I RUSSIAN CONQUESTS SINCE 1689. I At tliia moment, whon Ruaaia has embarked on ; i a new uipeditjon. of conquest, it may not be inop- [ I portune to mention a few leading facts in Russian I hiitory, with a view of showing how the repoatod blows Btrnok by this gigantic barbarism at her j neighbours bavo always aimed at the same result j — n;imely, the extension o( Ruaaian [jower in the j Eaat. Whether the will of Petur the tireat woe i Napoleon or i .n Its mjunc- ; ncy. When Petet I ft mo, the Russian I I Empire had not a single inch of shore upon strictly j j European wiiters. Peter held undisputed posses- • sion of the Arctic Ocean from Varanger I ! Fiord (30' W. long., 70" N. iat.) to Var- I gatch Island, on the same parallel 30 degrees farther eastward. Not a. single grain of simd on the shores of the Baltic or Bluok Seas belonged to him; the whole of tho Sea of Azov was the property of Turkey; and that white elephant of waters, the Caspian Sea, was held chiefly by Turkey and Persia. At this period, therufore, Rnsaia was a gigantic area. witUout any practiwible outlet. The and the Treaty (if Nystadt was sigiiud. Knt only Livonia and the Baltic lalos, buc Esthonia, Ingerman, and Carelia. — all Baltic provinces —were tlien ceded to Kuasin. Peter obt;iineJ thus at one stroke two very decided advantages : , he crippled the . power of Sweden, and secured j a harbour fur his navy. Desirous of utdis- I ing to the full the advantai,'e3 thus gained, Peter othing was I with Circassia proper. The Crimean peiiindula followed oa a matter of couiao, and with it the immense district occupied by tlie Ccssacks ut' the Bln«k Sea, on the e;»st oi the Sea of Azov. Russia's foreslioro now exttoidod from Crouatadt to Riga in the Uahic, and from Odessa almost to Batouin in Porte ceded tli'j Crimea to Russia, and jieace bot\v(,'en tiio twi< iiuliiing was loade at J^sy, Russia d.'clared war iigainst I'uland. The second par- Podolia, Kiev, : mg wreck of tin Rnong llusaia, Prussia PoNver, of cuurso. tak Lvedc-n, Russia content with driving out the French, Russia in thia year achiL-vcd the more positive task : of liuUL-ung liesaarabiu was tUo conclu tJic 1.7 w ca[,liiro of t, hstrii, c gruit ivoi :ot , estroy- [•kto wiling RUSSIM WAES WITH TURKEY BY MAJOR FRANK S. RUSSELL 14th hussars rorjibrly of balliol college, oxford, and of the staff collegk WITH TWO MAPS CEDANT AEMA TOGiE HENRY S. KING & CO., LONDON 1877 (The rights of translation and of rciproduction are reserved) SRLE iJSL 5.138555 PEBFACE. The following pages lay no claim to originality, in them will be foimd no new theories of history — no startling discovery in the science of either war or politics. They are simply intended to lay before the public some pas- sages in the history of the past, and from them, if possible, to give a glimpse of the futm-e. The wars of 1828 and 1829 are given in detail; the account of them is derived from the works of Count Moltke, Colonel Chesney, Fonton, Valentine, Allison, and others. These campaigns, which hitherto have been but little noticed or read, would be most interesting, if only as an abstract study of the art of war. They have, how- ever, another claim to attention — sooner or later, if not in the days of the present, as is most probable, certainly in those of the next generation, there will be other battles under other leaders, but fought over the same battle- grounds and between the same nations. Monarchs, generals, armies change, but rivers, moun- tains, and the principles of strategy remain the same. vi PREFACE. Until the day comes — and may it be far distant — when the word England is but the geographical expression for a foggy ' little island set in stormy seas,' Englishmen have reason to look with anxiety to the East — they have interests to guard, possessions to defend ; hence the history of the past seems to be well worth their study. There are some now amongst us — the Cleons of our time — who would recommend a policy which savours of the selfishness of China coupled with the isolation of Japan, who would endeavour to separate political from strategic considerations. These men may be honest and sincere, they may be politicians, but certainly they are not statesmen. ^^^lile the following pages are being sent to the printer for the last time, the news has arrived that the representatives of the Grreat Powers have finally presented their reduced and now irreducible demands to the Porte. If these conditions are rejected, war appears imminent — if accepted, as they afford no certain guarantee whatever for the better government of the Christian subjects of the Turk, war can only be postponed. Paris : January 18th, 1877. CONTENTS PAGE Inteoductiox . . .1 CHAPTER I. THE EAELT WARS UP TO 1828. Treaty of Caiiowitz in 1699— War of 1709— Treaty of Pruth— Peace of Passarowitcli — War of 1735 — Siege of Azopli — Details of war — Continuance of war in 1738 and 1739 — Defeat of Count Wallisat Belgrade — Success of armies of Czarina — Ttiirty years' peace — War of 1769 — Successor of Komanzoff — Continuation of war — Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardghi — War of 1787 — Siege of Ismail — Continuation of war — Peace of Jassy — War of 1806 — Exploit of Admiral Duck%Yortli— Peace of Tilsit— War of 1810- 11 — Siege of Eustcliuk — Defeat of Turks — Conclusion of peace between Alexander I. and the Porte — Events from Peace of 1815 to 1828 U CHAPTER H. THE POSITION AXD RESOUPvCES OF THE TWO COMBATANTS AT THE OPEXIXG OE THE WAPv IX 1828. Position of Russia in Europe in 1828 — Position of Turkey— Condi- tion of her army and her fleet — Convention of Akkerman — Forces available to be brought into the field by Turkey — Forces avail- able for invasion by Eussia — Disposition of forces at opening of campaign — Lines of defence possessed by Turkey — The Pruth— The Danube— The Balkans— Biijuk Chekmedge . . 55 Tui COSTENTS. CHAPTER III. THE CAMPAIGN LN' EUEOPE IX 1828. PAGE Eeasons why operations were delayed — Method of Paissian advance —Passage of Danube — Siege of Brailow — Peculiarities of Turkisli defence of fortresses — Advance of Russians towards Varna — Strategy of Turks — Schumla — Siege of Varna — At- tempts at relief —Fall of Varna — Contests before Schumla — Retreat of Russians to the Danube — Operations of 6th Corps in Wallachia — Siege of Silistria . . . . . .71 CHAPTER lY. KEMARKS OX CAilPAIGX OE 1828 IX ErEOPE. Campaign commenced too late — Russian force too weak — Arm)' should have marched on Varna — Diversion to Schumla a mis- take — Strategy of the Turks — Tardiness of Grand Vizier — Results of Campaign in Bulgaria — General Geismar and his operations 97 CHAPTER V. THE CAMPAIGX OP 1829 IX EUEOPE. Situation at commencement of year — Resources of Russians — Diebitsch — Resources of Turks — Commencement of hostilities Capture of Sizeboli — Naval exploit of Turks — Siege of Silistria — Diebitsch "s march on Schumla and subsequent operations — Battle of Kiilewtscha — March across the Balkans — Capture of Adrianople — Position of Russian army at Peace of Adrianople — Signature of Peace 108 CONTENTS. CHAPTER VI. REMAKKS OlSr THE CAMPAIGN EST EUROPE OF 1829. PAGE The character of the Russian operations — Remarks thereon — Ex- tracts from Appendix to Count Moltke's book on sickness in the Russian army — Field-marshal Diebitsch 138 CHAPTER Vn. THE CAMPAIGN IN ASIA IN 1828. State of affairs in Asia in winter of 1827-28 — Attitude of Persia — Russian preparations for invasion of Asia Minor— -Resources at her disposal — Alternative methods of attack — Preparations of Turks — Commencement of campaign — Fall of Kars — Outbreak of the plague — Capture of Akhaltsikh — Defeat of the Seras- kier — Capture of other fortresses— Conclusion of campaign — Remarks 156 CHAPTER Vm. ASIATIC CAMPAIGN OF 1829. Preparations of Turks for campaign — Threatening attitude of Persia — Consequent precautions of Paskewitch — Turkish at- tempt on Akhaltsikh — Successful defence and results — Letter of Paskewitch — Defeat of Hadgi Pacha — Defeat of the Seraskier near Kainly — Retreat of Hadgi Pacha— Fall of Erzeroum — Check of the Russians at Khart— Final defeat of the Seraskier — Retreat of Russians — Conclusion of war — Remarks on campaign Conditions of peace 164 COXTEyTS. CHAPTER IX. WAR ON THE DANUBE OP 1853 AND 1854 AND rEEVIOTJS EVENTS FEOM PEACE OF ADRIANOPLE. PAGlf Relations that existed between Russia and Turkey after 1829 — Revolt of Mehemet Ali — Victories of P^rahim Pacha in Syria — Assistance given to Turkey by Russia in 1833 — Russian forces quit Constantinople — Second revolt of Mehemet Ali in 1839 — Intervention of Allies — Danger of an European war — Strategi- cal position of Jaffa and Acre — Bombardment of Beyrout and Acre — Convention of 1840 — Occupation of Principalities by Russia in 1849 — Events that occasioned Crimean War — Assur- ances of Nicholas — War on the Danube in 1853 ; success of Omar Pacha — Siege of Silistria — Retreat of Russian Army — Landing in the Crimea — War in Asia and fall of Kars — Peace signed — The Treaty of Paris 179 CHAPTER X. THE EESOrRCES AND AE:\IED STRENGTH OF RUSSIA AN"D TURKEY AT THE PRESENT TliTE. Events connected with Eastern Question from Treaty of Paris up to present time — The Russian army — Russian railroads — Roumania, Servia, Montenegro, and Greece — Resources of Turkey— Turkish Army 204 CHAPTER XI. THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS POSSESSED BY EACH COXBATANT IN THE EVENT OF AVAR. Divergence of views on the subject — To ensure success a large f(»rce required by Russia — Probable Russian system of invasion — Time required by the various Corps to reach the Danube and CONTENTS. xi PAGE Schumla — Lines of defence to be occupied l:)y the Turks — Line of the Danube — Schumla — The Balkans — Selimno Pass — Flank- ing column by Servia — Time required to reach Adrianople — Probable date when Constantinople would be threatened — Keasons why Schumla cannot be disregarded — Alternative plans of operation — Difficulties of railway transport — Importance of Schumla— Description of the position of the Chekmedg^s — of that of the Dardanelles — of the position in Asia Minor — Opportunity lost by Russia in 1876 — Concluding remarks . 254 CHAPTER XII. THE POLITICAL ASPECT OF THE EASTERN QUESTION. Importance of Austria in a Eusso- Turkish war — The Slaves — Policy of Austria — How the action of Aiistria might be neutralised, externally and internally — Slavonic question — Danger to Austria — Limits of Bulgaria — Interests of England- -Tradi- tional policy of Russia — Essentially aggressive in its character — Various lines of policy open to England — Which it is her interest to adopt — Unfortimate natural antagonism between Russia and England — Advantages of the policy suggested . 288 Appendix 309 EUSSIAN WARS WITH TUEKEY. INTRODUCTION. It is a common saying that history repeats itself ; perhaps it might be said with greater truth that, as in the common occurrences of life, so also in history, similar causes pro- duce similar results. It now seems as if there is to be another of the many successive conflicts that have taken place between Eussia and Turkey within the last hundred years. The same causes are at work, the same symptoms are visible. On the one side the misgovernment and tyranny of the oppressor, coupled with lamentation and cries for aid on the part of the oppressed : on the other side sympathy for suffering brethren of the same race and religion, and indignation against their taskmasters. On the one hand a rapidly decaying and bankrupt power, existing, as it were, on the sufferance of its neighbours, but possessed of, perhaps, the most fertile and highly favoured territories of the earth, whose fertility they turn 2 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. to no account, and whose advantages they neglect ; and these highly favoured lands inhabited by people anta- gonistic in religion, in habits, in feelings, the dominant race far inferior in numbers, receding in civilisation, in- tolerant, unyielding ; the subject race rapidly increasing in numbers, advancing in prosperity, and daily more and more ambitious for the sovereign power, for which they are still unfitted. On the other hand a gigantic and powerful empire, with great resources still undeveloped, with territories whose sterility is their bane, and whose vast extent is their weakness, peopled by races but half civilised and more than half fanatic — races obedient to the dictates of a single man, but with prejudices so strong and feelings so deep, that this man, great as is his power, sacred as is his person, if he values his life cannot afford to dis- regard them. And as it were within the grasp of this mighty nation, there is a land flowing with milk and honey, which would supply all that in their own land is wanting, whose conquest would alike coincide with the tenets of their religion, with the dictates of their feelings, and with the consideration of their material advantage. In truth, one may say, however sincere be expressions of peace-loving rulers, however earnest the endeavours of highly skilled diplomatists, it may be possible to postpone but it is wholly impossible to prevent these wars between Russia and Turkey, that are as natural in their origin as they are historic in their recurrence. "Whether the year 1877 will or will not see another campaign on the banks RECURRENCE OF WARS WITH THE TURKS. 3 of the Danube, and on the slopes of the Balkans, we may rest assured that so long as the crescent flies on the dome of St. Sophia, so long as the Muscovite empire remains imited, there must be sooner or later a contest for very existence between the * Colossus of the North and the Sick Man of the South.' The Eastern question will still be unanswered, and there will still be a dormant volcano which one day will convulse Europe. Ever since the year 1453, when the Turks conquered Constantinople, it may be said that they have been in almost a chronic state of dissension or war with their Ohristian neighbours. Up to 1683, when Mahomet tlie Fourth besieged Vienna, the tide of their conquest was advancing ; since then it has been slowly but certainly receding. On three successive occasions their naval power has been destroyed by the combined fleets of other nations, and twice has England participated in this de- struction. In 1571, at Lepanto, the fleets of Spain, Grenoa, Malta, Venice, and Pius V., combined to destroy their navy; again in 1770 they were defeated by the fleet of Eussia aided by Englishmen, in the passage of Scio ; once more, fifty-seven years later, in 1827, at Navarino the Tm'kish navy was annihilated by the united fleets of England, Eussia, and France. The Turks have not un- frequently been called ^ our ancient allies ; ' it will be found on referring to history that they might with greater truth be called 'our ancient enemies,' as up to 1840 we were nearly always allied against them. B 2 4 BUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. England has always had a considerable interest in Eastern afifairs, both on account of her commerce and for her vast possessions in the East ; but that interest has in-- creased within the last fifty years, in a degree scarcely realised at the present time. As our Indian empire has been added to, as it has become yearly more and more bound up with the associations, the feelings, and the for- tunes of Englishmen, so have our interests in the East become magnified, and our solicitude as to how they may be best protected has become hourly more and more intense. It is remarkable to note the comparative indifi'erence with which our fathers, grandfathers, and great-grand- fathers heard of a war between the Russians and the Turks, and the complacency with which they witnessed the near approach of Russian armies to Constantinople. It will be asked, why is there not this indifference now ? Why are we more anxious, more solicitous, more nervous than those who have gone before us ? The answer is plain. In those days neither the overland route to India nor the Suez Canal had been established ; our communi- cation to India was round the Cape, and hence the con- version of the Black Sea into a Russian lake, and the preponderance of Russian power and influence in the ^Mediterranean were important only so far as they affected our commerce, and indirectly prejudiced our position and general prestige. It is needless to remark that the case is very different now to what it was in 1791, or even in 1829, and those who attempt to argue that because oiu* INCREASED INTEREST OF ENGLAND IN THE EAST. 5 ancestors were indifferent, we should be so likewise, start from false premisses, which must lead to mistaken con- clusions. While, however, the position of England has materially altered within the last fifty years, it cannot be said that the positions of either Eussia or Turkey have changed within the last hundred and fifty. The former State is, undoubtedly, more powerful for attack, the latter is weaker for defence, but as regards interest and causes for disagreement they are precisely the same as they have been for the last two centuries. Eussia is still somewhat cut off and isolated by the very existence and geographical position of the Ottoman empire, and would derive enormous benefit from an extension of her southern territory. Turkey still hideously misgoverns her subjects and ill-treats her Christian population, though from all accounts not so much as in former days, not more than Eussia herself ill-treats some of the inhabitants of her subject and recently subdued provinces. Turkey still occupies the position described as follows, by Sultan Mahmoud : ' The Franks envy us oiu- possessions in Europe, and must sooner or later drive us into Asia. This would have been done twenty years before I mounted the throne had it been possible to divide Constantinople between them ; but like a beautiful female captive, she has remained inviolate in the bosom of banditti. They cannot yet agree whose prize she is to be.' But while the positions of Eussia and Turkey have re- RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. mained almost unchanged, the position of Austria, as will be shown in a future chapter, has altered in a degree, if possible, more striking than that of England. The events of 1866 and 1870 have bequeathed a legacy of danger to the Court of Vienna such as she cannot ignore or disregard. As before remarked, until there is a complete and radical change in the entire state of affairs in the East, wars between Eussia and Turkey are inevitable and must recur as often, if not indeed oftener, than they have done in the last hundred years. It is therefore especially desirable that we should thoroughly realise the character of these contests — that we should study alike their politi- cal and their strategic aspect, and should be fully pre- pared for any eventuality which the course of events may bring about. ^Mlen we look back we find that since the year 1709 Eussia has made war against Turkey no less tlian eight times, namely : From 1 709-1 711. — Single-handed. „ 1735-1739. — In alliance with Austria. „ 1768-1774.— Single-handed. ,, 1787-1791. — In alliance with Austria. ,, 1806-1807. — A short time in alliance with England. „ 1810-1812.— Single-handed. „ 1828-1829.— Single-handed. „ 1853-1855. — Crimean War, In these eight contests Eussia has invariably been the aggressor, and nearly always has added to her territory. In fact, to quote the words of a distinguished writer on Eastern affairs in the year 1854: ' A reference to the THE PROGRESS AND AGGRESSIONS OF RUSSIA. 7 map will show that Eussia has advanced her frontier in every direction ; and even the Caspian Sea, which appeared to present an impediment to her progress, she has turned to advantage by appropriating it to herself. It will be seen that the plains of Tartary have excited her cupidity, while the civilised States of Europe and Asia have been dismembered to augment her dominions. It will be seen that the acquisitions she has made from Sweden are greater than what remains of that ancient kingdom ; that her acquisitions from Poland are as large as the whole Austrian empire ; that the territory she has wrested from Turkey in Europe is equal to the dominions of Prussia, exclusive of her Rhenish provinces ; and that her acquisi- tions from Turkey in Asia are equal in extent to all the smaller states of Grermany, the Rhenish provinces of Prussia, Belgium, and Holland taken together ; that the country she has conquered from Persia is about the size of England ; that her acquisitions in Tartary have an area equal to Turkey in Europe, G-reece, Italy, and Spain ; and that the territory she has acquired within the last sixty- four years (since 1772) is greater in extent and impor- tance than the whole empire she had in Europe before that time. .........' ' The power and resources of Russia lie in the countries to the west of the Volga, not in the wilds of Siberia ; and her empire in Europe has been nearly doubled in little more than half a century. In sixty-four years she has advanced her frontier eight hundred and fifty miles towards 8 liUSSIA^^ WARS WITH TURKEY. Vienna, Berlin, Dresden, Munich, and Paris ; she has approached four hundred and fifty miles nearer to Con- stantinople; she has possessed herself of the capital of Poland, and has advanced to within a few miles of the capi- tal of Sweden, from which, when Peter the First mounted the throne, her frontier was distant three hundred miles. Since that time she has stretched herself forward about one thousand miles towards India, and the same distance towards the capital of Persia. The regiment that is now stationed at her furthest frontier post on the western shore of the Caspian has as great a distance to march back to Moscow as onward to Attock on the Indus, and is actually further from St. Petersburg than from Lahore, the capital of the Punjab. The battalions of the Russian Imperial Gruard that invaded Persia found, at the termination of the war, that they were as near to Herat as to the banks of the Don ; that they had already accomplished half the distance from their capital to Delhi ; and that therefore, from their camp in Persia, they had as great a distance to march back to St. Petersburg as onward to the capital of Hindostan.' Whatever opinion we may entertain of the intentions, the wishes, and the character of the present ruler of the Muscovite empire and of his government, no one, we may add, who has watched their career can have other than a high one ; no one can question their sincerity : neverthe- less facts and history remain, and the traditional policy of a mighty empire, which possesses patriotic and faithful REPEATED ESCAPES OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE. 9 children, cannot change in a day or suddenly become unag- gressive and peaceful after having been for centuries the reverse. Alison has remarked that ' such are the natural strength and incomparable local advantages of Constantinople, that it has, both in ancient and modern times, enabled the empire of which it formed the head to survive the usual causes of decay, which after the lapse of a few generations generally prostrate the most powerful Asiatic monarchies.' No one who studies the history of the last century can fail to be struck by the truth of this reflection, — it is impossible to avoid feeling the greatest astonishment that the Turkish empire has so often and miraculously survived the destruc- tion which on so many occasions has apparently impended over her. Eight times she has been in danger from Russia : twice, in 1711 and 1739, she has saved herself by force of her own arms ; twice, in 1774 and 1829, has she been saved by the plague; once, in 1807, has she been saved by acci- dental circumstances ; and three times, in 1791, 1812, and 1853, has she been saved by the intervention of other powers. In truth a succession of marvellous escapes — for- tunate perhaps for her, but most unfortunate for other nations, since indirectly, from her gross misgovernment, from her apparent helplessness, and the temptation she affords for attack, Turkey is the chronic and inveterate dis- turber of peace in Europe. She and her antagonist Russia were the only disturbers of the great fifty years' peace ; again they brought that peace to a close, falsifying the 10 HUSSIA^' WARS WITH TURKEY. fond dreams of Utopian believers in the efficacy of inter- national exhibitions as harbingers of a terrestrial Millen- nium. Xow, again, are they threatening to inflict on Europe, for the tliird time within fifty years, the horrors of an Eastern war. The ' Eastern Question ' has been defined ' as the question whether Russia will have Constantinople or whether she will not.' This is a concise, and not alto- gether an inappropriate definition, but it is not sufficiently complete or exhaustive ; to it also might be added how the Turks can be made to govern properly, or, if that is an impossibility, how they may be satisfactorily replaced. Until these questions are solved, and indeed for some time after their solution, should that time ever arrive, all history bearing on the East must be replete with interest and instruction. From the earlier conflicts, which are sum- marised in the following pages, but little can be learnt from a military point of view. In those days the science of war had made but little progi'ess in Europe, and the East was even then far behind the West in enlightenment. As remarked by Frederick the Gfreat, the Russians and Turks,, when fighting, resembled ' a number of one-eyed men thrashing a number of blind ones.' Still physical charac- teristics remain the same, the sea still retains its position, and obstacles, which did not prove insurmountable for- merly, most certainly would not be insurmountable now, as some believers in the Turks and in their powers of defence would imagine. When we come to the campaigns SITUATION OF 1827 NOW REPEATED. 11 of only fifty years ago — those fought in 1828 and 1829 — within the memory of some living men, we find in every way much that can with advantage be studied ; likewise at the commencement of the Crimean War there were many remarkable events of both a political and a strategic significance. Thus in looking back and pondering over what has gone before, we must not fail to remember that the past is little else than a reflection of the future, while history is the mirror in which this reflection may be seen. Since the above pages were written, affairs in the East have taken an unexpected turn, illustrating more than ever the truth of the saying that ' history repeats itself.' The reader can judge for himself as to the aptness of the parallel between the situation now and what it was fifty years ago. In 1827 the misgovernment and barbarities of the Turks had utterly disgusted Europe, had converted their allies into enemies, and had deprived them of either material or moral support. Then it was also a case of oppressed nationalities, the Greeks being the sufferers instead of the Slaves. Eussia, as now, came forward as the philanthropic and disinterested champion of the sufferers fromi misrule, and was aided by England and the great Powers in her charitable efforts. A conference was assembled at London, and the delegates of the Powers there represented, ignoring the fact that ' there were 12 HUSSIAy WARS WITH TURKEY. Turks in Turkey,' arranged the affairs of the Ottoman Empire to their own satisfaction, but without consulting the Ottomans. They suddenly found that they had reckoned without their host — to their advice, to their suggestions, remonstrances, menaces, and armed demon- strations, the Divan showed itself equally indifferent. There followed Xavarino — that ' untoward event ' as it was termed in the Speech from the Throne of the following- year ; even this somewhat energetic demonstration failed to induce the Turk to swallow the wholesome dose which his kind physicians had prepared for him. The converse of the Malacle imaginaire, although fearfully sick, he refused to acknowledge his sickness. The French and English ambassadors left Constantinople and retired to Corfu, while Eussia was left mistress of the situation. This situation was, however, by no means an enviable one — even in those days the Eussian army was not, as a whole, the same as the splendid guards that kept watch over the Emperor's palace at St. Petersburg — even in those days there existed defaulting contractors — corrupt ofl&cials — gunpowder that would not ignite— guns that would not go off, and stores that existed only in the bills which the Grovernment had paid for them. Austria be- came alarmed and began to intrigue ; England, though loyal and true as ever, was by no means eager to convert Constantinople into a Eussian stronghold ; France was not a whit more anxious to encompass the same end. In fact, the Emperor Nicholas found that, though moral support SITUATION OF 1827 NOW REPEATED. 13 was apparently freely accorded him, as regards material assistance he must rely on his own resources. Neverthe- less, his word was pledged, his prestige, and perhaps his life, were at stake, and hence there followed the war of 1828. Time alone can show how far the parallel will hold good to the end. 14 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. CHAPTER I. THE EARLIER WARS UP TO 1828. Treaty of Carlowitz in 1699— War of 1709— Treaty of Priith— Peace of Passarowitcli— War of 1735 — Siege of Azoph — Details of war — Continuance of war in 1738 and 1739 — Defeat of Count Wallis at Belgrade — Success of armies of Czarina — Thirty years' peace— War of 1769 — Successor of Romanzoff — Continuation of war — Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardgi— War of 1787 — Siege of Ismail — Continuation of war — Peace of Jassy — War of 1806 — Exploit of Admiral Duck- worth—Peace of Tilsit— War of 1810-11— Siege of Rustchuk- Defeat of Turks — Conclusion of peace between Alexander I. and the Porte— Events from peace of 1815 to 1828. It would be difficult to trace out separately, or even to summarise, all the various wars in which from time to time the Turks have been engaged since they entered Europe. In point of fact they were for centuries more or less at war, which was carried on vigorously or not according to the means they happened to have for waging it. Their neighbours were their enemies, and all Christendom com- bined against them as against a common foe. Russia did not appear as their separate and definite antagonist until the commencement of the eighteenth century, but since then the contest between these two nations has been continually renewed at short intervals. EARLY WARS OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 15 About the year 1694 there occurred the last great miited alliance against Turkey, in which all the Eastern Powers of Christendom joined ; the war lasted more or less for about five years, and was at last brought to a close by a treaty of peace, which was concluded between the Sultan and the Czar, then Peter the Grreat, in 1699, at Carlowitz ; at that time, through the intervention of England, an armistice for thirty years was agreed on between the belli- gerents, and Turkey, having had the worst of the conflict, ceded Transylvania and Hungary to Austria, and portions of what is now the south of Russia, including Azoph, to Peter the Grreat. This may be termed the first serious commencement of the decay and fall of the Turkish empire, as it will be chronicled in the pages of some future Gfibbon. Xot- withstanding this formal treaty and solemn armistice, we find a few years later, in 1709, another war breaking out between Russia and Turkey. This time the armies of the Czar were defeated, and in the hour of his need Prussia and his other allies deserted him ; he had thus to accept the best terms he could get, and to renounce all the advantages he had gained in 1699. In 1711 the treaty of Pruth was signed and matters remained in statu quo until 1720, when we find the Muscovite and Ottoman ompires, strange to say, allied together against Persia. In the meantime it may be remarked that the Turks had been engaged in a desperate conflict -with the Venetians and Austrians, and had been signally defeated. 16 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. In 1711 they besieged Corfu, but were repulsed with loss; in the same year they lost Belgrade, which was then termed the key of the Turkish Empire on the western frontier. Prince Eugene, in command of a large force of Austrians, besieged the fortress and defeated an army of 180,000 men which hastened to its relief. The result was the peace of Passarowitz between the Grerman Empire and the Porte, signed in the following year. As before stated, in 1720 Eussia and Turkey were allied together against Persia ; this alliance, however, was not of long duration. Turkey became alarmed by the progress of Eussian arms, and was with difficulty restrained by Austria and France from declaring war. In 1722 peace was proclaimed between Eussia, Turkey, and Persia, and a convention signed, in which many advantages were con- ceded to the Czar. This peace likewise did not last long, for in 1735 the Empress Anne, seeing, as she thought, a favourable opportunity for recovering some of the advan- tages given up by the treaty of Pruth, discovered a pretext for declaring war with the Porte, and induced Austria to join her in hopes of a share in the spoil. This war was of such great duration and of so serious a character that it merits more than a passing notice. The actual and formal rupture between the Porte and Eussia did not take place till the spring of 1736, although in the previous year every preparation had been made for war. At first the Emperor of Austria attempted mediation between the Czarina and the Sultan ; but finding his efforts vain he SIEGE OF AZOPH IN 1736. 17 preferred to join the Russians and to aid in the disniem- berment of his Mussulman neighbour. The campaign commenced with the siege of Azoph, some details of which are narrated as follows by Sir Edward Cust in his ' Annals of the Wars ' : ' ^Marshal Miinnich, who had been appointed to the command of the Eussian army, commenced operations in the month of March, having assembled six regiments of infantry, and three of cavalry, together with 3,000 Cossacks of the Don, at St. Anne, about eighty leagnies from Azoph. On the 27th Miinnich passed the Don and began his march with so much precaution and silence that he arrived near Azoph without having been perceived by the enemy ; and he immediately attacked and carried by storm two castles on the river-side without the loss of a single man. On April 3rd, the Russians carried the fort of Lutick with little loss. He now gave over to Count Lacy the care of blockading and taking the town, and left the camp for the grand army that was formed on the Dnieper, where he arrived on the 18th, and found himself at the head of from 50,000 to 54,000 men. ' On May 1 9th, Miinnich sent off five detachments, each composed of 400 dragoons and 150 Cossacks; and as the steppe-land was one vast unbroken plain, they had orders to march within sight of each other, so as to unite whenever the force of the opposing army should make it necessary. They had marched only about two leagues when they came up with a body of Nogay Tartars, whom they c 18 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. attacked and routed. They had gone about two leagues farther when General Spiegel, who commanded, was obliged to unite his detachments as quickly as he could, since he suddenly found himself in presence of about 20,000 men advancing upon him. Spiegel had just time to form square, ordering the front rank to dismount, when these attacked him with most horrid yells, and poured forth a flight of arrows. Miinnich, apprised of the danger in which Spiegel was, put himself at the head of 3,000 dragoons and 2,000 Cossacks, and marched rapidly to his relief. As soon as the enemy perceived his approach, they retired with great precipitation, leaving 200 dead on the field. It was ascertained from the prisoners taken that the Khan, with an army of 100,000 men, was encamped at twenty leagues from the spot, and that the body that had retreated was under the command of the Kalga Sultan, or generalissimo of the Tartars of the Crimea. On the 26th the Eussians were encamped on the side of the river Kalantshi, when on a sudden they were attacked and surrounded by these troops, but at the first shot fired from some field-pieces the latter all fled with precipita- tion to the lines of Perekop. ' The Marshal determined to force these famous lines, and, marching all night, came upon them suddenly at break of day, to the astonishment of the Tartars, who had known nothing of his movements, and were astounded when they saw the Russian force formed up in six columns for the attack. These lines were extraordinary works, WAJR OF 1736. 19 nearly two French leagues in extent from the Sea of Azoph to the Black Sea. There was but one entrance, and six towers of stone, mounted with cannon, flanked the approach. The ditch was twelve toises broad and seven deep, the height of the parapet seventy feet, and its thick- ness in proportion. The troops advanced boldly to the ditch, under the command of Manstein, but on arriving there found it more deep and broad than they could have expected : nevertheless, they threw themselves into it and assisted one another to climb the parapet under an exceed- ingly brisk fire of the enemy. The Tartars, now finding the affair serious, did not wait for the Russians to reach the top, but betook themselves to flight, leaving no im- pediments to the free passage of the line?. ' On June 5th the Marshal advanced into the Crimea. The Tartars harassed them incessantly in the march, but scampered away immediately they were attacked. As they advanced they soon found water to fail. The natives, who fled from the villages, burned all the forage and spoiled the water of the wells. The absence of all water (for rain water is the only resource of this country and very scarce) caused the troops to suffer a good deal, and much disease ensued in consequence. On the 26th Miinnich advanced upon Baktchi-Serai, and on the 27th they repulsed the enemy and entered the town. He had intended to proceed to Cafifa, but his army was so reduced that he resolved to return to Perekop, where he destroyed the lines, and on August 28th returned to the Ukraine. c 2 20 EUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. ' Count, now Marshal, Lacy commenced the siege of Azoph on May 15th. On the 19th Admiral Bredal, who had come down the Don with fifteen galleys and a great number of other vessels, arrived off Azoph. The Turkish fleet, under the Capudan Pacha, Dgiannon Conja, entered the Sea of Azoph to succour the place, but the mouth of the Don is so barred with sands and shoals that neither fleet could get near each other. The works against the place continued by sap till June 13th. During this time the besieged made continual sallies, which were repulsed. The Marshal himself, in one of them, was nearly taken prisoner, and received a gun-shot wound in the thigh. On the 18th the usual accompaniment of a Turkish siege took place. One of the largest powder magazines exploded, by which more than 100 houses were thrown down, and 300 men lost their lives. At midnight, on the 28th, the assault was given, and although two mines were sprung the besiegers effected a lodgment, so that on June 29th the Pacha governor requested a capitulation, and Lacy, after lea\T.ng a garrison in the town, marched away to rejoin Munnich in the Ukraine. It was at this siege that the effects of the discipline which Miinnich had established in the Kussian armies were made curiously apparent. Sick- ness prevailed in the camp to a great extent, occasioned by intemperance and a general disgust for the service. ' To remedy this evil the Marshal issued an order for- bidding anyone to be sick, on pain of being buried alive ! ' In addition to the operations related above, the Em- WAJR OF 1737. 21 press Anne had directed an army against the Turkish territories of the Kuban. In this campaign she was also successful, and before the close of 1836 the entire district had submitted to her. In the year 1737 the war was continued with unabated vigour. Sir Edward Cust gives the following account of the operations of the Russians : — ' Marshal Miinnich took the field towards the end of April, and found his army to consist of 63 battalions and 145 squadrons, which might be reckoned at 60,000 or 70,000 men. There were in the artillery-train 62 guns of siege and 11 mortars, besides 165 field-pieces and 16 howitzers. On July 10th they were within three leagues of Ochzakow, where they came to blows with some Tm'ks of the garri- son, who had sallied out to the number of 15,000 men. On the 11th he began the siege between the river Dnieper and the Black Sea, and had the governor known what he was about at this time, and made a sally, he could have foiled the Russians, and forced them to retire ; but a powder magazine blew up, which bmied 6,000 men in the ruins, and threw the whole garrison into consterna- tion. Miinnich chose this moment for an assault, and finding his troops unwilling to face the flames, he opened a battery upon his own soldiers ; so that the place was at length carried by men who feared the enemy less than their own terrible general. It sm-rendered at discretion on July 13th. ' In the meantime Marshal Lacy advanced again into 22 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. the Crimea with about 40,000 men. On June 28th, sup- ported by a fleet in the Sea of Azoph, he crossed an arm of the sea by a bridge, and marched along the narrow strip of land that stretches as far as Arabat. The Khan, who never imagined the Russians would enter the country on that side, had posted himself with all his troops behind the lines of Perekop, which he had taken care to have repaired, and trusted to be enabled to dispute more suc- cessfully than had been done the year before. He now found them of no use, for Lacy was in full march for Arabat, without the loss of a single man. The Khan thought to rectify his mistake by posting himself with all diligence across the narrow spit of land formed by the Sea of Azoph on one side, and the Putrid Sea on the other. As soon, however, as Lacy heard that the Khan had arrived at Arabat, he caused the Putrid Sea to be sounded, and found a means of crossing through it, to the astonish- ment of the Khan, who forthwith retreated to the moun- tains. It was not the Khan alone who judged of this enterprise in marching along the spit of Arabat as a rash one. All the generals except Spiegel represented to Lacy that he ran the risk of seeing his whole army perish. The Marshal answered that there was danger in all military enterprises, but that he did not see more in this than in others. However, he begged their opinion as to what they thought best to be done. They unanimously replied, " To return with all possible speed." Upon which Lacy rejoined, that since the generals had a mind to return, he would have WJJR OF 1737-1739. 23 their passports made out accordingly ; and called for his secretary to deliver them without delay. He even com- manded a party of 200 dragoons to be their escort to the Ukraine, there to wait his return. It was three whole days before the generals could prevail on the Marshal to relent, and forgive them their presumption in proposing a retreat to him. On July 2oth Lacy was within a few miles of Kara-su Bazar, which was immediately abandoned.' After the operations as above related were brought to a successful issue, there was an attempt on the part of the Turks to retake Ochzakow, which failed, and also a naval action in the Sea of Azoph of an indecisive character. While, however, the Eussians were thus engaged on their southern frontier, and had achieved considerable success, their allies the Austrians had not been so fortunate. With that timid and undecided policy, which seems to be inse- parable from the traditions of the Viennese Court, the Emperor at first did not throw himself into the contest with vigour or determination, and when his troops actually were engaged, by his interference with his generals, he caused their defeat. Marshal Seckendorff had been placed in chief command of the Imperialist troops, and he framed a plan of operations which was to commence with the capture of Widdin, and to be seconded by an advance of the Eussians towards the Pruth. Neither of these operations were carried out, and at the close of the year 1737 the Ottoman forces remained master of the situation, while Seckendorff was disgraced. 24 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. Dm'ing the years of 1738 and 1739 this war still con- tinued. It will afford some idea of the strength and resources of the Tui'kish empire in those days, as com- pared with her present condition, if we consider that for nearly four years she was opposed single-handed to the combined forces of Eussia and Austria, and although she suffered many reverses, still in the end she maintained her position, and certainly the integTity of her empire, against them both. The year 1738 was marked by a Eussian in- vasion of the Crimea under Marshal Lacy, who crossed the Sea of Azoph in July, almost dry-shod, with an army of 35,000 men. The Khan of the Crimea assembled an army of 40,000 men to resist the invasion, and being assisted by a storm in the Black Sea, which dispersed the fleet intended to supply the Eussian army, he succeeded in repelling the invaders, who were forced to retire ^vithout any practical result beyond the destruction of the lines of Perekop. At the same time Marshal Miinnich, with about 50,000 men, was engaged in operations on the banks of the Dniester, but eventually was forced to retire. The Austrians were not more successful on the borders of Transylvania. Here the Turks had taken the offensive early in the year, and soon captured Orsova. The campaign closed mth the retreat of the Imperialists and by the disgrace of Konig- segg, the general who had replaced Seckendorff as generalissimo. In 1739 the war was again renewed, and again proved unfavourable to the fortunes of the Emperor of Austria. BATTLE OF CROTSKA IN 1739. 25 Count Wallis, who had been placed in chief command of his army, assembled an army of about 56,000 men, be- sides cavalry and artillery, near Belgrade, and in June encountered the Turkish army at the battle of Crotska, which is thus described by Sir Edward Oust :— ' The Grrand Vizier with his whole force had taken post on two hills between the defile and the village of Crotska. The Prince of Hildburghausen formed the first battalion that cleared the defile into square, whilst the left wing- passed along a narrow path, and extended itself on the heights overlooking the Danube. In this position the Imperialists withstood repeated attacks from the Turks,, who assailed them, with far superior numbers, from five in the morning till sunset, when Wallis ordered a retreat under cover of the approaching darkness. The Imperialists were hampered by the defile in which the Grand Vizier had caught them. On their side four generals were killed and five wounded; and 7,000 men, with 400 officers, were left dead on the field of battle. In this desperate conflict both parties sus- tained considerable loss, but the Turks displayed new skill in the art of war. Instead of tumultuous and uncon- nected attacks, they fought in the greatest order and in regular bodies ; and when broken they rallied with speed and activity. This was due in a great measure to the admirable discipline they had received from Count Bon- neval, a French military adventurer, who, after having served in the navy and army of France with distinction^ 26 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. took afterwards an Austrian commission, and subsequently became a Mussulman under the appellation of Aclimet Pacha. He was meditating a return to Christendom when he was surprised by death, eight years later than the present events. His memoirs are amusing and curious, as showing the rewards attendant upon those who adopt service among Orientals. ' The Imperial flotilla under Admiral Pallavicini fell down the Danube to co-operate with the army, so that when Wallis retreated the admiral found himself ex- posed to severe handling from the Turkish batteries, and only regained Belgrade on the 24th in a most dilapidated condition. The Imperialists took up so strong a position at Kinza, and placed their artillery with so much skill, that on the following day he repulsed a considerable body of troops headed by the Grand Vizier. Wallis, however, seized with despondency again, retreated during the night, and occupied the lines of Belgrade ; when, being still alarmed at the appearance of some Turkish irregulars, and deeming himself unequal to the defence of this strong position, he recrossed the Danube the following night. The Turks now instantly advanced against Belgrade, and the Grand Vizier, investing the place on the side of Servia, commenced the siege in form. He summoned the garrison to siurender on July 29. The Earl of Crawford, who served as a volunteer in the Imperial army, signalised his courage in an extraordinary manner on the occasion, and was dangerously wounded.' TREATY OF BELGRADE. 27 After the defeat of the Imperial army at Crotska, the Tm'ks invested Belgrade and prepared to push their suc- cesses to the utmost. No opportunity, however, was afforded them for any further triumphs over the Austrians ; the Emperor and his advisers, appalled by such a series of disasters, were only too glad to conclude a separate peace, by which Belgrade, Servia, and other portions of territory v^ere handed over to the Porte, which now was left to engage Russia by itself. While their allies had suffered such defeat and humi- liation, the armies of the Czarina had been far more fortunate. Count Miinnich, with about 60,000 men, invaded Turkey from the side of Poland, and after a series of operations succeeded in utterly routing the main Ottoman army at the battle of Cho-czim on August 28th, 1739. Peace soon followed, and the Sultan, notwith- standing his recent defeat, succeeded in making almost as advantageous terms with Russia as with Austria ; the former relinquished Belgrade, the latter Azoph, while it was arranged that Muscovite vessels of war should not appear in the Black Sea, and that commerce should be carried on by Ottoman vessels. This treaty, by some called the convention of BelgTade, by others that of Nissa, was signed in 1739, and remained in force for thirty years, until 1769, when the partition of Poland took place. As this was a violation of existing engagements, and was calculated to alarm the Divan for the integrity of its own territories, the reigning Sultan determined to take the 28 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. initiative, and having been promised assistance by France — an assistance, it may be remarked, never really accorded him — he declared war. The conflict which resulted was most disastrous to Turkey. The Crimea was invaded,. Eomanzoff's armies were most successful on the Pruth^ Ismail and Bender were captured, and in 1770 the Turkish fleet was destroyed in the Bay of Tchesme, by Elphinstone,. an Englishman in the Kussian service. The details of this war, disastrous in its results, and nearly productive of the destruction of the Ottoman empire, are of so complicated a character that it seems- unnecessary to do more than indicate shortly their general bearing. Little was done in the first year of the conflict,, 1768, beyond preparations and concentration of troops. Early, however, in 1769, two Russian armies under Prince Gallitzin and General Romanzoff respectively com- menced operations on the north-west and northern frontier of Turkey. At first Grallitzin was defeated, but by the middle of September the Russians had obtained so great a success at Cho-czim, on the Dniester, that by the end of the year they had subjugated all the open country north- west of the Danube. It may be remarked that this great Russian victory was principally caused by the extra- ordinary rashness of the Turks, who crossed the Dniester to attack their enemies without having secured their communications in rear, or made corresponding attacks on the enemy's flank, and who, when on a sudden flood of the stream and the consequent destruction of their WAR OF 1769-1772. 29 temporary bridges, ^ere 'left in the air' and utterly Touted. After their successes of the 1769 campaign the Eussian army under the supreme command of Eomanzofif retreated l)ehind the Dniester, while the Tm-ks on their part con- centrated behind the Danube. Early in 1770 both com- batants crossed the rivers before them and advanced to attack. Eomanzoff first encountered an Ottoman army under the Khan of the Crimea between the Pruth and the Larga. The Turks here occupied an intrenched camp, and could not be attacked; but fortunately they were induced by repeated challenges to descend into the plains, and there were utterly routed. Eomanzoff next met the main Tm'kish army of a nominal strength of 1 50,000 ; this force he also defeated on the banks of the Prath at Kagul on August 2nd, and ultimately drove it across the Danube. This great victory was soon followed by the fall of Bender, on the Dniester, the great Turkish fortress of the north, and with this capture the campaign of 1770 ended. Eomanzoff established his headquarters at Jassy, and remained master of Moldavia and Wallachia. During the three following years this apparently end- less war was continued ; in 1771 the Eussians invaded the Crimea and conquered the entire peninsula, while the un- fortunate Khan escaped to Constantinople, and it is stated died of grief. The Tm^ks also made a counter attack on the Danube and captm-ed Griurgevo, but were defeated in the Dobrudscha ; on the whole, this year ended without any 30 JiUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. very decisive results to either party in the Danubian provinces, though it may be said that on the whole the Eussians had the advantage. In 1772 the war languished in the early part of the year, and in the autumn an armistice was concluded, but neither party being agreed as to the terms of peace, in 1773 the contest was renewed with all vigoiu-. The operations of this and the following campaigTi are somewhat interesting, as the Eussians started from much the same base as they would now occupy in a Turkish war. They had possession of the entire territory north of the Danube, and their operations veiy much resembled those which afterwards took place in 1828 and 1829, both as regards preliminaries and results. On June 18th and 19th, 1773, Eomanzoflf crossed the Danube near Brailow, defeated a Turkish army, which he encountered ten days later near Silistria, and then at once proceeded to besiege that fortress. On the approach, however, of a large Turkish army the siege was raised, and the Eussians recrossed the Danube between July 2nd and July 5th. There they remained until October, when they again recrossed the river in two divisions ; one of these recommenced the siege of Silistria, while the other moved on Varna and attacked it. They were repulsed from both these places, and by December had to retrace their steps into winter quarters in Wallachia without having achieved any decisive results. It is stated that at this time, as also in other wars, the superiority of the Tm'kish over the Eussian TREATY OF KUCKUK KAIKARDGHI. 31 cavalry was most remarkable, and contributed more than anything else to cause the retreat of the invading army. In 1774 the Eussians were more fortunate than in the previous year, and all but succeeded in actually reaching^ Constantinople. This time the Eussians again crossed the Danube in several columns, the principal passage being effected at Turtakai, which had been captured by Suwarrow in the previous year. The Turks, as on several other occasions, did not attempt to defend the line of the Danube, but concentrated their forces in Bulgaria, while the garrisons of Eustchuk and the other fortified towns thi'eatened the Muscovite communications. The disor- ganisation, however, of the Turkish army rendered any military plans, however well devised, entirely futile. The Grrand Vizier was shamefully defeated on Jnne 20th by Kaminski and Suwarrow, and was deserted by almost all his army. He shut himself iip in Schumla, and his government sued for peace. Now, as fifty-nine years later pestilence came to the aid of the Turks, this was fortunate, since, in addition to external dangers, some of her principal possessions, Egypt, Tripoli, Grreece, and Syria, revolted from her ; it may truly be said that the Ottoman Power was never in greater straits than now, and that the Eussians had never a better chance of reach- ing the Bosphorus. In fact, nothing retained the Turk in Europe but the appearance of the plague, which broke out witli unexampled malignity, spread frcm the Neva to the Euphrates, and entirely paralysed both the combatants. 32 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. At last, in 17 74, the treaty of Kuckuk Kainardghi was signed between Catherine II. and Abdul Hamid ; by this Russia obtained free navigation of the Black Sea with the passage of the Dardanelles, provided only one ship of war was kept in the seas of Constantinople. She acquired Azoph, Taganrog, Kertch, and the Kinburn, her frontier was advanced to the Bogue, she obtained the sovereignty of the two Kabardas, and the Crimea was made independent, with a view to its future annexation. This treaty was even more important in its consequence than its conditions at first seemed to indicate, since by it alone Eussia obtained that ascendancy in the Caucasus, and in Greorgia, which led to their subsequent conquest and to the conversion of the Caspian into a Russian lake. The peace proclaimed in 1774 only lasted about twelve years, as the Empress Catherine placed a large army under Potemkin on the line of the Caucasus, while Suwarrow threatened the line of the Danube ; she then concluded an alliance with Austria for the partition of Tm'key, and in the meantime seized the Crimea. The Sultan, in presence of the great danger that was threaten- ing him, acknowledged the sovereignty of Russia in the Crimea, but thereby wholly failed to avert the storm ; at last, seeing that it was inevitable, he took the initiative, and declared war in 1787. The coalition against the Porte was at this time almost as formidable as it had been fifty years before. The Emperor Joseph of Austria looked forward to a large extension of territory on his eastern fron- 7FAR OF 1788. 33 tiers, while the Empress Catherine was to have Byzantium as the seat of the empire of the East, Egypt being offered to France as the price of her connivance. The Austrians were first in the field, and also, as events turned out, were first out of it. Four Imperial armies assembled in the spring of 1788 for the invasion of Turkey, one at Cronstadt in Croatia under Greneral de Vig-ne ; a second at Peterwardin in Hungary under General Langlois ; a third under Greneral Febris on the borders of Lithuania • and a fourth in the Bukowine under the orders of the Prince of Coburg. Tlie Russians, on the other hand, had concentrated a force of 150,000 men by June 18 on the river Bug, and prepared in the first in- stance for the siege of Ochzakow, to be followed afterwards by an invasion of Tm^kish territory. The Austrian army commenced operations soon after February 10th, 1788, when war was declared; they were opposed by the Grrand Vizier, who at the head of about 200,000 men had taken up a commanding position, first near Silistria and afterwards at Belgrade, which latter fortress the Emperor was peculiarly desirous of capturing. Operations of no very great importance were carried on imtil August ; on the 7th and 8th, however, of that month, the Ottomans boldly assumed the offensive, and after a sanguinary battle at a place called Temeswar, near old Orsova, defeated the Austrians with gTeat loss. The success, however, was not followed up with the ability which caused it to be achieved, and by the end of October D 34 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. the Vizier had to conduct an unfortunate retreat from the position he had previously gained, and in November an armistice was concluded for an indefinite period. AMiile these events had been taking place on the borders of Transylvania, the Eussians, who likewise had a Swedish war on their hands, had also been engaged with the Turks, and had achieved considerable successes. The Ottomans had been defeated in an attempt to retake Kinburn, both Cho-czim and Ochzakow had fallen after de- sperate sieges, and in some slight naval engagements in the Black Sea victory had equally remained with the Mus- covites. At this time a Scotchman, Admiral G-reig, was in chief command of the Russian fleet in the Euxine, and it is related that nearly all their principal naval officers were British subjects. So high an opinion did the Empress Catherine entertain for British seamanship that she named the notorious Paul Jones to the chief command of her fleet in the Baltic, an appointment which caused sixty British officers in her service to resign their com- missions. The year 1789 did not da\vn hopefully for the pro- spects of the Turks ; as usual their unsuccessful generals were first made the victims of popular discontent at national disasters. Jussuf Pacha, the Grrand Vizier, was seized at the head of his army, carried to Constantinople, disgraced and subsequently murdered. These vigorous measures, however, in no way brought victory to the Crescent. The Turks were defeated in every quarter both WAR OF 1790. ;J5 l)y the Austrians and the Eussians. Marshal Loudon, in command of the former, captured Grradisca in Croatia and subsequently reduced Belgrade ; while Potemkin, the Muscovite general, made himself master of Bender, having previously defeated an Ottoman army in the open field. In fact, so great were the misfortunes of the Porte in the year that, if there had not been an insurrection in the Netherlands which partially paralysed the Austrian empire, it is more than probable that Constantinople would have actually fallen before the armies of the allies. Early in 1790, on February 20th, the Emperor Joseph expired, and with him all energy on the part of Austria in prosecuting the Turkish war. The contest, it is true, was renewed in the spring, and an action favourable to the Ottomans took place at Grim-gevo ; but on July 27th the Court of Vienna made a separate peace at Eeichenbach, the conditions being the renunciation of the Muscovite alliance, and the status quo. Thus the Eussians were once more deserted, and left to continue the contest single- banded. Up till quite late in the autumn of 1790 the armies of the Empress Catherine continued inactive; this was owing, it is stated, partly to the state of the health of their mistress, who was as determined as ever on the conquest of Constantinople, but was unable to spare sufficient energy for the direction of affairs. In October the operations commenced, and consisted mainly of two D 2 36 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY, operations. In the first place there was a struggle between the Black Sea and the Caucasus. Butah Pacha had ad- vanced with 50,000 men from Anapa to invade the Mus- covite territory ; he was met by Greneral Herman near the river Kuban on October 10th and utterly routed. The other operation took place on the Danube, and was the celebrated siege and surrender of Ismail by Suwarrow. The following graphic account of the capture of this fortress is taken from Sir Edward Gust's ' Annals of the Wars : ' — ' It was late in October when Suwarrow received rein- forcements and supplies, with this brief and peremptory letter from Potemkin: "You will take Ismail, cost what it may." This strong fortress was the key of the Lower Danube, and, on account of its importance, a garrison of 13,000 men, the flower of the Turkish troops, was posted there to defend it. The works had lately been much improved and strengthened in a most masterly manner, under the able direction of a Spanish engineer officer. It was the only fortress of any value that remained to the Turks in those parts, and there was nothing between it and Constantinople but the intrenched camp at Schiimla, and the difficult passes of the Balkan mountains. A fleet of galleys under Admiral Eibas invested Ismail by water, and Suwarrow completely surrounded the fortress by land, after which he summoned the Turkish governor, who returned a haughty defiance. ' It was already the month of December, not the time for making a regular siege, during the fogs and rigour SIEGE OF ISMAIL, 1790. 37 of that most inclement region ; but it was not suited to the genius of this rudest and roughest soldier of fortune to undertake any slow and regular process of military science. He therefore surrounded the place with batteries constructed on every spot of ground which could answer his piu'pose, and armed them with the heaviest battering cannon and mortars, as well as with every kind of machine that could carry any form of hostile projectile, while forges for heating balls were constructed everywhere, to pour destruction into the devoted place. The dreadful roar of a most stupendous bombardment awoke the garri- son at five o'clock in the morning of December 25th. At seven such showers of red-hot shot, bombs, and carcasses had been already thrown that, thinking the enemy to be cowed, the Russian commander determined to try the effect of an assault by brute force. Twenty-three thousand men, divided into eight columns, one of which was led by Suwarrow in person, and each column appropriated to its particular point of attack, advanced against the fortress, while the Russian galleys, mounting 567 guns, played upon it from the river. A most desperate conflict ensued for three hours. Ismail looked like a volcano in action ; it was a most dreadful battle. ' At length the assailants were repulsed ; the galleys rowed away with a terrible loss in men and officers ; the Turks sallied out upon the retiring columns to swell the bloody rout with the sword and ataghan. Suwarrow wa& seen exhibiting the most extraordinary valom- in his own 38 HUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. person, to reanimate bis troops and recall them to the fight* To allow his men time to recover their spirits, or perhaps to bring up fresh troops, be determined to distract the at- tantion of the Mussulmans by a fresh bombardment from all the batteries on land and from the galleys by water* The assault was then renewed, but the Russians were again and again driven back. ' At last one earth-battery was carried, Suwarrow being the first to apply the scaling-ladder, and, with a standard in his hand, he mounted, and planted it on the work. lb is reported of him that, when he was leading or driving his people to the assault, he cried out, " Brothers, no quarter to-day, for our bread is scarce." The first line of works was at length carried, but the contest was still dreadful, for the Turks strained every nerve to recover what they had lost, and totally dismissed from their minds the preservation of life. Fresh rein- forcements had arrived to the Russians, whilst the Otto- mans were wearied and worn down by this long and continual conflict, and these were now at last beaten back to the defence of the second parapet ; this they defended as desperately as they had done the first, and they then showed as bold a front behind the third parapet as they had done at the first and second. ' At length, an hour after sunset, the third line was carried, and a torrent of savage and irritated Muscovites led on by Suwarrow, as at the first, burst into the very heart of the city, and began a carnage that lasted through CAPTURE OF ISMAIL, 1790. 39 the night, accompanied by horrors of which humanit}^ could scarcely endure the recital. Many Turks, inca- pable of witnessing them, and to shorten their own misery, rushed desperately upon the bayonets of their enemies. The rising sun in Ismail exhibited such a scene as had never before shocked the eyes of the beholders. About 30,816 Turks of all ages are said to have perished in the storm and subsequent massacre. The gallant (3ld Seraskier Pacha who had held the chief command was found pierced with sixteen bayonet-thrusts. Six or seven Tartar princes of the ancient family of Grherai also perished. 'The Eussiansare believed to have lost 13,000 men in the assault, including an amazing number of officers, some of them of the highest rank. The Prince de Ligne was wounded, and the Duke de Eichelieu had a narrow escape — both of these had been volunteers. Suwarrow's despatch on this occasion was in his usual laconic style, and addressed to the Empress : " Mother, Ismail is at your feet." The bloody trophies taken at Ismail were displayed in an ostentatious and grand triumph at St. Petersburg, and the Czarina said sarcastically to Sir Charles Whit worth, the British Ambassador, on the occa- sion, " Since the King, your master, is determined to drive me out of St. Petersburg, I hope he will permit me to retire to Constantinople." Nothing now appeared to be in the way of that long-coveted object. The Grrand Vizier with his dispirited army retired into the defiles of the Balkan, and Eussian detachments under Prince 40 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. Galitzin, Prince Eepnin, and other generals, crossed the Danube, and drove every Turk that dared to show him- self out of Bulgaria.' In 1791 the war was renewed between the Russians and Turks, and again the latter suffered great disasters. On April 6th the Ottoman army was signally routed by Prince Gralitzin, afterwards it was again defeated near Matchin on July 9th ; similarly, in the province of Kuban, the Muscovites achieved a great but most sanguinary victory on July 3rd. These were the last actions of this war, which, it is stated, for carnage and cruelty exceeded any other that had been recorded in history. The Turkish army was practically disbanded, and the road to Constantinople lay open, hence no course was open to the Sultan but to sue for peace and to accept such conditions as the Empress Catherine might choose to dictate. It was indeed fortunate for Turkey at this juncture that the defection of Austria, the exhaustion of the Russian ex- chequer, and the action of England prevented the Czarina from carrying out her avowed intentions of conquering Constantinople, certainly there was nothing whatever to prevent her legions from marching straight to the Bosphorus — and probably nothing but the certainty that such a step would involve a European war, for which she was ill prepared, prevented her raising the Russian standard on the dome of St. Sophia. On August 4th the preliminaries of peace were signed, and on Januaiy 9th the following year WAR OF 1806. 