not appear at first to have under- stood General Gordon's character, began to be alarmed at his impulsiveness. On February 8, Lord Granville wrote to me : " I own your letters about Gordon rather alarm. His changes about Zobeir are difficult to understand.^ Northbrook consoles me by saying that he says all the foolish things that pass through his head, but that his judgment is excellent." I am not prepared to go ^ Whilst on his way to Khartoum, Colonel Stewart wrote me a letter, from which it was clear that, at one time, the relations between him and General Gordon were much strained. He asked me to tear it up directly I had read it, without showing it to any one. This I accordingly did. Subsequently, they appear to have been fully reconciled, but it was only natural that there should have been occasional jars between two men of such very different characters and habits of thought ^ This is an allusion to circumstances which took place at Cairo, and which will be presently narrated. VOL. I 2 F 434 MODERN EGYPT ft. m so far as to say that General Gordon's judgment was excellent. Nevertlieless, there was some truth in Lord Xorthbrook's remark. I often found that, amidst a mass of irrelevant verbiage and amidst many contradictory ophiions, a vein of sound common sense and political instinct ran through General Gordon's proposals. So much was I impressed with this, and so fearful was I that the sound portions of his proposals would be rejected in London on account of the eccentric language in which they were often couched, that, on February 12, I telegraphed to Lord Granville: " In considering Gordon's suggestions, please re- member that his general views are excellent, but that undue importance must not be attached to his words. We must look to the spirit rather than the letter of what he says." In spite of General Gordon's high qualities, however, I do not think that a man of his peculiar character was a proper person to send on such an extremely difficult mission as that of arranging for the evacuation of the Soudan. The task was, indeed, so difficult that it is probable that no one could have carried it out successfully, but I believe that a better chance of success would have pre- sented itself if Colonel Stewart had been sent without General Gordon. It is singular how entirely General Gordon's reputation has over- shadowed that of Colonel Stewart. I have rarely come across anybody wlio impressed me more favourably than this cool, sagacious, and courageous soldier. His premature death was a great loss both to England and to Egypt. One further point remains to be considered. Who was responsible for sending General Gordon ? In a sense, the main responsibility rests with the press of England, and, notably, with the Pall Mall Gazette. The people of England, as represented CH. XXII THE GORDON MISSION 435 by the press, insisted on sending General Gordon to the Soudan, and accordingly to the Soudan he was sent. "Anonymous authorship," one of the wisest political thinkers of modern times has stated, '* places the public under the direction of guides who have no sense of personal responsibility." ^ The arguments in favour of newspaper influence are too commonplace to require mention. But newspaper government has certain disadvantages, and these disadvantages were never more clearly shown than in the incident now under discussion. The attitude of the British press, however, though it may be pleaded in palliation of the mistake which was made, does not, of course, exonerate the Government from responsibility. The truth is, that Mr. Gladstone's Government did not fully realise the importance of the step they were taking. Whilst entirely agreeing in the policy of evacuating the Soudan, I had pressed upon the Government the extreme difficulty of carrying the policy into execution. I had told Lord Granville that any one who went to the Soudan would " undertake a service of great difficulty and danger." But these warnings fell unheeded, neither can it be any matter for surprise that they should have done so, for the one person who the Government were told on all sides was the highest authority on Soudan affairs, namely. General Gordon himself, did not share my apprehensions in any degree ; neither was any danger-signal hoisted by Colonel Stewart. There can be no doubt that when General Gordon was in London, his views were far too optimistic. He did not rightly appreciate either the state of affairs which then existed in the Soudan, or the diffi- culties of the task which he had undertaken. Being deceived himself, it was natural that lie should, ^ Sir G. Coniewall Lewis, On the Injluence of Authority in Matters oj Opinion, p. 355. 436 MODERN EGYPT pt. m quite unintentionally, have deceived the Govern- ment, and should have encouraged them in the optimism to which all Governments are somewhat prone.^ On January 28, after having seen General Gordon, I wrote to Lord Granville : " Gordon speaks very hopefully of being able to do the whole thing in tiiree or four months." So late as Feb- ruary 20, that is to say, two days after his arrival at Khartoum, General Gordon wrote to Colonel Coetlogon : " I have proposed to you to go back to Cairo because, in my belief, there is not the least chance of any danger being now incurred in Khartoum, which I consider as safe as Cairo. . . . You may rest assured that you leave a place which is as safe as Kensington Park." To sum up, — the main defence of the Govern- ment, for what it is worth, is contained in the saying of the French revolutionary leader when he was reproached for obeying, the dictates of the Jacobin mob : *' Je suis leur chef; il faut que je les suive." The Government did not attempt to guide public opinion. They followed it. Nevertheless, the opinions which General Gordon entertained, may be pleaded as some justification for the line of policy adopted by the Government. If the British Ministers erred on the side of optimism, it is certain that their optimistic views were shared by General Gordon, and, indeed, were largely based on what he said both before leaving London and whilst on his way to Khartoum. So far as my personal responsibility is concerned, I can plead no such justification, or, at all events, I can only plead it to a less degree. I was never * On September 28, 1884, General Gordon wrote in his Journal (p. 110): "The Government may say that tiiey liad reasonable hopea that I would succeed ; 1 will neither say 1 gave them such assurance or that 1 did not give it. I think 1 was neutral in giving or in not giving such an assurance." When General Gordon wrote this, he must have forgotten many of his previous utterances. OH. XXII THE GORDON MISSION 437 under any delusion as to the difficulties of the task which General Gordon had undertaken, or as to the personal danger which he and Colonel Stewart would run. More than this, I mistrusted General Gordon's judgment, and I was in reality adverse to his employment. I am not now making use of ea^ post facto arguments. I have such a vivid recol- lection of my own frame of mind at that time, that I can state very positively why it was that, after having twice refused to utilise General Gordon's services, I yielded on being pressed a third time by Lord Granville. I believed that at that time I stood alone in hesitating to employ General Gordon. Public opinion in England was calling loudly for his employment. Lord Granville's telegrams, though couched in language from which it might be inferred that the Government would defer to my opinion, showed, nevertheless, clearly enough a strong wish on the part of the Govern- ment that General Gordon should be employed. Nubar Pasha concurred in this view. I did not, however, attach much importance to his opinion on the special point at issue. Sir Evelyn AA^ood's opinion carried more weight with me. He was favourable to the employment of General Gordon. So also was Colonel Watson, who was at that time on the staff of the Egyptian army, and who spoke with the authority of one who knew General Gordon well, having served under him in the Soudan. With this array of opinion against me, I mis- trusted my own judgment. I did not yield because I hesitated to stand up against the storm of public opinion. I gave a reluctant assent, in reality against my own judgment and inclination, because I thought that, as everybody differed from me, I must be wrong. I also thought that I might be unconsciously prejudiced against General Gordon 438 MODERN EGYPT ft. iii from the fact that his habits of thought and modes of action in dealing with pubhc affairs differed widely from mine. In yielding, I made a mistake which I shall never cease to regret. It may well be that, had I not yielded, the result would have been the same. The public feeling in favour of sending General Gordon was so strong as to be almost irresistible. But this consideration does not constitute any consolation to me. By yielding, I rendered myself in some degree responsible for all the valuable lives which were lost, and the treasure which was subsequently expended in the Soudan. The whole incident left a strong impression on my mind. Unquestionably, much harm has been done at times by Governments failing to yield, or yielding too late, to a clear and unmistakable ex- pression of public opinion. Nothing, in fact, can be more foolish or hurtful than that officials should unreasonably oppose a stiff barrier of bureaucratic obstruction to the views of the outside public. If they do so, they are liable to be swept away. But occasions do occur, which in these democratic days are becoming more rather than less frequent, when the best service a Government official can render to his country is to place himself in opposition to the public view. Indeed, if he feels certain that he is right, it is his bounden duty to do so, especially in respect to questions as to which public opinion in England is ill-informed. Such an occasion ])re- sented itself when there was a question of sending General Gordon to the Soudan. It was worth while to incur a good deal of unpopularity and misie])re- sentation in order to save the Government and the nation from making so great a mistake. " A man," it has been truly said, " who never disagrees with his countrymen, and who shrinks from unpopularity as the worst of all evils, can never have a share in CH.XXII THE GORDON MISSION 439 moulding the traditions of a virile race, though for a time he may make its fashions." ^ I repeat, therefore, that I shall never cease to regret that I did not stand to my guns and maintain, to the best of my ability, my original objections to the Gordon mission. Had I known General Gordon better, I should certainly never have agreed to his employment. * Oliver's Alexander Hamilton, p. 436. CHAPTER XXIII GORDON AT CAIRO January 24-26, 1884 General Gordon wishes to go to Suakin — He goes to Cairo — (!!on- sequences which resulted from the change of route — General Gordon's views as to the Soudan — His London instructions — Instructions issued at Cairo — General Gordon appointed Governor- General of the Soudan — And furnished with certain Proclamations — Reasons why General Gordon's instructions were changed — The Darfour Sultan — General Gordon proposes tliat Zobeir Pasha should accompany him — Interview between General Gordon and Zobeir Pasha — It is decided not to employ Zobeir Pasha — General Gordon leaves Cairo. When, on January 18, Lord Granville informed me that General Gordon and Colonel Stewart were about to proceed to Egypt, be added tbat General Gordon was anxious not to go to Cairo, and tbat he would go through the Suez Canal straight to Suakin. I was requested to meet him at Ismailia. The reason why General Gordon did not wish to visit Cairo was obvious. He had publicly criticised the conduct of the Khedive in no measured terms, and did not wish to meet him. The road from Suakin to Berber was at this time blocked. The tribes were in a state of open rebellion, and had gained a series of successes over the Egyptian troops. It was certain that General Gordon would never be able to reach Khartoum by the Suakin route. I, therefore, telegraphed to Eord Granville, on January 19, urging the desirability of General Gordon's coming to Cairo. Lord Granville supported my view. The result 440 CH. XXIII GORDON AT CAIRO 411 was that General Gordon came to Cairo. He arrived on the evening of January 24. If I had not interfered as regards General Gordon's route, a point which seemed at the time to be one of detail, the course of history in the Soudan would have been changed and many valuable lives, including probably that of General Gordon himself, would have been saved. General Gordon would possibly never have got to Khartoum, and it would not, therefore, have been necessary to send any British expedition to the Soudan. It is probable, indeed almost certain, that in a few weeks he would have returned to England without having effected anything of importance towards the accomplishment of his mission. I remember that it crossed my mind that I had better not interfere, but leave General Gordon to work out his plans in his own way. It was, however, clear that, in going to Suakin, General Gordon would foredoom his mission to failure, and that he would never have made any such proposal had he been well acquainted with the state of affairs then existing in the Eastern Soudan. I had, therefore, excellent reasons for interfering, but, looking back upon events as they subsequently occurred, I regret that I did so. On the morning of January 25, General Gordon accompanied me to the Ismailia Palace to see the Khedive. Colonel Stewart wrote in his journal : ''Gordon apologised to Tewfik for his former brusque behaviour, and the interview went off very well The question of General Gordon's instructions then had to be discussed. I shall have to deal with this matter at some length, as it has formed the subject of much misapprehension.^ ^ For iustance. Sir William Butler {Charles George Gordon, p. 200) says: ''Few persons are aware that the English Government knew 442 MODERN EGYPT pt. m On January 23, whilst on his way to Egypt, General Gordon wrote a Memorandum settinir forth the line of policy which he proposed to pursue in the Soudan. It contained the following passage : "My idea is that the restoration of the country should be made to the different petty Sultans, who existed at the time of Mehemet All's conquests, and whose families still exist ; that the Mahdi should be left altogether out of the calculations as regards the handing over of the country, and that it should be optional with the Sultans to accept his supremacy or not. As these Sultans would probably not be likely to gain by accepting the Mahdi as their sovereign, it is probable that they will hold to their independent positions. . . . The most difficult question is how, and to whom, to hand over the arsenals of Khartoum, Dongola, and Kassala, which towns have, so to say, no old- standing families, Khartoum and Kassala having sprung up since Mehemet All's conquest. Prob- ably it would be advisable to postpone any decision as to these towns till such time as the inhabitants have made known their opinion." Colonel Stewart in recording his "cordial agreement " with General Gordon's views, added : " Handing back the territories to the families of the dispossessed Sultans is an act of justice both towards them and their people. The latter, at any rate, will no longer be at the mercy of foreign mer- cenaries, and if they are tyrannised over, it will be more or less their own fault. Handing back the districts to the old families is also a politic act, as raising up a rival power to that of the INIahdi. As it is impossible for Her Majesty's Government to nothing of the appointment of their officer as Governor-General of the Soudan^ or of the clianj^e of his destination from iSuakin to tlie Nile route, until some days after hoth had been ejected by our Minister in Cairo." Both of these statement are devoid of foundation. CH. xxm GORDON AT CAIRO 443 foresee all the eventualities that may arise during the evacuation, it seems to me as the more judicious course to rely on the discretion of General Gordon and his knowledge of the country." The policy of setting up the local Sultans to govern the country appeared at the time wise and politic; but, looking at events with an after-know- ledge of what subsequently happened, it is evident that General Gordon both underrated the power of the JNIahdi, and overrated the influence of the local Sultans. The most powerful and warlike tribes in the Soudan were partisans of the Mahdi. The families of the local Sultans, who had governed the Soudan in former times, had lost all hold on the public opinion of the country. JNIoreover, General Gordon himself indicated one great difficulty in the way of giving effect to this policy. It was that, in respect to Khartoum, Dongola, and Kassala, there were " no old-standing families." Now, whoever holds Khartoum, domi- nates a large part of the Soudan ; unless, therefore, the policy in question could be carried into execu- tion as regards Khartoum, it was almost sure to fall to the ground altogether. When General Gordon arrived in Egypt, I received a copy of the instructions, dated January 18, which were given to him in London by Lord Granville. The principal portion of these instruc- tions was as follows : — *' Her Majesty's Government are desirous that you should proceed at once to Egypt to report to them on the military situation in the Soudan, and on the measures which it may be advisable to take for the security of the Egyptian garrisons still holding positions in that country, and for the safety of the European population in Khartoum. " Vou are also desired to consider and report upon the best mode of effecting the evacuation of 444 MODERN EGYPT pt. m the interior of the Soudan, and upon the manner in which the safety and the good administration by the Egyptian Government of the parts on the sea-coast can best be secured. . . . " You will consider yourself authorised and instructed to perform such other duties as the Egyptian Government may desire to intrust to you and as may be communicated to you by Sir E. Baring." On the morning of January 25, a meeting took place to consider whether, acting on the authority I had received from Lord Granville, I should issue further instructions to General Gordon. At this meeting were present Nubar Pasha, General Gordon, Colonel Stewart, Sir Evelyn AVood, and myself After a long discussion, the meeting was adjourned till the following afternoon. It was arranged that, in the interval, I was to embody in a letter addressed to General Gordon the conclusions at which we had arrived. On the occasion of the second meeting, I went through the draft instructions which I had pre- pared, and discussed them with General Gordon and the others who were present. A few changes were made. The following extracts will be sufficient to show the leading features of these instructions : — "It is believed that the number of the Euro- peans at Khartoum is very small, but it has been estimated by the local authorities that some 10,000 to 15,000 people will wish to move north- wards from Khartoum only when the Egyptian garrison is withdrawn. These people are native Christians, Egyptian employees, their wives and children, etc. The Government of His Highness the Kliedive are earnestly solicitous tiiat no effort should be spared to ensure the retreat both of these people and of the Egyptian garrison without loss OH. XXIII GORDON AT CAIRO 445 of life. As regards the most opportune time and the best method for effecting tlie retreat, whether of the garrisons or of tlie civil populations, it is neither necessary nor desirable that you should receive detailed instructions. . . . " You will bear in mind that the main end to be pursued is the evacuation of the Soudan. This policy was adopted, after very full discussion, by the Egyptian Government, on the advice of Her Majesty's Government. It meets with the full approval of His Highness the Khedive, and of the present Egyptian Ministry. I understand, also, that you entirely concur in the desirability of adopting this policy, and that you think it should on no account be chanoed.^ You consider that it may take a few months to carry it out with safety. You are further of opinion that ' the restoration of the country should be made to the different petty Sultans who existed at the time of Mehemet Ali's conquest, and whose families still exist ; and that an endeavour should be made to form a confedera- tion of those Sultans.' In this view, the Egyptian Government entirely concur. It will, of course, be fully understood that the Egyptian troops are not to be kept in the Soudan merely with a view to consolidating the power of the new rulers of the country. But the Egyptian Government have the fullest confidence in your judgment, your know- ledge of the country, and your comprehension of the general line of policy to be pursued. You are, therefore, given full discretionary power to retain the troops for such reasonable period as you may think necessary, in order that the abandonment of the country may be accomplished with the least possible risk to life and property. " A credit of £100,000 has been opened for you * The last part of this sentence was added at Gordon's own request (vide ante, p. 390). 446 MODERN EGYPT pi\ in at the Finance Department, and further funds will be supplied to you on your requisition when this sum is exhausted." Simultaneously with the issue of these instruc- tions, a letter was addressed by the Khedive to General Gordon appointing him Governor-General of the Soudan. General Gordon was, at the same time, furnished with two Proclamations from the Khedive addressed to the inhabitants of the Soudan. In one of these, the appointment of General Gordon to be Governor-General was notified, and the people were invited to obey his orders. In the other Proclamation, more distinct allusion was made to the intention of the Government to evacuate the Soudan. "We have decided," it was said, "to restore to the families of the kings of the Soudan their former independence." " General Gordon," I wrote to Lord Granville on February 1, "has authority and discretion to issue one or other of these Proclamations whenever he may think it desirable to do so. He fully understands that he is going to Khartoum for the purpose of carrying out the policy of evacuation, and has expressed to me his fullest concurrence in the wisdom of this policy. Your Lordship will have seen, by my instructions to him, that no doubt is left on this point, and these instructions were drafted at the request and with the entire approval of General Gordon himself It was, however, thought desirable, after full discussion here, that the widest discretionary powers should be given to General Gordon as regards the manner of carrying out the policy, and as to the best time and mode of announcing it at Khartoum." It has been frequently stated, first, that the instructions which General Gordon received at Cairo differed so widely from those which were given to him in London as to alter entirely the character cH. XXIII GORDON AT CAIRO 447 of his mission ; and, secondly, that the change in his instructions was effected by myself without any reference to London. These statements were freely made by the press. They were echoed by Mr. Egmont Hake, Sir William Butler, and others who have written on the Gordon Mission. The British Government, also, wrote to me a despatch in which, though they approved of the instruc- tions given to General Gordon, tliey confirmed the erroneous popular impression that the London instructions had been materially altered by me, acting on my own authority, without reference to the Foreign Office. " Her Majesty's Government," it was said, "bearing in mind the exigencies of the occasion, concurred in these instructions, which virtually altered General Gordon's mission from one of advice to that of executing, or at least directing, the evacuation not only of Khartoum, but of the whole Soudan, and they were will- ing that General Gordon should receive the very extended powers conferred upon him by the Khedive to enable him to effect this very difficult task," The statement that the instructions, which General Gordon received in Cairo, altered the character of his mission is substantially correct. The statement that I altered General Gordon's instructions without authority from the British Government is wholly devoid of foundation. I never cared to go into this subject at the time, because my hands were full of other work, and, moreover, by the time the discussions to which I allude took place, the question merely had an historic interest. But I may now state what occurred. In the first place, I have to observe that the importance of this question has been exaggerated. In reality, it mattered little what instructions 448 MODERN EGYPT pt. m General Gordon received, because he was not the sort of man to be bound by any instructions.^ In the second place, the instructions, which General Gordon received in London, were manifestly written without a due appreciation of the neces- sities of the situation. The Egyptian Government had asked for "a well -qualified British officer to go to Kliartoum with full powers, both civil and military, to conduct the retreat." It would have been a mere mockery if, instead of an executive officer, they had been given some one whose sole duty it would have been to write a report. There had already been a sufficient number of reports about the Soudan. The moment had arrived when it was necessary to cease writing and to act. It would have been particularly ridiculous to send General Gordon, of all men in the world, as a "mere reporter upon a difficult situation."^ General Gordon was essentially a man of action. No one, who knew anything of his character, could have supposed for one moment that he would confine himself to mere reporting. The idea, however, appears to have originated with General Gordon himself On January 15, Loid Granville telegraphed to me that General Gordon was prepared to go to the Soudan on certain "rather vague terms," the principal of which was that he was to "report to Her Majesty's Government on the military situation of the Soudan." JNIoreover, on February 14, Sir Charles Dilke stated in tlie House of Commons : " General Gordon drafted his own instructions. . . . Believing him to be the highest authority, that he knew more of the conditions, and that he was better able to form a * On January 21, 1884, I wrote to Lord Granville : " It is as well that Gordon sliould be under my orders, but a man who habitually consults the Prophet Isaiah when he is in a difficulty is not apt tc obey the orders of any one." '^ Too Late, p. 4. CH. XXIII GORDON AT CAIRO 449 judgment on the subject than anybody else, we asked him to draft his own instructions." In spite of this fact, however, nothing can be more certain than that General Gordon never considered his mission to be that of a simple reporter. Indeed, on the day (January 18) on which General Gordon received his London instructions. Lord Granville telegraphed to me : "Gordon suggests that it may be announced in Egypt that he is on his way to Khartoum to arrange for the future settlement of the Soudan for the best advantage of the people." Nothing was said of reporting. If General Gordon was to arrange for *'the future settlement of the Soudan," I fail to see how he could do so without exercising; some executive authoritv. In the third place, it is to be observed that the proposal that General Gordon should be made Governor-General of the Soudan did not emanate from any one in Cairo. It was made by General Gordon himself, whilst he was on the journey from London to Egypt, and was communicated to me by Lord Granville who, on January 22, telegraphed to me certain " suggestions made by Gordon as to the steps which should be taken with regard to the present state of affairs in the Soudan." ^ The first of these suggestions was that the Khedive should issue a Proclamation to the people of the Soudan, in the following terms : " To the people of the Soudan ! The immense distances which have separated me from you have given rise to disorders which have resulted in revolt against my authority. This revolt has cost much blood and treasure, far beyond any adequate compensation, and has thrown » See Egypt, No. 2 of 188i, p. 4. A short despatch from Lord Granville to nie is published in this Parliamentary paper. From tliis despatch it appears that certain suggestions of General (Gordon's were telegraphed to me, and tliat 1 was authorised to cai ry them out. But the suggestions themselves were not published. If tliey had been publislied, no misapprehension on the point now under discussion would have been possible. VOI,. I 2 G 450 MODERN EGYPT pt. iii burdens on Lower Egypt which are mtolerable. I have, tlierefore, determined to restore to the various Sultans of the Soudan their independence, and for this purpose I have commissioned General Gordon, hite Governor-General of the Soudan, to proceed there as my representative, and to arrange with you for the evacuation of the country and the withdrawal of my troops. Her Majesty's Government, being most desirous of your welfare, have also appointed General Gordon as their Com- missioner for the same purpose. General Gordon is hereby appointed Governor-General for the time necessary to accomplish the evacnatio7i." ^ The second su<><>:estion was that a Proclama- tion should be issued in General Gordon's name, announcing that he had "accepted the post of Governor-General of the Soudan.''^ "I recommend," General Gordon said in his telegram to Lord Granville, which was repeated to me, "that these Decrees and Proclamations should be published as soon as possible in the Soudan." In forwarding General Gordon's recommendations to me, Lord Granville added : *' Her JNIajesty's Government have not sufficient local knowledge to enable them to form an opinion as to the practicability of these suggestions, and I therefore authorise you, as time is valuable, either immediately to make the arrange- ments suggested, or to await General Gordon's arrival, and consult with him as to the action to be taken." As, when I received this telegram. General Gordon had already left Brindisi, I did not think it desirable to act upon the authority given to me to cause these Proclamations to be issued at once. I decided to await General Gordon's arrival. Wlien he arrived, I moved the Khedive to name him Governor-General of the Soudan. This was in accordance with General * The italics are not iu the oriii-iual. CH. XXIII GORDON AT CAIRO 451 Gordon's own suggestion, upon wliich I had been authorised by Lord Granville to act. Further, as I have already mentioned,^ certain Proclama- tions were prepared and given to General Gordon with discretionary power to use them should he think fit to do so. These Proclamations did not differ materially from those wliich had been com- municated to me in Lord Granville's telegram of January 22. Under these circumstances, it was with some surprise that, on February 4, I received a telegram from Lord Granville asking me whether " General Gordon had accepted any appointment from the Khedive." And it was with still greater surprise that I found myself accused, not only by the public, but also to a certain extent by the Govern- ment, of having altered the character of General Gordon's mission without any authority to do so. The documents quoted above are sufficient to show that this accusation was altofjether groundless. Indeed, so little importance did I attach to the changes in the instructions, which had been made at Cairo, that on January 28, I wrote privately to Lord Granville: " You will see that I gave Gordon, at his own request, additional instructions, of which I hope you will approve. They really amount to nothing more than what he had already received, but they give him a little latitude as to the time at which the troops shall be withdrawn." Looking to the fact that, on the face of the thing, it was absurd to send General Gordon as a mere reporter, to the further fact tliat General Gordon, who had just arrived from London, never said one word to me to induce the belief that such was the intention of the Government, and also to the fact that Lord Granville had him- self authorised me to secure General Gordon's * Vide untey p. 446. 452 MODERN EGYPT pt. m nomination as Governor-General of the Soudan, it never occurred to me that I was departing from the wishes and instructions of the British Government by one hair's-breadth. The explana- tion of all this confusion is, however, very simple. I believe that the original intention of the British Government was that General Gordon should limit himself to reporting, and that Lord Granville did not see that, in authorising General Gordon to accept the appointment of Governor-General of the Soudan, he changed the spirit of the instructions which he had issued on January 18. He was, therefore, surprised to find out what he had done. Leaving aside, however, the personal and, there- fore, unimportant question of who is responsible for naming General Gordon Governor-General of the Soudan, I wish to say that, in my opinion, the decision was a wise one. General Gordon was about to depart on a very difficult and dangerous mission. He had resided for some while in the Soudan, and was supposed to be well acquainted with the affairs of that country. The only chance of success lay in following his advice, and adopthig such measures as he thought most likely to conduce to the accomplishment of his task. He wished to be named Governor-General, and he was obviously right. Otherwise, he would have exercised no authority. To resume the narrative. It has been already mentioned that one of the mahi difficulties, which stood in the way of re-establishing the rule of the local Sultans in the Soudan, was that in some of the most important portions of the country tliere were no old-standing families. This difficulty did not, however, exist in respect to Darfour. Only ten years had elapsed since that province had been annexed by Egypt. Before that period, the country had been governed by a line of Sultans on. XXIII GORDON AT CAIRO 453 which had existed for more than four hundred years. When the annexation took place, the surviving members of the reigning family were deported to Cairo. The Egyptian Government doled out allowances to them. In respect toDarfour, therefore, there seemed to be some prospect of carrying into execution the policy advocated by General Gordon. There were several members of the Darfour family at Cairo. It was no easy matter to decide which to choose. The position of a Roi en exil is not under any circumstances calculated to ennoble the character. When the ex-monarch happens to be an ignorant barbarian leading a slothful life in a semi -civilised Oriental capital, such as Cairo, and dependent on the charity of the Government for his subsistence, no element is wanting to hasten the process of moral decadence. The uses of adversity had not been turned to account by the Darfour family. The materials from which a choice had to be made were, therefore, unpromising. How- ever, a choice was made. The individual chosen was Emir Abdul-Shakour, son of the late Sultan Abdul -Rahman. He is described in Colonel Stewart's Journal as a "common-looking, unintelli- gent, and badly-dressed native." He was given "£E.2000, a well-embroidered coat, and the biggest decoration that could be found." He at first wished to remain in Cairo for several days in order to make preparations for his departure, but General Gordon was in a hurry to be off, and the Darfour Sultan was with some difficulty induced to start with him. Colonel Stewart, speaking of General Gordon's departure from Cairo on the night of January 26, wrote in his Journal : " Some delay was caused at starting by the numerous retinue of the Darfour Sultan. Extra carriages had to be put on for the accommodation of his twenty-three wives and a quantity of baggage. At the last 454 MODERN EGYPT ft. m moment, his gala uniform was almost forgotten, and there was some commotion until it was found." Altogether, it did not look much as if an " un- intelligent native " with twenty -three wives and a quantity of baggage, who was, as it subsequently appeared, inordinately proud of his decoration and of his "gala uniform," would be very helpful in inaugurating the new policy. One further incident of importance occurred whilst General Gordon was in Cairo. In the course of this narrative allusion has already been made to Zobeir Pasha.^ It is need- less to dwell at length on the history of his pre- vious relations with General Gordon. It will be sufficient to say that Zobeir Pasha's social position, '^ the wealth which he had amassed in slave-hunting, his courage, ability, and force of character, had at one time won for him a position of commanding influence in the Soudan. In June 1878, Zobeir Pasha's son, Suleiman, raised a revolt in the Bahr- el-Ghazal province, and killed 200 of the Egyptian regular troops. General Gordon's lieutenant, Gessi, was sent against him, and, in the beginning of 1879, the rebellion was crushed. Suleiman was taken prisoner and shot. A letter from Zobeir Pasha was found in Suleiman's possession, in which the father incited the son to revolt. Zobeir Pasha's property was confiscated. In 1884, he was residing at Cairo. He was detained there, but was allowed his personal liberty and received an allowance from the Egyptian Government. Under these circum- stances, it was natural that there should be enmity between General Gordon and Zobeir Pasha. On January 22, whilst General Gordon was on his way to Egypt, I received the following telegram * Vide ante, pp. 402-404. ^ Zobeir Pasha is a descendant of the Abbaside dynasty of Khalifs. CH. XXIII GOllDON AT CAIRO 455 from Lord Granville : " Gordon considers it most important that Zobeir should be well watched by a European to prevent his sending emissaries or letters to the Soudan. He has suggested that Zobeir should be sent to Cyprus, but there is no legal power to detain him if sent." On receiving this telegram, I took steps to have Zobeir Pasha watched. On January 25, whilst paying a visit to Cherif Pasha, General Gordon accidentally met Zobeir Pasha. A short conversation ensued between the two, with the result that General Gordon ex- pressed a wish that he and Zobeir Pasha should meet in my presence with a view to the latter stating his complaints. On the morning of the 26th, I received a written Memorandum from General Gordon, in which, after sketching the history of the events which led to Zobeir Pasha's expulsion from the Soudan, he went on to express himself as follows : — " Zobeir, without doubt, was the greatest slave- hunter who ever existed. Zobeir is the most able man in the Soudan, he is a capital general, and has been wounded several times. Zobeir has a capacity of government far beyond any other man in the Soudan. All the followers of the INIahdi would, I believe, leave the Mahdi on Zobeir's approach, for the Mahdi's chiefs are ex-chiefs of Zobeir. Person- ally, I have a great admiration for Zobeir, for he is a man, and is infinitely superior to those })oor fellows who have been Governors of the Soudan. But I question in my mind, 'Will Zobeir ever forgive me the death of his son ? ' and that question has regulated my action respecting him, for I have been told he bears me the greatest malice, and one cannot wonder at it, if one is a father. I would even now risk taking Zobeir, and would wilHngly bear the responsibility of doing so, convinced as I am that Zobeir's approach ends the JNIahdi, which 456 MODERN EGYPT pt. iii is a question which has its pulse in Syria, the Hedjaz, and Palestine, " It cannot be the wish of Her Majesty's Government, or of the Egyptian Government, to have an intestine war in the Soudan on its evacua- tion, yet such is sure to ensue, and the only way which would prevent it is the restoration of Zobeir, who would be accepted on all sides, and who would end the Mahdi in a couple of months. My duty is to obey the orders of Her Majesty's Govern- ment, i.e. to evacuate the Soudan as soon as possible vis-a-vis the safety of the Egyptian em- ployes. To do this, I want no Zobeir. But if the addenda is made that I leave a satisfactory settlement of affairs, then Zobeir becomes a si^ie qua non. Therefore, the question resolves itself into this, does Her Majesty's Government, or Egyptian Government, desire a settled state of affairs in the Soudan after the evacuation ? Do those Governments want to be free of this trouble- some fanatic ? If they do, then Zobeir should be sent ; if the two Governments are indifferent, then do not send him, and I have confidence we will get out the Egyptian employes in three or four montlis, and will leave a cockpit behind us. It is not my duty to dictate what should be done. I will only say — " 1. 1 was justified in my action against Zobeir. "2. That if Zobeir bears no malice personally against me, I would take him at once, as a humanly certain settler of the Mahdi and of those in revolt. ** I have written this Memorandum, and Zobeir's story may be lieard. 1 only ask that after he has been interrogated, I may be questioned on such subjects as his statements are at variance with mine. I would wish the inquiry to be official, and in such a way tliat whatever may be the decision come to, it may be come to in my absence. CXI.XX1I1 GORDON AT CAIRO 457 •* With respect to the Skive Trade,^ I think nothing of it, for there will be Slave Trade always as long as Turkey and Egypt buy the slaves, and it may be Zobeir will or might see his interests to stop it in some manner. " I will, therefore, sum up my o])inion, viz. that I would willhigly take the responsibility of taking Zobeir up with me, if after an interview with Sir E. Baring and Nubar Pasha, they felt the mystic feeling I could trust him, and which mystic feeling I felt I had for him to-night when I met him at Ch^rif Pasha's house. Zobeir could have nothing to gain in hurting me, and I would have no idea of fear. In this affair my desire, I own, would be to take Zobeir. I cannot exactly say why I feel towards him thus, and I feel sure that his going- would settle the Soudan affair to the benefit of Her Majesty's and Egyptian Governments, and I would bear the responsibility of recommending it." The interview between General Gordon and Zobeir Pasha took place on the afternoon of January 26 in the presence of Nubar Pasha, Sir Evelyn Wood, Colonel Stewart, Colonel Watson, Giegler Pasha, and myself.^ A shorthand writer and an interpreter were present. The scene was dramatic and interesting. Both General Gordon and Zobeir Pasha were labouring under great excitement and spoke with vehemence. Zobeir Pasha did not deny that his son had rebelled against the Egyptian Government, but he denied his own complicity in the rebellion. General Gordon's case rested mainly upon the letter addressed by Zobeir ' General Gordon's instructions given to him in London, contained the following passage : " You should pay especial consideration to the question of the steps that may usefully be taken to counteract the stimulus which it is feared may possibly be given to the Slave Trade by the present insurrectionary movement, and by the withdrawal of the Egyptian authority from the Interior." 2 A full account of this interview is given in Egypt, No. 12 of 1884, pp. 38-41. 458 MODERN EGYPT pt. m Pasha to his son, which was found by Gessi. This letter could not be produced at the time, but I saw a copy of it subsequently. If genuine, it afforded sufficient proof of Zobeir Pasha's com- plicity in his son's rebellion. After this interview was over and Zobeir Pasha had retired, General Gordon's Memorandum, in which he had proposed that Zobeir Pasha should accompany him to Khartoum, was discussed. All present, more especially Colonel Stewart, were opposed to sending him. I had always been rather in favour of employing Zobeir Pasha in the Soudan. Moreover, I saw tliat the main difficulty in the way of carrying out General Gordon's policy was the absence of any strong local men to whom to entrust the future government of the Soudan, and especially of Khartoum. I believed that, by giving Zobeir Pasha money and an influential position, it might be possible to secure his friendshij) towards General Gordon ; and there could be no doubt that, if this friendship could be secured, he would prove a valuable instrument in the execution of General Gordon's policy. The arguments on the other side were, however, strong. In the first place, the employment of Zobeir Pasha would be sure to raise an outcry in England. I should not have minded this, if 1 could have felt certain that his employment was desirable. But was it desirable ? I was not at that moment prepared to take the responsibility of answering this question in the affirmative. The weight of authoritative opinion was decidedly against sending him to the Soudan. My wish was to follow General Gordon's lead, but he himself hesitated as to what course to pursue. It was impossible to say how far this impulsive man was animated, not so much by a consideration of the political necessities of the case, as by a chivalrous feeling that possibly CH. XXIII GORDON AT CAIRO 459 in former times he might have done some injustice to Zobeir Pasha, and that he wished to atone for such injustice by giving his old adversary an oppor- tunity of retrieving his position. The argument, however, which convinced me that, for the time being at all events, it was undesirable to employ Zobeir Pasha, was that forty-eight hours before I received General Gordon's Memorandum proposing that Zobeir Pasha should accompany him to the Soudan, I had received, through Lord Granville, a proposal, also emanating from General Gordon, that Zobeir Pasha should be deported to Cyprus.^ A few minutes' conversation with Zobeir Pasha, and a "mystic feeUng " which that conversation had engendered, had led General Gordon to jump from one extreme to the other. Instead of being con- sidered as an enemy, Zobeir Pasha was to be treated as a trusted ally, on whose conduct the success of the mission was to depend. 1 have no confidence in opinions based on mystic feelings. Colonel Stewart subsequently (M.irch 11) wrote to me from Khartoum: "I never saw or met any one whose mind and imagination are so constantly active as Gordon's. For him to giasp an idea is to act on it at once." Short as my personal acquaintance had been with General Gordon, it was clear to me that his various obiter dicta were not to be regarded as expressions of his matured opinions. It might eventually be desirable to employ Zobeir Pasha, but it was necessary to give General Gordon more time to think over the matter before taking action. Under these circumstances, I had no hesitation in deciding against the immediate employment of Zobeir Pasha. " At General Gordon's suggestion," I wrote to Lord Granville, " I informed Zobeir Pasha that he would be allowed to remain in Cairo, and that the future treatment he would receive at the * Vide ante, p. 455. 460 MODERN EGYPT pt. m hands of the Egyptian Government depended in a great measure upon whether General Gordon returned alive and well from the Soudan, and upon whether, whilst residing at Cairo, Zobeir Pasha used his influence to facilitate the execution of the policy upon which the Government had determined." Thus the matter was settled for the moment. On the night of January 26, General Gordon and Colonel Stewart left Cairo on the ill-fated expedi- tion from which they were destined never to return. General Gordon was in excellent spirits and hopeful of success. My own heart was heavy within me. I knew the diflficulties of the task which had to be accomplished. I had seen General Gordon. Nothing could have been more friendly than his behaviour. The main lines of his policy appeared wise and prac- tical. Nevertheless, I was not relieved of the doubts which I originally entertained as to the wisdom of employing him. Manifestly, in spite of many fine and attractive qualities, he was even more eccentric than I had originally supposed. How- ever, the die was cast. A comet of no common magnitude had been launched on the political firmament of the Soudan. It was difficult to predict its course. It now only remained for me to do my best to help General Gordon, and to trust to the shrewd common sense of his companion, Colonel Stewart, to act in some degree as a correc- tive to the impulsiveness of his wayward chief.^ * I may mention that during- the short period whilst General Gordon and Colonel Stewart were at Cairo I was most unfortunately afflicted with a severe sore throat, which well-nigh deprived me of any powers of speech. The health of individuals in responsible positions, more especi- ally at critical moments, has a more serious bearing on public affairs than is often supposed. During the Egyptian Conference, which sat in London in the summer of 188.5, the course of events was, I am in- clined to think, a good deal influenced by the fact that Lord Granville had a rather unusually severe attack of gout. Further, I may mention that whilst the question of Zobeir Pasha's despatch to the Soudan waa under discussion, Mr. Gladstone was ill in bed. (See further remarks on this subject, p. 631.) CHAPTER XXIV Gordon's journey to khartoum January 26-February 18, 1884 Contradictory nature of General Gordon's proposals — The Darfour Sultan — General Gordon proposes to visit the Mahdi — Or to retire to the Equator — He issues a Proclamation announcing the inde- pendence of the Soudan — The Slavery Proclamation — General Gordon arrives at Khartoum — He is sanguine of success — Colonel Stewart's warning. On February 1, Colonel Stewart wrote to me from Korosko : " I shall be very glad when we are actually at Khartoum and face to face with the situation. Gordon is so full of energy and action that he cannot get along without doing something, and at present he revenges himself for his enforced inactivity by writing letters, despatches, etc., and sending telegrams." Now, in fact, began a period during which I received a large number of very bewildering and contradictory messages from General Gordon. They began immediately after he left Cairo. Sir Henry Gordon subsequently wrote : *' It was no part of General Gordon's character to form a definite opinion from imperfectly known facts, and to adhere obstinately to that opinion, notwithstanding the evidence of altered circumstances and new elements." Much may be forgiven to fraternal afiec- tion. The truth, however, is that General Gordon's 461 462 MODERN EGYPT ' pt. m main defect was that he was constantly forming strong opinions on imperfectly known facts. Extreme consistency in political matters is certainly not a cardinal virtue. It lias, indeed, been char- acterised by Emerson as "the hobgoblin of little minds." But the peculiarity of General Gordon was that, in great things as in small, his revulsions of opinion were so ra})id and so complete that it was almost impossible to follow him. On INIarch 11, Colonel Stewart wrote to me from Khartoum: "I most sincerely congratulate you on the interruption in the telegraphic communication.^ The shower of telegrams which we have been sending you of late must have acted somewhat like a cold douche. Yesterday, I told Gordon that his numerous com- munications might tend to confuse you, but he replied that he was merely giving you different aspects of the same question." General Gordon's communica- tions did, indeed, tend to confuse me. In addition to the other difficulties of the situation, this further difficulty was now superadded, that I had, if I may be allowed to coin such an expression, to learn Gordonese. I had to distinguish between such pro- posals of General Gordon as represented his matured opinions, and others which were mere bubbles thrown up by his imaginative brain, probably forgotten as soon as made, and, therefore, un- worthy of serious attention. I do not say that I al,ways succeeded in eliminating the dross in order to arrive at the valuable residuum. I can only say that the task was one of great difficulty, and that I did my best to accomplish it. 1 Before telep^raphic communication between Khartoum and Cairo was permanently interrupted, several temporary breaks took place owin^ to the line being in a very bad condition. Lord Granville expressed much the same idea as Colonel Stewart, On March 21, he wrote to me: "I am not sure that the stoppage of communication with Gordon for a time is the greatest of niihlortunes either for himself or us." CH.XXIV JOURNEY TO KHARTOUM 463 The policy of setting up the local Sultans did not begin well. The Darfour Prince, who accom- panied General Gordon, was a wretched creature. On January 29, General Gordon telegraphed to me : "The Emir Abdul-Shakour has taken to drinking." On the 30th, Colonel Stewart wrote in his diary : "The Darfour Sultan decided to get out here (Assouan) and not to come with us any farther." Two days previously (28th), Gordon wrote to me : " Please listen to no telegrams from the Sultan of Darfour's family. I have explained to him that, having placed him at Dongola, whence clear roads exist to Darfour, we wash our hands of him, for it is his work to raise the tribes in his favour. We have nought to do with him and will not support him, for we cannot do so." The Darfour Prince was manifestly deficient in the qualities necessary to carry out a policy such as that projected by General Gordon. He got as far as Dongola, where he remained for some months, and then returned to Cairo. Whilst General Gordon was on his way from Brindisi to Port Said, he gave tlie following mes- sage for Mr. Clifford Lloyd to an English officer, who was a fellow -passenger on the same ship : "Tell Lloyd, no panics. It is possible that I may go to the Mahdi and not be heard of for two months, for he might keep me as a hostage for Zobeir. You can tell Lloyd this when you get to Cairo, so that he can publish it at the right time, if necessary." Owing to Mr. Clifford Lloyd being confined to his house through illness, I did not hear of this message until General Gordon was half-way to Khartoum. Looking to General Gordon's very singular character, I thought it not impossible that he would carry out the idea of going to the Mahdi. Had he done so, he would certainly have been detained a prisoner for life, unless a 454 MODERN EGYPT pt. m British force had been sent to release liiin. I, therefore, telegraphed to him : " I hope you will give me a positive assurance that you will on no account put yourself voluntarily in the power of the JNIahdi. Tlie question is not a personal one. There would, in my opinion, be the strongest political objections to your risking a visit to the iNIahdi." In reply, General Gordon telegraphed tc me that he had no intention of visiting the Malidi. I do not believe that he ever seriously contemplated this step. It was merely an idea which flashed through his brain for a moment. But, had he gone, the consequences both to himself and, pos- sibly, to his country, would have been so serious that it was as well to obtain from him an assur- ance that he would not give effect to this hare- brained project. I turn to another incident which occurred about this time. On February 1, General Gordon wrote to me from Korosko enclosing a letter for the King of the Belgians. In this letter, he spoke of going up the AVhite Nile, taking possession of the Bahr-el- Ghazal and Equatorial Provinces, and then handing them over to the King of the Belgians. I received this letter on February 9. This project did not appear to me to be feasible. INIoreover, I was always afraid of General Gordon acting on the impulse of the moment without sufficient reflection. I, therefore, telegraphed to Lord Granville : " I do not think tliat General Gordon should be allowed, at all events for the present, to go anywhere south of Khartoum." At the same time, I sent the following private telegram to Lord Granville : "Do I understand riglitly that I have full powers to give Gordon positive orders not to ])roceed beyond a certain point, if I think it necessary to do so? I believe he would obey oiders, but I doubt his caring much about suggestions. If he CH. XXIV JOURNEY TO KHARTOUM 4G5 comes to any harm, it will be the worst thing that has happened yet. I am more anxious lest his total disregard for his own safety should lead to further serious difficulties than almost anything else." On February 10, Lord Granville, in reply to my inquiry, sent me the following private telegram : " You have full powers. Instruct Gordon not to proceed at present south of Khartoum." This was followed, on February 11, by an official telegram, which was to the following effect : " Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that General Gordon should not, at present, go beyond Khartoum." I communicated the views of the British Govern- ment on this point to General Gordon on February 12, and in reply received a telegram, stating that he would not go south of Khartoum without my permission. It may be as well, for the sake of clearness, that I should anticipate this narrative so far as to state, in the present place, what subsequently occurred in connection with this particular })oint. On March 9, General Gordon sent me several tele- grams. In one of them he proposed to resign his commission in the British army, to " take all steamers and stores up to the Equatorial and Bahr- el-Ghazal provinces, and consider those provinces as under the King of the Belgians." Later on, I shall have to deal with the reply which Lord Granville gave to the various proposals then under discussion. I need here only state that, in communicating to General Gordon the views of the British Govern- ment, I instructed him to hold on at Khartoum until I could communicate with Her Majesty's Government, and I told him that he should on no account proceed to the Bahr-el-Ghazal and Equa- torial provinces. In his Journal, General Gordon complained bitterly of not having been allowed to proceed up the White Nile. Writing on October 5, VOL. I 2 H 466 MODERN EGYPT ft. m 1884, he said: "Her INIajesty's Government ought to have taken the bold step of speaking out and saying, SHIFT FOR YOURSELF in 3Iarch,'^ when I could have done so, and not now when I am in honour bound to the people after six months' bothering warfare. Not only did Baring not say ' Shift for yourself,' but he put a veto upon my going to the Equator, vide his telegrams in Stewart's Journal." As regards General Gordon's complaint on this subject, I have tlie following observations to make. In the first place, I doubt whether General Gordon would in any case have attempted to go up the White Nile. If he had done so, he would have been obliged to abandon the garrisons of Khartoum and other places, and this, as Colonel Stewart wrote to me so early as INIarch 4, he was " the last man in the world to do." In the second place, if General Gordon had made the attempt, I believe he would have failed. Both he and his followers would almost certainly have been taken prisoners by the Mahdi. In the third place, in spite of the entry in General Gordon's Journal, to which I have alluded above, it is clear that, as a matter of fact, the instructions received from me on this particular point did not hamper his action. I received an undated telegram from him, on April 16, 1884, which was to the following effect : " I consider myself free to act accordincr to circumstances. I shall hold on here as long as I can, and if I can suppress the rebellion, I shall do so. If I cannot, I shall retire to the Equator." Colonel Stewart, at the same time, telegraphed that he did not think it would be possible to get to Berber. " I am inclined," he * In this and other quotations from General Gordon's Journal, the capitals and italics, save in a few cases to which attention is specially drawn, are in the original. CM. XXIV JOURNEY TO KHARTOUM 407 added, "to think my retreat will perhaps be safer by the Equator. 1 siiall, therefore, follow tlie fortunes of General Gordon." Mr. Power, the British Consuhir Agent at Khartoum, telegraphed to the same effect. These messages constitute a sufficient proof that, in spite of my telegram of P^ebruary 12, General Gordon did not think himself precluded from retiring up the White Nile, should he have thought fit to do so. It will be borne in mind that General Gordon took with him two Proclamations, one of which stated that the Egyptian Government had decided to withdraw their troops from the Soudan, whilst in the other it was stated that General Gordon was appointed Governor-General of the Soudan.^ On February 1, Colonel Stewart wrote to me from Korosko : *' It seems to me that at present the most suitable plan is not to publish abroad throughout the Soudan that we mean to leave. Before doing so, we ought at any rate to place the kinglets in their several districts. Whether it will be possible to induce Gordon to remain silent in the matter is, however, more than doubtful." On February 11, General Gordon and Colonel Stewart arrived at Berber. The following entry occurs in Colonel Stewart's Journal, dated February 12 : "I was called up at 5 a.m. by General Gordon, who, having pondered deeply all night, had come to the decision of opening the Pandora box, and openly proclaiming the divorce of the Soudan from Egypt, and the forming of local militias, and the appoint- ment of Soudan officials in every important post. At 8 A.M., Hussein Pasha Khalifa, and JNlohammed Tahir, the judge of the civil court, a man w^e have every reason to believe is a bosom-friend of the Mahdi, made their a})pearance. With their * Vide ante, p. 44G. 468 MODERN EGYPT ft. m assistance, and after showing them the secret Firmans, which the General thought necessary to show them to allay their alarm at the over- turning of the Khedive's authority, a Proclamation was drawn up. This Proclamation appointed a Committee, or provisional Government consisting of six of the most influential Notables of the Mudirieh, and proclaimed that the JNIudirieh was from henceforth independent of Cairo, but subject to General Gordon as Governor -General and Commissioner of the British Government. The Proclamation was affixed to the gate, and caused a good deal of excitement ; so far as I am able to judge, the people appeared to approve of it." On February 13, the following further entry occurs in Colonel Stewart's Journal : " At 2 p.m., Hussein Pasha Khalifa and the leadino; men of the province assembled in secret conclave, and General Gordon, after a speech, showed them the secret Firman. This document caused the most profound astonishment, but in so far as one could judge from what they said, nothing could exceed their delight. We have tried to fathom what those present really thought, and we are told that it was a mistake to have shown it. We are told that the probable effect will be to lead those who read the Firman to conclude that all the concessions made by General Gordon, viz. : — half -tax {sic), were made merely with a view to getting the troops out of the country without danger, and to leave the people to stew in their own juice. On consideration, it may perhaps have been a mistake to show this Firman, but General Gordon says that, as the object of his mission is to get out of the country and to leave tliein independent, that he could not have put a sharper spur into them to organise their government tlian by this action. It is certain that they fondly believe that by some CH.XX1V JOURNEY TO KHARTOUM 469 means or other they would be rid of the Cairo Government, and remain inde])endent under General Gordon, who would give them greater local liberties and not interfere with their darling slave-trade. As regards my own opinion on the matter, I fully admit that the question of showing or not showing the Firman is a difficult one to answer. Perhaps 1 should have preferred follow- ing Nubar Paslia's advice and delaying any action in the matter till a later period, wlien I could have better judged what would have been the result, or at any rate, till the political situation had become clearer." In a letter to me of the same date, February 13, Colonel Stewart wrote : '* You will see by my Journal that Gordon has taken his leap in the dark and shown his secret Firman. How it will act, and what will be the result, goodness only knows. At any rate, the deed is done and we must now abide by the result and hope for the best." General Gordon says in his Journal (p. 28.5) that the Khedive's Firman — by which he meant the Proclamation which was g-iven to him in Cairo — was not " promulgated " in the Soudan, and the same statement is repeated by the editor of the Journal (Mr. Egmont Hake) in a note on p. 309. It is clear, however, from the facts narrated above, that, after the events which took place at Berber, the existence of the Firman must have been known throughout the Soudan. There can be little doubt that General Gordon committed an error of judgment in showing the Firman at Berber. News of the intended abandon- ment of the Soudan had, indeed, reached Khartoum prior to that date. But it was only half believed. It was not till after the events which took place at Berber on February 12 and 13, that the inten- tions of the Egyptian Government became widely 470 MODERN EGYPT pt. lu known. Sir Reginald Wingate^ alludes to the " fatal Proclamation wliich gave the Soudan away," and he has informed me verbally that his researches have led him to the conclusion that General Gordon's difficulties were greatly increased by the action taken at Berber. If General Gordon had not stated the fact himself, and if we did not know something of his peculiar character, it would be almost incredible that he should have shown such an important document as the Khedive's Firman to the Sheikhs at Berber without having fully mastered its contents. Such, however, is the case. He appears subsequently to have seen that he made a mistake in showinjj the Firman, for, on November 9, 1884, the following entry occurs in his Journal (p. 309) : " If the Mahdi got this {i.e. the Firman), he would have crowed, though he may know of it,^ for I sliowed ^ Mahdiism, etc., p. 121. Father Ohi-walder also says: ''Gordon himself committed a mistake by which he gave a death-blow to himself and his mission. On his way to Khartoum, he stopped at Berber and interviewed the Mudir Hussein Pasha Khalifa ; he imprudently told him that he had come up to remove the Egyptian garrisons, as Egypt had abandoned the Soudan. At Metemmeh also ... he committed a similar imprudence, by giving the same information to Haj AH Wad Saad, the Emir of Metemmeh." — Ten Years' Captivity in the Muhdi's Camp, p. 123. 2 On October 22, i.e. eighteen days before General Gordon made this entry in his Journal, he had received a letter from the Mahdi (Appendix to Journal, p. 522), in which the latter gave a list of the documents which had fallen into his possession at the time of Colonel Stewart's death. Inter alia, the Mahdi wrote: "Also we have seen your telegram dated August 28, 1884^, stating that, as for the Firman emanating from the Khedive to all the Nobles and Notables and people of the Soudan, announcing the withdrawal of the troops of the Government from it, and their evacuation of tiie country, and leaving it to the Soudanese to appoint rulers of the country from among the natives, — you had not been aide to communicate it, or to show it to any one on account of what had taken place." The receipt of this letter is recorded in General (lordon's Journal (p. 220) in the followinar cliaracteristic words written on October 22, 1884 : ''Tlie Mahdi's letter is to relate how he captured the post, etc. , Abbas (the steamer in which Stewart went down the Nile), etc. .My answer was tliat I did not care who had surrendered and who had l)een captured. As for these letters, I cannot make head or tail of them, so I leave them to the Arabic sciiolars of tlie Univer- sities." General Gordon knew very little Arabic, neither does he appeal cflxxiv JOURNEY TO KHARTOUM 471 it, not knuwhig well its contents,^ to Hussein Pasha Khalifa {vide Stewart's Journal, which went down and in which I criticised my having done so)." I now turn to another episode. In 1877, a Convention was signed between the British and Egyptian Governments having for its object the abolition of slavery and of the Slave Trade in Egypt. The Convention was not to come into operation in the Soudan till the year 1888. It would, under any circumstances, have been very difficult to apply the Convention to the Soudan. General Gordon knew this. So early as October 11, 1883, Lord Granville wrote privately to me : " About slavery, I was very keen at first, and the first cold water I got was, of all people in the world, from Colonel Gordon, who seemed to me sensible on the matter." In other words, in spite of his anti-slavery sympa- thies, and although he had himself been a witness of the horrors of the Slave Trade, General Gordon recognised the facts of the situation more fully than his friends, who, in so far as the incident about to be narrated is concerned, became his critics. On February 12, Colonel Stewart, who was then at Berber, made the following entry in his Journal : " A deputation of the Notables came to inquire whether the Treaty, which had been printed and published by General Gordon, in November 1877, by which all slaves would be freed in 1889, was in his present programme. General Gordon, knowing the utter futility of saying ' Yes,' replied ' No,' and published a Proclamation to this effect. It is probable that this Proclamation interested and pleased the people more than anything else." A few days later, the Proclamation was publisheci to have taken pains to ^et Arabic documents properly translated to him. This, added to his habitual carelessness in the transaction of business, led him into the committal of many mistakes which might have been avoided. 1 The italics are not in the oiijjiual. 472 MODERN EGYPT pt. iii in Kliartoum. It was to the following effect: " My sincerest desire is to adopt a course of action which shall lead to public tranquillity, and knowing your regret at the severe measures taken by the Govern- ment for the suppression of the slave traffic, and the seizure and punishment of all concerned, according to the Convention and Decrees, I confer upon you these rights, that henceforth none shall interfere with your property ; whoever has slaves, shall have full right to their services and full control over them. This Proclamation is a proof of my clemency towards you." This Proclamation naturally caused some ex- citement in England. That a man who had heretofore been considered a champion of the anti- slavery cause, should, immediately on his arrival at Khartoum, sanction slavery and thus run counter to the traditions of his previous career, seemed, indeed, astonishing. The special supporters of the anti - slavery movement were up in arms. Party managers, moreover, were not likely to let slip such a good opportunity for attacking the Government. On February 18, Sir Stafford Northcote, speaking in the House of Commons, asked, amidst the '* loud cheers " of his supporters, whether " General Gordon's powers extended to the issue of such a Proclamation ? " The Government were, in fact, in an em- barrassing position. It was obvious from the first that, if the Soudan were abandoned, a stimulus would be given to slavery and the Slave Trade. Nothing General Gordon could have said or done could have acted as an antidote. He rightly judged that he had to look to the main object of his mission, which was to evacuate the Soudan. He sought, therefore, to make some capital out of permitting the continuance of an abuse which he was powerless to arrest. Without doubt, under OH. XXIV JOURNEY TO KHARTOUM 473 ordinary circumstances, it would have been better, if he could not remedy the evil, at all events not to have given the sanction of his name to its con- tinuance. But the circumstances in which General Gordon was placed were far from being ordinary. The difficulties of carrying out his task were such that he could not afford to miss a point in the game. He was free from the peculiar feature which, according to many foreign critics, is such a promi- nent defect in the English character, and which, if it be not cant, is nearly allied to cant. I mean that particular phase of thought which, although it cannot deny that certain unpleasant facts exist, hesitates to draw the logical conclusion from their existence, and hesitates still more to make any open acknowledgment of their existence. General Gordon probably reasoned thus : " As I cannot stop slavery, there can be no harm in my saying so, and in acting accordingly." A section of British public opinion, on the other hand, reasoned some- what as follows : " We know that you cannot stop slavery, but you had better hide the unpleasant fact from the eyes of the world." General Gordon's action in this matter appeared to me to be justifiable. I, therefore, determined to support him to the best of my ability. On February 21, General Gordon telegraphed to me as follows : " Several telegrams have been sent from the press asking about what I said respecting slaves. The question asked me was this : Did I insist on the liberation of slaves in 1889, as per Treaty of 1877 ? I answered that the Treaty would not be enforced in 1889 by me, which, considering the determina- tion of Her JNIajesty's Government respecting the Soudan, was a self-evident fact. The question is one of slave-holding, not of slave-hunting, and, in my opinion, that Treaty of 1877 will never be carried out in Cairo as to slave-holding." 474 MODERN EGYPT pt. m I sent the following reply : " About your Slavery Proclamation, 1 am sure I quite under- stand your reasons. I have telegraphed home to say that I think you are quite right. You are doing admirably, and may rely on my full support in everything." At the same time (February 21), I sent the following telegram to Lord Granville : *' It is only natural that the Proclamation issued by General Gordon at Khartoum should have caused a good deal of surprise in England. But in reality his declaration with regard to the buying and selling of slaves is of very little practical importance, and it is easy enough to understand his reasons for making it. " It was obvious from the first that a revival of slavery in the Soudan would result from the policy of abandonment. Nothing tliat General Gordon can do at Khartoum will prevent this revival ; knowing that he is powerless to stop slavery in the future, General Gordon evidently intends using it as a concession to the people which will strengthen his position in other matters. I con- sider that he has succeeded admirably so far, and I sincerely trust that he will be allowed full liberty of action to complete the execution of his general plans. I have informed him that my personal opinion is entirely in his favour, and that I will give him all tiie support in my power. " As to the best means of preventing slavery, the subject will have to be considered carefully and discussed afresh, in view of the altered circum- stances of the situation." After this, the subject was allowed to drop. The Pall iMall Gazette wrote : " The Government stood by their agent with commendable courage, and, as is usual when responsible authorities well-informed as to facts resist the clamour of OH. XXIV JOURNEY TO KHARTOUM 475 ill-informed public opinion, the cry promptly subsided." On February 18, General Gordon readied Khartoum. His arrival was announced to me by Mr. Power, in the following telegram : " Gordon arrived here this morning, and met with a wonder- ful demonstration of welcome on the part of the population. The state of affairs here, since it was heard that Gordon was coming, gives every promise of the speedy pacification of this portion of the Soudan. His speech to the people was received with the greatest enthusiasm." On the following day (February 19) Mr. Power sent me another telegram. " Gordon," he said, " met with a great reception yesterday. Has ordered all white troops to leave for Cairo. Soudani soldiers kept in Khartoum. Has formed Council of twelve Notables, Arabs, to sit with him. Burned all old records of debts against people, and instru- ments of torture in Government House. Colonel Stewart at prison striking irons off all prisoners of war, debtors, and men who have long ago served their sentences. Gordon sends Ibrahim Pasha down with detachment of white troops. Every- thing is now safe here for troops and Europeans. He is giving the people more than they expected from the Mahdi." General Gordon was at tliis time hopeful as regards the future. Without doubt, he was over- sanguine, but at the time a reasonable prospect seemed to exist that he would be able to carry out his mission successfully. He had begun well. On February 12, he telegraphed to me: "Do not fear for the Khartoum garrison. It can come by Berber, if necessary, but neither the men who attacked Baker, nor those who attacked Hicks, will ever leave tribal limits. What had to be feared was the rising of other peoples, which I trust I 4>7G MODERN EGYPT pt. hi have prevented by libenil concessions." Again, on February 14, he telegraphed to me : " I believe you need not give yourself any further anxiety about this part of the Soudan. The people, great and small, are heartily glad to be free of a union which only caused them sorrow." To a certain extent, General Gordon was right in his view of the situation. The tribes round Khartoum were wavering. If they openly joined the Malidi, the difficulties of the situation would be greatly increased. The only chance of ensuring their friendship was by making liberal concessions. General Gordon had made such concessions. He had issued a Proclamation sanctioning slavery, which, although it caused consternation in London, was hailed with delight at Khartoum. He had remitted taxes. He had destroyed the bonds of the usurers — always a most popular proceeding in an Oriental country. He had released prisoners who were unjustly confined. His mere presence at Khartoum was interpreted as a guarantee that the future government of the Soudan would be less oppressive than that of the past. Lord Gianville's buoyant spirits at once rose. On February 15, he wrote privately to me : '* It was an anxious moment while Gordon was in the desert. \Mien he gets at the head of 6000 men, it becomes more of a normal situation. It looks as if he would succeed." ^ 1 On another occasion (December 28, 1883), speaking' of Eg-yptian affairs jj^eiierally, Lord (Jninville wrote to nie : " 1 was delighted to see that you do not feel the alarm, which is felt here, and apparently in Egypt. I am perpetually reproaching myself with heing too optimistic. The difficulties are great, especially the enormous one of finance, but they ouglit not to be insurmountable." I do not think tliat I was ever very optimistic about Egyptian affairs. Indeed, as regards finance, 1 at one time erred somewhat on the side of undue pessimism. What 1 felt during this period was that, amidst all the excitement that then prevailed, and which resulted in some very wild and ill-considered suggestions being occasionally made, it w.aa necessary for me to keep my head, to ascertain so far as was CH. XXIV JOURNEY TO KHARTOUM 477 The shrewd Scotchman, who accompanied General Gordon, was not, however, carried away by the jubilation of the moment. On February 17, Colonel Stewart wrote to me : *' The problem of evacuating the Soudan is continually in our minds. I must confess the more one looks at it, the more difficult it becomes. However, perhaps, when actually tackled, it will resolve itself somehow or other." I have already stated that it was, in my opinion, a mistake ever to have sent General Gordon to the Soudan. Once sent, however, the best chance of success lay in adopting the course advocated by the Pall Mall Gazette. General Gordon should have had *' carte blanche to do the best that could be done," so long as he conformed to the broad lines of the policy which he was sent to carry out. I saw this from the first, and regulated my conduct accordingly. My difficulty lay in discovering, amidst the numerous contradictory opinions that emanated from General Gordon, what it was he really wished should be done. Unfortunately, a section of the British public did not realise suffi- ciently the importance of giving General Gordon a free hand. In spite of his popularity, directly he made proposals which ran counter to the current of preconceived public opinion, a chorus of dis- approbation was raised, in which some of General Gordon's warmest friends and supporters joined. possible the real facts of tlie case, to consider carefully the merits of any proposal before acting upon it, and especially to avoid the use of sensational or exaggerated language. On April 13, 1884, (ienoral Gordon sent me a telegram wliicli I did not receive till six years later (March 20, 18i)0), and in which he exhorted me to depart "from that delicious diplomatic calm wliich is Paradise." He fre(|uently used language of a somewhat similar description in his Journal. The "diplomatic calm " existed in a somewhat less degree than General Gordon supposed. Its appearance was mainly due to the fact that, in my opinion, the greater the difficulties, the more does it behove any one in a responsible position to maintain a clear judgment, and not be carried away by sentiment or rash advice. 478 IMODERN EGYPT pt. m The Government accepted the principle thcat they must follow General Gordon's advice. Mr. Glad- stone, speaking in the House of Commons, on February 12, said that it was the duty of the Government " to beware of interfering with General Gordon's plans generally." They adhered to this principle, at all events in respect to the Slavery Proclamation, with the result that the agitation against it speedily died a natural death. The Soudan question was, indeed, as Colonel Stewart said, to be solved *' somehow or other," but its solution was to bring to the British Government the political discredit which always attaches itself to failure. It was to cause a great waste of public treasure and to involve the sacrifice of many valu- able lives, including those of the two brave men on whose actions the attention, not only of England and Egypt, but it may also be said of all Europe was then fixed. CHAPTER XXV ZOBEIR PASHA February 18-March l6, 1884 The turning-point of General Gordon's Mission — General Gordon's Memorandum of February 8— Change in General Gordon's views — He asks for Zobeir Pasha — I advise that Zobeir Pasha should be General Gordon's successor — llie Government reject this proposal — General Gordon proposes to " smash up" the Mahdi — Conflicting policies advocated by General Gordon — His Proclamation stating that British troops were coming to Khartoum — General Gordon's neglect of his instructions — I again urge the employment of Zobeir Pasha — Difficulty of understanding General Gordon's telegrams — Colonel Stewart recommends that Zobeir Pasha should l)e sent — I support this view — General Gordon recommends that the Berber- Suakin route should be opened — ITie Government object to the employment of Zobeir Pasha — I again urge the employment of Zobeir Pasha — General Gordon's communications to tlie Times' correspondent — The tribes round Khartoum waver — The Govern- ment reject the Zobeir proposal — I instruct General Gordon to hold on to Khartoum — I again urge on the Government the necessity of employing Zobeir Pasha — The proposal is rejected — I remonstrate — Final rejection of the Zobeir proposal — Were the Government right in their decision ? Everything of political importance connected with General Gordon's Mission took place within a few weeks of his arrival at Khartoum. The essential facts connected with the history of those eventful weeks can be summed up in a few words. General Gordon proposed that Zobeir Pasha should govern the Soudan as a feudatory of the Egyptian Govern- ment. Colonel Stewart and myself at first liesitated as to the desirability of sending Zobeir Pasha to the Soudan, but after a brief interval we came 479 480 INIODERN EGYPT pt. iii round to General Gordon's opinion. The British Government would not agree to tlie employment of Zobeir Pasha. Subsequently, the tribes round Khartoum rose. General Gordon and Colonel Stewart were besieged. It was clear that General Gordon's political mission had failed, and from that moment there only remained an im])ortant military question to decide, viz., whether a British military force should or should not be sent to the relief of Khartoum. The broad facts of the case are already well known. They were set forth in the Parliamentary papers, which were published at the time. I am not, however, aware that any attempt has as yet been made to give so clear a p?Tcfs of the whole of the correspondence as to enable a thorough appreciation to be formed of the parts played respectively by those who were the principal actors in this political drama — I might almost say political tragedy. I propose, at the risk of being tedious, to make such Si precis. On February 8, General Gordon, who was then at Abu Hamed, addressed to me an important Memorandum. He wrote : " In spite of all that has occurred, I feel satisfied that the prestige of the Cairo Government, except in so far as the conduct of their troops in the field is concerned, is not seriously shaken, and lliat the people still continue to look up to the Cairo Government as the direct representatives of the Sultan as Khalif, and would look with horror on a complete separa- tion." He proposed that the Egyptian Government " should continue to maintain their position as a Suzerain Power, nominate the Governor-General and Moudirs" — v;ho were to be Soudanese — "and act as a supreme Court of A])peal. Their control- ling influence should, however, be a strictly moral one, and limited to giving advice." " I would, there- cH. XXV ZOBEIll PASHA 481 fore," he added, ''earnestly beg that evacuation, but not abandonment, be the programme to be followed, and that the Firman, with which I am provided, be changed into one recognising moral control and suzerainty." Accompanying this Memorandum, were some remarks by Colonel Stewart upon General Gordon's proposals, to which he gave a qualified support. He said that he " did not quite agree with General Gordon that the prestige of Cairo had not been greatly diminished." General Gordon's Memor- andum and Colonel Stewart's observations did not reach me till February 23. In the meanwhile, I had received a private letter from Colonel Stewart, dated Korosko, February 1, in which the following passage occurred : " Gordon is apparently still hankering after Zobeir, says he feels a sympathy for him, etc. It is impossible to say that he may not of a sudden request him to be sent up. Should such be the case, I trust you will not let him leave Cairo unless under very cogent reasons. I am convinced his coming up would be a dangerous experiment. It is also quite possible that he may not have the influence attributed to him, now that it is said his Bazingers (slave soldiers) have ceased to exist." On the other hand, General Gordon wrote to me from Abu Hamed on February 8 : " W^ith respect to Zobeir, he is the only man who is fit for Governor-General of the Soudan if we wish it to be quiet, and as for his touching me, he would have no object to do so. I wish you would see more of this remarkable man. ... I wish Lady Baring would see him." There can be no doubt that, as General Gordon approached Khartoum and as he became better informed of the situation in the Soudan, not only did the optimism of the views, which he had previously held, fade away, but also his sympathy VOL. I 2 I 482 MODERN EGYPT pt. m for the people of the country led him to forget the main object for the accomplishment of which he had been sent to the Soudan. But a few months were to elapse before the same man who had insisted that, in his mstructions, it should be stated that the policy of evacuating the Soudan " should on no account be changed," was to write in his Journal : " I hate her Majesty's Government for their leaving the Soudan after having caused all its troubles." The first indication I got of the rapid change which was to take place in General Gordon's views was contained in a letter from Colonel Stewart, dated Berber, February 13, in which he wrote : " Gordon is so full of sympathy for these people that he is inclined to use every effort to mitigate the efi'ect of our withdrawal, but I am convinced no effort of his will prevent the reign of anarchy. Personally, although I regret the unavoidable, still I am persuaded that the evacuation policy is the right one, and that it will probably be in the end the best for all parties." Immediately upon his arrival at Khartoum, on February 18, General Gordon sent me the following telegram : "In a previous INIemorandum,^ I alluded to the arrival of an epoch when whites, fellaheen troops, civilian employes, women and children of deceased soldiers — in short, the Egyptian element in the Soudan — will be removed ; when we shall be face to face with the Soudan administration, and when I must witlidraw from the Soudan. I have stated that to withdraw without being able to })lace a successor in my seat would be the signal for general anarchy throughout the country, which, though all Egyptian element was withdrawn, would be a misfortune, and inhuman. * This is the Memorandum of February 8, which did uot reach me till the 23rd. Vide ante, pp. 480-481. CH. XXV ZOBEIR PASHA 483 " Also, I have stated that, even if I placed a man in my seat unsupported by any Government, the same anarchy would ensue. " Her Majesty's Government could, I think, without responsibility in money or men, give the commission to my successor on certain terms which 1 will detail hereafter. If this solution is examined, we shall find that a somewhat analogous case exists in Afghanistan, where Her Majesty's Government give moral support to the Ameer, and go even beyond that in giving the Ameer a subsidy, which would not be needed in the present case. " I distinctly state that if Her Majesty's Govern- ment gave a Commission to my successor, I recom- mend neither a subsidy nor men being given. I would select and give a commission to some man, and promise him the moral support of Her Majesty's Government and nothing more. " It may be argued that Her Majesty's Govern- ment would thus be giving nominal and moral support to a man who will rule over a Slave State, but so is Afghanistan, as also Socotra. ** This nomination of my successor must, I think, be direct from Her Majesty's Government. "As for the man. Her Majesty's Government should select one above all others, namely, Zobeir. He alone has the ability to rule the Soudan, and would be universally accepted by the Soudan. He should be made K.C.M.G., and given presents." After stating the terms under which Zobeir Pasha should be nominated. General Gordon continued : " Zobeir's exile at Cairo for ten years, amidst all the late events and his mixing with Europeans, must have had a great effect on his character. Zobeir's nomination, under the moral countenance of Her Majesty's Government, would bring all the mer- chants, European and others, back to the Soudan in a short time. I have asked Stewart to gfive his 484 MODERN EGYPT pt. m opinions independently of mine, in order to pre- vent a one-sided view. He is a first-rate man." At the same time, Colonel Stewart sent me the following telegram : " With reference to Gordon's telegram of to-day, I think that the policy he urges would greatly facilitate our retirement from the country. As to Avhether Zobeir Pasha is the man who should be nominated, I think we have hardly yet a sufficient knowledge of the country to be able to form an opinion. It is, however, prob- able that whoever is nominated will be accepted for a time." I thought that General Gordon, when at Cairo, had made his proposal to utilise Zobeir Pasha's services without sufficient deliberation. When, however, I found that, after an interval of three weeks and after having had an opportunity of judging of the situation at Khartoum, General Gordon still thought that Zobeir Pasha's services might be utilised, it appeared to me safe to assume that he was expressing something in the nature of a matured opinion, and that he was not, as so frequently happened, dashing off an ill-considered proposal on the spur of the moment. I, therefore, resolved to support him in so far as the ultimate utilisation of Zobeir Pasha's services was concerned. On the other hand, there was manifestly a risk in allowing Zobeir Pasha and General Gordon to be at Khartoum together. Moreover, General Gordon's cautious companion. Colonel Stewart, entertained considerable doubts as to the advisability of em- ploying Zobeir Pasha. I had great confidence in Colonel Stewart's judgment. I wished to give him the time, for whicli he asked, to form an opinion. On February 19, therefore, I re])eated to Lord Granville General Gordon's and Colonel Stewart's telegrams of the I8th, with the following remarks of my own : — ciL XXV ZOBEIR PASHA 485 " As regards the choice of his (General Gordon's) successor, there is, as Colonel Stewart says in his telegram, no necessity to decide at once, but I believe Zobeir Pasha to be the only possible man. He undoubtedly possesses energy and ability, and has great local influence. "As regards the Slave Trade, I discussed the matter with General Gordon when he was in Cairo, and he fully agreed with me in thinking that Zobeir Pasha's presence or absence would not affect the question in one way or the other. I am also con- vinced, from many things that have come to my notice, that General Gordon is quite right in thinking that Zobeir Pasha's residence in Egypt has considerably modified his character. He now understands what European power is, and it is much better to have to deal with a man of this sort than with a man like the Mahdi. " I should be altogether opposed to having General Gordon and Zobeir Pasha at Khartoum together. As soon as General Gordon has arranged for the withdrawal of the garrison and the rest of the Egyptian element, he could leave Khartoum, and Zobeir Pasha might shortly afterwards start from Cairo. One of my chief reasons for allowing the interview betw een the two men to take place was that I wished to satisfy myself to some extent of the sentiments entertained by Zobeir Pasha towards General Gordon. I would not on any account run the risk of ])utting General Gordon in his power. " If Zobeir Pasha is nominated, it will be very necessary to lay down in writing and in the plainest language what degree of support he may expect from Her Majesty's Government. I cannot recom- mend that he should be promised the moral support of Her Majesty's Government. In the first place, he would scarcely understand the sense of the phrase, and, moreover, I do not think he would 486 MODERN EGYPT pt. hi attach mucli importance to any support which was not material. It is for Her JNlajesty's Government to judge what the effect of his appointment would be upon public opinion in England, but except for that, I can see no reason why Zobeir Pasha should not be proclaimed Ruler of the Soudan with the approbation of Her IMajesty's Government. It should be distinctly explained to him in writing that he must rely solely upon his own resources to maintain his position. He might receive a moder- ate sum of money from the Egyptian Government to begin with. His communications with that Government might be conducted through Her Majesty's Representative in Cairo, as General Gordon suggests. " With regard to the detailed conditions men- tioned by General Gordon, 1 think they might form the subject of further consideration and dis- cussion, both with General Gordon and with others in authority here. I am inclined to doubt whether such conditions would be of any use ; they would probably not long be observed. " In conclusion, I may add that I have no idea whether Zobeir Pasha would accept the position which it is proposed to offer him." On February 22, Lord Granville replied : " Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the gravest objections exist to the appointment by their authority of a successor to General Gordon. The necessity does not, indeed, appear to have yet arisen of ffoino; bevond the sujjcrestions contained in General Gordon's Memorandum of the 23rd ultimo,^ by making a special provision for the government of the country. " In any case, the public opinion of this country would not tolerate the appointment of Zobeir Pasha." • Vide ante, p. 442. CH.XXV ZOBEIR PASHA 487 Simultaneously with the receipt of this tele* gram, I received General Gordon's Memorandum written at Abu Hamed on February 8. This Memorandum, though in some respects at variance with the proposals contained in his telegram of the 18th, enabled me more fully to understand the general line of policy which he wished to advocate. I repeated to General Gordon Lord Granville's telegram of the 22nd, and at the same time I added the following remarks of my own : "The views expressed in your telegram of the 18th do not appear to me to harmonise with those contained in your letter of the 8th instant, which I received this morning, but that is of no conse- quence. The real difficulty is to find a man, or several men, who will take over the government of the country to the south of Wadi Haifa, especially the government of Khartoum itself. In view of the objections entertained in England against Zobeir, can you suggest any other names ? " I resolved to postpone any further connnunica- tion to Lord Granville until I had received General Gordon's reply to my question. It came on Feb- ruary 26, and was as follows : " Telegram of the 23rd February received respecting Zobeir. That settles question for me. 1 cannot suggest any other. Mahdi's agents active in all directions. No chance of Mahdi's advance personally from Obeid. You must remember that when evacuation is carried out, Mahdi will come down here, and, by agents, will not let Egypt be quiet. Of course, my duty is evacuation, and tlie best I can for establishing a quiet government. The first I hope to accomplish. The second is a more difficult task, and concerns Egypt more than me. If Egypt is to be quiet, Mahdi must be smashed up. Mahdi is most unpopular, and with care and time could be smashed. Remember that once Khartoum belong-s 488 MODERN EGYPT pt. iii to Mahdi, the task will be far more difficult ; yet you will, for safety of Egypt, execute it. If you decide on smashing JNIaluli, then send up another £100,000, and send up 200 Indian troops to Wadi Haifa, and send officer up to Dongola under pretence to look out quarters for troops. Leave Suakin and JNIassowah alone. I re})eat that evacuation is pos- sible, but you will feel effisct in Egypt, and will be forced to enter into a far more serious affiiir in order to guard Egypt. At present, it would be comparatively easy to destroy Mahdi." I have now arrived at the moment which was the turning-point of General Gordon's mission. It will be well to pause in order that I may give a summary of the situation as it then stood. On February 26, the date on which I received the above telegram from General Gordon, thirty- nine days had elapsed since he had left London, thirty-one days since he had left Cairo, and eight days since he had arrived at Khartoum. During that period, leaving aside points of detail, as to which his contradictions had been numerous, General Gordon had marked out for himself no less than five different lines of policy, some of which were wholly conflicting one with another, whilst others, without being absolutely irrecon- cilable, differed in respect to some of their most important features. On January 18, he started from London with instructions which had been dictated by himself. His wish then was that he should be merely sent to " report upon the best means of effecting the evacuation of the interior of the Soudan." He expressed his entire concurrence in the policy of evacuation. This was the first and original stage of General Gordon's opinions. Before he arrived in Egypt on January 24, he had changed his views as to the nature of the vjH. XXV ZOBEIR PASHA 489 functions he should fulfil. He no longer wished to be a mere reporter. He wished to be named Governor-General of the Soudan with full execu- tive powers. He supplemented his original ideas by suggesting that the country should be handed over to "the different petty Sultans who existed at the time of Mehemet All's conquest.' This was the second stage of General Gordon's opinions. Fifteen days later (February 8), he wrote from Abu Hamed a Memorandum in which he advo- cated "evacuation but not abandonment." The Government of Egypt were "to maintain their posi- tion as a Suzerain Power, nominate the Governor- General and Moudirs, and act as a supreme Court of Appeal." This was the third stage of General Gordon's opinions. Ten days later (February 18), General Gordon reverted to the principles of his JNIemorandum of the 8th, but with a notable difference. It was no longer the Egyptian, but the British Government which were to control the Soudan administration. The British Government were also to appoint a Governor -General who was to be furnished with a British commission, and who was to receive a British decoration. Zobeir Pasha was the man whom General Gordon wished the British Govern- ment to select. 'This was the fourth staff e of General Gordon s opinions. Eight days later (February 26), when General Gordon had learnt that the British Government were not prepared to approve of Zobeir Paslia being sent to the Soudan, he proposed that the JNlahdi should be " smashed up," and that, to assist in this object, 200 British Indian troops should be sent to Wadi Haifa. This was the fifth staae of General Gordon s opinions. In thirty-nine days, therefore. General Gordon had drifted by successive stages from a proposal 490 MODERN EGYPT ft. iii that he should report on the affairs of the Soudan, to advocating the policy of "smashing up" the Mahdi. It would, he said, be '* comparatively easy to destroy the JNIahdi." It is inconceivable that General Gordon should have thought that the JNIahdi could be destroyed with any force which the Egyptian Government could place at his disposal. British or British-Indian troops would have to be employed. He must have known this. Accordingly, three days later he took another step in advance. He proposed (February 29) that British-Indian troops should be used to open up the Suakin-Berber road. This, he said, "will cause an immediate collapse of the revolt." About the same time (February 27), he issued a Proclama- tion in which he stated that he had advised the people to desist from rebellion, but, he added, "finding that my advice had no effect on some people, I have been compelled to use severe measures, so much so that British troops are now on their way to reach Khartoum." Mr. Egmont Hake says,^ "the statement that British troops were on their way to Khartoum is, of course, inexplicable. It was probably due to the fact that Gordon had heard that British troops were advancing along the Suakin-Berber route." This explanation is wholly insufficient. At this time, telegraphic communication between Khartoum and Cairo was open. Nothing could have been easier than for General Gordon to have asked me whether such rumours, supposing there to have been any, were true, and I should, of course, at once have replied in the negative. It is clear that General Gordon made the statement about British troops being on their way to Khartoum knowing it to be unfounded. He wished to exercise a moral effect upon the population. I will not attempt to * The Story of Chbicm (lordon, pp. 82 and 163. OH. XXV ZOBEIR PASHA 491 discuss wlietlier, under the circumstances in which General Gordon was placed, his statement was justifiable from a moral point of view.' Many a military commander before General Gordon has found it necessary to employ ruses of various descriptions. From the point of view of ex- pediency, it would appear that General Gordon made a mistake. It was certain that, in a short time, the people would find out that no British troops were on their way to Khartoum. Thus, General Gordon would be discredited. Indeed, when eventually Lord Wolseley's expedition ad- vanced, the news of the approach of a British force failed to obtain credence. It can be no matter for surprise that the British Government should have been bewildered by the rapid changes in General Gordon's opinions. And this bewilderment was mixed with some alarm, for their impulsive agent appeared to be hurrying them along a path which would almost certainly lead to British armed intervention in the Soudan. Now, the Government lield that one of the main objects of their policy should be to avoid any such inter- vention. Mr. Gladstone, speaking in the House of Commons on February 23, 1885, said: "When General Gordon left this country and when he arrived in Egypt, he declared it to be — and I have not the smallest doubt it was — a fixed })ortion of his policy, that no British force should be employed in aid of his mission." This statement is unques- tionably correct. The following letter from Lord Northbrook, dated February 29, contains such a clear description of the difficulties of the moment, that I give it in full : — What a queer fellow Gordon is and how rapidly he changes his opinions ! I. Zobeir is to be sent to Cyprus before Gordon ari'ives in Egypt. 492 MODERN EGYPT pt hi II. Zobeir is to rule at Khartoum. I. The Mahdi is a good kind man, whom Gordon is to visit quietly and settle affairs with. II. The Mahdi is to be Emir of Kordofan. III. The Mahdi is to be smashed up. I. The Suakin-Berber route is to be opened up, and the Hadendowa tribe is to be set upon by the other tribes.^ II. Suakin is to be left alone.^ Why should Zobeir be trusted ? His antecedents are all against it. Why should he oppose the Mahdi .'* He is supposed to have had a main hand in the insurrection. Why should he protect Egypt ? He knows her weakness, and is just as likely to be her worst enemy.^ Why should he like us ? Gordon and you must have very good reasons, but I hope you will let us know them. There is no disposi- tion here to negative Zobeir, simply because his nomination woukl undoubtedly be extremely distasteful to every one who has paid any attention to the history of the Soudan, or cares about checking the Slave Trade. But, looked at with refer- ence to the real interests of Egypt, the arguments and probabilities against seem to me greatly to preponderate. The Mahdi must be " smashed up.'"* This seems to be Gordon's view now. But he gives no reasons, and it is utterly contrary to our policy hitherto. Indeed, his telegram does not differ very much from Cherif Pasha's programme of keeping Khartoum, upon which you turned him out. Things may be in such a condition that a change may be necessary, but I cannot say I feel that confidence in Gordon's opinions, which are often most hastily expressed and con- stantly changed, to induce me to think without further reasons being given, that we were all wrong in January last. * This proposal was contained in an undated Memorandum sent to me by General Gordon which I received on February 4, 1884. See Egypt, No. 12 of 1884, p. 61. ^ When General (iordou was in Cairo, he wished the whole of the garrison of Suakin to be witlidrawn, except 1.50 men. I think that this question must have formed the subject of further discussion between General Gordon and Colonel Stewart after their arrival at Khartoum, for on March 4, Colonel Stewart wrote to nie : "I trust the Govern- ment will not be so ill-advised as to send away the troops from Suakin ; it would be in every way a very had move, and very prejudicial to us." ^ Lord Northbrook might have quoted General Gordon's own testi- mony in support of tliis view. When, early in December 1883, I favoured the idea that Zobeir Pasha should be sent to Suakin, General Gordon wrote : " Zobeir will mana2:e to get taken prisoner and wili head the revolt." — JJirtit.s, etc., p. 314. CH. XXV ZOBElll PASHA 493 If the religious movement is really so serious that the Mahdi must be " smashed up " for the safety of Egypt, how is it to be done ? For my part, I can only see one way, and that is to set Musulman against Musulman, and to try and induce the Turk to take the business up. Turk against Arab it will be, and a serious business too. Pray do not suppose that, because we hesitate to take very grave decisions involving a considerable change of policy without time to consider and without further motives upon which to form our judgment, that we have the least want of confidence in you. As to Gordon, I have great confidence in his wisdom in action — little in his steadiness in Council. We certainly have the mostdifhcult job to tackle between us that any men ever had, and I am sure it requires great steadiness all round. Before General Gordon had been long at Khar- toum, his combative spirit completely got the better of him. As a soldier, he could not brook the idea of retirino^ before the Mahdi. Moreover, as a civilised European, he winced at the idea that a country, in which some germs of civilisation had been sown, should relapse into barbarism. On April 11, 1884, he telegraphed tome : ^ " Having visited the schools, workshops, etc., it is deplorable to think of their destruction by a feeble lot of stinking Dervishes." He wished, therefore, to " smash up " the Mahdi, and perhaps it was natural that he should have done so. But in taking up this attitude, which necessarily involved armed British interference in the country, he departed from the spirit of his instructions. He was sent to evacuate the Soudan. A subsidiary portion of his instructions — I look to the spirit of those instructions rather than to the strict letter — was that, if possible, he was to leave behind him a fairly good government, which would not constitute a standing menace to Egypt. It is difficult to understand how General Gordon could have made his proposal to wage war against * I did uot receive this message till March 26, 1890. 494 MODERN EGYPT pt. hi the Mahdi with British troops tally with these instructions. It was not until February 23, when I received General Gordon's JNIeniorandum of February 8 written at Abu Hamed, that I fully understood his telegram of the 18th from Khartoum, in which he proposed to utilise Zobeir Pasha's services. I tlien set myself to work to consider what it was that General Gordon really wanted. I swept aside all the minor contradictions in his proposals. I did not consider that the suggestion about " smashing up " the Mahdi was worthy of serious discussion. It was obviously impracticable without employing British troops, a policy the adoption of which the British Government would certainly have rejected. It appeared to me, however, that at the bottom of all General Gordon's contradictions there was an underlying vein of common sense. He wished, in the terms of his Memorandum of February 8, to advocate a policy of " evacuation but not abandonment." The policy of setting up the local Sultans, which he had put forward at Cairo, was manifestly impossible of execution, not because it was faulty in principle, but because there were no local Sultans to set up. He wished, therefore, to carry out the same principle, but in a manner differing from that which had been originally proposed. One man, Zobeir Pasha, was to be set up, who was to govern the most important portions of the Soudan. He was to be a feudatory of the Egyptian Government. This was a serious departure from the policy of reporting, which had been adopted in London. It was not, however, a serious departure from, but rather a modification of the policy embodied in the instructions given to General Gordon at Cairo. Some two years later. Lord Nortlibrook wrote to me : *' INIy own opinion of the reason of CH. XXV ZOBEIR PASHA 495 the failure is that, instead of doing as we wished, viz., withdrawing the garrison of Khartoum, Gordon, on his arrival, hankered after the ignis fatiius of arranging for a settled government of a country, which could not be settled excepting by a lengthened and possibly a permanent occupation in force." It may be that this view is right. But at the time it seemed to me that it would be a wise policy to establish a " buffer state " in the Soudan, which would hold much the same relation to Egypt as Afghanistan holds to British India. The policy was, I thought, at any rate worthy of a trial, and, so far as I could judge from General Gordon's utterances, he was of opinion that the difficulties in the way of its accomplishment, though great, were not altogether insurmountable. It was with this view uppermost in my mind that, on February 28, I repeated to Lord Granville General Gordon's telegram of the 26th ^ and added the following remarks : — " I will now submit to your Lordship my views upon the main points at issue, after having care- fully considered the different proposals made by General Gordon. There are obviously many con- tradictions in those proposals ; too much import- ance should not be attached to the details. But I venture to again recommend to the earnest atten- tion of Her Majesty's Government the serious question of principle which General Gordon has raised. " Two alternative courses may be adopted. One is to evacuate the Soudan entirely, and to make no attempt to establish any settled government tiiere before leaving ; the other is to make every effort of which the present circumstances admit to set up some settled form of government to replace the former Egyptian Administration. * Vide ante, p. 487. 496 MODERN EGYPT pt. m '* General Gordon is evidently in favour of the latter of these courses. I entirely agree with him. The attempt, it is true, may not be successful, but I am strongly of opinion that it should be made. From every point of view, whether political, military, or financial, it will be a most serious matter if complete anarchy is allowed to reign south of Wadi Haifa. And this anarchy will inevitably ensue on General Gordon's departure, unless some measures are adopted beforehand to prevent it. " With regard to the wish of Her Majesty's Government not to go beyond General Gordon's plan, as stated in his Memorandum of the 23rd ultimo, I would remark that he appears to have intended merely to give a preliminary sketch of the general line of policy to be pursued. Moreover, in that Memorandum he makes a specific allusion to the difficulty of providing rulers for Khartoum, Dongola, and other places where there are no old families to recall to power. " It is clear that Her Majesty's Government cannot afford moral or material support to General Gordon's successor as Ruler of the Soudan, but the question of whether or not he should be nominally appointed by the authority of Her Majesty's Government appears to me to be one of very slight practical importance. " Whatever may be said to the contrary. Her Majesty's Government must in reality be respon- sible for any arrangements which are now devised for the Soudan, and I do not think it is possible to shake off that responsibility. " If, however, Her Majesty's Government are unwilling to assume any responsibility in the matter, then I think they should give full liberty of action to General Gordon and the Khedive's Government to do what seems best to them. CH.XXV ZOBEIR PASHA 497 "I have no doubt as to the most advisable course of action. Zobeir Pasha should be per- mitted to succeed General Gordon. He should receive a certain sum of money to begin with, and an annual subsidy of about £50,000 for the first five years, to depend upon his good behaviour. This amount would enable him to maintain a moderate-sized army, and the whole arrangement would be an economical one for the Egyptian Government. " The main difficulty lies in the selection of the man. It is useless to send any one who has no local influence. There are certain obvious objections to Zobeir Pasha, but I think too great weight is attached to them, and I believe that General Gordon is quite right when he says that Zobeir Pasha is the only possible man. I can suggest none other, and Nubar Pasha is strongly in favour of him. " It is for Her Majesty's Government to judge of the importance to be attached to public opinion in England, but I venture to think that any attempt to settle Egyptian questions by the light of English popular feeling is sure to be productive of harm, and in this, as in other cases, it would be preferable to follow the advice of the responsible authorities on the spot." On March 1, Lord Granville replied : " I have received your telegram of the 28th ultimo, inform- ing me of General Gordon's views with regard to the proposals which he made for placing Zobeir Pasha in power at Khartoum. " Her Majesty's Government desire further information as to the urgency of any immediate appointment of a successor to General Gordon, who they trust will remain for some time longer at Khartoum. " If it be found necessary to make an arrange- voi« I 2 K 498 MODERN EGYPT pt. in ment of this subject eventually, Her INIajesty's Government will carefully weigh your opinions as to the proper person for the post. *' They are, at the same time, of opinion that if such an appointment is made, it might be advantageous that it should receive the confirma- tion of the Sultan." I repeated this telegram to General Gordon. Lord Granville wrote me a private letter, on February 29, which shows the views entertained by the Government at the time this telegram was despatched. "Pray do not," he said, "doubt our full confidence in you, but as circumstances naturally sometimes oblige you to change the view you had taken when things were in a different state, we often desire to have your opinion before a final decision. We had a Cabinet, and although there would have been much reluctance if we had been obliged to answer at once categorically about Zobeir, yet we should, probably, have yielded to your, Gordon's and Nubar's opinion. If you persist in it, I am certain it will be carefully considered. The Cabinet were startled at what appeared to be a change of front as to withdrawal from the Soudan. I apprehend that your answer would be that you do not propose an Egyptian Government administering the Soudan with Egyptian troops scattered about the desert, that it is only proposed that an individual should be appointed with a large salary to govern the country as best he could, and in a friendly manner towards Egypt. But even this offers many considerations. As to the person, I do not doubt that Zobeir is the only man strong enough to cope with the iNIahdi. But can you guarantee that tlie official income will be a sufficient bribe to prevent his embarking in his former lucrative pursuits, or even of his not going over to the Mahdi ? " OH. XXV ZOBEIR PASHA 499 It was obvious that I could give no guarantee of the sort required by Lord Granville. As has been already mentioned, the attitude of tlie British Government in respect to Egyptian affairs was often of an exclusively negative and hypercritical character. The objections to the adoption of any particular course were clearly seen. Those objections Avere allowed to prevail. But as no alternative policy was adopted, the Government became tlie sport of circumstances. On April 18, 1884, Lord Granville wrote to me: "The misfortune during the last two years has been that we hardly ever have had anything but bad alternatives to choose from. The objectors to whatever was decided were pretty sure to have the best of it." In the interval between the receipt of General Gordon's telegram of February 26 ^ and that of Lord Granville's reply on March 1,- General Gordon sent me a large number of telegrams. It was difficult to understand from them what it was he really wanted. Moreover, the language hi which they were couched led me to the conclusion that he was making a number of proposals on matters of general policy without sufficient reflection. On March 2, therefore, I telegraphed to him : " I am most anxious to help and support you in every way, but I find it very difficult to understand exactly what it is you want. I think your best plan will be to reconsider the whole question carefully, and then state to me in one telegram what it is you recom- mend, in order that 1 can, if necessary, obtain the instructions of Her IMajesty's Government." I added some further observations drawing attention to the main points which required consideration. At the same time (March 2), I sent the follow- ing telegram to Colonel Stewart: "Private. As regards my long telegram to Gordon, pray make 1 Vide ante, p. 487. ^ ^ide ante, p. 497. 500 MODERN EGYPT pt. m him understand that my sole object is to help him to the best of my ability, but it adds immensely to my difficulties to receive constant and somewhat contradictory telegrams, apparently written on the spur of the moment, in respect to matters of policy. What I should like him to do is to consider the whole question carefully and deliber- ately, and then to let me know what he thinks and what he recommends. At present, with the best possible intentions, I can really do little to help him, for I cannot clearly miderstand what it is he wants." * Prior to the despatch of this telegram to Colonel Stewart, I had, on February 29, sent the following private telegram to Lord Granville : " I have received a fresh batch of telegrams from Gordon. His statements and proposals are hopelessly bewildering and contradictory. I do not mean to say that I have lost confidence in Gordon. Such is not the case. But in dealing with his proposals it is often difficult to know what he means, and still more difficult to judge what is really worthy of attention, and what is more or less nonsense. It is really of no use my forwarding all he sends home for instructions, for the difficulty for you will be even greater than for me. I think, on the whole, you had better give me full authority ' On receiving this telegram. Colonel Stewart wrote to me (March 4): "1 fully sympathise with you about the many and rather divergent teleg-rams you get. Gordon telegraphs directly an idea strikes him. There is no use in trying to stop it. Were I you, 1 should always wait for a few days before acting unless the subject matter is so evident that there can be no doubt about it." Matters were so urgent tliat I was unable to follow Colonel Stewart's advice to the extent of " waiting for a few days before acting." But I rarely acted on any telegram of General Gordon's directly I received it. I generally found a batch of them waiting for me when I began my work in the nioiniiig. My practice was to put them on one side and wait till the afternoon, by wliich time more had generally arrived. I used then to compare the different telegrams, to try to extract from them what it was that General Gordon really wanted, and then to decide what could be done towards carrying out his wishes. OH. XXV ZOBEIR PASHA 501 to do the best I can. I fully understand the policy of Her Majesty's Government, and you can rely on my doing nothing contrary to it, but, of course, I can only do this if I feel sure I possess the entire confidence of Her JNIajesty's Government. 1 should, in any case, like an answer about Zobeir as a question of principle is involved." To this telegram Lord Granville replied on March 2 : " I am not surprised at your private message. We have full confidence in you and give the full discretion you ask. When you have time, we like to know your reasons." I received several telegrams from General Gordon in reply to my message of IMarch 2. I need not give them in full. They were to the effect that he maintained the policy of eventually evacuating the Soudan, including Khartoum ; that, in consequence of the evacuation, anarchy would ensue, about which. General Gordon said, " I would not trouble myself"; and that the imme- diate withdrawal of all the Egyptian employes was impossible. General Gordon dwelt strongly on the necessity of sending Zobeir Pasha to Khartoum at once. "The combination," he said, "at Khartoum of Zobeir and myself is an absolute necessity for success, and I beg you and Lord Granville to believe my certain conviction that there is not the slightest fear of our quarrelling, for Zobeir would know that the subsidy depended on my safety. To do any good we must be together, and that without delay. . . . Pray abandon fear of Zobeir's hurting me. His interests are bound up with mine. Believe me I am right, and do not delay. . . . Things are not serious, although they may become so if delay occurs in sending Zobeir. Mv weakness is that of bein:reement with them as to the future of the country ? " As regards the second question, the following points require consideration. "First, how is the proposal to nominate and * Vide ante, p. 498. CH.XXV ZOBEIR PASHA 511 subsidise Zobeir to be reconciled with the policy of evacuation ? *' Secondly, how is it to be reconciled with the prevention or discouragement of slave-hunting or the Slave Trade ? "Thirdly, how is it to be reconciled with the security of Egypt ? In dealing with this latter question, it is desirable to consider how far Zobeir can be trusted to remain friendly to Egypt. Might he not make common cause with the Mahdi, should he become powerful, and prove a source of danger, on his own account, rather than of assistance to Egypt ? Many people think that he has instigated the revolt of the Mahdi. Have you any reasons to believe that he has done so ? " Having answered these questions, please reply fully to Lord Granville's question as to the prospects of extricating the garrisons, including Darfour." My object in sending this telegram was to ask General Gordon a series of leading questions, which he might answer in a form calculated to produce an effect in London. I felt, however, that some further explanation was due to him, for he might reasonably cavil at questions being addressed to him which, so far as was possible, he had already answered several times. Simultaneously, therefore, with the despatch of my official telegram, I sent him the following private message : "Please under- stand, as regards my long telegram of to-day, that I could answer many of the questions myself, but I want to get your opinions and then see whether they agree with mine. You can regard the Zobeir question as still under consideration, but the Home Government does not like the proposal, and recpiires solid reasons to be given before they can accept it. Send me a careful and well-argued answer on the different points I raise." 512 MODERN EGYPT ft. iii On INIarch 8, I received General Gordon's reply. It was as follows : *'The sending of Zobeir means the extrication of the Cairo employes from Khartoum, and the garrisons from Sennar and Kassala. I can see no possible way to do so except through him who, being a native of the country, can rally the well -affected around him, as they know he will make his home here. I do not think that the giving a subsidy to Zobeir for some two years would be in contradiction to the policy of entire evacuation. It would be nothing more than giving him a lump sum in two instalments under the con- ditions I have already written. As for slave-hold- ing, even had we held the Soudan, we could never have interfered with it. I have already said that the Treaty of 1877 was an impossible one ; there- fore, on that head, Zobeir's appointment would make no difference whatever. As for slave-hunt- ing, the evacuation of the Bahr-el-Ghazal and Equatorial provinces would entirely prevent it. Should Zobeir attempt, after his two years' subsidy was paid him, to take those districts, we could put pressure on him at Suakin, which will remain in our hands. I feel sure that Zobeir will be so occupied with the Soudan proper, and with consolidating his position, that he will not have time to devote to those provinces. As for the security of Egypt, Zobeir's stay in Cairo has taught him our power, and he would never dream of doing anything against Egypt. He would rather seek its closest alliance, for he is a great trader. As to progress made in extrication of garrisons, all I have done is to send down from Khartoum all the sick men, women, and children of those killed in Kordofan. Sennar, I heard to-day, is quite safe and quiet. Kassala will hold out without difficulty after Graham's victory, but the road there is blocked, as also is the road to Sennar. It is quite impos- OH. XXV ZOBEIR PASHA 513 sible to get the roads open to Kassala and Sennar, or to send down the white troops, unless Zobeir comes up. He will change the whole state of affairs. As for the Equatorial and Bahr-el-Ghazal provinces, they are all right, but I cannot evacuate them till the Nile rises, in two months. Dongola and Berber are quiet ; but I fear for the road between Berber and Khartoum, where the friends of the JNIahdi are very active. A body of rebels on the Blue Nile are blockading a force of 1000 men, which have, however, plenty of food; till the Nile rises, I cannot relieve them. Darfour, so far as I can understand, is all right, and the restored Sultan should now be working up the tribes to acknow- ledge him. It is impossible to find any other man but Zobeir for governing Khartoum. No one has his power. Hussein Pasha Khalifa has only power at Dongola and Berber. If you do not send Zobeir, you have no chance of getting the garrisons away ; this is a heavy argument in favour of sending him. There is no possibility of dividing the country between Zobeir and other Chiefs ; none of the latter could stand for a day against the Mahdi's agents, and Hussein Pasha Khalifa would also fall. The Chiefs will not collect here, for the loyal are defending their lands against the disloyal. There is not the least chance of Zobeir making common cause with the Mahdi. Zobeir here would be far more powerful than the Mahdi, and he would make short work of the Mahdi. The JNIahdi's power is that of a Pope, Zobeir's will be that of a Sultan. They could never combine. Zobeir is fifty times the Mahdi's match. He is also of good family, well known and fitted to be Sultan ; the Mahdi, in all these respects, is the exact opposite, besides being a fanatic. I daresay Zobeir, who hates the tribes, did stir up the fires of revolt, in hopes that he would be sent to quell it. It is VOT,. 