^^ 
 
 REESE LIBRARY 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 Received *^^^^^kLcjpt£^OiiL^^ _ _ 188.^?— 
 
 Accessions yV<?. _^ OLf ?^^ Shelf No. 
 
 C«- 
 
J 
 
 I 
 
I 
 
ROYAL ENGINEER PRIZE ESSAY 
 
 FO R 1875. 
 
 THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION 
 
 SELECTED AS 
 
 A FIELD OF BATTLE. 
 
 CAPTAIN T. FBASER, R. E 
 
 WOOLWICH: 
 
 A. W. AND J. P. JACKSON, PEINTBE9, THOMAS STREBT, 
 
 1875. 
 
u 
 
 2^^ J -^ << 
 
CONDITIONS OF ESSAY FOR 1875. 
 
 The occupation of a position selected as a field of battle, and the 
 means to be taken to strengthen and prepare it under various con- 
 ditions of occupation, such as more or less time for the construc- 
 tion of works, and greater or less proximity to the enemy, including 
 the possibility of immediate attack, the ground being taken up in his 
 presence. 
 
 The conditions should be stated which determine the position for the 
 Artillery, also the occupation of adjacent villages, farms, enclosures, 
 woods, &c., the readiest means of turning these and such other 
 natural or artificial objects, as woods, railways, rivers, &c., as are 
 ordinarily met with, to the best account, should also be stated. 
 
 The Essay should contain a discussion as to the least number of 
 troops of the various arms requisite for the defence of a given 
 position. 
 
 All general principles should be illustrated, when possible, by 
 reference to examples from actual warfare. 
 
 The nature of works should be described, and, when necessary, 
 explained by sketches with figured dimensions. 
 
 The usual appliances which accompany a well equipped modern 
 army in the field, are to be considered available for the purpose of the 
 
 The length of the Essay should not exceed 24 pages of the Pro- 
 fessional Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers. 
 
 Essays to be sent in by the 31st of March, 1875. 
 
ERRATA. 
 
 Page 11, line 35, for *' manceuvring" read " manoeuvering." 
 
 Page 12, line 21, for " Carriere" read " Carrieres." 
 
 Page 12, line 35, for " manoeuvring" read " manoeuvering." 
 
 Page 12, Foot Note J for " Crossay" read " Croissy." 
 
 Page 13, line 28, for " lie'* read " lay." 
 
 Page 15, Foot Note J for "Loelein" read " Lohlein." 
 
 Page 16, Foot Note * after « Iggion " read <' du Rhdne " and " le 
 general Cremer." 
 
 Page 16, Foot Note || for " face" read " pace." 
 
 Page 20, Foot Note J for " Henri" read •' Henry." 
 
 Page 22, line 21, for « Vandois" read " Vaudois." 
 
 Page 22, Foot Note § for " Lcelein" read " Lohlein." 
 
 Page 23, Foot Note t for " Henri" read " Henry." 
 
 Page 23, Foot Note % for " Loelein" read " Lohlein." 
 
 Page 23, Foot Note f for " Loelein" read " Lohlein," 
 
 Page 27, Foot Note • for " Wissemberg" read " Weissemberg." 
 
 PI. yii. Note to Fig. 47, for " (Ai to B)" read " (Ai to A.)" 
 
169. 
 
 [ Tout Jours prest.'] 
 
 TJJE i;)pFENCE OF A POSITION, SELECTED AS 
 
 /^^^"-".F thk"'' a field of battle. 
 
 Du gelist nicht weg, dann gelit cler feiad weg," — Boguslaivski. 
 
 The question of the defence of positions is a constantly recurring one in the 
 history of war, because, of two forces in the field, it generally happens that one 
 is driven or led to act on the defensive, either from inferiority of any kind alone, 
 or with a view to gain or maintain some strategetical or other advantage. In 
 saying this, we admit, in general, that the force capable of taking the offensive 
 is the one more likely to succeed in obtaining decisive results : what we are con- 
 cerned with, is rather to consider when the defensive is desirable or unavoidable, 
 and how, under these circumstances, it can be used most successfully. 
 
 Objects of the Defensive. 
 In speaking of cases in which the defender aims at a decisive result, that is, 
 at crushing the attack on the battlefield, we shall refer to liis tactics as " Offen- 
 sive-defensive''' while, if his main object be attained by simply holding his position, 
 the action is called a covering action. Even in this case, however, a purely 
 passive defence is rarely advisable, though the extent to which offensive returns 
 can be carried out, is usually limited by want of numbers. 
 
 Offensive-Defensive Actions. 
 
 A commander most often decides on offensive-defensive action when, with a 
 force about equal or not much inferior to his opponent, he can find an offensive 
 position which either bars or threatens the hostile advance, and at the same time 
 so favourable for defence, that the lesser part of his forces can be trusted to 
 shatter the assailant, while it lets him strike in force at the moment of reaction, 
 and push his success. 
 
 Such were some of our battles in Spain, where, under a chief, whose know- 
 ledge of fire tactics was far in advance of that of his contemporaries, the assailant's 
 shock was stopped by fire and repulsed by a counter stroke. In the Peninsula, 
 however, the fiie contest was most often shortlived, and the infantry line, after a 
 few rounds, frequently took the oft'ensive ; while with the new arms, the forward 
 advance of the shooting line has become both difficult and questionable, and the 
 counter attack is more often made by reserves held in hand for the purpose. 
 
 Covering Actions. 
 
 The following appear to be the circumstances which most often lead to cover- 
 ing actions in a defended position, namely : — 
 
 (1). When the position is meant to cover important points on lines of com- 
 munication. 
 
 (2). When it covers the capital or some important town, magazine, or arsenal. 
 
 (3). When a circle of investment is prepared defensively. 
 
 (4). When a force is called upon to cover the operations of a siege which 
 the enemy threatens to interrupt or raise. 
 
2 THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION. 
 
 (5). When the position covers part of the front of an army acting offensively. 
 (6). When a garrison is enabled, by occupying advanced defensive positions, 
 to hold the enemy at a greater distance from the fortress. 
 (7). When a rear guard holds a position to cover a retreat. 
 
 Defence of Communications. 
 Under the first head, cases -will occur, as for instanf^e at important passages of 
 rivers, or in the defence of deiiles where the enemy's aim, and, consequently, the 
 line of his advance, is defined within small limits ; and where also the defender 
 may have the great advantage of placing both flanks in security from turning 
 movements : this relieves him from the necessity of extreme extension, and short 
 lines, strongly fortified, seem suitable, provided that their situation be such as to 
 prevent the hostile artillery from occupying positions whence its fire could reach 
 the communications. 
 
 Defence of Strategic Points. 
 In the second case, the force covering a town or arsenal must hold a position 
 sufficiently advanced, and, therefore, extended, to prevent an assailant from in* 
 flicting serious injury by means of his distant artillery fire, without being driven 
 to risk an assault. The position prepared and taken up by the French army of 
 the Loire (war of 1870-71) to cover the arsenal of Bourges, to a certain extent, 
 fulfilled these conditions, and alone, according to Gcetze, prevented its capture by 
 the Germans. 
 
 These two first cases of covering actions often take place in positions prepared 
 beforehand, with a view to possible retreat, which frequently take the form of 
 intrenched camps on sites of strategical importance, at which reserves and ma- 
 terials may be collected, and under cover of which, troops, which have been 
 worsted, may re-organise and recruit. The camp at Chalons was intended to 
 be, and was not, so used in the war of 1870-71 . In the case of an invasion, such 
 positions, even if they do not compel attack, at least narrow the lines of the in- 
 vader's advance, and cause him to lose time or incur risk in passing them. In 
 the latter case both intrenched camps and manoeuvring bridge-heads are used as 
 strategical pivots for the field army, and should be prepared oflensively. On the 
 other hand, an invader may prepare similar positions to secure his hue of opera- 
 tions and prevent disaster.* 
 
 The Defence of Lines of Investment. 
 Of all classes of defensive actions, none seem to have received so extraordinary 
 adevelopment in the war of 1870-71 as those in which, not only garrisons, but 
 great field armies, have been shut within tlieir fortresses, and there held till the 
 excess of their own numbers compelled them to surrender. History records no 
 events of the kind which even approach those of the surrender of Metz and Paris 
 since the days that Caesar in the same country, and with a force only 70,000 
 strong, enclosed Vercinjetorix in Alesia, and in 70 days compelled his surrender 
 with 80,000 men. 
 
 The peculiarities of these investing operations are, that the investing force 
 must, at the commencement, act energetically on the offensive, so as to secure a 
 circle of defensive positions on as short a circumference as possible, and to gain 
 time for preparation ; after which the force so shut in can only act by taking the 
 offensive, and that too ivithout the power of making flank attacks. 
 
 llie defensive preparations for investment are often made more easy by the 
 railways which converge on the town, and by the number and excellence of the 
 roads in the neiglibourhood. To these advantages may be added the small sub- 
 divisions of land and the number of houses, enclosures, Niliages, parks, &c., which 
 are commonly found about great cities. 
 
 * In the corapai^ni of I SKI, Nnpoleon fortified Dresden as an intrenched camp, and 
 Pirna as a bridge head : the works round Kars iu 1854 also formed an intrenched camp. 
 
THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION. 3 
 
 The Catering of a Siege. 
 
 In actions fought to cover a siege or investment, the covering troops look to 
 those of the investing force to retain the garrison. The most favourable cover- 
 ing position may often be at a considerable distance from the place, but, in any 
 case, entirely out of the reach of its guns, and so lar from the investing line, that 
 the latter may be in no way afiected by the artillery lire of the attack, f 
 
 Offensive use of Defences. 
 In recent wars, while the defender has had, more than ever, to use the offen- 
 sive to secure success, the assailant has constantly had to keep the defensive in 
 view : thus the great importance of flank attacks has led occasionally to the 
 fortifying of part of the front of an army on the offensive, preparatory to an attack 
 made from a flank. \ This was particularly the case in the late American 
 war, towards the close of which tlie combatants had acquired considerable skill 
 both in manoeuvring and in using intrenchmeuts. 
 
 Field Defence hy the Betieged. 
 At the beginning of a siege, the besieger is forced to draw the line of invest- 
 ment at a considerable distance from the fortress ; and if, in addition, an active 
 defender holds a prepared position within the range of the place, the investing 
 line is still further thrust out along its front, and the difficulties and delays that 
 occur are much increased. In this case the fortress affords to the defender a 
 secure ba^e, wliile its guns support his position and render it extremely difficult 
 for the attack to press home an assault on it. Thus the protracted defence of 
 Belfort ( 1870-71) was due, in a great measure, to the line of defended villages 
 (Danjoutin, Perouse, &c.) occupied for some time by the French, for the capture 
 of which night attacks had to be resorted to. 
 
 Action of a Rear-Guard. 
 
 The ^reat increase in retaining power afforded by the breech-loader has 
 directly mcreased the efficiency of a rear-guard. Kear-guard actions have this 
 peculiarity, that they are often, though not always, fought with the object of 
 holding the position for a short time only, in which case special thought must be 
 given to the lines of retreat and to the means of covering them. 
 Modern Defensive Tactics. 
 
 The above considerations (chiefly strategical) are generally as applicable to 
 former wars as to those of the immediate fuiure. They have been entered into 
 to show the extent of defensive action and the modifications that are caused by 
 circumstances. \N hen, however, we come to the tactical management of the 
 defence, we find that a change in the method of fighting has, as usual, followed 
 the changes in arms. The effect of rifled field guns began to be felt in 1859, 
 while in 1866 the power of the breech-loader was established beyond all doubt ; 
 but, in the latter case particularly, the German superiority in all points, except 
 perhaps in artillery tactics, was so marked, that success was not entirely due to 
 the arm. In the campaign of 1870-71, however, the opposing forces were for 
 the first time armed with the new weapon. Hence this campaign alone can be 
 considered as a true index of what we have now to expect, and no excuse is 
 wanted for drawing mainly upon it, and upon the conclusions come to by the 
 actors in it, for the consideration of our subject. 
 
 t In the war of 1870-71 the battles at Bapaume and on the Lisaine were fought to 
 cover the sieges of Peronne aud Belfort. 
 
 J This use of defences differs from the offensive-defensive, for in the latter the 
 offensive generally follows, while in the former it may precede defensive action, 
 
4 THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION. 
 
 Causes qualifying the conclusions from the War 0/ 1870-71. 
 
 There are, however, a few reservations to be made in accepting these con- 
 elusions. In the first place, national vanity generally* leads each country to 
 believe that the more brilliant role of the attack is best fitted for the genius of 
 its soldiers. For this cause, prejudice is apt to incliue the balance of opiuioa in 
 favour of the attack, while success on the offensive is more often set down to in- 
 dividual superioriiy than to that of numbera and organization, which in 1870 
 were really among the main causes. Again, in this campaign the infantry arm 
 of the Germans was much inferior in shooting power to that of the French, and 
 to those now in use in the armies of Europe, and this has, perhaps, led them 
 rather to under-rate the distance of the most effective infantry fire, a distance 
 which, though limited by the range of distinct vision, we may expect to see some ■ 
 what increased when the newest armaments come into action, f 
 
 With these reservations, however, we are bound to accept the teachings of ex- 
 perience ; and though in our campaigns against inferior races, where daring is 
 perhaps the chief element of success, we need not always be bound to the latest 
 European tactics, still, the tactics which are found to be the best under the most 
 trying conditions, cannot fail, if wisely modified, to be the same under those of 
 less difficulty. 
 
 Captain May's criticisms in the ** Tactical retrospect " on the action of the ar- 
 tillery and engineer services in 1866 (for which they should be ever grateful), 
 were shewn, in 1870, to have borne fruit in bringing them both to the front. 
 
 Again, with reference to the investing works round Paris in 1870-71, we fiud 
 another infantry officer remark, " The works directed by engineer officers, how- 
 ever excellent they may have been with regard to their technical execution, did 
 not always show that these officers had, so to say, understood how to reduce to 
 practice the tactical ideas of the present time."]; Such an opinion justifies us in 
 giving great prominence to the tactical considerations that bear on the subject, 
 and we cannot do better than commence by examining the mechanism of the 
 attack for which the defence has to prepare. 
 
 Formations f 07' Attack. 
 
 Although our field exercises do not define very exactly what our formations 
 for attack should be,§ what concerns us more in this case is, that in the great 
 continental armies, a certain uniformity of opinion seems to have been arrived at 
 as the result of recent experience. 
 
 Owing to the great difficulty of a direct advance against the breech-loader, the 
 attacking force will now most often endeavour to use its superiority by trying to 
 turn one or both flanks of the position, jj while holding the front, by an attack 
 which should keep the defender's troops opposed to it, from extending to, or rein- 
 forcing the flanks. This attack may not be pushed home till that on the flank 
 or flanks has struck. Tlie assailant plainly puts his strength to the best use 
 when he so times his attack that he engages the whole of the defender's line at 
 once. With iucreased extension, however, this is now less easy, and in the war 
 
 * Our Peninsular experience has rather iacliaed us to the defensive in European 
 wars. 
 
 f We raust remembei-, too, that the Germans only Ui5ed common shell with percus- 
 sion fuzes, while the French, time fuzes botu foi- common and shrapnel were meant 
 only for two ranges. 
 
 X Boguslawski, " Taktische Folgerungen aus dem Feldzuge 1870-71 ;" tran.slated by 
 Graham. 
 
 § Since writing the above, very clear and concise regulations for the attack have 
 been i.ssued for use in the Manoeuvres of 1875, 
 
 II The way in which the assailant's masses are now often made to converge on to 
 the buttle lield makes this more easy. Thus at Kouiggratz, Le Mans, &;c. 
 
THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION. ^ 
 
 of 1870-71. it was often the case that the advanced guard of a brigade or divi- 
 sion was seriously engaged before the general attack began.* In all cases the 
 actual advance will be more or less frontal even when directed on a flank, and 
 the main ideas of such an attack seem to be. f 
 
 1st. Preparation for the infantry advance by a powerful concentric artillery 
 fire in order to shake and paralyze the defender, and to destroy material obstacles. 
 
 2nd. Preparation for the assault, by infantry in individual order, which at- 
 tempts, by its fire, at effective musketry range, to overcome the defender's power 
 of resistance. 
 
 3rd. The advance to the assault of the same infantry, backed up by its reserves. 
 
 This use of the individual order gives the attack the greatest mobility and 
 security from fire while developing its own fire to the utmost. After the fight 
 has been opened by the reconnaissances which the assailant must make to get 
 information and to gain time for consideration, for the giving of orders and the 
 preparation for turning movements (all of which must be arranged at this stage 
 and not later), the advancing columns deploy as they approach the zone of the 
 defender's artillery fire, which, under conditions favourable to its use, may extend 
 as far as 3,000 yards from the position, though the ground, fog, mist, &c., may 
 often lessen this distance. J 
 
 The assailant's artillery comes into action at about this range, and will pro- 
 bably have to make one or two advances during the fight. In doing so it strives 
 to place itself so that it may continue its support to the attacking infantry up to 
 the moment of the assault ; § while at each stage of the attack it aims at divert- 
 ing the defender's fire as much as possible from the infantry to itself, using at the 
 same time every accident of ground, &c., which can give it cover. 1| 
 
 The attacking line of infantry is divided into : — 
 
 (1) Shooting line ; (2) Supports ; (3) Main body. 
 
 The supports may sometimes be as strong as the shooting line, but rarely less 
 than half the latter, and the two together are from one-fourth to one-half of the 
 whole force. In order to get the maximum efi'ective fire, the men in the shooting 
 line are as close together as they can be, so as to move and shoot ; namely, each 
 occupying about 1^ paces. 
 
 Thus a battalion of 1,000 men, with two or three companies in the shooting 
 
 * At Spicheren, for example. At the battle of Belfort, too, one cause of failure Vvaa 
 that the attacks along the line were so isolated aud ill-timed, that the defender was 
 allowed to shift his reserves from place to place, as each was threatened in succession. 
 
 t The analogy between the attack of a position and of a fortress is well pointed out 
 in Gen. Ducrot's late pamphlet, " Instruction des Tirailleurs." He says, " We think 
 the general's art has much analgoy with that of the engineer." The difference be- 
 tween the art of the engineer and that of the general being, that the one is opposed to 
 the work of years ; the other to that of hours. 
 
 X Thus the French, in attacking Hericourt (battle of Belfort, 1871), on the IGth of 
 January, were enabled, under cover of a dense fog, to get close up to the town. On 
 the other hand, the late trials at Dartmoor (1875), point to the probability of even 
 longer effective ranges. Thus the IG-pounder water and Shrapnel shells made an ave- 
 rage of U hits each, on targets representing a column of squadrons, at 4,000 yards 
 (known) range, with percussion fuzes onlv ; the 9 seconds T fuze being only good for 
 about 3,000 yards ; at the latter range, Shrapnel with T fuze averaged four to six hits 
 per shell on a half battalion column target. 
 
 § At the attack of the village of Chenebier (battle of Belfort, 1871), it is mentioned 
 in " Le General Cremer" that the French artillery ceased fire when their infantry got 
 up to within 1,200 metres of the Germans ; and the French lost 1,100 men in driving 
 two battalions out of the village. At St. Privat, on the contrary, the German guns 
 fired on the village after their infantry got in. 
 
 II At the same battle the French, during the attack, intrenched a number of field 
 guns by the Mont Chevis Farm, whence their fire silenced some German field guns in 
 the open.— Von der Wengen (Die Kampfe vor Belfort). 
 
o THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION. 
 
 line, would give a front of about 350 to 550 paces, according to the cover 
 available. 
 
 I^ature of Fire hearing 07i the Attach. 
 
 In advancing from deployment, the infantry first enters the zone of the de- 
 fender's unaimed musketry fire at from 1,000 to 1,200 yards from the position. 
 In crossing tbis zone to that of his aimed fire (500 to 700 yards from the posi- 
 tion), speed alone saves loss * and the nature of formation does not much aflfect 
 it, except when aimed fire is kept up, as it often will be, at very long ranges ; 
 when, of course, large compact bodies suffer most : in any case the defender's 
 artillery fire will prevent the use of large bodies, if exposed. 
 
 In crossing the zone of aimed fire, the advance of the main body is only pos- 
 sible owing to the fact that though the defender would gain most by firing on the 
 main body and supports, he is sure to be tempted into firing mostly on the shoot- 
 ing line, while his guns may be drawn to fire on those of the attack. 
 