41 the peace of Jassy was concluded. By this treaty Eussia advanced her territory in Europe to the Dniester, and acquired important rights and concessions in Asia. Between 1792 and 1806 the ever-recurring contests between Russia and Turkey were suspended — the wars of the French Revolution and the rise of Napoleon allowed the Eastern question for a time to lie dormant. National antagonism, however, of so violent a nature as that existing between the Muscovite and the Turk must soon find a vent in action, and Napoleon was not slow in turning their anta- gonism to account. Through French intrigues, a difference was easily excited between the cabinets of Constantinople and St. Petersburg, and, although the former yielded on all the points of difference, the Emperor Alexander, now absolutely without the shadow of an excuse, caused an army of 80,000 men under Greneral Michelson to invade the Danubian provinces. At first brilliant success attended his arms, and the Turks were driven across the Danube. The victories, however, of Napoleon in the West rendered a further advance impossible, since every available man was required elsewhere. In this juncture England came to the aid of Russia and helped her both by land and sea. An expedition was sent to Egypt, and Admiral Duckworth made the celebrated passage of the Dardanelles with the fleet. Neither of these ventures were fortunate in their results, the expedition to Egypt ended disastrously, and Admiral Duckworth, having had Constantinople for more than a week at his mercy, was so long beguiled by the 42 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. promises of the Divan, that finally he had to execute a somewhat ignominious retreat. This incident in our naval history seems to deserve more than a passing notice, especially as it illustrates what has frequently been said of the foreign policy of England, that she loses by diplomacy what she has gained by the sword. Napoleon, seeing the importance of an alliance with Turkey and thereby of neutralising a large portion of the Russian army, had sent one of his most skilled diplomatists, Greneral Sebastiani, to Constantinople with orders to get up a war by all the means in his power, Bonaparte's choice was a happy one, and his instructions were carried out with equal ability and success. It is unnecessary to recount the various stages of the negotiations which ultimately brought matters to such a crisis, sufi&ce to say the aid of England was so urgently required by Russia that Sir John Duckworth, then cruising off Ferrol, with four ships of the line, was ordered to unite with a squadron of three line of battle ships and four frigates, lying in Besika Bay, and to force the Divan by threats of an immediate bombardment of Constantinople to accept the Russo-English and renounce the French alliance. Favoured by a fair wind the gallant admiral sailed through the Dardanelles, notwithstanding the cannonade which the formidable batteries on its shore directed on him; with but trifling loss he reached the sea of Marmora and delivered an imperative ultimatum to the panic-stricken government of the Sultan. Words PEACE OF TILSIT. 4^ can scarcely describe the terror and amazement of Con- stantinople ; the capital was utterly defenceless ; the sea batteries were imarmed ; and the population rose in in- sm-rection, loudly demanding the heads of Eeis Effendi and of the French Ambassador, whom they considered the causes of their misfortunes. Sebastian! was, however, equal to the occasion ; disregarding alike his own personal danger and the threats of the English admiral, he counselled temporising and delay ; a few days were all that was required to arm the batteries and to render the capital safe. The brave but unwary English sailor fell into the snare ; day after day was passed in the exchange of diplo- matic notes and negotiations ; meanwhile the Turks were making Constantinople safe and were cutting ofi' the retreat of their enemies ; at last after the lapse of four days the British admiral perceived his danger, and to save his fleet had to retire. The passage of the Dardanelles was again forced, this time also successfully, but with considerable loss, and, except for the impression it made on Europe, this gallant expedition was as to results entirely fruitless. This war, on the whole disastrous to Turkey, was con- cluded by the peace of Tilsit, then, thanks to the inter- vention of Napoleon, she escaped the loss of Molda\ia and Wallachia, which were occupied by Eussia temporarily, as it was termed, but which otherwise would have been ceded to her. It may be remarked, however, that secret clauses were added to the treaty signed at Tilsit, and that by these the partition of the Turkish empire was arranged between 44 HUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. Alexander and Napoleon. Previous to the invasion of Eussia by the Grrand Army in 1812, as will be seen hereafter, the Czar deemed it politic to reveal these secret clauses to the Divan to ensure their neutrality in the approaching contest. In this he was perfectly successful, and subse- quently for many years to come the influence of England replaced that of France in the council-chambers of Con- stantinople. The peace arranged at Tilsit did not last long, any more than those which had preceded it. As before re- marked, ever since 1807 the Eussian troops had remained in occupation of the principalities, but, in the beginning of the year 1810 the Czar, now being relieved from his Swedish war, deemed it an opportune time formally to annex these provinces, and he at once commenced prepa- rations still further to increase his dominions. The army of the Danube was increased to 100,000 men, 30,000 of whom were cavalry, a young and active general Kamenskoi was placed in command of it, and was directed to cross Bulgaria and the Dobrudscha early in the year before the unhealthy season had commenced or the Turks had time to collect their forces for a serious resistance. So early as March 14th the Eussians attempted to <;ross the Danube opposite Ostrova, but were foiled in their attempt, and did not finally effect the passage till May. The 3rd of June found them at Bazardjik, where they defeated a small force opposed to them, the Turks, according to their custom both in previous and in sub- WAR OF 1810. 45 sequent wars, having abandoned the line of the Danube and concentrated on Schumla. The Muscovite general, after this first success, divided Ids army into two columns ; with one he made an attempt on Varna, the other he despatched under Langeron to occupy Bulgaria north of the Balkans, and to reduce the inland fortresses. The attack on Varna failed, whereupon the Eiissian army con- centrated and moved on Schumla ; here they were also unsuccessful, and after a blockade of three weeks had to retire to Rustchuk, which had previously been besieged by a detached corps. The siege of this fortress, and of its tete de jjont, Griurgevo, together with the efforts made by the Ottomans to relieve it, occujoied until September 26th, when finally the place surreudered, the Pacha in chief command being permitted to retain his ' horse-tail,' and to march out with other honours. The incidents of this siege, as is the case with the defence of nearly all similar fortresses occupied by Turks, were most curious and striking. So early as August 3rd the Eussians attempted to execute an assault, but were repulsed with enormous loss ; there were the usual cruelties on both sides, including decapitation of prisoners, and the appli- cation of the knout. Had the Grrand Vizier been false to his national characteristics, and shown any real energy after the departure of the Muscovite army from Schumla, the latter would probably have been forced to recross the Danube ; as it was, he dejDuted to his second in command, Muktar Pacha, the task of relieving Rustchuk. The 46 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. relieving army encountered a force of Muscovites sent to meet them at Battin on August 7th, and were defeated with a loss of 6,000 prisoners, 178 flags, and 14 guns. The loss of standards on both sides, but more especially on that of the Turks, is a noteworthy feature in these wars — apparently a great number must have been carried by armies in the field. From all accounts, Eussian armies have now gone to the other extreme, since in the Crimean war their regiments, it is said, brought no colours into action. Some minor subsequent operations on the Upper Danube brought the war of this year in Europe to a conclusion, and by October 23rd the head-quarters of the Eussian army were established in winter quarters at Bucharest. In Asia the forces of the Czar were far more decisively successful than in Europe ; although both the Persians and the Asiatic allies and subjects of the Sultan opposed them, a large portion of the shores of the Caspian as far as Lankaran were subdued and added to the empire of Eussia. The year 1811 was marked by an unwonted amount of energy on the part of the Ottoman Grovernment, as from the events occurring in other parts of Europe there was every prospect of Eussia being much embarrassed in her war with the Porte. The Turkish fleet, having been refitted, threatened a landing in the Crimea, and three distinct corps were despatched to encounter the Muscovites on the Danube. One advanced on the right to Turtukai, another on the left towards Widdin, while Achmet Pacha, WAR OF 1811. 47 the commander-in-chief, with the third, moved on Riistchuk and there entrenched himself. The Eussian commander- in-chief, Greneral Kutusov, had been obliged to assume a defensive attitude, five corps of his army having been de- spatched to the frontiers of Poland in view of disagreements with France. Their great weakness as regards numbers caused the Muscovites to be defeated, and on July 5th Rustchuk was abandoned, while the entire army recrossed the Danube, and entrenched themselves on the left bank. They were followed by the Tm'ks, who also entrenched themselves, and thus the rival armies remained confronting each other until October 10th. Each made various sorties at different times, but neither achieved any important advantage. At last Greneral Kutusov, having collected every available man, which raised his army to a strength of 35,000, took the offensive. His operations are related as follows by Sir Edward Gust : — ' General Kutusov now resolved, as the season was advancing, to carry into effect his long-matured offensive operations. He learned from the country people that the Turkish camp, on the right bank, was very bare of troops, and that even the fortress of Rustchuk was not properly garrisoned or defended. He therefore ordered General Markov to pass with 14 battalions, 2 companies of artillery, and a body of cavalry, from his camp at Slobodsca to the right bank, to endeavour to surprise the camp and the fortress. Leaving their tents all standing to deceive the enemy, this division marched away in the 48 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. night of the 10-1 1th, but the flotilla did not come up as ordered, and accordingly only as many men were crossed as the pontoons could pass, while the Cossacks swam the stream on their horses. In consequence of these delays, it was the morning of the 15th before General Markov could report the passage of his entire force. Kutusov, displeased at this delay, ordered General Sabanajev to go and super- sede Markov ; but, before he could do so, the general was in full march, and as, happily for him, the Turks had not penetrated the intention of his movements, he reached their camp without being noticed, and threw it into com- plete disorder. They had not dreamed of being assailed on their own side of the river, and general consternation seized the Grand Vizier, and all his high functionaries, as well as the merchants and traders, who, as is usual in Eastern armies, thronged the encampment with the requisite supplies for the army. The rich tents and campaign fm^niture of the Grand Vizier, together with hosts of camels and numerous carriages, were all deserted, and their owners and keepers fled for their lives through the fortress of Rustchuk, and many of them never stopped till they reached Rasgrad and even Schumla. General ]\Iarkov, like a true soldier, without giving a thought to the booty, seized the batteries, and turned the guns against the enemy's camp on the other side of the Danube ; while Kutusov, seeing from the height of Slobodsca the whole course of events on the opposite shore, immediately ordered an advance of his entire army upon the entrenched camp before him. JFAE OF 1811. 49 ' The result of this combined movement was a furious attack from the two sides of the river at once. The rush of the Muscovites to battle, as they dashed into the fight with loud cries, and amid the roar of eighty pieces of artillery, did not long leave the victory doubtful. The Grand Vizier, who had hastily got into a boat, and sought only his personal safety, sent a messenger to Kutusov to propose an armistice, which might be followed by a treaty of peace, but, not receiving a favourable answer, he escaped to Rustchuk, and thence to Constantinople. He might, perhaps, have been taken prisoner, but Kutusov, who was a great politician, as well as an artful strategist, and had been Eussian ambassador to the Porte, is sup- posed to have known his man, and to have been convinced that he would prove useful at the Divan in accomplishing those further objects which the general knew were now aimed at by his sovereign. Tchappan-Oglou Pacha, a man of great bravery and considerable firmness of character and military ability, succeeded to the command of the army after the departure of the Grrand Vizier. ' The position in which he was placed demanded the exercise of all his best qualities, and he now by his wisdom extorted the admiration of all. The Eussians brought up every day a fresh supply of artillery, until 200 pieces played upon the Turkish camp. Nevertheless, the " son of the shepherd " resisted every offer of capitulation, and silently resolved to cut his way out of the dilemma by his own prowess. Provisions now began to fail in the Turkish E 60 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. camp ; of forage there was none, and the horses were numerous; they were therefore sacrificed to the necessities of the army, and being so placed as to be exposed to the ceaseless tempest of shot, they were rendered available for the food of the soldiers. Their tents and useless arms in like manner served for fuel, but the Pacha still held firm. ' At length an armistice was negotiated ; but it was not until December 4th that Tchappan-Oglou and his army finally quitted their camp in virtue of a convention, by which they were to evacuate it without their arms or cannon, and be quartered in the village about Bucharest imtil peace was concluded : 5,000 men with fifty-one guns surrendered, but some 120,000 had already perished by disease or by the cannonade, and a large number of the gun-carriages were burned and the guns thrown into the Danube. On the 14th Kutusov established his head- quarters at Bucharest, where the negotiations were con- cluded, and the Eussian general-in-chief invited Prince Tchappan-Oglou to join him there, and treated him with great distinction. Such a result to the Eussian arms on the Danube was most fortunate for the Czar at this critical period. G-reat Britain lent all her influence to induce the Porte to agree to terms, and successfully resisted all the endeavours of the French ambassador, Latour-Maubourg, to counteract this issue. The astonished Turk had now revealed to him the secret articles of the Peace of Tilsit, by which Napoleon had agreed to the destruction and partition of the Turkish empire, and to the further stipu- REMARKS ON FORMER WARS. 51 lations made at Erfurth with the same object ; and the Divan, in view of this flagitious policy, now abandoned themselves unreservedly to G-reat Britain, whose ambas- sador regained all his former credit with the Porte.' In concluding a summary of the wars of the first period and before dealing with those of a later date, and of a different character as regards their military peculiarities, a few words on the methods of warfare then practised by the Turks and their opponents may not be out of place. The first thing that strikes one in reading the his- tory of these wars is that the Ottomans, whenever they met the Russians in the open field, were invariably defeated. Their operations were as dilatory and tardy in their commencement as they were slow in execution. Their superior ofiicers were by no means able and appa- rently were far too luxurious in their habits to be good soldiers. The next point is the extraordinary manner in which both sides alike made use of entrenchments ; the Turks more especially appeared to regard the spade as their most valuable weapon, and, in place of rapid man- oeuvring and skilful combination, they had no thought of doing anythiug but moving slowly to a position, there fortifying themselves and making subsequent sorties. In former days, as in all their recent wars, Ottomans, whether regular troops, irregulars, or untrained inhabitants, have always fought brilliantly behind entrenchments ; in fact they seemed especially to rely on this quality as their strong- point and safeguard. The wars not unfrequently were little E 2 52 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. else than a succession of sieges, in which the Kussians often had the worst of it. The Turks had little or no military science, and knew nothing of engineering, hence their attack on fortresses was by no means so brilliant as their defence. The arm in which they more especially excelled was their cavalry, and in this they were undoubtedly far superior to their opponents, the Kussians, and continued to be so until quite recently. As regards discipline and nnorale but little can be said for the troops of the Sultan. The Janissaries, of whom the main portion of the Ottoman armies were composed, were alike tiu-bulent in peace and unsteady in war. No Turkish army has ever yet fought a losing battle, and after a disaster the largest force generally melts away like snow. If we refer to any of the successful contests that the Russians have fought, we find that subse- quently during the same campaign they had but little trouble, and that there was scarcely ever a drawn battle, as is often the case between European armies. When we turn to the Russians and their combats with the Turks, but little is to be said ; the Muscovite armies in those days were so well known throughout Europe that the characteristics of their soldiers were also thoroughly appreciated. The same stolid determination, the same cool com'age and obedience, were exhibited on the Danube, in the steppes of Bessarabia, and on the slopes of the Balkans, as was shown at Zorndorff, at Eylau, and at Borodino ; there was the self-same courage as that which finally repelled Napoleon, in 1812, and rendered battles in TREATY OF LONDON IN 1827. 53 which Russian armies engaged the most sanguinary of the century. The treaty of Bucharest finally brought this war to a ■conclusion ; by this convention the Russian frontier was advanced to the Pruth, the navigation of the Danube was secured, and all the Turkish fortresses in Servia were demolished. Had it not been for the great and pressing- danger which then menaced the Muscovite empire, there ■can be little doubt that terms far more severe, and terri- tory far more extended, would have been exacted from the Porte. After the fall of Napoleon, the weariness of wars and the desire for peace which possessed Western Europe seem also to have extended to Russia, since, up to the year 1828, we find her at peace with Turkey, although the pretexts for getting up a quarrel during that period were perhaps more numerous and certainly were more justifiable than frequently has been the case, either in former or in later years. In fact, Turkish misgovernment and cruelty seem about this time to have reached a pitch unequalled before or since. Insurrections and subsequent massacres appear to have been of no unfrequent occurrence ; the struggle for Grreek independence, which may be said to have lasted more or less from 1822 till 1830, was little more than a perpetual succession of atrocities perpetrated almost equally by both sides. Of these outrages the massacre of Scio by the Turks was the most celebrated and the most revolting. The slaughter lasted for ten 54 JRUSSIAN WAItS WITH TURKEY. days, and it is said that 40,000 persons of both sexes were- put to the sword. In July 1827 the treaty of London was sig-ned by Eussia, Grreat Britain and France, on behalf of Grreece,. and in October of the same year there was the destruction of the Ottoman navy by the combined fleets of these powers at the battle of Xavarino. There then followed the campaign of 18fi8 and 1829, the only contest, by which the gTcat Eiu'opean peace of fifty years was broken ; strange to say, it was destined that these very same powers should again be the first to interrupt that peace, and the wars that have followed may be traced to that fatal interruption. 55 CHAPTER II. THE POSITION AND EESOURCES OF THE TWO COMBATANTS AT THE OPENING OF THE WAR IN 1828. Position of Eussia in Europe in 1828 — Position of Turkey — Condition of her army and her fleet — Convention of Akkerman — Forces avail- able to be brought into the field by Turkey — Forces available for invasion by Russia —Disposition of forces at opening of campaign — Lines of defence possessed by Turkey — The Pruth — The Danube — The Balkans — Kuchuk Chekmedge. Apparently the Emperor Nicholas had everything in his favour when he embarked in the war with Turkey in the spring of 1828. His prestige in Europe was at its zenith, his credit was excellent, his people were devoted, and his army was supposed to be highly trained and thoroughly efficient. He had no avowed enemies, but many faithful and devoted allies. Eussia had temporarily outlived the suspicion and mistrust with which the constant aggressions of successive rulers had in former years caused it to be regarded throughout Europe. Prussia, then a second-rate power, was benevolently neutral, Austria not actually hostile, France was complacent and indifferent. England, led away by sympathy for the Grreeks, and by a righteous 56 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. indignation against Turkish barbarities, had become oblivious of the interests of her Eastern empire, and would have acquiesced in the transfer of the Muscovi^^e capital from St. Petersburg to Constantinople almost without a murmur. Last, but not least, the Turkish fleet had been annihilated at Xavarino, and Eussia, mistress of the Black Sea, had the inestimable advantage of being- able to feed and supply her armies by water transport. Nevertheless, if we look at the other side of the picture, the prospect was by no means so encouraging. Eussia had not yet recovered the exhaustion caused by the wars of Napoleon, while her army had lost the efficiency which stood it in such good stead at Borodino and Leipsic. She had been engaged in a series of successful but most trying wars with Persia. Her military system had only just been reorganised : Poland was still a thorn in her side, and Austria, although professedly neutral, maintained an attitude of hostile expectancy and thereby detained on the Transylvanian frontier a body of troops that would have sufficed to place the Eussian standard on the dome of St. Sophia. If, however, the condition of Eussia in '28 was in some respects unsatisfactory, that of Turkey was infinitely worse. The war of Greek independence had been going on for six years, and had seemingly strained the resources of the Porte to the utmost, while it had estranged all the allies that, under other circumstances, might have afforded it assistance. The Ottoman navv, as before stated, had THE JANISSARIES. 57 "been destroyed on October 20th, 1827, by the combined navies of Eussia, England, and France, and as regards the army, it was practically non-existent as a body, while what remained of it, by spreading disaffection, was a source of weakness rather than of strength. In order to explain how this was brought about, it is necessary to revert to the liistory of the Janissaries, and to the manner in which they were destroyed. When the Turks first entered Europe, and their exploits carried terror into the courts of every Christian king, their battles were won, not by those who were born followers of Islam, but principally by compulsory renegades, the children of Christian parents, torn from their homes when young, and afterwards converted into staunch fol- lowers of the Prophet. These mercenary soldiers, Janis- saries as they were called, soon discovered their power, and, like the standing armies of other countries in those days, not unfrequently ruled the sovereign whom they nominally served. But as their turbulence increased, their military valour diminished ; discipline, the first necessity in an army that hopes for success, deserted them, and the only command they obeyed with readiness was the order to retreat. For three centuries they had been the support of the Ottoman empire, now they became its bane. Sultan after Sultan had attempted to cajole them, to conciliate them, to subdue them ; but Sultan after Sultan failed ; some lost their lives, others their thrones, others succumbed, but the power of the Janissaries and of 58 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. their society remained supreme. At last there came a leader of the faithful, who combined boldness with pru- dence, cunning with moral courage. He formed a stand- ing army on the European model, conciliated the Aga of the Janissaries, Hussein Pacha, and gave him command of it. This general renounced all allegiance to his clasSy and devoted himself to the service of his master. When the Janissaries after several mutinies broke out into open insurrection on June 14th, 1826, he aided the Sultan to rout and disperse them. Mercy was a quality but little strained in Turkey at that time, and certainly none was shown to the mutineers: their power was thoroughly broken, their chiefs were hung or exiled, and as a body they were no longer formidable, but nevertheless their disaffection was widely spread, their influence was still formidable, and a& their members were scattered throughout the empire, they did much to weaken the power of the Grovernment and to increase the danger then threatening the Ottoman state. In point of fact in the year 1827, when the differences with Eussia began to culminate, there was no Turkish army worthy of the name in existence ; hence everything* was to gain time in order to create one, and the Eussian ultimatum of eighty-two articles, termed the convention of Akkerman, was signed on September 25th, 1827, although^ as openly avowed afterwards, there was never for a moment any intention to hold to its conditions. In the meantime, every effort was made to raise an army, recruits were seized in all parts of the country, carried in chains THE SITUATION OF THE TURKISH EMPIRE, 59 to Constantinople, and there converted into a curious and hybrid force, which is described as follows in the Intro- duction to Count von Moltke's book, ' The Eussians in Bulgaria and Roumelia ' — ' The army therefore was com- posed of men disciplined after the European fashion, wearing Russian jackets and Turkish trousers, with Tartar saddles, French stirrups, and English sabres ; it consisted of Timariots, or troops giving feudal service — of troops of the line, whose service was for life, and of militia, who served only a term of years, of whom the leaders were recruits, and the recruits mere children. The system of organisation was French, and the instructors were men from all parts of Europe. The splendid appearance, the beautiful arms, the reckless bravery of the Moslem horde,, had disappeared ; but yet this new army had one quality which placed it above the numerous host which in former times the Porte could summon to the field — it obeyed.' The same author thus sums up the condition of affairs at this period : — ' The Turkish empire, just before the outbreak of the Russian war, stood on the brink of perdition. The Turkish army had been destroyed by the Sultan at Constantinople, the Turkish navy by the Franks at Navarino. The Russians were waiting on the frontiers both of Europe and Asia, ready to advance. The French held the Morea, and Ibrahim Pacha was reduced to great straits. The Greek flag was free, and the Mediterranean was closed by all the maritime powers. In addition to 'GO JRUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. this, the finances were much embarrassed, the population partly in open revolt, and all discontented. Well might the Sultan exclaim to his vizier, " Keep your wits together, for Allah knows the danger is great ! " ' It cannot be said that this picture is overdrawn ; but there was vitality still remaining in the system, and the cert 1 in symptoms of internal decay had not made them- selves visible. Europe had not yet awoke to the inherent and hopeless viciousness of the Turkish rule, the subject races were still cowed and ignorant of their powers, and this — this and the plague — saved the Turkish empire. It is not necessary to consider the actual available force which each of the two combatants could bring into the field. As is usual historians differ as to numbers, and in those days there were no official accounts of campaigns by wdiich the statements or theories of individuals could be corrected. Moltke puts down the entire Turkish army at 1 80,000 men, under the following headings : — Paid Infantry, including 6,000 Guards or Bostangis . 60,000 Spaliis (Cavalry) ^ . 10,000 Regular Cavalry 2,600 Ai'tillery, &c., about 3,000 Irregulars, chiefly Asiatic horsemen .... 97,000 In all about 180,000, of whom at least one-third were cavalry. Chesney estimates the available Turkish force at considerably less, whereas Alison puts it at a some- what higher figure. All, however, are agreed that the THE HUSSIAN ARMY IN 1828. 61 regular troops did not exceed 60,000, and that the great strength of the army lay in irregular cavalry, in which arm alone they were superior to their antagonists. The artillery was on the whole fair, being well served, but infamously appointed, the iield guns were mostly drawn by bullocks, and as regards numbers were far inferior to those of the Eussians, nevertheless the gunners fought with such bravery that the results were most satisfactory. When we turn to the Eussians we find a formidable and compact army assembled for the invasion of Turkey ; but still a force far inferior to what could now be collected in a fortnight by means of railroads, and even in those days by no means proportionate to the resources and mag- nitude of the Muscovite empire. As the events proved, it was insufficient for the task before it ; but still so su- perior to anything by which it was met, that, had it been properly led, a great and signal success must inevitably have crowned its eftbrts. With respect to the actual num- bers, accounts, as usual, differ. Moltke says there were no- minally 120,000, but only 100,000 effectives, and on the commencement of the campaign only 65,000. Imanitschew puts the number at 1 30,000 ; Witzleben at 95,000; and Alison at 158,800, including the Imperial Gruard of about 20,000, and the 2nd Corps of about 31,000, neither of which arrived until the end of August. Chesney says there were 120,000 at the opening of the war. On the whole, there- fore, it maybe concluded that considerably under 100,000 effective men, and something over 300 guns were under •62 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. the order? of Count AVittgenstein, when he invaded Turkey in Ma\^ 1828. On the sea the Russians were infinitely superior to their antagonists, they had in the Euxine alone sixteen line-of-battle ships, six frigates, and seven corvettes. The Turks had a few vessels remaining after the battle of Navarino, but these, with the exception of one solitary excursion, never ventured to show themselves outside the Bosphorus. The only arm in which the Turks were greatly supe- rior was their cavalry, and in this they certainly excelled. Their irregular horsemen were numerous and daring, they hung round the flanks and rear of the enemy's army, and invariably had the best of any encounter with their rivals. The Emperor Nicholas had practically ruined the Eussian cavalry, which is now only beginning to recover from the effects of his endeavours to assimilate it to the cuirassiers of Kellerman, that saved the fortunes of France, at Marengo and Austerlitz. In place of bringing into Turkey Cossacks, whose hardy ponies could live on grass and endure all hardships, the Russian army was encum- bered with heavy ponderous men on heaA-y ponderous horses, magnificent but useless, unable to live on the bad food, and soon broken down by the hardships of the bivouack and the march ; in point of fact this cavalry before long- ceased to exist, later in the campaign its place was sup- plied by Cossacks. The Turkish cavalry, although but poorly drilled and unable to manoeuvre, were admirably THE TURKISH ARMY IN 1828. 63 suited for the requirements of a long campaign. Their horses were small and well broken, principally stallions of the Arabian breed ; they could endure heat and cold, were accustomed to be picqueted out, and were only fed and watered once a day, a great matter when marches were long and forage scarce. Having discussed the numbers and quality of the op- posing armies we now have to consider the manner in which they were disposed. According to Moltke the Turkish army was divided as follows at the opening of the campaign : — 30,000 at Constantinople to keep order. 7,000 at the Dardanelles. 25,000 in various forts. 10,000 in Thessaly to check the Greeks. . 30,000 in Asia Minor. 26,000 in the fortresses of the Danube and Dobrudscha. 30,000 in reserve at Adrianople. 25,000 at Schumla. In all probability the above estimate of numbers is very much exaggerated, and not a half of this force was in position when the Kussians crossed the Pruth ; the Asiatic troops more especially were late in coming up, and no fewer than 12,000 cavalry did not reach Constantinople until after the fall of Varna. According to Chesney, even so late as June 2nd there were only 13,000 cavalry and 19,800 infantry to cover the fortresses of the Danube, and to defend Eoumelia from invasion. Before describing the Russian plans of operation, it is necessary to say a few words re- garding the -theatre of war. 64 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. In tlie year 1828 — and the same may be said now — there are four distinct natural lines on which an invasion of Turkey by Eussia might be resisted. The first is the line of the Pruth, the second the line of the Danube, the third the line of the Balkans, and, lastly, the positions which are termed those of Kuchuk Chekmedge and Biijuk Chekmedge, about twenty miles to the north of the Bos- phorus, supposed by some to have been the place where Attila was checked in his march eastwards, and where the Huns were defeated by Belisarius. The first line — that of the Pruth — is practically untenable, and is never defended. It has the great disadvantage of being at right angles to the other bases of operations, and an army defending it is liable to have its flank turned, and its communications cut by any hostile force that succeeds in crossing the Lower Danube by Tulcha. In 1828 the line of the Pruth was not defended, nor yet in 1853 ; in fact, hitherto the Turks have limited their resistance in an invasion to the line of the Danube and the Balkans, or rather the entrenched camps in front of the latter, Schumla and Varna, the positions of Kuchuk Chekmedge and Biijuk Chekmedge have in latter years never yet been reached by an invader. The Danube is a most serious obstacle to an invading armv, since not only is the river a deep and rapid stream with steep banks on the Bulgarian side, but its course is studded with strongholds more or less formidable. The following were possessed by the Turks at the opening of the campaign : — Widdin, Xikopolis, Rustchuk, Giurgevo, THE LINE OF THE BANVBE. 65 Turtukai, Silistria, Hirsova, Matchin, Brailow, Isakchi, and Tulcha. Of these Widdin, Eustchuk, Silistria, and Brailow were the strongest, largest, and most formidable ; none were well armed, or well fortified, bnt the gal- lantry of the garrisons covered many deficiencies. There is no doubt whatever that in the face of a fairly large army well led a passage of the Danube from Wallachia must be a perilous operation, as was proved by Omar Pacha in 1853. In the campaign, however, of which we are now speaking, the Turks were too weak to attempt any of the counter strokes which alone can render the defence of a river successful. The following detailed description extracted from Count Moltke's work^ before referred to, will give a good idea of the peculiarities of this river, both in a physical and military point of view : — ' Between Grolubracz and Griadova, a distance of about forty miles, the Danube breaks through the limestone rock which runs from north to south between the Carpathians and the Balkans. At the former point, where there is an old Servian castle, the stream, which is not less than 2,000 paces wide, is suddenly narrowed to a width of only a few hundred paces, and pursues a very winding course between high and in many places precipitous walls of rock with a very rapid fall. At several points, especially Bilnitz and the Iron Gate (Demir Capu), its bed is crossed by reefs of rock which, when the water is low, rise above the surface of the river, and when it is high create prodigious whirlpools, always 66 HUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. rendering the navigation of the river difficult, and at those points impassable. On this point of the river's course are the Tiu'kish fortresses of New Orsova (Ada-Kalessi, the Island Fort) and Gladova (Feti-Islam, the Triumph of the Faith). The width of the stream throughout this tract is on an average 600 to 900 paces, and on both sides lies an almost uncultivated, thickly wooded, and very inaccessible hilly country. Very little below the Iron Grate, however, the character of the stream changes altogether. On the Servian side, it is true, wooded heights still stretch along the right bank of the river as far as the boundary stream of Timock, but below that the mountains recede far away on either side, and the river flows on through a plain above a hundred miles in breadth down to its mouth. Lesser Wallachia, as far as the Aluta, and the north of Bulgaria are indeed traversed by a few chains of hills branching off from the high mountains, and are altogether less flat and low than the vast plains of Grreater Wallachia, nevertheless they are on the whole level countries. There is, however, a very marked difference between the opposite banks of the river. On the Bidgarian side (all the way below Widdin) they rise steep and high immediately overhanging the stream, while on the Wallachian they are flat and muddy, with extensive meadows intersected by branches of the Danube, and overflowed whenever the water rises. As the river flows on, these low banks become wider and wider, and more and more marshy, and the islands larger and more numerous. Below Rustchuk there is only a single THE LINE OF THE DANUBE. 67 «pot, at the mouth of the Dembowicsa opposite Turtukai, where the shore is firm and dry though flat, down to the edge of the river, which at that point is not impeded by any islands. Opposite to Silistria, too, a road passable at all seasons leads from Kallarasch to the Danube. In the Dobrudscha, too, the right bank is considerably the highest ; the opposite low Wallachian shore is for the most part firm and dry down to the edge of the river as far as the Bortisa branch of the Danube, but the islands form a marsh covered with trees and rushes many miles in breadth, which is always flooded when the river is high. Hirsova is the first point at which the valley becomes narrower, and a passage across the river is practicable. At Brailow the left side of the valley of the Danube first begins to rise from the river in perpendicular terraces of clay of about eighty or a hundred feet high. ' From Brailow and Gralatz there are roads across the wide marshes, practicable in the fine season, to Matchin, which place commands their debouches, and beyond which the fine picturesque tops of the Matchin and Betschepe mountains rise to a height of above 1,000 feet. Below Isakchi the Danube flows through its delta in three branches, of which only one, the Sulina, is navigable, and this is not above 200 paces wide at its mouth. The whole space, thirty miles in width, between the northern and the southern branches (the Kedrilleh and the Kilibogas) is covered by an unbroken waving sea of rushes ten feet high, above which only the rigging of the ships is visible. F 2 68 liUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. The Danube below the Iron Gates, except where it is divided by islands into several arms, is nowhere under 900 paces in breadth and in many places it is more than double that width. In places it is as much as seventy or eighty feet deep, but at many points it is far shallower. Below Pesth, where a suspension bridge has been con- structed, the might}^ river is only crossed by one single bridge of boats, that at Peterwardein. Of the massive bridge built by Trajan at Grladova nothing now remains but the piers and a sort of tower on the Wallachian shore. At Tultscha the river is diagonally crossed by a sand- bank which leaves a navigable channel only fourteen or fifteen feet deep. At this point a bridge on piles might be thrown across the main channel if the approach on the left bank were not rendered impossible by extensive marshes and islands overgrown with reeds. Everywhere else the passage of the river could only be effected by means of boats or pontoons. Although the fall of the Danube is not nearly so great below the Iron Grates, the current on an average does not even then run less than two and a-half miles an hour. We next come to the line of the Balkans ; these mountains are of no very great height, varying from 500 to 3,000 feet; they run east and west, parallel to the Danube, and have hitherto been considered formidable as obstacles, more from the few and bad roads that traverse them than from any difficulties which they themselves present. The passes are clearly marked on the map, and THE LINE OF THE BALKANS, 69 are now much about the same as they were in 1828, only considerably better and more practicable for artillery. From the fact that the Eussians commanded the sea, the western passes were not taken into account in this cam- paign, although probably in the next war they will be turned to account. Moltke names the following roads as being alone practicable for troops at the time of which he writes : — 1. From Tirnova to Kasanlik— an easy pass which might be forced without much difficulty. 2. From Tirnova by Demirkapu to Slivno. 3. From Tirnova to Osman-Basari, thence by Kasan to Selmeid — and to Kamabat. 4. From Schumla by Tshalikarak and DobroU to Kamabat. 5. From Kosludja to Pravadi or Jenikoi to Aidos. 6. From Varna along the coast by Biu-ghas and Missivri. For an army pivoting on the sea, as the Eussians in 1828 and 1829, routes 4, 5, and 6 are the most important, and these might be easily barred by an army at Aidos, who could engage each column singly as it issued from the passes. In addition to these recognised and known roads there are also a number of paths or sheep-walks by which infantry can be easily conducted across the mountains It cannot therefore be said that the Balkans, if undefended, would offer a serious obstacle to an invading army, any more than the mountains of Bohemia in 1866, or the 70 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. Vosges in 1870 hindered the advance of the Prussians^ In fact the real strength of the Balkans lies in the position of the entrenched camps of Varna and Schumla in front of them. As remarked by Moltke, so long as both or even one of these strongholds can be retained ^ passing the Balkans will always be a hazardous undertaking.' We come lastly to the positions of Kuchuk Chek- medge and Biijuk Chekmedge before spoken of. As these lines were neither attacked nor defended in 1828 and 1829, it is scarcely necessary here to allude to them, but as they will inevitably exercise a great influence in any future war where Constantinople is in danger, in another chapter they will be described in detail. 71 CHAPTER III. THE CAMPAIGN IN EUROPE OF 1828. Eeasons why operations were delayed — Method of Kussian advance — Passage of Danube — Siege of Brailow — Peculiarities of Turkish defence of fortresses — Advance of Russians towards Varna — Strategy of Turks — Schumla — Siege of Varna — Attempts at relief — Fall of Varna — Contests before Schumla — Retreat of Russians to the Danube — Operations of 6th Corps in Wallachia — Siege of Silistria. The Turkish Government had issued its Hatti-sheriff, amounting practically to a declaration of war, on Decem- ber 18th, 1827 ; but no reply was made by the Czar until April of the following year, and neither the Pruth nor the Danube were crossed until May 7 th and June 8th respec- tively. It is somewhat difficult to account for this delay in commencing the campaign. Moltke speaks of it ^ as a great sacrifice made to political at the expense of military expediency.' It seems, however, that political causes scarcely afford a sufficient explanation. It was all impor- tant to the Kussians to hasten the commencement of hostilities, not only because every day of respite granted to the Turks enabled them to reorganise their army, to strengthen their fortresses, and to mature their various 72 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. preparations for defence, but there was another important reason for having a winter's campaign. During the month of January the Danube might be crossed on the ice without difiQculty, and the country roads, which in rainy weather soon become impassable for heavy traffic and artillery, would, in a frozen condition, be admirable lines of communication. It cannot, moreover, be said that Europe was more hostilely inclined in December than in May ; Austria was, if anything, more inclined to oppose a Russian invasion of Turkey in the latter than in the former month, and in both the remainder of Europe was equally passive and indifferent. We must therefore look to other than political causes for an explanation of the time of year when the campaign commenced in 1828. In all probability the great distances which have to be tra- versed by Russian troops in order to effect a concentration on the southern frontier, and the consequent time always required to carry out a mobilisation of their army, may be regarded as the first cause of the delay ; and the second will probably be found in the stormy character of the Black Sea during the winter months. As Wittgen- stein's army was almost entirely dependent for its sup- plies on water transport, it was far more important that the aea should be calm and the winds favourable than that the Danube should be frozen and the country roads hard. The Russian army when it commenced operations was divided into three corps, to which the following duties INVASION OF TURKEY IN 1828. 73 Tvere assigned: — The 3rd Corps, under Greneral Eudje- witsch, about 38,000 strong, was to cross the Lowei- Danube, march through the Dobrudscha into Bulgaria, and thence direct on Varna. The 7th Corps, under the G-rand Duke Michael, about 24,000 strong, with the siege train was to besiege Brailow and to cover the flank of the 3rd ; while the 6th Corps, about 22,000, under Eothof, was to occupy Moldavia and Wallachia, take Silistria if possible, and generally protect the communications and flank of the remainder of the army. On May 7th and 8th the 6th and 7th Corps crossed the Pruth with flags flying and bands playing : the common soldiery had all the enthusiasm of the Crusaders, and con- sidered that they were about to engage in a sacred and religious war ; the officers had all the confidence in them- selves and the contempt for their enemies which are stated to have been the peculiar characteristics of the early followers of the first Napoleon. No difficulty whatever was encountered in crossing the Pruth, bridges were made at Falschi and Woduly-Isakchi, where bridges were established and permanently maintained. The 6th Corps occupied the principalities without hindrance. Bucharest was occupied by Cossacks on May 12th; and Crajova, the capital of Lesser Wallachia, on the 21st. On June 2nd a sortie from Widdin by a force composed, it is stated, of 4,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry, and 10 guns, was repiflsed by G-eneral Greismar at Kalafat, but beyond this and the occupation of a position at Turtukai, which prevented the 74 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. passage of the Danube at Oltenitza, as had been intended, no attempt at resistance was made by the Ottoman troops- north of the Danube. Exception not unfrequently has been taken to the policy of Wittgenstein in thus occupy- ing ^Moldavia and "Wallachia ; it has been said that he thereby scattered his force, ah'eady too weak, that he- wasted valuable time, and unnecessarily excited the jealousy of Europe. When, however, we leam that the Eiissian Staff compelled the inhabitants of these provinces to furnish 250,000 measures of grain, 40,000 loads of hay, 50,000 kilderkins of brandy, and 23,000 oxen for the use of the troops; also that 16,000 peasants were sent to make hay on the Danube, and that an enormous number of waggons and horses were put into requisition — we can scarcely question the wisdom of the measure, more espe- cially if we consider that an army which did not command the left bank of the Danube above Brailow would be liable at any moment to have its communications and rear threatened by a hostile field force operating in Wallachia or issuing from Brailow itself, from Eassowa or from Silis- tria. Undoubtedly these fortresses might have been masked or reduced, and the command of the sea rendered the Russian army comparatively independent of other sup- plies ; so on the whole the policy or impolicy of the course actually adopted must always remain an open question. While the 6th Corps effected the occupation of the principalities, the 7th Corps commenced the siege of Brailow, and the 3rd prepared to cross the Lower Danube THE CROSSING OF THE DANUBE. 75 at Satunovo, nearly opposite Isakchi. The passage of this river was effected on June 9, but the success of the operation was owing more to bravery and good fortune than to skill and wisely devised combinations. The^ Danube at this point is only about 900 paces in widths and seeing that preparations had been made for a crossing here, the Turks had taken means to oppose it. A battery of about fifteen guns had been placed on the opposite bank, and about 10,000 men had assembled to support and aid the battery. In all probability the crossing would have been successfully opposed, had not some Zaporogua Cossacks been persuaded by the governor of Ismail to join the invaders ; these new allies ferried about 1,500 light troops across the Danube unperceived by the Turks ; the latter were taken in flank and disgracefully routed, leaving the passage of the river free. Not only was a brilliant success thereby achieved and an entrance into the Dobrudscha secured, but this feat of arms was followed by the immediate surrender of the fortress Isakchi, only 4,000 yards from where the river was crossed. From the insufficient defences of this town, and the absence of out- works, it is probable that no very protracted or formidable resistance could in any case have been offered by it. Still its immediate surrender was as disgraceful to the Turks as its possession was important to the Russians. The fortress contained large stores and eighty-five guns of heavy calibre. This passage of the Danube by the 3rd Corps is interesting for many reasons. It shows the difficulties 76 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. which attend the passage of that river, as well as the manner in which they may be surmounted. Count Moltke remarks that in the whole course of the Lower Danube, Satunovo was the only place where the Russians could cross ; that as the left bank could only be reached by means of a dyke, which it took weeks to build, their intentions must become known to their enemies, who had ample time to frustrate them, more especially as the point selected was immediately opposite a fortress. Hence he deduces the conclusion that it would have been wiser to dispense with a bridge in the first instance, and only to collect materials for its construction, while the actual crossing was effected in boats at Eeni or some place where no preparations had been made to oppose it. We saw that the 7th Corps after crossing the Pruth on the 7th and 8th of May had marched to Brailow. The siege of this fortress is so remarkable an incident in the history of the war that it deserves special notice, all the more as it exemplifies the warlike peculiarities of the Turks, and the desperate manner in which they often conduct the defence of a place, when troops of another nation would only think of capitulating. It seems un- necessary to give a detailed description of the fortress or of the manner in which the engineers on both sides conducted the attack and defence. The introduction of rifled firearms has so entirely altered all the conditions of warfare as regards fortresses, that little can be learnt from what occurred at Brailow previous to the actual assault. THE SIEGE OF BRAILOW. IT Suffice to say that Brailow at the time in question was a town of about 24,000 inhabitants, of whom about 7,000 or 8,000 were capable of bearing arms. It stood on the edge of the Danube, was not commanded on any side, and was surrounded by fortifications consisting of eight bastioned fronts with revetted scarps and counterscarps. According to Colonel Chesney, the height, or relief as it is termed, of these fortifications was gTeater than in any other Turkish fortress, and there was a castellated citadel flanked by eight round towers, defending the western front of the town. Although there were no outworks and no casemated protection for the garrison, this fortress was the strongest place on the Danube, it was also well pro- visioned, was armed with 278 guns besides mortars, and, all told, had a garrison of about 8,000 men — in short it was a hard nnt to crack. On May 11th the investment was commenced, and by May 25th the first parallel of the attack was completed ; also five batteries had been erected by the Archduke Michael on the north-eastern side of the town. The Kussians used every diligence in pushing on their works, and by June 6th their third parallel was finished at a dis- tance of about 130 yards from the counterscarp. Up to this time the defence had been merely passive, being con- fined to a few insignificant sorties and desultory firing ; now it may be said that the resistance of the Turks really commenced. In order to make up for the want of ricochet and proper breaching-batteries, the Russians had 78 EUSSIAX WARS WITH TURKEY. to employ mines, and by June loth five were ready for ex- plosion. During these operations, of which Count Moltke gives a detailed account, including a sketch, the works of the besiegers were much hindered by repeated sallies made with great determination and bravery. On the morning in question these mines were charged, and two columns of troops prepared to storm the place as soon as a signal was given by three rockets for the firing of the mines. Unfortunately a mistake occurred, and out of five mines only three exploded. Hence the column on the left liad no breach before it. As from the smoke and confusion, the officers were unable to see the ramparts or their condition, all advanced boldly to attack, and searched in vain for a breach in the escarp. It is needless to say that they were utterly routed, in fact it is stated that only one man was left alive, he a sergeant, who was pushed into the Danube and saved himself by swimming. The right column, notwithstanding that they had a breach to storm, were not much more successful. The Turks fought with a vigour and determination perfectly unequalled, so much so that altliough the attack only commenced at nine o'clock, by half-past eleven the Russians were repulsed with a loss of about 2,000 killed and wounded. It is probable that the defence of Brailow would have been even still more protracted had it not been for two circumstances — the defeat of the Turkish flotilla on the Danube and the surrender of the fortress of Matchin. On June 8th a Russian squadron of eighteen vessels, under THE SIEGE OF BRAILOW. 79 Vice Admiral Zaradowsky, attacked and defeated, with a loss of thirteen of their number, an Ottoman flotilla of thirty-two gun-boats, which retired from before Brailow up the Danube to Silistria, thus giving the Kussians the command of the river. The surrender of Matchin was alike unexpected and inexcusable — it was a strong fortress and had only been subject to a slight bombardment; nevertheless, it capitulated almost at once. Count Moltke says that ' the badness of the defence was not to be attributed to military or local causes, but entirely to personal considerations ! ' In fact, there is little doubt that in this case, as in that of many other Turkish for- tresses, the commandants had belonged to the Janissaries and were disaffected, also that they frequently preferred the Eussian gold, to be acquired by a speedy surrender, to the Turkish bowstring, which was the almost inevitable consequence, whether the defence had been gallant or the reverse. Suliman Pacha, the Grovernor of Brailow, not- withstanding his gallant defence at the commencement and his reply to the first summons of surrender — ' When the rampart is destroyed we shall form a living one of our bodies,' is not free from the suspicion of corruption. Colonel Chesney states, on apparently good authority — that of the Russian commander in Wallachia — ' that the gates of Brailow had been opened by a golden key.' In any case the fortress capitulated long before it need have done so ; the two unexploded mines were successfully fired on June 16th, and two days afterwards the surrender was 80 HUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. finally arranged. The garrison were permitted to march out with ' bag and baggage,' and were allowed ten days to evacuate the place — a not unimportant condition, since thereby the 7th Corps was delayed for that time in its southward march when its support was much needed by the 3rd Corps. It is stated that there were provisions for several months' defence captured in the place, besides quantities of ammunition and nearly 300 guns, also that the siege cost the Eussians, in round numbers, about 4,000 men, according to some authors 5,000. The fall of Brailow was immediately followed by that of all the fortresses in the Dobrudscha, namely, Isakchi, Hirsova, Tultscha, and Kostendji. The capture of the latter place was peculiarly timely, as thereby the Eussians got possession of a safe and fortified seaport, where their sup- plies could be landed, and where their fleet could rest in security. Of this advantage they were not slow in availing themselves, since almost immediately after its capture, on. July 5th, a transport fleet of twenty-six sail from Odessa entered the harbour. As remarked by Count Moltke, the defence of Turkish fortresses has hitherto presented two striking peculiarities as contrasted with the system of resistance carried out by other nations. In the first place, whereas the efforts made to check the approaches of the besiegers are most unscientific and feeble, the defence of the breach is most desperate, in fact the defence commences where with other armies it ends. Secondly, as a rule, in other countries forts THE SKIRMISH OF BAZARDJIK, 81 held only by regular garrisons make a good defence, while inhabited towns usually capitulate as soon as they are sub- ject to bombardment. This was specially noteworthy in the late war of 1870, for whereas Bitsch held out until the last, Soissons,Thionville,Strasburg, and other towns surrendered almost as soon as a few shells had burst in their streets. The converse of this has hitherto been the case in Turkey, and ' peaceful inhabitants ' have made a far better defence than professional soldiers. Time alone can show whether iriodern arms have altered this peculiarity ; possibly they have, and long-ranged weapons may have caused as great a revolution in the Turkish as in other methods of fighting. We left the 3rd Corps having just crossed the Danube atSatunovo; by June 11th the whole of the force had passed over and was on its march southwards. Its progress, however, was necessarily slow, since it did not reach Karasu, near Trajan's wall, only 75 miles' distance, till June 25th ; there it remained for eight days, awaiting the fall of Brailow, and then marched on leisurely towards Bazardjik. Here occurred the first fight of the war in the open field ; it was a cavalry affair, and in this the Turkish horsemen showed that they were nearly as formidable as in the days when the Russian infantry were obliged to carry chevaux-de-frise in light carts for their protection. Hussein Pacha had sent on about 8,000 men, chiefly cavalry, to occupy Bazardjik ; on the approach of the advance-guard of the Muscovite army the Turks evacuated the town and took up a position behind some hills in G 82 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. front of it, thereby forming what may be termed an am- bush on the flank of the Kussians. The latter fell into the trap and were driven back with a loss of nearly 1 2,000 men. Eventually, when the artillery of the invaders appeared, the Ottomans had to retreat ; but this skirmish was by no means unimportant in its results, not only from the moral effect it produced, but likewise from the fact that the Emperor's army was thereby detained for nearly a week at Bazardjik, it not being deemed prudent to advance until reinforcements arrived from the 7th Corps, now set free by the fall of Brailow. A portion of this Corps joined the main army on July 11th, the remainder of which had been detached to watch Silistria on the 21st. Their places had been taken in front of that fortress by 10,000 men of the 6th Corps, who, after having vainly endeavoured to effect a passage of the Danube near Rustchuk, had been obliged to march round by Hirsova to get into their required position. We therefore find, in the middle of July, that the Russian army was thus distributed : — The 3rd and 7th Corps on the march through the Dobrudscha, advancing on Varna. The 6th Corps partly (10,000 men) in front of Silistria, the remainder occupying AVallachia. The Guards and 2nd Corps on the march southwards through Russia — these did not arrive until the end of August. As regards numbers, Von Moltke gives the following estimate : — THE STRATEGY OF THE TURKS. 83 At Bazardjik 24,000 In Wallachia and about 11,750 Before Silistria 10,750 Escorting troops on the flotilla and at halting-places in the rear ........ 5,500 Before Varna ........ 5,100 The Advance-guard at Kosludja 6,000 Before Anapa ' 2,000 Total .... 65,100 There is, however, great reason to suppose that these numbers are considerably under-stated ; Imanitschew gives the numbers at 85,000, which, probably, is an exag- geration. And where now were the Turks ? The ques- tion is by no means easily answered, as the official reports issued by the Ottoman Gfovernment are at all times few and far between, while they are even less to be depended on than those issued by the Eussians. From the commencement of the campaig-n the Turkish commander-in-chief had apparently made up his mind to adopt a Fabian system of defence — no attempt whatever was made to defend the line of the Danube and the first serious opposition afforded to the Eussian advance took place before Schumla. There were, however, various skirmishes, in which the Turks were on the whole success- ful. First there was the affair near Bazardjik, previously mentioned, there was another cavalry encounter on July 12th near Kosludja, in which Greneral Eudiger's force was severely handled, and lastly there were two rather serious skirmishes on the 14th and 15th before Varna, resulting G 2 84 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. in the repulse of the Eiissians. With respect to these con- tests, Count Moltke makes the following observations: 'The Turks in these skirmishes had hitherto acted with equal prudence and determination, and according to their own view? they had everywhere beaten the Russians. They certainly expected that their adversaries would have brought larger masses of men into the field, and were astonished to find that with the enormous means at Russia's disposal only a few squadi'ons of horse and a handful of infantry were brought against them. Unim- portant as was the result of these skirmishes, their moral effect was favourable to the Turks, and the confidence of the Russian cavalry diminished with the strength of their heavy parade horses.' As before mentioned, it is wholly impossible to form even an approximate idea of the number and position of the entire Turkish army at this time ; it is, however, tolerably certain that immediately in front of the Emperor Nicholas there were — In Schumla about 40,000, In Varna about 7,000. In rear of these on the other side of the Balkans there were reserves variously estimated at from 25,000 men up- wards, and there were of course large bodies of Ottoman troops in course of organisation, in addition to the garri- sons of the fortresses of Silistria, Rustchuk, Widdin, I*ravadi, &c. THE POSITION OF SCHUMLA. 85 Up to July 1 6th the march of the Russian columns had been directed on Varna as the objective ; on this day, how- ever, their plans were changed, they joined the advanced guard under General Rudiger at Kosludja and marched on Schumla, weak divisions under Greneral Suchtelen and Ben- kendorff being detached to watch Varna and Pravadi. The wisdom of this change in direction will be discussed here- after ; we will now confine ourselves to a narration of events as they occurred, a few words first are necessary to describe Schumla, inasmuch as this fortress occupies much the same position as regards Constantinople that Metz did as regards Paris before the late war. The town of Schumla lies at the foot of a group of hills to the north of the Balkan range and separated from it by the valleys of the Kamtchik. In the year of which we write, it contained about 40,000 inhabitants, was unfortified, but had a line of outworks round it on a range of heights at a distance of about 1,500 paces from the town. When the Russians first appeared before it there were no detached forts ; two, however, were subsequently erected during the siege. The position formed an entrenched camp of great natural strength, capable of containing from 30,000 to 40,000 men, and from its strategic situation of great importance, since, although it does not actually command any of the Balkan passes, a force issuing from it could act on the flank and rear of an army moving southwards. As the Russians had not a sufficient force to mask it and march on, as the Grermans masked Metz in 1870, they 86 EUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. Avere obliged to halt and commence a regular siege or rather investment, since the strength of the garrison and the well-known gallantry of the Turks behind entrenchments made an assault out of the question. It seems unnecessary to enter into the details of this siege, or of the various affairs in the open which took place during its course. On July •20th a small Turkish force occupying the heights between Kisjila and Boulanlik behind the Pravadi river was attacked by the main Russian army, and was driven into Schumla. Before and after the investment of the fortress was completed, the Turks made many sorties, all of which were carried out with great gallantry, and with tolerable success, but without producing any very decisive result on the fortunes of either force. At last on August 3rd it became evident to the Emperor Nicholas, who had recently joined the army, that, if he wished to bring the campaign to a conclusion, he must direct his attention elsewhere. Accordingly he proceeded to Varna, taking with him reinforcements and twelve guns, and leaving Marshal Wittgenstein with the main army to continue the blockade and siege of Schumla,. where for a time we also will leave him, and turn to the operations before Varna. Varna is a seaport. town at the mouth of the Devno ; in 1828 it contained about 25,000 inhabitants, and for those days was strongly fortified. From its geographical position it was of peculiar strategic importance ; not only did it aftbrd an excellent base where supplies might be landed^ THE SIEGE OF VARNA. 