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 THE UNIVERSITY 
 
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 LOS ANGELES
 
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 THE PATERNOSTER LIBRARY. 
 
 Croivn Svo, y. dd. each. 
 
 Vol. I. PHYSICS AND POLITICS ; or, Thoughts on 
 the Application of the Principles of "Natural 
 Selection " and " Inheritance " to Political 
 Society. V,y Walter Bagehoi. Nintli Tliousand. 
 
 Vol. II. LOMBARD STREET: A Description of the 
 Money Market. By Walter Bagehot. Twelfth 
 Thousand. 
 
 Vol.111. THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. By Walter 
 
 Bagehot. liighth 'J'housand. 
 
 Vol. IV. ESSAYS ON PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 By Walter Bagehot. 
 
 Vol. V. CETYWAYO AND HIS WHITE NEIGH- 
 BOURS ; or, Remarks on Recent Events in Zulu- 
 land, Natal, and the Transvaal. By H. Rider 
 Haggard. Sixth Edition. 
 
 Vol. VI. THEORY OF LEGISLATION. By Jeremy 
 
 Bentham. Translated from the Trench of Etienne Dumont 
 by R. HiLDKETH. Tenth Edition. 
 
 To befoUozved at intervals by further Volumes. 
 
 London : KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRtJBNER, & CO. LIP
 
 CETYWAYO 
 
 HIS WHITE NEIGHBOURS 
 
 on, 
 
 REMARKS ON RECENT EVENTS IN ZULULAND, NATAL, 
 AND THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 BY 
 
 H. RIDER HAGGARD. 
 
 NE W AND CHEAPER EDITION, 
 
 LONDON: 
 KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TKUBNER, & CO. T/° 
 
 PATRRNOSTRR HOUSE, CIIARINO CROSS ROAD. 
 189G.
 
 "1 am told that iheso men (the Boer^) arc told to keep oii 
 Rgit.itiiig in this way, for a change of Government in England 
 may give them again the old order of things. Nothing can show 
 greater ignorance of English politics than such an idea. I tell 
 you there is no Government — Whig or Tory, Liberal, Conser- 
 vative, or Radical — who would dare, under any circumstances, 
 to give back this country (the Transvaal). They would not dare, 
 because the English people would not allow them." — (Extract 
 from Speech of Sir Gcwiiet WoUeley, delivered at a Public Banquet 
 in Pretoria, on the lyth December iSyg.) 
 
 "There was a still stronger reason than that for not receding 
 (from the Transvaal) ; it was impossible to say what calamities 
 such a step as receding might not cause. . . . For such a risk he 
 could not make himself responsible. . . . Difficulties with the 
 Zulu and the frontier tribes would again arise, and looking as 
 they must to South Africa as a whole, the Government, after a 
 careful consideration of the question, came to tlie conclusinn 
 tliat wo could not relinquish the Transvual." — (Extract from 
 Speech of Lord Kimberley in the House of lords, z^lh May iSSo. 
 It. /'. D., vol. cclii., p. zoS.) 
 
 The rights of translation and of reproduction are reserved.
 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 Introduction . . xi 
 
 Preface Ixxiii 
 
 CETYWAYO AND THE ZULU SETTLEMENT. 
 
 Claims of affairs of Zululand to attention — Proposed visit of Cety- 
 wayo to England — Chaka — His method of government — His 
 death — Dingaan — Panda — Battle of the Tugela — John Dunn 
 — Nomination of Cetyvrayo — His coronation — His lady ad- 
 vocates — Their attacks on officials — Was Cetywayo blood- 
 thirsty ? — Cause of the Zulu war — Zulu military system — 
 State of feeling amongst the Zulus previous to the war — 
 Cetywayo's position — His enemies — His intentions on the 
 Transvaal — Their frustration by Sir T. Shepstone — Cety- 
 wayo's interview with Mr. Fynney — His opinion of the Boers 
 — The annexation in connection with the Zulu war — The 
 Natal colonists and the Zulu war — Sir Bartle Frere — The 
 Zulu war — Cetywayo's half-heartedness — Sir Garnet Wolse- 
 ley's settlement— Careless selection of chiefs — The Sitimela 
 plot — Chief John Dunn — Appointment of Mr. Osborn as 
 British Resident — His difficult position — Folly and cruelty 
 of our settlement — Disappointment of the Zulus — Object 
 and result of settlement — Slaughter in Zululand — Our re- 
 sponsibilities to the Zulus — Lord Kimberley on Zululand 
 — Cetywayo's son — Necessity of the proper settlement of 
 Zululand — Should Cetywayo be restored ? . . . 1-57
 
 vi CONTENTS. 
 
 NATAL AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT. 
 
 PAOE 
 
 Nutal — Cauaoa of increase of the native population — Happy 
 condition of the Natal Zulus — Polygamy — Its results on 
 population — The impossibility of eradicating it — Relations be- 
 tween a Zulu and his wives — Connection between polygamy 
 and native law — Missionary work amongst the Zulus — Its 
 failure — Reasons of its failure — Early days of Natal — Growth 
 of the native question— Coming struggle between white and 
 black over the land question — Difficulty of civilising the Zulu 
 — Natal as a black settlement — The constitution of Natal — 
 Request for responsible government — Its refusal ^The request 
 renewed and granted — Terms and reason of Lord Kimberley'a 
 offer — Infatuation of responsible government party in Natal 
 — Systematic abuse of colonists in England — Colonial specu- 
 lators — Grievances against the Imperial Government — Sir 
 Henry Bulwer — Uncertain future of Natal — Its available 
 force — Exterior dangers — The defence question shirked by 
 the " party of progress " — The confederation question — The 
 difficulty of obtaining desirable immigrants — The only real 
 key to the Natal native question — Folly of accepting self- 
 government till it is solved ...... 58-83 
 
 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 Chapter I. — Its Inhabitants, Laws, and Costomb. 
 
 Invasion by Mosilikatzi — Arrival of the emigrant Boers — Estab- 
 lishment of the South African Republic — The Sand River 
 Convention — Growth of the territory of the republic — The 
 native tribes surrounding it — Capabilities of the country — 
 Its climate — Its inhabitants — The Boers — Their peculiarities 
 and mode of life — Their abhorrence of settled government 
 and payment of taxes — The Dutch patriotic party — Form 
 of government previous to the annexation — Courts of law 
 — The commando system — Revenue arrangements — Native 
 races in the Transvaal 85-108
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 Chapter II. — Evknts Preceding the Annexation. 
 
 PACE 
 
 Mr. Burgers elected president — His character and aspirations — 
 His pension from the English Government — His visit to 
 England — The railway loan — Relations of the republic with 
 native tribes — The pass laws — Its quarrel with Cetywayo 
 — Confiscation of native territory in the Keate Award — 
 Treaty with the Swazi king — The Secoccsni war — Capture 
 of Johannes' stronghold by the Swazi allies — Attack on 
 Secocoeni's mountain — Defeat and dispersion of the Boers 
 — Elation of the natives — Von Schlickmann's volunteers — 
 Cruelties perpetrated — Abel Erasmus — Treatment of natives 
 by Boers — Public meeting at Potchefstroom in 1868 — The 
 slavery question — Some evidence on the subject — Pecuniary 
 position of the Transvaal prior to the annexation — Internal 
 troubles — Divisions amongst the Boers — Hopeless condition 
 of the country ..,,..,. 109-135 
 
 Chapter III. — The Annexation. 
 
 Anxiety of Lord Carnarvon — Despatch of Sir T. Shepstone as 
 Special Commissioner to the Transvaal — Sir T. Shepstone, 
 his great experience and ability — His progress to Pretoria, 
 and reception there — Feelings excited by the arrival of the 
 mission — The annexation not a foregone conclusion —Charge 
 brought against Sir T. Shepstone of having called up the 
 Zulu army to sweep the Transvaal — Its complete false- 
 hood — Cetywayo's message to Sir T. Shepstone — Evidence 
 on the matter summed up — General desire of the natives 
 for English rule — Habitual disregard of their interests — 
 Assembly of the Volksraad — Rejection of Lord Carnarvon's 
 Confederation Bill and of President Burgers' new con- 
 stitution — President Burgers' speeches to the Raad — His 
 posthumous statement — Communication to the Raad of Sir 
 T. Shepstone's intention to annex the country — Despatch of 
 Commission to inqiiire into the alleged peace with Secocceni 
 — Its fraudulent character discovered — Pi-ogress of affairs in 
 the Transvaal — Paul Kruger and his party — Restlessness of 
 natives — Arrangements for the anne.xation — The annexation 
 proclamation 136-172
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAri'KR IV.— The Thansvaal under British Rdlk. 
 
 TAGB 
 
 lleception of the annexation — Major Clarke and the Volunteers 
 — Effect of the annexation on credit and commerce — Hoist- 
 ing of the Union Jack — Ratification of the annexation by 
 Parliament — Messrs. Kruger and Jorissen's mission to 
 England — Agitation against the annexation in the Cape 
 Colony — Sir T. Shepstone's tour — Causes of the growth of 
 discontent among the Boers — Return of Messrs. Jorissen 
 and Kruger — The Government dispenses with their services 
 —Despatch of a second deputation to England — Outbreak 
 of war witii Secocoeni — Major Clarke, R.A. — The Gunn of 
 Gunn plot — Mission of Captain Paterson and Mr. Sergeaunt 
 to Matabeleland — Its melancholy termination — The Isand- 
 hlwana disaster— Departure of Sir T. Shepstone for England 
 — Another Boer meeting — The Pretoria Horse — Advance of 
 the Boers on Pretoria — Arrival of Sir B. Frere at Pretoria 
 and dispersion of the Boers — Arrival of Sir Garnet Wolse- 
 ley — His proclamation — The Secocoeni expedition —Proceed- 
 ings of the Boers — Mr. Pretorius — Mr. Gladstone's Mid- 
 Lothian speeches, their effect — Sir. G, Wolseley's speech at 
 Pretoria, its good results — Influx of Englishmen and cessation 
 of agitation — Financial position of the country after three 
 years of British rule — Letter of the Boer leaders to Mr. 
 Courtney ......... 1 73-205 
 
 Chapter V. — The Boer Rebellion. 
 
 Accession of Mr. Gladstone to power — His letters to the Boer 
 leaders and the loyals — His refusal to rescind the annexation 
 — The Boers encouraged by prominent members of the Radical 
 party — The Beznidenhout incident — Despatch of troops to 
 Potchefstroom— Mass meeting of the 8th December 1880 — 
 Appointment of the Triumvirate and declaration of the re- 
 jiublic — Despatch of Boer proclamation to Sir 0. Lanyon — 
 His reply — Outbreak of hostilities at Potchefstroom — De- 
 fence of the court-house by Major Clarke — The massacre of 
 the detachment of the 94th under Colonel Anstruther — Dr. 
 Ward — The Boer rejoicings — The Transvaal placed under 
 martial law — Abandonment of their homes by the people of
 
 CONTENTS. ii 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Pretoria — Sir Owen Lanyon's admirable defence organisation 
 — Second proclamation issued by the Boers — Its complete 
 falsehood — Life at Pretoria during the siege — Murders of 
 natives by the Boers — Loyal conduct of the native chiefs — 
 Difficulty of preventing them from attacking the Boers — 
 Occupation of Lang's Nek by the Boers — Sir George Oolley's 
 departure to Newcastle — The condition of that town — The 
 attack on Lang's Nek — Its desperate nature — Effect of vic- 
 tory on the Boers— The battle at the Ingogo — Our defeat 
 — Sufferings of the wounded — Major Essex — Advance of the 
 Boers into Natal — Constant alarms — Expected attack on 
 Newcastle — Its unorganised and indefensible condition — 
 Arrival of the reinforcements and retreat of the Boers to the 
 Nek — Despatch of General Wood to bring up more rein- 
 forcements — Majuba Hill — Our disaster, and death of Sir 
 George C<illey — Cause of our defeat — A Boer version of the 
 disaster — Sir George Colley's tactics .... 206-243 
 
 Chapter VI. — The Retrocession of the Transvaal. 
 
 The Queen's Speech— President Brand and Lord Kimberley — Sir 
 Henry de Villiers — Sir George Colley's plan — Paiil Kruger'a 
 offer — Sir George Colley's remonstrance — Complimentary 
 telegrams — Effect of Majuba on the Boers and English 
 Government — Collapse of the Government — Reasons of the 
 surrender — Professional sentimentalists — The Transvaal In- 
 dependence Committee — Conclusion of the armistice — The 
 preliminary peace — Reception of tlie news in Nat.1l — New- 
 castle after the declaration of peace — Exodus of the loyal 
 inhabitants of the Transvaal — The value of property in 
 Pretoria — The Transvaal officials dismissed — The Royal Com- 
 mission — Mode of trial of persons accused of atrocities — 
 Decision of the Commission and its results — The severance 
 of territory question — Arguments pro and con — Opini(m of 
 Sir E. Wood — Humility of the Commissioners and its cause 
 — Their decision on the Keate Award question — TheMontsioa 
 difficulty — The compensation and financial clauses of the re- 
 port of the Commission — The duties of the British Resident 
 — Sir E. Wood's dissent from the report of the Commission 
 — Signing of the Conventiim — Burial of the Union Jack — 
 The native side of the question — Interview between the
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 PAOB 
 
 Coiiirnissionera and the native chiefs— Their opinion of the 
 surrender — Objections of the Boer Volksraad to the Con- 
 vention — Mr. Gladstone temporises — The ratification — Its 
 insolent tone — Mr. Hudson, the British Resident — The Boer 
 festival — The results of the Convention — The larger issue of 
 the matter — Its effect on the Transvaal — Its moral aspects 
 — Its effect on the native mind ..... 242-288 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 I. The Potchefstroom Atrocities, &c. ..... 2S9 
 
 II. Pledges given by Mr. Gladstone's Government as to the 
 
 Retention of the Transvaal ..... 299 
 
 III. The case of Indabezimbi 301 
 
 IV. A Boer Advertisement ....... 308 
 
 v. " Transvaal's " Letter to the Standard .... 309
 
 INTEODUCTION, 
 
 A NEW edition of this book having been called for 
 after the lapse of more than five years from the date 
 of its first appearance, I have found myself in some 
 difficulty as to the matter. In the course of five 
 years many things happen in South Africa, and re- 
 marks which applied to a certain anterior condition 
 of affairs necessarily lose most of their freshness and 
 some of their weight. It would not be convenient to 
 rewrite the book, for to do so would be to destroy 
 whatever value it may possess as a contemporaneous 
 historical record. It appears, therefore, that the only 
 suitable course is to add an introduction, or rather 
 a brief summary, of such important events as have 
 occurred between 1882 and the present date. 
 
 Prophecy is a dangerous thing. Probably there are 
 few writers who could turn after a lapse of years to a 
 political history dealing with interests so various as 
 those with which we are confronted in South Africa, 
 without a secret fear that somewhere in its pages they 
 would find their sage predictions utterly confounded
 
 xii INTRODUCTION. 
 
 by the development of events. I confess that such a 
 fear was present to my mind. It is therefore with 
 some relief and yet with sorrow that I find it to be 
 in the main unfounded. In some cases, as in that of 
 Zululand, the clouds to which I pointed have burst ; 
 in some, as in that of Natal, they still gather and 
 darken/ On one point, however, I have fallen into 
 signal error. I predicted, as can be seen by reference, 
 that financial ruin would overtake the Transvaal. 
 This has not happened ; on the contrary, the country 
 is very prosperous. The reason of this prosperity is 
 not far to seek, though I failed to foresee it. The 
 vast gold-fields of the Transvaal have been opened up, 
 and its coffers are being filled to overflowing by the 
 enterprise of the diggers. On the other hand, a chance 
 remark that I made in connection with this country 
 has been signally verified. I suggested that a close 
 parallel existed between the case of the Transvaal and 
 that of Ireland, and that the state of affairs which 
 was held to justify the surrender of the one country 
 might equally well be advanced in excuse of the sur- 
 render of the other. But here also I made a mistake. 
 After driving my parallel — which was, I remember, 
 
 ^ As I have pointed out in my chapter on " Natal and Responsible 
 Government," there seems to be only one possible solution of the native 
 question in that colony, namely, the removal of the natives to Zulu- 
 land. Since that chapter was written, however, a considerable portion 
 of the best and most fertile country in Zululand has been seized by the 
 Boers, and as the Zulu people must live somewhere themselves, there 
 is naturally less room left in which to try the experiment of trans- 
 planting the native hordes of NataL
 
 INTRODUCTION. xiii 
 
 treated with contempt, not to say contumely, in some 
 quarters — as far as I conveniently could, I remarked 
 that it must break down at last, because " it mattered 
 little to England whether or no she let the Transvaal 
 go, but to let Ireland go would be more than even 
 Mr. Gladstone dare attempt." So I thought in 1882, 
 in common with most Englishmen, In 1888 ex- 
 perience has shown how gratuitous was any such 
 assumption. 
 
 In concluding my chapter on Zulu history and 
 affairs, which was written just before Cetywayo's visit 
 to England, I said : " On the whole, I am of opinion 
 that the Government that replaces Cetywayo on the 
 throne of his fathers will undertake a very grave 
 responsibility, and must be prepared to deal with 
 many resulting complications." That the responsibility 
 was grave indeed the following pages will show. 
 
 It will be remembered that on the conclusion of 
 the Zulu war. Sir Garnet Wolseley, acting no doubt 
 under instructions, settled Zululand in a fashion that 
 did not commend itself to the common sense or ideas 
 of justice of most people acquainted with the circum- 
 stances. In the place of one king he set up thirteen, 
 who, of course, did not altogether agree. No sooner, 
 however, was this settlement announced than a strong, 
 and in some ways a natural agitation sprang up 
 against it. As it became more and more clear to the 
 English mind how ill-judged, I might almost say how 
 unjust, was the Zulu war, this agitation gathered
 
 xiv INTRODUCTION. 
 
 strength, and with singular unreason took the form of 
 a demand for the restoration of Cetywayo. Now, 
 whatever personal sympathy one may have with the 
 late king, there is no doubt that he was in a degree 
 doubly an offender. He was an offender against the 
 Imperial Power in that he had not kept the promises 
 which he solemnly entered into at the time of his 
 coronation, and he was a much deeper offender against 
 his own people, whom he had ruled with considerable 
 cruelty. Therefore the war against him could to some 
 extent be justified ; whereas the war against the Zulu 
 people, who were never other than our friends, admits 
 of no possible justification. Sir Bartle Frere recognised 
 this when he declared that he made war on Cetywayo, 
 not on Zululand. If, then, we could in any way be 
 held to owe reparation to Cetywayo, how much greater 
 was the reparation that we owed to his unfortunate 
 people, which could, of course, have been fully made 
 by extending the blessings of British rule over Zulu« 
 land. But the agitation never took this form, at least 
 not in England. Nobody thought about the Zulus, 
 while everybody's voice was raised on behalf of the 
 dethroned king. A monarch, black or white, is an 
 interesting person, especially when he appears in the 
 streets of London ; but his war-smitten people, mourn- 
 ing their dead, seven thousand miles away, do not 
 appeal so actively to the imagination. " The Zulu 
 people," says Sir Henry Bulwer, on 25th August 1882, 
 in his exhaustive and most valuable report on the
 
 INTRODUCTION. xv 
 
 settlement of the Zulu country,^ " there is little doubt, 
 would have gladly come under the direct rule of the 
 British Government. They would have accepted that 
 rule without question and without misgiving. They 
 would have accepted it for all reasons, not only because 
 it was the rule of the Government that had conquered 
 them, but because they knew it to be a just and 
 merciful rule. . . . ' The Government conquered us (they 
 say) ; we belong to the Government.' " And again ^ 
 he says : " Great numbers of the Zulu people have no 
 wish to return under his (Cetywayo's) rule, and would 
 regard any obligation to do so as one of the greatest 
 misfortunes that could befall them." 
 
 These considerations, however, were not allowed 
 to weigh with Her Majesty's Government. In spite 
 of the Wolseley settlement, to which, such as it was, 
 we had solemnly pledged ourselves; in spite of the 
 cautious but none the less marked disapproval of Sir 
 Henry Bulwer, and of the outspoken protests of the 
 entire white population of Natal (the ex-king's friends 
 and agents alone excepted), it was determined to restore 
 Cetywayo. In vain did Sir Garnet Wolseley write to 
 the Colonial office ^ to place on record liis " strong 
 conviction that the return of Cetywayo to Zululand 
 would be fraught with considerable danger to Natal, 
 and would give rise to serious trouble and bloodshed 
 in Zululand itself, whilst it would be in direct con- 
 
 ' [C. 3466], 1883, p. 139- ' [0. 3466I, p. 199. 
 3 Ibid. 1883, p. I.
 
 xvi INTRODUCTION. 
 
 travention of the guarantee that I gave to all the 
 thirteen existing chiefs of Zululand, viz., that under 
 no circumstances should Cetywayo be ever allowed to 
 settle again in the country." In vain did he on a 
 subsequent occasion ^ feel bound to state that Mr. Dunn 
 " would not have accepted the position of Chief had I 
 not, as Her Majesty's High Commissioner, given him 
 a promise in the name of the Government of England 
 that under no circumstances should Cetywayo be ever 
 allowed to return to Zululand, a promise approved of 
 by the Government of the day." It is, by the way, 
 impossible not to sympathise with Sir Garnet Wolseley, 
 for this is the second occasion upon which promises 
 solemnly uttered by him in the name of the Queen 
 and by order of the British Government were within 
 a few years deliberately set aside. For the other 
 instance I refer to his famous proclamation in which 
 he announced, on behalf of the Queen, that the Trans- 
 vaal should continue a British possession for ever. It 
 is dangerous to make promises on behalf of a country 
 governed by party. 
 
 All these protests, together with those of a multi- 
 tude of smaller folk, went by Lord Kimberley like the 
 wind. Acting on the sacred principle that agitation 
 must be acceded to, he determined to restore Cetywayo. 
 Even the request of the Transvaal Government, made as 
 usual " in the interests of humanity," that the ex-king 
 should be re-established, did not put him on his guard. 
 » [C. 3466], 1883, p. 269.
 
 INTRODUCTION. xvii 
 
 But it was found impossible, with tlie best will in 
 the world, to re-establish Cetyvvayo in the position of 
 sole Zulu king, which he held before the war. As 
 Sir Henry Buhver pointed out in various despatches, 
 out of the thirteen chiefs established under the 
 Wolseley settlement only five showed any disposition 
 to welcome their departed king. It therefore became 
 necessary to reserve some territory, where the dis- 
 sentients could take refuge. Lord Kimberley did not 
 like this. Indeed he positively refused to allow any 
 part of Zululand to be annexed to the Empire or to 
 Natal,^ but, taking refuge in one of those half measures 
 that have done so much harm in South Africa, stated, 
 characteristically enough, that Her Majesty's Govern- 
 ment " would not object to such arrangements for the 
 control of chiefs by a Commissioner as you (Sir Henry 
 Bulwer) might consider indispensable for the peace 
 and security of that part of the country not placed 
 under the rule of Cetywayo." Sir Henry Bulwer pro- 
 posed a boundary to this Eeserved Territory, which 
 finally came under English protection for native pur- 
 poses only, though nominally in so vague a fashion 
 that it is not possible to define its status with reference 
 to the Empire. This boundary was, however, rejected 
 as taking too much territory from Cetywayo. A 
 narrower one was then proposed, including the terri- 
 tories of Hlubi and John Dunn, and cutting off about a 
 fourth part of Zululand from its southern side where it 
 1 [C. 3466], p. 91.
 
 xviii INTRODUCTION. 
 
 marclies on Natal. This line was ultimately accepted, 
 and the country so cut off became a most successful and 
 self-sujsporting native state, under the direct rule of Mr. 
 Osborn, who took his orders from the Governor of Natal. 
 Another portion in the north of Zululand, of about 
 half the area of the Eeserved Territory, was set apart 
 for the occupation of the chief, Usibepu, who alone of 
 the kinglets now remained in an independent position. 
 Usibepu is a cousin of Cctywayo's, and the hereditary 
 chief of the Manhlagasi tribe. Of all the Zulu chiefs 
 living at the date of which I write he was recognised 
 to be the best. Sir Henry Bulwer speaks of him as 
 "a man of considerable force of character, moderate in 
 counsels, strong in action, straightforward in his con- 
 duct, courageous, self-reliant," nor does his subsequent 
 history belie this report. He was against the Zulu 
 war, but when it had been undertaken fought loyally 
 for Cetywayo. By his people he was beloved, and it 
 was said of him that in his country " men live to be 
 old." But not unnaturally he did not wish to see 
 Cetywayo back, and on the whole it was thought best 
 to leave him in an independent position. Indeed any 
 other course would have been difficult if not impossible 
 Cetywayo was thus to be restored to about two- 
 thirds of Zululand. Moreover, he was to be restored 
 under conditions — on paper. By these conditions, as 
 assented to by him in his days of captivity, he was 
 made to promise to do many things excellent in them- 
 Bclves and conducive to the good government and
 
 INTRODUCTION. xix 
 
 prosperity of his country. Amongst others, he 
 solemnly undertook not to make treaties or war with 
 anybody without the consent of the British Govern- 
 ment, and to refer all disputes to its arbitration. Of 
 course he never adhered to a single one of these nicely 
 written conditions, and in all probability never intended 
 to adhere to them any more than he did to his corona- 
 tion promises. The ignorance of human nature shown 
 by those who imagined that he would is really 
 astonishing. Could they indeed have believed that a 
 savage king, finding himself in his own country, but 
 shorn of a third of his territories and more than half 
 his royal prerogative, would bear upon his heart so 
 vivid an impression of long conditions read to him by 
 a "entleman in a frock coat in Downing Street, to which 
 pressure of circumstances had brought him to assent 
 with an unwilling mind, that he would on their account 
 refrain from doing those things that a Zulu so placed 
 is accustomed to do ? The notion is ridiculous, how 
 ridiculous the issue shows most clearly. When in 
 Zululand paper alone stands between an assegai and 
 an enemy, woe to the enemy — assegais cut paper ! 
 
 Of course this half restoration did not satisfy 
 Cetywayo's friends, more especially his white friends, 
 any more than it satisfied the king himself. However, 
 it was in January 1883 duly and ably carried out 
 by Sir Theophilus Shepstone, not without some risk 
 to himself and his party. Sir Theophilus's report ^ of 
 1 [0. 3616], 18S3, p. 40.
 
 rx INTRODUCTION. 
 
 his journey and the final ceremony is most interesting 
 reading, and shows two things very conclusively, first, 
 that Cetywayo, even before he was reinstalled, had 
 made up his mind to . break the conditions he had 
 promised to obey; and secondly, that the great bulk 
 of the nation was by no means enthusiastic about his 
 return. Thus on the very day of his landing at Port 
 Durnford, for it had not been thought advisable to 
 bring him through Natal, the king sent a message to 
 the Zulu people desiring them to meet and welcome 
 him, and " to disregard the alleged curtailment of his 
 territory . . . that it was only a Natal device, which 
 he would defeat." The Zulus could not at all under- 
 stand our conduct in restoring Cetywayo, and were loud 
 in praise of its magnanimity, although they were for 
 the most part more than doubtful as to its results. 
 They called it "a marvel, a miracle, the raising to life 
 of a man on whose grave for years the grass had 
 grown ; clothing dry bones with living flesh." Cety- 
 wayo himself, however, began to grow anxious — his 
 welcome even at the hands of his own Usutu party 
 was not quite all that he had hoped for. A presage 
 of his fate seems to have oppressed him.^ He talked 
 of Sikukuni, who was restored to his people and 
 instantly murdered. Then with singular insight into 
 our ways, he said that "should assassination be his 
 fate, the British Government would do nothing beyond 
 
 ' There is little doubt that Cetywayo perished by poison and not by 
 heart disease, as was at first believed.
 
 INTRODUCTION. xxi 
 
 expressing regret and asking for information, and Ly 
 the time information was forthcoming it would be 
 found inconvenient to do any tiling in the matter, and 
 so the assassin would go free, and his fate be un- 
 avenged." Tliese things indeed came to pass. 
 
 Some chiefs, as in the case of Umfanawendhlela, 
 Cetywayo's uncle, were bold enough to express their 
 open dislike of the restoration. Usibcpu came in, 
 not to greet Cetywayo, of whom it will be remembered 
 he was independent, but to pay his respects to Sir T. 
 Shepstone and Mr. Osborn. As he rode past Cety- 
 wayo's camp he was received with taunts and threats, 
 Mdiich were soon to be translated into acts. Before 
 he went he told Sir Theophilus that he wanted to 
 interfere with nobody, but that if the Usutu attacked 
 him he should defend himself, and he was as good as 
 his word. 
 
 At length the restoration was carried out, and Sir 
 Theophilus and his escort returned to Natal, leaving 
 Mr. Fynn in the thankless position of Eesident and 
 general adviser to Cetywayo. 
 
 This was done in January 1883. Hardly had the 
 echoes of Sir T. Shepstone's words died away, when 
 preparations for the destruction of Usibepu began to 
 be made, if not by Cetywayo's direct orders, most 
 certainly with his cognisance. On the 30th March a 
 force of about five thousand Usutus, acting on the 
 orders of Undabuko, Cetywayo's brother, made an 
 unprovoked attack upon Usibepu's territory, burnt
 
 xxii INTRODUCTION. 
 
 two of his kraals, and finally met with a crushing 
 defeat at the hands of that chief himself, in which 
 great numbers of the assailants perished. This was 
 the beginning of the end. Undeterred by his repulse^ 
 Cetywayo set to work to gather a fresh force to 
 operate, it was said, against Uhamu. In May these 
 forces came into action without decisive results. 
 Much bloodshed, however, took place both on the side 
 of Cetywayo and that of Uhamu. These and other 
 distressing incidents were of course duly reported to 
 Lord Derby, who was much grieved at the " continued 
 disregard by Cetywayo of the conditions of his restora- 
 tion." Lord Derby seems to have felt some perplexity 
 as to what argument would have most weight with 
 the intractable king. At length, however, he found 
 one.'^ " You will add," he says in his despatch to Sir 
 Henry Bulwer of the I2th July 1883, "that if he 
 (Cetywayo) continues to disregard his undertakings 
 and promises, it will become a serious question 
 whether Her Majesty's Government should not take 
 the step of loithdrawing the British Resident from 
 him." No doubt when this dreadful threat reached 
 Cetywayo's ears he was duly impressed. Unfortu- 
 nately, however, the British Eesident had some months 
 before, on the plea of ill health, sent in his resigna- 
 tion of a post which had become unendurable.^ 
 
 1 [C. 3705], iS83,p. 115. 
 
 - Mr. Fynn did not, however, actually leave Zululand till after 
 Cetywayo's death.
 
 INTKODUCTION. xxiii 
 
 Cetywayo meanwhile was daily growing more 
 difficult to deal with. Thus in June we find him 
 repudiating the boundaries assigned to him and claim- 
 ing the whole of Zululand. Towards tlie natives in 
 the Eeserve Territory he assumed a threatening atti- 
 tude, ordering them to come and fight for him in the 
 various conflicts wherein he was from week to week 
 engaged. 
 
 Up to this time there were three main factors in 
 Zulu affairs, i. The English Government, as repre- 
 sented by Mr. Osborn and the Eeserve Territory; 2. 
 Cetywayo; 3. Usibepu. Now, however, a fourth 
 appeared, the Boer freebooters. When natives are 
 engaged in warfare these men gather and sit like vul- 
 tures round a sick ox, awaiting the right moment to 
 develop their plan of campaii^n. Sooner or later one 
 of the contending parties applies to them for assist- 
 ance, nor do they turn a deaf ear to its pleading. 
 Only certain little formalities have first to be attended 
 to. The signature of the chief and a few of his 
 headmen is required to a paper, which, as the signa- 
 tories may or may not understand, cedes the greater pare 
 of their territory to their kind allies in return for the 
 services they are willing to render " in the name of 
 humanity." These preliminaries arranged, the enemy 
 is attacked, and by the help of the Boer rifles utterly 
 destroyed. So far so good, but then comes the hour 
 of settlement. It always ends in the same wa}', un- 
 less, as in the case of Bechuanaland, the British
 
 sxlv INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Government can be induced to interfere. The natives 
 find that they have paid for their folly with their 
 country, and that the price of their triumph over the 
 enemy of an hour is their utter national ruin and 
 destruction. 
 
 The first appearance of the Boers in the present 
 case is reported by Uhamu to Sir Henry Bulwer on 
 7th July 1883, when, according to his account,^ an 
 Impi of Umdeta's with ten Boers attacked his people 
 residing out of the Transvaal line and " killed all his 
 people there, as well as their wives and children." 
 Mr. Meek, a resident in the Derby District of the 
 Transvaal, also reports ^ what appears from the dates 
 to be the same attack, though it is difficult to be sure 
 of this, as no mention is made of the presence of 
 Boers. This attack on the Sicini Mountains, where 
 Uhamu's people had taken refuge, was carried out in 
 the name of Cetyvvayo, and with every ch'cumstance of 
 barbarity. The assailants were repulsed five times, 
 on the sixth they effected an entrance. Nearly every- 
 body was slaughtered. " They left several companies," 
 says Mr. Meek, " to destroy all remaining life . . . 
 women are lying there with their infants bound to 
 their backs, stabbed right through both their bodies, 
 some with their heads smashed, and others most 
 brutally mutilated. The caves which they did not 
 enter they rammed grass and rubbish into, and then 
 set it on fire, and by so doing burnt and suffocated 
 » [C. 3S64], 1S84, p. 55- " Iljid. P- 85.
 
 INTRODUCTION. xxv 
 
 many to death. At the entrance lay fifty-two dead 
 men, and five hrothers lay dead in a heap, making a 
 total of fifty-seven, all within a few paces, and several 
 women not far from them lay behind the stones with 
 their children on their backs, ripped open. ... I can 
 mention the names of no less than twelve women, 
 eleven girls, and five infants which lay close to one 
 cave, all well known, let alone the remaining numbers 
 that lay on the Sicini Mountain. I should say at 
 a rough estimation there are about 350 lying for the 
 vultures, and for only one reason, viz., ' cattle,' ' cattle, 
 ' cattle.' " 
 
 In short the restoration policy now began to bear 
 fruit. No wonder that Lord Derby threatened to with- 
 draw the British Eesident from Cety wayo ! By way of 
 comment on this heroic scheme it may, however, be 
 mentioned that as Her Majesty's Government very 
 well knew, all slaughter could have been stopped, and 
 Zululand reduced to an almost immediate state of 
 quietude by the simple expedient of extending the 
 authority of the Queen over the country. This, how- 
 ever, would have involved " responsibility." Of course 
 the piled-up slaughters of thousands of unoffending 
 human beings did not do this, at any rate not in a 
 sense that was likely to find expression at the English 
 polling-booths. And yet we have heard of " blood- 
 guiltiness." 
 
 At length, on the 21st July 1883, the war between 
 Cetywayo and the Usutu party against Usibepu, a
 
 xxvi INTRODUCTION. 
 
 war entirely unprovoked "by the latter, came to an 
 issue. Cetywayo was gathering the Usutu for an 
 attack upon Usibepu, when by a sudden and brilliant 
 move that chief entirely out-generalled him. Avoid- 
 ing the main body of the Usutu impi, he made a 
 forced march, and about eight on the morning of the 
 2 1st hurled himself upon Cetywayo's camp at UlundL 
 Cetywayo had about 5000 men with him, and these 
 moved out to meet the attack. But they could not 
 stand before the fierce charge of the Manhlagazi. 
 They broke, scattered, and fled, and after them streamed 
 the pursuers. Soon Ulundi was in flames, and here 
 perished six of Cetywayo's wives and his little son. 
 Here also, among hundreds of others, fell the two 
 chiefs, Seketwayo and Chingwayo, Haiana, Usibepu's 
 own brother, who was bitterly opposed to him, and 
 the Indunas, Sirayo, Umkosana, and Umwumandaba. 
 At first it was believed that Cetywayo himself wag 
 among the slain, but this was not the case. He was 
 discovered hiding in a bush, and two young men of 
 the attacking party threw assegais at him, wounding 
 him twice in the thigh. He then called out that he 
 was the king, and the young men left him, whereon 
 he made goood his escape, finally reaching the Eeserve 
 Territory, where he took refuge in a kloof near the 
 Inkankla forest. Here, on the i6th August, Mr. 
 Osborn went in search of him, but finding that he 
 was being surrounded by armed men, fell back, 
 and sent a message to him tellinrr him that he had
 
 INTRODUCTION. xxvii 
 
 come to protect liim and to escort him to Esliowe. 
 Cetywayo's reply was couched in a very unsatisfactory 
 and overbearing tone. He said that the whole country 
 belonged to him, that it was all given to him in 
 England, and intimated that he meant to go on in his 
 own way. Finally, on the I5tli October, recognising 
 that circumstances were too strong for him, Cetywayo 
 consented to go " into Mr. Osborn's armpit," or in 
 other words, to accept his protection, and was escorted 
 to Eshowe by Mr. Eynn, who, though he had resigned 
 his position as Eesident, had not yet left Zululand. 
 Here, at Eshowe, the hing remained till he died, 
 nominally of heart disease. 
 
 Meanwhile this state of affairs was not unnaturally 
 viewed with great anxiety by Sir Henry Bulwer. On 
 the 1 6th November we find him writing and telegraph- 
 ing to Lord Derby,^ submitting various alternative plans 
 for the settlement of Zululand, pointing out Cetywayo's 
 violation of the conditions of his restoration, and stating 
 that he sees " no hope of peace or order being maintained 
 in the country unless Cetywayo is removed." Among 
 other things he suggests the extension of the Eeserve 
 Territory, to which Lord Derby replies in much haste 
 that it is " impossible." On the 24th November Lord 
 Derby telegraphs again complaining that he has no 
 means of ascertaining " what party was the strongest." 
 Evidently in its despair the Home Government was 
 coming to the conclusion that force was a remedy 
 1 [C. 3S64], 1 884, p. 224.
 
 xxviii INTRODUCTION". 
 
 and that first priaciples must be allowed to assert 
 themselves. 
 
 MeauNvhile the Boers, who proved to be " the 
 strongest " in the end, were beginning to creep into 
 Zululand. ^ The High Commissioner for South Africa 
 directed Mr. Hudson, the British Eesident at Pretoria, 
 to remonstrate with the Government of the Transvaal 
 as to this encroachment of Dutch burghers upon 
 Zulu territory. The answer of the Boer Government ^ 
 was very plain, and quite in accordance with its 
 traditions. The Boers, they said, were entering Zulu- 
 land without authority, " thus the Government cannot 
 interfere at all in the matter in question." In sending 
 such an answer it knew well that it was dealing with 
 a power that would hoM its hand at remonstrance. 
 
 Hard upon this ominous occurrence followed another 
 great event. On the afternoon of the 8th of February 
 1884, Mr. Osborn was summoned by a messenger 
 who informed him that Cetywayo was very ill. He 
 fetched Dr. Harvie Scott, the senior medical officer 
 of the troops stationed in the Reserve, and together 
 they went to the Jazi kraal, where the king was. 
 Before they arrived they heard that he was dead. 
 Entering they found the corpse of Cetywayo stretched 
 upon a bed and already nearly cold. Tlie doctor 
 wished to hold a post mortem ; it was not allowed by 
 the relatives. So he certified that " it is probable that 
 Cetywayo died from ' syncope, the result of disease 
 
 1 [C. 3S64], 1SS4, pp. 313-316. - [0. 4037], 1SS4, p. 4.
 
 INTRODUCTION. xxix 
 
 of the heart.' " What is still more probable, however, 
 is that he died from the results of poison administered 
 by nobody knows who. Cetywayo was played out, 
 he was no longer serviceable to the Usutu party, and 
 when tyrants cease to be useful and lose their power 
 there are always among their followers men who do 
 not shrink from robbing them of life. Or an open 
 enemy may have done this thing. There is no medical 
 testimony one way or the other. The cleverest doctor 
 in the world cannot in such a case say with certainty 
 what a man died of unless he examines the body, and 
 nobody ever heard that Cetywayo suffered from heart 
 disease. Another suspicious circumstance is that Mr. 
 Osborn, although he was quite close at hand, was not 
 summoned till the king had been dead for some time. 
 He states that his hands were already cold and his 
 body nearly so. Altogether it is my firm belief, 
 gathered from information which I have received, that 
 Cetywayo died by poison, a fact which I believe is 
 not now disputed by those who are in the best posi- 
 tion to know the truth. 
 
 And so Cetywayo, child of Panda, passed from the 
 stage. He was a man of some virtues and many 
 faults, who inherited much of his great uncle Chaka's 
 ferocity without his genius. Eor his breach of the 
 conditions under which he was reinstated in Zululand 
 I for one am not inclined to blame him overmuch, 
 but rather the Government which was weak enough 
 to suppose that a savage potejitate would adhere to
 
 XXX INTRODUCTION. 
 
 sucli conditions. Cetywayo was unfortunate in many 
 things, but in nothing was lie so unfortunate as iu 
 his friends and advisers. Had it not been for these 
 meddlesome people, who either from misplaced sym- 
 pathy and enthusiasm, or from a desire for notoriety, 
 or in order to thwart the Government of Natal, con- 
 tinually encouraged him to fresh acts of folly, it is 
 possible that his history might have had a dil'ferent 
 end. It is possible that he might then have con- 
 sented to be guided by his proper advisers, Sir Henry 
 Bulwer, Mr. Osborn, and Mr. Fynn, and to forego 
 the schemes of aggrandisement that ended in his ruin. 
 But it is useless to discuss possibilities. So died the 
 last king of Zululand. 
 
 Cetywayo's death did not stay the progress of hos- 
 tilities. He was gone, but Dinizulu, his son, remained, 
 and it was, apparently without foundation, put about 
 by the Usutu chiefs that Cetywayo had specially nomi- 
 nated him to be his successor. Accordingly, the war 
 against Usibepu was carried on. But the Usutu party 
 was now not strong enough to deal with Usibepu 
 alone. He had out-geueralled them and twice signally 
 defeated them. Therefore in their rage and hate they 
 cast round for a means of destruction and found it in 
 the Boers. The Boers were ready to take up arms ; 
 indeed, according to their proclamation of 1 6tli August 
 1884,^ they deemed it "a holy duty to accede to the 
 appeals of the Zulu chiefs, in the interests of humanity 
 1 [C. 4214], 1884, p. 85.
 
 INTRODUCTION. xxxi 
 
 and civilisation." In pursuance of this holy duty tliey 
 next, according to their own account, entered Zululand 
 some hundreds strong, crowned Dinizulu, Ceytwayo's 
 son, king, attacked Usibepu and destroyed his people, 
 and in pursuance of a certain agreement of 23d May 
 1884, took as their reward over three million acres of 
 land, or somewhere about half of the Zulu country. 
 
 Of course these shameful procedings did not escapa 
 the observation of Sir Henry Bulwer. After Cety- 
 wayo's death he earnestly pressed upon Lord Derby the 
 necessity of extending our authority in Zululand, but 
 without the smallest result. Lord Derby, speaking 
 in the name of the Grovernment, absolutely refused to 
 do anything. " Her Majesty's Government," he tele- 
 graphs on the 1 6th May, " adhere to the decision not 
 to extend British sovereignty or protection over Zulu- 
 land." Meanwhile the Usutu party, growing more 
 bold, commenced to molest the Eeserve Zulus. Mr. 
 Osborn remonstrated and in vain. The upshot of it 
 was that early in the morning of the loth May his 
 camp was attacked by about 10,000 Usutus, whom he 
 repulsed with a loss of a hundred men. On the 8th 
 of the same month, just before this event, Sir Henry 
 Bulwer, realising the extraordinary gravity of the 
 situation, telegraphed urgently to Lord Derby.-"- " If 
 we allow Boers to interefere and make Dinizulu king 
 it will be a most serious blow to British power in 
 Africa. They will also become masters of Zululand, 
 * [0. 4037]. 1S84, p. 90.
 
 xxxii INTRODUCTION. 
 
 to the permauent loss of the Zulu people and the 
 great injury of Natal. . . . For the great interests 
 at stake, I submit that we should not leave question 
 to solve itself, and that if action is to be taken the 
 longer delayed the more difficult it vpill be. Situation 
 yet possible to save by proclaiming Zululand part of 
 Her Majesty's dominions." 
 
 But Lord Derby still refused to move. 
 
 Again and again did Sir Henry Bulwer write and 
 telegraph in this sense. He might have spared him- 
 self the trouble. The High Commissioner, also acting 
 from Cape Town, forwarded several complaints more 
 or less feeble to the Transvaal Government, which 
 treated them with polite contempt, utterly refusing 
 to interfere. 
 
 All this while the Boers, who as a people generally 
 know what they want, and are not particular as to 
 the means they employ to get it, were steadily push- 
 ing on. On the ist May 1884 a committee of Dini- 
 zulu's volunteers, as they called themselves, sent an 
 ultimatum to Usibepu requesting him to lay down his 
 arms, and informing him that " we have not come to 
 wage war ; our object is to restore and maintain peace 
 throughout the whole of Zululand." On the 8th May 
 Sir Henry Bulwer, writing to Lord Derby, earnestly 
 advanced the claims of Usibepu to assistance against 
 the threatened attack. " It will," he says/ " indeed 
 be a cruel case if the Usutus, with the aid of a Boer 
 i [C. 4191], 1884, p. 24.
 
 INTRODUCTION. xxxiii 
 
 force, are able to defeat Usibepu. It is feared that 
 they will spare neither age nor sex, that no mercy 
 will be shown, and that the finest people in Zululand 
 will be destroyed. Usibepu will not deserve his fate, 
 and his fate will be a reproach upon us in the native 
 mind which it will not be easy to remove. I would 
 therefore trust that some interposition on our part 
 may yet be in time to avert that fate, and avert the 
 further consequences that will result from it, for there 
 can be no doubt that we shall feel the effect when 
 once we have lost so brave and loyal a friend of the 
 English Government." On the 19th June Lord 
 Derby answers this despatch thus : " You will have 
 learned from the decision conveyed to you in my 
 telegram of the 17th ultimo, that Her Majesty's 
 Government had decided not to sanction military 
 operations beyond the Reserve." 
 
 The " brave and loyal friend of the English Govern- 
 ment," who had been established by the English 
 Government, was to be left to his fate, which he " did 
 not deserve." On the 5th of May it overtook him. 
 The Usutus, assisted by some five hundred of those 
 Boers who had come "to restore and maintain peace," 
 attacked Usibepu at his kraals. At first his warriors 
 drove them back, but the accurate Boer fire was too 
 much for their valour. They were slain by hundreds, 
 men and women together, their cattle were looted, 
 their kraals were burnt, they were utterly destroyed, 
 Usibepu himself barely escaping with his life into the
 
 xxxiv INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Reserve Territory. Here he pleaded liis sad case to 
 Mr. Osborn. " I and my people belong to the 
 English," he said. " I come to ask those to whom I 
 belong to give me armed assistance." He pleaded in 
 vain. The great English people did not hear his cry, 
 spoken in a strange tongue. There is no fouler stain 
 in our history, no not even in South Africa, than this 
 cruel, this wanton and shameless desertion, of a true 
 and gallant friend. The Boers themselves have done 
 nothing quite so black. They at any rate kill and 
 plunder for an end. We had no end to gain unless 
 it was the wretched and paltry end of a few thousand 
 votes which the Government wished to hold or win, 
 and which might have been affected by their taking 
 action. The matter speaks for itself, further comment 
 on it is superfluous. 
 
 On the 1 6th August i 884, Dinizulu, King of Zulu- 
 land by grace of the Boer volunteers, issued a procla- 
 mation in which he makes known that he has ceded 
 to the said volunteers some two million seven hundred 
 .and fifty thousand acres of land wherein to establish 
 an independent Eepublic. This was the heavy price 
 to be paid for the wicked destruction of Usibepu. 
 The proclamation was countersigned by a certain Mr. 
 William Grant, the self-constituted "representative 
 and adviser " of the Zulu nation, who appears to have 
 acted as the agent of the Aborigines Protection Society.^ 
 
 ^ Since the above was written, I have been informed by Mr. Chesson, 
 the secretary of the Aborigines Protection Society, that although his 
 Society was in frequent communication with Mr. Grant, to whom it
 
 INTRODUCTION. xxxv 
 
 ]Mr. Grant's efforts in the cause of Zululand may have 
 been well intentioned, but the method of their execu- 
 tion certainly left much to be desired. The same 
 thing may be said of the Society which he represented, 
 or at any rate with which he was in constant com- 
 munication, and whose support he received. In their 
 eagerness to promote the aggrandisement of the family 
 of Cetywayo they, in my humble judgment, overlooked 
 the true interests of the unfortunate aborigines they 
 were bound to protect. Who can say that respect for 
 the monarchical principle is on the wane, when a desire 
 to see its triumph in the person of a savage king leads 
 kind-hearted and disinterested men to such destructive 
 excesses ? It is, however, more pleasant to believe that 
 they were beguiled by coloured reports into believing 
 that the interests of the Zulu people were identical 
 with those of Cetywayo's family. 
 , Well might the Zulus cry out, as they afterwards did 
 bitterly enough, and more especially the Usutu portion 
 of them. " Save us from our friend," our friend who 
 countersigned a proclamation that robbed us for ever of 
 our birthright. The thing was too much even for the 
 members of the Aborigines Protection Society. On the 
 17th November 1884^ we find them writing to Lord 
 Derby in vehement defence of Mr. Grant. At the 
 
 was introduced by Bishop Colenso, and made official use of liis letters, 
 he was not its agent. He never received money or instructions from 
 the Society, which only attached importance to his views as those of a 
 person having influence with the Zulus 
 1 [0. 4274], 1885, p. 30.
 
 xxxvi INTRODUCTION. 
 
 end of tlieir letter, however, they protest against the 
 alienation of territory, sanctioned if not actually pro- 
 moted by Mr. Grant himself. They " venture to 
 express a hope that Her Majesty's Government will 
 refuse to recognise the validity of the cession of so 
 large a portion of Zululand to adventurers from the 
 Transvaal. That agreement is a clear violation of the 
 conditions which the Government have repeatedly 
 imposed upon the Zulus since the conquest of their 
 country by British arms." 
 
 Quite so ! But why did not the Society foresee all 
 this long before ? Why did it not cut short the 
 philanthropic efforts of Mr. William Grant ? It was 
 now too late, the mischief was done, and on Mr. 
 Grant's shoulders rests a large portion of the responsi- 
 bility, which is one that few would care to carry. 
 The eyes of the Zulus themselves were soon opened 
 in this matter. So soon as the shoe began to pinch, 
 that is, so soon as the Boers took possession of the 
 farms they had marked out, loud was the outcry 
 raised by the Usutu people. They declare and declare 
 again that Mr. Grant deceived them, that they never 
 understood that they were ceding so much land to the 
 Boers. The blue-books are full of such statements, 
 but one example of them will suffice. On August 
 the 4th and 5th, 1886, we find Dinizulu himself, 
 Umnyamana, the Pjime Minister, and other great 
 Usutu chiefs, writing two letters in Zulu to Sir A. E. 
 Havelock, Sir Henry Bulwer's successor in the Gover-
 
 INTRODUCTION. xxxvii 
 
 norship of Natal.' The first of these letters deals 
 with their sad state, and more especially with their 
 treatment at the hands of the Boers. " We are 
 wandering from place to place having nowhere to 
 plant. . . . We shall die and the country will be 
 desolate," they say. Then they complain of the 
 desecration of the grave of Senzangacona, the father 
 of Chaka and Dingaan, " our originator and root." A 
 Boer opened the grave and removed the pots placed 
 with the corpse, than which in Zulu eyes there can 
 be no greater sacrilege. " chief," the letter goes on, 
 " we appeal to you regarding our people. In all 
 the country where there is a Boer — we need not 
 name any one in particular — they are beaten, they 
 are tied up, — men, women, and children; they have 
 wounds on their heads and wheals on their backs, 
 and the eating up of their cattle. With regard to 
 this matter of Mr. Grant's, chief, which says it 
 is we, the head of the Zulu people, who gave tlie 
 Boers our country, he has invented it for us ; he says 
 nothing but untruth; we solemnly swear it and we 
 shall die swearing it." The letter of the following 
 day deals still more fully with the Zulu " representa- 
 tive and adviser." It says that Mr. Grant beguiled 
 them with good words when they were in the position 
 of dead people, " but alas we were but fatally injuring 
 ourselves ; we took up a torpid snako and put it in 
 our bosom, and behold when it became warm it woke 
 1 rc. 49S0], 1SS7, p. 25.
 
 xxxviii INTRODUCTION. 
 
 lip and bit us . . . the document written at tlie 
 lilobane, which is the cause of our ruin, to say that 
 we had given the Boers our country, was written by 
 him. We here wish to swear solemnly in the face of 
 the chief that we know nothing of that letter, and 
 that he never told one single person of its contents." 
 Finally, the letter ends in a formal " wiping out " of 
 the name of Mr. Grant. It will be seen from all this 
 that the relations between the Usutu chiefs and their 
 " representative and adviser " have become a little 
 strained. He is now a " torpid snake," and a person 
 not too particular about the exact truth. 
 
 But all this must not be taken too seriously. It is 
 •wonderful how differently people look at things when 
 they have an object to gain, and when that object has 
 been gained and resulted in their utter ruin. It is 
 possible that Dinizulu and his chiefs did not under- 
 stand the enormous extent of the concessions they 
 were making to the Boers, although Mr. Grant must 
 have understood them well enough. But they did 
 know that they were making concessions, and urged 
 on thereto by the evil advice of their sympathisers 
 and so-called advisers, they in their blind hate against 
 Usibepu, were willing to make them, to their undying 
 sorrow and misfortune. As they have sown so must 
 they reap, and though they were not the only guilty 
 ones all the harvest will be theirs. 
 
 The Boers were not slow in taking advantage of 
 their position. Without delay they mapped out by
 
 INTRODUCTION. xxxix 
 
 far the greater part of central Zululand in farms even 
 down to the sea coast. Then at last Her Majesty's 
 Government determined to do something. Under a 
 treaty made in 1843 with Panda, Cety way o's father, 
 St. Lucia's Bay, a very worthless harbour on the coast 
 of Zululand, was ceded to the English. Lord Derby 
 directed an English man-of-war to proceed thither 
 and hoist the British flag. This accordingly was done. 
 Wandering Boers pulled down or defaced the flag- 
 staffs, and the Government of the Transvaal pro- 
 tested, claiming the bay as its own. But in the end 
 St. Lucia's Bay remained English property. 
 
 Meanwhile the state of Zululand and the encroach- 
 ment of the Boers was awakening universal anxiety. 
 The colonists of Natal almost to a man petitioned 
 either that British rule should be extended over the 
 whole country, or that it should be annexed to Natal. 
 Lord Derby vanished from the Colonial Office, finding, 
 we may hope, more peace than he left behind him, 
 and Lord Granville ruled in his stead. From this 
 time things began to mend a very little. Perhaps 
 the letter of the Bishop of Zululand,^ in which he 
 prays in fervent language, " For God's sake, my lord, 
 in common justice and mercy, take over the whole 
 land and rule it" produced some little effect. Probably 
 Sir Henry Bulwer's two admirable memoranda,^ in 
 v.'hich he sums up the whole recent history of Zulu- 
 land, produced more. At any rate we find Sir 
 
 1 [C. 4913I, 18S7, p. 48. - Ibid. p. I, et sej.
 
 t\ INTRODUCTION. 
 
 A. E. Ilavelock, the new Governor of Natal, ceasing 
 to be abject and adopting a firmer tone with the Boers 
 of tlie jSTew Republic. As Sir Henry Bulwer points out 
 in his memoranda the position was now changed. We 
 had allowed the case against us to go by default. 
 The Boers had occupied Zululand and we had assented 
 to their presence. All that we could do was to make 
 the best terms possible under the conditions. We 
 could insist upon some settlement, nothing more. But 
 a very little while before we might, by merely lifting 
 our finger, have preserved Zululand to the Zulus. We 
 would not do this, now it remained to us to save 
 what we could. 
 
 While Sir A. Havelock negotiated, another untoward 
 incident happened which throws a sufficiently strong 
 light on the treatment the Zulus were meeting with 
 at the hands of the Boers. Dabulamanzi, a brother 
 of Cetywayo's, had a dispute with a Boer about a 
 horse. At the trial he said some words as to the 
 country belonging to Diuizulu, whereon the Field- 
 Cornet arrested him, to be sent, together with his 
 son, to Vrijheid in the escort of two Boers, called 
 Vanderburg and Joubert. After going some way 
 JJabulamanzi, when on the Eeserve Territory, refused 
 to proceed. Thereon A^anderburg fired three shots at 
 him and killed him. He also fired at Umzingeli, the 
 son, but did not hit him. Nothing came of this cruel 
 murder, which, being that of a great chief, excited some 
 attention. Indeed it is difficult to recall a case iu
 
 INTRODUCTION. xli 
 
 wliicli a Buer lias suffered for the murder of an 
 Englishman or a native. The Home Government 
 remonstrates and inquires, in some cases with the 
 result that the accused persons are brought to trial 
 before a Dutch jury and acquitted, and there the 
 matter ends. In the case of Dabulamanzi the autho- 
 rities of the New Eepublic expressed their inability to 
 find the offender. 
 
 On the 1 6th October 1886 the Commissioners 
 charged with powers to act on behalf of the Boers in 
 the New liepublic, entered into conference with Sir 
 A. Havelock with a view of arriving at a settlement 
 of the boundaries of the state which they had carved 
 out of the heart of Zululand. It is neither interest- 
 ing nor useful to trace the negotiations. In the up- 
 shot the Boers, feeling that their claim was not a 
 strong one, and mindful of the altered tone of the 
 Colonial Office, moderated their pretensions to a 
 considerable extent, with the result that instead of 
 getting 4234 square miles of territory as they claimed 
 under the agreements with Dinizulu of 1884, they 
 only got 2854 square miles. Under the circumstances 
 this settlement was as good a one as we could hope 
 to make on behalf of the Zulus ; indeed both Mr. 
 Stanhope, who was then Secretary of the Colonies, and 
 Sir A. Havelock are to be congratulated on it. 
 Matters had been allowed to drift so far, that the Boers 
 could not have been expelled from Zululand without 
 
 i[C. 5143I, 1SS7, p.40.
 
 xlii INTRODUCTION. 
 
 recourse to arms, and as that was held to be out of the 
 question it only remained to make the best bargain 
 possible. Of course the settlement was by no means 
 universally popular. The Natal colonists did not like 
 it, and least of all did the Zulns themselves like it. 
 Thus on the iith November 1886 we find three of 
 the chiefs writing to the Queen, " the Mother of us 
 all," protesting against the cutting off of the country. 
 " We are your children yesterday, to-day, and to- 
 morrow, and for ever. We cry to you as children 
 who have been injured. We cry in the name of the 
 Zulu people." This is all very well, and is, moreover, 
 poetically expressed, but what they forget to add is 
 that the Usutus themselves, Mr. William Grant assist- 
 ing, made this wicked bargain with the Boers where- 
 by a large portion of their tribal inheritance was 
 alienated for ever. They made this bargain, or rather 
 a much worse bargain, in order to enable them to 
 cruelly destroy an unoffending man, Usibepu. And 
 now M'heu the bond has to be fulfilled in part they 
 are loud in their protests. Had it not been for the 
 interference of the English Government the Boers 
 by this time would have had not a third or a half but 
 all of Zululand, and in a very few years the Zulu 
 people would have utterly ceased to be. Of course 
 this argument cannot be pushed too far against the 
 Usutus, for it is the English Government that is 
 really responsible for the partition of Zululand, as 
 it is responsible for every Zulu life that has been
 
 INTEODUGTION. xliii 
 
 lost since the restoration of Cetywayo. The English 
 Government, notwithstanding its solemn obligations 
 towards them, allowed the Zulus to take a road that 
 must lead them to ruin, indeed by restoring Cetywayo 
 it encournged them to do so. Then it stood by with 
 folded hands and watched the inevitable result, which 
 it could at any moment have prevented. It allowed 
 the Boers to enter Zululand and destroy its friend and 
 ally, Usibepu, and finally to occupy the land. So it 
 is not fair to lay all the weight of the national mis- 
 fortune upon the Usutu leaders. Savages are like 
 children endowed with the strength and intellect (as 
 opposed to the intelligence) of men. They long to 
 attain the object of the moment with the passionate 
 longing of a child for a new toy. Their intellect may 
 warn them of the dangers in the path, they may 
 clearly see these dangers, but their intelligence is over- 
 ruled by their desire. Tliey live for the moment 
 and grasp at the advantage of the hour. The spear 
 with which they strike their foe may certainly draw 
 down the lightning on their heads, but they still will 
 strike. In short, there are no human beings who, 
 when they have an interest to serve, are more care- 
 less of the future or who take shorter views than 
 bavages of the Bantu race — unless indeed it is those 
 white men who are from time to time responsible 
 for the efhciency and maintenance of Her Majesty's 
 navy. 
 
 But when all is said and done, Dinizulu and his
 
 xliv INTRODUCTION. 
 
 advisers arc still directly to blame for the partition 
 of Zululand. 
 
 By this time the Colonial Office, now under 
 a regime differing in some particulars from that of 
 Lord Derby, had become convinced of the necessity 
 of action in Zululand. On the 8th February 1887 
 Mr. Osborn notified to the Zulus that Her Majesty's 
 supreme authority and protection was extended over 
 Zululand beyond the borders of the New Eepublic. 
 On the nth May 1887 Sir H. Holland, the last of 
 the series of Colonial Secretaries who have had to deal 
 with South African affairs during the five years since 
 Cetywayo's restoration, telegraphed to Sir A. Havelock 
 authorising him to issue a proclamation annexing 
 Zululand, the New Eepublic, of course, excepted. Tliis 
 proclamation was issued, and received with thankful- 
 ness by tlie natives. Indeed there is only one man 
 in Zululand who can regret this happy change or 
 who shows any sign of giving trouble, and that man 
 is Dinizuln, Cetywayo's son. It is indeed natural that 
 his heart should be sore at seeing himself reduced 
 to the position of a petty pensioned chief under the 
 English Eesident. But it must always be borne in 
 mind that, had not the English Government interfered 
 on his behalf, all Zululand would now have passed to 
 the Boers, and he would have had no place to lay his 
 head. Dinizulu has certainly not behaved in a way 
 to entitle him to special consideration at our hands, 
 and even now he is a source of some anxiety to us.
 
 INTRODUCTION. xlv 
 
 But if the authorities only show that they are in 
 earnest, that there will be no more vacillations of 
 policy, that they have command, and mean to keep it, 
 there is little fear that the personal interests and in- 
 fluence of Dinizulu will ever be allowed to disturb the 
 peace of what is left of Zululand. Should he at any 
 time attempt a rising, which he would scarcely do unless 
 supported by a Boer commando, it is probable that but 
 a very few of the extreme Usutus would be found to 
 follow him, and his influence would be more than 
 counterbalanced by that of Usibepu, now, I believe, 
 restored to his old chieftainship, of course under the 
 authority of the Eesident. Indeed, there is every 
 prospect of stability in the settlement, of which we 
 may say, taking all things into consideration, that it 
 might have been much worse. Most of Zululand has 
 at any rate been saved, and this result we owe almost 
 entirely to the unselfish and ceaseless efforts of Sir 
 Henry Bulwer and Mr. Osborn, who, in face of official 
 callousness and discouragement, opposition, intrigue, 
 and anarchy, for several years continually strove to 
 save the Zulu people from destruction. It is an 
 instance of a truth which will probably have struck 
 most students of recent South African politics, namely, 
 that the history of the country for good and evil has 
 to a very large degree been shaped by the policy 
 and actions of individuals rather than by that of the 
 Home Government. Thus it was Sir Bartle Frere 
 who embarked upon the Zulu war, and Lord Chelms-
 
 xlvi INTRODUCTION. 
 
 ford wlio turned it into a war of disaster. In the 
 same way, it is to Sir George CoUey's rashness that 
 we owe the retrocession of the Transvaal, for it was 
 not till we had been thrice defeated that we began to 
 realise our bloodguiltiness. To come to minor but 
 happier instances, Sir Henry Bulwer and Mr. Osborn 
 saved Zululand ; Sir Marshall Clarke has done the 
 same for Basutoland, and it is scarcely too much to say 
 that we owe the establishment of British Bechuana- 
 land and the salvation of its people to the personal 
 efforts of the Eev. John Mackenzie. In South Africa, 
 as in India and elsewhere, our empire has been built, 
 not by Governments, but by the hands of individuals, 
 and it is to individual ability that we must, to a large 
 extent, look for its maintenance. 
 
 On the 2 1st June 1887, the day of Her Majesty's 
 Jubilee, Mr. Osborn, before an assemblage of some 
 nine thousand Zulus, which included most of those 
 chiefs appointed under the Wolseley settlement who 
 still look upon the light, and several members of the 
 royal family, formally annexed what remains of Zulu- 
 land to the Crown, and hoisted the Union Jack. 
 Thereon each tribe, forming itself into companies, 
 marched past, every company giving to the flag the 
 royal salute of Bayete. It was a happy occasion and 
 a happy day on which to celebrate the annexation, 
 that, in the words of Sir A. Havelock, " will confer 
 upon Zululand those blessings of peace, good order, 
 and good government which are secured by British
 
 INTRODUCTION. xlvii 
 
 rule."^ lu the Zulu people the Queen will, I am con- 
 vinced, find subjects as loyal and as devoted as any 
 that she owns. The country will be no burden on liei 
 treasury, for it can easily be made self-supporting, as 
 the Eeserve already is ; and for so long as it is ruled 
 as Zulus expect to be ruled, with firmness and without 
 vacillation, there is little fear of serious disturbance. 
 It is indeed melancholy to think that this act of 
 common justice and mercy, namely, the extension of 
 our authority, might equally well have taken place 
 at the termination of the Zulu war, or, failing that, 
 on the death of Cetywayo. In that case there would 
 now have been no New Boer Eepublic established in 
 the heart of Zululand, and many thousands of men, 
 women, and children whose bones strew the caves 
 and whiten the veldt would to-day have been alive. 
 But Her Majesty's advisers, in their terror of incurring 
 a responsibility which had already been incurred, would 
 not interfere to save a people and a country. And now, 
 in the end, we have been forced to acknowledge that 
 responsibility and to interfere to save the remnants of the 
 people and such country as the Boers have left to it. 
 
 The recent history of the Transvaal, now once 
 more a republic, "will fortunately admit of much briefer 
 treatment than that of Zululand. It is, so far as 
 England is concerned, very much a history of conces- 
 sion. For an account of the first convention I must 
 refer my readers to the remarks which I have made 
 1 [C. 5 1 43], 18S7, p. 64.
 
 xlviii INTRODUCTION. 
 
 in the chapter of this book headed " The Eetroces- 
 siou of the TransvaaL" It will there be seen that the 
 Transvaal Volksraad only ratified the first convention, 
 which was wrung from us (Sir Evelyn Wood, to his 
 honour be it said, dissenting) after our defeats at 
 Lang's Nek, Ingogo, and Majuba, as a favour to the 
 British Government, which in its turn virtually pro- 
 mised to reconsider the convention, if only the Volks- 
 raad would be so good as to ratify it. This conven- 
 tion was ratified in October 1881. In June 1883 
 the Transvaal Government^ telegraphs briefly to Lord 
 Derby through the High Commissioner that the 
 Volksraad has " resolved that time has come to re- 
 consider convention." Lord Derby quickly telegraphs 
 back that " Her Majesty's Government consent to 
 inquire into the working of convention." Human 
 nature is frail, and it is impossible to help wishing 
 that Lord Palmerston or Disraeli had been appointed 
 by the Fates to answer that telegram. But we have 
 fallen upon different days, and new men have arisen 
 who appear to be suited to them ; and so the conven- 
 tion was reconsidered, and on the 27th of February 
 1884 a new one was signed, which is known as the 
 convention of London. It begins by defining bound- 
 aries to which the " Government of the South African 
 Republic will strictly adhere, . . . and will do its 
 utmost to prevent any of its inhabitants from making 
 any encroachments upon the said boundaries." The 
 ' [C. 3659], 1SS3.
 
 INTRODUCTION. xlix 
 
 existence of the New Eepublic in Zululand is a strik- 
 ing and practical comment on this article. Article ii. 
 also provides for the security of the amended south- 
 west boundary. The proclamation of i6th September 
 1884 (afterwards disallowed by the English Govern- 
 ment), by which the South African Eepublic practically 
 annexed the territories of Montsioa and Moshette, 
 already for the most part in the possession of its free- 
 booters, very clearly illustrates its anxiety to be bound 
 by this provision. Art. xii. provides for the indepen- 
 dence of the Swazis ; and by way of illustrating the 
 fidelity with which it has been observed, we shall pre- 
 sently have occasion to remark upon the determined 
 attempts that have continually been made by Boer free- 
 booters to obtain possession of Swaziland — and so on. 
 In order to make these severe restrictions palatable 
 to the burghers of a free and haughty Eepublic, Lord 
 Derby recommends Her Majesty's Government to re- 
 mit a trifling sum of ;^ 127,000 of their debt due to 
 the Imperial Treasury, which was accordingly done. On 
 the whole, the Transvaal had no reason to be dissatisfied 
 with this new treaty, though really the whole affair 
 is scarcely worth discussing. Convention No. 2 is 
 almost as much a farce and a dead letter as was 
 Convention No. i . It is, however, impossible to avoid 
 being impressed with the really remarkable tone, not 
 merely of equality, but of superiority, adopted by the 
 South African Eepublic and its officials towards this 
 country. To take an instance. The Eepublic had
 
 1 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 found it convenient to wage a war of extermination 
 upon some Kafir chiefs. Two of these, Mampoer and 
 Njabel, fell into its hands. Her Majesty's Government 
 was, rightly or wrongly, so impressed with the injus- 
 tice of the sentence of death passed upon these un- 
 fortunates, that, acting through Mr. Hudson, the British 
 Eesident at Pretoria, it strained every nerve to save 
 them. This was the upshot of it. In a tone of 
 studied sarcasm. His Honour the State President 
 " observes with great satisfaction the great interest in 
 these cases which has been manifested by your Honour 
 and Her Majesty's Government." He then goes on 
 to say that, notwithstanding this interest, Mampoer 
 will be duly and effectually hung, giving the exact 
 time and place of the event, and Njabel imprisoned 
 for life, with hard labour. Finally, he once more con- 
 veys "the hearty thanks of the Government and the 
 members of the Executive Council for the interest 
 manifested in these cases," ^ and remains, &c. 
 
 The independence of Swaziland -was guaranteed by 
 the convention of 1884. Yet the Blue-books are full 
 of accounts of various attempts made by Boers to obtain 
 a footing in Swaziland. Thus in November 1885 
 Umbandine, the king of Swaziland, sends messengers 
 to the Governor of Natal through Sir T. Shepstone, 
 in which he states that in the winter Piet Joubert, 
 accompanied by two other Boers and an interpreter, 
 came to his kraal and asked him to sign a paper " to 
 I [C. 3841], 1884, p 148.
 
 INTRODUCTION. li 
 
 Bay that lie and all the Swazis agreed to go over and 
 recognise the authority of the Boer Government, and 
 have nothing more to do with the English." ^ Um- 
 bandine refused, saying that he looked to and recog- 
 nised the English Government. Thereon the Boers, 
 growing angry, answered, " Those fathers of yours, the 
 English, act very slowly ; and if you look to them for 
 help, and refuse to sign this paper, we shall have 
 scattered you and your people, and taken possession 
 of the land before they arrive. Why do you refuse to 
 sign the paper ? You know we defeated the English 
 at Majuba." Umbandine's message then goes on to 
 say that he recognises the English Government only, 
 and does not wish to have dealings with the Boers. 
 Also, in the following month, we find him making a 
 direct application to the Colonial Office tlirough Mr. 
 David Eorbes,^ praying that his country may be taken 
 under the protection of Her Majesty's GQvernment. 
 
 More than one such attempt to secure informal rights 
 of occupation in Swaziland appears to have been made 
 by the Transvaal Boers. Mr. T. Shepstone, CM G., is 
 at present acting as Eesident to Umbandiue, though 
 he has not, it would seem, any regular commission 
 from the Home Government authorising him to do so, 
 probably because it does not consider that its rights 
 in Swaziland are such as to justify such an assumption 
 of formal authority over the Swazis. However this 
 may be, Umbandine could not have found a better 
 1 [0. 4645], 1886, p. 64. =* Ibid p 70.
 
 lii INTKODUCTION. 
 
 man to protect his interests. Of course, when acts 
 like that of Piet Joubert are reported to the Govern- 
 ment of the South African Eepublic and made the 
 subject of a remonstrance by this country, all know- 
 ledge of them is repudiated, as it was repudiated in 
 the case of the invasion of Zululand. 
 
 It is part of the policy of the Transvaal only to 
 become an accessory after the fact. Its subjects go 
 forth and stir up trouble among the natives, and then 
 probably the Boer Government intervenes " in the in- 
 terests of humanity," and takes, or tries to take, the 
 country. This process is always going on, and, unless 
 the British Government puts a stop to it, always will 
 go on. We shall probably soon hear that it is de- 
 veloping itself in the direction of Matabeleland. A 
 country the size of France, which could without diffi- 
 culty accommodate a population of from eight to ten 
 millions of industrious folk, is not large enough for 
 the wants of a Boer people, numbering something 
 under fifty thousand souls. Every young Boer must 
 have his six or more thousand acres of land on which 
 to lord it. It is his birthright, and if it is not forth- 
 coming he goes and takes it by force from the nearest 
 native tribe. Hence these continual complaints. Of 
 course, there are two ways of looking at the matter. 
 There is a party that does not hesitate to say that the 
 true policy of this country is to let the Boers work 
 their will upon the natives, and then, as they in turn 
 fly from civilisation towards the far interior, to follow
 
 INTRODUCTION. liii 
 
 on their path and occupy the lands that they have 
 swept. This plan is supported by arguments about the 
 superiority of the white races and their obvious destiny 
 of rule. It is, I confess, one that I look upon as little 
 short of wicked. I could never discern a superiority 
 so great in ourselves as to authorise us, by right divine 
 as it were, to destroy the coloured man and take his 
 lands. It is difficult to see why a Zulu, for instance, 
 has not as much right to live in his own way as a 
 Boer or an Englisliman. Of course, there is another 
 extreme. Nothing is more ridiculous than the length 
 to which the black brother theory is sometimes driven 
 by enthusiasts. A savage is one thing, and a civilised 
 man is another ; and though civilised men may and do 
 become savages, I personally doubt if the converse is 
 even possible. But whether the civilised man, with 
 his gin, his greed, and his dynamite, is really so very 
 superior to the savage is another question, and one 
 which would bear argument, although this is not the 
 place to argue it. My point is, that his superiority 
 is not at any rate so absolutely overwhelming as to 
 justify him in the wholesale destruction of the savage 
 and the occupation of his lands, or even in allow- 
 ing others to do the work for him if he can prevent 
 it. The principle might conceivably be pushed to in- 
 convenient and indecent lengths. Savagery is only a 
 question of degree. When all true savages have been 
 wiped out, the most civilised and self-righteous among 
 the nations may begin to give the term to those whom
 
 liv INTRODUCTION. 
 
 they consider to be on a lower scale than themselves, 
 and apply the argument also. Thus there are " cul- 
 tured " people in another land who do not hesitate to 
 say that the humble writers of these islands are rank 
 and rude barbarians not to be endured. Supposing 
 that, being the stronger, they also applied the argwrmnt^ 
 it would be inconvenient for some of us, and perhaps 
 the world would not gain ■ so very much after all. 
 But this is a digression, only excusable, if excusable at 
 all, in one who has endured a three weeks' course of 
 unmitigated Blue-book. To return. 
 