 Advance of the Shooting Line. 
 
 The shooting line moves through the zone of unaimed fire, firing, if at all, by 
 word of command. On reaching the zone of aimed fire, tbey advance by alter- 
 nate fractions in rushes of 50 to t^O paces, the fraction not in motion keeping up 
 fire to cover the rush. When tlie line gets up to the most effective range,f it 
 commences rapid independent firing. Formerly the decision of a fight was said 
 to rest on the fact that two hostile bodies could not at the same time occupy the 
 same space. Now-a-days it appears that they cannot both hold on under fire for 
 many minutes, even when some hundred yards apart : J hence the crisis of the 
 fire contest ends quickly, either by the repulse of the shooting line, now aug- 
 mented by the supports, or by its rapid advance, supported by its main body, to 
 the point of assault. 
 
 Advance ofihe Supports^ 
 
 Up to the zone of aimed musketry fire, the supports follow the shooting line at 
 say 300 paces distance. This distance seems most suitable, for while all muske- 
 try fire ranges considerably, it has been observed § that artillery fire is more ac- 
 curate, and is more often low than high, so that when directed on one object, its 
 effects do not extend much over 300 paces beyond |1 As the supports feel the 
 effects of the aimed fire, they form line, and then open line (files covering as they 
 do not fire), spreading out and closing iu as they best can. The supports feed 
 the shooting line on which they close, as it gets to the position for rapid firing, 
 and by the time the main body approaches, they will all have joined it. 
 
 Advance of the Main Body. 
 Up to the unaimed fire zone, the main body advances in small shallow columns 
 of from half to a quarter of a battalion. From this on, the defensive artillery fire 
 makes it best to sub-divide further into bodies with a front of 30 to 40 paces, and 
 
 * Colonel Gawler, " The British line in the attack " : von Scherff, " The new tactics 
 of infantry ; " translated by Graham. 
 
 t Boguslawski puts this at from 600 to 150 paces ; Von ScherfE at from 400 to 200 
 paces from the defender's line, 
 
 % " Assuming, from the lessons of the late war, that a rapid independent tire from 
 both sides, such as above supposed, cannot well last above hve minutes, without bring- 
 ing things to a crisis." — ScherfE, 
 
 § ScherfE. 
 
 II Thus at 2,000 yards (known) with targets representing 100 men one pace apart, 
 with 100 in support at 2r)0 paces, and L'OO as main body GOO paces in rear of them (the 
 two latter in line, two deep), 288 shells tired at the shooting line made 388 hits on it, 
 and only 10 or 12 on the supports, and two or three on the main body.— Dartmoor, 1875. 
 
THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION. 7 
 
 60 to 80 paces apart. Some of these, if much exposed, form open line, but get 
 together again where cover permits. In order to be up in time for tlie assault, 
 the main body will, at first, keep about 500 yards behind the skirmishers, so that 
 when the latter commence the rapid firing, the main body will be within 250 to 
 350 yards of them. When the main body gets within about 50 yards of the 
 skirmishers, the moment of the assault arrives, and the whole move forward, the 
 main body aiming at the point of entry. Once in, they will endeavour to gain 
 the further border of the defences, but will leave the conduct of a further advance 
 to fresh troops. 
 
 Advance of the Artilleiy. 
 
 The divisional artillery will, in the meantime, have advanced with, or before, 
 the main body to their final positions, at a distance of 1,000 to 1,500 yards from 
 the defenders.* 
 
 Supporting Lines, 
 
 The attacking line, even when the front is short, will have troops in support. 
 When the front is extensive, a small intermediate body, or second line, will 
 follow 200 or 300 yards behind the main body, to fill up gaps that may occur, 
 while a reserve, or third line (|th or Ard of the whole) follows at 400 to 500 
 yards in rear of the second fine. Both these bodies help to protect the attacking 
 line from counterstrokes, and, after the assault, the second clears the defender 
 out of the captured works, while the third pushes further forward if need be. 
 
 Advantages of the Offensive. 
 
 The advantages claimed for the offensive are — 
 
 1st. That of the initiative, wherein its strength has always lain, which enables 
 it to decide ivhen, where, and hoio to strike. Tliis is, however, to some extent 
 limited by the judgment of the defender in choosing the position. f 
 
 2nd. That the attack has, with the new arms, an increased power of bringing 
 a converging and cross fire on the defender's line, and particularly on the points 
 of assault. In attacks on posts % or small positions, the converging nature of its 
 fire gives great power to the attack. When, however, the position is extensive, 
 it only gets this advantage in so far as it can overlap the defender's rianks. 
 
 Much stress is laid on the effect of the preliminary artillery fire, and its moral 
 effect on exposed troops is, no doubt, great. We must, however, remember that 
 even in ordinary fights, the losses due to this fire are set down at only 1-1 2th or 
 l-13th of the whole ; § so that against troops under cover the loss cannot be 
 very great. 
 
 In the artillery engagement at long ranges there is, however, one point in 
 favour of the attack when firing against intrenchments, namely, that at those 
 ranges the angle of descent is considerable. Thus the drop of a 16-pdr. M.L.R. 
 shell at 4,000 yards is roughly 15" or 1 in 4 ; at 3,000 yards it is almost 10=* 
 or 1 in 5-7 ; at 2,000 yards it is about 5f ^ or I in 10 ; and at 1,000 yards 
 about 2i° or 1 in 28 ; while with the 9-pdr. M.R.L. the drop at 3,000 yards is 
 over 1 in 5 : hence the attack gains in searching power, and the defence loses in 
 grazing power with direct fire at long ranges. In both cases, however, when it 
 
 * Capt. Hime, R.A, (R.A. prize essay), puts the limit of musketry fire against guns 
 at 900 yards. 
 
 \ " The defender possessed and still possesses a certain general initiative by means of 
 which (if only his position be sti-ategically good) he can, from the nature of tlie posi- 
 tion taken up, attract his opponent and force him to advance in one or more directions 
 determined by and known to him beforehand." — Von ScherfE. 
 
 % That on Le Bourget, for instance. — Paris, 1870—71. 
 
 § Home, " Precis of Modern Tactics." 
 
O THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION. 
 
 is too far for the gunners to see * the effects, they are comparatively f slight. At 
 the same time the successful use of curved fire in recent sieges, where the ranges 
 were known, may lead to its use by the defence for searching out open spaces 
 concealed by ground or woods, where the attacking troops may mass provided 
 that the positions and ranges have been learned beforehand. The addition of the 
 64-pr. M.L. howitzer of 18 cwt , now under trial, as a gun of position, would 
 make this the more easy (Fig. 29, PI. VI.) 
 
 3rd. That infantry can now load and fire in any position (a gain to the defence 
 as well) and when moving, and that while in attacking they present an ever- 
 shifting mark to the enemy, they fire at a fixed object. The latter, however, is 
 weighted with the drawback that the mode of advance is by 60 yard rushes, 
 under the load of a knapsack, + and that the range is constantly changing. § 
 
 Lastly. The assailant has the great moral advantage of leaving the dead and 
 wounded behind, and has the excitement of the forward movement, which, being 
 in individual order, can be made more quickly, and is not now so ham; ered by 
 obstacles. 
 
 Advantages of the Defensive. 
 
 Let us now consider the advantages of the defensive, particularly with reference 
 to the tactics of to-day. With the new arms, its fire has gained considerably in 
 range, raindity, and accuracy, and with small-arms in grazing effect, jj When 
 tliese advantages can be brought fully into play, the assailant is now forced to 
 cross a widely increased fire zone, where the intensity of fire is also greater than 
 of old. The defender in the meantime is firing at rest from a rest, more or less 
 under cover, at ranges more or less foreknown, and with supports and reserves 
 under cover and closer at hand ; and also, except when taking the offensive, he 
 feels, much less than the assailant, the greatly increased difficulty of controlling 
 troops once launched into action. 
 
 From the nature of the case, particularly when railway transport is available, 
 and time and distance justify its use, the defence is generally well situated as 
 regards supplies and tools, and in the power of its artillery, being able to bring 
 the heavier natures into action, as was done by the French at Orleans, and by 
 the Germans on the Lisaine, in 1870-71. For the same reason, the question of 
 reserve ammunition is one that can be arranged beforehand by the defence, and 
 is a great difficulty for the attack. 
 
 Increased Facilities for Counter strode. 
 Although in acting offensively, the defender subjects himself to many of the 
 disadvanta^ies to which an assailant is exposed, still the defensive preparations 
 of the latter cannot be extensive, and several causes now combine to aid the 
 offensive character of the defensive. The great retaining power of the breech- 
 loader enables comparatively few men to hold the defensive zone, thus freeing 
 large numbers for offensive action, and the rapidity of the defender's fire makes it 
 less necessary for him to use obstacles simply to gain time to fire on the attack : 
 
 • Hoffbower mentions, that while in action -with his battery at Coulombay, he only 
 twice got a glimpse of guns, &c., on which to direct his aim ; the smoke and flash being 
 generally the only mark,—" The German Artillery in the battles near Metz ;" translated 
 by Hollist. 
 
 t The hits on deployed infantry at 3,300 and 2,200 yards by artillery fire are put 
 down as 1 to 3. — Home. 
 
 % In 1870—71 the Germans generally fought in marching order on the offensive, and 
 without knapsacks on the defensive. 
 
 § The introduction of range-finders must be admitted to be a distinct gain to the 
 artillery of the attack. Those in our service have been proved accurate up to 4,000 
 yards and over. 
 
 II The former grazing effect, up to 000 yards, of our Martini-Henry bullet has, it is 
 said, been somewhat increased by its reduction to 110 grains. 
 
THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION. 9 
 
 this frees him from the hindrances to counter-attack, which such obstacles used to 
 cause. Again, the extended order in which alone the assailant can advance, 
 renders him less able to opjwse attacks on his flank, particularly from the stage 
 of rapid independent firing to the finish of the assault. Lastly, the flank move- 
 ments of the defender's reserves are made on interior lines, along prepared com- 
 munications, over known ground, often also under cover and close up to the 
 front ; while flank movements of the attack must more often be carried out at a 
 distance. 
 
 Use of Telegraphs, Signals, Sj-c. 
 The arrangements of the defence generally, and particularly those of the 
 counter attack, are also greatly aided by the use of field telegraphy and signal- 
 ling to connect the operations, and give the commander an instantaneous know- 
 ledge of the state of things. 
 
 Change in Defensive Fortification. 
 The great power and range of musketry fire now render il more efficient for 
 the purposes of close defence than that of artillery, to which a distinct and sepa- 
 rate zone of action is more appropriate. The increased power of fire has also 
 led to this change, namely, that while formerly each work or post had mostly 
 to depend upon its own form for musketry flank defence, flanking defence has 
 now become more mutual, one intrenchment being efficiently flanked by anotlier 
 even at ranges of 400 to 500 yards. Hence we have greater simplicity of trace 
 and increased direct fire to the front. 
 
 The all- importance of fire has also relatively diminished the value of material 
 impediments, and the fact that the crisis of the fight now occurs before the attack 
 closes, has lessened the value of small details of flanking defence, except in 
 restricted areas such as the interiors of villages. At the same time obstacles, when 
 used, are now under efiective fire at much longer ranges than formerly. 
 
 Above all, the holding of decisive points at considerable intervals apart, is 
 now to a great extent, sufficient to secure the ground between them, if such 
 ground be well flanked and closed, when need be, by obstacles. 
 
 Considerations as to the Choice of a Position. 
 A commander has, therefore, to consider, in choosing a position,* 
 1st. How to compel the enemy to attack. 
 2nd. How, when, and where to assume the offensive. 
 3rd. How, by superiority of fire, to repel and shatter the attack. 
 The Strategy of the Defensive. 
 The first is a strategical question, already discussed, as far as space permits. 
 
 The Counters trohe. 
 For the second, as in all cases of offensive action, the answer to the " how" 
 is " strike quick, strike hard, and strike heavy." 
 
 To strike " quick," the troops must be formed up near at hand, under cover, 
 and separated from those for the passive defence ; they should also be unimpeded 
 in their advance. 
 
 To strike " hard," they must, while adhering to the formations of the day, be 
 as much concentrated as possible. 
 
 To strike " heavy," they must be the whole of the available force.f 
 * In addition come the questions of encampmeut and supply. 
 
 t On this subject Sclierff holds a position to be a bad one for the offensive-de- 
 fensive if it require more than half tiie force for passive defence ; and, to be good, 
 two-thirds of the whole force sliould, he thinks, be available for the offensive. These 
 conditions are often, of course, impossible in covering actions. 
 
10 THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION. 
 
 As to the '* when," the defender must be ready to profit by any mistakes made 
 in the conduct of the attack, when, for instance, large gaps are left between the 
 attacking bodies, or when the attack wavers along a part of the front. Yet the 
 whole scheme of the defensive is to take decisive action only when the defensive 
 fire has told to the utmost. This period is, in most cases, arrived at between 
 the approach of the attack to within the most effective musketry range, and the 
 completion of the assault or period of re-action ; the more so, as the disorgani- 
 sation of the attack is then greatest, and its power of resistance, except to its 
 front, is very small ; even cavalry flank attacks being then, it is thought, practi- 
 cable for the defensive. An earlier advance on the part of the defender subjects 
 him also to the disadvantages of the assailant, particularly as his formation will 
 be somewhat dense. Success, too, will be less likely if the assailant, when re- 
 pulsed, can fall back on cover of any kind and assume the defensive. 
 
 The decision as to the " where," must be arrived at by the commander accord- 
 ing to the situation, and must be thought of in preparing the position. Assuming 
 that one flank at least is secured from a turning movement, the counterstroke 
 may probably be best made from the other, where, if the troops be massed in 
 echelon, under cover, they will also be at hand to resist any turning movements. 
 Occasionally the advance may be made from between two decisive points, the 
 ground between which has been kept clear for the purpose, after which the 
 troops, by turning right or left, may take the attack in flank. This has, how- 
 ever, the great disadvantage of masking the fire of part of the defensive zone.* 
 
 With a view, therefore, to the offensive, the position should have sufficient 
 depth for manoeuvring, and one or both flanks secured. It should have free lateral 
 communications, hidden, if possible, from the front. It should provide cover 
 behind w^oods, undulations, &c., for the concealment where wanted, of large 
 bodies of troops. It should not, by its formation to the front, impede the counter- 
 attack or aid the assailant in taking the defensive. 
 The Passive Defence. 
 For the passive defence, the position is good chiefly in so far as it favours fire- 
 action and provides cover.f Hence it should afford the following advantages :— 
 1st. A clear field for fire, with cover and room for the defenders. 
 2nd. Security for the flanks. 
 3rd. Strong decisive points in the line. 
 
 4th. Strong defensive positions for the reserves, and to cover retreat. 
 5th. Free communication both lateral and to the rear. 
 6th. Obstacles in front under fire, and which do not hinder counter-attack. 
 
 Clem' Field for Fire. 
 The first and all-important point is to have the widest possible space to the front 
 exposed to fire ; if possible, up to the extreme range of artillery, but at all events 
 up to the limit of effective musketry fire. 
 The causes that affect this are — 
 
 (1) The form of the ground. (2) Surface obstructions. 
 
 On a level plain the least obstruction gives cover ; thus, even a line of skir- 
 mishers partly conceals its own supports. Hence, as the assailant has to get what 
 cover he can, while the defender can generally use artificial means ; a level 
 country, particularly when much enclosed, is the least favourable for defence.;]; 
 * The Duke of Wurtemberg ascribes tbe failure of tlie French counter-attacks to 
 their exclusive use of the direct offensive, 
 
 f A salient defensive zone has the advantage of inviting or compelling attack. — 
 Wagneb ( Gruudriss der Fortification), 
 
 % This is particularly the case in England. "We are fortunate, however, in having 
 between the capital and the south coast, at least one range of heights, with, in general, 
 a clear foreground and good command, 
 
THE DEFKNCE OF A POSITION. 11 
 
 Ground falling gently from the position both gives the defender the power of 
 seeing all the foreground, and protects his works from being seen into. For 
 artillery fire, a fall of 1 in 100 is said to be most favourable, while in our service 
 the limit of depression is about 5 deg.» Even for infantry, a steep slope to the 
 front is not desirable, as it is more difficult to fire down it, and men are more 
 exposed in doing so. (Fig. 23, Plate VI. )f Even a comparatively gentle slope 
 of 5 deg., if it extend for some hundred yards, is a severe check to a rapid 
 advance, while on slopes of 10 deg. and upwards, a rush for any distance is 
 impossible. 
 
 The position may be 
 
 (1). On a slope rising to the rear. 
 
 (2). On one rising to a plateau which may have reverse slopes. 
 
 (3). On a hog's back or narrow ridge. 
 
 In the first case, the defender may secure the advantage of tiers of fire, the 
 guns being posted on high ground behind the infantry J ; the ground, too, dimin- 
 ishes the grazing eflect of the assailant's fire. At the same time there is often 
 a difficulty in concealing movements and screening the reserves, and, in case of 
 retreat, the troops are for some time exposed, though the rear guard can gene- 
 rally be well posted to cover the movement. 
 
 In defending a plateau, the most favourable position is the forward brow ; ad- 
 vanced terraces and knolls, which favour distant fire, being sometimes occupied 
 by the guns and infantry told off to begin the fight. The salient spurs of the 
 brow are the best infantry positions, while guns are often well placed in the re- 
 entering bends or, when the plateau has a gentle rise, on higher ground in rear 
 of the brow. If the brow be straight and the plateau level, the guns may be on 
 the brow, and the infantry positions some way down the slope. When, owing 
 to steepness or obstructions, the forward slope is unfavourable, and the plateau 
 is wide and clear, it may be best to use it as a foreground ; but, in any case, the 
 position should be well in front of the rear brow : § for, in case of retreat from 
 a position on that brow, the assailant at once seizes commanding ground from 
 which to fire on the retreating troops, who will suffer in proportion as the slopes 
 are difficult, bare, impeded by obstacles which hinder retreat, such as ravines, 
 marshes, &c., and without defensible localities for the rear guard to hold. 
 
 Again, a narrow ridge or hog's back, or a plateau, with a thick wood or other 
 impediment behind it, would not give enough manoeuvring depth, and is there- 
 fore unsuitable for defence || Ground of the form (Fig. 30, PI. VI.) would allow 
 the artillery to fire over the first fine, and would cover supports and reserves, 
 and also lateral movements. 
 
 The reuerse slopes should not be parallel to the drop of the projectiles, or they 
 become dangerous for supports and reserves. When so exposed, the steeper they 
 are the better, within the limits suitable for secure and easy movement. 
 
 In a position extending for many miles, all forms of ground may have to be dealt 
 
 * Captain Hime, E.A., (prize essay). Brunner, however, (" Leitfaden zum unterrichto 
 in der Feldbefestigung " ) gives the limit of depression as 7 to 8 deg. for guns, and 
 45 deg. for infantry. Artillery can, of course, defend much steeper slopes by being 
 posted so as to fire obliquely down tliem. 
 
 f The German loss in advancing up the long bare slope of 4 deg. or 5 deg. before 
 St. Privat (battle of Gravelotte, 1870) is an example known to every one ; while at 
 Spicheren some of the slopes were as steep as 20 deg. (Fig. 23, PI. VI.) 
 
 % It is true that in such positions the guns can seldom fire at short ranges on the 
 immediate foreground of the infantry positions in front of them ; but they can mutually 
 flank neighbouring foregrounds at ranges such that the trajectory is not too flat. See 
 further on, the defence of Hericourt. — Bethoucourt. 
 
 § Brunner suggests a distance of at least 500 yards from the rear brow. 
 
 II The depth wanted for manoeuvring varies, of course, with the defender's numberis, 
 
12 THE DEFENCE OF A POSITIOIf. 
 
 with, thus the general line of defence may, in places, be astride a ridge ; in which 
 case the crest should be strongly fortified, and should be most salient, so as to 
 flank the neighbouring parts of the line ; the latter being somewhat retired where 
 they dip into the valleys* 
 
 A line of heights, if not too elevated or steep, may be a good position, as the 
 
 heights naturally form strong points, commanding the saddle-backs between them, 
 
 through which an assailant will try to pass : for the same reason, when gapsf 
 
 occur in a ridge, the shoulders commanding them become of extreme importance. 
 
 Ohstructiotis to Fire. 
 
 Apart from the form of the ground, vegetation of all kinds, from forests to 
 grass, and in some cases buildings and embankm'ents, are the chief obstructions. 
 The question whether the position can best be cleared of them, or retired from 
 them^ must be settled on the spot. 
 
