MB 
 
 1 
 
 JL&W 
 
 H V : 
 
 WT 
 
 IB 
 
(M 
 
 ' 
 
 
 N 
 
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT 
 
 CONSIDERED WITH REFERENCE TO 
 
 A REFORM OF PARLIAMENT, 
 
 EAEL GEEY. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 EICHAED BENTLEY, NEW BUELINGTON STEEET, 
 
 isher in rtomarg to $er fftajestg. 
 
 1858. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 THE following Essay was begun, and great part of 
 it written, a considerable time ago, and without any 
 view to its publication. I have determined to finish 
 and to publish it, because there seems to be no doubt 
 that the subject to which it relates is about to oc- 
 cupy the serious attention of Parliament and of the 
 Country. Her Majesty's Speech from the Throne, on 
 the 3rd of December, has given ground for expecting 
 that some measure of Parliamentary Reform will be 
 proposed by the Government in the Session of 1858. 
 Though I entertain no doubt that a further Reform 
 of Parliament is needed, I regret that it is to be at- 
 tempted immediately, and, as I believe, prematurely. 
 Upon considering the various schemes for the im- 
 provement of the Representation of the People which 
 
 -52871 
 
IV PREFACE. 
 
 have been proposed, and the manner in which the 
 Reform Bills laid upon the table of the House of 
 Commons by Lord John Russell, in the years 1852 
 and 1854, were received, I am led to the conclusion 
 that no partial measure is likely to be carried, or, if 
 carried, to prove beneficial to the Nation. Assuming 
 that the existing constitution of the House of Com- 
 mons cannot remain unaltered, I am persuaded that 
 the best and safest course will be to attempt a com- 
 plete revision of our Representative System, rather than 
 the introduction of minor changes founded upon no 
 fixed principle, and arbitrary in their character and 
 extent. But the Country is not at present prepared 
 for so large a measure as would be found necessary 
 if a complete revision of our Representation were de- 
 termined upon ; nor could any Ministry now hope 
 to carry such a plan, even if it were able to prepare 
 one, without further inquiry. More discussion out- 
 of-doors is wanted, before this most difficult subject 
 can be considered ripe for being dealt with by Par- 
 liament. 
 
 The principles and practical working of the Con- 
 stitution, as it stands, require to be carefully studied, 
 and its real defects to be ascertained, in order that the 
 
PREFACE. V 
 
 objects to which measures of reform should be directed 
 may be determined, and a sound judgment formed as 
 to the means of effecting them. 
 
 These pages are intended as a contribution to that 
 preliminary inquiry, which I believe to be necessary 
 before any plan of Parliamentary Reform can be 
 either drawn up, or considered with advantage. But 
 in expressing my opinion that further inquiry and 
 discussion ought to precede an attempt to legislate 
 upon a subject of such vital interest, I must guard 
 myself against being supposed to make this sugges- 
 tion with any view of getting rid of a troublesome 
 question for an indefinite time. Far from entertain- 
 ing such a feeling, while I deprecate precipitation in 
 dealing with this subject, I consider it to be one of 
 which as prompt a settlement as is consistent with 
 due deliberation is indispensable for the welfare, if 
 not for the safety, of the Nation. I recognize the 
 necessity, and even the urgent necessity, of amending 
 our Constitution ; but I hold that it would be most 
 unwise to risk its destruction by haste and rashness 
 in attempting to improve it, since, with all its faults, 
 it has been the means of securing to this Country 
 a larger measure of true freedom, and of good go- 
 
VI PREFACE. 
 
 vernment, than any other nation upon earth has 
 enjoyed. 
 
 I have only to add, that I greatly regret having 
 been compelled, in the course of my argument, to 
 express in strong terms my unfavourable opinion of 
 the Government of the United States of America ; and 
 I am anxious to explain, that this opinion applies 
 to the Government only, and not to the People of 
 those States. For that People I feel very sincere 
 goodwill and high admiration, though I am not blind 
 to the fact that, like every other Nation, they have 
 their own peculiar faults. 
 
 December, 1857. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTEE I. 
 
 ORIGIN AND RESULTS OF PARLIAMENTARY 
 GOVERNMENT. 
 
 Subject of this Essay. Nature of Parliamentary Government. 
 It virtually unites the Executive and Legislative Powers. But sub- 
 ject to limitations. How this system of Government differs from 
 the ancient Government of England. The last was suited to the 
 state of Society at the time. The present system has grown gra- 
 dually out of it. This has worked well on the whole. Evidence of 
 its having done so in the prosperity and progress of the Nation. 
 And in its moral improvement. Parliamentary Government is pe- 
 culiar to this Country. No other instance of its having continued 
 long in successful operation Page 1 
 
 CHAPTEE II. 
 ADVANTAGES OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 
 
 Parliamentary Government provides for the harmonious action 
 of the different Powers of the State. Advantage of this. Espe- 
 cially in Financial arrangements. Representative Assemblies, where 
 there is no individual responsibility, prone to error in questions of 
 Money. Experience of the United States and British Colonies. 
 Ministerial responsibility has a corrective tendency. Useful also in 
 
viii CONTENTS. 
 
 general Legislation. Parliament controls the Executive Govern- 
 ment without directly interfering with it. Brings Opinion to bear 
 on foreign Policy. Contests for power rendered less injurious by- 
 Parliamentary Government. Evils arising from these contests in 
 despotisms. In pure democracy. Under Parliamentary Govern- 
 ment contests for Power still contests for the favour of the People. 
 But their effects not the same as when rulers are directly elected. 
 Parliamentary Government provides a safe mode of transferring 
 power to new hands. Such transfers necessary. Murder of the 
 Emperor Paul. Revolution averted by the fall of Walpole. Con- 
 ferring power for a limited term does not answer equally well. Pre- 
 sidents of the United States have sometimes lost the confidence of the 
 People. Evils also from Presidential elections. From President's 
 want of authority towards the close of his term of office. Parlia- 
 mentary Government not subject to these inconveniences. Favour- 
 able to the selection of fit men to govern the Nation. Higher qua- 
 lities necessary to obtain the post of a Parliamentary leader than to 
 become the Minister of a despotism. Or the President of a Re- 
 public. Parliamentary debates help to raise the standard of poli- 
 tical morality. And to enlighten the Nation . . . Page 16 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 EVILS AND DANGERS OF PARLIAMENTARY 
 GOVERNMENT. 
 
 Tendency of Parliamentary Government to encourage corrup- 
 tion. Comparison with other free Governments. Bribery of Mem- 
 bers of Parliament. Formerly common.' Gradually discontinued. 
 Systematic corruption not thereby got rid of. Diminished by Re- 
 form of Parliament. But favour still an instrument of Govern- 
 ment. How brought to bear on the House of Commons. All Ad- 
 ministrations have partly depended on corrupt influence. But 
 none entirely. On great occasions it loses its power. Spirit of 
 faction excited by distribution of patronage to party in power. 
 Difficulty of bringing fittest men to act together as Ministers under 
 Parliamentary Government. Suggestions that Ministers should be 
 separately responsible. No real need for this. It would be incon- 
 sistent with the system of Government by Party. Parliamentary 
 Government leads to good measures being opposed and bad ones 
 
CONTENTS. IX 
 
 supported for party objects. Debates sometimes mislead instead 
 of enlightening the Nation. Faults of Parliamentary Government 
 generally those of all free Governments. Much less than those of 
 despotic ones Page 36 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 REASONS OF THE SUCCESS OF PARLIAMENT ART 
 GOVERNMENT. 
 
 Success of Parliamentary Government peculiar to this Country. 
 Character of Parliament also peculiar. House of Lords. House of 
 Commons. Anomalies and irregularities in its composition. These 
 the source of its merits as well as of its faults. Authority of 
 Ministers in the House of Commons. Its superiority as a delibe- 
 rative assembly to other representative bodies. This due to the 
 variety of its elements. Advantage of its admitting men holding 
 unpopular opinions. Close Boroughs. Tyranny as described by 
 Blackstone. Abuse of powers of the House of Commons would 
 produce it. Averted by the composition of the House of Commons. 
 Importance of this. Want of true liberty in the United States. 
 Would be more felt in this Country with a House of Commons 
 representing the numerical majority. Advantages arising from the 
 Septennial Act. Objection that useful measures are delayed by the 
 mixed character of the House of Commons not well founded. 
 Delay not more than is necessary for well-considered and permanent 
 legislation. Tendency of the House of Commons to undertake 
 unnecessary work. Acts requiring costs of collecting revenue, and 
 various fixed charges, to be voted annually . . . Page 58 
 
 CHAPTER Y. 
 
 EFFECTS OF PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 Reform of Parliament in 1832 only aimed at the correction of 
 practical evils. Maintained the mixed character of the House of 
 Commons. Redressed the balance of the Constitution. Wisdom 
 of the change shown by its results. The measure was not perfect. 
 Its faults as shown by experience. It diminished too much the 
 power of Ministers in the House of Commons. Evils of a weak 
 
 6 
 
X CONTENTS. 
 
 Government. Results of its becoming impossible to form an Ad- 
 ministration able to guide the House of Commons. Reasons for 
 fearing that this may happen. Could not have done so before the 
 Reform of Parliament. Great power then possessed by the Crown. 
 Objectionable from not being necessarily exercised by its Minis- 
 ters. Objection also to the source from which it was derived. 
 Otherwise the power in itself useful. Mr. Hallam denies the ne- 
 cessity of influence. Reasons for differing from him. Diminution 
 of Parliamentary authority of the Government likely to be more 
 felt hereafter. Constitution would be virtually altered if Ministers 
 were to cease directing the House of Commons. More danger of 
 this since no change of law would be required. Diminution of 
 Ministerial responsibility would be particularly injurious in questions 
 of Money. Open questions ought not to be multiplied. Since 
 Reform Act facilities for bringing certain Members into the House 
 of Commons deficient. Former utility of Close Boroughs. Field 
 of selection for Parliamentary Offices now narrowed. Advantage 
 of Ministers not representing large Constituencies. Mr. Canning. 
 Sir R. Peel. Lord John Russell. Law Officers of the Crown 
 and holders of subordinate Offices. Reform Act has failed in putting 
 an end to corruption. Has not diffused political rights as widely as 
 would now be desirable. Notwithstanding its imperfections Reform 
 Act of 1832 a great and beneficial change . . . Page 84 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 CONSIDERATIONS AS TO A NEW REFORM BILL. 
 
 Difficulty of framing a new Reform Bill. Points to be considered. 
 I. Legislation does not always work as it is intended. Bribery. 
 Penal laws fail to stop it. II. Danger of attempting to correct admit- 
 ted faults by partial measures. Faults in opposite directions should 
 be dealt with together. Corrupt influence, and influence of dema- 
 gogues. Irregularities of Representation and patronage of the Crown 
 have good as well as bad effects. III. A new Reform Act should 
 effect a durable settlement. Importance of stability to a Govern- 
 ment. Policy of Reform Bill of 1831. Inexpediency of a different 
 policy now. IV. Proper objects of a new Reform Bill. Transfer 
 of political power not now required. Danger of adding strength 
 to the democratic element in the Constitution. Evils of extreme 
 
CONTENTS. XI 
 
 democracy in ancient times. In Europe. In the United States. 
 Would be greater here. V. Means of carrying a Reform Bill re- 
 quire to be considered. Danger from an abortive one. A good 
 measure cannot entirely please any party. None can be carried 
 except by compromise, unless violently democratic. Struggle such 
 a measure would occasion, and its danger. Experience of 1831-2. 
 Warning to be derived from it. Resistance to all Reform would be 
 unwise in the Conservative party. Equal danger in small advances 
 towards Democracy. A complete and fair settlement of the question 
 of Reform desirable. Equally desirable for Liberal Politicians. 
 Danger to a Liberal Government from the present state of this 
 question. How to arrive at a settlement of it. Committee of the 
 Privy Council Page 115 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 ON THE EXERCISE OP PATRONAGE UNDER PARLIA- 
 MENTARY GOVERNMENT. 
 
 Difficulty of securing a right exercise of patronage under any 
 form of Government. Formerly much abused in this Country. 
 Practice now improved. Appointment and promotion of Officers 
 in the Army and Navy. Tenure of office in Civil Service. Order 
 of promotion in it. Advantages of this system. Purchased by 
 some sacrifice of energy. -" Red Tape." Constitution of Civil 
 Service susceptible of improvement. Not by competitive exami- 
 nations for appointments. Objections to them. Importance of not' 
 depriving the Government of its patronage. Suggestions for im- 
 proving the Civil Service. In principle the existing system should 
 be adhered to. Reasons for fearing that it may be broken down. 
 Can only be maintained by Public Opinion . . Page 157 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN THE BRITISH 
 COLONIES. 
 
 Question whether Parliamentary Government is adapted to British 
 Colonies. Its evils aggravated by circumstances of small societies. 
 
Xll CONTENTS. 
 
 Corruption. Want of fit persons for the higher Offices of the Go- 
 vernment. Party spirit, its prevalence and bitterness in Colonies. 
 Parliamentary Government less necessary in Colonies than in this 
 Country. Their former Government like that of England prior to 
 1688. Its advantages. Chief objection to it does not apply to the 
 Colonies. Discredit of former system of Colonial Government. 
 Its causes. Colonial expenditure provided for by Imperial Parlia- 
 ment. Consequences of this practice. Abuse of Colonial patronage. 
 Change produced by the reform of Parliament. Conflict of in- 
 terests caused by our Commercial Policy. Other abuses. Usurpa- 
 tion of powers of the Crown by Jamaica Assembly Demand for 
 responsible Government in Canada. Rightly conceded. Doubt 
 whether imitation of Canada has not led to premature changes 
 elsewhere. Australian Colonies. Constitution given in 1842 to 
 "New South Wales had worked fairly. New System less so. Fre- 
 quent changes of the Administration. Alteration in the constitu- 
 tion of the Legislature increased the difficulty of Responsible 
 Government Page 198 
 
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT 
 
 AND 
 
 REPOBM OP PARLIAMENT. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 ORIGIN AND RESULTS OF PARLIAMENTARY 
 GOVERNMENT. 
 
 OFTEN as the British Constitution has been described 
 and discussed, it affords a subject for inquiry that is 
 still far from being exhausted. The changes it has 
 undergone, and the manner in which its working at 
 the present day has been affected by these changes, 
 do not appear to have been yet examined as closely 
 as they deserve. And while it must always be 
 interesting to study the Government under which we 
 live, it is especially so at a time when there is reason 
 to anticipate that alterations of extreme importance 
 in its existing arrangements will soon be attempted. 
 In speaking of that Government, Burke has ad- 
 
X ORIGIN AND RESULTS OF 
 
 mirably said, that " the machine of a free Constitu- 
 tion is no simple thing, but as intricate and as deli- 
 cate as it is valuable." Concurring in this opinion, 
 I believe that the whole construction of the machine 
 requires to be very carefully examined before we can 
 safely attempt tojmprove it, even in what may appear 
 at first sight to be minor details ; because parts of a 
 machine which may seem to an ignorant or a careless 
 observer very unimportant, may in reality be essen- 
 tial to its safe working. For this reason, I conceive 
 that, as a first step towards arriving at a sound judg- 
 ment with regard to the nature and extent of the re- 
 forms now required in our Constitution, it can hardly 
 fail to be of use to inquire in what respects Parlia- 
 mentary Government, as it now exists in this country, 
 differs from other forms of Representative Govern- 
 ment what are its chief merits and faults ; whether 
 any of the causes of its success among us can be 
 traced ; how its working has been affected by the 
 great constitutional change accomplished in 1832; 
 what are the principal defects which experience has 
 brought to light in our representative system, as it 
 has been modified by the celebrated Acts passed in 
 that year, " for the amendment of the Representation 
 of the People in Parliament ;" and how any attempt 
 to remove these defects should be conducted. 
 
 Such are the questions which I propose to consider 
 
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 3 
 
 in the following pages ; and although I a^ very sen- 
 sible how little I can do justice to so difficult a sub- 
 ject, I would fain hope that my remarks may be found 
 not altogether destitute of value (at least as suggesting 
 materials for thought to others), since they are the 
 fruit of the observation of more than thirty years, du- 
 ring which time I have enjoyed no small opportunities 
 of closely watching the working of our government. 
 In discussing the questions I have, undertaken to exa- 
 mine, I shall abstain from adverting further than may 
 be necessary for the elucidation of my immediate sub- 
 ject, to the fundamental principles of our Constitution, 
 and to the division of power between the different au- 
 thorities of the State on which it is founded. These 
 have been described and commented upon by writers 
 of such eminence, that it would be worse than useless 
 for me to go again over ground which they have fully 
 occupied. Nor, in fact, have I any temptation to do 
 so. The writers I allude to have considered the Bri- 
 tish Constitution with reference rather to the legal 
 distribution of power among the several authorities 
 of the State, and to the manner in which the power 
 assigned to each was formerly exercised, than to the 
 practice of the present day ; whereas my object is to 
 inquire into the nature and the operation of the 
 system of Parliamentary Government now established 
 in this country. 
 
 B 2 
 
4 ORIGIN AND RESULTS OP 
 
 In prosecuting this inquiry, I have in the first 
 place to remark, that, since the establishment of Par- 
 liamentary Government, the common description of 
 the British Constitution,* as one in which the execu- 
 tive power belongs exclusively to the Crown, while 
 the power of legislation is vested jointly in the Sove- 
 reign and the two Houses of Parliament, has ceased 
 to be correct, unless it is understood as applying only 
 to the legal and technical distribution of power. It 
 is the distinguishing characteristic of Parliamentary 
 Government, that it requires the powers belonging to 
 the Crown to be exercised through Ministers, who are 
 held responsible for the manner in which they are 
 used, who are expected to be members of the two 
 Houses of Parliament, the proceedings of which they 
 must be able generally to guide, and who are consi- 
 dered entitled to hold their offices only while they 
 possess the confidence of Parliament, and more espe- 
 cially of the House of Commons. 
 
 By this arrangement the Executive power and the 
 power of Legislation are virtually united in the same 
 hands, but both are limited, the executive power by 
 the law, and that of legislation by the necessity of 
 obtaining the assent of Parliament to the measures 
 brought forward, so that even the strongest admi- 
 nistrations do not venture to propose the passing of 
 
 * See Blackstone'e ' Commentaries,' book i. ch. 2. 
 
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 5 
 
 laws to which public opinion is decidedly opposed. 
 The exercise of this high authority is ^iso placed 
 under the check of a strict responsibility and control, 
 and its possession is made to depend on the confi- 
 dence placed by the Representatives of the People in 
 the Ministers to whom it is committed. There is a 
 further safeguard against abuse, in its being requisite 
 that the Ministers of the Crown should obtain its di- 
 rect sanction for all their most important measures. 
 The Crown, it is true, seldom refuses to act upon the 
 advice deliberately pressed upon it by its servants, nor 
 could it do so frequently without creating great incon- 
 venience. But the Sovereigns of this country never- 
 theless may, and generally have exercised much in- 
 fluence over the conduct of the Government ; and in 
 extreme cases the power of the Crown to refuse its 
 consent to what is proposed by its servants, may be 
 used with the greatest benefit to the nation. A re- 
 fusal on the part of the Sovereign to sanction mea- 
 sures which the Ministers persist in recommending as 
 indispensable, is indeed a legitimate ground for their 
 resignation : and if the question which leads to this is 
 one on which they have the support of public opinion, 
 they must in the end prevail. But if this high power 
 is exercised with wisdom, and is reserved for great 
 emergencies, the Crown may generally calculate on 
 the support of the Nation in refusing to sanction mea- 
 
6 ORIGIN AND RESULTS OF 
 
 sures improperly pressed upon it by its Ministers, 
 especially where the measures so urged involve an 
 abuse of the royal authority for their own party 
 objects. 
 
 Such a government as I have now described, has 
 obviously but little resemblance to that under which 
 our ancestors lived in the reigns of the Plantage- 
 nets, the Tudors, and even of the Stuarts. The So- 
 vereigns of these Houses took a far larger personal 
 share in the government of the country than those 
 of modern times. Their Ministers, instead of being 
 counsellors whose advice can seldom be rejected, and 
 who cannot really be dismissed at pleasure, were, in 
 the strictest sense of the words, the servants of the 
 Crown, and the instruments for giving effect to its 
 commands. Parliament was then, as now, the guar- 
 dian of the interests of the Nation ; but its mode of 
 action was quite different from what it has since be- 
 come. It was seldom slow to interfere by remon- 
 strance, by insisting on the removal and punishment of 
 favourites and bad advisers, and even on great emer- 
 gencies by the deposition of the King, when the abuse 
 of the royal authority excited strong discontent in 
 the Nation ; but, except on such occasions, it meddled 
 little with the conduct of the Executive Government. 
 Its power, resting on its control over the public purse, 
 was greatest when the demands for money were the 
 
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 7 
 
 most pressing; that is, practically, when there was most 
 need for the exercise of its authority. When public 
 affairs were ill-administered under weak and foolish 
 princes, want of money almost invariably ensued, which 
 compelled them to submit to the advice of their 
 Parliaments. On the other hand, the ablest Sove- 
 reigns of those times exercised a larger measure of in- 
 dependent authority, by so managing their finances 
 as generally to avoid the necessity of asking for extra- 
 ordinary pecuniary aid, except when engaged in war, 
 for which Englishmen have in all times been but too 
 ready to give their money and their blood. 
 
 This comparatively simple form of government, 
 which was well suited to the state of society and the 
 circumstances of the country at the time, was very 
 unlike (as I have already observed) our own far more 
 complex system of Parliamentary Government. But, 
 wide as is the difference between these two systems 
 of Government, the one has grown naturally out of 
 the other, by the gradual development of principles, 
 which are to be recognized in the working of our Con- 
 stitution almost from its earliest days. The change 
 has been brought about partly by legislation, but far 
 more by slow and silent alterations of practice and of 
 usage, introduced to meet the new wants of an ad- 
 vancing society, and the new difficulties which from 
 time to time arose in managing the more and more 
 
8 ORIGIN AND RESULTS OF 
 
 complicated affairs of a country continually increas'ng 
 in wealth and population. 
 
 I will not attempt to trace the successive steps by 
 which our present system of Parliamentary Govern- 
 ment has been thus gradually created ; it is sufficient 
 for me to observe, that it may be considered to have 
 begun, though at first in a very imperfect form, in the 
 reign of William III.,* that it acquired more consis- 
 tency and regularity in that of Anne, but can hardly . 
 be said to have been completely established'until after 
 the accession of the House of Hanover. So late a^ 
 the beginning of the reign of George L, Lord Oxford 
 pleaded the commands of the Sovereign as a justifica- 
 tion of the acts of the Ministers, in the debate in the 
 House of Lords on his impeachment ; on which Mr. 
 Hallam remarks, that "the "first instance where I can 
 find the responsibility of some one . for every act of 
 the Crown strongly laid down, is in a speech of the 
 Duke of Argyll, in 1739."f It i.s hardjy necessary to 
 observe that this rule is now regarded as one of the 
 fundamental principles of our Constitution, j 
 
 Even up to our own time, Parliamentary Govern- 
 
 * See Macaulay's ' History of England,' vol. iv. pp. 434-^36. 
 
 t Hallam's ' Constitutional History bf England,' vol. iii. p. 315. 
 
 J Arguments have sometimes been used, even of late years, which 
 imply that the administration of the army ought to be an exception 
 to this rule. It has been said more than once, and by very high 
 autLorities, that the administration of the army belongs solely to the 
 
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 9 
 
 merit has continued to undergo important modifica- 
 tions, and to have its rules and practice more clearly 
 defined and more firmly settled. These modifications 
 have generally been effected through the establishment 
 of some new practice for the sake of convenience, or 
 the decision of undetermined constitutional questions 
 by controversies which, arising accidentally from the 
 events of the day, have produced permanent and 
 ^ometimes very important results. Thus the highly 
 beneficiaj c\istom of holding Cabinet Councils without 
 
 Crown, and^hat any interference with it by the House of Commons 
 ought to be carefully guarded against as unconstitutional. Any 
 direct interference on the part of either House of Parliament with 
 the management of the army, would undoubtedly be a violation of 
 the yinciples of our Constitution ; but the same observation applies 
 to every branch of the executive authority. The Long Parliament, 
 by its committees, assumed various executive functions ; but its doing 
 so is admitted to have been a usurpation, and since that time the 
 rule has been recognized bqIi in theory and in practice, that all such 
 functions belong only to the ftrown. This rule is quite consistent 
 with another not less important, namely, that either House of Par- 
 liament is entitled to offerees advice to the Crown on the manner in 
 which any of its powers are exercised, and that there can be nothing 
 done by the royal authority for which some servant of the Crown 
 must not be responsible to Parliament. There is no distinction in 
 this respect between the exercise of the Royal authority over the 
 the army and over all other branches of the public service, and it cer- 
 tainly would not be for the true interest of the Sovereign that any 
 such distinction should be drawn. If some servant of the Crown is 
 not to be held responsible for every act done in the management of 
 the army, that responsibility must of necessity fall on the Sovereign 
 personally. But nothing could be more dangerous for the Sovereign 
 than to be subjected to such personal responsibility, by which the 
 
10 ORIGIN AND RESULTS OF 
 
 the presence of the Sovereign arose from George the 
 First's not knowing English ; and the contest, which 
 in the reign of George the Third ended in establish- 
 ing the practice of publishing the debates of the two 
 Houses of .Parliament, made a change of transcendent 
 importance in the working of the Constitution, without 
 the passing of any new law. 
 
 Parliamentary Government having thus been more 
 or less completely in operation among us for about a 
 century and a half, we must judge of its merits by 
 the state and progress of the Nation during that pe- 
 riod, since the only real test of the advantages and 
 disadvantages of different forms of government is that 
 afforded by their results. Applying this test to our 
 system of Parliamentary Government, and making 
 due allowance for the imperfection of all human insti- 
 tutions, it must, I think, be admitted, that our judg- 
 
 odium of having caused some great military disaster might be thrown 
 upon the Crown instead of on its Ministers. Nor would the incon- 
 venience be much less, if it were maintained that the Commander-in- 
 Chief were to be singly responsible for all acts of military adminis r 
 tration. The holder of that office would stand in a most unsafe 
 position, if he could not depend upon the support of the Ministers 
 of the Crown in case of his measures being questioned in Parlia- 
 ment ; and they cannot be expected to give this support, unless the 
 officer who trusts to it communicates with them in the performance 
 of his duties, in such a manner as to enable them to guard against 
 his taking, or omitting to take, any step for which they will not be 
 prepared to defend him. 
 
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 11 
 
 ment of it ought, on the whole, to be favourable. 
 Our national annals since the Revolutign of 1688 pre- 
 sent, it is true, a sad picture of the selfishness, base- 
 ness, and corruption of the great majority of the actors 
 on the political stage, and record too many lamentable 
 follies and excesses into which the Nation has allowed 
 itself to be misled by passion and prejudice. But 
 this seems to be rather the fault of human nature than 
 of our institutions ; at least I am not aware that there 
 is any country of which the history would not justify 
 remarks equally severe on the conduct of its statesmen 
 and of its people ; while, on the other hand, we may 
 safely assert that Great Britain* stands distinguished 
 among the nations of the earth for the prosperity it 
 has enjoyed, and for the social progress it has made 
 during the time it has been under a Parliamentary 
 government.! Internal tranquillity has scarcely been 
 interrupted during that whole period, except by the 
 two brief rebellions of 1715 and 1745; the security of 
 persons and property has been almost uniformly main- 
 
 * I must acknowledge, with deep regret and shame for my coun- 
 try, that this would not be true if it were said of the whole United 
 Kingdom, including Ireland; but Ireland has only been placed 
 under the same government as Great Britain for rather more than 
 half a century, and it is not yet thirty years since the Union of the 
 two countries has been rendered complete by the repeal of the last 
 of the penal laws against the Roman Catholics. 
 
 f M. de Remusat, in his ' L'Angleterre au XYIII me Siecle,' has 
 well described the results of Parliamentary Government in this 
 
12 ORIGIN AND RESULTS OF 
 
 tained, together with a more than usual exemption 
 from injurious restraints on the freedom of individual 
 thought and action. Fostered by these advantages, in- 
 dustry and commerce have flourished almost beyond ex- 
 ample, and, in spite of the heavy drain on our national 
 resources, occasioned by the wars in which we have 
 been engaged, the population, wealth, and power of the 
 country have been wonderfully increased. The material 
 prosperity which the nation has enjoyed during the 
 period in which it has been under a Parliamentary 
 government, is too well known to require to be 
 further insisted upon ; but I must remark that this 
 period is still more distinguished as one of great intel- 
 lectual activity and moral improvement. The former 
 has been evinced by the successful cultivation of litera- 
 ture and of science, and the application of science to 
 all the useful arts. Abundant evidence of the moral 
 improvement which has been going on may be found 
 in the remarkable change for the better which has 
 
 country during that century in the following passage: "Qu'on 
 recrie done sur le mal, on le peut ; qu'on signale avec indignation, 
 les violences et les mensonges de 1'esprit de parti, la venalite 
 effrontee, les exces de 1'orgueil, de 1'avidite et de la haine ; que 
 Ton remarque meme dans le passe de la societe Anglaise une cer- 
 taine rudesse d'egoisme de 1'ancienne Home, il n'en reste pas moms 
 vrai que nulle nation n'a ete a la fois plus libre, plus heureuse et 
 plus puissante, et que dans les temps modernes les vertus politiques 
 n'ont brille longtemps que chez elle. La race Anglo-Normande eat 
 restee digne de sa liberte." (Vol. i. p. 103.) 
 
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 13 
 
 taken place in the habits of all classes of the people 
 since the Revolution of 1688. Notwithstanding the 
 vices and the political abuses and corruption which 
 have undoubtedly prevailed, the standard of right and 
 wrong to which opinion requires men to conform, both 
 in public and private life, has been gradually raised, 
 though it is still unfortunately much lower than it 
 ought to be. This last point is one of paramount 
 importance, and I think our form of government 
 compares advantageously as regards its effect on 
 the national character with the governments of other 
 countries, whether we look to those which give a less 
 amount of liberty to the people, or to those of a much 
 more democratic character than our own, like that of 
 the great kindred Republic of the United States of 
 America. 
 
 I am far indeed from attributing all that is satis- 
 factory in our condition to our form of government ; 
 but at all events the government to which this coun- 
 try has been subject has permitted its condition to 
 become what we now see it. And perhaps little more 
 can be expected from any government, than that it 
 should allow a fair field for the exertions of indivi- 
 duals in working out the physical and moral welfare 
 of the people, and that it should favour the growth 
 of those habits and dispositions of mind which most 
 contribute to that welfare. Parliamentary Government 
 
14 ORIGIN AND RESULTS OF 
 
 therefore, if judged by its fruits, may fairly be re- 
 garded as having proved successful in this country. 
 
 But it is a remarkable circumstance that no other 
 example can be found of a government of this kind 
 having been able to maintain itself for any consider- 
 able time. There was no approach to this system of 
 government among the various representative consti- 
 tutions which prevailed in Europe during the Middle 
 Ages, nor has the constitution of the United States at 
 this day any resemblance to it. After the fall of Na- 
 poleon, a government modelled on our own was esta- 
 blished in France ; but two revolutions in little more 
 thirty years have shown that, hitherto at least, the 
 scheme has failed. In some of the other States of 
 Europe, and especially in the kingdoms of Belgium 
 and Sardinia, governments of this kind have been 
 adopted, but have been too short a time in operation 
 to enable us as yet to assert with confidence that the 
 experiment* has succeeded. The same remark applies 
 to those British Colonies in which governments of a 
 similar kind have been introduced ; the definitive 
 establishment of this system of government does not 
 
 * In Belgium, where Parliamentary Government has existed for 
 five-and-twenty years with great success, it has not yet stood the 
 trial of a change of Sovereign, and it is difficult to decide how much 
 of its success hitherto may have been due to the personal character 
 of King Leopold and to the skill and judgment with which he has 
 played the part of a constitutional monarch. 
 
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 15 
 
 in any of them date back much more than ten years. 
 Hence, although the prospect of its succeeding is at 
 least in some cases encouraging, (in others I fear it is 
 the reverse,) it cannot yet be said to have stood the 
 test of experience. 
 
 Having thus taken a general view of the nature and 
 effects of Parliamentary Government in this country, 
 the succeeding chapters of this Essay will be devoted 
 to a more particular examination of the questions 
 which it is my object to consider. 
 
16 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 ADVANTAGES OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 
 
 ON comparing Parliamentary Government as it now 
 exists in this country with other Representative Go- 
 vernments, the following seem to be the chief advan- 
 tages belonging to the former. 
 
 First. It enables the different powers of the State to 
 work together with harmony and energy, and provides 
 for the systematic direction of the measures of the 
 Legislature to objects of public good, more perfectly 
 than Representative Constitutions of a different kind. 
 In the latter, the executive power and the power of 
 legislation are lodged in separate and independent 
 authorities, while under the system of Parliamentary 
 Government, those to whom the executive authority 
 is entrusted, have also the duty of recommending to 
 the Legislature the measures it should adopt, and 
 
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 17 
 
 must retire if their advice is not generally followed. 
 By this arrangement the Executive Government is 
 able to act with the vigour which the assurance of 
 having its policy supported when necessary by Legis- 
 lation, can alone give to it. We cannot read a page, 
 either of our own history, or of that of other countries, 
 without perceiving how constantly the Executive Go- 
 vernment of a great nation is compelled to apply to 
 the Legislature for new powers, or new laws to meet 
 new exigencies that arise ; and how greatly its action 
 would be crippled, if it could not depend upon ob- 
 taining the assistance of this kind which it requires. 
 
 This remark applies more particularly to financial 
 arrangements. The imposition of taxes, and the 
 appropriation of the revenue to the public service, 
 constitute one of the chief duties of Representative 
 Legislatures, as well as the source of their power. 
 In the performance of this part of their duties, it is 
 of the utmost importance that they should act in 
 strict concert with the Executive Government, or 
 rather under its direction. Without this there can 
 be no security for efficiency and economy in conduct- 
 ing the public service. The Government cannot be 
 responsible for the former, if it cannot command the 
 grants of money it considers necessary for the dif- 
 ferent branches of the service; while experience has 
 demonstrated, that jobs and injudicious expenditure 
 
 c * 
 
18 ADVANTAGES OF 
 
 in some cases, are no less to be expected than equally 
 injudicious parsimony in others, from entrusting the 
 finances of a State to the uncontrolled management 
 of a popular assembly. Under such a system there 
 is no individual responsibility for errors and abuses 
 that may be committed ; and the responsibility which 
 is divided among all the members of a numerous 
 body, is far too slight a restraint upon them to pre- 
 vent these evils. 
 
 They have accordingly prevailed to a very great 
 extent, both in the United States and in some of our 
 own Colonies. Private and corrupt interests have had 
 too much weight in deciding questions relating to the 
 grant of money in their Legislatures, which have also 
 not unfrequentiy been led into acts of real impro- 
 vidence, by the reluctance of any individual member 
 to incur the odium of proposing or supporting an 
 unpopular outlay of money or an increase of taxation, 
 however urgently the one or the other might be called 
 for by the true interests of the Country. It is the na- 
 ture of popular assemblies in a still higher degree than 
 of men acting individually, to shrink from looking 
 unpleasant truths in the face, and to listen with the 
 greatest favour to those who tell them what they wish 
 to believe, and who recommend the measures which 
 will impose upon them the smallest immediate sacri- 
 fices. The effects of this disposition are not got rid 
 
 
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT, 19 
 
 of even by throwing on the Executive Government 
 the duty of guiding the deliberations of the Legis- 
 lature ; for unhappily Ministers are too often tempted 
 to propose rather what is agreeable at the moment, 
 than what their judgment tells them would be best 
 for the permanent interests of the Nation. Still, it 
 may safely be asserted, that the responsibility which 
 rests upon Ministers in this country for the financial 
 measures which they propose to Parliament, or to 
 which they assent, is a powerful though an imperfect 
 check upon the tendency to those errors in financial 
 administration to which popular assemblies are most 
 prone. 
 