87 but it also commanded the principal and shortest line from the Russian frontier to Constantinople. Count Moltke remarks that the whole force of an invading army ought to be directed against Varna, and that when Witt- genstein changed the direction of his march to Schumla he committed a fatal error, which was tlie ' turning point in the campaign of the year 1828.' As before mentioned, G-eneral Suchtelen had been detached to watch Varna with a weak division on July 14th, he remained in observation until August 3rd, having in the meantime had various skirmishes with the garrison, who under Capudan Pacha made frequent sorties. Towards the end of the month the Eussian fleet anchored in Varna bay, bringing some detachments from Anapa, where a descent had been made, and about August 6th the siege was regularly commenced. Notwithstanding the presence of the Emperor Nicholas himself, notwithstanding the arrival of the siege train from Brailow, and the co-operation of the fleet, it may be said that two months elapsed without the Russians being really nearer the capture of the place than they were when they first appeared before it. The Turks had succeeded in reinforcing the garrison, and had carried out an active defence with extraordinary bravery, and a very consider- able amount of skill. There had been various encounters, almost amounting to battles, during the course of the in- vestment, and not only did the besieged execute a succession of sorties and attacks on the Russian works with great deter- mination, but a relieving army under Omar Vrione having 88 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. been collected at Adrianople, advanced to raise the siege. After several sanguinary battles, in which both combatants exhibited great braveiy, the superior quality of tlie Muscovite troops in the open field proved decisive, the attempt to raise the siege failed, and Omar Vrione was obliged to content himself with a position in observation outside. Had the quality of the Turkish troops been somewhat better, there can be little doubt that the battle of Kurt-Tepe, or Kurtesse as some call it, which was fought on September 30th, would liave been a most disastrous defeat to the Eussians. As it was, Prince Eugene, who then commanded them, had to retire on the night of the battle, and was only saved from the consequences of defeat by the enemy refusing to face him on the following day. Moltke remarks ' that although the attack failed, the moral effect which the courage of the Eussian troops produced upon the Turks did much towards bringing the campaign to a successful issue.' To return, however, to the siege of Varna. By October 9th the position of the Eussian army became most pre- carious ; winter was rapidly approaching, Schumla was un- subdued and could not even be invested, the Turks were daily increasing in numbers and confidence ; unless Varna could be captured all was lost, nothing remained but a dis- astrous defeat in an enemy's country before a relentless enemy. What was to be done ? Force of arms would cer- tainly never cause the fall of Varna in time to save the Eussian army ; other means must be tried, and tried they THE SIEGE OF SCHUMLA. 89 were with admirable results — that ne^er-failing instrument the golden key was again applied to the gates of this fortress, and it opened them with its accustomed success. The second in command, Jussuf Pacha, on this occasion was the traitor; the commandant, Capudan Pacha, refused to capitulate, and shut himself up in the citadel ; however the result was the same, Varna surrendered unconditionally after a siege of eighty-nine days in all, twenty-seven of which were after a practicable breach had been effected. Whereas Jussuf Pacha was conducted away as prisoner of war, and afterwards received an ample grant of land in the Crimea from the Emperor Nicholas, Capudan Pacha was permitted to march out and join Omar Vrione on the Kamtchik, who on hearing of the fall of the fortress retired to Aidos unmolested. We left Marshal Wittgenstein before Schumla on August 3rd, endeavouring to maintain an investment of the stronghold with forces scarcely sufficient for that purpose. Up to August 26th but little was done on either side beyond a few skirmishes, attacks on redoubts, and counter- attacks. Gradually, however, the Seraskier, who here was in chief command of the Ottoman troops, began to understand the danger of his enemies. And on the night of August 26th, although, as remarked by Count Moltke, a night assault is a phenomenon in Turkish military his- tory, such was carried out on the Muscovite redoubts, and at the same time a very formidable onslaught was made on the main Russian position in hopes of breaking through it. 90 RUSSIAN WAIiS WITH TUIiKEY. Thanks to the information given by a Bulgarian spy this attack failed, but it had the effect of causing the Russians to draw in their forces and to abandon the investment. This enabled the garrison to obtain supplies and to detach 14,000 men to join the Grrand Vizier, who at last was advancing from Adrianople to attempt the relief of Varna. On September 9th the Turks again attacked the Russian redoubts and once more were repulsed in consequence of previous information of their attack having been given by spies. Finally the Russians under Wittgenstein were compelled to remain entirely on the defensive, and they retained this attitude during the latter portion of September until the fall of Varna. Dm'ing this period their sufferings were fearful ; it is stated by Count Moltke that their cavalry, now reduced to about 3,000 men, lost on an average from 100 to 150 horses daily, and soon became almost dismounted — hence the foraging parties could no longer be protected from the Turkish cavalry who made repeated attacks on convoys. The infantry, encamped in an open plain, with the ther- mometer at 125° in the daytime, had to live on biscuit and bad beef, had no water for washing, with very little to drink, and suffered enormously, more especially when the cavalry were unable to perform the outpost duty. In fact the position of the Russian army was in the highest degree critical and even dangeious when Varna surrendered, and had it not been for the extraordinary supineness and BET BEAT OF THE RUSSIANS. 91 incompetency of the Turkish generals, even that event would not have saved them. Almost as soon as the Turkish prisoners had been safely cleared out of the town of Varna, the Emperor set sail for Odessa, and Wittgenstein commenced his retreat northwards. Both experienced many dangers : the Emperor was nearly blown into the Bosphorus. It is related that when the captain of the vessel proposed to run the ship ashore as the only liope of safety, Nicholas replied that he preferred death to falling into the hands of the Sultan; the wind then changed and the Emperor was saved both from death and captivity. Marshal Wittgenstein commenced his retreat on October 15th ; so well had his movements been concealed that for a feAV days he was unmolested; then the Turkish cavalry proved as formidable as the Cossacks to Napoleon's grand army in the retreat from Moscow. The roads through Bulgaria, bad at any time, had become almost impassable, and by the time his wearied troops reached the Danube they had lost half their baggage and nearly a third of their niunber. Before concluding the histor}^ of the twenty-eighth campaign it is necessary to say a few words regarding the operations of the Eussian 6th Corps, which had been left partly in Wallachia and partly opposite Silistria, when the remainder of the army marched southwards. Silistria has on several occasions proved a serious obstacle to Russian armies, and in 1828 it was successful in resist- ^2 HUSSIAX WARS WITH TURKEY. ing their attacks. At that time it contained about 24,000 inliabitants, but was scarcely better fortified than it had been when it endured the siege of Kaminski in 1770. The defences were principally earthworks, and were devoid of outworks or any of the more elaborate protection gene- rally used in modern fortresses. Count Moltke remarks the ' position of the town is equally important in a strate- gical point of view, and unfavourable for the purposes of fortification,' and that the only means of converting it into a good fortress would be to erect strong outworks on certain heights which command the town and to erect a tete-du-pont on the left bank of the Danube. The Russian army under Greneral Eoth arrived before Silistria on July 21st. At first the besiegers were not more numerous than the besieged, and therefore had to take up a defensive position. For seven weeks the two rival forces remained opposite to each other making mutual sorties and mutually engaged in entrenching their respective posi- tions. At last, on September loth, some reinforcements arrived for the besiegers in the shape of the 2nd Corps- d'armee, and tlius enabled them to commence active opera- tions; it was not, however, until nearly the end of October, when the Russian army was raised to 30,000 men by the arrival of parts of the 6th and 3rd Corps from Schumla, that the fortress could be invested. Then, however, the season was already too far advanced to prosecute the siege, and it was finally raised on November 10th. On the other side of Wallachia the Russian armv mider OPERATIOXS IN WALLACHIA. 9a Greneral Greismar, numbering about 10,000 men, had been compelled to remain on the defensive, and in fact had expe- rienced some difficulty in retaining its position. The Pachas of Widdin and Eustchuk, the latter afterwards well known as Kuchuk Hamed, were men of considerable energy and daring. The former succeeded in collectiDg about 10,000 men, and the latter 8,000, and with these they commenced a series of desultory attacks on the Russians by means of the tetes-de-pont Kalafat and Giurgevo opposite Widdin and Eustchuk respectively. At first Kuchuk Hamed was the most active and made two rather formid- able sorties on June 2nd and July 3rd from Griurgevo. These, however, were repulsed without much trouble and for a short time Greneral Greismar was unmolested. Re- ceiving information, however, Irom Grreek spies that the Pacha of Widdin was meditating a raid, he moved up to Golenz near Kalafat, so as to watch and check the enemy's movements. From this point he was forced to retreat to the entrenched camp of Tchovoza behind the Schyll half way to Crajova on August 18th, having been attacked by superior numbers. The Turks then overran Lesser Wallachia, carried off great stores of provisions that had been prepared for the Russian army, and did much mischief. After this they returned to Widdin, but made another sortie on August 27th, which forced Greneral Geismar to retreat to Crajova, while the country was again ravaged. Nothing further occurred until September 24th, when the Seraskier of •94 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. Widdin, with a force of about 26,000 men and thirty guns, issued from Kalafat, marched round the right flank of the Eussian force which was entrenched as before at Tchovoza, and threatened their communications. The danger was imminent. Greneral Greismar had only about 5,000 men on the spot, while his adversaries had, according to some authors, nearly five times that number, irregulars though they were; his own communications were in the greatest danger, and those of the main army were seriously threatened ; the only hope of safety lay in a vigorous offensive, and this he adopted. In place of marching direct at the Ottoman army, who, according to their custom, had entrenched themselves, he marched on their communications with Widdin ; the result was a serious cavalry encounter on September 27th, which concluded in a manner by no means decisively favourable to the Russians : both armies retained their positions at nightfall and prepared for the final and decisive struggle on the following day. For this struggle, however, Greneral Greismar with the enormous odds against him could not afford to wait, he was indeed in a critical position, retreat was impossible, and a battle on equal terms was almost synonymous with defeat. Nothing remained but a night attack, and this he executed with the most perfect success. Orientals are notoriously careless in their outpost duty at night, the Turks have ever been negligent even beyond other Orientals ; trusting to this the Muscovite commander caused his artillery to redouble its fire just before sunset CONCLUSION OF CAMPAIGN. 95 as if to cover his retreat. He then waited till the enemy tad had sufficient time to settle down to repose, and, dividing his force into eight columns, advanced to attack their camp. The attacking columns first came on the ■camp of the irregular cavalry, who without a single vedette fell an easy prey to the surprise — the vizier fled on a mule, liis lieutenant on foot. The Turkish infantry, however, having had some notice of their danger, showed more steadiness, and for some time the fortunes of the day, or rather of the night, hung in the balance. At last the village caught fire and the rout of the Ottomans was com- plete ; it was a ' sauve-qui-peut,' nothing was saved. At two o'clock in the morning General Geismar was master of the smoking ruins of Bojeles-chti, which was the name of the village, and of the trophies it contained. Among the latter were arms for 10,000 men, twenty-four standards, 424 waggons, and last, but not least, a letter from the Sultan giving orders for the complete destruction of General Geismar's corps. After this signal defeat the Turks gave no more trouble in Wallachia — their demoralisation was complete, so much so that on October 25th, without being attacked, they evacuated the important tete-de-pont of Kalafat, which was immediately occupied by the Eussians and fortified towards Widdin. During the winter the tete-de- joont of Nicopolis was also taken. Both of these were important captures for the operations of the ensuing campaign. During the winter there were a few minor 96 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. operations on the Danube, but these belong to the war of the following year. After the siege of Silistria had been raised, and Witt- genstein had retreated from before Schumla, it may be said that the campaign of 1828 was ended ; both combatants returned to their winter quarters to reorganise their shat- tered armies. The Russians were disposed as follows : — Greneral Eoth at Varna with the principal part of the 6th and 7th Corps ; also occuppng Pravadi, &c. The G-uard Corps in Bessarabia. The 2nd and 3rd Corps in Moldavia and Wallachia. It is stated that of more than 100,000 Muscovites that crossed the Pruth barely 60,000 were alive at the end of October. In truth, the losses of the campaign were gTeat and the results were small. 97 CHAPTER IV. REMARKS ON CAMPAIGN OF 1828 IN EUROPE. Campaign commenced too late — Russian force too weak — Army should have marched on Varna — Diversion to Schumla a mistake — Strategy of the Turks — Tardiness of Grand Vizier — Results of campaign in Bulgaria — General Geismar and his operations. In reviewing the events of the 1828 campaign in Europe we have the great advantage of possessing the criticisms of Count von Moltke, written at a time when his opinions were probably just as valuable as at present, but from the fact that the writer was comparatively unknown, were but little read or noticed. Count Moltke, at that time a captain, was attached to the head-quarters of the Russian army, and served with it through the campaign. Hence his remarks are deserving of special attention, not only from the subsequent reputation acquired by their author, but because he had special opportunities of personally seeing and judging of the operations which he thus criticises. Other authors have also added their obser- vations, and, although but few have written much on these wars, and still fewer have attempted to draw prac- tical deductions from them, nevertheless, if only as a H 98 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. statement of the other side of the question, their views are in many instances worthy of observation, all the more as Count Moltke, impartial as he undoubtedly is in a remarkable degree, from the circumstance that he served with the Emperor Nicholas's army, necessarily regarded events peculiarly from a Eussian point of view. The first point to be remarked as to the manner in which the campaign was conducted is the great mistake that was made in beginning it too late. As the Danube was not crossed till June 8th, and as the distance from the Lower Danube to Constantinople is at least 480 miles, it was quite impossible for an army to reach Constantinople until the middle of October, even supposing it marched with extraordinary diligence and encountered few or no obstacles on the road ; when we consider that there were fortresses to be subdued and Turkish armies to be con- quered, it may confidently be asserted that before the war was commenced its fate as regards a complete success was sealed. There is no distinct information as to why this fatal delay was incurred. Count ]Moltke attributes it to political causes, but does not state their nature. The next point on which especial stress may be laid is the fact that the Eussian army was far too weak for the task imposed on it ; and this mistake Count Moltke considers to have had far more to do with the failure of the campaign than the delay. He says : ' If the Eussian Government was guided by the recollection of the days when Miinnich, Komanzoff, and Suwarrow with 17,000 Eussians beat THE ERRORS OF WITTGEXSTEIN. 99 160,000 Mussulmans, it should also be borne in mind that in the campaign of 1828-9 the Russians had not to fight the Turks in the endlesti steppes of Bessarabia, Mol- davia, and Wallachia, but in the forests of the Balkan. On the former European tactics may have great advantage over undisciplined hordes, but in the forests of the Balkan the Turkish Spahi, with his long rifle, mounted on his quick horse, and supported by swarms of skirmishers on foot, is by no means a despicable foe. Moreover, expe- rience of all former wars should have taught the Russians to expect an obstinate resistance from the Moslem behind stone walls.' He adds in another place : ' The campaigns of 1809-11 had shown that an army of 70,000 men in Bulgaria was so fully occupied by the lines of the Danube that it had no strength left to cross the Balkans ; never- theless in 1828 the same fault was committed, as the Ouards could not reach Varna before the end of August, and the 2nd Corps could not arrive at the Danube until September, when the time for operations was over. . . . * Another fault was that three months after the com- mencement of hostilities the battering train had not yet reached the army, drawn up before a fortress on the sea, and that the same park of artillery was intended to serve both for Varna and Anapa.' After committing a fatal error, both as regards the time of commencing the war and the strength of the forces •employed to carry it out, Marshal Wittgenstein seems to have been equally unfortunate in his first operation. H 2 100 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. Tempting as were the supplies to be obtained in the principalities, nevertheless as the Eussian army had the command of the sea, it appears that it was a fatal error to disperse the small army available in the occupation of Moldavia and AVallachia. The Pruth and the Danube should have been crossed simultaneously, and while one armv ascended the right the other should have advanced along the left bank of the latter river. Brailow and Silistria should at once have been invested, and after both had been reduced the main army might have marched on. Probably AMttgenstein did not expect to meet with so much resistance at Brailow ; had this place fallen without serious resistance the 7th Corps could have at once marched on to Silistria and secured the crossing of the river at Turtukai for the 6th Corps. Thus the march of the 3rd Corps and the main body would not have been delayed and Varna would have been invested at least a month sooner than it was. Last, but not least, the Tm'ks would not have had time to collect their forces, and pro- bably the march of the Russians would not have been diverted from its original object by the presence of a formidable force of the enemy at Schumla. Having thus commenced the war with a series of mistakes the Eussian generals continued their course of error. The original plan of the campaign made Varna their first objective point, as being a fortified seaport it was all-important to them for the supply of their army ; it also commanded the main and shortest road from the THE MOVEMENT ON SCHUMLA. 101 Kussian frontier to Constantinople. Unfortunately they were diverted from their original intention, and marched on Schumla, a strategical error of the most fatal description. In the first place, the capture of that place was almost an impossibility, being an entrenched camp of great strength and occupied by a force almost twice as numerous as that which they could bring against it, and secondly, even if they had captured Schumla its posses- sion would have been of but little use to them — they would still have had to reduce Varna if they wished to supply their army and to be in possession of the best and shortest road to the capital of the enemy. Varna once occupied, a corps of observation might have been left opposite Schumla and the remainder of the army, if strong enough, might have continued its march southwards. It was also very desirable to entice the Turkish commander out into the open, where the superior quality of the Russian troops might counterbalance the superior numbers of their enemies — but to undertake a war of mutual entrench- ments — of, as it was termed, ' circumvallation and contra- vallation,' was an unaccountable error of a flagrant de- scription ; by it the Russians exposed themselves to imminent danger with but small hope of success. As remarked by Count Moltke : ' Forty thousand Turks with everything they wanted were posted in a central and almost unassailable position ; opposite to them la}^ a Russian corps, little more than half their number, on the <5ircumference of a circle twenty miles long, which the 102 JiUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. Turks could cut through at every point by short and covered marches. The Seraskier could everywhere attack them with superior forces, and a concentration of the Russian forces at any threatened point was impossible, not only from the distance, but because in defending one point some other parts of the lines of investment would be left bare of men. The whole Eussian army was stretched out in a cordon before Schumla ; there was no reserve, and, had there been one, place it where you would, it must always have arrived too late, as on such ground it was impossible to discriminate beforehand between a real and a false attack. ' But putting aside the immediate danger that threatened them, the Russians were in an awkward pre- dicament. They were without light cavalry, one may almost say without any cavalry at all, in the face of a swarm of Turkish horsemen, while they might easily have drawn from the numerous hordes of Cossacks under the Russian sway an analogous body of horsemen invaluable for the protection of the army and for collecting provi- sions. They had not a single point within 160 miles in the rear whither they could transport their sick and wounded ; nor had they any retreat open to them in case the strong garrisons of Rustchuk, Silistria, and Varna should break through the few troops that invested them^ and bring together 30,000 in the rear of the Russians.' After once committing the error of besieging Schumla in place of Varna, according to Count Moltke they should THE STRATEGY OF THE TURKS. 103 have continued in the course they had chosen, as it was nothing but the extraordinary apathy of Hussein Pacha which saved the portion of Wittgenstein's army remaining before Schumla from utter destruction, as G-enerals Eudiger and Durnowo's corps were cut off from all sup- port and communication. Even supposing Schumla had been captured, the real difficidty of passing the Balkans was by no means overcome, as the local position of defence lies beyond the Kamtchik. We have thus far dealt with the strategy of the Kussian commanders in their offensive operations, which practically ceased after the appearance of the main Turkish army in the field. Let us now turn to the Ottomans and consider how they conducted the defence of their territory. In the first place we must concede that exceptional difficulties stood in the way of the generals of the Sultan and absolutely precluded them from the possi- bility of conducting an active defence, such as with a more disciplined and mobile army would have been their best and safest course to pursue. Possessing, as they did, all the strongholds of the Danube and the tetes-de-pont opposite them, a tolerably efficient army by pivoting on the river, and threatening the Eussian communications, might have effectually checked any further advance of a hostile army of the strength which was actually opposed to them ; just as Eadetzky in 1848 and 1849 in Italy checked, and ultimately defeated the Sardinians under Charles Albert : we will, however, suppose that such a 104 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY, course was not within the powers of the Ottoman com- manders, and was rendered wholly impossible by the con- dition of the forces at their disposal. In such a case they undoubtedly did right to abandon territory which they could not effectually defend, just as the Prussians in 1870 had prepared to abandon the Ehenish provinces and retire • behind the Ehine if they had not been able to forestall the French and take the initiative. Schumla and Varna were undoubtedly, under these circumstances, the first line of de- fence by which Constantinople might be defended, and an active field army should have pivoted between the two to assist the garrison of either. Here, however, as too often the case in Tm'kish war, the execution was by no means equal to the design. The dilatory movements of the Grrand Vizier and of his commander-in-chief are simply unac- countable. Count Moltke concludes his observations on the campaign in the following words : — ' The whole strategy of the Turks had up to the attempted relief of Varna consisted in passive resistance : by this system, favoured by natural advantages of the ground, they had succeeded in driving their foe to the brink of destruction. It required only one last effort to hurl him over, but they were incapable of it. ' Neither was it in the least owing to the combination of Russian strategy that matters had come to a tolerable issue. The preparations were insufficient, the campaign began too late, and the direction of the main army was not likely to ensure a successful result. IMPORTANCE OF THE FALL OF VARNA. 105 ' But all these faults were atoned for by the innate excellence of the Eussian troops. The self-sacrificing- obedience of their commanders, the steadiness of the common soldiers, their power of endurance, and unshaken bravery in time of danger, were qualities that enabled them to avert the dangers of their position before Schumla, and to hold the Seraskier in check ; to make up for all deficiencies and overcome all resistance in Varna, and to strike such terrur into Omar Vrione that even after de- feating the Russians he remained ten days in his camp, as it were thunderstruck, doing nothing, while A'arna, the bulwark of the kingdom, fell before his eyes. We cannot say much for the skill of the Turkish commander, but the conduct of the Turks from the highest officer to the last soldier, at the storming of Brailow, their courage at Kurt- Tepe, their steadiness in the mines and trenches before Varna, are far above all praises. ^ The fall of Varna was most fortunate for the Russians. It decided the campaig-n. Had Schumla fallen into their hands in place of Varna, on October 11th — and it was against the latter place that all their efforts had been directed — they might indeed have destroyed all the weak works of that position, but, with Varna and Silistria in their rear, and cut off from the sea, it would have been impossible for them to take up their winter quarters in Bulgaria. The strategical importance of Schumla is equally great to the Turks with or without earthworks. 106 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. and the Eussians would have had to take the position again in the next campaign. ' If we consider the enormous sacrifices that the war cost the Eussians in the year 1828, it is difficult to say whether they or the Turks won or lost it. It remained for a second campaign to decide the value of the first.' Thus does Count Moltke sum up and conclude his criticisms on the campaign, and on the measures adopted by the military leaders on both sides to carry it out. His remarks are certainly not favourable, either as regards Wittgenstein or his opponents, nor, strange to say, does he make any exception when thus reflecting generally on the incapacity of the Eussian generals. It seems, however, that in this instance there has been an omission, since in another part of his work, when speaking of the operations in Wallachia, he says : — ' The task entrusted to G-eneral Greismar was a thankless one, inasmuch as the greatest success could lead to no important victory, nor could it in- fluence the issue of the campaign. Considering, however, the small means at his disposal, General Greismar accom- plished the difficult mission intrusted to him with equal courage and prudence.' It may be remarked that the above was written before the year 1853, when Omar Pacha, by occupying precisely the same position as the Pacha of Widdin in 1828, and not having met a Greismar, entirely paralysed j;he opera- tions of the Eussian army. Therefore it seems evident til at, although a great success on the part of General GENERAL GEISMAKS OPERATIONS. 107 Geismar could not influence the result of the contests going on before Varna and Schumla, or decide the fate of the campaign, still a great defeat would have inevitably proved of enormous detriment, the communications of the main army would have been most seriously imperilled, and probably all advantages gained in the south thrown away. That this defeat was only prevented by the ability and boldness of the Eussian general is undoubted, and hence he is apparently deserving of far more credit than either his own contemporaries or subsequent history have accorded him. It is by no means improbable that the example of what occurred in Wallachia at the close of 1828 induced Omar Pacha twenty-five years afterwards to take up his admirable strategic position at Kalafat, by which, as before stated, he obtained great material ad- vantao'e. 108 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. CHAPTER V. THE CAMPAIGN OF 1829 IN EUROPE. Situation at commencement of year -Eesources of Russians — Diebitsch — Resources of Turks — Commencement of hostilities — Capture of Sizeboli— Xaval exploit of Turks — Siege of Silistria — Diebitsch's march on Schumla and subsequent operations — Battle of Kulew- tscha — March across the Balkans — Capture of Adrianople — Po- sition of Russian army at peace of Adrianople — Signature of peace. The political and military situations at the commence- ment of the year 1829 are equally interesting and de- serving of attention. In the first place there was every reason why Turkey should be left to continue the contest single-handed. The English and French ambassadors had both withdrawn from Constantinople to Corfu, in conse- quence of the refusal of the Sultan Mahmoud to sign the treaty of July 6th, 1827. So long as the Sultan held out on this point, and he continued obdurate almost to the last, there was no reason to expect help from England, and even had the Cabinet of St. James, overcome by jealousy of Russia, waived the important matter of the treaty and despatched its fleet to aid the Turks in the Black Sea, as pointed out by Count Moltke, in conse- THE ATTITUDE OF THE GREAT POWERS. 109 quence of the small force then possessed by Great Britain, 'notwithstanding the acknowledged superiority of the English navy,' it is more than doubtful, in face of the large Muscovite fleet in those waters, whether any rein- forcement that could have reached the Ottomans from Malta would have sufficed to give them the command of the Euxine. France was bound, if not to hostility, at least to a hostile neutrality. Greneral Schneider's brigade was then in the Morea for the protection of the Grreeks, and the Algerian expedition was being fitted out ; hence, as this was sufficient to occupy the attention of the French public, so serious a thing as a European war, which assistance to the Turks would have entailed, was not to be thought of. Lastly, Austria was in firm pursuit of her traditional policy — that of allowing other people to do disagreeable work, while she reaped any benefit to herself that might accrue from it. Had the Eussians been very successful in the previous year, and had it appeared that the safety of Constantinople was seriously jeopardised, then possibly the Court of Vienna might have assumed a warlike attitude and have adopted a definite line of policy ; but as this was not the case, as in fact both combatants were much exhausted, the Eussians more especially having suffered enormous losses, and having achieved only a doubtful success, there was apparently no occasion for immediate or decided action ; on the contrary, it was better to w^ait and act as mediator, possibly also exacting some favourable conditions for the performance of that 110 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. office. Prussia alone, according to Count Moltke, acted in a manner to be commended, and was mainly respon- sible for the fact that the war was localised, although, of course, under no circumstances would her interests liave necessitated her taking part in it. On the whole, there- fore, it was evident that the two combatants would have to fight it out by themselves. Let us now consider how far they were respectively prepared for the encounter. First, as regards Eussia, we have seen that at the close of 1828 she occupied Varna, had reduced all the fortresses in the Dobrudscha, but had failed to capture either Silistria or Schumla. The Eussians had also command of the sea — an all-important advantage. Count Moltke gives their naval strength as follows : in the Black Sea, eleven ships of the line, two of which were three-deckers ; eight frigates, two of which carried sixty guns ; and twelve cor- vettes and brigs of war ; the squadron altogether had 1,800 guns and had Sebastopol to fall back upon. In addition to this force there was the squadron of Admiral Heyden, which blockaded the Dardanelles and consisted of eight ships of tlie line, seven frigates, and twenty smaller vessels, carrying altogether about 1,500 guns. To oppose this formidable force the Tm'ks had only eight ships of the line, three of which were three-deckers, frigates, five cor- vettes, and three brigs, altogether about 1,000 guns. During the entire winter of 1828-1829 — a very severe one, as so often happens when there is a war — the Mus- covites made every effort to repair the losses of the pre- REORGANISATION OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY. Ill vious year. Marshal Wittgenstein was replaced by the chief of his staff, Diebitsch, who started in his command with special advantages, inasmuch as he was not hampered by the presence of the Emperor Nicholas on his diplo- matic following. He was alike general and negotiator, lie was not forced to make military considerations sub- servient to those of politics, and, as there was no telegraph in those days to St. Petersburg, he had the entire fate of the campaign in his hands — a great responsibility, but one that principally contributed to his eventual success. The new commander-in-chief joined his army on Feb- ruary 24th, ] 829, and Count Moltke gives the following- account, derived probably from personal observation, of the measures taken to improve the Eussian forces : — ' G-eneral Diebitsch immediately devoted the greatest attention to the reorganisation of his army. The treat- ment of the soldier was much improved, the intolerable restraint and the unnatural stiff carriage somewhat abated. Nevertheless, much still remained to be done ; for in- stance, skirmishers were always forced to keep step and rank; for this reason they were only of use on level ground. The men's dress and accoutrements were changed for others better suited to the climate. The commissariat, a most important matter for the coming campaign, was put on a different footing ; an immense baggage-train was unavoidable over uncultivated or wasted provinces. Long- columns were composed of thousands of waggons drawn by oxen, which served a double purpose — for draught and 112 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. for food. The parties covering the columns were armed, and had two guns, so as to be able to defend themselves if necessary ; but as these waggons could not be used on the other side of the Balkan, thousands of camels had been bought on the steppes of Asia for the use of the army. This useful, patient, and strong animal, which can carry a. heavy burden even through snow and on the smallest amount of food, is especially fitted to follow the move- ments of an army. In spite, however, of all the measures taken, provisions were scant. Each soldier received one pound of meat and a glass of brandy three times a week, besides twelve biscuits and some oatmeal daily. ' The cavalry made a splendid appearance at starting — they were entirely remounted. The front rank of the hussar regiments was provided with lances, so as to keep out of the reach of the Spahis' sabres, and the number of Cossacks was much increased. The infantry bore traces of the hardships they had undergone in their bad winter quarters. According to the testimony of an eye-witness the men's faces wore an expression of sadness and pain. After all that they had suffered in the former campaign, they looked upon themselves as martyrs to their religion and their emperor. Nowhere in the Eussian quarters were to be seen or heard the jokes that never fail among German soldiers when in tolerable plight. Singing was the only expression of joy that was heard, but the songs had the melancholy character peculiar to the Sclavonian race. The soldiers were much given to religious cere- STRENGTH OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY. 113 monies, and crossed themselves at every meal ; in every camp a tent was fitted up as a churcli, and mass celebrated daily.' As regards the actual force at the disposal of the Eussian generalissimo, it was, if anything, smaller than that which had taken the field in the previous year. The Gruard Corps did not participate in the campaign, nor yet the mounted Chasseurs ; these were the same corps as before. General Palden commanded the 2nd Army Corps, Greneral Krassowsky the 3rd Corps, Greneral Eoth the 6th, and Lieutenant-Greneral Rudiger the 7th. There were also 22 regiments of Cossacks, each regiment consisting of about 200 or 250 men, but some were weaker than this. Count Moltke gives the following estimate of the strength of the entire army : — ' The cavalry consisted of 2 divisions of Hussars, 2 of Lancers, and 1 of Dragoons : — men men Altogether about 88 squadrons, or . . . 10,500 Of Cossacks there were about . . . 5,500 Altogether . . 16,000 ' The infantry consisted of 10 divisions, making up 120 battalions at most 48,000 guns The artillery of 7 horse batteries, or . . 60 And 30 foot batteries, or ... . 240 Altogether . . .300 4,000 Or of actual combatants 68,000 ' The arm}', taken altogether, was just as strong as it had been during the previous campaign until tlie Gruards I 114 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. and the 2nd Corps-d'armee joined it : it was, however, somewhat stronger in artillery and light cavalry.' "When we turn to the Turks, there is much difficulty in forming even an approximate idea of the numbers that they brought into the field. Colonel Chesney estimates their forces at 150,000, including all those eventually collected for the campaign. Of these, he says, ' 100,000 were irregulars distributed in Rustchuk under Hussein Pacha, and in the other fortresses. A part of the re- mainder, or Nizam, was employed in Asia, and 12,000 men were in the lines thrown up at Ramid Tchifflik to cover the capital ; thus there remained about 36,000 infantry, and 10,000 cavalry, with nearly 100 guns drawn by bullocks, to oppose the enemy in the field. But if such a number of men actually joined the Sultan's standard, which is not impossible, it could only be made out by taking into account the levies which arrived at successive periods; for there is no reason to believe that anything like 150,000 men were under arms at the same time. The effective force, however, may have equalled that of 1828.' In one point, however, the Ottoman G-overnment were in abetter position than during the previous year— their people Avere, as a rule, more united, and in some instances were even enthusiastic in their wish to repel the Russian invasion. In order to please the population of Constantinople the Russian prisoners were frequently displayed, also a Russian ship, which accidentally fell a prize to the Ottoman squadron. PREPARATIONS OF THE TURKS. 115 It is also related that less civilised trophies were exhibited — previously Eussian heads were invariably forwarded to Constantinople as presents for the Sidtan after any engagement. It being found, however, that these tokens of respect were somewhat cumbersome, a more portable form of present was resorted to — salted ears took the place of heads, and were, it is said, regarded with much interest and favour by patriotic Mussulmans. But little was done during the spring, both sides being occupied in preparations. The Grrand Vizier went to Schumla on March 28th, and found only 10,000 men there ; the regular army, which was raised to 50,000 men, was afterwards principally despatched to Schumla. The quality of this army, however, is stated to have been of the worst — none but tlie poorest class of Osmanli would enlist this year, and all old soldiers were excluded, as being disaffected and attached to the Janissaries ; the greater number of the recruits came from Asia, and were dragged thence by force. There was also a change in the superior officers of the Turkish army. Reschid Mohammed Pacha was named to the chief command in place of Hussein Pacha, who was very justly considered too much of a Fabian commander. Omar Vrione disappeared entirely from the scene. In some respects, however, the Porte was even worse off than previously — the Bosniaks refused entirely to serve, and the Amauts, a most valuable and warlike tribe, held l^ack until they saw some chance of obtaining the pay for wliich they bargained. On the whole it would be difficult to say I 2 116 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. which side at the outset had the advantage — the Eussians started from a base comparatively neajr their objective, Constantinople, and had it not been for the plague, there is no doubt that they would have eventually reached the capital of the enemy. The first object of the Eussians in entering on their new campaign was to establish a proper base of operations south of the Balkans. This, of course, must be a fortified seaport, on which their onward march to Adrian ople might be based, just as the advance to Varna was based on Kostendji and Mangalia, and the siege of that place on Kavarna and Baltjih. Sizeboli was selected as the most desirable spot, and as affording the best and safest harbour on the whole of the western coast of the Black Sea. On February 1 5th this place was taken by a coup- de-niain — a thousand Albanians, who were the garrison, having surrendered after a mere cannonade. The Sultan was very indignant at such boldness on the part of his enemy so near Constantinople, and he ordered the admiral of the fleet, Capitan Pacha, and Hussein Pacha, his commander-in-chief, then at Aides, at once to retake the place. Although Aides is only three days' march from Sizeboli, Hussein did not appear before the fort until April 9th, seven weeks after he got the order. Then a vigorous attack was made on some works that the Eus- sians during this time had been busily erecting, but it signally failed. After this the Eussians were left in undis- puted possession of their important conquest to the end of the war. As regards the naval expedition against Sizeboli EXCURSION OF THE TURKISH FLEET. 117 €ount Moltke gives the following graphic description of it : — * Nothing could be more unexpected than the appear- ance of a Turkish fleet in the Black Sea. The captain of the Russian ship Raphael, forty-five guns, which was cruising in company with another vessel on the coast of Anatolia, fell in during the night with several ships which he took for his own squadron. He accordingly joined company with them without making any signal. Grreat was the amazement of the Turks next morning when they fomid the number of their ships increased by two, and still greater the alarm of the Russian captain, who found himself in the very midst of the enemy's ships. Such was the inexperience of the Turkish sailors that they would have remained in doubt which was the friend and which the foe, if the Raphael had but hoisted the red flag ; but the captain lost his head, and lowered the blue cross at the first shot from the admiral's vessel. The brig Mercury, on the other hand, which was leeward, set every stitch of canvas, her gallant commander. Lieutenant Kasarski, nailed his flag to the mast, and the officers swore that the last of them left alive would fire a pistol into the powder- magazine, and blow the brig into pieces rather than let her fall into the hands of the Tm-ks. The Mercury suc- ceeded in escaping from the awkward pursuit and ill- directed fire of the Capitan Bey. ' The Turkish admiral had made a prize, he himself knew not how or why. Allah had literally sent it to 118 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. him in his sleep. It was none the less a subject of pride- and exultation ; St. Kaphael was replaced by a fir cone, and the vessel taken to Constantinople in triumph.' In the year 1829 the commencement of operations by the Eussians was again postponed till the month of May. The corps that had wintered in the principalities crossed the Danube at two places, Hirsova and Kalaratch, a little below Silistria. Those that effected the passage at Hirsova joined the 6th and 7th Corps between Pravadi and Varna, the others were delayed by the Danube. The first task, which Greneral Diebitsch undertook was the reduction of Silistria : the siege was commenced on May 1 7th and lasted until July 1st. On that day, after a most brilliant defence, the fortress capitulated, and 9,000 men surrendered themselves as prisoners ; the capture of this place cost the Eussians about 2,600 men and 115 officers, and the losses of the besieged were between 3,000 and 4,000. The particulars of this siege are given in great detail by Count Moltke, but it is scarcely our task here to reca- pitulate them ; suffice it to say that on this occasion, as on many others, the Ottomans exhibited extraordinary deter- mination and bravery in the manner in which they fought behind entrenchments; they also betrayed great ignorance and incapacity. Strange to say, during the entire winter, although they had been subject to a siege during the previous campaign, and knew for certain that it would be renewed as soon as weather permitted, they took no steps whatever to strengthen the very insufficient fortifications- ADVANCE OF RESCHID PACHA. 119 that existed at Silistria. Had the Turks been commanded by scientific and energetic officers, it is more than doubful whether either Brailow, Varna, or Silistria would ever have succumbed. Count Moltke points out that, as it w^as, these three places occupied 50,000 Eussians during a period of from two to three months, and that this number was ' scarcely sufficient to meet the pressing exigencies of the case.' Let us now turn to the main army, and see what was going on while Silistria w^as being besieged. As before stated, the Grand Vizier Eeschid Pacha had collected an army at Schumla, and by the middle of May he had so far organised it as to be capable of assuming the offensive. Had he been somewhat less dilatory in his movements, he might liave attacked Greneral Roth with the 6th and 7th Corps before reinforcements had reached him from the north. As it happened he did not move at all till May 17th, nor commence his principal movement until the beginning of June. Then, having arranged, as he thought, with Hussein Pacha to make a simultaneous advance from Rustchuk, an arrangement, it may be re- marked, which was not carried out, the Turkish com- mander-in-chief sallied forth from Schumla with all his available force to attack Pravadi. On arriving there he , posted himself on the neighbouring heights and com- menced an irregular siege. No sooner did General Diebitsch hear of the movement of the Grrand Vizier, than trusting to the well-known carelessness of the Turks in the matter of reconnoitring, he conceived the brilliant idea of 120 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. making a rapid march from Silistria, of throwing himself on the communications of the Ottoman army, and occupy- ing the only road which led back to their refuge, Schumla. By this means he forced the Grand Vizier either to fight in the open, and probably at a great disadvantage, or else to abandon his communications, the camp of Schumla, and to retreat the best way he could. In order to co- operate with this movement, the corps of Eoth and Rudiger, together with the garrison of Pravadi, were ordered to occupy the defiles in rear of that place until the Muscovite army had accomplished its intended detour. The details of this operation, which Count Moltke remarks decided the fate of the campaign, are of so interesting and important a nature that they are worthy of being recounted at length. The following account is extracted from the work of Colonel Chesney, who was intimately acquainted with the nature of the ground, and visited it soon after these events occurred ; he says : — ' Count Pahlen, with the advance of the army, reached Kuchuk Kainardji on June 5th, and on the 8th a communication was opened by Greneral Matadoff with Greneral Roth at Molatch. G-eneral Kreutz, whose advance was at Kizil Childir, in front of the valley of Newtscha, formed the main body near Koargou, an elevated and strongly entrenched position. Continuing to advance, the main body was joined on the 8th at Alexjat by parts of the 6th and 7th Corps, bringing the intelligence that the Grand Vizier still continued on the plateau of Rowno, OPERATIONS NEAR SCHUMLA. 121 with Eoth opposite to him at Eski Arnauthar. Favoured "by a dense fog, and by the ignorance of the Turks, tlie Eussian army reached Tauchan Kosluche during the night of the 9th, and the advance under Count Pahlen was pushed onward at the same time to Yeni-Bazar, where his Cossacks encountered some Turkish cavalry. These proved to be the advance of a force under Veli Pacha, which had quitted Schumla by order of the G-rand Vizier, to threaten the rear of Eoth and Eudiger. Count Pahlen having driven the Pacha back almost into that fortress, turned to the left and established himself at Madara, on the direct road between Pravadi and Schumla. ' On the following day another important movement took place, when Greneral Eoth, leading two regiments to watch the Grrand Vizier, effected his junction with Greneral Diebitsch by a daring flank march. This was the more hazardous, since it was parallel to the line by which the G-rand Vizier might have been returning to Schumla at that very moment, and he could, in this case, have crossed the hill to overwhelm him. ' Towards the evening of the same day, the 1 0th, the capture of two Tartars informed the Eussian G-eneral that the G-rand Vizier's army was in motion. Uncertainty as to the direction of his march caused some alarm in the camp ; since from a position near Markowtscha, which is midway between Schumla and Pravadi, the concentrated force of the enemy might overwhelm any part of the exposed line of the Eussians, extending as it did from 122 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. Boulanik, by Matara, Yeni-Bazar, and Tauchan Kosluche, to Pravadi, a distance of twenty-live miles. There was, however, but little occasion for uneasiness ; for the various posts which had been occupied with reference to the siege of Silistria had so completely cut off the Grrand Vizier's communications with that fortress, that he was still entirely ignorant of General Diebitsch's march. ' Under the impression that the demonstration against Veli Pacha was the precursor of an attack upon Schumla, Ibrahim Pacha, who was in that place, had summoned the Grrand Vizier to his aid. He marched accordingly in that direction, with the full expectation of being able to over- power the forces of Roth and Rudiger, which, as he supposed, threatened his rear. Instead, therefore, of proceeding south- ward by Marash, or more northerly by way of Eski Arnanthar and Tauchan Kosluche, he chose the direct central line. The first part of his march was parallel to that of the Russians, from whom the Turks were separated by a mountain chain, whence their movement was watched by Russian vedettes. ' On reaching Markowtscha early on the morning of the 1 1th, the G-rand Vizier found a strong body of cavalry posted in his front, with six guns, and supported by infantry in the rear. This force had been rapidly brought from Pravadi by General Kuprianoff, in the full expectation that his very strong position would enable him to prevent the passage of the Turkish army, which now suddenly appeared in his front. ' Kara Djehennem, the general of the Ottoman artillery^ BATTLE OF KULEWTSCHA. 123 immediately planned the following attack upon the sup- posed corps of Eoth and Eudiger. The cavalry advanced, masking tive field-pieces which eventually opened upon the enemy at a suitable distance ; and the charge which took place under cover of their fire was completely suc- cessful, for the Russian cavalry was routed, with the loss of five guns, and 400 killed. The infantry, however, was more fortunate, for by rapidly changing front they gained the protection of a neighbouring wood. ' Having thus opened a road across the mountain, the Turks continued to advance, till, on reaching the other side, they discovered the advance of the Eussian army ; which under G-eneral Ostrochenko, had in the interim occupied the defiles between Tschirkowna and Kulewtscha ; while behind the latter place other divisions of the enemy's army had been successively forming. 'The position of Greneral Diebitsch was particularly strong, comprising as it did a succession of wooded hills separated by deep ra\dnes. The principal of these ravines is about 1,600 yards long, with a breadth varying from between 100 to 200 yards. The narrowest part is that touching the mountain near the village of Tochirkowna, and this necessarily became the first position of the Turks ; who had, consequently, very little room for either their cavalry or infantry. The Eussian position was much more favourable, for at the other extremity of the defile the hills are rather lower, and terminate at the village of Kulewtscha in an open plateau. 124 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. ' On this advantageous ground five battalions were posted in chequered squares, supported by two pieces of artillery, with orders to maintain their position at all risks, imtil the expected support, which was in full march, could aiTive from the direction of Kalugvi and Ma- tara. On the other side of this position there is a succession of gentle hills crossing the Schumla road in the shape of a crescent, which at once encloses, and most advantageously commands, the valley of Pravadi. ' The Turkish army is said to have numbered 33,000 men ; including the siege artillery they had fifty-six guns. The Russians, including the force with the baggage, had about the same number; but their 146 guns gave them a decided superiority, independently of the fact that the greater part of the Turkish force was -composed of militia. ' By changing front and making a rapid flank move- ment by way of Marash, the Grand Vizier might still have reached Schumla without a battle ; but, nothing daunted by finding the whole instead of a part of the Eussian army in his front, he determined to attack Greneral Diebitsch forthwith. With this object a battery opened its fire from the commanding ground against the plateau occupied by the enemy, and at eight a.m. the loud hurrahs of the Turks were heard as they advanced through the smoke of the artillery. ' Notwithstanding the extreme difficulty caused by broken ground, a mixed body of cavalry and infantry charged the Russians with such impetuosity that, accord- BATTLE 01 KULEWTSCHA. 126 ing to the account given to the author on the spot by a Eussian officer, two of the squares were broken, and one of them, ] ,600 in number of Murom's regiment, was entirely cut to pieces as the men stood in their ranks. Six guns were also taken ; the villages of Kulewtscha and Tschir- kowna were carried ; the plateau was nearly cleared, and the remainder of the Eussians were actually giving way, and about to be exposed to the sabres of the victorious Turks, when the hussars under Count Pahlen arrived most opportunely to save them from their impending fate. Had the Grrand Vizier followed up his victory by bringing up his reserve to attack the enemy's right wing, the day must have been completely his ; but he contented himself with driving the hussars back and then resumed his former position, which gave the enemy time to bring up more troops and attack in his turn. ' Greneral Arnoldi, with the Hulan division and a twelve-gun horse battery, came up from Matara, and, assisted by Count Pahlen with fourteen battalions and thirty-five guns, made an attack on the left of the Turks, which was led by Greneral Budberg. Although the Turks suffered severely from the fire of the enemy's guns, which their artillery, consisting chiefly of battering guns slowly drawn by buffaloes and oxen, could not adequately return, they yet succeeded in repulsing this attack. ' During the progress of these two affairs, the main body of the Eussian army continued to arrive, and formed on the crescent- shaped hills already mentioned, which 126 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. outflanked the Schumla road, as well as the Turkish position on both side.-. Towards noon Reschid Pacha, with a view of throwing back the Eussian right wing on the main body, and thus opening a road to Schumla, made a grand attack with his infantry, which advanced by the valley from the left of their position. In carrying out this movement they got beyond the plateau, and the latter would have been turned and the passage of Schumla opened, had it not been for some Russian troops and guns strongly posted to defend that road : the corps of Roth and Rudiger, which had just advanced from Matara, were among the number. ' Greneral Diebitsch, having now his whole force in hand, prepared a decisive attack upon the Grrand Vizier, who had resumed his original position at the edge of the wood behind Tschirkowna. For this purpose the Jagers were formed under Ostrochenko near this village, and five divisions under Count Pahlen still further to the right. Two of Roth's divisions were posted, under Greneral Zoll, the chief of the staff, so as to outflank the left of the Turks, having in reserve twenty -four battalions and some hussars. The second division, under Kuletza, was detached to Marash, to operate against the rear of the G-rand Vizier. ' These arrangements being made, Greneral Arnoldi, with four battalions and a twelve-gun horse battery, sup- ported by two battalions with another twelve-gun liorse battery and some hussars, led the attack. The gi'ound BATTLE OF KVLEWTSCHA. 127 narrowed as tliey advanced ; but, as the Turks remained tirm, it became necessary to resort to a cannonade on both sides. This was of course greatly to the disadvantage of the Ottomans, owing to the limited space occupied by them, and the battery of General Arnold! did fearful execution with case shot. 'Notwithstanding this the contest was maintained without losing ground up to four p.m., when the fire of the Eussian battery caused the explosion of two caissons in the very centre of the Turkish army. A similar mis- chance occurred to two other tumbrils, which had a dis- heartening effect. According to Lieutenant Schaufuss, the officer already mentioned as having been present, this gave the turn to the battle — confusion ensued, and was succeeded by flight. The Grrand Vizier endeavoured to rally the fugitives, and for this purpose posted the fourteen regiments of the Nizam most advantageously on strong ground, that might have been defended without difficulty sufficiently long to effect this object. But these troops abandoned their post without resistance, and the flight of the Turkish army became general ; it fled through the wood of Markowtscha, leaving the six Eussian guns which had been taken, together with the rest of the artillery and baggage, in the hands of the enemy. The fugitives being met near the village of Markowtscha by the garrison of Pravadi, turned to the right and crossed the wooded mountains towards Kamtchik ; thus, by a considerable detour, they succeeded in reaching Schumla. 128 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. ' It has been already mentioned that the G-rand Vizier, on breaking up his camp near Pravadi, had de- spatched orders to the garrison of Schumla to make a diversion in his favour by attacking the rear of the Eussians. This was accordingly attempted, and with some success ; but it was not sufficiently followed up. On meeting a slight check, Veli Pacha retired within the lines of Schumla; and in so doing he committed the second mistake, by abandoning entirely some of those exterior redoubts which had been such serious impedi- ments to the enemy in 1828. If, therefore, General Diebitsch had instantly pursued the retreating garrison, he might, and probably would, have carried the important entrenchment of Schumla on the evening of the 11th, or even on the morning of June 12th, for on the former day the Eussian army was only a few miles from the place, and under the most favourable circumstances, it having already acomplished the double object of cutting off and defeating the Turkish army.' Had Diebitsch been aware of the extent of his success, he might probably have at once taken Schumla, just as the Allies might have marched into Sebastopol after the battle of the Alma ; he contented himself, however, with sending a force on the 12th, under General Eoth, to intercept the enemy, who nevertheless managed by a circuitous route to regain the camp. It is stated that at the expiration of ten days there were about 30,000 men assembled there under the Grand Vizier — the remnants of his beateiL RESULTS OF THE RUSSIAN VICTORY. 129 array. This victory practically placed Turkey at the feet of Russia ; it and the campaign were lost, as Yon Moltke remarks, in consequence of the adventurous spirit of the Grrand Vizier, just as the previous campaign had been lost by the inactivity and lethargy of Hussein Pacha, his 23redecessor. Nothing now remained to place the crown on Greneral Diebitsch's success but to march at once across the Balkans on Constantinople. There was every reason why this course should be adopted : the Tm'ks were demoralised and would have no time to collect their forces or fortify Aidos ; the season was favourable, the heat not yet being excessive ; Silistria was completely invested ; supplies were to be had from the sea ; and there was nothing to bar the way in the shape of a formidable hostile force or formidable fortifications. Moreover the plague had broken out among the Russian troops, and a change of scene and air was of vast importance. There was only one thing to stop the Russians, and that was want of men. Diebitsch had but 25,000; if only 10,000 were detached to watch the 30,000 men in Schumla, but 15,000 remained to cross the Balkans and penetrate into the heart of the enemy's country. It was therefore determined to wait for the fall of Silistria, when the 3rd and 4th Corps would be set free, and in the meantime to negotiate and watch Schumla. Four weeks passed in this way. At last the 3rd Corps arrived from Silistria on July 13th ; and preparations were at once made for crossing the Balkans. K 130 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. The details of this operation are given at some length by Von Moltke, but it seems sufficient here to indicate the routes by which the various columns marched. There is no trustworthy or distinct account of the exact strength of the Eussian army at this time. Colonel Chesney puts it at about 40,000 men, 10,000 being left at Schumla and 30,000 forming the main body. Probably, when we come to consider the amount of sickness that prevailed in the Russian army, the real effective force did not exceed 35,000 in all. The first care of Diebitsch was to deceive the Otto- mans as to his intentions ; in this he succeeded perfectly by marching as if in retreat to Silistria as far as Yeni-Bazar, when he directed his columns to the right. One under Greneral Roth moved on Devna, — another under G-eneral Rudiger on Kupriquoi, — a third being left temporarily at Yeni-Bazar, — where head-quarters were fixed on the 18th. The Russians pushed on as fast as possible, and before the Grrand Vizier had divined their object, had succeeded in crossing the Kamtchik river, which runs past Kupriquoi, without encountering much opposition ; each man, it is stated, carried four days' provisions, and ten days' more followed in the company carts. After reaching Kupriquoi the columns turned westward to the. sea-coast and by the 20th the head-quarters of the army were established at a village called Dervish -jowan, a little to the south of the mouth of the Kamtchik. While Greneral Roth moved along the sea-coast to Missivri, the main body advanced CAPTURE OF ADRIANOPLE. L31 on Aidos (both places fell with bat little resistance), and on the 27th — nine days after the departure from Schmnla — the columns had united south of the Balkans, prepared to move onwards to Constantinople. Burghas and the towns on the sea-coast yielded, and nothing remained but to march on Adrianople. Jamboli was reached on July 31st; here a minor affair occurred with the usual result — the flight of the Turks. At this place enormous stores fell into the hands of the Russians, who thereby were much aided in their onward march. At last, on August 1 9th, the Muscovite army encamped before Adrianople ; at one time there was an appearance of danger, and Greneral Diebitsch concentrated his troops and turned aside to Selimno ; it was found, however, that this town was only occupied by a small force, who were ieasily routed. As remarked by Count Moltke, ' the exertions of two campaigns, the expenditure of 100,000 millions of roubles, and the sacrifice of over 50,000 men, had brought 20,000 Russians to the gates of Adrianople ' — great as had been the sacrifices the triumph was also great. Fortunately for the Russian general and his army their actual strength was unknown to the Turks ; an officer sent by Osman Pacha to reconnoitre had reported that ' it was easier to count the leaves of a forest than the heads of the enemy.' Thanks to this ignorance the town of Adrianople, con- taining 80,000 inhabitants with many fugitives from the army, at once capitulated, while Halil Pacha, in place of defending the town marched out to Constantinople, with K 2 ]32 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. a force of about 12,000 men, on the very day that Die- bitsch appeared from the northwards. Fortune seemed most certainly to smile so far on the arms of the Czar.. Had a defence a quarter as determined been offered at Adrianople as was offered at Varna, Brailow, Silistria, and other places, the weak Eussian army could scarcely have carried it, and once their strength was known their ruin was practically sealed. Having got so far, it has been said that General Die- bitsch should have at once moved on, and that the time he spent in Adrianople, besides being the destruction of his army in a sanitary point of view, was a gross strategic mistake. Count Moltke reviews his position at this junc- tm-e as follows : — 'General Diebitsch still had 150 miles between him and the capital of Turkey. Between Adrianople and Karistiran, the ancient Jastiuian way, is intersected by tributaries of the Ergineh, which afford positions of de- fence at every two or three miles, supposing any Turkish corps had been disposed to occupy them. The ruins of the wall of Athanasius, extending right across the isthmus, form a fresh entrenchment ; and the positions on the main road at Biijuk, and especially at Ktitchuk-Chekmedge, are absolutely impregnable. They may, however, be avoided by a circuit on the north, as the so-called Strandscha mountains are, in fact, a mere chain of wooded hills from 600 to 800 feet high, and passable for infantry in every part. Two practicable roads from SITUATION OF RUSSIANS AT ADRIANOPLE. 