 The process of absorption attempted in Swaziland, 
 and brought to a successful issue in Zululand, also 
 went forward merrily in Bechuanaland, till recently, 
 under the rule of Mankorane, chief of the Batlapius, 
 and Moutsioa, chief of the Baralongs. These two 
 chiefs have always been devoted friends and adhe- 
 rents of the English Government, and consequently are 
 not regarded with favour by the Boers. Shortly after 
 the retrocession of the Transvaal, a rival to Mankorane 
 rose up in the person of a certain Massou, and a 
 rival to Montsioa named Moshette. Both Massou 
 and Moshette were supported by Boer fillibusters, and 
 what happened to Usibepu in Zululand happened to 
 these unfortunate chiefs in Bechuanaland. They were 
 defeated after a gallant struggle, and two Eepublics 
 called Stellaland and Goschen were carved out of 
 their territories and occupied by the fillibusters. 
 fortunately for them, however, they had a friend in
 
 INTRODUCTION. Iv 
 
 the person of the Eev. John Mackenzie, to whose 
 valuable work, " Austral Africa," I beg to refer the 
 reader for a fuller account of these events. Mr. 
 Mackenzie, who had for many years lived as a mis- 
 sionary among the Bechuanas,had also mastered the fact 
 that it is very difficult to do anything for South Africa 
 in this country unless you can make it a question of 
 votes, or, in other words, unless you can bring pressure 
 to bear upon the Government. Accordingly he com- 
 menced an agitation on behalf of Mankorane and Mont- 
 sioa, in which he was supported by various religious 
 bodies, and also by the late Mr. Forster and the 
 Aborigines Protection Society. As a result of this 
 agitation he was appointed Deputy to the High Com- 
 missioner for Bechuanaland, whither he proceeded 
 early in 1884 to establish a British protectorate. He 
 was gladly welcomed by the unfortunate chiefs, who 
 were now almost at their last gasp, and who both of 
 them ceded their rights of government to the Queen. 
 Hostilities did not, however, cease, for on the 3 1 st 
 July 1884 the fillibusters again attacked Montsoia, 
 routed him, and cruelly murdered Mr. Bethell, his 
 English adviser. Meanwhile Mr. Mackenzie's success 
 was viewed with very mixed feelings at the Cape. To 
 the English party it was most acceptable, but the 
 Dutch,^ and more numerous party, looked on it with 
 
 ^ By the Dutch party I mean the anti-Imperial and retrogressive 
 party. It must be remembered that many of the now educated and 
 progrressive Boers do not belong to this.
 
 Ivi INTRODUCTION. 
 
 alarm and disgust. They did not at all wish to see 
 the Imperial power established in Bechuanaland ; so 
 pressure was put upon Sir Hercules Eobinson, and 
 through him on Mr. Mackenzie, to such an extent indeed 
 as to necessitate the resignation of the latter. Thereon 
 the High Commissioner despatched a Cape politician, 
 Mr. Cecil Ehodes, and his own private secretary, 
 Captain Bower, E.N., to Bechuanaland. These gentle- 
 men at once set to work to undo most of what Mr. 
 Mackenzie had done, and, generally speaking, did not 
 advance either British or native interests in Bechuana- 
 land. At this point, taking advantage of the general 
 confusion, the Government of the South African Ee- 
 public issued a proclamation placing both Montsioa 
 and Moshette under its protection, as usual " in the 
 interests of humanity." 
 
 But the agitation in England had, fortunately for 
 what remained of the Bechuana people, not been 
 allowed to drop. Her Majesty's Government dis- 
 allowed the Boer proclamation, under Article iv. of 
 the convention of London, and despatched an armed 
 force to Bechuanaland, commanded by Sir Charles 
 Warren. This good act, I believe I am right in 
 saying, we owe entirely to the firmness of Sir Charles 
 DUke and Mr. Chamberlain, who insisted upon its being 
 done. Meanwhile Messrs. Upington and Sprigg, mem- 
 bers of the Cape Government, hastened to Bechuanaland 
 to effect a settlement before the arrival of Sir Charles 
 Warren's force. This settlement, though it might
 
 INTRODUCTION. Ivii 
 
 have been agreeable to the fillibusters and the anti- 
 Imperialists generally, was disallowed by Her Majesty's 
 Government as unsatisfactory, and Sir Charles Warren 
 was ordered to occupy Bechuanaland. This he accord- 
 ingly did, taking Mr. Mackenzie with him, very much 
 against the will of the anti-English party, and, be it 
 added, of Sir Hercules Eobinson. Indeed, if we may 
 accept Mr. Mackenzie's version of these occurrences, 
 which seems to be a fair one, and adequately supported 
 by documentary evidence, the conduct of Sir Hercules 
 Eobinson towards Mr. Mackenzie would really admit 
 of explanation. As soon as the freebooters saw that 
 the Imperial Government was really in earnest, of 
 course there was no more trouble. They went away, 
 and Sir Charles Warren took possession of Bechuana- 
 land without striking a single blow. He remained in 
 the country for nearly a year arranging for its per- 
 manent pacification and government, and as a result 
 of his occupation, on the 30th September 1885, all 
 the territory south of the Molopo Eiver was declared to 
 be British territory, and made into a quasi crown colony, 
 the entire extent of land, including the districts ruled 
 over by Khama, Sechele, and Gasitsive, being about 
 1 60,000 square miles in area. I believe that the new 
 colony of British Bechuanaland is proving a very con- 
 siderable success. Every provision has been made for 
 native wants, and its settlement goes on apace. There 
 is no reason why, with its remarkable natural advan- 
 tages, it should not one day become a great country,
 
 Iviii INTRODUCTION. 
 
 with a prosperous white, and a loyal and contented 
 native population. When this comes about it is to be 
 hoped that it will remember that it owes its existence to 
 the energy and firmness of Mr. Mackenzie, Sir Charles 
 Dilke, Mr. Chamberlain, and Sir Charles Warren. 
 
 It is probably by now dawning upon the mind of 
 the British public that when we gave up the Trans- 
 vaal we not only did a cowardly thing and sowed a 
 plentiful crop of future troubles, we also abandoned 
 one of the richest, if not the richest, country in the 
 world. The great gold-fields which exist all over 
 the surface of the land are being opened up and 
 pouring out their treasures so fast that it is said that 
 the Transvaal Government, hitherto remarkable for 
 its impecuniosity, does not know what to do with its 
 superfluous cash. To what extent this will continue 
 it is impossible to say, but I for one shall not be sur- 
 prised if the output should prove to be absolutely 
 unprecedented. And with gold in vast quantities, 
 with iron in mountains, and coal-beds to be measured 
 by the scores of square miles, with lead and copper 
 and cobalt, a fertile soil, water, and one of the most 
 lovely climates in the world, what more is required 
 to make a country rich and great ? Only one thing, 
 an Anglo-Saxon Government, and that we have taken 
 away from the Transvaal. Whether the English flag 
 has vanished for ever from its borders is, however, 
 still an open question. The discovery of gold in such 
 quantities is destined to exercise a very remarkable
 
 INTRODUCTION. lix 
 
 influence upon the future of the Transvaal. Where 
 gold is to be found, there the hardy, enterprising, 
 English-speaking diggers flock together, and before 
 them and their energy the Boer retreats, as the native 
 retreats and vanishes before the rifle of the Boer. 
 Already there are many thousands of diggers in the 
 Transvaal ; if the discoveries of gold go on and prove 
 as remunerative as they promise to be, in a few mora 
 years their number will be vastly increased. Sup- 
 posing that another five years sees sixty or seventy 
 thousand English diggers at work in the Transvaal, 
 is it to be believed that these men will in that event 
 allow themselves to be ruled by eight or nine thousand 
 hostile-hearted Boers ? Is it to be believed, too, that 
 the Boers will stop to try and rule them ? From such 
 knowledge as I have of their character I should say 
 certainly not. They will trek, anywhere out of the 
 way of the Englishman and his English ways, and 
 those who do not trek will be absorbed. Should this 
 happen, it is, of course, possible, and even probable, 
 that for some time the diggers, fearing the vacillations 
 of Imperial policy, would prefer to remain independent 
 with a Eepublican form of Government. But the 
 Englishman is a law-abiding and patriotic creature, 
 and as society settled itself in the new community, 
 it would almost certainly desire to be united to the 
 Empire and acknowledge the sovereignty of the Queen. 
 So far as a judgment can be formed, if only the gold 
 holds out the Transvaal will as certainly fall into the
 
 Ix INTRODUCTION. 
 
 lap of the Empire as a green apple will one day drop 
 from the tree — that is, if it is not gathered. 
 
 Now it is quite possible that the Germans, or some 
 other power, may try to gather the Transvaal apple. 
 The Boers are not blind to the march of events, and 
 they dislike us and our rule. Perhaps they might 
 think it worth their while to seek German protection, 
 and unless we are prepared to say " no " very firmly 
 indeed — and who knows, in the present condition of 
 Home politics, what we are prepared to do from one 
 day to another ? — Germany would in such a case almost 
 certainly think it worth her while to give it. Very 
 likely the protection, when granted, would in some ways 
 resemble that which the Boer himself, his breast aglow 
 with love of peace and the " interests of humanity," 
 is so anxious to extend to the misguided native pos- 
 sessor of desirable and well-watered lands. Very likely, 
 in the end, the Boer would be sorry that he did not 
 accept the ills he knew of. But that is neither here 
 nor there. So far as we are concerned, the mischief 
 would be done. In short, should the position arise, 
 everything will depend upon our capacity of saying 
 " no," and the tone in which we say it. It will not 
 do to rely upon our London convention, by which 
 the Transvaal is forbidden to conclude treaties with 
 outside powers without the consent of this Govern- 
 ment. The convention has been broken before now, 
 and will be broken again, if the Boers find it con- 
 venient to break it, and know that they can do so
 
 INTRODUCTION. Ixi 
 
 with impunity. Meanwhile we must rest on our oars 
 and watch events. One thing, however, might and 
 should be done. Some person having weight and real 
 authority — if he were quite new to South Africa so 
 much the better — should be appointed as our Consul 
 to watch over the welfare of Englishmen and our 
 Imperial interests at Pretoria, and properly paid for 
 doing so. It is difficult to find a suitable man unless 
 he is adequately salaried and supported. 
 
 But quite recently this country has awakened to 
 the knowledge that Delagoa Bay is important to its 
 South African interests, though how important it per- 
 haps does not altogether realise. For years and years 
 the colony of Natal has been employed in the inter- 
 mittent construction of a railway with a very narrow 
 gauge, which is now open as far as Ladysmith, or 
 to within a hundred miles of the Transvaal border. 
 Natal is very poor, and in common with the rest of 
 South Africa, and indeed of the world, has lately been 
 passing through a period of great commercial depres- 
 sion. The Home Government has refused to help it 
 to construct its railways (if it had done so, how many 
 hundreds of thousand pounds would have been saved 
 to the British taxpayer during the Zulu and Boer 
 wars !), and has equally refused to allow it to borrow 
 sufficient money to get them constructed, with the 
 result that a large amount of the interior trade has 
 already been deflected into other channels. And now 
 a fresh and very real danger, not only to Natal, but to
 
 Ixii INTRODUCTION. 
 
 all Imperial interests in South Africa, has sprung into 
 sudden prominence, that is, in this country, for in Africa 
 it has been foreseen for many years. Above Zululand 
 is situated Amatongaland, which reaches to the southern 
 shore of one of the finest harbours in the world, 
 Delagoa Bay. This great bight, in which half a dozen 
 navies could ride at anchor, the only really good haven 
 on the coasts of South Africa, is fifty-five miles in 
 width and twenty in depth, that is, from east to west. 
 It is separated from the Transvaal, of which it is the 
 natural port, by about ninety miles of wild and sparsely 
 inhabited country. 
 
 The ownership of this splendid port was for many 
 years in dispute between this country and the Portu- 
 guese, with whose dominions of Mozambique it is con- 
 nected by a strip of coast, and who have a small 
 fort upon it. This dispute was finally referred by 
 Lord Granville in 1872 to the decision of Marshal 
 MacMahon, and on this occasion, as on every other 
 in which this country has been weak enough to go to 
 arbitration, that decision was given against us. Into 
 the merits of the case it is not necessary to enter, 
 further than to say, as has already been recently 
 pointed out by a very able and well-informed corre- 
 spondent of the Morning Post, that it is by no means 
 clear by what right the matter was referred to arbitra- 
 tion at all. The Amatongas are in possession of the 
 southern shore of the bay, including, I believe, the 
 Inyack Peninsula and Inyack Island, and they are
 
 INTRODUCTION. Ixiii 
 
 an independent people. The Swazis also abut on it, 
 and they are independent. What warrant had we 
 to refer their rights to the arbitration of Marshal 
 MacMahon ? The evidence of the exercise of any 
 Portuguese sovereignty over these countries is so 
 shadowy that it may be said never to have existed ; 
 certainly it does not exist now. This is a point, but 
 it is nothing more. We must take things as we find 
 them, and we find that the Portuguese have been for- 
 mally declared and admitted by us to be the owners 
 of Delagoa Bay. 
 
 Now, so long as we held the Transvaal it did 
 not so much matter who had the sovereignty of the 
 Bay, since a railway constructed from there could 
 only run to British territory. But we gave up the 
 Transvaal, which is now virtually a hostile state, 
 and the contingency which has been so long foreseen 
 in South Africa, and so blindly overlooked at home, 
 has come to pass — the railway is in course of rapid 
 completion. What does this mean to us ? At the 
 best, it means that we lose the greater part of the trade 
 of South-eastern Africa; at the worst, that we lose 
 it all. In other words, it means, putting aside the 
 question of our Imperial needs and status in Africa, a 
 great many millions a year in hard cash out of the 
 national pocket. Let us suppose that the worst hap- 
 pens, and that the Germans get a footing either in 
 the Transvaal or Delagoa Bay. Obviously they will 
 stop our trade in favour of their own. Or let us
 
 Ixiv INTRODUCTION. 
 
 suppose that the Transvaal takes advantage of one of 
 our spasms of Imperial paralysis, such as afflicted us 
 during the regime of Lord Derby, and defies the pro- 
 vision in the convention which forbids them to put a 
 heavier tax upon our goods than upon those of any 
 other nation. In either event our case would be a 
 bad one, for our road from the eastern coast to the 
 vast interior is blocked. But it is of little use crying 
 over spilt milk, or anticipating evils which it is our 
 duty to try to avert, and which in all probability 
 still could be averted by a sound and consistent 
 policy. 
 
 To begin with, both Swaziland and Amatongaland 
 can be annexed to the Empire. It is true that the in- 
 dependence of the first of these countries is guaranteed 
 by Article xii. of the convention of London of 1884. 
 Here is the exact wording : — " The independence of 
 the Swazis within the boundary-line of Swaziland, as 
 indicated in the first article of this convention, will 
 be fully recognised." But England has for years 
 exercised a kind of protective right over Swaziland — 
 a right, as I have already shown, fully acknowledged 
 and frequently appealed to by the Swazis themselves. 
 And for the rest, what is the obvious meaning of this 
 provision ? It means that the independence of Swazi- 
 land is guaranteed against Boer encroachments ; its 
 object was to protect the Swazis from extermination 
 at the hands of the Boers. Further, the Boers have 
 again and again broken this article of the convention
 
 INTRODUCTION. Ixv 
 
 in their repeated attempts to get a foothold in Swazi- 
 land. It has now become necessary to our interests 
 uhat the Swazis should come under our rule, as indeed 
 they are most anxious to do, and a way should be 
 found by which this end can be accomplished. 
 
 Then as to Amatongaland, or Maputaland, as it is 
 sometimes called, only a month or two ago an 
 embassy from the Queen of that country waited on 
 the Colonial Office, praying for British protection. It 
 is not known what answer they received ; let us trust 
 ^hat it was a favourable one.^ The protection that 
 should be accorded to the Amatongas, both in their 
 interests and our own, is annexation to the British 
 Empire upon such terms as might be satisfactory to 
 them. The management of their country might be 
 left to them, subject to the advice of a Eesident, and 
 the enforcement of the ordinary laws respecting life 
 and property common to civilised states. Drink and 
 white men might be strictly excluded from it, unless 
 the Amatongas should wish to welcome the latter. But 
 the country, with its valuable but undefined rights over 
 Dolagoa Bay, should belong to England, for whoever 
 owns Swaziland and Amatongaland will in course of 
 time be almost certain to own the Bay also. It must 
 
 ' I understand that the treaty which we have concluded with 
 A.matongaland (where, by the way, it is said a new harbour has been 
 liscovered) binds the authorities of that country not to cede territory 
 o any other Power. But there is nothing in such a treaty to prevent, 
 ;ay Portugal or the Boers, from taking possession of the land by force 
 if arms. Were the country annexed to the Crown, or a British Pro- 
 cctorate established, they would not dare to do this.
 
 Ixvi INTRODUCTION. 
 
 further be remembered that circumstances have already 
 given us certain rights over the Amatongas. They 
 regarded Cetywayo as their suzerain, and it was, I 
 believe, at his instance that Zambila was appointed 
 regent during the minority of her son. As we have 
 annexed what remains of Zululand, Cetywayo's suze- 
 rainty has consequently passed to us. 
 
 Meanwhile, can nothing be done by direct treaty 
 with the Portuguese ? A little while ago the Bay 
 could no doubt have been acquired for a very mode- 
 rate consideration, but those golden opportunities have 
 been allowed to slip from hands busy weaving the web 
 of party politics. Now it is a different affair. Delagoa 
 Bay is of no direct value to Portugal except for the 
 honour and glory of the thing. Portugal has never 
 done anything with it, any more than she has with 
 her other African possessions, and never will do any- 
 thing with it. But it has become very valuable, 
 indeed, so far as its South African interests are con- 
 cerned, almost vital, to this country, and of that fact 
 Portugal is perfectly well aware. Consequently, if 
 we want the Bay we must pay for it, if not in cash, 
 at the offer of which the Portuguese national pride 
 might be revolted, then in some other equivalent. 
 Surely a power like England could find a way of 
 obliging one like Portugal in return for this small 
 concession. Or an exchange of territory might be 
 effected. Perhaps Portugal might be inclined to 
 accept of some of our possessions on the West Coast
 
 INTRODUCTION. Ixvii 
 
 or an island or two in the West Indies. It is hard 
 to suppose that there is no way out of the trouble ; 
 but if indeed there is none, why, then, one must be 
 found, or we must be content to lose a great part of 
 our African trade. 
 
 The reader who has followed me through this brief 
 and imperfect summary of recent events in South 
 Africa will see how varied are its interests, how 
 enormous its areas, and how vast its wealth. In that 
 great country England is still the paramount power. 
 Her prestige has, indeed, been greatly shaken, and she is 
 sadly fallen from her estate of eight or nine years gone. 
 But she is still paramount ; and if she has to face the 
 animosity of a section of the Boers, she can, notwith- 
 standing her many crimes against them, set against it 
 the love and respect of every native in the land, with the 
 exception, perhaps, of a few self-seekers and intriguers. 
 The history of the next twenty years, and perhaps of 
 the next ten, will decide whether this country is to 
 remain paramount or whether South Africa is to be- 
 come a great Dutch, English-hating Eepublic. There 
 are some who call themselves Englishmen, and who 
 possessed by that strange itch which prompts them to 
 desire any evil that can humble their country in the 
 face of her enemies, or can bring about the advantage 
 of the rebel to the injury of the loyal subject, to whom 
 this last event would be most welcome, and who have 
 not hesitated to say that it would be welcome. To 
 such there is nothing to be said. Let them follow
 
 Ixviii INTRODUCTION. 
 
 their false lights and earn the wonder of true-hearted 
 men and the maledictions of posterity. 
 
 But, addressing those of other and older doctrines, 
 I would ask what such an event would mean ? It 
 would mean nothing less than a great national cala- 
 mity; it would mean the utter ruin of the native 
 tribes ; and, to come to a reason which has a wider 
 popularity, for as I think Mr. S. Little says in his 
 work on South Africa, " the argument to the pocket is 
 the best argument to the man," it would mean the loss 
 of a vast trade, which, if properly protected, will be 
 growing while we are sleeping And this calamity can 
 yet be averted ; the mistakes and cowardice of the past 
 can still be remedied, at any rate to a great extent ; 
 the door is yet open. We have many difficulties to 
 face, among the chief of which are the Transvaal, the 
 question of Delagoa Bay, and last, but not least, the 
 question of the Dutch party at the Cape, which may be 
 numerically the strongest party. When, in our mania 
 for representative institutions, we thrust responsible 
 government upon the Cape, we placed ourselves 
 practically at the mercy of any chance anti-English 
 majority. It is possible that in the future we may 
 find some such majority urging upon an English 
 Ministry the desirability of the separation of the Cape 
 Colony from the Empire, and may find also that the 
 prayer meets with favourable attention from those to 
 whom there is but one thing sacred, the rights of a 
 majority, and especially of an agitating majority.
 
 INTRODUCTION. Ixix 
 
 But let not the country be deceived by any such 
 representations. The natives too have a ri<iht to a 
 voice in the disposal of their fortunes and their lands. 
 They are the majority in the proportion of three to 
 one, and let any doubter go and ask of them, any- 
 where from the Zambesi to Cape Agulhas, whether 
 they would rather be ruled by the Queen or by a 
 Boer Eepublic, and hear the answer. When it was 
 a question of surrendering the Transvaal we heard a 
 great deal of the rights of some thirty thousand Boers, 
 and very little, or rather nothing, of the rights of the 
 million natives who lived in the country with them, 
 and to whom that country originally belonged. And 
 yet, if the reader will turn to that part of this book 
 which deals with the question, he will find that they 
 had an opinion, and a strong one. No settlement of 
 South African questions that does not receive adequate 
 consideration from a native point of view can be a 
 just settlement, or one which the Home Government 
 should sanction. Moreover, the Cape is not by any 
 means entirely anti-English at heart, as was shown 
 clearly enough by the number and enthusiasm of the 
 loyalist meetings when its Ministry was attempting 
 to undo Mr. Mackenzie's work in Bechuanaland in 
 the interests of the Patriot-party. 
 
 Still, it is possible that movements may arise under 
 the fostering care of the Africander Bond and its sym- 
 pathisers, having for object the separation of the colony 
 from the Empire, or other ends fatal to Imperial in-
 
 Ixx INTRODUCTION. 
 
 terests ; and in this case the Home Government should 
 be prepared to disallow and put a final stop to them. 
 We cannot afford to lose our alternative route to India 
 and to throw these great territories into the hands of 
 enemies, from which they would very probably pass into 
 those of commercial rivals. In such an event all that 
 would be required is a show of firmness. If once it 
 was known that an English Ministry really meant what 
 it said, and that its promises made in the Queen's name 
 were not liable to be given the lie by a succeeding 
 set of politicians elected on another platform, there 
 would be an end to disloyalty and agitation in South 
 Africa. As it is, loyalists, remembering the experiences 
 of the last few years, are faint-hearted, never knowing 
 if they will meet with support at home, while agitators 
 and enemies wax exceeding bold. 
 
 Our system of party government, whatever may be its 
 merits, if any,as applied to Home politics, is agreatenemy 
 to the welfare and progress of our Colonies, the affairs 
 of which are, especially of late years, frequently used as 
 stalking-horses to cover an attack upon the other side. 
 Could not the two great parties agree to rule Colonial 
 affairs, and especially South African affairs, out of the 
 party game ? Could not the policy of the Colonial Office 
 be guided by a Commission composed of members of 
 different political opinions, and responsible not to party, 
 but to Parliament and the country, instead of by a 
 succession of Ministers as variable and as transitory 
 as shadows ? Lord Eosebery and Mr. Chamberlain,
 
 INTRODUCTION. Ixxi 
 
 for instance, are Eadicals ; but, putting aside party 
 tactics and exigencies, are their views upon Colonial 
 matters so widely different from those of, let us say, 
 Sir Michael Hicks Beach and Lord Carnarvon that it 
 would be impossible for these four gentlemen to act 
 together on such a Commission ? Surely they are not ; 
 and perhaps a day may come when the common-sense 
 of the country will lead it to adopt some such system 
 which would give to the Colonies a fixed and intelli- 
 gent control aiming at the furtherance of the joint 
 interests of the Empire and its dependencies. If it ever 
 does, that day will be a happy one for all concerned. 
 
 Meanwhile, there is .so far as South Africa is con- 
 cerned, a step that might be taken to the great benefit 
 of that country, and also of our Imperial aims, and 
 that is the appointment of a High Commissioner who 
 would have charge of all Imperial as distinguished 
 from the various Colonial interests. This appointment 
 has already been advocated with ability by Mr. 
 Mackenzie in the last chapter of bis book, " Austral 
 Africa," and it is undoubtedly one that should receive 
 the consideration of the Government. Such an officer 
 would not supersede the Governors of the various 
 colonies or the administrators of the native territories, 
 although, so far as Imperial interests were concerned, 
 they would be primarily responsible to him. At present 
 there is no central authority except the Colonial Office, 
 and Downing Street is a long way off and somewhat 
 overworked. Each Governor must necessarily look at
 
 Ixxii INTRODUCTION. 
 
 South African affairs from his own standpoint and 
 througli local glasses. What is wanted is a man of 
 the first ability, whose name would command respect 
 abroad and support at home; and several such men could 
 be found, who would study South African politics as a 
 whole as an engineer studies a map, and who would set 
 himself to conciliate and reconcile all interests for the 
 common welfare and the welfare of the mother-country. 
 Such a man, or rather a succession of such men, might, 
 if properly supported, succeed in bringing about a 
 very different state of affairs from that which has beeu 
 briefly reviewed and considered in these pages. They 
 might, little by little, build up a South African Con- 
 federation, strong in itself and loyal to England, that 
 shall in time become a great empire. For my part, 
 notwithstanding the difiBculties and dangers which we 
 have brought upon ourselves, and upon the various 
 South African territories and their inhabitants, I be- 
 lieve that such an empire is destined to arise, and that 
 it will not take the form of a Dutch Eepublic. 
 
 H. RIDER HAGGARD. 
 
 2Sth January 1888.
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 The writer on Colonial Affairs is naturally, to some extent, 
 discouraged by the knowledge that the subject is an un- 
 attractive one to a large proportion of the reading public. 
 It is difficult to get up anything beyond a transient interest 
 in the affairs of our Colonial dependencies; indeed, I believe 
 that the mind of the British public was more profoundly 
 moved by the exodus of Jumbo, than it would be were one 
 of them to become the scene of some startling catastrophe. 
 This is the more curious, inasmuch as, putting aside all 
 sentimental considerations, which indeed seem to be out 
 of harmony with the age we live in, the trade done, even 
 with such comparatively insignificant colonies as our South 
 A-frican possessions, amounts to a value of many millions 
 of pounds sterling per annum. Now, as the preachers of 
 the new gospel that hails from Birmingham and North- 
 ampton have frequently told us, trade is the life-blood of 
 England, and must be fostered at any price. It is there- 
 fore surprising that, looking on them in the light of a com- 
 mercial speculation, in which aspect (saith the preacher) 
 they are alone worthy of notice, a keener interest is not 
 taken in the well-being and development of the Colonies. 
 We have only to reflect to see how great are the advantages 
 that the Mother Country derives from the possession of 
 her Colonial Empire : including, as they do, a home for 
 her surplus children, a vast and varied market for her
 
 Ixxiv PEEFACE. 
 
 productions, and a wealth of old-fashioned loyalty and 
 deep attachment to the Old Country — " home," as it is 
 always called — which, even if it is out of date, might 
 prove useful on emergency. It seems, therefore, almost a 
 pity that some Right Honourable Gentlemen and their 
 followers should adopt the tone they do with reference to 
 the Colonies. After all, there is an odd shuffling of the 
 cards going on now in England ; and great as she is, her 
 future looks by no means sunny. Events in these latter 
 days develop themselves very quickly; and though the 
 idea may, at the present moment, seem absurd, surely it 
 is possible that, what between the rapid spread of Radical 
 ideas, the enmity of Ireland, the importation of foreign 
 produce, and the competition of foreign trade, to say 
 nothing of all the unforeseen accidents and risks of the 
 future, the Englishmen of, say, two generations hence, 
 may not find their country in her present proud position. 
 Perhaps, and stranger things have happened in the his- 
 tory of the world, she may by that time be under the pro- 
 tection of those very Colonies for which their forefathers 
 had such small affection. 
 
 The position of South Africa with reference to the 
 Mother Country is somewhat different to that of her sister 
 Colonies, in that she is regarded, not so much with apathy 
 tinged with dislike, as with downright disgust. This feel- 
 ing has its foundation in the many troubles and expenses 
 in which this country has been recently involved, through 
 local complications in the Cape, Zululand, and the Trans- 
 vaal : and indeed is little to be wondered at. But, whilst 
 a large portion of the press has united with a powerful 
 party of politicians in directing a continuous stream of 
 abuse on to the heads of the white inhabitants of South 
 Africa, whom they do not scruple to accuse of having 
 created the recent disturbances in order to reap a money
 
 PREFACE. Ixxv 
 
 profit from them, it does not appear to have struck any- 
 body that the real root of this crop of troubles might, after 
 all, be growing nearer home. The truth of the matter is, 
 that native and other problems in South Africa have, till 
 quite lately, been left to take their chance, and solve 
 themselves as best they might ; except when they have, 
 in a casual manner, been made the corpus vile of some 
 political experiment. It was during this long period of 
 inaction, when each difiiculty — such as the native question 
 in Natal — was staved off to be dealt with by the next 
 Government, that the seed was sown of which we are at 
 present reaping the fruit. In addition to this, matters 
 have recently been complicated by the elevation of South 
 African affairs to the dignity of an English party question. 
 Thus, the Transvaal Annexation was made use of as a 
 war-cry at the last general election, a Boer rebellion was 
 thereby encouraged, which resulted in a complete reversal 
 of our previous policy. 
 
 Now, if there is any country dependent on England that 
 requires the application to the conduct of its affairs of a 
 firm, considered, and consistent policy, that country is 
 South Africa. Boers and Natives are quite incapable of 
 realising the political necessities of any of our parties, or 
 of understanding why their true interests should be sacri- 
 ficed in order to minister to those necessities. It is our 
 wavering and uncertain policy, as applied to peoples, who 
 look upon every hesitating step as a sign of fear and failing 
 dominion, that, in conjunction with previous postponement 
 and neglect, has really caused our troubles in South Africa. / 
 For so long as the affairs of that country are influenced by 
 amateurs and sentimentalists, who have no real interest in 
 it, and whose knowledge of its circumstances and conditions 
 of life is gleaned from a few blue-books, superficially got 
 Up to enable the reader to indite theoretical articles to the
 
 Ixxvi PREFACE. 
 
 Nineteenth Centimj, or deliver inaccurate speeches in 
 the House of Commons — for so long will those troubles 
 continue. 
 
 If I may venture to make a suggestion, the affairs of 
 South Africa should be controlled by a Board or Council, 
 like that which formerly governed India, composed of 
 moderate members of both parties, with an admixture of 
 men possessing practical knowledge of the country. I 
 do not know if any such arrangement would be possible 
 under our constitution, but the present system of govern- 
 ment, by which the control of savage races fluctuates in 
 obedience to every variation of English party politics, is 
 y^ most mischievous in its results. 
 
 The public, however, is somewhat tired of South Africa, 
 and the reader may, perhaps, wonder why he should be 
 troubled with more literature on the subject. I can assure 
 him that these pages are not written in order to give me 
 an opportunity of airing my individual experiences or 
 ideas. Their object is shortly — i. To give a true history 
 of the events attendant on the Annexation of the Transvaal, 
 which act has so frequently been assigned to the most 
 unworthy motives, and has never yet been fairly described 
 by any one who was in a position to know the facts. 
 2. To throw as much publicity as possible on the present 
 disgraceful state of Zululand, resulting from our recent 
 settlement in that country. 3. To show all interested in 
 the Kafir races what has been the character of our recent 
 surrender in the Transvaal, and what its effect will be on 
 our abandoned native subjects living in that country. 
 
 It may, perhaps, seem an odd statement, considering that 
 I have lived in various parts of South Africa for about six 
 years, and have, perhaps, enjoyed exceptional advantage 
 in forming my opinions, when I say that my chief fear 
 in publishing the present volume, is lest my knowledge
 
 PREFACE. Ixxvii 
 
 of my subject in all its bearings should not be really equal 
 to the task. It is, I know, the fashion to treat South 
 African difficulties as being simple of solution. Thus it 
 only took Sir Garnet Wolseley a few weeks to understand 
 the whole position of Zulu affairs, and to execute his 
 memorable settlement of that country : whilst eminent 
 writers appear to be able, in scampering from Durban vid 
 Kimberley to Cape Town in a post-cart, to form decided 
 opinions upon every important question in South Africa. 
 The power of thus rapidly assimilating intricate knowledge, 
 and of seeing straight through a wall whilst ordinary in- 
 dividuals are still criticising the bricks, is no doubt one 
 of the peculiar privileges of genius — which is, perhaps 
 fortunately for South Africa, rare. To the common run 
 of mind, however, the difficulty of forming a sound and 
 accurate judgment on the interlacing problems that dis- 
 close themselves to the student of the politics of South- 
 Eastern Africa, is exceedingly great and the work of years. 
 
 But although it is by no means perfect, I think that my 
 knowledge of these problems and of their imminent issues 
 is sufficiently intimate to justify me in making a prophecy 
 — namely, that unless the native and other questions of 
 South-Eastern Africa are treated with more honest intelli- 
 gence, and on a more settled plan than it has hitherto been 
 thought necessary to apply to them, the British taxpayer 
 will find that he has by no means heard the last of that 
 country and its wars. / 
 
 There is one more point to which, although it hardly 
 comes within the scope of this volume, I have made some 
 allusion, and which I venture to suggest deserves the con- 
 sideration of thinking Englishmen. I refer to the question 
 of the desirability of allowing the Dutch in South Africa, 
 who are already numerically the strongest, to continue to 
 advance with such rapid strides towards political supremacy.
 
 •i 
 
 Ixxviii PREFACE. 
 
 That the object of this party is to reduce Englishmen and 
 English ideas to a subordinate position in the State, if not 
 actually to rid itself of our rule and establish a republic, 
 there is no manner of doubt. Indeed, there exists a 
 powerful organisation, the Africander Bond, which has its 
 headquarters in the Cape, and openly devotes its energies 
 to forwarding these ends, by offering a sturdy opposition 
 to the introduction of English emigrants and the use 
 of the English language, whilst striving in every way to 
 excite class prejudices and embitter the already strained 
 relations between Englishman and Boer. In considering 
 this question, it is as well not to lose sight of the fact that 
 the Dutch are, as a body, at heart hostile to our rule, chiefly 
 because they cannot tolerate our lenient behaviour to the 
 native races. Should they by any chance cease to be the 
 subjects of England, they will, I believe, become her open 
 enemies. This of itself would be comparatively unimpor- 
 tant, were it not for the fact that, in the event of the 
 blocking of the Suez Canal, it would be, to say the least, 
 inconvenient that the Cape should be in the hands of a 
 hostile population. 
 
 In conclusion, I wish to state that this book is not 
 written for any party purpose. I have tried to describe 
 a state of affairs which has for the most part come under 
 my own observation, and events in which I have been 
 interested, and at times engaged. That the naked truths 
 of such a business as the Transvaal surrender, or of the 
 present condition of Zululand, are unpleasant reading for 
 an Englishman, there is no doubt ; but, so far as these 
 pages are concerned, they owe none of their ugliness to 
 undue colouring or political bias. 
 
 Windham Club, St. James' Square, 
 June 1882.
 
 CETYWAYO AND THE ZUEU 
 SETTLEMENT.
 
 CETYWAYO AND THE ZULU 
 SETTLEMENT. 
 
 ZuLULAND and the Zulu settlement still continue to 
 receive some attention from the home public, partly 
 because those responsible for the conduct of affairs 
 are not quite at ease about it, and partly because of 
 the agitation in this country for the restoration of 
 Cetywayo. 
 
 Tliere is no doubt that the present state of affairs 
 in Zululand is a subject worthy of close consideration, 
 not only by those officially connected with them, but 
 by the public at large. Nobody, either at home or in 
 the colonies, wishes to see another Zulu war, or any- 
 thing approaching to it. Unless, however, the affairs 
 of Zululand receive a little more attention, and are 
 superintended with a little more humanity and intel- 
 ligence than they are at present, the public will sooner 
 or later be startled by some fresh catastrophe. Then 
 will follow the usual outcry, and the disturbance will 
 be attributed to every cause under the sun except the 
 riglit one — want of common precautions. 
 
 The Zulu question is a very large one, and I only 
 propose discussing so much of it as is necessary to 
 the proper consideration of the proposed restoration of 
 Cetywayo to his throne. 
 
 A
 
 2 CETYWAYO 
 
 The king is now coming to England,^ where he will 
 doubtless make a very good impression, since his appear- 
 ance is dignified, and his manners, as is common among 
 Zuhis of high rank, are those of a gentleman. It is 
 probable that his visit will lead to a popular agitation. 
 in his favour, and very possibly to an attempt on the 
 part of the English Government to reinstate him in his 
 kingdom. Already Lady Florence Dixie waves his 
 banner, and informs the public through the columns of 
 the newspapers how good, how big, and how beautiful 
 he is, and " E. W. G. X." describes in enthusiastic 
 terms his pearl-like teeth. But as there are interests 
 involved in the question of his reinstatement which 
 are, I think, more important than Cetywayo's personal 
 proportions of mind or body, and as the results of such 
 a step would necessarily be very marked and far-reach- 
 ing, it is as well to try and understand the matter in all 
 its bearings before anything is done. 
 
 There has been a great deal of special pleading about 
 Cetywayo. Some writers, swayed by sentiment, and 
 that spirit of partisanship that the sight of royalty in 
 distress always excites, whitewash him in such a per- 
 sistent manner that their readers are left under the 
 impression that the ex-king is a model of injured 
 innocence and virtue. Others again, for political 
 reasons, paint him very black, and predict that his 
 restoration would result in the destruction, or at the 
 least, disorganisation, of our South African empire. The 
 
 ' Since the above was written the Government have at the lafst 
 moment decided to postpone Cetywayo's visit to this country, chiefly 
 on account of the political capital which was being made out of the 
 event by agitators in Zululand. Tlie project of bringing the king to 
 England does not, however, appear to have been abandoned.
 
 AND THE ZULU SETTLEMENT. 3 
 
 truth in this, as in the majority of political controversies, 
 lies somewhere between these two extremes, though it 
 is difficult to say exactly where. 
 
 To understand the position of Cetywayo both with 
 reference to his subjects and the English Government, 
 it will be necessary to touch, though briefly, on the 
 history of Zululand since it became a nation, and also 
 on the principal events of the ex-king's reign. 
 
 Chaka, Cetywayo's great uncle, was the first Zulu 
 king, and doubtless one of the most remarkable men 
 that has ever filled a throne since the days of the 
 Pharaohs. "When he came to his chieftainship, about 
 181 3, the Zulu people consisted of a single small tribe ; 
 when his throne became vacant in 1828, their name 
 had become a living terror, and they were the greatest 
 Black power in South Africa. The invincible armies of 
 this African Attila had swept north and south, east and 
 west, had slaughtered more than a million human beings, 
 and added vast tracts of country to his dominions. 
 Wherever his warriors went, the blood of men, women, 
 and children was poured out without stay or stint; 
 indeed he reigned like a^yisible Death, the presiding 
 genius of a saturnalia of slaughter. 
 
 His methods of government and warfare were pecu- 
 liar and somewhat drastic, but most effective. As he 
 conquered a tribe, he enrolled its remnants in his army, 
 so that they miglit in their turn help to conquer others. 
 He armed his regiments with the sliort stabbing assegai, 
 instead of the throwing assegai which they had been 
 accustomed to use, and kept them subject to an iron dis- 
 cipline. If a man was observed to show the slightest 
 hesitation about coming to close quarters with the 
 enemy, he was executed as soon as the figlit was over.
 
 4 CETYWAYO 
 
 If a regiment had the misfortune to be defeated, whether 
 by its own fault or not, it would on its return to head- 
 quarters find that a goodly proportion of the wives and 
 children belonging to it had been beaten to death by 
 Chaka's orders, and that he was waiting their arrival 
 to complete his vengeance by dashing out their brains. 
 The result was, that though Ohaka's armies were occa- 
 sionally annihilated, they were rarely defeated, and they 
 never ran away. I will not enter into the history of 
 his numerous cruelties, and indeed they are not edifying. 
 Amongst other things, like N'ero, he killed his own 
 mother, and then caused several persons to be executed 
 because they did not show sufficient sorrow at her 
 death. 
 
 At length, in 1828, he too suffered the fate he had 
 meted out to so many, and was killed by his brothers, 
 Dingaan and Umhlangan, by the hands of one Umbopa. 
 He was murdered in his hut, and as his life passed out 
 of him he is reported to have addressed these words to 
 his brothers, who were watching his end : " Wliat ! do 
 you stab me, my brothers, dogs of mine own house, 
 whom I have fed ? You hope to be kings ; but though 
 you do kill me, think not that your line shall reign for 
 long. I tell you that I hear the sound of the feet of 
 the great white people, and that this land shall be 
 trodden by them." He then expired, but his last words 
 have always been looked upon as a prophecy by the 
 Zulus, and indeed they have been partly fulfilled. 
 
 Having in his turn killed Umhlangan, his brother 
 by blood and in crime, Dingaan took possession of the 
 throne. He was less pronounced than Chaka in his 
 foreign policy, though he seems to have kept up the 
 family reputation as regards domestic affiiirs. It was
 
 AND THE ZULU SETTLEMENT. 5 
 
 he who, inllueuced, perhaps, by Chaka's dying prophecy 
 about white men, massacred Eetief, the Boer leader, and ' 
 his fifty followers, in the most treacherous manner, and 
 then falling on the emigrant Boers in Natal, murdered \ 
 men, women, and children to the number of nearly six 
 hundred. There seems, however, to have been but little 
 love lost between any of the sons of Usengangacona 
 (the father of Chaka, Dingaan, Umhlangan, and Panda), 
 for in due course Panda, his brother, conspired with 
 the Boers against Dingaan, and overthrew him witli 
 their assistance. Dingaan fled, and was shortly after- 
 wards murdered in Swaziland, and Panda ascended the 
 throne in 1840. 
 
 Panda was a man of different character to the remain- 
 der of his race, and seems to have been well content 
 to reign in peace, only killing enough people to keep 
 up his authority. Two of his sons, Umbelazi and Cety- 
 wayo, of whom Umbelazi was the elder and Panda's 
 favourite, began, as their father grew old, to quarrel 
 about the succession to the crown. On the question 
 being referred to Panda, he is reported to have remarked 
 that when two young cocks quarrelled the best thing 
 they could do was to fight it out. Acting on this hint, 
 each prince collected his forces, Panda sending down 
 one of his favourite regiments to help Umbelazi. The 
 fight took place in 1856 on the banks of the Tugela. 
 A friend of the writer, happening to be on the Natal 
 side of the river the day before the battle, and knowing 
 it was going to take place, swam his horse across in the 
 darkness, taking his chance of the alligators, and hid in 
 some bush on a hillock commanding the battlefield. It 
 was a hazardous proceeding, but the sight repaid the 
 risk, though he describes it as very awful, more espe-
 
 6 CETYWAYO 
 
 cially when the regiment of veterans sent by Panda 
 joined in the fray. It came up at the charge, between 
 two and three thousand strong, and was met near his 
 liiding-place by one of Cetywayo's young regiments. 
 The noise of the clash of their shields was like the 
 roar of the sea, but the old regiment, after a struggle 
 in which men fell thick and fast, annihilated the other, 
 and passed on with thinned ranks. Another of Cety- 
 wayo's regiments took the place of the one that had 
 been destroyed, and this time the combat was fierce 
 and long, till victory again declared for the veterans* 
 spears. But they had bought it dear, and were in no 
 position to continue their charge ; so the leaders of that 
 brave battalion formed its remnants into a ring, and, 
 like the Scotch at Flodden — 
 
 "The stubborn spearmen still made good 
 The dark, impenetrable wood ; 
 Each stepping where his comrade stood 
 The instant that he fell," 
 
 till there were none left to fall. The ground around 
 them was piled with dead. 
 
 But this gallant charge availed Umbelazi but little, 
 and by degrees Cetywayo's forces pressed his men back 
 to the banks of the Tugela, and finally into it. Thou- 
 sands fell upon the field and thousands perished in the 
 river. When my friend swam back that night, he had 
 nothing to fear from the alligators : they were too well 
 fed. Umbelazi died on the battlefield of a broken 
 heart — at least it is said that no wound could be found 
 on his person. He probably expired in a fit brought 
 on by anxiety of mind and fatigue. A curious story 
 is told of Cety wayo with reference to his brother's death.
 
 AND THE ZULU SETTLEMENT. 7 
 
 After the battle was over a Zulu from oue of his own regi- 
 ments presented himself before him with many saluta- 
 tions, saying, " prince ! now canst thou sleep in peace, 
 for Umbelazi is dead." "How knowest thou that he 
 is dead ? " said Cetywayo. " Because I slew him with 
 my own hand," replied the Zulu. " Thou dog ! " said 
 the prince, " thou hast dared to lift thy hand against 
 the blood royal, and now thou makest it a matter of 
 boasting. Wast thou not afraid ? By Chaka's head 
 thou shalt have thy reward. Lead him away." And 
 the Zulu, who was but lying after all, having possessed 
 himself of the bracelets off the dead prince's body, 
 was instantly executed. The probability is that Cety- 
 wayo acted thus more from motives of policy than from 
 affection to his brother, whom indeed he hoped to 
 destroy. It did not do to make too light of the death 
 of an important prince : Umbelazi's fate to-day might 
 be Cetywayo's fate to-morrow. This story bears a 
 really remarkable resemblance to that of the young 
 man who slew Saul, the Lord's anointed, and suffered 
 death on account thereof at the hands of David. 
 
 This battle is also memorable as being the occa- 
 sion of the first public appearance of Mr. John Dunn, 
 now the most important chief in Zululand, and, be it 
 understood, an unknown quantity in all future trans- 
 actions in that country. At that time Dunn was a 
 retainer of Umbelazi's, and fought on his side in the 
 Tugela battle. After the fight, however, he went over 
 to Cetywayo and became Ids man. Prom that time 
 till the outbreak of the Zulu war he remained in 
 Zululand as adviser to Cetywayo, agent for the Natal 
 Government, and purveyor of firearms to the nation at 
 large. As soon as Cetywayo got into trouble with the
 
 8 CETYWAYO 
 
 Imperial Government, Dunn, like a prudent man, de- 
 serted him and came over to us. In reward Sir Garnet 
 Wolseley advanced him to the most important chief- 
 tainship in Zululand, which he hopes to make a stepping- 
 stone to the vacant throne. His advice was largely 
 followed by Sir Garnet in the bestowal of the other 
 chieftainships, and was naturally not quite disinter- 
 ested. He has already publicly announced his intention 
 of resisting the return of the king, his old master, by 
 force of arms, should the Government attempt to rein- 
 state him. 
 
 A period of sixteen years elapsed before Cetywayo 
 reaped the fruits of the battle of the Tugela by succeed- 
 ing to the throne on the death of his father, Panda, 
 the only Zulu monarch who has as yet come to his 
 end by natural causes. 
 
 In 1 86 1, however, Cetywayo was, at the instance of 
 the Natal Government, formally nominated heir to the 
 throne by Mr. Shepstone, it being thought better that 
 a fixed succession should be established with the con- 
 currence of the Natal Government than that matters 
 should be left to take their chance on Panda's death. 
 Mr. Shepstone accomplished his mission successfully, 
 though at great personal risk. For some unknown 
 reason, Cetywayo, who was blown up with pride, was 
 at first adverse to being thus nominated, and came 
 down to the royal kraal with three thousand armed 
 followers, meaning, it would seem, to kill Mr. Shepstone, 
 whom he had never before met. Panda, the old king, 
 had an inkling of what was to happen, but was power- 
 less to control his son, so he confined himself to address- 
 ing the assembled multitude in what I have heard 
 Sir Theophilus Shepstone say was the most eloquent
 
 AND THE ZULU SETTLEMENT. 9 
 
 and touching speech he ever listened to, the subject 
 being the duties of hospitality. He did not at the 
 time know how nearly the speech concerned him, or 
 that its object was to preserve his life. This, how- 
 ever, soon became manifest when, exception being 
 taken to some breach of etiquette by one of his ser- 
 vants, he was surrounded by a mob of shouting savages, 
 wliose evident object was to put an end to him and 
 those with him. For two hours he remained sitting 
 there, expecting that every moment would be his last, 
 but showing not the slightest emotion, till at length 
 he got an opportunity of speaking, when he rose and 
 said, " I know that you mean to kill me ; it is an easy 
 thing to do ; but I tell you Zulus, that for every drop 
 of my blood that falls to the ground, a hundred men 
 will come out of the sea yonder, from the country of 
 which Natal is one of the cattle-kraals, and will bitterly 
 avenge me." As he spoke he turned and pointed 
 towards the ocean, and so intense was the excitement 
 that animated it, that the whole great multitude turned 
 with bini and stared towards the horizon, as though 
 they expected to see the long lines of avengers creep- 
 ing across the plains. Silence followed his speech ; his 
 imperturbability and his well-timed address had saved 
 his life. Prom that day his name was a power in the 
 land.i 
 
 ^ A very good description of this scene was published in the London 
 Qvai-terly Review in 1878. The following is an extract: — 
 
 " In the centre of those infuriated savages he (Mr. Shepstone) sat 
 for more than two hours, outwardly calm, giving confidence to his 
 solitary European companion by his own quietness, only once saying, 
 'Why, Jem, you're afraid,' and imposing restraint on his native at- 
 tendants. Then, when they had shouted, as Cetywayo himself said in 
 our hearing, ' till their throats were so sore that they could shout no
 
 lo CETYWAYO 
 
 It was on this occasion that a curious incident occurred 
 which afterwards became of importance. Among the 
 Zulus there exists a certain salute, " Bayete," which it 
 is the peculiar and exclusive privilege of Zulu royalty 
 to receive. The word means, or is supposed to mean, 
 " Let us bring tribute." On Mr. Shepstone's visit the 
 point was raised by the Zulu lawyers as to what salute 
 he should receive. It was not consistent with their 
 ideas that the nominator of their future king should be 
 greeted with any salute inferior to the Bayet^ and this, 
 as plain Mr. Shepstone, it was impossible to give him. 
 The difficulty was obvious, but the Zulu mind proved 
 equal to it. He was solemnly announced to be a Zulu 
 king, and to stand in the place of the great founder 
 of their nation, Chaka. Who was so fit to proclaim 
 the successor to the throne as the great predecessor of 
 the prince proclaimed ? To us this seems a strange, 
 not to say ludicrous, way of settling a difficulty, but 
 there was nothing in it repugnant to Zulu ideas. Odd 
 as it was, it invested Mr. Shepstone with all the attri- 
 butes of a Zulu king, such as the power to make laws, 
 order executions, &c., and those attributes in the eyes 
 of Zulus he still retains. 
 
 more,' they departed. But Sompseu (Mr. Shepstone) had conquered. 
 Cetywayo, in describing the scene to us and our companion on a visit 
 to him a short time afterwards, said, ' Sompseu is a great man : no 
 man but he could have come through that day alive.' Similar testi- 
 mony we have had from some of the Zulu assailants, from the native 
 attendants, and the companion above mentioned. Next morning 
 Cetywayo humbly begged an interview, which was not granted but on 
 terms of unqualified submission. From that day Cetywayo has sub- 
 mitted to British control in the measure in which it has been exercised, 
 and has been profuse in his expressions of respect and submission to Sir T. 
 Shepstone ; but in his heart, as occasional acts and speeches show, he 
 writhes under the restraint, and bitterly hates the man who imposed it."
 
 AND THE ZULU SETTLEMENT. n 
 
 In 1873 messengers came down from Zululand to 
 the Natal Government, bringing with tliem the " king's 
 head," that is, a complimentary present of oxen, announc- 
 ing the death of Panda. " The nation," they said, " was 
 wandering; it wanders and wanders, and wanders again;" 
 the spirit of the king had departed from them ; his 
 words had ceased, and " none but children were left." 
 The message ended with a request that Mr. Shepstone, 
 as Cetywayo's " father," should come and instal him on 
 the throne. A month or two afterwards there came 
 another message, again requesting his attendance ; and 
 on the request being refused by the Lieutenant-Gover- 
 nor of Natal, there came a third message, to which the 
 Natal Government returned a favourable answer. 
 
 Accordingly Mr. Shepstone proceeded to Zululand, 
 and on the 3d September 1873 proclaimed Cetywayo 
 king with all due pomp and ceremony. It was on this 
 occasion that, in the presence of, and with the enthusi- 
 astic assent of, both king and people, Mr. Shepstone, 
 " standing in the place of Cetywayo's father, and so 
 representing the nation," enunciated the four following 
 articles, with a view to putting an end to the continual 
 slaughter that darkens the history of Zululand : — 
 
 1. That the indiscriminate shedding of blood shall 
 cease in the land. 
 
 2. That no Zulu shall be condemned without open 
 trial, and the public examination of witnesses for and 
 against, and that he shall have a right to appeal to 
 the king. 
 
 3. That no Zulu's life shall be taken without the 
 previous knowledge and consent of the king, after such 
 trial has taken place, and the right of appeal has been 
 allowed to be exercised.
 
 12 CETYWAYO 
 
 4. That for minor crimes the loss of property, all or 
 a portion, shall be substituted for the punishment of 
 death. 
 
 Nobody will deny that these were admirable regula- 
 tions, and that they were received as such at the time 
 by the Zulu king and people. But there is no doubt 
 that their ready acceptance by the king was a sacrifice 
 to his desire to please " his father Sompseu " (Mr. 
 Shepstone) and the Nutal Government, with both of 
 whom he was particularly anxious to be on good terms. 
 He has never adhered to these coronation regulations, 
 or promises, as they have been called, and the proba- 
 bility is that he never intended to adhere to them. 
 However this may be, I must say that personally 
 I have been unable to share the views of tiiose who 
 see in the breach of these so-called promises a justifica- 
 tion of the Zulu war. After all, what do they amount 
 to, and what guarautee was there for their fulfilment ? 
 They merely represent a very laudable attempt on the 
 part of the Natal Government to keep a restraining 
 iuimJ on Zulu cruelty, and to draw the bonds of friend- 
 ship as tight as the idiosyncrasies of a savage state 
 would allow. The Government of Natal had no right 
 tu dictate the terms to a Zulu king on which he was to 
 hold his throne. The Zulu nation was an independent 
 nation, and had never been conquered or annexed by 
 Natal. If the Government of that colony was able by 
 friendly negotiation to put a stop to Zulu slaughter, 
 it was a matter for congratulation on humanitarian 
 grounds; but it is difficult to follow the argument that 
 because it was not able, or was only partially able, to 
 do so, therefore England was justified in making war 
 on the Zulus. On the other hand, it is perfectly
 
 AND THE ZULU SETTLEMENT. 13 
 
 ludicrous to observe the way in which Cetywayo's 
 advocates overshoot the mark in arguing this and 
 similar points; especially his lady advocates, whose 
 writings upon these subjects bear about the same 
 resemblance to the truth that the speech to the jury by 
 the counsel for the defence in a hopeless murder case 
 does to the summing up of the judge. Having demon- 
 strated that the engagements entered into by Cetywayo 
 meant nothing, they will proceed to show that, even if 
 they did, cold-blooded murder, when perpetrated by 
 a black paragon like Cetywayo, does not amount to a 
 great offence. In the mouths of these gentle apologists 
 for slaughter, massacre masquerades under the name 
 of " executions," and is excused on the plea of being, 
 " after all," only the enforcement of " an old custom." 
 Again, the employment of such phrases, in a solemn 
 answer to a remonstrance from the Lieutenant-Governor 
 of Natal, as '' I do kill ; but do not consider that I 
 have done anything yet in the way of killing, ... I 
 have not yet begun ; I have yet to kill," are shown to 
 mean nothing at all, and to be " nothing more than the 
 mere irritation of the moment." ^ Perhaps those of 
 
 * The following is the text of the message : — 
 
 " Did I ever tell Mr. Shepstone I would not kill ? Did he tell the 
 white people I made such an arrangement ? Because if he did he has 
 deceived them. I do kill ; but do not consider tliat I have done any- 
 thing yet in the way of killing. Why do the white people start at 
 Jiothing ? I have not yet begun ; I have yet to kill ; it is the custom 
 of our nation, and I shall not depart from it. Why does the Governor 
 of Natal speak to me about my laws ? Do I go to Natal and dictate 
 to him about his laws ? I shall not agree to any laws or rules from 
 Natal, and by doing so throw the large kraal wliich I govern into the 
 water. My people will not listen unless they are killed ; and while 
 wishing to be friends with tlie English, I do not agree to give my 
 people over to be governed by laws sent to me by them. Have I not
 
 14 CETYWAYO 
 
 Cetywayo's subjects who suffered on account of this 
 mere momentary irritation took a more serious view of 
 it. It is but fair to the particular authoress from whom 
 I quote (Miss Colenso's " History of the Zulu War," 
 pp. 230-231) to state that she considers this reply from 
 the " usually courteous and respectful king " as " no 
 doubt petulant and wanting in due respect." Con- 
 sidering that the message in question (which can be 
 read in the footnote) was a point-blank defiance of Sir 
 Henry Bulwer, admitting that there had been slaughter, 
 but that it was nothing compared to what was coming, 
 most people will not think Miss Colenso's description 
 of it too strong. 
 
 To admit that the Zulu king has the right to kill as 
 many of his subjects as he chooses, so long as they will 
 tolerate being killed, is one thing, but it is certainly 
 surprising to find educated Europeans adopting a line 
 of defence of these proceedings on his behalf that 
 amounts to a virtual expression of approval, or at least 
 of easy toleration. Has philanthropy a deadening 
 effect on the moral sense, that the people who consti- 
 tute themselves champions for the unfortunate Zulu 
 king and the oppressed Boers cannot get on to their 
 hobbies without becoming blind to the difference 
 between right and wrong ? Eeally an examination 
 of the utterances of these champions of oppressed 
 
 asked the English to allow me to wash my spears since the death of 
 my father ' Umpandi,' aud they have kept playing with me all this 
 time, treating me like a child? Go back and tell the English that I 
 shall now act on my own account, and if they wish me to agree to their 
 laws, I shall leave and become a wanderer ; but before I go it will be 
 seen, as I shall not go without having acted. Go back and tell the 
 white men this, and let them hear it well. The Governor of Natal 
 and I are equal ; he is Governor of Natal, and I am Governor here."
 
 AND THE ZULU SETTLEMENT. 15 
 
 innocence would almost lead one to that conclusion. 
 On the one hand they suppress and explain away 
 facts, and on the other supply their want of argu- 
 ment by reckless accusations and vicious attacks on 
 the probity of such of their fellow-Englishmen, espe- 
 cially if in ofQce, as have had the misfortune to pursue 
 a course of action or to express opinions not pleasing 
 to them or their prot^g^s. For instance, an innocent 
 and unenlightened reader of the very interesting work 
 from which I have just quoted probably lays it down 
 with the conviction that both Sir Bartle Frere and 
 Sir Theophilus Shepstone are very wicked men and 
 full of bad motives, and will wonder how a civilised 
 Government could employ such monsters of blood- 
 thirsty duplicity. As he proceeds he will also find that 
 there is not much to be said for the characters of either 
 Sir Garnet Wolseley or Lord Chelmsford; whilst as 
 regards such small fry as Mr. John Shepstone, the pre- 
 sent Secretary of Native Affairs in Natal, after passing 
 through Miss Colenso's mill their reputations come out 
 literally in rags and tatters. He will be shocked to find 
 that not only did one and all of these gentlemen make 
 gross errors of judgment, but, trusted and distinguished 
 servants of their country as they are, they were one and 
 all actuated by dark personal motives that will not bear 
 examination. 
 
 Heaven help the members of the Shepstone family 
 when they fall into the hands of the gentler but more 
 enthusiastic sex, for Miss Colenso is not their only 
 foe. In a recent publication called a " Defence of 
 Zululand and its Kings," Lady Florence Dixie gibbets 
 Mr. Henrique Shepstone, and points him out to be 
 execrated by a Cety way 0- worshipping public, because
 
 1 6 CETYWAYO 
 
 the ex-king is to oe sent to England in his charge ; 
 when, according to Lady Dixie, he will certainly be 
 scoundrel enough to misinterpret all that Cetywayo 
 says for his own ends, and will thereby inflict a " cruel 
 wrong " upon him, and render his visit to England " per- 
 fectly meaningless." Perhaps it has never occurred to 
 Lady Dixie that this is a very serious charge to bring 
 against an honourable man, whose reputation is pro- 
 bably as dear to him as the advancement of Cetywayo's 
 cause is to her. It is all very well to be enthusiastic, 
 but ladies should remember that there are other people 
 in the world to be considered beside Cetywayo. 
 
 As regards the question of Cetywayo's bloodthirsti- 
 ness, which is so strenuously denied by his apologists, 
 I cannot say that a careful study of the blue books 
 bearing on the subject brings me to the same conclusion. 
 It is true that there is not much information on the 
 point, for the obvious reason that the history of slaughters 
 in Zululand in the vast majority of cases only reached 
 Natal in the form of rumours, which nobody thought 
 it worth while to report. There were no newspaper 
 correspondents in Zululand. There is not, however, 
 any doubt that Cetywayo was in the habit of killing 
 large numbers of people ; indeed it was a matter of the 
 commonest notoriety ; nor, as will be seen from the 
 message I have transcribed, did he himself deny it, 
 when, being angry, he spoke the truth. At the same 
 time that this message was sent, we find Mr. Osborn, 
 then resident magistrate at Newcastle in Natal, who 
 is certainly not given to exaggeration, writing to the 
 Secretary for Native Affairs thus : — " Erom all I have 
 been able to learn, Cetywayo's conduct has been, and 
 continues to be, disgraceful. He is putting people to
 
 AND THE ZULU SETTLEMENT, 17 
 
 death in a shameful niauner, especially girls. The 
 dead bodies are placed by his order in the principal 
 paths, especially where the paths intersect each other 
 (cross roads). A few of the parents of the young 
 people so killed buried the bodies, and thus brought 
 Cetywayo's wrath on themselves, resulting not only in 
 their own death, but destruction to the whole family. 
 ... It is really terrible that such horrible savagery 
 could take place on our own borders. . . . Uhamu 
 reproved Cetywayo the other day, reminded him of 
 his promises to Mr. Shepstone, and begged him to 
 spare the people. This advice, as could be expected, 
 was not relished." 
 
 Again, Mr. Fynney, in his report of his visit to 
 Zululand in 1877, states that though the king and 
 his " indunas " (councillors) denied that men were 
 killed without trial, the people told a very different 
 tale. Thus he says, " In every instance, where I had 
 so far gained the confidence of the Zulus as to cause 
 thom to speak freely, was I assured of the truthfulness 
 of the statement that the king, Cetywayo, caused his 
 people to be put to death in great numbers ; and when 
 I remarked that of course he did so after a fair and 
 proper trial, in some cases my remark was greeted with 
 a suppressed laugh or a smile. Some remarked, ' Yes, 
 a trial of bullets;' others, 'Yes, we get a trial, but that 
 means surrounding the kraal at daybreak and shooting 
 us down like cattle.' One asked me what the Govern- 
 ment in Natal intended doing, or what was thought in 
 Natal about the killing, saying, ' It was not in the night 
 that Sompseu spoke, but in tlie sunshine; the king was 
 not alone, but his people were around him, and the ears 
 of all Zululand heard these words, and the hearts of all 
 
 B
 
 1 8 CETYWAYO 
 
 Zulus were joyful, and iu gladness they lifted up their 
 hands saying: The mouth of our white father has spoken 
 good words ; he has cautioned his child in the presence 
 of his people, and a good sun has risen this day over 
 Zululand ! How is it now ? Has the king listened ? 
 Does he hold fast those words ? No ! not one. The 
 promises he made are all broken. What does Sompseu 
 say to this ? You should dine at my kraal yonder for 
 a few days, and see the izizi (cattle and other property 
 of people who have been killed) pass, and you would 
 then see with your own eyes how a case is tried.' " 
 Farther on Mr. Fynney says, " When a charge is made 
 against a Zulu, the question is generally asked, ' Has 
 he any cattle ? ' and if answered in the affirmative, 
 there is little chance of escape. Instances of killing 
 occurred while I was in Zululand, and to my know- 
 ledge no trial was allowed. An armed party was 
 despatched on the morning I left Ondine, and, as I 
 was informed, to kill." 
 
 There is no reason to suppose that Mr. Fynney was in 
 any way prejudiced in making these remarks ; on the 
 contrary, he was simply carrying out an official mission, 
 and reporting for the general information of the Govern- 
 ments of Natal and the Transvaal. It is, however, 
 noticeable that neither these nor similar passages are 
 ever alluded to by Cetywayo's advocates, whose object 
 seems to be rather to suppress the truth than to put it 
 fairly before the public, if by such suppression they 
 think they can advance the cause of the ex-king. 
 
 The whole matter of Cetywayo's private policy, 
 however, appears to me to be very much beside the 
 question. Whether or no he slaughtered his oppressed 
 subjects in bygone years, which tliere is no doubt he
 
 AND THE ZULU SETTLEMENT. 19 
 
 did, is not our affair, since we were not then, as we are 
 now, responsible for the good government of Zululand ; 
 and seeing the amount of slaughter that goes on under 
 our protectorate, it ill becomes us to rake up these 
 things against Cotywayo. What we have to consider 
 is his foreign policy, not the domestic details of his 
 government.^ 
 
 1 A gentleman, who has recently returned from travelling in Zulu- 
 land, relates the following story as nearly as possible in the words in 
 which it was told him by a well-known hunter in Zululand, Piet Hogg 
 by name, now residing near Dundee, on the Zulu border. The story is 
 a curious one as illustrative of Zulu character, and scarcely represents 
 Cetywayo in as amiable a light as one might wish. Piet Hogg and 
 my informant were one day talking about the king when the former 
 said, "I was hunting and trading in Zululand, and was at a military 
 kraal occupied by Cetywayo, where I saw a Basuto who had been 
 engaged by the king to instruct his people in building houses, that 
 were to be square instead of circular (as are all Zulu buildings), for 
 which his pay was to be thirty head of cattle. The Basuto came to 
 Cetywayo in my presence, and said that the square buildings were 
 made ; he now wished to have his thirty head of cattle and to depart. 
 Cetywayo having obtained what he required, began to think the man 
 
 overpaid, so said, 'I have observed that you like (a Zulu woman 
 
 belonging to the kraal) ; suppose you take her instead of the thirty 
 head of cattle.' Now this was a very bad bargain for the Basuto, as 
 the woman was not worth more, in Zulu estimation, than ten head of 
 cattle ; but the Basuto, knowing with whom he had to deal, thought 
 it might be better to comply with the suggestion rather than insist 
 upon his rights, and asked to be allowed till the next morning to con- 
 sider the proposal. After he had been dismissed on this understanding, 
 Cetywayo sent for the woman, and accused her of misconduct with 
 the Basuto, the punishment of which, if proved, would be death. She 
 denied this vehemently, with protestations and tears. He insisted, 
 but, looking up at a tree almost denuded of leaves which grew close 
 by, said, significantly, 'Take care that not a leaf remains on that tree 
 by the morning.' The woman understood the metaphor, and in an 
 hour or two, aided by other strapping Zulu females, attacked the un- 
 fortunate Basuto and killed him with clubs. But Cetywayo having 
 thus, like the monkey in the fable, employed a cat's paw to do his
 
 20 CETYWAYO 
 
 I do not propose to follow out all the details of the 
 boundary dispute between Cetywayo and the Trans- 
 vaal, or to comment on the different opinions held 
 on the point by the various authorities, English and 
 Zulu. The question has been, for the moment, settled 
 by the Transvaal Convention, and is besides a most 
 uninteresting one to the general reader. 
 
 Nor shall I enter into a discussion concerning the 
 outrages on which Sir Bartle Frere based his ultimatum 
 previous to the Zulu war. They were after all insignifi- 
 cant, although sufficient to serve as a casus belli to a 
 statesman determined to fight. The Zulu war was, in 
 the opinion of Sir Bartle Frere, necessary in self-defence, 
 which is the first principle of existence. If it admits of 
 justification, it is on the ground that the Zulu army 
 was a menace to the white population of South Africa, 
 and that it was therefore necessary to destroy it, lest at 
 some future time it should destroy the whites. It is 
 ridiculous to say that the capture of two Zulu women 
 in Natal and their subsequent murder, or tlie expulsion 
 on political grounds of a few missionaries, justified us 
 in breaking up a kingdom and slaughtering ten thousand 
 men. Sir Bartle Frere declared war upon the Zulus 
 because he was afraid, and had good reason to be afraid, 
 
 dirty work, began to think the Basuto's untimely death might have an 
 ugly appearance in my eyes, so gave orders in my presence that, as a 
 punishment, six of the women who had killed the Basuto should also 
 be put to death. This was too much for me, knowing, as I did, all 
 that had passed. I reproached Cetywayo for his cruelty, and declared 
 I would leave Zululand without trading there, and without making 
 him the present he expected. I also said I should take care the 
 great English 'Inkose' (the Governor of Natal) should hear of his 
 conduct and the reason of my return. Cetywayo was then on friendly 
 terms with the English, and being impressed by my threats, he recon- 
 sidered his orders, and spared the lives of the women."
 
 AND THE ZULU SETTLEMENT. 21 
 
 that, if he did not, Cetywayo would before long sweep 
 either the Transvaal or Natal ; whilst, on the other 
 hand, the Zulus fought us because our policy was too 
 philanthropic to allow them to fight anybody else. 
 This statement may appear strange, but a little exami- 
 nation into Zulu character and circumstances will, I 
 think, show it to be correct. 
 
 It must be remembered that for some years before 
 Panda's death the Zulus had not been engaged in any 
 foreign war. When Cetywayo ascended the throne, it was 
 the general hope and expectation of the army, and there- 
 fore of the nation, that this period of inaction would 
 come to an end, and that the new king would inaugu- 
 rate an active foreign policy. They did not greatly 
 care in what direction the activity developed itself, pro- 
 vided it did develop. It must also be borne in mind 
 that every able-bodied man in the Zulu country was a 
 member of a regiment, even the lads being attached to 
 regiments as carriers, and the women being similarly 
 enrolled, though they did not fight. The Zulu military 
 system was the universal-service system of Germany 
 brought to an absolute perfection, obtained by subordi- 
 nating all the ties and duties of civil life to military 
 ends. Thus, for instance, marriage could not be con- 
 tracted at will, but only by the permission of the king, 
 which was generally delayed until a regiment was well 
 advanced in years, when a number of girls were handed 
 over to it to take to wife. This regulation came into 
 force because it was found that men without home ties 
 were more ferocious and made better soldiers, and the 
 result of these harsh rules was that the Zulu warrior, 
 living as he did under the shadow of a savage discipline, 
 for any breach of which there was but one punishment,
 
 22 CETYWAYO 
 
 death, can hardly be saidto have ledalifeof domestic com- 
 fort, such as men of all times and nations have thouglit 
 their common right. But even a Zulu must have some 
 object in life, some shrine at which to worship, some 
 mistress of his affections. Home he had none, religion he 
 had none, mistress he had none, but in their stead he had 
 his career as a warrior, and his hope of honour and 
 riches to be gained by the assegai. His home was on 
 the war-track with his regiment, his religion the fierce 
 denunciation of the isanusi,^ and his affections were 
 fixed on the sudden rush of battle, the red slaughter, and 
 the spoils of the slain. " War," says Sir T. Shepstone, 
 in a very remarkable despatch written about a year be- 
 fore the outbreak of the Zulu war, "is the universal cry 
 
 ^ Witch-doctor. These persons are largely employed in Zulnland to 
 smell out witches who are supposed to have bewitched others, and are 
 of course very useful as political agents. Any person denounced by 
 them is at once executed. A friend of the writer's was once present at 
 a political smelling-out on a large scale, and describes it as a very 
 curious and unpleasant scene. The men, of whom there were some 
 thousands, were seated in a circle, as pale with terror as Zulus can be. 
 Within the circle were several witch doctors ; one of whom amidst his 
 or her incantati(ms would now and again step forward and touch some 
 unfortunate man with a forked stick. The victim was instantly led 
 away a few paces and his neck twisted. The circle awaited each de- 
 nunciation in breathless expectation, for not a man among them knew 
 whose turn it might be next. On another occasion, an unfortunate 
 wretch who had been similarly condemned by an isanusi rushed up to 
 the same gentleman's waggon and besought shelter. He was hidden 
 under some blankets, but presently his pursuers arrived, and insisted 
 upon his being handed over. All possible resistance was made, until 
 the executioners announced that they would search the waggon and 
 kill him there. It was then covenanted that he should have a start in 
 the race for life. He was, however, overtaken and killed. These in- 
 stances will show how dark and terrible is the Zulu superstition con- 
 nected with witchcraft, and what a formidable weapon it becomes in 
 the hands of the king or chief.
 