1 2 L 514 MODERN EGYPT pt. in the irony of fate that he will get his wish if he is sent up." At the same time, I received some further tele- grams from General Gordon, which showed that the danger of communication between Berber and Khartoum being cut off was daily becoming more imminent, although, General Gordon added, "for Khartoum itself, there is not any fear." On March 9, I repeated to Lord Granville General Gordon's long telegram of the 8th, adding the following remarks : — " I think that the policy of sending Zobeir to Khartoum and giving him a subsidy is in harmony with the policy of evacuation. It is in principle the same policy as that adopted by the Govern- ment of India towards Afghanistan and the tribes on the north-west frontier. I have always con- templated making some arrangements for the future government of the Soudan, as will be seen from my despatch of December 22, 1883, in which 1 said that it would be 'necessary to send an English officer of high authority to Khartoum with full powers to withdraw all garrisons in the Soudan, and make the best arrangements possible for the future government of the country.' " As regards slavery, it may certainly receive a stimulus from the abandonment of the Soudan by Egypt, but the despatch of Zobeir Pasha to Khar- toum will not affect the question in one way or the other. No middle course is possible so far as the Soudan is concerned. We must either virtually annex the country, which is out of the question, or else we must accept the inevitable consequences of the policy of abandonment. " Your Lordship will see what General Gordon says about the question of the security of Egypt. I believe that Zobeir may be made a bulwark agahist the approach of the INIahdi. Of course. CH. XXV ZOBEIR PASHA 515 there is a risk that he will constitute a danger to Egypt, but this risk is, I think, a small one, and it is in any case preferable to incur it rather than to face the certain disadvantages of withdrawing without making any provision for the future government of the country, which would thus be sure to fall under the power of the Mahdi. '* I venture to urge upon Her Majesty's Govern- ment the necessity of settling this question without delay. General Gordon's telegrams have latterly caused me some uneasiness. He evidently thinks that there is a considerable dano:er of his bein<>" hemmed in and blockaded by the rebels at Khar- toum, and he appears to contemplate the despatch of British troops to extricate him. Moreover, so far as I can judge. General Gordon exercises little or no influence outside Khartoum, and, altliough he was at first hailed as a deliverer, his influence is sure to decline as time goes on."" An incident now occurred which practically destroyed all hopes of utilising Zobeir Pasha's services. Up to this moment, nothing definite was known to the public about the proposal to send Zobeir Pasha to Khartoum. Mr. Power was employed by the Times as its special correspondent at Khartoum. On March 8 or 9, INIr. Moberly Bell, who was Times correspondent in Egypt, com- municated to me a telegram from Mr. Power for transmission to the Times, from which it appeared that General Gordon had given to him all the information which was contained in his telegrams to me. I subsequently received a letter from Colonel Stewart, dated March 8, which informed me of what had taken phice in connection with this subject. "The telegram," Colonel Stewart wrote, " shown you by Bell this morning has, no doubt, surprised you. Gordon also sent you a tele- gram giving in his resignation if his views were not 516 MODERN EGYPT pt. iii carried out. Yesterday evening, he got very irritated with me because I did not at once accede to his request to send you a telegram about Zobeir and the ])ropriety of sending him up with a British force to Berber. I said tliat you had ah'eady told us the chief difficulty was not at Cairo, but at London, etc. " I did not refuse to write the telegram, I merely asked for a little time to think. G. got very impatient and finally left the table. Seeing that he was annoyed, I got up and wrote the telegram as he desired. On returning, I found him with the Times correspondent. Tlie result was the telegram you have been shown. We had a discussion on the subject, but it was of no avail. He then telegraphed his resignation to you, but this I fortunately succeeded in getting put into cipher. The affair is very annoying, but I think the Ministry at home ought to let him have his wish and give him Zobeir." General Gordon wrote in his Journal : " Baring pitched into me for indiscretion in asking openly for Zobeir, which I did on purpose, in order to save Her Majesty's Government the odium of such a step."^ As regards the indiscretion, there can be no doubt whatever. It was not only that the publication of General Gordon's views raised a storm of opposition in England to Zobeir Pasha's a])pointment, but also that the difficulties of neffotiatino- with Zobeir Pasha were greatly increased. Instead of my being able to send for him and point out to him that he had hitherto been under a cloud, but that now he had an o})portunity of retrieving his reputation, he was placed in a position in which it would have appeared possible to him to dictate his own terms. * Journal, September 19, 1884, vol. i. p. 67. I remember sending a telegram urging on Genenil Gordon the dcsinibility of reticence in his communications to the press, but I cannot lay my hands on it. CH. XXV ZOBEIR PASHA 517 Indeed, he received advice to act in this manner from the numerous persons in Cairo who were eager to seek any and every opportunity for showing hostility to England. As regards the effect in England, Mr. Sturge, the Chairman of the Anti-Slavery Society, wrote, on March 18, to Lord Granville that he had been instructed by a full Committee of tlie Society to state that they were '* unanimous in the feeling that countenance in any shape of such an individual {i.e. Zobeir Pasha) by the i3ritish Government would be a degradation for England and a scandal to Europe. . . . As yet, however, the Committee are unable to believe that Her Majesty's Government will thus stultify that anti-slavery policy which has so long been the high distinction of England, or that they will thus discharge a trust which they have undertaken on behalf of the British people and of Europe." The action of the Anti-Slavery Society was injudicious. It can scarcely be doubted that their opposition, together with the fact that there was every indication of the matter being taken up as a party question in England, greatly contributed to the rejection of the views put forward by General Gordon, Colonel Stewart, and myself. Before dealing with the reply which Lord Granville sent to my telegram of March 9, I must describe the further correspondence which took place between General Gordon and myself on March 9, 10, and 11. On the 9th, General Gordon telegraphed to me : **I shall await your decision {i.e. the decision about Zobeir Pasha) ; if wire is cut, I shall consider your silence is consent to my propositions, and shall hold on to Khartoum and await Zobeir and British diversion at Berber." I had still some hope of being permitted to utilise Zobeir Pasha, but, in view of the fact that telegraphic communication with Khartoum 518 MODERN EGYPT pt. iii might at any moment be interrupted, I did not think it was either just or desirable to leave General Gordon under tlie impression that the British Government had any intention of sending an expedition to Berber, wlien I knew that they had no such intention. I, therefore, replied at once : " So far as I know, there is no intention on the part of the Government to send an English force to Berber." On JNIarch 10 and 11, I received a large number of telegrams from General Gordon. I need not give them in full. They were to the general effect that the Sheikh-el-Obeid was undecided whether to join the Mahdi or not,^ that there was considerable risk of communication between Berber and Khartoum being interrupted, but that Khartoum itself was not in any danger, and that the utility of Zobeir Pasha had been greatly diminished by the delay in settling the question of his employment, '* which had forced the loyal to join tlie enemy." *' If,'' General Gordon telegraphed, "you mean to make the proposed diversion to Berber (of British troops), and to accept my proposal as to Zobeir, to install him in the Soudan and evacuate, then it is worth w hile to hold on to Khartoum. " If, on the other hand, you determine on neither of these steps, then I can see no use in holding on to Khartoum, for it is impossible for me to lielp the other garrisons, and I shall only be sacrificing the whole of the troops and employes here. *' In this latter case, your instructions to me had better be that I should evacuate Khartoum, and, with all the employes and troops, remove the seat of government to Berber. You would under- ' The Sheikh-el-()beid occupied a position of importance, as his tribal influence extended over the popul.ition lyin";' between Kliartoum and Berber. Colonel Steuart, in a letter to me, described him as "a very lioly man, but a decided trimmer." CH. XXV ZOBEIR PASHA 519 stand that such a step would mean the sacrificmg of all outlymg places except Berber and Dongola. '* You must give a prompt reply to this, as even the retreat to Berber may not be in my power in a few days ; and even if carried out at once, the retreat will be of extreme difficulty. " I should have to leave large stores and nine steamers, which cannot go down. Eventually, some question would arise at Berber and Dongola, and I may utterly fail in getting the Cairo em- ployes to Berber. " If I attempt it, I could be responsible only for the attempt to do so." In another telegram, General Gordon said : " If the immediate evacuation of Khartoum is deter- mined upon, irrespective of outlying towns, I would propose to send down all the Cairo employes and white troops with Colonel Stewart to Berber, where he would await your orders. I would also ask Her Majesty's Government to accept the resig- nation of my commission, and I would take all steamers and stores up to the Equatorial and Bahr- el-Ghazal Provinces, and consider those provinces as under the King of the Belgians. *' You would be able to retire all Cairo employes and white troops with Stewart from Berber to Dongola, and tlience to Wadi Haifa. " If you, therefore, determine on the immediate evacuation of Khartoum, this is my idea. If you object, tell me. *' It is the only solution that I can see if the immediate evacuation of Khartoum, irrespective of the outlying towns, is determined upon." ^ Lord Granville's reply to my telegram of March 9 was despatched to me on the 11th. It * Some of the telegrams, which Gordon sent me at this moment, did not reach me till many days later, owing to the frecjuent interruptions of telegraphic communication. 520 MODERN EGYPT . ft. hi was to the following effect : " Her Majesty's Government have carefully considered your tele- grams of the 9th instant with regard to the future government of Khartoum and the Soudan, but they do not consider that the arguments against the employment of Zobeir Pasha have been satis- factorily answered. They are prepared to agree to any other Mohammedan assistance, as well as to the supply of any reasonable sum of money which General Gordon may consider necessary in order to carry out successfully the objects of his mission. " Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to send troops to Berber. They understand from your telegrams that General Gordon and yourself are of opinion that the withdrawal of the garrisons will take a considerable time, and that the chief difficulty arises from the uncertainty felt by the inhabitants of the Soudan with regard to the future government of the country. While attaching great importance to an early evacuation. Her Majesty's Government have no desire to force General Gordon's hand prematurely, and they pro- pose, therefore, to extend his appointment for any reasonable period wliich may be necessary to enable him to carry out the objects of the mission with which he has been intrusted. You will communi- cate with General Gordon in the sense of this despatch." Immediately afterwards (March 12), I received the following telegram from Lord Granville: "Her Majesty's Government desire to learn whether General Gordon's proposal as to his eventual successor refers to the whole of the Soudan, and, if not, to what districts of it. They would also be glad to receive information as to whether his proposed jurisdiction would embrace points from which Slave Trade or slave - hunting could be carried on." CH.XXV ZOBEIR PASIIA 521 I repeated Lord Granville's teleiirams to General Gordon, instructing liini at the same time to hold on to Khartoum until I could communicate further with the British Government. I also told him "on no account to proceed to the Bahr-el-Ghazal and Equatorial provinces." I do not think that General Gordon ever received this message. Nevertheless, I regret that I sent it. I have already discussed this matter partially in dealing with the question of the prohibition placed on his action in respect to retiring southwards.^ I may now add that, in view of the danger of tele- graphic communication being interrupted, it would have been better for me, instead of telling General Gordon to hold on to Khartoum, to have taken upon myself the responsibility of directing him to retire at once to Berber, if he thought fit to do so. Also, it would have been better for me to have accepted the conclusion that the British Govern- ment were determined not to employ Zobeir Pasha. If it could have been announced, before the tribes between Berber and Khartoum rose, that Zobeir Pasha was to be installed as Governor-General of the Soudan with a force of black troops at his disposal to maintain order, it is possible that the Sheikh-el- Obeid and his followers would never have joined the Mahdi. But the favourable moment for in- fluencing them in this direction had been allowed to pass by. At the time, however, I thought from the tone of Lord Granville's telegrams of the 11th and 12th of March that the employment of Zobeir Pasha was still an open question. I, therefore, repeated to him a summary of General Gordon's most recent telegrams. I also replied at length to the questions addressed to me, and at the same time 1 sent to him the following private telegram : "If you eventually decide to send Zobeir, please » Vide ante, pp. 465-467. 522 MODERN EGYPT pt. m keep it, if possible, secret, till I have dealt with him here. I am told that he will not fjo unless Gordon comes away, as, if Gordon came to any harm, he thinks he would be accused of causino; it. The publicity, which Gordon gave to this matter, is most unfortunate. Newspaper correspondents are interviewing Zobeir, and some people here are urging him to make his own terms, as we cannot get on without him. All this will make him difficult to deal with." Lord Granville replied immediately (March 13) : "I have received your telegram of the 13th instant on the subject of General Gordon's sugges- tions with regard to the appointment of Zobeir Pasha as Governor of Khartoum and the despatch of British troops to Berber. Her Majesty's Government are unable to accept these proposals. If General Gordon is of o})inion that the prospect of his early departure diminishes the chance of his accomplishing his task, and that by staying at Khartoum himself for any length of time wiiich he may judge necessary he would be able to establish a settled government at that place, he is at liberty to remain there. In the event of his being unable to carry out this suggestion, he should evacuate Khartoum and save that garrison by conducting it himself to Berber without delay. " Her Majesty's Government trust that General Gordon will not resign his commission. He should act according to his judgment as to the best course to pursue with regard to the steam -vessels and stores." ^ ^ On March 14, Lord Granville wrote to me privately : " We have had two Cabinets (at which Gladstone was not present) ; there wag a difference of opinion as to the abstract advantaj^es or disadvantasfeg of Zobeir, but the unanimous opinion of tlie conunoners in the Cabinet was that no Liberal or (Joiisorvative (ioveriimeut could appoint Zobeir. And the difficulty of sending troojis to Berber is very great, and may entail unlimited difficulties upon us." CH. XXV ZOBEIR PASHA 523 On March 14, I replied to T^ord Granville's telegram of the 13th: "The instructions contained in your Lordship's telegram of the 13th are likely to lead to such very serious consequences that, even if the line were not still interrupted, I should hesitate to repeat them to General Gordon until I have again asked your Lordship whether the question has been fully considered in all its bearings. When it is said that General Gordon may stay at Khartoum for any length of time which he may judge necessary to establish a settled government, is it meant that he may stay an indefinite time, and that he will be succeeded by some other Governor - General working, as before, under orders from Cairo ? This is a possible policy, but it is, of course, a reversal of abandon- ment. It must lead either to the Egyptian Government endeavouring to govern the Soudan unaided (and this they cannot do, and should not be allowed to attempt), or it will lead to the appointment of a succession of English Governors- General, and probably of other English officials. This must ultimately involve the English Govern- ment becoming virtually responsible for the govern- ment of the Soudan. I trust Her Majesty's Government will not for a moment think of adopting such a policy. If, on the other hand, it is merely intended to prolong General Gordon's period of office for a few months, then I can assure your Lordship that delay will not facilitate his task. On the contrary, the difficulty of establish- ing a settled government will, I believe, increase rather than diminish with time. The alternatiA'e, which General Gordon will probably adopt, of evacuating Khartoum at once and retiring on Berber, is open to very great objections, and will be most difficult to execute. It involves the certainty of sacrificing the garrisons of Sennar, 524 MODERN EGYPT pt hi Bahr-el-Ghazal, and Gondokoro. The garrisons of Kassala and the neighbourhood may perhaps be brought down to JNIassowah, but it is at present impossible to speak with certainty on this point. I do not think that the retreat could be carried out without great personal risk to Gordon and Stewart. The ultimate effect will be that Khar- toum must fall to the IMahdi, whose powers will be thus immensely increased, and the policy of creating a bulwark between Egypt and the Mahdi, which I cannot but think is the only wise course to follow, will have to be finally abandoned. I would beg your Lordship not to attach undue importance to some of the minor contradictions in General Gordon's telegrams. His main contentions ap])ear to me to be perfectly clear and reasonable. They are, first, that the two questions of with- drawing the garrisons and of arranging for the future government of the country cannot be separated. Secondly, that it is most undesirable, even if it be possible, for him to withdraw without leaving some permanent man to take his place. I regret that no one but Zobeir can be found to succeed Gordon, and although I believe the opinions held in England as to the effect of Zobeir's appointment are based on an incorrect appreciation of the facts, I am nevertheless fully aware of the great difficulties which would have to be encountered in England, if the appointment is made. But the real question is, not whether the appointment of Zobeir is objectionable, but whether any other practical and less objectionable alter- native can be suo-jijested. I can su<:^<>est none. I trust your Lordship will not think that, after the repeated telegrams I have received, I am unduly pressing for the Zobeir solution. I should not again urge it, if I could see any other less objection- able way out of the present very difficult position. CH. XXV ZOBEIR PASHA 525 On the other hand, I should not be doing my duty if I did not lay before Her Majesty's Govern- ment the grave dangers which will result from, and the objections which may be urged against the alternative set forth in your Lordship's tele- gram under reply." Simultaneously with the despatch of this tele- gram, news arrived from Berber which left no further doubt that the Sheikh-el-Obeid had de- clared in favour of the Mahdi, and that the tribes between Berber and Shendy were in revolt. On March 16, Lord Granville telegraphed to me : " I have received your telegram of the 14th instant, in which you discuss the question of the future government of the Soudan ; and after full consideration of the weighty arguments put forward therein. Her Majesty's Government adhere to the instructions contained in my telegram of the 13th. While the objections of Her Majesty's Government to Zobeir are unaltered, the prospect of good results attending his appointment seem to be diminished. The instructions to General Gordon to remain in the Soudan only apply to the period of time which is necessary for relieving the garrisons throughout the country, and for affording a prospect of a settled government. If General Gordon agrees with you that the difficulty of establishing a settled government will increase rather than diminish with time, there can be no advantage in his remaining, and he should, as soon as is practicable, take steps for the evacuation of Khartoum in accordance with the instructions contained in my telegram of the 13th instant. On evacuating Khartoum, he should exercise his discretion as to what is to be done with the steamers and stores there." Tt was evidently useless to continue the correspondence. The British Goverinnent were 526 MODERN EGYPT pt. iii determined not to send Zobeir Pasha, and, moreover, now that there was no longer any doubt that the tribes between Berber and Khartoum had joined the Mahdi, the favourable moment for sending him was passed. On March 17, therefore, T sent a long telegram to General Gordon, informing him of the result of the correspondence which had taken place between Lord Granville and myself. I added : " I think you must now regard the idea of sending Zobeir as finally abandoned, and that you must act as well as you can up to the instructions contained in Lord Granville's telegrams." I do not think that General Gordon ever received this telegram. On JNIarch 17, I wrote a despatch to Lord Gri.i- ville in which I stated that I did not propose to continue the correspondence about the employment of Zobeir Pasha. I added : '* I regret the decision at which Her Majesty's Government has arrived, and I look forward with considerable apprehension to the results of the policy which it has now been decided to adopt. But your Lordship may rely on my using my best endeavours to carry out the instruc- tions which I have received." On March 28, Lord Granville wrote to me a despatch stating at length the reasons which had induced the Government to reject the proposal that Zobeir Pasha should be employed. The despatch alluded to the condemnatory terms which, on various occasions, General Gordon had employed in speaking of Zobeir Pasha. It was pointed out, with perfect accuracy, that both Colonel Stewart and myself had, in the course of the correspondence, greatly modified our original opinions. After giving a summary of the corres})ondence which had taken place. Lord Granville went on to say : " If reliance could safely have been placed upon Zobeir to serve loyally with General Gordon, to act in a friendly manner to\vards Egypt, and to CH. XXV ZOBEIR PASHA 527 abstain from encouraging the Slave Trade, the course proposed was undoubtedly the best which could have been taken under the circumstances ; but upon this most vital point General Gordon's assurances failed to convince Her Majesty's Govern- ment. They felt the strongest desire to comply with his wishes, but they were bound, at the same time, to exercise their own deliberate judgment upon a proposal the adoption of which might produce such serious consequences. Tliey could not satisfy themselves of the probability that the establishment of Zobeir's authority would be a security to Egypt ; on the contrary, his ante- cedents, and character and disposition, led them to the conclusion that it would probably constitute a serious danger to Egypt. There seemed to Her Majesty's Government to be considerable risk that Zobeir might join with the Mahdi, or if he fought and destroyed him, that he would then turn against Egypt. The existence of an outbreak of Musul- man fanaticism was undoubted ; but the INIahdi had not shown any personal qualifications which threatened to convert it into a military power and organisation. To have let loose in the Soudan a Musulman of undoubted ability and ambition, possessed of great military skill, and with a grievance against the Egyptian Government, appeared to Her Majesty's Government to be so perilous a course that they were unable to accept the responsibility of adopting it. They were unable to share General Gordon's confidence that Zobeir's blood feud with him involved no serious danger, and they felt that the opinion originally expressed by General Gordon, by tlie Council at Cairo, and by yourself, was more likely to be correct than the subsequent one. The chivalrous character of General Gordon appeared to be likely to lead him into the generous error 528 MODERN EGYPT pt. iii of trusting too much to the loyalty of a man whose interests and feelings were hostile to him. "Besides these considerations affecting the in- terests of Egypt and the safety of General Gordon, Her Majesty's Government had further to consider how far it was probable that his authority might be exercised to renew the slave-hunting raids for which he was notorious. The temptation to em- bark in such lucrative transactions would be great to himself, and there would be the additional risk that having to rely on the support of his former friends and dependents, the slave-hunters, he would be obliged to purchase their support by connivance at their nefarious practices. Her JM'jesty's Govern- ment understand the reasons which compelled General Gordon to announce that the property in slaves in the Soudan would be recognised ; but this is a very different thing from using the authority of Great Britain to establish a notorious slave- hunter as ruler over that country. General Gordon, indeed, proposed that the Bahr-el-Ghazal and Equatorial provinces should be excluded from Zobeir's rule, but England would have possessed no power to secure his adherence to such a stipula- tion. " These were the considerations which led Her Majesty's Government to address to you the in- structions of the 13tli instant." On April 14, 1 rephed as follows to this despatch : " I trust your Lordship will permit me to say that, in my opinion, the despatch under reply contains a very fair statement of a question which I think was beset with more difficulties than any which, in the course of my experience, I have had to consider. If the arguments used in that despatch stood alone, they would, I think, be unanswerable ; but the diflficulty which I experienced in treating this question was to suggest some alternative which CH. XXV ZOBEIR PASHA 529 would be preferable to that which I recommended. If eventually any better solution is found, I shall be tlie first to admit that I was in error in pro- posing to send Zobeir Pasha to the Soudan." Were the British Government right in their deci- sion not to employ Zobeir Pasha ? It is, of course, impossible to give more than a conjectural answer to this question. Reviewing the matter now, after a lapse of many years, I am still of opinion that Zobeir Pasha should have been employed.^ I believe that if, when General Gordon sent his first telegram on the subject from Khartoum on February 18, the Government had stated that they had no insuperable objections to the employ- ment of Zobeir Pasha, the course of events in the Soudan might possibly have been changed. AVhen once General Gordon was supported by Colonel Stewart, I should have yielded to his pressure that Zobeir Pasha should have been despatched to Khartoum at once, to which I was at first reluctant to consent. He could have left Cairo before the end of February, or at all events very early in March. It is not improbable that the announcement of his departure would have pre- vented the tribes round Khartoum, who \.ere then wavering, from joining the Mahdi. But the favourable moment was very fleeting. Regarded by the light of after events, it is evident that the discussion of this subject was prolonged for a fortnight longer than was necessary. Even if the Government had yielded when the correspondence 1 There can be no question as to the extent of the influence which Zobeir Pasha then exercised in the Soudan, more especially over the tribes between Berber and Khartoum. 'When I visited the Soudan thirteen years later, I found that even tlie jioorest classes, however ignorant of other matters, were well acquainted with Zobeir Pasha'a name, and asked eagerly for news of his welfare. In the spring of 1000, he was allowed to return to the Soudan. VOL. I 2 M 530 MODERN EGYPT pt. hi closed in the middle of INTarch, no good would have been done. The propitious moment had been allowed to pass by. Whilst, however, my personal opinion is that the British Government made a mistake in not giving General Gordon and myself a free hand in this matter, the error was one which I do not think that any impartial critic, even supposing he adopts our views, will be disposed to condemn severely. The objections which Lord Granville urged against the employment of Zobeir Pasha were, in truth, very forcible. Lord Northbrook, for whose calm judg- ment and independence of character I entertained the highest respect, wrote to me two years later : " I believe that to have sent Zobeir would have been a gambler's cast, and that the probabilities were in favour of his action against Gordon, and of his raising a power in the Soudan, which would have been a greater danger to Egypt than there is now. I can say most positively that my own conclusion, with every disposition to agree with you, was very deliberately formed against Zobeir, and I am still of the same opinion." Without doubt, the risks involved in employing Zobeir Pasha were considerable. My own opinion was, and still is, that the advantages which might have accrued from employing him were of a nature to counter- balance those risks. Moreover, my main objec- tion to the policy of the Government was that, as so often occurred in Egyptian affairs, the British Government confined themselves to criticism on what was })roposed without being able to suggest any alternative and less objectionable plan. I re- peat, however, that all this is conjectural. No one can positively decide whether tlie British Govern- ment on the one hand, or General Gordon, Colonel Stewart, and myself on the other hand, showed the greater amount of foresight. All that can be said CH. XXV ZOBEIR PASHA 531 is that disastrous circumstances ensued after the refusal to employ Zobeir Paslia, but any one who asserts that those circumstances were due to the non-employment of Zobeir Pasha falls into the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy. One further point remains to be examined. Were the British Government really averse to the employment of Zobeir Pasha, or did they merely act under the pressure of British public opinion ? I will endeavour to answer this question. On INIarch 21, that is to say, after the final decision of the Government had been given, Lord Granville wrote to me privately : " There was much difference of opinion as to the abstract merits of sending Zobeir, but there was really none as to the vote of the House of Commons. Three of the members of the Commons in the Cabinet who were in favour of Zobeir,^ were of opinion that, not only would the House of Commons pass a censure, but that they would do it so immediately as to stop the possibility of his going. I should not have minded the vote, if I had been sure the policy was right, but I see nothing in its favour, excepting the great authority of you, Gordon, and Nubar, and 1 Mr. Morley {Life of Gladstone, vol. iii. p. 169) writes: "The matter was considered at two meetings of the Cabinet, but the Prime Minister was prevented by his physician from attending. A difference of opinion showed itself upon tlie despatch of Zobeir ; viewed as an abstract question, three of the Commons members inclined to favour it, but on the practical question, the Commons members were unanimous that no Government from either side of tlie House could venture to sanction Zobeir. Mr. Gladstone had become a strong convert to the plan of sending Zobeir. . . . One of the Ministers went to see him in his bed, and they conversed for two hours. The Minister, on his return, reported with some ironic amusement that Mr. Gladstone considered it very likely that they could not bring Parliament to swallow Zobeir, but believed that he himself could. Wliellier his confidence in this was right or wrong, he was unable to turn his Cabinet. The Queen telegraphed her agreement witli tlie Prime Minister. But this made no difierence. 'On Saturday 15,' Mr. Gladstone notes, ' it seemed as if by my casting vote Zobeir was to be sent to Gordon. But on Sunday and receded from their ground, and I gave way.'" 532 MODERN EGYPT pt. iii two of you have supplied very strong arguments the other way." This, without doubt, represented the real state of the case. Some members of the Government would have had the courage to face the storm of opposition if they had been convinced that it was wise to employ Zobeir Pasha. But they entertained an honest conviction that it was unwise to employ him. Others were inclined to accept the proposal of General Gordon and myself, but they would naturally hesitate to insist on the adoption of this view in a doubtful case against the adverse opinions of their colleagues. The opposition, which was certain to be encountered in Parliament and in the press, contributed to turn the scale. Whether that opposition was in reality so serious as it was represented to be is a point on which, having had no personal experience of parliamentary proceed- ings, I cannot express any valuable opinion. But I cannot help thinking that there is a good deal of truth in the following remarks of the Pall Mall Gazette : " The opposition, getting wind of Gordon's application for Zobeir, and displaying their usual anxiety to damage the Government, coute que coute, began to raise a hue and cry against Zobeir. Yet, it was pre-eminently a case in which a strong Government could and ought to have supported their agent. Public opinion, no doubt uninformed, and unaware of the arguments which were used by General Gordon and Sir Evelyn Baring, was outraged by the very sugges- tion of Zobeir's appointment. But, if the ])ublic liad been phiced in possession of the facts laid before the Government, the appointnicnt of Zobeir woukl have been aj)proved, nor would it have excited more serious opposition than the Slave- holding Proclamation." To an outsider, indeed, the case did not seem hope- CH. XXV ZOBEIR PASHA 533 less from a parliamentary point of view. I do not say that the arguments in favour of employing Zobeir Pasha were by any means conclusive, but tliey were certainly strong. However high party spirit may run, there must surely always be a certain number of moderate men on both sides of the House of Commons, who would pause before, in a very serious matter of this sort with which they were imperfectly acquainted, they would deliberately reject the opinion of the best qualified authorities on the spot. From the point of view of an appeal to authority, the case was a strong one. General Gordon's name carried immense weight with the public. Both Colonel Stewart and myself were less known, and our opinions would have certainly carried far less weight with the general public than those of General Gordon. Nevertheless, we might possibly have exercised some influence over the views of those who may have felt, but were re- luctant to express a certain want of confidence in General Gordon owing to the eccentricities to which allusion has been made in these pages. General Gordon's character and habits of thought differed widely from both Colonel Stewart's and mine, but, as it appears to me, the fact that these differences existed served rather to strengthen the case in so far as it depended on an appeal to authority. Mr, Gladstone, speaking in the House of Commons on February 23, 1885, said : " It is well known, that if, when the recommendation to send Zobeir was made, we had complied with it, an address from this House to the Crown would, before forty-eight hours were over, have paralysed our action ; and, although it is perfectly true tluit the decision arrived at was the judgment of the Cabinet, it was also no less the judgment of Parliament and of the people." Without doubt. 534 MODERN EGYPT pt. iir there is much truth in this argument. But there was this notable difference between the Govern- ment on the one side, and ParUament and the people on the other side. The former were well informed of the facts and arguments ; the latter were, in a great degree, ignorant of them. I believe that the final catastrophe at Khartoum might possibly have been averted if Zobeir Pasha had been employed. If I am right in this conjecture, the main responsibility must naturally devolve on Mr. Gladstone's Government. But it must in fairness be added that the responsibility must be shared by the British Parliament and by the people generally, notably by the Anti- Slavery Society. The Ministers who objected to the employment of Zobeir Pasha were perhaps in some degree want- ing in imagination and elasticity of mind. They could not transport themselves in spirit from Westminster to Khartoum and Cairo. They do not appear to have shown the versatility necessary to deal with the rapidly shifting scenes in the drama which was being; unfolded in the Soudan. The arguments which they applied against General Gordon and myself appear to me to be rather those of debaters trained in the art of dialectics than of statesmen whose reason and imagination enable them to grasp in an instant the true situation of affairs in a distant country widely differing from their own. Nevertheless, even supposing my appreciation of the facts to be correct, it must be adinitte 1 that in a matter of such difficulty an error of judgment is, to say the least, pardon- able. CHAPTER XXVI THE PROPOSED DASH TO BERBER March 16-April 21, 1884 Sir Gerald Graham proposes to move on Sinkat — Lord Granville approves — The proposed movement on Wadi Haifa — Proposal to send a British expedition to Berber — It is rejected — The order to move on Sinkat is cancelled — Remarks on this decision — Proposal to despatch a force to VV^adi Haifa — General Gordon recommends the employment of a Turkish force — The Government reject the pi'oposal — Necessity of preparing for a Relief Expedition. The decision not to employ Zobeir Pasha, coupled with the rising of the tribes between Khartoum and Berber, completely altered the aspect of affairs in the Soudan. From that moment it became certain that, with- out external military aid, the Soudan must fall under the domination of the Mahdi. No such aid was available, yet without it any attempt to establish an anti-Mahdist Government at Khartoum was merely, to use Lord Northbrook's phrase, to follow a will-o'-the wisp. This, however, did not constitute the only change in the situation. Communication with Khartoum was cut off. It became clear that the question of employing British troops might before long present itself for solution under different aspects from those which had heretofore existed. General Gordon and Colonel Stewart were sur- rounded by hostile tribes. It miglit become neces- sary to consider whether an expedition should be 535 53G MODERN EGYPT pt. iii sent, not to re-establish order in the Soudan, or to reheve the beleaguered Egyptian garrisons, but to bring away the officers who had been sent by the British Government to Kliartoum. It was obviously desirable that the necessity for sending any expedition to Khartoum should be avoided. The best chance of avoiding it lay in opening up the road from Suakin to Berber at once, and thus facilitating General Gordon's retreat before the JNlahdists could gather in force to oppose it. It was futile to rely any longer on diplomacy, on political concessions, or on individual influence to execute the aims of British policy in the Soudan. Diplomatists and politicians had had their say. Whether their efforts had been skilfully or unskil- fully directed, was now immaterial. The political concessions made by General Gordon immediately after his arrival at Khartoum merely produced a temporary effect. His influence, although consider- able on those with whom he was brought into per- sonal contact, was manifestly confined to the walls of Khartoum. It had proved powerless to prevent the neighbouring tribes from throwing in their lot with the JNIahdi. It was becoming daily more and more clear that it was only by the use of force that anything effective could be done to help General Gordon. The course of events in the Eastern Soudan up to the middle of JNIarch 1884 has been already described.^ Osman Digna's forces had been de- feated by Sir Gerald Graham, first at El Teb on February 29, and again at Tamai on JNIarch 13. There was at one time some hope that, as a result of the latter victory, the road from Suakin to Berber would be opened without further military operations of a serious nature. It soon became ap})arent, how- ever, that the effect of the victories at El Teb and * y^ide Chapter XXI. OH. XXVI THE BERBER EXPEDITION 537 Tamai had not been so great as was anticipated. The Mahdists were, indeed, discouraged, but they thought that the British troops could do no more, and that they would leave the country. It would be necessary, therefore, to follow up the victories, at all events to the extent of making a demonstration towards Berber. On March 15, Sir Gerald Graham telegraphed to Lord Harting- ton that both Admiral Hewett and himself were of opinion that " an advance to Sinkat would now have a great effect, and ratify the late victories." A copy of this telegram was sent to me from Suakin. I decided to support Sir Gerald Graham's recommendation. On March 16, I telegraphed to Lord Granville : " With reference to Graham's message to the War Secretary recommending an advance on Sinkat, so far as I can judge of the situation from here, I should say it would be a wise measure. It will facilitate Chermside's negotiations with the tribes.^ Chermside agrees in this view. It has now become of the utmost importance not only to open the Berber-Suakin route, but to come to terms with the tribes between Berber and Khar- toum. If we fail in the latter point, the question will very likely arise of sending an expeditionary force to Khartoum to bring away Gordon. I do not think that he is in any immediate danger. He has provisions for six months." On the following day (March 16), Lord Gran- ville replied : " Graham's movement on Sinkat has been approved, but we cannot authorise the advance of any troops in the direction of Berber until we are informed of the military conditions, and are satisfied that it is necessary for Gordon's safety, and confined to that purpose. Our present ^ Major (subsequently Sir Herbert) Cbermside, R.E., was attached to Si:- Gerald Graham's staff with the object of assisting in negotiations with the tribes. 538 MODERN EGYPT pt. iii information is that it would not be safe to send a small body of cavalry as proposed, and that it would be impossible to send a large force." No further communication on this subject of any importance passed until March 21, on which day Lord Granville telegraphed to me that the British Government " would deprecate the despatch of an expedition against Osman Digna, with whom they would be disposed to recommend, if possible, treat- ing on the basis of his submission, and rendering himself answerable for the safety of the Berber road and the protection of traders and other travellers." The details of the instructions to be given to Sir Gerald Graham were left to my dis- cretion. I, therefore, telegraphed to the latter (March 21) the substance of the instructions received from Lord Granville, and added : " A wide discretion must be left to you, acting on the best local advice obtainable, as to the best method of dealing with the tribes. . . . You must judge whether it is necessary to send an expedition against Osman Digna, or whether it is possible to treat with him on the basis of submission and becoming answerable for the peace of the Berber road and the protection of traders and others." 1 reported to Lord Granville the nature of the instructions which I had sent to Sir Gerald Graham, and added : " It appears to me undesir- able to debar General Graham from attacking Osman Digna, if he thinks it necessary to do so in order to open up the road to Berber." On March 22, Sir Gerald Graham replied to my telegram in the sense which I had anticipated. " It would be useless," he said, " to enter into com- munication with Osman Digna." I repeated tliis telegram to Lord Granville, and added that I was of opinion that Sir Gerald Graham " should be allowed to attack Osman Digna as he proposed." CH. XXVI THE BERBER EXPEDITION 539 On March 23, Lord Granville replied : " Her Majesty's Government are averse to further mili- tary operations being undertaken without any definite object ; but if General Graham considers that the security of the Berber road will be thereby ensured, he is authorised to advance to Tamanib as proposed." I repeated this to Sir Gerald Graham, and in reply received the following message from Admiral Hewett : " In Graham's opinion and mine the security of the Berber road cannot be attained so long as Osman Digna remains in arms. The first object of the advance on 'J'amanib is, therefore, to disperse him. No further fighting is anticipated." It will be seen from this correspondence that, whilst my opinion was veering round to the neces- sity of employing force to help General Gordon, the British Government, on the other hand, were daily becoming more reluctant to sanction the use of force. The truth was that, whereas the Govern- ment had but a few weeks before been sharply criticised for their delay in proceeding to the relief of Tokar, they were now being attacked for having caused the useless slaughter of a number of Dervishes. They were unwilling to yield to the pressure in the direction of vigorous action, which was now being applied from Cairo and Suakin. At the same time, they wished to do something to help General Gordon. On March 22, therefore. Lord Granville telegraphed to ask my opinion on the following points : first, whether it would be desir- able to " despatch a portion of the Egyptian army to garrison Wadi Haifa in order to lend moral support to General Gordon at Khartoum " ; secondly, whether some British officers " with some knowledge of Arabic and experience in dealing with natives" might not advantageously be sent to Berber, " there to await instructions from General Gordon." 540 MODERN EGYPT ft. m I consulted Sir Frederick Stephenson, Sir Evelyn \^^ood, and Colonel Watson on these proposals. Our joint opinion was that the des- patch of a handful of fellaheen troops to Wadi Haifa was a half measure which would be of little use. I, therefore, telegraphed to Lord Granville in this sense. There was more to be said in favour of sending some officers to Berber, but it was questionable whether they would be able to get there. JNIajor Kitcliener and Major Rundle were, however, directed to proceed to Berber. By the time they got to Assouan, it became clear that it would be imprudent to allow them to proceed any farther. Their original orders were, therefore, cancelled, and it was fortunate that this was done, for, had they pro- ceeded to i^>erber, they would certainly liave been made prisoners. The more I thought over the whole matter, the more did it seem to me, first, that it was essential not only to open up the Suakin-Berber road, but also to clear the road from Berber to Khartoum ; and secondly, that this could not be accomplished without the despatch of a British force to Berber. I discussed with Sir Frederick Stephenson and Sir Evelyn Wood the question of whether it would be possible to send a British force from Suakin to Berber. They were both of opinion that the operation was possible, although it was attended with risk, and although the health of the troops would suffer from the climate. On March 24, therefore, I telegraphed to Lord Granville : " It appears to me tliat, under present circum- stances. General Gordon will not be able to carry out your Lordship's instructions, although those instructions involve the abandonment of the Sennar garrison on the ]5hie Nile, and the garrisons of Bahr-el-Ghazal and Gondokoro on cH. XXVI THE BERBER EXPEDITION 541 the White Nile. The question now is how to get General Gordon and Colonel Stewart away from Khartoum. In considering this question, it should be remembered that they will not will- ingly come back without bringing with them the garrison of Khartoum and the Government officials. I believe that the success gained by General Graham in the neighbourhood of Suakin will result in the opening of the road to Berber, but I should not think that any action he can take at or near Suakin would exert much influence over the tribes between Berber and Khartoum. Unless any unforeseen circumstance should occur to change the situation, only two solutions appear to be possible. The first is to trust General Gordon's beino^ able to maintain himself at Khartoum till the autumn, when, by reason of the greater quantity of water, it would be less difficult to conduct operations on the Suakin- Berber road than it is at present. This he might perhaps be able to do, but it of course involves running a great risk. The only other plan is to send a portion of General Graham's army to Berber with instructions to open up communica- tion with Khartoum. There would be very great difficulty in getting to Berber, but if the road were once open, it might be done by sending small detachments at a time. General Gordon is evidently expecting help from Suakin, and he has ordered messengers to be sent along the road from Berber to ascertain whether any English force is advancing. Under present circumstances, I think that an effort should be made to help General Gordon from Suakin, if it is at all a possible military operation. General Steplienson and Sir Evelyn Wood, whilst admitting the very great risk to the health of the troops, besides the extra- ordinary military risks, are of opinion that the 542 MODERN EGYPT pt. iii undertaking is possible. They think that General Graham should be further consulted. We all consider that, however difficult the operations from Suakin may be, they are more practicable than any operations from Korosko and along the Nile. If anything is to be done, no time should be lost, as each week increases the difficulty as regards climate." On March 25, Lord Granville replied : " Having regard to the dangers of the climate of the Soudan at this time of the year, as well as the extraordinary risk from a military point of view, Her Majesty's Government do not tliink it justifiable to send a British expedition to Berber, and they wish you to communicate this decision to General Gordon, in order that he may adopt measures in accordance therewith. Her Majesty's Government desire to leave full discretion to General Gordon to remain at Khartoum, if he thinks it necessary, or to retire by the southern or any other route which might be found available." On the following day (March 26), I received a further telegram from I^ord Granville, directing me to send the following instructions to Sir Gerald Grahan : " The Government have no intention of sending British troops to Berber. The operations in which you are now engaged must be limited to the pacification of the district around Suakin, and restoring communication with Berber, if possible by other means and influence of friendly tribes. Re- ports of the effect of heat on the troops strengthen the desire of Government that your operations should be brought to a speedy conclusion, and preparations made for the immediate embarkation of the bulk of your force. Report when you can dispense with the services of regiments from India." I confess that when I received these two tele- grams I found it difficult to preserve the " diplo- CH. XXVI THE BERBER EXPEDITION 543 matic calm," which formed the subject of General Gordon's sarcasms.^ It was not so much that I minded the decision that no expedition should be sent to Berber, in so far as that decision was based upon military grounds. The militaiy question was undoubtedly difficult of solution. There was a difference of opinion amongst the military authorities as to the practicabiHty of opening the road to Berber. It could, therefore, be no matter for surprise that the Government should lean preferentially to the side of those who deprecated immediate action. The tone of the telegrams, however, grated upon me. The question which I had propounded to Lord Granville was how to get General Gordon and Colonel Stewart away from Khartoum. The march of events had been rapid, and it was obvious that at this moment the relief of General Gordon and Colonel Stewart was the most important point at issue. On March 25, I telegraphed to Lord GranviUe that Hussein Pasha Khalifa, who commanded at Berber, had reported that Khartoum was sur- rounded, and that the rebels were receiving reinforcements. The only answer I got was that the British Government left full discretion to General Gordon either to remain where he was or to retire by any route which might be found avail- able. The Government, therefore, begged the question. They did not appear to realise the situation. They shut their eyes to the probability that before long no route would be available by which to retreat from Kliartoum. I, therefore, telegraphed to Lord Granville on March 26: "I cannot say whether it will be possible for me to communicate your Lordship's message to Gordon, but in any case I cannot reconcile myself to making the attempt to forward * Vide ante, p. 477, note. 544 MODERN EGYPT pt. m such a message without again addressing your Lordship. Let me earnestly beg Hor Majesty's Government to place themselves in the position of Gordon and Stewart. They have been sent on a most difficult and dangerous mission by the English Government. Their proposal to send Zobeir, which, if it had been acted on some weeks ago, would certainly have entirely altered the situation, was rejected. The consequences which they foresaw have ensued. If they receive the instructions contained in your Lordship's telegram of the 25th, they cannot but understand them as meaning that they and all with them are to be abandoned and to receive no help from the British Government. Coetlogon, who is here, assures me that so long as the rebels hold both banks of the river above the sixth cataract, it will be quite impossible for boats to pass. He does not believ^e that Gordon can cut his way through by land. He ridicules the idea of retreating with the garrison to the Equator, and we may be sure that Gordon and Stewart will not come away alone. As a matter of personal opinion, I do not believe in the impossibility of helping Gordon, even during the summer, if Indian troops are employed, and money is not spared. But if it be decided to make no attempt to afford present help, then I would urge that Gordon be told to try and maintain his position during the summer, and that then, if he is still beleaguered, an expedition will be sent as early as possible in the autumn to relieve him. This would, at all events, give him some hope, and the mere announcement of the intention of the Government would go a long way to ensure his safety by keeping loyal tribes who may be still wavering;. No one can regret more than 1 do the necessity of sending British or Indian troops to the Soudan, but, having sent Gordon to Khartoum, it CH. XXVI THE BERBER EXPEDITION 545 appears to me that it is our bounden duty, both as a matter of humanity and pohcy, not to abandon him." On March 28, Lord Granville replied : " We cannot accede to the proposals in your telegram. We have given it our most serious consideration, and, vi^ith the greatest wish to assist General Gordon, we do not see how we can alter our instructions of the 25th. Communicate them as soon as possible to General Gordon. We are not prepared to add to them until we hear what is General Gordon's actual condition and prospects as to security, and also, if possible, his plans of proceeding and his desires under present circumstances." ^ It was evidently useless to continue the correspondence any further. I endeavoured to communicate to General Gordon the views of the British Government, as explained in Lord Gran- ville's telegrams of the 25th and 28th of March, but I do not think that he ever received my message. On March 27, Sir Gerald Graham telegraphed from Suakin : " I consider that my active operations are now completed and that I can at once dispense with the services of the regiments Mhich came from India." On JNIarch 29, he was informed by the War Office that the Sinkat expedition was not to be undertaken, and that the British troops were to leave Suakin as soon as they were relieved by * On March 29, Lord Granville wrote to me privately: "You shot a heavy cannon-ball, — your last protest as to our instructions to Gordon. Although your proposals were a complete reversal of our policy, we quite understood your feelings. We could not agree to pledge ourselves to a promise to Gordon to send a military expedition to Khartoum in the autumn. We hope that the victories of Graham may have corrected the bad effects of Baker's defeat. 'ITie military authorities assure us that, unless the garrison rebels against Gordon, the Arabs cannot take Khartoum. He is known to have six months' provisions. The only incident, as aifecting the original views with which Gordon set out, and upon which we consented to send him, waa the restriction upon Zobeir joining him, the objections to which wer« chiefly furnished by you and him." VOL. I 2 N 546 MODERN EGYPT ft. iii Egj^tian troops from Cairo. Shortly afterwards, the greater portion of the British garrison of Suakin was withdraAMi. Were the British Government right or wrong in refusing to send a portion of Sir Gerald Graham's force from Suakin to Berber ? As in the case of the proposed employment of Zobeir Pasha, it is impossible to give more than a conjectural answer to this question. If it be admitted that the operation was practicable from a military point of view, there can scarcely be any doubt that the Government made a serious mistake. It appeared probable at the time that the decision not to send a small expeditionary force to Berber in the spring of 1884 would lead to the despatch of a larger force at a later period, and this, in fact, is what actually happened. The arguments based on the alleged necessity of obtain- ing " a better knowledge of General Gordon's actual position, his resources and his requirements," appeared to me at the time valueless, and I regard them in the same light on reading the correspond- ence over again after a lapse of many years. But it carmot on that account be stated positively that the decision of the Government was unwise. The question was wholly military. Was the operation practicable or not ? On this point, the military authorities were not all of one mind. Sir Frederick Stephenson and Sir Evelyn Wood, whilst acknow- ledging the risks and the objections on the score of cHmate, thought that the operation should be undertaken. I believe that I am correct in stating that the military authorities at Suakin were less favourably disposed to undertaking the expedition than tliose at Cairo. I have always understood tliat it was not only the objections as regards the effect of the climate on the health of the British OH. XXVI THE BERBER EXPEDITION 547 troops, but also the difficulties of providing transport sufficient even for a small force, which rendered them averse to the expedition. It is possible that they erred on the side of caution, but if they did so they can quote the higli authority of Colonel Stevi^art to justify the advice which they gave. In the last letter which he wrote to me from Khartoum, dated March 11, Colonel Stewart said: "Notwithstanding our telegrams, I really fail to see how you can at this season of the year send an expedition from Suakin to Berber. The road is bad enough in the winter, but how any soldiers, but particularly English soldiers, could get along it in summer, I cannot conceive. I cannot picture to myself the English soldier getting over that awful plain between Obok and Berber. Also, from the time Ariab is left, there is no water. Of all animals in the world, I think the English soldier the least suited for the effort. Turks, Indians, etc., might do it, but it would be tough work." General Gordon also recognised the difficulty of employing British troops during the summer. The following entry occurs in his Journal, dated September 18, 1884 : " One cannot help seeing that it is quite im- possible to keep British troops after January. . . . I certainly will, with all my heart and soul, do my best, if any of Her Majesty's forces come up here, or to Berber, to send them down before January." My personal opinion at the time was that a very lightly equipped force of from 1000 to 1500 men might have been sent on camels from Suakin to Berber, and that, in spite of tlie risks and difficulties, the attempt should have been made. I remain of the same opinion still. On the other hand, it must be admitted that, in view of the conflicting nature of the military opinions laid before them, the Government had some fairly good grounds for rejecting the advice tendered by 548 MODERN EGYPT pt. m Sir Frederick Stephenson, Sir EveljTi Wood, and myself. However this may be, it is certain that from the moment the proposal to make a dash to Berber with a small force was rejected as being impracticable, the despatch of a larger expedition at a later period became an almost unavoidable necessity. Some while was, however, yet to elapse before the Government fully realised the facts of the situation. On April 8, Lord Granville telegraphed to me : " General Gordon has several times suggested a movement on Wadi Haifa which might support him by threatening an advance on Dongola ; and under present circumstances at Berber, this might be found advantageous." I was instructed to consult Sir Frederick Stephenson and Sir Evelyn Wood with regard to this proposal. This matter had been already fully considered. On receipt of Lord Granville s telegram, however, a further consultation took place between Nubar Pasha, Sir Frederick Stephenson, Sir Evelyn Wood, and myself General Stephenson thought the " step was open to great objections on account of the climate during the summer months, and he also considered it unwise to leave a detachment at so great a distance from its base." " On the whole," 1 tele- graphed to Lord Granville on April 10, " we are disposed to think that the objections to undertak- ing the movement outweigh the benefits Ukely to accrue from it. Those benefits are of a very doubtful nature." I am inclined to regret that I expressed an opinion adverse to this proposal, but my regret s solely based on the feeling that, situated as General Gordon then was, any suggestion emanating from him, especially if he reiterated it, should have been acted on if it was possible of execution. I did not cH. XXVI THE BERBER EXPEDITION 549 believe at the time, and I do not believe now, that the despatch of a small body of men to Korosko or Wadi Haifa would have affected the position of General Gordon at Khartoum. When, at a later period, a British force was at Dongola, and was preparing to march on Khartoum, General Gordon wrote (November 8, 1884) : " It is curious what a very little effect all our immense preparations at Dongola, etcetera, have had on the course of events ; one may say that they have not had up to the present time the least." On April 9, I received about thirty telegrams, which had been delayed in transmission, from General Gordon. They brought news from Khar- toum up to April 1. In one of them he said : " I wish I could convey to you my impressions of the truly trumpery nature of this revolt, which 500 determined men could put down. Be assured that, for the present, and for two months, we are as safe here as at Cairo. I break my head over our im- potence, and the more so when I feel that, once the Soudan taken, you may expect such a crop of troubles in all Moslem states. The only worry I have is that you will dawdle away your time, and do nothing till too late. If you would only put your pride in your pocket and get by good pay 3000 Turkish infantry and 1000 Turkish cavalry, the affair, including the crushing of the Mahdi, would be accomplished in four months." General Gordon attached great importance to this proposal. He constantly alluded to the subject in his Journal. " If," he said, " the Soudan is given back to Egypt, in a couple of years we would have another JNIahdi ; therefore, our choice lies between Zobeir and the Turks. Now, the time has gone by when Zobeir, almost alone, would suffice. . . . Therefore, give the country to the Turks. If I was Lord Wolseley, / would make Her JNIajcsty's 550 MODERN EGYPT ft. in Government send the Turks here. . . . The Turks are the best sohition, though most expensive. They ivoicid keep the Soudan; give them two milhons." " The more I think of it, the more the Turk sohition appears Hobson's choice. ... I get out of all my troubles if the Turks come, for 1 shunt them on the Turks, and so do you." The Soudan "should be handed over to the Sultan with a sub- sidy." " The only possible solution is the Sultan, let the subsidy be what it may." The reasons why General Gordon made this proposal may be gathered from his telegrams and his Journal. In the first place, he thought any solution was better than allowing the country to fall into the hands of the Mahdi. " To give up countries," he said, " which are to some extent civilised, which, if properly governed, are quiet and orderly, to the Turks or to Zobeir, and to allow the Slave Trade to flourish again in tenfold intensity, is not a very high 7-0/e, but quoi faire ? We have not the men to govern these lands, we cannot afford the money ; consequently, I advise what I have said. ... It would be nobler to keep the Soudan, but is too much to ex,pect our taxpayers to agree to." His whole energy, therefore, was devoted, not so much to evacuating the Soudan as to " smashing up " the Mahdi. In two imdated telegrams, which were received in Cairo on September 18 and 20, 1884, respectively, he said : " It would be the best course to negotiate with the Porte for the despatch of Turkish troops. ... It is impossible to leave Khartoum without a regular government estab- lished by some Power. . . . Perhaps tlie British Government will be displeased with the advice which I have given. The people of the Soudan are also displeased with me on account of my fighting against them, and on account of their not attaining their object in following the JNIahdi. I cH. XXVI THE BERBER EXPEDITION 5.31 wish for negotiations with the Sublime Porte, so that the necessary assistance may be quickly sent here, so asy to render it possible to extinguish the flame of this false Mahdi before it becomes difficult." In the second place, General Gordon was greatly irritated with the Soudanese for continuing the revolt. On April 12, 1884, he telegraphed to me : " I wonder you do not give the Soudan to the Sultan with a subsidy of £150,000 a year. He would finish the rebellion in three months, in- cluding the Mahdi. After the way these people have rejected my terms, I would be inclined to let the Turkish harrow go over them. The Sultan would need only 3000 men."^ These extracts are sufficient to show that General Gordon underrated the serious nature of the revolt with which he had to deal ; it was by no means a "trumpery revolt which 500 men could put down." On the contrary, from the local point oi view it was a revolt of the most serious description, for the suppression of which a far larger force than that indicated by General Gordon would have been required. On the other hand, he overrated the consequences, which would ensue in Eg^^pt and elsewhere, if the JNlahdist movement were crowned with local success. He spoke of the Mahdi re- ceiving " lots of letters from Cairo, Stamboul, and India." "What," he asked, "is to prevent the Mahdi's adherents gaining Mecca, where there are not 2000 men ? Once at Mecca, we may look out for squalls in Turkey, etcetera." He spoke of the necessity of eventually " smashing up " the Malidi if "peace were to be retained in Egypt." If the Mahdi took Khartoum he felt sure that "a rising would occur in Egypt." We now know that these fears were exaggerated. The Malidi obtained * I did not receive this telegram till March 26, 189.0. 552 MODERN EGYPT pt. iii supreme power in the Soudan, but the effect ol the rebelhon was entirely local. It did not cause any trouble in other JMohamniedan countries. Even at that time, it was clear that, if the Mahdists attempted the invasion of Egypt, their onward march would be arrested when once they came in contact with British troops.^ The reply of the British Government to General Gordon's proposal was contained in a despatch addressed to Mr. Egerton by Lord Gran\'ille on May 1 : '* The employment of Turkish troops in the Soudan," Lord Granville wrote, " would be contrary to the views advocated by General Gordon on former occasions. I need not remind you that in his Proclamations issued at Berber and Khartoum, he declared that he had averted the despatch of troops by the Sultan, and had come in person to prevent further bloodshed. JSIoreover, such a course would involve a reversal of the original policy of Her Majesty's Government, which was to detach the Soudan from Egypt, and restore to its inhabitants their former independence. ... It is clear . . . that General Gordon's object in asking for these troops is to effect the withdrawal of the Soudan garrisons by military expeditions, and to bring about the collapse of the Mahdi. . . . With respect to General Gordon's request for Turkish troops with a view to offensive operations. General Gordon cannot too clearly understand that these opera- tions cannot receive the sanction of Her Majesty's * Tliere can be no doubt tbat tbe alleged necessity of "smashing the Mahdi" on the ground that his success in the Soudan would be productive of serious results elsewhere, exercised a powerful influence over British public opinion throughout the whole of this period. Never- theless, the best authorities on Eastern politics were at the time well aware that these fears were groundless, or at all events much exagger- ated. Thus, on March 21, 1884, Sir Alfred Lyall wrote to Mr. Henry Reeve : " The Mahdi's fortunes do not interest India. Tlie tali< in some of the papers about the necessity of smashing him in order to avert the risk of some general Mohammedan uprising is futile and imaginative." — Memoirs of Henry Reeve, vol. ii. p. 329. cH. XXVI THE BERBER EXPEDITION 553 Government, and that they are beyond the scope of his mission." So long as General Gordon confined himself to making proposals which could, even with a certain amount of straining, be made to harmonise with the general line of policy which lie had been sent to carry out, a strong moral obligation rested upon the British Government to adopt his suggestions. The proposal to hand over the Soudan to the Sultan and to utilise Turkish troops in order to crush the revolt of the INIahdi was, however, opposed both to the spirit of his instructions, and to the views which he had himself persistently advocated up to that time. From whatever point of view the question be regarded, the Government were, therefore, fully justified in exercising their own discretion as to whether so complete a change of policy as that recommended by General Gordon was either possible or desirable. It cannot be doubted that the Government exercised a wise discretion in declining to follow General Gordon's advice in this particular connection. I doubt whether the execution of the policy recommended by General Gordon was possible. I have no doubt that, supposing it to have been possible, its execution was undesirable. I base my doubts as to the possibility of the execution of the policy on the difficulties of nego- tiating with the Sultan on a matter of this sort, difficulties which were exemplified when there was a question of sending Turkish troops to suppress the Arabi revolt ; on the special difficulty of moving the Porte to speedy and vigorous action, such as would have been required to ensure success in this particular instance ; on the impecuniosity of the Ottoman Treasury ; on the impossibility of tlu'ow- ing the charge of the expedition on the Egyptian Treasury ; and on the gravity of the rebeUion, 554 MODERN EGYPT ft. m the suppression of which would have required a far larger force than General Gordon estimated. 1 base my opinion on the undesirability of adopt- ing the policy recommended by General Gordon on the fact that the occupation of the Soudan by Turkish troops would assuredly have brought in its train a continuance, and not improbably an aggra- vation of the misgovernment which was the primary cause of the rebelHon ; and on the further fact that a Turkish occupation would not have afforded any final settlement of the Soudan question. As a choice of evils, indeed, it was preferable in the interests of England, of Egypt, of the civilised world in general and of the people of the Soudan, that the Mahdi should obtain possession of the country rather than that it should be handed over to the Sultan. Dervish rule in the Soudan was, without doubt, an evil, but even at that time it could be foreseen that the evil would in all proba- bility only be temporary. A Turkish occupation would have been an evil of a more permanent nature. It was almost irreconcilable with the idea of future Egyptian reconquest. It would have caused endless political and financial complications. It is well, therefore, that the British Government declined to follow General Gordon's suggestions in this connection. In the meanwhile, the situation at Khartoum was daily becoming more critical. On March 29, I received a telegram from General Gordon, dated the 17th, giving an account of an action which had been fought in the neighbourhood of Khartoum on the 16th, and in which, owing apparently to the treachery of two Pashas, who were subsequently executed, the Egyptian troops suffered a severe defeat. Shortly afterwards, a panic occurred at Berber. Every one who could get away left the place. Hussein Pasha Khalifa, who was in com- CH.XXVI THE BERBER EXPEDITION odd mand at Berber, telegraphed : " The Government having abandoned us, we can only trust in God." General Gordon had not received all the tele- grams which had been sent to him from Cairo. But he was aware that the Government had negatived his proposal to employ Zobeir Pasha, and that there was no intention of sending a relief expedition from Suakin to Berber. He was greatly irritated at the rejection of these proposals. On April 7, he sent me a telegram which, Mr. Egmont Hake observes, "at once became historical." It was as follows : " As far as I can understand, the situation is this : you state your intention of not sending any rehef up here or to Berber, and you refuse me Zobeir. I consider myself free to act according to circumstances. I shall hold out here as long as I can, and if I can suppress the rebellion I shall do so. If I cannot, I siiall retire to the Equator, and leave you the indelible disgrace of abandoning the garrisons of Sennar, Kassala, Berber, and Dongola, with the certainty that you will eventually be forced to smash up the Mahdi under great diffi- culties if you would retain peace in Egypt." The strong expressions employed in this telegram were caught up by political partisans, who dwelt with rapturous emphasis on the " indelible dis- grace " which the British Government was said to have incurred. For my own part, I caimot under- stand how any impartial person can consider that the British Government were responsible for the difficulties which at that time beset the garrisons of Sennar, Kassala, Berber, and Dongola. Those who dwelt on the disgrace which Avould be incurred if the garrisons of those places fell into the hands of the Mahdi, should have had the courage of their opinions. They should have urged the only pos- sible remedy for preventing the consummation which they deplored. That remedy was the 556 MODERN EGYPT ft. iii despatch of a strong British expedition, or perhaps I should rather say, several expeditions, to the relief of the garrisons. For the most part, however, the critics shrank from adopting the logical consequences of their own criticisms. Although tlie British Government were under no moral obligation to relieve the Egyptian garri- sons, they were under a strong obligation to prevent General Gordon and Colonel Stewart from falling into the hands of the Mahdi. It was becoming more and more probable every day that a military expedition would have to be sent to Khartoum to bring them away. I was so impressed with the necessity for timely preparation that, on April 14, I wrote the following despatch to I^ord Granville: " I wish again to draw your Lordship's attention to General Gordon's position at Khartoum. In doing so, I wish particularly to state that I have no sort of wish to urge that an expedition should be sent to relieve General Gordon, unless, after very full consideration, it would appear that no other alternative can be adopted. No one can entertain stronger objections than I do to the despatch of a force to Khartoum, but, at the same time. Lord Hartington has declared in the House of Commons that Her Majesty's Govern- ment feel that ' tliey are greatly responsible for General Gordon's safety,' and, even if no such declaration had been made, tiie fact is in itself sufficiently obvious. " I think it my duty, therefore, to lay before your Lordship the following remarks, more with a view to showing what the actual situation is, so far as can be ascertained, than with the object of making any very definite proposals in connection with it. That situation is one of such very great difficulty that I frankly confess that I hesitate to advise very positively on it. OH. XXVI THE BERBER EXPEDITION 557 "Your Lordship will observe that in one of General Gordon's most recent telegrams, which are enclosed in my despatch of the 9th instant, he says that for the next two months to come, that is to say, to the end of May, he is as safe at Khartoum as at Cairo. " I am not quite sure whether this statement is to be read as signifying that General Gordon can hold out for two months and no more. I trust this is not his meaning, for it would, I conceive, be impossible for an expedition to reach Khartoum by the end of JNIay. *' Former telegrams had led us to suppose that General Gordon had provisions for six months, and if the Mahdi makes any advance, it is not probable that he will do so before September or October. I have asked him to explain this point more fully, but the difficulty of communicating with Khartoum is very great, and in any case a con- siderable time must elapse before I can get an answer. " In the meanwhile, as it appears to me, we are in this dilemma — as a last resource the Govern- ment would, I conceive, be obliged to go to the help of General Gordon. All the authorities whom I have consulted say that, if any operations are to be undertaken along the valley of the Nile, which is by some considered the best route, no time should be lost in making preparations, so as to be ready to move directly the water rises. It may be, and I hope it will be, that General Gordon will be able to extricate himself without any expedition. In that case, the preparations will have been useless. On the other hand, unless they are undertaken now, it may be that, when the necessity for moving arises, so long a delay will ensue as to frustrate the objects of the expedition. Under these circumstances, I venture 558 MODERN EGYPT ft. in to think that it is a question worthy of considera- tion whether the naval and miUtary authorities should not take some preliminary steps in the way of preparing boats, etc., so as to be able to move should the necessity arise. It would be better, I think, to run the risk of incurring some unnecessary expenditure rather than to find our- selves unable to seize the opportunity of moving when the favourable moment arrives." 1 left Cairo for England on April 21 to attend the Conference, which was about to sit in London to consider the financial situation of the Egyptian Treasury. Mr. (afterwards Sir Edwin) Egerton was appointed to act as Agent and Consul- General during my absence. CHAPTER XXVII THE RELIEF EXPEDITION April 21-October 5, 1884 General Gordon's motives — Spirit in which the question should be approached— Did General Gordon try to carry out the policy of the Government? — The situation at Herber — Messages to General Gordon and his replies — Sir Frederick Stephenson instructed to report on the Relief E^xpedition — The Suakin-Berber Kiiilway — The fall of Berber — The vote of credit — Lord Wolseley appointed to command the Nile expedition — He arrives at Wadi Haifa — Remarks on the above narrative. Before proceeding further with the narrative, it will be as well — even at the risk of repeating some remarks which have been already made — to describe the motives which, so far as can be judged, actuated General Gordon's conduct at this time. Did he make any serious effort to carry out the policy of the British and Egyptian Governments in the Soudan ? Was that policy practicable ? More especially, would it have been possible for him to have retreated from Khartoum without the aid of a relief expedition ? A few preliminary observations are necessary before entering upon an examination of these questions. In the first place, it is obvious that General Gordon's conduct should be judged with the utmost generosity. I do not consider that this generosity need, or, in the interests of liistorical truth, sliould go so far as to exonerate him from blame if, on a ' 559 560 ISIOUERN EGYPT pt. m careful examination of the evidence, it be found that blame can fairly be imputed to him. But I do hold that, looking to the very difficult situation in which he was placed, to the fact that when he arrived at Kliartoum many circumstances must have been brought to his knowledge of which he was ignorant in London and in Cairo, and to the further fact that neither he nor his gallant companion are now alive to answer criticisms or to affiDrd explanations, it will only be just to his memory to place the most favourable construction on anything he either did or said, which may appear blameworthy. Again, looking to General Gordon's impulsive character, and to his habit of recording any stray idea which flashed through his mind, undue im- portance should not be attached to any chance expressions which he may have let fall. I have endeavoured to form an idea both of his motives and of the opinions which he held during the siege of Khartoum, based, not so much on any one of his utterances, as on the general tenor of his Journal, letters, and telegrams. The action of the British Government should also be judged in a somewhat similar spirit. It is neither possible nor desirable that detailed instruc- tions should be given to an official engaged in a difficult work such as that undertaken by General Gordon. All that the Government could do was to lay down the general policy which they wished to pursue, leaving to their subordinate a wide discretion as to the manner of its execution. In judging both of the action of the Government and of the conduct of General Gordon, regard should be had to the spirit rather than to the text of his instructions. Did, therefore. General Gordon make any serious effiart to carry out the policy of the British and Egyptian Governments in the Soudan ? There can be little doubt that when General CH. XXVII RELIEF EXPEDITION 561 Gordon left Cairo he agreed in that policy. Not only did he repeatedly express his agreement in expUcit terms, not only did he practically write his own instructions both in London and in Cairo, but the policy, which he was sent to carry out, was in conformity with the opinions to which he had frequently given utterance ever since his first con- nection with the Soudan. He was never tired of dwelling on the iniquities of Egyptian, or, as he usually called it, Turkish rule in the Soudan. He acknowledged that the country was a " useless possession." He exhorted the British Government "to leave them (the people of the Soudan) as God had placed them."^ In fact, General Gordon persistently advocated the policy of " The Soudan for the Soudanese." But General Gordon said of himself : " No man in the world is more changeable than I am."^ There can, in fact, be no doubt that, when he arrived at Khartoum, a complete revulsion took place in his views about the Soudan. He had seen from the first the desirability of endeavourmg to provide the country with some settled form of government, and he clung to this policy long after its execution had become wholly impracticable. His first intention was to hand the country over to the local Sultans, but it soon became apparent that there were no local Sultans available who could serve as instruments in the execution of this policy. Then he proposed to set up Zobeir Pasha, and, had his proposal been promptly adopted, it is at least conceivable that the attempt to form an anti-Mahdist government in the Soudan would have been successful. But the opportunity was allowed to shp by. For reasons already narrated, the proposal to utilise Zobeir Pasha's services was rejected. From that moment, it was evident * Memorandum of Januurxj 23, 1884. * Gordons Letters to His tSister, p. x. VOL. I 2 o 562 MODERN EGVPT pt. iii that the Soudan iniist fall into the hands of the JNIalidi. Tliis General Gordon failed to recognise, or j)erhaps it would be more correct to say that the idea of admitting the JNlahdi's supremacy was so distasteful to him that he would not recognise the inevitable conclusion, which could alone be drawn from a consideration of the facts of the situation. He clung to the idea of erecting some anti-IMahdist government in the Soudan when, to use Lord Northbrook's metaphor, the project had become nothing more than an ignis J at 11 us. In order to accomplish this end, he was prepared to sacrifice his most cherished con- victions. Over and over again he proposed that the Soudan should be handed over to the Turkish administration, against whose malpractices he had before inveighed so vigorously. He was aware that the result would be that the people of the Soudan would be oppressed, but he thought that Turkish oppression was preferable to a recognition of the Mahdi. At the same time, with character- istic inconsistency, whilst he was pressing for the .country to be handed over to the Sultan, he admitted that it was preferable to abandon it rather than allow it to remain "under these wretched effete Eg^^ptian Pashas." Whatever may have been the defects of the Egyptian Pashas, there is no reason to suppose that Turkish Pashas would have been in any way. superior to them. In fact, as General Gordon well knew, the Egyptian Pashas were at that time nearly all Turks or Circassians. The truth is that General Gordon was above all things a soldier, and, moreover, a very bellicose soldier.^ His fighting instincts were too strong to admit of his working heartily in the interests of * Sir Samuel Baker, who knew General Gordon well, said to me, some years after the fall of Kliartoiim : "When 1 lieard that Gordon was to go to the Soudan, I knew there would be a fight." CH. XXVII RELIEF EXPEDITION 563 peace. The Arabs, he said, " must have one good defeat to wipe out Hicks's disasters and my defeats. ... I do not care to wait to see the INIahdi walk in on your heels into Khartoum. One cannot tliink that ... it is a satisfactory termination if, after extricating the garrisons and contenting ourselves with that, we let the Mahdi come down and boast of driving us out. It is a thousand pities to give up Khartoum to the Mahdi when there is a chance of keeping it under Zobeir.^ So long as the JNIahdi is alongside, no peace is possible." In fact, General Gordon wished to " smash up " the Mahdi. This was the keynote of all his actions in the Soudan. " If," he wrote on November 7, " Zobeir had been sent to tlie Soudan, we would have beaten the Mahdi without any exterior help ; it is sad, when the Mahdi is moribund, that we should by evacuation of Khartoum raise him again." As to his instructions, he threw them to the winds.^ Both the spirit and the text of his instruc- tions were clear. " The main end to be pursued," he was told in the letter addressed to him on January 25, 1884, "is the evacuation of the Soudan." The policy of establishing some sort of settled government in the Soudan was approved, but this, though desirable, was considered a sub- sidiary point. It was specifically stated that it must "be fully understood that the Egyptian troops M^ere not to be kept in the Soudan merely with a view to consolidate the power- of the new rulers of the country." When it was decided not to employ Zobeir Pasha, General Gordon sliould * This was written on September 24, 1884, that is to say, several months after the Zobeir policy had been i-ejected by the Government, and had, in fact, become quite impracticable. ^ On May 28, 1880, General Gordon wrote to his sister : " Having the views I hold, T could never curb myself sufficiently to remain in Her Majesty's service. Not one in ten million can a^ree witji my motives, and it is no use expecting to change their views." — Letters, etc., p. 158. 564 MODERN EGYPT ft. m have seen that all that remained for him to do was to concentrate his efforts on evacuation. He did nothing of the sort. He thought mainly of the subsidiary portion of his instructions and neglected the main issue. But, it may be said, even if General Gordon had abandoned the idea of establishing an anti-INIahdist government in the Soudan, he would still have been unable to carry out his instructions, for the garrisons of the Soudan were scattered, and it was impossible to save all of them. General Gordon appears to have held that it was incumbent on him to save the whole of these garrisons. " I was named," he wrote, "for EVACUATION OF SOUDAN (against which I have nothing to say), not to run away from Khartoum and leave the garrisons else- where to their fate."" He reverts to this subject over and over again in his Journal.^ He held that it was " a palpable dishonour " to abandon the garri- sons, and that " every one in the Soudan, captive or hemmed ia, ought to have the option and power of retreat." On November 19, he wrote: "I declare positively and once for all that I will not leave the Soudan until every one wlio wants to go down is given the chance to do so, unless a government is established which reheves me of the charge ; there- fore, if any emissary or letter comes up here ordering me to come down, I WILL NOT OBEY IT, BUT WILL STAY HERE AND FALL WITH THE TOWN AND RUN ALL RISKS." All that can be said about arguments of this sort is that they bring to mind General Bosquet's famous remark on the Balaklava charge : " C'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la guerre."^ We » Journal, pp. 66, 72, 93, 112, 113, 125, 292, 298, 305, 307. ' This remark is frequently attributed to Marshal Canrobert. According to Kinglake (Invasion of the Crimea, vol. iv. p. 269), it was made by General Bosquet to Mr. Layard la the field and at the time of the charge. CH. XXVII RELIEF EXPEDITION 565 may admire, and for my own part, I do very much admire General Gordon's personal courage, his dis- interestedness, and his chivalrous feeUng in favour of the beleaguered garrisons, but admiration of these quahties is no sufficient plea against a con- demnation of his conduct on the ground that it was quixotic. In his last letter to his sister, dated December 14, 1884, he wrote : " I am quite happy, thank God, and, Hke Lawrence, I have tried to do my duty."^ The phrase, which must have occurred to many a countryman of Sir Henry Lawrence when placed in a position of difficulty or danger, has become historical. The words, under the circum- stances in which they were first used by Sir Henry Lawrence and afterwards "repeated by General Gordon, are particularly touching. But, after all, when the emotions are somewhat quelled, and the highly dramatic incidents connected with the situation are set aside, reason demands answers to such questions as these : What was General Gordon's duty ? Did he in reaUty try to do his duty ? I am not now dealing with General Gordon's character, which was in many respects noble, or with his military defence of Khartoum, which was heroic, but with the political conduct of his mission, and from this point of view I have no hesitation in saying that General Gordon cannot be considered to have tried to do his duty unless a very strained and mistaken view be taken of what his duty was. He appears to me to have set up for himself a certain standard of duty without any deliberate thought of the means by which his objects were to be accom- plished, or of the consequences which would prob- ably ensue to the British Government and the British nation from attempting to accomplish them. As a matter of public morahty, I camiot » Lettem, etc., p. 21)0. 566 MODERN EGYPT pt. m think that General Gordon's process of reasoning is defensible. The duty of a public servant placed in his position was to sink his personal opinions, and to consider the wishes and true interests of the Government and the nation whom he was called upon to serve. General Gordon was not sent to Khartoum with orders that he was to secure the retreat of every man, woman, and child who wished to leave the Soudan. He was sent to do the best he could to carry out the evacuation. Much was left to his own discretion. It was felt, when he left Cairo, that it would be very difficult to help the outlying garrisons, particularly those in the Bahr - el - Ghazal and Equatorial provinces. In giving General Gordon his instructions, therefore, attention ^vas more especially drawn to the garrison and civil population of Khartoum, which were numerically larger than those situated in any other locality, and with whom it was relatively easy to establish communications. It appears to me that General Gordon's principal duty was to do his best to accomplish his difficult mission and, at the same time, to avoid all the misery, bloodshed, and waste of money, which would certainly occur if it became necessary to send a British expedition to the Soudan. The British Government were not responsible for the position in which the Soudan garrisons were placed. They might, indeed, have been made prisoners, and that was the worst that could have happened. As Lord Granville, with great good sense, wrote to me on March 14: "If Gordon can save the garrisons of Khartoum, of Berber, and of Dongola, it will be in itself a great feat. Gordon ridiculed to us the idea of the garrisons being massacred, and proved to be right as regarded Tokar." The capture of the outlying garrisons by the Mahdi would certainly have been a much less evil than the despatch of a cfl. XXVII RELIEF EXPEDITION 5G7 British expedition to relieve Khartoum. It must also be remembered that the presence of a British force at Khartoum would not have assisted the distant garrisons in the Darfour, Bahr-el-Ghazal, and Equatorial provinces. General Gordon, I conceive, would hardly have proposed to send a British expedition to those remote regions.^ General Gordon, however, took a different, and, as I think, a mistaken view of his duty. He wrote on October 1 : " / think we are bound to extricate the garrisons whatever it costs." He was aAvare that these were not the views of the British Govern- ment, for he added : " they {i.e. the Government) do noty^ but although his military training had instilled into him a certain sense of discipline, which he could not altogether shake off, he had a singular habit, when he felt that he was acting insubordinately, of discovering a number of falla- cious arguments — mentis ^ratissimi errores — to still the prickings of his official conscience. In this case, he appears to have thought that his personal responsibility was covered when he suggested that, as he objected to carry out the \'iews of the British Government, Abdul Kader Pasha should be appointed in his place, but he added : " I own the proposition I make is in some degree a trap, for I feel confident that there will be no end of trouble even in placing Abdul Kader Pasha in my place and trying to evacuate." The truth is that General Gordon was so eag-er to " smash the Mahdi," and so possessed with the idea that it was the bounden duty of the Government to extricate all the garrisons, that he tried to force the hand of the Goveriniient and to oblige them to send an expedition to the Soudan. His personal ' In one passage of his Journal, however, he speaks of the desir- ability of sending a Biitisli force to Kordofan (p. 86). He appears to have thought that it would not be necessary " to go fifty miles beyond Khartoum." 568 MODERN EGYPT ft. m reputation for good faith towards the people of the Soudan was involved in the despatch of a British expedition. So early as February 27, as has been already mentioned,^ he issued a Proclamation, in which the following words occurred : " Britisli troops are now on their way to Khartoum." The intention in issuing this Proclamation was, without doubt, to produce a moral effect, for he was at the time perfectly w^ell aware tliat there existed no intention of sending a British force to Khartoum. But the people of tiiat town naturally took him at his word. They believed for a time that British troops were really coming, and when they found that none arrived, they thought that the British Government had " deserted " them,^ the fact being that the pledge to afford military assistance had been given by General Gordon on his own responsibihty without consultation of any kind with either the British Government or their representative in Cairo. That General Gordon felt that he was under an obligation to carry out the pledges, which he had so rashly given, cannot be doubted. On October 6, he wrote : " The appearance of one British soldier or officer here settles the question of reUef vis-a-vis the townspeople, for then they know that I have not told them lies " ; and in an undated telegram, received on September 18, 1884, he said : " Through having so often promised the people of Khartoum that assistance would come, we are now as bars in their eyes." Obviously, the best thing General Gordon could have done, after communication with Cairo was cut off, would have been to have retreated to Berber with the Khartoum garrison, and such of the civil popu- lation as wished to leave the place. But he does not appear to have made any serious attempt to do so, because he thought that, if he retreated, there » Vide ante, p. 490. • Journal, p. 307. cir. XXVII RELIEF EXPEDITION 561) would be less probability of the British Govern- ment sending an expedition for the relief of the outlying garrisons. On October 5, he made the following significant entry in his Journal : " It may be argued, Why not retreat on Berber ? I would rather not do that, for I would wish to show in a positive way, that I had no part or lot in the abandoning of the garrisons," etc., etc. A later entry in his Journal, dated October 29, puts the case still more clearly : " I wanted to capture Ber- ber, which was the proper military operation to undertake. . . . Perhaps if we had taken Berber, Her Majesty's Government would have said that no expedition was necessary for the relief of the garrisons \ but it would not have been correct to reason thus, for, though Berber might have been taken, we could not have garrisoned it ; and it would have been a barren victory, and not have done much towards the solution of the Soudan problem, or the withdrawal of the garrisons, while it might, on the other hand, have stopped the expedition for their relief^ I think that this was a wrong view to take. Leaving on one side any question of official sub- ordination, and leaving aside also the waste of money, which was subsequently involved, and for the expenditure of which General Gordon was certainly in some measure responsible, I consider that it was of greater importance to the British ' Another instance of the curious arguments by which General Gor- don sought to justify to himself his own conduct may here be given. On September 19 lie wrote : " I think 1 say truly, I have never asked for a British expedition. I asked for 200 men to be sent to Berber at a time when, Graham having beaten Osman Digna, one might have sup- posed there was no risk for tbose 200 men." General Gordon, as a soldier^ must have known that the British Government would never have agreed to sending so small a force as 200 men to Berber. But, in truth, General Gordon's contention that he never asked for a British expedition cannot be maintained. Not only the specific words, but the whole tenor of his Journal shows that all his actions and opinions were of a nature to force the Government into sending an expedition. 570 INIODERN EGYPT pt. m nation to have been spared the loss of such valu- able public servants as General Gordon himself, Sir Herbert Stewart, General Earle, and the many other gallant Englishmen who fell during the subsequent campaign in the Soudan, than to have prevented the outlying garrisons at Sennar and elsewhere from being taken prisoner by the iVIahdi. For these reasons I do not think that it can be held that General Gordon made any serious effort to carry out the main ends of British and Egyptian policy in the Soudan. He thought more of his personal opinions than of the interests of the State. He did not adapt his means to his ends. He knew, or at all events he should have known, what were the main and w\vdt the subsidiary objects of British policy, and he deliberately ranked the second before the first, because his personal predilections tended in that direction. He was left a wide discretionary power, and he used it in a manner opposed to the spirit, if not to the actual text, of his instructions. However much we may admire his personal hero- ism, the facts narrated above are, in my opinion, a conclusive proof that a more unfortunate choice could scarcely have been made than that of General Gordon to carry out the policy of evacuating the Soudan. The execution of that policy should have been in the hands of a man who could fight if neces- sary, but who would devote all his efforts to turning his mission into one of peace rather than of w^ar ; he should have been cool, self-controlled, clear-headed, and consistent, deliberate in the formation of his plans after a careful study of the facts with which he had to deal, and steadfast in their execution w^hen once his mind was made up. He should have had a sufficient knowledge of English public life to have been able to form some fairly accurate conjecture of the motives which were likely to guide the British Government, even if no definite OH. XXVII RELIEF EXPEDITION 571 expression of opinion had been conveyed to him. Genera] Gordon possessed none of these quahties. He was extremely pugnacious. He was hot-headed, impulsive, and swayed by his emotions. It is a true saying that " he that would govern others, first should be the master of himself." One of the lead- ing features of General Gordon's strange character was his total absence of self-control. He was liable to fits of ungovernable and often of most unreasonable passion. He formed rapid opinions without delibera- tion, and rarely held to one opinion for long. His Journal, in which his thoughts from day to day are recorded, is, even in the expurgated form in which it was published, a mass of inconsistencies. He knew nothing of English public life, or, generally, of the springs of action which move governing bodies. He appears to have been devoid of the talent, so valuable to a pubhc servant in a distant country, of transporting himself in spirit elsewhere. His imagination, indeed, ran riot, but whenever he endeavoured to picture to himself what was passing in Cairo or London, he arrived at conclusions which were not only unworthy of himself, but grotesque, as, for instance, when he likened himself to Uriah the Hittite, and insinuated that the British Govern- ment hoped that he and his companions would be killed or taken prisoners by the Mahdi. In fact, except personal courage, great fertility in military resource, a lively though sometimes ill- directed repugnance to injustice, oppression, and meaimess of every description, and a considerable power of acquiring influence over those, necessarily limited in numbers, with whom he was brought in personal contact. General Gordon does not appear to have possessed any of the qualities which would have fitted him to undertake the difficult task he had in hand. I now turn to the other questions propounded 572 MODERN EGYPT pt. m at the beginning of this chapter. Was the execu- tion of the pohcy laid down by the British Govern- ment possible? More especially, would it have been possible for General Gordon to have retreated from Khartoum if no expedition had been sent to his relief? The answer to the first question depends on the view taken as to the scope of British policy. If it be held, with General Gordon, that the British Government were under an obligation to withdraw every one who vdshed to leave from the most remote provinces of the Soudan, then there can be no hesitation in saying that the policy was im- possible of execution. But, for reasons which have been already given, I do not think that the British Government were under any such obhgation.^ If the garrison and civil population of Khartoum could have been saved, a great feat would, as Lord Granville said, have been accomplished, and, con- sidering the extreme difficulties of the situation, General Gordon would have done all that could reasonably have been expected of him. It is difficult to give a positive answer to the question of whether General Gordon could have retreated from Khartoum, if no expedition had been sent to his relief On March 27, 1884, Colonel Coetlogon, who was then at Cairo, wrote to me : " The White Nile to Berber is very low, and there are only two small steamers that can make the passage ; the river begins to rise about the middle of May. I consider that a retreat of a force by river is now impossible, even if unopposed, on account of the lowncss of the river." * The views of the Khedive, when General Gordon started from Cairo, were thus stated to Baron Malortie : ''I have no douht that Gordon Pasha will do his best to sacrifice as few as po-sible ; and, should he succeed, with God's help, in accomplishinf? the evacuation of Khar- toum and the chief posts in the Eastern Soudan, he will be entitled t« the everlasting gratitude of my people." — Too Lute, p. 4. OH. XXVII RELIEF EXPEDITION 573 Would it, however, liave been possible to have effected a retreat by land ? It is almost certain that after May 26, on which day Berber fell into the hands of the Dervishes, re- treat by land was impossible. When General Gordon was asked his reasons for remaining at Khartoum, he wrote in his Journal : " The reasons are those horribly plucky Arabs," and there cannot be any doubt that at tlie time he wrote these words (September 19, 1884), the explanation was sufficient. It is, however, not so certain whether, prior to May 26, the operation might not have been under- taken with a fair prospect of success. " I wanted," General Gordon wrote, on October 29, " to capture Berber, which was the proper military operation." " Had it not been," he wrote on September 19, " for the defeat of Mehemet Ali Pasha,^ I should have got out at least two- thirds of those at Khartoum and Sennar." On the other hand, the passage already quoted from his Journal ^ shows that he did not care for the capture of Berber as it would "not have done much towards the solution of the Soudan problem or withdrawal of the garrisons, while it might, on the other hand, have stopped the expedi- tion for thei?' reliefs It is impossible to draw any very definite con- clusions from the evidence which is available on this subject. All that can be said is that the operation of retreat would have been one of very great difficulty, but it is not certain that it would have been altogether impossible if it had been undertaken before the middle of May. It is clear, however, that inasmuch as General Gordon con- sidered, first, that he was bound to establish some settled government at Khartoum, and secondly, * This was the defeat at El-Eilafun on the Blue Nile, which took place oil September 14. — Wiugate, Mahdiism, etc., p. 167. * y^ide ante, p. 569. 574 JMODERN EGYPT in. iii that he was under an obligation to save the garri- sons of Sennar, Bahr-el-Ghazal, and the Equatorial Province, he never contemplated the possibility of withdrawing from Khartoum and leaving the other garrisons to their fate. To resume the narrative. It has been already mentioned that by the end of March 1884, ail regular communication with Khartoum was cut off. Then followed four or five months of fatal indecision. It was not till August, or even September, that it was definitely decided to send a relief expedition. I will endeavour to summarise the correspondence which passed during that period. On April 21, Lord Granville telegraphed to Mr. Egerton that '* the danger to Berber appeared to be imminent." Mr. Egerton was, therefore, requested, at\er consultation with the authorities at Cairo, to report " whether there was any step, by negotiation or otherwise, which could be taken at once to relieve it." Mr. Egerton replied, on April 23, to the effect that there was no possibility of effecting anything by negotiation without the employment of force, that Nubar Pasha wished to send two Egyptian battalions at once to Berber, that Sir Frederick Stephenson and Sir Evehm Wood objected to sending the Egyptian troops by themselves, but considered that it woidd be possible to send an Anglo-Eg}"ptian force to Berber either over the Korosko desert, or i)id AVadi Haifa and Dongola, but that, at the most favourable com- putation, it would take not less than eight weeks to reach Berber by the Korosko route, or sixteen weeks via Dongola. " All," JNIr. Egerton said, " that can be done for the immediate safety of Berber is to give the assurance that English material aid shall be rendered as soon as possible." Lord Granville replied that the British Govern- CH. XXVII RELIEF EXPEDITION 575 ment could not sanction the attempt to send a British force to Berber via Korosko, neither would they allow Egyptian troops to be sent alone. The Governor of Berber was to be informed that no immediate assistance could be given to him. On the same day (April 23), I^ord Granville telegraphed to Mr. Egerton : " Gordon should be at once informed, in cypher, by several messengers at some intervals between each, through Dongola as well as Berber, or in such other way as may on the spot be deemed most prompt and certain, that he should keep us informed, to the best of his ability, not only as to immediate, but as to any prospective danger at Khartoum ; that, to be pre- pared for any such danger, he should advise us as to the force necessary in order to secure his removal, its amount, character, route for access to Khartoum, and time of operation ; that we do not propose to supply him with Turkish or other force for the purpose of undertaking military expedi- tions, such being beyond the scope of the commis- sion he holds, and at variance with the pacific policy which was the purpose of his mission to the Soudan ; that if with this knowledge he continues at Khartoum, he should state to us the cause and intention with which he so continues. Add expressions both of respect and gratitude for his gallant and self-sacrificing conduct, and for the good he has achieved." Various unsuccessful efforts were made to com- municate this message to General Gordon. It was not till the third week of May that a messenger was found who, it was thought, would be able to get into Khartoum. It was then (JNIay 17) decided to make the following additions to the message ; ^ ^ In the iuterval between April 23 and May 17, Nubar Pasha and Sir Evelyn Wood asked Mr. Ej^erton " to request Her Majesty's Government to give their opinion as to whether or not the Moiidir 576 MODERN EGYPT ft. iii "As the original plan for the evacuation of the Soudan has been dropped, and as aggressive opera- tions cannot be undertaken with the countenance of Her Majesty's Government, General Gordon is enjoined to consider and either to report upon, or if feasible, to adopt, at the first proper moment, measures for his own removal and for that of the Egyptians at Khartoum who have suffered for him or who have served him faithfully, including their wives and children, by whatever route he may consider best, having especial regard to his own safety and that of the other British subjects. " With regard to the Egyptians above referred to. General Gordon is authorised to make free use of money rewards or promises at his discretion. For example, he is at liberty to assign to Egyptian soldiers at Khartoum sums for themselves and for persons brought ^vith them per head, contingent on their safe arrival at Korosko, or whatever point he may consider a place of safety ; or he may employ and pay the tribes in the neighbourhood to escort them. Her Majesty's Government presume that the Soudanese at Khartoum are not in danger. In the event of General Gordon having despatched any person or agent to other points, he is authorised to spend any money re- quired for the purpose of recalling them or securing their safety." ^ of Dong-ola should be told to make the best terms he could for his safety and that of the people with him." Mr. Egerton, in telejfraphing this request to Lord Granville, added : " I can only explain their askinjr a question, which has become one of pure humanity, by their belief that, if some promise be obtained from Her Majesty's Government to send an expedition later on to relieve General Gordon, the Governor of Don^ola mi^ht be enabled to ofi'er some resistance to the stream of rebellion." Tliis was, in effect, the same proposal which I had made in my telegram of March 2(; {t-idc ante, p. 643-545). On May 13, Lord Granville replied : " Her Majesty's Government can make no promise as to future action. The Moudir should be told to make the best terms he can." * General Gordon received this telegram. Allusion to it is made on pp. 39 and 59 of his Journal. CH. XXVII RELIEF EXPEDITION 577 It was not till July 20 that a message was re- ceived from General Gordon, dated June 22. It was evidently not in answer to Mr. Egerton's messages. It was addressed to the Moudir of Dongola, and merely stated that Khartoum and Sennar were still holding out, and that General Gordon wished to be informed of "the place where the expedition coming from Cairo is, and the numbers coming." In forwarding this letter, the Moudir of Dongola requested to be informed of the nature of the reply which should be sent. Lord Granville, to whom the matter was referred, replied to Mr. Egerton : " Her Majesty's Government desire, in the first place, that the messages sent to General Gordon on the 23rd April and the 17th May should be repeated to him, unless you are con- vinced that he has already received them ; and he should further be informed that these com- munications will show him the interest taken by Her Majesty's Government in his safety ; that Her Majesty's Government continue to be anxious to learn from himself his views and position, so that if danger has arisen, or is likely to arise in the manner they have described, they may be in a position to take measures accordingly." On August 17, another glimpse was obtained of what was passing at Khartoum. On that day, Mr. Egerton informed Lord Granville that the Moudir of Dongola had received a letter from General Gordon, dated July 28. This letter stated that Khartoum and Sennar were safe, and asked for information as to " the route and the numbers of the expedition coming from Cairo." By that time, preparations were being made for the despatch of a relief expedition. On August 18, Mr. Egerton asked Lord Granville whether he might inform General Gordon of the nature of these preparations. In reply, Lord Granville telegraphed : " Inform VOL. I 2 P 578 MODERN EGYPT pt. hi General Gordon of the preparations for bis relief in case of need ; refer him to former messages, with directions from Her Majesty's Government to conform to them, and ask the causes of our not having received any reply." On August 28, a further letter was received from General Gordon, dated July 13, in which he said : " We are all well and can hold out for four months." On August 30, Mr. Egerton instructed Colonel Kitchener in the following sense : " Tell Gordon steamers are being passed over the Second Cataract, and that we wish to be informed exactly, through Dongola, when he expects to be in difficulties as to provisions and ammunition." It was not till the 17th, 18th, and 20th of September that several messages were received from General Gordon via Dongola, apparently in answer to the inquiries made by the British Government.^ A httle later (September 28) some letters were received from General Gordon, via Suakin, the latest of which was dated July 31st. The gist of General Gordon's answer to the Government in- quiries was contained in the following words : " You ask me to state cause and intention in staying at Khartoum knowing Government means to abandon Soudan, and in answer I say, I stay at Khartoinn because Arabs have shut us up and will not let us out." In a telegram to the Khe(Hve, General Gordon complained that the English telegrams did not state what were the intentions of the Government, " and only ask for information and waste time." He insisted again on tiie necessity of sending Zobeir Pasha and on entering into negotiations with the Porte, " so as to render it possible to extinguish the flame of this false Mahdi before it becomes difficult." He * Tliese telegrams are given at length in Egypt, No. 35 of 1884, pp. 96-99. CH. XXVII RELIEF EXPEDITION 579 expressed his intention of retaking Berber, burning the town, and returning to Khartoum. " Stewart Pasha," he said, " will proceed to Dongola. Then I will send to the Equator to withdraw the people who are there. After that, it will be impossible for Mohamed Ahmed to come here, and please God, he will meet his death by the hands of the Soudanese. ... It will be impossible to leave Khartoum without a regular government estab- lished by some Power. I will look after the troops on the Equator, Bahr-el-Ghazal, and in Darfour, although it may cost me my life. Per- haps the British Government will be displeased with the advice which I have given. The people of the Soudan are also displeased with me on account of my fighting against them, and on account of their not attaining their object in following the Mahdi." The nature of the military preparations, which were being made whilst the correspondence summar- ised above was going on, must now be described. It has been already explained that, on April 14, I urged the British Government to prepare for a relief expedition.^ A few days earlier (April 8), Lord Wolseley addressed a Memorandum to Lord Hartington in which he discussed the composition of the force which would be required, and the route which it would be advisable to take. In this Memorandum Lord AVolseley said : " Time is the most important element in this question. ... I recommend immediate and active preparations for operations that may be forced upon us by and by." In consequence of these recommendations, Sir Frederick Stephenson was instructed, on April 25, to report " on the best plan of operation for the relief of Gordon, if necessary." A long inter\al, however, elapsed before anything was done. It • Vide ante, pp. 550-558. 580 INIODERN EGYPT ft. iii was at first intended to despatch a force from Suakin to Berber, and, on June 14, Sir Frederick Stephenson was directed to take some preliminary- steps to facilitate the construction of a railway from Suakin, should one eventually become neces- sary. But three weeks later (July 4), it was ex- plained that the Government had no mtention of undertaking any expedition "unless it should appear to be absolutely necessary for ensuring the safe withdrawal of General Gordon from Khartoum." The Government were still waiting for General Gordon's replies to the questions which had been addressed to him. So little was known of what was going on in the Soudan that, although reports had reached Egypt of the fall of Berber, which took place on May 26, all doubts as to their truth were not removed until a month later, that is to say, on June 27. It was not till August 8 that, a vote of credit for £300,000 having been obtained from ParUa- ment, Lord Hartington authorised Sir Frederick Stephenson to take certain preliminary measures with a view to moving troops south of Wadi Haifa. A good deal of difference of opinion existed amongst the military authorities as to whether it would be desirable to move by Suakin, or to adopt the Nile route. Lord Wolseley preferred the latter alternative, and his view was eventually adopted by the Government. Whilst, however, authorising these preliminary measures, the Government only did so under the following reserve: "Her JNI ajesty's Government are not at present convinced that it will be impos- sible for General Gordon, acthig on the instructions which he has received, to secure the withdrawal from Khartoum, either by the employment of force or of pacific means, of the Egyptian garrisons, and of such of the inhabitants as may desire to leave. CH. XXVII RELIEF EXPEDITION 581 "The time, however, which has elapsed since the receipt of authentic information of General Gordon's ^exact position, plans, and intentions, is so long, and the state of the surrounding country, as evidenced by the impossibility of communicating with him, is so disturbed, that Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the time has arrived when some further measure for obtaining accurate information as to his position, and if necessary, for rendering him assistance, should be adopted." On August 26, Lord Wolseley was appointed to command the expedition. He arrived in Cairo on September 10, with Lord Northbrook^ and myself. On September 17, Lord Hartington, whilst complying with a demand made by Lord Wolseley for reinforcements, said : "In arriving at this decision. Her Majesty's Government desire to remind you that no decision has yet been arrived at to send any portion of the force under your command beyond Dongola. . . . You are fully aware of the views of Her Majesty's Government on this subject, and know how averse they are to undertake any warlike expedition not called for b}' absolute necessity." It was not till October 8, that is to say, more than five months after communication between Cairo and Khartoum had been interrupted, that I was authorised to issue to Lord Wolseley instiTic- tions, which had been drafted in consultation between him, Lord Northbrook, and myself The principal passage in these instructions was as follows : " The primary object of the expedition up the valley of the Nile is to bring away General Gordon and Colonel Stewart from Khartoum. When that object has been secured, no further ^ Lord Northbrook, as will be hereafter explained (see Chapter XLV. ), was at the time sent on a special mission to Egypt. 582 MODERN EGYPT niii offensive operations of any kind are to be under- taken. " Although you are not precluded from advanc- ing as far as Khartoum, should you consider such a step essential to insure the safe retreat of General Gordon and Colonel Stewart, you should bear in mnid that Her IMajesty's Government is desirous to limit the sphere of your military operations as much as possible. They rely on you, therefore, not to advance any farther southwards than is absolutely necessary in order to attain the primary object of the expedition. You will endeavour to place yourself in communication with General Gordon and Colonel Stewart as soon as possible." Before tliese instructions were issued, Lord VVolseley had left Cairo. On October 5, he arrived at Wadi Haifa, and the Nile Campaign may be said to have definitely begun. I now propose to make some remarks on the events narrated above. The summer months of 1884 constitute the most gloomy period of the British connection with Egypt. It would seem, indeed, as if some spiteful fairy had presided over the deliberations of the Gladstone Government when Egyptian affairs came under consideration. Mr. Gladstone said (February 23, 1885) : " The difficulties of the case have passed entirely beyond the limits of such political and military difficulties as I have known in the course of an experience of half a century." Under these circumstances, it can be no matter for surprise that mistakes were made. Subsequent events have shown that the Government were sometimes right and sometimes wrong in their decisions. In my opinion, in so far as the broad lines of their general policy are concerned, they were more right than their critics. But when it came to a question of cH. XXVII RELIEF EXPEDITION 583 action, they appear, whether from accident or want of foresight, to have rarely done the right tiling at the right moment. Festinare nocet, nocet et cunctatio saepe, Tempore quaeque suo qui facit, ille sapit. The Government were, indeed, remarkably un- successful in avoiding the extremes of tardiness and precipitation. If the attack on the Alexandria forts had been delayed for a day or two, reinforce- ments would have arrived, and the town would not have been at the mercy of Arabi's rabble. If the expedition to Tokar had arrived a day or tw^o sooner, the Egyptian garrison would have been reheved. There can scarcely be a doubt that if the decision to send an expedition to General Gordon's relief had been taken in April or May, instead of in August, the objects of the expedition would have been attained. The main responsibility for this delay rests on Mr. Gladstone. " I want," Sir Stafford Northcote said in the House of Commons on February 23, 1885, "to see the Government a little inconsistent and to realise facts." INIr. Glad- stone was slow to recognise facts when tliey ran counter to his wishes. The natural result ensued. The facts asserted themselves. When a vote of censure on the conduct of the Government was moved in the House of Commons, Mr. Gladstone acknowledged that errors of judg- ment might have been committed. " It is not for me," he said, "to arrogate to myself or my colleagues infallibility." But Mr. Gladstone laid claim to "honesty of purpose." Every one who is impartial ^vill readily admit this claim. The only question which admits of discussion is whether the errors of judgment, which \\ere assuredly committed, were excusable or the reverse. 584 MODERN EGYPT it. iii A statesman in the responsible position which Mr. Gladstone then occupied, does well to pause before he calls upon a great nation to put forth its military strength. Can, however, the lengthened pause, which Mr. Gladstone made before he decided to send an expedition to Khartoum, be justified? I will endeavour to answer this question. Mr. Gladstone's principal reply to his critics is contained in the following words, which he used in the House of Commons on February 23, 1885 : " Our contention," he said, " was that we must be convinced that an expedition for the relief of General Gordon was necessary and practicable. We had no proof, as we believed, that General Gordon was in danger within the walls of Khar- tomn. We believed, and I think we had reason to believe from his own expressions, that it was in the power of General Gordon to remove himself and those immediately associated with him from Khartoum by going to the south. . . . General Gordon said himself, speaking of it as a thing distinctly within his power, that he would in certain contmgencies withdraw to the Equator." I proceed to analyse these remarks. No one will be disposed to contest the state- ment that, before the Government decided on sending an expedition, it was incumbent on them to be convinced that the adoption of this measure was both " necessary and practicable." It only remains to be considered whether the evidence in respect to both the necessity and the practicability was not sufficient to justify action being taken before the month of ^iugust. The practicability argument may be readily disposed of It was conclusively answered by Lord Hartington at a later period (February 27) of the debate in which Mr. Gladstone used the OH. XXVII RELIEF EXPEDITION 58.5 words quoted above. With characteristic honesty, Lord Hartington said: "Although the difficulties of a military decision were great, and although there was a difference of opinion among military authorities, I have no hesitation in saying that the justification or, if you will, the excuse of the Government has rested mainly on the fact, which we have never attempted to conceal, that the Government were not, until a comparatively recent period, convinced of the absolute necessity of send- ing a military expedition to Khartoum." This frank statement, coming from the Minister who was then responsible for the administration of the War Office, effectually disposes of the argument in justification of delay based on the doubtful practicability of the military enterprise. I turn, therefore, to the question of necessity. " We had no proof," Mr. Gladstone said, " as we believed, that General Gordon was in danger within the walls of Khartoum." The gist of the Government case is contained in these words. The same idea was embodied in all the messages, which- Mr. Egerton was instructed to send to General Gordon during the summer of 1884, and which 1 find it difficult, even after the lapse of many years, to read without indignation. Not only does reason condemn them, but their whole tone runs, without doubt unconsciously, counter to those feelings of generous sympathy, which the position of General Gordon and his companions was so well calculated to inspire. Before General Gordon left London, I had warned the Government that, if he were sent to Khartoum, he would "undertake a service of great difficulty and danger." General Gordon, it is true, had, more suo, been inconsistent in his utterances on this subject. He had, in the first place, greatly underrated the difficulties of his task. So late as February 20, 1884, he had spoken o\ 586 MODERN EGYPT ft. iii Khartoum being "as safe as Kensington Park." But the last messages, which he sent before telegraphic communication between Cairo and Khartoum was interrupted, breathed a very different spirit. He spoke, on jNIarch 8, of " the storm which was likely to break," of the prob- ability of his being "hemmed in," and he added, with something of prophetic instinct, " 1 feel a conviction that I shall be caught in Khar- toum." Lord Wolseley, myself, and others had dwelt on the dangers of General Gordon's position, and even if no such warnings had been given, the facts spoke for themselves. General Gordon and Colonel Stewart were beleaguered in a remote African town by hordes of warlike savages, who were half mad with fanaticism and elated at their recent successes. Yet JMr. Gladstone wanted further proof tliat they were in danger. If the proofs which already existed in the early summer of 1884 were not sufficient, one is tempted to ask w^hat evidence would ha\'e carried conviction to Mr. Gladstone's mind, and the only possible answer is that Mr. Gladstone was well- nigh determined not to believe a fact which was, naturally enough, most distasteful to him,^ General Gordon, in a passage of his Journal, which would be humorous if it were not pathetic, has himself described what every one of connnon sense must tliink of Mr. Gladstone's attitude during this period. " It is," he wrote on September 23, " as if a man on the bank, having seen his friend in the river already bobbed down two or three times, ' There is a close aiialosry between Mr. Gladstone's attitude at this time and that of Lord Aberdeen before the Crimean \\^ar. Hoth prac- tised the art of self-deception. "Alnidst to the last," Mr. Kinglake says {Invasion of the Crimea, vol. i. p. 3i)7), " Lord Aberdeen mis-juided himself. Ilis loathing for vv.ir took such a shape that he could not ;ind would not believe in it ; and wiien at last the spectre was close upou him, he covered his eyes and refused to see." -H. XXVII RELIEF EXPEDITIOX 587 hails : ' I say, old fellow, let us know when we are to throw you the life-buoy ; I know you have bobbed down two or three times, but it is a pity to throw you the life-buoy until you are really in extremis, and I want to know exactly, for I am a man brought up in a school of exactitude.'" Mr. Gladstone said that General Gordon spoke of withdrawing to the Equator " as a thing distinctly in his power." It is true that in two telegrams of March 9 and of April 7, General Gordon had spoken of the possibility of retiring towards the E(piatorial Province, but I had inforined Lord Granville, on March 26, that Colonel Coetlogon, who spoke with authority on this subject, ridiculed the idea, and although Colonel Stewart had sadd at the beginning of April : " I am inclined to think my retreat will be safer by the Equator," the context clearly showed that he only used these words because he considered retreat via Berber so difficult, unless a British expedition were sent to open the road, that he preferred the desperate risk of a retreat in a southerly direction. It was, in fact, only necessary to look at a map, to glance at the accounts given by Generil Gordon himself and by Sir Samuel Baker of the physical difficulties to be overcome in moving up the White Nile, and to remember that both banks of that river for a long distance above Khartoum were in the hands of the Dervishes, to appreciate the fact that retreat in the direction of Gondokoro was little better than a forlorn hope. For these reasons, the arguments adduced by Mr. Gladstone do not appear to affi3rd any sufficient justification for the long delay which ensued before it was decided to send an expedition to Khartoum. A different class of argument may, however, be advanced in favour of the course adopted by the Government at this time. It may be said that General Gordon never attempted to carry out the 588 MODERN EGYPT pt. iii policy of the Government, that he was sent to evacuate the Soudan, that he turned his peaceful mission into an endeavour to "smash the JMahdi," and that he could have retreated from Khartoum, but that he never attempted to do so. Little was said about this aspect of the question at the time, for this line of argument necessarily involved reflec- tions on General Gordon's conduct, which, under all the circumstances of the case, would have been considered ungenerous, and which, moreover, would have produced little effect, for the pubhc were in no humour to listen to them. General Gordon, in Mr. Gladstone's words, was considered a " hero of heroes," and, at the time, a defence based on any faults he might have committed would, for all Parliamentary purposes, have been worse than none at all. At the same time, the order of ideas embodied in these arguments did to a certam extent find expression. Whilst Sir Stafford Northcote invited the House of Commons to assert the prmciple that it was incumbent on England to secure " a good and stable government for those portions of the Soudan which were necessary to the security of Egypt," Mr. John JNIorley, in a powerful speech, moved an amend- ment which was hostile alike to the Government and to the Opposition. He invited the House to express its regret that " the forces of the Crown were to be employed for the overthrow of the power of the JNI ahdi."