133 Kara-Buniu on the Black Sea by Boghaskoi likewise lead to the capital. Although all these roads offer excellent positions for entrenchments, their capabilities of defence mattered little under existing circumstances. But it was impossible for the Eussians to march upon Constantinople without leaving at least a few thousand men in "so consider- able a town as Adrianople, were it only to maintain order and protect the sick ; it was, moreover, quite out of the question to advance while such an army as that commanded by the Pacha of Scodra remained in the rear un watched. If only 6,000 or 8,000 men were appointed for this duty the Russian army would not number above 10,000 by the time it reached Constantinople.' It may be mentioned tliat Mustapha Pacha of Scodra in Albania, an old Janis- sary, had held back hitherto, with his 40,000 men, Arnauts ; but now that the capital was in danger he appeared on the scene — or rather made his appearance when it was too late, since having refused to fight during the war, after peace had been proclaimed, he absohitely refused to be quiet, and for a time caused much uneasi- ness at the Russian head-quarters by his warlike demon- •strations. Between August 20th and 28th there was neither a •movement forward nor an attempt at negotiation at Adrianople. On the latter day, however, envoys from the Porte arrived, and at the same time Russian plenipo- tentiaries made their appearance at Burghas. In fact, the position of the Russian army was so critical as to cause the l:J4 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. greatest uneasiness at St. Petersburg, so much so that the Emperor Nicholas ordered a fresh levy of 90,000 men and pressed forward overtures for peace with the greatest \iL;our. In order to hasten this much-desired arrange- ment and to overcome the notorious procrastination of the Turk, Greneral Diebitsch adopted a course equal in bril- liancy and wisdom to his march from Silistria on the A^izier's communications at Schumla. He gave the orders for an advance on Constantinople. Three columns moved forwards : one on the left opened communications with Admiral Grreig in command of the Black Sea fleet on September 7th. At the same time the right wing reached Enos on the Mediterranean, and the centre column advanced to Karistiran on the direct road to Constan- tinople. As the magnanimity of the Russians in not going farther has recently been lauded it is well to quote Count Moltke's own words as to their position at this time ; he says : ' Thus on the day when the Turkish plenipotentiaries broke off the negotiations, the advanced troops of the Russian army stood with their right wing at ]\Iidia on the Black Sea, and their left at Enos on the ^Egean, covering a space of 110 miles. The two corps at Visa and Luleh Burgass amounted in all to about 8,000 men, and might therefore pass for the advanced corps of a considerable army^ As they had already marched half-way from Adrianople to Constantinople it was time that the main body should make its appearance. This consisted of the 7th Corps at POSITION OF RUSSIAN ARMY. 135 Adrianople : from this corps one detachment with two guns had been sent to Hermanly in the direction of Philippopoli ; the 37th Eegiment of Chasseurs had re- mained at Slivno, and one regiment of Bug-lancers had been sent to Enos. Thus, then, the so-called " Grros " con- sisted of ten battalions and fifteen squadrons ; in all, after deducting the numerous sick, about 4,000 or 5,000 men. Such was the army which was to make head against 30,000 Arnauts, to keep in subjection a town of 80,000 inhabitantSj and finally to conquer another city containing 500,000 souls.' When speaking also of the possibility of Greneral Diebitsch marching on Constantinople direct from Adrian- ople, he says : ' It is pretty clear that the time of action was over for Greneral Diebitsch; he could only make demonstrations which might overawe the Turks ; this he accordingly did. The Eussians at Adrianople were estimated, even by the European ambassadors at Pera, at 60,000 men : if he had marched upon Constantinople this delusion would have been dispelled. At St. Peters- burg the war was by no means looked upon as ended because the Balkans had been crossed, as is shown by the iikase of August 10th ordering a levy of three souls upon every 500, which in Kussia amounts to about 90,000 men. A few reserve regiments and companies of invalids were now directed upon Adrianople, Admiral Heyden's fleet was strengthened by three ships of the line and several frigates from the Baltic, and the second half of the loan of 136 HUSSIAX WARS WITH TURKEY. 42,000,000 florins negotiated with Holland was now raised. The position of General Diebitsch with 20,000 men in a hostile town of 80,000 inhabitants, lialf-way between 30,000 Turks at Constantinople and 30,000 Albanians at Sophia, while his own corps was exhausted by exertion and disease, must have given rise to very serious uneasiness at St. Petersburg. Greneral Krassowski had endeavoured to make himself master of Schumla, but had failed. He had commenced a regular siege, opened trenches, and had several skirmishes without taking one of the Turkish works ; Prince Madatof had been mortally wounded, and Greneral Kisselef found great difficulty in keeping the Turks out of Wallachia. Widdin, Nicopolis, Sistoro, Rustchuk, and Griurgevo still held out, and the communication between these places by the Danube was restored. Greneral Greismar, it is true, had crossed the river, but only in order to follow and observe the menacing- movements of the Pacha of Scodra. However, it matters little how critical was the position of Diebitsch and his army : neither the Sultan, nor yet the European diplomatists who were the advisers of the Ottoman Grovernment, knew it. Accordingly, yielding to the panic which prevailed at Constantinople, and to the representations of the foreign ambassadors, more espe- cially the ambassador of England, Mahmoud gave way, and on August 28th, 1829, the Peace of Adrianople was signed. The conditions of this treaty were by no means very onerous or humiliating to the Porte. In accordance CONDITIONS OF PEACE. lo7 with his previously declared intentions the Czar gained no increase of territory in Europe — what he acquired in Asia will hereafter be noticed. The fortresses held by Tiukey on the left bank of the Danube — Turnau, Kaleh, and Griurgevo — were relinquished and their fortifications razed ; the principalities, Servia and Montenegro, though nomi- nally still vassals of the Sultan, were placed under the pro- tection of Russia : and last, but by no means least, no Turkish garrisons were to be allowed to occupy them. These conditions were in reality more advantageous to Russia than they appeared — but nevertheless they cannot be re- garded as severe. And thus ended the war of 1829. 138 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. CHAPTEE VI. REMARKS ON THE CAMPAIGN IN EUROPE OF 1829. The character of the Russian operations — Remarks thereon — Extract from Appendix to Count Moltke's book on sickness in the Russian army — Field-marshal Diebitsch. Many who read the history of the campaigns of 1828 and 1829 in a cursory manner and regard the military results, rather than the causes that produced them, have arrived at conclusions which on closer study are found to be mistaken, and which are calculated rather to mislead than to guide those who would wish to gain an insight into the future from the history of the past. Let us first consider the manner in which the opera- tions of the war of L829were conducted, taking, as before. Count Moltke's remarks for our guide. As in the pre- vious year the campaign was delayed in its commence- ment until May, and the forces employed by Eussia were far too small for the task they had to perform. The campaign lasted, deducting the stay at Adrianople, three months, and consisted of one siege, one battle, and a march of about 500 miles. The great advantage which the ^luscovites had was the possession of Varna ; without this ERRORS OF RESCHID PACHA. 139 and Sizeboli it would have been almost impossible for the army, such as it was, to obtain sufficient supplies to carry it throughout its long march. The two movements which decided the contest were first the flank march from Silistria and consequent suc- cessful battle of Kulewtscha, which destroyed the Otto- man army, and secondly the bold movement across the Balkans, leaving Schumla in the rear. The passage of these mountains was effected practically by only one road, which was for all effective purposes undefended ; this fact, however, in no way lessens the credit due to the boldness of General Diebitsch, who had no reason to know that he would be thus unopposed. Rescbid Pacha, although energetic and venturesome, appears to have made two mistakes, the one venturing out to attack Pravadi, thereby allowing himself to be surprised on the flank and rear, and the other remaining at Schumla after Diebitsch had broken up his camp. Instead of remaining there for fourteen days, he ought at once to have issued out with 20,000 men, leaving 10,000 behind, who were amply enough to j^i'otect the fortress ; he should have marched via Kotesch Eski, Stamboul and Kasan to Selimno, — there he might have united with the Arnauts, and appearing on Diebitsch's flank must have hindered his further advance. If, however, the Vizier could not or did not choose to act as suggested, he should have kept his forces together, and not squandered them in weak detachments as at Aidos, &c. On the whole it may be 140 liUSSIAX JVARS WITH TURKEY. ■said that as, in the campaign of the previous year, it was not the ability of Wittgenstein, but the incapacity of Hussein Pacha that caused the defeat of the Turks, so in tlie present one it was the genius of Diebitsch and not the folly of Eeschid Pacha that gave victory to the Eussians. In reading the remarks of the great strategist of the age on these operations, it is impossible to avoid perceiving the analogy between the movements which he criticises and those which he himself years afterwards directed with such brilliant success. One might almost say that the battle of Sedan was won, not on the playing-fields of Eton, but on the hills before Schumla. Diebitsch's Hank march bears a striking resemblance to the movement of the German armies, which ended in Mac^NIahon's ruin; and the masking of Schumla with the bold advance onwards to the blockade of Metz and the forward movement on Paris. There can be little doubt that the lessons learnt by the Prussian Captain attached to the Staff of the Eussian head-quarters in 1828 and 1829 bore fruit in the knowledge that raised the Prussian Monarchy to the Empire of Grermany. We have seen the weakness of Diebitsch's army and its critical condition when the peace of Adrianople put an end to hostilities. From this it has been argued that no Eussian army has a chance of reaching Constantinople, and that the Turks are perfectly able to take care of themselves. Before arriving at this conclusion, which appears to be entirely a false one, it is well to consider what were the causes of such extraordinarv weakness on SICKNESS IN THE RUSSIAN ARMY. 141 the part of the Muscovites. Those who read the following- pages extracted from the Appendix of Count Moltke's book will wonder — not that Diebitsch performed so little, having got so far, — but that lie ever reached the Balkans. Certainly the horrors here described are a warning to all armies whose fate it may be to campaign in the same- regions. Extracts froon Appendix, ' No sooner, indeed, had the Eussian army entered the Principalities than a vast number of the soldiers fell ill. The surgeons were unanimous in considering the disease to be of a very malignant character, but they differed as to whether it were a low gastric fever or a putrid fever — whether typhus or the plague. The name, it is true, did not matter much, as the plague is closely related to those diseases, and indeed is perhaps merely another form of them, aggravated by the influence of soil and climate. The characteristic symptoms, such as buboes, carbuncles, and boils, made their appearance, but no one liked to utter the dreaded name, or to resort to quarantine regu- lations, which were hardly compatible with a campaign. ' Some measures of the kind were, liowever, indisjDen- sable ; for though a few recent experiments have appeared to prove the contrary, long and frequent experience has shown that infection may be communicated by the touch of plague-stricken persons, and still more by that of their clothes. 142 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. ' Before the breaking out of the war there were in Eiissia two lines of quarantine — on the Dnieper and the Pruth ; tlie former had been taken off at the beginning of the campaign in order to facilitate communication. But before the entrance of the Eussian troops, scattered cases of plague had appeared in Wallachia, and the Hospodar had established a plague-hospital at Dudeshteh. The cases became more numerous in the spring, and by the middle of May four convents were filled with the «ick. Now the quarantine on the Pruth Avas taken off, and that on the Dnieper reimposed with a duration of sixteen days, and boards of inspection were organised at Bucharest and Jassy. A little later the main army before Schumla had to be protected by quarantine regulations, not only against Turkish deserters, but also against Wallachia. Unfortunately, the plague broke out in Hirsova, the principal point of communication between the army and Kussia, and it became necessary to establish -a quarantine at Bazardchik. At Varna the troops were inspected every week, and these precautionary measures were so successful that the main corps in Bulgaria remained free from the plague all through the year 1828. As the inhabitants had foretold, the character of the disease in the Principalities changed when the hot weather set in ; it did not, however, die out, as the com- munication could not entirely be stopped ; at one time the Eussians were infected by the natives, at another the natives by the Eussians ; it was in vain that the sick soldiers were lodged in separate huts of brushwood, that SICKNESS IN THE RUSSIAN ARMY. 143 the clothes, linen, and even the munitions of whole battalions were cleansed, and a number of suspected houses burnt. Spite of all these precautions, the sickness continued to spread in the Principalities throughout the autumn, and by the middle of November 1840 villages were infected. It was not until the severe cold set in in December that the plague entirely ceased among the troops that were besieging Griurgevo and Kalarash, and in the hospitals at Bucharest it still continued. What made the matter worse was that those hospitals were only calcu- lated for the reception of 500 sick, whereas thousands were brought thither from all directions, of whom a great number proved to be infected with the plague. On February 11th, 1829, sixty-one villages were purified by -order of Greneral Eoth. 'Hitherto we have spoken only of the plague, but nervous intermittent and putrid fevers, dysentery, scurvy, and inflammatory disorders^ prevailed everywhere, and destroyed ten times as many soldiers as the plague, which had hitherto been confined within narrow limits. Mean- while the opening of the new campaign drew near ; the €ycle of diseases of the first campaign was closed, and in February 1829 the number of sick and dead was at its miminum between the two campaigns. The diseases had reached their acme in September and October ; during the latter month alone 20,000 sick had been received in the hospitals without counting the field hospitals. The greatest number of deaths had occurred in January 1829 ; for in this month, during which there was an armistice, 144 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. 6,000 men died ; but the relative mortality of the first campaign did not reach its highest point until February, 1829, when one out of four sick died. ' I'he intensity of the disease is shown in the following table. ' The number of deaths per cent, were — 1828 1829 May June July Aug. 2-7 16-6 Sept. 5-6 18-9 Oct. 7-2 22-3 Nov. 10-9 23-4 Dec. 10-5 23-3 Jan. 25-5 Feb. 28-8 In the regimental 1 hospitals . ./ In the hosjDitals . 1-8 7-4 2-7 7-2 2-0 10-2 ' The vast amount of illness is shown by the fact that during the ten months from May 1828 to February 1829 no less than 75,226 of the less serious cases were treated in the field hospitals, and 134,882 serious cases in the hospitals, making altogether 210,108 sick. ' Reckoning the whole strength of the Russian army, including non-combatants, at 100,000 men, which is a very liberal calculation, every man had on an average,, therefore, been twice in hospital. From this positive information, and the rates of percentage given in the table, it appears that during the first campaign, and the subsequent winter quarters, the Russians lost at least 82,000 men in the hospitals. This number does not, of course, include those who were killed on the field of battle, and therefore were not brought into hospital at all. It may therefore be said, without exaggeration, that this SICKNESS IN THE RUSSIAN ARMY. 145 first campaign cost the Russians nearly one half of their actual effective force. ' In the middle of May 1829 symptoms of plague broke out for the first time on the right bank of the Danube, at Czernavoda, Babandagh, Kostendje, Mongolia, Bazard- chik, Kavarna, and at last in Varna, the most important point of all, at which were the reserves, magazines, and arsenals of the whole army, and a depot of 4,000 invalids. The infection was supposed to have been spread by the distribution of the munitions which had belonged to the deceased soldiers of the 16th division of infantry, and which had been shut up for a long time in a magazine. At all events the guardians of the arsenal were the first who died with positive symptoms of plague. However, the close quarters of the troops, the bad food, and the exhalations from so many dead bodies, generated scurvy, and the most malignant forms of fevers. In the middle of June the numbers daily admitted into the hospital at Varna amounted to from fifty to eighty, and the death of eight surgeons deprived the sick of almost all assistance. ' A few battalions were removed to an encampment out- side the town ; the men were made to bathe in the sea ; the tents were fumigated with vinegar ; the munitions were aired, the clothes of the dead burnt ; and a space enclosed with ditches set apart for plague-stricken patients. ' The appearance of this plague hospital, if such it can be called, was frightful. The sick staggered al)out, T. 146 HUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. gasping beneath the burning sun, among dying and dead. In June the plague reached such a height, that about 1,000 men a week were brought into the plague hospital. By August 26th, 5,509 sick had been received here; of these 3,959 died. ' One day, June 25th, there were 300 deaths, the corpses were heaped up like dogs and carted away. Out of forty- one surgeons twenty-eight were infected, and of these twenty died. Out of seven apothecaries four died, besides thirty dressers, hospital attendants, &c. ' As the surgeons only arrived a few at a time, intervals occurred during which there was only one doctor to take care of all these sick. The enormous mortality among the surgeons was the more unfortunate, as they were re- placed, for the most part, by inexperienced young men, generally foreigners and unable to speak the language. Not only in the hospitals but on every road into the town, in every field, and behind every hedge, were found dead and dying men, while drinking and riot was going on in the tents of the cantiniers. The state of things was no better in other places. Brailow was completely deserted ; even the posting-house was removed out of the town so that travellers might not be forced to enter it ; 1,200 men were treated there for plague in June, of these 774 died ; almost all the surgeons and hospital officers were dead. ' In Slobodjeh the entire management of the plague hospital was left in the hands of one single non-com- missioned officer. The plague had broken out in Bess- SICKNBSS IK THE HUSSIAX ARMY. 147 Arabia. At this time the main corps of the Russian army lay before Schumla, and it was of course of vital impor- tance to protect it from a fearful pestilence. The corps was surrounded by a cordon of outposts. The large convoys which had been despatched with proper precau- tions were suffered to pass free, but the carts of the cantiniers which were to supply the head-quarters were stopped here in crowds, while the greatest scarcity pre- vailed in the camp. Spite of all, the infection crept through, but the cases of plague were scattered, and on the whole the state of health of the main army was good ; what the troops chiefly suffered from was dysentery. ' As soon as the army had begun to cross the Balkans, all the sick in the ambulances of head-quarters were transported to Balchik. The troops which had to pass through suspected places marched between cordons of outposts, to prevent all communication with the inhabi- tants. All the convoys from Varna were purified before starting, and re-examined on their arrival. A strict quarantine was introduced along the course of the Kamt- chik, and the seaports in the Bay of Burgass were provided with lazarettos. ' A great number of the men sunk under the fatigue during the first few days' march. By the time they had reached Devno the number of sick in the ambulance had reached 400, who were suffering from diarrhoea, jaundice, and scurvy. Many of the men threw away their ten days' provisions of oatmeal and biscuit, unable to bear the ■L 2 148 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. weight. The corps reached the first ascent of the moun- tain with sadly thinned ranks, and even at Derwash- Jowann a hospital had to be established under temporary- huts for the accommodation of 600 sick. 'At the southern foot of the mountain the troops rested from their long fatigues and privations, beneath the shade of fine oaks and beeches, and amid gardens affording vegetables and half-ripe grapes. The soldiers were rejoiced and encouraged by their successful passage of the Balkans, and were filled with fresh life and hope. Only about fifty men had been wounded at the taking of Aidos, and there were not a hundred sick in the town. In Aidos the streets had to be cleared of the dead bodies of the besieged, and the houses to be cleansed from dirt. No symptom of plague showed itself here, but the army was now attacked with intermittent fevers. In a very few days both officers and men complained of incon- ceivable languor and fatigue, insomuch that many of them could scarcely walk. Besides the intermittent, they were attacked by continued fever, accompanied by delirium, and such relaxation of the capillaries, that the slightest blow, or even touch, caused blue marks in the skin ; the bite of the flies, which attacked these patients with especial avidity, produced purple spots half an inch in diameter in a few moments. On the fifth or sixth day the patients died in a state of unconsciousness, and their bodies im- mediately began to decompose like those of hunted ani- mals. The intermittent fevers, with redoubled paroxysms. SICKNJESS IN THE RUSSIAN ARMY. 149 rendered the patients weary of life, and were worse than the plague. Very few had been wounded, but these were attacked by tetanus ; more than half the number of deaths, however, were caused by dysentery. ' Every day hundreds left the ranks of the army already so much enfeebled ; somelost their senses for thirty-six hours in the paroxysms of fever, others were perishing of thirst. The hospitals on the farther side of the Balkans filled so fast that there was neither room to receive the sick nor •clothes and linen for their use. Most of the necessaries had been left behind in Bulgaria, where, during the month of July alone, 19,000 sick had been added to the 1 8,000 who had been left there. Thus during the month of July no less than 40,000 men, more than half the active force of the army, lay in hospital. As yet the plague had not followed the main army, but it hung like a black cloud over the northern horizon of Bulgaria. The quarantine establishment on the Kamtchik was filled with persons suspected of plague, and the character of the con- tinued fevers became so malignant that it threatened to tiu'n to plague. ' During the month of September 2,096 men lay sick at Burgass, 6 of whom had buboes. In October, out of 2,117 sick, 53 had the plague, and in November one-half the whole number of sick were plague-stricken. The quarantine had been kept up with the utmost rigour, and it seems probable that the plague had developed itself from the fever without contagion. .... 160 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. ' By the time the army had been in Adrianople a week, 1,616 sick were taken there; by Sejjtember 1st it contained 3,666, and by the middle of the month 4,641,. one-fourth of the whole remaining disposable force. After the conclusion of the war the plague broke out in the hospital in its most fearful shape, and in the midst of peace carried off those who had withstood the sword, fatigue, and disease until the end of the campaign. ' To these immense numbers of sick nothing could be afforded but a bare shelter. Adrianople did not contain a supply of stores suflScient to last any length of time ; the most ordinary food was wanting ; there was not even hay or straw to litter down the sick upon the wooden pallets of the barracks ; they were laid upon torn-up Turkish tents with knapsacks as pillows and no covering but their cloaks. The winter set in with fearful severity ; most of the windows were unglazed, and the doors would not shut^ In a short time the beautiful grove of plane trees had disappeared, for even the healthy troops wanted firewood, and the very bones of the dead out of the cemeteries were used as fuel. At first there was no lack of surgeons, but the work they had to do was beyond human powers : there were no dressers to be found at all and scarcely any hos- pital attendants. The doctors were forced to prepare and administer their remedies themselves, and when the plague broke out they nearly all fell victims to it, as was the case wherever it prevailed. ..... SICKNESS IN THE HUSSIAN ARMY. 151 ' Dui-ing the month of October 1,300 men died at Adrianople alone of diaiThcea ; 1,500 were sent thither from Kirklissa, suffering imder the same disease, and scarcely able to reach the hospital from exhaustion. The diarrhoea patients, whose vital powers were completely ex- hausted, perished with cold like flies in autumn, with the thermometer at about 41°. In order to protect their feet against cold they kept on their boots until they com- plained of violent pains in their feet, and upon their feet being examined, about October 16th, they were found to have mortification in the toes, arising from want of ex- ternal and vital heat. ' According to the terms of the treaty of peace, the Russian army was to go into winter quarters at Burgass, but it was absolutely impossible to transport such a number of sick people along such roads; 4,700 sick, with 300 or 400 men commanded to serve as attendants, had to remain at Adrianople under cover of the 36th Eegiment of Chasseurs, making altogether about 6,000 men. ' Before the departure of the corps on October 29th5 the first case of plague occurred in the hospital, and soon afterwards the disease spread with irresistible violence until not one of the 800 wards was free from it. ' The external symptoms of the plague are described by the Eussian physicians as follows. The outbreak of the disorder soon become rigor, and change towards midnight into violent heat with delirium, resembling an inflam- 162 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. matory fever. In this stage the patient is very talkative, and maintains that his illness is no case of consequence. If anyone approaches him, he jumps up, but immediately staggers backwards, or falls as if struck by lightning : the face is swollen, the expression altered, and the eyes fixed and covered with a white film. The patient sees and hears imperfectly and speaks thick, but much and fast ; his memory is so weak that he often does not know his own name or that of his regiment : on the whole his appearance is that of a drunken man. In a subsequent stage of the disease he sinks into a torpid silence and plucks his clothes ; he complains of cold, crawls about on the earth, heedless of the injuries he inflicts on himself, and often dies at the very moment that he is tearing his neighbour in order to drag off his clothing for himself. The breaking out of buboes does not save him from death, which ensues at the end of forty-eight or twenty.four, and sometimes of even four hours. The only favourable crisis is violent perspiration. ' In a disease of which the course was so rapid, all in- ternal remedies were found unavailing. At Varna, pour- ing cold water over the patients had sometimes cured, and always relieved them, but at Andrianople the weather was too unfavourable, and the patients too sensitive to cold, to admit of this treatment, and the only thing which afforded any relief was external friction with oil. Towards the end of September the plague reached its utmost height ; from fifty to seventy men died every day, and the SICKNUSS IN THE RUSSIAN ARMY. 153 disease only died out in the following March from want of more victims. ' Only two transports went to Burgass at all, one in December with 300 convalescents, and one in May with 170 sick. They were escorted by 300 or 400 men in good health ; all the rest had perished. Of the 6,000 who stayed behind in Adrianople 5,200 died. ' The number of deaths per cent, was as follows :- • 1829 • Mar. Apr. May June 10-7 56-6 July 10-0 41-1 Aug. IM 33-7 Sept. 14-3 34-6 Oct. 18-8 42-0 Nov. 27-3 45-6 Dec- 19-6 39-1 In the regimental ~\ hospitals . ./ In the hospitals . 20-4 25-6 9-3 28-2 ' On an average, therefore, there died in 1828 : — In the field regimental hospitals, 5 per cent. In the hospitals, 19*2 per cent. ' And in 1829 — In the field regimental hospitals, 14*6 per cent. In the hospitals 37*0 per cent. ' In the regular hospitals alone were — 1829 Received In March . , . 12,170 sick „ April . . . 17,625 „ „ May .... 14,419 „ „ June . . . 18,000 „ „ July .... 19,000 „ That is, during- 5 months 81,214 Of these there died . I = 2,434 , I = 4,406 Above i= 4,806 : 7,600 28,746 154 JiVSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. ' During the following months the mortality rose from one-third to two-fifths, and even to one-half. The number of sick continued to increase in the small army at Adrianople, and the deaths during the last five months of the year were at least as numerous as dm-ing the five previous months. AVe know that 5,200 men more died out of the number left behind there. If to all these we add the deaths which took place in the field hospitals, and the number of those killed in battle, we shall probably fall far short of the truth if we reckon the loss sustained by the Eussians during their last campaign at 60,000 men. ' This estimate, no doubt, includes part of the great body of non-combatants and of the small reinforcements which followed the main body from Sizeboli to Adrianople. We may, however, assume that not more than 10,000 or 15,000 combatants returned home across the Pruth, and that the Eussianarmy was almost wholly destroyed during the second campaign. ' Such an extraordinary state of health or rather sick- ness could not have been foreseen; it far exceeded all calculation, and it is difficult to form a conception of an army engaged in offensive operations of which the larger half is lying sick in the hospitals. ' The blame which has been cast upon the higher branches of military administration in this respect appears to us unjust ; it was manifestly impossible in such a country to carry the means and appliances for nursing and curing FIELD-MARSHAL DIEBITSCH. 155 40,000 sick, or to enforce dui-ing a campaign the quaran- tine regulations necessary in a time of plague. But such a state of things as that which we have just described must not be left out of our calculations in forming an opinion as to the performances c>f an army and its leaders.' On reading the account of these horrors, the feeling naturally arises, What must have been the talent and determination of the general who was undeterred by them and still led his army on I As Greneral Diebitsch was such a hero, the following description of him, given by Lord Albemarle in his ' Fifty Years of my Life,' may prove interesting ; being derived from personal observation, it is undoubtedly authentic. He gives, as an extract from his diary : ' Field-Marshal Diebitsch is a little fat plethoric- looking man, scarcely five foot high, with a large head, long black hair, and a complexion of the deepest scarlet, and a countenance indicative of a certain irritability of temper, which has earned for him from the troops, in addition to his proud title of Yabalanski, or crosser of the Balkans, that of Smawar, or tea-kettle.' 156 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. CHAPTER VII. THE CAMPAIGN IN ASIA IN 1828. State of affairs in Asia in winter of 1827-28— Attitude of Persia — Russian preparations for invasion of Asia Minor — Resources at her disposal — Alternative methods of attack — Preparations of Turks — Commencement of campaign — Fall of Kars — Outbreak of the plague — Capture of Akhaltsikh — Defeat of Seraskier — Capture of other fortresses — Conclusion of campaign — Remarks. The campaign in Asia in 1828, although not on so large a scale as that in Em'ope, was far more successful and decisive in its conclusion. Just as the war conducted by Marshal Wittgenstein, his lieutenants, and his opponents, was little else than a succession of strategic misconcep- tions and tactical blunders, so that waged by Greneral Paskewitch, the Russian commander-in-chief in Asia, was a striking example of how small means and insigni- ficant opportunities, if turned to proper account, may produce brilliant results. The seat of the Asiatic campaign in 1828 was the tract of land between the Caspian and the Euxine. In the previous year Russia had been engaged in a successful war with Persia, and had forced the latter power to conclude peace. The Shah, however, on the publication FRONTIER OF ASIA MINOR. 157 of the Turkish Hatti-scheriff in December 1827, refused to ratify the treaty which he had previously signed, in hopes that, in view of the impending war with Turkey, he might obtain better terms. Orders were consequently sent from St. Petersburg to Count Paskewitch to prosecute a winter campaign against Persia with all vigour. He therefore advanced in the snow as far as the range named Kaftan-ku, and thereby so struck terror into the heart of the Persian court that, almost without a shot having been fired, they sent envoys to sue for peace. The treaty of Turkman-chai, signed on February 10th, 1829, was the result — by it Eussia acquired the Khanates of Erivan and Nak-nihchevan, the fortress of Abbas-Abad, a large indemnity, and the sole right to maintain vessels of war in the Caspian Sea. The conclusion of this treaty was a great advantage to Russia, since not only was a certain enemy thereby neutralised, but also a large tract of terri- tory was acquired, which formed a valuable base of operations for the coming campaign. Although the frontier of Asia Minor after the conquest of tlie Caucasus by Russia had no natural defensive boundaries, and with their usual apathy the Turks had almost entirely neglected the fortifications of all the frontier fortresses, nevertheless the invasion of Asiatic Turkey presented many difficulties and many dangers. In the first place the distances to march were enormous, and neither the resources of the country nor the quality of the roads were such as to permit a force of any size to 158 HVSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. advance far, still less to manoeuvre with rapidity. The population were, as a rule, hostile and warlike, and if the generals of the Sultan had taken the trouble to organise their forces with sufficient energy, and in good time, they might have brought into the field an army that would have entirely enveloped the small force which was all that Paskewitch could array against them. As usual, accounts differ as to the numbers of the Russian army. M. Felix Fonton, in his work ' La Eussie dans 1' Asie Mineure,' puts it at 23,393 infantry, 6,192 cavalry, and 130 guns, while 13,860 infantry, 2,391 cavalry, and 42 guns remained in reserve in Russia ; others have estimated the entire force at some thousands less. There is, however, no doubt whatever that the column under the immediate command of the Russian general, which did the real work of the campaign, only numbered about 8,000 infantry, about 3,000 cavalry, and 70 guns. In addition to these land forces, there was the fleet under Admiral Grreig of eight sail of the line, five frigates, and eleven smaller vessels, and a contingent of about 6,000 men, which was sent in May from the 7th Corps to take Anapa. It may be said that three separate and distinct lines of operation were open to Count Paskewitch. The first is the road which coasts along the shore of the Black Sea to Trebizonde, the second runs from Tiflis to Kars and Erzeroum, by the pass of Saganlugh over the Allaghery mountains, the third and last is by Ararat. Not only is the centre road by far the best, being the main communi- COMMENCEMENT OF CAMPAIGN. 159 cation from Asia to Constantinople, bat it leads to those towns which it was particularly necessary to subdue, hence it was selected by Paskewitch for his main advance ; while two other columns were also despatched to the flanks, one under Greneral Hesse, consisting of six battalions, a regiment of Cossacks and sixteen light guns, to the Black Sea, the other on the left under Greneral Tchevtchevade to Armenia. With that secrecy and prudence which Jomini declares to be essential to great and successful operations, Paskewitch concealed his intentions so well during the winter of '27 and '28, that the Turkish rulers made no preparations whatever to oppose the coming- invasion ; it is stated that the Pacha of Kars even per- mitted the inhabitants to sell their grain in the Greorgian markets, thereby materially contributing to the pro- visioning of the Eussian army. The war commenced with a descent on Anapa, which took place about May 14th with the force before men- tioned. The fortress was attacked with all vigour, and on June 23rd surrendered with its garrison of 85 guns and 3,000 men. The main Eussian land force commenced its operations almost simultaneously with the attack on Anapa. On May 25th about 12,000 were assembled at Gumri, reserves of guns and ammunition being estab- lished at Tiflis, Eedut-Kala, Baku, and Dervent, and proceeded at once to advance on Kars. As usual the Turks were taken unprepared and Paskewitch encountered no opposition until he reached that town, which he pro- 160 RUSSIAN WAliS WITH TURKEY. ceeded to attack on the southern side. Had the Ottoman commanders been less dilatory in their arrangements, not improbably the Muscovite army might have encountered a serious disaster, since the Pacha of Erizerum was col- lecting 60,000 men to relieve Kars and the Pacha of Akhaltsikh was engaged in concentrating forces on their right. Fortunately, however, for Paskewitch both Pachas were late, and Kars capitulated on June 23rd with 129 cannon, 22 mortars, 33 standards, and about 17,000 men. On the whole the defence was fair, but by no means equalled the attack either in skill or determination. Kars was at this time supposed to be impregnable and was certainly one of the most formidable fortresses in Asia. It had been built by Amurath III. between the years of 1578 and 1589. In addition to a position of gTeat natural strength, being on one side inaccessible, it had more fortifications than are usually accorded by Turks to their fortresses, and thereby was enabled to make a successful resistance to Nadir Shah in 1735 and again to the Eus- sians in 1807. Hence its capture in so short a time had a great moral effect throughout Asia. Just as tlie Russian flag was hoisted on the battlements of Kars the Turkish force intended to relieve the town appeared on the neighbouring heights, and was obliged to retrace its steps to the mountains. Immediately after this brilliant success a new enemy to the Russian army appeared on the scene : the plague broke out and before its course could be averted by the ATTACK ON AKHALTSIKH. 161 vigorous measures adopted by Paskewitch, it carried off several hundred people. This outbreak of disease some- what delayed Paskewitch and enabled the Seraskier to collect 35,000 men whom he placed at Ardagun on the right rear of the Muscovite army. The Russian general, however, did not tarry long ; he made a demonstration as if he were about to attack Erzeroum, thereby causing the Seraskier to retreat ; he then retraced his steps and sud- denly appeared before Akhalkalaki. This little fortress was defended to the last, but being of insignificant strength it soon succumbed, as also the post of Hertviz, which was taken by a detached force of about 3,000 men. The next operation was the attack on Akhaltkish, or Akhaltsikh as it is also called, which was reached about August 12th after a march of many difficulties and dangers. Almost simultaneously with the arrival of the Russian army the Seraskier also appeared, this time again too late to prevent his enemies occupying a strong position on tlie west side of the town. Both armies entrenched them- selves and both endeavoured to assume the offensive, the Turks being in the proportion of more than two to one. The Ottoman general, however, had committed the fatal mistake of separating his forces into four bodies. Pas- kewitch profited by the error, and in a brilliant night attack entirely defeated the Turkish field forc*^, capturing ten of their guns. After this catastrophe the fortress of Akhaltkish was left to its fate, and the army intended for its relief retired towards Ardagun. The Akhaltsikheans, M 162 HUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. however, manfully refused to yield, and mindful of the boast that * they had never been subdued ' held out to the last. As the town was entirely commanded by adjoining heights tlie defence could not be a very long one, more especially as the Jews and Christians of the place were by no means so desirous as the Turks of being killed or burnt amid their houses. Finally, after a succession of assaults and struggles almost without precedent in history, the stronghold was taken on August 27th. It is stated that the defenders lost no fewer tlian 4,000 men, and the at- tackers, according to their own account, about 6,000, })ut probably far more. The defence of this fortress has not inappropriately been compared to that of Saragossa : in both the principal resistance was made by the inhabitants from house to house ; if anything, the Asiatic town was more desperately defended than the European. Every inch was obstinately contested, and the town was only captured by the defend- ers being burnt out. Even then the remnant that re- mained retreated to the citadel, whence the}^ were allowed to march out for Erzeroum with all the honours of war. The fall of Akhaltsikh was followed by that of Atskhur and Ardagun ; as is often the case when a strong fortress is captured after a desperate resistance, the actual capture of the place itself is but the smallest portion of the results. The moral effect caused by such a capture induces the gar- risons of neighbouring places to lose heart, and to yield almost without striking a blow. This appears to be more especially the case with the Turks. After the fall of Brailow CONCLUSION OF CAMPAIGN. 163 one after another the strongholds of the Dobrudscha 3'ielded as scon as they were attacked, — in the same way after the fall of Akhaltsikh every place before which the Eus- sians appeared capitulated at once and the invaders were left masters of the territory as far as the Saganlugh. Prince Tchertzevadze had been almost equally successful in Armenia, and an advance of the Pacha of 3Iush having been checked by the Eussian garrison of Kars, at the end of September the invaders had finished the campaign and were unmolested. The results of these brilliant exploits of Paskewitch, effected though they were with so small an army, were by no means unimportant — o fortresses, 313 pieces of cannon, 195 standards, and 8,000 prisoners had fallen into his liands within five months. He was master of the whole of the territory from the Georgian frontier as far as Saganlugh; in fact, when the winter set in, a small Eussian army of about 1 5,000 men, with 34 guns, occupied a triangle of which Kars was the apex, and thus were in an admirable and secure position for an advance in the following spring. It may be remarked that in addition to the move- ments of the centre column, which we have followed, there were also minor operations on the flanks, as before men- tioned, on the coast of the Black Sea and in Armenia, These were just as successful as the movements of the main body, so that Count Paskewitch, while Persia re- mained neutral, had no reason to feel anxiety either respecting his actual position or as to his base of opera- tions for the campaign of the following year. M 2 Ifi4 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. CHAPTEE VIII. ASIATIC CAMPAIGN OF 1829. Preparations of Tiu'ksfor campaign — Threatening attitude of Persia — Consequent precautions of Paskewitch — Tiirkish attempt on Ak- haltsikh — Successful defence and results — Letter of Paskewitch — Defeat of Hadgi Pacha — Defeat of the Seraskier near Kainly — Re- treat of Hadgi Pacha — Fall of Erzeroum — Check of the Russians at Khart — Final defeat of the Seraskier — Retreat of Russians — Con- clusion of war — Remarks on campaig-n — Conditions of peace. The Asiatic campaign of 1829 commenced almost with the new year. So alarmed was the Sultan by the advance and successes of Paskewitch that he lost no time in putting- forth all his energies to regain his lost territory and to re- establish the prestige of the Ottoman armies in Asia. His first step was to disgrace the leaders who had been defeated, ^ pour encourager les autres.'^ The Seraskier, Halil Pacha, and his lieutenant, Kiossa Mahomet Pacha, alike shared this fate, and were replaced by Hadgi-Saleh, Pacha of Maidan, and Hagkhi Pacha of Sivaz, both of whom were supposed to be men of ability and energy. These leaders at once commenced their preparations for the coming campaign ; large depots of provisions and ammunition were stored at Erzeroum and elsewhere ; all COMMENCEMENT OF CAMPAIGN. 165 believers were summoned to the defence of the Crescent, their religious fanaticism and loyalty to the Sultan were .appealed to with the most fervid proclamations, while at the same time — an unusual occurrence in Turkey — the ■sinews of war were not wanting, large sums of money being- sent to the commanders from Constantinople, still further to intensify the sacred devotion of the Faithful to their supreme Leader. It was hoped that these preparations would enable two large armies to be set on foot by the commencement of spring. One of these, 80,000 strong, with 66 guns, was to assemble at the base of the Sagan- lugh and march on Kars and Akhaltsikh, while another, numbering 50,000 men and 50 guns, under the Pachas of Mush and Vann, was to attack the left flank of the Eus- sians and penetrate into Armenia. Before, however, these preparations could be carried out or perfected, an event occurred which precipitated matters. On February 12th, 1829, the Russian minister at the Persian Court was assassinated. It was supposed by both parties that this event, accidental although it might be, probably would be the forerunner of a Persian and Russian war ; hence Greneral Paskewitch had to dispose his troops so as to resist, if necessary, the advance of a Persian army on the left bank of the Araxes, while the Seraskier deemed that he might commence operations without further hesitation. The first operation of the Mussulman army was directed against Akhaltsikh. This place was selected for 16G RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. attack not only on account of the moral effect which the recapture of so important and renowned a fortress would produce on wavering allies, but also because it seemed more open to attack than Kars or some of the less impor- tant strongholds. Accordingly, Ahmed Bey with 15,000 men appeared before Akhaltsikh on February 18th, while simultaneously the Seraskier threatened Kars in order to distract the attention of Paskewitch. The latter, however, was not deceived ; he not only reinforced the garrison of Akhaltsikh, but despatched as large a body of troops as he could spare to assist in relieving it. Notwithstanding this reinforcement the defenders only numbered 2,000 men, being commanded by Prince Bebutoff, whose name has ever since been handed down with honour throughout the annals of Eussian history. The attack and defence of the fortress were equally determined and brilliant. The outer town was carried at once, and the citadel was nearly lost owing to the presence of some houses near its walls which had not been levelled, and which the Turks occu- pied. Finally, on the morning of March 1 6th, when the besieged were at the last extremity, signs were seen of a retreat on the part of the investing army. Prince Bebutoff immediately sallied out to pursue them, and about two o'clock in the afternoon was met by the head of the Eussian columns under G-eneral Burtsdorff, who had been sent to raise the siege. Akhaltsikh was saved, and witli it the hardly-won results of the last campaign. The successful defence of this fortress had an immense- PASKEWITCH ON ENGLISH POLICY. 167 moral effect favourable to the armies of the Czar throughout Asia, just as its fall would probably have been the first cause of their ultimate defeat and ruin. The Shah, on hearing the news of the Muscovite success, immediately changed his policy, suspended his warlike preparations, and forwarded to St. Petersburg the assurances of his devoted attachment to the Emperor Nicholas. A letter of exhortation addressed at this time by Paskewitch to Abbas Mirza, and quoted by Fonton, is peculiarly interest- ing to Englishmen, as indicating that, although nominally allies, even in those days there existed between the Russian and English Grovernments that antagonism of interests and feelings which of late years has unhappily been so strongly developed. He says, ' Ne comptez pas ni sur les promesses des Anglais ni sur les assertions des Turcs. Les Anglais ne vous defendront pas ; leur politique n'a en w.q que les interets de leurs possessions dans les Indes. Nous pouvons conquerir en Asie un royaume et personne ne s'en inquietera. En Europe chaque pouce de terrain pent donner lieu a des gueiTes sangiantes ; la Turquie est necessaire a I'equilibre europeen ; mais les puissances de I'Europe ne regardent pas qui gouverne la Perse.' The events of the last fifty years have proved most forcibly the truth of Paskewitch's remarks. Russia has acquired ranges of territory in Asia equal in extent to half-a-dozen European kingdoms, and except an accidental protest — the result of the extreme inquisitiveness of some 168 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. troublesome traveller — she has met with no opposition beyond what the inhabitants of the country she annexed could offer her, whereas the least advance or encroachment in Europe has at once raised an Eastern question and twenty years ago involved her in a calamitous war whicli threw her back a century. Eastern and semi-independent potentates have never been remarkable for fidelity to their nominal ruler; the chieftains of Asia Minor in 1829 were by no means bright exceptions to the usual rule. The Pacha of Mush, when he found the Russian arms still triumphant, promptly gave in his adherence to what he believed to be the winning side, and thereby deprived the vSultan of the services of about 12,000 Kurdish cavalry, who were much needed. The Seraskier also found much difficulty in collecting troops, although, had time been allowed him, probably he would have eventually assembled a most respectable army. Paskewitch, however, was not one of those who allow golden moments to pass by unheeded. As he was enormously outnumbered, his only chance was to take his enemy in detail, and he selected for his first point of attack that frontier which was nearest and weakest. Accordingly when the Seraskier's lieutenant or ' Kaia,^ Hadgi Pacha, was still preparing for another assault on Akhaltsikh, Gfeneral Burtsdorff was ordered to attack him in front while General Mouraieff, was detached from Ardagun to threaten his left flank. The two Russian columns united on June 2nd at a village called Dighor, and BRILLIANT MAJSCEVVRE OF PASKEWITCH. 160 although only about 7,000 against 15,000, they succeeded in defeating the Kaia with the loss of 1,200 men, and drove his army back on the mountains in a thoroughly disorganised condition. By this success the Kussian general was enabled to join his right wing to his centre ; he concentrated a force of about 12,000 infantr}^, 5,700 cavalry, and 7 guns on June 9th at Kotanly, and proceeded to attack the Seraskier, who was threatening Kars. The Turkish army was ■strongly posted ; it was very numerous, and, unless out- manoeuvred, could not be attacked with any prospect of success. With the true inspiration of a great commander, Paskewitch at once determined to execute a movement apparently most hazardous, but whose brilliant success was its complete justification. On June 13th the Seraskier, jSalegh Pacha, with no less than 30,000 men, was moving up to occupy a strong position on the road to Erzeroum at Zermi, while Hadgi Pacha, having collected his routed forces, amounting to about 20,000, chiefly irregulars, had posted himself on the flank of the road near Milli-Dux. If these forces were permitted to effect a junction, Pas- kewitch had but a poor chance of success ; accordingly while he distracted the attention of the Kaia in front with one small column, with another, comprising the main body, he made a circuitous march and interposed himself between the two forces of the enemy, thereby abandoning his communication with Kars, and in case of defeat making his ruin almost certain. It is stated that the Russian 170 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. column which effected this turning movement marched thirty-two miles over two snow}^ ridges without making a halt, and only just reached the desired pass in time to prevent its occupation by the Seraskier. As soon as the Kaia discovered that the attack on his own camp was nothing but a feint, he at once detached a small force under Osman Pacha to occupy the Zermi road and endeavour to prevent any further advance of the enemy imtil the arrival of reinforcements. Osman Pacha per- formed his task well, but was overwhelmed by the superior numbers of the Eussians, and thus the separation of the Turkish army was completed. It cannot, however, b& said that Paskewitch's position was in any way secm'e. Notwithstanding his first success, he found himself at Kainly between two forces both infinitely superior in numbers to his own. The question was, which should he attack first : he wisely selected the most formidable, and threw himself on the Seraskier with all his army. The attack was just made in time ; had it been delayed even a day the Kussian army might have been attacked in flank or rear by Hadgi Pacha, while it was engaged with the Seraskier in front. As it was the main body of the Ottoman army was defeated with great loss, and by the night of June 1 9th was in full retreat. It may be remarked that all accounts agree in stating that this battle, although in results favourable to the Eussians, was by no means easily won — in fact, it was perhaps the hardest fouglit and the most critical contest SURRENDER OF ERZEROVM. Yl\ of the two campaigns. However, it was won, and now Paskewitch was able to turn on the Kaia, whose irregular troops, demoralised by the defeat of their comrades, gave but little trouble. The entrenched camp at Milli-Dux was taken without difficulty, and with it Hadgi Pacha and staff. 3,000 prisoners, nineteen cannon, and nineteen standards fell into the hands of the Muscovites — in fact, the rout of the Ottomans was complete. The per- formances of Paskewitch's army on this occasion, if all accounts are true, have seldom be^n equalled, either in ancient or modern w^arfare. In less than twenty-five hours they had marched thirty- five miles, had beaten two armies, both more numerous than themselves — they had captured two camps, two Pachas, one general-in-chief, besides prisoners, guns, standards, and were in a condition to follow up their successes without delay or hindrance. The Russian general did not fall into the error of Hannibal and halt after his victory, thereby losing its fruits. He pressed on without delay, captured the fortress of Hassan-Kale, on the road to Erzeroum, by June 23rd, and four days afterwards was in possession of the capital itself. The surrender of this town was the immediate result of the defeat of the field army ; although not elaborately fortified, it might have opposed a serious resistance if properly defended. The Asiatic militia were wholly unable to follow Horace's maxim of ' sequam memento rebus in arduis servare mentem.' They became utterly demoralised by defeat, and those who did not 172 IiU>SSIA^' WARS WITH TURKEY. disperse to tLeir homes but remained in the field were an encumbrance rather than an assistance to the general who commanded them. After the fall of Erzeroum the campaign practically came to an end, although various operations of minor importance took place before peace was actually declared. It may be mentioned that, while the main body of the Russian army was operating against Erzeroum, the Pacha of Vann took advantage of the weakness of the Muscovite left and attacked Bazarjid : the town fell, but the citadel held out until the news of the surrender of the capital caused the Pacha to retire. As soon as Paskewitch was established in Erzeroum he pushed on some troops to Kniss and Baiburt, both of which places were easily captured. He then directed G-eneral Biu:tsdorff on Khart ; there the Russian army encountered, on July 19th, its first reverse : the Lazians, who occupied the town, fought desperately, and repulsed the invaders with the loss of their general. This check, however, was soon avenged by Paskewitch himself ; he marched out and by a rapid turning movement intercepted a force coming to relieve Khart, and reduced the town itself. But little now remained between the Russian army and Trebizonde. The capture of this place woidd have been of enormous im- portance if only on account of the communication thereby opened with the fleet in the Black Sea — accordingly, the army advanced, and on August 14th had reached Kara- kaban and Grhurnish Khana, only forty-six miles from RETREAT OF RUSSIAN ARMY. 173 Trebizonde. Here the difficulties in the way of a further advance were found insurmountable. The population, in place of their being friendly as in Armenia, were hostile, and threatened the communications. The army itself, never very strong, had been so weakened by detachments at the various points on its route, that now it was almost insufficient for its own protection ; in addition to this the roads were found to be impracticable for artillery. Finally, in face of these drawbacks, tlie Eussian general was re- luctantly compelled to order a retreat. Baiburt was evacuated, the works blown up, and on August 29th the invading army was concentrated at Erzeroum ; while the main body had been thus occupied, various operations had likewise taken place on the flanks. Greneral PankzatiefF had been most successful in Gruriet and on the shores of the Black Sea, where he had defeated 8,000 Turks in the defiles of Mukha-Estatt, and had captured sixty-eight guns. An expedition undertaken by Greneral Sachen, governor of Akhaltsikh, to subdue the Adjars was not so fortunate. At the beginning of September heavy autumnal rains set in, and Paskewitch made preparations to withdraw his troops to G-eorgia, leaving only garrisons in the captured towns. On hearing of the retreat of the Russians, the Ottoman militia again reassembled, the Pacha of Vann again moved out of his Pashalik, and the Seraskier con- centrated about 1,000 men at Baiburt, with 6,000 at Tchifflick. Paskewitch apparently continued his prepa- 174 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. rations for retreat; in reality he collected his troops and turnino- back with about 6,000 men again separated the two forces of the enemy, and utterly routed that which was at Baiburt. Twelve hundred prisoners, six guns, and twelve standards remained in his hands. The Seraskier who again had come up too late, retreated to Balakhor, when he heard of the armistice which pre- ceded the treaty of Adrianople and the conclusion of peace. Thus ended this most brilliant and successful campaign. Paske witch left garrisons in the conquered towns and marched back to G-eorgia. As he passed over the Saganlugh he was met by the baton of Field Marshal despatched to him by his Imperial master — never was a reward more deserved or better earned. These campaigns of Paske witch in Asia bear a striking resemblance to some of the wars which mark the early history of the British empire in India. In both we see a small force advancing, as it were, with extraordin- ary rashness, into the heart of an enemy's country, fighting battle after battle against extraordinar}^ odds, taking fortress after fortress by the most desperate assaults, and, in fact, securing victory when by all the ordinary rules of war it ought to be beaten. Paskewitch, like Clive, displayed his great genius by his correct appreciation of the (quality and capabilities of his enemy. He took liberties which, in the face of an European army, must have caused his ruin, but which, as events proved, were his only chance of securing victory. BRILLIANT TALENTS OF PASKEWITCH. 175 In the 1828 campaign, at once grasping the point which he should make his first objective, he marched straight on Kars, and, unlike Wittgenstein, did not permit himself to be deterred or diverted from his object by a threaten- ing but not really serious danger on his flank. He thoroughly understood the Asiatic character, and the effect which a bold offensive, coupled with great rapidity of movements, invariably produces on it. He struck sharply and quickly, giving his enemy no time to think or recover from his first astonishment. Eather than cause a delay, which would raise the morale of his adver- sary, he would run the risk of moving with insufficient preparations, and even thereby in some degree imperil the certainty of his success — thus armies melted before him like snow, and the capital of Asia Minor surrendered almost from the very terror of his name. Undoubtedly the most brilliant and likewise the most hazardous of all his opera- tions was when he placed himself between the two Turkish armies at Milli-Dux ; any hesitation would then have been his destruction, nothing saved him but his boldness and the fighting qualities of liis soldiers. While, however, we give Paskewitch all the credit which he so fully deserves, it must not be forgotten that the quality of the troops with whom he had to contend was of the worst description. The Turkish soldiers fighting against Wittgenstein and Diebitsch were bad, but those opposing Paskewitch were far worse ; being chiefly composed of militia and irregulars, they had neither the discipline nor 176 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. the stability required to rally after a defeat, althougli in case of success they would probably have fought well and might have exhibited great qualities. Similarly we do not find in Paskewitch's campaigns either that determination or persistence on the part of his adversaries which was so frequently opposed to the British troops in India, — none of those battles fought from dawn to eve and renewed on the following day, such as are not unknown in our history. Paskewitch also seems to have avoided allowing his men to engage in those cavalry skirmishes, which were so frequent in the war in Europe, and which so tended to demoralise the Eussian and en- courage the Turkish cavalry. Perhaps the Ottoman horse- men that fought in Asia were less formidable than those who rallied round the Sultan in Europe, most certainly they were far less successfid. When speaking of these skirmishes, in which during the '28 campaign the Mus- sulmans almost invariably had the best of it. Count Moltke makes some remarks on the Turkish method of warfare which are worth repeating. He says : ' The remark that whenever you see one turban you may be sure there are a thousand more, is in the main correct. The Turks know nothing of advanced guards, outposts, and other military precautions, but always remain together in large bodies. They forced their adversaries to do the same if they did not wish to encounter the same checks as heretofore. The Turkish way of fighting is like that of the wild boar, which does not seek his foe, but awaits his- CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TURKS. 177 approach in the thicket and then rushes blindly upon him. An impetuous attack may be expected from the Turks, but not a lasting or obstinate defence. Against Orientals it is no use keeping troops in reserve. The best cards should be played out at once. A few hours always decide the fate of the engagement ; and Turkish history affords no example of battles fought from sunrise to sunset, like those in the west of Europe.' As far as can be gathered from the accounts of the various combats that took place in Asia Minor during these two years the characteristics thus indicated by Count JNIoltke were almost always displayed by the Tm'ks. On one or two occasions they fought well and even desperately, but were wholly unable to maintain a long or doubtful battle. Their marching power seems also either to have been very indifferent or not to have been turned to proper account. Although the operations of the second campaign were on the Turkish side far better conducted than those of the first year, still in both the commanders invariably ap- peared on the scene of action too late to be of any use. The Seraskier arrived just after Kars had been taken — simi- larly he was too late at Akhaltsikh. In the following year the new generals, although warned by the fate of their pre- decessors, were scarcely less dilatory, but their plans were better conceived, and had they remembered Napoleon's maxim that 'victories are more often won with the legs than the arms of soldiers,' they might not improbably have achieved considerable success. 