 Protection of Flanks. 
 
 As a protection against turning movements, one, or if possible, both flanks, 
 shsuld rest on strong, defensive localities, or on rivers, morasses, &c X In the 
 latter cases, these barriers, if impassable, have the serious disadvantage of re- 
 stricting the defender's power of extending to the flank ; while if he can securely 
 hold passages over them, they give him the advantages of defiles, a rapid advance 
 through which, say with cavalry and horse artillery, might enable him to enfilade 
 the assailant's line from his flank, or to frustate a similar attempt on the part of 
 the attack. It was thus that, on the occasion of the sortie of Montretout (1871) 
 five German batteries, posted near Carriere on the right bank of the Seine, en- 
 filaded the French right when attacking the positions of the 5th Army Corps. 
 On the contrary, the danger to the defensive of having woods close up to the 
 front or flank into which the enemy can penetrate, has been shown among other 
 instances at Koniggriitz, and on the French left at Spicheren. At the same time 
 it is to be remembered that, when some hundred yards of clear space separate 
 the defender and the border of the wood from which the attack must defile (un- 
 supported by artillery), the advance of the latter ought never to succeed. 
 Decisive Points. 
 
 The localities along the defensive zone should be of the nature of decisive 
 points (with reference to the probable lines of attack), which, by commanding the 
 best lines of approach, of necessity attract the assailant, and between which he 
 cannot venture to pass while held by the defensive. These points should each 
 form an independent command. The defenders are thus so grouped as to be 
 easily kept in hand. 
 
 On the ofiensive zone, these points form pivots for the manceuvring troops, 
 and, if need be, cover their retreat. The part they themselves perform is a 
 purely defensive one, and they should be extensive enough not to be easily sur- 
 rounded ; the spaces between them, to be thoroughly defended by their musketry 
 fire, should not, it is thought, be wider than about 1,000 yards ;§ while the ar- 
 
 • These parts, which are apt to be seen into, are thus also more easily defiladed. If 
 the outer slope of such a ridge form the flank of a position, it should be thoroughly 
 swept by the lire of its works. 
 
 t Those, for instance, at Guildford and Dorking, in the Surrey ridge. 
 
 X The greatest security is obtained when both flanks are so protected ; thus the lines 
 of Torres- Vcdras rested on the Tagus and the Sea, and in the same way, the position ©f 
 the Germans before Paris (1870-71) between Sevres and Croisay, had both flanks se- 
 cured by the Seine. 
 
 § Brunner recommends that the decisive points be not more than 1,500 paces apart. 
 Waguer, writing in 1872, suggests 800 paces as the widest interval for musketry de- 
 fence. 
 
THE DEFENCE OF A rOBlTIOIT. 13 
 
 tillory fire of each will effectively flank the foreground of those next it, even if 
 tliey be 2,0U0 yards apart.* It is only, however, when the intervals are 
 tlioroughly commanded by musketry that intermediate works can he dispensed 
 with. For wider spaces up to 5,000 or 6,00U yards, if the ground be favour, 
 able, the guns at the decisive points will search the whole of the intermediate 
 intervals ; but artillery fire alone cannot be relied upon to check the advance of 
 skirmishers, and in such cases intermediate posts must be provided ; the strength 
 of the decisive points and of the intermediate posts being, as lar as possible, pro- 
 portioned to the intervals between the former. 
 
 Again, in order not to require too many defenders, and also with a view to 
 oflfensive returns, these " forts of the line" should not be too close to each other. 
 On the defensive zone, when the counter attacks are made on a small scale (say 
 with the front of a battalion) , clear intervals rather less than one quarter of a 
 mile are required ; while on the offensive zone, in order to allow of an advance 
 with the front of a brigade, the intervals should be at least half a mile, and 
 sometimes more. 
 
 Jn the German defensive line south of Paris (1870-71), where it faced the 
 plateau of Villejuif, the villages of Bagneux, Bourg.la-Reine, I'Hay, and Thais, 
 and the park of Chevilly were decisive points, I'Hay being 1,000 yards to the 
 left, and '1 hais 2,200 yards to the right of Chevilly ; while further east the de- 
 cisive points of the parks of Coeuilly and of Villiers-le-desert were about 1,600 
 yards apart. We shall have occasion, further on, to mention the fight on the 
 Lisaine, where some of the localities were at much wider intervals. 
 
 Communications alotig and to the Bear. 
 
 The necessity for the rapid movement of the reserves has already been re- 
 ferred to. Not a little of the labour of preparation often consists in securing 
 this, and the difBculties are increased if the front be intersected by ravines, water- 
 courses, &c. 
 
 1 he communications to the rear should also be considered ; the lie of the 
 positfon being best, if at right angles to them, so as to cover them as much as 
 possible. 
 
 Natural Obstacles in Front and Hear. 
 
 An impassable marsh or stream in front, and under the fire of the defensive 
 zone, of course hinders the attack : at the same time the obstacle may hamper 
 the defender in taking the offensive. 
 
 An obstacle pei'pendicular to, but ending short of the defender's line, must 
 tend to divide the attack, or else to limit its extent, by confining it to one side 
 of the obstacle. 
 
 Again, an impassable obstacle in rear of a position, is fatal in case of a retreat ; 
 while, if it be conveniently passable, the holding of the passages gives the de- 
 fender the advantage of protected defiles. 
 
 Occupation of Advanced Posts. 
 
 In most cases it will happen that there are localities in front, and occasionally 
 beyond the flanks, which must be occupied or otherwise denied to the enemy. 
 As a rule, the loss of a weak forepost should never be risked, on account of its 
 moral effect, and commonly it will be best to clear away such, or render them 
 useless to the assailant. A strong post, however, (say 600 or 600 yards to the 
 
 » With intei-vals of 1,000 yards between the localities, mitrailleur fire would effec- 
 tively flank alternate foregrounds ; while such fire would command intermediate spaces 
 not exceeding 2,000 or even 3,000 yards in width. The effective range of case from 
 field guns is now less than that of musketry, and shrapnel hurst at the muzzle seems 
 to answer as well or better.— Dartmoor, 1875. 
 
14 THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION. 
 
 front) wliicli can be supported by tbe musketry fire of the position, if it can be 
 held throughout, will oblige the attack to deploy earlier, will force him to attack 
 it, and while held will take the general line of his advance in flank. 
 Battle op Belfort. 
 
 Many of the principles referred to are illustrated by the defensive position held 
 against the French before Belfort, in 1871. In the beginning of January, when 
 it seemed certain that Bourbaki, who was behind the Doubs, would try to raise 
 the siege, von Werder moved to his left from Vesoul, in order to fight a covering 
 action between Belfort and Besangon. To gain time for preparation, he cl ecked 
 the French by the action at Villersexel on the 10th, and then fell back towards 
 the fortress which Tresckow was besieging. It was known that Manteufel, with 
 two army corps, was about to move on Vesoul, towards the middle of the month, 
 whence he would act against the French as circumstances required. The pro- 
 blem, therefore, was, how to delay their advance till Manteufel could make him- 
 self felt. 
 
 A force of about 42,000 men, opposed to an array more than three times its 
 strength, could only attempt this in a position of limited extent, and the dispa' 
 rity in numbers made it important to secure the flanks from turning move- 
 ments. (PI. I.) Accordingly, the left rested on the neutral frontier at Delle, 
 whence the position ran west to ^.lontbehard, at the junction of the Lisaine and 
 AUaine. From hence, the left bank of the Lisaine formed the line of defence, 
 the right of which was at Frahir, on the Lure-Belfort road. Beyond this, the 
 Vosges mountains* some 4 or 5 miles to the north, and the difficult nature of 
 the country at their feet, made a wide turning movement round Frahir very 
 difficult. 
 
 Nature of Country. 
 
 The country west of Belfort is hilly, much cut up by ravines and with many 
 woods, often with thick underwood, and at this time leafless and full of snow, so 
 that while they gave less cover, movement through them was most difficult, f 
 
 The main feature of the position was the obstacle in front of the centre, formed 
 by the network of streams below Montbeliard, where the Doubs joins the Allaine 
 and the canal. This drove the assailant eitlier to divide his forces or to fight ou 
 a narrow front, while the defender, who held the bridges at Montbeliard and on 
 the Allaine, had complete freedom of action. The obstacle, therefore, played a 
 part not unlike that of the mountain range, which ran towards, and ended short 
 of the outer of the lines of Torres-Vedras.J 
 
 'I'he assailant being between the Ognon and the Doubs, and his inferior ma- 
 noeuvring power being known, it was rightly judged that he would not venture 
 to attack in force on both banks of the latter stream, and as the position, Mont- 
 beliard- Frahir, was astride the great roads Besangon- Belfort and Lure-Belfort, 
 it seemed the more hkely battle field, and was prepared accordingly. 
 
 The Allaine Position. 
 In order, as it seems, not to give too great saliency to the centre at Mont- 
 beliard, Debschitz's detachment was intrenched, in the positions indicated, be- 
 tween Croix and Exincourt, with his front partly covered by the elbow of the 
 Doubs and the stream of the Gland ; § while, were the main attack made south 
 
 * The passes through the Vosges were broken up by a party of engineers, though the 
 deep snow made this almost unnecessary. 
 
 f The woods in front of the Lisaine position were chiefly beech copses of from 5 to 
 20 years' growth. 
 
 X Hamley's Art of War. 
 
 § The bridges at Seloucourt and Herimoucourt ou the Gland had been blown up. 
 
THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION. 15 
 
 of the Doubs, he could fall back on the line of the AUaine and the canal* Tho 
 bridges across the former at Sochaux, Fesches, Morvilliars, Grandvilliars, Jon- 
 cherey, and Delle, were ready to be blown up, and 16 siege guns were placed iu 
 rear of them to command the passages. The canal itself lies partly in a cutting, 
 and tliis and the high ground north of the river, afforded good infantry posi- 
 tions, within reach of the reserves behind Montbeliard and Bourogne. 
 
 llie Lisaine Position. 
 
 From its junction with the Allaine, the Lisaine valley is narrow, and has 
 steep ground on each side as far as Hericourt. The stream itself, 1 5 to 20 feet 
 wide, and 3 or 4 feet deep, is fordable in many places. From Hericourt tho 
 valley widens out as far as Chagey, whence the woods shut in the stream and 
 road for more than a mile. Beyond this it again widens out and is marshy, open, 
 and surrounded by woods. 
 
 Along the Lisaine position, the decisive points were in most cases at the pas. 
 sages of the obstacle. They were the town and castle of Montbeliard, the vil- 
 lage of Bethoncourt, with the railway embankments there and opposite Bussurel, 
 Hericourt, Luze, Chagey, Chenebier, and Frtihir, all of which were more or less 
 prepared for def nce.-f- The old citadel, Little Bethoncourt and its churchyard, 
 the fortified hill of Mougnot, and the factory Chevot were held as advanced 
 posts. The village of Bussurel was unoccupied. The high plateau at Moulin 
 Eougeot formed a strong reserve position for the right flank. The infantry po- 
 sitions before the battle and those of the siege guns are shewn on the plan. 
 Reconnaissances. 
 
 While preparing from the 11 th to the 15th, the defenders never lost the touch 
 of the enemy, and, till driven in, their infantry outposts were kept some miles to 
 the front — at Arcey and St. Marie for instance. In front of the right flank a 
 reconnaissance was pushed forward to Rouchamps, J and a cavalry regiment was 
 sent out on the 14th as far as Luxeuil. 
 
 Position of the Reserves. 
 
 As a general reserve for the right flank, 6| battalions and 3 batteries were 
 placed under Keller, north of Brevilliers. Just to the south-east, 2 battalions 
 and 2 batteries were placed as reserves for Hericourt and Bussurel ; while by 
 Vieux Charmont, 6 battalions and 4 batteries stood for the support of the Mont- 
 beliard section, or, if needed, for Debschitz's detachment. 
 
 Advantages and Disadvantagei of the Position. 
 From the above it will be seen that the position, besides being stragetically 
 offensive, had the following advantages, viz. : — 
 
 1 . An obstacle in front limiting or dividing the attack. 
 
 2. A flank secured, and the other partly protected. 
 
 3. The front covered by one or more lines of water obstacles. 
 
 4. The lines of attack few in number and well defined. 
 
 5. In general, good infantry and artillery positions, with clear foreground. 
 
 6. The line of the Savoureuse formed a reserve position, on which it was 
 decided to fall back as a last resource. 
 
 On the other hand, the position was too extensive for the force ; it was much 
 cut up by ravines, and its lateral communications were bad. The right flank 
 was isolated from the right centre ; it lacked good artillery positions, and was 
 
 • The caual bridges are moveable draw-bridges, 
 t The buildings and bridges are of limestone. 
 
 % It consisted of four Cavalry Regiments, one Light Battery, and two Companies of 
 Jagers. — L(elein,— Die operationen des korps des general's von Werder, 
 
16 THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION. 
 
 too far from the reserves for quick support. The woods also lay so close to some 
 of the decisive points, that the attack could approach under cover. 
 The Fight. 
 
 On the day of the fight fortune favoured the French ; for, with the thermo- 
 meter at zero, most of the line of water obstacles along the front was frozen, so 
 as to bear infantry, while guns could cross the morasses. 
 
 The general idea of the assailant was * to advance pivoting on the right, 
 which rested on the Doubs, and to attack along the Une Montbeliard Chagey.f 
 This was carried out on the 1 5th, and the French got into Bussurel and ac- 
 ciipied the old citadel ; as the latter commanded Montbeliard, the defenders re- 
 tired to high ground in rear, but held the castle. The attack failed to carry 
 the advanced posts at Bethoncourt and Mougnot, and was repulsed at all other 
 points. On the 16th, all attacks on the line Hericourt-Montbeliard were re- 
 pulsed, but Chenebier was captured, and the German right fell back behind the 
 woods of la Brise and Essoyeux and to Moulin Rougeot. It now became neces- 
 sary to make a counterstroke to save the right flank from being turned, and 
 Keller J was ordered to take the offensive on the night of the 16th- 17th. He 
 advanced in two columns, occupied Frahir, and got into Chenebier. The French, 
 however, held on to the upper parts of the latter village, and, after daylight, he 
 had to fall back, but so as to cover the commanding plateau of Genechier and 
 the road to Chagey. The French, in the meantime, had failed in two night 
 attacks on Hericourt and at Bussurel. 
 
 On the 17th attacks against Chagey, Luze, and Montbeliard again failed, and 
 in the night the French, owing to their moral condition, had to retreat. 
 Strength of a Defensive Force. 
 
 The question as to the least number of troops of the various arms wanted for 
 the defence of a given position, is plainly one dependent on the circumstances of 
 each case, such as the relative strength, numerical or otherwise, of the troops 
 engaged ; the time available for preparation ; the nature of the country, and the 
 capabihties of the position. 
 
 Strength of the Infantry, 
 
 It has already been noticed that the general idea of the defensive is to occupy 
 the decisive points in force, and only to observe or slightly veil the intermediate 
 spaces; and again, as all recent experience shows, the defender should aim at 
 repelling the assailant before he closes. For these reasons, and on account of 
 the terrible loss in retreat under 6re, the strength of the defence should be put into 
 the first line.§ It does not, however, appear desirable any longer to use skir- 
 mishers two deep under cover, as the loss is probably more than double that with a 
 single line, while the defensive power of the latter is enough for any purpose when 
 the men are as close together as they can be while shooting freely. For this purpose 
 a pace per man has been found sufficient: 1| as also the defensive supports can 
 generally be kept close at hand and under cover, they suffer but little in rein- 
 forcing, and need not number more than half the strength of the skirmishers. 
 
 * According to Lecomte (Guerre-Franco-Almande,) " Historique de la premiere 
 legion le general Cremer and du Rlione." 
 
 f A weak detachment was thrown across towards Audincourt, but no serious attack 
 was made on the Allaine position. 
 
 X With eight battalions, four batteries, and four squadrons. — Wengex. 
 
 § The main position selected was generally strongly occupied in first line.— BOGUS- 
 
 LAWSKI. 
 
 II Scherff, speaking of the passive defence, says, " One skirmisher to every face of 
 front." 
 
THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION. 17 
 
 while in the case of the immediate reserves, who should also be under cover, 
 a strength not greater than that of the supports, and sometimes as little as 
 |rd of them, a[ipears to have been found suflicient* This gives us from 2 to 3 men 
 to the pace for the actual defence of decisive points. 
 Second and Third Lines. 
 In addition, in order to give the defensive formation the advantage of depth, 
 whether for support or counterstroke, second and third lines or reserves must be 
 provided, the strength of which sliould be increased at the most important points, 
 and also in proportion as the interval between the decisive points is greater. If, 
 for instance, the decisive positions occupied |rd of the defensive line, the stren.t,aii 
 of these reserves mi^ht not he greater than that of the fighting line. This 
 would give us at the lowest from 4 to 6 men to a pace of defended line, or 
 about 1| to 2 men for each pace of front, of which, however, a proportion may- 
 be cavalry, Again, if the keys of the position were to occupy only about l-ikh 
 of the defensive zone, these reserves would probably not be less than three 
 times the strength of the fighting line, making a total of 12 men for a pace of 
 defended line, or two men as before for each pace of the whole line. 
 
 Tims, at the battle of Montretout, 19ih January, 1871, the Vth German Army 
 Corps mustered about 20,000 men, or about 2i men for each pace of front, while 
 the assailants, according to Vinoy, were about \0\ men to the pace. With these 
 numbers, the defenders had ample reserves for an offensive return in the after- 
 noon, which drove the French back from the heights of Garches. The position, 
 however, had been fortified for months, and the attacking troops were inferior. 
 
 Again, on the Lisaine, von Werder held the position Montbeliard-Frahir witli 
 only li men to the pace ; and even if it be objected that the defence of the right 
 flank was not successful, and we credit the position Montbeliard-Chagey with 
 the whole of the reserves, we tind here that a force ofii8,000 men, or barely 2 
 men to the pace, held a line of 7 milesf with comp^'te success, and that too\ 
 against an army, ill-disciplined and ill-found it is true, but still composed of^'^ 
 well armed Frenchmen, and more than three times the defender's 8lrfcugtL.:|['" 
 Strength of Artillery. .-, , r t \^. / 
 
 Under ordinary circumstances, one cause of the strengtb-o? fills d^feasivej.Jk's 
 in the greater opportunities it has for bringing up guns, particularly' the heavier 
 natures. As a rule, therefore, the artillery will be in great strength, and the 
 position must be considered with a view to its development. Thus, von Werder 
 on the Lisaine, had about A\ guns per 1,000 sabres and bayonets. Seeing, how- 
 ever, it is admitted that the assailant can hardly succeed without much previous 
 artillery tire, while after all the main strength of the defensive lies in its infantry 
 fire,§ it seems reasonable to suppose, in considering the least number, that the 
 artillery requirements of the defensive are rather less than those of the attack ; 
 and though it is plainly desirable to be strong in guus, as tliey are one of the 
 
 * Scherff and Boguslawski. 
 
 t Against this part of the line the French appear to have opposed their 15th, 20th, 
 2'lth, and part of their 18th army corps. 
 
 X lu the proposed German scheme for covering Rouen (1870-71) it was intended to 
 have placed strong redoubts for 300 men at a mile apart, and it was thought that under 
 the circumstances, a force of 1| battalions and 6 guns to the mile could hold the posi- 
 tion. In this case the opposing troops were of inferior quality. Brunncr, assuming 
 that a weak unfortified position would require G men to the pace, considers that a, 
 naturally strong pus'tion, if unfortified, might be held by 4, and, if fortified, by 3 men 
 to the pace. With the latter Wagner agrees. 
 
 § At Gravelotte, it is said, only 6 per cent, of the German loss was due to the de- 
 fender's artillery. — Home. With improved fuzes and hhrapnel, we may find this per 
 centage somewhat larger in future, 
 
 C 
 
18 THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION. 
 
 factors to be considered in deciding the limit of extension and also the range 
 within which the ground may he flanked hetween decisive points, still the German 
 proportion of 2f guns per 1,000 men ought, surely, to be sufficient for a good 
 defence * In some cases, too, the situation does not present good artillery 
 positions. Thus the position of the Vth German Army Corps already referred 
 to, was so wooded, that only 56 to 63 of the 90 guns of the corps appear to 
 have been engaged on the 19th ot January, alorg a front of nearly four miles ; 
 while south of Paris, where the decisive points stood in bare open plains, a 
 greater preponderance was given to the action of artillery. 
 