^ Moreover, although Mr. Gladstone's parliamentary position obliged him to oppose jNIr. 5lorley's amendment, it is perhaps no very far-fetched conjecture to imagine that this amendment embodied an opinion, which did not differ widely from the views which Mr. Glad- stone personally entertained. Mr. Gladstone had formerly spoken of the Soudanese as a "people * Mr. Alorley's amendment was rejected by 455 to 112 votes. CH. XXVII RELIEF EXPEDITION 589 rightly struggling to be free." The phrase had become historical. It was indiscreet in the mouth of an English Prime Minister, but at one time it contained a certain element of ti'uth.^ JNIoreover, I often heard at the time that Mr. Gladstone reasoned somewhat after this fashion : " The Soudanese wash to get rid of the Egyptians. The Egyptians, under pressure from England, are prepared to leave the Soudan. It is inconceivable tliat, if the matter were properly explained to the JNIahdi, he would not agree to facilitate the peaceful retreat of the Egyptian garrisons." To the logical European mind this position appears unassailable, but Mr. Gladstone never realised the fact that he was deal- ing with a race of savage fanatics to whom European processes of reasoning were wholly in- comprehensible. The JNIahdist movement was not only a revolt against misgovernment. It was also, in the eyes of its followers, a religious move- ment having for its object the forced conversion of the whole world to Mahdiism. There can be little doubt that it would have been practically impossible to treat with tlie Mahdi on the basis of a peaceful withdrawal of the Egyptian troops. The line of argument to which allusion is made above, would appear more worthy of attention than that actually adopted by the Government. It has been already shown that General Gordon paid little heed to his instructions, that he was consumed with a desire to " smash the Mahdi," and that the view that he was constrained to withdraw every one who wished to leave from the most distant parts of the Soudan was, to say the least, quixotic. The conclusion to be dra^vn from these facts is that it w^as a mistake to send General * I mean that the Mahdist revolt would never have taken place if the people of the Soudan had not wished to throw off the Egyptian yoke. 590 JNIODERN EGYPT ft. hi Gordon to the Soudan. But do they afford any justification for the delay m preparing and in despatching the rehef expedition ? I cannot think that they do so. Whatever errors of judgment General Gordon may have committed, the broad facts, as they existed in the early summer of 1884, were that he was sent to Khartoum by the British Go^'ernment, who never denied their responsibility for his safety, that he was beleaguered, and that he was, therefore, unable to get away. It is just possible that he could have effected his retreat if, having abandoned the southern posts, he had moved northwards with the Khartoum garrison in April or early in JNlay. . As time went on and nothing was heard of him, it became more and more clear that he eitlier could not or would not, — probably that he could not, — move. The most indulgent critic would scarcely extend beyond June 27 the date at which the Government should have decided on the question of whether a relief expedition should or should not be despatched. On that day, the news that Berber had been captured on May 26 by the Dervishes was finally confirmed. Yet it was not till six weeks later that the Government obtained from Parliament the funds necessary to prepare for an expedition. I began the examination of this branch of the subject by asking whether the errors of judgment committed by Mr. Gladstone's Government in the summer of 1884 were excusable. The points, which have been previously discussed, such as the tacit permission given to the Hicks expedition, the despatch of General Gordon to Khartoum, the rejection of Zobeir Pasha's services, and the refusal to make a dash to Berber in March, are questions as to which it may be said, either that the fact of any error havdng been committed may be contested, or that any condemnatory conclusion must in some CH. XXVII RELIEF EXPEDITION 691 degree be based upon an after-knowledge of events, which was not obtainable when the decisive step had to be taken. The same cannot be said of the point now under discussion. The facts were at the time sufficiently clear to any one who wished to under- stand them, and the conclusions to be drawn from them were obvious. Those conclusions were (1) that unless a military expedition was sent to Khar- toum, General Gordon and his companions must sooner or later fall into the hands of the Mahdi ; and (2) that prompt action was needed, all the more so because it was only during the short period while the Nile was high that rapidity of movement was possible. If Mr. Gladstone had said that the expenditure of blood and money which would be involved in an expedition to Khartoum was incom- mensurate with the objects to be attained, the argument would, in my opinion at all events, have been unworthy of the leader of a great nation, and to none of Mr. Gladstone's arguments does a censure of this description in any degree apply. Moreover, the adoption of this attitude would have probably sealed the fate of the Ministry in forty-eight hours. But such a statement would have had the merit of being comprehensible. The argument that no expedition was necessary because General Gordon was not proved to be in danger was so totally at variance with facts, which were patent to all the world, as to be well-nigh in- comprehensible. On these grounds, I maintain that of all the mistakes committed at this period in connection with Egyptian and Soudanese affairs, the delay in sending an expedition to the relief of Khartoum was the least excusable.^ The House of Commons * Lord Northbrook wrote to me subsequently (January 13, 1886) : " You gave us very distinct warnings in time that if Gordon was to be rescued an expedition would have to be sent, and no one regrets more 592 MODERN EGYPT pt. m practically condemned the conduct of the Govern- ment. In a full House, the Government only- escaped censure by a majority of 14. *' If," General Gordon wrote on November 8, " it is right to send up an expedition now, why was it not right to send it up before ? " The fact that General Gordon's pathetic question admits of no satisfac- tory answer must for ever stand as a blot on INIr. Gladstone's political escutcheon. than I do that the preparations were delayed from May to August." I may add that, some ten years later, I sent to Lord Northbrook a type- written copy of the portion of this work which deals with the Soudan. He wrote the following words on the margin opposite the passage to which this note is attached : "I am afraid that all this is quite true. ... As I had the misfortune to be a member of Mr. Gladstone's Government, I have to bear the blame with the rest But 1 resolved never to serve under him again I " CH. XXVII RELIEF EXPEDITION 593 APPENDIX Note on the Khedive s telegram to General Gordon of September 14, 1884. The following entry occurs in General Gordon'^s Journal (vol. ii. p. 359), dated November 25, 1884 : " Tewfik, by a telegram, cancels his Firman, which gives up the Soudan, which I have torn up. *' A telegram to the Ulemas from Tewfik says : * Baring is coming up with Lord Wolseley.'' " It appears from the numerous discussions which have taken place in connection with the Gordon mission that some misapprehension exists with regard to the circumstances under which the telegrams to which allusion is here made were sent. I propose, therefore, to state what actually took place. On September 14, 1884, the Khedive sent a telegram to General Gordon. The full text of this telegram is given in a note to an article written by Sir Reginald Wingate, and pub- lished in the United Service Magazine of July 1892. For my present purposes the following extracts will suffice : " We inform you now that a great change has taken place since the time that the aforenamed {i.e. the British) Govern- ment advised the evacuation of the Soudan, and com- munication with you had been cut. . . . But the English troops will shortly occupy Dongola, and Colonel Chermside, the Governor of Suakin, has been ordered to communicate with the tribes regarding Kassala ; also Major Kitchener, one of the officers of my new army, is ordered to confer at Dongola, and we hope he will shortly be able to open com- munication with you. Again, it becomes necessary, under these circumstances, to modify the Firman which we had granted you, so that your authority will now be confined to being Governor of the Soudan, including Khartoum, Sennar, Berber, and their present vicinities. . . . You will also receive the 'necessary instructions from the British Govern- ment, through Sir E. Baring and Lord Wolseley, who has been made Commander-in-Chief of the English expedition, and who is at present in Cairo."" At the same time, a telegram was sent to the Ulema of Khartoum, urging them to do their utmost to maintain the honour of the Government. VOL. I 2 Q 594 MODERN EGYPT pt. iii So far as I am aware, no British authority was consulted before these telegrams were sent. I certainly never saw them until long after General Gordon's death. Inasmuch, how- ever, as General Gordon could not know that the Khedive had sent the telegrams solely on his own authority, this point is of slight importance. On receipt of the Khedive's message. General Gordon ap- pears to have published the Proclamation given in Appendix Y to his Journal (vol. ii. p. 552). This Proclamation contains the following passage: "Formerly the Government had decided to transport the Egyptians down to Cairo and abandon the Soudan ; and, in fact, some of them had been sent down during the time of Hussein Pasha Yusri, as you yourself saw. On our arrival at Khartoum, on account of pity for you, and in order not to let your country be destroyed, we communicated with the Khedive of Egypt, our Effendi, concerning the importance and inexpediency of abandoning it. Whereupon, the orders for abandoning the Soudan were cancelled." From a perusal of these documents, it is easy to judge of what took place. On February 27, 1884, that is to say, nine days after his arrival at Khartoum, General Gordon had practically announced to the public the abandonment of the policy which he was sent to carry out. In a Proclamation issued on that day he said : " British troops are now on their way to Khartoum."^ He had many misgivings as to the correctness of this proceeding. The Khedive's telegram of September 14, 1884, is worded in such a manner as to render it possible to misapprehend its meaning. General Gordon, therefore, readily seized the opportunity to put himself, as he thought, in the right. A mere comparison of the dates of General Gordon's original Proclamation and of the Khedive's telegrams is sufficient to show that, as evidence as to how far General Gordon endeavoured to carry out his instructions on his arrival at Khartoum, the entry in the Journal on November 25, 1884, is valueless. * Vide ante, p. 490. END OF VOL. I MODERN EGYPT MODERN EGYPT BY THE EARL OF CROMER In his first inter--uieiv 'with the Go--vernor of St. Helena, Napoleon said emphatically .■ ' " E^ypt is the most important country in the nuorld" Rose, Life of Napoleon, vol. i. p. 356. Eariitn proprie rerum sit historia, quibus rebus gerendis interfuerit is qui narret. Gellius, Noctes Atticae, v. 18. TO. S' epya Twi' Trpa\6i\'TMi' er nij TroAe/x'i) ovk €k Toii TrapaTiiyoi'TOS TTVvdavojievo'i //^tojcra ypucfieLV, ovo (US e/xoi eSoKft, aXX ots re arros irapiji', Kat irapa TdU' aAAtoi' ocrov Swarov aKpifiela irepl eKacrrov eTre^eXOwv. Thucydides, i. 22. IN TWO VOLUMES VOL. II THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 1916 ./i/t rights reser'ved Copyright, 1908, By the MACMILLAN COMPANY. Set up and electrotyped. Published March, 1908. Reprinted April, May, August, 1908 ; January, 1909; March, 1916. J. S. Gushing Co. — Berwick & Smith Co. Norwood, Mass., U.S.A. CONTENTS PART III (Continued) THE SOUDAN 1882-1907 CHAPTER XXVIII The Fall of Khartoum October 5, 1884-Januaby 26, 1886 Murder of Oslonel Stewart— Difficulties of the Expedition — News from General Gordon — Occupation of Jakdul — The battle of Abu Klea — Death of Sir Herbert Stewart — The column reaches the Nile — Two steamers leave for Khartoum — They arrive too late — Events at Khartoum — General Gordon's character — Capitulation of Omdurmao — General Gordon's death — Effect on public opinion ....... 9 CHAPTER XXIX The Evacuation of the Soudak Januaby 26, 1885-Decbmber 30, 1886 Lord Wolseley in-ges the necessity of an autumn campaign — The Government hesitate — And then agree — Sir Redvers Buller retreats to Korti — Battle of Kirbekan — The movement on Berber arrested — Operations at Suakin — Action at Hashin — And at Tofrik — Suspension of the Suakin operations — The autumn campaign abandoned — Question of holding Dongola — Change of Government in England — Evacuation of Dongola — Death of the Mahdi — Battle of Ginniss — Review of British policy ........ 19 ▼ vi MODERN EGYPT CHAPTER XXX The Debris of the Soudan PAOl The outlying provinces : — 1. Darfour : Surrender of the province — The Senoussieh sect — The revolt of Abu Geraaizeh. 2. Bahr-el- Ghazal : Lupton Bey surrenders — His death. 3. Equatoria : Emin Pasha summoned to surrender— He maintains his posi- tion—The Stanley expedition. 4. Sennar : The garrison sur- renders. 5. iTassaia : The garrison surrenders. 6. The Abyssinian Frontier Garrisons : The Hewett treaty — The garrisons of Amadib, Senhit, Galabat, Gera, and Gedaref. 7. Berbera: Its political status — It is occupied by British troops. 8. Ilarrar : Withdrawal of the Egyptian garrison — Installation of the Emir Abdullah — King Menelek occupies the province. 9. Zeyla : It is occupied by British troops. 10. Tajourrah : The French occupy it. 11. Massowah : Its political status— Attitude of the British Government — The Italians occupy Massowah • .85 CHAPTER XXXI The Defence of Egypt 1886-1892 The Egyptian army — Negotiations with the Dervishes— Fighting on the frontier— The siege of Suakin— Defeat of Osraan Digna — Wad-el-Nejurai— Nejumi advances— The battles of Argin and of Toski— Death of Wad-el-Nejumi— Results of the battle- Situation at Suakin— The reoccupation of Tokar— Defeat of Osman Digna ....... flO CHAPTER XXXn The Reconquest of Khartoum October 1895-September 1898 Necessity of reconquering the Soudan — Danger of premature action — The Italian defeat at Adua — It is decided to advance on Dongola — Provision of funds — Sir Herbert Kitchener — Indian expedition to Suakin — Railway construction — Battle of Firket — Capture of Dongola — The Egyptian Government repay the money advanced by the Commissioners of the Debt — The British Government advance £800,000— Question of a further oiTensive movement — Capture of Abu Hamed and Berber — Reoccupation of Kassala— British troops sent to the Soudan — The battle of the Atbara— The battle of Omdurman— Cost of the campaign—The War Office — The policy of reconquest . 79 CONTENTS vii CHAPTER XXXIII The New Soudan PAQI Question of the future political status of the Soudan — Anomalies of the British position — Objections to annexation — And to complete incorporation with Egypt — Intricacy of the problem — The two flags — Speech at Omdurman — The right of con- quest — The Agreement of January 19, 1899 — Its unusual nature — Its reception by Europe — Advantages of a Free Trade policy ........ HI PART IV THE EGYPTIAN PUZZLE CHAPTER XXXIV The Dwellers in Egypt The Englishman's mission — Conditions under which it was under- taken — Population of Egypt — Its mixed character — Hostility to England — Main tenets of Islam — Its failure as a social system — Degradation of women — Immutabihty of the law — Slavery — Intolerance — Incidents of religious belief and cere- monial — Mental and moral attributes — Seclusion of women- Polygamy — Divorce — Coarseness of literature and conversation — Filial piety — Government — Conservatism — Spirit of the laws — Language — Art — Music — Customs — Obstacles to England's mission ........ 189 CHAPTER XXXV The Moslems Classification of the population — The Turco - Egyptians — The Egyptians — The hierarchy — The Grand Mufti — The head of the El-Azhar University — The Grand Kadi — The Sheikh el-Bekri — Mohammed el-Saadat — Abdul-Khalik el-Saadat — Mohammed Abdu— Mohammed Beyram — The Omdehs and Sheikhs — Their submissiveness to the Pashas — Their sympathy with Ardbi — Their tyranny over the fellaheen — Their feelings towards England — The Fellaheen — The Bedouins . . 168 Appendix. — ^Translation of a Letter from a Sheikh of Keneh to a Sheikh of the Mosque of Scyyidna-Hussein at Cairo . . 200 viii MODERN EGYPT CHAPTER XXXVI The Christians PAOI The Cons — The conservatism of their religion — Their character — Their attitude towards the English — The reform movement — The Syrians — Their position — Their unpopularity — Their attitude towards the English — The Armenians — Their sub- serviency to the Turks — Nubar Pasha — His son Boghos — Yacoub Pasha Artin — Tigrane Pasha — The Egyptians should not be weighed in European scales .... 901 CHAPTER XXXVn The Europeanised Egyptians The Europeanised Egyptians are generally Agnostics — Effects of Europeanising the East — Gallicised Egyptians — Attractions of French civiUsation — Unsuitabihty of the French system to form the Egyptian character — The official classes generally hostile to England ....... 928 CHAPTER XXXVIII The Europeans Number of Europeans — The Levantines — Their characteristics^ The Greeks — Their commercial enterprise — The EngUsh — The Army of Occupation — Anglo - Egyptian officials — Feelings entertained by other Europeans towards the English — Summary of the classes friendly and hostile to England . . . 945 CHAPTER XXXIX The Machinery of Government Nature of the machinery — Parts of the machine — 1. The Sulta* —The Firman of 1892— The Sinai Peninsula— 9. The Khedivk — Rescript of August 28, 1878 — Constitutionalism of Tewfik Pasha — 3. The Ministers — The Departments — Position of an Egyptian Minister — 4. The Organic Law of May 1, 1883 — The Provincial Councils — The Legislative Council — The Legislative Assembly ...... fW CONTENTS ix' CHAPTER XL The British Officials FAOa Qualifications required of an Anglo-Egyptian official — Positions of the civil and military officials — The French in Tunis — The Financial Adviser — Sir Edgar Vincent — The Judicial Adviser — History of his appointment — Sir Raymond West — Justice under Egyptian management — Sir John Scott — The Public Works Department — Sir Colin Scott-Moncrieff — Sir William Garstin — The Financial Secretary — Blum Pasha — Lord Milner — Sir Eldon Gorst — Sub -Departments of Finance — The Interior — Public Instruction — European and Egyptian officials 280 CHAPTER XLI The International Administrations Internationalism — 1. The Commission of the Public Debt— Functions of the Commission — The Egyptian Accounts — The Reserve Fund — Uselessness of the Commission — 2. The Railway Administration — 3. The Daira Sanieh — 4. The Domains Administration ...... 901 CHAPTER XLII The Judicial System The Mixed Courts — Nubar Pasha's objects in creating them — Attributes and composition of the Mixed Courts — Defects in the institution — The Consular Courts — The Native Tribunals and the Kadi's Courts — Summary of jurisdictions in Egypt . 316 CHAPTER XLin The Workers of the Machine Importance of persons rather than of systems — The British Consul- General— Tewfik Pasha— The Prime Ministers— Ch^rif Pasha — ^Nubar Pasha — Riaz Pasha — Mustapha Pasha Fehmi . S91 X MODERN EGYPT PART V BRITISH POLICY IN EGYPT CHAPTER XLIV The Struggle for a Policy 1882-1883 r»am Intentions of the British Government — Proposal to reduce the garrison — Sir Edward Malet's opinion — Difficulty of combining reform and evacuation — I recommend reduction and concentra- tion at Alexandria — The Government approve of this recom- mendation — The reduction is countermanded . . . 349 Appendix. — Despatch from Sir Evelyn Baring to Earl Granville, dated October 9. 1883 363 CHAPTER XLV The Northbrook Mission September-November 1884 It is decided to send a Special Commissioner to Cairo — The policy of reporting — Lord Northbrook arrives in Egypt — His financial proposals — His General Report — The Government reject his proposals .....«•• 366 CHAPTER XLVI The Wolff Convention August 1885-October 1887 Sir Henry Wolff appointed Special Commissioner — Convention of October 24, 1885— Moukhtar Pasha— Convention of May 29, 1887 — Comparison of the two Conventions — Frontier affiiirs — The army — Civil reforms — Evacuation — France and Russia oppose the Convention — The Sultan refuses to ratify it — Moukhtar Pasha permanently located in Egypt — Results of the Wolff mission ....... 371 CHAPTER XLVH The Neutralisation of the Suez Canal Neutralisation of Egypt — Neutrahsation of the Canal — The word neutrality — Circular of January 3, 1883 — The Suez Canal Com- CONTENTS xi PAOB mission of 1885— The Commission dissolved— The Wolff Gjn- Tention — Signature of the Canal Convention — Its appUcation . S8i CHAPTER XLVIII The Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 Apparent insolubility of the Egyptian question — Gradual change in public opinion — Statement of Lord Ellenborough — The busi- ness of diplomacy — The main facts of the problem— The events of 1904 — Morocco — Signature of the Anglo-French Agreement — Remarks on the Agreement . • • • • 386 PART VI THE REFORMS CHAPTER XLIX The Courbash Universal nse of the courbash — Lord Dufferin's Circular — It was partially inoperative — Final abolition of the courbash . , S97 CHAPTER L The Corvee Connection between the courbash and the corvee — Merits and demerits of the corvee system — The corvee law — Dredging the canals — Proposed reduction of the land-tax — Proposal to abohsh the corvee instead of reducing the land-tax — The Powers object — Action of the British Government — The corvee is not called out — A Decree is issued partially abolishing the corvee — Final lettlement of the question in 1892 . . • . 406 CHAPTER LI Corruption Universality of corruption — Steps taken to arrest it — Example of British officials — Diminution of corrupt practices . . 420 xii MODERN EGYPT CHAPTER LH European Privilege TAOm Origin of the Capitulations — Difference between Turkey and Egypt — Abuse of the Capitulations — Raison d'etre of European privi- lege — Anomaly of the British position — Impossibility of arriving at any general solution — Minor changes — The right to enact by- laws — The House Tax — The Professional Tax — Proposal to create a local legislature — Internationalism . , , 426 CHAPTER LHI Finance The first bankruptcy of Egypt— Risk of a second bankruptcy — The Race against bankruptcy — The era of reform — Fiscal relief — Reduction of taxation— Increase of revenue — Expenditure — Aggregate surplus since 1888— The indebtedness of the fella- heen — Distribution of land— Importance of the financial ques- tion 443 CHAPTER LIV Irrigation Nature's bounty to Egypt — The work of the Pharaohs— Turkish neglect — Progress under British guidance— Programme of the future — Causes of the progress— Qualifications of the officers selected — Absence of international obstruction — Loan of f 1,800,000 — Support of the pubhc— Importance of the work . 456 CHAPTER LV The Army Disbandment of the army in 1882— History of the array— Mehemet Ali's Syrian campaigns- Ismail Pasha— The Abyssinian cam- paign— Tel-el-Kebir— It is decided to form a fellaheen array officered by Englishmen— The black battalions— Will the army fight ?— Reasons why the reorganisation has been successfully conducted ........ 4^0 CONTENTS xiii CHAPTER LVI The Interior PAOB Uncertainty of British policy — Difficulties of administrative reform — Lord Dufferin's Police proposals — Mr. Clifford Lloyd — Changes made in the Police organisation — Nubar Pasha's conflict with Mr. Clifford Lloyd — The latter resigns — Friction in the Interior — Appointment of an Adviser — And of Inspectors — Difficulties of the present moment .... 478 CHAPTER LVn Sub-Departments of the Interior 1. Prisons— State of the prisons in 1882— Reform— 2. Slavery — The Slave Trade and slavery— The Convention of 1877— The Slave Home — Change of opinion in Egypt — Success of the Convention — 3. Medical and Sanitary AoMiNiSTRAnoN — Egyptian superstitions — Clot Bey — State of things in 1883 — Improvements effected — Sanitary reform — Impediments to progress — Treatment of epidemics .... 491 CHAPTER LVni Justice Sir Edward Malet's opinion — The Mixed and Consular Courts^ The Kadis' Courts — The Native Tribunals — Justice prior to 1883 — The French system taken as a model — The judicial machinery — Reforms instituted by Sir John Scott and Sir Malcolm Mcllwraith — Opposition to these reforms — The personnel of the Courts — Result of the reforms . . .514 CHAPTER LIX Education Educational policy — Obstacles to progress — Want of money — The Pashas — Intellectual awakening of Egypt — The Mosque schools — Primary and Secondary education — Progress made in forming the characters of the Egyptians — Female education . , 524 xiv MODERN EGYPT CHAPTER LX The Soudan PAOB The nature of the Soudan problem— Extent— Population— Results obtained by the Convention of 1899 — Executive agency— Finance— Ilailways— Slavery ..... 543 CHAPTER LXI Conclusion Summary of this work— Changes since the time of Ismail — The British reformers — Their Egyptian allies — Stability of the reforms ........ 555 PART vn THE FUTURE OF EGYPT CHAPTER LXn The Future of Egypt Quo Vadis? — The question of the occupation — Its duration- Egyptian autonomy— The Capitulations— Desirability of train- ing the Egyptians — Importance of finance — Display of sym- pathy—Conclusion ...... 563 APPENDIX Khedives of Egypt— British Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs —British Agents and Consuls-General in Egypt— Chronological Table of Events ....... 573 INDEX .685 PART III (Continued) THE SOUDAN 1882-1907 VOL. II CHAPTER XXVIII THE FALL OF KHARTOUM October 5, 1884-January 26, 1885 Murder of Colonel Stewart — Difficulties of the Expedition — News from General Gordon — Occupation of Jakdul — The battle of Abu Klea — Death of Sir Herbert Stewart — The column reaches the Nile — Two steamers leave for Khartoum — They arrive too late — Events at Khartoum — General Gordon's character — Capitulation of Omdurman — General Gordon's death — Effect on public opinion. It is not within the scope of this work to write a detailed history of the military operations which took place in the Soudan. Those operations have been recorded by others who are more competent than myself to deal with military matters. I pro- pose, therefore, as in the case of the Egyptian campaign of 1882, merely to give a brief sum- mary of the chief events connected with the Nile Campaign of 1884-85. Scarcely had the campaign commenced, when news arrived that Colonel Stewart had been killed. On September 10, he left Khartoum in a steamer accompanied by Mr. Power, M. Herbin, the French Consul, and about forty others. Colonel Stewart had been instructed by General Gordon to inform the various authorities concerned of the true nature of the situation at Khartoum. Berber and Abu Hamed were passed in safety, and it was thought that the main difficulties of the voyage had been overcome, when, on the 18th, the steamer struck 4 MODERN EGYPT pt. m on a rock near the village of Hebbah, some sixty miles below Abu Hamed. The boat was hopelessly disabled. Colonel Stewart and his companions landed, and were subsequently induced to lay aside their arms and enter a house in the village, where they were treacherously murdered by Suleiman Wad Gamr, the Sheikh of the JNIonasir tribe. It is singular that Colonel Stewart, who must have known the treacherous character of the Bedouins, should have fallen into the trap which was laid for him. The explanation has probably been afforded by General Gordon, who said that Colonel Stewart *' was not a bit suspicious." ^ I have frequently in the course of this narra- tive alluded to Colonel Stewart's high character, judgment, and ability. I can only repeat that by his premature death the Queen and the British nation lost a most capable public servant. A more gallant fellow never lived. The Nile expedition. Colonel Colville says,' "was a campaign less against man than against time. Had British soldiers and Egyptian camels been able to subsist on sand and occasional water, or had the desert produced beef and biscuit, the army might, in spite of its late start, have reached Khartoum in November." The difficulties of supply and transport were, in fact, very great. * Journal, p. 281. The whole of this passage is worth quoting, as it shows what a singularly accurate forecast General Gordon made of the manner in which Colonel Stewart had been murdered, before he had learnt any of the details. " I feel somehow," General Gordon wrote on November 5, ''convinced they were captured by treachery — the Arabs pretending to be friendly — and surprising them at night. I will own that, without reason (apparently, for the chorus was that the trip was safe), I have never been comfortable since they left. Stewart was a man who did not chew the cud, he never thought of danger in perspective ; he was not a bit suspicious (while 1 am made up of it). I can see in imajrination the whole scene, the Sheikh inviting them to land, saying, ' Thank God, the Mahdi is a liar/ — bringing in wood — men going on shore and dis])ersed. The Abbas with her steam down, then a rush of wild Arabs, and all is over ! " ' Hiatory of the Soudan Campaign, p. 61. CH. XXVIII FALL OF KHARTOUM 5 But British energy and perseverance overcame them. By the end of December, Lord Wolseley was ready to move from Korti across the desert to Metemmeh. News had been received that suppUes were run- ning short at Khartoum, and it was clear that, if General Gordon was to be saved, not a day would have to be lost in estabhshing communica- tions with him. It was resolved to divide the British force into two portions. One division, under Sir Herbert Stewart, was to take the desert route. The other, under General Earle, was to follow the course of the Nile with a view ultimately to the capture of Berber, which General Gordon had warned Lord Wolseley "not to leave in his rear." On December 30, the day on which Sir Herbert Stewart left Korti, a messenger arrived with a piece of paper the size of a postage stamp, on which was written, "Khartoum all right. 14.12.84. C. G. Gordon." This was in General Gordon's hand- writing, and his seal was affixed to the back of the document. The letter was, however, accompanied by a verbal message from General Gordon which showed the straits to which he was reduced. " Our troops," he said, " at Khartoum are suffering from lack of provisions. The food we still have is Uttle, some grain and biscuit. We want you to come quickly. ... In Khartoum there is no butter, no dates, little meat. All food is very dear." The force which left Korti at 3 p.m. on December 80, under the command of Sir Herbert Stewart, consisted of about 1100 British officers and men, and 2200 camels. It reached the wells of Jakdul, ninety-eight miles distant, early on the morning of January 2. A garrison of 422 men was left there with instructions to rig up pumps and otherwise improve the water-supply. On the evening of the 2nd, Sir Herbert Stewart left with the remainder of the force, and reached Korti at noon on the 5th. 6 MODERN EGYPT ft. iii On the 8th, he again started from Korti with the main body of the desert column, consisting of about 1600 eiFective British troops, some 300 camp-followers, and about 2400 camels and horses. His orders were to advance and occupy Metemmeh, to leave a strong detachment there, and then to return to Jakdul. Sir Charles Wilson accompanied the column, and, after the occupation of Metemmeh, was to proceed to Khartoum at once with a small detachment of infantry on board the steamers which, it was known, were in the neighbourhood. The column reached Jakdul early on the morning of the 12th. After halting for a day, the march was resumed. On the night of the 16th, the force bivouacked about three and a half miles from the wells of Abu Klea, which were occupied in con- siderable force by the Dervishes. On the following morning (the 17th), the force advanced in square to attack the enemy. A desperate engagement ensued. The Dervishes charged the square with the utmost gallantry, and succeeded in penetrating a gap which had been temporarily caused in its rear face. The camels, Colonel Colville says, " which up to this time had been a source of weakness to the square, now became a source of strength. The spearmen by weight of numbers forced back the rear face of the square on to the camels ; these formed a Uving traverse that broke the rush, and gave time for the right face and front face to take advantage of find- ing themselves on higher ground, and to fire over the heads of those engaged in a hand-to-hand struggle on to the mass of the enemy behind. A desperate conflict ensued in the centre of the square, but the slaughter caused by the musketry from the rising ground caused the rearward Arabs to waver and then to fall back. Within the square, the din of battle was such that no words of CH. XXVIII FALL OF KHARTOUM 7 command could be heard, and each man was obliged to act on the impulse of the moment. Officers and men aUke fought well in this short hand-to-hand encounter, and many acts of heroism were per- formed. . . . Before five minutes had elapsed, the httle band of less than 1500 British soldiers had, by sheer pluck and muscle, killed the last of the fanatics who had penetrated into their midst." The victory was complete, but it had been dearly bought. Eighteen officers and 150 non- commissioned officers and men were killed and wounded. The enemy's loss was heavy; 1100 bodies were counted in the immediate proximity of the square, and the number of wounded is said to have been very great. On the night of the 17th, the troops bivouacked at the Abu Klea wells. The baggage animals did not arrive till early on the morning of the 18th. The result was that the troops passed the night without food, coats, or blankets. Sir Herbert Stewart then determined to make a night march to Metemmeh, about twenty -three miles distant. At 4 p.m. on the 18th, the column left Abu Klea. The night was dark. Many of the men had been without sleep for two nights. The camels were exhausted. The route lay for a considerable distance through thick bush. Halts were numerous. At last, after a toilsome march of some sixteen hours, the Nile appeared in sight. It was, however, apparent that the river could not be reached without further fighting. Whilst pre- parations were being made for an advance, the Dervishes kept up a hot fire from the long grass in which they were concealed. It was at this moment that the gallant Stewart received his death-wound. Colonel Burnaby, who it had been intended by Lord Wolseley should succeed Sir Herbert Stewart in the event of the latter's death, had been killed 8 MODERN EGYPT pt. m at Abu Klea. The chief command devolved on Sir Charles Wilson. At 3 P.M. on the 19th, the force advanced in square, and after a sharp engagement, in which an attack of the Dervishes was successfully repulsed, occupied a position on the Nile a short distance north of Metemmeh. The British loss on this day was 9 officers and 102 non-commissioned officers and men killed and wounded. On the following morning (the 20th), the force moved to Gubat. At 10 a.m. on the 21st, four steamers, which had been sent by General Gordon, arrived from Khartoum. They brought his Journal and several letters, in one of which, dated December 14, he said that he expected a catastrophe in the town after ten days' time. The latest news was written on a small scrap of paper. It was to the following effisct : " Khartoum is aU right. Could hold out for years. C.G.Gordon. 29.12.84." It was known at the time that General Gordon wrote this so that, in the event of his letter falling into the hands of the Dervishes, they would be deceived. In reaUty, he was in the greatest straits. Obviously, the next thing to do was to send the steamers back to Khartoum with some soldiers on board of them. It was not, however, until the morning of the 24th that two steamers, the Bordein and the Telaha- wiyeh, left. The interval between the 21st and the 24th was occupied in reconnaissances both up and down the river, and in making arrangements for the proper protection of the force at Gubat. ^ Both the steamers carried smaU detachments of British soldiers, as well as larger detachments of Soudanese troops. Sir Charles Wilson embarked * The delay at Gubat has formed the subject of much discussion. The conclusion at which I have arrived, after a careful examination of all the facts, is that if the steamers had left Gubat on the afternoon of the 21st, they would probably have arrived at Khartoum in time to save the towa. cH. XXVIII FALL OF KHARTOUM 9 on board the Bordein. All went well until, at 6 P.M. on the 25th, the Bordein struck on a rock in the Sixth Cataract, the navigation of which is intricate. This caused a delay of twenty-four hours. On the night of the 26th, the steamers were only three miles nearer Khartoum than they had been on the previous evening. An early start was made on the 27th. The dangerous gorge of Shabluka was passed without difficulty. The steamers continued their voyage under a musketry fire from the banks, and in the evening stopped near the small village of Tamaniat. During the after- noon, a man on the bank called out that Khartoum had fallen and that General Gordon had been killed, but he was not beheved by those on board. The steamers started early on the 28th, hoping to reach Khartoum by the evening. They advanced under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery until they came within sight of the Government House at Khar- toum. An eager search was made through glasses to see whether the Egyptian flag was still flying. No sign of it could be discovered. More than this, as the steamers advanced it was seen that Government House and the buildings near it had been wrecked. The Khartoum side of the White Nile was in the possession of the enemy. It was clear that the indomitable defender of Khartoum had at last succumbed. The expedition had arrived too late. Sir Charles Wilson ordered the steamers to be put about and to run down stream. On the return journey, both the steamers were wrecked, but those on board were rescued from the perilous position, in which they were at one time placed, by a party sent out in the steamer Safieh under Lord Charles Beresford. On the afternoon of February 4, Sir Charles Wilson and his companions rejoined the main body of the British troops, which were encamped at Gubat. 10 MODERN EGYPT ft. m It is now time to go back to the events which were passing in Khartoum. In the course of this narrative, I have alluded to General Gordon's numerous inconsistencies. I have pointed out errors of judgment with which he may justly be charged. I have dwelt on defects of character which unsuited him for the conduct of political affairs. But, when aU this has been said, how grandly the character of the man comes out in the final scene of the Soudan tragedy. History has recorded few incidents more calculated to strike the imagination than that presented by this brave man, who, strong in the faith which sustained him, stood undismayed amidst dangers which might well have appalled the stoutest heart. Hordes of savage fanatics surged around him. Shot and shell poured into the town which he was defending against fearful odds. Starvation stared him in the face. " The soldiers had to eat dogs, donkeys, skins of animals, gum and palm fibre, and famine prevailed. The soldiers stood on the fortifications Uke pieces of wood. The civilians were even worse off. Many died of hunger, and corpses filled the streets — no one had even the energy to bury them."^ Treachery and internal dissension threatened him from within, whilst a waste of burning African desert separated him from the outward help which his countrymen, albeit tardily, were straining every nerve to afford. " All the anxiety he had undergone had gradually turned his hair to silvery white. "^ "Yet," said an eye-witness, " in spite of all this danger by which he was surrounded, Gordon Pasha had no fear." " Go," he said, " teU all the people in Khartoum that Gordon fears nothing, for God has created him without fear."^ Nor was this an idle boast. * Account given by Bordeini Bey, Mahdiism, etc., p. 166. " Mahdiism, etc., p. 169. * Ibid. p. 164. CH. XXVIII FALL OF KHARTOUM 11 General Gordon did not know what the word fear meant. Death had no terrors for him. " I would," he wrote to his sister, " that all could look on death as a cheerful friend, who takes us from a world of trial to our true home."^ Many a man before General Gordon has laid down his life at the call of duty. Many a man too has striven to regard death as a glad relief from pain, sorrow, and suffering. But no soldier about to lead a forlorn hope, no Christian martyr tied to the stake or thrown to the wild beasts of Ancient Rome, ever faced death with more unconcern than General Gordon. His faith was subhme. Strong in that faith, he could meet the savage who plunged a spear into his breast with a "gesture of scorn,"^ and with the sure and certain hope of immortality which had been promised to him by the Master in whose footsteps he had endeavoured to follow. From a military point of view, the defence of Khartoum was a splendid feat of arms. When Ismail Pasha tried to use General Gordon as a pawn on his financial and political chessboard, kindly laughter was provoked from all who knew the facts or who knew the man. General Gordon was too rash and imj.ulsive for the conduct of political affairs in this work-a-day world. But as the military defender of a beleaguered city, he was in his element. The fighting instinct, which was strong within him, had full scope for action. His example and precept, his bravery and resource, encouraged the faint-hearted and enabled him, even with the poor material of which he disposed, to keep a formidable enemy at bay for ten long months. His personal influence was felt by all the inhabitants of the town, who regarded him as their sole refuge in distress, their only bulwark against disaster. * Letters, etc., p. xiL • Muhdiism, etc., p. 171. 12 MODERN EGYPT pi. m To return to the narrative. After the defeat of El Eilafun on September 1, the position at Khartoum became well-nigh desperate. AU the tribes in the neighbourhood submitted to the Mahdi and hurried to Khartoum to take part in the siege. " They fired projectiles from the guns, rockets, and fii'earms of all descriptions, which fell on the town from all sides. From time to time, the troops made sorties out of the city to drive them off, but almost each time their efforts proved fruitless, and they had to return to the garrison, for the pro- jectiles of the rebels were numerous." On January 5, 1885, Omdurman capitulated. " Khartoum then fell into a dangerous state. The rebels surrounded it from all sides, and cut off all supplies. . . . The soldiers suffered terribly from want of food ; some of them deserted and joined the rebels. Gordon Pasha used to say every day, ' Tliey [the English] must come to-morrow,' but they never came, and we began to think that they must have been defeated after all. . . . We all became heart- broken, and concluded that no army was coming to relieve Khartoum." The townspeople began to talk of capitulation. General Gordon appealed to them, on January 25, to make a determined stand for another twenty-four hours, by which time he thought that the Enghsh relief would arrive. *' What more can I say ? " were his words to Bordeini Bey. " The people will no longer believe me. I have told them over and over again that help would be here, but it has never come, and now they must see I tell them lies. If this, my last promise, fails, I can do nothing more. Go and collect all the people you can on the lines and make a good stand. Now leave me to smoke these cigarettes.'' The end was very near. Early on the morning of January 26, by which time Sir Charles Wilson's steamers had reached the foot of the CH. XXVIII FALL OF KHARTOUM 13 Sixth Cataract, the Dervishes made a general attack on the lines and met with but a feeble resistance from the half- starved and disheartened soldiers. Farag Pasha, the commandant, who was suspected of treachery, escaped to the Mahdist camp, and met his death a short time afterwards at the hands of an Arab with whom he had a blood feud. The Palace was soon reached. General Gordon stood in front of the entrance to his office. He had on a white uniform. His sword was girt around him, but he did not draw it. He carried a revolver in his right hand, but he disdained to use it. The final scene, in which the civilised Christian faced barbarous and triumphant fanaticism, is thus described by Bordeini Bey, and it would be difficult, whether in tales of fact or of fiction, to find a more pathetic, or, it may be added, a more dramatic passage : " Taha Shahin was the first to encounter Gordon beside the door of the Divan, apparently waiting for the Arabs and standing with a calm and dignified manner, his left hand resting on the hilt of his sword. Shahin, dashing forward with the curse, ' Malaoun^ el-yom yomak ' (O cursed one, your time is come !), plunged his spear into his body.^ Gordon, it is said, made a gesture of scorn with his right hand and turned his back, when he received another spear -wound, which caused him to fall forward, and was most likely his mortal wound. The other three men closely following Shahin then rushed in, and cutting at the prostrate body with their swords, must have killed him in a few seconds. His death occurred just before sunrise. He made no resistance, and did not fire a shot from his revolver. From all I know, I am convinced that he never intended * From information subsequently obtained, it would appear that General Gordon received his death-blow, not from Taha Shahin, as stated above, but from Sheikh Mohammed Nebawi, who was eventually killed at the battle of Omdurmau. 14 MODERN EGYPT pt. iii to surrender. I should say that he must have intended to use his revolver only if he saw it was the intention of the Arabs to take him prisoner aUve ; but he saw such crowds rushing on him with swords and spears, and there being no im- portant Emirs with them, he must have known that they did not intend to spare him, and that was most likely what he wanted ; besides, if he had fired, it could only have delayed his death a few moments, the wild fanatical Arabs would never have been checked by a few shots from a revolver. Gordon Pasha's head was immediately cut off and sent to the Mahdi at Omdurman, while his body was dragged downstairs and left exposed for a time in the garden, where many came to plunge their spears into it." ^ Foul creatures were not wanting to kick the dead lion. Bordeini Bey goes on to say : " I saw Gordon Pasha's head exposed in Omdurman. It was fixed between the branches of a tree, and all who passed by threw stones at it. The first to throw a stone was Youssuf Mansour, late IMamour of PoUce at El Obeid, whom Gordon Pasha had dismissed for misconduct, and who afterwards com- manded the Mahdi's artillery." Thus General Gordon died. Well do I remember the blank feeling of grief and disappointment with which I received the news of his death, and even now, at this distance of time, I cannot pen the record of those last sad days at Khartoum without emotion. If any consolation can be offered to those who strove, but strove in vain, to save him, it is to be found in the fact that it may be said of General Gordon, perliaps more than of any man, that he was Jelia^ oppoi'tunitate mortis. • The best evidence obtainable j2:oes to prove that Bordeini Bey's account of General Gordon's death is substantially correct. It differs, however, in many important particulars from the account given by M. Neufeld in chap. xxv. of ^ l'ri.soner of the Khali/a. CH. XXVIII FALL OF KHARTOUM 15 Could we but choose our time and choose aright, 'Tis best to die, our honour at the height, When we have done our ancestors no shame, But served our friends, and well secured our fame. Then should we wish our happy life to close, And leave no more for fortune to dispose ; So should we make our death a glad relief From future shame, from sickness, and from grief. Dryden's Imes may well serve as General Gordon's epitaph. He died m the plenitude of his reputation, and left a name which will be revered so long as the qualities of steadfast faith and indomitable courage have any hold on the feelings of mankind. Rarely has pubUc opinion in England been so deeply moved as when the news arrived of the fall of Khartoum. The daily movements of the reUef expedition had been watched by anxious multitudes of General Gordon's countrymen, yearning for news of one who seemed to embody in his own person the pecuhar form of heroism which is perhaps most of all calculated to move the Anglo-Saxon race. When General Gordon's fate was known a wail of sorrow and disappointment was heard throughout the land. The Queen's feelings, as a Sovereign and as a woman of hvely sympathies, were touched to the quick. Her Majesty wrote a sympathetic letter to Miss Gordon, deeply lamenting her "dear brother's cruel, though heroic fate." On this, as on other occasions, the Queen's language truly represented the feehngs of the nation.^ Yet the * On March 19, 1885, Sir Henry Ponsonby, the Queen's Private Secretary, wrote to me : " I now quite admit that I did not understand Gordon, that I did not see what you did, the force and reality of liig position and requirements. The Government were to hlame in not understanding? this also, but 1 tliiuk we all here— the people, high and low— should share the responsibility, for we did not grasp the situation as we should have done. The Queen was in a terrible state about the fall of Khartoum, and indeed it had a good deal to do with making her ill. She was just going out when she got the telegram, and sent for 16 MODERN EGYPT pt. m British nation had done its duty. Parliament voted supplies in no grudging spirit to enable an expedition to be sent to General Gordon's relief, and public opinion ratified the vote. The British army also sus- tained its ancient reputation. Mistakes may have been, and, indeed, were made. But whatevei judg- ment may be pronounced by competent critics in connection with some points of detail, the true reasons for the failure must be sought elsewhere. They are thus stated by Sir Reginald Wingate : '• To innumerable enemies, flushed with victory and ardent fanaticism, Gordon exposed a skill and experience in savage warfare which few could equal. Ill-provisioned in a place naturally and artificially weak, Gordon for months preserved an undaunted front. Neither treachery in the besieged nor the stratagems of the besiegers caused the fall of Khartoum. The town fell through starvation, and despair at long neglect. There were no elements of chance in the expedition to relieve General Gordon. It was sanctioned too late. As day by day no Enghsh came, so day by day the soldiers' hearts sank deeper and deeper into gloom. As day by day their strength wasted, so that finally gum, their only food, was rejected, so day by day the Nile ebbed back from the ditch it had filled with mud, and from the rampart it had crumbled, and left a broad path for who should dare to enter." * me. She then went out to my cottage, a quarter of a mile off, walked into the room, pale and trembling, and said to my wife, who was terrified at her appearance — ' Too late ! ' " Throughout the wliole of this difficult period, I received the utmost support from the Queen. On March 13, 18R5, the following note, written by Her Majesty, was communicated to me by my brother (Mr. Edward Baring, subse(iuently Lord Revelstoke) : ''The concluding paragraph of Sir E. Baring's telegram" (I am not quite sure to what particular telegram allusion is here made) " is admirable. Let the Queen have a copy. She wishes Mary" (Lady Ponsonby, who was Lady Revelstoke's sister) " would tell Mr. Edward Baring that the Queen has endorsed everything his brother has said." 1 Mahdiism, etc., p. 15G. CH. XXVIII FALL OF KHARTOUM 17 In a word, the Nile expedition was sanctioned too late, and the reason why it was sanctioned too late was that Mr. Gladstone would not accept simple evidence of a plain fact, which was patent to much less powerful intellects than his own. Posterity has yet to decide on the services which Mr. Gladstone, during his long and brilliant career, rendered in other directions to the British nation, but it is improbable that the verdict of his con- temporaries in respect to his conduct of the affairs of the Soudan will ever be reversed. That verdict has been distinctly unfavourable. ** Les fautes de I'homme puissant," said an eminent Frenchman,^ "sont des malheurs publics." Mr. Gladstone's error of judgment in delaying too long the despatch of the Nile expedition left a stain on the reputa- tion of England which it will be beyond the power of either the impartial historian or the partial apologist to efface. * Senancour. VOL. II CHAPTER XXIX THE EVACUATION OF THE SOUDAN January 26, 1885-December 30, 1886 Lord Wolseley urges the necessity of an autumn campaign — The Governmeut hesitate — And then agree — Sir Redvers Buller retreats to Korti — Battle of Kirhekan — The movement on Berber arrested — Operations at Suakin — Action at Hashin — And atTofrik — Suspension of the Suakin operations — 'l"he autumn campaign • abandoned — Question of holding Dongola — Change of Government in England — Evacuation of Dongola — Death of the Mahdi — Battle of Ginniss — Review of British policy. When Lord Wolseley heard of the battle of Abu Klea and of Sir Herbert Stewart having been wounded, he decided to send Sir Redvers Buller to take command of the desert column, and to rein- force it by two battalions. Shortly afterwards, news arrived of the fall of Khartoum. General Earle was ordered to arrest the forward movement of the river column on Abu Hamed. Pending the receipt of instructions from London as to the policy which was now to be pursued, a discretionary power was left to Sir Redvers Buller to act according to local circumstances. General Earle accordingly halted at Berti, about midway between Korti and Abu Hamed. Sir Redvers Buller arrived at Gubat on February 11. He found that there were only about twelve days' supplies at Gubat, and another twelve days' supplies at Abu Klea, whilst the camels were in a weak and emaciated condition. News had been 18 CH. XXIX THE EVACUATION 19 received that a Dervish force of about 4000 men and six guns was on its way from Khartoum to Gubat. Sir Redvers Buller, therefore, wisely decided to fall back on Jakdul. The retreat began on February 14. Jakdul was reached on the 26th. In the meanwhile, the British Government were in a position of great difficulty. The sole object of the expedition had been to bring General Gordon and Colonel Stewart away from Khartoum. This object had not been attained. Obviously, unless the policy of the Government was to undergo a com- plete change, the most logical course to have pursued would have been to desist from any further inter- ference in the Soudan, to withdraw the British troops to some good strategical position in the valley of the Nile, and there to await the attack of the Mahdist forces. This was what was eventually done, and, judged by the light of after events it can scarcely be doubted that it would have been better if the Government had at once decided to take up a defensive attitude. It can, however, be no matter for surprise that, in the first instance, the Government decided otherwise. British public opinion was greatly excited. Both the natioti and the army were smarting under a sense of failure. The soldiers were burning to avenge their comrades, and to show the Dervishes that they were no match for British troops. It was certain that the fall of Khartoum would increase the influence and prestige of the Mahdi ; neither was it easy to foresee what might be the effect of his success in Egypt,^ and amongst Mohammedans in other parts of the world. ^ Directly the news of the fall of Khartoum reached Cairo on February 6, 1 telegraphed to Lord Granville as follows : " It is too early to express any opinion worth having as to the effect wl)ich tlie fall of Khartoum will produce in Egypt proper. Moreover, much will no doubt depend on the course which Her Majesty's Government now decide to pursue in the Soudan. But I may say that, so far as I tan 20 MODERN EGYPT pt. m General Gordon's fame was then at its zenith. His Journal, which had been received, and was immediately published, gave a clear indication of his views. He strongly advocated a policy of "smashing up" the JNJahdi. The weight of Lord Wolseley's authority was thrown into the same scale. He deprecated the adoption of a defensive policy. " It must never be forgotten," he said, *'that the question of whether this war shall or shall not go on does not rest with us, unless we are prepared to give up Egypt to the False Prophet. We shall not bring about a quiet state of affairs by adopting a defensive poHcy. The Mahdi has repeatedly declared it to be lus full and settled intention to possess himself of Egypt, and his followers look upon themselves as engaged in a war the object of which is not to rest contented with the capture of Berber, but to drive the infidels into the sea." Lord Wolseley thought that the final struggle with Mahdiism might perhaps be staved off for a few years, but these years, he said, "will be years of trouble and disturbance for Egypt, of burdens and strains to our military resources, and the contest that will come in the end will be no less than that which is in front of us now. This is all we shall gain by a defensive poHcy." There could, he thought, be little differ- ence of opinion as to the line of action which was " most befitting our national dignity and honour." The Mahdi must be crushed. That, Lord Wolseley thought, was the only policy, "worthy of the Enghsh nation." Tliese views were shared by others on the spot. The Government had, therefore, to face a strong at present judjre, I do not anticipate any disturbance so far as the Egyptian population is concerned. The effect produced upon the Bedouins on the frontier is more difficult to forecast, and it would be as well to be prepared to send at short notice another battalion to Assouan, as proposed some little while ago by Lord ^V'^olseley." 3H.XXIX THE EVACUATION 21 body of local opinion favourable to offensive action. At first, the Ministers hesitated, and they might well do so, for they were asked to embark on a crusade against Mohammedan fanaticism, to adopt an adventurous policy of which no one could foresee the end, and to wage a costly war in a remote country under conditions of exceptional difficulty imposed by the climate, by the scantiness of local supplies, and by the absence of facilities for trans- port and locomotion. Lord Wolseley had warned them that "the strength and composition of his little army was calculated for the relief, not for the siege and capture of Khartoum, the tM^o operations being entirely different in character and magnitude. . . . Khartoum in the hands of the enemy could not be retaken until the force under his command had been largely augmented in numbers and in artillery." Lord Wolseley's first instructions, which were issued on February 6, were " to check the advance of the Mahdi in districts now undisturbed." "Whether," it was added, "it will be ultimately necessary to advance on Khartoum or not, cannot now be decided." I was at the same time told to give the Khedive general assurances of support, and to inform Lord Wolseley that it was the desire of the Cabinet "that if the Mahdi should make any proposals he should transmit them immediately to Her Majesty's Government for their consideration." The Mahdi never made any proposals, neither was there at this or any other time the smallest likelihood of his doing so. I^ord Wolseley replied that Lord Hartington's telegram gave him " no information as to the policy with reference to the Soudan which Her JMajesty's Government meant to pursue." Thus pressed, the Government yielded. On February 9, Lord Hartington telegraphed to Lord Wolseley : " Your •22 MODERN EGYPT Fr. iii military policy is to be based on the necessity, which we recognise on the statement of facts now before us, that the power of the JNIahdi at Khartoum must be overthrown." Unquestionably, it was a mistake to issue these orders. It is easy to see now that both General Gordon and Lord Wolseley credited the Mahdi with an amount of strength for offensive purposes which he was far from possessing. But this was not so clear then as it became later. Lord Wolseley, therefore, thanked Lord Hartington for his " ex- plicit statement of policy," and added : " I am sure it is the correct one, as the JNIahdi's power is incompatible with good government in Egypt." The military arrangements necessary for giving effect to the policy of the Government had then to be settled. An immediate advance on Khartoum was out of the question. Time would be required for the necessary reinforcements to come from England. Moreover, the hot season was approach- ing. Lord Wolseley, therefore, determined to capture Berber and Abu Hamed by a combined movement of the forces under Sir Redvers Buller and General Earle, and to hold those places during the summer, preparatory to an advance on Khartoum during the ensuing cool season. At the same time, a force was to co-operate from Suakin with a view to keeping open the road to Berber. " The sooner," Lord Wolseley telegraphed to Lord Hartington, "you can now deal with Osman Digna the better." Sir Redvers Buller was ordered, on February 10, to take Metemmeh "as soon as he felt himself strong enough to do so," and then to combine with General Earle in an attack on Berber. He re- ceived these instructions late on the night of the 13th, when he had already partly evacuated Gubat, and had made all the arrangements necessary for leaving it entirely at daylight on the following CH. XXIX THE EVACUATION 23 morning. For reasons which have been already given,^ Sir Redvers Buller decided to continue the retrograde movement on Abu Klea. The course he adopted met subsequently with the approval of Lord Wolseley. Orders were issued for the desert column to move on Merowi, but in the meanwhile it had become clear that it would be impossible to under- take operations such as those contemplated by Lord Wolseley. Sir Redvers Buller wrote several letters to Lord Wolseley from Jakdul in which " he not only drew attention to the fact that the transport of the desert column was completely exhausted, but further stated that the boots of the men were thoroughly worn out, and that many of them were almost shoeless." Sir Evelyn Wood, who was also at Jakdul, confirmed the views expressed by Sir Redvers Buller. " I do not think," he wrote on February 20, " that the debili- tated state of our transport is reaUsed at Korti." Manifestly, a retreat on Korti was imposed by the circumstances of the situation. Lord Wolseley's original plan, under which a combined movement of the river and desert columns was to be made on Berber, was no longer feasible. The last troops of the desert column arrived at Korti on JNlarch 16. I now turn to the movements of the river column. Lord Wolseley's orders to halt reached General Earle on February 5. On the 8th, General Earle received orders to push on to Abu Hamed. These were supplemented later on the same day by orders to advance on Berber, and to co-operate with Sir Redvers Buller in the capture of that place. Shortly after leaving Berti, the enemy were found in force occupying a ridge called Jebel Kirbckan. On the 10th, they were attacked and driven from the position with heavy loss. The British loss was * Vide ante, p. 18. 24 INIODERN EGYPT ft. in 7 officers and 50 men killed and wounded. It was in this action that, to the great sorrow of all who knew him, General Earle lost his life. After his death. General Brackenbury assumed the command of the river column. Subsequently to the action at Kirbekan, the for- ward movement was continued. On February 24, when the column was about thirty miles from Abu Hamed, General Brackenbury received a message from Lord Wolseley informing him of the retreat of the desert column. " 1 have," Lord Wolseley said, "abandoned all hope of going to Berber before the autumn campaign begins." General Brackenbury was, therefore, ordered to withdraw his force to JNIerowi. He arrived there on March 5. It is now time to describe the operations in the vicinity of Suakin. Sir Gerald Graham was appointed to the chief command. His instructions were to make the best arrangements he could for " the destruction of the power of Osman Digna." When this had been done, he was to " arrange for the military occupation of the Hadendowa terri- tory, lying near the Suakin -Berber road." He was further directed to do all in his power to facilitate the construction of the Suakin -Berber railway. A force of 13,000 men was placed at his disposal, consisting of British and British -Indian troops, and also of a battalion of infantry and a battery of artillery, which were lent by the Govern- ment of New South Wales. By the middle of INlarch, the force was ready for action, and Sir Gerald Graham proceeded to carry out the first portion of his instructions, namely, to crush Osman Digna. It was reported that the main body of the Dervishes, in number about 7000, occupied Tamai, whilst smaller bodies held Hashin and Handoub, all places lying within a few miles of Suakin. It was decided, in the first CH.XXIX THE EVACUATION 25 instance, to drive the enemy out of Hashin. This object was effected on JNlarch 20 and 21, with the loss of 1 officer and 44 non-commissioned officers and men killed and womided. The force then returned to Suakin. The next step was to crush the main Dervish force at Tamai. On INIarch 22, a force under Sir John McNeill left Suakin. Sir John JNIcNciU's orders were to establish an intermediate post be- tween Suakin and Tamai. At 10.30 a.m. the troops halted at a spot named Tofrik, a few miles from Suakin, and proceeded to entrench themselves in a stockade. Whilst many of the men were scattered in the act of cutting brushwood, a sudden attack was made by a body of about 5000 Dervishes. A scene of great confusion ensued. Many of the Dervishes penetrated into the half-formed stockade. After twenty minutes of confused fighting, they were driven back with the loss of 1500 in killed besides many wounded, but the British force suffigred severely. Fifteen officers and 278 non-commissioned officers and men were killed, wounded, or missing. The camp-followers suffered severely. Five hun- dred camels were killed or missing. Shortly after this engagement, Osman Digna withdrew his forces from Tamai, which was occupied by Sir Gerald Graham on April 3. According to the terms of his original instruc- tions. Sir Gerald Graham should now have turned his attention to opening up the route for the rail- way. On April 15, however, orders were issued from London to suspend the construction of the railway. Suakin was " to be held for the present, as also any position in the neighbourhood necessary for protection from constant attacks as last year.'* Whilst the operations described above were going on, the policy of the British Government had undergone a complete change. In the middle of 26 MODERN EGYPT ft. m February, Lord AVolseley wished to issue a Procla- mation to the people of the Soudan to the effect that his mission was " to destroy utterly the power of the JNIahdi at Khartoum." ^ The Government agreed to the issue of this Proclamation with a characteristic amendment, which was made at the instigation of Mr. Gladstone. It was stipulated that the word "utterly" should be omitted from the Proclamation. Two months later, the Govern- ment had decided to go farther than the omission of the word " utterly " from a Proclamation. The Mahdi was neither to be utterly destroyed nor, indeed, destroyed at all, but was to be left alone for the time being to rule undisturbed over the inhospitable deserts of the Soudan. Many considerations contributed to bring about this change of policy, or perhaps it should rather be said, to bring about a return to the original poHcy of the Government, which in a moment of excitement had been too hastily abandoned. Pubhc opinion in England, which had been violently excited when the news of the fall of Khartoum arrived, had somewhat calmed down. It had found its natural and constitutional safety- valve in the shape of an acrimonious debate in Parliament, resulting in a division in which the Government narrowly escaped defeat. The military operations subsequent to the fall of Khartoum had shown that any forward movement in the autumn would be a costly and difficult undertaking. The ' This Proclamation, as it was originally drafted, consisted of short, crisp sentences, with somewhat of a Napoleonic ring about them, which, it was supposed, would create a deep impression on the people of the Soudan. I gave it to a talented Kgyptian friend of mine, after it had been trans- lated into Arabic, and asked him to give me his opinion upon it. He said that he thorouglily understood what was meant, but that to the Soudanese the Proclamation would be quite incomprehensible. At my ri'(]uest, he prepared a counter project conveying the same ideas in dirterent language. It was an extremely eloquent document, and reminded me, more especially in its vituperative passages, of a chapter in Isaiah. cH.xxix THE EVACUATION 27 voices of politicians and diplomatists, which had at . first been hushed by the clang of arms, began to be heard. The disadvantages of an offensive, and the advantages of a defensive policy became more and more clear as the matter was calmly considered. Further — and this exercised a very material in- fluence on the views of the Government — affairs on the Indian frontier gave cause for anxiety.^ It was, therefore, undesirable to engage in a campaign in the Soudan, which would in some degree cripple the military strength of the nation in the event of the services of the army being required elsewhere. The sound good sense of the British nation, which was well represented m the Gladstone Cabinet, reasserted itself, and a policy based upon a sober appreciation of national interests was eventually adopted.^ On April 21, it was announced in both Houses of Parhament that it was not intended to advance on Khartoum or to undertake any further offensive operations in the Soudan. Lord Wolseley was instructed accordingly. The question then arose whether the British and Egyptian troops should continue to hold Dongola, or whether they should fall back to some more northerly point along the valley of the Nile. Lord Wolseley 's opinions were expressed im- mediately after the Government had decided to * The news that General Komaroff had attacked and defeated the Afghans at Penjdeh readied London on April 10. 2 On April 3, I wrote a private letter to Lord Granville in which, after dwelling' on the ambiguity of Mr. Gladstone's statements in the House of Commons, I urged the necessity of facing the facts and of laying down some definite Soudan policy for the future. I concluded in the following words : "Tlie main question which 1 have propounded in this letter is as follows : — Do the English Government intend to establish a settled form of government at Khartoum or not? My own opinion is that this question should be answered in the negative. Hence, I am of opinion tliat tlie military decision to advance to Khartoum should be reversed and that no such advance should take place." 28 MODERN EGYPT pt. iii abandon the idea of an autumn campaign against the Mahdi. " If," he telegraphed to Lord Hart- ington on April 14, " our position is to be ex- clusively one of defence, I would hold Wadi Haifa and Korosko as outposts, with a strong brigade at Assouan." The next day he added : " Hold on to Dongola province. As long as you do this, you prevent Mahdiism spreadLig in Egypt, secure allegiance of frontier tribes, and save henceforth trouble, disturbances, and possibly local risings, which a policy of retreat will prob- ably entail, and which will necessitate uicreased garrisons in Egypt and mihtary occupation of the larger towns." Sir Redvers Buller, Sir Charles Wilson, and Colonel Kitchener were asked their opinions. They all deprecated a retreat from Dongola, but it was clear that their reason for doing so was that they wished to revert to the policy of advancing on Khartoum. " The Soudan," Sir Redvers Buller said, "will never be quiet till the Mahdi is disposed of." " I still beUeve," Sir Charles AVilson said, " as always, that the control of the Soudan is necessary to Egypt." "The JNIahdi must advance or disappear," Colonel Kitchener said, " and I deprecate leaving him this fresh lease of life and power." I did not agree in the view that Dongola should be held with the intention of advancing on Khartoum. At the same time, I was fearful of the political effect which might be produced in Egypt if an immediate retreat were carried out. I did not like letting the Dervishes come so far down the Nile valley as Wadi Haifa. I was inclined to adopt a proposal put forward by Sir Charles Wilson, to the effect that Dongola should be held until some black troops could be organised, and that the government should be entrusted to CH. XXIX THE EVACUATION 29 Abdul -Kader Pasha. "I would earnestly im- press," I said, "upon Her Majesty's Government that it would be neither politically wise nor dignified to carry out at once the policy of re- treat from Dongola and the immediate neighbour- hood." The Government, however, held firmly to their original opinions. On May 8, Lord Hartington telegraphed to Lord Wolseley : " The Government, after considering all reports received, adhere to the decision to adopt the proposal for the defence of the Egyptian frontier at Wadi Haifa and Assouan contained in your telegram of April 14." Whilst measures were being taken to carry out these instructions, a change of Government took place in England. On June 24, 188,5, the Ministry of Lord Sahsbury succeeded that of Mr. Gladstone. Lord Wolseley urged the new Government to abandon a defensive and to adopt an offensive policy. " No frontier force," he said, " can keep Mahdiism out of Egypt, and the Mahdi sooner or later must be smashed, or he will smash you. . . . To advance on Khartoum and discredit the JNIahdi by a serious defeat on his own ground would certainly finish him." After a short interval, Lord Wolseley was informed that the new Government adhered to the decision wliich had been taken by their predecessors. The retreat was to be continued. There can be little doubt that the British Government acted wisely in deciding to retreat from Dongola. The views of the military authorities were based on the presumed poHtical necessity of " smashhig tlie Mahdi" at Khartoum. No such necessity existed in reality. It is possible that the policy, wliich I recommended, of setting up an Egyptian semi - independent Governor at Dongola might have succeeded, if British troops 30 MODERN EGYPT pt m had been allowed to remain long enough to enable a black force to be organised, but I am glad that tlie experiment was not tried. Indeed, had I at the time thoroughly appreciated the physical features of the country between Wadi Haifa and Dongola, I do not think I should ha\'e made the proposal. In the autumn of 1889, I visited Wadi Haifa aiid went as far as Sarras, about thirty miles south of that place. I saw enough to convince myself that, as an advanced position, Wadi Haifa is far stronger than Dongola. On July 5, the British troops evacuated Don- gola. In view, however, of the threatening attitude of the Dervishes, the movement north- wards took place slowly. The JNIahdi died suddenly on June 20, and his death exercised a dispiriting effect on his followers. His place was taken by the Khalifa Abdullah - el - Taaslii, who proceeded to carry out his predecessor's intention of invading Egj^t. It was not, how- ever, till December 30, 1885, that a mixed British and Egyptian force, under the command of Sir Frederick Stephenson, met the Dervishes at Ginniss, about inidway between AVadi Haifa and Dongola. The Dervishes were defeated with a loss of about 800 killed and wounded. The British and Egyptian loss was 41 killed and wounded. This action in- flicted a severe blow on the Khalifa, and for the time being allayed all fear of a serious invasion of Egypt by the Dervishes. By April 13, 1886, the British and Egyptian troops were concentrated at Wadi Haifa. \\''adi Haifa was then left to the care of the Egyptian troops, and the British force retired to Assouan, which place they reached on May 7. With the action at Ginniss, purely British inter- vention in the affairs of the Soudan may be said practically to have ceased for the time being. The moment, therefore, is opportune for reviewing the CH. XXIX THE EVACUATION 31 results attained by British policy during the pre- vious two years. My own belief is that the fundamental principles of tliat policy were sound, if once the fatal mistake of non-interference prior to the Hicks defeat be condoned. If a veto had been placed on the Hicks expedition, the prob- ability is that the Egyptian Government would never ha^e lost possession of Khartoum. When once General Hicks's army had been destroyed, the policy of withdrawal was enforced by the circumstances of the situation. The British Ministers wisely set their faces against reconquest by British arms. They obliged the Egyptian Government to look the facts in the face, and in doing so they rendered a great service to the Khedive and to the Egyptian people. But although the fundamental principles of British policy were, with the reserve stated above, perfectly sound, the execution of the pohcy was defective. At almost every point, failure was incurred. The British Government endeavoured to assist the Egyptian Government in effecting the peace- able withdrawal of the garrisons and Egyptian civil population from the Soudan. The withdrawal was for the most part never effected at all. Sir Reginald Wingate estimated ^ that the total garrisons in the Soudan, including General Hicks's army and the force sent under General Baker to Suakin, amounted to about 55,000 men. Of these, about 12,000 were killed. 11,000 eventually returned to Egypt, leaving about 30,000 who remained in the Soudan. This figure is exclusive of civilians, women, and children, the number of whom Sir Reginald Wingate roughly estimated at 5000. These figures speak for themselves. Again, the Government sent two high officials * Mahdiism, etc. 82 MODERN EGYPT pt. in on a special mission to the Soudan. They failed to accomplish the objects of their mission. A military force was then sent to save the lives of the two British emissaries. It arrived too late. Both General Gordon and Colonel Stewart were killed. Lastly, at one time the Government intended to deal a decisive blow to the power of the Mahdi. The project was abandoned and, in my opinion, wisely abandoned. Nevertheless, the impression was left on the minds of the Dervishes that a British army had attempted to reconquer the Soudan, and had failed to do so. Eventually, the Government fell back en its original pohcy of withdrawal, from which it had temporarily drifted. The Gordon mission and the Nile expedition were thus mere episodes in Egyptian and Sou- danese history. They will be remembered as mistakes accompanied by suffering and sorrow to individuals, and by failure in an undertaking on which the British nation had set its heart. It is melancholy to think of the blood and treasure which were wasted. Few of those who have sacri- ficed their hves for their country have done so to so Httle purpose as the gallant soldiers who fell at Abu Klea, Kirbekan, and in the neighbourhood of Suakin. The only practical result of the Nile expedition was to inspire in the minds of the Dervishes a wholesome dread of British soldiers, and to break the force of the Dervish advance when it eventually occurred. It would be an exaggeration to say that this result was of no utility, but it was obtained at a cost altogether incommensurate with its real value. The same result would have been more easily and perhaps more thoroughly obtained by the adoption of a defensive policy from the first. CH.XXIX THE EVACUATION 33 Looking more closely to the details in the execution of the British policy, the following are the conclusions at which I arrive : — In the first place, it was a mistake to send any British official to Khartoum. The task he had to perform was well-nigh impossible of execution, and his nomination involved the assumption of respon- sibilities on the part of the British Government, which it was desirable to avoid. Secondly, if any one was to be sent, it was a mistake to choose General Gordon. In spite of many noble traits in his character, he was wanting in some of the qualities which were essential to the successful accomplishment of his mission. Thirdly, when once General Gordon had been sent, he should have been left a free hand so long as he kept within the main lines of the pohcy which he was authorised to execute. It is, in my opinion, to be regretted that General Gordon was not allowed to employ Zobeir Pasha, but any view held as to the probable results of employing him must be conjectural. Fourthly, the question of whether an expedition should or should not have been sent from Suakin to Berber in the spring of 1884 depends on the military practicability of the undertaking, a point on which the best military authorities differed in opinion. Fifthly, a great and inexcusable mistake was made in delaying for so long the despatch of the Gordon relief expedition. Sixthly, the Government acted vdsely, after the fall of Khartoum, in eventually adopting a defen- sive pohcy and in ordering a retreat to Wadi Haifa. Lastly, it may be said that the British Govern- ment were extraordinarily unlucky. Whatever amount of foresight be shown, success in doubtful VOL. II D 34 MODERN EGYPT pt. iii and difficult enterprises, such as the Gordon Mission and the Nile Expedition, must always depend a good deal on adventitious circumstances, which cannot be foreseen, and over which no Govern- ment can exercise any control. I am far from saying that in all the matters which are dis- cussed in these pages, the British Government exercised a proper amount of foresight, but it must be admitted tliat whenever the goddess Fortune could play them a trick, she appeared, with pro- verbial fickleness, to take a pleasure in doing so. The British Government made at the time a great stir in the world. The result in the end was that no object of any importance was attained. Gratis anhelans, multa agendo nihil agens. But the situation was one of inordinate difficulty, and those who have had most experience in the conduct of political affairs, and who know how difficult it is to be right and how easy it is to make mistakes, will be least of all inclined to criticise severely the principal actors on the scene. CHAPTER XXX THE DEBRIS OF THE SOUDAN rhe outlying provinces : — 1, Darfour : Surrender of the province — The Senoussieh sect — The revolt of Abu Gemaizeh. 2. Bnhr-el-Ghazal : Lupton Bey surrenders — His death. 3. Equatoria : Emin Pasha summoned to surrender — He maintains his position — The Stanley expedition. 4. Sennar : The garrison surrenders. 5. Ka)s\sula : The garrison surrenders. 6. The Abyssinian Frontier Garrisons : The Hewett treaty — The garrisons of Amadib, Senhit, Galabat, Gera, and Gedaref. 7. Berbera : Its political stt, No. 1 of 1907, p. 119. CH. XXX DEBRIS OF THE SOUDAN 47 Sermar remained under Dervish rule till the downfall of the Khahfa's power in 1898. 5. Kassala. Kassala is the most important inland town in the Eastern Soudan. Its population numbers about 13,000. In November 1883, it was besieged by- one of Osman Digna's lieutenants. The siege continued vdth varying fortunes until July 1885. Hopes were from time to time entertained that relief would come from Abyssinia. The garrison was also encouraged to hold out by the presence of British troops at Suakin. But no relief came. By April 13, 1885, all the donkeys in the town had been eaten. A successful sally, made on June 15, in which 1000 oxen and 1000 sheep were captured, enabled the defence to be prolonged. But the relief was only temporary. By July 30, every kind of food, including gum and hides, had been exhausted. The garrison capitulated. They re- ceived a promise that their hves would be spared, but the promise was broken. " It Was believed," Sir Reginald Wingate wrote, " that the inhabitants had secreted treasure, and this was made the plea for every description of torture, cruelty, and robbery.' In 1894, Kassala was occupied by the Italians, but three years later (December 1897) was evacuated. It now forms part of the Anglo-Egyptian Soudan. 6. The Abyssinian Frontier Garrisons. When, in the winter of 1883, the policy of with- drawal from the Soudan was adopted, the British Government decided to send a mission to King John of Abyssinia, with whom they were on friendly terms, in the hope that his aid might be enlisted in facilitating the retreat of the garrisons 48 MODERN EGYPT pt. iii from the Egyptian posts adjoining the frontier of Abyssinia. Sir WilUam Hewett was accordingly sent to Abyssinia to act on behalf of the British Government. He was accompanied by INIason Bey, an American officer in the Egyptian service, who was well acquainted with the affairs of the Soudan, and who acted on behalf of the Egyptian Government. The result of this mission was that a Treaty was signed at Adowa on June 3, 1884. The main provisions of this Treaty were that the province of Bogos, which the King had for long coveted, was to be ceded to him, and that in return he was to facilitate the withdrawal of the Egyptian frontier garrisons, and to permit their retreat through Abyssinian territory. Public attention at this time was so exclusively directed to the events which were passing at Khartoum, that the British Government never got due credit for the successful efforts which were made to save the Egyptian garrisons on the Abyssinian frontier. On Septeriiber 12, 1884, the province of Bogos was, in accordance with the terms of the Treaty, handed over to Abyssinia. During the spring of 1885, the Egyptian garrisons of Amadib and Senliit were brought safely doAvn to Massowah. One of the most important garrisons was that of Galabat. In August 1884, Colonel Chermside, who was at that time Governor- General of the Red Sea Littoral, despatched Major Saad Rifaat to Abyssinia to assist in the preparations which were being made for the relief of Galabat, which was then besieged by the Dervishes. Leaving Adowa with a considerable force of Abyssinia ns on January 27, 1885, Major Rifaat shortly afterwards attacked and defeated the enemy, and succeeded in CH. XXX DEBRIS OF THE SOUDAN 49 bringing the garrison and population, numbering about 3000 men, women, and children, in safety to Massowah, whence those who wished to return were sent back to Egypt. The garrison of Gera, which had hkemse been besieged for some months, was also extricated by the Abyssinians, the Egyptian soldiers being, more- over, subsequently clothed and fed by King John. About 5000 men, women, and children were brought down to Massowah and despatched to Cairo. In fact, of the posts on the Abyssinian frontier, the only one of which the garrison fell into the hands of the Dervishes was Gedaref, called also Suk Abu Sin. The commandant of this post, which was garrisoned by about 200 men, capitu- lated in April 1884, that is to say two months before the Hewett Treaty had been concluded. On the whole, therefore, the results of the Treaty were satisfactory. 7. Berbera. Ismail Pasha was not content with extending Egyptian authority to the sources of the Nile. Pash adorn, with its baneful accompaniments of misrule and oppression, stretched its tentacles to the Somali coast and inland to the fertile province of Harrar. When the parent trunk rotted, the first of the branches to fall off was Berbera. It fell at the feet of the Queen of England. The Egyptian Governor of Berbera was of the ordinary type. Mr. F. L. James, who had travelled much in the Soudan and in Somaliland, wrote to me on April 21, 1884 : " On all hands we heard nothing but the most bitter complaints as to the ill-treatment the natives (Somalis) met with at the hands of the Egyptian Governor of Berbera, Abdul Rahman Bey. . . . That he is detested by the people and a very bad Governor is not open to VOL. II E 50 MODERN EGYPT pt. m doubt ; and after wliat happened two years ago to myself and party, while travelling in the Soudan, I am surprised at no enormity on the part of an Egyptian Governor." Sir Richard Burton wrote in 1856: "The occupation of the port of Berbera has been advised for many reasons. In the first place, Berbera is the true key to the Red Sea, the centre of East African trafnc, and the only place for shipping upon the western Erythraean shore from Suez to Guardafui. Backed by lands capable of cultivation, and by hills covered with pine and other valuable trees, enjoying a comparatively temperate climate, with a regular, although thin monsoon, this harbour has been coveted by many a foreign conqueror. Circum- stances have thrown it, as it were, into our arms, and, if we refuse the chance, another and a rival nation will not be so blind." ^ The Indian authori- ties had always been alive to the desirability of preventing Berbera from falling into the hands of any European Power. The political status of the coast eastward of Zeyla was on a different footing from that portion of the coast which extends from Zeyla to the straits of Bab-el-JNIandeb. The Sultan exercised rights of sovereignty over the territory between Bab-el-Mandeb and Zeyla, which rights, although never formally recognised by the British Govern- ment, had not been disputed. On the other hand, the sovereign rights of the Sultan over the Somali tribes lying between Zeyla and Ras Hafoun had been repeatedly denied by the British Government. In' 1877, a Convention was negotiated between Ismail Pasha and tlie British Government, the main object of whicli was to recognise the juris- diction of the Khedive, under the suzerainty of the Sultan, as far eastward as Ras Hafoun. The BurtoUj First Footsteps in East Africa, p. xxxiv. CH. XXX DEBRIS OF THE SOUDAN 51 fifth article of this Convention stipulated that it was not to come into operation until the Sultan gave a formal assurance to the British Government tliat no portion of the territory on the Somali coast should be ceded to any foreign Power. In spite of repeated invitations, the Sultan had never given this assurance. The Convention was, therefore, invalid, and the hands of the British Government were free. Lord Granville, accordingly, on being pressed by the India Office to move in the matter, instructed Lord Dufferin on May 29, 1884, to denounce the Convention and to inform the Porte that " with regard to the coast eastward of Zeyla, it was the intention of Her Majesty's Government, on the withdrawal of the Egyptians, to make such arrangements as they might think desirable for the preservation of order and the security of British interests, especially at Berbera, from which Aden drew its chief supplies." This communication drew forth some remonstrances from Constantinople ; they were set aside. In October 1884, a British official was charged with the administration of Berbera ; a small force of police and sepoys was placed at his disposal. A notification of the estab- lishment of a British Protectorate over this part of the coast was conveyed to the French Government by Lord Lyons on April 23, 1885. Thus Berbera, with the neighbouring port of Bulbar, were peace- ably absorbed into the British dominions. 8. Harrar. The fertile province of Harrar Hes about 200 miles south-west of Zeyla. Sir Richard Burton visited it in 1856. In his time, the province was governed in a barbarous fashion by Emir ^V limed, one of a family whicli had for long held dominion over the country. The fertility of Harrar excited 52 MODERN EGYPT pi. in the ambition of Ismail Pasha. It was annexed, and in 1874 the reigning Emir was put to death by Raouf Pasha, himself a bad specimen of a bad class. The usual results followed. JNIajor Hunter, who visited Harrar early in 1884, reported : " The Khedive's rule is extremely unpopular, and justly so, for the admitted object of the Governors is to tax the inhabitants to the utmost. No justice is obtainable, peculation is rife, trade is stifled, the soldiery pillage the villages, and the troops are discontented owdng to deferred payment and pro- longed expatriation. . . . The Governor, AU Pasha, is a shaky, garrulous old man of Turkish extraction, who has no idea beyond filling the Treasury, presumably for the benefit of the Egyptian Government." JManifestly, the only wise course to pursue, both in the interests of Harrar and of Egypt, was that the Egyptian Government should abandon a trust which had been so grossly abused. The evacuation of the province was pressed upon the Egyptian Ministers, who, albeit reluctantly, accepted the inevitable logic of facts. The withdrawal of the garrison, and of others who wished to leave, across 200 miles of country, inhabited by tribes who were far from friendly to the Egyptians, was no easy matter. The duty of executing this task was entrusted to Major Hunter, who was assisted by two other British officers. Radwan Pasha was sent from Cairo to act as Egyptian Commissioner ; he co-operated loyally with Major Hunter. The retreat was skilfully conducted. The garrison and followers, to the number of 8359 persons, were marched down to the coast in detachments during the early months of 1885, and embarked for Egypt. The government of the province was then handed over to Abdullah, a son of the last reigning CH.XXX DEBRIS OF THE SOUDAN 53 Emir. The new Emir did not maintain his posi- tion for long. In January 1887, King Menelek of Shoa attacked and took possession of Harrar. 9. Zeyla. It has been already mentioned that the political status of Zeyla was different from that of Berbera. In the latter case, the Sultan could not put forward any vaUd claim to suzerainty. Zeyla, on the other hand, had formed part of the Ottoman dominions before it came under Egyptian jurisdiction. In 1875, it was farmed by the Sultan to Ismail Pasha, on payment of a tribute of £13,500 a year. The British Government, through their Ambas- sador at Constantinople, invited the Porte on May 14, 1884, "to resume direct jurisdiction over the ports on the Egyptian coast of the Red Sea and to occupy them with Turkish troops." On July 17, the Porte was again invited to take " the necessary steps, on the withdrawal of the Egyptian troops, to maintain its authority over Tajourrah and Zeyla." It was, at the same time, stated that the British Government were " anxious to receive the reply of the Porte with as httle delay as possible." The Porte treated the matter in its usual dilatory fashion. No definite answer was given. In the meanwhile, there was an imminent risk of dis- turbances in the neighbourhood of Zeyla. On August 1, 1884, therefore. Lord Dufferin was instructed to "inform the Porte that unless the Turkish Government were prepared to take imme- diate steps for the occupation of Zeyla, it would be necessary for Her 5lajesty's Government to send a force there to preserve order." Still the Sultan did not move. Action became necessary on the part of the British Government. On August 24, 1884, Major Hunter telegraphed to 54 MODERN EGYPT ft. m me : " Force landed at Zeyla. Somalis impressed. Governor oblifj^ino-," The obliu'inf? Governor was kept in his place for a while, because some dis- cussion ensued as to the future of Zeyla. A difference of opinion existed among the British authorities as to whether it was worth keeping or not. It is now British territory. The Egyptian tribute was paid to the Porte for some while after the British occupation of Zeyla. Eventually, in connection with certain Custom- house negotiations, an understanding was arrived at between Cairo and Constantinople that the payment of the tribute should cease. 10. Tajourrah. It was not to be supposed that, whilst this scramble for Egyptian territory was going on, the French would remain idle. In 1862, they had taken possession of Obokh, in virtue of a Conven- tion made with some local Sheikhs. The French Government now decided to annex the neigh- bouring territory of Tajourrah. Early in May 1884, a French ship arrived at Richal, a port near Tajourrah ; ten sailors, accompanied by the Vizier of Tajourrah, landed, told the local Sheikhs that the place belonged to them, and that they would return to take possession of it. JNI. Barrere, the French representative at Cairo, " knew nothing of the matter ; he knew Tajourrah was Egyptian territory." Mr. Egerton "thought it possible that there might be some misunderstanding." There was, however, no misunderstanding. The Porte uttered some feeble protests, and tried to excite English jealousy of French extension. The British Ciovernmcnt, however, wisely remained indifferent. Since 1884, Tajourrah has been a French possession. CH.XXX DEBRIS OF THE SOUDAN 55 11. 3fassowah. Suakin and Massowah were placed under Egyptian jurisdiction by an Imperial Firman issued in 1865. The tribute payable by Egypt to the Sultan was, at the same time, raised by £37,500 a year. The same disorder reigned at Massowah as elsewhere. Colonel Chermside telegraphed from Suakin on January 22, 1885 : " I do hope you wiU take a speedy decision as to the Massowah ques- tion, as, without wishing to reflect on the long string of my predecessors, it is hard to carry on at all in the chaos everything is in, police, pensions, establishment of employes, dues, contracts, water- supply, public works, military garrison, every- thing is in indescribable confusion, costly without efficiency." The Egyptian Government were in- capable of evolving order out of this chaos. The only possible course was to let Massowah go the way of the other lost possessions of Egypt. The question then arose as to who should step into possession of the property, which was about to be abandoned. " LTtalie," a French diplomatist said at the time of the Berlin Congress, " rode autour du monde pour trouver un endroit quelconque ou elle pourra placer son drapeau." The Italian nation has, in fact, ever since its creation, shown a good deal of the restless ambition which often attaches itself to youth. The desire manifested of late years in Italy to estabhsh colonies in distant lands appears to be based to some extent on the plea that other great Powers have founded colonies, and that, therefore, Italy must do the same. The Italians, in all the exuberance of youthful national life, forgot, in 1885, that the monk's cowl does not necessarily make the monk, and rushed into v56 MODERN EGYPT pt. m African colonisation with all the impetuosity which characterises Southern nations. Some years previously, the Italians had estab- Hshed themselves at Assab Bay, a proceeding wliich was viewed with a good deal of rather unnecessary ill-humour by the Indian Government of the day. When it became apparent that the neighbouiing territory of JNIassow^ah was hkely to be in the pohtical market, Italian ambition fired up. It was thought necessary to acquire this desirable possession before it could fall into the hands of any rival claimant. The first thing to do was to secure the goodwill of England ; Lord Granville was sounded on the subject. On December 22, 1884, he wrote to the British Ambassador at Rome : " I have informed Count Nigra (the Italian Ambassador in London) that Her Majesty's Government were desirous of showing their friendly feeling towards Italy in all ways. The Egyptian Government were unable, I said, to continue their hold on all the African Httoral of the Red Sea. Under these circumstances, the ports naturally reverted to Turkey. We had for some time been giving advice to the Porte to retake possession of them. I was glad, I continued, to observe that M. INIancini fully recognised that we had no right and made no pretension to give away that which did not belong to us. If the ItaUan Government should desire to occupy some of the ports in question, it was a matter between Italy and Turkey ; but I was able to inform him that Her JNIajesty's Govern- ment, for their part, had no objection to raise against the ItaHan occupation of ZuUa, Beilul, or Massowah." When, at a subsequent period, many sober- thinking Italians regretted the occupation of Massowah, it was occasionally alleged that England had instigated the occupation, and that Italy had, CH. XXX DEBRIS OF THE SOUDAN 57 in fact, been used as a eatspaw in order to get the British Government out of a difficulty. These statements are devoid of foundation. The British Government never proposed to Italy to occupy Massowah. All they did was to adopt a friendly attitude towards Italy, and to abstain from creating difficulties which might have proved obstacles to the attainment of Italian aspirations. The British Government did nothing to thwart the ItaHans ; but beyond this they did not go. Indeed, I remember telling M. de Martino, the Italian Consul- General at Cairo, that my personal opinion was that the Italians were making a mistake in occupying Massowah. He was inclined to share my views, but the matter was not one for him to decide. The Italian Government and the Italian Parliament were naturally presumed to be the best judges of Italian interests. M. INIancini, who was then Minister for Foreign Affairs, warmly espoused the cause of occupation, and he was at the time supported by public opinion in Italy. Dissuasion or opposition on the part of England would have been regarded as an unfriendly act dictated by an unworthy jealousy of Itahan extension. When the Italian Government were assured of the absence of objection on the part of England, they acted with promptitude. Plausible excuses for action were not wanting. Some Italian travellers had been murdered in the neighbourhood of Massowah, and the Italian Government had failed to obtain adequate satisfaction. Early, therefore, in the month of February 1885, a formidable squadron appeared at Massowah and took possession of the place. The Egyptian garrison was shortly afterwards withdrawn. The Sultan was indignant. For a time, the Foreign Offices of Europe rang with angry but ineffectual protests from the Porte. The Powers 58 MODERN EGYPT pt. m who had guaranteed the integrity of the Ottoman Empire were implored to interfere. But no one had any real interest in the matter. The Cabinets of Europe turned their heads the other way, and the diplomatic clamour soon died out. From that time forth, Italy has been in possession of Massowah. Whether it is worth while for the Tuscan and Neapohtan peasant to continue to pay taxes for the maintenance of Itahan authority over a territory, which will probably never be of any great value either from a commercial or from any other point of view, is a matter for the Italian nation to decide. Nations are not, however, entirely governed by considerations of material interests. The national honour and dignity are supposed to be at stake, and they ^\dll, without doubt, so far carry the day as to prevent Italy from abandoning territory v.hich possibly many Italians now think it was unwise ever to have seized. Thus it was that the huge unwieldy edifice, which Ismail Pasha had sought to erect, fell with a crash which resounded throughout North-Eastern Africa. The Englishman, the Italian, the French- man, the Abyssinian, the Dervish, and the slave- hunter divided the spoils between them. And why did the edifice fall ? The destruction of General Hicks's army precipitated the catastrophe. But the real reason w^hy Ismail Pasha's empire fell was that it was eventually overtaken by the fate inevitably attending all poHtical fabrics wliich are rotten to the core. It fell because it deserved to fall. It may be that the light of Western civilisation will some day be shed over the whole of Africa, but if this consummation is ever to be attained, it must be through other agents than the slave- hunting, corrupt, and tyrannical Pashas, CH. XXX DEBRIS OF THE SOUDAN 59 who were employed by the Egyptian Govern- ment, and who, themselves but semi -civilised, introduced none of the blessings but some of the curses of civilisation amongst the people who, by a cruel fate, were for a time placed under their control CHAPTER XXXI THE DEFENCE OF EGYPT 1886-1892 The Egyptian army — Negotiations with the Dervishes — Fighting on the frontier — The siege of Suakin — Defeat of Osman Digna — Wad-el-Nejumi — Nejumi advances — The battles of Argin and of Toski — Death of Wad-el-Nejumi — Results of the battle — Situation at Suakin — The reoccupation of Tokar — Defeat of Osman Although British military aid to a very limited extent was subsequently on one or two occasions afforded to the Egyptian Government, it may be said that from the date of the battle of Ginniss (December 30, 1885) the defence of Egypt against the Dervishes practically devolved on the Egyptian army. That army was now officered by a well- selected body of Englishmen. Its organisation had been greatly improved. The men were gaining confidence in themselves. A small Egyptian Camel Corps had fought at Kirbekan, and its conduct had obtained General Brackenbury's commendations. A more considerable Egyptian force had taken a creditable part in the battle of Ginniss. Hopes, therefore, began to be entertained that for the future the Egyptian army would of itself suffice to repel any attack which might be made by the Dervishes. The sequel showed that these* hopes were destined to be realised. It has been already sho^vn that a great shrinkage 60 cH. XXXI THE DEFENCE OF EGYPT 61 of Egyptian territory had taken place. The army was no longer called upon to defend remote regions in the centre of Africa. Its task was of a more modest nature. In the first place, it had to prevent the Dervishes from descending the valley of the Nile farther than Wadi Haifa ; in the second place, it had to maintain whatever was left of Egyptian authority in the Eastern Soudan. For the time being, this latter task was confined to the defence of the town of Suakin, for Egyptian authority did not extend beyond its walls. For obvious reasons, based on the difficulties of communication, the operations in the valley of the Nile and at Suakin were to a great extent independent of each other. Before entering upon a description of the miUtary operations which were about to take place, it will be as well to allude briefly to an attempt which was made to negotiate with the Dervishes. A Convention between the British Government and the Porte was signed at Con- stantinople, on October 24, 1885, in virtue of which two Commissioners, one British and one Turkish, were despatched to Cairo. ^ The second article of the Convention provided that the Ottoman Commissioner was to consult with the Khedive " upon the best means of tranquillising the Soudan by pacific measures." After some delay, it was arranged that Youssuf Pasha Shuhdi should be sent to Wadi Haifa in order to try his hand at negotiation with the Dervishes. He left Cairo for the frontier in May 1886. It was as weU to make an attempt to negotiate, if only to show to those who beheved in the possibility of successful negotiations that it was hopeless to attempt to come to any arrangement with the Dervishes. But to all who had any appreeiation of the true nature of the Mahdist * This subject is more fully treated in Chapter XLVI 62 JNIODERN EGYPT it. iii movement, it was obvious that Youssuf Pasha Shuhdi's mission was foredoomed to faihire. It proved, in fact, to be wholly unproductive of results. A year later, the Khalifa addressed letters to the Queen, the Sultan, and the Khedive, which breathed the true spirit of Mahdiism. The letter to the Queen terminated in the following eloquent, if somewhat bombastic peroration : " And thou, if thou wilt not yield to the command of God, and enter among the people of Islam and the followers of the Mahdi — grace be upon him — come thyself and thy armies and fight with the host of God. And if thou wilt not come, then be ready in thy place, for at His pleasure and at the time that He shall will it, the hosts of God will raze thy dwelling and let thee taste of sorrow, because thou hast turned away from the path of the Lord, for therein is sufficiency, and salvation is to him who followeth the JNlahdi." For three years subsequent to the battle of Ginniss, desultory fighting continued in the neigh- bourhood of Suakin, and in the Nile valley. Notably, a brilliant skirmish took place on April 28, 1887, at Sarras, which resulted in the defeat of the Dervishes with a loss of about 200 men, the Egyptian loss being 51 killed and woimded. It was not, however, until December 1888 that any serious engagement occurred. By that time, the indigenous tribes near Suakin had learnt to appreciate the true character of Dervish rule. They were either openly hostile to Osman Digna, or were only prevented by fear from throwing off tlieir allegiance to the Mahdi. Osman Digna, however, still terrorised the country with tribal levies drawn from a distance. He obtained rein- forcements and laid siege to Suakin. It was eventually decided that he should be attacked, and for this purpose more Egyptian troops were cu. XXXI THE DEFENCE OF EGYPT G3 despatched from Cairo. In addition to these, owing to pressure brought to bear upon the Government in Parhament, a small British force was sent from Cairo to Suakin, though its presence was quite unnecessary. Sir Francis Grenfell, who had succeeded Sir Evelyn Wood as Com- mander-in-Chief of the Egyptian army, conducted the operations in person. On December 20, 1888, the Dervishes were attacked and driven from their entrenchments with a loss of 500 men. The British and Egyptian loss was 2 officers and 50 men killed and wounded. The result of this action was to relieve the pressure on Suakin. Osman Digna, however, still maintained his hold over the Eastern Soudan generally. A further result of no slight importance was that the Egyptian troops acquired confidence in themselves and inspired confidence in the minds of the public. Previous to this action, few believed in the Egyptian army. Subsequent to the action, the voice of criticism was to a certain extent silenced. It had been proved that some reliance could be placed on Egyptian troops. Afler this engagement, the valley of the Nile became the chief centre of interest. A period of political hurricane, whether the scene be laid in savage Africa or in civilised Europe, generally brings to the front some individual who appears to embody in his own person the genius of the principles which it is sought to assert. Arabi, though no hero, was a fitting representative of the justifiable, but blind, sullen, and unintelligent discontent which prevailed amongst the Egyptians at the time of the rebellion of which he was the leader. The JNlahdist Avatar was of a different type. The true incarnation of Mahdiism was not to be found in Osman Diffna. nor even in the Mahdi himself. Both of these 64 MODERN EGYPT ft. m men were in some degree strutting on the stage. It may well be doubted whether either of them believed in himself. Enlightened self-interest, more especially in the shape of the acquisition of wealth, lurked behind the grandiloquent periods of their Proclamations, and may be traced in the stage tricks by which it was sought to strengthen the faith of a credulous and fanatical population. When a prophet puts pepper under his finger-nails in order to excite his lachrymal glands^ a safe indication is given that he has descended from his prophetic pedestal, and that, by his own confession, he may be classed amongst P}i:honesses, the mani- pulators of Delphic oracles and winking virgins. It was reserved for Wad-el- Nejumi to embody in his own person the true principles of mihtant JNIahdiism. He was at once the Peter the Hermit of the JNIahdist crusaders and the Prince Rupert of Dervish chivalry. He believed in Mahdiism, and he believed in himself. When summoned by Sir Francis Grenfell to surrender previous to the battle of Toski, he replied, " We are not afraid of any one ; we only fear God ! " and, ^vithout doubt, he spoke the truth. Brave, resourceful, and per- tinacious, Nejumi inspired amongst his followers a confidence which he carried to his grave, and which stood the test of mihtary defeat and death. Few pictures are more touching than that of the host of wild Dervish prisoners mourning with heart- felt sorrow in the palm-grove of Toski over the body of the chieftain who had led them, their companions, their wives and their children, through suffering and privation, to the destruction of their poUtical hopes and to death. Sir Reginald Wingate * " The Greek who came in told the Greek Consul that the Mahdi puts pepper under his finjrer-nails, and when he receives visitors then he touches liis eyes and weeps copiously ; that he eats a few grains of dhoora openly, but in the interior oi" tlie house he has tine feeding and drinks alcoholic drinks." — Gordon's Journal, vol. i. p. 32. CH.XXX1 THE DEFENCE OF EGYPT 65 thus describes the character of this picturesque savage : " Nejumi's career closed only at Toski, when his devoted bodyguard sold their hves dearly in defence of his revered corpse. He was a Jaalin, but one in whom the Baggara recognised warhke quahties similar to their own, and with whom it was important to keep on good terms. In early life a Fiki, like the Mahdi, and his devoted friend, stern, hard, ascetic, the thin dark man was the incarnation of a blind sincerity of conviction. He never transgressed the self-appointed strictness with which he ruled his conduct. Withal, a spice of madness entered into his composition. There was no man but trusted his word, and his was the distant enterprise, his the forefront of danger always. Mahdiism was the natural outlet for his wild temper. He was the Khalid of the Prophet's wars. He it was who prepared the stratagem which annihilated Hicks. He it was who crept silently round through the shallow mud beyond the crumbled ramparts of Khartoum." The defeat at Ginniss checked the advance of the Dervishes, but their leaders were not dis- couraged. It is probable that the Soudanese population failed to reahse the fact that any military reverse had been sustained. The Khahfa vied with Napoleon in the mendacity of his bulletins. Moreover, the main facts, as they must have presented themselves to the minds of his followers, were that a British force had invaded the Soudan, that it had failed to accomplish its object, that the capital of the Soudan had fallen in spite of British endeavours to save it, and that the British army had then retired and had assumed a defensive attitude. It can, therefore, be no matter for surprise that " general rejoicings " took place at Khartoum. The Dervishes, confident in the sacred nature and ultimate success of their VOL. II F 66 MODERN EGYPT Fr. m cause, were stimulated to fresh exertions. As Lord Wolseley, General Gordon, and others had pre- dicted, it was decided to invade Egypt. " Nejumi," Sir Reginald AVingate says, " burnt his house at Omdurman, and vowed that he would not return until he had conquered Egypt. On his departure, the Khalifa AbduUah assembled the four KhaUfas and all the Emirs. They all stretched out their hands in the direction of Cairo, and called out *Allahu Akbar,' three times. Then the Khalifa Abdullah called out in a loud voice, ' O Ansar 1 fear not for the fight for the land of Egypt ; you will suffer much at the battle of Assouan, after which the whole of Egypt will fall into your hands. O Ansar ! you will also suffer much at the battle of ISlecca, after which the whole country will be yours.' " Some time, however, elapsed before any for- ward movement was made. A revolt against the Khahfa's authority took place in Kordofan ; troubles occurred in Darfour, and considerable bodies of men bad to be detached for service on the Abyssinian frontier. Moreover, the important tribe of Kababish Arabs, who inhabit the territory west of Dongola, assumed an attitude of hostility to INIahdiism, nor was it till 1887 that they were crushed and their chief, Saleh Bey, killed in a decisive engagement. The Mahdist leaders, there- fore, had their hands full for the space of three years. As successive seasons passed and no forward movement was made, it began to be thought that Dervish invasion was a mere bugbear. At last, however, the long-expected invasion took place. In the summer of 1889, Nejumi advanced down the valley of the Nile with a motley force, consisting in all of over 11,000 souls. He was joined at Sarras by a further body of 1200 fighting men, of whom about 300 were armed with CH. XXXI THE DEFENCE OF EGYPT 07 rifles, and some 1 000 camp - followers. A short distance south of W'adi Haifa, Nejumi left the river. He decided to turn Wadi Haifa, to move along the west bank parallel to, but at some little distance from the Nile, and then to strike the river again at a point somewhere between Wadi Haifa and Korosko. He hoped and believed that he would be joined by the Nubian population. This plan was faulty in its conception. It was of a nature to facilitate the conduct of defensive operations. It involved toilsome marches under a burning sun over a trackless desert devoid of water. The difficulty of obtaining supplies was great. Even before leaving the river, many of the horses, camels, and donkeys had been killed and eaten. Constant excursions to the river were necessary in order to obtain water, and the river was occupied by Egyptian troops, who could be moved from point to point with comparative ease by utilising the steamers and barges which were at the disposal of Colonel Wodehouse, the com- mandant of the frontier. In the language of strategists, the Egyptian army was acting on interior lines. By July 2, Nejumi's force occu- pied a position in the desert a sliort distance from Arguin, a village on the river about 3^ miles noilh of AVadi Haifa. His movements were carefully watched and followed by Colonel Wodehouse with a flying column of about 2000 men. The Dervishes attacked the village and, after a sharp engagement, were repulsed with a loss of about 900 men, amongst whom were several important Emirs. The Egyptian loss consisted of 4 officers and 66 men killed and wounded. This spirited action reflected great credit on Colonel AVodehouse and the force which he commanded. It discouraged the Dervishes, and contributed materially to tlie final and decisive victory at Toski. ^lany of 68 MODERN EGYPT pt. m Nejumi's men deserted. Abdul Halim, his prin- cipal lieutenant, ad\dsed a retreat. It was futile, he thought, "to attempt an invasion of Egypt with insufficient men, no food, and enormous difficulties in obtaining water." Nejumi's indomit- able spirit was, however, not to be broken. He made an eloquent appeal to the religious zeal of his followers, who resolved to go on, and if needs be to die mth him. Accordingly, the unwieldy column, dogged at every step by the watchful and pertinacious Colonel Wodehouse, moved slowly and laboriously northward. The Der\ashes suffered greatly. " Desultoiy skirmishes," Sir Reginald Wingate wrote, "took place daily, and numbers of camp - followers, women and children, were captured. One and all gave pitiable accounts of the state of affairs in the Arab camp. The numbers of camels, horses, and donkeys were rapidly diminishing, as they constituted almost the sole food. Might was right ; so the lion's share, such as it was, fell to the fighting men, while the miserable camp - followers subsisted on powdered date-seeds and the core of the date-palm tree, which, when ground, is said to have certain nutritive properties. But many of these un- fortunate people were reduced to a state of starva- tion and, flocking to the river-bank in numbers, were received by patrolling gun-boats, and brought to the Egyptian camp, where they were fed and cared for, and, if wounded, admitted to hospital." In the meanwhile, reinforcements, both British and Egyptian, were hurrying up from Cairo. The Eg}^)tians were the first io amve, and Sir Francis Grenfell, who had assumed the command, seeing a favourable opportunity, struck the decisive blow before the main body of British troops came up.^ 1 A small body of British cavalry, however, took part iu the battle of Toski. CH. XXXI THE DEFENCE OF EGYI'T 69 On August 2, the Egyptian force occupied Toski, a village on the west bank of the Nile, about mid- way between Wadi Haifa and Korosko. Nejumi camped, on the night of the 2nd, in the desert about five miles from the village. Early on the morning of the 3rd, Sir Francis Grenfell made a reconnaissance in force, and, on approaching the Dervish position, at once recognised that the topographical features of the ground were very favourable to the Egyptian troops. I visited the battlefield of Toski a few months later. Many of the Dervish dead were still unburied. The empty cartridge cases, which were strewed about, showed clearly the positions which had been occupied by the Egyptian troops. It would be difficult to conceive ground better calculated to give disciplined, well-armed, and well -equipped troops every possible advantage over hordes of courageous but iU-disciphned savages. The soil of the desert, which is here undulating, is composed of hard shingly sand, over which infantry, cavalry, and artillery can move with ease and rapidity. Here and there, a few rocks and boulders, behind which shelter can be obtained, rise up from the plain. Save, however, in these localities, the ground is completely bare. Once driven from the shelter of the rocks, it was clear that the arms of precision, with which the Egyptian soldiers were furnished, would work with deadly effect on the Dervishes. Sir Francis Grenfell, therefore, with the eye of a true tactician, determined to bring on an action at once. Orders were sent to Toski for the remainder of the Egyptian troops to come out. In the meanwhile, the cavalry, under Colonel Kitchener, headed Nejumi, who at first wished to avoid an action, and was endeavouring to slip away to the north. It was evident to Nejumi that he had to accept Sir Francis Grenfell's challenge. 70 MODERN EGYPT pt. m He gave his followers an Arab version of Xelson's order at Trafalgar. " We must all," he said, " stand prepared to meet our Maker to-day." It is unnecessary to give a detailed account of what followed. It will be sufficient to say that Nejumi's force was routed ; 1200 of his followers were killed, and the greater portion of the remainder were taken prisoner, either immediately or during the next three days. Sir Reginald AVingate estimates that the total force with which Xejumi crossed the frontier on July 1, together with the reinforcements he subsequently received, amounted to about 5700 fighting men and 8000 camp-followers. Of these, about 1000 fighting men and 2000 camp- followers returned to their homes. The remainder were either killed, died of disease and starvation, or were taken prisoners. The Egyptian loss at the battle was 165 killed and wounded. What, however, became of him who is the one interesting figure in Dervish history ? AVhat became of the savage chieftain who had looked down on the lines of Wadi Haifa but a few weeks previously and had sworn, in words that bring back Border minstrelsy to the mind of an EngHshman, that he would " stable his steed in Wodehouse's chamber " ? Nejumi was slightly wounded at an early stage of the fight. One of his relations, who was taken prisoner at Toski, said : " On the capture of the first position, one of the Emirs escaped from the onslaught and rushed breathlessly by, crying to Nejumi that all was over and that he should fly. Instead of listening to this advice, Nejumi mounted his horse and, dashing down to the plain, vainly endeavoured to rally his men." He was again ^yolUl(led, this time severely, and liis horse was shot under him, but he reached the shelter of the hills. He appears then to have been wounded yet a third time. " During the artillery attack on the CH.XXXI THE DEFENCE OF EGYPT 71 second position," Sir Reginald Wingate says, "a well-directed shell brought down the largest banner, which was subsequently discovered to be Nejumi's, and it is probable that the shell which broke his flag-pole also wounded Nejumi again." He was carefully tended by his faithful bodyguard, who placed him on a rough camel -litter, and en- deavoured to carry him to the rear. The party, " on being observed, was fired on by a troop of cavalry ; the camel fell, and most of the men appeared to have been killed ; the cavalry then followed up, and called on the remainder to surrender, but as they approached, the Arabs supposed to have been killed, suddenly sprang up, and rushing at them, a hand-to-hand encounter ensued ; a number were killed, and the remainder returned once more to their camel. They were again called upon to surrender, but their only response was a second charge, which resulted in all being killed except one, who, mounting a passing horse, succeeded in escaping." It was then found that the camel carried the dead body of Nejumi. " One of his sons, a boy of five years old, was found dead beside the camel, while another baby boy scarcely a year old was brought by his iiurse into the camp at Toski on the following day." ' There is a rude pathos about the life and death of this savage warrior, which brings to the mind an avrjp apt(TTo^tian ; he is more manly, and the greater the quantity of Turkish blood running in his veins, the more will his manly qualities appear. He is sometimes truthful and outspoken CH. XXXV THE MOSLEMS 173 after his own fashion. He has a rude standard of honour. Go where you will in Egypt, if any bit of administrative work requiring a certain amount of energy has been well done by a native official, it will generally be found that the official in question is a Circassian or a Turco-Egyptian, who is probably more Turk than Egyptian. The Turco-Egyptian can, in fact, still to a certain extent command, and that is why, with all his defects, and in spite of the fact that the class to which he belongs is generally Anglophobe — although there are some notable exceptions, — it will often be found that the in- dividual Englishman will get on well with the individual Turk, and better with the Turco- Egyptian than with the pure Egyptian, the Syrian or the Armenian. The northerner and the Oriental meet on the common ground that the Englishman is masterful, and that the Turco-Egyptian, though less masterful than the pure Turk, is more so than the pure Egyptian. The Englishman belongs to an imperial race, and the Turco-Egyptian to a race which but yesterday was imperial. The English, Nubar Pasha once said to me, " are the Turks of the West." The second category of Egyptian Moslems may ' be divided into three heads. These are — first, the hierarchy ; second, the squirearchy ; and third, the feUaheen. The Ulema — the learned men^ — of the El- Azhar Mosque constitute a distinct religious cor- poration, which is divided into grades, and which is officially recognised by the Government. A University is attached to the JNIosque. The number of Ulema is limited ; in order to qualifv for the rank of " Alim," which carries with it the right to wear a pelisse conferred by the Khediv;e, ' "Ulema" is tlie plural of the Arabic word "Alim," signifying learned, a doUor of laws. 174 MODERN EGYPT pt. iv a candidate must have studied at the University, and have passed certain examinations to test his knowledge of the Koran, the Traditions (Hadith), and the Sacred Law of Islam. Many a Moslem may be learned in the ordinary acceptation of the term ; he may, for instance be a " Hafiz," who can repeat the whole Koran by heart, or, at all events, is supposed to be able to do so ; but unless he has undergone the necessary examination at the El-Azhar University, he is not, technically speak- ing, considered an "Alim." He may officiate at religious services, but he will not have acquired the right to expound either the tenets of Islam or the Sacred Law at any of the principal Mosques. The three chief Ulema are the Grand Mufti, the head of the El-Azhar University, and the Grand Kadi. The last named takes what is the equivalent of his degree, not at Cairo, but at Constantinople. The Grand JNlufti is the chief law-doctor of the country. It is his duty to pronounce ex cathedra opinions (Fetw^as) upon any doubtful points of the Sacred Law, w^iich may be submitted to him. He is a magnate of whose spiritual authority the temporal rulers of the country must take account. Despotic Khedives and even, it is said, Suleiman the Magnificent,^ have tried to force the hand or override the decisions of the Grand Mufti, and hke their Christian prototype who tried to throw off • It is related that Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent asked Sheikh Ahu Saoud, who was one of the f^reatest of the Ottoman Muftis, to issue a Fetua declaring it lawful to put to death all the inhahitants of con- quered European pi-ovinces who refused to emhrace the fa,ith of Islam. ITie Grand Mufti would not comply with this request. Abhas I. is said to have requested the Grand Mufti (Sheik)i-el- Abbasi, who died in 18!