 AND THE ZULU SETTLEMENT. 23 
 
 among the soldiers, who are anxious to live up to their 
 traditions, .... and the idea is gaining ground among 
 the people that their nation has outlived the object of 
 its existence." Again he says, " The engine (the Zulu 
 military organisation) has not ceased to exist or to 
 generate its forces, although the reason or excuse for 
 its existence has died away : these forces have con- 
 tinued to accumulate and are daily accumulating with- 
 out safety-valve or outlet." 
 
 Desirable as such a state of feeling may be in an 
 army just leaving for the battlefield, it is obvious that 
 for some fifty thousand men, comprising the whole 
 manhood of the nation, to be continually on the boil 
 with sanguinary animosity against the human race in 
 general, is an awkward, element to fit into the peaceable 
 government of a state. 
 
 Yet this was doubtless the state of affairs with which 
 Cetywayo had to contend during the latter years of his 
 reign. He found himself surrounded by a great army, 
 in a high state of eiftciency and warlike preparation, 
 proclaiming itself wearied with camp life, and clamour- 
 ing to be led against an enemy, that it might justify its 
 traditions and find employment for its spears. Often 
 and often he must have been sorely puzzled to find 
 excuses wherewithal to put it off. Indeed his position 
 was both awkward and dangerous : on the one hand 
 was Scylla in the shape of the English Government, 
 and on the other the stormy and uncertain Charybdis 
 of his clamouring regiments. Slowly the idea must 
 have began to dawn upon him that unless he found 
 employment for the army, which, besides being dis- 
 gusted with his inactivity, was somewhat wearied witli 
 his cruelties, for domestic slaughter had ceased to divert
 
 24 ^ CETYWAYO 
 
 and had begun to irritate, the army, or some enter- 
 prising members of it, might put it beyond his power 
 ever to find employment for it at all, and bring one of 
 his brothers to rule in his stead. 
 
 And yet who was he to fight, if fight he must? 
 There were three possible enemies — i. The Swazis. 
 2. The Transvaal Boers. 3. The English. 
 
 Although the English may have held a place on 
 Cetywayo's list as possible foes, there is no ground for 
 supposing that, until shortly before the war, he had 
 any wish to fight with us. Indeed, whereas their 
 hatred of the Boers was pronounced, and openly ex- 
 pressed, both the Zulu king and people always pro- 
 fessed great respect for Englishmen, and even a certain 
 amount of liking and regard. 
 
 Therefore, when Cetywayo had to settle on an enemy 
 to attack, it was not the English that he chose, but 
 the Swazis, whose territory adjoined his own, lying 
 along the borders of the Transvaal towards Delagoa 
 Bay. The Swazis are themselves Zulus, and Cetywayo 
 claimed certain sovereign rights over tliem, which, 
 however, they refused to recognise. They are a power- 
 ful tribe, and can turn out about 10,000 fighting men, 
 quite enough for Cetywayo's young warriors to try 
 their mettle on. Still the king does not appear to 
 have wished to undertake the war without first 
 obtaining the approval of the Natal Government, 
 to whom he applied several times for permission "to 
 wash his spears," saying that he was but half a king 
 until he had done so. The Natal Government, how- 
 ever, invariably replied that he was on no account to 
 do anything of the sort. This shows the inconveniences 
 of possessing a complimentary feudal hold over a savage
 
 AND THE ZULU SETTLEMENT. 25 
 
 potentate, the shadow of power without the reality. 
 The Governor of Natal could not in decency sanction 
 such a proceeding as a war of extermination against 
 the Swazis, but if it had occurred without his 
 sanction, the Swazis would have suffered no doubt, 
 but the Zulu spears would have been satisfactorily 
 washed, and there would have been no Zulu war. 
 As it is, Englishmen have been killed instead of 
 Swazis. 
 
 Thwarted in his designs on the Swazis, Cetywayo next 
 turned his attention to the Transvaal Boers. The 
 Zulus and the Boers had never been good friends since 
 the days of the massacre of Retief, and of late years 
 their mutual animosity had been greatly increased 
 owing to their quarrels about the boundary question 
 previously alluded to. This animosity reached blood- 
 heat when the Boer Government, acting with the arro- 
 gance it always displayed towards natives, began to lay 
 its commands upon Cetywayo about his relations with 
 the Amaswazi, the alleged trespassing on Boer territory, 
 and other matters. The arrogance was all the more 
 offensive because it was impotent. The Boers were not 
 in a position to undertake the chastisement of the 
 Zulus. But the king and council of Zululand now 
 determined to try conclusions with the Transvaal on 
 the first convenient opportunity, and this time witliout 
 consulting the Government of Natal. The opportunity 
 soon occurred. Secocceni, the powerful chief of the 
 Bapedi, one of the tribes whose territories border on 
 the Transvaal, came to a difference with the Boers over 
 another border question. There is good ground for 
 supposing that Cetywayo incited him to withstand the 
 Boer demands ; it is certain that during the course of
 
 26 CETYWAYO 
 
 the war that followed he assisted him with advice, and 
 more substantially still, with Zulu volunteers. 
 
 To be brief, the Secocoeni war resulted in the discom- 
 fiture of the Transvaal forces. Another result of the 
 struggle was to throw the whole state into the most 
 utter confusion, of which the Dutch burghers, always 
 glad of an opportunity to defy the law, took advantage 
 to refuse to pay taxes. National bankruptcy ensued, 
 and confusion grew worse confounded. 
 
 Cety wayo took note of all this, and saw that now was 
 his opportunity to attack. The Boers had suffered both 
 in morale and prestige from their defeat by Secocoeni, 
 who was still in arms against them ; whilst the natives 
 were proportionately elated by their success over the 
 dreaded white men. There was, he knew well, but 
 little chance of a rapid concentration to resist a sudden 
 raid, especially when made by such a powerful army, 
 or rather chain of armies, as he could set in motion. 
 Everything favoured the undertaking ; indeed, humanly 
 speaking, it is difficult to see what could have saved the 
 greater part of the population of the Transvaal from 
 sudden extinction, if a kind Providence had not just 
 then put it into the head of Lord Carnarvon to send out 
 Sir T. Shepstone as Special Commissioner to their 
 country. When Cetywayo heard that his father 
 Sompseu (Sir T, Shepstone) was going up to the 
 Transvaal, he held his hand, sent out spies, and awaited 
 the course of events. The following incident will show 
 with what interest he was watching what took place. 
 At the Vaal Eiver a party of Boers met the Special 
 Commissioner and fired salutes to welcome him. It 
 was immediately reported to Cetywayo by his spies 
 that the Boers had fired ovar Sir T. Shepstone's waggon.
 
 AND THE ZULU SETTLEMllj^T. 27 
 
 Shortly afterwards a message arrived at Pretoria from 
 Cetywayo to inquire into the truth of the story, coolly 
 announcing his intention of sweeping the Transvaal if 
 it were true that " his father " had been fired at. In a 
 conversation with Mr. Fynney after the Annexation, 
 Cetywayo alludes to his intentions in these words : — 
 
 " I heard that the Boers were not treating him 
 (Sompseu) properly, and that they intended to put him 
 in a corner. If they had done so I should not have 
 waited for anything more. Had but one shot teen fired, 
 I should have said, " What more do I wait for ? they 
 have touched my father." I should have poured my 
 men over the land, and I can tell you, son of Mr. 
 Fynney, the land would have burned with fire." This 
 will show how eagerly Cetywayo was searching for 
 an excuse to commence his attack on the Transvaal. 
 When the hope of finding a pretext in the supposed 
 firing at Sir T. Shepstone or any incident of a similar 
 nature faded away, he appears to have determined to 
 carry out his plans without any immediate pretext, and 
 to make a casus belli of his previous differences with the 
 Government of the Eepublic. Accordingly he massed 
 his impis (army corps) at different points along the 
 Transvaal border, where they awaited the signal to 
 advance and sweep the country. Information of Cety- 
 wayo's doings and of his secret plans reached Pretoria 
 shortly before the Annexation, and confirmed the mind 
 of the Special Commissioner as to the absolute necessity 
 of that measure to save the citizens of the Eepublic 
 from coming to a violent end, and South Africa from 
 being plunged into a native war of unexampled magni- 
 tude. The day before the Annexation took place, when 
 it was quite certain that it would take place, a message
 
 J 
 
 25 ' CETYWAYO 
 
 was sent to Cetywayo by Sir T. Shepstone telling him 
 of what was about to happen, and telling him too in the 
 sternest and most straightforward language, that the 
 Transvaal had become the Queen's land like Natal, and 
 that he must no more think of attacking it than he 
 would of attacking ISTatal. Cetywayo on receiving the 
 message at once disbanded his armies and sent them 
 to their kraals. " Kabana," he said to the messenger, 
 " my impis were gathered ; now at my father's (Sir T. 
 Shepstone's) bidding I send them back to their homes," 
 
 This fact, namely, that at the bidding of his old 
 mentor, Sir T. Shepstone, Cetywayo abandoned his 
 long-cherished plans, and his undoubted opportunity 
 of paying off old scores with the Boers in a most 
 effectual manner, and gave up a policy that had so 
 many charms for him, must be held by every unpre- 
 judiced man to speak volumes in his favour. It must 
 be remembered that it was not merely to oblige his 
 "father Sompseu" that he did this, but to meet the 
 wishes of the English Government, and the act shows 
 how anxious he was to retain the friendship and fall 
 in with the views of that Government. Evidently 
 Cetywayo had no animosity against us in April 1877. 
 
 In his interview with Mr. Fynney, Cetywayo speaks 
 out quite frankly as to what his intentions had been. 
 He says, " I knew all about the soldiers being on their 
 way up, but I would have asked Sompseu to allow the 
 soldiers to stand on one side for just a little while, only 
 a little, and see what my men could do. It would have 
 been unnecessary for the Queen's people to trouble. 
 My men were all ready, and how big must that stone 
 have been, with my father Sompseu digging at one side 
 and myself at the other, that would not have toppled
 
 AND THE ZULU SETTLEMENT. 29 
 
 over ? Eveu though the size of that mountain (pointing 
 to a niouutaiu range), we could put it" on its back. 
 Again I say I am glad to know the Transvaal is 
 English ground; perhaps now there may be rest." 
 
 This and other passages show beyond all doubt from 
 what an awful catastrophe the Transvaal was saved by 
 the Annexation. That Cetywayo personally detested 
 the Boers is made clear by his words to Mr. Fynney. 
 " • The Boers,' he says, ' are a nation of liars ; they are 
 a bad people, bad altogether. I do not want them near 
 my people ; they lie and claim what is not theirs, and 
 ill-use my people. Where is Thomas ? ' (President 
 Burgers). I informed him that Mr. Burgers had left 
 the Transvaal. ' Then let them pack up and follow 
 Thomas,' said he. * Let them go. The Queen does not 
 want such people as those about her land. What can 
 the Queen make of tliem or do with them ? Their evil 
 ways puzzled both Thomas and Rudolph, Landdrost 
 of Utrecht ; they will not be quiet.' " 
 
 It is very clear that if Cetywayo had been left to 
 work his will, a great many of the Boers would have 
 found it necessary to "pack up and follow Thomas," 
 whilst many more would have never needed to pack 
 again, 
 
 I am aware that attempts have been made to put 
 another explanation on Cetywayo's warlike prepara- 
 tions against the Boers. It has been said that the Zulu 
 army was called up by Sir T. Shepstone to coerce the 
 Transvaal. It is satisfactory to be able, from intimate 
 personal knowledge, to give unqualified denial to that 
 statement, which is a pure invention, as indeed is 
 easily proved by clear evidence, which I have entered 
 into in another part of this book. Cetywayo played for
 
 30 
 
 CETYWAYO 
 
 his own hand all along, and received neither commands 
 nor hints from the Special Commissioner to get his army- 
 together. Indeed, when Sir T. Shepstone discovered 
 what was going on, he suffered great anxiety lest some 
 catastrophe should occur before he was in a position to 
 prevent it. Notliing short of the Annexation could 
 have saved the Transvaal at that moment, and the 
 conduct of the Boers after the danger had been taken 
 on to the shoulders of the Imperial Government is a 
 startling instance of national ingratitude. 
 
 Here again then the Zulu king was brought face to 
 face with the ubiquitous British Government, and that 
 too at a particularly aggravating moment. He was 
 about to commence his attack when he was met with 
 a polite, "Hands off; this is British territory." No 
 wonder that we find him in despair renewing his 
 prayer that Sompseu will allow him to make "one 
 little raid only, one small swoop," and saying that "it 
 is the custom of our country, when a new king is 
 placed over the nation, to wash their spears, and it has 
 been done in the case of all former kings of Zululand. 
 I am no king, but sit in a heap. I cannot be a king 
 till I have washed my assegais." All of which is 
 doubtless very savage and very wrong, but such is the 
 depravity of human nature, that there is something 
 taking about it for all that. 
 
 It was at this period of the history of South Africa 
 that many people think we made our crowning mistake. 
 We annexed the Transvaal, say they, six months too 
 soon. As things have turned out, it would have been 
 wiser to have left Zulus and Transvaal Boers to try 
 conclusions, and done our best to guard our own 
 frontiers. There is no doubt that such a consummar
 
 I 
 AND THE ZULU SETTLEMENT. 31 
 
 tion of affairs would haVe cleared the political atnio's- 
 phere wonderfully ; the Zulus would have got enough 
 fiohtins to last them some time, and the remainder of 
 the Boers would have entreated our protection and 
 become contented British subjects ; there would have 
 been no Isandhlwana and no Majuba Hill. But to 
 these I say, who could foresee the future, and who, in 
 the then state of kindly feeling towards the Boers, could 
 wish to leave them, and all the English mixed up with 
 them, to undergo, unprepared as they were, the terrible 
 experience of a Zulu invasion? Besides, what guar- 
 antee was there that the slaughter would stop in the 
 Transvaal, or that the combat would not have developed 
 into a war of races throughout South Africa ? Even 
 looking at the matter in the light of after events, it is 
 difficult to regret that humanity was on this occasion 
 allowed to take precedence of a more cold-blooded 
 policy. If the opponents of the Annexation, or even 
 the members of the Transvaal Independence Committee, 
 knew what a Zulu invasion meant, they would scarcely 
 have been so bitter about that act. 
 
 From the time of the Annexation it was a mere 
 matter of opinion as to which direction the Zulu ex- 
 plosion would take. The safety-valves were loaded 
 whilst the pressure daily increased, and aU acquainted 
 with the people knew that it must come sooner or 
 later. 
 
 Shortly after the Transvaal became British territory 
 the old Zulu boundary question came to the fore again, 
 and was made more complicated than ever by Sir T. 
 Shepstone, who had hitherto favoured the Zulu claims, 
 taking the Boer side of the controversy, after examina- 
 tion of the locality and of persons acquainted with the
 
 32 CETYWAYO 
 
 details of the matter. There was nothing wonderful in 
 this change of opinion, though of course it was attri- 
 buted to various motives by advocates of the Zulu 
 claims, and there is no doubt tliat Getywayo himself 
 did not at all like it, and, excited thereto by vexation 
 and the outcry of his regiments, adopted a very different 
 and aggressive tone in his communications with the 
 English authorities. Indeed his irritation against the 
 Boers and everybody connected with them was very 
 great. Probably if he had been left alone he would in 
 time have carried out his old progrannne, and attacked 
 the Transvaal. But, fortunately for the Transvaal, 
 which, like sailors and drunken men, always seems to 
 have had a special Providence taking care of it, at this 
 juncture Sir Bartle Frere appeared upon the scene, and 
 after a few preliminaries and the presentation of a strong 
 ultimatum, which was quite impracticable so far as 
 Getywayo was concerned, since it demanded what it 
 was almost impossible for him to concede — the disband- 
 ment of his army — invaded Zululand. 
 
 It is generally supposed that the Natal colonists had a 
 great deal to do with making the Zulu war, but this is 
 not the case. It is quite true that they were rejoiced at 
 the prospect of the break-up of Cetywayo's power, be- 
 cause they were very much afraid of him and of his "celi- 
 bate manslaying machine," which, under all the circum- 
 stances, is not wonderful. But the war was a distinctly 
 Imperial war, made by an Imperial officer, without 
 consultation with Golonial authorities, on Imperial 
 grounds, viz., because Getywayo menaced Her Majesty's 
 power in South Africa. Of course, if there had been 
 no colonies there would have been no war, but in that 
 way only are they responsible for it. Natal, however,
 
 AND THE ZT;LU SETTLEMENT. 33 
 
 has not grudged to pay ^^250,000 towards its expenses, 
 which is a great deal more than it can afford, and, 
 considering that the strange settlement made by Sir 
 Garnet Wolseley is almost sure to involve the colony 
 in trouble, quite as much as should be asked. J 
 
 The fact of the matter was, that Sir Bartle Frere was 
 a statesman who had the courage of his convictions ; he 
 saw that a Zulu disturbance of one kind or another was 
 inevitable, so he boldly took the initiative. If things 
 had gone right with him, as he supposed they would, 
 praise would have been lavished on him by the Home 
 authorities, and he would have been made a peer, and 
 perhaps Governor-General of India to boot; but he 
 reckoned without his Lord Chelmsford, and the element 
 of success whicli was necessary to gild his policy in the 
 eyes of the home public was conspicuous by its absence. 
 As it was, no language was considered to be too bad 
 to apply to this " imperious proconsul " who had taken 
 upon himself to declare a war. If it is any consolation 
 to liim, he has at any rate the gratitude of the South 
 African Colonies, not so much for what he has done, 
 for that is being carefully nullified by the subsequent 
 action of the Home Government, but because, believing 
 his policy to be right, he had the boldness to carry it 
 out at the risk of his official reputation. Sir Bartle 
 Frere, rightly or wrongly, took a larger view of the 
 duties of the governor of a great dependency than to 
 constitute himself the flickering shadow of the Secre- 
 tary of State in Downing Street, who, knowing little 
 of the real interests of the colony, is himself only the- 
 reflection of those that hold the balance of power, to 
 whom the subject is one of entire indifference, provided 
 that there is nothing to pay. >/ 
 

 
 34 CETYWAYO 
 
 The details of the Zulu war are matters of melancholy 
 history, which it is useless to recapitulate here. With 
 the exception of the affair at Eorke's Drift, there is 
 nothing to be proud of in connection with it, and a 
 great deal to be ashamed of, more especially its final 
 settlement. There is, however, one point that I wish 
 to submit to the consideration of my readers, and that 
 is, that Cetywayo was never thoroughly in earnest 
 about the war. If he had been in earnest, if he had 
 determined to put out his full strength, he would 
 certainly have swept Natal from end to end after 
 his victory at Isaudhlwana, There was no force to 
 prevent his doing so : on the contrary, it is probable 
 that if he had advanced a strong army over the border, 
 a great number of the Natal natives would have de- 
 clared in his favour through fear of his vengeance, 
 or at the least would have remained neutral. He 
 had ample time at his disposal to have executed the 
 manoeuvre twice over before the arrival of the rein- 
 forcements, of which the results must have been very 
 dreadful, and yet he never destroyed a single family. 
 Tiie reason he has himself given for this conduct is 
 that he did not wish to irritate the wliite man ; that 
 he had not made the war, and was only anxious to 
 defend his country. 
 
 When the fighting came to an end after the battle 
 of Ulundi, there were two apparent courses open to us 
 to take. One was to take over the country and rule 
 it for the benefit of the Zulus, and the other to enforce 
 the demands in Sir Bartle Frere's ultimatum, and, 
 taking such guarantees as circumstances would admit 
 of, leave Cetywayo on the throne. Instead of acting 
 on cither of these plans, however, Sir Garnet Wolseley
 
 AND THE ZULU SETTLEMENT. 35 
 
 proceeded, in the face of an extraordinary consensus 
 of adverse opinion, which he treated with calm con- 
 tempt, to execute what has proved to be a very cruel 
 settlement. Sir Garnet Wolseley has the reputation 
 of being an extremely able man, and it is only fair 
 to him to suppose that he was not the parent of this 
 political monster, by which all the blood and treasure 
 expended on the Zulu war were made of no account, 
 but that it was dictated to him by authorities at home, 
 who were anxious to gratify English opinion, and 
 partly ignorant, partly careless of the consequences. 
 At the same time, it is clear that he is responsible for 
 the details of the scheme, since immediately after the 
 capture of Cetywayo he writes a despatch about them 
 which was considered so important, that a member of 
 Ids staff was sent to England in charge of it. In this 
 document he informs the Secretary of State that 
 Cetywayo's rule was resolutely built up " without any 
 of the ordinary and lawful foundations of authority, 
 and by the mere vigour and vitality of an individual 
 character." It is difficult to understand what Sir Garnet 
 means in this passage. If the fact of being the right- 
 ful and generally accepted occupant of the throne is 
 not an " ordinary and lawful foundation of authority," 
 what is ? As regards Cetywayo having built up his 
 rule by the "mere vigour and vitality of an individual 
 character," he is surely in error. Cetywayo's position 
 was not different to that of his immediate predecessors. 
 If Sir Garnet had applied the remark to Chaha, the 
 first king, to the vigour and vitality of whose individual 
 character Znluland owes its existence as a nation, it 
 would have been more appropriate. The despatch goes 
 on to announce that he has made up his mind to divide
 
 36 CETYWAYO 
 
 the country into thirteen portions, in order to prevent 
 the " possibility of any reunion of its inhabitants under 
 one rule," and ends in these words : " I have laboured 
 with the great aim of establishing for Her Majesty's 
 subjects in South Africa, both white and coloured, as 
 well as for this spirited people against whom unhappily 
 we have been involved in war, the enduring founda- 
 tions of peace, happiness, and prosperity." The spirited 
 people were no doubt vastly thankful, but the white 
 man, reading such a passage as this, and knowing 
 the facts of the case, will only recognise Sir Garnet 
 Wolseley's admirable talent for ironical writing. 
 
 Sir Garnet entered into an agreement with each of 
 his kinglets, who, amongst other things, promised that 
 they would not make war without the sanction of the 
 British Government. He also issued a paper of instruc- 
 tions to the gentleman who was first appointed British 
 Kesident (who, by the way, very soon threw up his 
 post in despair). From this document we learn that 
 all the ex-king's brothers are to " be under the eye of 
 the chief John Dunn," but it is chiefly remarkable for 
 the hostility it evinces to all missionary enterprise. 
 The Resident is instructed to " be careful to hold your- 
 self entirely aloof from all missionary or proselytising 
 enterprises," and that "grants of land by former kings 
 to missionaries cannot be recognised by the British 
 Government," although Sir Garnet will allow mission- 
 aries to live in the country if the chief of the district 
 does not object. These instructions created some 
 adverse comment in England, with the result that, in 
 the supplementary instructions issued on the occasion 
 of Mr. Osborn's appointment as Eesident, they were 
 somewhat modified. In the despatch to the Secretary
 
 A^D THE ZULU SETTLEMENT. 37 
 
 of State in which he announces the new appointment, 
 Sir Garnet says that "Mr. Osborn is to be the "coun- 
 cillor, guide, and friend" of the native chiefs, and 
 that to his " moral influence " " we should look I think 
 for the spread of civilisation and the propagation of 
 the Gospel." What a conglomeration of duties, — 
 at once "prophet, priest, and king!" Poor Mr. 
 Osborn ! 
 
 Of the chiefs appointed under this unfortunate settle- 
 ment, some were so carelessly chosen that they have no 
 authority whatsoever over the districts to which they 
 were appointed, their nominal subjects preferring to 
 remain under the leadership of their hereditary chief. 
 Several of Sir Garnet's little kings cannot turn out an 
 hundred men, whilst the hereditary chief, who has no 
 official authority, can bring up three or four thousand. 
 Thus, for instance, a territory was given to a chief 
 called Infaneulela. The retainers of this gentleman 
 live in a kraal of five or six huts on the battlefield of 
 Ulundi. A chief called Dilligane, to whom the district 
 should have been given, is practically head man of the 
 district, and takes every possible opportunity of defying 
 the nominee chief, Infaneulela, who is not acknowledged 
 by the people. Another case is that of Umgitchwa, to 
 whom a territory was given. In this instance there are 
 two brothers, Umgitchwa and Somhlolo, born of dif- 
 ferent mothers. Umgitchwa is the elder, but Somhlolo 
 is the son of a daughter of the king, and therefore, 
 according to Zulu custom, entitled to succeed to 
 the chieftainship. Somhlolo was disinherited by Sir 
 Garnet on account of his youth (he is about twenty-five, 
 and has many wives). But an ancient custom is not to 
 be thus abrogated by a stroke of the pen, and Somhlolo
 
 38 CETV'WAYO 
 
 is practically chief of the district. Fighting is imminent 
 between the two brothers. 
 
 A third case is that of Hlubi, who, though a good, 
 well-meaning man, is a Basuto, and being a foreigner, 
 lias no influence over the Zulus under him. 
 
 A fourth instance is that of Umlandela, an old and 
 infirm Zulu, who was made chief over a large proportion 
 of tlie Umtetwa tribe on the coast of Zululand. His 
 appointment was a fatal mistake, and has already led 
 to much bloodshed under the following curious cir- 
 cumstances, which are not without interest, as showing 
 the intricacy of Zulu plots. 
 
 The Umtetwas were in the days of Chaka a very 
 powerful tribe, but suffered the same fate at his hands 
 as did every other that ventured to cross spears with 
 him. They were partially annihilated, and whilst some 
 of the survivors, of whom the Umtetwas in Zululand 
 are the descendants, were embodied in the Zulu regi- 
 ments, others were scattered far and wide. Branches 
 of this important tribe exist as far off as the Cape 
 Colony. Dingiswayo, who was the chief of the Umtetwas 
 when Chaka conquered the tribe, fled after his defeat 
 into Basutoland, and is supposed to have died there. 
 After the Zulu war Sir G. Wolseley divided the Umtetwa 
 into two districts, appointing an Umtetwa chief named 
 Somkeli ruler over one, and Umlandela over the other. 
 Umlandela, being a Zulu and worn with age, has 
 never had any authority over his nominal subjects, 
 and has been anxious to rid himself of the danger and 
 responsibility of his chieftainship by transferring it on 
 to the shoulders of j\[r. John Dunn, whose territory 
 adjoins his own, and who would be, needless to say, 
 nothing loth to avail himself of the opportunity of
 
 AND THE ZULU SETTLEMENT. 39 
 
 increasing bis taxable area. Whilst this intrigue was 
 in progress all Zululand was convulsed with the news 
 of our defeats by the Boers and the consequent surren- 
 der of the Transvaal. It was commonly rumoured that 
 our forces were utterly destroyed, and that the Boers 
 were now the dominant Power, following on the 
 heels of this intelligence was a rumour to the effect 
 that Cetywayo was coming back. These two reports, 
 both of which had a foundation of truth, had a very 
 bad effect on the vulgar mind in Zululand, and resulted 
 in the setting in motion of a variety of plots, of which 
 the following was the most important. 
 
 The Umtetwa tribe is among those who are not 
 anxious for the return of Cetywayo, but see in the 
 present state of affairs an opportunity of regaining 
 the power they possessed before the days of Chaka. 
 If they were to have a king over Zululand they de- 
 termined that it should be an Umtetwa king, and 
 Somkeli, one of the chiefs appointed by Sir Garnet, 
 was the man who aimed at the throne. He was not, 
 however, anxious to put out his hand at first further 
 than he could draw it back, so he adopted a very 
 ingenious expedient. It will be remembered that tlie 
 old chief Dingiswayo fled to Basutoland, where he is 
 reported to have married. It occurred to Somkeli that 
 if he could produce a descendant or a pseudo-descendant 
 of Dingiswayo he would have no difficulty in beginning 
 operations by dispossessing Uinlandela of his territory 
 in favour of the supposed lawful heir. In fact he 
 wanted a cat to pull the chestnuts out of tlie fire 
 for him, who could easily be got rid of afterwards. 
 Accordingly one Sitimela was produced, who is sup- 
 posed to be an escaped convict from Natal, who gave
 
 40 CETYWAYO 
 
 out that he was a grandson of Dingiswayo by a Lasuto 
 woman, and a great mediciue-mau, able to kill every- 
 body by a glance of bis eye. 
 
 To this impostor adherents flocked from all parts of 
 Zululand, and Umlandela flying for his life into John 
 Dunn's territory, Sitimela seized upon the chieftainship. 
 The Eesident thereupon ordered him to appear before 
 him, but he, as might be expected, refused to come. 
 As it was positively necessary to put an end to the 
 plot by some means, since its further development 
 would have endangered and perhaps destroyed the 
 weak-knee'd Zulu settlement, Mr. Osborn determined 
 to proceed to the scene of action. Mahomet would 
 not go to the mountain, so the mountain had to go 
 to Mahomet. On arrival he pitched his tents half 
 way between the camps of Sitimela and John Dunn, 
 who had Umlandela under his charge, and summoned 
 Somkeli, the author of the plot, to appear before him. 
 Ten days elapsed before the summons was obeyed. 
 During this time, and indeed until they finally escaped, 
 the Eesident and his companion could not even venture 
 to the spring, which was close at hand, to wash, for 
 fear of being assassinated. All day long they could 
 see lines of armed men swarming over the hills round 
 them, and hear them yelling their war-songs. At 
 length Somkeli appeared, accompanied by over a 
 thousand armed warriors. He was ordered to with- 
 draw his forces from Sitimela's army and go home. 
 He went home, but did not withdraw his forces. The 
 next day Sitimela himself appeared before the Eesident. 
 He was ordered to come with ten men : he came with 
 two thousand all armed, wild with excitement and 
 " moutied " (medicined). To make this medicine they
 
 AND THE ZULU SETTLEMENT. 41 
 
 had killed and pounded up a little cripple boy and 
 several of Umlandela's wives. It afterwards trans- 
 pired that the only reason Sitimela did not then and 
 there kill the Resident was that he (Mr. Osborn) had 
 with him several chiefs who were secretly favourable 
 to Sitimela's cause, and if he had killed him he would, 
 according to Zulu custom, have had to kill them too. 
 Mr. Osborn ordered Sitimela to disperse his forces or 
 take the consequences, and waited a few days for him 
 to do so; but seeing no signs of his compliance, he 
 then ordered the neighbouring chiefs to fall on him, 
 and at length withdrew from his encampment, — none 
 too soon. That very night a party of Sitimela's men 
 came down to kill him, and finding the tent in which 
 he and his companion had slept standing, stabbed at 
 its supposed occupants through the canvas. 
 
 Sitimela was defeated by the forces ordered out by 
 the Eesident, with a loss of about 500 men. It is, 
 however, worthy of note, and shows how widespread 
 was the conspiracy, that out of all the thousands 
 promised, Mr. Osborn was only able to call out two 
 tliousand men. 
 
 The appointment, however, that has occasioned the 
 most criticism is that of John Dunn, who got the 
 Bcnjaniin share of Zululand in preference to his brother 
 chiefs. The converting of an Englishman into a Zulu 
 chief is such a very odd proceeding that it is difficult 
 to know what to think of it. John Dunn is an 
 ambitious man, and most probably has designs on the 
 throne; he is also a man who understands the value 
 of money, of which he makes a great deal out of his 
 chieftainship. At the same time, it is clear that, so 
 far as it goes, hig rule is better than that of the other
 
 42 CETYWAYO 
 
 chiefs ; he has a uniform tax fixed, and has even done 
 something in the way of starting schools and making 
 roads. From all that I have been able to gather, his 
 popularity and influence with the Zulus are overrated, 
 though he has lived amongst them so many years, and 
 taken so many of their women to wife. His appoint- 
 ment was a hazardous experiment, and in the long run 
 is likely to prove a mischievous one, since any attempted 
 amendment of the settlement will be violently resisted 
 by him on the ground of vested interests. Also, if 
 white men are set over Zulus at all, they should be 
 gentlemen in the position of government officers, not 
 successful adventurers. 
 
 Perhaps the only wise thing done in connection with 
 tlie settlement was the appointment of Mr. Osborn, 
 C.M.G., as British Eesident. It is not easy to find a 
 man fitted for that difficult and dangerous position, 
 for the proper filling of which many qualifications are 
 required. Possessed of an intimate knowledge of the 
 Zulus, their language, and their mode of thought and 
 life, and being besides a very able and energetic officer, 
 Mr. Osborn would have saved the settlement from 
 breaking down if anybody could have saved it. As it 
 is, by the exercise of ceaseless energy and at great 
 personal risk, he has preserved it from total collapse. 
 Of the dangers and anxieties to which he is exposed, 
 the account I have given of the Sitimela incident is a 
 sufficient sample. He is, in fact, nothing but a shadow, 
 for he has no force at his command to insure obedience 
 to his decisions, or to prevent civil war; and in Zulu- 
 land, oddly enough, force is a remedy. Should one 
 chief threaten the peace of the country, he can only 
 deal with him by calling on another chief for aid, a
 
 AND THE ZULU SETTLEMENT. 43 
 
 position that is iieitlier dignified nor right. What is 
 worst of all is that the Zulus are beginning to discover 
 what a shadow he is, and with this weakened position 
 he has to pit his single brains against all the thousand 
 and one plots which are being woven throughout Zulu- 
 land. The whole country teems with plots. Mnya- 
 mane, the late Prime Minister, and one of the ablest, 
 and perhaps tlie most influential man in Zululand, is 
 plotting for tlie return of Cetywayo. Bishop Colenso, 
 again, is as usual working his own wires, and creating 
 agitations to forward his ends, whatever they may be 
 at the moment. John Dunn, on the other hand, is 
 plotting to succeed Cetywayo, and so on ad infinitum. 
 Such is the state of affairs with which our unfortunate 
 Kesident has to contend. Invested with large imaginary 
 powers, he has in reality nothing but his personal 
 influence and his own wits to help him. He has no 
 white man to assist him, but living alone in a broken- 
 down tent and some mud huts built by his son's hands 
 (for the Government have never kept their promise to 
 put him up a house), in the midst of thousands of rest- 
 less and scheming savages, amidst plots against the 
 peace and against his authority, he has to do the best 
 he can to carry out an impracticable settlement, and 
 to maintain the character of English justice and the 
 honour of the English name. Were Mr. Osborn to 
 throw up his post or to be assassinated, the authorities 
 would find it difficult to keep the whole settlement 
 from collapsing like a card castle. 
 
 Nobody who understood Zulu character and aspira- 
 tions could ever have executed such a settlement as 
 Sir Garnet Wolseley's, unless he did it in obedience to 
 some motive or instructions that it was not advisable
 
 44. CETYWAYO 
 
 to puLlish. It is true that Sir Garnet's experience of 
 the Zulus was extremely small, and that he put aside 
 the advice of those who did know them with that con- 
 tempt with which he is wont to treat colonists and 
 their opinions. Sir Garnet Wolseley does not like 
 colonial people, possibly because they are so rude as 
 to openly say, that, in their opinion, he did more 
 mischief in Africa in a few months than it would take 
 an ordinary official a lifetime to accomplish. 
 
 However this may be, stop his ears as much as he 
 might, Sir Garnet cannot have been entirely blind to 
 the import of what he was doing, and the only explana- 
 tion of his action is that he entered on it more with 
 the idea of flattering and gratifying English public 
 opinion, than of doing his best for the Zulus or the 
 white colonists on their borders. A great outcry had 
 been raised at home, where, in common with most 
 South African affairs, the matter was not thoroughly 
 understood, against the supposed intended annexation 
 of Zululand for the benefit of "greedy colonists." It 
 was argued that colonists were anxious for the annexa- 
 tion in order that they might get the land to speculate 
 with, and doubtless this was, in individual instances, 
 true. I fully agree with those who think that it would 
 be unwise to throw open Zululand to the European 
 settler, not on account of the Zulus, who would benefit 
 by the change, but because the result would be a state 
 of affairs similar to that in Natal, where there are a 
 few white men surrounded by an ever-growing mass of 
 Kafirs. But there is a vast difference between Annexa- 
 tion proper and the Protectorate it was our duty to 
 establish over the natives. Such an arrangement would 
 have presented few difficulties, and have brought with
 
 AND THE ZULU SETTLEMENT. 45 
 
 it many advantages. White men could have been 
 forbidden to settle in the country. A small hut-tax, 
 such as the Zulus would have cheerfully paid, would 
 have brought in forty or fifty thousand a year, an 
 ample sum to defray the expenses of the Eesident and 
 sub-Eesidents, the maintenance of an adequate native 
 force to keep order, and even the execution of necessary 
 public works. It is impossible to overrate the advan- 
 tages that must have resulted both to the Zulus and 
 their white neighbours from the adoption of this obvious 
 plan, among them being lasting peace and security to 
 life and property ; or to understand the folly and 
 cruelty that dictated the present arrangement, or rather 
 want of arrangement. Not for many years has England 
 missed such an opportunity of doing good, not only 
 at no cost, but with positive advantage to herself. Did 
 we owe nothing to this people whose kingdom we had 
 broken up, and whom we had been shooting down by 
 thousands ? They may well ask, as they do continually, 
 what they have done that we should treat them as we 
 have and are doing ? 
 
 It cannot be too clearly understood, that, when the 
 Zulus laid down their arms, they did so, hoping and be- 
 lieving that they would be taken over by the English 
 Government, which, having been fairly beaten by it, 
 they now looked on as tlieir head or king, and be ruled 
 like their brethren in Natal. They expected to have to 
 pay taxes and to have white magistrates placed over 
 them, and they or the bulk of them looked forward to 
 the change with pleasure. It must be remembered that 
 when once they have found their master, there exists 
 no more law-abiding people in the world than the 
 Zulus, provided they are ruled firmly, and above all
 
 46 
 
 CET7WAY0 
 
 justly. Believing that such a rule would fall to tlieir 
 lot they surrendered when they did. How great, then, 
 must their surprise have been when they found that, 
 without their wishes being consulted in the matter, 
 their own hereditary king was to be sent away, and 
 thirteen little kings set up in his place, with, strangest 
 of all, a white man as chief little king, whilst the 
 British Government contented itself with placing a 
 Eesident in the country to watch the troubles that 
 must ensue. 
 
 Such a settlement as this could only have one object 
 and one result, neither of which is at all creditable to 
 the English people. The Zulus were parcelled out 
 among thirteen chiefs, in order that their strength 
 might be kept down by internecine war and mutual 
 distrust and jealousy : and, as though it were intended 
 to render this result more certain, territories were 
 chucked about in the careless way I have described, 
 whilst central authority was abolished, and the vacant 
 throne is dangled before all eyes labelled " the prize of 
 the strongest." Of course Sir Garnet's paper agree- 
 ments with the chiefs were for the most part disre- 
 garded from the first. For instance, every chief has 
 his army, and uses it too. In Zululand bloodshed is 
 now a thing of everyday occurrence, and the whole 
 country is torn by fear, uncertainty, and consequent 
 want.^ The settlement is bearing its legitimate fruit ; 
 some thousands of Zulus have already been killed in 
 direct consequence of it, and more will doubtless follow. 
 And this is the outcome of all the blood and treasure 
 spent over the Zulu war! Well, we have settled 
 
 * A severe famine is said to be imminent in Zululand.
 
 AND THE ZULU SETTLEMENT. 47 
 
 Zululand on the most approved principles, and thank 
 Heaven, British influence has not been extended ! 
 
 To show that I am not singular in my opinion as to 
 the present state of Zululand, I may be allowed to quote 
 a few short extracts, taken at random, from half-a-dozen 
 numbers of the Natal Mercury. Talking of the Zulu 
 settlement terms as dictated by Sir G. Wolseley, tlie 
 leading article of the issue 21st November 1881 says: 
 — " It will at once be apparent that these terms have 
 in several cases been flagrantly violated, especially as 
 regards clauses of 2, 3, 4, and 6. This last will 
 assuredly be broken again and yet again, so long as 
 the British Eesident occupies the position of an official 
 mollusc. The chiefs themselves perceive and admit 
 the evils that must arise out of the absence of any 
 efTective central authority. These evils are so obvious, 
 they were so generally recognised at the outset as being 
 inherent in the scheme, that we might almost suppose 
 their occuirence had been deliberately anticipated as a 
 desired outcome of the settlement. The morality of 
 such a line of policy would be precisely on a par with 
 that which is involved in the proposal to reinstate 
 Cetywayo as a means of dealing with the Boers. The 
 creation of thirteen kinglets in order that they might 
 destroy each other, is as humane and higli-minded an 
 effort of statesmanship as would be the restoration of a 
 banished king in order that he might eat up a people 
 to whom the same power has just given back their 
 independence. To the simple colonial mind such deep 
 designs of Machiavellian statecraft are as hateful as 
 they are inhuman and dishonest," 
 
 A correspondent of the Mercury in Zululand writes 
 under date of 13th October : —
 
 48 CETYWAYO 
 
 "I send a line at the last moment to say that things 
 are going from bad to worse at railway speed. Up to 
 the arrival of Sir Evelyn Wood, the chiefs did not fully 
 realise that they were really independent at all. Now 
 they do, and if I mistake not, like a beggar on horse- 
 back will ride to the devil sharp. Oham has begun by 
 killing a large number of the Amagalusi people. My 
 information is derived from native sources, and may 
 be somewhat exaggerated. It is that the killed at 
 Isandhlwaua were few compared with those killed by 
 Uhamu a few days ago. Usibebu also and Undabuka 
 are, I am told, on the point of coming to blows ; and if 
 they do that it will be worse still, for Undabuka will 
 find supporters throughout the length and breadth of 
 Zululand. Undabuka, the full brother of the ex-king, 
 is the protdg^ of the Bishop of Natal. The Bishop, I 
 find, has again sent one of his agents (Amajuba by 
 name) calling for another deputation. The deputation 
 is now on its way to Natal, and that, I understand, 
 against the express refusal of the Eesident to allow it." 
 In the issue of 14th November is published a letter 
 from Mr. Nuun, a gentleman well known in Zululand, 
 from which, as it is too long to quote in its entirety, 
 I give a few extracts : — " Ohams Camp, Oct. 1 5. — The 
 Zulus cannot comprehend the Transvaal affair, and it 
 has been industriously circulated amongst them that the 
 English have been beaten and forced to give back the 
 Transvaal. They do not understand gracious acts of 
 restoration after we have been beaten. Eour times this 
 year has Unniyamana called his army together and 
 menaced Oham, who has several times had to have 
 parties of his followers sleeping around his kraal in 
 the hills adjacent, so as to give him timely notice to fly.
 
 AND THE ZULU SETTLEMENT. 49 
 
 When Ohain left his kraal for the purpose of attending 
 the meeting at Inslasatye, the same day the whole of 
 the Maquilisini tribe came on to the hills adjacent to 
 Oham's kraal, the 'Injamin,' and threatened that dis- 
 trict. This has been the case on two or three former 
 occasions, and simultaneously Umnyamana's tribe and. 
 Undabuka's followers always flew to arms, thus threat- 
 ening on all sides. . . . Trading is and has been for 
 months entirely suspended in this district. The fields 
 are unplanted, no ploughs or Kafir-picks at work — all 
 are in a state of excitement, not knowing the moment 
 a collision may take place. Hunger will stare many 
 in the face next year, and all the men yelling to their 
 chiefs to be let loose and put an end to this state of 
 uncertainty." 
 
 Mr. Nunn encloses an account by an eye-witness of a 
 battle which took place on the 2d October 1881 between 
 Oham's army and the Maquilisini tribe. The following 
 is an extract : — " On the 2d there was a heavy mist, 
 and on moving forward the mounted party found them- 
 selves in the midst of the enemy (the Maquilisini), and 
 on hearing a cry to stab the horses, they rode through 
 them with no casualty (except one horse slightly 
 wounded with a bullet). The army, moving in a half 
 circle, now became generally engaged in a hand-to-hand 
 fight, and our men were checked and annoyed by a 
 number of the enemy armed with guns, who were in a 
 stone-kraal, and kept up a constant fire. Amatonga, 
 now at the head of the mounted party, charged and 
 drove the enemy out of the kraal, from which they three 
 several times charged the enemy on the flank, assisted 
 by a small infantry party, and cut paths through their 
 ranks. The fight, which had now lasted nearly an hour,
 
 so CETYWAYO 
 
 commenced to flag, and Oliam's army making a sudden 
 rush entirely routed the enemy, and the carnage lasted 
 to the Bevan river, the boundary of the Transvaal. No 
 ■women or children were killed, but out of an army 
 of about 1500 of the enemy but few escaped" (sic). 
 ..." The men, as they were being killed, repeatedly 
 exclaimed, 'We are dying through Umnyamana and 
 Umlabaku.' " 
 
 In the Natal Mercury of the 13 th March occurs the 
 following : — ■ 
 
 "Zulu Country. — As to the state of the country it 
 is something we cannot describe ; everything is upside 
 down, and the chiefs appointed by the Government are 
 mere nobodies, and have not any power over their own 
 people. Even the Eesident is in a false position, and 
 seems perfectly powerless to act either way. We had 
 one row, just arriving at a kraal in time to save it from 
 being eaten up. Witchcraft and killing, one of the pre- 
 tences on which the English made "war, are of every- 
 day occurrence, and fifty times worse than they were 
 before the war. Oham and Tibysio (?) keep their men 
 continually in the field, consequently those districts are 
 at present in a state of famine." 
 
 Sir Garnet Wolseley executed the Zulu settlement 
 on the ist September 1879. The above extracts will 
 suffice to show the state of the country after it has 
 been working for little more than two years. They 
 will also, I believe, suffice to convince any just and 
 impartial mind that I do not exaggerate when I say 
 that it is an abomination and a disgrace to England. 
 The language may be strong, but when one hears of 
 1500 unfortunates (nearly twice as many as we lost at 
 Isandhlwana") bein" slaucjhtered in a single intertribal
 
 AND THE ZULU SETTLEMENT. 51 
 
 broil, it is time to use strong language. It is not as 
 though this were an unexpected or an unavoidable de- 
 velopment of events, every man who knew the Zulus 
 predicted the misery that must result from such a settle- 
 ment, but those who directed their destinies turned a 
 deaf ear to all warnings. They did not wish to hear. 
 
 And now we are told that civil war is imminent 
 between the Cetywayo or anti-settlement party, and 
 what I must, for want of a better name, call the John 
 Dunn party, or those who have acquired interest under 
 the settlement, and who for various reasons wish to see 
 Cetywayo's face no more. If this occurs, and it will 
 occur unless the Government makes up its mind to do 
 something before long, the slaughter, not only of men, 
 but also of women and children, will be enormous ; 
 fugitives will pour into Natal, followed perhaps by 
 their pursuers, and for aught we know the M-ar may 
 spread into our own dominions. We are a philan- 
 thropic people, very, when Bulgarians are concerned, or 
 when the subject is one that piques a morbid curio- 
 sity, or is the rage of the moment, and the subject of 
 addresses from great and eloquent speakers. But we 
 can sit still, and let such massacres as these take place, 
 when we have but to hold up our hand to stop them. 
 When occasionally the veil is lifted a little, and the 
 public hears of "fresh fighting in Zululand," a ques- 
 tion is asked in the House; Mr. Courtney, as usual, 
 has no information, but generally discredits the report, 
 and it is put aside as " probably not true." I am well 
 aware that of those who read these words many will 
 disbelieve them, or say that they are written for some 
 object, or for party purposes. But it is not the case ; 
 they are written in the interest of the truth, and in the
 
 52 CETYWAYO 
 
 soinewliat faint hope that they may awaken a portion 
 of the public, however small, to a knowledge of our 
 responsibilities to the unfortunate Zulus. For try to 
 get rid of it as we may, those responsibilities rest upon 
 our shoulders. When we conquered the Zulu nation 
 and sent away the Zulu king, we undertook, morally at 
 any rate, to provide for the future good government of 
 the country : otherwise, the Zulu war was unjust indeed. 
 If we continue to fail, as we have hitherto, to carry 
 out our responsibilities as a humane and Christian 
 nation ought to do, our lapse from what is right will 
 certainly recoil upon our own heads, and, in the stern 
 lessons of future troubles and disasters, we shall learn 
 that Providence with the nation, as with the individual, 
 makes a neglected duty its own avenger. We have 
 sown the wind, let us be careful lest we reap the whirl- 
 ^Yind. 
 
 It is very clear that things cannot remain in their 
 present condition. If they do, it is probable that the 
 Eesident will sooner or later be assassinated ; not from 
 any personal motives, but as a political necessity, and 
 some second Chaka will rise up and found a new Zulu 
 dynasty, sweeping away our artificial chiefs and divisions 
 like cobwebs. This idea seems to have penetrated into 
 Lord Kimberley's official mind, since in his despatch of 
 instructions to Sir H. Bulwer, written in February last, 
 lie says : " Probably if the chiefs are left to themselves 
 after a period more or less prolonged of war and anarchy, 
 some man will raise himself to the position of supreme 
 chief." The prospect of war and anarchy in Zululand 
 does not, however, trouble Lord Kimberley at all ; in 
 fact, the whole despatch is typical to a degree of the 
 Liberal colonial policy. Lord Kimberley admits thet
 
 AND THE ZULU SETTLEMENT. 53 
 
 what little quiet the country has enjoycLl iincl(3r the 
 settlement " was due to a mistaken belief on the part 
 of the Zulus that the British Government was rulinrj 
 them, or would rule them through the Resident." He 
 evidently clearly sees all the evils and bloodshed that 
 are resulting and that must result from the present 
 state of affairs ; indeed he recapitulates them, and then 
 ends up by even refusing to allow such slight measures 
 of relief as tlie appointment of sub-Residents to be 
 carried out, although begged for by the chiefs, on the 
 ground that it might extend British influence. Of the 
 interests of the Zulus themselves he is quite careless. 
 Tlie whole despatch can be summed up thus : " If you 
 can find any method to improve the state of affairs 
 which will not subject us to the smallest cost, risk, or 
 responsibility, you can employ it ; if not, let them fight 
 it out." Perhaps Lord Kimberley may live (officially) 
 loncj enough to find out that meanness and selfishness 
 do not always pay, and that it is not always desirable 
 thus to sacrifice the respect and crush the legitimate 
 aspirations of a generous people. 
 
 Unless something is done before long, it is possible 
 that John Dunn may succeed after a bloody M'ar in 
 securing the throne ; but this would not prove a per- 
 manent arrangement, since he is now getting on in life 
 and has no son to carry on the dynasty. Another 
 possibility, and one that is not generally known, at any 
 rate in this country, though it is perhaps tlie most pro- 
 bable of all, is this. Cetywayo has left a son in Zulu- 
 land, who is being carefully educated under the care of 
 Mnyamane, the late king's Prime Minister. The boy 
 is now about 16 years of age, and is reported to possess 
 very good abilities, and is the trump card that Mnya-
 
 54 CETYWAYO 
 
 mane will play as soon as the time is ripe. This young 
 man is the hereditary heir to the Zulu crown, and it is 
 more than probable that if he is proclaimed king the 
 vast majority of the nation will rally round him and 
 establish him firmly on his tlirone. There is little use 
 in keeping Cety wayo confined whilst his son is at large. 
 The lad should have been brought to England and 
 educated, so that he might at some future time have 
 assisted in the civilisation of his country : as it is, he 
 is growing up in a bad schooh 
 
 And now I come to the root of the whole matter — the 
 question whether or no, under all these circumstances, 
 it is right or desirable to re-establish Cety wayo on the 
 throne of Zululand. In considering this question, I 
 think that Cetywayo's individuality ought to be put on 
 one side, however much we may sympathise with his 
 position, as I confess I do to some extent myself. After 
 all, Cetywayo is only one man, whereas the happiness, 
 security, and perhaps the lives of many thousands are 
 involved in the issue of the question. In coming to any 
 conclusion in the matter it is necessary to keep in view 
 the intentions of the Government as regards our future 
 connection with Zululand. If the Government intends 
 \ to do its duty and rule Zululand as it ought to be ruled, 
 by the appointment of proper magistrates, the establish- 
 ment of an adequate force, and the imposition of the 
 necessary taxes, then it M'ould be the height of folly 
 to permit Cetywayo to return, since his presence would 
 defeat the scheme. It must be remembered that there 
 is as yet nothing whatsoever to prevent this plan being 
 carried out. It would be welcomed with joy by the large 
 majority of both Zulus and colonists. It would also 
 solve the problem of the increase of the native popula-
 
 AND THE ZULU SETTLEMENT. 55 
 
 tion of Natal, which is assuming most alarming propor* 
 tions, since Zululand, being very much under-populated, 
 it would bo easy, were that country once quietly settled, 
 to draft the majority of the Natal Zulus back into it. 
 This is undoubtedly the best course, and indeed the 
 only right course ; but it does not at all follow that 
 it will be taken, since governments are unfortunately 
 more concerned at the prospect of losing votes than 
 with the genuine interests of their dependencies. The 
 proper settlement of Zululand would not be popular 
 amongst a large class in this country, and therefore it 
 is not likely to be carried out, however right and neces- 
 sary it may be. 
 
 If nothing is going to be done, then it becomes a 
 question whether or no Cetywayo should be sent 
 back. 
 
 The large majority of the Natalians consider that his 
 restoration would be an act of suicidal folly, and their 
 opinion is certainly entitled to great weight, since they 
 are after all the people principally concerned. The 
 issue of the experiment would be a matter of compara- 
 tive indifference to people living 7000 miles away, but 
 is naturally regarded with some anxiety by those who 
 have their homes on the borders of Zululand. It is 
 very well to sympathise with savage royalty in distress, 
 but it must be borne in mind that there are others to 
 be considered besides the captive king. Many of the 
 Zulus, for instance, are by no means anxious to see him 
 again, since they look forward with just apprehension 
 to the line of action he may take with those who have 
 not shown sufficient anxiety for his return, or have in 
 other ways incurred his resentment. One thing is 
 clear, to send the king back to Zululand is to restore
 
 56 CETYWAYO 
 
 the status in quo as it was before the war. There can 
 be no half measures about it, no more worthless paper 
 stipulations ; a Zulu king must either be allowed to 
 rule in his own fashion or not at all. The war would 
 go for nothing, and would doubtless have to be fouglit 
 over again with one of Cetywayo's successors. 
 
 Also it must be remembered that it is one thing to 
 talk of restoring Cetywayo, and another to carry his 
 restoration into effect. It would not simply be a ques- 
 tion of turning him down on the borders of Zululand, 
 and letting him find his own way back to his throne, 
 for such a proceeding would be the signal for the out- 
 break of civil war. It is not to be supposed that John 
 Dunn, and those whose interests are identical with 
 Dunn's, would allow the ex-king to reseat himself on 
 the throne without a struggle ; indeed the former has 
 openly declared his intention of resisting the attempt 
 by force of arms if necessary. He is by no means 
 anxious to give up the ;^i 5,000 a year that his hut-tax 
 brings in, and all the contingent profits and advantages 
 of his chieftainship. If we wish to restore Cetywayo 
 we must first depose Dunn ; in fact, we must be ready 
 to support his restoration by force of arms. 
 
 As regards Cetywayo himself, I cannot share the 
 opinion of those who think that he would be personally 
 dangerous. He has learnt his lesson, and would not be 
 anxious to try conclusions with tlie English again ; in- 
 deed, I believe he would prove a staunch ally. But 
 supposing him re-established on the throne, how long 
 would it be before a revolution, or the hand of the 
 assassin, to say nothing of the ordinary chances of 
 nature, put an end to him, and how do we know that 
 his successor in power would share his views ?
 
 AND THE ZULU SETTLEMENT. 57 
 
 Cetywayo's rule, bad as it was, was perhaps prefer- 
 able to the reign of terror that we have established 
 under the name of a settlement. But that we can still 
 remedy if we choose to do so, whereas, if we once restore 
 Cetywayo, all power over the Zulus passes out of our 
 hands. 
 
 We have many interests to consider in South Africa, 
 all of which will be more or less affected by our action 
 in this matter. On the whole, I am of opinion that 
 the Government tliat replaces Cetywayo on the throne 
 of his fathers will undertake a very grave responsi- 
 bility, and must be prepared to deal with many result- 
 ing complications, not the least of which will be the 
 utter exasperation of the white inhabitants of Natal.
 
 ( 58 ) 
 
 NATAL AND RESPONSIBLE 
 GOVERNMENT. 
 
 Natal has an area of about 18,000 square miles, and 
 its present population is, roughly, 25,000 whites and 
 400,000 natives of the Zulu race. When, in 1843, 
 it first became a British colon}', the number of natives 
 living within its borders was very small, and they 
 were for the most part wanderers, fragmentary rem- 
 nants of the tribes that Chaka had destroyed. I shall 
 probably be under, rather than over the mark, if I 
 say, that the Zulu population of the colony has multi- 
 plied itself by ten during the last thirty years. Two 
 causes have combined to bring about this extraordinary 
 increase — firstly, wholesale immigration from the sur- 
 rounding territories ; and, secondly, the practice of 
 polygamy. 
 
 This immigration has been due to a great want of 
 foresight, or want of knowledge, on the part of the 
 Home authorities, who have allowed it to go on with- 
 out check or hindrance till it has, in conjunction with 
 its twin evil polygamy, produced the state of affairs 
 it is my object to describe. Ever since its first 
 establishment as a colony Xatal has been turned into 
 a city of refuge for the native inhabitants of Zululand, 
 the Transvaal, Swaziland, and elsewhere. If news
 
 NATAL AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT. 59 
 
 came to a Zulu chief that his king purposed to eat 
 him up, he at once fled across the Tugela with liis 
 wives and followers and settled in Natal. If the 
 Boers or Svvazis destroyed a tribe, the remnant found 
 its way to Natal. <J r i 
 
 Tliat country, indeed, is to the South African native ' ' 
 
 7 
 
 a modern Isles of the Blest. Once across the border ' •" /, 
 line, and, whatever his crime, he is in a position to 
 defy his worst enemy, and can rest secure in the pro- 
 tection of the Home and Local Governments, and of 
 the enactments specially passed to protect him and 
 his privileges. The Government allots him land, or 
 if it does not he squats on private land, bringing with 
 him his own peculiar and barbarous customs. In all 
 the world I do not know a race more favoured by 
 circumstances than the Natal Zulus. They live ou 
 the produce of the fields that their wives cultivate, or 
 rather scratch, doing little or no work, and having no 
 occasion to do any. They are very rich, and their 
 taxes are a mere trifle — fifteen shillings per annum for 
 each hut. They bear no share of the curse that comes 
 to all other men as a birthright — they need not 
 labour. Protected by a powerful Government, they 
 do not fear attack from without, or internal disorder. 
 What all men desire, riches and women, are theirs in 
 abundance, and even their children, the objects of so 
 much expense and sore perplexity to civilised parents, 
 are to them a source of wealth. Their needs are few — 
 a straw hut, corn for food, and the bright sun. Tiiey 
 are not even troubled with the thought of a future 
 life, but, like the animals, live through their healthy, 
 happy days, and at last, in extreme old age, meet a death 
 which for them has no terrors, because it practically
 
 6o NATAL 
 
 means extinction. When compared to that of civilised 
 races, or even of their own brethren in the interior, 
 their lot is indeed a happy one. 
 
 Bat the stream of immigration, continuous though 
 it has been, would not by itself have sufficed to bring 
 up the native population to its present enormous total, 
 without the assistance of the polygamous customs of 
 the immigrants. 
 
 I believe that inquirers have ascertained, that, as 
 a general rule, the practice of polygamy has not the 
 effect of bringing about an abnormal growth of popula- 
 tion. However this may be elsewhere, in Natal, owing 
 in great measure to the healthy customs of the Zulu 
 race,^ the rate of increase is unprecedented. Many 
 writers and other authorities consider polygamy as an 
 institution to be at once wicked and disgusting. As 
 to its morality, it is a point upon which it is difficult 
 to express any opinion, nor, indeed, does the question 
 enter into the scope of what I have to say ; but it 
 must be remembered that in the case of the Zulu his 
 whole law and existence is mixed up with the institu- 
 tion, and that it is necessary to him to repair the gaps 
 made in his ranks by war. Violent anti-polygamists 
 in this country always make a strong point of the 
 cruelty it is supposed to involve to the women, and 
 talk about the " violation of their holiest feelings." 
 As a matter of fact, sad as it may appear, the Zulu 
 women are much attached to the custom, nor would 
 they, as a general rule, consent to marry a man who 
 
 ^ As soon as a Zulu woman is discovered to be pregnant her husband 
 ceases to cohabit with lier, nor does he live witli her again until tlie 
 child is weaned, eighteen months, and sometimes two years, after its 
 birth.
 
 AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT. 6i 
 
 only purposed taking one wife. There are various 
 reasons for<this: for instance, the first wife is a person 
 of importance, and takes precedence of all the others, 
 a fact as much appreciated by the Zulu woman as by 
 the London lady. Again, the more wives there are, 
 the more wealth it brings into the family, since in the 
 ordinary course of nature more wives mean more 
 female children, who, when they come to a marriage- 
 able age, mean in their turn at least ten cows each 
 (the Government price for a wife). The amount thus 
 obtained is placed to the credit of the estate of the 
 mother of the girl married, and for this reason all 
 Zulu women are extremely anxious to have children, 
 especially female children. Finally, the liking of Zulu 
 women for the custom is bred in them. It has been 
 going on for countless generations, and it is probable 
 that it will go on for so long as the race endures. 
 Nations do not change such habits unless the change is 
 forced on them, with the alternative of extermination. 
 
 Polygamy will never be eradicated by moral persua- y 
 sion, because, even if a native could be brought to think 
 it wrong, which is in itself impossible, its abolition 
 would affect his interests irredeemably. A Zulu's 
 wives are also his servants ; they plough his land and 
 husband his grain, in addition to bearing his children. 
 Had he but one wife most of her time would be taken 
 up with the latter occupation, and then the mealie- 
 planting and gathering would necessarily fall to the lot 
 of the husband, a state of affairs he would never consent 
 to. Again, if monogamy were established, girls would 
 lose their value, and a great source of wealth would be 
 destroyed. It must, however, be understood that Zulu 
 girls are not exactly sold ; the cows received by the
 
 62 NATAL 
 
 parents are Ly a legal fiction supposed to be a gift 
 presented, not a price paid. Should the wife subse- 
 quently run away, they are, I believe, returnable. 
 
 On these subjects, as is not to be wondered at when 
 so many interests are concerned, the Zulu law is a 
 little intricate. The cleverest counsel in the Temple 
 could not give an opinion on such a case as the 
 following : — 
 
 A. has four wives, and children by Nos. i and 3. 
 On his death his brother, B., a rich man, takes over his 
 wives and property, and has children by each of the 
 four women. He has also children by other wives. 
 On his death, in extreme old age, how should the 
 property be divided amongst the descendants of the 
 various marriages ? 
 
 It is clear that if such a case as this is to be dealt 
 with at all it must be under native law, and this is one 
 of the great dangers of polygamy. Once rooted in a 
 state it necessitates a double system of laws, since 
 civilised law is quite unable to cope with the cases 
 daily arising from its practice. It is sometimes argued 
 that the law employed is a matter of indifference, 
 provided that substantial justice is done, according to 
 the ideas of people concerned, and this is doubtless 
 very true if it is accepted as a fact that the Zulu popu- 
 lation of Natal is always to remain in its present 
 condition of barbarism. To continue to administer 
 their law is to give it the sanction of the white man's 
 authority, and every day that it is so administered 
 makes it more impossible to do away with it. I say 
 " more impossible " advisedly, because I believe its 
 abrogation is already impossible. There is no satis- 
 factory way out of the difficulty, because it has it3
 
 AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT. 63 
 
 roots in, and draws its existence from, the principle of 
 polygamy, which I believe will last while the people 
 last. J 
 
 Some rely on the Missionary to effect this stupen- y 
 dous change, and turn a polygamous people into 
 monogamists. But it is a well-known fact that the 
 missionaries produce no more permanent effect on the 
 Zulu mind than a child does on the granite rock 
 which he chips at with a chisel. How many real 
 Christians are there in Zuhiland and Natal, and of 
 that select and saintly band how many practise 
 monogamy ? But very few, and among those few 
 there is a large proportion of bad characters, men who 
 have adopted Christianity as a last resource. I mean 
 no disrespect to the missionaries, many of whom are 
 good men, doing their best under the most unpromis- 
 ing conditions, though some are simply traders and 
 political agitators. But the fact remains the same. 
 Christianity makes no appreciable progress amongst 
 the Zulu natives, whilst, on the other hand, no one 
 having any experience in the country M'ill, if he can 
 avoid it, have a so-called Christian Kafir in his house, 
 because the term is but too frequently synonymous 
 with that of drunkard and thief. I do not wish it to 
 be understood that it is the fact of his Christianity 
 that so degrades the Zulu, because I do not think it 
 has anything to do with it. It is only that the 
 novice, standing on the threshold of civilisation, as a 
 rule finds the vices of the white man more congenial ^ 
 than his virtues. 
 
 The Zulus are as difficult to convince of the truths 
 of Christianity as were the Jews, whom they so much 
 resemble in their customs. They have a natural
 
 64 NATAL 
 
 (lisincliDation to believe that which they cannot see, 
 and, being constitutionally very clever and casuistical, 
 are prepared to argue each ii>dividual point with an 
 ability very trying to missionaries. It was one of 
 these Zulus, known as the Intelligent Zulu, but in 
 reality no more intelligent than his fellows, whose 
 shrewd remarks first caused doubts to arise in the 
 mind of Bishop Colenso, and through him in those of 
 thousands of others. 
 
 Another difficulty in the way of the missionary is, 
 that he is obliged to insist on the putting away of 
 surplus wives, and thus to place himself out of court 
 at the outset. It is quite conceivable that in the 
 opinion of wild and savage men it is preferable to let 
 the new teaching alone, rather than to adopt it at the 
 cost of such a radical change in their domestic arrange- 
 ments. As a case in point I may quote that of Hlubi, 
 the Basuto appointed chief of one of the divisions of 
 Zululand by Sir Gr. Wolseley. Hlubi is at heart a 
 Christian, and a good man, and anxious to be baptized. 
 The missionaries, however, refuse to baptize him 
 because he has two wives. Hlubi therefore remains 
 a heathen, saying, not unnaturally, that he feels it 
 would be impossible for him to put away a woman 
 with whom he has lived for so many years. 
 
 Whilst polygamy endures Christianity will advance 
 with but small strides. It seems to me that we are 
 beginning at the wrong end. We must civilise first 
 and Christianise afterwards. As well try to sow corn 
 among rocks and look to gather a full crop, as expect 
 the words of Grace and Divine love to bear fruit in 
 the hearts of a people whose forefathers have for 
 countless generations been men of blood, whose prized
 
 AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT. 65 
 
 traditions are one long story of slaughter, and who, if 
 they are now at peace, are, as it were, only gathering 
 strength for a surer spring. First, the soil must be 
 prepared before the seed is sown. 
 
 To do this tliere is but one way. Abolish native 
 customs and laws, especially polygamy, and bring our 
 Zulu subjects within the pale of our own law. Deprive 
 them of their troops of servants in the shape of wives, 
 and thus force them to betake themselves to honest 
 labour like the rest of mankind. 
 
 There is only one objection in the way of the 
 realisation of this scheme, which would, doubtless, 
 bring about, in the course of a generation, a much 
 better state of things, and gather many thousand con- 
 verts into the fold of the Church ; and that is, the 
 opportunity has, so far as Natal is concerned, been 
 missed — the time has gone by when it could have 
 been carried out. To young countries, as to young 
 men, there come sometimes opportunities of control- 
 ling their future destinies, which, if not seized at the 
 moment, pass away for ever, or only to return after 
 long and troubled years. Natal has had her chance, 
 and it has gone away from her, thougli througli no 
 I'ault of her own. If, when the colony was first 
 settled, the few natives who then lived there had been 
 forced to conform to the usages of civilised life or to 
 quit its borders ; if refugees liad been refused admis- 
 sion save on the same terms, it would not occupy 
 the very serious position it does at the present 
 moment. 
 
 To understand the situation into which .Natal has 
 drifted witli reference to its native inhabitants, it is 
 necessary to premise that that country has hitherto
 
 66 NATAL 
 
 had practically no control over its own affairs, more 
 especially as regards native legislation. 
 
 In its early days it was a happy, quiet place, a 
 favoured clime, where the traveller or settler could 
 find good shooting, cheap labour, and cheap living. 
 No enemy threatened its rest, and the natives were 
 respectful and peaceful in their behaviour. But it 
 was in those days that the native difficulty, that Upas 
 tree that now overshadows and poisons the whole 
 land, took root ; for slowly from all parts, all through 
 that quiet time, by ones, by tens, by hundreds, refugees 
 were flowing in, and asking and receiving land to 
 settle on from the Government. 
 
 It is not, however, to be supposed that the local 
 officials did not perceive the gathering danger, since 
 it has again and again been pointed out to different 
 Secretaries of State, and again and again been ignored 
 by them, or put off for the consideration of their 
 successors. Hand-to-mouth legislation has always 
 been the characteristic of our rule in South Africa. 
 On one occasion Sir Theophilus, then Mr. Shepstone, 
 went so far as to offer to personally draw off a large 
 portion of the native population, and settle them on 
 some vacant territory bordering on the Cape Colony, 
 but the suggestion was not acceded to, for fear lest 
 the execution -of the scheme should excite disturbances 
 amongst the natives of the Cape. Thus year after 
 year has passed away — plan after plan has been put 
 aside, — and nothing has been done. 
 
 In the colony a great deal of abuse is poured out 
 on the head of Sir T. Shepstone, to whom the present 
 native situation is unjustly attributed by a certain 
 party of politicians. Sir T Shepstone was for very
 
 AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT. 67 
 
 many years Secretary for Native Affairs in Natal, 
 but until he came to England, shortly before the 
 termination of his official career, he was personally 
 unknown to the Colonial Office, and had no influence 
 there. It was totally out of his power to control the 
 policy of the Home Government with reference to 
 the Natal natives ; he could only take things as he 
 found them, and make the best of such materials as 
 came to his hand. As he could not keep the natives 
 out of the colony or prevent polygamy, he did what 
 he could towards making them loyal and contented 
 subjects. How well he succeeded, and with what 
 consummate tact and knowledge he must have exer- 
 cised his authority, is shown by the fact that in all 
 these years there has been but one native disturbance, 
 namely, that of Langalibalele, and by the further fact 
 that the loyalty of the Natal Zulus stood the strain 
 of the Zulu war. Also, there never has been, and pro- 
 bably never will be, another white man so universally 
 beloved and reverenced by the natives throughout the 
 length and breadth of South Africa. 
 
 But Sir T. Shepstone's influence for good will pass 
 away, as all purely personal influence must, and mean- 
 while, what is the situation ? On the one hand, there 
 is a very slowly increasing, scattered, and mixed popu- 
 lation of about 25,000 whites, capable, at the outside, 
 of putting a force of 4000 men in the field. On the 
 other, there is a warlike native population, united by 
 the ties of race and common interests, numbering at 
 the present moment between 400,000 and 500,000, 
 and increasing by leaps and bounds, capable of putting 
 quite 80,000 warriors into the field, and possessing, 
 besides, numerous stronffholds called locations. At
 
 68 NATAL 
 
 present these two rival populations live side by side 
 in peace and amity, though at heart neither loves the 
 other. The two races are so totally distinct that it 
 is quite impossible for them to have much community 
 of feeling ; they can never mingle ; their ideas are 
 different, their objects are different, and in Natal their 
 very law is different. Kafirs respect and like indi- 
 vidual Englishmen, but I doubt whether they are par- 
 ticularly fond of us as a race, though they much prefer 
 us to any other white men, and are devoted to our 
 rule, so long as it is necessary to them. The average 
 white man, on the other hand, detests the Kafir, and 
 looks on him as a lazy good-for-nothing, who ought 
 to work for him and will not work for him, whilst he 
 is quite incapable of appreciating his many good points. 
 It is an odd trait about Zulus that only gentlemen, in 
 the true sense of the word, can win their regard, or 
 get anything out of them. 
 
 It is obvious that, sooner or later, these two races 
 must come into contact, the question being how long 
 the present calm will last. To this question I will 
 venture to suggest an answer, — I believe the right 
 one. It will last until the native gets so cramped 
 for room that he has no place left to settle on, except 
 the white man's lands. The white man will then 
 try to turn him off, whereupon the native will fall 
 back on the primitive resource of killing him, and 
 possessing himself of the land by force. This plan, 
 simultaneously carried out on a large scale, would place 
 the colony at the mercy of its native inhabitants. 
 
 Nor is tlie time so very far distant when English- 
 men and Zulus will stand face to face over this land 
 question. In the early days of the colony, locations
 
 AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT. 69 
 
 were established in the mountainous districts, because 
 they were comparatively worthless, and the natives 
 were settled in them by tribes. Of what goes on in 
 these locations very little is known, except that they 
 are crowded, and that the inhabitants are as entirely 
 wedded to their savage customs as their forefathers 
 were before them. As there is no more room in the 
 locations, many thousands of Kafirs have settled upon 
 private lands, sometimes with and sometimes without 
 the leave of the owners. But, for many reasons, this 
 is a state of affairs that cannot go on for ever. In 
 a few years the private lands will be filled up, as well 
 as the locations, and what then ? 
 
 Zulus are a people who require a very large 
 quantity of land, since they possess great numbers 
 of cattle which must have grazing room. Also their 
 cultivation being of the most primitive order, and 
 consisting as it does of picking out the very richest 
 patches of land, and cropping them till they are 
 exhausted, all ordinary land being rejected as too 
 much trouble to work, the possession, or the right of 
 usor, of several hundred acres is necessary to the 
 support of a single family. Nor, if we may judge 
 from precedent, and its well-marked characteristics, 
 is it to be supposed that this race will at the pinch 
 suit itself to circumstances, take up less land, and 
 work harder. Zulus would rather fight to the last 
 than discard a cherished and an ancient custom. 
 Savages they are, and savages they will remain, and 
 in the struggle between them and civilisation it is 
 possible that they may be conquered, but I do not 
 believe that they will be converted. The Zulu Kafir 
 is incompatible with civilisation.
 
 70 NATAL 
 
 It will be seen, from what I have said, that Natal 
 might more properly be called a Black settlement 
 than an English colony. Looking at it from the 
 former point of view, it is a very interesting experi- 
 ment. For the first time probably since their race 
 came into existence, Zulu natives have got a chance 
 given them of increasing and multiplying without 
 being periodically decimated by the accidents of war, 
 whilst at the same time enjoying the protection of a 
 strong and a just government. It remains to be seen 
 what use they will make of their opportunity. That 
 they will avail themselves of it for the purposes of 
 civilising themselves I do not believe; but it seems 
 to me possible that they will learn from the white 
 man tlie advantages of combination, and aim at de- 
 veloping themselves into a powerful and united black 
 nation. 
 