 The same principle applies (though not with the 
 same force) to legislation upon other subjects as well 
 as upon finance. In order that such laws may be 
 passed as are required for the welfare of the Nation, 
 and for its social advancement, it is right that the 
 Ministers should be held responsible both for pre- 
 paring and carrying these measures, and also for 
 opposing such as may be unwisely urged by others. 
 This is a duty which has been imposed upon the 
 advisers of the Crown only by degrees, and chiefly 
 since the passing of the Reform Acts of 1832. For- 
 merly Ministers took little charge of the proceedings 
 of Parliament on all- matters not immediately con- 
 nected with their executive duties. This led to much 
 
 c 2 
 
20 ADVANTAGES OF 
 
 unwise legislation, and to the habitual neglect of all 
 systematic endeavour to effect improvements in our 
 laws as occasion for them arose. A different system 
 has of late years grown up, and the Ministers of 
 the Crown are now justly regarded as responsible for 
 bringing forward such measures as are required, and 
 for opposing any objectionable proposals from other 
 quarters. 
 
 Secondly. Closely connected with the advantage 
 I have just described as belonging to Parliamentary 
 Government, is that which it derives from the man- 
 ner in which it brings the policy of the Executive 
 Government under the review and control of the 
 Legislature. Parliament does not interfere directly 
 in carrying on the Executive Government ; and it is 
 right that it should abstain from doing so, since 
 experience has demonstrated the unfitness of large 
 deliberative assemblies for this function. But every 
 measure of the Ministers of the Crown is open to cen- 
 sure in either House; so that, when there is just or 
 even plausible ground for objecting to anything they 
 have done or omitted to do, they cannot escape being 
 called upon to defend their conduct. By this arrange- 
 ment, those to whom power is entrusted are made to 
 feel that they must use it in such a manner as to 
 be prepared to meet the criticisms of opponents con- 
 tinually on the watch for any errors they may com- 
 
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 21 
 
 mit, and the whole foreign and domestic policy of the 
 Nation is submitted to the ordeal of free discussion. 
 
 The discussion of the measures of the Executive 
 Government in Parliament contributes to keep the 
 Nation well informed as to its own concerns, and to 
 throw light upon what are its duties, and its true 
 interests, with regard to the various questions with 
 which the Government has to deal. This is more 
 especially useful with reference to the relations of 
 the State with foreign Powers. The policy pursued in 
 this important branch of public affairs is explained by 
 the debates which take place in Parliament, not only 
 to the public at home, but to the civilized world ; and 
 the opinion of the world is thus brought to bear upon 
 the Nation and on its rulers. At the same time, as 
 the Crown is invested with large executive powers, 
 which are exercised by its Ministers without requiring 
 the previous sanction of Parliament, so long as they 
 possess its general confidence, the vigorous action of 
 the Government is not impeded, as it would be if 
 Parliament were called upon to concur more directly 
 in conducting it. When the confidence of Parlia- 
 ment is withdrawn from the Ministers, it is their 
 duty to retire, and to make way for others to whom 
 it may be granted ; so that the affairs of the country 
 may always be conducted by men who, in their com- 
 munications with foreign Powers, are able to speak 
 
22 ADVANTAGES OF 
 
 f 
 
 with the authority which can only belong to the 
 Executive Government while it is supported by the 
 Legislature. 
 
 These advantages are not equally secured by other 
 forms of representative government. In the United 
 States, for instance, the two Houses of Congress, and 
 especially the Senate, have great power to thwart the 
 measures of the President and of his Cabinet ; but if 
 they disagree with him as to the line of policy which 
 ought to be pursued, they have no authority to en- 
 force the adoption of that which they consider to 
 be right, or to require him to change his Ministers ; 
 and the Constitution provides no means by which due 
 concert between the executive and legislative autho- 
 rities, in conducting the foreign policy of the Nation, 
 can be restored, if it should be interrupted, during 
 the term for which the President is elected. 
 
 Thirdly. It is another great advantage which 
 may, I think, justly be attributed to Parliamentary 
 Government, that it renders the contests of men for 
 power as little injurious as possible, and furnishes 
 what seems on the whole the best solution hitherto 
 discovered of the great problem, how to provide 
 some safe mode of determining to what hands the 
 principal direction of public affairs shall be entrusted. 
 Ambition is so strong a passion of human nature, that 
 in every age of the world, in every state of society ? 
 
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 
 
 and under every different form of government, men 
 have continually carried on, in some way or other, 
 contests for political power. In the old despotisms 
 of the East, the earliest Governments of which we 
 have any historical record, open violence, murder, 
 and treason seem to have played the principal part 
 in these contests. We read of one despot thus wrest- 
 ing the sceptre from another ; or of ambitious Mi- 
 nisters snatching, by the destruction of their rivals, 
 the power exercised in the name of their nominal 
 masters. Among the semi-civilized nations and tribes 
 of Asia, the same means are to this day employed for 
 the same object, and bloody changes of rulers are of 
 constant occurrence. 
 
 In other states of society, free Governments have 
 not been exempt from evils of the same kind -with 
 those to which these despotisms have been liable, but 
 have often been distracted, and sometimes ultimately 
 overthrown, by sanguinary tumults and civil wars 
 arising from contests for power among ambitious 
 men. Society must be considered to have made a 
 great step in advance, when violence and blood- 
 shed can be excluded from these contests, but much 
 evil may remain even when this has been accom- 
 plished. When force ceases to be employed, the 
 struggle for power in despotic governments usually 
 assumes the form of a strife for the favour of the 
 
24 ADVANTAGES OF 
 
 4 
 
 Sovereign. If he is a great and wise ruler, this favour 
 is won by the ability and honesty of the servants he 
 selects; but history teaches us, that even the best 
 despots are apt to be deceived in this all-important 
 matter, and that the favour of kings is not in general 
 obtained by those qualities which render men most 
 fit to be trusted with power. Too often, as in France 
 before the Revolution, the surest road to power has 
 been found in flattery, or in base compliances to 
 mistresses and favourites. In a pure democracy, when 
 the People at large directly choose their rulers, flat- 
 tery and unworthy compliances seem equally to be 
 the means- resorted to for obtaining power, the arts 
 used being much of the same character as under a 
 despotism, with the single difference, that it is the 
 People themselves whose passions and prejudices are 
 encouraged and flattered, instead of the despot or his 
 favourites. It is by no means clear that this dif- 
 ference renders the use of such arts less dangerous 
 or less demoralizing to the Nation. The Presidential 
 elections seem, from the accounts given to us by the 
 best observers, to exercise a most pernicious influence 
 on the national character in the United States ; and 
 the tone of the newspapers, and of the speeches 
 made in favour of different parties, in these exciting 
 contests, leads to the same conclusion. 
 
 M. de Tocqueville has shown, that the effect of the 
 
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 25 
 
 system has been nearly to exclude from public bu- 
 siness the men most eminent among their fellow- 
 citizens for talents and for virtue. Since he wrote, 
 these evils have grown more and more apparent ; and 
 it is becoming a subject of anxious speculation, to 
 those who take an interest in the welfare of mankind, 
 what part the United States will hereafter play in the 
 affairs of the world. They possess gigantic and fast 
 increasing power, the direction of which seems day 
 by day to be falling more completely into the hands 
 of the least estimable of their citizens, men little 
 under the restraint of any sense of justice, or of right 
 or wrong among nations, and whose party organiza- 
 tion enables them to control the measures of those who 
 are ostensibly entrusted with the conduct of affairs. 
 
 In Parliamentary Government, as it now exists 
 among us, the contest for power is still substantially 
 a contest for the favour of the People. Public opinion 
 determines, in the last resort, to what hands authority 
 shall be entrusted ; for though the Ministers are the 
 servants of the Crown, and are appointed by the 
 Sovereign, yet as the Sovereign must choose Minis- 
 ters who can command the confidence of Parliament, 
 it is practically the People who decide, through their 
 Representatives, by whom the powers of Government 
 shall be wielded. There is, however, a vast difference 
 in the effect produced by giving to the People, instead 
 
26 ADVANTAGES OF 
 
 * 
 
 of the power of nominating their rulers by direct 
 election, only an indirect control, through their Re- 
 presentatives, over the selection of the Ministers by 
 whose advice the powers of the Crown are exercised. 
 
 Parliament, and especially the House of Commons, 
 is become, not only the authority which virtually de- 
 cides the contest for power among the different can- 
 didates for it, but also the arena in which the contest 
 is mainly carried on. Its debates are the means by 
 which rival parties chiefly seek to recommend them- 
 selves both to the House itself and to the Public ; 
 and, though it is easy to perceive the imperfection of 
 this method of determining by whom the affairs of the 
 Nation are to be administered, and the very serious 
 evils to which it gives rise, it may well be doubted 
 whether any better method of deciding this great 
 question has yet been discovered, and found to suc- 
 ceed in practice. 
 
 Experience has proved that the system of Parlia- 
 mentary Government provides a safe mode of effect- 
 ing changes, from time to time, in the persons to 
 whom power is committed. It is impossible, while 
 ambition continues to be one of the strongest passions 
 of human nature, that such changes should not take 
 place ; nor is ambition their only cause. Men seem 
 to get tired of being very long subject to the same 
 ruler, so that when the reigns of even the best and 
 
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 27 
 
 most popular Sovereigns who have kept power in 
 their own hands, have been unusually protracted, the 
 accession of unknown and perhaps very inferior suc- 
 cessors has commonly been hailed with satisfaction by 
 their, subjects ; as when James the First was raised 
 to the throne of England by the death of Queen 
 Elizabeth. This feeling by no means arises from the 
 mere capriciousness of human nature. The long pos- 
 session of power has a tendency to unfit men for 
 making the best use of it, and there can be no doubt 
 of the great advantage which a Nation derives from 
 having the management of its affairs occasionally 
 transferred to the hands of men who bring to the 
 task fresh minds, and the knowledge and judgment 
 acquired in private life. A change of rulers is also 
 the only effectual means by which a Nation can ob- 
 tain a change in the system of government, when this 
 is called for by the state of its affairs or of public 
 opinion. Thus the Emperor Paul* was murdered, 
 in order to effect a change in the policy of Russia, 
 which was considered necessary by its leading men. 
 In this country a change of Ministers affords the 
 
 * " Les institutions ont encore plus tort que les hommes. ... A 
 Petersbourg on egorgeait \m empereur pour amener un changement 
 de politique ; a Londres, au contraire, sans catastrophe sanglante, la 
 politique de la paix y succedait a la politique de la guerre, par la 
 substitution de M. Addington a M. Pitt." Tillers, Histoire du 
 Consulat et de V Empire, vol. ii. p. 437. 
 
28 ADVANTAGES OY 
 
 means of accomplishing a transfer of power to new 
 hands, without violence or disturbance of the public 
 peace. The fall of Sir Robert Walpole has been said 
 to have probably averted a revolution,* since the in- 
 tense desire of the Nation at that time for a transfer 
 of power from the hands by which it had been so 
 long held (and, it may be added, on the whole so 
 wisely used) could hardly have failed to produce a 
 change of dynasty if it had not been appeased by the 
 overthrow of the Minister. 
 
 The practice of providing for occasional changes in 
 the persons to whom the administration of public 
 affairs is entrusted, by changes of Ministry occurring 
 at uncertain intervals, as the necessity for them arises, 
 has also marked advantages over another system of 
 government which, to a certain degree, meets the 
 same object, by placing the supreme authority in the 
 hands of a single individual, or of a council or more 
 numerous body, elected for a fixed period. Under 
 this last system, those who are chosen to exercise 
 power can have it entrusted to them for only a very 
 limited time, unless the risk is incurred of its being 
 sometimes left in the hands of men whose policy 
 has ceased to be in harmony with the feelings and 
 opinions of the Nation. Though the President of 
 the United States is elected for only four years, it is 
 
 * See Lord J. Russell's 'Essay on the English Government,' p. 189. 
 
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 29 
 
 well known to have happened more than once, that 
 those who have been called to that post by the votes 
 of their countrymen, have lost the public confidence 
 before the end of their term of office. 
 
 On the other hand, if supreme power in the State 
 is given to one or more persons for a fixed and short 
 time, much inconvenience must arise from the fre- 
 quent recurrence of the agitation and excitement pro- 
 duced in a Nation when it is called upon to choose 
 its rulers, and also from the weakness and want of 
 proper authority which those who hold power only for 
 a limited term must necessarily experience when the 
 expiration of that term approaches. Both these evils 
 are strongly felt in the United States. All observers 
 agree as to the mischievous consequences which arise 
 from the almost unceasing excitement occasioned by 
 the Presidential Elections and by the preparations 
 which, soon after one such contest is over, begin to be 
 made for another. Scarcely less inconvenience arises 
 from the want of proper authority in the President, 
 which gradually becomes apparent as the time for 
 his leaving power draws near.* It is obvious that 
 the commands of the Chief of the State can carry 
 little weight in the internal government, as soon as 
 it becomes probable that he will not hold office long 
 enough to punish disobedience or to reward zealous 
 
 * See ' Democratic en Amerique,' vol. ii. p. 154 (13th Edition). 
 
30 ADVANTAGES OF 
 
 service; while it is by no means impossible that his 
 subordinates may sometimes think, that to thwart 
 his measures may be the surest mode of recommend- 
 ing themselves to his successor. The holders of a 
 power which is about to expire must experience 
 still greater difficulties in managing the relations of 
 a State with foreign countries. 
 
 Our system of Parliamentary Government, though 
 it must be admitted that it mitigates only, and does 
 not obviate, the evils arising from contests for power, 
 is at all events free from these inconveniencies. The 
 Nation is not kept in constant excitement by the pro- 
 gress or prospect of an election of its chief magistrate; 
 and when a change of Ministers becomes necessary, 
 there is seldom an interval of more than a few days, 
 or at all events of a few weeks, between the time 
 when one Administration loses its moral power, by 
 its being ascertained that it must retire, and the ap- 
 pointment of a new one. 
 
 On the all-important point of providing for the 
 selection of fit men to govern the Nation, experience 
 seems also to be in favour of the system of Parlia- 
 mentary Government. Taking the whole period, from 
 the Revolution downwards, it can hardly be disputed, 
 that the Statesmen by whom this Country has been 
 governed, have generally shown themselves not want- 
 ing in ability, and need not fear a comparison, in 
 
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 31 
 
 this respect, with the successive rulers of any other 
 Nation during an equal number of years. Greater 
 men than perhaps even the greatest who have risen 
 to eminence in Parliamentary contests, have been 
 raised by other means to power in various countries, 
 especially in times of political convulsion ; but the in- 
 terest of a State requires, rather that its affairs should 
 be managed by a succession of capable men, than 
 that they should generally fall into inferior hands, 
 with an occasional brilliant exception. It is also 
 more for the interest of a Nation, that it should be 
 governed even by the most ordinary men who may 
 be brought into power without disturbance to its 
 internal peace, than that it should sacrifice the ines- 
 timable blessing of domestic tranquillity, to obtain a 
 ruler of the highest genius. Mr. Carlyle, with all his 
 contempt of mere talk, and all his admiration for his 
 hero Oliver Cromwell, would hardly hold it to be de- 
 sirable for a Nation to pass through the horrors of a 
 civil war, in order to find out, and to raise to power, 
 the unknown Cromwells who may be concealed 
 among its inhabitants. I am not aware of any means 
 of determining by whom a country is to be ruled, 
 which experience will justify us in considering as 
 more successful than our own system in bringing 
 forward able men, and at the same time consistent 
 with the maintenance of internal peace. 
 
32 ADVANTAGES OF 
 
 Success as a Parliamentary debater is indeed far 
 from being a certain index of a man's fitness for the 
 duties of a Minister, but it is, at least, no bad test 
 of intellectual power, and of the knowledge which a 
 Minister possesses of the affairs entrusted to his ma- 
 nagement. No prompting by subordinates, and no 
 assistance which can be commanded, can prevent the 
 ignorance of a Minister, when it exists, from being 
 brought to light by the strict ordeal of Parliamen- 
 tary discussion. Our system, therefore, affords a very 
 tolerable security that the highest offices of the State 
 shall, in general, be filled by men not greatly want- 
 ing in the indispensable qualifications of capacity and 
 knowledge. Nor is it true, that the confidence of the 
 House of Commons can be gained merely by talents 
 for debate. To win and keep that confidence, other 
 qualities are required ; and these are undoubtedly 
 of a far higher kind, not only than those by which 
 the Ministers of a despotic Sovereign usually obtain 
 the favour of their master, but also than those by 
 which, in the United States, candidates for the Pre- 
 sidency are often recommended to the Electors. A 
 man who has failed to establish, in the party he 
 belongs to, a character for the judgment with which 
 he can conduct it, and for ability, can hardly become, 
 as the leader of the House of Commons, the most 
 important member of a British Ministry. But such 
 
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 33 
 
 a man may, as we know, not only be elected Pre- 
 sident of the United States, but may even owe his 
 being raised to that high position to the fact of his 
 not being distinguished by the possession of eminent 
 talents or any other great qualities. 
 
 Fourthly. It is another advantage of Parliamentary 
 Government, that, by causing the inevitable contests 
 among men for power to assume the form of debates 
 on the policy by which the Nation is to be governed, 
 and on measures affecting its most important in- 
 terests, it has tended to raise these contests above 
 those of a mere selfish and personal character. No 
 doubt selfish and personal interests have often really 
 governed the conduct of Parliamentary leaders and 
 their followers ; but the motives publicly appealed to 
 have been of a far higher order ; and though the prac- 
 tice of politicians has fallen lamentably short of their 
 theory, the habit of Parliamentary debates, in which 
 high principles of right and wrong have been recog- 
 nized, and unworthy conduct meets with severe repro- 
 bation, has tended to raise by degrees the standard to 
 which men are expected to conform in public life, and 
 to render ambitious men less unscrupulous in their 
 conduct in this than in other countries. If we com- 
 pare our own political contests with those of other 
 times and of other nations, I think we may fairly take 
 credit to ourselves to this extent. At the same time, 
 
 D 
 
34 ADVANTAGES OF 
 
 we have little reason to boast ; and we must acknow- 
 ledge and lament, that the improvement made in our 
 own political morality, during the last century, is very 
 small as compared to what is wanted. It is still 
 common for improper means, such as corruption and 
 immoral compliances with the prejudices and passions 
 of the day, intrigue, or abuse of the great power of 
 the Press, to be employed for the purpose of securing 
 victory in Parliamentary contests, and of recommend- 
 ing individuals and parties to the favour of the Nation 
 and of its Representatives. 
 
 Fifthly. The mode in which our Parliamentary 
 contests have been carried on, has had the further 
 and great advantage of contributing much to instruct 
 the Nation at large on all the subjects most deeply 
 concerning its interests, and to form and guide public 
 opinion. If men's passions and feelings were not 
 so much excited by political struggles, it is not likely 
 they would read, as they do, the debates in Parliament 
 in which these subjects are discussed, and in which, 
 amidst all the trash and sophistry that disfigure them, 
 the keen encounter of intellects seldom fails in the 
 end to lead to the discovery of truth and to the tri- 
 umph of sound reason over error. The value of 
 Parliament as an instrument for the instruction of 
 the Nation, and for enabling it to arrive at just and 
 wise conclusions on matters affecting its welfare, is 
 
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 35 
 
 hardly less than that which belongs to it as the organ 
 for expressing and enforcing the national will when 
 it has been deliberately formed. The former function 
 our Parliament discharges much more perfectly than 
 the Congress of the United States, probably, in part, 
 because the debates in Congress are not read with 
 the same interest, from their having no immediate 
 effect on the tenure of power by those to whom the 
 Executive Government is entrusted. 
 
 Such appear to be the chief advantages which 
 belong to Parliamentary Government, as it now exists 
 in this country. On the other hand, it has also its 
 evils and its dangers, which I shall next proceed to 
 consider. 
 
 D 2 
 
36 
 
 CHAPTEE III. 
 
 EVILS AND DANGERS OF PARLIAMENTARY 
 GOVERNMENT. 
 
 AMONG the evils and dangers of our system of Par- 
 liamentary Government, the worst are probably those 
 which arise from its tendency to encourage corrup- 
 tion, including, under the general name of corruption, 
 all the various methods which may be used to bias 
 men from the right exercise of their political power, 
 and the honest discharge of their political duties, by 
 appeals to their selfish interests. A tendency to cor- 
 ruption in this sense of the word is the common evil 
 of all free Governments. No such Government, of 
 which we possess a trustworthy account, has been 
 exempt from the taint, nor do I see any reason for 
 believing that it has prevailed to a greater degree in 
 this country than elsewhere. 
 
 Without going back to ancient times, if we turn 
 to the United States, which stand next to ourselves 
 in the list of nations possessing free Constitutions, we 
 
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 37 
 
 shall find symptoms of the existence of corruption, 
 not less extensive, and of a worse kind than here.* 
 We know, from the authentic evidence of the laws 
 passed against bribery at elections, that corruption in 
 this its most naked form is no more unknown in the 
 United States than among ourselves. The distribu- 
 tion of places in the public service for party and per- 
 sonal objects, instead of with a view to the public 
 interest, takes place there to an extent and with a 
 total absence of any attempt at concealment, which 
 throws quite into the shade any such abuses of which 
 we have to complain. We are told that the accession 
 to office of a new President, is habitually followed by 
 the immediate transfer of some thousands of places 
 from the former holders to his own adherents; and, 
 what is yet worse, imputations have been freely made, 
 not only of the abuse of their trust by public servants 
 in the United States, for the purpose of enriching 
 themselves by illicit gains, but also of such practices 
 having been connived at for party purposes. Money 
 also is notoriously much used, in gaining the support 
 of the Press for measures calculated to promote the 
 interests of individuals or of parties ; and it has even 
 been asserted, and believed, that attempts to obtain 
 the passing of acts of legislation by directly pur- 
 
 * See M. de Tocqueville's 'Democratic en Amerique,' Tremen- 
 heere on the Constitution of the United States, etc. 
 
38 EVILS AND DANGERS OF 
 
 chasing the support of Members of influence in Con- 
 gress, or in the State Legislatures, have neither been 
 uncommon nor unsuccessful. No man believes that 
 in this country the passing of an Act of Parliament 
 could be obtained by the most profuse expenditure of 
 money, in trying to gain the votes of Members of 
 either House ; and the attempt to carry a Bill by such 
 means would be so dangerous, that it is not likely to 
 be made.* 
 
 But there is this peculiarity about Parliamentary 
 Government, as compared with other forms of free 
 government, that in the latter, corruption is as it were 
 an accident, very probably an accident which may 
 always attend them, but still an evil the entire extir- 
 pation of which, if it were possible, would have no 
 tendency to derange their working; whereas Parlia- 
 mentary Government derives its whole force and power 
 of action from the exercise of an influence which is at 
 
 * I fear this assertion only holds good with regard to our public 
 legislation. In the passing of private Bills, and especially of Rail- 
 way Bills, it is believed that money or money's worth has had much 
 influence in both Houses of Parliament. I hope that the extent to 
 which this has been the case is exaggerated, but I am not prepared 
 to dispute the existence of some ground at least for the belief com- 
 monly entertained. It is however to be observed, that in private 
 legislation, the Members of both Houses are subject to much less 
 responsibility (as their conduct is less open to scrutiny) than they 
 are with regard to public Bills, and also that the Government in 
 general exercises a very slight control over the former. 
 
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 39 
 
 least very much akin to corruption. The possession 
 and exercise, by the Ministers of the Crown, of a 
 large measure of authority in Parliament, is the foun- 
 dation upon which our whole system of government 
 rests; while this authority has from the first been 
 maintained principally by means of the patronage of 
 the Crown, and of the power vested in the Adminis- 
 tration, of conferring favours of various kinds on its 
 Parliamentary supporters. Sir Robert Walpole's Ad- 
 ministration has become almost proverbial for its 
 extreme corruption, and there is no doubt that he 
 retained the command of his majority in the House 
 of Commons mainly by corrupt means, among which 
 were included the habitual use of direct money bribes 
 to Members of Parliament. But it seems pretty clear 
 that, with respect to corruption, the chief difference 
 between Sir Robert Walpole and the Ministers who 
 preceded and followed him was, that he took less 
 pains than others to conceal the methods he employed 
 for obtaining Parliamentary support, and that the 
 same methods continued long afterwards, to be as 
 largely and systematically used for the same purpose. 
 
 By degrees corruption ceased to be practised in 
 the coarse form of money bribes to Members of Par- 
 liament; but the same end was attained by jobs of 
 all kinds, perpetrated for the benefit of those who 
 had influence in returning Members of the House of 
 
40 EVILS AND DANGERS OF 
 
 Commons, and by the abtfse of an enormous patron- 
 age, for their advantage. The arts by which this was 
 accomplished, and by which votes in the House of 
 Commons were obtained, in return for favours be- 
 stowed on Members themselves, their patrons, or 
 constituents, were reduced to a regular system, and 
 brought to a high pitch of perfection. This system 
 continued in full force up to the time of passing the 
 Reform Act, in 1832. By that measure, by the diffu- 
 sion of education, and by the increasing power of 
 opinion, a great improvement in political morality 
 has been effected. No Minister would now dare to 
 be guilty of the practices which were formerly com- 
 mon, and favour is become a far less potent instru- 
 ment of government than it was. But it would be 
 idle to deny, that it still continues to be one of the 
 chief sources of the moving force by which the action 
 of the political machine is maintained. The power 
 which the Ministry of the day possesses of conci- 
 liating its Parliamentary supporters, by favours con- 
 ferred upon them, either directly or indirectly, through 
 their friends and constituents, is one of the principal 
 means by which the necessary authority of the Go- 
 vernment in both Houses of Parliament is supported. 
 Parliamentary Government is essentially a govern- 
 ment by party, and one of the bonds by which all 
 parties are kept together is that of the selfish in- 
 
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 41 
 
 terests of their adherents. Among all classes of men 
 who have any share of political power, whether they 
 are Peers, Members of the House of Commons, 
 or electors, there are too many who allow consi- 
 derations of their private advantage, not those of 
 the public good, to determine what party they shall 
 support. Electors, we know, are influenced some- 
 times by actual bribes, or, what is much the same, 
 by money's worth, in the shape of land or houses let 
 to them below their value, sometimes by a wish to 
 secure the favour of those persons in their town or 
 county who are most able to advance their interest. 
 Others again, (often the local leaders of parties,) are 
 led to take an active part in supporting this or that 
 candidate for a seat in the House of Commons, by the 
 hope that, if they are successful, and if the party they 
 espouse is also successful in Parliament, they may 
 expect, by the assistance of the Member to whose re- 
 turn they have contributed, to enjoy a share in the 
 patronage of the Government. 
 
 Corruption is the more apt to prevail in this form, 
 because it is difficult in many cases to distinguish 
 conduct which deserves to be branded with such a 
 reproach, from that which is free from blame. No just 
 objection can be taken to a man's seeking employ- 
 ment in the public service, for himself, his friends 
 or relations, by honourable means ; and he may fairly 
 
42 EVILS AND DANGERS OF 
 
 f 
 
 expect that his political as well as his personal friends 
 will assist him in doing so. Nor can those to whom 
 patronage is entrusted be reasonably censured for 
 giving a preference to their own political friends, in 
 the appointments they make, so long as they neither 
 neglect any just claims to employment on the part of 
 others, nor place it in unworthy hands. It is when 
 men support measures or a party which their judg- 
 ment condemns, for the sake of office, or when they 
 make appointments, knowing them to be wrong, from 
 favour, or to purchase political support, that their 
 conduct is to be regarded as corrupt. The same 
 actions therefore may be corrupt or not, according to 
 the motives from which they spring; and thus men 
 easily deceive themselves, not less than others, as to 
 the true character of what they do. 
 
 This helps to account for the fact, of which I fear 
 there can be no doubt, that the abuse of patronage 
 for the sake of influence is both very common and 
 very injurious to the public interest ; and it is through 
 their constituents that such influence is brought with 
 most power to bear upon Members of the House of 
 Commons. Owing to the love of power and distinc- 
 tion natural to men, there is so general a desire to 
 have a seat in Parliament, and the competition for 
 seats is so keen, that few men can obtain them, ex- 
 cept as the adherents of some considerable party; and 
 
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 43 
 
 the candidates who can procure for their supporters 
 the favours which the Government has to confer, have 
 a decided advantage over their rivals. Thus there is 
 established a chain of influence, from the elector to 
 the Minister, which does not leave the latter at liberty 
 to use the patronage of the Crown with a single eye 
 to the public good, and which is apt to bias both 
 voters and their representatives in the exercise of 
 their respective political powers. ^The Minister can- 
 not dispense with Parliamentary support : to secure 
 it, he must keep those from whom he receives it in 
 good humour ; he cannot therefore resist their urgent 
 applications for favours for their constituents, when 
 they come recommended to him by the Parliamentary 
 Secretary to the Treasury. The Ministerial Member, 
 in his turn, must press on that important functionary 
 the clamorous demands of those -who have influence 
 in the county or borough he represents ; and that 
 his applications may be favourably listened to, he must 
 be ready to answer the calls which the same func- 
 tionary, in his character of " Whip," makes for his 
 vote on party questions. 
 
 But though it is undoubtedly true, that there never 
 has been a Parliamentary Administration which has 
 not owed some part of its strength to the exercise of 
 an influence more or less corrupt in its character, it 
 is certain that in these days (and probably it was 
 
44 EVILS AND DANGERS OF 
 
 true even in the worst times,) no Minister can stand 
 exclusively, or even principally, by such means; nor 
 has corruption so large a share as some cynical 
 writers would make us believe, in carrying on the 
 government of this country. All Parliamentary parties 
 have numbered in their ranks many unscrupulous and 
 self-interested adherents ; and if the motives of men's 
 public conduct were strictly scrutinized, they would 
 seldom be found altogether free from some taint of 
 selfishness. But admitting this to be true, it is not 
 less true that a love for their country, and a sincere 
 desire to promote what they believe to be its interests, 
 have generally a very large share (commonly, I hope, 
 a principal share) in determining men's choice of a 
 political party. And when great occasions have arisen, 
 a generous contempt of their own individual interest, 
 in competition with their public duty, has been re- 
 peatedly shown by all ranks of our countrymen, from 
 the leaders of parties, to the humblest voter in some 
 petty borough. It is when no great public questions 
 have been at issue, and when politics have dege- 
 nerated into a scramble among individuals for the 
 honours and emoluments of office, that corruption 
 has chiefly prevailed. If we were to judge of Parlia- 
 mentary Government by its character in such times, 
 as for instance, the earlier part of the reign of 
 George III., it would be difficult to overcome the 
 
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 45 
 
 feeling of disgust created by the general prevalence 
 of corruption, and the low and sordid motives by 
 which the conduct of politicians seems to have been 
 almost universally governed. But whenever great 
 political questions have arisen, on which men's real 
 opinions have been much divided, parties have been 
 formed and bound together far more by agreement 
 and sympathy on these subjects, than by the pur- 
 suit of selfish interests. Men have been found to 
 adhere honourably to such parties, under circum- 
 stances of the greatest discouragement ; and the people 
 have shown themselves superior to all base and mer- 
 cenary motives, in the exercise of their political rights. 
 The general election in which Mr. Pitt defeated 
 the Coalition, and that of 1831, which secured the 
 passing of the Reform Act, may be cited as cases in 
 which this has happened. 
 
 A tendency to encourage corruption, and especially 
 that kind of corruption which consists in the misuse 
 of patronage, must however be regarded as inherent 
 in the system of Parliamentary Government. Nor 
 can it be denied that this system of Government, 
 even when most purely administered, is unfavourable 
 to the selection of men for the subaltern employ- 
 ments in the public service with a single view to 
 their fitness. Every Government which depends for 
 its existence upon the support of a party, must neces- 
 
46 EVILS AND DANGERS OF 
 
 sarily be influenced more dr less by considerations of 
 party interest, in making its appointments, and can- 
 not therefore enjoy the same facilities as Govern- 
 ments of another character for bringing only the 
 fittest persons into the service of the State. 
 
 The practice of giving the patronage of the State 
 chiefly to the party in power, has also a tendency to 
 increase the bitterness of party contests, and to excite 
 a spirit of faction in the Nation. This must be ad- 
 mitted to be a serious drawback from the advantages 
 of Parliamentary Government ; and it is an evil which 
 springs so directly from the same sources as the ad- 
 vantages of the system, as hardly to admit of being 
 separated from them. 
 
 In the above remarks, I have adverted to the ex- 
 ercise of patronage only so far as it relates to sub- 
 ordinate offices in the public service ; I have already * 
 endeavoured to show that the manner in which the 
 distribution of the highest is provided for, under the 
 system of Parliamentary Government, possesses great 
 advantages. But it would be a mistake to suppose 
 that its rules upon this subject do not, in some re- 
 spects, lead to inconvenience. The difficulties arising 
 from party connections, and the necessity of conferring 
 these offices on men who belong to the same party 
 and can act together, must generally prevent them 
 
 * See Chapter II. 
 
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 47 
 
 from being all held, at any one time, by those most 
 fit for them. A general change of Administration, 
 even when most decidedly for the better on the 
 whole, usually involves the transfer of some offices to 
 worse hands ; and the State has often lost services 
 which could ill be spared in some department, because 
 the person by whom it was well managed belonged to 
 a Cabinet, of which the members, collectively, failed 
 to satisfy Parliament and the Country. This is an 
 inconvenience which obviously belongs to party go- 
 vernment by its very nature ; but the difficulty goes 
 further. Even within the ranks of the same party, it 
 has occasionally happened, that an important depart- 
 ment cannot be entrusted to the person who, from his 
 knowledge and experience, is the fittest to conduct 
 it, because he does not agree in opinion, upon matters 
 entirely unconnected with the business of that de- 
 partment, with those who would be his colleagues 
 if he accepted office. Thus, the man most capable of 
 carrying on the business of the Exchequer, or of the 
 Admiralty, might be excluded from either of these 
 departments, because he differed from the Prime Mi- 
 nister, or other Members of the Government, upon 
 Church questions, or questions of foreign policy. 
 
 This has been regarded by some persons* as so 
 serious an evil, that they have proposed to attempt its 
 
 * See ' Cox's British Commonwealth.' 
 
48 EVILS AND DANGERS OF 
 
 removal by a change of the rule which makes all the 
 Members of the Cabinet answerable for the measures 
 adopted in every department of the Government. In- 
 stead of this, it has been suggested that each Minister 
 should only be held responsible for his own acts ; by 
 which arrangement, it has been argued, that far greater 
 facilities than now exist would be afforded for obtaining 
 the services of the ablest men in every branch of the 
 Administration, with the further advantage of relieving 
 thos who conduct the great departments of the State 
 from being embarrassed by the necessity of obtaining 
 the assent to their measures of colleagues who must 
 be less perfectly acquainted than themseLves with the 
 matters to which they relate. It is urged, that the af- 
 fairs of this country are now so complicated and diver- 
 sified, that it would be difficult to find even two men 
 entertaining the same views upon them in all points, 
 and that it is absurd to suppose that such an agree- 
 ment is possible among the larger number of persons 
 composing a Cabinet. Besides its increasing the dif- 
 ficulty of filling the high offices of the Government in 
 the best manner, the practice of making all the Mem- 
 bers of the Cabinet jointly responsible for each other's 
 act^, must therefore, it is said, have the effect of 
 compelling them to profess a concurrence of opinion 
 with each other which cannot really exist, and must at 
 the same time expose each Minister to be thwarted, in 
 
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 49 
 
 conducting his own department, by the conflicting 
 views of his colleagues. 
 