 Strength of Cavalry. 
 As regards cavalry, the use of it for preliminary reconnaissances is not less 
 important to the defence than to the attack, and opportunities are now afforded 
 it, while acting as a defensive reserve, for making rapid counter-strokes on dis- 
 organized attacking infantry. Again, great protection is afforded to an exposed 
 flank by pushing large bodies of cavalry many miles outwards to observe the 
 enemy, report his movements, and with the aid of mounted sappers, to break 
 bridges, block roads, and otherwise delay him. Hence the defensive, though it 
 need not be very strong in cavalry, should have enough for the above purposes, 
 according to the more or less favourable nature of the ground. f 
 
 Strength of Engineers. 
 
 On this subject it may at all events be said that the least number cannot be 
 less than that laid down in regulations, namely, one company for each divisioa 
 of 9,400 men; J and when defensive preparations are extensive, there are 
 several reasons why this number will be found too small. In the first place, in 
 order that the commander may rely on unity of plan in his defensive scheme, he 
 makes known his intentions to the officers commanding the artillery and 
 engineers, with whom he consults. To the former, he must look for the defen- 
 sive use of the artillery, while the commanding engineer is naturally charged 
 with the general scheme of fortifying the position. He in his turn will instruct 
 his officers accordingly, and attach them with sappers to the different sections of 
 the defence. The commander ot the troops in each section chooses the actual 
 fighting ground, and leaves the supervision of the work of preparing to the 
 engineers of his section. The mass of the work must of course be exe- 
 cuted by the infantry, as with so few sappers, all they can do is to assist their 
 officers to get the work carried out, § 
 
 Supposing, however, that this supervision can be managed, there is in addi- 
 tion a great deal of work that requires skill and a knowledge of certain trades. 
 In armies raised by conscription, and in those formed as in the American war of 
 
 * A British Army Corps, as defined in 1875, lias 90 guns to 27,500 sabres and bayo- 
 nets, or about 3^ guns per 1,000, including the reserve artillery— a proportion due to 
 the fact that, with our want of men, we are bound to use artillery as far as possible, to 
 make up for numbers : the more so as our lack of reserves would be specially felt in 
 replacing technical troops. 
 
 f At the battle of Belfort, the proportion of cavalry was about one-eighth of the 
 force. — Blune, campaign of 1870-71, 
 
 J In a German Army Corps the "pioneers" are about one-fortieth, while in a British 
 one the sappers are about one-fiftieth of the combatants. 
 
 § Boguslawski, in speaking of the defensive positions before Paris, says :—" Possi- 
 bilities and chances should be carefully weighed, and the dii-ection of the works should 
 be given to an Engineer officer, under supervision of the officer commanding the sec- 
 tion." At the same time he ascribed a want of unity of plan to the fact that this 
 could not be done in all cases on account of the many other duties, such as bridge and 
 road-making, on which they had to be employed." 
 
THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION. 19 
 
 1861-64, the proportion of tradesmen, such as carpenters* and masons, is about 
 the same in the ranks as among the civil population, while in this country the 
 majority are retained in the sieve of the labour market ; nor do we even secure 
 many navvies or woodsmen in our recruiting net. Hence, much of the timber 
 work and the preparation of walls and barricades, falls to the sapper carpenters 
 and masons. Again, apart from the infantry preparations, tlie engineers have 
 to direct the making of any batteries required for the guns of position, and the 
 formation of redoubts, &c., for strengthening the flanks, and other important 
 points. In addition to the actual work of fortifying, the clearing of the front 
 must be done by the engineer corps, with the help of infantry working parties. 
 Here again the employment of meu accustomed to the use of tools, makes it de- 
 sirable to work, as far as possible, with sappers ; add to which, the corps is 
 charged with all the works of communication and the preparation of field observa- 
 tories and posts of observation. Under these circumstances, it seems reasonable 
 to believe that for defensive preparations, a much larger force of engineers of all 
 ranks is required. f 
 
 Preliminary Reconnaissances. 
 
 In the choice of a position, much time may be saved if the ground can be 
 sketched beforehand on a scale of 3 or 4 inches to a mile, the quickest way being 
 to make an enlarged skeleton of the roads, &c., from the route maps (if any exist) 
 on which the slopes and other military features may be clearly laid down. While 
 the ground is being finally reconnoitred, the commander's decisions can then be 
 recorded on the sketch. The reconnaissance should be extended, if possible, to 
 the ground likely to form the artillery positions of the assailant, so as to judge of 
 his probable action, with a view both to the protection and placing of the troops of 
 the defence. 
 
 Defensive Formations. 
 
 While bearing in mind the mechanism of the attack, the defender must regu- 
 late his defensive by his tactical arrangements, j; Hence, each part should be 
 fit for some tactical unit, from the group that holds a rifle pit, to the battalion 
 that holds a village or an earthwork : hence, too, the whole position should be 
 divided into sections, each of which may coincide with one or several of the de- 
 cisive points in the line. To each a commander and a given force is assigned. 
 Great care is required to prevent the junctions of contiguous commands from 
 being weak points, and tur this reason the sections should be so spaced that a 
 line of probable attack does not lall between them. Thus along the Lisaine 
 front, the division into sections was as follows : — 
 
 The first extended from tSochaux to Bussurel, including Montbeliard and 
 Bethoncourt. 
 
 The second as far as the graveyard north of Hericourt, thus embracing the 
 great road to Belfort, and including the advanced post of Mougnot. 
 
 The third as far as Chagey, including Luze. 
 
 The fouith included Chenebier and Frahir.§ 
 
 * Some of the regiments of the North in the late American war were almost all 
 backwoodsmen. 
 
 t The arrangements for the field telegraph, it is assumed, would be carried out by 
 the half telegraph troop with each Army Corps. 
 
 X " Instead of making the fight dependent on the intrenchments, we would make the 
 intrenchments dependent on the tight "—Tactical retrusjject. 
 
 § The following were the forces iu fighting liue for each of these sections, exclusive 
 of the guns of position : — 
 
 For the first, 8 battalions 2 squadrons and 2 field batteries 
 
 For the second, 7 „ 2 „ 4 „ 
 
 For the third, G „ 4 „ 6 „ 
 
 For the fourth, 3 „ 2 „ 3 „ — Wengbn. 
 
20 THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION. 
 
 Injantry Dispositions, 
 
 The front of a position at the decisive points is lielJ by a thick chain of skir- 
 mishers with tlieir supports in small bodies close in rear of them ; behind these 
 come the immediate reserves. Thus, on open ground, with a battalion of eight 
 companies, each 120 strong, each company might throw forward a half company, 
 extending 40 men as skirmishers and 20 as supports, 80 or 100 yards in rear, 
 while the remaining half companies would be posted some hundred * yards fur- 
 ther back, often behind the flanks ol the post, and covered, if need be, by hitreuch- 
 ments. 
 
 While the shooting line, reinforced by the supports, opposes its fire to the 
 assailant's advance, opportunities will occur for the reserves to strike at him as he 
 closes or after his entry. This distinction is important, because the opinion is 
 often held that the defensive arrangements at every point should admitof a direct 
 advance of the shooting line Such is not the impression given by the German 
 defensive works of 1870-71 : the shooting line along the decisive points was 
 generally solidly covered, and was meant to stick to shooting; while passages for 
 counter attack were provided either by the clear spaces between the main de- 
 fences, or, if these spaces had been closed with obstacles, by allowing the lines of 
 defence to over-lap, so as to i>ermitof offensive returns; the performance of which 
 fell, more often, when on a small scale, to the immediate reserves ; while, on a 
 large scale, they were carried out by other troops, namely, those of the second 
 and ihird lines. These were placed out of fire, but as close to the front as they 
 could be.f 
 
 Infantry Fire Tactics, 
 
 The shooting line geaerally reserves its fire for the most effective ranges, but 
 in conjunction with the guns pushed forward to force on the development -of the 
 attack, small infantry parties will be employed to fire at long ranges, either on 
 bodies of troops when visible, or so as to search out hollows and undulations of 
 ground, &c.,J the directions of which should be previously marked and their dis- 
 tances found out. 
 
 Second and Third Defensive Lines. 
 
 It will occasionally happen that second and even third defensive lines may be 
 provided by iutrenchments in rear of the first line. Thus, before Paris, the lOth 
 German division occupied two sections, each about 1,500 yards along the first 
 line. At 1,100 yards in rear there was a second position on the plateau of La 
 Celle St. Cloud, and 700 to 1,300 yards in rear of the second was a thii-d from 
 Le Butard to Bougival. 
 
 The Artillery Positioiis. 
 
 To the question, " what to fire at ?" § the only safe answer seems to be " guns 
 should bear on that arm that threatens most" || ; and this, at first, will often be 
 tlie attacking artillery : still, it seems agreed that the main duty of the defender's 
 guns is to fire on any bodies of attacking infantry which can be reached. Occa- 
 
 * Scherff recommeuds a distance of 300 or 400 paces from the skirmishers, so as to 
 put them somewhat beyond the elfect of artillery lire aimed fst the latter. 
 
 f Bjfoi-e Paris, each division was given its own defensive zone, which it occupied 
 •wit;i a brigade and artillery. The rest of the division formed a second line in support, 
 while the x-emainder of the army corps formed a third line or general reserve.— Boaus- 
 
 LAWSKI. 
 
 X The Martini-Henri rifle, with the reduced bullet of 410 grs., ranges 2000 and 1500 
 yards, with elevations of 7| deg. and 5j dug., and the drop at these ranges is about 1 in 
 C and 1 in 8 : while at lO'JO and 500 yards, it is only about 1 iu 15 and 1 in 40. 
 
 § See Capt. Himo's, l\,L. prize essay of 1872. 
 
 II Hamley, 
 
THK DEFENCE OF A POSITION. 21 
 
 sicnally, as the assailants' guns wlieel for action, they should be fired upon, but, 
 as a rule, the maxim of Prince Holenlohe will be Ibllowed, viz , " Never fire at 
 the enemy's artillery when there are any otiier troops to fire at." * 
 
 The defender's artillery should, like that of the attack, be able to take part 
 in the fight from first to last. While, however, the attacking guus take ground 
 to the front once or twice, those of the defender generally remain stationary, 
 and, protected by pits and batteries, fire at the last on the assaulting inflmtry 
 at short ranges. As the crisis of the musketry fight takes place some 300 or 
 400 paces in front of the defender's shooting line, it is desirable that the guns be 
 then as much retired as is permissible, bearing in mind the preliminary stages 
 of the attack, for were they very far back, the zone of their fire would be much 
 limited. As a mean between the two, some of the guns will be placed in line 
 with the immediate reserves about 400 paces behind the shooting line, where 
 they do not ofi'er a double mark. Here they cannot, it is true, use the direct 
 fire of case, but they can still join in, right or left, with shrapnel ; while were 
 they in tlie shooting line, exposed to the fire of both arms directed on it, many 
 of them would probably be silenced just when most wanted. Even if the 
 shooting line be carried, guns, as far back as the reserves, can then fire with 
 case to check the assailant's further advance. 
 
 With salient decisive points, the guns can be retired between them so as to 
 flank the approaches. f Thus between Chevilly and Thais, south of Paris 
 (1870-71), the artillery positions were well retired, 24 guns being placed in 
 pits along the great road from Choisey, where it crosses the route d'Antibes at ia 
 Belle Epiue. 
 
 Choice of Ground for Guns. 
 
 In choosing ground for his guns, the defender has to see — 
 
 (1) 'I'hat they can be got into position without great ditficulty.J 
 
 (2) That the position favours direct fire on the distant foreground. 
 
 (3) That it permits of a concentrated fire on the lines of approach. 
 
 (4) That it allows of a cross fire on the infantry as they close. 
 
 (5) That it is secure from enfilade fire,§ and hard to assault. 
 
 As to the first, our guns and gunners will always go wherever guns can go ; but 
 time and labour are saved if they can be got easily into place. 
 
 Few positions will at the same time fulfil all these conditions. In some cases, 
 as for instance when opposing a landiig, artillery may be screened on a flank by 
 the form of the ground. (Fig. 40, pi. vii.) 
 
 In using the flankmg fire of guns, it is to be remembered that splinters from 
 field shells range 400 or 500 yards, and may strike the defenders when not well 
 covered. With case shot also, which is used up to 200 yards, the spread is so 
 great [j that the guns cannot safely fire along the borders of the defensive 
 zone. 
 
 * Artilleiy is said, by the same authority, to have been decisive against artillery at 
 ranges not exceeding 2000 paces in 1870-71. If shrapnel can be at all as well timed ia 
 ■war as at practice, this, as regards the men and teams, will now probably be increased 
 to 3000 paces. 
 
 f The heavier natures being the least easily moved, are generally those placed fur- 
 ther to the rear. 
 
 X On the Lisaine, roads had to be made in order to get up some of the guns, and 
 even then, many had to be moved by hand. 
 
 § When the assailant's guns become masked by his infantry, he will probably turn 
 them on the guns of the defence, which at that stage are wanted specially to fire at the 
 attacking infantry. 
 
 II The cone of dispersion of case is often as much as 10° from the gun up to 200 
 yards ; beyond this it is very uncertaiu. With shrapnel the dispersion is 0° or 7° from 
 the buret, 
 
22 THE DEFENCE OF A POSITIOIT. 
 
 In general, the flanks of a position should be strong in artillery, both as s 
 protection against turning movements, and to hinder the assailant from placing 
 batteries to enfilade the defensive hne ; * but some of it may be drawn, when 
 wanted, from the reserves. 
 
 German Artillery Positions, Battle of Belfort. 
 
 The following sketch of where the guns stood along the Lisaine.f will help to 
 explain much that has been referred to : — 
 
 To begin at Montbeliard, on the morning of the 15th, a field battery stood at 
 the old citadel, and another by the town. In the castle, which was prepared as 
 a keep, were two 12-prs and four heavy 6-prs. ; the latter fired on the citadel 
 and along the road to Arcey. On the hill of la Grange Dame, five long 24-prs. 
 were placed in a sunken battery, so as to fire down the gentle slope towards the 
 town, and also so as to command the opposite heights and the valley to the north 
 almost up to Bussurel. 
 
 At Hericourt, a light battery fought, at first, in gun-pits at Mougnot, and was 
 afterwards intrenched on the hill of Salamon at the railway station, near which 
 were two other batteries in gun-pits. These could all fire down the valley and 
 sweep the passages at Bussurel ; they also commanded the plateau of Tavey 
 and the great road to Belfort. This plateau and road were further commanded 
 by seven 12-prs, intrenched on high ground north of Hericourt ; while between 
 that town and Luze there were 3U field guns in gun-pits]}; dug out of the 
 lower slopes of Mont Vandois. Some of these fired up to Chagey ; while the 
 mass of them commanded the valley and open ground by Couthenans and the 
 road Beverne-Hericourt. For the defence of Chenebier, two batteries were 
 placed north of Bas-des-Essert ; while three 24-prs. § stood at Moulin Kougeot, 
 and could fire to Frahir and Evette.H 
 
 Considerations as to Ground. 
 
 As to the ground, favourable slopes should be sought, as well as accidents or 
 undulations, which can be easily turned to account for cover for guns and their 
 limbers close at hand. The nature of the soil, too, as affecting both the making 
 of cover and the bursting of the enemy's shells is to be considered. Hard, rocky, 
 or stony ground is in both ways bad, and increases the effect of splinters, &c. 
 
 * Even the unaimed infantry fire of a flank attack seriously affects the defender, 
 
 •f Along the AUaiue the guns of position stood as follows, viz :— 
 
 Two 6 prs. N.W. of Sochaux, firing to Exincourt ; two 6-prs by Allanjoie, command- 
 ing Fesches, 
 
 Two 24-prs. to E. and two to W, of Bourogne, commanding the passages of the 
 St. Nicholas stream and the road to the bridge of Morvilliars. 
 
 Two 12-prs. behind Grandvilliars ; four 24-prs. behind Joncherey ; two 12-prs. E. 
 of Delle. 
 
 The German 6, 12, and 24-prs. throw shells of about 14, .SO, and 56 lb. respectively. 
 
 X With the exception of four in a hollow road and two behind a hedge. 
 
 § These were got up by hand from before Belfort, when the flank was threatened.— 
 
 LCELEIN. 
 
 II In the fire contest on the 16th of January, the flanking power of modern firearms 
 was well shewn. The French, after failing to cross the Lisaine from Bussurel, attacked 
 both at Hericourt and Bethoncourt. As they did so, the three German batteries, which 
 had supported the fight on ground N.E. of IJussurel, turned their fire across the front 
 of Mouguot ; while the left company behind the railway embankment before Bussurel 
 fired on° the assailants across the front of Bethoncourt. As the French skirmishers 
 dipped into the valley their supports, debouching from the Bois Bourjois, fired over 
 their heads ; while the Germans at Bethoncourt replied with tiers of musketry fire. At 
 the same time, two batteries to the S.E. of Bethoncourt joined in the fight : while tha 
 guna on la Grange Dame brought a flanking fire to bear on the assailants. The attack 
 was repulsed and renewed, and, on this occasion, the three German batteries which stood 
 facing Bussurel, fired down the valley in support of Bethoncourt. 
 
THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION. 23 
 
 Artillery Fire Tactics. 
 The mass of the defender's guns will not generally open except at effective 
 ranges ; but to force the assailant to deploy early, detachments of horse artillery 
 and cavalry, and sometimes small infantry parties, are posted forward for a time, 
 and are afterwards rapidly retired, so as not to mask the fire of the position. 
 These advanced parties should be far enough forward to check the assailant under 
 fire of the defender's guns, but beyond the range at which he could use musketry 
 against the guns. 
 
 Reserve Artillery, 
 
 A proportion of guns must be kept with the other arms in reserve, either to 
 reinforce tbreateued points, or to accompany a counter.stroke. Of the 130 field 
 guns available along the Lisaine, 34 were in reserve, or (including the position 
 guns), rather more than one-third of the whole.* 
 Mitrailleurs. 
 
 Guns of this class represent the fire of a certain number of infantry, in a small 
 space, with a somewhat greater effective range than the latter. Their fire has 
 rone of the searching and destructive power of common shells, and they should 
 rot be pitted against artillery. They are also more dependent on a knowledge 
 of the range, which the latter can judge by its effects. f It eeems to be thought 
 tbat the use of these guns will be confined to the defensive ; still, owing to their 
 mobility, a defender may occasionally employ them to accompany the offensive 
 action of horse artillery, either in the development of the fight before the 
 assailant's guns are in a position to crush them, or with flanking parties to aid 
 them in checking the advance of flank attacks along roads, or as they debouch 
 from woods or defiles. 1 heir chief use, however, will be to fire at critical 
 moments, on restricted areas, and in definite lines, as on bridges,^ down streets, 
 &c., and also for the close flanking defence of decisive points, where, the disper- 
 sion being more regulated, they are safer than guns firing shells or case. In the 
 latter positions they may often be screened from the direct fire of artillery and 
 may fire through loopholes in walls. Jn all cases they should be concealed so as 
 to act as a surprise § 
 
 Preparations for Defence. 
 
 The position being decided on, the first consideration is the amount of time 
 available. It may be foreseen that the work can be spread over many weeks ; 
 or, again, from the known position of the enemy, several days may be counted on, 
 as was the case on the Lisaine. It often happens, however, when in the pre- 
 
 • Of these, three batteries were brought up in support at Bussurel, and four batteries 
 afterwards accompanied Keller's counter-attack. 
 
 t The service Catling (bore 0-45 ins., weight complete 16^, cwt.) fires 400 rounds a 
 minute, the greatest effect being up to 1200 yards. Repeated trials at Shoeburyness, 
 at ranges of from 300 to 1200 yards, showed that one Gatling represents the fire of 
 about 22 infantry with Martini-Henri breech-loaders, and for these ranges makes 
 nearly as many hits as would be made by two 9-pr. muzzle loading rifle guns. It has 
 the power of diepersion, there is no recoil, and, unlike the French gun, its fire is con- 
 tinuous, and does not attract much attention by its noise. Each gun has 2,400 rounds, 
 with a reserve of 3,600, but does not fire small arm ammunitio/i. It is sighted to 2,400 
 yards (elevation 8-22.) On this subject see a paper by Captain Owen, R.A., in Vol. Vlll. 
 Royal Artillery Institution Papers. 
 