 It is in the face of this state of things that Lord 
 Kimberley now proposes to grant responsible govern- 
 ment to the white inhabitants of Natal, should they be 
 willing to accept it, providing that it is to carry with 
 it the responsibility of ruling the natives, and further, 
 of defending the colony from the attacks of its neigh- 
 bours, whether white or coloured. 
 
 Natal has hitherto been ruled under a hybrid con- 
 stitution, which, whilst allowing the Legislative As- 
 sembly of the colony to pass laws, &c., reserves all real 
 authority to the Crown. There has, however, been for 
 some years past a growing agitation amongst a pro- 
 portion of its inhabitants, instituted with the object of 
 inducing the Home Government to concede practical 
 independence to the colony, Her Majesty having on 
 several occasions been petitioned on the subject by the
 
 AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT. 71 
 
 Legislative Council. On the 13th February 1880, 
 Sir G. Wolseley, who was at the time Governor of 
 Natal, wrote what I can only call an intemperate 
 despatch to the Secretary of State, commenting on the 
 prayer for responsible government, which he strongly 
 condemned. He also took the opportunity to make a 
 series of somewhat sharp attacks on the colonists in 
 general, whose object in asking for independence was, 
 he implied, to bring the black man in relations of 
 " appropriate servitude to his white superior." It 
 would appear, however, from words used by him towards 
 the end of his despatch, that the real reason of his 
 violence was, that he feared that one of the first acts 
 of the Natal Parliament would be to put an end to his 
 settlement in Zululaud, which was and is the laughing- 
 etock of the colony. He was probably right in this 
 supposition. The various charges he brings against 
 the colonists are admirably and conclusively refuted 
 in a minute adopted by the Legislative Council of 
 Natal, dated 20th December 1880. 
 
 In a despatch, dated 15th March 1881, Lord Kim- 
 berley refuses to accede to the request for the grant 
 of Responsible Government. 
 
 On tlie 28 th of December, the Legislative Council 
 again petitioned the Crown on the subject, and forwarded 
 to Lord Kimberley a report of a Select Committee 
 appointed to consider the matter, in which the following 
 words occur : — 
 
 " Your committee hold that while the colony may 
 well be held responsible for its defence from such 
 aggression as may be caused by the acts or policy of 
 a responsible government, it cannot justly be saddled 
 with the obligation to meet acts of aggression from
 
 72 NATAL 
 
 bordering territories that have arisen out of the cir- 
 cumstances or measures over wliich such government 
 have had no control ; although, as a matter of fact, the 
 brunt of defence (must be borne ?) in the first instance 
 by the colonists. The Council, therefore, neither exer- 
 cises, nor desires to exercise, any control over terri- 
 tories adjacent to or bordering on tlie colony ; for tlie 
 preservation of its own internal peace and order the 
 colony is prepared to provide. The duty of protecting 
 the colony from external foes, whether by sea or land, 
 devolves on the Empire as a whole, otherwise to be a 
 section of that Empire constitutes no real privilege." 
 
 To this report, somewhat to the surprise of tlie 
 Natalians, Lord Kimberley returned, in a despatch 
 addressed to Sir H. Bulwer, on the occasion of his depar- 
 ture to take up tlie Governorship of Natal, and dated 2d 
 February 1882, a most favourable reply. In fact, he 
 is so obliging as to far exceed the wishes of the Natalians 
 as expressed in the passage just quoted, and to tell them 
 that Her Majesty's Government is not only ready to 
 give them responsible government, but that it will ex- 
 pect them to defend their own frontiers, independently 
 of any assistance from the Imperial Government. He 
 foirther informs them that the Imperial troops will 
 lie withdrawn, and that the only responsibility Her 
 Majesty's Government will retain with reference to the 
 colony will be that of its defence against aggression by 
 foreign powers. 
 
 This sudden change of face on the part of the 
 Imperial Government, which had up till now flatly 
 refused to grant any measttre of self-government to 
 Natal, may at first seem rather odd, but on examina- 
 tion it will be found to be quite in accordance with
 
 AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT. 73 
 
 the recently developed South African policy of Mr. 
 Gladstone's Government. There is little doubt that 
 it is an article of faith among the Liberal party that 
 the less the mother-country has to do with her colonies, 
 and more especially with her South African colonies, 
 the better. A grand step was made in the direction 
 of the abandonment of our South African Empire when 
 we surrendered the Transvaal to the Boers, and it is 
 clear that if our troops can be withdrawn from Natal 
 and all responsibility for the safety of that colony put 
 an end to, the triumph of self-effacement will be still 
 more complete. But there is another and more im- 
 mediate reason for Lurd Kimberley's generous offer. 
 He knows, no one better, that the policy pursued in 
 South Africa, both as regards the Transvaal and 
 Zululand, must produce its legitimate fruit — bloodshed 
 ■ — before very long. He, or rather his Government, 
 is consequently anxious to cut the connection before 
 anything of the sort occurs, when they will be able to 
 attribute the trouble, whatever it is, to the ill-advised 
 action of the Colonial Legislature. 
 
 What is still more strange, however, is that the 
 colonists, having regard to the position they occupy 
 with reference to the Kafirs that surround them, to 
 whom they bear the same relative proportion that the 
 oases do to the desert, or the islands of an archipelago 
 to the ocean that washes their shores, should wish for 
 such a dangerous boon as that of self-government, if 
 indeed they really do wish it. When I lived in 
 Natal, I often heard the subject discussed, and watched 
 the Legislative Council pass its periodical resolutions 
 about it, but I confess I always looked on the matter 
 as being more or less of a farce. There exists, how-
 
 /4 NATAL 
 
 ever, in Natal a knot of politicians who are doubtless 
 desirous of the chancre, partly because they think that 
 it would be really beneficial, and partly because they 
 are possessed by a laudable ambition to fill the high 
 positions of Prime Minister, Treasurer, &c., in the future 
 Parliament. But these gentlemen for the most part 
 live in the towns, where they are comparatively safe 
 should a native rising occur. I have not noticed the 
 same enthusiasm for responsible government among 
 those Natalians who live up country in the neighbour- 
 hood of the locations. 
 
 Still there does exist a considerable party who are 
 in favour of the change — a party that has recently 
 sprung into existence. Many things have occurred 
 within the last few years to irritate and even exasperate 
 people in Natal with the Imperial Government, and 
 generally with the treatment that they have received 
 at our hands. For instance, colonists are proverbially 
 sensitive, and it is therefore rather hard that every 
 newspaper correspondent or itinerant bookmaker who 
 comes to their shores should at once proceed to print 
 endless letters and books abusing them without mercy. 
 The fact of the matter is that these gentlemen come, 
 and put up at the hotels and pot-shops, where they 
 meet all the loafers and bad characters in the country, 
 whom they take to be specimens of the best class of 
 colonists, whom they describe accordingly as the 
 " riddlings of society." Into the quiet, respectable, 
 and happy homes that really give the tone to the 
 colony they do not enter. 
 
 It is also a favourite accusation to bring against 
 the people of Natal that they make the South African 
 wars in order to make money out of them. For
 
 AND EESPONSIBLE GOVEUNMENT. 75 
 
 instance, in a leading article of one of the principal 
 English journals, it was stated not long ago, tliat the 
 murmurs of the colonists at being forced to eat the 
 bread of humiliation in the Transvaal matter arose 
 from no patriotic feeling, but from sorrow at the early 
 termination of a war out of which they hoped to suck 
 no small advantage. This statement is quite untrue. 
 
 No doubt a great deal of money has been made 
 out of the wars by a few colonial speculators, some 
 of it, maybe, dishonestly ; but this is not an unusual 
 occurrence in a foreign war. Was no money made 
 dishonestly by English speculators and contractors in 
 the Crimean War ? Cannot Manchester boast manufac- 
 turers ready to supply our enemies, — for cash payments, 
 — with guns to shoot us with, or any other material 
 of war ? 
 
 It is not to be supposed that because a few specu- 
 lators made fortunes out of the Commissariat that the 
 whole colony participated in the spoils of the various 
 wars. On the contrary, the majority of its inhabi- 
 tants have suffered very largely. Not only have they 
 run considerable personal risk, but since, and owing 
 to, the Zulu and Boer wars the cost of living has 
 almost, if not quite doubled, which, needless to say, 
 has not been the case with their incomes. It is there- 
 fore peculiarly cruel that Natal should be gibbeted as 
 the abode of scoundrels of the worst sort, men pre- 
 pared to bring about bloodshed in order to profit by 
 it. Sir Garnet Wolseley, however, found in this report 
 of colonial dishonesty a convenient point of vantage 
 from which to attack the colonists generally, and in 
 his despatch about responsible government we may be 
 sure he did not spare them. The Legislative Council
 
 76 NATAL 
 
 thus comments on his remarks : " To colonists a war 
 means the spreading amongst them of distress, alarm, 
 and confusion, peril to life and property in outlying 
 districts, the arrest of progress, and general disorgani- 
 sation. . . . Tlie Council regard with pain and indigna- 
 tion the uncalled-for and cruel stigma thus cast upon 
 the colonists by Sir Garnet Wolseley." 
 
 At first sight these accusations may not appear to 
 have much to do with the question of whether or no 
 the colonists should accept responsible government, 
 but in reality they have, inasmuch as they create a 
 feeling of soreness that inclines the Natalians to get 
 rid of Imperial interference and the attendant criticism 
 at any price. 
 
 More substantial grievances against the English 
 Government are the present condition of the native 
 problem, which the colonists justly attribute to Im- 
 perial mismanagement and that triumph of genius, Sir 
 Garnet Wolseley's settlement in ZuUiland. They see 
 these evils, which they know were preventable, grow- 
 ing more formidable day by day, and they imagine, 
 or some of them do, that if they had free institutions 
 it would still be in their power to stop that growth. 
 
 The whole question has now been referred to the 
 colony, which is to elect a fresh Legislative Assembly 
 on the issue of responsible government. The struggle 
 between " the party of progress," i.e., the responsible 
 government section, and the reactionists, or those who 
 are prepared to dispense with " freedom," provided 
 they can be sure of safety, is being carried on keenly, 
 and at present it is doubtful which side will have a 
 majority. I do not, however, believe that the majority 
 of any Council returned will consent to accept Lord
 
 AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT. 77 
 
 Kimberley's proposal as it stands ; to walk into a 
 parlour in which the spicier is so very obvious, and to 
 deliberately undertake the guardianship of all the Im- 
 perial interests in South-Eastern Africa. If they do, 
 they will, in my opinion, deserve all they will get.^ 
 
 The Natalians are fortunate at the present crisis 
 in having, by dint of vigorous agitation against the 
 ap[)ointment of Mr. Sendall, a gentleman selected by 
 Lord Kimberley to govern them, obtained the re- 
 appointment of their former Governor, Sir Henry 
 liulwer. Sir Henry, during his first tenure of office, 
 lost credit with the South African colonists on account 
 of his lukewarmness with reference to the Zulu war, 
 but the course of events has gone far towards justify- 
 ing his views. He is one of the most hard-working 
 and careful Governors that Natal lias ever had, and, 
 perhaps, the most judicious. Of a temperate and a 
 cautious mind, he may be more safely trusted to pilot 
 a country so surrounded with difficulties and dangers 
 as Natal is than most men, and it is to be hoped that 
 the application to the questions of the day of the 
 strong common sense that he possesses in such an 
 eniiueut degree may have a cooling eflect on the 
 hot heads and excited imaginations of the " party of 
 progress." 
 
 In considering the pros and cons of the responsible 
 government question, it must be steadily kept in 
 sight that Natal is not likely to be a country with a 
 
 ^ Since this chapter was written the Natal constituencies have, as I 
 thought probable, declared against the acceptance of Lord Kimberley's 
 oiler in its present form, by returning a majority of auti-responsible 
 government men. It is, however, probable that the new Legislative 
 Council will try to reopen negotiations ou a different, or, at any rate, 2 
 modified basis.
 
 78 NATAL 
 
 peaceful future. To begin with, she has her native 
 inhabitants to deal with. To-day they number, say 
 450,000 ; fifteen or twenty years hence they will 
 number a million, or perhaps more. These men are no 
 longer the docile overgrown children they were twenty 
 years ago. The lessons of our performances in the Zulu 
 and Boer wars, more especially the latter, have not 
 been lost upon them, and they are beginning to think 
 that the white man, instead of being the unconquer- 
 able demigod they thought him, is somewhat of a 
 humbug. Pharaoh, we know, grew afraid of the 
 Israelites ; Natal, with a much weaker power at com- 
 mand than that of Pharaoh, has got to cope with a 
 still more dangerou selement, and one that cannot be 
 induced to depart into the wilderness. 
 
 And after all what does the power of Natal amount 
 to ? Let us be liberal, and say six thousand men — it 
 is the outside. In the event of a native rising, or any 
 other serious war, I believe tliat of this number at 
 least two thousand would make themselves scarce. 
 There exists in all colonies a floating element of in- 
 dividuals who have drifted there for the purpose of 
 making money, but who have no real affection for the 
 (temporary) country of their adoption. Their capital 
 is, as a rule, small and easily realised, and the very 
 last thing that they would think of doing wouLl be 
 to engage in a deadly life or death struggle on behalf 
 of a land that they only look on as a milch cow, out 
 of which their object is to draw as much as possible. 
 On the contrary, they would promptly seek another 
 cow, leaving the old one to the tender mercies of the 
 butcher. 
 
 Their defection would leave some 4000 men to cope 
 
 i
 
 AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT. 79 
 
 with the difficulty, wliatever it was, of which number 
 at least 1000 would be ineffective from age and 
 various other causes, whilst of the remainder quite 1000 
 would be obliged to remain where they were to protect 
 women and children in outlying districts. This would 
 leave a total effective force of 2000 men, or, deduct- 
 ing 500 for garrison purposes, of 1500 ready to take 
 the field. But it would take some time to collect, 
 arm, and equip even this number, and in the mean- 
 while, in the case of a sudden and preconcerted native 
 rising, half the inhabitants of the colony would be 
 murdered in detail. 
 
 But Natalians have got other dangers to fear besides 
 those arising from the presence of this vast mass of 
 barbarism in their midst. After a period of anarchy 
 a new king may possess himself of the throne of Zulu- 
 land, and it is even possible that he might, undet 
 circumstances that will arise hereafter, lead his armies 
 into Natal, and create a difficulty with which the i 500 
 available white men would find it difficult to cope. 
 Or the Boers of the Orange Free State and Transvaal 
 may get tired of paying customs dues at Durban, and 
 march 5000 men down to take possession of the port! 
 Perhaps Natal might provide herself with an effective 
 force by enrolling an army of 10,000 or 20,000 
 Kafirs, but it seems to me that the proceeding would 
 be both uncertain and expensive, and, should the 
 army take it into its head to mutiny, very dangerous 
 to boot. 
 
 It is a noticeable fact that those who so ardently 
 advocate the acceptance of Lord Kimberley's offer, in 
 all their speeches, addresses, and articles, almost 
 entirely shirk this question of defence, which is, after
 
 8o NATAL 
 
 all, the root of the matter, I have formed my esti- 
 mate of the number of men forthconiin;.;- m time of 
 clanger on the supposition that a burgher law was in 
 force in Natal, that is, that every man remaining in 
 the country should be obliged to take a part in its 
 defence. But they do not even hint at a burgher law 
 — in fact, they repudiate the idea, because they know 
 that it would not be tolerated. The universal service 
 system is not the Natalian's idea of happiness. They 
 simply avoid the question, calling it the " defence bug- 
 bear," and assume that it will all be arranged in some 
 unforeseen way. 
 
 The only suggestion that I have yet seen as re- 
 gards the arrangements for the future defence of the 
 colony, should it become independent, is a somewhat 
 ominous one, namely — that Natal should enter into 
 a close alliance, offensive and defensive, with -the 
 Transvaal and the Orange Free State, But, as the 
 advocates of " freedom " would soon find, the Orange 
 Free State (for even if willing to help them, the 
 Transvaal will for some years have enough to do with 
 its own affairs) will not come forward for nothing. 
 There would first have to be a few business formalities 
 with reference to the customs dues collected in Durban 
 on goods passing through to the interior, which yield 
 the bulk of the Natal revenue, and possibly some 
 concessions to Boer public opinion as regards the 
 English mode of dealing with the Natal natives. I 
 incline to the opinion that in relying on the assistance 
 of the Boers in time of trouble the inhabitrmts of 
 Natal would be leaning on a broken reed. They are 
 more likely to find them in arms against them than 
 fiiihting on their side.
 
 ANT) RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT. 8l 
 
 The party of progress also talks much about the 
 prospects of confederation with the Cape, if once they 
 get responsible government. Most people, however, 
 will think that the fact of their being independent, 
 and therefore responsible for their own defence, will 
 hardly prove an inducement to the Cape to offer to 
 share those responsibilities. The only confederation 
 possible to Natal as a self-governing community will 
 be a Boer confederation, to which it may be admitted — 
 on certain terms. Another cry is that the moment 
 responsible government is established immigrants will 
 flow into the country, and thus restore the balance of 
 races. I take the liberty to doubt the truth of this 
 supposition. The intending emigrant from Europe 
 does not, it is true, understand the ins and outs of the 
 Natal native question, but he does know that it is a 
 place where there are wars and rumours of wars, and 
 where he might possibly be killed, and the result is 
 that he wisely goes to some other colony that has 
 equal advantages to offer and no Kafirs. To suppose 
 that the emigrant would go to Natal when he came 
 to understand that it was an independent settlement 
 of a few white men, living in the midst of a mass of 
 warlike Kafirs, when Australia, New Zealand, Canada, 
 and the United States are all holding out their arms 
 to him, is to suppose him a bigger fool than he is. At 
 the best of times Natal is not likely to attract many 
 desirable emigrants : under a responsible government I 
 do not believe that it will attract any. 
 
 It seems to me that there is only one condition of 
 affairs under which it would be at all possible for the 
 Natalians to assume the responsibilities of self-govern- 
 ment with any safety, and that is when the great bulk 
 
 p
 
 82 NATAL 
 
 of the native population has been removed back to 
 whence it came — Zululand. Causes of a diametrically 
 opposite nature to those that have been at work among 
 the natives of Natal have been in operation amongst 
 their brethren in Zululand. In Natal, peace, poly- 
 gamy, plenty, and immigration have bred up an enor- 
 mous native population. In Zululand, war, private 
 slaughter by the king's order, and the severe restric- 
 tions put upon marriage, have kept down the increase 
 of the race ; also an enormous number of individuals 
 have fled from the one country into the other. I do 
 not suppose that the population of Zululand amounts, 
 at the present moment, to much more than half that 
 of Natal. 
 
 In this state of affairs lies the only real key to the 
 Natal native difficulty. Let Zululand be converted 
 into a black colony under English control, and its 
 present inhabitants be established in suitable locations ; 
 then let all the natives of Natal, with the exception 
 of those who choose to become monogamists and be 
 subject to civilised law, be moved into Zululand, and 
 also established iu locations. There would be plenty 
 of room for them all. Of course there would be diffi- 
 culties in the way of the realisation of this scheme, 
 but I do not think that they would prove insuperable. 
 It is probable, however, that it would require a show 
 of force before the Natal natives would consent to 
 budge. Indeed, it is absurd to suppose that anything 
 would induce them to leave peaceful Natal and plunge 
 into the seething cauldron of bloodshed, extortion, and 
 political plots that we have cooked up in Zululand 
 under the name of a settlement. Proper provisions 
 must first be made for the government of the country,
 
 AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT. 83 
 
 and security to life and property made certain. Till 
 this is done, no natives in their senses will return to 
 Zululand. 
 
 Till this is done, too, or till some other plan is dis- 
 covered by means of which the native difficulty can 
 be effectively dealt with, the Natalians will indeed 
 be foolish if they discard the protection of England, 
 and accept the fatal boon of self-government. If they 
 do, their future cancer may be brilliant ; but I believe 
 that it will be brief. 
 
 It is no answer to urge that at present the natives 
 seem quite quiet, and that there is no indication of 
 disturbance. 
 
 History tells us that before the destruction of 
 doomed Pompeii, Vesuvius was very still ; only day by 
 day the dark cloud hanging over the mountain's summit 
 grew denser and blacker. We know what happened 
 to Pompeii. 
 
 I do not wish to suggest anything unpleasant, far 
 from it; but sometimes I cannot help thinking that 
 it is perliaps a matter worth the consideration of the 
 Natalians whether it might not be as well, instead 
 of talking about responsible government, to improve 
 upon the example of the inhabitants of Pompeii, and 
 take to their ships "before the volcano begins to work. 
 
 It seems to me that there is an ugly cloud gathering 
 on the political horizon in Natal.
 
 THE TRANSVAAL.
 
 ( 87 ) 
 
 THE TRANSVAAL, 
 
 CHAPTEE I. 
 
 ITS INHABITANTS, LAWS, AND CUSTOMS. 
 
 The Transvaal is a country without a history. Its 
 very existence was hardly known of until about fifty 
 years ago. Of its past we know nothing. The genera- 
 tions who peopled its great plains have passed utterly 
 out of the memory and even the tradition of man, 
 leaving no monument to mark that they have existed, 
 not even a tomb. 
 
 During the reign of Chaka, i8 13—1828, whose 
 history has been sketched in a previous chapter, one 
 of his most famous generals, Mosilikatze, surnamed the 
 Lion, seceded from him with a large number of his 
 soldiers, and striking up in a north-westerly direction, 
 settled in or about what is now the Morico district of 
 the Transvaal. The country through which Mosilikatze 
 passed was at that time thickly populated with natives 
 of the Basuto or Macatee race, whom the Zulus look 
 upon with great contempt. Mosilikatze expressed the 
 feelings of his tribe in a practical manner, by mas- 
 sacring every living soul of them that came within
 
 88 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 bis reach. That the numbers slaughtered were very 
 great, the iiumurous ruins of Basuto kraals all over 
 the country testify. 
 
 It was Chaka's intention to follow up Mosilikatze 
 and destroy him, but he was himself assassinated be- 
 fore he could do so. Dingaan, his successor, how- 
 ever, carried out his brother's design, and despatched a 
 large force to punish him. This army, after marching 
 over 300 miles, burst upon Mosilikatze, drove him 
 back with slaughter, and returned home triumphant. 
 The invasion is important, because the Zulus claim 
 the greater part of the Transvaal territory by virtue 
 of it. 
 
 About the time that Mosilikatze was conquered, 
 1 83 5-1 840, the discontented Boers were leaving the 
 Cape Colony exasperated at the emancipation of the 
 slaves by the Imperial authorities. First they made 
 their way to Natal, but being followed thither by the 
 English flag they travelled further inland over the 
 Vaal Eiver and founded the town of Mooi Eiver Dorp 
 or Potchefstroom. Here they were joined by other mal- 
 contents from the Orange Sovereignty, which, though 
 afterwards abandoned, was at that time a British 
 possession. Acting upon 
 
 " Tlie good old rule, the simple plan, 
 Of let him take who has the power, 
 And let him keep who can," 
 
 the Boers now proceeded to possess themselves of as 
 much territory as they wanted. Nor was this a diffi- 
 cult task. The country was, as I have said, peopled 
 by Macatees, who are a poor-spirited race as compared 
 to the Zulus, and had had what little courage they
 
 ITS INHABITANTS, LAWS, AND CUSTOMS. 89 
 
 possessed crushed out of them by the rough handling 
 they had received at the hands of Mosilikatze and 
 Dingaan. The Boers, they argued, could not treat 
 them worse than the Zulus had done. Occasionally 
 a chief, bolder than the rest, would hold out, and then 
 such an example was made of him and his people that 
 few cared to follow in his footsteps. 
 
 As soon as the Boers were fairly settled in their 
 new home, they began to think about setting up a 
 Government. First they tried a system of Comman- 
 dants, with a Commandant-general, but this does not 
 seem to have answered. Next, those of their number 
 who lived in Lydenburg district (where the gold-fields 
 now are) set up a Eepublic, with a President and 
 Volksraad, or popular assembly. This example was 
 followed by the other white inhabitants of the country, 
 who formed another Eepublic and elected another 
 President, with Pretoria for their capital. The two 
 republics were subsequently incorporated. 
 
 In 1852 the Imperial authorities, having regard to 
 the expense of maintaining an effective government 
 over an unwilling people in an undeveloped and half- 
 conquered country, concluded a convention with the 
 emigrant Boers " beyond the Vaal River." The fol- 
 lowing were the principal stipulations of this conven- 
 tion, drawn up between Major Hogg and Mr. Owen, 
 Her Majesty's Assistant-Commissioners for the settling 
 and adjusting of the affairs of the eastern and north- 
 eastern boundaries of the Colony of the Cape of Good 
 Hope on the one part, and a deputation representative 
 of the emigrant farmers north of the Vaal River on 
 the other. It was guaranteed " in the fullest manner 
 on the part of the British Government to the emigrant
 
 go THE TEANSVAAL. 
 
 farmers beyond the Vaal River the right to manage 
 their own affairs, and to govern themselves according 
 to their own laws, witliout any interference on the 
 part of the British Government, and that no encroach- 
 ment shall be made by the said Government on the 
 territory beyond to the north of the Vaal Eiver, with 
 the further assurance that the warmest wish of the 
 British Government is to promote peace, free trade, 
 and friendly intercourse with the emigrant farmers 
 now inhabiting, or who hereafter may inhabit that 
 country, it being understood that this system of non- 
 interference is binding on both parties." 
 
 Next were disclaimed, on behalf of the British 
 Government, " all alliances whatever and with whom- 
 soever of the coloured nations to the north of the 
 Vaal Eiver." 
 
 It was also agreed " that no slavery is or shall be 
 permitted or practised in the country to the north of 
 the Vaal River by the emigrant farmers." 
 
 It was further agreed "that no objection shall be 
 made by any British authority against the emigrant 
 Boers purchasing their supplies of ammunition in any 
 of the British colonies and possessions of South 
 Africa ; it being mutually understood that all trade 
 in ammunition with the native tribes is prohibited 
 both by the British Government and the emigrant 
 farmers on both sides of the Vaal River." 
 
 These were the terms of this famous convention, 
 which is as slipshod in its diction as it is vague in 
 its meaning. What, for instance, is meant by the 
 territory to the north of the Vaal River ? According 
 to the letter of the agreement, Messrs. Hogg and Owen 
 ceded all the territory between the Vaal and Egypt.
 
 ITS INHABITANTS, LAWS, AND CUSTOiMS. 91 
 
 This historical document was the Charta of the new- 
 born South African Kepublic. Under its provisions, 
 the Boers, now safe from interference on the part of 
 the British, established their own Government and 
 promulgated their " Grond Wet," or Constitution. 
 
 The history of the Republic between 1852 and 
 1876 is not very interesting, and is besides too weari- 
 some to enter into here. It consists of an oft-told tale 
 of civil broils, attacks on native tribes, and encroach- 
 ment on native territories. Until shortly before the 
 Annexation, every burgher was, on coming of age, en- 
 titled to receive from the Government 6000 acres 
 of land. As these rights were in the early days of 
 the llepublic frequently sold to speculators for such 
 trifles as a bottle of brandy or half a dozen of beer, 
 and as the seller still required his 6000 acres : for a 
 Boer considers it beneath his dignity to settle on less, 
 it is obvious that it required a very large country 
 to satisfy all demands. To meet these demands, the 
 territories of the Republic had to be stretched like an 
 elastic band, and they were stretched accordingly, — at 
 the expense of the natives. The stretching process 
 was an ingenious one, and is very well described in a 
 minute written by Mr. Osborn, the late magistrate 
 at Newcastle, dated 2 2d September 1876, in these 
 words : — 
 
 " The Boers, as they have done in other cases and 
 are still doing, encroached by degrees on native terri- 
 tory, commencing by obtaining permission to graze 
 stock upon portions of it at certain seasons of the 
 year, followed by individual graziers obtaining from 
 native headmen a sort of right or license to squat 
 upon certain defined portions, ostensibly in order to
 
 92 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 keep other Boer squatters away from thu same land. 
 These licenses, temporarily intended as friendly or 
 neighbourly acts by unauthorised headmen, after a 
 few seasons of occupation by the Boer, are construed 
 by him as title, and his permanent occupation ensues. 
 Damage for trespass is levied by him from the very 
 man from whom he obtained the right to squat, to 
 which the natives submit out of fear of the matter 
 reaching the ears of the paramount chief, who would 
 in all probability severely punish them for opening the 
 door to encroachment by the Boer. After a while, 
 however, the matter comes to a crisis in consequence 
 of the incessant disputes between the Boers and the 
 natives ; one or other of the disputants lays the case 
 before the paramount chief, who, when hearing both 
 parties, is literally frightened with violence and threats 
 by the Boer into granting him the land. Upon this 
 the usual plan followed by the Boer is at once to 
 collect a few neighbouring Boers, including a field 
 cornet, or even an acting provisional field cornet, 
 appointed by the field cornet or provisional cornet, the 
 latter to represent the Government, although without 
 instructions authorising him to act in the matter. A 
 few cattle are collected among themselves, which the 
 party takes to the chief, and his signature is obtained 
 to a written document alienating to the Eepublican 
 Boers a large slice of all his territory. The contents 
 of this document are, as far as I can make out, never 
 clearly or intelligibly explained to the chief, who signs 
 and accepts of the cattle under the impression that 
 it is all in settlement of hire for the grazing licenses 
 granted by his headmen. This, I have no hesitation 
 in saying, is the usual method by which the Boers
 
 ITS INHABITANTS, LAWS, AND CUSTOMS. 93 
 
 obtain what they call cessions to them of territories 
 by native chiefs. In Secocoeni's case they allege that 
 his father Sequati cedes to them the whole of his terri- 
 tory (hundreds of square miles) for a hundred head of 
 cattle." 
 
 So rapidly did this process go on that the little 
 Eepublic to the *• North of the Vaal Eiver " had at the 
 time of the Annexation grown into a country of the 
 size of France. Its boundaries had only been clearly 
 defined where they abutted on neighbouring White 
 Communities, or on the territories of great native 
 powers, on which the Government had not dared to 
 infringe to any marked degree, such as those of Lo 
 Bcngula's people in the north. But wlieresoever on 
 the State's borders there had been no white Power 
 to limit its advances, or where the native tribes had 
 found themselves too isolated or too weak to resist 
 aggressions, there the Eepublic had by degrees en- 
 croached, and extended the shadow, if not the sub- 
 stance, of its authority. 
 
 The Transvaal has a boundary line of over 1600 
 miles in circumference, and of this a large portion is 
 disputed by different native tribes. Speaking generally, 
 the territory lies between the 22° and 28° of South 
 Latitude and the 25° and 32° of East Longitude, or 
 between the Orange Free State, Natal and Griqualand 
 West on the south, and the Limpopo Eiver on the 
 north ; and between the Lebombo mountains on the 
 east, and the Kalihari desert on the west. On the 
 north of its territory live three great tribes — the 
 Makalaka, the Matabele, (descendants of the Zulus who 
 deserted Chaka under Mosilikatze), and the Matyana. 
 These tribes are all warlike. On the west, following
 
 94 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 the line down to the Diamond Field territory, are the 
 Sicheli, tlie Bangoaketsi, the Baralong, and the Koranna 
 tribes. Passing round by Griqualand West, the Free 
 State, and Natal, we reach Zululand on the south-east 
 corner; then come the Lebombo mountains on the 
 east, separating the Transvaal from Amatonga land, 
 and from the so-called Portuguese possessions, wliich 
 are entirely in the hands of native tribes, most of 
 them subject to the great Zulu chief, Umzeila, who 
 has his stronghold in the north-east. 
 
 It will be observed that the country is almost sur- 
 rounded by native tribes. Besides these there are 
 about one milHon native inhabitants living within its 
 borders. In one district alone, Zoutpansberg, it is 
 computed that there are 364,250 natives, as compared 
 to about 750 whites. 
 
 If a beautiful and fertile country were alone 
 necessary to make a state and its inhabitants happy 
 and prosperous, happiness and prosperity would rain 
 upon the Transvaal and the Dutch Boers. The capa- 
 bilities of this favoured land are vast and various. 
 Within its borders are to be found highlands and low- 
 lands, vast stretches of rolling veldt like gigantic 
 sheep downs, hundreds of miles of swelling bushland, 
 huge tracts of mountainous country, and even little 
 glades spotted with timber that remind one of an 
 English park. There is every possible variety of soil 
 and scenery. Some districts will grow all tropical 
 produce, whilst others are well suited for breeding 
 sheep, cattle, and horses. Most of the districts will 
 produce wheat and all other cereals in greater per- 
 fection and abundance than any of the other South 
 African colonies. Two crops of cereals may be
 
 ITS INHABITANTS, LAWS, AND CUSTOMS. 95 
 
 obtained from the soil every year, and both the vine 
 and tobacco are cultivated with great success. Coffee, 
 sugar-cane, and cotton have been grovi^n with profit 
 in the northern parts of the State. Also the un- 
 developed mineral wealth of the country is very great. 
 Its known minerals are gold, copper, lead, cobalt, iron, 
 coal, tin, and plumbago : copper and iron having long 
 been worked by the natives. Altogether there is 
 little doubt that the Transvaal is the richest of all the 
 South African states, and had it remained under English 
 rule it would, with the aid of English enterprise and 
 capital, have become a very wealthy and prosperous 
 country. However there is little chance of that now. 
 
 Perhaps the greatest charm of the Transvaal lies in 
 its climate, which is among the best in the world, and 
 in all the southern districts very healthy. During 
 the winter months — that is, from April to October 
 — little or no rain falls, and the climate is cold and 
 bracing. In summer it is rather warm, but not over- 
 poweringly hot, the thermometer at Pretoria averaging 
 from 65° to 73° and in the winter from 59° to 65°. 
 The population of the Transvaal is estimated at about 
 40,000 whites, mostly of Dutch origin, consisting of 
 about thirty vast families ; and one million natives. 
 There are several towns, the largest of which are 
 Pretoria and Potchefstroom. 
 
 Such is the country that we annexed in 1877, and 
 were drummed out of in 1881. Now let us turn 
 to its inhabitants. It has been the fashion to talk 
 of the Transvaal as though nobody but Boers lived 
 in it. In reality the inhabitants were divided into 
 three classes : i. Natives; 2. Boers; 3. English. I 
 say were divided, because the English class can now
 
 96 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 hardly be said to exist, the country having been 
 made too hot to hold it since the war. The natives 
 stand in the proportion of nearly twenty to one to 
 the whites. The Boers were in their turn much 
 more numerous than the English, but the latter owned 
 nearly all the trading establishments in the country, 
 and also a very large amount of property. 
 j^l The Transvaal Boers have been very much praised 
 
 r' up by members of the Government in England, and 
 
 others who are anxious to advance their interests, 
 as against English interests. Mr. Gladstone, indeed, 
 can hardly find words strong enough to express his 
 admiration of their leaders, those " able men," since 
 they inflicted a national humiliation on us ; and doubt- 
 less they are a people with many good points. That 
 they are not devoid of sagacity can be seen by the way 
 they have dealt with the English Government. 
 J The Boers are certainly a peculiar people, though 
 they can hardly be said to be " zealous of good works." 
 They are very religious, but their religion takes its 
 colour from the darkest portions of the Old Testa- 
 ment ; lessons of mercy and gentleness are not at all to 
 their liking, and they seldom care to read the Gospels. 
 What they delight in are the stories of wholesale 
 butchery by the Israelites of old ; and in their own 
 position they find a reproduction of that of the first 
 settlers in the Holy Land, Like them they think 
 they are entrusted by the Almighty with the task of 
 exterminating the heathen native tribes around them, 
 and are always ready with a scriptural precedent for 
 slaughter and robbery. The name of the Divinity 
 is continually on their lips, sometimes in connection 
 V with very doubtful statements. They are divided
 
 ITS INHABITANTS, LAWS, AND CUSTOMS. 97 
 
 into three sects, none of which care much for tlie 
 other two. These are the Doppers, who number 
 about half the popuktion, the Orthodox Eeform, and 
 the Liberal Eeform, which is the least numerous. Of 
 these three sects the Doppers are by far the most un- 
 compromising and difficult to deal with. They much 
 resemble the Puritans of Charles the First's time, of 
 the extreme Hew-Agag-in-pieces stamp. 
 
 It is difficult to agree with those who call the 
 Boers cowards, an accusation which the whole of their 
 history belies. A Boer does not like lighting if he 
 can avoid it, because he sets a high value on his own 
 life ; but if he is cornered, he will fight as well as 
 anybody else. The Boers fought well enough in the 
 late war, though that, it is true, is no great criterion 
 of courage, since they were throughout flushed with 
 victory, and, owing to the poor shooting of the British 
 troops, in but little personal danger. One very un-l/ 
 pleasant characteristic they have, and that is an 
 absence of regard for the truth, especially where land,'/ 
 is concerned. Indeed the national characteristic is 
 crystallised into a proverb, " I am no slave to my 
 word." It has several times happened to me to see 
 one set of highly respectable witnesses in a land case 
 go into the box and swear distinctly that they saw 
 a beacon placed on a certain spot, whilst an equal 
 number on the other side will swear that they saw it 
 placed a mile away. Filled as they are with a land 
 hunger, to which that of the Irish peasant is a weak 
 and colourless sentiment, there is little that they will 
 not do to gratify their taste. It is the subject of 
 constant litigation amongst them, and it is by no 
 means uncommon for a Boer to spend several thousand 
 
 a
 
 V 
 
 gS THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 pounds in lawsuits over a piece of land not worth as 
 many hundreds. 
 
 Personally Boers are fine men, but as a rule uyly. 
 Their women-folk are good-looking in early life, but 
 get very stout as they grow older. They, in common 
 with most of their sex, understand how to use their 
 tongues ; indeed, it is said that it was the women 
 who caused the rising against the English Government. 
 None of the refinements of civilisation enter into the 
 life of an ordinary Transvaal Boer. He lives in a way 
 that would shock an English labourer at twenty-five 
 shillings the week, although he is very probably worth 
 fifteen or twenty thousand pounds. His home is but 
 too frequently squalid and filthy to an extraordinary 
 degree. He himself has no education, and does not 
 care that his children should receive any. He lives 
 by himself in the middle of a great plut of land, his 
 nearest neighbour being perhaps ten or twelve miles 
 away, caring but little for the news of the outside 
 world and nothing for its opinions, doing very little 
 work, but growing daily richer through the increase of 
 his flocks and herds. His expenses are almost nothing, 
 and as he gets older wealth increases upon him. 
 The events in his life consist of an occasional trip on 
 " commando " against some native tribe, attending a 
 few political meetings, and the journeys he makes with 
 his family to the nearest town, some four times a year, 
 in order to be present at "Kachtmaal" or communion. 
 Foreigners, especially Englishmen, he detests, but he 
 is kindly and hospitable to his own people. Living 
 isolated as he does, the lord of a little kingdom, he 
 naturally comes to have a great idea of himself, and 
 a corresponding contempt for all the rest of mankind.
 
 ITS INHABITANTS, LAWS, AND CUSTOMS. 99 
 
 Laws and taxes are things distasteful to him, and he 
 looks upon it as an impeitinence that any court 
 should venture to call him to account for his doings. 
 He is rich and prosperous, and the cares of poverty, 
 and all the other troubles that fall to the lot of civilised 
 men, do not affect him. He has no romance in him, 
 nor any of the higher feeh'ngs and aspirations that are 
 found in almost every other race ; in short, unlike the 
 Zulu he despises, there is little of the gentleman in 
 his composition, though he is at times capable of acts 
 of kindness and even generosity. His happiness is to 
 live alone in the great wilderness, with his children, 
 his men-servants, and his maid-servants, his flocks and 
 his herds, the monarch of all he surveys. If civilisa- 
 tion presses him too closely, his remedy is a simple 
 one. He sells his farm, packs up his goods and cash 
 in his waggon, and starts for regions more congenially 
 wild. Such are some of the leading characteristics of 
 that remarkable product of South Africa, the Transvaal 
 Boer, who resembles no other white man in the world. 
 Perhaps, however, the most striking of all his 
 oddities is his abhorrence of all government, more 
 especially if that government be carried out according 
 to English principles. The Boers have always been 
 more or less in rebellion ; they rebelled against the 
 rule of the Company when the Cape belonged to 
 Holland, they rebelled against the English Govern- 
 ment in the Cape, they were always in a state of semi- 
 rebellion against their own Government in the Trans- 
 vaal, and now they have for the second time, with the 
 most complete success, rebelled against the English 
 Government. The fact of the matter is that the bu3\ 
 of their number hate all Governments, because Govern-
 
 loo THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 ments enforce law and order, and tliey hate the 
 English Government worst of all because it enforces 
 law and order most of all. It is not liberty they long 
 for, but license. The " sturdy independence " of the 
 Boer resolves itself into a determination not to have 
 his affairs interfered with by any superior power what- 
 soever, and not to pay taxes if he can possibly avoid 
 it. But he has also a specific cause of complaint 
 against the English Government, which would alone 
 cause him to do his utmost to get rid of it, and that 
 is its mode of dealing with natives, which is radically 
 opposite to his own. This is the secret of Boer 
 patriotism. To understand it, it must be remembered 
 that the Englishman and the Boer look at natives 
 from a very different point of view. The Englishman, 
 though he may not be very fond of him, at any rate 
 regards the Kafir as a fellow human being with feelings 
 like his own. The average Boer does not. He looks 
 upon the " black creature " as having been delivered 
 into his hand by the " Lord " for his own purposes, 
 that is, to shoot and enslave. He must not be blamed 
 too harshly for this, for, besides being naturally of a 
 somewhat hard disposition, hatred of the native is 
 hereditary, and is partly induced by the history of 
 many a bloody struggle. Also the native hates the 
 Boer fully as much as the Boer hates the native, 
 though with better reason. Now native labour is a 
 necessity to the Boer, because he will not as a rule do 
 hard manual labour himself, and there must be some 
 one to plant and garner the crops and herd the cattle. 
 On the other hand, the natives are not anxious to 
 serve the Boers, which means little or no pay and 
 plenty of thick stick, and sometimes worse. The
 
 ITS INHABITANTS, LAWS, AND CUSTOMS. loi 
 
 result of this state of affairs is that the Boer often has 
 to rely on forced labour to a very great extent. But 
 this is a thing that an English Government will not 
 tolerate, and the consequence is that under its rule lie 
 cannot get the labour that is necessary to him. 
 
 Then there is the tax question. If lie lives under 
 the English flag the money has to be paid regularly, 
 but under his own Government lie pays or not as he 
 likes. It was this habit of his of refusing payment 
 of taxes that brought the Eepublic into difficulties 
 in 1877, and that will ere long bring it into trouble 
 again. He cannot understand that cash is necessary 
 to carry on a Government, and looks upon a tax as 
 though it were so much money stolen from him. 
 These things are the real springs of the "sturdy 
 independence " and the patriotism of the ordinary 
 Transvaal farmer. Doubtless there are some who are 
 really patriotic ; for instance, one of their leaders, Paul 
 Kruger. But with the majority, patriotism is only 
 another word for unbounded license and forced labour. 
 
 These remarks must not be taken to apply to the 
 Cape Boers, who are a superior class of men, since 
 they, living under a settled and civilised Government, 
 have been steadily improving, whilst their cousins, 
 living every man for his own hand, have been deterio- 
 rating. The old Voortrekkers, the fathers and grand- 
 fathers of the Transvaal Boer of to-day, were, without 
 doubt, a very fine set of men, and occasionally you 
 may in the Transvaal meet individuals of the same 
 stamp wliom it is a pleasure to know. But these are 
 generally men of a certain age, with some experience 
 of the world ; the younger men are very objectionable 
 in their manners.
 
 I03 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 The real Dutcli Patriotic party is not to be found 
 in the Transvaal, but in the Cape Colony. Their 
 object, which, as affairs now arc, is well within the 
 bounds of possibility, is by fair means or foul to 
 swamp the English element in South Africa, and to 
 establish a great Dutch Piepublic. It was this party, 
 which consists of clever and well educated men, who 
 raised the outcry against the Transvaal Annexation, 
 because it meant an enormous extension of English 
 influence, and who had the wit, by means of their 
 emissaries and newspapers, to work upon the feeling 
 of the ignorant Transvaal farmers until they persuaded 
 them to rebel ; and finally, to avail themselves of the 
 yearnings of English radicalism for the disruption of 
 the Empire and the minimisation of British authority, 
 to get the Annexation cancelled. All through this 
 business the Boers have more or less danced in obedi- 
 ence to strings pulled at Cape Town, and it is now 
 said that one of tlie chief wire-pullers, Mr. Hofmeyer, 
 is to be asked to become President of the Eepublic. 
 These men are the real patriots of South Africa, and 
 very clever ones too — not the Transvaal Boers, who 
 vapour about their blood and their country and the 
 accursed Englishman to order, and are in reality 
 influenced by very small motives, such as the desire 
 to avoid payment of taxes, or to hunt away a neigh- 
 bouring Englishman, whose civilisation and refinement 
 are as offensive as his farm is desirable. Such are 
 the Dutch inhabitants of the Transvaal. I will now 
 give a short sketch of their institutions as they were 
 before the Annexation, and to wdiich the community 
 has reverted since its recision, with, I believe, but few 
 alterations.
 
 ITS INHABITANTS, LAWS, AND CUSTOMS. 103 
 
 The form of government is republican, and to 
 all intents and purposes manhood suffrage prevails, 
 supreme power resting in the people. The executive 
 power of the State centres in a President elected by 
 the people to hold office for a term of five years, every 
 voter having a voice in his election. He is assisted 
 in the execution of his duties by an Executive Council, 
 consisting of the State Secretary and such other three 
 members as are selected for that purpose by the legis- 
 lative body, the Volksraad. The State Secretary 
 holds office for four years, and is elected by the Volks- 
 raad. Tlie members of the Executive have all seats 
 in the Volksraad, but have no votes. The Volksraad 
 is the legislative body of the State, and consists of 
 forty-two members. The country is divided into 
 twelve electoral districts, each of which has the right 
 to return three members; the Gold Eields have also 
 the right of electing two members, and the four prin- 
 cipal towns one member each. There is no power ill 
 the State competent to either prorogue or dissolve the 
 Volksraad except that body itself, so that an appeal to 
 the country on a given subject or policy is impossible 
 without its concurrence. Members are elected for 
 four years, but half retire by rotation every two years, 
 the vacancies being filled by re-elections. Members 
 must have been voters for three years, and be not less 
 than thirty years of age, must belong to a Protestant 
 Church, be resident in the country, and owners of 
 immovable property therein. A father and son cannot 
 sit in the same Eaad, neither can seats be occupied 
 by coloured persons, bastards, or officials. 
 
 For each electoral district there is a magistrate or 
 Landdrost, whose duties are similar to those of a Civil
 
 I04 THE TRANSVA.1L. 
 
 Commissioner. These districts are again subdivided 
 into wards presided over by field cornets, who exercise 
 judicial powers in minor matters, and in times of war 
 liave considerable authority. The Eoman Dutch law 
 is the common law of the country, as it is of the 
 colonies of the Cape of Good Hope and Natal, and of 
 the Orange Free State. 
 
 Prior to the Annexation justice was administered 
 in a very primitive fashion. First, there was the 
 Landdrosts' Court, from which an appeal lay to a court 
 consisting of the Landdrost and six councillors elected 
 by the public. This was a court of first instance as 
 well as a court of appeal. Then there was a Supreme 
 Court, consisting of three Landdrosts from three dif- 
 ferent districts, and a jury of twelve selected from the 
 burghers of the State. There was no appeal from this 
 court, but cases have sometimes been brought under 
 the consideration of the Volksraad as the supreme 
 power. It is easy to imagine what the administration 
 of justice was like when the presidents of all the law 
 courts in the country were elected by the mob, not on 
 account of their knowledge of the law, but because 
 they were popular. Suitors before the old Transvaal 
 courts found the law surprisingly uncertain. A High 
 Court of Justice was, however, established after the 
 Annexation, and has been continued by the Volks- 
 raad, but an agitation is being got up against it, and 
 it will possibly be abolished in favour of the old 
 system. 
 
 In such a community as that of the Transvaal 
 Boers the question of public defence was evidently of 
 the first importance. This is provided for under what 
 is known as the Commando system. The President,
 
 ITS INHABITANTS, LAWS, AND CUSTOMS. 105 
 
 with the concurrence of the Executive Council, has 
 the right of declaring war, and of calling up a com- 
 mando, in which the burghers are placed under the 
 field cornets and commandants. These last are chosen 
 Ly the field cornets for each district, and a Com- 
 mandant-general is chosen Ly the whole laager or 
 force, but the President is the Commander-in-Chief of 
 the army. All the inhabitants of the State between 
 sixteen and sixty, with a few exceptions, are liable for 
 service. Young men under eighteen, and men over 
 fifty, are only called out under circumstances of 
 emergency. Members of the Volksraad, officials, 
 clergymen, and school-teachers are exempt from per- 
 sonal service, unless martial law is proclaimed, but 
 must contribute an amount not exceeding i^i 5 towards 
 the expense of the war. All legal proceedings in 
 civil cases are suspended against persons on com- 
 mando, no summonses can be made out, and as soon 
 as martial law is proclaimed no legal execution can be 
 prosecuted, the pounds are closed, and transfer dues 
 payments are suspended until after thirty days from 
 the recall of the proclamation of martial law. Owners 
 of land residing beyond the borders of the Eepublic 
 are also liable, in addition to the ordinary war tax, to 
 place a fit and proper substitute at the disposal of the 
 Government, or otherwise to pay a fine of ^15. The 
 first levy of tlie burghers is, of men from eighteen to 
 thirty-four years of age ; the second, thirty-four to 
 fifty ; and the third, from sixteen to eighteen, and 
 from fifty to sixty years. Every man is bound to 
 provide himself with clothing, a gun, and ammunition, 
 and there must be enough waggons and oxen found 
 between them to suffice for their joint use. Of the
 
 io6 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 booty taken, one quarter goes to Government, and tlies 
 rest to the bvirghers. The most disagreeable part of 
 the commandeering system is, however, yet to come ; 
 personal service is not all that the resident in the 
 Transvaal Eepublic has to endure. The riglit is vested 
 iu field cornets to commandeer articles as well as 
 individuals, and to call upon inhabitants to furnish 
 requisites for the commando. As may be imagined, it 
 goes very hard on these occasions with the property of 
 any individual whom the field cornet may not happen 
 to like. 
 
 Each ward is expected to turn out its contingent 
 ready and equipped for war, and this can only be 
 done by seizing goods riglit and left. One unfortunate 
 ^^•ill have to find a waggon, another to deliver over 
 his favourite span of trek oxen, another his riding- 
 horse or some slaughter cattle, and so on. Even 
 when the officer making the levy is desirous of doing 
 his duty as fairly as he can, it is obvious that very 
 great hardships must be inflicted under such a system. 
 Piequisitions are made more with regard to what is 
 wanted than with a view to an equitable distribution 
 of demands ; and like the Jews in the time of the 
 Crusades, he who has got most must pay most, or take 
 the consequences, which may be unpleasant. Articles 
 which are not perishable, such as waggons, are sup- 
 posed to be returned, but if they come back at all tliey 
 are general!}' worthless. 
 
 In case of war, the native tribes living within the 
 borders of the State are also expected to furnish cou- 
 tingents, and it is on them that most of the hard 
 work of the campaign generally falls. They are put 
 in the front of the battle, and have to do the hand-
 
 ITS INHABITANTS, LAWS, AND CUSTOMS. 107 
 
 to-hand fighting, wliich, liowever, if of the Zulu race, 
 they do not object to. 
 
 The revenue of tlie State is so arranged that the 
 burden of it should fall as much as possible on the 
 trading connnunity, and as little as possible on the 
 fanner. It is chiefly derived from licenses on trades, 
 professions, and callings, 30s. per annum quit-rent on 
 farms, transfer dues and stamps, auction dues, court 
 fees, and contributions from such native tribes as can 
 be made to pay them. Since we have given np the 
 country, the Volksraad has put a very heavy tax on 
 all imported goods, hoping thereby to beguile the Boers 
 into paying taxes wiihout knowing it, and at the same 
 time strike a blow at the trading community, which 
 is English in its proclivities. The result has been 
 to paralyse what little trade there was left in the 
 country, and to cause great dissatisfaction amongst 
 the farmers, who cannot understand why, now that 
 the English are gone, they should have to pay twice 
 as much for their sugar and coffee as tliey have been 
 accustomed to do. 
 
 I will conclude this chapter with a few words about 
 the natives who swarm in and around the Transvaal. 
 Tliey can be roughly divided into two great races, the 
 Amazulu and their offshoots, and the Macatee or 
 Lasuto tribes. All those of Zulu blood, including the 
 Swazis, Mapock's Kafirs, tlie Matabele, the Knob- 
 noses, and others are very warlike in disposition, and 
 men of fme physique. The Basutos (who must not 
 be confounded with the Cape Basutos), however, differ 
 from these tribes in every respect, including their lan- 
 guage, which is called Sisutu, the only mutual feeling 
 between the two races being their common detestation
 
 io8 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 of the Boers. They do not love war; iu fact, they 
 are thnid and cowardly by nature, and only fight 
 when they are obliged to. Unlike the Zulus, they 
 are much addicted to the arts of peace, show consider- 
 able capacities for civilisation, and are even willing to 
 become Christians. There would have been a far 
 better field for the Missionary in the Transvaal than 
 in Zululand and NataL Indeed, the most successful 
 mission station I have seen in Africa is near Middle- 
 burg, under the control of Mr. Merensky. In person 
 the Lasutos are thin and weakly when compared to 
 the stalwart Zulu, and it is their consciousness of 
 inferiority both to the white men and their black 
 brethren that, together with their natural timidity, 
 makes them submit as easily as they do to the yoke 
 of the Boer.
 
 ( loy ) 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 EVENTS PRECEDING THE ANNEXATION. 
 
 In or about the year 1872, the burghers of the Eepublic 
 elected Mr. Burgers their President. This remarkable 
 man was a native of the Cape Colony, and passed the 
 first sixteen or seventeen years of his life, he once in- 
 formed me, on a farm herding sheep. He afterwards 
 became a clergyman noted for the eloquence of his 
 preaching, but his ideas proving too broad for his con- 
 gregation, he resigned his cure, and in an evil moment 
 for himself took to politics. 
 
 President Burgers was a man of striking presence 
 and striking talents, especially as regards his oratory, 
 which was really of a very high class, and would have 
 commanded attention in our own House of Commons. 
 He possessed, however, a mind of that peculiarly vola- 
 tile order that is sometimes met with in conjunction 
 with great talents, and which seems to be entirely with- 
 out ballast. His intellect was of a balloon-like nature, 
 and as incapable of being steered. He was always 
 soaring in the clouds, and, as is natural to one in that 
 elevated position, taking a very different and more 
 sanguine view of affairs to that which men of a more 
 lowly, and perhaps a more practical, turn of mind 
 would do.
 
 no 
 
 THE TRANSVxVAL. 
 
 But notwitlistaiiding his fly-away ideas, President 
 Burgers was undoubtedly a true patriot, labouring night 
 and day for the welfare of the State of which he had 
 undertaken the guidance ; but his patriotism was too 
 exalted for his surroundings. He wished to elevate to 
 the rank of a nation a people who had not got the 
 desire to be elevated ; with this view he contracted 
 railway loans, made wars, minted gold, &c., and then 
 suddenly discovered that the country refused to support 
 him. In short, he was made of very different clay to 
 that of the people he had to do with. He dreamt of a 
 great Dutch Bepublic " with eight millions of inhabi- 
 tants," doing a vast trade with the interior through the 
 Delagoa Bay Railway. Thej^ on the other hand, cared 
 nothing about republics or railways, but fixed their 
 affections on forced labour and getting rid of the neces- 
 sity of paying taxes — and so between them the Repub- 
 lic came to grief. But it must be borne in mind that 
 President Burgers was throughout actuated by good 
 motives ; he did his best by a stubborn and a stiff-necked 
 people ; and if he failed, as fail he did, it was more their 
 fault than his. As regards the pension he received from 
 the English Government, which has so often been brought 
 up against him, it was after all no more than his due 
 after five years of arduous work. If the Republic had 
 continued to exist, it is to be presumed that they would 
 have made some provision for their old President, more 
 especially as he seems to have exhausted his private 
 means in paying the debts of the country. What- 
 ever may be said of some of the other officials of the 
 Republic, its President was, I believe, an honest man. 
 
 In 1875, Mr. Burgers proceeded to Europe, having, 
 he says in a posthumous document recently published,
 
 EVENTS rRECEDIXG THE ANNEXATION. in 
 
 been empowered by the Volksraad " to carry out my 
 plans for the development of the country, by opening 
 up a direct communication for it, free from the tram- 
 mels of British ports and influence." According to this 
 document, during his absence two powerful parties, viz., 
 " the faction of unprincipled fortune-hunters, rascals, 
 and runaways on the one hand, and the faction of the 
 extreme orthodox party in a certain branch of the 
 Dutch Reform Church on the other, began to co-operate 
 against the Government of the Republic and me per- 
 sonally Ill as I was, and contrary to the advice 
 
 of my medical men, I proceeded to Europe, in the be- 
 ginning of 1875, to carry out my project, and no sooner 
 was my back turned on the Transvaal than the con- 
 spiring elements began to act. The new coat of arms 
 and flag adopted in the Raad by an almost unanimous 
 vote were abolished ; the laws for a free and secular 
 education were tampered with; and my resistance to a 
 reckless inspection and disposal of Government lands, 
 still occupied by natives, was openly defied. The 
 Raad, filled up to a large extent with men of ill repute, 
 who, under the cloak of progress and favour to the 
 Government view, obtained their seats, was too weak to 
 cope with the skill of the conspirators, and granted 
 leave to the acting President to carry out measures 
 diametrically opposed to my policy. Native lands were 
 inspected and given out to a few speculators, who held 
 large numbers of claims to lands which were destined 
 for citizens, and so a war was prepared for me, on my 
 return from Europe, which I could not avert." This 
 extract is interesting, as showing the state of feeling 
 existing between the President and his officers previous 
 to the outbreak of the Secocoeni war. It also shows
 
 112 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 how entirely he "was out of sympathy with the citizens, 
 seeing that, as soon as his back was turned, they, with 
 Mr. Joubert and Paul Kruger at their head, at once 
 undid all the little good he had done. 
 
 When Mr. Burgers got to England, he found that city 
 capitalists would have nothing whatever to say to his 
 railway scheme. In Holland, however, he succeeded 
 in getting ^90,000 of the ;^ 300,000 he wished to borrov/ 
 at a high rate of interest, and by passing a bond on 
 live hundred Government farms. This money was 
 immediately invested in railway plant, which, when it 
 arrived at Delagoa Bay, had to be mortgaged to pay 
 the freight on it, and that was the end of the Delagoa 
 Bay railway scheme, except that the ;^90,ooo is, I 
 believe, still owing to the confiding shareholders iu 
 Holland. 
 
 On his return to the Transvaal the President was 
 well received, and for a month or so all went smoothly. 
 But the relations of the Eepublic with the surrounding 
 native tribes, had by this time become so bad that an 
 explosion was imminent somewhere. In the year 1874 
 the Volksraad raised the price of passes under the 
 iniquitous pass law, by which every native travelling 
 through the territory was made to pay from £1 to ;^5. 
 In case of non-payment the native was made subject to 
 a fine of from £1 to ;^io, and to a beating of from •'* ten 
 to twenty- five lashes." He was also to go into service 
 for three months, and have a certificate thereof, for 
 which he must pay five shillings; the avowed object of 
 the law being to obtain a supply of Kafir labour. This 
 was done in spite of the earnest protest of the President, 
 who gave the Eaad distinctly to understand that by 
 accepting this law they would, in point of fact, annul
 
 EVENTS PRECEDING THE ANNEXATION. 113 
 
 treaties concluded with the chiefs on the south-western 
 borders. It is not clear, however, if this amended pass 
 law ever came into force. It is to be hoped it did not, 
 for even under the old law natives were shamefully 
 treated by Boers, who would pretend that they were 
 authorised by Government to collect the tax; the 
 result being that the unfortunate Kafir was frequently 
 obliged to pay twice over. Natives had such a horror 
 of the pass laws of the country, that when travelling 
 to the Diamond Fields to work they would frequently 
 go round some hundreds of miles rather than pass 
 through the Transvaal. 
 
 That the Volksraad should have thought it necessary 
 to enact such a law in order that the farmers should 
 obtain a supply of Kafir labour in a territory that had 
 nearly a million of native inhabitants, who, unlike 
 the Zulus, are willing to work if onl}^ they meet with 
 decent treatment, is in itself an instructive commentary 
 on the feelings existing between Boer master and Kafir 
 servant. 
 
 But besides the general quarrel with the Kafir race 
 in its entirety, which the Boers always have on hand, 
 they had just then several individual differences, in each 
 of which there lurked the possibilities of disturbance. 
 
 To begin with, their relations with Cetywayo were 
 by no means amicable. During Mr. Burgers' absence 
 the Boer Government, then under the leadership of 
 P. J. Joubert, sent Cetywayo a very stern message — a 
 message that gives the reader the idea that Mr. Joubert 
 was ready to enforce it with ten thousand men. After 
 making various statements and demands with reference 
 to the Amaswozi tribe, the disputed boundary line, &c., 
 it ends thus : — 
 
 n
 
 114 1'IIE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 "AlLhougli the Government of the South African 
 Eepublic has never wished, and does not now desire, 
 that serious disaffection and animosities should exist 
 between you and them, yet it is not the less of the 
 greatest consequence and importance for you earnestly 
 to weigh these matters and risks, and to satisfy them ; 
 the more so, if you on your side also wish that peace 
 and friendship shall be maintained between you 
 and us." 
 
 The Secretary for Native Affairs for I^Tatal comments 
 on this message in these words : " The tone of this 
 message to Cetywayo is not very friendly, it has the 
 look of an ultimatum, and if the Government of the 
 Transvaal were in circumstances different to what it is, 
 the message would suggest an intention to coerce if the 
 demands it conveys are not at once complied with ; but 
 I am inclined to the opinion that no such intention 
 exists, and that the transmission of a copy of the mes- 
 sage to the Natal Government is intended as a notifica- 
 tiou that the Transvaal Government has proclaimed the 
 territory hitherto in dispute between it and the Zulus 
 to be Eepublican territory, and that the Republic intends 
 to occupy it." 
 
 In the territories marked out by a decision known 
 as the Keate Award, in which Lieutenant-Governor 
 Keate of Natal, at the request of both parties, laid down 
 the boundary line between tlie Boers and certain native 
 tribes, the Boer Government carried it with a yet higher 
 hand, insomuch as the natives of those districts, being 
 comparatively unwarlike, were less likely to resist. 
 
 On the 1 8th August 1875, Acting President Joubert 
 issued a proclamation by which a line was laid down 
 far to the southward of that marked out by Mr. Keate,
 
 EVENTS PRECEDING THE ANNEXATION. 115 
 
 and consequently included more territory within tlio 
 elastic boundaries of the Eepuhlic. A Government 
 notice of the same date invites all claiming lands now 
 declared to belong to the Eepublic to send in their 
 claims to be settled by a land commission. 
 
 On the 6th March 1876, another chief in the same 
 neighbourhood (Montsoia) writes to the Lieutenant- 
 Governor of Griqualand West in these terms : — 
 
 " My Friend, — I wish to acquaint you with the 
 doings of some people connected with the Boers. A 
 man-servant of mine has been severely injured in the 
 head by one of the Boers' servants, which has proved 
 fatal. Another of my people has been cruelly treated 
 by a Boer tying a rein about his neck, and then 
 mounting his horse and dragging him about the place. 
 My brother Molema, who is the bearer of this, will 
 give you full particulars." 
 
 Molema explains the assaults thus: "The assaulted 
 man is not dead ; his skull was fractured. The assault 
 was committed by a Boer named Wessels Badenhorst, 
 who shamefully ill-treated the man, beat him till he 
 fainted, and, on his revival, fastened a rim round his 
 neck, and made him run to the homestead by the side 
 of his (Badenhorst's) horse cantering. At the home- 
 stead he tied him to the waggon- wheel, and flogged 
 him a^jain till Mrs. Badenhorst stopped her husband." 
 
 Though it will be seen that the Boers were on good 
 terms neither with the Zulus nor the Keate Award 
 natives, they still had one Kafir ally, namely, Uni- 
 bandeni, the Amaswazi king. This alliance was con- 
 cluded under circumstances so peculiar that they are 
 worthy of a brief recapitulation. It appears that in 
 the winter of the year 1875, Mr. Eudolph, the Land-
 
 ii6 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 clrost of Utrecht, went to Swaziland, and, imitating 
 the example of the Natal Government with Cety- 
 wayo, crowned Umbandeni king, on behalf of the 
 Boer Grovernmeut. He further made a treaty of 
 alliance with him, and promised him a commando to 
 help him in case of his being attacked by the Zulus. 
 Now comes the curious part of the story. On the 
 1 8th May 1876, a message came from this same 
 Umbandeni to Sir H. Bulwer, of which the following 
 is an extract: — "We are sent by our king to thank 
 the Government of Natal for the information sent to 
 him last winter by that Government, and conveyed 
 by Mr. Eudolph, of the intended attack on his people 
 by the Zulus. We are further instructed by the king 
 to thank the Natal Government for the influence it 
 used to stop the intended raid, and for instructing a 
 Boer commando to go to his country to render him 
 assistance in case of need ; and further for appointing 
 Mr. Eudolph at the head of the commando to place 
 him (Umbandeni) as king over the Amaswazi, and 
 to make a treaty with him and his people on be- 
 half of the Natal Government. . . . The Transvaal 
 Government has asked Umbandeni to acknowledge 
 himself a subject of the Eepublic, but he has dis- 
 tinctly refused to do so." In a minute written on 
 this subject, the Secretary for Native Affairs for Natal 
 says, "No explanation or assurance from me was 
 sufficient to convince them (Umbandeni's messengers) 
 that they had on that occasion made themselves sub- 
 jects of the South African Eepublic; they declared it 
 was not their wish or intention to do so, and that 
 they would refuse to acknowledge a position into 
 which they had been unwittingly betrayed." I must
 
 EVENTS PRECEDING THE ANNEXATION. 117 
 
 conclude tliis episode by quoting the last paragraph 
 of Sir H. Bulwer's covering despatch, because it con- 
 cerns larger issues than the supposed treaty : " It will 
 not be necessary that I should at present add any 
 remarks to those contained in the minute of the 
 Secretary for Native Affairs, but I would observe 
 that the situation arising out of the relations of the 
 Government of the South African Eepublic with the 
 neighbouring native States is so complicated, and pre- 
 sents so many elements of confusion and of danger 
 to the peace of this portion of South Africa, that I 
 trust some way may be found to an early settlement 
 of questions that ought not, in my opinion, to be left 
 alone, as so many have been left, to take the chance 
 of the future." 
 
 And now I come to the last and most imminent 
 native difficulty that at the time faced the Eepublic. 
 On the borders of Lydenburg district there lived a 
 powerful chief named Secocoeni. Between this chief 
 and the Transvaal Government difficulties arose in the 
 beginning of 1876 on the usual subject — land. The 
 Boers declared that they had bought the land from the 
 Swazis, who had conquered portions of the country, 
 and that the Swazis offered to make it " clean from 
 brambles," i.e., kill everybody living on it; but that 
 they (the Boers) said that they were to let them be, 
 that they might be their servants. The Basutos, on 
 the other hand, said that no such sale ever took place, 
 and, even if it did take place, it was invalid, because 
 the Swazis were not in occupation of the land, and 
 therefore could not sell it. It was a Christian Kafir 
 called Johannes, a brother of Secocoeni, who was the 
 immediate cause of the war. This Johannes used to
 
 n8 THE TEANSVAAL. 
 
 live at a place called Botsobelo, the mission-station of 
 Mr. Merensky, but moved to a stronghold on the Spek- 
 boom river, in the disputed territory. The Boers sent 
 to him to come back, but he refused, and warned the 
 Boers off his land. Secocceni was then appealed to, 
 but declared that the land belonged to his tribe, and 
 would be occupied by Johannes. He also told the 
 Boers " that he did not wish to fight, but that he was 
 quite ready to do so if they preferred it." Thereupon 
 tlie Transvaal Government declared war, although it 
 does not appear that the natives committed any out- 
 rage or acts of hostility before the declaration. As 
 regards the Boers' right to Secocceni's country. Sir 
 H. Barkly sums up the question thus, in a despatch 
 addressed to President Burgers, dated 28th ISTov. 1876: 
 — " On the whole, it seems perfectly clear, and I feel 
 bound to repeat it, that Sikukuni was neither de jure 
 or de facto a subject of the Eepublic when your Honour 
 declared war against him in June last." As soon as 
 M'ar had been declared, the clumsy commando system 
 was set working, and about 2500 white men collected ; 
 the Swazis also were applied to to send a contingent, 
 which they did, being only too glad of the opportunity 
 of slaughter. 
 
 At first all went well, and the President, who accom- 
 panied the coiumaudo in person, succeeded in reducing 
 a mountain stronghold, which, in his high-flown way, 
 he called a "glorious victory" over a "Kafir Gibraltar." 
 
 On the 14th July another engagement took place, 
 when the Boers and Swazis attacked Johannes' strong- 
 hold. The place was taken with circumstances of 
 great barbarity by the Swazis, for when the signal 
 was given to advance the Boers did not move. Nearly
 
 EVENTS PRECEDING THE ANNEXATION. 119 
 
 all the women M'ere killed, and the brains of the chil- 
 dren were dashed out against the stones ; in one instance, 
 before tlie captive mother's face. Johannes was badly 
 wounded, and died two days afterwards. When he was 
 dying, he said to his brother, " I am going to die. I am 
 thankful I do not die by the hands of these cowardly 
 Boers, but by the hand of a black and courageous 
 nation like myself . . ." He then took leave of his 
 people, told his brother to read the Bible, and expired. 
 The Swazis -were so infuriated at the cowardice dis- 
 played by the Boers on this occasion that they returned 
 home in great dudgeon. 
 
 On the 2d of August Secocoeni's mountain, wliich is 
 a very strong fortification, was attacked in two columns, 
 or rather an attempt was made to attack it, for when 
 it came to the pinch only about forty men, mostly 
 English and Germans, would advance. Thereupon the 
 whole commando retreated with great haste, the greater 
 part of it going straight liome. In vain the President 
 entreated them to shoot him rather than desert him; 
 they had had enough of Secocceni and his stronghold, 
 and home they went. The President then retreated 
 with what few men he had left to Steelport, where he 
 built a fort, and from thence returned to Pretoria. The 
 news of the collapse of the commando was received 
 throughout the Transvaal, and indeed the whole of 
 South Africa, with the greatest dismay. For the first 
 time in the history of that country the white man had 
 been completely worsted by a native tribe, and that 
 tribe wretched Basutos, people whom the Zulus call 
 their " dogs." It was glad tidings to every native from 
 the Zambesi to the Cape, who learnt thereby that the 
 M'hite man was not so invincible as he used to be.
 
 I20 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 Meanwhile the inhabitants of Lydenburg were filled 
 with alarm, and again and again petitioned the 
 Governors of the Cape and ISTatal for assistance. Their 
 fears were, however, to a great extent groundless, for, 
 with the exception of occasional cattle-lifting, Secocoeui 
 did not follow up his victory. 
 
 On the 4th September the President opened the 
 special sitting of the Volksraad, and presented to that 
 body a scheme for the establishment of a border force 
 to take the place of the commando system, announcing 
 that he had appointed a certain Captain Von Schlick- 
 mann to command it. He also requested the Eaad to 
 make some provision for the expenses of the expedition, 
 which they had omitted to do in their former sitting. 
 
 Captain Yon Schlickmann determined to carry on 
 the war upon a different system. He got together a 
 band of very rough characters on the Diamond Fields, 
 and. occupied the fort built by the President, from 
 whence he would sally out from tim.e to time and 
 destroy kraals. He seems, if we may believe the re- 
 ports in the blue-books and the stories of eye-witnesses, 
 to have carried on his proceedings in a somewhat savage 
 way. The following is an extract from a private letter 
 written by one of his volunteers : — 
 
 " About daylight we came across four Kafirs. Saw 
 them first, and charged in front of them to cut off their 
 retreat. Saw they were women, and called out not to 
 fire. In spite of that, one of the poor things got her 
 
 head blown off (a d d shame). . . . Afterwards two 
 
 women and a baby were brought to the camp prisoners. 
 Tlie same night they were taken out by our Kafirs and 
 
 murdered in cool blood by order of . Mr. 
 
 and myself strongly protested against it, but without
 
 EVENTS rHECEDING THE ANNEXATION. 121 
 
 avail. I never heard such a cowardly piece of business 
 in my life. No good will come of it, you may depend. 
 . . . says he would cut all the women and chil- 
 dren's throats he catches. Told him distinctly he Nvas 
 a d d coward." 
 
 Schlichmann was, however, a mild-mannered man 
 when compared to a certain Abel Erasmus, afterwards 
 denounced at a public dinner by Sir Garnet Wolseley as a 
 fiend "in human form." This gentleman, in the month 
 of October, attacked a friendly kraal of Kafirs. The 
 incident is described thus in a correspondent's letter : — 
 
 " The people of the kraals, taken quite by surprise, 
 fled when they saw their foes, and most of them took 
 shelter in the neighbouring bush. Two or three men 
 were distinctly seen in their flight from the kraal, and 
 one of them is known to have been wounded. Accord- 
 ing to my informant the remainder were women and 
 children, who were pursued into the bush, and there, 
 all shivering and shrieking, were put to death by the 
 Boers' Kafirs, some being shot, but the majority stabbed 
 with assegais. After the massacre he counted thirteen 
 women and three children, but he says he did not see 
 the body of a single man. Another Kafir said, pointing 
 to a place in the road where the stones were thickly 
 strewn, ' the bodies of the women and children lay like 
 these stones.' The Boer before mentioned, who has 
 been stationed outside, has told one of his own friends, 
 whom he thought would not mention it, that the shrieks 
 were fearful to hear." 
 
 Several accounts of, or allusion to, this atrocity can 
 be found in the blue-books, and I may add that it, in 
 common with others of the same stamp, was the talk 
 of the country at the time.
 
 i:2 THE TRAN'SVAAL. 
 
 I do not relate these horrors out of any wish to rake 
 lip old stories to the prejudice of tlie Boers, but because 
 I am describing the state of the country before the 
 Annexation, in which they form an interesting and 
 important item. Also, it is as well that people in 
 England should know into what hands they liave 
 delivered over the native tribes m'Iio trusted in their 
 protection, Wliat happened in 1876 is probably hap- 
 pening again now, and will certainly happen again and 
 again. The character of tlie Transvaal Boer and his 
 sentiments towards the native races have not modified 
 during the last five years, but, on the contrary, a large 
 amount of energy, which has been accumulating during 
 the period of British protection, will now be expended 
 on their devoted heads. 
 