 No doubt this is a plausible objection to the sy- 
 stem of Parliamentary Government, and one which is 
 by no means entirely without foundation. Under this 
 system, as it now exists amongst us, it is true that 
 able men, who might each manage his own depart- 
 ment under an absolute Sovereign, cannot always 
 combine to carry on together a Government, for all 
 the acts of which they must be jointly responsible 
 to Parliament; and that, when they do so, they 
 must be prepared to make considerable concessions 
 of their individual opinions to those of their col- 
 leagues, without avowing the difference in public. 
 But the inconvenience arising from this cause is 
 not found in practice to be so serious as might have 
 been anticipated. A general concurrence of opinion 
 among the Members of a Cabinet, as to the main 
 objects to which the measures of the Government 
 are to be directed, usually leads them to agree on 
 the means by which these ends are to be pursued, 
 so far as is necessary to enable them to act toge- 
 ther. And, so long as no insurmountable differences 
 arise on questions of importance to the welfare of 
 the Nation, all those who have the honour of serving 
 the Crown feel it to be their duty to waive some 
 of their individual opinions, for the sake of ren- 
 
50 EVILS AiND DANGERS OF 
 
 dering it possible for the Government to be carried 
 on. 
 
 Nor ought the common responsibility of the whole 
 Cabinet, for the measures taken by the several Mi- 
 nisters in their own departments, to interfere injuri- 
 ously with the vigour and despatch with which these 
 departments are administered. It is only so far as 
 regards the general line of policy pursued in each 
 department, and as to important measures, that every 
 Minister is to be considered liable to blame for what 
 has been wrongly done by another. The amount 
 of business to be transacted in the public offices of 
 this Country is so great, that it is impossible its de- 
 tails should be submitted to the Cabinet ; and it is 
 clear that the Members of the Cabinet cannot be 
 regarded as really answerable for measures taken 
 without their concurrence, though it is very properly 
 held that they are bound to support what has been 
 done by a colleague, unless, on becoming aware of it, 
 they have marked their disapproval by withdrawing 
 from the Government. Among honourable men this 
 can lead to no difficulty, since a Minister entitled to 
 that character would never think of taking, without 
 the knowledge of his colleagues, steps which he thinks 
 they would disapprove ; while they, on the other hand, 
 feel that, in considering any question brought before 
 them, much deference is due to the opinion of the 
 
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 51 
 
 Head of the Government, and to that of the Chief of 
 the department to which it relates. 
 
 It is right, or rather it is absolutely necessary, that 
 all the Members of a Ministry should be guided by 
 this feeling, because, unless the measures adopted in 
 any of the principal branches of the public service are 
 allowed to take their main direction and colour from 
 a, single mind, they must necessarily become marked 
 with that character of feebleness and uncertainty al- 
 ways attaching to any important course of action, the 
 successive steps of which are decided upon by several 
 persons entertaining views not perfectly identical. So 
 long therefore as there is no such difference upon great 
 questions of policy, as to make it necessary that the 
 Members of a Cabinet should cease to act together, 
 they best discharge their public duty by generally 
 acquiescing in what may be recommended by each 
 Minister in his own department, after he has fully 
 heard the opinions of his colleagues. Every Minister 
 presiding over a great department, ought to derive 
 much assistance from the advice of his colleagues, and 
 his own views must often be modified by theirs ; and 
 yet it ought seldom to happen, that the difficulty of 
 obtaining their assent should prevent him from fol- 
 lowing the final dictates of his own judgment, when 
 he has a decided opinion on any important question 
 he may bring before the Cabinet. 
 
 E 2 
 
52 EVILS AND DANGERS OF 
 
 Injury to the public service is most apt to arise 
 from the common responsibility of the Members of 
 the Cabinet, when its Chief, or the Minister entrusted 
 with any department, throws himself too much on 
 the assistance of others, and does not recommend with 
 sufficient decision what measures should be taken in 
 pursuance of the policy he is charged with directing. 
 The deliberations of a Cabinet seldom lead to a sa- 
 tisfactory result, when any question of difficulty is 
 brought under its consideration by a Minister who is 
 not prepared to lay before his colleagues some distinct 
 opinion of his own. The true cause of questions being 
 submitted to the Cabinet in this unsatisfactory man- 
 ner, is sometimes to be found in the fact, that a dif- 
 ference of opinion on some great principle, or on some 
 vital point of policy, really exists among the Mem- 
 bers of an Administration, though it is concealed for a 
 time by a reluctance on both sides to come to a clear 
 understanding on the subject. In such cases both 
 parties are generally wrong in seeking to avoid, or to 
 defer, a separation which ought, for the public good, 
 to take place at once. Of two lines of policy, it often 
 happens that either might succeed if steadily pursued; 
 but failure is certain, when the Members of an Admi- 
 nistration, knowing that they could not agree, shrink 
 from coming to a clear decision to adopt either, and 
 are content to determine separately each step that has 
 
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 53 
 
 to be taken, so long as it is possible to stave off a 
 rupture by abstaining from any decided measure on 
 the one side or on the other. 
 
 Upon the whole, I do not believe the inconvenience 
 that results from holding all the Members of an Ad- 
 ministration jointly answerable for its acts, to be so 
 serious as is sometimes supposed ; but were it greater 
 than it really is, the existing practice could not be 
 altered without altering the whole character of our 
 Government. Party connection must cease to be the 
 mainspring of its movements, if every Member of 
 the Administration could no longer depend upon 
 the support of his colleagues, and if they did not all 
 continue to act in strict union. But further ; those 
 who have proposed that each Minister should be 
 held responsible only for his own acts, seem to forget 
 that the various departments of the Administra- 
 tion are but parts of a single machine, all the opera- 
 tions of which are directed to one common end, and 
 that the various branches of the Government have 
 a close connection and mutual dependence on each 
 other. Questions of foreign policy, for instance, have 
 constantly to be considered with reference to those 
 affecting our domestic and colonial interests ; and in 
 the administration of the Army and Navy, the nature 
 of the demands upon these services, which are to be 
 anticipated from the state of affairs both at home and 
 
54 EVILS AND DANGERS OF 
 
 abroad, as well as the extent to which it is proper to 
 draw T upon the resources of the Nation, must be taken 
 into account in coming to every important decision. 
 Instead of loosening the bonds that unite the different 
 branches of the Government, it would rather be de- 
 sirable to draw them tighter. The fault of being too 
 departmental has been justly attributed to some Ad- 
 ministrations, of which the Chiefs have not held the 
 reins with firmness, and have failed to exercise the 
 authority which properly belongs to their office, in 
 order to secure that harmonious co-operation among 
 the different departments on which the efficiency of 
 the Government so much depends. Perhaps it would 
 be for the advantage of the public service, if the 
 hands of the Prime Minister were strengthened, and 
 if a larger measure of authority were entrusted to him, 
 in order to render this less likely to recur in future. 
 
 To return, however, to the point more immediately 
 under consideration, I would remark, that there is no 
 form of Government in which evil influences of some 
 kind are not brought to bear upon the choice of those 
 who are to serve the State, either in high or in subor- 
 dinate offices. These influences are different in each 
 different kind of Government; and while I admit their 
 existence and their injurious effects under our own, I 
 believe that no other can be shown to have suffered 
 less from them in some of their many various shapes. 
 
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 55 
 
 I have stated in the last Chapter, that one of the 
 merits of this kind of government is, its tendency to 
 make those contests for power which are inevitable 
 amongst men, take the form of debates upon ques- 
 tions of policy, and upon the measures affecting the 
 interest of the Nation which are brought before Par- 
 liament. These debates are thus rendered a valuable 
 instrument for enlightening the public mind; but 
 with this advantage is unfortunately united the great 
 evil, that the same circumstance leads too often to 
 questions deeply affecting the welfare of the People 
 being decided, not on their merits, but according to 
 their bearing on the interests of political parties. 
 Measures are apt to be supported, or opposed, not 
 because they are good or bad in themselves, but 
 because they have been brought forward by this or 
 that party ; and nothing is more common than for a 
 popular cry to be got up in favour of some mis- 
 chievous scheme, or against some useful proposal, 
 merely for the purpose of overturning or giving 
 strength to a Ministry. Many examples are to be 
 found in our history, of bad measures having been 
 carried, and of good ones having been rejected or 
 delayed, owing to this cause. 
 
 So also there are drawbacks from the advantages 
 which I have stated in the last Chapter, to arise from 
 the practice of discussing questions of foreinn policy 
 
56 EVILS AND DANGERS OF 
 
 in Parliament. The debates upon such subjects, in- 
 stead of serving, as they ought, to enlighten the Na- 
 tion with respect to its duties and its true interests 
 in its relations with foreign countries, have sometimes 
 become the means of encouraging the most pernicious 
 errors. Opponents of the Government, instead of con- 
 demning its errors, have occasionally been guilty of 
 attacking it for having done right, or for not having 
 gone far enough in a wrong policy, and in assert- 
 ing unreasonable pretensions against other Powers. 
 Public men have not always resisted the temptation 
 of vying with each other in courting the favour of 
 the People, by flattering their passions and prejudices, 
 instead of enforcing the principles of justice and a 
 high standard of political morality. 
 
 An impartial consideration of the nature and effects 
 of Parliamentary Government, leads to a recognition 
 of the evils I have pointed out in this Chapter, as 
 detracting in no small degree from its merits. At 
 the same time, in admitting these faults, it is to be 
 observed that, for the most part, they belong to it in 
 common with every other form of free Government, 
 since they arise mainly from the tendency of the 
 People to misuse the power placed in their hands. 
 And, granting that there is this tendency in all free 
 Governments, we must not forget, either that power, 
 wherever it is placed, must always be liable to abuse ; 
 
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 57 
 
 and that flatterers, for their own purposes, will try 
 to mislead those to whom it is entrusted or that a 
 long experience has proved, that the abuses prevailing 
 in despotic Governments have been far greater, and 
 far more injurious to the welfare of the People, than 
 those to which political liberty gives rise under a well- 
 regulated Constitution. If we compare what has been 
 the condition of the People under free and under 
 arbitrary Governments, in all ages of the world, we 
 can have no hesitation, in spite of their faults, in 
 giving a preference to the former ; and among these, 
 we may assert with confidence, that there is none in 
 which evil has been found to be mixed up with good 
 in a smaller proportion than in our own system of 
 Parliamentary Government. 
 
58 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 SEASONS OF THE SUCCESS OF PARLIAMENTARY 
 GOVERNMENT. 
 
 I HAVE remarked in the first Chapter that our own 
 Country, since the Revolution of 1688, affords the 
 only example which is to be found, of a Parliamen- 
 tary Government carried on with success for any 
 considerable number of years. In considering what 
 peculiar circumstances there may be to account for 
 the success of this kind of Government in this one 
 instance only, our attention cannot fail to be imme- 
 diately arrested by the fact, that the British Parlia- 
 ment differs widely in its character from the Legis- 
 latures which have been elsewhere constituted for 
 the purpose of introducing a similar system of go- 
 vernment. 
 
 The House of Lords has always been recognized 
 as a body peculiar to this country, and one which 
 it is impossible to imitate by creating a Peerage, 
 
REASONS OF SUCCESS. 59 
 
 where such an institution has not grown up, so as to 
 derive from long prescription the authority which 
 nothing else could impart to it. But the difference 
 between the British Parliament and the Legislatures 
 which have been established on the same general 
 model in other countries, is by no means exclusively, 
 nor perhaps even principally, due to the peculiar cha- 
 racter of the Upper House. The House of Commons 
 is also very unlike all the other Representative Bodies 
 of which I have ever seen a description. It is dis- 
 tinguished from them mainly by the variety of the 
 elements which enter into its composition, and by its 
 having among its Members some returned by consti- 
 tuencies of a highly democratic character, with many 
 others who owe their Seats to various kinds of influ- 
 ence, rather than to the free choice of large bodies 
 of electors. Before the passing of the Reform Act, 
 Members of the last description were so numerous, 
 as to constitute a large majority of the whole House, 
 and they still form no small proportion of it ; since it 
 was neither the design nor the effect of that measure 
 to accomplish such a total change in the character of 
 the House of Commons, as would have resulted from 
 an attempt to make it conform to the notion com- 
 monly entertained of a perfect Representation of the 
 People. 
 
 The anomalies and irregularities of our Represen- 
 
60 REASONS OF THE SUCCESS 
 
 tative system are often, but I believe very incorrectly, 
 regarded as mere abuses, the entire removal of which 
 is indispensable for the purification of the British 
 Constitution. Without denying the reality of the 
 abuses which arose from the manner in which many 
 Seats were obtained in the unreformed House of 
 Commons, or even that these abuses still exist to 
 a considerable extent, it seems to me that the evil 
 has been by no means unmixed with good, and 
 that reasons are not wanting for regarding the ir- 
 regularities of our Representation as having consti- 
 tuted so important a part of the machine of our 
 Government, that the purposes they have answered 
 could not have been left unprovided for without 
 putting a stop to its working. It is certain, at all 
 events, that, from a much earlier date than the com- 
 mencement of Parliamentary Government in this 
 country, these irregularities have existed; and whe- 
 ther it be thought that our Constitution would have 
 been better or worse without them, there can be no 
 doubt that it would have been very different. 
 
 Hence it can only be a matter of speculation, on 
 which we have no experience to guide our judgment, 
 how our system of government would have worked, 
 with what is called a perfectly pure system of Re- 
 presentation. But in questions of government, the 
 speculations of even the most enlightened reasoners 
 
OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. Gl 
 
 are little to be trusted. We know that Constitutions 
 drawn up on speculative principles, have almost in- 
 variably failed in practice ; consequently, nothing but 
 experience can be considered to afford safe means of 
 judging how any system of government will be found 
 to work. I therefore hold, that the mere fact, that 
 the history of the world affords, as yet, no example of 
 the permanent success of Parliamentary Government 
 with a Legislature formed on the strict principle of 
 popular Representation, would alone be sufficient to 
 create serious doubts whether it could be carried on 
 under such conditions. But it is further to be ob- 
 served, that we cannot examine with care the cha- 
 racter and composition of the House of Commons, 
 and the manner in which they have affected its con- 
 duct, without finding strong reasons for believing that 
 the success with which it has been able to take so 
 active a part in the government of the Country, and 
 its peculiar excellencies, are to be attributed, quite 
 as much as some of its faults, to what are regarded 
 as defects and departures from principle in our Re- 
 presentative system. 
 
 In the first place, it is to be remarked, that it is 
 chiefly by means of these defects that the Ministers 
 of the Crown have been enabled to obtain the autho- 
 rity they have exercised in the House of Commons. 
 Their possession of that authority is what gives its 
 
62 REASONS OF THE SUCCESS 
 
 peculiar character to Parliamentary, as compared to 
 other forms of Representative Government, and it is 
 also what has enabled the House of Commons to 
 become distinguished from other popular assemblies 
 by the steadiness with which it generally acts, and 
 by its seldom allowing itself to be led into rash and 
 inconsistent decisions. At some periods the power of 
 the Crown in Parliament has doubtless been exces- 
 sive, so as occasionally even to threaten to deprive the 
 Nation of the real enjoyment of political liberty ; but 
 it is not the less certain that it is of the very essence 
 of Parliamentary Government, that the servants of 
 the Crown should possess some considerable power 
 within the walls of the House of Commons, and that 
 hitherto they have obtained this power through the 
 irregularities of its composition. Had all its Mem- 
 bers been returned by such constituencies as West- 
 minster or Yorkshire, it must be plain to the most 
 careless observer, that the working of the Government 
 as it has hitherto been carried on would have been 
 impracticable. 
 
 A comparison of the House of Commons with other 
 Representative Bodies elected under a more popular, 
 and what is usually regarded as a purer system, leads 
 further to the conclusion, that the manner in which it 
 has been chosen has been favourable to its character 
 as a deliberative Assembly. Among such Bodies, that 
 
OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 63 
 
 which may be regarded as coming next to it in 
 importance, is the House of Representatives in the 
 United States. That House exercises authority over a 
 nation which stands in the very first rank among the 
 nations of the world ; it is chosen by a population 
 which, taken altogether, cannot be regarded as inferior 
 to our own in education and intelligence; indeed I 
 fear that in these qualifications for the exercise of 
 political power, the inhabitants of the British Empire 
 are decidedly inferior to those of the Eastern States 
 of the American Union, arid are scarcely equal to 
 the average of the whole Republic. If therefore the 
 systems of election in the two countries were equally 
 well calculated to secure the return of efficient legis- 
 lative bodies, the House of Representatives in the 
 United States ought to show no inferiority to the 
 House of Commons ; whereas the fact of its great 
 inferiority is undoubted. So impartial and acute an 
 observer as M. de Tocqueville* describes its defici- 
 encies in the strongest terms, and his testimony is con- 
 firmed by that of almost every other traveller. Still 
 more decisive evidence to the same effect may be 
 drawn from comparing the reports of the proceedings 
 of the House of Representatives at Washington with 
 those of the House of Commons. No one can have 
 been in the habit of doing so, without being struck 
 
 * ' Democratic en Amerique,' vol. i. p. 241. (13th Edition.) 
 
64 REASONS OF THE SUCCESS 
 
 with the far higher tone, both of intellectual power and 
 of moral feeling, displayed in the debates of the latter. 
 In the decorum and dignity with which its business 
 is habitually conducted, the House of Commons has 
 a still greater advantage. Accordingly, the debates 
 of the British Parliament excite much more interest 
 throughout the civilized world, and exercise a much 
 greater influence over opinion both at home and 
 abroad, than those of the American Congress. 
 
 This superiority of the House of Commons is, I 
 think, to be ascribed in a great measure to the cir- 
 cumstance of its Members not all owing their seats 
 to the choice of large bodies of constituents. Had 
 they all been thus returned, experience justifies the 
 inference, that they would have consisted almost ex- 
 clusively of men ready to adopt, and make themselves 
 the organs of, the popular feeling of the day, what- 
 ever it may be. The men of enlightened views and 
 independent character, but unfitted for encountering 
 the storms of a popular election, who have hitherto 
 been found in the House of Commons, would have 
 been almost, if not altogether, excluded from it. But 
 it is the mixture of men of this sort with others sym- 
 pathizing more closely with the People, and express- 
 ing their passions and feelings, the great variety, in 
 short, of different elements entering into its com- 
 position, which has given to the House of Commons 
 
OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 65 
 
 its very peculiar character. To this we owe, more 
 especially, its having answered so admirably the pur- 
 pose of a public instructor. If there had not existed 
 facilities for the entrance into the House of Commons 
 of able men holding unpopular opinions, as well as 
 of Members expressing the conflicting views of the 
 various classes of society, and of the many different 
 interests which exist in the Nation, its debates would 
 have lost much of their interest, and still more of 
 their value, as the means of enlightening the minds 
 of the People, and gradually dispeUing prevailing 
 errors. I must add, that an examination of our Par- 
 liamentary records will prove, that a large majority of 
 the chief ornaments of the House of Commons, from 
 the Revolution to the present time, have been in- 
 debted for their first entrance within its walls to the 
 existence of those irregularities in our system of Re- 
 presentation which have been so much complained of. 
 While the Reform Bill was under discussion, its op- 
 ponents relied much on the argument that the rotten 
 Boroughs had been the means of introducing into the 
 House of Commons a large proportion of its most 
 distinguished Members, nor was this assertion denied 
 by the enlightened advocates of that measure. With- 
 out contesting the fact, that in this respect the then 
 state of our Representation had been attended with 
 advantage, they held, that it had become the source 
 
 F 
 
66 REASONS OF THE SUCCESS 
 
 of evils outweighing any benefit derived from it, and 
 that a state of things had grown up which rendered 
 a change of the system, to the extent then proposed, 
 necessary for the welfare of the country. 
 
 There is yet another consequence of the irregu- 
 larities which have always existed, and still continue 
 to exist, in our Representative system, that has con- 
 tributed to the success of Parliamentary Government. 
 It has been remarked by Blackstone, that " in all ty- 
 rannical governments, the supreme magistracy, or the 
 right of both making and enforcing the laws, is vested 
 in one and the same man, or in one and the same 
 body of men; and whenever these two powers are 
 united together, there can be no public liberty. The 
 magistrate may enact tyrannical laws, and execute 
 them in a tyrannical manner, since he is possessed, in 
 his quality of dispenser of justice, with all the power 
 he, as legislator, thinks proper to give himself."* 
 The House of Commons, under the system of Par- 
 liamentary Government, unites with its legislative 
 authority a complete control over the Executive Go- 
 vernment, through the Ministers of the Crown, who 
 hold their offices only while they retain its confi- 
 dence. There would thus seem to be some danger that 
 our Constitution might produce that concentration 
 of power in the same hands, which Blackstone, in the 
 
 * Blackstone's Commentaries, Boot I. chap. ii. 
 
OP PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 67 
 
 foregoing passage, has justly described as constituting 
 a tyranny. We have however escaped this danger, 
 and may congratulate ourselves upon enjoying a larger 
 measure of public liberty, (meaning by that phrase a 
 state of things in which all men enjoy security for 
 their persons and property, together with an absence 
 of any undue restrictions on the freedom of individual 
 thought and action,) than any other nation on the 
 earth. 
 
 For this great happiness, I believe that we are 
 indebted to the peculiar character of our system of 
 Representation, which has admitted the democratic 
 element into the House of Commons without allowing 
 it to become predominant. The powers already en- 
 joyed by that House are so large, that, if it were to 
 abuse them, and to be supported in doing so by the 
 Nation, it might easily engross all those which pro- 
 perly belong to the other constituted authorities of 
 the State, and thus establish a complete tyranny. 
 That this should not have happened, notwithstanding 
 the general tendency to encroachment which belongs 
 to all rulers and ruling bodies, is, I think, to be 
 accounted for only by the circumstance that our sy- 
 stem of Representation has always given an ascend- 
 ancy in the House of Commons to the upper classes 
 of society, who have felt that they could not hope to 
 retain the great power thus placed in their hands, 
 
 r 2 
 
68 REASONS OF THE SUCCESS 
 
 unless they exercised it in a spirit of moderation and 
 of respect for the rights of others. If the House of 
 Commons had been so constituted as to render it the 
 mere organ of the popular will, this motive to mode- 
 ration in the exercise of its powers would have been 
 wanting, and these powers would at the same time 
 have been enormously increased, because there would 
 have existed no appeal against any abuse of power 
 by the House of Commons, to the opinion of a larger 
 public than that by which it is elected. Various ex- 
 amples might be quoted from our history, showing 
 how useful a check has been exercised on the House 
 of Commons by opinion out of doors. I will, how- 
 ever, only refer to the famous case of Wilkes, and to 
 the questions which have more than once arisen be- 
 tween the House and the other authorities of the 
 State, as to the extent of its privileges. 
 
 This check would be almost entirely destroyed, 
 if the House of Commons were chosen in such a 
 manner as to make it directly reflect the wishes, and 
 express the feelings and passions of the numerical 
 majority of the population. To estimate the import- 
 ance of such a change, we must bear in mind, that it 
 is the nature of an unbalanced democracy, at least as 
 much as of a despotism, to weigh oppressively upon 
 all who venture to oppose the will of the governing 
 power. M. cle Tocqueville has borne testimony to the 
 
OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 69 
 
 manner in which this has been felt in the United 
 States : he says :* " Ce que je reproche le plus au 
 gouvernement democratique, tel qu'on Fa organise aux 
 Etats Unis, ce n'est pas, comme beaucoup de gens le 
 pretendent en Europe, sa faiblesse, mais au contraire 
 sa force irresistible. Et ce qui me repugne le plus en 
 Amerique, ce n'est pas 1'extreme liberte qui y regne, 
 c'est le peu de garantie qu'on y trouve contre la 
 tyrannic." Again he says, " Je ne connais pas de 
 pays ou il regne en general moins d'independence 
 d 'esprit et de veritable liberte de discussion qu'en 
 Amerique." 
 
 Such is the evidence of so unexceptionable a witness 
 as M. de Tocqueville, as to the effect in the United 
 States of a purely democratic government. Yet, how- 
 ever democratic may be the constitution of that Re- 
 public, it is one which provides checks against the 
 abuse of power by the governing majority, which 
 would be entirely wanting in this country, if the House 
 of Commons were a purely democratic body. In the 
 American Union, the division of authority between 
 the Central and the State Governments, and the inde- 
 pendence of the President in the exercise of his exe- 
 cutive functions, together with the constitution of the 
 Supreme Court, effectually prevent the concentration 
 of all power in the hands of one man or of one set 
 
 * Democratic en Amerique, vol. i. p. 305. 
 
70 REASONS OF THE SUCCESS 
 
 of men. But in this country, the machinery of the 
 Government places in the hands of the House of 
 Commons such means of overruling all the other 
 authorities of the State, that, if it were elected under 
 a purely democratic system, it could hardly fail, in 
 times of popular excitement, to become an irresistible 
 engine for carrying into effect any measure, however 
 violent, which the passions of the People might dic- 
 tate. Unrestrained by any of the checks upon abuse 
 created in the United States by the division of au- 
 thority, such a House of Commons would find, in the 
 extreme use of its acknowledged powers, easy means 
 of compelling the Crown, the House of Lords, and 
 even the Courts of Law, to become the mere instru- 
 ments of its will. 
 
 Among the circumstances which have produced a 
 marked effect upon the character of the House of 
 Commons, that of its being elected for a period of 
 seven years, unless sooner dissolved by the authority 
 of the Crown, must not be lost sight of. Although it 
 was formerly, and is still to a certain extent, a popular 
 doctrine, that the duration of Parliaments ought to be 
 abridged, and that the Septennial Act was an unfor- 
 tunate and improper measure, I see no ground what- 
 ever for this opinion. On the contrary, I concur in 
 the opinion entertained by some of the highest au- 
 thorities of our own times, and which is said also to 
 
OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 71 
 
 have been held by Speaker Onslow,* that the begin- 
 ning of a great improvement in the character, and a 
 corresponding increase in the influence, of the House 
 of Commons, may be dated from the passing of the 
 Septennial Act. From not being too frequently re- 
 newed, the Members of that House have become, as 
 a body, more experienced in the transaction of bu- 
 siness, and there has been greater consistency and 
 steadiness in its conduct than when the duration of 
 Parliaments was limited to three years. Above all, 
 the extension of the term for which the House has 
 been elected, has been favourable to its maintaining 
 its proper character, as a deliberative assembly, in- 
 stead of becoming an assembly of delegates, not ex- 
 ercising their own judgment on the various questions 
 submitted to them, but merely expressing the wishes 
 of the several bodies of constituents by whom they 
 are returned. The extreme importance of not lowering 
 the Members of the House of Commons into mere 
 delegates, has been admirably explained by Burke, 
 in his well-known speech at Bristol ; and very little 
 observation of the proceedings of Parliament and of 
 popular elections is necessary, in order to perceive 
 how difficult it would be for Members of the House 
 of Commons to preserve the power of acting at all on 
 
 * See Lord John Kussell's Essay on the English Government, 
 p. 214. 
 
72 REASONS OF THE SUCCESS 
 
 their own independent judgment, if they were com- 
 pelled too frequently to submit to the ordeal of a 
 new election. Even as it is, I fear that Members are 
 far too much disposed to vote against their own 
 opinions and their own knowledge of what is right, in 
 deference to popular clamour excited by ignorance or 
 passion, and that their tendency to do so is increasing. 
 It is an alarming symptom of deterioration, in the 
 character of public men and of the House of Com- 
 mons, that it has more than once happened, of late 
 years, that motions have been carried, so decidedly 
 against the opinion of a large proportion of those 
 who have voted for them, that they have not scrupled 
 in private to express their regret at finding themselves 
 in a majority. 
 
 Before I quit the subject of the character of the 
 House of Commons, I must notice one objection that 
 is frequently made, to its being composed in such a 
 manner as to include men of such various opinions, 
 and to place a preponderating influence in the hands 
 of those who do not represent the wishes of the nume- 
 rical majority of the Nation. It is said that, owing 
 to this, great delay arises in effecting the various 
 reforms that are required, and in carrying all useful 
 legislation ; and it is a common complaint, that there 
 is so much talking and so little done in Parliament. 
 No doubt this is, to some extent, an evil ; but I 
 
OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 73 
 
 believe it to be one much exaggerated, and for which 
 there is ample compensation in advantages which 
 would be lost if attempts were made, unless with 
 extreme caution, to render the action of Parliament 
 more prompt and easy. The facilities which the ex- 
 isting constitution of Parliament affords, for resistance 
 to changes in our legislation, by those who conceive 
 their interests to be threatened by them, are not so 
 great as ever to prevent the ultimate passing of mea- 
 sures called for by the voice of the Nation. At pre- 
 sent the fault of the House of Commons is, not that 
 the power it gives to popular opinion, or clamour (for 
 they are not always easily distinguished), is too small, 
 but rather that it is perhaps too great. From this 
 cause it sometimes happens that measures, for which 
 there is a momentary cry, are rashly granted, con- 
 trary to the true interest of the Nation and the 
 opinion of the majority of enlightened men; while 
 various other measures, which such men would gene- 
 rally concur in recommending as wise, are not even 
 proposed, from a fear of offending the prejudices of 
 the day. 
 
 Certainly it cannot be said, with any colour of 
 reason, that public opinion is too weak, since, when it 
 is finally and clearly formed upon any question, it 
 invariably triumphs. The difficulty which it has to 
 surmount in doing so, is not more than is necessary 
 
74 REASONS OF THE SUCCESS 
 
 in order to secure the due consideration of objections 
 to measures for which there is a popular cry, and to 
 afford means for testing by discussion the sound- 
 ness or fallacy of conflicting arguments. A few years, 
 though much in the life of an individual, are little 
 in the life of a Nation; and some delay in passing 
 useful measures may well be submitted to, as cheaply 
 purchasing the advantages we obtain in return for 
 it. Among these advantages, the intellectual and 
 moral training which the Nation derives from the 
 discussion of changes in the law which encounter 
 serious resistance, is not perhaps one of the smallest ; 
 but what is most important is, that such changes can 
 seldom be carried until after they have received such 
 ample deliberation, and till public opinion is so com- 
 pletely settled with regard to them, that, when once 
 passed, they are almost invariably permanent, and 
 more completely effective than they could become if 
 adopted in a different manner. If we look back at 
 the history of our legislation, for many years past, we 
 shall find that it has been steadily progressive ; and 
 that, although some of the greatest improvements in 
 our laws have not been achieved without years of 
 arduous struggle, yet, when once accomplished, they 
 have been secure against all attempts to repeal them, 
 and have commanded the complete obedience of the 
 Nation. 
 
OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 75 
 
 Experience proves that these advantages are not 
 equally enjoyed in countries the institutions of which 
 present greater facilities for prompt legislation. Good 
 laws, passed prematurely, before the minds and habits 
 of the People are prepared for them, are seldom pro- 
 perly obeyed ; nor would it be difficult to point out 
 cases in which measures, wise in themselves, adopted 
 by despotic rulers more enlightened than their sub- 
 jects, have, from this cause, failed to produce the 
 benefit which might have been reasonably expected 
 from them. So also in those popular governments 
 where no obstacle exists to the immediate accom- 
 plishment of every change in the law which is de- 
 manded by the majority of the People, it is found that 
 that majority is disposed to act under the influence of 
 sudden impulse rather than of deliberate conviction, 
 and that the instability of the law too often detracts 
 from its usefulness. M. de Tocqueville informs us 
 that this is strikingly the case in the United States, 
 where he describes it as common for laws to be 
 made and again repealed with a lightness amounting 
 to caprice, and leading to serious inconvenience.* 
 
 * He quotes the opinions expressed by Hamilton, Madison, and 
 Jefferson, as to the magnitude of the evil arising from the instability 
 of legislation in the United States. The first of these distinguished 
 men speaks of it as " the greatest blemish in the character and genius 
 of our government ;" and Jefferson thought the inconvenience so 
 great as to require the adoption of very severe restrictions on the 
 power of the Legislature. Democratic en Amerique, vol. i. p. 243. 
 
76 REASONS OF THE SUCCESS 
 
 Though the progress of legislative improvement in 
 this country may seem too slow to men of eager and 
 impatient tempers, if we consider fairly what has been 
 done since the meeting of the first reformed Parlia- 
 ment, we shall find no just grounds for complaining of 
 the rate of our advance, when we remember how safely 
 and surely that progress has been made. 
 
 At the same time, I am far from denying that there 
 is a constant tendency in Parliament, or rather in the 
 House of Commons, unduly to retard its proper work, 
 by undertaking business for which it is unfit, and by 
 indulging in discussions of unnecessary length. The 
 inconvenience of excessively protracted debates has 
 already attracted public attention, which of itself will 
 probably go far to diminish the evil. Members will 
 learn moderation in the exercise of their right of 
 speaking and of bringing forward motions, when they 
 find that by failing in this discretion they incur the 
 disapproval of the House and of the Country. The 
 tendency of the House of Commons to deprive itself 
 of sufficient time for the due discharge of its most 
 important functions, by undertaking unnecessary busi- 
 ness, is more to be feared, because it is encouraged 
 both by the public and by persons of high influence. 
 Injudicious changes in this direction are usually re- 
 ceived with general applause. 
 
 Striking examples of this may be found in the 
 
OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 77 
 
 recent Acts of Parliament, by which various per- 
 manent charges have been removed from the Con- 
 solidated Fund, and by which it is required that the 
 gross instead of the net revenue should in future be 
 paid into the Exchequer, leaving the expense of col- 
 lecting the revenue to be voted by the House of Com- 
 mons in Committee of Supply, instead of being paid, 
 as heretofore, by the authority of the Crown. These 
 measures, and especially the abolition of the power of 
 the Crown to provide for the cost of collecting the 
 revenue by deductions from the gross receipts, have 
 been exceedingly applauded ; yet it may be safely 
 asserted, that their effect will be to encumber the 
 House of Commons with a considerable amount of 
 additional business, with which there was not the 
 slightest occasion that it should be burdened, and 
 which it is impossible that it can perform properly. 
 There was no reason for the House thus to increase the 
 demands upon its time and attention, because it already 
 possessed a complete control over the expense incurred 
 by the Government in the collection of the revenue, 
 and in the management of services provided for by 
 permanent charges on the Consolidated Fund. Full 
 accounts of this expenditure were habitually laid be- 
 fore Parliament, and if more ample information upon 
 particular points was asked for, it was never withheld. 
 Members of the House of Commons could therefore 
 
78 REASONS OF THE SUCCESS 
 
 call its attention, when they thought fit, to any ob- 
 jectionable expenses, and no job was safer from detec- 
 tion and reproof, because it was paid for without the 
 previous sanction of Parliament. Perhaps, indeed, the 
 worst jobs of recent years have been those perpetrated 
 by means of votes in Committee of Supply. 
 
 The House also nominally assumed a duty which it 
 was utterly impossible for it really to perform. To re- 
 gulate the various establishments for the collection of 
 the revenue, in such a manner, as at once to avoid un- 
 necessary expense, and to ensure the efficient perform- 
 ance of this important branch of the public service, is 
 a task requiring great experience, and great knowledge 
 of minute details. When an estimate is presented to 
 the House of Commons, to provide for the charge of 
 a certain number of officers of different ranks, and 
 receiving different rates of pay, in the various Revenue 
 departments, the Members who discuss the estimate 
 in Committee of Supply have no means whatever of 
 forming a sound judgment on the details of the esta- 
 blishment submitted for their approval. To those 
 who know how business is done in a Committee of 
 Supply, it can hardly be necessary to point out how 
 impossible it is that such details should there be use- 
 fully discussed. All that the House of Commons can 
 really do is, to compare the revenue with the amount 
 spent in collecting it, and if the cost of collection 
 
OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 79 
 
 should appear to exceed a reasonable percentage on 
 the income realized, to call upon the Government to 
 take care that it is reduced, imposing upon the ser- 
 vants of the Crown the responsibility which properly 
 belongs to them of enforcing strict economy. With- 
 out any change in the ancient practice of paying only 
 the net revenue into the Exchequer, the House of 
 Commons had many years ago succeeded in putting 
 an end to the old abuses of making improper pay- 
 ments out of the gross revenue, and in providing for 
 the collection of the revenue at a singularly moderate 
 cost. In determining to go further, and to take upon 
 itself the duty of voting annually the charges for the 
 collection of the revenue, the House of Commons has, 
 in my opinion, altogether mistaken its proper function 
 in this matter. That function is, to exercise a watch- 
 ful, but general, control over the Executive Govern- 
 ment, not to attempt to scrutinize details, upon which 
 it may waste precious hours required for far more 
 important purposes. 
 