 X Several cases are recorded, in 1870-71, at Gravelotte, Sedan, and elsewhere, in 
 which the Germans, in debouching from cover within range of mitrailleurs, suffered 
 very severely from their fire : for instance, Loelein mentions that the Germans, in 
 attempting to retake Chenebier, lo.st 21 men by a single discharge from a mitrailleur ; 
 the French having brought in several of them for the defence of the place. 
 
 § Gatling guns being without recoil, may be used with ease in towers or rooms, or in 
 small boats, caponiers, blockhouses &c. 
 
24 THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION. 
 
 sence of the enemy, that he will attack on the morning after his approach, or 
 even on the clay itself. If the former, a night is available for preparing. Even 
 in the latter case, an army corps, with two roads for its advance, occupies nine 
 miles in length, and requires several hours after the advanced guards are engaged 
 for the complete development of its attack.* Hence, though the contingency 
 seems hardly to apply to the case of a position selected as a field of battle, yet, 
 even under these circumstances, troops may prepare under cover of skirmishers 
 till almost under fire ; f the real difficulty being, not so much the want of time 
 to do the work, as the delay in arranging and getting to work. 
 
 T'jols arid Materials. 
 
 Whatever be the time, the amount of work is limited by the tools, &c. , avail- 
 able on the spot. The proportion of intrenching to cutting tools should properly 
 vary according to the more or less open nature of the seat of war ; but, ibr the 
 general question of defence, we can only count on the present appliances of our 
 army. Accordingly we find that a section with tools forms part of the Engineer 
 Company with each division, and from the position now assigned to the company 
 in the advanced guard, we may rely on these tools being up when wanted. With 
 a British army corps there would also be a 4th E.E. company and the tools of 
 the field \yArk.X 
 
 In addition, a tool waggon is now assigned by regulation to each battalion of 
 infantry. § Experience will show whether the regiments will feel the same amount 
 of interest in bringing up these tools as the engineers. We may, however, as- 
 sume that each of the 21 battalions of an army corps will now be able to furnish 
 two working companies of 125 men each, with their tools for each relief, viz. : 
 
 For intrenching, 142 ; j] for sod cutting, 10 ; for clearing timber, &c., 75; for 
 brickwork, &c., 4 ; for reserve, 19. In addition, working parties may be re- 
 quired in proportion to the number of engineer tools available, and also for revet- 
 ting. When brushwood has to be cut or used for revetments, some of the work 
 may, if need be, be done with the soldiers' cla=p knives. 
 
 Besides these resources, the officer charged with the defensive preparations 
 will do well, at once, to collect all tools ^ from the villages, and post sentries 
 over them and any timber or other materials likely to be useful. 
 
 With the more deliberate operations, or in connection with a siege, the defender 
 may frequently be able to draw on the siege equipment. Thus, the resources of 
 the besieger were also ubed (1671) in the preparations on the Lisaine. 
 
 * The sturdy resistance of the German outposts at Dung and Earth on the morning 
 of the 1 5th of January, delayed the French attack on Montbeliard till within a few 
 hours of sunset, 
 
 t The German Engineers worked at breaking the ice and completing the defences 
 along the Lisaine, after the French advance had sounded. — Lcelein. 
 
 A light battery at Mongnot (battle of Belfort) after firing all its ammunition, retired 
 to re-till, and then intrenched itself during the action on the hill of Salamon. — 
 Wen GEN. 
 
 X Hence the engineer tools, &c , with each company and army corps respectively, 
 may be reckoned as 130 and G06 picks, and as many shovels, 6 and 32 spades, 81 and 
 495 axes, 13 and 58 hand-saws, 4 and 22 cross-cut saws, 40 and 250 bill hooks, 13 and 
 74 boring and crow bars, 20 and 128 heavy hammers, besides other articles. 
 
 § To carry 150 light picks, as many light shovels, 10 spades, 25 felling axes, 50 bill- 
 hooks, and 4 crow-bars. 
 
 II This leaves 8 picks and shovels and 6 axes (pioneers) for use in bivouac. 
 
 ^ In an unexhausted district, at least in this country, each house of a hamlet would 
 furnish a spade, an axe or hatchet, a bill-hook, a spud or mattock, and a saw ; a few 
 wheelbarrows would also be available. 
 
THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION. 25 
 
 Simplicify in Details. 
 
 In the case of hasty operatious, works of whatever kuid shouhl have the greatest 
 simplicity : — 
 
 (1) Of climeusions ; (2) Of arrangement ; (3) In the distrihution of Lahour. 
 
 Dimensions and Arrangement of Work. 
 The dimensions shouhl be few, and in earthworks feet and half-feet are gene- 
 rally the smallest desirable. W hile adhering to dimensions in the tasks, anything 
 like finish in the form of the parapet is worse than useless. 
 
 The work in the field should be simply a reproduction of the peace instructions, 
 modified where need be. Although, in the German defences of 1870-71, there 
 was great variety in the forms of the shelter trenches, yet, in those works which 
 require previous arrangement, they adhered closely to their reglements ; these, 
 though not always the best, relieved the officers from having to design, when they 
 were wanted for supervision, and the men from requiring much looking to or ex- 
 planation. 
 
 Distribution and Executio7t. 
 In war, where more time is often spent in getting to work than in doing it, and 
 when both time and superintendence may be scanty, simplicity in distribution is 
 of the first necessity. All work should, if possible, be so arranged as to let each 
 man have a distinct task, and, to allow of this, ice give each digger a pick and 
 shovel. As a rule they should be distributed in a single line at intervals of two 
 paces, closer than which, untrained men cannot work freely. Agaiu, owing to 
 the reducing efiects of hardships, and the distances the working parties may have 
 to come, it is well not to calculate on tasks much greater thtm bO or 90 cubic 
 feet : though, for spells of an hour only, it is found that men can, at a push, dig 
 out 50 cubic feet from shallow trenches.* 
 
 Provided that the depth do not exceed 4 or 5 ft., a digger can manage 80 or 
 90 cubic feet in from four to six hours, after which little more is to be got out of 
 him : hence, though in siege operations there may often be a ditficulty in chan- 
 ging, and longer rehefs, with intervals for rest and food, may be more convenient ; 
 in the field au average of five hours seems best. 
 
 Supply and Formation of Working Parties. 
 In a siege, too, where the work goes on regularly, the infantry working parties 
 are detailed in general orders over night. This, however, is impracticable in 
 more hasty operations, and the officer charged with the defensive arrangements 
 should be in direct communication with the commander of the section, so as, iu 
 all cases of pressure, to get the necessary help ■without delay. 
 
 As far as possible the company will be tlie working unit, and will be charged 
 with some one portion of the defences. The superintending K.E. officer or nou. 
 commissioned officer should see that all tools he has to supply are ready when 
 wanted, and, in earthwork, that the work is traced beforehand with lines f ov 
 pickets, or else spitlocJced out. J 
 
 * Iu doing such work, there is not much difference between the small and large 
 tools. In a relief, however, the former do less work, particularly if the task be 
 deep, or the throw long. The large (.E.E.i tools should, therefore, he used as far as 
 ])ossible for deep work, and for secoud aud other reliefs. If the small tools must be so 
 used, the men, in day or moonlight, may be only 1 ft. apart ; but, iu the dark, all should 
 work at the two pace intervals, and, in heavy work, the parties with small tools may 
 have au extra man for each digger, or two, according to the harduess of the soil ; to 
 keep the tools in use while the diggers rest. 
 
 t Each company (U.E.) has twelve hamboro' lines, each 50 yards long. 
 X A supply of Stick gauges of the depth aud width of the tasks are beltur than mta- 
 suriug rods. 
 
 D 
 
26 THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION. 
 
 The working columns parade under their own officers, and with the tools of 
 their own battalion, as far as they go.* There should be, with each, a reserve of, 
 say, 10 men per ceut.f 
 
 EmpIoT/ment of Civilian Labour. 
 
 "When preparation is made at leisure, the civil population may sometimes he 
 induced or forced to help, but, witliout military organisation, the results are not 
 always satisfactory^ : still, owing to the pressure of war, work by contract may 
 be unavoidable ; and the best safeguards are to have every detail decided on in 
 peace, and so designed that the work may be capable of defence at each stage ; 
 and to employ reliable men to execute it. 
 
 In countries v/here Europeans can work but little, native corps are organized 
 by the Engineers, as was done most successfully in the war of 1874, in Ashantee. 
 
 Classification of Defensive Works. 
 In the preparation of a position the work to be done consists of— § 
 (1.) Clearing the foreground for fire. 
 (2.) Covering the shooting hue. 
 (3.) Covering the guns. 
 (4.) Covering the supports and reserves. 
 (5.) Placing obstacles. 
 (6.) Making communications. 
 (7.) Laying field telegraphs, putting up field observatories and signal stations, 
 
 measuring and marking out ranges. 
 (8.) Preparing rear-guard stand-points. 
 
 Clearing the Foreground. 
 
 (1.) The importance of denying cover to the assailant has now become so 
 great, that the work of clearing the front and flanks must be undertaken 
 systematically. In each class of work, a proportion of the cutting tools with the 
 Eoyal Engineers and the regiments will be required, and circumstances must 
 decide the number available for clearing, and consequently the strength of the 
 parties. Timber of all sorts is that which most often screens the advance ; 
 hedges, even when perpendicular to the front, now impede lateral movements 
 less, while they act as screens from the defensive cross-fire ; wire fences, however, 
 are kept as obstacles. 
 
 Clearing Timher. 
 
 The time required for clearing is always rather uncertain. ]] In clearing woods, 
 
 • They also generally parade with arms, and always with filled water bottles. 
 
 f Some of the reserve do odd jobs ; others replace casualties, or help men to finish, 
 ■who are unavoidably behindhand. If, through neglect, men do not finish, they should 
 be kept back till they do ; in the case of another relief, helping those who are set to 
 their unfinished work. 
 
 \ Vinoy, in the " Si^ge de Paris," complains bitterly of the way in which the first 
 preparations were spun out bj^ the contract ^n-s and their labourers, 
 
 § The works connected with encampments, water-supply, &c,, must also be provided 
 for. 
 
 II The following results may give an idea of the time. Hedges have been cut down 
 by men at two pace intervals, in from 6 to 18 minutes ; if very bushy, a pole and 
 ropes may be used to expose the lower branches to the axe. (Fig. 16, pi. V.) Troops, 
 at 5 paces apart, clear .30 paces forward in brushwood five or six years old, in 8 hours. 
 Again, in felling hop woods of ten years growth, a woodman, in this country, clears 5 
 paces by 36 paces in a day. Two untrained soldiers, with axes, cut down trees of 4, 6, 
 9, 12, and 18 inches in diameter, in about 1, 3, 6, 0, and 15 minutes respectively. Soft 
 wood trees (when not more than two to three feet in diameter) can be felled in 20 to 30 
 minutes by 4 men ; if of hard wood they may take three times as long. Large trees 
 when felled must often be lopped so as to prevent their acting as cover on the ground. 
 
THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION. 27 
 
 the men are commonly at five pace intervals. Bill-books are the best tools for 
 brushwood ; axes for small trees ; while, with cross-cut saws for those over 9 in. 
 in diameter, the work is done in about half the time required with axes. Gun- 
 cotton can rarely be spared to cut down trees. Used as necklaces, it is not re- 
 liable, and about ten times as much of it is required as when augur-holes are 
 used. The power of cutting down trees instantly, may be valuable when it is 
 wanted to unnuisk a battery, or unexpectedly to barricade a road or passage, 
 which may thus be kept open to the last moment. 
 
 Occasionally, tall grass, corn, or reeds may impede the defender's fire, and 
 should be trampled down by men in line, or cut down, or burnt.* 
 
 Timber felled in clearing, has often also to be moved for defensive use. The 
 wagons of the Pontoon Train, when available, are convenient for carrying small 
 trees and brushwood, but for heavy logs, devil-carts are best. 
 
 The wagons of the Engineer Train with an Army Corps carry some spare 
 wheels and axles, and others are often to be got from country carts, &c. Poles, 
 (fig. 17, pi v.) can be fixed to these axles in an hour or two, and the spare 
 drag-chains used as slings. The working parties can then handle the timber 
 with ease, aided by troop horses with lassoes. 
 
 Clearing away Walls and Filling Holloivs. 
 
 Walls, unless very thick, can be knocked down by from 15 to 20 men using 
 a trunk of a tree, or a railway bar, as a ram ; this saves gun-cotton. Low build- 
 iuii-s mav be similarly treated ; if high, they must generally be blown down.-j- 
 The ruins must be levelled so as not to give cover. 
 
 Hollows are best filled with abatis ; they may sometimes be inundated. 
 
 Where to Clear, 
 
 Cover should be removed wherever it is judged that the assailant can make 
 most use of it. J Slopes swept by the defensive fire should be cleared in pre- 
 ference to those which lie facing the position, and can be better seen into, and 
 through which an advance may be impeded, even by narrow belts of entangle, 
 ments. Again, it is most important to clear away, in front of localities occupied 
 as decisive points, any enclosures or other cover extending beyond the limits of 
 the shooting line. Every effort should be made to clear from the front to a dis- 
 tance of from 400 to 600 yards, particularly on those portions of ground, where 
 the attacking skirmishers will make their stand for the fire contest with the de- 
 fenders. In a very open country, the clearing may occasionally be carried much 
 further forward. The clearing parties are also charged with tlie destruction or 
 barricading of advanced communications, fords, and bridges. These works should 
 be carried out up to the limit of the defensive fire, and further, it likely to cause 
 much delay. On a line of river obstacle, the bridges§ may be blown up, pre- 
 pared for demolition, or only barricaded. Thus, to return to our example, the 
 
 * At Wissembei-g, in 1870, the French fire from the hill of the Geisberg was thus 
 impeded. 
 
 ■f Each R.E. company carries 500 lbs. of gun-cotton. A pound to a foot cuts down 
 an IS-in. wall when laid untamped on the ground against it ; while less will answer if 
 well tamped, 
 
 X Trees on the defensive line and in rear often screen without hindering the de- 
 fenders, and should be left, when they do not give a mark to fire at ; single trees, too, 
 may be left in front to mark ranges. Trees should be felled so as to lie, " tips to the 
 front," as otherwise even their trunks may give the assailant cover, and also they are 
 more easily passed. 
 
 § Stone bridges can hardly be destroyed without explosives, neither can large gir- 
 ders. The gnu cotton should therefore be chiefly saved for these. Small gh-ders can 
 be thrown oil their bearings, and wooden bridges can, if need be, be cut down, or, 
 which is less certain, burnt with petroleum, 
 
28 THE DEFENCE OF A POSITIOR'. 
 
 road bridges over the Allaine were all mined, aud the railway bridges destroyed. 
 A bridge at Montbeliard, one at Bethoncourt, and two at Bussurel were blown 
 up ; that at Hericourt was mined, but kept open, on account of the farepost at 
 Mougnot ; while the britlge at Luze was only barricaded, as the ice above it bore 
 infantry, and, as in the case of a neighbouring ford or passage, nothing would 
 have been gained by destroying it. 
 
 Cover for Defence. 
 
 We have already seen that the chief defensive preparations are to be made 
 along the fronts of the decisive points, and above all ai the ftank or flanks ex- 
 posed to turning movements, and here they should be begun earliest. 
 
 The moral effect of cover is to give cunfidence to tlie defender and to dis- 
 courage the assailant, particularly when he only learns its strength as he closes 
 to attack. 
 
 'J'he material effects are, to diminish the loss and conceal the effects due to 
 fire, and also to conceal the defender's strength and formations. The advantages 
 of cover are self-evident, but their extent is perhaps best realized by looking at 
 the results of recent successful^ defensive actions. Bogulawski gives the 
 average loss of the Germans, on the defensive, as 1-I5th or l-16th; while he 
 mentions that the losses of those of their troops actually engaged at Gravelotte 
 were almost l-4th. He estimates their loss at the battle of Montretout at 750, 
 (l-29thf) while the French lost 3,000 to 6,000 men. J Again, on the Lisaine 
 Werder's loss was about 1780 men (1-2UL§), while he inflicted a loss of 5,000 
 or 6,000 men on tbe assailant. Such results speak for themselves, H as to 
 the power both of avoiding and inflicting loss that preparation gives the de- 
 fender. In providing cover, we have to remember that war, being wasteful 
 alike of life and labour, demands quantity more than quality in the work to be 
 done : hence we should not aim at impossible perfection, and thereby cramp its 
 extent ; the total loss being most diminished by giving the best cover we 
 can to the many, rather than perfect cover to the few ; for however imperfect 
 co'ver may be, it will always diminish the per centage of loss, and even a mis- 
 taken sense of security makes men shoot straigliter than without it.^ 
 Covering the Suooting LI^E. 
 
 Cover for the shooting line consists— 
 
 I St, of prepared locahties, such as villages and enclosures, with their hedges, 
 banks, and walls ; of forests, woods, &c , and of portions of railroads. 
 
 2nd, of shelter trenches and epaulments. 
 
 3rd, of redoubts. 
 
 * In defeat, on the contrary, that " Mors et fugacem persequitur virum " is now 
 more than ever true. 
 
 f 050, RUSTOW (war for the Rhine frontier). 
 
 % 3,000, ViNOY. 
 
 § According to Lohlein andWengen : about 1 -3rd of these fell in the fighting round 
 Chenebier. Lohlein gives the French loss as 8,000 to 10,000. 
 
 II Maurice, in his Wellington essay, mentions tliat the French losses, on the defen- 
 sive, were only \, while on the offensive they were oird times those they caused the 
 (iermans. 
 
 <1[ It should be remembered that blind field shells, such as those of our 12 pr. B.L.R., 
 only penetrate 3 or 4 feet into earth at l,(i()0 yards' range ; 2 feet or less into brick- 
 work ; 1 foot into rubble masonry ; and 2 feet into solid oak : the penetration of the 
 live shells being less. While at the shortest ranges the 480 gr. M.H. bullet, perhaps 
 the Iieaviest of the new musket bullets, will not penetrate moi-e than 12 or 13 inches 
 into loose and ] or 1 1 inches into rammed earth or sand bags ; nor will it pass through 
 soft wood logs of 10 inches, or hard logs of 5 inches diameter, nor through 3-8th inch 
 iron or 3- Kith inch steel plates; and these penetrations are generally much greater 
 than those oE shrapnel bullets aud of small spliulers. With sluapnel at Dartmoor 
 (lb75j, many bullets, no doubt after graze, stuck in the J inch lir of the targets. 
 
THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION. 29 
 
 All these means of defence are combined with obstacles and worked in to- 
 gether, so as to enclose the decisive point with a continuous liue. '1 here is a 
 maxim more preached than practised, namely, that infantry must never be put 
 behind walls exposed to artillery. If exceptions are wanted to prove the rule, 
 the late war furnishes plenty. It is doubtless wise not to put men behind walls 
 if you can do better, but the fact is, the effects of artillery on walls are much 
 over-rated.* It is to be remembered that what gives cover from musketry fire, 
 protects also from most of the effects of artillery : for of the small proportion of 
 casualties caused by shells, nearly all are due to the effects of shrapnel or splin- 
 ters, both of which are completely stopped by walls, while a field shell on strik- 
 ing a thin wall, makes a hole of lito 2 feet, bursring only if used with a 
 percussion fuze, and then with small lateral effect.f Upon buildings, the effects 
 are more serious in proportion to their height, and a concentrated fire will ren- 
 der them untenable, but will rarely make them unfit for occupation when it has 
 ceased. We see, therefore, that villages and enclosures give good cover, and 
 conceal the positions of supports and reserves : hence they have played, and 
 continue to play, a part in tactics, increasing in importance in proportion to the 
 development of skirmishing, and to the decrease of cavalry action on the battle 
 field.+ 
 
 The position of villages is often very important, lying as they sometimes do 
 astride rivers, or on ridges commanding roads, as is the case of many round Metz. 
 Uses of Localities. 
 
 In the defence of a position, villages, farms, and enclosures may be used occa- 
 sionally as detached posts, frequently as posts of observation and advanced 
 jiosts, and constantly as decisive points in the shooting line, or as reduits for 
 reserves. In any case the houses shelter the troops. 
 
 Detached Posts and Posts of Observation. 
 
 For a detached post, a strong building or group of houses is chosen and pre- 
 pared according to the rules in books, every obstruction being cleared away all 
 round for some hundreds of yards if possible. They are chiefly used where not 
 much exposed to artillery ; often to check the turning of a flank. 
 