}.3 at the age of ninety) to issue a Fetwa s(;iting that the power of ratifying a sentence of death lay not, as was then the practice, with the Sultan, but with the Viceroy. 'Hie Grand Mufti refused. He was exiled to the Soudan, hut, in the face of the strong protests made by many of the leading Mohammedans of Cairo, eveu ^-9spotic Abbas was ol)liged to yield. The Mufti "vas recalled. CH.XXXV THE MOSLEMS 175 the spiritual yoke, they have generally been obliged to go to Canossa.^ The English politician also has to recognise the Mufti's existence. When, indeed, the venerable old man, who at one time occupied the post of Grand Mufti, advocated, as the most natural thing in the world, the crucifixion of criminals,^ it was scarcely necessary for the Englishman to raise his httle finger in order to remind the Egyptian world that, although the onward tramp of civilisation might be heard but faintly within the sacred precincts of the Mosque, he was nevertheless standing outside its walls with his treaties, his newspapers, and if needs be, his soldiers, to assert the validity of anti-crucifixionist principles. But, though in an extreme case such as this the Englishman could impose a veto on some barbarous act, he could not do much more. He could not make the Egyptian horse drink of the waters of civilisation, albeit the most limpid streams of social and juridical reform were turned into the trough before him, if the Mufti condemned the act of drinking as impious. Popes and other ecclesi- astical dignitaries have before now shown that they cannot be dragooned into submission. Neither do Muftis fear red-coated soldiers. Moreover, they fear *iie wrath of the European press even less than the}' fear redcoats. The head of the famous El-Azhar University exercises a certain degree of control in temporal matters over those of the Ulema who lecture in the mosques, and must himself be, par excellence, an " Alim." The incumbent of this office during the first few years of my residence in Egypt was a worthy old man, with whom I entertained excellent personal relations, although, as has been already ^ I say " generally" because there have been exceptions to the rule. Thus, in 1G37, Amurath IV. put the Grand Mutti to death. — Creasy. Ottoman Turks, p. 253. * Vide ante, p. 136 176 MODERN EGYPT pt. iv mentioned,^ our views as to the movements of the planets were not identical. The Grand Kadi is perhaps the greatest of the Ulema. Up to the present time, he has always been a Turk from Constantinople. He pronounces final judgment on all subjects which come within the domain of personal law, having been bereft of criminal and civil jurisdiction by the progress which is constantly kibing the heel of his decadent system. I well remember the Grand Kadi who was in office when I first went to Cairo. His venerable face, long white beard, small hands, dignified mien, and graceful robes rendered him a striking figure. Such, I can fancy, were the Pharisees who were members of the Jewish Sanhe- drim. His manners were perfect, perhaps more so than his judgments. His successor was a younger man with a fine intelliofcnt face. He arrived at Cairo with excellent intentions ; he was going to purify his court of false witnesses, and he was delighted when he found that I was able to talk to him in Turkish, albeit very bad Turkish, on the subject. I welcomed an ally, and awaited the result with interest. I had not long to wait. The Kadi soon came to the conclusion that the Egyptians were an uninteresting race. As they appeared to like the corrupt system to which they were accus- tomed, why should he kick against the pricks in trying to reform it ? Tliese three are, from their official positions, the most important of the class, who, by reason of their acquaintance ^vith theological lore and ancient custom, are termed " learned." It may, however, be interesting to sketch a few other types of their class. The Sheikh el-Bekri is an " Alim," and a notable one of his class. The first incumbent of the office * Vide ante, p. 163. CH.XXXV THE MOSLEMS 177 during my residence in Cairo was a small wizened man with a pock-marked countenance, who, when I paid him my Ramazan visit, used to peer at me through a pair of cunning little eyes, in which fear and hatred of his visitor seemed to be struggling for predominance. I always felt that, when I left his house, he cursed me, my race, and my rehgion, and I never entertained the least ill-will against him for doing so. When he died, liis brother, a much younger man, succeeded him. It soon became apparent that a new Sheikh el-Bekri had arisen. When the spiritual head of a variety of Moslem sects boasted of his acquaintance with Lord SaHsbury and Mr. Gladstone ; when he quoted Jean Jacques Rousseau to me on the Rights of Man in excellent French ; when he indulged in platitudes on the blessings of parHamentary government ; and when he asked me to lend him a few books which might enable him to understand the "philosophy of the French Revolution," — then I asked myself whether I was in a dream. Was this Jin de siecle Sheildi, this curious compound of INIecca and the Paris Boulevards, the latest development of Islamism ? I should add that the combination produced no results of any importance. The new Sheikh soon sank into political insignificance. I can best describe another " Ahm" by relating an anecdote about him. Sheikh JNIohammed el-Saadat, as his name signifies, was a Seyyid, a descendant of the Prophet.^ He was, moreover, w^ealthy and influential. I happened to hear at one time that he was raving against the English. My experience had taught me that political opinions in Egypt are not unfrequently connected with some personal grievance. I called on the Sheikh, and asked him how he thought matters were going on. * "Saadat" is the plural form of the Arabic word "Seyyid," which means a descendant of the Prophet, an aristocrat, lord, master. VOL. II N 178 MODEKN EGYPT pt. iv Everything, he said, was very bad. I encouraged him to talk. Then he burst out into a long tirade about the desperate state of the country. Could he, I asked, point out any particular abuse, for it was difficult to deal with generaUties ? Certainly he could do so ; he had no water for a portion of his property, whereas he always got water before the English came into the country. I inquired into the matter. As I had expected, I found that the Sheikli's statement was quite correct. He belonged to the privileged class. Under the old regime, he always got water, although his neighbours often went without it. Since the English engineers had taken the irrigation of the country in hand, they had recognised no privileges. All were treated alike. The Sheikh had to await his turn. Naturally enough, he did not like this levelling process. Fortunately, shortly after my interview with him, the Sheikh's turn came. He, of course, attributed this to the exercise of my influence on his behalf. I heard afterwards that his language at once changed. He spoke in terms of warm commenda- tion of the British administration. Sheikh Abdul- Khalik el-Saadat, a nephew of the last-named Sheikh, is the head of one of the oldest purely Egyptian families in Egypt. Napoleon made great efforts to ingratiate himself with one of this Sheikh's ancestors, who was at first decorated with the Legion of Honour, and on this treatment proving ineffectual to produce the required results, was bastinadoed. The present Sheikh is a member of the Legislative Council. He is ignorant of public affairs, but, by reason of the respect in which his family is held, exerts, or at all events might exert a certain amount of influence. I used to see a good deal of him at one time, but eventually, for reasons on which I need not dwell, I had to drop his acquaintance. CH. XXXV THE MOSLEMS 179 Sheikh Mohammed Abdu was an *' Alim " of a different and, I should add, a very superior type to those of his brethren whom I have so far described. He was one of the leading spirits of the Arabi movement. When I came to Egypt in 1883, he was under a cloud. Good-natured Tewfik, acting under British pressure, pardoned him, and made him a judge.^ He did his work well and honestly. Sheikh Mohammed Abdu was a man of broad and enlightened views. He ad- mitted the abuses which have sprung up under Oriental Governments. He recognised the neces- sity of European assistance in the work of reform. But he did not belong to the same category as the Europeanised Egyptian, whom he regarded as a bad copy of the original. He was anti-Khedivial and anti-Pasha, not that he would have objected to a certain degree of Pashadom if he could have found good Pashas, but in his experience he had met but few Pashas who were good. In fact, Sheikh Mohammed Abdu was a somewhat dreamy and unpractical but, nevertheless, genuine Egyptian patriot ; it were perhaps well for the cause of Egyptian patriotism if there were more like him. But, regarded from the point of view of possible politicians of the future, there were some weak points in the armour of Mohammed Abdu, and of those who follow his teaching. Mr. Stanley Lane Poole remarks that an upper-class Moslem must be " a fanatic or a concealed infidel." ^ This dilemma, in a somewhat different form, has presented difficulties to those Christians who look to the letter rather than to the spirit of Christ's teaching. It presents far greater difficulties to strictly orthodox Moslems, who look almost exclusively to the letter rather than to the spirit * Mohammed Abdu was, in 1899, appointed Grand Mufti. He died in 1906. ^ Studies in a Monquef p. 111. 180 MODERN EGYPT pt. iv of their faith. I suspect that my friend Abdu, although he would have resented the appellation being applied to him, was in reality an Agnostic. His associates, although they admitted his ability, were inclined to look askance at him as a "filosouf." Now, in the eyes of the strictly orthodox, one who studies philosophy or, in other words, one who recog- nises the difference between the seventh and the twentieth centuries, is on the high road to perdition. The political importance of Mohammed Abdu's life lies in the fact that he may be said to have been the founder of a school of thought in Egypt very similar to that established in India by Syed Ahmed, the creator of the Alighur College. The avowed object of those who belong to this school is to justify the ways of Islam to man, that is to say, to Moslem man. They are the Girondists of the Egyptian national movement. They are too much tainted with a suspicion of heterodoxy to carry far along with them the staunch conservative Moslem. On the other hand, they are often not sufficiently Europeanised to attract the sympathy of the Eg}^tian mimic of European ways. They are inferior to the strictly orthodox Moslem in respect to their Mohammedanism, and inferior to the ultra - Europeanised Egyptian in respect to their Europeanisation. Their task is, therefore, one of great difficulty. But they deserve all the encouragement and support which can be given to them. They are the natural allies of the European reformer. Egyptian patriots — sua si bona norint — will find in the advancement of the followers of Mohammed Abdu the best hope that they may gi-adually carry out their programme of creating a truly autonomous Egypt. ^ 1 For many years, I ^ave to Mohamined Abdu all the encouragement in my power ; but it was uphill work, for, besides the stronj;^ antagonism which he encountered from conservati\e Moslems, he was unfortunately CH. XXXV THE MOSLEMS 181 I give yet one further sketch of a typical "AHm." Sheikh Mohammed Beyram, who is now, alas ! dead, was one of my best friends in Egypt. He was, moreover, one of the most re- markable t)^es with which I have met in the course of my Eastern experience. He looked like a thorough gentleman. I have rarely seen a more striking figure than that of this grave Oriental, with his high intellectual forehead, refined features, melancholy eyes, dignified mien, exquisite manners, and graceful costume, who would sit mth me by the hour^ and sing a dirge over the decadence of Islam. Moreover, Sheikh Mohammed Beyram not only looked a gentleman ; he was one. In no country have I come across a man of more elevated and refined feelings, or one whose on very bad terms with the Khedive, and vi'as only able to retain his place as Mufti by relying on strong British support. In my Annual Reports I frequently spoke of him in high terms, and no one regretted his premature death more sincerely than myself. At the same time, I must confess that I experienced a shock in reading some of the revelations in Mr. Wilfrid Blunt's book. Mr. Blunt's views on Egyptian affairs appear to have been mainly based on wliat he heard from Mohammed Abdu, whom he calls (Secret Hhtory, etc. p. 7) a "great philosopher and patriot." Notably, I read with surprise and regret (p. 489) the following statement of Mohammed Abdu's: "ISheykh Jemal ed Din proposed to me, Mohammed Abdu, that Ismail should be assas- sinated some day as he passed in his carriage daily over tlie Kasr-el-Nil bridge, and I strongly approved, but it was only talk between ourselves, and we lacked a person capable of taking lead in the aHair." Without going into the ethics of tyrannicide, it will be sufficient to say that the civilised world generally is disposed to look askance at patriots, and still more at pliilosophers, who are prepared to further their political aims by resorting to assassination. ' One of the obstacles which lie in the path of the European when he wants to arrive at the true opinion of the Oriental is that the European, especially if he be an official, is almost always in a hurry. If, he thinks, the Oriental has anything to say to me, why does he not say it and go away? I am quite prepared to listen most attentively, but my time is valuable and I have a quantity of other business to do ; I must, therefore, really ask him to come to the point at once. This frame of mind is quite fatal if one wishes to arrive at the truth. In order to attain this object, the Oriental must be allowed to tell his story and put forward his ideas in his own way ; and his own way is generally a lengthy, circuitous, and very involved way. But if any one has tlie patience to listen, he will sometimes be amply rewarded for his pains. 182 MODERN EGYPT ft. rv opinions and actions were less tainted with worldly self-interest, than this Tunisian aristocrat.^ Few things have given me a more unfavourable im- pression of native Egyptian society than that the fine qualities of this really eminent man — whose appearance and character /ere alike remarkable, whose private Ufe was irreproachable, whose religious faith was fouried on a rock, whose patriotism was enlightened, and whose public aims were noble — should have been scarcely recognised by the herd of Pashas, place-hunters, and greedy Sheikhs, who were not worthy to un- loose the latchet of his shoe. When he went down to his grave, none but a few knew that a star, which under happier auspices might perhaps have been of some magnitude, had fallen from the political firmament of Egypt, or perhaps, it would be more correct to say, of Islam. Pope's fine lines well describe my honoured friend : — Statesman, yet friend to truth ! of soul sincere, In action faithful, and in honour clear ! Who broke no promise, served no private end, AVho gained no title, and who lost no friend. Mohammed Beyram was a devout Moslem. His faith was far more earnest than that of Mohammed Abdu, and men of a similar type. The subject which mainly interested him was how to bring Islam and its ways into harmony with modern society ; in other words, how to square the circle ; and in discussing the sundry and manifold branches of this question with him, any tendency to dispar- age the Mohammedan religion at once disappeared. From the point of view of the moralist, criticism ' Mohammed Reyram belonged to the Beylu^l family of Tunis, and, on his mother's side, was descended from the Moorish kings of Spain. His ancestors h&i :he highest offices in Tunis without inteiinission for 300 years. CH. XXXV THE MOSLEMS 183 cannot be directed against the fundamental prin- ciples of the faith, but only against the abuses which have sprung up and which now obscure its primitive simplicity. Mohammed Beyram, re- garded, not as a practical politician, but as a believer in the faith of Islam, was, in fact, a type of the best class of Moslem, a type w^hich is, unfortunately, of rare occurrence. He looked sadly out over a world which appeared to him to have gone mad ; he saw all that was noble in the faith which he revered stifled by parasitic growths ; he noted that Islam was tottering to its fall by reason of internal decay ; he did not so much fear the advance of needy disreputable Europe, for he knew that, though the Moslem might be robbed and cheated, there was still a hope for Islam so long as its moral code and the material benefits it conferred were only contrasted with the practice and principles of adventurers who were the dregs of European civilisation ; but he knew that the tap of the northern drum, which had been heard in the streets of Cairo and might ere long be heard in those of Stamboul, brought more than the dragoon and the rifleman in its wake ; his instinct taught him that the institutions, which his fore- fathers had cherished, must in time crumble to the dust when they were brought face to face with the lofty principles w^hich were inscribed on the Englishman's banner. He was not blind to these things and, albeit he still clung tenaciously to the skirts of the Prophet of Arabia, he crieS out in the agony of his spirit : " Where shaL wisdom be found ? and where is the place of understanding ? " And the answer he gave to himself was that which was delivered by the patriarch Job w^hen the world was young : " The fear of the Lord, that is wisdom : and to depart €rom evil, that is understanding." On that common 184 MODERN EGYPT ft. iv ground, the Moslem of the Mohammed Beyram type could meet the Christian, and discuss matters of common interest without stirring the fires of re- ligious strife. But when the discussion took place, how melancholy was the result ! The Moslem and the Christian would agree as to the nature of the fungus which was stifling all that was at one time healthy in the original growth ; they would appreciate in like fashion the history of its exten- sion ; but, whilst the sympathetic Christian would point out with courteous but inexorable logic that any particular remedy proposed would be either inefficacious or would destroy not only the fungus but at the same time the parent tree, the Moslem, too honest not to be convinced, however much the conviction might cost him pain, could only utter a bitter wail over the doom of the creed which he loved, and over that of the baneful system to which his creed has given birth. We may sympathise, and, for my own part, I do very heartily sympathise, vn^th the Mohammed Beyrams of Islam, but let no practical politician think that they have a plan capable of resuscitating a body, which is not, indeed, dead, and which may yet linger on for centuries, but which is nevertheless politically and socially moribund, and whose gradual decay cannot be arrested by any modern palliatives however skilfully they may be applied. I have dwelt on the characters of these few individuals, not in order to disparage some, or in order to deliver a panegyric on others, but because each of those who have been depicted may to some extent be regarded as one type of the hierarchical class. It must not, however, be supposed that the Ulema are the only members of the hierarchy. A crowd of Imams (preachers), inferior Kadis, and others may be considered as affiliated to the Ulema. These are all so many agents scattered over the CH. XXXV THE MOSLEMS 185 face of the country who keep alive religious senti- ment and hierarchical influence. The special point to be noted for the purpose of the present argument is that the attitude of the whole of the hierarchy, from the highest " Alim " to the smallest teacher in a " Kuttab," ^ has generally been more or less hostile to the work of the British reformer in Egypt. This was, indeed, inevitable. The hostility of the hierarchy is, however, based on somewhat different grounds from that of the Pashas. In respect to one point, indeed, the sentiments of the two classes coincide. Both are inspired by an instinct of self- preservation. At the time when the British occupa- tion took place, both were in the enjoyment of privileges which they had abused, and the con- tinuance of which they thought was threatened. Both had a pecuniary interest in resisting reform. Whilst the Pasha feared lest the fellaheen, whom he had for so long plundered, should, under the aegis of England, escape from his grasp, the " Alim," on the other hand, was somewhat nervous lest the Englishman, in spite of his protestations that he would not interfere in religious matters, might some day begin to ask unpleasant questions about the appropriation of funds belonging to rehgious endowments and such like matters ; and the " Alim " would resent this, for although there are some honourable exceptions, he is but too often so profoundly self-deceived that he considers it an essential portion of the relations between man and his Maker that a few privileged persons should be allowed to appropriate to their own use funds which were intended to be applied to the maintenance of Mosques, the feeding of the poor, or other charitable objects. But, in addition to this cause of suspicion, based on self-interest, there is this further point to be borne in mind that, as guardians of the citadel of ' The school attached to a Mosque, where the Koran is taught. 186 MODERN EGYPT rr. iv Islam, the hierarchy naturally represent the ne plus ultra of conservatism. Hence, the representa- tives of the Mohammedan rehgion mistrusted the English reformer even before he began to reform, both by reason of his creed, and because they could not help suspecting him of some sinister intentions in the direction of shaking the foundations of their ancient faith. In spite of the Englishman's care and tenderness in dealing with them, their religion, and their vested interests, some of them will mis- trust him all the more, the more he succeeds in introducing reforms for which they have no sympathy. They will continually expect that their turn is coming next. Turning from the hierarchy to the squirearchy, it vsdll be found that, as we descend the social ladder, we enter strata where the prejudice enter- tained against the alien and the Christian is more or less mitigated by recognition of the material benefits conferred by the reformer. The squire- archy consists, for the most part of Omdehs (village mayors) and Sheikhs of villages. These are gener- ally landed proprietors on a small scale. They occupy a position midway between the Pasha and the fellah. Many of them are sturdy, honest yeomen who are well deserving of respect. Others are inclined to cringe before the Pashas and to bully the fellaheen. I should add that these latter tendencies, which were especially marked in the pre-reforming days, are rapidly disappearing. As to the submissiveness of the village Sheikhs, the following picture drawn by a careful observer of Egyptian social life was, at one time, by no means exaggerated. The scene is the court of a Mudirieh. The Pasha is presiding. " Gradually the court becomes more and more crowded with brown - skinned and brown-mantled country people. The village mayors and village patriarchs (Sheikhs) cH. XXXV THE MOSLEMS 187 are summoned into the divan. With a deep obeisance, they go through the usual form of lifting dust from the smooth marble floor and pressing it to their lips as a mark of respect. . . . A Decree is read, and the people are required *",o signify their assent to it, and bind themselves to obey it. * Right willingly,' answer the honour- able village mayors with one voice, 'as your Excellency commands ; we are thy slaves and the slaves of our Sovereign ; nothing but good comes from thee ; thy opinion is our opinion.' ' Then seal the document,' says the Governor ; and the heads of the communes, one after the other, give their brass seal to the scribe, who smears it with ink, and fills the sheet with their important names. When the Sheikh has sealed, the villager does so likewise, although he has only a glimmering of what it is that he has pledged himself to." ^ When the English took Egyptian affairs in hand, the submissiveness of the Sheikhs to the Pashas had been somewhat tempered by recent events, for the backbone of the Arabist party, in so far as that party represented a national movement and not a military mutiny, was to be found amongst this class. The greater part of the yeomanry of the country were sympathisers with Arabi ; he was of their kith and kin ; they looked to him to deliver them from the usurer and the Pasha. Arabi ruled for a moment. During that short period, Chaos umpire sat. And by decision more embroiled the fray By which he reigned. Though, at the time of the Arabi revolt, the Sheikh class suffered from the general disorder, though even the short experience which they gained of the maimer in which Arabist principles were put in • Klunzinger, Upper Egypt, p. 73. 188 MODERN EGYPT pt. iv practice led the most intelligent amongst the Sheikhs to doubt whether it was wise to hand them- selves and their cause over to a mutinous army, nevertheless, when order was restored, they fell back on the recollection that Arabi to some extent represented the ascendency of Sheikhdom in sub- stitution for that of Pashadom. They never forgot that, had not England thrown her weighty sword into the scale, the Turco-Egyptian Pasha and his satellites would have been swept into the sea, and that the Sheikh class would have thus been left to plunder the fellaheen alone, instead of being obliged to content itself with whatever escaped from the rapacity of the Pashas. To all outward appearance, the ancient submissiveness to Pashadom returned after Tel-el- Kebir. When the Pasha gave the order, the village Sheikh, with smiles on his lips and curses in his heart, would pay considerable sums of money, which the Pasha, after levying a contribution for his personal use, would devote to fireworks in honour of a ruler for whom the Sheikh in reality felt but httle sympathy. AVhen, in 1893, the relations between the British Government and Abbas II. were somewhat strained, the Sheikh, always acting under orders, would form part of a deputation to congratulate the ruler of his country on his courage and patriotism.^ But for all that, his submissiveness was the old submissiveness with a difference. He was anxious to have it whispered behind the scenes to the diplomatic representative of England that, though he was constrained to all this lip-service, in reality he meant nothing by it ; that he was in deadly fear ; and that his one hope was that England would stand firm and save him from being again cast into the jaws of Pashadom. * I give in an Appendix to this cliapter one anioufrst many letters from the Slieikh class, which was shown to me at this time. It 8ho\»\' • capacity for trimming which is characteristic. CH.XXXV THE MOSLEMS 189 Moreovei, when Moukhtar Pasha, the representa- tive of the KhaUf, came to Egypt, very mixed feehngs were excited in the minds of the village Sheikhs, who let the British Consul-General know that, in spite of the spiritual connection, they did not want to be brought into any closer connection with their Khalif or his agents ; on the contrary, that they preferred to receive water for their fields at the hands of the English engineer. JMoreover, as time went on, the minds of the squirearchy underwent some change. In spite of all outward and visible signs of submissiveness, they are now no longer mere Egyptian clay in the hands of the Turkish potter, as in the pre-reforming days. Years of British rule have taught them that they too have their rights, and it may be that they would not remain so passive as of yore if those rights were infringed. I have said that when the English came to Egypt, many of the village Omdehs and Sheikhs, though they cringed before the Pashas, revenged themselves by bullying the fellaheen. The latter part of this statement merits some further develop- ment. The village is the administrative unit in Egypt. The Omdehs and Sheikhs are the corner-stone on which the edifice of provincial society rests. They have certain duties to perform. They are con- sidered responsible for public security. If, in past times, a crime was committed in the neighbour- hood of the village, and if the criminal was not forthcoming, the imperious rulers of the country had some rude methods for ensuring his arrest. The usual practice was to make the Sheikhs suffer vicarious punishment,^ until the criminal was ' Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace [Egypt and the Egyptian Question, p. 261) tells a characteristic story, which was related to him by au old fellah, of how Mehemet Ali paid a visit to his village and ordered the 190 MODERN EGYPT .r.iv produced. This generally had the desired effect. The head of the village was responsible for the assessment and, to a certain extent, for the collec- tion of the taxes. He furnished gangs for the corvee. He was answerable for obtaining recruits for the army. The exercise of these functions supplied him with opportunities for illicit gain , for, provided the taxes were paid, the corvee gangs forthcoming, and a sufficient number of youths delivered annually to feed the vultures of the Soudan, no questions were asked. The village Sheikhs were practically uncontrolled. They naturally abused the privileges of their position, and developed into petty tyrants. The village Sheikh, like the Pasha and the "Alim," felt an instinct of self-preservation alive within him at the approach of the English reformer. He foresaw that his privileged position would be shaken. Neither did his prophetic instinct err. For, before the Englishman had been long at work, the corvee was abolished ; the assessment and collection of the taxes, as well as the recruit- ing for the army, were taken out of the hands of the village authorities. So far, indeed, did the zeal of the English reformer go, that the Sheikli began to mutter Nolo episcopari. The position of the head of a \dllage became no longer lucrative. The Sheikh class began to doubt whether, under these circimistances, it was worth w^iile to assume responsibilities from which little or no compensa- ting advantage was to be derived. The English- man, on the other hand, found that not the least Sheikhs to produce two robl)ers, who were supposed to be hidino^ in the neifrhl)ourhood. The Sheikhs stated that they were unable to do so. " In the twinkling of an eye, all six Sheikhs were lyinj"^ on the ground, face downwards, receiviiijj the bastinado from a dozen of His Hij^hness' stalwart attendants." Hefore the bastinadoinsr process had proceeded far, one of the Sheikhs said that he knew where the criminals were 'I'wo men were accordingly produced^ and at once hanged. cH. XXXV THE MOSLExMS 191 difficult part of his administrative task was to preserve what was good and useful in the village system, whilst purging it of all that was bad. It may, therefore, be said that in the pre-reform- ing days, the tyranny of the Sheikhs over the fellaheen was only one degree less oppressive than that of the Pashas. In some respects, indeed, the oppression of the former was more burdensome and more irksome than that of the latter ; for the Sheikh was always present in the village, whilst the Pasha was distant, and only swooped down occasionally to plunder and to flog. There are a number of Arabic proverbs which owe their origin to the sentiments entertained by the fellaheen as regards the Pasha and the Sheikh respectively. For instance, " Let the lion eat me at a mouthful rather than the mosquito piecemeal." Another is, " The tyranny of the cat is better than the justice of the mouse." The feelings of the Sheikh class towards the English were, therefore, divided. On the one hand, they were willing to rely on English aid for pro- tection against the tyranny of the Pashas ; on the other hand, they resented the interference which curbed the exercise of their own time-honoured tyi-anny over the fellaheen. As time went on, and the benefits of the British occupation became year by year more apparent, the former of these two sentiments probably predominated over the latter ; but any praise which the Sheikh class might perhaps otherwise have accorded to English efforts on behalf of the Egyptian population, was tempered by the idea that the Englishman was, after all, only carrying out the original programme of Arabi. A few of the most observant did, hideed, recognise that in Arabi's hands the programme would not have been executed with so much skill and in- telligence. On the other hand, no inconsiderable 192 MODERN EGYPT ft. iv number regretted that Arabi was not allowed to have his way, not only because he was then- compatriot and co-religionist, but also because they thought, and perhaps with some degree of reason, that whilst Arabi would have executed that portion of the EngUsh programme wliich involved placing a restraint upon the Turco-Egyptian Pasha, he would have been more careful of their interests in that he would have allowed the tyramiy of the Sheikh to continue unchecked.^ I now turn to that class of Egyptian society which, if not the most interesting, is certainly more deserving of sympathy than any other. It is un- necessary to describe at any length the character and condition of the blue-shirted Egyptian fellah. Every Nile tourist knows what he is hke. Any handbook of Egypt can tell all that the practical pohtician need know of his past history. Every writer on Egyptian affau's has touched, m a gi'cater or less degree, on the sufferings which he has undergone at the hands of a long succession of despotic rulers. From time immemorial, his main end in life has been to find some means for evading the extortionate demands of the tax-gatherer. " The Romans," Mommsen says, '* assure us that the Egyptians were proud of the scourge-marks received for perpetrating frauds in taxation."^ As it was in the days of Augustus, so was it in the days of Ismail. " It is a point of honour," Mr. McCoan wrote in 1877, "to bear any amount of ' stick,' if, by so doing, the impost or any part of it can be evaded. The fellah, mdeed, who will ^ Tliese remarks were written some few years ago, I leave them unaltered, as they were at one time quite correct. But they are so to a less extent now. The recollection of the events of 1882 is rapidly dying out. Other influences have taken the place of the Arabi myth. P'urther, whatever defects may still exist generally amongst the Sheikh class, I have little douht that their moral and intellectual standard is now considerably higlier tliau was the case in 1882. * The Provinces of the Roman Empire, voL. ii, p. 268. OH. XXXV THE MOSLEMS 193 not do so is despised by even his own Avife as a poltroon, and if, after only a dozen or score of blows, he disgorges the coin which endurance of fifty might perhaps have saved, the conjugal estimate of his spirit is generally shared by his fellows."^ Next to evading taxation, the fellah above all things wishes to evade mih'tary service. His favourite method of attaining this object was, at one time, not to cut off a finger, as was done by the poltroons "^ of the Roman army, but to sacrifice an eye. In dealing vvdth the fellah, the English politician had mainly two points to bear in mind. The first point was that the immense majority of the popula- tion of Egypt are fellaheen. The fellaheen, there- fore, deserve consideration on account of their numbers. This fact would at first sight appear sufficiently obvious, but it was at one time frequently forgotten by Pashas and others. The second point was that, as the fellah, at the time of the British occupation, possessed no privileges, unless the Hability to be indiscriminately robbed and flogged can be called a privilege, there would be no difficulty in dealing with him on the ground that the reformer was laying a rash hand on his vested rights. As he stood on the lowest rung of the social ladder, there was no one below him over whom he could tyrarmise. The main problem which the EngUshman had to solve was this : How to confer on the fellah the privilege of no longer being robbed and flogged, without shattering the edifice, which, rotten as it was, had still kept Egyptian society together for centuries past. In dealing with this problem, one thing was certain. The fellah had everything to ^ Egypt as it is, p. 26. ^ The derivation usually given for the word " poltroon " ^jt>o//ic« truncus — is, however, more than douhtful. See Skeat's Etymologicai Dictionary. VOL. II O 194 MODERN EGYPT pt. iv gain and nothing to lose by the work of the English reformer. There cannot, in fact, be a shadow of doubt that the fellah has gained enormously owing to the efforts made on his behalf by the EngUsh- man. He has gained far more than any other class of society, because in his case there is absolutely no disadvantage to throw into the scale against the immense benefits which he has received. Does the Egyptian fellah appreciate the benefits which have been conferred on him ? Does he entertain any feelings of gratitude towards his benefactor ? These are questions which are inter- esting in themselves, and, moreover, are not altogether devoid of political importance. After a fashion, the fellah appreciates very highly the benefits which have been conferred on him. Ignorant though he be, he is wise enough to know that he is now far better off than he was prior to the British occupation. He would shudder at any notion that the old regime was to be re-established. Moreover, in a vague sort of way he probably recog- nises that these benefits have been conferred upon him by the Anglo-Saxon race. But he is singularly wanting in the logical faculty. He is incapable of establishing clearly in his mind that, for the time being at all events, good administration and the exercise of a paramount influence by England are inseparably linked together. It has been the mis- fortune of the English in Egypt that the classes who, under their political programme, most bene- fited by British rule, were those who were least of all able to make their voices heard. The fellaheen are, politically speaking, ciphers. They are too apathetic, too ignorant, and too little accustomed to take the initiative, to give utterance in any politi- cally audible form to their opinions even when they have any. Moreover, in the event of a premature withdrawal of the British garrison, they would CH.XXXV THE MOSLEMS 195 probably not form any definite opinion as to the results of the measure until positive proof had been afforded to them that a fatal mistake had been made. Then it is possible that, having tasted the fruits of good administration and being emboldened by the freedom conferred on them by the English- man, they might turn round and rend the Pashas. As to whether the fellaheen are grateful or the re- verse, it is to be observed that gratitude is not, gener- ally speaking, a national virtue. Moreover, many of those who have mixed in native society in Egypt consider that ingratitude is one of the predominant features of the Egyptian character.^ However this may be, the ordinary fellah is kindly and jovial. If he were left to himself he would certainly not entertain any unfriendly feelings towards the Englishman, in spite of the difference of race or creed ; indeed, although he might not be effusively grateful, it may be doubted whether on his own initiative he would ever do anything to render himself open to the charge of ingratitude. Unfor- tunately, he is emotional, ignorant, and credulous. He is easily led away by lying agitators and intriguers. Under the influence of ephemeral passion, his sense of gratitude for past favours would disappear like chaff before the wind. At such a moment, the same man, who was but yesterday blessing the English engineer for watering his fields, might to-morrow, should the occasion arise, brain his benefactor with a " nabout " ^ in a fit of savage passion. It should be added that, imme- diately afterwards, he would probably be very sorry for what he has done. My reason tells me that this is so. Yet I hate ' " The natives of Egypt in general, in common with the Arabs of otlier countries, are (according to our system of morals) justly charge- able with a fault, wliich is regarded by us as one of great magnitude ; it is want of gratitude." — Lane, Modern Egyptians, vol. i. p. 366. * A " nabout" is a staff, which is sometimes loaded with lead 196 MODERN EGYPT pt. iv to believe it. A diplomatist, and especially a diplo- matist in Egypt, sees a good deal of the ignoble side of life. Constant dealings with corrupt Pashas, scheming adventurers, and other hostile elements, who tliink that all is fair in business or politics, are apt to shake one's faith in the goodness of human nature. JNIore than this, the question of whether the fellaheen of Egypt are happy or unhappy, grateful or ungrateful, though a matter of some interest to themselves and of somewhat more than philanthropic interest to others, is, after all, only one of the factors which must contribute to guide the action of the British diplomatist. He has to think, or at all events the Government whom he is serving has to think of the interests of the farmers of Yorkshire, the fishermen of Yarmouth, the artisans of Sheffield, and their brother taxpayers, who are his own countrymen, and he has to ask himself, what is it to these whether or not the Egyptian fella- heen are flayed alive by greedy Pashas and tyrannical Sheikhs ? All this I know. Mais pour ctre diplo- mate^ on nest pas moins liomme. Even a matter-of- fact official may be allowed to cherish what is perhaps an illusion. He may be pardoned, especially if he has lived much in the inconsistent East, if he nourishes a trace of inconsistency in the recesses of his heart, if he struggles against being reasoned out of a noble hope. Often during the long period when my countrymen and myself were engaged in what at one time seemed the hopeless task of evolving order out of the Egyptian chaos, have I repeated to myself those fine lines of the Latin poet which Pitt quoted when he dealt the first blow to the infamous traffic in slaves : Nosque ubi primus equis Oriens afflavit anhelis, Illic sera rubens accendit lumina Vesper.^ * Stanhope's Life of Pitt, p. 146. The quotation is from the first Georgic, 260-261. (ir. XXXV THE MOSLEMS 197 Was the prophecy of the Enghsh statesman, I asked myself, about to be fulfilled ? Is it destined that, under the guiding hand of England, the rays of true civilisation shall at last pierce into the oldest and most interesting corner of the dark African continent, and lighten with their sunshine even the mud hut of the Egyptian fellah ? Is the English- man to show, by precept and example, that usury and drunkenness are not the only handmaids of Christian education ? Pray Heaven it may be so ! When Sir Robert Peel committed that great and wise act of political apostasy for which his name will ever live in English history, he said that although he had suffered much in separating himself from his former political friends, he still hoped that he would " leave a name sometimes remembered with expressions of goodwill in those places which are the abode of men whose lot it is to labour and to earn their daily bread by the sweat of their brow." I may perhaps be permitted to paraphrase this memorable passage. In spite of the ignorance and alleged ingratitude of the Egyptians, I still dare to cherish a hope that the present and future genera- tions of fellaheen, who certainly earn and will continue to earn their daily bread by the sweat of their brow, will remember with some feeling akin to gratitude that it was the Anglo-Saxon race who first delivered them from the thraldom of their oppressors, who taught them that they too had the right to be treated like human beings, who conferred upon them the material blessings which follow in the train of true Western civilisation, and who opened out to them the path which leads to moi^l progress and elevation of thought. The time, it may be hoped, is past when Egypt ^ and the * Hoary Memphis boasts her tombs alone, The mournful types of mighty power decayed. Shenstone, Elegy XJY, 108 MODERN EGYPT fi. iv Egyptians could be cited as one of the most striking contrasts the world has ever known between past grandeur and modern decadence. In any case, whether the Egyptian fellah be capable or incapable of gratitude, there can be no doubt that it was the hand of England which first raised him from the abject moral and material condition in which he had for centuries wallowed. If, now that he is beginning to emerge from his slough of despond, I thought that he would be permitted to relapse into his former state, and that the work on which, in common with many of my countrymen, I have spent the best years of my Ufe woidd be undone, then would I say rore fioc x'^voi evpela x^^^- I hasten to add that I not merely hope, but strongly believe that no such disappoint- ment of my political hopes is, in the smallest degree, probable. The last category of INIoslem dwellers in Egypt of whom it is necessary to speak is the Bedouins, semi-sedentary and nomad. Of these, but little need be said. A number of proverbs are current in Egypt indicative of the dislike entertained by the dwellers in the \'alley of the Nile to those in the desert. Of these, the best known is, " Better tlie tyranny of the Turk than the justice of the Bedouins." The Bedouins are, in fact, supposed to be very cruel and unjust. Another proverb is in the form of a narrative : " The Bedouin told my wife tliat there was no water in the well. She at once went hastily to the well with four buckets." Tliis is in allusion to the alleged selfishness and untruthfulness of the Bedouins.^ On the other hand, the Bedouins despise the fellaheen, whom they consider an unmanly race. The Bedouins occasionally complain that in the * Burckhardt (Amhic Prorerhs, p. 123) gives another: "Eutertai the Bedouin, lie will steal thy clothes." CH. XXXV THE MOSLEMS 199 matter of military service, from which they are exempted, the Egyptian Government wish to "reduce them to fellaheen." It is wise policy to keep them contented and to encourage them to settle on the cultivated lands. Otherwise, they are apt to turn into marauders and to cause disturbances of various sorts. Their ancient privileges have, therefore, for the most part, been preserved to them. This treatment has proved effective. The figures of the census of 1897 compared with those of 1882 show that, since the British occupation, there has been a strong tendency on the part of the Bedouins to abandon their nomadic habits, and to settle in the villages bordering on the desert. Broadly speaking, the Bedouins, for the purposes of the present narrative and argument, may be considered a quantite negligeable. They did not exercise any consider- able influence on the course of British policy in. Egypt. 200 MODERN EGYPT pt. iv APPENDIX Translation of a Letter from a Sheikh of Keneh to a Sheikh of the Mosque of Seyyidna-Hussein at Cairo. February 2, 1894. During these days, the talk has been great among the people, and tongues have wearied as to the difference which had sprung up, so they said, between our Lord the Khedive and Barino;. There were those who said : " The English have many soldiers, and must prevail." Others said, and among these many of the Ulema : " HE has said (Grace be on Him !) how often hath a small force overcome a great one by the aid of the Almighty, be His name exalted ! " Then it was reported in our districts : " Behold the Infidel is overcome, and Baring has fled in haste to his own country. The days of Abbas shall be like those of his forefathers ; the people and the Pashas shall be bread for him to eat ; the foreigner will be his servant," So we took counsel, and thought to send a mission from Keneh to say : " Good news ! Effendina has returned to his fit place ! " For the poet has said : " The wise man gives honey to the bear in the day of his fatness, but the fool smites him on the head with a pole." Then, while we still pondered, came a message from Cairo that Baring and his English walked in the city like leopards among dogs, and that Abbas had withdrawn into his castle and sat scowling, for the Government of Baring had said : " Be meat that we may devour you ! " So we were hushed, and resolved to say nothing of any deputation. And, of a truth, I think that it is not easy, and will be less 30 in time to come, to send deputations of good tidings to our Lord the Khedive. Now, I had myself thought that the end could only be thus, for I have seen the English and I know them. But aloud 1 said : " The blessing of God on the deputation, and the aid of His mighty arm ! for are we not all Moslems and brethren ? (God increase the might of Islam !) " But, O my friend ! I beg you to keep this letter very secret, for the poet has said: "III is his lot in the court whom the Kadi has heard to whisper, ' There is justice amongst the unbelievers,"' "^ ' A change has been made in the last paragraph without alteriug the general sense. The o:iginal was too course to be reproduced. CHAPTER XXXVI THE CHRISTIANS TTie Copts — The conservatism of their religion — TTieir character — Thrir attitude towards the Eiif^lish — The reform movement — The Syrians — Their position — Their unpopularity — Their attitude towards the Eng:lish — The Akmenians — Tlieir subserviency to the Turks — Nubar Pasha— His son Boghos — Yacoub Pasha Artin — Tigraue Pasha — The Egyptians should not be weighed in European scales. The Egyptian native Christians may be divided into three categories, viz. (1) the Copts ; (2) the Syrians ; and (3 ) the Armenians. Of these, the most important in point of numbers are the Copts. The census of 1897 showed that there were at that time 608,000 Copts in Egypt. Of these, some few are Cathohcs and some Protestants, but by far the greater number belong to what is termed the Orthodox Church. Beyond mentioning that the Orthodox Copts are Monophysites, and that they separated from the main body of the Christian Church subsequent to the Council of Chalcedon in a.d. 451, it is needless to dwell on the special tenets of the Coptic creed. One point in connection with the religion of the Copts should, however, be men- tioned, inasmuch as it is intimately connected with an understanding of tlie general cliaracteri sties of the Coptic community. The Christianity of the Copt has been as conservative as the Islamism of the Moslem. "The Eastern Church," Dean Stanley says, "was, like the East, stationary and •201 202 MODERN EGYPT pt iv immutable ; the Western, like the West, pro- gressive and flexible. . . . The theology of the East has undergone no systematising process. The doctrines remain in the same rigid yet undefined state as that in which they were left by Constantine and Justinian." If a religious belief cannot adapt itself to the requirements which are constantly cropping up as the world grows older, one of two things will probably happen. Either society advances and the religious belief is stranded and eventually forgotten, or the creed holds society in its grip and bars the way to advancement. It is the proud boast of the Christian religion, and more especially of the Protestant variety of that religion, that it is not obliged to choose between either of these alternatives. It possesses sufficient elasticity to adapt itself to modern requirements. It is true that the Coptic Christian has remained stagnant, but there is this notable difference between the stagnation of the JNIoslem and that of the Copt. The Moslem stands in everything on the ancient ways because he is a Moslem, because the customs which are interwoven with his religion, forbid him to change. " Swathed in the bands of the Koran, the Moslem faith, unlike the Christian, is powerless to adapt itself to varying time and place, keep pace with the march of humanity, direct and purify the social life, or elevate mankind."^ The Copt, on the other hand, has remained immutable, or nearly so, not because he is a Copt, but because he is an Oriental, and because his religion, which admits of progress, has been surrounded by associa- tions antagonistic to progress. In the case of the Copt, it is not necessary, as in that of the Moslem, to strike off any rehgious shackles before he can proceed along tlie path of political and social advancement. The reformer in temporal * fcjir William Muir, T}ie Caliphate, p. 594. on. XXXVI THE CHRISTIANS 203 matters does not at every turn find himself face to face with the priest, who in tlie name of rehgion or rehgious custom bars the way to progress. From the point of view of principle, the difference is immense. From the point of view of practice, the difference has so far been slight. In spite of his religion which, as the history of the world has shown, admits of progress, the Copt has been arrested by barriers very similar to those which have appUed in the case of the Moslem. It is, indeed, natural that such should have been the case. The minority must of necessity submit to the influence of the majority. In India, the Moslems have to a certain extent become Brahminised. In spite of the unbending tenets of their creed, custom and asso- ciation have been too strong for them. The Hindoos, being in a majority of five to one, have copied nothing from the Moslems. The INloslems, on the other hand, have insensibly assimilated certain Hindoo ideas, notably the idea of caste. The Indian Moslem will not eat with the Chris- tian, although there is nothing in his religious code which forbids him to do so, and although his brother- Moslem, who is not exposed to Hindoo association, does so willingly. The same principle has applied in the case of the Egyptian Copts. The Moslem has in no way become Christianised. The Copt, on the other hand, has, without know- ing it, assimilated himself to the Moslem. " The modern Copt has become from head to foot, in manners, language, and spirit, a Moslem, however unwilling he may be to recognise the fact."^ Coptic women are almost as secluded as INIoslems. Coptic children are generally circumcised. The marriage customs and funeral ceremonies of the Copts are very similar to those of JNloslems. Much has been written about the general * Upper Egypt, etc., p. 89. 204 MODERN EGYPT it. iv characteristics of the Copts. All generalisations about the attributes of a nation or of a class are apt to be imperfect, and must necessarily do injustice to exceptional mdividuals. The Copts have somewhat specially suffered from hasty generalisation. Until of recent years, when by reason of the British occupation a flood of Hght has been thrown on everything connected with Egypt, most Englishmen who paid any attention to the national characteristics of the "Modern Egyptians" took their ideas from the classic work, which has immortalised the name of Lane. Now Lane was a strong Mohammedan sympathiser. He knew but little about the Copts. All the information he supplies about them appears to have been based on the testimony of one " respectable Copt " whose acquaintance he happened to make,^ and who certainly gave a most unfavourable account of his co-religionists. " One of the most remarkable traits," Lane says, " in the character of the Copts is their bigotry. They bear a bitter hatred to all other Christians, even exceeding that with which the Moslems regard the unbelievers in El- Islam. . . . They are, generally speaking, of a sullen temper, extremely avaricious, and abominable dissemblers ; cringing or domineering according to circumstances. The respectable Copt, to whom I have already acknowledged myself chiefly indebted for the notions which I have obtained respecting the customs of his nation, gives me a most unfavourable account of their character. He avows them to be generally ignorant, deceitful, faithless, and abandoned to the pursuit of worldly gain, and to indulgence in sensual pleasures."'^ * " I had the g'ood fortune to become acquainted with a character of which 1 had doubted tlie existence, a Copt of a liberal as well as an intelligent mind ; and to his kindness I am indebted for the knowledge of most of the facts related in the foUowiiiir brief memoir." — Modem Egyptians, vol. ii. p. 273. ^ Modern Egyptians, vol. ii. p. 295. CH. XXXVI THE CHRISTIANS 205 This judgment appears to err greatly on the side of severity. Even if it be admitted that the un- pleasing quahties, which I^ane indicates, are some- times to be found amongst the Copts, it is to be observed that the Copts have no monopoly of those qualities. Bigotry, ignorance, dissimulation, deceit, faithlessness, the pursuit of worldly gain, and in- dulgence in sensual pleasures, may, to a certain extent, be Egyptian, but it can scarcely be held that they are especially Coptic attributes. They are to be found in an equal degree amongst Egyptian JMoslems. Sir John Bowring, who next to Lane is probably the best of the less recent authorities on Egyptian national characteristics, passes a more kindly judg- ment on the Copts. Although, he says, the Turks have always considered the Copts as "the parialis of the Egyptian people, yet they are an amiable, pacific, and intelligent race, whose worst vices have grown out of their seeking shelter from wrong and robbery." Lane appears to me to be prejudiced in this matter. His statement is, to say the least, much too highly coloured as regards the present race of Egyptians, whether Moslems or Copts. Bow- ring, on the other hand, hardly states the whole case. My own experience leads me to the follow- ing conclusions : first, that, owing to circum- stances uncomiected with the difference of religion, the Egyptian Copt has developed certain moral attributes which also belong to the Eg3^ptian Moslem ; secondly, that, owing to circumstances which are accidentally connected with, but which are not the consequences of his religion, the Copt has developed certain in^tellectual qualities, in which, mainly from want of exercise, the Egyptian Moslem seems to be deficient ; thirdly, that for all purposes of broad generalisation, the only 206 MODERN EGYPT pt. iv difference between the Copt and the Moslem is that the former is an Egyptian who worships in a Christian church, whilst the latter is an Egyptian who worships in a IMohamniedan mosque. The question now under discussion is one of great interest, for it involves nothing less than this — has the Christian religion, taken by itself and apart from all other influences, been able in the course of centuries to develop moral qualities in the Coptic community superior to those generally attributable to the non-Christian com- munity by which the Copts have been surrounded ? I am reluctantly constrained to answer this question in the negative.^ It is, so far as I am aware, impossible to mdicate any moral quality in respect to which the Copt, with his 1500 years of Christianity behind him, is notably superior to the Moslem. The moral code by which the relations between man and man are regulated is, in the case of the Copt, no more ele\ated than in the case of the Moslem. In spite of his religion and his monogamous habits, the Copt has developed no high ideal of womanhood. More than this, in respect to one important point the Moslem occupies a more elevated moral position than the Copt. The former, when untainted by European association, is distinguished for his sobriety — a moral quality which is noticeable to a less extent amongst the Copts. ^ It is, of course, true that the defects of Coptic character are not attributable to their religion. It is also true that * It is, however, to be rememljered, looking' to the past history of the Copts, that they deservi' ufieat credit for the steadfastness with whicli they liave adhered to tlieir faith in tlie face of persecution. As to the persecution see, inter uliu, Makrizi's //?5/or// (Maian's transhition), p. 88. lu Dr. Butler's admirable work, The Arab (.'onqnext of Egypt, a full account is given of the persecution to which the Copts were at cue time subject. ^ " Intoxication is a frequent vice amongst the Copts."— Bowring'g Report, p. 8. See also Cairo, p. 206. CH. XXXVI THE CHRISTIANS 207 the Copt has been exposed to the influence of a somewhat debased form of Christianity ; that that influence has been exerted under specially unfavourable conditions ; and that the defects in the Coptic character are, more often than not, "the vices of servitude."^ Nevertheless, to those who beheve in the morahsing and civihsing influence of the Christian religion, it is dis- appointing to find that, in differentiating the Egyptian Copt from his compatriots who are Moslems, it is not possible to indicate any one special virtue, and to say that, in spite of every adventitious disadvantage, the Christian religion has fostered and developed that virtue, and has thus given a certain moral superiority to the Christian over the Moslem. Such, however, appears to be the case. I fear it must be admitted that so far the Copt has stood before the world as a Christian who, by reason of adverse circum- stances, has been unable to profit to any great extent by his Christianity. Turning from moral attributes to mental quali- ties, it cannot be said that, in any of the higher branches of intellectual life, the Copts have shown any superiority over the Moslems. But, under the stress of circumstances, they have developed certain mediocre aptitudes. As compared with the un- bending Moslem, they have shown a greater degree of flexibility m adapting themselves to a few of the elementary requirements of civilisation. They have seized on those crumbs from the Moslem table which the Moslem was too proud, too careless, or too unintelligent to appropriate to himself They made themselves useful, indeed almost indispensable to their oppressors, aj d the aptitudes which they thus acquired during the period of oppression, ought to have stood them 1 Cairo, p. 208. 208 INIODERN EGYPT ft. iv ill good stead when the flood -tide of European civilisation set in. For the European will recog- nise that the Copt possesses in some degree that accurate habit of thought which is wanting in the JMoslem, and which is the god at whose altar the logical European is an unceasing devotee. He will accord a lukewarm welcome to the Copt, not on account of his religion, but because the Copt can add and subtract, because he knows his multiplication table, because he can measure the length and breadth of a plot of ground without making any gi'oss error in the measurement, and because, although his system of accounts is archaic, at the same time it is better to be in possession of a bad system of accounts than, like the Egyptian Moslem, to have scarcely any system at all. " The Copts," Bowring said, " are the surveyors, the scribes, the arithmeticians, the measurers, the clerks, in a word, the learned men of the land. They are to the counting-house and the pen what the fellah is to the field and the plough." What, however, was the attitude of the Copts towards the English reformer ? The question is of some interest and import- ance, for although the Englishman, strong in the righteousness of his cause, was confident of the ultimate result, at the same time, looking to all the obstacles in his path, to the inertia of the mass of the population whom he wished to befriend, and to the activity of various hostile elements of Egyptian society, who would assuredly never cease from harrying him, he would have been glad to welcome the most humble allies. And where would the Englishman more probably find allies than amongst a body of persons who were bound to him by a general community of religion, who had suffered from the oppression of the Moslem and notably from that of the Moslem Pasha, and CH. XXXVI THE CHRISTIANS 209 who possessed various humble aptitudes, which it would be in the interest of the Englishman to turn to account, and in that of the Copt to display to the best advantage in the presence of the Enghsh- man ? The premises of this argument were seem- ingly correct ; the inference was plausible ; but, as we are dealing with the illogical East, we need not be surprised to find that it was erroneous. For, in fact, the Copt was, in the first instance at all events, animated by no very friendly feehngs towards the English reformer. The principles of strict impartiality on which the Englishman proceeded were foreign to the nature of the Copt. When the British occupation took place, certain hopes began to da^^ii in his mind. I, said the Copt to himself, am a Christian ; if I had the power to do so, I would favour Christians at the expense of Moslems ; the English are Christians ; therefore — and it was here that the Copt was guilty of a sad ignoratio elenchi — as the English have the power, they will assuredly favour Christians at the expense of Moslems. When the Copt found that this process of reasoning was fallacious, and that the conduct of the Englishman was guided by motives which he had left out of account, and which he could not understand, he was disappointed, and his disappointment deepened into resentment. He thought that the Enghshman's justice to the Moslem mvolved injustice to liimself, for he was apt, perhaps unconsciously, to hold that injustice and absence of favouritism to Copts were well-nigh synonymous terms. The Copt, moreover, had another cause of com- plaint against the Enghsh reformer. Not only was he disappointed that no special favours were accorded to him, but he saw with dismay that, under British auspices, he was in danger of being supplanted by his rival, the Syrian Christian. VOL. II P 210 MODERN EGYPT pt. im When the English took Egyptian affairs in hand, the accountants in the employment of the Egyp- tian Government were ahuost exclusively Copts. Their system of accounts v^^as archaic. Moreover, it was well-nigh incomprehensible to any but themselves. All tendencies in the direction of reform were resisted, partly from conservatism, and partly from instincts of self-preservation, for it was clear that if the system were simplified to such an extent as to be comprehensible to the uninitiated, the monopoly, which the Copts had heretofore enjoyed, would be endangered. Finding that he could not untie the knot, the Enghshman, with characteristic energy, cut it. The Coptic system of accounts had manifestly to be abolished, and as the Copts either could not or would not assist in the work of abohtion, they had to give way to other agents. In the early days of the English occupation a good many Syrians, there- fore, took the places of Copts. The reform was necessary, but it naturally caused much dissatis- faction amongst the Coptic community. The English, therefore, found that the Copts were, during the early days of the occupation, generally unfriendly, but they did not show their unfriendliness in any very overt form, for there is one quahty in which the Copt excelled. He was an accomplished trimmer. He wished to pose both as Anglophobe and as an Anglophile according to the requirements of his audience, and according to the part which for the moment appeared to be most in harmony with his personal interests. His remarkable powers of intrigue, which were developed in the days of Moslem oppression, here came to his assistance. I should add that, as the occupation was prolonged, the benefits derived from the British administration of Egypt were gradually more and more recognised by the Copts. cH. XXXVI THE CHRISTIANS 211 They began to understand that they had to rely mainly on their own efforts, and those efforts were often crowned with success. Many of the Copts now in the Government service are very capable men. A Copt of marked ability (Boutros Pasha Ghali) has occupied for a long time, and with great credit to himself, the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs. Before leaving this branch of the subject, it should be mentioned that for many years past a large number of Copts have been educated in the excellent schools established throughout Egypt by the American missionaries. Many of the younger generation speak English, and show a tendency to develop moral and intellectual qualities greatly superior to those of their fathers, to whom the description given above mainly applies. This pro- cess of education has produced its natural result. The young Copts see that, unless they wish to be left behind in the race of life, they must bestir them- selves. Once having eaten of the tree of know- ledge, they begin to recognise the decrepitude of their antique hierarchical and educational systems, and they are stimulated in the acquirement of this knowledge by the fact that the Syrian, by reason of his superior intellectual attainments, is taking away the birthright of the Copts. The young Copt, starting with Christianity developed by Western education in his favour, has sufficient versatility to draw from this fact the conclusion at which the slow-thinking Moslem, weighted by his leaden creed, arrives more tardily. If I am to outstrip the Syrian, the young Copt says, it is of no use simply cursing him ; I must abandon my ancient ways, and strive to be his equal. So a movement has been developed, the object of which is to apply Coptic religious endowments to useful purposes ; to question the necessity of devoting funds, dru^vn 212 MODERN EGYPT ft iv from the general body of the community, exclu- sively to the maintenance of a number of priestly sinecures ; to establish seminaries, where those who wish to enter holy orders may learn something more than how to mumble a few set formulse expressed in an archaic language, which has been dead for the last two centuries ; ^ to devote any surplus funds to secular education ; and, generally, to instil life into a body which has been stagnant since its earliest creation. The movement natur- ally meets with resistance from the hierarchy. At first, it appeared as if this resistance would be at once overcome. The crisis happened to take place at the moment when Abbas II. succeeded to Tewfik I. An enlightened Prime JMinister (JNIustapha Pasha Fehmi), acting in general con- formity mth English ideas, favoured the views of the Coptic reformers. The Coptic Patriarch, who was the incarnation of the most stolid form of conservatism, was sent to one of those desert monasteries, where in the early days of Christianity the misguided anchorites of Egypt tortured their bodies m the behef that they were doing God service. But a turn in the political wheel brought about a different order of things. Riaz Pasha, who was a conservative Moslem, succeeded to power. Moslem opinion was adverse to the cause of the Coptic reformers. This opposition was based on two grounds. In the first place, the staid INIoslem was shocked at rebellion against legitimate hier- archical authority, neither did he care to inquire whether that authority was wisely or unwisely ^ M. Cogordan, at onetime French Consul-General in Egypt, whose premature death was deplored by all who were privileged to know him, wrote : " Le Pere Vansleb a vu a Assiout, en 1(572, un vieillard qu'on lui pre'sentait com me le dernier Egyptien parlant le Copte. Mais il est probable que bieu d'autres le jKirlcrent apres celui-ci ; la petite ville de Nagadeh passe pour etre celle on cet idiome se conserva le plus tard, jusqu'a la fin du XVIlIe siede probablemeut." — Relation du Voyage /ait au Convent de Saint Antoine, p. 116. b^. XXXVI THE CHRISTIANS 213 exercised. In the second place, the Moslem, con- scious of his own defects, was alarmed at the appearance of a new rival in the shape of a Coptic progressionist. These influences being in the ascendart, the Patriarch was recalled from his eremitic retreat. The British diplomatist, who alone could have prevented this consummation, stood aside. However much he might sympathise with the cause of Coptic reform, his worldly know- ledge told him that he would act unwisely in thrusting himself into the midst of a quarrel between the temporal and spiritual authorities of a creed which was not his own. For the time being, therefore, the anti-reformers triumphed. But the triumph is assuredly but temporary. Time is on the side of the reformers ; they must eventually gain the day in spite of Patriarchal opposition. The reformers themselves are not without the faults which belong to political youth and inexperi- ence. Their self-esteem is somewhat inflated. Nevertheless, we may wish them well. " The Copts," Bowring said, "will probably occupy no small part of the field in the future history of Egypt." Until recently, there appeared but little prospect of this prophecy being fulfilled ; but this latter-day movement of the young Copts affords ground for hope. If it be continued, the Coptic community may in time develop attributes which win generate and foster self-respect. When they have done this, they will deserve and will obtain the respect of others. They will be carried on by the stream of social and political progress, instead of being engulfed or remaining stranded on the shore. Turning from the Copts to the Syrians, it is to be observed that there are a certain number of Moslem Syrians resident in Egypt, but, from a political point of view, the Christian Syrians are 214 MODERN EGYPT pt. iv far more important than the Moslems. In the following remarks, therefore, attention will be confined to the Christians. It is not possible to state how many Syrian Christians there are in Egypt. Without doubt, the Syrians constitute a very small community as com- pared with the Copts. They derive their import- ance, however, not from their numbers, but from the positions which they occupy. Considerable numbers of upper and upper-middle class Syrians are Government employes. In almost every village in Egypt, a usurer is to be found who, if he is not a Greek, is generally a Syrian. There are numerous Jews in Egypt ; nevertheless, it is correct to say that the Syrians occupy to a great extent in Egypt the positions held by the Jews in many countries of Europe. Thus, on the one hand, the Syrians encounter the jealousy of those JNloslems and Copts who are aspirants for public employment. On the other hand, they are regarded by the mass of the population with those feeUngs of dislike which improvident debtors usually entertain towards creditors who hold them in their grip. The Syrian moneylender has the reputation of being singularly grasping and merci- less. Moreover, his exactions have been facilitated by the onward march of civilisation in Egypt, for the Code Napoleon, which was suddenly applied without sufficient modification to the regulation of the monetary transactions of the country, affords little protection to the poor and ignorant debtor, whilst it is capable of becoming a terrible engine for legalised oppression in the hands of a grasping creditor. It is only of recent years that the Syrians have acquired their present position in Egypt. Lane and Bowring scarcely allude to them. When, however, Ismail Pasha began to Europeanise the cH. XXXVI THE CHRISTIANS 215 Egyptian administrative services, it was natural that a demand should arise for intelligent em- ployes, who could speak both Arabic and French, in which latter language most of the European work of the country was conducted, and who, from their training and habits of thought, possessed some aptitude for assimilating European administrative procedures. It was at the time hopeless to expect much assistance from the ordinary unassimilative Moslem who, as the movement swept by him, merely looked up for a moment with a scowl from the Koran, and then relapsed into a state of political torpor. The Copt was a Httle more helpful, but he also had developed no high degree of versatiUty, and, moreover, was rarely acquainted with any foreign language. When the demand for employes was first felt, the supply of Europeanised Egyptians was insufficient, and further, the Europeanised Egyptian was often a less useful agent than his social and political kins- man, the Syrian. The Syrian's opportunity, there- fore, came, and he profited by it. He possessed all the quahfications required. Arabic was his mother tongue. He was generally familiar with French, having been educated at some French college in Syria. He was versatile, pushing, and ambitious. His confidence in his own capacity was as bound- less as that of the esurient Greek of the Roman satirist. He possessed in no small degree the talent, which was particularly useful in a cosmo- pohtan society, of being all things to all men. He found, therefore, little difficulty in jostling himself into some position of authority, and once there, being animated by strong feelings of race affinity, he opened the door to others amongst his country- men, and took little heed of the charges of nepotism which were brought against him. When the English took Egyptian affairs in 216 MODERN EGYPT ft. iv hand, circumstances again favoured the Syrian. For the Englishman, himself generally ignorant of Arabic and only semi - conversant with French, looked over the Eg^^tian administrative chaos, and said to himself: Where am I to find subordinates who will assist me ? The Moslem is for the time being, useless ; the Copt is little better. I am debarred by political and financial reasons from employing Europeans. Under these circumstances, the Syrian was a godsend. It is probable that the employment of Syrians did at one time more towards rendering the British regime unpopular amongst certain classes in Egypt than anything else. For the more intelligent Moslem, when he gradually woke up to what was going on around him, said to himself: The Eng- lishman I understand ; I recognise his good qualities ; he brings to bear on his work, not only knowledge, but energy superior to my own ; I do not like him, but I am aware that he means well by me, and I see that he confers certain material benefits on me, which I am very willing to accept ; but what of this Syrian ? Am I not as good as he ? If native agents be required, why should not my kinsman be employed rather than this alien, who possesses neither the advantages of the European nor those of the true Egyptian ? Accordingly, the Moslem, followed at no great distance by the Copt, poured forth all the vials of his wrath on the Syrian. Even Tewfik Pasha, whose views were habitually temperate, warmed to fever-heat when he spoke of the Syrians, whilst the same subject roused Riaz Pasha's more sturdy Islamism to the boiling-point of vituperation. In 1890, Riaz Pasha proposed to issue an edict, wliich virtually prohibited all Syrians from entering the Egyptian service. Then the British diplomatist had to step forward and to point out in a cold-blooded, accurate, European CH. XXXVI THE CHRISTIANS 217 fashion that, so long as red-coated soldiers were walking about the streets of Cairo, no absolute proscription on the ground of race or creed could be tolerated ; moreover, that, from the point of view of equity and common sense, a distinction should be drawn between those Syrians whose families resided in Syria, and who had merely come to Egypt to make their fortunes, and those who, though of Syrian origin, had been born and bred in Egypt, and who were, therefore, to all intents and purposes, Egyptians. The result was a compro- mise. Syrians who had hved for fifteen years in Egypt were admitted to the pubUc service on the same terms as Egyptians. The JNIohammedan sentiment on this subject is very natural. The Egyptian Moslems are, in fact, now in the transitionary phase through which their co-religionists in India have already passed. When, after the events of 1857, all the paraphernalia of European administrative systems were introduced into India, the more subtle and assimilative Hindoo everywhere got the better of the slow -moving Moslem. In course of time, however, the latter woke up to the fact that there was need for self- exertion ; and accordingly, if all accounts be true, he is now running neck and neck with the Hindoo, having possibly cast aside some of the obstructive customs which hang on to the skirts of his creed before he could attain the goal. The Egyptian 'Moslem must of necessity undergo the same pro- cess. He will find that protective laws against Syrian and Coptic encroachments will be of little avail, but, if he braces himself to the work, he may yet beat the Syrian with the latter's o\\ti weapons. He must, however, bestir himself, or he will be outstripped in the race. It is difficult to predict what will become of the JNIoham- medan religion if the Moslem wins. It will 218 MODERN EGYPT pt. iv possibly suffer slightly in the excitement of the contest. The Syrian, equally with the Copt, has to a certain extent developed "the vices of servitude." He has been obliged to bend before Moslem oppression or European intellectual superiority, and the process of adapting himself to Moslem caprice, or of imitating European procedures and habits of thought, is not calculated to develop the manly qualities. Nevertheless, whether from a moral, social, or intellectual point of view, the Syrian stands on a distinctly high level. He is rarely corrupt. There are many gradations of Syrian society. A high-class Syrian is an accom- plished gentleman, whose manners and general behaviour admit of his being treated on a footing of perfect social equaUty by high-class Europeans. His intellectual level is also unquestionably high. He can do more than copy the European. He can understand why the European does what he does, and he is able to discuss with acuteness whether what is done is wisely or unwisely done. He is not by any means wanting in the logical faculty. It would, in a word, be wholly incorrect to say that he merely apes civilisation. It may be said with truth that he really is civilised. In this respect, he is probably superior, not only to the Copt, but also to the Europeanised Egyptian, who is but too often a mere mimic. There is yet one further point to be considered as regards the Syrians. AVhat was the attitude of the Syrian towards the British reformer ? This question was at one time a never-ending source of difficulty to the Syrian himself, for he was torn with conflicting emotions. His French education had predisposed him to look askance at everything English. The Englishman's direct, common -sense mode of procedure, and his scorn CH. XXXVI THE CHRISTIANS 219 for formalities, were foreign to the subtle, formal- istic mind of the Syrian, whose tendencies were ultra -bureaucratic. These considerations, coupled with a certain amount of resentment at insular haughtiness, led the Syrian to dislike the English- man. On the other hand, was it not possible that in the long run it would pay better to show English rather than French prochvities ? Amidst the doubts which hung over the future of Egypt, it was difficult to give any positive answer to this question. Under the circum- stances, the best thing the Syrian could do was to be Anglophile or Francophile according to the requirements of the moment. He would even, under the pressure of self-interest, occasionally emit sparks, which to the uninitiated might appear to emanate from the forge of Egyptian patriotism. But in reahty his heart, or perhaps it should rather be said his head, was attracted by the theoretical perfection of French administrative systems. He had no sympathy with the English or with English methods, though he rendered lip-service to the Englishman and gladly accepted anything which the Englishman had to give him. This view held good more especially at the commencement of the British occupation, for, as time went on, the Anglophobia of the Syrians was, to say the least, greatly diminished in intensity. Lastly, something should be said of the Armenians. The Armenian community in Egypt is small. It consists for the most part of shop- keepers. The political importance of the Armenians, however, is derived from the fact that, almost ever since the dynasty of Mehemet Ali was founded, a few Armenians of distinction have occupied high positions under the Egyptian Government. The Copts have, for the most part, never occupied any but subordinate posts in the Egyptian adminis- 220 MODERN EGYPT pt iv tration. The Syrians, in spite of their abiUty, have so far never been able to push beyond places of secondary, though considerable, importance. Armenians, on the other hand, have attained the highest administrative ranks, and have at times exercised a decisive influence on the conduct of public affairs in Egypt. The number of upper-class Armenians in Egypt is insufficient to justify my attempting any broad generalisation of Armenian characteristics based on personal observation. But I may say that those few Armenians with whom I have been brouofht in contact appear to me to constitute, with the Syrians, the intellectual cream of the near East. There is one point about the Armenians which is worthy of note. Observe a middle-class Armenian enter the room of a Turkish Pasha. On arriving at the door, he will make several profound obeisances. The Pasha, without rising from his seat, will, with contemptuous condescension, motion to him to sit down, but the Armenian will not do so at once ; he will cross his hands in front of his body, cast his eyes on the ground, sidle along the wall or shuffle gradually forward without ever lifting his feet from the floor ; at last, he will sink slowly down on the edge of a chair or divan, join his knees in front of him, cross his hands on his breast, and in this attitude of profound humility will wait until the lordly Pasha thinks fit to address a few words to him. A highly educated or highly placed Armenian will not, indeed, go through all this pantomime. Moreover, the younger Armenians are less defer- ential to the Turks than their fathers. But no Armenian, in the presence of a Turkish Pasha, can ever forget that he is a Christian raya and that the Turk is his oppressor ; neither can this be any matter for surprise, for the oppression of the Turk has, in« deed, in the case of the Armenians, been extreme. CH. XXXVI THE CHRISTIANS 221 The most distinguished of the present generation of Armenians in Egypt was unquestionably Nubar Pasha, to whose character and aptitudes incidental allusion has ah'eady been made, and of whom it will become necessary to speak more fully at a later period of this narrative. Nubar Pasha's son, Boghos Pasha Nubar, is a man of marked ability. He at one time occupied, with great credit to himself, the post of Egyptian member of the Railway Administration, and, since his retirement from the service, has taken a most useful and intelligent interest in public affairs. Yacoub Pasha Artin is a highly cultivated gentle- man, who has done excellent work in the cause of educational reform. But perhaps one of the most typical Armenians in Egypt was Nubar Pasha's son-in-law, Tigrane Pasha, who for a long time occupied the post of Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and who sub- sequently became Foreign JNIinister.^ He was a highly educated gentleman of polished manners. He spoke French perfectly ; in fact, French was the language in which he was most at home. He spoke English well. He knew no Arabic, and but little Turkish. Without being, from a political point of view, a Gallophile, his habits of thought were cast in a French mould. Most of the young Egj^tians of the early days of the occupation, although by no means always sjtii- pathisers with the aims and pohcy of the French Government, were saturated with ideas which had their origin in French education, in association with Frenchmen, and in the fact that they were more conversant with French than any other European literature. ' Tigrane Pasha, to the great regret of all who knew him, died in 1904. Although I often disagreed with him, I preserve the most pleasant recollection of our long and intimate personal relations. 222 MODERN EGYPT rx iv One of the peculiarities of the Anglo-Saxon race is that when they take possession or semi- possession of a country, which does not belong to them, they are apt in one respect to forget the position which they occupy towards the inhabitants. They are conscious of their own good intentions ; they earnestly desire to govern the people of the country well and justly ; they cannot understand how any one can question the excellence of their motives ; and they look with much disUke and suspicion, which is not at all unnatural, on all who place obstacles in the way of their praiseworthy designs being executed. Thus, forgetful of the fact that they are not dealing with the mhabitants of Kent or Norfolk, the English speedily apply the term " loyal " to those who co-operate with them, and the term " disloyal " to those who display hostility or merely lukewarm friendship. From this point of view, Tigrane Pasha was far from being "loyal," neither can any moral blame be imputed to him for the degree of disloyalty which he at times displayed. He was not an Anglophobe in the ordinary sense of the term, but he disagreed with the broad lines of British poHcy in Egypt. Personal ambition may have had something to do with this mental attitude. It is possible that the class to which Tigrane Pasha belonged, — unless, indeed, as is not improbable, it was swept away at the first breath of discontent from the alumni of the El-Azhar University, — would occupy positions of greater importance in the world of Egyptian poHtics if British influence were diminished than those to which they can attain whilst that influence remains paramount. It may be, also, that, in order to remove the taint of being a Christian and an alien ignorant of the vernacular language, Tigrane Pasha was obliged to display a somewhat more ardent degree of .11. XXXVI THE CHRISTIANS 223 patriotism in the cause of his adopted country than would have been necessary had he been, in fact as w^ell as in name, a real hall-marked Egyptian struggling for the cause of Egypt. But it is doubtful whether Tigrane Pasha was consciously influenced by either of these considerations. It is more probable that he honestly thought that the Egyptians, that is to say, the Europeanised Egyptians, of whom for all practical purposes he may be said to have been one, were capable of governing Egypt without any considerable degree of British assistance, and certainly without the presence of a British garrison in the country.^ In holding this opinion he was certainly wrong, but the fact that he did entertain an opinion of this sort, though it may have afforded ground for criticising his reasoning powers, afforded no ground whatever for moral reprobation. Tigrane Pasha was, in fact, a perfectly honourable and straightforward gentle- man, with somewhat doctrinaire views, whose standard of public and private morality was in no way inferior to that of men of honour in any European country. It is, however, from the intellectual and not from the moral point of view that the study of Tigrane Pasha's character was mainly of interest. It is here that his national — that is to say, Armenian, not Egyptian — characteristics came out in strong relief. Tigrane Pasha's mind may be characterised as having been Franco- Byzantine, that is to say, the foundation was Byzantine, whilst the superstructure was French. He was, intellectually speaking, the direct descendant of those Orientals who, in the * There is some reason for believing that Tigrane Pasha's political views were a good deal modified before his death. During the last few years of his life, he was not in office, and, moreover, suffered from very bad health. The consequence was that, to my great regret, I saw less of him than at previous periods. I cannot, therefore, speak with confidence on this point. 224 MODERN EGYPT pt.iv early days of Christianity, engaged in endless dis- putes over barren and almost incomprehensible points of theology. He would have revelled in the subtleties submitted to the decision of the Council of Nice, but he would probably never have come to any definite conclusion as to whether Arius or Athanasius was in the right. He was very intelhgent, particularly about matters of detail, and quick-witted, but was often incapable of grasping the true point at issue. When any plain, practical question had to be decided, he would sometimes rush off into an a piiori dis- cussion of some principle, which was only remotely connected with the matter in hand. On the other hand, when some broad question of principle was at stake, Tigrane Pasha would spht hairs over a minor issue, which was almost incomprehensible, or which was at all events devoid of importance to the non- Byzantine mind. In political affairs, he had but little idea of proportion. He endeavoured to understand European, and especially British politics, — a rock on which many Orientals have split, — and as the result of his studies, he was generally able to give the most plausible reasons for arriving at conclusions, which were usually erroneous. To make use of a French expression, Ilprenait des vessies pour des lant ernes. His minor premiss appeared to him to be of such importance, that he was apt to forget the existence of liis major premiss. His mind refused to accept a simple inference from simple fsicts, which were patent to all the world. The very simplicity of the conclusion was of itself enough to make him reject it, for he had an elective affinity for everything that was intricate. He was a prey to intellectual over-subtlety — Graecorum ille morbus, as it was termed by Seneca. Tigrane Pasha was the dme damnee of a succession CH. XXXVI THE CHRISTIANS 225 of Egyptian Ministries. He always proffered advice, which he honestly considered was in the best interests of Eg3^t ; yet on most occasions of importance, the result of following his advice was to produce an effect the opposite of that which he had intended. His main desire for many years was to diminish the power of the English in Egypt, and he became instrumental in aug- menting their power. From time to time, he laboriously constructed a diplomatic house of cards, which he thought must produce the required result. When one house of cards was overturned by a movement of the Englishman's little finger, he was not dismayed. He did not see that the way to get rid of the Englishman was, not to oppose him, but to co-operate with him. Untaught by experience, he set to work to construct some other flimsy fabric, which also disappeared at the first tiny blast of the British diplomatic horn. The motives, which led Tigrane Pasha into a number of honest but very palpable errors, are worthy of respect. Those errors were due to the Franco- Byzantine frame of mind, which is hypercritical, and which is, moreover, unwilling to adopt a severe process of inductive reasoning. In politics, it is essential to ascertain the facts correctly before coming to any conclusion. This Tigrane Pasha was apt to forget. His sympathies drove him to a certain conclusion ; he was wont to accept that conclusion, and to let the facts, on which the con- clusion ought to have been based, take care of themselves. With one exception, to which allusion \^^ll presently be made, the various elements which make up native Egyptian society have thus been described. Some of the judgments which have been passed may appear harsh. They have, VOL. II Q 226 MODERN EGYPT pt. iv however, been written with an object, which will now be explained. At the period of history of which this narra- tive treats, it happened that Egypt had to be Europeanised. The Englisli were the main agents in this process of Europeanisation. It is true that the English reformers attempted in some measure to Egyptianise themselves. They were possessed of little social, but of much political and adminis- trative elasticity, which enabled them to adapt themselves and their procedures to strange circum- stances more readily than would have been the case with some other members of the European family. At the same time, the Egyptian had to meet the Englishman more than half-way. European civilisation, though not absolutely a bed of Procrustes, is not very elastic. Broadly speaking, in spite of every effort, the bed could not be made to fit the Egyptian ; the Egyptian had to adapt himself to lying on the bed. Viewed in this light, it is more important to know what the Egyptian is from the point of view of the educated European, than it is to inquire what Europeans, whether educated or the reverse, are from the point of view of the Egyptian. I have, therefore, en- deavoured to depict the Egyptians of different classes of society as they appear in the eyes of an educated European. I have attempted to show how little suited the Eg}^:)tian is to lie on the bed which, as an incident of modern progress, has been prepared for him. I have wished to bring into relief how his religion, his history, his moral and intellectual attributes, and his social customs contribute to establish a gulf between him and his European guides. But I have no wish whatever to blame the individual Egyptian, be he Moslem or Christian, for being that which I find him to be. An Englishman who had been long resident in cH. XXXVI THE CHRISTIANS 227 China, once said : " It is the misfortune of the Chinese Government and people to be weighed in a balance, which they have never accepted, and to have their shortcomings, so ascertained, made the basis of reclamations of varying degrees of gravity."^ This observation holds as gOod about Egypt as it does about China. I am aware that in the remarks made in this and the two preceding chapters, the Egyptian has been weighed in a balance which he has never accepted, and in which, moreover, it is somewhat unjust to weigh him ; for, from whatever point of view we look at the Egyptian, we should never forget that he is what the accidents of his history, climate, religion, and geographical position have made him. It is useless and, indeed, hurtful to hide his defects, or to disguise from ourselves the fact that the reception of true European civilisation by a population such as that which is described above must be the work of generations. But there is no occasion to poipt the finger of Pharisaical scorn at the Egyptians, whilst any feel- ing of self-congratulation that we are not as these less fortunate political publicans should surely be checked by the reflection that some, at least, of the defects in the Egyptian character are due to associa- tion with European civilisation in a debased form. Rather let us, in Christian charity, make every possible allowance for the moral and intellectual shortcomings of the Egyptians, and do whatever can be done to rectify them. * Mr. Alexander Michie, China and Christianity, p, 1, 1892. CHAPTER XXXVII THE EUROPEANISED EGYPTIANS rhe Europeanised Egyptians are generally Agnostics — Effects of Europeanising the East — Gallicised Egyptians — Attractions of French civilisation — Unsuitability of the French system to form the Egyptian character — The official classes generally hostile to England, A moment's reflection will show how it is that, in the peculiar political phase through which Egypt is now passing, the Europeanised Egyptian occupies a position of somewhat special importance. If the country were still governed on the lines of the old Oriental despotisms, a small number of educated Egyptians might perhaps be employed in sub- ordinate positions, but they would be mere adjuncts ; they would not truly represent the spirit of the Government. If, on the other hand, the Government and society of Egypt were farther advanced on the road to civiUsation, the Euro- peanised Egyptian would probably be something different from what he actually is ; he would have become in spirit, though not necessarily in senti- ment, less Egyptian and more thoroughly European. But inasmuch as Egyptian society is in a state of flux, the natural result has been to produce a class of individuals many of whom are, at the same time, de- moslemised Moslems and invertebrate Europeans. In deahng with the question of introducing Eurv^)ean civilisation into Egypt, it should never 228 CH. XXXVII YOUNG EGYPT 229 be forgotten that Islam cannot be reformed ; that is to say, reformed Islam is Islam no longer ; it is something else ; we cannot as yet tell what it wiU eventually be. " Christian nations," Sir William Muir says, " may advance in civilisation, freedom, and morality, in philosophy, science, and the arts, but Islam stands still. And thus stationary, so far as the lessons of history avail, it will remain." ^ But little assistance in the work of reform can, therefore, be expected from the steady orthodox Moslems, who cling with unswerving fidelity to their ancient faith, and whose dislike to European civilisation often increases as that civilisation advances. The Syrians and Armenians are foreigners. The Copts, besides being Christians, are — or, at all events, in 1882, were — but little better educated than the ordinary Moslems. Having regard, therefore, to the dis- qualifications of his competitors, the Europeanised Egyptian naturally becomes, if not the only possible, at all events the principal agent for administering the country, except 'in so far as it is administered by Europeans. Nominally, the Europeanised Egyptian is in the majority of cases a Moslem. In reality, he is generally an Agnostic. The gulf between him and Jthe " Alim " of the El-Azhar University is as great as between the " Alim " and the European. Indeed, it may be doubted whether the gulf is not in reality greater in the former than in the latter case. For a thoughtful European will not only look with interest at the *' Alim " as the representa- tive of an ancient faith, which contains much that is highly deserving of respect ; he will, if the "Alim" is a worthy specimen of his class, sympathise with him because he is religious, albeit his religion is not that of Christ. The Europeanised Egyptian, on the other hand, will often look on the *' Alim " » The Caliphate, p. 697. 230 MODERN EGYr r pt. iv with all the pride of an intellectual paTvenu. From the pedestal of his empirical knowledge, he will regard the " Alim " as a social derelict, who has to be tolerated, and even occasionally, for political purposes, to be utilised, but who need not be respected. The truth is that, in passing through the European educational mill, the young Egyptian Moslem loses his Islamism, or, at all events, he loses the best part of it. He cuts himself adrift from the sheet-anchor of his creed. He no longer believes that he is always in the presence of his Creator, to whom he will some day have to render an account of his actions. He may still, however, take advantage of the least worthy portions of his nominal religion, those portions, namely, which, in so far as they tolerate a lax moral code, adapt themselves to his tastes and to his convenience in the affairs of this world. Moreover, in losing his Islamism, the educated Egyptian very rarely makes any approach towards Christianity. There are practically no cases of Christian converts amongst the educated classes. INIore than this, although the Europeanised Egyptian is no true Moslem, he is often as intolerant, and sometimes even more intolerant of Christianity than the old orthodox Moslem, who has received no European education. He frequently hates Christians with a bitter hatred, and he does so partly because many of the Christians with whom he has been brought in contact deserve to be hated, and partly because the Christian, in his capacity of being a European, is a rival who occupies positions, which tlie Europeanised Egyptian thinks he should himself occupy. It is doubtful whether the price which is being paid, or which, at all events, may have to be paid for introducing European civilisation into these backward Eastern societies is always recognised CH. XXXVII YOUNG EGYPT 231 so fully as it should be. The material benefits derived from Europeanisation are unquestionably great, but as regards the ultimate effect on public and private morality the future is altogether uncertain.^ European civilisation destroys one religion without substituting another in its place. It remains to be seen whether the code of Christian morality, on which European civilisation is based, can be dissociated from the teaching of the Christian religion. This question can only be answered by generations which are now un- born. For the present, there is little to guide us in any forecast as to what the ultimate result will be. It may, however, be noted that there is an essential difference between the de-moslemised Moslem and the free-thinker in Europe. The latter is surrounded by an atmosphere of Chris- tianity : he will often, sometimes with a pang of envy, admire trustfulness and faith, in which qualities his reasoning faculties forbid him to share ; if he is a politician, he will, or at all events he should recognise the utilitarian side of Christianity ; he will, more often than not, reject the idea that there is no alternative presented to him but that of being either an atheist or a full believer in the Christianity of the schools ; the fact that he is a free-thinker does not cut him off from association and co-operation with his friends, who may not share his disbelief or his doubts ; his reason, his associations, and his hereditary qualities alike impel him to assert, no less strongly than the orthodox Christian, that the code of Christian morality must * The whole of this question has been admirably treated, from the Hindoo point of view, in the second series of Sir Alfred Lyall's brilliant Asiatic :^tiidies. Every European wlio occupies a high position in the East should study Sir Alfred Lyall's works. They display a pro- found knowledge of Eastern habits of thought, and a remarkable gra,s^ of the difficulties underlying the treatment of Eastern problems. 232 JNIODERN EGYPT pt. iv form the basis to regulate the relations between man and man in modern society. That morality has, indeed, taken such deep root in Europe that if, as would appear probable, the hold which revealed religion and theological dogma has on mankind is destined to be gradually relaxed, no moral cataclysm is to be anticipated. Far different is the case of the Egyptian free- thinker. He finds himself launched on a troubled sea without any rudder and without any pilot. Neither his past history nor his present associations impose any effective moral restraint upon him. He finds that, amongst many of his own countrymen, the cause of religion is often identified with opposi- tion to the most reasonable reforms, and in trampling indignantly on the particular religion which can lead to such results, he is disposed to cast aside religion altogether. Having cut himself loose from his creed, no barrier, save that of cynical self-interest, serves to keep him within the limits of the moral code which is in some degree imposed on the European, whose system he is endeavouring to copy. The society in which he moves does not seriously condemn untruthfulness and deceit. The social stigma with which vice of various kinds is visited is too feeble to exercise much practical effect. As he leaves the creed of his forefathers, he casts no lingering look behind. He not only leaves it, but he spurns it. He rushes blindfold into the arms of European civilisation, unmindful of the fact that what is visible to the eye constitutes merely the outward signs of that civilisation, whilst the deep- seated ballast of Christian morality, which regulates the occasionally eccentric movements of the vessel, is hidden beneath the surface, and is difficult of acquisition by the pseudo-European imitator of the European system. He calls Heaven to witness that he has cast aside all prejudices based on CH. XXXVII YOUNG EGYPT 233 religion, and that he despises the teachings of his forefathers. See, he says to the European, I have my railways, my schools, my newspapers, my law- courts, and all the other things which, as I can plainly see, go to make up your boasted civilisation ; in what, then, am I inferior to you ? Alas ! the de-moslemised Moslem, although he is wholly un- aware of the defect, is inferior in one respect wherein his inferiority cannot be removed by a stroke of the pen, for the civilised European, as we understand him, though he may not be an orthodox Christian, is in spite of himself to a great extent the outcome of Christianity, and would not be what he is had he not 1900 years of Christianity behind him. " No hostility to Christian doctrine can justify indiffer- ence to the truth, that the world owes to Chris- tianity the matured idea of Progress, and the one serious attempt to realise it." ^ It is at present useless to speculate on the ultimate product of the forces which are now being brought into play in the Moslem world.^ That any great accession of strength wiU accrue to Christianity is improbable. A revival of Islam, that is to say, the Islam of the Koran and the Traditions, is nothing but the dream of poetic natures whose imaginations are carried away by the attractions which hover round some incidents of this faith. Yet, as has been often observed, history records no instance of a nation being without a religion. " Man everywhere shows ' Liddon, University Sermons, 1873, p. 33. 2 M. Leroy-Beaulieu makes the following remarks as regards the dissolvent effect exercised by Western civilisation on Judaism : " Qu'est ce qui a conserve le juif a travers les siecles et I'a empeche de dispa- raitre au milieu des nations ? C'est sa religion. Or, ces rites protecteiiis, cette cuirasse ou cette carapace d'ol)servances qui I'a defendu duiant deux mille ans, et que rien ne pourrait traiispercer, notre esprit occi- dental I'a entamee. . . . Si le judaisme, dcbilite', vcnait k se decomposer et a se dissoudre, qu'advieudrait-il du juif? Forme et saufgarde par sa religion, le juif ne risque-t-il point de s'e'vanouir avec le judaisme?" — Israel chez les Nations, p. 77. 234 MODERN EGVrT pt. iv invincible religious tendencies." ^ It is conceivable that, as time goes on, the Moslems will develop a religion, possibly a pure Deism, which will not be altogether the Islamism of the past and of the present, and which will cast aside much of the teaching of Mohammed, but which will establish a moral code sufficient to hold society together by bonds other than those of unalloyed self-interest. The Europeanised Egyptian, as we now see him, is the first, not the last, word of reformed Moslem society. It is possible that, in course of time, some higher moral and intellectual ideal will be developed. In the meanwhile, let the European politician bear this in mind, that in the process of his well-intentioned and very necessary reforms he will do well to abstain, on utilitarian grounds, from any measure which is calculated to undermine the Moslem faith more than the strict requirements of the case demand. The missionary, the philanthropist, the social reformer, and others of the same sort, should have a fair field. Their intentions are excellent, although at times their judgment may be defective. They will, if under some control, probably do much good on a small scale. They may even, being carried away by the enthusiasm which pays no heed to worldly pru- dence, effect reforms more important than those of the administrator and politician, who will follow cautiously in their track, and perhaps reap the results of their labours. Nevertheless, let those who have to guide the machine of state beware how they wittingly shake the whole mQral fabric of Eastern society. It is dangerous work, politically, socially, and morally, to trifle with the religious belief of a whole nation. The first point, therefore, to be borne in mind in dealing with the Europeanised Egyptian is that ' Boyd Carpenter, The Permanent Elements of Religion, p. 77. cH. XXXVII YOUNG EGYPT 235 he is generally an Agnostic. The second point is that the term Europeanised, when applied to the Egyptian educated in Europe, though not a mis- nomer, is lacking in precision. For the majority of Europeanised Egyptians at the commencement of the British occupation, and for some years subsequent to that event, were, in truth, Gallicised Egyptians. When Mehemet Ali took some tentative steps towards introducing European civilisation into Egypt, he naturally turned to France for assist- ance. He was haunted with the idea that England would one day take possession of Egypt. ^ An increase of French influence in Egypt would, he thought, constitute some barrier against British aggression. A number of young Egyptians were, therefore, sent to France to be educated, and several schools were established in Egypt at the heads of which French professors were placed. Thus, the first impress of civiUsa- tion given to Egypt was through the medium of the French language, which, it may be added, has during the latter part of the last century been supplanting Italian as a common language for the use of divers nationalities throughout the Levant. The French thus obtained a start which they have never lost. The Government and the people of France, being gifted with more political foresight of a certain kind, and being more capable of grasping a general idea than the English, saw their advantage, and followed it up. They were aware that, if the youth of Egypt learnt the French language, they would, as a necessary con- sequence, be saturated with French habits of thought, and they hoped that sympathy with France and * Vide ante, vol. i. p. 16, note. Sir Charles Murray, in his Short Memoir (p. 5), says that Mehemet All's sympathy for the French was in some degree due to the kindness shown to him when a child by a French resident at Cawala^ named Lion. 236 MODERN EGYPT ft. iv French political aims would ensue. For half a century prior to the British occupation, therefore, during ^vhich time the British Government were wholly inactive in respect to Egyptian education, no effort was spared to propagate a knowledge of French in Egypt. The agents for the accomplish- ment of this object have been mainly Catholic priests. The great apostle of anti- clericalism in France, INI. Gambetta, was careful to explain that his anti-clerical ideas were only intended for home consumption ; they were not meant for export. The French Republic claims to be the defender of the Catholic Church in the East, and is very sensi- tive if its rigiit to do so is in any way questioned. A Republican Go^'ernment and their agents, be they never so anti-clerical at home, are fully alive to the advantages of taking clericaUsm by the hand abroad as a useful instrument to further their political aims. Apart, however, from any consequences re- sulting from the action taken either by Mehemet Ali or by the French Government, it is to be observed that French civilisation possesses a special degree of attraction, not only to the Asiatic, but also to the European races of the Levant. This point is one of considerable im- portance, for amongst the obstacles, which have stood in the way of the British reformer in Egypt, none is more noteworthy than that both Euro- peanised Egyptians and Levantines are impregnated with French rather than with English habits of thought. The reasons why French civilisation presents a special degree of attraction to Asiatics and Levant- ines are plain. It is, as a matter of fact, more attractive than the civilisations of England and Germany, and, moreover, it is more easy of imita- tion. Compare the undemonstrative, shy EngUsh* CH. XXXVII YOUNG EGYPT 237 man, with his social exclusiveness and insular habits, with the vivacious and cosmopolitan Frenchman, who does not know what the word shyness means, and who in ten minutes is apparently on terms of intimate friendship with any casual acquaintance he may chance to make. The semi -educated Oriental does not recognise that the former has, at all events, the merit of sincerity, whilst the latter is often merely acting a part/ He looks coldly on the Enghshman, and rushes into the arms of the Frenchman. Look, again, to the relative intellectual attrac- tions which the two Western races present. The Englishman is a follower of Bacon without knowing it. Inductive philosophy has become part of his nature. He instinctively rejects a priori reasoning. He will laboriously collect a number of facts before arriving at any conclusion, and, when he has collected his facts, he will limit his conclusion to the precise point which is proved. Compare this frame of mind with that of the quick-witted Frenchman, who, on the most slender basis of fact, will advance some sweeping generalisation with an assurance untempered by any shadow of doubt as to its correctness. Can it be any matter for surprise that the Egyptian, with his light intel- lectual ballast, fails to see that some fallacy often lies at the bottom of the Frenchman's reasoning, or that he prefers the rather superficial brilliancy of the Frenchman to the plodding, unattractive industry of the Englishman or the German ? Look, again, at the theoretical perfection of French administra- tive systems, at their elaborate detail, and at the ^ Shortly after the Franco-German AVar, in defending the French against General Blumenthal, I said, "You must admit. General, that the French are good actors." The sturdy old Gallophobe replied, " It is the only thing they can do. They aie always acting." I do not at all agree with the first part of the distinguished General's view. 'ITi© French can do a great many things besides act welL 238 MODERN EGYPT ft. iv provision which is apparently made to meet every possible contingency which may arise. Compare these features with the Englishman's practical systems, which lay down rules as to a few main points, and leave a mass of detail to individual discretion. The half-educated Egyptian naturally prefers the Frenchman's system, for it is to all outward appearance more perfect and more easy of application. He fails, moreover, to see that the Englishman desires to elaborate a system which will suit the facts with which he has to deal, whereas the main objection to applying French administrative procedures to Egypt is that the facts have but too often to conform to the ready-made system. From whatever point of view the subject be regarded, the same contrast will be found. On the one side, is a damsel possessing attractive, albeit somewhat artificial charms ; on the other side, is a sober, elderly matron of perhaps somewhat greater moral Morth, but of less pleasing outward appearance. The Egyptian, in the heyday of his political and intellectual youth, naturally smiled on the attractive damsel, and turned his back on the excellent but somewhat ill-favoured matron. In some respects it is, for his own sake, greatly to be regretted that he did so. What the Egyptian most of aU requires is, not so much that his mind should be trained, as that his character should be formed. It is certain that a \^ery high tone of morality pervades those admirable educational institutions which spring, Pallas-like, from the fertile brain of tlie \'atican, and most of which, in Egypt, are under French control. It is also certain that those who base their opinion of French character and morals on the light French literature of the day are wholly in error. I believ^e that ij; no country are the domestic virtues more generally CH. xxxvn YOUNG EGYPT 239 cherished than in France. It has, however, to be remembered ^ that the Oriental has a remark- able capacity for assimilating to himself the worst and rejecting the best parts of any European civilisation with which he may be brought in contact. It is not from the best, but rather from the least admirable traits in the French character that those young Egyptians who have been brought under French influences, have generally drawn their moral inspirations. It is not to be supposed that the educated Egyptian fails to note the defects of his European monitors, be they French or English. He often sees those defects clearly enough, and the result not unfrequently is that, even though he may himself become partially Europeanised, he will despise European civilisation. In what respect, he says to himself, are we Egyptians morally inferior to our teachers ? We may be deceitful, untruthful, and unchaste, but we are not one whit worse than those whom we are told to regard as the ultimate product of European civilisation.^ The result is that the Europeanised Egyptian often returns to Egypt in order to become, both by precept and example, an apostle of anti-European ideas. The conservatism of older Moslems, who regard him as a living warning that they should beware of European civilisation, ^ Vide ante, vol. i. p. 59. ' The moral superiority of English over French training is recognised by the Egyptians themselves, and has at times been recognised by culti- vated Frenchmen. Senior (Conversations, etc., vol. i. p. 213) relates the following conversation : " Uekeki/an. It is remarkable that all the Egyptians and Asiatics whom Mehemet Ali sent to England for education came back, like myself and young Stephan, Anglonianiacs ; while all whom he sent to France returned disgusted with Europe. . . . Clot (the founder of the Egyptian School of Medicine). I have niade the same remark. . . . Our students see only bad company in Paris, and are disgusted with it. In London they get, if not into the fashion- able world, at least into a respectable world, infinitely superior in •morals, knowledge, and intelligence to anything in the East." 240 MODERN EGYPT pt. iv becomes stereotyped on observing his behaviour and on hearing his language ; whilst he himself, in spite of his partial Europeanisation, will, with an inconsistency which would be strange were we not dealing with the " Land of Paradox," hate the Europeans quite as much as the less educated sections of his own countrymen. The question of the effect of European, and notably French education on the rising generation of Egyptians has to be considered from another point of view. The tendency of every Egyptian official is to shirk responsibility. He thinks less of what should be done than of acting in such a manner that no personal blame can be attached to himself. This habit of thought makes the Egyptian official instinctively shrink from the British system of administration, for under that system much is left to the discretion of the individual, who is, therefore, obliged to think for himself. He flies for refuge to the French system, and there he finds administrative procedures prescribed which exactly suit his character and habits of thought. He finds that provision is apparently made for everything, to the most minute detail, in a series of elaborate codes. Entrenched behind these codes, the Europeanised Egyptian is, to his joy, relieved in a great degree from the necessity of thinking for himself. Some emergency may, indeed, occur which requires prompt action and the exercise of common sense. The Europeanised Egyptian, however, but too often does not recog- nise emergencies, and he spurns common sense. He refers to some article in his regulations, and maintains that he cannot depart from the provisions of that article by one hair's -breadth. The result may be disastrous, but he is indifferent as to the result ; for, having conformed strictly to his orders, he caimot be blamed by his superiors. The CH. XXXVII YOUNG EGYPT 241 Egyptian official was always predisposed to be an automaton/ Once Europeanised — more especially if he be Gallicised — his automatic rigidity becomes more wooden than it was before. It can scarcely be doubted that, from this point of view, French training has done little to rectify the defects of the Egyptian national character. In everything, it has tended to stereotype the Egyptian predisposition to look to the letter which killeth, and neglect the spirit which giveth life. Scores of cases could be mentioned illustrative of the tendency to which allusion is here made. One or two instances will, however, suffice. A case occurred of a stationmaster declining to send a fire-engine by a train which was about to start, in order to help in putting down a serious fire. He pointed with inexorable logic to the regulations, which did not permit of trucks being attached to that particular train. No exception was to be found in the code, with which he had been furnished, to meet the case of a burning town to which a fire-engine had to be despatched. Again, at one time it was the practice, if an accident occurred in the streets, not to transport the individual who had been injured at once to the hospital, but to leave him lying on the ground, whatever might be his condition, until the proper official had arrived to make a " Proces-verbal " of the facts connected with the accident. On one occasion, a doctor was sent to examine into the condition * It has been conclusively shown by Taine and others that many of the administrative methods generally practised on the continent of Europe are not, as is very commonly supposed, the result of the French Revolution, but that they existed — often under a different form — in pre-Revolutionary days. Similarly, the idea, whicli is somewhat prevalent, that the extreme formalism which characterises Egyptian official life is the result of contact with Europe, though it may be partially correct, does not convey the whole truth. Mr. St. John {Egypt and Mohammed AH, vol. ii. p. 419) gives a remarkable instance of the extreme formalism with which Egyptian official work was con- ducted in his time. VOL. II R 242 MODERN EGYPT pt. iv of a stationmaster, supposed to be insane. On entering the room, he was attacked and nearly strangled by the madman. He was able, after a sharp struggle, to call on two orderhes, who had been present all the time, to seize the man. They saluted and did so. On being asked why they had not interfered sooner, they replied that they had received no orders to that effect. Without doubt, they considered that the struggle on the floor, which they had witnessed, was part of some strange European process, with which they were unfamiliar, for dealing with insane stationmasters.^ I may mention that a subordinate Egyptian official, notably a policeman, regards the prepara- tion of a " Proces- verbal" as a proceeding of peculiar sanctity. It matters little what the docu- ment contains. Provided he can get a "Proc^s- verbal " prepared in due form, the Egyptian official considers that he is free from responsibility, and he is, therefore, happy. Other^dse, he feels that a certain amount of personal responsibility weighs upon him, and he is miserable. This plethora of " Proces - verbaux " has done a good deal to nip in the bud any feeble tendencies towards individualism which might otherwise have been developed. In a word, the French bureaucratic and legal systems, although there is much to be said in their favour when they are carried into execution by a highly civilised and intelligent race such as the French, are little adapted to the formation of either competent officials or useful citizens in a country such as Egypt. Such, therefore, is the Europeanised Egyptian. His intellectual qualities have, of late years, ^ These cases have already been cited in my Report for the year 1903 {Egypt, No. 1, of 190-1, p. 7^)- An endless number of similar illustrations of the tendency to which allusion is made above, might be given. CH. XXXVII YOUNG EGYPT 24;j certainly been developed. His moral attributes have generally been little, if at all, improved by contact with Europe. The old orthodox Moslem is bound hand and foot by ancient custom based on his religion. The Europeanised Egj'ptian is often bound almost as fast by a set of rigid formulas, which he mistakes for the substance, whereas they are in reality but some fortuitous hicidents of European civilisation. Although the description given above holds generally good as regards the class now under discussion, it is to be noted that there are excep- tions, and, moreover, that the exceptions are year by year becoming more numerous. Some of the younger generation of Egyptians are turning into excellent officials, especially those employed under the Department of Justice. In view of the character of the modern Egyptian, it is obviously more easy to develop a certain amount of judicial capacity than it is 'to train good executive officers. The judge merely has to interpret his code. The executive official must of necessity rely to a greater extent on his individual resource and judgment. One point remains to be considered. What was the attitude of the Europeanised Egyptian towards the British reformer ? After what has been already said, it is needless to dilate on this subject. Envy, dislike of British administrative systems, ignorance of the English language,^ jesent- ment at the stand-off manners and at the airs of conscious superiority which the Englishman, some- what unwisely, is prone to give himself, and want of appreciation of the better side of tlie Enghsh character, all drove the Europeanised Egyptian in one direction. With a few exceptions, the whole * This fertile source of misunderstanding is, it may be hoped, rapidly disappearing. The number of young Egyptians who understand Knglish is steadily increasing, as also the number of Britisli officials who speak Arabic. ! 244 MODERN EGYPT pt. iv class was, at the commencement of the British occupation, Anglophobe. It may be doubted whether of late years this Anglophobia has diminished. Indeed, indications are not wanting that, mainly by reason of the misrepresentations of the vernacular press, it has somewhat increased in intensity. It is the duty of the British officials in the service of the Egyptian Government to use their utmost endeavours to mitigate feelings of this description by sympathetic treatment, and by abstaining from passing too harsh a judgment on whatever defects they may find to exist amongst the rising generation of Egyptians. Those defects are the natural outcome of the pecu- liar political conditions under which the country is governed, and of the unhealthy influences to which the young Egyptians are often exposed. CHAPTER XXXVIII THE EUROPEANS Number of Europeans — The Levantines — Their characteristics — The Greelis — Their commercial enterprise — The English — The Army of Occupation — Anglo-Egyptian officials — Feelings entertained by other Europeans towards the English — Summary of the classes friendly and hostile to England. According to the census of 1897, there were at that time about 113,000 Europeans resident in Egypt.^ These 113,000 persons were divided as follows : Greeks ...,,. 38,000 Italians ..... 24,000 French. ..... 14,000 Austrians ..... 7,000 English (including Maltese and other British subjects, as well as the Army of Occupation) 20,000 Other nationalities .... 10,000 Total . . . 113,000 The classification by nationalities, though im- portant in many respects, is misleading to this extent, that when it is said that there are 24,000 Italians, 14,000 Frenchmen, 7000 Austrians, and so on in Egypt, it is not to be supposed that there are that number of Italians, Frenchmen, or Aus- trians in the country possessing the special national ^ There can be no doubt that since the census of 1897 was taken, the number of Europeans in Egypt has largely increased. I have already stated (mde ante, p. 129, note) that the detailed figures of the census taken in 1907 are not yet available. 