 In like manner, the removal from the Consolidated 
 Fund of many charges formerly borne on it, for the 
 purpose of voting them in the estimates, involves a 
 worse than useless addition to the labours of the 
 House, and to its opportunities for indulging in un- 
 necessary discussion. With scarcely an exception, 
 these charges are to provide for services of a perm a- 
 
30 REASONS OF THE SUCCESS 
 
 nent character, and it is a part of true economy that 
 the means allotted for such services should not vary 
 from year to year, but should continue unaltered so 
 long as the circumstances remain the same. When 
 there was any change of circumstances calling for a 
 change in these appropriations, their being provided 
 for from the Consolidated Fund opposed no obstacle 
 to its being effected ; the only effect of their being so 
 charged was to avoid giving opportunities for debates 
 that lead to nothing. 
 
 4 Even in the discussion of those estimates which 
 must be voted annually, in consequence of their vary- 
 ing amount, and the nature of the services for which 
 they are intended to provide, few experienced Mem- 
 bers of the House of Commons would deny that the 
 sort of nibbling at details which is sometimes prac- 
 tised, is a mere waste of time. In the discussion of 
 the miscellaneous estimates during the late Session, 
 this waste of time was carried further than usual, and 
 the House showed an extraordinary misconception of 
 its proper functions, by entering into details with which 
 it is impossible for any large assembly to deal with 
 success, and which ought to be left to the Executive 
 Government. Complaints were even made that the 
 forms of the House did not afford an opportunity of 
 pushing still further this ill-advised scrutiny of the 
 petty items of expenditure ; and a Select Committee 
 
OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 81 
 
 has advised that these forms should be altered. The 
 natural consequence of this error was, that the most 
 important legislative business had afterwards to be 
 neglected or very imperfectly done. Even the clauses 
 of the Divorce Bill could only be considered in a most 
 unsatisfactory manner, in the month of August, by a 
 House jaded with fatigue and deprived of the services 
 of a large proportion of its Members. 
 
 There is, also, no greater error, than to suppose 
 that the mere fact of certain charges being annually 
 voted by the House of Commons, is the slightest 
 security for economy in providing for them. Extra- 
 vagant charges are at least as apt to escape detec- 
 tion in estimates of proposed expenditure, as in ac- 
 counts laid before Parliament of that already incurred, 
 while the Government is sheltered from responsibi- 
 lity by votes in supply. If the publicity necessary 
 to prevent jobs is maintained, and corrupt extrava- 
 gance is thus guarded against, the Ministers of the 
 Crown have every motive, both of duty and of inter- 
 est, to induce them to enforce economy in the public 
 service. They usually do this far more effectually, 
 and above all far more steadily, than the House of 
 Commons, which, like all popular bodies, is apt to 
 be led sometimes into extravagance, sometimes into 
 injudicious parsimony. 
 
 A curious example of the changes of temper to 
 
 6 
 
82 REASONS OF THE SUCCESS 
 
 which the House of Commons is liable on questions 
 of economy, and of the inconsistencies into which it 
 is apt to fall when it refuses to follow its accustomed 
 leaders, is afforded by its conduct with respect to the 
 Civil Service Bill in the late Session. The object of 
 this Bill was to relieve the permanent civil servants 
 of the Crown from deductions made from their salaries 
 under an Act of Parliament, for the purpose of raising 
 a fund for superannuations, a relief which would be 
 equivalent to augmenting their salaries by an amount 
 varying from two and a half to five per cent. The 
 second reading of this Bill was carried against the 
 Government by a large majority, though it is not more 
 than nine or ten years since the Ministers of that day 
 had the greatest difficulty in resisting a proposal pre- 
 cisely the reverse of that now adopted, namely, to 
 diminish all salaries by ten per cent. This proposal, 
 for cutting down salaries generally, was supported, at 
 the time when the economical fit was strong upon the 
 House of Commons, by many of the very Members 
 whose votes have now swelled the majority for aug- 
 menting them. The Superannuation Act, the chief 
 clauses of which this Bill was intended to repeal, was 
 itself passed, in deference to the feeling of the House, 
 in one of its fits of economy. The defeat of the 
 Government upon this question also illustrates the 
 power now exercised by means of an artificial and 
 
OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 83 
 
 organized agitation. This machinery (an invention of 
 the last few years), skilfully worked by those inter- 
 ested in the measure, had led so many Members of 
 the new Parliament to pledge themselves in favour 
 of the Bill, as to ensure its success. 
 
 I have dwelt at greater length than I should other- 
 wise have done on the error I conceive the House of 
 Commons to have committed in undertaking duties 
 that do not properly belong to it, because there ap- 
 pears to be a strong disposition on the part of the 
 public to encourage the House in a mistake which, 
 if persisted in, may detract materially from its use- 
 fulness. If, however, either from this or from any 
 other cause, the proper business of Parliament should 
 suffer such delay as to create serious inconvenience, 
 we may trust that the practical good sense of the 
 Nation will lead to the adoption of some mode of 
 correcting the evil. Hitherto (as I have said) I think 
 we have had no real reason to complain of the slow- 
 ness with which the work of legislative improvement 
 has been carried on. 
 
84 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 EFFECTS OF PAELIAMENTAEY EEFOEM. 
 
 HAVING, in the preceding Chapters, considered the 
 nature of our system of Parliamentary Government, 
 its merits and its faults, I propose now to inquire 
 in what manner the working of this system has been 
 affected by the Reform of the Representation which 
 was carried in 1832, and to offer some remarks on the 
 character and consequences of that celebrated mea- 
 sure. 
 
 The three Acts for the Amendment of the Repre- 
 sentation of the People in Parliament, in England, 
 Scotland, and Ireland, must be regarded as forming 
 together a single measure, having for its object the 
 transfer of a large amount of political power to the 
 People, from the hands of a comparatively small 
 number of persons, who were previously enabled to 
 command a majority of the seats in the House of 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 85 
 
 Commons. So great a change in the distribution of 
 political power has, probably, seldom or never been ac- 
 complished in any country without violence or convul- 
 sion ; it amounted, in fact (as was justly said at the 
 time,) to a revolution, though a peaceful and, I believe, 
 a most beneficial revolution. Still, large as it was, the 
 measure did not profess to sweep away all the ano- 
 malies and irregularities of our system of Representa- 
 tion, in order to create a new one more in accordance 
 with what is considered by some persons to be the 
 true theory of Representation. On the contrary, the 
 design was to correct evils which had been practically 
 felt, but to introduce no further changes than were 
 indispensable for this purpose, in a Constitution of 
 which, in spite of some imperfections, the general 
 excellence was recognized. Experience had proved 
 that, in the House of Commons as then constituted, 
 public opinion was so weak, and influence of another 
 kind so powerful, that the conduct, both of Parlia- 
 ment and of the Executive Government, was habitually 
 biassed in a manner detrimental to the general welfare 
 of the Nation. Clear evidence of this was to be found 
 in the manner in which the Country had for many 
 years been governed, and especially in the heavy 
 burden of taxation imposed upon the people. There 
 could be little doubt that the public expenditure had 
 been habitually maintained upon a scale beyond what 
 
86 EFFECTS OF 
 
 was required by the real interest of the Nation, with 
 the view of securing the support of those who had a 
 commanding influence in the election of the House of 
 Commons. But while this was an evil urgently re- 
 quiring to be remedied, it was believed that it was 
 neither necessary for that purpose, nor safe, to make 
 the total change in the character of the House of 
 Commons, which would ensue were all its Members 
 to be returned by large popular Constituencies. 
 
 The Reform Acts for the three divisions of the 
 United Kingdom, which received the sanction of Par- 
 liament in 1832, were framed in conformity with 
 these views. By the preservation of many of the 
 smaller Boroughs, and by regulating the County Re- 
 presentation in a manner which left much influence to 
 the great landed proprietors, the former mixture of 
 classes and interests in the House of Commons was 
 preserved ; and, though the strength of the democratic 
 element in its composition was greatly augmented, it 
 was neither the intention nor the effect of the mea- 
 sure to render that element all-powerful. What was 
 aimed at, and accomplished more successfully than 
 could well have been anticipated, was, to redress the 
 balance of the Constitution, not to make it incline as 
 much on one side as it had previously done on the other. 
 
 The wisdom with which this great change in the 
 Constitution was designed, is shown by its results. 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 87 
 
 It has now been twenty-five years in operation, and 
 it is impossible to compare the spirit of our legisla- 
 tion and government during that period with that 
 of former times, without perceiving how much it has 
 been altered for the better. No doubt, during this 
 period, many mistakes have been made, both by Par- 
 liament and by the different Administrations which, 
 under its control, have exercised the powers of the 
 Executive Government. But it may be safely asserted, 
 that these mistakes have been only such as are to be 
 accounted for by errors of judgment in the Nation 
 itself, and may be looked for under the best of 
 human institutions. The measures of Parliament and 
 of the Government have been directed by a sincere 
 desire to promote the genera] welfare, and upon the 
 whole, it must be admitted, with success, if we con- 
 sider the number of important reforms in every 
 branch of Administration which have been effected 
 in a comparatively short time. Lastly, this great 
 stimulus has been given to improvement with no 
 social disturbance, beyond the temporary agitation of 
 the struggle by which the Reform Bill was carried, 
 and without giving that shake to the power and au- 
 thority of the Government, either at home or abroad, 
 which is so often the consequence of political changes, 
 and is the source, when it occurs, of so much danger. 
 But though the measure of Parliamentary Reform 
 
88 EFFECTS OF 
 
 which was passed in 1832 has been thus successful, 
 and is, I think, conclusively proved by its results to 
 have been, upon the whole, a wise and good one, it 
 was by no means perfect. It had, on the contrary, 
 serious faults, which were so easily to be discerned, 
 even while it was under discussion, that it is impos- 
 sible to suppose they could have escaped the observa- 
 tion of its authors, though it was not in their power 
 to avoid them. The strength of the opposition to be 
 overcome before the Bills could pass, and the excite- 
 ment under the influence of which they were carried, 
 were such, as not only to account for the errors to be 
 found in the plan, but to make it marvellous that they 
 were not far greater. 
 
 On considering the whole scheme of the Parliamen- 
 tary Reform of 1832, with the light thrown upon it 
 by the experience we have had of the working of our 
 amended system of Representation during five-and- 
 twenty years, the following appear to be the chief de- 
 fects of the measure. First : I am inclined to think 
 that its greatest fault was, that it failed to provide 
 adequately against the danger that the removal of 
 abuses might incidentally diminish too much the 
 power of the Government in Parliament. It has often 
 been said, and with truth, that, under our present 
 Constitution, the worst Administration we can have 
 is a weak one. A weak Ministry has not the power 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 89,' 
 
 of acting rightly; it must bring forward in Parlia- 
 ment, not the measures it knows to be best for the 
 interests of the Country, but those it can hope to 
 carry; it cannot venture to conduct the Executive 
 Government according to the dictates of its own 
 judgment ; and in the exercise of the authority and 
 patronage of the Crown, it is compelled to yield to 
 every popular cry and to the unreasonable claims 
 of its adherents ; it is under a constant temptation 
 unduly to court popularity, and to exaggerate the 
 faults of party Government, by striving, in all its 
 measures, to promote the interests of its Party rather 
 than those of the Nation. Such a Government has a 
 tendency to become more than usually corrupt, be- 
 cause an evenly-measured contest of Parties affords 
 to unscrupulous men, desirous of using their votes 
 or political interest for their own selfish advantage,* 
 
 * The following passage in Lord Derby's Speech in the House of 
 Lords, on the 8th of February, 1855, gives a striking description of 
 the position of a Minister not enjoying adequate Parliamentary 
 support: 
 
 " My Lords, I can conceive no object of higher or nobler am- 
 bition, none more worthy of the anxiety of a true patriot and lover 
 of his country, than to stand in the high and honourable position of 
 the Chief Minister of the Crown and Leader of the councils of this 
 great Empire, assisted and supported by colleagues combined with 
 him by unity of sentiment and mutual and personal respect, and 
 with the knowledge that this and the other House of Parliament 
 would give to such a Minister the assurance that, except on most 
 extraordinary and unusual occasions, he would be enabled, with life 
 
90 EFFECTS OF 
 
 peculiar facilities for driving hard bargains with the 
 Administration. 
 
 Nor is this all ; our whole system of Parliamentary 
 Government rests, as I have already remarked, upon 
 the Ministers of the Crown possessing such authority 
 
 and energy, to carry out his plans and to mature and accomplish his 
 objects, and, practically as well as nominally, control and govern 
 th.e legislation and internal economy of this great Country. On the 
 other hand, to hold that highly responsible situation dependent for 
 support from day to day upon precarious and uncertain majorities, 
 compelled to cut down this measure, and to pare off that, to con- 
 sider with regard to each measure, not what was for the real welfare 
 of the country, but what would conciliate some half-dozen men here, 
 or obviate the objections of some half-dozen there, to regard as a 
 great triumph of Parliamentary skill and Ministerial strength to 
 scramble through the session of Parliament, and to boast of having 
 met with few and insignificant defeats, I say this is a state of things 
 which cannot be satisfactory to any Minister, and which cannot be 
 of advantage to the Crown, or to the People of this Country. But, 
 my Lords, to enter on the duties of office, not with a precarious ma- 
 jority, but with a sure minority of the other House of Parliament ; 
 to be aware that from day to day you were liable to defeats at any 
 moment, by the combination of parties amounting to a sure ma- 
 jority, and only waiting for the moment when it would be most 
 convenient to introduce motions for the attainment of such an end ; 
 to be a Minister on sufferance ; to hold such a position without any 
 security for enforcing your own views ; with the fear of exposing 
 your own friends and the Country, your friends to perpetual mor- 
 tification, and the Country to constant disappointment to undertake 
 the responsibilities and the duties of office under such circumstances 
 and in such a state of things, would be such an intolerable and 
 galling servitude as no man of honour or character would voluntarily 
 expose himself to, and such as no man would willingly submit to, 
 except from motives of the purest patriotism and as proof of the 
 absolute necessity of such self-sacrifice." 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 91 
 
 in Parliament as to enable them generally to direct 
 its proceedings, and especially those of the House of 
 Commons. This foundation would fail, and the system 
 itself must fall into ruin, if it should become im- 
 possible, for any considerable time, that an Adminis- 
 tration of proper strength should be formed. This 
 might happen if the House of Commons, from the 
 absence of any strong party feeling or bond of union 
 in the supporters of the Government, should show a 
 disposition on light occasions to reject the advice of 
 the Servants of the Crown, although the persons hold- 
 ing office had, upon the whole, more of its confidence 
 than any other Ministers would be able to command. 
 Should such a state of things arise, with parties in 
 the country so divided as to afford no prospect of a 
 House of a different character being obtained by a 
 dissolution of Parliament, it would be inevitable that 
 new rules of political conduct, and a new mode of 
 carrying on the public business, should be introduced. 
 Hitherto it has been considered to. be the duty of 
 the Ministers of the Crown to resign, if they find 
 themselves without adequate support in the House 
 of Commons. Their doing so would be useless in the 
 case supposed ; and there would be no resource but 
 to tolerate the existence of an Administration unable 
 to guide the proceedings of Parliament. 
 
 But this would involve a complete abandonment of 
 
92 EFFECTS OF 
 
 the essential principle of a Parliamentary Government, 
 even though it should continue to be held, that an 
 Administration against which a direct vote of want of 
 confidence had been carried must retire. What par- 
 ticularly distinguishes our present system of govern- 
 ment, and constitutes, as I have endeavoured to show, 
 one of its main advantages, is the responsibility which 
 it imposes, both on Parliament and on the Servants 
 of the Crown. Every Member of the House of Com- 
 mons feels, or ought to feel, that it is a serious step 
 to give a vote which may compel the existing Govern- 
 ment to retire, without a reasonable prospect that 
 another better able to conduct the affairs of the 
 Country can be formed. The Ministers, on the other 
 hand, know that they are not held to be absolved 
 from responsibility for unwise measures, because they 
 have been forced upon them by the House of Com- 
 mons ; but that, if they continue to administer the 
 affairs of the Country when powers they think neces- 
 sary have been refused, or a course they disapprove 
 has, in spite of their advice, been adopted by the 
 House, they are justly held answerable for the policy 
 of which they consent to be the instruments. But 
 if it should ever come to be regarded as not being 
 wrong, that Ministers should retain office though they 
 were no longer able to guide the proceedings of the 
 House of Commons, there would cease to be in any 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 93 
 
 quarter an effective responsibility for the prudence 
 and judgment with which the affairs of the Nation 
 are conducted in Parliament. Ministers could not 
 be held answerable for the conduct of a Parliament 
 they had no power to direct, and the only responsi- 
 bility left would be that of the House collectively. 
 Experience, as I have already remarked, proves, that 
 a responsibility shared amongst so many is really 
 felt by none; and that a popular assembly, which 
 will not submit to follow the guidance of some leader, 
 is ever uncertain in its conduct and unstable in its 
 decisions. 
 
 After the Revolution of 1688, when the House of 
 Commons had by that event acquired great power, 
 and had not yet been brought under the discipline of 
 our present system, these evils were grievously felt.* 
 They would be far more so in the present state of 
 society, and we must expect to see the House of Com- 
 mons arriving at many hasty and ill-judged decisions, 
 and its Members giving their votes much oftener 
 than they now do contrary to their judgment, in de- 
 ference to popular clamour, if they were relieved from 
 the apprehension of creating the difficulties that arise 
 from a change of Government. Those who have 
 watched the proceedings of Parliament, cannot be 
 ignorant how many unwise votes have been prevented 
 
 * See Macaulay's History of England, vol. iv. p. 434. 
 
^4 EFFECTS OF 
 
 by a dread of the resignation of Ministers, and that 
 the most effective check on factious conduct on the 
 part of the Opposition, is the fear entertained by its 
 leaders of driving the Government to resign on a 
 question upon which, if they should themselves succeed 
 to power, they would find insuperable difficulties in 
 acting differently from their predecessors. The House 
 of Commons would lose its distinguishing character ; 
 it would become more like the Congress of the United 
 States,* but without the checks by which Congress is 
 restrained ; and we should have a government at once 
 weak, capricious, and tyrannical, if the practice should 
 ever grow up of regarding the Ministers, who are 
 now the Servants of the Crown, as the servants of 
 the House of Commons, and justified in pleading the 
 will of that House as their excuse for adopting or 
 acquiescing in measures of which their own judgment 
 and conscience disapproved. 
 
 * In the Life of Horace Greeley, editor of the 'New York 
 Tribune' (a book which contains much curious information as to 
 the working of the Constitution of the United States), there is ^ 
 letter, in which the following passage affords a remarkable illustra- 
 tion of the effects of the absence of any individual responsibility for 
 the decisions of the House of Representatives. "It was but yester- 
 day that a Senator said to me, that though he was utterly opposed 
 to any reduction of mileage, yet if the House did not stop passing 
 Retrenchment Bills for Buncombe, and then running to the Senate 
 and begging Members to stop them there, he for one would vote 
 to put through the next Mileage Reduction Bill that came to the 
 Senate, just to punish Members for their hypocrisy." Page 298. 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 95 
 
 The political events of the last few years afford 
 much ground for apprehending that the Country may 
 be exposed to these very serious evils, from its be- 
 coming impossible that any Administration should be 
 formed having sufficient strength in the House of 
 Commons. Before the passing of the Reform Acts, 
 there was little danger that such a state of things 
 could arise. The former state of the Representation, 
 together with the large means of influence which then 
 existed, gave so much power to the Crown, that Mi- 
 nisters unacceptable to the Sovereign could seldom 
 long maintain their position ; and those who enjoyed 
 the cordial support of their Royal Master were enabled 
 to command so large a number of votes, that they 
 could scarcely be left in a minority, except in cases 
 when public opinion was declared against them with 
 overwhelming force. Nothing can more clearly prove 
 how completely the power of the Crown was at that 
 time predominant in the House of Commons, than the 
 well-known fact, that the combined opposition of Pitt 
 and Fox, with all their Parliamentary talents and per- 
 sonal influence, would have failed to overthrow the 
 Addington Administration, in spite of the general 
 opinion entertained of its incompetence, if the state of 
 mind of George the Third had not excited such just 
 apprehension in his Minister, that he shrank from 
 maintaining the contest. 
 
96 EFFECTS OF 
 
 The political condition of the Country, when such 
 an Administration could be supported under such 
 circumstances by the power of the Crown, was a 
 very bad one, but its evils seem to have arisen less 
 from the power of the Crown having been excessive 
 in itself, than from the fact that this power depended 
 in a great measure on the personal influence of the 
 Sovereign, and was derived from sources which led 
 naturally to its abuse. The personal influence of the 
 Sovereign might be used, not to support, but to un- 
 dermine his responsible Ministers ; and we know that 
 it was habitually so employed by George the Third, 
 whenever he was compelled for a short time to accept 
 the services of Ministers he disliked. It was the 
 knowledge of this fact that contributed so much, 
 during that reign, to give undue power to those 
 Administrations which were supposed to enjoy the 
 royal favour, because every shabby politician (and 
 unfortunately the class is a large one) shrank from 
 joining an Opposition which was obnoxious to the 
 Court, and which therefore could not hope for more 
 than a very brief tenure of power, even if, by the 
 strong support of public opinion, it should be enabled 
 to attain it. The correspondence of the statesmen 
 of the earlier part of the reign of George the Third, 
 of which so much has now been published, presents 
 a painful picture of the abuses and intrigues which 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 97 
 
 prevailed when Court favour had so large a share in 
 deciding the contest for political power; and Burke 
 has described with just severity the system under 
 which a party grew up and acquired so much strength, 
 under the name of the King's Friends. 
 
 The means, also, by which the Ministers of the 
 Crown were enabled to command the votes of a large 
 number of Members of the House of Commons, 
 before the passing of the Reform Bill, had grown to 
 be very injurious and onerous to the country. So 
 large a proportion of the whole House was then 
 returned by the influence of Borough proprietors 
 and other powerful persons, instead of by any really 
 popular election, that Ministers were necessarily led to 
 depend for the maintenance of their power, less on 
 meriting the confidence and approbation of the Nation, 
 than on the support of those who possessed Parlia- 
 mentary interest, which too commonly could only be 
 purchased at the expense of the general good. This 
 evil seems to have been increased, (so far at least as 
 regards the burden upon the Nation,) instead of being 
 diminished, by the gradual discontinuance of the prac- 
 tice of giving direct money bribes to the supporters 
 of the Government in the House of Commons; be- 
 cause bribes given in this form, from the votes for 
 secret service, were not really more immoral, and were 
 far less costly, than those which were accepted in the 
 
 H 
 
98 EFFECTS OF 
 
 form of jobs, and of places created, not for the public 
 service, but for the benefit of the holders. But apart 
 from the means by which it was obtained, the com- 
 mand of a considerable number of votes in the House 
 of Commons by the Ministers was highly useful, and 
 its continuance would have been an advantage, as 
 conducing to the firm and vigorous administration 
 of affairs, if it had been preserved in such a manner 
 as to be enjoyed by the Advisers of the Crown in virtue 
 of their offices, irrespective either of Court favour or of 
 those sinister influences to which they were compelled 
 to submit in order to secure it. 
 
 A comparison of the working of the Constitution, 
 before and after the passing of the Reform Bill, 
 must, I think, convince us that the question asked 
 by the Duke of Wellington while it was in progress, 
 " How is the King's Government in future to be 
 carried on?" deserved more consideration and a more 
 practical answer than it received. From the com- 
 bined effect of the Acts of Parliamentary Reform and 
 of the many other reforms, especially those of an 
 economical character, which have been carried in the 
 last forty years, the power of the Crown has been so 
 much diminished, that there seem to be good grounds 
 for believing that the state of things which, in 1780, 
 amply justified Dunning's celebrated resolution against 
 the increase of that power, has been reversed, and 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 99 
 
 that the balance of the Constitution may now be in 
 no slight danger of being deranged by the too great 
 diminution of the influence in Parliament which the 
 Servants of the Crown formerly enjoyed. . 
 
 I am aware that so high an authority as Mr. Hal- 
 lam has expressed an opinion, that there is no occa- 
 sion for the Ministers of the Crown to possess any 
 influence in Parliament beyond that which they would 
 derive from a conscientious and effective discharge of 
 their duties. He says : " There is no real cause to 
 apprehend that a virtuous and enlightened Govern- 
 ment would find difficulty in resting upon the repu- 
 tation justly due to it, especially when we throw into 
 the scale that species of influence which must ever 
 subsist, the sentiment of respect and loyalty to a 
 Sovereign, of friendship and gratitude to a Minister, 
 of habitual confidence in those entrusted with power, 
 of averseness to confusion and untried change, which 
 have in fact more extensive operation than any sordid 
 motives, and which must almost always render them 
 unnecessary." * 
 
 In giving this opinion, Mr. Hallam has. I fear, not 
 made sufficient allowance for the effect of the various 
 motives by which the Members of both Houses of 
 Parliament are apt to be biassed in giving their votes. 
 Discontent, ambition, the love of popularity, and even 
 
 * See Hallam's Constitutional History, vol. iii. p. 355. 
 
 H 2 
 
100 EFFECTS OF 
 
 of notoriety, and various personal feelings, are found 
 in practice to exercise so much influence, and must 
 always be expected to array so many Members of 
 the House of Commons in Opposition, that, unless 
 the Government is enabled by some means or other 
 to throw a considerable weight into the scale, by 
 virtue of its official position, it is impossible it should 
 exercise that authority which, as the very keystone 
 of the whole system of Parliamentary Government, 
 it ought to possess in the decision of questions 
 submitted to the House of Commons. Hitherto, the 
 undue diminution of this kind of authority in the 
 Government, since the passing of the Reform Acts, 
 has not been so seriously felt as it is likely to be 
 hereafter. Until lately, various circumstances, and 
 especially the existence of Parties formed previously 
 to the alteration in the constitution of the House of 
 Commons, have combined to avert, or at least greatly 
 to mitigate, the inconvenience that might have been 
 apprehended from this source. We cannot however 
 expect this to continue, and already there are clear 
 indications of the approach of a different order of 
 things, in which, from the dissolution of ancient Party 
 ties, and the great curtailment of the indirect influ- 
 ence of the Government, the existence of weak Ad- 
 ministrations may become habitual. The fact, of all 
 the most important public questions on which Parties 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 101 
 
 were formerly divided having been finally settled, has 
 contributed to increase the difficulty of maintaining 
 the authority of the Government in the House of 
 Commons. While these questions were still at issue, 
 they served as a bond of union both to the Party 
 which supported, and to that which resisted, the 
 measures in dispute, and helped to keep up the 
 Party discipline upon which the strength of a Mi- 
 nistry, as well as that of an Opposition, greatly 
 depends.* 
 
 The events of the last few years are obviously 
 tending to that virtual alteration in the Constitution 
 which would result from the loss of the authority 
 
 * There is another consequence of the settlement of these ques- 
 tions which deserves to be remarked. Since the various reforms 
 which thirty years ago were so strenuously contended for by one 
 Party, and no less strenuously opposed by another, have been suc- 
 cessively carried, it would be difficult to draw any clear distinction 
 between parties from their opinions on public questions, and thus 
 the division between them is made to depend more than formerly 
 on personal feelings and interests. This tends both to lower 
 the tone of Parliamentary warfare, and to diminish the whole- 
 some authority formerly exercised by the leaders of Parties. Al- 
 though the accomplishment of these reforms is in itself a great ad- 
 vantage to the Nation, it cannot be denied that new dangers have 
 arisen from the termination of the struggle by which they were 
 won. While that struggle lasted, it helped to keep politics in a 
 healthy state, as the peril of her mortal strife with Carthage is said 
 to have preserved Some from that flood of corruption which soon 
 ensued after her final triumph over her formidable enemy. The 
 consequences in this respect of the termination of our old Parlia- 
 mentary contests, only add another to the many proofs to be every- 
 
102 EFFECTS OF 
 
 of the Administration in Parliament. There is the 
 greater danger of this, because no change of the law 
 is necessary to bring about such a change in the cha- 
 racter of our Government. The principle, that the 
 confidence of the House of Commons is necessary to 
 a Ministry, was established by no legal enactment, 
 but by opinion and usage, which grew up by degrees. 
 These may be altered as gradually and insensibly as 
 they were originally formed ; and the more easily, as 
 there has never at any time been a uniform and un- 
 bending rule that Ministers ought to retire whenever 
 
 where found, how vain it is in human affairs to look for the quiet 
 continuance of a state of things with which we may sit down con- 
 tented. To be in a constant conflict with evil in some shape or 
 other, is obviously the condition appointed by Providence both for 
 men and nations, and the moment that struggles for improvement 
 cease, corruption and decay commence. The following are M. de 
 Tocqueville's admirable remarks on " little Parties," the designa- 
 tion he applies to those that are formed in free countries when all 
 great questions are settled, and only minor points remain at issue : 
 " Les petits Partis sont en general sans foi politique. Comme ils ne 
 se sentent pas Sieves et contenus par de grands objets, leur carac- 
 tere est empreint d'un egoisme qui se produit ostensiblement a 
 chacun de leurs actes. Us s'echauffent toujours au froid; leur 
 langage est violent, mais leur marche est timide et incertaine. Les 
 moyens qu'ils emploient sont miserables comme le but meme qu'ils 
 se proposent. De la vient que quand un temps de calme succede a 
 une revolution violente, les grands hommes semblent disparaitre 
 tout-a-coup, et les ames se renfermer en elles-memes. Les grands 
 Partis bouleversent la societe, les petits 1'agitent ; les uns la de- 
 chirent, et les autres la depravent ; les premiers la sauvent quelque- 
 fois en 1'ebranlant, les seconds la troublent toujours sans profit." 
 Democratic en Amerigiie, vol. i. pp. 208-9. 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 103 
 
 they meet with a Parliamentary defeat. The strongest 
 Governments have all occasionally experienced such 
 defeats, under circumstances that have been regarded 
 as making it their duty to bow to the decision of 
 Parliament. The government of the country could 
 hardly be carried on, and the just weight of the 
 House of Commons at the same time maintained, if 
 the Administration were not allowed on certain oc- 
 casions thus to submit to it without retiring. But 
 hitherto the rule has been the other way, and it is 
 only of late that there has appeared to be a dispo- 
 sition to multiply exceptions in a manner which may 
 break down the rule. As it becomes more difficult 
 to constitute strong Governments, this disposition is 
 likely to increase. A weak Ministry, when a popular 
 clamour is raised in favour of measures they know 
 to be wrong, must always be too much tempted to 
 take shelter from responsibility in a sham resistance 
 to them. The House of Commons and the Public, 
 on the other hand, may also be frequently tempted 
 to acquiesce in the continuance of a Government on 
 these terms, as the easiest mode of carrying some object 
 in favour of which the passions or prejudices of the 
 People may be excited, in opposition to the sober 
 judgment of enlightened and right-minded men. 
 
 Any diminution of Ministerial responsibility would 
 be peculiarly dangerous on questions affecting the 
 
104 EFFECTS OF 
 
 pecuniary interests of individuals, since no jobs are 
 so bad as those perpetrated by a popular assembly, 
 through private canvass. A wholesome rule of Par- 
 liamentary law debars the House of Commons from 
 making any grants of money without the previous 
 recommendation of the Crown through its responsible 
 Servants ; but unfortunately this rule may be evaded 
 by addresses from the House to the Crown, praying 
 that certain grants may be made, and promising to 
 provide for them. Such addresses have been too often 
 moved of late years ; and if the House of Commons 
 should fall into the habit of thus virtually setting 
 aside the wise principle of our Constitution which 
 makes the Ministers of the Crown responsible for 
 originating all grants of money, a door will be opened 
 to the very worst corruption. 
 
 Ministerial responsibility may also be injuriously 
 weakened by the multiplication of open questions ; 
 that is to say, of questions on which Members hold- 
 ing office are allowed to take opposite sides without 
 resigning. It is probably impossible altogether to 
 dispense with open questions, but they must be re- 
 garded as an evil, and the public ought to be jealous 
 of their multiplication. Every addition to the number 
 of such questions tends to increase the risk of having 
 divided Administrations, and also to relieve inde- 
 pendent Member's of Parliament who aspire to office 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 105 
 
 from a wholesome responsibility. The fear of em- 
 barrassing their future career, by pledging themselves 
 to impracticable measures, is a most useful check 
 upon the votes of those who have not the responsi- 
 bility of office ; and it would be highly inexpedient to 
 diminish the force with which this motive operates, in 
 restraining Members of the House of Commons from 
 voting in favour of what they know to be wrong or 
 unwise, from deference to momentary clamour. 
 
 Secondly. Another fault which I think may justly 
 be found with the reformed House of Commons, is, 
 that there is a want of proper facilities for bringing 
 into it some of the classes of Members who were for- 
 merly returned by the close Boroughs. I have already 
 admitted the force of the arguments urged in favour 
 of these Boroughs, during the debates on the Reform 
 Bill, on the ground of their having been the means 
 of bringing into the House of Commons many of its 
 most useful Members; and though, from the abuses 
 to which they had also led, I cannot doubt its having 
 been right, or rather absolutely necessary, at that time, 
 to abolish Boroughs of this description, it is, I think, to 
 be regretted, that this was not done in such a manner 
 as to provide some other means of bringing into Par- 
 liament certain classes of Members whose return by 
 the close Boroughs had been attended with advan- 
 tage. We miss in the reformed House of Commons 
 
106 EFFECTS OF 
 
 the Members who virtually represented certain special 
 interests, and those who, occupying an independent 
 position, and not looking for the retention of their 
 Seats to the favour of any numerous body of consti- 
 tuents, were able boldly to oppose any popular delu- 
 sion of the day. My remark however on the want of 
 a substitute for the close Boroughs, as regards some 
 of the persons they were the means of bringing into 
 Parliament, applies chiefly to the Ministers, and to 
 those subordinate members of the Government who 
 hold offices requiring that they should sit in the 
 House of Commons. 
 
 While close Boroughs existed, the Administration 
 of the day had no difficulty in appointing the fittest 
 persons that could be found to those situations which, 
 according to the existing practice, must be held by 
 Members of the House of Commons. But it has now 
 become difficult (except perhaps at a general Election) 
 for a Minister to find Seats in the House of Commons 
 for persons he may wish to appoint to Parliamentary 
 offices ; his choice, therefore, in the selection of candi- 
 dates for these places, is practically limited to men 
 who are already in Parliament, or who have the 
 means of obtaining admission to it. He cannot even 
 choose freely in the House of Commons itself, since 
 it often happens that a Member who has been re- 
 turned at the preceding general Election could not 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 107 
 
 vacate his Seat afterwards, with any prospect of re- 
 gaining it. 
 