 As regards the truth of these atrocities, the majority 
 of them are beyond the possibility of doubt ; indeed, to 
 the best of my knowledge, no serious attempt has ever 
 been made to refute such of them as have come into 
 public notice, except in a general way, for party pur- 
 poses. As, however, they may be doubted, I will quote, 
 the following extract from a despatch written by Sir 
 H. Barkly to Lord Carnarvon, dated i8th December 
 1876:— " 
 
 "As Von Schlickmann has since fallen fighting 
 bravely, it is not without reluctance that I join in 
 affixing this dark stain on his memory, but trutli 
 compels me to add the following extract from a letter 
 which I have since received from one whose name 
 (which 1 communicate to your Lordsliip privately) 
 forbids disbelief : ' There is no longer the sliglitest doubt 
 as to the murder of the two women and the child at 
 Steelport by the direct order of Schlickmann, and iu
 
 EVENTS PRECEDING THE ANNEXATION. 123 
 
 the attack on the kraal near wliicli tliese women were 
 captured (or some attack about that period) he ordered 
 his men to cut the throats of all the wounded ! This 
 is no mere report ; it is positively true.' " He concludes 
 by expressing a hope that the course of events will 
 enable Her Majesty's Government to take such steps 
 "as will terminate this wanton and useless bloodshed, 
 and prevent the recurrence of the scenes of injustice, 
 cruelty, and rapine wldch ahcndant evidence is every day 
 forthcoming to j7?'o^•'6 have rarely ceased to disgrace the 
 llepublics beyond the Vaal ever since they first sprang 
 into existence" ^ 
 
 These are strong words, but none too strong for the 
 facts of the case. Injustice, cruelty, and rapine have 
 always been the watchwords of the Transvaal Boers. 
 The stories of wholesale slaughter in the earlier days 
 of the Eepublic are very numerous. One of the best 
 known of those shocking occurrences took place in the 
 Zoutpansberg war in 1865. On this occasion a large 
 number of Kafirs took refuge in caves, where the Loers 
 smoked them to death. Some years afterwards Dr. 
 Wangeman, whose account is, I believe, thoroughly 
 reliable, describes the scene of their operations in these 
 words : — 
 
 "The roof of the first cave was black with smoke; 
 the remains of the logs which were burnt lay at the 
 entrance. The floor was strewn with hundreds of skulls 
 and skeletons. In confused heaps lay karosses, kerries, 
 assegais, pots, spoons, snuff-boxes, and the bones of 
 men, giving one the impression that this was the grave 
 of a whole people. Some estimate the number of those 
 who perished here from twenty to thirty thousand. This 
 
 ^ The italics are my own. — AcTHOR.
 
 124 THE TllANSVAAL. 
 
 is, I believe, too liigli. In the one chamber there were 
 from two hundred to three hundred skeletons ; the 
 otlier chambers I did not visit." 
 
 In 1868 a public meeting was held at Potchefstroom 
 to consider the war then going on with the Zoutpans- 
 berg natives. According to the report of the proceed- 
 ings, the Eev. Mr. Ludorf said that "on a particular 
 occasion a number of native children, who were too 
 young to be removed, had been collected in a heap, 
 covered with long grass, and burned alive. Other 
 atrocities had also been committed, but these were too 
 horrible to relate." When called upon to produce his 
 authority for this statement, Mr. Ludorf named his 
 authority " in a solemn declaration to the State Attor- 
 ney." At this same meeting Mr. J. G. Steyn, who had 
 been Landdrost of Potchefstroom, said, " there now was 
 innocent blood on our hands which had not yet been 
 avenged, and the curse of God rested on the land in 
 consequence." Mr. Ptosalt remarked that "it was a 
 singular circumstance that in the different colonial 
 Kafir wars, as also in the Basuto wars, one did not hear 
 of destitute children being found by the commandoes, 
 and asked how it was that every petty commando that 
 took the field in this Eepublic invariably found num- 
 bers of destitute children. He gave it as his opinion 
 that the present system of apprenticeship was an essen- 
 tial cause of our frequent hostilities with the natives." 
 Mr. Jan Talyard said, "Children were forcibly taken 
 from their parents, and were then called destitute and 
 apprenticed." Mr. Daniel Van Nooren was heard to 
 say, " If they had to clear the country, and could not 
 liave the children they found, he would shoot them." 
 Mr. Pield-Cornet FurstenburLC stated "that wh6'n he
 
 EVENTS PRECEDING THE ANNEXATION. 125 
 
 was at Zoutpansberg with liis burghers, the chief Ivatse- 
 Kats was told to come down from the mountains ; that 
 he sent one of his subordinates as a proof of amity; 
 that whilst a delay of five days was guaranteed by 
 Commandant Paul Kruger, who was then in command, 
 orders were given at the same time to attack the natives 
 at break of day, which was accordingly done, but which 
 resulted in total failure." Truly, this must have been 
 an interesting meeting. 
 
 Before leaving these unsavoury subjects, I must 
 touch on the question of slavery. It has been again 
 and again denied, on behalf of the Transvaal Boers, that \ 
 slavery existed in the Eepublic. Now, this is, strictly 
 speaking, true ; slavery did not exist, but apprentice- 
 ship did — the rose was called by another name, that is 
 alb The poor destitute children who were picked up 
 by kind-hearted Boers, after the extermination of their 
 parents, were apprenticed to farmers till they came of 
 age. It is a remarkable fact that these children never 
 attained their majority. You might meet oldish men 
 in the Transvaal who were not, according to their 
 masters' reckoning, twenty-one years of age. The asser- 
 tion that slavery did not exist in the Transvaal is only 
 made to hoodwink the English public. I have known 
 men who have owned slaves, and who have seen whole 
 waggon-loads of "black ivory," as they were called, 
 sold for about £1^ a-piece. I have at this riioment a 
 tenant, Carolus by name, on some land I own in Natal, 
 now a well-to-do man, who was for many years — about 
 twenty, if I remember right — a Boer slave. During 
 those years, he told me, he worked from morning till 
 night, and the only reward he received was two calves. 
 He finally escaped into Natal.
 
 126 THE TEANSVAAL. 
 
 If other evidence is needed it is not difficult to find, 
 so I will quote a little. On the 22d August 1876 we 
 find Khama, king of the Bamangwato, one of the most 
 worthy chiefs in South Africa, sending a message to 
 "Victoria, the great Queen of the English people," in 
 these words : — 
 
 "I write to you. Sir Henry, in order tliat your Queen 
 may preserve for me my country, it being in her hands. 
 The Boers are coming into it, and I do not like them. 
 Their actions are cruel among us black people. We 
 are like money, they sell us and our children. I ask 
 Her Majesty to pity me, and to hear that wliicli I write 
 quickly. I wish to hear upon what conditions Her 
 Majesty will receive me, and my country and my people, 
 under her protection. I am weary with fighting. I do 
 not like war, and I ask Her Majesty to give me peace. 
 I am very much distressed that ray people are being 
 destroyed by war, and I wish them to obtain peace. I 
 ask Her Mnjesty to defend me, as she defends all lier 
 people. There are three things which distress me very 
 much — war, selling people, and drink. All these things 
 I shall find in the Boers, and it is these things which 
 destroy people to make an end of them in the country. 
 The custom of the Boers has always teen to cause people 
 to he sold, and to-day they are still selling people. Last 
 year I saw them pass with two waggons full of people 
 whom they had bought at the river at Tanane " (Lake 
 Ngate). 
 
 The Special Correspondent of the Cape Argus, a 
 highly respectable journal, writes thus on the 28th 
 November 1876: — "The Boer from whom this infor- 
 mation was gleaned has furnished besides some facts 
 which may not be uninteresting, as a commentary on
 
 EVENTS PEECEDING THE ANNEXATION. 127 
 
 the repeated denials by Mr. Eargers of the existence, 
 of slavery. During the last week slaves have been 
 offered for sale on his farm. The captives have been 
 taken from Secocoeni's country by Mapoch's people, 
 and are being exchanged at the rate of a child for a 
 heifer. He also assures us that the whole of the High- 
 veld is being replenished witli Kafir children, whom 
 the Boers have been lately purchasing from the Swazis 
 at the rate of a horse for a child. I should like to see 
 this man and his father as witnesses before an Imperial 
 Commission. He let fall one or two incidents of the 
 past which were brought to mind by the occurrences of 
 the present. In 1864, he says, 'The Swazis accom- 
 panied the Boers against Males. The Boers did nothing 
 but stand by and witness the fearful massacre. The 
 men and women were also murdered. One poor woman 
 sat clutching her baby of eight days old. The Swazis 
 stabbed her through the body, and when she found that 
 she could not live, she wrung the baby's neck with her 
 own hands to save it from future misery. On the return 
 of that commando the children who became too weary 
 to continue the journey were killed on the road. Tlie 
 survivors were sold as slaves to the farmers.' " 
 
 The same gentleman writes in the issue of the 12th 
 December as follows: — "Tlie whole world may know 
 it, for it is true, and investigation will only bring out 
 the horrible details, that through the whole course of 
 this Eepublic's existence it has acted in contravention 
 of the Sand Eiver Treaty; and slavery lias occurred 
 not oidy here and there in isolated cases, but as an 
 unbroken practice, and has been one of the peculiar 
 institutions of the country, mixed up with all its social 
 and political life. It has been at the root of most of
 
 128 TITE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 its wars. It has been carried on regularly even m 
 times of peace. It has been cliaracterised by all those 
 circumstances which have so often roused the British 
 nation to an indignant protest, and to repeated efforts 
 to banish the slave trade from the world. The Boers 
 have not only fallen on unsuspecting kraals simply 
 for the purpose of obtaining the women and children 
 and cattle, but they have carried on a traffic through 
 natives who have kidnapped the children of their 
 weaker neighbours, and sold them to the white man. 
 Again, the Boers have sold and exchanged their victims 
 among themselves. Waggon-loads of slaves have been 
 conveyed from one end of the country to the other for 
 sale, and that with the cognisance of, and for the direct 
 advantage of, the highest officials of the land. The 
 writer has himself seen in a town, situated in the south 
 of the Eepublic, the children who had been brought 
 down from a remote northern district. One fine morn- 
 ing, in walking through the streets, he was struck with 
 the number of little black strangers standing about 
 certain houses, and wondered where they could have 
 come from. He learnt a few hours later that they were 
 part of loads which were disposed of on the outskirts 
 of the town the day before. The circumstances con- 
 nected with some of these kidnapping excursions are 
 appalling, and the barbarities practised by cruel masters 
 upon some of these defenceless creatures during the 
 course of their servitude are scarcely less horrible than 
 those reported from Turkey. It is no disgrace in this 
 country for an official to ride a fine horse which was 
 got for two Kafir children, to procure whom the father 
 and mother were shot. No reproach is inherited by 
 the mistress who, day after day, tied up her female
 
 EVENTS PRECEDING THE ANNEXATION. 129 
 
 servant in an agonising posture, and had her beaten 
 until there was no sound part in her body, securing 
 her in the stocks during the intervals of torture. That 
 man did not lose caste who tied up another woman and 
 had her thrashed until she brought forth at the whip- 
 ping-post. These are merely examples of thousands of 
 cases which could be proved were an Imperial Commis- 
 sion to sit, and could the wretched yictims of a prolonged 
 oppression recover sufficiently from the dread of their 
 old tyrants to give a truthful report." 
 
 To come to some evidence more recently adduced. 
 On the 9th May 1881, an affidavit was sworn to by the 
 Eev. John Thorne, curate of St. John the Evangelist, 
 Lydenburg, Transvaal, and presented to the Royal Com- 
 mission appointed to settle Transvaal affairs, in which 
 he states : — " That I was appointed to the charge of a 
 congregation in Potchefstroom, about thirteen years 
 ago, when the Eepublic was under the presidency of 
 Mr. Pretorius.^ I remember noticing one morning, 
 as I walked through the streets, a number of young 
 natives, whom I knew to be strangers. I inquired where 
 they came from. I was told tliat they had just been 
 brought from Zoutpansberg. This was the locality from 
 which slaves were chiefly brought at that time, and 
 were traded for under the name of ' Black Ivory.' One 
 of these natives belonged to Mr. Munich, the State 
 Attorney. It was a matter of common remark at that 
 time that the President of the Pepublic was himself 
 one of the greatest dealers in slaves." In the fourth 
 paragraph of the same affidavit ]\Ir. Thorne says, "Tliat 
 the Ptev. Doctor Nachtigal, of the Berlin Missionary 
 Society, was the interpreter for Shatane's people in the 
 
 ' One of the famous Triumvirate.
 
 130 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 private office of Mr. Eoth, aiul, at the close of the in- 
 terview, told me what had occurred. On my expressing 
 surprise, he went on to relate that he had information 
 on native matters which would surprise me more. He 
 then produced the copy of a register, kept in the Land- 
 drost's office, of men, women, and children, to tlie num- 
 ber of four hundred and eighty (480), who had been 
 disposed of by one Boer to another for a consideration. 
 In one case an ox was given in exchange, in another 
 goats, in a third a blanket, and so forth. Many of these 
 natives he (Air. Nachtigal) knew personally. The copy 
 was certified as true and correct by an official of the 
 Eepublic, and I would mention his name now, only 
 that I am persuaded that it would cost the man his 
 life if his act became known to the Boers." 
 
 On the i6th May 188 1, a nativ^e, named Frederick 
 Molepo, was examined by the Eoyal Commission. Tlie 
 following are extracts from his examination: — 
 
 " (Sir E. Wood.) Are you a Christian ?— Yes. 
 
 " {Sir H. de Villicrs.) How long were you a slave ? — - 
 Half a year. 
 
 "How do you know that you were a slave ? Might 
 you not have been an apprentice ? — No, I was not 
 apprenticed. 
 
 " How do you know? — Tliey got me from my parents, 
 and ill-treated me. 
 
 " (Sir E. Wood.) How many times did you get the 
 stick ? — Every day. 
 
 " {Sir E. de Villiers) What did the Boers do with 
 you when they caught you ? — They sold me. 
 
 " How much did they sell you for ? — One cow and a 
 big pot." 
 
 On the 28th May 1881, amongst the other documents
 
 EVENTS PRECEDING THE ANNEXATION. 131 
 
 handed in for the consideration of tlie Royal Commission, 
 is the statement of a headman, whose name it has been 
 considered advisable to omit in the blue-book for fear 
 the Boers should take vengeance on him. He says, 
 "I say, that if the English government dies I shall die 
 too ; I would rather die than be under the Boer Govern- 
 ment. I am the man who helped to make bricks for 
 the church you see now standing in the square here 
 (Pretoria), as a slave without payment. As a represen- 
 tative of my people I am still obedient to the English 
 Government, and willing to obey all commands from 
 them, even to die for their cause in this country, rather 
 than submit to the Boers. 
 
 "I was under Shambok, my chief, who fought the 
 Boers formerly, but he left us, and we were put up to 
 auction and sold among the Boers. I M-ant to stale 
 this myself to the Tioyal Commission in Newcastle. I 
 was bought by Eritz Botha and sold by Erederick Botha, 
 who was then veld cornet (justice of the peace) of the 
 Boers." 1 
 
 It M'ould be easy to find more reports of the slave- 
 trading practices of the Boers, but as the above are fair 
 samples it will not be necessary to do so. My readers 
 will be able from them to form some opinion as to 
 whether or not slavery or apprenticeship existed in the 
 
 ^ I have taken the liberty to quote all these extracts exactly as they 
 etand in the original, instead of weaving their substance into my nar- 
 rative, in order that I may not be accused, as so often happens to 
 authors who write upon this subject, of having pre.-ented a garbled 
 version of the truth. The original of every extract is to be found in 
 blue-books presented to Parliament. I have thought it best to confine 
 myself to these, and avoid repeating stories of cruelties and slavery, 
 however well authenticated, that have come to my knowledge privately, 
 such stories being always more or less open to suspicion.
 
 132 THE TRANS VAAI^ 
 
 Transvaal. If they come to the couchision that it did, 
 it must be borne in mind that what existed in the past 
 will certainly exist again in the future. Natives are 
 not now any fonder of working for Boers than they 
 were a few years back, and Boers must get labour some- 
 how. If, on the other hand, it did not exist, then the 
 Boers are a grossly slandered people, and all writers on 
 the subject, from Livingstone down, have combined to 
 take away their character. 
 
 Leaving native questions for the present, we must 
 now return to the general affairs of the country. When 
 President Burgers opened the special sitting of the 
 Volksraad, on the 4th September, he appealed, it will 
 be remembered, to that body for pecuniary aid to 
 liquidate the expenses of the war. This ap|.3al was 
 responded to by the passing of a war tax, under which 
 every owner of a farm was to pay ;^io, the owner of 
 half a farm £^, and so on. The tax was not a very 
 just one, since it fell with equal weight on the rich 
 man who held twenty farms and the poor man who 
 held but one. Its justice or injustice was, however, to 
 a great extent immaterial, since the free and indepen- 
 dent burghers, including some of the members of the 
 Volksraad who had imposed it, promptly refused to pay 
 it, or indeed, whilst they were about it, any other tax. 
 As the Treasury was already empty, and creditors were 
 pressing, this refusal was most ill-timed, and things 
 began to look very black indeed. Meanwhile, in addi- 
 tion to the ordinary expenditure, and the interest pay- 
 able on debts, money had to be found to pay Von 
 Schlickmann's volunteers. As there was no cash in 
 the country, this was done by issuing Government 
 promissory notes, known as "goodfors," or vulgarly as
 
 EVENTS PRECEDING THE ANNEXATION. 133 
 
 "good for nothings," and by promising them all booty, 
 and to each man a farm of two thousand acres, lying 
 east and north-east of the Loolu mountains — in other 
 words, in Secocceni's territory, -which did not belong to 
 the Government to give away. The officials were the 
 next to suffer, and for six months before the Annexation 
 these unfortunate individuals lived as best they could, 
 for they certainly got no salary, except in the case of a 
 postmaster, who was told to help himself to his pay in 
 stamps. The Government issued large numbers of bills, 
 but the banks refused to discount them, and in some 
 cases the neighbouring colonies had to advance money 
 to the Transvaal post-cart contractors, who were carry- 
 ing the mails, as a matter of charity. The Government 
 even mortgaged the great salt-pan near Pretoria for the 
 paltry sum of ^^400, whilst the leading officials of the 
 Government were driven to pledging their own private 
 credit in order to obtain the smallest article necessary 
 to its continuance. In fact, to such a pass did things 
 come that wlien the country was annexed a single 
 threepenny bit (which had doubtless been overlooked) 
 was found in the Treasury chest, together with acknow- 
 ledgments of debts to the extent of nearly ;i^3O0,000. 
 
 Nor was the refusal to pay taxes, which they were 
 powerless to enforce, the only difficulty with which the 
 Government had to contend. Want of money is as bad 
 and painful a thing to a State as to an individual, bub 
 there are perhaps worse things than want of money, 
 one of which is to be deserted by your own friends and 
 household. This was the position of the Government 
 of the Eepublic; no sooner was it involved in over- 
 whelming difficulties than its own subjects commenced 
 to bait it, more especially the English portion of it3
 
 1.34 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 subjects. They complained to the English authorities 
 about the commandeering of members of their family 
 or goods; they petitioned the British Government to 
 interfere, and generally made themselves as unpleasant 
 as possible to the local authorities. Such a course of 
 action was perhnps natural, but it can hardly be said 
 to be either quite logical or just. The Transvaal 
 Government had never asked them to come and live 
 in the country, and if they did so, it was presumably 
 at their own ri&k. On the other hand, it must be 
 remembered that many of the agitators had accumu- 
 lated property, to leave which would mean ruin ; and 
 they saw that, unless something was done, its value 
 woidd be destroyed. 
 
 Under the pressure of all these troubles the Boers 
 themselves split up into factions, as they are always 
 ready to do. The Dopper party declared that they 
 had had enough progress, and proposed the extremely 
 conservative Paul Kruger as President, Burgers' time 
 having nearly expired. Paul Kruger accepted the 
 candidature, although he had previously promised his 
 support to Burgers, and distrust of each other was 
 added to the other difficulties of the Executive, the 
 Transvaal becoming a house very much divided against 
 itself. Natives, Doppers, Progressionists, Officials, Eng- 
 lish, were all pulling different ways, and each striving 
 for his own advantage. Anything more hopeless than 
 the position of the country on the ist January 1877 ^^ 
 is impossible to conceive. Enemies surrounded it ; on 
 every border there was the prospect of a serious war. 
 In the exchequer there was nothing but piles of over- 
 due bills. The President was helpless, and mistrustful 
 of his officers, and the officers were caballing against
 
 EVENTS PRECEDING THE ANNEXATION. 135 
 
 the President. All the ordinary functions of Govern- 
 ment had ceased, and trade was paralysed. Now and 
 then wild proposals were made to relieve the State of 
 its burdens, some of which partook of the nature of 
 repudiation, but these were the exception ; the majority 
 of tlie inhabitants, who would neither fight nor pay 
 taxes, sat still and awaited the catastrophe, utterly 
 careless of all consequences.
 
 ( 136 ) 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE ANNEXATION. 
 
 The state of affairs described in the previous chapter 
 was one tliat filled the Secretary of State for the 
 Colonies with alarm. During his tenure of office 
 Lord Carnarvon evidently had the permanent welfare 
 of South Africa much at heart, and he saw with 
 apprehension that the troubles that were brewing in 
 the Transvaal were of a nature likely to involve the 
 Cape and Natal in a native war. Though there is a 
 broad line of demarcation between Dutch and English, 
 it is not so broad but that a victorious nation like the 
 Zulus might cross it, and beginning by fighting the 
 Boer, might end by fighting the white man irrespective 
 of race. When the reader reflects how terrible would 
 be the consequences of a combination of native tribes 
 against the Whites, and how easily such a combination 
 might at that time have been brought about in the 
 first flush of native successes, he will understand the 
 anxiety with which all thinking men watched the 
 course of events in the Transvaal in 1876. 
 
 At last they took such a serious turn that the Home 
 Government saw that some action must be taken if 
 the catastrophe was to be averted, and determined to 
 despatch Sir Theophilus Shepstone as Special Commis-
 
 THE ANNEXATION. . 137 
 
 sioner to the Transvaal, with powers, should it be neces- 
 sary, to annex the country to Her Majesty's dominions, 
 " in order to secure the peace and safety of Our said 
 colonies and of Our subjects elsewhere." 
 
 The terms of his Commission were unusually large, 
 leaving a great deal to his discretionary power. In 
 choosing that officer for the execution of a most 
 difficult and delicate mission, the Government, doubt- 
 less, made a very wise selection. Sir Tlieophilus 
 Shepstone is a man of remarkable tact and ability, 
 combined with great openness and simplicity of mind, 
 and one whose name will always have a leading place 
 in South African history. During a long official life- 
 time he has had to do with most of the native races 
 in South Africa, and certainly knows them and their 
 ways better than any living man ; whilst he is by 
 them all regarded with a peculiar and affectionate 
 reverence. He is par excellence their great white chief 
 and " father," and a word from him, even now that he 
 has retired from active life, still carries more weight 
 than the formal remonstrances of any governor in 
 South Africa. 
 
 With the Boers he is almost equally well ac- 
 quainted, having known many of them personally for 
 years. He possesses, moreover, the rare power of 
 winning the regard and affection, as wull as the 
 respect, of those about him in such a marked degree 
 that those who have served him once would go far 
 to serve him again. Sir T. Shepstone, however, has 
 enemies like other peojDle, and is commonly reported 
 among them to be a disciple of Machiavelli, and to 
 have his mind steeped in all the darker wiles of Kafir 
 policy. The Annexation of the Transvaal is by them
 
 vl 
 
 138 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 attributed to a successful and vi[;orous use of those arts 
 that distinguished the diplomacy of two centuries ago. 
 Falsehood and bribery are supposed to have been the 
 great levers used to effect the change, together witli 
 threats of extinction at the hands of a savage and 
 unfriendly nation. 
 
 That the Annexation was a triumph of mind over 
 matter is quite true, but whether or no tliat triumph 
 was unworthily obtained, I will leave those who read 
 this short chronicle of the events connected with it to 
 judge. I saw it somewhat darkly remarked in a 
 newspaper the other day that the history of the 
 Annexation had evidently yet to be written ; and I 
 fear that the remark represents the feeling of most 
 people about that event, implying as it did that it 
 was carried out by means certainly myster'ously and 
 presumably doubtful, I am afraid that those who 
 think thus will be disappointed in what I have to 
 say about the matter, since I know that the means 
 employed to bring the Boers — 
 
 " Fracli licllo, fatitque repulsL " — 
 
 under Her Majesty's autliority were throughout as 
 fair and honest as_ the Annexation itself was, in 
 my opinion, right and necessary. 
 
 To return to Sir T. Shepstone. He undoubtedly 
 had faults as a ruler, one of the most prominent of 
 which was that his natural mildness of character 
 would never allow him to act with severity even 
 when severity was necessary. The very criminals 
 condemned to death ran a good chance of reprieve 
 when he had to sign their death-warrants. He has 
 also that worst of faults (so-called), in one fitted by
 
 THE ANNEXATION. 139 
 
 r.ature to become great — want of ainbition, a failing 
 that in such a man marks him the possessor of an 
 even and a philosophic mind. It was no seeking of 
 his own that raised him out of obscurity, and when 
 his work was done to comparative obscurity he elected 
 to return, though whether a man of his ability and 
 experience in South African affairs should, at the 
 present crisis, be allowed to remain there, is another 
 question. 
 
 On the 20th December 1876, Sir T. Shepstone 
 wrote to President Burgers, informing him of his ap- 
 proaching visit to the Transvaal, to secure, if possible, 
 the adjustment of existing troubles, and the adoption 
 of such measures as might be best calculated to pre- 
 vent their recurrence in the future. 
 
 On his road to Pretoria, Sir Theophilus received a 
 hearty welcome from the Boer as well as the English 
 inhabitants of the country. One of these addresses to 
 him says : " Be assured, high honourable Sir, that we 
 burghers, now assembled together, entertain the most 
 friendly feeling towards your Government, and that 
 we shall agree with anything you may do in conjunc- 
 tion with our Government for the progress of our 
 State, the strengthening against our native enemies, 
 and for the general welfare of all the inhabitants of 
 the whole of South Africa. Welcome in Heidelberg, 
 and welcome in the Transvaal." 
 
 At Pretoria the reception of the Special Commis- 
 sioner was positively enthusiastic ; the whole town 
 came out to meet him, and the horses having been 
 taken out of the carriage, he was dragged in triumph 
 through the streets. In his reply to the address 
 presented to him, Sir Theophilus shadowed forth the
 
 J 
 
 140 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 objects of his mission in these words : " Eecent events 
 in this country have shown to all thinking men the 
 absolute necessity for closer union and more oneness 
 of i^urpose among the Christian Governments of the 
 southern portion of this continent : the best interests 
 of the native races, no less than tlie peace and pro- 
 sperity of the white, imperatively demand it, and I 
 rely upon you and upon your Government to co- 
 operate with me in endeavouring to achieve the great 
 and glorious end of inscribing on a general South 
 African banner the appropriate motto — " Eendragt 
 ^y maakt magt " (Unity makes strength). 
 
 A few days after his arrival a commission was 
 appointed, consisting of Messrs. Henderson and Osborn, 
 on behalf of the Special Commissioner, and Messrs. 
 Kruger and Jorissen, on behalf of the Transvaal 
 Government, to discuss the state of the country. 
 Tills commission came to nothing, and was on both 
 sides nothing more than a bit of by-play. 
 
 J The arrival of the mission was necessarily regarded 
 
 with mixed feelings by the inhabitants of the Trans- 
 vaal. By one party it was eagerly greeted, viz., the 
 English section of the population, who devoutly hoped 
 that it had come to annex the country. AVith the 
 exception of the Hollander element, the officials also 
 were glad of its arrival, and secretly hoped that the 
 country would be taken over, when there would be 
 more chance of their getting their arrear pay. The 
 better educated Boers also were for the most part 
 satisfied that there was no hope for the country unless 
 England helped it in some w^ay, though they did not 
 
 J like having to accept the help. But the more bigoted 
 and narrow-minded among them were undoubtedly
 
 THE ANNEXATION. 141 
 
 opposed to English interference, find under their leader, 
 Paul Kruger, who was at the time running for the 
 President's chair, did their best to he rid of it. They 
 found ready allies in the Hollander clientelle, with 
 which Mr. Burgers had surrounded himself, headed 
 by the famous Dr. Jorissen, who was, like most of 
 the rulers of this singular State, an ex-clergyman, 
 but now an Attorney-general, not learned in the law. 
 These men were for the most part entirely unfit for y 
 the positions they held, and feared that in the event 
 of the country changing hands they might be ejected 
 from them ; and also, they did all Englishmen the 
 favour to regard them with that peculiarly virulent 
 and general hatred which is a part of the secret creed , 
 of many foreigners, more especially of such as are y 
 under our protection. As may easily be imagined, 
 what between all these different parties and the pre- 
 sence of the Special Commissioner, there were certainly 
 plenty of intrigues going on in Pretoria during the first 
 few months of 1877, and the political excitement was 
 very great. Nobody knew how far Sir T. Shepstone 
 was prepared to go, and everybody was afraid of 
 putting out his hand further than he could pull it 
 back, and trying to make himself comfortable on two 
 stools at once. Members of the Volksraad and other 
 prominent individuals in the country who had during 
 the day been denouncing the Commissioner in no 
 measured terras, and even proposing that he and his 
 staff should be shot as a warning to the English 
 Government, might be seen arriving at his house 
 under cover of the shades of evening, to have a little 
 talk with him, and express the earnest hope that it 
 was his intention to annex the country as soon as
 
 4 
 
 142 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 possible. It is necessary to assist at a peaceable 
 annexation to learn the depth of meanness human 
 nature is capable of. 
 
 In Pretoria, at any rate, the ladies were of great 
 service to the cause of the mission, since they were 
 nearly all in favour of a change of government, and, 
 that being the case, they naturally soon brought their 
 husbands, brothers, and lovers to look at things from 
 the same point of view. It was a wise man who 
 said that in any matter where it is necessary to obtain 
 the goodwill of a population you should win over the 
 women ; that done, you need not trouble yourself 
 about the men. 
 
 Though the country was thus overflowing with 
 political intrigues, nothing of the kind went on in the 
 Conmiissioner's camp. It was not he who made the 
 plots to catch the Transvaalers ; on the contrary, they 
 made the plots to catch him. For several months all 
 that he did was to sit still and let the rival passions 
 work their way, fighting what the Zulus afterwards 
 called the " fight of sit down." When anybody came 
 to see him he was very glad to meet them, pointed 
 out the desperate condition of the country, and asked 
 them if they could suggest a remedy. And that was 
 about all he did do, beyond informing himself very 
 carefully as to all that was going on in the country, 
 and the movements of the natives within and outside 
 its borders. There was no money spent in bribery,: 
 as has been stated, though it is impossible to imagine 
 a state of affairs in which it would have been more 
 easy to bribe, or in which it could have been done 
 with greater effect; unless indeed the promise that 
 some pension should be paid to President Burgers can
 
 THE ANNEXATION. 143 
 
 be called a bribe, which it was certainly never intended 
 to be, but simply a guarantee that after having spent 
 all his private means on behalf of the State he should 
 not be left destitute. The statement that the Annexa- 
 tion was effected under a threat that if the Government 
 did not give its consent Sir T. Shepstone would let 
 loose the Zulus on the country is also a wicked and 
 malicious invention, but with tliis I shall deal more 
 at length further on. 
 
 It must not, however, be understood that the An- 
 nexation was a foregone conclusion, or that Sir T. 
 Shepstone came up to the Transvaal with the fixed 
 intention of annexing the country without reference 
 to its position, merely with a view of extending British 
 influence, or, as has been absurdly stated, in order to 
 benefit Natal. He had no fixed purpose, whether it 
 were necessary or no, of exercising the full powers 
 given to him by his commission ; on the contrary, he 
 was all along, most anxious to find some internal 
 resources within the State by means of which Annexa- 
 tion could be averted, and of this fact his various 
 letters and despatches give full proof. Thus, in his 
 letter to President Burgers, of the 9th April 1877, in 
 which he announces his intention of annexing the 
 country, he says : " I have more than once assured 
 your Honour that if I could think of any plan by 
 which the independence of the State could be main- 
 tained by its own internal resources I would most 
 certainly not conceal that plan from you." It is also 
 incidentally remarkably confirmed by a passage in 
 Mr. Burgers' posthumous defence, in which he says : 
 "Hence I met Shepstone alone in my house, and 
 opened up the subject of his mission. AVith a candour
 
 144 THE TEANSVAAL. 
 
 tliat astonislied me, he avowed that his purpose was 
 to annex the country, as he had sufficient grounds for 
 it, unless I could so alter as to satisfy his Government. 
 My plan of a new constitution, modelled after that of 
 America, of a standing police force of two hundred 
 mounted men, was then proposed. He promised to 
 give me time to call the Volksraad together, and to 
 abandon his design if the Volksraad would adopt these 
 measures, and the country be willing to submit to 
 them, and to carry them out." Further on he says : 
 "In justice to Shepstone I must say that I would not 
 consider an officer of my Government to have acted 
 faithfully if he had not done what Shepstone did." 
 
 It has also been frequently alleged in England, and 
 always seems to be taken as the groundwork of argu- 
 ment in the matter of the Annexation, that the 
 Special Commissioner represented that the majority 
 of the inhabitants wished for the Annexation, and 
 that it was sanctioned on that ground. This statement 
 shows the great ignorance that exists in this country 
 of South African affairs, an ignorance which in this 
 case has been carefully fostered by Mr. Gladstone's 
 Government for party purposes, they having found it 
 necessary to assume, in order to make their position 
 in the matter tenable, that Sir T. Shepstone and other 
 officers had been guilty of misrepresentation. Un- 
 fortunately, the Government and its supporters have 
 been more intent upon making out their case than 
 upon ascertaining the truth of their statements. If 
 they had taken the trouble to refer to Sir T. Shep- 
 stone's despatches, they would have found that tlie 
 ground on which the Transvaal was annexed was, not 
 because the majority of the inhabitants wished for it
 
 THE ANNEXATION. . 145 
 
 but because the State was drifting iuto anarchy, was 
 bankrupt, and was about to be destroyed by native 
 tribes. They would further have found that Sir T. 
 Shepstone never represented that the majority of 
 the Boers were in favour of Annexation. What he 
 did say was that most tliinking men in the country 
 saw no other way out of the difficulty ; but what pro- 
 portion of the Boers can be called " tliinking men ? " 
 He also said, in the fifteenth paragraph of his des- 
 patch to Lord Carnarvon of 6th March 1877, that 
 petitions signed by 2500 people, representing every 
 class of the community, out of a total adult male 
 population of 8000, had been presented to the Govern- 
 ment of the Eepublic, setting forth its difficulties and 
 dangers, and praying it " to treat with me for their 
 amelioration or removal." He also stated, and with 
 perfect truth, that many more would have signed had 
 it not been for the terrorism that was exercised, and 
 that all the towns and villages in the country desired 
 the change, which was a patent fact. 
 
 This is the foundation on which the charge of 
 misrepresentation is built — a charge which has been 
 manipulated so skilftdly, and with such a charming 
 disregard for the truth, that the British public has 
 been duped into believing it. When it is examined 
 into, it vanishes into thin air. 
 
 But a darker charge has been brought against the 
 Special Commissioner — a charge affecting his honour 
 as a gentleman and his character as a Christian ; and, 
 strange to say, has gained a considerable credence, 
 especially amongst a certain party in England. I 
 allude to the statement that he called up the Zulu 
 army with the intention of sweeping the Transvaal 
 
 E
 
 £46 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 if the Annexation was objected to. I may state, 
 from my own personal knowledge, that the report is 
 a complete falsehood, and that no such threat was 
 ever made, either by Sir T. Shepstone or by anybody 
 connected with him, and I will briefly prove what 
 I say. 
 
 • "When the mission first arrived at Pretoria, a 
 message came from Cetywayo to the effect that he 
 had heard that the Boers had fired at " Sompseu " 
 (Sir T. Shepstone), and announcing his intention of 
 attacking the Transvaal if " his father " was touched. 
 About the middle of March alarming rumours began 
 to spread as to the intended action of Cetywayo with 
 reference to the Transvaal ; but as Sir T. Shepstone 
 did not think that the king would be likely to make 
 any hostile movement whilst he was in the country, 
 he took no steps in the matter. Neither did the 
 Transvaal Government ask his advice and assistance. 
 Indeed, a remarkable trait in the Boers is their 
 supreme self-conceit, whicli makes them believe that 
 they are capable of subduing all the natives in Africa, 
 and of thrashing the whole British army if necessary. 
 Unfortunately, the recent course of events has tended 
 to confirm tliem in their opinion as regards their 
 white enemies. To return : towards the second week 
 in April, or the week before the proclamation of 
 Annexation was issued, things began to look very 
 serious ; indeed, rumours that could hardly be dis- 
 credited reached the Special Commissioner that the 
 whole Zulu army was collected in a chain of Impis 
 or battalions, with the intention of bursting into the 
 Transvaal and sweeping the country. Knowing how 
 terrible would be the catastrophe if this were to
 
 THE ANNEXATION. i^j 
 
 happen, Sir T. Shepstone was much alarmed about 
 the matter, and at a meeting with the Executive 
 Council of the Transvaal Government he pointed out 
 to them the great danger in which the country was 
 placed. This was done in the presence of several 
 officers of his staff, and it was on this friendly exposi- 
 tion of the state of affairs that the charge that he had 
 threatened the country with invasion by the Zulus 
 was based. On the i ith April, or the day before the 
 Annexation, a message was despatched to Cetywayo, 
 telling him of the reports that had reached Pretoria, 
 and stating that if they were true he must forthwith 
 give up all such intentions, as the Transvaal would at 
 once be placed under the sovereignty of Her Majesty, 
 and that if he had assembled any armies for purposes 
 of aggression they must be disbanded at once. Sir T. 
 Shepstone's message reached Zululand not a day too 
 soon. Had the Annexation of the Transvaal been ^ 
 delayed by a few weeks even — and this is a point 
 which I earnestly beg Englishmen to remember in con- 
 nection with that act — Cetywayo's armies would have 
 entered the Transvaal, carrying death before them, and c^ 
 leaving a wilderness behind them. 
 
 Cetywayo's answer to the Special Commissioner's 
 message will sufficiently show, to use Sir Theophilus' 
 own words in his despatch on the subject, " the pin- 
 nacle of peril which the Eepublic and South Africa 
 generally had reached at the moment wdien the 
 Annexation took place." He says, "I thank my 
 Father Sompseu (Sir T. Shepstone) for his message. 
 I am glad that he has sent it, because the Dutch have 
 tired me out, and I intended to fight them once and 
 once only, and to drive them over the Vaal. Kabana
 
 148 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 (name of messenger), you see my Impis (armies) are 
 gathered. It was to fight the Dutch I called them 
 together ; now I will send them back to their homes. 
 Is it well that two men (' amadoda-amabili ') should 
 be made ' iziula ' (fools) ? In the reign of my father 
 Umpanda the Boers were constantly moving their 
 boundary further into my country. Since his death 
 the same thing has been done. I had therefore deter- 
 mined to end it once for all ! " The message then 
 goes on to other matters, and ends with a request to 
 be allowed to fight the Amaswazi, because " they 
 fight together and kill one another. This," says Cety- 
 wayo naively, "is wrong, and I want to chastise them 
 for it." 
 
 This quotation will suffice to convince all reason- 
 able men, putting aside all other matters, from what 
 imminent danger the Transvaal was delivered by the 
 much-abused Annexation. 
 
 Some months after that event, however, it occurred 
 to the ingenious mind of some malicious individual in 
 Natal that, properly used, much political capital might 
 be made out of this Zulu incident, and the story that 
 Cetywayo's army had been called up by Sir Theophilus 
 himself to overawe, and, if necessary, subdue the 
 Transvaal, was accordingly invented and industriously 
 circulated. Although Sir T. Shepstone at once caused 
 it to be authoritatively contradicted, such an astonish- 
 ing slander naturally took firm root, and on the 1 2 th 
 April 1879 we have Mr. M. W. Pretorius, one of the 
 Boer leaders, publicly stating at a meeting of the 
 farmers that " previous to the Annexation Sir T. 
 Shepstone had threatened the Transvaal with an attack 
 from the Zulus as an argument for advancincj the
 
 THE ANNEXATION. 149 
 
 Annexation." Under such an imputation the Govern- 
 ment could no longer keep silence, and accordingly 
 Sir Owen Lanyon, who was then Administrator of the 
 Transvaal, caused the matter to be officially investi- 
 gated, with these results, which are summed up by 
 him in a letter to Mr. Pretorius, dated ist May 
 1879:— 
 
 1. The records of the Ptepublican Executive Council 
 contained no allusion to any such statement. 
 
 2. Two members of that Council filed statements iu 
 which they unreservedly denied that Sir T. Shepstone 
 used the words or threats imputed to him. 
 
 3. Two officers of Sir T. Sliepstone's staff, who were 
 always present with him at interviews with the Exe- 
 cutive Council, filed statements to the same effect. 
 
 " I have no doubt," adds Sir Owen Lanyon, " that 
 the report has been originated and circulated by some 
 evil-disposed person." 
 
 In addition to this evidence we have a letter written 
 to the Colonial Office by Sir T. Shepstone, dated Lon- 
 don, August 12, 1879, in which he points out that 
 Mr. Pretorius was not even present at any of the 
 interviews with the Executive Council on which occa- 
 sion he accuses him of having made use of the threats. 
 He further shows that the use of such a threat on his 
 part would have been the depth of folly, and " know- 
 ingly to court the instant and ignominious failure of 
 my mission," because the Boers were so persuaded of 
 their own prowess that they could not be convinced 
 that they stood in any danger from native sources, and 
 also because " such play with such keen-edged tools 
 as the excited passions of savages are, and especially 
 such savages as I knew the Zulus to be, is not what
 
 ISO THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 an experience of forty-two years in managing tliem 
 inclined me to." And yet, in the face of all this accu- 
 mulated evidence, this report continues to be believed, 
 that is, by those who wished to believe it. 
 
 Such are the accusations that have been brought 
 against the manner of the Annexation and the officer 
 who carried it out, and never were accusations more 
 groundless. Indeed, both for party purposes, and from 
 personal animus, every means, fair or foul, has been 
 used to discredit it and all connected with it. To take 
 a single instance, one author (Miss Colenso, p. 134, 
 " History of the Zulu War ") actually goes the length 
 of putting a portion of a speech made by President 
 Lurgers into the mouth of Sir T. Shepstone, and then 
 abusing him for his incredible profanity. Surely this 
 exceeds the limits of fair criticism. 
 
 Before I go on to the actual history of the Annexa- 
 tion there is one point I wish to submit to my reader. 
 In England the change of Government has always 
 been talked of as though it only affected the forty 
 thousand white inhabitants of the country, whilst 
 everybody seems to forget that this same land had 
 about a million human beings living on it, its original 
 owners, and only, unfortunately for themselves, pos- 
 sessing a black skin, and therefore entitled to little 
 consideration, — even at the hands of the most philan- 
 thropic Government in the world. It never seems to 
 have occurred to those who have raised so much out- 
 cry on behalf of the forty thousand Boers, to inquire 
 what was thought of the matter by the million natives. 
 If they were to be allowed a voice in their own dis- 
 posal, the country was certainly annexed by the wish 
 of a very large majority of the inhabitants. It is true
 
 THE ANNEXATION. 151 
 
 that Secocccni, instigated thereto by the Boers, after- 
 wards continued the war against us, but, with the 
 exception of this one chief, the advent of our rule was 
 hailed with joy by every native in the Transvaal, and 
 even he was glad of it at the time. During our period 
 of rule in the Transvaal the natives have had, as they 
 foresaw, more peace than at any time since the white 
 man set foot in the land. They have paid their taxes 
 gladly, and there has been no fighting among them- 
 selves ; but since we have given up the country we 
 hear a very different tale. It is this million of men, 
 women, and children who, notwithstanding their black 
 skins, live and feel, and have intelligence as much as 
 ourselves, who are the principal, because the most 
 numerous sufferers from Mr. Gladstone's conjuring 
 tricks, that can turn a Sovereign into a Suzerain as 
 airily as the professor of magic brings a liiter of 
 guinea-pigs out of a top hat. It is our falsehood and 
 treachery to them whom we took over " for ever," as 
 we told them, and whom we have now hanled back 
 to their natural enemies to be paid off for their loyalty 
 to the Englishman, that is the blackest stain in all 
 this black business, and that has destroyed our prestige, 
 and caused us to be looked on amongst them, for they 
 do not hide their opinion, as " cowards and liars." 
 
 But very little attention, however, seems to have 
 been paid to native views or claims at any time iu 
 the Transvaal ; indeed they have all along been treated 
 as serfs of the soil, to be sold with it, if necessary, to 
 a new master. It is true that the Government, acting 
 under pressure from the Aborigines Protection Society, 
 made, on the occasion of the Surrender, a feeble effort 
 to secure the independence of some of the native
 
 152 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 tribes; but when the Boer leaders told them shortly 
 that they would have nothing of the sort, and that, 
 if they were not careful, they would reoccupy Laing's 
 Nek, the proposal was at once dropped, with many 
 assurances that no offence was intended. The worst 
 of the matter is that this treatment of our native 
 subjects and allies will assuredly recoil on the heads 
 of future innocent Governments. 
 
 Shortly after the appointment of the Joint-Com- 
 mission alluded to at the beginning of this chapter, 
 President Burgers, who was now in possession of the 
 Special Commissioner's intentions, should he be unable 
 to carry out reforms sufficiently drastic to satisfy the 
 English Government, thought it best to call together 
 the Volksraad. In the meantime, it had been an- 
 nounced that the "rebel" Secocoeni had sued for 
 peace and signed a treaty declaring himself a subject 
 of the Eepublic. I shall have to enter into the 
 question of this treaty a little further on, so I will at 
 present only say that it was the first business laid before 
 the Eaad, and, after some discussion, ratified. Next 
 in order to the Secocoeni peace came the question of 
 Confederation, as laid down in Lord Carnarvon's Per- 
 missive Bill. This proposal was laid before them in 
 an earnest and eloquent speech by their President, 
 who entreated them to consider the dangerous position 
 of the Piepublic, and to face their difficulties like men. 
 The question was referred to a committee, and an 
 adverse report being brought up, was rejected without 
 further consideration. It is just possible that intimi- 
 dation had something to do with the summary treat- 
 ment of so important a matter, seeing that whilst it 
 was being argued a large mob of Boers, looking very
 
 THE ANNEXATION. 153 
 
 formidable with their sea-cow hide whips, watched every 
 move of their representatives through the windows of 
 the Volksraad Hall. It was Mr. Chamberlain's caucus 
 system in practical and visible operation. 
 
 A few days after the rejection of the Confederation 
 Bill, President Burgers, who had frequently alluded 
 to the desperate condition of the Eepublic, and stated 
 that either some radical reform must be effected or 
 the country must come under the British flag, laid 
 before the Eaad a bran new constitution of a very 
 remarkable nature, asserting that they must either 
 accept it or lose their independence. 
 
 The first part of this strange document dealt with 
 the people and their rights, which remained much as 
 they were before, with the exception that the secrecy 
 of all letters entrusted to the post was to be inviolable. 
 The recognition of this right is an amusing incident 
 in the history of a free liepublic. Under following 
 articles the Volksraad was entrusted with the charge 
 of the native inhabitants of the State, the provision 
 for the administration of justice, the conduct of 
 education, the regulation of money-bills, &c. It is 
 in the fourth chapter, however, that we come to the 
 real gist of the Bill, which was the endowment of the 
 State President with the authority of a dictator. Mr. 
 Burgers thought to save the State by making himself 
 an absolute monarch. He was to be elected for a 
 period of seven instead of five years, and to be eligible 
 for re-election. In him was vested the power of 
 making all appointments without reference to the 
 Legislature. All laws were to be drawn up by him, 
 and he was to have the right of veto on Volksraad 
 resolutions, which body he could summon and dissolve
 
 1 54 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 at will. Finally, liis Executive Council was to consist 
 of heads of dciiartnients appointed by himself, and of 
 one nienibcr of tlie Volksraad. The Volksraad treated 
 this Bill in much the same way as they had dealt 
 with the Permissive Confederation Bill, gave it a casual 
 consideration, and threw it out. 
 
 The President, meanwhile, was doing his best to 
 convince the Paad of the danger of the country ; that 
 the treasury was empty, whilst duns were pressing, 
 that enemies were threatening on every side, and, finally, 
 that Her Majesty's Special Commissioner was encamped 
 within a thousand yards of them, watching their 
 deliberations with some interest. He showed them 
 that it was impossible at once to scorn reform and 
 reject friendly offers, that it was doubtful if anything 
 could save them, but that if they took no steps they 
 were certainly lost as a nation. The " Fathers of the 
 land," however, declined to dance to the President's 
 ]iiping. Then he took a bolder line. He told them 
 that a guilty nation never can evade the judgment 
 that follows its steps. He asked them " conscientiously 
 to advise the people not obstinately to refuse a union 
 with a powerful Government. He could not advise 
 them to refuse such a union. . . . He did not believe 
 that a new constitution would save them ; for as little 
 as the old constitution had brought them to ruin, so 
 little would a new constitution bring salvation. . . . 
 n the citizens of England had behaved towards the 
 Crown as the burghers of this State had behaved to 
 their Government, England would never have stood 
 so long as she had." He pointed out to them their 
 hopeless financial position. " To-day," he said, "a bill 
 for ;{^ I 1 00 was laid before me for signature ; but I
 
 THE ANNEXATION. 155 
 
 would sooner have cut off my right hand than sign 
 that paper^(cheer3) — for I have not the slightest 
 ground to expect that, when that bill becomes due, 
 there will be a penny to pay it with." And finally, 
 he exhorted them thus : " Let them make the best of 
 the situation, and get the best terms tliey possibly 
 could ; let them agree to join their hands to those of 
 their brethren in the south, and then from the Cape 
 to the Zambesi there would be one great people. 
 Yes, there was something grand in that, grander even 
 tlian their idea of a Eepublic, something v.diich minis- 
 tered to their national feeling — (cheers) — and would 
 this be so miserable ? Yes, this would be miserable 
 for those who v/ould not be under the law, for the 
 rebel and the revolutionist, but welfare and prosperity 
 for the men of law and order." 
 
 These powerful words form a strong indictment 
 against the Eepublic, and from them there can be little 
 doubt that President Burgers was thoroughly convinced 
 of the necessity and wisdom of the Annexation. It 
 is interesting to compare them, and many other utter- 
 ances of his made at this period, with the opinions he 
 expresses in the posthumous document recently pub- 
 lished, in which he speaks somewhat jubilantly of the 
 lessons taught us on Laing's Nek and Majuba by sucli 
 " an inherently weak people as the Boers," and points 
 to them as striking instances of retribution. In this 
 document he attributes the Annexation to the desire 
 to advance English supremacy in South Afiica, and to 
 lay hold of the way to Central South Africa. It is, 
 however, noticeable that he docs not in any way indi- 
 cate how it could have been averted, and the State 
 continue to exist ; and he seems all alon" to feel that
 
 156 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 his case is a weak one, for in explaining, or attempting 
 to explain, why he had never defended himself from 
 the charges brought against him in connection witli 
 the Annexation, he says : " Had I not endured in 
 silence, had I not borne patiently all the accusations, 
 but out of selfislmess or fear told the plain truth of 
 the case, the Transvaal would never have had the con- 
 sideration it has now received from Great Britain. How- 
 ever unjust the Annexation was, my self-justification 
 would have exposed the Boers to such an extent, and the 
 state of the country in such a way, that it would have 
 deprived them both of the sympathy of the world and 
 the consideration of the English politicians." In other 
 words, " If I had told the truth about things as I 
 should have been obliged to do to justify myself, there 
 would have been no more outcry about the Annexa- 
 tion, because the whole world, even the English 
 Eadicals, would have recognised how necessary it was, 
 and what a fearful state the country was in." 
 
 But to let that pass, it is evident that President 
 Burgers did not take the same view of the Annexation 
 in 1877 as he did in 1881, and indeed his speeches 
 to the Volksraad would read rather oddly printed in 
 parallel columns with his posthumous statement. The 
 reader would be forced to one of two conclusions, 
 either on one of the two occasions he is saying what 
 he does not mean, or he must have changed his mind. 
 As I believe him to have been an honest man, I 
 incline to the latter supposition ; nor do I consider it 
 so very hard to account for, taking into consideration 
 his natural Dutch proclivities. In 1877 Burgers is 
 the despairing head of a State diiving rapidly to ruin, 
 if not to actual extinction, when the strong hand of
 
 THE ANNEXATION. ' 157 
 
 tlie Enirlish Government is held out to him. Wliafc 
 
 O 
 
 wonder that he accepts it gladly on behalf of his 
 country, which is by its help brought into a state of 
 greater prosperity than it has ever before known ? In 
 1 88 1 the wheel has gone round, and great events 
 have come about whilst he lies dying. The enemies 
 of the Boers have been destroyed, the powers of the 
 Zulus and Secocceni are no more ; the country has 
 prospered under a healthy rule, and its finances have 
 been restored. More, — glad tidings have come from 
 Mid-Lothian to the " rebel and the revolutionist," 
 whose hopes were flagging, and eloquent words have 
 been spoken by the new English Dictator that have 
 aroused a great rebellion. And, to crown all, English 
 troops have suffered one massacre and three defeats, 
 and England sues for peace from the South African 
 peasant, heedless of honour or her broken word, so 
 that the prayer be granted. With such events before 
 him, that dying man may well have found cause to 
 change his opinion. Doubtless the Annexation was 
 wrong, since England disowns her acts ; and may not 
 that dream about the great South African Eepublic 
 come true after all ? Has not the pre-eminence of the 
 Englishman received a blow from which it can never 
 recover, and is not his control over Boers and natives 
 irredeemably weakened ? And must he, — Burgers, — 
 go down to posterity as a Dutchman who tried to for- 
 ward the interests of the English party ? No, doubt- 
 less the Annexation was wrong ; but it has done good, 
 for it has brought about the downfall of the English : 
 and we will £nd the argument in the very words of 
 his last public utterance, with which he ends his 
 statement : " South Africa gained more from this, and
 
 158 THE TPwlNSVAAL. 
 
 has made a larger step forward in the march of freedom, 
 than most people can conceive." 
 
 Who shall say that he is wrong ? the words of 
 dying men are sometimes prophetic ! South Africa 
 has made a great advance towards the " freedom " of 
 a Dutch Eepublic. 
 
 This has been a digression, but I hope not an un- 
 interesting one. To return — on the ist March, Sir 
 T. Shepstone met the Executive Council, and told 
 them that in his opinion there was now but one 
 remedy to be adopted, and that was that the Trans- 
 vaal should be united with the English colonies of 
 South Africa under one head, namely the Queen, say- 
 ing at the same time that the only thing now left to 
 the Eepublic was to make the best arrangements it 
 could for the future benefit of its inhabitants, and to 
 submit to that which he saw to be, and every thinking 
 man saw to be, iuevitable. So soon as this information 
 was officially communicated to the Raad, for a good 
 proportion of its members were already acquainted with 
 it unofficially, it flew from a state of listless indifference 
 into vigorous and hasty action. The President was 
 censured, and a committee was appointed to consider 
 and report upon the situation, which reported in favour 
 of the adoption of Burgers' new constitution. Accord- 
 ingly, the greatest part of this measure, which had 
 been contemptuously rejected a few days before, was 
 adopted almost without question, and ]\Ir. Paul Kruger 
 was appointed Vice-President. On the following day, 
 a very drastic treason law was passed, borrowed from 
 the statute-book of the Orange Free State, which 
 made all public expression of opinion, if adverse to the 
 Government, or in any way supporting the Annexa-
 
 THE ANNEXATION. 159 
 
 tiou party, high treason. This done, the Assembly 
 prorogued itself until — October 1881. 
 
 During and after the sitting of the Eaad, rumours 
 arose that the chief Secocceni's signature to the treaty 
 of peace, ratified by that body, had been obtained by 
 misrepresentation. As ratified, this treaty consisted 
 of three articles, according to which Secocceni con- 
 sented, first, to become a subject of the Eepublic, and 
 obey the laws of the country ; secondly, to agree to a 
 certain restricted boundary line ; and, thirdly, to pay 
 2000 head of cattle ; which, considering he had cap- 
 tured quite 5000 head, was not exorbitant. 
 
 Towards the end of February a written message 
 was received from Secocceni by Sir T. Shepstone, dated 
 after the signing of the supposed treaty. The original, 
 which was written in Sisutu, was a great curiosity. 
 The following is a correct translation : — 
 
 February 16, 1S77. 
 
 " For Myn Heer SiiEErsTOXE, — T beg you, Chief, 
 come help me, the Boers are killing me, and I don't 
 know the reasons why they should be angry with me ; 
 Chief, I beg you come with Myn Heer Merensky. — 
 I am SiKUKUNi." 
 
 This message was accompanied by a letter from 
 Mr. Merensky, a well-known and successful mis- 
 sionary, who had been for many years resident in 
 Secocceni's country, in which he stated that he heard 
 on very good authority that Secocceni had distinctly 
 refused to agree to that article of the treaty by which 
 he became a subject of the State. He adds that he 
 cannot remain " silent while such tricks are played."
 
 i6o THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 Upon this information, Sir T. Sliepstoue wrote to 
 President Burgers, stating that " if the officer in whom 
 you have placed confidence has witliheld any portion 
 of the truth from you, especially so serious a portion 
 of it, he is guilty of a wrong towards you personally, 
 as well as towards the Government, because he has 
 caused you to assume an untenable position," and 
 suggesting that a joint-commission should be despatched 
 to Secocoeni, to thoroughly sift the question in the 
 interest of all concerned. . This suggestion was after 
 some delay agreed to, and a commission was appointed, 
 consisting of Mr. Van Gorkom, a Hollander, and Mr. 
 Holtshausen, a member of the Executive Council, on 
 behalf of the Transvaal Government, and Mr. Osborn, 
 R.M., and Captain Clarke, R.A.,^ on behalf of the 
 Commissioner, whom I accompanied as Secretary. 
 
 At Middleburg the native Gideon who acted as 
 interpreter between Commandant Ferreira, C.M.G. 
 (the officer who negotiated the treaty on behalf of the 
 Boer Government), and Secocoeni was examined, and 
 also two natives, Petros and Jeremiah, who were with 
 him, but did not actually interpret. All these men 
 persisted that Secocoeni had positively refused to be- 
 come a subject of the Republic, and only consented to 
 sign the treaty on the representations of Commandant 
 Ferreira that it would only be binding as regards to the 
 two articles about the cattle and the boundary line. 
 
 The Commission then proceeded to Secocoeni's town, 
 accompanied by a fresh set of interpreters, and had 
 a long interview with Secocoeni. The chief's Prime 
 Minister or " mouth," Makurupiji, speaking in his 
 
 ^ Now Sir Marshall Clarke, Special Commissioner for Basutolaud.
 
 THE ANNEXATION. r6i 
 
 presence and on his behalf, and making use of the 
 pronoun " I " before all the assembled headmen of the 
 tribe, gave an account of the interview between Com- 
 mandant Ferreira in the presence of that gentleman, 
 who accompanied the Commission, and Secocoeni, in 
 almost the same words as had been used by the in- 
 terpreters at Middleburg. He distinctly denied having 
 consented to become a subject of the Eepublic or to 
 stand under the law, and added that he feared he 
 " had touched the feather to " (signed) things that he 
 did not know of in the treaty. Commandant Ferreira 
 then put some questions, but entirely failed to shake 
 the evidence ; on the contrary, he admitted by his 
 questions that Secocoeni had not consented to become 
 a subject of the Eepublic. Secocoeni had evidently 
 signed the piece of paper under the impression that 
 he was acknowledging his liability to pay 2000 head 
 of cattle, and fixing a certain portion of his boundary 
 line, and on the distinct understanding that he was 
 not to become a subject of the State. 
 
 Now it was the Secocoeni war that had brought 
 the English Mission into the country, and if it could 
 be shown that the Secocoeni war had come to a 
 successful termination, it would go far towards help- 
 ing the Mission out again. To this end, it was 
 necessary that the chief should declare himself a 
 subject of the State, and thereby, by implication, 
 acknowledge himself to have been a rebel, and admit 
 his defeat. All that was required was a signature, 
 and that once obtained the treaty was published and 
 submitted to the Eaad for confirmation, without a 
 whisper being heard of the conditions under which 
 this ignorant Basuto was induced to sign. Had no 
 
 L
 
 i62 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 Commission visited Secocoeni, this treaty would after- 
 wards have been produced against him in its entirety. 
 Altogether, the history of the Secocoeni Peace Treaty 
 does not reassure one as to the genuineness of the 
 treaties which the Boers are continually producing, 
 purporting to have been signed by native chiefs, and, 
 as a general rule, presenting the State with great 
 tracts of country in exchange for a horse or a few 
 oxen. However fond the natives may be of their 
 Boer neighbours, such liberality can scarcely be genuine. 
 On the other hand, it is so easy to induce a savage to 
 sign a paper, or even, if he is reticent, to make a cross 
 for him, and once made, as we all know, litera scripta 
 manet, and becomes title to the lands. 
 
 During the Secocoeni investigation, affairs in the 
 Transvaal were steadily drifting towards anarchy. 
 The air was filled with rumours ; now it was reported 
 that an outbreak was imminent amongst the English 
 population at the Gold Fields, who had never forgotten 
 Von Schlickmann's kind suggestion that they should 
 be " subdued ; " now it was said that Cety wayo had 
 crossed the border, and might shortly be expected at 
 Pretoria ; now that a large body of Boers were on their 
 road to shoot the Special Commissioner, his twenty-five 
 policemen, and Englishmen generally, and so on. 
 
 Meanwhile, Paul Kruger and his party were not 
 letting the grass grow under their feet, but worked 
 public feeling with great vigour, with the double 
 object of getting Paul made President and ridding 
 themselves of the English. Articles in his support 
 were printed in the well-known Dutch paper Die 
 Patriot, published in the Cape Colony, which are so 
 typical of the Boers and of the only literature that
 
 THE ANNEXATION. 163 
 
 has the slightest influence over them, that I will quote 
 a few extracts from one of tliem. 
 
 After drawing a very vivid picture of the wretched 
 condition of the country as compared to what it was 
 when the Kafirs had " a proper respect " for the 
 Boers, before Burgers came into power, the article 
 proceeds to give the cause of this state of affairs. 
 "God's word," it says, "gives us the solution. Look 
 at Israel, while the people have a godly king, every- 
 thing is prosperous, but under a godless prince the 
 land retrogrades, and the whole of the people must 
 suffer. Eead Leviticus, chapter xxvi., with attention, 
 &c. In the day of the Voortrekkers (pioneers), a 
 handful of men chased a thousand Kafirs and made 
 them run ; so also in the Free State war (Deut. 
 xxxii. 30; Jos. xxiii. lO; Lev. xxvi. 8). But mark, 
 now, when Burgers became President, he knows no 
 Sabljath, he rides through the land in and out of town 
 on Sunday, he knows not the church and God's 
 service (Lev. xxvi. 2, 3), to the scandal of pious 
 people. And he formerly was a priest too. And 
 what is the consequence ? No harvest (Lev. xxvi. 
 16), an army of 6000 men runs because one man 
 falls (Lev. xxvi. 17, &c.). What is now the remedy ? " 
 The remedy proves to be Paul Kruger, " because there 
 is no other candidate. Because our Lord clearly 
 points him out to be the man, for why is there no 
 other candidate ? Who arranged it this way ? " Then 
 follows a rather odd argument in favour of Paul's 
 election. " Because he liiniself (Paul Kruger) acknow- 
 ledges in his own reply that he is incompetent, but 
 that all his ability is from our Lord. Because he 
 is a warrior. Because he is a Boer." Then Paul
 
 1 64 THE TT^ANSVAAL. 
 
 Kruger, the warrior and the Boer, is compared to 
 Joan of Arc, "a simple Boer girl who came I'rom 
 behind the sheep." The burghers of the Transvaal 
 are exhorted to acknowledge the hand of the Lord, 
 and elect Paul Kruger, or to look for still heavier 
 punishment. (Lev. xxvi. 1 8 et seq.) Next the 
 Patriot proceeds to give a bit of advice to " our 
 candidate, Paul Kruger." He is to deliver the land 
 from the Kafirs. " The Lord has given you the 
 heart of a warrior, arise and drive them," a bit of 
 advice quite suited to his well-known character. But 
 this chosen vessel was not to get all the loaves and 
 fishes ; on the contrary, as soon as he had fulfilled his 
 mission of " driving " the Kafirs, he was to hand over 
 his office to a "good" President. The article ends 
 thus : " If the Lord wills to use you now to deliver 
 this land from its enemieo, and a day of peace and 
 prosperity arises again, and you see that you are not 
 exactly the statesman to further govern the Eepublic, 
 then it will be your greatest honour to say, ' Citizens, 
 I have delivered you from the enemy, I am no states- 
 man, but now you have peace and time to choose and 
 elect a good President.' " 
 
 An article such as the above is instructive reading, 
 as showing the low calibre of the minds that are 
 influenced by it. Yet such writings and sermons 
 have more power among the Boers than any other 
 arguments, appealing as they do to the fanaticism 
 and vanity of their nature, which causes them to 
 believe that the Divinity is continually interfering on 
 their behalf at the cost of other people. It will be 
 noticed that the references given are all to the Old 
 Testament, and nearly all refer to acts of blood.
 
 THE ANNEXATION. 165 
 
 These doctrines were not, however, at all acceptable 
 to Burgers' party, or the more enlightened members 
 of the community, and so bitter did the struggle of 
 rival opinions become that there is very little doubt 
 that had the country not been annexed, civil war 
 would have been added to its other calamities. Mean- 
 while the natives were from day to day becoming 
 more restless, and messengers were constantly arriving 
 at the Special Commissioner's camp, begging that their 
 tribe might be put under the Queen, and stating that 
 they would fight rather than submit any longer to the 
 Boers. 
 
 At length on the 9th April, Sir T. Shepstone in- 
 formed the Government of the Eepublic that he was 
 about to declare the Transvaal British territory. He 
 told them that he had considered and reconsidered 
 his determination, but that he could see no possible 
 means within the State by which it could free itself 
 from the burdens that were sinking it to destruction, 
 adding that if he could have found such means he 
 would certainly not have hidden them from the 
 Government. This intimation was received in silence, 
 though all the later proceedings witli reference to the 
 Annexation were in reality carried out in concert with 
 the authorities of the Eepublic. Thus on the 13th 
 March the Government submitted a paper of ten 
 questions to Sir T. Shepstone as regards the future 
 condition of the Transvaal under English rule, whether 
 the debts of the State would be guaranteed, &c. To 
 these questions replies were given which were on the 
 whole satisfactory to the Government. As these re- 
 plies formed the basis of the proclamation guarantees, 
 it is not necessaiy to enter into them.
 
 i66 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 It was further arranged by the Eepublican Govern- 
 ment that a formal protest should be entered against 
 the Annexation, which was accordingly prepared and 
 privately shown to the Special Commissioner. The 
 Annexation proclamation was also shown to President 
 Burgers, and a paragraph eliminated at his sugges- 
 tion. In fact, the Special Commissioner and the 
 President, together with most of his Executive, were 
 quite at one as regards the necessity of the proclama- 
 tion being issued, their joint endeavours being directed 
 to the prevention of any disturbance, and to secure a 
 good reception for the change. 
 
 At length, after three months of inquiry and nego- 
 tiation, the proclamation of annexation was on the 
 1 2th of April 1877 read by Mr. Osborn, accompanied 
 by some other gentlemen of Sir T. Shepstone's staff. 
 It was an anxious moment for all concerned. To use 
 the words of the Special Commissioner in his despatch 
 home on the subject, "Every effort had been made 
 during the previous fortnight by, it is said, educated 
 Hollanders, and who had but lately arrived in the 
 country, to rouse the fanaticism of the Boers, and to 
 induce them to offer ' bloody ' resistance to what it 
 was known I intended to do. The Boers were 
 appealed to in the most inflammatory language by 
 printed manifestoes and memorials; .... it was 
 urged that I had but a small escort, which could 
 easily be overpowered." In a country so full of 
 desperadoes and fanatical haters of anything English, 
 it was more than possible that, though such an act 
 would have been condemned by the general sense of 
 the country, a number of men could easily be found 
 who would think they were doing a righteous act in
 
 THE ANNEXATION. 167 
 
 greeting the " ainiexatiouists " with an ovation of 
 bullets. I do not mean that the anxiety was personal, 
 because I do not think the members of that small 
 party set any higher value on their lives than other 
 people, but it was absolutely necessary for the success 
 of the act itself, and for the safety of the country, 
 that not a single shot should be fired. Had that 
 happened it is probable that the whole country would 
 have been involved in confusion and bloodshed, the 
 Zulus would have broken in, and the Kafirs would 
 have risen ; in fact, to use Cetywayo's words, " the 
 land would have burned with fire." 
 
 It will therefore be easily understood what an 
 anxious hour that was both for the Special Commis- 
 sioner sitting up at Government House, and for his 
 staff down on the Market Square, and how thankful 
 they were when the proclamation was received with 
 hearty cheers by the crowd. Mr. Burgers' protest, 
 which was read immediately afterwards, was received 
 in respectful silence. 
 
 And thus the Transvaal Territory passed for a 
 while into the great family of the English Colonies. 
 I believe that the greatest political opponent of the 
 act will bear tribute to the very remarkable ability 
 with which it was carried out. When the variety 
 and number of the various interests that had to be 
 conciliated, the obstinate nature of the individuals who 
 had to be convinced, as well as the innate hatred of 
 the English name and ways which had to be overcome 
 to carry out this act successfully, are taken into con- 
 sideration, together with a thousand other matters, 
 the neglect of any one of which would have sufficed 
 to make failure certain, it will be seen what tact and
 
 i68 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 skill and knowledge of human nature was reqmred 
 to execute so difficult a task. It must be remem- 
 bered that no force was used, and that there never 
 was any threat of force. The few troops that were 
 to enter the Transvaal were four weeks' march from 
 Pretoria at the time. There' was nothing whatso- 
 ever to prevent the Boers putting a summary stop 
 to the proceedings of the Commissioner if they had 
 thought fit. 
 
 That Sir Theophilus played a bold and hazardous 
 game nobody will deny, but, like most players who 
 combine boldness with coolness of head and justice of 
 cause, he won ; and, without shedding a single drop 
 of blood, or even confiscating an acre of land, and at 
 no cost, annexed a great country, and averted a very 
 serious war. That same country four years later cost 
 us a million of money, the loss of nearly a thousand 
 men killed and wounded, and the ruin of many more 
 confiding thousands, to surrender. It is true, however, 
 that nobody can accuse the retrocession of having 
 been conducted with judgment or ability — very much 
 the contrary. 
 
 There can be no more ample justification of the 
 issue of the Annexation proclamation than the pro- 
 clamation itself. 
 
 First, it touches on the Sand Eiver Convention of 
 1852, by which independence was granted to the 
 State, and shows that the " evident objects and in- 
 citing motives " in granting such guarantee were to 
 promote peace, free-trade, and friendly intercourse, in 
 the hope and belief that the Republic " would become 
 a flourishing and self-sustaining State, a source of 
 strength and security to neighbouring European com-
 
 THE ANNEXATION. 169 
 
 munities, and a point from which Christianity and 
 civilisation might rapidly spread toward Central 
 Africa." It goes on to show how these hopes have 
 been disappointed, and how that " increasing weakness 
 in the State itself on the one side, and more than 
 corresponding growth of real strength and confidence 
 among the native tribes on the other, have produced 
 their natural and inevitable consequence . . . that 
 after more or less of irritating conflict with aboriginal 
 tribes to the north, there commenced about the year 
 1867 gradual abandonment to the natives in that 
 direction of territory settled by burghers of the Trans- 
 vaal "in well-built towns and villages and on granted 
 farms." 
 
 It goes on to show that " this decay of power and 
 ebb of authority in the north is being followed by 
 similar processes in the south under yet more dan- 
 gerous circumstances. People of this State residing 
 in that direction have been compelled within the last 
 three mouths, at the bidding of native chiefs, and at a 
 moment's notice, to leave their farms and homes, their 
 standing crops ... all to be taken possession of by 
 natives, but that the Government is more powerless 
 than ever to vindicate its assumed rights or to resist 
 the declension that is threatening its existence." It 
 then recites how all tlie other colonies and communi- 
 ties of South Africa have lost confidence in the State, 
 how it is in a condition of hopeless bankruptcy, and 
 its commerce annihilated, wldlst the inhabitants are 
 divided into factions, and tlie Government has fallen 
 into "helpless paralysis." How also the prospect of 
 the election of a new President, instead of being 
 looked forward to with hope, would in the opinion of
 
 I70 THE TKANSVAAL. 
 
 all parties be the signal for civil war, anarchy, and 
 bloodshed. How that this state of things affords the 
 very strongest temptation to the great neighbouring 
 native powers to attack the country, a temptation 
 that they were only too ready and anxious to yield 
 to, and that the State was in far too feeble a condi- 
 tion to repel such attacks, from which it had hitherto 
 only been saved by the repeated representations of 
 the Government of Fatal, The next paragraphs I 
 will quote as they stand, for they sum up the reasons 
 for the Annexation. 
 
 " That the Secocceni war, which would have pro- 
 duced but little effect on a healthy constitution, has 
 not only proved suddenly fatal to the resources and 
 reputation of the Eepublic, but has shown itself to be 
 a culminating point in the history of South Africa, in 
 that a Makatee or Basuto tribe, unwarlike and of no 
 account in Zulu estimation, successfully withstood the 
 strength of the State, and disclosed for the first time 
 to the native powers outside the Eepublic, from the 
 Zambesi to the Cape, the great change that had taken 
 place in the relative strength of the white and black 
 races, that this disclosure at once shook the prestige 
 of the white man in South Africa, and placed every 
 European community in peril, that this common danger 
 has caused universal anxiety, has given to all con- 
 cerned the right to investigate its cause, and to protect 
 themselves from its consequences, and has imposed 
 the duty upon those who have the power to shield 
 enfeebled civilisation from the encroachments of bar- 
 barism and inhumanity." It proceeds to point out 
 that the Transvaal will be the first to suffer from the 
 results of its own policy, and that it is for every
 
 THE ANNEXATION. 171 
 
 reason perfectly impossible for Her Majesty's Govern- 
 rneut to stand by and see a friendly white State 
 ravaged, knowing that its own possessions will be the 
 next to suffer. That Her Majesty's Government, 
 being persuaded that the only means to prevent 
 such a catastrophe would be by the annexation of the 
 country, and, knowing that this was the wish of a 
 large proportion of the inhabitants of the Transvaal, 
 the step must be taken. Next follows the formal 
 annexation. 
 