 Posts of observation must often be abandoned, but their use may be denied to 
 the enemy by choosing the building which will make§ the biggest shell, lodging 
 charges in it (under earth if exposed to guns) and firing them by fuze or elec- 
 tricity : or the buildings may be prepared for burning || Gas too, it is thought, 
 may supply a ready means for extensive demolitions by regulating its escape and 
 
 • Vinoy mentious that in attacking tlie German positions south of Paris from I'Hay 
 to Choisy, the right attack failed because the German infantry held a wall at the 
 former place under the fire of 2o-prs. from Les Hautes Brnyferes, distant only 1,200 
 yards. Again, the sortie of the Imperial Guard from Metz, by Ladonchamps (1870', 
 which was preceeded by a heavy cannonade, was for a time completely checked at St. 
 Eemy, by two landwehr battalions behind a wall which a horse could jump. 
 
 t Wagner states that an 18 inch brick wall is proof against a German G-pr. shell at 
 750 metres : our 16 pr. shell breaks up less readily. 
 
 % In the days of Frederic the Great, villages were rather avoided by both sides, and 
 often burnt. More recently we may quote, as instances of fights for localities, those at 
 the village of Vierzenheiligen at Jena ; of Hassenhauseu at Awerstaedt ; at the brick 
 walls round Liitzen ; the " Speicher-haus" at Esling ; and the farm of Hougoumont, 
 with its 9 ft. wall, at Waterloo. 
 
 § The Gare-aux-Boeufs, a factory between Vitry and Choisy, was thus used by the 
 Germans in 1870, and on one occasion taken by the French, who however left it in the 
 afternoon, without knowing it was mined. At midnight it was blown to pieces while 
 unoccupied. — Vinoy. 
 
 II Petroleum is now so much used, it can generally be got for burning houses, par- 
 ticularly where there is no gas. 
 
30 THE DEFJINCE OF A POSITION. 
 
 then firing it. Field shells will set fire to buildings, but the fires may be kept 
 under : Bussurel was thus fired in 1871 by the Germans; yet the French stuck 
 to it for three days. 
 
 Advanced Posts, 
 
 Advanced posts are fortified like others, but, as with redoubts, their gorges 
 should be defensible when surrounded, and yet exposed to the guns of the de- 
 fence. What answers best, perhaps, when the gorge is not " looked into" from 
 higher ground on the position, is a musket-proof hurdle wall, (fig. 2, pi. v.) 
 which guns can quickly destroy* : wide exits to retire through are wanted. A 
 most important use of advanced posts is to protect exposed flanks. 
 Preparation of Villages, Sfc. 
 
 The text books deal with the defensive details of villages and hamlets, but we 
 may notice that the chief innovation is the placing of the shooting line behind 
 advanced enclosures about 50 to 200 paces in front of the houses. _ These en- 
 closures constantly have salient and re-entering portions which furnish flanking 
 defence. Hedges are often inconvenient, but in these cases they come in well, 
 and may be used as screens (figs. 1, 5, and 11, pi. v., and 47, pi. vii.) or 
 revetments (fig. 6, pi. v.) They are sometimes strong enough to form entangle- 
 ments when cut down. 
 
 Rail fences, like hedges, may be used as revetments for earth, or as supports 
 for log parapets ; or they may be planked to act as screens. Walls too, used 
 with earth, act as revetments or as obstacles ; or, if in the body of a parapet, as 
 cores to burst shells with slow fuzes. Sometimes they may be covered by a 
 detached earth screen, (fig. 9, pi. v.) Their chief use, however, is as inde- 
 pendent cover for infantry. The books show how they are prepared according 
 to height, thickness, and the command required. If loopholed,f they give 
 most cover, but with only about 40 crowbars to a division, not more than 200 
 or 300 loopholes can be made in a relief,^ and these wdll be in the flanking 
 portions and in the angles of buildings. Experience § shows that the quicker 
 methods, viz., using furniture, &c., for banquettes, knocking down the tops of 
 walls (fig 5y), pi. VIII.), notching them with a pickaxe, or making log loop- 
 holes (fig. 25, pi. VI.), are those most often resorted to. For want of sand bags,]) 
 sods are used to fill up the tops of the notches or build small bonnettes on 
 walls, and also to fill up windows of houses. Dry brick walls may often be 
 built up as breastworks against musketry ;^ and, as we have learned in 
 India, mud walls are quickly made, easily loopholed, and very tough. When 
 high walls are not wanted as screens, the top parts may be knocked down if 
 exposed to guns. A long length of enclosure wall often requires to be traversed 
 with earth or timber (fig. 55, pi. viii ), and should also be flanked. Where the 
 men have to shoot standing in order to see the ground, tambours (figs. 50 and 
 52,) projecting 10 to 15 feet from the wall may be used if not much exposed 
 to artillery. Sunken caponiers, whenever they are suitable are more easily and 
 quickly made, and are less exposed, (fig, 14, pi. v.) Works of this kind, though 
 
 • Such a wall has been made in three-quarters of an hour, on a hard r©ad. In 
 streets, the earth to fill up with, is carried from the gardens : a barrow load filb a pace. 
 
 t Loopholes on the ground floor are best made horizontal (4 ins. to 6 ins. high, and 
 1 foot wide.) If need be, men can shoot at 2 feet intervals, 
 
 { The best tools are 18 inch masons' chisels and hammers ; with these a man can 
 make a loophole in an 18 inch wall iu a quarter of an hour. We carry only 10 to an 
 Army Corps. 
 
 § See, further on, the foot note on the defence of Hericourt (1871). 
 
 II With each division we have 1,000 sand bags. A man with a spade cuts 100 sods 
 in an hour. Dry bricks can be laid at the rate of one a minute, by each man. 
 
 ^ A field shell knocks down a dry stone wall 2 ft. (5 in, thick. Dartmoor, 1875. 
 
THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION. lil 
 
 rather more roomy, were much used in 1870-71 for advanced positions hefore 
 Paris, and Bogiislawski says tliey were found to answer best. Tliese works, 
 ^vith somewhat tliicker roois atid screened from the front, mit^lit also be placed 
 at the shoulders of the shooting line, in front of localities, instead of tlie small 
 closed redoubts generally recommended, which, by their pretension to strength, 
 are apt to draw a fire that disables them when wanted. 
 
 The cover for the shooting line, whatever be its description, should protect the 
 men as much as possible under the preliminary artillery fire, and, when the pre- 
 parations are not very hasty, a second or even a third defensive zone may bo 
 prepared ; or the whole village may form a keep : cover for the supports and 
 reserves and cartridge magazines are arranged for ; entrances are barricaded, 
 and wide communications, both lateral and to the rear, are provided. The troops 
 for the defence are moved about the village, so as to be familiar with the 
 roads and passages ; for the close defence depends, to a great extent, on the 
 prompt action of the supports and reserves. Much depends, too, on tlie lay of the 
 village ; those end on to the front (pi. iii.) are most liable to enfilade along 
 the main streets, show least front, and want most outworks ; but they are least 
 easily turned, and allow of the most protracted defence. If they be very long 
 and straggling, it is sometimes thought best to hold a line of retrenchment across 
 them, and clear as far forward as possible, gutting those houses that are left and 
 hear on the defences. Villages broadside on (pi. ii.) show the best front; while 
 compact villages (pi. iv.) answer both purposes. Sometimes positions must be 
 held in rear of villages : these should either be within effective musketry ran<,'e 
 of the rear outlets, so as to keep in the defenders, as the Germans did at the 
 passages of Bussurel in 1871 ; or else just within the effective range of guns, so 
 as not to suffer from the covered musketry fiiv from the village In general, 
 the supporiing artillery is retired on one or both flanks*, as at Ilericourt (pi. i.) 
 Shelter Trenches. 
 
 From the sketches (pis. ii. to iv.) it will be seen that earth cover is always 
 more or less used. When either the time fur work is very short, or when, as occa- 
 sionally happens, an advance may have to be made over them, the form (fig, 21, 
 pi. vi.) used by the French and Germans, or our own-j- field exercise trench may be 
 employed. The former is the least possible obstacle, but though its section is 
 so small, it takes as long to make as the latter, which gives more cover. The 
 lowness of such parapets makes them difficult to hit, J but when permissible, 
 better cover should be provided. A shelter trench may be im proved § so as to be 
 available for men firing standing either on the bottom (fig. 20, pi, vi.) or 
 higher up (fig. 23) when required. In intrenching heights, great care is wanted 
 in choosing the exact position on the crest whence the ground in front can be 
 swept. Thus at Spicheren, in 1870, the shelter trenches did not always sweep 
 the slopes before them. The method in fig. 35, pi. vii., may be applied here also. 
 
 • Stains was supported by gims on high ground 800 yards to its left rear. Bagneiix 
 somewhat the same : while Bourg-la-reine was defended by artillery on the heights of 
 Sceaux. Villages in hollows (fig, 48, pi. Vlll.) cannot be shelled from a distance. 
 
 f Now 4 ft by 1 1 ft. The 2 ft. width is too cramped for long use, and in hasty work 
 saves only 12 or 15 minutes. 
 
 I At Dartmoor (1869), when firing at known ranges up to 1,r>00 yards on different 
 small trenches, the average of hits on two-deep infantry was four for every ten 12-pr. 
 B.L.K. shells. At 1,200 yards 24 rounds (shrapnell and segment) made 14 hits on 24 ft. 
 of 4 ft. by 1 ft. 3 in. shelter trench containing 1.5 tile of dummies two deep. Again, in 
 1875, 48 9-pr. M.L.li. shells (common, water and shrapnel) fired to enfilade a 
 2 ft. by 1 ft. (j in. trench, at angles with its crest of 36° and 19°, and at known ranges 
 of 1,455 and 1,930 yards, made 29 hits on 4G dummies, 4 ft. high and one pace .apart. 
 
 § The deeper trenches have, of course, the disadvantage of giving more cover to a 
 successful assailant. 
 
32 THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION. 
 
 Wlien a relief is available, cover can be provided, in which the shooting line 
 can crouch down at moments of great exposure. The sections (figs. 25 and 29), 
 are sufficient for most purposes, and these, or the smaller kinds, might be used 
 according to the situation, the time, and the tools available. In all of them, 
 great protection is afforded if board -troughs, brushwood-cylinders (fig. 19), 
 or logs of wood can be used to form loopholes. Occasionally very exposed portions 
 of the line may be blinded somewhat as in fig. 14, pi. v. 
 
 If the position be in a very open country, shelter trenches and breastworks, 
 with perhaps a few redoubts, will form the bulk of the defences. 
 Trench- Work by an English Division. 
 
 We have seen that with each division* we may expect to have about 130 
 engineer, and 1,000 infantry sets of picks and shovels; and a division, 
 having to intrench itself in first line, could generally be reinforced by half of the 
 4th Royal Engineer company with the corps. Ibis would make up the tools in 
 round numbers to 1200 sets.f These, with only a clear half or three-quarters 
 of an hour ior work, would give the power of making 2,400 paces of common 
 shelter trench, or of section 21. N^ ith about an hour available, we could throw 
 up about 1,800 paces of common shelter trench, and, say l,200of sections 20 or 23. 
 
 With the prospect of not more than a relief of five hours, the same sections 
 would be used ; except here and there where bits of the breastworks, 25 and 29, 
 might be best. 
 
 Thus the division might, in five hours, throw up about 1,500 paces of com- 
 mon trench; 1,500 of sections 20 or 23, and at the most important points 400 
 paces of section 29 : the latter being trarrd to form faces and flanks. 
 
 Could we calculate on two reliefs and if the ground or localities provided moi e 
 cover, we might, in the first relief, use only 1 ,oOO paces of sections 20 or 23 ; 
 and with the remaining 700 sets of tools, begin 500 or 600 paces of section 32, 
 placed in decisive situations so as to become the faces and flanks of two or three 
 redoubtsj In the second relief, the 700 sets of tools might be used to comph-te 
 the redoubt sections to a height of 6 ft. ; while, in the same relief, fresh parties 
 would work at the gorges, and close or half close those that required it. Others 
 would make field casemates (fig. 12, pi. v.) in the works and help to complete 
 the traverses, for which tongues would have been left. 
 
 The balance of the intrenching tools would be used in this relief to complete 
 any cover required, in addition to that thrown up in the first relief. Witli a 
 third relief, 250 to 300 diggers in the reduubt ditches, would thicken the parapets 
 to 9 or 10 feet, and others would deepen parts of the trenches and blind them 
 with logs or rails and earth (fig. 32). 
 
 In addition, any desirable improvements in the existing shelter trenches would 
 be carried out. 
 
 The divisional artillery would, in like manner, intrench itself according to the 
 time available. 
 
 In the mean time, the engineers, with the infantry in support and reserve, 
 would prepare any additional gun-pits and position gun batteries, would provide 
 cover for the supports and reserves, and work on the communications. The 
 
 * It has been thought best to consider the intrenching resources of a division rather 
 than of an army corps ; for a transfer of tools from one division to another, does not 
 seem practicable. In urgent cases, however, a commander might dispose of the engi- 
 neers of the army corps, so as to give relief to the division or divisions on which the 
 brunt of the work of fortifying happens to fall. 
 
 t Exclusive of the six sets to each iield gun and of about 200 spades for sod cutting- 
 which would be used with their own companies where most wanted. 
 
 % For this purpose the engineer tools should be used in preference ; any small sols 
 being double-manned if the soil be hard. 
 
THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION. 33 
 
 tools available, including those of the field park, would be more nunierous, ia pro- 
 portion to the extent of these works, than for tliose of the first line. 
 Redoubts, &c. 
 
 Into the details of the larger earthworks we cannot enter ; but there are 
 several questions connected with them which may he referred to. First, we see 
 tliat the time and tools required, in any case limit their coiistrucrton-, Ce^i^s (!^li<;tfK 
 their supposed strengtli draws such a fire on to them, that, unless lari^'e and well 
 provided with splinter-proof cover, the infantry defenders may be completely 
 silenced, or obliged to leave them, as was the case with the Duppel redoubts iu 
 1864. 
 
 Again, as to the placing of artillery in them. In the case of isolated works, 
 exposed on all sides, the whole of their means of defence, including guns, must 
 be inside. When, however, it can be avoided, there are several reasons why the 
 guns are better outside. First, the barbettes and traverses cannot be made in 
 two or three reliefs, while the parapets can. Again, as there is not enough 
 interior space for teams and limbers, the guns are tied to the works ; while in- 
 fantry can bivouac outside, and come and go quickly. 
 
 Tlie strongest objectiou, however, seems to be that the attacking guns ** kill 
 two birds with one stone," for while engaged in silencing the artillery they 
 equally disable the infantry, unless there has been time to cover the latter very 
 effectually ; while, during the close attack, the guns in redoubts are less efiicieut 
 than, and are only in the way of, the infantry defenders. In fact each arm 
 is in the wrong place during one stage of the attack. 
 
 To get over the difficulty as to* time, it has been suggested to throw up low bat- 
 teiies fn front of the faces or flanks of redoubts, with communications ihrougli 
 the parapets of the latter ; but in the first place, the guns lose the advantage of 
 command ; while any one who has seen tlie glacis of a -work that has been 
 shelled, will agree that the battei-y would be a trap for the shells that fell short 
 of the redoubt, while the latter, with weakened parapets, would be as much 
 knocked about as before. The Austrian plan of having low blinded pits beside 
 the barbettes, into which the guns are run during the artillery attack, is only ap- 
 plicable to works thrown up at leisure ; but even then, the [irinciple of reser- 
 ving the fire of the guns for the close attack is surely questionable, except in 
 the^case of works for guns only ; as at this stage they will soon be silenced by 
 the assailant's infantry, and they take up space which might be used for 
 musketry. Under these circumstances they would, it is thought, do better service 
 if placed some 300 or 400 yards to the rear and in flanking positions.f 
 
 It seems, therefore, that for an ordinary battle field, it will be best to intrench 
 the guns in rear ot the flanks of the redoubts, whence they may often also fire 
 into the works if captured. Gatling guns, however, with nearly the same 
 range as infantry, are suitable for use at the shoulders of infantry redoubts % 
 
 Trace. 
 
 The trace of redoubts, &c., must suit the ground and the general form of the 
 position: when the front is most exposed it is generally shallow from front to 
 rear. (Figs. 24 and 26, pi. vi.) Wagner points out that, if need be, the sweep 
 of musketry from a parapet is about 30° right or left of the front. Ibis gives 
 some latitude in lajing out the lines of a work, so as to avoid either the labour 
 of defilading them, or the risk of their being enfiladed. 
 
 * Brielmont •' Fortitication Improvisee." 
 
 t Although guns were placed in most of the largest redoubts used in 1870-71 (all 
 of which took a week to make), as a rule the artillery were iu distinct jiositious. 
 J They only want 8 ft. leui^th of parapet aud 10 ft. to the rear. 
 
34 THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION. 
 
 Works are most secure if closed, but are more tenable if taken, and less easily 
 retaken. Decisive works on a flank, those to be held to the last by a rear 
 guard, and those looked into by higher positions in rear, should be closed. The 
 gorges of others, like those of advanced posts, may be secured against surprise, 
 but not against the guns of the rear works. The trace of the gorge, should 
 provide flanking defence. Occasionally works are left quite open, so as to ex- 
 pose the interior spaces to musketry fire. 
 
 Size. 
 
 The size may depend on the ground or on the object of the work. The 
 garrison must be a tactical unit, numbering about one man to each pace of 
 parapet, and, in addition, half or a third in reserve, according to the amount of 
 secure cover for them.* 
 
 Defilade. 
 
 Works are best defiladed by their position. A closed work, with faces on a 
 crest and interior on a reverse slope, is favourably placed for defilade. High 
 parapets only conceal ; blindages alone give cover from curved fire. 
 J^xecuiion. 
 
 Before the working parties come up, the cutting lines of the ditches and 
 trenches must be marked and, in place of each profile, two stout poles may 
 be let into the ground, and cut to mark the heights of the superior and exterior 
 crests. 
 
 The ditches are not obstacles, unless the scarps are steep f and over 7 feet 
 high, but the defenders, if they are to succeed, will now more often repulse the 
 attack before it nears the ditch. Ditches with caponiers have been made in three 
 short reliefs, but, unless the caponiers have space for a good number of rifles, and 
 the bottom of the ditch can be palisaded to check the assailant, the arrangement 
 seems hardly worth the labour. Even with V shaped ditches, when the usual 
 communication has been prepared under the parapet, a Gatling pit (fig. 45, 
 pi. VII.) can be made, and the gun blinded in 3 or 4 hours after the ditch has 
 been excavated : the fire of this gun would represent that of over 20 rifles. J 
 
 In deep ditches, caponiers may be made somewliat like fig. 61, pi. vin. ; but 
 they are much more exposed than the sunken kind. 
 
 Woods. 
 
 Woods have frequently played an important part in wars, and those of 186G 
 and 1870-71, furnish many examples of their influence. Woods in front, or on 
 the flanks of a position, which give cover to the attack, are a source of great 
 danger. On the contrary, if they are, or can be, made impassable, they diminish 
 the area for, and the lines of, a possible advance : in woods not naturally im- 
 passable, this is best secured by felling the near border ; the debouche from this, 
 if it be 400 or 500 yards from the defenders, is generally impossible over open 
 ground. 
 
 Another important part played by woods, is to deny the use of otherwise suit- 
 able positions for the assailant's guns. Woods on the defensive zone may, if not 
 too extensive, form advanced posts, as at Mougnot, on the Lisaine : decisive 
 points in the shooting line, as at the hois I'Abbe by Coeuilly S.E. of Paris 
 (1870-71): supporting positions, as on the road Grigny-Courcelles E. of Metz 
 (1870); or as rear guard positions. In all cases of wood defence, the great 
 point is to hold the border and keep out the assailant. With a position including 
 
 • This agrees closely with Wagner's two men to a metre of parapet, 
 f A scarp of 2 in 1 is impracticable, and solid earth often stands as steep as this for 
 some time : when this is not so, abatis (fig. 33, pi, Vl.), is very effective, 
 t Page 23. 
 