 There can be no doubt, that much practical evil 
 has resulted from this state of things. In the first 
 place, it has been an obstacle to placing important 
 offices in the Government in efficient hands; and, 
 if it were not invidious to do so, there would be 
 no difficulty in pointing out very bad appointments 
 which have been made solely from this difficulty. It 
 has further, on more than one occasion, caused ar- 
 rangements which had been made for filling the 
 highest posts in the public service to be disturbed 
 by the mere caprice of some local constituency, in 
 rejecting as their representative a person selected for 
 one of these posts by the Crown. Ministers have 
 sometimes been thus driven to make arrangements of 
 very questionable propriety, in order to obtain the 
 Seats which were necessary for the performance of 
 their duties; and at other times, have been exposed 
 to a pernicious local influence in the discharge of 
 their official functions. Indeed, it is so difficult for 
 a Minister, who represents a large body of consti- 
 tuents, to exercise his judgment with proper freedom 
 and to escape altogether from being biassed by 
 their local interests and feelings, that it appears to 
 me very desirable, that in general the Servants of the 
 Crown should not hold Seats of this kind. Such 
 
108 EFFECTS OF 
 
 seems to have been the opinion of Mr. Canning, who, 
 when he became Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
 and Leader of the House of Commons, very wisely, as 
 I think, resigned his Seat for Liverpool, and came in 
 for a close Borough. In like manner, it was, I believe, 
 a great advantage to Sir Robert Peel, as a Minister, 
 that, after the passing of the Reform Act, he sat, not 
 for a large and populous place, but for one of the 
 smaller Boroughs, where he possessed a commanding 
 influence ; while, on the other hand, it was a disad- 
 vantage to Lord John Russell, in his Ministerial 
 career, to represent the City of London. It is not 
 however with regard to Cabinet offices that the in- 
 convenience I am now referring to is most felt. These 
 offices are usually conferred on men already known 
 and distinguished ; and to such men it is not often a 
 matter of much difficulty to obtain a Seat in Parlia- 
 ment. But it is far otherwise with regard to the 
 persons whom it would be most desirable to select for 
 Law Officers of the Crown, for Under-Secretaries of 
 State, or for any of the subordinate Parliamentary 
 offices. For some of these situations, it is of great 
 importance that the Government should be able to 
 choose the young men of whose talents and acquire- 
 ments they may think most highly, not only in order 
 that the duties of these offices may be well performed 
 at the time, but perhaps even more for the sake of 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 109 
 
 providing, for the future, a sufficient supply of men 
 well trained for the highest posts of the Government. 
 With respect to the Law Officers of the Crown, it 
 is of still greater consequence that they should be 
 chosen with the utmost care from the whole Profes- 
 sion, since, both from the nature of their duties, and 
 from their supposed claims to be advanced to the 
 highest judicial offices, the vital interests of the Na- 
 tion, in the due administration of justice, are deeply 
 concerned in the appointments that are made. The 
 Law Officers should always, if possible, be men who 
 stand in the highest estimation for professional know- 
 ledge and ability, and who are also looked up to and 
 respected as men of honour and integrity. But it 
 is most improbable, that either the young men 
 best qualified for subordinate political offices, or the 
 lawyers most fit to become Attorney or Solicitor- 
 General, will always be found in the House of Com- 
 mons. Experience has demonstrated, that the quali- 
 ties which are required for these situations are not 
 those which most recommend men to the favour of 
 electors. With regard to the Law Officers of the 
 Crown more especially, I fear, that the necessity of 
 selecting them from the ranks of the House of Com- 
 mons has already had an injurious effect on the whole 
 legal Profession. It has taught the Bar generally to 
 look for advancement, less to professional distinction 
 
110 EFFECTS OF 
 
 and to acquiring a high character, than to success in 
 the House of Commons ; and as lawyers have usually 
 little opportunity of cultivating the favour of any body 
 of electors in the legitimate exercise of their Profes- 
 sion, a competition has been created to gain Seats in 
 Parliament by other means, too often of a very ques- 
 tionable character. 
 
 Thirdly. It must also, I think, be admitted that 
 the Reform Act has failed to do as much towards 
 putting down corruption as was desired and expected. 
 Many persons go further, and assert that corruption 
 has been actually increased by that measure; but I 
 can see no grounds whatever for supposing this to 
 be true. Corruption I believe to have been far more 
 general before the passing of the Reform Acts than 
 now ; the mistake of supposing the reverse to be the 
 case, seems to have arisen from overlooking the fact, 
 that it could formerly escape detection much more 
 easily than at present. The forms of proceeding 
 before Election Committees, till within a few years, 
 were such as to throw the greatest difficulty in the 
 way of proving bribery, even in flagrant cases ; whereas, 
 by recent changes in the Law, the principle of using 
 the most searching means to inquire into alleged 
 corruption has been carried almost to an extreme. 
 Many of the corrupt transactions of former days were 
 also different in kind from what take place now ; the 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. Ill 
 
 sale of Boroughs by their proprietors, for instance, 
 was practised openly and avowedly; and, though there 
 is scarcely an instance of its attracting the notice or 
 censure of Parliament, it was certainly not less cor- 
 rupt than the sale of their votes by individual electors. 
 The only difference between the two transactions is, 
 that in the one case the purchaser of the Seat bought 
 it in gross from an individual proprietor, whereas in 
 the other, he buys it in detail from the several persons 
 among whom the right of disposing of it is shared. 
 Perhaps the wholesale purchase was the most dan- 
 gerous of the two, since in that case it not unfre- 
 quently happened that the Government was the buyer, 
 and paid the price of the Seats in honours or in jobs. 
 It is true that the owners of Boroughs often insisted 
 on the purchasers of the Seats being of the same 
 politics with themselves ; but this was by no means 
 the invariable practice, nor can it be regarded as 
 altering the character of the transaction, even when 
 it was followed. In many of the most corrupt Bo- 
 roughs the voters habitually accept in preference the 
 bribes of candidates of their own Party, but it has 
 never been held that they thus escaped the guilt of 
 corruption. But though corruption may have been 
 considerably checked, as I believe that it has been, 
 by the passing of the Reform Act, it would be ab- 
 surd to pretend that it has been put down, or that 
 
112 EFFECTS OF 
 
 the Measure has in this respect been as successful as 
 was hoped. 
 
 Lastly. The Reform Acts of 1832 were advisedly, 
 and, as I think, wisely, framed in such a manner as 
 to leave many anomalies and irregularities in our 
 Representative system, and to keep within moderate 
 limits the extension of political power to classes of 
 the population which had not previously enjoyed it. 
 Since those Acts were passed, the Nation has made 
 much progress, and the state of things is greatly 
 altered. The People are, I believe, become more fit 
 to exercise political rights, and a strong desire has 
 grown up for their more extensive diffusion, and for 
 the correction of some of the anomalies and irre- 
 gularities still left in our Representation. Hence 
 the constitutional arrangement of 1832, when con- 
 sidered with reference to the circumstances of the 
 present time, must, I think, be regarded as defective. 
 
 Such appear to me to be the chief defects, now 
 requiring to be corrected, in our system of Represen- 
 tation, as it was settled by the celebrated Acts passed 
 in 1832; but having freely acknowledged these faults, 
 and not having attempted in any way to disguise or 
 diminish them, I must conclude this Chapter as I 
 began it, by expressing my opinion, that, in spite of its 
 inevitable imperfections, the Measure was on the whole 
 one of the greatest and most beneficial changes which 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 113 
 
 any country ever effected in its institutions. We owe 
 to it numberless other reforms, including the correc* 
 tion of abuses which were eating into the very vitals 
 of the Nation, which nothing short of this alteration 
 in the constitution of the House of Commons would 
 have rendered it possible to extirpate, and which, if 
 allowed to continue, must have led to some frightful 
 convulsion ; we owe to it also a quarter of a century 
 of domestic peace, and of the greatest prosperity and 
 progress which as a Nation we have ever enjoyed. 
 
 It may justly be regarded as having been the means, 
 under Providence, of securing these blessings to the 
 country; not merely because the Reformed Parliament 
 has passed measures and supported a policy which could 
 not have been looked for from the unreformed House 
 of Commons, but also because the confidence of the 
 People, which had been withdrawn from the latter, has 
 been freely given to the former. This confidence has 
 given it strength, both for legislation and to support 
 the Executive Government. Some of the most useful 
 Acts passed since 1832 would hardly have been ac- 
 cepted by the Nation from a Parliament in which it 
 did not feel that it was really represented, even if such 
 a Parliament could have been induced to adopt them. 
 And in 1848, amidst the crash of the old Govern- 
 ments of Europe and of the revolutionary passions then 
 let loose, the Constitution and the Throne could not 
 
 i 
 
114 EFFECTS OF PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 have maintained their stability in this country, to the 
 astonishment and admiration of the world, if the great 
 Measure of 1832 had not been successful in recover- 
 ing for the Legislature the previously alienated affec- 
 tion and confidence of the People. 
 
 It is quite consistent with holding this opinion, as 
 to the merits and beneficial results of the Reform 
 Act, to believe that it has faults which it would be 
 highly desirable to remedy. Time, and those changes 
 which are always going on in every human society, 
 have rendered its original imperfections more obvious, 
 and more injurious to the working of our Govern- 
 ment, than they were in the first instance. I believe 
 these imperfections to be capable of being in some 
 cases removed, and in others diminished ; but I am 
 persuaded that the utmost caution will be necessary 
 in attempting to correct them, lest changes should 
 be introduced, which, though plausible, and not per- 
 haps apparently involving any departure from the prin- 
 ciples of our Constitution, would yet be found, in 
 practice, to obstruct the working of the complex 
 machine of our Government. In the next Chapter 
 I will endeavour to point out some of the considera- 
 tions to which it seems to me most important to 
 attend, in framing any plan for a further reform of 
 Parliament. 
 
115 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 CONSIDERATIONS AS TO A NEW REFORM BILL. 
 
 THE difficulty of drawing up a plan for reforming 
 the Representation of the People in Parliament, in a 
 manner that would be at once safe and effectual, can 
 hardly be overrated. I do not propose undertaking a 
 task to which I should be entirely unequal, nor will I 
 even describe some improvements in the existing law 
 which, from observing its effects, I have been led to 
 believe ought to form part of any measure that may 
 be adopted. My humbler aim in this Chapter will be 
 to call the serious attention of those whose duty it 
 may be to frame a new Reform Bill, and of those to 
 whose judgment such a Bill may be submitted, to a 
 few considerations which it seems to me very im- 
 portant not to overlook in dealing with so difficult a 
 subject. 
 
 I. In the first place I would observe, that it ought 
 
 i 2 
 
116 CONSIDERATIONS AS TO A 
 
 constantly to be borne in mind that the power of 
 Parliament is by no means unlimited. It does not 
 follow, because the objects aimed at by a law are 
 right, that its effects will necessarily be good, or be- 
 cause certain things are prescribed and others for- 
 bidden by Acts of Parliament, that men will do what 
 is commanded, or abstain from doing what is pro- 
 hibited. Unless legislation is in accordance with the 
 feelings of the People, it will be unsuccessful, and 
 laws passed without a due consideration of the mo- 
 tives that govern the conduct of mankind are sure to 
 be disregarded. This is so obvious a truth that I 
 should have thought any reference to it quite unne- 
 cessary, were it not that it appears to be often over- 
 looked in practice, and to have recently been so by 
 Parliament, in a matter with which any new Reform 
 Bill will have to deal. 
 
 One of the objects of such a Bill undoubtedly 
 ought to be, to guard as far as possible against 
 corruption ; but it would be a delusion to flatter our- 
 selves that this can be easily accomplished, or that 
 the evil can be eradicated by penal laws, such as that 
 which was passed a year or two ago against bribery. 
 Little advantage can, I think, be anticipated from 
 legislation of this kind. The penalties of the new 
 Act against bribery are very severe, and it gives 
 powers of a highly inquisitorial character for the de- 
 
NEW REFORM BILL. 117 
 
 tection of the offence ; but it does nothing either to 
 diminish the desire for Seats in Parliament, in men 
 who are willing to spend large sums of money to 
 obtain them, nor yet to take away from those who 
 have the power of disposing of these much coveted 
 Seats, their natural inclination to make this privilege 
 the means of advancing their own private interests. 
 While the possession of a Seat in Parliament gives 
 power and distinction, men will be ready to make 
 great sacrifices to obtain one ; and while three or four 
 hundred voters, many of them in humble life and 
 needy circumstances, are invested with the right of 
 giving away a Seat, it is not consistent with the nature 
 of mankind to suppose that they will always resist 
 the attempts which are sure to be made to gain their 
 favour by money or by money's worth. They have 
 nothing to induce them to reject such overtures except 
 a sense of duty, and the interest they have, in com- 
 mon with the Nation at large, in the best candidate 
 being returned to Parliament. I fear that a sense of 
 duty, in such a case, is but a feeble security against 
 the strong temptations to which voters in these cir- 
 cumstances will be exposed, and that appeals to their 
 interest as individuals, will outweigh that which they 
 have in promoting the general good of the commu- 
 nity by making an honest use of their franchise. 
 Legislation may throw some difficulties (not however 
 
118 CONSIDERATIONS AS TO A 
 
 difficulties likely to prove long insurmountable*) in 
 the way of giving money bribes for votes, but it is 
 powerless to prevent an understanding between the 
 parties, for giving and receiving money's worth. The 
 voter may have a house or land let to him on such 
 advantageous terms as to be equivalent to an annual 
 present from his landlord, to whom consequently he 
 will not refuse his vote. This is probably the most 
 common mode of bringing the pecuniary interest of 
 the elector to bear upon his use of the franchise ; 
 and while this continues to be notoriously practised 
 with impunity, it is impossible that, in counties and 
 boroughs where property is thus used by one party, 
 those on the other side will think themselves morally 
 more guilty of bribery than their opponents, if they 
 endeavour to compensate the disadvantage to which 
 they would be thus exposed, by giving to the voters 
 who support them an equivalent in money for what 
 is given by their antagonists in value. 
 
 If men wish to give their votes in return for some 
 personal advantages to themselves, instead of according 
 to their judgment and conscience, the modes in which 
 appeals may be made to their corrupt interests are so 
 innumerable, that it is utterly impossible for the law 
 
 * The results of the late Election Committees inspire a strong 
 suspicion that means of evading the stringent provisions of the new 
 laws have already been discovered and used with no small success. 
 
NEW REFORM BILL, 119 
 
 to provide against them. Hence it follows, that such 
 practices cannot be stopped by direct legislation, and 
 that the only hope of putting them down is to make ar- 
 rangements, which will have the effect of taking away 
 on one side the disposition to give, and on the other 
 the willingness to receive, bribes in return for votes. 
 
 I will not however pursue this subject further; what 
 I have said respecting the Bribery Act is merely in- 
 tended to give a single example of the error of sup- 
 posing, that the objects aimed at by laws will really 
 be accomplished by them, when they are passed with- 
 out due consideration of the motives which govern 
 men's conduct. In laws that deal with the distri- 
 bution of political power this error is peculiarly dange- 
 rous, and ought therefore to be carefully guarded 
 against in framing a new Reform Bill. 
 
 II. It ought not to be too hastily concluded that, 
 because there are undeniable objections to some parts 
 of our constitutional system, or to practices which 
 have grown up under the existing law, it would there- 
 fore be safe at once to adopt measures designed to 
 remedy these particular defects, without at the same 
 time providing against evils of a different kind, which 
 may be less apparent but not less real. No form of 
 government is perfect, but those which have been 
 most successful in practice (and especially our own) 
 seem to have been mainly indebted for their success 
 
120 
 
 CONSIDERATIONS AS TO A 
 
 to the fact that their opposite defects have, as it were, 
 counterbalanced each other. This balance might be 
 destroyed, by correcting faults of one kind without 
 applying any remedy to those which may act in an 
 opposite direction. For instance, referring again to 
 bribery, there can be no doubt that its prevalence at 
 elections is a great evil ; but it is not a greater evil, 
 nor is such an employment of money more immoral, 
 than the use of other means to pervert the judgment 
 of voters. To give money bribes to electors is not 
 worse, or rather not nearly so bad, as to court their 
 favour by flattering their passions and prejudices, 
 and by encouraging them, knowingly, in mischievous 
 political errors. More real guilt is incurred, because 
 greater injury is done to the Nation, by having re- 
 course to the arts of the demagogue, than by the 
 illicit use of money for the purpose of carrying an 
 election, and at the present moment the former abuse 
 seems to be more common than the latter. 
 
 Hence, if all appeals, direct or indirect, to the pecu- 
 niary interests of electors could be put down, with- 
 out at the same time taking precautions against the 
 complete ascendency of the class of candidates who 
 trust to unscrupulous flattery of the mob, the change 
 to be expected in the character of the House of Com- 
 mons would be one rather for the worse than for the 
 better. Demagogues would probably take the places 
 
NEW REFORM BILL. 121 
 
 of men recommended by their wealth. The object 
 therefore which ought to be aimed at is, to check 
 both kinds of abuse as far as possible, and to make 
 arrangements which will favour the return of Mem- 
 bers to Parliament, who should not owe their seats 
 either to their money or to their base courting of 
 popularity. To accomplish this object would no doubt 
 be difficult, but if its importance were recognized, I 
 see no reason to despair that something at least might 
 be done towards effecting it. 
 
 In like manner it must be admitted that the exist- 
 ence of extreme inequalities in the distribution of the 
 right of returning Members to Parliament is an evil, 
 and that abuses have often arisen from the extensive 
 patronage possessed by the Crown. But, on the other 
 hand, the inequalities and anomalies of our Represen- 
 tation have been the means of giving that peculiar 
 character to the House of Commons, to which I have 
 endeavoured to show that its usefulness has been 
 mainly attributable ; and, but for the large patronage 
 possessed by the Servants of the Crown, it is difficult 
 to understand how their authority could have been 
 maintained. Upon this last point (the use and abuse 
 of patronage) so much dangerous error seems to me 
 to prevail, that I shall return to the subject in another 
 Chapter. I am far from contending that the faults I 
 have just mentioned, and others which no doubt exist 
 
122 CONSIDERA.TIOKS AS TO A 
 
 in our Constitution, ought not to be corrected, but I 
 hold it to be absolutely necessary, for the safety of 
 any measures which may be adopted with that view, 
 that they should be directed at the same time against 
 defects of opposite tendencies. In sweeping away ad- 
 mitted abuses, it should be borne in mind that they 
 sometimes arise from the same political arrangements 
 which have likewise produced results indispensable 
 for the safe working of the State machine; so that 
 when, in order to get rid of the abuses, these arrange- 
 ments are altered, the useful purposes they have also 
 answered ought to be provided for by some other 
 means. In spite of the close connection between 
 what is good and what is bad in these arrangements, 
 I believe that in most cases it would not be impossible 
 to separate the one from the other ; and that, if the 
 task were undertaken in the right spirit, it would be 
 practicable to devise a measure which should both 
 meet the just wishes of those who are anxious for 
 reform, and at the same time preserve whatever is 
 valuable in our present system, and maintain the 
 balance of the Constitution. But to discover the 
 best means of accomplishing this object, would be no 
 easy task for the united wisdom of many experienced 
 and able men ; it would therefore be presumptuous in 
 me to express, or even to form, a decided opinion as 
 to how it ought to be attempted. 
 
NEW REFORM BILL. 123 
 
 III. Whatever may be the reforms resolved upon, 
 it is of the greatest moment that they should be of 
 such a character as to afford a reasonable prospect 
 of their accomplishing a settlement of the Constitu- 
 tion which will not speedily be again disturbed, at 
 least so far as regards its leading provisions. There 
 is no course that I should view with greater alarm, 
 than the bringing forward a plan of reform of such 
 a nature as to be likely to increase the desire and 
 prepare the way for more extensive alterations. The 
 habit of making frequent constitutional changes is one 
 of the most dangerous which a People can acquire; 
 nor is anything so fatal to good government, and to 
 the prosperity of a Nation, as the constant agitation of 
 questions as to the form of its institutions. These 
 questions are so exciting in their nature, that while 
 they are agitated they absorb men's attention, to the 
 exclusion of all practical measures ; and w r hile the con- 
 struction of the machine by which a Country is to be 
 governed is in debate, there is little leisure for consi- 
 dering how it is governed, in the meantime, by that 
 which actually exists. One of the first requisites also 
 for a good Government is, that it should possess 
 that authority and moral force which nothing but 
 a general assurance of its stability and permanence can 
 confer; and the power of commanding the prescriptive 
 reverence and confidence of its subjects, which a 
 
124 CONSIDERATIONS AS TO A 
 
 Government derives from long duration in the same 
 form, is an element of wholesome strength, of which 
 it is impossible to supply the place or overrate the 
 value. Frequent changes in the institutions of a Na- 
 tion prevent its Government from ever acquiring this 
 strength, and render it impossible that a belief in the 
 permanence of the authority they are called upon to 
 obey should take root in the minds of the People. 
 
 These considerations were declared, in 1831, to 
 have had a large share in determining the Adminis- 
 tration of that day, to bring forward a measure of 
 Parliamentary Reform, which is well known to have 
 been far larger than was expected either by their 
 friends or their opponents. It was hoped and be- 
 lieved, that the extent of the Measure would render it 
 unnecessary, for some considerable time, to disturb the 
 settlement then to be effected; and the fact that it 
 remains still in force, without any material alteration, 
 after having been five-and- twenty years in operation, 
 is a sufficient proof that this policy was successful. 
 A similar policy ought, I am persuaded, to be now 
 followed, if any attempt is made to effect a further 
 amendment in our Representation. But to make any 
 comparatively small alteration in the existing distribu- 
 tion of the right of returning Members to Parliament 
 among different Constituencies, (by adopting, for in- 
 stance, the plan which has been suggested, of disfran- 
 
NEW REFORM. BILL. 125 
 
 chising all Boroughs having less than a thousand 
 electors, and disposing of the vacant Seats by confer- 
 ring them on the largest unrepresented towns, and 
 dividing the largest of the present constituent bodies,) 
 would be to pursue a policy of the very opposite cha- 
 racter. In the actual state of public opinion, it is 
 clear that any such measure would fail to settle, even 
 for a single year, the question as to what our repre- 
 sentative system is to be in future. The anomalies of 
 our existing system, which it is so easy to describe in 
 a manner to raise a prejudice against them, would 
 remain with but slight diminution; while a second 
 measure of this kind, following the Acts of 1832, 
 would render untenable the ground of prescription, 
 on which alone it is possible to defend the right of 
 the smallest bodies of electors, which would still con- 
 tinue in existence, to an equal share of Parliamentary 
 power with the largest. The distribution of the right 
 of sending Members to Parliament, which would be 
 left after such an alteration as I have referred to, 
 would rest on no principle, and would be incapable of 
 being supported against the attacks which would not 
 fail to be immediately directed against it. 
 
 IV. The great difference between the circumstances 
 of the present time, and those of 1831, ought not to 
 be overlooked ; nor the fact that, if another Reform 
 of Parliament is now needed, it is not for the same 
 
126 CONSIDERATIONS AS TO A 
 
 reasons, and ought not to have the same objects, as 
 the original Reform Bill. I have remarked in a 
 former Chapter, that, in 1831 a great change in the 
 distribution of political power was urgently required, 
 because experience had demonstrated that the House 
 of Commons, as then constituted, was not sufficiently 
 under the influence of public opinion, and that its 
 conduct was habitually biased by the selfish interests 
 of those who returned a majority of its Members, to 
 the injury of the Nation at large. No similar charge 
 can, with any justice, be brought against the reformed 
 House of Commons ; errors of judgment may be im- 
 puted to it on many occasions, but its whole conduct 
 affords clear evidence of a sincere desire to do what is 
 best for the Nation at large ; and, instead of having 
 shown itself insensible to public opinion, it has, on 
 the contrary, been rather too easily swayed by the 
 popular feeling of the day, so as to lose somewhat of 
 that deliberative character which it ought to possess. 
 
 I make this assertion with confidence; because, 
 even in the speeches of the most violent advocates for 
 the passing of a new Reform Bill on democratic prin- 
 ciples, I observe that few attempts have been made to 
 show that the existing distribution of power has led to 
 any injustice to the humbler classes of society on the 
 part of the Legislature. Far from this having been 
 the case, it is notorious that Parliament, of late years, 
 
NEW REFORM BILL. 127 
 
 has shown in all its measures, and especially in its 
 financial measures, a most anxious desire to promote 
 the welfare of the working classes. So much so, that 
 it is the opinion of some persons well qualified to 
 form a judgment, that, in the distribution of the 
 burden of taxation, these classes have been even 
 unduly favoured; and that their real interests have 
 sometimes suffered from the too great eagerness of 
 Parliament to consult their wishes, even when they are 
 mistaken, by passing measures such as the Factory 
 Acts, which have been condemned by many high 
 authorities as meddling legislation. The only prac- 
 tical wrong ever alleged to have been suffered by the 
 people, from the want of a more popularly constituted 
 Representation, is, that of their having been excluded 
 from a fair share of the patronage of the State. Even 
 this complaint would, I believe, prove on investigation 
 to be unfounded ; and, at all events, it must be ad- 
 mitted, that the reformed House of Commons has 
 not shown the disposition, imputed to the unreformed 
 one, to keep up the public establishments on a scale 
 of unnecessary magnitude, for the sake of providing 
 lucrative employment for those by whose influence its 
 Members are elected. 
 
 These are facts of which it is most material that we 
 should never lose sight, in considering the question of 
 a new Reform Bill, since the only sound principle on 
 
128 CONSIDERATIONS AS TO A 
 
 which constitutional changes can be attempted, is that 
 of directing them to practical improvements of the 
 Government, and to the removal of evils that have 
 been felt, not to the gratification of men's passions 
 or their love of change. But, if this principle is 
 recognized, it follows that a new Reform Bill ought 
 not, like the former one, to aim at the transfer of a 
 large amount of political power from one class of 
 society to another, since this is no longer necessary, 
 in order to protect the general interests of the com- 
 munity from being sacrificed to those of a minority 
 of its Members. It is not however to be inferred, 
 that no reform of our Representation is required, be- 
 cause there is no occasion for altering the existing 
 distribution of political power among different classes 
 of society. A reform is wanted, though not for the 
 same reasons as formerly. In the present state of 
 things, the objects that ought to be aimed at by 
 such a measure are, to interest a larger proportion 
 of the people in the Constitution, by investing them 
 with political rights, without disturbing the existing 
 balance of power ; to discourage bribery at elections, 
 without giving more influence to the arts of dema- 
 gogues ; to strengthen the legitimate authority of 
 the Executive Government, and at the same time to 
 guard against its being abused ; and to render the 
 distribution of the Parliamentary franchise less nn- 
 
NEW REFORM BILL. 129 
 
 equal and less anomalous, but yet carefully to pre- 
 serve that character which has hitherto belonged to 
 the House of Commons, from its including among its 
 Members men representing all the different classes of 
 society, and all the different interests and opinions to 
 be found in the Nation. 
 
 Much public good might be anticipated from the 
 passing of a new Reform Bill having these for its 
 objects, but it would be far otherwise with one of 
 which it should be the design or the effect to render 
 the House of Commons more democratic in its cha- 
 racter, since, in the present state of society, it can 
 hardly be doubted, that any increased power given to 
 the democratic element in our Constitution, must end, 
 sooner or later, in its complete ascendency. Though 
 strongly convinced of the value of free institutions, 
 and a firm friend of popular liberty, I am yet per- 
 suaded that such a change in the character of our 
 Government would be one of the greatest misfortunes 
 that could befall the Country; I therefore earnestly 
 hope that all who are disposed to support measures 
 calculated to lead, more or less directly, to this result, 
 will carefully consider whether it would not be likely 
 to prove injurious to all classes of society, and per- 
 haps to none more than to that which might seem, at 
 first sight, to be the most direct gainer by it. 
 
 The mere possession of political power is of itself 
 
 K 
 
130 CONSIDERATIONS AS TO A 
 
 no advantage to the People at large. Indeed, it is 
 impossible that such power should be directly exer- 
 cised by the People of a great Nation. Under the 
 most democratic Constitution, it must be delegated, 
 either avowedly or virtually, to a few individuals. 
 The privilege of choosing these holders of power, is 
 all that such a Constitution can even profess to confer 
 upon the People; and it has been found that there 
 is no security that this privilege shall be more than 
 a delusion. The dexterous management of a few 
 unscrupulous men may, under a system of Universal 
 Suffrage and Vote by Ballot, impose upon a com- 
 munity rulers who possess its confidence as little as 
 they deserve it. Thus there has been lately seen in 
 California the extraordinary spectacle of an armed 
 insurrection of the inhabitants, virtually deposing the 
 authorities of the State so elected by themselves, in 
 order to execute the decisions of a self-constituted 
 Vigilance Committee. 
 
 The possession of political power is valuable to the 
 People, not for its own sake, but as the means of 
 ensuring good government ; their real interest there- 
 fore is, not that they should have the largest possible 
 share of power, but that they should have such a 
 measure of it, and that the Government should be 
 so constituted, as to afford them the best security for 
 its being well conducted. And a Government is to 
 
NEW REFORM BILL. 131 
 
 be considered as well conducted, when wise laws are 
 passed and impartially enforced; when public em- 
 ployments are placed in the hands of honest and 
 capable men ; when the relations of the State with 
 foreign nations are managed with firmness and a 
 regard for justice ; and when every member of the 
 community is effectually protected against wrong from 
 any quarter, without unnecessary interference with 
 the freedom of thought or action on the part of indi- 
 viduals, or undue or unequal pressure of taxation. 
 
 A Government is to be considered better or worse 
 in proportion as it more or less perfectly fulfils these 
 conditions; and adopting this as the test, good go- 
 vernment has not been found, either in ancient or in 
 modern times, to be the result of extreme democracy. 
 The great political philosophers of antiquity have 
 drawn, as we know, a highly unfavourable judgment 
 of its nature and effects, from what had been ob- 
 served when they wrote of the working of Govern- 
 ments of this character. Though it has of late be- 
 come the fashion of some political speculators, to 
 treat the works of these authors as no longer worth 
 attention, 1 still believe that the results of their ex- 
 perience well deserve the consideration so long paid 
 to them, and that their writings contain lessons of 
 wisdom not less applicable to our days than to theirs. 
 The discovery that the People may act through their 
 
 K 2 
 
132 CONSIDERATIONS AS TO A 
 
 Representatives, instead of directly, in public affairs, 
 has indeed removed one of the difficulties which in 
 ancient times obstructed the working of purely de- 
 mocratic Governments, and rendered them only prac- 
 ticable upon a small scale ; but I see no indication of 
 the nature of this kind of government having been 
 altered, from being carried into operation on a much 
 larger scale, by the machinery of representative bo- 
 dies. On the contrary, there is an almost mar- 
 vellous resemblance between the characteristics of de- 
 mocratic governments in ancient and modern times, 
 considering how completely the state of society is 
 changed. In France, and in some other European 
 countries, those brief periods during which unre- 
 stricted democracy has obtained the ascendency in 
 the last seventy years, have afforded examples of 
 abuses and excesses singularly like those which are 
 described as having followed democratic revolutions 
 in ancient times, and have led, much in the same 
 manner, to the extinction, for a time at least, of poli- 
 tical liberty. 
 
 The United States of America afford the most 
 favourable example of the working of a purely demo- 
 cratic system of government, during any considerable 
 period in modern times. But its results, even in that 
 great and flourishing Republic, seem to me to con- 
 firm the unfavourable conclusions of ancient writers, 
 
NEW REFORM BILL. 133 
 
 whether we look to the working of the general Go- 
 vernment, or of the Governments of the several States 
 composing the Union. This is an opinion I express 
 with reluctance, because I would not willingly say 
 anything to wound the susceptible feelings of our 
 American kinsmen ; but when we are on the eve of 
 being called upon to consider some plan of Parlia- 
 mentary Reform, and when it appears to be the wish 
 of a large party, that the expected measure should 
 be of a highly democratic character, it is right that 
 we should look (for our own guidance) at what have 
 been the results of extreme democracy, in the country 
 where it has been most successful. A lesson of the 
 highest value to ourselves, in the present circum- 
 stances of the country, may be drawn from the expe- 
 rience of the United States. I shall therefore, even at 
 the risk of giving offence I would gladly avoid, and of 
 repeating the substance of some observations I have 
 made in former Chapters, call attention to the follow- 
 ing results of the working of their Government, as 
 compared with our own, which seem to be clearly 
 established by indisputable evidence. 
 
 The Government of the United States has undoubt- 
 edly proved highly favourable to the material pros- 
 perity of the Nation, to its being preserved from the 
 undue pressure of taxation, and to the accumulation 
 of wealth. Even in these respects, it may be ques- 
 
134 CONSIDERATIONS AS TO A 
 
 tioned whether it is now really superior to the Go- 
 vernment of this Country ; if we take into consider- 
 ation the advantages it has enjoyed from its large 
 extent of unoccupied territory, and from its geogra- 
 phical position having hitherto given to the American 
 Union little temptation or opportunity to engage in 
 expensive wars, such as those of which the charges 
 are still the cause of so large a part of our public 
 burdens. Granting, however, that in this respect the 
 Government of the United States has been favourable 
 to the welfare of the people, there are large draw- 
 backs from the advantage thus derived from it. Men 
 enjoy under it far less real liberty than they do with 
 us, because the tyrannical pressure* of the majority 
 
 * " L' Amerique est done un pays de liberte ou, pour ne blesser 
 personne, 1'etranger ne doit parler ni des particuliers, ni de 1'Etat, 
 ni des gouvernes, ni des gouvernements, ni des entreprises pu- 
 bliques, ni des entreprises privees, de rien enfin de ce qu'on y 
 rencontre sinon peut-etre du climat et du sol ; encore trouve-t-on 
 des Americains prets a defendre 1'un et 1'autre, comme s'ils avaient 
 concouru a les former." Democratic en Amerique, vol. i. p. 284. 
 (13th edit.) 
 
 " Je ne connais pas de pays ou il regne en general moins d'inde- 
 pendance d'esprit et de veritable liberte de discussion qu'en Ame- 
 rique." Ibid., p. 307. 
 
 " En Amerique la majorite trace un cercle formidable autour de la 
 pensee. Au dedans de ces limites 1'ecrivain est libre, mais mallieur 
 aluis'il ose en sortir. Cen'est pas qu'il ait a craindre un auto-da-fe, 
 mais il est en butte a des degouts de tous genres, et a des persecu- 
 tions de tous les jours. La carriere politique lui est fermee ; il a 
 offense la seule puissance qui ait la faculte de 1'ouvrir. On lui 
 
NEW REFORM BILL. 135 
 
 cramps the freedom of thought and action of in- 
 dividuals. Both Congress * and the State Legisla- 
 tures are described as being ill calculated, either 
 by their composition or the manner in which they 
 conduct their business, to gain the respect of the 
 public. Their Legislation is less directed than our 
 
 refuse tout, jusqu'a la gloire. Avant de publier ses opinions, il 
 croyait avoir des partisans ; il lui semble qu'il n'en a plus maintenant 
 qu'il s'est decouvert a tous ; car ceux qui le blament s'expriment 
 hautement, et ceux qui pensent comme lui, sans avoir son courage, se 
 taisent et s'eloignent. H cede, il plie enfin sous 1'effort de chaque 
 jour, et rentre dans le silence comme s'il eprouvait des remords d'avoir 
 dit vrai." Ibid., p. 308. 
 
 " Les monarchies absolues avaient deshonore le despotisme,prenons 
 garde que les republiques democratiques ne le rehabilitent, et qu'en 
 le renclant plus lourd pour quelques-uns, elles ne lui 6tent, aux 
 yeux du plus grand nombre, son aspect odieux et son caractere 
 avilissant." Ibid., p. 309. 
 