246 246 MODERN EGYPT pt. iv characteristics, which are generally held to belong to the inhabitants of Italy, France, or Austria. Apart from the fact that there are a large number of protected subjects, who are often Orientals, it is to be observed that in many cases the Frenchman resi- dent in Egypt is only technically a Frenchman, the Italian may in reality be only half an Italian in so far as his national characteristics are concerned, the Austrian is often merely a subject of the Emperor of Austria for purposes of Consular protection and nothing more. For, in truth, many individuals of these and of other nationalities are, above all things, Levantines, and the Levantines, though not a separate nation, possess characteristics of their own which may almost be termed national. Every one who has lived in the Eastern part of the Mediterranean knows what is meant by a Levantine, though a precise definition of tliis term is difficult, if not impossible. The Levantine can, of course, be described as a European resident in the Levant, generally in the Ottoman dominions situated in the Levant. This definition is, how- ever, not satisfactory, for some Europeans may be born and bred in the East and pass all their lives in the Levant, without losing the special character- istics of their country of origin, or acquiring in any considerable degree those of the Levantine. In the case of others, a short residence in the Levant will suffice to produce t}^ical Levantine character- istics. Others, again, already approached so nearly to Levantines in their country of origin, that they may almost be said to have been Levantines before they emigrated to the Levant. In fact, inasmuch as the Levantines are more or less Orientalised Europeans,^ just as Egyptian Moslems educated in * The process of manufacturing Levantines is at least as old as the Crusades. Thus, Mr. Stanley Lane Poole says (S'a/«iym, p. 28): "The early Crusaders, after thirty years' residence in Syria, had become very much assimilated in character aud habits to the people whom they had CH. XXXVIII THE EUROPEANS 247 France are Gallicised Egyptians, they necessarily present every gradation of character, from the European v^ath no trace of the Oriental about him, to the European who is so thorouglily orientalised as scarcely to have preserved any distinctive European characteristics. A considerable number of Levantines lie midway between these two extremes. Starting sometimes with national char- acteristics which bear some resemblance to those of Easterns, they develop those characteristics to a still greater degree by residence in the East. They become semi-orientalised Europeans. If compared with the northern races of Europe, the predomi- nance of the Oriental portion of their characters will come out in strong relief. If, on the other hand, they are compared with the southern Euro- pean races, any process of differentiation will bring out their distinctive Oriental characteristics in a less striking manner. The majority of Levantines are recruited from the southern races of Europe, and, in respect to these more especially, their technical nationality is, from the point of view of the present argument, of slight importance. The particular Consulate at which the Levantine is inscribed is a Aiere accident. He is, above all things, a Levan- tine, though he dislikes to be designated by that appellation ; for, partly because he is aware that the Levantines do not generally bear a high character, partly because he dislikes to merge his national individuality in a cosmopolitan expression, and partly because he is sensible of the material benefits which he derives from his foreign nationality, the Levantine will often develop a specially ardent degree of patriotism for the country which affords him Consular protection. partly conquered, among whom they lived, and whose daughters they did not disdain to marry ; they were growing into Levantines ; they were known as Pullani or Creoles." 248 MODERN EGYPT pt. iv Germans and Englishmen, however long they may reside in the Levant, rarely become typical Levantines. Starting with strongly marked national characteristics, they generally preserve those char- acteristics more or less intact. As a class, they do not differ materially from their fellow-countrymen of the same social standing in Germany or England, The case of the Italians, of whom there are a large number in Eg}^t, is different. Many of the skilled artisans in Egypt, the bricklayers, masons, carpenters, etc., are Italians. They are, as a rule, a steady, industrious race, whose presence is very use- ful to the Egyptians, as it enables the latter to learn various crafts requiring skill in their application. As a body, these Italians do not differ from their countrymen of the same social position in Italy. On the other hand, there are some middle-class Italians, who, with their famihes, have been long resident in Eg}^t, and who may, as a class, be con- sidered representative Levantines. The transition from being Italian to being Levantine is, in these cases, more easy than in the case of the Englishman or the German. Much the same may be said of the Austrians, who do not generally come from Austria proper, but from the neighbourhood of Trieste. Many of these are Jews. Their language is generally not German but Itahan. The French occupy a pecuHar position. The French colony contains every gradation of type, from the most GaUic Gaul to the ultra-Levantinised Levantine. In respect to the latter class, however, the question arises of whether the Frenchman has become Levantinised, or whether the counter- process has not taken place ; whether it is not that the Levantine has become Gallicised. The fact is that both processes are constantly in operation. cH. XXXVIII THE EUROPEANS 249 Next, what are the main characteristics of the Levantines ? There are, of course, many Levan- tines — merchants, professional men, shopkeepers, and others — who are higlily respectable members of society, and who carry on their business upon the same principles as they would adopt were they living at Trieste, Genoa, or Marseilles. But these are not representatives of the class, which is con- jured up in the mind of the Egyptian JNIinister or his British adviser, when the word Levantine is mentioned. It is the misfortune of the Levan- tines that they suffer in reputation by reason of qualities which are displayed by only a small minority of their class. It cannot, in fact, be doubted that amongst this minority are to be found individuals who are tainted with a remark- able degree of moral obliquity. These are the Levantines who regard the Egyptians, from prince to peasant, as their prey. In days now happily past, they brought all their intellectual acuteness, which is of no mean order, to bear on the work of depredation. Whatever national defects they may have possessed in their country of origin, appear to have been enhanced when, on arrival in Egypt, they had to deal with a people who were ignorant, credulous, and improvident, and, there- fore, easily despoiled ; who, by reason of their oviTi low moral standard, seemed, to a perverted mind, in some degree to justify reciprocity of low morals in dealing with them ; and who, being weak and defenceless, invited spoliation at the hands of the unprincipled adventurer armed with all the strength which he drew from intellectual superiority, diplo- matic support, and intimate acquaintance mth all the forms and back-alleys of the Civil Code. This is the class which has to a certain extent made European civilisation stink in the nostrils of the Egyptians. The Levantines of this description 250 INIODERN EGYPT pt. iv have done a small amount of good by introducing European capital on a limited scale into the country. They have done a vast amount of harm by associating the name of European in the minds of the Egyptians with a total absence of scruple in the pursuit of gain. The upper-class Levantine naturally used to consider the upper- class Egyptian as his prey. The lower-class Le\'antine tricked the fellaheen. The Greeks are so numerous that they deserve consideration by themselves. In 1897, there were 38,000 Greeks in Egj^t. The question of who is and who is not a subject of the King of the Hellenes is a never - ending cause of dispute between the Ottoman and Greek Governments. Under what conditions of birth and residence are the Greeks, who were born and bred outside Greece and who have only casually lived in that country, to be considered Greek subjects ? It is needless to dwell on the details of this wearisome question. It will be sufficient to say that, in spite of the resistance of the Egyptian authorities, most Greek-speaking Greeks generally manage to produce sufficient evidence to enable them to claim the privileges attaching to Greek nationality. In Alexandria, which may almost be said to be a Greek town, a gi-eat many influential and highly respectable Greeks are to be found. Their presence in Egypt is an unmixed benefit to the country.^ More than this, many of the smaU ' I wish to insist very strongly on this point. None have suffered more tlian the Greeks from the practice, which is but too common, of coinleiimiiijr a whole class or community because the conduct of certain individuals belonging to it is worthy of condemnation. I have the best reasons for knowing that none regret more than the very numerous high -class Greeks established in Egypt the fact that their national reputation should at times be tiirnished by the behaviour of some individuals belonging to their nation. In spite of the blemishes recorded in these pages, it may be said with truth that the Greeks in Egypt have, as of old, carried high the torch of civilisation in their adopted country. GH. XXXVIII THE EUROPEANS 251 Greek traders are fully deserving of respect. Still the fact remains that a portion of the Greek colony in Egypt consists of low-class Greeks exercising the professions of usurer, drink-seller, etc. The Greek of this class has an extraordinary talent for retail trade. He will risk his life in the pursuit of petty gain. It is not only that a Greek usurer or a bakal (general dealer) is established in almost every village in Egypt ; the Greek pushes his way into the most remote parts of the Soudan and of Abyssinia. Wherever, in fact, there is the smallest prospect of buying in a cheap and selhng in a dear market, there will the petty Greek trader be found. In 1889, I visited Sarras, some thirty miles south of Wadi Haifa. It was at that time the farthest outpost of the Egyptian army, and is situated m. the midst of a howhng wilderness. The post had only been established for a few days. Nevertheless, there I found a Greek already selling sardines, biscuits, etc., to a very limited number of customers, out of a hole in a rock in which he had set up a temporary shop. We may, therefore, give the low-class Greek credit for his enterprising commercial spirit. Nevertheless, his presence in Egypt is often hurtful. Whatever healthy moral and political influences remain untouched after the Turco-Egyptian Pasha, the tyrannical Sheikh, and the fanatical "Alim" have done their worst, these the low-class Greek seeks to destroy. He tempts the Egyptian peasant to borrow at some exorbitant rate of interest, and then, by a sharp turn of the legal screw, reduces him from the position of an allodial proprietor to that of a serf. He undermines that moral quality of which the Moslem, when untainted by European association, has in some degree a speciality. That quality is sobriety. Under Greek action and influence, the Egyptian villagers are taking to 252 MODERN EGYPT pt. iv drink. Mr. Gladstone, in a speech which has become historical, once said that it would be a good thing if the Turks were turned " bag and baggage " out of Europe.^ This may or may not be the case. But there can be no doubt that a counter -proposition of a somewhat similar nature holds good. It would be an excellent thing for Turkey and its dependencies if some of the low- class Greeks, who inhabit the Ottoman dominions, could be turned bag and baggage out of Turkey. Before passing on to a consideration of the sentiments entertained by the Europeans resident in Egypt towards the English reformer, it will be as well to say something of the English themselves. The English in Eg}^t may be divided into three categories, viz. (1) the non-official residents; (2) the army of occupation ; (3) the officials in the Egyptian service. The permanent British colony in Egypt is small. It consists mainly of a few merchants who reside at Alexandria, and who employ a small number of subordinate English agents to watch over their business in the provinces. The greater part of the export trade is in the hands of British firms. The Alexandrian Englishman, like most of his countrymen, is somewhat exclusive. He mixes Uttle in foreign society. The general standard of probity in business matters amongst • Mr. Gladstone was guilty of an unconscious plagiarism. Few people probably know that the expression, as applied to the Turks, originated with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, whose opinions have passed down to posterity as representing the ne p/ua ultra of Turcophilism. Such, however, is the case. Writing to Mr. Canning on September 29, 1821, Lord Stratford said : "As a matter of humanity, I wish with all my soul that the Greeks were put in possession of their whole patri- mony, and that the Sultan was driven, bag and baggage, into the lieart of Asia" (77(« Life of Stratford Canning, vol. i. p. 307). Canon MacCoU says {Fortnightly Rei^iew, June 1808) : " \Vhat Mr. Gladstone proposed was that the Turkish administration should 'all, bag and baggage, clear out '—not ' from Kurope, but from the provinces which they had desolated and profaned.'" The difference does not appear very material. CH. XXXVIII THE EUROPEANS 253 the English in Egypt is high. The Enghsh are, for the most part, eminently fair and reasonable. They never give any trouble. They have the great merit of attending exclusively to their own affairs. During the many years that I was' Consul- General in Egypt, I do not remember an instance in which I was asked by an Englishman resident in Egypt to support any manifestly unfair or pre- posterous claim. The Englishman knows his rights ; he knows that if they are infringed he has his legal remedy, and that it is unnecessary to apply for the support of his Consul- General. I doubt whether the representative of any other Power in Egypt could say the same. Passing to a different stratum, there are a certain number of Englishmen in Egypt, who are employed in various unofficial capacities, and who are generally vigorous, honest, straightforward specimens of humanity, but who in exceptional cases sometimes make the British race unpopular by their bad manners and self-assertion. Their conduct is in this respect highly reprehensible. Nevertheless, taken as a whole, the English dwellers in Egypt are a sturdy, self-respecting, and, therefore, respected race, who do credit to their country of origin, and whose presence is useful to their country of adoption. Little need be said of the army of occupation. The discipline and good conduct of the British army in all its ranks are recognised by the most bitter Anglophobes. The worst that can be said of the soldiers is that some of them disgrace them- selves by getting drunk off the vile liquor supplied to them in the bazaars. From the political point of view, the main characteristic of the British officer is his exclusiveness. In whatever clime he may serve, he carries his uisular habits and national pastimes with him. In Egypt, he rarely mixes in 254 MODERN EGYPT pt. iv any society which is not English, and he abstains from doing so, partly because of his ignorance of any language but his own, and partly because his social habits differ from those of the cosmopolitan society of the Egyptian towns. A\"hat does the Frenchman or Italian care for horse-races, polo, cricket, golf, and all the other quasi -national institutions, which the British officer establishes wherever he goes, whether his residence be in the frigid or the torrid zone ? This exclusiveness has its advantages and also its disadvantages. If a French army had been in Egypt, the officers would have fraternised mth the European residents. They would have been seen sitting outside every cafe. The result would have been, on the one hand, the creation of greater social sympathy between the army and certain classes of the urban population, and, on the other hand, the occurrence of more fi-equent quarrels. The British officer does not attract the sympathy, but he avoids the quarrels. He is respected. On the other hand, he does not excite any lively sentiment of sympathy or friend- ship. On the whole, it may be said that, from the point of view of the politician, the advantages predominate over the disadvantages. Tlie British officers obey orders ; they neither know, nor care to know anything about local politics ; they rarely cause any trouble ; they behave for the most part like English gentlemen. Under all the circum- stances of the case, these are ideal qualities. They are qualities which were appreciated by the most astute of Egyptian statesmen, Xubar Pasha. I was once talking to a Levantine in a Cairo street when a young British officer rode by. ]\Iy friend stopped in the middle of his conversation and said : " Che bella razza ! Come sono forti e puliti I " That was what most struck him — that the British officers were physically strong, and, cu. XXXVIII THE EUROPEANS 255 moreover, that they were washed. I was struck with the expression. I fancy it represents the opinions of a good many Southerners. At a later period of this narrative, the positions held by the British officials in the Egyptian service will be more fully treated. For the present all that need be said is that, being for the most part better linguists, they are generally less exclusive than the officers of the army of occupation. At the same time, the society in which they move is mainly English. The next point to consider is the attitude of the Europeans resident in Egypt towards the English, and more particularly towards the small band of Englishmen who were instrumental in carrying out the work of Egyptian reform. Enough has been already said to show that there is little social sympathy between the English, and any class of Europeans in Egypt. The best amongst the Europeans respect the British officials ; they admire their good qualities — their honesty, their energy, and above all their tenacity. But few like them. Moreover, few understand them. To the European resident in Egypt the British officials were, in the first instance at all events, somewhat of an enigma. Being generally accus- tomed to Continental official procedure, they could not understand a member of a bureaucracy who rather despised forms and had no bureaucratic tendencies, and who, moreover, did his work in an unobtrusive way without any unnecessary fuss. But as the occupation was prolonged, and the effects of British predominance became year by year more apparent, the ways of the British official became better understood. The usurer, the drink - seller, and others of the same species, naturally looked askance at the Englishman and his reforms from the very 256 MODERN EGYPT ft. iv first. Though these classes recognised that the presence of a British army in Egypt afforded security to their Uves and properties, and though they were aware that, in the event of an ebullition of Moslem fanaticism, they would be the first to suffer, still they would not readily forgive the Englishman for standing between them and their prey ; they could not forget that, had British influence not been predominant, the rate of interest would have been quadrupled ; they, therefore, at one time looked back regretfully to those halcyon days before the British occupation, when they were able to plunder the Egyptian Government at will, and when they and the Egyptian Government agreed together to plunder the Egyptians. The political sympathies of the various nation- alities count also for a good deal in the formation of European public opinion as regards the action of the British officials in Egypt. On these, I need not dwell. Inasmuch as they depend on the occurrence of political events outside Egypt, they naturally varied greatly during the period of my tenure of office. In this, and in the four preceding chapters, an attempt has been made to describe the principal elements of Egyptian society with special reference to the attitude which each section assumed towards the English reformer, more especially in the early days of the occupation. It is now possible to marshal the opposing forces and to distinguish between friends and foes. Some were avowedly hostile. Some vacillated between lukewarm friend- ship and covert hostility. Others, constituting a large numerical majority, were friendly, but dared not give expression to their friendship, and were, moreover, powerless to help the cause of their benefactors. Lastly, a small minority were friendly oH.xxxvm THE EUROPEANS 257 and had the courage of their opinions, but the occasion for asserting them was generally wanting. The Turco - Egyptian Pashas, the jMoslem hierarchy, the Europeanised Egyptians, and the French were, in the first instance, for various reasons hostile. The squirearchy, the Copts, the Syrians, and the Levantines hovered between friendship and hostility, being torn by conflicting sentiments and driven hither and thither by every passing breeze of self-interest. The mass of the population, that is to say, the fellaheen, were certainly from the very first friendly, but they were politically speechless, and, moreover, were so credulous and ignorant that, had they attempted to make their voices heard, they would just as hkely as not have fallen into the hands of frothy demagogues or unprincipled news- paper editors, who would have made them say the opposite of what they really thought. A small body of respectable and intelligent Europeans were friendly, but their friendship was platonic. They took little part in local politics, and were, for the most part, mere spectators of what was passing on the political stage. It will be seen that the hostile, quasi -hostile: and apathetic forces, though less numerous, were more powerful than those who were friendly. On the one side, stood the stolid conservatism of the East, religious prejudice, ignorance, international jealousy, and a number of powerful vested interests, some of an ignoble type. On the other side, stood the force derived from an honest endeavour to secure the well - being of a whole population, which had been trodden under foot for centuries. The battle seemed in some respects unequal. Vet the Englishman took heart of grace. He proceeded with caution and he won the day. VOL. II s 258 MODERN EGYPT pt. iv He felt from the first that he was fighting in a good cause. He liad the goodwill of intelligent and impartial Europe. He had a mili- tary force behind him to prevent any premature upset of the whole machine. He was able to employ agents of experience trained in all the intricacies of Oriental government. Ten years after the battle of Tel-el-Kebir a competent observer was able to write : " Even our superb administra- tion of India is hardly a brighter jewel in our imperial crown than the marvellous regeneration of Egypt." ^ More than this. As the occupation continued, a great change came over the opinions of various sections of Egyptian society. The benefits conferred by the exercise of British influence were, indeed, so palpable that they could not be denied. Amongst both European and Eg}^tian society, all but a very small class ranged themselves, either actively or passively, on the side of England.^ Notably, both ItaUan and Greek sympathy was on many occasions displayed in a very remarkable degree. The representatives of the various Christian conmiunities resident in Egypt seized every possible opportunity for ex- pressing their friendliness to England. With a few exceptions, even the Moslems acquiesced in the policy of reform. The open or covert hostility of various sections of society in Eg}^t has not been the only, neither, indeed, has it been the principal difficulty which has beset the path of the English reformer. Under » Cairo, p. 243. * I wrote tliese remarks in 190,3, and, in spite of any appearances to the contrary, my conviction is that they still (1907) lioid good. During the last three or four years, a strong and very legitimate desire to take a greater part than heretofore in the administration of tiie country has made itself felt among intelligent Egyptians, hut my belief is that the number of those who would really wish the reforming work of England in Egypt to be brought prematurely to a close still comprise a "very small," and, 1 may sJiA, a wholly unrepresentative, class. CH. XXXVIII THE EUROPEANS 259 the combined influences of rival diplomatists, bondholders, foreign jurists, and others, who have from time to time borne a part in Egyptian affairs, a variety of fantastic institutions grew up, many of which were originally devised to check misgovern- ment, but wliich, under altered circumstances, have, as a matter of fact, acted as powerful obstacles to reform. An endeavour will now be made to guide the reader through some of the intricate windings of this administrative labyrinth. CHAPTER XXXIX THE MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT Nature of the machinery — Parts of the machine — 1. The Suttan — The Firman of 1892 — The Sinai Peninsula — 2. The Khedive — Rescript of August 28, 1878 — Constitutionalism of Tewfik Pasha — 3. The Ministers — ^The Departments — Position of an Egyptian Minister — 4. The Organic Law of May 1, 1883 — The Provincial Councils — The Leg'islative Council — The Legislative Assembly. If any one unacquainted with mechanics enters a factory where a quantity of steam machinery is at work, he is for a moment deafened with the noise, and his first impression will not improbably be one of surprise that any delicate bit of workmanship can result from the apparent confusion which he sees before him. Gradually, however, he comes to understand that the rate at which each wheel turns is regulated to a nicety, that the piston of the steam-engine cannot give a stroke by one hairs- breadth shorter or longer than that which it is intended to give, that the strength with which the hammer is made to descend is capable of the most perfect adjustment, that safety-valves and a variety of other checks and counterchecks exist which are sufficient guarantees against accident, and that, generally, each portion of the machinery is adapted to perform a certain specified bit of work and is under such perfect control that it cannot interfere with the functions of any other portion. He will then no longer be surprised that, with a little care in oiling the difTcrent parts of the machinery, a 260 CH. XXXIX THE GOVERNMENT 261 highly finished piece of workmanship is eventually produced. If, on the other hand, he finds on examination that the confusion is even worse than at first sight appeared, that the movement of each wheel is eccentric in the highest degree, that the piston is hable at any moment to stop working, that there is no adequate machinery for adjusting the strength of the stroke to be given by the hammer, that safety-valves and other guarantees against accident are wanting, that the work to be performed by each separate portion is uncertain and variable, that some portions are of the latest and most improved patterns whilst others are old, rusty, and obsolete, that a strong centrifugal force is con- stantly at work impelling the different parts of the machinery to fly out of their own orbits, and that a mistake on the part of the engineer in not removing any small particle of grit betimes, or not applying the right amount of oil at the right moment, may bring about a collapse of the whole fabric, — he will then no longer look for the production of any highly finished article. Indeed, he will be surprised that the mechanical chaos before him is capable of producing any article at all. The Egyptian administrative system bears to the administration of any higlily civilised European State much the same relation as the second factory described above bears to the first. In Europe, we know what a despotism means, and we know what constitutional government means. The words absolute monarchy, limited monarchy, republic, parliamentary government, federal council, and others of a like nature, when applied to the government of any country, will readily convey to an educated European a general idea of how the government of the particular country in question 262 MODERN EGYPT pt. iv is conducted. But the political dictio!iary may be ransacked in v^ain for any terse description of the Government of Egypt. In the first place, tliat Government is, in reality, not a Government at all. Nubar Pasha frequently said : " Ce nest pas un Gouvernement ; c'est une administration." This is quite true. The Khedive is deprived by the Egyptian constitutional charter of all rights of external sovereignty, neither does he possess to the full those rights of mternal sovereignty which are inherent in the rulers of all independent, and even of some semi-independent states. In the second place, the manner in which the legislative power is exercised in the Ottoman dominions, of which Egypt forms a part, is unique. We readily ufiderstand what a Ukase issued by the Czar of Russia means. An intelligent foreigner will at once seize on what is meant when it is said that the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland has given his assent to a Bill which has passed through both Houses of Parlia- ment. But the Khedive's power is dissimilar to that of either a despotic or a constitutional ruler. He cannot, on his own authority, issue any Decree the provisions of which will be binding on all the inhabitants of Egypt. Legislation has to be conducted by diplomacy. The President of the United States and the King of Sweden have to give their consent before the provisions of any new law can be applied to the subjects of the Emperor of Austria or the King of the Belgians, for in legislation by diplomacy unanimity amongst the diplomatic legislators is required ; otherwise no legislation can take place. The system, as Lord Salisbury once wrote to me, "is like the liherum veto of the Polish Diet, without the resource of cutting off the dissentient's head." SH. XXXIX THE GOVERNMENT 263 In the third place, the executive power is so disseminated as to render it impossible to say where it resides. In certain matters, the Khedive and his Ministers are practically vested with despotic power. .In others, their hands are tied to a greater extent than those of the Governors of the most democratic States. Moreover, it often happens that, although the text of the document which confers some special power may be clear, it will be found, on closer inspection, that some international or other hgament exists, which is apparently so flimsy as to be only visible to the eye of a trained diplomatist, but which is in reality of so tough a texture as to place an effectual obstacle in the way of the practical exercise of the power. In the fourth place, the judicial system is a tangle of conflicting jurisdictions. The law is at times apphed by a body of foreign judges who, being free from the restraints of any legislature, are practically a law unto themselves. At times, again, the law is administered by Eg}^tian judges. Each Consul judges his own countrymen for crimmal offences according to the laws of his own country, whilst close by the Kadi is endeavouring to settle some dispute over a will according to the rusty principles laid down thirteen centuries ago by Mohammed. The complicated machinery, whose general nature is described above, will now be explamed in detail. It will be as well, in the first instance, to enimierate the parts of the machine. They are as follows : — 1. The Sultan. 2. The Khedive. 3. The Ministers. 4. The Legislative Council and As- sembly. 5. The superior European officials, mostly British, who are attached in various capacities to the different JNIinistries. The above constitute the Turkish, Egyptian, and 264 MODERN EGYPT pt. iv Anglo -Egyptian, as opposed to the International portions of the administration. The International, or, as they are usually called, the IMixed Administra- tions were created in virtue of arrangements made, from time to time, between the ^Egyptian Govern- ment and the Powers. Neither their functions nor their constitution can be changed without the assent of the Powers. In 1882, when the British occupation commenced, they were as foUows : — 1. The Commission of the Public Debt. 2. The Railway Board, under which was also placed the administration of the Telegraph Department and of the Port of Alexandria. 3. The Daira Ad- ministration. 4. The Domains Administration. Lastly, justice is administered by the following law-courts : — 1. The Mixed Tribunals. 2. The Native Tribunals. 3. The Consular Courts. 4. The Mehkemeh Sheraieh. 1. The Sultan, The relations between the Sultan and the Khedive are laid down in a variety of Firmans dating from 1841 to 1892. Of these, the most recent is naturally the most important. It was issued to Abbas II. on March 27, 1892. Save in respect to one point, to which allusion will presently be made, this Firman does not differ from that of August 7, 1879, granted to Tewfik Pasha. The main provision of the Firman of 1892 is that under certain restrictions, the civil and financial administration of Egypt is confided to the Khedive Abbas II. and his male descendants taken in order of primogeniture. The restrictions are as follows : — In the first place, it is laid down that all Egyptians are Ottoman subjects. The taxes are to be levied in the name of the Sultan. There can, therefore, conformably with the Firman, be no CH. XXXIX THE GOVERNMENT 265 such thing as a separate Egyptian State, or a separate Egyptian nationality. In the second place, it is taken for granted that the Khedive has no right to make political Treaties with foreign states. Conventions dealing with com- mercial affairs, or with those which relate solely to matters of purely internal administration, may, however, be made. Mr. James Scott, the lecturer at the Khedivial School of Law, says : " In regard to the right of the Egyptian Government to make International Conventions, it would appear that it has power to make Conventions in reference to every question except the cession of territory, or the making of peace or war."^ As a natural result of this political relationship, the Khedive has no right to appoint a diplomatic repre- sentative to any European court. Further, as a general rule, when the European Powers meet in conclave, Egypt is represented by the Ottoman delegate. Separate Egyptian representation has, however, been allowed at Conferences assembled to deal with special subjects, in which Egypt is interested. It is not easy to lay down any very precise rule on this subject. Thus, when, in 1884, a Conference was assembled in London to consider the financial affairs of Egypt, the Egyptian Government were denied any separate representation. Musurus Pasha, the Turkish Am- bassador in London, sat, and often slept at the Council table,^ whilst the Egyptian delegates, • The Law affecting Foreigners in Egypt, as the Result of the Capitulations, p. 145. 2 I cannot refrain from relating a somewhat amusing incident which happened at this Conference. At that time, all the Powers, except perhaps Italy, were acting in concert against England. England was defending Egyptian interests. Count Munster proposed that the quarantine question, in which Germany at that moment took much interest, should be discussed. Lord Granville pointed out that, if once the Conference went beyond the limits for which it had been assembled, there was no reason why every description of Eastern question should not be brought within its cognisance. Thus, an undesirably wide 266 MODERN EGYPT ft. iv Tigrane Pasha and Blum Pasha, occupied a side table, and were not allowed to take any direct part in the discussions. On the other hand, at the Conference, which met at Venice in 1892 to discuss quarantine affairs, the Egyptian Government were accorded the right of separate representation to this extent, that the Egyptian delegates could speak but could not vote. A further step in advance was made at the Sanitary Conference held at Paris in 1904. The Egyptian delegates were accorded the right of voting in Committee, but not at the plenary sittings of the Commission. In the third place, the Khedive cannot abandon to a third party any of the territorial rights of the Sultan. In respect of this matter, theory and fact came into collision when the Italians occupied Massowah. In the fourth place, traditional Turkish jealousy of Egypt is shown by the provision that the Egyptian army cannot, under ordinary circum- stances, exceed 18,000 men. If, however, Turkey is at war, the Egyptian army may be called upon to fight in the cause of the Sultan, in which case it may be increased according to the requirements of the moment. Following on the same order of field would be opened up for discussion. The French and Russian representatives pointed out that no dang-er of this sort was to be feared, for that no one wished to raise any other question save that of quarantine. Tlie question was put to the vote, which proceeded on what ma)' be termed strictly party lines, until it came to the turn of Musurus Pasha. A true emblem of the country which he represented, Musurus Pasha was fast asleep, and had heard nothing of the discussion which led to the vote. He was awakeneil, and was informed that he had to vote on the question of wliether quarantine matters should or should not be brought before the Conference. He was at the time acting in general concert witli tlie anti-Knglish j)arty, but, as he had not been told beforehand wliat he had to do, he gave utterance to a perfectly independent opinion. " Parfaitement," he said, "je suis de cet avis ; mais alors j'ai bcaucoup d'autres questions que je voudrais porter a la coniiaissance de la Conference." Lord Granville had found an unconscious and involuntary ally. He curried his point. (Quarantine affairs were not discussed. jH. XXXIX THE GOVERNMENT 267 ideas, it is provided that the Khedive cannot construct any ironclads {bdtiments hlindcs) without the authority of the Sultan. The Turkish flag is to be the Egyptian flag. The distinctive marks of mihtary rank are to be identic in the two armies. The Khedive may grant the rank of Colonel to military, and that of Sanieh (second-class Bey) to civil officials, but he may not confer any higher titles. In the fifth place, the coinage of Egypt is to be issued in the name of the Sultan. In return for concessions made at various times by the Sultans, Ismail Pasha undertook to pay a Tribute of £682,000 a year to the Porte.' The original sum paid in 1841 by JNlehemet Ali was £377,000, but under the combined influence of ambitious Khedives and of impecunious Sultans, the figure was nearly doubled at subsequent periods. It has been already stated that, save in respect to one point, the Firman of 1892 was a repro- duction of that of 1879. It will be as well to allude briefly to the exception. The Firman of 1879 laid down that the Khedivate of Egypt was to be " tel qu'il se trouve forme par ses anciennes hmites et en comprenant les territoires qui y ont ^te annexes." When the Firman of 1892 was in course of preparation, the British Ambassador at Constantinople was assured that it was identic with that of 1879. There w^as, however, reason to believe that this statement was incorrect. The Porte had always been sensitive as regards European interference in or near the Hedjaz. Indeed, the law allowing foreigners to acquire real property in the Ottoman dominions forbids any European to settle in the Hedjaz. * Practically the whole of the Tribute is mortgaged to the Ottoman bondholders. 268 MODERN EGYPT pt. iv More than this, the Sultan's suspicions had been aroused by two recent incidents. One was tliat Turkish misgovernment had produced a revolt in the province of the Yemen, which was, without a shadow of foundation, attributed to British intrigue. The second was that a well-intentioned German enthusiast, named Friedmami, of Jewish origin, was, at the moment when the Firman was under discussion, endeavouring to establish a settlement of some couple of dozen Jews, who had been expelled from Russia, on the eastern shore of the Gulf of Akaba. This was suspicious. INIoukhtar Pasha pointed out that the Jews had always been waiting for a Messiah to reconquer Jerusalem, and that, without doubt, they would think he had now appeared in the person of Mr. Friedmami. It was not difficult to convince Moukhtar Pasha that Mr. Friedmann was devoid of any such pretensions.^ But the suspicions of the Sultan were not so easily calmed. The result was that the Firman laid down the Egyptian frontier as drawn from Suez to El-Arish. The Peninsula of Sinai, which had been administered by the Khedives of Egypt for the last forty years, would thus have reverted to Turkey. It was undesirable to bring Turkish soldiers down to the banks of the Suez Canal. When, therefore, the Firman arrived, the British Government interposed and placed a veto on its promulgation. After a short dela} , the Grand N^izier telegraphed to the Khedive accepting a proposal, which had been offered to the Sultan some weeks previously, but which His Imperial Majesty had then refused to entertain.^ Under * Mr. Friedmann may be known to some Englishmen as the author of a history of Anne Boleyn. ^ 'I'he settlement of this question was in a great measure due to the skill with which the negotiations at Constantinople were conducted by the late Sir Edmund Fane, who was at the time in charge of the Embassy. CH. XXXIX THE GOVERNMENT 269 this arrangement, the frontier of Egypt was drawn from El-Arish to the head of the Gulf of Akaba. The incident was thus for the time being termin- ated, and tlie Firman was promulgated with all customary pomp. Occasion was taken to lay down again the prmciple that "no alteration could be made in the Firmans regulating the relations between the Sublime Porte and Egypt without the consent of Her Britannic JNIajesty's Government." In 1905, another and more determined effort was made by the Sultan to occupy the Sinai Peninsula, but after a brief, and somewhat stormy negotiation, the arrangement made in 1892 was confirmed. Shortly afterwards, the Turco-Egyptian frontier was delimitated by a Joint Commission. Such, therefore, are the official relations between the Sultan and the Khedive. From the observa- tions which have been made in the course of this narrative, it will have been gathered that the constant endeavour of the Sultan has been to encroach on the rights of the Khedive. On the other hand, the sentiments of the ruling classes in Egypt towards the Sultan may be described as a compound of fear, religious sympathy, and political dislike. Which of these sentiments is predominant depends on the fleeting circumstances of the moment. 2. The Khedive. It was explained in the first part of this work how an unwilling recognition of the principle of ministerial responsibility was wrung from Ismail Pasha. Ismail's Rescript of August 28, 1878,^ was, indeed, violated almost immediately after its issue. Nevertheless, it forms to this day the JMagna Charta of Egypt. Naturally enough, more depends on the spirit * Vide ante, vol. i. p. 62. 270 MODERN EGYPT ft. iv in which the Rescript is applied than on the terms of the document itself. By a fortunate accident, Ismail Pasha was succeeded by a Khedive who had a natural turn for constitutionahsm. Tewfik Pasha acted up to the spirit of his father's declara- tions. He asserted his legitimate prerogatives, but he governed " through and with his Council of Mmisters." The terms of the Rescript are, how- ever, sufficiently elastic to enable all the most objectionable abuses of personal government to be re-established without any apparent violation of the letter of Ismail Pasha's declaration. So long as the British occupation lasts, a solid guarantee exists that any tendency towards the re-establish- ment of a bad form of personal government will be checked before disastrous consequences ensue. 3. The Ministers. The Egyptian administrative machine is divided into seven Departments, over each of which a Minister presides. These are Foreign AHairs, Finance, Justice, War, Pubhc Works, Education, and the Interior. The Post Office, the Customs, and the Light- houses are under the Financial Department. The Sanitary Department and the Prisons are attached to the Interior. The Wakfs (religious endowments) are administered by a Director- General, who in practice takes his orders direct from the Khedive. The proceedings of the Council are conducted partly in Arabic and partly in French, the latter language being em})loyed to suit the convenience of those European officials who have a right to be present at the meetings of Council, and of Egyptian Ministers^ who are not acquainted with the Arabic language. * E.g. Nubar and Ti^raiie Paslias. CH. XXXIX THE GOVERNMENT 271 The position of an Egyptian Minister is difficult and delicate. There are usually in his Department one or more high European officials, who are subordinate to him. The ideal state of things would be if the INIinister showed no jealousy of his subordinate, worked cordially with him, followed his advice when it was sound, and stated his objec- tions intelligently when he thought it was question- able ; and if, on the other hand, the European official was careful never to be aggressive, or to press unduly for the adoption of his views in doubtful cases. It has not always been easy to find Egyptian Ministers who will carry out the first, or Europeans who will carry out the second part of this pro- gramme. Nevertheless, the system has on the whole worked smoothly. More especially of late years, the relations between the Egyptian Ministers and their British coadjutors have been most cordial and friendly. 4. The Organic Law of May 1, 1883. Briefly stated, the provisions of the Organic Law of May 1, 1883, which was framed under Lord Dufferin's auspices, are as follows : — A Provincial Council, composed of from eight to three members, according to the size of the province, is established in each Moudirieh. The Moudir is the President. The functions of these Councils are to deal with local matters, such as the alignment of roads and canals, the establishment of markets, etc. The total number of Provincial Councillors is seventy. When we are liberal in Egypt, we do not content ourselves with half- measures. The members of the Council are elected by universal suffi-age. The Legislative Council is composed of thirty members. Of these, fourteen, including the 272 MODERN EGYPT m. iv Tresident, are named by the Egyptian Government. Of the remainder, fourteen are elected by the Pro- vincial Councils from amongst their own members, one is elected by the town of Cairo, and one by Alexandria and some other less important towns. No Law or Decree " portant reglement d'adminis- tration publique" can be promulgated without its having been previously submitted to the Council. The Government are not obhged to adopt the views of the Council, but, in the event of their not doing so, the reasons for the rejection must be com- municated to the Council. " L'exposition de ces motifs ne pent donner lieu a aucune discussion." The Budget has to be submitted to the Council, who may "emettre des avis et des vceux sur chaque chapitre du Budget." The Government are, however, not obliged to conform to any views which may be expressed by the Council in connec- tion with the Budget, nor may tlie latter discuss any financial charge incumbent on the Egyptian Treasury, which results from an international arrangement. The Egyptian Ministers may take part in the discussions of the Council, or may cause themselves to be represented by any high functionaries of their respective Departments. The Legislative Assembly consists of eighty-two members, viz. : The six Ministers, the thirty members of the Legislative Council, and forty-six delegates who are elected by the population. Certain (juali- fications are necessary in order to become a candidate for election to the Assembly. The candidate must be not less than thirty years old, he must be able to read and write, and he must pay direct taxes to the amount of not less than £E.30 a year. No new direct tax can be imposed without the approval of the Assembly. The Assembly must also be consulted about any public loans, about the con- struction of canals and railways, and about the CH. XXXIX THE GOVERNMENT 273 classification of lands in connection with the pay- ment of the land-tax. The Assenibl} may also spontaneously express its views on all economic, administrative, and financial questions. As in the case of the Legislative Council, the Government are not under any obligation to adopt the opinions of the Assembly in such matters, but the reasons for not adopting them must be stated. The Assembly must meet at least once in two years. The public are not admitted to the sittings either of the Council or of the Assembly. In the last Report I wrote before leaving Egypt * I expressed myself favourably to the proposal that reporters should be admitted to the sittings of the Council. If this proposal encounters opposition, it will come, not from any European authority, but from the members of the Council themselves. I have reason to believe that, amongst these, a good deal of difference of opinion exists as to the desirability of effecting this reform. Besides these institutions, the Organic Law of May 1, 1883, provided for the establishment of a Council of State (Conseil d'Etat) whose organisa- tion and functions were to be explained in a subsequent Decree. This institution was borrowed from France. Its alleged object was to prepare draft laws for submission to the legislature. When I arrived in Egypt, in September 1883, I found that the formation of the Council of State was a burning question. It very soon became apparent that, under cover of this institution, international government was to be introduced into every branch of the Egyptian administration. The discussion went on for several months until, on January 19, 1884, I informed Lord Granville that the Council of State would be a useless and expensive body. Nubar Pasha was of the same opinion. Egypt 1 Egypt, No. 1 of 1907, p. 29. VOL. II T 274 MODERN EGYPT ft. iv was thus mercifully saved from this particular form of international plague. Such, therefore, are the constitution and func- tions of the Egyptian Houses of Parliament. Lord DufFerin's law was conceived in a liberal and statesmanlike spirit. The leading idea was to give the Egyptian people an opportunity of making their voices heard, but at the same time not to bind the executive Government by parlia- mentary fetters, which would have been out of place in a country whose political education was so little advanced as that of Egypt. The question of the extension of representative institutions in Egypt has recently formed the subject of much public discussion. I do not propose to deal with this question at any length. The main object of this work, which will, I fear, extend to greater length than I originally intended, is to narrate the history of the past, rather than to discuss questions which now occupy the attention of the public, and of the responsible Egyptian authorities. Moreover, my views on this particular issue have already been fully and publicly ex- pressed.* My remarks will, therefore, be very brief. In the first place, I vdsh to say that Lord Dufferin was under no delusion as to the time which would elapse, and as to the difficulties which would have to be encountered before free institu- tions could take root in the somewhat uncongenial soil of Egypt. All he hoped to do was " to erect some sort of barrier, however feeble, against the intolerable tyranny of the Turks." He hoped that, "under British superintendence," the legislative bodies which he created "might be fostered, and educated into fairly useful institutions, proving a * Vide, inter alia, Egypt, No. 1 of 1906, pp. 11-13 ; Egypt, No. 1 of 1907, pp. 3-8, 26-d2, and 66 ; and Egypt, No. 3 of 1907. CH. XXXIX THE GOVERNMENT 275 convenient channel through which the European element in the Government might obtain an insight into the inner mind and the less obvious wants of the native population." ^ There cannot be a shadow of doubt that, far from considering that progress had been objectionably slow, Lord DufFerin was not merely gratified, but also some- what astonished at the extent to which, up to the time of his death, the services of the institutions, of which he was the creator, had been utilised. Next, I have to observe that, if anything is to be done in the direction of a further development of the institutions created in 1883, by far the wisest course will be to begin at the bottom of the legislative ladder. " It is certain," Lord Dufferin very truly said in his Report, " that local self-government is the fittest preparation and most convenient stepping-stone for anything approaching to a constitutional regime." During the last twenty- four years, a good deal more has been done in the way of developing local self-government than many of those who write on Egyptian affairs seem to be aware of.^ In many of the most important provincial towns. Mixed Municipalities — that is to say, municipal bodies of which some of the members are European and others are Egyptian — have been estabHshed. The difficulty of extending the system lies in the fact that whilst, on the one hand, no very great or rapid progress can be made unless the JNIujiicipal Commissioners are invested with certain powers of local taxation, on the other hand, no local taxes can be imposed on Europeans without the consent of the Powers. Hence, until the regime of tlie * These passages are quoted from a letter addressed to me by Lord Dufferiu. It is given in Sir Alfred Lyall's Life of the Marquis of Dufferin, vol. ii. p. 260. * This branch of the subject is more fully treated in my Report for the year 1906. See Egypt, No. 1 of 1907, pp. 29-32. 276 MODERN EGYrT ft. iv Capitulations is modified, it will not be possible to create Mixed Municipalities in any towns unless the whole of the population are willing to submit to a system of voluntary taxation. In a large number of other towns, Local Com- missions have been appointed who administer the funds placed at their disposal by the Egyptian Government. It is, I think, in the direction of increasing the numbers and extending the powers of the Munici- palities and Local Commissions that the principal development of local self-government is, in the near future, to be anticipated. Care, however, will have to be taken in dealing with this matter. One of the greatest errors into which Europeans employed in the East are liable to fall is to imagine that Orientals are as much impressed as they are them- selves with the necessity of speedily providing roads, drains, lighting, and all the other parapher- nalia of civilisation. The present race of Egyptians are, indeed, willing enough to profit by all these things, if they are provided for them from the pro- ceeds of general taxation, but the crucial ques- tion is whether they are themselves willing to pay additional taxes in order to attain these objects. They have not, up to the present time, shown much disposition to do so. It will be wise, therefore, not to force the pace. It should always be remembered that what the mass of tlie popula- tion in a backward Eastern country care for above almost all things is that taxation sliould be light. As regards the Provincial Councils, a detail which slipped into the Organic Law of 1883 — very possibly without its effect being fully realised — has done a good deal to nnpair their utility. It was hiid down tliat no I'rovincial Council could meet without being convoked by the Moudir, and that the latter could not convoke the Council without the CH. XXXIX THE GOVERNMENT 277 issue of a Khedivial Decree, laying down both the time and duration of the meeting. The practical re- sult of this arrangement has been that the Councils have never met more than once a year. The time has certainly come when the whole of this question may usefully be considered. One of the last pro- posals I made before leaving Egypt ^ was that the Provincial Councils should be reorganised, their powers somewhat increased, and that steps should be taken to carry out more fully what was unques- tionably Lord DufFerin's intention, viz. that the Councils should be real working bodies, acting as advisers to the Moudir. Sir Eldon Gorst has this matter in hand, and will, I do not doubt, with the help of the British and Egyptian officials, be able to devise a scheme suitable to the requirements and present condition of the country. The question of whether the powers and con- stitution of the Legislative Council may advan- tageously be changed is one of far greater difficulty. As I have already said, I do not propose to discuss it at length. I will, therefore, only say that whilst I am not prepared to maintain that some cautious steps in this direction might not before long be prudently taken, I am very strongly of opinion that any attempt to confer full parliamentary powers on the Council would, for a long time to come, be the extreme of folly and would be highly detrimental to the true interests of the Egyptians themselves. The facts that many of the members of the Council are men of unquestionable honesty and intelligence, and that some are personal friends , of my own, cannot blind me to the fact that, as a whole, the Council, — as would, indeed, be the case with any similar body which could, under present circumstances, be constituted in Egypt, — possesses two great defects. » See Egypt, No. 1 of 1907, pp. 29-32. 278 MODERN EGYPT pt. iv The first is one which they share with repre- sentative bodies in some other countries. It is that, acting under pubHc pressure, they are too apt to propose important changes in tlie fiscal system, and, at the same time, to advocate large additional expenditure on public objects, without sufficient con- sideration of the financial results which would ensue were effect given to their proposals. It should never be forgotten that any extension of repre- sentative institutions, which was obtained at the risk of again plunging Egypt into all the financial embarrassment from which the country has been so hardly and so recently rescued, would be far too dearly bought. The second defect, which in the eyes of any one acquainted with the past history of modern Egypt is extremely pardonable, is that the most enlightened members of the Council have not, as yet, acquired all those qualities necessary to give them the moral courage to assert their true opinions fearlessly. Notably, many of them are terrorised by the local press. To the European mind, it may seem a con- tradiction in terms to say that freedom of speech is checked by the freedom of the press. But in the Land of Paradox all things are possible. I have no doubt whatever that a large number — probably a majority — of the members of the Legislative Council would welcome the enactment of a rigorous press law as a measure calculated to free them from the moral shackles which now hamper their liberty of speech and action. Of all the institutions created by Lord Dufferin, the Legislative Assembly has, in practice, turned out to be the least useful and efficient. It was, and still is, too much in advance of the require- ments and political education of the country. No real harm would be done if it were simply abolished, and, indeed, the cause of representative government CH. XXXIX THE GOVERNMENT 279 would, I believe, benefit if, simultaneously with its abolition, the Legislative Council were re- organised, and its powers somewhat increased. Without doubt, however, the adoption of this course would be regarded by many — erroneously, in my opinion — as a retrograde measure. It ma)', therefore, be politically desirable not to entertain the idea. In that case, I hold that, for the time being, the Legislative Assembly should be left alone. I deprecate any attempt to enlarge its powers, and I think it would be extremely difficult to amend its constitution. The purely Egyptian portion of the machinery of government has now been described. This part of the machinery would, however, never get into motion were it not impelled by some strong motive power. That motive power is furnished by the British officials in the service of the Egyptian Government. The special functions of these officials will be described in the next chapter. CHAPTER XL THE BRITISH OFFICIALS Qualifications required of an Ang-lo-E^yptian official — Positions of the civil and military officials — The French in Tunis — The Financial Adviser — Sir Edg^ar Vincent — Tlie Judicial Adviser — History of his appointment — Sir Raymond West — Justice under Eg-yptian management — Sir John Scott — The Public Works Department — Sir Colin Scott-Moncrieif — Sir William Garstin — The Financial Secretary — Blum Pasha — Lord Milner — Sir Eldon Gorst — Sub- Departments of Finance — The Interior — Public Instruction — European and Egyptian officials. It is related that a lady once asked Madame de Stael to recommend a tutor for her boy. She described the sort of man she wished to find. He was to be a gentleman with perfect manners and a thorough knowledge of the world ; it was essential that he should be a classical scholar and an accom- plished linguist ; he was to exercise supreme authority over his pupil, and at the same time he was to show such a degree of tact that his authority was to be unfelt ; in fact, he was to possess almost every moral attribute and intellectual faculty which it is possible to depict, and, lastly, he was to place all these qualities at the service of Madame de Stael's friend for a very low salary. The witty Frenchwoman listened with attention to her friend's list of indispensable qualifications and eventually replied : *' INla chere, je comprends parfaitement bien le caractcre de I'homme qu'il vous faut, mais je dois vous dire que si je le trouve, je I'epouse." 280 CH.XL THE BRITISH OFFICIALS 281 This story is applicable to the qualifications demanded of an ideal Anglo-Egyptian official. The Anglo-Egyptian official must possess some technical knowledge, such as that of the engineer, the accountant, or the lawyer ; otherwise, he will be unable to deal with the affairs of the Depart- ment to which he is attached. At the outset of his career, he is usually ])laced at a great disadvan- tage. He must often explain his ideas in a foreign language, French, with which he has probably only a limited acquaintance. Unless he is to run the risk of falling into the hands of some subordinate, often of doubtful trustworthiness, it is, at all events in respect to many official posts, essential that he should acquire some knowledge of a very difficult Oriental language, Arabic. These, however, are all faculties to which it is possible to apply some fairly accurate test. The Anglo-Egyptian official must be possessed of other qualities, which it is moi-e difficult to gauge with precision, but which are in reality of even greater importance than those to which allusion is made above. He must be a man of high character. He must have sufficient elasticity of mind to be able to apply, under circumstances which are strange to him, the knowledge which he has acquired elsewhere. He must be possessed of a sound judgment in order to enable him to distin- guish between abuses, which should be at once reformed, and those which it will be wise to tolerate, at all events for a time. He must be versatile, and quick to adapt any local feature of the administration to suit his own reforming purposes. He must be well-mannered and con- ciliatory, and yet not allow his conciliation to degenerate into weakness. He must be firm, and yet not allow his firmness to harden into dictation. He must efface himself as much as possible. In fact, besides his special technical knowledge, he 282 MODERN EGYPT pimv must possess all the qualities which we look for in a trained diplomatist, a good administrator, and an experienced man of the world. It is not easy in any country to produce a number of officials, who have undergone a depart- mental training, and who at the same time possess all these qualities. It is especially difficult, when they are found, to attract them to Egypt on salaries of £2000 a year and less. The efficient working of the administrative machine depends, however, mainly on choosing the right man for the right place. What often happens when any place has to be filled is this, — on the one hand, are a number of candidates who wish to occupy the post, but who do not possess the qualifications necessary to fill it with advantage to the public interests ; on the other hand, are a very small number of persons, who possess the necessary qualifications, but who, for one reason or another, are reluctant to accept the appointment. Under these circum- stances, it is a matter for congratulation that administrative successes have been the rule, whilst the failures have been the exceptions. Looking to the anomalous positions occupied by the Anglo -Egyptian officials, it is, indeed, greatly to their credit that, as a body, they should have succeeded in performing the several tasks allotted to them. Without doubt, they have had diplomatic support behind them. JNIoreover, and this is perhaps more important than the support itself, it has been felt by all concerned that the possibility of stronger support than that which was actually afforded lay in the background. Neverthe- less, the British officials in Egypt have had to rely mainly on their individual judgment and force of character. The l^ritish Consul-General can occa- sionally give advice. lie may, when speaking to the British official, temper the zeal of the latter for CH.XL THE BRITISH OFFICIALS 283 reform, or, when talking to the Egyptian ^linister, advocate the views of the reformer. But he cannot step seriously upon the scene unless there is some knot to be untied which is worthy of a serious effort. He cannot at every moment interfere in matters of departmental detail. The work done by the Anglo-Egyptian official is, therefore, mainly the outcome of his own resource and of his own versatility. If he is adroit, he can make the fact that the soldiers of his nation are in occu})ation of the country felt without flaunting their presence in any brusque fashion before the eyes of his Egyptian superior. As a matter of fact, the most successful Anglo-Egyptian officials have been those who have relied most on their own powers of persuasion, and have rarely applied for diplomatic support. In describing more particularly the position of the Anglo-Egyptian officials, a distinction must be drawn between civilians and soldiers. The British officers of the Egyptian army have had to contend against considerable difficulties, but, as compared with their civilian colleagues, they have from one important point of view been at an advantage. There is a reality about the position of the soldier which does not exist in the case of the civilian. The Egyptian Commander-in-Chief, or, to call him by his Egyptian title, the Sirdar, not only com- mands the army. It is recognised by the Egyptian Government and by the public that he commands it. There is thus no flagrant contradiction between his real and his nominal position. Most of the superior officers of the army, whether departmental or regi- mental, are British. The Sirdar is, therefore, master of the situation. He can decide on what orders to give, and he can rely on his orders being obeyed, not only in the letter but in the spirit. He is not obliged to trim his sails to every passing political breeze. 284 MODERN EGYPT pt iv Far otlier is the position of the Anglo-Egyptian civilian. Some of the most important civil functionaries possess no executive functions. They can only advise. No special system exists to enforce the acceptance of their advice. All that can be said is that, in the event of their advice being systematically rejected, the British Govern- ment will be displeased, and that they will probably find some adequate means for making their dis- pleasure felt. Further, of those Anglo-Egyptian civil officials who possess executive power, few can be certain that their power is effective ; they cannot rely confidently on their subordinates, who are rarely British, to carry out the letter, and still less the spirit of their instructions. The Anglo- Egyptian official is also driven by tlie necessities of his position into being an opportunist. The least part of his difficulties lies in deciding what should be done. That is usually easy. AVlien once he clearly sees before him the action which ought to be taken, he has to decide the more difficult questions of when to act and how to conduct himself in order to get others to act with him. And, in deciding on these latter points, he often has to take into consideration matters which at first sight appear to be not even remotely connected with the immediate subject under discussion. Every Anglo-Egyptian civil official, therefore, has not only to be guided by the general impulse given by British diplomacy to Egyptian affairs, but he also has to do a good deal of diplomatic work on his own account. Comparisons have been occasionally instituted between the position of the English in Egypt and that of the French in Tunis. In 1890, a report on Tunisian affairs was prepared by IVI. Ribot. A glance at this report is sufficient to show that, for all practical purposes, the French Government have CH.XL THE BRITISH OFFICIALS 285 annexed Tunis. Scarcely a semblance of native authority remains. The French officials have a free hand in dealing with the administration of the country. The French Resident-General presides at the Council of Ministers and directs the Ministry of Foreiffn Affairs. No law is valid which has not been countersigned by him. The Ministry of \Var is in the hands of the General in command of the French army of occupation. All the important offices of the State are held by Frenchmen. A French Secretary-General receives all the letters addressed to the Tunisian Government and pre- pares the answers. "Ainsi," it is said, "aucune affaire ne pent echapper a sa surveillance, et dans toutes, il peut donner ses conseils et faire prevaloir la pensee du Protectorat." By the side of each of the " Caids," who answer to the Egyptian Moudirs, is placed a French Controller who, amongst other functions, has the Police under his command. M. Ribot concluded his account of the system of administration in the following terms : " II fallait ensuite qu'aucun detail dans I'application de ces decisions ne put nous echapper. Aucun docu- ment n'entre dans les bureaux de I'Administration centrale ou n'en sort, aucune lettre n'est presentee a la signature du Premier JNIinistre, aucune corre- spondance n'est envoyee aux destinataires sans passer par Tintermediaire du Secretaire general et etre sou mis a son examen. Tout ce qui arrive aux Caids ou dmane d'eux est de la meme maniere soumis a I'examen des Controleurs civils. Rien ne peut done se faire dans la Regence qui ne soit approuve par nous." This is sufficiently explicit. In point of fact, Tunis is just as much a part of France as the Department of the Seine. A qualified Tunisian has explained the position of the Bey of Tunis in the following terms : " Les attributions du Bey de Tunis se reduisent seule- 286 MODERN EGYPT pt.iv ment a la nomination de quelques employes sub- alternes et meme ces nominations sont soumises a Tapprobation du JNIinistre Resident de France, ou de son premier secretaire, qui est en meme temps Secrdtaire-General du Gouvernement Tunisien." More than this, the attitude of the other Powers, and notably of England, towards the French administration of Tunis has been per- sistently friendly. The British Government speedily abandoned the Capitulations at the instance of France, an example which was followed by Italy and other Powers.^ It is, therefore, clear that no analogy exists between the conditions under which France took in hand the Tunisian problem and those which obtained, and still obtain, in respect to the Anglo- Egyptian administration of Egypt. The most important British official in Egypt is the Financial Adviser. After the Arabi revolt, the question of how to place the financial administra- tion of Egypt under European control had to be reconsidered. It was decided to appoint a British official with the title of Financial Adviser. He was to have no executive functions, but he was to be present at the meetings of the Council of Ministers. No attempt has ever been made to define his duties in any very precise manner. Broadly speaking, however, it may be said that, as his official title implies, he has to advise on all important financial matters, without unduly encroaching on the prerogatives of the Finance Minister. Outside his special duties, his position is also of importance. As he is present at all the meetings of the Council, he has the best oppor- tunities for knowing what is going on in Egyptian ^ The friendly attitude of England and Germany towards France in I'unis has been recognised in a work entitled La Politique Franfaise en Tiinisie (p. 374), wliicli, though published anonymously, was, it is well known, written by a member of the French diplomatic corps. cii. XL THE BRITISFI OFFICIALS 287 ministerial circles. He can often guide the INIinis- ters on matters which are unconnected with finance. He can keep the British Consul-General well in- formed. Being an Egyptian official, he can often give advice on his own behalf in a form which is more palatable than if it were tendered with all the weight of the British diplomatic representative speaking on behalf of his Government. Sir Auckland Colvin was the first Financial Adviser. In the autumn of 1883, he was succeeded by Sir Edgar Vincent. At the time, some doubts were expressed as to whether Sir Edgar Vincent was not too young for the post. These doubts were soon removed. A more fortunate selection could not have been made. Sir Edgar Vincent possessed in a high degree the quality specially necessary for the performance of his duties. He was eminently resourceful ; he never despaired daring the blackest period of the Egyptian financial chaos. He was sanguine of ultimate success, and as at every turn new and unexpected difficulties had to be encountered, he was always ready with some ingenious device to stave off the evil day of bankruptcy, and thus to gain breathing time during which the financial ship would, at all events, have a chance of righting herself. He stayed long enough to see that his labours had not been in vain. The rehabilitation of Egyptian finance is in a large degree the work of Sir Edgar Vincent. After his departure in October 1889, he was succeeded by Sir Elwin Palmer, who again was succeeded in 1898 by Mr. (afterwards Sir Eldon) Gorst. In 1904, Sir Eldon Gorst's place was taken by Sir Vincent Corbett. On the latter's resigna- tion in 1907, he was succeeded by Mr. Harvey. I now turn to the Judicial Department. When I arrived in Egypt, in September 1883, I found that Native Tribunals, based on a French model, 288 MODERN EGYPT pt. iv were about to be establislied, and that Sir Benson Maxwell had been a])pointed to the post of Procureur- General. He did not remain long. JNIr. (afterwards Sir) Raymond West, an Indian judge of distinction, was named to succeed him. He was a man of great learning and capacity. No one could be better qualified to devise a sound judicial system for Egypt. For several months, he studied his subject, and then produced a voluminous report. It contained many valuable suggestions, some of which were, after a consider- able lapse of time, carried into execution. Nubar Pasha, who was at the time in office, did not, however, concur in Mr. West's views. The result was that the latter returned to India. This happened in 1885, that is to say, at the most involved period of Egyptian history since the British occupation. It was necessary to throw overboard a certain amount of cargo in order to lighten the political ship. Nubar Pasha enjoyed a reputation as a judicial reformer. There was much to be said in favour of leaving the Department of Justice in Egyptian hands. It was resolved, there- fore, not to press for any British successor to Mr. West, but to see what the Egyptians could do in the way of judicial reform if left to themselves. The experiment had a fiiir trial, and proved a complete failure. For the next five years, con- stant complaints were made as regards the adminis- tration of justice, but it was desirable to give public opinion time to mature before taking any definite action in the matter. In the meanwhile, Nubar Pasha, fearful of English interference, named a Belgian, M. Le Grelle, to be Procureur- General.^ M. Le Grelle brought to light the * M. Le Grelle resip^ned his appointment in 1895, and was succeeded by an Ep:yptian. In 1897> an Englishman (Mr. Corbet) was appointed • to the place. CH. XL THE BRITISH OFFICIALS 289 existence of some serious abuses. Notably, he dis- covered that for several years past the ordinary Tribunals had not been dealing with the most important cases of crime which occurred in the country. They had been practically superseded by certain " Commissions of Brigandage," which were in reality Courts -Martial sitting under the presidency of the Moudirs. Under the auspices of these Commissions, every species of abomina- tion had been committed. Witnesses had been tortured. Some 700 or 800 people had been con- demned to imprisonment, and a certain number had been hung. In many cases, the evidence was wholly insufficient to justify a conviction ; it cannot be doubted that a good many innocent persons were punished. After a good deal of rather acrimonious discussion, the Commissions of Brigandage were abolished. The evidence in the most doubtful cases was re-examined ; some of the prisoners were released, either at once or subsequently.^ * Mr. Morice, an English official attached to the Department of Justice, who was subsequently deputed to inquire into the cases of these prisoners, reported as follows : — " I may here state that in tlie 126 cases examined, I have never once come across any witnesses I'oi the defence ; it would, therefore, seem to have been generally decided that this was not of any importance ; individuals once arrested and brought before the Commission seem to have had very little chance of regaining their liberty. 1 was so struck by the total absence of any defence being set up by the accused, apart from a denial of the charge, that 1 closely questioned those men in whose cases, after a careful examination of the documents, I had formed a conviction tliat they had been most unjustly sentenced, and I was invariably informed that although they, at the time of their trial, stated that they could produce witnesses to prove their innocence, their demands were never listened to, but they were informed that one thief's word was as good as another's, and that witnesses produced would be treated as accomplices, etc. Indeed, it was sufficient for one man, whose guilt was fully established, either by recognition on the part of tlie victim of the assault or robbery, or by the finding: of stolen property in his posses- sion, to accuse another, for tliis latter to be sentenced to a very severe term of imprisoimient. I have been told the most pitiful stories by convicts I have interrogated concerning the horrible treatment they received when in prison, a treatment which, it is needless to say, in- variably ended in a confession being obtained. One has only to examine the preliminary inquiries in order to be convinced of this." VOL. II U 290 MODERN EGYPT pt. iv This episode is very Egyptian, and is illustrative of the extent to which an Egyptian Minister often cares more for theory than for practice. An elaborate system of justice existed in aj)pearance. In reality, the system was inoperative. Persons accused of crime were condemned to death or to lifelong imprisonment at the will of some ignorant and tyrannical Moudir. With the suppression of the Commissions of Brigandage, crime of a serious natin-e increased. This had been anticipated. It became daily more and more clear that no Egyptian Minister was capable of coping with the situation. The Egyp- tian Government, therefore, reluctantly consented to appoint an Englishman to the post of Judicial Adviser. It was not easy to find a competent man, for few English lawyers have made a study of the French legal system. A fortunate selection was, however, made in the person of Mr. (after- wards Sir John) Scott. His appointment created a flutter in the Egyptian political dovecot. Riaz Pasha shortly afterwards resigned, and his resigna- tion was in some measure due to his dislike to Sir John Scott's nomination. The establishment of a sound judicial system in Egypt may be said to date from the time of Sir John Scott's assump- tion of the office of Judicial Adviser. In 1898, Sir John Scott resigned his place to take up an appohitment in London. He was succeeded by Sir Malcolm Mcllwraith. Previous to the British occupation, the Public Works Department had been mainly in French hands. In 1883, it was resolved to appoint a British Under-Secretary to this Department, and to brin": a staff of British officials from India to superintend the improvements in the canalisation of the country. Sir Colin Scott -Moncrieff was named Under - Secretary. The selection was a CH.XL THE BRITISH OFFICIALS 291 most happy one. Apart from his very remarkable technical attainments, Sir Colin Scott- Moncrieff was a man of the highest character. The most prejudiced Pasha respected qualities which were so dissimilar to any which he himself possessed. The most venomous journalist paused before he threw his political vitriol over a character so trans- parently honest. No Englishman employed in the Egyptian service during the early days of the occupation did more to make the name of England respected than Sir Colin Scott-MoncriefF, who, by the way, is not an Englishman, but one of that race which so frequently succeeds in foreign parts by virtue of its sterling good qualities. Sir Colin Scott-MoncriefF comes from well north of the Tweed. In 1892, Sir Colin Scott-MoncriefF found a very worthy successor in the person of Sir William Garstin, under whose intelligent auspices very large sums of money were, to the great advantage of the country, spent on public works of various descriptions. It would be difficult to exaggerate the debt of gratitude which the people of Egypt owe to Sir William Garstin. The Financial Secretary also occupies a post of great importance. He is an executive officer. He performs the duties of the Financial Adviser when the latter is absent. During the early days of the occupation this post was held by Blum Pasha, a very intelligent Austrian, who had the rare merit of having served the Egyptian Government during the lax and corrupt rule of Ismail Pasha without the most censorious critic being able to whisper a word against his honesty. He was a most capable official and worked cordially with the English. On his retirement in 1889, he was succeeded by Mr. (now Lord) Milner, the well-known author of England in Egypt. Of Lord Milner all that need 292 MODERN EGYPT pt. iv be said in this place is that he is one of the most able Englishmen who have served the Egyptian Government. Not only was he versed in all the technicalities of his own Department, but he had a wide grasp of the larger aspects of Egyptian affairs. On his being named, in 1892, to an appointment in England, he was succeeded by Sir Eldon Gorst, who belonged to the diplomatic service. Sir Eldon Gorst had occupied his leisure time in acquiring a knowledge of Arabic. Being endowed with a singular degree of tact and intelligence, he generally managed to get all he wanted done without applying for diplomatic support. Since 1894, when Sir Eldon Gorst was appointed Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior, the post of Financial Secretary has changed hands more than once, but it has always been held by a very carefully selected British official. There are three sub -departments attached to the Ministry of Finance. These are the Customs, the Lighthouses, and the Post Office. The first two of these are under superior British super- vision. The Post Office was reorganised by an English Director- General, who was eventually succeeded by an extremely competent Syrian, Saba Pasha, under whose direction various postal reforms of great importance and utility have been introduced. Until 1894, the Police was commanded by an English Inspector-General who had a small staff of British officers under him. In the autumn of 1894, a change of system was effected. The post of Inspector- General was abolished and an Adviser (Sir Eldon Gorst) was appointed to the Ministry of the Interior. In 1898, Mr. Machell was appointed to succeed Sir Eldon Gorst. The duties attached to the post of Adviser underwent, at the same time, some modifications of no great CH.XL THE BRITISH OFFICIALS 293 importance. The head of the Sanitary Depart- ment is EngUsh, as is also the Director-General of Prisons. The supreme direction of the Educational Department has always been in Egyptian hands, but, in 1906, an English Adviser (Mr. Dunlop) was appointed to this Department. A considerable number of Europeans are employed as school- masters.^ Allusion has so far only been made to the highest appointments. It will, however, be as well to speak briefly of the total number of Englishmen employed in Egypt. The subject is one of importance, for it has at times given rise to much exaggeration, and, moreover, the employment of Europeans is naturally viewed with jealousy by those Egyptians who are aspirants for official positions. It is generally recognised that European assist- ance, to a certain extent, is necessary to carry on the work of government in Egypt. Differences of opinion, however, arise when any attempt is made to lay down with any degree of precision the extent to which recourse should be had to European agency. Weighty arguments may be advanced on both sides. On the one hand, it is frequently urged that the efficiency of the service suffers by reason of the inadequacy of the European staff ; that the welfare of the mass of the population must be placed before all other considerations ; that the vast majority of voiceless Egyptians prefer good administration to national government ; and that, therefore, for the present, and probably for a long time to come, the employment of a large number of Europeans is absolutely necessary. On the other hand, it is stated that the Egyptians prefer * The numbers were, in 1896, Egyptians, 631 ; Europeans, 92 ; and, in 1906, Egyptians, 794 ; Europeans, 160. 294 MODERN EGYPT ft. rv a defecth e system of government administered by their own countrymen to a relati\ ely perfect system administered by aliens ; that it is in the highest degree impolitic to push on education and at the same time to close the door of hi<>h Government employment to the educated classes ; that the Egyptians can n^ver learn to govern themselves unless they are allowed to make the attempt ; that any causes which tend towards maladministration will be temporary and will gradually disappear as a result of the experience which will be gained ; and that, therefore, the number of Europeans in the service of the Government should not merely be reduced to the lowest limit compatible with efficiency, but that that limit should be exceeded, and that temporary inefficiency, even in a somewhat marked degree, should be tolerated in order to attain the desired end. There is not much to be gained by dwelling at length on the abstract principles enunciated above. The subject under discussion is eminently one as to wliich, for all purposes of practical politics, a compromise has to be effected between the extremes of the conflicting principles invoked on either side. What is quite clear is, that if AVestern civilisation is to be introduced into Egypt, it can only be done by Europeans, or by Egyptians who have imbibed the spirit of that civilisation, and have acquired the knowledge necessary in order to apply Western methods of government. The extent to which Europeans, or Egyptians who have received a European training, should respectively be employed, depends mainly on the supply which is available of the latter class. The main difficulty of dealing with the question is that, for the present, the demand for qualified Egyptians of this class is greatly in excess of the supply. The general policy which has been pursued since CH. XL THE BRITISH OFFICIALS 295 the British occupation of the country took place, in 1882, has been to hmit the number of Europeans in the employment of the Government as much as possible, to employ Egyptians in the very great majority of the subordinate and in a large number of the superior administrative posts, and gradually to prepare the ground for increasing the number of Egyptians in high employment. This policy is thoroughly understood by all the leading British officials in Egypt. Some, possibly, have been more successful than others in training their Egyptian subordinates. Some, again, may be inclined to insist on a rather excessive standard of efficiency on the part of the Egyptian before they will readily acquiesce in foregoing the appointment of a Euro- pean. But the higher British officials in Egypt have never shown any tendency to question the wisdom of the policy, or the least reluctance to give effect to it when once they were convinced that a qualified Egyptian could be found to take any post which might happen to be vacant. This matter is frequently discussed on the assumption that a number of places under Govern- ment are now occupied by Europeans for which competent Egyptians could, without difficulty, be found. I will not go so far as to say that this assumption is absolutely unfounded, but it certainly gives a very incorrect view of the facts of the situation. I do not doubt that there are a few cases as to which it may be said that, if the European occupant of some post vacated his place, a competent Egyptian might at once be found to replace him. But, in the very large majority of cases, the reason why the European holds the post is that to which I have already alluded, namely, that the supply of competent Egyptians is not nearly equal to the demand. To any one who will calmly and impartially 296 MODERN EGYPT pt. iv consider the recent history and the present situation in Egypt, the state of things which I have described above can be no matter for surprise. Rather would it be astonishing if the difficulties to which I have alluded had not occurred. European agency is required in Egypt for two reasons : in the first place, to supply the technical knowledge, which, until very recently, the Egyptians liave had no opportunity of acquiring ; in the second place, to remedy those defects in the Egyptian character which have been developed by a long course of misgovernment. In so far as numbers are concerned, the first is by far the more contributory cause. The rapidity with Which the material prosperity of Egypt has advanced during the last fifteen or twenty years is probably without a parallel in history. The suddenness of the movement has proved by no means an unmixed blessing to the country. I will not dwell on the moral aspect of this question beyond saying that it is a commonplace of economics to hold that a great and sudden accretion of wealth, without any corresponding increase of knowledge as to how the newly acquired wealth should be used, is a very doubtful benefit, whether to an individual or a nation. From the point of view of the question im- mediately under discussion, it cannot be doubted that this sudden leap from poverty to affluence greatly increased the difficulties of executing the policy of employing Egyptian rather than European agency in administrative work. For, when once the full tide of prosperity set in, demands arose on all sides for the employment of agents possessing technical knowledge of all sorts. European lawyers were re({uired to deal with the numerous legal questions which arose, and in which a knowledge of Europeans and their laws was indispensable. CH.XL THE BRITISH OFFICIALS 297 Hydraulic engineers were required to deal with irrigation questions ; medical men, to look after the hospitals and the sanitary condition of the country ; veterinary surgeons, to arrest the cattle plague ; trained surveyors, to map the fields ; mechanical engineers and mechanics, to perform a great variety of work — and so on. All these demands fell suddenly on a country almost wholly unprepared to meet them. Neither, although the difficulties which have subsequently arisen were in some degree foreseen, were the British advisers of the Egyptian Government able, during the early years of the occupation, to do much towards providing for them. For at least six years, all that could be done was to struggle against bankruptcy, to throw off the incubus of the Soudan, and by scraping together funds in order to improve the system of irrigation, to lay the foundations of the prosperity which the country now enjoys. I shall, at a later period of this work, deal more fully with the question of education. Here I will only say that, for some years, educational progress was, owing to tlie financial difficulties against which the Government had to contend, necessarily slow. Recently it has been more rapid, and I now take a somewhat sanguine view of the possibility of gradually substituting Egyptian for European agency in those offices wiiere the necessity for employing Europeans is at present based on the want of technical knowledge on the part of tiie Egyptians. But any attempt to hurry can only lead to disappointment, and, eventually, in all prob- ability, to a reaction which will be to the detriment of Egyptian interests. I liave said that, besides those Europeans who are employed on the ground that their technical knowledge is indispensable, the services of others are necessary to act as some corrective to the 298 MODERN EGYPT pt. iv defects of the Egyptian character. The number of those who may be classed in this category is comparatively small. On the other hand, they often occupy positions of greater importance than those who are employed merely by reason of their technical skill. The substitution of Egyptian for European agency must necessarily take even more time in these cases than in those where the transfer depends on the acquisition of technical knowledge by the Egyptians. National character is a plant of slow growth. Such instruction as can be afforded in schools and colleges only constitutes one of the elements which contribute to its modification and development. All that can be said is that no effort should be spared to foster the growth of all those moral and intellectual qualities which, collectively, tend to the formation of character. I may add that amongst the defects which, for purposes of administration, appear most of all to require recti- fication, are, the fear of assuming individual re- sponsibility ; the absence of adequate capacity to exercise with firmness, intelligence, and considera- tion for others, such functions as are usually vested in responsible agents ; and the tendency, so common amongst Egyptians, of running to extremes both in thought and action. Before leaving this branch of the subject, it may be as well that I should give some figures showing the extent to which Europeans are now employed in the Egyptian service.^ The following table shows the composition of the Egyptian Civil Service at the close of the years 1896 and 1906 respectively :— * A more detailed analysis of tliese figures was given in my Report for the year 1006, Egypt, No. 1 of 1!)()7, pp. 33-44. The remarks made above are quoted almost textually from this Report. OH. XL THE BRITISH OFFICIALS 299 Year. Egyptians. Europeans. Total. 1896 1906 8444 12,027 690 1252 9134 13,279 In the course of the decade, therefore, the total number of officials increased by 4145. Of these, 3583 were Egyptians, and 5G2 were Europeans. I should mention that, out of the total increase of 562 Europeans, no less than 303 belonged to the Railway Administration, over which, until quite recently, the Egyptian Government have been able to exercise little or no control. Further, it is to be remembered that not only the convenience, but also, to a great extent, the lives of the travelling public depend on efficient railway administration. Hence, there is in this case relatively little scope for the application of the general and semi-political arguments involved in the issues now under dis- cussion. These figures bear eloquent testimony to the fact that the number of Europeans appointed to the Egyptian public service has been strictly con- trolled. It may be that in some few cases addi- tional Europeans will be required, but these will be more than counterbalanced by the increase of Egyptians in other Departments. In view of the rapid strides being made in education — more especially in technical education — there now appears for the first time to be a prospect of carrying out more fully than heretofore what has always been the real policy of the British Government in Egypt. The execution of that policy was retarded by financial difficulties which, since the Anglo-French Agreement was signed, have been to a great extent removed. 300 MODERN EGYPT pt. iv One observation may be added before leaving this branch of the subject. It is that in countries such as India and Egypt the best poHcy to pursue is to employ a small body of well-selected and well- paid Europeans, Everything depends on finding the right man for the right place. If he can be found, it is worth while to pay him well. It is a mistake to employ second or third-rate Europeans on low salaries. They often do more harm than good. Public opinion generally condemns high salaries, but on this particular point the European administrator in the East will do well to follow his own judgment and not to be unduly influenced by outside criticism. It is worth while to pay something extra in order to secure the services of a really competent and thoroughly trustworthy official. CHAPTER XLI THE INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIONS Internationalism — 1. The Commission of the Public Debt — Functions of the Commission — The Egyptian Accounts — The Reserve Fund — Uselessness of the Commission — 2. The Railway Administua- TioN — 3. The Daira Sanieh— 4. The Domains Administration. Cosmopolitanism, as opposed to exclusive patriot- ism, has ever been the dream of theorists and the butt of practical statesmen. Probably, few lines of any British poet have been more frequently quoted — especially of late years — than those in which Can- ning ridiculed the "friend of every country but his own." Of recent years, although there has been no diminution but rather a recrudescence of inter- national rivalry, a tendency towards the inter- national treatment both of European and of extra -European questions has become manifest, not only amongst theorists, but amongst practical statesmen. This tendency is the natural outcome of the circumstances Avhich obtained in the latter part of the nineteenth century. There appears little prospect that the Utopia of the early free- traders will be realised. Trade, with its hand- maids, the railway and the telegraph, does not so far appear to have bound nations together in any closer bonds of amity than existed in the days of slow locomotion and communication. On the other hand, the European body politic has become 801 302 MODERN EGYTT pt. rv more sensitive than heretofore. National interests tend towards cosmopoHtanism, however much national sentiments and aspirations may tend towards exclusive patriotism. The whole world is quickly informed of any incident which may occur in any part of the globe. Not only in the cabinet of every JNIinister, but in the office of every news- paper editor the questions to which its occurrence instantly give rise are, how does this circumstance affect the affairs of my country ? What course should be taken in order to safeguard our interests ? It is more difficult than heretofore to segregate a quarrel between any two States. In a certain sense Europeans, in spite of themselves, have become members of a single family, though not always of a happy family. They are all oppressed by one common dread, and that is that some accident may precipitate a general war, of which not the wisest can foretell the final issue. If any minor State shows a tendency to light the match which may lead to a general conflagration, the voice of inter- national rivalry is to some extent hushed in presence of the danger, and the diplomatic fire- engine is turned on from every capital in Europe in order to quench the flame before it can spread. A certain power of acting together has thus been developed amongst the nations and Governments of Europe, and it cannot be doubted that the world has benefited by the change. In all the larger affairs of state, internationalism constitutes a guarantee for peace. It in some measure obliges particular interests to yield for the general good of the European community. Internationalism has, however, done more than group together certain States and ensure common or quasi-common action on occasions of supreme importance. Semi-civilised countries, in which the rulers are sometimes only possessed of incomplete CH. xLi INTERNATIONALISM 303 sovereign rights, open up a wide field for the de- velopment of internationalism. In such countries, some European Powers have interests which they wish to safeguard without arousing the jealousy of their rivals by too open an assertion of strength, whilst others are led to claim a seat at the inter- national table in order to assert their political exist- ence and to remind the world that their interests, albeit they are of relatively slight importance, cannot be altogether neglected. Cases sometimes arise which involve prolonged supervision and control in the interests of the European Powers, but which do not justify exclusive action on the part of any one of them, or which, if they justify it, are of a nature not to allow of exclusive action without a risk of discord in respect to the particular nation by whom it is to be exercised. What can be more natural in cases of this kind than for the Powers to say — we are agreed as to all that is essential ; certain points of detail remain to be settled locally ; let us each appoint an expert who will represent our interests and see that they get fair play, but who at the same time will have no very marked political bias, and who will treat the technical questions which come under his consideration on their own merits ? Nothing could in appearance be more equitable or more calculated to obviate the risk of serious friction. But alas ! however much exclusiveness may in appearance be expelled by the cosmopolitan pitch- fork, it but too often comes back apain to its natural resting-place. The experiment of adminis- trative internationalism has ]:)robably been tried in the No Man's Land of which this history treats to a greater extent than in any other country. The result cannot be said to be encouraging to those who believe in tlie efficacy of international action 304 MODERN EGYPT pt. iv in administrative matters. What has been proved is that international institutions possess admirable negative qualities. They are formidable checks to all action, and the reason why they are so is tliat, when any action is proposed, objections of one sort or another generally occur to some member of the international body. Any action often involves a presumed advantage accorded to some rival nation, and it is a principle of internationalism, which is scornfully rejected in theory and but too often recognised as a guide for practical action, that it is better to do nothing, even though evil may ensue, than to allow good to be done at the expense of furthering the interests, or of exalting the reputa- tion of an international rival. For all purposes of action, therefore, administrative international- ism may be said to tend towards the creation of administrative impotence. 1. Commission of the Public Debt The Commission of the Public Debt originally consisted of four members, an Englishman, a Frenchman, an Austrian, and an Italian. In 1885, a German and a Russian Commissioner were added, thus bringing the total number of Commissioners up to six. Until 1904, the functions of the Commission were briefly as follows. The officials responsible for the collection of the revenues pledged to the service of the Debt were under an obligation to pay all monies collected by them into the hands of the Com- missioners, and to furnish them with the informa- tion necessary in order to enable an effective financial control to be exercised. The Commis- sioners had a right to name and dismiss their own employes. No loan could be contracted cH. xLi INTERNATIONALISM 305 without their consent. Lastly, and this was a provision of the higliest imj)ortance, the Com- missioners, in their capacity of legal representatives of the bondholders, were empowered to sue the Egyptian Government in the Mixed Courts in the event of any infringement of the Law of Liquidation taking place. It will be seen that the powers thus conferred on the Commissioners were extensive. Neverthe- less, those portions of the Law of Liquidation to which allusion has so far been made, did not in practice give rise to much difficulty subsequent to the British occupation. They were provisions in- tended to guard against an act of bankruptcy, and inasmuch as the result of the British occupation was to place the Egyptian Treasury in a state of assured solvency, any preventive action on the part of the Commission of the Debt became unnecessary when once the first few years of acute crisis were passed. Other functions were, however, vested in the Commissioners, which were of greater practical importance. The Law of Liquidation, coupled with the Decree of July 27, 1885, which was promulgated on the occasion of the issue of an Egyptian Loan of £9,000,000 guaranteed by the Powers of Europe, laid down a method for balancing the accounts of the Egyptian Treasury at the end of each year which was a triumph of financial cumbersomeness and ineptitude. At the time of the London Con- ference, the French, who were supported by some other Continental Powers, were politically hostile to England, and, moreover, looked almost ex- clusively to the interests of the bondholders. The British Treasury officials could see but one point, namely, that the Government of Egypt were embarrassed by having spent too much money in the past ; therefore, it was held, a stringent control VOL. II X 306 INIODERN EGYPT pt. iv should be exercised to prevent extravagant ex- penditure in tlie future. The argument was sound, but it was forgotten at the time that the expenditure was being incurred under conditions wholly different from those which had obtained in the past. A wise foresight would have given greater latitude to the British advisers of the Egyptian Government than could have been prudently accorded to Ismail Pasha. It was, however, im- possible to obtain a hearing for arguments of this nature. The Egyptian Government did, indeed, manage to obtain a sum of £1,000,000 to spend on Irrigation, but beyond this it was found impossible to shake the mistrust of the French and the pre- conceived ideas of the British Treasury officials. The latter aided in establishing a system which proved subsequently to be a fertile source of embarrassment to their own countrymen in Egypt. It had been laid down by the Decrees of 1876 that certain revenues should be pledged to the service of the Debt, whilst other revenues should be left at the disposal of the Egyptian Govern- ment to provide for their administrative expenditure. AVhen the Guaranteed Loan of 1885 was contracted, the distribution of what, in Gallicised English, are called the "affected" and the " non - affected " revenues, had to be reconsidered. Care was taken to increase the relative amount of the former, so that the bondholders should not run any risk, with the result that the amount of the latter was rela- tiv^ely diminished. The administrative expenditure was fixed at a certain figure, the only concession, which was with difficulty obtained, being that the working expenses of the Railway administration should not be unalterable, but should be taken at 45 per cent^ of the gross receipts. If the non- * In 1902, after prolonged negotiations, this figure was increased to a maximum of 55 per cent. CH. xLi INTERNATIONALISM 307 affected revenues did not yield the sum at which the administrative expenditure was fixed, the deficit had to be made good from the affected revenues. The surpkis on the whole account con- sisted of the money remaining in the hands of the Commissioners of the Debt from the affected revenues after the deficit in the non - affected revenues, if any, had been made good. This surplus was divided into two portions. One portion remained in the hands of the Commis- sioners ; the other was paid to the Egyptian Government. The result was that, if the Govern- ment wished to spend £lO in excess of the adminis- trative limit prescribed by international agreement, revenue to the extent of £20 had to be collected in order to meet the expenditure. As the country progressed, legitimate demands for fresh expendi- ture arose, but under the system devised in 1885, the anomaly was presented that the Government had to pay double for everything in the nature of an improvement involving fresh expenditure ; that the administration was starved ; that money was plentiful ; but that no one benefited in any adequate degree from its abundance. It would be tedious to describe in detail the involved calculation which had to be made before the true surplus at the disposal of the Egyptian Treasury could be ascertained. It will be sufficient to quote the figures of one year as an example of the results obtained under the system. In 1892, the revenue of the Egyptian Govern- ment amounted to £E. 10,304,000, and the expen- diture to £E.9,595,000. It would naturally be supposed by any one unacquainted with the intri- cacies of Egyptian finance that a surplus remained at the disposal of the Government amounting to the difference between these two sums, namely, 308 MODERN EGYPT pt. iv £E. 769,000. Any such conclusion would have been altogether erroneous. After winding through the financial labyrinth, which was constructed by the Powers, and which is a typical instance of the results of international administration, it was found that the real surplus in the hands of the Egyptian Treasury was only £E. 179,000, a difference of no less than £E.590,000. Appearances in Egypt are deceptive. It was originally intended that any surplus remaining in the hands of the Commissioners should be applied to the extinction of debt. For the first few years of the British occupation, this matter was not of much ])ractical importance, as no surplus was available. But when financial affairs became more settled, Sir Edgar Vincent's inven- tive mind gave birth to a scheme under which the surplus at the end of each year was to be allowed to accumulate in a Reserve Fund. Extinc- tion of debt was not to begin until the Reserve Fund amounted to £E.2,000,000. Thus, the Treasury would, it was hoped, eventually have a large sum of money in hand to guard against any unforeseen contingencies which might occur. The idea was excellent. It obtained the assent of the Powers, and was embodied in a Decree dated July 12, 1888. Article 3 of this Decree described how the money belonging to the Reserve Fund might be spent. Inter alia, it was to be applied to " extraordinary expenditure undertaken with the previous assent of the Commission of the Debt." This was a provision of great importance, for as the Reserve Fund increased, it was found possible to turn the money over, and, by making advances to the Government, to allow various works of public utility to be constructed. As, however, it rested with the Commission to decide whether any advance should be made, it is obvious CH. xLi INTERNATIONALISM 309 that, under the Decree of 1888, the powers vested in the Commissioners were notably increased.^ Such, therefore, were the attributes of the Commission of the Pubhc Debt. During Ismail Pasha's time, this institution, though its organisa- tion was in many respects defective, played an important and useful part in Egyptian affairs. Subsequent to the British occupation, the inutility of the Commission became, year by year, more apparent. It cost the Treasury some £E. 40,000 a year. All the necessary work of a National Debt Office could have been done by one official and a small staff of clerks. In blaming the institution, however, it would be unjust to cast indiscriminate blame on the individuals concerned. Some of the Commis- sioners have been intelligent and capable men who have performed their duties in a reasonable spirit of impartiality. Indeed, the Egyptian authorities have always preferred dealing with the Commission of the Debt to dealing with the Powers. The Commissioners, being on the spot, are exposed to local influences, and possess a certain amount of local knowledge. They are, therefore, more likely to judge financial matters on their own merits than those who, sitting at a distance, look at Egyptian affairs from a wholly political point of view. It is, however, none the less true that whatever reforms have been accomplished with the co-operation of the Caisse could have been equally well and probably better accomplished had the Caisse not existed. The only purpose which this institution eventually served was to act as an obstacle to progress, and occasionally as an agency for the manifestation of hostility * Tlie question of how this Decree should be interpreted gave rise to a lawsuit when, in 189G, a majority of the Commissioners of tlie Debt made a grant of £E. 500,000 to meet the expenses of the Dougola campaign. — Vide p. 85 et seq. 310 MODERN EGYPT pt. iv towards England. It often happens that an institution survives after the circumstances to which it owes its origin have passed away. The result is that the institution becomes hurtful, although the individuals associated with it may- be deserving of respect. This is what took place with regard to the Commission of the Public Debt In 1904, as a result of negotiations with the Powers, the functions of the Commission of the Debt underwent a radical change. Without going into any elaborate detail, it may be said that the Commissioners are now merely receivers on the part of the bondholders. They cannot in any way interfere with administrative affairs. In 1912, the Egyptian Government will be free to convert the whole of the Debt. If the con- version takes place, the Commission of the Debt will presumably disappear altogether. 2. Railway Administration, Under the Decree of November 18, 1876, a Board was constituted to administer the Railways, the Telegraphs, and the Port of Alexandria. It originally consisted of two Englislmien, of whom one was President, a Frenchman, and two Egyp- tians. Subsequently, the number of English and of Egyptian members was reduced to one of each nationality. The English and French members were named on the proposal of their respective Governments. The Board made appointments to all subordinate places in the administration. The superior officials were nominated by the Khedive on the proposal of the Board. Changes of tariff were made by the Board with the sanction of the Egyptian Government. CH. xLi INTERNATIONALISM 311 Two very competent Englishmen, Colonel Marindin and Mr. (now Lord) Farrer, were em- ployed in 1887 to report on the Egyptian Railways. This is the judgment which they passed on the system of administration : — " The administration of the Egyptian Railways, as at present constituted, differs considerably from any with which we are acquainted. The control is vested in three members whose functions are midefined as regards the different branches of the working of the railway. We understand that there is no one individual who is separately responsible for the management of the railways. It is obvious that the result of this divided responsibility has been especially injurious to the working of a commercial business such as railways must necessarily be, and we are of opinion that it is absolutely essential for the satisfactory working of the Egyptian Railways, and for the maintenance of discipline upon them, that the management of them, as a whole, together with the control of heads of Departments, should be vested in one person with a position analogous to that of the Managing Director or General Manager of Rail- ways in other countries." Obviously, the management should have been vested in one person, but internationalism abhors the one-man system as much as nature abhors a vacuum. The sheet-anchor of internationalism is, indeed, that several men should be set to do the work of one. It was, however, said of Richelieu, by one of his enemies, *'il est capable de tout, meme du bien." So also it may be noted that international administration, although it can never yield fruits at all comparable with those which may be obtained under more rational administrative systems, may at times be forced into some 312 MODERN EGYPT pt.iv degree of action, and will then produce results which the casual observer may think are due to the excellence of the system, whereas they are in reality for tlie most part obtained by the occurrence of adventitious circumstances in spite of the system. Administrative internationalism, like Richelieu, is occasionally capable, if not of absolute good, at all events of assuming a fictitious appearance of goodness. Thus, the Egyptian Railways benefited by the increase of prosperity and by the general reform- ing impulse which was imparted to the Egyptian administrative macliine by the predominance of British influence in the country. They would have benefited still more had the British reformers been from the first allowed a free hand in dealing with their administration. In 1904, as a consequence of the arrangements with the Powers, to which allusion has already been made, the Egyptian Government acquired full right to deal with the Railway Administration in any way they might think fit. Few, save those behind the scenes, have prob- ably recognised fully that the Anglo - French Agreement was only signed just in time to prevent a complete breakdown of the Railway Administra- tion. Such, however, is unquestionably the case. If means had not been found to spend a large amount of capital on developments and improve- ments, the railways of Egypt would have been wholly unable to cope with the growing require- ments of the country. Towards the close of 1905, Sir Charles Scotter visited Egypt and made a full report on the con- dition of the Egyptian Railways.^ His suggestions are now being carried out. The Railway Adminis- tration is being thoroughly reorganised. Capital » See Egypt, No. 1 of 1906, pp. 110-113. CH. xLi INTERNATIONALISM 313 expenditure to the extent of £3,000,000 has been sanctioned, of which £1,635,000 was ex])ended before the close of 1906. It is probable that an additional grant of £1,000,000 will be eventually required. Thus, it may be hoped that before long the Egyptian Railway Administration will be in thoroughly good order. Looking back to one of my earliest Reports ^ I notice that in 1890, the Egyptian Railways carried 4,700,000 passengers and 1,683,000 tons of goods. In 1906, they carried no less than 22,550,000 passengers and 20,030,000 tons of goods. These figures serve as a striking illustration of the im- mense improvement in the material condition of the country Avhich has taken place during the last few years. They also afford an ample justification for the large reductions which have been made in the rates. ^ In addition to the State Railways, a network of 1145 kilometres of Agricultural Railways, which are owned by private companies, exists in Egypt. These railways are largely used. In 1906, they carried 6,924,000 passengers and 929,000 tons of goods. 3. Daira Sanieh. The Daira properties formed part of the huge estates which Ismail Pasha contrived, generally by illicit and arbitrary methods, to accumulate in his own hands. They originally extended over an area of more than half a million of acres. When Ismail got into financial difficulties, he borrowed > Egypt, No. 1 of 1802, p. 20. 2 1 may remark that the same lesson is to be learnt from an examination of the statistics of the Post Office and Teleji^raph Depart- ments, in both of which the rates liave been largely reduced. In 1885, only 12,500,000 letters and 83,000 parcels passed throuj^h the Post Office. In 1905,the figures were : letters, .50,700,000 ; parcels, 250,000. In 1906, no less than 1,925,000 telegrams, of which 1,248,000 were io Arabic, passed over the lines, as compared to about 311,000 in 1890. 314 MODERN EGYPT pt.iv £9,500,000 on the security of these properties. They were administered by a Board of Directors, consisting of an Egyptian Director-General, and two Controllers, one British and one French. The Director-General was the executive officer, but the Controllers had ample powers of supervision and inspection. They alone were the legal representa- tives of the bondholders. Until the year 1891, the Daira expenditure was always in excess of the revenue. On several occasions the deficits exceeded £200,000. With the exception of the year 1895, when there was a deficit amounting to £102,000, the accounts of every year subsequent to 1890 showed a surplus. In the two years 1904-5, the revenue exceeded the expenditure by no less than £817,000. In 1898, an arrangement was made under which the Daira estates were sold to a company, who again resold them in lots. The sales are now com- plete. Most of the purchasers were Egyptians. The Government share in the profits of the liquidation amounted to about £3,280,000. 4. The Domains Administration, The properties, known by the name of the Domains, comprise the estates ceded, under pres- sure, by Ismail Pasha in 1878.^ On the security of these estates, a loan of £8,500,000 was negoti- ated with Messrs. Rothschild. It was, at the same time, arranged that the Domains should be ad- ministered by a Commission consisting of an Englishman, a Frenchman, and an Egyptian. Up to the year 1899, the reveinie yielded by the estates was invariably less than the expendi- ture. In one year (1885) the deficit amounted to no less than £275,000. From 1900 onwards, a * Vide ante, \o\. i. p. 63. CH. xLi INTERN ATIONALISJSl 315 surplus, varying from £26,000 to £150,000, was always realised. By gradual sales ^ the extent of the Domains properties, which originally consisted of nearly 426,000 acres of land, was reduced by the close of 1906 to about 147,000 acres. Simultaneously, the outstanding capital of the loan was reduced from £8,500,000 to about £1,316,000.^ It cannot be doubted that the whole of this loan will be paid off before long, and that, when this is done, some very valuable lands will remain at the disposal of the Government.^ With the sale of the Daira and Domains lands, almost the last traces of the injury which Ismail Pasha inflicted on his country, by accumulating 1,000,000 acres of the best land in Egypt in the hands of himself and his family, will disappear. Some comprehension of these institutions is necessary in order to understand the extent to which the freedom of action of the British officials in Egypt was at one time crippled. A brief examination of that curious mosaic termed the Judicial System of Egypt will tend to bring into still stronger relief the anomalous position occupied by the Anglo-Egyptian reformer. In the case of those institutions of which I have so far treated, the shackles have now been, for the most part, struck off. In the case of those with which I am about to deal, they still remain and bar the way to reform. ^ The great majority of the purchasers have been Egyptians. The land was, for the most part, sold in small lots. 2 On November 30, 1907, the outstanding capital of this loan amounted to only £1,050,940. ^ If the present price of land is maintained, the value of the estates which will remain over after the complete liquidation of the loan will probably be about £6,000,000. CHAPTER XLII THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM The ?