 Together with the proclamation, an address was 
 issued by Sir T. Shepstone to the burghers of the 
 State, laying the facts before them in a friendly 
 manner, more suited to their mode of thought than 
 it was possible to do in a formal proclamation. 
 This document, the issue of which was one of those 
 touches that insured the success of the Annexation, 
 was a powerful summing up in colloquial language of 
 the arguments used in the proclamation, strengthened 
 by quotations from the speeches of the President. It 
 ends with these words : " It remains only for me to 
 beg of you to consider and weigh what I have said 
 calmly and without undue prejudice. Let not mere 
 feeling or sentiment prevail over your judgment. 
 Accept what Her Majesty's Government intends sliall 
 be, and what you will soon find from experience, is a 
 blessing not only to you and your children, but to 
 the whole of South Africa through you, and believe 
 that I speak these words to you as a friend from my 
 heart." 
 
 Two other proclamations were also issued, one 
 notifying the assumption of the office of Administrator 
 of the Government by Sir T. Shepstone, and the other
 
 172 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 repealing the war-tax, which was doubtless au uueqiial 
 and oppressive impost. 
 
 I have in the preceding pages stated all the prin- 
 cipal grounds of the Annexation and briefly sketched 
 the history of that event. In the next chapter I 
 propose to follow the fortunes of the Transvaal under 
 British Eule.
 
 ( 173 ) 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 TTIE TRANSVAAL UNDER BRITISH RULE. 
 
 The news of the Annexation was received all over the 
 country with a sigli of relief, and in many parts of it 
 with great rejoicings. At the Gold Fields, for instance, 
 special thanksgiving services were held, and " God save 
 the Queen" was sung in church. Nowhere was there 
 the slightest disturbance, but, on the contrary, addresses 
 of congratulation and thanks literally poured in by 
 every mail, many of them signed by Boers who have 
 since been conspicuous for their bitter opposition to 
 English rule. At first, there was some doubt as to 
 wliat would be the course taken under the circum- 
 stances by the volunteers enlisted by the late Republic. 
 Major Clarke, R.A., was sent to convey the news, and 
 to take command of them, unaccompanied save by his 
 Kafir servant. On arrival at the principal fort, he at 
 once ordered the Republican flag to be hauled down 
 and the Union Jack run up, and his orders were 
 promptly obeyed. A few days afterwards' some mem- 
 bers of tlie force thovight better of it, and having made 
 up their minds to kill lam, came to the tent where he 
 was sitting to carry out their purpose. On learning 
 their kind intentions, Major Clarke tixed his eye-glass 
 in his eye, and after steadily glaring at them throuo-h
 
 7 
 
 r74 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 it for some time, said, " You are all drunk, go back to 
 your tents." The volunteers, quite overcome by his 
 coolness and the fixity of his gaze, at once slipped off, 
 and there was no further trouble. About three weeks 
 after the Annexation, the i-i3th Regiment arrived at 
 Pretoria, having been very well received all along the 
 road by the Boers, who came from miles round to hear 
 the band play. Its entry into Pretoria was quite a 
 sight ; the whole population turned out to meet it ; 
 indeed the feeling of rejoicing and relief was so pro- 
 found that when the band began to play " God save the 
 Queen " some of the women burst into tears. 
 
 Meanwhile the effect of the Annexation on the 
 country was perfectly magical. Credit and commerce 
 were at once restored; the railway bonds that were 
 down to nothing in Holland rose with one bound to 
 par, and the value of landed property nearly doubled. 
 Indeed it would have been possible for any one, know- 
 ing what was going to happen, to have realised large 
 sums of money by buying land in the beginning of 
 1877, and selling it shortly after the Annexation. 
 
 On the 24th May, being Her Majesty's birthday, all 
 the native chiefs who were anywhere within reach 
 were summoned to attend the first formal hoisting of 
 the English flag. The day was a general festival, and 
 the ceremony was attended by a large number of Boers 
 and natives in addition to all the English. At mid- 
 day, amidst the cheers of the crowd, the salute of 
 artillery, and the strains of " God save the Queen," the 
 Union Jack was run up a lofty flagstaff, and the Trans- 
 vaal was formally announced to be British soil. The 
 flag was hoisted by Colonel Brooke, R.E., and the 
 present writer. Speaking for myself, I may say that
 
 THE TRANSVAAL UNDER BRITISH RULE. 175 
 
 it was one of the proudest moments of my life. Could 
 I have foreseen that I should live to see that same flag, 
 then hoisted with so much joyous ceremony, within a 
 few years shamefully and dishonourably hauled down 
 and buried,^ I think it would have been the most 
 miserable. y 
 
 The Annexation was as well received in England as 
 it was in the Transvaal. Lord Carnarvon wrote to Sir 
 T. Shepstoue to convey "the Queen's entire approval 
 of your conduct since you received Her Majesty's com- 
 mission, with a renewal of my own thanks on behalf 
 of the Government for the admirable prudence and 
 discretion with which you have discharged a great 
 and unwonted responsibility." It was also accepted 
 by Parliament with very few dissentient voices, since 
 it was not till afterwards, when the subject became 
 useful as an electioneering howl, that the Liberal party, 
 headed by our " powerful popular minister," discovered 
 the deep iniquity that had been perpetrated in South 
 Africa. So satisfied were the Transvaal Boers with the 
 change that Messrs. Kruger, Jorissen, and Bok, who 
 formed the deputation to proceed to England and 
 present President Burgers' formal protest against the 
 Annexation, found great difficulty in raising one-half 
 of the necessary expenses — something under one thou- 
 sand pounds — towards the cost of the undertaking. 
 The thirst for independence cannot have been very great 
 when all the wealthy burghers in the Transvaal put 
 together would not subscribe a thousand pounds towards 
 retaining it. Indeed, at this time the members of the 
 deputation themselves seem to have looked upon their 
 
 ' The English flag was during the signing of the Convention at Pre- 
 toria formally buried by a large crowd of Englishmen and loyal natives.
 
 176 THE TKANSVAAL. 
 
 undertaking as being both doubtful and undesirable, 
 since they informed Sir T. Shepstone that they were 
 going to Europe to discharge an obligation which had 
 been imposed upon tliem, and if the mission failed, 
 they would have done their duty. Mr. Kruger said 
 that if they did fail, he would be found to be as faith- 
 ful a subject under the new form of government as he 
 had been under the old; and Dr. Jorissen admitted 
 with equal frankness that " the change was inevitable, 
 and expressed his belief that the cancellation of it 
 would be calamitous." 
 
 Whilst the Annexation was thus well received in 
 the country immediately interested, a lively agitation 
 was commenced in the Western Province of the Cape 
 Colony, a thousand miles away, with a view of inducing 
 the Home Government to repudiate Sir T. Shepstone's 
 act. The reason of this movement was that the Cape 
 Dutch party, caring little or nothing for the real interests 
 of the Transvaal, did care a great deal about their scheme 
 to turn all the white communities of South Africa into 
 a great Dutch Eepublic, to which they thought the 
 Annexation would be a deathblow. As I have said 
 elsewhere, it must be borne in mind that the strings 
 of the anti-annexation agitation have all along been 
 pulled in the Western Pn^vince, whilst the Transvaal 
 Boers have played the parts of puppets. The instru- 
 ments used by the leaders of the movement in the 
 Cape were, for the most part, the discontented and 
 unprincipled Hollander element, a newspaper of an 
 extremely abusive nature called the VolJcstem, and 
 another in Natal known as the Natal Witness, lately 
 edited by the notorious Ay 1 ward, which has an almost 
 equally unenviable reputation.
 
 THE TRANSVAAL UNDER BRITISH RULE. 177 
 
 Oil the arrival of Messrs. Jorisseu aud Kruger in 
 England, they were received with great civility by 
 Lord Carnarvon, who was, however, careful to explain 
 to them that the Annexation was irrevocable. In this 
 decision they cheerfully acquiesced, assuring his lord- 
 ship of their determination to do all they could to in- 
 duce the Boers to accept the new state of things, and 
 expressing their desire to be allowed to serve under 
 the new Government. 
 
 Whilst these gentlemen were thus satisfactorily ar- 
 ranging matters with Lord Carnarvon, Sir. T. Shepstone 
 was making a tour round the country which resembled 
 a triumphal progress more than anything else. He was 
 everywhere greeted with enthusiasm by all classes of 
 the community, Boers, English, and natives, and numer- 
 ous addresses were presented to him couched in the 
 warmest language, not only by Englishmen, but also 
 by Boers. 
 
 It is very difficult to reconcile the enthusiasm of a 
 great number of the inhabitants of the Transvaal for 
 English rule, and the quiet acquiescence of the remain- 
 der, at this time, with the decidedly antagonistic atti- 
 tude assumed later on. It appears to me, however, that 
 there are several reasons that go far towards accounting 
 for it. The Transvaal, when we annexed it, was in the 
 position of a man with a knife at his throat, who is 
 suddenly rescued by some one stronger than he, on cer- 
 tain conditions which at the time he gladly accepts, but 
 afterwards, when the danger is passed, wishes to repu- 
 diate. In the same way the inhabitants of the South 
 African Eepublic were in the time of need very thank- 
 ful for our aid, but after a while, when the recollection 
 of their difiiculties had grown faint, when their debts 
 
 M
 
 178 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 had been paid and their enemies defeated, they began 
 to think that they would like to get rid of us again, and 
 start fresh on their own account with a clean sheet. 
 What fostered agitation more than anything else, how- 
 ever, was the perfect impunity with which it was allowed 
 to be carried on. Had only a little firmness and decision 
 been shown in the first instance there would have been 
 no further trouble. We might have been obliged to 
 confiscate half-a-dozen farms, and perhaps imprison as 
 many free burghers for a few months, and there it 
 would have ended. Neither Boers or natives under- 
 stand our namby-pamby way of playing at government; 
 they put it down to fear. What they want, and what 
 they expect, is to be governed with a just but a firm 
 hand. Thus when the Boers found that they could agi- 
 tate with impunity, they naturally enough continued to 
 agitate. Anybody who knows them will understand 
 that it was very pleasant to them to find themselves in 
 possession of that delightful thing, a grievance, and, in- 
 stead of stopping quietly at home on their farms, to feel 
 obliged to proceed, full of importance and long words, 
 to a distant meeting, there to spout and listen to the 
 spouting of others. It is so much easier to talk politics 
 than to sow mealies. Some attribute the discontent 
 among the Boers to the postponement of the carrying 
 out of the Annexation proclamation promises with re- 
 ference to the free institutions to be granted to the 
 country, but in my opinion it had little or nothing to 
 do with it. The Boers never understood the question 
 of responsible government, and never wanted that in- 
 stitution; what they did want was to be free of all 
 English control, and this they said twenty times in the 
 most outspoken language. I think there is little doubt
 
 THE TRANSVAAL UNDER BRITISH RULE. 179 
 
 the causes I have indicated are the real sources of the 
 agitation, though there must be added to them their 
 detestation of our mode of dealing with natives, and of 
 being forced to pay taxes regularly, and also the cease- 
 less agitation of the Cape wire-pullers, through their 
 agents the Hollanders, and their organs in the press. 
 
 On the return of Messrs. Kruger and Jorissen to the 
 Transvaal, the latter gentleman resumed his duties as 
 Attorney-General, on which occasion, if I remember 
 aright, I myself had the honour of administering to 
 him the oath of allegiance to Her Majesty, that he 
 afterwards kept so well. The former reported the pro- 
 ceedings of the deputation to a Boer meeting, when he 
 took a very different tone to that in which he addressed 
 Lord Carnarvon, announcing that if there existed a 
 majority of the people in favour of independence, he 
 still was Vice-President of the country. 
 
 Both these gentlemen remained for some time in 
 the pay of the British Government, Mr. Jorissen as 
 Attorney-General, and Mr. Kruger as member of the 
 Executive Council. The Government, however, at 
 length found it desirable to dispense with their services, 
 though on different grounds. Mr. Jorissen had, like 
 several other members of the Eepublican Government, 
 been a clergyman, and was quite unfit to hold the post 
 of Attorney-General in an important colony like the 
 Transvaal, where legal questions were constantly arising 
 requiring all the attention of a trained mind ; and after 
 he had on several occasions been publicly admonished 
 from the bench, the Government retired him on liberal 
 terms. Needless to say, his opposition to English rule 
 then became very bitter. Mr. Kruger's appointment 
 expired by law in November 1877, and the Government
 
 i8o THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 did not think it advisable to re-employ him. The 
 terms of his letter of dismissal can be found on page 
 135 of Blue-book (c. 144), and involving as they do a 
 serious charge of misrepresentation in money matters, 
 are not very creditable to him. After this event he 
 also pursued the cause of independence with increased 
 vigour. 
 
 During the last months of 1877 and the first part of 
 1878 agitation against British rule went on unchecked, 
 and at last grew to alarming proportions, so much so 
 that Sir T. Shepstone, on his return from the Zulu 
 border in March 1878, where he had been for some 
 months discussing the vexed and dangerous question 
 of the boundary line with the Zulus, found it necessary 
 to issue a stringent proclamation warning the agitators 
 that their proceedings and meetings were illegal, and 
 would be punished according to law. This document, 
 which was at the time vulgarly known as the " Hold- 
 your-jaw" proclamation, not being followed by action, 
 produced but little effect. 
 
 On the 4th April 1878 another Boer meeting was 
 convened, at which it was decided to send a second 
 deputation to England, to consist this time of Messrs. 
 Kruger and Joubert, with Mr. Bok as secretary. This 
 deputation proved as abortive as the first, Sir. M. Hicks 
 Beach assuring it, in a letter dated 6th August 1878, 
 that it is " impossible, for many reasons, . . . that the 
 Queen's sovereignty should now be withdrawn." 
 
 Whilst the Government was thus hampered by in- 
 ternal disaffection, it had also many other difficulties 
 on its hands. First, there was the Zulu boundary 
 question, which was constantly developing new dangers 
 to the country. Indeed, it was impossible to say what
 
 THE TRANSVAAL UNDER BRITISH RULE. r8i 
 
 might happen in that direction from one week to another. 
 Nor were its relations with Secocceni satisfactory. It 
 will be remembered that just before the Annexation 
 this chief had expressed his earnest wish to become 
 a British subject, and even paid over part of the fine 
 demanded from him by the Boer Government to the 
 Civil Commissioner, Major Clarke. In March 1878, 
 however, his conduct towards the Government under- 
 went a sudden change, and he practically declared war. 
 It afterwards appeared, from Secocoeni's own statement, 
 that he was instigated to this step by a Boer, Abel 
 Erasmus by name — the same man who was concerned 
 in the atrocities in the first Secocceni war — who con- 
 stantly encouraged him to continue the struggle. I do 
 not propose to minutely follow the course of this long 
 war, which, commencing in the beginning of 1878, did 
 not come to an end till after the Zulu war : when Sir 
 Garnet Wolseley attacked Secocceni's stronghold with 
 a large force of troops, volunteers, and Swazi allies, and 
 took it with great slaughter. The losses on our side 
 were not very heavy, so far as white men were con- 
 cerned, but the Swazis are reported to have lost 400 
 killed and 500 wounded. 
 
 The struggle was, during the long period preceding 
 the final attack, carried on with great courage and 
 ability by Major Clarke, E.A., C.M.G., whose force, at 
 the best of times, only consisted of 200 volunteers and 
 100 Zulus. With this small body of men he contrived, 
 however, to keep Secocceni in check, and to take some 
 important strongholds. It was marked also by some 
 striking acts of individual bravery, of which one, per- 
 formed by Major Clarke himself, whose reputation for 
 cool courage and presence of mind in danger is unsur-
 
 1 82 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 passed in South Africa, is worthy of notice ; and which, 
 had public attention been more concentrated on the Seco- 
 coeni war, would doubtless have won him the Victoria 
 Cross. On one occasion, on visiting one of the outlying 
 forts, he found that a party of hostile natives, who were 
 coming down to the fort on the previous day with a flag 
 of truce, had been accidentally fired on, and had at once 
 retreated. As his system in native warfare was always 
 to try and inspire his enemy with perfect faith in the 
 honour of Englishmen, and their contempt of all tricks 
 and treachery even towards a foe, he was very angry 
 at this occurrence, and at once, unarmed and unat- 
 tended save by his native servant, rode up into the 
 mountains to the kraal from which the white flag party 
 had come on the previous day, and apologised to the 
 chief for what had happened. When I consider how 
 very anxious Secocoeni's natives were to kill or capture 
 Clarke, whom they held in great dread, and how terrible 
 the end of so great a captain would in all probability 
 have been had he been taken alive by these masters of 
 refined torture, I confess that I think this act of gentle- 
 manly courage is one of the most astonishing things I 
 ever heard of. When he rode up those hills he must 
 have known that he was probably going to meet his 
 death at the hands of justly incensed savages. When 
 Secocoeni heard of what Major Clarke had done he was 
 so pleased that he shortly afterwards released a volun- 
 teer whom he had taken prisoner, and who would other- 
 wise, in all probability, have been tortured to death. I 
 must add that Major Clarke himself never reported or 
 alluded to this incident, but an account of it can be 
 found in a despatch written by Sir 0. Lanyon to the 
 Secretary of State, dated 2d February 1880,
 
 THE TRANSVAAL UNDER BRITISH RULE. 183 
 
 Concurrently with, though entirely distinct from, the 
 political agitation that was being carried on among the 
 Boers having for object the restoration of independence, 
 a private agitation was set on foot by a few disaffected 
 persons against Sir T. Shepstone, with the view of ob- 
 taining his removal from office in favour of a certain 
 Colonel Weatlierley. The details of this impudent plot 
 are so interesting, and the plot itself so typical of the 
 state of affairs with which Sir T. Shepstone had to deal, 
 that I will give a short account of it. 
 
 After the Annexation had taken place, there were 
 naturally enough a good many individuals who found 
 themselves disappointed in the results so far as they 
 personally were concerned ; I mean that they did not 
 get so much out of it as they expected. Among these 
 was a gentleman called Colonel Weatherley, who had 
 come to the Transvaal as manager of a gold-mining- 
 company, but getting tired of that had taken a pro- 
 minent part in the Annexation, and who, being subse- 
 quently disappointed about an appointment, became a 
 bitter enemy of the Administrator. I may say at once 
 that Colonel Weatherley seems to me to have been 
 throughout the dupe of the other conspirators. 
 
 The next personage was a good-looking desperado, 
 who called himself Captain Gunn of Gunn, and who 
 was locally somewhat irreverently known as the very 
 Gunn of very Gunn. This gentleman, whose former 
 career had been of a most remarkable order, was, on 
 the annexation of the country, found in the public 
 prison charged with having committed various offences, 
 but on Colonel Weatherley's interesting himself strongly 
 on his behalf, he was eventually released without trial. 
 On his release, he requested the Administrator to pub-
 
 i84 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 lish a Government notice declaring him innocent of the 
 charges brought against him. This Sir, T. Shepstone 
 declined to do, and so, to use his own words, in a des- 
 patch to the High Commissioner on the subject, Captain 
 Gunn of Gunn at once became " what in this country is 
 called a patriot." 
 
 The third person concerned was a lawyer, who had 
 got into trouble on the Diamond Fields, and who felt 
 himself injured because the rules of the High Court 
 did not allow him to practise as an advocate. The 
 quartette was made up by Mr. Celliers, the editor of the 
 patriotic organ, the Volkstem, who, since he had lost the 
 Government printing contract, found that no language 
 could be too strong to apply to the personnel of the 
 Government, more especially its head. Of course, there 
 was a lady in it ; what plot would be complete without? 
 She was Mrs. Weatherley, now, I believe, Mrs. Gunn of 
 Gunn. These gentlemen began operations by drawing 
 up a long petition to Sir Bartle Frere as High Com- 
 missioner, setting forth a string of supposed grievances, 
 and winding up with a request that the Administrator 
 might be " promoted to some other sphere of political 
 usefulness." This memorial was forwarded by the 
 "committee," as they called themselves, to various 
 parts of the country for signature, but without the 
 slightest success, the fact of the matter being that it 
 was not the Annexor but the Annexation that the Boers 
 objected to. 
 
 At this stage in the proceedings Colonel "Weatherley 
 went to try and forward the good cause with Sir Bartle 
 Frere at the Cape. His letters to Mrs. Weatherley 
 from thenco, afterwards put into Court in the celebrated 
 divorce case, contained many interesting accounts of
 
 THE TRANSVAAL UNDER BRITISH RULE. 185 
 
 his attempts in that direction. I do not think, however, 
 that he was cognisant of what was being concocted by 
 his allies in Pretoria, but being a very vain, weak man, 
 was easily deceived by them. With all his faults he 
 was a gentleman. As soon as he was gone a second 
 petition was drawn up by the " committee," showing 
 "the advisability of immediately suspending our present 
 Administrator, and temporarily appointing and recom- 
 mending for Her Majesty's royal and favourable con- 
 sideration an English gentleman of high integrity and 
 honour, in whom the country at large has respect and 
 confidence." 
 
 The English gentleman of high integrity and honour 
 of course proves to be Colonel Weatherley, whose 
 appointment is, further on, " respectfully but earnestly 
 requested," since he had " thoroughly gained tlie affec- 
 tions, confidence, and respect of Boers, English, and 
 other Europeans in this country." But whilst it is 
 comparatively easy to write petitions, there is some- 
 times a difficulty in getting people to sign them, as 
 proved to be the case with reference to the documents 
 under consideration. When the " committee " and the 
 employes in the office of the Volkstem had affixed 
 their valuable signatures it was found to be impossible 
 to induce anybody else to follow their example. Now, 
 a petition with some half dozen signatures attached 
 would not, it was obvious, carry much weight with the 
 Imperial Government, and no more could be obtained. 
 
 But really great minds rise superior to such difficul- 
 ties, and so did the " committee," or some of them, or 
 one of them. If they could not get genuine signatures 
 to their petitions, they could at any rate manufacture 
 them. This great idea once hit out, so vigorously was
 
 i86 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 it prosecuted that they, or some of them, or one of 
 them, produced in a very little while no less than 3883 
 signatures, of which sixteen were proved to be genuine, 
 five were doubtful, and all the rest fictitious. But the 
 gentleman, whoever he was, who was the working part- 
 ner in the scheme — and I may state, by way of paren- 
 thesis, that when Gunn of Gunn was subsequently 
 arrested, petitions in process of signature were found 
 under the mattress of his bed — calculated without his 
 host. He either did not know, or had forgotten, that 
 on receipt of such documents by a superior officer, they 
 are at once sent to the officer accused to report upon. 
 This course was followed in the present case, and the 
 petitions were discovered to be gross impostures. The 
 ingenuity exercised by their author or authors was really 
 very remarkable, for it must be remembered that not 
 one of the signatures was forged; they were all invented, 
 and had, of course, to be written in a great variety of 
 hands. The plan generally pursued was to put down 
 the names of people living in the country, with slight 
 variations. Thus " De Filliers " became " De WiWievs," 
 and " Van Zyl " " Van Zwl." I remember that my own 
 name appeared on one of the petitions with some slight 
 alteration. Some of the names were evidently meant 
 to be facetious. Thus there was a "Jan Verneuker," 
 which means " John the Cheat." 
 
 Of the persons directly or indirectly concerned in this 
 rascally plot, the unfortunate Colonel Weatherley sub- 
 sequently apologised to Sir T, Shepstone for his share 
 in the agitation, and shortly afterwards died fighting 
 bravely on Kambula. Captain Gunn of Gunn and 
 Mrs. Weatherley, after having given rise to the most 
 remarkable divorce case I ever heard — it took fourteen
 
 THE TRANSVAAL UNDER BRITISH RULE, 187 
 
 days to try — were, on the death of Colonel Weatherley, 
 united in the bonds of holy matrimony, and are, I 
 believe, still in Pretoria. The lawyer vanished I know 
 not where, whilst Mr. Celliers still continues to edit 
 that admirably conducted journal the Yolkstem ; nor, 
 if I may judge from the report of a speech made by 
 him recently at a Boer festival, which, by the way, 
 was graced by the presence of our representative, Mr. 
 Hudson, the British Eesident, has his right hand for- 
 gotten its cunning, or rather his tongue lost the use 
 of those peculiar and rechercM epithets that used to 
 adorn the columns of the Volkstem. I see that he, 
 on this occasion, denounced the English element as 
 being " poisonous and dangerous '" to a State, and 
 stated, amidst loud cheers, that " he despised " it. Mr. 
 Cellier's lines have fallen in pleasant places ; in any 
 other country he would long ago have fallen a victim 
 to tlie stern laws of libel. I recommend him to the 
 notice of enterprising Irish newspapers. Such is tlie 
 freshness and vigour of his style that I am confident 
 he would make the fortune of any Hibernian journal. 
 
 Some little time after the Gunn of Gunn frauds a very 
 sad incident happened in connection with the govern- 
 ment of the Transvaal. Shortly after the Annexation, 
 the Home Government sent out Mr. Sergeaunt, C.M.G., 
 one of the Crown Agents for the Colonies, to report on 
 the financial condition of the country. He was accom- 
 panied, in an unofficial capacity, amongst other gentle- 
 men, by Captain Patterson and his son, Mr. J. Sergeaunt; 
 and when he returned to England, these two gentlemen 
 remained behind to go on a shooting expedition. About 
 this time Sir Bartle Frere was anxious to send a friendly 
 mission to Lo Bengula, king of the Matabele, a branch of
 
 1 88 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 the Zulu tribe, living up towards the Zambesi. This 
 chief had been making himself unpleasant by causing 
 traders to be robbed, and it was thought desirable to 
 establish friendly relations with him, so it was suggested 
 to Captain Patterson and Mr. Sergeaunt that they 
 should combine business with pleasure, and go on a 
 mission to Lo Bengula, an offer which they accepted, 
 and shortly afterwards started for Matabeleland with 
 an interpreter and a few servants. They reached their 
 destination in safety ; and having concluded their busi- 
 ness with the king, started on a visit to the Zambesi 
 Falls on foot, leaving the interpreter with the waggon. 
 The falls were about twelve days' wallc from the king's 
 kraal, and they were accompanied thither by young 
 Mr. Thomas, the son of the local missionary, two Kafir 
 servants, and twenty native bearers supplied by Lo 
 Bengula. The next thing that was heard of them was 
 that they had all died through drinking poisoned water, 
 full details of the manner of their deaths being sent 
 down by Lo Bengula. 
 
 In the first shock and confusion of such news it was 
 not very closely examined, at any rate by the friends 
 of the dead men, but, on reflection, there were several 
 things about it that appeared strange. For instance, it 
 was well known that Captain Patterson had a habit, 
 for which, indeed, we had often laughed at him, of, 
 however thirsty he might be, always having his water 
 boiled when he was travelling, in order to destroy 
 impurities, and it seemed odd that he should on this 
 one occasion have neglected the precaution. Also, it 
 was curious that the majority of Lo Bengula's bearers 
 appeared to have escaped, whereas all the others were, 
 without exception, killed; nor even in that district is
 
 THE TRANSVAAL UNDER BRITISH RULE. 189 
 
 it usual to find water so bad that it will kill with 
 the rapidity it had been supposed to do in this case, 
 unless indeed it had been designedly poisoned. These 
 doubts of the poisoning-by-bad-water-story resolved 
 themselves into certainty when the waggon returned 
 in charge of the interpreter, when, by putting two and 
 two together, we were able to piece out the real history 
 of the diabolical murder of our poor friends with con- 
 siderable accuracy, a story which shows what blood- 
 thirsty wickedness a savage is capable of when he 
 fancies his interests are threatened. 
 
 It appeared that, when Captain Patterson first inter- 
 viewed Lo Bengula, he was not at all well received by 
 him. I must, by way of explanation, state that there 
 exists a pretender to his throne, Kruman by name, 
 who, as far as I can make out, is the real heir to the 
 kingdom. This man had, for some cause or other, fled 
 the country, and for a time acted as gardener to Sir T. 
 Shepstone in Natal. At the date of Messrs. Patterson 
 and Sergeaunt's mission to Matabeleland he was living, 
 I believe, in the Transvaal. Captain Patterson, on 
 finding himself so ill received by the king, and not 
 being sufficiently acquainted with the character of 
 savage chiefs, most unfortunately, either by accident or 
 design, dropped some hint in the course of conversation 
 about this Kruman. From that moment Lo Bengula's 
 conduct towards the mission entirely changed, and, 
 dropping his former tone, he became profusely civil; 
 and from that moment, too, he doubtless determined 
 to kill them, probably fearing that they might forward 
 some scheme to oust him and place Kruman, on whose 
 claim a large portion of his people looked favourably, 
 on the tliroue.
 
 igo THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 When their business was done, and Captain Patter- 
 sou told the king that they were anxious, before 
 returning, to visit the Zambesi Falls, he readily fell 
 in with their wish, but, in the first instance, refused 
 permission to young Thomas, the son of the missionary, 
 to accompany them, only allowing him to do so on the 
 urgent representations of Captain Patterson. The reason 
 of this was, no doubt, that he had kindly feelings 
 towards the lad, and did not wish to include him in 
 the slaughter. 
 
 Captain Patterson was a man of extremely methodical 
 habits, and, amongst other things, was in the habit of 
 making notes of all that he did. His note-book had 
 been taken off his body, and sent down to Pretoria 
 with the other things. In it we found entries of his 
 preparations for the trip, including the number and 
 names of the bearers provided by Lo Bengula. We 
 also found the chronicle of the first three days' journey, 
 and that of the morning of the fourth day, but there 
 the record stopped. The last entry was probably made 
 a few minutes before he was killed; and it is to be 
 observed that there was no entry of the party having 
 been for several days without water, as stated by the 
 messengers, and then finding the poisoned water. 
 
 This evidence by itself would not have amounted to 
 much, but now comes the curious part of the story, 
 showing the truth of the old adage, " Murder will out." 
 It appears that when the waggon was coming down to 
 Pretoria in charge of the interpreter, it was outspanned 
 one day outside the borders of Lo Bengula's country, 
 when some Kafirs — Bechuanas, I think — came up, 
 asked for some tobacco, and fell into conversation with 
 the driver, remarking that he had come up \\ith a full
 
 THE TRANSVAAL UNDER BRITISH RULE. 191 
 
 waggon, and now he went down with an empty one. 
 The driver replied by lamenting the death by poisoned 
 water of his masters, whereupon one of the Kafirs told 
 him the following story : — He said that a brother of his 
 was out hunting, a little while back, in the desert for 
 ostriches, with a party of other Kafirs, when hearing 
 shots fired some way off, they made for the spot, 
 thinking that white men were out shooting, and that 
 they would be able to beg meat. On reaching the 
 spot, which was by a pool of water, they saw the bodies 
 of three white men lying on the ground, and also those 
 of a Hottentot and a Kafir, surrounded by an armed 
 party of Kafirs. They at once asked the Kafirs what 
 they had been doing killing the white men, and were 
 told to be still, for it was by " order of the king." They 
 then learned the whole story. It appeared that the 
 white men had made a mid-day halt by the water, when 
 one of the bearers, who had gone to the edge of the 
 pool, suddenly shouted to them to come and look at a 
 great snake in the water. Captain Patterson ran up, 
 and, as he leaned over the edge, was instantly killed by 
 a blow with an axe ; the others were then shot and 
 assegaied. The Kafir further described the clothes 
 that his brother had seen on the bodies, and also some 
 articles that had been given to his party by the mur- 
 derers, that left little doubt as to the veracity of his 
 story. And so ended the mission to Matabeleland. 
 
 No public notice was taken of the matter, for the 
 obvious reason that it was impossible to get at Lo Ben- 
 gula to punish him ; nor would it have been easy to 
 come by legal evidence to disprove tlie ingenious story 
 of the poisoned water, since anybody trying to reach 
 the spot of the massacre would probably fall a victim
 
 192 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 to some similar accident before he got back again. It 
 is devoutly to be hoped that the punishment he deserves 
 will sooner or later overtake the author of this devilish 
 and wholesale murder. 
 
 The beginning of 1879 was signalised by the com- 
 mencement of operations in Zululand and by the news 
 of the terrible disaster at Isandhlwana, which fell on 
 Pretoria like a thunderclap. It was not, however, any 
 surprise to those who were acquainted with Zulu tactics 
 and with the plan of attack adopted by the English 
 commanders. In fact, I know that one solemn warning 
 of what would certainly happen to him if he persisted 
 in his plan of advance was addressed to Lord Chelms- 
 ford, through the officer in command at Pretoria, by a 
 gentleman whose position and long experience of the 
 Zulus and their mode of attack should have carried 
 some weight. If it ever reached him, he took, to the 
 best of my recollection, no notice of it whatever. 
 
 But though some such disaster was daily expected by 
 a few, the majority both of soldiers and civilians never 
 dreamed of anything of the sort, the general idea being 
 that the conquest of Cetywayo was a very easy under- 
 taking ; and the shock produced by the news of Isandhl- 
 wana was proportionately great, especially as it reached 
 Pretoria in a much exaggerated form. I shall never 
 forget the appearance of the town that morning ; busi- 
 ness was entirely suspended, and the streets were filled 
 with knots of men talking, with scared faces, as well 
 they might: for there was scarcely anybody but had 
 lost a friend, and many thought that their sons or 
 brothers were among the dead on that bloody field. 
 Among others. Sir T. Shepstone lost one son, and 
 thought for some time that he had lost three.
 
 THE TEANSVAAL UNDER BRITISH RULE. 193 
 
 Shortly after this event Sir Theophilus went to Eng- 
 land to confer with the Secretary of State on various 
 matters connected with the Transvaal, carrying with 
 him the affection and respect of all who knew him, not 
 excepting the majority of the malcontent Boers. He 
 was succeeded by Colonel, now Sir Owen Lanyon, who 
 was appointed to administer the Government during 
 the absence of Sir T. Shepstone. 
 
 By the Boers, however, the news of our disaster 
 was received with great and unconcealed rejoicing, or 
 at least by the irreconcilable portion of that people. 
 England's necessity was their opportunity, and one 
 of which they certainly meant to avail themselves. 
 Accordingly, notices were sent out summoning the 
 burghers of the Transvaal to attend a mass meeting 
 on the 1 8th March, at a place about thirty miles from 
 Pretoria. Emissaries were also sent to native chiefs, 
 to excite them to follow Cetywayo's example, and 
 massacre all the English within reach, of whom a man 
 called Solomon Prinsloo was one of the most active. 
 The natives, however, notwithstanding the threats used 
 towards them, one and all declined the invitation. 
 
 It must not be supposed that all the Boers who 
 attended these meetings did so of their own free will ; 
 on the contrary, a very large number came under com- 
 })ulsion, since they found that the English authorities 
 were powerless to give them protection. The recal- 
 citrants were threatened with all sorts of pains and 
 penalties if they did not attend, a favourite menace 
 being that they should be made "biltong" of when 
 the country was given back (i.e., be cut into strips 
 and hung in the sun to dry). Few, luckily for them- 
 selves, were brave enough to tenipt fortune by refusing 
 
 N
 
 194 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 to come, but those who did have had to leave the 
 country since the war. Whatever were the means 
 employed, the result was an armed meeting of about 
 3000 Boers, who evidently meant mischief. 
 
 Just about this time a corps had been raised in Pre- 
 toria, composed, for the most part, of gentlemen, and 
 known as the Pretoria Horse, for the purpose of pro- 
 ceeding to the Zulu border, where cavalry, especially 
 cavalry acquainted with the country, was earnestly 
 needed. In the emergency of the times officials were 
 allowed to join this corps, a permission of which I 
 availed myself, and was elected one of the lieutenants.^ 
 The corps was not, after all, allowed to go to Zululand 
 on account of the threatening aspect adopted by the 
 Boers, against whom it was retained for service. In 
 my capacity as an officer of the corps I was sent out 
 with a small body of picked men, all good riders and 
 light weights, to keep up a constant communication 
 between the Boer camp and the Administrator, and 
 found the work both interesting and exciting. My 
 headquarters were at an inn about twenty-five miles 
 from Pretoria, to which our agents in the meeting used 
 to come every evening and report how matters were 
 proceeding, whereupon, if the road was clear, I des- 
 patched a letter to headquarters ; or, if I feared that 
 the messengers would be caught en route by Boer patrols 
 and searched, I substituted different coloured ribbons 
 according to what I wished to convey. There was a 
 relief hidden in the trees or rocks every six miles, all 
 
 ^ It is customary in South African volunteer forces to allow the 
 members to elect their own officers, provided the men elected are such 
 as the Government approves. This is done, so that the corps may not 
 afterwards be able to declare that they have no confidence in their 
 officers in action, or to grumble at their treatment by them.
 
 THE TRANSVAAL UNDER BRITISH RULE. 195 
 
 day and most of the night, whose business it was to 
 take the despatch or ribbon and gallop on with it to the 
 next station, in which way we used to get the despatches 
 into town in about an hour and a quarter. 
 
 On one or two occasions the Boers came to the inn 
 and threatened to shoot us, but as our orders were to do 
 nothing unless our lives were actually in danger, we 
 took no notice. The officer who came out to relieve 
 me had not, however, been there more than a day or 
 two before he and all his troopers were hunted back 
 into Pretoria by a large mob of armed Boers whom they 
 only escaped by very hard riding. 
 
 Meanwhile the Boers were by degrees drawing nearer 
 and nearer to the town, till at last they pitched their 
 laagers within six miles, and practically besieged it. 
 All business was stopped, the houses were loopholed 
 and fortified, and advantageous positions were occupied 
 by the military and the various volunteer corps. The 
 building, normally in the occupation of the Government 
 mules, fell to the lot of the Pretoria Horse, and, though 
 it was undoubtedly a post of honour, I honestly declare 
 that I have no wish to sleep for another month in a 
 mule stable that has not been cleaned out for several 
 years. However, by sinking a well, and erecting bas- 
 tions and a staging for sharpshooters, we converted it 
 into an excellent fortress, though it would not have 
 been of much use against artillery. Our patrols used 
 to be out all night, since we chiefiy feared a night 
 iL-fcack, and generally every preparation was made to 
 L'sist the onset that was hourly expected, and I believe 
 that it was that state of preparedness that alone pre- 
 vented it. 
 
 Whilst this meeting was going on, and when matters
 
 196 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 had come to a point that seemed to render war inevi- 
 table, Sir Bartle Frerc arrived at Pretoria and had several 
 interviews with the Boer leaders, at which they persisted 
 in demanding their independence, and nothing short of 
 it. After a great deal of talk the meeting finally broke 
 up without any actual appeal to arms, though it had, 
 during its continuance, assumed many of the rights of 
 government, such as stopping post-carts and individuals, 
 and sending armed patrols about the country. The 
 principal reason of its break-up was that the Zulu war 
 was now drawing to a close, and the leaders saw that 
 there would soon be plenty of troops available to sup- 
 press any attempt at revolt, but they also saw to what 
 lengths they could go with impunity. They had for a 
 period of nearly two months been allowed to throw the 
 whole country into confusion, to openly violate the 
 laws, and to intimidate and threaten Her Majesty's 
 loyal subjects with war and death. The lesson was not 
 lost on them ; but they postponed action till a more 
 favourable opportunity offered. 
 
 Sir Bartle Frere before his departure took an oppor- 
 tunity at a public dinner given liim at Potchefstroom 
 of assuring the loyal inhabitants of the country that 
 the Transvaal would never be given back. 
 
 Meanwhile a new Pharaoh had arisen in Egypt, in 
 the shape of Sir Garnet Wolseley, and on the 29th 
 June 1879 we find him communicating the fact to Sir 
 0. Lanyon in very plain language, telling him that he 
 disapproved of his course of action with regard to 
 Secocceni, and that "in future you will please take 
 orders only from me." 
 
 As soon as Sir Garnet had completed his arrange- 
 ments for the pacification of Zululand, he proceeded
 
 THE TRANSVAAL UNDER BRITISH RULE. 197 
 
 to Pretoria, aud having caused himself to be sworn in 
 as Governor, set vigorously to work. I must say that 
 in his dealings with the Transvaal he showed great 
 judgment and a keen appreciation of what the country 
 needed, namely, strong government ; the fact of the 
 matter being, I suppose, that being very popular with 
 the Home authorities he felt that he could more or less 
 command their support in what he did, a satisfaction 
 not given to most governors, who never know but that 
 they may be thrown overboard in emergency to lighten 
 the ship. 
 
 One of his first acts was to issue a proclamation, 
 stating that, "Whereas it appears that, notwithstand- 
 ing repeated assurances of contrary effect given by Her 
 Majesty's representatives in this territory, uncertainty or 
 misapprehension exists amongst some of Her Majesty's 
 subjects as to the intention of Her Majesty's Govern- 
 ment regarding the maintenance of British rule and 
 sovereignty over the territory of the Transvaal : and 
 whereas it is expedient that all grounds for such uncer- 
 tainty or misapprehension should be removed once and 
 for all beyond doubt or question : now therefore I do 
 hereby proclaim and make known, in the name and on 
 behalf of Her Majesty the Queen, that it is the will 
 and determination of Her Majesty's Government that 
 this Transvaal territory shall be, and shall continue to he 
 for ever, an integral portion of Her Majesty's dominions 
 in South Africa." 
 
 . Alas ! Sir G. Wolseley's estimate of the value of a 
 solemn pledge thus made in the name of Her Majestj'^, 
 whose word has hitherto been held to be sacred, differed 
 greatly to that of Mr. Gladstone and his Government. 
 
 Sir Garnet Wolseley's operations against Secocoeni
 
 198 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 proved eminently successful, and were the best arranged 
 bit of native warfare that I have yet heard of in South 
 Africa. One blow was struck, and only one, but that 
 was crushing. Of course the secret of his success lay 
 in the fact that he had an abundance of force ; but it 
 was not ensured by that alone, good management being 
 very requisite in an affair of the sort, especially where 
 native allies have to be dealt with. The cost of the 
 expedition, not counting other Secocoeni war expendi- 
 ture, amounted to over ;^300,ooo, all of which is now 
 lost to this country. 
 
 Another step in the right direction undertaken by 
 Sir Garnet was the establishment of an Executive 
 Council and also of a Legislative Council, for the 
 establishment of which Letters Patent were sent from 
 Downing Street in November 1880. 
 
 Meanwhile the Boers, paying no attention to the 
 latter proclamation, for they guessed that it, like other 
 proclamations in the Transvaal, would be a mere hru- 
 tum fulmen, had assembled for another mass meeting, 
 at which they went forward a step, and declared a 
 Government which was to treat with the English 
 authorities. They had now learnt that they could 
 do what they liked with perfect impunity, provided 
 they did not take the extreme course of massacring 
 the English. They had yet to learn that they might 
 even do that. At the termination of this meeting, a 
 vote of thanks was passed to " Mr. Leonard Courtney 
 of London, and other members of the British Parlia- 
 ment." It was wise of the Boer leaders to cultivate 
 Mr. Courtney of London. As a result of this meeting, 
 Pretorius, one of the principal leaders, and Bok, the 
 secretary, were arrested on a charge of treason, and
 
 THE TRANSVAAL UNDER BRITISH RULE. 199 
 
 underwent a preliminary examination ; but as the 
 Secretary of State, Sir M. Hicks Beach, looked rather 
 timidly on the proceeding, and the local authorities 
 were doubtful of securing a verdict, the prosecution 
 was abandoned, and necessarily did more harm than 
 good, being looked upon as another proof of the im- 
 potence of the Government. 
 
 Shortly afterwards, Sir G. Wolseley changed his 
 tactics, and, instead of attempting to imprison Pre- 
 torius, offered him a seat on the Executive Council, 
 with a salary attached. This was a much more 
 sensible way of dealing with him, and he at once 
 rose to the bait, stating his willingness to join the 
 Government after a while, but that he could not 
 publicly do so at the moment lest he should lose his 
 influence with those who were to be brought round 
 through him. It does not, however, appear that Mr. 
 Pretorius ever did actually join the Executive, probably 
 because he found public opinion too strong to allow 
 him to do so. 
 
 In December 1879 a new light broke upon the Boers, 
 for in the previous month Mr. Gladstone had been 
 delivering his noted attack on the policy of the Con- 
 servative Government. Those Mid-Lothian speeches 
 did harm, it is said, in many parts of the world ; but 
 I venture to think that they have proved more mis- 
 chievous in South Africa than anywhere else ; at any 
 rate, they have borne fruit sooner. It is not to be 
 supposed that Mr. Gladstone really cared anything 
 about the Transvaal or its independence when he was 
 denouncing the hideous outrage that had been perpe- 
 trated by the Conservative Government in annexing 
 it. On the contrary, as he acquiesced in the Annexa-
 
 200 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 tion at the time (when Lord Kimberley stated that 
 it was evidently unavoidable), and declined to rescind 
 it when he came into power, it is to be supposed that 
 he really approved of it, or at the least looked on it as 
 a necessary evil. However this may be, any stick will 
 do to beat a dog v^ith, and the Transvaal was a con- 
 venient point on which to attack the Government. He 
 probably neither knew nor cared what effect his reckless 
 words might have on ignorant Boers thousands of miles 
 away ; and yet, humanly speaking, many a man would 
 have been alive and strong to-day whose bones now 
 whiten the African Veldt had those words never been 
 spoken. Then, for the first time, the Boers learnt that, 
 if they played their cards properly and put on sufficient 
 pressure, they would, in the event of the Liberal party 
 coming to office, have little difficulty in coercing it as 
 they wished. 
 
 There was a fair chance at the time of the utterance 
 of the Mid-Lothian speeches that the agitation would, 
 by degrees, die away ; Sir G. Wolseley had succeeded 
 in winning over Pretorius, and the Boers in general 
 were sick of mass meetings. Indeed, a memorial was 
 addressed to Sir. G. Wolseley by a number of Boers in 
 the Potchefstroom district, protesting against the main- 
 tenance of the movement against Her Majesty's rule, 
 which, considering the great amount of intimidation 
 exercised by the malcontents, may be looked upon as 
 a favourable sign. 
 
 But when it slowly came to be understood among 
 the Boers that a great English Minister had openly 
 espoused their cause, and that he would perhaps soon 
 be all-powerful, the moral gain to them was incal- 
 culable. They could now go to the doubting ones and 
 
 I
 
 THE TRANSVAAL UNDER BRITISH RULE. 201 
 
 say, — we must be right about the matter, because, 
 putting our own feelings out of the question, the great 
 Gladstone says we are. We find the committee of the 
 Boer malcontents, at their meeting in March 1880, 
 reading a letter to Mr. Gladstone, "in which he was 
 thanked for the great sympathy shown in their fate," 
 and a hope expressed that, if he succeeded in getting 
 power, he would not forget them. In fact, a charming 
 unanimity prevailed between our great Minister and 
 the Boer rebels, for their interests were the same, the 
 overthrow of the Conservative Government. If, how- 
 ever, every leader of the Opposition were to intrigue 
 or countenance intrigues with those who are seeking 
 to undermine the authority of Her Majesty, whether 
 they be Boers or Irishmen, in order to help himself to 
 power, the country might suffer in the long run. 
 
 But whatever feelings may have prompted Her 
 Majesty's Opposition, the Home Government, and their 
 agent, Sir Garnet Wolseley, blew no uncertain blast, if 
 we may judge from their words and actions. Thus we 
 find Sir Garnet speaking as follows at a banquet given 
 in his honour at Pretoria : — 
 
 " I am told that these men (the Boers) are told to 
 keep on agitating in this way, for a change of Govern- 
 ment in England may give them again the old order 
 of things. Nothing can show greater ignorance of 
 English politics than such an idea; I tell you that 
 there is no Government, Whig or Tory, Liberal, Con- 
 servative, or Radical, who would dare under any circum- 
 stances to give lack this country. They would not dare, 
 because the English people would not allow them. To 
 give back the country, what would it mean ? To give 
 it back to external danger, to the danger of attack by
 
 202 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 hostile tribes on its frontier, and who, if the English 
 Government were removed for one day, would make 
 themselves felt the next. Not an official of Government 
 paid for months ; it would mean national bankruptcy. 
 No taxes being paid, the same thing recurring again 
 which had existed before would mean danger without, 
 anarchy and civil war within, every possible misery ; 
 the strangulation of trade, and the destruction of 
 property." 
 
 It is very amusing to read this passage by the 
 light of after events. On other occasions Sir Garnet 
 Wolseley will probably not be quite so confident as 
 to the future when it is to be controlled by a Eadical 
 Government. 
 
 This explicit and straightforward statement of Sir 
 Garnet's produced a great effect on the loyal inhabitants 
 of the Transvaal, which was heightened by the publica- 
 tion of the following telegram from the Secretary of 
 State : — " You may fully confirm explicit statements 
 made from time to time as to inability of Her Majesty's 
 Government to entertain any proposal for withdrawal 
 of the Queen's sovereignty." 
 
 On the faith of these declarations many Englishmen 
 migrated to the Transvaal and settled there, whilst 
 those who were in the country now invested all their 
 means, being confident that they would not lose their 
 property through its being returned to the Boers. The 
 excitement produced by Mr. Gladstone's speeches began 
 to quiet down and be forgotten for the time, arrear 
 taxes were paid up by the malcontents, and generally 
 the aspect of affairs was such, in Sir Garnet Wolseley's 
 opinion, as justified him in writing, in April 1880, to 
 the Secretary of State expressing his belief that the
 
 THE TRANSVAAL UNDER BRITISH RULE. 203 
 
 agitation was dying out.^ Indeed, so sanguine was he 
 on that point that he is reported to have advised the 
 withdrawal of the cavalry regiment stationed in the 
 territory, a piece of economy that was one of the 
 immediate causes of the revolt. 
 
 The reader will rememl^er the financial condition of 
 the country at the time of the Annexation, which was 
 one of utter bankruptcy. After three years of British 
 rule, however, we find, notwithstanding the constant 
 agitation that had been kept up, that the total revenue 
 receipts for the first quarter of 1879 and 1880 amounted 
 tO;^22,773 and £a^'j,(^^2 respectively. That is to say, 
 that, during the last year of British rule, the revenue of 
 the country more than doubled itself, and amounted to 
 
 ^ In Blue-Book No. (C. 2866) of September 1881, which is descrip- 
 tive of various events connected with the Boer rising, is published, as 
 an appendix, a despatch from Sir Garnet Wolselej', dated October 1879. 
 This despatch declares the writer's opinion that the Boer discontent is 
 on tlie increase. Its publication thus — apropos des hottes — nearly two 
 years after it was written, is rather an amusing incident. It certainly 
 gives one the idea that Sir Garnet Wolseley, fearing that his reputation 
 for infallibility might be attacked by scoffers for not* having foreseen 
 the Boer rebellion, and perhaps uneasily conscious of other despatches 
 very different in tenor and subsequent in date ; and, mindful of the 
 withdrawal of the cavalry regiment by his advice, had caused it to be 
 tacked on to the Blue-Book as a documentary "I told you so," and a 
 proof that, whoever else was blinded, he foresaw. It contains, how- 
 ever, the following remarkably true passage : — " Even were it not im- 
 possible, for many other reason.s, to contemplate a withdrawal of our 
 authority from the Transvaal, the position of insecurity in which we 
 should leave this loyal and important section of the community (the 
 English inhabitants), by exposing them to the certain retaliation of 
 the Boers, would constitute, in my opinion, an insuperable obstacle to 
 retrocession. Subjected to the same danger, moreover, would be those 
 of the Boers, whose superior intelligence and courageous character has 
 rendered them loyal to our Government." 
 
 As the Government took the trouble to republish the despatch, it is 
 a pity that they did not think fit to pay more attention to its contents.
 
 204 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 about ^160,000 a-year, taking the quarterly returns at 
 the low average of ^^ 40,000. It must, however, be re- 
 membered that this sum would have been very largely 
 increased in subsequent years, most probably doubled. 
 At any rate the revenue would have been amply suffi- 
 cient to make the province one of the most prosperous 
 in South Africa, and to have enabled it to shortly repay 
 all debts due to the British Government, and further to 
 provide for its own defence. Trade also, which, in April 
 1877, w^s completely paralysed, had increased enor- 
 mously. So early as the middle of 1879, the Com- 
 mittee of the Transvaal Chamber of Commerce pointed 
 out, in a resolution adopted by them, that the trade of 
 the country had in two years risen from almost nothing 
 to the considerable sum of two millions sterling per 
 annum, and that it was entirely in the hands of those 
 favourable to British rule. They also pointed out that 
 more than half the land-tax was paid by Englishmen, 
 or other Europeans adverse to Boer Government. Land, 
 too, had risen greatly in value, of which I can give the 
 following instance. About a year after the Annexation 
 I, together with a friend, bought a little property on the 
 outskirts of Pretoria, which, with a cottage we put up 
 on it, cost some ;^300. Just before the rebellion we 
 fortunately determined to sell it, and had no difficulty 
 in getting £6$o for it. I do not believe that it would 
 now fetch a fifty-pound note. 
 
 I cannot conclude this chapter better than by draw- 
 ing attention to a charming specimen of the correspond- 
 ence between the Boer leaders and their friend Mr. 
 Courtney. The letter in question, which is dated 26th 
 June, purports to be written by Messrs. Kruger and 
 Joubert, but it is obvious that it owes its origin to some
 
 THE TRANSVAAL UNDER BRTTTSII RULE. 205 
 
 member or members of the Dutch party at the Cape, 
 from whence, indeed, it is written. This is rendered 
 evident both by its i^eneral style, and also by the use of 
 such terms as " Satrap," and by references to Napoleon 
 III. and Cayenne, about whom Messrs. Kruger and 
 Joubert know no more than they do of Peru and the 
 Incas. 
 
 After alluding to former letters, the writers blow a 
 blast of triumph over the downfall of the Conservative 
 Government, and then make a savage attack on the 
 reputation of Sir Bartle Frere. The " stubborn Satrap " 
 is throughout described as a liar, and every bad motive 
 imputed to him. Eeally, the fact that Mr. Courtney 
 should encourage such epistles as this is enough to give 
 colour to the boast made by some of the leading Boers, 
 after the war, that they had been encouraged to rebel 
 by a member of the British Government, 
 
 At the end of this letter, and on the same page of 
 the Blue-Book, is printed the telegram recalling Sir 
 Bartle Frere, dated ist August 1880. It really reads 
 as though the second document was consequent on the 
 first. One thing is very clear, the feelings of Her 
 Majesty's new Government towards Sir Bartle Frere 
 differed only in the method of their expression from 
 those set forth by the Boer leaders in their letter to 
 Mr. Courtney, whilst their object, namely, to be rid 
 of him, was undoubtedly identical with that of the 
 Dutch party in South Africa.
 
 ( 2o6 ) 
 
 CHAPTEE V. 
 
 THE BOEK REBELLION. 
 
 When the Liberal ministry became an accomplished 
 fact instead of a happy possibility, Mr. Gladstone did 
 not find it convenient to adopt the line of policy with 
 reference to the Transvaal that might have been ex- 
 pected from his utterances whilst leader of the Opposi- 
 tion. On the contrary, he declared in Parliament that the 
 Annexation could not be cancelled, and on the 8th June 
 1880 we find him, in answer to a Boer petition, written 
 with the object of inducing him to act up to the spirit 
 of his words and rescind the Annexation, writing thus : 
 — " Looking to all the circumstances, both of the Trans- 
 vaal and the rest of South Africa, and to the necessity 
 of preventing a renewal of disorders which might lead 
 to disastrous consequences, not only to the Transvaal, 
 but to the whole of South Africa, our judgment is, that 
 the Queen cawiot he advised to relinquish her sovereignty 
 over the Transvaal ; but, consistently with the mainten- 
 ance of that sovereignty, we desire that the white in- 
 habitants of the Transvaal should, without prejudice to 
 the rest of the population, enjoy the fullest liberty to 
 manage their local affairs. We believe that this liberty 
 may be most easily and promptly conceded to the Trans- 
 vaal as a member of a South African confederation."
 
 THE BOER REBELLION. 207 
 
 Unless words have lost their signification, this pas- 
 sage certainly means that the Transvaal must remain a 
 British colony, but that England will be prepared to 
 grant it responsible government, more especially if it 
 will consent to a confederation scheme. Mr. Gladstone, 
 however, in a communication dated ist June 1881, and 
 addressed to the unfortunate Transvaal loyals, for whom 
 he expresses "respect and sympathy," interprets his 
 meaning thus: "It is stated, as I observe, that a promise 
 was given by me that the Transvaal never should be 
 given back. There is no mention of the terms or date 
 of this promise. If the reference be to my letter, of 
 8th June 1880, to Messrs. Kruger and Joubert, I do 
 not think the language of that letter justifies the de- 
 scription given. Nor am I sure in what manner or to 
 what degree the fullest liberty to manage their local 
 afiliirs, which I then said Her Majesty's Government 
 desired to confer on the white population of the Trans- 
 vaal, differs from the settlement now about being made 
 in its bearing on the interests of those whom your 
 Committee represents." 
 
 Such twisting of the meaning of words would, in a 
 private person, be called dishonest. It will also occur 
 to most people that Mr. Gladstone might have spared 
 the deeply wronged and loyal subjects of Her Majesty 
 whom he was addressing tlie taunt he levels at them 
 in the second paragraph I have quoted. If asked, he 
 would no doubt say that he had not the slightest inten- 
 tion of laughing at them ; but when he deliberately 
 tells them that it makes no ditiercnce to their interests 
 whether they remain Her Majesty's subjects under a 
 responsible Government, or become the servants of men 
 who were but lately in arms against them and Her
 
 2o8 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 Majesty's authority, ho is either mocking them, or offer- 
 in" an insult to their understandings. 
 
 By way of comment on his remarks, I may add that 
 he had, in a letter replying to a petition from these 
 same loyal inhabitants, addressed to him in May 1880, 
 informed them that he had already told the Boer repre- 
 sentatives that the Annexation could not be rescinded. 
 Although Mr. Gladstone is undoubtedly the greatest 
 living master of the art of getting two distinct and 
 opposite sets of meanings out of one set of words, it 
 would try even his ingenuity to make out, to the satis- 
 faction of an impartial mind, that he never gave any 
 pledge about the retention of the Transvaal. 
 
 Indeed, it is from other considerations clear that he 
 had no intention of giving up the country to the Boers, 
 whose cause he appears to have taken up solely for 
 electioneering purposes. Had he meant to do so, he 
 would have carried out his intention on succeeding 
 to office, and, indeed, as things have turned out, it is 
 deeply to be regretted that he did not ; for, bad as such 
 a step would have been, it would at any rate have had 
 a better appearance than our ultimate surrender after 
 three defeats. It would also have then been possible 
 to secure the repayment of some of the money owing to 
 this country, and to provide for the jiroper treatment of 
 the natives, and the compensation of the loyal inhabi- 
 tants who could no longer live there : since it must 
 naturally have been easier to make terms with the 
 Boers before they had defeated our troops. 
 
 On the other hand, we should have missed the grandest 
 and most soul-stirring display of radical theories, prac- 
 tically applied, that has as yet lightened the darkness 
 of this country. But although Mr. Gladstone gave his
 
 THE BOER REBELLION. 209 
 
 official decision against returuing the country, there 
 seems to be little doubt that communications on the 
 subject were kept up with the Boer leaders through 
 some prominent members of the Radical party, who, 
 it was said, went so far as to urge the Boers to take 
 up arms against us. When Mr, White came to this 
 country on behalf of the loyalists, after the surrender, 
 he stated that this was so at a public meeting, and said 
 further that he had in his possession proofs of his state- 
 ments. He even went so far as to name the gentleman 
 he accused, and to challenge him to deny it. I have 
 not been able to gather that Mr. White's statements 
 were contradicted. 
 
 However this may be, after a pause, agitation in the 
 Transvaal suddenly recommenced with redoubled vigour. 
 It began through a man named Bezeidenhout, who re- 
 fused to pay his taxes. Thereupon a waggon was seized 
 in execution under the authority of the court and put 
 up to auction, but its sale was prevented by a crowd of 
 rebel Boers, who kicked the auctioneer off the waggon 
 and dragged the vehicle away. This was on the nth 
 November 1880. When this intelligence reached Pre- 
 toria, Sir Owen Lauyou sent down a few companies of 
 the 2 1st Regiment, under the command of Major Thorn- 
 hill, to support the Landdrost in arresting the rioters, 
 and appointed Captain Raaf, C.M.G., to act as special 
 messenger to the Landdrost's Court at Potchefstroom, 
 with authority to enrol special constables to assist him 
 to carry out the arrests. On arrival at Potchefstroom 
 Captain Raaf found that, without an armed force, it 
 was quite impossible to effect any arrest. On the 26th 
 November Sir Owen Lanyon, realising the gravity of 
 the situation, telegraphed to Sir George CoUey, asking 
 
 o
 
 2IO THE TRANSVAAL 
 
 that the 58th Eegiment should be sent back to the 
 Transvaal. Sir George replied that he could ill spare 
 it on account of " daily expected outbreak of Pondoa 
 and possible appeal for help from Cape Colony," and 
 that the Government must be supported by the loyal 
 inhabitants. 
 
 It will be seen that the Boers had, with some 
 astuteness, chosen a very favourable time to com- 
 mence operations. The hands of the Cape Government 
 were full with the Basuto war, so no help could be 
 expected from it ; Sir G. Wolseley had sent away the 
 only cavalry regiment that remained in the country, 
 and lastly. Sir Owen Lanyon had quite recently 
 allowed a body of 300 trained volunteers, mostly, if 
 not altogether, drawn from among the loyalists, to be 
 raised for service in the Basuto war, a serious drain 
 upon the resources of a country so sparsely populated 
 as the Transvaal. 
 
 Meanwhile a mass meeting had been convened by 
 the Boers for the 8th January to consider Mr. Glad- 
 stone's letter, but the Bezeidenhout incident had the 
 effect of putting forward the date of assembly by a 
 month, and it was announced that it would be held 
 on the 8 th December. Subsequently the date was 
 shifted to the i 5th, and then back again to the 8th. 
 Every effort was made, by threats of future vengeance, 
 to secure the presence of as many burghers as pos- 
 sible ; attempts were also made to persuade the native 
 chiefs to send representatives, and to promise to join 
 in an attack on the English. These entirely failed. 
 The meeting was held at a place called Paarde Kraal, 
 and resulted in the sudden declaration of the Repub- 
 lic and the appointment of the famous triumvirate
 
 THE BOER REBELLION. 21 1 
 
 Kruger, Joubert, and Pretorius. It then moved into 
 Heidelberg, a little town about sixty miles from Pre- 
 toria, and on the i6th December the Kepublic was 
 formally proclaimed in a long proclamation, contain- 
 ing a summary of the events of the few preceding 
 years, and declaring the arrangements the malcontents 
 were willing to make with the English authorities. 
 The terms offered in this document are almost iden- 
 tical with those finally accepted by Her Majesty's 
 Government, with the exception that in the procla- 
 mation of the 1 6th December the Boer leaders declare 
 their willingness to enter into confederation, and to 
 guide their native policy by general rules adopted in 
 concurrence " with the Colonies and States of South 
 Africa." This was a more liberal offer than that which 
 we ultimately agreed to, but then the circumstances 
 had changed. 
 
 This proclamation was forwarded to Sir Owen 
 Lanyon with a covering letter, in which the follow- 
 ing words occur : — " We declare in the most solemn 
 manner that we have no desire to spill blood, and 
 that from our side we do not wish war. It lies in your 
 hands to force us to appeal to arms in self-defence. 
 . . . We expect your answer within twice twenty- 
 four hours." 
 
 I beg to direct particular attention to these para- 
 graphs, as they have a considerable interest in view 
 of what followed. 
 
 The letter and proclamation reached Government 
 House, Pretoria, at 10.30 on the evening of Friday 
 the 17th December. Sir Owen Lanyon's proclama- 
 tion, written in reply, was handed to the messenger 
 at noon on Sunday, 19th December, or within about
 
 212 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 thirty-six hours of his arrival, and could hardly have 
 reached the rebel camp, sixty miles off, before dawn 
 the next day, the 20th December, on which day, at 
 about one o'clock, a detachment of the 94th was 
 ambushed and destroyed on the road between Middle- 
 burg and Pretoria, about eighty miles off, by a force 
 despatched from Heidelberg for that purpose some 
 days before. On the i6th December, or the same day 
 on which the Triumvirate had despatched the pro- 
 clamation to Pretoria containing their terms, and ex- 
 pressing in the most solemn manner that they had no 
 desire to shed blood, a large Boer force was attacking 
 Potchefstroom. 
 
 So much then for the sincerity of the professions 
 of their desire to avoid bloodshed. 
 
 The proclamation sent by Sir 0. Lanyon in reply 
 recited in its preamble the various acts of which the 
 rebels had been guilty, including that of having 
 " wickedly sought to incite the said loyal native 
 inhabitants throughout the province to take up arms 
 against Her Majesty's Government," announced that 
 matters had now been put into the hands of the 
 officer commanding Her Majesty's troops, and pro- 
 mised pardon to all who would disperse to their 
 homes. 
 
 It was at Potchefstroom, which town had all along 
 been the nursery of the rebellion, that actual hostili- 
 ties first broke out. Potchefstroom as a town is much 
 more Boer in its sympathies than Pretoria, which is, 
 or rather was, almost purely English. Sir Owen 
 Lanyon had, as stated before, sent a small body of 
 soldiers thither to support the civil authorities, and 
 had also appointed Major Clarke, C.M.G., an officer
 
 THE BOER REBELLION. 213 
 
 of noted coolness and ability, to act as Special Com- 
 missioner for the district. 
 
 Major Clarke's first step was to try, in conjunction 
 with Captain Raaf, to raise a corps of volunteers, in 
 which he totally failed. Those of the townsfolk who 
 were not Boers at heart had too many business 
 relations with the surrounding farmers, and perhaps 
 too little faith in the stability of English rule after 
 Mr. Gladstone's utterances, to allow them to indulge 
 in patriotism. At the time of the outbreak, between 
 seventy and eighty thousand sterling was owing to 
 firms in Potchefstrooni by neighbouring Boers, a sum 
 amply sufficient to account for their lukewarmness in 
 tlie English cause. Subsequent events have shown 
 that the Potchefstroom shopkeepers were wise in their 
 generation. 
 
 On the 1 5 th December a large number of Boers 
 came into the town and took possession of the print- 
 ing-office in order to print the proclamation already 
 alluded to. Major Clarke made two attempts to enter 
 the office and see the leaders, but without success. 
 
 On the 1 6th a Boer patrol fired on some of the 
 mounted infantry, and the fire was returned. These 
 were the first shots fired during the war, and they 
 were fired by Boers. Orders were thereupon signalled 
 to Clarke by Lieutenant-Colonel Winsloe, 21st Regi- 
 ment, now commanding at the fort which he afterwards 
 defended so gallantly, that he was to commence firing. 
 Clarke was in the Landdrost's office on the Market 
 Square with a force of about twenty soldiers under 
 Captain Falls and twenty civilians under Captain 
 Eaaf, C.M.G., a position but ill-suited for defensive 
 purposes, from whence fire was accordingly opened.
 
 214 THE TEANSVAAL. 
 
 the Boers taking up positions in the surrounding 
 houses commanding the office. Shortly after the com- 
 mencement of the fighting, Captain Falls was shot 
 dead whilst talking to Major Clarke, the latter having 
 a narrow escape, a bullet grazing his head just above 
 the ear. The fighting continued during the 17th and 
 till the morning of the i8th, when the Boers suc- 
 ceeded in firing the roof, which was of thatch, by 
 throwing fire-balls on to it. Major Clarke then ad- 
 dressed the men, telling them that, though personally 
 he did not care about his own life, he did not see that 
 they could serve any useful purpose by being burned 
 alive, so he should surrender, which he did, with a loss 
 of about six killed and wounded. The camp meanwhile 
 had repulsed with loss the attack made on it, and was 
 never again directly attacked. 
 
 Whilst these events were in progress at Potchef- 
 stroom, a much more awful tragedy was in preparation 
 on the road between Middleburg and Pretoria. 
 
 On the 23d November, Colonel Bellairs, at the 
 request of Sir Owen Lanyon, directed a concentration 
 on Pretoria of most of the few soldiers that there were 
 in the territory, in view of the disturbed condition of 
 the country. In accordance with these orders. Colonel 
 Anstruther marched from Lydenburg, a town about 
 180 miles from Pretoria, on the 5th December, with 
 the headquarters and two companies of the 94th 
 Eegiment, being a total of 264 men, three women, 
 and two children, and the disproportionately large 
 train of thirty-four ox-waggons, or an ox-waggon 
 capable of carrying five thousand pounds' weight to 
 every eight persons. And here I may remark that it 
 is this enormous amount of baggage, without which it
 
 THE BOER REBELLION. 215 
 
 appears to be impossible to move the smallest body 
 of men, that renders infantry regiments almost useless 
 for service in South Africa except for garrisoning pur- 
 poses. Both Zulus and Boers can get over the ground 
 at thrice the pace possible to the unfortunate soldier, 
 and both races despise them accordingly. The Zulus 
 call our infantry " pack oxen." In this particular in- 
 stance, Colonel Anstruther's defeat, or rather, annihila- 
 tion, is to a very great extent referable to his enormous 
 baggage train ; since, in the first place, had he not 
 lost valuable days in collecting more waggons, he 
 would have been safe in Pretoria before danger arose. 
 It must also be acknowledged that his arrangements 
 on the line of march were somewhat reckless, though 
 it can hardly be said that he was ignorant of his 
 danger. Thus we find that Colonel Bellairs wrote to 
 Colonel Anstruther, warning him of the probability of 
 an attack, and impressing on him the necessity of 
 keeping a good look-out, the letter being received and 
 acknowledged by the latter on the 17th December. 
 
 To this warning was added a still more impressive 
 one that came to my knowledge privately, A gentle- 
 man well known to me received, on the morning after 
 the troops had passed through the town of Middleburg 
 on their way to Pretoria, a visit from an old Boer 
 with whom he was on friendly terms, who had pur- 
 posely come to tell him that a large patrol was out 
 to ambush the troops on the Pretoria road. My in- 
 formant having convinced himself of the truth of the 
 statement, at once rode after the soldiers, and catching 
 them up some distance from Middleburg, told Colonel 
 Anstruther what he had heard, imploring him, he 
 said, with all the energy he could command, to take
 
 2i6 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 better precautions against surprise. The Colonel, how- 
 ever, laughed at his fears, and told him that if the 
 Boers came " he would frighten them away with the 
 big drum." 
 
 At one o'clock on Sunday, the 20th December, the 
 column was marching along about a mile and a half 
 from a place known as Bronker's Splint, and thirty- 
 eight miles from Pretoria, when suddenly a large num- 
 ber of mounted Boers were seen in loose formation 
 on the left side of the road. The band was playing 
 at the time, and the column was extended over more 
 than half a mile, the rearguard being about a hundred 
 yards behind the last waggon. The band stopped 
 playing on seeing the Boers, and the troops halted, 
 when a man was seen advancing with a white flag, 
 whom Colonel Anstruther went out to meet, accom- 
 panied by Conductor Egerton, a civiKan. They met 
 about one hundred and fifty yards from the column, 
 and the man gave Colonel Anstruther a letter, which 
 announced the establishment of the South African 
 Eepublic, stated that until they heard Lanyon's reply 
 to their proclamation they did not know if they were 
 at war or not; that, consequently, they could not 
 allow any movements of troops, which would be taken 
 as a declaration of war. This letter was signed by 
 Joubert, one of the Triumvirate. Colonel Anstruther 
 replied that he was ordered to Pretoria, and to Pretoria 
 he must go. 
 
 Whilst this conference was going on, the Boers, of 
 whom there were quite five hundred, had gradually 
 closed round the column, and took up positions behind 
 rocks and trees which afforded them excellent cover, 
 whilst the troops were on a bare plain, and before
 
 THE BOER REBELLION. 217 
 
 Colonel Anstruther reached his men a murderous fire 
 was poured in upon them from all sides. The fire 
 was hotly returned by the soldiers. Most of the 
 officers were struck down by the first volley, having, 
 no doubt, been picked out by the marksmen. The 
 firing lasted about fifteen minutes, and at the end of 
 that time seven out of the nine officers were down 
 killed and wounded ; an eighth (Captain Elliot), one 
 of the two who escaped untouched, being reserved 
 for an even more awful fate. The majority of the 
 men were also down, and had the hail of lead con- 
 tinued much longer it is clear that nobody would have 
 been left. Colonel Anstruther, who was lying badly 
 wounded in five places, seeing what a hopeless state 
 affairs were in, ordered the bugler to sound the cease 
 firing, and surrendered. One of the three officers who 
 were not much hurt was, most providentially, Dr. 
 Ward, who had but a slight wound in the thigh ; all 
 the others, except Captain Elliot and one lieutenant, 
 were either killed or died from the effects of their 
 wounds. There were altogether 56 killed and 10 1 
 wounded, including a woman, Mrs. Fox. Twenty 
 more afterwards died of their wounds. The Boer loss 
 appears to have been very small. 
 
 After the fight Conductor Egerton, with a sergeant, 
 was allowed to walk into Pretoria to obtain medical 
 assistance, the Boers refusing to give him a horse, or 
 even to allow him to use his own. The Boer leader 
 also left Dr. Ward eighteen men and a few stores 
 for the wounded, with which he made shift as best 
 he could. Nobody can read this gentleman's report 
 without being much impressed with the way in which, 
 though wounded himself, he got through his terrible
 
 2i8 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 task of, without assistance, attending to the wants of 
 10 1 sufferers. Beginning the task at 2 p.m., it took 
 him till six the next morning before he had seen the 
 last man. It is to be hoped that his services have 
 met with some recognition. Dr. Ward remained near 
 the scene of the massacre with his wounded men till 
 the declaration of peace, when he brought them down 
 to Maritzburg, having experienced great difficulty in 
 obtaining food for them during so many weeks. 
 
 This is a short account of what I must, with reluct- 
 ance, call a most cruel and carefully planned massacre. 
 I may mention that a Zulu driver, who was with the 
 rearguard, and escaped into Natal, stated that the 
 Boers shot all the wounded men who formed that 
 body. His statement was to a certain extent borne 
 out by the evidence of one of the survivors, who 
 stated that all the bodies found in that part of the 
 field (nearly three-quarters of a mile away from the 
 head of the column), had a bullet hole through the 
 head or breast in addition to their other wounds. 
 
 The Administrator of the Transvaal in council thus 
 comments on the occurrence in an official minute : — 
 "The surrounding and gradual hemming in under a 
 flag of truce of a force, and the selection of spots from 
 which to direct their fire, as in the case of the unpro- 
 voked attack by the rebels upon Colonel Anstruther's 
 force, is a proceeding of which very few like incidents 
 can be mentioned in the annals of civilised warfare." 
 
 The Boer leaders, however, were highly elated at 
 their success, and celebrated it in a proclamation of 
 which the following is an extract : — " Inexpressible is 
 the gratitude of the burghers for this blessing con- 
 ferred on them. Thankful to the brave General F.
 
 THE BOER REBELLION. 219 
 
 Joubert and his men who have upheld the honour of 
 the Kepublic on the battlefield. Bowed down in the 
 dust before Almighty God, who had thus stood by 
 them, and, with a loss of over a hundred of the enemy, 
 only allowed two of ours to be killed." 
 
 In view of the circumstances of the treacherous 
 hemming in and destruction of this small body of un- 
 prepared men, most people would think this language 
 rather high-flown, not to say blasphemous. 
 
 On the news of this disaster reaching Pretoria, 
 Sir Owen Lanyon issued a proclamation placing the 
 country under martial law. As the town was large, 
 straggling, and incapable of defence, all the inhabitants, 
 amounting to over four thousand souls, were ordered 
 up to camp, where the best arrangements possible were 
 made for their convenience. In these quarters they 
 remained for three months, driven from their comfort- 
 able homes, and cheerfully enduring all the hardships, 
 want, and discomforts consequent on their position, 
 whilst they waited in patience for the appearance of 
 that relieving column that never came. People in 
 England hardly understand what these men and women 
 went through because they chose to remain loyal. 
 Let them suppose that all the inhabitants of an 
 ordinary English town, with the exception of the class 
 known as poor people, which can hardly be said to 
 exist in a colony, were at an hour's notice ordered — 
 all, the aged and the sick, delicate women, and tiny 
 children — to leave their homes to the mercy of the 
 enemy, and crowd up in a Little space under shelter 
 of a fort, with nothing but canvas tents or sheds to 
 cover them from the fierce summer suns and rains, 
 and the coarsest rations to feed them ; whilst the
 
 220 THE TEANSVAAL, 
 
 husbands and brothers were daily engaged with a cun- 
 ning and dangerous enemy, and sometimes brought 
 home wounded or dead. They will then have some 
 idea of what was gone through by the loyal people of 
 Pretoria, in their weak confidence in the good faith of 
 the English Government. 
 
 The arrangements made for the defence of the town 
 were so ably and energetically carried out by Sir 
 Owen Lanyon, assisted by the military officers, that 
 no attack upon it was ever attempted. It seems to 
 me that the organisation that could provide for the 
 penning up of four thousand people for months, and 
 carry it out without the occurrence of a single un- 
 pleasantness or expression of discontent, must have 
 had something remarkable about it. Of course, it 
 would have been impossible without the most loyal 
 co-operation on the part of those concerned. Indeed 
 everybody in the town lent a helping hand ; judges 
 served out rations, members of the Executive inspected 
 nuisances, and so forth. There was only one instance 
 of " striking ; " and then, of all people in the world, 
 it was the five civil doctors who, thinking it a favour- 
 able opportunity to fleece the Government, combined 
 to demand five guineas a-day each for their services. 
 I am glad to say that they did not succeed in their 
 attempt at extortion. 
 
 On the 23d December, the Boer leaders issued a 
 second proclamation in reply to that of Sir 0. Lanyon 
 of the 1 8th, which is characterised by an utter absence 
 of regard for the truth, being, in fact, nothing but a 
 tissue of impudent falsehoods. It accuses Sir 0. Lanyon 
 of having bombarded women and children, of arming 
 natives against the Boers, and of firing on the Boers
 
 THE BOER REBELLION. 221 
 
 without declaring war. Not one of these accusations 
 has any foundation in fact, as the Boers well knew ; 
 but they also knew that Sir Owen, being shut up in 
 Pretoria, was not in a position to rebut their charges, 
 which they hoped might, to some extent, be believed, 
 and create sympathy for them iu other parts of the 
 world. This was the reason of the issue of the pro- 
 clamation, which well portrays the character of its 
 framers. 
 
 Life at Pretoria was varied by occasional sorties 
 against the Boer laagers, situated at different points 
 iu the neighbourhood, generally about six or eight 
 miles from the town. These expeditions were carried 
 out with considerable success, though with some loss, 
 the heaviest incurred being when the Boers, having 
 treacherously hoisted the white flag, opened a heavy 
 fire on the Pretoria forces, as soon as they, beguiled 
 into confidence, emerged from their cover. In the 
 course of the war, one in every four of the Pretoria 
 mounted volunteers was killed or wounded. 
 
 But perhaps the most serious of all the difficulties 
 the Government had to meet was that of keeping the 
 natives in check. As has before been stated, they 
 were devotedly attached to our rule, and, during the 
 three years of its continuance, had undergone what 
 was to them a strange experience, they had neither 
 been murdered, beaten, or enslaved. Naturally they 
 were in no hurry to return to the old order of things, 
 in which murder, flogging, and slavery were events of 
 everyday occurrence. Nor did the behaviour of the 
 Boers on the outbreak of the war tend to reconcile 
 them to any such idea. Tlius we ihid that the farmers 
 had pressed a number of natives from Waterberg into
 
 222 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 one of their laagers (Zwart Koppies) ; two of them 
 tried to ruu away, a Boer saw them and shot them 
 both. Again, on the 7th January, a native reported to 
 the authorities at Pretoria that he and some others were 
 returning from the Diamond Fields driving some sheep. 
 A Boer came and asked them to sell the sheep. They 
 refused, whereupon he went away, but returning with 
 some other Dutchmen fired on the Kafirs, killing one. 
 
 On the 2d January information reached Pretoria 
 that on the 26th December some Boers fired on some 
 natives who were resting outside Potchefstroom and 
 killed three; the rest fled, whereupon the Boers took 
 the cattle they had with them. 
 
 On the 1 1 th January some men, who had been 
 sent from Pretoria with despatches for Standerton, 
 were taken prisoners. Whilst prisoners they saw ten 
 men returning from the Fields stopped by the Boers 
 and ordered to come to the laager. They refused 
 and ran away, were fired on, five being killed and 
 one getting his arm broken. 
 
 These are a few instances of the treatment meted 
 out to the unfortunate natives, taken at haphazard 
 from the official reports. There are plenty more of 
 the same nature if anybody cares to read them. 
 
 As soon as the news of the rising reached them, 
 every chief of any importance sent in to offer aid to 
 Government, and many of them, especially Montsioa, 
 our old ally in the Keate Award district, took the 
 loyals of the neighbourhood under their protection. 
 Several took charge of Government property and cattle 
 during the disturbances, and one had four or five 
 thousand pounds in gold, the product of a recently 
 collected tax, given him to take care of by the Com-
 
 THE BOER REBELLION. 223 
 
 missioner of his district, who was afraid that the 
 money would be seized by the Boers. lu every 
 instance the property entrusted to their charge was 
 returned intact. The loyalty of all the native chiefs 
 under very trying circumstances (for the Boers were 
 constantly attempting to cajole or frighten them into 
 joining them) is a remarkable proof of the great affec- 
 tion of the Kafirs, more especially those of the Basuto 
 tribes, who love peace better than war, for the Queen's 
 rule. The Government of Pretoria need only have 
 spoken one word to set an enormous number of armed 
 men in motion against the Boers, with the most serious 
 results to the latter. Any other Government in the 
 world would, in its extremity, have spoken that word, 
 but, fortunately for the Boers, it is against English 
 principles to set black against white under any cir- 
 cumstances. 
 
 Besides the main garrison at Pretoria there were 
 forts defended by soldiery and loyals at the following 
 places: — Potchefstroom, Eustenburg, Lydenburg, Mara- 
 bastad, and Wakkerstroom, none of which were taken 
 by the Boers.^ 
 
 One of the first acts of the Triumvirate was to 
 despatch a large force from Heidelberg with orders to 
 advance into Natal Territory, and seize the pass over 
 the Drakensberg known as Lang's Nek, so as to dispute 
 the advance of any relieving column. This movement 
 was promptly executed, and strong Boer troops patrolled 
 Natal country almost up to Newcastle. 
 
 The news of the outbreak, followed as it was by 
 
 ^ Colonel Winsloe, however, being short of provisions, was beguiled 
 by the fraudulent representations and acts of the Boer commandeT into 
 Burrendering the fort at Potchefstroom duriug the armietice.
 
 224 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 that of the Bronker's Spruit massacre, and Captain 
 Elliot's murder, created a great excitement in Natal. 
 All available soldiers were at once despatched up 
 country, together with a naval brigade, who, on arrival 
 at Newcastle, brought up the strength of the Imperial 
 troops of all arms to about a thousand men. On the 
 lotli January Sir George Colley left Maritzburg to 
 join the force at Newcastle, but at this time nobody 
 dreamt that he meant to attack the Nek with such an 
 insignificant column. It was known that the loyals 
 and troops who were shut up in the various towns 
 in the Transvaal had sufficient provisions to last for 
 some months, and that there was therefore nothing to 
 necessitate a forlorn hope. Indeed the possibility of 
 Sir George Colley attempting to enter the Transvaal 
 was not even speculated upon until just before his 
 advance, it being generally considered as out of the 
 question. 
 
 The best illustration I can give of the feeling that 
 existed about the matter is to quote my own case. I 
 had been so unfortunate as to land in Natal with my 
 wife and servants just as the Transvaal troubles began, 
 my intention being to proceed to a place I had near 
 Newcastle. For some weeks I remained in Maritz- 
 burg, but iindiiig that the troops were to concentrate 
 on Newcastle, and being besides heartily wearied of 
 the great expense and discomfort of hotel life in that 
 town, I determined to go on up country, looking on 
 it as being as safe as any place in the colony. Of 
 course the possibility of Sir George attacking the Nek 
 before the arrival of the reinforcements did not enter 
 into my calculations, as I thought it a venture that 
 no sensible man would undertake. On the day of
 
 THE BOER REBELLION. 225 
 
 my start, however, there was a rumour about the 
 town that the General was going to attack the Boer 
 position. Though I did not believe it, I thought it 
 as well to go and ask the Colonial Secretary, Colonel 
 Mitchell, privately, if there was any truth in it, adding 
 that if there was, as I had a pretty intimate knowledge 
 of the Boers and their shooting powers, and what the 
 inevitable result of such a move would be, I should 
 certainly prefer, as I had ladies with me, to remain 
 where I was. Colonel Mitchell told me frankly that 
 he knew no more about Sir George's plans than I 
 did ; but he added I might be sure that so able and 
 prudent a soldier would not do anything rash. His 
 remark concurred with my own opinion ; so I started, 
 and on arrival at Newcastle a week later was met 
 by the intelligence that Sir George had advanced that 
 morning to attack the Nek. To return was almost 
 impossible, since both horses and travellers were pretty 
 nearly knocked up. Also, anybody who lias travelled 
 with his family in summer-time over the awful track 
 of alternate slough and boulders between Maritzburg 
 and Newcastle, known in the colony as a road, will 
 understand that at the time the adventurous voyagers 
 would far rather risk being shot than face a return 
 journey. 
 
 The only thing to do under the circumstances was 
 to await the course of events, which were now about 
 to develop themselves with startling rapidity. The 
 little town of Newcastle was at this time an odd sight, 
 and remained so all through the war. The hotels 
 were crowded to overflowing with refugees, and on 
 every spare patch of land were erected tents, mud 
 huts, canvas houses, and every kind of covering that 
 
 p
 
 226 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 could be utilised under the pressure of necessity, to 
 house the many homeless families who had succeeded 
 in effecting their escape from the Transvaal, many of 
 whom were reduced to great straits. 
 
 On the morning of the 2 8di January, anybody 
 listening attentively in the neighbourhood of Newcastle 
 could hear the distant boom of heavy guns. We were 
 not kept long in suspense, for in the afternoon news 
 arrived that Sir George had attacked the Nek, and 
 failed with heavy loss. The excitement in the town 
 was intense, for, in addition to other considerations, 
 the 58th Eegiment, which had suffered most, had 
 been quartered there for some time, and both the 
 officers and men were personally known to the in- 
 habitants. 
 
 The story of the fight is well known, and needs 
 little repetition, and a very sad story it is. The Boers, 
 who at that time were some 2000 strong, were posted 
 and entrenched on steep hills, against which Sir 
 George Colley hurled a few hundred soldiers. It was 
 a forlorn hope, but so gallant was the charge, espe- 
 cially that of the mounted squadron led by Major 
 J^ronlow, that at one time it nearly succeeded. But 
 nothing could stand under the withering fire from the 
 Boer schanses, and as regards the foot soldiers, they 
 never had a chance. Colonel Deane tried to take 
 them up the hill with a rush, with the result that 
 by the time they reached the top, some of the men 
 were actually sick from exhaustion, and none could 
 hold a rifle steady. Tliere on the bare hill-top they 
 ci'ouched and lay, whilst the pitiless fire from redoubt 
 and rock lashed them like hail, till at last human 
 nature could bear it no longer, and what was left of
 
 THE BOER REBELLION. 227 
 
 them retired slowly down the slope. But for many 
 that gallant charge was their last earthly action. As 
 they charged they fell, and where they fell they were 
 afterwards buried. The casualties, killed and wounded, 
 amounted to 195, which, considering the small number 
 of troops eni^^aged in the actual attack, is enormously 
 heavy, and shows more plainly than words can tell 
 the desperate nature of the undertaking. Amongst 
 the killed were Colonel Deane, Major Poole, Major 
 Hingeston, and Lieutenant Elwes. Major Essex was 
 the only staff officer engaged who escaped, the same 
 officer who was one of the fortunate four who lived 
 through Isandhlwana. On this occasion his usual 
 good fortune attended him, for though his horse was 
 killed and his helmet knocked off, he was not touched. 
 The Boer loss was very trivial. 
 
 Sir George Colley, in his admirably lucid despatch 
 about this occurrence addressed to the Secretary of 
 State for War, does not enter much into the question 
 as to the motives that prompted him to attack, simply 
 stating that his object was to relieve the besieged 
 towns. He does not appear to have taken into con- 
 sideration, what was obvious to ^nybody who knew 
 the country and the Boers, that even if he had suc- 
 ceeded in forcing the Nek, in itself almost an impossi- 
 bility, he could never have operated with any success 
 in the Transvaal with so small a column, without 
 cavalry, and with an enormous train of waggons. He 
 would have been harassed day and night by the Boer 
 skirmishers, his supplies cut off, and his advance made 
 practically impossible. Also the Nek would have 
 been re-occupied behind him, since he could not have 
 detached sufficient men to hold it, and in all proba-
 
 228 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 bility Newcastle, his base of supplies, would have fallen 
 into the hands of the enemy. 
 
 The moral effect of our defeat on the Boers was 
 very great. Up to this time there had been many 
 secret doubts amongst a large section of them as to 
 what the upshot of an encounter with the troops 
 might be ; and with this party, in the same way that 
 defeat, or even the anxiety of waiting to be attacked, 
 would have turned the scale one way, victory turned 
 it the other. It gave them unbounded confidence in 
 their own superiority, and infused a spirit of cohesion 
 and mutual reliance into their ranks which had before 
 been wanting. Waverers wavered no longer, but gave 
 a loyal adherence to the good cause, and, what was 
 still more acceptable, large numbers of volunteers, 
 — whatever President Brand may say to the contrary, 
 — poured in from the Orange Free State. 
 
 What Sir George Oolley's motive was in making so 
 rash a move is, of course, quite inexplicable to the 
 outside observer. It was said at the time in Natal 
 that he was a man with a theory : namely, that small 
 bodies of men properly handled were as useful and as 
 likely to obtain the object in view as a large force. 
 Whether or no this was so, I am not prepared to say ; 
 but it is undoubtedly the case that very clever men 
 have sometimes very odd theories, and it may be that 
 he was a striking instance in point. 
 
 For some days after the battle at Lang's Nek affairs 
 were quiet, and it was hoped that they would remain 
 so till the arrival of the reinforcements, which were 
 on their way out. The hope proved a vain one. 
 On the 7th February it was reported that the escort 
 proceeding from Newcastle to the General's camp with
 
 "THE BOER EEBELLION. 229 
 
 the post, a distance of about eighteen miles, had been 
 fired on and forced to return. 
 
 On the 8th, about mid-day, we were all startled by 
 the sound of fighting, proceeding apparently from a 
 hill known as Scheins Hoogte, about ten miles from 
 Newcastle. It was not known that the General con- 
 templated any move, and everybody was entirely at a 
 loss to know what was going on, the general idea 
 being, however, that the camp near Lang's Nek had 
 been abandoned, and that Sir George was retiring on 
 Newcastle. 
 
 The firing grew hotter and hotter, till at last it was 
 perfectly continuous, the cannon evidently being dis- 
 charged as quickly as they could be loaded, whilst 
 their dull booming was accompanied by the unceas- 
 ing crash and roll of the musketry. Towards three 
 o'clock the firing slackened, and we thought it was all 
 over, one way or the other, but about five o'clock it 
 broke out a^ain with increased vigour. At dusk it 
 finally ceased. About this time some Kafirs came 
 to my house and told us that an English force was 
 hemmed in on a hill this side of the Ingogo Eiver, 
 that they were fighting bravely, but that " their arms 
 were tired," adding that they thought they would be 
 all killed at night. 
 
 Needless to say we spent that night with heavy 
 hearts, expecting every minute to hear the firing begin 
 again, and ignorant of what fate had befallen our poor 
 soldiers on the hill. Morning put an end to our 
 suspense, and we then learnt that we had suffered 
 what, under the circumstances, amounted to a crush- 
 ing defeat. It appears that Sir George had moved out 
 with a force of five companies of the 60th Eegiment,
 
 230 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 two guns, and a few mounted men, to, in his own 
 words, " patrol the road, and meet and escort some 
 waggons expected from Newcastle," As soon as he 
 passed the Ingogo he was surrounded hy a body of 
 Boers sent after him from Lang's Nek, on a small 
 triangular plateau, and sharply assailed on all sides. 
 With a break of about two hours, from three to five, 
 the assault was kept up till nightfall, with very bad 
 results so far as we were concerned, seeing that out of 
 a body of about 500 men, over 150 were killed and 
 wounded. The reinforcements sent for from the camp 
 apparently did not come into action. Tor some un- 
 explained reason the Boers did not follow up their 
 attack that night, perhaps because they did not think 
 it possible that our troops could effect their escape 
 back to the camp, and considered that the next morn- 
 ing would be soon enough to return and finish the 
 business. The General, however, determined to get 
 back, and scratch teams of such mules, riding-horses, 
 and oxen as had lived through the day being harnessed 
 to the guns, the dispirited and exhausted survivors of 
 the force managed to ford the Ingogo, now swollen by 
 rain which had fallen in the afternoon, poor Lieutenant 
 Wilkinson, the adjutant of the 60th, losing his life in 
 the operation, and to struggle through the dense dark- 
 ness back to camp. 
 
 On the hill- top they had lately held the dead lay 
 thick. There, too, exposed to the driving rain and 
 bitter wind, lay the wounded, many of whom would be 
 dead before the rising of the morrow's sun. It must 
 indeed have been a sight never to be forgotten by 
 those who saw it. The night — I remember well — 
 ^f!as cold and rainy, the great expanses of hill and
 
 THE BOER REBELLION. 231 
 
 plain being sometimes lit by the broken gleams of an 
 uncertain moon, and sometimes plunged into intensest 
 darkness by the passing of a heavy cloud. Now and 
 again flashes of lightning threw every crag and outline 
 into vivid relief, and the deep muttering of distant 
 thunder made the wild gloom more solemn. Then a 
 gust of icy wind would come tearing down the valleys 
 to be followed by a pelting thunder shower — and thus 
 the night wore away. 
 
 When one reflects what discomfort, and even danger, 
 an ordinary healihy person would suffer if left after a 
 hard day's work to lie all night in the rain and wind 
 on the top of a stony mountain, without food, or even 
 water to assuage his thirst, it becomes to some degree 
 possible to realise what the sufferings of our wounded 
 after the battle of Imro^o must have been. Those 
 who survived were next day taken to the hospital at 
 Newcastle 
 
 What Sir George Colley's real object was in expos- 
 ing himself to the attack has never transpired. It 
 can hardly have been to clear the road, as he says in 
 his despatch, because the road was not held by the 
 enemy, but only visited occasionally by their patrols. 
 The result of the battle was to make the Boers, whose 
 losses were trifling, more confident than ever, and to 
 greatly depress our soldiers. Sir George had now lost 
 between three and four hundred men out of his 
 column of little over a thousand, which was thereby 
 entirely crippled. Of his staff officers Mnjor Essex 
 now alone survived, his usual good fortune having 
 carried him safe through the battle of Ingogo. What 
 makes his repeated escapes the more remarkable is 
 that he was generally to be found in the heaviest
 
 232 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 firing. A man so fortunate as Major Essex ought to 
 be rewarded for his good fortune if for no other reason, 
 though, if reports are true, there would be no need to 
 fall back on that to find grounds on which to advance 
 a soldier who has always borne himself so well. 
 
 Another result of the Ingogo battle was that the 
 Boers, knowing that we had no force to cut them off, 
 and always secure of a retreat into the Free State, 
 passed round Newcastle in Tree State Territory, and 
 descended from fifteen hundred to two thousand strong 
 into Natal for the purpose of destroying the reinforce- 
 ments which were now on their way up under General 
 Wood. This was on the nth of February, and from 
 that date till the i8th the upper districts of Natal 
 were in the hands of the enemy, who cut the telegraph 
 wires, looted waggons, stole herds of cattle and horses, 
 and otherwise amused themselves at the expense of 
 Her Majesty's subjects in Natal. 
 
 It was a very anxious time for those who knew what 
 Boers are capable of, and had women and children to 
 protect, and who were never sure if their houses would 
 be left standing over their heads from one day to 
 another. 
 
 Every night we were obliged to place out Kafirs as 
 scouts to give us timely M'arning of the approach of 
 marauding parties, and to sleep with loaded rifles close 
 to our hands, and sometimes, when things looked very 
 black, in our clothes, with horses ready saddled in the 
 stable. Nor were our fears groundless, for one day a 
 patrol of some five hundred Boers encamped on the 
 next place, which by the way belonged to a Dutchman, 
 and stole all the stock on it, the property of an 
 Englishman. They also intercepted a train of waggons,
 
 THE BOER REBELLIO^T. 233 
 
 destroyed the contents, and burnt them. Numerous 
 were the false alarms it was our evil fortune to experi- 
 ence. For instance, one night I was sitting in the 
 drawing-room reading, about eleven o'clock, with a door 
 leading on to the verandah slightly ajar, for the night 
 was warm, when suddenly I heard myself called by 
 name in a muffled voice, and asked if the place was in 
 the possession of the Boers. Looking towards the door 
 I saw a full-cocked revolver coming round the corner, 
 and on opening it in some alarm, I could indistinctly 
 discern a line of armed figures in a crouching attitude 
 stretching along the verandah into the garden beyond. 
 Tt turned out to be a patrol of the mounted police, who 
 had received information that a large number of Boers 
 had seized the place and had come to ascertain the 
 truth of the report. As we gathered from them that 
 the Boers were certainly near, we did not pass a very 
 comfortable night. 
 
 Meanwhile we were daily expecting to hear that the 
 troops had been attacked along the line of march, and 
 knowing the nature of the country and the many 
 opportunities it affords for ambuscading and destroying 
 one of our straggling columns encumbered with innumer- 
 able waggons, we had the worst fears for the result. 
 At length a report reached us to the effect that the 
 reinforcements were expected on the morrow, and that 
 they were not going to cross the Ingagaan at the 
 ordinary drift, which was much commanded by hills, 
 but at a lower drift on our own place, about three 
 miles from Newcastle, which is only slightly com- 
 manded. We also heard that it was the intention of 
 the Boers to attack them at this point and to fall back 
 on my house and the hills behind. Accordingly, m'g
 
 234 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 tliouglit it about time to retreat, and securing a few 
 valuables, such as plate, we made our way into the 
 town, leaving the house and its contents to take their 
 chance. At Newcastle an attack was daily expected, 
 if for no other reason, to obtain possession of the stores 
 collected there. 
 
 The defences of the place were, however, in a wretched 
 condition, no proper outlook was kept, and there was 
 an utter want of effective organisation. The military 
 element at the camp had enough to do to look after 
 itself, and did not concern itself with the safety of the 
 town ; and the mounted police — a colonial force paid 
 by the colony — had been withdrawn from the little 
 forts round Newcastle, as the General wanted them for 
 other purposes, and a message sent that the town nmst 
 defend its own forts. There were, it is true, a large 
 number of able-bodied men in the place who were 
 willing to figlit, but they had no organisation. The 
 very langer was not finished until the danger was 
 past. 
 
 Then there was a large party who were for surrender- 
 ing the town to the Boers, because if they fought it 
 might afterwards injure their trade. With this section 
 of the population the feeling of patriotism was strong, 
 no doubt, but that of pocket was stronger. I am con- 
 vinced that the Boers would have found the capture of 
 Newcastle an easy task, and I confess that what I then 
 saw did not inspire me with great hopes of the safety 
 of the colony when it gets responsible government, 
 and has to depend for protection on burgher forces. 
 Colonial volunteer forces are, I think, as good troops as 
 any in the world ; but an unorganised colonial mob, 
 pulled this way and that by different sentiments and
 
 THE BOER REBELLION. 235 
 
 interests, is as useless as any other mob, with the 
 difference that it is more impatient of control. 
 
 For some unknown reason the Boer leaders provi- 
 dentially changed their minds about attacking the rein- 
 forcements, and their men were withdrawn to the Nek 
 as swiftly and silently as they had been advanced, and 
 on the 17th February the reinforcements marched into 
 Newcastle, to the very great relief of the inhabitants, 
 wlio had been equally anxious for their own safety and 
 tliat of the troops. Personally, I was never in my life 
 more pleased to see Her Majesty's uniform ; and we were 
 equally rejoiced on returning home to find that nothing 
 liad been injured. After this we had quiet for a while. 
 
 On the 2ist February, we heard that two fresh regi- 
 ments had been sent up to the camp at Lang's Nek, 
 and that General Wood had been ordered down country 
 by Sir George Colley to bring up more reinforcements. 
 This item of nev/s caused much surprise, as nobody 
 could understand why, now. that the road was clear, 
 and that tliere was little chance of its being again 
 blocked, a General should be sent down to do work 
 which could, to all appearance, have been equally well 
 done by the officers in command of the reinforcing 
 regiments, with the assistance of their transport riders. 
 It was, however, understood that an agreement had been 
 entered into between the two Generals that no offensive 
 operations should be undertaken till Wood returned. 
 
 With the exception of occasional scares, there was 
 no further excitement till Sunday the 27th February, 
 when, whilst sitting on the verandah after lunch, I 
 thought I heard the sound of distant artillery. Others 
 present differed with me, thinking the sound was caused 
 by thunder, but as I adhered to my opinion, we deter-
 
 236 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 mined to ride into town and see. On arrival thero 
 we found the place full of rumours, from which we 
 gathered that some fresh disaster had occurred; and 
 that messages were pouring down the wires from 
 Mount Prospect camp. We then went on to camp, 
 thinking that we should learn more there, but they 
 knew nothing about it, several officers asking us what 
 new "shave" we had got hold of. A considerable 
 number of troops had been marched from Newcastle 
 that morning to go to Mount Prospect, but when it 
 was realised that something had occurred, they were 
 stopped, and marched back again. Bit by bit we 
 managed to gather the truth. At first we heard that 
 our men had made a most gallant resistance on the 
 hill, mowing down the advancing enemy by hundreds, 
 till at last, their ammunition failing, they fought with 
 their bayonets, using stones and meat tins as missiles. 
 I wish that our subsequent information had been to 
 the same effect. 
 
 It appears that on the evening of the 26th, Sir 
 George CoUey, after mess, suddenly gave orders for a 
 force of a little over six hundred men, consisting of 
 detachments from no less than three different regi- 
 ments, the 58th, 60th, 92d, and the Naval Brigade, to 
 be got ready for an expedition, without revealing his 
 plans to anybody until late in the afternoon; and 
 then without more ado, marched them up to the top 
 of Majuba — a great square- topped mountain to the 
 right of, and commanding the Boer position at Lang's 
 Nek. The troops reached the top about three in the 
 morning, afcer a somewhat exhausting climb, and were 
 stationed at different points of the plateau in a scientific 
 way. Whilst the darkness lasted, they could, by the
 
 THE BOER REBELLION. 237 
 
 glittering of the watch-fires, trace from this point of 
 vantage the position of tlie Boer Laagers that lay 2000 
 yards beneath them, whilst the dawn of day revealed 
 every detail of the defensive works, and showed the 
 country lying at their feet like a mop. 
 
 On arrival at the top, it was represented to the 
 General tliat a rough entrenchment should be thrown 
 up, but he would not allow it to be done on account of 
 the men being wearied with their marching up. This 
 was a fatal mistake. Behind an entrenchment, however 
 slight, one would think that 600 English soldiers might 
 have defied the whole Boer army, and much more the 
 200 or 300 men by whom they were hunted down 
 Majuba. It appears that about 10.15 ^■^^■> Colonel 
 Stewart and Major Eraser again went to General Colley 
 " to arrange to start the sailors on an entrenchment." . . . 
 " Finding the ground so exposed, the General did not 
 give orders to entrench." 
 
 As soon as the Boers found out that the hill was in 
 the occupation of the English, their first idea was to 
 leave the Nek, and they began to inspan with that 
 object, but discovering that there were no guns com- 
 manding them, they changed their mind, and set to 
 work to storm the hill instead. As far as I have been 
 able to gather, the number of Boers who took the 
 mountain was about 300, or possibly 400; I do not 
 think there were more than that. The Boers them- 
 selves declare solemnly that they were only 100 strong, 
 but this I do not believe. They slowly advanced up 
 the hill till about 11.30, when the real attack began, 
 the Dutchmen coming on more rapidly and confidently, 
 and shooting with ever-increasing accuracy, as they 
 found our fire quite ineffective.
 
 238 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 About a quarter to one, our men retreated to the 
 last ridge, and General Colley was shot through the 
 head. After this, the retreat became a rout, and. the 
 soldiers rushed pell-mell down the precipitous sides of 
 the hill, the Boers knocking them over by the score as 
 they went, till they were out of range. A few were 
 also, 1 heard, killed by the shells from the guns that 
 were advanced from the camp to cover the retreat, but 
 as this does not appear in the reports, perhaps it is not 
 true. Our loss was about 200 killed and wounded, 
 including Sir George Colley, Drs. Landon and Cornish, 
 and Commander Eomilly, who was shot with an 
 explosive bullet, and died after some days' suffering. 
 When the wounded Commander was being carried to 
 a more sheltered spot, it was with great difficulty that 
 the Boers were prevented from massacring him as he 
 lay, they being under the impression that he was Sir 
 Garnet Wolseley. As was the case at Ingogo, the 
 wounded were left on the battlefield all night in very 
 inclement weather, to which some of them succumbed. 
 It is worthy of note that after the fight was over 
 they were treated with considerable kindness by the 
 Boers. 
 
 Not being a soldier, of course, I cannot venture to 
 give any military reasons as to how it was that what 
 was after all a considerable force was so easily driven 
 from a position of great natural strength ; but I think 
 I may, without presumption, state my opinion as to 
 the real cause, which was the villainous shooting of the 
 British soldier. Though the troops did not, as was 
 said at the time, run short of ammunition, it is clear 
 that they fired away a great many rounds at men who, 
 in storming the hill, must necessarily have exposed
 
 THE BOER REBELLION. 239 
 
 themselves more or less, of whom they managed to hit 
 — certainly not more than six or seven — which wns 
 the outside of the Boer casualties. From this it is 
 clear that they can neither judge distance nor hit a 
 moving object, nor did they probably know that when 
 shooting down hill it is necessary to aim low. Such 
 shooting as the English soldier is capable of may be 
 very well when he has an army to aim at, but it is 
 useless in guerilla warfare against a foe skilled in the 
 use of the rifle and the art of taking shelter. 
 
 A couple of months after the storming of Majuba, 
 I, together with a friend, had a conversation with a 
 Boer, a volunteer from the Free State in the late war, 
 and one of the detachment that stormed Majuba, who 
 gave us a circumstantial account of the attack with 
 the greatest willingness. He said that when it was 
 discovered that the English had possession of the 
 mountain, they thought that the game was up, but 
 after a while bolder counsels prevailed, and volun- 
 teers were called for to storm the hill. Only seventy 
 men could be found to perform the duty, of whom 
 he was one. They started up the mountain in fear 
 and trembling, but soon found that every sliot passed 
 over their heads, and went on with greater boldness. 
 Only three men, he declared, were hit on the Boer 
 side ; one was killed, one was hit in the arm, and he 
 himself was the third, getting his face grazed by a 
 bullet, of wliich he showed us the scar. He stated 
 that the first to reach the top ridge was a boy of 
 twelve, and that as soon as the troops saw them they 
 fled, when, he said, he paid them out for having nearly 
 killed him, knocking them over one after another " like 
 bucks " as they ran down the hill, adding that it was
 
 240 TPIE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 " alter lecker " (very nice). He asked us how many 
 men we had lost during the war, and when we told 
 him about seven hundred killed and wounded, laughed 
 in our faces, saying he knew that our dead amounted 
 to several thousands. On our assuring him that this 
 was not the case, he replied, " Well, don't let's talk 
 of it any more, because we are good friends now, and 
 if we go on you will lie, and I shall lie, and then we 
 shall get angry. The war is over now, and I don't 
 want to quarrel with the English ; if one of them takes 
 off his hat to me I always acknowledge it." He did 
 not mean any harm in talking thus ; it is what Eng- 
 lishmen have to put up with now in South Africa; 
 the Boers have beaten us, and act accordingly. 
 
 This man also told us that the majority of the rifles 
 they picked up were sighted for 400 yards, whereas the 
 latter part of the fighting had been carried on within 
 200. 
 
 Sir George Colley's death was much lamented in the 
 colony, where he was deservedly popular ; indeed, any- 
 body who had the honour of knowing that kind-hearted 
 English gentleman, could not do otherwise than deeply 
 regret his untimely end. What his motive was in oc- 
 cupying Majuba in the way he did has never, so far 
 as I am aware, transpired. The move, in itself, would 
 have been an excellent one, had it been made in force, 
 or accompanied by a direct attack on the Nek, but, 
 as undertaken, seems to have been objectless. There 
 were, of course, many rumours as to the motives that 
 prompted his action, of which the most probable seems 
 to be that, being aware of what the Home Government 
 intended to do with reference to the Transvaal, he de- 
 termined to strike a blow to try and establish British
 
 THE BOER REBELLION. 241 
 
 supremacy first, knowing how mischievous any ap- 
 parent surrender would be. Whatever his faults may 
 have been as a General, he was a brave man, and had 
 the honour of his country much at heart. 
 
 It was also said by soldiers who saw him the night 
 the troops marched up Majuba, that the General was 
 " not himself," and it was hinted that continual anxiety 
 and the chagrin of failure had told upon his mind. As 
 against this, however, must be set the fact that his 
 telegrams to the Secretary of State for War, the last 
 of which he must have despatched only about half 
 an hour before he was shot, are cool and collected, 
 and written in the same unconcerned tone — as though 
 he were a critical spectator of an interesting scene — 
 that characterises all his communications, more espe- 
 cially his despatches. They at any rate give no evi- 
 dence of shaken nerve or unduly excited brain, nor 
 can I see that any action of his with reference to the 
 occupation of Majuba is out of keeping with the 
 details of his generalship upon other occasions. He 
 was always confident to rashness, and possessed by 
 the idea that every man in the ranks was full of as 
 high a spirit, and as brave as he was himself. In- 
 deed, most people will think, that so far from its 
 being a rasher action, the occupation of Majuba, bad 
 generalship as it seems, was a wiser move than either 
 the attack on the Nek or the Ingogo fiasco. 
 
 But at the best, all his movements are difficult to 
 be understood by a civilian, though they may, for 
 ought we know, have been part of an elaborate plan, 
 perfected in accordance with the rules of military 
 science, of which, it is said, he was a great student.
 
 ( 242 ) 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE KETROCESSION OF THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 When Parliament met in January 1881, the Govern- 
 ment announced, through the mediumship of the 
 Queen's Speech, that it was their intention to vin- 
 dicate Her Majesty's authority in the Transvaal. I 
 have already briefly described the somewhat unfor- 
 tunate attempts to gain this end by force of arms; 
 and I now propose to follow the course of the diplo- 
 matic negotiations entered into by the ministry with 
 the same object. 
 
 As soon as the hostilities in the Transvaal took a 
 positive form, causing great dismay among the Home 
 authorities, whose paths, as we all know, are the 
 paths of peace — at any price ; and whilst, in the 
 first confusion of calamity, they knew not where to 
 turn. President Brand stepped upon the scene in the 
 character of "Our Mutual Friend," and, by the Govern- 
 ment at any rate, was rapturously welcomed. 
 
 This gentleman has for many years been at the head 
 of the Government of the Orange Free State, whose 
 fortunes he had directed with considerable ability. 
 He is a man of natural talent and kind-hearted dis- 
 position, and has the advancement of the Boer cause 
 in South Africa much at heart. The rising in the
 
 THE RETROCESSION OF THE TRANSVAAL. 243 
 
 Transvaal was an event that fiave him a ^reat and 
 threefold opportunity : first, of interfering with the 
 genuinely benevolent object of checking bloodshed; 
 secondly, of advancing the Dutch cause throughout 
 South Africa under the cloak of amiable neutrality, 
 and striking a dangerous blow at British supremacy 
 over the Dutch and British prestige with the natives ; 
 and, thirdly, of putting the English Government 
 under a lasting obligation to him. Of this oppor- 
 tunity he has availed himself to the utmost in each 
 particular. 
 
 So soon as things began to look serious, Mr. Brand 
 put himself into active telegraphic communication with 
 the various British authorities with the view of pre- 
 venting bloodshed by inducing the English Govern- 
 ment to accede to the Boer demands. He was also 
 earnest in his declarations that the Eree State was 
 not supporting the Transvaal; which, considering that 
 it was practically the insurgent base of supplies, where 
 they had retired their women, children, and cattle, and 
 that it furnished them with a large number of volun- 
 teers, was perhaps straining the truth. 
 
 About this time also we find Lord Kimberley tele- 
 graphing to Mr. Brand that "if only the Transvaal 
 Boers will desist from armed opposition to the Queen's 
 authority," he thinks some arrangement might be made. 
 This is the first indication made public of what was 
 passing in the minds of Her Majesty's Government, 
 on whom its Eadical supporters were now beginning 
 to put the screw, to induce or threaten them into sub- 
 mitting to the Boer demands. 
 
 Again, on the nth January, the President tele- 
 graphed to Lord Kimberley through the Orange Free
 
 244 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 State Consul in London, suggesting that Sir H. de 
 Villiers, the Chief Justice at the Cape, should be ap- 
 pointed a Commissioner to go to the Transvaal to settle 
 matters. Oddly enough, about the same time the same 
 proposition emanated from the Dutch party in the Cape 
 Colony, headed by Mr. Hofmeyer, a coincidence that 
 inclines one to the opinion that these friends of the 
 Boers had some further reason for thus urging Sir 
 Henry de Villiers' appointment as Commissioner beyond 
 his apparent fitness for the post, of "which his high 
 reputation as a lawyer and in his private capacity was 
 a sufficient guarantee. 
 
 The explanation is not hard to find, the fact being 
 that, rightly or wrongly. Sir Henry de Villiers, who is 
 himself of Dutch descent, is noted throughout South 
 Africa for his sympathies with the Boer cause, and 
 both President Brand and the Dutch party in the 
 Cape shrewdly suspected that, if the settling of dif- 
 ferences were left to his discretion, the Boers and 
 their interests would receive very gentle handling. 
 The course of action adopted by him, when he be- 
 came a member of the Eoyal Commission, went far 
 to support this view, for it will be noticed in the 
 iieport of the Commissioneis that in every single 
 point he appears to have taken the Boer side of the 
 contention. Indeed so blind was he to their faults, 
 that he would not even admit that the horrible 
 Potchefstroom murders and atrocities, which are con- 
 demned both by Sir H, Robinson and Sir Evelyn 
 Wood in language as strong as the formal terms of 
 a report will allow, were acts contrary to the rujes 
 of civilised warfare. If those acts had been perpe- 
 trated by Englishmen on Boers, or even on natives,
 
 THE EETROCESSION OF THE TRANSVAAL. 245 
 
 I venture to think Sir Henry de Villiers would have 
 looked at them in a very different light. 
 
 In the same telegram in which President Brand 
 recommends the appointment of Sir Henry de Villiers, 
 he states that the allegations made by the Triumvirate 
 in the proclamation in which they accused Sir Owen 
 Lanyon of committing various atrocities, deserve to be 
 investigated, as they maintain that the collision was 
 commenced by the authorities. Nobody knew better 
 than Mr. Brand that any English official would be 
 quite incapable of the conduct ascribed to Sir Owen 
 Lanyon, whilst, even if the collision had been com- 
 menced by the authorities, which as it happened it 
 was not, they would under the circumstances have 
 been amply justified in so commencing it. This re- 
 mark by President Brand in his telegram was merely 
 an attempt to throw an air of probability over a series 
 of slanderous falsehoods. 
 
 Messages of this nature continued to pour along 
 the wires from day to day, but the tone of those from 
 the Colonial Office grew gradually humbler. Thus we 
 find Lord Kimbeiiey telegraphing on the Sih February, 
 that if the Boers would desist from armed opposition 
 all reasonable guarantees would be given as to their 
 treatment after submission, and that a scheme would 
 be framed for the "permanent friendly settlement of 
 difficulties." It will be seen that the Government had 
 already begun to water the meaning of their declara- 
 tion that they would vindicate Her Majesty's autho- 
 rity. No doubt Mr. Chamberlain, Mr. Courtney, and 
 their followers had given another turn to the lladical 
 screw. 
 
 It is, however, clear that at this time no idea of
 
 246 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 the real aims of the Government had entered into 
 the mind of Sir George Colley, since on the 7th Feb- 
 ruary he telegraphed home a plan which he proposed 
 to adopt on entering the Transvaal, which included a 
 suggestion that he should grant a complete amnesty 
 only to those Boers who would sign a declaration of 
 loyalty. 
 
 In answer to this he was ordered to do nothing of 
 the sort, but to promise protection to everybody and 
 refer everything home. 
 
 Then came the battle of Ingogo, which checked for 
 the time the flow of telegrams, or rather varied their 
 nature, for those despatched during the next few days 
 deal with the question of reinforcements. On the 
 13th February, however, negotiations were reopened 
 by Paul Kruger, one of the Triumvirate, who offered, 
 if all the troops were ordered to withdraw from the 
 Transvaal, to give them a free passage through the 
 Nek, to disperse the Boers, and to consent to the 
 appointment of a Commission. 
 
 The offer was jumped at by Lord Kimberley, who, 
 without making reference to the question of with- 
 drawing the soldiers, offered, if only the Boers would 
 disperse, to appoint a Commission with extensive 
 powers to develop the " permanent friendly settle- 
 ment " scheme. The telegram ends thus : " Add, that 
 if this proposal is accepted, you now are authorised 
 to agree to suspension of hostilities on our part." 
 This message was sent to General AVood, because 
 the Boers had stopped the communications with 
 Colley. On the 19th, Sir George Colley replies in 
 these words, which show his astonishment at the 
 policy adopted by the Home Government, and which,
 
 THE RETROCESSION OF THE TRANSVAAL. 247 
 
 in the opiuion of most people, redound to his 
 credit — • 
 
 " Latter part of your telegram to Wood not under- 
 stood. There can be no liostilities if no resistance is 
 made, but am I to leave Lang's Nek in Natal territory 
 in Boer occupation, and our garrisons isolated and short 
 of provisions, or occupy former and relieve latter?" 
 Lord Kimberley hastens to reply that the garrisons 
 must be left free to provision themselves, "but we 
 do not mean that you should march to the relief of 
 garrisons or occupy Lang's Nek if an arrangement 
 proceeds." 
 
 It will be seen that the definition of what vindica- 
 tion of Her Majesty's authority consisted grew broader 
 and broader; it now included the right of the Boers 
 to continue to occupy their positions in the colony 
 of Natal. 
 
 Meanwhile the daily fire of complimentary messages 
 was being kept up between President Brand and Lord 
 Kimberley, who alternately gave " sincere thanks to 
 Lord Kimberley " and " fully appreciated the friendly 
 spirit" of President Brand, till on the 21st February 
 the latter telegraphs through Colley : " Hope of amic- 
 able settlement by negotiation, but this will be greatly 
 facilitated if somebody on spot and friendly disposed 
 to both could by personal communication with both 
 endeavour to smooth difficulties. Offers his services 
 to Her Majesty's Government, and Kruger and Pre- 
 torius and Joubert are willing." Needless to say his 
 services were accepted. 
 
 Presently, however, on 27th February, Sir George 
 Colley made his last move, and took possession of 
 Majuba. His defeat and death had tlie effect of causing
 
 24S THE TEANSVAAL. 
 
 another temporary check in the peace negotiations, 
 ■whilst Sir Frederick Koberts with am[)Ie reinforcements 
 was despatched to Natal. It had the further effect 
 of increasing the haughtiness of the Boer leaders, and 
 infusing a corresponding spirit of pliability or gene- 
 rosity into the negotiations of Her Majesty's Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 Thus on 2d March, the Boers, through President 
 Brand and Sir Evelyn Wood, inform the Secretary of 
 State for the Colonies that they are willing to negotiate, 
 but decline to submit or cease opposition. Sir Evelyn 
 Wood, who evidently did not at all like the line of 
 policy adopted by the Government, telegraphed that 
 lie thouQ-ht the best thing to do would be for him to 
 engage the Boers, and disperse them vi et armis, with- 
 out any guarantees, " considering the disasters we have 
 sustained," and that he should, " if absolutely neces- 
 sary," be empowered to promise life and property to 
 the leaders, but that they should be banished from the 
 country. In answer to this telegram, Lord Kimberley 
 informs him that Her Majesty's Government will am- 
 nesty evci'ylody except those who have committed acts 
 contrary to the rules of civilised warfare, and that they 
 will agree to anything, and appoint a Commission to 
 carry out the details, and " be ready for friendly com- 
 munications with any persons appointed by the Boers." 
 
 Thus was Her Majesty's authority finally re-estab- 
 lished in the Transvaal. 
 
 It was not a very grand climax, nor the kind of 
 arrangement to which Englishmen are accustomed, but 
 perhaps, considering the circumstances, and the M-ell- 
 known predilections of those who made the settlement, 
 it was as much as could be expected.
 
 THE EETROCESSION OF THE TRANSVAAL. 249 
 
 The action of the Government must not be considered 
 as though they were unfettered in their judgment; it 
 can never be supposed that they acted as they did 
 because they thought such action right or even wise, 
 for that would be to set them down as men of a 
 very low order of intelligence, which they certainly 
 are not. 
 
 It is clear that no set of sensible men, who had after 
 much consideration given their decision that under all 
 the circumstances the Transvaal must remain British 
 territory, and who, on a revolt subsequently breaking 
 out in that territory, had declared that Her Majesty's 
 rule must be upheld, would have, putting aside all 
 other circumstances, deliberately stultified themselves 
 by almost unconditionally, and of their own free will, 
 abandoning the country, and all Her Majesty's subjects 
 living in it. That would be to pay a poor tribute to 
 their understanding, since it is clear that if reasons 
 existed for retaining the Transvaal before the war, as 
 they were satisfied there did, those reasons would exist 
 M'ith still greater force after a war had been under- 
 taken and three crushing defeats sustained, which if left 
 unavenged must, as they knew, have a most disastrous 
 effect on our prestige throughout the South African 
 continent. 
 
 I prefer to believe that the Government was coerced 
 into acting as it did by Radical pressure, both from 
 outside and from its immediate supporters in the 
 House, and that it had to choose between making an 
 unconditional surrender in the Transvaal and losing 
 the support of a very powerful party. Under these 
 circumstances it, being Liberal in politics, naturally 
 followed its instincts, and chose surrender.
 
 250 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 If such a policy was bad in itself, and necessarily 
 miscliievous in its consequences, so much the worse 
 for those who suffered by it ; it was clear that the 
 Government could not be expected to lose votes in 
 order to forward the true interests of countries so far 
 off as the South African Colonies, which had had the 
 misfortune to be made a party question of, and must 
 take the consequences. 
 
 There is no doubt that the interest brouglit to bear 
 on the Government was very considerable, for not only 
 had they to deal with their own supporters, and with 
 the shadowy caucus that was ready to let the lash of 
 its displeasure descend even on the august person of 
 Mr. Gladstone, should he show signs of letting slip 
 so rich an opportunity for the vindication of the holiest 
 principles of advanced Radicalism, but also with the 
 hydra-headed crowd of visionaries and professional 
 sentimentalists who swarm in this country, and who 
 are always ready to take up any cause, from that of 
 Jumbo or of a murderer to that of oppressed peoples, 
 such as the Bulgarians or the Transvaal Boers. 
 
 These gentlemen, burning with zeal, and filled with 
 that confidence which proverbially results from the 
 hasty assimilation of imperfect and erroneous informa- 
 tion, found in the Transvaal question a great oppor- 
 tunity of making a noise; and — -as in a disturbed 
 farmyard the bray of the domestic donkey, ringing 
 loud and clear among the utterances of more intelli- 
 gent animals, overwhelms and extinguishes them — so, 
 and with like effect, amongst the confused sound of 
 various English opinions about the Boer rising, rose 
 the trumpet-note of the Trau=ivaal Independence Com- 
 mittee and its supporters.
 
 THE RETROCESSION OF THE TRANSVAAL. 251 
 
 As we have seen, tliey did not sound in vain. 
 
 On the 6th of March an armistice with the Boers 
 had been entered into by Sir Evelyn Wood, which 
 was several times prolonged np to the 21st March, 
 when Sir Evelyn Wood concluded a preliminary peace 
 with the Boer leaders, which, under certain conditions, 
 guaranteed the restoration of the country within six 
 months, and left all other points to be decided by a 
 Eoyal Commission. 
 
 The news of this peace was at first received in the 
 colony in the silence of astonishment. Personally, I 
 remember, I would not believe that it was true. It 
 seemed to us, who had been witnesses of what had 
 passed, and knew what it all meant, something so 
 utterly incredible that we thought there must be a 
 mistake. 
 
 If there had been any one redeeming circumstance 
 about it, if the English arms had gained a single 
 decisive victory, it might have been so, but it was 
 hard for Englishmen, just at first, to understand that 
 not only had the Transvaal been to all appearance 
 wrested from them by force of arms, but that they 
 were henceforth to be subject, as tliey well knew 
 would be the case, to the coarse insults of victorious 
 Boers, and the sarcasms of keener-witted Kafirs. 
 
 People in England seem to fancy that when men go 
 to the colonies they lose all sense of pride in their 
 country, and think of nothing but their own advantage. 
 I do not think that this is the case, indeed.. I believe 
 that, individual for individual, there exists a greater 
 sense of loyalty, and a deeper pride in their nationality, 
 and in the proud name of England, among colonists, 
 than among Englishmen proper. Certainly the humili-
 
 252 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 ation of the Transvaal surrender was more keenly felt 
 iu South Africa than it was at liome; but, perhaps, 
 the impossibility of imposing upon people in that 
 country with the farrago of nonsense about blood- 
 guikiness and national morality, which w^as made 
 such adroit use of at home, may have made the dif- 
 ference. 
 
 I know that personally I would not have believed 
 it possible that I could feel any public event so 
 keenly as I did this ; indeed, I quickly made up my 
 mind that if the peace was confirmed, the neighbour- 
 hood of the Transvaal would be no fit or comfortable 
 residence for an Englishman, and that I would, 
 at any cost, leave the country, — which I accordingly 
 did. 
 
 Newcastle was a curious sight the night after the 
 peace was declared. Every hotel and bar was crowded 
 with refugees, who were trying to relieve their feel- 
 ings by cursing the name of Gladstone with a vigour, 
 originality, and earnestness that I have never lieard 
 equalled ; and declaring in ironical terms how proud 
 they were to be citizens of England — a country that 
 always kept its word. Tlien they set to work with 
 many demonstrations of contempt to burn the effigy 
 of the Eight Honourable Gentleman at the head of 
 Her Majesty's Government, an example, by the way, 
 that w^as followed throughout South Africa. 
 
 Even Sir Evelyn Wood, who is very popular in the 
 colony, was hissed as he walked through the town, 
 and great surprise was expressed that a soldier who 
 came out expressly to fight the Boers should consent 
 to become the medium of communication in such a 
 dirty business. And, indeed, there was some excuse
 
 THE RETROCESSION OF THE TRANSVAAL. 253 
 
 for all this bitterness, for the news meant ruin to very 
 many. 
 
 But if people in Katal and at the Cape received the 
 news with astonishment, how shall I describe its effect 
 upon the unfortunate loyal inhabitants in the Transvaal, 
 on whom it burst like a thunderbolt ? 
 
 They did not say much, however, and indeed there 
 M'as nothing to be said. They simply began to pack up 
 such things as they could carry with them, and to leave 
 the country, which they well knew would henceforth 
 be utterly untenable for Englishmen or English sym- 
 pathisers. In a few weeks they come pouring down 
 through Newcastle by hundreds ; it was the most 
 melancholy exodus that can be imagined. There were 
 people of all classes, officials, gentlefolk, work-people, 
 and loyal Boers, but they had a connecting link ; they 
 liad all been loyal, and they were all ruined. 
 
 Most of these people had gone to the Transvaal since 
 it became a British colony, and invested all they had 
 in it, and now their capital was lost and their labour 
 rendered abortive ; indeed, many of them whom one 
 had known as well to do in the Transvaal, came down 
 to Natal hardly knowing how they would feed their 
 families next week. 
 
 It must be understood that so''soon as the Queen's 
 sovereignty was withdrawn the value of landed and 
 house property in the Transvaal went down to nothing, 
 and has remained there ever since. Thus a fair-sized 
 house in Pretoria brought in a rental varying from ten 
 to twenty pounds a month during British occupation, 
 but after the declaration of peace, owners of houses 
 were glad to get people to live in them to keep them 
 from falling; into ruin. Those who owned land or had
 
 254 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 invested money in businesses suffered in the same way ; 
 their property remains neither profitable or saleable, 
 and they themselves are precluded by their nationality 
 from living on it, the art of "Boycotting" not being 
 peculiar to Ireland. 
 
 Nor were they the only sufferers. The officials, many 
 of whom had taken to the Government service as a 
 permanent profession, in which they expected to pass 
 their lives, were suddenly dismissed, mostly with a 
 small gratuity, which would about suffice to pay their 
 debts, and told to find their living as best they could. 
 It was indeed a case of vae viciis, — woe to the conquered 
 loyalists,^ 
 
 The Commission appointed by Her Majesty's Govern- 
 ment consisted of Sir Hercules Eobinson, Sir Henry de 
 Villiers, and Sir Evelyn Wood, President Brand being 
 also present in his capacity of friend of both parties, 
 and to their discretion were left the settlement of all 
 outstanding questions. Amongst these, were the mode 
 of trial of those persons who had been guilty of acts 
 contrary to the rules of civilised warfare, the question 
 
 ^ The following extract is clipped from a recent issue of the Trans- 
 vaal Advertiser. It describes the present condition of Pretoria : — 
 
 "The streets grown over with rank vegetation; the water-furrows 
 uncleaned and unattended, emitting offensive and unhealthy stenches ; 
 the houses showing evident signs of dilapidation and decay ; the side 
 paths, in many places, dangerous to pedestrians — in fact, everything 
 the eye can rest upon indicates the downfall which has overtaken this 
 once prosperous city. The visitor can, if he be so minded, betake him- 
 self to the outskirts and suburbs, where he will perceive the same sad 
 evidences of neglect, public grounds unattended, roads uncared for, mills 
 and other public works crumbling into ruin. These palpable signs of 
 decay most strongly impress him. A blight seems to have come over 
 this lately fair and prosperous town. Rapidly it is becoming a 'deserted 
 village,' a ' city of the dead.' "
 
 THE RETROCESSION OF THE TRANSVAAL. 255 
 
 of severance of territory from the Transvaal on the 
 eastern boundary, the settlement of the boundary in 
 the Keate- Award districts, the compensation for losses 
 sustained during the war, the functions of the British 
 Resident, and other matters. Their place of meeting 
 was at Newcastle in Natal, and from thence they pro- 
 ceeded to Pretoria, 
 
 The first question of importance that came before 
 the Commission was the mode of trial to be adopted 
 in the cases of those persons accused of acts contrary 
 to the usages of civilised warfare, such as murder. 
 The Attorney-General for the Transvaal strongly ad- 
 vised that a special tribunal should be constituted to 
 try these cases, principally because " after a civil war 
 in which all the inhabitants of a country, with very 
 few exceptions, have taken part, a jury of fair and 
 impartial men, truly unbiassed, will be very difficult 
 to get together." It is satisfactory to know that the 
 Commissioners gave this somewhat obvious fact " tlieir 
 grave consideration," which, according to their Eeport, 
 resulted in their determining to let the cases go before 
 the ordinary court, and be tried by a jury, because in 
 referring them to a specially constituted court which 
 would have done equal justice without fear or favour, 
 " the British Government would have made for itself, 
 among the Dutch population of South Africa, a name 
 for vindictive oppression, which no generosity in other 
 affairs could efface." 
 
 There is more in this determination of the Commis- 
 sioners, or rather of the majority of them — for Sir E. 
 Wood, to his credit be it said, refused to agree in their 
 decision — than meets the eye, the fact of the matter 
 being that it was privately well known to them, that,
 
 2 56 THE TRANSVAAL, 
 
 though the Boer leaders might be willing to allow a 
 few of the murderers to undergo the form of a trial, 
 neither they nor the Boers themselves meant to permit 
 the farce to go any further. Had the men been tried 
 by a special tribunal they would in all probability 
 have been condemned to death, and then would have 
 come the awkward question of carrying out the sentence 
 on individuals whose deeds were looked on, if not with 
 general approval, at any rate without aversion by the 
 great mass of their countrymen. In short, it would 
 probably have become necessary either to reprieve them 
 or to fight the Boers again, since it was very certain 
 that they would not have allowed them to be hung. 
 Therefore the majority of the Commissioners, finding 
 themselves face to face with a dead wall, determined to 
 slip round it instead of boldly climbing it, by referring 
 the cases to the Transvaal High Court, cheerfully con- 
 fident of what the result must be. 
 
 After all, the matter was, much cry about little wool, 
 for of all the crimes committed by the Boers — a list of 
 some of which will be found in the Appendix to this 
 book — in only three cases were a proportion of the 
 perpetrators produced and put through the form of 
 trial. Those three were — the dastardly murder of Cap- 
 tain Elliot, who was shot by his Boer escort whilst 
 crossing the Vaal river on parole; the murder of a 
 man named Malcolm, who was kicked to death in his 
 own house by Boers, who afterwards put a bullet 
 through his head to make the job " look better ; " and 
 the murder of a doctor named Barber, who was shot 
 by his escort on the border of the Free State. A few 
 of the men concerned in the first two of these crimes 
 were tried in Pretoria; and it was currently reported
 
 THE RETROCESSION OF THE TRANSVAAL. 257 
 
 at that time, that in order to make their acquittal 
 certain our Attorney-General received instructions not 
 to exercise his right of challenging jurors on behalf 
 of the Crown. Whether or not this is true I am not 
 prepared to say, but I believe it is a fact that he did 
 not exercise that right, though the counsel for the 
 prisoners availed themselves of it freely, with the 
 result that in Elliot's case, the jury was composed of 
 eight Boers and one German, nine being the full South 
 African jury. The necessary result followed ; in both 
 cases the prisoners were acquitted in the teeth of the 
 evidence. Barber's murderers were tried in the Free 
 State, and were, as might be expected, acquitted. 
 
 Thus it will be seen that of all the perpetrators of 
 murder and other crimes during the course of the war 
 not one was brought to justice. 
 
 The offence for which their victims died was, in 
 nearly every case, that they had served, were serving, 
 or were loyal to Her Majesty the Queen. In no single 
 case has England exacted retribution for the murder 
 of her servants and citizens ; but nobody can read 
 tlirougli the long list of these dastardly slaughters 
 without feeling that they will not go unavenged. The 
 innocent blood that has been shed on behalf of this 
 country, and the tears of children and widows, now 
 appeal to a higher tribunal than that of Mr. Glad- 
 stone's Government, and assuredly they will not appeal 
 in vain. 
 
 The next point of importance dealt with by the 
 Commission M'as the question whether or no any 
 territory should be severed from the Transvaal, and 
 kept under English rule for the benefit of the native 
 inhabitants. Lord Kimberley, acting under pressure 
 
 R
 
 2S8 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 put i;pon liini by inenibers of the Aborigines Protection 
 Society, instructed the Commission to consider the 
 advisability of severing the districts of Lydenburg and 
 Zoutpansberg, and also a strip of territory bordering 
 on Zululand and Swaziland, from the Transvaal, so 
 as to place the inhabitants of the first two districts 
 out of danger of maltreatment by the Boers, and to 
 interpose a buffer between Zulus, and Swazis, and Boer 
 arrrrression, and vice versa. 
 
 The Boer leaders had, it must be remembered, ac- 
 quiesced in the principle of such a separation in the 
 preliminary peace signed by Sir Evelyn Wood and 
 themselves. The mnjority of tlie Ccmmission, however 
 (Sir Evelyn Wood dissenting), finally decided against 
 the retention of either of these districts, a decision 
 ■which, I think, was a wise one, though I arrive at that 
 conclusion on very different grounds to those adopted 
 by the majority of the Commission. 
 
 Personally, I cannot see that it is the duty of 
 England to play policeman to the whole world. To 
 have retained these native districts would have been 
 to make ourselves responsible for their good govern- 
 ment, and to have guaranteed them against Boer 
 encroachment, which I do not think that we were 
 called upon to do. It is surely not incumbent upon 
 us, having given up the Transvaal to the Boers, to 
 undertake the management of the most troublesome 
 part of it, the Zulu border. Besides, bad as the 
 abandonment of the Transvaal is, I think that if 
 it was to be done at all, it was best to do it 
 thoroughly, since to have kept some natives under 
 our protection, and to have handed over the rest to 
 the tender mercies of the Boers, would only be to
 
 THE RETROCESSION OF THE TRANSVAAL. 259 
 
 render our injustice more obvious, Avliilst weakening 
 the power of the natives themselves to combine in 
 self-defence, since those under our protection would 
 naturally have little sympathy with their more un- 
 fortunate brethren — their interests and circumstances 
 being different. 
 
 The Commission do not seem to have considered the 
 question from these points of view; but putting them 
 on one side, there are many other considerations con- 
 nected with it which are ably summed up in their 
 Eeport. Amongst these is the danger of disturb- 
 ances commenced between Zulus or Swazis and Boers 
 spreading into Natal, and the probability of the 
 fomenting of disturbances amongst the Zulus by 
 Eoers. The great argument for the retention of 
 some territory, if only as a symbol that the English 
 had not been driven out of the country, is, however, 
 set forth in the forty-sixth paragraph of the Eeport, 
 which runs as follows : — " The moral considerations 
 that determine the actions of civilised governments 
 are not easily understood by barbarians, in whose 
 eyes successful force is alone the sign of superiority, 
 and it appeared possible that the surrender by the 
 British Crown of one of its possessions to those who 
 had been in arms against it, might be looked upon 
 by the natives in no other way than as a token of 
 the defeat and decay of the British power, and that 
 thus a serious shock might be given to British 
 authority in South Africa, and the capacity of Great 
 Britain to govern and direct the vast native popula- 
 tion within and without her South African dominions 
 — a capacity resting largely on tlie renown of her name 
 —might be dangerously impaired."
 
 26o THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 These words, coming from so imexpected a source, 
 do not, though couclied in such mild language, hide 
 the startling importance of the question discussed. 
 On the contrary, they accurately and with double 
 weight convey the sense and gist of the most damning 
 argument against the policy of the retrocession of the 
 Transvaal in its entirety; and proceeding from their 
 own carefully chosen Commissioners, can hardly have 
 been pleasant reading to Lord Kimberley and his col- 
 leagues. 
 
 The majority of the Commission then proceeds to 
 set forth the arguments advanced by the Boers against 
 the retention of any territory, which appear to have 
 been chiefly of a sentimental character, since we are 
 informed that "the people, it seemed certain, would 
 not have valued the restoration of a mutilated country. 
 Sentiment in a great measure had led them to insur- 
 rection, and the force of such it was impossible to dis- 
 regard." Sir Evelyn Wood, in his dissent, states that he 
 cannot even agree with the premises of his colleagues' 
 argument, since he is convinced that it was not senti- 
 ment that had led to the outbreak, but a "general and 
 looted aversion to taxation." If he had added, and 
 a hatred not only of English rule, but of all rule, he 
 would have stated the complete cause of the Transvaal 
 rebellion. In the next paragraph of the Eeport, how- 
 ever, we find the real cause of the pliability of the 
 Commission in the matter, which is the same that 
 influenced them in their decision about the mode of 
 trial of the murderers and other questions — they feared 
 that the people would appeal to arms if they decided 
 against their wishes. 
 
 Discreditable and disgraceful as it may seem, nobody
 
 THE RETKOCESSION OF THE TRANSVAAL. 261 
 
 can read this Eeport without plainly seeing that the 
 Commissioners were, in treating with the Eoers on 
 these points, in the position of ambassadors from a 
 beaten people getting the best terms they could. Of 
 course, they well knew that this was not the case 
 but whatever the Boer leaders may have said, the 
 Boers themselves did not know this, or even pretend 
 to look at the matter in any other light. When we 
 asked for the country back, said they, we did not get 
 it; after we had three times defeated the English we 
 did get it ; the logical conclusion from the facts being 
 that we got it because we defeated the Eno,lish. This 
 was their tone, and it is not therefore surprising that 
 whenever the Commission threatened to decide any- 
 thing against them, they, with a smile, let it know that 
 if it did, they would be under the painful necessity 
 of re-occupying Lang's Nek. It was never necessary 
 to repeat the threat, since the majority of the Com- 
 mission would thereupon speedily find a way to meet 
 the views of the Boer representatives. 
 
 Sir Evelyn Wood, in his dissent, thus correctly 
 sums up the matter : — " To contend that the Eoyal 
 Commission ought not to decide contrary to the wishes 
 of the Boers, because such decision might not be 
 accepted, is to deny to the Commission the very power 
 of decision that it was agreed sliould be left in its 
 hands." Exactly so. But it is evident that the Com- 
 mission knew its place, and so far from attempting to 
 exercise any " power of decision," it was quite content 
 with such concessions as it could obtain by means of 
 bargaining. Thus, as an additional reason against 
 the retention of any territory, it is urged tliat if this 
 territory was retained " the mnjority of your Commi.s-
 
 262 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 sioners . . . would have found themselves in no favour- 
 able position for obtaining the concurrence of the Boer 
 leaders as to other matters." In fact, Her Majesty's 
 Commission, appointed, or supposed to be appointed, 
 to do Her Majesty's will and pleasure, shook in its 
 shoes before men who had lately been rebels in arms 
 against her authority, and humbly submitted itself to 
 their dicta. 
 
 The majority of the Commission went on to express 
 their opinion, that by giving way about the retention 
 of territory they would be able to obtain better terms 
 for the natives generally, and larger powers for the 
 British Eesident. But, as Sir Evelyn "Wood points 
 out in his Report, they did nothing of the sort, the 
 terms of the agreement about the Eesident and other 
 native matters being all consequent on and included 
 in the first agreement of peace. Besides, they seem 
 to have overlooked the fact that such concessions as 
 they did obtain are only on paper, and practically 
 worthless, whilst all hond fide advantages remained 
 with the Boers. 
 
 The decision of the Commissioners in the question 
 of the Keate Award, which next came under their 
 consideration, appears to have been a judicious one, 
 being founded on the very careful Eeport of Colonel 
 Moysey, E.E., who had been for many months collect- 
 ing information on the spot. The Keate Award Terri- 
 tory is a region lying to the south-west of the Transvaal, 
 and was, like many other districts in tliat country, 
 originally in the possession of natives of the Baralong 
 and Batlapin tribes. Individual Boers having, however, 
 more suo taken possession of tracts of land in the dis- 
 trict, difficulties speedily arose between their Govern-
 
 THE RETROCRSSrON OF THE TRANSVAAL. 263 
 
 ment and the native chiefs, and in 1871 Mr. Iveate, 
 Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, was by mutual consent 
 called in to arbitrate on the matter. His decision was 
 entirely in favour of the natives, and was accordingly 
 promptly and characteristically repudiated by the Boer 
 Volksraad. From that time till the rebellion the ques- 
 tion remained unsettled, and was indeed a very thorny 
 one to deal with. The Commission, acting on the prin- 
 ciple in medio tuiissimus ibis, drew a line through the 
 midst of the disputed territory, or, in other words, set 
 aside ]\Ir. Keate's award, and interpreted the dispute in 
 favour of the Boers. 
 
 This decision was accepted by all parties at the 
 time, but it has not resulted in the maintenance of 
 peace. The principal chief, Montsioa, is an old ally 
 and staunch friend of the English, a fact which the 
 Boers are not able to forget or forgive, and they 
 appear to have stirred up rival chiefs to attack him, 
 and to have allowed volunteers from the Transvaal 
 to assist them. Montsioa has also enlisted some 
 white volunteers, and several fights have .taken place, 
 in which the loss of life has been considerable. 
 Whether or no the Transvaal Government is directly 
 concerned it is impossible to say, but from the fact 
 that cannon are said to have been used against 
 Montsioa it would appear that it is, since private in- 
 dividuals do not, as a rule, own Armstrong guns.^ 
 
 Amongst the questions remaining for the consider- 
 ation of the Commissioners was that of what com- 
 liensation should be given for losses during the war. 
 
 1 I beg to refer any reader interested in this matter to the letter 
 of "Transvaal" to the Standard, which I have republished in the 
 Appendix to this book.
 
 264 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 Of course, the great bulk of the losses sustained were 
 of an indirect nature, resulting from the necessary 
 and enormous depreciation in the value of land and 
 ether property, consequent on the reirocession. Into 
 this matter the Home Government declined to enter, 
 thereby saving its pocket at the price of its honour, 
 since it was upon English guarantees that the country 
 would remain a British possession that the majority 
 of the unfortunate loyals invested their money in it. 
 It was, however, agreed by the Commission (Sir H. 
 de Villiers dissenting) that the Boers should be 
 liable for compensation in cases where loss had been 
 sustained through commandeering seizure, confisca- 
 tion, destruction, or damage of property. The sums 
 awarded under these heads have already amounted 
 to about ;^ 1 10,000, which sum has been defrayed by 
 the Imperial Government, the Boer authorities stating 
 that they were not in a position to pay it. 
 
 In connection with this matter I will pass to the 
 financial clauses of the Eeport. When the country 
 w^as annexed, the public debt amounted to £ioi,y2j. 
 Under British rule this debt was liquidated to the 
 extent of ;£"i 50,000, but the total was brought up 
 by a Parliamentary grant, a loan from the Standard 
 Bank, and sundries to ;^ 390,404, which represented 
 the public debt of the Transvaal on the 31st December 
 1880. This was further increased by moneys advanced 
 by the Standard Bank and English Exchequer during 
 the war, and till the 8th August 1881, during which 
 time the country yielded no revenue, to £AS7>Z9l- 
 To this must be added an estimated sum of ^200,000 
 for compensation charges, pension allowances, &c., and 
 a further sum of iJ'383,000, the cost of tlie successful
 
 THE RETROCESSION OF THE TRANSVAAL. 265 
 
 expedition against Secocojni, that of the unsuccessful 
 cue being left out of account, bringing up the total 
 public debt to over a million, of which about £800,000 
 is owing to this country. 
 
 This sum, with the characteristic liberality that 
 distinguished them in their dealings with the Boers, 
 but which was not so marked where loyals were con- 
 cerned, the Commissioners (Sir Evelyn Wood dissent- 
 ing) reduced by a stroke of the pen to ^265,000, thus 
 entirely remitting an approximate sum of ^500,000, 
 or _;^ 600,000. To the sura of ;^ 265, 000 still owing 
 must be add-jd say another ;^i 50,000 for sums lately 
 advanced to pay the compensation claims, bringing 
 up the actual amount now owing to England to 
 something under half a million, of which I say with 
 confidence she will never see a single ^^ 10,000. As 
 this contingency was not contemplated, or if contem- 
 plated, not alluded to by the Royal Commission, pro- 
 vision was made for a Sinking Fund, by means of which 
 the debt, which is a second charge on the revenues 
 of the States, is to be extinguished in twenty-five 
 years. 
 
 It is a strange instance of the proverbial irony of 
 fate, that whilst the representatives of the Imperial 
 Government were thus showering gifts of hundreds 
 of thousands of pounds upon men who had spurned 
 the benefits of Her Majesty's rule, made war upon 
 her forces, and murdered her subjects, no such con- 
 sideration was extended to those who had remained 
 loyal to her throne. Their claims for compensation 
 M'ere passed by unheeded ; and looking from the win- 
 dows of the room in which they sat in Newcastle, 
 the members of the Commission might have seen
 
 2C6 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 them floclving down from a country tliat could no 
 longer be their home ; those that were rich among 
 them made poor, and tliose that were poor reduced 
 to destitution. 
 
 The only other point which it will be necessary 
 for me to touch on in connection with tin's Report 
 is the duties of the British Eesident and his rela- 
 tions to the natives. He was to be invested as repre- 
 sentative of the Suzerain with functions for securing 
 the execution of the terms of peace as regards — (i) 
 the control of the foreign relations of the State ; (2) 
 the control of the frontier affairs of the State ; and 
 (3) the protection of tlie interests of the natives in 
 the State. 
 