178 BUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. On the whole, considering the vast amount of territory and the number of fortresses which his armies had subdued, more especially in Asia, it cannot be said that the terms which the Emperor Nicholas exacted at the Peace of Adrianople were excessive or severe. He had, it is 'true, loudly proclaimed to all Europe that in making war he desired not an increase of territory — not personal or national aggrandisement, but that he was solely actuated by a desire to improve the condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte, hence it was expected that he would be reasonable in his demands : but assurances and mani- festoes before the commencement of a war are not always binding at its successful conclusion. ' Might is right ' may too often be considered the motto of philanthropic monarch s. A¥e must therefore certainly accord the praise of moderation to Nicholas and to his government on this occasion. We have already seen that he exacted a large indemnity and occupied some provinces till it was paid — also that he acquired Brailow and a small amount of territory on the Danube, but this was all in Europe. In Asia, however, the fortress and Pashalik of Akhaltsikh were ceded to him ; not indeed a very large but neverthe- less a very important tract of country, both from its possessing a considerable portion of coast on the Black Sea and from the facilities it afforded for an invasion of Asia Minor in the event of a future war. 179 CHAPTER IX. WAR ON THE DANUBE OF 1863 AND 1854: AND PREVIOUS EVENTS FROM PEACE OF ADRIANOPLE. Eelations that existed between Russia and Turkej- after 1829 — Revolt of Mehemet Ali — Victories of Ibrahim Pacha in SjTia — Assistance given to Turkey by Russia in 1833— Russian forces quit Constan- tinople — Second Revolt of Mehemet Ali in 1839 — Intervention of Allies — Danger of an European War— Strategical Position of Jaffa and Acre — Bombardment of Beyrout and Acre — Convention of 1840— Occupation of Principalities by Russia in 1849 — Events that occasioned Crimean War — Assurances of Nicholas — War on the Danube in 1853 ; success of Omar Pacha — Siege of Silistria— Re- treat of Russian Army — Landing in the Crimea— War in Asia and fall of Kars — Peace signed — The Treaty of Paris. After the signature of the Peace of Adrianople in 1829, twenty-four years elapsed before Eussia and Turkey were again opposed to each other. Then there occurred the great conflict called the Crimean War, which threw the Muscovite empire back for a century, and shook the whole of Europe to its foundations. It is beside our task here to enter into the latter period of this war, when the allies were the principal combatants and the Turks played but a most insig-nificant part. It even seems unnecessary to refer to the various actions after the invasion of the Crimea, although in some of these the n2 180 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. Ottoman troops engaged the Eussians, both as auxiliaries and single-handed, with more or less success. It is in the highest degree improbable that an invasion of the Crimea or any portion of the Russian territory in the Black Sea will be again attempted, except as a diversion. Certainly the Porte single-handed would hesitate before engaging in such an undertaking, and any futm^e allies that she may possess, would scarcely be so foolish as to repeat the Crimean experiment. Hence the events that took place in the latter end of 1854 and in 1855 can scarcely be said to afford any indication as to what may occur in any possible contest of the future between these hereditary and national enemies. It is, however, different with respect to the earlier portion of the war, and the campaign on the Danube in 1853 and 1854 is in the highest degree inte- resting and instructive to those who would wish to study the strategical and with it the political bearing of the entire question. Before entering into the actual events which were the commencement of the Crimean War, it is necessary to re- view shortly the relations which existed between the Rus- sian and the Ottoman empires during the twenty-four years which immediately succeeded the Peace of Adrian- ople. Scarcely had Tiukey been delivered from the great peril which menaced it in 1829 before another and even still more serious danger appeared to threaten its existence. Mehemet Ali, the Pacha of Egypt, was a man of remark- MEHEMET ALL 181 uble ability and insatiable ambition ; born, strange to say, in the same year as both Napoleon and Wellington, he had spent the greater portion of his eventful life in pre- paring for the one great stroke which should place him and his family for ever on the throne of Egypt, not as vassals of the Divan, but as independent monarchs, — which should make him possessed of the fertile lands of Syria ; and, if fortune favoured, might even enable him to sup- plant the family of Othman in the leadership of the Faith- ful. At last there appeared to be a favourable opportunity for the accomplishment of all his designs, and his army was admirably drilled and well officered ; he had a fleet of seven sail of the line, and twelve frigates, a force superior to what now remained of the Turkish fleet after Navarino. Above all he had a son Ibrahim Pacha, who had studied the art of war, and who, as events proved, could turn his study to the best possible account. And while his prepa- rations were thus completed, the condition of the armies which he would have to encounter was such as would seem in every way to favour the chances of their defeat. While the material and numbers of the Ottoman troops had not yet had time to recover from the drain and exhaustion consequent on the campaigTis of 1828 and 1829, their leaders and the Imperial government, with the usual apathy of the Turk, had done nothing what- ever to remedy the deficiencies which those wars had made so evident. The discipline of the rank and file was in no way improved ; the officers were not better 182 JRUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. selected, nor were they more zealous in the study of their profession ; the arsenals were still exhausted, and the exchequer still empty ; in truth the opportunity was well chosen and the measures which so long had been prepared for profiting by it, were on the whole admirably carried out. The pretext for a war was soon found. In the autumn of 1831 the Pacha of Acre had received and sheltered some thousands of ' fellahs/ or peasants belonging to the delta of Egypt, who had fled to Syria to escape from the exactions of their own government, and to obtain employ- ment during the harvest. Mehemet Ali demanded the surrender of the fugitives, and when this was refused, he fitted out an army of about 30,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry, and despatched it under the command of Ibrahim Pacha to enforce his demands. It is not our task here to follow out the campaign of 1832 between the Turks and Egyptians, highly interesting though it is ; but for those who regard Syria as a futui'e and not improbable battlefield, where the British road to India may one day be defended, a study of this war will be by no means thrown away. The physical characteristics of this country are peculiarly adapted for defence, and thus may be explained the vast number of wars that have from the earliest days been fought on its soil. The only practicable line by which Asia Mino]' can be reached from Egypt is the coast road, on which Acre and Jaffa lie, and which they command ; hence nearly all the contests which COMMEIi CEMENT OF EGYPTIAN WAR. 183 have taken place in Syria have centred round these strongholds from the pre-historic days of Troy down to those of Napoleon. The defence of Acre by Sir Sidney Smith is still more than famous ; by it Napoleon declared that he missed his destiny, since, had he taken it, ' he would have changed the face of the world.' As soon as the Egyptian forces appeared on his fron- tier Abdallah Pacha, ithe Pacha of Syria, at once threw himself into Acre with 2,500 men, which was all the force that he could muster. The siege of the place was at once undertaken with great vigour by Ibrahim Pacha, but his o^vn talent as a general in the held was not equalled by the skill of his engineers, and the besiegers made but slow progress. From the middle of December 1831 to the end of March 1832, the fortress was still unreduced, and by this time the Divan had been able to collect some forces for its relief. Three armies were set on foot — one of about 18,000 men, under Hussein Pacha, the celebrated general of the '28 campaign, formerly the aga and destroyer of the Janissaries, was airected through Anatolia ; another of about the same strength advanced towards Homs on the Orontes, while a third, of about 1 0,000 men, seized Tripoli and occupied the sea-coast. Ibrahim Pacha was by no means taken aback by these dangers, great as they appeared ; he at once raised the siege of Acre, as Napoleon, when General Bonaparte, raised the siege of Mantua in 1796 ; and following the example of his great predecessor the Egyptian general took up a central position between his 184 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. enemies and at once boldly attacked them. The force at Tripoli was easily routed, and the others paused in their onward march. Ibrahim was thus enabled to return to Acre, and on May 27th he carried it by assault. The fall of this fortress gave him a base of operations on the sea-coast and enabled him to act independently of his communica- tions by land, giving a freedom of action which he turned to the best possible account. The Turkish armies suffered a series of crushing defeats at Homs, at Beylau, and at /7]^ Konieh. So decisive was this last-named engagement that, had Ibrahim known the extent of his success, he might have marched direct on the Bosphorus, but, as remarked by Allison, the empire of Constantinople was protected by the shadow of its former renown, and most fortunately for the house of Othman, Ibrahim fell into the error of Han- nibal, and remained inactive for a month. Then on Jan. 20, 1833, he marched on, and by Feb. 1st had reached Kutchieh, near Scutari, too late to achieve the brilliant results which his great success might have won for him. Among the many miraculous escapes from destruction, which in the last hundred and fifty years have been re- corded in the history of the Ottoman empire, there was none more extraordinary or miraculous than this ; al- though in truth it is a page in history which for the honour of Mussulmans and for the dignity of their religion had better never have been written. The danger, indeed, was one that appeared to involve the entire disruption of the Turkish power. The fame of Ibrahim's victories had INTERVENTION OF RUSSIA. 18o spread far and wide from the Euphrates to the Danube ; from the Caspian to the Mediterranean ; the wild tribes of Asia, and the down-trodden Greeks of Europe were alike moved by them, and both equally desired to escape the tyrannic rule which for centuries had oppressed them. In the hour of his need the Sultan turned his eyes to Grreat Britain, and implored her assistance against his rebellious vassal. At that time England was in no condition to de- fend even her most vital interests, still less to protect an ally. Her forces reduced to a minimum, were otherwise oc- cupied, and France, who was next appealed to, was equally disinclined to despatch any force to the East. There was no resource left for the Porte but to throw itself into the arms of Eussia, and this time the appeal was not disre- garded. With a promptness, only equalled by its timeli- ness, a Russian army and fleet appeared at Constantinople, and the onward march of the Egyptians was stayed. At Constantinople a peace was soon afterwards pro- claimed with Egypt. Mehemet Ali, finding that he had to face the power of Eussia, williugly acceded to terms, and accepted the government of his various con- quests, which were confirmed to him by -d Jirinan of am- nesty is:>ued by the Sultan. The Eussians were now masters of the situation, but agreeable as their position at Constantinople might be to themselves, it was by no means so pleasant to the Western Powers, who at last were roused from their indifference. Diplomacy became most active, and at last it was arranged, at the demand of Eng- 186 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. land and France, that the Eussian troops and fleet should retire from the Bosphorus as soon as the Egyptian army had recrossed the Taurus. This arrangement was carried out, and apparently the Emperor Nicholas had derived no advantage whatever from his kind and philanthropic action in rescuing his neighbom-, except a treaty of alli- ance, which was a mutual compliment rather than a mutual advantage. To this treaty, however, named that of Unkiaz-Skelessi, there was added a secret clause, which gave to Eussian ships of war alone the right to enter the Dardanelles. The importance of this concession can scarcely be over-estimated ; the material power of Eussia in the Black Sea was thereby enormously increased, and her influence became predominant. Eventually, perhaps,, this secret treaty was the cause of all her misfortunes in 1854 and 1855, since its discovery first caused France and England to unite in their action regarding the Eastern Question, and was the primary cause of the Crimean War. After this it might have been hoped that affairs in the East would, for a time at least, have remained tranquil, and that the peace of Europe would not again have been disturbed by them. Such, however, was not the case. So- soon as the year 1839 there was a complication, which brought France and England to the verge of war, and which was only settled by the force of arms. Mehemet Ali, encouraged by a French alliance, again was the cause of war, but this time he can sincerely be called the ag- gressor. Sultan Mahmoud, feeling certain of English sup- TREATY OF 1840. 187 port, precipitated matters, and brought to blows the enmity which had long existed between himself and his vassal. As in 1833, he was signally defeated both by land and sea, but fortunately for himself was carried off by death before he had had time to see the extent of his discomfiture. The boy who succeeded Mahmoud, Abdul-Medjid by name, fortunately did not possess the iron will of his predecessor, and was no obstacle to peace. It is, how- ever, probable that the complications would have had even more serious results than attended them had not Ser\ia at this juncture revolted. This and other indica- tions of approaching decay proved to the Great Powers that active intervention was indispensable in the affairs of Turkey. Each Power being more or less jealous of the others, vied with the others in offers of assistance ; finally, in July 1840, a treaty was signed between Kussia, Austria^ England, Prussia, and Tm-key, by which the differences between the Porte and Mehemet Ali were finally settled. France, however, was not included in this convention, and had Louis Philippe then listened to the counsels of his Prime Minister of the day, M. Thiers, or had Lord Pal- merston been less bold and resolute, the excitement of the French nation at the slight supposed to have been offered them must have had a vent in war. As it was, probably mutual jealousy of the designs of Eussia had some effect in causing the counsels of j)eace to prevail, as they were urged by M. Gruizot, who succeeded M. Thiers,, and was a devoted friend of England. As it happened, it 188 EUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. was indeed fortunate for this country that Louis Philippe did not yield to the popular clamour of his people, since never was England naore defenceless — a cry for economy had reduced her armaments by sea and land to the lowest ebb, and she had only nine sail of the line in the Medi- terranean to meet twenty sail that the French and Egyp- tians could muster. Boldness, however, made up for want of material strength, and the naval campaign that fol- lowed is alike honourable to the gallantry and skill of English sailors, as it was to the courage and decision of the government that directed them. A few words only are required to explain this maritime war, which is important if only to show the importance of naval superiority and prompt action in campaigns that have their theatre in Syria. The characteristics of this country are thus described by Allison : — ' It results from its peculiar physical conformation that the possession of the coast-line is indispensable for any military operations, either of Egypt against Asia, or of Asia against Egypt. All conquerors on either side, from the earliest times, have gone by this route. By it, on the one hand, Sesos- tris led his invincible hosts to the conquest of Persia, and Saladin brought his fiery squadrons to combat the Cru- saders, and Napoleon advanced from the banks of the Nile to revolutionise Asia. By it, on the other, Cam- byses passed when on his march to Thebes, and Darius led the Persians to avenge the victories of the conquering queen, and Alexander marched from vanquished Thebes TRE SYRIAN WAR. 189 to the shrine of Jupiter Ammon. An army advancing from Egypt to Syria must bring up all its supplies by this line ; its whole communications lie through the sea- port towns. Thence their vital importance in war. An enemy who, from the sea, succeeds in interrupting the possession of the line, has achieved the greatest feat in strategy ; he has thrown himself on his adversaries' com- munications without compromising his own. A blow at Acre or Jaffa is like a severe stroke on the spinal marrow ; it paralyses all below the wound.' At this time the Egyptian troops were occupying Syria, and any unaided attempts of the Turks to dislodge them would have been hopeless ; hence the allies de- termined to strike a decided blow before the French had time to interpose. A British fleet under Admiral Stopford bombarded Beyrout in August 1840, and soon destroyed the town. A few weeks later Acre was similarly attacked and also captured, while an allied force numbering 12,000 men lauded and reduced Sidon. After these reverses, more especially after the loss of Acre, the key of Syria, the Egyptian troops could only retire, and their government soon after came to terms. In 1 841 a convention was signed by all the Grreat Powers, including France. As this treaty remained in force until the Crimean War, and is of great importance as regards the strategic and political bearing of the Eastern Question at the present day, it is well to note its conditions. They were as follow : — 190 RUSSIAN lV4IiS WITH TURKEY. ' 1 . That the straits of the Bosphorus and the Darda- nelles, in conformity with the ancient usages of the Otto- man empire, shall remain permanently closed against all foreign vessels of war as long as the Ottoman Porte shall enjoy j^eace. 2. The Sultan declares, on his side, that he is firmly resolved to maintain immovably the ancient rule of the empire, in virtue of which it is forbidden to vessels of war of all nations to enter the Dardanelles or the Bos- phorus, and in virtue of which these straits remain for ever closed, as long as the Ottoman Porte shall be at peace. 3. His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, and their Majesties the King of the French, the Queen of Oreat Britain, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of Kussia, on their part engage to respect that resolution of the Sultan, and to act in conformity with the principle there expressed. 4. The ancient rule of the Ottoman empire being thus established and recognised, the Sultan reserves to himself the right to grant firmans of passage to small vessels of war, which, in conformity with usage, are employed in the service of ambassadors of friendly Powers. 5. The Sultan reserves t© himself the right to notify the terms of this treaty to all the Powers with which he is on terms of amity, and to invite their acces- sion to it.' For the next twelve years there was apparent peace and tranquillity in the East ; once, it is true, there was a difference between the courts of St. Petersburg and the Porte, but this was readjusted by the intervention of OCCUPATION OF PRINCIPALITIES IN 1848. 191 England, and up to the commencement of the year 1853 there was no reason whatever to imagine that this ever- igniting Eastern Question would again disturb the peace of Europe. Then came the Crimean War, which is still fresh in the recollection of the present generation. The causes of this war were precisely the same as the causes of all the numerous Eusso-Turkish wars that have occiu-red in the last centiuy and a half — ambition on the one side, mis- government of her subjects and helpless weakness on the other. The pretexts, however, for the contest were numerous and complex, while the manner in which it was eventually brought about and the various negotiations that preceded it would fill a volume if they were faithfully recorded. It will suffice for our present purpose merely to summarise the events as they occurred, and to call atten- tion to the salient points in the military operations. It may be remarked that only on one occasion between the Convention of 1841 and the events immediately pre- •ceding the Crimean War, was there any serious difference between the Comts of St. Petersburg and Constanti- nople. In 1848 the revolutionary fever which pervaded Europe extended also to Wallachia, and this afforded a pretext to Eussia to occupy the Principalities. In conse- quence of this step diplomatic relations were suspended between the Czar and the Porte, but were renewed by the interposition of England in 1849 ; and the Eussian troops were withdrawn. Also by the treaty of May 1st in the same year, signed at Balta Liman, the protective duties 192 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. imposed on the Principalities by Kussian influence were withdrawn, and great commercial prosperity was the result. It is stated that before the end of the year no less than 1,400,000 quarters of wheat were sent to England from the port of Gralatz alone. We now come to the events which brought about the war of 1853. On February 20th of that year Prince Men- chikoff appeared at Constantinople charged with a special mission to the Divan. Neither his own conduct nor that of his followers was conciliatory, and on March 22nd he delivered an imperative demand for a Sened or Conven- tion for a protectorate over the Greek Christians of Turkey. Negotiations of various descriptions continued until May 21st, when Prince Menchikoff and his mission quitted Constantinople, his demands having been refused by the Porte, who in the meantime, however, had issued, as is its custom, many firmans, circulars, and hatti-scherilBfs, and had set on foot active warlike preparations for the ap- proaching appeal to arms. In all the negotiations that were thus going on now and subsequently in the Turkish capital, the French, and more especially the English ambassador. Lord Stratford de Eedcliffe, took an active part ; they both supported the Divan in its refusal to grant the Eussian demands, and further gave proof of their intention to afford material as well as moral support by summoning the fleets on J\me 1 5th to Besika Bay. After the departure of Prince Menchikoff from Con- stantinople there was still an interchange of the accus- RUSSIAN ASSURANCES IN 1853. 193 tomed diplomatic notes and despatches. On May 31st Count Nesselrode, the minister of the Czar, announced in a letter to Eeschid Pacha that, as the demands of the Eussian government had not been acceded to, in a few weeks the Imperial troops would receive orders to cross the Pruth — ^ Not to make war upon a sovereign who has always been considered as a faithful ally, but in order to secure a material guarantee until the Ottoman Grovern- ment should give -those proofs of equity which had hitherto been sought for in vain.' Subsequently, in a despatch dated June 11th, addressed to the ministers and agents of Kussia at foreign courts it was stated that ' His Majesty does not aim at the ruin and destruction of the Ottoman empire, which he himself on two occasions has saved from dissolution. On the contrary, he has always regarded the existing status quo as the best possible com- bination to interpose between European interests, whicli would necessarily clash in the East if a void were actually declared; and that, as far as regards the Eusso-G-reek ]'eligion in Turkey, we have no necessity, in order to secure its interests, of any other rights than those which are already secured to us by our treaties, our position, and the religious sympathy which exists between 50,000,000 Eussians of the Greek persuasion and the great majority of the Christian subjects of the Sultan.' . . . Also: 'After three months of laborious negotiations, and after having exhausted even the last possible concessions, the Emperor is now compelled peremptorily to insist on the uncondi- o 194 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. tional (pur et simple) acceptation of the draft of the note. But still influenced by those considerations of patience and forbearance which have hitherto guided him, he has granted the Porte a fresh reprieve of eight days, in which it has to take its decision. That period passed, pain- ful though it may be to his conciliatory disposition, he will be compelled to think of the means of obtaining, by a more decisive attitude, the satisfaction which he has in vain sought by peaceful means.' Finally, on July 3rd, three Kussian army-corps crossed the Pruth and occupied the Principalities, and now, practi- cally, the war commenced, although the formal declaration was not issued by Turkey before October 23rd, and not until every eflbrt had been made by the usual diplomatic expedients to bring matters to a peaceful issue. While war had been thus threatening, every preparation had been made by the Porte to render itself capable of meet- ing the approaching storm. Affairs, as has been remarked, afforded a remarkable contrast to their condition in the year 1828. While in the days of Sultan Mahmoud half the Mussulman population were disaffected or lukewarm ; now they vied with each other in sacrifices to display their loyalty and to assist their government to the utmost of their power. The support of the Western Powers gave an additional stimulus to Turkish confidence and en- thusiasm ; in fact of the many wars in which, as has been related in the foregoing pages, the Ottoman empire has been engaged with Russia, in none would she have THE OCCUPATION OF THE PRINCIPALITIES. 19.5 iiacl a better chance of contending successfully than in 1853, even supposing she had entered the contest single- handed. It has been suggested that probably, had not the Western Powers interfered and by urging moderation and ■caution on the Divan caused it to lose time, a defence of the Principalities would have been attempted : this appears unlikely, both from the precedents of former wars and from considerations of actual military expediency at the time. Colonel Chesney, who brings forward this view, points out the advantage which, possessing the resources of Moldavia and Wallachia, was conferred on Eussia, and the manner in which the finances of the Ottoman Grovernment and the spirit of its subjects suffered by the dela}^ He acknowledges, however, that not improbably the Turkish troops might have had very soon to abandon the line of the Pruth altogether and retire on the Danube ; imder these circumstances the policy of ever occupying an un- tenable position and squandering an army by useless de- tachments may well be questioned. While Colonel Ches- ney thus argues that the allies conferred a great advantage on Eussia by indirectly being the cause of her occupying the Principalities without resistance, Mr. Kinglake, on the other hand, in his ' History of the Crimean War,' declares that the Emperor Nicholas committed a gross strategic error by occupying Moldavia or Wallachia at •all, as thereby the communications of his army were o 2 196 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. exposed to a flank attack, and as he had imposed the Danube as a boundary on himself he was at a disadvan- tage, for there was no reason whatever why the Turks should in any way limit themsehes to the right bank of tlie river. Omar Pacha was appointed commander-in-chief of the Ottoman army, and his subsequent exploits fally justified the wisdom of the choice. Since the beginning of the period when war seemed inevitable, he had been col- lecting his forces on the right bank of the Danube ; in all, there was a nominal and fairly appointed force of 100,000 men, but from all accounts scarcely more than 70,000 effectives — the main portion of these were posted at Widdin. Prince Gortchakoff, on the other hand, the generalissimo of the Eussians, had about 80,000 men in Wallachia and Moldavia ; but these, as appears always to be the case with Eassian armies in the field, were suffering terribly from sickness. On October 23rd active hostilities commenced by a Eussian flotilla attempt- ing to force a passage up the Danube ; a few days later Omar Pacha crossed the river,^aDd by November 4th had established himself on the left bank at Kalafat on the Upper, and at Turtukai on the Lower Danube ; a similar attempt to sieze Gim-gevo had failed. The check which the Muscovites received in opposing the passage of the Ottoman troops on these occasions had its influence in many ways. It inspirited the Turks to a remarkable degree, and probably was to some extent the cause of ADVICE OF PASKEWITCH. . 197 their making a better stand against their traditional enemies in the actions of this war than in those of the many that preceded it. Omar Pacha also thereby acquired a position of great strategic importance ; it will be seen on referring to the map that while holding Kalafat and Widdin, he entirely outflanked the Eussians, and could seriously molest their communications ; also that his occupation of Turtukai gave him a similar advantage lower down the stream. He could cross the Danube him- self without hindrance, and make incursions on the enemy, while on the other hand he was protected from similar reprisals by the obstacle of the river itself, and by the self-imposed boundary which the Czar had made of it for the action of the Muscovite troops. In these said incur- sions Omar Pacha freely indulged dm-ing the course of the winter, with more or less success, and also he repelled, after a four days' struggle, an attack that was made early in January on the entrenched camp at Kalafat. At last the Emperor Nicholas began to understand that he had committed one of the most fatal errors which can be ■committed in war ; he had lent himself to half-measures, and had thereby incurred all the consequences without deriv- ing any of the advantages of a vigorous offensive. In his difficulties the Czar called the celebrated Paskewitch to his aid, now named Erivanski from his Asiatic conquest of the province of Erivak. This renowned warrior pointed out that the boldest course was likewise the safest, and that the only hope of success lay in a vigorous offen- 198 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. sive. The Lower Danube was to be crossed early in the spring, Silistria was to fall by May 1st, and Lesser Wal- lachia being abandoned, the main army was to press for- ward, as in '28 and '29, on Schumla and the Balkans, tlience to Adrianople, and thence farther, if it could, to the Bosphorus. Before, however, speaking of the events that occurred in the attempted Kussian invasion of 1854, the affair of Sinope on November 30th, 1853, must be re- counted. It must be remarked that, although the Porte liad for- mally declared war against Eussia on October 23rd, the Czar by announcing that he in no way desired to injure the Turks, but only required ' material guarantees,' had to a certain extent debarred himself from hostile operations ; at least this apparently was the view which the Western Powers took of his position, hence their indignation when on the date before named a squadron consisting of seven frigates, and two corvettes was attacked in the bay of Sinope by a Eussian fleet consistmg of six line-of-battle ships, two frigates, and four steamers, and was destroyed. The in- dignation which this action excited in Europe far counter- balanced the material advantage it gave to the Eussians. by the destruction of the Turkish vessels, and exemplifies still further the false position in which the Czar had placed himself by his self-imposed restrictions. The Eussian operations in the spring of 1854 did not commence as early as intended, and in place of having reduced Silistria by May 1st, it was already the 19th of SIEGE OF SILISTRIA IN 1854. 199 that month before Paskewitch appeared before the town. This fortress, stated by Count Moltke to be the worst on the Danube, has nevertheless almost always played an im- portant part in Eusso-Turkish wars. In 1854 the defences had been planned and renewed by an able Prussian engineer and, as is their custom, the Turks turned these defences to the best possible account by the determination and brilliancy of their individual prowess when they were led and commanded by English officers. Notwithstanding that the siege was pressed with great vigour and that Omar Pacha, from some reason hitlierto unexplained, did not march from Schumla where his troops were concen- trated, to its relief, nevertheless the Russians were un- successful, and on June 22nd, barely more than a month after the cutting of their first parallel, they raised the siege and recrossed the Danube. A few days later, on July 7th, the Ottomans had another triumph at Griurgevo ; here, as at Silistria, they were so fortunate as to receive the assistance of British officers. About twelve battalions of Eussian infantry, some squadrons of cavalry, and some guns were encamped at Griiu-gevo, and opposite them at Eustchuk there was a large Turkish force under Hassan Pacha. Apparently the Turkish general had as little inten- tion of making an attack as the Eussian had expectation of receiving one. General Cannon, however, and some other English officers, who arrived in the Ottoman camp, per- suaded the commander to allow some portions of his force to cross the Danube in various places, and to execute what 200 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. Hassan believed to be a reconnaissance, but which in effect turned out to be a bold and skilful offensive movement. In the encounter that followed the Muscovites were worsted, and had to retire, leaving the Turks in possession of the field. Three days later Prince Grortchakoff ap- peared on the scene with his whole army set free from the siege of Silistria ; but in the meantime some British gun- boats had ascended the Danube, under Lieutenant Glyn, and had established a bridge of boats across the river. Probably over-estimating the force before him, the Eus- sian generalissimo abstained from an attack and retired to Bucharest. A short time afterwards, in compliance with a peremptory demand from Vienna, the Principalities were evacuated by the troops of the Czar and replaced by those of the Austrian Emperor, and thus ended the occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia and the campaign on the Danube of 1853 and 1854. In the beginning of September the allied armies, which previously had been concentrated in the neigh- bourhood of Varna, set sail for the Crimea. On the 14th and four subsequent days they landed, and oa the 20th the battle of the Alma was fought. From henceforth until the close of the war in 1856 the contest became one of the Western Powers against Eussia, and no longer continued to be a Turkish war. The details of the campaign in all its phases have been fully and ably recounted elsewhere, and it is no way part of our present task to enter into them. As before remarked, it is im- THE SIEGE OF KARS. 201 probable that the Crimean experiment will be again repeated. If a landing is at any future time attempted on the Eussian coast of the Black Sea it will be only as a diversion, and will be distinct from the main and decisive operations of the campaign. It only now remains to notice shortly the campaign in Asia, which ended in the capture of Kars by the Eussians. In July 1854 Lieutenant-Colonel Williams, now Sir Fen- ^vick Williams, was appointed by the British Grovernment to accompany the Turkish forces in Asia Minor. He joined the army at Kars on September 14th ; it then had a nomi- nal strength of 28,000 men — some of whom were twenty- two months in arrears of pay. The Eussians had previously been preparing an invasion of Turkish territory, and a powerful army under Greneral Mouravieff appeared before Kars in the summer of 1855. On June 16th the first attack was made on the fortress but was repulsed ; by the middle of July the place was invested, and on September 21st an attempt was made to carry the place by assault : this also failed ; and notwithstanding fearful sufferings and hardships the heroic garrison held out until November 26th, when they were allowed to march out with all the honours of war. While the siege of Kars was proceeding, an army had been despatched under Omar Pacha to effect its relief. Unfortunately the delay in assembling this army was so great and apparently its movements were so unnecessarily slow, that it arrived too late to effect the object for which it had been intended. About 20,000 202 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. men were landed at Kedoute-Kaleli in September, and by October 28th the Tm'kish commander had got together altogether about 30,000 men ; 20,000 of these were available for field operations, and proceeded to move on the Russian communications. On November 6th, they had reached the river Ingoun, where they met a force of Russians of greatly inferior numbers, and succeeded in repelling them. After this successful action, Omar Pacha apparently rested on his laurels, and we hear no more of him or his army of relief during the remainder of the war. Early in 1856 negotiations were set on foot for peace between Russia and the Allied Powers. On March 30th the treaty of Paris was signed ; by it Russia relinquished a small portion of territory in Bessarabia, thus abandoning^ all control over the Danube. She likewise subscribed to various other conditions, by far the most important of which were the neutralisation of the Black Sea. As these articles were repudiated in 1870, they are given in ex- tenso as follows : — 'Art. 11. — La mer Noire est neutralisee ; ouverts a la marine marchande de toutes les nations, ses eaux et ses ports sont, formellement et a perpetuite, interdits au pavilion de guerre, soit des puissances riveraines, soit de toute autre puissance, sauf les exceptions mentionnees aux articles 14 et 19 du present traite. 'Art. 12. — Libre de toute entrave, le commerce, dans les ports et dans les eaux de la mer Noire, ne sera assu- jetti qu'a des reglements de sante, de douane, de police. TREATY OF PARIS. 203^ conpus dans un esprit favorable au developpement des transactions commerciales. ' Pour donner aux interets commerciaux et maritimes de toutes les nations la securite desirable, la Russie et la Sublime Porte admettront des consuls dans leurs ports situes sur le littoral de la mer Noire, conformement aux principes du droit international. ' Art. 1 3. — La mer Noire etant neutralisee, aux termes de I'article 11 , le main ti en ou Tetablissement sur son littoral d'arsenaux militaires-maritimes devient sans necessite comme sans objet. En consequence, Sa Majeste I'Em- pereur de toutes les Russies et Sa Majeste imperiale le Sultan s'engagent a n'elever et a ne conserver sur ce littoral aucun arsenal militaire-maritime.' .204 HUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. CHAPTER X. THE RESOURCES AND ARMED STRENGTH OF RUSSIA AND TURKEY AT THE PRESENT TIME. Events connected with Eastern Question from Treaty of Paris up to Present Time — The Kussian Army — Eussian Railroads — Roumania, Servia, Montenegro, and Greece — Resources of Turkey — Turkish Army We have carried the history of the various and many wars between Kussia and Turkey up to the close of the great contest in the Crimea, which resulted in the treaty of Paris. From the date on which this was signed up to 1870 affairs in the East wore a most tranquil aspect. Russia, deprived of the power of organising hostile arma- ments in the Black Sea, devoted herself to internal re- forms and to the construction of railways, which unhappily for the country through which they run, and for those who advanced money to further their development, were laid down solely on strategic principles without any regard to their commercial utility, or to the convenience of the inhabitants for whose use they were nominally intended. It must, however, be mentioned that before Russia had had time to recover from the exhaustion consequent on the struggle she maintained for two years against the THE POLISH INSURRECTION. 205 Western Powers, she had to undergo a trial which, if any- thing, tested her strength and paralysed her resources even more than, or certainly as much as, almost any of the external wars in which during the course of her history she has so frequently been engaged. In 1863 there was a Polish insurrection, or rebellion it might more properly be termed. So serious was this out- break, and so strong and even savage were the measm-es taken to repress it, that intervention was meditated and even proposed by some of the other European Powers. The Emperor Napoleon suggested a conference to settle the affairs of Eussia, just as a conference was recently proposed to settle the affairs of Turkey. Eventually he was not supported, the idea of the conference fell through, and the Polish rebellion was crushed with a high hand ; probably the stories of Eussian atrocities at the time were in a gTeat measure fabricated or exaggerated, but that they were fully credited in this country is proved by the indignation meetings that were held throughout the country to pro- test with that warmth of heart that characterises the English people against oppression and barbarous cruelty. It may be added that in 1865 there was a Druse and Maronite war in Syria, which was suppressed by a tem- porary occupation of French troops. During this period the Turk was indulging in the, to him novel, amusement of borrowing money from other nations, and of wasting it on himself; not indeed that the waste was novel, but the power of borrowing was one of 506 HUSSIAX WARS WITH TURKEY. the many advantages which he derived from the Crimean War. Had the money thus freely lent him been fairly or profitably expended, the Turkish empire might now be in a flourishing condition, and its inhabitants might be contented and well-doing. As it is, there are nothing but some ironclads, some big guns, and a number of im- perial palaces to show for the vast sums of which foreign bondholders have been robbed. Thus fourteen years passed away almost without inci- dent, so far as the Eastern Question was concerned. In 1870, however, as soon as the fall of Metz was announced, Kussia, without further warning, gave notice to her re- presentatives at foreign courts that there were some clauses in the treaty of Paris which she must decline to consider any longer binding. The clauses referred to were those given above, and which relate to the neutralisation of the Black Sea. After some negotiations, her demands were acceded to ; at the time England and perhaps Austria were the only two Powers who were in a position to offer even a protest at this sudden and high-handed announce- ment. Both Grermany and France were far too busily engaged to enter into such matters ; Austria pursued her accustomed policy of a masterly inactivity, and the Grovern- ment of the day in England, which was the power above all others affected by the proposed concession, apparently did not realise the magnitude of the point they then with- out difficulty yielded. As it happens, the finances of Russia have lately been too embarrassed, and the time has THE RUSSIAN ARMY. 207 l^een too short to enable her to profit hy the great privi- lege which she then gained without effort or clanger. She is still comparatively powerless in the Black Sea, and as yet there is no great arsenal, like Sebastopol, either to menace Constantinople or to shelter the fleet which doubt- less in the course of a few years she will not fail to create. In considering, therefore, the resources of the two ancient and traditional combatants, should they again come to blows, we have only to consider the land forces of Eussia ; her fleet is now so inferior in point of numbers to that of Turkey, that it may be left out of the question. In estimating the forces of Eussia, it must be remem- bered that there is much on paper that does not exist in reality, and that her military system is now in a transition state. The following extracts from some articles that re- cently appeared in the Times give in a concise form an account of her army, and of the methods in which it is raised. The author is not responsible for these articles himself, nor does he know who wrote them ; as, however, they appear to be specially valuable, he ventures to make some extracts. There are at present at work in Russia two different sys- tems. The old one was in use up to 1874 ; the new one is not yet, and will not for a long tirae be in working order. Both systems are complicated, and we must endeavom- to avoid con- fusing the reader with too many details. Let us begin with the old system. Though we have marked the division between the two systems in force by the year 1874, the reform, or re-orga- 208 EUSSTAN WARS WITH TURKEY. nisation, was projected several years back, and to prepare for ifc many changes had been made. The Russian soldier was always a conscript, but before the reign of the pi-esent Emperor he was genei'ally a conscript foi- the tei-m of his working life. By de- grees modifications were made. Service was reduced step by step as to its dm-ation ; thei-efore to keep up the same number of men in the ranks more recruits had to be taken, in propor- tion to the reduction in length of service. At last, in 1870, under the administration of the very clever and liberal-minded ^Minister of War, General Milutine, the principle of general sei'vice prevailing in Germany was adopted, except for the Cos- sacks, a force more or less ii-regular and very tenacious of its privileges. Since then an attempt has been made to apply the law to them, and even out of the depths of the Czar's dominions have come reports of resistance to the execution of the decree. To give a notion of what such a step means, we can only fancy the result of a general conscription of Sikhs and Ghoorkas in. India, or of the Scotch Highlanders 200 years ago. The orga- nisation of the Cossacks will be described hereafter ; for the pi-esent it must suffice to say that they have always been con- sidered as h-regulai- troops, having then- o^m officers, manners and customs. The new law for recruiting may possibly have affected the strength of the army between 1870 and 1874, but to avoid confusion we will take as the old system that which pi-e vailed up to 1870, and continued to be in force nominally until the new one was introduced. Up to the beginning of the year 1874 the military forces of Russia were divided into three distinct parts : — 1. The Regular Ai'my ; 2. The Irregular Army ; 3. The Imperial Militia, or General Levy. The Regular Army was fm-ther divided into : — A. Tlie Field Troops, or Active Army ; B. The Reserve Troops ; C. The Sedentaiy, or Local Troops. THE RUSSIAN ARMY. 200 {a). The Field Troops, or Active Army, consisted of 188 regiments of infantry, 32 battalions of rifles, and 48 frontier battalions, 56 regiments of cavaliy, 310 batteries of ai-tilleiy, 3 of which were mountain artillery and 47 mitrailleuse batteries, 11 battalions of sappers, 6 half-battalions of pontoniers (or bridge equipage), 6 parks of military telegraphs, 28 half-parks of field artillery (doubled in time of war), 7 half-parks of horse artillery, 2 parks of siege artillery, and 47 divisional ambu- lances. {b). The Reserve Troops. — These we find variously esti- mated by different general staffs ; the latest gives one cadre per regiment of infantry, 56 squadrons of cavalry, 7 batteries of artillery, and 4 battalions of sappers. (c). The Sedentary, or Local Troops. — These consisted of fortress troops, including 25 battalions of infantry, 59 com- panies of artillery, increased to 9 1 on a war footing ; ti-oops for interior duty, including 72 Government battalions and about 600 district detachments which were charged with etappen duties, the maintenance of order, tkc. ; troops of instruction, in- cluding one battalion, one squadron, two batteries, and one company of electricians. This is a sufiiciently elaborate organisation for the militai-y forces of a nation which desires to be early in the field, and a few explanations are necessaiy before it can be understood. First, with regard to the Active Army. Some of the regiments consisted of three battalions, others of four. Each cavalry le- giment had four squadrons besides the one squadron counted in the Reserve. The frontier battalions garrisoned the military districts of Orenburg and Western and Eastern Siberia, consti- tuting, with the Cossacks, the military force of those disti-icts. Others, quai'tered in the Caucasus or Turkistan, gaiiisoned the fortresses and, if called upon, had to take the field with the P 210 RVSSIAN WAIiS WITH TVRKF.Y. rest of the Active Army. Twenty-four were in the Caucasus,, two in Orenburg, four in Western Siberia, six in Eastern Si- beria, and twelve in Turkistan. They had four companies each, and one company of rifles. Each battery of field artillery had in peace four gims horsed, and in war eight guns. Horse ai-tillery batteries had all theii- eight guns horsed in peace, but had only two waggons and reduced detachments. The battalion of Sappers had each four companies, and consisted on a war footing of 900 rank and file per battalion. The pontoniers wei-e for bridge-making, and each half-battalion had 240 pontoniers on a war footing, made up to a total of 424 by officers, chivers, kc. It carried 26 iron pontoons and 12 trestles, so that it could build a military bridge 700 feet m. length. The field and horse aitillery pai'ks are for the supply of ammunition, Ijoth for ai-tilleiy and infantry, and for the refitment of the batteries. The use of siege artillery and ambulance parks is too well known to need explanation. The organisation of transport for the Intendance was left to be organised Lq time of war ac- cording to the ciixumstances of the case, and this was clearly a defect. The Reserve Troops were employed to traiu recruits and horses and supply the losses of the army in peace and war. They were distributed throughout the vaiious military districts. The Sedentary Troops were used for garrisons and for keep- ing order in the districts. For the latter pm-pose the Govern- ment battalions, Circle detachments, and othei-s act as police guards, &c. Let us now glance at that exti-aordiuaiy and peculiaiiy Kussian force — the Cossacks, or Irregular troops. These A^dld horsemen — for though there are some Cossack Infantiy they aie quite subordinate in interest to the great force of Cavalry — possass certain pri^dleges which they hold by tenure of military THE RUSSIAN ABMY. 211 service. With the exception of an insignificant portion, they pi'ovide their own equipment for war. They have not been subjected to the oi-dinary militaiy organisation of the empire, nor obliged to fight in other than their old wild way. They have even a difl:erent system of outpost duty from that of the regular ti-oops. Their dress is diflerent, they ride hoi'ses which would almost be called ponies in England, and are but little dependent on supplies carried by trains labouiing in the rear of the army. Unencumbered by baggage, unless it be the spoils taken from the enemy, and going home to their savage wives and children, they can march almost incredible distances, hang round the front, flanks, and rear of an enemy's army like files buzzing about the head of a trotting horse. They can intercept convoys and keep troops guarding the communications of an army always on the alert. Woe betide the stragglers of an army which invades Russian territory! The Cossacks aie of various tribes and cannot all be sent away from theii- homes even in war. Those of the Caucasus were used against the Cir- cassians, and, frequently mating themselves with stolen beauties who seem equally at home in a Sultan's harem or a Cossack's hut, produced by far the handsomest race in Kussia. In 1812- 14 these strange horsemen formed a chain of posts from the Seine to the Don to carry off systematically works of art and other booty from Paris. Their horses are as intelligent as dogs. Their pace is the gallop, and they will go on for many miles over rough country with noses lowered almost to the ground, picking their way like packs of hounds ; or they will remain perfectly quiet while their masters stand ei'ect on the saddle to survey the surrounding country. If om^ Heavy Cavaliy a:e called big men on big horses, the Cossacks are essentially little, but strong men on little horses. But where the horse of a Scots p 2 212 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TVRKEY. Grey or Tnniskilling would starve, the Cossack pony flourishes. Of little use for a chai-ge, they ai-e wondeiful as light cavalry, and obey orders with submission and alacrity. Only they will execute the commands in their own way, and we have previously i-emarked that repoi'ts of resistance to the imposition of a new law of service have reached this country. They are divided into several tribes, the Cossacks of the Don, who alone are liable to general service everywhere, the Kuban Cossacks, the Cossacks of the Terek, the Astrakan Cos- sacks, the Orenburg Cossacks, the Cossacks of the Ural and of Siberia, the Siemiryechensk and Transbaikal Cossacks, and the Cossacks of the Amur. The Cossacks of the Don, the Kuban Cossacks, the Ural Cossacks, and the Cossacks of the Terek fur- nish detachments foi' the guard of the Czar, and have a certain proportion always ready for service in time of peace ; the rest are only available in war, and then only for local and frontier defence. Among iii-egular troops must be included a militia of about 5,000 men formed in the provinces of the Caucasus, who also furnish thiee squacbons for the Czar's guard. The Cossacks ai-e all formed in polks or regiments, and each jyolk is divided into different numbers of sotnias or hundi-eds, usually either six or fom*. Since the gi-eatest interest attaches to the Cossacks of the Don, we will pay particular attention to them. The Cossacks of the Don include the regiment of Cossacks of the Guard and the Ataman Regiment of the Guard, which together number about 2,320 men and very nearly the same numbei- of horses, and are each foi-med in six squadrons ; the Hereditary Gi-and Duke Eegiment, which has also six squad- rons ; besides 64 polks of Don Cossacks having six sotnias each, numbering each 924 men and 894 horses when mobilised ; and an Instiuction j^olk. They have theii- own artillery, which THE BUSSIAX ARMY. 213 consists of one horse battery of the Guard and 13 field batteries, numbered from 1 to 13. The horse battery of the Guard has foiu' guns in peace, but when ready for war has 12 guns, and is divided in two half-batteries for the field and one half-battery for reserve. Nor are the ordinary field batteries of the Don Cossacks complete in peace. They have only two guns till they are called out for war, when they receive the rest of theii^ guns and equipments from stoi-e at Kiev, being made up to eight giuis per battery, with their ammunition waggons and stores. But it must not be supposed that the 64 sotnias of Don Cos- sacks, or even the Guard, are continually in a state of readiness for war. About a tliird only are employed in Finland and in the districts of Wai-saw, Vilna, Odessa, and Kiev. At St. Petersburg thei'e are only a division from each Guard regiment and one half-battery of the Guard. The remainder ai-e at home on furlough, ready to take their turn of duty. When war comes, not the 64 polks only can be called out and mobilised, the whole of the j^olhs are ordered to the war, and such men as are not caused to fight in the ranks are yet armed and consi- dered available at least for home defence, because every Don Cossack is liable to do military duty at any time. This seems a severe tax on their time and Kves, yet they bear it cheerfully as an ancient custom, though they object to the modern form of general service. Their ch-ess is a tunic, loose baggy trousers, a cloak, and a sheepskin cap. Other Cossacks have fiu- caps. The arms of the Don Cossacks and several other tribes consist of pikes, Circassian swords, and rifled carbines. Cimously enough, only the Cossacks of the Guard wear spurs, but, perhaps, they would find it difficult to use them, for they have a peculiar seat on horseback with theii' legs tucked up very high. The artil- lery wear the same dress as the cavalry, and are armed with Circassian sword and pistol. The swoi'd is worn in the belt. 214 I^rSS'IAX WAJRS WITH TURKEY. The hoi'se equipments consist of blanket, wooden saddle-tree, liorse-rng, chahraque, two leathern wallets, and a forage rojje. The Ural Cossacks of the Guard indulge in the luxmy of a valise. The usual regimental train of most nations is repre- sented among the Cossacks by only one waggon per regiment, but a pack animal is allowed for every ten men in war, and we are much mistaken if it is not sometimes pretty well laden with Ijooty. It would hardly I'epay the trouble of the reader if we were to enter into a description of the rest of these wild feudal sol- diers, especially because they do not a])pear in war, though their watch over the home country frees forces which would other- wise have to do duty in distiicts or garrisons. The main point to be remembered is that on the outbreak of war Russia can always flood an enemy's country with almost savage hoi-semen, who have none of the mild traditions of ciAT.lised warfare, and would act according to their untamed nature. They could never stand against moderately good regular cavaliy ; but they can move so far and so fast, galloping over slippery stony paths, appearing and disappearing without any sense of shame at re- treating, that they would be as unmanageable by regular ca- valiy as little boys are by a policeman. If England were ever in collision with liir^sia, the best answer to the Cossacks could be given by bi-inging over some of the corres]3onding cavalry which exists under her hand or that of her great feudatories in India. The Turkomans, also from Central Asia, are horsemen of much the same chai-acter. It is imjjossible to give the exact strength of the Don Cossacks for war, since it is govei-ned, not by any special organisation, but by the number of men who can actually be taken. During the Crimean war 84 2^olks were called out, and if we take the strength of a j)olk at 900 men, this would give more than 75,000 men, besides the regular THE -RUSSIAN ARMY. 215 cavalry. AVe do not know the actual state of tlie controversy as to change of organisation, but it is probable that the arrange- ments which prevailed up to quite lately would hardly be over- thiown on the eve of a campaign. What there is of Cossack Infantry belongs to tribes which do not march with the field army in time of war, and they have no special reputation. Having thus spoken of the Cossacks and irregular troops, who have always played such a great part in Kus- sian wars, we will turn to the regular army and see how far the system on which it is raised coincides with that now adopted by other Continental Powers. One of the results of the 1870 campaign in France was to cause all European nations to reorganise their armies. Kussia was no exception to this rule. Universal military service was at once introduced, and committees were appointed to draw up a law for regulating it ; to quote the words of the same writer in the Times : — This law, known to be drawn up in 1873, and published everywhere in 1874, did not come into actual operation till January 1, 1875. It was based upon the compulsion of eveiy Russian subject to form part of the mihtary system, without power to furnish a substitute for his personal ser\dce. What did this mean 1 The population of Russia is said to reach the enormous figure of 82,000,000 souls, of whom about 76,000,000 are in Europe. When the men suitable by theii' age for military service came to be reckoned, it was found that there were 6,000,000 of them. Estimating that one-third would have to be exempted on account of physical incapacity oi- other valid reasons, there still remained 4,000,000 sturdy men able to fight at the bidding 216 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. of the Czar. But no country, least of all Russia, could face the expense of training so vast a body of soldiers, nor could they be taken from their homes without greater pressure than even now exists upon the labour of the country. The number to be taken is terrible enough, amounting as it does on paper to nearly 2,000,000, without inchiding the militia ; but that num- ber will not be even partially trained for several years to come, and it is very doubtful whether the Imperial finances could stand the strain. If the men are ever pro\dded, they cannot be armed, clothed, trained, and put in the field without an ex- penditure of which Russia is not likely to be capable in our time. The very efibrt to do so will cripple her and add to the general difficulty of the task she has set before her. HowcA^er, the organisation has been decreed, and is being carried out as far as it can be, and we will now give the principal facts con- cerning it. Personal military service is compulsory on every Russian from the age of twenty ; but this provision did not apply to the Cossacks, who were to have a special organisation little different from their former irregular and half- voluntary service. The number of men actually taken as soldiers in each year — the 'contingent,' as it is called — may vary accordmg to cii'cum- stances, and this is in itself a hardsliij). But whatever it be for a particular year, it is divided into two unequal parts, 25 per cent, of the recruits being taken for the field army, and 75 per cent, for the local troops, which are destined to form the re- serves. The 25 per cent, taken for the field army have to give fifteen years of service, six of which are supposed to be passed with the colours, though in reality the men are on furlough during the fifth and sixth years. Up to tlie end of the eighth year they belong to the 1st Resei-ve, and foi- the next four years to the 2nd Reserve, which is intended to form battalions ready THE RUSSIAN ARMY. 217 to supply losses in the field, and thus feed the active army. The remaiQing three years of service are to be passed in another portion of the Eeserve liable to be used as cii-cumstances may direct. The 1st Eeserve fills up the regiments when mobilisa- tion is ordered ; the 2nd Reserve supplies losses in the field or hospital ; the remainder may either be used like the 2nd Re- serve, or form new divisions if required. But the 75 per cent, do not escape scot free. They also serve for fifteen years, but only in their own districts, where they undergo a certain amount of instruction, and in case of war are called up to form local reserves. When the fifteen years of service are past, all the men of the contingent fall for the next five years into the Reichswehr, which also includes all Russians not forming part of any of the annual contingents. These also owe service to the Czar from tlieii- twentieth to fortieth year of age, only they ^vill not be called upon to take the field unless the crisis requires their services. Volunteers, as in Germany and France, may join the service earlier than theii' twenty-first year, and will only be kept in the ranks for a period varying from three months to two years, according to theii' education and military aptitude. A lad may A'olunteer when he is seventeen years old, and go home before he is eighteen. This institution of short service volunteers is a sort of safety-valve, guarding against the pressure of universal liability upon the well-to-do classes. It takes the place of the old system of substitutes, and, while allowing none of the contingent to escape personal service, makes that service as easy as possible. The Reserves, after their first training, may be called up twice to attend manoeuvres, but cannot be kept longer than six weeks for each mancEuvre. The Reichswehr cannot be called out at all in time of peace. If the new organisation were in full working order, which it can- not be for some years to come, and if all expectations are veri- 218 JiT'SSIAX VrARS WITH TURKEY. fied by facts, the Russian ai-my would stand about as follows, including Cossacks : — Field Ai-my .... First Reserve .... Second and last Reserve . Cossacks 755,000 men. 110,000 „ . 'J00,000 „ 180,000 „ Total .... . 1, -145,000 „ The Reicliswehr is expected to reach the figure of about 1,500,000 men (250,000 being old soldiers), wliich would bring the Russian military forces to a total of nearly three millions and a half of armed men, or nearly two millions more than were available for war according to the old organisation. If we count only the 250,000 old soldiers of the Reichswehr as being really effective, there would still remain the terrible incubus of nearly 2,200,000 strong men destined for the trade of war. At present the numbers do not nearly reach this enormous figure. The war strength of Russia was on paper, in 1874, 1,579,268 men, out of whom the cavalry formed no less than 1.217 squadrons, and the ai-tillery possessed 2,728 guns. Of these about 1,150,000 were in Europe, more than 200,000 in the Caucasus, nearly 125,000 in Asia. The general services of the army accounted for the i-est. Omitting the sedentary troops from the calculation, the ELiroj)ean Army was supposed to have of field troops and reserA^es about 755,000 and 250,000 respectively : in the Caucasus there were about 170,000 field troops and 23,300 reserves. The new organisation has given even a higher proportionate number for the army intended to act in Em-ope. We find that the original estimate was, without counting either non-combatants or last i-eserve, or garrison troops or Reichswehi- : — For Europe, about 27,500 officers and 1,025,000 men; Caucasus, 3,600 officers and 13,600 THE RUSSIAN ARMY. 219 men; Turkestan and Orenburg, 1,000 ojfficers and 42,000 men; Siberia, 850 officers and 45,000 men. These numbers ai-e given roughly, and do not even include the combatant Staff". They are, however, merely imaginary as far as tbe present crisis is concerned, and we should probably exaggerate Russia's militaiy power if we wei-e to take the esti- mate of the old organisation as our guide, and give her 755,000 field troops with reserve of 250,000 as the army in Europe was supposed to stand in 1874. The Austrians study Russia, very carefully. A book on the strength of her army, published by the Austrian General Staff* in 1871, and translated for the English War Office, gave a strength of 534,960 infantry, 92,474 cavalry, and 1,572 guns as the movable army for offensive opera- tions in Europe, with a strategical i-esei've of 83,440 combatants. The same writer in the Times, from whose articles the above extracts are made, gives the following informa- tion regarding the quality and personnel of the troops that form the cadres already described : — Of all the European states Russia is the best supplied with horses. No less than 16,000,000 of one sort or another exist vv?-ithin the donunions of the Czar, and, exportation being difficult, their price is low, averaging about 20/. They are for the most part small and rough in appearance, but extremely hardy, and capable of picking up a subsistence where most troopers would starve. This fact makes mobilisation easier than it is among more civilised communities, and the same re- mark applies to almost all the necessaries of an army. Russia is also well provided with artillery of a modern type, breech- loaders of a system superior to that of the Germans in the late war, and closely resembling the new German model. The pieces bear a high proportion to the numbers of infantry and 220 RUSSIAN WABS WITH TURKEY. cavalry — namely, about 3J per thousand. One of the most striking measures adopted by the Czar in view of the tactics in 1S66 and 1870-71 was the increase of cavalry and field artil- lery, and there exists a school of tacticians who believe that horsemen and guns will play a greater paii; in future wars than has yet been generally supposed. But cavalry are of compara- tively little use iii hilly countries, and, supposing Bulgaria occupied by the Noi-thern army, the chain of the Balkans would have to be passed before fui-ther progress could be made towards Constantinople. Guns do not constitute the whole value of an artillery force; and unless the Kussian artillery — removed as it is from the quickening influence of competition with other nations — has improved vastly since we last saw it about seven years ago, it is exti-emely slow in movement, and altogether inferior to the iirfantry. It has never yet achieved a reputation comparable with that of Germany, Austria, England, or France in her old days. We are, however, anxious to insist on the fact that while the enormous paper forces of Russia cannot for the present be put in the field, she has ample means of all kinds, lioth in men and weapons, for a campaign against Turkey. The infantiy are armed with breech-loaders, the last and best pattern being the Berdan rifle, of which there are sufficient for her pre- sent purpose, even if that purpose be beyond a mere occupation of Bulgaria. The same may be said of engineers' bridge equi- page and train, and the new organisation provides for a full supply of these. It is probable that these services are not at present all on the spot where they are needed, but we must again remember that Russia is mobilising her army at leisure, and is under no pressiu-e such as ruined the French in 1870. She has also for some time been oiganising railway battalions, to which, besides their own officei-s, will be attached both officers and men from the engineers and the rest of the army. Tele- THE BUSSIAX ABMY. 221 -graph parks have been established, each of which will have 306 men in time of war. Each park is divided into three sections. The fii'st section will move with the army of operation, taking with it thii'teen carriages laden \dt}i materials for theii' mai-- velloiis work. The second section will constitute a resei-ve with ten cai-riages, and the third section will have the dutv of keeping up the communication between these active sections and the State telegi^aph lines. All this is very different from the dull Russian army of the Crimean war. The Cossacks of the Don, who used to be entirely irregular, but alone of all the Cossacks were available for general service in war, are now supposed to be on a more regular footing and are intended to be formed in regiments. Tliey used to supply their own horses and equipment in time of war. The Russian Government now offers to take either the whole or a part of this expense off theii- hands ; but, as we mentioned in a previous article, there are i-umoui-s that these wild horsemen object to be caught and tamed, even though the hook be golden. The Cos- sacks of Asia will remain, as formerly, ii^regular troops. The whole teriitory of Russia is divided into fourteen gi-eat military circumscriptions, ten of which are in Europe and four in Asia ; the Cossacks of the Don form a special circumscription. Each of the circumscriptions is divided into four divisional dis- tricts, which comprise several governments, and these again are subdivided into recruiting ciixles. The whole of this arrange- ment has been based upon the distribution of the field and local troops, the condition of the commimications, and also upon geo- giaphical considerations. A general officer commands each cu-- cumscription and administei-s its military as well as its political affairs. Each division of the army, when mobib'sed, is to recei%e one regiment of Don Cossacks, and each army corps will have one division of cavahy. But the army corps have no organisa- 222 BUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. tion in time of peace ; they have to be formed freshly with all theii- special trains and equipments when war is determined upon. Hence ai-Lses a necessity to mobilise long before the armies are to march. In this respect Russia is on a very dif- ferent footing from Gei-many, which would put off mobilisation to the last moment, certain to be in time at last, whei-eas it is very improbable that Russia could mobilise a large force under at least a month, and we cannot but believe that hei- prepara- tions are not yet on so great a scale as would be necessary if the words of the Czar were untrue, and he had formed the deli- berate intention of marching his army to Constantinople. We have now given all the leading facts which seem neces- sary foi- a general comprehension of Russian oi'ganisations for war. To enter into fui-ther details would be confusing to the general i-eader and might mislead the student, for the greatest of all facts to be had in remembrance is that the present events find her in such a state of change as must hamper her own movements, and leave uncertain whether any particular part of the organisation will be worked on the new or the old system. But before quitting the subject of the Russian army we must say a few words as to the flesh and blood of which it is composed. In the first place the law of general service cannot possibly have leavened the mass of the army with men of superior intel- lio-ence. Education is behindhand in Russia, and the mass of the old recruits were dull and heavy, incapable of fighting in any othei- formation than that of the column, whereby every man was supported in spirit by the comrades round him. It remains to be seen whether the tactics rendered necessary by modern firearms can be practised with success by the Russian troops in war. The few intelligent men who may find them- r.olves in the ranks must be swallowed up among the mass of THE RUSSIAN ARMY. 223 ignorance. It is impossible that there can be many of them yet, for the best of them will be volunteers who have had only three to six months' training, and there can be little doubt that, behind the veil of her exclusiveness, Russia conceals a system by which her educated sons take care to escape among those who ai-e either not included in the annual contingent, or, at least, slip out of the net, which has meshes big enough to favour the escape of 75 per cent, of those named. Still the Muscovite soldier is not to be despised. If he is intemperate and of a dogged temper, he is at least hardy for the first few years of his life, and learns to shift for himself without the constant super- vision held to be wiser in Western armies. There is, however, a wrong side to this picture. As his oificer is no special Pro- vidence to him and the use of the stick is not unusual, the goodwill that exists in the English army between officers and men is unknown in Kussia. Again, recent changes and increases of the army have tended to lower the position of the officer more than the attempt at higher education has raised it. Up to 1866 the position of officer in the army was an appanage of nobility ; the new law has thrown open the commissioned ranks of the Army to all Russian subjects who are capable of passing certain educational tests. jSTow, we by no means side with that influ- ential party in Russia which has for years insisted that the Czar, by adopting the reforms suggested by General Miliutine, has been playing into the hands of the immense democratic forces known to exist in spite of general service, a wealthy aristocracy, and an army of secret police. But it may be doubted whether a country and an army which have recently undergone such vast and organic changes are in a position to sustain with equanimity and steadiness anything like a defeat, or even a severe check. The average Russian soldier nevei- sees a gi-eat toM'n, never learns what civilisation and mental trainini?: reallv mean. Un- 224 RUSSIAN WABS WITH TURKEY. foi'tiinately the same fate befalls the bulk of the officers, most of whom pass neai-ly the whole of their lives in barbarous regions, where society, ns we know it, hardly exists, and where the cravings raised by a certain amount of education cannot be fed with theii- propel- food, but stiiv'e to quench themselves in strong drink and gross forms of sensuality. We are far from saying that this is a universal picture, but all who know the Russian army insist that it ls not uncommon. As the superstition with which nobility used to be regarded dies out of the nature of the Russian soldier, he is likely to be critical upon such so-called education as leaves his officer only better than himself in that he can afford a greater amount of sensual pleasures. Officers are promoted by seniority up to and including the i-ank of Lieutenant-Colonel. The Czar then selects for the higher ranks until the officer be- comes a General, when seniority again comes into play. The rank of Field-Marshal is, as usual, reserved for those who have rendered the highest services at the head of armies in the field. The officers of the Old Guard count two gi-ades higher than their comrades of the Line. Officei-s of the other Guai-d i-egiments take rank with the Staff — namely, one grade higher than regi- mental officers of the same standing. To become eligible for the Staff, an officer must have passed through a certain course of ti-aining in the military schools, and most j^raiseworthy efforts are l3eing made by the Czar to spread a higher education throughout all the ranks of the ai-my. The above gives a fair idea of the Russian army in its normal condition ; when, however, we attempt to discover the actual amount of forces which she could bring into action for offensive purposes we are almost entirely in the dark. So much secrecy is used in connection with all state matters in the ^luscovite empire ; newspapers are so RUSSIAN RAILWAYS. 225 quickly and relentlessly suspended for publishing informa- tion regarding the army, and moreover there is so much corruption and mismanagement among officials, that any statements regarding actual effective numbers must be almost entirely derived from conjecture. There are, how- ever, some essential points connected with the means she possesses for putting her vast forces into motion, such as must not be overlooked, and regarding which we have tolerably full information. The great defect and weakness of Eussia is the ab- sence of proper communications throughout her vast and, as a rule, sterile territories. It was hoped that railways w^ould remedy these deficiencies, and they have hitherto always been regarded as the means by which the Mus- covite empire would attain a power and importance un- equalled since the days of the Eomans. Unfortunately, the bane of many countries — military despotism — has made its hurtful influence visible in the matter of rail- ways, as in m^y other affairs. We learn from an article published by the ' Grazette of the Grerman Eailway Association' that the lines now exist- ing in Eussia are of the most inconvenient and unsatis- factory description. All those in the south and south-west, with the exception of the portion between Odessa and Eazdelnaia, a distance of seventy kilometres, are only single lines, and have stations at great distances from each other. Thus the number of trains that can travel on them is necessarily most limited. Sixteen kilometres is the least Q 226 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. distance between stations on the line from Kharkow to Nikolaiew, and eighteen kilometres on the lines from Kiew to Best and from Landvarovo-Eomuy, twenty kilometres on the Loyovo-Sebastopol line, while the maximum dis- tance sometimes attains twenty-five kilometres. The in- convenience of these long distances is self-evident, more especially as there is but a small supply of rolling-stock ; and it is calculated that it would be quite impossible to despatch more than twelve trains per day, and this number only if all went well and worked without mistake or mis- carriage. The general manner, moreover, in which the lines are laid out is most unfortunate and mistaken ; they avoid all the large towns as being difficult to protect, and pass through forests and steppes, which contain often neither water, food, nor shelter. The celebrated line from Moscow to St. Petersburg and the line of the Crimea are cited as examples of this. In addition, moreover, to mistaken designing in the first instance, the railways themselves are badly laid do^vn, the permanent way is infamous, and the curves very sharp, so as to preclude the possibility of very long trains or a rapid rate of speed. Also the entire system is now only partially developed ; for instance, the whole region between the towns of Kiew, Brest-Setowski, Minsk, and KowotofF, a tract larger than Belgium and Holland combined, has not a single line through it. There is also another serious objection — the absence of a proper supply of water, which is indispensable for the supply of the locomotives and for FOSSIBLE RUSSIAN ALLIES. 2i>7 the use of passengers, whether human beings or animals. Aqueducts and reservoirs have been constructed, but these require to be kept perpetually full, and their failure at any point might cause an enormous amount of obstruc- tion and delay. The stations, moreover, are of the most meagre description, and there are no sheds, accommoda- tion, or shelter for troops, such as they would of necessity require in the long journeys to be made through Kussia in the event of a concentration on the southern frontier. The last point noted is the absence of an efficient railway staff, which in case of an emergency could not hastily be supplied. The moral that we draw from the above information is that the Russian Grovernment, if they intend war, acted wisely in allowing full time for mobilisation, since the precedent of Grermany, in the 1870 campaign, in their case by no means holds good. Having spoken of the resources and strength of Russia, let us now turn to consider her possible allies, and how far they are in a position to assist her. It may be here remarked that while trying to examine the forces that Russia could bring into the field, we have only dealt with the European part of the question, as undoubtedly in Europe the decisive conflict would be fought. In Asia the Muscovite superiority is probably beyond question, as hereafter will be noticed : and although the Turkish fortresses of Erzeroum, Bajaret, Kars, and Batoum are re- ported to be in a good state of defence, and to have been Q 2 228 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. recently strengthened, still there is but little effectually to check a Russian advance into Asia Minor. The first possible European ally of Russia is Roumania. This kingdom was incorporated as such from the provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia in 1859, and is now governed by a prince of the Hohenzollern family. Although nomi- nally subject to Turkey, and paying an annual tribute of 4,000,000 piastres, it is practically independent, and could no more refuse to join with Russia in case of a war than Hesse-Cassel could decline to assist Germany in 1870, that is to say, unless its neutrality was guaranteed and insisted on by the Grreat Powers. The history of this country is a curious study, and illustrates the danger that inevitably must attend those lands which lie between two powerful nations. At one time protected by Russia, at another subject to the Porte, it has been for cen- turies the bone of contention, and not unfrequently the battle-ground, of neighbouring powers. The two Prin- cipalities, as they are termed, in some respects resemble Holland and Belgium ; and for the peace and balance of power in Europe, they ought to be as sacredly pro- tected from the rapacity and ambition of their powerful neighbours. It is unnecessary here to enter into the physical pecu- liarities of the kingdom except so far as they affect the mili- tary and political situation. On the whole, the country is decidedly favourable both for the passage and the main- tenance of an army on the march from Bessarabia to the COMMUNICATIONS THROUGH ROVMANIA. 229 Danube. The railways are niarked on the map, and are of the same gauge as those in Turkey, namely, 4 ft. 8^ in., Russia, with a most wise prescience and regard to strategic considerations, having made a break of gauge on all her frontiers, so that in the event of invasion, by simply removing the rolling-stock, she might render her lines of rail useless to an invader. The gauge of the Eussian rail- ways is 5 ft. Moldavia possesses some good and well- planned roads, in most cases paved and admirable lines of communication ; the bye roads are as a rule unmetalled, but in hard weather would be available for the use of waggons and artillery. Wallachia, although it possesses few if any metalled roads, is also fairly provided with means of communication. The following are the lines of railway in actual working : — a. G-iurgevo — Bukarest. h. Bukarest — Pitesti. c. Bukarest — Ploesti — Buzeo — Braila — Gralatz. d. Gralatz — Tecuci — Adsiud — Baceu — Roman-Pascani — Vereschti. e. Vereschti — Suezava — Itcani. /. Vereschti — Botosani. g. Pascani — Jassy. h. Tecuci — Berlad. The following lines are projected : — a. Pitesti — Slatina — Craj ova — Turn — Severin — Yqx- 'Cerova. 6. Buzeo — Kronstadt (in Transylvania). 230 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. c. Jassy — Sculeni — Kiseneff (in Bessarabia). d. Gralatz — Keni — Odessa. The following roads are those of most importance ; many are now bnt indifferent, but before long it is in- tended to have them all metalled, and their repair tho- roughly carried out : — 1. From Bukarest by Plojesti and Buzeo to Focsani^ joining here the existing metalled road ascending the valley of the Sereth. 2. From Bukarest by Pitesti, Slatina, Crajova, to Surn-Severin. 3. From Slatina by Kalinesti to the Rothenthumin Pass. 4. From Pitesti to Kalinesti. 5. From Pitesti by Kimpolung to La Crucea in the Sorzburg Pass. 6. From Kalafat to Crajova. 7. From Plojesti to the Predial in theTomoser Pass.. 8. From Turnul-Migureli to Slatina. 9. From Picetul to Tirgujiul. 10. From Olteniza to Bukarest. 11. From Braila to Buzeo. 12. From Gralatz to Tecuci. As regards the means of supporting an army there are few countries that contain such resources as Roumania. The soil is most fertile, the climate most favourable, and the population very industrious. There is a great amount of cattle and sheep ; pigs are also bred in large numbers.. POSSIBLE ALLIES OF RUSSIA. 231 The country is well provided with country-carts and ve- hicles ; there is also a fair amount of horses and draught animals. As regards the army, it also presents a respectable force, and would be most valuable as a contingent. It is divided into 1. The standing army and reserve. 2. The territorial army and reserve. 3. The militia. 4. The national guard and rural levies. It is estimated that in time of war the standing army would afford 36,000 infantry, 1,700 cavalry, and 96 guns ; the territorial army about 40,000 men, 12,000 irregular cavalry, and the personnel of 83 batteries, which as yet are not armed. The militia would furnish about 33,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry. This would appear a most formidable force for so small a kingdom; as, however, very frequently happens, these troops exist principally in prospective and on paper. It may, however, be safely assumed that Eoumania, if allied with Kussia in a war, could certainly put on foot about 50,000 men, and the proper proportion of cavalry, it not of artillery also, to co-operate in the open field, and could maintain this army in a fairly long campaign. As regards the quality of the army, but little opportunities have as yet been afforded for testing its fighting capabilities. The training and instruc- tion both of officers and men appear to be very fair : the infantry of the regular army are armed with 'Peabody' 23a IiUSSIA^'' WARS WITH TURKEY. rifles, the others still retain the needle-gun ; the cavalry are mounted on light horses of the Cossack type ; and the artillery have Prussian breech-loading guns. From all accounts the military stores are fairly maintained, and undoubtedly all the administrative departments are far better organised than in Turkey. Of the other possible Russian allies among the small states, we have Servia, Montenegro, and Greece. The value and quality of the Servian troops have been so fully tested in the late war that it appears unnecessary to refer to them. Of the original army as it existed in the spring of 1876, probably very little now remains, and from all accounts it would be no easy matter to raise even a mob of ^ men with muskets ' out of the thoroughly wearied and disheartened population. Nevertheless we may conclude that a certain contingent would in any case be forthcoming in the event of its being demanded by the Czar. Opinions of the best informed ditfer as to the numbers that could be brought into the iield, and probably the Servian Grovern- ment are themselves in absolute ignorance of the really efficient forces at their disposal. When, however, we con- sider that the population of Serbia numbers 1,325,437 souls, that there is a nominal army of 102,598 on a war footing, and that there is a reserve of nearly 38,000, there can be little doubt that, even after all the many losses of the recent campaigTi, and the demoralisation defeat has produced, a very valuable contingent would still be avail- able as auxiliaries to the Russiau armv. It would be by MONTENEGRO. 233 no means an extravagant estimate to put this contingent down at 30,000 men, which, even if not of the best quality, would be most valuable in masking fortresses, in guard- ing communications, and in such duties, the performance of which so much reduce the strength of an invading army. We next come to Montenegro. This province, al- though nominally an integral portion of the Ottoman em- pire, has never really formed part of it, and has been a source of weakness rather than of strength. The area of the country only covers 1,557 square miles, and the popu- lation only numbers about 130,000 Serbs, who are princi- pally Grreek Christians. In character they are warlike and turbulent, and as their country is mountainous and suited to guerilla warfare, they have from time to time given the Porte much trouble. In the event of a war they are cer- tain to be allied with the enemy, and not unfrequently get up serious disturbances on their own account. There is no standing army, but the fighting men enrolled num- ber about 25,000 ; these are of most excellent quality, but are miserably armed, which is not surprising, considering that the revenue of the country is under 5,000^. a-year. Still so admirable are their fighting qualities, and so great their aversion to the Turk, that if supplied with arms, money, and officers by Eussia, Montenegro might furnish several thousand men, who doubtless would perform excel- lent service in the case of an invasion of Turkey, and from their geographical position, by uniting with the Servians, and advancing on the flank of an Ottoman army, either 234 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. posted in front or in rear of the Balkans, they would seriously threaten its communications, and cause a formid- able diversion. We come lastly to Grreece. This little state, which, it may be said, owes its existence to the classic traditions and sentimental philanthropy of Europe, has a population of about 1,457,894 souls, including the inhabitants of the islands. It has a nominal revenue of 1,217,964^., and a rapidly increasing debt of twelve millions. Unfortunately the administration of the government, either as regards ability or absence of corruption, does not present a favour- able contrast, even with that of Turkey. Financial difi&- culties have tended to render the army a force only dan- gerous in name, whose energies in peace time are fully occupied in keeping down the brigandage which they have been wholly unable entirely to eradicate. All the popula- tion are liable to military service between the ages of twenty and forty, and the annual contingent is set down at 2,500. According to the official return the effective force of the Grreek army capable of taking the field is as follows : — Infantry 24,514 Artillery 1,577 Cavalry 575 Engineers 715 Gendarmes 2,346 Total .... 29,697 In addition to the above there are volunteer corps, about 20,000 strong, and about 80,000 National Gruards avail- RESOl'RCES OF TURKEY. 235 able in case of invasion. It cannot, however, be said that any part of this force is in the least formidable, and it would be extremely difficult effectively to mobilise it from the want of stores, arms, and equipments. Neverthe- less the diversion it might effect on the frontier of Thessaly would be by no means unimportant, if thereby it only succeeded in neutralising twenty thousand Turkish troops that probably would be sadly needed elsewhere. The navy of Grreece comprises two ironclads and two or three un- armed vessels, none of much account, and armed with obso- lete guns — the material of the sailors is excellent. However, from the turn that affairs have recently taken, and the great jealousy that has arisen between the Slaves and the Grreeks, it is by no means certain, or even probable, that Greece would side with Kussia, even sup- posing that Tm'key seemed to be getting: the worst of the contest. In the first instance, until the fortune of war was fairly decided, we may be tolerably certain that Greece would remain neutral, or at least would take no part in active operations. It now remains only to speak of Tm'key and the forces at her disposal. Here again we are somewhat in the dark. Like her neighbour and possible antagonist, the greater portion of her army exists only on paper ; and her stores and military equipments are only to be seen on the invoices presented to the Government. The Turkish empire is stated by the most recent autho- rities to have an area of 1,812,048 English square miles, 236 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY and a population of 35,350,000. Of this area 207,438 square miles. and about 15,500,000 inhabitants are in Europe; 660,870 square miles and 16,050,000 inhabitants in Asia; and the remainder in Africa. The various races are classified in the official return as follows ; but it cannot be said that this table can be considered as accurate, even at the time when it was published ; now, of course, the estimate can only be an approximate one. In Europe In Asia In Africa Total Ottomans 2,100,000 10,700,000 12,800,000 Greeks . 1,000.000 1,000,000 2,000,000 Armenians 400,000 2,000,000 2,400,000 Jews 70,000 80,000 150,000 Slaves . 6,200,000 6,200,000 Eoumans 4,000,000 4,000,000 Albanians 1,500,000 1,500,000 Tartars . 16,000 ' 20,000 '. \ 36,000 Arabs ' 885,000 3,800,000 4,685,000 Syrians and| Cbaddensj 200,000 200,000 Druses . . 81,000 80,000 Kurds 1,000,000 1,000,000 Turcomans 85,000 85,000 Gipsies . Total . 214,0*00 . 214,000 15,500,000 16,050,000 3,800,000 35,350,000 Practically, when we deduct the tributary states we find that the direct subjects of the Porte in Europe number about 9,500,000, and in Asia 16,750,000. Of the former about five millions are Christians, and four millions Mahomedans, the remainder belonging to various other sects. It is, however, stated by those best acquainted MILITARY ^SYSTEM OF TURKEY. 237 with the country, that at least two millions of the nominal followers of Islam are so from necessity, not from choice, and would in the event of a threatened dis- turbance of the Turkish power, at once attach themselves to the popular and national cause. We thus find about two millions of Mahomedans face to face with upwards of seven millions belonging to other creeds and races, from whom they have taken the sovereign power, and whom they rule with a government whose obstructions and oppression are only equalled by its corruption. From the days of the Janissaries, who were of Christian parents, kidnapped in early youth and reared as Mussul- mans, the Turkish army was up to 1856 entirely recruited by Mahomedans, when the impolicy of such a system becoming daily more and more evident to the Divan, the liability to military service was extended to all subjects of the empire. Formerly the Christians had to pay a sort of poll-tax as exemption ; this was abolished, and in its place there was established a war-tax, which gained from about '211. to 45^. per recruit, the nominal annual con- tingent to be furnished by the Christian population being 16,000 men. Practically, however, this reform only re- sulted in a raising of the revenue from 40,000,000 to 65,000,000 piastres, but in no way caused the Christians to have any share in the military service, and at the present time Mussulmans alone take part in it. As is the case in all the countries of Europe except our own, the military system of Turkey is modelled on that of 2.38 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. Prussia. The empire is divided into six eorps, which, have their head-quarters at the following places : — 1st Corps (Guards) Constantinople 2nd „ (Danube) . Schmnla. ord „ (Roumelia) . Monaster. 4tli „ (Anatolia) . Erzeroum, 5th ,, (Syria) . . Damascus. 6th „ (Irak) . . Bagdad. Each corps district furnishes a Nizam or active army, in which all those liable to service are supposed to spend four years for the infantry, and five years for the cavalry and artillery ; they then pass to the Ihtiat or first reserve for two years in the case of the infantry, and one year in the case of the cavalry and artillery soldier : then the men are transferred to the Eedif or second reserve for six years, three years in each class ; finally, they go into the Mustafiz or territorial militia for eight years. It was cal- culated that by the year 1878, by which time the system would be in full working, the nominal force of the empire would be as follows : — 1. Nizam Io0,000| '>iqqqq Ihtiat 60,000 i " ' 2. Redif , 1st class .... 1)6,000) -, ^^ ^^^ „ 2nd „ .... UGjOOoi '' 8. Mustatiz 300,000 Total 702,000 The army corps, according to the latest reports ob- tainable, actually comprise the following troops of the Nizam (standing: army) and special regular levies : — MILITARY RESOURCES OF TURKEY. 239 First Corps (Guards). Infantry : — Seven line regiments of three battalions Seven rifle battalions .... Cavalry : — Five line regiments of six squadrons One Cossack brigade (two regiments of four squadrons Artillery : — One line regiment of nine field and three horse batteries One reserve regiment (Ihtiiih) of twelve field and one mountain battery .... Engineers : — One sapper company One engineer brigade of four battalions each of two companies. Total eight companies. One battalion of artificers. Total, exclusive of Engineers Secoxd Corps (Danube). Infant r 3^ : — Six line regiments of three battalions Six rifle battalions One frontier regiment on the Danube Cavalry : — Four line regiments of six squadrons . Artillery : — One line regiment .... Engineers : — One sapper company. Total .... Third Corps (Roumelia). Infantry : — Seven line regiments Seven rifle battalions Bosnian brigade, two regiments Frontier regiment on Greek border „ „ Bosnian border „ battalion (Niksic) Austro-Herzegovinian battalion Cavalry : — Four line regiments 21 battalions 7 30 squadrons 12 batteries 13 ( 29 battalions 38 squadrons (25 batteries 18 batalions 6 5) 3 5J 24 squadrons 12 batteries (21 battalions 24 squadrons ll2 batteries 21 battalions 7 6 3 4 1 1 i 24 squadrons 240 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. Artillery : — One line regiment . . . . Mountain batteries in Herzegovina Engineers : — One sapper company. Total . 12 batteries 3 '43 battalions 24 squadrons- 15 batteries First Voluxteer Corps (Anatolia). Infantry : — Five line regiments of three battalions . .15 battalions One regiment of one battalion, the others being with the Ilmen division ... 1 „ Six rifle battalions 6 „ Cavalry : — Three line regiments of six squadrons . 6 squadrons Artillery : — One line regiment Engineers : — One sapper company . Total .... Fifth Corps (Syria). Infantry : — Seven line regiments . . . . . Seven rifle battalions Cavalry : — Four line regiments One dromedary corps about to be established . Artillery : — One line regiment .... One sapper company Total Sixth Corps (Bagdad). Infantry : — Six line regiments Six rifle battalions Cavalry : — Two line regiments Artillery : — One regiment (incomplete) . Total i; 12 batteries battalions squadrons batteries battalions squadrons batteries battalions sqiiadrons batteries 18 battalions 6 12 squadrons batteries 24 battalions 6 12 squadrons . 9 batteries MILITARY RESOURCES OF TURKEY. 241 It is, however, needless to say that this force, or half of it, exists only on paper, and that, even were the regulations strictly carried out, and the annual contingent of recruits regularly brought to the colours, from the great extent of the Ottoman dominions and the necessity of overawing the disaffected populations, only a comparatively small army would ever be available for action at any one par- ticular point. It is unnecessary here to enter into the detail of either the administration or the organisation of the army ; suffice it to say that the administration, if it can be called such, is of the worst description, and the systems on which it is conducted are enveloped in such hopeless confusion as to render explanation of them imi- possible. There is no organised train or commissariat service whatever, and the method of clothing the troops is ill- regulated and wasteful ; whereas the garrison of Constan- tinople is dressed and equipped in an unnecessarily liberal manner, the troops of the provinces are utterly neglected. The only exception to this lamentable picture of malad- ministration and mismanagement is the organisation of the sanitary department, which is excellent, and will in gar- rison bear comparison with any other in Europe ; in the field, however, this service is no exception to the general rule, as, from all accounts at present, there is no regular organisation adapted to the requirements of war. As regards the fighting qualities of the troops themselves, they are probably much the same as they have always R 242 HUSSIAX WARS WITH TURKEY. been. The material of the Turkish rank and tile has always been excellent, but the officers, more especially the superior ones, are wanting both in education, ability, and interest in their profession ; the infantry are drilled en- tirely according to the tactics of the French army, but the practical training is lamentably deficient, and extends very little beyond common parade movements, outpost duty and real essentials being entirely neglected. The infantry at present, as a rule, are armed with Sniders. It is stated, moreover, that about 40,000 Henry-Martini rifles have recently been delivered by foreign firms who previously had detained them from want of payment ; but the men are little, if at all, trained in the use of firearms ; still they possess many qualities most valuable in war — they fight admirably behind entrenchments, can endure great hardships, and— an important matter in Turkey — do not mutiny when they receive no pay. The cavalry in its present state cannot be spoken of so favourably. It has a nominal strength of twenty-two line regiments, each regiment of six squadrons ; and two regiments of the Cossack brigade of the guard — each of four squadrons; so that in all we have 140 squadrons of regular cavalry, each of a nominal war strength of 143 horses. The cavalry is all light, and is most indifferent, being deficient in manoeuvring power, badly officered and wretchedly equipped. The horses, however, are hardy and serviceable. Two squadrons of each regiment are armed with a carbine, the remainder with a lance and THE TURKISH CAVALRY. 243 Tevolver ; the drill is also entirely of French type, and -apparently is as indifferently carried out as in the case of the infantry. In fact, it may be said that the Turkish horsemen of the present time have lost all the dash and enterprise which rendered them during the last century the terror of European armies, and contributed so much to carry the Crescent to victory, while they have gained none of the solidity and steadiness of the troops on which they are modelled, and whose deficiencies only they have succeeded in copying. The entire force of regular cavalry in Turkey numbers on a war footing about 20,000 horses, exclusive of its camel corps ; formerly there was also a dromedary corps that were practically mounted riflemen, but this, from all account:^, has been abolished. We next come to the artillery, which is decidedly the best arm, both as regards organisation and instruction. According to the returns, the following is its approximate strength : — ( 522 officers. ... ,. . ^ . ^ T 1 ^, • ! 7,944 combatants. bix line regiments of twelve batteries . ' 1 9 9-8 h i 432 guns. Eeserve regiment of thirteen battalions about ]^'^^^ horses. ^ 78 guns. There is also a garrison artillery of a nominal strength of 14,000 men. Although every effort has recently been made by the Turkish Government to improve the arma- ment of its forces, for financial reasons the orders _given for guns to foreign contractors have not been exe- cuted with the same readiness as they have been given. B 2 244 HUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. Hence, at present, cannons of all descriptions and systems- are mixed up in hopeless confusion, and we find not unfrequently muzzle-loaders and breech-loaders, rifled and smooth bores in the same battery. There is lastly an engineer corps about 2,400 strong, which is of very little account, few of the officers possess any professional or teclmical knowledge, and the equipment of the force is of the most meagre and insufficient description. In addition to the regular army, which we have just described, there are also irregular forces, some of whom have been used in the Servian war and in Bulgaria with results only too fatal to the prestige and interests of the Government by whom they were employed. They are divided into a Enlisted Bashi-Bazouks. h Volunteer Spahis, Bedouins, &c. The former are a badly organised and worse disciplined infantry, recruited fiMm the scum of the Turkish towns,. and allured to the military service by the hopes of plunder, in which they freely indulge on friend and foe alike. They are more an incumbrance than an assistance to an army, if engaged in regular warfare ; and are only employed with any effect against unarmed or semi-armed inhabitants of a disaffected district. The Spahis, &c., are exclusively cavalry, and are mainly furnished by the Arab races ; they are formed in troops under their chiefs, and are in no way to be depended upon. In the Crimean War,. it is said that about 10,000 were raised, but they were IRREGULAR FORCES OF TURKEY. 245 never used. Nevertheless, it is probable that if properly- led and organised they would perform valuable service in irregular warfare, in outpost duty, and in the pursuit of a defeated army, like the Cossacks who hung on the rear of the Grrand Army in Napoleon's retreat from ^Moscow in 1812. It is calculated that about 60,000 irregular troops could, in the event of very pressing danger, be enlisted in defence of the Porte, and of these the greater portion would be in Asia ; it is doubtful, however, whether a quarter of this force would be worth their rations. To the above forces of the Ottoman Empire proper may be added contingents from Egypt and Tunis. Both these states have already sent some troops to Constanti- nople, but the exact number is not known. There can be little doubt that the former power could, under certain circumstances, contribute a most valuable auxiliary force ; the Egyptian army numbers, in its normal condition, nearly 60,000 men, and the capabilities of its troops (if properly led) were fully proved in the campaigns of Ibrahim Pacha. The Egyptian officers moreover are vastly superior to the Turkish, and are properly trained and educated. At the present time, however, it is })y no means probable that any force which the Khedive could send to the assistance of the Porte, would be very nume- rous or very valuable. Egyptian finances have recently been reorganised, the Exchequer has been drained, the army exhausted and partially demoralized by the disas- trous wars with Abyssinia, and lastly it is the interest of 240 BUSSIAX WARS WITH TURKEY. the Egyptian Grovernment as far as possible to dissociate itself from the falling fortunes of the Ottoman empire* Independence is doubtless the end which the Khedive is desirous of obtaining, and which probably before long the Great Powers of Europe will be only too glad to accord him. If we put down the Egyptian contingent at about 15,000, or at the most 20,000 men, we shall probably have overshot the mark. Lastly, we come to Tunis. The armed strength of this state since the suppression of piracy has been by na means formidable, and at present would add but little ta the resources of the state to which it is nominally subject* There is no means of obtaining any exact information either as to the forces which have already been sent to- Constantinople from Tunis, or as to those which might eventually follow. It is however stated, on good autho- rity, that between 4,000 and 5,000 partially drilled men, half regulars and half irregulars, are all that could be relied on. In conclusion it may be broadly stated that the entire strength of the Ottoman empire presents now a total effective of 365,000 men ; of these 203,000 men are in first line, 129,000 in the second line or reserve, and about 33,000 gendarmerie — trained soldiers who are required and mainly employed on police duties. Of this nominal force it is needless to remark that probably only about 70 per cent, could be brought into line, if indeed so many, and for actual operations to resist an invasion from Europe we' THE DANGERS MENACING TURKEY. 247 may consider that 160,000 is the very maximum which, under the most favourable circumstances, could be collected. Under these circumstances it cannot be questioned that were Eoumania, Servia, Montenegro, and Greece to unite and co-operate with a Eussian advance from the Danube, it would be wholly impossible for the Porte permanently to retain Constantinople. The geographical conditions, the present state of the Turkish fortresses, and more especially the temper of the subject populations, all tend to this conclusion ; these points, however, will be discussed hereafter. It cannot, however, be said that the danger which in case of war with Eussia threatens the Turkish empire comes only from the north of the Balkans ; a danger almost as great, or according to some, even greater, threatens her in Asia. Five lines of railway are available for the concentration of Eussian troops on the confines of Ar- menia, namely those that lead to the Volga at Nizninov- gorod, Caricini, and Sarton, by means of which troops can be conveyed on the Volga and the Caspian, vui Baku, to the South Caucasus. There are also two other lines from the interior to Xoro-Cerkask, whence troops could be conveyed to the great military station of Tiflis. The army of the Caucasus is always more or less on a war footing, and has probably an effective strength of about 50,000 men, although it is considerably more on paper. This force might be easily doubled in less than a month by means of the railways named, and at least 248 RUS!SIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. 90,000 men would be available for the invasion of Asia Minor. Even supposing that this invasion were not carried out, a simple concentration of troops on the Kus- sian frontier would hold fast half the Turkish army on the border of Armenia, if indeed half or even a quarter of that army could be spared, which is more than doubt- ful, since the 6th Corps must occupy Nedschid in force, unless Arabia be relinquished ; the 7th Corps could scarcely be spared from Jemen, and we may rest assured that a very large body of troops would be required throughout the interior of Asia Minor, unless the Turkish army opposiug the invaders wished to have their communications cut, and themselves attacked in rear. Centuries of misgovern- ment have not rendered the Ottoman rule more popular in Asia than in Europe, and most certainly there w^ould not be wanting intrigues and external encouragement to foster civil dissension in the event of a war. It seems evident that four out of the seven corps, into which tlie Turkish army is formed, could not be spared from Asia Minor, and they could apparently oppose but an ineffec- tual resistance to a well-organised and numerous Eussian army advancing fi'om the Caucasus ; more especially if the latter were commanded by a Paskewitch. In any case only three corps would be available for the defence of Constan- tinople if threatened from the North. In fact it is diffi- cult to say whence the greater danger might come from, Em-ope or Asia. Erzeroum is from all accounts now well defended, but would really be but an insignificant obstacle THE TURKISH NAVY. i^49 to an advance were there a sufficient force to mask it, and, although the distance to march is much greater, until we come near Scutari, there are no lines of defence in Asia Minor which can be compared to the Danube and the Balkans, still less to the position before mentioned at Biijuk-Checkmedge to the north of the Bosphorus. It is true that nature apparently has done all in her power to render Constantinople fitted for the seat of empire of the world, as even on the south side there is a fair defensive position in Asia Minor ; this, however, would require forti- fications which do not exist. As regards the resources of the Porte on the sea, a far more favourable report may be given than of her forces on land. The Turkish navy is by far the most formidable por- tion of the defences of the empire. At the end of 1874, it comprised twenty ironclads and eighty steamships, all, with one or two exceptions, constructed in the best dock- yards of Europe, and on the whole fairly armed. The ma- terial of the sailors is by no means good, and they have not sufficient practice to render them really efficient. The greatest proportion of the navigating officers and engineers are foreigners, and the admiral in supreme command of the navy, Hobart Pacha, is an Englishman. It is stated to be the intention of the Porte to give the command of all their ships to English officers if they can procure them. As with all the other administrative departments in Tur- key, the naval arsenal is by no means well organised or well provided with stores. Notwithstanding, however, all 250 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. its defects, the Ottoman navy is that branch of its defen- sive force with which it has the least reason to be dis- satisfied. For offence it probably would not be very for- midable, but for the protection of Constantinople its value is undoubted. Having spoken of the Turkish fleet our remarks would be incomplete were no mention to be made of that pos- sessed by Russia, comparatively insignificant as it is. Mr. Reed, a competent authority on these matters, gives, in a letter to the Times, the following account of it : — The na\^ of Russia consLsts of three floating-batteries of about 3,300 tons displacement, canning 4J and in one case 6 -inch armour, with no gun larger than one of 9^ tons, and with a speed below ten knots. Next, there are ten small American type monitors, of from 1,400 to 1,600 tons displace- ment, carrying 5 -inch armour, and two 15^-ton guns, at a speed of seven to eight knots. Also three similar vessels, slightly larger, but no stronger, except in carrying two turrets instead of one. Next come four vessels which were built in the days w^hen many persons believed in rigged ironclads with low- free- board, and which would have shared the fate of the ' Captain ' had they ever been :-ent to sea. They are vessels of about 3,600 tons displacement, canying comparatively thin armour (5^ and 6 inches), with guns in some cases of 27 tons weight, and steaming at 10 J to 11 knots. The capsizing of the 'Captain' doomed these foui' vessels to harbour-service ; then follow two wooden armoui--plated frigates of large size and fan- speed, but carrying very weak armour and comparatively hght guns. A third frigate, bidlt of u^on, but somewhat smaller, and in no sense stronger, may be classed with these. This last vessel, the ' Prince Pojarsky,' is the only, or almost the only, ironclad that THE RUSSIAN NAVY. 251 Enssia was able to send to Besika Bay when the British fleet had assembled there. All the above vessels, with the last-named exception, are in the Baltic, and will probably remain there for ever; for, although many of them would, no doubt, be more or less valuable for defensive purposes, they cannot be considered fit for operating at any great distance from Cronstadt. There remain of Russian ironclads but six, among which are the ' Peter the Great,' and the two cii'cular ironclads, of neither of which need I say more here. Neither, indeed, need the remaining three be dwelt upon, inasmuch as they are but partially armoured vessels, having a belt of armour only, and being designed as cruising vessels, cai'rying, therefore, a large spread of canvas. Of these vessels only one, the 'General Admiral,' has reached approximate completion ; the other two, the ' Duke of Edinburgh ' and the ' Mineen,' may, however, be finished in the course of next year. Subsequent to the above, there appeared a letter in the Times from an apparently well-informed correspondent, who wrote from St. Petersburg on January 3rd, 1877, and who gives some interesting information regarding the present condition of the Muscovite fleet. It is, however, only fair to add that his statements are to a certain extent questioned by Mr. Reed. He points out that the Russian Naval Budget is now third on the list of European Powers, and that if this money had been properly laid out ' she would now be in possession of a fleet, not only stronger than the miserable Mediterranean squadron, which is now in American waters, but of one capable of coping with that of Turkey.' He maintains that ' it would have been more profitable in 252 IiUS>SIAN WARS WITH TURKEY, every way for the state, had the Eussian Grovernment spent more money in developing the ship-building capa- bilities of Nicolaieff, instead of going to the enormous expense of building two vessels of an untried type at St. Petersburg and sending them by i-ail to the Black Sea.' As reo'ards the actual effective condition of the much- vaunted vessel 'Peter the Great,' he makes the following statements r — ' She is so weak that if driven through the water at a speed greater than eight knots she shakes to such a degree as to leak in an alarming manner. Although the extent of her longest voyage is the distance between Cronstadt and Reval, her boilers are already under repair, and a Commission which was lately assembled to examine her has expressed an opinion that all the large steam pipes should be renewed. As to her present capabilities for either offensive or defensive purposes, it is sufficient to say that when her heavy guns are fired rivet-heads fly about unpleasantly. I think I have said enough about this ironclad, the pride of the Russian navy.' As regards the ' Popopkas ' — the two Russian gunboats in the Black Sea — he says that 'it is literally dangerous to fire the guns on board of them. Daring a recent gun practice on board one of them near Otchakof, the following results were obtained : — At the first round almost every man on board was knocked down ; the whole of the superstructure on deck was blown away, and the deck itself, which is iron-plated, was considerably bulged in a downward direction.' THE HUSSIAN NAVY. 253 If the above is true, the Grovernment of the Czar need not hope to derive much assistance from their navy in any immediate war with the Turks. However strong the Eussian navy might be in the Baltic or in the Mediter- ranean, so long as the Ottomans hold the Dardanelles it could have little, if any, influence on a campaign in Bulgaria and Koumelia. This fact appears to have been forgotten by many, who have recently discussed this question, — the naval force in the Black Sea is the im- portrint point, and as long as this is practically limited to two gunboats, as at present, the Eussians would be at an enormous disadvantage. As before ex.jlained, the com- mand of the Euxine would be useful to them for two reasons, first for the supply of their army, and secondly in order to turn the lines, which are about twenty miles to the north of Constantinople, and which, if properly for- tified, would from the land side be practically impreg- nable. 2o4 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. CHAPTER XL THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS POSSESSED BY EACH COMBATANT IN THE EVENT OF WAR. Divergence of Views on the Subject — To ensure success a large force required by Russia — Probable Russian system of invasion — Time required by the various Corps to reach the Danube and Schumla — Lines of defence to be occupied by the Turks— Line of the Danube — Schumla— The Balkans — Selimno Pass — Flanking column by Servia — Time required to reach Adrianople — ^Probable date when Constantinople would be threatened — Alternative plan of opera- tions —Difficulties of railway transport — Importance of Schumla — Description of the position of the Chekmedg^s— of that on the Dardanelles — of the position in Asia Minor — Opportunity lost by Russia in 1876 — Concluding remarks. Having reviewed the armed strengtli of the two possible combatants, Eussia and Turkey, it now remains for us to consider the chances which they will respectively have in any contest that may ensue, either now or hereafter. If, at the present moment, the opinions of those best able to form a judgment on this question were collected, probably we should find an enormous divergence of views. Some are convinced the Russians have nothing whatever before them but a triumphal march on Constantinople — ' there may perhaps be a few skirmishes, an insignificant siege, and possibly a considerable action, but the result of CHANCES OF RUSSIAN SUCCESS. 255 none of these, they say, can be doubtful.' The Turks have never been able to stand against the Russians in the open field, and their fortresses, not being fitted to resist modern artillery, are now worse than useless, as they only serve to paralyse a number of troops that would be far more useful in the open field. Another party, on the contrary, and in England perhaps they are in the majority, profess the greatest confidence in the Turks. They say that in previous wars the Ottoman empire has held her own, and so it will again ; they point to the condition of the Eussian army at the peace of Adrianople, and to Omar Pacha's successes on the Danube in 1854 ; they lay stress on the fact that at the present time the Muscovites have not got command of the sea, and declare that conse- quently a large invading army would starve, while a small one would be defeated. Probably, the truth lies between these two extremes, and in any case it can only be a matter of conjecture not of certainty. Let us examine the grounds on which a correct opinion may be based. It appears that the actual result of any campaign between these two powers— leaving Austria entirely out of the question — depends 1st. On tlie condition of the Russian army. 2nd. On the condition of the Turkish army. 3rd. On the state of the Turkish fortresses. At the present time, on all these points information is but meagre and by no means trustworthy. It has been shown that the Russian railways are very badly organised, and in 256 HUSSIAX WARS WITH TURKEY. no way fitted for the transport of troops ; also that the army is now in a transition state, and that, while one system has been disarranged, the other has not yet had time to get into working order. These circumstances alone are quite sufficient to account for reports that have come from Bessarabia regarding the great difficulty ex- perienced by the Russian authorities in mobilising and in transporting their forces to the frontier ; the strength of the corps there from all accounts is considerably below the nominal establishment on a war footing, and hence the numbers of the force prepared to cross the Pruth very 23robably are short of the 210,000 men supposed to be assembled. This of course is a most serious consideration, AVe have seen that the failure of Diebitsch to reach Con- stantinople in 1829 was entirely owing to the insufficiency of the force under his command for the task it had to perform, and it is absolutely essential to ensure success in the invasion of Turkey that a Eussian army should be sufficiently strong to mask Eustchuk, Silistria, and Schumla, as Strasburg, Metz, and the other French fortresses were masked in 1870, and still to have the power of marching upon Constantinople. G-eneral Fadeeff, in his ' Opinion on the Eastern Question,' estimates that if 250,000 men reach the Danube, 150,000 will attain Constantinople, whether the Maritime Powers oppose or not, the only obstacle to this arrangement being Austria. We have pre-supposed the neutrality of this Power and will consider her political and strategic position else- where. CHANCES OF RUSSIAN SUCCESS. 257 It therefore would appear that if Greneral Fadeeff's opinion is correct, as indeed seems likely, the nominal strength of the Russian army at present mobilised, namely, 210,000 men, is barely sufficient, even if Roumania affords a contingent, which is doubtful, and Servia adds the remnant of her beaten army, which is certain. Sup- posing an invading army of a strength inferior to the necessary minimum of 250,000 were to proceed to occupy Bulgaria, unless the Ottoman army is in a far worse state than usually represented, and unless the various frontier fortresses are practically useless, the invaders would have to act like Romanzoff, Potemkin, and Suwarrow in former days, and to sit down before all the fortified places halt- ing until these were reduced ; this would more especially be necessary, inasmuch as the command of the sea is lost, and the only means of supplying the army under such circumstances is by rail and road ; hence the communi- cations must be made secure. The Turkish railways are so constituted as to be of little use for an invading army in the passage of the Balkans, and in all probability the rolling stock would have been removed. This would be a most serious matter, as t]ie gauge is different from that of the Russian railways, although the same as that of Roumania, and there would be no time to make carriages or trucks. Thus country waggons and carts would be the principal means of transport ; of such conveyances, from all accoimts, there are plenty in Bidgaria and Roumelia, but the difficulty of supplying an army of more tlian 258 HUSSIAX WARS WITH TURKEY. 150,000 men in a march of nearly ,300 miles by these alone is self-evident. If, as not impossible, the war were to resolve itself into a series of sieges, knowing as we do the valour of the Turks behind entrenchments, it is scarcely possible that the contest could be brought to a decisive close in one campaign. A prolongation of hostilities would be fatal to Eussia, not only in a financial point of view, as hinted by Lord Beaconsfield at the Gruildhall, but also because the various G-reat Powers would have had time to become alarmed, to organise their forces, and to mterpose. A lengthened conflict between Eussia and Turkey must result in the utter financial ruin of both — certainly of the former power, since the latter may be already termed ruined— and also either in a European war of gigantic proportions, or an armed intervention in favour of the Porte. The only hope which Eussia possesses of reach- ing Constantinople is by a coitp-de-main ; had she the command of the sea there would be but little difficulty in effecting this : under the present circumstances, how- ever, her sole chance is the rapid and unchecked march of a large army, whose supplies would principally be drawn from home, and whose communications would extend over about 400 miles of country. It may here be remarked that some have suggested that an occu- pation of Bulgaria, opposed by the Porte, would not necessarily imply any attempt to march on the capital. Sucli an hypothesis is evidently absurd, the present ALTERED COXDITIONS OF INVASION. 259 iRussian generals are not likely to fall again into the error x)f the Emperor Nicholas in 1853, who, when he occupied the Principalities, made a declaration of his peaceful in- tentions, and imposed on himself the boundary of the Danube, while he in no way bound his adversary to it. Such a strategic error, if repeated, could only result in a repetition of the same disasters to the army that committed it. There is another reason why, in case of war, an at- tempted march on Constantinople would be inevitable ; by this means alone could the war be brought to a con- •clusion ; otherwise, a harassing conflict might go on for years. Muscovite soldiers would die, ^Muscovite roubles would be squandered, but no result whatever would be gained. Let us suppose that a Kussian army of the required strength, which is not less than 250,000 men, has assem- bled on the Pruth, that the co-operation or benevolent neu- trality of Poumania is assured, and that Austria abstains entirely from all share in the contest, and let us examine the probable lines by which the invaders would advance. It must be prefaced, before drawing deductions from previous campaigns, that in the present instance the con- ditions are materially altered from what they were in 1828 and 1829, by the fact that there is now no object in seizing a fortified seaport ; hence Varna need no longer be the objective, and the only reason for capturing it would be to make use of the coast road which it commands. Likewise Servia is available as a base, whicli was not the s 2 260 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. case formerly, although as there is no railway in that principality south of Belgrade, and as Austrian territory cannot be violated, but little use can be made of this advantage. If, therefore, four corps in the first instance take the field — that is to say about 150,000 men — we may expect to see that, beginning from the Eussian left, No. 1 will cross the Danube near Eeni, Isakchi, or Brai- low into the Dobrudscha and march up the right bank of the liver past Matchin and Dovian to Hirsova. No. 2 will move along the post road from Kischenau to Faltsi or Faltsey, as it is also called, will there cross the Pruth, and march up the right bank of that river and the left bank of the Danube as far as Hirsova, where pro- bably it will cross, and then in conjunction with No. 1 will march onwards towards Schumla, having on its way detached a force to watch Silistria. Nos. 3 and 4 will probably be conveyed by railway from Kischenau to Jassy, thence by Eoumanian railway to Gralatz, Bucharest, and Giurgevo, where they will concentrate. If a fifth corps is available — or the portion of a corps — it may perhaps be despatched to Servia, there to join a contingent of Servians and Montenegrins, to mask Widdin, and march on Nissa or Nisch, which probably is not capable of offering much resistance, and thence via Sophia and Samakovo on the Philippopolis railway ; thus turning the Balkans and the position of any Ottoman army defending those mountains. 31 ARCH OF RUSSIAN CORPS. 261 It has been calculated that not more than 7,000 men n day could be moved along the Eoumanian railway. As will be shown hereafter, it would appear that even this is an over-estimate, considering that the line is single and the curves sharp, which prevent either long trains or a rapid speed. If two corps (in all about 70,000 men), are sent by railway, it would take ten days for them to concentrate at Griurgevo. We must allow at least six to eight days more for artillery and train, so that under the most favourable circumstances about three weeks must elapse after the declaration of war before the pas- sage of the Danube can be effected in any force near the point named. If we turn to corps Nos. 1 and 2, we shall find that the former would have to cross the Danube and march about 80 miles in order to get to Hirscva from the Southern Bessarabian frontier, while ]S'o. 2, which is supposed to have been echelloned further north and to have crossed the Pruth at Falsti, would have about 140 miles to march before it reached the same place. At the rate of ten miles a day for five days a week, and allowing four days for crossing the Danube, as probably the passage would be opposed, we find that these two corps would probably arrive at Hirsova about the same time, namely, between the eighteenth and tv^entieth day after the commencement of their march ; perhaps under favourable circumstances a day or two sooner. It thus appears the passage of the Danube might be 202 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. effected almost simultaneously by the three corps on its left bank. Nearly a week would probably be required by the corps Nos. 3 and 4 to cross with their train and ar- tillery, and No. 2 would need about half that time. We have now got to the twenty-seventh day from the com- mencement of operations. The distance from Hirsova ta Schumla is about 150 miles, and from Eustchuk about ",5'^ one column would need about three weeks, and tlie otlier a week and three days to perform this dis- tance ; therefore, on or about the forty-eighth day from the crossing of the Pruth, if all goes well with the Eussian army, we may expect to hear of a concentration and probably of a decisive engagement before Schumla. Of course it is needless to remark that the weather and the condition of the roads will have a very material in- fluence on the pace at which the armies move. The above suggestions are hazarded on the supposition that the campaign begins in May or the end of the April. If it were opened in January with a hard frost and not much snow, the operations would be considerably hastened — the Danube could be crossed on the ice, proV^ably in the space of two days in the place of a week, and the troops might march 60 or even 70 miles a week in the place of 50. If, on the other hand, it were an open winter, it would be almost wholly impossible to move troops at all,- and no doubt the Russian Government would continue negotiations, and postpone crossing the Pruth until a time came which suited military expediency. Having PROBABLE STRATEGY OF THE TURKS. 263 thus conducted the invaders so far on their road, let us now turn to the defenders. As we all know frequently occurs in j^olitics, three distinct courses would be open to the Turks in the event of invasion. The first would be to defend the line of the Danube ; the second to concentrate on Schumla and make a stand there ; the third and last to leave garrisons only in Rustchuk, Silistria, Schumla, and Varna, to retreat across the Balkans and wait for the enemy at Aidos, Karnabad, and Selimno. The first course would un- doubtedly be the one to pursue with an army of anything like the same strength as that opposed to it, provided also that it were movable and fairly provided with a train. Although accounts differ as to the amount of forces which Turkey could put into the field, varying from 300,000 to 120,000, it is probable that the latter is nearer the truth than the former, and that, allowing for garrisons, &c., a field army of 80,000 men is the utmost that could assemble on the Danube. As was shown by Radetzky in 1848 and 1849 in Italy, a small army, if properly handled on a river line, can keep in check one of twice its strength, but then it is necessary that it should possess tetes-de- pont on the other side, and should have an efficient train so as to enable it to move quickly. Turkey pos- sesses neither of these advantages. Whereas formerly she had command of the left bank of the Danube, Kalafat, G^iurgevo, Oltenitza, Kalarash, &c., are now Roumanian, and will be used against her, also she has absolutely no or- 264 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. ganised train or transport service. Her fortresses, moreover, on the Danube — Widdin, Nicopolis, Eustchuk, Silistria, and Tulcha — are neither so numerous nor so formidable as in days gone by. Widdin is commanded by Kalafat and practically useless — the two most important ones, Rust- chuk and Silistria, are daily being strengthened and, if there is time to make them so, will probablj^ become for- midable. An active army pivoting between the two might either check the advance of an invader or cause him to give battle at a disadvantage ; it is, however, most improbable that the Turks will thus make use of them. The second course open to the Ottomans is to retire on Schumla, and this is the one which in all probability they would adopt. The place has so often been spoken of in the preceding pages that it seems now unnecessary to say much of it. The power of modern artillery has much diminished its importance, since the range of hills round it is now its weakness. A large fort, however, has been built lately, capable, it is said, of containing 18,000 men, and various other defensive measures taken to render the place if possible impregnable. As a week's work may entirely alter the whole defensive capabilities of any of these Turkish fortresses, it is impossible to say what re- sistance, when the time comes, they will or will not offer. From all one hears, however, they have hitherto been much neglected. In its best days Schumla was only a fortified position, requiring a large body of troops to de- PROBABLE STRATEGY OF THE TURKS. 2Co fend it, not a fortress which might be held by a small garrison, and it could always be turned to the west by the route from Eski-Jurna and Osman-Bazar, as well as to the east by the road from Pravadi to Karnabad. At the pre- sent time the main line of railway is twelve miles from the town, and is not commanded — a great disadvantage for the defenders, and the opposite for an invading army. If the Turks assembled in force before Schumla it is pro- bable that the Eussian army would be forced to give battle; otherwise they would leave a body to mask the place, and march onward over the Balkans. Again, here the question ai'ises as to the strength of the army that could thus move on. We have supposed that 150,000 men actually crossed the Danube about thirty-two days after the declaration of war, about 60,000 being in re- serve, and about 35,000 l:ieing detached to co-operate in Servia. These numbers are probably much in excess of Avhat in fact would be available. At least 20,000 men would be required to guard each of the fortresses, Silistria and Eustchuk, and 10,000 may be allowed for the ca- sualties and guarding the communications. This leaves 100,000 men to reach Schumla; 30,000 would probably be required for this fortress ; hence there only remain 70,000 to cross the Balkans. When the reserves come lip, and either Silistria or Eustchuk falls, of course this number would be increased. The Turks might possibly elect to defend the passes of the Balkans. That such a course would be advisable is 266 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. undoubted, provided only that the main army were not scattered and rendered liable to be defeated in detail. It is, however, doubtful whether such a defence, in the face of an enterprising and numerous enemy, would be suc^ cessful. An enemy might be greatly delayed, but from all accounts he could scarcely be repelled in these passes. They have already been named and described. In addi- tion there are numerous sheep-walks along which infantry might be conducted, so as to turn any position that de- fenders could occupy. The following description given by Lord Albemarle of the Selimno Pass is interesting, and is applicable to the greater proportion of these so-called obstacles to the progress of an invading army. He says : After a ride of three miles we entered the mountain gorge. The Balkan here runs north-east by south-west. We traversed its side, which is covered with vineyards from the summit to the base. The road, which was paved at the beginning of the ascent, was in good order, and broad enough in the nan-owest part to allow two carriages to pass ; it is practicable foi* artil- lery, and, indeed, for eveiy description of wheeled conveyance. The soil of the countiy of which the road is made is sandstone, which, containing a portion of common clay, forms qiuckly,, when broken into pieces, a compact substance admii^ably adapted for the pui^ijose. It is impervious to damp, for it was neither affected by the rain of the four or five preceduig days, nor by the fall of snow which was meltmg at the time. It is easily i-epauable, the soil itself forming the materials. With so much facihty is this road constructed, that any cart actually makes its own road by the track of its wheels. This remark is not only applicable to this part of the Balkan, but is generally to the- PROBABLE STRATEGY OF THE TURKS. 267 hilly parts of Roiimelia and Bulgaria, which we traversed. Hence it is evident that should an army wish to cross by the Selimno Pass it has nothing to do but cut away the brushwood, di-aw it out on one side, and the baggage and battering-trains form the road. This, in fact, is what the Russians did in that part of the Balkan by which they advanced. They cut down a few trees and nlled up the inequalities of the gi'ound. The number of carriages that accompanied that army is a proof how trifling were the difficulties that had to be encountered. Almost every iield-officer had his caleche, and the general officers three or four, and every company a cai't for their- camp kettles. It is evident from the above that one pass at least offers no natural obstacles to an invader, and this descrip- tion is in the main applicable to nearly all the others. It will be remembered that General Diebitsch and his army in 1829 crossed by a route much to the east of the one here named. As before remarked, the Turks will probably choose the position which they finally select for their principal stand, according as their army is numerous and efficient, or the reverse. If they feel themselves very strong, they will probably defend the line of the Danube ; if only moderately strong, they will concentrate round Schumla, and if very weak they will retire behind the Balkans, defending the passes over those mountains as best they can, and finally preparing from some central position such as Aidos, Karnabad, or Selimno, to crush the enemy's columns as they emerge from the defiles of the mountains. The intermediate position is the most likely one, the last 268 jRUSSIA^' WARS WITH TURKEY. would be the most prudent, since it is evident that the further they make the invader fight from his base, the smaller will be the force which they have to encounter. If either of the two retired positions are occupied, the column advancing from Servia by Sophia will have an im- portant influence on the strategic situation. In order that its presence may be felt, it is necessary that its move- ments should, to a certain extent, coincide with those of the main body. Let us see how this could be arranged. As there is only one line of railway through Roumania from Gralatz to the junction north of Bucharest, in the direction of Servia, and as armed bodies of men could not pass through Austrian territory like the Eussian volun- teers during the Servian war, much delay must occur before the corps intended to co-operate in the west could arrive at its destination. It might be forwarded by rail, either in advance of the main body destined for G-iiu'gevo, simultaneously with it, or in rear of it. In the two former cases the concentration at Griurgevo would be delayed at least eight days ; in the latter case, five corps could scarcely arrive at Verciorova or Orsova, the terminus of the Roumanian railway on the Servian frontier, before the twenty-sixth day after the declaration of war. This would be manifestly too late, so probably a middle course would be pursued : it would be sent on between corps Nos. 3 and 4, and might arrive at the starting-point of its southern march on or about the twenty-first day. It may be remarked that it is a two days' journey by rail from PROBABLE MARCHES OF THE RUSSIANS. 269 Bessarabia to the Servian frontier. It might either start from Belgrade, in which case it would have a march of about 300 miles to Philippopolis, or it might cross the Danube at Grladova, and then commence a march of about 270 miles. As probably the Servians do not march better than they hght, forty-two and thirty-seven days would be respectively needed to accomplish these distances. Therefore it may be said that this flanking corps could scarcely exercise an important influence on the main oper- ations before the iifty-eighth day after the declaration of war at earliest. On or about this day it ought to reach Philippopolis — thence to Adrianople by railway is about 120 miles — so on the seventy-fourth day it might be ex- pected to reach the latter place. The main army having arrived opposite Schumla about the forty-eighth day would have had to fight probably once or twice, cross the Bal- kans, and march 130 miles before it reached Adrianople. If it were fortunately and energetically carried out, from twenty-one to twenty- five days might suffice for this operation, thus the converging columns of the invading army might liope possibly to find themselves united before Adrianople about seventy-four days after the passage of the Pruth. From Adrianople to Constantinople is 150 miles, to the position of Biijuk Chekmedge 130 miles; therefore supposing the same rate of march were main- tained, namely, ten miles a day during five days in the week, more than ninety days must elapse after the decla- ration of war before tlie capital of the Turkish empire 270 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. could be seriously threatened. It may appear to some that the rate of march named is unusually slow : it is certainly less than that accomplished by the Prussian columns either in 1866 or in 1870; but it is probably more than could be actually carried out in Bulgaria ; the Prussians, moreover, are notoriously the best marchers in Europe, the Eussians by no means the best, and some great authorities, to whom the writer has spoken, agree in considering that this rate is as much as under the most favourable circumstances could be expected. It may be remarked, w^hy should the main Russian army be weakened by the Servian column being de- tached, more especially as the latter could only arrive after the decisive actions had probably taken place ? To this it may be replied, that such a diversion might be made, first, because it would bring up a not unimportant contingent of Servians and Montenegrins ; secondly, be- cause it would neutralise an equal, perhaps even a su- perior, force of the enemy in its front ; thirdly, because in the event of the Turkish army making a successful stand either before or behind the Balkans, it would turn their position and take them in flank and rear of their communications ; and lastly, that it would cause the evacuation of Bosnia by any Ottoman force occupying it, or would effectually cut off that force altogether. There is also another plan of operations, which not impossibly might be adopted by the Russians, more •especially were the campaign to be opened in the early PROBABLE MARCHES OF THE RUSSIANS. 271 spring, when probably the roads through the Dobrudscha and up the left bank of the Danube would be in a soft condition and unfavourable for the passage of troops. If, moreover, as would be the case in the present instance, war had long been threatened, if there had been ample time for preparations, and thus opportunities had been afforded for creating a large amount of rolling stock on the Rou- manian railways,^ the following plan would appear to possess very great advantages. We will suppose that six corps have been concentrated on the Bessarabian frontier, each corps numbering about 35,000 men, in all about 210,000, and that this force is further supplemented by reserves of regular troops, suffi- cient to fill up the gaps in the field army, keeping the latter up to its normal strength; while also there are reserves of militia — say about 60,000 strong, and capable of performing valuable service in guarding communica- tions and blockading fortresses, although perhaps unfitted for active operations in the open field. To these forces, possibly the Roumanian army may also be added. From all accounts the troops of this monarchy are not very for- midable as regards quality — the probable numbers that would be available have already been estimated in the last chapter. Nevertheless, as a contingent, and employed in the same way as the militia, they would be a most valuable assistance. In any case it is probable that the Moldavian 1 It is stated that at i^resent there are in Roumania only 1,200 car- riages and trucks lit fur military transport. •272 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. and Wallachian soldiers are fully as efficient as the greater part of the ' men with rifles ' now rallied under the flag of the Porte. Supposing, therefore, that all these forces are available in place of dividing the columns, as previously suggested, it might be decided to concentrate four out of the six corps by rail near Griurgevo, while one corps joined the Servians, and the other protected the left flank of the main army, making diversions on the Lower Danube and threatening the passages of the river below Silistria. Were this plan adopted it would possess the following advantages : — 1st. The main army destined for decisive operations would have a far shorter distance to march than if two columns advanced up the Lower Danube, one on each bank, as has often been done in former wars. 2nd. The unhealthy and barren district of the Dob- rudscha would be entirely avoided. 3rd. The line of communications to be defended would be comparatively short and up to within about 90 miles of Schumla would be entirely by rail. 4th. The general advance would be fairly united ; and the column on the right flank, advancing from Servia, would be able to co-operate more closely with the move- ments of the main army than would be the case if the eastern route were adopted. It may also be added, that with such a splendid screen before them as the Danube, coupled with the notorious PROBABLE MARCHES OF THE RUSSIANS. 273 inefficiency of the Ottoman cavalry, as it now exists, the movements and intentions of the Russian army might be entirely concealed from their enenaies, and were the corps on the left flank skilfully handled, the Turks might be kept in entire ignorance as to whence they would have to expect the principal attack. Hence a large portion of their forces might be neutralized about Tulscha, Silistria, and in the Dobrudscha, leaving but a small body to oppose the main body of the invaders. Let us now consider the time that would be required to concentrate the four corps about Griurgevo as suggested. Bucharest by rail is 42 miles from the Danube ; it is also about 290 miles distant from Roman, on the Jassy rail- way, according to the railway guide-books, and from Roman to Kischenau, according to the map, is 140 miles. Thus, supposing that these four, or rather five, corps were sliipped on the railway at Kischenau, they would have a railway journey of 330 miles before they reached Bucha- rest, which probably would be the main point of concen- tration. It is certainly more than doubtful if this distance could be performed in one day with a single line, as ordi- nary trains in peace time require twelve hours to go from Roman to Bucharest. Under any circumstances, 7,000 men per day may safely be regarded as the very highest number that could be transported between the two points, and this without including either artillery or trains. It is probable that an effort would be made as soon as possible after the declaration of war to seize and hold the T 274 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. two places Gfiurgevo and Oltenitza, which, in every war that has taken place on the Danube for the last century and a half, have always been important points for the pas- sage of the river. The amount of force required for this operation would entirely depend on whether the Turks had previously taken any measures for the defence of these passages, and whether they occupied Eustchuk and Turtu- kai on the opposite bank in force or not. In all proba- bility the Russians would have obtained complete and detailed information as to the movements and position of the Turkish army by means of spies and from other sources, and would regulate their plans accordingly. If the Ottomans had taken no special precautions to prevent a passage of the river at the points named, then probably as soon as one corps with its artillery, or even a smaller force, could be collected near Bucharest — that is, in little more than a week — a forward movement would be made ; otherwise, at least two corps would be required for the proposed operation. Allowing, therefore, 7,000 men per day, three days for the artillery and indispensable train of each corps, and four days for the march from Bucharest to the Danube, nothing could be well attempted within a period of twenty days after the declaration of war. We will therefore suppose that two corps have been safely deposited at Bucharest, and that they have success- fully occupied Giurgevo and Oltenitza, and are busy mak- ing preparations for effecting the passage of the Danube, and thus preparing for the advance of the main army. I PROBABLE MARCHES OF THE RUSSIANS. 275 No time probably would now be lost in forwarding on lo Servia the corps or the portion of a corps destined for that flank. As before mentioned, this force would have to pass along the same line of railway as the main army, so far as the junction a little to the north of Bucharest ; this would delay the arrival of the two remaining corps of the central force for at least eight days, even supposing that the great proportion of the train and reserve ammu- nition were not forwarded on until later. Thus, at the rate of 7,000 men per day, and allowing three days per corps for the transit of artillery and necessary train, which is a most moderate allowance, it would require sixteen and eight, in all twenty-four more days before the main body would be concentrated on the left bank of the Danube. It may be presumed that while the rear of the army are thus being forwarded to the front, the advance guard and main body have already effected the passage of the river, have established bridges across it, and have them- selves crossed. In this manner each body of troops, as it disembarked from the railway at Bucharest, at Komana, or elsewhere, might at once march on, and there would be but little delay in crossing the Danube. We will allow four days after the concentration of the entire army for this operation, and it will be seen, according to this calcu- lation, that 20 added to 24 and 4, in all about 48 days must elapse after the declaration of war before four corps could assemble on the right bank of the Danube for a combined advance on the Balkans. 276 RUSSIAN WARS IVITH TURKEY. The difficulties and delays of a purely railway method of transport are thus self-evident; let us see how long it would require for these same corps to reach the same places on the Danube by march route. According to the map, the distance from Kischenau to Rustchuk by road is about 300 miles. Allowing that they march ten miles a day for five days in the week, and as before require four- days to cross the Danube, on or about the forty-sixth day the four corps would be united on the right bank. Under these circumstances it is probable that a medium course- would be adopted, that the advance guard, lieavy artilleryy and supplies would be forwarded by train to Gralatz and Rustchuk, while the main body of the infantry, of course the cavalry, and the gTeater portion of the artillery would follow by road, — in any case much the same time would be needed, namely, about seven weeks and a half from the first crossing of the Pruth before the final advance on the Balkans could be commenced. It may be remarked that,, according to recent calculations, about 800 railway trains would be required to concentrate the Russian army on the Danube, and that twenty trains per day is the very maxi- mum that could be despatched. • At present it is by no means improbable that the advance of a corps from Servia would be entirely dispensed with. The great distance that it would have to march — about 470 miles ; the long railway journey that it would in the first instance have to perform, namely, dQ^ miles — 330 from Kischenau to Bucharest, and 236 from Bucharest PROBABLE MARCHES OF THE RUSSIANS. 277 •to the Servian frontier — before it could even commence the invasion, would equally tend to make such a detachment from the main army undesirable. When, moreover, we •consider the character of the contingent with which such .a detached corps would have to co-operate, the small influ- ence it would exercise on the most decisive portion of the ■operations, and the large force that would be needed with the main body to mask the various Ottoman fortresses, we may safely express our conviction that such a diversion through Servia will not, under existing circumstances, be attempted by the commander-in-chief of the Eussian army. Under all circumstances whatsoever it seems inevitable that the main advance must be based on the Griurgevo and Bucharest railway, and that the main army will find itself, about seven weeks after the commencement of the cam- paigTi, somewhere between Eustchuk and Silistria. The subsequent movements will then depend on the attitude of the Turks, of which probably the Russian staff vv^ill have ample information. If the Ottomans intend to make a stand near Schumla, the Russian army will have to turn aside and fight them ; if, on the other hand, the Turkish generalissimo has concentrated south of the Balkans — about Burghas, Aides, Praoadi, and Selimno, as before suggested — then the Muscovites will probably detach a force to defend their left flank, and will make a dash for the western passes of the Balkans, entirely ignoring those von the east. From Rustchuk direct there are three good 278 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. roads leading to the Balkans ; the first, beginning from the west, is somewhat circuitous, leading by Tirnova either to Selimno or to Kasanlik ; the second, not marked in ac- companying map, goes nearly due south to Osman-bazar, where it unites with No. 3, which proceeds via Easgrad and Eski-Djuma either to Kasan or to Selimno. The distances to these Balkan passes from Eustchuk are as follows : — By western road about 100 miles to Selimno pass, and 90 via Tirnova to Kasanlik pass. By centre road about 80 miles to Kasan pass, and the same distance to the Selimno defile. By eastern road (Easgrad, &c.) 90 miles to Kasan pass. It is probable that forced marches would be made to seize these important defiles, and therefore about six or seven days would suffice for the Eussian army to reach them. The Kasan and Selimno passes are those where in all likelihood fighting would take place, and therefore the description of the latter by Lord Albemarle, as already given, is all the more interesting. It is impossible to foretell the action of the Turks if they were deceived by a demonstration towards Schumlu ; it is not impossible that they would form a position at Aidos, direct their principal attention to the passes on the east, neglecting those on the west. In any case their task of defending the Balkans would be a most difficult one, if only from the great range of country which they would PROBABLE MARCHES OF THE RUSSIANS. 279 have to watch. Doubtless the railway from Adrianople to Zamboli and Philippopolis would much aid them, but still, as in the case of Benedek and the Austrian army in 1866, they would always be liable to have fractions of their army engaged by superior numbers and defeated in detail. Even supposing that, favoured by the advantages of ground, they were temporarily successful in checking an advance guard, they would be liable at any moment to liDd themselves face to face with the entire Russian army, and probably might share the fate which befell Vaudamme at Chulm in 1813. As before remarked, if the Ottoman army coucentrated near Schumla, they would have to be defeated before any advance could be made on the Balkans ; if, on the other hand, they assembled round Aidos or anywhere south of the mountains, a general action must take place before Adrianople could be captured. The scene of this action and the date on which it takes place will depend on the dispositions of the Turkish generals, and cannot be pre- dicted any more than its result. If tliis action is in any way unfavourable to the Turks, it will probably make the Russians masters of the entire country up to the position of Biijuk Chekmedge, and will decide the campaign, but not tlie fate of Constantinople, which can scarcely fall before an enemy that has not the command of the sea. In every previous war a great defeat lias almost com- pletely prostrated the energies and the defensive powers of the Ottoman Grovernment. Turkish armies never rally 280 liUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. after a serious disaster, whereas the soldiers of the Czars have always been celebrated for their steadiness in ad- versity. It may be remaiked that, whatever plan of operations be adopted, much the same time, namely, about forty- eight days, would be needed after the declaration of war before Schumla could be reached, and if all went well, and the Eussian army were sufficiently large to mask and disregard the fortresses, the invaders could scarcely threaten Stamboul within a period of ninety days after they crossed the Pruth. With respect ii> the actual force that, after so long a march might arrive at the last position before Constanti- nople — this could only be a matter of the wildest conjec- ture ; as before mentioned, Greneral Fadeeff considers that if 250,000 men arrived on the Danube, 1 50,000 ought to reach the capital. Even, however, supposing that this number of men got so far — an improbable contingency under the present circumstances — it by no means follows that Constantinople is lost ; there still is the celebrated position of the Chekmedges to be carried. Although still unfortified, it is so favoured by nature for defence, that but a few weeks' work would suffice to render it im- pregnable. This position has been often described, but the following account of it, given in General ^Nlackin- tosh's ' Strategic Tour in Bulgaria,' appears to be the most detailed and graphic that has yet been published. It was written in the vear 1854. but of course the BUJUK CHEKMEDG^. 281 physical characteristics are now the same as they were tvventy-tliree years ago. On the Adi'ianople side the country resembles the rest of the immediate neighbourhood of Constantinople, but at the distance of two hours it ascends considerably ; and beneath the last height in that dii-ection lies the lake of Chekmagee. This lake is separated from the sea by a marshy tongue or isthmus, narrow, and divided by outlets from the lake, which is brackish. The breadth of the lake is here about three-quartei's of a mile, but it increases higher up, and at the distance of three or four miles divides into a fork, that nearest Constantinople receiving the river which anciently bore the name of the Bathynias. At the Great Lake, about two hours fiu-ther on, beyond a country of heights and valleys, is also a position which looks down upon the lake and isthmus of Buguk Chekmagee, the lattei" of which is reached by a zigzag road, descending fi'om the crest above into the town of that name. The spot is very strong, but nothing has been done by art to I'cndei- it stronger. A few works on the height above, and to the left of the town near a buiying-ground, would command the isthmus and close the road from Adrianople, or even a couple of martello towers in advance of the bridge, not immedi- ately commanded fi-om the heights, in that direction, might pos- sibly lead to the last-mentioned result. As it is, there is not a gun near the spot, and the country is genei-ally smooth and open. Nothing seems done with judgment, on any side to cover the capital so strongly situated by nature. The lakes in question form the left of a strong defensible line wliich has its right on the fort of Kara Borneo on the Black Sea, which is agaiai streng-thened by the proximity to its front of another laro-e salt lake. Between this fort and Domus- 282 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. dereh, near the entry of the Bosphorus, there is no practicable landing-place for a hostile force. The town of Chatsalda is about ten miles from the passage over the marshy ledge which separates the greater lake (Buguk Chekmagee) from the sea. That lake is gradually lost in marsh near Chatsalda, and the advance of troojDS might be rendered very difficult by taking advantage of the country immediately east of that place, and streng-thening it artificially. The distance from Chatsalda to the Black Sea is about thirteen miles, and a little to the north- east the range of little Balkan begins, wliich runs pretty steeply down to the shore of the Bosphorus, but slopes more gi^adually towards the Black Sea. The routes thi^ough it are difficult and unmade, and there can be little doubt that this line, if properly strengthened and defended, would put Constantinople beyond the risk of capture. It would cover effectually the great bends or reservoirs on which the city depends for water, and the country which would be inclosed by it might be rendered prosperous and fruitful, so as to yield supplies to the capital. It may be mentioned that this position was surveyed by Sir John Burgoyne in 1853, that recently also it has been examined, and forts have been projected on it, which now only have to be constructed. A line of railway in rear of the forts by Adhemkoi has been marked out. In another part of his work the same writer gives the following information regarding the position on the Dar- danelles:- - Even though the Russians were to be the conquerors in case of hostilities with the Turks, and even though they were to effect the occupation of Constantinople, the Dardanelles might THE DAIWAKELLES. 283 still be held by a power having the command of a fleet, even though that fleet might not be on the very spot at the moment ; but this could only be done if that position were to be aug- mented in sti-ength on the land side. On the Asiatic side of these straits, forts were erected about the time of Mehemet All's defection, from a fear of his advancing and seizing on that im- portant channel ; but when I last passed through it, no new work had been even commenced on the European side, which is a peninsula connected by a narrow neck with the mainland. In case of a land attack, it could not be defended by the old Turkish castles or batteries, chiefly on the water's edge ; and if the penin- sula were once occupied they must themselves very soon fall into the hands of the assailants. To prevent such an occupation by a force passing ovei' the neck or isthmus, I would propose that a strong line of defensive works should be erected across its narrowest part, wliich is only a few miles bi-oad, and at which point the slope of the land is favourable for the ^^urpose. It lies some miles above, that is, north-east of Gallipoli. If the Russians wei-e enabled to advance on Constantinople, there is no doubt they would make a simultaneous movement on the Dardanelles, and would easily carry the batteries on the European side by the gorge. I say the gorge, as the works have only thin walls on the land side. Constantinople itself is so extensive, that an army might occupy its inland portions without fear of being dislodged by a fleet, though it might bombard and batter the districts near the water. A struggle of this kind would cause the entire destruc- tion of the city, but mere operations from the sea would have little other result. After thus de?;cribing- the means of defence possessed by Constantinople on the European side, General Mackin- 284 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. tosh refers as follows to the manner in which it may be protected in Asia Minor : — In case of the immediate vicinity of ConstantinoiDle being thi'eatened on the Asiatic side, either by the advance of an enemy from the direction of Erzeroom, or in consequence of such a landing having been effected as I have supposed, the country presents an interior line of defence, commencing at the Bay of Chalcedon, without the suburbs of Scutari, and ex- tending to Anatoli- Hissar, the first Asiatic castle above the capital. The suburl) of Scutari is enveloped by a chain of heights descending from Mount Bourgarloo, and connected in an oblique line with an eminence near the castle, but beyond the valley in which it stands. Although, however, this elevated spot com- mands one of the narrowest parts of the strait, it ought not to be occupied, as it is itself commanded by a higher ridge ; but about four hundred yards further on is a plateau embracing a view as far as Therapia, which would cross its fire with the bat- teries on the European side ; and here a fort, aided by another on Mount Bourgarloo, would enable the defenders to hold the enemy at bay, in a line extending from Chalcedon to the Giant's Mountain. All the positions, in fact, are very strong, being supported on both flanks by precipitous ravines, so that they might be held by a corps very inferior in number to that of the enemy, who would be obliged to occupy a very extensive line, while the defending force could confine itself to one comparatively very limited. The advance of an enemy, even to the water's edge, would not, on this side, be at once so decisive as on the other, from the obstacle presented by the Bosphorus. Still the loss of the Asiatic forts, and the destruction of the DEFENCES OF CONSTANTINOFLE. 2S5- villages and dwellings, extending nearly ten miles up the strait, wliich must be the consequence of such an advance, would be a very heavy calamity, tending much to the ultimate success of an enemy. Even should nothing moi-e effective be done, works on the heights behind are imperatively requii'ed for the defence of both shores, for which the only provision yet made is some small wooden blockhouses, erected in 1853, behind the fort of Youska, ^\dth six or seven siuiilar constructions at other points, of which one w^as in the rear of Roomeli-Kavac, on the European side. That at Youska appeared to me to be commanded behind by the Giant's Mountain, and all these blockhouses seemed mean and combustible defences. They are, however, provided with a small ditch and glacis, and theii' roofs are covered with earth to deaden the effect of shells and other projectiles. Such are the natural facilities possessed by Constanti- nople for defence. A reference to the map will suffice to show her extraordinary commercial advantages, situated as she is between the continents of Europe and Asia, and at the junction of two great inland seas. Hence it can scarcely be wondered that for sixteen centuries she has been coveted by all neighbouring nations ; that she enables the Government by which she is held preternatu- rally to survive the ordinary causes of decay, and that, now as formerly, she is regarded as the chief seat of the empire of the world. In conclusion, therefore, we may consider that, great as would be the obstacles to a Eussian army advancing on Constantinople, these obstacles are by no means insur- 286 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. inountable ; altliough about three-and-half months would be required to reach the Bosphorus, nevertheless the feat might be accomplished, even without the command of the sea. If Eussia were mistress of the Euxine, the ope- ration would be enormously facilitated, and most of the real difficulties that now exist, namely those connected with supply and transport, would in a great measure be removed. This being the case, as, by the amendment of the treaty of Paris in 1870, there is nothing to prevent the creation of a formidable Eussian fleet in the Black Sea, it seems more than probable that the present time would not voluntarily have been selected for an attack on the Turkish empire. Force cf circumstances, not choice, has forced Eussia to assume her present attitude. If deep and ulterior designs are nom'ished against the inde- pendence of the Porte, the contest will possibly be post- poned at least half a dozen years, until the deficiencies of the Eussian railways are supplied ; until a Eussian fleet has been constructed ; until the Slavonian agitation has reached a climax ; and until the continued insolvency of the Ottoman Government has permitted her land and sea forces alike to relapse into a condition of inefficiency and decay. It must, however, be added that, from information which the author has received on undoubted authority of the condition of the Turkish armaments at the outbreak of the Servian war, he has no doubt whatever that had the Eussian Government been able in May 1876 to mobilise and concentrate 200,000 men in Bessarabia, within a .SUMMARY. 287 month they might have marched to Constantinople almost without hindrance, and might have encamped on the Bosphorus within nine weeks of the day on which their rear-^uard crossed the Danube. It need scarcely be added that the suggestions made above regarding the probable lines of advance, and the marches of the various columns, are only intended to be conjectural, that the distances given are taken from the map and are only approximate, there being no good itine- rary or even guide-book of Turkey-in-Europe ; and lastly that, as in the other matters of life, still more in the march of armies, the chapter of accidents has at all times a powerful, and in some cases a decisive influence. 288 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. CHAPTER XII. THE POLITICAL ASPECT OF THE EASTERN QUESTION. Importance of Austria in a Eusso-Turkish War — The Slaves — Policy of Austria— How the action of Austria might be neutralized, ex- ternally and internally — Slavonic question— Danger to Austria — Limits of Bulgaria— Interests of England — Traditional policy of Russia — Essentially aggressive in its character — Various lines of policy open to England — ^Maich it is her interest to adopt — Un- fortunate natural antagonism between Russia and England — Ad- vantages of the policy suggested. In the foregoing chapter, and in those that preceded it, no account whatever has been taken of the position of Austria or of the attitude which the Slavonic and Grreek population of Turkey might assume in the event of any complication and subsequent war with Russia. A glance at the map will show that in a strategic point of view Austria holds the key of the situation ; no Russian army could possibly reach Constantinople from the Danubian frontier, if Austria were to forbid. This fact has been dilated on at considerable length and with great clearness by the Russian General Fadeeff,^ who thereupon argues that the real enemy of Russia is not Turkey but Austria, since the latter power may prevent any designs of aggres- sion being carried out on the former. ' Vide Appendix. RESOURCES OF ENGLAND. 289 This author, however, apparently overslioots the mark : ■while taking it for granted that Turkey, if unassisted, would prove an easy prey to a Muscovite attack, and that an invading army would only require six weeks to march from the Danube to Constantinople, he considers that not more than 60,000 men could be sent by the maritime powers to assist the Porte. This evidently is an under- estimate. France, perhaps, need not be taken into account, as since the '70 campaign her great object has been to es- tablish a Kussian alliance ; but were either Italy or Eng- land to enter into the contest both powers could alone place in the field a far larger force. Considering the enor- mous amount of shipping at the disposal of England, two corps could be despatched from their shores at a week's notice, and an equal number from India in scarcely a longer time, and could certainly arrive at the Bosphorus before the Eussians could get there from the Danube. It is, however, extremely improbable, having in view the present temper of the English people, and the present financial difficulties of the Italian Government, that either one power or the other would, at all events in the first in- stance, take any part in the quarrel. Hence Turkey would stand alone, having in her favour the possible intervention of Austria, and having against her the probability of an extensive rising on the part of the Slave population. Let us first turn to Austria. The past political his- tory of this country exhibits a strange mixture of weak- ness, indecision, temporary boldness, and chronic tear. No u 290 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. country has less reason to desire a Russian occupation of Constantinople, or has greater cause to wish the Danube to remain free and neutralised ; nevertheless of all the in- terested powers, there is not one that has lent herself with greater readiness to Russian designs. We have seen that twice in the last century she allied herself against Turkey, and in only one of the eight wars in which during the last 170 years Russia and Turkey have been engaged has Austria assumed in any way a hostile attitude to the Muscovite armies. That once — in the Crimean War — she took no active part in the contest, although, as clearly shown by Kinglake, she led the Western Powers on the ice, distinctly assuring them that she would support their ulti- matum to the Emperor Nicholas, and drawing back at the last moment. In 1829, according to Von Moltke, she encouraged the Turks to continue the contest, hoping from the apparent exhaustion of the combatants that she might eventually step in as an umpire and dictate terms to both. In 1870, when Russia issued her celebrated note, announcing that she could no longer be bound by the treaty of Paris as to the Black Sea, Austria pursued her accustomed and traditional policy of masterly in- activity. It is true at the time she was not supported. The English ministry of the day failed to appreciate the importance of the clauses involved ; the Sultan Abdul Aziz was too busy with his palaces and his harems to take much account of the doings of infidels. France and Grer- many were engaged in mortal strife ; Italy had only just POLICY OF AUSTRIA. 291 •got to Eome and hoped to stay there ; Austria alone could iiave said ' No,' and this ' No ' would probably have been decisive, but she failed to say it. Thus one of the great safeguards against Eussian aggression was swept away by the stroke of a pen ; what had cost thousands of lives and millions of pounds to effect was abandoned without a blow or a struggle. At the present juncture, who can doubt that a simple -concentration of Austrian troops on the Transylvanian frontier would make war an impossibility ? There would he no more panics on all the bourses in Europe ; no more failures from the prostration of trade ; but faithful to her •ancient policy Austria remains still. War rumours con- tinue, and if peace intervenes we shall owe but few thanks to the Cabinet of Vienna. It cannot be said that Austria is to blame for the policy which she thus consistently pur- sues ; she is perfectly right to allow others to pull the chestnuts out of the fij-e for her ; but it must always be remembered by those who look to Austria to check Eussian .aggression that, if they ti-ust to her, they trust to a broken reed ; not only from habitual policy, but also from external circumstances, she cannot be regarded in any way as a dependable element connected with the Eastern question. For let us consider how her action might be neu- tralised, however willing she might be to act. Of course first comes Grermany. An understanding between Prince Grortchakoff and Prince Bismarck, and a simple warning issued by the latter, would prevent a single u 2 292 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. Austrian soldier moving a foot forwards towards the Principalities ; and the bribe that could be offered for this passive assistance might be a tempting one, say Holland, the Gferman-speaking Baltic provinces, or Bohemia, with Austrian G-ermany. Then, again, there is Italy ; lately there were rumours of a Russo- Italian alliance : it is said that wherever there is smoke there is also fire. The action of Italy would much paralyse Austria, and would neutralise a large portion of her troops — the bribe there would not be so tempting, and it could not so certainly be administered ; it would be the Trentino, or perhaps the eastern shores of the Adriatic. It thus may be seen that complications may easily occur, which would render Austria by no means a free agent. It is fortunate for Europe that the states- men both of Germany and Italy of the present day are notoriously honest and high-minded, otherwise the possi- bilities here suggested might become realities. Then again, there is the Slavonic question — so much talked of now, but which has only recently come into pro- minence. It is somewhat difficult to disentangle the actual truth from the web of falsehood and random asser- tion with which it is involved. It would appear, how- ever, from the writings of those who are both friendly and hostile to Russia, that for years past a most compli- cated and deep-seated intrigue has been proceeding — insti- tuted and carried out by secret societies ^ — according to some fostered, and certainly regarded by no means with ' Vide Appendix, Lord Palmerston"s opinions. THE SLAVONIC QUESTION. 293 disfavour, by the Russian Government. The object of this intrigue or conspiracy is nominally the freedom of the Slavonic races from the dominion of Turkey, and the creation of either a number of independent or, as it is termed, ' autonomous ' states, or else of a single Slavonic kingdom under the protection of Russia. What this would ultimately result in, it is unnecessary to point out. The protection of small independent states on the frontier of a great and aggressive empire must result, as in the case of the Crimea, in the word protection being replaced by incorporation. This scheme, if carried out, would be a double-edged weapon in the hands of Russia — it would tend towards the dismemberment not only of the Ottoman but also of the Austrian empire. The Slave states, that owe alle- giance to the Court of Vienna, would inevitably be attracted to a Slave kingdom, just as the minor states of Italy were attracted round Piedmont, and those of Ger- many round Prussia. Unfortunately the Austrian rule can scarcely be called assimilating, like that of her neigh- bours ; the various races that own allegiance to the yellow and black flag still retain their individuality, and in a great degree their mutual hostilities. It is different in Germany ; one of the great triumphs of comparatively free and constitutional governments may be witnessed in the success achieved by the new German empire in reconciling the different and previously hostile Germanic kingdoms to her rule, and in imbuing them with a mutual regard 294 EUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. and united patriotism. Undoubtedly the war of 1870' was in a ^reat degree instrumental in bringing this- about, nevertheless the complete success is not the less commendable. The secession of her Slave provinces from Austria would inevitably be followed by an entire disruption of the empire. Hungary would probably become an independent kingdom, the German provinces would go to Prussia, the Italian Tyrol and some other pickings to Italy. That this is an end which would be of enormous benefit to Eussia is unquestionable, the road to Constantinople would at once be open, and any danger of a reconstitution of the Polish kingdom would be removed for ever. It has been remarked by many Eussian writers that Austria could use Polish disaffection as a most valuable weapon against Eussia. An offer to restore G-alicia and erect a free Poland at Warsaw would probably neutralise the action of 150,000 Eussian troops, and cause disaffection among many thousands more. As directed against Turkey the value of the Slavonic agitation is self-evident, it means insurrection and utter paralysis of resources in case of war — be it remarked, moreover, that this would not be confined to Christians alone, since the Slave Mahome- dans are by no means an unimportant body, and miglit be supposed to side with their brethren of similar race and language. Were this agitation ripe for action, were the Christian population armed, a single great defeat of the Turkish army would result not only in an utter col- HUSSIAN BJSSIGNS ON THE BALKANS. 295 lapse of that army itself, as has always been the case in former wars, but in an utter prostration of all further means of defence ; the defeaders would be taken in flank and rear, faithful Mussulmans would lose lieart — would mutter ' Ejsmet,' and the Sultan with his advisers would decamp ' bag and baggage ' from Constantinople. Even if at the last moment the Western Powers were to take fright and save the capital, a JNIuscovite army encamped almost within sight of St. Sophia — a Muscovite army in occupation of all the Turkish provinces, and an uprising of all the subject populations, would place the St. Petersburg Cabinet in a very different position from that which it now occupies, with a half-mobilised army encamped in the steppes of Bessarabia, dying of cold and privation on the banks of the Pruth. Were all that has been written and said regarding Eussian designs to be believed, the credulity or, to use a most expressive French word, the gohemoucherie of us all would be strained to the utmost, A recent publica- tion ^ has given an elaborate account of all the various intrigues and machinations by which Eussia has endea- voured to cause the term ' Bulgaria ' to extend south of the Balkans, and thus to give her army after the proposed occupation the advantage of starting from a base which has already surmounted the great strategic obstacle of those mountains. The writer of this pamphlet even goes so far as to say that the ' whole attention of diplomacy ^ 'Attention aux Balkans,' translated by Edgar Whitaker. 296 HUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. ought to be directed to the Balkans.' Apparently the military value of this defensive line has been enormously over-estimated ; as previously shown, the only time that an army has ever got so far, it had no difficulty in marching on. History, moreover, contains but few examples of the successful defence of a mountain range which contains as many as thirteen practicable passes, and which might also be turned, as is the case in the present instance. Never- theless, both in the interest of the Grreeks and in that also of military expediency, the limitation of Bulgaria to the country north of the Balkans is most desirable. We have hitherto endeavoured to discuss the political elements which might influence the military situation in a Eusso-Turkish war ; it now only remains for us to con- sider how far the interests of England may be concerned in the settlement of the ' Eastern,' or, as it has now begun to be termed, the ' Slavonic Question.' We liave all received the assurances of the present Emperor of Russia that he has no designs whatever on Constantinople, and that the only explanation of the recent attitude which the G-overnment of St. Peters- burg has been forced to assume is their earnest desire to improve the condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte. The character of the Czar stands so high, his honesty is so undoubted, his regard for England so universally known, and his liberality so great, that the assurance thus gratuitously given has, notwithstanding the unfortunate Khivan affair, carried with it univer- RUSSIAN DESIGNS ON CONSTANTINOPLE. 297 ■sal confidence ; it has done much to calm public feel- ing in this country, and hence to direct and influence the general policy of the English nation. Possibly, were the present Emperor to live for ever, we might afford to view with indifference all that takes place in the East. Unfortunately, as with all of us, the Czar and his policy are but tenants for life ; and in the interests of ourselves, our children, and our grandchildren, we must look farther than the actual present. The fact remains that for the last two centuries the <3apture of Constantinople has been the great object to which the efforts and aims of Eussian policy have been consistently directed. We put aside the apocryphal will of Peter the Grreat as probably a fable ; we will suppose that some of the eight wars in which since his death Eussia has been engaged with Turkey as an antagonist, were undertaken for philanthropic motives like those now professed ; but on referring to history we find the Empress Anne in the year 1736 concluded an alliance with Austria for the partition of Turkey ; in 1786 a similar convention was made between Catherine II. and Joseph II. ; Alexan- der I. at the peace of Tilsit in 1807 made the same ar- rangement with Napoleon ; and in 1853, as isweU known, the Emperor Nicholas made distinct proposals in the same sense to Sir Hamilton Seymour. To say, therefore, that Eussia as a nation has no desig-ns on Constantinople is to do the patriotism of her statesmen great injustice. It is, moreover, an historical absurdity, just as much as to say 298 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. that ' the possession of Constantinople would be a misfortune for Russia ' is a geograpliical absurdit3^ The following passage, extracted from General Fadeeff's book, shows the opinion of a patriotic Russian on this point. He says : — ' There is yet another place on the earth immeasurably important to Russia, having no material character, but from its exceptional position too important to belong to any small people — Constantinople, with the surrounding suburbs, country, and straits. The most positive interests of Russia render it desirable that that city — far more eternal than Rome — should become the free city of a tribal union.' The term ' free city of a tribal union ' is indeed a mockery. Can there be anything connected with Russia that is free ? Russian writers talk of making the Slaves free I Until the institutions, laws, and entire system of government in the Muscovite empire are changed from the foundation, a transfer from the rule of Turkey to that of Russia would — to use a common expression — be a trans- fer from the frying-pan to the fire. In addition to the influence of her traditional policy for centuries, there are other causes which tend to make Russia an aggressive and conquering power. In the first place she possesses but few safety-valves for the energy of her youth, such as are offered in a commercial or colo- nising country under a constitutional government. There is but one profession — the army — and the entire system of government is a militar}^ despotism. Hence a war SOCIAL DANGERS IN RUSSIA. 299- would, as a rule, be viewed in Eussia by all the governing class except the Minister of P'inance, as a pleasing variety, more especially as those in whom chief power is vested do not bear the burden of the taxation. There are likewise social dangers of a most serious character, which effect pressure from within that tends to cause expansion out- wards. The taxation is levied on principles that are op- posed alike to all rules of justice and of political economy. The peasant pays heavily, wliile the noble and the mem- ber of the Imperial family go almost free. The burden of universal military service — a legacy from the year 1870 — presses heavily on the population, and, more even than in G-ermany, tends to arrest all progress and to paralyse all industry. M. Leroy-Beaulieu, in the Revue des Deux Mondes, has brought out most vividly the present internal condition of the Muscovite empire, and other recent works on the same subject are equally explicit, so much so that when we see the solicitude exhibited by Eussia for the sufferings of Turkish subjects, the saying arises to our lips, ' Physician, heal thyself.' ^ It seems, therefore, incontestable that whatever may be the disinterested and philanthropic motives that have prompted the action of Eussia as regards the Eastern Question during the last year, the natural action of her ^ It has been remarked by a recent writer on this subject, Mr, Alfred Austin, that the solicitude of Eussia for the welfare of Turkish subjects is of recent date, whereas the interest of Russia in Turkish territories is as old as Turkish decline in defensive capacity and Russia's consciousness of oifensive streno-th. /300 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. G-overnment is essentially ambitious and aggTessive. When opportunity offers that action will be carried out. It only remains for England to decide on a definite policy to be pursued — a policy which will be maintained whatever Government may be in office, whatever events may occur, and which will not be influenced either by Polish or by Bulgarian atrocities. It may be said that, as frequently happens, three dis- tinct lines of policy are open to us. The first is that which was pursued at the time of the Crimean War, to support Turkey to the last, to guarantee her integrity and independence, and be prepared to main- tain both by force of arms. The second is to conclude an alliance with Russia, the ultimate object of which, whatever might be its imme- diate pretext, would be the dismemberment of the Otto- man empire, and a share in the spoils when the day of dismemberment came. The third and last course is to await the course of events, to lavish on the Porte plenty of excellent advice and as many diplomatic notes as circumstances may ren- der desirable ; but beyond this on no account to move, still less to fight, for a continuance of Turkish rule in Europe. The first line of policy is not one which it is probable will ever again commend itself to the English nation. Were it to be pursued consistently, notwithstanding the great militarv difficulties of conducting a war thousands of miles THE POLICY OF ENGLAND. 301 from a base, there is no doubt that it could be successfully carried out. The wealth and resources of England ai'e so enormous that certainly for many years to come, with no allies but the Turks, she could effectually arrest the pro- gress of Russia towards the south, even supposing that her resolute attitude did not infuse fresh life and determina- tion into the councils of Austria. It may, however, be well questioned whether the enormous expenditure of money and lives which such a course of policy must en- tail, would be worth the ends at which it is aimed. If the Turkish rule in Europe were a beneficent, enlightened rule, if it tended to improve the condition of its subjects and to develop the resources of the country which it governs, the case would be different ; but as notoriously Turkish pachas are corrupt and oppressive, as the whole system on which the Ottoman government is carried out is essentially rotten, carrying with it the causes of its own decay, any attempt of England to perpetuate it would be equally wrong and in the end unavailing. If the consti- tution, recently announced, effects such a radical change as is anticipated, then possibly the system of government in the Ottoman states may become of so enlightened a character that it may be deserving of all support from England ; and that support we may rest assured, when the day comes. Englishmen will most freely accord. The second course of policy, namely, a close alliance with Russia, is almost an impossibility. There is no reason why a free country, possessed of a constitutional 502 HUSSIAN WAFS WITH TURKEY. government, should not ally itself with an enlightened des- potism, such as the government of Russia may become, if the wishes and reforms of the present Emperor are carried out. Unfortunately, at present, this enlightened des- potism seems just as far distant as beneficent government •on the part of Turkey. There are also other reasons why such an alliance could not be honestly maintained. It would be utterly repug-nant to the feelings and traditions of the English nation to assist, even in prospective, in the possible dis- memberment of a former ally. Statesmen out of office may talk of the expulsion of the Turk, ' bag and bag- gage,' out of Europe, but were they in office probably their language and certainly their action would be very differently modelled. Lastly, it is true, however much to be regretted, that the interests of Russia and Eng- land are, like their respective politics, in many ways, distinctly antagonistic. Not only in Europe, but still more in the East, this unfortunate antagonism becomes every day more and more apparent. While England is un- aggressive, peaceful, and commercial, Russia is aggressive, warlike, and military. While England practises free trade in the purest sense, and grants liberty of the press with absolute freedom as regards the movements and expressed opinions of her subjects, Russia indulges in a protective system of trade suited almost to the dark ages, the press is gagged, and Russian subjects can scarcely venture either to move or to speak without being prepared to face conse- THE POLICY OF ENGLAND. 303 -quences of the most serious description. Doubtless, much "has been done by the present Emperor to remedy these matters, but still there is yet much to be desired, and, until this improvement takes place, an Anglo-Eussian alliance can only exist in the dim prospect of the future. We now come to the third and last line of policy — that of awaiting the course of events — of affording our best offices in aid of peace and order, but steering, if possible, clear of any warlike complications. It does not follow that we are at once to give up all that we should not be prepared to maintain by force of arms. Lord Palmerston's opinion on this point is worth remarking.^ Or that we should proclaim to the world our fixed peace- ful determinations. Such a proclamation would materially iveaken our influence for good, and would be calculated entirely to mislead the rest of Europe, thereby not im- possibly tending to cause the very war which it was specially intended to avert. Moreover such an announce- ment could not be based on sufficient grounds to justify its being made. The feelings of the English people are most changeable, and their temper on occasions most war- like ; at any moment, as before the Crimean war, the Government of the day might find itself carried away by popular enthusiasm and forced to enter on a war the possibility of" which it had previously scouted. The pros- pect of the immediate capture of Constantinople might at any moment evoke an outburst of feeling and excitement • Vide Appendix, 304 HUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. in this country of a most violent and unexpected nature. Bulgarian atrocities would at once be forgotten, and pro- bably the old policy of former days would be hurriedly embraced. As regards the presence of Russia at Con- stantinople, one word must be said. Until recently it has always been regarded in England as an axiom that the seizure by Eussia of the seat of the empire of the world would be a ' pistol levelled at the head of India,' just as the possible occupation of Antwerp by the French in former days could have been regarded as a 'pistol levelled at the head of England.' Since the opening of the Suez Canal this axiom would appear to be even still more self-evident. It has, how- ever, recently been questioned, and hence is no longer an axiom. It is related that recently a large bet was made that the sun went round the earth and not the earth round the sun. A treatise also not long since was written to prove that the surface of the globe was flat and not round. It seems as unnecessary here to discuss the value of Constantinople, as to demonstrate the truth of the facts in physical science which these two statements have called in question. Let it be granted, however, that a Russian occupation of the Bosphorus would be a danger to our communications with our Indian empire, and that we should feel disquieted were such an event to occur, just as a farmer possessed of a field full of valuable stock, and distant from his own house, would feel uneasy if lie heard that an ill-conditioned neighbour had suddenly THE REQUIREMENT OF EXGLAND. 305 acquired the power to stop up the road to that field, and to cut off the water with which it is supplied. This must be conceded. It now remains for us to consider what niaterial guarantees should we take for our safety. The abandonment of Corfu, one of our great bases in the Mediterranean, appears now, more than ever, peculiarly unfortunate. It has been termed ' an unaccountable ac- cess of sentimental insanity.' The remarks attributed to Prince Bismarck regarding this voluntary surrender are es- pecially approjDriate — ' When a nation begins to give up, she begins to decline,' or words to that effect. However, the deed is done; being many thousand miles from our na- tural base it behoves us to establish in the Mediterranean as many artificial bases as we require. The geographical position of Candia, with its admirable harbour of Suda, at once suggests itself, and as a strategic point for land defence the importance of Acre has already been shown in a previous chapter. The occupation of Constantinople presents many difficulties — the principal one being the large number of troops required to carry out such an oc- cupation effectually. Then again, the wishes of the Turks are not an unimportant element in such a proposal. If we have an alliance with Turkey at all it must be an active not a passive alliance. It would be alike detrimen- tal to the interests of England, and incompatible with the honour and feelings of the English army, that British troops should occupy the position of Biijuk-Checkmedge, w'hile the Turks are doing all the fighting on the Balkans X .306 RUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. or on the Dauube. Such a proposal is not to he for a moment entertained. Lastly there is the position on the Daradnelles ; the advantage of occupying this is self-evi- dent, thereby we should possess a guarantee valuable alike in a commercial and in a naval point of view. As long as we hold the Dardanelles, no Russian fleet could suddenly emerge from the Euxine and cut us off from our Indian Empire at a moment when our countrymen there may- most urgently need our assistance. It also should not be forgotten that eventually Constantinople must be on the main channel of communication between Europe and Asia. The day must come when a railway will unite London with Calcutta, and the line of this railway will pause at the Bosphorus. Hitherto, in discussing the political aspect of the Eastern Question, but little mention has been made of Germany, although, as the greatest military power of the West, she must of necessity exercise an all-important influence in the councils of Europe, even if her own im- mediate interests are only indirectly affected by the pro- gress of Eussia in the East. No one who has ever mingled much with the Grermans of the present day can be igno- rant of their universal and deep-rooted conviction that in order to consolidate and finally to secure the Grerman Em- pire a war with Russia is an inevitable necessity. Situ- ated between three great military nations, and having vanquished two, it now remains to vanquish the third. The one danger that Germany has to fear is a French and CONCLUSION. 307 ■Russian alliance. Were the Muscovites finally weakened and humbled, the danger would be past ; then armaments migh\ be reduced, taxes might be lightened, and the fear- ful burden under which Grerman industry groans might in a great measure be removed. The relations now existing between the courts of 8t. Petersburg and Berlin forbid anything approaching to open hostility, and the Emperor William is far too loyal and true ever to cherish a feeling or to favour an intrigue which could in any way prejudice the cordiality and friend- ship between himself and his nephew. Nevertheless, when national interests are at stake, family and personal feelings only too often are forgotten ; in future years the cordiality which now exists between the Czar and the German Emj)eror may have passed away. Even at the present time no patriotic German states- man can forget that a war which would weaken Eussia would strengthen Germany, and that for the interests of the Fatherland it is far better that this war should be fought on the slopes of the Balkans than on the banks of the Vistula. In conclusion, it need only be remarked that whatever be the immediate result of the Conference, its ultimate effect must be politically to strengthen the position of Russia. In place of being isolated and ' acting indepen- dently,' she has been associated with the other Great Powers ; she has induced their representatives to attempt to impose on the Porte conditions such as were utterly X 2 308 JiUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY. incompatible with the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire ; she has given evidence of her own moderation, whether sincere or feigned it is unnecessary to inquire ; and last, but not least, she has succeeded in isolating her traditional antagonist from exterior alliance and support. APPENDIX. Extract from ' 02nnion on the Eastern Question,^ hy General Rotislar Fadeeff, of the Russian Army. Translated hy T. Mitchell, C.B., late Secretary to Her Majesty's Embassy, and Consul at St. Petersburg. It is generally considered in Prussia that France and England are the principal obstacles to an armed intei-vention in Tm-kish affairs ; but, in reality, however much they might desire it, France and England are not in a position to defend European Turkey against Russia, provided the hands of Russia are untied on the western frontier. It is a matter of impossibility to struggle, by landing forces, against a power of equal strength which has open access overland into the disj^uted country Such a struggle is impossible, both in respect to time and to numbers. Of what avail would be the means of maritime transport against an army of 200,000 men acting continuously? In 1854 the allies employed a part of the winter and the whole of the spring in transporting 60,000 soldiers to Turkey*; they then requii-ed a considerable time for the organisation of their waggon-train ; until June they were chained to the sea-coast, and they had not acquii-ed mobility even by the end of that month. Their forces in the Crimea grew to the dimensions of a numerous army only by the gradual transport of fresh troops during the course of a 310 APPENDIX. whole year. Meanwhile the Russian army requires only six weeks, and even less, to march from the Danulje to Constanti- nople, provided, of coui-se, it be sufficiently numerous for the blockade of foi-ti-esses in the rear, during a foi^ward movement, that shall also be as far as possible uninteiTupted. In dealing with the Turks, a war may be pushed on as rapidly as the trans- port train can be made to advance. It is to be presumed that the war will support itself on the Balkan peninsula, provided the rapidity of the campaign does not permit the enemy to devastate methodically the country which, under such circum- stances, would of course not submit to him without opposition. Hitherto, following old traditions, Paissia has fought in Euro- pean Turkey step by step, besieging fortresses to the astonish- ment of Europe, and without the justification of an unavoid- able military necessity. In 1829, however, there was a political reason for such a plan of campaign ; it was necessary to secure, as far as possible, the rear- of the Russian army against any sudden hostile attack on the part of Austria. In order to settle the fate of Eui-opean Turkey, in spite of the maritime powers, it will be sufficient for 150,000 troops to reach the Bosphorus, i.e., that 250,000 men, on the broadest calculation, should reach the Danube. There can be no difficulty in supplying these numbei-s, even with oui- present military orga.nisation, allowing also for a sufficient and satisfac- tory occupation of the shores of the Baltic and Black Seas, and for the employment of 50,000 active troops on the side of the Caucasus. Russia can always forestal the land foi-ces of her Westein opponents, not only in the Balkans, but even at Con- stantinople. Even if they should succeed, after considerable difficulty, in meeting the Russian army in fi-ont of that cajDital with a force like that which, after the lapse of many months, they got together in 1854 at Yarna, 60,000 Europeans, sup- APPENDIX. 811 ])orted by any number of Turks, would not be able to defeat a Russian army of 150,000 men. Moreover, there would be no regular Turkish troops in existence at such a time : they would have been dispersed earlier in Europe and in Asia. The Straits would fall into the hands of the captors of Constantinople ; their fortifications could not hold out against a land force ; and the entrances into the' Sea of Marmora, once occupied and properly defended, any serious attempt from seaward to dispute the pos- session of Turkey would become almost im])0ssible. The largest force that has ever yet been landed was the army of the Crimea, which consisted of 60,000 troops, without cavalry or waggon- train, and with but a small proportion of artillery. The landing was crowned with success in consequence of two special reasons, namely, the shortness of the voyage (only thirty-six hours), and the numerical inferiority — to the extent of one-half — -of our troops on shoi-e. But a landing in the face of superior numbers, or of an enemy of equal strength abundantly supplied with wai-like resources, would lead to destruction. The army of Wellington, transported in ships supplied from sea, and having a strong place of refuge at the moutb of the Tagus, maintained its footing in Spain against the superior, although divided, forces of the French, only because the country was for that army ; but imagine the opposite position. Could a French army, between 1807 and 1812, sm-rounded by a national insurrection, have held its ground in Spain against superior English forces 1 And such would be exactly the position of the Eui-opean allies in Tui-key if Kussia acted with decision. Indeed, were Russia to act with j^rompti- tude and decision, those allies would not, in all probability, be found in Turkey at all. Were the maritime powei-s to resolve on defending Turkey without having the co-operation of Aus- tria, they would defend it only with their naval forces, and only with such a number of land troops as they could carry on -12 APPENDIX. board theii* fleet without inconvenience ; but they would never risk their army. Many are led into error by the fact that the allies of 1854 were able to carry the war into Paissia and to maintain themselves there. But how were they able to efiect this ? Simply by taking up a strong position on the coast, which they succeeded in fortifying befoi-e a sufficient force could Le collected against them. There are many similar positions on the Tm-kish coast, but it would be impossible to save the Turkish dominions by encamping a small force on a sea-shore. In reality France and England can as little protect European Turkey against Eussia ^ith theii- land forces as they can protect Canada or Mexico against the Americans. The difficulty is this, that it is impossible for Eussia to cai'iy on a war on the Balkan peninsula without the permission of Austria, and that permission she can under no cii'cumstances obtain. Look at the map. Eussia can reach European Turkey only by one road thi'ough the gate foi-med by the south-east angle of the Carpathians and the mouth of the Danube : the key of that gate is in the hands of Austria. By crossing the Danube or even the Pruth, a Eussian army would expose her rear to Austria. In this awkward position the fii'st threatening demonstration on the part of Eussia's good neighbour would compel the army to beat a hasty retreat as in 1854. The Lower Danube is accessible only ^^dth an Austrian passpoi-t. In rela- tion to Eussia, the geogi-aphical position of Eiu-opean Tiu'key may be compared to a strong chest, of which Austria forms the lid ; without bfting that lid, it is impossible to get anything out of the chest. Eussia has had sufficient experience of that. It was iiimoured in 1854 that Prince Paskewitch strongly represented to the late Emperor that, once resolved on a war with Tiu-key, it was necessary, above all, to prepaie for a war with Austria. He affirmed that the Eastern question could be APPENDIX. 313 solved only at Vienna, not in Turkey. Events have proved the correctness of the views of that celebrated waiiior. While Russia held possession of the Black Sea, an attempt might have been made to break open the chest from the other side, i.e., to knock out the bottom of it by a landing in the Bosphorns. The result would have been a rising of the entii-e Christian population, the paralysing of Turkey during the fol- lowing months, and probably her final dissolution ; b; t in whose favour ? The siege of Constantinople and the sti-aits would not settle that question. It would have to be settled by a war on land against a coalition of which Austria would be the soul. During the continuance of such a war the Christian population of the Balkan peninsula would be in a chaotic condition. It would fight the Mussulman inhabitants of the towns, but it would not be able to give Russia any assistance beyond its own territoiy. In order to occupy the straits and the entii^e penin- .sula, it would be necessaiy to detach forces greater than those which would be required in case of a war in the West to defend the shores and land frontier of Russia against a live Turkey ; so that, in reality, the seizure of Constantinople from seawai'd, while such a seizure was yet possible, would have increased but very little the material probabilities of the final success of Russia. In questions of the character of the last Greek ques- tion a fleet in the Black Sea might have exei-cisecl a weighty influence : it might have been used as a strong diplomatic exjDe- dient, but it would have been no very important military weapon in view of the objects that appertain to Russia. It is naturally impossible to estimate speculatively the moral effect of such a stupendous event as the entry of the Russian ti-oops into Constan- tinople, even if it were unexpected, but such an event would in any case be a double-edged weapon. 3U Ari'ENDIX. OPIXIOX OF LOED PALMEESTON. Tlie folloichvj extracts from Lord P aimer sto as Utters ami opi- nions on the Eastern Question appeared in the ' Mornimj Post' of Decemher 30, 1876. As they appear iJeculiarly ap- propriate at the jyresent time, they are here reproduced. It is ueai-ly forty years since Lord Palmerston wi-ote to the Secretary of the Embassy at Constantinople in these words : — ' People go on talking of the ineritahle and progi-essive decay of the Turkish empii^e, which they say is crumbling to pieces. In the fii^st place, no empire is likely to fall to pieces if left to itself, and if no kind neighbours tear it to pieces. In the next place, I much question that there is any process of decay going on in the Turkish empire ; and I am inclined to susj^ect that those who say that the Turkish empire is i-apidly going from bad to woi-se, ought rather to say that the other countries of Europe are year by year becoming better acquainted with the manifest and manifold defects of the organisation of Tiu-key. . . . Half the conclusions at wliich mankind anive are reached by the abuse of metaphors, and by mistaking general resemblance or imaginary similarity for real identity. Thus people compare an ancient monarchy with an old building, an old tree, or an old man, and because the building, tree, oi- man must, fi-om the nature of things, cnimble, or decay, or die, they imagine that the same thing holds good with a community, and that the same laws which govern inanimate matter, or vegetable and animal life, govern also nations and states ; than which there cannot be a greater or more utterly unphilosophical mistake. For, besides all other points of difference, it is to be remembered that the com- ponent parts of the building, tree, or man remain the same, or are either decomposed by external causes or are altered ia their APPENDIX. 315 iiitemal structure by the process of life, so as ultimately to be unfit foi- their original functions ; while, on the contrary, the component parts of a community are undergoing daily the pro- cess of physical renovation and of moral improvement. There- fore all that we hear every day of the week about the decay of the Turkish empire, and its being a dead body or a sapless trunk, and so forth, is puie and unadulterated nonsense.' Still, as he says elsewhere, '' you can't expect much energy of a people with no heels to their shoes.' In a letter to Lord Clarendon of May 22, 1853, Lord Pal- mei-ston writes as follows :— ' The policy and practice of the Russian Government have always been to push forward its encroachments as fast and as far as the apathy or want of firmness of other Governments would allow it to go, but always to stop and retire when it was met with decided resistance, and then to wait for the next favourable opportunity to make another spring on its intended victim. In furtherance of this policy, the Russian Government has always had two strings to its bow — moderate language and disinterested professions at Petersburg and at London ; active aggression by its agents on the scene of operations. If the aggression succeed locally, the Petersburg GoveiTiment adopts them as a fait accompli which it did not intend, but cannot, in honour, recede from. If the local agents fail, they are chsavowed and recalled, and the language previously held is ap- pealed to as a proof that the agents have overstepped their instructions. This was exemplified in the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi and in the exploits of Simonivitch and Vikovitch in Persia. OrloflT succeeded in extorting the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi from the Turks, and it was represented as a sudden thought, suggested by the circumstances of the time and place, and not the result of any previous instructions; but having S16 APPENDIX. been done it could not be undone. On the otber hand, Simoni- vitch and Vikovitch failed in getting possession of Herat in- consequence of oiu" vigorous measures of resistance ; and as they failed, and when they failed, they were disavowed and recalled, and the language previously held at St. Petersburg was appealed to as a proof of the sincerity of the disavowal, although no human being with two ideas in his head could for a moment doubt that they had acted under specific instructions.' Again, on September 21. 1853, he says in a letter to Mr. Sidney Herbert : — ' I am coming leluctantly to the conclusion that war between the Emperor of Russia and Turkey is becoming inevitable. If such war should happen, upon his head be the responsibility of the consequences. I by no means think with you that he will have an easy victory over the Turks. On the contrary, if the l)etting is not even, I would lay odds on the Turks. All that the Turkish aimy wants is directing officers, and it would be strange indeed if England, France, Poland and Hungary could not amply supply that deficiency. I do not believe in the disaffection of the Turkish provinces — this is an oft-rejjeated tale got up by the Russians. The best refutation is that for many months past the Russian agents have been tiying ^^e?- fas et nefas to provoke in- surrection in Turkey, and have failed. The fact is that the ChrLstian subjects in Tm-key know too well what Russian rejime is not to be aware that it is of all things the most to be ch-eaded.' Hei-e is a striking passage on the ' bag-and-baggage ' policy : ' I have no partiality for the Turks as Mohammedans, and should be very glad if they could be turned into Christians ; but as to the character of the Turkish Government in regard to its treatment of Christians, I am well convinced that there are a vast number of Christians under the Governments of Russia, Austria, Rome, and Naples, who would be rejoiced to be as well APPENDIX. 317 treated and to enjoy as much seciuity for person and property as the Christian subjects of the Sultan. To expel from Europe the Sultan and his two million of Mussulman subjects, including the army and the bulk of the landowners, might not be an easy task ; still the five Powers might effect it, and play the Polish drama over again. But they would find the building up still more difficult than the pulling down. There are no sufficient Christian elements as yet for a Christian State in European Tui-key capable of performing its functions as a component part of the Eui-opean system. The Greeks are a small minority, and could not be the governing race. The Sclavonians, who are the majority, do not possess the conditions necessary for be- coming the bones and sinews of a new State. A reconstruction of Turkey means neither more nor less than its subjection to Russia, dii-ect or indii-ect, immediate or for a time delayed.' In the following letter to Lord Clarendon, which is dated May 14, 1855, he summarises the most necessary reforms for Tiu-key, and anticipates part of the Constitution just promul- gated : — ' What 1-emain.s to be done for the nonconformists in Turkey would be, I apprehend, speaking generally : — («.) Capacity for military ser\dce by volimtary enlistment, and eligibility to rise to any rank in the army, {h.) Admission of non-Mussulman evidence in civil as well as criminal cases, (c.) Establishment of mixed courts of justice (with an equal number of Christian and Mussulman judges) for all cases in which Mohammedans and non-Mohammedans arc parties. (<:/.) Appointment of a Christian officer as assessor to . every governor of a jirovince, when that governor is a Mussulman ; such assessor to be of suitable rank, and to have full liberty to aj^peal to Constanti- nople against any act of the governor unjust, oppressive, or cor- rupt, (e.) Eligibility of Christians to all places in the Admiois- ^18 APPUXDIX. tration, whethei* at Constantinople or in the Provinces, and a practical a]^plication of this i-nle by the appointment of Chris- tians at once to some places of trust, civil and military. (/.) The total abolition of the present system, by which offices at Constantinople and in the piovince are bought and sold, and given to nnfit and unworthy men for money paid or promised. Such men become tyrants in theii* offices, either from incapacity or bad passions, or from a desire to repay themselves the money paid for their appointments. There ought not only to be com- plete toleration of non-Mussulman religions, but all punishment on converts from Islam, whether natives or foreigners, ought to be abolished.' The following forms part of a letter to Baron Brunnow, the Russian Ambassador, on the occasion of the Polish insurrection in 1863 :— ' Je regrette beaucoup les insurrections qui ont eclate en Pologne et en plusieurs des provinces de la Bussie. . . . Mais, quant au Gouvernement Russe, je considere ces insun-ections, comme une juste punition du Ciel pour les menees dont ce Gou- vernement a ete conpable, pour preparer pour le printemps des revoltes et des insurrections dan^s la Moldo-Wallachie, en Servie et en Bosnie, contre le Sultan. Kon lex est justior iilla Quam necis artifices arte perire sua. ' II est vrai que ces insurrections, ou eclatees ou preparees, nemenacent de mort ni I'Empii-e Russe ni 1' Empire Ottoman; la Russie saura mettre ordre dans les provinces, et la Poi-te saura apprendre a Couza, an Prince de Servie, et aux Bosniacs, qu'il est mieux de rester fidele a son Souverain que d'ecouter les conseils subversifs d'un voisin ambitieux. Mais, pour le moment, la Rus- sie souffre dans son interieur le mal qu'elle a I'intention d'infliger a un voisin inoffensif Vous concevez bien que je parle mainte- APPENDIX, 319 nant des cent mille et pliTS de fusils que la Gouvemement Russe a envoyes en Servie et en Bosnie par des chemins detournes et avec toutes les precautions poirr cacher, autant que possible, ce que Ton faisait ; et je fais allusion aussi a cette nuee d'agents provocateiu's qui, venant de la Russie, abondeut et travaillent dans les provinces Europeennes de la Turquie.' The letter just quoted was wiitten, it must be remembered, seven years after the close of the Crimean war : and it shows how systematic and how sustained has been the agitation car- ried on by Russian agents in Servia. We may conclude this series of extracts with one from Lord Dalling's ' Biography of Lord Palmerston,' which we specially commend to those agi- tators who recommended that, before entei-ing into negotiations at Constantinople, we should take care to announce, beyond the possibility of misconstruction, that no possible action on the part of Russia would induce England to take up arms. ' Lord Palmei'ston mamtained, indeed, as may have been learnt from his correspondence relative to Belgium, that the true policy of England was never to put forward any pretension that was unjust, but to give up none which justice supported so long as there was a possibility of defending it by arms, if its value justified our having recourse to arms ; by negotiating if we caiTied our defence no farther than argument ; leaving our adversary in doubt, however, till the last as to whether we should finally protest or fight. He laughed to scorn the theory that you should yield immediately everything for which you are not prepared to go to war. " Wliy," he used to say, " every State would be disposed to give up three out of every four questions sooner than go to war to maintain them. If you choose to give way hastily on these because you are not prepared to go to war for them, you will most frequently anticipate yom- antagonist. iS'oi- is this all. It is not concession on this matter or that .320 APPENDIX. which is of national importance ; it is the habit of making con- cessions, and ci-eating a belief that you will make them, which is fatal to a nation's interest, tranquillity, and honour. To create such a belief in a Democratic Government, especially a Government which is prone to seek at all times to please the multitude, is a sure way to have constant troubles with that Government ; from every difficulty you avoid to-day will arise twenty difficulties round you to-moiTow 3 for every man who seeks popularity will attempt to gain it at yoiu" expense." ' LONDON : PBISTBD BY PPOTTISWOODE AKD CO., SEW-STEKET SQUARE A\D PAULIAMEST STKEET •^T^i^^^V'-- ^\ '' \ (. ;\ ^./Is^^lA Ston/brd's Gec^xph} JL'siaiir Lorvdon The Russians in Central Asia. A Critical Examination, down to tlie Present Time, of the Geography and History of Central Asia. By Baron F. Von Hellwald. Translated by Lieut.-Col. Theodore Wirgman, LL.B. With Map. Large post 8vo. cloth, price 12s. Explorations in Central Asia are being simultaneously carried on by the Russians and the English, the two great rivals in the Asiatic world. Scientific research follows in the footsteps of military operations, Eussia gives to Asia culture and civilisation. Every disinterested man must admit that this opening of new spheres to the development of civilisation is the greatest gain which mankind derives from warlike expeditions. ' A learned account of the geograpliy of this still ill-known land, of the characteristics of its main divisions, of the nature and habits of its numerous races, and of the progress through it of Kussian influence It contains a large amount of valuable information.' — Times. 'A lucidly written and apparently accurate account of Turkestan, its geograpliical features and its history. Its worth to the reader is further enhanced by a well-executed map, based on the most recent Eussian sui-veys.' — Glasgow News. ' We think that the book is important ; the author has done us signal service in bringing the facts so forcibly before us that they must arrest attention. Nor is our debt a slight one to Lieutenant "Wirgman, who has accomplished his task of translation thoroughly well.' Westminster Revtkw. ' We have reason to thank Herr Von Hellwald for hig highly interesting and right-minded work, which is by far the best on this subject which has been produced in England Color el Wirgman has done a good service to his mother country in publishing his translation, and h!^s accomplished his task well.'— Pall ]\Iall Gazette. HENRY S, KING 6- CO., London. y Eastern Experiences. By L. BowRiNG, C.S.I., Lord Canning's Private Secretary, and for many years Chief Commissioner of Mysore and Coorg. Illustrated Tvdth Maps and Diagrams. Demy 8vo. cloth, price 16s. The sketches contained in this volume are based upon notes made dviring the course of several tours through the pro-snnces of Mysore and Coorg. Information has been added from published official reports and such other sources as could be comprised within moderate limits. ' An admirable and exhaustive geographical, political, and industrial survey.' — Athen^um. ' Interesting even to the general reader, but especially so those who may have a special concern in that portion of our Indian Empire.'— Mornin-g Post. ' This compact and methodical summary of the most authentic information relating to countries whose welfare is intimately connected with our own.' — Daily New.s. The Ashantee War. A Popular Narrative. By the Special Correspondent of the Baihj News. Crown 8vo. cloth, price 6s. This account of the Ashantee War does not pretend to the dignity of a HiSTOEY, but attempts to provide a connected narrative of what took place, with descriptions of the country and scenes passed through. ' Trustworthy and readable, and well fitted to serve its purpose as a popular narrative. The Daily News correspondent secures interest chiefly by bringing together sugges- tive incidents, and by clearing up points that his readers would naturally be desirous of knowing.'— EXAJITNER . ' What this writer has to tell us is well told, and it forms a valuable and welcome addition to the literature of the Ashantee War.'— Naval and Miutaky Gazette. HENR V S. KING 6- CO., London. The History of Japan PROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE PRESENT TIME.. By F. 0. Adams, H.B.M.'s Secretary of Embassy at Paris, formerly H.B.M.'s Charge d' Affaires, and Secretary of Legation at Yedo. New Edition, revised. In 2 vols, with Maps and Plans, demy 8vo. cloth, price 21s. each. This is the only History of Japan accessible to English readers. It is compiled from official sources, and the high diplomatic position long held by the Author gave him an insight into Japanese politics possessed by few- Europeans. ' He marshals his facts with skill and judgment ; and he writes ^ith an elegance worthy of a very skilled craftsman in Uterary work We hope Mr. Adams will not keep the pubUc long without the second voliune, for the appearance of which all who read the first wiU anxiously look.' — Staxdard. ' As a diplomatic study, and as referring to a deeply interesting episode in contemporary history, it is well worth reading. The information it contains is trustworthy, and is carefully compiled, and the style is all that can be desii-ed.'— Satuiiday Review. ' A most valuable contribution to our knowledge of an interesting people.' — Examixer. ' It will form a valuable record of the stirring events which have marked the annals of this strange country dm-iug the last twenty years, long after the immediate interest now attaching to its transformation has ceased.' — Academy. The Inner Life of Syria, Palestine, and the Holy Land. By Mrs. Richard Burton. "With Photographic Portraits, Coloured Illustrations, and Map. Second Edition, revised, ^2 vols, demy 8vo. cloth, price 24s. This volume is intended to present a sketch of the vie intime of the Holy Land in general and of Damascus in particular, and to convey an idea of the life which an Englishwoman may make for herself in the East. ' We must commend heartily to our readers Mrs. Burton's account of " The Inner Life of SjTia." '— ExAinxER. • Mrs. Burton presents us with vivid pictures of the outer as well as the inner life of the Syrians. We welcome her book the more warmly because it may be long before any one with equal powers of observation enjoys equal opportunities of instructing us.' — Pall Mall Gazette. ' A more delightful and instructive book on " The Inner Life of Syria, Palestine, and the Holy Land " we have never read. We heartily recommend a perusal thereof to every one interested in this most attractive subject.' — Jewish Chroxtcle. HEARY S. KING c- CO., London. Western India Before and During the Mutinies. Pictares Drawn from Life. By Major-General G. Le Gkaxd Jacob, K.C.S.I., C.B. Second Edition. Crown 8vo. cloth, price 7s. 6d. ' The most important contribution to the histo-y of Western India during the Mutinies which has yet, in a popular form, been made public' — Athex^cm. ' Few men are more competent than himself to speak authoritatively concerning Indian affairs.' — Staxdard. ' This volume is interesting, and contains many valuable remarks on the policy of the Government of India, the result of a large experience in a department which is the best school for Indian statesmen.' — Exgllshm.a>.' of Ixdia. ' We cannot leave this Ijook without a word of commendation for the fresh and pleasant style in which it is written.'— WEsrinxsTER Re^tew, Persia-Ancient and Modern. By JoH>: PiGGOTT, F.S.A., F.R.G.S. Post 8vo. clotb, price 10s. 6d. A general view of Ancient and Modern Persia is, here presented to the xeader. It is supplemented by chapters on the religion, literature, commerce, arts, sciences, army education, language, sport, &c., of the country. In the chapter on travelling, the routes to the country, its climate, roads, modes of conveyance, and all other necessary details are described. ' That Mr. Piggott has spared no pains or research in the execution of his work is apparent in the list of autlioritie=;, classic and modern, which he continually quotes ; his style, also, when not recounting history, is lively and pleasant, and the anecdotes which he culls from the writings of travellers are frequently amusing.'— Hour. ' Mr. Piggott has made good use of the materials collected by others, and the result is a clear, readable, and truthful account of the poUtical history of modem Persia.' — ATHEN^mi. ' He has read up to the level of his subject ; old and new authorities have been explored and digested ; the style is clear and unambitiotis ; and his compilation is well planned and is not too long.' — Saturday Review. HEXRY S. KING d- CO., LondoJi. >5, CornhiH, and i, Pafcrnostcr Square, London, December, 1876. A LIST OF HENRY S. KIN-G AND CO.'S PUBLICATIONS. ABBEY (Henry). Ballads of Good Deeds, and Other Verses. Fcap. 8vo. Cloth gilt, price ^s. ABDULLA (Hakayit). Autobiography of a Malay Munshi. Translated by J. T. Thomson, F. R. G. S. With Photo- lithograph Page of Abdulla's MS. Post 8vo. Cloth, price 12.?. ADAMS (A. L.), M.A., M.B, F.R.S., F.G.S. Field and Forest Rambles of a Naturalist in New Bruns- wick. With Notes and Observations on the Natural History of Eastern Canada. Illustrated. 8vo. Cloth, price \i,s. ADAMS (F. O.), F.R.G.S. The History of Japan. From the Earliest Period to the Present Time. New Edition, revised. 2 volumes. With Maps and Plans. Demy 8vo. Cloth, price 2i.y. each. ADAMS (W. D., Jun.). Lyrics of Love, from Shake- speare to Tennyson. Selected and arranged by. Fcap. 8vo. Cloth extra, gilt edges, price 3^. 6d. ADAMS (John), M.A. St. Malo's Quest, and other Poems. Fcap. 8vo. Cloth, 5.$-. ADON. Through Storm & Sunshine. Illustrated by M. E. Edward.s, A. T. H. Paterson, and the Author. Crown 8vo Cloth, price -js. 6d. A. K. H. B. A Scotch Communion Sun- day, to which are added Certain Discourses from a University Cit}-. V^y the Author of " The Recreations of a Country Parson." Second Edition. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price ^s. ALLEN (Rev. R.), M.A. Abraham ; his Life, Times, and Travels, as told by a Contem- porary 3,800 years ago. With Map. Post 8vo. Cloth, price 105-. 6d. AMOS (Prof. Sheldon). Science of Law. Second Edition. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price Volume X. of The International Scientific Series. ANDERSON (Rev. C.), M.A. New Readings of Old Parables. Demy 8vo. Cloth, price 4^. 6d. Church Thought and Church Work. Edited by. Second Edition. Demy 8vo. Cloth, price 7^. 6d. Words and Works in a London Parish. Edited by. Second Edition. Demy 8vo. Cloth, price 6s. The Curate of Shyre. Se- cond Edition. 8vo. Cloth, price 7.J. 6d, ANDERSON (Col. R. P.); Victories and Defeats. An Attempt to explain the Causes which have led to them. An Officer's Manual. Demy 8vo. Cloth, price 14 J. ANDERSON (R. C), C.E. Tables for Facilitating the Calculation of every Detail in connection with Earthen and Masonry Dam?. RoyalSvo. Cloth, price ;^ 2 2s. A List of ANSON (Lieut.-Col. The Hon. A.), V.C, M.P. The Abolition of Purchase and the Army Regulation Bill of 1871. Crown 8vo. Sewed, price is. Army Reserves and Militia Reforms. Crown 8vo. Sewed, price I .J. Story of the Supersessions. Crown 8vo. Sewed, price 6d. ARCHER (Thomas). About my Father's Business.' Work amidst the Sick, the Sad, and the Sorrowing. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price s^. ARGYLE (Duke of). Speeches on the Second Reading of the Church Patron- age (Scotland) Bill in the House of Lords, June 2, 1874 ; and Earl of . Camperdown's Amendment, June 9, 1874, placing the Election of INIinisters in the hands of Ratepayers. Crown 8vo. Sewed, price zs. Army of the North German Confederation. A Brief Description of its Organi- zation, of the Different Branches of the Ser\ace and their role in War, of its Mode of Fighting, &c., &c. Translated from the Corrected Edi- tion, by permission of the Author, bj' Colonel Edward Newdigate. Demy 8vo. Cloth, price 55-. Ashantee War (The). A Popular Narrative. By the Special Correspondent of the ' ' Daily News." Crown 8vo. Cloth, price 6.f. ASHTON (J.). Rough Notes of a Visit to Belgium, Sedan, and Paris, in September, 1870-71. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price 35-. 6d. Aunt Mary's Bran Pie. By the author of " St. Olave's." Illustrated. Cloth, price 35-. 6d. Aurora. A Volume of Verse. Fcap. 8vo. Cloth, price 5^. AYRTON (J. C). A Scotch Wooing. 2 vols. Crown 8vo. Cloth. BAGEHOT (Walter). Physics and Politics; or, Thoughts on the Application of the Principles of " Natural Selection " and "Inheritance" to Political So- ciety. Third Edition. Crown Svo. Cloth, price ^s. Volume II. of The International Scientific Series. The English Constitution. A New Edition, Revised and Corrected, with an Introductory Dissertation on Recent Changes and Events. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price ■js. 6d. Lombard Street. A Description of the Money Market. SLxth Edition. Crown Svo. Cloth, price -js. 6d. BAIN (Alexander), LL.D. MindandBody: the Theories of their relation. Fifth Edition. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price ^s. Volume IV. of The International Scientific Series. BALDWIN (Capt. J. H.), F.Z.S., Bengal Staff Corps. The Large and Small Game of Bengal and the North-West- ern Provinces of India. 4to. With numerous Illustrations. Cloth, price 21s. BANKS (Mrs. G. L.). God's Providence House. New Edition. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 3^. 6d. BARING (T. C), M.A., M.P. Pindar in English Rhyme. Being an Attempt to render the Epinikian Odes with the principal remaining Fragments of Pindar into English Rhymed Verse. Small Quarto. Cloth, price js. BARLEE (Ellen). Locked Out : a Tale of the Strike. With a Frontispiece. Roj-al lomo. Cloth, price \s. 6d. BAUR (Ferdinand), Dr. Ph., Professor in Maulbronn. A Philological Introduction to Greek and Latin for Students. Translated and adapted from the German of B3' C. Keg.\n Paul, M.A. Oxon., and the Rev. E. D. Stone, M.A., late Fellow of King's College, Cambridge, and Assistant Master at Eton. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 6s. Henry S. King 6^ Co.'s Publications. BAYNES (Rev. Canon R. H.), M.A. Home Songs for Quiet Hours. Third Edition. Fcap. 8vo. Cloth extra, price ^s. 6d. This may also be Iiad handsomely hound in Morocco with gilt edges. BECKER (Bernard H.). The Scientific Societies of London. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price e^s. BENNETT (Dr. W. C). Baby May. Home Poems and Ballads. With Frontispiece. Crown 8vo. Cloth elegant, price 6s. Baby May and Home Poems. Fcap. Svo. Sewed in Coloured Wrapper, price rs. Narrative Poems & Ballads. Fcap. Svo. Sewed in Coloured Wrap- per, price IS. Songs for Sailors. Dedicated by Special Request to H. R. H. the Duke of Edinburgh. _ With Steel Portrait and Illustrations. Crown Svo. Cloth, price y. 6d. An Edition in Illustrated Paper Covers, price is. Songs of a Song Writer. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 6s. BENNIE(Rev. J. N.), M.A. The Eternal Life. Sermons preached during the last twelve years. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 6s. BERNARD (Bayle). Samuel Lover, the Life and Unpublished "Works of. In 2 vols. With a Steel Portrait. Post Svo. Cloth, price 21J. BERNSTEIN (Prof.). The Five Senses of Man. With 91 Illustrations. Second Edition. Crown Svo. Cloth, price sj. Volume XXI. of The International Scientific Series. BETHAM - EDWARDS (Miss M.). Kitty. With a Frontispiece. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 3^. 6d. Mademoiselle Josephine's Fridays, and Other Stories. Crown Svo. Cloth, price js. 6d. BISCOE(A. C). The Earls of Middleton, Lords of Clermont and of Fetter- cairn, and the Middleton Familj-. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 10^. 6d. BISSET (A.) History of the Struggle for Parliamentary Government in England. 2 vols. Demy Svo. Cloth, price 24^. BLANC (H.), M.D. Cholera: How to Avoid and Treat it. Popular and Practical Notes. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 4J. 6d. BLASERNA (Prof. Pietro). The Theory of Sound in its Relation to Music. With numer- ous Illustrations. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 5^-. Volume XXII. of The International Scientific Series. BLUME (Major W.). The Operations of the German Armies in France, from Sedan to the end of the war of 1870- 71. With Map. From the Journals of the Head-quarters Staff. Trans- lated by the late E. ]\I. Jones, Maj. 20th Foot, Prof, of Mil. Hist., Sand- hurst. Demy Svo. Cloth, price 95-. BOGUSLAWSKI (Capt. A. von). Tactical Deductions from the War of 1870-71. Translated by Colonel Sir Lumley Graham, Bart., late 18th (Roj-al Irish) Regi- ment. Third Edition, Revised and Corrected. Demy Svo. Cloth, price -js. BONWICK(J.), F.R.G.S. The Tasmanian Lily. With Frontispiece. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 5.?. Mike Howe, the Bushranger of Van Diemen's Land. With Frontispiece. Crown Svo. Clcth, price 5J. A List of BOSWELL (R. B.), M.A., Oxon. Metrical Translations from the Greek and Latin Poets, and other Poems. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price IS. BOTHMER (Countess von). Cruel as the Grave. A Novel. 3 vols. Crown 8vo. Cloth. BOWEN (H. C), M.A., Head Master of the Grocers' Company's Middle Class School at Hackney. Studies in English, for the use of Modem Schools. Small Crown 8vo. Cloth, price u. dd. BOWRING(L.), C.S.I. Eastern Experiences. Illustrated with Maps and Diagrams. Demy 8vo. Cloth, price 165. BRADLEY (F. H.). Ethical Studies. Critical Essays in Moral Philosophj-. Large post 8vo. Cloth, price 9^. Brave Men's Footsteps. By the Editor of " Men who have Risen." A Book of Example and Anecdote for Young People. With Four Illustrations by C. Doyle. Third Edition. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price 3^. ()d. BRIALMONT(Col. A.). Hasty Intrenchments. Translated by Lieut. Charles A. Empson, R. A. With Nine Plates. Demy 8vo. Cloth, price i>s. Briefs and Papers. Being Sketches of the Bar and the Press. By Two Idle Apprentices. Second Edition. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 7^-. td. BROOKE (Rev. J. M. S.), M. A. Heart, be Still. A Se:-mon preached in Holy Trinity Church, Southall. Imperial 32mo. Sewed, price td. BROOKE (Rev. S. A.), M. A,, Chaplain in Ordinary to Her Majesty the Queen, and Minister of Bedford Chapel, Bloomsbury. The Late Rev. F. W. Ro- bertson, M.A,, Life and Letters of. Edited by. I. Uniform with the Sermons. 2 vols. With Steel Portrait. Price 7^-. ()d. II. Library Edition. Svo. With Two Steel Portraits. Price \-zs. III. A Popular Edition, in i vol. Svo. Price ts. Theology in the English Poets. — CowpER, Coleridge, Wordsworth, and Burns. Third Edition. Post Svo. Cloth, price (^s. Christ in Modem Life. Ninth Edition. Crown Svo. Cloth, price •]$. 6d. Sermons. First Series. Ninth Edition. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 6j. Sermons. Second Series. Third Edition. Crown Svo. Cloth, price -js. Frederick Denison Maurice: The Life and Work of A Memorial Sermon. Crown Svo. Sewed, price \s. BROOKE (W. G.), M.A. The Public Worship Regulation Act. With a Classified Statement of its Provisions, Notes, and Index. Third Edition, reWsed and corrected. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 3.y. 6d. Six Privy Council Judg- ments— 1850- 1872. Annotated by. Third Edition. Crown Svo. Cloth, price gs. BROUN (J. A.). Magnetic Observations at Trevandrum and Augustia Malley. Vol. I. 410. Cloth, price 63J. The Report from above, separately sewed, price au. Henry S. King &> Go's Publications. BROWN (Rev. J. Baldwin), B.A. The Higher Life. Its Reality, Experience, and Destiny. Fourth Edition. Crown 8vo. TS. 6d. ny. CI( loth, price Doctrine of Annihilation in the Light of the Gospel of Love. Five Discourses. Second Edition. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price 2s. 6d. BROWN Q. Croumbie), LL.D. Reboisement in France; or, Records of the Replanting of the Alps, the Cevennes, and the Pyre- nees with Trees, Herbage, and Bush. Demy 8vo. Cloth, price 12s. 6d. The Hydrology of Southern Africa. Demy Svo. Cloth, price 10s. 6d. BROWNE (Rev. M. E.) Until the Day Dawn. Four Advent Lectures. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 2s. 6d. BRYANT (W. C.) Poems. Red-line Edition, With 24 Illustrations and Portrait of the Author. Crown Svo. Cloth extra, price js. 6d. A Cheaper Edition, with Frontis- piece. Small crown Svo. Cloth, price 3.y. 6d. BUCHANAN (Robert). Poetical Works. Collected Edition, in 3 vols., with Portrait. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 6s. each. Master-Spirits. Post Svo. Cloth, price 10s. 6d. BULKELEY (Rev. H. J.). Walled in, and other Poems. Crown Svo. Cloth, price ^s. BUNNETT(F. E.). Linked at Last. Crown Svo. Cloth. BURTON (Mrs. Richard). The Inner Life of Syria, Palestine, and the Holy Land. With Maps, Photographs, and Coloured Plates. 2 vols. Second Edition. Demy Svo. Cloth, price 24.?. CADELL(Mrs. H. M.). Ida Craven : A Novel. 2 vols. Crown Svo. Cloth. CALDERON. Calderon's Dramas : The Wonder- Working Magician,— Life is a Dream— The Purgatory of St. Patrick. Translated by Denis Florence MacCarthy. Post Svo. Cloth, price 10s. CARLISLE (A. D.), B. A. Round the World in 1870. A Volume of Travels, with Maps. New and Cheaper Edition. Demy Svo. Cloth, price 6s. CARNE(MissE. T.). The Realm of Truth. Crown Svo. Cloth, price $s. 6d. CARPENTER (E.). Narcissus and other Poems. Fcap. Svo. Cloth, price 5-S-- CARPENTER (W. B.), LL.D., M.D., F.R.S., &c. The Principles of Mental Physiology. With their Applica- tions to the Training and Discipline of the Mind, and the Study of its IMorbid Conditions. Illustrated. Fourth Edition. Svo. Cloth, price X2S. CARR (Lisle). Judith Gwynne. 3 vols. Second Edition. Crown Svo. Cloth. CHRISTOPHERSON (The late Rev. Henry), M.A. Sermons. ^Yith an Intro- duction by John Rae, LL.D., F.S.A. First Series. Crown Svo. Cloth, price JS. 6d. Sermons. With an Intro- duction by John Rae, LL.D., F.S.A. Second Series. Crown Svo. Cloth price 6^-. A List of CLAYTON (Cecil). Effie's Game; How She Lost and How She Won. A Novel. 2 vols. Cloth. CLERK (Mrs. Godfrey). 'Ham en Nas. Historical Tales and Anecdotes of the Times of the Early Khalifahs. Translated from the Arabic Originals. Illus- trated with Historical and Explana- tory Notes. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price CLERY(C.), Capt. Minor Tactics. With 26 Maps and Plans. Third and revised Edition. Demy 8vo. Cloth, price i6s. CLODD (Edward), F.R.A.S. The Childhood of the World : a Simple Account of ]Man in Early Times. Third Edition, Crown 8vo. Cloth, price 35. A Special Edition for Schools. Price IS. The Childhood of Reli- gions. Including a Simple Account of the Birth and Growth of jNIyths and Legends. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price 55. COLERIDGE (Sara). Pretty Lessons in Verse for Good Children, with some Lessons in Latin, in Easy Rhyme. A New Edition. Illustrated. Fcap. Svo. Cloth, price -^s. 6d. Phantasmion. A Fairy Tale. With an Introductory Preface by the Right Hon. Lord Coleridge, of Ottery St. Marj-. A New Edition. Illustrated. Crown 8V0. Cloth, price 7,y, 6d. Memoir and Letters of Sara Coleridge. Edited by her Daughter. With Index. 2 vols. With Two Portraits. Third Edition, Revised and Corrected, Crown Svo. Cloth, price 2j^s. Cheap Edition. With one Portrait. Cloth, price 7^-. 6ci COLLINS (Mortimer). The Princess Clarice. A Story of 1871. 2 vols. Cloth. Squire Silchester's Whim. 3 vols. Cloth. Miranda. A INIidsummer IMadness. 3 vols. Cloth. Inn of Strange Meetings, and other Poems. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 5s. The Secret of Long Life. Dedicated by special permission to Lord St. Leonards. Fourth Edition. Large crown Svo. Cloth, price ^s. COLLINS (Rev. R.), M.A. Missionary Enterprise in the East. With special reference to the Syrian Christians of Malabar, and the results of modern Missions. With Four Illustrations. Crowii Svo. Cloth, price 6s. CONGREVE (Richard), M.A., M.R.C.P.L. Human Catholicism. Two Sermons delivered at the Positivist School on the Festival of Humanity, 87 and 88, January i, 1875 and 1876. Demy Svo. Sewed, price is. CONWAY (Moncure D.). Republican Superstitions. Illustrated by the Political History of the United States. Including a Correspondence with M. Louis Blanc. Crown Svo. Cloth, price ^s. CONYERS (Ansley). Chesterleigh. 3 vols. Crown Svo. Cloth. COOKE (M. C), M.A., LL.D, Fungi ; their Nature, Influ- ences, Uses, &c. Edited by the Rev. M. J. Berkeley, M.A., F. L. S. With Illustrations. Second Edition. Crown Svo. Cloth, price ^s. Volume XIV. of The International Scientific Series. Henry S. King &" Co.'s Publications. COOKE (Prof. J. p.), of the Har- vard University. The New Chemistry. AVith 31 Illustrations. Third Edition. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price ^s. Volume IX. of The International Scientific Series. Scientific Culture. Crown Svo. Cloth, price \s. COOPER (T. T.), F.R.G.S. The Mishmee Hills : an Account of a Journey made in an Attempt to Penetrate Thibet from Assam, to open New Routes for Commerce. Second Edition. With Four Illustrations and Map. Post Svo. Cloth, price loy. Q>d. Cornhill Library of Fiction (The). Crown Svo. Cloth, price 2,s. td. per volume. Half-a-Dozen Daughters. By J. Alasterman. The House of Raby. By Mrs. G. Hooper. A Fight for Life. By ]\Ioy Thomas. Robin Gray. By Charles Gibbon. Kitty. By Miss M. Betham- Ed wards. One of Two ; or, The Left- Handed Bride. By J. Hain Fris- well. Ready - Money Mortiboy. A Matter-of-Fact Storj'. God's Providence House. By Mrs. G. L. Banks. For Lack of Gold. By Charles Gibbon. Abel Drake's Wife. By John Saunders. Hirell. By John Saunders. CORY (Lieut. Col. Arthur). The Eastern Menace ; or, Shadov^s of Coming Events. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 55. Cosmos. A Poem. Fcap. Svo. Cloth, price zs. 6d. COTTON (R. T.). Mr. Carington. A Tale of Love and Conspiracy. 3 vols. Crown Svo. Cloth, CRESSWELL (Mrs. G.). The King's Banner. Drama in Four Acts. Five Illustrations. 4to. Cloth, price 10s. 6d. . CROMPTON (Henry). Industrial Conciliation. Fcap. Svo. Cloth, price 2.y. 6d. CUMMINS (H. I.), M. A. Parochial Charities of the City of London. Sewed, price i.s. CURWEN (Henry). Sorrow and Song: Studies of Literary- Struggle. Henr^' Miirger • — Novalis — Alexander Petofi — Hon- ore de Balzac — Edgar Allan Poe — Andre Chenier. 2 vols. Crown * Svo. Cloth, price 153-. DANCE (Rev. C. D.). Recollections of Four Years in Venezuela. With Three Illus- trations and a Map. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 7.^. 6d. D'ANVERS (N. R.). The Suez Canal : Letters ■ and Documents descriptive of its Rise and Progress in 1854-56. By Ferdinand de Lesseps. Translated by. Demy Svo. Cloth, price 10s. 6d. Little Minnie's Troubles. An Ever^--day Chronicle. With Four Illustrations by W. H. Hughes. Fcap. Cloth, price 35. 6d. DAVIDSON(Rev. Samuel), D.D., LL.D. The NewTestament, trans- lated from the Latest Greek Text of Tischendorf. A new and thoroughly revised Edition. Post Svo. Cloth, price los. 6d. Canon pi the Bible : Its Formation, History^ and Fluctua- tions. Small crown Svo. Cloth, price ss'. A List of DAVIES (G. Christopher). Mountain, Meadow, and fv/Iere : a Series of Outdoor Sketches of Sport, Scenery, Adventures, and Natural Histor>'. With Sixteen Il- lustrations by Bosworth W. Har- . court. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price 6^. Rambles and Adventures of Our School Field Club. With Four Illustrations. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 55-. DAVIES (Rev. J. L.), M.A. Theology and Morality. Essays on Questions of Belief and Practice. Crown 8%o. Cloth, price DE KERKADEC (Vicomtesse Solange). A Chequered Life, being* Memoirs of the Vicomtesse de Leo- | ville JNIeilhan. Edited bj'. Crown i Svo. Cloth, price -js. 6d. DEL'HOSTE(Col. E. P.). ; The Desert Pastor, Jean Jarousseau. Translated from the French of Eugene Pelletan. With a Frontispiece. New Edition. Fcap. Svo. Cloth, price 3.^. 6d. DE REDCLIFFE (Viscount Stratford), P.C, K.G., G.C.B. Why am I a Christian ? Fifth Edition. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 35. DE TOCQUEVILLE (A.). Correspondence and Con- versations of, with Nassau Wil- liam Senior, from 1834 to 1859. Edited by M. C. M. Simpson. 2 vols. Post Svo. Cloth, price 21s. DE VERE (Aubrey). Alexander the Great. A Dramatic Poem. Small crown Svo. Cloth, price 5.?. The Infant Bridal, and Other Poems. A New and En- larged Edition. Fcap. Svo. Cloth, price JS. id. DE VERE {A\:ihT&yy-co7itiji7ted: The Legends of St. Patrick, and Other Poems. Small crown Svo. Cloth, price ^s. St. Thomas of Canterbury. A Dramatic Poem. Large fcap. Svo. Cloth, price $s. DE WILLE (E.). Under a Cloud; or, Johan- nes Olaf. A No^•el. Translated by F. E. Biuinett. 3 vols. Crown Svo. Cloth. DENNIS (J.). English Sonnets. Collected and Arranged. Elegantly bound. Fcap. Svo. Cloth, price 3^. 6d. DOBSON (Austin). Vignettes in Rhyme and Vers de Societe'. Third Edition. Fcap. Svo. Cloth, price 5^. DONNE (A.), M.D. Change of Air and Scene. A Physician's Hints about Doctors, Patients, Hygiene, and Society ; with Notes of Excursions for Health. Second Edition. Large post Svo. Cloth, price gs. DOWDEN (Edward), LD.D. Shakspere: a Critical Study of his Mind and Art. Second Edition. Post Svo. Cloth, price 12s. Poems. price 5J. Fcap. 8vo. Cloth, DOWNTON (Rev. H.), M.A. Hymns and Verses. Ori- ginal and Translated. Small crown Svo. Cloth, price 35^. 6d. DRAPER (J. W.), M.D., LL.D., Professor in the University of New York. History of the Conflict be- tween Religion and Science. Seventh Edition. Crown Svo. Cloth, price ^s. Volume XIII. of The International Scientific Series. Henry S. King c^ Co.'s Publications. DREW (Rev. G. S.), M.A. Scripture Lands in con- nection with their History. Second Edition. 8vo. Cloth, price 105-. (id. Nazareth : Its Life and Lessons. Third Edition. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price <~,s. The Divine Kingdom on Earth as it is in Heaven. 8vo. Cloth, price \qs. 6d. The Son of Man : His Life and Ministry'. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price js. 6d. DREV/RY(G. O.), M.D. The Common - Sense Management of the Stomach. Third Edition. Fcap. Svo. Cloth, price 25. 6d. DREWRY (G. O.), M.D., and BARTLETT (H. C), Ph.D., F.C.S. Cup and Platter : or, Notes on Food and its Effects. Small 8vo. Cloth, price 2S. 6d. DRUMMOND (Miss). Tripps Buildings. A Study from Life, with Frontispiece. Small crown 8vo. Cloth, price 35. 6d. DURAND(Lady). Imitations from the Ger- man of Spitta and Terstegen. Fcap. 8vo. Cloth, price 45. DU VERNOIS (Col. von Verdy). Studies in leading Troops. An authorized and accurate Trans- lation by Lieutenant H. J. T. Hildyard, 71st Foot. Parts I. and II. Demy Svo. Cloth, price 75. EDEN (Frederick). The Nile without a Dragoman. Second Edition. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 7.^. 6d. EDWARDS (Rev. Basil). Minor Chords; Or, Songs for the Suffering : a Volume of Verse. Fcap. Svo. Cloth, price 35. 6d. ; paper, price 2s. 6d. EILOART(Mrs.). Lady Moretoun's Daughter. 3 vols. Crown Svo. Cloth. ELLIOTT (Ebenezer), The Corn Law Rhymer. Poems. Edited by his son, the Rev. Edwin Elliott, of St. John's, Antigua. 2 vols. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 185-. ENGLISH CLERGYMAN. An Essay on the Rule of Faith and Creed of Athanasius. Shall the Rubric preceding the Creed be removed from the Prayer- book ? Sewed. Svo. Price is. Epic of Hades (The). By a New Writer. Author of " Songs of Two Worlds." Fcap. Svo Cloth, price 5.^. Eros Agonistes. Poems. By E. B. D. Fcap. Svo. Cloth, price ^s. 6d. Essays on the Endowment of Research. By Various Writers. List of Contributors. ]\Iark Pattison, B. D. James S. Cotton, B. A. Charles E. Appleton, D. C. L. Archibald H. Sayce, M.A. Henry Clifton Sorby, F. R. S. Thomas K. Cheyne, M. A. W. T. Thiselton Dyer, M. A. Henry Nettleship, M.A. Square crown octavo. Cloth, price T.OS. 6d. EVANS (Mark). The Story of our Father's Love, told to Children ; being a New and Enlarged Edition of Theology for Children. With Four Illustrations. Fcap. Svo. Cloth, price 3J. 6d. A Book of Common Prayer and Worship for Household Use, compiled exclusively from the Holy Scriptures. Fcap. 8vo. Cloth, price 2^^. 6d. EYRE (Maj.-Gen. Sir V.), C.B., K.C.S.I.,&c. Lays of a Knight -Errant in many Lands. Square crown Svo. With Six Illustrations. Cloth, price 'JS. 6d. lO A List of FAITHFULL(Mrs. Francis G.). Love Me, or Love Me Not. 3 vols. Crown 8vo. Cloth. FARQUHARSON (M.). I. Elsie Dinsmore. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price 35. 6d. II. Elsie's Girlhood. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price 3^. 6ci. III. Elsie's Holidays at Roselands. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 33-. 6d. FAVRE (Mons. J.)- The Government of the National Defence. From the 30th Tune to the 31st October, 1870. Translated by H. Clark. Demy 8vo. Cloth, price 10^. 6d. FERRIS (Henry Weybridge). Poems. Fcap. Svo. Cloth, price 55. FISHER (Alice). His Queen. 3 vols. Crown 8vo. Cloth. FOOTMAN (Rev. H.), M.A. From Home and Back ; or, Some Aspects of Sin as seen in the Light of the Parable of the Prodigal. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price 5.?. FORBES (A.). Soldiering and Scribbling. A Series of Sketches. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price 7.^. 6d. FOTHERGILL (Jessie). Aldyth : A Novel. 2 vols. Crown Svo. Cloth. Healey. A Romance. 3 vols. Crown 8vo. Cloth. FOWLE (Rev. T. W.), M.A. The Reconciliation of Re- ligion and Science. Being Essays on Immortality. Inspiration, INIira- cles, and the Being of Christ. Demy Svo. Cloth, price 10s. 6d. FOX-BOURNE (H. R.). The Life of John Locke, 1632— 1704. 2 vols. Demy Svo. Cloth, price 28J. ERASER (Donald). Exchange Tables of Ster- ling and Indian Rupee Curren- cy, upon a new and extended system, embracing Values from One Far- thing to One Hundred Thousand Pounds, and at Rates progressing, in Sixteenths of a Penny, from is. qd. to 2S. 3^. per Rupee. Royal Svo. Cloth, price 10s. 6d. FRERE(SirH.BartleE.),G.C.B., G.C.S.I. The Threatened Famine in Bengal : How it may be Met, and the Recurrence of Famines in India Prevented. Being No. i of " Occa- sional Notes on Indian Affairs." With 3 Maps. Crown Svo. Cloth, price ^s. FRISWELL (J. Hain). The Better Self. Essays for Home Life. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 6^. One of Two; or. The Left- Handed Bride. With a Frontis- piece. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 3.y. 6d. GARDNER (H.). Sunflowers. A Book of Verses. Fcap. 8vo. Cloth, price s^. GARDNER (J.), M.D. Longevity: The Means of Prolonging Life after Middle Age. Third Edition, revised and enlarged. Small crown Svo. Cloth, price 4^-. GARRETT (E.). By StJll Waters. A Story for Quiet Hours. With Seven Illus- trations. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 6s. GIBBON (Charles). For Lack of Gold. With a Frontispiece. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 2,s- (>d. Robin Gray. With a Frontis- piece. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 2S. 6d. Henry S. King 6^ Co.^s Publications. GILBERT (Mrs.). Autobiography and other Memorials. Edited by Josiah Gilbert. Second Edition. In 2 vols. With 2 Steel Portraits and several Wood Engravings. PostSvo. Cloth, price 24J. GILL (Rev. W. W.), B.A. Myths and Songs from the South Pacific. With a Preface by F. Max Miiller, M.A., Professor of Comparative Philology at Oxford. Post 8vo. Cloth, price gj. GODKIN (James). The Religious History of Ireland : Primitive, Papal, and Protestant. Including the Evange- lical Missions, Catholic Agitations, and Church Progress of the last half Century. 8vo. Cloth, price 125. GODWIN (William). William Godwin: His Friends and Contemporaries. With Portraits and Facsimiles of the handwriting of Godwin and his Wife. By C. Kegan Paul. 2 vols. Demy Svo. Cloth, price 28^-. The Genius of Christianity Unveiled. Being Essays never before published. Edited, with a Preface, by C. Kegan Paul. Crown Svo. Cloth, price ■]$. 6d. GOETZE (Capt. A. von). Operations of the German Engineers during the W^ar of 1870- 1871. Published by Authority, and in accordance with Official Docu- ments. Translated from the German by Colonel G. Graham, V.C, C.B., R.E. With 6 large Maps. Demy Svo. Cloth, price 21J. GOODENOUGH (Commodore J. G.), R.N., C.B., C.M.G. Journals of, during his Last Command as Senior Officer on the Australian Station, 1873-1875. Edited, with a Memoir, by his Widow. With ]Maps, Woodcuts, and Steel En- graved Portrait. Square post Svo. Lloth, price ij!,s. GOODMAN (W.). Cuba, the Pearl of the Antilles. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 7^-. 6d. GOULD (Rev. S. Baring), M.A. The Vicar of Morwenstow: a Memoir of the Rev. R. S. Hawker. With Portrait. Third Edition, re- vised. Square post Svo. C\oih.,ios.6d. GRANVILLE (A. B.), M.D., F.R.S.,&c. Autobiography of A. B. Granville, F. R. S., etc. Edited, with a brief account of the concluding years of his life, by his youngest Daughter, Paulina B. Granville. 2 vols. With a Portrait. Second Edi- tion. Demy Svo. Cloth, price 32J. GRAY (Mrs. Russell). Lisette's Venture. A Novel. 2 vols. Crown Svo. Cloth. GREEN (T. Bowden). Fragments of Thought. Dedicated by permission to the Poet Laureate. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 7J. 6d. GREENWOOD (J.), " The Ama- teur Casual." In Strange Company; or, The Note Book of a Roving Corre- spondent. Second Edition. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 6s. GREY (John), of Dilston. John Grey (of Dilston) : Memoirs. By Josephine E. Butler. New and Revised Edition. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 3.?. 6d. GRIFFITH (Rev. T.), A.M. Studies of the Divine Mas- ter. Demy Svo. Cloth, price 12s. GRIFFITHS (Capt. Arthur). Memorials of Millbank,and Chapters in Prison History. With Illustrations by R. Goflf and the Author. 2 vols. Post Svo. Cloth, price 21^. The Queen's Shilling. A Novel. 2 vols. Cloth. 12 A List of GRIMLEY (Rev. H. N.), M.A., Professor of Mathematics in the University College of Wales, and Chaplain of Tremadoc Church. Tremadoc Sermons, chiefly on the Spiritual Body, the Unseen j World, and the Divine Humanity. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price 75. 6d. GRUNER(M. L). Studies of Blast Furnace Phenomena. Translated by L. D. B. Gordon, F.R.S.E., F.G.S. Demy 8vo. Cloth, price 7^. 6d. GURNEY(Rev. A. T.). Words of Faith and Cheer. A Mission of Instruction and Sugges- tion. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price 6^-. First Principles in Church and State. Demy Svo. Sewed, price IS. 6d. HAECKEL (Prof. Ernst). The History of Creation. Translation revised by Professor E. Ray Lankester, M.A., F.R.S. With Coloured Plates and Genealogical Trees of the various groups of both plants and animals. 2 vols. Second Edition. Post Svo. Cloth, price 325. HARCOURT (Capt. A. F. P.). The Shakespeare Argosy. Containing much of the wealth of Shakespeare's Wisdom and Wit, alphabetically arranged and classi- fied. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 6s. UhVJ'ElS (Rev. H. R.), M.A. Current Coin. ^^laterialism — The Devil — Crime — Drunkenness — Pauperism — Emotion — Recreation — The Sabbath. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 65. Speech in Season. Tliird Edition. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 9^. Thoughts for the Times. Ninth Edition. Crown Svo. Cloth, price -js. 6d. Unsectarian Family Prayers, for Morning and Evening for a Week, with short selected passages from the Bible. Square crown Svo. Cloth, price ^s. 6d. HAWTHORNE (Julian). Bressant. A Romance. 2 vols. Crown Svo. Cloth. Idolatry. A Romance. 2vols. Crown Svo. Cloth. HAWTHORNE (Nathaniel). Nathaniel Hawthorne. A Memoir with Stories, now first pub- lished in this countrj-. By H. A. Page. Post Svo. Cloth, price 7^. 6d. Septimius. A Romance. Second Edition. Crown Svo. Cloth, price gs. HAYMAN (H.), D.D., late Head Master of Rugby School. Rugby School Sermons. With an Introductory- Essay on the Indwelling of the Holy Spirit. Crown Svo. Cloth, price js. 6d. Heathergate. A Story of Scottish Life and Cha- racter. By a New Author. 2 vols. Crown Svo. Cloth. HELLWALD (Baron F. von). The Russians in Central Asia. A Critical Examination, down to the present time, of the Geography and History' of Central Asia. Translated by Lieut. -Col. Theodore Wirgman, LL.B. Large post Svo. With Map. Cloth, price 12s. HELVIG (Capt. H.). The Operations of the Ba- varian Army Corps. Translated by Captain G. S. Schwabe. With Five large !\Iaps. In 2 vols. Demy Svo. Cloth, price 24^. HINTON (James). The Place of the Physician. To which is added Essays on the Law of Human Life, and on the Relation between Organic and Inorganic Worlds. Second Edi- tion. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 3J. 6d. Physiology for Practical Use. By various Writers. With 50 Illustrations. 2 vols. Second Edition. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 125. 6d. Hemy S. Kt7ig &= Go's PuUicatmis. 13 HINTON {l2iVa.&s)—co7itinued: An Atlas of Diseases of the Membrana Tympani. With Des- criptive Text. Post Svo. Vx\c&£6(>s. The Questions of Aural Surgery. AV'ith Illustrations. 2 vols. Post Svo. Cloth, price i2i-. 6d. H. J. C. The Art of Furnishing. A Popular Treatise on the Principles of Furnishing, based on the Laws of Common Sense, Requirement, and Picturesque Eftect. Small crown Svo. Clofh, price 35-. 6rd Stanley of Alder- ley. 2 vols. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 2 1 J. Pandurang Hari; or, Me- moirs of a Hindoo. A Tale of Alahratta Life sixty years ago. With a Preface by Sir H. Bartle E. Frere, G.C.S.L, &c. 2 vols. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 2i.y. HOFFBAUER (Capt.). The German Artillery in the Battles near Metz. Based on the official reports of the German Artillery'. Translated by Capt. E. O. Hollist. With Map and Plans. Demy Svo. Cloth, price i^s. Hogan, M.P. A Novel. 3 vols. Crown Svo. Cloth. HOLMES (E. G. A.). Poems. Fcap. Svo. Cloth, price 5^-. HOLROYD (Major W. R. M.) Tas-hil ul Kalam ; or, Hindustani made Easy. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 55-. HOPE (James L. A.). In Quest of Coolies. With Illustrations. Second Edition. Crown 8yo. Cloth, price 6s. HOOPER (Mary). Little Dinners: How to Serve them with Elegance and Economy. Eleventh Edition. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 55-. Cookery for Invalids, Per- sons of Delicate Digestion, and Children. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 2s. 6d. HOOPER (Mrs. G.). The House of Raby. With a Frontispiece. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 35-. 6d. HOPKINS (M.). The Port of Refuge; or, Counsel and Aid to Shipmasters in Difficulty, Doubt, or Distress. Second Edition. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 6s. HORNE (William), M.A. Reason and Revelation : an Examination into the Nature and Contents of Scripture Revelation, as compared with other Forms of Truth. Demy Svo. Cloth, price 12s. HOWARD (Mary M.). Beatrice Aylmer, and other Tales. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 6s. HOWARD (Rev. G. B.). An Old Legend of St. Paul's. Fcap. Svo. Cloth, price 4s. 6d. HOWELL (James). A Tale of the Sea, Son- nets, and other Poems. Fcap. Svo. Cloth, price 55-. HUGHES (Allison). Penelope and other Poems. Fcap. Svo. Cloth, price i,s. 6d. HULL (Edmund C. P.). The European in India. With a Medical Guide for Anglo- Indians. By R. R. S. Mair, M.D., F.R.C.S.E. Second Edition, Revised and Corrected. Post Svo. Cloth, price 6s. 14 A List of HUMPHREY (Rev. W.). Mr. Fitzjames Stephen and Cardinal Bellarmine. Demy 8vo. Sewed, price is. HUTTON (James). Missionary Life in the Southern Seas. With Illustrations. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price 7^. td. IGNOTUS. Culmshire Folk. A Novel. New and Cheaper Edition. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price 6^. INCHBOLD(J. W.). Annus Amoris. Sonnets. Foolscap Svo. Cloth, price i,s. td. INGELOW (Jean). The Little Wonder-horn. A Second Series of " Stories Told to a Child." With Fifteen Illustrations. Square 24mo. Cloth, price 3^. td. Off the Skelligs. (Her First Romance.) 4 vols. Crown Svo. Cloth. International Scientific Series (The). I. The Forms of Water in Clouds and Rivers, Ice and Glaciers. By J. Tyndall, LL.D., F.R.S. With 25 Illustrations. Sixth Edition. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 5^. II. Physics and Politics ; or. Thoughts on the Application of the Principles of " Natural Selection " and "Inheritance" to Political So- ciety. By Walter Bagehot. Third Edition. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price 4^. III. Foods. By Edward Smith, M.D., LL.B., F.R.S. With nu- merous Illustrations. Fourth Edition. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price 5^. IV. Mind and Body: The Theo- ries of their Relation. By Ale.xander Bain, LL.D. ^Vith Four Illustra- tions. Fifth Edition. Crown Svo. Cloth, price \s. V. The Study of Sociology. By Herbert Spencer. Sixth Edition. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 5^. VI. On the Conservation of Energy. By Balfour Stewart, M.A., LL. D. , F. R. S. With 14 Illustrations. Third Edition. Crown Bvo. Cloth, price 5^. International Scientific Series {^'\\€)—coiithmed, VII. Animal Locomotion ; or. Walking, Swimming, and Fljnng. By J. B. Pettigrew, M.D., F.R.S., etc. With 130 Illustrations. Second Edition. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 5.^. VIII. Responsibility in Mental Disease. By Henry Maudsley, M.D. Second Edition. Crown Svo. Cloth, price ^s. IX. The New Chemistry. By Professor J. P. Cooke, of the Har- vard L'ni'.ersity. With 31 Illustra- tions. Third Edition. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 5^. X. The Science of Law. By Professor Sheldon Amos. Second Edition. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 5^. XI. Animal Mechanism. A Treatise on Terrestrial and Aerial Locomotion. By Professor E. J. Marey. With 117 Illustrations. Second Edition. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 5^^. XII. The Doctrine of Descent and Darwinism. By Professor Os- car Schmidt (Strasburg Universitj-). With 26 Illustrations. Third Edi- tion. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 5.?. XIII. The History of the Con- flict between Religion and Sci- ence. By J. W. Draper, M.D., LL.D. Eighth Edition. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 5.?. XIV. Fungi ; their Nature, In- fluences, Uses, &c. By M. C. Cooke, M.A., LL.D. Edited by the Rev. M. J. Berkeley, M.A., F. L. S. With numerous Illustrations. Second Edition. Crown Svo. Cloth, price IS. XV. The Chemical Effects of Light and Photography. By Dr. Hermann Vogel (Polytechnic Aca- demy' of Berlin). Translation tho- roughly revised. With 100 Illustra- tions. Third Edition. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 55^. XVI. The Life and Growth of Language. By William Dwight Whitney, Professor of Sanskrit and Comparative Philolog>' in Yale Col- lege, New Haven. Second Edition. Crown Svo. Cloth, price ^s. Henry S. King c^" Co.^s Pubucations. 15 International Scientific Series (The) — continued. XVII. Money and the Mecha- nism of Exchange. By W. Stan- ley Jevons, M.A., F.R.S. Third Edition. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price ^s. XVIII. The Nature of Light: With a General Account of Physical Optics. By Dr. Eugene Lommel, Professor of Physics in the Univer- sity of Erlangen. With 188 Illustra- tions and a table of Spectra in Chro- mo-lithography. Second Edition. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price 5.?. XIX. Animal Parasites and Messmates. By Monsieur Van Beneden, Professor of the University of Louvain, Correspondent of the Institute of France. With 83 Illus- trations. Second Edition. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price ^s. XX. Fermentation. By Professor Schiitzenberger, Director of the Chemical Laboratory at the Sor- bonne. With 28 Illustrations. Second Edition. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price 5^-. XXI. The Five Senses of Man. By Professor Bernstein, of the Uni- versity of Halle. With 91 Illustra- tions. Second Edition. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price s^. XXII. The Theory of Sound in its Relation to Music. By Pro- fessor Pietro Blaserna, of the Royal University of Rome. With numerous Illustrations. Second Edition. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price 55-. Fo7'thcojning Vohtmes. Prof. W. KixGDON Clifford, M.A. The First Principles of the Exact Sciences explained to the Non-ma- thematical. Prof. T. H. Huxley, LL.D., F.R.S. Bodily Motion and Consciousness. Dr. W. B. Carpenter, LL.D., F. R. S. The Physical Geography of the Sea. W. Lauder Lixdsay, INI.D., F.R.S.E. Mind in the Lower Animals. Sir John Lubbock, Bart., F.R.S. On Ants and Bees. Prof. W. T. Thiselton Dyer, B.A., B. Sc. Form and Habit in Flowering Plants. International Scientific Series (The) — continued. Mr. J. N. LocKYER, F.R.S. Spec- trum Analj-sis. Prof. MiCH.\-EL Foster, M.D. Pro- toplasm and the Cell Theory. H. Charlton Bastian, M.D., F.R.S. The Brain as an Organ of Mind. Prof. A. C. Rams.\y, LL.D., F.R.S. Earth Sculpture : Hills, Valleys, ^Mountains, Plains, Rivers, Lakes ; how they were Produced, and how they have been Destroyed. Prof. J. Rosenthal. General Phy- siology of INIuscles and Nerv es. P. Bert (Professor of Physiology, Paris). Forms of Life and other Cosmical Conditions. Prof. Corfield, M.A., M.D. (Oxon.) Air in its relation to Health. JACKSON (T. G.). Modern Gothic Architec- ture. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price 5.5-. JACOB (Maj.-Gen. Sir G. Le Grand), K.C.S.I., C.B. Western India Before and during the Mutinies. Pictures drawn from life. Second Edition. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price -js. td. JENKINS (E.) and RAYMOND a-), Esqs. A Legal Handbook for Architects, Builders, and Build- ing Owners. Second Edition Re- vised. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price 6^-. JENKINS (Rev. R. C), M.A. The Privilege of Peter and the Claims of the Roman Church confronted with the Scriptures, the j Councils, and the Testimony of the I Popes themselves. Fcap. 8vo. Cloth, j price 35-. 6(f. '\ JENNINGS (Mrs. Vaughan). j Rahel : Her Life and Let- ! ters. With a Portrait from the j Painting by Daffinger. Square post I Svo. Cloth, price -js. 6d. i6 A List of JEVONS (W. Stanley), M.A., F.R.S. Money and the Mechanism of Exchange. Second Edition. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price 55. VolumeXVII. of The International Scientific Series. KAUFMANN (Rev. M.), B.A. Socialism : Its Nature, its Dangers, and its Remedies con- sidered. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price -]$. 6d. KEATINGE (Mrs.). Honor Blake : The Story of a Plain Woman. 2 vols. Crown 8vo. Cloth. KER (David). On the Road to Khiva. Illustrated with Photographs of the Country' and its Inhabitants, and a copy of the Official Map in use during the Campaign, from the Sur- vey of Captain Leusilin. Post 8vo. Cloth, price 12^. The Boy Slave in Bokhara. A Tale of Central Asia. With Illus- trations. Crown Bvo. Cloth, price 5^. The "Wild Horseman of the Pampas. Illustrated. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price 5^. KING (Alice). A Cluster of Lives. Cro^\•n 8vo. Cloth, price 7^. 6d. KING (Mrs. Hamilton). The Disciples. A New Poem. Second Edition, with some Notes. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price 75-. 6d. Aspromonte, and other Poems. Second Edition. Fcap. 8vo. Cloth, price ^. 6d. KINGSFORD(Rev. F.W.),M.A., Vicar of St. Thomas's, Stamford Hill ; late Chaplain H. E. I. C. (Bengal Presidency). Hartham Conferences; or, Discussions upon some of the Religi- ous Topics of the Day. " Audi alte- ram partem." Crown Svo. Cloth, price y. 6d. KNIGHT (A. F. C). Poems. Fcap Svo. Cloth, price 5^. KINGSLEY (Charles). Letters and Memories of his Life. Edited by his Wife. 2 vols. Demy 8vo. With 2 Steel engraved Portraits and numerous Illustrations on Wood, and a Facsimile of his Handwriting. Cloth, price 36.?. LACORDAIRE (Rev. Pere). Life : Conferences delivered at Toulouse. A New and Cheaper Edition. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price 2S. 6d. Lady of Lipari (The). A Poem in Three Cantos. Fcap. Svo. Cloth, price 53-. LAURIE (J. S.). Educational Course of Secular School Books for India : The First Hindustani Reader. Stiflf linen wrapper, price 6d. The Second Hindustani Reader. Stiff linen wrapper, price 6d. The Oriental (English) Reader. Book I., price 6d.; II., price -j^d. ; III., price gd. ; IV., price zs. Geography of India ; with jNIaps and Historical Appendix, tracing the Growth of the British Empire in Hindustan. Fcap. Svo. Cloth, price is. 6d. LAYMANN (Capt.). The Frontal Attack of Infantry. Translated by Colonel Edward Newdigate. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 2s. 6d. L. D. S. Letters from China and Japan. With Illustrated Title-page. Crown Svo. Cloth, price ys. 6d. LEANDER (Richard). Fantastic Stories. Trans- lated from the German by Paulina B. Granville. With Eight full-page Illustrations by IVI. E. Fraser-Tytler. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 5^. LEATHES (Rev. S.), M.A. The Gospel Its Own Wit- ness. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 55-. Henry S. King c5^' Go's Publications. 17 LEE (Rev. F. G.), D.C.L. The Other World; or, Glimpses of the Supernatural. 2 vols. A New Edition. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price \^s. LEE (Holme). Her Title of Honour. A Book for Girls. New Edition. With a Frontispiece. Crown 8yo. Cloth, price 5^. LENOIR (J.). Fayoum; or, Artists in Eg}'pt. A Tour with M. Gerome and others. With 13 Illustrations. A New and Cheaper Edition. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price 3J. 6d. Leonora Christina, Memoirs of, Daughter of Christian IV. of Denmark. Written during her Im- prisonment in the Blue Tower of the Roj'al Palace at Copenhagen, 1663- 1685. Translated by F. E. Bunxett. With an Autotj-pe Portrait of the Princess. A New and Cheaper Edition. IMedium 8vo. Cloth, price LEWIS (Mary A.). A Rat with Three Tales. With Four Illustrations by Catherine F. Frere. Cloth, price 5^. LISTADO (J. T.). Civil Service. A Novel. 2 vols. Crown 8vo. Cloth. LOCKER (P.). London Lyrics. A New and Revised Edition, with Additions and a Portrait of the Author. Crown 8vo. Cloth, elegant, price yj. td. LOMMEL (Dr. E.), The Nature of Light : With a General Account of Physical Optics. Second Edition. With 188 Illustra- tions and a Table of Spectra in Chromo-lithography. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price 55-. _ Volume XVIII. of The Interna- tional Scientific Series. LORIMER (Peter), D.D. John Knox and the Church of England : His Work in her Pulpit, and his Influence upon her Liturgj-, Articles, and Parties. Demy Svo. Cloth, price 125-. LOTHIAN (Roxburghe). Dante and Beatrice from 1282 to 1290. A Romance. 2 vols. Post Svo. Cloth, price 245-. LOVEL (Edward). The Owl's Nest in the City: A Storj% Crown 8vo. Cloth. LOVER (Samuel), R.H.A. The Life of Samuel Lover, R. H. A. ; Artistic, Literarj', and Musical. With Selections from his Unpublished Papers and Correspon- dence. By Eayle I^ernard. 2 vols. With a Portrait. Post Svo. Cloth, price 213-. LOWER (M. A.), M.A., F.S.A. Wayside Notes in Scandi- navia. Being Notes of Travel in the North of Europe. Crown Svo. i Cloth, price 9^. LUCAS (Alice). Translations from the Works of German Poets of the 18th and 19th Centuries. Fcap. Svo. Cloth, price 53-. LYONS (R. T.), Surg.-Maj. Ben- gal Army. A Treatise on Relapsing Fever. Post Svo. Cloth, price 7.^. 6^/. MACAULAY (J.), M.A., M.D., Edin. The Truth about Ireland: i Tours of Obser\'ation in 1872 and J.875. With Remarks on Irish Public Questions. Being a Second Edition ' of "Ireland in 1872," with a New I and Supplementary' Preface. Crown I Svo. Cloth, price 35. bd. ' MAC DONALD (G.). I Malcolm. A Novel. 3 vols. I Second Edition. Crown Svo. Cloth. j St. George and St. Michael. j 3 vols. Crown Svo. Cloth. \ MACLACHLAN(A.N.C.), M.A. I William Augustus, Duke j of Cumberland : being a Sketch of ' his Military Life and Character, chieflj as exhibited in the General I Orders of His Royal Highness, ; 1745—1747. With Illustrations. Post j Svo. Cloth, price 15J. i8 A List of MAC KENNA (S. J.)- Plucky Fellows. A Book for Boys. With Six Illustrations. Second Edition. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price 35. 6c/. At School with an Old Dragoon. With Six Illustrations. Second Edition. Crown Svo* Cloth, price Si'. McCLINTOCK. Sir Spangle and the Dingy Hen. Illustrated. Imperial i6mo. Cloth, price 2^. ^d. MAIR (R. S.), M.D., F.R.C.S.E. The Medical Guide for Anglo-Indians. Being a Compen- dium of Advice to Europeans _ in India, relating to the Preservation and Regulation of Health. With a Supplement on the Management of Children in India. Crown 8vo. Limp cloth, price y. 6d. MANNING (His Eminence Car- dinal). Essays on Religion and Literature. By various Writers. Third Series. Demy 8vo. Cloth, price T.OS. 6d. MAREY (E. J.). Animal Mechanics. A Treatise on Terrestrial and Aerial Locomotion. With 117 Illustrations. Second Edition. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 5^. Volume XI. of The International Scientific Series. MARKEWITCH (B.). The Neglected Question. Translated from the Russian, by the Princess Ourousoff, and dedicated by Express Permission to Her Imperial and Royal Highness Marie Alexan- drovna, the Duchess of Edinburgh. 2 vols. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 14^-. MARRIOTT (Maj.-Gen. W. F.), C.S.I. A Grammar of Political Economy. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 6s. MARSHALL (H.). The Story of Sir Edward's Wife. A Novel. Crown Svo. Cloth, price io.f. 6d. j MASTERMAN (J.). Half-a-dozen Daughters. With a Frontispiece. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 35-. 6d, MAUDSLEY (Dr. H.). Responsibility in Mental Disease. Second Edition. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 55-. Volume VIII. of The International Scientific Series. MAUGHAN (W. C). The Alps of Arabia; or, Travels through Eg^^pt, Sinai, Ara- bia, and the Holy Land. V/ith Map. Second Edition. Demy Svo. Cloth, price ss. MAURICE (C. E.). Lives of English Popular Leaders. No. i. — Stephen Lang- ton. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 7^. 6;/. No. 2. — Tyler, Ball, and Old- castle. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 7J. 6d. Mazzini (Joseph). A Memoir. By E. A. V. Two Photographic Portraits. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 3^. 6d. MEDLEY(Lieut.-Col. J. G.),R.E. An Autumn Tour in the United States and Canada. Crown Svo. Cloth, price 55-. MENZIES (Sutherland). Memoirs of Distinguished Women. 2 vols. Post Svo. Cloth, price 10^. 6d. MICKLETHWAITE (J. T.), F.S.A. Modern Parish Churches : Their Plan, Design, and Furniture. Crown Svo. Cloth, price js. 6d. MILNE (James). Tables of Exchange for the Conversion of Sterling Money into Indian and Ceylon Currencj', at Rates from is. 8d. to 2S. yL per Rupee. Second Edition. Demy Svo. Cloth, price ;^ 2 25, Henry S. King c^ Go's Puhlicat-ions. 19 MIRUS (Maj.-Gen. von). Cavalry Field Duty. Trans- lated by Major Frank S. Russell, 14th (King's) Hussars, Crown 8vo. Cloth limp, price 7^'. bd. MIVART (St. George), F.R.S. Contemporary Evolution : An Essay on some recent Social Changes. Post 8vo. Cloth, price 7^. (id. MOORE (Rev. D.), M.A. Christ and His Church. By the Author of " The Age and the Gospel," &c. Crown 8vo. Cloth, price 3^. (id. MOORE (Rev. T.). Sermonettes : on Synony- mous Texts, taken from the Bible and Book of Common Prayer, for the Study, Family Reading, and Private Devotion. Small crown 8vo. Cloth, price 45-. 6