/Hxed Courts — Nubar Pasha's objects in creating them — Attributes and composition of the Mixed Courts — Defects in the institution — Tlie Consular Courts — The Native Tribunals and the Kadi's Courts — Summary of jurisdictions in Egypt. In creating the International Tribunals, or, as they are more frequently called, the Mixed Courts, Nubar Pasha had two objects in view. In the first place, he was struck with the fact that, inasmuch as the European adventurers who flocked to Egypt during the reigns of Said and of Ismail had no legal means for obtaining a redress of any real or imaginary grievances, they fell back, in case of need, on diplomatic support, with results that were not unfrequently disastrous to the Egyptian Treasury. Nubar Pasha, therefore, conceived the statesmanlike project of creating law-courts, which should com- mand the confidence of Europe, and which should be empowered to try civil suits between Europeans, on the one hand, and Egyptians or the Egyptian Government, on the other hand. In the second place, although in dealing with Ismail Pasha this aspect of the case was kept in the background, Nubar Pasha wished to erect a legal barrier between the population of Egypt and the capricious despotism of the Khedive. His original intention was to place all the inhabitants of Egypt, whether Europeans or Egyptians, under the jurisdiction of 316 CH.XLII THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM 317 the Mixed Courts. This part of the project, however, fell to the ground owing to the strong opposition which it encountered at Constantinople, and perhaps it was as well that it did so, for the complete realisation of Nubar Pasha's idea would have entailed the internationalisation of the whole judicial system of the country. Nubar Pasha's first object was, however, attained. From 1875 onwards, any European who has had a claim either against an Egyptian or against the Egyptian Government, has no longer been under the necessity of seeking diplomatic support. He has been referred both by the Egyptian Government and by the diplomatic agent of his country to a properly constituted law-court in which it was com- petent for him to make good his claim, if it was a just one. From every point of view, the result has been beneficial. The claimant, with the Egyptian code before him, has been able to form a fair idea of what he might expect from the law-courts. The Egyptian Government have, on the one hand, been obliged to acknowledge their legal and contractual obligations ; on the other hand, they have been re- lieved from capricious diplomatic pressure on behalf of individuals, and they have not unfrequently in- voked the law with success in order to be saved from the exorbitant demands of contractors and others. The diplomatic agent has been relieved from the unpleasant obligation of supporting claims, which were often of doubtful validity from a technical, and of more than doubtful morality from an equitable point of view. By the irony of fate, the institution to which Ismail Pasha was induced to assent, probably with only a half knowledge of what it meant, was the instrument which dealt him his political death- blow. When the law-courts, to whose creation the Powers of Europe had been parties, condemned 318 MODERN EGYPT pt. iv him to pay certain sums of money, and wlien he found himself unable to pay them, the cup of his iniquity overflowed, and Europe — legally outraged, and politically timorous of what the future might bring forth — spoke out and said, " You must pay or go." Ismail Pasha could not pay. After a few ineffectual struggles, he went. It is unnecessary to describe at length the attri- butes and composition of the Mixed Courts. It will be sufficient to say that a Court of Appeal sits at Alexandria, and that three Courts of First Instance exist, one at Cairo, one at Alexandria, and one at Mansourah. Egyptian judges sit on all these Courts, but most of the real work is done by Europeans. The European judges of the Court of Appeal are for the most part chosen from amongst the subjects of the Great Powers. All the Powers, without distinction, are represented on the Courts of First Instance. The choice of judges rests nominally with the Egyptian Government. In reality, the judges have until quite recently been nominated by their respective Governments. The jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts extends over all civil cases between Europeans and Egyptians, whether the European appears as plaintiff or defendant ; also, over civil cases between Europeans of different nationalities. The principal defect of the Mixed Courts is that the judges are not merely interpreters of the law ; they are also to a great extent makers of it. They are not under the effective control of any legislature. If, as is both natural and occasionally almost unavoidable, they attempt, by a some- what strained interpretation of their charter, to usurp functions which do not belong to them, there is no one to restrain them. In order that any new law should be recognised by the Mixed Courts, it must receive the assent of all the CH. xLii THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM 319 Powers, and experience has shown that it is generally impossible, and always dijEficult and tedious, to ensure the required unanimity. Legis- lation by diplomacy is probably the worst and most cumbersome form of legislation in the world. Under these circumstances, it is easy to understand that the judges of the Mixed Courts are practically a law unto themselves. When the Indian code was framed, some of the most acute intellects of the time devoted themselves to a lengthy examination of the subject with a view to deciding what provisions of European law and procedure, whether British or Roman, could be adapted to the circumstances and requirements of India. The result was the pro- duction of an admirable code, which was essentially Indian. No such care was taken in Egypt. The Egyptian code was originally little more than a textual copy of the French code, and, moreover, it was applied by judges who, although in some instances men of ability, were necessarily ignorant of Egyptian manners and customs. The result was that great hardship was at times inflicted, more especially in respect to the application of the laws regulating the relations between debtor and creditor. The ignorant Egyptian debtor found himself, before he was aware of it, gripped in the iron hand of the law, which was mercilessly applied by his Levantine creditor. Eventually, some modifications were made, but even now the law and procedure are too European for the country. The Mixed Courts only exercise criminal juris- diction over Europeans in a certain number of specified cases, most of which are of rare occurrence. For the most ])art, any European resident in Egypt who is accused of crime is tried by his Consul according to the laws of his own country. The Native Tribunals instituted under Lord 320 MODERN EGYPT pr.rf Dufferin's auspices exercise civil and criminal jurisdiction over Ottoman subjects, save in respect to matters relating to personal status, which are decided by the Kadi according to the system of ecclesiastical jurisprudence embodied in the Sacred Law of Islam. The working of these Tribunals will be discussed at a later period of this work. To sum up, if an Egyptian and a European wish some civil cause of dispute between them to be decided, they go to the ^lixed Courts. If an European commits a criminal offence against an Egyptian, he is tried by his Consul, with an appeal possibly to Aix, Ancona, Odessa, or elsewhere, according to the nationality of the accused. If an Egyptian brings a civil suit against another Egyptian, or if he commits any criminal offence whether against a European or another Egyptian, he comes under the jurisdiction of the Native Tribunals, which administer the French code, modified in some respects to suit Egypt. If an Egyptian wishes to prove a will or to dispute a succession, he has to go to the Kadi, who will decide according to the Sheriat. Enough has now been said to give an idea of the main features of the judicial labyrinth which time and international rivalry have built up in Egypt. CHAPTER XLIII THE WORKERS OF THE MACHINE Importance of persons rather than of systems — The British Consul- General — Tewfik Pasha — The Prime Ministers — Cherif Pasha — Nubar Pasha — Riaz Pasha — Mustapha Pasha FehmL An endeavour has been made in the four preceding chapters to give some idea of the machinery of Government in Egypt in so far as the different parts of the machine can be described by reference to documents setting forth the official functions which are assigned to the various individuals and corporations who collectively make or, at one time, made up the governing body. This description is, however, incomplete ; indeed, in some respects it is almost misleading ; for allusion has so far only been made to those portions of the State machinery whose functions can be described with some deo-ree of precision. There are, however, other portions of that machinery whose functions are incapable oi exact definition, but whose existence is none the less real. Whether, in fact, the whole machine works well or ill depends in no small degree upon the action of those parts of the machinery which, to a superficial observer, might appear unnecessary, if not detrimental to its efficient working. In the Egyptian body politic, the unseen is often more important than the seen. Notably, of late years a vague but preponderant power has been vested in the hands of the British Consul-GeneraL The VOL. II 821 T 322 MODERN EGYPT pt. iv defects in this system of government are obvious. Its only justification is that, under the existing condition of affairs in Egypt, it is impossible to substitute anything better in its place. I proceed to give a sketch of the duties of the British Consul-General, but inasmuch as during the greater portion of the period of which this history treats, I occupied the post of Consul-General, I must, for obvious reasons, leave it to others to appreciate the manner in which those duties were performed. Looking to the general condition of Egyptian society ; to the unscrupulous methods by which it was customary to advance personal aims ; to the untruthfulness, corruption, and intrigue with which Egyptian society was honeycombed ; and finally, to the fact that whatever pseudo-civilisation existed in Egypt was often tainted by reason of its having drawn its inspirations from those portions of the European social system which are least worthy of imitation, — it always appeared to me that the first and most important duty of the British representa- tive in Egypt was, by example and precept, to set up a high standard of morality, both in his public and private life, and thus endeavour to raise the standard of those around him. If I have in any way succeeded in this endeavour ; if I have helped to purge Egyptian administration of corruption ; if it is gradually dawning on the Egyptian mind that honesty is not only the most honourable but also the most paying policy, and that lying and intrigue curse the liar and intriguer as well as his victim, — I owe the success, in so far as public matters are concerned, to the co-operation of a body of high-minded British officials who have persistently held up to all with whom they have been brought in contact a standard of probity heretofore unknown in Egypt, and, in so far as CH. xLiii THE WORKERS 323 social life is concerned, T owed it, until cruel death intervened to sever the tie which bound us together, mainly to the gentle yet commanding influence of her who first instigated me to write this book. The duty of a diplomatic agent in a foreign country is to carry out to the best of his ability the policy of the Government which he serves. My main difficulty in Egypt was that the Britisli Government never had any definite policy which was capable of execution ; they were, indeed, at one time constantly striving to square the circle, that is to say, they were endeavouring to carry out two policies which were irreconcilable, namely, the policy of reform, and the counter-policy of evacua- tion. The British Government are not to be blamed on this account. The circumstances were of a nature to preclude the possibility of adopting a clear-cut line of action, which would have enabled the means to be on all occasions logically adapted to the end. I never received any general instructions for my guidance during the time I lield the post of British Consul-General in Egypt, and I never asked for any such instructions, for I knew that it was useless for me to do so. IMy course of action was decided according to the merits of each case with which I had to deal. Sometimes I spurred the unwilling Egyptian along the path of reform. At other times, I curbed the impatience of the British reformer. Sometimes I had to explain to the old- world Mohammedan, the Mohammedan of the Sheriat, the elementary differences between the principles of government in vogue in the seventh and in the nineteenth centuries. At other times, I had to explain to the young Gallicised Egyptian that the principles of an ultra-Republican Government were not applicable in their entirety to the exist- ing phase of Egyptian society, and that, when we 324 MODERN EGYPT pt.iv speak of the rights of man, some distinction has necessarily to be made in practice between a Euro- pean spouting nonsense through the medium -of a fifth -rate newspaper in his own country, and man in the person of a ragged Egyptian fellah, possessed of a sole garment, and who is unable to read a newspaper in any language whatsoever. I had to support the reformer sufficiently to prevent him from being discouraged, and sufficiently also to enable him to carry into execution all that was essential in his reforming policy. I had to check the reformer when he wished to push his reforms so far as to shake the whole political fabric ^ in his endeavour to overcome the tiresome and, to his eyes, often trumpery obstacles in his path, and thus lay bare to the world that measures which were dictated in the true interests of Egypt were opposed by many who had, by accident or by the political cant of the day, been elevated to the position of being the putative representatives of Egyptian public opinion. I had to support the supremacy of the Sultan and, at the same time, to oppose any practical Turkish interference in the administration, which necessarily connoted a relapse into barbarism. I had at one time to do nothing inconsistent with a speedy return to Egyptian self- government, or, at all events, a return to govern- ment by the hybrid coterie of Cairo, which flaunts before the world as the personification of Egyptian autonomy ; whilst, at the same time, I was well aware that, for a long time to come, European guidance will be essential if the administration is to be conducted on sound principles. I had at times to 1 Sir John Seeley (Growth of British Policy, ii. p. 323), speaking of William III., says: "The main reason why his work has proved so stranii^ely durable is that it was never excessive. He had a wise parsimony in action. . . . The masterpieces of the statesman's art are for the most part not acts, but abstinences from action." A somewhat eimilar view was frequently advanced by Burke. cH. xLiii THE VVOUKEKS 325 retire into my diplomatic shell, and to pose as one amongst many representatives of foreign Powers. At other times, I had to step forward as the representative of the Sovereign whose soldiers held Egypt in their grip. At one time, I had to deftnd Egypt against European aggression, and, not un- frequently, I had in the early days of the occupa- tion to defend the British position against foreign attack. I had to keep in touch with the well- intentioned, generally reasonable, but occasionally ill-informed public opinion of England, when I knew that the praise or blame of the British Parliament and press was a very faulty standard by which to judge the wisdom or unwisdom of my acts. I had to maintain British authority and, at the same time, to hide as much as possible the fact that I was maintaining it. I had a military force at my disposal, which I could not use save in the face of some grave emergency. I had to work through British agents over whom I possessed no control, save that based on personal authority and moral suasion. I had to avoid any step which might involve the creation of European difficulties by reason of local troubles. I had to keep the Egyptian question simmering, and to avoid any action which might tend to force on its premature consideration, and I had to do this at one time when all, and at another time when some of the most important Powers were more or less opposed to British policy. Lastly, the most heterogeneous petty questions were continually coming before me. If a young British officer was cheated at cards, I had to get him out of his difficulties. If a slave girl wanted to marry, I had to bring moral pressure on her master or mistress to give their consent. If a Jewish sect wished for official recognition from the Egyptian Government, I was expected to obtain it, and to explain to an Egyptian Minister all I 326 MODERN EGYPT va. iv knew of the difference between Ashkenazian and Sephardic practices. If the inhabitants of some remote village in Upper Egypt were discontented witli their Sheikh, they a})pealed to me. I have had to write telegrams and despatches about the most miscellaneous subjects — about the dismissal of the Khedive's English coachman, about pre- serving the lives of Irish informers from the Clan- na-Gael conspirators, and about the tenets of the Abyssinian Church in respect to the Procession of the Holy Ghost. I have been asked to interfere in order to get a German missionary, who had been guilty of embezzlement, out of prison ; in order to get a place for the French and Italian Catholics to bury their dead ; in order to get a dead Mohammedan of great sanctity exhumed ; in order to prevent a female member of the Khedivial family from striking her husband over the mouth with a slipper ; and in order to arrange a marriage between two other members of the same family whom hard-hearted relatives kept apart. I have had to take one English maniac in my own carriage to a Lunatic Asylum ; I have caused another to be turned out of the English church ; and I have been informed that a tliiid and remarkably muscular madman was on his way to my house, girt with a towel round his loins, and bearing a poker in his hands with the intention of using that implement on my head. I have been asked by an Egyptian fellah to find out the whereabouts of his wife who had eloped ; and by a German professor to send him at once six live electric shad-fish, from the Nile. To sum up the situation in a few words, I had not, indeed, to govern Egypt, but to assist in the government of the country without the appearance of doing so and without any legitimate authority over the ajxents with whom I had to deal. Under these somewhat bewildering circum- CH. xLiii THE WORKERS 327 stances, the only general principles which I was able to lay down for my own guidance were, first, to settle all purely local matters on the spot, with as little reference as possible to London ; secondly, to refer for instructions in respect to any matter which was calculated either to raise diplo- matic questions outside the local sphere of interest, or to attract serious attention in Parliament. On the whole, I think it may be said that this system worked as well as could, under the very peculiar circumstances of the situation, have been expected. A middle course was steered between the extremes of centralisation and decentralisation. It is clear that the working of a nondescript Government, such as that which has existed in Egypt since 1882, must depend mainly on the personal characteristics of the individuals who are at the head of affairs. The principal person who figured on the Egyptian stage during the first nine years of the British occupation was the late Khedive, Tewfik Pasha. The best friends of Tewfik Pasha would probably not contend that he was a great man or an ideal Khedive. There was, in fact, no real greatness about him. He was a monogamist, and thus set a good example to his countrymen. He was an indulgent and well-intentioned father who en- deavoured to educate his children well. He acquired a reputation for devotion, whilst he was devoid of any tinge of the intolerance with which devout Islamism is sometimes tainted. His piety kept him in touch with his Moslem subjects, and thus constituted a political factor of some importance. Judged by the standard of his surroundings, he was loyal and straightforward. Like most of liis countrymen, he would shirk responsibility, and would endeavour to throw as much as he could on the shoulders of others, He would complain of the 328 MODERN EGYPT ft. nr number of Europeans in the Egyptian sen ice, and when any European asked him for a place, he would reply that personally he would be delighted to grant the request, but that some British authority prevented him from following the benevolent dictates of his heart. He was apathetic, and wanting in initiative, but, when forced to take a decision, would not unfrequently show a good deal of dignified common sense and shrewdness. He was kind-hearted, and even at times displayed some signs of gratitude for services rendered to him, a quality which is rare in an Oriental ruler. Warned by the example of his father, he shunned extravagance to the extent, indeed, of being occasionally accused of avarice, but he sometimes performed acts of real generosity. There was little of the typical Oriental despot in Tewfik Pasha's character. He professed a deep, and, without doubt, genuine dislike to all arbitrary, oppressive, or cruel acts. He was never personally responsible for the commission of any such act, although it may well be that from apathy and negligence he allowed injustice to be occasionally perpetrated in his name. He was not highly educated. He rarely, if ever, read a book, but he studied the newspapers ; he conversed with all sorts and conditions of men ; he was fairly quick in mastering any facts which were explained to him, and in picking up the thread of an argument. From the point of view of intellectual acuteness, he was probably rather above the average of his countrymen. He obtained, not by study but by practical experience in dealing with men and things, a fair education of a nature which is useful to a man occupying a high public position. I^ike most of his countrymen, he would yield a ready assent to any high-sounding general principle. In practice, he would often fail to see that some action, which CH. xLiii THE WORKERS 329 it was proposed to take, was at variance with the principle to whicli he had assented ; nevertheless, when the dissonance between the particular act and the principle was brought home to him, he would generally, by some process of reasoning, which would be unfamiliar, if not incomprehensible, to the clear-cut European mind, arrive at the conclusion that the commission of the act was reprehensible. His conduct during the events of 1882 showed that he was not wanting in courage. On the whole, it may be said that, if Tewfik Pasha's virtues were mediocre, his faults were of a venial character. If he excited none of the admiration due to moral greatness or to high intellectual qualities, neither did he excite repro- bation by sinking below the moral and intellectual standard of his surroundings. He was morally and intellectually respectable, and, considered as a man rather than as a ruler of men, he met with the qualified commendation which is usually meted out to respectability. His character and conduct were not of a nature to excite enthusiasm on his behalf. On the other hand, they rarely formed the subject of severe condemnation. In the majority of cases which attracted })ublic attention, the faint praise, which is scarcely distinguishable from an implication of blame, was accorded to him. He probably deserved more praise than he ever obtained. He honestly wished to do his duty. He was really interested in the welfare of his subjects, but he was bewildered by the involved nature of his position, and did not see clearly how his duty could best be performed. For this he may be pardoned, more especially when it is remembered that he had no ex])erience of the world outside Egypt. Tewfik Pasha never visited Europe. If he was not a great man, neither was he an 330 MODERN EGYPT pt. iv ideal Khedive. If he had been a man of excep- tionally firm will, high character, and acute intellect, he would have put himself at the head of the policy of reform in Egypt ; he would have asserted his own authority ; he would have shown no jealousy of the Englishmen who were employed in his service ; he would have co-operated actively with them in the cause of reform, and he would have forced the Egyptians in his service to yield a similar loyal co-operation. Tewfik Pasha did not possess the strength of character to adopt a bold policy of this sort, and perhaps it would have been Utopian to expect that he should have done so. Although, however, Tewfik Pasha was not an ideal Khedive, nevertheless, looking to all the circumstances of the time, and to the character- istics of Oriental rulers generally, it may be said that he possessed, in a somewhat exceptional degree, many qualities which singularly fitted him to occupy the post he held during the time he held it. Under the regime of a fanatical Moslem, or of a man of arbitrary temperament and despotic tendencies, or of a feeble voluptu- ary indifferent to everything which did not minister to his own pleasures— all types which are common in the history of Oriental countries — the difficulties in the way of launching Egypt on the path of progress would have been greatly increased. Tewfik Pasha possessed the negative virtue that he answered to none of these descriptions, and, under the circumstances, this was a virtue of incalculable value. But he possessed more than negative virtues. He could lay claim to some good qualities of a positive character. If he did not take any active part in initiating reforms, he was content that others should do so for him. If he could not lead the reformers, he had no objection to follow- cii. xLiii THE WORKERS 331 ing their lead. If he did not afford any very active assistance to the small band of Englishmen who were laying the foundations of a prosperous future for Egypt, neither did he interfere actively to place obstacles in their path ; indeed, he often used his influence to remove obstacles. His position was one of great difficulty. On the one hand, it was dangerous to oppose the English, and, moreover, he was sufficiently intelligent to see that it was contrary to his own interests and to those of his country to do so. On the other hand, if he threw himself into the arms of the English, he was sure to lose popularity amongst certain influential sections of his own countrymen. The natural result was that Tewfik Pasha developed a consider- able talent for trimming. The circumstances of the time were, indeed, such that he could scarcely with prudence adopt any other line of policy ; and, as a trimmer, he played his part remarkably well. He afforded an admirable link between the Englishman nnd the Egyptian, and he often per- formed useful work in moderating the views of either side. In the performance of this task, he naturally came in for a good deal of criticism from both quarters. He might often have said : In moderation placing all my glory, While Tories call me Whig, and Whigs a Tory, Moreover, Tewfik Pasha possessed another very valuable quality. He knew his country and his countrymen well. It was not in vain tliat Arslbi had marched with horse, foot, and artillery into the square of Abdin Palace, and had imposed his will on his reluctant Sovereign. It was not in vain that he had listened to the inflated rubbish talked by would-be patriots about free institutions, which were uncongenial to the soil of Egypt. He had laid these matters to heart. He knew the ignorance 332 IMODERN EGYPT pi. iv and credulity of the mass of the population. He recognised the danger of fanning the smoulder- ing embers of Moslem fanaticism. He apj^reciated the difficulties of his position, and he knew that if he did not lean on the strong arm of England, many of those who knelt at his feet would be ready, should the occasion arise and should they see their own profit in doing so, to turn on him and rend him. He was deeply impressed with the fact that he owed his position to British interference. He recognised his weakness, and he knew that, should he ever incur the serious displeasure of England, that two-handed engine at the door, in the shape of the British fleet and the British army, stood ready to strike once and strike no more. Thus, though he would coquette with those who urged him to oppose the English, he never allowed himself to be pushed too far in this direction. I once had to remind him that Ismail Pasha was on the shores of the Bosphorus, and that his return to Cairo was not altogether outside the verge of practical politics, upon which Tewfik Pasha made the significant remark: "Un JSIinistre on pent toujours changer, mais le Khedive — c'est autre chose." A change of INlinistry shortly afterwards occurred, for Tewfik Pasha was wise enough never to identify himself fully with the policy of any Minister. He knew that a change of JNIinistry was an admirable political safety-valve, and when he felt his own ])osition in any danger, he very wisely did not hesitate to send a ministerial scapegoat into the wilderness. I bear Tewfik's name in kindly and respectful remembrance, for thougli I daresay he winced under the pressure, which I occasionally brought to bear on him, my relations with him were very pleasant and friendly, neither did tliey in any way redound to his discredit. The idea, which under the influence cH. xLiii THE WORKERS 333 of the Anglophobe party took some root in Egypt, to the effect that he was a mere tool in my hands, is wholly untrue and most unjust to his memory. I used to discuss matters with him. When any difference of opinion occurred, I yielded to him quite as often — indeed, I think more often — than he yielded to me. We generally came to some equitable compromise between our conflicting views. When he died, he was just beginning to reap the fruits of the reforming policy. He had become popular by reason of the reforms, although, as a matter of fact, he had not taken any leading part in effecting them. He acquiesced in them of his own free will, but sometimes with an unwilling mind, — eK^v aeKovri ye Ovfxw. His death was a great loss to Egypt. Whatever may have been his faults, he deserves a somewhat prominent niche in the Valhalla of Oriental potentates. Posterity will be unjust if they forget that it was during the reign of Tewfik Pasha that Egypt was first started on the road to prosperity, and that he took not, indeed, the most leading part in the rehabilita- tion of his country, but still ii part of which his descendants may well be proud ; for, without his abstention from opposition, and without his sup- port, albeit it was at times rather lukewarm, the efforts of the British reformer would have been far less productive of result than has actually been the case. Had he been a man of stronger character and more marked individuahty, it is possible that his country would have progressed less rapidly. He should be remembered as the Khedive who allowed Egyj)t to be reformed in spite of the Egyptians. The leading personage in the Egyptian political world is the Khedive. The Prime JNIinister, how- ever, also occupies a position of great import- ance. After the bombardment of Alexandria in 334 MODERN EGYPT pt. iv 1882, Cherif Pasha was named to this office. In January 1884, he was succeeded by Nubar Pasha, who remained in office till June 1888. On Nubar Pasha's fall, Riaz Pasha became Prime Minister. His INIinistry lasted till May 1891. His successor was Mustapha Pasha Fehmi. On January 7, 1892, Tewhk Pasha died. His son and successor, Abbas Pasha, kept Mustapha Pasha Fehmi in office till January 1893, when he was succeeded by Riaz Pasha, who, again, in April 1894, was succeeded by Nubar Pasha. In the autumn of 1895, Nubar Pasha's failing health obliged him to quit office. He was succeeded by Mustapha Pasha Fehmi. Of Cherif Pasha little need be said. He was a Minister of the pre - occupation days rather than of the occupation. His character is almost sufficiently described in the narrative given in a previous portion of this work. To what has been already said it is only necessary to add that Cherif Paslia was the least Egyptian of any of the Moslem Prime Ministers of recent times. He was a pure Turk who, in early life, had come from Constanti- nople. The ordinary Turco-Egyptian is generally more Egyptian than Turk. Cherif Pasha, on the other hand, was a Turco-Egyptian in the first stage of Egyptianisation. It is true that he favoured Egyptian semi -autonomy, and that he viewed with dislike any increased interference by the Sultan in Egyptian affiiirs ; but he was out of sympathy with the pure Egyptians, whom he regarded as a conquered race ; he was, in fact, the incarnation of the ])olicy of " Egypt for the Turco- Egyptians." Whatever was not Turkish in his character, was French. He had assimilated a good deal of the bonhomie which sometimes, and of the keen sense of the ridiculous which more frequently is to be found amongst the French, but CH.XLIII THE WORKERS 335 tie never lost the predominant characteristics of a Turkish aristocrat. He was proud, courageous, honest after his way, and, in his public life, always negligent of detail and sometimes of principle. Occasionally, he would emit flashes of true states- manship, but he was too careless, too apathetic, and too wanting in persistence to carry out his own principles in practice. With all his faults, he was, on the whole, one of the most sympathetic figures on the political stage of Egypt during recent times. Nubar Pasha was by far the most interesting of latter-day Egyptian politicians. Intellectually, he towered above his competitors. Bearing in mind, however, the intellectual calibre of those com- petitors, he deserves more than such faint praise as this. He was, indeed, a bad administrator, and this defect detracted from his political usefulness, more especially by reason of the fact that, according to his own admission,^ Egypt stood in need of administrators rather than of statesmen. Never- theless, even in Egypt some statesmanlike qualities are demanded from those who are at the head of affairs, and Nubar Pasha could unquestionably lay claim to the possession of qualities, which can be characterised as statesmanlike. He was a thorough Oriental, but, unlike many Orientals, his foreign education had not resulted in his assimilating the bad and discarding the more worthy portions of European civilisation. He was far too great a man to be atti-acted by all tlie flimsy tinsel and moral obliquity which lie on the surface of European civilisation, that is to say, the civilisation of the Paris Boulevards, whose principal apostles are usually European or Levant- ine adventurers. He saw all these things, but unlike the Gallicised Egyptian, who is too often » Vide ante, p. 262. 336 MODERN EGYPT ft. it lured to his moral destruction by them, the only effect which they produced on his more elevated mind was to make him ask himself — how can I protect my country of adoption against the inroads of the quick-witted but unscrupulous European ? It is clear that Egypt is to be Europeanised ; how can this process best be effected ? The answer which Nubar Pasha gave to these questions was worthy of a statesman. He rightly differentiated the divergences between Eastern and Western systems of government. Personal rule, he said to himself, must give way before a reign of law. The Egyptians must learn from Europe how to protect themselves both against the arbitrary caprices of their rulers, and against the advancing and somewhat turbid tide of Euro- peans with whom they are destined to be associated. They can only do so by assimilating that respect for the law which forms the keystone of the arch on which European systems of government rest. It cannot be contended that this idea was very original, or that any great mental effort was required for its conception. But to Nubar Pasha belongs the credit tliat he was the first Egyptian statesman who conceived it, or, at all events, who endeavoured to carry it into practice. Whatever may have been the blemishes in Nubar Pasha's character, and whatever may be the defects in the judicial institutions which he created, it should never be forgotten that he first endeavoured to bring home to the Egyptian governing class and to the Egyptian people that, whereas might, whether in the person of despotic Khedives or dictatorial di])lomatists, had heretofore been right in Egypt, the foundation of good government in any com- munity pretending to call itself civilised is that the maxim should be reversed, and that might should yield to right. CH.XLIII THE WORKERS 887 Nubar Pasha had, therefore, no difficulty m grasping a European principle. Indeed, the wider the principle, the more readily he grasped it, for he dearly loved dealing in generalities. His defect was that, having once got hold of a sound principle, he would not unfrequently ride it to death. He did not sufficiently adapt it to the circumstances with which he had to deal. Or, again, he would sometimes think that, having enunciated the principle, he had done all that was required of him. He rarely endeavoured to acquaint himself thoroughly with facts, or to see that the practice was made to conform with the principle which he had adopted. Moreover, he would some- times readily assent to some wide general principle without any serious intention of applying it at all, and he was led to do this all the more because his subtle intellect was not slow to perceive that Europeans, and especially Englishmen, are liable to be soothed by plausible, albeit often fallacious generalities. Nubar Pasha was a brilliant conversationalist. He possessed a marvellous power of imparting a character of perfect verisimilitude to the series of half-truths, bordering on fiction, which he was wont to pour into the ears of his interested listener. The educated European was struck by his ap- parently wide grasp and bold generalisations, the fallacies of which could often only be detected by those who had a perfect acquaintance with the facts. The European would readily fall a victim to the fascinating manners, the graceful diction, the subtle reasoning, and deferential deportment, which distinguish the peculiar type of Oriental of whom Nubar Pasha was perhaps the most typical representative. It was only after experi- ence and reflection that he would perceive that, the premises being hicorrect, the conclusions of his VOL. II z 338 MODERN EGYPT ft. iv teacher in Egyptian affairs were often erroneous, and tliat the broad enunciations of principle with which he had been charmed were intended more for academic discussion in the closet than for practical decision in the Council Chamber. Nubar Pasha's readiness, his versatility, the audacity with which he would defend the most glaring fallacies, and his great command of language, acquired for him some reputation as a diplomatist. To a certain extent, this reputation was well deserved. On many occasions, he showed himself to be a skilful negotiator. He was especi- ally skilful in throwing a cloud of ambiguity over his meaning and his intentions. He was a master of the French language, and one of the peculiarities of that language is that, although it is eminently precise when the writer or speaker wishes to give precision to his thoughts, on the other hand, it is full of ambiguous expressions, which afford a powerful help to a diplomatist who wishes to leave open some back door through which to retreat from the engagements which he is apparently taking, and this was not unfrequently Nubar Pasha's case. He would probably have been more successful as a diplomatist in the eighteenth than in the nineteenth century. Modern diplomacy is not mere jugglery, neither is the most successful diplomatist he who can best throw dust in the eyes of his opponent. Under the influence of publicity, and perhaps to some extent of Prince Bismarck, the whole art, if diplomacy can be dignified by such a name, has been simplified ; perhaps some, including Nubar Pasha himself, would say that it has been brutalised. The affairs between nation and nation are now conducted on more business-like principles than heretofore. A plain answer is required to a plain question, and although some tricks of the trade still survive, they are, by com- CH. xLiii THE WORKERS 339 parison with the past, of little practical utility. It was Nubar Pasha's misfortune that, during the latter part of his career, he had to deal princi- pally with a European nation whose members are distinguished for their straightforward mode of conducting business. In a way, he understood the English character. He once made a signi- ficant and characteristic remark. ** L'Anglais," he said, " est tres naif, mais lorsqu'on pense qu'on I'a tromp4 tout d'un coup il se tourne et il vous flanque un terrible coup de pied quelque part." But although he knew that intrigue was of little real use against the Englishman, he could not resist the temptation of intriguing. He could not abandon his favourite weapon of offence and defence. The natural result ensued. In spite of his real talents, his suavity, his earnest devotion to civilised principles of government, and his profuse professions of friendship and esteem, he inspired but little confidence amongst those Englishmen with whom he was brought in con- tact. They mistrusted him, perhaps more than he deserved to be mistrusted. He could never under- stand the feelings which his behaviour excited in the minds of Englishmen. He went to his grave with a hardy and unimpaired belief in the political virtues of finesse bordering on duplicity. Nubar Pasha's political views during the early period of the British occupation of Egypt were characteristic. He was in favour of the occupa- tion. He saw that a British garrison was necessary to maintain order. '* If," he frequently said, *' the British troops are withdrawn, I shall leave Egypt with the last battalion." But, on the other hand, he was opposed to what he termed the "adminis- trative occupation." In other words, what he wanted was a military force, in whom perfect reliance could be placed, to keep him in power, 340 MODERN EGYPT pt. n whilst he was to be allowed a free hand in every- thing connected with the civil administration of the country. Hence his extreme civility to all British military officers, whose praises he was never weary of singing. AVhat, indeed, for all the purposes which he had at heart, could be more perfect than the presence in Egypt of a thoroughly disciplined force, commanded by young men who took no interest in local politics, and who occupied themselves exclusively with polo and cricket ? Hence, also, his constant opposition during his first period of office (1884-88) to the British civilians in the Egyptian service and to myself, as the British diplomatic representative who supported them. Our action jarred terribly with the Nubarian programme. It is strange that a really able man, such as Nubar Pasha, should have thought his programme capable of realisation, and that he should not have seen the impossibility of the British Government looking on as passive spectators whilst a British force was in Egypt, and allowing the maladministration of the Egyptian Pashas to remain practically unchecked. And this would certainly have been the result of acquiescence in Nubar Pasha's system of government.^ With any ordinary degree of prudence, Nubar Pasha could have remained Prime Minister for an indefinite period, and it is a pity that he did not do so, for his talents were far superior to those of his competitors. His fall in 1888 came about in this fashion. For some four years, I got on fairly well with liim. On many occasions, I afforded him strong support. I shut my eyes to a good deal of intrigue, which I knew was going on around me. In an evil moment for himself, Nubar ^ In illustration of the truth of this remark, I may refer to what happened about the Commissions of Brigandage {vide ante, p. 289 and infra, p. 405). CH.XLIII THE WORKERS 341 Pasha went to England. He had an interview with Lord Salisbury at wliich I was present. To my surprise, for he liad not giv^en me any warning of his intentions, he burst out into a violent tirade against the British officials in Egypt in general, and against Sir Edgar Vincent and myself in particular. All this produced very little effect on Lord Salisbury, but the ultimate result — for this was only the beginning of a breach which sub- sequently widened — was such as Nubar Pasha hardly anticipated. He thought he was' doing a clever stroke of business. What he really did was to bring about his own downfall. He thought to pose as the defender of Egyptian rights against British aggression, and thus to mitigate the pre- judices entertained against him by the JMohammedan population by reason of his race and creed. What he really did was to open the mouths of all his numerous enemies in Egypt, who had only remained silent because they thought that, strong in the support of England, his position was unassailable. Nubar Pasha failed to see that which was apparent to others possessed of none of his intellectual subtlety, namely, that the English were his natural allies, and that directly he broke up the alliance his fall was inevitable. When once it became apparent that he could no longer rely on British support, Tewfik Pasha seized on some trivial pretext for dismissing him.^ * I did nothing to hasten the downfall of Nubar Pasha. The European situation was at that time (1888) somewhat critical. Lord Salisbury, who was then in office, was, therefore, rather desirous of postponing any crisis in Egyptian affairs. On February 17, 1888, he wrote to me : ''I have asked you by telegraph to try and manage to postpone any breach with Nubar to a more convenient season. ... I believe you are right in this controversy, but if I thought you wrong, I should still think it impossible to retreat before Nubar in the face of the whole East. It is not, therefore, from any doubt about support- ing you that 1 urge you to keep the peace for the present, but because I do not wish our administration in Egypt to be the cause to which the long European war is to be ascribed by the future historian." 342 MODERN EGYPT ft. iv I really believe that I regretted Nubar Pasha's fall more than he did himself. His Protean changes, his emotional character, and his ignorance of the rudiments of many of the administrative questions with which he had to deal, were at times exasper- ating. Nevertheless, I could not help liking him. It was pleasant to have to deal with a man of real ability, who could converse rationally and who, if he did not understand much which should be familiar to any politician and administrator, could at all events grasp the main lines of action which should guide the Government of a civilised com- munity. Moreover, there was an indescribable charm about Nubar Pasha which was almost irresistible. I have never known any one more persuasive, or more skilled in the art of making the worse appear the better reason. I used often to half believe him, when I knew full well that he was trying to dupe me. I felt towards him much what Shakespeare felt towards his faithless mistress : — When my love swears that she is made of truth, I do believe her, though I know she lies. I admired his talents, and I never could forget that, in spite of his defects, he possessed some unquestionably statesmanlike qualities. If he had only recognised the fact that in the government of the world mere intellectual gifts are not all-powerful, and that high character and reputation also exercise a potent influence over mankind, he would have been a really great man. I find some difficulty in writing about Kiaz Pasha, not only because, I am glad to say (1907), he is still living, but also because he is a personal friend for whom I entertain the highest regard and esteem. I may say, however, that Nubar Pasha and Riaz Pasha were the Egyptian representatives of two wilely different schools of CH. xLiii THE WORKERS 343 political and social thought. Nubar Pasha recognised the fact that there was only one true civilisation in the world, and that was the civilisation of Europe. Accordingly, he set to work to Europeanise the main framework of Egyptian institutions by means which were sometimes wise, and sometimes, possibly, the reverse, but he never entertained any doubt as to the nature of the object to be attained. Riaz Pasha, on the other hand, represented the apotheosis of Islamism. AVhy, he thought, should not the Saturnia regna, when Moslems were really great, return ? He would barely recognise the necessity of the least European assistance in the process of Egyptian regeneration. " Seul," he said to himself, "je ferai le bonheur de mon peuple." He held that Mohammedans and Mohammedanism contain within themselves all that is needed for their own regeneration. It would be both unjust and ungenerous not to extend some sympathy to views of this sort. It would be too much to expect that a fervid Moslem and a sincere Egyptian patriot — and Riaz Pasha answers both of these descriptions — should readily accept the facts, which are almost certainly true, namely, that Islamism as a social and political system — though not as a religion — is moribund, that the judicial and admin- istrative procedures common amongst Moslems are so closely interwoven with their religion as to be almost inseparable the one from the other, and that for many a long year to come the Egyptians will be incapable of governing themselves on civilised principles. Riaz Pasha's political life may be divided into four different phases ; first, as a INIinister and as a Commissioner of Inquiry under Ismail Pasha; secondly, as Prime Minister under Tewfik Pasha during the period of the Anglo-French Control ; thirdly, as Prime Minister under Tewfik Pasha 344 MODERN EGYPT ft. iv during the time of the British occupation; and, fourthly, as Prime Minister under Abbas II. He appeared to most advantage in the first phase. He was indignant at the ruin which Ismail Pasha brought on his country. He stood out boldly as a reformer at a time when a reforming Egyptian could not state his true opinions without risk to his life and property. Whatever faults Riaz Pasha may have subsequently committed, it should never be forgotten that during this phase of his career he showed a great deal of real courage and foresight.^ In the early portions of the second phase, that is to say, the period of the Anglo-French Control, Riaz Pasha also showed to advantage. He was placed in such a position that his dislike to European interference was of necessity tempered by the consideration that the Europeans, with whom he was principally associated, were very useful. The Controllers stood between him and the hungry creditors of the Egyptian Government, and Riaz Pasha was aware that he did not possess sufficient technical knowledge to evolve order out of the existing financial chaos without European assistance. During the later portion of the Control period, he had to deal with a question which possibly required higher qualities, and a greater degree of political insight, tlian any that he possessed. He was swept off his legs by the Arabi movement, of which he failed to see the importance until too late. The third phase of Riaz Pasha's political career was when, in succession to Nubar Pasha, he was made Prime Minister by Tewfik during the period of the British occupation. At first matters went fairly well. Riaz had some advantages over Nubar Pasha. He was by far the better administrator of the two. He knew Egypt well ; lie was himself a * Vide utile, vol. i. p. 45. CH.XLIII THE WORKERS 345 first-rate practical agriculturist, and could discuss all matters bearing on tiie condition of the agricultural classes with a thorough knowledge of his subject. He exercised great authority over the Egyptian officials. The fact that a devout JMohammedan was at the head of affairs produced a tranquillising effect on Mohammedan public opinion. On the other hand, he was too inelastic to manage so delicate a machine as the government of Egypt during the occupation period. He did not altogether appreciate the change which time and the political situation of the day had effected in the system of governing the country. He failed to see that, under a reign of law, he could not always have his own way, for Riaz Pasha, although he had a certain rough idea of justice, had but little respect for the law. He thought that when laws or regulations clashed with his ideas of what was right and wrong, they should be broken. The result of his peculiar temperament and habits of thought was that, after a while, he quarrelled with almost every one, European and Egyptian, and produced a state of administrative friction, which rendered his retirement frcmi office inevitable. The fourth phase of Riaz's career was when he was Minister under Abbas II. — a period with the history of which I am not attempting to deal in the present work. To sum up, Riaz Pasha is a staunch Moslem, possessed of intellectual qualities which are certainly equal, and of moral qualities which are decidedly superior to those of the class to which he belongs. Notably, his physical and moral fearlessness deserve high commendation. It were well for the cause of Egyptian patriotism, if there were more ]Kitriots endowed with the sterling qualities which are cons})icuous in Riaz Paslia's rugged, yet very sympathetic character. 346 MODERN EGYPT pt. iv The simplicity of Mustapha Pasha Fehmi's character renders it unnecessary to allude to him at any length. Loyal, thoroughly honest, truthful, and courteous, he possesses all the qualities which Englishmen usually associate with the word gentle- man. He has been statesmanlike enough to see that the interests of his country would best be served by working loyally with the British officials, instead of opposing them. During his tenure of office, Egypt has made greater progress, both moral and material, than at any previous period. Having now described the machinery of the Government, and the principal individuals who were entrusted with its working, it would appear logical to deal with the work whic^) the machine produced. Before, however, describing what the English did in Egypt, it will be as well to say something of what they wished to do. The next chapters will, therefore, be devoted to describing that strange phantom which, under the name of British Policy in Egypt, was constantly eluding the grasp both of those to whom it owed its being and of others who endeavoured, from time to time, to understand its true significance. It was not until 1904 that this phantom disappeared, and that a more substantial political creation was substituted in its place. PART V BRITISH POLICY IN EGYPT We trust it may he granted to tis to lahoiirfor maintaining the interests of the Empire, foi' pj'omoting the welfare of the Egyptian people^ and for doing honest work towards the establishment of the peace and order of the world. Speech of Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons^ July 27, 1882. 847 CHAPTER XLIV THE STRUGGLE FOR A POLICY 1882-1883 Intentions of the British Government — Proposal to reduce the garrison — Sir Edward Malet's opinion — Difficulty of combining reform and evacuation — I recommend reduction and concentration at Alexandria — The Government approve of this recommendation — The reduction is countermanded. It is probable that, if any one had told Lord Gran- ville on the morrow of the battle of Tel-el-Kebir that twenty-five years later a British force would still be garrisoned in Egypt, and that for twenty- two out of those twenty -five years the Egyptian question, in its political aspects, would remain unsettled, he would have ridiculed the idea. For, in truth, in 1882 the British Government had a tolerably clear policy. Its execution was very difficult, but at the time the difficulties did not appear absolutely insurmountable. Their policy was to restore order, to introduce some elementary reforms, and then to withdraw the British troops. The sound of the guns at Tel-el-Kebir had scarcely died away, when Lord Granville requested Sir Edward INIalet to send " as soon as possible, sugges- tions as to the army, finances, and the administration for the future." At tliat time, "Her JNLijesty's Government contemplated shortly commencing the withdrawal of tlie British troops from Egypt." During the summer of 1883, the British force 349 350 MODERN EGYPT pt. v numbered about 7000 men. On August 25, 1883, Chdrif Pasha addressed a Memorandum to Sir Edward Malet urging, on grounds of economy, that the force should be reduced to 2000 men. Sir Edward Malet agreed that there could be no doubt as to the necessity of economy. "The question," he added, "which unfortunately presents itself, and to which there can be no decisive answer, is whether the existing tranquillity is not mainly due to the presence of the troops." He was unable to recommend so large a reduction as that proposed by Cherif Pasha. "An immediate reduction of 2000 men was," he thought, " the most that should be effected." On September 6, Lord Granville wrote me a despatch, which reached Cairo simultaneously with my arrival from India. In this despatch, after alluding to Sir Edward Malet's communication, which is quoted above, he went on to say : — " Her Majesty's Government entirely concur in the desire to reduce the force as far as is consistent with the preservation of public order, but they have been unwilling to take any fresh step for the purpose until they could have the advantage of your opinion. Sir Evelyn Wood has expressed to me personally his belief that the British garrison might be entirely withdrawn from Cairo without disadvantage. The number of troops to be retained elsewliere and their disposition, would be matter for careful consideration. I have to request that you will consult the military authorities, and report fully to me on the subject." From recollection, and from a perusal of con- temporaneous despatches and private letters, I am able to give an accurate account of my frame of mind at this time. I was deeply penetrated with the importance of the step taken by the British Government in sending a military force to Egypt, LH.XLIV STRUGGLE FOR A POLICY 351 and I doubted whether the Ministers themselves fully realised its gravity. They saw, indeed, the obvious objections to a permanent occupation of Egypt ; they held to the broad lines of Lord Palmer- ston's policy ; ^ but they underrated the difficulties of getting out of the country. Nevertheless, all history was there to prove that when once a civilised Power lays its hand on a weak State in a barbarous or semi-civilised condition, it rarely relaxes its grasp. I was in favour of the policy of evacua- tion, and I saw that, if the British troops were to be withdrawn, no long delay should be allowed to ensue ; otherwise, the occupation might drift insensibly into a condition of permanency. Total and immediate evacuation was, indeed, impossible for the reason given by Sir Edward Malet, that is to say, that by the adoption of such a measure, public tranquillity would be endangered. But although the maintenance of public tranquillity stood first in the order of importance, the question of the withdrawal of the garrison could not be decided with reference to a consideration of this point alone. The question had to be considered in another aspect. What would be the effect of the withdrawal on the ftiture of the country ? What prospect was there of Lord Duffigrin's programme being carried out if the British troops were withdrawn ? I did not see so clearly as at a later period that the alternative policies of reform and evacuation were absolutely irreconcilable, but I had some fairly clear perception of the fact, I saw that the system of government in Egypt had been shaken to its base, and that, if once the British troops were withdrawn, it would be necessary to leave to the Khedive a tolerably free hand in the govern- ment of the country. I saw more esi)ecially that the Egyptian Government should be allowed full * Vide ante, vol. i. p. 92. 352 MODERN EGYPT pt. v freedom in the direction of suppressing any attempt to disturb public tranquillity. AVhat at the time I most feared was that the British Government, under the influence of public opinion in England, would first withdraw their troops and then cry out if the use of the courbash increased, and, generally, if the rough-and-ready means dear to the hearts of Oriental rulers were employed for the maintenance of public order. I wished to warn the Government that if they decided on a policy of evacuation, they must be prepared to turn a deaf ear to the cries, which would, without doubt, be raised both in Parliament and in the press, when the Egyptian Government proceeded to govern according to their own lights. It was with these feelings uppermost in my mind that on October 9, that is to say, about a month after my arrival in Cairo, I answered the question which Lord Granville had addiessed to me on Sep- tember 6. I began by stating that, after consultation with Sir Frederick Stephenson, I had come to the conclusion that the British garrison could safely be withdrawn from Cairo, and that the total force in Egypt might be reduced to about 3000 men, who should be concentrated at Alexandria. I did not express any opinion on the question of when it would be possible to withdraw the whole of the garrison, but in a private telegram to Lord Gran- ville, dated October 8, I told him that "for the present there could be no question of total with- drawal from Egypt." I dwelt at some length on the state of the country, and, writing with a view to ultimate publication, I indicated in a manner which was sufficiently clear that, if the Egyptian Govern- ment were to be left to themselves, they must be allowed to maintain order in their own way. When my despatch reached London, it created a considerable stir in official circles. It became CH.XLIV STRUGGLE FOR A POLICY 353 apparent that, although perhaps the Ministers were themselves aware that they could not attain two irreconcilable objects, they thought it undesirable to place this view of the case before the public. Lord Granville telegraphed to me asking that my despatch should be divided into two, and that the portion which spoke of non-interference with vigorous measures after the withdrawal of the British garrison should be treated separately and confidentially. I accordingly wrote two despatches. The first, which was very short, dealt with the proposed reduction of the garrison and the withdrawal of the troops from Cairo. This was published.^ The second, which was longer, dealt with the probable consequences of withdrawal. This was not published. It is, from a historical point of view, a document of some interest. It is reproduced in an Appendix to this chapter. On November 1, Lord Granville wrote to me that the British Government approved of my recommendation that the British force in Egypt should be reduced to 3000 men, who were to be concentrated at Alexandria. "The British garrison being thus withdrawn from Cairo," it was added, *'the main responsibility for preserving order throughout Egypt will, as you point out, devolve upon the Government of the Khedive, and in the execution of that task they may rely upon the full moral support of Her JNIajesty's Government." Three weeks later, and before any practical steps had been taken to withdraw the garrison from Cairo, news arrived of the annihilation of General Hicks's army. Lord Granville telegraphed on November 22 directing me, after consultation with Sir Frederick Steplienson and Sir Evelyn Wood, to state my opinion as to whether the existing » See Egypt, No. 1 of 1884, pp. 60-51. VOL. II 2 A 854 MODERN EGYPT pt. ^ state of affairs in the Soudan was a cause of danger to Egypt. In that case, I was requested to state my views as to what measures were desirable. In my reply, dated November 24, I said that Sir Frederick Stephenson, Sir Evelyn Wood, and myself were of opinion that *' the recent success of the Mahdi was a source of danger to Egypt," that the withdrawal of the garrison from Cairo should be postponed, and that for the time being no reduction should be made in the strength of the British force. On November 25, Lord Granville telegraphed that "the preliminary steps for the withdrawal of the British troops were to be postponed." The post- ponement has lasted until the day on which I am writing. It will be observed that during all this time there was no question of total and immediate evacuation. Every responsible authority on the spot was opposed to any such measure, and the Government, although anxious to withdraw entirely, saw that it was im- possible to carry the policy of total withdrawal into execution at once. The only question under discussion was whether the garrison should be reduced and the British force concentrated at Alexandria with a view to eventual withdrawal at no remote period. It may be doubted whether, even if the Hicks disaster had not occurred, it would have been possible within a short while to have withdrawn the whole of the British troops. This, however, is mere conjecture. What is more certain is that, when the military power of Egypt in the Soudan was crushed, the last chance of immediate, or nearly immediate, evacuation dis- appeared. Moreover, it is historically interesting to note that the deathblow to the policy of speedy evacuation was dealt by a statesman who was earnestly desirous to withdraw the British troops. If Lord Granville had not been so fearful of CH xLiv STRUGGLE FOR A POLICY 355 incurring any responsibility in respect to the Soudan on the oround that, in doing so, he might prolong the British occupation of Egypt, and if he had placed a veto on the Hicks expedition, it is conceivable that the British garrison might have been withdrawn after a short time. As it was. Lord Granville, in his desire to shorten the occupa- tion, contributed by his action to its prolongation. Before leaving this branch of my subject, I should mention that on October 28, that is, between the time when I recommended the concentration at Alexandria, and the arrival of the news of the Hicks disaster, I again urged on Lord Granville, in a private letter, the impossibility of reconciling the two policies of speedy evacuation and reform. I reproduce the whole of this letter. It was as follows : — " I have now been here long enough to take stock of the main elements of the situation. There is an immense deal to be done, and there are many difficult questions to be solved. Looking at these questions from the point of view of their intrinsic merits, there is no reason why most of them, at all events, should not be solved within a reasonable period. But there is one obstacle which stands in the way of almost every move forward, and that is the necessity of consulting every Power in Europe before any important steps can be taken. "To take a single instance, the Blue Book on the appointment of the Indemnity Commission last year is a positive curiosity in its way. This question was so simple that three or four people sitting round a table ought to have been able to settle it in half an hour. Yet a voluminous corre- spondence ensued, and endless delays occurred before Stockholm, Brussels, etc., could be got to agree. "As matters stand, it will be scarcely possible 856 MODERN EGYPT pt.t to carry out the whole of our programme. On the one hand, we are bound before we go to start Egypt on the high road to good government. We ought not to leave the Egyptian Government in such a position as that they may plead as an excuse for future bad government that their hands are so tied as to render them powerless to execute reforms. On the other hand, we must not, for European, Egyptian, and purely English reasons, stay too long. " Under present conditions, it is scarcely con- ceivable that both of these objects should be attained. In fact, the one is almost a contradiction in terms to the other. If we are to wait until all the essential reforms have been carried out by the slow process of consulting each Power separately on every question of detail, we shall wait a very long time, and there will be danger of drifting into a policy of annexation, or something tantamount to it. " If we cut the knot by withdrawing without having done our work, and leaving Egypt to stew in its own juice of administrative, financial, and economic anarchy, there will be a very considerable risk that something will occur before our backs have long been turned, which will raise up the whole Egyptian question again. I confess I do not see my way out of this dilemma. "We may, indeed, before long retire without any absolute danger to public order and tranquillity in the immediate future. But surely more than this is, under all the circumstances, expected of us both by Europe and by English public opinion. If we leave a crop of unsettled burning questions behind us, we can never feel any confidence that our hands will not be forced, that is to say, that we may again find ourselves in the position of being obliged to interfere or stand aside whilst others. CH. xLiv STRUGGLE FOR A POLICY 357 probably the French, take up the work which we, as it would then appear, had failed to acconi])lish. " Getting out of Egypt is a very different problem from getting out of Afghanistan. In the latter case, we had to deal with a country in whose internal administration no one but the Afghans was, to any very considerable extent, concerned. There was no very great difficulty in leaving this quasi-barbarous people to be governed after their own fashion by their quasi-barbarous Governors. Here the foundations of the edifice, which are to be found in the moral and material condition of the people, are scarcely less barbarous than in Afghanistan. But, on these foundations is built a top-heavy and exotic superstructure, such as an enormous external debt, Western law-courts, complete liberty of contract, and, in fact, all the paraphernalia of European civilisation with some of its worst and not many of its best features. I do not suppose that Europe will stand by and let this superstructure fall to pieces. *' We are making very fair progress in all matters which fall within the competence of the Egyptian Government, such as prison reform, local tribunals, etc. " But as regards international subjects — and all the most important subjects are international — we are almost at an absolute standstill. "In spite of every effort, we have not yet succeeded in getting the house tax through. After the house tax, comes the professional tax and the stamp duty, each with its own peculiar difficulties. " The reforms in the Mixed Tribunals and the abolition of the Consular jurisdiction in criminal cases, will probably involve interminable negotia- tions. " Then there is the great question of the Law of Liquidation, with all its attendant political 358 MODERN EGYPT ft. v difficulties. There is not, I fear, the least chance of our being able to regulate the financial situation without modifying that law. I thought at one time we might manage to arrange matters by getting the consent of the Commissioners of the Debt, but the political objections to the adoption of this course are scarcely less great than if we tried to get the Powers to consent to alter the law itself. " The question of the debts of the fellaheen cannot be settled without going to the Powers, for whatever is done will almost certainly hivolve some changes in the code administered by the Mixed Tribunals.^ '* There are several questions connected with the Daira Sanieh and the Domains which ought to be settled, but here again the international difficulty bars the way. "Even some subjects which have no direct international character, depend indirectly upon the concord of the Powers. Thus, a considerable capital expenditure on irrigation is almost a necessity ; so also is the Soudan Railway. But for both of these money is wanted, and it will be very difficult to find any money until the financial situation is placed on a sound footing. " You may well ask me why I say all this, which you already know, INly reason is to ask you to consider whether it is not possible to apply some remedy to this state of things. Would it not be possible to issue a Circular to the Powers explaining our difficulties, and saying that we did not propose to consult them any more on each detail, but that, when we had put matters straight, we should ask them to accept the settlement eii bloc, and that we should then at once withdraw our troops ? ^ This question was, many years subsequently, settled without reference to the Powers. An Agricultural Bank was established (see p. 452). In 18y3j it would have been scarcely possible to have called such an institution into existence. cH.xLiv STRUGGLE FOR A POLICY 359 " Give me 2000 men and power to settle matters between the English and Egyptian Governments, and I will guarantee that in twelve months there sliall not be a British soldier in Egypt, and that tlie country is put in such a position as to render it very improbable that any Egyptian question will be raised again for many years to come at all events.^ But if we adhere to our present procedure, I really despair of doing much within any reasonable time — I mean, of course, as regards international questions. As regards purely Egyptian questions, there are plenty of difficulties, but they are not insurmountable. " I put forward this suggestion with much hesitation. I am aware that the matter cannot be regarded wholly from the point of view of Egyptian internal reform. The general political situation has to be considered, and from this point of view there may be insuperable obstacles to the adoption of any course such as that which I suggest. Anyhow, I think it right to submit to you the aspect of the case which I have set forth in this letter. Your wider knowledjxe and experience may possibly be able to hit upon some other plan superior to my — possibly crude — suggestion. " I may add that I am confident that I could, by developing the arguments I have briefly stated here, make out a very strong case for taking a new point of departure, but it would, of course, be useless for me to write a public despatch in this sense, unless I thought that some practical good might come out of it." In other words, what I proposed amounted to the temporary assumption on the part of England of the task of governing Egypt. On November 9, * This forecast of what was possible was unquestionably much too Banguiue. 360 MODERN EGYPT ft. v Lord Granville acknowledged the receipt of this letter. "It would require," he said, "some time to consider and answer your powerful but gloomy view of the situation in Egypt. I am afraid the remedy you suggest is too drastic, but I will reflect over what you say, and let you know my impres- sions, and those of others. I have escaped the Lord Mayor's dinner. Gladstone will speak sliortly, and will only deal with generalities on Egyptian questions." On November 14, Lord Granville again wrote to me as follows : " I go to Stratton ^ on Saturday, when I hope to talk over with Gladstone and Northbrook your very important letter of, I think, the 24th October. I hope you will think what Gladstone said in concert with me about Egypt at the Mansion House was harmless." Finally, on November 30, Lord Granville wrote : " I have talked over your views on the Liquidation Law with Gladstone and with North - brook. We do not see our way to acting en bloc, but it might be possible, particularly after recent events, for you to perfect a scheme on any of the most important subjects, with a view to our getting the consent of the Powers." This was, of course, tantamount to a rejection of my proposal. I did not for many years make any other having for its object a radical change in the political status of Great Britain in Egypt. Hence- forward, I devoted myself entirely to the task of evolving order out of chaos, under such political and administrative conditions as existed at the time when the occupation took place. It was not tor some years that I felt at all sanguine of success. From the time when the orders for concen- tration at Alexandria were countermanded, all idea of s})eedy evacuation was abandoned. Tiie * Lord Norllibrook's country seat iu Hampshire. CH.XLIV STRUGGLE FOR A POLICY 361 attention of the British and Egyptian Govern- ments was for the next two years almost wholly directed to the affairs of the Soudan. During this period, the British officials in Cairo were slowly and laboriously taking some tentative steps in the direction of reducing the Egyptian administrative chaos into order. By the time the Soudan question had passed out of an acute stage, Egypt had been fairly launched on the path of reform. The policy, which as a pis aller I had suggested as possible in 1883, of allowing the Khedive and the Turco- Egyptians to govern after their own fashion, had become more than ever difficult of execution, for the country had advanced, whilst the intelligence and governing capacity of the ruling classes had almost stood still. The Turco - Egyptians, who might perhaps have been able to govern the country after a rude fashion in 1883, were incapable of doing so when once the full tide of civilisation had set strongly in. Before long, we had drifted into a position which necessitated the presence of a Britisli garrison, not in order to admit of reforms being initiated and carried out, but in order to prevent a relapse into the confusion which existed in the pre- reforming days. That is the present stage of the Egyptian question. Two efforts were made subsequent to 1883, one by Mr. Gladstone's Government, and the other by the Government of Lord Salisbury, to deal with the larger aspects of the Egyptian question. To these reference will now be made. 362 MODERN EGYPT pt.v APPENDIX Despatch from Sir Evelyn Baring to Earl Granville Cairo, October 9, 1883. My Lord — It may be advisable that in a separate despatch I should offer some further observations on the question of the withdrawal of the British troops from Egypt beyond those which are contained in my separate despatch of this day"'s date.^ I propose, in the first instance, to make some remarks upon the question of the total withdrawal of the Army of Occupation. The frequent declarations which have been made by Her Majesty's Ministers on this subject, have weakened, but have not altogether eradicated the belief entertained by some sections of the community in Egypt that the country will be permanently occupied by British troops. I have lost no opportunity of stating that there is no intention whatever of departing from the policy in pur- suance of which the whole of the British troops will eventu- ally be withdrawn from Egypt. In spite, however, of the very cordial sympathy with which I regard that policy, 1 regret that I am at present unable to recommend the total withdrawal of the Army of Occupation. I consider that it would be at present premature to discuss the question. Under these circumstances, the only practical questions to be considered are those which are discussed in my separate despatch. In making the proposals contained in that despatch, it may be desirable that I should add some observations of a general nature on the political situation of the moment. It would be difficult to conceive of the existence of a worse Government than that of the late Khedive, Ismail Pasha. But that Government possessed one single merit — it preserved order. The methods by which it preserved order were cruel and oppressive in the highest degree, but the general * This was the despatch to which allusion is made on pp. 352-353, and in which it was recommended that the British garrison should be reduced and the troops concentrated at Alexandria. CH.XLIV STRUGGLE FOR A POLICY 363 result was that life and property were secure from all attacks save those dictated by the action of the Government them- selves. Recent events have completely shattered the system of government which prevailed under Ismail Pasha and his predecessors. The use of the " courbash " has been nearly, if not completely, abolished. Measures are being taken under which it may be reasonably hoped that arbitrary arrest and imprisonment will no longer be possible. Properly con- stituted tribunals are about to be established, under whose jurisdiction it may be hoped that but few persons will suffer for crimes of which they are innocent, although possibly in the first instance some guilty persons may escape punishment. In a word, a reign of law is being introduced. The period of transition from the old to the new order of things would, under any circumstances, have been somewhat critical. It is rendered more so from the fact that recent events must have imbued the people with the idea, hereto- fore unfamiliar to them, that properly constituted authority may, for a time at least, be successfully resisted. The present position of the country is that the old order of things has either passed or is rapidly passing away. On the other hand, the new systems of administration or of judicial procedure are either in process of organisation, or have not yet acquired the stability which time alone can give to them. I believe His Highness the Khedive and his Ministers to be sincerely desirous of introducing the reforms, whose main features were set forth in Lord Dufferin's report, and of which the country stands so much in need. But the intro- duction of those reforms must necessarily occupy some time. During the period of their introduction it may be anticipated that many persons, imperfectly appreciating the difficulties of the situation, may be impatient that more rapid progress is not made. On the other hand, the turbulent and lawless portion of the community may not improbably learn to dis- respect a Government which does not manifest its authority, or impose its legitimate orders, by the use of those arbitrary methods to which the country has for generations been accustomed. If the system of government in Egypt is to be reformed, it is above all things necessary that order should be preserved during the process of reformation, and that any changes, whether in the existing laws or in the form of government or in the composition of the ministry, should be effected by legal and constitutional methods. Force should 364 MODERN EGYPT pt. v be put down by force, and inasmuch as the lesson has scarcely yet been learnt in Egypt that the arm of the law is as strong as that of arbitrary and capricious power, it might, under certain circumstances, become desirable in the interests of the country that a greater degree of severity should be exercised in the suppression of disturbance than would be necessary amongst a population which had for long been accustomed to a law-abiding and orderly system of govern- ment. The main responsibility for preserving order throughout Egypt will, as I have said in my separate despatch, devolve on the Egyptian Government. Under these circumstances, I venture to think that, within any reasonable limits, full freedom should be left to the Egyptian Government in the exercise of that power, the possession of which is a necessary condition to the assumption of responsibility. I have no reason to suppose that, should any disturbance occur at Cairo or elsewhere, the Egyptian Government would be disposed to use excessive or unnecessary severity in its suppression. The personal character of the Khedive is, indeed, of itself almost a sufficient guarantee that no such tendency exists. At the same time, it cannot be denied that the events of the last few years have shaken the authority of the Government in Egypt, a result which is not, I believe, due to any change in the personal character of the individuals who compose the Government, but to the change of system, which, most fortunately for the country, has been in course of progress since the abdication of Ismail Pasha. In order to reassert that authority, the existence of which is essential to the progress of orderly reform, it might be deemed necessary by the Egyptian Government to exercise a degree of severity in the suppression of disturbance which might possibly not commend itself to public opinion in England. Under these circumstances, I venture to think that it would be desirable that both the Egyptian Government and the public in Egypt should fully understand that, whilst Her Majesty's Government would view with serious dis- pleasure any attempt to return to the system of government which prevailed in the past, they would not, save in some very exceptional case, be inclined to interfere with the dis- cretion of the Egyptian Government in the adoption of such measures as the latter might consider desirable for the pre- servation of public order and tranquillity. CH. xLiv STRUGGLE FOR A POLICY 365 I make these observations not because I have any reason to suppose that any disturbance is likely to ensue upon the partial withdrawal of the British force, but because it appears to me desirable that, before the British garrison is reduced, the responsibility and the power of the Egyptian Government should alike be somewhat clearly defined. The considerations which I have thus ventured to lay before your Lordship will, of course, apply with even greater force when the time eventually arrives for dealing with the question of the total withdrawal of the British garrison. — I have, etc., E. Baring. CHAPTER XLV THE NORTHBROOK MISSION September-November 1884 It is decided to send a Special Commissioner to Cairo — The policy of reporting — Lord Nortlihrook arrives in Egypt — His financial pro- posals — His General Report — The Government reject his proposals. The difficulties and complications of the Egyptian question were, of course, greatly increased by the events in the Soudan. Amongst other causes for anxiety, the bankruptcy of tlie Egyptian Treasury appeared imminent. A Conference of the Powers assembled in London in the summer of 1884 to consider the financial situation, but separated with- out arriving at any practical conclusions.^ Under the circumstances, what was a well - intentioned Government, which had drifted into a position which it very imperfectly understood, to do ? Undoubtedly, the question was difficult to answer. After a short period of hesitation, Mr. Gladstone resorted to his favourite device. He determined to send to Cairo a Special Commissioner to *' report and advise Her Majesty's Government touching the counsel wliich it might be fitting to offisr the Egyptian Government in the present situation of affairs in Egypt, and as to the measures which * Subsequently, some decisions were taken as regards the matters discussed at the Conference. They were embodied in an Agreement signed in London by the reprosentatives of all the Great Powers ou March 17, 1B85. See Egypt, No. G of 1886. 366 CH.XLV THE NORTHBROOK MISSION 367 should be taken in connection with them." The Commissioner's special attention was to be directed to the '* present exigencies of Egyptian finance." There was really little about which to report. The main facts with which the Government had to deal were patent to all the world. Only a year previously, a Special Commissioner of great ex- perience and ability had compiled an elaborate Report on the condition of Egypt. Since then, a detailed Report on the financial situation had been prepared by a Committee of experts sitting in London. The subject had also been thorouglily discussed at the Conference. No further collection of facts was, therefore, required. Any detailed information which might have been necessary before deciding on what policy to adopt, could easily have been furnished by the various authorities on the spot. What was required was the decision of character necessary to arrive at a definite con- clusion, when once the facts had been collected. Lord Northbrook was designated as the Special Commissioner. A better choice could not have been made. His high character, his wide adminis- trative experience, the knowledge of the East which he had gained as Viceroy of India, his power of rapidly acquiring a mastery over com- plicated financial questions, and the breadth and statesmanlike nature of his views — all pointed him out as exceptionally qualified to fulfil the duties entrusted to him. To myself, the appointment was especially pleasing. The relationship between Lord Northbrook and myself, and the mutual esteem and affection which we entertained for each other, were of themselves a sufficient guarantee that we should work cordially together. It was, without doubt, the knowledge that the ap})oint- ment would not be displeasing to me whicli to some extent led Lord Granville, with that 368 MODERN EGYPT pt.> courteous consideration for others which nevei failed him, to nominate Lord Northbrook. Lord Northbrook possessed another, and very important quahfication for successfully carrying out the duties assigrned to him. He did not blind him- self to facts. He had the courage of his opinions. When he had studied his facts and come to some definite conclusions, he was in the habit of stating them without reference to whether they harmonised with any preconceived theories. The policy of reporting, which was so dear to Mr. Gladstone's Government, appears always to have brought about results which were in each case somewhat similar. Under the graceful diction of Lord Dufferin's Report, in spite of the apparent ease with which the skilled diplomatist glided over difficulties and eluded burning questions, it was easy to observe that the main facts of the situation did not escape the statesmanlike eye of the author, and that he in reality expected the Government to recognise them. Connected, as I was, by general political sympathy with a Liberal Government, and by ties of long-standing family friendship and relationship with some members qf Mr. Gladstone's Cabinet, I came to Egypt with a hearty desire to aid to the best of my ability in the successful execution of his Egyptian policy. I thought I understood that policy, and, if I understood it rightly, I felt sure that it met with my general concurrence. I soon found, however, that I was pursuing a phantom which constantly eluded my grasp, and that, even when I understood something of the general principles which were guiding the action of the Government, the vacillation shown in the execution of the detail was simply heart- breaking. I could not blind myself to facts to please ISIr. Gladstone, and directly I stated the facts and pointed out the inevitable conclusions to CH.XLV THE NORTHBROOK MISSION 3G9 be drawn from them, I found that, however clear they might be, they were ignored. To cite another instance, General Gordon was sent to the Soudan, not to act, but to report. General Gordon had failed to recognise the real facts in connection with the Soudan when he undertook his mission. After his arrival at Khartoum, he recognised them, but he could not enforce their recognition on Mr. Gladstone ; the latter's blindness to facts, which were patent to all the world, eventually resulted in the death of General Gordon, of Colonel Stewart, and of many other brave men. Every one knows the reluctance which many men feel about making a will. Inability to recognise that death is the common lot of all has from time immemorial formed the text alike of the divine and the satirist. Mr. Gladstone appears to have lain under a similar dis- ability in dealing with Egyptian affairs. He ignored all unpleasant facts. Lord Northbrook's fate was to be that of his predecessors. He was asked to " report and advise." It was almost certain, before he began his work, that his report would pass unheeded and that Mr. Gladstone would turn a deaf ear to his advice, unless, which was improbable, it happened to be such as he had wished to receive at the time when, ex hypothesis the Government were in partial ignorance of the facts. Lord Northbrook arrived in Egypt on September 9, 1884. He remained in the country about six weeks, during which time he laboured strenuously to master all the complicated facts connected with the situation. Before he left Cairo he prepared the draft of his report, but, inasmuch as when he arrived in London, it appeared that his views were distasteful to Mr. Gladstone, his proposals were modified before they assumed their final shape. Eventually, he sent in two reports, both dated November 20, 1884. One of these dealt exclusively VOL. II 2 b 370 MODERN EGYPT pt. v with the financial situation. The other 'was of a more general nature. It is unnecessary to dwell at length on Lord Northbvook's financial proposals. It will be suffi- cient to say that they involved : (1) adequate provision being made for the improvement and extension of the system of irrigation ; (2) a prospect of the abolition of the corvee; (3) the acquisition by the Egyptian Government of greater freedom in the matter of imposing taxes on foreigners ; (4) the abolition of the dual administration of the Daira, Domains, and Railways ; (5) a reduction of the land-tax, and of the taxes on the export and transit of produce; and (6) the issue of a loan for about £9,000,000, the interest of which was to be guaranteed by the British Government. " The effect of the proy)osals which I have made," Lord Northbrook said in concluding his report, '*will undoubtedly be to substitute the financial control of England for the international control which was proposed by the Conference ; but the alteration seems to me to be an advantage both to the Egyptian and to the English Govern- ments. Nor do I see what objections the other Powers of Europe can entertain to this control being exercised by Great Britain after the sacrifices which have been made in maintaining the peace and safety of Egypt, and the financial liability which has now to be undertaken." In his general report, after dwelling on the reforms which had already been accomplished. Lord Northbrook added : " The progress, in order to be solid, nuist necessarily be gradual in a country where the people have had to be taught to compre- hend the first elements of decent government. . . , " I cannot recommend Her Majesty's Govern- ment to fix any date at wliich the British troops serving in Egypt shall be withdrawn. In my OH.XLV THE NORTHBROOK MISSION 371 report, I have stated my reasons for anticipating that their strength may be reduced before long to about 4000 men, b it it is my duty to express my decided opinion that it would not be safe or wise to fix any definite time for their entire withdrawal, because the safety of such a step must depend on the internal state of the country, and upon the political position of Egypt, which has been left in uncertainty in consequence of the failure of the Conference of London." It will be seen that Lord Northbrook did not attempt to solve the Egyptian question in so far as its solution depended on the continuance of the British occupation. He expressed a strong opinion that the garrison could not be at once withdrawn from Egypt, and there he left the matter. But he made some excellent proposals in respect to the finances of the country. Had these proposals been accepted by the Cabhiet and carried into execution, internationalism, which has been the bane of Egypt, would have received a heavy blow, and the paramount power of Great Britain, as the guide and protector of Egypt, would have been asserted. Lord Northbrook's views were, however, too thoroughgoing for INlr. Gladstone, who was not prepared to guarantee the interest on an Egyptian loan. The proposals also did not receive the support which they deserved from the English press. The result was that nothing was done in the direction of carrying Lord Northbrook's policy into execution. His mission was a failure. Mr. Gladstone's Government, which fell in June 1885, made no subsequent attempt to settle the Egyptian question in its larger aspects. It is now necessary to deal with an endeavour to arrive at a solution which was made under the auspices of Mr. Gladstone's successor. Lord Salisbury. CHAPTER XLVI THE WOLFF CONVENTION August 1885-October 1887 Sir Henry Wolff appointed Special Commissioner — Convention of October 24, 1885— Moukhtar Pasha— Convention of May 22, 1887 — Comparison of the two Conventions — Frontier aiFairs — The army — Civil reforms — Evacuation — France and Russia oppose the Convention — The Sultan refuses to ratify it — Moukhtar Pasha permanently located iu Egypt — Results of the Wolff mission. It might have been thought that a sufficient number of Special Commissioners, diplomatists, and others had already reported on the affairs of Egypt. Such, however, was not the view of the British Government. Lord Salisbury determined to take a leaf out of the book of his predecessors. It was decided to send Sir Henry Wolff, who had been a prominent member of what was then known as the Fourth Party, and who had lost his seat in Parliament at the General Election which had recently taken place, on a mission to Constantinople and Cairo. He was given a sort of general com- mission to examine into Egyptian affairs. He was to invite the co-operation of the Sultan in the settle- ment of the Egyptian question ; more especially it was thought that it was " in His Majesty's power to contribute materially to the establishment of settled order and good government" in the Soudan. Sir Henry Wolff arrived in Constantinople on 372 CH.XLVI THE WOLFF CONVENTION 373 August 22, 1885. On October 24, he signed a Convention with the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs. All that this first Convention settled was the nature of the subjects which were to be discussed. It provided that the British and Turkish Govern- ments were each to send a Special Commissioner to Egypt, where the Ottoman Commissioner was to consult with the Khedive " upon the best means of tranquillising the Soudan by pacific means." The two Commissioners, in concert with the Khedive, were to reorganise the Egyptian army, and also to "examine all the branches of the Egyptian administration, and introduce into them the modifications which they considered necessary, within the limits of the Imperial Firmans." The sixth and most important article of the Convention was couched in the following terms : " So soon as the two High Commissioners shall have established that the security of the frontiers and the good working and stability of the Egyptian Government are assured, they shall present a Report to their respective Governments, who will consult as to the conclusion of a Convention regulating the withdrawal of the British troops from Egypt in a convenient period." In a despatch, dated October 24, Sir Henry Wolff pointed out the advantages which, he thought, had accrued, or were likely to accrue, from the signature of this Convention. "The conclusion of an arrangement," he said, " of any kind has done much to allay the irritation that has existed for some time in the minds of the Turks towards England. . . . The experience of the Sultan's Commissioner, if wisely chosen, will be useful in the elaboration of institutions which must combine both Eastern and Western elements. The same reason will hold good with respect to the regulations in the Soudan. It mvist, doubtless. 374 MODERN EGYPT pt v have been very difficult for English gentlemen, however able and conciliatory, to come to terms with races who had suffered so severely at our hands. The regulations which are to be under- taken, with our assent and countenance, but between the Khalif and those who recognise his autliority, are more likely to lead to a rapid and satisfactory result." Sir Henry Wolff arrived in Cairo on October 29. The departure from Constantinople of Ghazi Moukhtar Pasha, a distinguished soldier, who was named Turkish Commissioner, was delayed; he did not arrive in Cairo till December 27. It is unnecessary to describe the lengthy negotia- tions which ensued. It will be sufficient to say that, after eighteen months of discussion, a further Convention was signed at Constantinople, on May 22, 1887, between Sir Henry Wolff and two Turkish Plenipotentiaries acting on behalf of the Sultan. The two Conventions may now be compared with a view to ascertaining how far the latter accomplished the objects proposed by the former. As regards the tranquillisation of the Soudan, Sir Henry Wolff's efforts were foredoomed to failure from the commencement. He spoke of negotiations being undertaken *' between the Khalif and those who recognised his authority." Moukhtar Pasha and other Turks were naturally slow to believe that any JNIohammedans refused to recognise the authority of the Sultan as Khalif. But every one in Egypt knew that tlie Mahdi con- founded Christians and Turks alike in one common anathema, and that the idea of conjuring witli the Sultan's name in the Soudan was a dehision. On this particular point, therefore, the negotia- tions conducted by Sir Henry Wolff and Moukhtar Pasha ended in failure. It was reserved for Sir CH.XLVI THE WOLFF CONVENTION 375 Francis Grenfell and Colonel Wodehouse to arrive at some settlement of the frontier question by methods which were efficacious because they were based on the true facts of the case, and not on the imaginary facts evolved from the brains of Turkish diplomatists. The defeats which the Dervishes sus- tained at Arguin and Toski in the summer of 1889, gave peace to the frontier. Powder and shot proved more effective agents than the "authority of the Khalif" Much discussion took place about the reorganisa- tion of the Egyptian army. At one time, a proposal was put forward to recruit troops in Turkey, an idea which did not find favour with the Sultan. At another time, the notion of importing a number of Turkish officers into Egypt was started. Eventually, however, nothing was done. The British officers were fortunately left to re- organise the Egyptian army after their own fashion. On this point also, therefore, the Con- vention of October 24, 1885, was unproductive of result. Much the same may be said as regards admin- istrative reforms. A Protocol annexed to the Convention of May 22, 1887, provided that the British and Ottoman Governments should jointly address the Powers with a view to modifying the Capitulations in the sense of bringing all residents of Egypt "under a local and uniform jurisdiction and legislation." A second Protocol provided that joint representations should be made to the Powers with a view to reforming tlie administrations of the Domains, Daira, and Railways, defining the powers of the Commissioners of the Debt, and enacting laws relative to the press and to quarantine. But beyond making an enumeration of the points which required the attention of the reformer, nothing was done. 376 MODERN EGYPT pt.v There remains to be considered the sixth and most important article of the Convention of October 24, 1885, namely, that which provided that the Commissioners should discuss the ques- tion of the withdrawal of the British garrison from Egypt. It was perhaps rather a bold flight of the official imagination to indulge in the hope that any possible steps taken by the two Commissioners would assure "the good working and stability of the Egyptian Government." The good working and stability of that Government are still assured by the presence of the garrison whose speedy withdrawal from Egypt formed the main subject of the discussions which took place in 1885-87. Too much attention should not, however, be attached to the wordinor of the Convention of o October 1885. Diplomatic instruments of this sort usually abound hi euphemisms and picturesque conventionalities. In plain English, the first Con- vention signed by Sir Henry Wolff meant that England and Turkey were to endeavour to come to terms over the Egyptian question, and, although nothing practical came of the endeavour, some cautious and intelligent steps were taken in the direction intended. Article V. of the Convention of May 22, 1887, laid down that "at the expiration of three years from the date of the present Convention, Her Britannic Majesty's Government will withdraw its troops from Egypt." This clause seemed explicit enough, but it was followed by another clause, under the provisions of which the British troops were not to withdraw at the end of three years if there was any "appearance of danger in the interior or from without." It was not specifically stated who was to judge whether the internal or external danger was sufficient to justify the reten- tion of the British garrison in Egypt, but in the CH.XLVI THE WOLFF CONVENTION 377 absence of any specific arrangement on this point, it was obvious that the decision rested with the British Government. One important definition was, however, given to the words " danger from without." Article VI. of the Convention laid down that, after the ratification by England and Turkey, the Powers, who were parties to the Treaty of Berlin, should be invited to adhere to it. The ultimate execution of the Convention depended, in fact, on its acceptance by the Powers. In a letter attached to the Convention, which was addressed by Sir Henry Wolff to the Turkish Plenipoten- tiaries, he said : " If, at the expiration of the three years stipulated in the Convention of this day for the withdrawal of the British troops from Egypt, one of the Great Mediterranean Powers shall not have accepted it. Her Britannic Majesty's Government would consider this refusal as the appearance of a danger from without, provided against by Article V. of the Convention, and the means of executing the aforesaid Convention shall be again discussed and settled between the Imperial Ottoman Govern- ment and Her Britannic Majesty's Government." More than this, Article V. provided that if, at any time subsequent to the evacuation, " order and security in the interior were disturbed, or if the Khedivate of Egypt refused to execute its duties towards the Sovereign Court, or its international obligations," both the Ottoman and British Govern- ments would have the right to occupy the country with troops, and, moreover, that if, "by reason of hindrances," the Sultan did not avail himself of his right of occupation, the British Government could none the less take military action on their own account, and that, in that case, the Sultan would "send a Commissioner to remain durine same conclusion as his foes, but by a different process of reasoning. If, they said, you would declare your intention to remain permanently in Egypt and to undertake the administration of the country, we should not be unwilling to concede our privileges, for we should then have some solid guarantee against an abuse of power. But as you are constantly asseverating that you are but sojourners in the land, and" that your occupation is only temporary, we fail to see what guarantees against abuse will exist when you carry out your declared intentions. There could be no question as to the validity of this argument. JNIoreover, it was one which the British Government were themselves obliged to recognise and adopt. Hence, the British nation had characteristically placed itself in tliis illogical position — that whilst its official repre- sentative was obliged at times to maintain privilege in British interests for fear of eventual abuse by the Egyptians, he was also called upon by the British reformer to aid in the abolition of ])rivilege in order to further that work of reform in which th,e Government and people of England were deeply interested. The creation of this singular position may be regarded as a triumph of Anglo- Saxon inconsistency. "England," iMontalembcrt 432 MODERN EGYPT pt. vi once said, " fortunately for herself, is not the pedantic slave of logic." Fully as I recognise the value of this encomium, I have sometimes, as a humble agent charged with the execution of British policy, wished that that policy was a little more logical. Under all these circumstances, only one solution was for many years possible. It was that, in so far as the main issues were concerned, there should be no solution at all. Unless the British Govern- ment were prepared to assume permanently the responsibility of governing Egypt, it was neither possible nor desirable to assimilate the legal status of all the inhabitants of the country. It was, indeed, painful enough to see the parasitic and ignoble growths which clung round European civilisation, but as Egypt was to be civilised on a European model without being formally placed under a European Government, it was inevitable that, together with many blessings, some of the curses of civilisation should devolve on the country. Apart from the practical and political difficulties which stood in the way of radical reform, it was to be observed that, looking at the matter broadly, the blessings greatly predominated over the curses. The material prosperity of Egypt depended in no small degree on the presence of a numerous European colony, and on the attractions for the investment of European capital. The European would not reside in Egypt unless he could make money by doing so, and he could not make money unles's his life and property were guaranteed against the arbitrary pioceedings of a Government which but recently was very bad, and which, as he rightly thought, would probably relapse into its former condition if the controlling hand of England were withdrawn. Broadly speaking, therefore, the question of CH.LII EUROPEAN PRIVILEGE 433 European privilege stood, up to 1904, in much the same position as it did in 1882. Nevertheless, if we descend from general principles to detail, it will be found that a few minor reforms were undertaken of a nature to mitigate some of the worst abuses of the system which the English found in existence when they took Egyptian affairs seriously in hand. The main blot in the system under which Egypt was, and, unfortunately, still is governed, is the absence of any legislative machinery capable of passing laws binding on all the inhabitants of the country. As the absence of any properly con- stituted Tribunals created, to use Nubar Pasha's expressive phrase, a "judicial Babel," so the absence of any supreme legislature creates a "legislative Babel." History affords abundant examples of countries whose systems of legislation have been bad. Egypt affords a unique example of a country well advanced on the road to civilisa- tion which, for all practical purposes, may be said to possess no general legislative system whatsoever. Although, however, the system of legislation by diplomacy, in so far as its main features are con- cerned, still holds the field, and although it is true that the continuance of this system involves an almost complete legislative deadlock, nevertheless, after vast travail, the diplomatic mountain did at last bring forth a small but not altogether ridiculous mouse, which in some degree mitigated the evils necessarily attendant on legislative impotence. Nubar Pasha, to whom must be attributed the merit of the innovation about to be described, pointed out that, apart from questions of the first importance, such as criminal jurisdiction and the right of taxing Europeans, there remained a considerable field of petty but not unimportant legislation on matters relating to what he termed "la vie journaliere de la population." Questions VOL. II 2 F A34 MODERN EGYPT ft. vi were frequently arising as to the extent to which Europeans were subject to regulations edicted by the Egyptian Government on such matters as the maintenance of dykes and canals, the establishment of drinking-shops and places of amusement, the right to carry arms, and a host of other minor subjects, which in Europe are often treated by by-laws framed by some subordinate legislative authority, to whom power has been delegated by the supreme legislature. After some discussion, the Powers ag-reed to confer leoislative rijrhts on the Egyptian Government in respect to these matters, subject to the condition that the Egyptian proposals, before acquiring the force of law, should receive the approval of the General Assembly of the INIixed Tribunals. It was provided that no greater punishment than a fine of £l or seven days' imprisonment could be incurred for infringing these by-laws.^ The Decree introducing these changes, which is dated January 31, 1889, is a document of some importance in so far as it represents the first faltering steps taken in the direction of a real Egyptian legislative autonomy. The arrangement is obviously open to some objections in principle. It is unusual that judges should frame the laws, which they have to administer. But the necessities of the case were such as to render it impossible to attach much weight to objections based on the undesirability of amalgamating legislative and judicial functions. In Egypt, legislators have to be caught wherever they can be found. As a legislative machinery composed of judges was ready to hand, that 1 In very nimuMoiis cases, Uie penalty for infring^in^ the law is altogether insufliciont to ensure general respect heiug paid to its provi- sions. Moreover, the procedure of tlie law-courts is often complicated and unduly slow in action. These defects have become notably apparent in dealing with the illicit sale of Hashish, the use of which is a fertile source of lunacy in Kgypt. See Egypt, No. 1 of lUOG, p. 64. CH. Lii EUROPEAN PRIVILEGE 435 machinery had to be utilised in default of anything better. The fundamental idea of the Decree of January 31, 1889, was, therefore, to transfer a certain portion of the legislative functions, heretofore exercised collectively by the Powers, to the judges of the Mixed Tribunals. Some beneficent measures have been enacted under its provisions. To quote a single instance, the Egyptian Government have been enabled to control the sale of liquor in the agri- cultural districts, and have thus placed some sort of check on the demoralisation which the foreign pur- veyor of alcoholic and often adulterated drinks spreads around him.^ Passing to another reform, it is to be observed that when the British occupation took place, certain direct taxes were paid by Egyptians, but not by Europeans. These were the house tax and the professional tax. No valid arguments could be adduced in favour of exempting Europeans from the payment of these taxes. The reason why they did not pay them was because they did not like paying them. Secure in the support of their diplomatic representatives, they had succeeded in maintaining their fiscal privileges intact. The injustice was so glaring that the Powers were forced into applying a remedy. On March 17, 1885, they went so far, at the instance of the British Government, as to sign a Declaration stating that they "recognised the justice of making their subjects in Egypt liable to the same taxes as the natives." They agreed in principle to a Decree under the terms of which Europeans were rendered liable to the payment of the house tax ; tliey 'equally declared that they accepted the appli- cation to their subjects, in the same manner as to * For further remarks on this very importaut subject, see, inter alia, Egypt, No. 1 of li)07, pp. 73-7G. 436 MODERN EGYPT pt. vi the natives, of the stamp tax and Ucence tax ; and they engaged to undertake immediately, in concert with the Egyptian Government, the study of the draft laws establishing these two taxes." Both before and after the signing of this Declara- tion, the usual unedifying and wearisome wrangling took place. It was not till April 15, 1886, that a Decree was at last issued which rendered Europeans liable to the payment of the house tax. Although the Powers undertook, on March 17, 1885, to study " immediately " the draft laws necessary for the imposition of the licence or professional tax on Europeans, it is to be borne in mind that the word " immediate " is, in diplomatic phraseology, a relative term. Six years elapsed before, on March 8, 1891, a Decree was issued, under which Europeans were rendered liable to the payment of the professional tax. The law had not, however, been put in operation when, in connection with the corvee negotiations,^ the French Government pressed for its repeal. There was a ofood deal to be said in favour of abolishing the tax. In spite of the prolonged study which preceded the issue of the Decree, many of its details were faulty. JNIoreover, in an Oriental country, a direct tax is always liable to abuse by reason of the untrustworthy nature of the agency employed in its assessment and collection. The Egyptian Government and their British advisers, therefore, decided to rest content with the victory which had been already gained. By dint of strenuous per- severance, they had remedied an injustice ; they had asserted the principle that in fiscal matters Europeans and Egyptians were to be treated on a footing of equality ; there could be no objection to a relief of taxation which would be applied to Europeans and Egyptians alike. The professional » Vide ante, p. 418. CH. Lii EUROPEAN PRIVILEGE 437 tax was, therefore, abolished by a Decree issued on January 28, 1892. To sum up. The results of British intervention in Egypt, in so far as European privilege is con- cerned, have up to the present time been as follows : — 1. A slight advance has been made in the direction of Egyptian legislative autonomy. 2. Europeans and Egyptians have been placed on a basis of equality in so far as taxation is concerned. With the signature of the Anglo-French Con- vention in 1904, the question of dealing with the Capitulations entered into a new phase. The prospects of reform brightened. It became possible to discuss the subject on its own merits without the introduction of irrelevant issues. I have already stated that the main object of this work is to narrate the history of the past, rather than to discuss questions which now occupy public attention. Acting on this principle, I abstain from entering fully into a discussion of the method under which the existing regime of the Capitulations might advantageously be modified. In my Annual Report for the year 1905 ^ I dwelt on this subject, and in my Report for the following year,^ I sketched out the broad features of a plan, having for its object the creation in Egypt of a Council invested with powers to enact laws binding on all Europeans resident in Egypt. I concluded with the following remarks : — " I am well aware of the danger of making Constitutions which may look well on paper, but which will not work in practice. It is one against which Lord Dufferin very wisely uttered a note of warning when he was framing proposals for the creation of an Egyptian Legislative Assembly. I » Egypt, No. 1 of 1906, pp. 1-8. > Egypt, No. 1 of 1907, pp. 10-26. 438 MODERN EGYPT tt.yi have endeavoured, to the best of my abihty, to avoid this danger. INIy wish has been to create an institution which, albeit it will not be free from anomalies, and may possess many theoretical imperfections, will, on the whole, be suited to the present practical requirements of Egyptian political and administrative life. I have more particularly endeavoured to utilise such elements as are avail- able, in order to guard, so far as is possible, against that danger to which, possibly, Egypt is somewhat specially exposed — I mean the danger of making what Burke once called * a stock -jobbing Con- stitution.' I am far from saying that I have altogether succeeded, but I trust that what I have proposed may form the basis for further discussion, with the result that any defects which may be discovered in the scheme set forth in this Report may be remedied. "Much will depend upon the views taken by the natural leaders of public opinion in Egypt. To the Egyptians, I would say that some plan based on the broad features of that which I have sketched out is, I am convinced, the only method by which they can, within any period which it is now possible to foresee, be relieved of those portions of the Capitulations which retard the progress of their country, and of which they so frequently, and, I should add, so legitimately, complain. To the Europeans who have made Egypt their home, I would say that, in my desire to guard against any reappearance of the arbitrary methods of government against which the Capitu- lations were intended to protect them, I am no less European than they ; that though the rights and privileges which they very naturally prize are taken away in one form, they are simultaneously granted in another form of equal and far less objectionable efficacy ; and that, in addition, the CH.LII EUROPEAN PRIVILEGE 439 inestimable privilege will be granted to them of making their own laws, instead of being dependent on the vicissitudes of European politics and on the views taken in fifteen different capitals of the world by others, who, however much they may be animated by good intentions, must necessarily be ignorant of local requirements. It is only in the *Land of Paradox' that the bestowal on a whole community of the right to manage its own affairs could be regarded as the destruction of a privilege. "Before moving any further in the matter, I ask the leading Europeans resident in Egypt whether they wish to support an archaic system of government which has outlived its time, and which acts as a clog to all real progress, or whether they would not rather prefer to assist in reforming that system in order to ilneet the altered conditions of the country, and thus lay the foundation-stone of an Egyptian nationality in the best and only practicable sense of that much-abused term." I have now only to express an earnest hope that this question will not be allowed to drop. By far the most important reform now required in Egypt is to devise some plan which will enable laws binding on Europeans resident in the country to be enacted. Until this is done, progress in many directions, where reform is urgently required, will be barred. I would add that the mere transfer of criminal jurisdiction over Europeans from the Consular to the Mixed Courts — a project which nnds support in some quarters — altogether fails to meet the requirements of the situation. The main reform required is legislative, not judicial.^ The abolition of indefensible privileges is part and parcel of the work of modern progress. In * Some further remarks on this subject will be found on p. 668. 440 MODERN EGYPT pt. vi the West, the work of destroyhig privilege is well- nigh complete, and the next generation will probably see democracy pass from the destructive, and enter upon the constructive phase of its existence, with what result we cannot now foretell. The backward East is still in the stage in which a privilege destroyed, whether it be of a Western or of an Eastern type, may be regarded as a battle won. The constructive period of Eastern political existence is as yet afar, neither can any one of the present generation hope to see what will eventually happen to the curious amalgam of fanaticism and agnosticism, of old-world despotism and latter-day republicanism, which in Egypt, as in other Oriental countries, is now laid on the anvil, and which receives blows from all quarters of such diverse strength as to render it a matter of haphazard conjecture to foretell what will be the shape which it will ultimately assume. In the mean- while, assuming the abolition of such privileges as those enjoyed by Europeans in Egypt to be an advantage, it may be noted that the Egyptian Government, under British auspices, made one considerable step forward. They placed all the residents in Egypt, whether European or Egyptian, on a footing of fiscal equality. But they have so far been unable seriously to attack the Capitulations, which constitute the main citadel of privilege. These, as in the days prior to the British occupation, remain for the present inviolate. Why was this ? It was because the international system of govern- ment barred the way to advance. This work has been written to little purpose if it has not shown the radical defects of inter- nationalism, considered as a machinery for adminis- tration and legislation. In making this remark, however, I must carefully guard against being misunderstood. In condemning executive action CH. Lii EUROPEAN PRIVILEGE 441 through international agency, I do not in any degree wish to deprecate the employment of officials of various nationalities in certain executive functions. The system which I wish to condemn is that under which executive officials are practically nominated by foreign Governments and become, as experience in Egypt has abundantly proved, the political agents of their countries of orighi. Not only is there no objection to the Egyptian Govern- ment being free to choose their European officials from any country in Europe, but great advantage is to be derived from the adoption of this system. Some solid guarantee is thus afforded that the individuals nominated will be chosen solely by reason of their professional merits, and that they will not be moved by political considerations to overstep the limit of the functions assigned to them. The same remark applies, even to a greater extent, to the case of those in judicial employment. European judges for the Egyptian law-courts should continue, as at present, to be chosen from various nationalities. The case of legislative internationalism is some- what different. Egypt is essentially a cosmopolitan country. It follows, therefore, as a • matter of course, that if any local legislature is created, it must, if it is to be truly representative, be cosmo- politan in character. The internationalism which I wish to condemn is, therefore, confined to what may be termed political internationalism, that is to say, the system which admits of the employment of political agents, who, acting under whatever instructions they may receive from their several Foreign Offices, are prone to introduce into the discussion of some purely local question, considerations based on the friendliness or hostility, in other parts of the world, of their countries of origin. Political 442 MODERN EGYPT pt. vi passions are — or, at any moment may become — too strong to allow of an international system of this latter type working smoothly. "The principles of true politics," Burke once said, "are those of morality enlarged, and I neither now do, nor ever will, admit of any other." An influential school of English politicians have been zealous in supporting the principle of action thus advocated by Burke. "I would not," Mr. Bright said in 1877, "dissociate what is true in morals from what is true in statesmanship." Few persons would wish to speak in disparaging terms of these noble principles. They certainly command my full assent, and, I may add, that during a long diplomatic career, I have persistently acted upon them to the best of my ability. But, whilst our principles may be elevated, our application of them must be subordinated to the facts with which we have to deal. Do not let us imagine that nations and Governments in general are prepared altogether to assimilate public and private morality. Mr. Lecky says with truth : " Nothing is more calamitous than the divorce of politics from morals, but in practical politics public and private morals will never absolutely correspond." ^ Internationalism, in spite of its fair exterior, which proclaims equality of governing power and equitable treatment towards subject races, means but too often in practice political egotism, a disregard of the rights of subject races, and, in the case now under discussion, a decadence in the authority of that European Power on the maintenance of whose paramount influence the advance of true civilisation in Egypt depends. That Power is Great Britain. » Map o/Life, p. 18L CHAPTER LIII FINANCE The first bankruptcy of Egypt — Risk of a second bankruptcy — The Race against Bankruptcy — The era of reform — Fiscal relief — Reduction of taxation — Increase of revenue — Expenditure — Aggregate surplus since 1888 — The indebtedness of the fellaheen — Distribution of land — Importance of the financial question. "Great," says Carlyle, "is Bankruptcy. . . . Honour to Bankruptcy ; ever righteous on the great scale, though in detail it is so cruel. Under all falsehoods it works unweariedly mining. No false- hood, did it rise heaven high and cover the world, but Bankruptcy, one day, will sweep it down and make us free of it." ^ In Egypt, bankruptcy, of a truth, destroyed many false gods and pricked many bubbles. Notably, it dashed down Ismail Pasha, the great high- priest of Sham, from that false eminence which he had attained, .and allowed him to be pulverised by the adventurers who were his former worshippers. More than this, bankruptcy, riding roughshod over all who would not recognise the irresistible nature of its action, brought home to the minds of a reluctant Egyptian Ministry that they must needs abandon the Soudan, at all events for a time, because they could not afford to stay there. These and many other benefits did bank- ruptcy, in its ruthlessness, confer on a land whose * French Revolution, Book iii. c. i. 443 444 MODERN EGYPT ft. vi government had for many years been one gigantic falsehood. When the British troops occupied Egypt in 1882, one act of bankruptcy had ah*eady been committed. In 1879, the Government of Egypt declared themselves insolvent. In 1880, a composi- tion with their creditors was effected. Nevertheless, under the combined influences of the Arabi re- bellion and the cataclysm in the Soudan, the Treasury was again on the high road, to another act of bankruptcy. There was, however, this difference between the financial chaos of 1878-79 and that of 1882-83. During the earlier of these two periods, the hopes of every well-wisher to Egypt were based on a declaration of bank- ruptcy. It was impossible to apply a remedy until the true facts of the case were recognised. In 1882-83, on the other hand, it was in the true interest of every Egyptian, and of every sympathiser with Egypt, to stave off" bankruptcy, for the remedy which would certainly have been applied, had a condition of bankruptcy been declared, was almost as bad as the disease. That remedy was inter- national government in excelsis. Hence, the Egyptian Government had to enter upon what Lord Milner has aptly termed " The Race against Bankruptcy." The struggle was long and arduous. For some while, the issue seemed doubtful. The final result was a complete triumph. It may be said that the period of doubt lasted till 1888. By that time, the race had been virtually won. So long as the Egyptian Government and their British advisers were in constant danger of being throttled by bankruptcy, it was hopeless to think seriously of fiscal reform. More than this, any improvement in the administrative system which involved an increase of expenditure — and it may cH. Liii FINANCE 445 be said that practically every improvement required money — had to be set aside. Attention was con- centrated on one object, and that was how to make both ends meet. But when financial equilibrium was assured, the aspect of affairs changed. When it became known that the Egyptian Treasury was in possession of a surplus, all the various interests concerned clamoured for the redress of long-standing and often very legitimate grievances. The inhabitant of the country pleaded that his land-tax was too high, and pointed with justice to the fall in the price of agricultural pro- duce as a reason for affording him relief. The inhabitant of the town complained of the oppres- sive nature of the octroi duty. The population in general urged that the price of salt was excessive. The possessor of live stock asked why he should pay a tax for every sheep or goat, on his farm. The seller of produce at every market or fair dwelt on the fact that his goods had to be weighed by a Government official who charged a fee for the Treasury and another fee for himself. Why, again, it was urged, should railway, postal, and telegraph rates be higher in Egypt than elsewhere ? Why should a boat passing under a bridge pay a toll, whilst a passenger going over the bridge paid nothing ? These, and a hundred other arguments and proposals, were put forward by the advocates of fiscal reform. On the other hand, each zealous official, anxious to improve the administration of his own Depart- ment, hurled in demands for money on a poverty- stricken Treasury. The soldier wanted more troops, and painted in gloomy colours the dangers to which the frontier was exposed by reason of the proximity of the Dervishes. The Police officer wanted more policemen to assist in the capture of brigands. The jurist urged that, without well-paid judges, it was impossible to establish a pure system 446 MODERN EGYPT rr. vi of justice. The educationalist pointed out with great truth that, unless the sums placed at the dis- posal of the Department of Pubhc Instruction were greatly increased, the execution of the policy of employing Egyptian rather than European agency in the administration of the country would have to be indefinitely postponed. The soldier, the policeman, the jurist, the director of prisons, and the schoolmaster all joined in asking for the construction of expensive buildings. The medical authorities clamoured for hospitals, and pointed out that, without improved sanitation, which was a bottomless financial abyss, there could be no guarantee against epidemic disease. The engineer showed that it was false economy not to extend the system of irrigation, to drain the fields, to make roads, and to develop railway communication. Following on the larger demands, came every species of minor proposal. Would it not be an attraction to the tourists, who spent so much money in Egypt, if a theatrical company visited Cairo in the winter ? How could this be managed unless the Government gave a subvention to the theatre ? Was it not a scandal, now that a civilised Power was virtually governing Egypt, that more was not done to pro- tect the ancient monuments of the country from injury ? What report would the winter visitors to Egypt make when they returned to Europe, if, in driving to the Pyramids, they were bumped over a road which had not been repaired since the Empress Eugenie drove over it some twenty years previously ? These, and scores of other questions, were asked, in tones of more or less indignant remonstrance, by individuals who realised the desirability of paying attention to some one or other subject in which they were interested, but who had no clear perception of the financial situation considered as a whole. cH. Liii FINANCE 447 Under all these circumstances, it behoved those who were responsible for the financial guidance of the Egyptian Government to act with great caution. It was clear that, as a wave of European civilisa- tion was to sweep over the land, all the parapher- nalia of civilisation — that is to say, its judges and law-courts, its hospitals, its schools, its reforma- tories for juvenile offenders, and so on — would, sooner or later, have to be introduced ; but the main point to be borne in mind was this : that, in introducing all these reforms, Egypt should not be allowed to slip back into the slough of bankruptcy from which it had been so hardly and so recently rescued. The principal difficulty was to decide which were the most pressing amongst the many points requiring attention. It was thought that, before the sick man was provided with a comfort- able hospital, before the criminal was lodged in a prison built on improved penological principles, before schools w^ere provided, and even before rival litigants could be provided with an adequate number of honest and capable judges, or before the judges could be located in suitable buildings, it was essential to alleviate the burthens which weighed on the mass of the population. Fiscal relief had a prior claim to administrative reform. It was, therefore, decided that, whilst penuri- ously doling out grants to the spending Depart- ments, the principal eff()rts of the Government should be devoted to devising means for the relief of taxation. It is not necessary that I should give in detail the fiscal history of Egypt since the British occupation. It will be sufficient to say that direct taxation has been reduced by little less than £2,000,000 a year. In the domain of indirect taxation, the Salt Tax, the collection of which was attended with great hardship to the poorest classes 448 MODERN EGYPT pt. vi of the population,^ the octroi duties, the bridge and lock dues on the Nile,^ and the tax both on river boats and on sea fishing -boats have been wholly abolished. The Registration dues on the sale of land have been reduced from 5 to 2 per cent. The Light dues have been greatly diminished in amount. So also has the tax on ferries. The Customs duties on coal, liquid fuel, charcoal, firewood, timber for building purposes, petroleum, live stock, and dead meat have been reduced from 8 to 4 per cent. The inland fishery industry has been relieved from the vexatious and onerous restrictions which were formerly imposed on it. The Postal, Tele- graph, and Railway rates have been largely reduced. The only increase in taxation has been in the tobacco duty, which has been raised from P.T. 14 to P.T. 20 per kilogramme. There cannot be a doubt that the whole Egyptian population is now very lightly taxed. The taxation is, however, still unequally distributed. The urban population do not bear their fair share of the public burdens. In this, as in so many other matters, the Capitulations bar the way to reform. In spite of these large reductions of taxation, the revenue has grown from £E.8,935,000 in 1883 to £E.15,337,000 in 1906 — an increase of no less than £E.6,402,000. The expenditure has, of course, increased with the growing revenue, but it lias been carefully controlled. In 1883, it amounted to £E.8,554,000, and in 1906 to £E.12,393,000''— an increase of £E.3,839,000. » See Egypt, No. 1 of 1906, p. 33, and No. 1 of 1906, p. 191. ^ The development of Nile traffic has been very remarkable. I give a single instance. The number of boats passing the Atfeh lock, which connects the Mahmoudieh Canal and the Nile, in 1900 — the year before the abolition of the toll — was only 4564. In 1905, nearly 22,000 passed. 