THE DEFENCl': OF A POSITION. 35 
 
 part of a forest on a flank, this would often lead to too great an extension, aiul 
 yet tlio attack will try aud advance througli it. All that can be done, when in 
 such a plight, is to block up, as solidly as posjible, all tracks it can use, and to 
 clear as broad a belt as possible from front to rear along the flank. This defen- 
 sive border must be observed along its length, and should have a track in rear of 
 it, along which small reserves can move, to support threatened points. This 
 method was largely employed by ihe Vth German Army Corps, in the forest 
 country S.E. of Paris (1870-71.) 
 
 In holding the borders of woods in 1870-71, the plan used, was to fell a belt 
 along the edge (either of trees, or of their brandies only if the trees were large) 
 to bar the entrance. Obstacles were also placed some distance to the front ; for 
 those at tlie edge alone have this disadvantage, that if ever the assailant gets up 
 to them, he generally does so because the defenders have fallen back, and the ob- 
 stacles are therefore undefended.'*^ Generally, too, shelter-trenches were used 
 along the borders in salient positions ; often half-hid among the trees so as not to 
 draw fire. In flanking straight borders, small salient fleches outside the entangle- 
 ments are so exposed to enfilade fire, that it is often best (the timber being so near) 
 to use blinded pits (fig. 14, pi. v.) instead. These, if screened with branches, are 
 not seen at a distance. 
 
 With large close-growing trees, the supports are safe, if so far in that they can- 
 not see " the open" between the trunks : with small or scattered trees, cover must 
 be made.f Direct and well marked tracks to the reserves were provided ; these 
 should have a bend as they approach the border, so as not to be enfiladed from the 
 front. Guns were often brought up to the border, generally alongside a road, and 
 were put behind pits or parapets. Blinded mitrailleur pits, screened till wanted 
 (fig. 45, pi. VII. ), are also suitable. If the border be carried, the defenders, 
 knowing the wood, should be better able to hold together, and should use counter- 
 attacks on the flanks of the attacking parties. Gun cotton may be used to throw 
 trees across the tracks, the defenders firing from behind abatis along the sides 
 of them. Open spaces in the interior, and accidents of ground, such as streams, 
 ravines, &c, may be cleared to form a retrenchment, where, behind walls or 
 breastworks (pi. Vi.), and unassailed by artillery, the defender should not fail to 
 hold his ground. 
 
 Railways. 
 
 Apart from their strategical use as communications, aud from the uses that 
 can be made of the materials they furnish when destroyed ; J the features of a 
 railway are sometimes of tactical importance. A line passing through a position 
 from rear to front, may be an obstacle to both forces. To the front, therefore, 
 the '• over -head''' bridges should be blown down, '■'under" bridges blocked up so 
 as not to serve either as passages or cover ; wliile rails should be taken up at, and 
 obstacles placed on, the level crossings. Within the position, long cuttings may 
 have to be bridged, and ramps made to cross embankments. In pi. i, the rail- 
 way approaches the position, and then runs along the front ; on this portion, the 
 embankments would give cover to the shooting line, by notching them on the near 
 side (fig. 10, pi. v.), when flanked by advanced villages, such as Le petit 
 Belhoncourt, or by shelter treuciies along the outer edge when unflanked.§ lu 
 any case these embankments give cover to the supports. 
 
 * Boguslawski remarks, that the Gerniaa obstacles iu 1870-71 were often placed in 
 and not in front of the defensive line. 
 
 f Young shrubs and brushwood give concealment, but do little to stop projectiles. 
 
 X Fig. 8, pi. V. ; and figs. 49, 51, 51, and 60, pi. vill. 
 
 § If a length of railway be unkeyed at the ends and cleared of ballast, rails and 
 sleepers can be turned over by a row of men a pace apart (tig. 10, pi. v,> 
 
36 THE DEFE.NX'E OF A POSITION. 
 
 A cutting may be used as an obstacle in front of an artillery position, or for 
 infantry,* as in pi. ii., or on sloping ground as in fig. 11, pi. v., wbere two 
 tiers of fire are obtained. With the defenders on the advanced edge, the 
 supports are covered in the cutting. To turn it, the assailant will make for the 
 level crossings, which, however, can be well defended by reserves for the purpose 
 near the mouths of the cuttings, and sometimes by mitrailleurs or guns concealed 
 there. The railway in question is peculiarly favourable for the use of plated gnu 
 wa<Tons.-f- These might have come into action on the curve at Hericourt. While 
 even unblinded heavy guns on railway wagons, could have been brought up by 
 enoines or horses, and placed further south in cuttings, from the mouths or in- 
 teriors of which, they could have fired (under cover) along the Lisaine, and have 
 enfiladed the ground in front of the position. The curves, too, in a line, can often 
 be turned to account to increase the sweep of the guns, which should have 
 besides, a traversing arrangement of their own on the wagons J 
 
 Rivers. 
 
 The use of rivers, as obstacles, has already been referred to. In the late 
 American and French wars, large rivers like the Seine and Loire, aiid some of 
 those in America, were used for gun-boats to take part in the operations. 
 
 Ready-made casemates for these are often furnished by the bridges, and even 
 if exposed, 2-inch plating renders them safe against field shells. If the assailant 
 have any gunboats, the defender lays down torpedoes, and sinks vessels across 
 the channel, flanking the obstacles with works on the bank.§ 
 
 Coyer for Guns. 
 
 The general artillery positions having been chosen, it remains to improve or 
 make cover for the gnnslj. The sites for the pits or batteries are safer, if they 
 have steep pitches just in front, which catch projectiles, (fig. 30, pi. vi ) : the 
 guns, too, then stand higher than the shooting line, and fire over it. The bene- 
 fit is greatest, when the shell fire directed on the shooting line, is at short ranges ; 
 for then its effects may extend 500 or 600 paces to the rear of that line. Guns 
 on the level of the shooting fine, are more exposed to these effects ; and besides, 
 require gaps, to fire through, in the parts which are in front of them. 
 
 The division of 10 men with each field gun has 6 picks and 6 shovels, and 
 can often intrench its own gun ; but it is desirable also to have additional 
 epaulments ready to meet the contingencies of the fight^. Accidents of ground 
 will sometimes give cover in either of the ways shevm (fig. 47, pi. vii.J, or a 
 crest may be notched (fig. 35) so as just to fire over it. 
 
 Cover can always be obtained by sinking the guns, or putting them behind 
 breastworks. The first method is the quicker and less laborious ; but the terre- 
 
 * At the battle of Nuits (1870-71) the Germans suffered severely in attacking a cut- 
 ting held by the French :— " Le General Cremer." See also pi. ill. 
 
 t Railway wagons were used in four of the sorties before Pai-is in 1870-71. None were 
 disabled, though their 2 in. plating was often struck. Breech-loaders are required for 
 railway wagons. 
 
 I In deliberate preparations, the service traction engines would be available to haul 
 on roads or raih'oads, as well as for sawing, &c. 
 
 § The Seine was thus barricaded below Eouen (1870-71.)— Gcetze : " Thatigkeit der 
 deutschen ingeuieur." 
 
 II Of the 102 guns in first line on the Lisaine, all but three or four batteries were in- 
 trenched. As to protection, the guns so covered lost in the three days lighting, on an 
 average, less than four men in each field battery.— Wengbn. 
 
 % Thus on la Grange Dame, reserve gun-pits were made for the two Held battorieSj 
 which at first stood at the old citadel and by Moutbiliard,— Lohlein. 
 
 ^ 
 
TUE DEFENCE OF A POSITION. 37 
 
 plein mny be wet and is generally softer than the natural crust ; nor will the 
 guns always have the necessary command.* 
 
 Our present pattern of pit does well for B L. guns or mitrailleurs ; but it is 
 too short for 16-pr. M.L. guns, the recoil of which is 16 or 17 feet on the level. 
 As to the relative merits of breech and muzzle-loaders, artillerymen are the 
 proper judges : thuse on the continent fancy that a breech-loader with a 
 chamber which burns a charge of mild powder, does the same work with less 
 recoil, and so rasiy be fought on a lighter carriage, and can be intrenched and 
 worked in a less space, f 
 
 Construction. 
 
 To be quickly used, gun-pits must be simple in trace and make. A number 
 of ways of covering field guns and guns of position are shown in pi. vii. For guns 
 opposed only to field artillery, it does not seem necessary to have parapets thicker 
 than 9 to 12 feet, as most of the damage to them is done by shells pitching 
 within 3 or 4 feet of the suixrior crest, and against this, additional thickness is 
 of little use. Indeed the enormous effect of shrapnel with time fuzes, makes 
 height to cover the detachments the more important point. Unfortunately, with 
 our carriages for position-guns, we must either fire through embrasures or over 
 low parapets, as with field guns, and when much sweep is required, the latter 
 seem best ; but, by way of protection, some of the available sand bags should 
 be placed as moveable bonnettes on the fronts of the gun batteries, thick turfs, 
 fascines, &c., being used for the field guns. 
 
 Protection and Concealment of Guns. 
 
 When space permits, gun-pits may be placed 25 to 30 paces apart or more. 
 Important groups, or those much exposed, should be secured from a sudden rush, 
 by obstacles or other slight defences. Occasionally in exposed artillery positions, 
 storm-proof redoubts, for guns alone, may be required. The supporting infantry 
 will generally be in shelter-trenches on the flanks. Flanking guns, exposed on 
 one side only, may be placed alongside a parapet, like that in fig 36 (only higher 
 and longer), and in the trench, which should be at least 6 feet wide. It is often 
 important to hide the guns till they open fire. Trees partly cut through or 
 prepared with gun-cotton may be tliruwu down when required. Hedges cut down 
 in clearing the front may be replanted, and even snow parapets used for the pur- 
 pose. Again, epaulmeuts may be both supported and concealed by he<]ges {fig. 
 47, pi. VII ) ; portions of tall hedges may be cut through, and pulled out wlien 
 going to fire. If no other screen can be got, the principle of the earth screen, 
 so happily introduced for siege batteries, may be used with or without gun-pits. 
 
 Platforms, 
 For guns of position, platforms must be improvised. Heavy logs laid hori- 
 zontally, act as sleepers, roof and floor joists being fixed to them with spikes or 
 trenails, or a plank and two wedges (fig. 39) will answer the purpose. J 
 
 Limber Pits. 
 
 Limber pits should not be placed directly in rear of the guns, as was some- 
 times done in lb70-71. Our pattern of pit, across the range, seems as good as 
 any, but limber-pits are seldom wanted ; as small magazines, by the gun-pits 
 (pi. VII.), where ammunition can be stored in boxes, barrels, &c., are often more 
 convenient in exposed places. 
 
 • Some of the emplacements used in 1870-71, were simply walls of turf 3 ft bigli and 
 thick. 
 
 f The German field gun-pit for B.L. is only 13 ft. long in the terrepleia. - Wagmee. 
 
 J Even a couple of railway sleepers, bedded under the wheels, arc useful. 
 
38 THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION. 
 
 Gatlinj Gun Pits. 
 As Gatling guns have no recoil, the wheels and trail may be sunk ; or pits, 
 traced as in fig. 45, and 2 feet deep, may be made, eacli by 5 men, ia an hour. 
 When timber can be got, these may be deepened and blinded. Rails are evtn 
 better than timber for roofing purposes (fig. 49, pi. viii.)* 
 
 Cover for Supports and Reserves. 
 
 The cover for the supports, and sometimes for the reserves, differs in this 
 respect from other cover,-}- namely, that the troops may not require to shoot 
 from it. The thin shooting line, though much exposed, offers but a small target ; 
 while bodies in support, in the open, would suffer much more. Formerly, in the 
 Peninsula for example, a shallow trench and parapet gave enough cover to 
 troops behind it ; but now, on account of the increased drop of the long ranging 
 projectiles in use, and the severity of the opening fire, such cover is hardly suf- 
 ficient. One of the chief lessons of the war of 1870-71, is the use that was made 
 of blindages, or field casemates, for the supports, when exposed to heavy fire, and 
 when timber or rails were procurable. When sub-soil water is not met with, 
 these are best made sunken, as the low roofs are more easily concealed and offer 
 less of a mark. The methods that seem to have answered best are indicated in 
 figs. 3, 4, 7, 12, and 18, pi. v., and fig. 43, pi. viii.J 
 
 The jjosts for the reserves should, if possible, be unseen from the front, so as 
 not to be exposed to the assailant's distant fire. When so exposed, earthworks 
 are often best. 
 
 Second and Third Lines. 
 
 Except when there is much time for preparation, as was the case before Metz 
 in 1870, and Paris in 1870-71, second and third lines, it is thought, will now be 
 less used ; the holding of the first or shooting line being all-important. Portions 
 of such lines, consisting of localities or earthworks, § may be used in support of 
 the first line, when situated lacing the spaces between the decisive points in that 
 line, and 800 to 1,000 paces to the rear of them ; or they may be placed 
 directly in rear of these points, and at about half the above distances, so as to 
 cotnmatid them. 
 
 Obstacles. 
 
 Obstacles are most valuable in a close country, and where the field for fire is 
 small. The formations for attack are now less impeded by obstacles ; but with the 
 necessity for increased extension, their value has increased, as a means of neu- 
 tralising certain areas over which the assailant might advance, and of deflniug 
 the lines of advance. For this purpose they are used any distance to the front, 
 within the limits of the defender's fire. 
 
 Along the oflfensive zone, if placed rather further forward than the position 
 the assailant strives to reach for the fire contest with the defender's infantry;|l the 
 latter, with rather a greater effective range, can still command them ;^ and 
 
 * Mitrailleurs do not injure their own embrasures as guns do. 
 
 f It is perliaps to be regretted tliat w^e have not given the names "shelter-trenches" 
 to those for cover only, and " shooting-trenches" to those from which men fire 
 
 J In all timber worlc of this Icind, wooden trenails act as tenons, and supply the place 
 of spikes : the 2 in, pocket augurs are invaluable for this work. When the earth is not 
 solid, board or hurdle revetments keep it up, and increase the cover given by the 
 parapet. 
 
 § Such were the Paulus and Semacourt redoubts before Metz : the latter with good 
 casemates. 
 
 II Distant, as we have already seen, about 200 to 400 paces from the defenders ; 
 hence these obstacles might be a little over ;J00 yards forward. 
 
 % In firing standing at oOO yards, the M.H. bullet, aimed at a man's middle, only 
 rises to 6 ft, 9 iu, and grazes at 3G0 yards. 
 
THE DEFKXCIC OF A POSITION. 39 
 
 obstacles so placed, leave a clear field for couater-attack ia front of tbe shooting- 
 line. 
 
 Along the defensive zone, the obstacles before decisive points are perfectly 
 commanded, if between 50 and 200 paces forward. Those closing the intervals 
 may be eitlier retired like a curtain, with 50 yard gaps close to the decisive 
 points, throngli wliich the reserves debouch ; or they may be so far to the iront, 
 as to give the latter room to strike the assailants as they close. 
 
 The text books deal with the nature and details of obstacles and the condi- 
 tions tliey have to fulfil. We may remark, liowovcr, in the first place, that 
 obstacles, which with little labour cover a large area, are now most valuable. 
 They should also be capable of resisting tlie powerful rush of men. 
 
 Timber makes the best obstacle, whether as abatis or entanglements, and 
 when it is plentiful and on the spot, quantity is more important than quality. 
 No anif unt of artillery fire will destroy a broad belt of abatis,* nor does it 
 burn wlien green. 
 
 Next to abatis, wire entanglements are most generally useful, but wire cannot 
 often be found ; nor, unfortunately, do we carry it in the field. f It is fastened 
 " knee high" above ground to several rows of stout, strongly driven stakes, placed 
 chequerwise, and 7 to 10 feet apart, or to stumps of trees. 
 
 Pointed stakes, if strong, answer ail the purposes of shallow pits, and are 
 very quickly driven and then sharpened. J Our Chinese experience showed the 
 value of these. 
 
 Barricades, when unavoidably exposed to artillery, should be very solid, and of 
 earth, paving stones, or timber. They should (figs. 26 and 27, pi. vr.) have 
 gaps both for sorties and retreat. When a road is barricaded in front of a 
 position, abatis is best, as a parapet gives cover to the assailant. 
 
 Fougasses or mines may be fired either mechanically or cheraicall}', when 
 trodden on ; and occasionally by§ electricity (by observation or contact). 'J'hey 
 are chiefly valuable in defending mountain passes, where small charges may be 
 used to start avalanches of stones, which, once in motion, keep going of them- 
 selves. Against night attacks, too, certain kinds are useful. 
 
 By means of dams, a stream may be made impassable, or a hollow flooded. 
 Thus, in 1871, the bed of the Lisaine was deepened, H and two dams, to raise the 
 water level, were made, one above Montbeliard, and the other against the broken 
 bridge of Bethoncourt. The latter was of dung, and formed a foot bridge to 
 little Bethoncourt. The left front of Stains (pi. ii. ) was also inundated. 
 
 Stockades are often useful as barriers or screens^, when earth could not be 
 raised so high (fig. 51, pi. viii.), sometimes also as a parapet. Guns cannot 
 breach them easily; 'thus, in New Zealand, an 8 in. gun, two 24-pr. howitzers, 
 and a 9-pr., were fired for two hours, at a native stockade (fig. 31, pi. vi.), and 
 failed to breach it at 200 yards' range, because the shells passed through before 
 bursting ; and it took over an hour to do so at 900 yards' range, with six 12-pr. 
 B.L.K. guns. Kockets, with gun-cotton bursters, seem likely to be eftective in 
 such cases. 
 
 • Belts of abatis 150 paces wide, were used in 1S70-71, before Metz and Paris. 
 
 f A mile of 14 B.AV.G. wire, wliicli answers for this and for siege purposes, weighs 
 only 90 lbs. : weight for weight, perhaps the most useful material wo could carry. 
 Telegraph wire (JSo. 8) is better, but is live times as heavy and very stiff. 
 
 X Each R.E. Company has 13 draw-knives for the purpose : sharpened sword-bayo- 
 nets maj' be used. 
 
 § For tie first, the small-arm gun-lock, and the artillery friction tube are the means 
 most often available : for the last, there is a dynamo-electric machine with each R.E. 
 Company, 
 
 II This can only be done in water less than knee-deep. — Wagner. 
 
 ^ Stockades of vertical fascines make very tall screens with little trouble, and if well 
 connected, resist explosives extremely well. 
 
40 THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION. 
 
 Night Attacks. 
 
 It may not be out of place to refer here, to the growing importance of night 
 attacks. The subject is now receiving much attention on the continent, and in 
 the war of 1870-71, the Germans, thanks to their own high discipline, and to the 
 bad patroUing of the French, were in these operations constantly successful.*^ The 
 method used, was to combine a front attack, with another taking the front in re- 
 verse, and as tlie defender, at night, loses much of his superiority of fire, such 
 attacks are very serious. To guard against surprise, when in the presence of 
 the enemy, troops must be bivouaced near the defences they are to hold, so as to 
 assemble, on the first warning, at their proper alarm posts, and man the works 
 previously occupied by sentries. The outposts should be numerous, and the 
 ground should be carefully patrolled well to the front, particularly before 
 dawn ; signalling parties, with lamps, may advance in rear of the 
 patrols, and report hostile movements. Wire entanglements, with bells, were 
 used by the Germans in 1870-71, to prevent an enemy from approaching 
 unheard. I'he possible lines of advance, should be limited by obstacles and 
 closed by wire, which may be used to fire fougasses ; some of which, may also be 
 arranged to explode when trodden on. These, however small,f would produce 
 much moral and some material effect, as the assailant must move in close order ; 
 for which reason, also, guns (to fire case) and mitrailleurs should be laid to sweep 
 particular lines of advance. To judge when to shoot, and to let the infantry 
 see the ground, the outposts, in retiring, light fires, with screens towards the 
 defenders ;% and lime-lights may occasionally be posted in salient positions, so as, 
 at critical moments, to light up the fore-ground for several hundred yards, while 
 the defenders are in darkness. § 
 
 Communications in Rear. 
 
 The work of " clearing for action " for defence divides itself into — 
 
 (1.) The widening and improving of existing roadsjl, and the making of new 
 roads, and occasionally of bits of railroads,^ and of platforms for unloading. 
 
 (2.') The making of bridges and ramps, or the marking out of fords at all 
 breaks in the communications**. 
 
 (3.) The mining of bridges, which may have to be blown up along the lines 
 of retreat. 
 