 As regards the first of these points, it was arranged 
 that the interests of subjects of the Transvaal should 
 be left in the hands of Her Majesty's representatives 
 abroad. Since Boers are, of all people in the world, 
 the most stay-at-home, our ambassadors and consuls 
 are not likely to be troubled much on their account. 
 With reference to the second point, the Commission 
 made stipulations that would be admirable if there 
 were any probability of their being acted up to. The 
 Eesident is to report any encroachment on native 
 territory by Boers to the High Commissioner, and 
 when the Eesident and the Boer Government differ, 
 the decision of the Suzerain is to be final. This is 
 a charming way of settling difficukies, but the Com- 
 mission forgets to specify how the Suzerain's decision 
 is to be enforced. After what has happened, it can 
 hardly have relied on awe of the name of England to 
 bring about the desired obedience ! 
 
 But besides thus using his beneficent authority to
 
 THE rtETROCESSION OF THE TRANSVAAL. 267 
 
 prevent subjects of the Transvaal from trespassing on 
 their neighbour's land, the Eesident is to exercise a 
 general supervision over the interests of all the natives 
 in the country. Considering that they number about 
 a million, and are scattered over a territory larger than 
 France, one would think that this duty alone would 
 have taken up the time of any ordinary man ; and, 
 indeed. Sir Evelyn Wood was in favour of the appoint- 
 ment of sub-residents to assist him. The majority of 
 the Commission refused, however, to listen to any 
 such suggestion — believing, they said, "that the least 
 possible interference with the independent Government 
 of the State would be the wisest." Quite so, but I sup- 
 pose it never occurred to them to ask the natives what 
 their views of the matter were ! The Eesident was 
 also to be a member of a Native Location Commission, 
 which was at some future time to provide land for the 
 natives to live on. 
 
 In perusing this Eeport it is easy to follow M'ith 
 more or less accuracy the individual bent of its 
 framers. Sir Hercules Eobinson figures throughout 
 as a man who has got a disagreeable business to 
 carry out, in obedience to instructions that admit of 
 no trifling with, and who has set himself to do the 
 best he can for liis country, and those who suffer 
 through his country's policy, whilst obeying those 
 instructions. He has evidently choked down his 
 feelings and opinions as an individual, and turned 
 himself into an official machine, merely registering 
 in detail the will of Lord Kimberle}'. With Sir 
 Henry de Villiers the case is very different. One 
 feels throughout that the task is to liim a congenial 
 one, and that the Boer cause has in Idm an excellent
 
 2G8 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 friend. Indeed, had he been an advocate of their 
 cause instead of a member of the Commission, he 
 could not have espoused their side on every occa- 
 sion with greater zeah According to him they were 
 always in the rii:ht, and in them he could find no 
 guile. Mr. Hofmeycr and President Brand exercised 
 a M'ise discretion from their own point of view 
 when they urged his appointment as Special Com- 
 missioner. I now come to Sir Evelyn Wood, who 
 was in the position of an inilependeiit Englishman, 
 neither prejudiced in favour of the Boers, or the 
 reverse, and on whom, as a military man, Lord 
 Kimberley would find it difficult to put the official 
 screw. The results of his hapjty position are obvious 
 in the paper attached to the end of the Report, and 
 signed by him, in which he totally and entirely 
 differs from the majority of the Commission on 
 every point of any importance. Most people will 
 think that this very outspoken and forcible dissent 
 deducts somewhat from the value of the Eeport, and 
 tlirows a shadow of doubt on the wisdom of its pro- 
 visions. 
 
 The formal document of agreement between Her 
 Majesty's Government and the Boer leaders, com- 
 monly known as the Convention, was signed by both 
 parties at Pretoria on the afternoon of the 3d August 
 1 88 1, in the same room in which, nearly four years 
 before, the Annexation Proclamation was signed by 
 Sir T. Shepstone. 
 
 Whilst this business M'as being transacted in Govern- 
 ment House, a curious ceremony was going on just 
 outside, and within sight of the windows. This was 
 the ceremonious burial of the Union Jack, which was
 
 THE llETEOCESSION OF THE TKANSVAAL. 269 
 
 followed to the grave by a crowd of about 2000 loyalists 
 and native chiefs. On the outside of the cot^n was 
 written the word " Eesui gam," and an eloquent oration 
 was delivered over the grave. Such demonstrations 
 are, no doubt, foolish enough, but they are not entirely 
 without political significance. 
 
 But a more unpleasant duty awaited the Commis- 
 sioners than that of attaching their signatures to a 
 document, — consisting of the necessity of conveying 
 Her Majesty's decision as to the retrocession to about 
 a hundred native chiefs, until now Her Majesty's sub- 
 jects, who had been gathered together to hear it. It 
 must be borne in mind that the natives had not been 
 consulted as to the disposal of the country, although 
 they outnumber the white people in the proportion 
 of twenty to one, and that, beyond some worthless 
 paper stipulations, nothing had been done for their 
 interests. 
 
 Personally, I must plead guilty to what I know is 
 by many, especially by those who are attached to 
 the Boer cause, considered as folly, if not worse, 
 namely, a sufficient interest in the natives, and 
 sympathy with their sufferings, to bring me to the 
 conclusion that in acting thus we have inflicted a 
 cruel injustice upon them. It seems to me, that as 
 they were the original owners of the soil, they wero 
 entitled to some consideration in the question of itg 
 disposal, and consequently and incidentally, of their 
 own. I am aware that it is generally considered 
 that the white man has a right to the black man's 
 possessions and land, and that it is his high and holy 
 mission to exterminate the wretched native and take 
 his place. But with this conclusion I venture to
 
 270 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 differ. So far as my om'ii experience of natives hna 
 gone, I have found that in all the essential qualities 
 of mind and body they very much resemble white 
 men, with the exception that they are, as a race, 
 quicker-witted, more honest, and braver than the 
 ordinary run of white men. Of tliem might be aptly 
 quoted the speech Shakespeare puts into Shylock's 
 mouth : " Hath not a Jew eyes ? hath not a Jew 
 hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, pas- 
 sions ? " In the same way I ask. Has a native no 
 feelings or affections ? does he not suffer when his 
 parents are shot, or his children stolen, or when he 
 is driven a wanderer from his home ? Does he not 
 know fear, feel pain, affection, hate, and gratitude ? 
 Most certainly he does; and this being so, I cannot 
 believe that the Almighty, who made both white 
 and black, gave to the one race the right or mission 
 of exterminating or even of robbing or maltreating 
 the other, and calling the process the advance of 
 civilisation. It seems to me, that on only one con- 
 dition, if at all, have we the right to take the black 
 men's land ; and that is, that we provide them with 
 an equal and a just Government, and allow no mal- 
 treatment of them, either as individuals or tribes, 
 but, on the contrary, do our best to elevate them, 
 and wean them from savage customs. Otherwise, the 
 practice is surely undefensible. 
 
 I am aware, however, that with the exception of a 
 small class, these are sentiments which are not shared 
 by the great majority of the public, either at home 
 or abroad. Indeed, it can be plainly seen how little 
 sympathy they command, from the fact that but scanty 
 remonstrance was raised at the treatment meted out
 
 THE rvETEOCESSION OF THE TltAKSYAAl.. 271 
 
 to our native subjects in the Transvaal, when they 
 "Were, to the number of nearly a million, handed over 
 from the peace, justice, and security that on the whole 
 characterise our rule, to a state of things and possi- 
 bilities of wrong and suffering which I will not try 
 to describe. 
 
 To the chiefs thus assembled Sir Hercules Robinson, 
 as President of the Eoyal Commission, read a state- 
 ment, and then retired, refusing to allow them to speak 
 in answer. The statement informed the natives that 
 "Her Majesty's Government, with that sense of justice 
 which befits a great and powerful nation," had returned 
 the country to the Boers, " whose representatives, 
 Messrs, Kruger, Pretorius, and Joubert, I now," said 
 Sir Hercules, " have much pleasure in introducing to 
 you." If reports are true, the native chiefs had, 
 many of them personally, and all of them by reputa- 
 tion, already the advantage of a very intimate acquaint- 
 ance with all three of these gentlemen, so that an 
 introduction was somewhat superfluous. 
 
 Sir Hercules then went on to explain to them that 
 locations would be allotted to them at some future 
 time ; that a British Piesident would be appointed, 
 whose especial charge they would be, but that they 
 must bear in mind that he was not ruler of the 
 country, but the Government, " subject to Her Majesty's 
 suzerain rights." Katives were, no doubt, expected to 
 know by intuition what suzerain rights are. The state- 
 ment then goes on to give them good advice as to the 
 advantages of indulging in manual labour when asked 
 to do so by the Boers, and generally to show them how 
 bright and happy is tlie future that lies before them. 
 Lest they should be too elated by such good tidings,
 
 272 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 they are, however, reminded that it will be necessary 
 to retain the law relating to passes, which is, in the 
 hands of a people like the Boers, about as unjust a 
 regulation as a dominant race can invent for the 
 oppression of a subject people, and had, in the old 
 days of the Eepublic, been productive of much hard- 
 ship. The statement winds up by assuring them that 
 their " interests will never be forgotten or neglected 
 by Her Majesty's Government." Having read the 
 document the Commission hastily withdrew, and after 
 their withdrawal the chiefs were "allowed" to state 
 their opinions to the Secretary for Native Affairs. 
 
 In availing themselves of this permission, it is notice- 
 able that no allusion was made to all the advantages 
 they were to reap under the Convention, nor did they 
 seem to attach much importance to the appointment 
 of the British Eesident. On the contiary, all their 
 attention was given to the great fact that the country 
 had been ceded to the Boers, and that they were no 
 longer the Queen's subjects. We are told, in Mr. 
 Shepstone's Eeport, that they " got very excited," and 
 " asked whether it was thought that they had no 
 feelings or hearts, that they were thus treated as a 
 stick or piece of tobacco, which could be passed from 
 hand to hand without question." Umgombarie, a 
 Zoutpansberg chief, said : " I am Umgombarie. 1 have 
 fought with the Boers, and have many wounds, and 
 they know that what I say is true, ... I will never 
 consent to place myself under their rule. I belong 
 to the English Government. I am not a man who 
 eats with both sides of his jaw at once; I only use 
 one side. I am English, I have said." Silamba said : 
 " I beloncc to the English. I will never return under
 
 THE RETROCESSION OF THE TRANSVAAL. 273 
 
 the Boers. You see me, a man of my rauk aud posi- 
 tion ; is it right that such as I should be seized aud 
 laid on the ground and flogged, as has been done to 
 me and other chiefs ? " 
 
 Sinkanhla said : " We hear and yet do not hear, 
 we cannot understand. We are troubling you, Chief, 
 by talking in this way ; we hear the chiefs say that 
 the Queen took the country because the people of the 
 country wished it, and again that the majority of the 
 owners of the country did not wish their rule, and 
 that therefore the country was given back. We should 
 like to have the man pointed out from among us black 
 people who objects to the rule of the Queen. We are 
 the real owners of the country ; we were here when 
 the Boers came, and without asking leave, settled 
 down and treated us in every way badly. The English 
 Government then came and took the country ; we 
 have now had four years of rest and peaceful and just 
 rule. We have been called here to-day, and are told 
 that the country, our country, has been given to the 
 Boers by the Queen. This is a thing which surprises 
 us. Did the country, then, belong to the Boers ? Did 
 it not belong to our fathers and forefathers before us, 
 long before the Boers came here ? We have heard 
 that the Boers' country is at the Cape. If the Queen 
 wishes to give them their laud, wliy does she not give 
 them back the Cape ? " 
 
 I have quoted this speech at length, because, although 
 made by a despised native, it sets forth their case more 
 powerfully and in happier language than I can do. 
 
 Umyethile said : " We have no heart for talking. 
 I have returned to the country from Sechelis, where 
 I had to fly from Boer oppression. Our hearts are 
 
 k
 
 274 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 black and heavy with grief to-day at the news told 
 us, we are in agony, our intestines are twisting and 
 writhing inside of us, just as you see a snake do when 
 it is struck on the head. . . . We do not know what 
 has becorqe of us, hut we feel dead ; it may be that 
 the Lord may change the nature of the Boers, and that 
 we will not be treated like dogs and beasts of burden 
 as formerly, but we have no hope of such a change, 
 and we leave you with heavy hearts and great appre- 
 hension as to the future." In his Eeport, Mr. Shep- 
 stone (the Secretary for Native Affairs) says : " One 
 chief, Jan Sibilo, who has been, he informed me, 
 personally threatened with death by the Boers after 
 the English leave, could not restrain his feelings, but 
 cried like a child." 
 
 I have nothing to add to these extracts, which are 
 taken from many such statements. They are the very 
 words of the persons most concerned, and will speak 
 for themselves. 
 
 The Convention was signed on the 3d August 1881, 
 and was to be formally ratilied by a Volksraad or 
 Parliament of the Burghers within three months of 
 that date, in default of which it was to fall to the 
 ground and become null and void. 
 
 Anybody who has followed the course of affairs 
 with reference to the retrocession of the Transvaal, 
 or who has even taken the trouble to read through 
 this brief history, will probably come to the conclusion 
 that, under all the circumstances, the Boers had got 
 more than they could reasonably expect. Not so, 
 however, the Boers themselves. On the 28th Sep- 
 tember the newly-elected Volksraad referred the Con- 
 vention to a General Committee to report on, and on
 
 THE RETROCESSION OF THE TRANSVAAL. 275 
 
 the 30th September the Eeport was presented. On 
 the 3d October a telegram was despatched through the 
 British Eesident to " His Excellency W. E. Gladstone," 
 in which the Volksraad states that the Convention 
 is not acceptable — 
 
 (i.) Because it is in conflict with the Sand River 
 Treaty of 1852. 
 
 (2.) Because it violates the peace agreement entered 
 into with Sir Evelyn Wood, in confidence of which the 
 Boers laid down their arms. 
 
 The Volksraad consequently declared that modifica- 
 tions were desirable, and that certain articles timtst be 
 altered. 
 
 To begin with, they declare that the " conduct of 
 foreign relations does not appertain to the Suzerain, 
 only supervision," and that the articles bearing on 
 these points must consequently be modified. They 
 next attack the native question, stating that " the 
 Suzerain has not the right to interfere with our 
 Legislature," and state that they cannot agree to 
 Article 3, which gives the Suzerain a right of veto 
 on Legislation connected with the natives ; to Article 
 13, by virtue of which natives are to be allowed to 
 acquire land; and to the last part of Article 26, by 
 which it is provided that whites of alien race living 
 in the Transvaal shall not be taxed in excess of the 
 taxes imposed on Transvaal citizens. 
 
 They further declare that it is infra dignitatem 
 for the President of the Transvaal to be a member 
 of a Commission. This refers to the Native Location 
 Commission, on which he is, in the terms of the Con- 
 vention, to sit, together with the British Eesident, and 
 a third person jointly appointed.
 
 2/6 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 They next declare tliat the amount of the debt for 
 which the Commission has made them liable should 
 be modified. Considering that England had ah'eady 
 made them a present of from i^6oo,ooo to ^800,000, 
 this a most barefaced demand. Finally, they state 
 that "Articles 15, 16, 26, and 27 are superfluous, 
 and only calculated to wound our sense of honour " 
 (sic). 
 
 Article 1 5 enacts that no slavery or apprenticeship 
 shall be tolerated. 
 
 Article 16 provides for religious toleration. 
 
 Article 26 provides for the free movement, trading, 
 and residence of all persons, other than natives, con- 
 forming themselves to the laws of the Transvaal. 
 
 Article 27 gives to all the right of free access to the 
 Courts of Justice. 
 
 Putting the " sense of honour " of the Transvaal 
 Volksraad out of the question, past experience has 
 but too plainly proved that these Articles are by no 
 means superfluous. 
 
 In reply to this message, Sir Hercules Eobinson 
 telegraphs to the British Eesident on the 2 i st October 
 in the following words : — 
 
 " Having forwarded Volksraad Eesolution of i 5 tli 
 to Earl of Kimberley, I am desired to instruct you in 
 reply to repeat to the Triumvirate that Her Majesty's 
 Government cannot entertain any proposals for a modi- 
 fication of the Convention until after it has been rati- 
 fied, and the necessity for further concession proved 
 by experience." 
 
 I wish to draw particular attention to the last part 
 of this message, which is extremely typical of the 
 line of policy adopted throughout in the Transvaal
 
 THE RETROCESSION OF THE TRANSVAAL. 277 
 
 business. The English Government dared not make 
 any further concession to the Boers, because they felt 
 that they had already strained the temper of the country 
 almost to breaking in the matter. On the other hand, 
 they were afraid that if they did not do something, the 
 Boers would tear up the Convention, and they would find 
 themselves face to face with the old difficulty. Under 
 these circumstances, they have fallen back upon their 
 temporising and un-English policy, which leaves them 
 a back-door to escape through, whatever turn things 
 take. Should the Boers now suddenly turn round and 
 declare, which is extremely probable, that they re- 
 pudiate their debt to us, or that they are sick of the 
 presence of a British Resident, the Government will 
 be able to announce that " the necessity for further 
 concession " has now been " proved by experience," 
 and thus escape the difficulty. In short, this tele- 
 gram has deprived the Convention of whatever final- 
 ity it may have possessed, and made it, as a document, 
 as worthless as it is as a practical settlement. That 
 this is the view taken of it by the Boers themselves, 
 is proved by the text of the Eatification which followed 
 on the receipt of this telegram. 
 
 The tone of this document throughout is, in my 
 opinion, considering from whom it came, and against 
 whom it is directed, very insolent. And it amply 
 confirms what I have previously said, that the Boers 
 looked upon themselves as a victorious people making 
 terms with those they have conquered. The Ratifica- 
 tion leads off thus : " The Volksraad is not satisfied 
 with this Convention, and considers that the members 
 of the Triumvirate performed a fervent act of love for 
 the Fatherland when they upon their own responsibility
 
 278 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 signed sucli an unsatisfactory state document." This 
 is damning with faint praise indeed. It then goes on 
 to recite the various points of objection, stating that 
 the answers from the English Government proved that 
 they were well founded. " The English Government," 
 it says, " acknowledges indirectly by this answer (the 
 telegram of 21st October, quoted above) that the 
 difficulties raised by the Yolksraad are neither fictitious 
 nor unfounded, inasmuch as it desires from us the con- 
 cession that we, the Volksraad, shall submit it to a 
 practical test." It will be observed that England is 
 here represented as begging the favour of a trial of her 
 conditions from the Volksraad of the Transvaal Boers. 
 The Eatification is in these words : " Therefore is it 
 that the Eaad here unanimously resolves not to go into 
 further discussion of the Convention, and maintaining 
 all ohjections to the Convention as made before the Eoyal 
 Commission or stated in the Eaad, and for the purpose 
 of showing to everybody that the love of peace and 
 unity inspires it, for the time and provisionally sub- 
 mitting the articles of the Convention to a practical 
 test, herely complying with the reqiLcst of the English 
 Government contained in the telegram of the 13th 
 October 1881, proceeds to ratify the Convention." 
 
 It would have been interesting to have seen how 
 such a Eatification as this, which is no Eatification but 
 an insult, would have been accepted by Lord Beacons- 
 field. I think that within twenty-four hours of its 
 arrival in Downing Street, the Boer Volksraad would 
 have received a startling answer. But Lord Beaconsfield 
 is dead, and by his successor it was received with all 
 due thankfulness and humility. His words, however, 
 on this subject still remain to us, and even his great
 
 THE RETROCESSION OF THE TRANSVAAL. 279 
 
 rival miglit have done well to listen to them. It was 
 iu the course of what was, I believe, the last speech 
 he made in the House of Lords, tliat speaking about 
 tlie Transvaal rising, he warned the Government that 
 it was a very dangerous thing to make peace with 
 rebellious subjects in arms against the authority of the 
 Queen. The warning passed unheeded, and tlie peace 
 was made in the way I have described. 
 
 As regards the Convention itself, it will be obvious 
 to the reader that the Boers have not any intention of 
 acting up to its provisions, mild as they are, if they 
 can possibly avoid them, M-hilst, on the other hand, 
 there is no force at hand to punish their disregard or 
 breach. It is all very well to create a Eesident with 
 extensive powers ; but how is he to enforce his deci- 
 sions ? Wliat is lie to do if his awards are laughed at 
 and made a mockery of, as they are and will be ? The 
 position of ]\Ir. Hudson at Pretoria is even worse than 
 that of Mr. Osborn in Zululand. Por instance, the 
 Convention specifies in the first article that the Trans- 
 vaal is to be known as the Transvaal State. The 
 Poer Government have, however, thought fit to adopt 
 the name of " South African Eepublic " in all public 
 documents. Mr. Hudson was ~ accordingly directed to 
 remonstrate, which he did in a feeble way ; his remon- 
 strance was politely acknowledged, but the country is 
 still officially called the South African Republic, the 
 Convention and Mr. Hudson's remonstrance notwith- 
 standing. Mr. Hudson, however, appears to be better 
 suited to the position than would have been the case 
 had an Englishman, pure and simple, been appointed, 
 since it is evident that things that would have struck 
 the latter as insults to the Queen he represented,
 
 2 So THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 and Ins country generally, arc' not so understood by 
 him. In fact, he admirably represents his official 
 superiors in his capacity of swallowing rebuffs, and 
 when smitten on one cheek delightedly offering the 
 other. 
 
 Thus we find him attending a Boer meeting of thanks- 
 giving for the success that had waited on their arms 
 and the recognition of their independence, where most 
 people will consider he was out of place. To this 
 meeting, thus graced by his presence, an address was 
 presented by a branch of the Africander Bond, a 
 powerful institution, having for its object the total 
 uprootal of English rule and English customs in South 
 Africa, to which he must have listened with pleasure. 
 In it he, in common with other members of the meeting, 
 is informed that "you took up the sword and struck 
 the Briton with such force " that " the Britons through 
 fear revived that sense of justice to which they could not 
 be brought by petitions," and that the " day will soon 
 come that we shall enter with you on one arena for 
 the entire independence of South Africa," i.e., independ- 
 ence from English rule. 
 
 On the following day the Government gave a dinner, 
 to which all those who had done good service during 
 the late hostilities were invited, the British Eesident 
 being apparently the only Englishman asked. Amongst 
 the other celebrities present I notice the name of Buskes. 
 This man, who is an educated Hollander, was the 
 moving spirit of the Potchefstroom atrocities; indeed, 
 so dark is his reputation that the Eoyal Commission 
 refused to transact business with him, or to admit him 
 to their presence. Mr. Hudson was not so particular. 
 And now comes the most extraordinary part of tlie
 
 THE RETEOCESSION OF THE TRANSVAAL. 281 
 
 episode. At the dinner it was necessary that the 
 health of Her Majesty as Suzerain should he proposed, 
 and with studied insolence this was done last of all 
 the leading political toasts, and immediately after that 
 of the Triumvirate. Notwithstanding this fact, and 
 that the toast was couched by Mr. Joubert, who stated 
 that " he would not attempt to explain what a Suzerain 
 was," in what appear to he semi-ironical terms, we find 
 that Mr. Hudson " begged to tender his thanks to the 
 Honourable Mr. Joubert for the kind way in which he 
 proposed the toast." 
 
 It may please Mr. Hudson to see the name of the 
 Queen thus metaphorically dragged in triumph at the 
 chariot wheels of the Triumvirate, but it is satisfac- 
 tory to know that the spectacle is not appreciated in 
 England : since, on a question in the House of Lords, 
 by the Earl of Carnarvon, who characterised it as a 
 deliberate insult. Lord Kimberley replied that the 
 British Eesident had been instructed that in future he 
 •was not to attend public demonstrations unless he had 
 previously informed himself that the name of Her 
 Majesty would be treated with proper respect. Let us 
 hope that this official reprimand will have its effect, 
 and that Mr. Hudson will learn therefrom that there 
 is such a thing as trop de zele — even in a good cause. 
 
 The Convention is now a thing of the past, the 
 appropriate rewards have been lavishly distributed to 
 its framers, and President Brand has at last prevailed 
 upon the Volksraad of the Orange Free State to allow 
 him to become a Knight Grand Cross of Saint Michael 
 and Saint George, — the same prize looked forward to 
 by our most distinguished public servants at the close 
 of the devotion of their life to the service of their
 
 2?2 THE TllANSVAAL. 
 
 country. But its results are yet to come — though it 
 would be difficult to forecast the details of their 
 development. One thing, however, is clear : the signing 
 of that document signalised an entirely new departure 
 in South African affairs, and brought us within a 
 measurable distance of the abandonment, for the pre- 
 sent at any rate, of the supremacy of English rule in 
 South Africa. 
 
 This is the larger issue of the matter, and it is 
 already bearing fruit. Emboldened by their success 
 in the Transvaal, the Dutch party at the Cape are 
 demanding, and the demand is to be granted, that 
 the Dutch tongue be admitted ^:)ari ^:)rtssw with English, 
 as the official language in the Law Courts and tlie 
 House of Assembly. When a country thus consents 
 to use a foreign tongue equally with its own, it is a 
 sure sign that those who speak it are rising to power. 
 But " the Party " looks higher than this, and openly 
 aims at throwing off English rule altogether, and 
 declaring South Africa a great Dutch republic. The 
 course of events is favourable to their aspiration. 
 Responsible Government is to be granted to Natal, 
 which country, not being strong enough to stand alone 
 in the face of the many dangers that surround her, 
 will be driven into the arms of the Dutch party to 
 save herself from destruction. It will be useless for 
 her to look for help from England, and any feelings 
 of repugnance she may feel to Boer rule will soon be 
 choked by necessity, and a mutual interest. It is, 
 however, possible that some unforeseen event, such 
 as the advent to power of a strong Conservative 
 ]\Iinistry, may check the tide that now seta so strongly 
 in favour of Dutch supremacy.
 
 THE RETROCESSION OF THE TRANSVAAL. 283 
 
 It seems to me, however, to Le a question worthy 
 of the consideration of those who at present direct 
 the destinies of the Empire, whether it would not 
 Le wise, as they have gone so far, to go a little further 
 and favour a scheme for the total abandonment of 
 South Africa, retaining only Table Bay. If they do 
 not, it is now quite within the bounds of sober possi- 
 bility that they may one day have to face a fresh 
 Transvaal rebellion, only on a ten times larger scale, 
 and might find it difficult to retain even Table Bay. 
 If, on the other hand, they do, I believe that all the 
 White States in South Africa would confederate of 
 their own free-will, under the pressure of the necessity 
 for common action, and the Dutch element being pre- 
 ponderant, at once set to work to exterminate the 
 natives on general principles, in much the same way, 
 and from much the same motives that a cook exter- 
 minates black beetles, because she thinks them ugly, 
 and to clear the kitchen, 
 
 I need hardly say that such a policy is not one 
 that commands my sympathy, but Her Majesty's 
 Government having put their hand to the plough, 
 it is worth their while to consider it. It would at 
 any rate be in perfect accordance with their declared 
 sentiments, and command an enthusiastic support from 
 their followers. 
 
 As regards the smaller and more immediate issue 
 of the retrocession, namely, its effect on the Transvaal 
 itself, it cannot be other than evil. The act is, I 
 believe, quite without precedent in our history, and 
 it is difficult to see, looking at it from those high 
 grounds of national morality assumed by the Govern- 
 ment, what greater arguments can be advanced in its
 
 284 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 favour, tlian could be found to support the abandon- 
 ment of, — let us say, — Ireland. Indeed a certain 
 parallel undoubtedly exists between the circumstances 
 of the two countries. Ireland was, like the Transvaal, 
 annexed, though a long time ago, and has continually 
 aiiitated for its freedom. The Irish hate us, so did 
 the Boers. In Ireland, Englishmen are being shot, 
 and England is running the awful risk of blood- 
 guiltiness, as it did in the Transvaal. In Ireland, 
 smouldering revolution is being fanned into flame by 
 Mr. Gladstone's speeches and acts, as it was in the 
 Transvaal. In Ireland, as in the Transvaal, there 
 exists a strong loyal class that receives insults instead 
 of support from the Government, and whose property, 
 as was the case there, is taken from them without 
 compensation, to be flung as a sop to stop the mouths 
 of the Queen's enemies. And so I might go on, finding 
 many such similarities of circumstances, but my parallel, 
 like most parallels, must break down at last. Thus — • 
 it mattered little to England whether or no she let the 
 Transvaal go, but to let Ireland go would be more than 
 even Mr. Gladstone dare attempt. 
 
 Somehow, if you follow these things far enough, 
 you always come to vulgar first principles. The dif- 
 ference between the case of the Transvaal and that 
 of Ireland is a difference not of justice of cause, for 
 both causes are equally unjust or just according as 
 they are viewed, but of mere common expediency. 
 Judging from the elevated standpoint of the national 
 morality theory, however, which, as we know, soars 
 above such truisms as the foolish statement that force 
 is a remedy, or that if you wish to retain your prestige 
 you must not allow defeats to pass unavenged, I can-
 
 THE RETROCESSION OF THE TEANSVAAL. 285 
 
 not see why, if it was righteous to abandon the Trans- 
 vaal, it would not be equally righteous to abandon 
 Ireland ! 
 
 As for the Transvaal, that country is not to be 
 congratulated on its success, for it has destroyed all 
 its hopes of permanent peace, has ruined its trade 
 and credit, and has driven away the most useful and 
 productive class in the community. The Boers, elated 
 by their success in arms, will be little likely to settle 
 down to peaceable occupations, and still less likely 
 to pay their taxes, which, indeed, I hear they are 
 already refusing to do. They have learnt how easily 
 even a powerful Government can be upset, and the 
 lesson is not likely to be forgotten, for want of repeti- 
 tion to their own weak one. 
 
 Already the Transvaal Government hardly knows 
 which way to turn for funds, and is, perhaps fortu- 
 nately for itself, quite unable to borrow, through want 
 of credit. 
 
 As regards the native question, I agree with Mr. 
 H. Shepstone, who, in his Eeport on this subject, 
 says that he does not believe that the natives will 
 inaugurate any action against the Boers, so long as 
 the latter do not try to collect taxes, or otherwise 
 interfere with them. But if the Boer Government is 
 to continue to exist, it will be bound to raise taxes 
 from the natives, since it cannot collect much from 
 its white subjects. The first general attempt of the 
 sort will be the signal for active resistance on the 
 part of the natives, whom, if they act without concert, 
 the Boers will be able to crush in detail, though with 
 considerable loss. If, on the other hand, they should 
 have happened, during the last few years, to have learnt
 
 2S6 THE TEANSVAAL. 
 
 the advantages of combinatiou, as is quite possible, 
 perhaps they will crush the Boers. 
 
 The only thing that is at present certain about the 
 matter is that there will be bloodshed, and that before 
 long. For instance, the Montsioa difficulty in the Keate 
 Award has in it the possibilities of a serious war, and 
 "there are plenty such difficulties ready to spring into 
 life within and without the Transvaal. 
 
 In all human probability it will take but a small 
 lapse of time for the Transvaal to find itself in the 
 identical position from which we relieved it by the 
 Annexation. 
 
 What course events will then take it is impossible 
 to say. It may be found desirable to re-annex the 
 country, though, in my opinion, that would be, after 
 all that has passed, an unfortunate step ; its inhabi- 
 tants may be cut up piecemeal by a combined move- 
 ment of native tribes, as they would have been, had 
 they not been rescued by the English Government in 
 1877, or it is possible that the Orange Free State 
 may consent to take the Transvaal under its wing : 
 who can say ? There is only one thing that our re- 
 cently abandoned possession can count on for certain, 
 and that is trouble, both from its white subjects, and 
 the natives, who hate the Boers with a bitter and a 
 well-earned hatred. 
 
 The whole question can, so far as its moral aspect 
 is concerned, be summed up in a few words. 
 
 Whether or no the Annexation was a necessity at tlie 
 moment of its execution — which I certainly maintain 
 it was — it received the unreserved sanction of the 
 Home authorities, and the relations of Sovereign and 
 subject, with all the many and mutual obligations
 
 THE RETROCESSION OF THE TRANSVAAL. 2S7 
 
 involved in that connection, were established between 
 the Queen of England and every individual of the 
 motley population of the Transvaal. Xor was this 
 change an empty form, for, to the largest proportion 
 of that population, this transfer of allegiance brought 
 with it a priceless and a vital boon. To them it meant 
 freedom and justice — for where, on any portion of 
 this globe over which the British ensign floats, does 
 the law even wink at cruelty or wrong ? 
 
 A few years passed away, and a small number of 
 the Queen's subjects in the Transvaal rose in rebellion 
 against her authority, and inflicted some reverses 
 on her arms. Thereupon, in spite of the reiterated 
 pledges given to the contrary — partly under stress of 
 defeat, and partly in obedience to the pressure of 
 " advanced views " — the country was abandoned, and 
 the vast majority who had remained faithful to tlie 
 Crown, was handed to the cruel despotism of the 
 minority who had rebelled against it. 
 
 Such an act of treachery to those to whom we M'ero 
 bound with double chains — by tlie strong ties of a 
 common citizenship, and by those claims to England's 
 protection from violence and wrong which have hitherto 
 been wont to command it, even where there was no 
 duty to fulfil, and no authority to vindicate — stands, 
 I believe, without parallel on our records, and marks 
 a new departure in our history. 
 
 I cannot end these pages without expressing my 
 admiration of the extremely able way in wliich the 
 Boers managed their revolt, wlien once they felt that, 
 having undertaken the thing, it was a question of 
 life and death with them. It shows that they have 
 good stuff in them some\yhere, which, under the
 
 THE TRANSVAAL. 
 
 firm but just rule of Her Majesty, might liave beou 
 much developed, and it makes it the more sad that 
 they should have been led to throw off that rule, and 
 have been allowed to do so by an English Government. 
 
 In conclusion, there is one point that I must touch 
 on, and that is the effect of the retrocession on the 
 native mind, which I can only describe as most 
 disastrous. The danger alluded to in the Eeport of 
 the Eoyal Commission has been most amply realised, 
 and the prevailing belief in the steadfastness of our 
 policy, and the inviolability of our plighted word, 
 which has hitherto been the great secret of our hold 
 on the Kafirs, has been rudely shaken. The motives 
 that influenced, or are said to have influenced, the 
 Government in their act, are naturally quite unin- 
 telligible to savages, however clever, who do believe 
 that force is a remedy, and who have seen the in- 
 habitants of a country ruled by England defeat English 
 soldiers and take possession of it, whilst those who 
 remained loyal to England were driven out of it. It will 
 not be wonderful if some of them, say the natives of 
 Natal, deduce therefrom conclusions unfavourable to 
 loyalty, and evince a desire to try the same experiment. 
 
 It is, however, unprofitable to speculate on the future, 
 which must be left to unfold itself. 
 
 The curtain is, so far as this country is concerned, 
 down for the moment on the South African stage; 
 when it rises again, there is but too much reason to 
 fear that it will reveal a state of confusion, which, 
 unless it is more wisely and consistently dealt with in 
 the future than it has been in the past, may develop 
 into chaos.
 
 APPENDIX.
 
 .^^
 
 APPENDIX. 
 I. 
 
 THE POTOHEFSTROOM ATROCITIES, &c 
 
 There were more murders and acts of cruelty committed 
 during the war at Potchefstroom, where the behaviour of the 
 Boers was throughout both deceitful and savage, than at any 
 other place. 
 
 "When the fighting commenced a number of ladies and 
 children, the wives and children of English residents, took 
 refuge in the fort. Shortly after it had been invested they 
 applied to be allowed to return to their homes in the town 
 till the war was over. The request was refused by the Boer 
 commander, who said that as they had gone there, they 
 might stop and "perish" there. One poor lady, the wife of 
 a gentleman well known in the Transvaal, was badly wounded 
 by having the point of a stake, which had been cut in two by 
 a bullet, driven into her side. She was at the time in a state 
 of pregnancy, and died some days afterwards in great agony. 
 Her little sister was shot through the throat, and several other 
 women and children suffered from bullet wounds, and fever 
 arising from their being obliged to live for months exposed 
 to rain and heat, with insufficient food. 
 
 The moving spirit of all the Potchefstroom atrocities was 
 a cruel wretch of the name of Buskes, a well-educated man, 
 who, as an advocate of the High Court, had taken the oath 
 of allegiance to the Queen.
 
 292 APPENDIX. 
 
 One deponent swears that he saw this Buskes wearing 
 Captain Fall's diamond ring, which he had taken from 
 Sergeant Eitchie, to whom it was handed to he sent to 
 England, and also that he had possessed himself of the 
 carriages and other goods belonging to prisoners taken by 
 the Boers. ^ Another deponent (whose name is omitted in 
 the Blue Book for precautionary reasons) swears, " That on 
 the next night the patrol again came to my house accom- 
 panied by one Buskes, who was secretary of the Boer Com- 
 mittee, and again asked where my wife and daughter were. 
 I replied, in bed ; and Buskes then said, ' I must see for 
 myself.' I refused to allow him, and he forced me, with a 
 loaded gun held to my breast, to open the curtains of the 
 bed, when he pulled the bedclothes half off my wife, and 
 altogether off my daughter. I then told him if I had a gun 
 I would shoot him. He placed a loaded gun at my breast, 
 when my wife sprang out of bed and got between us." 
 
 I remember hearing at the time that this Buskes (who is 
 a good musician) took one of his victims, who was on the 
 way to execution, into the chapel and played the " Dead 
 March in Saul," or some such piece, over him on the organ. 
 
 After the capture of the Court House a good many English- 
 men fell into the hands of the Boers. Most of these were 
 sentenced to hard labour and deprivation of " civil rights." 
 The sentence was enforced by making them work in the 
 trenches under a heavy fire from the fort. One poor fellow, 
 E. W. Finlay by name, got his head blown off by a shell from 
 his own friends in the fort, and several loyal Kafirs suffered 
 the same fate. After these events the remaining prisoners 
 refused to return to the trenches till they had been "tamed" 
 by being thrashed with the butt end of guns, and by threats 
 of receiving twenty-five lashes each. 
 
 But their fate, bad as it was, was not so awful as that 
 Buffered by Dr. Woite and J. Van der Linden. 
 
 ^ Buiikes was afterwards forced to deliver up the riug.
 
 THE POTCHEFSTROOM ATROCITIES, ETC. 293 
 
 Dr. Woite had attended the Boer meeting which was held 
 before the outbreak, and written a letter from thence to 
 Major Clarke, in wliich he had described the talk of the Boers 
 as silly bluster. He was not a paid spy. This letter was, 
 unfortunately for him, found in Major Clarke's pocket-book, 
 and because of it he was put through a form of trial, taken 
 out and shot dead, all on the same day. He left a wife and 
 large family, who afterwards found their way to Natal in a 
 destitute condition. 
 
 The case of Van der Linden is somewhat similar. He was 
 one of Raaf's Volunteers, and as such had taken the oath 
 of allegiance to the Queen. In the execution of his duty 
 he made a report to his commanding officer about the Boer 
 meeting, and which afterwards fell into the hands of the 
 Boers. On this he was put through the form of trial, and, 
 though in the service of the Queen, was found guilty of 
 treason and condemned to death. One of his judges, a little 
 less stony-hearted tlian the rest, pointed out that " when the 
 prisoner committed the crime martial law had not yet been 
 proclaimed, nor the State," but it availed him nothing. He 
 was taken out and shot. 
 
 A Kafir named Carolus was also put through the form of 
 trial and shot, for no crime at all that I can discover. 
 
 Ten unarmed Kafir drivers, who had been sent away from 
 the fort, were shot down in cold blood by a party of Boers. 
 Several witnesses depose to having seen their remains lying 
 together close by Potchefstroom. 
 
 Various other Kafirs were shot. None of the perpetrators 
 of these crimes were brought to justice. The Koyal Com- 
 mission comments on these acts as follows : — 
 
 " In regard to the deaths of Woite, Van der Linden, and 
 Carolus, the Boer leaders do not deny the fact that those men 
 had been executed, b\it sought to justify it. The majority of 
 your Commissioners felt bound to record their opinion that 
 the taking of the lives of these men was an act contrary to
 
 294 APPENDIX. 
 
 the rules of civilised warfare. Sir H. de Villiers was of 
 opinion that the executions in these cases, having been 
 ordered by properly constituted court martial of the Boers' 
 forces after due trial, did not fall under the cognisance of 
 your Commissioners. 
 
 " Upon the case of William Finlay the majority of your 
 Commissioners felt bound to record the opinion that the 
 sacrifice of Finlay's life, through forced labour under fire 
 in the trenches, was an act contrary to the rules of civilised 
 warfare. Si7- H. de Villiers did not feel justified by the facts 
 of the case in joining in this expression of opinion (sic). As 
 to the case of the Kafir Andries, your Commissioners decided 
 that, although the shooting of this man appeared to them, 
 from the information laid before them, to be not in accord- 
 ance with the rules of civilised warfare, under all the cir- 
 cumstances of the case, it was not desirable to insist upon a 
 prosecution." 
 
 " The majority of your Commissioners, although feeling 
 it a duty to record emphatically their disapproval of the 
 acts that resulted in the deaths of Woite, Van der Linden, 
 Finlay, and Carolus, yet found it impossible to bring to justice 
 the persons guilty of these acts." 
 
 It will be observed that Sir H. de Villiers does not express 
 any disapproval, emphatic or otherwise, of these wicked 
 murders. 
 
 But Potchefstroom did not enjoy a monopoly of murder. 
 
 In December 1880, Captain Elliot, who was a survivor 
 from the Bronker Spruit massacre, and Captain Lambart, 
 who had been taken prisoner by the Boers whilst bringing 
 remounts from the Free State, were released from Heidel- 
 berg on parol on condition that they left the country. An 
 escort of two men brought them to a drift of the Vaal river, 
 where they refused to cross, because they could not get their 
 cart through, the river being in flood. The escort then 
 returned to Heidelberg and reported that the officers would
 
 THE POTCHEFSTROOM ATROCITIES, ETC. 205 
 
 not cross, A civil note was then sent back to Captain 
 Elliot and Lambart, signed by P. J, Joubert, telling them 
 •' to pass the Vaal river immediately by the road that will 
 be shown to you." What secret orders, if any, were sent 
 with this letter has never transpired ; but I decline to be- 
 lieve that, either in this or in Barber's case, the Boer escort 
 took upon themselves the responsibility of murdering their 
 prisoners, without authority of some kind for the deed. 
 
 The men despatched from Heidelberg with the letter found 
 Lambart and Elliot wandering about and trying to find the 
 way to Standerton. They presented the letter, and took 
 them towards a drift in the Vaal. Shortly before they got 
 there the prisoners noticed that their escort had been rein- 
 forced. It would be interesting to know, if these extra men 
 were not sent to assist in the murder, how and why they 
 turned up as they did and joined themselves to the escort. 
 The prisoners were taken to an old and disused drift of the 
 Vaal river and told to cross. It was now dark, and the 
 river was much swollen with rain ; in fact, impassable for 
 the cart and horses. Captains Elliot and Lambart begged to 
 be allowed to outspau till the next morning, but were told 
 that they must cross, which they accordingly attempted to do. 
 A few yards from the bank the cart stuck on a rock, and 
 whilst in this position the Boer escort poured a volley into 
 it. Poor Elliot was instantly killed, one bullet fracturing 
 his skull, another passing through the back, a third shatter- 
 ing the right thigh, and a fourth breaking the left wrist. 
 The cart was also riddled, but strange to say, Captain 
 Lambart was nntouched, and succeeded in swimming to the 
 further bank, the Boers firing at him whenever the flashes 
 of lightning revealed his whereabouts. After sticking some 
 time in the mud of the bank he managed to effect his escape, 
 and next day reached the house of an Englishman called 
 Groom, living in the Free State, and from thence made his 
 way to NataL
 
 296 APPENDIX. 
 
 Two of the murderers were put through a form of trial, 
 after the conclusion of peace, and acquitted. 
 
 The case of the murder of Dr. Barber is of a somewhat 
 similar character to that of Elliot, except that there is in 
 this case a curious piece of indirect evidence that seems to 
 connect the murder directly with Piet Joubert, one of the 
 Triumvirate. 
 
 In the month of February 1881, two Englishmen came 
 to the Boer laager at Lang's Nek to offer their services as 
 doctors. Their names were Dr. Barber, who was well known 
 to the Boers, and his assistant, Mr. Walter Dyas, and they 
 came, not from Natal, but the Orange Free State. On 
 arrival at the Boer camp they were at first well received, but 
 after a little while seized, searched, and tied up all night to 
 a disselboom (pole of a waggon). Next morning they were 
 told to mount their horses, and started from the camp 
 escorted by two men who were to take them over the Free 
 State line. 
 
 When they reached the Free State line the Boers told 
 them to get off their horses, which they were ordered to 
 bring l^ack to the camp. They did so, bade good-day to 
 their escort, and started to walk on towards their destina- 
 tion. When they had gone about forty yards Dyas heard 
 the report of a rifle, and Barber called out, "My God, I 
 am shot ! " and fell dead. 
 
 Dyas went down on his hands and knees and saw one of 
 the escort deliberately aim at him. He then jumped up, 
 and ran dodging from right to left, trying to avoid the buUet. 
 Presently the man fired, and he felt himself struck through 
 the thigh. He fell with his face to the men, and saw his 
 would-be assassin put a fresh cartridge into his rifle and aim 
 at him. Turning his face to the ground he awaited his 
 death, but the bullet whizzed past his head. He then saw 
 the men take the horses and go away, thinking they had 
 finished him. After waiting a while he managed to get up,
 
 THE POTCHEFSTROOM ATROCITIES, ETC. 297 
 
 and struggled to a house not far oflF, where he was kindly 
 treated and remained till he recovered. 
 
 Some time after tliis occurrence a Hottentot, named Allan 
 Smitli, made a statement at N"ewcastle, from which it appears 
 that he had been taken prisoner by the Boers and made to 
 work for them. One night he saw Barber and Dyas tied to 
 the disselboom, and overheard the following, which I will 
 give in his own words : — 
 
 " I went to a fire where some Boers were sitting ; among 
 them was a low-sized man, moderately stout, with a dark- 
 brown full beard, apparently about thirty-five years of age. 
 I do not know his name. He was telling Ms comrades that 
 he had brought an order from Piet Jouhert to Viljoen, to 
 take the two prisoners to the Free State line and shoot them 
 there. He said, in the course of conversation, ' Piet Joubert 
 het gevraacht waarom was de mensche neet dood geschiet 
 toen hulle bijde eerste laager gekom het.' ('Piet Joubert 
 asked why were the men not shot when they came to the 
 first laager.') They then saw me at the fire, and one of them 
 said, ' You must not talk before that fellow ; he understands 
 what you say, and will tell everybody.' 
 
 " Next morning Viljoen told me to go away, and gave me 
 a pass into the Free State. He said (in Dutch), ' You must 
 not drive for any Englishman again. If we catch you doing 
 so we will shoot you, and if you do not go away quick, and 
 wo catch you hanging about when we bring the two men to 
 the line, we will shoot you too.' " 
 
 Dyas, who escaped, made an affidavit with reference to 
 this statement in which he says, " I have read the foregoing 
 affidavit of Allan Smith, and I say that the person described 
 in the third paragraph thereof as bringing orders from Piet 
 Joubert to Viljoen, corresponds with one of the Boers who 
 took Dr. Barber and myself to the Free State, and to the 
 best of my belief he is the man who shot Dr. Barber." 
 
 The actual murderers were put on their trial in the Free
 
 298 APPENDIX. 
 
 State, and, of course, acquitted. In his examination at the 
 trial, Allan Smith says, "It was a young man who said that 
 Joubert had given orders that Barber had to be shot. . . . 
 It was not at night, but in the morning early, when the 
 young man spoke about Piet Joubert's order." 
 
 Most people will gather, from what I have quoted, that 
 there exists a certain connection between the dastardly 
 murder of Dr. Barber (and the attempted murder of Mr. 
 Dyas) and Piet Joubert, one of that " able " Triumvirate of 
 which Mr. Gladstone speaks so highly. 
 
 I shall only allude to one more murder, though more are 
 reported to have occurred, amongst them that of Mr. Mal- 
 colm, who was kicked to death by Boers, — and that is Mr. 
 Green's. 
 
 Mr. Green was an English gold-digger, and was travelling 
 along the main road to his home at Spitzcop. The road 
 passed close by the military camp at Lydenburg, into which 
 he was called. On coming out he went to a Boer patrol with 
 a flag of truce, and whilst talking to them was shot dead. 
 The Eev. J. Thorne, the English clergyman at Lydenburg, 
 describes this murder in an affidavit in the following 
 words : — 
 
 " That I was the clergyman who got together a party of 
 Englishmen and brought down the body of Mr. Green who 
 was murdered by the Boers and buried it. I have ascertained 
 the circumstances of the murder, which were as follows : — 
 Mr. Green was on his way to the gold-fields. As he was 
 passing the fort, he was called in by the officers, and sent out 
 again with a message to the Boer commandant. Immediately 
 on leaving the camp, he went to the Boer guard opposite 
 with a flag of truce in his hand ; while parleying with the 
 Boers, who proposed to make a prisoner of him, he was shot 
 through the head." 
 
 No prosecution was instituted in this case. Mr. Green 
 left a wife and children in a destitute condition.
 
 ( 299 ) 
 
 II. 
 
 PLEDGES GIVEN BY MR GLADSTONE'S GOVERN- 
 MENT AS TO THE RETENTION OF THE 
 TRANSVAAL AS A BRITISH COLONY. 
 
 The following extracts from the speeches, despatches, and 
 telegrams of members of tlie present Government, with refer- 
 ence to the proposed retrocession of the Transvaal, are not 
 without interest : — 
 
 During the month of May 1880, Lord Kimberley des- 
 patched a telegram to Sir Bartle Frere, in which the follow- 
 ing words occur : " Under no circumstances can the Queen's 
 authority in the Transvaal he relinquished. " 
 
 In a despatch dated 20th May, and addressed to Sir Bartle 
 Frere, Lord Kimberley says, " That the sovereignty of the 
 Queen in the Transvaal could not be relinquished." 
 
 In a speech in the House of Lords on the 24th May 1880, 
 Lord Kimberley said : — 
 
 " There was a still stronger reason than that for not reced- 
 ing ; it was impossible to say what calamities such a step as 
 receding might not cause. We had, at the cost of much 
 blood and treasure, restored peace, and the effect of our now 
 reversing our policy woiild be to leave the province in a state 
 of anarchy, and possibly to cause an internecine war. For 
 such a risk, he could not make himself responsible. The 
 number of the natives in the Transvaal was estimated at 
 about 800,000, and that of the whites less than 50,000. Diffi-
 
 300 APPENDIX. 
 
 culties with the Zulus and frontier tribes would again arise, 
 and, looking as they must to South Africa as a whole, the 
 Government, after a careful consideration of the question, 
 came to the conclusion that we could not relinquish the 
 Transvaal. Nothing could be more unfortunate than un- 
 certainty in respect to such a matter." 
 
 On the 8th June 1880, Mr. Gladstone, in reply to a Boer 
 memorial, wrote as follows : — 
 
 "It is undoubtedly a matter for much regret that it should, 
 since the Annexation, have appeared that so large a number 
 of the population of Dutch origin in the Transvaal are opposed 
 to the annexation of that territory, but it is impossible now 
 to consider that question as if it were presented for the first 
 time. We have to do with a state of things which has 
 existed for a considerable period, during which obligations 
 have been contracted, especially, though not exclusively, towards 
 the native population, which cannot be set aside. Looking to 
 all the circumstances, both of the Transvaal and the rest of 
 South Africa, and to the necessity of preventing a renewal of 
 disorders, which might lead to disastrous consequences, not 
 only to the Transvaal but to the whole of South Africa, our 
 judgment is that the Queen cannot be advised to relinquish the 
 Transvaal." 
 
 Her Majesty's Speech, delivered in Parliament on the 6th 
 January 1881, contains the following words: "A rising 
 in the Transvaal has recently imposed upon me the duty of 
 vindicating my authority.'" 
 
 These extracts are rather curious reading in face of the 
 policy adopted by the Government, after our troops had been 
 defeated.
 
 ( 30i ) 
 
 m. 
 
 THE CASE OF INDABEZIM13I. 
 
 This is a case which came under my own notice. The com 
 plainant is now a tenant of my own. Wlien Indabezimbi 
 appeared before Mr. Cochrane and myself, his appearance 
 fully bore out his description of the assault made upon him. 
 We did everything in our power to help him to recover his 
 son and his property, but without effect. The matter was 
 fully reported to Sir Hercules Robinson and Sir E. Wood, 
 and a question was asked on the subject in the House of 
 Commons. I append Mr. Courtney's answer. This case, 
 which is perfectly authentic, will prove instructive reading, 
 as showing the treatment the Kafir must expect at the hands 
 of the Boer, now that he is no longer protected by us. It 
 must be remembered that the vast majority of such incidents 
 are never heard of. The Kafirs suffer, and are stilL The 
 assault and robbery of Indabezimbi took place in Natal 
 territory. 
 
 Statement of Indabezimbi. 
 
 " I used to work on Mr. Robson's son's place, and on his 
 death I went to Meyer's (in the Utrecht district of the 
 Transvaal) about a year ago. I took all my property with 
 me. There lived on the farm old Isaac Meyer, Solomon
 
 302 APPENDIX. 
 
 Meyer, who died during the war, young Isaac Meyer, Jan 
 Meyer, Martinus Meyer, also a man called Cornelius, a 
 " bijwooner," who lived on Solomon's place after he died. 
 
 " According to custom, I sent my son to work for old Isaac 
 Meyer, as I lived on his place. When tlie war began all the 
 Meyer family moved further into the Transvaal, my son 
 going with them as herd. I went up to Klip River with 
 them as driver, where the river forms the boundary between 
 the Free State and Transvaal. I returned at once, leaving 
 my son with the Meyers. He was a small boy about twelve 
 years of age. At the termination of the war the Meyers 
 sent for me to drive them down. I met them a day's 
 journey this side of Klip River. I asked them where my 
 son was. Old Isaac Meyer told me he had sent him to look 
 for horses ; he did not return ; and another boy was sent 
 who brought the horses. The horses were found close by. 
 No one went to look for my son. I asked old Isaac Meyer 
 for leave to go and offer a reward amongst the Kafirs for my 
 son. He refused, saying I must drive him home, and then 
 he would give me a pass to come back and look for him. 
 On our arrival at the farm I and my wife again applied to 
 old Isaac Meyer to be allowed to go and see about my son. 
 He refused, saying I must first shear the sheep. I replied 
 that he well knew that I could not shear sheep. I said, 
 ' How can I work when my heart is sore for my son ? ' 
 Meyer said again that I must wait awhile as the rivers were 
 full. I said how could that matter, seeing that both in 
 coming and going with the waggons we crossed no rivers ? 
 As he refused me a pass, I started without one to seek my 
 son. On arrival at Mavovo's kraal I met my brother, who 
 told me that I must go no further, or the Boers would shoot 
 me. Having no pass I returned. On my return my wives 
 told me that the Meyers had come every niorniug to look for 
 me with guns to shoot me, telling them that ' it was now no 
 longer the days for sjamboking (flogging with hide whips)
 
 THE CASE OF INDABEZIMBI. 303 
 
 the natives, but the days for shooting them.' On hearing 
 this 1 collected my go<^ds, and by morning had everything 
 on the Natal side of the BuflFalo River — on Natal ground. 
 About mid-day Martinus Meyer overtook us by Degaza's 
 kraal and asked me what I was doing on the Natal side of 
 the river, I told him I was leaving for Natal, because I 
 found it altogether too hot for me in the Transvaal. He 
 said that if I came back he would make everything comfort- 
 able. I refused. He then attacked me with a knobkerrie, 
 and would have killed me had not one of my wives, seeing 
 that I was badly hurt, knocked him down with a piece of 
 iron. Martinus then mounted his horse and galloped off. 
 I then got on my horse and fled. My wives hid themselves. 
 In the afternoon there came to the waggon Jan Meyer, 
 Martinus Meyer, young Isaac Meyer, and the man called 
 Cornelius. They hunted all about for us with the object of 
 shooting us, as they told Degaza's Kaflrs. My wives then 
 saw them inspan the waggon and take everything away. I 
 had a waggon, twelve oxen, four cows, and a mare, also a 
 box containing two hundred pounds in gold, a telescope, 
 clothes, and other things. My wives found the box broken 
 on the ground and all the contents gone. Forty sacks of 
 grain belonging to me were also taken. I was robbed of 
 everything I had, with the exception of the horse I escaped 
 on. The waggon was one I hired from my brother (a rela- 
 tion) ; the oxen were my own brother's. Eighty pounds of 
 the money I got from the Standard Bank in Newcastle for 
 oxen sold to the owner of the store on the Ingagane Drift. 
 The rest I had accumulated in fees from doctoring. I am a 
 doctor amongst my own people. I come now to ask you to 
 allow me to settle on your land as a refugee. 
 
 " (Signed) Indabezimbi, 
 his X mark. 
 *' This statement was made by Indabezimbi at Hilldrop, 
 Newcastle, Natal, on the Seventeenth of August, Eighteen
 
 304 APPENDIX. 
 
 hundred and eighty-one, in the presence of the undersigned 
 witnesses. 
 
 " (Signed) H. Eider Haggard. 
 
 A. H. D. COOHRANB. 
 
 J. H. Gay Kobbbts. 
 " N.B. — The outrage of which Indahezimbi has here given 
 an account occurred within a week of the present date, 
 August 17th, 1 88 1." 
 
 Statement of the looman Nongena, wife of Indabezimhi. 
 
 " My master's name is Isaac Meyer ; he lives in the Trans 
 vaal, south of Utrecht. "We have lived on the farm about 
 a year. On the farm lived also Jan Meyer, Martinus Meyer, 
 and young Isaac Meyer, sons of old Isaac Meyer. There 
 was also another man on the farm, whose name I do not 
 know. When the waggon went up with the Meyers family 
 to the centre of the Transvaal, when the late war broke out, 
 my husband drove old Isaac Meyer's waggon, and my sou 
 Ungazaan also went to drive on stock. After my husband 
 had driven the waggon to its destination in the Transvaal he 
 returned to the kraal, leaving his son Ungazaan with the 
 Meyers. After the war was over my husband was sent for 
 by the Meyers to drive back the waggons. On arrival of the 
 Meyers at the farm I found my husband had returned, but 
 my son was left behind. I asked my master where my son 
 was ; my master replied, ' He did not know, he had sent the 
 boy to bring up horses, but he had not brought them.' 
 Another boy was sent who brought the horses. He said he 
 had not seen the boy Ungazaan since he left to look for 
 the horses, as they had left the place the morning after the 
 boy was missing. My husband asked for a pass to go back 
 and look for the boy ; Meyer refused, and my husband went
 
 THE CASE OF INDABEZTMBI. 305 
 
 without one to look for Ungazaan, my son. He returned 
 without the boy, owing, he said, to the want of a pass. 
 My husband dared not go into the country without a pass. 
 During my husband's absence, the three sons of old Isaac 
 Meyer, namely, Martinus, Jan, and Isaac, came every morn- 
 ing to search for my husband, saying, ' We will kill him, he 
 leaves our work to go without our leave to look for the boy.' 
 They came once with sjamboks, but afterwards with guns, 
 saying they would kill him if they found him. I told my 
 husband this directly he returned home. On hearing this 
 my husband said, ' We cannot then stay here longer.' He 
 then went at once and borrowed a waggon and twelve oxen, 
 and during the night we packed the waggon three times, and 
 took three loads across the Buffalo River to Degaza's kraal, 
 which is on Natal ground, forty sacks of grain, ;£2qo in a 
 box, with clothes and other things, also mats and skins, and 
 four head of cattle and a horse. All these things were at 
 Degaza's kraal before sunrise the next morning. The Induna 
 Kabane, at the magistrates' office at Newcastle, knows of the 
 money, and from whence it came. All the money is our 
 money. 
 
 " About mid-day on the day after the night we moved, 
 Martinus came on horseback to us at Degaza's kraal, and I 
 saw him beating my husband with a kerrie ; he hit him also 
 in the mouth with his fist. He hit my husband on the head 
 with a kerrie ; he beat my husband on the foot when he was 
 trying to creep away in a hut, and would have killed him 
 had not one of his wives named Camgagaan hit Martinus on 
 the head with a piece of iron. Martinus, on recovery, rode 
 away; my husband also fled on a horse. 
 
 " I with the other wives fled, and hid ourselves close by 
 in the grass and stones. Presently we saw from our own 
 hiding place three white men, armed with guns, seeking for 
 us. Their names were jMartinus Meyer, Jan Meyer, and 
 Isaac Meyer, all three sons of old Isaac Meyer. They sought 
 
 u
 
 3o6 APPENDIX. 
 
 us in vain. From our hiding-place we heard the waggon 
 driven away; and later, when we went back to Degaza's 
 kraal, they told us that the Meyers had inspanned the 
 waggon, and had returned with it to the Transvaal side of 
 the Buffalo River. The names of those who saw the Boers 
 go away with the waggon are Gangtovo, Capaches, Noma- 
 tonga, Nomamane, and others. The Boers took away on the 
 waggon that night all the last load we had brought over from 
 the Transvaal, together with all our clothes ; and some of 
 the sacks first brought over were loaded up, all our cattle 
 were taken, and our box was broken, and the ;^20o taken 
 away. We found the pieces of the box on the ground when 
 we came from our hiding-place. We then fled. The people 
 at Degaza's kraal told us that the Boers had said that they 
 would return, and take away that which they were forced to 
 leave behind when they took the first load. We have since 
 heard from Degaza that the Boers came back again and took 
 what remained of our property at Degaza's kraal. Degaza 
 saw the Boers take the things himself. 
 
 " This is all I know of the facts. The assaults and robbery 
 took place, as near as I can say, about fourteen days ago." 
 
 (Signed) Nongena, 
 
 her X mark. 
 
 Gagaoola, also wife of Indabezimbi, states : " I have heard 
 all that Nongena has told you. Her words are true ; I was 
 present when the assault and robbery took place." 
 
 (Signed) Gagaoola, 
 
 her X mark. 
 
 These statements were made to us at Hilklrop, Newcastle, 
 Natal, on the Twenty-second of August, Eighteen hundred 
 and eighty- one. A. H. D. Cochrane. 
 
 H. Rider Haggard. 
 
 (Signed) Ayah, 
 
 her X mark, 
 Interpreter.
 
 THE CASE OF INDABEZIMBl. 307 
 
 Indabezimbi. 
 
 "Mr. Alderman Fowler asked the Under Secretary of 
 State for the Colonies, whether the British Eesident at Pre- 
 toria had brought under the notice of the Transvaal Govern- 
 ment the circumstances of an outrage committed in August 
 last, by a party of Boers, on the person and property of a 
 Kafir named Indabezimbi, who was at that time residing 
 in Natal ; and whether any steps had been taken by the 
 authorities of the Transvaal either to institute a judicial 
 inquiry into the matter, or to surrender the offenders to the 
 Government of Natal. 
 
 "Mr. Courtney. — On the 13th of October the British 
 Resident reported that, according to promise, the Govern- 
 ment had caused an investigation to be made at Utrecht, and 
 informed him that the result was somewhat to invalidate 
 the statement of Indabezimbi ; but that the documents con- 
 nected with the investigation at Utrecht would speedily be 
 forwarded to him with a view to correspondence through 
 him with the Natal Government. No further communication 
 has been received. It must be observed that, in the absence 
 of any extradition convention, a judicial inquiry in this case 
 is practically impossible, the outrage, whatever it was, having 
 been committed in Natal, and the offenders being in the 
 Transvaal. Her Majesty's Government are taking active 
 steps to re-establish a system of extradition, in pursuance of 
 Article 29 of the Convention. The despatches on this sub- 
 ject will be given to Parliament when the correspondence is 
 completed."
 
 ( 3o8 ) 
 
 IV. 
 A BOER ADVERTISEMENT. 
 
 It may be interesting to Englishmen to know what treat- 
 ment is meted out to such of their fellow-countrymen as 
 have been bold enough, or forced by necessity, to remain in 
 the Transvaal since the retrocession. The following is a 
 translation of an advertisement recently published in the 
 Volksstem, a Transvaal paper, and is a fair sample of what 
 " loyalists " have to expect : — 
 
 " WARNBsra. 
 
 " We, the undersigned Burghers of the Ward Aapies river, 
 hereby warn all loyal persons who have registered themselves 
 with the British Resident, that they are not to come into 
 our houses, or into our farms, and still less to offer to shake 
 hands. They can greet at a distance on the road like Kafirs, 
 and those who act contrary to this notice can expect the 
 result." 
 
 Presumably " the result " that the Englishman who takes 
 the liberty to offer to shake hands with a Boer can expect, 
 is to be beaten or murdered. This notice is signed by the 
 Justice of the Peace or " Veld Cornet " of the district. Any- 
 body who knows the estimation in which a Kafir is held 
 by the Boers will understand its peculiar insolence.
 
 ( 309 ) 
 
 "TRANSVAAL'S" LETTER TO THE 
 STANDARD. 
 
 The following letter appeared in the issue of the Standard 
 of the 31st May 1882, and is dated Pretoria, 27th April. 
 It is signed " Transvaal," probably because the author, were 
 he to put his name at the foot of so candid a document, 
 would find himself in much the same position as that 
 occupied at the present moment by an Irish landlord who has 
 outraged the susceptibilities of the Land League. He would 
 be rigorously " boycotted," and might, in the event of any 
 disturbance, be made into a target. The Transvaal Boers 
 are very sensitive to criticism, especially where their native 
 policy is concerned. I take the liberty to reprint the letter 
 here, partly because I feel sure that I shall be forwarding 
 the wishes of the writer by assisting to give publicity to his 
 facts, and partly on account of the striking and recent con- 
 firmation it affords, on every point, to my remarks on the 
 same subjects : — 
 
 " Sir, — In calling your attention to what is going on on 
 the south-western border of the Transvaal, I may possibly 
 tell you of some things which you may already have heard 
 of, for in the present isolated condition of the country, with- 
 out telegraphs, and with a very imperfect postal system, 
 added to the jealousy of the Boer Government in keeping 
 their actions secret from the outside world, it is not only
 
 3IO APPENDIX. 
 
 very difficult to get at the truth of what is happening, but 
 the people in one portion of the country are in many cases 
 totally ignorant of what is going on in another. Neverthe- 
 less, I feel it incumbent on me to call the attention of the 
 English people, through your widely circulating journal, to 
 what has come under my observation with reference to the 
 disgraceful native war which is, and has been, raging on the 
 south-west border of this country. 
 
 " During the late Boer war, you may be aware of the fact 
 that a very large number, if not all, of the natives, were 
 strongly in favour of the English Government, and only 
 awaited the signal from it to rush upon their old oppressors- 
 But the natives, although forbidden by the English Govern- 
 ment from joining with them against the Boers (it is hardly 
 necessary to say that had it not been for this the war would 
 have had a very different ending), nevertheless afforded an 
 asylum and protection to the lives and property of refugee 
 Englishmen and loyalists. Notable among these natives was 
 a chief named Montsiou, whose tribe is situated just outside 
 the borders of the Transvaal to the south-west. This chief 
 and his people received numbers of refugees who fled to them 
 for protection from the rapacity of the Boers, and watched 
 over them and their property throughout the war. For this 
 offence the Boers swore to be revenged on him, and hardly 
 was the war finished when they commenced commandeering 
 in the Potchefstroom district, under the pretence of protect- 
 ing their borders, but with the ostensible purpose of inflict- 
 ing chastisement on this loyal chief; and, the better to 
 effect their purpose, they allied themselves with a neighbour- 
 ing chief, who had some old grudge against him, and, by 
 promises of assistance and hopes of plunder, induced him to 
 commence a war, under cover of which they could join, and 
 thus effect the purpose they had in view. 
 
 "The chiefs whom the Boers had instigated to harass 
 Montsiou got the worst of it, and the action of the Boers,
 
 LETTER TO THE STANDARD. 311 
 
 who were actively commandeering in the Potchefstroom 
 (district *?), under Commandant Cronge, was brought to the 
 notice of the Royal Commission through complaints made 
 by loyal Boers, and resulted in an inquiry into the subject, 
 which showed that his opponent was the aggressor, and was 
 acting under the advice of and assistance from the Boers. 
 The Royal Commission managed to patch matters up, but 
 no sooner were their labours over, and the country fairly 
 handed over to the Boers, than Moshete and Masouw, insti- 
 gated by the Boers, commenced again harassing Montsiou, 
 with the avowed purpose of bringing on a war, and so far 
 succeeded as to oblige Montsiou to take up arms in self- 
 defence. 
 
 " From that time forward the war has gone on increasing 
 in dimensions, until other chiefs have been drawn into 
 it, and the Boer volunteers fighting against Montsiou and 
 Monkoroane are almost equal in numbers to the natives. 
 The Boers, while doing all they can to crush Montsiou on 
 account of the protection he afforded loyalists during the 
 late war against the English Government, are careful not to 
 do it in an official way, because that might cause trouble 
 with England, whereas, by aiding and assisting it privately, 
 they could do quite as much without incurring responsibility. 
 You may naturally ask how I know all this, and what proofs 
 I can advance in support of it. Some time after the Royal 
 Commission had left the country, and the war had com- 
 menced again, Piet Joubert, who is Commandant-General, 
 went down to the border with the object of putting an end 
 to the war. This, I presume, he did for the sake of appear- 
 ances, for it is well known that he entertains a strong hatred 
 against those natives who in any way showed a partiality for 
 British rule ; and when it is remembered that Piet Joubert's 
 journey did not result in a cessation of hostilities, but in an 
 increase, and that ever since his journey the war has increased 
 in area and in numbers, and that in no single instance has a
 
 312 APPENDIX. 
 
 Boer volunteer been prevented crossing the border, or ammu- 
 nition for use against Montsiou been stopped, the sincerity 
 of his intentions may well be doubted. 
 
 "Then, again, officers in the Boer Jagers went about Pre- 
 toria endeavouring to obtain volunteers to fight against Mont- 
 siou, saying that they were to have some months' leave from 
 the Government, and that subscriptions would be raised to 
 assist those men who had no private means. This took place 
 almost immediately after Piet Joubert's return from the 
 border, and while he was in Pretoria, and the general opinion 
 was that he was at the bottom of it ; but as it became rather 
 more public than was intended, the British Resident was 
 obliged to take notice of it, and the result was that the Boers, 
 though in general treating the British Resident with little 
 consideration, thought it wisest to carry on their operations 
 in a more private manner, more especially as their object 
 could be attained quite as effectually in this way. 
 
 " "While the Boers are assisting Moshete and Masouw by 
 every means in their power, with the sole object of crushing 
 Montsiou and Monkoroane, another loyal chief, the Colonial 
 Government, no doubt under instructions from home, are 
 doing their best to prevent volunteers or ammunition reach- 
 ing them, and have already arrested men in Kimberley, who 
 have been trying to raise volunteers to go to their assistance. 
 
 " The result of this is, that the loyal chiefs are suffering 
 under a double disadvantage ; for while their enemies are 
 receiving every assistance, they are blockaded on all sides, 
 and, through the action of the English Government in pre- 
 venting them obtaining assistance, are rapidly falling a prey 
 to the Boers. Those only who know anything of the Boer 
 method of warfare against natives will know what this 
 means ; and in spite of the Boer Government doing all they 
 can to keep things secret, horrible tales of the cruelties per- 
 petrated by them leak out occasionally. 
 
 It seems to me a disgraceful thing, and a stain on the
 
 LETTER TO THE STANDARD. 313 
 
 honour of England, that these loyal chiefs and their tribes 
 should be robbed, plundered, and shot down like dogs, 
 simply because they afforded protection to the lives and pro- 
 perty of Englishmen during the late war, and yet these things 
 are going on and are being perpetrated on the border of Eng- 
 land's Colonies. If England will not step in and insist on 
 the Boers putting a stop to this murderous war, then in God's 
 name let her not prevent these poor natives from obtaining 
 ammunition and assistance to enable them to defend their 
 country. They succoured our countrymen, and if we cannot 
 succour them, the least we can do is not to interfere to pre- 
 vent them from protecting themselves I 
 
 " Of course, it suits the Boer Government to make out 
 that they have nothing to do with the war, and cannot pre- 
 vent Boer volunteers from fighting these chiefs ; and so 
 long as the English Government rests satisfied with these 
 answers, so long will this disgraceful state of things go on. 
 Let the English Government be firm, however, and insist 
 on the Boers taking no part in this war, and it will cease 
 — a sure proof that the Boer Government have the power 
 to stop it if they have the will. 
 
 " Not only are the Boers wreaking vengeance upon Mont- 
 siou and Monkoroane, but a friend of theirs, a chief of the 
 name of Kalafin, whose tribe is situated in the Zeerust dis- 
 trict, Transvaal, has been robbed by them of everything he 
 possessed. This chief had English sympathies ; and as he 
 presumed to build a wall round his town he gave the Boers 
 the excuse they wanted. He was ordered to take the wall 
 down, which he did, at the same time proving that he only 
 built it to prevent his cattle straying among the huts. He 
 was then ordered to come to Pretoria, which he did accord- 
 ingly. He was then ordered to pay a fine of three thousand 
 cattle, which fine he paid. No sooner was this done than 
 the Boers, bent on his ruin, raised the fine to ten thousand 
 head. The poor chief in vain pleaded his inability to pay.
 
 314 APPENDIX. 
 
 It was the old story of the wolf and the lamb. Because he 
 couldn't pay, the Boers construed it into an act of disobedi- 
 ence, and at once ordered their men to go in and take every- 
 thing he possessed. This tribe is small and weak, which 
 the Boers well knew. Eye-witnesses of what followed say 
 it was a heartrending sight. The women, with children in 
 their arms, pleaded in vain to the Boers to leave them some- 
 thing or they would starve, but the latter only jeered at 
 them. What these poor people will do God only knows, for 
 the Boers stripped them of every living thing they possessed, 
 and with the proceeds of this robbery the Boer Government 
 intend to replenish their coffers. 
 
 " The British Resident, Mr. Hudson, it is believed, abuts 
 his eyes to many things. No doubt his is a difficult position 
 to fill ; and doubtless he is aware that, if he reports every- 
 thing to the English Government, the Boers have it in their 
 power to make his position anything but a pleasant one. In 
 any case, the English portion of community here, while 
 admitting his good qualities socially, have little confidence 
 in him officially. 
 
 " My object in writing this letter, however, is not so much 
 to show what a disgraceful state the Government is in, as to 
 try and awaken sympathy in the breasts of my countrymen 
 for the cause of these loyal chiefs. While the Government 
 are writing despatches to the British Resident, these chiefs 
 and their people are being ruined past remedying." 
 
 THB END. 
 
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 Eiiinburgh ana London
 
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