 * " Lorsque vous entrez dans la salle des Representants a Wash- 
 ington vous vous sentez frappe de 1'aspect vulgaire de cette grande 
 assemblee. L'oail cherche en vain dans son sein un homme celebre. 
 Presque tous ses membres sont des personnages obscurs dont le nom 
 ne fournit aucune image a la pensee. Ce sont pour la plupart des 
 avocats de village, des commercants, ou meme des hommes apparte- 
 nant aux dernieres classes. Dans un pays ou 1'instruction est 
 presque universellement repandue, on dit que les representants du 
 peuple ne savent pas toujours ecrire." Ibid. 
 
 Horace Greeley, in a letter in the ' Tribune,' describing the usual 
 proceedings of the House of Representatives, says that a person 
 having made his way to the gallery " can only look down on the 
 noisy Bedlam below him, somebody speaking and nobody listening; 
 but a buzz of conversation, the trotting of boys, the walking about 
 of Members, the writing and folding of letters, calls to order, 
 cries of question, calls for 'yeas' and 'nays,' etc., give him large 
 
136 CONSIDERATIONS AS TO A 
 
 own by an enlightened regard for the good of the 
 whole community; witness the maintenance of a 
 tariff at variance with every sound principle, for the 
 supposed advantage of certain classes of producers. 
 The management of public affairs is thrown into the 
 hands of men selected for employment without regard 
 to their fitness; the grossest corruption* notoriously 
 
 opportunities for headache meagre ones for edification. Half an 
 hour will usually cure him of all passion for listening to debates in 
 the House. There are, of course, occasions when it is a privilege to 
 be here, but I speak of the general scene and impression. 
 
 " Today, but more especially yesterday, a deplorable spectacle has 
 been presented here a glaring exemplification of the terrible growth 
 and diffusion of office-begging. The Loco-Foco house has ordered 
 a clean sweep of all its underlings door-keepers, porters, mes- 
 sengers, wood- carriers, etc. etc. I care nothing for this so far as the 
 turned- out are concerned ; let them earn a living like other folks ; 
 but the swarms of aspirants that invaded every avenue and hall of 
 the Capitol, making doubly hideous the dissonance of its hundred 
 echoes, were dreadful to contemplate. Here were hundreds of 
 young boys, from twenty down to twelve years of age, deep in the 
 agonies of debasing earwigging and button-holding, talking of the 
 services of their fathers or brothers to ' the party/ and getting 
 Members to intercede for them with the appointing power. The 
 new doorkeeper was in distraction, and had to hide behind the 
 Speaker's chair, where he could not be hunted except by proxy." 
 H. Gh-eeleys Life, p. 246. 
 
 * The biographer of Horace Greeley, when speaking of the 
 Presidential election in which Jackson defeated Adams, says, 
 " Hurrah for Jackson ! carried the day. The last of the gentlemen 
 of the revolutionary school retired. The era of wire-pulling began. 
 That deadly element was introduced into our political system which 
 rendered it so exquisitely vicious that henceforth it worked to cor- 
 ruption by an irresistible necessity. It is called, rotation in office. 
 
NEW REFORM BILL. 137 
 
 prevailing, both in making appointments to office and 
 in the general conduct of public business, whether by 
 the Federal Government, or by the State or Municipal 
 authorities. Even the administration of justice is in- 
 fected with the taint, and fails to command the confi- 
 
 It is embodied in the maxim, * To the victors belong the spoils.' It 
 has made the word office-holder synonymous with the word sneak. 
 It has thronged the Capitol with greedy sycophants. It has made 
 politics a game of cunning, with enough of chance in it to render it 
 interesting to the low crew that play. It has made the President a 
 pawn, with which to make the first move, a puppet, to keep the 
 people amused while their pockets are picked. It has excluded 
 from the service of the State nearly every man of ability and worth, 
 and enabled bloated and beastly demagogues, without a ray of 
 talent without a sentiment of magnanimity, illiterate, vulgar, in- 
 sensible to shame, to exert a power in this Republic which its 
 greatest Statesmen in their greatest days never wielded." Greeleys 
 Life, p. 100. "We are not, of course, to accept this description as 
 being literally correct ; it is obviously written under the influence 
 of excited feelings which must probably have led to a good deal of 
 exaggeration ; but making all allowance for this, the state of things 
 which could be viewed in this light by an American citizen must 
 be very bad. There is also abundant other evidence as to the main 
 fact of the general prevalence of corruption. 
 
 Mr. Baxter, in his ' America and the Americans' (page 59), speak- 
 ing of several Americans having been heard to declare, " that they 
 believed their own Government to be the most corrupt on the earth," 
 says, " This appears to me too strong a condemnation ; but the 
 disease prevails in the State Legislatures, and in the Councils of the 
 various cities, just as much as at Washington. No one in New York 
 seemed for a moment to doubt the alleged jobbery and trickery 
 resorted to in obtaining privileges from the civic rulers. Leading men 
 of every shade in politics, informed me that offices and favours were 
 there openly bought and sold ; that aldermen and councilmen ac- 
 cepted these situations for the avowed purpose of getting quickly 
 
138 CONSIDERATIONS AS TO A 
 
 dence of the Public for its impartiality and fairness.* 
 The policy of the Nation is mainly directed by dema- 
 gogues, and those who are least scrupulous in flattering 
 the passions of the People, f Lastly, though it is less 
 than seventy years since the Constitution of the United 
 
 rich, and that jobs every week were there perpetrated with impu- 
 nity, which, in this country, would bring to disgrace every person 
 connected with them. I believe that as great corruption exists in 
 the government of that city as was ever brought to light in the days 
 of the Stuarts ; and what is more, I have heard people defend it, on 
 the ground that in America all can, at one time or other, share in 
 the plunder, whereas in Europe public robbery was the privilege of 
 the few. Within the limits of that municipality murders are of 
 frequent occurrence, prisoners constantly escape, and highway 
 robberies are neither few nor far between, whilst the police force, in 
 1853, cost more than a million of dollars." 
 
 * " It is painful to observe, that in many instances mob violence 
 even yet interferes with justice in the Western Republic ; and that 
 wealth and station procure acquittals far more readily there than they 
 do in aristocratic England. So many American citizens admitted and 
 mourned over these evils to me, that I shall not occupy my space in 
 adducing proof." ..." Europeans will never believe that a country 
 is really free, so long as rowdyism reigns rampant in civilized cities ; 
 and social rank, partisanship, or pecuniary bribes corrupt the foun- 
 tain-head of justice. It is mockery for citizens of these States, 
 where punishment seldom or ever overtakes the rich, to talk of 
 liberty and equality. Under the shadow of ultra- democratic Go- 
 vernments in the other hemisphere, every year judicial decisions 
 are given without exciting attention, so unrighteous and so strongly 
 marked by a mean subserviency to wealth and station, that were 
 they pronounced in monarchical Britain, no matter how high the 
 authority, the consequences would endanger the peace of the nation, 
 and shake the very pillars of the throne." -Baxter s America and the 
 Americans, pp. 100, 101. 
 
 t Democratic en Amerique, vol. i. p. 238 (13th edit.). 
 
NEW REFORM BILL. 139 
 
 States was established, and it has, within a much 
 shorter period, undergone those modifications which 
 have given to the democratic spirit its present complete 
 ascendency, it is matter of general observation, that 
 already this system of government has done much to 
 lower the moral tone and character of the statesmen 
 and people of the Republic.* 
 
 These evils are traced, by the best observers, to the 
 unbalanced power of the democracy. It is the form 
 of Government in the United States, not the People, 
 that is to blame for them ; since the high qualities of 
 the American People at the time of the Revolution are 
 universally admitted, and probably have alone enabled 
 so ill-constituted a Government to be carried on at 
 all. Such is the experience we have of the working 
 
 * " A mon arrivee aux I^tats Unis, je fas frappe de surprise en 
 decouvrant a quel point le merite etait commun parmi les gouvernes, 
 et combien il 1'etait pen chez les gouyernants. C'est un fait constant 
 que de nos jours, aux Etats Unis, les homines les plus remarquables 
 sont rarement appeles aux fonctions publiques, et 1'on est oblige 
 de reconnaitre qu'il a ete ainsi a mesure que la democratic a depasse 
 toutes ses anciennes limites. II est evident que la race des homines 
 d'Etat Americains s'est singulierement rapetissee depuis un demi- 
 siecle." Ibid., vol. i. p. 236. 
 
 " When the United States contained only three millions of in- 
 habitants, they produced generals, statesmen, philosophers, and 
 orators, whose fame will live as long as the English language. Now 
 there is not a single man of distinction among their twenty millions. 
 Every President has been inferior to his predecessor." Opinion of 
 Signor Manin (the defender of Venice), as given in the N, British 
 Review for February, 1855, p. 321. 
 
140 CONSIDERATIONS AS TO A 
 
 of an unbalanced Democracy in America, and those 
 who have closely watched public events of late years, 
 must surely have already observed significant sym- 
 ptoms that its operation in this Country (should it 
 ever unhappily be established here) would be even 
 worse, and that we must expect it to give a disastrous 
 ascendency, in the conduct of public affairs, to dema- 
 gogues who would make the worst use of their power. 
 
 V. Lastly, it is of the highest importance, that, 
 before any measure of Parliamentary Reform is 
 brought forward or supported by the Ministers of 
 the Crown, the means by which it is to be carried 
 should be very carefully considered. An abortive 
 attempt made by the Government to effect a change 
 in the Constitution, must inevitably produce much 
 evil, and might lead to even fatal results, so that the 
 responsibility of the Ministry that brings forward such 
 a proposal would be very great. But, unless I am 
 entirely mistaken in the views I have endeavoured to 
 explain in this and the preceding Chapter, a measure 
 of Parliamentary Reform, in order to be good and 
 safe, ought not to be limited to merely extending the 
 privileges of the People, but ought also to furnish 
 securities against the overthrow of the balance of the 
 Constitution by the undue extension of democratic 
 power. 
 
 A Bill framed upon this principle must, however, 
 
NEW REFORM BILL. 141 
 
 contain among its provisions, some that would be 
 unpalatable to each of the two great divisions under 
 which political Parties in this country may be classed. 
 If such a Bill, therefore, were brought forward by 
 any Minister in the ordinary manner, that is to say, 
 without having secured the previous concurrence of 
 the leaders of different parties, there would be no 
 probability, or rather no possibility, of its success. If 
 proposed by a Conservative Minister (which is most 
 unlikely), it would be viewed with jealousy by the 
 majority of the Nation ; and those parts of it which 
 were designed as a safeguard against democracy, 
 coming from such hands, without the concurrence 
 of the known friends of popular privileges, would 
 provoke an opposition that could hardly be surmount- 
 ed. If, on the other hand, any large measure of 
 Parliamentary Reform were brought forward by a 
 Whig or Radical Administration, without concert 
 with the Conservative party, they must be expected 
 to oppose it, since their opinions would naturally lead 
 them to take this course. But the resistance of this 
 great Party could be overcome only by the strenuous 
 support of a still larger and more powerful Party. 
 This there would be no chance of forming, in the 
 present state of the Country, without obtaining the 
 co-operation of the great body of persons who hold 
 ultra- democratic opinions ; while their assistance could 
 
142 CONSIDERATIONS AS TO A 
 
 not be expected, unless for a Measure from which all 
 that would be distasteful to them had been omitted. 
 
 Hence it may fairly be concluded, that no Bill 
 making any considerable change in our Representative 
 system is ever likely to be carried through Parliament, 
 unless it is either adopted by the general consent of 
 political Parties, as a compromise between their con- 
 flicting views, or else is of so violent a nature as to se- 
 cure the energetic support of the great democratic Party. 
 There would be no prospect of carrying a new Re- 
 form Bill of this last description through both Houses 
 of Parliament without a fearful struggle, or without 
 the use of means of a character more or less revolu- 
 tionary. Little doubt can be entertained on this 
 point by those who will consider how great would be 
 the strength of the Conservative Party, when rein- 
 forced by that numerous and powerful body of men 
 who would be driven into their ranks by the propo- 
 sal of a highly democratic measure of Parliamentary 
 Reform. The danger to which the Country would 
 be exposed by a fierce and prolonged contest on this 
 question, and the amount of evil it must certainly 
 produce, can hardly be exaggerated. 
 
 The history of the Reform Act of 1832 ought to 
 teach a useful lesson to men of all parties, as to the 
 importance of not allowing a change in the Constitu- 
 tion again to become a subject of party strife. The 
 
NEW REFORM BILL. 143 
 
 struggle by which that measure was carried was one of 
 which the full danger and difficulty were not generally 
 known ; but those who are aware of the truth, must, 
 I am sure, concur with me in believing, that a nation 
 has seldom passed safely through such peril of a fear- 
 ful convulsion. Though it would not become me to 
 enlarge upon the subject, I trust I may without im- 
 propriety express my conviction, that, under Provi- 
 dence, we owe our escape from that great peril to the 
 judgment and the firmness with which the helm of 
 the Government was held by its Chief, and to the 
 steady course which he steered, in spite both of the 
 bitter opposition to which he was exposed on the one 
 side, and of the violent counsels so urgently pressed 
 upon him by almost all his friends on the other. To 
 engage the Nation again in a contest of the same 
 kind, without the same urgent necessity for it, would 
 be an act either of the most reckless folly, or of the 
 deepest guilt. 
 
 Nor is it only as to the danger of such a contest, 
 that the events of 1831 and 1832 are instructive. If 
 we carefully consider the whole course of the proceed- 
 ings on the Reform Bills, we must, 1 think, come to 
 the conclusion that these measures might have been 
 greatly improved, and that three much better Acts 
 might have been passed (for the three divisions of 
 the Kingdom), if, instead of being carried as they 
 
144 CONSIDERATIONS AS TO A 
 
 were, they had been settled by temperate and candid 
 discussion between the leaders of different parties. 
 Instead of making a life-and-death battle for the 
 maintenance of existing abuses, the Tory Party, had 
 they been wise, would have frankly accepted, as un- 
 avoidable, the transfer of a large measure of political 
 power from the hands of the Borough-holders to 
 those of the People at large, and would have confined 
 their efforts to the improvement of the Measure, so 
 as to obviate the most reasonable of their objections 
 to it. If they had shown a disposition to take this 
 course, I feel convinced that the Ministers of that day 
 would not have refused to meet them in a conciliatory 
 spirit. As it was, the violence of the opposition which 
 the Measure encountered made it utterly impossible 
 that the question of amending it should be calmly 
 considered ; and unfortunately the changes which, to 
 ensure its success, were made in it during its pro- 
 gress, were for the most part changes for the worse. 
 
 At the same time, it would be most unjust to 
 throw the whole blame of the struggle by which the 
 Reform Bill was carried upon the Tory Party. It 
 must in fairness be admitted, that the violence of 
 some of the partisans of the Measure was well calcu- 
 lated to increase the alarm which its magnitude might 
 reasonably create, even in men influenced by no sel- 
 fish considerations, but only by an honest concern 
 
NEW REFORM BILL. 145 
 
 for the good of the Country. Sufficient anxiety 
 was not felt by many of the Reformers, to reconcile 
 adversaries of this class to what was, in truth, a 
 hazardous experiment, an experiment which I be- 
 lieve it to have been absolutely necessary to make, 
 but of which the result could not fail to be a matter 
 of anxiety, not alone to its opponents, but also to 
 those of its supporters who understood its real cha- 
 racter.* 
 
 The error committed by the Tory Party, in 1831, 
 seems therefore to me to have been natural and par- 
 donable ; but it ought not the less, on that account, to 
 be a warning to them not again to fall into a similar 
 mistake. To avoid doing so, they ought to consider 
 dispassionately the present state of the Country, and 
 
 * What I regard as tlie just view of the Reform Bill, and of the 
 opposition it encountered, is so well stated in an article in the 
 * North British Heview,' that I cannot forbear quoting the pas- 
 sage. " The Reform Bill, it is impossible to deny, was a transfer 
 of power and political influence from the aristocracy to the middle 
 classes. Who now will not acknowledge that this was a revolution, 
 at the magnitude of which genuine patriots might well stand aghast, 
 which cautious men might well deem wild and perilous, which even 
 men who loved progress, if they loved safety likewise, might well 
 deprecate and dread? Those who loved the People might not un- 
 reasonably doubt the wisdom of entrusting this new weapon to tl.e 
 People's hands. No one will no\v deny that it was a great experi- 
 ment. No one will deny that in some respects its opponents judged 
 it more truly, and saw further into its consequences, than its pro- 
 moters. For ourselves, we confess that, approving it as we did aud 
 do, believing it to have been a just, a wise, and a necessary mea- 
 
 L 
 
146 CONSIDERATIONS AS TO A 
 
 the direction in which the tide of public opinion 
 is setting, on the subject of Parliamentary Reform. 
 Looking with this view to the declarations of candi- 
 dates on the hustings, and to the result of the recent 
 Elections, it must be admitted, that they afford clear 
 evidence that a general desire does exist among the 
 People for further changes in the constitution of the 
 House of Commons, though this desire does not at 
 present seem to be very strong, or to be founded on 
 a sense of any real evils arising from causes that such 
 changes would remove, and is to a great extent fac- 
 titious. Most candidates in places where there are 
 large numbers of electors, have thought it necessary 
 to promise their support to proposals for further 
 reforms in the Representation ; and those who have 
 refused to give promises of this kind, or have been 
 
 sure, tracing in the main to its secondary influences the rapid 
 progress of reforms in other lines, we yet see in it several dangers, 
 drawbacks, and extensive seeds of future and questionable change, 
 which we did not see when it was passed ; we acknowledge much 
 weight and wisdom in many of the hostile arguments which at the 
 time we scouted as the mere dictates of selfishness and folly ; and 
 we look back with something like remorse and shame at the violence 
 of our language, the acrimony of our feelings, the imperfection of 
 our philosophy, and the shortness of our vision. We were blind to 
 much that our adversaries saw j we were obstinately deaf to many 
 representations that ought to have been listened to with deference 
 and profit ; and if the thing had to be done again, we should act 
 with greater modesty and temperance, with far less confidence, 
 and far more misgiving." North British Review for August, 1854, 
 p. 573. 
 
NEW REFORM BILL. 147 
 
 most cautious as to how far they would go in doing 
 so, have generally been defeated by bolder or less 
 scrupulous competitors. A large proportion of the 
 Members of the new Parliament, including some 
 who hold a commanding position, are thus pledged 
 to measures of organic change of greater or less 
 importance. In future Parliaments, the number of 
 Members committed to the same policy is not likely 
 to be diminished ; it seems therefore impossible that 
 the adoption of some measures of this kind should 
 long have been averted, even if the present Minis- 
 ters of the Crown had declined to entertain the 
 question. The pledge which they have given ren- 
 ders it absolutely necessary that the subject should 
 be dealt, with, either by the existing Administration, 
 or by any other which may take its place if it should 
 be dissolved. Assuming this to be true, it follows, 
 that the great object of those who desire to prevent a 
 dangerous disturbance of the balance of the Constitu- 
 tion, ought to be, to secure the adoption of a just and 
 well-considered plan of Reform, instead of one based 
 upon the principle of ultra- democracy. 
 
 But the ultimate passing of a Measure of the last 
 kind, is not more likely to be ensured by a deter- 
 mined resistance to all Reform, than by allowing Bills 
 to pass which make apparently slight additions to 
 the democratic power, and which may perhaps be 
 
 L 2 
 
148 CONSIDERATIONS AS TO A 
 
 plausible in themselves. I advert to such proposals as 
 that for the extension of the County franchise, which 
 was defeated by a small majority in the last House 
 of Commons, and would probably have been carried 
 in the new one, but for the effect of the Ministerial 
 promise. As part of a large Measure, holding out 
 the prospect of settling the question of Parliamentary 
 Reform for some considerable time, this is a proposal 
 which might probably be adopted with advantage, 
 but which, if carried singly, would be calculated only 
 to increase both the appetite for further change, and 
 the power of those who demand it. The danger 
 of such alterations in the franchise is exceedingly 
 well stated by M. de Tocqueville in the following 
 passage. He says : " Lorsqu'un peuple commence 
 a toucher au cens electoral, on peut prevoir qu'il 
 arrivera, dans un delai plus ou moins long, a le faire 
 disparaitre completement. C'est la Tune des regies 
 les plus invariables qui regissent les societes. A 
 mesure qu'on recule la limite des droits electoraux, on 
 sent le besoin de reculer da vantage ; car apres chaque 
 concession nouvelle, les forces de la democratic aug- 
 mentent, et ses exigences croissent avec son nouveau 
 pouvoir. L'ambition de ceux qu'on laisse au dessous 
 du cens, s'irrite en proportion du grand nombre de 
 ceux qui se trouvent au dessus. L'exception devient 
 enfin la regie ; les concessions se succedent sans 
 
NEW REFORM BILL. 149 
 
 relache, et on ne s'arrete plus, que quand on est 
 arrive au suffrage universel."* 
 
 Nothing can be more just than this reasoning, and 
 it leads directly to the conclusion, that there is more 
 real danger in such small and partial measures as 
 that I have mentioned (which are mere steps towards 
 democracy) than in a more extensive change in our 
 Representation, provided the latter is founded on a 
 deliberate review of our whole system, and is so 
 framed as to correct the faults in opposite directions 
 which are to be found in it. If, therefore, permanent 
 resistance to all change in the state of the Represen- 
 tation is (as I believe) impossible, the wise course 
 for those who hold Conservative opinions is, to show 
 themselves ready to concur in some fair and reason- 
 able settlement of the question of Parliamentary Re- 
 form. Their doing so, would be no less for their 
 interest as a Party, than for the good of the Country; 
 since in the present state of opinion, so long as the 
 question of Parliamentary Reform remains unsettled, 
 not only the general question itself, but those parti- 
 cular ones which form part of it, such as the Ballot, 
 the extension of the Franchise, and the shortening of 
 Parliaments, will throw difficulties in the way of 
 Conservative candidates in populous places. 
 
 To these reasons, in favour of the adoption by the 
 
 * Democratic en Amerique, vol. i. pp. 67-68 (13th edition). 
 
150 CONSIDERATIONS AS TO A 
 
 Conservative Party of the policy I have described, 
 I would add, that the events of the last few years 
 strongly indicate that, even if there were no wish on 
 the part of the People for organic change of any kind, 
 the time is coming when it will be impossible that 
 things should remain as they are. The difficulties in 
 carrying on our system of Parliamentary Government, 
 to which I have adverted in a former Chapter, as 
 having arisen partly from the Reform Acts of 1832, 
 partly from other causes, seem to be growing more 
 and more serious, and threaten virtually to break 
 down the system itself, unless something is done to 
 strengthen the authority of the Servants of the Crown 
 in Parliament. But it would obviously be imprac- 
 ticable to effect this, unless the changes which may 
 be proposed with that view should form part of a 
 general Measure, by which an extension of popular 
 rights should also be granted. 
 
 Nor is a fair settlement of this question less de- 
 sirable to Liberal than to Conservative politicians, 
 even looking at it merely with reference to their Party 
 interests. Until it is settled, every Liberal Govern- 
 ment must be placed in a false position, in which no 
 course will be open to it free from difficulties and dan- 
 gers. Such a Government cannot oppose motions 
 like that of Mr. Locke King, or that of Mr. Berkeley, 
 for the Ballot, without finding itself divided from its 
 
NEW REFORM BILL. 151 
 
 usual supporters, and compelled to depend upon its 
 opponents, while at the same time it brings the Seats 
 of many of its Members into jeopardy. Nor can it, 
 without extreme discredit, support such motions, and 
 at the same time decline to pledge itself as a Govern- 
 ment to carry the measures it has agreed to ; while, 
 if it should take that course, it would run the risk 
 of being brought into a very embarrassing position 
 by the resistance to be expected from the House of 
 Lords. An Administration might, it is true, en- 
 deavour to force its measures of Reform through the 
 House of Lords, but (as I have already endeavoured 
 to show) there would be little chance of success in 
 that attempt, unless a strong popular feeling were 
 excited in its favour by proposing great concessions 
 to the' democratic spirit. But if a Bill involving 
 such concessions were brought forward, it is by no 
 means impossible that a Conservative reaction might 
 be produced, and overthrow both the Bill and its au- 
 thors ; since there is no longer the same necessity as in 
 1831 for a sweeping change in the distribution of po- 
 litical power, and I believe there are few persons even 
 in the Liberal party who desire to lower the British 
 Constitution to the level of an unbalanced democracy. 
 For these reasons it seems to be equally the interest 
 of the Nation at large, and of all political parties, that, 
 by means of an amicable arrangement among these 
 
152 CONSIDERATIONS AS TO A 
 
 Parties, a new Reform Bill, founded upon a fair com- 
 promise between conflicting opinions, should be passed. 
 It ought not to be impossible to arrive at an agree- 
 ment as to the provisions of such a Bill, if the Leaders 
 of the principal Parties could be induced to meet, 
 in order to consider the subject in a spirit of mutual 
 forbearance, and with a sincere desire to settle the 
 question. The difficulty is, to find some mode of 
 bringing together, to consult upon this matter, those 
 whose agreement as to what is to be done is necessary. 
 No private and unauthorized consultation among the 
 Leaders of different Parties, to enable them to arrive 
 at an understanding as to the Measure they would 
 support, would be likely to answer. Such a course 
 would infallibly be denounced an odious cabal, and an 
 improper attempt to control the deliberations of Par- 
 liament by a secret conspiracy, and against a cry of 
 this sort no measure could be expected to succeed. 
 Whatever steps are taken must be open and avowed, 
 and ought also to have the character of a formal pro- 
 ceeding, sanctioned by authority. 
 
 If I might hazard a suggestion on the subject, I 
 would venture to recommend, that the Queen should 
 nominate a Committee of her Privy Council, composed 
 of Members taken from different political parties, to 
 consider and report what measures of Reform ought 
 to be adopted. This suggestion is partly founded 
 
NEW REFORM BILL. 153 
 
 upon one I remember to have seen in some periodical 
 publication, that the course taken for the amendment 
 of the Poor Law should be followed as a precedent, 
 and that a Royal Commission should be appointed to 
 inquire into the present state of the Representation, 
 and the best mode of improving it. No doubt that 
 course was eminently successful in the reform of the 
 Poor Law, but the present is not quite a parallel case. 
 Though a searching inquiry, calmly conducted by able 
 men, would be useful for the purpose of discovering 
 how our institutions may be most safely and effectually 
 improved, something more is wanted. With respect 
 to political changes, it is necessary to find out, not 
 only what would be the best, but also what are the 
 measures that could be carried with the assent of the 
 chief political Parties in the Country. A Commission 
 constituted like that which so ably investigated the 
 question of the Poor Law, could throw little light 
 on this point ; but a well-selected Committee of the 
 Privy Council might inquire, as well as a Commission, 
 into the best mode of reforming our Representation, 
 while it would also afford the means of discovering 
 what measures could be carried, if it had among its 
 members some of the Leaders of all the great Parties 
 in the State, not excluding the Radical party. Even 
 if it should prove impossible to induce the members of 
 this Party to accept as sufficient such reforms as others 
 
154 CONSIDERATIONS AS TO A 
 
 would regard as safe, there ought to be a full oppor- 
 tunity of considering their views ; and the Party num- 
 bers in its ranks men who might with great propriety 
 be made Privy Councillors for the purpose of enabling 
 them to serve on such a Committee. 
 
 Should it be practicable to prevail upon a Com- 
 mittee, or a considerable majority of a Committee so 
 constituted, to concur in a Report, recommending a 
 plan of Parliamentary Reform suited to the present 
 state of the Country, this Report, after having been 
 approved by Her Majesty in Council, on the advice 
 of Her responsible Servants, might be made the 
 foundation of a Bill, to be introduced by them into 
 Parliament ; and there can be no doubt that, if thus 
 brought forward, it would be passed without difficulty. 
 
 The course now suggested is no doubt one for 
 which it would be hard to find an exact precedent,* 
 
 * This was the course followed in preparing the Bill for regulating 
 the Constitutions of the Australian Colonies, in the year 1850, with 
 the single exception, that, on that occasion, the Committee of 
 Privy Council by which the subject was considered, included no po- 
 litical opponents of the Government of the day. No doubt there 
 would in practice be a very material difference between what is now 
 suggested, and the course then followed, but it is no difference in 
 principle. Two Members of the Committee of the Privy Council 
 on the Australian Constitutions, did not hold office in the Govern- 
 ment, and the Ministers made themselves responsible for the 
 measure, by advising the Queen to approve the Report of the 
 Committee in Council, and by bringing into Parliament a Bill 
 founded upon it. 
 
NEW REFORM BILL. 155 
 
 but it is strictly in accordance with the law, and with 
 the spirit of the Constitution ; and the extraordinary 
 nature of the difficulty to be surmounted may well jus- 
 tify the adoption of extraordinary means to get over it. 
 At the same time, it is comparatively immaterial whe- 
 ther this or any other mode of proceeding be adopted, 
 for the purpose of arriving at an amicable settlement 
 of the question of Parliamentary Reform. What is 
 really important is, to avert, if possible, the risk of a 
 change in the Constitution becoming again the subject 
 of party strife ; not only on account of the certain evils 
 and still greater danger of such a contest, but also 
 because there would be a far better prospect of the 
 success of a measure passed by conciliatory means, 
 than of one, equally good in itself, but carried in 
 spite of the resistance of the opponents of Reform. 
 Assuming, even, that the provisions of the measure 
 would be the same in either case, it is obvious that 
 when any new system of Representation was first 
 brought into play, its working would probably be for 
 some time embarrassed by the passions and the ex- 
 aggerated expectations which a struggle on such a 
 subject could not fail to raise. 
 
 These considerations ought to have weight with 
 men of all shades of political opinion, and I see no 
 reason to despair of an amicable settlement of this 
 difficult question, if the leaders of Parties will have 
 
156 CONSIDERATIONS, ETC. 
 
 patriotism enough to join in an honest endeavour to 
 arrive at that result, casting aside for a time all re- 
 gard to party and selfish interests, and looking only 
 to the best means of promoting the safety and wel- 
 fare of the Nation. But if, instead of following this 
 line of conduct, the chief Statesmen of the day should 
 endeavour to use the question of Reform as an in- 
 strument for their own advancement, still more if 
 they should try to outbid each other as candidates 
 for popularity, by the extent of the changes they may 
 profess their readiness to support, they will incur 
 the heavy responsibility of bringing into peril, and 
 probably destroying, what is most valuable in our 
 Constitution. 
 
157 
 
 CHAPTEE VII. 
 
 ON THE EXERCISE OF PATEONAGE UNDEE 
 PAELIAMENTAEY GOYEENMENT. 
 
 THE working of Parliamentary Government in this 
 Country has been much affected by the greater or 
 less amount of patronage possessed by the Crown at 
 different times, and by alterations of practice as to 
 the exercise of that patronage which have taken place 
 in the last century and a half; and it must also be 
 much influenced hereafter by any changes which may 
 be made on these points. It does not therefore seem 
 foreign to the subject of this Essay, to consider the 
 nature and effects of the system which has prevailed 
 in this country, in filling up those civil and military 
 offices which are not held by the Ministers of the 
 Crown. 
 
 Under all forms of government, from despotism to 
 unbridled democracy, complaints have been common, 
 that the servants of the State have not been wisely 
 
158 THE EXERCISE OF PATRONAGE 
 
 and honestly selected, but that merit has been habi- 
 tually passed by, and the public interest sacrificed, by 
 the appointment of incompetent men to perform impor- 
 tant duties. No doubt these complaints are often the 
 mere clamour of disappointed candidates, but they are 
 also frequently well founded. Every different kind of 
 government has its own difficulties in this matter, and 
 none is free from the operation of some of the various 
 influences that may tend to misdirect the stream of 
 patronage. Under our own form of government 
 (and the same may be said of free governments in 
 general), those entrusted with patronage are under ja 
 temptation to use it corruptly, because they may thus 
 purchase support which may help to prolong their 
 own power. This abuse was formerly carried to a 
 great excess in this country, and the Ministers of the 
 day usually trusted to an unscrupulous use of the 
 patronage vested in their hands as one of the prin- 
 cipal means of maintaining themselves in office. So 
 lately as in the reign of George the Third, not only 
 were places and pensions bartered without shame for 
 political support, but the dismissal of officers in the 
 Army or Navy for votes given in the House of Com- 
 mons was occasionally resorted to, and there were 
 even instances of the removal of public servants from 
 situations now regarded as permanent, for the avowed 
 purpose of punishing their friends and relations for 
 
UNDER PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 159 
 
 having pursued in Parliament a line of conduct ob- 
 noxious to the Minister. 
 
 A striking improvement has taken place in the 
 practice of Governments, and in the tone of public 
 feeling upon this subject. No Minister would now dare 
 to incur the responsibility of abusing the patronage 
 of the Crown and its power of dismissing its servants, 
 by such acts as were committed with impunity less 
 than a century ago. In the last seventy or eighty 
 years, public opinion has gradually brought the exer- 
 cise of these powers of the Crown under the control 
 of certain rules, which, though for the most part en- 
 forced by no written law, are yet practically binding 
 upon the Government, and have put an end to many 
 abuses. 
 
 Formerly, the appointment and promotion of naval 
 and military officers was made almost openly a matter 
 of mere favour. No rules existed prescribing certain 
 periods of service in the lower ranks in the Army and 
 Navy before the higher ones could be attained, and 
 nothing was more common than to see men rise 
 through political influence to the command of regi- 
 ments and ships of the line, with scarcely any service 
 or knowledge of their profession to recommend them. 
 There are now very strict rules, as to the time that 
 officers must serve in different ranks before they can 
 be promoted ; and it is universally recognized as the 
 
160 THE EXERCISE OP PATRONAGE 
 
 duty of those entrusted with the powers of the Crown, 
 to be guided in the distribution of promotion and 
 professional employment in the Army and Navy by 
 the rules of the Service and the merits of officers. 
 I am far from asserting that favour has not still its 
 influence in these matters, nor, human nature being 
 such as it is, can we expect that this will ever cease 
 to be the case. But it is certain that the exercise of 
 patronage in the Army and Navy is now watched 
 with so jealous an eye, that those by whom it is ad- 
 ministered are compelled to be exceedingly careful 
 how they employ it, and that thus gross abuses at least 
 (such as were formerly of everyday occurrence) are 
 now become rare, and the errors that are committed 
 are chiefly errors of judgment. A Ministry, even if 
 inclined to act corruptly, would no longer dare to 
 abuse the military and naval patronage of the Crown 
 for that purpose, since it is certain that far more 
 would be lost than gained by the attempt. 
 
 The change which has taken place is not confined 
 to the Army and Navy. The civil patronage of the 
 Crown has been greatly reduced by the many eco- 
 nomical reforms effected since the Peace of 1815, and 
 especially since the Reform of Parliament in 1832; 
 and some of the abuses which were formerly not 
 uncommon, have been rendered impossible by the 
 system now firmly established as to the tenure by which 
 
UNDER PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 161 
 
 all civil offices are held, except what are called poli- 
 tical offices, that is to say, those which are usuallv 
 conferred on Members of either House of Parliament. 
 As a general rule, the Civil Servants who do not sit 
 in Parliament hold their offices technically and legally 
 during the pleasure of the Crown, but are in practice 
 considered as having a right to remain in undisturbed 
 possession of them, so long as they continue to dis- 
 charge their functions properly. This principle is so 
 universally recognized, that the dismissal of a person 
 holding a permanent office is never heard of now, 
 except for misconduct. 
 
 In most of the Public Departments a regular order 
 of promotion has also been established, so that by far 
 the majority of the higher permanent offices in the 
 Civil Service are filled up by the appointment of 
 persons who have been gradually advanced to them 
 from its lower ranks. The rule that these promo- 
 tions should be strictly governed by a fair considera- 
 tion of the respective claims of the several candidates, 
 from seniority and merit, is recognized in principle ; 
 nor is it often departed from in practice, through 
 undue favour or partiality. The odium which the 
 Ministers who have to decide upon these promotions 
 know that they would incur, both in their own offices 
 and out of doors, by being guilty of favouritism, acts 
 as so powerful a check upon abuse, that I believe it 
 
 M 
 
162 THE EXERCISE OF PATRONAGE 
 
 may be said never to occur. Errors of judgment 
 are no doubt frequently committed, in performing the 
 very difficult duty of selecting public servants for ad- 
 vancement ; but the most common error, according to 
 my observation, is that of giving undue weight to 
 seniority, and too little to ability and merit, from fear 
 of incurring the suspicion of partiality. 
 