3 These figures are exclusive of £E. 1,238,000 debited to Special Funds in 1883, and of £E. 769,000 similarly debited in 1906. CH. LIII FINANCE 449 The following three facts will perhaps bring clearly home to the mind of the reader the general nature of the results obtained by the financial administration of Egypt since the British occu- pation in 1882. In the first place, I have to record that, up to 1888, either a deficit was annually incurred, or else financial equilibrium was preserved with the utmost difficulty. Then the tide turned. During the eighteen years from 1889 to 1906, both inclusive, the aggregate surplus realised by the Egyptian Treasury amounted to more than 27^ millions sterling. The second fact which I have to record is no less striking. During the twenty years preceding December 31, 1906, extraordinary expenditure to the extent of £E. 19,303,000 was incurred on rail- ways, canals, and public buildings. Of this large sum, only £E. 3,6 10,000 was borrowed. The remainder was provided out of revenue. More- over, on December 30, 1906, a Reserve Fund of £E.3,050,000 stood to the credit of the Commis- sioners of the Debt. The Reserve Fund of the Egyptian Government amounted on the same date to £E.ll, 055,000, of which only £E.2,353,000 had at that date been engaged for capital expenditure. Both of these Funds, amounting in the aggregate to £E.14,105,000, were provided out of revenue. In the third place, I wish to draw attention to the facts and figures relating to the indebtedness of Egypt. In 1883, the capital of the Debt, which was then held exclusively by the public, amounted to £96,457,000, and the charge on account of interest and sinking fund to £4,208,000. Since then, the Guaranteed Loan, which amounted to £9,424,000, has been issued ; £4,882,000 has been borrowed for the execution of public works, and for the commutation of pensions and of allocations to VOL. II 2 o 450 MODERN EGYPT pt. vi the Khedivial family. The conversion operation of 1890 added £3,904,000 to the nominal capital of the Debt. In all, £18,210,000 has been added to the capital of the Debt. On the other hand, the Daira Loan, which in 1883 amounted to £9,009,000, has been entirely paid off. The Domains Loan, which in 1883 amounted to £8,255,000, has been reduced to £1,316,000. The Guaranteed Loan has been reduced to £7,765,000, a reduction of £1,659,000 from the original amount. On December 28, 1906, the outstanding capital of the Debt in the hands of the public amounted to £87,416,000.^ The charge on account of interest and sinking fund borne by the taxpayers was £3,368,000. There has, therefore, in twenty-three years been a reduction of £9,041,000 in the capital of the Debt, and of £900,000 in the charge on account of interest and sinking fund. These facts and figures speak for themselves. Considerations of space preclude me from de- scribing in detail the beneficial results which have accrued to the population of Egypt in every direction from the substitution of a sound fiscal policy for the oppressive and ruinous system of government to which they were formerly subjected. I may, however, allude to one point of special importance. Lord Dufferin, writing in 1883, alluded to "the encumbered condition of a considerable proportion of the fellaheen lands " as " one of the most dis- tressing subjects connected with the present social condition of the country." There was a tendency, he added, " for the land to pass out of tlie hands of the present owners into those of foreign creditors." 1 In addition to this, stock to the amount of £8,700,000 was held by the Egyptian Treasury and the Commissioners of the Debt. 'I'his stock will be gradually sold, and the proceeds of the sales expended on remunerative public works. In the meanwhile, the interest is, of course, credited to the Egyptian Government. cHLin FINANCE 451 There can be no doubt of the very great im- portance of the question to which Lord DufFerin drew attention. In the first place, as Lord Dufferin very truly remarked, a transfer on a huge scale of the landed property of the country to foreign creditors " could scarcely take place without producing an agrarian crisis (Lord Dufferin might also have added, a political crisis) which would prove equally disastrous to the creditors, the debtors, and the Government." Then, again, the arguments in favour of small holdings apply with somewhat special force in Egypt. Owing to the fact that there is not generally any serious congestion of the population, competition rents have not as yet resulted in any grave strife between landlords and tenants. Nevertheless, as the popula- tion increases, and the area of cultivable but uncultivated land diminishes, there will be, to say the least, a risk that issues will eventually arise between landlords and tenants, somewhat similar to those which have caused so much trouble in other countries — notably in India and in Ireland. The best way to postpone this strife, as also to mitigate its intensity should it eventually prove to be inevitable, will be to avoid the adoption of any measures which will tend towards the dis- appearance of the small proprietors. The political arguments in favour of this policy are no less strong than those of a purely economic character. I know of no measure more calculated to destroy any hopes that the Egyptians will eventually become really autonomous, and that they will exercise whatever self-governing powers they may some day acquire in the interests of the whole community, than the displacement of the small proprietors, more especially if the large landowners, who would take their places, were, to any excessive degree, of European nationality. 452 MODERN EGYPT pt. vi The policy which has been persistently pursued by the Egyptian Government of recent years has, therefore, been to endeavour, by a variety of indirect but perfectly legitimate means, to main- tain the small proprietors in the possession of their holdings, and, whilst affording all reasonable facilities for the employment of European capital in land development, to do nothing which would tend towards ousting Egyptian proprietors and substituting Europeans in their places. Of these means, the improvement in the system of irrigation has perhaps been the most important and the most productive of result. The establish- ment of an Agricultural Bank, which has ad- vanced sums amounting in the aggregate to about £9,000,000 in small sums to the fellaheen, and of Agricultural and Horticultural Societies, which have been the means of spreading a knowledge of scientific agriculture and horticulture, and have also facilitated the purchase by the cultivators of good seed and of manure, have also been potent influences acting in the same direction.^ There can be no doubt that these efforts have been crowned with success. On January 1, 1907, only 665,226 acres were held by 6021 foreign landowners,^ as against 4,765,546 acres held by 1,224,560 Egyptian proprietors. Of the latter, the holdings of 1,081,348 proprietors were of less than 5 acres in extent ; the holdings of 132,198 varied from 5 to 50 acres, thus leaving 11,054 * Full descriptions of the creation and working both of the Agri- cultural Bank and of the Agricultural and Horticultural Societies are given in the Annual Reports which have been laid before Parliament. 2 For further details up to December 31, 1906 see Egypt, No. 1 of 1907, p. 60. A great deal of the laud now held by foreigners belongs to Land Companies. It will eventually be sold. One of the highest authorities on this subject in Kgypt (the late iM. Felix Suares) assured me that he was convinced that, before many years had passed, almost the whole of the laud in Fgypt would be in the hands of Egyptians. cii. Liii FINANCE 453 proprietors of more than 50 acres. It may, I think, be confidently stated that the danger, which Lord Duiferin apprehended, has been averted. Finance is often considered a repellent subject, and, because it is repellent, it has gained a reputa- tion for being more difficult to understand than is really the case. There are, indeed, some few economic and currency questions which are abstruse, but the difficulty of understanding even these has been in no small degree increased by the cloud of words with which writers on subjects of this sort often surround issues in themselves simple. One merit of the Egyptian financial situation was this, that no semi -insoluble economic problem lurked between the leaves of the Budget. The Finance Minister had not, as in India, to deal with a congested population, of whom a large percentage were in normal times living on the verge of starva- tion. He never had to refer to the pages of Malthus or Mill, of Ricardo or Bastiat. The complications arising from a bewilderhig political situation had done a good deal to obscure the problems which he had to solve, and to hinder their solution. But, in truth, all that was required in Egypt, in order to understand the situation, was a knowledge of arithmetic, patience to uinavel the cumbersome system of accounts which was the offspring of internationalism, and a sturdy recogni- tion of the fact that neither an individual nor a State can with impunity go on living for an indefinite period above his or its income. The main facts relating to Egyptian finance, when once the thread of the international labyrinth had ^ been found, were, in fact, very simple ; when ^ I use the past tense because, witli the practical abolition of the Caisse de la Dette, the financial situation, and notably the system of accounts, has been very greatly simplified. 454 MODERN EGYPT pt. vi they were understood, they were not uninteresting. "Nothing," as Lord JNlihier truly says, "in tliis strange land is commonplace." The subject cannot surely be devoid of interest when it is remembered that the difference between the magic words surplus and deficit meant whether the Egyptian cultivator was, or was not, to be allowed to reap the fruits of his labour ; whether, after supplying the wants of the State, he was to be left with barely enough to keep body and soul together, or whether he was to enjoy some degree of rustic ease ; whether he was to be eternally condemned to live in a wretched mud hut, or whether he might have an opportunity given to him of improving his dwelling-house; whether he should or should not have water supplied to his fields in due season ; whether his disputes with his neighbours should be settled by a judge who decided them on principles of law, or whether he should be left to the callous caprice of some individual ignorant of law and cognisant only of bakhshish ; whether, if he were ill, he should be able to go to a well-kept hospital, or whether he should be unable to obtain any better medical assistance than that which could be given to his watch-dog or his donkey; whether a school, in which something useful could be learnt, should be provided for his children, or whether they should be left in the hands of teachers whose highest know- ledge consisted in being able to intone a few texts, which they themselves only half understood, from the Koran ; whether, if he suffered from mental aber- ration, he should be properly treated in a well-kept Lunatic Asylum, or whether he should be chained to a post and undergo the treatment of a wild beast ; whether he could travel from one part of the country to another, or communicate with his friends by post or telegraph, at a reasonable or only at a prohibitive cost ; in fact, whether he, and the CH. Liii FINANCE 455 ten millions of Egyptians who were like him, were or were not to have a chance afforded to them of taking a few steps upwards on the ladder of moral and material improvement. This, and much more, is implied when it is stated that the British and Egyptian financiers arrested bankruptcy, turned a deficit into a surplus, relieved taxation, increased the revenue, controlled the ex- penditure, and raised Egyptian credit to a level only second to that of France and England. All the other reforms which were effected flow from this one fact, that the financial administration of Egypt has been honest, and that the country, being by nature endowed with great recuperative power, and being inhabited by an industrious population, responded to the honesty of its rulers. It may be doubted whether in any other country such a remarkable transformation has been made in so short a time. CHAPTER LIV IRRIGATION Nature's bounty to Egypt — The work of the Pharaohs — Turkish neglect — Progress under British guidance — Programme of the future — Causes of the progress — Qualifications of the officers selected — Absence of international obstruction — Loan of £1,800,000 — Support of the public — Importance of the work. " If you dispute Providence and Destiny,** says an ancient author, "you can find many things in human affairs and nature that you would suppose might be much better performed in this or that way; as, for instance, that Egypt should have plenty of rain of its o^vn without being irrigated from the land of Ethiopia." ^ It may be doubted whether nowadays any one would be inclined to dispute Providence and Destiny on this ground. Indeed, the extraordinary fertility for which Egypt has from time immemorial been famous, which made Homer apply to it the epithet of fe/S^po?, and which led Juvenal to sing of the divitis ostia N^ili, is mainly due to the fact that its fields are not irrigated by the rain which falls within its own confines, but by the vast stores of water which sweep down the Nile from the centre of Africa. In no other country in the world may the agri- culturist be so surely guaranteed against the accidents and vicissitudes of the seasons. It is true that if the Nile is unusually high or low, the ' Strabo, Book iv. c i. 456 CH. Liv IRRIGATION 457 cultivator is or, at all events, was exposed, in the one case, to the evils of inundation, and in the other case, to those of drought. But there is this notable difference between risks of this nature and those incidental to the cultivation of the fields in countries which depend for their water-supply on their own rainfall, namely, that whereas no human effort can increase or diminish the quantity of rain which falls from the clouds, it is, on the other hand, within the resources of human skill to so regulate the water of the Nile flood as to mitigate, if not altogether to obviate, any dangers arising from an insufficient or an excessive supply of water. In this highly favoured country, Nature seems to have said to Man : I grant you the most favourable conditions possible under which to till the soil, — a genial climate, an assured supply of water, and a natural fertilising element, which, with scarcely an effort of your own, will every year recuperate the pro- ductive powers of the soil ; it is for you to turn to advantage the gifts which I have lavished on you. How did Man utilise his advantages ? In the early days of Egyptian civilisation, he made great and creditable eiibrts to turn them to account. *'It is certain," says Colonel Ross, "that in old days, there must have been native engineering talent of the very highest order, and when we read of such and such a King restoring public works in a long and glorious reign, there must have existed a continuous supply of good engineer- ing talent which had carte blanche from the ruler of the day." ^ The Pharaohs, it would thus appear, used their talent according to the best of their lights. The Turks, who ultimately succeeded them, hid theirs in a napkin, with the result that Nature, indignant at the treatment accorded to her, minimised the * Colonel Ross's Introduction to \Villcocks' Egyptian Irrigation, p. vL 458 MODERN EGYPT pt. vi value of her gifts and exacted penalties for the neglect of her laws. In later Mohammedan times, no serious efforts were made to avert drought or inundation. The general condition of Egyptian irrigation at the time when England took the affairs of the country in hand, was thus described by Colonel Ross : — "There can be no manner of doubt that, up to 1882, Egyptian irrigation was going downhill. Every year, some false step was taken in spite of the engineer. Every year, the corvee lost ground in its out-turn of work, drains were abandoned or became useless, and canals became less of artificial and more of natural channels wholly influenced by the natural rise and fall of the Nile. . . . Owing to many causes, the native talent has sunk so low that, without modern scientific aid, the Egyptians could not work their own canals. They have sunk into a dead conservatism. . . . The absence of repairs, so common to all JNIohammedan countries, and the existence of the corvee, or forced labour, have also largely contributed to the lowering of the standard of Egyptian engineers' design and method." Here was a grand opportunity for the English- man, and nobly did he avail himself of it. Con- sidering the importance of the subject, and the pride which every Englishman must feel at the splendid results obtained by those of his countrymen whom Lord INIilner rightly terms "the saviours of Egyptian irrigation," a sore temptation exists to deal with this matter in some detail. On the other hand, it is desirable to abridge this work ; moreover, the subject has been already treated by a highly qualified writer. The lassitude wliicli pervades both man and beast in Egypt during the hot months, when the land is baked by the fiery African sun and windswept by the scorching khamsin ; the general relief experienced when the CH. Liv IRRIGATION 459 Nile begins to rise ; the anxiety to know whether the water will pass the level of those "low cubits" which, it is said, were designated by the Arabs "the angels of death " ;^ the fear lest Nature should be too prodigal of her gifts and destroy by excess what, it was hoped, she would have bestowed by moderation ; the revival of the whole country when the waters retire and the earth begins to yield forth her increase ; all these things have been admirably related by Lord Milner in a chapter of his work, entitled TJie Struggle for Water. He has also described the care, the watchfulness, and the un- tiring energy displayed by the British engineers in their endeavours to direct and bridle the forces of Nature. At one time, water had to be economised and hydraulic skill exercised to make the most of a scanty supply. Again, at other times, constant vigilance was required to guard against inundation. During the season of low Nile, a system of rotations was adopted, under which the limited supply of water was turned to the best advantage in the interests of the entire population. The privileged classes learnt to their dismay that the rights of their humble neighbours must be respected. The Barrage — a work which owed its origin to the genius of a French engineer — was, in spite of strong opposition, repaired and rendered capable of doing excellent service.^ New canals were * " With good reason the Arabs desig-nate the low cubits by the name of the "angels of death," for, if the river does not reach its full height, famine and destruction come upon the whole land of Egypt." — Mommsen's Provinces of the Roman Empire, vol. ii. p. 252. 2 When the works at the Barrage were in course of construction, I visited them in company with Ali Pasha Moubarek. He was at that time Minister of Public W^orks, and had passed many years of his life in the service of that Department. He strongly opposed Sir Colin Scott- MoncriefF's plan for repairing the Barrage, and was in favour of the costly and wasteful alternative of erecting huge pumps. He remarked to me casually on his way down the river that he had not visited the Barrage for twenty-seven years. He was quite unconscious of the criticism on his own conduct which this admission involved. 460 MODERN EGYPT pt. vi dug. A variety of useful works were executed in Upper Egypt to guard against the effects of a low Nile. Drainage went hand in hand with irrigation. Before the British engineers had been at work ten years, the cotton crop was trebled, the sugar crop more than trebled, and the country was being gradually covered with a network of light railways and agricultural roads in order to enable the produce to be brought to market. Much, however, as the British engineer has done for Egypt, his work is not yet complete. The whole of the cultivable lands in Egypt are not as yet brought under cultivation.^ In order to attain this object, it is estimated that it will be necessary to store about four million cubic metres of water. The magnificent dam constructed at Assouan, which has already rendered invaluable service to the country,^ is capable of storing one million cubic metres. Works are now in course of execution which will increase its storage capacity to about 2j millions of cubic metres. It is not as yet decided how any further supply will be obtained, but a general sketch of the projects which are worthy of consideration has been given in Sir William Garstin's masterly report of JNIarch 1904.^ Prob- ably, I shall not be far from the mark if I say that, in the course of the next fifteen or twenty years, some twenty millions sterling may profit- ably be spent in improving the Egyptian and Soudanese systems of irrigation. * The question of the extent to which the area of cotton-bearing land is capable of increase was examined iu some detail in my Report for the year 1900. See Egypt, No. 1 of 1907, pp. 45-47. '^ To g'ive one example^ it is estimcated that the conversion, which ia now nearly complete, of 404,470 acres of land in Middle Egypt from a system of basin to one of perennial irrigation will increase the rental value of those lands by no less tlian £'E.2,()22,.'3.50, and the sale value by £E.28,312,900. —^nnua/ Report of the Irrigation Department, 1906, p. 178. 8 See Egypt, No. 2 of 1904. CH. Liv IRRIGATION 461 When, eventually, the waters of the Nile, from the I^akes to tlie sea, are brought fully under control, it will be possible to boast that Man — in this case, the Englishman — has turned the gifts of Nature to the best possible advantage. Tlie operations of the Irrigation Department have, in fact, been singularly successful, perhaps more so than those of any other Department of the Government. To what causes may this success be attributed ? It has, in the first place, been due to the high character and marked capacity of the British engineers, who were chosen with the utmost care. The superior officials of the Irrigation Department came from India, a country which affords an excellent training for the hydraulic engineer. Armed with the previous knowledge which they had acquired, they studied the various problems which Egyptian irrigation presented for solution, and proposed nothing until they had obtained a thorough mastery of the facts with which they had to deal. So far as I know, they have never yet made a serious mistake. But the qualifications of the individuals, high though they were, would have availed but little had not their labours been exerted in a sphere where adventitious circumstances were favourable to success. The first of these circumstances was that, rela- tively to some other branches of the Egyptian service, the Public Works Department was from the first freed from the incubus of internationalism. It is not to be supposed that the actions of the British engineers were not in some degree hampered by the meshes which an obstructive diplomacy had, with perverse ingenuity, flung over the whole governmental machine of Egypt. Any such supposition would be erroneous. Ubiquitous inter- 462 MODERN EGYPT ft. vi nationalism, by imposing a fantastic financial system on the country, and by secreting for many years the economies resulting from the partial con- version of the Debt, limited the funds which it was possible to place at the disposal of the British engineers, and thus diminished their power of doing good. More than this, that duality, which was the bane of the Egyptian administrative system, existed at one time in the heart of the Public Works Department, but fortunately in a relatively innocuous form. This duality was, how- ever, abolished at an early period of the occupation. It was felt that, in view of the importance of the Irrigation Department, it should be exclusively in British hands. " It is evident," Lord Dufferin wrote in 1883, " that the present irrigation service of Egypt is wanting in intelligent direction and honest and efficient inspection. . . . Egypt is so similar to many of the irrigated districts in India that it is only natural to turn to that country for advice." Thus, the British engineers were left free to design and to execute their own plans for the canalisation of the country. They were spared the calamity of having to deal with an International Board. They could decide on the construction of a canal without having to consider whether the policy of Great Britain in the Pacific or Indian Oceans was viewed with favour at Berlin or Paris. This was a great negative advantage. The comparative freedom of action accorded to the British engineers contributed in no small degree to the success which attended their operations. In one other respect, the British engineers were fortunate. However remarkable may have been their professional skill, and however sound their plans, it is obvious that they could have done nothing without money. Funds were fortunately CH. Liv IRRIGATION 463 provided for them. When the London Confer- ence on the financial affairs of E<4ypt took place in 1884, it was proposed to borrow £1,000,000, to be applied to the improvement of tlie irrigation system of the country. The proposal met with a good deal of opposition. Doubts were at the time expressed by competent British authorities as to the wisdom of adopting this course. Those doubts were based on reasonable grounds. Exces- sive borrowing had brought Egypt to the verge of ruin, and it was pointed out that to increase the debt of a State which was then in a well-nigh bankrupt condition was, at best, a hazardous experiment. Others, who had more confidence in the future of Egypt and in the elasticity of its resources, were in favour of a bolder policy. They supported the view which, it must be admitted, at the time appeared somewhat paradoxical, that the best way to relieve the country from the burthen of a crushing debt resulting from loans, the proceeds of which had been to a large extent squandered, would be to contract a further loan, and to apply tlie money thus obtained to developing the resources of the country. After a sharp struggle, this latter view prevailed. A sum of £1,000,000 for irrigation purposes was included in the loan contracted for the payment of the Alexandria indemnities and otiier purposes. In 1890, an additional sum of £800,000 was phiced at the disposal of the Public Works Department for irrigation and drainage works. In my Report for 1891, after describing the ex- tent to w Inch the productive powers of the country had been increased by irrigation, I added : — " The policy of increasing the debt of Egypt, which was adopted seven years ago, has been amply justified. I should be the last to wish that the facts which I have narrated above should be 464 MODERN EGYPT pt. vi used as a justification for reckless borrowino-, but they certainly do show that cases may arise in which a quasi-bankrupt State, if it be possessed of great natural resources, may be placed in a position of solvency by adding to its debt, provided always that the money borrowed be judiciously applied. In cases of this sort, the main difficulty generally is to ensure the execution of the proviso. So far as Egypt is concerned, I have no hesitation in say- ing that the expenditure of this £1,800,000 on irrigation and drainage has contributed probably more than any one cause to the comparative pros- perity that the country now enjoys. It ensured the solvency of the Egyptian Treasury, and until this was done, no very serious effort was possible in the direction of moral and material progress." Lastly, when once his value had been recognised — that is to say, in a very sliort space of time — the British engineer secured tlie support of Egyptian public opinion. The facts were, indeed, so strong as to bring conviction to the minds of the most prejudiced and sceptical. The fellah might fail to realise the utility and insignificance of some of the reforms instituted under British tutelage, but he knew the value of water to an extent which can perhaps scarcely be appreciated by inhabitants of northern countries. No amount of misrepre- sentation could persuade him that the man who brought to his fields, in a measure surpassing his wildest expectations, the element for which he thirsted, was not his benefactor. Till taught by pain, Men really know not what good water's worth. ^ The British engineer, in fact, unconsciously accomplished a feat which, in the eyes of a politician, is perhaps even more remarkable than ' Don Juan, ii. 84. CH. Liv IRRIGATION 465 that of controlling the refractory waters of the- Nile. He justified Western methods to Eastern minds. He inculcated, in a manner which arrested and captivated even the blurred intellect and way- ward imagination of the poor, ignorant Egyptian fellah, the lesson that the usurer and the retailer of adulterated drinks are not the sole products of European civilisation ; and, inasmuch as he achieved this object, he deserves the gratitude not only of all intelligent Asiatics, but also of all Europeans — of the rulers of Algiers and of Tunis as well as those of India. VOL. II 2 H CHAPTER LV THE army' Disbandment of the army in 1882 — History of the army — Mehemot All's Syrian campaio'ns — Ismail Pasha — The AbJ^ssinian campaign — Tel-el-Kebir — It is decided to form a fellaheen army officered by Englishmen — The black battalions — Will the army fight? — Reasons why the reorganisation has been successfully conducted. In leaving the work of the civilian for that of the soldier, we at once seem to pass from the involved and cautious language of diplomacy to the out- spoken behests of the barrack-yard. One of the first points which had to be considered after the battle of Tel-el-Kebir had been fought and won was what should be done with the Egyptian army. The soldier advisers of the British and Egyptian Governments answered this question with military frankness. The Egyptian army, as then consti- tuted, was worse than useless. It had proved itself a danger to the State. It could mutiny, but it could not, or would not fight. The logical conclu- sion to be drawn from this statement of facts was that the existing army should be disbanded, and another army created in its place. Accordingly, on September 19, 1882, that is to say, six days after the battle of Tel-el-Kebir had been fought, the following laconic Decree appeared in the Official Journal : — * In the preparation of this chapter, I have been materially aided by Sir Reginald VVingate. 466 CH.LY THE ARMY 467 " Nous, Khddive d'Egypte, considdrant la rebellion militaire, D^CR^TONS Art. 1. L'armde Egyptienne est dissoute. (Signe) Mehemet Tewfik.* Out of what material was a new army to be formed ? Could the fellaheen, who had but recently shown themselves so destitute of military qualities, be made into good soldiers ? It was im- possible at the time to answer this latter question confidently in the affirmative. Nevertheless, the past history of Egypt was there to show that the behaviour of the troops at Tel-el-Kebir did not constitute a sufficient proof that the answer should be a decided negative. For centuries past, Egypt had been ruled by foreign conquerors, who intro- duced their own or mercenary troops in order to maintain their authority. The Egyptian fellah had inherited no warlike attributes ; rather was he the outcome of a system of serfdom and slavery well calculated to stifle all military instincts. It has been the custom to give JNlehemet Ali the credit of having been the first to realise that Egypt had ready to hand in the fellaheen the raw material out of which a national army could be formed. The defeats which he inflicted on the Turkish armies in Syria are adduced in proof of the success of his military policy. To a certain extent, the praise bestowed on Mehemet Ali in this connection is justified. What he did was briefly this. His early campaigns against the Wahabis (1811-18), and his campaigns in Nubia and Sennar (1820-22) were conducted with mer- cenary troops. Subsequently, that is to say, in 1822-24, being carried away by the regnandi dira 468 MODERN EGYPT ft. vi cupido, he required a larger army. It was not possible to obtain an adequate supply of Albanians or Circassians. An attempt made to utilise the blacks of the Soudan resulted in failure, by reason of the mortality which prevailed amongst them when they were transported from tropical Afi'ica to the relatively cold climate of Egypt. Mehemet Ali had, therefore, to fall back on the Egyptian peasantry. The experiment was crowned with some measure of success. The fellah is hardy and robust. He soon proved himself to be a docile soldier. In 1824, a battalion of Egyptians was sent to Arabia, another to Sennar, and four battalions were de- spatched to the Morea, under the celebrated Ibrahim Pasha. Then came the first Syrian war, when the veteran ranks were swelled by crowds of fellaheen raised under the most tyrannous of con- scriptions.^ Yet this force carried all before it. There can be little doubt that, had not European diplomacy intervened, Ibrahim Pasha might, after the battle of Konia, have marched to Constantinople with little or no opposition. It was this success, followed by the victory at Nezib over the Turkish troops in the second Syrian war of 1839, which had the effect of raising the Egyptian soldiery to a position of some celebrity as a force of acknow- ledged value. o Prior to the battle of Konia, the strength of the Egyptian army and navy, the former of which had been organised by French officers, consisted, accord- ing to Clot Bey,' of 277,000 men, of whom 130,000 were regular troops. Of the regular troops, the bulk of the infantry was nominally composed of * " Women were hunja^ up by the hair of the head and vvliipped till they disclosed tlieir sons' ]ii(lini,'--p]aces. Those that were taken were never seen again. Once a soldier always a soldier, in Ibrahim Pasha'a jirmy." — Life and Letters of Lady Ilenter Stanhopef p. 2G3. '^ AperfU sur fEyypte, vol. ii. p. 2.35. ch.lv the AKMY 469 fellaheen, but the system under which they were recruited leaves little doubt that there was a con- siderable foreign element in the ranks. Not only the officers, but also a large proportion of the non- commissioned officers were Turks, Albanians, etc. It is said that, as the result of Ibrahim Pasha's experience in Arabia, it was decided never to pro- mote an Egyptian above the rank of sergeant. As regards the composition of the other arms, it is not possible to obtain accurate statistics, but during the early years of the British, occupation tliere were still many living who could remember that a large proportion of the rank and file of the cavalry were Turks and Circassians, whilst in the artillery the proportion of the latter was still greater. It is to be remembered that when, in 1826, Sultan JNIah- moud ordered the massacre of the Janissaries, a large number of the survivors fled to Egypt, where they accepted service in the newly organised army. Again, during Ibrahim Pasha's campaign in Syria, he increased his strength by recruiting locally from the mountain tribes and Bedouins. It is clear, therefore, that the army with which Ibrahim Pasha won his victories was not, in the true sense of the term, a purely national army. A strong foreign element existed, not only amongst the officers and non-commissioned officers, but also amongst the rank and file. Moreover, in judging of the importance to be attached to the military prowess of the Egyptian troops in the days of Mehemet Ali, account has to be taken of the state of the Turkish army. Prior to 1826, the armed forces of Turkey consisted of the Janissaries. After their destruction and dis- bandment, there was, in point of fact, no disciplined Turkish military force left. The disaster of Navarino, followed by the Ilusso- Turkish war of 1828-29, left Sultan JNIahmoud in the position 470 MODERN EGYPT pt. vi of having to send against Ibrahim "disaffected armies of raw recruits, badly officered and worse generalled." ^ In comparison with these raw levies, the Egyptian army represented a well-organised and well -disciplined force, trained by able foreign officers on Eiu'opean principles, and, moreover, leavened with a considerable proportion of veteran troops who had had experience of actual war in the Morea, Arabia, and elsewhere. More than this, they had in Ibrahim Pasha a leader possessed of undoubted military genius, whose actions bore the stamp of energy, foresight, and skill. Ibrahim Pashas successes in Syria afford, therefore, ample proof that a well -disciplined and well-led force will almost invariably defeat badly disciplined and untrained levies, however superior be the numbers of the latter. But to say more than this would exceed the limits of justifiable deduction. To make tlie result of the Syrian battles the standard by which to gauge the per- manent fighting value of the Egyptians would involve a generalisation of too hasty and too sweeping a character. Mr. William Dye, an American officer formerly in the Egyptian service, after reviewing the military history of Egypt, says : '* Ibrahim's successes at Konia and elsewhere were due to his generalship, certainly not to any peculiar qualities that the fellah may have possessed as a soldier." The fact that under Abbas I. the Egyptians were driven from Nejd, and that the Wahabite State regained its independence, con- firms the correctness of this opinion. Said Pasha, the successor of Abbas I., at first played with his soldiers, and then disbanded the greater part of the army. In 1863, it consisted of only 3000 men. The personnel was disorganised and the material defective. * Creasy's History of the Ottoman Turks, vol. ii. p. 437. CH. Lv THE ARMY 471 On Ismail's accession, his first care was to increase the military power of the State. He believed, or, at all events, he acted as if he believed in the fighting qualities of the fellaheen. Said Pasha had been the first to employ men of fellah extraction as officers, but he did not allow them to be promoted above the rank of captain. Ismail Pasha made an important and hazardous innovation. He allowed Egyptians to be promoted to the rank of colonel. The first opportunity of testing the value of Ismail Pasha's army occurred in 1874, when a rebellion broke out in Darfour. It was suppressed by General Gordon, who discarded his Egyptian soldiers and mainly employed troops raised on the spot. " The officers and men," he wrote, " are a cowardly set. They are good marchers, and bear privation well, but that is all I can say in their favour. ... I have not the least confidence in my officers and men. ... I cannot bear these Egyptian officers. Tliey have no good quality. I like the blacks ; now, these black soldiers are the only troops in the Egyptian service worth anything."^ Then came the disastrous Abyssinian campaign of 1876, when the Egyptians were, on several occasions, routed with heavy loss. Mr. Dye, in criticising these operations, says : '* There was no unity of command, there was no cohesion among the parts of the army. This was due to the want of individual interest among the men in the campaign, a general need of good officers and a lack of discipline, and of any equitable system of rewards and punishments." That the Egyptian army did not suffer any further reverses during Ismail Pasha's reign is probably due to the fact that it was not again seriously involved in warlike operations. Ismail * General Gordon in Central Africa, p 161. 472 IMODERN EGYPT pt. vi was assuredly more successful, during the latter years of his reign, in disorganising, than he had been, during his earlier years, in organising an army. It has been shown in the course of this narrative how the son reaped, in the shape of overt mutiny, the whirlwind which the father had sown. It is impossible for an army to mutiny without its value as a fighting- machine being impaired. We are, indeed, so accustomed to connect military efficiency with military subordination that it is well-nigh impossible to dissociate the two ideas. Nevertheless, the greater or less degree of harm inflicted on military efficiency by any mutiny must depend in some measure on the causes and circumstances of the mutiny itself. If, as happened in India in 1857, the rank and file rebel against their officers, the mutineers must of necessity take the field under circumstances of great disadvantage to themselves. The men are suddenly deprived of the leaders to whom they have been accustomed to yield implicit obedience. The case of Arabics army was different. The men did not mutiny against their officers ; it was the officers who mutinied against the Khedive, and who carried the rank and file with them. It may be said that practically the army rebelled en bloc. It is true that a few Turkish and Circassian officers disappeared, the Arabi movement having been primarily directed against them. But their numbers were not sufficient to dislocate the military machine. INIore- over, their disa])pearance only enhanced the lesson, wliich was rudely inculcated by Lord AVolseley, as to the fighting value of an Egyptian army led by Egyptian officers. Arabi's soldiers had, in fact, every inducement to fight, and every oppor- tunity of showing what they could do in the way of fighting. They represented, or, at all events, they purported to represent, the forces of indignant ch.lv the army 473 patriotism calling on the sons of the soil to repel a foreiijn foe. Their cause was that of the INIoslem against the Christian, of the native Egyptian against the upholders of Turkish tyranny. They fought under local conditions of great advantage. Arabi occupied at Tel-el-Kebir an entrenched position of great strength. The attacking force, which had to advance up a " glacis-like slope," was numerically only one-half as strong as the defenders. Yet within twenty minutes of the first shot being fired, the Egyptian force was in full retreat with a loss of upwards of 2000 killed, whilst the British force, which delivered a frontal attack, only lost 459 men killed and wounded. Manifestly, Arabi's force was, in Dryden's oft-quoted words, nothing but a rude militia, In peace a charge, in war a weak defence. Europe was astonished, and some hostile critics, being unable to show that Arabi had in reality been a victor in the fray, found consolation in the fiction that the battle had been won by British gold. The subsequent history of the Soudan confirmed the lesson which was to be derived from the experi- ence of Tel-el-Kebir. Everywhere the Dervishes drove the fellaheen soldiers before them. Such were the historical facts with which Lord Dufferin and his military advisers had to deal in 1882. They all pointed to one inevitable con- clusion. It was that an Egyptian army officered by native Egyptians was worse than useless. The question of employing mercenary soldiers was dis- cussed. Lord Dufferin wisely decided to put aside all idea of enrolling Albanians, Circassians, or other waifs and strays of the JNIediterranean. He laid it down as a principle that the army "should be essentially composed of native Egyptians. . . . Egypt has had enough of Mamelukes and their 474 MODERN EGYPT rr. vi congeners.** The officers were to be supplied from England. An experiment was to be made with a view to ascertaining whether what Lord Dufferin termed "the metamorphic spirit of the age" — aided by a certain number of British officers and drill-sergeants — could achieve the remarkable feat of turning the fellah into an efficient soldier. Sir Evelyn Wood — who was subsequently succeeded, first, by Lord Grenfell, and, later, by Lord Kitchener and Sir Reginald Wingate — was appointed to command the army. The cadres of battalions were formed by carefully selecting from the debris of Arabi's army the requisite number of officers and non-commissioned officers. The rank and file were taken straight from the plough. The British officers had an arduous task to perform. Not only had every branch of the military administrative machine to be created afresh ; not only had the oppressive recruiting System, which formerly existed, to be swept away and an improved system put in its place ; not only had the Englishman to wage unremit- ting war against corruption and against the other chronic diseases of Egyptian administration and society ; but, in reversing the old, and entering upon the new order of things, it was necessary to implant in the minds of the fellaheen the fact that discipline could be strict without being oppressive ; that the ])eriod of service for which they had been enrolled would not be prolonged beyond that prescribed by law ; that they would receive their pay and their food regularly ; that the former would never be stopped except for misconduct ; that they would no longer be subjected to brutal treatment at the hands of their officers ; that any complaints which they might make would be impartially investigated, and that, if they committed any crime, they would be fairly tried and ch.lv the army 475 would only receive punishment in proportion to the gravity of the offence. All these difficulties were overcome. Professional skill was brought to bear on all administrative questions. High character and integrity gradually weaned the fellaheen soldiers from the idea that the exercise of authority was synonymous with the committal of injustice. Indeed, the moral reforms which the British officers achieved rank even higher than their administrative successes, albeit these latter were also remarkable. Looking to the past history and actual condition of Egypt in 1882, it might well have been thought that confidence in those placed in authority over him would be a plant of very slow growth in the mind of the Egyptian fellah. Yet, the British officers of the Egyptian army speedily accomplished the remarkable feat of obtaining the complete confidence of their men. Not only, moreover, does this spirit of confidence now pervade all ranks of the army, but it extends to every family in the country. The relations of the soldiers understand the altered con- ditions under which conscription is conducted, and the regulations of the army enforced. " The re- appearance of the fellah soldier," Lord Milner says, **in his native village after an absence of a year in the barracks — not crawling back mutilated, or smitten by some foul disease, but simply walk- ing in as a visitor, healthy, well-dressed, and with some money in his pocket — was like the vision of a man risen from the dead."^ Thus, the reconstituted army consisted, in the first instance, only of fellaheen. About 6000 men were raised. These were formed into two brigades, one of which was commanded by British and the other by Egyptian officers. It was intended that this force should mainly be used as an aid to * England in Egypt, p. 176. 476 MODERN EGYPT pt. vi the constabulary in the nmiiiteiiance of internal tranquillity. The soldiers were to "prevent the Bedouins from causino; trouble along; the desert border." They were to suppress " small local insurrections."^ It was not contemplated at the time that they would ever be employed in the Soudan. As, however, events in the Soudan de- veloped and the power of the Mahdi grew, it became evident that the southern frontier of Egypt would either have to be permanently defended by British troops, or that the Egyptian army would have to be increased and improved to such an extent as to render it possible to dispense with British aid. To have relied wholly on fellaheen troops would manifestly have been dangerous. The necessity of stiffening what Lord Dufferin called " the invertebrate ranks of the fellaheen soldiery " had arisen. An unsuccessful attempt was made to raise a brigade of Turks. The nucleus of a battalion of Albanians was formed. They mutinied, and were disbanded in a few weeks. It was then decided to ftiU back on the blacks of the Soudan. Thus, Lord Dufferin's fellaheen army was eventually converted into a combined force of fellaheen and blacks. The blacks, who join as volunteers, belong for the most part to the tribes who are found on the Upper Nile from near Kodok to the Equatorial Province ; others come from the west beyond Kordofan, and even from as far as Wadai and Bornou. JNIany of them are little better than savages. They are difficult to control, and are as thoughtless, capricious, and wanting in fore- sight as children. They are not quick at drill, nor are they fond of it, affording in this respect * Some authorities went so far in 1882-83 as to hold that no Eg'yptian army was required. Lord Duft'erin wisely rejected this extreme view. CH. LV THE ARMY 477 a contrast to the fellah, who, true to his national characteristics, is an admirable automaton. The blacks are very excitable. On the other hand, their initiative, dash, and instincts of self-defence make them invaluable as fighting troops. Before the British officers had been long at work, it was clear that they had created a small army superior in quality to anything which Egypt had heretofore possessed. That army was endowed with all those outward and visible signs of efficiency of which note can be taken in time of peace. Would it, however, fight? That was a question which for some while remained doubtful. But all doubts have now been removed. The history of the Soudan, which has been narrated in this work, enables the question to be confidently answered in the affirmative. The reasons why the endeavours to form an efficient military force in Egypt have been crowned with success are clear. The British officer has been allowed a free hand ; he has had even greater liberty of action than the British engineer. Even a devotee of cosmopolitan principles would hesitate to subject the command of an armed force to the disintegrating process of internationalism. In spite, however, of the success which has so far attended the efforts of military reformers in Egypt, it should never be forgotten that an army composed of Moslems and officered to a considerable extent by Christians is a singularly delicate machine, which requires most careful handling. CHAPTER LVl THE INTERIOR Uncertainty of British policy — Difficulties of administrative reform — Lord Dufferin's Police proposals — Mr, Clifford Lloyd — Chanp;e8 made in the Police organisation — Nubar Pasha's conflict with Mr. Clifford Lloyd — The latter resigns — Friction in the Interior — Appointment of an Adviser — And of Inspectors — Difficulties of the present moment. Cases have so far been discussed in which the reformer was, to a greater or less extent, crippled by internationalism, or hampered by the anomalous nature of an official position in which he was expected to fulfil many of the functions of a Minister without possessing ministerial rank or authority. It is now necessary to deal with a case in which the evils arising from the uncer- tainty, which for many years hung over the future of British policy in Egypt, come into special prominence. Whether the British occupa- tion was to be temporary or permanent, there could be no doubt as to the desirability of relieving taxation, digging canals, and creating a well- disciplined army which would be able to repel Dervish invasion. The financier, the engineer, and the soldier might, indeed, think that the edifice which each had reared would either collapse at once, should British influence cease to be para- mount, or gradually decay when exposed to the dry-rot of unchecked Pasliadom. But however that might be, there could be no doubt as to tlie 478 CH.LVI THE INTERIOR 479 kind of edifice which liad to be constructed ; its nature was, indeed, indicated by certain well- recognised professional canons. The case of internal administrative reform was different. It might have been thought that the work of organising the Department of the Interior would, relatively to other Departments, have presented but little difficulty to the Englishman, with his law - abiding tendencies, his practical common sense, and his freedom from bureaucratic formalism. The main thing was to organise a Police force, to appoint a few Police Magistrates, and to lay down a few simple rules for the relations which were to exist between the judicial and executive authorities. Work of this sort could not surely present any insuperable difficulties to a nation whose dominion was world-wide, and who had shown a special genius for the government of subject races. Conclusions drawn from general arguments of this nature are often liable to error from foro-etful- ness of the fact that certain combinations will not bring about certain anticipated results unless it be ascertained that no link is wanting in the chain of circumstances necessary to fulfil the conditions of the required combination. Even Euclid had to assume the truth of his postulates. There can be little doubt that if the conditions under which the work of Egyptian administrative reform was undertaken had been favourable, a success equal to that of which the British administrative reformer may boast in India and elsewhere would speedily have been achieved. But the conditions were not only less favourable than in other countries, they were unfavourable even when judged by the standard of Egyptian intricacy. It was not only that the British reformer was deprived of liberty of action to such an extent as to be unable to 180 MODERN EGYPT pt.vi 2xecute his own plans. It was not only that he had to pose as a subordinate and, at the same time, to act in a great measure as a superior. Ditficulties even more formidable than these had to be encountered. He was in the position of an architect who was told to design a house without any indication as to whether the build- ing was to be a king's palace or the cottage of a peasant. No one could tell him precisely what was required of him. Was he to allow the abominable Police system which he found in existence to remain in force with merely some slight modifications ? Certainly not. He was expected to reform, and he was well aware that he could not make a silk purse out of a sow's ear. Was he to take the matter vigorously in hand, employ agents on whom he could thoroughly rely, and intro- duce a rational system based partly on the experience gained in other countries, and partly on the special requirements of Egypt ? From many points of view this would unquestionably have been the best course to pursue, but he had to remember — and here the most important link in the chain of circumstances necessary to ensure success snapped in twain — that the British occupation was only temporary, that the authority of the native rulers must not be impaired, and that it was useless to begin the construction of a system which could not be completed in the limited time at his disposal, and which would of a surety fall to pieces directly the Englishman turned his back. For, indeed, a severe relapse could, in this instance, be predicted with absolute certainty. Tliere might be some faint hope that, if the occupa- tion ceased, self-interest would lead the rulers of Egypt to employ British engineers to su])ervise the supply and distribution of water. It was con- ceivable, though improbable, that the first outcome CH.LVI THE INTERIOR 481 of the withdrawal of effective British control would not be the reproduction of financial chaos. But it was altogether inconceivable tliat the cause of in- ternal administrative reform should prosper in the hands of the Egyptian governing classes, if they were left entirely to their own devices. P'or, in fact, the centre of gravity of Egyptian misgovernment lay in the Department of the Interior. That Depart- ment was the very citadel of corruption, the headquarters of nepotism, the cynosure of all that numerous class who hoped to gain an easy, if illicit, livelihood by robbing either the Treasury or the taxpayers, or, if both these courses were impossible, by obtaining some well-paid sinecure. Every vested interest in the country was sure to be against the reformer, who at each step would find that his views clashed with long-standing abuses, perverted morals, and habits of thought with which he was unfamiliar. Neither could he hope to gain that degree of support from local public opinion which was, however grudgingly, accorded to the engineer. He would be unable to produce material proofs, which could be visible to the eye or palpable to the touch, of the good work he was doing. In order to succeed, he would have to be a moral, even more than an administrative reformer. He would have to be engaged in a succession of conflicts on matters of detail, the mass of which, taken collectively, were indeed of great importance, but which, taken separately, were little calculated to arouse en- thusiasm or sympathy on his behalf. Moreover, besides these general causes, other special hindrances stood in the way of the internal reformer. It was no easy matter to sweep away the abuses of the ancient village system of govern- ment, without wrecking the system itself. Still less easy was it to establish a modus vivendi between VOL. II 2 I 482 MODERN EGYPT pt. vi British ideas of Police duties and Franco-Egyptian ideas of judicial functions. The regime of the Capitulations also barred the way to many useful reforms. The work of internal reform presented, therefore, difficulties of a very peculiar character. They were the result partly of the actual circumstances with which the reformer had to deal, but still more of the want of reality which attended the whole system of government by reason of the uncertainty of British policy in connection with Egypt. The question of the organisation of the Police force naturally attracted the attention of Lord DufFerin. He dwelt on the necessity of forming "an intelligent, active, and ubiquitous provincial constabulary," which was to partake of a civil rather than of a military character. The force of provincial and urban constabulary, including two reserve battalions of 500 men each, was to consist of 6500 men. They were to be under a European Inspector - General, who was to act under the control of the Minister of the Interior. General V^alentine Baker was appointed to this post ; a few European officers were nominated to act as his subordinates. When I arrived in Egypt in September 1883, I found that ]Mr. Clifford Lloyd was in Cairo. He had come on a vague roving commission to " superintend internal reforms." Even in Egypt, the chosen home of lax official nomenclature, it was found that this definition of Mr. Cliffi)rd Lloyd's functions was wanting in precision. In January 1884, he was, therefore, appointed Under- Secretary to the Department of the Interior. I have rarely come across any man who, on first acquaintance, created such a favourable impression as Mr. Clifford Lloyd. His appearance and de- meanour, his singularly sympathetic features and CH. Lvi THE INTERIOR 483 clear blue eyes, his courteous manner, and the rare mixture of decision and moderation with which he was wont to expound his opinions, all bespoke a man of strong will, who could assert his authority without bluster, and who could be firm witliout being unconciliatory. Neither was this first im- pression erroneous. Mr. Clifford Lloyd possessed many remarkable qualities. In spite of some obvious defects of character, this straightforward, honourable, courageous English gentleman was always to me a very attractive figure. In a dis- turbed district of India or Ireland, he would have been an ideal Government official. But he had not the versatility and tact necessary for the work he had in hand in Egypt. He was unable to adapt himself to local circumstances. More- over, he wished not only to do the work, but to let all the world know that he was doing it. To quote a single instance of how little careful he was to avoid wounding native susceptibilities, he would not adopt the ordinary Egyptian custom of stamping his letters with a seal on which his signature in Arabic was engraved. He insisted on signing his name in English to all the letters he wrote to Egyptian officials. Moreover, he had never been behind the scenes of a central adminis- tration, with the result that he had no experience of how work at the headquarters of government is really carried on. These defects were sufficient to mar his finer qualities, and to detract from his usefulness as a Government official. One of the first results of his appointment was the issue of a Decree, on December 31, 1883, laying down the nature of the relations which were to exist between the Police and the Moudirs. Egypt was, for Police purposes, divided into three circles, to each of which a European Inspector, who was to be the delegate of the Inspector-General, was 484 INIODERN EGYPT pt. n appointed. European Inspectors were also to be employed in the principal towns. The Inspector was to be the intermediary between the Police and the MoLidir. The investigation of crime was to be conducted by the Police, independently of the Parquet. The adoption of these measures gave rise to a feud which lasted somewhat longer than the siege of Troy. On the one side it was urged, more especially by Nubar Pasha, who succeeded to office immedi- ately after the issue of the Decree of December 31, 1883, that whenever a European was placed under an Egyptian, the former would usurp the functions of the latter. There can, in fact, be little doubt that the European Inspectors looked more to the orders of the Inspector-General than to those of the INIoudirs, although the latter were nominally their official superiors. No one, therefore, knew who was really responsible for the maintenance of public tranquillity. Nubar Pasha was never tired of complaining of what he called " la duality dans les provinces." The authority of the Moudirs had, in fact, been impaired, and nothing sufficiently definite had been substituted in its place. They were not allowed to rule according to their own rude lights. On the other hand, they could not, or would not assist in ruling according to the new methods which found favour with their English coadjutors. Under these circumstances, although they were powerless to prevent the change of system, they were sufficiently strong to counteract any beneficial results which might have accrued from its adoption. They fell back on the arm in the use of which the Oriental excels. They adopted a system of passive obstruction. On the other side, it was urged, with much force, that unless the Moudirs were placed under CH. Lvi THE INTERIOR 485 some European control, all the abuses of the past would reappear. When complaints were made that the people no longer respected the Moudirs, it was replied — in the words of Sir Benson ]M ax well, who was then Procureur- General — that the old respect "was merely the offspring of the terror felt by the helpless inhabitants in the presence of the officer who was armed with the courbash and the keys of the gaol. If the restora- tion of the power was not accompanied by fresh abuses, tlie respect would not revive, since the fear on which it rested would not." If Nubar Pasha had been prepared to accept a certain limited amount of European co-operation and inspection, both at the Ministry of the Interior and in the provinces, a compromise might have been effected. But, although at first inclined to entertain proposals of this nature, he subsequently rejected them. Apart, however, from the merits or demerits of the new Police system, it soon became clear that two men so dissimilar in character as Nubar Pasha and Mr. Clifford Lloyd could not work together for long. Early in April 1884, the first of a suc- cession of petty crises arose. The points at issue were laid before Lord Granville. "The real question," Mr. Clifford Lloyd said, "is whether Her Majesty's Government will now face the inevitable and appoint an English President of the Council, or by withdrawing me deal a death-blow to reformation in this country." Now, if there was one thing in the world which Lord Granville disliked, it was "facing the in- evitable." He was constitutionally averse to any line of policy which, in Mr. Clifford Lloyd's words, was intended to " clear the way for all that had to be done, once and for all." Moreover, in this particu- lar instance, he could give some very valid reasons 486 MODERN EGYPT rtw for declining to act on the advice of his masterful subordinate. Mr. Clifford Lloyd had been sent to Egypt, not to initiate a new Egyptian policy, but to do the best he could under the difficult and abnormal circumstances of the situation. Of course, if an English President of the Council had been appointed — in other words, if England had assumed the direct government of Egypt — all administrative difficulties would have been solved. Any one, as has truly been said, can govern in a state of siege. But Mr. Clifford Lloyd had not been asked to govern, neither had he been commissioned to introduce such radical changes as would neces- sarily involve a complete change of governors. His task was, partly by persuasion, and partly by a moderate amount of diplomatic support, to intro- duce such partial reforms in the existing system of administration as were possible without shattering the flimsy political fabric with which he had to deal. He was constitutionally unsuited for the performance of this delicate task. He could not understand half measures. JVil actum credens, dum quid super esset agendum, was his motto. Never, probably, did he show his want of discernment more conspicuously than when he exhorted a Minister, who was pre-eminently opportunist, to resort to heroic measures. Lord Granville was equal to the occasion. He could elude the point of the ra])ier even when the hilt was held by a skilled diplomatist and dialectician ; how much more, therefore, could he escape from the sledge-hammer blows and wild tlirusts of this blunt, outspoken tyro in official life. Acting under Lord Granville's instructions, I ])atched up a truce between Nubar Pasha and Mr. Clifford Lloyd, but the feud soon broke out again. Eventually, towards the end of May 1884, Mr. CHfford Lloyd resigned his appointment and left Egypt. CH. Lvi THE INTERIOR 487 It was a misfortune that his mission did not prove successful. Had he managed to acquire a commanding influence over the affairs of the Interior, not only would much good have accrued to Egypt, but a great deal of friction, which sub- sequently ensued, would have been avoided. I have often asked myself whether, had I supported Mr. Clifford Lloyd more strongly, a more favourable result might have been obtained. If the circumstances of the time had been different, and if I had been able to devote myself more ex- clusively to the solution of this particular diffi- culty, it is possible that the conflict between Nubar Pasha and Mr. Clifford Lloyd might not have become so acute as was actually the case. But the circumstances of the time were ab- normal. General Gordon was inundating me with violent and contradictory telegrams from Khartoum. Whatever time could be spared from Soudan affairs, had mainly to be devoted to finance, which was then the burning question of the day. The representatives of almost every Power in Europe were banded together in opposition to England, and to every proposal emanating from a British source. On the other hand, Nubar Pasha jauntily threw off all responsibility for Soudanese or financial affairs, and concentrated all the efforts of his astute mind on an endeavour to upset the Clifford Lloyd combination, and to free the Egyptian Government from all European control in so far as the affairs of the Interior were concerned. Under circumstances such as these, the result of the struggle was almost a foregone conclusion. Even, however, without the special circum- stances existing at the moment, I do not think that Mr. Clifford Lloyd could have remained for long in Egypt. Despite his high character and un- questionable ability, he was not the right man in 488 MODERN EGYPT pt. vi the right place. He was not fitted for the delicate work of Egyptian administration. As well might it be expected that a brawny navvy should be able to mend a Geneva watch with a pickaxe. It would, of course, have been possible to have appointed an English successor to INIr. Clifford Lloyd, but at that time the difficulties of the situation were so great, and the work was so heavy, that it was desirable to throw a certain amount of cargo overboard in order to lighten the ship. INIr. Clifford Lloyd's place was, there- fore, filled by an Egyptian. It is needless to describe the minor changes which the Police organisation underwent during the next ten years. It will suffice to say that the system did not work smootlily. The old cause of complaint always existed, namely, that the presence of European Police officers in the provinces dimin- ished the authority of the Moudirs. One Egyp- tian JNIinister succeeded another, but all adopted an attitude of hostility to, or at best of surly acquiescence with the new system. At last, as generally happens in such cases, an opportunity came of settling the question. When Nubar Pasha assumed office in the summer of 1894, he at once took up the matter. A j)lan, having for its object the decentralisation of the Police, which was to be left in Egyptian hands, coupled with the establishment of an efficient Euro})ean control at the Ministry of the Interior, was elaborated and eventually accepted. An English "Adviser" was appointed, whose functions were to co-operate with the Minister in charge of the Department. Subsequently, a very few young Englishmen, who had been specially trained for Egyptian service, were appointed to be Ins])ectors. Since the change in 1894, a great improvement has unquestionably taken place in the Administra- CH. Lvi THE INTERIOR 489 tioii of the Interior. Nevertheless, the old difficulty still remains. The presence of British Inspectors in the Provinces tends to weaken the authority and to diminish the sense of responsibility of the Moudirs. On the other hand, it is certain that the total withdrawal of the Inspectors from the provinces would be attended with a serious risk that many of the abuses of the past would re- appear, and, generally, that great administrative confusion would arise. It is, in fact, impossible to avoid altoorether the disadvanta":es of over -inter- ference, without incurring the evils which would result from total non-interference. The most that can be done is to effect the best compromise of which the circumstances admit. But, in working a system where so much depends upon the characters and idiosyncrasies of the individuals concerned, it is inconceivable that complete success can be attained. A heroic remedy, which has occasionally been suggested, would be to appoint British Moudirs. I greatly deprecate the adoption of this measure. It would be a very distinct step backwards in the direction of dissociating the Egyptians from the government of their own country. Moreover, although I do not mean* to say that all the In- spectors are equally tactful and efficient, or that all the Moudirs possess every qualification which could be wished, I am convinced that the former are steadily gaining knowledge and experience of the country, and that the latter are generally far more efficient than their predecessors of a few years ago. If this be so, and if, as I hold, a policy of complete non - interference is not only open to great objections, but would also be very unpopular with the mass of the population, tliere is nothing for it but to continue to work on the broad lines of the present system, with all its 490 MODERN EGYPT pt. vi recoofnised defects. All that can be done is to watch its operation, to choose the Moudirs with the utmost care, to constantly impress on the European Inspectors the necessity of dealing in a spirit of friendliness and sympathy with the Egyptian authorities, and to move — whenever this can prudently be done — in the direction of diminishing rather than of enhancing the degree of British interference in the details of the administration.* * I must refer those who wish for more detailed information as regards the work of the Interior, in connection with village organiaa- tion and other matters, to my Annual Reports. CHAPTER LVII SUB-DEPARTMENTS OF THE INTERIOR !• Prisons — State of the prisons in 1882 — Reform — 2. Slavery — The Slave Trade and slavery — The Convention of 1877 — The Slave Home — Change of opinion in Egypt — Success of the Convention — 3. Medical and Sanitary Axuuinistration — Egyptian superstitions — Clot Bey — State of things in 1883 — Improvements effected — Sanitary reform — Impediments to progress — Treatment of epidemics 1. Prisons, Those who have only a slight acquaintance with the ways of Eastern Governments may perhaps be astonished to learn of the existence of a Turkish Habeas Corpus Act. In reality, however, this is no cause for surprise. Contact with Europe has led to the adoption of the forms and the incorpora- tion of much of the jargon of Western civilisation, but has been powerless to make the East imbibe its spirit. Oriental rulers have, indeed, discovered a plan, by the adoption of which, as they think, they can satisfy European reformers without in- curring all the consequences which would result from the execution of a reforming policy. Broadly speaking, this plan consists in passing a law, and then acting as if the law had never been passed.^ * ''No reform is clamoured for which does not already figure in the statute-book ; no complaint is made which cannot be disproved by statistics. . . . Eastern peoples, not only in Turkey but in many other countries, form a solid national conspiracy against foreign anil Christian influences. They know wlien their Government is forced to 491 492 MODERN EGYPT pt. vi According to Ottoman law, an accused person must be examined within twenty-four hours of his arrest by competent officials ; when the charge against him is formulated, the conditions under which he may be admitted to bail are clearly laid down. So much for the theory. The practice is different. Sir Herbert Chermside and Mr. Beaman, who were deputed by Lord Dufferin to inquire into the state of the Egyptian prisons in 1882, wrote : " It is impossible, in the face of the deluge of complaints as to no examination or trial during months and years of confinement, which has met us, to avoid concluding that the present system of arrest and sending to trial is, in practice, a flagrant injustice, and aggravated by venality, tyranny, and personal vindictiveness." Two causes were at work during the pre- occupation days, one of which tended unduly to deplete, and the other unduly to crowd the prisons. On the one hand, a number of offences were committed for which no one was ever punished. This immunity from punishment tended to keep the prisons empty. On the other hand, when the authorities took cognisance of an offence, it was their practice to arrest not only every one who might possibly have been implicated in it, but also a number of their relations, as well as all the witnesses, whether they were on the side of the prosecution or of the defence. The result of this twofold injustice was that, whilst a number of persons were free who siiould have been in prison, at the same time a number of persons were in give way af!:ainst its will ; tliey know when orders are meant to be obeyed, and answer the rein in a moment ; they also know when tliey are not meant to be obeyed^ but are what are called ' watery commands,' and then they do not obey them. ... In the end, this national con- spiracy, tliis ' invincible inertia,' nearly always wins the day." — Turkey in Kuroj/r, p. 1.'j8. CH. Lvii THE INTERIOR 493 prison who should have been free;' and, once in prison, no distinction was made between those who had been convicted, those who were awaiting trial, and others, such as witnesses, who were detained, not for any offence, but because it was more con- venient to keep them in prison, in case they were wanted, than to set them at liberty. " In the East," Sir Herbert Chermside wrote, " every man is treated as if guilty of tlie offence of which he is accused until he has established his innocence." The condition of the prisons was horrible in the extreme. "No report," Mr. Beaman said, "can convey the feeblest impression of the helpless misery of the prisoners, who live for months, like wild beasts, without change of clothing, half- starved, ignorant of the fate of their families and bewailing their own. They only look forward to the day of their trial as synonymous with the day of their release, but the prospect of its advent is too uncertain to lend much hope to their wretchedness. From the moment of entering the prison, even on the most trifling charge, they consider themselves lost. It is impossible for them to guess at the time when a new official may begin to clear off the cases in his district, or when the slow march of the administration may reach them. It may be weeks, it may be months, and it may be years ; many of them have long since ceased to care which." In those days, the only hope of the Egyptian prisoner lay in the possession of money. A moderate bribe to the gaoler would insure relatively good treatment in prison. A further sum to the judge might hasten the trial. The tariff for an acquittal was naturally somewhat higher. ' " It is esteemed an act of Imperial clemency when the Sultan orders the release from prison of ' all persons against whom there is no charge.' " — Turkey in Europe, p. 140. 494 MODERN EGYPT pt. vi There is, however, nothing surprising in all this. The state of the Egyptian prisons in 1882 does not seem to have been much worse than that of the prisons in England before those reforms were undertaken which have made the name of John Howard for ever famous. It is unnecessary to describe in detail the series of reforms in this Department which have been effected since 1882. It will suffice to say that, here as elsewhere, order and justice have taken the place of confusion and tyranny. The old prisons have been improved and placed in a sanitary condition. Large sums have been spent in the con- struction of new prisons. Special prisons have been constructed for women. Reformatories for juvenile offenders have been instituted. The prisoners have been provided with proper food and clothing. Many of them are taught trades. These reforms took time. Even now (1907) the prison accom- modation can scarcely be said to be adequate to meet all the requirements of the country. The only criticism now directed against the Prison Administration is — to quote the words of Coles Pasha, to whom the credit of reforming this branch of the Public Service is mainly due — that, in the eyes of many " prison life is not sufficiently deterrent, and that the swing of the pendulum has carried the Administration too far in the direction of humanity, if not of luxury." There may possibly be some truth in this criticism, but there can, of course, be no question of reverting to tlie brutal methods of the past in order to make punish- ment more deterrent. In Egypt, as elsewhere, tlie tendency of the best qualified penological experts is to move in the direction of reforming rather tlian in that of administering very seveie punishment to criminals. CH.LVU THE INTERIOR 495 2. Slavery. There is an obvious distinction between the Slave Trade and Slavery. Both are bad ; but, whereas nothing can be said in defence of the Slave Trade, some mitigating pleas may be advanced as regards domestic slavery, which, although they in no degree justify the existence of the institution, are of a nature to temper the zeal of the reformer who aspires towards its immediate abolition. Most Englishmen have been made familiar with the horrors of the Slave Trade. They have been told how peaceable villages in Central Africa have been invaded by parties of ruffianly Arab raiders ; how the older inhabitants, male and female, have been shot down without mercy ; how the girls and boys — the latter after undergoing the most cruel process of mutilation to which any man can be subjected ^ — have been marched long distances down to the coast; how numbers died of exhaustion on the way ; and how eventually the survivors were sold to be the household servants of the Turkish and Egyptian Pashas.^ Some arguments, more or less specious, can generally be found to defend most of the worst abuses which exist, or at times have existed in the world. The Slave Trade stands alone as an abomination which is incapable of any defence whatsoever, unless it be the vicious plea that Pashas require servants, and that they are unable to obtain them in sufficient numbers, or at * The high price paid for these unfortunate boys is due to the fact that a large proportion of them die under the process of mutilation. The operation is performed in the most ruthless and barbarous manner by persons devoid of any surgical skill. 2 It is a mistake to suppose that the black girls from Central Africa always become the concubines of their masters. It would be an exagger- ation to say that cases of this sort never occur, but they are rare. 'ITie wives and concubines of the Pashas come almost exclusively from Circassia and Abyssinia. The blacks are almost always bought with the object of being employed as household servants. 496 MODERN EGYPT pt. vi a sufficiently low price, by any other means than those to which allusion is made above. The case of domestic slavery, considered inde- pendently of the Slave Trade, is different. A slave in the Ottoman dominions lies under certain civil disabilities which shock the European's sense of justice; nevertheless, in practice, the disabihties in question lie lightly on the slaves themselves. Moreover, under unreformed Ottoman law, the slave is not free to carry his labour to any market which he chooses. This is unjust. On the other hand, as a general rule, slaves are well treated ; ^ they lead an easy life and are not overworked. On the whole, save that the stigma of slavery is attached to them — a consideration which is all-im- portant from the European, but relatively unim- portant from the Eastern point of view ^ — it may be doubted whether in the majority of cases the lot of slaves in Egypt is, in its material aspects, harder than, or even as hard as that of many domestic servants in Europe. Indeed, from one point of view, the Eastern slave is in a better posi- tion than the Western servant. The latter can be thrown out of employment at any moment. In Egypt, on the other hand, although under the existing law, which is the outcome of contact with * There are, however, exceptions. I remember a case wliich occurred early in 1885. It was brought to my notice that a white slave girl in the harem of a lady of high social position in Cairo was very badly treated, and tliat she wished to escape." With some diffi- culty, I obtained an interview with her at my house. She declared to me most positively that she was very well treated, and that she wished to return to the harem. I had no alternative but to comply witli her reijuest. Shortly afterwards, I went to England. On my return, tlie girl had disappeared. There were good reasons for believing that the statement she made to me was untrue, that she had been promised a large sura of money if she made it, that she was never paid the money, and that, on my departure from Egypt, she was beaten to death. But in cases of this sort it is, of course, impossible to obtain positive proof. ^ Many Egyptians of the highest social classes are the sons of slave mothers, who are often married to their masters after having borne a child. CH. Lvu THE INTERIOR 497 the West, the slave can, if he chooses, free himself from his master, no provision is made for the con- verse case of a master who wishes to get rid of a slave. Custom, based on religious law, obliges him to support his slave. Cases are frequent of masters who would be glad to get rid of their slaves, but who are unable to do so because the latter will not accept the gift of liberty. A moral obligation, which is universally recognised, rests on all masters to support aged and infirm slaves till they die ; this obligation is often onerous in the case of those who have inherited slaves from their parents or other relatives. On these grounds, therefore, some distinction must be drawn between the Slave Trade and Slavery. It is, however, none the less true that the one is intimately connected with the other. Where there is a demand, a supply will follow. If the institution of slavery did not exist, the Slave Trade would perish. In order to check the Slave Trade, if for no other reason, it is necessary to do all that is possible to discourage slavery. The object of the English reformer has, therefore, been twofold. In the first place, he has endeavoured to prevent slaves from being brought into the country, and has thus to some extent cut off the supply. In the second place, he has endeavoured to wean the slave-owning classes from their ancient habits, and has thus done much to diminish the demand. Whether Ismail Pasha was moved by a sincere desire to abolish an infamous traffic, or whether he merely wished to throw dust in the eyes of humani- tarian Europe, it is certain that to him belongs the credit of having given the first blow to the institu- tion of slavery in Egypt. In August 1877, a Convention was signed between the Egyptian Government and Lord Vivian, acting on behalf of the British Government. Under the terms of this VOL. II 2 k 498 MODERN EGYPT pt. vi Convention and the annexes attached to it, the Slave Trade was formally forbidden on Egyptian territory. Slave dealers were to be tried by court martial, and were rendered liable to severe penalties. The sale of slaves from family to family was to be tolerated until August 1884, after which time it was declared illegal. Any slave who chose to claim his or her liberty could obtain it on applica- tion to certain Bureaux of Manumission which were specially created. It is now necessary to explain a point in con- nection with the institution of slavery in Egypt, the importance of which is often insufficiently re- cognised by those who are specially interested in this subject. On February 6, 1883, Lord Dufferin wrote : — " Slavery might be abolished by Khedivial Decree, but a Convention is so much more formal and binding that it would seem preferable. I would, therefore, propose that a new Convention be entered into between Great Britain and Egypt, by which slavery would entirely cease in Egypt and its Dependencies seven years after the date of signa- ture." It may be doubted whether Lord Dufferin fully realised the obstacles which must have been encountered had any endeavour been made to give effect to his proposal. In 1883, those obstacles were practically insurmountable. Slavery in the East does not exist by virtue of any special Decree or law emanating either from the executive govern- ments or from the legislatures under which Eastern countries are governed. It exists because its existence is authorised by the Sacred Law of Islam, which is as immutable as were the laws of the Medes and Persians. That law cannot be abro- gated by any Khedivial Decree, and still less by any Convention signed with a Christian Power, CH. Lvii THE INTERIOR 499 Kadis, Muftis, and Ulema would regard Decrees and Conventions, which infringed the fundamental religious law of Islam, much as devout French Catholics must have regarded the attempts of Anacharsis Clootz and other maniacs of the, French revolution to effect the legal abolition of • the Christian religion. They would altogether decline to recognise the validity of a law which, inasmuch as it altered the Sheriat, would in their eyes be considered as an attempt to justify sacrilege. It is true that, some fifty years ago, tlie rulers of India ignored the Mohammedan relioious law. In 1843, an Act was passed by the Indian legislature, which provided that the status of slavery should not be recognised by any law-court in the country, criminal or civil. But, although in the abstract, the Sheriat may be as inviolable at Calcutta as it is at Cairo, the question of the total and immediate abolition of slavery presented itself, from a practical point of view, in a very different aspect in Egypt under Lord Dufferin from that which obtained under Lord Ellenborough in India. In 1843, the English had been for half a century in India. They were the absolute rulers of the country. The law-courts, which they had established, inspired confidence. Moreover, they had to deal, not with one compact body of JNIohammedans, but with a Mohammedan population which, though numerous, possessed little or no cohesion, owing to the fact that it was merged amongst the members of a more numerous And more tolerant creed. Under such circum- stances, a radical reform, such as that effected in 1843, becomes possible. Under the political con- ditions which prevailed in Egypt in 1883, it would have been impossible, or at all events in the highest degree imprudent, to have attempted to follow the Indian precedent. Under the Sheriat, a slave cannot marry or 500 MODERN EGYPT ft vi inherit property without the consent of his master. When, therefore, it is said that, under the Con- vention of 1877, any slave was able to obtain his or her liberty on application to a Manumission Bureau, it is to be understood that the term "liberty" is used in a restricted sense. The Convention gave to the slave the right to go wherever he pleased, and to work or remain idle as he pleased. But it did not allow him to marry or to inherit property without the consent of his master. To this extent, in spite of nineteenth- century intervention, Islam of the seventh century still held the manumitted slave in its grip. It was inevitable that the British occupation should give a fresh stimulus to the work of emancipation which was begun in 1877. One important consideration, however, tempered the zeal of the reformer. Almost all the slaves in Egypt were women. When they left the harems, having no means of support, they either starved or fell into a life of vice. Under these circum- stances, those who were desirous of hastening the work of emancipation hesitated to act for fear of producing evils as bad as, if not worse than slavery. To remedy this defect, money was subscribed in England with the help of the Anti- Slavery Society, who, in this connection, did some excellent work. With the money thus obtained, which was supplemented by a grant from the Egyp- tian Treasury, a Home for Freed Female Slaves was established at Cairo. The manumitted slaves are now housed and fed in this Home until employ- ment can be obtained for them.^ This system has worked well. Respectable Mohammedans con- stantly apply to the Home for domestic servants. 1 So few slaves now apply to the Mainimissioii Bureaux that it will proliably soon become a <|uestion wliethcr the Home for Freed Slaves need be auy longer maintained. CH. Lvii THE INTERIOR 501 It would be probably an exaggeration to say that any public opinion adverse to slavery has been evoked in Egypt. The purchase and employment of slaves is not generally regarded with any moral reprobation, neither, under all the circumstances which exist, would it be reasonable to expect any such reprobation. In 1894, no less a person than the President of the Legislative Council, who was a Turco-Egyptian, was arraigned before a Court- martial for purchasing slaves, and only escaped imprisonment on account of his bad health and advanced years. Nevertheless, the slavery reforms instituted under British auspices have produced a notable change in the behaviour, if not in the opinions, of the slave-owning classes in Egypt. There are no longer any slave -markets. The purchase of a slave is a criminal offence attended with danger both to the buyer and to the seller. The slave routes are carefully watched. It is only with great difficulty that a few slaves are occasionally smuggled into the country. The result of these measures has been, not only that it has become year by year more difficult to obtain slaves, but that also, when any clandestine purchase is effected, a price considerably higher than that which formerly ruled has to be paid. The slave- owner is, therefore, beginning to ask himself whether slave labour is not, after all, more ex- pensive as well as more troublesome than free labour, and whether it is worth while, besides com- mitting a criminal act for which he may be severely punished, to pay a considerable sum for a slave girl who can, on tlie morrow of her purchase, walk out of the harem and obtain, not only her freedom, but also the strong support of the British repre- sentative if any attempt is made to tamper with her liberty of action. Thousands of slaves have, during the last few 502 MODERN EGYPT pt. vi years, been granted their certificates of freedom. Those who remain in the harems know that they can obtain their liberty if they choose to ask for it. In the meanwhile, as very few fresh slaves are imported, and as the numbers born in slavery must certainly be inconsiderable in proportion to the number of those who have been manumitted, the supply of slaves is gradually falling short of the demand. Very few eunuchs are now to be found in Egypt. The objections to their employ- ment from the Egyptian point of view are that a very high price has to be paid for them ; that, on account of their bad physique, they are use- less as servants ; and that they are liable to die of consumption. It may safely be asserted that slavery in Egypt, although it will take a long time to die out completely, is moribund. It may be asserted with an almost equal degree of confidence that both the Slave Trade and slavery would revive if vigilance were relaxed. From one point of view, the particular reform of the Egyptian social and administrative system now under discussion is remarkable. In view of the state of the JNIohammedan law, of the fact that slavery, although discouraged by the founder of the Mohammedan religion, has, by a perverted view of his original preaching, become associated with the disthictive features of the JNIohammedan faith ; and of the further fact that material interests of some importance were involved in the abolition of slavery — it might well have been thought that the introduction of Western ideas in connection with this subject would have encountered o})position of a somewhat specially strong description. As a matter of fact, the opposition has been mild, and has been easily overcome. A great change has been going on insensibly. It has, indeed, been almost imperceptible to tnose who, it might be CH. Lvii THE INTERIOR 503 thought, were most interested in the maintenance of the existing abuse. No lieroic measures have been adopted. Nothing has been done to clash with Mohammedan opinions and prejudices. Never- theless, a considerable measure of success has been attained. This result is due to the fact that the Convention of 1877 was admirably adapted to achieve, in a prudent and unostentatious manner, the object for which it was intended. The late Lord Vivian's name is rarely, if ever, mentioned as one of the chief initiators of Egyptian reform. Yet it is due to the wise moderation of the Convention which he negotiated that slavery has been gradually disappearing from Egypt. At the commencement of this work, some words of Bacon were quoted as an example of the general principles which should guide the reformer in an Eastern country : '* It were good that men in their innovations would follow the example of Time itself, which, indeed, innovateth greatly, but quietly and by degrees scarce to be perceived." That is the principle which has been adopted in connection witli the abolition of slavery in Egypt. Lord Vivian's action in this matter was based on strictly Baconian principles. In 1895, a fresh Slavery Convention was signed between the British and Egyptian Governments. It gave precision to the existing law, and in some respects altered the procedure. INIoreover, it pro- vided that it was a criminal offence to interfere in any way with the full liberty of action of an enfi-anchised slave. This change is important. It practically effects by a side wind all that was done by the Indian Act of 1843. Any one in Egypt who prevents a freed slave from marrying or from inheriting property is now liable to imprisonment. A scholarly writer, who has paid special atten- tion to this subject, calls slavery the " Nemesis of 504 MODERN EGYPT pt. vi Nations." "Civilisation," he says, "begins with the crack of the slave whip."^ It may be placed to the credit of latter-day civilisation that the crack of that whip can no longer be heard in Egypt 3. Medical and Sanitary Administration, Whatever may be the case at present, it is certain that but a few years ago the lowest classes in Egypt rarely souglit for medical aid until the patient was well-nigh moribund. The recipes of village barbers and of the old women, who were sometimes called in to attend the sick, as often as not aggravated the condition of the patient.^ Great faith was entertained in the healing properties of written charms. These generally consisted of passages of the Koran for Mohammedans, or from the Psalms and Gospels for Copts, which were inter- mingled with numerical combinations, diagrams, and symbols. Persons of all creeds, being possessed of evil spirits, were said to be cured at certain Coptic convents, notably at the convent of St. Damianus^ near Mansourah, and at that of St. Michael near Birket-el-Sab. An operation which was "warranted to cure all diseases which were not fatal," could be performed if the sick person was fortunate enough to become * Paterson's Nemesis of Nations, p. 63. • The instances of superstition in this chapter are mainly taken from a pamphlet entitled Medical Matters in Egypt, written liy Or. F. M. Sandwith in August 1884. Dr. Sandvvith's researches revealed a stajj^e of medical knowledge amongst the poorer classes not materially in advance of that reached in I'liaraonic times. M. Maspero {Causeries d'Egypte, p. 313) says that an ancient Egyptian medical practitioner was obliged to be "aussi expert en exorcismes qu'en formules de phannacie." ' St. Damianus and his brother St. Cosmos were both doctors. They underwent martyrdom during the persecution of Diocletian, about A.D. 303. Pope Felix IV. built a Basilica ia their honour at Rome. CH. Lvii THE INTERIOR 505 possessed of a brass bowl, made in a peculiar fashion, and to the rim of which forty-one oblong strips of brass were attached. On each of these strips the words " In the name of the most merciful God," were inscribed. This bowl had to be filled on a Friday night with Nile water, into which some drugs and nuts were thrown. The sick person was instructed to stand in a basin of water before sunrise on the following morning, to drink out of the bowl, and to eat the nuts, throwing the shells behind his back. This operation had to be repeated on three consecutive Fridays. It was, and perhaps still is a common practice amongst both Copts and Mohammedans to wear about their persons a bone taken from the body of a polytheist or of a Jew. This was supposed to afford immunity from all sorts of fevers. A bone taken from any ancient Egyptian mummy was often worn. The remedy for sterility was for the woman who wished to become a mother to step over the corpse of an executed criminal, or into a basin of water which had been used to wash his corpse, or to tread on a human skull, or walk between the tombs of a cemetery, or step over some antique resemblance of a cat or other relic of old Egypt. The cure for a stye in the eye was to eat bread obtained from seven different women, each called Fatma, the name of the Prophet's daughter. Headache was cured by driving a nail into one of the gates of Cairo, called the Bab-el-Zueilah. For toothache, it was considered necessary to extract the tooth, and deposit it in a crevice of the same gate. The latter part of this operation was supposed to prevent other teeth from aching. One of the most frequent antidotes for poison was to write certain texts of the Koran on slips of paper, which were then thrown into a dish of 506 MODERN EGYPT pt. vi water. The water was stirred and the solution drunk. Innumerable remedies existed, and probably still exist, to counteract the dreaded effects of the Evil Eye, belief in which has existed from time im- memorial in Egypt. ^ The most efficacious is to steal a piece of the dress of the supposed envier, burn it, and fumigate the envied person with it. Another common practice is to heat some alum, and to prick one of the water bubbles, saying at the same time : " I prick the eye of the envier." Cornelian and charcoal are worn on the forehead by Moslem children for the same purpose. Parents also some- times keep a monkey or a gazelle in the house in order to avert the Evil Eye. I may here mention a curious case of super- stition which came under my personal notice. Some years ago, my eldest son was dangerously ill with typhoid fever at Cairo. A short time before his illness, he had been given a black dog, which used to live in the house. The pattering of the dog's footsteps on the floor of the room disturbed the patient's rest. The dog was, therefore, sent out of the house. I afterwards learnt that my Egyptian servants looked on the dog as an *' Afrit " (devil), that they considered the case hopeless so long as the dog remained in the house, but entertained no doubt of ultimate recovery directly the animal was removed. In this particular instance, as my son recovered, their belief in the power of "Afrits" must have been strengthened. In the instances so far given, the fantastic remedies applied in cases of sickness have their * "Abundant testimony exists in the oldest monuments in the world that among the ancient Ejjyptians belief in and dread of the Evil Eye were ever present ; their efforts to avert or to bailie it, both as regarded the living and the dead, who they knew would live again, were perhaps the most constant and elaborate of any, of which we can now decipher the traces." — Elworthy's Tlie Evil Eye, p. 6. CH. Lvii THE INTERIOR 507 origin in superstition. Instances of prescribed cures based on complete ignorance of medical science and dissociated from any religious belief, however perverted, might readily be added. Thus, Dr, Sandwith tells of a Coptic bone-setter of celebrity, who was called in to attend a woman with a dis- located hip. He "gave instructions that the woman's hip should be tightly bound to a half- starved cow, and that the cow should then be fed until the rapid swelling of the animal had caused the reduction of the dislocation."^ The credit of having first brought true know- ledge to bear on all this mass of ignorance and credulity belongs to an eminent Frenchman. Dr. Clot Bey, who was the father of Egyptian medical reform, was summoned to Egypt by Mehemet Ali. Under his auspices, a School of Medicine and Pharmacy, as well as a Maternity Hospital for the instruction of mid wives, were created ; a sanitary service for the interior of the country was also organised. A European doctor and apothecary, who were aided by Egyptian medical men and women, were appointed to every province in Lower Egypt. Under the intelligent stimulus thus afforded, considerable progress was made in the direction of medical and sanitary reform. All the superior officers possessed a European diploma. At a later period, Egyptians, possessing only * The state of things described above was but little, if at all, worse than that which existed in England and Scotland so late as the eighteenth cen- tury. During the first half of that century " medicines in common use contained brains of hares and foxes, snails burnt in the shell, powder of human skull and Egyptian mummy, burnt hoofs of horses, calcined cockle-shells, pigeon's blood, ashes of little frogs — like to the diabolical contents of the witches' cauldron in Macbeth " (Graham's Social Life in Scotland in the Eighteenth Century, vol. i. p. 51). The Poor Man's Physician, written by the "famous John Moncrieff of Tippermalloch," prescribes the following as a cure for whitlow : "Stop the finger with a cat's ear, and it will be whole in half an hour." In 1744, Mrs. Delany sent to her nephew, as an infallible cure for ague, "a spider put into a goosequill, well sealed and secured^ and hui^g about the child's neck." — Mrs. Delany's Memoirs, p. 138. 508 MODERN EGYPT pt. vi certificates issued locally, were nominated to high posts. European control was relaxed. The re- forms, which had begun to blossom, withered under the misrule of Ismail. The shadow of approach- ing bankruptcy fell upon the land. Useful expenditure was everywhere cut down with an unsparing hand in order to compensate for the financial vagaries of a spendthrift Khedive. " At the end of 1878," Dr. Sandwith says, "all sanitary, quarantine, and hospital buildings had fallen into ruin for want of funds, and the provincial hospitals naturally suffered to a greater degree than others." By the time the British occupied the country in 1882, three-fourths of the good effects of Clot Bey's reforms had been obliterated. The School of Medicine still existed, but the instruction afforded to the students was very defective. The greater number of the medical officers serving under the Egyptian Government were ignorant and in- competent. They were also underpaid, with the natural result that they used the numerous oppor- tunities afforded to them in the exercise of their official functions to increase their incomes by illicit means.^ The state of the hospitals was deplorable. Nothing could be worse than the general adminis- tration of the Medical Department. Sir Guyer Hunter, who was sent to Egypt in 1883 to report on the cholera epidemic which then prevailed, wrote : " The hospitals, as a rule, are in a more or less tumble - down, dirty condition, impregnated with * "A dishonest man may occasionally threaten to cause some sweeping reform to be carried out in a village, unless a sum of money is immediately collected for him by the headman, or money may be obtained from a private individual by threatening to perform an autopsy on the dead body of his relative, on the plea that there is some suspicion of foul play. To the uneducated Musulman, who believes that the dead can feel and should be treated with a respect similar to the living, this idea is naturally repugnant." — Sandwith, Medical Mutters in Egypt, p. 7- CH.LVII THE INTERIOR 509 foul odours, and containing beds filthy in the ex- treme ; they are, in fact, noisome places, utterly unfit for the reception of human beings. . . . The medical administration is simply deplorable. I took the opportunity of examining the hospital registers. Here, as in everything else wliich met my observation under this administration, matters were as bad as bad could be." As to the Lunatic Asylum in Cairo, an English doctor, who visiter! this institution in 1877, wrote: " The whole place is so utterly beyond the ken of civilisation that it remains as hideous a blot on the earth's surface as is to be found even in the Dark Continent." The veterinary art is of special importance in Egypt owing to the ravages which have at times been made by the cattle disease. The veterinary surgeons, however. Dr. Sandwith, speaking of the early days of the occupation, said, " may be fairly passed over with the remark that they are more ignorant, and not more honest, than their medical brethren." It would be beyond the scope of this work, and moreover, would be of little interest to the general reader, were an attempt made to give the details connected with the work of reform accomplished as regards the subject now under discussion. The results may, however, be briefly summarised. Modern medicine and surgery are essentially European sciences. The superiority of Western over Eastern therapeutic methods; the cosmopolitan char- acter of the work performed by the physician and the surgeon ; the dissociation which exists, or which at all events should exist between the art of healing the sick and political, racial, or religious rivalry ; and the manifest benefits which the Egyptian people, whether as doctors or patients, are capable of receiving from European guidance and tuition — 510 MODERN EGYPT ii.yi are all so clear that it might well have been thought that, in this instance at all events, the beneficent co-operation of the Eng-lishman would not only have been accepted without demur, but would even have been invited and welcomed. Such, however, was unfortunately not the case. The best, and, indeed, the only method of providing for the medical wants of Egypt without flooding the country with European doctors, was to take in hand the work of medical education. It was from the first evident that a few qualified Englishmen at the School of JNIedicine would, through the influence of teaching, be able in a few years to spread the light of \A^estern science throughout the country. A cruel fate, however, ordained that, by a fortuitous and most unfortunate combination of circumstances, which are not worth relating in detail, the School of JNIedicine was for some while a hotbed of ultra-JNIohammedan and anti-European feeling. This obstacle, though sufficient to retard, was powerless to arrest the progress of medical instruction. With characteristic Anglo-Saxon energy, the Englishman set to work to make the Egyptian " un medecin malgre lui." His per- severance was rewarded. The School of Medicine at Cairo was eventually, in spite of much opposi- tion, put on a sound footing. A capable staff of Egyptian doctors, some of whom have European diplomas, is being gradually created. The hospitals, the number of which has been largely increased, are now clean, properly equipped with beds, bedding, and clothing, and supplied with medicines, ap])liances, and instruments. The pre- judice, which formerly existed, against being treated in a hospital, is gradually disappearing. About 31,000 in-patients and 118,000 out-patients were treated in the Government Hospitals during 1906. The number both of in- and out-patients is steadily CH. Lvn THE INTERIOR 511 increasing every year. A staff of trained English nurses has been attached to the principal hospital in Cairo, to the great benefit of the Egyptian nurses and pupils, whom they train and educate by precept and example. Dispensaries, where the poor can obtain gratuitous treatment, have been opened in several towns. Vaccination has been carried out on a large scale amongst the Egyptian population, though the Capitulations hinder its extension amongst Europeans.^ A vigorous campaign, initiated in the first instance by the munificence of Sir Ernest Cassel, has been commenced against ophthalmia, which vjas formerly the curse of Egypt.^ A Foundling Hospital has been erected by private subscription in memory of a European lady who had endeared herself to the whole population. The Lunatic Asylum at Cairo, which has been placed in charge of an English specialist, is now in perfect order. Another large Asylum is in course of construction. Considerable progress has also been made in the Veterinary Department since 1886, when it was put under the control of an English veterinary surgeon. The butchers' shops, dairies, slaughter- * " Half the cases of small-pox notified occurred among' Europeans, a proportion which is extremely heavy when we consider the pre- ponderance of the natives in Cairo, and was, no doubt, due to non- vaccination, many of the lower-class Europeans neglecting to have their children vaccinated. Though vaccination is compulsory on all persons residing in Egypt, the law is evaded by some of the Europeans from the fact that the births among this class of the population are not notified at the Public Health Ofliice, but at the respective Consulates, and the Consuls in many cases do not send in the notifications to this Department, and the Government are unable to enforce the law on the parents." — Report of the Public Health Department for 1905. 2 Not very long ago Mrs. Ross, the daugliter of Lady Duff Gordon, visited Egypt. Forty years previously, she had had peculiar facilities for observing the condition of the people. 1 asked her what was the change which struck her most. I was pleased, and also surprised at her reply. She said, "The marked decrease in ophthalmia." 512 MODERN EGYPT pt. vi houses, cattle-sheds, etc., have been regularly- inspected and controlled, their owners being in- duced or compelled to maintain them in a satis- factory sanitary condition. Several outbreaks of pleuro-pneumonia and other epizootic diseases have been stamped out. A Veterinary College, as also an Anti-Rabic Institute, have been established. On the whole, although of course much remains to be done, it may be said that, in so far as medical instruction and organisation, veterinary administra- tion, and the proper maintenance of hospitals, dis- pensaries, and lunatic asylums are concerned, an amount of progress has been realised which is as great as could reasonably be expected. The very capable Englishmen who have devoted their energies to the work of this Department, and who, like all other British officials in Egypt, have had great obstacles to encounter, have at all events succeeded in introducing the first commonplace elements of Western order and civilisation into the country. Sanitary reform has, of course, progressed less rapidly than improvements in the medical service. In the former case, the conservative instincts of the people, and their indifference to sanitation, constitute an almost insuperable barrier to rapid progress. At the same time, much has already been done. The water-supply of the principal towns has been taken in hand. The Mosque latrines are no longer drained into the Nile or the canals, and in most of the towns the JNIosques themselves have been put in a satisfactory sanitary condition. Authority has been obtained to remove cemeteries pronounced to be a danger to public health. A commencement has been made in filling up the highly insanitary pools which are to be found hi close proximity to most Egyptian villages. As funds become available, it cannot be CH. Lvii THE INTERIOR 513 doubted that sanitary reform will, year by year, occupy a more prominent place in the Government programme. Before leaving this branch of my subject, some brief allusion must be made to the eminent services rendered by the Sanitary Department in arresting the progress of the various epidemics which have visited Egypt of late years. In the cholera epi- demic of 1883, 58,369 deaths from this disease were registered, and it is certain that the real number was far in excess of this figure. In 1896, another severe epidemic of cholera visited the country. The number of deaths was limited to 18,105. It cannot be doubted that the reduced mortality was, in a great measure, due to the improved efficiency of the Sanitary Department, under the auspices of Sir John Rogers and Sir Horace Pinching. This Department also dealt successfully with the cholera epidemic of 1902, and, moreover, gained well- deserved laurels in its treatment of the epidemic of plague in 1898 and subsequent years. Some interesting statistics have been drawn up, showing the relative number of deaths in Alex- andria from the plague epidemic which lasted from 1834 to 1843, as compared with those for the years 1899 to 1905. The number of deaths in the former period of ten years was 12,380. The number in the latter period of seven years was 647. The statistics of the earlier period are probably very imperfect. At the same time, they are sufficient to show the effisct produced by the more stringent measures recently taken to check the disease, as compared with the results obtained by the methods adopted during the earlier of the two epidemics. VOL. II 2 L CHAPTER LVIII JUSTICE Sir Edward Malet's opinion — The Mixed and Consular Courts — The Kadis' Courts — The Native Tribunals — Justice prior to 1883 — The French system taken as a model — Tiie judicial machinery — Reforms instituted by Sir John Scott and Sir Malcolm Mcllwraith — Opposition to these reforms — The personnel of the Courts — Result of the reforms. When Sir Edward Malet left Egypt in 1883, he declared that the first requirement of the Egyp- tian population was justice. In the present chapter, an endeavour will be made to state very briefly how far this requirement has been met. It has been already explained ^ that the Mixed Tribunals deal with all civil cases, in which Euro- peans are concerned, and the Consular Courts with all criminal cases in which Europeans are the accused parties. The latter Courts apply their national laws. Of these institutions, no more need be said. Up to the present time (1907) the juris- diction of the Consular Courts remains unchanged. The law administered by the Mixed Tribunals has merely undergone some minor modifications. In each of these cases, the reasons for this long immunity from change have, broadly speaking, been twofold. The first is that neither the Mixed nor the Consular Courts stood nearly so much in need of reform as the Egyptian portions of the > See Chapter XLII. 514 CH. Lviii JUSTICE 515 judicial system. The second is that, hedged behind the ahnost impenetrable barrier of internationalism, both of these jurisdictions have so far been able to defy the efforts of the reformer. Neither need much be said about the Kadis' Courts. These Courts deal with all questions affecting the personal status of Moslems. If they are ever to be improved, the movement in favour of reform must come from within. It must be initiated by the Egyptians themselves. Any serious attempt to impose reforms by pressure from without would be extremely impolitic, and, moreover, would probably result in failure. The British reformer, therefore, being partly convinced of the uselessness of attack and partly impelled by political neces- sity, turned aside from ^lohammedan law-reform. Although he made some faltering steps in the direction of improving the Kadis' Courts, his energies were mainly applied in other directions, where better results were to be obtained. There remain the Native Tribunals instituted in 1883. These deal with all civil cases in which both parties are Ottoman subjects, and with all criminal cases in which an Ottoman subject is the accused party. It can scarcely be said that these Courts took the place of any existing institutions. They were new creations. The judges were the instruments who gave expression to a phase of thought which had been hitherto unfamiliar to the Egyptian mind. Prior to 1883, a system of punishment existed, or it would be perhaps more correct to say that a method was in force by which occasionally somebody was punished for an offence which as often as not he had never committed, whilst not unfrequently others were punished without any offence at law having been committed at all. Moreover, the existence of some rude code of Civil Law was so far recognised as to enable the 516 MODERN EGYPT pt. vi worst illegalities to be hallowed by legal sanction. For instance, when Ismail Pasha confiscated the vineyard of some Naboth among his subjects, the transfer was always effected in accordance with strictly legal forms. But any system of justice, pro- perly so called, was unknown in the country. The divorce between law, such as it was, and justice was absolute. It has been already explained ^ how, in 1883, the Department of Justice was, to some extent, placed under British management ; how, during the storm and stress of the years 1884-85, when the Anglo-Egyptian bark was being tossed hither and thither by the waves of Soudanese troubles, bankruptcy, and international rivalry, this Department, as well as that of the Interior, were confided to Egyptian hands ; how the experiment, which was then tried, resulted in complete failure ; and how eventually, with the nomination of Sir John Scott to the post of Judicial Adviser, an era of real reform commenced. It is true that, prior to 1883, no system of justice existed in Egypt. It is not, however, on that account to be supposed that the English were free to introduce into the country any system which they preferred. Such was far from being the case. French law and procedure had already taken root in Egypt. The codes administered by the Mixed Tribunals were French. All the young Egyptians who had received any legal training had been educated in France. It was, therefore, inevit- able that the new Tribunals should be based on a French rather than on an English model. The necessity was regrettable, for a simple code of law and procedure, somewhat similar to that which was subsequently introduced into the Soudan, would — more especially in criminal matters — have probably been more suited to the 1 Vide ante, pp. 288-90. CH. LVIII JUSTICE 517 requirements of the country than that which was actually adopted.^ Proposals have frequently been made to sweep away the system of criminal justice inaugurated shortly after the British occupation took place, and to substitute something else in its place. Apart from other and very valid objections to the adoption of this course, it is to be observed that those who have urged this radical treatment of the question have not, perhaps, sufficiently realised that, although the system is, indeed, by no means perfect, the main difficulties which have to be encountered in introducing any improvements are inherent in the situation, and cannot be removed by any mere change of system. They arise from the character of the people, from the impossibility of creating rapidly a competent judiciary calculated to inspire confidence and respect, and, generally, from the circumstances which are the necessary accompaniment of a tran- sition ary period from arbitrary government to a reign of law. It was, therefore, decided to make no radical changes, but to remedy the defects which existed by gradually introducing such minor reforms as experience showed were calculated to adapt the system more fully to the requirements of the country. It is unnecessary that I should describe in detail the nature of the changes which, from time to time, have been carried out under the auspices of * The danger of making too faithful a copy of European judicial institutions is fully recognised by the best French authorities on colonial affairs. In an interesting article, written by M. de Lavigne Sainte- Suzanne, and entitled " La Justice Indigene aux Colonies," which appeared in the Revue Diplomatique, the following passage occurs : — '* C'est surtout dans I'organisation de la justice indigene que r&- trouve son application cette formule qui devrait servir de base a tout le programme du droit colonial : pas d'assimilation. S'il est absurde de transporter chez des peuples encore primitifs tous les rouages administratifs en usage dans la vieille Europe, il devient dangereux et inique d'imposer aux indigenes notre legislation et notre organisation judiciaire." 518 MODERN EGYPT pt.vi successive Egyptian Ministers of Justice aided by Sir John Scott, and his successor, Sir Malcolm Mcllwraith. The most important of these have been the establishment of a Committee of Surveil- lance who, without possessing any power to upset or revise judgments already delivered, watch over the proceedings of the Courts of First Instance ; the partial decentralisation, first of Civil, and subsequently of Criminal justice; the revision of the Criminal Codes with the object of freeing them from useless formalism ; and the establishment of Assize Courts whose judgments, save on points of law, are final. These reforms followed what may be considered the normal course of all administrative change in Egypt. When any new measure is proposed, a certain amount of opposition is sure to be encountered. This opposition will sometimes be based on the conservative tendencies of the more old-fashioned class of Egyptians, who look askance at any one who aspires to moUri res novas ; or, it may be based on the mental inelasticity of the Egyptian reformer, who, albeit somewhat prone to radical change, finds it difficult to get out of the special groove into which, by the accident of educa- tion and association, his intellectual forces have been directed. When the reform is eventually accomplished, it is discovered that the fears of the opposition were groundless, and that the measure, so far from having done harm, has done much good. This experience will in no degree act as a pre- ventive to a repetition of similar tactics on some future occasion ; but it is a point which the European reformer should bear in mind that, pro- vided always that his proposals be reasonable, they will generally, after a certain amount of murmur- ing, be accepted. All Easterns carry fatalism into the practical aflkirs of life ; they readily bow before CH. Lviii JUSTICE 519 an accomplished fact. In the particular cases described above, the somewhat fictitious opposition, which was at one time excited against Sir John Scott's and Sir Malcolm Mcllwraith's proposals, died an unusually speedy death. The benefits derived from the reforms were, in fact, too manifest to admit of doubt. Experience soon pricked the theoretical bubbles of which the opponents of practical reforms in Egypt are at times prodigal.^ So far, the main features of the judicial system which were introduced have been described. The chief difficulty in this, as in so many other cases, has, however, been not to devise a system, but to find men capable of working it. Sir John Scott, writing in the early part of 1894, said : " ' Tant valent les juges, tant valent les lois,' is a principle which had been overlooked before 1890 ; and judges had been named in Appeal, as well as in First Instance, who were far from possessing the necessary qualifications." In point of fact, when the Tribunals were first instituted in 1883, few Egyptians were to be found who were capable of exercising judicial functions. Moreover, amongst those few, the best men were frequently not selected. The appointments were jobbed. Gradually, the least capable men have been weeded out. It cannot be doubted that the standard of efficiency in the law-courts is steadily improving. I should add that the personnel of the * Perhaps the most striking instance of the collapse of opposition was in the case of the Assize Courts. Few measures have heen more violently or more universally condemned. Yet, very shortly after the change of system had been eflPected, one of the most competent of the Egyptian judicial officials was able to write : " Nothing sliovvs more clearly the efficiency and excellency of the new system tlian the absence of all criticisms upon the results obtained by its adoption, especially when it is remembered tliat, when the project was under consideration, it gave rise to much difference of opinion, and to fears as to the con- sequence which would be entailed from the point of view of justice." The establishment of these Courts has, inter alia, rendered justice much more expeditious than formerly. 520 MODERN EGYPT pt. vi Judicial Department is almost wholly Egyptian. Out of a total staff of 1600, only 36 are Europeans. Have the changes, whose main features have thus been briefly described, given to the population of Egypt a sound system of justice, on the neces- sity of which Sir Edward Malet insisted in 1883 ? In a sense, this question may unhesitatingly be answered in the affirmative. The system, which I do not doubt Sir Edward Malet wished to advo- cate, was one under which law-courts should be placed in a position to protect the most humble individual of the community against the caprices of his ruler and of the Government agents, of whose malpractices Sir Edward Malet had been a scandalised witness. Law-courts possessing both the power and the will to attain this object have been created. Not only are the judges indepen- dent of the Government, but they are in the highest degree sensitive of any words or deeds calculated to call their independence in question. Justice is no longer bought and sold. It may be dilatory, and, as in other countries, it may occasion- ally err. It may perhaps be that, where racial or religious feelings are evoked, some — probably un- conscious — bias may be discerned. But no more grave accusation than this can be brought against the Egyptian law courts. So early as March 9, 1893, I was able to write to Lord Rosebery : '*It can now be said that justice in Egypt is adminis- tered on fixed princi})les and, with occasional exceptions, the decisions are just." The fact that no more than ten years after the British occupa- tion commenced a statement of this sort could be recorded reflects great credit, not only on the Ministers and their Judicial Advisers, who have guided the work of reform in this Department, but also on the European and Egyptian judges and other officials who have co-operated with them. CH. Lviii JUSTICE 521 The Anglo-Saxon race have broad shoulders. They may well pardon a little pedantry, as well as the Anglophobia which the Egyptian judges have at times displayed, and which is to a great extent the result of ignorance and misguidance, if, in dealing with the litigious affairs of their own countrymen, their " decisions are just." The protection of the weak against the strong is, however, not the sole function of justice. It should also be able to protect society against evil- doers. That this protection has, of late years, been inadequate in Egypt, can scarcely be doubted. It is easy to indicate the main reason for this state of things. On the one hand, civilisation insists on the cardinal principle that no man is to be punished for any offence unless he is clearly proved to have committed it. On the other hand, the peculiar conditions of Egyptian society render it often a matter of extreme difficulty to obtain evidence of guilt sufficient to warrant a conviction. In the last report which I wrote from Egypt before tendering tlie resignation of my appoint- ment, I made the following remarks, to which I have nothing to add : — " I have no hesitation in stating that the increase of crime, to which I have frequently alluded in former Reports, is the most unsatisfactory feature in the whole Egyptian situation. The Govern- ment are frequently being pressed to examine into the causes which have led to the increase, and to look to the removal of those causes, rather tlian to the punishment of the offenders, as the true remedy for the existing state of affairs. As a matter of general principle, I entirely agree tliat when, in any country, it is found that the number of crimes is increasing', it is most necessarv to inquire into the cause, but the possibility of apply- ing any remedy other than that of punishment 522 MODERN EGYPT pt. vi must obviously depend upon the nature of the cause when once it has been ascertained. It gener- ally happens that increasing poverty is the parent of increasing crime. No one with the least know- ledge of the country will think that the recent in- crease of crime in Egypt is due to poverty. There must be some other cause, and, in my opinion, it is not far to seek. It is, I think, to be found in the fact that the law does not inspire sufficient terror to evildoers. Only 43*5 per cent of the crimes committed last year (1906) were punished. In the remaining 56'5 per cent, it was found im- possible to discover the criminals, or, if they were discovered, to prove their guilt. I was talking a short time ago to a distinguished Frenchman who was well acquainted with the affiiirs of Algeria. He explained to me that certain districts lying in the Algerian Hinterland, where military law used to be applied, had recently been brought under the ordinary criminal codes. The comment of one of the principal Algerian Sheikhs on this change was curious. 'Then,' he said, * there will be no justice. Witnesses will be required.' I commend this remark to those who are in a hurry to apply Western methods in their entirety to a backward Eastern population. The Sheikh was not in the least struck with the fact that, in the absence of witnesses, an innocent man might possibly be condemned. What struck him was that, as no one could be condemned without witnesses, guilty people would generally escape punishment. This is precisely what is happening in Egypt. I have said over and over again, and I now repeat, that I strongly deprecate any resort to heroic remedies in dealing witli this question. There must be no radical change of system. But there should be no delusion as to the time which will be required, or the difficulties which have still to be encoun- CH. Lviu JUSTICE 523 tered, before a well-established reign of law can take the place of the arbitrary system under which, until recently, the Egyptians were governed. In the meanwhile, let us by all means do everything that is possible, not merely to improve the Police and the judicial systems, but also, by indirect means, such as education and the establishment of adult reformatories, to diminish crime and check criminal tendencies. But, simultaneously with all this, I trust that criminals will receive adequate punishment when their guilt has been brought home to them. I deprecate the false sentiment which expends all its sympathy on the criminal and reserves none for his victims. I at times observe symptoms which lead me to believe that this sentiment prevails to a somewhat excessive degree in Egypt" ^ » Egypt, No. 1 of 1907, p. 86. CHAPTER LIX EDUCATION Eiducational policy — Obstacles to progress — Want of money — ^Th© Pashas — Intellectual awakening of Egypt — The Mosque schools — Primary and Secondary education — Progress made in forming the characters of the Egyptians — Female education. The subjects which have so far been treated fall within the domain of material or administrative progress. What, however, has been done in the direction of moral and intellectual progress ? Have the English made any endeavour to educate the Egyptians ? " Egypt," a high authority on Eastern affairs has said, "has always been the servant of nations."^ Have the English, as some critics of the baser sort aver, viewed this condition of politi- cal degradation with ill-disouised favour ? ^ Have they discouraged the acquisition of knowledge, with a view to keeping the Egyptians in a position of servitude to the British nation ? Or has a more noble policy been adopted ? Have the English, cast- ing aside all feelings based on a mistaken and ignoble egotism, endeavoured to educate the Egyptians and to lead them, so far as was possible, along the path which may possibly end in self-government ? 1 Muir, The Caliphate, p. 1G8. 2 It was not only with surprise, but also with a feeling of keen dis- appointment, that I read in a work written by M. de Guerville a letter from Sheikh Mohammed Abdou, in which that eminent man appeared to give the weight of his name to iiisinuatiou.s of tliis sort. He must have known perfectly well that they were wholly devoid of foundation. I had hoped for better things of him. . 524 cii. Lix EDUCATION 525 In the present chapter an attempt will be made to answer these questions. They are of vital im- portance, not only to the Egyptians themselves, but also to all Europe, and more especially to England. The reason why they are so important is that if ever the Egyptians learn to govern themselves — if, in other words, the full execu- tion of the policy of " Egypt for the Egyptians " becomes feasible — the Egyptian question will, it may be hoped and presumed, finally cease to be a cause of trouble to Europe, and the British nation will be relieved of an onerous responsibility. Many years ago. Lord Macaulay asked a perti- nent question in connection with the system under which India should be governed. "Are we," he said, *'to keep the people of India ignorant in order that we may keep them submissive ? " His reply was an indignant negative. " Governments, like men," he said, "may buy existence too dear. Propter vitam Vivendi perdere caicsas is a despicable policy both in individuals and in States."^ The English in Egypt have acted on the prin- ciple advocated by Macaulay. They may repel, with equal truth and scorn, the insinuation that, for political reasons, they have fostered Egyptian ignorance and subserviency. If a race of Egyptians capable of governing the country without foreign aid has not as yet been formed, the fault does not lie with the English. It must be sought elsewhere, neither need any impartial person go far afield to find where it lies. It lies mainly in the fact that two decades are but a short time in the life of a nation. Material progress may, under certain con- ditions, be rapid. Moral and intellectual progress must of necessity always be a plant of slow growth. It takes more time to form the mind of a states- man, or even to train a competent administrator, * Speech in the Flouse of Commons^ July 10, 1833. 526 MODERN EGYPT pr. vi than it does to dig a canal or to construct a rail- way. Wlien the unpromising nature of the raw material on which the English had to work is con- sidered, when it is remembered that for centuries prior to the British occupation the Egyptians were governed under a system eminently calcu- lated to paralyse their intellectual and warp their moral faculties, and when it is further borne in mind that the circumstances under which reform was undertaken were of an exceptionally difficult and complicated nature, it may well be a matter for surprise, not tliat so little, but that so much progress in the direction of a real Egyptian autonomy has been made in so short a time. Consider what is generally meant by Europeans when they talk of Egyptian self-government. If they meant that the Egyptians should be allowed to o;overn themselves accordin^T to their own rude lights, the task of educating them in the art of self-government would not merely have been easy ; there would have been no necessity that it should have been undertaken. The indigenous art of self- government had already been acquired in 1882, and we know with what results ; no European instruction would have been able to improve on its recognised canons. What Europeans mean when they talk of Egyptian self-government is that the Egyptians, far from being allowed to follow^ the bent of tlieir own unreformed propensities, should only be permitted to govern themselves after the fashion in which Europeans think they ought to be governed. I am not one of those who think that "any State can be saved, and any political problem solved, by enlightened administration."^ At the * This was the view held by Pereo:rino Rossi, who was subsequently assassinated, during the early strue:gles for Italian unity. — Trevelyan'i Garibaldi's D^ence of the Roman Republic, p. 74. CH. Lix EDUCATION 527 same time, looking to the magnitude of all the interests involved in Egypt, there is a limit to the defjree of maladministration which can be tolerated in order to ensure all the advantao-es of self-(yovern- ment. It cannot be doubted that that limit would be passed, if complete autonomy were suddenly bestowed on the Egyptians. To suppose that the characters and intellects of even a small number of Egyptians can in a few years be trained to such an extent as to admit of their undertaking the sole direction of one of the most complicated political and administrative machines which the world has ever known, and of guiding such a machine along the path of even fairly good government, is a sheer absurdity. I must apologise to those of my readers who have any real acquaintance with Egyptian affairs for indulging in platitudes of this description. If I do so, it is because it would appear that the race of those who dream dreams of real autonomy in the very near future is not yet extinct. The main reason why it is hopeless to expect that any immediate and important political fruit can be gathered from the tree of educational progress in Egypt has been already indicated. It is now necessary to explain the further obstacles which have stood in the way of rapid progress in the work of education. They were mainly twofold. The first and principal obstacle has been want of money. In 1877 and 1878 — that is to say, during the worst periods of the financial chaos created by Ismail Pasha — the Government expenditure on education only amounted to the paltry sum of £E.29,000 a year. Under the Dual Control, the grant was raised to about £E. 70,000 a year. During the eazly days of the British occupation, that is to say, whilst the issue of the "Race against Bankruptcy" was still doubtful, the 528 MODERN EGYPT pt. vi utmost economy had to be practised ; and even when the race was won, it was felt that, however necessary it might be to provide schools for Egyptian children, it was still more necessary to limit the excessive demands which the tax- gatherer had heretofore made on their parents. Fiscal relief, therefore, took precedence of every- thing. It was not until 1890 that the Financial Department found itself in a position to increase the sum of money spent by the State on education to £E.81,000. Since then, it has been steadily increasing in amount.^ It would long since have been largely increased had not internationalism, by depriving the Egyptian Government of the free use of their own resources, barred the way. Want of money, therefore, was the first obstacle in the way of rapid progress. The idiosyncrasies of Pashadom constituted the second. It was not that the Pashas did not wish to advance the cause of education in Egypt. Far from it. JNIany of them yearned — and very naturally and rightly yearned — for educational progress. They recog- nised that the acquisition of knowledge was the sole instrument by the use of which Egypt might perhaps eventually be freed from foreign control. But they were themselves too ignorant of educa- tional administration to be able to initiate the only measures which would have satisfied their very legitimate yearnings. The execution of their own policy was perpetually leading them to conclusions which their prejudices forced them to reject The natural result ensued. The policy of Pashadom was a mass of inconsistencies. INIoreover, the * £E.305,000 was expended on education in 1906. The provision made in the estimates for 1907 amounted to £'E.374,000, and this amount haa been increased to £E. 450,450 in tlie estimates for 1908. These figures represent only "ordinary" expenditure. They do not include the 8[)ecial credits for the construction and maiuteuauce of school build' ings. CH. ux EDUCATION 529 evil effects of those inconsistencies were enhanced by the fact that, at every turn of the wheel of nepotism, some fresh individual was, during the early years of the occupation, appointed to direct the affairs of the Department of Public Instruc- tion. "The frequent changes in educational policy during past years," I wrote in 1892, " have proved a great obstacle to educational progress in Egypt. During the past twenty-nine years, the Minister (or Director- General) of Public Instruction has been changed twenty-nine times. At each change, the schools have for a time been more or less completely upset and demoralised, as it has been the prevailing tendency of the Minister to reverse the administrative methods of his pre- decessor." At one moment, recourse has been had to the usual remedy of the Egyptian reformer. A ser- vile copy was made of some foreign institution. "On s'etait content^," says Yacoub Artin Pasha, who is by far the highest Egyptian authority on educational matters in Egypt, " de copier les programmes des ecoles de France, et sans se donner la peine de chercher a les modifier selon les besoins du pays et de notre culture future."^ At the next moment, the undisciplined mind of the old-fashioned Pasha, with characteristic want of moderation, would spring at a bound to the opposite extreme of anti-European sentiment. He might own that European knowledge was good, but he refused to accept the inevitable conclusion that, at all events until a capable staff of Egyptian teachers had been trained, Europeans alone could impart it. Sciences cannot be learnt save in those languages which possess a scientific literature and vocabulary. Yet the Pasha, under the infiuence of prejudices which his powers of reasoning were * Considerations sur I' Instruction Publique en Egypte, p. 116. VOL. II 2 M 530 MODERN EGYPT ft vi too feeble to stem, declared that a science which could not be taught in Arabic, should not be taught at all. There was one thing which the Pasha could do, and which, in fact, he did. He could multiply schools and scholars without any regard to the qualifications of the professors, to the value of the instruction imparted, or to the schoolroom accommodation which was available. He could thus practise his favourite art of self- deception. He could give statistical proof that he was moving rapidly forward, whilst all the time he was in reality stationary, if, indeed, his move- ments were not retrograde. On the whole, it may be said that one of the chief obstacles to the adoption of an enlightened educational policy in Egypt in the early days of the occupation was the presence of a few leading Pashas who, in theory at all events, favoured educational progress. There can be no doubt that, if the English had from the first had a free hand in this matter, greater progress would have been made than has actually been the case. From one point of view, however, the English took in hand the work of educating the Egyptians at a propitious moment. Almost simultaneously with the occurrence of the British occupation, the country underwent an intellectual awakening. The people of Egypt had, in fact, slumbered since the days of Mehemet Ali. One of the most singular traits in that remarkable man's character was that, although he was himself uneducated, although he could never write, and did not learn to read till he was forty- seven years old, and then imperfectly, he placed a high value on European knowledge.^ He establislied schools in the towns and large villages. JNIehemet Ali was, however, in some respects, in advance of * See M. de Lesseps' remarks to Mr. .Senior, Conversations, etc., p. 129. CH. Lix EDUCATION 531 his time. "Knowledge was then so unpopular that mothers bhnded their children to keep them from school."^ JNIore than half a century later, the population generally appreciated the value of education almost as little as they did in the days of Mehemet Ali. Writing in 1894, Yacoub Artin Pasha said : — " II n'y a pas une dizaine d'ann^es que le public en general, non seulement ne s'int^ressait pas k I'instruction de ses enfants, main encore y ^tait oppose, quoique dans une moindre mesure qu'il y a soixante ans." It is not to be supposed that the Egyptians were suddenly inspired with a thirst for know- ledge for its own sake, or that they awoke to a keen sense of shame at their own ignorance. The new spirit was, at all events in the first instance, rather to be attributed to the fact that, in a country where a large section of the upper and middle classes of society depends on Government employ- ment, parents suddenly realised that, unless their children were sent to school, they would probably not be able to gain their livelihood. Contact with the West, the partial Europeanisation of the ad- ministrative services, and the emulation inspired by the presence of European, Levantine, and Syrian competitors, produced, therefore, at least one beneficial result. But whatever be the cause, there can be no doubt of the fact. The best test of whether the Egyptians really desire to be educated is to ascer- tain whether they are prepared to pay for education. On this point, the evidence is conclusive. In the early days of the British occupation, nearly all the pupils who attended the Government schools were taught gratuitously. Before many years had * See M. de Lesseps* remarks to Mr. Senior, Conversations, etc. p. 130. 532 MODERN EGYPT pt. vi passed, by far the greater proportion paid for their instruction.^ In 1889, I visited many remote vilhiges of Upper Egypt in which the face of a European is rarely seen. No request was more frequently made to me than that I should urge the Govern- ment to establish a school in the village. "De differents cotes," Yacoub Artin Pasha wrote at about this period, " on demande des ecoles, et la ou il en existe deja on demande quelquefois leur de- veloppement, sans se rendre bien compte, il est vrai, de ce que Ton demande." The Egyptians have, in fact, made one great step forward in the race for a national existence. They have learnt that they are ignorant. They wish to be taught. It is now necessary to explain what measures were adopted for teaching them. '* The chief aim and object of education in Islam," JNlr. Hughes says, "is to obtain a know- ledge of the religion of Mohammed, and anything beyond this is considered superfluous and even dangerous."^ Under these circumstances, it was clear to the British reformer that the education imparted at the famous University of El-Azhar could not be utilised to raise the general standard of education in Egypt He, therefore, left that institution alone. The El-Azhar University stands at the summit * The policy which has of late years been pursued in connection with the matter to which allusion is here made, has been vigorously attacked. The grounds on which, as it appears to me, it may be successfully defended are stated at some length in Egypt, No. 1 of 1006, pp. 82-81). In this work, I have merely endeavoured to give a general sketch of the progress which has been made in the various brandies of the administration. It would lead me to too great length were 1 to attempt to answer all tlie criticisms wliich have, from time to time, been made on the working of tlie various Departments. 'Ihis remark applies with special force to the work of the Department of Public Instruction. It has formed the subject of a great deal of yery unjust animadversion. * Hughes's Dictionary of Islam, p. 106. CH. Lix EDUCATION 533 of the purely Moslem educational system of Eg}'pt. The village schools (Kuttabs), which are attached to most of the JNIosques in the country, stand at the base of that system. As regards the quality of the instruction afforded in these schools, JMr. Hughes makes the following remarks : — "The child who attends these seminaries 'is first taught his alphabet, which he learns from a small board on which the letters are written by the teacher. He then becomes acquainted with the numerical value of each letter. After this, he learns to write down the ninety-nine names of God, and other simple words taken from the Koran. When he has mastered the spelling of words, he proceeds to learn the first chapter of the Koran, then the last chapter, and gradually reads through the whole Koran in Arabic, which he usually does without understanding a word of it. Having finished the Koran, which is considered an incumbent religious duty, the pupil is instructed in the elements of grammar, and perhaps a few simple rules of arithmetic. . . . The ordinary school- master is generally a man of little learning." It would be an exaggeration to say that these Mosque schools are absolutely useless. Through their instrumentality, a certain number of children are taught to read and write. Organised as they were at the time the British occupation com- menced, they were, however, as nearly useless as any educational establishments could be. Want of funds at first stood in the way of any attempt to reform them, but about 1897 the matter was taken in hand. A reasonable curriculum, based on the teaching of the three Il's, was adopted. The teaching of any foreign language was rigorously excluded. Since 1898, the number of village schools under Government supervision has increased year by year. 534 MODERN EGYPT ft. vi In 1906, 4554 village schools were either directly under Government control or under departmental inspection for grants-in-aid. They gave instruction to 165,000 pupils, of whom nearly 13,000 were girls. It is on every ground of the highest importance that a sustained effort should be made to place elementary education in Egypt on a sound footing. The schoolmaster is abroad in the land. We may wish him well, but no one who is interested in the future of the country should blind himself to the fact that his successful advance carries with it certain unavoidable disadvantages. The process of manufacturing demagogues has, in fact, not only already begun, but may be said to be well advanced. The intellectual phase through which India is now passing stands before the world as a warning that it is unwise, even if it be not dangerous, to create too wide a gap between the state of education of the higher and of the lower classes in an Oriental country governed under the inspiration of a Western democracy. High education cannot and ought not to be checked or discouraged. The policy advocated by Macaulay is sound. Moreover, it is the only policy worthy of a civilised nation. But if it is to be carried out without danger to the State, the ignorance of the masses should be tempered paii passu with the intellectual advance of those who are destined to be their leaders. It is neither wise nor just that the people should be left intellectually defenceless in the presence of the hare-brahied and empirical projects which the political charlatan, himself but half-educated, will not fail to pour into their credulous ears. In this early part of the twentieth century, there is no possible general remedy agahist the demagogue except that which consists in educating those who are his natural prey to such an extent that they may, at all events. CH.LIX EDUCATION 535 have some chance of discerning the imposture which but too often lurks beneath his perfervid eloquence and political quackery. Considerations of space render it necessary that I should abstain — albeit somewhat reluctantly — from giving a description of the progress made of late years in Egypt in the direction of Primary and Secondary education. For the same reason, I do not deal with the very important question of Technical education.^ I must, therefore, confine myself to stating the bald fact that, in 1906, 505 educational establishments, exclusive of village schools, existed in the country. These gave employment to 4341 teachers, and instruction to about 92,000 pupils, of whom about 20,000 were girls. Under the enlightened administration of the present Minister, Saad Pasha Zagloul, and of his Adviser, Mr. Dunlop, education of every description is making rapid strides in advance. It cannot be doubted that the quality of the instruction afforded at the Government schools has of late years been greatly improved. The skilful methods and direct personal influence of the * Very full explanations have been given on all these subjects in my successive Annual Reports. The following remarks made by Mr. Lecky {Democracy and Liberty, vol. ii. p. 6) apply, with great force, to the Egyptian educational system : "The great mistake in the education of the poor has in general been that it has been too largely and too ambitiously literary. Primary education should . . . teach the poor to write well and to count well ; but, for the rest, it should be much more technical and industrial than literary, and should be more concerned with the observation of facts than with any form of speculative reasoning or opinions. There is much evidence to support the conclusion that the kinds of popular education which have proved morally, as well as intellectually, the most beneficial have been those in which a very moderate amount of purely mental instruction has been combined with physical or industrial training." In a very interesting article published in the Edinburgh Review for October 1907, and entitled "Signs of the Times in India," tho disastrous results which have ensued from unduly encouraging a purely literary education in that country to the neglect of scientific and technical training are very clearly indicated. 536 MODERN EGYPT pt. vi new European teachers, wlio have been introduced into the Department of Education, have been steadily raishig the general level of the schools, in spite of the numerous obstacles encountered. W^hilst there has been an increasingly strict super- vision of the teaching of Arabic and the Koran, the study of European languages has been placed on a new basis. Previously, pupils were allowed to waste their time and addle their brains by attem])ting the study of an impossible number of languages. It was a great step in advance when the time-honoured methods adopted in Egypt of loading the memory without exercising the mind were abandoned. English and French are now no longer merely treated as additional subjects of linguistic study. Either of these languages is used as the medium of instruction in certain subjects, such as history, science, etc. In course of time, as the number of highly trained Egyptian teachers increases, instruction will, without doubt, be given in Arabic to a much greater extent than heretofore.^ From the political point of view, the most important educational question is this : Do the educated Egyptians, whose number is now rapidly increasing, possess the qualities and characteristics of potentially self-governing Egyptians ? To put the same question in another way, if we speak of education in the broadest sense of the term — that is to say, if we include the formation, not only of the intellect, but also of the character — if, in a word, ^ That the absence of an adequate staff of trained E^ryptian teachers has greatly retarded the progress of education both in Kgypt and in tlie Soudan cannot be doubted. In my Annual Reports, I have frequently alluded to this imi)ortaiit subject. The cause has been the same as tliat which has operated in other Departments of the State, viz. want of money. It is only since tlie Anglo-French Convention was signed that it has bec-ome possible to take seriously in hand the question of rendering the profession of teaching attractive by iuci'easiug the salaries of the teachers. CH. Lix EDUCATION 537 we comprise all those manifold mental and moral influences which tend towards pre])ari!ig a boy or girl for a career of usefulness in after life, has any substantial progress been made ? It is obviously impossible to give more than a conjectural answer to this question. Nevertheless, although no positive proof can be adduced that such an opinion is correct, it may be stated with a fair amount of confidence that something has been done towards forming and elevating the characters of the Egyptians. The mere acquisition of the linguistic knowledge, which has enabled a certain number of young Egyptians to study the literature and sciences of Europe, must surely have tended in some degree to engender that accurate habit of thought which is the main characteristic of the Western as opposed to the Eastern mind ; whilst it is difficult to believe that constant contact with a number of high-minded Europeans, the example afforded by the elevated standard of thought from which all social and administrative questions have for some years past been approached, the aboli- tion of barbarous punishments, the suppression of forced labour and of torture, the introduction of the new ideas that the rights of property are sacred and that all men are equal in the eyes of the law, the practical abolition of slavery, the dis- couragement of nepotism, the stigma attached to the worst kinds of vice, and, generally, the fact that the Egyptian social and political atmosphere has for some years been heavily charged with ideas which should act as antidotes against moral degradation — have not in some degree contributed to a partial assimilation of the best European code of morals, in spite of the adverse intluence exercised by the immoral or dishonest acts of individual Europeans. Whilst, however, it may reasonably be held that something has been done in the 538 MODERN EGYPT ft. v\ direction of imparting rectitude, virility, and moral equipoise to the Egyptian character, it must be admitted that there is still abundant room for improvement in all these directions. If the moral influences to which the Egyptians are now exposed were withdrawn, or even weakened, a relapse would inevitably ensue. Let any one who is inclined to take a sanguine view of this subject cast, for a moment, all details aside, and consider the general nature of the problem which presents itself for solution. It is nothing less than this, that the new generation of Egyptians has to be persuaded or forced into imbibing the true spirit of Western civilisation. Although Europe was Christianised first and civilised after- wards, it may perhaps be argued with some degree of plausibility — more especially with the example of Japan before us — that the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy would be involved if it were held that Christianity is the necessary handmaid of European civilisation, and that it is impossible to assimilate the true spirit of that civilisation without adopting the Christian faith. I am insufficiently acquainted with the state of Japan to draw any precise inferences from its recent history. I confine myself, therefore, to arguments derived from facts and subjects which have come under my personal observation, merely observing that both the religion and the social system of Buddhism, and, I believe, of Shintoism, present greater possibilities for the assimilation of exotic secular ideas and forms of government than any which can be claimed for rigid Islamism. Looking then solely to the possibility of reforming those countries which have adopted the faith of Islam, it may be asked whether any one can conceive the existence of true European civilisation on the assumption that the position which women occupy in Europe is CH. Lix EDUCATION 539 abstracted from the general plan ? As well can a man blind from his birth be made to conceive the existence of colour. Change the position of women, and one of the main pillars, not only of European civilisation, but at all events of the moral code based on the Christian religion, if not of Christianity itself, falls to the ground. The position of women in Egypt, and in Mohammedan countries generally, is, therefore, a fatal obstacle to the attainment of that elevation of thought and character which should accompany the introduction of European civilisation, if that civilisation is to produce its full measure of beneficial effect. The obvious remedy would appear to be to educate the women. The remarkable and con- tinuous progress of female education in Egypt within the last few years marks, in fact, very clearly the changes of custom and alteration of ideas which are taking place in the country. When the first efforts to promote female education were made, they met with little sympathy from the population in general. When, many years ago, this matter was first taken in hand, Yacoub Pasha Artin was the only Egyptian who took the least interest in it. More than this, most of the upper-class Egyptians were not merely indifferent to female education ; they were absolutely opposed to it. They did not want the women to be educated. Even when girls' schools were, with much difficulty, established, parents, in the first instance, sent their daughters to school reluctantly, and took them away early. In order to encourage the education of girls, it was necessary to admit a large number of free pupils. Most of these came from the poorer classes, and left early, either to be married or because it was thought unbecoming for a girl to attend school after she had passed the earliest years of childliood. All this has now been changed. The reluctance of 540 MODERN EGYPT pt. vi parents to send their daughters to school has been largely overcome. Free education in the Govern- ment Primary Schools has been practically abrlished. Demands are frequently made for the estabhshment of other schools in different parts of the country. The number of private schools for girls has also greatly increased of late years. Further, it is to be observed that the steady output of boys from the Secondary Schools and Higher Colleges has indirectly stimulated the movement in favour of female education. The younger generation are beginning to demand that their wives should possess some qualifications other than those which can be secured in the seclusion of the harem. The interaction of the two branches of education does not stop here, for not only has the growth of education among boys stimulated the desire for instruction to girls, but it has also tended to improve the quality of the education given to girls by prolonging the period of instruction. There appears good reason for supposing that, where education has made progress, the age of marriage has risen, and that, in consequence, the girls are allowed to remain longer than heretofore at school. The prospects of the future are, there- fore, distinctly bright in connection with this all- important question. It, of course, remains an open question whether, when the Egyptian women are educated, they will exercise a healthy and elevating influence over the men. The few INIoslem women hi Egypt who have, up to the present time, received a European educa- tion are, with some very rare exceptions, strictly secluded. It is difficult, therefore, to form any matured opinion as to the results so far obtained. In Christian Europe, the religious faith of women is generally stronger than that of men. The woman feels and trusts, the man reasons. cH. Lix EDUCATION 541 The faith of ^loslem women, on the other hand, is probably rather less strong than that of Moslem men. Neither need this be any matter for surprise. It is not merely due to the curious impulse which appears almost invariably to drive the East and the West in opposite directions. It is a consequence of the fundamental differ- ences which separate Christianity from Islamism. Although it is an error to suppose that Mohammed's general plan did not involve a future life for women/ there can be no doubt that not only did he, by precept and example, relegate women to a position in this world inferior to that of men, but also that the religion which he founded is euiinently one conceived by the genius of a man and intended for men. It is, therefore, natural that women should generally be less fervent Moslems than men. But the Moslem woman is, after all, a woman first and a Moslem afterwards. She would belie her sex if she were not impulsive and inclined, even more than the men, to run to extremes. Although, therefore, the faith of the INIoslem woman may perhaps be comparatively weak, her prejudices in respect to all the customs and habits of thought which cluster round Islamism are as strong as, if not stronger than those of the men. A Europeanised Egyptian man usually becomes an Agnostic, and often assimilates many of the least worthy portions of European civilisation. Is there any reason why European education should not produce the same effect on the Eurojiennised Egyptian woman ? I know of none. Indeed, in so far as the Agnosticism is concerned, the woman, on the assumption that her faith is relatively luke- warm, would probably find less difficulty than the ^ Surah III,, verse 193, r.ml Surah IV., verse 123, of the Koran are conclusive as to Mohammed's teacliing' on this subject. Tliere can he no doubt that all devout Moslems believe that a future life is resej\ ed for women. 542 MODERN EGYPT pt. vi man in shaking herself free from the ideas and associations which have surrounded her from her cradle. It would obviously be neither safe nor just to draw any general conclusion in connection with this subject from such a limited number of facts and examples as can at present be adduced. If it be once admitted that no good moral results will accrue from female education in Egypt, then, indeed, the reformer may well despair of the cause of Egyptian education generally in the highest sense of the word. The experiment of female education should certainly be continued with vigour. Few people now living can hope to see its results. All that can at present be said is that those results must necessarily be uncertain. But whatever they may eventually be, this much is well-nigh certain — that the European reformer may mstruct, he may explain, he may argue, he may devise the most ingenious methods for the moral and material development of the people, he may use his best endeavours to "cut blocks with a razor" and to graft true civilisation on a society which is but just emerging from barbarism, but unless he proves himself able, not only to educate, but to elevate the Egyptian woman, he will never succeed in affording to the Egyptian man, in any thorough degree, the only European education which is worthy of Europe. What the Egyptian man most requires is the acquisition of all those qualities comprised in the expressive Greek term alSax; — poorly translated by the English word "self-respect" — and those qualities he can never fully acquire unless, like the Christian European, he becomes monogamous, and thus learns to honour the one woman whom he will also have sworn to love and to cherish until the hand of death parts him from his life-long helpmate. CHAPTER LX THE SOUDAN Tfce nature of the Soudan problem — Extent — Population — Results obtained by the Convention of 1899 — Executive agency — Finance — Railways — Slavery. Having dealt with the affairs of Egypt, I now propose to give a very brief sketch of the progress of administrative reform in the Soudan.^ The problems with which the Government has to deal in the Soudan are not only very different, but also, for the time being, far more simple than those which await solution in Egypt. This latter country has advanced half-way — perhaps many would think more than half-way — on the road towards Western civilisation. It has certainly passed beyond the stage in which the undivided attention of the reformer may be devoted to financial and administrative questions. It has entered on a phase where, unless I am much mis- taken, it will year by year become more apparent to all but very superficial observers that the further adaptation and effective assimilation of Western ideas is quite as much a social as a political or administrative question. The really vital issues which the future has reserved for Egypt are not how exotic political institutions can be forced to take root in a soil which is uncongenial to their * Most of the remarks contained in this chapter have already appeared in my Annual Reports from the year 1890 onwards. 648 544 MODERN EGYPT tt.vi JTowth, but how the relations of the sexes can be brought into conformity with modern ideas, how the moral code on which the laws of all civilised countries are based can be made to penetrate into the daily life and manners and customs of the people, and how, without shattering all that is worthy and noble in the Moslem religion, the quasi-religious institutions of the country can be reformed to such an extent as no longer to con- stitute an insuperable barrier to progress. The Government have sometimes been accused of moving too slowly in Egypt. Does any one who has reflected on the problems which I have briefly indicated above, and who really understands the facts connected with them, consider it possible that they can be solved with rapidity ? If so, he must be imbued with an optimism which I am unable to share. Nevertheless, until they are solved, the aspirations of the irresponsible advocate of reforms must always be tinged with a certain degree of unreality, whilst some disappointment must inevitably await the well-intentioned efforts of the responsible man of action. The case of the Soudan is, for the present, wholly different. Even the most advanced portions of that country are still in a very backward condition. For at least a generation to come, no complex question of how Western methods may best be adapted to Eastern minds will probably arise. Political issues are few in number and relatively simple in character. The most important, probably, is how slavery may be completely abolished without causing serious disorder. The rise and fall of some religious im- postor may cause some temporary trouble, but the methods for dealing with cases of this sort com- mand the assent alike of Westerns and of educated Orientals. Any danger from religious fanaticism may be mitigated, and perhaps altogether averted, CH.LX THE SOUDAN 545 by imposing some reasonable and salutary checks on the freedom of action of missionary bodies. Whatever may be the case in Egypt, there can be no question that what the Soudanese now most of all require is, not national government, but good government. Hence, Sir Reginald Wingate and his very capable staff will be able for the present to devote their entire attention to overcoming the physical difficulties with which they have to deal, and to the introduction of administrative, judicial, and financial measures suitable to the requirements of the primitive society whose interests are entrusted to their care. The Anglo-Egyptian Soudan covers an area of 950,000 square miles. By far the greater portion of this large territory consists of what the late Lord Salisbury once termed "light sandy soil." The area under cultivation has been steadily in- creasing of late years. Nevertheless, at the close of 1906, only about 1576 square miles were culti- vated. The remainder consisted of desert, swamp, and primeeval forest. The researches made by Sir Reginald Wingate into the past and present population of the Soudan, bring into strong relief the terrible results which ensued from Dervish misrule. It is estimated that, prior to the establishment of the Mahdi's power, the population of the Soudan was about S^ millions, that of these about 3J millions were swept away by famine^ and by disease, notably by small-pox, and that S^ millions were killed either in the engage- ments with the British and Egyptian troops, or in inter- tribal wars. The latter of these two causes accounted for by far the greater portion ot the terrible mortality in warfare. Several tribes opposed to the Baggara, who constituted the * The Dervish soldiery used to rob the inhabitants of their grain reserves, with the result that large numbers died of starvation. VOL. II 2 N 546 MODERN EGYPT pt. vi mainstay of the Dervish power, were well-nigh obliterated. These figures, Sir Reginald Wingate remarked, "seem almost incredible." Nevertheless, he considered them substantially correct. He cited a fact, which came under his personal observation, in support of their correctness. Prior to 1882, the district lying along the banks of the rivers Rahad and Dinder contained upwards of 800 villages. When Sir Reginald Wingate visited this district in 1902, "not a village remained." In an official report prepared on the Berber district towards the close of 1903, it was stated that "villages, which used to produce 500 fighting men, have now only fifty to sixty adults, and in some cases even less." My personal experience is of a nature to confirm this testimony. Shortly after the battle of Omdurman, I visited INIetemmeh, a town formerly inhabited by the Jaalin, and situated on the Nile between Berber and Khartoum. It was clear from the buildings which remained that it had formerly contained a large population. At the time of my visit, the inhabitants numbered about 1300, of whom all but 150 were women and children. The men had almost all been killed by the Dervishes. During the last few years, the population has been increasing, but it is probable that it does not now exceed two millions. The Convention between the British and Egyptian Governments, signed on January 19, 1899, of which a general description has already been given,^ may be termed the Constitutional Charter of the Soudan. In spite of many anomalies, which were mevitable under all the circumstances of the case, it has conferred an immense boon, both on the people of the Soudan, and on the Egyptians, who, whatever some of them may at * Vide ante, Chapter XXXllI. CH,LX THE SOUDAN 547 present think, are, and must always be deeply interested in the development and good govern- ment of that country. The Convention freed the Soudan from the incubus of the Capitulations, and it also obviated the very serious risks which would certainly have been incurred had the adoption of a highly civilised system of government been forced prematurely on the country. I do not suppose that the most ardent advocate, whether of inter- nationalism or of equality of treatment to all creeds and races, would seriously contend that it would have been possible in practice to have worked a system under which Kwat Wad Awaibung, a Shillouk who murdered Ajak Wad Deng because the latter bewitched his son, and caused him to be eaten by a crocodile,^ would have been tried by a procedure closely resembling that followed at Paris or Berlin, which would have necessitated a civil action brought by some chance European, resident on the upper waters of the Blue Nile, being tried by a body of Judges sitting at Cairo or Alexandria, and which would not have allowed the executive Government to close a liquor shop belonging to a Greek subject at El- Obeid or Mongalla without the presence of a Consular janissary. I need not describe in detail the executive agency through which effect has been given to the ^ A Shillouk named Kwat Wad Awaibung' was tried on the char^j^e of murdering Ajak Wad Deng. He pleaded guilty, and made the following statement : " The murdered Ajak ^Vad Deng owed me a sheep, but would not pay me. He said he would show me his work, and next day my son was eaten by a crocodile, which was, of course, the work of Ajak Wad Deng, and for that reason 1 killed him. We had had a feud for years, as 1 was a more successful hippopotamus- hunter than he was, and for that reason he was practising witchery over me and my family." Mr. Bonham Carter, the Legal Secretary of the Soudan Government, in reporting on this case, said : "The accused's belief that the crocodile was acting as agent of the murdered man in killing the accused's son was supported by several other witnesses, and represents a common local belief." 548 MODERN EGYPT rr.vi principles embodied in the Convention of 1899. I content myself with saying tliat the country was, in the first instance, divided into districts, each of which was placed under the control of a military officer. It would, however, be an entire mistake to suppose that the country is under a military government in the ordinary acceptation of that term. The Government, in all its more important features, is essentially civil, although the Governor- General and many of his principal subordinates are military officers. I have frequently rendered testimony to the very valuable services performed by these military officers. I need here only add that the system of education adopted at our Public Schools and INIilitary Colleges is of a nature to turn out a number of young men who are admirable agents in the execution of an Imperial policy. The German, the Frenchman, and others may be, and sometimes are better educated, but any defects on the score of technical knowledge are amply compensated by the governing powers, the willingness to assume responsibility, and the versatility under strange circumstances in which the Anglo-Saxon, trained in the free atmosphere which develops individ- ualism, excels beyond all other nations. I know of only one disadvantage in employing military officers, and that is, tl.at they are liable to be removed for service elsewhere, more especially in times of national emergency. A Civil service is, therefore, being formed, composed of young men taken from the British Universities. These will gradually take the place of the military officers now employed. I do not propose to dwell on the progress made in education, the establishment of a judicial system, the preservation of forests, and other administrative matters. Full details on these subjects will be found in my Annual Reports. cH. Lx THE SOUDAN 549 I confine my remarks to one or two points of special importance. Finance is, of course, ttie keystone of the situation. It was felt from the first that in the Soudan, as in Egypt, a sound financial position was the source from which all other reforms and improvements would have to flow. In the first instance, the situation certainly did not look promising. Those who had had most experience of the country had declared that the Soudan was, and was likely always to remain, a "useless possession." The ravages committed by the Dervishes deepened the sense of its inutility. The population had, as I have already shown, been more than decimated. Flocks and herds had been destroyed. Date- trees, which constitute one of the principal products of the country, had been hewn down in large numbers. Neither life nor property had, for many years, been secure. Under these discouraging auspices, the Soudan revenue for 1898 was estimated at the very modest figure of £E.8000. As a matter of fact, a revenue of £E. 35,000 was collected. The expenditure was £E.235,000, thus leaving a deficit of £E. 200,000, which had to be made good by the Egyptian Treasury. Eight years later, in 1906, the revenue was £E.804,000, and the net charge on the Egyptian Treasury, exclusive of interest on 3^ millions advanced for capital expenditure, amounted to only about £E.30,000. Inclusive of interest at the rate of 3 per cent on the capital advanced, the charge which had to be borne by the Egyptian Treasury, in 1906, was only £E. 130,000.' The amount is trifling in comparison to the unquestion- able advantages derived by Egypt from the mainten- ance of a settled government in the Soudan, and 1 From January 1, 1908, the Soudan Government will commence to pay interest on a portion of the capital advanced. 550 MODERN EGYPT pt. vi from the assured possession of the Nile Valley. I should add that, at the close of the year 1906, a Reserve Fund, amounting to over £E. 31 5,000, had accumulated in the hands of the Soudan Government. Thus, a very great and rapid improvement has taken place. ^loreover, it has been effected with- out increasing the burden of taxation. The fiscal legislation of the Soudan has been based on the unquestionably sound principle that, in the assess- ment and collection of the taxes, no innovation, based on Western ideas, should be introduced unless its introduction is altogether unavoidable. The main fault of Oriental fiscal administration has generally been, not so much that the principles on which the taxation is based are unsound, as that the method of applying them has been very defective. On going through the list of the taxes which were collected under the Khalifa's rule, it was found that, although the manner in which they had been levied had been cruel and extortionate to the last degree, they were based on principles which are generally recognised in all Moslem countries. No radical change of system was, therefore, necessary. Broadly speaking, all that was required was that the rates of taxation should in each case be fixed by law ; that the taxes should be moderate in amount, and that every care should be taken that no demands were made on the taxpayers save those which the law allowed. With every desire, however, to avoid the premature introduction of Western methods of administration into the Soudan, it was found practically impossible to devise any proper system for the recovery of taxes without having recourse to some of the principles on which European procedure in such matters is based. The Dervish svstem consisted in practice in taking as much as CH. Lx THE SOUDAN 551 the taxpayers could pay. On the other hand, if the land yielded no crop, the tax collector recog- nised the futility of making any demands on the cultivator/ The experience of other Eastern countries has shown that the elasticity thus obtained goes a long way to mitigate the rigour even of the worst fiscal systems. The European administrator, who has to look to financial equilibrium, naturally desires to intro- duce a system which will enable him to know, with tolerable accuracy, the amount of revenue on which he can count, not only for a single year, but for a series of years. It is comparatively easy for him to rectify the main defect of the Oriental system. He can substitute a fixed and moderate demand for one which was capricious and generally exorbitant. It is far less easy to obviate the rigidity which is, in some degree, an ahnost unavoidable accompaniment of the change of system. Notably, it is impossible to dispense altogether with the system of legal expropriation in cases of default, albeit this practice is wholly foreign to the ideas of a backward Oriental popula- tion. Sometliing, however, may be done to temper the comparative rigidity of European modes of procedure. Thus, in Egypt, although for many years past expropriation has been legalised, the best part of the Oriental fiscal system has been preserved. It has never been the practice, after imposing a fixed rate on land, to exact the amount of the taxes in good and bad years alike. Liberal concessions have been made to the holders * The execution of a system under which the tax is made pro- portionate to the crop of the year is, of course, iu some degree facilitated by the practice, common iu all Moslem countries, of taking payment in kind. It has been found necessary to continue this practice in some parts of the Soudan. But it is one which leads to numerous abuses, and it will be desirable to abolish it as soou M possible. It was abolished in Egypt some twenty years ago. 552 MODERN EGYPT ft. v\ of Sharaki, or uiiirrigated land. In the Soudan, an attempt has been made to carry this principle somewhat further. It has been laid down that, when a summons is taken out against any man for non-payment of tlie land tax, the INIagistrate, " if he is satisfied that the crop upon the land has failed through no fault of the owner or cultivator, and that the tax cannot be paid without depriving the owner of the means of earning his living as an agriculturist," may adjourn the summons, and report the case to the Governor- General. The latter can then, if he thinks fit, remit the tax. The clothing of the owner and that of his wife and children, the tools of an artisan or the implements of a cultivator, as well as cattle ordinarily employed in agriculture, are exempted from seizure. Further, the process for the recovery of taxes, though it may perhaps be criticised on the ground of being somewhat too elaborate, is manifestly devised with the express object of obviating a resort to expropriation, save in cases of absolute necessity. I make these remarks because the points here discussed are, in my opinion, of vital importance in the administration of all Eastern countries. I explained in a former part of this narrative^ that, at a moment when reckless borrowing had brought Egypt to the verge of ruin, resort was had to what at that time appeared the bold expedient of contracting a fresh loan. The causes which had led to the creation of a situation in the Soudan which, at one time, seemed almost desperate, were different from those which had operated in Egypt, but the remedy adopted was, in principle, the same. The country was prac- tically isolated. It was cut off from the world by a waste of burning and almost waterless desert. o > Vide ante, pp. 462-64. OH. Lx THE SOUDAN 553 Manifestly, the first thing to do was to establish the link through whose agency civilisation could gradually be introduced into the country. Scarcely had the sound of the guns of the battle of Omdurman died away, when works were commenced with a view to extending the Nile railway, which then extended only to the Atbara, to Halfaya, opposite Khartoum. It was, however, obvious that some port on the Red Sea coast constituted the natural outlet for the trade of the Soudan. After a full examination of the various alternatives which were available, it was decided to create such a port at a spot, now named Port Soudan, a short distance north of Suakin, and to connect it by railway with the Nile Valley. By January 1906, the railway works were completed. The harbour works are still in course of progress. Thus, the connection between the Soudan and the rest of the world was established. There is only one further point of special importance to which I need allude in connection with the administration of the Soudan. What has been done to remove the plague-spot of slavery ? The Soudan, of course, no longer constitutes the happy hunting-ground of the Arab slave-hunter. Nevertheless, in spite of every effort, the Slave Trade has not, as yet, been wholly suppressed. Slave raids are still, at times, made, more especially along the Abyssinian frontier. A recent report from Captain McMurdo, the head of the Depart- ment for the Suppression of Slavery, contains the following passage : " Speaking generally of the repression of slavery in the Soudan, I venture to state that progress is steadily being made, and that slavery has turned the corner into tlie high road of abolition, but it is a very long road, and it will take years to get to the end of it. It is not in nature that customs which have existed for centuries can 554 MODERN EGYPT pt. v be at once put aside. It is only by bringing to bear a steady pressure on slave - traffickers that abolition will be obtained." Domestic slavery in the Soudan itself is gradually dying a natural deatli. On this subject Sir Reginald Wingate wrote some two years ago : " By carefully protecting the interests of those who were previously slaves, and at the same time gradually employing them on renumerative work in other capacities — should they be unwilling to return to their masters as ordinary servants — we shall eventually, with the concurrence and assist- ance of the inhabitants themselves, gradually transform the status of slavery, and substitute for it a system of paid labour, which will probably be acceptable to master and servant alike.'* Thus, the Soudan has been launched on the path which leads to moral and material progress. With reasonable prudence in the management of its affairs, it should continue, year by year, to advance in prosperity. CHAPTER LXI CONCLUSION Summary of this work — Changes since the time of Ismail — The British reformers — Their Egyptian allies — Stability of the reforms A SHORT account has thus been given of the reforms which, during the last few years, have been carried out in all the more important branches of the Egyptian and Soudanese State administrations. The description given of those reforms is, indeed, defective. Several important subjects have not been even mentioned. No allusion has been made to the services of many officials who have done excellent work in their special spheres of action/ All that has been attempted is to give a general sketch of the progress of Egyptian reform. Even this imperfect sketch may, however, suffice to indicate the main features of the work which has been accomplished. It has been shown how the extravagance and maladministration of Ismail Pasha led to his own downfall, and to the im- position of a qualified European tutelage on the Egyptian Government ; how, at the moment when that tutelage was beginning to produce some * I take this opportunity of testifying: to the excellent services rendered by the first Secretaries in the Diplomatic Service who acted for me during my temporary absences from Egypt. These were Sir Gerald Portal, whose premature death was a great loss to his country, Sir Arthur Hardinge, Sir Rennell Rodd, and Mr. Findlay. I cannot speak too highly of the invaluable assistance I received from all of these gentlemen. 655 556 MODERN EGYPT tt.y\ beneficial results, the country was thrown back mto disorder by a military mutiny, the offspring of Ismail's reckless conduct, and by the growth of national aspirations in a form which rendered them incapable of realisation ; and how England finally intervened and bade disorder and administrative chaos cease. The readers of this book have been conducted, subject by subject, through the compli- cated mazes of the Egyptian administrative system. The degree of progress which has been made in the direction of introducing Western civilisation into the country has been described in some detail. No one can fully realise the extent of the change which has come over Egypt since the British occupation took place unless he is in some degree familiar with the system under which the country was governed in the days of Ismail Pasha. The contrast between now and then is, indeed, remark- able. A new spirit has been instilled into the population of Egypt. Even the peasant has learnt to scan his rights. Even the Pasha has learnt that others besides himself have rights which must be respected. The courbash may hang on the walls of the Moudirieh, but the JNIoudir no longer dares to employ it on the backs of the fellaheen. For all practical purposes, it may be said that the hateful corvee system has disappeared. Slavery has virtually ceased to exist. The halcyon days of the adventurer and the usurer are past. Fiscal burthens have been greatly relieved. Everywhere law reigns supreme. Justice is no longer bought and sold. Nature, mstead of being spurned and neglected, has been wooed to bestow her gifts on mankind. She has responded to the appeal. The waters of the Nile are now utilised in an intelli- gent manner. Means of locomotion have been improved and extended. The soldier has acquired some pride in the uniform which he wears. He CH. Lxi CONCLUSION 557 has fought as he never fought before. The sick man can be nursed in a well-managed hospital. The lunatic is no longer treated like a wild beast. The punishment awarded to the worst criminal is no longer barbarous. Lastly, the schoolmaster is abroad, with results which are as yet uncertain, but which cannot fail to be important. All these things have been accomplished by the small body of Englishmen who, in various capaci- ties, and with but little direct support or assistance from their Government or its representative, have of late years devoted their energies to the work of Egyptian regeneration. They have had many obstacles to encounter. Internationalism and Pashadom have stood in the path at every turn. But these forces, though they could retard, have failed to arrest the progress of the British reformer. The opposition which he has had to encounter, albeit very embarrassing, merely acted on his system as a healthy tonic. An eminent French literary critic^ has said that the end of a book should recall its commencement to the mind of the reader. Acting on this principle, I may remind those who have perused these pages that I began this work by stating that, although possibly counterparts to all the abuses which existed, and which to some extent still exist in Egypt, may be found in other countries, the conditions under which the work of Egyptian reform has been undertaken were very peculiar.^ The special diffi- culties which have resulted from those conditions have but served to bring; out in strono; relief one of the mam characteristics of the Anglo-Saxon race. Other nations might have equally well conceived the reforms which were necessary. It required the singular political adaptability of Englishmen to execute them. A country and a nation have * Joubert. 2 yjdg ^nte, vol. i. p. 6. 558 MODERN EGYPT pt. vi been partially regenerated, in spite of a perverse system of government which might well have seemed to render regeneration almost impossible. Yet, when it is said that all these things were accomplished by the Englishmen who have served the Egyptian Government, one qualifying remark should in justice be made. It should never be forgotten that many Egyptians have themselves borne a very honourable and useful part in the work of Egyptian regeneration. Is the skilled labour, the energy, the persever- ance, and the patient toil of the English reformers and their Egyptian allies to be thrown away ? Is Egypt again to relapse into a semi - barbarous condition ? Will posterity declare that this noble effort to elevate a whole nation ended in ultimate failure ? I cannot say what will be the future of Egypt, but I hope and believe that these questions may be answered in the negative. According to the Eastern adage, the grass never grows again where once the hoof of the Sultan's horse has trod. In the sorely tried country of which this history treats, the hoof of the Turkish horse, whether the rider were Sultan or Khedive, has, indeed, left a deep imprint. Nevertheless, I would fain hope it is not indelible. We are justi- fied in substituting a sanguine in the place of a despondent metaphor. Where once the seeds of true Western civilisation have taken root so deeply as is now the case in Egypt, no retrograde forces, however malignant they may be, will in the end be able to check germination and ultimate growth. The seeds which Ismail Pasha and his predecessors planted produced little but rank weeds. The seeds which have now been planted are those of true civilisation. They will assuredly bring forth fruit in due season. Interested antagonism, ignorance. CH. Lxi CONCLUSION 559 religious prejudice, and all the forces which cluster round an archaic and corrupt social system, may do their worst. They will not succeed. We have dealt a blow to the forces of reaction in Egypt from which they can never recover, and from which, if England does her duty towards herself, towards the Egyptian people, and towards the civilised world, they will never have a chance of recovering. PART VII THE FUTURE OF EGYPT Nullum numen abest, si sit p-ude)itia ; nos te, NosJucirnuSf FortunUy Deam coeloque locamus. Juvenal, Sat. x. 365. The essential qtialities of national greatness are morale not material. Lecky''s History of England, vol. i. p. 490. VOL. H Nl 2 O CHAPTER LXII THE FUTURE OF EGYPT Quo Vadisf — The question of the occupation — Its duration — Egyptian autonomy — The Capitulations — Desirability of training the Egyp- tians — Importance of finance — Display of sympathy — Conclusion. It is probable that few Englishmen ever ask them- selves seriously the question of Quo Vadis in con- nection with either Indian or Egyptian affairs. Even fewer are tempted to hazard any confident answer to this crucial question. The practical instincts of our race lead us to deal with whatever affairs we have in hand for the moment, and to discard any attempt to peer too curiously into the remote future. That instinct seems to me to be eminently wise. Whether, however, it be wise or unwise, it certainly exercises so powerful an influence over my mind as to pre- clude me from endeavouring to forecast what will be the ultimate solution of the Egyptian Question. That solution, moreover, depends, in no small degree, on a factor which is at present both unknown and uncertain, viz., the conduct of the Egyptians themselves. We cannot as yet predict with any degree of assurance the moral, intellectual, and political results likely to be obtained by the transformation which is at present taking place in the Egyptian national character. Although, however, I will not venture to pre- dict the goal which will eventually be reached, I 663 564 MODERN EGYPT ft. vii have no hesitation in expressing an opinion as to that which we should seek to attain. So far as can at present be judged, only two alternative courses are possible. Egypt must eventually either become autonomous, or it must be incorporated into the British Empire. Personally, I am de- cidedly in favour of moving in the direction of the former of these alternatives. As a mere academic question, I never have been, neither am I now in favour of the British occupa- tion of Egypt. Looking at the matter from a purely British point of view, I believe that the opinion enunciated by Lord Palmerston in 1857^ still holds good. More than this, however much I should regret to see the noble work of Egyptian reform checked, 1 am quite prepared to admit that, if it be in the interests of England to evacuate Egypt, we need not be deterred from doing so by the consideration that it is in the moral and material interests of the Egyptians, however little some few of them may recognise the fact, that we should con- tinue our occupation of the country. It does not appear to me that we need stay in Egypt merely to carry out certain administrative reforms, however desirable they may be, unless those reforms are so essential that their non-execution would contribute to produce serious political or financial complica- tions after the British garrison is withdrawn. All that we have to do is to leave behnid us a fairly good, strong, and — above all things — stable Govern- ment, which will obviate anarchy and bankruptcy, and will thus prevent the Egyptian Question from again becoming a serious cause of trouble to Europe. We need not inquire too minutely into the acts of such a Government. In order to ensure its stability, it should possess a certain liberty of action, even although it may use that liberty in a * Vide ante, vol. i. p. 92. OttLxn THE FUTURE OF EGYPT 565 manner wliich would not always be in accordance with our views. But it is essential that, subse- quent to the evacuation, the Government should, broadly speaking, act on principles which will be in conformity with the commonplace requirements of Western civilisation. The idea, which at one time found favour with a section of the British public, that Egypt may be left to " stew in its own juice," and that, however great may be the con- fusion and internal disorder which is created, no necessity for European interference will arise, may at once be set aside as wholly impracticable. It is absurd to suppose that Europe will look on as a passive spectator whilst a retrograde government, based on purely Mohammedan principles and obsolete Oriental ideas, is established in Egypt. The material interests at stake are too important, and the degree of civilisation to which Egypt has attained is too advanced, to admit of such a line of conduct being adopted. Public opinion would force the most sluggish Government into action. If England did not interfere, some other Power would do so. Of the many delusions which at one time existed about Egypt, the greatest of all is the idea that England can shake herself free of the Egyptian Question merely by withdrawing the British garrison, and then declaring to the world that the Egyptians must get on as well as they can by themselves. Lord Granville pursued a policy of this sort in dealing with the affairs of the Soudan, and we know with what result. It has sometimes been argued that, even if mis- government were again allowed to reign supreme in Egypt, British interests would be sufficiently secured if all danger of occupation by any other foreign Power were averted. I have already^ alluded to this aspect of the question, but the point > Vide ante, p. 383. 566 MODERN EGYPT PT.vn is one of so much importance that I need make no apology for reverting to it. It cannot be too clearly understood that neutral- isation, under whatsoever conditions, wholly fails to solve the Egyptian Question. The solution of that question would be little, if at all, advanced by merely obtaining guarantees against foreign inter- ference in Egypt. The main difficulty would remain untouched. That difficulty is to decide who is to interfere, on the assumption that some foreign interference is indispensable. If it were thought desirable to prevent competition and rivalry amongst the different offices of the Metro- politan Fire Brigade, the object might readily be obtained by forbidding any one of them to aid in extinguishing a fire. The practical result would hardly be considered satisfactory. This, however, is the political system which would be involved in the neutralisation of Egypt. Each member of the European Fire Brigade would be under an obligation not to turn his hose on to an Egyptian conflagration, in order to avoid wounding the susceptibilities of his neighbours. In the mean- while, the whole edifice of Egyptian civilisation might, and probably would be destroyed, to the infinite detriment not only of the indigenous in- habitants of Egypt, but also of the large number of Europeans who would be ruined if the country were allowed to relapse into anarchy and barbarism. The failure of international action to deal effectively with misgovernment in other parts of the Ottoman dominions serves as a warning in dealing with Egypt. Is it, however, possible to ensure the existence of a fairly good and stable government in Egypt if the British garrison were withdrawn ? That is the main question which has to be answered. I make no pretension to the gift of political prophecy. I can only state my deliberate opinion. CH. Lxii THE FUTURE OF EGYPT 567 formed after many years of Egyptian experience and in the face of a decided predisposition to favour the policy of evacuation, that at present, and for a long time to come, the results of executing such a policy would be disastrous. Looking to the special intricacies of the Egyptian system of government, to the licence of the local press, to the ignorance and credulity of the mass of the Egyptian popula- tion, to the absence of Egyptian statesmen capable of controlling Egyptian society and of guiding the very complicated machine of government, to the diminution of the influence exercised by the British officials and by the diplomatic Representative of England in Egypt which would inevitably result from the evacuation, and to the proved impotence of international action in administrative matters — it appears to me impossible to blind oneself to the fact that, if the British garrison were now withdrawn, a complete upset would most probably ensue. It has to be borne in mind that the Egypt of to-day is very different from the Egypt of the pre-occupation days. A return to personal rule of the Oriental type — and it is in this direction that events would probably trend — would create a revolution. A transfer of power to the present race of Europeanised Egyptians would, to say the least, be an extremely hazardous experiment, so hazardous, indeed, that I am very decidedly of opinion that it would be wholly unjustifiable to attempt it. It may be that at some future period the Egyptians may be rendered capable of governing themselves without the ])resence of a foreign army in their midst, and without foreign guidance in civil and military affairs ; but that period is far distant. One or more generations must, in my opinion, pass away before the question can be even usefully discussed. 568 MODERN EGYPT pt. vn The fact, however, that the occupation must last for a ])eriod which cannot now be defined, need not stand in the way of a gradual movement in the direction of autonomy in the sense in which I understand that term as applied to the special case of Egypt. The mere withdrawal of the British garrison would not render E^ypt autono- mous ; on the contrary, it would diminish the prospect of eventual autonomy. It is a con- tradiction in terms to describe a country as self- governing when all its most important laws are passed, not by any of its inhabitants or by any institutions existing within its own confines, but by the Governments and legislative institutions of sixteen foreign Powers.^ Such, however, will be the condition of Egypt until the existing regime of the Capitulations is altered. There are, so far as I know, only two methods for effecting a radical alteration of that regime. One is that Egypt should cease to form part of the Ottoman dominions and should be annexed by some foreign Power — a solution which 1 discard. The other is that means should be devised for establishing a local legislature competent to deal with all local matters. The only real Egyptian autonomy, there- fore, which I am able to conceive as either practic- able or capable of realisation without serious injury to all the various interests involved, is one which will enable all the dwellers in cosmopolitan Egypt, be they Moslem or Christian, European, Asiatic, or African, to be fused into one self-governing body. That it may take years — possibly generations — to ' It has also to be borne in mind that unanimity amongst all the foreign Powers is necessary before any law can come into force. Prior to 1867, the German ZoUverein was constituted on a somewhat similar basis. Every state of the union bad an absolute right of veto on any proposal submitted for its consideration. The system, Mr. Percy Ashley says {Modem Tariff History, p. 49), caused " innumerable difficulties and delays." It has, of course, long since ceased to exist. CH.LXII THE FUTURE OF EGYPT 569 achieve this object is more than probable, but unless it can be achieved, any idea of autonomy, in the true sense of the term, will, in my opinion, have to be aband jned. I stated in the last Report I wrote from Egypt that it is well for every individual and every nation to have an ideal. The ideal of the Moslem patriot is, in my opinion, incapable of realisation. The ideal which I substitute in its place is extremely difficult of attainment, but if the Egyptians of the rising generation will have the wisdom and foresight to work cordially and patiently, in co-operation witli European sympa- thisers, to attain it, it may possibly in time be found capable of realisation. In the meanwhile, no effort should be spared to render the native Egyptians capable of eventually taking their share in the government of a really autonomous community. Much has already been done in this direction, and it may be confidently anticipated, now that the finances of the country are established on a sound footing and the most press- ing demands necessary to ensure material prosperity have been met, that intellectual, and perhaps moral progress will proceed more rapidly during the next quarter of a century than during that which has now terminated. Only, it should never be forgotten that the rapidity of the progress must be made contingent on the means available for ensuring it. " Sound finance," as has been most truly said, " is the foundation of the independence of States." ^ Nothing caj. compensate the Egyptians for a financial relapse. Lastly, it should never be forgotten that, in default of community of race, religion, language, and habits of thought, which ordinarily constitute the main bonds of union between the rulers and the ruled, we must endeavour to forge such artificial * Oliver's Alexander Haniilton, p. 304. 570 MODERN EGYPT pt. vii bonds between the Englishman and the Egyptian as the circumstances of the case render available. One of the most important of these bonds must always be the exhibition of reasonable and disciplined sympathy for the Egyptians, not merely by the British Government, but by every individual Englishman engaged in the work of Egyptian administration. This sympathy is a quality, the possession or absence of which is displayed by Englishmen in very various degrees when they are brought in contact with Asiatic or African races. Some go to the extreme of almost brutal antipathy, whilst others display their ill-regulated sympathy in forms which are exaggerated and even mischievous. The Egyptians rightly resent the .conduct of the one class, and ridicule that of the other. A middle course, based on accurate information and on a careful study of Egyptian facts and of the Egyptian character, will be found more productive of result than either extreme. Another bond may, to some extent, be forged by appealing to the person or the pocket. A proper system of justice and of police can protect the former. Material interests can be served by various means, the most effective of which is to keep taxation low. Do not let us, however, imagine that, under any circumstances, we can ever create a feeling of loyalty in the breasts of the Egyptians akin to that felt by a self-governing people for in- digenous rulers if, besides being indigenous, they are also beneficent. Neither by the display of sympathy, nor by good government, can we forge bonds which will be other than brittle. Sir Herbert Edwards, writing to Lord Lawrence a few years after the annexation of the Punjab, said : " We are not liked anywhere. . . . The people hailed us as deliverers from Sikh maladministration, and we were popular so long as we were plaistering CH. Lxii THE FUTURE OF EGYPT 571 wounds. But the patient is well now, and he finds the doctor a bore. There is no getting over the fact that we are not Mahommedans, that we neither eat, drink, nor intermarry witli them."^ The present situation in Egypt is very similar to that which existed in the Punjab when Sir Herbert Edwards wrote these lines. The want of gratitude displayed by a nation to its alien benefactors is almost as old as history itself^ In whatever degree ingratitude may exist, it would be unjust to blame the Egyptians for following the dictates of human nature. In any case, whatever be the moral harvest we may reap, we must continue to do our duty, and our duty has been indicated to us by the Apostle St. Paul. We must not be "weary in well-doing." I take leave of a country with which I have been so long associated with the expression of an earnest hope that, in the future, as in the recent past, Egypt will continue to be governed in the interests of the Egyptians, and I commend to my own countrymen the advice which was given to Rome by one of the later Latin poets : ^ Quod regnas minus est quam quod regnare mereris. ^ Life of Lord Lawrence, vol. ii. p. 20. 2 Gre^orovius {Rome in the Middle Ages, i. 323) says, speaking of the rule of Theodorie in Italy : "The unhappy King now learnt by experience that not even the wisest and most liumane of princes, if he be an ah en in race, in customs, and religion, can ever win the hearts of the people." * RutiliuB. APPENDIIX KHEDIVES OF EGYPT Name. Born. Died. Reigned. Mehemet Ali 1769 1849 1811-1848 Ibrahim 1789 1848 1 S48 (June-Nov.) Abbas I. 1813 1854 1848-1854 Said . 1822 1863 1854-1863 Ismail . . , 1830 1895 1863-1879 Tewfik . , 1852 1892 1879-1892 Abbas II. . 1874 ... 1892- BRITISH SECRETARIES OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS Name. From. To. Earl of Derby February 21, 1874 April 2, 1878 Marquess of Salisbury . April 2, 1878 April 28, 1880 Earl Granville April 28, 1880 June 24, 1885 Marquess of Salisbury . June 24, 1885 February 6, 1886 Earl of Rosebery . Februaiy 6, 1886 August 3, 1886 Earl of Iddesleigh August 3, 1886 January 14, 1887 Marquess of Salisbury . January 14, 1887 August 18, 189ii Earl of Rosebery . August 18, 1892 March 11, 1894 Earl of Kimberley March 11, 1894 June 29, 1895 Marquess of Salisbury . June 29, 1895 November 12, 1900 1 Marquess of Lansdowne November 12, 190( ) December 11, 1905 1 Sir Edward Grey . 1 December 11, I90. 5 678 574 MODERN EGYPT BRITISH AGENTS AND CONSULS-GENERAL IN EGYPT Name. From. To. Lord Vivian May 10, 1876 March 20, 1879 Sir Frank Lascelles . March 20, 1879 . October 10, 1879 Sir Edward Malet . October 10, 1879 . September 11, 1883 Earl of Cromer . September 11, 1883 May 6, 1907 Sir Eldon Gorst May 6, 1907 . ^ CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF EVENTS 1875- \dhesion of the British Government to the International Law Courts .... July SI. 1876 Mr. Cave reports on the Finances of Egypt . March 23. The Khedive suspends payment of his Treasury Bills April 8. Creation of the Commission of the Public Debt May 2. Issue of the Goschen-Joubert Decree . . November 18. Appointment of English and French Controllers (Mr. Romaine and Baron de Malaret) . December 25. 1877 An English Commissioner (Sir Evelyn Baring) appointed to the Commission of the Debt . March 2. Signature of the Anti-Slavery Convention be- tween the British and Egyptian Govern- ments August 4. 1878 The Khedive consents to a full inquiry into the financial position of Egypt . . . April 4. Treaty of Berlin ...... August S. First Report of the Commission of Inquiry . August 19. The principle of Ministerial responsibility is re- cognised. Nubar Pasha charged with the formation of a Ministry. Suspension of the Dual Control. Sir Rivers Wilson and M. de Bligni^res appointed Ministers of Finance and Public Works respectively . . , August 28. Issue of the Domains Loan of £8,500,000 . . October 29 675 576 MODERN EGYPT 1879 Nubar Pasha and Sir Rivers Wilson assaulted by a crowd of Egyptian officers . . . February 18. Resignation of Nubar Pasha '. . . . February Ip. Prince Tewfik appointed Prime Minister . . March 10. Dismissal of the European Ministers. Ch^rif Pasha appointed Prime Minister . . April 7. Second Report of the Commission of Inquiry, and resignation of the Commissioners . April 10. The Sultan deposes the Khedive . . . Jiuie 26. Ismail Pasha leaves Egypt .... June 30. Chdrif Pasha resigns office .... August 18. The Dual Control revived. M. de Bligni^res and Sir Evelyn Baring appointed Controllers September 4. Riaz Pasha forms a Ministry . . • • September 22> 1880 Repeal of the Law of the Moukabala , • January 6. Appointment of a Commission of Liquidation . April 2. Sir Auckland Colvin appointed Controller in succession to Sir Evelyn Baring . . Jiuie 23. Promulgation of the Law of Liquidation • • July 17. 1881 Mutiny of the Egyptian Army. The Minister of War is dismissed ..... February 1. The Egyptian Army again mutinies. Fall of the Riaz Ministry. Ch^rif Pasha becomes Prime Minister ...... September 9. The Sultan sends two Commissioners to Egypt October 6. At the instance of the French and British Governments, the Turkish Commissioners leave Egypt ...... October 19- M. Gambetta assumes office . • • • November 12. 1882 The British and French Governments address a Joint Note to the Khedive . . . January 8. M. Gambetta resigns office. He is succeeded by M. de Freycinet ..... January 31. Ch^rif Pasha is dismissed from office. Mahmoud Pasha Sami api)ointcd Prime Minister, with Arabi as Minister of War .... February 5- TABLE OF EVENTS 577 M. de Bligni^res resigns his appointment of Con- troller-General ...... March. The Arabist Ministers resign, but are reinstated in office ... ... May 23. The British and French Consuls-General demand that Arabi should leave the country. The Arabist Ministry again resigns . . . May 27. The Arabist Ministry is again reinstated . . May 28. The Sultan sends Dervish Pasha as Special Com- missioner to Egypt ..... June 4. A serious riot, attended with loss of life, occurs at Alexandria . . . . . . June 11. Ragheb Pasha is named Prime Minister, with Arabi as Minister of War .... Jmie 1 7. A Conference, in which Turkey refuses to take part, meets at Constantinople . . . June 23. Bombardment of Alexandria. The Ar^bists set fire to the town ..... July 1 1. On the motion of M. Clemenceau, the French Chamber passes a vote adverse to the Ministry. M. de Freycinet resigns. M. Duclerc forms a Ministry .... August 1. Battle of Tel-el-Kebir September IS. Cairo occupied by British troops. Ardbi is arrested ....... September 15. The Egyptian Army is disbanded . . . September 19. Lord Dufferin instructed to go to Egypt . . October 29. Arabi condemned to exile .... December 3. It is decided not to re-establish the Dual Control December. Death of M. Gambetta December 31. 1883 Issue of a Circular prohibiting the use of the courbash ....... January l6. Capitulation of El-Obeid ..... Januaiy 19. Sir Auckland Colvin appointed Financial Adviser February 4. Promulgation of the Organic Law . . . May 1 . General Hicks's army leaves Duem . . . September 8. Massacre of Egyptian reinforcements sent from Suakin to Sinkat ..... October l6. Sir Evelyn Baring appointed Agent and Consul- General . September 11, The British Government agree to the reduction of the garrison and the concentration of British troops at Alexandria . . . November 1. Sir Edgar Vincent appointed Financial Adviser November 4. VOL. II 2 P 578 MODERN EGYPT Total defeat of the Egyptian troops sent to the relief of Tokar. Death of Captain MoncriefF, R.N. . . . . . November 4. News of the annihilation of General Hicks's army arrives at Cairo .... November 18. Sir Evelyn Baring recommends the abandonment of the Soudan ...... November 19. The British Government agree to the policy of abandoning the Soudan .... November 20. The reduction of the British garrison in Egypt countermanded ..... November 25. Defeat of the Egyptians at Tamanieb . . December 2. Fall of Dara. Slatin Bey is taken prisoner. The Province of Darfour falls into the power of the Mahdi , December 23. 1884 Ch«irif Pasha resigns office. Nubar Pasha forms a Ministry ...... January 8. General Gordon and Colonel Stewart leave Cairo for Khartoum ...... January 26. Defeat of General Baker's force at El Teb . February 4. Annihilation of the Sinkat garrison . . . February 8. General Gordon arrives at Berber . . . February 11. General Gordon arrives at Khartoum . . February 18. Sir Gerald Graham defeats the Dervishes at El Teb February 29. The British Government finally refuse to employ Zobeir Pasha in the Soudan . . . March 5. Sir Gerald Graham defeats the Dervishes at Tamai March 13. The British Government refuse to send troops from Suakin to Berber .... March 25. Fall of the Bahr-el-Ghazal Province . . . April 9. All communication with Khartoum is cut off . April 19. Fall of Berber May 19. First Meeting of the London Conference on Egyptian Finance ..... June 28. Last Meeting of the London Conference . August 2. The British Government obtain a vote of credit in the House of Commons on account of the Soudan Expedition August 8. Zeyla occupied by British troops . . . August 24. Lord Wolseley appointed to the command of the Soudan Expedition .... August 26. Murder of Colonel Stewart and Mr, Power . September 18. TABLE OF EVENTS 579 Berbera occupied by British troops . . . September 24. Lord Northbrook reports on the Egyptian situa- tion November 20. 1885 Battle of Abu Klea Sir Herbert Stewart is mortally wounded. The Desert Column arrives at Gubat Sir Charles Wilson leaves Gubat for Khartoum . Fall of Khartoum and death of General Gordon The Italians occupy Massowah .... Action of Kirbekan. Death of General Earle . An Egyptian loan of £9,000,000 is guaranteed by the Powers ...... Action at Hashin (Eastern Soudan) . . Action of Tofrik (Eastern Soudan) . Sir Francis Grenfell appointed to command the Egyptian Army ..... Evacuation of Harrar ..... The British troops retire from Dongola . . Death of the Mahdi Capitulation of Sennar ..... Capitulation of Kassala ..... Convention signed at Constantinople under which Sir Henry Wolff and Moukhtar Pasha pro- ceed as Joint-Commissioners to Egypt Battle of Ginniss .*.... January 17. January 19. January 24. January 26. February 5. February 10. March 18. March 20. March 22. April 19. April 26. June 13. June 22. August 19. September 30. October 24. December 30. 1886 The last of the British troops leave Suakin . January 26. Europeans resident in Egypt are rendered liable to the payment of the House Tax . . April 15. 1887 Signature of the Wolff Convention The Sultan having refused to ratify the Wolff Convention, Sir Henry Wolff leaves Con- stantinople ...... Sir Gerald Portal's mission to Abyssinia . May 28. July 15. October 12. 1888 Issue of a Decree partially abolishing the corvee April 2. The Suez Canal Convention is signed, but not made operative April 29. 580 MODERN EGYPT Riaz Pasha forms a Fall of Nubar Pasha. Ministry ....... June 9. Decree issued constituting a Reserve Fund of £2,000,000 July 12. Action of Gemaizeh. The Dervishes are driven from the neighbourhood of Suakin . . December 20. 1889 The power of making by-laws applicable to Europeans is conferred on the Egyptian Government ...... January 31. Stanley and Emin Pasha meet at Kavalli . . February 17. Sir Evelyn Baring reports that the " Race against Bankruptcy" is pi-actically won . February 18. Battle between the Abyssinians and the Der- vishes. Death of King John . . . March 9. Abolition of the Commissions of Brigandage . July. Colonel Wodehouse defeats the Dervishes at Arguin July 2. Sir Francis Grenfell defeats the Dervishes at Toski. Death of Wad-el-Nejumi . . August 3. Sir Elwin Palmer is appointed Financial Adviser in succession to Sir Edgar Vincent . . October 23. 1890 The repairs to the Barrage are completed . June. Issue of a Decree converting the Preference Stock ....... June 7. Issue of a Decree converting the Daira Stock . July 5, 1891 Appointment of Sir John Scott to be Judicial Adviser ....... February 15. The Dervishes are defeated, and the Province of Tokar is reoccupied ..... February 19. Fall of Riaz Pasha. Mustapha Pasha Fehmi forms a Ministry ..... May 14. 1892 Death of the Khedive Tewfik .... January 7. Total aboHtion of the corvee for dredging pur- poses. Reduction of the Salt Tax. Aboli- tion of the Professional Tax . . . January 28. TABLE OF EVENTS 581 Sir Herbert Kitchener succeeds Sir Francis Grenfell in command of the Egyptian Army April 9. 1893 Dismissal of Mustapha Pasha Fehmi . . January 15. Riaz Pasha forms a Ministry .... January 18. The Dervishes are defeated by the Italians at Agordat December 4. 1894 Resignation of Riaz Pasha. Nubar Pasha forms a Ministry ...... April 14. Kassala captured by the Italians . • , July 17. Appointment of Sir Eldon Gorst to be Adviser to the Department of the Interior . . November 2. 1895 Nubar Pasha resigns. Mustapha Pasha Fehmi is appointed Prime Minister . . November 11. 1896 Defeat of the Italian Army at Adua . . . March I. The British Government decide to recapture Dongola March 12. The Caisse de la Dette advances £500,000 to the Egyptian Government . . . March 26. Battle of Firket June 7. Dongola occupied ...... September 23, The Court of Appeal order the Egyptian Govern- ment to refund the money advanced by the Caisse de la Dette December 2. The money is repaid December 6. 1897 Capture of Rejaf by the Belgians . , . February 7. British mission despatched to Abyssinia . . March 10. Abu Hamed captured ..... August 7. Berber occupied August 31. Suakin-Berber road opened .... October 18. Railway from Wadi Haifa to Abu Hamed com- pleted October 3h Kassala reoccupied by Egyptian troops . . December 26. 582 MODERN EGYPT 1898 National Bank created with authority to issue promissory notes ..... June 25. Signature of the contract for the construction of the Nile Reservoirs .... February 20. Battle of the Atbara April 8. Signature of the contract for selling the Daira property ....... June 21. The French arrive at Fashoda .... July 10. Battle of Omdurman ..... September 2. Sir Malcolm Mcllwraith appointed Judicial Adviser . October 20. Sir Eldon Gorst appointed Financial Adviser, and Mr. Machell appointed Adviser to the Interior October 20. The French evacuate Fashoda . • • . December 11. 1899 Lord Cromer's speech at Omdurman . . January 4. Death of Nubar Pasha ..... January 14. Signature of the Soudan Gjnvention . . January 19. Destruction of the Khalifa's army. Death of the Khalifa and his leading Emirs. The Soudan declared open to trade . . . November 24. Lord Kitchener leaves Egypt. Sir Reginald Wingate assumes command of the Egyptian army ....... December 21. Soudan railway opened to Halfaya . . . December 30. 1900 Post-Office Savings Banks established Navigation dues on the Nile abolished January 1. November 29. 1902 Creation of an Agricultural Bank . . . June 1. Commercial Convention signed with France . November 26. Inauguration of the Nile Reservoirs . . . December 10. 1903 Octroi duties abolished January 1. TABLE OF EVENTS 583 1904 Sir William Garstin's report on the Nile . , March ] 2. Signature of the Anglo-French Agreement . April 8. Sir Vincent Corbett appointed Financial Adviser April 12. Issue of a Decree giving effect to the Anglo- French Agreement ..... November 28. 1905 Daira debt paid off • . . • . , October 15. 1906 The Salt Monopoly abolished .... January 1. The Nile- Red Sea Railway opened . . . January 27. Mr. Dunlop named Adviser to the Department of Public Instruction .... March 24. Sir Nicholas O'Conor addresses a note to the Porte which terminates the " Sinai Penin- sula" incident ...... May 15. Liquidation of the affairs of the Daira . . October. Appointment of Saad Pasha Zagloul to be Minister of Education .... October 29. 1907 He is succeeded Lord Cromer leaves Egypt. by Sir Eldon Gorst . Mr. Harvey appointed Financial Adviser May 6. October 9. on: Macmillan ScCo.Ltd. Sian^rd'S GeoQ^£sL2b^J,07uior\ !^SJ7S7!SSSVS!8S?S?T ■D MiunmHiui&Co.Ltd. I INDEX Abbas I., career and character, i. 19-20 Abdul Halim, Prince, i. 136 Abdul-Kader Pasha, i. 366-7 Abdul-Shakour, Emir, i. 453 Abyssinia, Kin^ of, treaty with, re frontier garrisons, ii. 48 Abyssinian frontier garrisons, ii. 47-9 Accounts Department, Egyptian, Sir Gerald Fitzgerald head of, i. 28 Administration, the — Of Interior, ii. 478-513 difficulties of reform,. U. 478-82 police reform, ii. 482-90' prisons, ii. 491-4 slavery, ii. 496-504 medical and sanitary, ii. 504-13 Of Justice, ii. 614-23 Committee of Surveillance, ii. 618 Lord Cromer's advice on re- form of, ii. 521 Of Education, ii. 524-42 lack of money for, ii. 627 Pashadom and, ii. 628-9 public desire for schools, iL 532 religious instruction, ii. 633 elementary education, ii. 533 pupils and teachers, ii. 635 value of ed ucating the women, ii. 639-42 Of the Soudan, ii. 643-64 general system, ii. 643-8 finance, ii. 649 taxes, ii. 650-2 slavery, ii. 653 Airolles, M. Liron d'. Secretary of Commission of Inquiry, i. 45 Ala-el-Din Pasha, i. 359 Alcester, Lord {also see Sir Beau- champ Seymour), instruc- tions to, i. 294 Alexandria («eea/*o Bombardment), Arabi's responsibility for burning, i. 297 Anglo-French Agreement, 1904, ii. 388-93 Annexation, the question of, L 93 ' Annexation ofSoudan by England, its- inadvisability, ii. 113 Anti-Slavery Society and the Soudan, i. 403, 617, ii. 60 'Arabi, Ahmed, Pasha — mutinies, i. 176-86 summons Notables, i. 187 motives of, i. 190-3, 208-9 and Sultan, i. 194, 198, 272 Minister for War, i. 243 the Arabi Ministry, i. 254-78 resignation and reinstatement of, i. 274-8 and slaughter of Christians, L 288 dismissal of, i. 300 surrender, trial, and exile, L 828, 886 returns to Egypt, i. 337 Armenians, the, ii. 219 Army, British (in Egypt) — in 1884, i. 420-1 Lord Nortli brook on withdrawal of, ii. 870 Wolff Convention on withdrawal of, ii. 376-81 comment on withdrawal of, ii.380 686 586 MODERN EGYPT Army, the Egyptian — recruitments for, i. 60 mutiny of officers, 1879, i. 74 petition of Arabi, i. 176-7 second mutiny of officers, i. 179 mutiny and F'rench Consul- General, i. 180 third mutiny, i. 192, 212 Military Budget, 1882, i. 225 condition of, in Soudan, 1882, i. 363 defence of Egypt devolves on, ii. 60 British Commanders-in-Chief, ii. 474 summary of facts, ii. 466-77 Assize Courts, ii. 618 Assouan Reservoir, the, ii. 82 Asylums, ii. 511 Atbara, battle of, ii. 98-102 Austria aarrees to bombardment of Alexandria, i. 296 Bahr-el-Ghazal under the Mahdi, ii. 41-3 Baird, Sir Alexander, i. 34, 35 Baker, Sir Samuel — on the Soudan in 1870, i. 349 on Gordon, i. 562 Baker, General Valentine, i. 362, ii. 482 on evacuation of Soudan, i. 376-7 despatched to Suakin, comment on, i. 400 instructions to, i. 401 his defeat, comment, i. 404-9 Bank, Egyptian National — proposed creation of, i. 12 created 1898, ii. 582 Baravelli, M., appointed Italian Commissioner of Debt, i. 12 Baring, Sir Evelyn. See Lord Cromer, a/so under British Government's Egyptian Policy Beaman, Mr., ii. 493 Bedouins, the, ii. 198-9 Beit-el-mal, i. 53 Belgians, King of the, Gordon and Equatorial Provinces, i. 464-6 Berber Expedition, the corre- spondence re, i. 637 Berbera, condition of, ii. 49 taken by Great Britain, ii. 61 Beresford, Lord Charles, ii. 9 Billot, M., ii. 385 Bismarck, Prince — on the claims of Egypt's credi< tors, i. 33, 132 epigram, i. 131 on proposed Conference, i. 284 on Arabi's power, i. 293 on international mandate, i. 803 his hostility to England, 1883- 1884, i'. 419 Black troops in Egyptian Army, ii. 476 Blignieres, M. de — French Commissioner of Debt, i. 12 his character, i. 40 succeeded by M. de Bughas, L 103 Minister of Public Works, i. 63 dismissed by Ismail, i. 77 French Controller of Finance, i. 159 resigns, i. 257 Blum Pasha, i. 103, ii. 291 Blunt, \Vilfrid, i. 235 his Arabist sjTnpathies, i. 255 employed as intermediary, i. 256 relations with Mr. Gladstone, i. 279-80 Secret History, I 286, 287, 297, 323, 335 Bombardment of Alexandria, the— negotiations prior to, i. 267-76 British Fleet arrives, i. 277 batteries raised at Alexandria, i. 293 Lord Alcester instructed to stop work on them, i. 294 French opinion on, i. 294 Austrian opinion on, i. 295 Turkish opinion on, i. 296 tlie bombardment, i. 296-7 Bondholders, the — point of view of the British, L 41 point of view of the French, L 42 INDEX 587 Bordeini, Bey, ii. 12, 13 Boutros Pasha Ghali, ii. 211 Bowring, Sir John — on the Copts, ii. 205-8-13 Reports to Lord Palmerston on — Europeans in Egypt, i. 17 Osmanlis in Egypt, i. 175 Brackenbury, General, ii. 24, 60 Bright, John, i. 299 British Government's Egyptian policy — Lord Beaconsfield's Govern- ment, 1874-1880— (Foreign Secretary, Lord Derby) — declines to appoint Debt Commissioner, i. 12 correspondence with Lord Vivian re Egyptian Debt and Taxes, i. 32 (Foreign Secretary, Lord Salisbury) — (British Agent in Egypt, Lord Vivian) — instructs Lord Vivian to act with French repre- sentative, i. 37 correspondence with Lord Vivian re Nubar Minis- try, i. 66, 87-8 (British Agent, Sir Frank Lascelles) — correspondence with Sir Frank Lascelles re Prince Tewfik's Ministry, i. 99 correspondence with Sir F. Lascelles re Ismail's en- gagements, i. 132-41 correspondence with Sir F. Lascelles re Tewfik Pasha's policy, i. 152-7 Mr. Gladstone's Government, 1880-1885— (Foreign Secretary, Lord Granville) — (British Agent, Sir Edward Malet)— correspondence with Am- bassador in Turkey dur- ing Arabi's mutiny, i. 196-9 general policy of, i. 200-5 correspondence with M. Crambetta and Sir Edward Malet re Joint Note, i. 214-29 correspondence with M. Gambetta and Sir Edward Malet re effects of Joint Note, i. 237-46 correspondence with M. Freycinet and Sir E. Malet during Arabi's ministry, i. 254-77 correspondence with Sir E. Malet and Lord Dufferin re Conference of Powers, i. 283-96 correspondence with Lord Dufferin re Turkish troops for Egypt, i. 310-21 was a national Government possible at time of Arabi's rebellion, i. 323 correspondence with Lord Dufferin re Arabi's trial, i. 337-45 correspondence with Sir E. Malet re the Soudan, i. 364-7 (British Agent, Sir Evelyn Baring (Lord Cromer)) — correspondence with Sir Evelyn Baring re Eng- lish troops for Soudan, i. 372-3, 376-84 correspondence with Sir Evelyn Baring and mili- tary chiefs re campaign in Eastern Soudan, i. 399-416 correspondence with Sir Evelyn Baring re em- ployment of General Gordon, i. 423-7 General Gordon appointed to evacuate Soudan, i. 427 reasons for and against his appointnu-nt, i. 427-39 correeoondence with Sir Evelyn Baring re Gor- don's instructions, i. 440-52 correspondence with Sir Evelyn Baring re Gor- 588 MODERN EGYPT don's slavery proclama- tion, i. 474 correspondence with Sir Evelyn Baring re em- ployment of Zobeir Pasha, i. 482-9, 494- 629 reasons for and against Zobeir's appointment, i. 629-34 correspondence with Sir Evelyn Baring re Berber Expedition, i. 637 - 9, 642-6 reasons for and against Expedition, i. 646-8 correspondence with Sir Evelyn Baring re em- ployment of Turkish troops in Soudan, i. 649-52 Sir Evelyn Baring points out seriousness of Gor- don's position, i. 556 did Gordon endeavour to carry out Government's policy ? i. 559-74 (Mr. Egerton, Temporary Agent) — correspondence with Mr. Egerton re relief of Berber, i. 574-7 correspondence re relief of Gordon (Lord ^V^olseley and Lord Hartington), i. 679-80 (British Agent, Sir Evelyn Baring (Lord Cromer)) — comment on Government's delay, i. 582-92 correspondence with Sir Evelyn Baring on fall of Khartoum, ii. 19 correspondence with Sir Evelyn Baring and Lord Wolseley re evacuation of Soudan, ii. 20-9 Lord Salisbury's Governments, 1885-1886, 1886-1892— (Foreign Secretary, Lord Salisbury) — (British Agent, Sir Evelyn Baring (Lord Cromer)) — Lord Wolseley informed the Soudan to be evacuated, ii. 29 comment on policy of evacuation, ii. 29-34, 78 correspondence with Sir Evelyn Baring re ad- vance on Tokar, ii. 76-6 (British Agent, Lord Cromer)- correspondence with, re re- conquest of Soudan, ii. 82 analysis of Government's policy, 1882-1883, ii. 349-65 the Northbrook Mission, ii. 366-71 the WolflF Convention, ii. 372- 81 neutralisation of the Suez Canal, ii. 382-7 the Anglo-French Agreement, ii. 388-93 British Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, ii. 673 Broadley, Mr., i. 297 Budgets — Budget of Commissioners, 1879, i. 123 Budget of Khedive, 1879, i. 125 Bughas, M. Bellaigues de — Commissioner of Debt in succes- sion to M. de Blignieres, i. 103 Buller, Sir iledvers, ii. 18-19 Burnaby, Colonel, death of, IL 7 Burton, Sir Richard — advises occupation of Berbera, ii. 50 in Harrar, ii. 61 Butler, Sir William, L 44, 441, 447 Cadastral Survey, i. 65, 104, 115 Camel Corps, Egyptian, ii. 60 Cameron, Mr., on Mehemet All's policy, i. 16 Canal, the Suez, measures for protecting, after bombard- ment of Alexandria, i. 303 Capitulations, use of, i. 326, ii. 428 Carter, Mr. Howard, reports a case of torture, i. 60 Cartwright, Mr., i. 289, 292, 293-4 INDEX 589 Cave, Mr. Stephen — Financial Report of, 1876, i. 4 comments on Balance Sheet, 1864-75, i. 11 comments on law of the Mouka- bala, i. 30 comments uu £gyptiau officials, i. 30-1 Cherif Pasha {see also under Egyptian Ministries) — summoned before Commis- sioners, i. 47 his policy, i. 153, 197-213 and Arabi's mutiny, i. 187 on Dual Control, i. 189 and National party and army, i. 206 suggests Turkish intervention, i. 244 his character, ii. 334 Chermside, Sir Herbert, i. 637 Christianity and the £uropeanised Egyptian, ii. 230 Christians, attacks on— slaughter of, i. 287 flight of, i. 289 Christians, the Egyptian, ii. 201- 227 Chronological Table of Events, ii. 575-83 Churchill, Lord Randolph, i. 339 Civil Service, Egyptian, ii. 298-9 Clemenceau, M., on F'rench inter- ference in Egypt, i. 303, 305 Clot Bey, Dr., ii. 607 Coetlogon, Colonel, i. 376, 644, 672 Coles Pasha on prisons, ii. 494 Colleges, English military, value of training for official life, ii. 548 Colville, Colonel, on Nile Cam- paign, ii. 4 Colvin, Sir Auckland, head of Cadastral Survey — resigns, i. 104 succeeds Sir Evelyn Baring as Debt Commissioner, i, 127 succeeds Sir Evelyn Baring as Controller-General, i. 173 his action during Arabi's mutiny, i. 183-6 on situation, September 19, 1881, i. 206-7 his memorandum, December 1881, i. 222-34 his despatch re state of parties in Egypt in December 1881, i. 218-22 on evacuating Soudan, i. 389 Commission of Debt instituted, i. 12, ii. 305 objects, working, and altera- tions of, ii. 304-10 {See also Debt) Commission of Inquiry into Egyp- tian Finances, i. 46 work of, i. 47-63 limitation of power of, i. 64 report of, i. 124 resignation of, i. 124 Commission of Liquidation, 1880, i. 162 Commission (International) to assess claims re Alexan- drian destruction, i. 339 Commissions of Brigandage, ii. 289 Conference, International, pro- posed by England and France, i. 283 meets at Constantinople, i. 291 Conference suspended, i. 312-13 Consular Courts, ii. 319, 514 Consul - General, the British, duties of, ii. 321-7 Controllers-General of Finances, 1879— division of work, i. 161-2 their power disappears, i. 267 Cookson, Sir Charles, L 184, 186, 257, 281, 287 Copts, the, ii. 201-13 Corbett, Sir Vincent, ii. 287 Corruption in the public services, ii. 420-6 Corvee, the, i. 60, ii. 405-19 the need for forced labour, iL 409 financial aspect of, ii. 410, 417 abolition of, ii. 419 Courbash, the, ii. 397-406. See also Corve'e Cromer, Lord (Sir Evelyn Bar- ing)— {See also under British Govern- ment's Policy) appointed British Commissioner of Debt, i. 16 590 MODERN EGYPT inquires into outstanding claims, i. 60-4 on the necessary reforms, i. 65- 62 on the Nubar ministry, i. 71 on differences between Lord V'ivian and Sir Rivers A\'il- son, i. 94-5 on Report of Commission of Inquiry, i. 122-7 resigns Commissionership of ■^Debt, i. 127 appointed English Controller- ^ General, i. 159 worl^ of Controller-General, i. 1G5-73 resigns Controllership, L 173 returns to Egypt as British representative, i. 346 his speech at Omdurmau, ii. 115 letter from Slieikh to Sheikh referring to " Baring and his English," ii. 200 his despatch to Lord Granville on withdrawal of British troops, ii. 362 Customs, control of, ii. 292 Daira Debt, i. 13 Daira Khassa loan, i. 123 Daira Sanieh loan, i. 123, ii. 313-14 Daoud Pasha, i. 182 Darfur during the Mahdi's re- hellion, ii. 36-41 Debt, the Egyptian Public — in 18G3and 1876, i. 11 Commission of Debt, i. 12, ii. 304-10 Lord Goschen and M. Joubert's arrangement of, i. 13 Sir Evelyn Baring appointed British Commissioner, i. 16 Funded Debt in 1877-78, i. 33-6 France and Great Britain act in concert, i. 37 Commission of Inquiry, i. 45-63 addition to Funded Debt, i. 64 interest on Debt, i. 65, 98 Report of Commission of In- quiry, i. 110-27 resignation of Commission of Inquir}', i. 124 Commissioners of Debt Bue Government, i. 126 Sir Evelyn Baring resigns, i. 127 Sir Auckland Colvin appointed Debt Commissioner, i. 127 Commission of Liquidation, i. 162 Law of Liquidation, ii. 305 changes in functions of Debt Commission, ii. 310 reduction of debt, ii. 460 Decrees, tlie, of 1876, i. 12, 13, 14 Derby, Lord, declines to nominate Comm.issioner, i. 12 on General Baker's defeat, i. 405 Dervish Pasha, i. 284, 286, 288-89 Dilke, Sir Charles, i. 235 Domains, the, administration of, i. 63, ii. 315 Dongola Expedition, ii. 86 financial difficulties, ii. 86, 91 battle at Firket, ii. 90 Dongola taken, ii. 91 *' Droits de voirie," i. 122 Dual Control, the, i. 93, 169, 161, 164-78 Che'rif Pasha on, i. 189 abolition of, i. 340 Duclerc, M., succeeds M. de Freycinet, i. 305 Dues on stamping mats and on sale of cattle, i. 122 Dufferin, Lord, i. 196, 270, 310 negotiates military convention with Turkey, i. 312-21 his mission to Egypt, i. 336 his report, comment on, i. 341- 45 and the Organic Law, ii. 271-79 and the courbash, ii. 399 on slavery, ii. 498 Dunlop, M.', ii. 636 Earle, General, tribute to, L 421, ii. 18, 24 Education. See Administration Education Department, Dunlop, Mr., Adviser to, ii. 293 Egerton, Sir Edwin, i. 432, 668 "Egypt for the Egyptians," fallacies of such a policy, i. 327, ii. 625-6 Egypt, Modern — Before British Occupation- extent of, i. 349 ITsDEX 591 ■tate of, 1S7G, i. 29 distribution of power in, i. 176 condition of, 1882, i. 212, 323-30 condition in 1884, L 417-23 Since occupation — extent of, ii. 126 population, ii. 129 races in, ii. 127-8 ruling classes, ii. 131-2 Islamism, ii. 132-49 women, position of, ii. 166 family life, ii. 160 law, ii. 162 Moslems, the, ii. 168-99 village, the, in, ii. 189 Christians, the, ii. 201-27 Europeanised Egyptian, ii. 228-44 Europeans in, ii. 246-59 Government, the, ii. 260-79 (See also under Army, Ad- ministration, Ministries, British Government, Debt, Finance, etc.) El Obeid, fall of, i. 367 El Teb, battle of, i. 414 Emin Pasha (Governor of Equa- toria), ii. 43-6 *' Emprunt Rouznanieli,"the, i. 53 English, the (in Egypt), ii. 252-5 their friends and foes, ii. 256-9 Equatoria under Emin Pasha, ii. 43-6 leased to Congo State, ii. 46 Essad Effcndi, i. 272, 285, 289 Europeanised Egyptians, the, anglophobia of, ii. 244 Europeans in Egypt — summoned by Mehemet All, i. 16 summoned by Ismail, i. 23 bad name acquired by, i. 23 character of official, i. 24 first European Ministers, i. 63 agitation against Ministers, i. 99 European intervention, i. 323-30 census of, ii. 245 orientalisation of, ii. 247 and British officials, ii. 255-6 privileges of, ii. 426-42 Famine of 1878, i. 34 Farrer, Lord, Report on Railways, ii. 311 Fehmi, Ali Bey, i. 176 Fellaheen, the, ii. 192-8 Finances (see also under Public Debt)— in 1876, i. 27 Lord Vivian's report on, i. 26 taxes and collection in 1876, i. 30-2 taxes and collection in 1878, i. 38 Commission of Inquiry in Finances, 1878, i. 45 work of Commission of Inquiry in Finances, i. 47-63 administration of, before 1878, i. 48 outstanding claims and deficits, 1878, i. 54 recommendations of Commis- sion, i. 55 credit and Oriental view of, L 58 revenue returns, 1878, i. 66 meetings between Sir Riverg Wilson, M. de Blignieres, and Sir Evelyn Baring j-e financial position, i. 88 report of Commission of In- quiry, i. 110-27 condition of finances on acces- sion of Tewiik Pasha, i. 149 Khedive's right to contract loans withdrawn, i. 158 Controllers-General appointed, i. 159 Commission of Liquidation, i. 162, 172-3 reform of taxation, 1880, i. 168- 171 Chamber of Notables claims to vote Budget, i. 242 financial position of Soudan, 1882, i. 364 conference on financial situa- tion, 1884, i. 658 Lord Northbrook's proposals, ii. 370 summary of facts, ii. 443-66 Financial advisers, ii. 287 Financial secretaries, ii. 291 Findlay, Mr., ii. 666 592 MODERN EGYPT Fitzgerald, Sir Gerald — head of Accounts Department, i. 26 his work and its results, i. 28 he resigns, i. 103 Flogging. See Courbash and Corvee Forced labour. See Corve'e Forster, Mr., on Soudan I'olicy of Government, i. 410 Freethinker, the Egyptian, ii. 232 French civilisation — its attractiveness to Asiatics, ii. 236 contrasted with English civilisa- tion, ii. 238, 240 French policy (Egyptian) — towards bondholders, i. 35-7 genei'al policy in 1879, i. 91-3, 130-1 in respect to Arabi's mutiny, i. 180, 196 in respect to British occupation, i. 204-5 proposed Anglo-French military control, i. 214 towards Turkish intervention, i. 155-6, 2(59, 275 subsequent to bombardment of Alexandria, i. 302, 305-6 in respect to Wolff Convention, ii. 372-81 in 1904, ii. 388 Freycinet, M. de — succeeds M. Gambetta, i. 247 suggests deposing Khedive, i. 260 suggests sending squadron, i. 266 suggests conference of Powers, i. 283, 291 Future of Egypt, the, suggestions and warnings, ii. 563-71 Gambetta, M. — urges united action by England and France, i. 216, 217 his policy, i. 216 prepares Draft Joint Note, i. 223 negotiations with F^ord Granville, i. 237-46 hit influence on the course of Egyptian history, i. 247-53 on the British occupation, i. 302 Garstin, Sir William, ii. 291 Gatacre, General, ii. 101 (Jermany's policy in respect to Egypt— in 1879, i. 131, 136 in 1882, i. 292 in 1904, ii. 391 Ghazi, Moukhtar Pasha, ii. 374 Giers, M. de — protests against WolflF Con- vention, ii. 378 Ginniss, battle at, ii. 30 Gladstone, Mr. {see also under British Government) — on responsibility for British occupation, i. 160 denies existence of National Party in Egypt, i. 226 relations with Mr. Wilfrid Blunt, i. 279-80 his objection to landing troops after bombardment of Alexandra, i. 298 on military pacification of EiTvpt, i. 301 on Baker Pasha's defeat, i. 405 on Gordon's Soudan policy, i. 478 in favour of Zobeir's appoint>- meut, i. 531 on unpopularity of Zobeir's appointment, i. 533 on difficulties of Egyptian affairs, i. 582 comment on his responsibility for delay in relieving Gordon, i. 682-92 responsibility for fall of Khar- toum, ii. 17 his phantom policy, ii. 368-9 Godeaux, M., succeeds Baron des Michels as French Diplo- matic Representative, i. 66 Gordon, General {see also under British Government) — invited to inquire into finances, i. 44 on value of Soudan, i. 390 his mission, i. 417-39 his instructions, i. 390, 443-6 popularity of, i. 427-31 INDEX 593 his appointment a mistake, i. 438-9 in Cairo, i. 440 his policy, i. 442 Governor of Soudan, i. 446, 450-2 and Zobeir Pasha, i. 454-60, 480 leaves for Soudan, i. 460-2 further instructions, i. 464-6 his proclamations, i. 470 on slavery, i. 471-4 at Khartoum, i. 475 his policy, i. 476-7 Precis of correspondence between him. Colonel Stewart, Lord Granville, and Sir Evelyn Baring, 1. 480-534 comment on his policy, 1884, i. 660-74 letters from, via Dongola, L 677-8 relief expedition, i. 674-82 comment on delay, i. 581-2 Khedive's telegram to, i, 693 expedition, ii. 6 battles at Abu Klea and Metemmeh, ii. 6-8 Journal, and letters from, ii. 8 death of, ii. 9-17 Gorst, Sir Eldon, ii. 287, 292 Goschen, Lord — his mission to Egypt, 1876, i. 13-14 he appoints Sir Evelyn Baring Commissioner of Debt, i. 15 Government of Egypt, ii. 260- 279 Graham, Major - General Sir Gerald, i. 410, 637, 538 Granville, Lord (see also under British Government) — his lack of initiative, i. 216 and Egyptian Constitutionalism, i. 238 his policy previous to occupa- tion compared with Lord Salisbury's, i. 252-3 personal notes on, i. 392, 420 his optimism, i. 476 Greeks, the, ii. 250-1 Grelle, M. Le, ii. 288-9 Grenfell, Sir Francis — Commander - in - Chief of the VOL. II Egyptian army, ii. 63, 64, 69, 72 Gre'vy, M. — on British military preparations, 1882, i. 305 Hake, Mr. Egmont, i. 447 Halim Pasha, i. 196 Harbour works, Alexandria, their cost, i. 51 Hardinge, Sir Arthur, ii. 555 Harrar annexed by Ismail, ii. 62 taken by King Menelek, ii. 63 Hartington, Lord, i. 411, 680-1 ; ii. 21, 29 Harvey, Mr., ii. 287 Hassan, Prince, i. 78 Herbin, M., ii. 3 Hewett, Admiral, i. 409 Hicks, General — appointed to Soudan army, 1883, i. 354 complains of his position, i. 361 appointed Commander-in-Chief, i. 361 his optimism, i. 361-3 his army destroyed, i. 368 Colonel Colville on disaster, L 368 Sir Reginald Wingate on battle- field, i. 369 Hicks-Beach, Sir Michael, ii. 94 Hoskins, Admiral, and French Admiral at Port Said, L 303 Hospitals, ii. 510-11 Hunter, General, ii. 100-1 Hussein Pasha Khalifa, i. 467 Ibrahim, his career and character, i. 18-19 Indian troops for Suakin, ii. 88 Interior, the, administration of. See Administration International administrations, ii. 304-15 Internationalism, in theory and practice, ii. 301-15 Irrigation (see also under Corvee) — • under the Pharaohs and Turks, ii. 457 Lord Milner on improved, ii. 458-9 2q 594 MODERN EGYPT Lord Cromer's report on, ii. 463 Ismail Pasha — aud Public Debt, i. 11 and European civilisation, i. 23 his extravagance, i. 61-2 his power, i. 56-9 cedes his estates, i, 61 aud Nubar-Wilson Ministry, i. 66-7 his exclusion from Council dis- cussed, i. 69-70 Sir Evelyn Baring's views on exclusion, i. 71-2 and officers' mutiny, i. 76-81 and constitutionalism, i. 83 and foreign interference, i. 83-4 excluded from Council, i. 89-90 and his Foreign Ministers, i. 99-100 his policy, i. 105-9, 143-6 advised to abdicate, i. 135-9 leaves Egypt, i. 141-2 Ismail Pasha Eyoub, on the cour- bash, ii. 399 Ismail Pasha Sadik, his exac- tions, i. 26 Italy- Egyptian policy of, i. 131, ii. 391 invited to co-operate with Eng- land, i. 308 takes Massowah, ii. 67 and Abyssinia, ii. 83 James, Mr. F, L., in Somaliland, ii. 49 Jebel Kirbekan, battle at, ii. 23 Joint Note of 1882, i. 214 its terms, i. 223 local situation when presented, i. 224 presented, i. 227 summary of views on the, i. 229-35 effects of, i. 236-53 Joubert, M., associated with Lord Gosthen, i. 13 Judicial Advisers, ii. 290 Judicial system, ii. 316-20 Justice. See Administration Kadi, the, legal functions of,ii. 320 courts of, ii. 515 Kalnoky, Count, i. 296 Kassala, during Mahdi's rebellion, ii. 47 Khalifa, the (Abdullah - el - Taashi) — succeeds Mahdi, ii. 30 battle at Ginniss, effect of, ii. 30 letter to Queen Victoria, ii. 62 battle of Toski, effect of, ii. 72 death of, ii. 105 Kbaradji lands, i. 114, 121 Khartoum — fall of, ii. 9-17 retaken, ii. 105 Khartoum Campaign, ii. 79-110 cost of, ii. 105-6 conduct of, ii. 106-9 Khedives of Egypt, ii. 573 the powers of, ii. 269-70 {See altio under Meliemet Ali, Ibrahim, Abbas I., Said, Ismail, Tewfik) Kinglake, i. 130, 323, 331 Kitchener, Major, i. 540, 678 Kitchener, Sir Herbert — to command Soudan force, ii. 86 his qualities for command, ii. 87-9 Khartoum Campaign, ii. 89-109 Kremer, Herr von. Commissioner of Debt, i. 12 Land, tenure and taxation — held by Khedive, 1876, i. 29 Law of the Moukabala, i. 29 ceded by Ismail, i. 61-3 Ouchouri and Kbaradji landg, i. 114-22 Lands, cultivable, ii. 460 Lascelles, Sir Frank — British Representative in Egypt, i. 96 reports agitation, April 1, 1879, against European Ministry, i. 99 Lesseps, M. Ferdinand de. Presi- dent of Commission of In- quiry, i. 45, 323 Levantine, the, ii. 246-7, 249 Liglitliouses, control of, ii. 292 Li(|ui(lation, Law of, i. 162, ii. 305 Lloyd, Mr. Clifford, i. 378, 419, ii. 482-8 INDEX 595 Lupton, Mr. Frank, ii. 42 Lyall, Sir Alfred, i. 562, ii. 231 Lyons, Lord, i. 199 MacDonald, Major, i. 338 Mcllwraith, Sir Malcolm, ii. 290, 618 McMurdo, Captain, ii. 653 McNeill, Sir John, ii. 25 Machell, Mr., ii. 292 Mahdi, the— of tradition, i. 351-2 Mohammed Ahmed proclaims himself, i. 352 rebellion of, comment on, L 356 Hicks's army destroyed by, i. 368 letter to Gordon, i. 470 Lord Wolseley on power of, ii. 22 death of, ii. 30 Bucceeded by Khalifa. See Khalifa Mahdiism, comment on, ii. 63-4 Mahmoud Pasha Baroudi, i. 179 Mahmoud Pasha Sami, i. 243, 257 Malaret, Baron de, Controller- General of Expenditure, i. 14 Malet, Sir Edward {see also under British Government), i. 164, 181 on mutinous army, i. 182 on Khedive's view of mutiny, i. 205-6 on effect of Joint Note, i. 228-9 protest to Lord Granville, i. 269 on slaughter of Christians, L 288 his illness, i. 289 on funds for Soudan army, i. 359 leaves Egypt, i. 345 Mallet, Sir Louis, i. 16 Marindin, Colonel, Report on Railways, ii. 311 Marriott, General, President of Railway Board, i. 14 Massowah, and Italy, ii. 55-8 Maxwell, Sir Benson, ii. 288 Medical reform, ii, 604 Medicine, School of, ii. 508 Mehemet Ali — his career and character, i. 16- 18 if his general principles had been adopted, i. 22 and education, ii. 530 Menelek, King, ii. 53, 83 Michels, Baron des — French diplomatic represen- tative, i. 37 succeeded by M. Godeauz, L 66 Milner, Lord, ii. 291-2, 459 Ministers, Egyptian, the, iL 270-1 Ministries (Egyptian) — Nubar Pasha's (Sir Rivers Wilson and M. de Bliguieres, members of), i. 64-81, 384, ii. 581 Cherif Pasha's, i. 103, 104, 188- 90, 300 Riaz Pasha's, i. 153-4, ii. 343, 681 " Arabi's," i. 254-78 Mustapha Pasha Fehmi's, iL 346, 580, 581 Mixed Courts, i. 33, 419, ii. 316 Moberly Bell, Mr., i. 515 Mohammed Ahmed. See Mahdi, the Mohammed Tahir, i. 467 Moncrieff, Captain, i. 398 Monogamy and family life, ii. 157 Montebello, Count de, protests against Wolff Convention, ii. 378 Morley, Mr. John — on Joint Note, i. 227 on M. Gambetta's policy, L 250 on Zobeir'a appointment, L 631 Morocco, Anglo - French agree- ment, ii. 391 Moslem sects, the, ii. 36, 37 Moslems in Egypt, ii. 168-99 Moudirs, the, i. 48, 258, ii. 484-6 Moukabala, law of the, i. 29, 98, 99, 115, 117, 118, 121 Mr. Stephen Cave on, i. 30 repeal of, i. 168 Moukhtar Pasha, ii. 380 596 Mustapha Pasha Fehmi, i. 265, ii. Musurus Pasha, i. 199, 284, 288 Napoleon III. and partition of North Africa, i. 91 National Movement, Sir Auckland Colvin's Memorandum on, i. 219-21 National Party in Egypt, its existence, i. 226 Native tribunals, ii. 287-9 Nejumi, W ad-el-, ii. 64-71 Nekib-el-Ashraf, i. 99 Nelidoff, M. de, protests against WoliF Convention, ii. 378 Neutralisation of Egypt, comment on, ii. 383 Nile Campaign, ii. 4, 6 Northbrook, Lord — on General Gordon, i. 429, 491-2 on Zobeir Paslia, i. 530 his mission to Egypt, ii. 366-71 Northcote, Sir Stafford, i. 472 Notables, Chamber of, the, i. 68, 254, 266 convoked by Ismail, i. 68, 73 protest of, i. 101 summoned by Arabi, 187 at the time of Joint Note, i. 224 claim to vote the Budget, i. 237> 242 Nubar Pasha — his relations with Ibrahim, i. 19 on Said's policy, i. 21 his Ministry, 1878-1879, i. 64- 81 his aims and character, i. 70, ii. 335-42 his unpopularity, i. 72 assaulted by officers, i. 74 he resigns, i. 77 his Ministry, 1884, i. 384 Occupation, the British — analysis of causes leading to, i. 252-3 French opinion, 1882, i. 305-6 the Temps on, i. 306 Italian opinion, i. 807-9 Turkish opinion, i. 309 preferability of, i. 328-30 MODERN EGYPT Octroi dues, i. 122 partly abolished, i. 168 Officials, British, ii. 280-300 qualifications of ideal official, iL 281 their position, ii. 282 the need for, ii. 293-8 their numbers, ii. 298-9 Omar Pasha Lutfi, i. 105 Omdehs, the, ii. 186 Omdurman, battle of, ii. 104 Organic law, the, proposed re- vision, i. 254, ii. 271-9 Osman Digna — the Mahdi's Emir, i. 396 his campaign in Eastern Soudan, i. 396-9 his hold on Eastern Soudan, ii. 63 Osman Pasha Rifki, i. 176, 262-3 Ouchouri land-tax, the, i. 68, 99, 114, 121 increased, i. 168 Paget, Sir Augustus, i. 307 Pall Mall Gazette, i. 389, 424, 427, 434, 474, 477, 532 Palmer, Sir Elwin, ii. 287 Palmerston, Lord, i. 10, 83, 84, 92 Pauncefote, Lord, ii. 384 Pickthall, Mr. (Folk-Lore of the Holy Land), i. 19 Pinching, Sir Horace, ii. 613 Plague, the, ii. 513 Police — Adviser to Minister of Interior appointed, ii. 292 reforms, ii. 478-82 Poll-tax, i. 122 Polygamy, effects of, ii. 167 Portal, Sir Gerald, ii. 555 Post Office, control of, ii. 292 statistics of, ii. 313 Power, Mr., i. 358, ii. 3 Prisons — Sir Herbert Chermside and Mr. Beaman report on, ii. 492-3 reform of, ii. 494 Press, the — vernacular Press attacks Euro- peans, i. 211 retorts of European Press, L 211 INDEX 597 Prime Minister, the Eg-yptian, bis importance, ii. 333 Prime Ministers from 1882, ii. 334 Privilege, European, ii. 426 its interference with reform, ii. 431 reforms of, ii. 437 Lord Cromer's report on, ii. 437 Protectorate, British, petition in favour of, i. 331 Public School, tlie English, value of training for official life, ii. 548 Public Works Department, iL 290-1 Queen Victoria — and Zobeir's appointment, i. 631 and fall of Khartoum, iL 15- 16 Ragheb, Paslia, i. 293 Railways, Egyptian — falsification of accounts, i. 27 constructed during Khartoum Campaign, ii. 90 administration, ii. 810-13 in Soudan, ii. 653 Reinacb, M. Joseph, on M. Gam- betta's Egyptian policy, i. 247-53 Riaz, Pasha {see also under Ministries, Egyptian) — Vice - President Commission of Inquiry, i. 45 Minister of Interior and Justice, i. 90-1 denounced as friend of Chris- tians, i. 99 relations with M. de Blignieres, i. 182 Minister of Interior, i. 300 his aims and worl<, ii. 842-6 Ring, Baron de, i. 180, 295 Ilodd, Sir Rennell, ii. 555 Rogers, Sir John, ii. 613 Romaine, Mr. , Coutrollei'-General of Revenue, i. 14 Rosebery, Lord, ii. 413 Rothscliild, Messrs. — loan, 1878, i. 63, 66 loan to pay mutinous officers, i. 78 Rouznameh loan, i. 53, 114-16 Rundle, Major, i. 540 Russia's policy in respect to Egypt, i. 131 Saba Paslia, ii. 292 Said I'aslia, his career and charac- ter, i. 20 St. Hilaire, M. Bartbelemy, I. 199 Salisbury, Lord, {see also under British Government) — criticises Government action, 1881, i. 201 his policy previous to occupa- tion compared with Lord Granville's, i. 252-3 on Hicks expedition, i, 367 moves vote of censure, i. 384 on soldier's advice on strategic points, ii. 76 on public indiil'erence, ii. 77 Salt Tax, i. 169 Sanitary Department, iL 613 Sanitiiry reform, ii. 604 Sartorius, Colonel and Mrs., I. 397 Schoolmasters, native and foreign, ii. 293 Schools, village, iL 634 Schvveinfurth, Dr., i. 266 Scott, Sir John, ii. 290, 618 Scott-Moncrieff, Sir Colin, ii. 290-1 Scotter, Sir Charles, Report on Railways, ii. 312 Senior, Mr. {Conversations and Journals in Egypt), i. 21 Sennar during Mahdi's rebellion, ii. 46 Senoussi movement, the, ii. 39 Seymour, Admiral Sir Beauchamp, arrives at Alexandria, L 277 Shahin Pasha, i. 106 Sheikh-el-Bekri, L 99 Slieikli-el-Obeid, i. 518 Slieikh-el-Senoussi, ii. 37 his relations with Mahdi, ii. 38* 39 Sheikli Mohammed Abdu, ii. 179 Sheikli Mohammed Beyrain, ii. 181 598 MODERN EGYPT Sheikh Mohammed-el-Saadat, ii. 177 Sheikhs of villages, the, i. 48, ii. 186 their views of the English, ii. 191 Sienkiewicz, M., i. 197, 198, 224, 228, 272, 276 Sirdar, the, position of, ii. 283 Slatin Bey, i. 357, ii. 36 Slave Trade, the, ii. 74, 495 Slavery — in Soudan, i. 350 General Gordon on, i. 471-2 position of the slave, ii. 496-7 Lord Dufferiu on, ii. 498 disappearing, ii. 499-504 Soudan, the {see also under British Government) — extent of, January 1883, i. 349 Sir Samuel Baker on, i. 349 Colonel Stewart on, i. 350-9 financial position of, 1882, i. 354 Grant for army, 1883, i. 355 the Mahdi, i. 856 Mr. Power and Lord Dufferin on army, i. 3-58 General Hicks in, i. 360-8 Osman Digna, i. 397-8, 415 Colonel Baker at Suakin, i. 400-5 Sir Gerald Graham at Tokar, i. 411-14 Battle of El-Teb, i. 414 comment on expedition, i. 414 the Berber Expedition, i. 536-58 Battles at Abu Klea and Metemmeh, ii. 6-8 fall of Khartoum, ii. 9 evacuation of, ii. 27-29 fate of Provinces of, ii. 35-69 comment on evacuation, ii. 29-34 reconquest of, ii. 79-110 Atbara, ii. 98-102 Omdurnian, ii. 104 Khartoum occupied, ii. 105 political status of new Soudan, ii. 116-19 size of new Soudan, ii. 545 administration of. (See Adminis- tration Stephenson, Sir Frederick, i. 376, 421, 548, 579, ii. 30 Stewart, Sir Herbert, ii. 6-7 Stewart, Colonel — on the Soudan, i. 350, 363-4-7- 8-60 with Gordon, i. 427, 433 contrasted with Gordon, i. 434 his reports, etc., on route to Khartoum, i. 466-9 on Gordon's policy in Soudan, i. 482-4 on value of Soudan, i. 603 death of, ii. 3 Sturge, Mr., i. 617 Suakin — suggested Turkish troops for, i. 381 Dervish victories near, i. 396-7 General Graham at, i. 544 Colonel HoUed Smith at, ii. 76 Indian troops for, ii. 88 Succession, the Egyptian Law of, i. 136, 155 Suez Canal — Credit Bill, i. 304 neutralisation of, ii. 382-7 Commission to discuss, ii. 386 Convention put in force, ii. 387 Suleiman Pasha, i. 361 Sultan Pasha, i. 265 Sultan, the, (see also under Turkey) — his relations with the Khedive, ii. 264-9 Superstitions, ii. 505-6 Syrians, the (Christian), ii. 213-19 Tajourrah annexed by France, ii. 54 Tamai, battle at, i. 416 Taxes. See Finances Tel-el-Kebir, battle of, i. 323 Tewfik Bey, i. 397 Tewfik Pasha — President of Council, i. 89-90, 100 proclaimed Khedive, i. 141 condition of Egypt at accession, i. 149-51 and Arabi, i. 176-93, 254-78, 335 Sir Edward Malet's defence of, i. 2(51 and slaughter OJ Christians, L 288 INDEX 599 and Gordon, i. 441, 693 his character, ii. 827-33 Tigrane Pasha, ii. 221-6 Times, The, i. 515 Tissot, M., i. 283 Tokar, Sir Evelyn Baring advises occupation of, ii. 74 Sir Francis Grenfell on, ii. 76 Colonel HoUed Smith takes, ii. 77 Toski, battle of, ii. 64-9 Toulba Pasha, i. 275 Trade, Egyptian, French capital employed in, i. 303 Trescow, M. de, i. 162 Tribunals, InternationaL See Mixed Courts Tribunals, native, ii. 319-20 Tunis, French Protectorate over, i. 332 Turco- Egyptian, the, character- istics of, ii. 169-73 Turkey's Egyptian Policy — proposal tliat Sir Evelyn Baring should he Minister of Fin- ance to Sultan of, i. 69 re Ismail's deposition, i. 129, 140 Bubsequent to Ismail's deposi- tion, i. 154-5 French and British Govern- ments, traditional policy towards, i. 155-6 during Arabi's mutiny, i. 194 France and England and, i. 196 Turkish envoys in Cairo, i. 199 re Joint Note, i. 258-9 and the Powers, 1882, i. 282-5 after slaughter of Christians, i. 288 and Military Convention with Great Britain, i. 308-21 relations between Khedive and Sultan of, ii. 264-9 and Woltf Convention, ii. 372- 81 Turkish Commissioner in Egypt, ii. 380 Ulema, the, characteristics of, ii. 173-86 Ulemas, i. 99 Unified Debt, i. 13 University of El-Azhar, ii. 532 Veterinary College, ii. 512 Vincent, Sir Edgar Vincent, L 422 value of his work, ii. 287 Vivian, Lord {see also under British Governments) — British Representative in Egypt, i. 14 Reports on Finances, 1876, L 27, 36 on funded debt, 1877, i. 33-4 on Ismail's hostility to Nubar, i. 67-8 his disagreement with Sir R. Wilson, i. 95 succeeded bv Sir Frank Lascelles, i. 96 Waddington, M., i. 36 Wakfs, the, i. 53, ii. 409 Wallace, Sir Donald Mackenzie, i. 324 Walne, Mr., on Said's policy, L 21 Weighing dues, i. 122 West, Sir Raymond, ii. 288 Wilson, Sir Charles W., i. 368, ii. 8 Wilson, Sir Rivers — Vice-President of Commission of Inquiry, i. 45 appointed Minister of Finance, i. 63 assaulted by officers, i. 74 on reinstatement of Nubar, L 88 his disagreement with Lord Vivian, i. 95 President of Commission of Liquidation, i. 162 references to, i. 78-9, 88, 91-6-8, 100-2-3, 172 Wiiigate, Sir Reginald — on witiidrawn Soudan garrisons, ii. 31 Sirdar, ii. 105 on Soudan, ii. 545-6, 554 reference to, ii. 66-8, 70 Wodehouse, Colonel, ii. 67 Wolff, Sir Henry, Convention with Turkey, ii. 372-81 Wolseley, Lord, i. 301, 323, 581 marches to relieve (Joidon, ii. 6 correspondence with British 600 MODERN EGVrT Government after fall of Khartoum, ii. 20-29 AVomen, Egyptian, importance of educating, ii. 539-42 Wood, Sir Evelyn, commands Egyptian army, i. 372, 399 on evacuation of Soudan, L 376-7 references to, i. 422, 648 Young Egypt, ii. 228-43 Zeyla — farmed to Ismail, ii. 63 taken by Great Britain, ii. 64 Zobeir Pasha — proposed despatch to Soudan, i. 402 his relations with Gordon, i. 454-60 on proposed appointment in Soudan, i. 480-534 his return to Soudan, i. 529 THE END Printed in the United States of America. 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