 For the first, all impediments, such as fences or walls, are cut or knocked down. 
 In woods, the underwood is cleared away for infantry, and trees cut down and 
 roots grubbed up for gun tracks. Swamps are corduroyed or made good with 
 fascines, ft 
 
 * Thus before Belfort, in 1870-71, Danjoutin and Perouse were taken with small loss : 
 though Vinoy mentions that the Germans failed to retake Ville-Evrart by a night 
 attaci? because the supports fired into the advance. The French failed in two night 
 attack's on the Lisaine. They succeeded at Noisseville and Flanville (Metz, 1870;, 
 
 f Fougasses of light-balls or carcasses would light up the ground just when wanted. 
 
 t Petroleum on hay or straw burns brightly, and would last long enough to show a 
 column at hand. 
 
 § Our telegraph troop can send out at least four parties with lanterns, and has eight 
 lime-lights : only half a troop, however, accompanies each army corps. 
 
 II Werder's troops had to lay sand and dung on the ice-covered roads, up which they 
 took their guns on the 14th of January, 1871. 
 
 ^ Before Metz, for example, in 1870. 
 
 ** In this, the pontoon troop, with each army corps, would generally assist, 
 
 tt Lieut. Col. Home mentions, tliat L'OO men to a mile was found the best strength 
 for road-making parties in Ashantce, in 1874, 
 
THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION. 41 
 
 In making commuuications, it should be remembered tliat, for rapid move- 
 ments, troops should move with as large a front as possible ; hence tlie com- 
 munications should be wide, but as the width of the narrowest brid<^e or 
 defile may limit the front ail through, it will often be useless to make some 
 parts wider than others, except where sidings are wanted to allow traflic to pass 
 both ways. 
 
 Tracks may be marked out by Mazed trees, and directions should be chalked 
 up on walls or boards, to point out the way at all junctions. 
 
 Field Telegraphs. 
 
 The tactical use of the field telegraph, as applied to a position, is to keep the 
 commander acquainted with the state of things all along the line,* and to ena])le 
 him to direct his. reserves, and judge the moment for counter-attacks. The sys- 
 tem used in 1870-71 before Paris and Metz, was to run the main wires from 
 head-quarters along the line of the reserves, with branches to important forward 
 stations. 
 
 Thus, with the resources of two English telegraph half troops, f a commander, 
 at Brevilliers, might (pi, i.) be in telegraphic communication with both flanks of the 
 Lisaine position, with Delle and Beaucourt, and with the besieger's head-quarters 
 at Bourogne ; whence, by a semi-permanent line to Miihlhauseu, he would be 
 connected with the head -quarters before Paris. Tlie branch line to Bavillard, 
 enables him to call on the siege troops to support his right flank ; while the 
 stations on Mont Vaudois and I'Ordon Brisee, with the signallers where shown, J 
 would inform him of the progress of the fight along the front. § The station on 
 the Pionchamps road and that facing Mandeure, are meant for lime- lights, and 
 should be withdrawn to pre-arranged points before the outposts are driven in. 
 
 Field Observatories. 
 
 Obser\atories may be made, when steeples, heights, &c., do not give a 
 good view of the front. They are mostly used with telegraph or signalling 
 stations, and have signalling telescopes. Platforms in tree-tops, or on 
 scaffolding, or single derricks can be used ; these may be hid behind woods, over 
 the tops of which the observer can look.|l 
 
 Measurement of Ranges. 
 
 Every one agrees that the distances to important points should be measured. 
 Without a few hours of daylight little can be done in this way. Tlie field 
 batteries have now the means of finding their own ranges ;^ but the ranges 
 from position batteries and from cover prepared beforehand, slioukl be measured 
 beforehand too. Each R.E. company has a theodolite and chain, and, in day- 
 
 * The lines of Torres Vedras were furnished with a system of semaphore stations, 
 
 t Each half troop carries 18 miles of wire, and provides 6 telegraph stations, 2 to 3 
 double parties of signallers, and 4 lime-lights, 
 
 J For distances under two miles, it is safest to use relays of orderlies, as was actually 
 done in this case. The flags work up to three or four miles, and may, in such cases, 
 save time. 
 
 § Since this essay was written, it has been ascertained that a field telegraph was 
 used, on the occasion of the fight, from Frahir thi-ough Brevilliers to Bourogne and 
 Delle. The French struck it at Frahir. — Wengen. 
 
 II For heights not over 50 ft. they can be raised in a night. They have been made as 
 high as ICO feet. 
 
 f Nolan's range-finder, approved for our field artillery, can now be used both with 
 and away from the guns. 
 
42 THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION. 
 
 light, officers who are constructing batteries, should take the most important 
 measurements. In the same way the engineer officer with each section of the 
 infantry defences, can use a pocket, sextant, to measure such ranges as may be 
 required.* In both cases, the ranges should be written up, and the points shown 
 to the officers concerned. 
 
 Rearguard Positions. 
 
 In order to provide against every contingency, the positions to be held by the 
 rearguards, in case of retreat, should be fixed upon. These will command the 
 lines^of retreat, and should, in any case, be at least so far behind the shooting 
 Ime, as not to be silenced by musketry fire from that line if taken ; their 
 situation should be such as will best prevent the assailant from commanding the 
 retreat w^ith his guns. Fortified localities answer well ; in default of them^ 
 closed earthworks may be used. 
 
 Conclusions. 
 
 We see, therefore, that when but one or two hours are available, trenches 
 can be dug, localities can be hastily barricaded, their immediate fronts cleared 
 a little, walls notched, banquettes formed, windows built up, and communi- 
 cations made, where most wanted. With woods, the salient parts of the 
 borders can be felled for entanglements, and bits of shelter trenches thrown 
 up ; while pits and epaulments can be made for some of the guns and mitrailleurs. 
 With a night available for work, it is all important that the directing officer 
 should decide, before dark, on what is to be done. After this, the parties are 
 hastily organized and all the available lanterns-j- are distributed ; the clearing of 
 the front is persevered in ; strong barricades are made in the villages ; the outer 
 shooting lines are strengthened, and gaps in them closed by breastworks, stock- 
 ades, and hurdle walls. The angles of walls and flanking portions are loopholed ; 
 houses are prepared for defence, and epaulments for infantry thrown up on the 
 flanks ; while in exposed places, shelter-trenches are made for the shooting line, 
 and a few blindages are provided for the supports, and preparations made for the 
 reserves ; the communications along the rear are improved, and those in front 
 impeded. Additional cover is provided for the guns, and working parties are 
 employed for a relief, in intrenching any guns of position. The field telegraph is 
 also laid;}: and organized. 
 
 If two reliefs be available in the night, a few large infantry redoubts may be 
 thrown up ; obstacles may be placed along the front with some care ; and the 
 positions for the reserves put into a state of preparation. In this way a good 
 deal can be done, but in the dark it will be done imperfectly. 
 
 When one or even many days are available, the works indicated above are 
 continually improved upon. A more extended use is made of obstacles ; the front 
 is carefully cleared, and' the communications along the rear further opened out. The 
 villages and localities are divided into defensive sections, exposed positions defiladed 
 by traverses, and long walls flanked by tambours. Field casemates are made for 
 the supports, and the reserves are further intrenched, -if need be, in infantry re- 
 
 * The method of tangents is the simplest in the field. With the theodolite, the 
 diiference of level can be taken at the same time as the range : the sextant gives good 
 results up to 1000 yards. 
 
 + Each R.E. company has only four lanterns ; a few can be got fi-om other services. 
 
 i The rate of reclhig out being from two to three miles an hour for each wagon. 
 
THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION. 43 
 
 doubts. Second lines of defence may be begun and prepared as time permits. * 
 
 It is true that the defender may sometimes calculate on having many days or 
 weeks for work, and in such cases, in open country particularly, he might occupy 
 the ground systematically with powerfid casemated works, similar to those thrown 
 up for the defence of Washington, in 1861-2 ; and round Dresden and Vienna ia 
 1866, where rails were largely used in making bomb-proof cover (fig. 54, pi. vm.) 
 
 Such works, with palisades and caponiers in the ditches, and with temporary 
 haxo-casemates (figs. 59 and 60) for the guns, and hollow traverses for the de- 
 fenders (figs. 56 and 62) could offer so great a resistance, that an assailant 
 might have to become a besieger. 
 
 A battle field is more often prepared (to use a homely phrase) " from hand to 
 mouth" : the defender not knowing what the next day may have in store. In 
 such cases we must do the best we can, in the time we are sure of, remembering 
 that at every stage, the work must be ready for the fight. 
 
 And now a word about the troops, compared with whom, these works are 
 but the husk of the defence. 
 
 Since the days of Thermopyla3 the defence, though the less brilliant part, has 
 always called for the highest virtues of the soldier ; and yet the popular notion is, 
 that for such a purpose any troops are good enough. This idea, always false, 
 is now more so than ever. Over and over again in 1871, we saw the French, 
 individually brave and apt at using cover, unable, for lack of discipline, to hold 
 their positions against inferior numbers of the invader ; while the superiority of 
 the latter on the defensive was equally marked. To discipline alone, is due the 
 foith in self and in each other, which gives coolness in action, and with it the 
 power of straight shooting and of orderly movement ; the willingness to bear 
 hardship with patience, and do irksome work when called upon, and above all 
 the determination to s(ay, which no hammering can overcome, and for which 
 our people have been always famous, 
 
 To discipline must be added, readiness both for war and in war. In 
 former days, when war was the business of life, success depended on being 
 " ever ready " to follow up words by deeds. In these days of " deeds without 
 words " the inventions of science, in the hands of armed nations, may crowd 
 the incidents of a war into the space of a few weeks, and readiness that comes of 
 forethought, is the only safeguard. 
 
 "Nullum numen babes, si sit prudentia : nos te," 
 
 •' Nos facimus, Fortuna, deam, cceloque locamus" 
 
 is more true now, than when it was the watchword of the great nation, which, 
 
 longer than all others, held the mastery in war ; and which, with a temple to 
 
 Fortune, left nothing to chance. 
 
 • As a practical comment on hasty preparation, the defence^ at Hfiricourtmay be re- 
 ferred to. It will be seen that, before the town, the wood du Chanois stretched across 
 the hill of Mougnot, a sort of pleasure ground covered with large trees. These would 
 have concealed an advance from Tavey, which thus could have taken the hdl and used 
 it against the town. The Germans therefore worked night and day to clear away the 
 wood. This they finished, except in the northern part. The foot of the hill was pro, 
 tected by abatis ; the old hollow road barricaded, and shelter-trenches and gun-Pi^s 
 for a batterv thrown up on the high ground. To the north, the chapel of St. Valbert 
 and the stone walls of the churchyard were occupied, and flanked the front of Mouguot ; 
 and the farm of Marion, surrounded by abatis, formed a keep to it. To the south, 
 shelter-trenches were thrown up along the great rpad to Bussurel, and supported by a 
 defended factory on the left bank. The western enclosure walls of HCricourt were pro- 
 vided with banquettes, and the windows of the houses looking west were blocked up 
 and loopholed. 
 
 A. W. AND J. 1'. JACKSON, PRINTERS, THOMAS STREET, \Y00L\YIC1I, 
 

 BATTLE OF BELFORT. 
 1871. 
 
 SITUATION ON THE 15^" JAN"?/ 
 ^TiysUai^^^. BEFORE THE BATTLE 
 
 ^ f^ / ^ Gcnimnf. in poi,dWTi. 
 
 J^ Mujds' of Frenrh 
 column.'! advarbcu(xj 
 to fitc aMaJfy 
 ._ Gnat Rcnd.'^ 
 
 Lanes <(■ Trdck.^ 
 
 .^ Pvsitijon^ baMmos 
 ^^ [Fidd TehgrcV^- 
 
 alliiui /)'' 
 \ ^ I SB Sw riffun.', in hbt( 
 ") \ \ arc the keight/f m M^irrs. 
 
 1^ 1%'" 
 
 Croix 
 
 ■Pio^ Kell Lith 40 Km! St Covenc &ardfin 
 
Tlw^ Kull Lillv •iO Xing Si Cowui Garden 
 

 ''i^ORini^. 
 
]B©WjEi<& LA MEIHE. 
 
 GARRISON 2 BATTALIONS or the 7'" BAVARIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE 
 (Pans 1870-71.) 
 
 -4— 
 
 REFERENCE. 
 
 ■_— rW/j tluvvm. drtvn /r 
 
 Drthiilrrl n7,//s 
 
 a^ Drihiiird Buihliiws 
 "■^-: J?c,uls 
 U«//s 
 
 "■B Jiviliiuiffs 
 
 ' '' l^lultvi- Traiches 
 
 ^^^ Wife Junicuigletnentti 
 
 ^~ BarriL-adcs 
 
 Esa Fu^ld (hsanaies 
 S *ten<- Fcuaasees 
 % FcrepcKt (hmmandtfi' 
 
 ./■ 
 
 
 
DLE WALL 
 
 /,■•/•( nru«hAvvo(l SOU'S 
 I I'trhebsir.'.iy''^' ■'! 
 rr Ua-rcu earlh 
 
 5 HOUR BLINDAGL USING 
 
 Pl.V. 
 
 EXPOSED SUPPORTS 
 
 ri',Hi,,( hliiiiliuHji 
 
 trl l,-ii(illix. sciiirtuiiry 
 lUlllls , 
 
 HOUR EARTH SCREEIN 
 BEFORE A WALL 
 
 'l-'rciil h.uil- Ui/rln 
 FIELD CASEMATE . [l 
 
 Fig 12 
 
 „ 
 
 j " Augu7v 
 
 ols ) .3 Scavs j ^--^ 
 
 I paces) S Sanimfrx I d (^90J 
 
 ( 2 ^rf26i- \ 
 
 Li. 
 
 Bigga^f <t 1 EexcUer W Z paces 
 
 READ 
 
 ///^ (iif^qers frr /his (uui the 
 h-wuio plai^v ai-r .fiippc.'ied i/i 
 
 at 2 parens ndfrvui u/i/fss 
 'u'/^i.sr staict] The ari\MS 
 H- the (lueclu^ii rTtJii-i • 
 
 /L^iu-e.5: eticJ/ysed ilijzji \ i 
 
 the TUimifet' <rf' Sqiixxi-e feet 
 c£ 13' a •'•''tytif'TL 
 
 sc f7irJr.'<f(] tfiij.s (^ (nv tJu' 
 uicber- of tiihlr ffict m a task 
 
 di (g) 
 
 
 ■xh' frr ((11 tJi£, Jucfurc-s, 
 EaTcpt N'.ll, W 
 
 (j.'i. 3 i-' e\ery seccrul up7Ujhl> has a pau 
 nits Jrim dcys ^vpiild be ueeA withj iht 
 ■/ when, procurnhle Thfy nitrnher of 
 s wvttJjt I'l iliiided en. on the spot 
 
 ' .X ft . thsnii.il.' hcl'tx .^'iipp.i-tf. 
 
 irr-iffi. ]^j^ s/iwn ff'latei- V/c VJ/I ' <ir< only m, 
 
 thr ttyaU^hh rn/3/enj:it \vcultl.tn each 
 Lsed- . 
 
HURDLE 
 
 ION OF 6 H» SHELTER FOR EXPOSED SUPPORTS 
 
 ^'l»' ^Jft*** 
 
 COMMON SHELTER TRENCH ftGA NST A 
 HEDGE W TH OPEN NGS ^FOR MEN KNEEL NG 
 
 
 
 5 HOUR BLINDAGE USING A 
 
 n T 7 
 
 ■^-t^\" 
 
 5 HOUR EARTH SCR 
 BEFORE A WALL 
 
 Fig 9 
 
 r ( HEDGE AS I 
 REVETMENT 
 
 
 ELD CASEMATE |T ME 6 HOURS) 
 
 RAILWAY EMBANKMENT 
 
 
 RS) 
 
 A 4_ jzri^_i i_ „ I B_ 
 
 SUNKEN APON ER FOR FLANK DEFENCE "^^ Seal * ' 
 
 T /(? i Tar 
 
 
 M 
 
 (3^ 
 
 
 
 
 ~- 
 
 
 
 __ _ 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 '^ "■ A .n 1 J 
 
 
 Haiu/ueJte tin- 
 
 , i 
 
 40m(.nl 
 
 
 
 
 READ 
 
 4U // iff / hi. ,nui the 
 i U ivij a plaUi> a •nip/?osed in 
 b at 2 p i -es fi it^in. a./ uri fe^s 
 ii t'wi/tp vti/ I The arf'ciis 
 shrx the duecttoTv cTtAif 
 71 h^m ey et closed iJazs I i 
 t fJ rmnii er / ^gtiarv feet 
 
 77ux mrh ei fJiisl^ tuv tJif 
 luii ihcr of Gib c f*i€i ui n tntih 
 
 Scale- frr all the. J'lcfit/cs, 
 E.vcepi Nrfl, ^ 
 
 \H fri /itjs 3&:7e\erysecotiduprigkthasapau- 
 ■/' \'i/i stfiits Iron.' dogs MviilU- be ueed' wiAiOu 
 •iij;r worh when, pFVCumhlc Ihc' nunther cf 
 , i.£irpefUer.K wotUti h i/n^dwl- ivi, vtv the spot 
 
 ThA r^tfmaits shewn.- (Hates Vtc M) ^wv Oi^- rm 
 yentionat, tin- ta'atlable nteUenzil tv*>iilii.; itv enrh 
 
IM VI 
 
 <-;?/.. 4. 2-'.x-^.' 
 
 Alt^rnaU porizone cwe^ hlxncLed/, 
 hxtl/'bUnde/L (for eaiit ) by 3''^ rel 
 (ind steps in r-ear revetted' 
 
 :» shjoob t/irouffh^ 
 £'berrw ts Ufl atl^by 211 ' Linihei's 
 
 Tno' Sall.LiUi, 40 En^ St Covent Gaxden 
 
i 
 
Rgl9 
 
 
 Hg .9 
 
 Acoyn^^ 
 
 
 7 / / 
 
 I J P ■/ 
 
 I 
 
 i ii 
 
 Lui/bjj M froracl by J"^ hi^ JI.{ 
 futti steps wy rear- reyette/i' JIL.\ 
 
 iS) loJ-i ie'^ 
 
 <>pf oUs at M for mert/ (o sfwct through. 
 (In earth U net suff O/ Z eientt^ re tt/l at Ji *)■ 
 
,^^ 
 
 B 
 
 rccrwUh 6^'t. Iras 
 d- H-iac/i t/ ti O'/'i. , 
 pits <(■ ramp fhnr r/id.''' 
 ■tk<' tJu- ShrlttT pils 
 
 HOUR PIT FOR HE 
 
 d Biaaers \ 
 
i 
 
'A>.^ H 
 
 II 1 ■'{ ca-ii^am,,, 
 
 _7] JT^ " ihcip^^ 
 
 Rg 38 
 
 
 3'i 
 
 ' !;.: 
 
 
 
 -, fill"- k^^^' 
 
 thfpff, dtt,h /cj/t i 
 
 . S Fi^ 4.3- 
 
 .,..-X: 
 
 
 ^v/;/n rf,«,„fr 
 
 "■""'" ^jy^'»'- 7 
 
 
 / 
 
 Fig,47 
 
 NL HOUR ^l,,.-..,.v.. F'' 
 
 Att/«^* I H^^ 
 
IM. Vlll 
 
 SECTION ON A. B . 
 
 Fig. 54'. 
 
 Fi^. 62 . 
 
 fx^i'^St^xf 
 
 TliD^ KealJtt^ 4-D,Eiii^ St. OmL Garden. 
 
SimElI''C]Hl£S FROM THE ^JYALPl of IS^Q-^li. 
 
 .aJc of YiUiLs (I .i7(iO) 
 
 m^-^y^^^^mtm 
 
 SECTION ALONG 
 
 Bfe SO 
 
 R§51 
 
 '^^IIT 
 
 iranr 
 
 Fig.55 
 
 Fig.eo. 
 
 UBER TRlVtRSES. 
 
 !ll! 
 
 Fig S3 
 
 ;tion oh a.b. 
 
 ALRY SHELTER SHED. 
 
 lit 
 
 FigST 
 
 Fig. 61 
 
 lliiilm! 
 
 '1 
 
 ll 
 
 i^- 
 
 ^ 
 
 :M 
 
/ 
 
I 
 
\' 
 
» 
 
» 
 
1 1 
 
HBBMaMBII 
 
» 
 
» 
 
t 
 
I 
 
y 
 
i 
 
I 
 
 v) 
 
UNIVERSITY OP CALIFORNIA LIBRARY 
 
 THIS BOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST DATE 
 STAMPED BELOW 
 
 u'4. 
 
bh