 The strict control under which the exercise of the 
 patronage of the Crown has thus been brought, and 
 the reduction of its amount, have had an important, 
 and, upon the whole, a highly beneficial effect on the 
 working of our system of Parliamentary Government, 
 though it would be a mistake to suppose the advan- 
 tage derived from these changes to have been un- 
 mixed with some inconvenience. The gain has been, 
 that the power of corruption has been diminished, 
 and that the distinct line drawn between permanent 
 and political offices, together with the complete esta- 
 blishment of the practice of regarding the former as 
 held during good behaviour, has diminished the evils 
 incidental to changes of Administration. It is the 
 very nature of Parliamentary Government, and indeed 
 of all free Governments, to cause power to be from 
 time to time transferred, from one man, or one set 
 of men, to another ; but by allowing these transfers 
 to affect only a comparatively small number of high 
 offices, and by retaining the great majority of the 
 
UNDER PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 163 
 
 Public Servants permanently in their situations, the 
 experience and traditional knowledge they possess of 
 the business of the several departments of the State 
 are rendered still available for the conduct of affairs. 
 By changing (when there is occasion for it) those to 
 whom the supreme direction of the Government is 
 entrusted, enough is done to secure its being carried 
 on in conformity with the feelings and opinions of the 
 Nation ; while, by leaving the details of business in 
 the same hands under successive Administrations, it 
 is made to proceed with a regularity and consistency 
 which would otherwise be wanting.* 
 
 The same arrangement also conduces to the Public 
 being well served at a moderate cost. A man can 
 with prudence accept a far lower remuneration for 
 his services, if they are permanently engaged, than 
 if his employment is precarious. The salaries now 
 paid to our Civil Servants (excluding of course the 
 holders of political offices, upon whom other motives 
 are brought to bear) would command a very inferior 
 class of men, if, instead of knowing that they are 
 in no danger of losing their employment unless by 
 misconduct, and that they may ultimately look for- 
 ward to a retiring pension, they were subject to be 
 turned out of their situations at any moment for no 
 
 * See some remarks on this subject in Macaulay's History of 
 England, vol. iii. p. 339. 
 
 M 2 
 
164 THE EXERCISE OF PATRONAGE 
 
 fault and without any compensation. Men would 
 hesitate before they abandoned other pursuits to serve 
 the State upon these conditions, unless they received 
 very high remuneration for doing so, either in salary, 
 or in the shape of other and perhaps irregular emo- 
 luments. 
 
 The penalty of dismissal is also far greater in the 
 one case than in the other, and consequently the se- 
 curity against misconduct afforded by apprehension 
 of that punishment. A Custom-house officer, for 
 instance, who risks the loss of a secure provision for 
 life, by taking a bribe to connive at some fraud on 
 the Revenue, is likely to be much less easily induced 
 to do so, than one who hazards nothing but a place 
 which he only holds till the next turn of the political 
 wheel, and which he cannot expect to keep for more 
 than three or four years. The general fidelity and 
 trustworthiness of all the subordinate public servants 
 in this country, are no doubt in some degree owing 
 to this cause. 
 
 Another, and perhaps a still more valuable result of 
 the permanent tenure by which the majority of public 
 Servants in this Country hold their situations is, its 
 tendency to mitigate the violence of party contests. 
 When a change of Administration involves only a 
 change in the holders of some fifty or sixty offices, 
 usually entrusted to Members of the two Houses of 
 
UNDER PARLIAMENT ART GOVERNMENT. 165 
 
 Parliament, the prospect of such an event is obviously 
 calculated to create much less excitement than when 
 it leads, as in the United States, to the transfer of 
 some thousands of offices of all classes, including the 
 very lowest, from one Party to another. Of late years 
 it has become the practice in the United States, when 
 a President is installed in power, to remove all op- 
 ponents of the Party to which he belongs from the 
 offices they hold, down to a village postmastership, 
 or the lowest clerkship in the Customs. Hence the 
 pecuniary interests of a large part of the population 
 are directly affected by Presidential elections, and it 
 is not surprising that they should create the intense 
 excitement evinced all over the Union when they are 
 approaching. We are happily spared from having 
 the bitterness of our Party struggles aggravated, as it 
 would be, if the fall of one Minister and the ap- 
 pointment of another were to be made the signal 
 for dismissing the vast number of persons employed 
 in the various branches of the Civil Service, and 
 filling up this multitude of places from the ranks 
 of the victorious Party. There can be no doubt that, 
 were this to become the practice, it would lead to a 
 perpetual succession of fierce political contests, vio- 
 lently exciting the hopes and fears of all classes of the 
 population throughout the kingdom, giving rise to 
 the grossest corruption and to all kinds of intrigues, 
 
166 THE EXERCISE OF PATRONAGE 
 
 and rousing the most baneful passions. Such a state 
 of things would be almost intolerable, and we pay a 
 cheap price for avoiding it in sacrificing something 
 of the energy of the Government. 
 
 It is certain that something of the energy of 
 the Government is sacrificed by the curtailment of 
 the patronage of the Crown, and the virtual indepen- 
 dence now given to the Civil Servants of the State, 
 because, however advantageous these changes may be 
 in other respects, they have doubtless diminished the 
 power of the Government to excite the zeal of those 
 it employs by the hope of reward, and to facilitate 
 the success of its measures by selecting the most effi- 
 cient agents for their execution. When the manner 
 in which the business is transacted in the Government 
 offices, and in those of private merchants and manu- 
 facturers, is compared, it ought to be borne in mind, 
 that the latter are absolutely free to choose whom they 
 will employ, and to change their servants at their 
 pleasure ; whereas the head of a public department 
 is compelled to carry on its duties by the aid of men 
 in the selection of whom he has generally had no voice, 
 and whom he cannot remove except for some flagrant 
 misconduct. 
 
 I have said that the force and energy of a Govern- 
 ment are necessarily diminished by this restriction on 
 its freedom of choice, but that this is a sacrifice wisely 
 
UNDER PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 167 
 
 made ; and the same remark applies to those rules for 
 the conduct of public business which have been con- 
 temptuously called the system of " red tape." Those 
 who are entrusted with more or less authority in the 
 management of the vast and complicated concerns of 
 a great Nation, are liable to be tempted to use their 
 power rather for their own selfish interests than for 
 those of the Public ; for which reason it has been 
 found necessary, in all countries, to lay down certain 
 rules, and to require certain forms to be adhered to 
 in the transaction of public business, for the purpose 
 of guarding against the abuses which would other- 
 wise be sure to arise. What is called the system of 
 "red tape" consists, in reality, only of the rules of 
 this kind which have been gradually established as 
 experience has proved them to be necessary, and 
 which, if carefully examined, would generally be found 
 to be wise in themselves, though they are no doubt 
 sometimes followed too slavishly. 
 
 In the organization of the public Departments of 
 such a Nation as this, it is desirable not only to arm 
 those who administer the Government with the means 
 of conducting it with the greatest possible efficiency, 
 but also to provide adequate checks against the ten- 
 dency to corruption which is inherent in the nature 
 of mankind. The advocates of what is called "Ad- 
 ministrative Reform " seem to have overlooked the 
 
168 THE EXERCISE OF PATRONAGE 
 
 fact, that it is impossible to devise any system which 
 shall be completely satisfactory in both respects. In 
 order to give the utmost vigour and energy to the 
 Government, those who direct it ought to have a large 
 discretion as to the manner of conducting its business, 
 and an unfettered freedom of action in appointing and 
 dismissing those whom they employ. On the other 
 hand, if the object is to guard against the possibility 
 of jobs, and to prevent the patronage of the Crown 
 from becoming an instrument of corruption, then 
 rules must be laid down which will act more or less 
 as restraints upon those to whom the powers of the 
 Crown are for the time entrusted. By attending 
 exclusively to either of these objects, one or other 
 of the two opposite evils would be incurred, either 
 that of destroying the vigour of the Government, 
 or else that of opening a door to dangerous abuses. 
 Something must be sacrificed on each side, in order 
 to place the Public Service on the footing which 
 shall upon the whole be most conducive to the wel- 
 fare of the Nation. This is what is aimed at by our 
 existing system, and upon the whole with consider- 
 able success. I have had an' opportunity of seeing a 
 good deal of the interior of several of our Public Of- 
 fices ; and I am convinced there is not one of them, 
 the permanent Members of which are not perfectly 
 capable of giving to the Minister who conducts it, as 
 
UNDER PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 169 
 
 effective assistance as he is entitled to expect. As a 
 body, the permanent Civil Servants of the State in 
 this country are remarkable for their intelligence, in- 
 dustry, and high sense of honour. There are cer- 
 tainly individuals of a different character to be found 
 in so numerous a body ; but, taking them altogether, 
 I cannot doubt that they would show a high average 
 of fitness for their important duties. 
 
 I am far from thinking the constitution of our Civil 
 Service so good as not to be susceptible of improve- 
 ment ; but the only practical suggestion for its amend- 
 ment which, as far as I am aware, has yet been made 
 by the Administrative Reformers, would, I am per- 
 suaded, be a change for the worse. I allude to the 
 proposal, that vacancies in the Public Departments 
 should be filled by what have been called "compe- 
 titive examinations." The plan which I understand 
 to be recommended for adoption is, that examinations 
 in literature, mathematics, and certain other branches 
 of knowledge, should be held periodically ; that they 
 should be open to all candidates who might think fit 
 to present themselves ; and that all the disposable 
 vacancies in the Public Departments should be con- 
 ferred on the successful competitors. The first ob- 
 jection to this scheme is, that the proposed examina- 
 tions would afford no test of the comparative fitness 
 of the different candidates for employment in the 
 
170 THE EXERCISE OF PATRONAGE 
 
 Public Service. Brilliant talents and great acquire- 
 ments are far less useful than moral qualities, in the 
 holders of permanent offices. Industry, regularity, 
 and fidelity, are the qualities which are most valuable 
 in persons filling these situations, the great majority 
 of which neither require, nor afford, a field for the 
 exercise of more than average abilities. If therefore 
 the scheme of competitive examinations were to prove 
 successful in filling our Public Departments with men 
 of first-rate talents, it may safely be predicted that 
 they would not be content either with their occupation 
 or with the advantages held out to them by the pre- 
 sent scale of salaries in the Civil Service, since they 
 would feel that in other pursuits their abilities would 
 command far higher advantages, and find more scope 
 for their exercise. 
 
 No doubt it would be possible to raise the general 
 scale of salaries, so as to make the permanent Civil 
 Service more attractive to men of the highest ability. 
 But this would remove only one part of the difficulty, 
 while it would occasion a formidable increase of the 
 public expenditure, and, what is much worse, would 
 open dangerous temptations to jobs, and to unfairness 
 in making promotions in the various Departments ; 
 perhaps also in conducting the competitive examina- 
 tions. While the present scale of payment enables the 
 Public to command the services of men equal to the 
 
UNDER PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 171 
 
 duties imposed upon them, it is hard to see on what 
 grounds an increase of salaries could be justified. 
 
 The best paid of the permanent Civil Servants 
 receive, it is true, emoluments which are small com- 
 pared to those of successful lawyers, physicians, or 
 merchants ; but they have a compensation in the cer- 
 tainty, for the moderate amount of their remuneration. 
 They are also relieved from any heavy responsibility, 
 by the subordinate position they must always occupy ; 
 for they can only enjoy the permanent tenure of their 
 offices upon the condition of remaining subordinate 
 to the Ministers of the Crown, who are answerable to 
 Parliament for the measures of the Government, the 
 responsibility of the permanent Civil Servants being 
 limited to the faithful execution of the instructions 
 they receive from the Ministers, assuming of course 
 that these instructions are consistent with the law. It 
 is no arbitrary rule, which requires that all holders 
 of permanent offices must be subordinate to some 
 Minister responsible to Parliament, since it is obvious 
 that, without it, the first principle of our system of 
 Government the control of all branches of the Ad- 
 ministration by Parliament would be abandoned. 
 Hence, though it has been sometimes treated as an 
 absurdity, that an experienced and able Under-Secre- 
 tary, in any of our great Departments, should be made 
 subordinate to even the least capable Minister who may 
 
172 THE EXERCISE OF PATRONAGE 
 
 be raised to be its temporary head in the vicissi- 
 tudes of party contests, this is in fact an inevitable 
 consequence of the nature of our Government ; and it 
 is quite certain that, if the able Under- Secretary were 
 relieved from subordination to any superior, either he 
 must submit to the general rule of retiring from office 
 when he ceased to possess the confidence of Parlia- 
 ment, or a system of irresponsible administration 
 would be introduced into the Department entrusted 
 to him. Accordingly, when the talents and ambition 
 of any of the permanent Servants of the Crown have 
 led them to aspire to the power and distinction of the 
 higher political offices, they have invariably given up 
 the humbler but safer situations they have previously 
 held.* But a profession, the very nature of which is 
 to retain those who adhere to it in subordinate situa- 
 tions, which holds out no great prizes, and the dis- 
 tinguishing characteristic of which is, that it offers only 
 moderate though certain advantages, is, by this very 
 
 * If I am not mistaken, both Mr. Huskisson and Mr. Herries 
 originally belonged to the permanent Civil Service, which they 
 quitted for political offices. It is to be regretted that there are not 
 greater facilities for such transfers, and that able men cannot be 
 more frequently brought from permanent to political offices. Such 
 removals have been rendered far more difficult than formerly by 
 confining the grant of pensions for political services within narrower 
 limits, and making it subject to more rigid conditions. The existing 
 rules as to the grant of such pensions seem therefore to be founded 
 on a short-sighted economy. 
 
UNDER PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 173 
 
 circumstance, one into which it is inexpedient to bring 
 the young men who stand in the first rank among 
 their contemporaries for talents and acquirements. 
 
 Nor is it by any means certain that, by competitive 
 examinations, we should attain the object of raising 
 the standard of the intellectual qualifications for their 
 duties possessed by our Public Servants. I have al- 
 ready observed, that moral qualities, which cannot be 
 tested at all by a competitive examination, are far 
 more important to them than great intellectual en- 
 dowments ; it may be added, that, even with regard 
 to the latter, such examinations are a most imperfect 
 test. All that can be ascertained by examinations 
 is, the comparative proficiency of the different can- 
 didates in certain kinds of knowledge, which can 
 seldom be directly useful in carrying on the busi- 
 ness of a public office. Great acquirements in lite- 
 rature or in science would not assist a clerk in the 
 War Office or Treasury, in checking a pay-list or 
 examining an account ; nor would they be more ser- 
 viceable in the performance of the ordinary duties of 
 ninety-nine out of a hundred clerks in all the various 
 departments of the State 
 
 Competitive examinations must therefore, it is to 
 be presumed, be recommended for the purpose of 
 ensuring the appointment of able clerks in our 
 public offices, on the assumption that the superior 
 
174 THE EXERCISE OF PATRONAGE 
 
 proficiency of the successful candidates in the subjects 
 in which they have been examined justifies the in- 
 ference that they must possess also a superiority of 
 mental power which will render them more capable 
 than their rivals of acquiring a knowledge of the 
 business of the Department into which they are 
 admitted, and of affording useful assistance in con- 
 ducting it. But this inference will by no means 
 always, probably not even generally, prove correct, 
 after the system has been some time in operation. 
 The comparative proficiency of different young men 
 in certain studies, might possibly be some test of 
 their comparative abilities, if these studies had been 
 prosecuted under circumstances of equal advantage, 
 and if equal labour had been devoted to them by the 
 competitors. But as this cannot be the case, com- 
 petitive examinations can afford no means of judging 
 of anything beyond the positive acquirements of 
 the several candidates, or, in other words, of the ex- 
 tent to which the memory has been stored, and the 
 expertness which has been attained in such things 
 as arithmetic and composition. Now it is certain 
 that judicious " cramming," as it is termed, may often 
 enable a youth of inferior abilities to show a greater 
 amount of such expertness, and of acquired knowledge 
 in a given range of subjects, than another, greatly 
 his superior in all the most valuable qualities of the 
 
UNDER PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 175 
 
 mind; nay more, these qualities may actually have 
 been to a great extent sacrificed to the acquisition of 
 that knowledge. 
 
 It is a well ascertained fact, that the premature 
 forcing of young minds has an injurious effect upon 
 their vigour in after life; and the acquisition of a 
 great amount of knowledge may be dearly pur- 
 chased, by weakening the powers of judgment, of 
 reflection, and of original thought.* If, therefore, 
 admissions into the Civil Service of the State were 
 given as a reward to the successful competitors in 
 examinations open to all candidates who might pre- 
 sent themselves, it is to be feared that, in the 
 struggle to obtain this much-coveted employment, 
 young men would be subjected to a system of educa- 
 tion by which they would acquire extraordinary pro- 
 ficiency in certain branches of knowledge, at the ex- 
 pense of qualities much more conducive to their use- 
 fulness in the real business of life. The adoption of 
 this scheme would therefore be calculated to render 
 the Public Servants, as a body, less, instead of better, 
 qualified than they now are for the work they have 
 to do, by filling the various Departments of the State 
 
 * See some interesting remarks on this subject in Sir B. Brodie's 
 ' Psychological Inquiries,' page 28, and the eloquent passage he has 
 quoted from Dr. Newman's Lectures (p. 245) on the evil effect of 
 compelling young men to " load their minds with a score of subjects 
 against an examination." 
 
176 THE EXERCISE OF PATRONAGE 
 
 with men possessing knowledge for which they would 
 find little use in the performance of their official 
 duties, but often deficient in that common sense and 
 power of thinking and acting for themselves which 
 would be invaluable, but which the over-training of 
 young men is apt to prevent them from acquiring. 
 The mischief might not stop there; the proposed 
 change would probably tend to introduce generally 
 into the country a system of education calculated to 
 injure the minds of the whole class of young men, 
 from whom the candidates for the rewards offered 
 for competition would be drawn. No more serious 
 evil than this could be inflicted on the Nation ; and 
 there is the more reason to apprehend that it might 
 follow from the proposed measure, in consequence 
 of what experience has shown to be the effects of 
 such a system in France. In 'that country, em- 
 ployment in the service of the State is made, to a 
 great extent, the prize of success in examinations 
 known by the name of Concours ; and I have 
 been informed on very high authority, that in the 
 struggle to obtain these prizes, the different schools 
 have gradually gone on increasing the amount of 
 labour exacted from their pupils, until it has be- 
 come most excessive. The consequence is said to be, 
 that diseases of the brain have become formidably 
 common, and that the young men who have been 
 
UNDER PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 177 
 
 thus overtasked in their early years, are in after-life 
 usually found inferior, in the more useful qualities 
 of the mind, to those who have received a more na- 
 tural education.* 
 
 The experience of our own Universities of late 
 years is said to be to the same effect. Many young 
 men of the highest promise are found to break down 
 their powers, either of body or of mind, and to render 
 themselves physically or morally unfit for the real 
 work of life, by the too intense labour they undergo 
 in the struggle to obtain the highest places in the list 
 of University honours. The cases however are com- 
 paratively rare, in which the voluntary exertions of 
 young men competing for honours only are carried to 
 an injurious excess. University examinations usually 
 act as a stimulus to industry with no more power than 
 is desirable, in order to overcome the temptations of 
 
 * It has been said by a very high French authority (whom I do 
 not however think myself at liberty to quote by name), that the 
 iWle Poly technique turns out only " des betes savantes ;" and this 
 seems to be the real meaning of the opinion respecting this School 
 which the Commissioners for inquiring into Foreign Military Edu- 
 cation quote as having been expressed by General Paixhans. Speak- 
 ing of the too great amount of abstract knowledge required from the 
 pupils, the General says, " Leur cerveau fatigue d'etudes mathema- 
 tiques compliquees, leurs vues incessamment dirigees vers 1'abstrac- 
 tion, ne redescendent pas facilement a terre, a la terre des etudes et 
 des travaux pratiques, lesquels sont en definitive ceux qui sont neces- 
 saires au jour de la lutte en campagne, dans une annee assiegeante, 
 ou dans une place assiegee." Report on Military Education, p. 28 
 
 N 
 
178 THE EXERCISE OF PATRONAGE 
 
 idleness and amusement. It is to be feared that exa- 
 minations open to all candidates, and offering employ- 
 ment in the public service as the prize of success, 
 would operate very differently. Most parents are so 
 anxious to obtain this sort of employment for their 
 sons, that the places of education which should prove 
 most successful in training candidates to compete for 
 it would soon be generally preferred. The managers 
 of places of education would be unable to resist this 
 impulse, and would be led to vie with each other in 
 striving to force the largest possible amount of know- 
 ledge into the minds of their pupils. The consequence 
 would be, that the rising generation in this country 
 would, in a few years, be subjected to a system of 
 over-driving like that which is said to prevail and to 
 be so pernicious in Trance. 
 
 Nor could this be prevented by an endeavour on 
 the part of the examiners to limit the extent to which 
 the examinations should be carried. In a school, 
 the stimulus of competition may be used, and at the 
 same time the discretion of the master may guard 
 against excessive labour being imposed on the scholars, 
 as he has a control both over their conduct and over 
 the examination.* But if there is to be competition 
 
 * This was done by Dr. Arnold, who, while he attached much 
 value to competition as a stimulus to exertion, expressed also a 
 strong opinion as to the necessity of preventing the boys under him 
 being overworked, and took great care to prevent it. See his Life, 
 vol. i. p. 126. 
 
UNDER PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 179 
 
 at all, among candidates who are not under such con- 
 trol, the examination must necessarily be carried up 
 to a point at which some of the candidates will 
 be less fully instructed than others. If it should 
 only test the possession of an amount of knowledge 
 which all can acquire completely, there will be no 
 means of distinguishing between the first and the 
 last ; while, if the examination is carried far enough 
 to show the comparative inferiority of some of the 
 competitors, it is impossible to limit the amount of 
 labour their instructors will impose upon them in 
 order that they may excel their rivals. 
 
 For these reasons it may well be doubted, whether 
 a better class of public Servants than we now have 
 would be obtained by competitive examinations ; and 
 I do not hesitate to express my decided opinion, that 
 another, and probably the principal, object aimed at 
 by those who recommend them namely, the reduc- 
 tion of the patronage of the Government would be 
 productive of injury, instead of advantage, to the 
 Nation. No Government can adequately perform its 
 functions, unless it possesses the power of reward as 
 well as that of punishment; since, if punishment is 
 necessary to enforce obedience to its commands, re- 
 ward is the great instrument by which it can call 
 forth zealous and able service. The Sovereigns and 
 Ministers whose government has been most success- 
 
 N 2 
 
180 THE EXERCISE OF PATRONAGE 
 
 ful, have almost invariably been remarkable for their 
 judicious exercise of the power of reward. But among 
 the rewards which a Government can bestow on those 
 who have deserved well at its hands, the conferring 
 upon their sons or near relations those appointments 
 which are given to young men as the beginning of a 
 career in the Public Service, is perhaps of all others 
 that which is the least liable to abuse, the least costly 
 to the public, and at the same time the most effectual. 
 I should therefore see with deep regret the wholesale 
 abolition of this sort of patronage, by the proposed 
 establishment of the system of competitive examina- 
 tions, and the more so because, in the war which has 
 very properly been made against the gross abuses of 
 former times, the means of reward possessed by the 
 Government of this Country have already, in the last 
 forty years, been perhaps too much curtailed. 
 
 It may be answered, that it is wrong to reward any 
 services, however meritorious, by conferring appoint- 
 ments on the incompetent sons or relations of those 
 by whom such services have been rendered. No 
 doubt it would be highly improper to saddle the 
 Country with incompetent young men in situations of 
 trust, from any motive whatever ; but this might be 
 guarded against without depriving the Government 
 of patronage, its possession of which, if rightly used, 
 is of great advantage to the Nation. None of the 
 
UNDER PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 181 
 
 objections to competitive examinations for the ad- 
 mission of candidates into the service of the State 
 apply to the establishment of a rule, that no young 
 man shall be allowed to obtain public employment 
 without having undergone a strict examination by an 
 independent and impartial authority, to ascertain his 
 fitness for it. This, if I rightly understand what has 
 been done, is the plan the Government has till of 
 late been generally* acting upon, in the place of that 
 originally announced to Parliament in the Session of 
 1854, which was founded on the principle of compe- 
 tition. If the qualification to be required from can- 
 didates for the Public Service is judiciously fixed, and 
 the examiners do their duty, examinations of this sort 
 will effectually exclude incompetent persons from our 
 public offices, without depriving the Government of 
 its patronage, or incurring the other inconveniences 
 to be apprehended from competitive examinations. 
 
 * I fear that this course caii no longer be pursued, in consequence 
 of the vote of the House of Commons on this subject in the last 
 Session, in which the Government was compelled to acquiesce. 
 This vote will probably cause the rest of the departments to follow 
 the bad example already set by some of them, which had adopted 
 the practice of making their appointments to depend either upon an 
 open competition, or upon a competition between a few selected can- 
 didates. This last plan is exposed to most of the same^objections as 
 free competition, with the additional fault of being sure to lead to 
 complaints of unfairness, in selecting candidates to compete against 
 each other. Already such complaints are beginning to be heard. 
 
182 THE EXERCISE OF PATRONAGE 
 
 I have discussed the scheme of making admission 
 into the Civil Service of the State the prize of suc- 
 cessful competition in public examinations, somewhat 
 more fully than is proportioned to its importance in 
 relation to the main subject of this Essay, because 
 the proposal has obtained a degree of support to 
 which I consider it little entitled, owing to its having 
 been originally recommended to Parliament by the 
 Ministers of the Crown, and to its having been since 
 supported by a party which, whatever may be its real 
 strength, is at all events remarkable for its activity. 
 At the same time, the rules which regulate the exer- 
 cise of the patronage of the Crown and the consti- 
 tution of the Civil Service, have much influence, as I 
 have already observed, on the working of our Parlia- 
 mentary Government, and are in themselves of high 
 importance. I shall therefore venture to make some 
 further observations, and to offer some suggestions on 
 the subject, before I take leave of it. 
 
 I have endeavoured to show, that security against 
 improper appointments might be obtained without 
 having recourse to competitive examinations ; but it is 
 not sufficient merely to provide that young men shall 
 be debarred admission into the service of the State who 
 are unfit even for the easy duties which are in the 
 first instance imposed upon them ; it is far more im- 
 portant, for the efficiency of the public Departments, 
 
UNDER PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 183 
 
 to ensure that promotion in them shall be given only 
 to those who have shown themselves fit for it, by the 
 manner in which they have performed their duties, 
 and by the pains they have taken to acquire a know- 
 ledge of their business. With this view, the system of 
 promotion which already exists in some offices should 
 be made general, and at the same time more perfectly 
 enforced. According to this system, the clerks in an 
 office are divided into several classes, and each va- 
 cancy in one of the higher classes is filled, as it occurs, 
 by the selection of any one of the class immediately 
 below who may, in the judgment of the Head of the 
 Department, have the best claim to promotion. It 
 was intended that merit, rather than seniority, should 
 be considered in forming this judgment; but the 
 propriety of not excluding from consideration the 
 comparative length of service of the different candi- 
 dates having been admitted, it is to be feared that 
 this system of promotion has a constant tendency to 
 degenerate into one of mere seniority, or at all events 
 into one in which the senior is passed over only for 
 decided incompetence, and not on account of marked 
 inferiority to a junior in ability or industry. The too 
 great regard shown to seniority in some offices, has 
 probably furnished most of the grounds that really 
 exist for the assertion so strongly made, that a large 
 proportion of incompetent men are to be found filling 
 
184 THE EXERCISE OF PATRONAGE 
 
 important situations in our Public Departments. 
 Young men entering these Departments at seven- 
 teen or eighteen, cannot reasonably be expected 
 always to prove diligent and anxious to improve 
 themselves from a mere sense of duty. Like men 
 of the same age in every other profession, they have 
 many temptations to idleness, and require some 
 strong stimulus to exertion. In an office, therefore, 
 in which advancement is equally sure to all who ab- 
 stain from gross misconduct, we have no right to look 
 for the same diligence and ability as may be expected 
 in one where these qualities find their sure reward in 
 early promotion. None who are acquainted with the 
 interior of our Public Departments, will have any diffi- 
 culty in recognizing the superior efficiency of those 
 in which merit has been allowed to have its proper 
 weight over seniority in promotions^ 
 
 Such being the case, it is most desirable that pro- 
 motion should be given in every Department upon 
 this principle; and, to enforce its being so, I would 
 suggest that the rule should be distinctly laid down, 
 as being applicable to all the Public Offices, by an 
 Order in Council ; and further, that whenever a pro- 
 motion was made, the reasons for it should be re- 
 corded. The Minister at the head of the Department 
 ought to be responsible for the promotions made 
 in it, as for all other official acts ; but he should be 
 
UNDER PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 185 
 
 required to found his decision on a Report (which 
 should be placed on record) from the Under Secre- 
 tary, or the person holding by any other title the 
 highest permanent situation in the office, who has 
 both the strongest interest in making a right choice 
 among the candidates for promotion, and the best 
 means of judging of their respective qualifications. 
 No Minister would venture, without good reasons, to 
 overrule the recommendations offered to him in such 
 a Report. In order still further to ensure, so far as 
 this can be done by any regulations, the right per- 
 formance of the all-important duty of selecting can- 
 didates for promotion in the Public Departments, it 
 ought further, I would suggest, to be prescribed by 
 Order in Council, that a Register should be kept in 
 each of these Departments, of the conduct of the dif- 
 ferent persons composing its establishment. A Register 
 is already kept in most of them of attendance ; but it 
 seems to me much more important that the manner 
 in which the several clerks perform their duties should 
 be recorded, than the mere fact of their punctual at- 
 tendance. No doubt it is much more difficult to have 
 a record showing how men perform their duties; 
 but to a great extent this might, I think, be accom- 
 plished, by having a Register in which, whenever a 
 clerk received the praise of his superiors for peculiar 
 diligence or ability, shown in the performance of any 
 
186 THE EXERCISE OF PATRONAGE 
 
 business entrusted to him, or when, on the other 
 hand, he incurred reproof by negligence or inatten- 
 tion, the commendation or the censure should be 
 recorded. Whenever a vacancy occurred which had 
 to be filled by promotion, this Register would be 
 referred to, and its establishment would be useful, 
 not only on such occasions, but also as a valuable 
 addition to the means of enforcing discipline and 
 giving a stimulus to exertion, in the ordinary course 
 of the business of the Department. 
 
 Such comparatively slight alterations as these 
 might be expected to improve the working of the 
 system of promotion in our Public Departments; 
 but there is another obstacle to the complete efficiency 
 of these Departments, which they would do nothing 
 towards removing. I allude to the want of greater 
 facilities for bringing men of talent and of mature 
 age into the Public Service. With all its advantages, 
 a regular system of promotion in the Government 
 offices has the inconvenience of rendering it ex- 
 ceedingly difficult for the Ministers of the Crown to 
 avail themselves of the great abilities and peculiar 
 fitness for business, sometimes displayed by men who 
 have not been brought up in official employment. It 
 would be absurd to propose to such men to become 
 junior clerks, with the duties and emoluments proper 
 to youths of eighteen, and there are, under the exist- 
 
UNDER PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 187 
 
 ing arrangements, very few appointments of a higher 
 order that can be conferred upon them without disap- 
 pointing the just expectations of those who have made 
 the Public Service their profession. What seems to 
 be wanted is, that there should be a few more offices 
 placed upon the same footing as the permanent Under- 
 Secretaryships of State and the corresponding situations 
 in other Departments, which are very properly regarded 
 as not falling within the regular course of promotion. 
 The members of the Department where the vacancy 
 occurs are not ineligible for these appointments, but 
 are not regarded as having any preferable claim to 
 them ; and in general they are given to men not pre- 
 viously in the Public Service. This ought to con- 
 tinue to be the practice, not only because a wider 
 field of selection is thus given to the Government 
 in filling up situations of great importance, but also 
 because other pursuits in life are more likely than 
 the training of a public office, to produce men well 
 fitted for these employments. 
 
 A moderate addition to the number of offices dis- 
 posable in this manner, would greatly facilitate the 
 efficient management of public affairs; and if the 
 Ministers, who keep their places only while they re- 
 tain the confidence of Parliament, are to be held 
 responsible for the manner in which the Public 
 Service is conducted, it is only just that they should 
 
188 THE EXERCISE OF PATRONAGE 
 
 be enabled to obtain the best assistance. No in- 
 crease of offices of this sort ought, however, to take 
 place at the price of diminishing the prospects of 
 reward now held out to those who have made the 
 Public Service their profession. On the contrary, it 
 seems to me that these prospects require to be im- 
 proved. I see no reason to doubt the sufficiency of the 
 general scale of salaries in our Public Departments ; 
 but I consider that, under the strong pressure of 
 the desire for economy which formerly prevailed in 
 the House of Commons, the abolition of the agen- 
 cies, and other appointments of little labour which 
 were often held with clerkships, has been carried too 
 far, and has unduly restricted the means which the 
 Government possessed, of rewarding peculiar merit 
 in its permanent Servants. This is a fault which I 
 should be glad to see corrected, at the same time 
 that provision was made for enabling the Government 
 to confer a few more offices, of some value, on men 
 who have not risen to them in the regular order of 
 promotion. 
 
 Improvements of this kind, and others which it 
 would not be difficult to suggest, might be introduced 
 with advantage into our Civil Service ; but in making 
 any such changes, I am persuaded that a departure 
 from the main principles of the system on which that 
 Service is now conducted ought to be most carefully 
 
UNDER PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 189 
 
 avoided. This remark applies more especially to the 
 tenure by which the Civil Servants of the State gene- 
 rally hold their offices. 
 
 The safe working of Parliamentary Government 
 depends in no small degree upon strictly adhering to 
 the practice upon this subject which I have described 
 above, as having been for a long time firmly esta- 
 blished in this Country. Much evil would arise from 
 departing from it in either direction; on the one 
 hand, by more directly limiting the authority of the 
 Ministers of the Crown to dismiss any of its sub- 
 ordinate servants ; on the other, by allowing a more 
 frequent or capricious exercise of this authority. I 
 have already pointed out the bad consequences to be 
 apprehended from the last; those of deviating from 
 the existing practice on the other side would be but 
 little less serious. An absolute legal power on the 
 part of the Crown to dismiss any of its Servants, on 
 the advice of its responsible * Ministers, is indis- 
 pensable, in order to give to the latter that authority 
 over those by whose agency and assistance they carry 
 on the public business, without which they could not 
 
 * When the responsible Ministers of the Crown are themselves 
 dismissed, the Sovereign must necessarily act in the first instance 
 without advice ; but it is now, I believe, a settled point, that those 
 who accept the offices thus vacated, render themselves responsible 
 for the dismissal of their predecessors, so that this forms no excep- 
 tion to the general rule, that there can be no exercise of the Crown's 
 authority for which it must not find some Minister to be responsible. 
 
190 THE EXERCISE OF PATRONAGE 
 
 justly be held accountable by Parliament for the 
 manner in which affairs are conducted. No law could 
 define the misconduct or incompetence for which 
 offices now regarded as permanent might be taken 
 away, in such a manner as to allow the tenure of 
 these offices to be made legally during good beha- 
 viour, without the risk of having the Executive Go- 
 vernment paralyzed by the passive resistance of per- 
 sons holding these situations, and by the obstructions 
 they would be able to throw in the way of Ministers 
 they wished to oppose. Law would be too clumsy 
 an instrument for regulating the conduct of the Mi- 
 nisters of the Crown and the permanent Civil Ser- 
 vants of the State in their relations to each other. 
 This is now far more effectually and far more safely 
 accomplished by the power of opinion. 
 
 So great is the authority of opinion, that no Mi- 
 nister now ever thinks of dismissing a public Ser- 
 vant from those offices which are regarded as per- 
 manent, unless for gross misconduct; but at the 
 same time he has the power (and opinion would 
 support him in using it) of dismissing such a ser- 
 vant for misconduct, which it might be impossible 
 for any law to define beforehand, and of which 
 there might be no legal evidence, though there was 
 a moral certainty. An attempt to embarrass the 
 Government by passive resistance, and by those dif- 
 
UNDER PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 191 
 
 faculties which might so easily be thrown in its way 
 by its permanent Servants, if they were independent, 
 would be precisely the kind of misconduct which 
 would be most dangerous, and of which either a 
 legal definition beforehand, or the proof by legal 
 evidence, would be most difficult. The knowledge 
 that there is no restraint by law on the power of 
 dismissal, to prevent a Minister from dealing with 
 such a case as it would deserve, has probably been 
 the principal reason why such cases do not arise ; and, 
 by preventing the possibility of a struggle between a 
 Government and its Servants, has kept up the good 
 feeling which has hitherto existed between them. All 
 who have had experience of the manner in which the 
 business of our great Public Departments is transacted, 
 would, I am sure, concur with me in bearing witness, 
 that it is a point of honour among the permanent 
 Members of these Departments, not to allow any party 
 feelings to interfere with the zealous and faithful dis- 
 charge of their official duties; to give their assist- 
 ance, within the sphere of those duties, as cordially 
 and honestly to a Ministry from which they differ in 
 political opinions, as to one composed of their own 
 friends ; and to abstain carefully from taking part in 
 active opposition to their official superiors for the time 
 being, however much they may be opposed to them 
 in feeling. 
 
192 THE EXERCISE OF PATRONAGE 
 
 This respect, on the part both of Ministers and 
 of their subordinates, for rights and duties not de- 
 fined, or capable of being so, by any positive law, 
 can only be enforced by public opinion, jealously 
 watching and marking with reprobation every de- 
 parture on either side from those rules of conduct 
 which have now been observed for many years with 
 so much advantage. Few greater misfortunes could 
 happen to the Country, than that they should fall into 
 disuse; I think it therefore right to remark, that some 
 symptoms of danger to their permanence may perhaps 
 be observed. What is most to be feared is, that the 
 habit which has grown up of regarding situations in 
 the Public Service as having almost the character of 
 freeholds; may lead their possessors to consider them- 
 selves too safe from dismissal, and may thus encourage 
 them to depart from that understanding which has 
 hitherto existed, that persons employed by a Govern- 
 ment are not at liberty to oppose it, and, above all, 
 not to use the Press as the means of doing so. No 
 Administration could long submit to an internal op- 
 position from its own Servants ; but would be driven 
 to put down any attempt of the kind, by exerting 
 the legal power of dismissing all who should directly 
 or indirectly take part in it, from offices held techni- 
 cally during the pleasure of the Crown. It would 
 indeed be the duty of a Minister to use this power, 
 
UNDER PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 193 
 
 rather than suffer his measures to be obstructed, and 
 perhaps defeated, by the very persons upon whose 
 agency he is obliged to depend for carrying them into 
 execution. 
 
 But a few dismissals of public Servants on such 
 grounds, would go far to shake the whole system 
 of regarding the tenure of non-political offices as 
 one during good behaviour, and to substitute for it 
 the practice which now prevails in the United States. 
 Secret opposition to the Government is not a charge 
 which could easily be proved against a permanent 
 Civil Servant, even though there might be such a 
 moral certainty of its truth as would justify the 
 punishment of the offender by dismissal. But the 
 more grounds there might really be for inflicting such 
 a punishment, the more surely it would be denounced 
 as an injustice by the political friends of the sufferer ; 
 so that, if power were subsequently to come into their 
 hands, they might be expected to retaliate by a similar 
 measure directed against some friend of their oppo- 
 nents, perhaps on much lighter grounds. For it is a 
 truth which ought never to be lost sight of, that rules 
 of conduct restraining the violence of political parties, 
 which rest only upon opinion, are peculiarly liable to 
 be broken down by departures from them, which, in 
 the first instance, may be of rare occurrence, and of 
 apparently trifling importance, but which gradually 
 
 o 
 
194 THE EXERCISE OF PATRONAGE 
 
 increase in frequency and in gravity. A first infringe- 
 ment (perhaps not without some plausible reason) 
 of a wholesome conventional rule, by one party 
 against its opponents, becomes a precedent and an 
 excuse for their also breaking it, when they in turn 
 have the power of doing so, probably with somewhat 
 less ground for it. Thus one departure from the rule 
 is followed by another and another, with less and less 
 justification, until the authority of the rule is altoge- 
 ther destroyed. This is the process by which the 
 decay of free institutions has been too often brought 
 about, through the gradual deterioration of political 
 morality in party contests. Great therefore is the 
 responsibility of those who set the first examples of 
 even trifling departures from any wholesome rule of 
 political conduct which men have been accustomed 
 to respect. 
 
 These considerations lead me to regard with great 
 alarm some few examples, which have of late years 
 occurred, of persons who hold permanent offices under 
 the Government meddling in political contests by 
 being concerned in party newspapers, or writing in 
 the newspapers on the disputed political questions of 
 the day. Whether this is done in order to sup- 
 port or to oppose the Administration for the time 
 being, is not very material ; in either case, such con- 
 duct is a departure from that strict neutrality in party 
 
UNDER PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 195 
 
 contests which it has hitherto been considered the 
 duty of the permanent Civil Servants to observe, 
 and which is the only condition on which they can 
 hope that their present secure tenure of office will be 
 allowed to continue. On the appointment of a new 
 Government after some great party struggle, could 
 the Ministers who succeeded to power be blamed, if 
 they regarded as political offices, and therefore liable 
 to change, those places which they might find in 
 the hands of men who had, through the newspapers, 
 been taking an active part in the contest ? 
 
 I must not, however, pursue this question further; 
 and, before I close this Chapter, I will only add, that 
 the conclusions to be drawn from a consideration of 
 the whole subject to which it relates, may, I think, 
 be thus summed up. The practice of our Govern- 
 ment, in all that relates to patronage, has been greatly 
 improved in the last century; the system which has 
 by degrees grown up, with respect to the appoint- 
 ment of the Servants of the State, is upon the whole 
 a good one ; and, though still susceptible of further 
 improvements, it is to the influence of a sound public 
 opinion, rather than to any new laws or regulations 
 with regard to patronage, that we ought to look for 
 preventing it from being made the instrument of 
 corruption. If this object were sought, by depriving 
 the Ministers of the Crown of all powers susceptible 
 
 o 2 
 
196 THE EXERCISE OF PATRONAGE 
 
 of being abused, the Government must be reduced to 
 a state of utter helplessness, since it cannot possess 
 vital force and energy without having power to reward 
 those who serve it well, and to employ those it thinks 
 most capable of doing so ; while the means placed at 
 its disposal for these purposes may, by their very 
 nature, be perverted to the ends of corruption. No 
 law can effectually guard against this abuse ; for laws 
 can only take cognizance of men's acts, not of the 
 motives which guide them in the exercise of a dis- 
 cretionary power. But opinion can judge of matters 
 which are beyond the reach of positive law ; and the 
 corrupt use by a Government of the patronage with 
 which it is entrusted, will be effectually restrained by 
 public opinion, if only public opinion itself is sound, 
 and the Nation shows itself to be capable of appre- 
 ciating what is honourable and right in the conduct 
 of its rulers, and prompt to reprobate what is wrong. 
 If the feelings of the People themselves were tho- 
 roughly right and earnest upon these questions of pa- 
 tronage, those who wield authority over them would, 
 even from selfish motives, be careful to abstain from 
 abuses which would then only bring them into dis- 
 grace. This is but another proof of that great truth, 
 which cannot be too constantly borne in mind, that 
 the success of all free Constitutions depends far less 
 on their particular form, than on the spirit and public 
 
UNDER PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 197 
 
 virtue of the People to be governed by them. When 
 a strong sense of public duty, respect for the consti- 
 tuted authorities and for the law, and a high standard 
 of political right and wrong generally prevail in a 
 Nation, even very defective institutions will produce 
 the fruits of good government ; while, with a People 
 of an opposite character, the best Constitution which 
 the wit of man could devise will fail to prevent the 
 worst abuses, and to guard against the ultimate esta- 
 blishment of tyranny in the hands of a mob, of an 
 oligarchy, or of a single despot. 
 
198 
 
 CHAPTEE VIII. 
 
 PAELIAMENTAEY GOVEENMENT IN THE BEITISH 
 COLONIES. 
 
 ALTHOUGH it formed no part of my original design 
 to inquire how far the system of Government I have 
 been considering is adapted to the British Colonies, 
 yet as the question is both highly interesting in itself, 
 and also one upon which some light may perhaps be 
 thrown by the reasoning contained in the foregoing 
 pages, a few remarks upon it will not, I trust, ap- 
 pear misplaced at the end of this Essay. It will be 
 my object in the following Chapter to support, by 
 some additional reasons, an opinion I have elsewhere* 
 expressed, against the hasty extension to all the Bri- 
 tish Colonies possessing representative institutions, 
 of what is generally known in them by the name of 
 " Responsible," but ought rather to be called " Par- 
 liamentary" or "Party" Government. 
 
 * See ' Colonial Policy of Lord John Eussell's Administration,' 
 vol. i. pp. 33-37. 
 
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. 199 
 
 Referring to the account I have given* of the 
 evils that generally belong to Parliamentary Govern- 
 ment, and detract from its advantages, I have to ob- 
 serve that, owing to the conditions under which it 
 has to work in Colonies at an early stage of their 
 progress, the worst of these evils are likely to be felt 
 there more seriously than they are in a great Nation. 
 And first, with regard to corruption. In such Colo- 
 nies the Legislatures, being drawn from a small popu- 
 lation, can consist of but a small number of Members; 
 and when Assemblies, composed of such limited num- 
 bers, are invested with all the power given to them 
 by a complete control over the Executive Govern- 
 ment, the high relative value of individual votes af- 
 fords a strong temptation to the exercise of corrupt 
 influence for the purpose of gaining them. We may 
 therefore expect that a strong tendency to jobbing 
 and corruption will be shown by the Colonial Legis- 
 latures. This apprehension is strengthened by our 
 experience of Municipal Corporations in this country. 
 The Town Councils of English Boroughs are not 
 very unlike these Assemblies, either in the number 
 of their members, or in the general character of the 
 business with which they have to deal ; and it is 
 notorious how apt they are to allow their conduct 
 to be warped by private interests, to the injury of the 
 
 * See Chapter III. 
 
200 PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT 
 
 public.* Yet, there are checks upon the misuse of 
 their power by English Corporations, from which Co- 
 lonial Assemblies are free. The former are subject to 
 the immediate control of Parliament, and of Courts 
 of Law perfectly independent, and above being af- 
 fected by local passions ; and, what is still more im- 
 portant, they are amenable to the opinion of a Public 
 of which the community they represent forms but 
 a small fraction, and over which they can exercise 
 little or no influence. In all these respects, the cir- 
 cumstances in which Colonial Assemblies are placed 
 are very different, and much more likely to encourage 
 abuses. 
 
 Again, from the state of society, and from the 
 nature of 'their occupations, there are but few of the 
 inhabitants of the Colonies, even in proportion to 
 their numbers, who are well qualified for the Public 
 Service, and can also afford to devote their time to 
 it without making it their profession. Serious dif- 
 ficulty cannot fail to arise from this cause in pro- 
 viding for the effective performance of the business 
 of the higher offices of Colonial Governments, when 
 they are held by the uncertain tenure of the support 
 of a Parliamentary majority; and, what is worse, those 
 
 * Some remarkable examples of the gross abuses that take place 
 were brought to light by the recent inquiry into the state of the 
 police in corporate towns. 
 
IN THE BRITISH COLONIES. 201 
 
 who so hold these offices will be exposed to a strong 
 temptation to avail themselves of their power while it 
 lasts, to grasp at irregular gains, in order to make up 
 for what they might otherwise lose by relinquishing 
 their private occupations for precarious employment 
 in the Public Service. The temptation to do so will 
 be rendered more powerful by the low salaries usually 
 attached to these offices, and by the facilities for jobs 
 of various kinds afforded by the circumstances of an 
 advancing Colony. 
 
 Of all the evils, however, incidental to Parliamen- 
 tary Government, its tendency to give a pernicious 
 influence to party spirit is probably that which will 
 be most aggravated by the circumstances of a com- 
 paratively small society. Factious animosities are 
 usually bitter in proportion as the field in which 
 they are displayed is contracted, partly perhaps be- 
 cause hostile partisans are there brought more im- 
 mediately into contact with each other. Accordingly, 
 party spirit is generally found to be very acrimonious 
 in Colonies, even when they do not enjoy Represen- 
 tative institutions; it can therefore be no matter of 
 surprise if it should run to great excesses, when they 
 are brought under a system of government of which 
 Party is the basis, and which recognizes party con- 
 tests as the legitimate means for determining by 
 whom office and power shall be enjoyed. 
 
202 PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT 
 
 The tendency of this kind of government to inflame 
 party animosities, and to give undue influence to 
 party considerations in the administration of public 
 affairs, is likely to be the more felt in the smaller 
 Colonies, because matters directly affecting the in- 
 terest of individuals occupy so large a share of the 
 attention of their Governments and Legislatures. 
 These Legislatures have seldom occasion to consider 
 those high questions of national policy, affecting the 
 relations of the State with foreign Powers and with 
 its dependencies, which take up so much of the time 
 of the Imperial Parliament. They are principally oc- 
 cupied with questions as to local improvements and 
 works of utility ; as to the mode of dealing with the 
 public lands ; as to taxation ; and as to the amount of 
 the Civil Establishment, and the rate at which salaries 
 should be fixed. These questions are also considered 
 and decided much more with reference to their bear- 
 ing on the personal interests of individuals, than the 
 corresponding questions in a larger society. Questions 
 of commercial policy and of taxation, with which 
 Parliament has to deal, do indeed deeply affect the 
 interests of individuals, and so also do those as to 
 the amount of establishments to be maintained, and 
 the rate at which public servants are to be paid. 
 And it is also true that it is their effect upon private 
 interests which has often caused such questions to 
 
IN THE BRITISH COLONIES. 203 
 
 be discussed in this Country with so much eagerness. 
 But still they are here considered as affecting the 
 interests of numerous classes, rather than those of 
 individuals. It happens comparatively seldom that 
 Members of the House of Commons know anything 
 of the effect the votes they give upon such questions 
 will have on the interests of particular persons, and 
 they are still more rarely influenced by the conside- 
 ration that a certain vote will benefit or will injure 
 Mr. A. or Mr. B., for whom they may entertain 
 feelings of regard or animosity. But in a small 
 Colonial Assembly there is hardly any question to 
 be decided, with respect to which the Members do 
 not know how it will affect the interests, not only 
 of classes of the community, but of particular men 
 whom they are daily meeting, and who are regarded 
 by some of their number as friends and by others 
 as enemies. 
 
 So also with regard to the measures of the Execu- 
 tive Government. In deciding on the measures of 
 the Government, and on the various administrative 
 questions that come before them, the Ministers of the 
 Crown in this country can rarely be exposed to the 
 temptation of allowing themselves to be influenced by 
 a consideration of the manner in which the interests 
 of particular persons will be affected by their deter- 
 mination. In a small Colonial society, on the contrary, 
 
204 PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT 
 
 the Members of the local Government must often be 
 aware that its acts will have a material influence on 
 the interests of persons well known to them, and who 
 are regarded by them as friends they wish to serve, 
 or as political enemies they are not sorry to injure. 
 Even, therefore, though they may conduct themselves 
 with perfect impartiality, and although they should 
 never yield to the temptation of showing favour to 
 their supporters, or the reverse to their opponents, 
 (which, when party struggles run high, it is not easy 
 to suppose will always be the case,) it must be diffi- 
 cult for them to gain credit for acting with this high 
 regard to principle. 
 
 These circumstances help to explain the extreme 
 bitterness 'of party strife in the Colonies, even before 
 " Responsible Government " was introduced, and why 
 it is that discussions in their Assemblies have ever 
 been apt to be carried on in that tone of virulent 
 personality which must strike all who are in the 
 habit of reading the accounts of their debates. Where 
 this spirit prevails, and where sometimes one fac- 
 tion, sometimes another, is invested with the whole 
 power of the Government, it is obvious that little 
 fairness towards opponents is to be expected in the 
 use made of that power, by those in whose hands it 
 is placed for the time. The patronage of the Go- 
 vernment is more especially likely to be abused under 
 
IN THE BRITISH COLONIES. 205 
 
 such circumstances, and there is much danger that it 
 may be so in the manner most pernicious to society, 
 by conferring judicial appointments on unscrupulous 
 partisans, thus throwing discredit on the administra- 
 tion of justice, which it is so important to keep, not 
 only pure, but above suspicion. 
 
 This system of government has not been established 
 in our Colonies long enough to allow these evil ten- 
 dencies to show themselves in a very marked manner; 
 but symptoms of their existence may already be 
 detected, and general reasoning warrants the appre- 
 hension that, by degrees, they will become more ma- 
 nifest, and will bear their natural fruit, unless some 
 means of preventing their development can be dis- 
 covered. But these means have still to be found. An 
 able Governor, it is true, by a judicious use of the 
 influence of his office, rather than of its authority, 
 may do something to mitigate evils as they arise, and 
 to check corruption and party violence, but his power 
 in this respect is very limited. Nor ought it to be 
 overlooked, that a Governor appointed by the Crown, 
 and bound to obey the instructions he receives by its 
 authority, while he is at the same time required to 
 carry on his administration by means of Ministers who 
 are responsible to the local Legislature for every act of 
 the Government, is placed in a difficult and anomalous 
 position. It is to be feared that the difficulty of re- 
 
206 PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT 
 
 conciling this system of Government with the relation 
 of a Colony to the Mother-Country has not been felt 
 as strongly as it is likely to be hereafter; and that, 
 without great judgment and forbearance on both 
 sides, it will be impossible to maintain that authority 
 on the part of the latter, without which its connec- 
 tion with its dependencies would be reduced to a 
 barren and onerous responsibility. 
 
 Prom what I have said, it will be seen that the 
 circumstances of the Colonies, and the relation in 
 which they stand to the Parent State, are calculated 
 to increase the difficulties of Parliamentary Govern- 
 ment, and to aggravate some of the worst faults 
 which I have described in the preceding pages as 
 inherent in its nature, and as constituting no small 
 drawback from its advantages even among ourselves. 
 On the other hand, these same circumstances, and the 
 connection of the Colonies with the Mother- Country, 
 rendered their adoption of Parliamentary Government 
 unnecessary for some of the purposes it answers in 
 this Country, and afforded facilities for securing to 
 these young societies all the substantial advantages 
 of good government, and of political freedom, under 
 such Representative Constitutions as many of them 
 formerly possessed. 
 
 These Constitutions bore a strong resemblance in 
 their working to that of England before the Revo- 
 
IN THE BRITISH COLONIES. 207 
 
 lution of 1688. I have already shown that at that 
 period, when the Sovereign not only reigned but 
 governed (to adopt the distinction drawn by a French 
 statesman), the system of government in England 
 was altogether unlike what it has now become, under 
 a Constitution nominally the same ; and I have ob- 
 served that it was well suited to the state of society 
 at that time. I have now further to point out, that 
 it had some important advantages over the system 
 by which it has been superseded, when it was ad- 
 ministered by wise Sovereigns. Party spirit was not 
 excited by it, as it is by Parliamentary Government ; 
 and the power possessed by the Crown, of distribu- 
 ting rewards and public employment without reference 
 to any consideration but the merits of those on whom 
 they were conferred, called forth great zeal and ability 
 in the service of the State, and conduced to a vigo- 
 rous administration of the affairs of the Nation with 
 comparatively little taint of corruption. At the same 
 time, the necessity of applying to Parliament when 
 supplies beyond the ordinary revenue were required, 
 acted as a check upon the improper exercise of the 
 large powers entrusted to the King; and, while it 
 enforced economy in the public expenditure, it also 
 gave weight to the remonstrances of the Representa- 
 tives of the People when they were called for by any 
 abuses. With Kings who were fit for their high office, 
 
208 PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT 
 
 and had judgment enough to understand the necessity 
 of keeping on good terms with their Parliament, this 
 was a sufficient security against misgovernment. 
 
 If we were to form our judgment only from the 
 best reigns, it would be difficult to resist the conclu- 
 sions that, at all events so long as the affairs of the 
 Country had not grown to be highly complicated by 
 its advance in wealth and population, this system of 
 government worked better than our own would have 
 done. But there was this great, not to say fatal, draw- 
 back from its advantages, that its success depended 
 entirely upon the personal character of the wearer of 
 the Crown ; and that, while it was impossible that the 
 reins of government should not sometimes fall into 
 bad hands,' the Law and the Constitution provided no 
 means by which the great power attached to the kingly 
 office could be taken from an unworthy holder. The 
 only effectual remedy the Nation possessed against an 
 abuse of the Royal authority was by armed resistance 
 to it, a remedy much too violent and dangerous to 
 be used, except in extreme cases. 
 
 The institutions of the British Colonies, possessing 
 Representative Legislatures, having been originally 
 modelled on our own, the powers entrusted by them 
 to the Governors were until lately almost the same 
 as those exercised by the English Kings prior to the 
 Revolution of 1688; and their possession of these 
 
IN THE BRITISH COLONIES. 209 
 
 powers, when they used them wisely, was productive 
 of the same benefit to those over whom they ruled. 
 But there was this most important difference between 
 a Colonial Governor and an English Sovereign of 
 the Houses of Plantagenet or Tudor, that the former 
 was responsible to a distant and generally an impar- 
 tial authority, to which the Colonists could always 
 appeal to relieve them from a Governor who abused 
 his power. The Crown could recall any Governor who 
 failed in the discharge of his duties ; and if it refused 
 to do so on a well-grounded complaint from the inhabi- 
 tants of a Colony, they were entitled to lay their griev- 
 ance before Parliament, to which the Ministers on whose 
 advice the Crown had acted were bound to answer for 
 what had been done.* Thus the chief objection to 
 the system of Government which formerly prevailed 
 in this Country did not apply to its operation in the 
 Colonies, while there was no apparent obstacle to its 
 producing in them the same advantages it had done 
 here. 
 
 Unfortunately, however, when public attention began 
 
 * It will be seen from the above statement that the responsibility 
 of Colonial Governors under the former system of Government was 
 a substantial one. It was therefore a mistake to give to Parliamen- 
 tary or Party Government in the Colonies, the name of " Responsible 
 Government," in order to distinguish it from that which it super- 
 seded. Under the old system, the responsibility of those who exer- 
 cised power was quite as real as under the new one ; perhaps it was 
 even more so. 
 
210 PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT 
 
 to be directed to Colonial affairs, this form of go- 
 vernment, which was in itself admirably adapted for 
 promoting the welfare of young societies, had become 
 discredited by the manner in which it had been admi- 
 nistered, and by abuses of different kinds which had 
 been suffered to grow up. During the long war of the 
 French Revolution, the spirit of reckless extravagance 
 in which the government of this Country was carried 
 on (the natural consequence of providing for a large 
 part of the national expenditure by loans), extended 
 to the Colonies, and led to the practice of defraying 
 many charges of their internal government by grants 
 of the Imperial Parliament. This practice, beside other 
 objections to it, had the bad effect of depriving the 
 Legislatures of these Colonies of their due weight. 
 When the Governors had the easy resource of draw- 
 ing upon the British Treasury, for expenses they could 
 not induce the Colonial Assemblies to provide for, 
 they were not obliged to show the deference to these 
 Bodies that would otherwise have been necessary, 
 and were thus encouraged to pay too little attention 
 in their administration to the wishes and opinions 
 of those over whom they ruled. To the same cause 
 must also be attributed the bad system which arose, 
 of the Ministers of the Crown abusing their Co- 
 lonial patronage, for the purpose of strengthening 
 their own Parliamentary interest. In proportion as 
 
IN THE BRITISH COLONIES. 211 
 
 the pecuniary assistance of Parliament diminished the 
 need for the willing co-operation of the local Legisla- 
 tures in the government of the Colonies, the Ministers 
 of the day naturally grew less solicitous to obtain this 
 co-operation by a good administration, and at the 
 same time became too anxious to use their Colonial 
 patronage to maintain their ascendency in the Impe- 
 rial Parliament. There can be no doubt that, in the 
 times I am speaking of, unfit men were often appointed 
 to governments, and to other important offices in the 
 Colonies, to the great injury of their inhabitants ; and 
 it is probable that the true explanation of this fact is 
 to be found in the circumstance I have mentioned. 
 
 The practice of providing for Colonial expenses 
 from the British Treasury, and the consequent abuse 
 of Colonial patronage, which had been encouraged by 
 the great war of the Revolution, did not cease with 
 its termination ; and it was not until after the pass- 
 ing of the Reform Act of 1832, and mainly owing to 
 that measure, that a change of system was gradually 
 accomplished. There was, however, another cause 
 which contributed to the mal-administration of the 
 Colonies, and which Parliamentary Reform did no- 
 thing to remove : I refer to the commercial policy to 
 which this Country so long adhered. While it con- 
 tinued to be a received opinion in the Country, and a 
 fixed principle of our legislation, that the chief advan- 
 
212 PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT 
 
 tage the Parent State had to look for from her Colonies 
 was the monopoly of their trade, and while they were 
 held to have a right in return to peculiar favour for 
 their produce in the British market, questions were 
 continually arising on which there was a conflict of 
 interests, or of supposed interests, between the Nation 
 and her Dependencies. So long as this state of things 
 lasted, Governors appointed by the Crown were ne- 
 cessarily liable to be brought into antagonism with 
 the societies placed under their authority, and to be 
 suspected of not always exercising their power with a 
 single view to the welfare of the governed. It was 
 not until the new commercial policy of this Country, 
 (begun by the Repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, and 
 completed -by that of the former Navigation Laws in 
 1849,) had been sanctioned by Parliament, and had at 
 length, after a severe struggle, been acquiesced in by 
 the Colonies, that the administration of their affairs 
 by Governors appointed from home ceased to be 
 exposed to a disturbing influence from this cause. 
 
 Abuses of a different kind had also arisen in some 
 Colonies. In Jamaica, for instance, a large part of the 
 duties which, according to the British Constitution, 
 properly belong to the Executive Government, had 
 been transferred to Committees of the Assembly. 
 This was particularly the case with regard to financial 
 business. The Governor, as representing the Crown, 
 
IN THE BRITISH COLONIES. 218 
 
 had lost the right which belongs to the Sovereign in 
 this Country of originating all grants of money by 
 recommending them to the Representative branch of 
 the Legislature. He had also lost the control of the 
 sums granted by the Assembly, and the duty of su- 
 perintending their application to the Public Service. 
 These functions had been assumed by the Assembly, 
 or by the members of that body under another name, 
 who were thus invested with great power without a 
 corresponding responsibility. The consequence was, 
 that gross abuses and extravagance in the public ex- 
 penditure had prevailed, as might have been expected. 
 Owing to these and other causes, (among which 
 must be reckoned the slight attention which Parlia- 
 ment, during the long war, and for some years after- 
 wards, was in the habit of giving to the affairs of 
 the Colonies,) the Representative Constitutions, which 
 some of them possessed, had failed to work in a sa- 
 tisfactory manner, and there were good grounds for 
 general complaints of maladministration, when the 
 demand for " responsible government " arose, and 
 was granted in Canada. The circumstances of that 
 Colony were such as, perhaps, to render this, upon 
 the whole, as good a plan as could have been adopted 
 for administering its affairs, when the union of the 
 two Provinces of Upper and Lower Canada had 
 brought a large population under the authority of the 
 
214 PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT 
 
 same Legislature. But it may well be doubted whe- 
 ther the imitation of Canada has not led to the pre- 
 mature introduction of a similar form of government 
 in Colonies at present ill fitted for it, and in which 
 Representative Constitutions of a different character 
 would have worked better. 
 
 This remark applies especially to the Australian 
 Colonies, which have availed themselves of the power 
 of altering their Constitutions, conferred upon them 
 by Parliament in 1850, in order to establish "re- 
 sponsible government." In New South Wales and 
 Victoria this form of government has superseded a 
 Representative Constitution of a different character, 
 which was granted to these Colonies, then undivided, 
 by an Act passed in 1842. The Constitution given 
 at that time to New South Wales differed in some 
 important points from the ancient form of Colonial 
 Constitutions, but it substantially agreed with them 
 in respect to the nature and extent of the powers 
 with which it invested the Governor. Though it was 
 hardly in operation long enough to give it a very fair 
 trial, this Constitution may be considered to have had 
 very tolerable success. While it continued in force, 
 party spirit occasionally ran high, and controversies 
 sometimes arose and were carried on with no little 
 acrimony between the Governor and the Legislature. 
 That Body was also guilty of several very obvious 
 
IN THE BRITISH COLONIES. 215 
 
 mistakes, but in general its measures were well di- 
 rected to meet the wants of the community. The fi- 
 nances were, during this period, judiciously managed, 
 the laws were vigorously and impartially administered, 
 and the Colony made rapid advances in wealth and 
 prosperity. 
 
 The new form of government which has been sub- 
 stituted for that which produced these results, has not 
 hitherto appeared to work equally well. Changes of 
 administration have followed each other with almost 
 ludicrous rapidity, and those who have been succes- 
 sively called upon to fill the chief places in these 
 ephemeral Governments, have been able to accomplish 
 little for the public good. Their failure to do so is 
 no proof of their unfitness for their offices, though 
 it must obviously be difficult to induce able men to 
 devote themselves to these offices, when their tenure 
 of them is so fleeting. Even if men of the highest 
 capacity had under this system been called to power, 
 their short tenure of it, and their want of adequate 
 authority even while in office, from their never being 
 able to command more than a precarious majority, 
 must have prevented the affairs of the Colony from 
 being managed by them on any settled and consistent 
 plan. All the advantages of following a steady and 
 well-considered course of action are lost, when power 
 is perpetually shifted from the hands of one set of 
 
216 PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT 
 
 men to those of another, having perhaps quite op- 
 posite views. In this respect the new system has 
 proved very inferior to the old one, under which the 
 Governors were themselves responsible for the policy 
 they pursued, and were assisted in their administra- 
 tion by men who held the chief offices under them 
 during good behaviour, instead of at the uncertain 
 pleasure of a Parliamentary majority, and were an- 
 swerable only for executing faithfully the directions 
 they received. Under the new arrangement, the go- 
 vernment of these Colonies has been conducted with 
 little steadiness or energy, and their Legislatures, in- 
 stead of applying themselves diligently to the public 
 business, and then allowing their Members to return 
 to their private concerns (from which in a young 
 society they cannot be long detained without injury 
 to the community), have been spending valuable time 
 to little purpose, in party struggles, and in debates 
 arising from the frequent changes of administration.* 
 From the accounts that have been published of 
 recent political transactions in these Colonies, such 
 appear to have been the effects of the last changes in 
 
 * The first Session of the Parliament of New South Wales, after 
 responsible government came into operation, lasted for five months. 
 In that time but one single Bill was passed, an Act to authorize a 
 loan, which went through both Houses in about an hour. The re- 
 mainder of the protracted Session seems to have been chiefly devoted 
 to Party squabbles and the overthrow of two Ministries. 
 
IN THE BRITISH COLONIES. 217 
 
 their form of government. It is right however to 
 add, that those changes were not confined to bringing 
 the Executive Government under the immediate con- 
 trol of the Legislatures, by adopting the principle of 
 " responsible government," but included an alteration 
 in the Constitution of the Legislatures. By the Acts 
 of Parliament of 1842 and 1850, the Legislatures of 
 New South Wales, and the other Australian Colonies, 
 were made to consist of a single Chamber, of which 
 one-third of the Members were nominated by the 
 Crown. This arrangement has been altered, and 
 Legislatures have been created, consisting of two 
 Chambers, and not admitting any nominated Mem- 
 bers to sit with the Representatives of the People. 
 The wisdom of this alteration, at the time it was 
 made, may be questioned, since the former Consti- 
 tution of these Legislatures was peculiarly adapted 
 to diminish the difficulties inseparable from the first 
 establishment of Parliamentary Government in Colo- 
 nies which still have but a small population. With 
 a Legislature of a single Chamber, the want of a suf- 
 ficient number of fit persons to compose it was less 
 felt, than when the Members are divided into two 
 bodies ; and if the Crown's power of nominating 
 one-third of the former Legislative Councils had been 
 allowed to continue, on the establishment of Parlia- 
 mentary Government, it would have been practi- 
 
218 PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT 
 
 cally exercised by the Administration of the day, arid 
 would thus have conferred upon it that authority in 
 the Legislature which I have shown to be the very 
 foundation of this system of government, and the 
 want of which has been so much felt since it was 
 adopted in the Australian Colonies. It would also 
 have tended to prevent the embarrassment that arises 
 from Parties being so divided, that none is strong 
 enough to govern, but each has sufficient power, 
 when combined with the allies it finds in Opposition, 
 to render government by its rivals impossible.* 
 
 These are considerations it would have been well 
 to have weighed carefully, before the Australian Co- 
 lonies resolved so hastily to use the power of altering 
 their Constitutions which Parliament had conferred 
 upon them, and to adopt alterations recommended to 
 them, as the result seems to prove, with very little 
 
 * The nomination of one-third of the Legislative Council on the 
 advice of an Administration supported by a majority of that Body, 
 would probably have had an effect not very different from that pro- 
 duced by the election of the Aldermen in the reformed English 
 Town Councils by the Council itself. This arrangement was agreed 
 to as a compromise between the two Houses of Parliament in pass- 
 ing the Municipal Reform Act of 1835 ; it is entirely different from 
 either of the opposite plans which each House at first adopted, and 
 its consequences were foreseen by no one when it was suggested as 
 a mode of getting out of a difficulty. It has however, I believe, 
 worked well, by preventing a too even division of parties, and ge- 
 nerally ensuring what is called "a working majority " to one party 
 or the other in the Town Councils. 
 
IN THE BRITISH COLONIES. 219 
 
 political wisdom. Happily, however, so little is re- 
 quired from the Government of these young commu- 
 nities, and their prosperity depends so much more 
 upon the enterprise and energy of individuals in their 
 private affairs, than upon the skill with which public 
 business is conducted, that there is no cause for ap- 
 prehending any serious check to their advance from 
 the error I believe them to have committed. We 
 may also trust that the practical good-sense, and the 
 capacity for self-government, which distinguish the 
 English race, will enable the inhabitants of Australia 
 ultimately to find some means of correcting any evils 
 that may arise from the political institutions they 
 have adopted. 
 
 THE END. 
 
PBINXED BY 
 JOHN EBWABD TAYLOB, LITTLE QUEEN STEEET, 
 
 LINCOLN'S INIT FIELDS. 
 

 THIS BOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST DATE 
 STAMPED BELOW 
 
 AN INITIAL FINE OF 25 CENTS 
 
 WILL BE ASSESSED FOR FAILURE TO RETURN 
 THIS BOOK ON THE DATE DUE. THE PENALTY 
 WILL INCREASE TO 5O CENTS ON THE FOURTH 
 DAY AND TO $t.OO ON THE SEVENTH DAY 
 OVERDUE. 
 
 
 19 *i3iS 
 
 
 
 , 
 
 *o 
 
 
 ^\l "V* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 srw'soui 
 
 
 49' 
 
 
YC 09798 
 
 52871 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY