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 GIFT OF 
 
 SEELEY W. MUDD 
 
 and 
 
 GEORGE I. COCHRAN MEYER ELSASSER 
 
 DR. JOHN R. HAYNES WILLIAM L. HONNOLD 
 
 JAMES R. MARTIN MRS. JOSEPH F. SARTOR! 
 
 to the 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 SOUTHERN BRANCH 
 
 JOHN FISKE
 
 tJNIVEKSlTY of CALIFOMHI^.^ 
 
 AT 
 
 LOS ANGELES 
 
 UBRAKY
 
 DEFENCE 
 
 OF THE 
 
 CONSTITUTIONS of GOVERNMENT 
 
 OF THE 
 
 UNITED STATES of AMERICA. 
 
 By JOHN ADAMS, LL. D. 
 
 AND A MKMBXR OP THI ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SC1KNCS8 
 AT BOSTON. 
 
 An nature's ^fference keeps all nature''s peace. Porx* 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 PRINTED FOR C. DILLY, IN THE POULTRT 
 
 J4.PCC.I.XXXV1J.
 
 V. 1 
 
 ' PREFACE. 
 
 THE arts and fciences, in general, during 
 the three or four laft centuries, have had a 
 regular courfe of progreflive improvement. The 
 inventions in mechanic arts, the difcoveries in na- 
 tural philofophy, navigation, and commerce, and 
 the advancement of civilization and humanity, 
 have occafioned changes in the condition of the 
 y world, and the human charadler, which would 
 ; ,7 have aftonilhed the mod refined nations of anti- 
 quity. A continuation of fimilar exertions is 
 every day rendering Europe more and more like 
 one community, or fingle family. Even in the 
 o theory and pradlice of government, in all the fim- 
 .^ pie monarchies, confiderable improvements hav 
 ' been made. The checks and balances of re- 
 c) publican governments have been in fome degree 
 tt) adopted by the courts of princes. By the erec- 
 U^ tion of various tribunals, to rcgillei- the laws, 
 and exercife the judicial power by indulging the 
 petitions and remonftrances of fubjedts, until by 
 habit they are regarded as rights a controul has 
 been eftablillied over minifters of ftate, and the 
 royal councils, which approaches, in fomc de- 
 gree, to the fpirit of republics. Property is ge- 
 nerally fecure, and perfonal liberty feldom in- 
 vaded. The prefs has great influence, even where 
 
 a it
 
 ii Preface. 
 
 it is not exprefsly tolerated ; and the public opi- 
 nion mufl be refpeded by a minifter, or his place 
 becomes infecure. Commerce begins to thrive : 
 and if religious toleration were cftablilhed, and 
 perfonal liberty a little more protected, by giving 
 anabfolute right to demand a public trial in a 
 certain reafonable time and the ftates invefted 
 with a few more privileges, or rather reftored to 
 fome that have been taken away thefe govern- 
 ments would be brought to as great a degree of 
 perfedion, they would approach as near to the 
 charaler of governments of laws and not of men, 
 as their nature will probably admit of. In fo ge- 
 neral a refinement, or more properly reformation 
 of manners and improvement in knowledge, is it 
 not unaccountable that the knowledge of the 
 principles and conftruftion of free governments, 
 in which the happinefs of life, and even the fur- 
 ther progrefs of improvement in education and 
 fociety, in knowledge and virtue, are fo deeply 
 interefted, fhould have remained at a full (land 
 for two or three thoufand years ? According to a 
 flory in Herodotus, the nature of monarchy, ari- 
 ftocracy, and democracy, and the advantages and 
 inconveniences of each, were as well underftood at 
 the time of the neighing of the horfe of Darius, 
 as they are at this hour. A variety of mixtures 
 of thefe fimple fpecies were conceived and at- 
 tempted, with different fuccefs, by the Greeks 
 and Romans. Reprefentations, inflead of collec- 
 tions, of the people a total feparation of the 
 
 '"xecutive
 
 Preface, lii 
 
 executive from the legiflative power, and of the 
 judicial from both and a balance in the legifla- 
 ture, by three independent, equal branchesarc 
 perhaps the three only difcoveries in the confti- 
 tution of a free government, fince the inftitution 
 of Lycurgus. Even thefe have been fo unfortu- 
 nate, that they have never fpread : the firft has been 
 given up by all the nations, excepting one, who 
 had once adopted it; and the other two, reduced to 
 pradice, if not invented, by the Englifh nation, 
 have never been imitated by any other except their 
 own defendants in America. While it would be 
 rafli to fay, that nothing further can be done to 
 bring a free government, in all its parts, ftill nearer 
 to perfe6tion-*-the reprefentations of the people 
 are moft obvioufly fufceptible of improvement. 
 The end to be aimed at, in the formation of a re- 
 prcfentative alTembly, feems to be the fenfe of the 
 people, the public voice : the perfe<5bion of the 
 portrait confifts in its likencfs. Numbers, or pro- 
 perty, or both, Ihould be the rule ; and the pro- 
 portions of dehors and members an affair of cal- 
 culation. The duration fhould not be fo long 
 that the deputy fhould have time to forget the 
 opinions of his conftituents. Corruption in elec- 
 tions is the great enemy of freedom. Among the 
 provifions to prevent it, more frequent eledions, 
 and a more general privilege of voting, are not all 
 that might be devifed. Dividing the diflrifts, 
 diminifhing the diftance of travel, and confining 
 the choice to rcfidents, would be great advances 
 
 a 2 towardc
 
 IV Preface'. 
 
 towards the annihilation of corruption. The 
 modern ariftocracies of Holland, Venice, Berne, 
 &c. have tempered themfelves with innumerable 
 multitudes of checks, by which they have given 
 a great degree of (lability to that form of govern- 
 ment : and though liberty and life can nevtr be 
 there enjoyed fo well as in a free republic, none is 
 perhaps more capable of profound fagacity. Wc 
 fhall learn to prize the checks and balances of a 
 free government, and even thofc of the modern 
 ariftocracies, if we recollect the miferies of Greece 
 which arofe from their ignorance of them. The 
 only balance attempted againft the ancient kings 
 was a body of nobles , and the confequences were 
 perpetual altercations of rebellion and tyranny, 
 and butcheries of thoufands upon every revolution 
 from one to the other. When the kings Vv'ere 
 aboliflied, the ariftocracies tyrannized j and then 
 210 balance was attempted but between arifto- 
 cracy and democracy. This, in the nature of 
 things, could be no balance at all, and therefore 
 the pendulum was for ever on the fwing. It is 
 ilimDfBble to read in Thucidydes, lib. iii. his ac- 
 count of the fadions and confufions throughout 
 all Greece, which v/ere introduced by this want 
 t>f an equilibrium, without horror. During the 
 few days that Eurymedon, with his troops, conti- 
 nued at Corcyra, the people of that city extended 
 the maflacre to all whom they judged their ene- 
 mies. The crime alleged was, their attempt to 
 overturn the democracy. Some periflied merely 
 
 tlirough
 
 Preface. v 
 
 through private enmity -, fom?, for the money 
 they had lent, by the hands of the borrower. 
 Every kind of death, every dreadful ad, was 
 perpetrated. Fathers flew their children ; fomc 
 were dragged from altars, fome were butchered 
 at them ; numbers, immerfed in temples, were 
 ftarved. The contagion fpread through the whole 
 extent of Greece : faflions raged in every city ; 
 the licentious many contending for the Athenians, 
 and the afpiring few for the Lacedcemonians. 
 The confequence was, feditions in cities, with all 
 their numerous and tragical incidents. Such 
 things ever will be, fays Thucidydes, fo long as 
 human nature continues the fame. But if this 
 nervous hiftorian had known a balance of three 
 powers, he would not have pronounced the dif- 
 temper fo incurable, but would have added -f 
 long as parties in cities remain unbalanced. He 
 adds Words loft their fignification : brutal ra(h- 
 nefs was fortitude ; prudence, cowardice ; modef- 
 ty, effeminacy ', and being wife in every thing, to 
 be good for nothing : the hot temper was manly 
 valour ; calm deliberation, plaufible knavery ; he 
 who boiled with indignation, was trultworthy ; 
 and he who prefumed to contradid:, was ever fuf- 
 peded. Connexion of blood was lefs regarded 
 than tranfient acquaintance : alTociations were 
 not formed for mutual advantage, confident with 
 law, but for rapine againll all law: truft was only 
 conimunication of guilt : revenge was more va- 
 lued, than never to have fuffered an injury : per- 
 a q iuries
 
 vi Preface. 
 
 juries were mafter-pieces of cunning , the dupe* 
 only blufhed, the villains moft impudently tri- 
 umphed. The fource of ail thefe evils is a thirft 
 of power, from rapacious or ambitious paffions. 
 The men of large influence, fome contending for 
 the juft equality of the democratical, and others 
 for the fair decorum of ariftocratical government, 
 by artful founds, embarraffed thofe communities, 
 for their own private lucre, by the keeneft fpirit, 
 the moft daring projedls, and moft dreadful ma- 
 chinations. Revenge, not limited by juftice or 
 the public welfare, was meafured only by fuch re- 
 taliation as was judged the fweeteft by capital 
 condemnations, by iniquitous fentences, and by 
 glutting the prefent rancour of their hearts with 
 their own hands. The pious and upright condudl 
 was on both fides difregarded ; the moderate 
 citizens fell victims to both. Seditions introduc- 
 ed every fpecies of outrageous wickednefs into the 
 Grecian manners. Sincerity was laughed out of 
 countenance : the whole order of human life 
 was confounded : the human temper, too apt to 
 tranfgrefs in fpite of laws, now having gain- 
 ed the afcendant over law, feemed to glory that 
 it was too ftrong for juftice, and an enemy to all 
 fuperiority. Mr. Hume has colledied, from Dio- 
 dorus Siculus alone, a few maflacres which hap- 
 pened in only fixty of the moft poliftied years of 
 Greece: From Sybaris 500 nobles baniftied j of 
 Chians, 600 citizens j at Ephefus, 340 killed, 
 1000 baniftied \ of Cyrenians, 500 nobles killed, 
 7 all
 
 Preface. vii 
 
 ali the reft banifhed ; the Corinthians killed 
 120, banifhed 500 ; Phsebidas banifhed 300 
 Boeotians. Upon the fall of the Lacedaemonians, 
 democracies were reftored in many cities, and 
 fevere vengeance taken of the nobles : the ba- 
 nifhed nobles returning, butchered their adverfa- 
 ries at Phialas, in Corinth, in Megara, in Phliafia, 
 where they killed 300 of the people ; but thefe 
 again revolting, killed above 600 of the nobles, 
 and baniilied the reft. In Arcadia, 1400 ba- 
 nifhed, befides many killed ; the banifhed retired 
 to Sparta and Pallantium ; the latter were deli- 
 vered up to their countrymen, and all killed. 
 Of the banifhed from Argos and Thebes, there 
 were 509 in the Spartan army. The people, be- 
 fore the ufurpation of Agathocles, had baniflied 
 600 nobles; afterwards that tyrant, in concurrence 
 with the people, killed 4000 nobles, and banifhed 
 6000 i and killed 4000 people at Gela : his 
 brother banifhed 8000 from Syracufe. The in- 
 habitants of -^gefta, to the number of 40,000, 
 were killed, man, woman, and child, for the fake 
 of their money : all the relations of the Libyan 
 army, fathers, brothers, children, killed : 7000 
 exiles killed after capitulation. Thefe num- 
 bers, compared with the population of thofe 
 cities, are prodigious ; yet Agathocles was a man 
 of character, and not to be fufpeded of cruelty, 
 contrary to the maxims of his age: fuch were the 
 fafhionable outrages of unbalanced parties. 
 
 a 4 In
 
 viii Preface. 
 
 In the name of human and divine benevolence, 
 is fuch a fyftem as this to be recommended to 
 Americans, in this age of the world ? Human na- 
 ture is as incapable now of going through revo- 
 lutions with temper and fobriety, with patience 
 and prudence, or without fury and madnefs, as it 
 was among the Greeks fo long ago. The latcft 
 revolution that we read of was conducled, at leaft 
 on one fide, in the Grecian ftyle, with laconic 
 energy j and with a little attic fait ; at leafl:, without 
 too much patience, forefight, and prudence, on 
 the other. Without three orders, and an effec- 
 tual balance between them, in every American con- 
 flitution, it mull be deftined to frequent unavoid- 
 able revolutions : if they are delayed a few years, 
 they muft come, in time. The United States are 
 large and populous nations, in comparifon of the 
 Grecian commonwealths, or even the Swifs can- 
 tons i and are growing every day more difpropor- 
 tionate, and therefore lefs capable of being held 
 together by fimple governments. Countries that 
 increafe in population fo rapidly as the States of 
 America did, even during fuch an impoverifhing 
 and deftrudive war as the laft was, are not to be 
 bound long with filken threads : lions, young 
 or old, will not be bound by cobwebs. It would 
 be better for America, it is neverthelefs agreed, to 
 ring all the changes with the whole fet of bells, 
 and go through all the revolutions of the Grecian 
 ftates, rather than eftablifh an abfolute monarchy 
 among them, notwithilanding all the great and 
 
 real
 
 Preface, ix 
 
 real improvements made in that kind of govern- 
 ment. 
 
 The objedion to thefe governments is not be- 
 caufe they are fupported by nobles, and a fubor- 
 dination of ranks ; for all governments, even 
 the moft democratical, are fupported by a fubor- 
 dination of offices, and of ranks too. None ever 
 exifted without it but in a ftate of anarchy and 
 outrage, in a contempt of law and juftice, no bet- 
 ter than no government. But the nobles, in the 
 European monarchies, fupport them more by 
 oppofing than promoting their ordinary views. 
 The kings are fupported by their armies : the 
 nobles fupport the crown, as it is in full pofTeflion 
 of the gift of all employments ; but they fupport 
 it ftill more by checking its minifters, and pre- 
 venting them from running into abufcs of power, 
 and wanton defpotilm : otherwife the people would 
 be pufhed to extremities and infurredions. It is 
 thus that the nobles reconcile the monarchical au- 
 thority to the obedience of the fubjeds ; but take 
 away the (landing armies, and leave the nobles to 
 themfelves, and they would overturn every mo- 
 narchy in Europe, in a few years, and ere6l arifto- 
 cracies. 
 
 It is become a kind of falhion among 
 writers, to admit, as a maxim, that if you could 
 be always fure of a wife, adive, and virtuous 
 prince, monarchy would be the beft of govern- 
 rrients. But this is fo far from being admiffible, 
 that it will for ever remain true, that a free go- 
 vernment has a great advantage over a fimple 
 
 monarchy.
 
 af Preface, 
 
 monarchy. The bed and wifeft prince, by means 
 of a freer communication with his people, and the 
 greater opportunities to colle<5t the bell advice 
 from the beft of his fubjedts, would have an im- 
 menfe advantage in a free ftate more than in a 
 monarchy. A fenate confiding of all that is mofl 
 noble, wealthy, and able in the nation, with a 
 right to counfel the crown at all times, is a check 
 to minifters, and a fccurity againft abufes, that a 
 body of nobles who never meet, and have no fuch 
 right, can never accomplifh. Another afiembly, 
 compofed of reprefentatives chofen by the peo- 
 ple in all parts, gives the whole nation free ac- 
 cefs, and communicates all the wants, knowledge, 
 projed:s, and wifhes of the nation, to government ; 
 excites an emulation among all clalTes, removes 
 complaints, redrefles grievances, affords opportu- 
 nities of exertion to genius though in obfcurity, 
 and gives full fcope to all the faculties of man ; 
 opens a paiTage for every fpeculation to the legif- 
 lature, to adminiftration, and to the public : it 
 gives a univerfal energy to the human character, 
 in every part of the ftate, which never can be ob- 
 tained in a monarchy. 
 
 There is a third particular which deferves atten- 
 tion both from governments and people. The mi- 
 nifters of ftate,in a fimple monarchy, can never know 
 their friends from their enemies : cabals in fccrec 
 undermine their influence, and blaft their reputa- 
 tions. This occafions a jcaloufy ever anxious and 
 irritated, which never thinks the government fafe 
 
 without
 
 Prefact. 
 
 without an encouragement of informers and fpies, 
 throughout every part of the ftate, who interrupt 
 the tranquillity of private life, deftroy the confi- 
 dence of families in their own domeftics and one 
 another, and poifon freedom in its fweeteft retire- 
 ments. In a free government, on the contrary, 
 the minifters can have no enemies of confequence 
 but among the members of the great or little 
 council, where every man is obliged to take his 
 fide, and declare his opinion, upon every qucftion. 
 This circumftance alone, to every manly mind, 
 would be fufficient to decide the preference in 
 favour of a free government. Even fecrecy, 
 where the executive is entire in one hand, is as 
 eafily and furely preferved in a free government 
 as in a fhTiplc monarchy ; and as to difpatch, all 
 the fimple monarchies of the whole univerfe may 
 be defied to produce greater or more examples of 
 it than are to be found in Englifh hiftory. An 
 Alexander, or a Frederic, pofieffed of the prero- 
 gatives only of a king of England, and leading 
 his own armies, would never find himfelf embar- 
 rafled or delayed in any honeft enterprize. He 
 might be reftrained, indeed, from runing mad, and 
 from making conquefts to the ruin of his nation, 
 merely for his own glory : but this is no argu- 
 ment againft a free government. There can be no 
 free government without a democratical branch in 
 the conftitution. Monarchies and ariftocracies are 
 in poflefllon of the voice and influence of every 
 univerfity and academy in Europe. Democracy, 
 
 fimple
 
 xii Preface, 
 
 fimple democracy, never had a patron among mer^ 
 of letters. Democratical mixtures in govern- 
 ment have loft almoft all the advocates they ever 
 had out of England and America. 
 
 Men of letters muft have a great deal of praifc, 
 and fome of the neceflaries, conveniences, and or- 
 naments of life. Monarchies and ariftocracies 
 pay well and applaud liberally. The people have 
 almoft always expefted to be ferved gratis, and 
 to be paid for the honour of ferving them ; and 
 their applaufes and adorations are beftowed too 
 often on artifices and tricks, on hypocrify and 
 fuperftition, on flattery, bribes, and largefles. It 
 is no wonder then that democracies and democra- 
 tical mixtures are annihilated all over Europe, 
 except on a barren rock, a paltry fen, an inaccef- 
 fible mountain, or an impenetrable foreft. The 
 people of England, to their immortal honour, are 
 hitherto an exception ; but, to the humiliation of 
 human nature, they ftiew very often that they arc 
 like other men. The people in America have 
 now the beft opportunity, and the greateft truft, 
 in their hands, that Providence ever commit- 
 ted to fo fmall a number, fince the tranfgeffion 
 of the firft pair : if they betray their truft, 
 their guilt will merit even greater puniftiment 
 than other nations have fufFered, and the indig- 
 
 CD 
 
 nation of heaven. If there is one certain truth to 
 be collefted from the hiftory of all ages, it is this : 
 That the people's rights and liberties, and the de- 
 mocratical mixture in a conftitution, can never be 
 prclerved wiLhout a ftrong executive, or, in other 
 
 word.s .
 
 Preface. xili 
 
 words, without feparating the executive power 
 from the legiflative. If the executive power, or 
 any confiderable part of it, is left in the hands 
 cither of an ariftocratical or a democratical aflem- 
 bly, it will corrupt the legiflature as neceflarily as 
 ruftcorrupts iron, or as arfenic poifons the human 
 body ; and when the legiflature is corrupted the 
 people are undone. 
 
 The rich, the well-born, and the able, acquire 
 an influence among the people, that will foon be 
 too much for fimplc honefty and plain fenfe, in 
 a houfc of reprelentatives. The mofl illuftrious 
 of them muft therefore be feparated from the 
 mafs, and placed by themfelves in a fenate : this 
 is, to all honed and ufeful intents, an oftracifm. A 
 member of a fenate, of immenfe wealth, the mofl 
 refpefted birth, and tranfcendent abilities, has no 
 influence in the nation, in comparifon of what he 
 would have in a fingie reprefentative affembly. 
 When a fenate exifts, the moft powerful man in 
 the ftate may be fafely admitted into the houfc 
 of reprefentativcs, becaufe the people have it in 
 their power to remove him into the fenate as 
 foon as his influence becomes dangerous. The 
 fenate becomes the great obje6l of ambition ; and 
 the richefl: and the mofl: fugacious wi(h to merit 
 an advancement to it by fervices to the public 
 in the houfe. When he has obtained the obje<5t 
 of his wiflics, you may ftill hope for the benefits 
 of his exertions, without dreading his pafllons ; 
 
 for
 
 %{v Prefacf, 
 
 for the executive power being in other hands, he 
 has loft much oF his influence with the people, 
 and can govern very few votes more than his own 
 among the fenators. 
 
 It was the general opinion of ancient nations, 
 that the divinity alone was adequate to the im- 
 portant office of giving laws to men. The Greeks 
 entertained this prejudice throughout all their 
 difperfions , the Romans cultivated the fame po- 
 pular dclufion i and modern nations, in the con- 
 fecrations of kings, and in feveral fuperftitious 
 chimeras of divine rights in princes and nobles, 
 are nearly unanimous in preferving remnants of 
 it: even the venerable magiftrates of Amersfort 
 devoutly believe themfelves God's vicegerents. 
 Is it that obedience to the laws can be obtained 
 from mankind in no other manner? Is the 
 jealoufy of power, and the envy of fuperiority, 
 fo ftrong in all men, that no confiderations of 
 public or private utility are fufficient to engage 
 their fubmiffion to rules for their own happinefs ? 
 Or is the difpofition to impofture fo prevalent 
 in men of experience, that their private views of 
 ambition and avarice can be accomplifhed only 
 by artifice ? It was a tradition in antiquity that 
 the laws of Crete were dictated to Minos by the 
 infpiration of Jupiter. This legiflator, and hig 
 brother Rhadamanthus, were both his fons : 
 once in nine years they went to converfe with 
 their father, to propofe queftions concerning the 
 
 wants
 
 Preface. xr 
 
 wants of the people ; and his anfwers were record- 
 ed as laws for their government. The laws of 
 Laced^mon were communicated by Apollo to 
 Lycurgus ; and, left the meaning of the deity 
 ftiould not have been perfectly comprehended, 
 or corredly exprcfled, were afterwards confirmed 
 by his oracle at Delphos. Among the Romans, 
 Numa was indebted for thofe laws which pro- 
 cured the profperity of his country to his con- 
 vcrfations with Egeria. The Greeks imported 
 thefc myfteries from Egypt and the Eaft, whofc 
 defpotifms, from the remoteft antiquity to this 
 day, have been founded in the fame folemn em- 
 piricifm ; their emperors and nobles being all de- 
 fcended from their gods. Woden and Thor were 
 divinities too ; and their pofterity ruled a thou- 
 fand years in the north by the ftrength of a like 
 credulity. Manco Capac was the child of the 
 fun, the vifible deity of the Peruvians ; and tranf- 
 mitted his divinity, as well as his earthly dignity 
 and authority, through a line of incas. And the 
 rudeit tribes of favages in North America have 
 certain families under the immediate proteflion 
 of the god war, from which their leaders are al- 
 ways chofen. There is nothing in which man- 
 kind have been more unanimous; yet nothing 
 can be inferred from it more than this, that the 
 multitude have always been credulous, and the 
 few artful. The United States of America have 
 exhibited, perhaps, the firft example of govern- 
 ments
 
 kvi Preface. 
 
 mcnts ereded on the fimple principles of na- 
 ture : and if men are now fufficiently enlightened 
 to difabufe themfelves of artifice, impofture, hy- 
 pocrify, and fuperftition, they will confider this 
 event as an aera in their hiftory. Although the 
 detail of the formation of the American govern- 
 ments is at prefent little known or regarded ei- 
 ther in Europe or America, it may hereafter be- 
 come an objed of curiofity. It will never be 
 pretended that any perfons employed in that fer- 
 vice had any interviews with the gods, or were 
 in any degree under the infpiration of heaven, 
 any more than thofe at work upon fhips or 
 houfes, or labouring in merchandize or agricul- 
 ture : it will for ever be acknowledged that thefc 
 governments were contrived merely by the ufe of 
 reafonandthefenfes. As Copley painted Chatham, 
 Weft, Wolf, and Trumbull, Warren and Mont- 
 gomery ; as Dwight, Barlow, Trumbull, and 
 Humphries compofed their verfe, and Belknap 
 and Ramzay hiftory ; as Godfrey invented his 
 quadrant, and Rittenhoufe his planetarium , as 
 Boylfton prailifed inoculation, and Franklin 
 eledricity , as Paine expofed the miftakes of 
 Raynal, and JefFerfon thofe of Butfon, fo unphi- 
 lofophically borrowed from the Recherches Phi- 
 lofophiques fur les Americains, thofe defpicable 
 dreams of De Paw neither the people, nor 
 their conventions, committees, or fub-commit- 
 tees, confidered legiflation in any other light 
 
 than
 
 Preface, xvii 
 
 than ordinary arts and fciences, only as of more 
 importance. Called without expeflation, and com- 
 pelled without previous inclination, though un- 
 doubtedly at the beft period of time both for 
 England and America, to ere6t fuddenly new 
 fyftems of laws for their future government, 
 they adopted the method of a wife architeft, 
 in erefling a new palace for the refidence of his 
 fovereign. They determined to confult Vitru- 
 vius, Palladio, and all other writers of reputa- 
 tion in the art 5 to examine the mod celebrated 
 buildings, whether they remain entire or in ru- 
 ins ; compare thefe with the principles of wri- 
 ters , and enquire how far both the theories and 
 models were founded in nature, op created by 
 fancy : and, when this fhould be done, as far 
 as their circum>ftanccs would allov/, to adopt 
 the advantages, and rejeft the inconveniences, of 
 all. Unembnrrafkd by attachments to noble 
 families, hereditary lines and fuccefTions, or any 
 confiderations of royal blood, even the pious 
 myftery of holy oil had no more influence than 
 that other of holy water : the people univerfally 
 were too enlightened to be impofed on by arti- 
 fice-, and their leaders, or more properly follow- 
 ers, v;ere men of too much honour to attempt 
 it. Thirteen governments thus founded on the 
 natural authority of the people alone, without a 
 pretence of miracle or myftery, which are def- 
 tined to fpread over the northern part of that 
 
 b whele
 
 xvVii Prefacg. 
 
 whole quarter of the globe, are a great point 
 gained in favour of the rights of mankind. The 
 experiment is made, and has completely fuc- 
 ceeded : it can no longer be called in queftion, 
 whether authority in magiftrates, and obedience 
 of citizens, can be grounded on reafon, mora- 
 lity, and the Chriftian religion, without the 
 monkery of prieRs, or the knavery of politi- 
 cians. As the v/riter was perfonally acquaint- 
 ed with moft of the gentlemen in each of 
 the dates, who had the principal fhare in the 
 firft draughts, the following letters were really 
 written to lay before the gentleman to whom 
 they are addrefied, a fpecimcn of that kind of 
 reading and reafoning wliich produced the Ame- 
 rican conflitutions. 
 
 It is not a little furprifmg that all this kind of 
 learning tliould have been unknown to any illuf- 
 trious philofopher and llatefman, efpecially one 
 who really was, what he has been often called, 
 " a v/ell of fcience." But if he could be unac- 
 quainted with ir, or it could have efcaped his 
 memory, we may fuppofe millions in America 
 have occafion to be reminded of it. I'he wri- 
 ter lias long ken with anxiety the facility with 
 which pliilofophers of greateft nam.e have under- 
 taken to v/rite of American affairs, without 
 knowing any thing of them, and have echoed 
 and re-echoed each other's vifions. Having nei- 
 ther talents, leifure, nor inclination, to meet fuch 
 champions in the field of literary controverfy, 
 .^ he
 
 PrefacT. Slix 
 
 he little thought of venturing to propofe to them 
 any queftions : circumftances, however, have 
 lately occurred, which feemed to require that 
 fome notice (hould be taken of one of thenii 
 If the publication of thefe papers fhould contri- 
 bute any thing to turn the attention of the 
 younger gentlemen of letters in America to this 
 kind of enquiry, it will produce an eifefl of 
 fome importance to their country. The fubje6t 
 is the moft interefbing that can engage the un- 
 derftanding or the heart , for whether the end 
 of man, in this ftage of his exiftence, be en- 
 joyment or improvement, or both, it can never 
 be attained fo well in a bad government as a 
 good one. 
 
 The prafticability or the duration of a repub- 
 lic, in which there is a governor, a fenate, and 
 a houfe of reprefentatives, is doubted by Taci- 
 tus, though he admits the theory to be lauda- 
 ble :" Cunflas na- ones et urbes, popuius, 
 ** aut priores, aut fin^ali, regunt. Delcda ex 
 *' his et conftituta reipublicce forma, iaudart 
 *' facilius quam inveniri ; vei, fi eveniu, haud 
 " diuturna efle poteft." Ann. lib. iv. Cicero 
 aflerts " Statuo efle optime conftitutam rcm- 
 " publicam, qua; ex tribus generibus iilis, re- 
 *' gali, oprimo, et populari, modice cor'rufa.'* 
 Frag. in fuch ptrcTiprory terms the luperio- 
 rity of fuch a government to all other forms, 
 that the lofs of his book upon republics is much 
 
 b 2 10
 
 XX Prefacs. 
 
 to be regretted. From a few paffages that have 
 been preferved, it is very probable he entered 
 more largely into an examination of the compo- 
 fition of monarchical republics than any other 
 ancient writer. He was fo far from apprehend- 
 ing "difputes" from a variety of orders, that 
 he alHrms it to be the firmeft bond of juftice, 
 and the flrongeft anchor of fafety to the com- 
 munity. As the treble, the tenor, and the bafs 
 exift in nature, they will be heard in the con- 
 cert : if they are arranged by Handel, in a fkil- 
 ful compofition, they produce rapture the moft 
 exquifite that harmony can excite-, but if they 
 are confufed together without order, they will 
 
 " Rend with tremendous found your ears 
 " aflmder." 
 
 *' Ut in fidibus ac tiblis, atque cantu ipfo, 
 a vocibus concentus efl quidam tenendus ex 
 diftinctis fonis, quern immutatum ac difcre- 
 pantem aures eruditse ferre non poffunt ; if- 
 que concentus, ex dijfimillimarum vocum mode- 
 rat i one ^ concors tamen ejficitur et congruens : fie 
 ex- fummis et hifjnis et mediis interjetlis ordi- 
 nibus, ut fonis, moderata raiioiie, civitas con- 
 fenfu diffimillimoium concinit; et qu2e har- 
 monia a muficis dicitur in cantu, ea eft in 
 civitate concord ia, arctiiTimum atque opti- 
 mum omni in repubiica vinculum incolumi- 
 tatisj qu fine juftitia nuUo pado eflie po- 
 I " teft/!
 
 Preface. xxl 
 
 '* teft." Cicero, Frag, de Repub. As all the 
 ages of the world have not produced a greater 
 ftatefman and philofopher united in the fame 
 character, his authority Ihould have great weight. 
 His decided opinion in favour of three branches 
 is founded on a reafon that is unchangeable ; 
 the laws, which are the only poffible rule, niea- 
 fure, and fecurity of juftice, can be fure of pro- 
 tedion, for any courfe of time, in no other form 
 of government : and the very name of a repub- 
 lic implies, that the property of the people 
 fhould be reprefented in the legiflature, and 
 decide the rule of juftice. *' Relpublica eft res 
 " populi. Populus autem non omnis coetus 
 *' multitudinis, fed coetus juris conl'enfu, et uti- 
 litatis communione fociatus." Frag, de Rep. 
 " Refpublica res eft populi, cum bene ac 
 jufte geritur, five ab uno rege, five a paucis 
 " optimatibus, five ab univerlb populo. Cum 
 vero injuftus eft rex, quem tyrannum voco ; 
 aut injufti optimates, quorum confenfus fac- 
 tio eft ; aut injuftus ipfe populus, cui no- 
 '* men ufitatum nullum reperio, nifi ut etiam 
 " ipfum tyrannum appellem \ non jam vitiofa, 
 fed omnino nulla refpublica eft ; quoniam non 
 eft res populi, cum tyrannus eam fadliove 
 *' capcflat ; nee ipfe populus eft fi fit injuftus, 
 quoniam non eft multitudinis juris confenfu, 
 et utilitatis unione fociata. '' Frag, de Re- 
 pub. 
 
 b3 " Ubi 
 
 (C
 
 5ixii Prqace. 
 
 " Ubl vero juftitia non eft, ncc jus pouit 
 *^' effe; quod enim jure fir, profe<5to jufte fit; 
 ' quod autem fit injufte, nee jure fieri poteft. 
 *' Non enim jura dicenda funt, vel putanda, in- 
 *': iqua hominum conftituta, cum illud etiam ipfi 
 *' jus efTe dicant quod de juftici^ fonie manave- 
 '' rit ; falfumque fit, quod a quibufdam non 
 ^' redle fentientibus dici folet, id jus efTe, quod 
 *': ei, qui plus potefl, utile efl." According to 
 this, a fimple monarchy, if it could in reality be 
 what it pretends to be a government of laws, 
 might be juftly denominated a republic. A li- 
 mited monarchy, therefore, efpecially when li- 
 mited by two independent branches, an arifto- 
 cratical and a democratical power in the confti- 
 tution, may with ftridl propriety be called by 
 that name. 
 
 If Cicero and Tacitus could revifit the earth, 
 and learn that the Engliih nation had reduced 
 the great idea to practice, and brought it nearly 
 to perfedlion, by giving each divifion a power 
 to defend itfelf by a negative , had found it the 
 mofl folid and durable government, as well as 
 tlie mofl free ; h^d obtained, by means of it, a 
 profperity among civilized nations, in an enlight- 
 ened age, like that of the Rornans among bar- 
 barians : and that the Americans, after having 
 enjoyed the benefits of fuch a conititution a 
 century and a half, were advifed by fome of the 
 greateft philofophers and politicians of the age
 
 Preface. xxiii 
 
 to renounce it, and fee up the governments of 
 ancient Goths and modern Indians what would 
 they fay ? That the Americans would be more re- 
 prehenfible than the Cappadocians, if they fliould 
 liften to fuch advice. It would have been much 
 to the purpofe to have inferted a more accurate 
 inveftigation of the form of government of the 
 ancient Germans and modern Indians ; in both, 
 the exiftence of the three divifions of power is 
 marked with a precifion that excludes all con- 
 troverfy. The democratical branch, efpecialiy, 
 is fo determined, that the real fovereignty re- 
 fided in the body of the people, and was exer- 
 cifed in the afiembly of king, nobles, and com- 
 mons together. Thefe inftitutions really colle6r- 
 ed all authority into one center of kings, nobles, 
 and people. But fmall as their numbers, and 
 narrow as their territories v/ere, the confequence 
 was confufion ; each part believed it governed 
 the whole: the chiefs thought they were fove- 
 r^^ign ; the nobles believed the power to be in 
 their hands , and the people flattered themfelve^ 
 that all depended upon them. Their purpofes 
 were well enough anfwered, without coming to an 
 explanation, while they were few in numbers, and 
 had no property , but when fpread over large 
 provinces of the Roman empire, now the great 
 kingdoms of pAirope, and grown populous and 
 rich, they found the inconvenience of not know- 
 iig each its place. Kings, nobles, and peopie 
 
 b -^ claimed
 
 xxiv Preface. 
 
 claimed the government in turn : and after all 
 the turbulence, wars, and revolutions, which 
 compofe the hiflory of Europe for fo many 
 ages, we find fimple monarchies eflablidied every 
 where. Whether the fyflem will now become 
 llationary, and laft for ever, by means of a few 
 further improvements in monarchical govern- 
 ments, we know not -, or v/hether flill further 
 revolutions are to come. The moft probable, or 
 rather the only probable change is, the intro- 
 dudlion of democratical branches into thofe go- 
 vernments. If the people fnould ever aim at 
 more, they will defeat themfelves j and indeed 
 if they aim at this, by any other than gentle 
 means, and by gradual advances , by improve- 
 ments in general] education, and informing 
 the public mind. The fyftems of legiflators are 
 experiments made on human life and manners, 
 fociety and government. Zoroafter, Confucius, 
 Mithras, Odin, Thor, Mahomet, Lycurgus, So- 
 lon, Romulus, and a thoufand others, may be 
 compared to philofophers making experiments 
 on the elements. Unhappily a political experi- 
 ment cannot be made in a laboratory, nor deter- 
 mined in a few hours. The operation once be- 
 gun, runs over whole quarters of the globe, and 
 is not finifhed in many thouiands of years. The 
 experiment of Lycurgus lafted itw^^n hundred 
 years, but never fpread beyond the limits of La- 
 conia, The procefs of Solon blowed out in one 
 
 century ^
 
 Freface. xxt 
 
 century , that of Romulus lafted but two cen- 
 turies and a half; but the Teutonic inftitutions, 
 defcribed by Csefar and Tacitus, are the moft 
 memorable experiment merely political, ever yet 
 made in human affairs. They have fpread all 
 over Europe, and have lafted eighteen hundred 
 years. They afford the ftrongeft argument that 
 can be imagined in fupport of the point aimed 
 at in thefe letters. Nothing ought to have more 
 weight with America, to determine her judgment 
 againft mixing the authority of the one, the few, 
 and the many, confufedly in one affembly, than 
 the wide-fpread miferies and final flavery of al- 
 moft all mankind, in confequence of fuch an 
 ignorant policy in the ancient Germans. What 
 is the ingredient which in England has preferved 
 the democratical authority ? The balance, and 
 that only. The Englilh have, in reality, blend- 
 ed together the feudal inftitutions with thofe of 
 the Greeks and Romans ; and out of all have 
 made that noble compofition, whiqh avoids the 
 inconveniences, and retains the advantages, of 
 both. The inftitutions now made in America 
 will never wear wholly out for thoufands of 
 years : it is of the laft importance then that 
 they fhould begin right , if they fet out wrong, 
 they will never be able to return, unlefs it be by 
 accident, to the right path. After having known 
 the hiftory of Europe, and of England in par- 
 pcular, it would be the height of folly to go 
 
 back
 
 Preface. 
 
 back to the inftltutions of Woden and of Thor, 
 as they are adviled to do : if they had been 
 counfelled to adopt a fimple monarchy at once, 
 it would have been lefs myfterious. Robertfon, 
 Hume, and Gibbon have given fuch admirable 
 accounts of the feudal inftitutions, and their 
 confequences, that it would have been more dif- 
 creet to have referred to them, perhaps, without 
 faying any thing more upon the fubjed. To col- 
 led tof^ether the legiflation of the Indians, v/ould 
 take up much room, but would be well worth 
 the pains. The fovereignty is in the nation, it is 
 true, but the three powers are ftrong in every 
 tribe i and their royal and ariftocratical dignities 
 are much more generally hereditary, from the 
 popular partiality to particular families, and the 
 luperftitious opinion that fuch are favourites of 
 the God of War, than the late writers upon this 
 fubjed have allowed. 
 
 Grofvenor Square^ 
 January i, 1787. 
 
 CONTENTS.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 I-ETTER 
 
 
 
 Page 
 
 I. 
 
 pRelminary Ohfer-vations 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 II. 
 
 
 
 "-" 
 
 5 
 
 
 DEMOCRATICAL REPUBLICS, 
 
 
 
 III. 
 
 St. Marino 
 
 
 
 , 
 
 S 
 
 IV. 
 
 Bifcay 
 
 
 
 
 
 i5 
 
 
 The Grifons 
 
 
 
 
 
 21 
 
 
 The United Provinces of the 
 
 Low 
 
 
 
 Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 22 
 
 V. 
 
 S':x;itzerland 
 
 
 
 
 
 ib. 
 
 
 Jppenzel 
 
 
 
 
 
 23 
 
 VI. 
 
 Underwald 
 
 
 
 
 
 iG 
 
 VII. 
 
 Claris -^ 
 
 
 
 
 
 28 
 
 yiii. 
 
 Zug 
 
 T^ 
 
 IX 
 
 31 
 . Uri
 
 xxviii CONTENTS. 
 
 LETTER Page 
 
 IX. Uri * m^ ^2 
 
 X, Switz 24 
 
 ARISTOCRATICAL REPUBLICS. 
 
 XI. Berne 35 
 
 XII. Fribourg "^39 
 
 XIII. Sokure -42 
 
 XIV". Lucerne 45 
 
 XV. Zurich 47 
 
 XVI. Schaffhaufe -49 
 
 Mulhoufe 5/Vm5 50 
 
 XVII. 5/. G^// 51 
 
 Geneva 52 
 
 XVIII. iL^f^ Genoa ""5^ 
 
 XIX. Venice 58 
 
 ST^^ United Provinces of the Low 
 
 Countries 69 
 
 MONARCHICAL REPUBLICS. 
 
 XX. 
 
 England - 
 
 70 
 
 XXI. 
 
 Poland 
 
 72 
 
 XXII. 
 
 Poland 
 
 74 
 
 XXIII. 
 
 Recapitulation 
 
 r 91 
 
 ANCIENT
 
 CONTENTS. XXIX 
 
 LETTER Page 
 
 ANCIENT REPUBLICS, AND OPINIONS OF 
 PHILOSOPHERS. 
 
 XXIV. Dr. Swiff 97 
 
 XXV. Dr. Franklin 105 
 
 XXVI. Dr. Price 121 
 
 MIXED GOVERNMENTS.' 
 
 XXVII. Machiavel Hi 
 
 Sidney H^ 
 
 XXVIII. Monteffiuieu i53 
 
 ANCIENT REPUBLICS, AND OPINIONS F 
 PHILOSOPHERS. 
 
 XXIX. Harrington 158 
 XXX. P^'/}'^/^^ -* 169 
 XXXI. Fclybius ^77 
 XXXII. Dionyfms Halicarnajfenfis Va- 
 lerius -^ I ^4 
 
 XXXIII. Flato 188 
 
 XXXIV. Sir "Thomas Smith "^ 207 
 
 ANCIENT DEMOCRATICAL REPUBLICS. 
 
 XXXV. Carthage -^ 210 
 
 ANCIENT
 
 XXX CONTENTS. 
 
 LETTER Page 
 
 ANCIENT ARISTOCRATICAL REPUBLICS. 
 
 XXXVI. Rome 215 
 
 ANCIENT MONARCHICAL REPUBLICS. 
 
 XXXVII. "Tacitus 22 
 
 XXXVIII. Homer Ph^acia 2,^2 
 
 XXXIX. Homer Ithaca 237 
 
 " Homer -'242 
 
 D 
 
 ANCIENT ARISTOCRATICAL REPUBLICS. 
 
 XL. Lacedamon 249 
 
 ANCIENT DEMOCRATICAL REPUBLICS. 
 
 XLI. Athens * 260 
 
 XLII, Antalcidas -* -2 85 
 
 XLIII. Achaia ' 295 
 
 XLIV. Crete 
 
 305 
 
 XLV. Corinth 308 
 
 XLVI. Argos * ' 311 
 
 XLVII. Iphitus - "^ ^^5 
 
 XLVIII. rhehes 318 
 
 ANCIENT ARISTOCRATICAL REPUBLICS. 
 
 XLIX. Crotom Pythagoras < 322 
 
 ANCIENT
 
 CONTENTS. xxx; 
 
 LETTER 
 
 
 
 rage 
 
 ANCIENT DEMOCRATICAL REPUBLICS. 
 
 
 L. 
 
 Syharis Charondas 
 
 
 
 327 
 
 LI. 
 
 Locris ZakucHS 
 
 
 
 3Z^ 
 
 LII. 
 
 Rome 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 
 334 
 
 LIII. 
 
 Congrefs 
 
 
 
 :62 
 
 LIV. 
 
 Locke^ MilioHy and Hume 
 
 
 
 3(^5 
 
 LV. 
 
 Ccndujion 
 
 
 
 372 
 
 
 Pojlfcript r* 
 
 r- 
 
 3 S3 
 
 LETTER
 
 LETTER L 
 
 GROSVENOR-uQLrARE, Ocloher /\.^ I786. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 ^I^HREE writers in Europe, of great abili- 
 JL tics, reputation, and learning, Mr, Turgot, 
 the Abbe De Mably, and Dr. Price, have turned 
 their attention to the conftitutions of government 
 in the United States of America, and have writ- 
 ten and publiflied their criticifms and advice. 
 They had all the mod amiable characters, and 
 unquefrionably the pureft intentions. They had 
 all experience in public affairs, and ample in- 
 formation in the nature of man, the neceflities of 
 fociety, and the fcience of government. 
 
 There are in the produitions of all of them, 
 amonj); many excellent things, fome fentiments, 
 however, that it will be difficult to reconcile to 
 reafon, experience, the conftitution of human na- 
 ture, or to the uniform teftimony of the greatefl: 
 ftatefmen, lej;iIitors, and philolophers of all en- 
 lightened nations, ancienc and modern. 
 
 Mr. T^v^jI^ in his letter to Dw Price, con- 
 feffes, *' tliat he is not fatisfjed with the coniti- 
 tutions which have h:dierto been formed for 
 the d life: en t ibues of America." He obferves, 
 that by mod of them the cuiloms of England 
 are im;ia:ed, without any particular motive. 
 Inllead of collecfting all autlv.rity into one ccn- 
 " ter, tnat of the nation, thev have ellabliflied 
 
 B 2 ' *' dilierent
 
 Preliminary Obfervations. 
 
 " different bodirs, a body of reprefentatives, a 
 *' council, and a governor, becaufe there is in 
 " England a houle of commons, a houfe of 
 lords, and a king. They endeavour to ba- 
 
 lance thefe different powers, as if this equili- 
 brium, which in England may be a neceffary 
 check to the enormous infiiience ot royalty, 
 could be of any ule in rcpublicks tounded 
 upon the equality of all the citizens, and as if 
 cilablilbrng different orders of men was not a 
 fource of divifions and difpucts," 
 There has been, from the beginning of the re- 
 volution in America, a party in everv flate, who 
 have entertained fentiments fimilar to theie of Mr, 
 Turgot. Two or three of them have eftabiifhed 
 governments upon his principle : and, by ad- 
 vices from Bofton, certain committees of coun- 
 ties have been held, and other conventions pro- 
 pofed in the MafFachuIetts, with the exprefs pur- 
 pofe of depofing the governor and fcnate, as ufe- 
 lefs and expenfive branches of the conilitution ; 
 and as it is probable that the publication of Mr. 
 Turgot*s opinion has contribueed to excite fuch 
 difcontents among the people, it becomes necef- 
 fary to examine it, and, if it can be fhown to be 
 an error, whatever veneration the Am.ericans very 
 juftly entertain for his memory, it is to be hoped 
 fhey will not be mifled by his authority. 
 
 LETTER
 
 Preliminary Ohfervations. 
 
 LETTER li. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 MR. Turgot is offended-, becaufe the cufLoms 
 of, England are imitated in moft of the 
 new cunftitucions in America, without anv parti- 
 cular motive. But, if we fuppofe that Englifh 
 cuftoms were neither good nor evil in themfelves, 
 and merely indifferent ; and the people, by their 
 birth, education, and habits, were tamiliarly at- 
 tached to them ; was not this a motive particular 
 enough for their prefervation, rather than endan- 
 ger the public tranquillity, or unanimity, by re- 
 nouncing them ? It thofe cuftoms were wife, 
 juft, and good, and calculated to fecure the li- 
 berty, property, and iafety of the people, as well 
 or better than any other inftitutions ancient or 
 modern, would iVlr. Turgot have advifed the na- 
 tion to reject them, merely becaufe it was at that 
 time juflily incenfed againll the Englifh govern- 
 ment ? What P^nglifh cuftoms have they retained 
 which may with any propriety be called evil ? 
 Mr. Turgot has inftanced only in one, viz. " thac 
 ** a body of reprefentatives, a council, and a go- 
 " vernor, has been eftabliflied, becaufe there is 
 " in England a houfe of commons, a houfe of 
 " lords, and a king." It was not fo much be- 
 caufe the legiflature m England confifted of three 
 branches, that fuch a divifion of power was 
 adopted by the ftares, as becaufe their own af- 
 femblies had ever been fo conltituted. It was not 
 fo much from attachment by habit to fuch a plan 
 of power, as from convidtion that it was founded 
 in nature and reafon, thac it was continued. 
 
 B 3 Mr;
 
 6 Preliminary Ohfervations. 
 
 Mr. Turgot Teems to be of a different opinion^ 
 and is for " colle6linp: all authority into one cen- 
 *' ter, the nation." It is eafily underftood how 
 all authority may be colie6"ted into " one center " 
 in a defpot or monarch ; but how it can be done, 
 when the center is to be the nation, is more diffi- 
 cult to comprehend. Before Vv/e attempt to dif- 
 cnls the notions of an author, we (hould be care- 
 ful to afcertain his meaning. It will not beeafy, 
 after the mod: anxious refearch, to dilcover the 
 true fcnfe of this extraordinary pafiage. If, after 
 the pains of " coliefting all authority into one 
 " center," ;hat center is to be the nation, we 
 fnall remain exactly where we began, and no col- 
 lection of authority at all will be made. The na- 
 tion will be the authority, and the authority the 
 nation. The center will be the circle, and the 
 circle the center. When a number of men, wo- 
 men, and children, are fimply congregated together, 
 there is no political authority am.ong them , nor any 
 natural authority, but that oi parents over their 
 children. To leave the women and children out 
 of the queftion for the prefenc, the men will all 
 be equal, \\tQ^ and independent of each other. 
 Not one Vv'ill have any authority over any other. 
 The firlt '^ colledcion " of authority mull be an 
 unanimous agreement to form themfelves into a 
 nation, people, cornviunity, or body politick, and to 
 be governed by the majority cf lulfragcs or 
 voices. But even in this cafe, although the au- 
 thority is collected into one center, that center is 
 no longer the nation, but the mc.ioriiy of the 
 nation. Did Mr. Turgot mean, that the people 
 of '\ irginia, for example, half a million of fouls 
 fcattered over a territory of two hundred leagues 
 fquare, fhould itop here, and have no other au- 
 thority
 
 Preliminary Ohfervaiions. 7 
 
 thority by which to make or execute a law, or 
 judge a caufe, but by a vote of the whole peo- 
 ple, and the decifion of a majority ! Where is 
 the plain large enough to hold them ; and what 
 are the means, and how long would be the time, 
 neceflary to afTemble them together ? 
 
 A fimple and perfed democracy never yet ex- 
 ifted among men. If a village of half a mile 
 fquare, and one hundred families, is capable of 
 exercifing all the legiflative, executive, and judi- 
 cial powers, in public affemblies of the whole, 
 by unanimous votest or by majorities, it is more 
 than has ever yet been proved in theory or expe- 
 rience. In fuch a democracy, the moderator 
 would be king, the town -clerk Icgiflator and 
 judge, and the conftable ilieriff, for the moft 
 part ; and, upon more important occafions, com- 
 mittees would be only the counfellors of both the 
 former, and commanders of the latter. 
 
 Shall we fuppofe then, that Mr. Turgot in- 
 tended, that an alfembiy of reprefentatives Ihoukl 
 be choi'en by the nation, and vefted with all the 
 powers of government; and that this alfembiy 
 Ihall be the center in which all the authority fhall 
 be collefled, and Ihall be virtually deemed the 
 nation. After long refledlion, 1 have not been 
 able to difcover any other icnit in his words, and 
 this was probably his real meaning. To examine 
 this fyftem in detail may be thought as trifling an 
 occupation, as the laboured reafonings of Sidney 
 and Locke, to fliew t!ie abfurdity of Filmar's 
 fuperftitious notion';, appeared to Mr. Iluine in 
 his enlightened days. Yet the nfillakes of great 
 men, and even the ablurdicies of fools, wlien 
 they countenance the prtjudiccs of numbers ot 
 people, efpecially in a young country, and ui^dcr 
 new governments, cannot be too fully con/uted. 
 ii J. You
 
 S JDemocratical Repuhlicsl 
 
 You will not then efteem my time or your own 
 milpent, in placing this idea of Mr. Turgot in 
 all its lights; in conlidering the confequences of 
 it , and in coUeding a variety of authorities 
 againft ,it. 
 
 LETTER III. 
 
 ST. MARINO, 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 " \ S O C I E T Y of gods would govern them-" 
 Jt\, " felves democratically," fays the eloquent 
 philolbpher of Geneva ; who however would 
 have agreed, that his " gods " muft not have 
 been the claffical deities : fince he knew from the 
 higheft authority, the poets, who had their infor- 
 mation from thofe divinities the Mufes, that all 
 the terrors of the nod, the arm, and the thun- 
 derbolts of Jupiter, with all the energy of his 
 tindifputed monarchy, were infufficient to hold 
 them in order. As it is impoflible to know what 
 "would have been his definition of the gods, we 
 may quietly purfue our enquiry, whether it is 
 pra6licable to govern men in this v/ay. It would 
 be very furprifing, if, among all the nations 
 that have exiited, not one has difcovered a fecret 
 of fo mu:h importance. It is not neceflary for 
 us to prove that no fuch government has exifted ; 
 it is incumbent on him who Ihall embrace the 
 opinion of Mr. Turgot, to name the age, the 
 country, and the people, in which fuch an ex- 
 periment has been tried. It might he eafier to 
 determine tne qucilion concerning the practicabi- 
 lity
 
 St. Marinol 
 
 lity or impradicability, the utility or inutility, of 
 a fimple democracy, if we could find a number 
 of examples of it. From the frightful piftures 
 of a dcmocrarical city, drawn by the mafterly 
 pencils of ancient philofophers and hiftorians, it 
 may be conjedVured that fuch governments exifted 
 in Greece and Italy, at Icail tor fhort fpaces of 
 time: but no paiticular hiftory of any one of 
 them is come down to us ; nor are we able to 
 procure any more latisfa<5lion to our curiofity 
 from modern hiftory. If fuch a phenomenon is 
 at this time to be feen in the world, it is pro- 
 bably in fome of thofe ftates which have the 
 name of democracies, or at leaft in fuch as have 
 preferved fome fhare in the government to the 
 people. Let us travel to fome of thofe countries, 
 and examine their laws. 
 
 The republic of St. Marino, in Italy, is fome- 
 times quoted as an inftance; and therefore it is 
 of fome importance to examine, i. Whether in 
 fa(5l this is a fimple democracy ; and, 2. Whe- 
 ther, if it were fuch, it is not" owing to particu- 
 lar circumftances, which do not belong to any 
 other people, and prove it to be improper for any 
 other, efpecially the United States of America, 
 to attempt to imitate it. 
 
 The republic of St. Marino, as Mr. Addifon 
 informs us, ftands on the top of a very high 
 and craggy mountain, generally hid among the 
 clouds, and fometimes under fnow, leven when 
 the weather is clear and warm in all the coun- 
 try about it. 
 
 This mountain, and a few hillocks that lie 
 
 fcattered about the bottom of it, is the whole 
 
 qircuit of the dominion. They have, what they 
 
 call, three cafties, three convents, and five 
 
 4 churches.
 
 lo Democraticd Republics. 
 
 churches, and reckon about five thoufand fouls in 
 their community. 
 
 St. Marino was its founder, a Dalmatian by- 
 birth, and by trade a mafon. He was employed, 
 about thirteen hundred years ago, in the repara- 
 tion of Rimini, and after he had finifhed his work, 
 retired to this folitary mountain as very proper 
 for the life of a hermit, which he led in the 
 greateft aufterities of religion. He had not been 
 long here, before he wrought a reputed miracle, 
 which, joined with his extraordinary fandtity, 
 gained him fo great an efteem, that the princefs 
 of the country made him a prefent of the moun- 
 tain, to difpole of it at his difcretion. His repu- 
 tation quickly peopled it, and gave rife to the 
 republic which calls itfelf after his name. The 
 bed of their churches is dedicated to the faint, 
 and holds his afhes. His flatue Hands over the 
 high altar, with the figure of a mountain in his 
 hands, crowned with three caftles, which is like- 
 \vife the arms of the commonwealth. They at- 
 tribute to his protection the long duration of the 
 Hate, and look on him the greateft faint next the 
 bleffed Virgin. In their ftatute-book is a law 
 againft fuch as fpeak difrefpectfully of him, who 
 are to be punillied in the fame manner as thofe 
 v/ho are convicted of blafphemy. This petty 
 republic has lafted thirteen hundred years, while 
 all the other ftates of Italy have feveral times 
 changed their mafters and forms of government. 
 Their whole hillory confifts in two purchafes of 
 a neighbouring prince, and two wars, in which 
 they affifted the pope againft a lord of Rimini. 
 
 They would probably fell their liberty as dear 
 as they could to any that attacked them ; for 
 there is but one road by which to climb up to 
 
 them.
 
 St. Marino. ri 
 
 them. All that are capable of bearing arms, are 
 exercifed, and ready at a moment's call. 
 
 The fovereign power of the republic was 
 lodged, originally, in what they call the arengo, 
 a great council, in which every houfe had its re- 
 prefentative -, but, becaule they found too much 
 confufion in fuch a multitude of ftatefmen, they 
 devolved their whole authority into the hands of 
 the council of fixty. The arengo, however, is 
 Hill called together in cafes of extraordinary im- 
 portance , and if, after due fummons, any mem- 
 ber abfents himfelf, he is to -be fined. In the 
 ordinary courfe of government, the council of 
 fixty, which, notvvithflanding the name, confifts 
 but of forty perfons, has in its hands the admi- 
 nillration of afi^airs, and is made up of half out 
 of the noble families, and half out of the ple- 
 beian. They decide all by ballotting, are not 
 admitted until five-and-twenty years old, and 
 choofe the officers of the commonwealth. 
 
 No fentence can ftand that is not confirmed by 
 two thirds of this council ; no fon can be admitted 
 into it during the life of his father, nor two be in 
 it of the fame family, nor any enter but by eleclion. 
 The chief officers of the commonwealth are the two 
 (cipitant'os^ who have fuch a power as the old l^oman 
 confuls had, but are chofen every fix months. Some 
 have been capitamos fix or feven times, though the 
 office is never to be continued to the fame perfons 
 twice fuccefilvely. The third ofiicer is the com- 
 mififary, who judges in all civil and criminal 
 matters : but becuufe the many alliances, friend- 
 fiiips, and intermarriages, as well as the perfonal 
 feuds and animolirics tJiat happen among fo fmail 
 a people, might obllrucft the courle of jufiice, if 
 one of their own number had tlie diifnbution of 
 it, they have always a foreigner for this employ, 
 1 1 V, iiom
 
 12 Democratical Republics. 
 
 whom they choofe for three years, and maintain 
 out oi the public ftock. He mult be a dodtor 
 of law, and a man of known integrity. He is 
 joined in commiffion with the capitaneos^ and a6t:i! 
 fomcthing like the recorder of London under the 
 lord mayor. The fourth man in the ftate is the 
 phyfician : another perfon, who makes no or- 
 dinary figure in the republic, is the fchoolm after. 
 Few in the place but have fome tindure of 
 learning. 
 
 The people are efteemed very honefl, and ri- 
 gorous in the execution of juffcice, and feem to 
 live more happy and contented among their rocks 
 and fnows, than others of the Italians do in the 
 pleafanteft vallies in the world. Nothing indeed 
 can be a greater inilance of the natural love 
 mankind has for liberty, and of their averfion 
 to arbitrary government, than fuch a favage 
 mountain covered with people, and the Campa- 
 nia of Rome, which lies in the fame country, 
 almoft deftitute of inhabitants. 
 
 This is the account of St. Marino. Yet, if 
 all authority is here colleded in one center, that 
 center is not the nation. Although the original 
 reprefentation in the arengo was of houfes, that is 
 to fay, of property, rather than of the perfons 
 of the citizens, and confequently not very equal, 
 as it excluded all perfonal property, as well as 
 all wiio had no property ; yet even fuch an 
 agrarian, it ftems, was not a fufficient check 
 to licentioufnefs, and they found it neceffary to 
 inftitute a fenate of forty men. Here, at leaft, 
 commenced as complete an ariilocracy as that of 
 ancient Rome ; or, lo exprefs it more exactly, as 
 complete a feparation of the ariftocratical from 
 the democratical part of the community : and 
 there are two remarkable circumilanccs in confir- 
 mation
 
 St. Marhw'. 13 
 
 mation of this -, one is, that there are not only 
 noble families in this illujirijjimd repuhlicd San5ii 
 Marini, but theconftitution has limited the choice 
 of the eledors fo far as to oblige them to choofe 
 one half the fenate out of thefc nobles ; the other 
 is, that the names of the agents for the common- 
 wealth, of the notary, and the witnefles to two 
 inftruments of purchafes made at feventy years 
 diftance from one another, one in 1 100, the other 
 in 1 170, are the fame. It is not credible that 
 they were the fame perfons : they were probably 
 fons or grandfons which is a ftrong proof of 
 the attachment to anftocratical families in this 
 little ftate, and of their defire to continue the 
 fame blood and the fame names in public em- 
 ployments, like the Oranges, Fagels, De Lin- 
 dens, &c. in Holland, and like innumerable other 
 examples in all naiions. 
 
 Another remarkable circumftance is, the reluc- 
 tance of the citizens to attend the afTcmbly of the 
 arengOt which obliged them to make a law, oblig- 
 ing themlelves to attend, upon a penalty. This is 
 a defe6V, and a misfortune natural to every de- 
 mocraticai conftitution, and to the popular part 
 of every mixed government. A general or too 
 common difinclination to attend, kaves room for 
 perfons and parties more active to carry points 
 oy fadlion and intrigue, which the majority, if 
 all were prefenr, would not approve. 
 
 It is curious to iee how many checks and li- 
 mitations are contrived for this legiflative afTcm- 
 bly. Half nobles, half plebeians all upwards 
 ot five-and-twcrnty years old two thirds mull 
 agree no fon can fit with his father j never two 
 of the fame family. 
 
 The capitaneos have the executive, like the Ro- 
 jnan coniuls, and the commilfary has the judi- 
 cial.
 
 14 Democrattcal Republics, 
 
 clal. Here again are remarkable limitations: 
 he muft be a foreigner, and he is for three years. 
 This is to give fome degree of {lability to the ju- 
 dicial power, and to make it a real and powerful 
 check both to the executive and legiflative. 
 
 We are not indeed told whether the council of 
 forty are elected annually or for life. Mr. Addi- 
 fon may, from his well-known characEler, be fup- 
 poied to have been more attentive to the grand 
 and beautiful mionuments of ancient arts of every 
 kind which furrounded him in Italy, than to this 
 rough hillock, although the form of government 
 might have excited his curiofity, and the fimpli- 
 city of manners his efteem , he has accordingly 
 given a very imperfeft fKCtch of its conftit!;,:oa 
 and hiitory. Yet enough appears to fhew incon- 
 teftibly, that St. Marino is by no means a per- 
 fed democracy. It is a mixture of monarchy, 
 ariftocracy, and democracy, as really as Sparta 
 or Rome were, and as the MaiTachufetts, New- 
 York, and Maryland now arcj in which the pow- 
 ers of the governor, fenate, and affcmbly, are more 
 exacl:ly afcertained and nicely balanced, but they 
 are not more diftinct than thofe of the capitaneos^ 
 council of forty, and the arengo are in St. Ma- 
 rino. 
 
 Should it be argued, that a government like 
 this, where the fovereignty refidcs in the whole 
 body of the people, is a democracy, it may be 
 anAvsred, that the right of fovereignty in all na- 
 tions is unalienable and indivifible, and does and 
 can refide no where elfe ; but not to recur to a 
 principle fo general, the exercife, as well as right 
 of fovereignty, in Rome, refided in the people, but 
 the government was not a democra'^y. In Ame- 
 rica, the right of fovereignty relides indifputably 
 in the body of the people, and they have the 
 
 whole
 
 Sl Marino. rs 
 
 whole property of land. There are no nobles or 
 patricians all are equal by law and by birth. 
 The governors and fenates, as well as reprefenta- 
 tive afTemblies, to whom the exercife of fove- 
 reignty is committed, are annually chofen. Go- 
 vernments more democratical never exifted ; they 
 are vaftly more fo than St. Marino. Yet the an- 
 nual adminiftration is divided into executive, le- 
 giflative, and judicial powers ; and the legiilature 
 itfelf is divided into monarchical, ariftocratical, 
 and democratical branches ; and an equilibrium 
 has been anxioufly fought for in all their deli- 
 berations and aftions, v/ith infinitely more art, 
 judgment, and fkill, than appears in this little 
 Italian commonwealth. 
 
 The liberty and the honefty of thefe people is 
 not at all furprifing. In fo fmall a ftate, where 
 every man perfonaily knows every other, let the 
 form of government be what it will, it is Tcarcely 
 podible that any thing like tyranny or cruelty can 
 take place. A king, or a decemvirate intruded 
 with the government, would feel the cenfures of 
 the people, and be conftantly confcious of the 
 facility of affembling the whole, and apprehenfive 
 of an exertion of their ftrength. 
 
 The poverty of this people appears, by the 
 fine of one penny impofed upon ablence from the 
 arengo , and by the law, that an ambaffkdor 
 fliould have a Hiilling a day. This however is a 
 falary in proportion to the numbers of the people, 
 as thirty guineas a day would be to an ambaf- 
 fador from x.\\c United States. It appears alfo, 
 irom the pliyfician's being obliged to keep a 
 hoiTe, probably there is not a carriage, nor ano- 
 ther laddle-horfe, in the commonwealth. 
 
 An handful ol" poor people, living in the fim- 
 pleil manner, by hard labour, upon the produce 
 
 of
 
 i6 Democratkal Repuhlicsl 
 
 of a few cows, (heep, goats, fwine, poultry, and 
 pigeons, on a piece of rocky, inowy ground, pro- 
 tedied from every enemy by their liruation, their 
 fuperftition, and even by their poverty, having 
 no commerce nor luxury, can be no example 
 for the commonwealth of Penfilvania, Georgia, or 
 Vermont, in one of which there are poffibly half a 
 million of people, and in each of the other ac 
 leaft thirty thoufands, fcattered over a large ter- 
 ritory. 
 
 Upon the whole, a ftronger proof cannot be 
 adduced of the neceffity of different orders, and 
 of an equilibrium between them, than this com- 
 monwealth of St. Marino, where there are fuch 
 ftrong fymptoms of both in a fociety, where the 
 leaft occafion for them appears that can be ima- 
 gined to take place in any conceivable fituation. 
 
 LETTER IV, 
 
 jB I s c A y. 
 Dear Sir, 
 
 IN a refearch like this, after thofe people \n 
 Europe who have had the fkill, courage, and 
 fortune, to preferve a voice in the governmenr, 
 Bifcay, in Spain, ought by no rreans to be omit- 
 ted. While their neighbours have long fince re- 
 figned all their pretenfions into the hands of 
 kings and priefls, this extraordinary people have 
 preferved their ancient language, genius, laws, 
 government, and manners, without innovation, 
 longer than any other nation of Europe. Of 
 Celtic extradion, they once inhabited fome of 
 
 the
 
 Bifcay. 1 7 
 
 the fined parts of the ancient Boetica ; but their 
 love of liberty, and unconquerable averfion to a 
 foreign fervitude, made them retire, when invaded 
 and overpowered in their ancient feats, into thefe 
 mountainous countries, called by the ancients 
 Cantabria. They were governed by counts, fent 
 them by the kings of Oviedo and Leon, until 
 859, vviien finding themfelves without a chief* 
 becaufe Zeno, who commanded them, was made 
 prifoner, they rofe and took arms to refift Or- 
 dogne, fon of Alfonfus the Third, whofe domi- 
 nation was too fevere for them, chofe for their 
 chief an iffuc of the blood-royal of Scotland, by 
 the mother's fide, and fon-in-law of Zeno their 
 governor, who having overcome Ordogne, in 870, 
 they chofe him for their lord, and his pofterity, 
 who bore afterwards the name of Haro, fucceed- 
 ed him, from father to fon, until the king Don 
 Pedro the Cruel, having put to death thofe who 
 were in pofTe/Tion of the iordfhip, reduced them 
 to a treaty, by which they united their country^ 
 under the title of a Iordfhip, with Caflile, by 
 which convention the king of Spain is now lord 
 of Bifcay. It is a republic ; and one of the pri- 
 vileges they have moft infifted on, is not to have 
 a king : another v/as, that every new lord, at his 
 accefTion, fhould come into the country in perfon, 
 with one of his legs bare, and take an oath to 
 preferve the privileges of the lordfliip. The pre- 
 fent king of Spain is the firft who has been com-* 
 plimenred with their confent, that the oath fhould 
 be adminiftered at Madrid, though the other hu- 
 miliating and indecent ceremony has been long 
 laid afide. 
 
 Their folicitude for defence has furrounded 
 with walls all the towns in the diftrid. They 
 
 C arg
 
 1 8 Democratlcal Repuhlics. 
 
 are on-and-twcnty in number ; the principal of 
 which are, Orduna, Laredo, Portugalete, Duran- 
 go, Bilbao, and St. Andero. Bifcay is divided 
 into nine merindades, a fort of Jurifdidion like a 
 bailiwick, befides the four cities on the coaft. 
 The capital is Bilbao. The whole is a collection 
 of very high and very fleep mountains, rugged 
 and rocky to fuch a degree, that a company of 
 men pofted on one of them might defend itfelf as 
 long as it could fubfift, by rolling rocks on; 
 their enemy. This natural formation of the coun- 
 try, v/hich has rendered the march of armies im- 
 pradticable, and the daring ipirit of the inhabi- 
 tants, have prefervcd their liberty. 
 
 A6tive, vigilant, generous, brave, hardy, in- 
 clined to war and navigation, they have enjoyed, 
 for two thoufand years, the reputation of the beit 
 foldiers and failors in Spain, and even of the beft 
 courtiers, many of them having, by their wit 
 and manners, raifed themfelves into offices of con- 
 fcquence under the court of Madrid. Their va- 
 luable qualities have recommended them to the 
 efteem of the kings of Spain, v/ho have hitherto 
 left them in pollefiion of thcfe great immunities 
 of which they are fo jealous. In 1632, indeed^ 
 the court laid a duty upon fait : the inhabitants 
 of Bilbao rofe, and maffacred all the officers ap- 
 pointed to collecl it, and ail the officers of the 
 grand admiral. Three thoufand troops were fenE 
 to punifli them for rebellion : thefe they fought, 
 and totally defeated, driving moft of them mto 
 the fea, which difcouraged the court from pur- 
 fuing their plan of taxation , and fince that time 
 the king has had no officer of any kind in the 
 lordffiip, except his corregidor. 
 
 Many writers afcribe their flouriffiing Gom-
 
 Bifcny. 19 
 
 ttierce to their fituation ; but, ps this is no better 
 than that of Ferrol or Coriinna, tliat advantage 
 is more probably due to their liberty. In riding 
 through this little territory, you would fancy 
 yourfelf in Connedicut , inftead of miferable 
 huts, built of mud, and covered with ftraw, you 
 fee the country full of large and commodious 
 houfes and barns of the farmer ; the lands well 
 cultivated; and a wealthy, harpy yeonanry. The 
 roads, fo dangerous and impaffable in moil other 
 parts of Spain, are here very good, having been 
 made at a vaft expence of labour. 
 
 Although the cTovernment is called a democra- 
 cy, we cannot here find all authority collefted 
 into one center-, there are, on the contrary, as 
 many diftindl governments as there are cities and 
 merindades. The general government has two 
 orders at lead ; the lord or governor, and the bi- 
 ennial parliament. Each of the thirteen fiibor- 
 dinate divifions has its organized government, 
 with its chief magiftrate at the head of it. We 
 may judge of the form of all of them by that of 
 the metropolis, which calls itfelf, in all its laws, 
 the noble and illuftrious republic of Bilbao, 
 This city has its alcalde, who is both governor 
 end chief juftice, its twelve regidores or counfel- 
 lors, attorney-general, &c. and by all thcfe, af- 
 lembled in the confillorial palace under the titles 
 of confejo^ jujlicia^ y regimiento^ the laws are made 
 in the name of the lord of Bifcay, and confirmed 
 by him. 
 
 Thefe officers, ic is true, are ele<5led by the ci- 
 tizens, but they mufl: by law be ekifled, as well 
 as the deputies to the biennial parliament or jun- 
 ta general, out of a few noble families, unllained, 
 both by the fide of father and mother, by any 
 mixture with Moors, Jews, new converts, peni- 
 C 2 tcntiarics
 
 to Democratical Republics. 
 
 tentiaries of the inquifition, &c. They muft be 
 natives and refidents, worth a thoufand ducats, 
 and mull: have no concern in commerce, manu- 
 factures, or trades , and, by a fundamental agree- 
 ment among all the merindades, all their depu- 
 ties to the junta general, and all their regidores, 
 findics, fecretaries, and treafurers, muft be no- 
 bles, at leaft knights, and fuch as never exer- 
 cifed any mechanical trades themfelves or their 
 fathers. Thus we fee the people themfelves have 
 eftablifhed by law a contracted ariftocracy, under 
 the appearance of a liberal democracy. Ameri- 
 cans, beware ! 
 
 Although we fee here in the general govern- 
 ment, and in that of every city and merindad, 
 the three branches of power, of the one, the 
 few, and the many ; yet, if it were as democra- 
 tical as it has been thought by feme, we could 
 by no means infer, from this inftance of a little 
 flock upon a few impracticable mountains, in a 
 round form of ten leagues diameter, the utility 
 or practicability of fuch a government in any 
 other country. 
 
 The difpofition to divifion, fo apparent in all 
 democratical governments, however tempered with 
 ariftocratical and monarchical powers, has fnewn 
 itfelf, jn breaking off from it Guipufcoa and Al- 
 laba i and the only prefervativc of it from other 
 divifions, has been the fear of their neighbours. 
 They always knew, that as foon as they fhould 
 fall into faiStions, or attempt innovations, the 
 court of Spain would interpol'c, and prefcribe 
 them a government not fo much to their tafte. 
 
 THE
 
 fhe Grifins, 21 
 
 THE ORISONS. 
 
 I N the republic of the Three Leagues of the 
 Grifons, the fovereign is all the people of a great 
 part of the ancient Rhetia. This is called a de- 
 mocratical republic of three leagues, i. The 
 League of the Grifons. 2. The League Caddee. 
 3. The League of Ten Jurildidions. Thefe 
 three are united by the perpetual confederation 
 of 1472, which has been feveral times renewed. 
 The government refides fovereignly in the com- 
 mons, where every thing is decided by the plu- 
 rality of voices. The commons eledl and inftru^t 
 their deputies for the general diet, which is held 
 once a year. Each league elects alfo its chief or 
 prefident, who prefides at the dietes, each one in 
 his league. The general diet affembles one year 
 at Ilanz, in the league of the Grifons ; one year 
 at Coire, in the league Caddee ; and one year at 
 Davons, in the league of Ten Jurifdiftions. There 
 is another ordinary aflembly, compofcd of chiefs 
 and of three deputies from each league, which is 
 held at Coire, in the month of January. Befidcs 
 ihele regular aflemblicb, they hold congrefles 
 whenever the neceflities of theftate require them; 
 fometimes of the chiefs alone, fomctimes of cer- 
 tain deputies from each league, according to the 
 importance of the cafe: thefe aflemblies are held 
 at Coire. The three leagues form but one body 
 in general affairs , and, although one league has 
 more deputies than another, they count the voices 
 without dittindion of leagues. They conduct 
 feparately their particular affairs. Their country 
 Ts thirty.fivc leagues in length, and thirty in 
 breadth. 
 
 C 3 Fven
 
 22 Beiwcratical Republics. 
 
 Even in this happy country, where there is 
 more equality than in almoft any other, there are 
 noble families, who, although they live like their 
 neighbours by the cultivation of the earth, and 
 think it no difgrace, are very proud of the im- 
 nienie antiquity of their defcent, and boaft of it, 
 and value themfelves upon it, as much as Julius 
 C^far did, who was defcended from a goddefs. 
 
 THE UNITED PROVINCES OF THE LOW 
 COUNTRIES. 
 
 There are in Friefland and Overyfiell, and 
 perhaps in the city of Dort, certain remnants of 
 democratical powers, the fragments of an ancient 
 edifice, which may pofiibly be re-eredted , but as 
 there is nothino; which favours Mr, Turgot's idea.. 
 I fhall pafs over this country for the prefent. 
 
 LETTER V. 
 
 SWITZERLAND. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 IT is commonly faid, that fome of the cantons 
 of Sv/itzerland are democratical, and others 
 ariftocratical : and if thele epithets are undcrflood 
 only to mean, that one of thefe powers prevails 
 in fome of thofe republics, and the other in the 
 reft, they are juft enough ; but there is neither a 
 fimple democracy, nor a fimpleariitocracy, among 
 them. The governments of thefe confederated 
 
 ilateso
 
 Switzerland. Q.% 
 
 flates, like thofe of the United Provinces of the 
 Netherlands, are very complicated, and there- 
 fore very difficult to be fully explained ^ yet the 
 moft fuperficial enquirer will find the moft evi^ 
 dent traces of a compofition of all the three pow- 
 ers in all of them. 
 
 To begin with the cantons commonly reputed 
 democratical. 
 
 DEMOCRATICAL CANTONS. 
 
 A P P E N Z E L. 
 
 The canton of Appenzcl confifls of a ferles 
 of vallies, Scattered among inaccelTible rocks and 
 mountains, in all about eighteen miles fquare. 
 The people are laborious and frugal, and have no 
 commerce but in cattle, hides, butter, cheefe, 
 and a little linen made of their own fiax. It has 
 no walled towns, and only two or three open bo- 
 roughs, and a few fmall villages : it is, like New 
 England, almoft a continued village, covered with 
 excellent houfes of the yeomanry, built of wood, 
 each of which has its territory of pailure grounds, 
 commonly ornamented with trees j neatnefs and 
 convenience are lludied without, and a remark- 
 able cleanlinefs within. The principal part of the 
 inhabitants have preferved the fimplicity of the 
 paftoral life. As there are nor, at moft, above 
 iifty thoufand louls, there cannot be more than 
 fen thouiand men capable of bearing arms. It is 
 not at all furprifing, among fo much freedom, 
 fb.ough among rocks and herds, to hear of lite- 
 rature, and men of letters who are an ornament to 
 their country. 
 
 C 4 Never-
 
 24 Democratical Cantons. 
 
 Neverthelefs, this fimple people, fo fmall in 
 number, in fo narrow a territory, could not agree. 
 After a violent conteft, in which they were in 
 danger of a civil war, by the mediation of the 
 other cantons, at the time of the Reformation, 
 they agreed to divide the canton into two por- 
 tions, the Outer and the Inner Appenze), or 
 Rhodes Exterior and Rhodes Interior. Each dif- 
 tridl has now its refpeftive chief magifcrate, court 
 of juftice, police, bandarer, and deputy to the 
 general dier, although the canton has but one 
 vote, and confequently lofes its voice if the two 
 deputies are of different opinions. The canton is 
 divided into no lefs than twelve communities ; fix 
 of them called the Inner Appenzel, lying to the 
 eafl ; and fix the Outer, to the weft. They have 
 one general fovereign council, which is compofed 
 of one hundred and forty-four perfons, twelve 
 taken from each community. 
 
 The fovereignty refides in the general aflembly, 
 which, in the interior Rhodes, meets every year 
 at Appenzel, the laft Sunday in April ; bur, in 
 the exterior Rhodes, it affembles alternarely at 
 Trogen and at Hundwyl. In the interior Rhodes 
 are the chiefs and officers, the land amman, the 
 tything-man, the governor, the treafurer, the cap- 
 tain of the country, the direftor of the buildings, 
 the direftor of the churches, and the enfign. The 
 exterior Rhodes have ten officers, viz. two land 
 ammans, two governors, two treafurers, two cap- 
 tains, and two enfigns. The interior Rhodes is 
 lubdivided into fix kifer ones, each of which has 
 fixteen counfellors, among whom are always two 
 chiefs. The grand council in the interior Rhodes, 
 as alfo the criminal jurifdidion, is compofed of 
 (5ne hundred and twenty-eight peifons, who af- 
 
 fembls
 
 Appenzel. 2$ 
 
 fcmble twice a year, eight days after the general 
 aflembly, and at as many other times as occafions 
 require. Moreover, they have alfo the little 
 council, called the weekly council, becaufe it 
 meets every week in the year. The exterior 
 Rhodes are now divided into nineteen communi- 
 ties ; and the fovcreignty of them confifts in the 
 double grand council of the country, called the 
 old and new council, which aflembles once a year, 
 eight days after the aflembly of the country, at 
 Trogen or at HerilW, and is compofed of ninety 
 and odd perfons. Then follows the grand coun- 
 cil, in which, befides the ten officers, the reign- 
 ing chiefs of all the communities have feats, the 
 diredors of the buildings, the chancellor, and the 
 fautier, which make thirty-five perfons; the reign- 
 ing land amm.an prefides. After this comes the 
 little council from before the fittern, which is 
 held every firft Tuefday of each month at Tro- 
 gen ; the reigning land amman is the prefident, 
 to whom always afiifts, alternat;ely, an officer, 
 with a member of council from all the thirteen 
 communities, the chancellor of the country, and 
 the fautier, and confifts of twenty and odd perfons. 
 The little council from behind the fittern is held 
 under the prefidency of the reigning land am- 
 man, whenever occafion requires ; it is held at 
 Herifaw, Hundwyl, or Urnaefchen : at it affift 
 the chancellor of the country, and the fautier, 
 with the counfellors of the fix communities be- 
 hind the fittern, appointed for this fervice. 
 
 Let me alk, if here are not different orders of 
 men, and balances in abundance ? Such aa 
 handful of people, living by agriculture, in pri- 
 mitive fimplicity, one would think might live 
 very quietly, almoft without any government at 
 iW-f yet, inllead of being capable of collecling
 
 a 6 Democralical Cantons. 
 
 all authority into one aflembly, they feem to 
 have been forcibly agitated by a mutual power 
 of repullion, which has divided tht^m into two 
 commonwealths, each of v/hich has it monarchi- 
 cal power in a chief magiiirate ; its ariftocratical 
 power in two councils, one for Icgifiation, and 
 the other for execution ; befides the two more 
 popular aflemblies. This is furely no I'lmple de- 
 mocracy.- Indeed a fimple democracy by repre- 
 Jentation is a contradi6cion in terms. 
 
 LETTER VI. 
 
 U N D E R W A L Do 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 THE canton of Underv/ald conHfts only of 
 villages and boroughs, although it is twen- 
 ty-five miles in length, and feventeen in breadth. 
 Thefe dimenfions, it feems, were too extenfive to 
 be governed by a legiflation fo imperfeclly com- 
 bined, and nature has taught and compelled them 
 to feparate into two divifions, the one above, and 
 the other below, a certain large foreft of oaks, 
 which runs nearly in the middle of the country, 
 from north to fouth. The inferior valley, below 
 the foreft, contains four communities -, and the 
 fuperior, above it, fix. The principal or capita! 
 is Sarncn. The fovereign is the whole country, 
 the fovereignty refiding in the general afiembly, 
 where all the males of fifteen have entry and fuf- 
 frage , but each valley apart has, v;ith refpe6l to 
 its interior concern?, its land amman, its officers 
 f admin ifrration, and its public aflcn.bly, com^ 
 IQ pofcd
 
 Underwald, t'j 
 
 pofed of fifty-eight fenators, taken from the com- 
 munities. As to affairs without, there is a ge- 
 neral council, formed of all the officers of adnii- 
 niftration, and of fifty-eight fenators chofen in 
 the faid councils of the two valleys. Eefides this, 
 there are, for juftice and police, the chamber of 
 {tvcn^ and the chamber of fifteen, for the up- 
 per valley, and the chamber of eleven for the 
 lower. 
 
 Here again are arrangements more complica- 
 ted, and ariftocratical preferences more decided, 
 in order to counterpoife the democratical aflem- 
 bly, than any to be found in America, and the 
 land amman is as g'eat a man in proportion as an 
 American governor. Is this a fimple democracy? 
 Has this little clan of graziers been able to col- 
 led all authority into one center } Are there not 
 three aflemblies here to moderate and balance 
 each other ? and are not the executive and judi- 
 cial powers feparated from the legiflative .? Is it 
 not a mixed government, as much as any in 
 America ^. although its conflitution is not by any 
 means fo well digefted as ten at lead of thofe of 
 the United States ; and although it would never 
 be found capable of holding together a great 
 nation, 
 
 LETTER
 
 28 JDemocratical Cdntons. 
 
 LETTER VII. 
 
 CLARIS* 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 THE canton of Claris is a mountainous 
 country, of eight miles long and four wide, 
 according to their own authors, perhaps intend- 
 ing German miles , but twenty-five miles in length 
 and eighteen in breadth, according to fome Eng- 
 iifh accounts. The com^merce of it is in cheeie, 
 butter, cattle, linen, and thread. Ten thou- 
 fand cattle, and four thoufand fheep, paftured 
 in fummer upon the mountains, conftitute their 
 wealth. 
 
 The inhabitants live together in a general equa- 
 lity, and mofl perfeft harmony ; even thofe of 
 the different perfuafions of Catholics and Proteft- 
 ants, who fometimes perform divine fervice in 
 the fame church, one after the other : and all the 
 offices of Hate are indifferently adminiftered by 
 both parties, though the Proteftants are more in 
 number, and fuperior both in indullry and com- 
 merce. Ail the houfes are built of wood, large 
 and folid, thofe of the richeft inhabitants differ- 
 ing only from thofe of the poorer, as they are 
 larger. 
 
 The police is well regulated here> as it is 
 throughout Switzerland. Liberty does not dege- 
 nerate into licentioufnefs. Liberty, independence, 
 and an exemption from taxes, amply compenfate 
 for a want of the refinements of luxury. There 
 are none fo rich as to gain an afcendency by lar- 
 geffes. If they err in their councils, it is an 
 error of the judgment, and not of the heart. As 
 
 there
 
 Claris, ig 
 
 there is no fear of invafion, and they have nocon- 
 quefts to make, their policy confifts in maintain- 
 ing their independence, and preferving the pub- 
 lic tranquillity. As the end of government is the 
 greateft happinefs of the greateft number, faving 
 at the fame time the ftipulated rights of all, go- 
 vernments like thefe, where a large fhare of power 
 is prelerved by the people, defer ve to be admired 
 and imitated. It is in fuch governments that hu- 
 man nature appears in its dignity, honeft, brave, 
 and generous. 
 
 Some writers are of opinion, that Switzerland 
 was originally peopled by a colony of Greeks. 
 The fame greatnefs of foul, the fame fpirit of in- 
 dependence, the fame love of their country, has 
 animated both the ancients and the moderns, to 
 that determined heroifm which prefers death to 
 (lavery. Their hiflory is full of examples of vic- 
 tories obtained by fmall numbers of men over 
 large armies. In 1388 the Auftrians made an 
 irruption into their territory, with an army of fif- 
 teen thoufand men ; but, inftead of conquering 
 the counrry as they expefled, in attacking about 
 four hundred men polled on the mountains ac 
 Nicfel, they were broken by the ftones rolled 
 upon them from the fummit : the Swifs, at this 
 critical moment, rufhed down upon them with 
 fuch fury, as forced them to retire with an im- 
 inenfe lofs. Such will ever be uiie characfler of a 
 people, who prefer ve fo large a fiiare to themfelves 
 in their legiflature, while they temper their con- 
 ftitution, at the fame time, with an executive 
 power in a chief magiftrate, and an arillocratical 
 power in a wife fenate. 
 
 The government here is by no means entirely 
 democratical. It is true, tliat the fovereign is 
 the whole country, and the Ibvereignty refides in 
 
 the
 
 go Democratical Cantons, 
 
 the general aflembly, where each male of fifteenj^ 
 with his Iword at his fide, has his feat and vote. 
 It is true, that this affembly, which is annually- 
 held in an open plain, ratifies the laws, lays 
 taxes, enters into alliances, declares war^ and 
 makes peace. 
 
 But it has a firft magifirate in a land amman, 
 who is the chief of the republic, and is chofen 
 alternately from among the Proteftants and from 
 among the Catholics. The Proteftant remains 
 three years in office ; the Catholic two. The 
 manner of his appointment is a mixture of elec- 
 tion and lot. The people choofe five candi- 
 dates, who draw lots for the office. The other 
 great officers of ftate are appointed in the fame 
 manner. 
 
 There is a council called a fenate, compofed 
 of the land amman, a ftadthalder, and fixty-two 
 fenators, forty-eight Proteftants and fourteen Ca- 
 tholics, all taken from fifteen tagwen or ccrvees, 
 into which the three principal quarters or parti- 
 tions of the country are fubdivided for its more 
 convenient government. In this fenate, called 
 the council of regency, the executive power re- 
 fides. Each tagwcn or corvee furnifhes four fe- 
 nators ; befides the borough of Glaris, which fur- 
 nifhes fix. 
 
 Inftead of a fimple democracy, it is a mixed 
 government, in which the monarchical power in 
 the land amman, fiadthalder or pro-conful, the 
 ariftocratical order in the fenate, and the demo- 
 cratical in the general airembly, are diftin<ftly 
 marked. It is, however, but imperfeftly ba- 
 lanced i fo much of the executive power in an 
 ariftocratical aflfembly v/ould be dangerous in 
 the higheft degree in a large ftate, and among a 
 rich people. If this canton could extend its do- 
 minion.
 
 minion, or greatly multiply its numbers, it would 
 foon find the necefTity of giving the executive 
 power to the land amman, in order to defend the 
 people againft the fenate; for the fenate, although 
 it is always the refervoir of wifdom, is eternally 
 |he very focus of ambition. 
 
 LETTER VIIL 
 
 Z U G. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 THE canton of Zug is finall, but rich, and 
 divided into mountains and plains. The 
 fovereign is the city of Zug, and part of the 
 country. It is divided into live quarters, which 
 polTcfs the fovereignty ; the city of Zug is two, 
 and the country three, Mentzingen, Egeri, and 
 Bar. The government is very complicated, and 
 the fovereignty refides in the general affembly of 
 the five quarters, where each male perfon of fif- 
 teen years of age has admittance and a voice. It 
 aflembles annually, to enad laws, and choofe 
 their magiftrates. Thus thefe five quarters make 
 a body of a democratical republic which com- 
 mands the reft of tiie canton. They furnifli al- 
 ternately the land amman, the head or chief of 
 the ftate, who mull always refide at Zug v/ith 
 the regency of the country, although he is chofen 
 by the fuffrages of all the quarters colledively. 
 He continues three years in ofiice when taken 
 from the diftrid of Zug, and but two wheii 
 chofcn from any of the others. 
 
 The
 
 52 Democraiical Cantons, 
 
 The council of regency, to whom the general 
 adminiftration of affairs is intruded, is compofed 
 of forty fenators, thirteen from the city, and 
 twenty-feven from the country. 
 
 The city, moreover, has its chief, its council, 
 and its officers apart, and every one of the other 
 quarters has the fame. 
 
 It is a total mifapplication of words to call 
 this government a fmiple democracy ; for, al- 
 though the people are accounted for fomething, 
 and indeed for more than in moft other free go- 
 vernments ; in other words, although it is a free 
 republic, it is rather a confederation of four or 
 five republics, each of which has its monarchical, 
 ariftocratical, and democratical branches, than a 
 limple democracy. The confederation too has its 
 three branches -, the general affembly, the regen- 
 cy of fenators, and the land amman \ being dif- 
 ferent orders tempering each other, as really as 
 the houfe, council, and governor, in any of the 
 United States of America. 
 
 LETTER IX. 
 
 U R I. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 THE canton of Uri, the place of the birth 
 and refidence of William Tell, fhook off 
 the yoke of Auttria in 1308, and, v/ith Switz and 
 Underwald, laid the foundation of the perpetual 
 alliance of the cantons, in 13 15. The c:.ntoa 
 confifts only of villages and little towns or bour
 
 Uri. 33 
 
 gades, and the whole is divided into ten genoffa- 
 men, or inferior communities. It has no city. 
 Altdorf, where the general afiemblies are held, 
 and the land amman and regency refides, is the 
 principal village. 
 
 The land amman and the principal magiftrates 
 are elefted in the general aflcmbly, in which all 
 the male perfons of fifteen years of age have a 
 right to a feat and a vote. 
 
 The fenate or council of regency, in whom is 
 vefted the executive power, is compofed of fixty 
 members, taken equally from each genoffamen, 
 though they refidc at the capital borough. From 
 this council are taken all the neceffary offi- 
 cers. 
 
 There are two other councils , one called the 
 chamber of feven, and the other the chamber of 
 fifteen, for the management of lefTer affairs. 
 
 The valley of Urferen, three leagues in length 
 and one in breadth, marches under the banners 
 of Uri i but it is but an ally, conneded by 
 treaty in 1410. It has its proper land amman 
 and council, and has alfo a bailiwick fubjcift 
 to it. 
 
 The village of Gerfaw is a league in breadth, 
 and two in length : there are about a thoufand 
 inhabitants. This is the fmalleft republic in Eu- 
 rope : it has however its land amman, its coun- 
 cil of regency, and its general afiembly of bur- 
 gefles, its courts of juilice and militia, although 
 It is faid there is not a fingle horfe in the whole 
 empire. Such a diminutive republic, in an ob- 
 fcure corner, and unknown, is interfiling to 
 Americans, not only becaufe every fpot of earth 
 on which civil liberty flourilhes defervcs their ef- 
 tecm, but upon this occaiion is particularly im- 
 D portanr.
 
 34 Denwcratical Cantons. Switz', 
 
 portant, as it fhews the impoffibility of eredling 
 even the imalien: government, among the poorett 
 people, without different orders, councils, and ba- 
 lances. 
 
 LETTER X. 
 
 SWITZ. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 THE canton of Switz has the honour of giv- 
 ing the name to the whole confederation, 
 becaufe the firft battle for independency was fought 
 there : yet it confifts only of villages divided into 
 fix quarters, the firll of which is Switz, where the 
 ordinary regency of the country refides. The fo- 
 vereign is the whole country ; that is to fay, the 
 fovereignty refides in the general affembly of the 
 country, where all the males of fifteen years of 
 age have a right of entry and fuffrage. 
 
 Yet they have their land amman , and their or- 
 dinary regency, at which the land amman pre- 
 fides, compofed of fixty counfellors, taken equally 
 from the fix quarters. All the necefifary officers 
 are taken from this council. 
 
 There are, befides, the fecret chamber, the 
 chaniber of feven, and the chamber of nine, for 
 finance, juftice, and police. 
 
 LETTER
 
 Arljiocratical Cantons. Berne. 35 
 
 LETTER XI. 
 ARISTOCRATICAL REPUBLICS. 
 
 THE CANTO M OF BERNE. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 IT is fcarcely poffible to believe that Mr. Tur- 
 gor, by collecting ail authority into one cen- 
 ter, could have intended an ariftocratical aiTcm- 
 bly. He muft have meant, however, a fimpie 
 form of government of Tome kind or other; and 
 there are but three kinds of fimple forms, demo- 
 cracy, ariftocracy, and monarchy. As we have 
 gone through moil, if not all, the governments 
 in Europe in which the people have any fhare j it 
 will throw much light upon our fubjedl: if we 
 proceed to the ariftocracies and oligarchies ; for 
 we fliall find all thefe under a necellity of eilab- 
 lilhing orders, checks, and balances, as much as 
 the democracies. As the people have been al- 
 ways heceffitated to ellablifli monarchical and 
 ariltocratical powers, to check tlicmiclvc's from 
 rufiiing into anarchy , lo hav e ariilocratical bo- 
 dies ever been obliged to contrive a number of 
 divifions of their povv^ers to ch.eck themielves from 
 running into oligarchy. 
 
 The canton of Berne has no other fovercign 
 than the fingle city of Berne. The fovercign:y 
 refides in the grand council, vvl^icli has the legif- 
 lative power, and the power of making peace, 
 ^var, and alliances, and is compoll-d of two. hun- 
 [) 2 died
 
 3 6 Arijlocratical Cantons. 
 
 dred counfellors and ninety-nine affcflbrs, the 
 eledion of whom is made, by rlie feizeniers and 
 the ienate, from the citizens, from whom they 
 are fuppofed virtually to derive their power-, but 
 a general afTembly of the citizens is never called 
 together, en any occafion, or for any purpofe, 
 not even to lay taxes, nor to make alliances or 
 war. To be eligible into the grand ccLincil, one 
 muft be a citizen of Berne, member of one of 
 the focieties or tribes, and at leail in the thirtieth 
 year of his age. 
 
 The executive power is delegated by the grand 
 council to the fenare or little council, which is 
 compofrd of twenty-feven perfons, including the 
 two avoyers or chiefs of ilic republic, the two 
 treafurers of the German cuntry, and of the 
 pays de Vaud, and the four bannerets or com- 
 manders of the militia, taken from the four firft 
 tribes, for the four diftriifls of the city. Vacan- 
 cies in this fenate are filled up by a complicated 
 mixture of ballot and lot : tv.'enty-fix balls, three 
 cf which are gold, are drav;n our of a box by 
 the feveral fenators , thofe who draw the golden 
 cnes nominate three eleftors out of the little 
 council ; in the fame m.anner, feven members are 
 defignated from the grand council, who nominate 
 feven electors from their body \ tl..:;e ten no- 
 minate ten candidatfs to be voted for in the 
 grand council : the four of thefe who have the 
 mod votes, draw each of them a ball out of a 
 box, which has in it two of gold and two of fii- 
 ver ; the two who draw the gold arc voted for in 
 th grand council, and he who has the moft 
 votes is chofen, provided he be married, and has 
 been ten years in the grand council. 
 
 Vacancies in the grand council are filled up, at 
 certain periods of about ten years, and two new 
 
 member!
 
 Benie. 37 
 
 members are appointed by each avoyer, one by 
 each feizenier and fenaror, and two or three others 
 by other officers of (late : if there are more va- 
 cancies, they are filled by the election of the fei- 
 zeniers and fenators. 
 
 The fcizeniers, who have this elccflive power, 
 are drawn by lot from among thole members of 
 the grand council vvho have held the office of 
 bailiffs, and who have finiilied the term of their 
 admini^dration. The bannerets and feizeniers 
 have, by the conRitution, an authority, for three 
 days in Eafter, refembling that of the cenfors in 
 ancient Rome, and may deprive any member of 
 either council of his place ; but, as their kn- 
 tence mull be confirmed by the great council, 
 they never exerciie their power. There are fix 
 noble families at Berne, who enjoy the precedence 
 of all the other fenators, although more ancient 
 members, and have rank immediately after the 
 bannerets. 
 
 The principal magiflrates are, the two avoycrs, 
 who hold their offices for life ; the two treafu- 
 rers, who continue for fix years -, and the four 
 bannerets, who remain only four. The avoyers 
 officiate alternately a year j and the reigning avo- 
 yer, although lie prefides in coumci!, in an ele- 
 vated feat under a canopy, anu has the public 
 feal before him, has no vote except in cales of 
 equd divifions, and never gives his opinion un- 
 lefs it is requ red. The avoyer, out of office, 
 is the fiill lenator and prefident of the lecrec 
 council. 
 
 The fecret council is compofed of the avover 
 
 out of office, the four bannerets, the two trea- 
 
 furers, and two other fecret counleilors talvcn 
 
 from the fenate. In this body all aHairs that re- 
 
 D 3 quic
 
 38 Arijlocratical Cant ens. 
 
 quire fecrecy, and Tome of thefe are of great im- 
 portance, are debated and determined. 
 
 The grand council afiembles and deliberates 
 by its own authority at dated times, and fuper- 
 intends all affairs, although the moil important 
 are delegated generally to the fenate. The whole 
 adminiftration is celebrated for its uncommon 
 moderation, precifion, and difpatch. 
 
 There are feventy-two bailiwicks, diftributed 
 in four clafles, comprehending a country of fixty 
 leagues in length, or a third part of all Switzer- 
 land, fubieft to this city. The bailiffs are ap- 
 pointed by lot from the grand council. They 
 were formerly chofen, but this method rendering 
 all the members dependent upon a few, who had 
 the moft influence, it had too flrong a tendency 
 to an oligarchy. The bailiwicks are the moil 
 profitable places, and are filled from the grand 
 council. The bailiffs live in much fplendour, 
 and are able to lay up tv>^o or" three thoufand 
 pounds flerling a year, befides difcharging all 
 their expences. They reprefent the fovereign au- 
 thority, put the laws in execution, collect the re- 
 venues, aft as judges in civil and criminal caufes ; 
 but an appeal lies to Berne, in civil caufes to the 
 courts of iuftice, and in criminal to the fenate : 
 but as the judges on appeal are perfons who ei- 
 ther have been or expect to be bailiffs, there fS 
 great reafon to be apprehenfive of partiality. 
 
 There is no Handing army, but every male of 
 fixteen is enrolled in the militia, and obliged to 
 provide himlelf an uniform, a nuid'ct, powder 
 and ball ; and no peafant is allowed to marry, 
 without producing his arms and uniform. The 
 arms are infpecled every year, and tlie men cx- 
 ercifed. There are arfenals of arms at Ecrne, arKJ 
 
 v.\
 
 Berne, 39 
 
 In every bailiwick, fufficient for the militia of the 
 diftri6l, and a fum of money for three months pay. 
 The dragoons are chofen from thefii'oftantial farm- 
 ers, who are obliged to provide their own horfcs 
 and accoutrements. There is a council of war, 
 of which the avoyer out of place is prefident, in 
 peace ; in war, a general is appointed to command 
 all the forces of the ftate. 
 
 There is a political feminary for the youth, 
 called the exterior ftate, which is a miniature of 
 the whole government. "Jhe young men aflem- 
 ble and go through all the forms ; they have 
 their grand council, fenate, avoyers, treafurers, 
 bannerets, fcizeniers, &c. : the poft of avoyer is 
 fought with great afllduity. They debate upon 
 political fubjedls, and thus improve their talents 
 by exercife, and became more capable of ferving 
 the public in future life. 
 
 The nobility in this country are haughty, and 
 much avcrfe to mixing in company, or any fami- 
 liar converfation with the common people : the 
 commons are taught to believe the nobles fupe- 
 riors, whofe right it is to rule ; and they believe 
 their teachers, and are very willing to be go- 
 verned. 
 
 LET T E R Xir. 
 
 F R I B O U R G. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 Tn E canton of Fribours; Is ariOorr; 
 not having more than fortv ;. .uiiic- 
 Can have any part in the govern 1 :\'., 
 live very nobly that is to fay, w\z\.:- 
 manuhicturcSj ur trades.
 
 40 Arijiocratical Cantons. 
 
 The fovereignty and legiflative authority refides 
 in the council of two hundred perfons, compofed 
 of the two avoyers, who are for life-, twenty- 
 two counfellors ; four bannerets; fixty other coun- 
 lellors, from whom the twenty four who com- 
 pofe the fenate, in which refides the executive 
 power, are taken when they are to be replaced 5 
 and one hundred and twelve others, whom ihey 
 call the grand fenate of two hundred. 
 
 The two avoyers are elected by the plurality 
 of fulTrages of all the citizens. They hold their 
 offices for life, and prefide alternately a year. 
 The rwenty-two counfellors are alfo for life, and 
 are defignated by lot, as well as the bannerets, 
 whofj charges continue but three years. The 
 fixty alfo arc nominated by lor, and are drawn 
 from the hundred and twelve, called the two 
 hundred. Thefe laft come forward in the rtate 
 by the prefcntation and nomination of the fecret 
 chamber, compofed of twenty-four befides the 
 bannerets, who are the chiefs of it. This 
 chamber, which is fovereign, befides the right of 
 rjomination to the ftate, has alone that of correc- 
 ^on, and of propofing regulations. 
 
 The two avoyers, the twenty-two counfellors, 
 and the four bannerets, form the little fenate, 
 which hears and determines civil caufes, and af- 
 fembles every day. 
 
 The affairs of ftate are carried before the o-rand 
 fenate of two hundred. 
 
 The tribes are corporations of tradefmcn, who 
 have no part in government, and who alfemble 
 in their abbays, only for the affairs of their oc- 
 cupations, and all their ftatutes are approved or 
 rejected by the fenate. 
 
 There are thirty-one bailiwicks fubjevfl to this 
 caniono The method of determining th? mem- 
 bers
 
 Fribourg'. 41 
 
 bers of the little fenate and fecret council is ano- 
 ther check. The names of the candidates in no- 
 mination are placed in a box, containing as many 
 partitions as there are perfons : the ballots are 
 thrown into this box by the eledors, without 
 knowing how the names are placed -, and the can- 
 didate whofe name occupies the divifion, which 
 receives by accident the moft ballots, has the lor. 
 This is to guard againft the influence of families; 
 for, among thofe few families from which alone 
 any candidate can be taken, fome have more in- 
 fluence than others. The canton contains flxty- 
 fix thoufand fouls. Its land produces good paf- 
 ture, fome corn, and little wine -, it has no com- 
 merce, and not much literature. It has more troops 
 in foreign fervice than any other canton in pro- 
 ^portion. As the rivers and lakes have a dired: 
 communication with the fea, th.ey might have a 
 valuable commerce; but as none of the perfons 
 concerned in government can be merchants, no 
 commerce can ever be in fafliion, except that of 
 their noble blood to foreign fovcreigns. It is no 
 doubt much to the honour of their fidelity and 
 valour to be chofen fo generally to be the life- 
 guards of princes-, but whether they can vindicate 
 fuch a traffic, upon principles of juilice, huma- 
 nity, or policy, or from the imputation of a 
 more mercenary fpirit than that of ordinary com- 
 merce, is for them to confidtr. The confervation 
 of the oligarchy is entirely owing however to this 
 cuftom: for a youthful fiery nobility, at home m 
 idlenefs, would necelfarily become ambitious of 
 popularity, and either procure, by intrigues and 
 infurrections, a greater fhare of importance to the 
 people, or let up one of the greacelt genius and 
 cnterprize among them lor a celpor. In fo:eign 
 fervice they exhault their refllels years, and re- 
 turn.
 
 :^2 Arijlocratical Cantons. 
 
 turn, after the deaths of their fathers, fatigued 
 with diffipation, to enjoy their honours and 
 eftates -, to fupporc thofe laws which are fo par- 
 tial to their wilhes -, and to re-aflume the manly 
 (implicity of manners of their native country. 
 
 LETTER XIIL 
 
 S O L E U R E. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 TH E canton of Soleure, {^vtn leagues m 
 breadth and twelve in length, contains fifty 
 thoufand fouls, and the Patrician families are in 
 quiet poffeffion of all the public offices. The 
 fovereign is the city of Soleure ; and the fove- 
 reignty refides in the grand council, conliiling of 
 two avoyers, who prefide alternately, and whofe 
 cledlion depends upon the council, and all the ci- 
 tizens in general, who are divided into eleven 
 tribes -, of twenty-three of the thirty-three fena- 
 tors taken from the tribes, each of which furnifhes 
 three , and of fixty-fix members who reprefenr 
 the citizens, and are taken alfo from the tribes in 
 equal numbers, viz. fix f-om each tribe. 
 
 The fenate is compofed of the two avoyers, and 
 the thirty-three fenators taken from the tribes, 
 making thirty-five in all, who are called the little 
 council, conduft the affairs of ftate, and judge 
 caufes civil and criminal. The two councils 
 make together the number of one hundred, with- 
 out computing the avoyer in office, who prefides 
 in chief. This body, named the grand council, 
 makes laws and ftatu.tes i treats of alliances^ peaci
 
 Soleure. 43 
 
 and war; decides appeals in the laft refort-, clefts 
 the treafurer, the fourth in rank in the ftatc, and 
 the exterior bailiffs. The thirty-three fenators 
 confift of eleven alt-raths or fenior counfellors, and 
 twenty-two yunk-raths or juniors. Upon the 
 removal by death of one of the alt-raths, the 
 eldeft of the yunk-raths fuccecds him, and this 
 vacancy is filled, out of the great council, by 
 eledlion of the eleven alt-raths. From among the 
 alt-raths, the two avoyers, the banneret, and the 
 treafurer, the four principal magiftrates of the 
 commonwealth, are chofen ; and on the death of 
 an avoyer, the banneret fucceeds to his place, 
 after having gone through the formality of a no- 
 mination by the general affembly of citizens. 
 Vacancies in the grand council are fupplied by 
 the alt-raths, from the lame tribe to vv'hich the 
 deceafed member belonged. There is an annual 
 meeting of the whole body of the citizens, in 
 which the avoyers and banneret are confirmed in 
 their places : the fenior and junior counfellors 
 at the fame time mutually confirm each other. 
 All thefe confirmations are matters of courfe, 
 and mere form. All other public employments 
 are difpofed of by the fen ate. 
 
 The revenues of the public, and falaries of of- 
 fices, are very confiderable, and afi\)rd the few 
 diftinguiihed families very profitable emoluments. 
 The grand fautier is annually eleded by all the citi- 
 zens. I'here are feveral tribunals and chambers : 
 the fccret council, formed of the two avoyers, 
 the banneret, the treafurer, the mod ancient of 
 the fcnators of the firfl; order or alt-raths, the 
 fecretary of (late, and attorney-general : the 
 council of war: the council of juttice, whuh 
 is compofcd of fix men^bers of the little coui'C,;^ 
 and eleven members of the orand councii, ou'j
 
 44 Arifiocratkal Cantons. 
 
 of whom is furniflied by each tribe; the grand 
 fautier prefides in it, inflead of the avoyer in of- 
 fice : the confiftory, and the chamber of or- 
 phans. This canton has a large country fubjed: 
 to it, comprehending eleven bailiwicks. 
 
 The foil is extremely fertile, yet there is a want 
 of hands for agriculture, and population decreafes ; 
 although commodioufly fituated for commerce, 
 they have none. Thefe circumftances are enough 
 to Ihew the bleffings of a government by a few 
 noble families. They fhew another thing, ftill 
 more curious; to wit, the confequences of mixing 
 the nobles and commons together. The latter 
 have here been induced to reduce their own con- 
 ilitutional Ihare in the government to a mere form, 
 and complaifantly to refign all the fubflance into 
 the hands of thofe Vvhom they think their natu- 
 ral fuperiors : and this will eternally happen, 
 fooner or later, in every country, in any degree 
 confiderable for extent, numbers, or wealth, 
 where the v/hole legiflative and executive power 
 are in one affembly, or even in two, if they have 
 not a third pov/er to balance them. 
 
 Let us by no means omit, that there is a grand 
 arfenal at Soleure, as there is at Berne, well itored 
 with arms in proportion to the number of inhabi- 
 tants in the canton, and ornamented with the tro- 
 phies of the valour of their anceftors. 
 
 Nor fliould it be forgotten, that a defenfive 
 alliance has fubfiited between France and feveral 
 of thefe cantons, for more than a century, to the 
 great advantage of both. Thefe republicans have 
 found in that monarchy a ileady, faithful, and 
 generous friend. In 1777 the alliance was renev/- 
 cd in this city of Soleure, Vv-here the French 
 ambalTador refides ; and extended to all the can- 
 tons. In the former treaty an article was inferted, 
 
 that
 
 Lucerne. 45 
 
 that if any dififenfions fhould arife between the 
 cantons, his majefty fhould, at the requeft of one 
 of the parties, interpofe his mediation by all gen- 
 tle means to bring about a reconciliation : but if 
 thefe fhould fail, he fhould compel the aggrefTor 
 to fulfil the treaties between the cantons and their 
 allies. As this article was manifeflly incompa- 
 tible with that independence which republicans 
 ought to value above all things, it has been 
 wifely omitted in the new treaty ; and it would 
 have become the dignity of the Swifs character 
 to have renounced equally thofe penfions, which 
 are called Argents de Paix et d'AUiance, as in- 
 confiftent not only with a republican fpirit, but 
 with that equality which ought to be the foun- 
 dation of an alliance. 
 
 LETTER XIV. 
 
 LUCERNE. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 TH E canton of Lucerne comprehends a 
 country of fixteen leagues long and eight 
 wide, containing fifteen bailiwicks, befides feveral 
 cities, abbays, monafleries, feigniories, &c. The 
 inhabitants are almoft wholly engaged in agricul- 
 ture, and the exportation of their produce. 
 Their commerce might be greatly augmented, 
 as the river Reufs iffues from the lake, pafTes 
 through the town, and falls into the Rhine. 
 
 The city contains lefs than three thoufand 
 fouls, has no manufaftures, little trade, and no 
 encouragement for learning : yet the fovereign is 
 this fingle city, and the fovcreignty rcfides in the 
 
 little
 
 4^ Arijtocratical Cantons. 
 
 little and great council, having for chiefs two 
 avoyers, who are alternately regents. There are 
 five hundred citizens in the town, from whom a 
 council of one hundred are chofen, who are no- 
 minally the fovereignty ; out of this body are 
 formed the two divifions, the little council, 
 ienate, or council of ftate, confifting of thirty- 
 lix members, divided into two equal parts of 
 eighteen each, one of which makes choice of the 
 other every half year. The whole power is ac- 
 tually exercifed by this body, the two divifions 
 of which adminiiler the government by turns. 
 They are fubjeft to no controul, are neither con- 
 firmed by the fovereign council, nor by the citi- 
 zens ; the divifion which retires confirming that 
 "which comes in. As the vacancies in the fenate are 
 filled up by themfelves, all power is in pcflelTion 
 of a few Patrician families. The fon fucceeds the 
 father, and the brother his brother. 
 
 The grand council confids of fixty-four per- 
 fons, taken from the citizens, v;ho are faid to have 
 their privileges; but it is hard to guefs what 
 they are, as the eleftions are made by the little 
 and great council conjointly. 
 
 The adminillration, the police, the finances, 
 and the whole executive power, is in the fenate, 
 which is conRantly fitting. 
 
 The grand council is aflembled only upon 
 particular occafions, for the purpofe of legiflation. 
 I'he fenate has cognizance of criminal caufes, but 
 in capital cafes the grand council is convoked to 
 pronounce fentence ; in civil caufes an appeal lies 
 irom the fenate to the grand council ; but thefe 
 appeals can be but mere forms, the fame fenators 
 being in both courts. 
 
 As the fenate conftitutes above a third of the 
 
 grand council, choofe their own members, confer 
 
 5 all
 
 Zurich. 47 
 
 all employments, have the nomination to ecclefi- 
 aftical benefices, two thirds of the revenues of the 
 canton belonging to the clergy, their influence 
 muft be uncontroulable. 
 
 The iwo avoyers are chofen from the fenate by 
 the council of one hundred, and are confirmed 
 annually. The relations of the candidates are 
 excluded from voting : but all fuch checks againft 
 influence and family connexions in an oligarchy 
 are futile, as all laws are cyphers. There are alfo 
 certain chambers of juftice and police. 
 
 In fome few inftances, fuch as declaring war 
 and making peace, forming alliances or impofing 
 taxes, the citizens muft be affembled and give 
 their confent, which is one check upon the power 
 of the nobles. 
 
 LETTER XV. 
 
 ZURICH. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 THE canton of Zurich contains one hun- 
 dred and fifty thoufand fouls, upon an area 
 of forty miles by thirty, abounds in corn, wine, 
 and all the ordinary productions of excellent paf- 
 tures. Literature has been encourngcd, and has 
 conftantly flourifhed in this country, from the 
 time of Zuinglius to that o{ Gei'ncr and Lavarer. 
 The inhabitants are induftrious, their manufac- 
 tures confidcrable, and their commerce extenfive. 
 
 In the city is a public granary, an admirable 
 refource againft fcarcity, and a magnificent arfe- 
 iial well filled with cannon, arms, and ammuni- 
 tion, panicularly mufqucts for tliiny thou land
 
 48 Arijiocratical Cantons. 
 
 men; the armour of the old Swifs warriors, and 
 the bow and arrow with which William Tell Ihoc 
 the apple on the head of his fon 
 
 Who with the generous ruilics fate, 
 On Uri's rock, in clofe divan. 
 And wing'd that arrov/, (ure as fate, 
 W'hich fix'd the facred rights of man. 
 
 The fovereign is the city of Zurich. The 
 fovereignty refides in fhe two burgomafters, in 
 the little council compofed of forty-eight mem- 
 bers, and the grand council compofed of one 
 hundred and fixty-two members -, all taken from 
 thirteen tribes, one of which is of the nobles, and 
 the other twelve of citizens. 
 
 Although there are twelve thoufand fouls in 
 the capital, and one hundred and fifty in the can- 
 ton, there are not more than two thoufand citizens. 
 In early times, when the city had no territory round 
 it, or a fmall one, the citizens were in pofTeffion 
 of the government -, when they afterwards made 
 additions by conqueft or purchafe, they ftill ob- 
 flinately held this power, and excluded all their 
 new fubjects. It is an hundred and fifty years 
 fince a nev/ citizen has been admitted : befides 
 elefting all the magiflrates and holding all offices, 
 they have maintained a monopoly of commerce, 
 and excluded all firangers, and even fubjeds of 
 the canton, from conducing any in the town. 
 Such are commons, as well as nobles and princes, 
 whenever they have power unchecked in their 
 hands! 
 
 There is even in this commercial republic a 
 tribe of nobles, who confider trade as a humi- 
 liation. 
 
 9 The
 
 Zurich, 49 
 
 The leglflative authority is veiled in the grand 
 council of two hundred and twelve, including 
 the fenate. 
 
 The fenate confifts of twenty-four tribunes," 
 and four counfellors chofen by the noble?, to 
 thefe are added twenty, elefted by the fovercign 
 council; making in all, with the two burgomafters, 
 fifty: half of them adminifter fix months, and arc 
 then fucceeded by the reft. The burgomafters 
 are chofen annually by the fovercign council, 
 and one of them is prefident of each divifion of the 
 fenate, which has the judicial power, in criminal 
 matters, without appeal, and in civil, with an 
 appeal to the grand council. 
 
 The members of the fenate are liable to be 
 changed, and there is an annual revifion of them, 
 which is a great reftraint. 
 
 The ftate is not only out of debt, but faves 
 money every year, againft any emergency. By this 
 fund they fupported a war in 1712, without any- 
 additional taxes. There is not a carriage in the 
 town, except it be of a ftranger. 
 
 Zurich has great influence in the general diet, 
 which Ihe derives more from her reputation for 
 integrity, and original Swifs independence of fpirir, 
 than from her power. 
 
 LETTER XVI. 
 
 SCHAFFHAUSE. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 TH E fovereign is the city of Schaffhaufe. 
 The citizens, about fixteen hundred, are 
 divided into twelve tribes, one of which confifts 
 of nobles, and eleven are ordinary citizens. 
 
 E The
 
 ^0 Arijlocratical RepuUics. 
 
 The fovereignty refides in the little and grand 
 councils. 
 
 The fenatc, or little council of twenty-five, has 
 the executive power. 
 
 The great council, comprizing the fenate, has 
 the legiilative, and finally decides appeals. 
 
 The burgomaflers are the chiefs of the repub- 
 lick, and alternately prefide in both councils, 
 
 Befides thefe there are, the fecret council, of 
 feven .of the higheft officers ; the chamber of 
 juflice, of twenty-five, including the prendent-, 
 the praetorian chamber, of thirteen, including 
 the prefident; the confiftory, of nine-, and the 
 chamber of accounts, of nine. The city has 
 ten bailliwicks fubjcfl to it. 
 
 THE CITY OF MULHOUSE. 
 
 The fovereign is the city : the fovereignty re- 
 fides in the little and the grand council. The 
 ieffer council is compofed of twenty-four perfons i 
 viz. three burgomafters, v/ho prefide by turns, 
 each one fix months, nine counfellors, and 
 twelve tribunes, who fucceed by eledion, and are 
 taken from the grand council. 
 
 The grand council is compofed of feventy- 
 eight, viz. the twenty-four of the lefier council, 
 thirty- fix members of the tribes, fix from each, 
 and eighteen taken from the body of the citizens, 
 and eieded three by each one of the fix tribes. 
 
 THE CITY OF BIENNE. 
 
 The republick of Bienne contains lefs than fix 
 
 thoufand fouls. 
 
 The
 
 ^he City of Blenne] t 
 
 The regency is compofed of the great council, 
 in which the legiflative authority refides, confift- 
 ing of forty members ; and of the little council, 
 compofed of twenty-four, who have the execu- 
 tive. 
 
 Each of thefe councils ele^l their own mem- 
 bers, from the fix confraternities of the city. 
 
 The burgomafter is chofen by the two coun- 
 cils, prefides at their meetings, and is the chief 
 of the regency , he continuc-s in office for life, 
 although he goes through the form of an annual 
 confirmation by the two councils, when the other 
 magirtrates fubmit to the fame ceremony. The 
 burgomafter keeps the feal, and, with the ban- 
 neret, the treafurers, and the fecretary, forms the 
 ceconomical chamber, and the chamber of or- 
 phans. 
 
 This town fends deputies to the general diets, 
 ordinary and extraordinary. 
 
 LETTER XVII. 
 
 THE REPUBLIC OF ST. G A L L^ 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 THE republic of St. Gall is a league and a 
 half in circumference, and contains nine 
 thoufand fouls. The inhabitants are very induf- 
 trious in manufa(5tures of linen, muflin, and em- 
 broidery, have an extenfive commerce, and arts, 
 fciences, and literature, are clteemed and culti- 
 E 3 vatcd
 
 5 Arijiocralical Republic si 
 
 vated among them. They have a remarkable 
 public library, in which are thirteen volumes of 
 original manufcript letters of the prft rerormers. 
 To fee the different effe6ls of diiicrent forms of 
 government on the human charader, and the nap- 
 pinefs and profperity of nations, it would be 
 worth while to compare this city with Conflance, 
 in its neighbourhood. 
 
 This happy and profperous, though diminutive 
 republic, has its grand counc;i of ninety perfons, 
 its little council of twenty-four, and three burgo- 
 mafters. The little council confifts of the three 
 burgomafters, nine fenators, and twelve tribunes. 
 The grand council confifts of all the little coun- 
 cil, and eleven perfons from each tribe; for the 
 city is divided into the fociety of the nobles, and 
 fix tribes of the artifans, of whom the weavers 
 are the principal. 
 
 Befides thele there are, the chamber of juftice, 
 the chamber of five, and fome others. 
 
 GENEVA. 
 
 In the republic of Geneva, the fovereignty re- 
 fidcs in the general council, lawfully convened^ 
 which comprehends all the orders of the ftate, 
 and is compofed of four fmdics, chiefs of the 
 republic, prefidents of all the councils , of the 
 lefTer council of twenty-five ; of the grand coun- 
 cil of two hundred, though it coniiils of two 
 hundred and fifty when it is complete ; and of 
 all the citizens of twenty- five years of age. The 
 rights and attributes of all thefe orders of the 
 ftate are fixed by the laws. The hiftory of this 
 ity deliervcs to be ftudied with anxious attentioa 
 
 by
 
 Geneva. 53 
 
 by every American citizen. The principles of 
 government, the neceffity of various orders, and 
 the fatal effeds of an imperfe<5t balance, appear 
 no where in a ftrongcr light. The fatal (lumbers 
 of the people, their invincible attachment to a 
 few families, and the cool deliberate rage of thole 
 families, if iuch an expreffion m^ay be allowed, 
 to grafp all authonty into their own hands, when 
 they are not controuled or over-awed by a power 
 above them in a firft magiftrate, are written in 
 every page. I need only refer you to Dr. d^l- 
 vernois's Hiftorical and Political View of the Con- 
 ftitution and Revolutions of Geneva in the Eigh- 
 teenth Century, which you received from the au- 
 thor, to convince you of this. 
 
 Let me add here, that the fads relating to the 
 Swifs cantons, and their environs, mentioned in 
 thefe letters, are taken from the ^arante 1'ables 
 Poliliqties de la Suijfe, par C. E. Faber^ Bernois, 
 Pafteur, a Bijhviller, in 1 746 ; with fome addi- 
 tional obfervations from the beautiful Sketches of 
 Mr. Coxe, which I fend you with this letter ; 
 and which you will find as inftrudive as they are 
 entertaining. 
 
 The petty council is indifferently called the 
 council of twenty five ^ tht petit council^ or they^- 
 nate. 
 
 The council of fixty is a body elected by the 
 fenate, and meets only for the dilcuffion of fo- 
 reign affairs. 
 
 The grand council, and council of two hun- 
 dred, are one and the lame body , it is ftill called 
 the council of two hundred, though it now con- 
 uils of two hundred and fifty members. 
 
 The general council, called indifcriminately 
 
 the [overeipi council^ the general ajfcmhly, the fove- 
 
 E 3 reipi
 
 54 'Arijlocratical Republics. 
 
 reign ajjembh^ the ajfembly of the people, or the ccuncil 
 general, is compokd ot all the citizens or freemen 
 of twenty-five years of age. 
 
 At the time of the Reformation, every affair, 
 important or trifling, was laid before the general 
 afTembly ; it was both a deliberating and afting 
 body, that always left the cognizance of details 
 to four findics : this was neceffary, in that time 
 of danger, to attach the affections of the citizens 
 to the fupport of the commonwealth by every en- 
 dearing tie. The city was governed by two fin- 
 dics of its own annual eledion. The multipli- 
 city of affairs had engaged each findic to nomi- 
 nate fome of the principal citizens to fcrve as af- 
 fefibrs during his adminiftration -, thefe afTcirors, 
 called counfellors, formed a council of twenty- 
 five perfons. In 1457 ^^'^ general council de- 
 creed, that the council of tv.'enty-five lliould be 
 augmented to fixty. This body, in 1526, was 
 augmented to two hundred. 
 
 Thus far the ariflocratical gentlemen proceeded 
 upon democratical principles, and all is done by 
 the general affembly. At this inftant commences 
 the firtl overt act of arifcocratical ambition. 
 Warm in their feats, they were loth to leave thrm, 
 or hold them any longer at the will of the peo- 
 ple. With all the fubtlety, and all the fagacity 
 and addrefs which is charaderiliic of this order 
 of mien in every age and nation, they prevailed on 
 the people to relinquifh for the future the right 
 of elefling counfellors in the general afTembly ; 
 and the people, with their characteriftic fimpli- 
 ciry, and unbounded confidence in tb.eir rulers 
 when they love them , became the dupes, and 
 rgiTed a law, that the two councils fhould for the 
 ^VJtUfe elcctj or at ieaft approve and ainnn, each 
 
 other,
 
 Geneva. 55 
 
 other. This is a natural and unavoidabje eflfedt 
 of doing all things in one affembly, or coUefling 
 all authority into one center. When nriagiftrates 
 and people meet in one affembly, the former will 
 for ever do as they pleafe, provided they proceed 
 with any degree of prudence and caution. 
 
 The confequence was, that the annual reviews 
 were a farce; only in a very few inftances, for 
 egregious faults, were any excluded : and the tvv'o 
 councils became perpetual, and independent of 
 the people entirely. The illufions of ambition 
 are very fubtle : if the motives of thefe magif- 
 trates, to extend the duration of their authority, 
 were the public good, we muft confefs they were 
 very ignorant, li is mofb likely they deceived 
 themfelves as well as their conftituents, and mif- 
 took their own ambition for patriotifm : but this 
 is the progreffive march of all alTemblies *, none 
 can confine themfelves within their limits, when 
 they have an opportunity of tranfgreffing them. 
 Thefe mao-iltrates foon It-arned to conlider their 
 authority as a family property, as all others in 
 general, in fimilar circumftances, ever did, and 
 ever will. 
 
 They behaved like all others in another refpeft 
 too : their authority being now permanent, they 
 immediately attack the findics, and transfer their 
 power to themfelves. 
 
 The whole hiftory of Geneva, fmce that pe- 
 riod, follows of couife : the people, by their fu- 
 pinenefs, had given up all balances, and betrayed 
 their owii privileges, as well as the prerogatives 
 of their iirll' magilbates, into the hands ot a tew 
 f:imil:es. 
 
 Tr-e people of Geneva, as enlightened as any, 
 
 have never confidered the neceflity of joining with 
 
 the fmdicSj nor the fmdics that of joining the 
 
 E 4. people,
 
 ^6 Arijlocratical Repuhlics. 
 
 people, but have conftantly aimed at an impofli- 
 bility, that of ballancing an ariflocratical by a 
 democratical aflembly, without the aid of a third 
 power. 
 
 T 
 
 LETTER XVIII. 
 
 L tr c c A. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 HE government of this republic is faid to 
 
 be purely ariflocratical ; yet the fupreme 
 power is lodged in the hands of two hundred and 
 forty nobles, with the chief magiftrate at their 
 head, who is called confalloniero, or ftandard- 
 bearer, and has the executive power. This ma- 
 giftrate is affifted by nine counfeliors, called am- 
 ziani, whofe dignity lafts but nine months ; he 
 has a life-guard of fixty Swifs, and lives in the 
 republic's palace, as do his counfeliors, at the 
 public expence : after fix years he may be re^ 
 chofen. The eleftion of all officers is decided in 
 the fenate by ballot. 
 
 GENOA. 
 
 The legiflative authority of Genoa is lodged 
 in the great fenate, confifting of feniors, or the 
 doge and twelve other members, with four hun- 
 dred noblemen and principal citizens, annually 
 eleded. All matters of ftate are tranfaded by 
 
 th'i
 
 Genoal 57 
 
 the feniors, the members of which hold their 
 places for two years, afTifted by fome other coun- 
 cils ; and four parts in five of the fenate muft 
 agree in pafling a law. The doge is obliged to 
 refide in the public palace the two years he en- 
 joys his office, with two of the feniors, and their 
 families. The palace where he refides, and where 
 the great and little council, and the two colleges 
 of the procurator! and gouvernatori alTemble, is 
 a large ilone building in the center of the city. 
 At the expiration of his time, he retires to his 
 own houfe for eight days, when his adminiftra- 
 tion is either approved or condemned ; and in the 
 latter cafe, he is proceeded againft as a criminal. 
 At the eleftion of the doge, a crown of gold is 
 placed on his head, and a fceptre in his hand, as 
 king of Corfica ; he is attended with life-guards, 
 is clothed in crimfon velvet, and ftyled Moft Se- 
 rene, the fenators Excellencies, and the nobility 
 Illuftrious. 
 
 The nobility are allowed to trade in the whole- 
 fale way , to carry on velvet, filk, and cloth ma- 
 nufactures ; and to have fhares in merchant fhips ; 
 and Ibme of them, as the Palavacini, are adlually 
 the greateft merchants in Genoa. 
 
 The extent is about one hundred and fifty-two 
 miles, the breadth from eight to twenty miles. 
 
 BETTER
 
 55 Arijtocratical Republics. 
 
 LETTER XIX. 
 
 VENICE. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 THE republic of Venice has exifted longer 
 than thofe of Rome or Sparta, or any other 
 that is known in hiftory. It was at firft demo- 
 eratical , and their magiftrates, under the name 
 of tribunes, were choien by the people in a ge- 
 neral afiembly of them. A tribune was appointed 
 annually, to diftribute juftice on each of thofe 
 iflands which this people inhabited. Whether 
 this can be called col!e6ling all authority into one 
 center, or whether it was not rather dividing it 
 into as many parcels as there were iQands, this 
 fimple form of government fufficed, in fo fmall a 
 community, to maintain order for fome time ; 
 but the tyrannical adminiftration of the tribunes, 
 and their eternal difcords, rendered a revolution 
 necefiary ; and after long altercations, and many 
 projefts, the people, having no adequate idea of 
 the only natural balance of power among three 
 orders, determined that one magiftrate fliould be 
 chofen, as the center of all authority the eter- 
 nal refource of every ignorant people, harrafied 
 with democratical diilradions or ariilocratical en- 
 croachments. This magiftrate mull not be called 
 king, but duke, and afterwards doge , he was to 
 be for life, but at his death another was to be 
 chofen-, he was to have the nomination of ?.ll 
 magiftrates, and the power of peace and war. 
 The unbounded popularity and great real merit 
 of Paul Luc Anafefte, added to the prefture of 
 tribunary tyranny, and the danger of a foreign 
 
 enemy.
 
 Venice, 
 
 , enemy, accomplifhcd this revolution. The new 
 do^e was to confult only fuch citizens as he 
 fhould judge proper : this, inftead of giving him 
 a conilitutional council, made him the mafter ; 
 he however fent polite meflages to thofe he liked 
 bcft, praying that they would come and advife 
 him. Thei'e were foon called pregadi, as the 
 doge's council is ftill called, though they are now 
 independent enough of him. The firft and fe- 
 cond doge governed mildly , but the third made 
 the people repent of their confidence : after ferv- 
 ing the ftate by his warlike abilities, he enflaved 
 it ; and the people, having noconftitutional means 
 to reftrain him, put him to death in his palace, 
 and refolved to abolifli the office. Hating alike 
 the name of tribune and of doge, they would have 
 a mafter of the militia, and he fhould be annu- 
 ally eligible. Fa6l;ons too violent for this tran- 
 fient authority arofe ; and, only five years after, 
 the people abolilhed this office, and reltored the 
 power of the doge, in the perfon of the fon of 
 him whom in their fury they had afTaffinated For 
 a long courfe of years after this, the Venetian 
 hiftory difclofes fcenes of tyranny, revolt, cruel- 
 ty, and affaffination, which excite horror. Doges, 
 endeavouring to make their power hereditary, af- 
 fociating their eldtft fons with them in office, and 
 both together oppreffing the people , thefe rifing, 
 and murdering them, or driving them into ba- 
 nillirnent, never once thinking of introducin;_', a 
 third order, between them and their firft magif- 
 trate, nor any other form of government by 
 which his power or theirs might be limited. In 
 the tenth century, a fon of their doge took arms 
 againft his father, but was defeated, banifh-d, 
 and declared incapable of ever bcinn- doce : vet 
 no looner was the father dead, than this wortiikis 
 
 'on
 
 o Arijlocratical Republics, 
 
 fon was elecled, and brought back in great pomp 
 to Venice : he became foon a tyrant and a mon^ 
 Her, and the people tore him tc pieces, but took 
 no meafure to frame a legal government. The 
 city increafed in commerce, and by conquefts, 
 and the new fubjeds were not admitted to the 
 privileges of citizens : this acceffion of dominion 
 augmented the influence of the doge. There was 
 no affembly but that of the people, and another 
 called the council of forty, for the adminiftra- 
 tion of juftice. This body, in the twelfth cen- 
 tury, formed fomething like a plan of govern- 
 ment. 
 
 Although the defcendants of the ancient tri- 
 bunes and doges were generally rich, and had a 
 fpontaneous refpedl fl^iewn to the antiquity of their 
 families, they were not properly a nobility, hav- 
 ing no legal rights, titles, or jurifdiclions. As 
 any citizen might be eleded to a public office, 
 and had a vote in the aflemblies, it was neceffary 
 for the proudeft among them to cultivate the good 
 will of the multitude, who made and murdered 
 doges. Through all thefe contefts and dilTen- 
 fions among a multitude, always impatient, often 
 capricious, demanding, at the fame time, all the 
 promptitude and fecrecy of an abfolute monar- 
 chy, with all the licence of a fimple democracy, 
 two things wholly contradidlory to each other, 
 the people had, to their honour, flill maintained 
 their right of voting in aflembly, which was a 
 great privilege, and nobody had yet dared to 
 aim a blow at this acknowledged right of the 
 people. 
 
 The council of forty now ventured to propofe 
 
 3 plan like that of Mr. Hume in his idea o; a 
 
 pcrf^cr. commonwealth, and like that which our 
 
 IP friend,
 
 Venice. i 
 
 ffiend, Dr. Price, informs us was propofed in the 
 convention of MafTachufett's. 
 
 The city was divided into fix diftrids, called 
 feftiers. The council of forty propofed, that 
 each of thefe partitions fhould name two elec- 
 tors, amounting to twelve in all, who fhould 
 have the power of choofing, from the whole city, 
 four hundred and feventy, who fhould have the 
 whole power of the general afTembly, and be call- 
 ed the grand council. 
 
 The people were amufed with line promifes of 
 order and regularity, and confoled with afiertions 
 that their right of election ftill continued, and 
 that thole who fliould not be chofen one year, 
 might be the next; and, not perceiving that this 
 law would be fatal to their power, fuffered that 
 ariftocracy to be thus founded, which fubfifts to 
 this hour. The next propofal was, that a com- 
 mittee of eleven fhould be appointed, to name the 
 doge. Though the defign of reducing the people 
 to nothing might have been eafily feen in thefe 
 manoeuvres, yet the people, wearied, irritated, 
 and difcouraged, by eternal difcords, agreed to 
 both. 
 
 The council of forty, having thus fecured the 
 people, turned their eyes to the doge, whofe au- 
 thority had often been perverted to the purpofes 
 of oppreffion, and, having no legal check, had 
 never been reftrained but by violence, and all 
 the confufions which accompany it. They pro- 
 pofed that a privy council of fix fliould be ap- 
 pointed for the doge, one from each divifion of 
 the city, by the grand council themlelves, and 
 that no orders fhould be valid without their con- 
 currence : this palled into a law, witii unanimous 
 applaufe. They then propofed a lenate of fixty, 
 V^ho were to be eleded out of the grand council,. 
 
 and
 
 6l Arijtocratical Repuhlics. 
 
 and to be called the pregadi : this too was ap- 
 proved. The grand council of four hundred and 
 fevenry, the fenate of fixty, the fix counfellors, 
 and eleven electors, were accordingly all chofen, 
 and the laft were fworn to choofe a doge, without 
 partiality, favour, or affedion : and the new- 
 chofen doge, having taken care to diftribute mo- 
 ney among the multitude, was received with uni- 
 yerfal acclamations. In his reign was inftituted, 
 by permiffion of the pope, the curious ceremony 
 of wedding the fea, by a ring call into it, in 
 fignum vert et perpetui imperii. Under the next 
 doge the avogadors were inftituted, to fee that 
 the laws were fully executed. 
 
 In the thirteenth century, fix new magiftrates, 
 called corredors, were created by the fenate, to 
 enquire into all abufes during the reign of a de- 
 ceafed doge, and report them to the fenate ; and 
 it was enaded, that the fortune of the doge Ihould 
 indemnify the ftate for whatever damage it had 
 fufFered during his adminiftration : and thefe cor- 
 redors have been appointed, at the deceafe of 
 every doge fince that time. In the next reign, 
 a new tribunal of forty was erected, for the trial 
 of civil caufes. In the thirteenth century, a new 
 method of appointing the doge, by the famous 
 ballot of Venice, a complicated mixture of choice 
 and chance, was adopted. 
 
 Each of the grand counfellors, now augmented 
 to forty-one to avoid the inconvenience of an 
 equal divifion, draws a ball out of a box, con- 
 taining thirty gilt, and the reft v/hite , thofe who 
 draw the gilt ones go into another room, where 
 is a box with thirty balls, nine of which are 
 gilt , draw again, and thole who obtain the gilt 
 balls are thtfirji dehors \ who choofe forty, com- 
 prehending themfelves in that number j the ionyy 
 
 by
 
 Venicft 63 
 
 by repeating the whole procefs, are reduced to 
 twelve fecond dehors, the firft of whom names 
 three, and the reft two a piece : thefe twenty-five 
 draw again from as many balls, nine of which are 
 gilti this reduces them to nine third ekoiors, each 
 of whom choofes five : which forty-five are re- 
 duced, by a repetition of the ballot, to eleven 
 fourth ele^ors, and they have the appointment of 
 forty-one, who are the direl eledlors of the doge. 
 The choice generally turns upon two or three 
 candidates, whofe names are put into another box, 
 and drawn out : the firft whofe name is drawn 
 retires, and proclamation is made for objections 
 againft him , if any are made, he comes in, and is 
 heard in his defence: then the eledors proceed to 
 determine by ayes and noes ; if there are twenty- 
 five ayes, he is chofen, if not, another name is 
 read, and the fame decifion repeated, until there 
 are twenty- five in the afiirmative. 
 
 The grand council, ever anxious to limit the 
 power of the doge, foon thought it improper that 
 the public ads Ihould be figned by chancellors 
 appointed by him, and accordingly determined 
 to appoint tiiis officer themfclves. 
 
 The fcnate then began to think it too great a 
 refpect to the people to have the new doge pre- 
 fented to them for their acclamations, and or- 
 dained that u iyndic fnould congraiuh^te him in 
 the name of the people on his election. The 
 populace,wiio had v.'cckly lurrcndered their rights, 
 wcie very angry at being deprived of this fhow, 
 and proclaimed a doge of their own ; but he v/as 
 atraid of the contcft, and retired, and the people 
 having no man of weight to head them, gave up 
 this point. 
 
 Tlic new doge, \vi;o had much contempt for 
 
 popular government, and lomc refentment for the 
 
 iz flight
 
 64 Arifiocratical Republics, 
 
 (light oppofitlon he had met with, procured i. 
 law to be pafled, that all the members of the 
 grand council fhould hold their places for life, 
 and tranfmit them to their pofterity, and that their 
 eleftions by the people's eledlors fhould ceafe. 
 This eftablifhment of an hereditary legiflative 
 nobility, no doubt fhocked the citizens in gene- 
 ral, but chiefly thofe of ancient families, who 
 were not at that moment members of the grand 
 council ; to filence thefe, the moft powerful of 
 them were received into the grand council, and 
 others were promifed that they fhould be admit- 
 ted at a future time. Commerce and wars foon 
 turned the attention of the reft of the people 
 from all thought about the lofs of their privileges. 
 Some few, however, fome time after formed a plan, 
 not to convene the people in a body, and new- 
 model the conftitution, but to aflaflinate the doge 
 and council all together. The plot, which was 
 carried on by the plebeians, was difcovered, and the 
 chiefs executed. Another originated amongft the 
 nobles, fome of them of the grand council, who 
 being of very ancient families, could not bear to 
 fee fo many citizens raifed to a level with them- 
 felves, and others of the moft diftinguiflied of 
 thefe, who were not of the grand council, and 
 had not been received afterwards according to 
 promife. This produced a fkirmifli in the city, 
 but fome of the confpiring nobles were killed, 
 the reft routed, and many executed, but it was 
 thought prudent to admit feveral of the moft dif- 
 tinguiftied families. Thefe two confpiracies pro- 
 duced a council of ten, upon which were after- 
 wards engrafted the ftate inquifition. 
 
 Great care is taken in Venice, to balance one 
 court againft another, and render their powers 
 mutual checks to each other. The college called 
 
 the
 
 J'emce'i 65 
 
 tne feigniory, was originally compofed of the 
 doge and fix counfellors ; to thefe were added fix 
 of the grand council chofen by the fenate, and 
 called the favii or fages j then five more for land 
 affairs, and then five for fea affairs, in the room of 
 wliom, five young noblemen are now cholen every 
 fix months, who attendj without a vote, for their 
 education i to thefe were added the three chiefs of 
 the criminal court, from a jealoufy of the power of 
 the college, which is both the cabinet council, and 
 the reprefentative of the (late, giving audience and 
 anfwers to ambaffadors, to agents of towns, and 
 generals of the army ; receives all petitions, fum- 
 mons the fenare, and arranges its bufinefs. 
 
 There is one inftaiice of a doge's concertino- a 
 confpiracy, to ihake off the controul of the fenate ; 
 but as it was an old man of fcurfcore, whofe 
 young wife, on whom he doted, was not treated 
 with fufficient rel'pecfl by the nobility, we need not 
 wonder, that he had not fenfe enough to think of 
 introducing a regular, well-balanced conftitution, 
 by a joint concurrence of the people, and the no- 
 bility : the whole plan was to maiHicre the grand 
 council ; and although he engaged in his defign 
 iome of the higheft officers, and a large party, 
 the plot was difcovered, the doge himfelf tried, 
 condemned, and beheaded, as fo infamous a piece 
 of mad villainy juftly deferred. 
 
 A puntfrual execution o^ ttie laws, is no doubt 
 cfleniial to the exillence of this Hate, and there 
 arc tlriking inftances of perfons punifhing their 
 iieared relations, with the motl unrelenting^ feve- 
 rity ; without this, the doge on one hand, or the 
 {leople on the other, would foon think of a union 
 agamll the ruling nobflity. The ariflocracy is 
 i always fagacious, and knows the neccfilty of a ri- 
 gorous impartiality, in order to prtlcrve its 
 
 F p'jwcr-
 
 66 Arifiocratical Repuhlics. 
 
 power, and all the barriers we have defcribed 
 have been ere6led for this purpofe : but all would 
 be infufficient to reftrain their paflions, without the 
 lions mouths and the ftate inquifitors; thefe were 
 engrafted on the council of ten. This terrible 
 tribunal, is fovereign in all crimes againfl: the 
 ftate ; it confifts of ten chofen yearly by the grand 
 council ; the fix of the feigniory affift, and the 
 doges prefide when they pleafe. Three chiefs, 
 appointed monthly by lot, to open all letters, 
 feize the accufed, take examinations, and profe- 
 cute the prifoner , who is clcfely confined, al- 
 lowed no council, and finally acquitted or con- 
 demned to death, in public or private, by the plu- 
 rality of voices. This was the original tribunal, 
 but it was not found fufRcient, and the ftate in- 
 quifitors were erefted in the beginning of the (ix- 
 teenth century. This tribunal confifts only of 
 three perfons, all taken from the council often, 
 who have authority to decide, without appeal, on 
 the life of every citizen, the doge himfelf not ex- 
 cepted. They employ what fpies they pleafe j if 
 they are unanimous, they may order a prifoner to 
 be ftrangled in gaol, or drowned in the canal, 
 hanged in the night, or by day, as they pleafe ^ 
 if they are divided, the caufe muft go before the 
 council of ten, but even here, if the guilt is 
 doubtful, the rule is to execute the prifoner in 
 the night. The three may command accefs to the 
 houfe of every individual in the ftate, and have 
 even keys to every apartment in the ducal palace, 
 may enter his bed-chamber, break his cabinet, 
 and fearch his papers. By this tribunal, have 
 doge, nobility, and people, been kept in awe, 
 and reftrained from violating the laws, and to 
 this is to be afcribed the long duration of this 
 ariftocracy. 
 
 Such
 
 Venice. 67 - 
 
 Such arc the happy effefts of the fpirit of fa- 
 milits, w!ien they are not bridled by an executive 
 authority, in the hands of a firft magiftrate oa 
 one hand, and by an alTrmbly of the peopk in 
 perfon, or by adequate reptefentation, on the 
 other. Such are the blefnngs which, in courfe of 
 ages, fpring from a negleft in tfie beginning, to 
 eflablifh three orders, and a perfe6l balance be- 
 tween thcin There can be, in the nature of 
 things, no balance v/ithout three powers. The 
 ariflocracy i." always more fagacious than an af- 
 leinbly of the people collectively^ or by repre- 
 iencation, and always proves an overmatch in po- 
 licy, fooner or later, l^hey are always more cun- 
 ning too than a firfl magirtrate, and always make 
 of him a doge of Venice, a mere ceremony, un- 
 lefs he makes an alliance with the people to fup- 
 port him againft them. What is the whole hif- 
 tory of the wars of the barons but one demon- 
 ftration of this truth ! What are all the Handing 
 armies in Europe, but anorh^r. Thefe v/ere all 
 given to kings by the people, to defend them 
 againft arillocrncies. The people have been ge- 
 nerally of Mr. Turgot's mind, that balances, 
 rind different orders, were iinneceflary, and, harraf- 
 ied to death with the domination of noble fa- 
 milies, rhcy have generally furrounded the thrones 
 with troops, to humble them. Ti)ey have fuc- 
 ! ceeded lo far as generally to make the nobles de- 
 j pendent on the crown, but having given up 
 the balance which they miglu have held in their 
 own hands, they are rtill fubjefl to as much 
 ariftocratical domination, as the crov/ns think 
 proper to permit- InVenice, the arillocratical paf- 
 fion for curbing the prince and the people, has 
 been carried to its utmoft length. It is *iVonilh- 
 
 T 2 in^
 
 68 u^HJiocraiical Republics. 
 
 ing to many, that any man will accept the office 
 of doge. Thefe fagacious nobles, who always 
 know at leaft the vices and weaknefies of the hu- 
 man heart better than princes or people, iliw that 
 there would be generally vanity enough in an in- 
 dividual to flatter himfelf, that he had qualities 
 to go through his adminiilration without incur- 
 ring cenfure, and with applaufe ; and farther, 
 that the frivolous diftinftion of living in the ducal 
 palace, and being the firtl man in the nation, 
 though it were only the firrt: among equals, would 
 tempt moft men to riique their lives and fortunes, 
 and accordingly it has fo happened. There has 
 been an uncommon folicitude ail along to reftrain 
 his power : this no doubt was to prevent him from 
 a polTibility of negociating with the people againit 
 them : on the other hand, there has been uncom- 
 mon exertions to annihilate every power, every 
 hope in the people: this was to prevent them 
 from having a legal poiTibility of applying to the 
 doge for afliftance. All this together, would not 
 however have fucceeded, if death, in thefliape of the 
 inquifition, had not been made to ftare both doge 
 and people in the face, upon the firft thought of 
 conferrino; together. 
 
 The nobles are divided into fix claHe-. 
 I. Twelve of the mod ancient families. 2. Four 
 families that in the year 880 lubfcribed to the 
 building of the abbey of St. George. ^. Thole 
 whofe names were written in the golden boolc, in 
 1296. 4. Thofe that were ennobled by the public 
 in 1385. 5. Thofe who purchaled their nobility 
 for one hundred thoufand tiucats in 1646. And 
 6. The itrangcrs who have been received into the 
 number of nobility : the whole make about two 
 thou land five hundred. 
 
 There
 
 Venice. 6<) 
 
 There arc four councils : i. The doge and fix 
 fignoria. 2. The configlio grande, in which all 
 the nobles have feats and voices. ^. Configlio 
 de pre<radi, of 250, and is the foul of the repub- 
 lic. 4. Configlio proprio delli dieci and the itats 
 inquifitors. 
 
 THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED PR.0- 
 VINCES OF THE LOW COUN' TRIES. 
 
 Here were a Stadtholder, an alTeinbly of the 
 States General, a council of fi:ate : the Stadtholder 
 hereditary had the command of armies and navies, 
 and appointment of all officers, &c. 
 
 Every province had an afifcmbly btfides, and 
 every city, burgo mailers, counfellors, and fche- 
 pens or judges, befides an hooft officer, and his 
 dienders, for the police. 
 
 The hiftory of this country, and its compli- 
 cated conftitutions, affords an inexhauftible (lore 
 of materials to our purpofe, bur, confidering the 
 critical fituation of it, prudence dicStates to pafs it 
 over : with all the fagacity, and more wifdom 
 than Venice or Berne, it has always had more 
 confideration of the people than either, and has 
 given more authority to the firft magiitrate : they 
 have never had any exclufive preferences of fami- 
 lies or nobles. Offices have, by law at leaft, been 
 Open to all men of merit. 
 
 F3 LETTER
 
 ^r Monarchical or regal Republics. 
 
 LETTER XX. 
 
 ENGLAND. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 POLAND and England. The hidorics of 
 thefe countries would confirm the gciierai 
 principle we contend for : the lait efpecially. But 
 who can think of writing upon this fubjed after 
 De Lclme, v/hofe book is the beft defence of the 
 political balance of three powers that ever was 
 written. 
 
 If the people are not equ'tably reprefented in 
 the houfe of commons, this is a departure in 
 pra6lice from the theory. If the lords return 
 members of the houfe of commons, this is an 
 additional difturbance of the balance : whether 
 the crown and the people in fuch a cafe will not 
 fee the neceflity of uniting in a remedy, are 
 queftions beyond my pretenfions : I only contend 
 that theEnglifn conflitution is, in theory, the moil 
 ilupendous fabrick of human invention, both tor 
 the adjuftment of the balance, and the prevention 
 of its vibrations \ and that the Americans ough': 
 to be applauded inllead of cenfured, for imitating 
 it, as fir as they have. Not the formation of lan- 
 guages, not the whole art of navigation and fliip 
 building, dees more honour to the human under- 
 Handing than this fyftem of government. The 
 Americans have not indeed imitated it in giving a 
 negative, upon their legillature to the executive 
 power \ in this refpel their balances are inccm- 
 pleat, very much I confcfs to my mortification : 
 in other rcfpe<5ts, tl-iey have feme of th-rrn fallen 
 
 Ihort
 
 England. 7 f 
 
 fhort of perfcftion, by giving the choice of fomc 
 militia officers, &c. to the people chefe are how- 
 ever fmall matters at prefent. They have not 
 made their firft magiftrates hereditary, nor their 
 fenators: here they differ from the Englifh confti- 
 tution, and with great propriety. 
 
 The Agrarian in America, is divided into the 
 hands of the common people in every (late, in fuch 
 a manner, that nineteen twentieths of the property 
 would be in the hands of the commons, let them 
 appoint whom they could for chief magiftrate and 
 fenators : the fovereignty then, in fad, as well as 
 morality, mull refide in the whole body of thtf 
 people; and an hereditary king and nobility, who 
 Ihould not govern according to rhe public opmion, 
 would infallibly be tumbled inftantly from their 
 places : it is not onlv moft prudent then, but ab- 
 Iblutely neceff" y, .o avoid continual violence, to 
 give the people a legal, conllitutional, and peace- 
 able mod': of changing thefe rulers, 'v henever they 
 difcover improper principles or difpofuions in 
 them. In the prefent ftate of fociety, and with 
 the prefent manners, this may be done, not only 
 without inconvenience, but greatly for the happi- 
 nefs and profperity of the country. In fucurc 
 ages, if the prefent ftates become great nations, 
 rich, powerful, and luxurious, as well as numerous, 
 their own feelings and good fenie will dictate to 
 them what to do : they may make tranfiuions to 
 a nearer refemblance of the Britifli conftitution, 
 by a fredi convention, without the fmallcft inter- 
 ruption to liberty. But this will never become 
 neceflary, until great quantities of property fhall 
 get into few hands. 
 
 The truth is, that the people have ever go- 
 verned in America : all the weight of the royal 
 governors and councils, even backed with fleets 
 
 F 4 and
 
 72 Monarchical Republics. 
 
 and armies, have never been able to get the ad- 
 vantage or chem, who have always ftood by iheir 
 houfes ot repreientatives in every inftance, and 
 carried all rheir points ; and no governor ( ver 
 Hood his ground againit a repreftntative allembly 5 
 as long as he governed by their advice he v/as 
 happy -, as foon ah iie differed from tb.cin he wa--^ 
 wretched, and fooa obiiaed to retire. 
 
 t LETTER XXI. 
 
 POLAND. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 TH E king of Poland is the firft rnagiilrate 
 in the republic, derives all his authority 
 from the nation. Ele has not the power to make 
 laws, raife taxes, contract alliances, or declare 
 war, nor to coin money, nor marry, without the 
 ratification of the diet. 
 
 The fenate is compofed of the clergy and nobi- 
 lity, the third eftate, or people, is not lb much as 
 known. The grand marfnal, the marfhal of the 
 court, the chancellor, vice chancellor, and the 
 treafurer, are the firil fenators. 
 
 The nobility, or gentry, polTefs the dignities 
 and employments, in whici) ihey never permit 
 llrangers, or the commonalty, to have any partici- 
 pation : they elect their king, and would never 
 fuffer the fenate to make themjtK cs maftcrs of this 
 eledtion. The peafants are Haves to the fjentry , 
 having no property, all their a. quifitions are made 
 for their matters, and are expoled to all their paf- 
 ixons, and are opprefTed with impunity. 
 
 The
 
 Poland. 73 
 
 The general diets, which are ufucilly held at 
 Warfaw or Grodno, are preceded by particular 
 iifleinblies of palatinates, in which the deputies are 
 cliofen for the general aflembly, and infirLided : 
 I he deputies afiembled in general diet, proceed to 
 the ejedion of a marfhal, who has a very extraor- 
 dinary power, that of impoling filence on whom 
 he pleafes ; he is the chief or fpeaker of the af- 
 fembly. 
 
 At the death, abdication, or depofition of a 
 king, the priniate calls the afiembly of the elec- 
 tors to an open field near Warfaw. Here the 
 eledlors take an oath, not to feparate until they 
 fhall have unanimoufly eleded a king, nor to 
 render him when eledted any obedience, until he 
 has fworn to obierve the Pa^a Convcnta^ and the 
 laws. 
 
 The candidates muft let their gold glitter, and 
 give fplendid entertainments, which muil be car- 
 ried into debauch : the nobility are captivated, 
 with the arrractions of mao-nificence and Hunga- 
 rian wine, and mfallibly declare in favour of the 
 candidate who caufes it to flow in the greateft 
 profbfion. The ambaifadors enter upon intrigues, 
 even in pubbc : the nobility receive liieir prefcnts, 
 fell their fuffrages with impunity, and render the 
 throne venal, but often behave with little fidelity 
 to the candidate in whole interell they pretend to 
 be cno;iif.;ed, and, forgetting the prelents they have 
 received, elpoufe the caufe of a more wealthy 
 competitor without hcfitation. When the candi- 
 date has gained all the fuffrages, he is de<:lared 
 king, and fworn to obfervc tlie Patfa Ccnventa, 
 an.; the laws, and then crowned. The Poles are 
 polite and friendly, but magnificence is the foible 
 of the nobility, and they lacrifice all things to 
 luxury : as they feldom fee any perfon fuperior to 
 
 them
 
 74 Mofiarchical Republics. 
 
 them In their own country, and treat their infe- 
 riors with an air of abfolure authority, they live 
 in all the fpkndor of princes. Tliis is the account 
 of the Abbe des Fontaines in the year 1736 ; ic 
 is to be hoped things have fmce changed for the 
 better, but if this account was then true, who can 
 wonder at what has happened fince. 
 
 Here again is no balance , a king, and an af- 
 fembly of nobles, and nothing more : the nobles 
 here difcover their unakerabie dilpofition, when- 
 ever they have the power, to limit the king's au- 
 thority ; and there being no mediating power of 
 the people, collectively or reprelentatively, between 
 them, the confequence has been, what it always 
 will be in fuch a cafe, confufion and calamity. 
 
 LETTER XXII. 
 
 P O L A N D. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 SINCE the letter conceriiing Poland was ieiu 
 y6u, Mr. Coxe's travels into that kingdom, 
 &c. have fallen into my hands : and they contain 
 fo many favls material to our argument, that 
 It is very proper to fend you the fubllance of this 
 account -, indeed there is fcarcely a book in the 
 world, in any manner relative to the hiflory of 
 government, or to thofe branches of philofopiiy 
 on which it depends, which is not much to our 
 purpofe. 
 
 In the mofb ancient times, v/hich records or 
 hiftory elucidate, the monarchy of Poland, like
 
 Poland. 75 
 
 all others denominated feudal, was in theory, and 
 pretenfion, abfolute. The barons too, in this 
 country as in all others, were very often impa- 
 tient under luch reftraint. When the prince was 
 an able ftatefman and warrior, he was able to 
 preferve order-, but when he was weak and indo- 
 lent, it was very common for two or three borons 
 in conjunction to make war upon him ; and fome- 
 times it happened that all together leagued againfb 
 him at once. In every feu'Jal country, where the 
 people had not the fenfe and fpirit to make them- 
 lelves of importance, the barons became an 
 ariftocracy, inreflancly encroaching upon the 
 crown, and, under pretence of limiting its autho- 
 rity, took away from it one prerogative after 
 another, until ir was reduced down to a mere doge 
 of Venice, or avoyer of Berne; until the kings, by 
 incorporating cities and granting privileges to the 
 people, fet them up againft the nobles, and ob- 
 tained by their means (landing armies, fufficient 
 to controul both nobles and commons. 
 
 The monarchy of Poland, nearly abfolute, 
 funk in the courfc of a few centuries, without any 
 violent convulfion, into an ariftocracy. 
 
 It came to be difputed whether the monarchy 
 was hereditary or eledlive, and whether its autho- 
 rity was fovereign or limited. The firft queftion 
 is refolved, by luppofing that the crown continued 
 always in the fame family, although, upon the 
 death of a king, his fucceflbr was recognizrd 
 in an aflembly of the nobles. The fecond, 
 may be anfwered by fuppofing, that when the 
 king was adfive and capable, he did as he 
 plealed , but when he was weak, he was diiftatcd 
 to by a licentious nobility. Caflimir the Grc it 
 retrenched the authority of the principal barons, 
 snd granted immunities to the leffer nobility and 
 
 gentry >
 
 76 Monarchical Republics. 
 
 gentry , well aware that no other expedient could 
 introduce order, except a limiration of the vaft 
 influence, pofiefled by the Palatines or principal 
 nobility. If this prince had been pofiefled of any 
 ideas of a free government, he might eafily have 
 formed the people and inftrior gentry into an af- 
 icmbly by themfelves, and, by uniting his piowcr 
 with theirs, againft the encroachments of the no- 
 bles upon both, have preferved it. liis nephew, 
 Louis of Hungary, who fucceedcd him, being a 
 fpreigner, was obliged by the nobility to fubfcribe 
 conditions at his acceffion, not to impofe any 
 taxes by his royal authority, without the confent 
 of the nation, that is of the nobles, for no other 
 nation is thought on : that in cafe of his demife 
 without male heirs, the privilege of appointing a 
 king fliould revert to the nobles. In conl'equence 
 of this agreement Louis was allowed to afcend 
 the throne: having no fon, with a view of infur- 
 ing the fucccflion to Sigifmund his fon in law, 
 he promiled to diminifli the taxes, repair the for- 
 trefles at his own expence, and to confer no offices 
 or dignities on forcio;ners. 
 
 Louis died : but Sigifmund Vr'as emperor, and 
 therefore powerful, and might be formidable to 
 the new immunities. The Poles, aware of this, 
 violated the compaft with Louis, neglected Sigif- 
 mund, and eledled Ladiflaus, upon his ratifying 
 Louis's promifes, and marrying his daughter. 
 
 Ladiflaus, having relinquifhed the right of im- 
 pofing taxes, called an aflembly of prelates, ba- 
 rons, and military gentlemen, in their refpecftive 
 provinces, in order to obtain an additional tribute. 
 Thefe provincial aflfemblies gave birth to the Die- 
 tines ; which now no longer retain the power of 
 raifmg money in their feveral diltrifts, but only 
 cle6t the nuncios or reprefentatives fqr the diet. 
 
 Ladiflaus
 
 Poland. 77 
 
 LadiQaus the third, the Ton of the former, 
 purchalcd his right to the fuccefllon, during the 
 life of his father, by a confirmation of all the 
 concelTions before granted, which he folemnly 
 ratified at his acceffion. Caffimir the third, bro- 
 ther of Ladillaus the third, confented to feveral 
 further innovations, all unfavourable to regal 
 prerogative One was the convention of a na- 
 tional diet, inverted with the fole power of grant- 
 ing fupplies. Each palatinate or province was 
 allowed to fend to the geiicral diet, befides the 
 Palatines and other principal barons, a certain 
 number of nuncios or rcprcfenratives, chofen by 
 the nobles and burghers. Is it not ridiculous, 
 that this reign fhould beconfidered by the popular 
 party, as the aera, at which the freedom of the 
 conftitution was permanently eftabliflied ? This 
 frecdoHi, wliich confifts in a king without autho- 
 rity ', a body of nobles in a itate or uncontrouled. 
 anarchy , and a peafantry groaning under the 
 yoke of feudal defpotifm : the greaieil inequality 
 of fortune in the world ; the extremes of riches 
 and poverty, of luxury and mifery, in the neigh- 
 bourhood of eacii other , a univerfal corruption 
 and venality pervading all ranks; even the firlb 
 nobles not blufhing to be penfioners of foreign 
 courts-, one proiefling himfeif publicly an Auf- 
 tnan, another a Prulfian, a third a Frenchman, 
 and a fourth a Kudian -, a country without manu- 
 fiiilures, without commerce, and in eveiy view 
 the moft diftrcficd in the world. But to proceed, 
 with an enumeration of the meafures by v^'hicli 
 tlicy have involved themfclves in thcfe pitiable 
 circumllances : 
 
 Calnmir was involved in feveral unfuccefsful 
 wars, which exhaulled liis treafuics : lie applied 
 to the diet for fubfiuies. 
 
 Everv
 
 yS Monarchical Republics. 
 
 Every fupply was accompanied with a lift of 
 grievances, and produced a diminution of the 
 royal prerogative. The barons, at the head of 
 their vafTals, were bound to fight, and the king 
 could require fuch feudal fervices in defence of 
 the kingdom : but Caffimir the third, to obtain 
 pecuniary aids, gave up the power of fummon- 
 irio; the nobles to his ftandard, and of enadintr 
 any law without the concurrence of the diet. 
 John Albert, to procure an elecftion in preference 
 to his elder brother, aflented to all the immunities 
 extorted from his predecefTors, and fwore to their 
 obfervance, in 1469. Alexander, his fucccfibr, 
 declared in 1505, the following limitations of 
 fovereign authority to be fundamental laws of the 
 kingdom. i. The king cannot impofe taxes. 
 2. He cannot require the feudal fervices. 3. Nor 
 alienate the royal domains. 4. Nor enadl laws. 
 5. Nor coin money. 6. Nor alter the procels in 
 the courts of juftice. Sigifmund the firft, fuc- 
 ceeded Alexander, and under his reign the Polilh: 
 conftitution was the moft tolerable, as the pro- 
 perty of thefubjeft was beft fecured, and the crown 
 had confiderable influence : but this did nor 
 fatisfy the nobles. Under Sigifmund Auguftus, 
 fon and fuccelTor of Sigifmund the firft, that fa- 
 vourite objed of the Polifh nobles, the free elec- 
 tion of the king, v/as publicly brought forward, 
 and the king obliged to agree, that no future 
 monarch fhould fucceed to the throne, unle!? 
 freely eleded by the nation : before this, the fo- 
 vereigns upon their accefTion, though formRily 
 raifed by the confent of the nation, ftill refted 
 their pretenfions upon hereditary right, always 
 ftiling themfelves heirs of the kingdom of Poland, 
 Sigifmund Auguftus was the laft who bore that 
 title 5 at his death, in 1572, all title to the crown 
 
 fron:;
 
 Poland. 79 
 
 from hereditary right was formally abolifhed, 
 and the abfolute freedom of eledion eftablilhcd 
 upon a permanent bafis : a charter of immunities 
 was drawn up at a general diet, a ratification of 
 which it was determined to exaft of the new fove- 
 reign, prior to his eledion. This charter, called 
 paSia com-enta, contained the whole body of privi- 
 leges obtained from Louis, and his fucceffors, 
 with the following additions: i-That the king 
 fhould be eledive, and that his fucceflbr fhould 
 never be appointed during his life. 2. That the 
 diets, the holding of which depended folely upon 
 the will of the kings, (liould be afiembled everr 
 two years. ^. That every noblemian or gentleman 
 in the realm fhould have a vote in the diet of elec- 
 tion. 4. That in cafe the king fhould infringe 
 the laws and privileges of the nation, his fubjects 
 fhould be abfolved from their oaths of allegiance. 
 From this period the pacla convent a^ occafionally 
 enlarged, have been confirmed by every Ibvereigri 
 at his coronation. 
 
 Henry of Valoir, brother of Charles the ninth 
 of France, who afcendcd the throne after the con- 
 flitution was thus new modelled, fecureJ his 
 < led ion by private bribes to the nobles, and by 
 llipulating an annual penfion to the republic from 
 the revenues of France. His example has been 
 followed by every fuccecding king, v.'ho, befides 
 an unconditional ratifjcation of the padla convenra, 
 lias always been conftraincd topurchafe the crown, 
 by a public laigefs, and private corruption. Such 
 is Polilli liberty, and fuch the blefTings of a mo- 
 narchy eledlive by a body of nobles. 
 
 Under Stephen Bathori, the royal authority, 
 
 or rather the royal dignity, was farther abridged, 
 
 by the appointment of lixreen fenators, chofen 
 
 at each diet, to attend the king., and to give their 
 
 z opinion
 
 So Monarchical Republics. 
 
 opinion in all matters of importance, fo that he 
 could not iflue any decree without their conient. 
 Another fatal blow was given to the prerogative 
 in 1578, by taking from the king the fupreme 
 jurifdidion of the caufes of the nobles : it was 
 cna6led, that without the concurrence of the king, 
 each palatinate (hould eledl in their dietines their 
 own judges, who fhould form fupreme courts of 
 " juftice, called trihunalia regni^ in which the caufes 
 of the nobles fliall be decided without appeal, a 
 mode which prevails to this day. 
 
 In the reign of John Caffimir, in 1652, was 
 introduced the libe'rum "jcto^ or the power of eacii 
 nuncio to interpofe a negative, and break up a diet, 
 a privilege which the king himfclfdoes not enjoy. 
 When the diet was debating upon tranfactions oi 
 the utmoft importance, which required a fpeedy 
 decifion, a nuncio cried out, " 1 ftop the pro- 
 " ceedings," and quitted the afiem.bly : and a 
 venal faction, who fupported his proceft, unheard 
 of as it was, obtained the majority, and broke up 
 the affembly in confufion. The conftitution 
 was thus wholly changed, and an unlimited fcope 
 given to facflion. The innovation was fupported 
 by the great officers of (late, the general, trea- 
 furer, and marlhal, who being once nominated 
 by the king, enjoyed their offices for life, refpon- 
 fible only to the diets, confcious that they could 
 at all times engage a nuncio to proteft, and thus 
 elude an enquiry into their adminiilration ; it was 
 alfo fupported by the adherents of many nobles 
 accufed of capital crimes before the diet, the only 
 tribunal before v/hich th-y could be tritd : ail the 
 nuncios who oppofed the raifmg of additional 
 fubfidies by taxes, which tlie exigencies of the 
 ftate then demanded, feconded the propofal of 
 putting an end to the afiembly. But the principal 
 
 caufe
 
 Poland, 8 1 
 
 caufe of all were the foreign powers, interefted to 
 foment confufions in the Polifh councils. Before 
 this, they were obliged to fecure a majority ; af- 
 terwards, thrcy might put an end to any diet, un- 
 friendly to their views, by corrupting a fingle 
 member. This veto broke up feven diets in the 
 reign of John Cafimir, four under Michael, fe- 
 ven under John Sobiefki, and thirty during the 
 reigns of the two Augufti. In confequence of 
 this neceflity of unanimity, which they call the 
 deareft palladium of Polifh liberty, Poland has 
 continued above a hundred years almoft without 
 laws, s 
 
 But as the king ftill bellowed the flaroflies, or 
 royal fiefs, which are held for life, and confer- 
 red the principal dignities and great offices of 
 ftate, he was ftill the fountain of honour, and 
 maintained great influence in the councils of the 
 nation ; but this laft branch of the royal prero- 
 gative was lately wrefted from the crown at the 
 eftablifliment of the permanent c. uncil. 
 
 Thus it appears in the hiftory of Poland, aa 
 in that of Venice, Genoa, Berne, Soleure, and 
 all others, that the nobles have continued with- 
 out interruption to fcramble for diminutions of 
 the regal authority, to grafp the whole executive 
 power, and augment their own privileges , and 
 have attained a dire6t ariftocracy, under a mo- 
 narchical name, where a few are above the con- 
 troul of the laws, while the many are deprived 
 of their protedlion. 
 
 The prefcnt wretched ftate of the towns, com- 
 pared with their former flourilhing condition , 
 the poverty of the peafants, whofe opprefllons 
 have increafcd in proportion to the power of the 
 nobles, having loft a protedor when the king 
 G loft
 
 82 Monarchical or regal Repuhlics. 
 
 loft his weight in the conftitution ; the total con- 
 fufion in all public affairs ; the declenfion of im- 
 portance, and lofs of territory all fliew that ab- 
 folute monarchy is preferable to fuch a republic. 
 Would twelve millions of inhabitants, under an 
 Englifh conftitution, or under the conftitution 
 of any one of the United States, have been par- 
 titioned and difmembered ? No -, not by a league 
 of all the abfolute fovereigns of Europe againft 
 them at once. Such are the effeds of collecting 
 all authority into one center, of neglecting an 
 equilibrium of powers, and of not having three 
 branches in the legiflature. 
 
 The pradice of cantoning a body of foldiers 
 near the plain where the kings are elected, has 
 been adopted by fevcral foreign powers for near a 
 century ; and, although it may be galling to the 
 nobility, prevents the effuGon of blood that for- 
 nierly deluged the afiembly. This was done, at 
 the election of Staniflaus Auguftus, by the cm- 
 prefs of Ruffia and the king of PrufTia j five 
 thoufand Ruffian troops were ftationed at a fmall 
 diftance from the plain of Vola. 
 
 Staniflaus was in the thirty-fecond year of his 
 age when he afcended the throne, in 1764. From 
 his virtues and abilities, the faireft hopes were 
 conceived of his raifing Poland from its deplo- 
 rable fituation -, but his exertions for the public 
 good were fettered by the conftitution, by the 
 factions of a turbulent people, and the intrigues 
 of neighbouring powers. His endeavours to in- 
 troduce order at home, and independence abroad, 
 which would have increafcd the power of his 
 country, and her confideration with foreign na- 
 tions, alarmed the neighbouring powers. The 
 fpirit of religious intolerance produced a civil 
 
 war.
 
 Poland. 83 
 
 war, and the fenate petitioned the ambaflador 
 from Peterfburg, not to withdraw the Ruffian 
 troops. The royal troops, aided by the Ruf- 
 fians, whofe difcipline was fuperior, were in fa- 
 vour of religious liberty. The Confederates, fe- 
 cretjy encouraged by Auftria, affifted by the 
 Turks, and fupplied with money and officers by 
 the French, were able to protradl hoftilities from 
 1768 to 1772: during this period the attempt 
 was made to alfaffinate the king. 
 
 Count Pulafki, who was killed in the fervice 
 of the United States, is faid to have planned an 
 enterprize fo much to his diffionour. No good 
 caufe ever wa?, or ever will be, ferved by afTaffi- 
 nation ; and this is happily, in the prefent age, 
 the univerfai fenfe of mankind. If a Papal nun- 
 cio was found in Poland, capable of bleffing the 
 weapons of confpirators againil this tolerant king, 
 he was a monfter, whofe bloody bigotry the libe- 
 ral fpirit of the Pope himfelf muft, at this en- 
 lightened period, abominate. The king did him- 
 feli-' immortal honour, by his interceffion with the 
 diet to remit the tortures and horrid cruelties de- 
 creed by the laws of mod kingdoms in Europe 
 againft treafon, and by his moderation towards all 
 the confpirators. 
 
 We are now arrived at the confummation of all 
 panegyrics upon a fovereignty in a fingle afiem- 
 bly the Partition. 
 
 Pruffia was formerly in a (late of vaflTalage to 
 this republic ; Ruffia once faw its capita) and 
 throne pofleffcd by the Poles ; and Auftria was 
 indebted to John Sobiefl^i, a fovereign of this 
 country, for compelling the Turks to raifc the 
 fiege of Vienna, but a century ago. A republic 
 fo lately the protestor of its neighbours, would 
 not, without the moft palpable imperfe<5lions in 
 G 2 the
 
 84 Monarchical or regal Republics. 
 
 the orders and balances of its government, h&vc 
 declined in an age of general improvement, and 
 become a prey to any invader much Icfs would 
 it have forced the world to acknowledge, that 
 the tranflation of near five millions of people, 
 from a republican government to that of abfo- 
 lute empires and monarchies, whether it were done 
 by right or by wrong, is a bleffing to them. 
 The partition was projected by the king of Pruf- 
 fia, who communicated it to the emperor and 
 cmprefs. The plague was one circumftancc, and 
 the Ruffian war againft the Turks another, that 
 favoured the defign , and the partition-treaty was 
 figned at Peterfburg, in February 1772, by the 
 Ruffian, Auftrian, and Pruffian plenipotentiaries. 
 The troops of the three courts were already in 
 pofieffion of the greateft part of Poland, and 
 the Confederates were foon difperfed. The par- 
 titioning powers proceeded with fuch fecrecy, that 
 only vague conjectures were made at Warfaw, 
 and that lord Cathcarr, the Englifh minifter at 
 Peterfburg, obtained no authentic information of 
 the treaty until two months after its fignature. 
 The formal notification, to the king and fenate 
 at Warfaw, was made, by the Imperial and Pruf- 
 fian ambaffadors, in September 1772, of the pre- 
 tenfions of their courts to the Polilh territory. 
 The remonftrances of the king and fenate, as well 
 as thofe of the courts of London, Paris, Stock- 
 holm, and Copenhagen, had no effedt ; and the 
 moft humiliating record, that ever appeared in the 
 annals of a republic, is leen in the king's fum- 
 mons " Since there are no hopes from any 
 " quarter, and any further delays will only tend 
 " to draw down the moft dreadful calamities 
 ** upon the remainder of the dominions which 
 *' are left to the republic, the diet is convened 
 
 " for
 
 Poland. ^5 
 
 ** for the 19th of April, 1773, auording to thf 
 *' will of the three courts ; neverthelcfs, in order 
 " to avoid all caufe of reproach, the king, with 
 "*' the advice of the fenate, again appeals to the 
 " guarantees of the treaty of Oliva." It is not 
 to be doubted, that if there had been in Poland 
 a people in exiftence, as there is in Holland, to 
 have given this amiable prince only the autho- 
 rity of a ftadtholder, he would have faid, " 1 will 
 *' die in the laft ditch." 
 
 Of the difmembered provinces, the Ruffian, 
 which is the largeft territory, contains only one 
 million and a half of fouls; the Auftrian, which 
 is the mod populous, contains two millions and 
 a half; the Pruffian, which is the mod commer- 
 cial, commanding the navigation of the Viftula, 
 contains only eight hundred and fixty thoufand, 
 and has given a fatal blow to the commerce of 
 Poland, by transferring it from Dantzick to Me- 
 mcl and Koniglburg. 
 
 The finilhing ftroke of all remains. 
 The three ambafladors, on the 13th of Sep- 
 tember, 1773, delivered, *' A part of thofe car- 
 " dinal laws, to the ratification of which our 
 *' courts will not fufFer any contradidion. 
 
 I. The ciov;n of Poland (hall be for ever 
 
 cledlive, and all order of fuccefTion profcribed : 
 
 any perfon who fliall endeavour to break this 
 
 law Ihall be declared an enemy to his country, 
 
 and liable to be punifhed accordingly. 
 
 " II. Foreign candidates to the throne, being 
 
 *' the frequent caufe of troubles and divifions, 
 
 " fhall be excluded ; and it fhall be enabled, 
 
 that, for the future, no perfon can be chofen 
 
 king of Poland, and great duke of Lithuania, 
 
 *' excepting a native Pole, of noble origin, and 
 
 ** pofTcfTing land within the kingdom. The fon, 
 
 G 3 " or
 
 8 6 Monarchical or regal Repuhlics. 
 
 " or grandfon, of a king of Poland, cannot be 
 " eleded immediately upon the death of their 
 " father or grandfather ; and are not eligible, ex- 
 " cepting after an interval of two reigns. 
 
 " III. The government of Poland fhall be for 
 *' ever free, independent, and of a republican 
 " form. 
 
 " IV. The true principle of faid government 
 *' confiding in the ftrift execution of its laws, 
 " and the equilibrium of the three eftates, viz. 
 *' the king, the fenate, and the equeftrian order, 
 " a permanent council fhall be eRablifhed, in 
 " which the executive power fhall be vefled. In 
 " this council the equeftrian order, hitherto ex- 
 " eluded from the adminiftration of affairs in 
 " the intervals of the diets, fhall be admitted, as 
 '' fhall be more clearly laid down in the future 
 
 (( 
 
 arrangements. 
 
 Thus the fupreme legiflative authority refides 
 in the three eltares of the realm, the king, the 
 fenate, and equeftrian order, affembled in a na- 
 tional diet ; but each eftate has no negative upon 
 the other, and therefore is no balance, and very 
 little check. The great families and principal 
 palatines will ftiU govern, without any effedlual 
 contrcul. 
 
 The executive power is now vefted in the fu- 
 preme permanent council ; but here neither have 
 they any checks, all being decided by the majo- 
 rity, and the fame principal families will always 
 prevail. 
 
 Thefe auguft legiflators have acknowledged 
 the principle of a free republican government, 
 that it confifts in a ftrid execution of the laws, 
 and an equilibrium of eftates or orders : but how 
 ^rti the laws to govern? and how is' the equili- 
 brium to be preferved f Like air, oil, and warer^ 
 % fhakea
 
 Poland. 87 
 
 fhaken together in one bottle, and left in repofe ; 
 the firft will rife to the top, the laft fink to the 
 bottom, and the fecond fwim between. 
 
 Our countrymen will never run delirious after 
 a word or a name. The name republic is given 
 to things, in their nature as different and contra- 
 diftory as light and darknefs, truth and falfehood, 
 virtue and vice, happinefs and mifery. There 
 are free republics, and republics as tyrannical as 
 an oriental defpotifm. A free republic is the 
 beft of governments, and the greateft blelTing 
 which mortals can afpire to. Republics which 
 are not free, by the help of a multitude of ri- 
 gorous checks, in very fmall dates, and for fhort 
 fpaces of time, have preferved fome reverence for 
 the laws, and been tolerable -, but there have been 
 oligarchies carried to fuch extremes of tyranny, 
 that the defpotifm of Turkey, as far as the hap- 
 pinefs of the nation at large is concerned, would 
 perhaps be preferable. An empire of laws is a 
 charafteriftic of a free republic only, and fhould 
 never be applied to republics in general. If 
 there fhould ever be a people in Poland, there 
 will foon be a real kingj and if ever there fhould 
 be a king in reality, as well as in name, there 
 will foon be a people : for, inflead of the trite 
 faying, " no bifliop, no king," it would be much 
 more cxa6t and important truth to fay, no peo- 
 ple, no king, and no king, no people, meaning 
 by the word king, a firfl magiftrate poflelTed ex- 
 clufively of the executive power. It may be Idd 
 down as a univerlal maxim, that every govern- 
 ment that has not three independent branches in 
 its legiflature will foon become an abfolute mo- 
 narchy i or, an arrogant nobility, increafing every 
 day in a rage for fplendor and magnificence, 
 will annihilate the people, and, attended with 
 G 4 their
 
 S8 Monarchical or regal Republic si 
 
 their horfes, hounds, and vaflals, will run down 
 the king as they would hunt a deer, wifhing for 
 nothing fo much as to be in at the death. 
 
 The philofophical king Staniflaus felt moft fe- 
 verely this want of a people. In his obferva* 
 tions on the government of Poland, publiihed in 
 the CEuvres du Philofophe hienfaifant^ torn. iii. he 
 laments, in very pathetic terms, the miferies to 
 which they were reduced. 
 
 " The violences," fays he, " which the pafi- 
 ** cians at Rome exercifed over the people of that 
 city, before they had recourfe to open force, 
 and, by the authority of their tribunes, ba- 
 lanced the power of the nobility, are a ftriking 
 pidure of the cruelty with which we treat our 
 plebeians. This portion of our ftate is more 
 debafed among us than they were among the 
 Romans, where they enjoyed a fpecies of li- 
 berty, even in the times when they were moft' 
 " enflaved to the firft order of the republic. 
 We may fay with truth, that the people are, 
 in Poland, in a ftate of extreme humiliation. 
 We muft, neverthelefs, confider them as the 
 principal fupport of the nation ; and I am per- 
 fuaded, that the little value we fet on them 
 will have very dangerous confeqijences. Who 
 are they, in faft, who procure abundance in 
 the kingdom ? who are they that bear the bur- 
 thens, and pay the taxes ? who are they that 
 '* furnifh men to our armies } who labour our 
 ^' fields ? who gather in the crops .'' who fuftain 
 *' and nourifh us ? who are the caufe of our in- 
 *' activity .? the refuge of our lazinefs .'' the re- 
 " fource for our wants ? the fupport of our lu- 
 *' xury ? and indeed the fource of all our plea- 
 1^' fu}'es } Is it not that very populace that we 
 
 "' trta;
 
 Poland. 89 
 
 ** treat with fo much rigour ? Their pains, 
 ** their fwear, their labours, do not they merit 
 
 *t 
 
 any better return than our fcorn and difdain ? 
 
 We fcarcely diftinguilh them from the brutes, 
 *' which they maintain for the cultivation oi our 
 *' lands ! we frequently have lefs confideration 
 ** for their ftrength, than we have for that of 
 *' thofe animals ! and too frequently we fell them 
 " to matters as cruel as ourfelves, who imme- 
 ** ^lately force them, by an excefs of hard la- 
 *' bour, to repay the price of their new flavery ! 
 " I cannot recoiled without horror that law which 
 *' impofes only a fine of fifteen livres upon a 
 " gentleman who fhall have killed a peafant. 
 ** Poland is the only country where the populace 
 ** are fallen from all the rights of humanity, we 
 " alone regard thefe men as creatures of another 
 " fpecies, and we would almoft refufe them the 
 " fame air which they breathe with us. God, in 
 " the creation of man, gave him liberty what 
 " right have we to deprive him of it ? As it is 
 " natural to fhake ofi^ a yoke that is rough, hard, 
 ** and heavy, may it not happen that this people 
 " may make an effort to wreft themfelves frpm 
 ** our tyranny ? Their murmurs and complaints 
 " muft, fooner or later, lead to this. Hitherto, 
 " accullomed to their fetters, they think not of 
 ** breaking them ; but let one fingle man arife, 
 ** among thefe unfortunate wretches, with a maf- 
 *' culine and daring fpirit, to concert and foment 
 *' a revolt, what barrier (hall we oppofe to the 
 ** torrent ? We have a recent inftance, in the, 
 ** infurredion in the Ukraine, which wgs only 
 *' occalioned by the vexations of thofe among us 
 ** who had there purchafed lands. We defpifed 
 f* the courage of the poor inhabitants of that 
 
 '' country
 
 90 Monarchical or regal Republics. Poland. 
 
 *' country they found a refource in defpair, and 
 *' nothing is more terrible than the defpair of 
 *' thofe who have no courage. What is the con- 
 " dition to which we have reduced the people of 
 " our kingdom ? Reduced by mifery to the ilate 
 *' of brutes, they drag out their days in a lazy 
 ** ftupidity, which one would almoft miftake for 
 *' a total want of fentiment : they love bo arr, 
 *' they value themfelves on no induftry -, they 
 " labour no longer than the dread of chaftifement 
 *' forces them ; convinced that they cannct enjoy 
 " the fruit of their ingenuity, they ftifle their ta- 
 " lents, and make no eflays to difcover them. 
 *' Hence that frightful fcarcity in which we find 
 *' ourfelves of the mod common artifansl Should 
 *' we wonder that we are in want of things the 
 *' moft neceffary, when thofe who ought to fur- 
 ** nifh them, cannot hope for the fmalleft profit 
 ** from their cares to furnifh us ! It is only 
 " where liberty is found, that emulation can 
 [' exift." 
 
 It would be a pleafure to tranflate the whole ; 
 but it is too long. It is a pity that the whole 
 people, whofe mifery he describes and laments, 
 were not as fenfible of the neceflity of a lefs cir- 
 cumfcribed royal authority. 
 
 I- E T T E R
 
 Recapitulation . g t 
 
 LETTER XXIIL 
 
 RECAPITULATION. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 AS we have taken a curfory view of thofc 
 countries in Europe, where the government 
 may be called, in any realbnable conftruftion of 
 the word, republican -, let us now paufe a few 
 moments, and rcfled upon what we have feen. 
 
 Among every people, and in every fpecies of 
 republics, we have conftantly found a firji magif- 
 trate, ahead, a chief, under various denominations 
 indeed, and with different degrees of authority, 
 with the title of ftadtholder, burgomafter, avoyer, 
 doge, confalloniero, prefident, fyndick, mayor, 
 alcalde, capitaneo, governor, or king : in every 
 nation, we have met with a dillinguifhed officer : 
 if there is no example in any free government, 
 any more than in thofe which are not free, of a 
 focicty without a principal perfonage, we may 
 fairly conclude, that the body politic cannot fub- 
 fift without one, any more than the animal body 
 without a head. If Mr. Turgot had made any 
 difcovery, which had efcaped the penetration of 
 all the legiflators and philolophers, who had lived 
 before him, he ought at leaft to have communi- 
 cated it to the world for their improvement-, but 
 as he has never hinted at any fuch invention, we 
 may fafely conclude that he had none , and there- 
 fore, that the Americans are not juftly liable to 
 cenlures, for m^iiuun^ ^overmrs^ 
 
 Jn
 
 92 Recapitulation, 
 
 In every form of government, we have {ctn 2 
 fenate, or little council^ a compofition, generally, of 
 fhofe officers of ftate, who have the moft experi- 
 ence and power, and a few other members feleft- 
 cd from the higheft ranks, and moft illuftrious 
 reputations. On thefe leflTer councils, with the 
 firft magiftrate at their head, generally refts the 
 principal burden of adminiftration, a fliare in the 
 Icgillative, as well as executive and judicial au- 
 thority of government. The admiffion of fuch 
 fenates to a participation of thefe three kinds of 
 pov/er, has been generally obferved to produce in 
 the minds of their members an ardent ariftocrati- 
 cal ambition, grafping equally at the prerogatives 
 of the firft magiftrate, and the privileges of the 
 people, and ending in the nobility of a few fami- 
 lies, and a tyrannical oligarchy : but in thofe 
 ftates, where the fenates have been debarred from 
 all executive power, and confined to the legifla- 
 tive, they have been obferved to be firm barriers 
 againft the encroachments of the crown, and often 
 great fupporters of the liberties of the people. 
 The Americans then, who have carefully confined 
 their fenates to the legiflative power, have done 
 wifely in adopting them. 
 
 We have feen, in every inftance, another and 
 a larger affembly, compoled of the body of the 
 people, in fome little ftates ; of reprefentatives 
 chofen by the people in others ; of members ap- 
 pointed by the fenates, and fuppofed to reprefenc 
 the people, in a third fort; and of perfons ap- 
 pointed by themfelves or the fenate, in certain 
 ariftocracies ; to prevent them from becoming 
 oligarchies. The Americans then, whofe afiem- 
 blies are the moft adequate, proportional, and 
 fouitable reprefcntacions of the people, that are 
 
 known
 
 ' Recapitulation, 93 
 
 Tcnown in the world, will not be thought erro- 
 neous in appointing houfes of reprefentacives. 
 
 In every republic, in the fniallcfl: and moft po- 
 pular, in the larger and more ariftocratical, as 
 well as in the largeft and moft monarchical, we 
 have obferved a multitude of curious and inge- 
 nious inventions to balance, in their turn, all 
 thofe powers, to check the paflions peculiar to 
 them, and to controul them from rufliing into 
 thofe exorbitancies to which they are molt ad- 
 di6led the Americans will then be no longer 
 ccnfured for endeavouring to introduce an equi- 
 librium, which is much more profoundly medi- 
 tated, and much more efFedual for the protedion 
 of the laws, than any we have feen, except in 
 England : we may even queftion whether that is 
 an exception. 
 
 In every country we have found a variety of 
 orders^ with very great diftinclions. In America, 
 there are different orders of offices^ but none of 
 men ; out of office all men are of the fame fpecies, 
 and of one blood ; there is neither a greater nor 
 a lefler nobility Why then are they acculed of 
 eftablifhing diflerent orders of men ? To our 
 inexprelfible mortification we muft have remark- 
 ed, that the people have preferved a fhare of 
 power, or an exiftence in the government, in no 
 country out of England, except upon the tops 
 of a few inacceffiblc mountains, among rocks and 
 precipices, in territories fo narrow that you may 
 Ipan them with an hand's breadth, where, living 
 unenvied, in extreme poverty, chiefly upon paf- 
 turagc, deftitute of manufadures and commerce, 
 they ftill exhibit the moft charming pidlure of 
 life, and the moft dignified chara(fler of human 
 natufe. 
 
 Wherever
 
 54 Recapitulation. 
 
 Wherever we have feen a territory fomewhac 
 larger, arts and fciences more cultivated, com- 
 merce flourifhing, or even agriculture improved 
 to any great degree, an ariftocracy has rifen up 
 in a courfe of time, confifting of a few rich and, 
 honourable families, who have united with each 
 other againft both the people and the firft ma- 
 giftrate ; wrefted from the former, by art and by 
 force, all their participation in the government, 
 and even infpired them with fo mean an efteem 
 of themfelves, and fo deep a veneration and ftrong 
 attachment to their rulers, as to believe and con- 
 fefs them a fuperior order of beings. 
 
 We have feen thele noble families, although 
 neceflitated to have a head, extremely jealous of 
 his influence, anxious to reduce his power, and 
 conftrain him to as near a level with themfelves 
 as poffible , always endeavouring to efiablifh a 
 rotation by which they may all equally in turn be 
 entitled to the pre-eminence, and equally an- 
 xious to preferve to themfelves as large a fliare 
 of power as polTible in the executive and ju- 
 dicial, as well as the legiilative departments of 
 the ftate. 
 
 Thefe patrician families have alfo appeared 
 in every inftance to be equally jealous of each 
 other, and to have contrived, by blending lot 
 and choice, by mixing various bodies in the elec- 
 tions to the fame offices, and even by the horrors 
 of an inquifition, to guard againft the fm that fo 
 eafily befets them, of being wholly influenced 
 and governed by a junto or oligarchy of a few 
 among themfelves. 
 
 We have feen no one government, in which is 
 a diftin(51: feparation of the legiflative from the 
 executive power, and of the judicial from both, 
 
 or
 
 Recapitulation, 95 
 
 or in which any attempt has been made to ba- 
 lance thefe powers with one another, or to form 
 an equilibrium between the one, the few, and 
 the many, for the purpofe of enabling and exe- 
 cuting equal laws, by common confent, for the 
 general intereft, excepting in England. 
 
 Shall we conclude, from thefe melancholy ob- 
 fervations, that human nature is incapable of li- 
 berty, that no honeft equality can be preferved 
 in fociety, and that fuch forcible caufes are al- 
 ways at work as muft reduce all men to a fub- 
 miilion to defpotifm, monarchy, oligarchy, orarif- 
 tocracy ? 
 
 By no means. We have feen one of the firft 
 nations in Europe, poflefled of ample and fertile 
 territories at home, and extenfive dominions 
 abroad, of a commerce with the whole world, 
 immenfe v/ealth, and the greateft naval power 
 which ever belonged to any nation, who have 
 ftill preferved the power of the people, by the 
 equilibrium we are contending for, by the trial 
 by jury, and by conftantly refuGng a Handing 
 army. The people of England alone, by pre- 
 ferving their mare in the legiflature, at the ex- 
 pence of the blood of heroes and patriots, have 
 enabled their kings to curb the nobility, without 
 giving him a (landing army. 
 
 After all, let us. compare every conflitution 
 we have feen, with thofe of the United States of 
 America, and we fhall have no reafon to blulli 
 for our country ; on the contrary, we fliall feel 
 the ftrongell motives to fall upon our knees, in 
 gratitude to heaven for having been gracioufly 
 pleafed to give us birth and education in that 
 country, and for having deftined us to live under 
 her laws ! We fhall have reafon to exult, if we 
 
 make
 
 g5 Recapitulation. 
 
 make our comparifon with England and he Eng- 
 lifli conftitution. Our people are undoubtedly fo- 
 vereign all the landed and other property is ir 
 the hands of the citizens not only their repre- 
 fcntatives, but their fenators and governors, arc 
 annually chofen there are no hereditary titles, 
 honours, offices, or diftindtions the legiQative,, 
 executive, and judicial powers are carefully fepa- 
 ratcd from each other the powers of the one, 
 the few, and the many, are nicely balanced in 
 their legiflatures trials by jury are preferved ii> 
 all their glory, and there is no (landing army 
 the habeas corpus is in full force the prefs is the 
 moft free in the world and where all thcfe cir- 
 cumftances take place, it is unneceflary to add 
 that the laws alone can govern. 
 
 LETTER
 
 Dr. Swift 97 
 
 LETTER XXIV. 
 
 ANCIENT REPUBLICS, AND OPINIONS 
 OF PHILOSOPHERS. 
 
 DR. S V/ I F T. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 THE authority of legiflators and philofo- 
 phers, in fupport of the fyftem we contend 
 for, is not difficult to find. The greatefb lights 
 of humanity, ancient and modern, have approved 
 it, which renders it difficult to explain how it 
 comes, in this enlightened age, to be called in 
 queftion, as it certainly has been, by others as 
 well as Mr. Turgor. I ffiall begin with one, 
 who, though feldom quoted as a legiflator, ap- 
 pears to have confidered this fubjedt, and fur- 
 niOied arguments enough, for ever to determine 
 the queilion. Dr. Swift, in his Contefts and 
 DiiTcnfions between the Nobles and Commons of 
 Athens and Rome, obfervt's, that the belt legii- 
 lators of all ages agree in this, that the abfolutc 
 power, which originally is in the whole body, is 
 a truil too great to be committed to any one man 
 or allcmbly , and therefore, in their feveral infti- 
 tutions of government, power in the lad refort, 
 was always placed by them in balance, among the 
 one, the few, and the many ; and it will be an 
 eternal rule in politics, among every free people, 
 that there is a balance of power to be held by 
 every Hate within itlelf. A mixed governmenr, 
 vartaking of the known forms received in the 
 H fchools
 
 g% Ancierit Republics, 6fr. 
 
 fchools, is by no means of Gothic invention, bur 
 hath place in nature and reafon, and feems very 
 well to agree with the fentiments of moft legifla- 
 tors : for, not ro n^ention the feveral republics 
 of this compofuion in Gaul and Germany, de- 
 fcribed by Csfar and Tacitus, Polybius tells us, 
 the belt government is that which confifls of three 
 forms, regno^ optimatium, et populi imperio. Such 
 was that of Sparta in its primitive intlitution by 
 Lycurgus, who, obferving the depravations to 
 which every one of thele was fubjeft, com- 
 pounded his fcheme out of all ; fo that it was 
 made up of r^^^^j-, fenicres, et pcpulns. Such alio 
 was the itate of Rome, under its coni'uls ; and 
 fuch, at Carthage, was the pov/cr in the lall re- 
 fort : they had their kings, fenate, and people. 
 A limited and divided power feems to have been 
 the moft ancient and inherent principle, both of 
 the Greeks and Italians, in matters of govern- 
 ment. The dilTerence between the Grecian mo- 
 narchies and Italian republics was not very great. 
 The power of thofe Grecian princes, who came 
 to the fie^e of Troy, was much of a fize with 
 that of the kings of Sparta, the archon of Athens, 
 the fuffctes at Carthage, and the confuls at Rome, 
 Thefeus ellablilhed at Athens rather a mixed mo- 
 narchy than a popular ftate, afflgmng to himfelf 
 the guardiandiip of the laws, and the chief com- 
 mand in war. This inditution continued during 
 the feries of kings to the death of Codrus, from 
 whom Solon was defcended, who, finding the 
 people engaged in two violent factions, of the 
 poor and the rich, and in great confufion, refu- 
 fing the monarchy which was offered him, chofe 
 rather to caft the government after another mo- 
 del, wherein he made due proviiion for fettling 
 ibe balance of fowcvy choofing a fenate of four 
 
 hundred.
 
 Dr. Szvift, 99 
 
 liundred, and difpofing the magiftracies and of- 
 fices according to men's eftates, leaving to the 
 multitude their votes in electing, and the power 
 of judging certain procelTes by appeal. This 
 council of four hundred was chofen, one hundred 
 out of each tribe, and feems to have been a body 
 reprefcntative of the people, though the people 
 collective referved a fhare of power to them- 
 felves. 
 
 In all free ftates, the evil to be avoided is ty- 
 ranny ; that is to fay, x.\\ftfumma imperii^ or unlimit- 
 ed power, folely in the hands of the one, the few, 
 or the many. Though we cannot prolong ihe 
 period of a commonwealth beyond the decree of 
 heaven, or the date of its nature, any more than 
 human life beyond the ftrength of the feminal 
 virtue; yet we may manage a fickly conltitution, 
 and preferve a (trong one , we may watch, and 
 prevent accidents , v/e may turn off a great blow 
 from without, and purge away an ill humour 
 that is lurking within ; and render a ftate long 
 lived, though not immortal. Some phyficians 
 have thought, that if it were pracflicable to keep 
 the feveral humours of the body in an exa6t ba- 
 lance of each with its oppofite, it might be im- 
 mortal ; and fo perhaps would a political body, 
 if the balance of power could be always held ex- 
 actly even. 
 
 All independent bodies of men feem naturally 
 to divide into the three powers, of the one, the 
 few, and the many. A free people met toge- 
 ther, as loon as they fall into any afts of civil 
 fociety, do of themfelves divide into three ranks. 
 The firft is, that of fome one eminent fpirit, who, 
 having hgnalized his valour and fortune in de- 
 fence of his country, or by the practice of po- 
 pular arts at home, comes to have great influence 
 jrl 2 on
 
 lOo Jncient Republics, ^c. 
 
 on the people-, to grow their leader in warlike 
 expeditions ; and to prefide, after a fort, in their 
 civil affemblies. The fecond is, of fuch men as 
 have acquired large poflcfTions, and confequently 
 dependencies, or defccnd from anceflors who 
 have left them great inheritances, together with aa 
 hereditary authority j thefe, eafily uniting in opi- 
 nions, and ading in concert, begin to enter upon 
 meafures for fecuring their properties, which 
 are bed upheld by preparing againll invafions 
 from abroad, and maintaining peace at home: 
 this commences a great council, or fenate, for the 
 v;eiglity affairs of the nation. The laft divifioii 
 is, of the mafs of the people, whofe part of 
 power is great and indifpurable, whenever they 
 can unite, either collectively or by deputation, to 
 exert it. 
 
 The true meaning of a balance of power is beft 
 conceived by confideringwhat the nature ofa balance 
 is. It fuppofes three things: firft, the part which is 
 held, together with the hand that holds it; and then 
 the two fcales, with whatever is weighed therein. 
 In a ftate within itfelf, the balance muft be held 
 by a third hand, who is to deal the remaining 
 power, with the utmoft exaftnefs into the feveral 
 fcales. The balance may be held by the weakeft, 
 who by his addrefs, removing from eicher fcale, 
 and adding his own, may keep the fcales duly 
 poifed : when the balance is broken by mighty 
 weights falling into either fcale, the power will 
 never continue long, in equal divifion, between 
 the two remaining parties ; but, till the balance is 
 fixed anew, will run entirely into one. This is 
 made to appear by the examples of the Decemviri 
 in Rome, the Ephori in Sparta, the four hundred 
 in Athens, the thirty in Athens, and the Domi- 
 natio Plebis in Carthage and Argos. 
 
 In
 
 Br. Swift. loi 
 
 In Rome, from the time of Romulus to Julius 
 Ca^far, the commons were growing by degrees 
 into power, gaining ground upon the patricians, 
 inch by inch, until at Jaft they quite overturned 
 the balance, leaving all doors open to popular and 
 ambitious men, who deftroyed the wifeft republic, 
 and enflaved the nobleft people, that ever entered 
 on the ftage of the world. Polybius tells us, that 
 in the fecond punic war, the Carthaginians were 
 declining, becaufe the balance was got too much 
 on the fide of the people , whereas the Romans 
 were in their greateft vigour, by the power re- 
 maining in the fenate. 1 he ambition of private 
 men did by no means begin, or occafion the war, 
 between Pompey ard Casfar, though civil diflen- 
 tions never fail to introduce and fpirit the ambi- 
 tion of private men ; for while the balance of 
 power is equally held, the ambition of private men, 
 whether orators or commanders, gives neither 
 danger nor fear, nor can poflibly enflave their 
 country , but that once broken, the divided par- 
 ties are forced to unite each to its head, under 
 whofe conduct or fortune one fide is at firft vic- 
 torious, and at lad both are flaves. And to put it 
 pall difpute, that the entire lubverfion of Roman 
 liberty was altogether owing to thofe meafures, 
 which had broke the balance between the patri- 
 cians and plebeians, whereof the ambition of pri- 
 vate men was but the effei^l and confequence ; 
 we need only confider, that when the uncorrupted 
 part of the lenate, by the death of Cselar, had 
 made one great etfort to reftore their liberty, the 
 uccefs did notanfwer their hopes ; but that whole 
 afiembly was fo funk in its authority, that thefe 
 patriots were obliged to fly, and give way to the 
 Riadncfs of the people, who by their own difpofK 
 
 H 3 tions
 
 102 Ancient Republics^ ^c, 
 
 tions, flirred up by the harangues of their ora- 
 tors, were now wholly bent upon fingle and de- 
 fpotic (laveryj elfe how cculd fuch a profligate 
 as Anthony, or a boy of eighteen like Odlavius, 
 ever dare to dream of giving law to fuch an em- 
 pire and fuch a people? Wherein the latter fuc- 
 ceeded, and entailed the vilefl: tyranny, that 
 Heaven in its anger, ever inflicted on a corrupt 
 and poifoned people. 
 
 It is an error to think it an uncontroulable 
 jnaxim, that power is always fafer lodged in many 
 hands than in one : for if thefe many hands be 
 made up from one of thofe three divifions, it is 
 plam, from the examples produced, and eafy to be 
 paralleled in other ages and countries, that they 
 are as capable of enflaving the nation, and of 
 acting all manner of tyranny and opprefiion, as it 
 is poffible for a fingle perlon to be, though v/e 
 fhould fuppofe their nun^,ber not only to be four 
 or five hundred, but three thoufaiid. In order 
 to preferve a balance in a mix'-d fiiate, the limits 
 of power depofitcd with each party, ought to be 
 afcertained and gc-nerally known: the defe(5t of 
 this is the cauie of thole ilrugglcs in a flate, about 
 prerogative and liberty , about encroachments of 
 the few upon the rig'. is of the many, and of the 
 many upon the privileges of the few \ which ever 
 did, and ever will, conclude in a tyranny; firfl: either 
 ot the few or the many, but at lafl, infallibly, of a 
 Jjngk perfrm : for whichever of the three divifions 
 in a itate is upon the Icramble for more power 
 than its own, as one of the three generally is 
 (unlefs due care be taken by the other tv/o) ; upon 
 every new queftion that ariles, they will be fure to 
 decide in favour of thcmfelves-, they will make 
 large demands, and fcanry concelTionSj ever rom^ 
 i in.f?
 
 Dr. Swift. 103 
 
 ing off confiderable gainers-, thus at length the 
 balance is broke, and tyranny let in, from which 
 door of the three it matters not. 
 
 The dcfires of men, arc not only exorbitant, 
 but endlels: they grafp at all; and can form no 
 fchemc of perfect happinefs with Icfs. Ever fince 
 men have been formed into governments, the en- 
 deavours after univerfal monarchy have been 
 bandied among them: the Athenians, the Spar- 
 tans, the Thebans, and the Achaians, feveral 
 times aimed at the univerfal dominion of Greece : 
 the commonwealths of Carthage and Rome affedt- 
 ed the univerfal empire of the world : in like 
 manner has ablolute power been purfued, by the 
 feveral powers in each particular ftate, wherein 
 fingle perfons have met with moil fuccefs, though 
 the endeavours of the few and the many have 
 been frequent enough ; yet being neither lb uni- 
 form in their defigns, nor fo dired: in their 
 views, they neither could manage nor maintain 
 the power they had got, but v/ere deceived by 
 the popular ambition of fome fingle perfon : lo 
 that it will be always a wrong Hep in policy, for 
 the nobles or commons to carry their endeavours 
 after power fo far as to overthrow the balance. 
 With all relpefl for popular aflembl^es be it 
 fpoken, it is hard to recoiled one folly, infirmity, 
 or vice, to which a fingle man is fubjedt, and 
 from which a body of commons, either coUedive 
 or reprefented, can be wholly exempt ; from 
 whence it comes to pafs, that in their refults, have 
 fometimes been found the fame fpirit of cruelty 
 and revenge, of malice and pride ; the fame blind- 
 nefs, and obftinacy, and unfteadinefs -, the fame 
 ungovernable rage and anger; the fame injuftice, 
 fophiftry, and fraud, that ever lodged in the bread 
 of any individual. When a child grows eafy by 
 
 H 4 being
 
 104 Antient Rspuhlics, ^c. 
 
 being humoured, and a lover fatisfied by fmall 
 compliances without further purfuits, then expe6t 
 popular aflemblies to be content with fmall con- 
 ceflions. \i there could one fmgle example be 
 brought from the whole compals of hiitory, of 
 any one popular affembly who, after beginning 
 to contend for power, ever fat down quietly with 
 a certain fhare-, or of one that ever knew, or pro- 
 pofed, or declared, what fhare of pow.r was their 
 due, then might there be fom.e hopes, that it was 
 a matter to be adjufted by reafonings, confe- 
 rences, or debates. An ufurping populace is its 
 own dupe, a mere under-worker, and a purchafer 
 jn truft tor fome fingle tyrant, whofe Hate and 
 power they advance to their ov>/n ruin, with as 
 blind an inftinft, as thofe worms that die with 
 weaving magnificent habits for beings of a fupe- 
 rior order. The people are more dextrous at 
 pulling down and letting up, than at preferving 
 what is fixed \ and they are not fonder of feizing 
 more than their own, than they are of delivering 
 it up again to the worft bidder, with their own 
 into the bargain. Their earthly devotion is fel- 
 dom paid to above one at a time, of their own 
 creation, whofe oar they pull with lefs murmuring 
 and more fkill, than when they fliare the leading, 
 or even hold the helm. 
 
 You will perceive by the ftyle, that it is Dr. 
 Swift that has been ipeaking; otherwife yoq 
 plight have been deceived, and imagined tl^at 1 
 was entertaining you with further reflections upon 
 the Ihort account prcvioiifly given you in thefc 
 letters, of the modern republics. I'here is not 
 an obfervation here that is not juftified by the 
 hiftory of every government we have confider- 
 cd. How much more maturely had this writer 
 weighed the fubjed, than Mr. Turgot Perhaps 
 
 thcrG
 
 Br. Franklin, 105 
 
 tbere Is not to be found, in any library, fo many- 
 accurate ideas of government exprefled with fo 
 much perfpicuity, brevity, and precifion. 
 
 LETTER XXV, 
 
 DR. FRANKLIN. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 AS it is impoffible to fuppofe that Mr. Turgot 
 intended to recommend to the Americans 
 a fimple monarchy or ariftocracy, we have admit- 
 ted, as a fuppofition the moft favourable to him, 
 that, by collecting all authority into one center, 
 he meant a fingle allembly of reprefentatives of 
 the people, without a governor, and without a 
 fenate ; and although he has not explained, whe- 
 ther he would have the aflembly chofen for life, 
 or years, we will again admit, as the moft benign 
 conftruftion, that he meant the reprefentatives 
 fhould be annually chofen. 
 
 Here we fhall be obliged to confider the reputed 
 opinion of another philofopher, I mean Dr. Frank- 
 lin : I lay reputed, becaufe I am not able to af- 
 firm that it is really his : it is, however, fo gene- 
 rally underftood and reported, both in Europe 
 and America, that his judgment was in oppofi- 
 tion to two alTemblies, and in favour of a fingle 
 one, that in a dilquifition like this it ought not to 
 be omitted. To be candid with you, a little be- 
 fore the date of Mr. Turgot's letter. Dr. Franklin 
 jiad arrived in Paris with the American conftitu- 
 pqns, and among the reft that of Penfylvania, in 
 
 which
 
 io6 Ancient Republics^ i^c. 
 
 which there was but one aflembly : it was report- 
 ed too, that the dodtor had prefided in tiie con- 
 vention when it was made, and there approved it. 
 Mr. Turgot, reading over the conftitutions, and 
 admiring that of Peniylvania, was led ro cenfure 
 the reft, which were fo different from it. 1 
 know of no other evidence, that the doctor ever 
 gave his voice for a fingle aiTembly, but the com- 
 mon anecdote which is known to every body. Ic 
 is faid, that in 1776, in the convention of Pen- 
 fylvania, of which the dodor was prefidenr, a 
 projed of a form of government by one affenibly, 
 was before them in debate : a motion was made to 
 add another affembly under the name of a fenate 
 or council ; this motion was argued by feveral 
 members, fome for the affirmative, and fome for 
 the negative; and before the queftion was put 
 the opinion of the prefident was requefted : the 
 prefident rofe, and faid, that " Two afTembhes 
 *' appeared to him, like a pra6lice he had fome- 
 *' where feen, of certain waggoners who, when 
 *' about to defcend a fteep hill, wirh a heavy load, 
 ** if they had four cattle, took off one pair from 
 ** before, and chaining them to the hinder part 
 '* of the waggon drove them up hill ; while the 
 " pair before, and the weight of the load, over- 
 " balancing the ftrength of thofe behind, drew 
 " them flowly and moderately down the hill." 
 
 The prefident of Peniylvania might, upon fuch 
 an occafion, have recoUeded one of Sir Ifaac 
 Newton's laws of motion, viz. " that re-action 
 *' muft always be equal and contrary to aftion," 
 or there can never be any reft. He might have 
 alluded to thofe angry affemblies in the Heavens, 
 which fo often overipread the city of Philadelphia, 
 till the citizens with apprehenfion and terror, 
 threatening to fee the world on fire, merely be- 
 
 cauf;,'
 
 Dr. Franklin, 1 07 
 
 caufe the powers within them are not fufficiently 
 balanced. He might have recollcded, that a 
 pointed rod, a machine as fmiple as a waggoner, 
 or a monarch, or a governor, would be fufficient 
 at any time, filcntly and innocently, to difarm 
 thofe aflcmblies of all their terrors, by reftoring 
 between-them the balance of the powerful fiuid, 
 and thus prevent the danger and deftruftion to 
 the properties and lives of men, which often hap. 
 pen for the want of it. 
 
 However, allufions and illuftrations drawni 
 from paftural and rural life are never difagreeable, 
 and in this cafe might be as appofite as if they 
 had been taken from the fciences and the fkics. 
 Plarrington, if he had been prefenc in convention, 
 would have exclaimed, as he did when he men- 
 tioned his two girls dividing and choofing a cake, 
 "Oh! the depth of rhewifdom ofGod, which in the 
 fimple invention of a carter, has revealed to man- 
 kind the whole myftery of a commonwealth ; 
 which confifls as much in dividing and equalizing 
 forces ; in controuling the weight of the load and 
 the a<R;ivity of one part, by the itrength of another, 
 as it does in dividing and choofing." Harrington 
 too, inftead of his children dividing and choofing 
 their cake, might have alluded to thofe attrac- 
 tions and rcpuKions, by which the balance of 
 nature is prcferved : or to thofe centripetal and 
 centrifugal forces, by which the heavenly bodies 
 are contmued in their orbits, inftead of rufliing 
 to the fun, or flying off in tangents among co- 
 mets and tixed ftars : impelled, or drawn by dif- 
 ferent forces in dilFerent dire(5tions, they are blef- 
 fings to tliL-ir own inhabitants and the neighbour- 
 \r\i{ {yfler.is ; but if they were drawn only by one 
 they would introduce anarchy wherever they 
 fho'jld <^o. There i? no objedion to fuch allu- 
 fions,
 
 loS Ancient Republics y ^c, 
 
 fions, whether fimple or fublime, as they may 
 amufe the fancy and illiiilrate an argumeni: ail that 
 is infilled on is, that whatever there is in them of 
 wit or argument, is all in favour of a complication 
 of forces, of more powers than one; of three 
 powers indeed, becaufe a balance can never be 
 fftablifhed between two orders in fociety, without 
 a third to aid the weakeft. 
 
 All that is furprifing here is, that the real force 
 of the fimile Ihould have been mifunderftood : if 
 there is any fimilitude, or any argument in it, it 
 is clearly in favour of two aflemblies. The 
 weight of the load itfelf would roll the waggon 
 on the oxen, and the cattle on one another, in one 
 fcene of deftrudion, if the forces v^/ere not di- 
 vided and the balance formed ; whereas by check- 
 ing one power by another, all defcend the hill in 
 fafety, and avoid the danger. It fhould be re- 
 membered too, that it is only in deicending un- 
 common declivities that this divifion of flrength 
 becomes neceffary. In travellmg in ordinary 
 plains, and always in afcsnding mountains, the 
 whole team draws together, and advances fafter 
 as well as cafier on its journey : it is alfo certain, 
 there are oftener arduous fteeps to mount, which 
 require the united flrength of all, with all the 
 H^ill of the director, than there are precipices tQ 
 defcend, which demand a divifion of :t. 
 
 Let us now return to Mr. Turgoi's idea of a 
 government confifling in a fingle aircmbly. He 
 tells us, our republics are '* founded on the equa- 
 ** lity of all the citizens, and therefore " orders" 
 *' and "equilibriums," are unnecefTary, and occa- 
 ** fion difputes." But what are we to underdand 
 here by equality ? Are the citizens to be all of 
 the fame age, fex, fize, llrength, ftature, activity, 
 touragCj h^rdinefs, indultry, patience^ ingcnui-r 
 
 ty.
 
 Dr. Franklin, ic 
 
 ty, wealth, knowledge, fame, wit, temperance, 
 conftancy, and wifdom ? Was there, or will there 
 ever be, a nation, whofe individuals were all equal, 
 in natural and acquired qualities, in virtues, ta- 
 knrs, and riches ? The anfwer, of all mankind 
 muft be in the negative. It muft then be ac- 
 knowledged, that in every (late, in the MalTachu- 
 jet's for example, there are inequalities which 
 God and nature have planted there, and which 
 no human Icgiflator ever can eradicate. I fhould 
 have chofen to have mentioned Virginia, as the 
 moft ancient ftate, or indeed any other in the 
 union, rather than the one that gave me birth, 
 if I were not afraid, of putting fuppofitions, 
 which may give offence, a liberty which my 
 neighbours will pardon : yet I fhall fay nothing 
 that is not applicable to all the other twelve. 
 
 \n this fociety of Maflachufettenfions then, 
 there is, it is true, a moral and political equa- 
 lity of rights and duties among all the individu- 
 als, and as yet no appearance of artificial ine- 
 qualities of condition, fuch as hereditary digni- 
 ties, titles, magiftracies, or legal diftinflions ; and 
 no edablilhed marks, as ftars, garters, crolTes 
 or ribbons : there are, nevertheiefs, inequalities of 
 great moment in the confideration of a legillator, 
 bccaufe they have a natural and inevitable influ- 
 ence in fociety. Let us enumerate fome of them : 
 I. There is an inequality of wealth : fome indivi- 
 duals, whether by d^-fcent from their anceftors, 
 or from greater Ikill, induftry, and fuccefs in 
 bufinefs, have eftates both in lands and goods of 
 great value -, others have no property at all ; and 
 all the reft of the fociety, much the greater num- 
 ber, are pofTelled of wealth, in all the variety of 
 degrees, between thefe extremes : it will eafily be 
 cwiiceived, that all the rich men will have many 
 
 of
 
 J 10 'Ancient Republics^ ^t. 
 
 of the poor, in the various trades, manufactures, 
 and other occupations in life, dependent upon 
 them for their daily bread : many of fm.aller for- 
 tunes will be in their debt, and in many ways 
 under obligations to them : others, in better cir- 
 cumftances, neither dependent nor in debt, nien 
 of letters, men of the learned profeffions, and 
 others, from acquaintance, converfation, and civi- 
 lities, will be connedted with them, and attached 
 to them. Nay farther, it will not be denied, that 
 among the wifeft people that lives, there is a 
 degree of admiration, abftracled from all depen- 
 dence, obligation, expeftation, or even acquaint- 
 ance, which accompanies fpiendid wealth, en- 
 fures fome refped, and beftows fome influence. 
 2. Birth. Let no man be furpriled, that this 
 fpecies of inequality is introduced here. Let the 
 page in hiftory be quoted, where any nation, an- 
 cient or modern, civilized or favage, is men- 
 tioned, among whom no difference was made be- 
 tween the citizens, on account of their extraction. 
 The truth is, that more influence is allowed to 
 this advantage in free republics, than in defpo- 
 tic governments, "or than would be allowed to it 
 in fimple monarchies, if fevere laws had not been 
 made from age to age to fee u re it. The children 
 of illuftrious families, have generally greater ad- 
 vantages of education, and earlier opportunities 
 to be acquainted with public charadlers, and in- 
 formed of public affairs, than thofe of meaner 
 ones, or even than thole in middle life , and Vv'hat 
 is more than all, an habitual national veneration 
 for their names, and the characters of their ancef- 
 tors deicribed in hiftory, or coming down by tra- 
 dition, removes them farther from vulgar jealoufy, 
 and popular envy, and fecures them in ibme de- 
 gree the favour, the afi^cdion, and refpect of the 
 
 public.
 
 Dr, Franklin. 1 1 1 
 
 public. Will any man pretend that the name of 
 Androfs, and that of Winthrop, are heard with 
 the fame fenfations in any village of New Eng- 
 land J* Is not gratitude the fentiment that attends 
 the latter, and difguft the feeling excited by the 
 former? In the Maffachufett's then, there are per- 
 fons defcendcd from fome of their ancient gover- 
 nors, counfellors, judges, whofe fathers, grandfa- 
 thers, and o;reat o;randfathers, are remembered with 
 cfteem by many living, and who are mentioned in 
 hiftory with applaufe, as benefaflors to the coun- 
 try, while there are others who have no fuch ad- 
 vantage. May we go a flep farther Know 
 thyfelf, is as ufeful a precept to nations as to 
 men. Go into every village in New England, and 
 you will find that the office of juftice of the peace, 
 and even the place of reprefentative, which has 
 ever depended only on the freeeft eledlion of the 
 people, have generally defcendcd from generation 
 to oeneration, in three or four families at moft:. 
 I'he prefent fubjeft is one of thofe which all men 
 refpeft, and all men deride. It may be faid of 
 this part of our nature, as Pope faid of the 
 whole : 
 
 Of human nature, wit her word may write. 
 We all revere it, in our own defpight. 
 
 If, as Harrington fays, the ten command- 
 ments, were voted by the people of Ifrael, and 
 have been enafted as laws by all other nations -, 
 and if we fliould prefume to fay, that nations had 
 a civil right to repeal them, no nation would 
 think proper to repeal the fifth, which enjoins 
 honour to parents : if there is a difference between 
 right and wrong ^ if any thing can be facred -, if 
 
 there
 
 Ii2 Ancient Repuhlics^ ^c, 
 
 there is one idea of moral obligation ; the dtcr^t 
 of nature mud force upon every thinking being, 
 and upon every feeling heart, the convidlion that 
 honour, affeflion, and gratitude are due from chil- 
 dren, to thofe who gave them birth, nurture, and 
 education. The fentiments and affedions which 
 naturally arife, from refledling on the love, the 
 cares, and the bleflings of parents, abflraded 
 from the confideration of duty, are fome of the 
 moft forcible and moft univerlal. When religion, 
 law, morals, affedlion, and even falliion, thus 
 confpire to fill every mind with attachment to 
 parents, and to ftamp deep upon the heart their 
 impreffions, is it to be expeded that men fnould 
 reverence their parents while they live, and begin 
 to delpife or negledl their memories as foon as 
 they are dead ? This is in nature impcffible ; on 
 the contrary, every little unkindnefs and fcverity 
 is forgotten, and nothing but endearments re- 
 membered with pleafure. 
 
 The fan of a wife and virtuous father, finds the 
 world about him fjmetimes as much difpofed as 
 he himfclf is, to honour the memory of his father; 
 to congratulate him as the fucceflbr to his eftate ; 
 and frequently, to compliment him with eledlions 
 to the offices he held. A fenfe of duty, his paf- 
 fions and his inierefl, thus confpiring to prevail 
 upon him to avail himfelf of this advantage, he 
 finds a few others in fimilar circumftances with 
 himfelf; they naturally afTociate together, and 
 aid each other. This is a faint Ikecch of the 
 fource and rife cf the family fpirit : very often 
 the difpofition to favour the family is as ftrong, 
 in the town, county, province, or kingdom, as it 
 is in the houfe itfelf. The enthufiafm is indeed 
 fometimes wilder, and carries away, like a torrent, 
 all before it. 
 
 I'hefe
 
 Dr, Franklin. 113 
 
 Thefe obfervations are not peculiar to any age ; 
 we have feen the efFedts of them in St. Marino, 
 Bifcay, and the Grifons, as well as in Poland, 
 and all other countries* Not to mention any 
 notable examples, which have lately happened 
 near us, it is not many months fince I was witnefs 
 to a converfation between Tome citizens of MafTa- 
 chufett's : one was haranguing on the jealoufy 
 which a free people ought to entertain of their 
 liberties, and was heard by all the company with 
 pleafure ; in lefs than ten minutes the converfa- 
 tion turned upon their governor ; and the jealous 
 republican was very angry at the oppofition to 
 him. '* The prefent governor," fays he, *' has 
 " done us fuch fervices, that he ought to rule 
 ** us, he and his pofterity after him for ever and 
 " ever." Where is your jealoufy of liberty ? 
 demanded the other. *' Upon my honour," replies 
 the orator, " I had forgot that ; you have caught 
 *' me in an inconfiftency j for I cannot know whe- 
 *' ther a child of five years old will be a fon of 
 *' liberty or a tyrant." His jealoufy was the 
 diftate of his underftanding: his confidence and 
 cnthufiafm the impulfe of his heart. 
 
 The pompous trumpery of enfigns, armorials, 
 and efcutchcons, are not indeed far advanced in 
 America. Yet there is a more general anxiety to 
 know their originals, in proportion to their num- 
 bers, than in any nation of Europe ; arifing from 
 the eafier circumflances and higher fpirit of the 
 common people : and there are certain families in 
 every ftate, as attentive to all the proud frivoli- 
 ties of heraldry. That kind of pride which looks 
 down on commerce and manufactures as degrad- 
 ing, may indeed, in many countries of Europe, 
 be a ufeful and neceflary quality in the nobility : 
 ic may prevent, in fome degree, the whole nation 
 
 I from
 
 114 Ancient Repuhlics, &c. 
 
 from being delivered up entirely to the fpirit of 
 avarice : it may be the cauie, why honour is pre- 
 ferred by fome to money : it may prevent the 
 nobility from becoming too rich, and acquiring 
 too large a proportion of the landed property. In 
 America, it would not only be mifchievous, but 
 "would expofe the higheft pretenfions of the kind 
 to univerfal ridicule and contempt. Thofe other 
 hauteurs, of keeping the commons at a diftance, 
 and difdaining to converfe with any but a few of 
 a certain race, may in Europe be a favour to the 
 people, by relieving them from a multitude of 
 affiduous attentions and humiliating compliances, 
 which would be troublefome ; it may prevent the 
 nobles from caballing with the people, and gain- 
 ing too much influence with them in eleftior"^ 'ind 
 otherwife. In America, it would juftly >xcitc 
 univerfal indignation ; the vaineft of all muft be 
 of the people, or be nothing. While every office 
 is equally open to every competitor, and the 
 people muft decide upon every pretenfion to a 
 place in the legiflature, that of governor and fe- 
 nator, as well as reprefentative, no fuch airs will 
 ever be endured. It muft be acknowledged ftill, 
 that fome men muft take more pains to deferve 
 and acquire an office than others, and muft behave 
 better in it, or they will not hold it. 
 
 We cannot prefume that a man is good or bad, 
 merely becaufe his father was one or the other -, 
 and fhould always inform ourfelves firft, whether 
 the virtues and talents are inherited, before we 
 yield our confidence. Wife men beget fools, 
 and honeft men knaves ; but thefe inftances, al- 
 though they may be frequent, are not general. 
 If there is often a likenel's in feature and figure^ 
 there is generally more in mind and heart, becaufe 
 education contributes to the formation of thefe as 
 
 well
 
 Dr, Franklin, 115 
 
 well as nature. The influente of example is very 
 great, and almoft univerfal, efpecially of parents 
 over their children. Jn all countries it has been 
 obferved, that Vices, as well as virtues, run down 
 in families, very often, from age to age. Any man 
 may run over in his thoughts the circle of his 
 acquaintance, and he will probably recolletfl in- 
 ftances of a difpofition to mifchief, malice, and 
 revenge, defcending, in certain breeds, from grand- 
 father to father and fon. A young woman was 
 lately convifted at Paris of a trifling theft, barely 
 within the law, which decreed a capital punifh- 
 ment. There were circumftances, too, which 
 greatly alleviated her fault ; fome things in her 
 behaviour that feemed innocent and modeft : every 
 fpeflator, as well as the judges, was affedted at 
 the fcenc, and fhe was advifed to petition for a 
 pardon, as there was no doubt it would be grant- 
 ed. ** No," fays fhe, *' my grandfather, father, 
 and brother, were all hanged for ftealing , ic 
 runs in the blood of our family to fleal, and 
 be hanged ; if I am pardoned now, I fhall fteal 
 again in a few months more inexcufeably : and 
 thereforel will be hanged now."- An hereditary 
 pafTion for the halter is a ftrong inftance, to be 
 fure, and cannot be very common : but fome- 
 thing like it too often defcends, in certain breeds, 
 from generation to generation. 
 
 If vice and infamy are thus rendered lefs odi- 
 ous, by being familiar in a family, by the ex- 
 ample of parents, and by education, it would b^ 
 as unhappy as unaccountable, if virtue and ho- 
 nour were not recommended and rendered more 
 amiable to children by the fame means. 
 
 There are, and always have been, in every ftate, 
 numbers poffefled of fome degree of family pride, 
 who have been invariably encouraged, if not flat- 
 
 I 2 tcred
 
 1 1 6 Ancient Republics, ^c. 
 
 tered in it, by the people. Thefe have moft ac- 
 quaintance, efteem, and friendfhip, with each 
 other, and mutually aid each other's fchemes of 
 intereft, convenience, and ambition. Fortune, it 
 is true, has more influence than birch ; a rich man 
 of an ordinary family, and common decorum of 
 condud, may have, greater weight than any 
 family merit commonly confers without it. 
 3. It will be readily admitted, there are great ine- 
 qualities of merit, or talents, virtues, fervices, 
 and, what is of more moment, very often of repu- 
 tation- Some, in a long courfe of fcrvice in an 
 army, have devoted their time, health, and for- 
 tunes, fignalized their courage and addrefs, ex- 
 pofed themfelves to hardfhips and dangers, loft 
 their limbs, and fhed their blood, for the people. 
 Others have difplayed their wifdom, learning, and 
 eloquence in council, and in various other ways 
 acquired the confidence and affedtion of their fel- 
 low citizens, to fuch a degree, that the public have 
 fettled into a kind of habit of following their 
 example and taking their advice. 4. There are 
 a few, in whom all thefe advantages of birth, for- 
 tune, and fame are united. 
 
 Thefe fources of inequality, which are com- 
 mon to every people, and can never be altered by 
 any, becaufe they are founded in the conftitution 
 of naturej this natural ariftocracy among mankind, 
 has been dilated on, becaufe it is a fad eflential 
 to be confidered in the inftitution of a govern- 
 ment. Jt is a body of men which contains the 
 greateft colledion of virtues and abilities in a 
 free government ; is the brighteft ornament and 
 glory of the nation; and may always be made the 
 greateft blefling of fociety, if it be judicioufly 
 managed in the conftitution. But if ic is not, it 
 is always the moft dangerous j nay, it may be 
 
 added,
 
 Dr. Franklin, 117 
 
 added, it never fails to be the deftruftion of the 
 commonwealth. What fhall be done to guard 
 againft it? Shall they be all mafTacred ? This expe- 
 riment has been more than once attempted, and 
 once at lead tried. Guy Faux attempted it in Eng- 
 land; and a king of Denmark, aided by a popular 
 party, effe<fled it once in Sweden ; but it anfwered 
 no good end. The moment they were dead, ano- 
 ther ariftocracy inftantly arofe, with equal art and 
 influence, with lefs delicacy and difcretion, if not 
 principle, and behaved more intolerably than the 
 former. The country, for centuries, never reco- 
 vered from the ruinous confequences of a deed fo 
 horrible, that one would think it only to be met 
 with in the hiftory of the kingdom of darknefs. 
 
 There is but one expedient yet difcovered, to 
 avail the fociety of all the benefits from this body 
 of men, which they are capable of affording, and 
 at the fame time to prevent them from under- 
 mining or invading the public liberty ; and that 
 is, to throw them all, or at lead the moft re- 
 markable of them, into one aflembly together, 
 in the legiflature ; to keep all the executive power 
 entirely out of their hands as a body , to ere6l a 
 firft magiftrate over them, invefted with the whole 
 executive authority ; to make them dependent on 
 that executive magiftrate for all public executive 
 employments , to give that firft magiftrate a ne- 
 gative on the legiflature, by which he may defend 
 both himfelf and the people from all their enter- 
 prizes in the legiflature ; and to ere<5t on the other 
 lide of them an impregnable barrier againft them, 
 in a houfe of commons, fairly, fully, and ade- 
 quately reprelenting the people, who fliall have 
 the power both of negativing all their attempts 
 at encroachments in the legiflature, and of with- 
 holding both from them and the crown all fup- 
 
 I 3 plies^
 
 'iiS Ancient Republics y ^e. 
 
 plies, by which they may be paid for their fervices 
 in executive offices, or even the public fervicc 
 carried on to the detriment of the nation. 
 
 We have feen, both by reafoning and in ex- 
 perience, what kind of equality is to be found or 
 expeded in the fimpleit people in the world. 
 There is not a city nor a village, any more than a 
 kingdom or commonwealth, in Europe or Ame-r 
 rica ; not a hord, clan, or tribe, among the ne- 
 groes of Africa, or the favages of North or South 
 America; nor a private club in the world, in 
 which fuch inequalities are not more or lefs vifi- 
 ble. There is then a certain degree of weight, 
 ia the public opinion and deliberations, which 
 property, family, and merit will have : if Mr. 
 Turgot had difcovered a mode of afcertaining the 
 quantity which they ought to have, and had re- 
 vealed it to mankind, fo that it might be known 
 to every citizen, he would have deferved more of 
 their gratitude than all the inventions of philo- 
 fophers. But, as long as human nature fhall have 
 paflions and imagination, there is too much rea- 
 son to fear that thefe advantages, in many inftances, 
 will have more influence than reafon and equity 
 canjuftify. 
 
 Let us then reflect, how the fmgle afle;mbly in 
 the MaflTachufett's, in which our great ftatefman 
 wifhes all authority concentered, will be com- 
 pofed. There being no fenate nor council, all the 
 rich, the honourable, and meritorious, will ftand 
 candidates for feats in the houfe of reprefentatives, 
 and nineteen in twenty of them obtain eleftions. 
 The houfe will be found to have all the inequali- 
 ties in it, that prevailed among the people at large. 
 Such an afliembly will be naturally divided into 
 three parts.- The firfl: is, of fome great genius, 
 fpme mafterly fpirit, who unites in himlelf all 
 ' ' 10 th
 
 Df, Franklin^ 119 
 
 the qualities which conftitute the natural founda- 
 tions of authority ; fuch as benevolence, wifdom, 
 and power : and all the adventitious attradlions of 
 refpedl; fuch as riches, anccftry, and perfonal 
 merit. All eyes are turned upon him for their 
 prcfident or fpeaker. The fecond divifion com- 
 prehends a third, or a quarter, or, if you will, a 
 lixth or an eighth of the whole ; and confifts of 
 thofe who have the mod to boaft of refembling 
 their head. In the third clafs are all the reft, 
 who are nearly on a level in underftanding, and 
 in all things. Such an aflembly has in it, not 
 only all the perfons of the nation who are moft 
 eminent for parts and virtues, but all thofe who 
 are moft inflamed with ambition and avarice, and 
 who are moft vain of their defcent. Thefe latter 
 will of courfe conftantly endeavour to increafe 
 their own influence, by exaggerating all the attri- 
 butes they poflfefs, and by augmenting them in 
 every way they can think of; and will have friends, 
 whofe only chance for rifing into public view 
 will be under their proteftion, who will even 
 be more active and zealous than themfelves in 
 their fervice. Notwithftanding all the equality 
 that can ever be hoped for among men, it is 
 eafy to fee that the third clafs will in general be 
 but humble imitators and followers of the fecond. 
 Every man in the fecond clafs will have con- 
 ftantly about him a circle of members of the 
 third, who will be his admirers ; perhaps afraid 
 of his influence in the diftrifts they reprefent, 
 related to him by blood, connedled with him in 
 trade, or dependent upon him for favours. 
 There will be much envy too, among individuals 
 of the fecond clafs, againft the fpeaker, although 
 a fmcere veneration is fliewn him by the majority, 
 and great external refpedt by ail. I faid there 
 
 I 4 would
 
 120 'Ancient RepuhUcs^ ^c\ 
 
 would be envy; becaufe there will be, among the 
 fecond clafs, fevcral, whofe fortunes, families, and 
 merits, in the acknowledged judgment of all, ap- 
 proach near to the firft ; and, from the ordinary 
 illufions of felf-love and felf-intereft, they and 
 their friends will be much difpofed to claim the 
 firft place as their own right. This will introduce 
 controverfy and debate, as well as emulation; and 
 thofe who wifh for the firft place, and cannot ob- 
 tain it, will of courfe endeavour to keep down the 
 fpeaker as near upon a level with themfelves as 
 poffible, by paring away the dignity and import- 
 ance of his office, as we faw in Venice, Poland, 
 and every where elfe. 
 
 A fingle afiembly thus conftituted, without any 
 counterpoife, balance, or equilibrium, is to have 
 all authority, legiflative, executive, and judicial, 
 concentered in it. It is to make a conftitution 
 and laws by its own will, execute thofe laws at 
 its pleafure, and adjudge all controverfies, that 
 arife concerning the meaning and application of 
 them, at difcretion. What is there to reftrain 
 them from making tyrannical laws, in order to 
 execute them in a tyrannical manner ? 
 
 Will it be pretended, that the jealoufy and 
 vigilance of the people, and their power to difcard 
 them at the next election, will reftrain them ? 
 Even this idea fuppofes a balance, an equili^ 
 brium, which Mr. Turgot holds in fo much con- 
 tempt ; it fuppofes the people at large to be a 
 check and controul to the reprefentative afiembly. 
 But this would be found a mere delufion. A jea- 
 loufy between the eledtors and the elefled neither 
 ought to exift, nor is poflible to exift. It is a 
 contradidion to fuppofe, that a body of elecflors 
 ihould have at one moment a warm affeflion and 
 entire confidence in a man, fo as to intruft him 
 
 with
 
 Dr. Price. 121 
 
 with authority, limited or unlimited, over their 
 lives and fortunes , and, the next moment after his 
 eledion, to commence a fufpicion of him, that fhall 
 prompt them to watch all his words, atlions, and 
 motions, and difpofe them to renounce and puniili 
 him. They choofe him, indeed, becaufe they 
 think he knows more, and is better difpofed, 
 than the generality, and even than themfelves 
 very often. Indeed the beft ufe of a reprefenta- 
 tive affembly, arifes from the cordial affedion 
 and unrefcrved confidence which fubfifts between 
 it and the coUedive body of the people. It is 
 by fuch a kind and candid intercourfe alone, that 
 the wants and defires of the people can be made 
 known, on the one hand, or the necefllties of the 
 public communicated or reconciled to them, on 
 the other. In what did fuch a confidence in one 
 aflembly end, in Venice, Geneva, Bifcay, Poland, 
 but an ariftocracy, and an oligarchy ? There is 
 no fpecial providence for Americans, and their 
 natures are the fame with others. 
 
 LETTER XXVI. 
 
 DR. PRICE, 
 
 Dear Sir, 
 
 TO demonftrate the nccefllty of two aflem- 
 blies in the legiflature, as well as of a third 
 branch in it, to defend the executive authority ; 
 it may be laid down as a firft principle, that 
 neither liberty nor juftice can be fecured to the 
 individuals of a nation, nor its profperity pro- 
 moted.
 
 122 Ancient Republics^ ^c. 
 
 moted, but by a fixed conftitution of government, 
 and ftated laws, known and obeyed by all. ' 
 Mr. Turgot, indeed, cenfures the '* falfity of the 
 " notion, fo frequently repeated by almofl: all 
 *' republican writers, 'that liberty confifts in be- 
 " ingfubjedt only to the laws ;' as if a man could 
 ** be free while opprefled by an unjuft la^v 
 " This would not be true, even if we coilj i'up-^ 
 *' pole, that all laws were the work o.' an. ai tm- 
 ** bly of the whole nation ; for certamiy every 
 *' individual has his rights, of which the nation 
 ** cannot deprive him, except by violence,, Mid 
 ** an unlawful ufe of the general power." 
 
 We often hear and read of free ftates, a aec 
 people, a free nation, a free country, a free king- 
 dom, and even ot free republics ; and we under^ 
 Hand, in general, what is intended, although every 
 man may not be qualified to enter into philofo- 
 phical difquifitions concerning the meaning of 
 the word liberty, or to give a logical definition 
 of it. 
 
 Our friend Dr. Price has diflinguiihed very 
 well, concerning phyfical, moral, religious, and 
 civil liberty : and has defined the laft to be 
 ** the power of a civil fociety to govern itfelf, 
 " by its own difcretion, or by laws of its own 
 *' making, by the majority, in a colledive body, 
 " or by fair reprefentation. In every free ftate, 
 *' every man is his own legiflator. Legitimate 
 ** government confifts only in the dominion of 
 " equal laws, made with common confent, and 
 " not in the dominion of any men over other 
 " men." 
 
 Mr. Turgot, however, makes the dodor too 
 great a compliment, at the expence of former 
 Englifh writers, when he reprefents him as " the 
 '* firft of his countrymen who have given a 
 
 " juft
 
 Dr, price. 123 
 
 ** juft idea of liberty, and (hewn the falfity, fo 
 " often repeated by almoft all republican writers, 
 " that liberty confifts in being fubjed only to the 
 " laws." 
 
 I (hall chearfully agree with Mr. Turgot, that 
 it is very polTible that laws, and even equal laws 
 made by common confent, may deprive the mi- 
 nority of the citizens of their rights. A fociety, 
 by a majority, may govern itfelf, even by equal 
 laws, that is by laws to which all, majority and 
 minority, are equally fubjedV, fo as to opprefs the 
 minority. It may eftablifli an uniformity in re- 
 ligion i it may reftrain trade ; it may confine 
 perfonal liberty of all equally, and againft the 
 judgment of many, even of the befb and wifeft, 
 without reafonable motives, ufe, or benefit. We 
 may go farther, and fay, that a nation may be una- 
 nimous in confenting to a law reftraining their 
 natural liberty, property, and commerce, and 
 their moral and religious liberties too, to a de- 
 gree that may be prejudicial to the nation and 
 every individual in it. A nation of Catholics 
 might unanimoufly confent to prohibit labour 
 upon one half the days in the year, as feaft days. 
 The whole American nation might unanimoufly 
 confent to a Sunday law, and a warden adl, which 
 ihould deprive them of the ufe of their limbs one 
 day in feven. A nation may unanimoufly agree to 
 a navigation a6t, which fliould fliackle the com- 
 merce of all. Yet Dr. Price's definition of civil 
 liberty is as liable to this objedion as any other. 
 Thele would all be equal laws, made with common 
 (cnfent : thefe would all be aifts of legitimate 
 government. To take in Mr. Turgot*s idea, then, 
 we muft add to Dr. Price's ideas of equal laws by 
 common confent, this other for the general inferejl, or 
 the pulflic good. But it is generally fuppofed, that 
 
 nations
 
 124 Ancient Republics, &c. 
 
 nations underftand their own intereft better than 
 another , and therefore they may be trufted to 
 judge of the public good : and in all the cafes 
 above fuppofed, they will be as free as they 
 defire to be ; and therefore may with great pro- 
 priety be called free nations, and their confti- 
 tutions free republics. There can be no way of 
 compelling nations to be more free than they 
 choofe to be. 
 
 But Mr. Turgot has miilaken the fenfe of 
 republican writers, efpecially of the Englifh ones. 
 What republican writers he had in view I know 
 not. There is none that I remember, of any 
 name, who has given fo abfurd a definition of 
 liberty. His countryman Montefquieu, who will 
 fcarcely be denominated a republican writer, has 
 faid fomething the moft like it -, but it is manifeft 
 that his meaning was confined to equal laws, made 
 by common confent. Although there may be 
 unjuft and unequal laws, obedience to which 
 would be incompatible with liberty ; yet no man 
 will contend, that a nation can be free, that is 
 not governed by fixed laws. All other govern- 
 ment than that of permanent known laws, is the 
 government of mere will and pleafure, whether it 
 be exercifed by one, a few, or many. Republican 
 writers in general, and thofe of England in parti- 
 cular, have maintained the fame principle with 
 Dr. Price, and have faid, that legitimate govern- 
 ments, or well-ordered commonwealths, or well- 
 conftituted governments, were thofe where the 
 laws prevailed , and have always explained their 
 meanings to be, equal laws made by common confent, 
 or the general will that is to fay, made by the 
 majority, and equally binding upon majority and 
 minority. As it is of importance to refcue the 
 good old republican writers from fuch an impu- 
 tation.
 
 Br. Pria, 125 
 
 tation, let me beg your patience while we look 
 into fome of them. 
 
 Ariftotle fays, that " a government where the 
 ** laws alone Ihould prevail, would be the king- 
 ** dom of God." This indeed fhows that this 
 great philofopher had much admiration of fuch a 
 government : but is not the aflertion that Mr. 
 Turgot condemns, viz. that liberty confifts in 
 being fubjed to the laws only. 
 
 Ariftotle fays too, in another place, *' Order is 
 ** law, and it is more proper that law Ihould go- 
 " vern, than any one of the citizens : upon the 
 " fame principle, if it is advantageous to place 
 " the fupreme power in fome particular perfons, 
 " they Ihould be appointed to be only guardi- 
 " ans, and the fervants of the laws." Thefe too 
 are very juft fentiments, but not a formal defini- 
 tion of liberty. 
 
 Livy too fpeaks of happy, profperous, and 
 glorious times, when " Imperia legum poten- 
 *' tiora fuerunt quam hominum." But he no 
 where fays that liberty confifts in being fubjeft 
 only to the legum imperio. 
 
 Sidney fays, " No fedition was hurtful to Rome, 
 " until, through their profperity, fome men gain- 
 ed a power above the laws." 
 In another place he tells us too, from Livy, 
 that fome, whofe ambition and avarice were impa- 
 tient of reftraint, complained that " leges rem 
 " furdam eflr, inexorabilem, falubriorem inopi 
 quam potenti." 
 
 And in another, that *' no government was 
 
 thought to be well conftituted, unlefs the laws 
 
 prevailed againft the commands of men." But 
 
 he has no where defined liberty to be fubje<5lion 
 
 to the laws only. 
 
 Harrington
 
 126 Ancient Republics ^ tic, 
 
 Harrington fays, " Government de juYe^ or ad- 
 *' cording to ancient prudence, is an art, where- 
 " by a civil fociety of men is inftitiited and pre- 
 " ferved upon the foundation of common intereji % 
 " or, to follow Ariftotle and Livy, it is an em- 
 " pire of laws and not of men. And govern- 
 *' ment, to define it according to modern pru- 
 " dence, or de faio^ is an art, by which fome 
 " man, or fome few men, fubjefb a city or a na- 
 *' tion, and rule it according to his or their pri- 
 *' vate intereft ; which, becaufe the laws in fuch 
 " cafes are made according to the intereft of a 
 *' man, or a few families, may be faid to be the 
 " empire of men and not of laws." 
 
 Harrington, Politicafter, fcene 2, agrees, that 
 law proceeds from the will of man, whether a 
 monarch or people , and that this will muft have 
 a mover ; and that this mover is intereft : but the 
 intereft of the people is one thing it is the pub- 
 lic intereft ; and where the public intereft go- 
 verns, it is a government of laws, and not of 
 men : the intereft of a king, or of a party, is 
 another thing it is a private intereft , and where 
 private intereft governs, it is a government of 
 men, and not of laws. If, in England, there 
 has ever been any fuch thing as a government of 
 laws, was it not magna charta ? and have not our 
 kings broken magna charta thirty times ? Did 
 the law govern when the law was broken ? or 
 was that a government of men ? On the contrary, 
 hath not magna charta been as often repaired by 
 the people ? and, the law being fo reftored, was it 
 not a government of laws, and not of men ? 
 "Why have our kings, in fo many ftatutes and 
 oaths, engaged themfelves to govern by law, if 
 there were not in kings a capacity of govern- 
 ing.otherwife ? It is true, that laws are neither 
 
 made
 
 Dr. Price. iij 
 
 made by angels, nor by horfes, but by men.' 
 The voice of the people is as much the voice of 
 men, as the voice of a prince is the voice of a 
 man ; and yet the voice of the people is the voice 
 of God> which the voice of a prince is not. The 
 government of laws, faid Ariftotle, is the go- 
 vernment of God. In a monarchy, the laws, be- 
 ing made according to the intereft of one man, or 
 a few men, muft needs be more private and par- 
 tial than fuits with the nature of juftice -, but in 
 a commonwealth, the laws, being made by the 
 whole people, muft come up to the public inte- 
 reft, which is common right and juftice and if 
 a man know not what is his own intereft, who 
 fhould know it ? and that which is the intereft of 
 the moft or greateft number of particular men, 
 being fummed up in the common vote, is the 
 public intereft. 
 
 Sidney fays, " Liberty confifts folely in an 
 ** independency on the will of another ; and, by 
 *' a flave, we underftand a man who can neither 
 *' difpofe of his perfon or goods, but enjoys all 
 " at the will of his mafter." And again, " As 
 " liberty confifts only in being fubjed: to no 
 ** man's will, and nothing denotes a flave but a 
 ** dependence upon the will of another; if there 
 " be no other law in a kingdom but the will of a 
 '* prince, there is no fuch thing as liberty.'* 
 
 Mr. Turgot might have perceived in thefe wri- 
 ters, that a government of laws and not of men, 
 was intended by them as a defcription of a com- 
 monwealth, not a definition of liberty. There 
 may be various degrees of liberty eftablifhed by 
 the laws, and enjoyed by the citizens, in diffe- 
 rent commonwealchs ; but ftill the general will, 
 as well as the general intereft', as far as it is un- 
 derftood by the people, prevails in all that can 
 
 be
 
 1^8 Ancient RepuMics, i^cl 
 
 be denominated free : as the fociety governs it- 
 felf, it is free, according to the definition of Dr. 
 Price. The enquiry of thefe writers, in fuch paf- 
 fages, was not into the higheft point of liberty, 
 or greateft degree of it, which might be efta- 
 blifhed by the general will, and the common fenfe 
 of intereft, in their refults or laws. They have 
 taken it for granted, that human nature is To 
 fond of liberty, that, if the whole fociety were 
 confulted, a majority would never be found to 
 put chains upon themfelves, by their own aft and 
 voluntary confent. 
 
 But all men, as well as republican writers, 
 muft agree, that there can be no uninterrupted 
 enjoyment of liberty, nor any good government, 
 in fociety, without laws, or where (landing laws 
 do not govern. In defpotic flates, in fimple mo- 
 narchies, in ariftocracies, in democracies, in all 
 poffible mixtures of thefe, the individual enjoys 
 continually the benefit of law, as he does thofc 
 of light and air, although, in moft of thofe go- 
 vernments, he has no fecurity for the continuance 
 of it. If the laws were all repealed at once, in 
 any great kingdom, and the event made knowa 
 fuddenly to all, there would fcarcely a houfe re- 
 main in pofTefilon of its prefent inhabitant, in the 
 great cities. 
 
 The great queflion therefore is, What combi- 
 nation of powers in fociety, or what form of go- 
 vernment, will compel the formation of good and 
 equal laws, an impartial execution, and faithful 
 interpretation of them, fo that the citizens may 
 conftantly enjoy the benefit of them, and be furc 
 of their continuance. The controverfy between 
 Mr.Turgot and me is-^v/hether a fingle aiTembly 
 of reprefentatives be this form. He maintains 
 the affirmative. I am for the negative : becaufc 
 
 fuch
 
 Br. Price', 129 
 
 fuch an aftembly will, upon the firfl day of its 
 exiftence, be an ariftocracy; in a few days, or 
 years at leaft, an oligarchy , and then it will loon 
 divide into two or three parties, who will foon 
 have as many armies ; and, when the battle is 
 decided, the vi6lorious general will govern with- 
 out or with the advice of any council or afiembly, 
 as he pleafes : or, if the aiTembly continues uni- 
 ted, they will in time exclude the people from all 
 fnare even in elections, and make the government: 
 hereditary in a few families. In order to be fully 
 convinced of this, we mult take an extenfive view 
 of the fubject; and the firft enquiry fhould be, 
 what kind of beings men arc ? You and I ad- 
 mire the fable of Triftram Shandy more than the 
 fable of the Bees, and agree with Butler rather 
 than Hobbes. It is weaknefs rather than wick- 
 ednefs v/hich renders men unfit to be trulled with 
 unlimited pov;er. The pafilons are all unlimit- 
 ed i nature has left them fo : if they could be 
 bounded, they would be extinft-, and there is 
 no doubt they are of indifpenfable importance in 
 the prefent fyftem. They certainly incrcafe too, 
 by exercife, like the body. The love of gold 
 grows fader than the heap of acquifition : the 
 love of praife increales by every gratification, 
 till it (lings like an adder, and bites like a 
 P^rpent , till the man is miferable every mo- 
 ment when he docs not fnuff the incenfe : am- 
 bition itrengthens at every advance, and at lad 
 takes poffefTion of the whole foul fo abfolutely, 
 that ttie man fees nothing in the world of im- 
 portance to others, or himfelf, but in his object. 
 The fubtilty of thcfe three pafTions, which have 
 been fcleited from all the others becaufe they 
 arc ariliocratical pafiions, in fubduing all other;., 
 
 K and
 
 13d Ancient Republics^ ^c 
 
 and even the underftanding Itfelf, if not the cofi- 
 fcience too, until they become abfolute and im- 
 perious mailers of the whole mind, is a curious 
 fpeculation. The cunning with which they hide 
 themfelves from others, and from the man him- 
 felf too % the patience with which they wait for 
 opportunities ; the torments they voluntarily fuf~ 
 fer for a time, to fecure a full enjoyment at 
 length ; the inventions, the difcoveries, the con- 
 trivances they fugged to the underftanding, fome- 
 times in the dullell dunces in the world, if they 
 could be defcribed in writing, would pafs for 
 great genius. 
 
 We are not enough acquainted with the phy- 
 fical or metaphyfical efixds they may have on 
 our bodies or minds, to be able to explain the 
 particular reafon v;hy every inftance of indulgence 
 ilrcngthens and confirms the fubfequent emo- 
 tions of defire. The caufe has been hitherto too 
 deep, remote, and fubtle, for the fearch of cor- 
 poreal or intelleclual microfcopes ; but the faft: 
 is too decided to deceive or efcape our obfer- 
 vation. Men fliould endeavour at a balance of 
 affedions and appetites, under the monarchy of 
 reafon and confcience, within, as well as at a ba- 
 lance of power without. If they furrender the 
 guidance, tor any courfe cf time, to any one paf- 
 fion, they may depend upon finding it, in the end,- 
 an ufurping, domineering, cruel tyrant. They 
 were intended by nature to live together in focie- 
 ty, and in this way to reiirain one anochtr, and 
 in general are very good kind of creatures ; buc 
 they know each other's imbecility lo v/ell, thas 
 they ought never to lead one another into temp- 
 tation. The pafijon that is lonf-*- induh^ed, and 
 continually gratified, becomes mad ; it is a Ipe- 
 
 cies 
 
 IE
 
 Dr. Price, 131 
 
 cies of delirium ; it fliould not be called guile, 
 but infanity : but who would truft his life, liber- 
 ty, and property, to a madman, or an aflembly 
 of them ? it would be fafer to confide in knaves. 
 Five hundred or five thoufand together, in an af- 
 fembly, are not lefs liable to this extravagance 
 than one. The nation that commits its affairs to 
 a fingle alTembly, will aifurcdly find that its paf- 
 fions and defires augment as fall as thofeof aking; 
 and therefore fuch a conftitution mufl be circn- 
 tially defedlive. 
 
 Others have feen this quality in human nature 
 through a more gloomy medium. 
 
 Machiavel fays, thofe who have written on ci- 
 vil government lay it dov/n as a firft principle, 
 and all hiftorians dcmonftrate the fame, that who- 
 ever would found a ftate, and make proper laws 
 for the government of it, mud prefume that all 
 men are bad by nature; and that they will not 
 fail to fliew that natural depravity of heart, 
 whenever they have a fair opportunity ; and, 
 though poiTibly it may lie concealed for a while, 
 oh account of iome fccret reafon, which does not 
 then appear to men of fmall experience, yet time, 
 which is therefore juftly called the father of truth, 
 commonly brings it to light in the end. Ma- 
 chiavcl's tranQator remarks, t'lat akhouirh this 
 feems a harili luppofition, does not every Chrif- 
 tian daily jullify the truth of it, by confeffiiig ic 
 before God and the world ^ and are we not ex- 
 prefsly told the lame in ievtral paff.igrs of the 
 holy Icriptures, and in all fy items of human plii- 
 lolophy ? 
 
 Montciquieu fiys, " Conllant experience fl:ews 
 
 us, t;:.;r every man invelled with power is ape 
 
 to .ibule JL: he puilies o;!, liii he crimes 10 
 
 *' fonieiliing that limits iiim. Is it r.oc ilraniie, 
 
 K 2 ' fhfM!^^'l
 
 i^i AncUnt Republics, l^c. 
 
 t 
 
 jhough trne, to fay, that virtue itfelf has need of 
 imits ? To prevent the abufe of power, it is necef- 
 fary, that, by the very difpofition of things, power 
 fhould be a check to power. A government may 
 be fo conltituted, as no man fliail be compelled to 
 do things to which the law dees not oblige him, 
 nor forced to abltain from things which the law 
 permits. 
 
 Swift, So cndlefs and exorbitant are the defires 
 of men, that they will grafp at all, and can form 
 no fcheme of perfe6l happinefs with lefs. It is 
 hard to recoiled one folly, infirmity, or vice, to 
 which a fmgle man is fubjeded, and from which a 
 body of commons, cclledive or reprefentative (and 
 he might have added a body ot nobles) can be 
 \?holly ex mpt. 
 
 Junius. Laws are intended, not to truft to what 
 men will do, but to guard againil what they may 
 
 do, 
 
 Beccaria. Ogni r.cmoft fa centra di iutie k ccmhina- 
 Jiioni del gloho. 
 
 Rochetaucault. The ambitious deceive them- 
 felves, when they propole an end to their ambition j 
 for that end, when attained, becomes a means. 
 
 JDe Lolme. Experience evinces, that the happieft 
 difpofitions are not proof againft the allurements of 
 power^ which has no charms but as it leads on to 
 new advances* Autliority endures not the very idea 
 of reftraint , nor does it ceafe to ftruggle, till it has 
 beaten down every boundary. 
 
 Hobbes, Mandeville, Rcchefaucnuit, havedravv-n 
 iVill more deteilable pidures; and RoufTtrau, in his 
 Jnequaiities among Mankind, gives a defcripdon of 
 a civilized heart, too black and horrible to be tran- 
 Icribed. 
 
 Even our amiable friends, tliofe benevolent 
 Chriftian philolbphers, Br. Price and Dr. Priciiiey,
 
 cc 
 
 Dr. Price. 135 
 
 acquaint us, that they are conflrained to believe 
 human nature no better than it fhould be. The 
 latter fays, there is no power on earth but has grown 
 exorbitant, when it has met with nocontroul. 
 
 The former. " Such are the principles that govern 
 " human nature-, fuch the weaknefs and folly of 
 " men; fuch their love of domination, felfifhnefs,and 
 depravity, that none of them can be raifed to an 
 elevation above others, without the utmofb dan- 
 ger. The conflant experience of the world has 
 verified this, and proved that nothing intoxicates 
 *' the human mind fo much as power. In the 
 eftablifhnient, therefore, of civil government, it 
 would be prepofterous to rely on the difcretion 
 of any men. A people will never opprefs them- 
 felves, or invade their own rights \ but if they 
 truft the arbitrary will of a body or fucceffion of 
 men, they truil enemies." 
 Shall we fay that all thefe philofophers were ig- 
 norant of human nature? With all my foul, I wifli it 
 were in my power to quote any palfugcs in hiftory or 
 philofophy, which might demonllrate ail thefe iacircs 
 on our fpecies to be falfe. But the phenomena are all 
 *n their favour; and the only quetiion to be raifed 
 with them is, whetlicr the caufe is wickednefs, weak- 
 nefs, or infanity.'' In all events, we mull agree, 
 that human nature is not lit to be trufted with 
 Mr. Turgot's fyflem, of all authority in a fingle 
 aflembly. 
 
 A fingle aflembly will never be a fleady guardian 
 of the laws, it Machiavel is right, vvlien he fays, 
 Men are never good but through neccffity : on 
 " the contrary, when good and evil are left to their 
 " choice, they will not fail to throw every tiling 
 " intodiforder and confufion. Hunger and poverry 
 '* mav make men indudrious, but laws on!v can 
 K 3 " m.-.ktf
 
 134 Ancient Republics^ ^c. 
 
 *' make them good -, for, if men were fo of them- 
 *',felves, there would be no occafion for laws; but, 
 *' as the cafe is far othervvife, they are abfolutely 
 *' necefiary. After the Tarquins were dead, v/ho 
 " had been fuch a check upon the nobility, fome 
 ** other expedient was wanting to have the fame 
 " effeft ; fo that, after much confufion and difor- 
 *' der, and many dangerous contefts between the 
 *' patricians and plebeians, certain officers, called 
 *' tribunes, were created for the fecurity of the lat- 
 *' ter-, who, being vefted w^ith fuch privileges and 
 *' authority as enabled them to become arbiters 
 *' betwixt thofe two eftates, effeflually curbed the 
 *' infolence of the former:" or, in the language of 
 Dr. Franklin, the people infilled upon hitching a 
 yoke of cattle behind the wagi^on, to draw up hill, 
 when the patricians before fnould attempt to go 
 too faft : or, in the ftile of Harrington, the commons, 
 finding the patricians difpofed to divide the cake 
 unequally, demanded the privilege of choofmg. 
 
 If Harrington's authority is not of great weight 
 with fome men, the reafons he affigns in fupport of 
 his judgment are often eternal, and unanfwerable 
 by any man. In his Oceana he fays, " Be the in- 
 '* terefl of popular government right reafon, a 
 " man does not look upon realbn as it is right or 
 " wrong in itfelf, but as it makes for him> or 
 " againfc him : wherefore, unlefs you can fhew fuch 
 orders of a government, as, like thofe of God in 
 " nature,, fhail be able to conftrain this cr that 
 *' creature to lliake off that inclination which is 
 more peculiar to it, and take up that which re- 
 gards the common good or intereft ; all this is to 
 no more end, than to perfuade every man, in a 
 popular government, nor to carve for himfelf 
 " of that which he likes bell or defires mod", but 
 
 ** to
 
 Dr. Price. l^^^ 
 
 to be mannerly at the public table, and give the 
 beft from himfeif to decency and iht common in- 
 tereft. But that fuch orders may be eftablifhed, as 
 may, nay mufl:,give the upper hand in all cafes to 
 common right and intereft, notwithftanding the 
 nearnefs that flicks to every man in private, 
 and this in a v/ay of equal certainty and facility, 
 is known even to girls-, being no other than 
 thofe which are of common practice with them 
 in diverfe cafes. For example: Two of them 
 have a cake, yet undivided, which was given 
 between them. That .each of them, therefore, 
 might have that which is due, *' Divide," fays 
 one, *' and I will choofe-, or let me divide, and 
 you fiiall choofe." If this be but once agreed 
 ** upon, it is enough , for the one dividing un- 
 *' equally, lofes, in regard that the ether takes the 
 " better half-, wherefore flie divides equally, and 
 " fo both have right. And thus, what great philo- 
 *' fophers are difputing upon in vain, is brought 
 " to light by two harmlefs girls -, even the whole 
 " myftery of a commonwealth, which lies only ia 
 *' dividin'jf and choofino;." 
 
 Nov/, if all auiiionty is to be collefled into one 
 central afiembly, it will have the whole power of 
 divifion and choice ; and we may eafily conjefture 
 what divifion and choice it will be. It will foon 
 have pofiefiion of all the cakes, loaves, and iidies. 
 
 Harrington proceeds: "" Nor has God, if his 
 ** works m nature be underllood, left fo much to 
 ^* mankind to difpute upon, as who fhall divide 
 *' and who cltoole, but ciiftributed them for ever 
 *' into tw;) orders ; whereof the one has the natural 
 *' right of dividing, and the other of choofing. 
 *' For example: A commonwealth is but a civil 
 ** focicty of men : let us take any numbpr of men, 
 
 K 4 * as
 
 (C 
 
 136 Ancient Republics, ^c. 
 
 " as twenty, and immediately make a common- 
 wealth. Twenty men, if they be not all ideots, 
 perhaps if they be, can never come fo together, 
 but there will be fuch a difference in them, that 
 " about a third will be wifer, or at leaft lefs foolifh, 
 than all the reft. Thefe, upon acquaintance, 
 though it be but fmall, will be difcovered, and 
 " (as flags that have the largeft heads) lead the 
 herd: for while the fix, difcourfing and arguing 
 one with another, fhew the eminence of their 
 ** parts, the fourteen difcover things that they 
 " never thought on, or are cleared in diverie truths 
 that formerly perplexed them : wherefore, in mat- 
 *' tersof commonconcernment, difficulty,ordanger, 
 they hang upon their lips, as children upon their 
 " fathers , and the influence thus acquired by the 
 *' fix, the eminence of whofe parts are found to be 
 *' a ftay and comfort to the fourteen, is the autho- 
 " riry of the fathers auEloritas -patriim. Where- 
 *' fore this can be no other than a natural arijlo- 
 *' <:r^n', diffufed by God throughout the whole body 
 *' of mankind, to this end and purpofe-, and there- 
 *' fore fuch as the people have not only a natural, 
 *' but a pofitive obligation to make ufe of as their 
 *' guides; as where the people of Ifrael are com- 
 *' manded to take wife men, and underftanding, and 
 *' known among their tribes, to be made rulers over 
 ** them. The fix then approved of, as in the pre- 
 " fent cafe, are the fenate-, not by hereditary right, 
 *' or in regard to the greatnefs of their eftates 
 " only, which would tend to fuch powei as would 
 " torce or draw the people; but by election for 
 " their excellent parts, which tends to the advance- 
 '* ment oi the influence of iheir virtue or authority; 
 " that leads the people. Wherefore the office of 
 " the fenate is not to be ccmnanders, but coun- 
 
 \' fellors
 
 Dr. Price. i^y 
 
 *' fellors of the people ; and that which is proper 
 " for counfellors is firft to debate, and after- 
 " wards to give advice in the bufinefs whereon 
 *' they have debated i whence the decrees of the 
 " fenate are never laws, nor fo called fenatus con- 
 *' fulta i and thefe, being maturely framed, it is 
 ** their duty to propofe to the people: wherefore 
 *' the fenate is no more than the debate of the com- 
 " monwealth. But to debate is to difcern, or put 
 " a difference between things, that, being alike, 
 " are not the fame-, or it is feparating and vveigh- 
 " ing this reafon againft that, and that reafon 
 " againft this ; which is dividing. 
 
 " The fenate then having divided, who fhall 
 " choofe ? Afk the girls-, for if flie that divided 
 *' mud have chofen alfo, it had been little v/orfe 
 *' for the other, in cafe llie had not divided at 
 '* all, but kept the whole cake to herfelf ; in re- 
 " gard that, being to choofe too, fhc divided ac- 
 *' cordingly. 
 
 *' Wherefore, if the fenate have any further 
 *' power than to divide, t!ie commonwealth can 
 *' never be equal. But, in a commonzvealth confifiing 
 *'*' of a fingle council^ there is ',io other to choofe than 
 '* that which divided: whence ic is, that fuch a 
 " council fails not to fcrarnble^ that is, to be fac- 
 *' tious; there being no dividing of t!ie cake, in 
 *' that cafe, but among themfelves : nor is there any 
 " other remedy., but to have another council to choofe. 
 *'' The vvifdoni of the few may be the light of 
 *' mankind \ but the intereft of the few is not the 
 " profit of mankinJ, nor of a commonwealth : 
 " v/hcrefore, feeing we have granted intereil to be 
 ** reafon, they mull not cliooie, left they put out 
 ** their light. But as the council dividing confifts 
 ** of the wildom of the commonweai:h, lo the af- 
 
 *' feinbly
 
 1 3 5 Ancient Republics^ ^c. 
 
 fembly or council choofing fhould confifl: of the 
 ** intereilof the commonwealth ; as the vvifdom of 
 *' the commonwealth is in the arillocracy, fo the in- 
 
 tereft of the commonvvealth is in the Vv'hole body 
 *' of the people : and whereas this, in cafe tlie 
 *' commonv/eakh confifts of a whole nation, is too 
 *' unwieldy a body to be aflembled, this council is 
 
 *' to confift of fuch a reprefenrative as may be 
 equal, and fo conftituted as it can never contra6t 
 any other intereft than that of the whole people. 
 But, in the prcfent cafe, the I'ix dividing, and the 
 fourteen choofing, m^uft of nccefficy take in the 
 whole interefb of the twenty. Dividing and 
 choofing, in the language of a commonwealth, is 
 debating and reiolving; and whatever, upon de- 
 bate of the fenate, is propofed to the people, and 
 refolved by them, is enacted by the authority of 
 the fathers, and by the power of the people ^ 
 "^ auc^oritate patriim et jujfu pcpuU -^ which concur- 
 ** ring, make a law." 
 
 Upon thefe principles, and to eilablifh a method 
 of enabling laws that mud of neceffity be wife 
 and equal, the people of moft of the United States 
 of America agreed upon that divifion of the le- 
 giflative power into two houfes, the houfe of repre- 
 fentatives and the fenate, which has given fo m^uch 
 difguft to Mr. Turgot. Harrington will (hew us, 
 equally well, the propriety and necefnty of the 
 other branch, the governor: but before v?e proceed 
 to that, it may be worth while to oblerve the fimi- 
 litude between this pafTage, and fome of thofe fenti- 
 ments and expreffions of Swift, v.'hich were quoted 
 in a former letter-, and there is in the Idea of a 
 Patriot King, written by liis friend Lord Boling- 
 broke, a paifage to the fame purpofe, fo nobly ex- 
 preffed, that 1 cannot forbear the pleafure of tran- 
 
 fcriDincr
 
 Dr. Price. i.'?g 
 
 fcribing it. *' It feems to me, that, in orfJer to 
 *' maintain the moral fvftem of the univerfe ac 
 ** a certain point, far below that of ideal perfec- 
 *' tion (for we are made capable of conceiving 
 " what we are not capable of attaining), it has 
 " pleafed the Author of Nature to mingle, from 
 ** time to time, among the focieties of men, a few, 
 " and but a few, of thofe on whom he has been 
 gracioufly pleafed to confer a larger proportion of 
 the etherial fpirit, than, in the ordinary courfe of 
 his providence, he bellows on the fons of men. 
 Thefe are they who engrofs almoft the whole 
 reafon of the fpecics. Born to dircd, to guide, 
 ** and to preferve, if they retire from the world 
 *' their fplendour accompanies them, and en- 
 " lightens even the darknefs of their retreat. If 
 " they take a part in public life, the effed is never 
 * indifierent : they either appear tiie inilruments 
 " of divine vengeance, and their couife through the 
 *' world is marked by delolation and opprefijon, by 
 '* poverty and fervitude ; or they are the guardiaa 
 ** angels of the country they inhabit, fcudious to 
 ' avert the moiL diltant evil, and to procure peace, 
 *' plenty, and the greatcil of human blefTings 
 *' liberty." 
 
 If there is then, in fociety, fuch a natural arifto- 
 cracy as thefe great v/ritcrs pretend, and as all 
 hiilory and experience ciemonftrare, formed partly 
 by genius, partly by birth, and partly by riches, 
 how n^.all t!ic len;inator av;.:! himlllf of their in- 
 fluencc tor the equal benc.'ir of the public? and 
 how, on the other hand, fliall he prevent them from 
 difturbing the public iKippinefs ? I anfwer, by ar- 
 ranging them all, or at leall the mod conlpicuous 
 of rhem, together in ont; aifembly, by the name of 
 ^ fenatei by leparating them frcm all prctenlions to 
 
 the
 
 H/^o Ancient Republics^ ^c. 
 
 the executive power; and by contronling, in the 
 legiQature, their ambition and avarice, by an af- 
 fembly of rcprefentatives on one fide, and by the 
 executive authority on the other. Thus you will 
 have the benefit of their wifdom, without fear of 
 their paffions. If among them there are fome of 
 Lord Bohngbroke's guardian angels, there will be 
 fome of his inftruments of divine vengeance too: 
 the latter will be here reftrained by a three-fold 
 tie ; by the executive power, by the reprcfentative 
 afiembly, and by their peers in the lenate. But if 
 thefe were all admitted into a fingle popular afiem- 
 bly, the worft of them might in time obtain the 
 afcendancy of all the reft. In fuch a fingle afiembly, 
 as has been obferved before, almofi: the whole of 
 this ariftocracy will make its appearance; being re- 
 turned members of it by the election of the people : 
 thefe will be one clafs. There will be another fct 
 of members, of middling rank and circumftances, 
 who will juftly value themfelves upon their inde- 
 pendence, their integrity, and unbiafied afi'edion to 
 their country, and will pique themfelves upon be- 
 ins under no obligation. But there will be a third 
 clafs, every one ot vvhom will have his leader 
 among the members of the firft clais, whofe cha- 
 rafter he will celebrate, and whofe voice he v.'ill 
 follow; and this party, after a courfe of time, will 
 be the moft numerous. The quefticn then will be, 
 whether this ariftocracy in the houfe will urjite or 
 divide? and it is too obvious, that deftruftion to 
 freedom muft be the confequence equally of their 
 union or of their divifion. If they unite gc-nerallyin 
 all things, as much as they certainly will in refped;- 
 ing each others wealth, birth, and parts, and con- 
 dud themfelves with prudence, they will ftrengthen 
 themfelves by infcnfibie degrees, by playing into 
 
 each
 
 Br. Price, 141 
 
 ^ach others hands more wealth and popularity, until 
 they become able to govern eledlions as they pleafe, 
 and rule the people at difcrttion. An independent 
 member will be their averfion -, all their arcificeswill 
 be employed to deftroy his popularity among his 
 conftituencs, and bring in a difciple of their own in 
 his place. 
 
 But if they divide, each party will, in a courfc 
 of time, have the whole houfe, and confequently 
 the whole Hate, divided into two fadtions, which will 
 llruggle in words, in writing, and at lad in arms, 
 until Casfar or Pompey muft be emperor, and en- 
 tail an endlefs line of tyrants on the nation. But 
 long before this cataftrophe, and indeed throuo-h 
 every fcene of the drama, the laws, inftead of beino* 
 permanent, and affording conflant proteflion to the 
 livef, liberties, and properties of the citizens, will 
 be alternately the fport of contending faftions, and 
 the mere vibrations of a pendulum. From the be- 
 ginning to the end it will be a government of men, 
 now of one fet, and then of another i but never 3l 
 government of laws. 
 
 LETTER XXVII. 
 MIXED GOVERNMENTS. 
 
 MACHIAVEL's DISCOURSES UPOM THE FIRST DECADE 
 or LIVY. BOOK I. C. 2. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 THE whole chapter is very much to the pur- 
 pofe, but the following paragraphs more 
 particularly fo. According to iowv^ authors, there 
 are but three forts of governments, viz. monarchy 
 
 Or
 
 142 Mixed GGver'mnenh. 
 
 or principality, ariftocracy, and democracy ; and 
 that thofe who intend to ere6l a new flate, muft hav^ 
 recourfe to fome one of thefe which he likes bed, 
 Others,and with more judgment, as many think, i^j 
 there are fix forts -, thrte of which are very bad, and 
 the other three good in themfelves-, but liable to be 
 fo corrupted that they may become the worft. The 
 three eood forts have been iuft; now mentioned: the 
 other three proceed from thefe; and every one ot 
 them bears fuch a refemblance to that on which it 
 refpeftively depends, that the tranfition from one to 
 the other is fhort and eafy; for monarchy often de- 
 generates into tyranny, ariftocracy into oligarchy, 
 and democracy into licentious anarchy and confu- 
 fion : fo. that whoever fets up any one of the former 
 three forts ot government, may alTurc himfelf it will 
 not be of any long duration -, for no precaution will 
 be fufncient to prevent its falling into the other that 
 is analogous to it, on account of the affinity v/hich 
 there feems to be in this cafe betwixt virtue and 
 vice, perfeclioR and imperfeclion. 
 
 This variety of governments among mankind ap- 
 pears to have been the effeft of chance: for in the 
 beginning of the world, the inliabitanrs beino; few^ 
 they fometimes lived feparate from each other, like 
 beads; but afterwards, as they multiplied, they 
 began to unite for their mutual defence, and put 
 themlelves under the prore(5lion of fuch as were mod: 
 emjinent amon2;d them for couraa;e and ftrenn^th, 
 whom they engaged to obey and acknowledge a^ 
 their chiefs. Hence arofe the diilindticn betwixt 
 honeft and difnoneft, juii and uniull;: for whea 
 any one injured his benefactor, his ingratitude ex- 
 cited a fort of fellow-feeling and indignation in 
 others, as v/ell as kindnefs and refpccl" for thofe 
 that behaved diiierentiy; and, as they confidered 
 that they rnigiu fome i;r.e or other, perhaps, be 
 
 treated
 
 Machiavel. 143 
 
 treared in the fame manner thcmfelves, if proper 
 meafures were not taken to prevent it, they thought 
 fit to make laws for the reward of good men, and 
 the punilhment of offenders. This firft gave rife 
 to juftice in the worki ; and from this confidera- 
 lion it came to pafs, in procefs of time, that, in 
 the eledlion of a new chief, they had not fo much 
 regard to courage and bodily ftrength, as to wif- 
 dom and integrity : but afterwards, as this kind of 
 government became gradually hereditary inftead 
 of eleflive, the heirs ot thefe chieftains fcon began 
 to degenerate from the virtue of their anceftors, and 
 to behave themielves as if they thought the main 
 duty of a prince conillled in i'urpafling all other 
 men in luxury, extravagance, effeminacy, and every 
 fort of voluptuoufnefs i by wliich, in a while, they* 
 jBrll grew odious to their fubjeds, and then fo 
 jealous for them.lelves, that they were forced to dif- 
 trels and cut off others for their own fecurity, and 
 at lad: to become downright tyrants. This firft oc- 
 cafioncd con^ibinations and confpiracics for the 
 deftrudion of princes ; not amongli: the weak and 
 pufillanimous part of their fubjccls, but among 
 iuch as, being more eminent for their gencrofity, 
 niagnanimjity, riches, and birth, could not endure 
 any longer to lubniit to t:;e!e pitiiul and oppreffive 
 -"^overr.ircrjis. 
 
 Ti;c mukicudc, therefore, f.vayt'd by tlie authority 
 of the nobles, r.)ie in arms i-e'^infl their prince; and 
 being freed tioni \\v.i yc!:e, !;ran::ferred their alle- 
 giance X.O tiieir dijliverers, v^ho, being thoroughly 
 difjUi-ed :it n-!onarcny,c!Ki/:iied the form of govern- 
 ment, and took it inro their own hands: after 
 whie!: tht..y conducled bo:h themfelvcs and the 
 fiaic according to the plan tliey had formed, pre- 
 tcrriii,; the coa^.mon good to any particular advan- 
 tage j ana behaving, in private as well as })ublic 
 
 affairs,
 
 144 Mixed Governments, 
 
 affairs, with affiduity and moderation ; whilft the 
 remembrance of their paft fufFerings continued frelh 
 upon their minds. But this authority afterwards 
 devolving upon their fons, who had not feen thefe 
 changes, nor experienced the miferies of tyranny, 
 they began to grow fo diflatisfied with that fort of 
 civil equality, that they caft off all reftraint, and 
 giving themfelves up to rapine, ambition, and lull, 
 foon changed the government again from arifto- 
 cracy into an oligarchy. Their adminiftration, how- 
 ever, becoming as infupportable, in a while, as the 
 tyranny of the other had formerly been, the people 
 naturally began to look out for fome deliverer 5 
 and, having fixed upon a leader, they put them- 
 felves under his banners, and eftablifhed oligarchy. 
 But when they had done this, and came to retledl 
 upon the oppreffions they fuitained under a tyrant, 
 they refolved never to be again governed by any 
 one man, and therefore agreed to let up a popular 
 government; which was confcituted in fuch a man- 
 ner, that the chief authority was not vefted either 
 in a prince or in a junto of the nobility. 
 
 Now, as all new eftabliflimcnrs are held in fome 
 degree of reverence and veneration at firft, this 
 form fubfifted for fome time -, though no longer 
 than thofe people lived, who had been the founders 
 of it: for, after their death, their defcendants dege- 
 nerated into licentioufnefs, and fuch a contempt for 
 ail authority and diftinftion, that, every man living 
 after his own caprice, there was nothing to be iiitn. 
 but confuficn and violence : lo that, either by the 
 advice of fome good and rcrpe(rcable man, or com- 
 pelled by the ablolute neceility of providing a re- 
 medy for thefe diforders and enormities, they at 
 laft determined once more to fubmit to the domi- 
 nion of one: from which ftate they fell again in 
 time, through tiie fame gradations, and from the 
 
 above-
 
 Machtavel. 145 
 
 abovementioned caufes, into mifrule and licenti- 
 oufnefs. Such is the rotation to which all dates 
 are fubjed; neverthelefs they cannot often revere 
 to the iame kind of goveriiment, becaufe it is 
 not poflible that they fhould fo long exift: as to 
 undergo many of thele mutations: for it frequent- 
 ly happens, that when a ilate is labourii^g under 
 fuch convulfions, and is dcfticute both of ii-ength 
 and counfel, it fails a prey to fome other neig!i- 
 bouring community or nation that is better go- 
 verned j otherwile it might pafs t'lrough the feve- 
 ral abovementioned revolutions again and again to 
 infinity. 
 
 All thefe forts of government then, in my opi- 
 nion, are infirm and infecure; the three former 
 from the ufual fliortnefs of their duration, and 
 the three latter from the malignity of their owa 
 principles. The wifcfl: legifiators, therefore, being 
 aware of thefe defefts, never eftabliHied an'/ one 
 of them in particular, but contrived another that 
 partakes of them all, confilling of a prince, lords, 
 and commons, which they looked upon as more 
 firm and liable, becaufe every one of thele mem- 
 bers would be a check upon the otlier ; and of 
 t'lofe legifiators, Lycurgus' certainly merits the 
 higheft praife, wtio conftituted an eftabliflinvjnt of 
 this kind at Sparta, which killed above eight liun- 
 dred years, to his own great honour, as v/cil as 
 the tranquillity of the citizens. 
 
 Very different was liie fate of the government 
 eflabliflied by Solon at Athens, which, being a 
 llmple democracy only, was of fo fliurt continu- 
 .:nce, that it gave way to the tyranny of Pifiilra- 
 tus, before the death of the legillator : and 
 t!)ough, indeed, the heirs of that tyrant were ex- 
 pelled about forty years after, and the Atlieniuna 
 not uidy recovered their liberty, but rc-cilablilh- 
 
 L ' fd
 
 146 Mixed Gcvemmmts', 
 
 ed Solon's laws and plan of governmentj yet the^ 
 did not maintain it above one hundred years, not- 
 withftanding they made feveral new regulations 
 to reftrain the infolence of the nobles, and the 
 licentioufnefs of the commons -, the neceffity of 
 which Solon had not forefeen : fo that for want 
 of tempering his democracy with a fhare of 
 ariftocracy, and princely power, it was of fhort 
 duration in comparifon of the conltitution of 
 Sparta. 
 
 But to return to Rome. Though that city had 
 not a Lycurgus to model its conflitution at firfi:, 
 in fuch a manner as might preferve its liberty 
 for a long courfe of time ; yet fo many were the 
 accidents which happened in the contefts betwixt 
 the patricians and plebeians, that chance ef- 
 fected, what the lawgiver had not provided for: 
 fo that if it was not perfedl at the beginning, it 
 became fo after a while-, for though the firft laws 
 were deficient, yet they were neither incapable of 
 amendment, nor repugnant to its future perfec- 
 tion j fince not only Romulus, but all the reft of 
 the kings that fucceeded him, made feveral good 
 alterations in them, and fuch as were well calcu- 
 lated for the fupport of liberty. But> as it was 
 their intention to found a monarchy, and not a- 
 republic ; when that city had fiiaken off the yoke 
 of a tyrant, there feemed to be many provifions 
 itill wanting for the further maintenance of its 
 freedom. And notwithftanding tyranny was at 
 laft eradicated, by the ways and means above- 
 mentioned, yet thofe who had chiefly contributed 
 to it, created two confuls to fupply the place of 
 royalty ; by which it came to pafs, that the name 
 alone, and not the authority, of princes was ex- 
 tinguifned : fo that the fupreme power being 
 lodged only in the confuls aad fcnate, the govern- 
 ment
 
 Macbiavel. i^y 
 
 hifent confided of ho more than two of the three 
 tftates, which we have fpoken of beforej that is, 
 of royalty and ariflocracy : it riemained, therefore, 
 ftill neccffary to admit the people into feme fhare 
 of the government : and the patricians growing 
 fo infolcnt in time (as I fhali fhew hereafter), that 
 the plebeians could no longer endure it, the lat- 
 ter took, arms, and obliged them to relinquifli 
 part of their authority, left they fhould lofe the 
 whole : on the other hand, the confuls and fena- 
 tors ftill retained fo much power in the commoti- 
 Vrealth, as enabled them to fupport their rank 
 and dignity with honour. This ftruggle gave 
 birth to certain officers, called tribunes of the peo- 
 ple i after the creation of whom, that ftate be- 
 came more, firm and compaft, every one of the 
 three decrees abovementioned having its proper 
 Ihare in the government ; and fo propitious was 
 fortune to it, that although it was changed from 
 a monarchy into ah ariftocracy, and afterwards 
 into a democracy, by the fteps and for the reafons 
 already affigned, yet the royal power was never 
 entirely abolilhed and given to the patricians, nor 
 that of the patricians wholly to the plebeians : on 
 the contrary, the authority of the three eftates be- 
 ing duly proportioned and mixed together, gave 
 it the higheft degree of perfedtion that any com.- 
 monwealth is capable of attaining to , and this 
 was owing in a great meafure, if not altogether, 
 to the diflentions that happened betwixt the patri- 
 cians and plebeians, as Ihall be fhcwn more at 
 large in the following chapters. 
 
 La LETTER
 
 148 Mixed or compofed Gcvernmerns'. 
 
 LETTER XXVII. 
 
 MIXED OR COMPOSED GO- 
 VE R N M E N T S. 
 
 SIDNEY, PACE 22, lO, 
 
 Dear Sir, 
 
 SOME fmall numbers of men, living within 
 the precincTts of one city, have, as it were, 
 call into a common ftock, the right which they 
 had of governing themfelves and children, and, 
 by common confcnt, joining in one body, exercifed 
 fuch pov;er over every Tingle perfon as leemed 
 beneficial to the v/hole , and this men call perfed: 
 democracy. Others chof:^ rather to be governed 
 by a fclecl number of fuch as mofl excelled in 
 wiicicm and virtue ; and this, according to the 
 fjonification of the word, v,^as called ariftocracv. 
 Y/hen one man excelled ail others, the govern- 
 ment was put into his hands, under the name of 
 monarchy. But th.e v/ifefl, beft, and by far the 
 greatell part of mankind, reje6ting thefe fimple 
 fpccies, did form governments mixed or compoied 
 cf the three, as fliall be proved hereafter, which 
 commonly received their refpcctive denomination 
 from the part that prevailed, and did receive praife 
 cr blame, as they were v/ell or ill proportioned. 
 
 Sidney, p. 13'8. 16. 'I'he beft governments 
 of the world have been compofed of monarchy, 
 ariftocracy, and democracy. 
 
 As for democracy, I believe it can fuit only 
 with the convenience of a fmall town, accom- 
 panied with fuch circumftances as are feldorn 
 
 found.
 
 Sidney. 149 
 
 found. But this no way obliges men to run into 
 the other extreme, in as niuch as the- variety of 
 forms, between mere democracy and abiclure mo- 
 narchy, is almioft infinite. And if I fliouki under- 
 take to iay, there never was a good gov.^rnment 
 in the world, that did not ccnfifL of the three 
 fmiple fpecies of monarchy, ariftocracy, and demo- 
 cracy, I think I may make it good. I'his at tiie 
 lead is certain, that the government of the He- 
 brews, inftituted by God, had a judge, the great 
 Sanhedrim, and general allemblies of the people. 
 Sparta had two kings, a lenate of twenty-eight 
 chofen men, and the like afiemblies. Ail the 
 Dorian cities had a chief magitlrate, a fenate, 
 and occafional afiemblies. The cities of Ionia, 
 Athens and others, had an Archon, the Areo- 
 pagit^, &c. and all judgments concerning 
 matters of the greateil importance, as well as 
 the election of magiltrates, were referred to the 
 people. Rome, in the beginning, had a king and a 
 fenate, while the election of kings, and judgments 
 upon appeals, remained in ttie people-, afterwards, 
 confuls reprefenting kings, and vefted with equal 
 power, a more numerous fenate, and more fre- 
 quent meetings of the people. Venice has at this 
 day, a duke, the fenate of t!ie pregadi, and the 
 great aflembly of the nobility, which is the whole 
 city, the rellof the inhabitants being only incols, 
 not cives ; and thofe of the other cities or coun- 
 tries are their fubjedts, and do nut participate in 
 the government. 
 
 Genoa is governed in like manner :, Lucca not 
 unlike to them. Germany is at this day governed 
 by an emperor, the princes or great lords in their 
 feveral piecinCls; the cities by their own magif- 
 trates ; and by general diets, in which the whole 
 power of the nation rcfidcs, and where the empe- 
 
 1^ ^ ror.
 
 J50 Mixed or compofed Government^. 
 
 ror, princes, nobility, and cities have their places 
 in perfon, or by their deputies. All the northern 
 nations which, upon the diflblution of the Roman 
 empire, pofTefifed the beft provinces that had com- 
 pofed it, were under that form, which is ufually 
 called the Gothick polity. They had king, lords, 
 commons, diets, aflemblies of eftates, cortcs, and 
 parliaments, in which the fovereign powers of 
 thofe nations did refide, and by which they were 
 cxercifed. The like was pradtifed in Hungary, 
 Bohemia, Sweden, Denmark, Poland : and, 
 if things are changed in fome of thofe places 
 within thefe few years, they muft give better 
 proofs of having gained by the change, than arc 
 yet feen in the world, before I think myfelf obliged 
 to change my opinion. 
 
 Some nations, not liking the name of king, 
 have given fuch a power as kings enjoyed in other 
 places to one or more magiftrates, either limited 
 to a certain time, or left to be perpetual, as beft 
 pleafed themfelves : others, approving the name, 
 made the dignity purely elective. Some have in 
 their eledions principally regarded one family as 
 long as it lafted : others confidered nothing but 
 the fitnefs of the perfon, and referved to themfelves 
 a liberty of taking where they pleafed. Some 
 have permitted the crown to be hereditary as to 
 jts ordinary courfej but reftrained the power, and 
 inftituted officers to infped the proceedings of 
 kings, and to take care that the laws were not 
 violated. Of this fort were the Ephori of Sparta, 
 the Maires du Palais, and afterwards the conftable 
 of France, the jufticiar in Arragon, the reichs- 
 hofmeeter in Denmark, the high fteward in Eng- 
 land J and in all places, fuch afiembliesas are be- 
 forementioned under feveral names, who had the 
 power of the whole nation, &c. 
 
 Sidney,
 
 Sidney* 151 
 
 Sidney, p." 147. 18. It is eonfefled, thit a 
 pure democracy can never be good, unlefs far a 
 imall town, &c. 
 
 Sidney, p. 160. 19. As to popular govern- 
 ment in the ftrifteft fenfe, that is, pure demo- 
 cracy, where the people in themfelves, and by 
 chemfelves, perform all that belongs to govern- 
 ment, I know of no fuch thing , and, if it be in 
 the world, have nothing to fay for it. 
 
 Sidney, p. i6i. It" it be faid, that thofe govern- 
 ments, in which the democratical part governs 
 moft, do more frequently err in the choice of 
 men, or the means of preferving that purity of 
 manners which is required for the well-being 
 of a people, than thofe wherein ariftocracy 
 prevails, I confefs it, and that in Rome and 
 Athens, the beft and wifeft men did for the 
 moft part incline to ariftocracy. Xenophon, 
 Plato, Ariftotle, Thucydides, Livy, Tacitus, Ci- 
 cero, and others, were of this fort. But if our 
 author there feck patrons for his abfolute monar- 
 chy, he will find none but Phalaris, Agathocles, 
 Dionyfius, Catiline, Cethegus, Lentulus, with the 
 corrupted crew of mercenary rafcals who did, or 
 endeavoured to fet them up : thefe are they, qui- 
 bus ex honefto nulla eft fpes : they abhor /i'^^'c-A/- 
 vioH of the law, becaufe it curbs their vices, and 
 make themfelves fubfervient to the lufts of a man 
 who may nourifti them. 
 
 Sidney, p. 165. 21. Being no way conc-ern- 
 cd in the defence of democracy, dzc. 1 may leave 
 our knighr, like Don Quixote, fighting againll 
 the phantafms of his own brain, and faying what. 
 he pleafes againft fuch governments as never were, 
 unlels in fuch a place as St. Marino, near Sini- 
 glaglia in Italy, where a hundred clowns govern 
 
 L 4 a bar-
 
 152 Mixed or compofed Gcvcrnments. 
 
 a barbarous rock chat no man invades, and relates 
 roching to our qucfiion. The republic of St. 
 Marino, next to that: of Millingen in Switzerland, 
 is the frnalieft republic in Kurope. The limits of 
 it ^^xtend no farther than the bafe of the moun- 
 tain on vvhich it is fcated. Its infigniiicance 
 is its fecurity. No neighbouring psrince ever 
 thought it worth his while to deilroy the indepen- 
 dency of fuch a B;'ehive. See Blainville's Travels, 
 vol. ii. p. 227. Addifon's Remarks on feveral 
 parts of Italy. 
 
 Sidney, p. 258. However, more ignorance 
 cannot be expi effed, than by giving the name 
 of democracy to thofe governments that are corn- 
 poled of the three fr.nple fpecies, as we have 
 proved that all the good ones have ever been : 
 for, in a ftri6l fenfe, it can only fuit Vv'ith thcfe, 
 where the people retain to themielves the admini- 
 ilration of the fupreme power -, and more largely, 
 when the populir part, as in Athens, greatly over- 
 balances the oti;er two, and the denomination h 
 taken from the prevailing pan. 
 
 LETTER
 
 Montefquku. 155 
 
 LETTER XXVIII. 
 MIXED GOVERNMENTS. 
 
 MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF LAWS, B. II. C- VI. 
 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 IN every government there are three forts of 
 power; the legiflative, the executive in refpedt 
 of things dependent on tlie law of nations, and 
 the executive in regard to things that depend on 
 the civil law. 
 
 By virtue of the firft (i, e. the legiflative power), 
 the prince or magiftrare enacts temporary or per- 
 petual laws, and amends or abrogates tiiofe that 
 have been already enaitcd. By the fecond, he 
 makes peace or war, fends or receives embaf- 
 lies, eftabliflies the public fecurity, and provides 
 againft invafions. By t!ie third, he puniflies cri- 
 minals, or determines the difputes tliat arife be- 
 tween individuals. The latter we fliall call the 
 judiciary power, and the other fimply tlie execu- 
 tive power of the Hate, 
 
 The political liberty of the citizen, is a tran- 
 quillity Oi mind, ariling from the opinion each 
 perfon has ot his fifety. In order to have this 
 liberty, it is rec]uifite the government be fo con- 
 itituted, as that one citizen need not be afraid of 
 another citizen. 
 
 When tJie legidative and executive powers are 
 united in the fame perfon, or in the fame body of 
 magiilrates, there can be no liberty , bccaufe 
 apprehenfions niay arife, Icll the fame monarch or 
 ienate, or die fame icnate fliould enad tyran- 
 nical
 
 1 54 Mixed Governments. 
 
 nical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical man- 
 ner. 
 
 Again, there is no liberty, if the power of 
 judging be not feparated from the leg Native and 
 executive powers : were it joined with l;;^ Icgifla- 
 tive, the life snd liberty of the cinzens wnuid be 
 expofed to arbitrary controul ; for the juuge 
 would then be legiilator : were it joined to the 
 executive power, the judge might bJiavev/ith 
 all the violence of r^^ oppreiTor. 
 
 There would be .-/ end of every thing {tout 
 feroit perdu) were the f. me nian, or the fame body, 
 whether of princes, of the nobles, or of the people, 
 to exercife thofe three pov. 's; that of enafting 
 laws, that of executing ..: . public refolutions, 
 and that of judging the CD'.nes or differences of 
 individuals. 
 
 Moll kingdoms in Europe enjoy a moderate 
 government, becaufe the prince, who is inverted 
 with the two firft powers, leaves the third to his 
 fubjedls. In Turkey, where thefe three powers 
 are united h:- the fultan's perfon, the fubjeds 
 groan under the weight of a moft frightful oppref- 
 iion. In the republics of Italy, where thefe three 
 powers are united, there is lefs liberty than in our 
 monarchies. Hence their government is obliged 
 to have recourfe to as violent methods for its 
 fupport, as even that of the Turks i witnefs the 
 ftate inquifitors at Venice, and the lion's mouth, 
 into which every informer may at all hours throw 
 his written accufations: what a fituation mult the 
 poor citizen be in under thofe poor republics ! 
 The fame body of magiftrates are polkfled, as 
 executors of the laws, of the Vv'hole power they 
 have given themfelves in quality of legiflaLors. 
 They might plunder the ftate by their general 
 determinations ; and as they have likewife the 
 judiciary power in their hands, every private 
 
 citizen
 
 Montefquicu, 155 
 
 icitizen may be ruined by their particular deci- 
 ficns. The whole power is here united in one 
 body ; and though there is no external pomp thac 
 indicates a defpotic fway, yet the people feel the 
 efFe6ts of it every moment. 
 
 Hence it is, that many of the princes of Europe, 
 whofe aim has been levelled at arbitrary power, 
 have conftantly fet out with uniting in their own 
 perfons all the branches of magiftracy, and all the 
 great offices of ftate. 
 
 I allow, indeed, that the mere hereditary arif- 
 tocracy of the Italian republicks, does not anfwer 
 exadly to the defpotic power of the eaftern 
 princes. The number of magiftrates fometimes 
 ibftcns the power of the magiftracy ; the whole 
 body of the nobles do not always concur in the 
 lame defigns ; and different tribunals are erefted 
 ^hat temper each other. Thus, at Venice, the 
 legiQative power is in the council, the executive 
 in the pregadi, and the judiciary in the quarantia. 
 JBut the mifchief is, that thefe different tribunals 
 jire compofed of magiftrates all belonging to the 
 fame body , which conftitutes almoft one and the 
 fame power. 
 
 The judiciary power ought not to be given to 
 ^ ftanding fenate ; it (hould be exercifed by per- 
 fons taken from the body of the people, as at 
 Athens, at certain times of the year, and purfuant 
 to a form and manner prcfcribed by law, in order 
 to ered a tribunal that fliould laft only as long as 
 neceffity requires. 
 
 By this means the power of judging, a power 
 fo terrible to mankind, not being annexed to any 
 particular ftate or profeftion, becomes, as it were, 
 inviftble. People have not then the judges con- 
 tinually prefent to their viewj they fear the office, 
 but not the magiftrate.
 
 156 Mh:ed Governments. 
 
 In accurations of a deep or criminal nature, it is 
 proper the pcrfon acciifed fhould have the privi- 
 lege of chuOng, in fome meaiure, his judges, in con- 
 currence with the law ? or, at leall, he fhouid have 
 a right to except againft fo great a number, that the 
 remaining part may be deemed Jiis own choice. 
 The other tv/o powers may be given rather to 
 magiftrates or permanent bodies, becauie they are 
 notexercifed on any private fubjecl:; one being no 
 more than the general v;iil of the iiate, and the 
 other the execution of that general will. 
 
 But though the tribunals ought not to be fixed, 
 yet the judgments ought, and to llich a degree as 
 to be always conformable to the exact letter of 
 the lav,'. Were they to be the private opinion of 
 thejudge, people vi^ould then live in fociety with- 
 out knov/ing exadly the obligations it lays them 
 under. 
 
 The judges ought likewiie to be in the fame 
 ftation as the accufed, or, in other words, his 
 peers, to the end that he may not imiagine he is 
 fallen into the hands of perlons inclined to treat 
 him with rigour. 
 
 If the legifiative leaves the executive power in 
 poffeffion of a right to impriibn tlioie fubjeds who 
 can give fecurity for their good behaviour, there 
 is an end of liberty ; uniefs they are taken up, 
 in order to anfwer, v/ithout delay, to a capital 
 crim.e , in this cafe they are really ittGy being fub-; 
 je6^ only to the pov/er of the law. 
 
 But fnould the legiilature think itfelf in danger, 
 by fome lecret confpiracy againft the fcate, or by 
 a correfpondence with a foreign enemy, it might 
 authoriie the executive power, for a fliort and 
 limited time, to imprifon fulpeded perions; who, 
 \n that cafe, would lofe their liberty only for a 
 while, to preferve it for eyer. And this is the 
 
 only
 
 Montefquieu, 257 
 
 only reafonable method that can be fubftituted 
 to the tyrannical magiitracy of the Ephori, and 
 to the ftate inquifitors of Venice, who are alfo 
 dcfpotical. 
 
 As, in a free ftate, every man who is fuppofed a 
 f'-ee agent, ought to be his own governor; fo the 
 legiflative power fliould refide in the whole body 
 of the people. But fince this is impoffible in 
 large Itates, and in fmall ones is fubjetl to many 
 inconveniencies-, it is fit the people fliould execute 
 by tiieir reprekntatives what they cannot execute 
 by themfclves. 
 
 The inhabitants of a particular town are much 
 better acquainted with its wants and interefts, 
 than with thole of other places -, and are better 
 judges of the capacity of their neighbours, than 
 of that of the reit of their countrymen. The 
 members therefore of the legiflature lliould not 
 be chofen from the general body of the nation; 
 but it is proper, that in every confiderable place, 
 a reprefentative fhould be eleded by the inhabi- 
 tants. 
 
 The great advantage of reprefentatives, is 
 their being capable of difcufiing affairs , for this 
 the people collectively are extremely unfit, which 
 IT one of the greateft inconveniencies of a demo- 
 cracy. 
 
 It is not at all neceflary tliat the reprefentatives, 
 who have received a general iudruftion from their 
 electors, lin)uld wait to be particularly inilrudled 
 on every alrair, as is pradiled in the diets of 
 Germany, 'irue it is, that. by tins way of pro- 
 ceednig, the Ipeeclies of the deputies might with 
 greater propriety be called the voice of the na- 
 tion : but, on the other hand, this would throw 
 them into infinite delays ; would give each de- 
 I'Uty a power of controuling the airembly ; and 
 
 on
 
 15^ Ancient RepuhlkSt and Opinions 
 
 on the moft urgent and prefling occafions, the 
 fprings of the nation might be flopped by a finglc 
 caprice. 
 
 LETTER XXIX. 
 
 ANCIENT REPUBLICS, AND OPINIONS 
 OF PHILOSOPHERS. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 IN fearching for the principles of government^ 
 we may divide them into two kinds : the prin- 
 ciples of authority, and the principles of power. 
 The firft are virtues of the mind and heart, fuch 
 as wifdom, prudence, courage, patience, tempe- 
 rance, jufticc, &c. : the fecond are the goods of 
 fortune, fuch as riches, extradlion, knowledge^ 
 and reputation. I rank knowledge among the 
 goods of fortune, becaufe it is the efFeft of edu- 
 cation, fludy, and travel, which are either acci- 
 dents, or ufual efFeds of riches or birth, and is by 
 no means neceffarily connefted with wifdom or 
 virtue: but, as it is univerfally admired and re- 
 fpeded by the people, it is clearly a principle of 
 power. The lame may be faid of reputationji 
 which, abftrafted from all confideration whether it 
 is merited or not, well or ill founded, is another 
 fource of power. 
 
 Riches will hold the firft place, in civilifed 
 focieties at leaft, among the principles of power, 
 and will often prevail not only over all the prin- 
 ciples of authority, but over all the advantages of 
 birth, knowledge, and fame. For, as Harrington 
 6 fays,
 
 of Philofophers. 159 
 
 fays, " Men are hung upon riches, not of choice 
 as upon the other, but of neceffity and by the 
 teeth : for as much as he who wants bread, is his 
 fervant that will feed him j and if a man thus 
 feeds a whole people, they are under his empire." 
 It already appears, that there muft be in every 
 fociety of men, fuperiors and inferiors, becaufe 
 God has laid in the conftitution and courfe of 
 nature the foundations of the diftinftion. And 
 indeed, as Harrington fays, " an army may as 
 well confift of foldiers without officers, or of 
 officers without foldiers, as a commonwealth con- 
 fifl: of a people without a gentry, or of a gentry 
 without a people." 
 
 " Let dates take heed," fays Lord Bacon, " how 
 their nobility and gentlemen multiply too fall, 
 for that makes the common fubje6t grow to be a 
 peafant and bafe fwain driven out of heart, and in 
 eficd but a gentleman's labourer. How fhall the 
 plow then be kept in the hands of the owners, and 
 not mere hirelings ? how fhall the country attain to 
 the charafter which Virgil gives of ancient Italy, 
 I'erra pot ens armis^ aique ubere gkba ? how, but by 
 the balance of dominion or property ?" 
 
 Notwithftanding Mr. Turgot's averfion to ba- 
 lances, Harrington difcovered, and made our, as 
 Toland his biographer informs us, that ** empire 
 follows the balance of property, whether lodged 
 in one, a few, or many hands." A noble difco- 
 very, of which the honour folely belongs to him, 
 as much as the circulation of the blood to 
 Harvey, printing to Laurence Colter, or of guns, 
 compafles, or optic glalfes to the feveral authors. 
 If this balance is not the foundation of all poli- 
 ticks, as Toland alferts, it is of fo much import- 
 ance, that no man can be thougljt a mailer of the 
 
 fubjeft
 
 1 6o Ancient Repuhlics, and Opinions 
 
 fubje(!n:, without having well weighed it. Mi%" 
 Turgot, it is plain, had not the leail idea of it. 
 
 " Tillage," fays Harrington, " bringing up a 
 good foldiery, brings up a good conimonweakh : 
 for where the owner of the plow comes to have the 
 fword too, he will ufe it in defence of his ovvn. 
 "Whence it has happened, that the people of Eng- 
 land, in proportion to their property, have been 
 always free, and the genius of this nation has ever 
 had fome refemblance with that of ancient Italy, 
 which was wholly addicted to commonwealths, 
 2nd where Rome came to make the greateft ac- 
 count of her ruftic tribes, and to call her confuls 
 from the plow : for in the v/ay of parliaments, 
 "which was the government of this realm, men of 
 country lives have been ftill imruded with the 
 greatelt affairs, and the people have conRantly 
 had an averfion to the v/ays of the court. Ambi- 
 tion loving to be gay and ro fav/n, has been a 
 gallantry looked upon as having fom.cthing in it 
 of the livery; and hufbandry, or the country vi^ay 
 of life, though of a grofier fpihning, as the beft 
 lUiiTof a commonwealth, according to Ariitotle; 
 fuch a one, being the moll obltinate aiTertrefs of 
 her liberty, and the lead fubitft to innovation or 
 turbulency. C(^'mmonweaIths, upon wliich the 
 city life has had the greateil ir.fiuence, as Athens, 
 have feldom or never been qji^et: but at beil are 
 found to have iniured their own bufinefs by over- 
 doing it. Whence the U -ban trib^-s of Rome, 
 confiiiing of the tiirbaforc'iJisvAO, lihcrtiiius^ that had 
 received their freedom by m^^numifiion, were of 
 no reputation in comparifon of the rnlHcs. A 
 tommonvv'ealth, confifting but of ore city, would 
 doubtlefs be ftcrmiy, in regard tiiat ambition would 
 be every man's trade: but where it confifts of n 
 country, the plow in the i:ands or the ov/ner iindi 
 
 iiims
 
 'of Phihfophers. i6i 
 
 Fiioi a better calling, and produces the mod inno- 
 cent and fteady genius of a commonwealth. 
 
 Oceana, p. 37. -Doineftic empire is founded 
 upon dominion, and dominion is property, real or 
 perfonal ; that is to fay, in Jands^ or in money and 
 goods. Landsi, or the parcels of a territory, are 
 held by the proprietor or proprietors of it, in fome 
 proportion ; and fuch (except it be in a city that 
 has little or no land^ and whofe revenue is in trade) 
 as is the proportion or balance of dominion or 
 property in land, fuch is the nature of the empire. 
 If one man be fole landlord of a territory, or 
 over- balance the people for example, three parts 
 in four he is grand feignior: for fo the Turk is 
 called from his property; and his empire is abfo- 
 lute monarchy. If the few, as a nobility and 
 clergy, be landlords, or overbalance the people to 
 the like proportion, it makes the Gothic balance, 
 and the empire is mixed monarchy, as thit of 
 Spain, Poland, and once of England: and if the 
 ^hole people be landlords, or hold the lands fo 
 divided among them, that no one man, or num- 
 ber of men, within the compafs of th.e few, or 
 ariftocracy, over-balance them, the empire is a 
 commonwealth. 
 
 If force be interpofed in any of thefe tliree 
 cafes, it muft either frame the government to the 
 foundation, or the foundation to the government; 
 or, holding the government not according to the 
 balance, it is not natural, but violent : and there- 
 fore if it be at the devotion of a prince, it is 
 tyranny; if at the devotion of the few, oligarchy ; 
 or if in the power of the people, anarchy. Each 
 of which confulions, the balance Handing other- 
 wife, is but of fliort continuance, becaufe againft 
 the niature of the balance; which not dellroyed, 
 irfellroys that which oppofes it. 
 
 M Here
 
 i6z 'Ancient RepuMes, andOpimcHJ 
 
 Here it would be entertaining to apply thcfc 
 obfervations to the force of fleets and armies, &c. 
 applied by Great Britain in the late conttd wiih 
 America. The balance of land, efpecially in 
 New England, where the force was firft applied, 
 was neither in the king nor a nobility, but im- 
 menfely in favour of the people. The intention 
 of the Britiih politicians was to alter this balance, 
 " frame the foundation to the government, by 
 bringing the lands more and more into the hands 
 of the governors, judges, counfellors, &c. &c. 
 v;ho were all to be creatures of a Britiih miniilry. 
 We have feen the effc6ls." The balance dcftroy- 
 ed that which oppofed it. 
 
 Harrington proceeds. But there are certain 
 other confufions, which being rooted in rhe ba- 
 lance, are of longer continuance, and of worfe 
 confequence-, as, firft, where a nobility holds half 
 the property, or about that proportion, and the 
 people the other half-, in which cafe, without 
 altering the balance, there is no remedy, but the 
 one muft eat out the other: as the people did tlic 
 nobility in Athens, and the nobility the people in 
 Rome. Secondly, where a prince holds about 
 half the dominion, and the people t're other half, 
 which was the cafe of the Roman emperors, 
 (planted partly upon their military colonies, and 
 partly upon thefenateand the people) rhe govern- 
 ment becomes a very fhambles, borii or the princes 
 and the people. It being unlav.ful in Turky 
 that any fliould pofTefs land but the grand feignior^ 
 the balance is fixed by the hw/, and that em.pire 
 firm". Nor, though the kings often roll, was the 
 throne of England kncv/n to f.rke, until the 
 ftatute of alienations broke ;; s piila'?, by giving 
 way to the nobility to il-il thvir cJlatcs. While 
 Lacedemon held to the d!v;i;cn o; land made by 
 
 . Lycur.QUS,
 
 tf Philofophers, 1^3 
 
 Lycurgns, it was immoveable ; but, breaking 
 that, couid (land no longer. This kind otlaw, 
 fixing the balance in lands, is called Agrarian, 
 and was firft introduced by God himfelf, who di- 
 vided the land of Canaan to his people by lot. 
 
 The public fword, without a hand to hold it, 
 is but cold iron. The hand which holds this 
 fword is the militia of a nation ; and the militia 
 of a nation is either an army in the field, or 
 ready for the field upon occafion. But an army 
 is a bead that has a great ocUy, and muft be 
 fed ; wherefore this will come to vv^hat pailurcs 
 you have, and what pnftures you have will 
 come to the balance of property, v/ithout v/hich 
 the public fword is but a namie^ He that can 
 graze this bead with the great belly, as the Turk 
 docs his timariots, may well deride him that ima- 
 gines he received his pou'cr by covenant. But if 
 the property of the nobility, flocked with their 
 tenants and retainers, be the pafture of that beaft, 
 the ox knows his mailer's crib ; and it is impofTi- 
 ble for a king, in fuch a conftitution, to reign 
 othcrwife than by covenant ; or, if he breaks it, 
 it is words that come to blov.-s. 
 
 Arillotle is full of this balance in divers 
 places, efpecially where he fays, tiiac immoderate 
 wealth, as where one man, or the few, have 
 greater poiTefrions than the equality or the frame 
 of the commonwealth will bear, is an occafion of 
 icdicion, which ends, for the greater part, in mo- 
 narchy ; and that, for tliis caufe, tlie oflracifm 
 has been received in divers places, as in Argos 
 rind Athens j but that it were better to prevent 
 the growth in the beginning, than, when it has 
 got head, to leek the remedy of fuch an evil. 
 
 Machiavel, not perceiving that if a common- 
 
 wi-rakh be galled by the gentry, it is by their 
 
 iVI 2 over-
 
 1 64. Ancient Republics, and Opinions 
 
 over-balance, fpeaks of the gentry as hoftile to 
 popular governments, and of popular governmentrj 
 as hoftile to the gentry j which can never be 
 proved by any one example, unlefs in civil war-, 
 feeing that, even in Switzerland, the gentry arc 
 not only fafe, but in honour. But the balance, 
 as I have laid it down, though unfeen by Ma- 
 chiavel, is that which interprets him, where he 
 concludes, " That he who will go about to make 
 a com.monweakh where there be many gentlemen, 
 unlefs he firft deftroys them, undertakes an im- 
 poITibility. And that he who goes about to in- 
 troduce monarchy, where the condition of the 
 people is equal, fhall never bring it to pafs, un- 
 lefs he cull out fuch of them as are the moft tur- 
 bulent and ambitious, and make them gentlemeri 
 or noblemen, not in name, but in effect , that is, 
 by enriching them with lands, caftles, and trea- 
 fures, that miay gain them power among the reft, 
 and bring in the reft to dependence upon them ; 
 to the end that they, maintaining their ambition 
 by the prince, the prince may maintain his power 
 by them." 
 
 Wherefore, as in this place I agree with Ma- 
 chiavel, that a nobility, or gentry, over- balancing 
 a popular governmenr, is the utter bane and de- 
 llruftion of it, lb I ftiall iliew in another, that a 
 nobility or gentry, in a popular government, 
 not over-balancing it, is the very life and foul 
 of it. 
 
 The public fword, or right of the militia, be 
 the government what it will, or let it change how 
 it can, is infeparable from the over- balance in do- 
 minion. 
 
 ;-!AR RING ton's
 
 cf Philofophers] 165 
 
 Harrington's prerogative of popular go- 
 vernment, c. iii. p. 226. 
 
 The balance of dominion in land Is the na- 
 tural caufe of empire; and this is the principle 
 which makes politics a fcience undeniable through- 
 out, and the mod demonfirrable of any wiiatevcr. 
 If a man, having one hundred pounds a year, 
 may keep one fervant, or have one man at his 
 command, then, having one hundred times fo 
 much, he may keep one hundred fervants ; and 
 this multiplied by a thoufand, he may have one 
 hundred thoufand men at his command. Now 
 that the fingle peribn, or nobility, of any country 
 in Europe, that had but half fo many men at 
 command, would be king or prince, is that which 
 1 think no man can doubt. But " No money, 
 *' no Swifs." The reafon why a fingle perfon, or 
 the nobility, that has one hundred thoufand men, 
 or half fo many, at command, will have the go- 
 vernment, is, that the eftate in land, whereby 
 they are able to maintain fo many, in any Euro- 
 pean territory, mud over- balance the reft that 
 remains to the people, at leaft three parts in four. 
 Now, for the fame reafon, if the people hold three 
 parts in four of the territory, it is plain there can 
 neicher be any fingle perfon or nobility able to 
 difpute the government with them. In this cafe, 
 therefore, except force be interpofed, they govern 
 themfelvts. So that by this computation of the 
 balance of property or dominion in the land, you 
 have, according to the three-fold foundation of 
 roperty, the root or generation of the three-fold 
 ind of government or empire. W one man bs 
 fole landlord of a territory, or over-balance the 
 whole people, three parts in four, or thereabouts, 
 he is grand fcigniorj for fo the Turk, not from 
 
 M 3 his 
 
 I
 
 1 66 Ancient Republics, and Opinions 
 
 his empire, but property, is called , and the em- 
 pire, in this cafe, is ablolute monarchy. It* the 
 few, or a nobility, or a nobility with a clergy, be 
 landlords to Juch a proportion as over- balances 
 tlie people in the like manner, t::ey may make 
 whom they pleafe king; or, if they bs not pleafed 
 with their king, down with him, and let up whom 
 they like better; a Henry the fourth, or kventh, 
 a Guiie, a Montfort, a Nevil, or a Porter, fhoiild 
 they find that belt for their own ends and pur- 
 pofes: for as not the balance of the king, but 
 that of the nobility, in this cafe, is the caule of 
 the government, lb not the eftate of the prince or 
 captain, but his virtue or ability, or fitnefs for 
 the ends of the nobility, acquires that command 
 or office. This for ariftocracy, or mixed mo- 
 narchy. But if the whole people be landlords, 
 or hold the lands fo divided among them, that 
 no one man, or number of men, v^'ithin the com.- 
 pafs of the few, or ariftocracy, over-balance them, 
 it is a comiinonwealth. Such is the branch in the 
 root, or the balance of property naturally pro- 
 ducinf^ eniDire. 
 
 Then follows a curious account of the lav.-s in 
 Ifrael againft ufury, and in Lacedemon againft 
 trade, Sec. which are well vvorch ftudying. 
 
 Page 254. That which, introducing two ef- 
 tates, caules divifion, or miakes a commonwealth 
 unequal, is net that fiie has a nobility, witiiout 
 which file is deprived of her inoil lixcial v^rna- 
 mcnr, and weakened in her conduct, but wnen 
 the nobility only is capable of magiilracy, or 
 of the fenate ; and where this is fo ordered, fce 
 is unequal, as Kome. But where the nobility 
 is no othervvife capable of magillracy, nor of 
 the fenate, than by t.leclion of the people, the 
 commonwealth confitls but of one order, and
 
 of Philofcphers. 167 
 
 is equal, as Lacedenion or Venice. Where the 
 nobility holds half the property, or about that 
 proportion, and the people the other half, the 
 iliares of the land may be equal-, but in regard 
 the nobility have much among few, and the 
 people little among many, the few will not be 
 contented to have authority, v^hich is all their 
 proper fhare in a commonwealth, but will be 
 bringing the people under power, which is not: 
 their proper (hare in a commonwealth; where- 
 fore this commonwealth mull needs be unequal ; 
 and, except by altering the balance, as the Athe- 
 nians did by the recifion of debts, or as the Ro- 
 mans went about to do, by an agrarian, it be 
 brought to fuch an equality, that the whole power 
 be in the people, and there remain no more than 
 authority in the nobility, there is no remedy, but 
 the one, with perpetual feuds, will eat out the 
 other, as the people did the nobility in Athens, 
 and the nobility the people in Rome. Where 
 the carcafe is, there wiil be the eagles alio ; where 
 the riches are, there will be the power: fo if a 
 few be as rich as all the reft, a few wiil have as 
 much power as all the red-, in which cafe the 
 commonwealth is unequal, and there can be no 
 tnd of icavi[ig and tailing till it be brought to 
 tc|i:ali[y. 
 
 'I'he eftates, be they one, or two, or three, are 
 fuch, as v.'as laid by virtue of iht balance upon 
 whicli tilC govcriiment nmil naturally depend : 
 cxemplilkd in France, &C. 
 
 page 2'-6. Ai! government is of three kinds : 
 a governnient of iervant:,, a government of fub- 
 jei;ts, or a government of citizens. 1 lie lirft is 
 abloluie moiiarclr/, as that of Tiirlcy ; the Iccond 
 ariflocraiical monarchy, as tiiat of France; tiie 
 M 4 third
 
 3 68 Ancient Republics^ and Opinions 
 
 third a commonwealth, as Ifrael, Rome, Hoi^ 
 land. Of thele, the government of fervants i.s 
 harder to be conquered, and the eafier to be held, 
 The government of fubjefts is the eafier to be 
 conquered, and the harder to be held. The go- 
 vernment of citizens is both tlie hardeft to bs 
 conquered, and the hardeft to be held. 
 
 The reafon why a government of fervants is 
 hard to be conquered, is, that they are under a 
 perpetual difcipline and command. Vv hy a go- 
 vernment of fubjects is eafily conquered, is oa 
 account of the fa6tions of the nobility. 
 
 The reafons why a government of citizens, 
 where the commonwealth is equal, is hardeft to 
 be conquered, are, that the invader of fuch a 
 fociety muft" not only truft to his own ftrength, 
 inafmuch as, the commonwealth being equal, he 
 muft needs find them united; but in regard that 
 fuch citizens, being all foldiers, or trained up to 
 their arms, which they ufe not for the defence of 
 flavery, but of liberty, a condition not in this 
 world to be bettered, they have, more fpecially 
 upon this occafion, the higheft foul of courage, 
 and, if their territory be of any extent, the vafteft 
 body of a well-difciplined militia, that is poffible 
 in nature: wherefore an example of fuch a one, 
 overcome by the arms of a monarch, is not to be 
 found in the world. 
 
 In the Art of Law-giving, chap. i. he enlarges 
 fcill farther upon this lubjed; and inftances Jo- 
 feph's purchafeof all the lands of theEgyptians for 
 Pharaoh, Vv^hereby they became fervants to Pha- 
 raoh ; and he enlara;es on the Pntrlifti balance, 
 &c. 
 
 In America, the balance is nine-tenths on the 
 fide of the people: indeed there is bur one ordei -
 
 vf Philofophers. i6<^ 
 
 and Gur fenators have influence chiefly by the 
 principles of authority, and very little by thofe 
 <i)f powerj but this muft be poftponed. 
 
 LETTER XXX. 
 
 ANTIENT REPUBLICS, AND OPINIONS 
 OF PHILOSOPHERS. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 MY defign is more extenfive than barely to 
 fliew the imperfedtion of iVIr. Turgot's 
 idea. This might be done in a few v^rords, and 
 a very fhort procefs of reafoning : but I wifli to 
 aflTemble together the opinions and reafonings of 
 philofophers, politicians, and hiftorians, who have 
 taken the moft extenfive views of men and fo- 
 cieties, whofe characters are defervcdly revered, 
 and whofe writings were in the contemplation of 
 thofe who framed the American conftitutions. It 
 will not be contefted, that all thefe chara6lers arc 
 united in Polybius, who, in a fragment of his 
 fixth book, tranflated by Edward Spelman, p. 
 c^gi, at the end of his tranflation of the Romaa 
 Antiquities of Dionyfiu*; Hallicarnaflenfis, fays: 
 *' It is cuftomary to ettablifli three forts of go- 
 vernments-, kingly government, arifl:ocracy, and 
 democracy : upon which one may very properly 
 alk them, whether they lay thefe down as tlie 
 only forms of government, or as the befl: j for in 
 both cafes they fcem to be in an oror, fince it is 
 
 manifeft.
 
 I yo AncioH Republics^ and Op'mons 
 
 manifed, that the beft form of government is that 
 which is compounded of all three, This is founded 
 not only in reafon but in experience, Lycurgus 
 havino; fet the example of this form of govern- 
 ment in the infiirution of the Lacedemonian com- 
 monwealth." 
 
 Six kinds of government m.ufc be allowed : 
 kingly government and monarchy, ariilocracy 
 and oligarchy, democracy, and the government 
 of the multitude. 
 
 Lycurgus concluded, that every form of go- 
 vernment that is fimple, by foon degenerating 
 into that vice that is allied to it, muft be unlia- 
 ble. The vice of kingly government is mo- 
 r.archy ; that of ariftocracy, oligarchy ; that of 
 democracy, rage and violence-, into which, in 
 procefs of time, all of them muft degenerate. 
 Lycurgus, to avoid thefe inconveniences, form- 
 ed his government not of one fort, but united in 
 one all the advantages and properiies of the beft 
 governments ; to the end tliat no branch of ir, 
 by f-A/eliing beyond its due bounds, might dege- 
 nerate into the vice which is congenial [o it ; and 
 that, while each of them v^'cre mutually acted 
 upon by oppojlte pczvers^ no one part might in- 
 cline any way, or cut-weigh the reft-, but that the 
 commonwealth, being equally poifcd and balanced, 
 like a Jhip or a waggon^ acted upon by contrary 
 povjers, might long remain in tlie fame fituation-, 
 while the king was reftrained from excels by the 
 fear of the people, who had a proper fhare in 
 the commonvv^ealth , and, on the other fide, the 
 people did not dare to difregard :he king, from 
 their fear of the fenate, who, being ail elected for 
 their virtue, would always incline to the juftcii; 
 fide*, by which means, that branch which hap- 
 pened to be opprelled became always fupcrior, 
 and, by the accclfional v*'v;ight of the fenate, cut- 
 
 ;,;--. ..,7
 
 cf Philofiphers, ' 171 
 
 halanced the other. This fviLem prefcrved the 
 Lacedemonians in liberty longer than any other 
 people we have heard of ever enjoyed it. 
 
 All the three principal orders of government 
 were found in the Roman commonwealth ; every 
 thing was conftituted and adminiftered vvi:h that 
 equality and propriety by thefe three, that it v/as 
 not poflible, even for a Roman citizen, to af- 
 fert pofitively, whether the. government, in the 
 whole, was ariilocratical, democratical, or monar- 
 chical. For when we caft our eyes on the power 
 of the confuls, the government appeared entirely 
 monarchical and kingly ; \%\'\^r\ on that of the fe- 
 nate, ariftocratical; and when any one confidered 
 the power of the people, it appeared plainly de- 
 mocratical. 
 
 The confuls, when they are at Rome, and be- 
 fore they take the field, have the adminiflration 
 of all public affairs ; for all other magiitrates 
 obey them, except the tribunes of the people : 
 they introduce anibalTadors into the fenate ; they 
 alfo propoTe to the fenate thofe fubjeds of debate 
 that require immediate difpatch; and are lolely en- 
 trulled Vv'ith the execution of the decrees : to them 
 belongs the confidcration of all public affairs of 
 which the people have cognizance, whom they 
 are to affeiuble upon all occafions, and lay before 
 them the decrees of the fenate, then purfue the 
 relolutions of the majority. They have almoft an 
 abfolute power in evc:ry thing that relates either to 
 the [^reparations of war, or to the conduft of it 
 in the held ; for they may give what orders they 
 pleafe to their allirs, and appoint the tribunes-, 
 they may raife forces, and enlid thofe who arc 
 proper for the fervice : they alfo have a power, 
 when in the field, of punifliing any who ferve 
 under them ; and of expending as mgch ai they 
 
 pleafe
 
 172 Ancient Republics, and Opinion; 
 
 pleafe of the public money, being always attend' 
 cd by a quasftor for that purpofe, whole duty it is 
 to yield a ready obedience to all their commands. 
 So that whoever cafts his eyes on this branch, 
 may with reafon affirm, that the iicvernment is 
 merely monarchical and kingly. 
 
 The fenate have, in the firft place, the com- 
 mand of the public money : for they have the 
 conduft of all receipts and difburfements , fincc 
 the qu^llors cannot iflue money for any particular 
 fervice without a decree of the fenate, except thofe 
 fums they pay by the direftion of the confuls. 
 
 It has the power over all difburfements made 
 by the cenfors, every fifth year, in ereding and re- 
 pairing public buildings; takes cognizance of all 
 crimes committed in Italy, fuch as treafons, con- 
 fpiracies, poifonings, and affaflinations , fends 
 cmbafiies out of Italy to reconcile differences, 
 ufe exhortations, fignify commands, admit allian- 
 ces, or declare war; determines, when ambafla- 
 dors come to Rome, in what manner they are to 
 be treated, and the anfvver to be given them. For 
 ihefe reafons, when a foreigner comes to Rome, 
 in the abfence of the confuls, the government ap- 
 pears to him purely ariftocratical. 
 
 There is ftill a moft confiderable fhare in the 
 government left for the people. They only have 
 the power of diftributing honours and punifh- 
 ments, to which alone both monarchies and 
 commonwealths, in a word all human inftitu- 
 lions, owe their liability : for wherever the diffe- 
 rence between rewards and punifhments is not 
 underftood, or injudicioufly applied, there no- 
 thing can be properly adminiftered, fince the 
 worthy and unworthy are equally honoured ! 
 
 They often take cognizance of thofe caufes 
 where the fine is confiderable, if the criminals are 
 
 per fans
 
 of PhilofcpherS; 173 
 
 pcrfons who have exercifed great employments ; 
 and in capital cafes they alone have jurifdiction i 
 and a cuftom prevails with them, to give thofe who 
 are tried for their lives a power of departing 
 openly to voluntary banifhment. 
 
 They have the power of conferring the magiftracy 
 upon thofe they think worthy of it, which is the 
 mod honourable reward of merit any government 
 can beftow. 
 
 They have the power of rejedling and confirm- 
 ing laws, and determine concerning peace and war, 
 alliances, accommodations, and conventions. 
 
 So that, from hence again, one may with reafon 
 afierr, that the people have the greateft fhare in 
 the government, and that the commonwealth is 
 democratical. 
 
 Thefe orders, into which the commonwealth is 
 divided, have the power to oppofe, afllft, and ba- 
 lance each other, as occafion may require. 
 
 Though the conful at the head of his army in 
 the field, feems to have an abfolute power to carry 
 every thing he propofes into execution, yet he ftili 
 (lands in need of the people and fenate, and with- 
 out their afiiftance can effecft nothing ; for neither 
 corn, clothes, nor pay, can be furnifhed to the army 
 without the confcnt of the fenate ; who have alfo 
 the power of fending another general to fucceed 
 him, as foon as the year is expired, or of continu- 
 ing him in the command. Again, they may either 
 magnify and extol, or obfcure and extenuate, the 
 viftories of the generals : for thefe cannot celebrate 
 their triumphs uniefs the fenate confents to it, and 
 furnilhes the neceffary expence. 
 
 As the power of putting an end to the war is 
 in the people, the generals are under a necefiity 
 of having their approbation, who have the right 
 of ratifying and annulling all accommodations and 
 
 conventions.
 
 1 74 Ancient Republics^ and Opinions 
 
 conventions. It is to the people that the generalsj 
 after the expiration of their command, give an ac- 
 count of their condufl : fo that it is by no means 
 fafe for them to difregard the favour either of the 
 fen ate, or of the people. 
 
 The fenate is under a neceffity of fliewing a re- 
 gard to the people, and of aiming at their appro- 
 bation ; as not having the power to punilh crimes 
 of the fii ft magnitude v.'ith death, unlefs the peo- 
 ple confirm the previous decree : if a law is pro- 
 pofed, by which part of the power of the fenate 
 is to be taken away, their dignities abolifhed, or 
 even their fortunes diminiPneci, the people have it 
 in their power either to receive cr rejedl it. If 
 one of the tribunes of the people oppofes the 
 paffing of a decree, the fenate are fo far from 
 being able to ena6l ir, that it is not even in their 
 power to confult or aiTemble at all. For all thefe 
 reafons, the fenaie ftands in av/e of the people. 
 
 The people alio are fubjp'ft: to the power of the 
 fenate, and under an obligation of cultivating the 
 good-will of all the fenators. Vv'ho have mjany op- 
 portunities both of prejudicing and advantaging 
 individuals. Judges are appointed out of the 
 fenate in rnofi; caules that relate to contrads, pub- 
 lic or private. There are many rivers, ports, 
 gardens, mints, and lands, and many works relat- 
 ing to erecting and repairing public buildings, let 
 out by the cenfors, under the care of the lenate ; 
 all thefe are undertaken by the people ; fome arc 
 purchafers, others partners, fome iureties for tlie 
 contrafts. All thefe things are under [he controul 
 of the fenate, which has power to g:ve time, to 
 mitigate, and, if any thing has happened to render 
 the performance of the contract impraclicable, to 
 cancel it. The people, thus dependent on the 
 fenate, and apprehending the uncertainty of the 
 
 occafions
 
 cf Philofcphers. 175 
 
 occafions in which they may (land in need of their 
 favour, dare nor refift or oppofe their will. 
 
 In like manner, they are nut eafily brought to 
 obdrud the defigns of the confuls, becaufe all of 
 them in general, and every one in particular, 
 become fubjed to their authority, when in the 
 field. ' 
 
 Such being the power of each order to hurm 
 and affift eacii other, their union is adapted to all 
 contingencies, and // is mpojphle to inven' a more 
 "perfefi fyjlem. When the common fear of a foreign 
 enemy compels them to act in concert, fuch is 
 the ftrength of t'le government, that nothino- ne- 
 ceflary is omitted, or comes too late, fince all vie 
 with each other in directing their thoughts to the 
 public good, and their endeavours to carry their 
 defigns into execution. The commonwealth, from 
 the peculiar frame of it, becomes irrefiftible, and 
 attains whatever it propoles. 
 
 When, in confequence of victory, they live in 
 profperity and affluence, enjoying their good for- 
 tune free from the fear of a foreign enemy, they 
 grow, through eafe and flattery, infoient and proud ; 
 their commonwealth is then chicliV obferved to 
 relieve iticlf : for when any branch of it becomes 
 ambitious, and, fwelling beyond its bound-, aims 
 at unwarraPitabie power, being fubjcct to the 
 controul oi the other two, it cannot run into 
 any excefs of power or arrogance ^ but all three 
 mud remain in the terms prelcribcd by t'le con- 
 Ititution. 
 
 Thus, my dear Sir, you fee tliat Poiybii.:.s's 1 
 opinion of different orders, checks, and balances^ \ 
 in a conimonwealth, is very different from thciC of 
 Mr. Turgor. I'he Roman conllitution formed 
 the noblcli people, and tlic greateft power, th.ii: 
 has ever exiiled. But if all the powers of the 
 S confuls.
 
 iyS ^Ancient Republics, and Opinion^ 
 
 confuls, fenate, and people, had been centered irr A 
 fingle affembly of the people, colledively or re- 
 prefentatively, will any man pretend to believe 
 that they would have been long free, or ever 
 great ? 
 
 The diftribution of power was however never 
 accurately or judicioufly made in that conftitu- 
 tion : the executive was never fufficiently fepa- 
 rated from the legiflative, nor had thefe powers a 
 controul upon each other defined with fufficient 
 accuracy : the executive had not power to inter-^ 
 pofc and decide betv/ecn the people and the 
 fen ate. 
 
 As we advance in this correfpondence, we may 
 fee caufe to differ widely from the judgment of 
 Polybius, " that it is impojfibls to invent a more 
 perfect fyfiem of government." We may be con- 
 vinced that the conftitution of England, if its 
 balance is {^^n to play, in practice, according to 
 the principles of its theory that is to fay, if the 
 people are fairly and fully repiefented, io as to 
 have the power of dividing or choof.ng^ of drav^ing 
 up hill or dowjiy inftead of being difpofed of by a 
 few lords is a fyilem much more perfect. The 
 conftitutions of feveral of tlie United States, it is 
 hoped, will prove themfelves improvements, both 
 upon the Roman, the Spartan, and tlie Englilh 
 commonwealths. 
 
 1. E T T E ^
 
 cf Phihfopherf, 
 
 LETTER XXXr. 
 
 ANCIENT RFPURLTCS, AND OPINIONS 
 OF PHILOSOPHERS. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 TH E generation and corruption of govern- 
 ments, which may in other w rds be called 
 the progrrefs and courie or human paffions in fociety, 
 are fubjtifts which li;ivc- engaj:i;>rd the attention of the 
 greateii writers-, and whether the ellays mey have 
 left us were copied from hiflorv, or wrought ouc 
 of their own conjeftures and reafonings, they are 
 very much to our purpofe, to fliew the utility 
 and necefiity of different orders of men, and of an 
 equilibrium of powers and privileges. They de- 
 monfbrate the corruptibility of every fpecies of 
 fimple government, by which I mean a power 
 without a check, whether in one, a few, or many. 
 It might be fufficient to fliev/ this tendency in 
 fimpie democracy alone, for fuch is the govern- 
 ment of one afTembly, whether of the people col- 
 ledlively or reprefentatively : hut as the genera- 
 tion and corruption of all kinds of government 
 have a fnnilitude with one another, and proceed 
 from the fame qualities in human naturr:, it will 
 throw the tnore li<Tht upon our lul^ject, the more 
 particularly we examine it. I fliall confine my^- 
 felf chiefly to Plato, Polybius, and your name- 
 fake Sir Thomas Smith. 
 
 Polybius thinks it manifefb, both from reafon 
 and experience, that the bell form of government 
 is not iimple, but compounded, becaufe of the 
 
 N ten*
 
 I'jB ^AncierJ RepuhUcs, and Opinions 
 
 tendency of each of the fimple forms to degene- 
 rate ; even democracy, in which it is an eftablifhed. 
 cuftom to worfhip the gods, honour their parents,^ 
 refpedt the elders, and obey ibc laws, has a flrong 
 tendency to change into a government wh>:'re the 
 multitude have a power of doing whatever they 
 defire, and where infolence and conten:i)t of pa- 
 rents, elders, gods, and laws, foon fucceed. 
 
 From whence do governments originally fpring? 
 From the weaknels of men, and the confequent 
 neceflity to aflbciate, and he who excels in ftrength 
 and courage, gains the command and authority 
 over the reft ; as among inferior animals, who 
 are not influenced by opinion, the ftrvngeft are, 
 by common coni'ent, allowed to be maiteis. This 
 is monarchy. But when the nation, by living 
 together, acquires Ibme tindlure of honour and 
 juftice, gratitude, duty, and their oppoiites, and 
 the monarch countenances thcle moral qualities, 
 and treats every one according to his merit, they are 
 no longer afraid of violence, but iubmit to him, 
 and unite in fupporting his government, akhough 
 he may again become Vvcak and advanced wi years. 
 By this means a monarch infenfibly bjcomes a 
 king, that is, when the power is transferred from 
 courage and ftrength to reafon. This is the origin 
 oi Uut kingly governmeniy for the people preferve 
 the command, not only to them, but to their 
 defcendants, bemg perfuaded, that thofe who have 
 received their birth ..nd educ.uion from fuch men 
 will refemble them in their principles. But if 
 they are diffatisfied with their defcendants, they 
 then choofe magiftrates and kmgs, with regard 
 only to fuperior fenfe and lealon, and not to 
 Hrength and courage-, having by experience been 
 convinced of the difference between them. Thofe 
 wlio were once cholcn and invefted v/ich the royal 
 4 dignity,
 
 cf Philofophers, 179 
 
 dignity, grew old in the enjoyment of it, poflcfled 
 themfelves of a territory, furrounded it with walls, 
 and fortified advantageous polls : thus confulting 
 the fecurity of their lubjedts, and fupplying thetn 
 v/ith plenty of provifions, differing little in their 
 clothes or tables from the people with whom 
 they paffed their lives, they continued blameiefs 
 and unenvied. But their pofterity, fucceeding to 
 the government by right of inheritance, and 
 finding every thing provided for fecurity and 
 fupport, they were led by fuperfluity to indulge 
 their appetites, and to imagine that it became 
 princes to appear in a different drefs, to eat in a 
 more luxurious manner, and enjoy, v/ithout con- 
 tradiction, the forbidden pleafures of love. The 
 firft produced envy, the other refentment and 
 hatred. By which means kingly government de- 
 generated into tyranny. 
 
 At the fame time a foundation was laid, and a 
 confpiracy formed, for the deftru6lion of thofe 
 who exercifed it; the accomplices of which v/ere 
 not men of inferior rank, but perfons of the mod 
 generous, exalted, and enterprizing fpirit i for 
 fuch men can leaft bear the infolence of thofe in 
 power. The people, having thefe to lead them, 
 and uniting againft their rulers, kingly govern- 
 ment and monarchy were extirpated, and arifto- 
 cracy began to be eftablifhed, for the people, as 
 an immediate acknowledgment to thofe who had 
 deflroyed monarchy, chofe thefe leaders for their 
 governors, and left all their concerns to them. 
 
 Thefe, at firil, preferred the advantage of the 
 public to all other confiderations, and adminiilered 
 all affairs, both public and private, with care and 
 vigilance. But their fons having fucceeded them 
 in the lame power, unacquainted with evils, flran- 
 ger$ to civil equality and libertv, educated from 
 IS 2 ' fcheir
 
 1 So Ancient RepuMics, and Opinions 
 
 tlieir infancy in the folendor of the power and 
 dignities of their parents, fome t-iving themfelves 
 up to avarice, others to intemperance, and others 
 to the abufe of women, by this behaviour changed 
 the ariftocracy into an oligarchy. 
 
 Their cataftrophe became the fame with that of 
 the tyrants -, for if any perfon, obferving the gene- 
 ral envy and hatred which thefe rulers have incurred, 
 has the courage to fay or do any thing againft them, 
 he finds the whole body of the people infpired 
 with the fame pafiions they were before poffeffed 
 with againft the tyrant, and ready to affift him. 
 Thereupon they put fome of them to death, and 
 banifh others ; but dare not, after that, appoint 
 a king to govern them, being ftill afraid of the 
 injuftice of the firft j neither dare they entruft the 
 government with any number of men, having ftill 
 before their eyes the errors which thofc had before 
 committed : fo that having no hope, but in them- 
 selves, they convert the government from an oli- 
 garchy to a democracy^ and take upon themfeives 
 the care and charge of public affairs. 
 
 And as long as any are living, who felt the 
 power and dominion of the few^ they acquiefce 
 under the prefent eftablilhrnicnt, and look upon 
 equality and liberty as the greateft of bleffings. 
 But v/hen a new race of men grows up, thefe, no 
 longer regarding equality and liberty, from being 
 accuftomed to them, aim at a greater fhare of power 
 than the reft, particularly thofe of the greateft 
 fortunes, who, grown now ambitious, and being 
 unable to obtain the power they aim at by their 
 own merit, diffipate their wealth, by alluring and 
 corrupting the people by every method ; and 
 when, to ferve their wild ambition, they have 
 once taught them to receive bribes and entertain- 
 znents, from that moment th? democracy is at an 
 
 end.
 
 of Philofophers. i8i* 
 
 end, and changes to force and violence^ For the 
 people, accuftomed to live at the expence of others, 
 and to place their hopes of a fupport in the for- 
 tunes of their neighbours, if headed by a man of 
 a great and enterprizing fpirir, v/ill then have re- 
 courfe to violence, and getting together, will mur- 
 der, banifli, and divide among themfelves the 
 lands of their adversaries, till, grown wild with 
 rage, they again find a mafter and a monarch. 
 
 This is the rotation of governments, and this 
 the order of nature, by which they are changed, 
 transformed, and return to the fame point of the 
 circle. 
 
 Lycurgus obferving that all this was founded 
 
 on neceflity and the laws of nature, concluded, 
 
 that every form of government that is fimple, by 
 
 fbon degenerating into that vice that is allied to it, 
 
 and naturally attends it, mull be unftable. For 
 
 as ruft is the natural bane of iron, and wormiS of 
 
 wood, by which they are fure to be deftroyed, 
 
 fo there is a certain vice implanted by the hand 
 
 of nature in every fimple form of government, 
 
 I and by her ordained to accompany it. The vice 
 
 I of kingly government is monarchy j that of arif- 
 
 tocracy, oligarchy ^ and of democracy, rage and 
 
 i 'violence \ into which all of them, in procefs of time, 
 
 I mull necefflirily degenerate. To avoid wiiicii 
 
 I Lycurgus united in one all the advantages of the 
 
 ( bed governments, to the end that no bi.inch of ir, 
 
 ] by fwelling beyond its bounds, might degenerate 
 
 into the vice that is congenial to it, and that, while 
 
 1 each was mutually acted upon by oppcfite pozcers, 
 
 I no one part might outweigli the rell. The 
 
 ! Romans arrived ac the lame enU by the fame 
 
 means. 
 
 Polybius, you perceive, my dear Sir, is more; 
 
 charitable in his reprefcntaciua of hu.man nifure 
 
 N ; than
 
 lS2 'Ancient Republics, and Opinions 
 
 than Hobbes, Mandeville, Rochefoucaulr, Machia- 
 vel, Beccaria, Ronfieau, De Lolme, or even than 
 our friend Dr. Price. He candidly fuppofes thac 
 the firft kingly government will be wifely and 
 honeftly adminifteied, during the life of the father 
 of his people , that the firil ariftccracy will be 
 conduced v/ith caution and moderation, by the 
 band of patriots to whom is due the glory of the 
 expulficn of the tyrant ; and that the people, for 
 a generation at leaft, who have depcfed the oli- 
 garchy, will behave with decorum. 
 
 But perjhaps it might be more exaflly true and 
 natural to fay, that the king, the ariftocracy, and 
 the people, as foon as ever they felt themfclves 
 fecure in the. polTcfiion ot their power, v/ould 
 begin to abufe it. 
 
 In Mr. Turgot's fingle alTembly, thofe wha 
 fliould think themfelves moft didinguifhed by 
 blood and education, as well as fortune, would 
 be moft ambitious , and if they found an oppo- 
 fition among their conftituents to their elections, 
 would immediarely have recourfe to entertain- 
 ments, fecret intrigues, and every popular art, 
 and even to bribes, to increafe their parties. This 
 would oblige their competitors, though they 
 might be infinitely better men, either to give up 
 their pretenfions, or to imitate thefe dangerous 
 praftices. There is a natural and unchangeable 
 inconvenience in all popular eledions. There 
 are always competitions, and the candidates 
 have often merits nearly equal. The virtuous 
 and independent eleclcrs are often divided : 
 this naturally caufes too much attention to the 
 moft profligate and unprincipled, who will fell 
 or give av/ay their votes for other confidera- 
 tions than wifdom and virtue. So that he who 
 has the deepeft purfe, or the feweft fcruples about 
 uling it, will generally prevail. 
 
 It
 
 of Phikfophers* 183 
 
 It is from the natural ariftocracy in a fingle af- 
 fembly that the firft danger is to be apprehended 
 in the prefent Hate of manners in America-, and 
 with a balance of hinded property in the hands of 
 the people, fo decided in their favour, the progrefs 
 to degeneracy, corruption, rage, and violence, 
 might not be very rapid ; neverthelefs it would 
 begin with the firft eledtions, and grow fafter or 
 flower every year. 
 
 Rage and violence would foon appear in the 
 aflfembly, and from thence be communicated 
 among the people at large. 
 
 The only remedy is to throw the rich and the 
 proud into one group, in a feparate affembly, and 
 there tie their hands ; if you give them fcope 
 with the people at large, or their reprefentatives, 
 they will deftroy all equality and liberty^ with 
 the confent and acclamations of the people them" 
 fehes. They will have much more power, mix- 
 ed with the reprefentatives, than feparated from 
 them. In the firft cafe, if they unite, they 
 will give the law, and govern all j if they differ, 
 they will divide the ftate, and go to a decifion by 
 force. But placing them alone by themfelves, 
 the fociety avails itfelf of all their abilities and 
 virtues; they become a folid check to the repre- 
 fentatives themfelves, as well as to the executive 
 power, and you difarrn them entirely of the power 
 to do mifchief. 
 
 N 4 i- H T-
 
 1 84 'Ancient Republics^ and Opinions 
 
 letter xxxii. 
 
 :ancient republics, and opinions 
 OF philosophers, 
 
 Dear Sir, 
 
 DIONYSIUS Haliearnaffenns, In his feventh 
 booi<:, has givt-n us an excellent fpcech in 
 the lenate, made by Manlius Valerius, a man ve- 
 jierable for his age and wifdom, and remarkable 
 for his conftant friendfbip ior the people. 
 
 " If any of you, fathers ! alarmed with an ap- 
 prehenfion that you will introduce a pernicious 
 cuftom into the commonwealth, if you grant the 
 people a power of giving their fufFrages againft 
 the patricians^ and entertain an opinion that the 
 tribunitian power, if confiderably ftrengthened, 
 will prove of no advantage, let them learn, that 
 their opinion is erroneous, and their imagination 
 contrary tc found reafoning : for if any meafure 
 can tend to prelerve this commonwealth, to aflfure 
 both her liberty and power, and to eftablifh a per- 
 petual union and harmony in all things, the mofl: 
 cfFedlual will be to give the people a fhare in the 
 government : and the mofc advantageous thing 
 to us will be, not to have a fimple and unmixed 
 form of government -, neither a monarchy, an oli- 
 garchy, nor a dcmiOcracy, but a conflitution tem- 
 pered with all of them : for each of thefe fornis, 
 \vhen fimple, very eafily deviates into abufe and 
 cxcefsj but when all of them are equally mixed, 
 that part which happens to innovate, and to exceed 
 the cudomary bounds, is always redrained by an- 
 j:ther that is fober, and adheres to the eitablifhed 
 
 order,
 
 of rhikfophers', 1S5 
 
 order. Thus monarchy, when it becomes cruel 
 and infolent, and begins to purfue tyrannical 
 meafures, is fubverted by an oligarchy, confiding 
 of good men , and an oligarchy, compofed of the 
 belt men, which is your form of government, when 
 elated with riches and dependants, pays no re- 
 gard to juftice, or to any other virtue, and is de- 
 itroyed by a wife people : and in a democracy, 
 when the people, from being modell in their de- 
 portment, and obfervant of the laws, begin to 
 run into diforders and excelTes, they are forced to 
 return to their duty by the power with which, 
 upon thofe occafions, the belt man of the com- 
 monwealth is invelled. You, fathers, have ufed 
 all poflible precautions to prevent monarchical 
 power from degenerating into tyranny -, for, in- 
 llead of a fingle perfon, you have invefted two 
 with the fupreme power ; and though you com- 
 mitted this magiltracy to them, not for an inde- 
 finite time, but only for a year, you neverthelefs 
 appointed three hundred patricians, the mod re- 
 fpedtable, both for their virtue and their age, 
 of whom this fenate is compofed, to watch over 
 their conduft ; but you do not feem hitherto to 
 have appointed any to watch over your own, and 
 to keep you within proper bounds. As K/r 
 yourfelves, I am as yet under no apprehenfions, 
 left you fhould fuffcr your minds to be corrupted 
 by great and accumulated profperity, who have 
 lately delivered your country from a long tyran- 
 ny-, and, through continual and lading wars, have 
 not as yet had leifure to grow infolent and lux- 
 urious. But with regard to your fucccfibrs, when 
 I confider how great alterations length of time 
 brings with it, 1 am afraid, left the men of power 
 in the femite fl^ould innovate, and filently tranf- 
 form our conftitution to a monarchical tyranny : 
 
 whereasj
 
 i86 Ancient Republics f and Opinions 
 
 whereas, if you admit the people to a fhare in the 
 government, no mifchief can Spring from the fe- 
 iiate ; but the man who aims at greater power 
 than the reft of his fellow citizens, and has form- 
 ed a faflion in the fenate, of all who are willing to 
 partake of his councils and his crimes (for 
 thofe who deliberate concerning public affairs 
 ought to forefee every thing that is probable) 
 this great, this awful perfon, I fay, when called 
 by the tribunes to appear before the people, mud 
 give an account both of his aflions and thoughts 
 to this people, inconfiderable as they are, and {o 
 jnuch his inferiors ; and, if found guilty, fuffer 
 the puniihment he deferves : and, left the people 
 themfelves, when veiled v/iih lo great a power, 
 fhould grow wanton, and, feduced by the worft- 
 of demagogues, become dangerous to the beft of 
 citizens, (for the multitude generally give birth 
 to tyranny) fome perfon of confummate pru- 
 dence, created didator by yourlelves, will guard 
 againit this evil, and not allow them to run iiuo 
 excefs , and being inverted v/ith abfolute powerj 
 and fubjed; to no account, will cut off the infed- 
 ed part of the commonwealth, and not fufrer that 
 which is not yet infected to be vitiated, reform 
 the laws, excite the citizens to virtue, and ap- 
 point fuch magiftrates a^ he thinks will govern 
 with the greateft prudence : and having effefted 
 thefe things within the fpace of fix months, he 
 will again become a private man, without receiv- 
 ing any other reward for thefe actions, than that 
 of being honoured for having performed them. 
 Induced, therefore, by thele confiderations, and 
 convinced that this is the moft perfed; form of 
 government, debar the people from nothing -, hut 
 as you have granted them a power of choofing 
 the annual magiftrates, who are to prefide over 
 
 the
 
 of Philofophers", ' J 87 
 
 the commonwealth, of confirming and repealing 
 laws, of declaring war, and making peace, which 
 are the greatefl and moft important affairs that 
 come under the confideration of our government, 
 not one of which you have fubmitted to the ab- 
 folute determination of the fenate, allow them, 
 in like manner, the power of trying offen- 
 ders, particularly iuch as are accufed of crimes 
 againft: the ftate, of raifing a fedition, of aiming at 
 tyranny, of concerting meafures with our enemies 
 to betray the commonwealth, or of any other 
 crimes of the like nature -, for the more formida- 
 ble you render the tranfgreffion of the laws, and 
 the alteration of difcipline, by appointing many 
 infpedors, and many guards over the infolent and 
 the ambitious, the more will your conftitution be 
 improved.'* 
 
 It is furprifing that Valerius fhould talk of an 
 equal mixture of monarchical, ariitocratical, and 
 democratical powers, in a commonwealth where 
 they v/ere lb unequally mixed as they were in 
 Rome. There can be no equal mixture without 
 a negative in each branch of the legiflature. But 
 one example of an equal mixture has ever exifted 
 in Europe, and that is in England. The confuls 
 in Rome had no negative; the people had a ne- 
 gative, bur a very unequal one, becaufe they had 
 not the lame time and opportunity for cool deli- 
 beration. The appointment of tribunes was a 
 very inadequate remedy. What match for a 
 Roman fenace was a iin^i-le mao-jftrate feated among- 
 them ? his abilities could not be equal ; his firm- 
 ncfs could not be always depended on : but what 
 is worfe, he was liable to be intimidated, flattered, 
 and bribed. It is really atlonifliing, that fuch 
 people as Greeks and Romans fliould ever have 
 thouglit four or five cpheri, or a fingle tribune, 
 
 an
 
 itB Ancient Republics, ^c. 
 
 er a college of ten tribunes, an adequnre repre- 
 fentation of themfelves. If Valerius had pro- 
 pofed, that the ccnful fnould have been made an 
 integral part of the legiflature, and that the Ro- 
 man people fhould choofe another council of two 
 or three hundred, equally reprefenting them, to 
 be another integral part, he would then have feen, 
 that the appointment of a didator could never in 
 any cafe become riecciTary. 
 
 LETTER XXXIII. 
 
 ANCIENT REPUBLICS, AND OPINIONS 
 OF PHILOSOPHERS. 
 
 Plat. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 PLATO has given us the mod accurate detail 
 of the natural viciflltudes of manners and 
 principles, the ufual progrefs of the paflions in 
 ibciety, and revolutions of governments into one 
 another. 
 
 In the fourth book of his Republic, he defcribes 
 his perfect commonwealth, where kings are phi- 
 lofophers, and phiiofophers kings : where the 
 whole city migh: be in the happieft condition, 
 and not any one tribe remarkably happy beyond 
 the refl: in one word, where the lazvs gcz'sm^ and 
 juitice is eftablifned: where the guarciians of the 
 Jaws are fuch in reality, and prelerve the confli- 
 tution, inilead of deftroying it, and promote the 
 happinefs of the whole city, not their own parti- 
 cularly : where the ilatc is cne, not many: where 
 
 there
 
 Plato] iZg 
 
 there are no parties of the poor and the rich at war 
 with each other : where, if any defcendant of the 
 guardians be vicious, he is difmilTcd to the other 
 claffes, and if any defcendant of the others be 
 worthy, he is raifed to the rank of the guardians : 
 where education, the grand point to be attended 
 to, produces good geniufes, and good geniufes, 
 partaking of fuch education, produce ftill better 
 than the former: where the children, receiving 
 from their infancy an education agreeable to the 
 laws of the conftitution, grow up to be worthy 
 men, and obfervant of the laws : where the 
 fyftem, both of laws and education, are contrived 
 to produce the virtues of fortitude, temperance, 
 wifdom, and juftice, in the whole city, and in all 
 the individual citizens : where, if among the 
 rulers, or guardians of the laws, there be one 
 furpaffing the reft, it may be called a monarchy, 
 or kingly government, if there be fcveral, an 
 ariftocracy. 
 
 Although there is but one principle of virtue, 
 thofe of vice are infinite ; of which there are four 
 which delerve to be mentioned. There are as 
 many fpecies of foul as there are of republics: 
 five of each. That which is above dekribed is 
 one. 
 
 In the eighth book of his Republic he defcribes 
 the other four, and the revokuioiis from one to 
 another. The firft he calls the Cretan, or Spar- 
 tan, or the ambitious republic-, the fecond, oli- 
 garchy; the third, democracy; and the fourth, 
 tyranny, the lall difeafe of a city. 
 
 As republics are generated by the manners of 
 the people, to which, as into a current, all other 
 things are drawn, of nectfluy there mull be as 
 many fpecies of men, as of republics. We have 
 already, in tlie fourth book, gone over that which 
 we have pronounced to be good and jult. Wc 
 
 arf
 
 Il9^ ^^cieni RepuhlicSy ^c. 
 
 are now to go over the contentious and ambitious 
 man, who is formed according to the Spartan 
 republic; and then, him relembling an oligarchy, 
 then the democratic , and then the tyrannic man, 
 that we may contemplate the mod unjuft man, 
 and fet him in oppofition to the moil jufl, that 
 our inquiry may be completed! The ambitious 
 republic is firft to be confidcied : it is indeed dif- 
 ficult for a city in this manner conilitutcd, i. e. 
 like Sparta, to be changed; but as every thmg 
 which is generated is liable to corruption^ even fuch 
 a conjlitution as this i^jHI not remain for ever, hut he 
 dijfolved. (I fhall pafs over a!l the aftrolcgical 
 and myflical whimfies which we meet with fo 
 often in Plato, interfperCed apjong the moft fub- 
 lime wifdom and profound knowledge, and infert 
 only what is intelligible.) The amount of v/hat 
 he fays in this place about numbers and mufic, 
 is, that miflakes will infenfibly be made in the 
 choice of perfons for guardians of the laws; and 
 by thefc guardians, in the rewards and promotion 
 of merit. They will not always expertly diflin- 
 guifh the feveral fpecies of geniufes, the golden, 
 the filver, the brazen, and the iron. Whilft iron 
 Ihall be mixed with filver, and brafs with gold, 
 dilTimilitude, and difcord arife, and generate war, 
 and enmity, and fedition. When fedition is rifen, 
 two of the fpecies of geniufes, the iron and brazen, 
 will be carried away after gain, and the acquifi- 
 tion of lands and houfes, gold and lilver. But the 
 golden and filver geniufes, as they are not in 
 want, but naturally rich, will lead the foul 
 towards virtue and the original conftitution. 
 Thus divided, drawing contrary ways, and living 
 in a violent manner, will not this republic be 
 in the middle, between ariftocracy and oligarchy, 
 imitating, in fome things, the former republic, 
 and in others oligarchy ? They will honour 
 
 their
 
 Tlato] 191 
 
 tlieir rulers, their military will abftain from agri- 
 culture and mechanic arts -, they will have com- 
 mon meals, gymnaftic cxercifes, and contefts of 
 war, as in the former republic ; but they will be 
 afraid to bring wile men into the magiftracy, be- 
 caule they have no longer any fuch as are truly 
 fimple and inflexible, but fuch as are of a mixed 
 kind, more forward and rough, more fitted by 
 their natural genius for war than peace, efteeming 
 tricks and ftratagems , fuch as thefc fliall defire 
 wealth, and hoard up gold and filver, as thofe who 
 live in oligarchies. While they fpare their own, 
 they will love to fquander the fubftance of others 
 upon tlieir pleafures : They will fly from the 
 law, as children from a father, who have been 
 educated not by perfuafion but by force. Such 
 a republic, mixed of good and ill, will be mofl: 
 remarkable for the prevalence of the contentious 
 and ambitious fpirit. 
 
 What now fliall the man be, correspondent to 
 this republic ? He will be arrogant and rough 
 towards inferiors ; mild towards equals, but ex- 
 tremely fubmiflive to governors-, fond of dignity 
 and the magiftracy, but thinking that political 
 management, and military performances, not elo- 
 quence, nor any fuch thing, fhould entitle him to 
 them: while young he may defpife money, but 
 the older lie grows the more he will value it, 
 becaufe he is of the covetous temper, and not: 
 fincerely aflecled to virtue and reaion. Such an 
 ambitious youth refcmbles fucii a city, and is 
 formed fomehow in this manner: His father, a 
 worthy man, in an ill-regulated city, fliuns ho- 
 nours, and magiftracies, and law-fuits, and all pub- 
 lic bufmefs, that, as he can do no good, he may 
 have no trouble. The ion hears his mother 
 venting her indignation, and complaining that
 
 192 ^Ancient Repuhlics, ^c'. 
 
 fhe is negle6led among other women, becaufe her 
 liufband is not in the magiftracy, nor attentive to 
 the making of money ; that he is unmanly and 
 remifs, and fuch other things as wives are apt to 
 cant over concerning fuch hufbands. The do- 
 meftics too privately fay the fame things to the 
 fons, ftimulating them to be more of men than 
 their father, and more attentive to their money. 
 When they go abroad they hear the fame things^ 
 and fee that thofe who mind their own affairs are 
 called fimple, and fuch as mind not their affairs 
 are commended. The young man comparing 
 the condudl, fpeeches, and purfuits of his father 
 with thofe of other men, the one watering the 
 rational part of his foul, and the others the ccncu- 
 pifcible and irafcible, he delivers up the govern- 
 ment within himfelf to a middle power, that which 
 is irafcible and fond of contention, and fo he be- 
 comes a haughty and ambitious man. We have 
 now the fecond republic, and the fccond man. 
 
 This fecond republic will be fucceedcd by 
 oligarchy, founded on men's valuations, in which 
 the rich bear rule, and the poor have no fliare in 
 the government. The change from the ambi- 
 tious republic to oligarchy is made by that trea- 
 fury which every one has filled with gold: for 
 firfl of all they and their wives find out methods 
 of cxpence, and to this purpofe ftrain and dilpb, y 
 the laws, one obferving and riva'ling another, the 
 generality become of this kind ; and proceeding to 
 greater defires of making money, the more ho- 
 nourable they account this to be, the more will 
 virtue be thought difhonourable. Virtue is fo 
 different from wealthi that they always weigh 
 againft each other. Whilfl wealth and the wealthy 
 are held in honour in the city, both virtue and the 
 good muft be more difhonoured, and what is 
 
 honoured
 
 Plato. 193 
 
 honoured is purfued, and what Is difhonoured is 
 negleded. Inftead then of ambitious men, they 
 will become lovers of gain. The rich they praife 
 and admire, and bring into the magiftrftqy, but 
 the poor man they defpife. They then make 
 laws, marking out the boundary of the conftitu- 
 tion, and regulating the quantity of oligarchic 
 power, according to the quantity of wealth ; more 
 to the more wealthy, and lefs to the lefs : fo that 
 he who hath not the valuation fettled by law is 
 to have no (hare in the government. What think 
 you of this conftitution? If we fliould appoint 
 pilots according to their valuation, but never 
 entruft a fhip with a poor man, though better 
 fkilled in his art, we fliould make very bad navi- 
 gation. 'Again, fuch a city is not one, but of 
 neccffity two-, one, confifcing of the poor, and 
 the other of the rich, dwelling in one place, 
 and always plotting againft one another. They 
 are, moreover, incapable to wage war, becaufe 
 of the necefllty they are under, either of em- 
 ploying the armed multitude, and of dreading 
 them more than the enemy, or to appear in bat- 
 tle, truely oligarchic, and at the lame time be 
 vinwiiling to advance money for the public fervice, 
 through a natural difpofition of covetoufnefs. 
 
 In luch a government almoft all are poor, ex- 
 cept the governors-, and where there are poor, 
 there are ibmewhere concealed thieves, and purfe- 
 cutters, and facrilegious perfons, and workers of 
 all other evils: thefe the magiftracy with dili- 
 gence and force rellrains : thefe arc drones in a 
 city with dangerous (lings. 
 
 This is oligarchy. Now let us confider the man 
 who refcmblcs it. The change from the ambi- 
 tious to the oligarchic man is chicliy in this man- 
 
 O ncr :
 
 194- Ancient Repullics, ^c, 
 
 ner: The ambitious man, has a fon, who emu- 
 lates his father, and follows his fleps ; afterwards 
 he dafhes on the city, as on a rock, wafting his 
 fubftance in the office of a general, or fome other 
 principal magiftracy; then falling into courts 
 of juftice, deftroyed by fycophants, ftripped of 
 his dignities, difgraced, and lofing all his fub- 
 ftance. When he has thus fuffered, and loft his 
 fubftance, in a terror he pufties headlong from 
 the throne of his foul that ambitious difpofition; 
 and, being humbled by his poverty, turns to the 
 making of money, lives fparingly and meanly, 
 and applying to work, fcrapes together fubftance. 
 He then feats in that throne the avaricious difpo- 
 fition, and makes it a mighty king within himfelf, 
 decked out with Perfian crowns, bracelets, and 
 fcepters. Having placed the virtuous and ambi- 
 tious difpofition low on the ground, he reafons on 
 nothing but how lefler fubftance ftiall be made 
 greater, admires and honours nothing but riches 
 and rich people. This is the change from an 
 ambitious youth to a covetous one, and this is the 
 oligarchic man. 
 
 Democracy is next to be confidered, in what 
 manner it arifes, and what kind of man it pro- 
 duces when arifen. The change from oligarchv to 
 democracy is produced through the infatiable defire 
 of becoming as rich as polTible. As thofe who are 
 governors in it govern on account of their pofTefllng 
 great riches, they will be unwill'ng to reftrain by 
 law fuch of the youth as are dilfolute, from 
 having the liberty of fquandering and wafting 
 their fubftance -, that {o, by purchafing the fub- 
 ftance of fuch perfons, and lending them on 
 ufury, they may ftill become richer, and be held 
 in greater honour. While they negleft education, 
 and l\if?jr the youth to grow licentious, they 
 
 1 1 fome-
 
 Plato. 105 
 
 fometimes lay under a necefTity of becoming poor, 
 fuch as are of no ungenerous difpofition : thefe 
 fit in the city, fome of thiem in debt, others in 
 contempt, hating and confpiring againft thofe 
 who poflfefs their fubftance, and with others very 
 defirous of a change. But the money-catchers, 
 ftill brooding over it, and drawing to themfclves 
 exorbitant ufury, fill the city with drones and 
 poor. They neglect every thing but maki:.-^; of 
 money, and make no more account of virtue than 
 the poor do. When thefe governors and their 
 fubje(5ts meet on the road, at public Ihovvs, in 
 military marches, as fellow foldiers or failors, or 
 in common dangers, the poor are by no means 
 contemned by the rich. A robuft fellow, poor and 
 funburnt, befide a rich man, bred up in the (hade, 
 fwoln With fiefn, and panting for breath, and in 
 agony in battle, thinks it is through his own and 
 his fellows fault that fuch men grow rich, and 
 fays. Our rich men are good for nothing. The 
 city foon grows into fedicion between the oligar- 
 chic and democratic parties; and the poor prevail- 
 ing over the rich, kill fome and banilh others, and 
 fliare the places in the republic, and the magiftra- 
 cies, equally among the remainder, and tor the 
 moft part the magKlracies are dilpofcd in it by 
 lot. \n what maiuicr do thefe live, and what lore 
 of republic is this? A democracy. The city is 
 full of all freedom of action and fpecch, and 
 liberty to do in it what any one inclines: ever/ 
 one will regulate his own method of life in vviuit- 
 ever way he pleafes. In luch a republic v\ill 
 arife men of all kinds. Tliis is the finelt of all 
 republics, variegated like a robe with all kirds 
 ot flowers, and diverfihcd with all lorts of man- 
 ners. The multituJc, ic i:> likely, judge i!iis 
 republic the bed, like childrirn and won-icn gazii-.q; 
 
 O i a
 
 igS Ancient Republics, ^c. 
 
 at variegated things. In truth it contains all kind's 
 of republics, and it appears neceflary for any 
 one, who wants to conftitute a city, as we do as 
 prefent, to come to a democratic city, as to a ge- 
 neral fair of republics, and choofc the form that 
 he fancies: he will not be in want of models. 
 Is not this a fweet and divine manner of life for 
 the prefent? To be under no neceffity to govern, 
 altiough you were able to govern ; nor to be 
 fubje(5t, unlefs you incline; nor to be engaged in 
 war when others are-, nor to live in peace when 
 others do fo, unlefs you be defirous of peace; and 
 though there be a law reftraining you from go- 
 verning or adminiftering juftice, to govern never- 
 thelefs, and adminifter juftice if you incline? 
 Have you not obferved, in fuch a republic, men 
 condemned to death or banifhment continuing 
 ftill, or returning like heroes, and walking up and 
 down openly, as if no one obferved them ? Is not 
 this indulgence of the city very generous, in mag- 
 nificently defpifing all care of education and dif- 
 cipline, and in not regarding from what fort of 
 purfuits one comes to adt in public affairs, 
 but honouring him, if he only fay he is well 
 afFefled towards the multitude? Thefe things, and 
 fuch as thefe ; are to be found in a democracy ; and 
 it would be a pleafant fort of republic, anar- 
 chical and variegated, diftributing a certain equa- 
 lity to all alike, without diO.indion. 
 
 Let us confider now the charader of a democra- 
 tical man, and how he arifes out of that parfimo- 
 nious one who, under the oligarchy, was trained 
 up by his father in his manners. Such a one by 
 force governs his own pleafures, which are expen- 
 five, and tend not to making money, and are called 
 unnecefiary. Eating, fo far as conduces to pre- 
 fcrve; life, health, and a good habit of body, is a 
 
 plea-
 
 Plato. 197 
 
 pkafureof thenecefiarykind: butthedefireof thcfe 
 things beyond thefe purpofes, is capable of being 
 curbed in youth -, and, being hurtful to the body and 
 to the foul, with reference to herattainingwifdom and 
 temperance, may be called unnecelTary : in the fame 
 manner we fhail fay of venereal defires, and others. 
 We juft now denominated a drone the man who 
 was full of fuch defires and pleafures -, but the 
 oligarchic man, him who was under the neceffary 
 ones. The democratic appears to arife from the 
 oligarchic man in this manner: When a young 
 man, bred up without proper inft:ru6tion, and in 
 a parfimonious manner, comes to tafte the honey 
 of the drones, and aflbciates with thofe vehemenc 
 and terrible creatures, who are able to procure 
 pleafures every way diverfified, from every quar- 
 ter ; thence imagine there is the beginning of a 
 change io him, from the oligarchic to the demo- 
 cratic. And as the city was changed by the 
 afllllance of an alliance from without, with one 
 party of it, with which it was of kin, (liall not the 
 youth be changed in the lame manner, by the 
 alTiiftance of one i'pecies of defires from without, 
 to another within him, which refemble.s it, and is 
 akin to it? By all means. If any afTiftance be 
 given to the oligarchic party within him, by his 
 father, or the others ot his family, adinonifliing 
 and upbraiding him, then truly ariles ledition and 
 oppofition, and a fight within him, with himfelf. 
 Sometimes the democratic party yields to the 
 oligarchic , fome of the defires are deftroyed, 
 others retire, on the rife of a certain modefty in the 
 foul of the youth, and he is again rendered 
 fomcwhat decent. Again, when fome defires re- 
 tire, there are others akin to them, which grow 
 up, and through inattention to the father's in- 
 ifrudions, become both many and powerful, 
 O 3 draw
 
 1 98 Ancient Repuhlics, &c. 
 
 draw towards intimacies among themfclves, and 
 generate a multitude, feize the citadel of the foul 
 of the youth, finding it evacuated of noble learning 
 and purfuits, and of true reafoning, which are the 
 bed watchmen and guardians in the underftand- 
 ings of men beloved of the gods -, and then falfe 
 and boailing reafonings and opinions, rufhing up 
 in their fiead, pofu-fs the fame place in fuch a 
 one. Thefe fa'.le and boafting reafonings, deno- 
 minating modefty to be fiupidity -, temperance, un- 
 inanlinefs ; moderation, rufticii:y; decent expence, 
 illiberality , thruft them all out difgracefully, and 
 expel them their territories, and lead in in triumph 
 tnfolence and anarchy, and luxury and impu- 
 dence, with encorniupns and applaufes, fhining 
 with a great retinue, and crcvvned with crowns. 
 Inlolence they denominate education , anarchy, li- 
 berty , luxury, magnificence , and impudence, 
 manhood. In this manner, a youth bred up witii 
 the neceffary defires changes into the licentiouf- 
 nefs and remiiTnefs of the unneceiTary and unprofit- 
 able pleafures ; his lire is not regulated by any or- 
 der, but deeming it pleafanr, free, and happy, he 
 puts all laws whatever on a level ; like the city, 
 he is fine and variegated, and mjany men and wo- 
 men too would defire to imitate his life, as he 
 hath in him a great many patterns of republics 
 and of mianners. 
 
 It remains, that we go over the mofl excellent 
 republic, which is tyranny, and the moPc excellent 
 man, who is the tyrant. The change is from de- 
 mocracy to tyranny, as from oligarchy to demo- 
 cracy. An infatiable defire of riches, and a ne- 
 glecl of other things, through attention to making 
 money, dellroys oligarchy , and an infatiable 
 thirfl: of liberty dellroys deinocracy. When a 
 city is under a detrjociacy, and is thirfting after li- 
 ber ty.
 
 Plato'. 199 
 
 berty, and happens to have bad cup-bearers, and 
 grows drunk with an unmixed draught of it, be- 
 yond what is necefiliry, it punifhes even the go- 
 vernors, if they will not be entirely tame, and af- 
 ford a deal of liberty, accufinjr them as corrupted, 
 and leaning towards oligarchy. Such as are obe- 
 .dient to magiftrates are abufed, as willing flaves, 
 and good for nothing. Magiftrates who refemble 
 fubjecls, and fubje(Sts who refemble magiftrates, 
 are commended and honoured, both in public and 
 private-, in fuch a city they of ncceffity foon go 
 to the highefc pitch of liberty, and this inbred 
 anarchy dclcends into private families. The fa- 
 ther refcmbles the child, and is afraid of his fons. 
 The fons accuftom themfelves to refemble the 
 father, and neither revere nor ftand in awe of their 
 parents. Strangers are equalled with citizens. 
 The teacher fears and flatters the fcholars, and 
 che fcholars defpife their teacliers and tutors. The 
 youth refemble the more advanced in years, and 
 rival them in words and deeds. The old men, 
 fitting down with the young, are full of merri- 
 ment and pleafantry, mimicking the youth, that 
 they may not appear to be morofe and dcfpotic. 
 The flaves are no lefs free than thofc who purchafe 
 them ; and wives have a perfedt equality and li- 
 berty with their hufbands, and hufbands with 
 their wives. The fum of all ihefe things, colledled 
 together, make the fouls of the citizens fo delicate, 
 that if any one bring near to them any thing of 
 flavery, they are filled with indignation, and can- 
 not endure it ; and at length they regard not the 
 laws^ written or unwritten, that no one whatever, 
 by any manner of mearvs, may become their maf- 
 ter. This is that government fo beautiful and 
 youthful, whence tyranny fprings. But any 
 thing in cxcefs, in anipnal or vc2etabi<? bodies, 
 
 Q 4 in
 
 20O Ancient Republics, ^c. 
 
 in feafons or in republics, is wont to occaHon a 
 mighty change to the reverfe ; and excefiive li- 
 berty feems to change into nothing but excefiive 
 flavery, both with a private perfon and a city. 
 Thus licentioufnefs defbroys the democracy. Out 
 of no other republic is tyranny conftituted but 
 out of democracy -, and out of the mod excefiive 
 liberty, the greatefl: and mofi: favage flavery. The 
 race of idle and profufe men, one part of which 
 was more brave, and were leaders, the ether more 
 cowardly, and followers, we compared to drones, 
 fome with filings, others with none. Thefe two 
 fpringing up in a republic, raife difturbance, 
 as phlegm and bile in a natural body. Let us 
 divide a democratic city into three, as it really is ; 
 for one fuch fpecies as the above grows through 
 licentioufnefs in it, no lefs than in the oligarchic, 
 but is much more fierce: in oligarchy, becaufe it 
 is not in places of honour, but is debared from the 
 magifi:racies, it is unexercifed, and does not be- 
 come ftrong J but in a democracy this is the pre- 
 fiding party, excepting a few; and now it fays 
 and does the mofi outrageous things. Some other 
 party is now always feparated from the multitude; 
 and while the whole are fomehow in purfuit of 
 gain, fuch as are the mofi: temperate become the 
 wealthieft, and have the greatefl quantity of ho- 
 ney ; hence the greatefi; quantity of honey, and 
 what comes with the greatefl: eafe, is prefixed 
 out of thefe by the drones. Such wealthy peo- 
 ple are the pafture of the drones. The people 
 who mind their own aff^airs, and meddle not with 
 any others, who have not much property, but 
 yet are the mofi: numerous, and the moft pre- 
 valent in democracy, whenever it is fully ajjemlledj 
 would be a third fpecies : but it will not often 
 fully aflTemble, if it does not get fome fi:iarc of the 
 honey. It does, however, always get a fliare, for 
 
 their
 
 Plato. 20 1 
 
 their leaders rob thofe who have fubftance, and 
 give it to the people, that they may have the moll 
 themfelves. Thefe, then, who are thus defpoiled, 
 are obliged to defend themfelves, faying and doing 
 all they can among the people. Others, Then, give 
 them occafion to form defigns againft the people, 
 and fo they become oligarchic, even although they 
 fliould have no inclination to introduce a change 
 of government : thence they go to accufations, 
 law-fuits, and contefts, one with another, the lead- 
 ers flandering, and the drones (tinging. 
 
 The people are wont always to fet fome one in 
 a confpicuous manner over themfelves, to cherifh 
 him, and greatly to increafe his power. When- 
 ever a tyrant rifes, it is from this root, and from 
 nothing elfe, that he bloff-)ms. What then is the 
 beginning of a change, from a prefident into a ty- 
 rant ? The wolf in the temple of Arcadia, dedi- 
 cated to Lycsan Jupiter, had this infcription, 
 ** That whoever tailed human entrails, mixed with 
 other facrifices, necefiarily became a wolf.*' la 
 the fame manner, he who, being prefident of the 
 people, and receiving an extremely fubmiffive 
 multitude, abftaineth not from kindred blood, 
 but unjuftly accufing them, and bringing them 
 into courts of juftice, ftains himfelf with blood- 
 fhed, and banifhes and flays, and propofes the abo- 
 lition of debts, and divifion of lands j mud not 
 fuch a one either be deftroyed by his enemies, or 
 exercife tyranny, and, from being a man, become 
 a wolf? He now becomes feditious towards thofe 
 who have fubftance, and when he fails he goes 
 againlt his enemies with open force, and becomes 
 an accompliflied tyrant , and if they be unable to 
 expel him, or put him to death by an accufation 
 before the city, they confpire to cut him off pri- 
 vately, by ^ violent death. On this account, all 
 
 ihofe
 
 2C2 Ancient Republics, ^c. 
 
 thofe who mount up to tyranny invent the celcx- 
 brated tyrannical demand of the people, certain 
 guards for their perfons, that the alTiftance of the 
 people may be fecured to them. The people, 
 afraid of his fafety, but fee u re as to their ov/n, 
 grant them. Then thofe who have fubftance, 
 and the crime of hating the people, fly ; and if 
 any one of them is caught, he is put to death. 
 This prefident of a city, thus not behaving like 
 a truely great man, tumbles dov/n many others, 
 and fits in his chair a confumm.ate tyrant, inftead 
 of a prefident of the city. Confider now the hap- 
 pinefs of the man and the city in which fuch a 
 mortal arifes : in the firft days, he fmiles, and fa- 
 lutes every one he meets, fays he is no tyrant, pro- 
 mifes many things, both in private and in public, 
 frees from debts, diftributes lands, both to the peo- 
 ple in general and thofe about him, affects to be 
 mild and of the patriot fpirit towards all. But 
 when he has reconciled to himfelf fome of hisforeic-n 
 enemies, and tranquillity is reilored, he raifes wars, 
 that the people may want a leader, and that, being 
 rendered poor by the payrnent of taxes, they may 
 be under a neceflity of becoming intent on a daily 
 fuftenance, and lefs ready to confpire againft him. 
 If he fufpects any of them, who are of free fpirits, 
 will not allow him to govern, in order to have 
 fome pretext for defiroying them, he expofes them 
 to the enem.y. On thefe accounts, a tyrant is al- 
 ways under a neceflity of raifing war. While he 
 is doing thefe things, he muft become more hate- 
 ful to his citizens : fome of thofe who have been 
 promoted along v/ith him, and are in power, fpeak 
 out freely, both to him and among themfelves, 
 finding fault with the tranfactions. It behoves the 
 tyrant then to cut ofl^ all thofe who are of a more 
 manly fpirit, if he means to govern, till lie leave 
 
 r.Q
 
 Plato, 203 
 
 no one, friend or foe, worth any thing; he muft 
 carefully obferve who is courageous, magnani- 
 mous, wife, rich, and of neceffity he muft be an 
 enemy to all thefe, and lay fnares, until he cleanfe 
 the city of them. Thus he muft live with wicked 
 people, and be hated by them too, or not live at 
 all -, the more he is hated, the more guards he will 
 want. But the worthy men being deftroyed, the 
 worft muft be his guards. What a blefied pof- 
 feflion! But this army of the tyrant, fo beautiful, 
 fo numerous, and multiform, muft be maintained. 
 If there be any lacred things in the city, thefe they 
 will fpend, and the people obliged to pay the 
 lighter taxes. When thefe fail, he and his drunken 
 companions and afibciatcs, male and female, fhall 
 be maintained out of the paternal inheritance; and 
 the people who have made the tyrant fhall nourifh. 
 him. It the people be enraged, and lay that they 
 did not make him to be (laves to his flaves, but 
 that they might be fet at liberty from the rich in 
 the city, who are now called good and worthy 
 men, and order him and his companions to be 
 gone out of the city, as a father drives out of his 
 houfe his fon, with his tumultuary, drunken com- 
 panions ; then indeed the people Ihall know what 
 a beaft they are themfelves, and what a beaft they 
 have generated, hugged, and bred up. While 
 they are the weaker, they attempt to drive out the 
 ilronger. The tyrant v^ill ftrip them of their ar- 
 mour. The people, defending themfelves againft 
 the fmoke of flavery, have fallen into the fire of 
 dcfpotifm i inftead of that excelTive and unfeafon- 
 able liberty, embracing tlie moft rigorous and 
 wretched flavery of bondmtfj. I'hus, to fpeak 
 modeftly, v/e have fufFiciently fliewn how tyranny 
 arifes out of democracy, and what it is after it 
 is rifen. 
 
 END or THE EIGHTH iOOK. 
 
 THE
 
 204 Ancient Republics ^ ^c. 
 
 THE NINTH BOOK. 
 
 THE tyrannical man himfelf remains yet to 
 be confidereci, in what manner he arifes out 
 of the democratic, and what kind of man he is, 
 and whether he is wretched or happy ; of thofe 
 pleafures and defires which are not nccefTary, fome 
 are repugnant to laia; thefe indeed appear to fpring 
 up in every one, but being chajlifed by the laws^ 
 and the better defires, along with reafon, they 
 either forfake fome men altogether, or are lefs in 
 number, and feeble ^ in others they are in greater 
 number, and more powerful. Thefe lawlefs 
 defires are fuch as are excited in fleep, when the 
 rational part of the foul which governs it is afleep, 
 and the part which is brutal and favage, being 
 filled with meats and drunkennefs, friflvs about, 
 and pufhing away fleep, wants to go and accom- 
 plifh its practices i in fuch a one it dares to do 
 every thing, as being loofed and difengaged from 
 all modefty and difcretion , for it fcruplcs not the 
 embraces, as it imagines, of gods, men, or beads ; 
 nor to kill any one ; in one word, is wanting in 
 no folly nor impudence. There is in every one 
 a certain fpecies of defires, which is terrible, fa- 
 vage, and irregular, even in fome who feem to us 
 to be entirely moderate. 
 
 Recolledl now what kind of man we faid the 
 democratic one was; educated from his infancy 
 under a parfimonious father, who valued the 
 avaricious defires alone ; but being afterwards 
 converfant with thofe who are more refined, run- 
 ning into their manner, and all fort of infolence, 
 from a deteftation of his father's parfimony , how- 
 ever, having a better natural temper than thofe 
 who corrupt him, and being drawn oppofite ways, ' 
 he fettles into a manner in the middle of both, and 
 participating moderately, as he imagines, of eac|^ 
 
 8
 
 J^lato. 205 
 
 of them, he leads a life neither illiberal nor licen- 
 tious, becoming a democratic man from an arifto- 
 cratic. His fon is educated in his manners, but 
 the fame things happening to him as to his father, 
 he is drawn into all kinds of licentioufnefs, which 
 is termed, however, by thofe who draw him off, 
 the moft complete liberty. His father, the do- 
 meftics, and others, are aiding to thofe defires 
 which are in the middle: but when the tyrant- 
 makers have no hopes of retaining the youth in 
 their power any other way, they contrive to ex- 
 cite in him a certain love, which prefides over the 
 indolent defires, and fuch as minifter readily to 
 their pieafures ; and when other defires make a 
 noife about him, full of theit- odours and per- 
 fumes, and crowns and wines, and the pleafures of 
 the moft diffolute kind, then truly he is fur- 
 rounded with miadnefs -as a life guard, and that 
 prefident of the foul rages with phrenzy, till he 
 kills all modefty, is cleanJed of temperance, and 
 filled with additional madnefs. This is the for- 
 mation of a tyrannical man. After this there are 
 feaftings among them, and reveliings, banquetting, 
 and miftreffes, and all fuch things as may be ex- 
 peded where the tyrants love, drunkennefs, and 
 madnefs, govern ail in the foul, ii'^ter this there 
 is borrowing and pillaging of fubftance, and 
 fearching for every thing which they are able, by 
 rage and phrenzy, deceit and violence, to carry off; 
 pillfering and beguiling parents. When the fub- 
 ftance of father and niother fails, he will break 
 into houfes, rob in the ftreers, riile temples. Thofe 
 defires which heretofore were only loofe from their 
 Slavery in deep, when he was yet under the laws 
 and his father, when under democratic government, 
 now when he is tyrannized over by his pafTions, 
 fhall be equally as loufc when he is awake, and 
 
 from
 
 4o6 Ancient Republics, and Opinions 
 
 from no horrid flaughter or deed fhall he abftain ; 
 
 but the tyrant within him, living without any rejlraint 
 of law and government^ fhall lead him on to every 
 rnad attempt. Such as thefe eftablifh as tyrant, 
 the man who among them hath himfelf mofl of 
 the tyrant, and in greateft ftrength within his own 
 foul. If the city relufts, he fhall bring in other 
 young people, and chaftife his formerly beloved 
 mother and father country^ as the Cretans lay. But 
 liberty and true friendfiiip the tyrannic difpofition 
 never tafted. Let us finifh then our worft man. 
 He will be awake fuch as we defcribed him afleep, 
 and he who appears the moft wicked, fliall really 
 be the moft wretched ; as many men as mjany 
 minds; as city is to city, as to virtue and happi- 
 nefs, fo will man be to man , kingly government 
 is the beft, and tyranny is the worft. No city is 
 more wretched than that which is under tyranny, 
 nor any more happy than that under regal power. 
 Both the city and the tyrant fhall be llavifh, poor, 
 timorous ; and you v/ill find more lamentations 
 and groans, weepings and torments, than in any 
 other city. We jhould not merely ccnjc^lure about 
 matters of fuch importance, but moft thoroughly enquire 
 into them, by reajoning of this kind, for the enquiry is 
 concerning the moft important w.atter, a good life and 
 a bad. 
 
 Such private men as are rich, and poflefs many 
 flaves, have this refemblance at leaft of tyrants, 
 that they rule over many : if they live fecurely, 
 and are not afraid of their domeftics, it is becaufe 
 the whole city gives affiftance to each particular 
 man : but if a god fhould lift a man, his wife and 
 children, with fifty flaves, out of the city, and let 
 them down in a defrtrt, in what kind of fear would 
 he be about himfelf, his wife and children, left 
 they fhould be deftroyed by the domeftics ! 
 
 Such,
 
 
 of Philofophers. 207 
 
 Such, and much worfe, is the tyrant in his 
 tyrannical city, envious, faithlefs, cowardly, un- 
 juft, unfriendly, unholy, and a fink and breeder 
 of all wickednefs. 
 
 Now tell me which is the firft and which the 
 laft, as to happinefs, the regal, the ambitious, the 
 oligarchic, the democratic, and the tyrannic man 
 and city. The befl and jufteft is the happieft. 
 
 Thus, Sir, you have fome of Plato's fentiments 
 of morals and politics, how much they are to Mr. 
 Turgot's purpofe, we may (hew in another letter; 
 mean time I am, &c. 
 
 LETTER XXXIV. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 IPromifed you to add to the refearches of Po- 
 ly bius and Plato, concerning the mutability 
 of governments, thofe of Sir Thomas Smith, who, 
 as he tells us, on the 28th of March, 1565, in 
 the 7th of Eliz. and 51(1 year of his age, was 
 ambalTador from that queen to the court of France, 
 and then publiflicd " The Commonwealth of 
 England," not as Pinto made his Republic, Xeno- 
 phon his Kingdom of PeiTia, or Sir Thomas Moore 
 his Utopia, feigned commonwealths, fuch as never 
 were nor fhall be, vain imaginations, phantafies 
 of philofophers, but as England ftood, and was 
 governed at that day. 
 
 In his 7th chapter, and the two following, he 
 gives us his opinion of the origin of a kingdom, 
 
 an
 
 %o8 Ancient RepuhlicSi and Opinions 
 
 an ariftocracy, and democracy. The third ht 
 fuppofes to grow naturally out of the fecond, and 
 the fecond out of the firft, which originated in 
 patriarchal authority. But as there is nothing 
 remarkable, either in favour of our fyftem or 
 againfl it, I fhould not have quoted the book in 
 this place, but for the fake of its title. The con- 
 ftitution of England is in truth a republic, and 
 has been ever fo confidered by foreigners, and by 
 the mod learned and enlightened Englifhmen, 
 although the word commonwealth has become 
 \inpopular and odious, fince the unfuccefsful and 
 injudicious attempts to abolilli monarchy and 
 ariftocracy, between the years 1640 and 1660. 
 
 Let us proceed then to make a few obfervations 
 upon the Difcourfes of Plato and Poiybius, and 
 fhew how forcibly they prove the neceffity of per- 
 manent laws, to reftrain the pafTions and vices of 
 men, and to fecure to the citizens the blefiings 
 of fociety, in the peaceable enjoyment of their 
 lives, liberties, and properties i and the neceffity 
 of different orders of men, with various and op- 
 pofite powers, prerogatives, and privileges, to 
 watch over one another, to balance each other, 
 and to compel each other at all times to be real 
 guardians of the laws. 
 
 Every citizen muft look up to the laws, as his 
 mafter, his guardian, and his friend; and when- 
 ever any of his fellow citizens, whether magiftrates 
 or fubjefts, attempt to deprive him of his right, 
 he muft appeal to the laws ; if the ariftocracy 
 encroach, he muft appeal to the democracy j if 
 they are divided, he muft appeal to the monarchical 
 power to decide between them, by joining with 
 that which adheres to the laws , if the democracy 
 is on the fcramble for power, he muft appeal to 
 the ariftocracy, and the monarchy, which by unit-
 
 cf Philofophers. 209 
 
 in^ may reftrain it. If the regal authority pre- 
 lumes too far, he mufl: appeal to the other two. 
 Without three dlvifions of power, ftationed to 
 watch each other, and compare each other's con- 
 duct with the laws, it will be impoflible that 
 the laws fhould at all times preferve their autho- 
 rity, and govern all men. 
 
 Plato has fufficiently aflerted the honour of the 
 laws, and the necefTity of proper guardians of 
 them; but has no where delineated the various 
 orders of guardians, and the neceflity of a ba- 
 lance between them : he has, nevcrthelefs, given 
 us premifes from whence the abfolute necefTity of 
 fuch orders and equipoifes may be inferred ; he 
 has (hewn how naturally every fimple fpecies of 
 government degenerates. The ariftocracy, or am- 
 bitious republic, becomes immediately an oligar- 
 chy What Ihall be done to prevent it ? Place 
 two guardians of the laws to watch the arifto- 
 cracy : one, in the Ihape of a king, on one fide 
 of it ; another, in the fhape of a democratical 
 aflembly, on the other fide. The ariftocracy, be- 
 come an oligarchy, changes into a democracy -v 
 How ftiall it be prevented .? By giving the na- 
 tural ariftocracy in fociety its rational and juft 
 weight, and by giving it a regal power to ap- 
 peal to, againft the madnefs of the people. De- 
 mocracy becomes a tyranny How fhall this be 
 prevented ? By giving it an able independent ally 
 in an ariftocratical allembly, with whom it may 
 unite againft the unjuft and illegal defigns of any 
 one man. 
 
 LETTER
 
 210 Ancient Bemocratical RepuUici, 
 
 LETTER XXXV. 
 
 ANCIENT DEMOCRATICAL 
 REPUBLICS. 
 
 CARTHAGE. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 IN order to fhew the theory of Socr&tes, as re* 
 ported by Plato, in a clearer light , and to be 
 convinced, that he has not exaggerated in his de- 
 fcription of the tnutability in the characters of 
 men^ and the forms of government ; we fhould 
 look into the hiftory of thofe ancient republics^ 
 from whence he drew his obfervations and rea- 
 fonings. Although it is probable that Greece 
 was his principal theatre, yet we may reafonably 
 fuppofe that Carthage, and a multitude of other 
 republics in Italy, befides that of Rome, were 
 not unknown to him. 
 
 The hiftory of Greece fhould be to our coun- 
 trymen, what is called in many families on the 
 continent a boudoir , an odagonal apartment in a 
 houfe, with a full-length mirror on every fide, 
 and another in the cieling. The ufe of it is, 
 when any of the young ladies, or young gentle- 
 men if you will, are at any time a little out of 
 humour, they may retire to a place where, in 
 whatever direction they turn their eyes, they fee 
 their own faces and figures multiplied without 
 end. By thus beholding their own beautiful per- 
 
 fonSj
 
 Carthage, 2 1 1 
 
 Tons, and feeing at the fame time the deformity 
 brought upon them by their anger, they may re- 
 cover their tempers and their charms together. 
 A few fhort fl'ietches of the ancient republics 
 will ferve to fliew, not only that the orders wc 
 defend were common to all of them , that the 
 profperity and duration of each was in propor- 
 tion to the care taken to bahvice them \ and that 
 they all were indebted, for their frequent fedi- 
 tlons, the rife and progrefs of corruption, and 
 their decline and fall, to the imperfection of their 
 orders, and their defcds in the balance. 
 
 As there are extant no writings of any Cartha- 
 ginian phiiofopher, ilatefman, or hiftorian, we 
 have no exact information concerning the form of 
 their commonwealth, but what appears in a few- 
 hints of Greek and Roman authors. Their com- 
 merce and riches, their empire of the fea, and 
 extenfive dominion of two thoufand miles on the 
 fea-coaft, their obilinate military contelts with 
 Rome, and the long duration of their govern- 
 ment, prove both that their population and power 
 were very great, and their conllitution good ; ef- 
 pecially as, for the fpace of five hundred years, 
 their tranquillity was never interrupted by Jedi- 
 tion, nor their liberties attempted by the ambi- 
 tion of any of their citizvrns. 
 
 The national charader was military, as well as 
 commercial ; and, although they were avaricious, 
 they were not effeminate. 
 
 The monarchical power was in two fufurtc^, 
 the ariftocratical in the fenate, and thedcniocia- 
 tical was held by the people in a body. Thefe 
 are faid to have been nicely balanced, l>ut wc 
 know not in what manner. The chief magiflrates 
 were annually eledcd by the people. Tne fena- 
 i"' 2 tors
 
 2 1 2 Ancient Democraticd Republics. 
 
 tors were elected too, and, although it is not cer- 
 tain, it is mod probable, by the people ; but it 
 appears, that three qualifications were indifpen- 
 fable in every fenator birth, merit, and wealth : 
 this laft requifite rendered commerce honourable, 
 even in the firft of the patricians and fenators 
 themfelves, and animated the commercial genius 
 of the nation. This government thus far refem- 
 bles thofe of the United States of America more 
 than any other of the ancient republics, perhaps 
 more than any of the modern : but when we en- 
 quire for the balance, it is not to be found. The 
 fuffetes had not more authority than Roman con- 
 fuls ; they had but a part of the executive power, 
 and none of the legiflative : much of the execu- 
 tive, and all the legiflative, was in the fenate and 
 people."^ The balance then could only be between 
 thefe two. Now it is impofTible to balance two 
 afTemblies, without introducing a third power ; 
 one or other will be moft powerful, and, which- 
 ever it is, it will continually fcramble till it gets 
 the whole : in fad, the people here had the 
 whole, as much as in any of our fiates ; fo that 
 while the citizens were uncorrupted, and gave 
 their votes honeftly for fuffetes and fenators, all 
 went well i and it is extremely remarkable, that 
 with all their acknowledged eagernefs for money, 
 this people were fo many centuries untainted with 
 luxury and venality ; and preferved their primi- 
 tive frugality of manners, and integrity in elec- 
 tions. As to the Roman accufations of infmce- 
 rity, there is no more reafon to believe them, 
 than there would be to believe a Carthaginian 
 who fliould retort the reproach. This, as well 
 as other inftances, may lead us to doubt the uni- 
 verfality of the do(^rine, that commerce corruprs 
 
 manners.
 
 Carthage. 213 
 
 manners. There was another remarkable in- 
 fticution, that the fenate fhould always be un- 
 animous , and if any one fenator infilled upon 
 his own opinion, againft: all the reft, there could 
 be no decifion, but by an appeal to the people. 
 This again gave a ftrong democratical caft 
 to the conftitution. Such a tendency could only 
 be balanced by the laws, which, requiring a large 
 fortune for every fenator and public officer, in 
 order to fupport his dignity, and fecure him 
 againft the temptations to corruption, confined 
 the choice to the firft families and abilities united. 
 This was liable to great objeflion ; becaufe 
 great abilities might often be pofTefled by men of 
 obfcurer original, and fmaller property, who 
 were thereby excluded. To this law, neverthe- 
 lefs, may be afcribed the duration of the re- 
 public. 
 
 Another remarkable check, which was perhaps 
 the original model from whence the Venetian in- 
 quifition was copied, was a committee of one 
 hundred and four members of the fenate, ap- 
 pointed to w^tch the ambition of the great fami- 
 lies. To this body all their admirals and gener 
 rals were required to render an account of their 
 condudl at the end of every year. 
 
 Out of this body were elected a fub-committee 
 of five, who had very great power : their office 
 was for life; and they filled up their own vacan- 
 cies out of the one hundred and four, and all 
 the vacancies, even in the one hundred and four, 
 out of the fenate-, they had the fupreme tribu- 
 nal of criminal jurifdidtion. This power muft 
 have been terrible to all ; to' the people, fenate, 
 and fuffetes , yet it was the check which pre- 
 ierved the ilate from fedition and convulfions. 
 
 I' 3 It
 
 214 Ancient Democratkal Repuhlics. 
 
 It grew unpopular ; and the law which at laft 
 made it annual and eledive, probably laid the 
 foundation of the ruin of the commonwealth, by 
 changing the balance, and introducing the domi- 
 mt'io phhis. The balances in thi?, the moll: demo- 
 cratical n-public of antiquity, contrived by the 
 people themillves to temper their own power, 
 are extremtrly reniarkable : the fuffetes reprefent- 
 ed, like i\\t ccnluls at l\ome, the mnjcfty of the 
 commonwealth, and had a fliare of executive au- 
 thority , tlie council of five had criminal jurifdic- 
 tion, and inouifitorial power j the one hundred 
 and four were a body chofen out of the fcnate, 
 by the five, for their I'upport-, then comes the 
 fenate ar large , and, lalt of all, the people at 
 large. Here are five orders completely diflind:, 
 befides the necelTary k-gal qualification of great 
 wealth : yet all thefe checks, although they pre- 
 ferved the ftate five hundred years, could not 
 prolong its period above \t\t\-\ hundred \ becaufe, 
 after all, the balance was not natural, nor effec- 
 tual. The executive power was not feparatcd 
 from the kgiflative-, nor the different parts of the 
 legiflature properly divided or balanced : the ex- 
 ecutive power and judicial were both chiefly in 
 legiflative hands. 
 
 The noble families, thus fecured in poffefiion 
 both of legifiative and executive pov/er, could 
 not be reftrained by all the ligaments which had 
 been contrived to preferve the equipoife betVv'een 
 thcmi and tlie people : they divided into two fac- 
 tions, with the family of Hanno at the head of 
 one, and that of Barcas of the other ^ firil at- 
 tacked the council of five, whofe power was un- 
 popular, as well as cdicjs to the r.obles -, eafily 
 procured a ].iw to make that annually elcci.ive, 
 
 or.
 
 Carthage, 215- 
 
 or, in other words, an inflrument always in the 
 hands of the prevailing fa6lion, as fuch a fmall 
 body, fo changeable, muft ever be , and over- 
 turned the conftitution. The R.omans had all. 
 the advantage of thefe difienfions in the war, by 
 v/hich they finally deftroyed their rival power fo 
 ciFcdually, that fcarce a trace of it remains to be 
 feen, even in ruins. Their virtues were not ex- 
 tinguiilied to the laft, and foine of the greatelt 
 examples of patriotifm and heroifm were exhi- 
 bited even in their expiring agonies. 
 
 LETTER XXXVI. 
 
 ANCIENT ARISTOCRATICA]L 
 REPUBLICS. 
 
 ROME. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 lONYSIUS HalicarnafTenfis has not only 
 
 D 
 
 given US his own judgment, that the moft 
 perfect form of government is that which con- 
 fifts of an equal mixture of monarchy, ariftocra- 
 cy, and democracy, in the fpeech which he puts 
 into the mouth of Valerius, but has repeated the 
 fame fentiment, in his own name, in other parts 
 of his work. In the fcventh fe<5tion of his fe- 
 CQn4 book of the Roman Antiquities, he fays 
 
 P4 of
 
 2 1 6 Ancient Arijiocratical Republics. 
 
 of Romulus, that he was extremely capable of 
 inftituting the moft perfe6l form of govern- 
 ment. And again, " I fliall firft fpeak of the 
 form of government he inftituted, which I look 
 upon, of all others, to be the moft felf-fuffi- 
 cient to anfwer all the ends both of peace and 
 war." This is a mixture of monarchy, arifto- 
 cracy, and democracy, extolled by Polybius -, and 
 is nearly the fame with that of Lycurgus, infti- 
 tuted at Sparta about a hundred years before. 
 As the conftitutions of Rome and Sparta lafted 
 fo many centuries longer than others of Greece 
 and Italy, and produced effcfls fo amazing upon 
 the human charafler, we may rationally afcribe 
 that duration, and thofe eiFecls, to this compofi- 
 tion, although the balance v/as very imiperfefl in 
 both. The legal power, both of the kings and 
 people, in both, were uneoAial to that of the fe- 
 nate, and therefore the predominant character in 
 both was ariftocracy. In Sparta, the influence 
 of the nionarchy and democracy was derived 
 chiefly from the oath taken by the kings and 
 ephori to fupport each other, -An authority 
 founded thus in opinion, in religion, or rather 
 fuperftition, not in legal power, would keep the 
 fenate in feme awe, but not in any certain re-, 
 ftraint. 
 
 Romulus divided all the people into three 
 parts, and appointed a perfon of the firft rank to 
 be the chief of each of them. Then he fubdi- 
 vided each of thefe into ten others, and appoint- 
 ed as many of the braveft men to be the leaders 
 of thefe. The greater divifions he called tribes, 
 and the lefler curiae : the commanders of the 
 tribes were called tribuni ; and thofe of the cu- 
 riae, cunoqes, He then divided th? land into 
 
 thirty
 
 Rome, 217 
 
 thirty portions, and gave one of them to each 
 curia. He diftinguiflied thofe who were eminenc 
 for their birth, virtues, and riches ; and to thefe 
 he gave the name of fathers. The obfcure, the 
 mean, and the poor, he called plebeians, in imi- 
 tation of the government at Athens, where, at 
 that time, thofe who were diftinguiflied by their 
 birth and fortune were called " well-born," to 
 whom the adminiftration of government was com- 
 mitted ; and the reft of the people, who had no 
 fliare in it, *' hufbandmen." Romulus appoint- 
 ed the patricians to be priefts, magiftrates, and 
 judges. The inftitution by which every plebeian 
 was allowed to choofe any patrician for his pa- 
 tron, introduced an intercourfe of good offices 
 between thefe orders, made the patricians emulate 
 each other in afts of civility and humanity to 
 their clients, and contributed to preferve the 
 peace and harmony of Rome in fo remarkable 
 a manner, that in all the contefts which happened 
 for fix hundred and twenty years, they never pro- 
 ceeded to bloodfhed. 
 
 The king, according to the inftitution of 
 Romulus, had feveral important funftions, viz. 
 I. Supremacy in religion, ceremonies, facrilices, 
 and worfliip. 2. The guardianlliip of the laws, 
 and adminiftration of juftice, in all cafes, whe- 
 ther founded on the law of nature, or the civil 
 law : he was to take cognizance of the greateft 
 crimes in perfon, leaving the Icfler to the fenate j 
 and to oblerve, that no errors were commitred in 
 their judgments : he was to affemble both the fe- 
 nate and the people ; to deliver his opinion firft, 
 and purfue the relolutions of the majority. Ro- 
 mulus, however, wifely avoided that remarkable 
 Spartan abfwrdity, of two kings. 
 
 The
 
 1 1 8 .^ncient Arijiocratical Repuhlics^ 
 
 The fenate were to deliberate, and determine, 
 by a majority of votes, all queftions which the 
 Icing fnould propofe to them. This inftitution 
 alfo Romulus took from the conftitution of the 
 Lacedaemonians. The kings, in both conftitu- 
 tions, were fo far from being abfolute, that they 
 had not the whole executive power, nor any ne- 
 gative upon the legiflature ; in fhort, the whole 
 power of the government was veiled in the fe- 
 nate. 
 
 The people had three privileges ; to choofe 
 magiftrates (yet all the great employments muft 
 be confined to the patricians) j to enadt laws ; and 
 to determine concerning war, when propofed by 
 the king : but the concurrence of the fenate be- 
 ing neceifary to give a fanftion to their decifions, 
 their power was not without controul. 
 
 To fsparate the executive from the legiflative 
 power, and the judicial from both, and to give the 
 king, the fenate, and people, each a negative in 
 the legiflature, is fo fmiple, and to us appears fo 
 obvious an improvement of this plan, that it is 
 furprifing it did not occur to Romulus, as well 
 as to Lycurgus : but, in thofe early times, per- 
 haps neither kings, nor nobles, nor people, were 
 willing to have their prerogatives and privileges 
 fo exadlly afcertained. The nobles, in both na- 
 tions, had almoft all the influence, and were no 
 doubt as jealous of royal as they were of popu^ 
 lar power. It is certain that, although the go- 
 vernment was called monarchical, it was in rea- 
 lity ariftocratical in an high degree. There is a 
 remarkable example of ariftocratical art, in the 
 manner of obtaining the determination of the 
 people : they were not permitted to vote in one 
 common affembly j they were called in their cu-
 
 Rome. 219 
 
 rins ; the majority of votes in a curia decided its 
 voice-, and a majority of curias was the refolve 
 of the whole people. 
 
 Had Romulus died in peace, and lefc a Ton, 
 his monarchy would probably have defcended in 
 his family ; but a conteH; arofe immediately here 
 (as it has done in all other nations where the peo- 
 ple had not a negative, and where the executive 
 power has been partly in the hands of a king, 
 and partly in a fenate) betv/een the king and the 
 nobles , and Romulus was put to death by the 
 patricians, for aiming, as they pretended, at more 
 power than his fliare. This enabled the patri- 
 cians to carry their firft point , for it is always 
 the firH: point of the ariftocracy to make the firft 
 magiftrate elective : in this they are always at 
 firft joined by the people , but, after feeing the 
 ufe which the nobles make of thefe eledlions a 
 few times, the people themfelves have always 
 made it hereditary. 
 
 Numa was chofcn, a man of peace, piety, and 
 humanity, v/ho had addrefs enough to make the 
 nobles and people believe that he was married to 
 the goddefs Egeria, and received from his celef- 
 tial conforc all iiis laws and meafures. 
 
 TuUus I-Joftilius, a man ot great merit, was 
 chofen in his ftead ; but after a glorious, at leaft 
 a viftorious, reign of thirty-two years, was mur- 
 dered by the patricians, headed by Ancus Mar- 
 cius, grandfon of Numa by his only daughter, 
 who thought his family-right prior to that of 
 TuUius. 
 
 Ancus was elc*5lcd king, and died a natural 
 death. 
 
 Liicius Tarquinius, after a reign of thirty- 
 eight years, in which he had enlarged the terri- 
 tory, beautified the city, and fhewn himfelf wor-
 
 220 Ancient Arijiocratical Republics . 
 
 thy of the crown, was aflafllnated in his palace 
 by the two Tons of Ancus Marcius, who had 
 learned the family policy : but their project was 
 unfortunate ; the people loved Lucius, executed 
 the inllruments of the murder, baniihed the two 
 fons of Ancus, and confifcated their eftates. 
 
 Servius Tullius, who had married the daugh- 
 ter of Lucius, was now elevated to the throne 
 by the people, much againfl the will of the fe- 
 nate and patricians, becaufe Lucius was not one 
 of them, but of Greek extraftion. Tullius was 
 chiefly fupported by the people, always difagre- 
 able to the patricians, who held his advancement 
 to the throne to be illegal. The adminiftration 
 of Tullius is an artful fyftem of duplicity, to 
 preferve his chara6ler, of the man of the people, 
 and, at the fame time, appeafe the fury of the 
 patricians, by really undermining the aiuhority 
 of the people, and throwing the whole power 
 into their hands. In purfuance of his prin- 
 ciple to pleafe both fides, he made excellent 
 equitable regulations for rcgiftering the people, 
 eftablifhing a militia, and proportioning the bur- 
 dens of war according to the property and abi- 
 lities of all ranks ; but he fubdivided the fix 
 clalTes into one hundred and ninety-three cen- 
 turies : the firfl clafs was compofed wholly of 
 the rich, and contained ninety-eight of the cen- 
 turies. If the centuries of the firft clafs were 
 unanimous, as they generally were, they carried 
 every point by a majority of three ; if they dif- 
 ao-reed, the centuries of the fecond clafs were 
 called i if they difagreed, the third came for- 
 ward J and fo on, till ninety-feven centuries a- 
 arced: if the numbers continued equal, ninety- 
 fix to ninety-fix', the fixth clafs was called, which 
 was compofed wholly of the pooreft people, and 
 
 contained
 
 Rome, 12 1 
 
 contained but one century -, but even the votes 
 of the fourth clafs were rarely called for, and the 
 votes of the fifth and fixth were generally ufelefs. 
 When the people voted by curias, the vote of 
 every citizen was given, and, as the poor were 
 moft numerous, they were always fure of a large 
 majority ; but when thus taken by centuries, that 
 numerous body of the poor, which compofed the 
 fixth century, were wholly infignificant, and thofe 
 of the fifth and fourth very nearly fo. By chang- 
 ing the votes from curias to centuries, Tullius 
 wholly changed the fundamental conftitution, and 
 threw the cleftions of magiftrates civil and mili- 
 tary, the power of enabling and repealing laws, 
 declaring war, and making peace, all into the 
 power of the rich patricians. The people had 
 not fenfe enough to lee this , nor to lee another 
 thing of more importance, viz. that the king had 
 been driven to the necelTity of this artful flattery 
 of the patricians, by his not being independent 
 of them, and by their fiiaring with him in the 
 executive power. Tullius had two daughters, 
 married to the grandfons of +iis predeceflbr, 
 Aruns and Tarquinius. The patricians were llill 
 caballing againlt Tullius, and (cz up Tarquin, 
 one of his Ibns-in-law, againil him ; but as a ma- 
 iority were not tor his drpofition, Tarquin and his 
 impious and inceftuous wife joined the cabal in the 
 murder of her firlt hufbind and Iier father. Tar- 
 quin, in time, murdered on all hands, patricians 
 and plebeians. lie was expelled by Brutus. 
 
 This whole hiltory, from Romulus to Tarquin, 
 is one continued (Irugglc ol the noble families 
 for the firft place; and another unanfwerable 
 proof of the necellUy of having t'nree orders, and 
 each order independent, in orJer to form an ef- 
 fectual equilibrium. The people were very little 
 
 regarded
 
 622 Ancient Arijiocratical Republics, 
 
 regarded by the fenate or patricians ; the kings 
 only now and then courted the people for fup- 
 port againft their rivals among the patrician fa- 
 milies. The tyranny of Tarquin made the name 
 of king odious and unpopular : the patricians, 
 who were the principal conduftors of the revolu- 
 tion, took advantage of this ; for what ? To 
 reftore and improve Romulus's plan of a mixed 
 government ? No ; but to eftablilh their favou- 
 rite ariftocracy upon the ruins of monarchy. Two 
 confuls, in imitation of the two Spartan kings, 
 were to be eledted annually, by the votes of the 
 people, which carried the name of a democratical 
 power ; but the votes were taken by centuries, 
 jiot by tribes, which made the patricians mafters 
 of the elcdlions, and conftituted an ariftocracy in 
 reality. From this moment a haughty faction of 
 felfifii patricians appears, who afl'ecled to defpife 
 the people, to reduce them to fervitude, and ef- 
 tablifh a defpotic oligarchy. The people had fuf- 
 fered their prejudices to blind them fo far as to be 
 tricked out of their king, who was at leaft a bet- 
 ter friend to them than the patricians were, and 
 now the contefts were wholly between patricians 
 and plebeians : the former had now got the con- 
 fuls, and confequently the executive power, as 
 jmuch in their hands as ever the nobles in Venice 
 had their doge, or as the nobles in Poland have 
 their king. 
 
 The plebeians were now in a moft wretched 
 fituation. They were obliged to ferve in the wars, 
 to keep out theTarquins and their allies, at their 
 own expence, which frequently obliged them to 
 borrow money at exorbitant intereft of the patri- 
 cians, who had engrofled the greater part of the 
 wealth ; and, as the country was often ravag^ed 
 by the enemy, many loft all their effccls. Un- 
 able
 
 Rome. 223 
 
 able to pay the principal, with accumulated loads 
 of intereil upon intereft, they were frequently 
 confined by their creditors in chains, and Icourged 
 with whips ; for the law, to which they had fool- 
 ifhly confented, had made the debtor a (lave to 
 the creditor. The people began to demand an 
 abolition of debts ; the Ibnate appointed a difla- 
 tor. A confufion of foreign wars and domeftic 
 diflenfions enfues, till we come to the (lory fo 
 feeautifully told by Livy and Dionyfius, of the 
 man who had been in twenty-eight battles, who 
 appeared before the people, and Ihewed on his 
 back the bleeding fears inflicted by a mercilefs 
 creditor. At this time the patricians had plunged 
 into their ufual difficulty, a violent conteft among 
 themfelves, between a furious headlong party 
 which always appears for an oligarchy, and the 
 moderate men, who defire to continue the ariilo- 
 cracy , the young patricians generally follow the 
 haughty Claudius, and the mild Valerius courts 
 the people. The olip;archy prevails, and the de- 
 cemvirate is cftablirticd : their tyranny drives the 
 people to the f'acred mountain ; and, at laO:, the 
 tribunate was eilablifhed. Here is the firft fymp- 
 tom of any fyftem purfued by the people : this 
 was a balance but what kind of balance ? No- 
 body thought of another council, a houfe of re- 
 prelentatives, who fliould have a negative; and, 
 if they had, it would not have availed without a 
 king i for iuch a new aflembly would loon have 
 been either wholly fubje^ficd to the fcnate,or would 
 have voted it ufelefs. In truth, the monarchical 
 power being fuppreffed, and the executive autho- 
 rity, as well as legiflative, b-ing now only in the 
 fenate and people, a ilruggle commenced between 
 thefe two. 
 
 Tlic
 
 2^4 Ancient Arijlccratkal Republics] 
 
 The people were on the fcramble for more 
 powers and firfl: obtained a law, that all laws 
 pafled in their aflemblies by tribes, fhould have 
 equal force with thofe made in the aflembly by 
 centuries ; then, that all pofts and dignities fhould 
 be enjoyed by the plebeians equally with the pa- 
 tricians ; and that the decrees of the people fhould 
 have the fame force, and affeft the patricians in 
 the fame manner, as thofe pafled by the fenate. 
 All this was very juft, and only brought the de- 
 mocracy to an equality with the ariftocracy ; but 
 whenever thefe two are equal in legal power, 
 numbers will foon turn the balance in favour of 
 the democracy, unlefs there is a third power to 
 intervene. Accordingly it fo happened, and the 
 people went on from ftep to ftep, increafing their 
 own importance, and diminifhing that of the fe- 
 nate, until it was found fhut up in Utica; bur, 
 before this, the people were divided into parties, 
 and Csefar, at the head of one, pafled the Rubi- 
 con, that is, fet the mod facred law of his coun- 
 try at open defiance. From this time the govern- 
 ipjcnt became a government of men, and the worfl 
 of men. 
 
 From this example, as from all others, it ap- 
 pears, that there can be no government of laws 
 without a balance, and that there can be no ba- 
 lance without three orders ; and that even three 
 orders can never balance each other, unlefs each 
 in its department is independent and abfolute. 
 For want of this, the fl:ruggle was firft between 
 the king and fenate , in which cafe the king 
 muft always give v;ay, unlefs fupported by the 
 people. Before the creation of tribunes, the peo- 
 ple were in no fenfe independent, and therefore 
 could not fupport the kings. Afier the aboli- 
 tion of kings, the fenate had no balance either 
 
 way.
 
 Radius] '2.1 S 
 
 "^ay, and accordingly became at once a tyran- 
 nical oligarchy. When the people demanded 
 their right, and obtained a check, they were not 
 fatisfied ; . and grafped at more and more power, 
 until they obtained all, there being no monarchi- 
 cal power to aid the fenate. But the moment 
 the power became colleded into this one center, 
 it was found in reality fplit into three; and as 
 Caefar had the largeft of the three fliares, he in- 
 ftantly ufurped the whole. 
 
 LETTER XXXVII. 
 
 ANCIENT MONARCFIICAL 
 REPUBLICS. 
 
 TACITUS. 
 
 Dear Sir, 
 EFORE we proceed to the Greeks, we may 
 
 B 
 
 even mention the favages. Every nation ia 
 North America has a king, a fenate, and a peopled 
 The royal office is eleftive, but it is for life; 
 his fachems are his ordinary council, where all the 
 national affairs are deliberated and refolved ia 
 the firft inftance : but in the greateft of all, 
 which is declaring war, the king and fachems 
 call a national afiembly round a great council 
 fire, communicate to the peopie their refolution, 
 and facrifice an animal. Thofc of the people who 
 approve the war, partake of the facrifice ; throw 
 ihc hatchet into a tree, after the example of the 
 
 Q. king;
 
 22.6 Ancient Monr.r'chkal Repuhlics. 
 
 king ; and join in the fubfequent war fongg 
 and dances. Thofe who difapprove, take no part 
 of the facrifice, but retire. 
 
 ANCIENT GERMANS. 
 
 The ancient German nations mentioned by Ta- 
 citus, had among them st leaft two forts of govern- 
 ments. One was monarchy; and the king was ab- 
 folute, as appears by thefe words: " Exceptis iis 
 " gentibus quae regnantur , ibi enim et fuper inge- 
 *' nuoSjCt fuper nobiies, afcenduntliberti: apud ce- 
 " teros, impares libertini, libertatis argumentum*. 
 The other fpecies of govcrnnient was ariftocracy \ 
 for though there was a mixture of monarchy, arif- 
 tocracy, and democracy, yet th'e power of the king 
 and people was fo feeble, and that of the nobles, as 
 comprehended under the titles of princes, dukes, 
 and counts, w^as fo pedominant, that the govern- 
 
 * There cannot be a ftronger proof than this, that the 
 monarchy was of the mcll abfolute kipd, that it was indeed 
 a fimple defpotifm ; and Tacitus himfelf gives the explana- 
 tion of it, in his account of the origin of this kind of fla- 
 very. " Aleam fobrii inter feria exercent, tanta lucrandi 
 *' perdendive temeritate, ut, cum omnia defecerunt, ex- 
 *' trcmo ac noviffimo jaftu, de libertate et de corpore 
 *' co'ntendant. Viftus voluntariam fervitutem adit ; quan- 
 ** quam junior, quanquam robuftior, alligari fe ac venire 
 *' patitur: ea eft in re prava pervicacia ; ipfi fidem vocant. 
 Servos conditionis hujus per commercia tradunt, ut fe 
 " quoque pudore vidoris exfolvant. Liberti non multum 
 " fupra fervos funt, raro aliquod momentum in domo, nun- 
 ** quam in civitate, exceptis duntaxat iis gentibus qua; 
 " regrantur," &c. If in thefe nations thofe freedmen, who 
 were nothing in the others, neither in the family or the 
 ftate, were held in more ellimation, and advanced to more 
 power, than the citizens, e\en than the nobles, thefe kings 
 inuft have been defpots, in the ftridtell fenfe of the word ; 
 otherwifc neither nobles nor people would have fuffered the 
 iodignity. 
 
 mcnt
 
 Tacitus.. 247 
 
 ment muft be denominated arlftocratical. " De 
 " minoribus rebus principes confultant, de majori- 
 *' bus omnes; ita tamen, ut ea quoque, quorum penes 
 " plebem arbitrium eft, apud principes pertra6lcn- 
 '* tur." If thofe things which were m.ofl clearly in 
 the power of the people, were firft difcuffed among 
 the nobles, the reference to the people after- 
 wards feems to have been rather a communi- 
 cation to them of the refult of the fenate, than a 
 fubmifiion of it to the popular judgment. 
 
 The nature and extent of the royal dignity 
 and authority, appears from thefe words : " Reges 
 " ex nobilitate fumunt-, nee regibus infinita aut 
 " libera potcftas." Kings were taken from the 
 nobility, or kings were chofen for their noble de- 
 fcentj fo that ordinarily the office defcended to 
 the next of kin : but it is here exnrefsly afcertained 
 that their power was neither unlimited nor inde- 
 pendent. They had no negative, and might in 
 all things be over-ruled, at leaft by the nobles 
 and people conjointly. 
 
 The nature and extent of the ariftocratical dis- 
 nities and authorities, may be coUefted from what 
 follows: *' Duces ex virtute fumunt; et duces exem- 
 " plopotiusquamimperio, fi prompti, ficonfpicui: 
 *' fi ante aciem agant, admiratione pr^efunt." The 
 feudal hierarchy, even in thcle early times, was fully 
 cftabliOied, although it was afterwards enlarged. 
 The titles of dukes and counts, the rank and power 
 they conferred, defcended in families, although there 
 was the bare formality of an tledlion in the grand 
 council. *' Arma liimere, non ante cuiquam moris, 
 " quam ci vitas fufi'e^lurum probaverit: turn, in ip- 
 " lb confilio, vel principum aliqiiis, vel pater, vel 
 *' propinquus, fcuto tramcaque juvtnem ornant. 
 *' Infignis nobilitas, aut magna patrum meritii, 
 *' principis dignationcm etiam adolcfcentulis af- 
 (^2 ^'fignant.':
 
 22S Ancient Monarchical Republics, 
 
 " fignant." " When the young men were firft ad- 
 " mitted into public fociety, it was in the great 
 " council i when fome one of the dukes, or the 
 *' father, or other relation, adorned the youth 
 *' with arms. And if he is of very noble birth, 
 " or his father has great merit, the dignity of a 
 *' duke is affigned to him, young as he is." 
 From this it is pretty clear that the crown, as well 
 as the titles of dukes and counts, defcended in 
 the family line-, although the formality of an ad- 
 mifllon into council was kept up. The nobles, 
 among whom the king was little more than the 
 iirft among equals at leaft he was not more fu- 
 perior to the dukes, than the dukes were to thf^ 
 counts had the game in their own hands, and 
 managed a rude people as they plealed. This 
 will appear probable from other paffages : " Cas- 
 " teris robuftioribus, ac jam pridem probatis, a^- 
 " gregantur , nee rubor inter comites afpicf, 
 " gradus quinetiam et ipfe comitatus haber, 
 *' judicio ejus quern feclantur. Magnaque et 
 *' comitum a^mulatio, quibus primus apud prin- 
 ** cipem Ilium locus ; et principum, cui plurimi 
 " ct acerrimi comites. Hasc dignitas, has vires, 
 *' magno femper ekflorum juvenum globo cir- 
 *' cumdari, in pace dccus, in bello prsfidium j 
 *' nee folum in fua gente cuique, fed apud fini- 
 " timas quoque civitates, id nomen, ea gloria 
 *' elf, fi numero ac virtute coniitatus emineatj 
 *' expetuntur enim legationibus, et muneribus or- 
 " nantur, et ipfa plerumque fama bella profli- 
 *' gant. Cum ventum in aciem, turpe principi 
 *' virtute vinci, turpe comitatui virtutem princi- 
 *' pis non adiEquare. Jam vero infame in omneni 
 *' vitam, ac probrofum, fuperftitem principi fuo 
 *' ex acie receffiife. Ilium defendere, tueri, fua 
 " quoque fortia fada glori ejus affignare, prce- 
 
 !' cipuuin
 
 (I 
 
 TacUus. 229 
 
 cipuum facramenturn eft. Principes pro vic- 
 toria pugnant, cornites pro principc. Si civi- 
 tas, in qua orti funr, longa pace et otio torpear, 
 plerique nobilium adoleicentiuin petunt ultro 
 eas nationes quns timi bellum aliquod gerunc j 
 quia ct ingrata genti quies, ec tacilius inter 
 ancipitia clarefcunr, magnucr.que comitatum 
 non nifi vi bellocue tucarc : exi^unt enim 
 * principis fui libt^ralicate ilium bellatorem 
 *' equum, illam cruentam viclricenique fra- 
 *' meam : nam epulas, et quanquam incompti, 
 " largi, tamen, apparatus pro ftipcndio cedunt ; 
 *' materia magnificentice per belia et raptus. 
 Nee arare terram, aut expedlare annum, tani 
 facile perfuaferis quani vocare hoftes, et 
 vulnera mereri ; pigrum quinimo et iners vi- 
 detur, fudore acquirere quod pofTis languine 
 parare." 
 
 "When the foregoing ties, by which the people 
 or the common Ibldiers were attached to the 
 nobles, and the young and inferior nobles to the 
 fuperior, are confidcred, a better judgment may 
 be formed of the authority which the people 
 really had in the "rand council or national af- 
 fembly. 
 
 The powers and privileges of the people, in 
 aflembly, appears from the following palfages : 
 Coeunt, nili quid tortuitum et fubitum incide- 
 *' rit, certis dicbus, cum aut inchoatur luna aut 
 *' implctur -, nam agendis rebus hoc aufpicatilTi- 
 " mum initium creduiit. -Illud ex libertate vi- 
 tium, quotl non f, mill nee jujji convcmimt^ fed ec 
 " alter et tertius dies cunctatione coeuntium ab- 
 *' fumitur." By this it llioulJ feem that the peo- 
 ple were lb far from eltccming the pi ivilcgc of 
 irecting, that the king a;, U nobles could fciucely 
 ;_^'.'t thi><ii together. They ha 1 lech an averfion to 
 
 C^ I tiicfe
 
 230 Ancient Monarchical Republics. 
 
 thefe civil and political deliberations, that the 
 chiefs could hardly colle6l them to receive their 
 orders. '* Ut turbjE placuit, confidunt armati. 
 ' Silenrium per facerdotes, quibus turn et coer- 
 " cendi jus eft, imperatur. Mox rex, vd prin- 
 " ceps, prout cetas cuique, prout nobilitas, prout 
 " decus bellorum, prout facundia, audiuntur, 
 " aucloritate luadendi magis quam jubendi po- 
 V teftate. Si liifplicuit lententia, fremitu afper- 
 *' nantur , fin placuit, frameas concutiunt." 
 Here is fome appearance of popular liberty : but 
 when it is confidtred that the nobles were pro- 
 bably all the Ipeakers -, that the numbers were not 
 counted, nor voices diftinclly taken -, affent ex- 
 preffed by a clafh of arms, and dilTcnt by a mur- 
 mur or a groan , and efpecially the dependence of 
 the people on their leaders, and attachment to 
 them by oath ; we may confider thefe affemblies 
 rather as called to receive the proclamation of the 
 laws or minds of the nobles, than as any efFe6lual 
 democratical check. There was one thing how- 
 ever, of great importance, done in thefe affemblies ; 
 judges, the poiTe comitatus, and juries, were here 
 appointed to adminifter juftice. " Eliguntur in 
 
 iifdem conciliis et principes, qui jura per pa- 
 
 gos vicofque reddunt. "Centcni fingulis ex 
 " plebe comites, confilium fimul et auftorita?, 
 *' adfunt." An hundred commoners attended 
 the judge, and out of thefe were juries appointed 
 10 give their opinion, " confilium j" and others, 
 or perhaps the fame, to afford their afiiftance, 
 
 auttoritas," in putting the fentences and judg- 
 ment into execution. 
 
 From other particulars related by Tacitus, it 
 is very probable there had been communications 
 between Germany and Greece ; from the wor- 
 ship of Hercules, Mars, Pvlincrva, &;c. j if not 
 
 from
 
 Tacitus, 2^r 
 
 from the altar of Ulyfies, and the name of Laer- 
 tes, and the other monuments, and infcriptions 
 in Greek letters, of which he fpeaks more doubt- 
 fully. However this may have been, there is a 
 r^^markable analogy between thefe political infti- 
 tutions of the Germans, and ihole defcribed by 
 Homer in the times of the Trojan war. It was, 
 in both, the prerogative of the king to lead in 
 war, and to rule in peace ; but it is probable he 
 was not fond of deliberating, any more than of 
 fighting, without company : and though he may 
 have done both fometimes, yet numbers of his 
 followers were ready to attend him in either. 
 The nation acknowledged him for their leiider j 
 but they were accuftomed, on great occafions, to 
 aflemble ; and, without any ftudied farm of demo- 
 cracy, took the fovereignty upon themielves, as 
 often as their paflions were itrongly enough af- 
 fefted to unite them in a body. The fuperior 
 claflTcs among themielves came as naturally to hold 
 their meetings apart ; and affembled frequei.tly, 
 when the occafion was not fufficient to enH.c.,oc t.ic 
 attention of the whole. There is one remark iblc 
 difference between the Germans and the v.r.cks. 
 Among the former ih;: pritfts v/cie a dii'tinct bcdv, 
 and feem to have had more deciiivc .Uitlioricy tiiaii 
 the kings, nobles, or people in t!ie g'^^neral alicm- 
 blies '" Silcnrium per faccrdotcs, quibu:-, tum et 
 " coercendi jus eil, imp'. ra:ur:" v-litricao, among 
 the latter, the kings we.e tiiemlclvco at tnc head of 
 the pricllhood. 
 
 In this fecond kind of German governments, 
 we lee the three orders of king, nuoles, and com- 
 mons diliinil'.y marked -, but no balance lixed, 
 no delineation ot the powers Ox e^^ch : w hch left 
 room ior each to claim the }overe;g!.rv, as v/e 
 tnow they afterwards ciid j at leail tiic kirr^ rr.d '' 
 ^4 " t'^c
 
 '232 'Anfiient Monarchical Republics. 
 
 the nobles claimed and contended for it for many 
 2ges : the people fometimes claimed it, but at lalt 
 gave it up to the king, as the leail evil of the two, 
 in every country except England. 
 
 LETTER XXXVIII. 
 
 H O M B^ R. 
 P H ^ A C r A, 
 
 Dear Sir, 
 
 IN the kingdom, or rather ariftocracy, of Phx- 
 acia, as reprefented in the Odyfiey, we have a 
 picture at full length of thofe forms of govern- 
 ment which at that time prevailed in Greece. 
 
 There is a king Akinous ; there is a council of 
 twelve other kings, princes, archons, or peers, 
 for they are called by all thefe names ; and there 
 is a multitude : but the laft do not appear to 
 have any regular, legal, or cuftomary part in the 
 government. Thi^y might be fummoned together 
 by the heralds, or called by the found of trumpet, 
 or a horn, to receive information of the refults of 
 their chiefs ; to affift at a facrifice or prcc; (Tion ; 
 to fee a ftranger, or a fhow, or to partake of a 
 feaft *, or they might alTemble of themfelves in a 
 rage againft an'oppreflbr, from enchufiafm for the 
 royal fceptre, or other caufes : and the kings had 
 often much dependance on their attachment to 
 their hereditary right, their defcent from the 
 gods, and the facred authority of the poets, who 
 were generally royalifts. The archons too were 
 often afraid of the fuperfiition of their people for 
 the king, and his regal popularity. But the legal 
 
 power
 
 Homsr, 233 
 
 power of the people was very far from being a 
 conftitutional check ; and the ftruggle lay be- 
 tween the kings and nobles. The lail finally pre- 
 vailed, as they ever will againft a king who is not 
 fuppo-ted by an adequate popular power. The 
 authority in Phaeacia was collected into one center, 
 and that center was thirteen kings confederated 
 together under a prefident only. Each archon 
 was a king in his own ifland, ftate, or diftri(fV, in 
 which his dignity and power were hereditary ; and 
 in cafe of a foreign war, he commanded his owa 
 dividon in the general camp. 
 
 Ulvfie'' is reprefented, at his firfl: entrance into 
 the Phgeacia.'i dominions, as obferving and admi- 
 ring the palaces of the archons, after having 
 furveyed the gardens, palace, and particular ter- 
 ritory of Alcinous ; 
 
 He next their princes lofty domes admires. 
 In feparate iQands crown'd with rifing fpires.' 
 
 Od. vii. 57.- 
 
 Alcinous is afterwards reprefented as defcrib- 
 ing the form of government to Ulyffcs : 
 
 Twelve princes in our realm dominion fhare. 
 O'er whom fjpreme imperial pow'r I bear. 
 
 Od, viii. 425. 
 
 Mr. Pope indeed, in this tranflation, has given 
 him the air of a Ibvereign ; but there is nothinfr 
 like it in the original. There Alcinous, with 
 all poITible fimplicity and modefty, only fays, 
 *' Twelve illuftrious kings, or archons^ rule over 
 *' the people, and I mylclf am the thirteenth.'* 
 Alcinous and his twelve archons were all prefent 
 at this interview : 
 
 Night
 
 2^4- Ancient Monarchical Republics'. 
 
 Night now approaching, in the palacTe iland. 
 With goblets crown'd, the rulers of the land, &c. 
 
 Od. viii. 182. 
 
 The nobles gaze, with awful fear oppreft ; 
 Silent they gaze, and eye the godlike gueft, &c. 
 
 Od. viii. 192. 
 
 Pleas'd with his people's fame the monarch hears. 
 And thus benevolent accofts the peers, &c. 
 
 Od. viii. 421. 
 
 Th* aiTenting peers, obedient to the king. 
 In hafte their heralds fend the gifts to bring. 
 
 Od. viii. 433. 
 
 The precious gifts th' illuftrious heralds bear. 
 And to the court th' embodied peers repair. 
 
 Od. viii. 453. 
 
 Then to the radiant thrones they move in ftate. 
 Aloft the king in pomp imperial fate. 
 
 Od. viii. 457. 
 
 We mufl not forget the poet, who with his 
 infpiration from the Mufes was a principal fup- 
 port of every Grecian king. It was the bard who 
 fung the praifes of the king, and propagated the 
 opinion that he was fprung from Jupiter, and 
 inftru6ted as well as dearly beloved by him. 
 
 The bard an herald guides ; the gazing throng 
 
 "ong. __ 
 Od. viii. 515. 
 
 Pay low obeifance as he moves along. 
 
 Beneath a fculptur'd arch he fits enthron'd. 
 The peers encircling form an awful round. 
 
 Lives
 
 Hmerl 235 
 
 Lives there a man beneath the fpacious Ikies, 
 IVho facred honours to the bard denies ? 
 The Mufe the bard infpires, exalts his mind; 
 The Mufe indulgent loves th' harmonious kind. 
 O more than man ! thy foul the Mufe infpires. 
 Or Phcebus animates u^ith all his fires. 
 
 Od. viii. 5ij2j 
 
 Every peer, in his own diftrifk or ftate, had 
 another fubordinate council, and a people ; fo 
 that the three powers, of the one, the few, and the 
 many, appeared in every archonfhip j and every 
 archon, in his own diftrid, claimed his office to be 
 hereditary in his family : and all the archons 
 agreed together to fupport each other in this 
 claim, even by arms. This, therefore, was rather 
 a confederacy of thirteen little kingdoms, than 
 one great one. The firft archon of the confedera- 
 tion was called king of all the people, and claimed 
 his office as hereditary, and often as abfolute. 
 The other archons were always difpofed to dif- 
 pute the hereditary defcent, and to make it elec- 
 tive. The fubordinate councils of the archons, 
 in their feveral diftridts, were probably often dif- 
 pofed to deny their offices to be hereditary, and 
 to infift upon eledions. Ulyiles, who was him- 
 felf one of the greateft and ableft of the Grecian 
 kings, difcovers his pertedl knowledge of the 
 hearts of Alcinous, his queen, and nobles, in the 
 compliment he makes them. Addrcffing him- 
 lelf to the queen, the daughter of great Rhexenor; 
 
 To thee, thy confort, and this royal train, 
 I To all that ffiare the bicffings of thy reign, 
 ^^ * ^ * ' ^ 
 
 So may the gods your better days increijfe, 
 And all youi" joys defcend on all your race ; 
 
 Sc
 
 236 Ancient Monarchical Republics. 
 
 So reign for ever on your country's brea(r. 
 Your people bleffing, by your people bleft. 
 
 This fupplication was addrefled to the king 
 and queen, the princes, archons, dukes, counts, 
 barons, peers, call them by what name you pleafe, 
 and it concludes with a compliment very flattering 
 to all. Ulyfles knew the ruling pafTion of Grecian 
 kings and nobles to be, that their dignities, even 
 fuch as had been conferred by the election of the 
 people, fhould become heredicary. Mr. Pope has 
 difguifed this fentiment, and made it conformable 
 to the notions of Englifhmen and Americans -, 
 but has departed from the fenfe of Homer, and 
 from the fact. 
 
 *' May you tranfmit to your children your 
 *' pofTelTions in your houfes, and v/hatever gifts, 
 *' rewards, or honours the people hath given 
 " you.'* 
 
 It is plain the kings claimed an hereditary rights 
 yet the fucceffion was fometimes fet afide in favour 
 of fome other noble, or branch of the royal blood: 
 and perhaps it was always fet afide when any one 
 of the nobles had more power than the heir appa- 
 rent. The nobles too claimed their honours to 
 be hereditary -, and they generally were fo : but 
 the people were fometimes bold enough to fet up 
 competitors, and give them trouble. But per- 
 haps there were never any very formal eledlions ; 
 prefenting a fucceffor, in prefence of the king and 
 the other nobles, to the people for their acclama- 
 tions, was probably the molt that was done : for 
 as there were no records, nor written conititution, 
 or laws, the right of kings, archons, and people^ 
 mull have been very loofe and undefined. 
 
 LETTER
 
 Homer, -237 
 
 LETTER XXXIX. 
 
 HOMER. 
 
 ITHACA. 
 
 Dear Sir, 
 
 THE court of Ithaca, in the abfence of Ulyf- 
 fcs, is an admirable example of the intrigues 
 of the archons, and their infatiable ambition. The 
 throne of Ithaca, and the fceptre of Laertes and 
 former kings, were the objefts which had fo many 
 charms in the eyes of the fuitors ; and Penelope*s 
 hand was chiefly courted, becaufe that would re- 
 concile the archon who Ihould pofiefs her to the 
 fuperftition of the people, and enable him to wield 
 the fceptre. The fuitors deny the fceptre to be 
 hereditary ; and Telemachus himfelf is doubt- 
 ful : he threatens indeed to call a council or af- 
 fembly of the people, but is afraid to truft them j 
 for fear they fhould fet up fome other Grecian 
 prince, whole blood might be nearer that of their 
 ancient kings. 
 
 To tempt the fpoufelefs queen with amorous 
 
 wiles, 
 Refort the nobles from the neighbouring ifles ; 
 From Samos, circled wirh th' Ionian main, 
 Dulichium, and Zacynthus' fylvan reign : 
 
 Ev'n, 
 
 5
 
 t^t Ancient Monarchical Republics. 
 
 Ev'n, with prefumptuous hope her bed t'afcend. 
 The lords of Ithaca their right pretend. 
 
 Od. i. 315. 
 
 My fentence hear: with ftern diflafte avow'd. 
 To their own diftrids drive the fuitor crowd. 
 
 Od. i, 352. 
 
 I to the peers aflembled fliall propofe 
 The firm refolve 1 here in few difclofe; 
 No longer live the cankers of my court. 
 All to your feveral Jlates with fpeed refort ; 
 Wafte in wild riot what your land allows. 
 There ply the early feall and late caroufe. 
 
 Od. i. 47^: 
 
 If ruin to our royal race ye doom. 
 Be you the fpoilers, and our wealth confume; 
 Then might we hope redrefs from jufter laws, 
 And raife all Ithaca to aid our caule: 
 . But while youf fons commit th' unpunilh'd 
 wrong, 
 You make the arm of violence too ftrong. 
 
 Od. ii. 83, 
 
 Ele6t by Jove his delegate of fway, 
 "With joyous pride the fummons I'd obey. 
 Should factious pow'r difpute my lineal right, 
 * * * * * 
 
 Some other Greeks a fairer claim may plead. 
 To your pretence their title would precede. 
 At kaft, the fceptre loft, I ftill fhould reign 
 Sole o'er my vaffals and domeftic train. 
 
 Od. i. 501.^ 
 
 Tq heaven alone 
 Refer the choice to fill the vacant throne ; 
 
 Your
 
 llcmer. 239 
 
 Yt)ur patrimonial ftates in peace poffefs. 
 Undoubted all your filial claim confefs : 
 Your private rigiit fhould impious power in- 
 vade. 
 The peers of Ithaca would arm in aid. 
 
 Od. i. ^og. 
 
 It is thus agreed on all hands, that, as one of the 
 archons, his hereditary title of his eftates, vaf- 
 fals, and government was indifputable. This 
 was the common caufe of all the archons, and' 
 they would arm in fupport of the claim of any 
 one. But the throne and fceptre of Ithaca were to 
 be difpofed of by augury, by the will of Jove, 
 fignified by fome omen. To this Telemachus 
 pays fome refped, but ftill infifts on his right of 
 blood ', and fays, that if the omen ll:iould be un- 
 favourable to him, it would not promote the 
 hopes of any of the archons of Ithaca; but fome 
 other Greeks, nearer of kin to the royal blood, 
 would fet up their claims. The archons, not 
 likely to fucceed in their fcheme of getting the 
 fceptre by the marriage of Penelope, nor by per- 
 fuading Telemachus to fubmit the queftion to 
 Jupiter and his omens, and afraid to appeal -to 
 the peopk% or to call them out in arms to dif- 
 pute the fucccflion, knowing the family of Laer- 
 tes and Ulyfies to be more popular than ihcm- 
 fclves, they take the rcfolution to allallinatc the 
 young prince. 
 
 . But die he fliall-, and, thus condemn'd to bleed. 
 Be now the fcene of inllant death decreed: 
 Wait ye till he to arms in council draws 
 The Greeks, avcrfc too juftly to our caufe ? 
 Strike, ere the Hates convca'd the foe betray. 
 Our murd'rous ambufli on the wat'ry way. 
 
 Or
 
 tj^O '^Anclent Monarchical Republics. 
 
 Or choofe yc vagrant from their rage to fiy, 
 Outcafts of earth, to breathe an unknown fky ? 
 But if fubmiffive you rengn the fway, 
 Slaves to a boy, go flatter and obeyj 
 Retire we inilanc to our native reign. 
 Nor be the wealth of kings confum'd in vain. 
 
 Od. xvi. 386. 
 
 Telemachus had before declared, that if any 
 archon of Ithaca, or any other Greek, obtained 
 the fceptre, he would no longer remain in the 
 confederation, but would reign feparately over 
 his paternal domain. Now Antinous declares, 
 that if the reft of the archons fubmit to the boy, 
 he will not, but will retire to his native archon- 
 Ihip. 
 
 Amphinomus afcends. 
 Who o'er Dulichium ftretch'd his fpacious reign, 
 A land of plenty, blefs'd with ev'ry grain. 
 O friends forbear, and be the thought with- 
 
 flood ! 
 'Tis horrible to fhed imperial blood ; 
 Confult we firft th' all -feeing pow'rs above. 
 And the fure oracles of righteous Jove. 
 
 Neither in Poland nor in Venice' was the arif- 
 tocratical rage to render weak, unfteady, and un- 
 certain the royal authority, more confpicuous 
 than it was here. They were afraid of the peo- 
 ple and the auguries ; but neither v/as a legal 
 check : and we fhall fee hereafter that thefe 
 llruggles of the archons very loon abolifiied every 
 monarchy in Greece, even that of Sparta, until 
 it was renewed upon anocher plan by Lycurgus. 
 And the fame progrefs of pafTions, through fedi- 
 tions, rebellions, and maHacres, n;uii for ever 
 
 take
 
 Plomei*. 241 
 
 take place in a body of nobles againft the crown, 
 where they are not effeftually reftrained by 
 an independent people, known and eftablifhed 
 in the iegiflature, colledliveiy or by reprefen- 
 tation. 
 
 That the Grecian kings, claiming from Jupi- 
 ter, and fupporced by their auguries and bards, 
 thought themfelves abfolute, and often punifhed 
 the crimes of the archons very tyrannically, is 
 true. Ulyfies is an example of it. Inftead of 
 bringing the fuitors to trial before the nation, 
 or their peers, he fhoots them all, without judge 
 or jury, with his own bow. A more remarkable 
 affertion of a claim to abfolute monarchy cannot 
 be imagined. 
 
 Antinous would retire to his native diftrifV,' 
 and fpend his revenues among his own people, 
 not confume his royal wealth by attendance at a 
 court of a confederation which would be no 
 longer to his talte. This was a popular fenti- 
 ment in his own dominions , his people wifhed 
 to have their kino- refide among; them^ and were 
 very willing to have the confederacy broken. 
 This principle it was that afterwards crumbled all 
 the Greek confederations to dult. 
 
 R LETTER
 
 242 Ancient Monarchical Republics. 
 
 LETTER XXXIX. 
 
 ANCIENT MONARCHICAL 
 REPUBLICS. 
 
 homer; 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 THE fimilitude between the ancient Greek 
 mcnarchies, as they are generally called, 
 though the predotrdnance of ariiiocracy in all cf 
 them is very tr.anifeft, and the feudal aridocracies 
 defcribed by Tacitus, is very obvious. Tltc de- 
 mocratical power is neverthelefs much more re- 
 gular, though not independent, in the latter :, 
 for, in addition to what is before quoted, it ap- 
 pears, tiiat the judicial authority was commonly 
 exercifed in national alTernblies " Licet aoud 
 ** concilium accufare quoque, et difcrimen capi- 
 tis intendcre. Diftindlio pcenarum ex deli($:to, 
 *' proditores ct transfugas arboribus fufpendunt j 
 *' ignavos, et imbellcs, et corpore infames, coeno 
 " ac palude, injecla infuper crate, mergunt. Di- 
 *' verlitas fuppiicii ilJuc refpicit, tanquam fce- 
 " lera oiiendi cpporteat dum puniuntur, flagiria 
 *' abfcondi. Scd et levioribus deliftis, pro modo 
 " pcsnarum, equorum pccorumque numero con- 
 " v'lt'd multantur; pars multx, regi vel civitati, 
 " pars ipfi qui vindicatur vel propincuis ejus ex- 
 " folvitur." 
 
 Although the mixture of monarchy, ariftocra- 
 cy, z:Yd democracy, is vinble in the republic of 
 
 rh:?:acia.
 
 Homer. 243 
 
 Phreaci."., vet the king appears little more amoiig 
 tiie archons than the lirft among equals, and the 
 authority of the people is ftill more faint and fee- 
 ble. In Ithaca, there appears a ftrong claim of 
 fovereicrnty in the king, and as flrong a preren- 
 fion to it in the archons ; and, although the peo- 
 ple are dreaded by both, and their claim to in- 
 terfere in' the difpofition of the crown is impli- 
 citly acknowledged, yet it feems to be as judges 
 of certain religious ceremonies, by which the will 
 of Jupiter was to be coUecled, than as any re- 
 guliir civil authority. 
 
 Homer was a royaliil, at Icafi; as much as Plato 
 and Ariftotle. 
 
 *' Jove loves our chief, from Jove his honour 
 
 fprings. 
 *' Beware ! for dreadful is the wrath of kings. 
 " Be filent, v'retch ! and think not here ai- 
 
 low'd 
 " That word of tyrants, an ufurping crowd : 
 
 To one fole monarch Jove commits the fway j 
 " His are the laws, and him let all obey. 
 
 //. ii. 233241. 
 
 The name of a republic is not found in any of 
 his writings : yet, in every Grecian goverimient 
 defcribcd by him, we find a mixture, not only 
 of an arillocracy, confilling in a council of 
 princes-, but of a democracy, in an ailcmbly of 
 the people. 
 
 Agamemnon, in the fccond Iliad, calls toge- 
 ther tlie v.'hole body. 
 
 Bid him in arms draw forth th' embattled train. 
 Lead all his Grecians to the dullv p!:.in. 
 
 R 2 The
 
 244- Ancient Monarchkal R epiihlics. 
 
 The king difpatch'd his heralds with command?- 
 To range the camp, and fummon all the bands. 
 The gath'ring hofts the monarch's word obey. 
 While to the fleet Atrides bends his way : 
 In his black fliip the Pylean prince he found. 
 There calls a fenate of the peers around. 
 Th* alTembly plac'd, the king of men exprell 
 The councils labouring in his artful brealt : 
 Friends and confed'rates ! with attentive ear 
 Receive my words, and credit what you hear; 
 111 fits a chief who mighty nations guides, 
 Dire(!:h in councils, and in war prefides. 
 To whom its fafety a whole people owes. 
 To wafle long nights in indolent repofe. 
 Now, valiant chiefs ! fince Heav'n itfelf alarms. 
 Unite, and roufe the fons of Greece to arms , 
 But firft with caution try what yet they dare, 
 "Worn with nine years of unfuccefsful war. 
 To move the troops to meafure back the main 
 Be mine, and yours the province to detain. 
 
 The kings without delay 
 
 DifTolve the council, and their chief obey. 
 The fcepter'd rulers lead; the following holl, 
 Pour'd forth by thoufands, darken all the coalt. 
 Nine facred heralds now, proclaiming loud 
 The monarch's will, fufpend the lift'ning crowd. 
 The king of kings his awful figure rais'd. 
 High in his hand the golden fceptre blaz'd 
 Ye fons of Mars ! partake your leader's care. 
 Heroes of Greece, and brothers of the war. 
 Fly, Grecians, fly ! your fails and oars employ, 
 And dream no more of Heaven-defended I'roy. 
 His deep defign unknown, the hofts approve 
 Atrides' fpeech j the mighty numbers move.
 
 Homer, 245 
 
 It appears from the whole narration, that the 
 great body of the people were difcontented, and 
 deftrous of raifing the fiege. The king, alarmed, 
 was obliged to call them together, with an artful 
 defign to obtain their confent to perfevere. He 
 feigns an intention to return home ; the people 
 were rejoiced at it. Then Ulyfles and the other 
 chiefs, in concert with Agamemnon, receives the 
 fceptre of command, and endeavours to perfuade 
 the people to make another effort. To this end 
 Ulyffcs harangues them. 
 
 He runs, he flies through all the Grecian train, 
 Each prince of name, or chief in arms ap- 
 proved, 
 He fir*d with praife, or with perfuallon mov*d.' 
 But if a clamorous vile plebeian rofe. 
 Him with reproof he check'd, or tam*d with 
 
 blows : 
 Be flill, thou fiave, and to thy better's yield. 
 Unknown alike in council or in field ! 
 Ye gods ! what daftards would our hofl com^ 
 
 mand ! 
 Swept to the war, the lumber of the land. 
 Be lilenr, wretch ! and think not here allow'd 
 That word of tyrants, an ufurping crowd. 
 With words like thele the troops Ulyfles rul'd. 
 The loudeft filenc'd, and the fierceft cool'd. 
 Back to th' afl^embly roll the thronging train, 
 Defert the fhips, and pour upon the plain. 
 Therfites only clamour'd in the throngs 
 Loquacious, loud, and turbulent of ton2:ue : 
 Aw'd by no fliame, by no rerpc(51: controuPd, 
 In fcandal bufy, in reproaches bold. 
 With witty malice ftudious to defame. 
 Scorn all his joy, and laughter all his aim : 
 
 K 3 But
 
 24^ Ancient Monarchical Repuhllcs. 
 
 But chief he gloried, with Iiceni:ious iiile 
 To lafli the grear, and monarchs to rcviie. 
 Spken to mankind his envious heart poxlcllj 
 And much he hated ali, but moll the beft ; 
 Ulylles or Achilles ftili his theme, 
 Vi'JX royal fcandal his delight lupreme. 
 Long had he iiv'd, the fcorn of ev'ry Greek, 
 Vext when he fpoke, yet ftill they heard hira 
 fpeak. 
 
 If from this onl;,', and the fubfequent harangue 
 of Therfites, we were to form a judgment, we 
 fhould conclude, that popular aiTcmbiies were 
 very frequent, and that the freedom of fpeech in 
 them was far advanced and well eftabliflied -, but 
 the furious anfwer of UlylTes, and the unmcrcifui 
 fio2:2;in2; he "ives him for his boklnefs, in the face 
 of the whole afiembly, which is applauded Ui;!- 
 verfally, fhews, that the demagogues had yet h\:x 
 very little influence, very litrie courage, and thai 
 popular alTeniblies had as yet very little co:irLi'.a- 
 tional power. 
 
 The principles of government were very l.'cilc 
 underitood, and all tlie political inftisutions ex- 
 tremely confufed, in the rimes of the Trojan War, 
 and from thence to Hom;er's time, Nothina- v/J3 
 precifeiy defined -, no laws v/ere v/rirten. TI:-": 
 moll diilincl rules, which arc wow to be traced, 
 were a luoremacv in kino-s, in n:lij;ion and war: 
 fom>ctimes they exercifed judicial power. Monar- 
 chies were generally herediiary \ yet a right of 
 the nation to interfere, and ah:cr the fucceilion, \i 
 admitted. The right of the ions of the ar;,ho;i3, 
 to fucceed to their ellatcs and difiridts, was an 
 agreed point among them ; but tliclc very arclions 
 ciiofe to keep open to competirion rhe fliccc'iion
 
 Homer, 247 
 
 to the throne, fo that there might always be room 
 for the pretenfions of the mod' powerful, who 
 would cafily make themfelves thought the moil 
 worthy. The moft celebrated kings, when ad- 
 vanced in years, and unable uo luftain tlie fatigues 
 of war, and cares of government, were obliged to 
 refign their power. The anxiety of Achilles, ex- 
 preiicd to UlyfTes in the ihadcs, is a proof of 
 this. 
 
 Say if my fire, the reverend Peleus, reigns 
 Great in his Pthia, and his throne maintains ? 
 Or, weak and old, my youthful arm demands 
 To fix the fceptre Itedfaft in his hands ? 
 Oh might the lamp of life re-kindled burn. 
 And death releale me from the filent urn ! 
 This arm, that thunder'd o'er the Phrygian 
 
 plain. 
 And Iweli'd the ground with mountains of the 
 
 ilain. 
 Should vindicate my injur'd father's fame, 
 Crulh the proud rebel, and affert his claim. 
 
 Od. ii. 60^, 
 
 Kings and their families, claiming their defcent 
 n:-.d power from Jupiter, contended very natu- 
 rally and confiilently that the one was heredi- 
 tary, and the other abfolute ; and accordingly, 
 v/hen the prince who fwayed the Iceptre was 
 active, brave, and able, he kept the archons in 
 :v.ve, and governed as he pleafed : but when he 
 was feeble, the archons grew ambitious, difputed 
 tiie fuccelfion, and limited tiie royal power. To 
 tl.is end both they and the kings, or heirs of 
 kings, lometimes looked to the people, and 
 fccmed to admit in them a right to be prefent 
 R 4 at
 
 'tjfi ^Ancient Monarchical Republics. 
 
 at the religious ceremonies by which the will of 
 Jupiter was to be declared ; for all parties agree, 
 that the will of Jupiter confers the fceptre, not 
 the mere eleftion of the people. 
 
 The right of primogeniture was favoured by 
 popular opinion, as well as hereditary defcent, 
 becaufe the family was the family of Jupiter, re- 
 lated to him, and defcended from him by blood; 
 and it was natural to fuppofe, that Jupiter's in- 
 clinations for defcent and primogeniture refembled 
 thofe of other fathers of families. 
 
 The chiefs, who are all called kings, as well 
 as the head of them, or archons, were like the 
 Teutonic counts or feudal barons, who exercifed 
 royal rights within their own diftrifts, flates, or 
 feparate territories. This principle preferved the 
 real and legal power chiefiy in their hands, and 
 conftitu-.ed the whole government more properly 
 an ariftocracy than a royalty. This gave an un- 
 controulable pride to thefe nobles, which could 
 not willingly fubmit to the pretenfions of the 
 kings (as reprefentatives of Jupiter) to omnipo- 
 tence, at lead to unlimited pov/er. Hence the 
 continual ftruggle between the kings and archons, 
 from Homer's time to that great and memora- 
 ble revolution throughout Greece, from monar- 
 chy to ariftocracy; that is, from kmgs to archons. 
 The people not yet poffefling nor claiming an 
 authority fufRciently regular and independent to 
 be a check to monarchy or ariftocracy, the latter 
 at laft prevailed over the former, as it ever did 
 and ever v/il], where the conteft is merely between 
 thefe two. 
 
 The people, only in extraordinary cafes, in the 
 moft eliential matters, and when the chiefs were 
 gfpatly divided, were at all confulted ; yet, in the 
 
 courle
 
 Homer I 24^ 
 
 courfe of the ftruggle between the kings and ar- 
 chons, the multitude were fo often called upon, 
 and fo much courted, that they came by degrees 
 to claim the whole power, and prepared the 
 way, in many of the Grecian dates, for another 
 fubfequent revolution, from ariftocracy to demo- 
 cracy. 
 
 Through the whole of Tacitus and Horner^ 
 the three orders are vifible both in Germany and 
 Greece -, and the continual flu6luations of law, 
 the uncertainty of life, liberty, and property, and 
 the contradidory claims and continual revolu- 
 tions, arofe entirely from the want of having the 
 prerogatives and privileges of thofe orders defined, 
 from the want of independence in each of them^ 
 ^nd a balance between them. 
 
 LETTER XL: 
 
 Ancient aristocratical 
 republics. 
 
 Lacedtemoj^, 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 FROM the days of Homer to thoTe of Licur* 
 gus, the governments in Greece were mo-, 
 narchicai in name and pretenfion, but ariftocra* 
 tical in reality. The archons were impatient of 
 regal government, conftantly ftruggling againft 
 their kings , and had prevailed in every other city, 
 
 except
 
 2^0 Ancient Arifiocratical Republics. 
 
 except Sparta, to aboli fn the royal authority, and 
 fubilitute an ariftocracy of archons in its place. 
 In Laceda^mon, too, where there were eight-and- 
 tv/enty archons contending againft two kings, tiiey 
 had brought the whole country into the urmoil 
 confufion. The circumftance of two kings, 
 which perhaps prolonged the regal power longer 
 in Sparta than in any other city, originated in the 
 fondnefs of a mother. Ariiiodemus, one of the 
 defcendants of Hercules, to whofe fnare Laconia 
 fell, upon the divifion of the Peloponnefus, after 
 the return of that family from banilliment, leaving 
 twin fons, Eurifthenes and Procles j their mother 
 refufing to determine which had the right of pri- 
 mogeniture, it v/as agreed that both Ihould fuc- 
 ceed to the crown with equal authority, and that 
 the pofterity of each fhould inherit. The nobles 
 took advantage of all the jealounes which aroie 
 between the two famJlies, obliged each to court 
 them, and from time to time to mmke them con- 
 ceffions, until the royal authority was loft ; .-.nd 
 as the archons could not agree, each party now 
 began to court the people, and univerfal anarchy 
 prevailed. 
 
 Lycurgus, of the family of Procles, and only 
 in the tenth defcent from Hercules, fucceeded his 
 brother Polideftes ; but being told his brother's 
 widov/ was with child, he declared himfelf pro- 
 teclor only, and refigned the crown. Such a dif- 
 interefted indifference to a crown in any one of 
 royal or noble blood, was fo unexampled in that 
 age, that no wonder it was much admired and 
 very popular. The ambitious princefs, his filler, 
 offered to marry him, and remove out of his v.'ay 
 the only competitor, by procuring an abortion. 
 He deceived lier by counterfeited tendernefs ; and 
 diverted her from the thoughts of an abortion, by 
 
 prominn;.^;
 
 Laced^emcn. 251 
 
 promifing to take the difpofition of the child up- 
 on himlclt when it (hould be born. The infant 
 was lent to him, when at Tapper with the principal 
 magifcrates: he took it in his arms, and cried, "A 
 " king, Spartans, is born to you," and placed it 
 in his own I'eat. The company were touched at the 
 tenderncls ot the fcene, and fell into a tranTporc 
 of enthufiaim, both of piety to the blood of Her- 
 cules, and admiration of the difinterefted integrity 
 of Lycurgus, who, like an able flatefman, per- 
 petuates the memory of the event, and the joy at 
 it, by the name with which, upon the fpot, he 
 chrillens the boy, Ciiarilaus, the peoples joy. But 
 all this exalccd merit, added to nis aci^nowledged 
 divine defcent, and the undoubted poiTcffion of 
 royal power, were not fufficient to ovcr-avvc the 
 jealouiy of the nobles, a ilrong parry of whom 
 joined the irritated c]ueen and her broth'.^r, and 
 railed continual factions againll him. Weary of 
 cabals, and fcimulated with a thirfh for knowledge, 
 he determined to travel ; vifited Crete and Eo;vpt, 
 the two Iburces of the theology and pohcy of 
 Greece i and brought home wirh him, on his re- 
 vwn to his own country, Thak^s the poet, and 
 the writings of IJomer, with the refoiution of 
 adopting the martial difcipline and political liber- 
 ty whiCii he read in the poet, and had leen cxrrn- 
 plif;cd in Cre:e. Nothing could be better cal- 
 cukued than his two poets, to infpire the nation 
 witii ti.at enthuliafm which he wanted, and con- 
 firm tiie belief, that kings were from Jupiter, and 
 beloved by him, ex-.ejning the reip;;nle of the 
 oracle, vvhich he took care to procure : " VVel- 
 con-;c, Lycurg'js, to th.is liappy place ; thou 
 tavourite of Heaven ! 1 itanu in dcjubt whetiier 
 I ihaii pron()U[ice ihee god or man : mclining 
 
 iliii to thiniv uhuu art a god ! " Herodotus. 
 
 The
 
 252 Ancient Arijlocratical Republics. 
 
 The diforders in Sparta were now become infiip- 
 portable ; the kings had as little authority as the 
 laws. All parties, except the tv/o kings, in de- 
 fpair of their private fchemes, applied to the great 
 legiflator, pointed out to all, by his divine origi- 
 nal, the infpiration of Homer and Thales, his 
 own integrity, wifdom, knowledge, and com- 
 manding authority over the minds of men, as 
 well as his fpecial divine mifHon pronounced by 
 the oracle, to be the only man capable of new- 
 jnodelling the conftitution. 
 
 In Crete he had acquired a deep infight into 
 human nature, at lead he had informed himfelf 
 fully of the length and breadth, the heighth and 
 depth, of the pafTion of ambition in the human 
 heart -, that complication of affections, which is 
 called by fo many names j the love of efteem, of 
 praife, of fame, of glory ; that fenfe of honour ir\ 
 which Montefquieu tells us monarchies are found- 
 ed; which Tacitus tells us made the ancient Teu- 
 tons fubmit quietly to be fold by their inferiors, 
 when they had gambled away their liberty, which 
 at this day enforces fo punctual a payment of 
 debts of honour contracted at play *, which fup- 
 ports againft all laws throughout Europe the 
 cuftom of duelling, and produces more fuicides 
 than any other caufe; which is commonly known 
 by the denomination of the point of honour^ and 
 may with as much propriety be called ambition , 
 Lycurgus appears to have underitood better than 
 any other legiQator, and to have made the founda- 
 tion of his inititution : for this reafon, Plato with 
 great propriety calls it " The ambitious Re- 
 public." 
 
 Lycurgus in fecret confulted the nobles, but 
 not the kings , formed a powerful party, called 
 an. affembly of the people, before whom his friends 
 
 appeared
 
 Lacedismon. 255 
 
 appeared in arms. Charilaus and Archllans were 
 not in the fecrer, but found themfelves obliged to 
 lubmit. What is all this but a body of nobles 
 completing, by the aid of Lycurgus, that aboli- 
 tion of monarchy which they had been purfuing 
 for ages,, unreftrained by any legal check in the 
 people, and unrefifted by any adequate power in 
 the crown ? But what was his new inflitution ? 
 
 In compliance with old prejudices, and from 
 attachment to his family, he confirmed the two 
 faniilies on the throne, eftablilhed the hereditary 
 defcent of the crown, but limited its authority. 
 The kings were to continue high priefts, to be 
 commanders in chief of the armies, and prefidents 
 of the fenate. Charilaus and Archilaus, terrified 
 by the fate of all the other kings of Greece, 
 agreed to accept of a certain, though limited au- 
 thority, in lieu of pretenfions more abfolute, and 
 more precarious. 
 
 The ancient dignities of the nobles were con- 
 firmed and enlarged: a fcnate of eight-and-twenty 
 of their chiefs was formed, at the head of whom 
 the two kings were placed. To the people he 
 committed the election of future fenators : but as 
 the prefent twenty-eight were for life, and the 
 influence of kings and fenators would be com- 
 monly ulcd with great unanimity, in favour of 
 the eldeft fon, to fill up a vacancy made by the 
 death of iiis lather ; and as tlie people were noc 
 permitted to debate, their choice was perhaps 
 little more than a confent by acclamations to a 
 nomination made by the king, and amounted to 
 the fame thing with an hereditary houfe of peers. 
 To this fcnate the whole executive power was 
 committed, and the molt important part of the 
 leQ-iQative ; for as all laws were to originate there 
 only, they had a negative before debate. Here 
 
 is
 
 254 Ancient Arijiocratlcai Republics. 
 
 is indeed all authority nearly collefled into one 
 center, and that center the nobility, for the king 
 was but the firft among equals, having no nega- 
 tive upon the fenate. It the legiflature had refted 
 here, his inititution would have been in effedt 
 a fimple hereditary oligarchy, pofitfTed of the 
 whole legifl^tive, executive, and judicial pov/er, 
 and probably as reillefs as ever, to reduce the 
 kings 'to elections for life, or years, and then 
 to take from them the power of religion, the 
 command of armies, and then to change the 
 title from king to archon, or from the family of 
 Hercules to other houfes. Wirh a view to counter- 
 balance this dangerous authority, he inftituted 
 affemblies of the people, but intruited them only 
 with the power of confirming or rejecting v/hat the 
 fenate propofed, and expreisly forbade them all 
 debate. The citizens were to give their fimple 
 ayes or noes, without being allowed to fpeak, even 
 Jo far as to give a reafon for their vote. He in- 
 ftituted moreover, as a farther check upon the 
 fenate, five magiilrates to infpecl the adminiftra- 
 tion, and maintain the conftitution ; to convoke, 
 prorogue, and diilblve both the greater aifembly 
 of the people, compofed of nine thoufand inhabi- 
 tants of the city, and the lefTer, confifting of 
 thirty thoufand inhabitants of the country or infe- 
 rior villages. Thefe magiftrates v/ere called the 
 ephori, and vv'ere to be annually appointed. But 
 the lawgiver faw that the king and people were 
 both too wenk, and the fenate would ftill have 
 power to fcramble after both ; he therefore con- 
 trived a kind of folemn alliance to' be perpetually 
 renewed between x'nc. mop^archical and democrat!- 
 cal branches, by v/iiich the ienate might be awed 
 into moderation. He ordered an oath to be taken 
 every month, by the kings and the ephori : the 
 
 former
 
 Laced<mon. 255 
 
 former fwore to obferve the laws, and the latter 
 iv;ore, for themfelves and the people whom they 
 reprelcnted, to maintain the hereditary honours 
 of the race of Flerciiles, to revere them as minif- 
 tcrs of religion, to obey them as judges, and fol- 
 low them as leaders. This was indeed a balance 
 founded in opinion and in religion, though not a 
 legal and independent check ; as it was not a ne- 
 gative in either. In this conditution then were 
 three orders, and a balance, not indeed equal to 
 that of England, for want of a negative in each 
 branch ; but the nearefi; refembling it of any we 
 have yet feen. The kings, the nobles, the fenate, 
 and the people in two aflemblies, are furely more 
 orders than a governor, fenate, and houfe. The 
 balance here attempted was as ftrong as religion 
 operating on human nature could make it, though 
 not equivalent to a negative in each of three 
 branches. Another balance was attempted, in the 
 rigorous feparation of the city from the country, 
 in tv/o aifemblies : it avoided the danger of jea- 
 loufies between town and country in the delibera- 
 tions of the people, and doubled the chances both 
 of the monarchy and democracy, for preferving 
 their importance in cafe of incroachments by the 
 fenate. If the fenate and nobles iliould prevail in 
 one affembly of tlie people fo far as to carry ?.ny 
 unconilitwfional point, the k'ngs and cphori 
 would find a refource in the other, to lead them 
 back. The Lacedaemonian republic may then, 
 v.-ith propriety, be called monarchical, and had 
 the three tfrenti:.! parts of the bell poffible go- 
 vernment , it was a mixure of monarchy, arillo- 
 cracy, and democracy. h failed, however, in 
 th.at elTential particular, tlie balance. The arifto- 
 cracy had a legil power, fu eminent above that 
 cr king or people, that it would loon have annihi- 
 q lated
 
 2^6 Ancient Arifiocraiical Repuhlicsl 
 
 lated both, if other precautions had not been 
 taken, which deftroyed all the real merit of this 
 celebrated inftitution. That the glory of the 
 defcendants of Hercules, and of their republic, 
 Hiight be the pride of every citizen, and that a 
 fuperftitious atattachment to both might be perpe- 
 tuated, it was neceflary to extinguilh every other 
 appetite, pafTion, and afFeftion, in human nature. 
 The equal divifion of property ; the banifhment 
 of gold and filver ; the prohibition of travel, and 
 intercourfe with flrangers; the prohibition of arts, 
 trades, and agriculture ; the difcouragement of 
 literature , the public meals , the incelTant war- 
 like exerciles ; the doflrinc, that every citizen was 
 the property of the Hate, and that parents fhould 
 not educate their own children \ although they 
 ferved to keep up the conftant belief of the divine 
 mifiion of Lycurgus, and an cnthufiaftic paffion 
 for the glory of the republic, and the race of Her- 
 cules i and although they are celebrated by the 
 ariftocratical philolbphers, hiftorians, and flatef- 
 men of antiquity ; muft be confidered as calcu- 
 lated to gratify his own family pride, rather than 
 promote the happinefs of his people. Four hun- 
 dred thoufand Haves m.uft be devoted to forty 
 thcufand citizens i weak and deformed children 
 muft be expofed -, morality and humanity, as well 
 as all the comforts, elegancies, and pleafures of 
 life, muft be facrificed to this glaring phantom of 
 vanity, fuperftition, and ambition. Separated 
 from the reft of mankind, they lived together, 
 deftitute of all bufinefs, pleafure, and amuiemenr, 
 but war and politics, pride and ambition ; and 
 thefe occupations and pafiions they tranfmitted 
 from generation to generation, for feven hundred 
 years i as if fighting and intriguing, and not life 
 and happinefs* were the end of man, and fociety ; 
 4 as
 
 Lacedamon. 257 
 
 as If the love of one's country, and of glory, were 
 amiable paffions, when not limited by jiiftice and 
 general benevolence ; and as if nations w^re to 
 be chained together for ever, merely that one 
 family might reign among them. Whether Ly- 
 CLirgus believed the defcent of his anceftor from 
 Jupiter, the divine inff)iration of Homer and 
 Thales, or the divinity of the Oracle, aoy more 
 than Mahomet beiicv^i'd his divine million, may 
 well be doubted. Whether he did or not, he 
 fliackled the Spartans to tlie ambitious views 
 of his family for fourteen fucceffion-; of Herculeaa 
 kings, at the cxpence of the continual 'JifLurh' mce 
 of all Greece, and the conftanc miiery of nis own 
 people. Amidft the conrradiclions of ancient and 
 modern writers, that account has been followed 
 concerning the inllitution of the ephori, vvhich 
 appears moll favourable to Lycurgus. The Ro- 
 man tribunes, and perhaps the Venetian inquiii- 
 tors, were borrowed from this inllitution. 
 
 Human nature perifhed under this frigid fyf- 
 tem of national and family pride. Population, 
 the furefl indication of national happinefs, de- 
 creafed fo fad, that not more than one thoufand 
 old Spartan families remained, v/hile nine thoufand 
 flrangers had intruded in fpite of all their prohi- 
 bitory laws. The conqueft of Athens gave them 
 a tade of wealth, and even the fear of the penalty 
 of death could not rellrain them from travcllinor. 
 Intercourfc with llrano-ers brouQ-ht in foreign 
 manners. The ephori were fomctimes bribed. 
 Divifions arole bccwecn the two l<in/s, Agis and 
 Leonidas : one joined with the people, the other 
 with the nobks, and the fedition procieden to 
 blood. Kings became (o tond of lu' Itiie^ tVom 
 foreign powers, tliat Agefilaus received tiiem i r;im 
 a king of Kgypt, and his enemy at tl:e lame 
 
 S time.
 
 258 Ancient Arijlocratical Repuhlics] 
 
 time. Agis was murdered by the order of the 
 ephori, who, inftead of honouring the blood of 
 Hercules according to their oath, took the fove- 
 reign power into their own hands. Here the ba- 
 lance broke ; Cleomenes, who endeavoured like 
 Agis to reftore the old laws and maxims, fell a 
 facrifice, and nothing appears afterwards in the 
 hidory of Sparta but profligacy, tyranny, and 
 cruelty, lii<:e that in Rome under the word of the 
 Csfars. 
 
 The inftitutJon of Lycurgus was well calcu- 
 lated to prcfcrve the independence of his country, 
 but had no regard to its happinefs, and very lit- 
 tle to its liberty. As the people's confent was ne- 
 ceffary to every law, it had lo far the appearance 
 of political liberty : but the civil liberty of it was 
 little better than that of a man chained in a dun- 
 geon ; a liberty to reil as he is. The influence of 
 this boafted ies:iflation on the human character 
 was to produce warriors and politicians, and no- 
 thing elfe. To fay that this people were happy, is 
 to contradicl every quality in human nature, ex- 
 cept ambition. They had no other gratification : 
 fcience and letters were facrificed, as well as com- 
 merce, to the ruling pafllon -, and Milton had no 
 reafon to " wonder how mufelels and unbookifli 
 " they v/ere, minding nought but the feats of 
 *' war," fince it was not fo much becaufe Ly- 
 curofus was " addidfed to elegant learnino-, or 
 " to mollify the Spartan furlmeis with imooth 
 " fongs and odes, the better to plant among 
 *' them law and civility," that he brought the 
 fcattered works of Komer from Ionia, and Thales 
 from Crete, but merely to propagate his own and 
 his fam.ily impoflure. The plan was profound, 
 and means were with great ability fitted to the 
 end : but as a lyftem of legiflation, which fhould 
 
 never
 
 Lacedtemon, 259 
 
 neve'f have any other end than the greateft happi- 
 nefs of the greateft number, faving to all their 
 rights^ it was not only the leatl relpedable, but 
 the moft deteftable in all Greece. To do it jul- 
 tice, however, it is much to be defired, that ex- 
 crcifes like thofe eftablifned by Lycurgus, run- 
 ning, wreftling, riding, fwimming, fcating, fenc- 
 ing, dancing, fhould be introduced into pub- 
 lic and private education in America, which 
 would fortify the bodies and invigorate the minds 
 of youth; inftead of thofe fedentary amufements 
 wiiich debilitate, and are taking entire polTeflion 
 of fociety all over the world. The ladies too 
 might honour fome of tliefe entertainments, though 
 not all, with their prefence and participation, to 
 the great advantage of their own health, and that 
 of polterity, without injury to their charms, or 
 their reputations. Bur, above all, the exiftence 
 of an all-perfect Intelligence, the parent of nature, 
 the wife and moral ruler of it ; the relponfibility 
 of every fubordinate intelled:ual and moral agent; 
 a future ftate of rewards and punifhments -, and 
 the facred obligations of oaths, as well as of the 
 relative duties of fecial life, cannot be too clear- 
 ly Bxed by rational arguments in the minds of 
 all the citizens. In this refpe(5l Lycurgus merits 
 praife. 
 
 But as a civil and political conftitution, taken all 
 together, it is infinitely inferior to another, which 
 Americans have taken for their model. The 
 Knglifii confticution is the refult of the moft ma- 
 ture deliberation on univerfal hiftory and philo- 
 lophy. If Harrington's council of legiflators had 
 read over the hillory, and iludied the conftitution 
 of every nation ancient and modern, remarked 
 the inconveniences and deteds of each, and bent 
 the wliole force of their invention to difcover a 
 S 2 remedy
 
 26o Ancient Bemccratical Republics. 
 
 remedy for it, they would have produced r,o 
 other regulations, than thofe of the Englifii 
 conftitution in its theory, unlefs they had found a 
 people fo circumftanced as to be able to bear an- 
 nual eleclions of the king and fenate. This im- 
 provement the Americans, in the prefent ftage of 
 Ibciety among them, have ventured on ; fenfible, 
 however, of the danger, and knowing perfeclly 
 well a remedy, in cafe their ele6lions fhould be- 
 come turbulent. Of this, at prefent^ there is no 
 appearance. 
 
 LETTER XLI. 
 
 ANCIENT DEMOCRATiCAL 
 REPUBLICS. 
 
 ATHENS, 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 CECROPS, an Egyptian, condufred a cobn/ 
 that fettled in Athens, and firft engaged the 
 wandering fliepherds and hunters of Attica to 
 unite in villages of hufbandmen. Although the 
 government of Esiypt was an abfolute monarchy, 
 he found it necefiary to eftablifh his own upon a 
 more limited plan. 
 
 The two rival families of Perfeus and Pelops, 
 anciently contended for the dominion of the Gre- 
 cian peninfula. The fortune of the defcendants of 
 the latter prevailed, and their fuperior profperity 
 led them to perfecute their enemies. The de- 
 fcendants of Hercules, who was a fon of Jupiter 
 by Alcmena, of the line of Perfeus, was ftripped 
 of all their pofleflions, and driven into exile. Af- 
 ter a feries of misfortunes, TemenuSj Crefphon- 
 
 tes.
 
 Athens. 261 
 
 tes, and Arlftodemus, defcendants in the fifth de- 
 gree from Hercules, conduced an expedition into 
 Greece, and conquered the whole country. 
 
 The governments of the little ftates of Greece 
 in the firft ages, though of no very regular and 
 certain conftitution, were all limited monarchies. 
 When, therefore, the Heraclides pofiefTed them- 
 felves of Peloponnefus, they eftabliflied every 
 where that hereditary limited monarchy, which 
 was fche only government affimilated to the ideas 
 and temper of the age, and an equality among 
 themlelves. Thofe vigorous principles of arifto- 
 cracy, and fome traces of the fpirit of democracy, 
 which had always exifted in the Grecian govern- 
 ments, began to ferment ; and in the courfe of a 
 few ages monarchy was every v^/here aboliflied : 
 the very name of king was profcribed ; a repub- 
 lic was thought the only government to which it 
 became men to fubmit \ and the term Tyrant was 
 introduced to denote thofe who, in oppofition to 
 thefe new political principles, acquired monarchi- 
 cal authority. Abiblute monarchy was unknov;:i 
 as a legal conftitution. The title of king implied 
 a fuptriority of lawful dignity and authority in 
 one perfon, above all others, for their benefit, not 
 a right ot ablolute power. Legiilation was never 
 witiiin their prerogative. A dilliudion of fami- 
 lies into thole of liigiier and lower r.inlv obtained 
 very early throu;;h()ut Greece, and no where 
 more tlian at Athens, where, bv tiie conllitution 
 of Tiiefeus, the EupiitriJes, or nobly born, formed 
 a diiLinct order of the Race v/ith great privileges. 
 Atccrwards wea't'i b;:;came the principal crite- 
 rion of rank, wliich amounted probably to the 
 fame thing, as the nobiy born were generally mod 
 wealcliy. Every eiciz.'n \w every Grecian (late 
 was bound to military fervice, as in modern times 
 
 S ::; amone:
 
 262 Ancient Democraikal P^epuhlics. 
 
 among the feudal kingdoms. It was natural that 
 the rich fhould ferve on horfeback -, and this was 
 the origin of knighthood both in ancient and 
 modern nations. Where the noble or the rich 
 held all the pov/er, they called their own govern- 
 ment ariftocracy, or government of the better 
 fort, or optimacy, government of the bed fort. 
 The people allowed the aopcllation of ariPcocracy 
 only to thofe governments where perfons, elected 
 by themfelves for their merit, held the principal 
 power. Democracy figiiified a government by 
 all the freemen of the ftate, or the people at 
 large, forming in aflembly the legal, ablblute 
 fovereign : but as this, above all others, was fub- 
 je6t to irregularity, confufion, and ablurdity, 
 when unchecked by fome balancing povver lodged 
 in fev^er hand?, it was called ochlocracy, or mob 
 rule. Muft of the Grecian itates had iome mix- 
 ture of tv/,) or more of the fe forms. Tlie mixtuie 
 of oligarchy and fiernocracy, in which the tormer 
 was fuperivjr, yet the latter fufficed to fecure liber- 
 ty and equal right to the people, might, according 
 to AriRotle, be called arii^ccracy. I'hat mixture 
 where the democratic pov.cr prevailed, yet was in 
 fome degree balanced by authority lodged in 
 fteadier hands, is diftinguirned by that great au- 
 thor by the name of polity. An equal mixture 
 of all three v;as never known in Greece, and there- 
 fore never obtained a diitincc name in chat lan- 
 guage. 
 
 A war happened between the Athenians and 
 Peloponnefians ; the armies wee ei^.^aniped near 
 each other, and the Delphian oracle was con- 
 fuked. The anf-vver of the Pythonei's implied, that 
 the Peloponnefians would be vidoriou.s, provided 
 they did not kill the Athenian king. Codrus dif- 
 guifUig himiclf like a clown, with a faggot on his 
 
 Ihoulder,
 
 Athens, 263 
 
 fhoulder, and a fork in his hand, determined to 
 devote his life, entered the enemy's camp, and 
 was killed. The Peloponnefian chiefs finding the 
 body to be Codrus, and fearing the prophecy, 
 withdrew their forces, and a peace enfued. Me- 
 don, the eldeft Ion of Codrus, wc;s lame; and bo- 
 dily ability was held in fo high rank in popular 
 efteem, that his younger brother difputed the fuc- 
 cefllon. Each had a powerful party, but the dif- 
 pute brought forward a third, which was for aho- 
 lifhing the royalty, and having no king but Ju- 
 piter. Fatal diflenfions were apprehended, wlien 
 a declaration of the oracle was procured in favour 
 of Medon ; and it was amicably accommodated 
 that IMedon (hould be firft magiftrate, with title 
 of archon, but not king. Although the honour 
 was to be hereditary, and that the archon fhould 
 be accountable to the afiembly of t!ie people for 
 his adminirtration, it was agieed that a colony 
 ihould be fent to Afia Minor, under Nelius and 
 Androclus, younger fons of Codrus, The moit 
 reltiefs fpirits joined in the migration, and no fur- 
 ther materials for hiitory remain for fcveral gene- 
 rations. 
 
 From the period where Homer's hillory ceafes, 
 to that in whicii the firft profe hiilorians lived, a 
 fpace of 250 years, there is little light to be ob- 
 tained. Twelve archons are named, who followed 
 Medon by liereditary lucccfriun, and filled up 300 
 years. On the death ot Alcmcon, Charops was 
 railed to the archonfliip, upan condition of holding 
 it for ten years only. Six archons followed Cha- 
 rops, by appointment, tor ten years \ but on the 
 expiration of the archonlhipot Eryxias, it was re- 
 folved that the otnce fliould be annual, and that 
 there fhould be nine perlons to execute it. 7'hey 
 had not all equal dignity, nor the fame fundions : 
 
 S 4 one
 
 2^4 .Ancient Dcmccraticd Repuhlicsl 
 
 one reprefented the majefty of the ftate, and was 
 ufualiy called the archon ; the fecond had the title 
 of king, and was head of the church ; the pole- 
 march was third, and chief of military affairs. The 
 other fix had the title of thcimoihc^crs ; they pre- 
 fided as judges in ordinary ccuris of juftice. The 
 Tiine together formed the council of fi.ate : here 
 methinks I fee the Poiifh nobles running covvn 
 the king, or thofe of Venice tlie doge, and di- 
 viding the fpoils of his prerogatives among 
 themfiilves. Legiflation was in the afiembiy 
 of the people j but the whole adminifLraticn, 
 civil, military, religious, and judiciary, was with 
 the archons, who were commonly appointed by 
 lot ', but fometimes the affembly of the people 
 interfered, and exercifed the power of naming 
 them. From the appointment of annual archons 
 there was nothing but inteftine troubles. That 
 weight which, from earlieft times, a few principal 
 families poiTeiTed among the Attic people, and 
 which was in a o-reat degree confirmed to them 
 by the conliitution of Thefeus, remained, amid 
 all the turbulence of democracy, to a late period. 
 Among thofe families th^e Alcm2on;des, claiming 
 fome connection by blood with the perpetual ar- 
 chons and kings of the ancient Neleid line, were 
 of great fame. Megacles, head of this family, 
 was archon when Cylon, a man of a very ancient 
 and powerful family, attempted to acquire the 
 fovereignty of his country. He feized the citadel 
 of Athens with fome troops he rc^ceived fro:n 
 Theagerus, tyrant of I^.icgara, whofc daughter he 
 had married. Flis vanity w.is excited not only 
 by his birth and marriage, but his perfonal m.erir, 
 having been victor in a cliariot race at the Olympic 
 games. The people ran to arms under their ar- 
 chons, and laid feigc to tlie citadel. Cylon fled.
 
 Athens. 265 
 
 and his party fled to the altars : they were pro- 
 mifed pardon, but condemned and executed. 
 This was an atrocious infidelity, and made the 
 adtors in it as odious, as it rendered Cylon and 
 his party again popular and powerful. 
 
 The miieries of a fludluating jurifprudence be- 
 came infufferable, and all parties united at laft in 
 the refoiution to appoint a lawgiver. Draco was 
 raifed to this important oliice ; a man whofe mo- 
 rals and integrity recommended him to the peo- 
 ple, but whofe capacity was equal to no im- 
 provement in the political conilitution, and to no 
 greater invention for reforminij; the judicatures, 
 than that of infliding capital punifnments m all 
 offences : and the knowing ones had no other 
 remedy than to get the oracle lo pronounce that 
 the laws of Draco were written in blood ; an ex- 
 preffion which ftruck the imagination and touch- 
 ed the heart, and therefore foon rendered this fyf- 
 tem unpopular. 
 
 Salamis, perceiving the divifions at Athens, re- 
 volted, and allied itielf to Megara. Several at- 
 tempts to recover it having failed, the lower peo- 
 ple, m oppofition to their chiefs, carried a law, 
 making it capital to propofe a renewal of tiie en- 
 terprize. Solon, of an ancient royal famiiy, who 
 had hitherto purfued nothing but literature and 
 poetry, perceiving tiiat this raih act of tiie popu- 
 lace began to give general difgud and repeni:..nce, 
 efpecially to the young Atlienians, ventured to 
 lead the people to repeal it. He cauied it to be 
 reported that he was mad, and for fome time kept 
 his houfe : in this retirement he compofed a \) lem, 
 fuch as he thought would excite the mukMide-, 
 then watching his op[)ortunity, during an affem- 
 bly of the people, he ran into the Agora like one 
 
 frantic.
 
 266 Ancient Democratical Republics. 
 
 frantic, mounted on a rock, and read his poem 
 to the people. Some of his friends, who were 
 in the fecrer, were prcfent, and ready to wonder 
 and applaud. The enthufiafm fpread, the law 
 was repealed, and an expedition fent under So- 
 lon's friends, which, being fi-riifully conducled, 
 recovered the ifland. But the party of Cvlon 
 were dill clamorous againft the partifans of Me- 
 gacles, for their breach of faith. Solon perfuad- 
 ed the accufed tfi fubmit to a trial : they were 
 condemned to banifhment , but this punifhment 
 not being fufficient to appeafe the deity, the bones 
 of thole who had been executed were removed be- 
 yond the mountains. During thefs troubles Sa~ 
 lamis was retaken. Superftition now gained the af- 
 cendant-, phantoms and omens were feen, and expia- 
 tions and purifications were neceffary. Kpimenides, 
 a Cretan philofopher, of great reputation for reli- 
 gious knowledge, and an intimate friend of Solon, 
 was invited to Superintend the religion of Athens. 
 Epimenides was the odenfible diredor, but So- 
 lon concerted with him the various improvements 
 in jurifprudence. By means of religious pomp, 
 ceremony, facrifices, and procefJions, he amuied 
 the people into fome degree of order and fufpcn- 
 lion of their faftions : but the tranquillity was 
 rot likely to be lafting. Three political parries 
 exiflcd : one for democracy, compofed of the land- 
 holders of the mountains; anotlicr for an arifto- 
 cracy, of the rich, confifting of the poffciTors of 
 the plain , a third preferred a mixture ot" oligar- 
 chy and democracy, confifting of the inhiibitaiits 
 of the coafr, and the moil difinierclted u.en. 
 There was another divifion of the people, into i\\Q 
 parties of the rich and the poor. Dangerous con- 
 
 vuUions
 
 Athens. i6y 
 
 vulfions were fo apprehended, that many fober 
 men thought the eliablilliment of a tyranny, in 
 one, neceilary to prevent greater evils. Solon's 
 reputation for wildom and integrity was univer- 
 fal ; and, as he had friends in all parties, they 
 procured the place of archon, with power to re- 
 form the conllitution. His firrt objctt was to 
 reconcile the rich with the poor : this he accom- 
 pliihed by lowering the interefb without annulling 
 the debt, and by taking from the creditor the ex- 
 orbitant powers over the perfon and family of the 
 debtor. He found fuch a predileftion for de- 
 mocracy in the minds of the citizens, that he 
 fireferved to every free Athenian his equal vote 
 in the alfembly of the people, which he made ib- 
 preme in all cafes, legiflative, executive, and ju- 
 fiicial. He had not, probably, tried the experi- 
 ment of a democracy in his own family, before 
 he attempted it in the city, according to the ad- 
 vice oi" Lycurgus ; but was obliged to edablifh 
 fucii a government as the people would bear, not 
 that which he thought the belt, as he faid him- 
 felf. 
 
 As the laws of Solon v/cre derived from Crete 
 and -^" gypt, were afterwards adopted by the Ro- 
 mans as their model, and have by thrm been 
 tranfmitted to all Europe, they arc a molt inte- 
 refting lubject of enquiry -, but it is not pofllble 
 to aicertain exactly which were his, wiilch were 
 thofe of Epimenides or I'heicus, or w!iat was, in 
 facit, the cop.ibtucion of Athens. '\\\c firit en- 
 quiry is, Wlio wcire cirizcns ? By a poll that 
 was taken in t!ie tirneot i'ericles, they were f uir.J 
 to be fourteen thouland pcrlons. liy another, in 
 tht time ot Demetrias Pi) derius, they were twen- 
 ty-one tiioufand : at tlic fame time there were 
 
 ten
 
 268 Ancient Bemocratkal Republics. 
 
 ten thoufand freemen, confifting of foreigners and 
 freed flaves, and four hundred thoufand fouls in 
 aftual bondage, who had no vote in the aflembly 
 of the people. The perfons therefore who fhared 
 the power, being not a tenth part of the nation, 
 were excufed from labour, in agriculture as well 
 as manufaftures, and had time for education , 
 they were paid too for attendance on public af- 
 fairs, which enabled the poorer citizens to attend 
 their duty. This is one circumftance which ren- 
 dered a government fo popular praclicable for a 
 time : another was, the divifion of Attica into 
 tribes and boroughs, or diftricts, like the Ame- 
 rican counties, towns, and pariftes, or the fliires, 
 hundreds, and ty things of England. The tribes 
 at firft were four, afterwards ten. Each tribe 
 had its prefiding magiftrate, called phylarchus, 
 analogous to the Englifn fneriif ; and each bo- 
 rough, of which there were one hundred and fe- 
 venty-fcur, its demarchus, like a conftable or 
 headborough. As the title of king was prefer ved 
 to the high-prieft, fo the perfon prefixing over 
 the religion of each tribe v,'as called philobafileus, 
 king's friend, and was always appointed from 
 among the nobly born, eupatrides. Thus reli- 
 gion was always in the hands of the ariuocratical 
 part of the community. As the oracles and 
 priefts were held by the people in fo much fa- 
 cred veneration, placing them, with all tl";cir 
 fplendid fhews and rites, always in the power of 
 the ariftocratical families, or perfons of befc edu- 
 cation, was as great a check to the democracy as 
 can v/ell be imagined. It fliould be here recol- 
 lefted too, that almcfc ail thefc eupatrides or no- 
 bles, among the Greeks, were beii-.-ved to be de- 
 fcended from the gods, nearly or remotely. No- 
 bility, 
 
 lO
 
 Athens. t6q 
 
 bflity, as well as royalty, were believed of divine 
 right, becaufe the gods and goddefTes had con- 
 defcended to familiar intercourfes with women 
 and men, on purpofe to beget perfons of a fupe- 
 rior order to rule among nations. The fuperi- 
 ority of priefts and nobles were aiTumed and con- 
 ceded with more confiftency than they are in Po- 
 land, Switzerland, and Venice, and they mull 
 have had a proportional influence with the peo- 
 ple. 
 
 Another check to this authority in one center,' 
 the nation, efl:abli(hed by Solon, was countenan- 
 ced by precedent introduced by Thefeus, who 
 divided the Attic people into three ranks : all 
 magiftrates were taken exclufivcly out of the 
 firll, Solon, by a new divifion, made four ranks, 
 determined by property, and confined all magif- 
 tracies to the firft three. By this regulation, he 
 excluded all thofe who had no will of their own, 
 and were dependent on others , but by Hill al- 
 lowing to the fourth, who were more numerous 
 than all the others, their equal votes in the af- 
 fembly of the people, he put all power into 
 hands the leaft capable of properly ufing it ; and 
 accordingly thefe, by uniting, altered the conili- 
 tution at their pleafure, and brought on the ruin 
 of the nation. By thefe precautions, however, 
 we fee the anxiety of Solon to avail himfelf of 
 every advantage of birth, property, and religion, 
 which the people would reJ"peft,to balance the love- 
 reign democracv. With the fame view, he inltitut- 
 ed a I'enate, of one hundred perfons out of each of 
 the four tribes j and this great council, to whxh 
 he committed many of the powers of the archons, 
 he hoped would have a weight which all the ar- 
 chons together had not been able to preferve. it 
 was afterwards increafed to five hundred, when 
 
 the
 
 270 Ancient Democratical Repuhlks. 
 
 the tribes were increafed to ten, fifty out of each, 
 and was then called the council of five h'j.ndrt;d. 
 They were appointed annually by lot -, but cer- 
 tain legal qualifications were required, as well as 
 a blamelcfs life. The members of each tribe in 
 turn, for thirty-five days, had luperior dignity, 
 and additional powers, with the title of prytanes, 
 from v.'hence the hall was called Prytaneium. The 
 prytanes were by turns prefiuents, had the cufto- 
 dv of the feal, and the keys of the treafury and 
 citadel, for one day. The whole aflembly formed 
 the council of ilate of the commonwealth, and 
 had the confiant charge of its political affairs ; the 
 moft important of which was the preparation of 
 bufinefs for the affembly of the people, in which 
 nothing was to be propufed which had not firfc 
 been approved here. This was Solon's law ; 
 and, if it had been obferved, would have formed 
 a balance of luch importance, that the common - 
 wealr.h would have lafted longer, and been more 
 Heady. But factious demagogues were often found 
 to reniind tlie people, that all authority v/as col- 
 lefted into one center, and that the lovereign ai- 
 fcmbly was taat center , and a popular afTembJy 
 being, in all ages, as much d^poled, v/hen un- 
 checked by an abfolute negative, to overleap the 
 bounds of law and conftitution as the nobles or 
 a king, the laws of Solon were often fpurned, 
 and the people demanded and took all power, 
 whenever they thought proper. 
 
 Senfible that the bufinefs of approving and re- 
 jecting magiiirates, receiving accuiations, cata- 
 logues of fines, enacting lav/s, giving audience 
 to ambafTadors, and difcufTions of religion, would 
 very often be uninterefting to many even of the 
 moll judicious and virtuous citizens-, that every 
 man's bufinefs is no man's -, Solon ordained it cri- 
 minal
 
 Athens, 271 
 
 minal in any not to take a fide in civil diftur- 
 bances. Certain times were flated for the meet- 
 ino- of the general aflembly j all gates were fliut, 
 but that which led to it ; fines were impofed for 
 non-attendance -, and a fmall pay allowed by the 
 public to thofe who attended pundually at the 
 hour. Nine proedri were appointed from the 
 council , from whom the moderators, epidates, 
 were appointed too by lor, with whom fat eleven 
 nomophylaces, whofe duty it was to explain the 
 tendency of any motions contrary to the fpirir of 
 the conltitution. The prytanes too had diflin^t 
 and confiderable powers in the afiembly. Whea 
 any change in the law was judged neceffary by 
 the people, another court, conlilling of a thou- 
 fand perfons, called nomothetes, v/ere directed to 
 confider of the beft mode of alteration, and pre- 
 pare a bill ; after all, five fyndics were appointed 
 to defend the old law before the aflembly, be- 
 fore the new one could be enafted. A law, paflfed 
 without liaving been previouQy publiilied, con- 
 ceived in ambicruous terms, or contrary to any 
 former law, fubjedted the propofer to penalties. 
 It was ufual to repeal the old law before a new 
 one was propofed, and this delay was an addi- 
 tional fecurity to the conltitution. The regular 
 manner of enafting a law was this: A hiil was 
 prepared by the council ; any citizen might, by 
 petition or memorial, mai<e a propofirion to the 
 jjrytanes, whofe duty it was to prcient it to the 
 council if approved by them, it became a pro- 
 boulema , and, being written on a tablet, was 
 expofed, for feveral days, for public coniidera- 
 tion, and, at the next alfembly, read to the peo- 
 ple then proclamation was made by a crier. 
 Who of thofe above fifty years of age chool'cs 
 " to fpeak ?" When thele had made their ora- 
 8 tions.
 
 272 Ancient DcKtccratlcal Republics. 
 
 tions, any other citiztn, not difqualified by law 
 for having fied from his colours in battle, being 
 deeply indebted to the public, or ccnvidled of 
 any crime, had an oppcttuniiy to fpeak \ but 
 the prytanes had a general power to enjoin fi- 
 lence on any man, fubject no doubt to the judg- 
 ment of the aBembly : v/ithouc this, debates might 
 be endiefs. When the debate was finilhed, the 
 crier, at the command of the proedri, proclaimed 
 that the queftion waited the determination of the 
 people, which was given by holding up the hand : 
 in fome uncommon cafes, particularly of impeach- 
 ments, the votes were given privately, by calling 
 pebbles into urns. The proedri examined the 
 votes, and declared the majority ; the prytanes 
 difmifled the affembly. Every one of thele pre- 
 cautions demonftrated Solon's convidion of the 
 necefiity of balances to fuch an afiembly, though 
 they were found by experience to be all ineffec- 
 tual. From the fan.e joliciiude for balances 
 againft the turbulence of democracy, he reftored 
 the court of Areopngus, improved its conllitu- 
 tion, and incrcafcd its povver: he compofed it of 
 thofe who had held with reputation the office of 
 archon, and admitteci them into this dignity and 
 authority for life. Tlie experience, the reputa- 
 tion, and permanency of thele Areopagites muft 
 have been a very powerful check. From the 
 Areopagus alone no appeal lay to the people ; 
 yet if they chofe to intertere, no balancing power 
 exifted to refiif their defpotic will. The confti- 
 tution authorized the Areopagus to ftcp the judi- 
 cial decrees of the afiembly of the people; annul 
 an acquittal, or grant a pardon to direct all 
 draughts on the public treaiury to punifii im- 
 piety, immorality, and diibrdcrly conducl to 
 luperintend the education of youtiii punifn idle- 
 
 nefs
 
 'Athens. 273 
 
 nefs to enquire by what means men of no pro- 
 perty or employment maintained themfelves. The 
 court fat in the night, without light, that the 
 members might be lefs liable to prejudice. Plead- 
 ers were confined to fimple narration of fafts, and 
 application of laws, w/ithour ornaments of fpeech, 
 or addrefs to the paffions. Its reputation for 
 v/ifdom andjuitice was fo high, that Cicero faid, 
 the commonwealth of Athens could no more be 
 governed without the court of Areopagus, than the 
 world without the providence of God. 
 
 The urgent neceffity for balances to a fovereiga 
 afiembly, in which all authority, legiflative, exe- 
 cutive, and judicial, was collected into one cen- 
 ter, induced Solon, though in fo fmall a Hate, to 
 make his conftitution extremely complicated : no 
 lefs than ten courts of judicature, four for crimi- 
 nal caufcs, and fix for civil, befides the Areopa- 
 gus and general aficmbly, were eftablillied at 
 Athens. In conformity to his own faying, cele- 
 brated among thole of the feven wife men, that 
 *' the moll perfect government is that where an 
 *' injury to any one is the concern of all," he di- 
 rcled that, in all the ten courts, caufes fliould 
 be decided by a body of men, like our juries, ta- 
 ken from among the people; the archons only 
 prefi'-iing like our judges. As the archons were 
 appointed by lor, they v.'cre often but indifferent 
 lawyers, and cliofe two perlons of experience to 
 adilt them , thefe, in time, became regular con- 
 flitiitional officers, by the name of Paredri, af- 
 feflbrs. The jurorr. v.cre paid for their fervice, 
 and appointed by lor. Th.is is the glory of So- 
 lon's laws : it is tl-.at dcpartm.ent which ou2;ht to 
 belong to the people at hirge , they are moll com- 
 petent for this : and the property, libertv, cqua- 
 T ' lity.
 
 2 74 Ancient Democratical Republics. 
 
 lity, and fecurity of the citizens, all require that 
 they alone fliould pciTefs it. Itinerant judges, 
 called the Forty, were appointed to go through 
 the counties, to determine aflaults, and civil ac- 
 tions under a certain Turn. 
 
 Every freeman was bound to military fervice. 
 The multitude of flaves made this necefiary, as 
 well as pratlicablc. Rank and property gave no 
 other diftindion than that of ferving on horfeback. 
 
 The fundamental principle of Solon's govern- 
 ment was the moft like Mr. Turgot's idea of any 
 we have feen. Did this prevent him from efta- 
 blifliing different orders and balances ? did it not 
 render neceffary a greater variety of orders, and 
 more complicated checks, thaa any in America ? 
 yet all were iniiifficicnt, for want of the three 
 checks, ubfolute and independent. Unlels three 
 powers have an ahfolute %-cio, or negative, to eve- 
 ry law^, the conftituiion can never be long pre- 
 ferved , and this principle we find verified in the 
 fubfequent hiflory of Athens, notwithftandilig the 
 oath he had the addrefs and influence to per- 
 fuade all the people to take, that they would 
 change none of his inftitutions for ten years. 
 Soon after his departure, the three parties of the 
 highland , ' , land?, and coalls, began to fhevv 
 themfelves afrefh. Thefe were, in fail, the party 
 of the rich, who v.-anted all power in their own 
 hands, and to keep the people in abfolute fub- 
 jedlion, like the ncbles ii Poland, Venice, Ge- 
 noa, Eerne, Soleure, &c. ; the democratical par- 
 ty, who wanted to abolifii the council of five 
 hundred, the Areopagus, the ten courts of judi- 
 cature, and every other check, and who, with 
 furious zeal for equality, v'erc the readied inllru- 
 ments of dcfpotilm J and the party of judicious 
 
 and
 
 Athens* 275 
 
 snd moderate men, who, though weaker than 
 either of the others, were the only balance be- 
 tween them. This lafb party, at this tiiriC, was 
 fupported by the powerful fa-.Tiily of the Alc- 
 mcRonides, of whom Megacles, the chief, had 
 greatly increafed the wealth and fnlc-ndour of his 
 hoiife, by marrying the daughter of the tyrant of 
 Sicion, and h3d acquired fame by victories in the 
 Olympian, I'ytbJan, and Iflhmian games : the 
 head of the oligarchic parry was Lycurgus, not 
 the Spartan lawgiver : the democratical party was 
 led by Pififtratus, claiming dcfcent from Codrus 
 and Neftor, with great abilities, courage, addrefs, 
 and reputation for military conduft in feveral en- 
 terprizes. Upon Solon's return, after an ab- 
 lence of ten years, he found prejudices deeply 
 rooted ; attachment to their three leaders dividinsc 
 the whole people. He was too old to dire6l the 
 ftorm : the fa6lions continued their manoeuvres ; 
 and at length Pififtratus, by an artifice, became 
 mailer of the commonwealth. Wounding him- 
 felf and his horfes, he drove his chariot violently 
 into the Agora, where the aflembly of the people 
 was held ; and, in a pathetic ipeech, declared 
 '' that he had been waylaid as he was going into 
 " the country that it was for being the man 
 " of the people that he had thus fufi'ered that 
 *' it was no longer fafe for any man to be a 
 " friend of the poor it was not fafc for him to 
 " live in Attica, unlefs they would take hini 
 *' under their protedion." Arillon, one of Iiis 
 partilans, moved for a guard of litty men, to de- 
 fend the perfon of the triend of the peopk% the 
 martyr for tb.eir caufe. In ipite of the utniult 
 oppofition of Solon, though Pififtratus v/as his 
 friend, this point was carried : Pififtr.itus, wiih 
 his guards, feizcd the citadel \ and, his oppo- 
 
 T 2 nents
 
 27^ Ancient Bemocratical Repuhlics. 
 
 nents forced into fubmifiion or exile, he became 
 the firft man, and from this time is called the 
 Tyrant of Athens , a term which meant a citizen 
 of a republic, who by any means obtained a fo- 
 vereignty over his fellow-citizens. Many of them^ 
 were men of virtue, and governed by law, after 
 being raifed to the dignity by the confent of the 
 people-, fo that t!ie term Tyrant was arbitrarily 
 iifed by the ancients, fometimes to fignify a law- 
 ful ruler, and fometim.es an ufurper. Piiiftratus, 
 of whom Solon faid, " Take away his ambition, 
 *' cure him of his luft of rcisinino;, and there is not 
 " a mian of m.ore virtue, or a better citizen," chang- 
 ed nothing in the confiitution. The laws, afiem- 
 bly, council, courts of juftice, aiid magiftrates, all 
 remained j he himfelf obeyed the fummons of the 
 Areopagus, upon the charge of murder. Solon 
 truiled to his old age againfl: the vengeance of 
 the tyrant, and treated him in all companies with 
 very iniDrudent freedcmjs of fpecch. But Pinf- 
 tratus carried ail his points with the people; and 
 had too much I'cn'i'i to regard the venerable legif- 
 lator, or to alter his fyilem. He returned his 
 reproaches vviih the higheft refneft ; and gained 
 upon him, according to feme authors, to conde- 
 fcend to live with him in great familiarity, and 
 afiift him in his adminifi:raticn. Others fay that 
 Solon, after having long braved the tyrant's rc- 
 ientment, and finding the people lofc to all fcnfe 
 of their danger, left A^thens and never returned. 
 
 Solon died at the age of eighty, tv/o years after 
 the ufurpation. Tlie ufurper foon fell. The de- 
 preiTed riva> chiefs, Megacles and Lycurgus, 
 imiting their parties, expelled him , but the con- 
 federated rivals could not agree. Mcgacles pro- 
 poled a coalition with Pififjratu.-, and offered him 
 his dangh'ter in marriage. I'he condition was ac- 
 cepted 5^
 
 Athens. 2/7 
 
 cepted ; but the people in afiembly muft be gain- 
 ed. To this end they drefiVd a fine girl with all 
 the ornaments and armour of Minerva, and drove 
 into the city, heralds prochiming before them, 
 " O Athenians, receive Pififtratus, vdiom Mi- 
 nerva honouring above all men, hcrfelf conduds 
 into your citadel." The people believed the maid 
 to be a goddeis, woriliipped her, and received Pi- 
 fiftratus again into tlie tyranny. Is tiiis govern- 
 ment, or the waves of the lea ? But Pifiilratus 
 was loon obliged to retire to Erctria, and leave 
 the party of Megacies mailers of Athens. He 
 ftrengthened his conneflions , and in tiie eleventh 
 year of this his fecond banilhment, he returned to 
 Attica with an army, and was joined by his friends. 
 The party of Megacies met him v^/ith another 
 army, ill difciplined and commanded, from the 
 city ; were attacked by iurprize, and defeated. 
 Pififtratiis proclaimed that none need fear, who 
 would return peaceably home. The known honour, 
 humanity, and clemency of his character, procured 
 liim confidence ; his enemies fied, and he entered 
 tiie city v/ithout oppofition. He made no funda- 
 mental change in the conilitution, though, as head 
 of a porty, he had the principal influence. 1 le de- 
 pendeil urnjn a larce fortune of his own, and a sood 
 underfL ii.wing with Thebes and Argos, to fupporc 
 him in it. lie died \n peace, and left his fon 
 fuccclTor to his indumce. Both his fons, Hip- 
 pias and Hipparchub, were excellent characters ; 
 and arts, agiicuiture, gardening, and literature, as 
 well as Vv^ildom and virtue, were iingularly culti- 
 vated by ti.e whole race of tliele tyrants. 1 lar- 
 modiu=; and ArilcOgeton, however, conipired tiic 
 deatli both of Hip[)ias and iiipparchus; the lat- 
 ter was killed, and ilippias v/as led to feve;iti',s : 
 riany x'Vthenians were put to death, liippias, to 
 
 i 3 ilrenL^cheii
 
 27 S Ancient Democratical Republics. 
 
 flrengthen his intereft v^ith foreign powers, mar- 
 ried his only daughter to the fon of the tyrant of 
 Lampfacus. Ker epitaph fnews that the title of 
 Tyrant was not then a term of reproach : " This 
 " duft covers Archedice, daughter of Hippias, in 
 " his time the firft of the Greeks. Daughter, 
 *' filler, wife, and mother of tyrants, her mind 
 " was never elated to arrogance." 
 
 The oppofite party were watchful to recover 
 Athens, and to increafe their inrertft with the 
 other Grecian ftates for that end. The temple of 
 Delphi was burnt. The Alcira^onidcs, to ingra- 
 tiate themfclves v/ith the oracle, the Amphidyons, 
 and all Greece, rebuilt it with Parian marble, in- 
 Itead of Forine ftone, as they had contracled to 
 do, without afking any additional price. The 
 confequence was, that whenever the Lacedaemo- 
 nians ronfulted the oracle, the aniwer alv/ays con- 
 cluded with an admonition to give liberty to 
 Athens. At length the oracle was obeyed -, and, 
 after fom.e varieiy of fortune, the Alcmasonides, 
 aided by Cleomcnes the Spartan, prevailed, and 
 Hippias retired to Sigeium. It v/as one maxim 
 of the Spartans, conflantly to favour aridocratical 
 power ; or rather, wherever they could, to efiablilh 
 an oligarchy : for in every Grecian city there was 
 always an ariftocratical, oligarchical, and demo- 
 cratical fadion. Whenever the Grecian ftates had 
 a war with one another, or a {edition within them- 
 felves, the Lacedaemonians were ready to inter- 
 fere as mediators. Thf^y conducted the bufinefs 
 generally v^ith great caution, moderation, and fa- 
 gacity , but never loft fight of their view to ex- 
 tend the inSuence of their ftatej nor of their fa- 
 vourite m.eafure for that end, the encouragemjeni: 
 of ariftocratical power, or rather oligarchical : 
 for a few principal families, i.ndebted to Laced^e- 
 
 mon.
 
 Athens. 279 
 
 mon for their pre-eminence, and unable to retain 
 it without her afllftance, were the beft inftruments 
 for holding the ftate in alliance. This policy they 
 now propofcd to follow at Athens. Cleifthenes, 
 fon of Megacles, head of the Alcmsonides, was 
 the firft perfon of the commonwealth. Having no 
 great abilities, a party was formed againft him 
 under Ifagoras, with whom moft of the principal 
 people joined. The party of Cleifthenes was 
 among the lower fort, who being all powerful in 
 the general aflembly, he made by their means 
 fome alterations in the conflitution favouring his 
 own influence. Cleifthenes was now tyrant of 
 Athens, as much as Pififtratus had been. In the 
 contefts of Grecian fa6lions, the alternative was 
 generally victory, exile, or death ; the inferior 
 party therefore reforted fometimes to harili expe- 
 dients. Ifagoras and his adherents applied to La- 
 cedasmon. Cleomenes, violent in his temper, en- 
 tered with zeal into the caufe of Jlagoras, and lent 
 a herald to Athens, by whom he iinpcrioufly de- 
 nounced banifhment againll Cleifthenes and his 
 party, on the old pretence of criminality for the 
 cxecu:ion of the partilans of Cyion. Cleifthenes 
 obeyed. Exulted by this proof of a dread of 
 Spartan power, he went to Athens with a ihiall 
 military force, and banilhed fevcn hundred fami- 
 lies at once : fuch was Athenian liberty. He 
 was then proceeding to change the conllitution, 
 to fuit the views of ^Spartan ambition, by diftblv- 
 in .; the council of five hundred, and committing 
 tiie whole power to a new council ot three hundred, 
 all partifans of liaaoras. Atliens was not fo tar 
 humbled. Tiie five hundred rellfted, and excited 
 the people, who flew to arms, and beficg-rd Cleo- 
 menes and Ifagoras in the citadel , who the third 
 day furrcndered, upon condition that theLacediC- 
 
 T 4 monians
 
 2 So A'rKient Bunocrathsd Republics. 
 
 monians migl^.t depart in i^S'^ity. Ifagoras went 
 with them. Many of his party were executed, 
 and Cleifthenes, and the exiled families, returned; 
 but confcious of their danger from their hoftile 
 fellow-citizens in concert with Lacedsmon, they 
 fent to folicit an alliance with Artaphernes, the 
 iatrap of Perfia. The anfwer was. If they would 
 give earth and water to Darius they might be re- 
 ceived, otherwife they muft depart. The ambaf- 
 fadors, confidering the imminent danger of their 
 country and party, confented to thefe humiliating 
 terms. Ahhous-h Athens was diftra.fted with do- 
 meuic fadlions, and prefled with the fear of an 
 attack from Cieonienes, the conduct of her am- 
 bafladors, in acknowledging fubjeilion to the Per- 
 fian king, in hopes of his proteclion, was highly 
 reprobated upon their return -, and it does not 
 appear that Perfian afllfcance was further defired : 
 yet the danger which huiig ever Athens was very 
 great. Cleonv.nes, bent on revenge, formed a 
 confederacy a2;ainft them, of the ThebanSj Corin- 
 thians, and Chalcidians. Thefe could no: agree, 
 and the Athenians gained fome advantages of two 
 of them. Cleom.enes then pretended that Sparta 
 had a6ted irreligiouily in expelling Hippias, who 
 ought to be reftored \ becaufe, when he was be- 
 fieged in the citadel at'Athens he had difcovered 
 a collufion between' the Delpi^ic priells and the 
 Alcmsonides. Sparta was wiiiing to reltore Hip- 
 pias ; but Corintli, their ally, was nor. Ilippias, 
 defpairing of other means, now in his turn applied 
 to Perfia, and brought upon his country tlie Per- 
 fian war , from v.'hich it v/as delivered by Miltia- 
 d-^is^ at the bairle of Marathon. M:!:i:.:.:e:i became 
 tne tnvy of the A}cn:,;con;Jc family. Xancidppus, 
 one of the nriricioal meii of Athens, v/ho had mar- 
 i'icd a daughter of Mc-racies. the great opponent 
 I "^ ' cf
 
 Athens. 281 
 
 of PifiRratus, conduded a capital accufation 
 againil him : he was condemned in a fine of 
 fifty talents, more than he was worth. His wound, 
 which prevented him from attending the trial, 
 mortified, and he died in prilbn. In order to 
 brand the family of Pififtratus, the fame of Har- 
 modius and Ariftogeron was now cried up. They 
 had afTaflinated Hipparchus from mere private 
 revenge % but tiiey were nosv called afierters of 
 public lib'jrty. The tyrannicide, as it was called, 
 was celebrated by fongs, ftatucs, ceremonies, and 
 religious feftivals. 
 
 \i m-jft be acknov/lcdged that every example 
 of a g'lvernment, v/hich has a large mixture of 
 democratical power, exhibits fomeihing to our 
 view v/hich is amiable, noble, and I had almoft 
 faid, divine. h\ every ftate hitherto mentioned, 
 this oblcrvation is verified. What is contended 
 for, is, tliat the people in a body cannot manage 
 the executive [)ower, and therefore that a fimple 
 democracy is impraclicable -, and that their fliare 
 of the legillative power inuil be always tempered 
 with two others, in order to enable them to pre- 
 ferve tlieir fharc, as well as to correct its rapid 
 tentlency to abufe. Without this, they are but a 
 tranfient glare of glory, winch paHes away like a 
 ilafh of lightning, or like a momentary appear- 
 ance ot a goddels to an ancient liero, which, by 
 revealing but a glimpfe of celetlial beauties, only 
 excited regret that he Iiud ever [c<:n them. 
 
 Tlie republic of Athens, the fchool-miilrefs of 
 the whole civilized world, for more than three 
 tiioiilar.d years, in art?, eloquence, and phiiofo- 
 phy, ;us well as in p.olitcneij and wit, was, for 11 
 ihort [x-riod of her duration, the moll democrati- 
 cal comn::on\vcalth of Greece. Unfortunately their 
 iiijlory, between (lie .'.buiicion of their kings and 
 
 the
 
 2S2 Anchnt 'Dcmocratkal Rcpuhlics. 
 
 the time of Solon, has not been circu:rifl:antiaily 
 preferved. Durinn; this period, they Teem to have 
 endeavoured to colitcl aii authority into one cen- 
 ter, and to have avoided a compofition of orders 
 and balances as carefully as Mr. Turgot : but 
 that center was a group of nobles, not the nation. 
 Their government confided in a fingle affembly 
 cf nine archons, chofen annually by the people. 
 But even here v/as a checlc -, for by lav,- the archons 
 muft all be chofen out of the nobility. But this 
 form of government had its ufual efreds, by intro- 
 ducing anarchy, and fuch a general profligacy of 
 manners, that the people could at length be re- 
 ftrained by nothing Ihort of the ultimate punifli- 
 ment from even the moll ordinary crimes. Draco 
 accordingly propofed a law, by which death fl:iould 
 be inflidted on every violation of the law. Hu- 
 manity fhuddered at fo fhocking a feverity ! and 
 the people chofe rather that all ohfences fhould go 
 unpuniihed, than that a law thus written in blood, 
 as they termed it both in horror and contempt, 
 fhould be executed. Confufions increafed, and 
 divided the nation into three factions ; and their 
 miferies became fo extreme, that they offered So- 
 lon an abfolute monarchy. He had too much 
 fenfe, as well as virtue, to accept it \ but employed 
 his talents in new-modelling the government. 
 Senfible, from experience, of the fatal efTeCiS of a 
 government too popular, he wifhed to introduce 
 an ariftocracy, moderated like that of Sparta ; 
 but thought the habits and prejudices of the peo- 
 ple too llrong to bear it. The archons he con- 
 tinued ^ but, to balance their authority, he creeled 
 a fenate of four hundred, to be choien by ballot 
 of the peonle. He alfo revived the court of Are- 
 opagus, wnich had jurifdi6lion in criminal cafes, 
 and the care of religion. He excluded from the 
 8 executive.
 
 j^fhc/is. 283 
 
 executive, or the magifrracy, al the citizens who 
 were not pofieired of a certain fortune , but vt fted 
 the fovereignty in a legiOative afTtrmbly of the 
 people, in which all had a right to vote. In this 
 manner Solon attempred a double balance. The 
 Areopagus was to check the executive in tiie 
 hands of the archons ; and the I'enate of four 
 hundred, the fichlenefs and fire of the people. 
 Every one muil; fee that thefe devices v/ould have 
 been no effectual controul in either cale ; yet they 
 were better than none. It was very right that the 
 people fhould have all elections , but democra- 
 tical prejudices were fo invetera:c, that he was 
 obliged not only to make them, aficmbled in a 
 body, an efiential branch of tlie legillature, but to 
 fnve them cognizance of appeals from all the fu- 
 pcrior courts Solon himlelt, in his heart, muft 
 have agreed with Anacharfis, that this conftitu- 
 tion was but a cobweb to bind the poor, while the 
 r:ch would cafily break through it. Pififtratus 
 foon proved it, by bribing a pariy, procurin;T 
 himfelf a guard, and demolifiii'-.g Sr)ion's vyhoie 
 fyllem before his eyes, and tiiajliihing a fino-le 
 tyranny. The tyrant was expclicd fcverai tliivjs 
 by the oppofition, but as often i;;ougI:t; bi. I:, ar.d 
 finally tranfmiticd his monarchy tv) '11s f j::s. O.ie 
 of thefe was afialLn.itcd by Marniodius an J. Arillo- 
 gctcn-, and the other driven inro baniilvnent by the 
 oppofition, aided bv the nelg'ibou'-ing ll.iie, Spar- 
 ta. He fljd to the t-'err!;ins, t^:c;:ed Darius aff,'.in!t 
 his country, and w.is killed at M.uatiion. Tlicfe 
 c;'!aniiMcs inlpired iiie people v;ith lucii terrors of 
 a f n^;!e tyrant, thpr, imrcad (n'thinkm;; to b.dmce 
 effctlually th^ir '' orders," they eikiblilkjJ t:-- ol- 
 tracilrn, to prevent any m.ui troni becoming too 
 popular : a clicck iiaked, but a very injudicious 
 one J for it only baniihed their belt men. llUlory 
 
 no
 
 2S4 Ancient Democratical Repuhlics. 
 
 no where furnifhes fo frank a confeffion of the 
 people themfclves, of their own infirmities, and 
 unfitnefs for managing the executive branch of 
 o-overnment, or an unbalanced fhare of the lecifla- 
 ture, as this infcitution. The lanrriiage of it is, 
 " -We know ourfeives fo well, that we dare not 
 *' truft cur own confidence and aaeclions, our 
 *' own admiration and gratitude for the greatelt 
 *' talents and fublimeft virtues. We know our 
 " heads will be turned, if we fuffer fuch charac- 
 *' ters to live among us, and we fnall always make 
 *' them kings." What more melancholy fpeclacle 
 can be conceived even in imagination, than that 
 .inconftancy which eredls ftatues to a patriot or a 
 hero one year, baniOies him the next, and the 
 third erects frcfn fbatues to his memory ? 
 
 Such a conftitution of governnienr, and the 
 education of youih which foilov/s neceffarily from 
 it, always produces fuch charadlers as Cleon and 
 Alcibiadcs ; mixtures of good c]ualitie3 enough to 
 acquire the conildence of a party, and bad ones 
 enough to lead them to dcllruftion ; whofe lives 
 ihew the miferies and final catallrophe of fuch 
 imperfect polity. 
 
 From the example of Athens it is clear, that 
 the governinent of a fmgie aiTembly of archons 
 chofen by the people, was found intolerable ; that, 
 to remedy the evils of it, Solon efiabliihcdfourfeve- 
 ral orders, an aflembly of the people, an affembly 
 of four hundred, an affembly of a."chons, and ti^e 
 Areopagus , that he endeavoured to bah^unce one 
 fingly bv anotiier, inftead of forming his balance 
 out of tlii'cc branch;ts. I'hus thcfe atreriipis at an 
 equilibrium v*'ere intrifetftual ; produced a never- 
 ending tiucluation in the national councils, con- 
 tinual factions, maifacres, proicriptions, banilh- 
 nienr. and death of the belt citizens; and the hif- 
 
 torv
 
 Athens. 285 
 
 tory of the Pcloponncfian War by Thucidydes, 
 will inform us how the rag-ino- flames at lalt 
 burnt out. 
 
 The people in each of the United States have, 
 after all, more real authority than they had in 
 Athens. Planted as they are over large domi- 
 nions, they cannot meet in one afTcmbly, and 
 therefore are not expofed to thofe tumultuous 
 comimotions, like the ragins; waves of the lea, 
 which always agitated the ecclefia at Athens. 
 They have all eledions, of governor and fenators, 
 as well as reprcfentatives, lo prudently guarded, 
 that there is fcarce a pofTibility of intrigue. The 
 property required in a reprefentative, fenaror, or 
 even governor, is fo fmall, that multitudes have 
 equal pretenfions to be cholen. No eledlion is 
 confined to any order of nobility, or to any great 
 wealth , yet the legiflature is fo divided into three 
 branches, that no law can be pafied in a pafTion, 
 nor inconfiftent with the conftitution. The exe- 
 cutive is excluded from the two legiflative aflem- 
 blies ; and the judiciary power is independent, as 
 well as feparate from all. This will be a fair 
 trial, whether a government fo popular can pre- 
 ferve itfelf. If it can, there is reafon to hope 
 for all the equality, all the liberty, and every 
 other good fruit of an Athenian democracy, with- 
 out any of its ingratitude, levity, convulfions, 
 or factions. 
 
 LETTER
 
 2 86 Ancient Democratical Repuhlics, 
 
 LETTER XLIL 
 
 ANTALCIDAS. 
 
 Dear Sir, 
 
 IN the year 1774, a certain BritiHi officer, then 
 at Bcfton, was ofren heard to fay, " I wifli 
 I were Parliarr.ent : I would not lend a fhip 
 or troop to this country ; but would forthwith 
 pafs a ftatutc, declarjnjr cvc^ry town in North 
 America a tree, Ibvereign, and independent 
 commonwealth. This is what they all dcfire, 
 and I would indulge them , I fiiould foon 
 have the picafure to fee them all at war with 
 one another, from one end of the continent to 
 the other." This was a gentleman of letters, 
 and perhaps had learned hie; politics from Antai- 
 cidas, whofe opinion concerning the government 
 of a fmgle afiembly, is very remarkable i but the 
 Greek and the Briton would both have found 
 their artiiices in Am,erica ineffec^tual, l"he Ame- 
 ricans are very far from beinp- defirous of fuch 
 multiplications and divifions of ilates, and know 
 too well the mifchiefs that would follow from 
 them : yet the natural and inevitable efrecl of 
 Mr. Turgot's fyftem of government, would, in a 
 courfe of time, be llich a fpirit among tlie peo- 
 ple. 
 
 It is not very certain whether Antalcidas was a 
 Spartan or not. If he was, he had violated the 
 law of Lycurgus by travel, and had refided long 
 
 if!
 
 Antalcidas, 287 
 
 in Perfia, an.i maintained an intercourfe and cor- 
 refpondence with feveral noble families. He was 
 bold, iubtle, infinuating, eloquent -, but his vices 
 and corruption were equal to his addrefs. The 
 ftern Spartan fcnate thought him a proper inftru- 
 mcnt to execute an infidious ccmmiffion at a pro- 
 fligate court. The inftitutions of his own coun- 
 try, Sparta, were the objefls of his ridicule ; hut 
 thofe of the democratical fcates of Greece, of his 
 fovereign contempt. The ancient maxim of fome 
 of the Greeks, " "That cjery thing is lawful to a 
 
 man in the fervice of his country " was now ob- 
 folete, and. had given way to a purer morality ; 
 but Antalcidas was probably one of thofe philo- 
 fophers, who thought every thing lawful to a man 
 which could ferve his private intcieft. The Spar- 
 tan fenate never adled upon a princi]:ile much 
 better ; and therefore might, upon tliis occafion, 
 have given their ambaflhdor the i.iilrLicticn which 
 he pretended, viz. to oiTer *' to refign all preten- 
 " lions to the Greek cities in Afia, which they 
 
 would acknowledge to be dependencies of the 
 " Perfian empire-, and to decl.T:e all the cities 
 '' and iflands, fmall and great, totally indepen- 
 " dent of each other." Thefc aiticlcs, in conl'c- 
 qucnce of which there would not be aiiv republic 
 powerful enough to difturb the tranquillity of 
 Perfia, were more advantageous to thern than the 
 mod iniblent courtier would Iia'^'C ventured to 
 propofe. The ambaifaJor was rcvvaided by a 
 magnificent prefcnr ; and tlic terr.KS of ])eace tranf- 
 mitted to court, to be rarifiedt by vlrtaxerxcs. 
 The negociation however langu^fn-d, and the war 
 was carried on with violence lor Icveral years ; and 
 all the art, activity, and addrefs of /Antalcidas 
 were put to the trial, before he obtained the r.'ti- 
 fication. The treaty was at la'il co.TDleced 
 
 i. Aai
 
 28 Anc'lent Bemocratical Reptihlics^. 
 
 " That all the republics, fmall and great, {liould 
 *' enjoy the independent government of their own 
 " hereditary laws ; and whatever people rejcdted 
 " thefe conditions, '^o evidently calculated for 
 " preferving the public tranquillity, muft cxpedt 
 *' the uti-ncft indignation of the Great King, who, 
 in conjunction with the republic of Sparta, 
 would make v/ar on their perverfe and dange- 
 rous obflinacy, by lea and land, with fnips 
 and money." 
 Antalcidas, and Teribazus the Perfian fatrap, 
 "with whom he had concerted the treaty, had fore- 
 feen, that, as Thebes mud refign her authority 
 over the inferior cities of Bceotia as Argos muft 
 withdraw her garrifon from Corinth, and leave 
 that capital in the power of the ariftocratic or 
 Lacedaemonian faction ^and as Athens mud 
 abandon the fruits of her recent victories there 
 might be an oppofition to the treaty made by 
 thefe three ftates : to guard againll which, they 
 had provided pov^erful armaments by fea and 
 land, which, with Spartan and Perfian threats, lb 
 intimidated all, that all at laft fubmiited. 
 
 This peace of Antalcidas forms a difgraceful 
 asra in the hiftory of Greece. Their ancient con- 
 federacies were difiblved ; the fmaller towns were 
 Icoiened from all connedion with the larp-e cities; 
 all were weakened, by being difunited. Wh:'.t 
 infamy to the magillrates of Sparta, and their in- 
 triguing, unprincipled ambalTador ! But Athens, 
 Thebes, and Argos, by vat friendfliip of the de- 
 rnocratical cities and confederacies, had become 
 powerful, and excited tlieir haughty jealoufy. 
 The article which declared the fmaller cities inde- 
 pendent, was peculiarly uieful to the views of 
 Sparta -, it reprefented them as the patrons of li- 
 berty, amcr.g the free. The flern policy cf 
 
 Sparta
 
 Antakidas] 289 
 
 Sparta had cruflied, in all her fecondary towns, 
 the hope of independence. The authority of 
 Athens, Thebes, Argos, and all the democrati- 
 tical confederacies, were lefs imperious ; the ic> 
 vereign and fubjcdl were more nearly on a foot- 
 ing of equality j and the Spartans knew, that 
 " men are difpofed to reject the juft rights of 
 
 their equals, rather than revolt againft the ty- 
 ** ranny of their mafters :" their own flaves and 
 citizens had furniflied them with conftant proof 
 of this. 
 
 But Sparta, by this mafter- piece of rorrucry, 
 meant not only to hold ftiil all her own fubordi- 
 nate cities in fubjeftion, not only to detach the 
 inferior communities from her rivals, but to add 
 them to her own confederacy. To this end fhe, 
 by her emiflaries, intrigued in all the fubordinate 
 cities. How ? by promoting liberty, popular go- 
 vernment, or proper mixtures of a well-ordered 
 commonwealth ? By no nieans ; but by fupport- 
 ing the ariilocratical faclions in all of ti:em, fo- 
 menting animofuies among the people againit 
 each other, and elpecially againit their capitals. 
 Complaints, occafioned by thefe cabals, were re- 
 ferred to the Spartan fenatc, v^hich had acquired 
 the reputation of ilie patron of the free, the weak, 
 and the injured, and always decided in their own 
 favour. But the ambition of Spartans, cool and 
 cunning as it v.-as, had not patience to remain 
 long fatisfied with iuch legal uTurpaiions , they 
 determined to mix the terror of their arnis with 
 the feduclion of policy. Before we proceed to 
 an account of their operations, we mull develop 
 a little more fully the policy of Antakidas, 
 Befides the free republics of Attica, Tlicbes, ar.d 
 Argos, which conliiled of fevcral cities, govern- 
 ed by thci- ^.,2. m.J<^iilrate, fenate, and pr; -'.!:% 
 
 U ' iji
 
 290 Ancient Demecraiical Republics. 
 
 m which the fubordinate cities always complain- 
 ed of the inordinate influence of the capital -, 
 there were feveral republics reputed ftill more 
 popular, becaufe they were governed by fingle 
 aflemblies, like Bifcay, the Grilons, Appcnzel, 
 Undervvald, Claris, &c. Thele republics con- 
 fifted of feveral tov/ns, each governed by ics own 
 firfl magiftrate, council, and people ; but con- 
 federated together, under the fuperintendance of 
 a fingle diplomatical aifembly, in which certain 
 common laws were agreed on, and certain com- 
 mon magiftrates appointed, by deputies from 
 each town. Thele confederacies are the only ex- 
 amples of governments by a fingle afTembly 
 which were known in Greece. Antalcidas knew 
 that each of thefe towns was difcontented with the 
 adminiftration of their common aficmibly, and in 
 their hearts wiQied for independence. It was to 
 this foible of the people that he addrefled that 
 policy, in his Pernan treaty, by which he twilled 
 to atoms, as if it had been a rope of fand, every 
 democraticai city and confederacy, and every one 
 in which democracy and ariftocracy were mixed, 
 throughout all Greece. The firft viclim of this 
 ambitious policy v/as Arcadia, in the center of 
 Peloponnelus, vvliole principal town was Manti- 
 n^ea. Arcadia v/as a fertile and beautiful valley, 
 furrounded by lofty mountains : the fcattered vil- 
 lages of fhepherds, inhabiting thefe hills and 
 vales, had grown into cities, by the names of 
 Tegea, Stymphaiis, Herrea, Orchomonus, and 
 Mantinsea. The inhabitants were diftinguifhed by 
 their innocence, and the fimpiicity of their man- 
 ners , but, whenever they had been obliged, from 
 neceflity, to engage in war, they had difplayed 
 fuch vigour, energy, and intrepidity, as made 
 their alliance very defirable. The dangerous 
 
 neigh-
 
 Antalcidas. 2gi 
 
 neighbourhood of Sparta had obliged them to 
 fortify their towns, and maintain garrifons ; but 
 jealoiifies arofe between Tegea and Mantinxa, 
 and emulations to be the capital. The year af- 
 ter the treaty of Antalcidas, ambafladors were 
 fent by the Spartan fenate to the aflembly at 
 Mantiniea, to command chem to demolifh the 
 walls of their proud city, and return to their 
 peaceful villages. The reafons afligned were, thac 
 the MantinjEans had difcovered their hatred to 
 Sparta, envied her profperity, rejoiced in her 
 misfortunes, and, in the late war, had furnifhed 
 fome corn to the Argives. The Mantinasans re- 
 ceived the propofal with indignation ; the ambaf- 
 fadors retired in difguft : the Spartans proclaimed 
 v/ar, demanded the aid of their allies, and march- 
 ed a powerful army under their king Agefipolis, 
 and invaded the territory. After the molt de- 
 ftruftive ravages of the country, and a long fiege 
 of Mantinsea, they were not able to lubdue the 
 fpirit of this people, until they turned the courfe 
 of the river Ophis, and laid the wills of the city 
 under water; thefe, being of raw bricks, dif- 
 folved, and fell. The inhabitants, intimidated, 
 offered to demolilh the walls, and follow Sparta 
 in peace and war, upon condition they might be 
 allowed to continue and live in the city. Agefi- 
 polis replied, t!i.\t while they lived together in 
 one city, their numbers expofed them to the de- 
 lufior.s of feditious demagogues, whofe addrefs 
 and eloquence feduced the multitude i'rom their 
 true interelt, and delboyed die influence of their 
 fuperiors in rank, wealth, and wifdom, on whofe 
 attachment alone the Lacedaemonians could de- 
 pend ; and therefore, that they mull deilroy their 
 houfes in the city, leparate into four communi- 
 ties, and return to thole villages which their an- 
 U 2 ceftors
 
 592 Ancient Democratkal Republics, 
 
 ceftors had inhabited. The terror of an imme- 
 diate aflault made it neceflary to comply ; and 
 the Spartans made a mighty merit of fuffering 
 fixty of the moft zealous partifans of democracy 
 to fly, unmurdered, from their country. 
 
 The little republic of Phlius too, like every 
 other where a balance is not known and preferv- 
 ed, was diftra(5led by parties. The popular party 
 prevailed, and baniflied their opponents, the 
 friends of ariftocracy. The Spartans threatened, 
 and the ruling party permitted the exiles to re- 
 turn; but not meeting with refpeclful treatment 
 enough, they complained, and the Spartans, un- 
 der Agefilaus, appointed commifnoners to try and 
 condemn to death the obnoxious leaders of the 
 people in Phlius. This odious oflice was exe- 
 cuted with fuch unexampled feverity, as terrified 
 thole who furvived into an invariable attachment 
 to Sparta. 
 
 The confederacy of Olynrhus was next at- 
 tempted. A number of towns, of which Olyn- 
 thus was the principal, between two rivers, had 
 been incorporated or ailbciated together, and 
 grown into feme pov/er, and greater hopes. This 
 was enough to aroule the jcaloufy of Sparta. They 
 fent four or five fucceflive armies, under their 
 ablefl: kings, to take the part of the ariftocratical 
 fadtion, and conquer this league. Such was the 
 fpirit and relburces of this little fpor, that they 
 defended themfelves for four or five campaigns, 
 and then were forced to fubmir. 
 
 Thebes had been torn with ariflocratic and 
 democratic factions, in confequence of the peace 
 of Antaicidas, and Sparta joined the latter, which 
 ultimately produced long and obftinate wars, and 
 the exalted characters of Pelopidas and Epami- 
 ncndas, who, however, with all their virtues, 
 
 were
 
 Antakidas. ig^ 
 
 were not able finally to eftabliih the independen- 
 cy of their country, though both perifhed in the 
 atten-pt ; H.paminondas, to the lafl-, refufing to 
 the leveral comnunities of Boeotia their heredi- 
 tary laws and government, although he was one 
 of the democraiical party. 
 
 Sparta, in the next place, fent a detachment to 
 fiipport the partidins of ariftocracy in Argoiis, 
 Achaia, and Arcadia, but were obliged to eva- 
 cuate that country by Pelopidas and Epaminon- 
 das; but the latter fupportcd ariHocratic govern- 
 ment. As foon as he retired, the Arcadians com- 
 plained againfl him, that a people, who knew by 
 their own exj)crience the nature of ariftocracy, 
 jQiould have confirmed that fevere form of go- 
 vernment in an allied or dependent province. 
 I'he multitude in Thebes condemned the pro- 
 ceedings of F.paminondas, and fent commiflion- 
 crs into Achaia, who aflllled the populace, and a 
 body of mercenaries, to diflblve the ariftocracy, 
 and banifli or put to death the nobks, and infti- 
 tutc a democracy. The foreign troops were 
 fcarccly departed, when the exiles, who were 
 very numerous and powerful, returned, and, after 
 a defpcrate and bloody llruggle, recovered their 
 ancient inPaicnce : tlie leaders of the populace 
 were now, in tlieir turn, put to death or expelled 5 
 the ariftocracy rc-e(labliflicd j and tlie magiftrates 
 craved tiie protediion of Sparta, which was rea- 
 dily granted. 
 
 It would be endlefs to purfue the confequences 
 of the peace ot Antalcidas : uninterrupted con- 
 ttlls and wars in every democratical ftate in 
 Greece were the confequence of it -, ariftocratical 
 and democratical fadiojis eternally dilputing for 
 fupciiority, mutually banifhing and butchering 
 U 3 each
 
 294 Ancient Democraticd Republics. 
 
 each other; profcriptioRS, affafiinations (of which 
 even Pelopidas was not innocent), treacheries, 
 cruelties without number and without end. But 
 no man, no party, ever thought of introducing 
 an effediual balance, by creating a king, with an 
 equal power, to balance the other two. The 
 Romans began to think of this expedient, but it 
 was referved for England to be the firft to reduce 
 it to praflice. 
 
 Would Mr. Turgot have faid, that if Thebes, 
 Athens, Argos, and the Achasan, Arcadian, and 
 Olynthian leagues, had been each of them go- 
 verned by a legillature compofed of a king, fe- 
 nate, and alTembly, with equal authority, and each 
 a decifive negative, that the caufe of liberty, in 
 all Greece, would have been thus crumbled to 
 diift by fuch a paltry trick of Antalcidas ? 
 Would the child ifh humour of feparaiing into 
 as many ftates as towns have ever been indulg- 
 ed or permitted ? Moft certainly they would 
 not. And if the power of negociation and trea- 
 ties, and the whole executive, had been in one 
 man, could the perfidious ambaffadors of Spar- 
 ta, and the other liates, have intrigued, and em-' 
 JDroiied every thing as they did ? 
 
 L E T T E H
 
 Achaia. 29 ^ 
 
 LETTER XLIII. 
 
 ACHAIA. 
 
 Dear Sir, 
 
 THE Achseans, whofe republic became fo fa- 
 mous in later times, inhabircd a long but 
 narrow ftrip of land along the Corini!i;an gulph, 
 which was deftitute of harbours, and, as its fnores 
 were rocky, of navigation and commerce ; but 
 the impartial and generous fpiric of their laws, 
 if we are to credit Polybius and their other pa- 
 negyrifts, were fome compenfation for the natu- 
 ral difadvantages of their fituation and territory. 
 They admitted ftrangers into their community on 
 equal terms with the ancient citizens ; and, as 
 they were the firft, and, for a long time, the only 
 republic of Greece which had fuch liberality, it 
 is not ftrange that they fhould have* enjoyed the 
 praifes of all foreigners. In all orhcr (iates of 
 Greece, in which the people had any fhare in 
 government, there were conftant complaints, that 
 one powerful capital domineered over the inferior 
 towns and villages, like Thebes in Boeotia, A- 
 thens in Attica. In Laconia, Lycurgus avoided 
 this inconvenience by two popular allcmblies, 
 one for Sparta, and one for the country ; but in 
 Achaia there was no commercial town, and all 
 were nearly equal, havj^-.r; common laws and in- 
 ftitutions, and common weights and mealurcs. 
 Helice, which is diftinguiihrd by Homer as tlie 
 moft confiderable town of Ach:;ia, was t!ie place 
 
 .1 or
 
 2<^6 Anchnt Bemocratical Republics. 
 
 of avic-mbly of the congrefs, until it was fwal- 
 lowed up in an earthquake ; then ZEcr^e became 
 the feat of congrefs, v/ho annually appointed pre- 
 fident<? ill rotation, and generals, who wer-e re- 
 fponfible to the congrels, as the members of con- 
 grefs were to ihe cities t'jey reprefcnted. Tiiis 
 is faid to be an excellent fyiieri) of gov.; ;-', 
 becaufe it checked the ambition of Achaia, le 
 it maintained its independence : and Poivbius is 
 full of the prailes of this people for their *"' vir- 
 *' vcc and probity in ail their ncgociations, which 
 " had acquired them the good opinion of the 
 " whole world, and procured them to be chofeii 
 " to be arbitrators between the Lacedsemonians 
 *'' and Thebans ; for their wife councils, and 
 ** good dilpofitions , for their equality and liber- 
 *' ty, which is in the uLmofb perfection among 
 " them , for their laws and infcitutions-, for their 
 " moderation, and freedom from ambition," &c. 
 Yet vdioever reads his own hiilory, will fee evi- 
 dent proofs, that much of this is the fond par- 
 tiality of a patriot for his country ; and that they 
 had neither the moderation he afcribes to them, 
 nor the excellent government. Better indeed than 
 the other republics of Greece it might be ; and 
 its congrefs, as a diplomatic aPfembly, might have 
 governed its foreign afEiirs very vvch', if the cities 
 rcprefented in it had been wcil cohuituted of a 
 mixture of three independent powers : But it is 
 plain they were not , but were in a continual 
 itruegle between tlicir nrtl magifcrates, nobles, 
 and people, for fuperiority, wliich occafioned their 
 fliort duration, and final ruin. As this exan)ple 
 defcrves to be fully examined by every Am.eri- 
 can, let us explain it a little more particularly. 
 
 Atreus, king of Argos and Mycene, was tlie 
 fon of Pelups, and father of /iga.memnon, who 
 
 was
 
 Achaia. 297 
 
 was the father of Oreftes, who was the father of 
 Tifamenus : Pelops, after wKom Peloponnefus 
 was named, was rhc fon ot Tantalus, a king of 
 Phrygia-, and Tantalus was the fon of Jupiter, 
 by the nymph Plota. 
 
 Tilamcnus, flying from Sparta, upon the return 
 of tiie Heraclicise governed in Achaia, and was 
 tiie firfl; king of that people. The dominion by 
 him there founded was continued, in a rightful 
 fucceiTion, down to Gyges. Notwithftanding his 
 delcent from Jupiter, his government was pro- 
 bably like that of Alcmous in Phasacia : Twelve 
 archons prtTided oyer the twelve cities, v/ho, each 
 in his diilncl:, was the firfl magiftrate ; and all 
 able to make out, fome way or other, their con- 
 neclion with ibme of the ancient families, who 
 were all alike honourably defcended, at lealf, from 
 an inferior god or goddefs. Tilamenus made the 
 thirteenth, and was firft among equals at leaft. 
 The fons of Gyges not governing by law, but 
 defpotically, the monarchy was abolifhed, and re- 
 duced to a popular Hate ; probably it was only 
 an ariftocracy of the twelve archons. Thefe hints 
 at the genealogy of thefe kings are to fliew how 
 intimately theology was intermixed with politics 
 in every Grecian llate and city -, and, at the fame 
 time, to IIkvv that the whole force of fuperlti- 
 tion, although powertul enough to procure crowns 
 to tiicfe perions, yet, for wane of the balance we 
 contend for, was not fuificient to rellrain the paf- 
 fions of tlie nobles, and prevent revolutions al- 
 molt as rapid as the motion of a wheel : nothino- 
 has ever been found to fupply the place of the 
 balance of three powers, 'Ihe abolition of this 
 limited monarciiy was not effected by the people, 
 for the [Durpofe of introducing democracy, or a 
 mixed governaient j but by the nobles, for the 
 
 fake
 
 tgS Ancient Bemccratlcal Repuhlics. 
 
 fake of eftablifhing an ariftocracy. The new go- 
 vernment, confequently, was a confederation of 
 twelve archons, each ruling as firil magiilrate in 
 a feparate city, with his council and people, as 
 an independent ftate. The twelve archons met in 
 a general aflembly, fometimes in perfon, and 
 fometimes by proxy, to confult of general affairs, 
 and guard againft general dangers. This whole 
 ftate could not be larger than another Bifcav, and 
 each city muft have been lefs than a nritrindade, 
 and its general affembly like the junta general : 
 yet fuch is the pafTion for independence, that this 
 little commonwealth, or confederacy of common- 
 wealths, could not hold together. The general 
 affembly was neglefted ; the cities became inde- 
 pendent : fome were conquered by foreigners, 
 and fome loft their liberties by domeftic tyrants, 
 that is, by their firft magiftrates affuming arbi- 
 trary power. Polybius difcovers as much affec- 
 tion for this little republic as Rouffeau did for 
 Geneva, and is very loth to confels their faults : 
 He colours over the revolutions they un- 
 derwent for a courfe of ages, by laying, that 
 though their affairs v/ere governed according 
 to the diverfity of times and occurrences, all 
 poffible endeavours were ufed to preferve the 
 form of a popular ftate. The commonwealth 
 was compofed of twelve cities, which are in 
 being at this day, Olenus and Helice only ex- 
 cepted, which were fwallowed up by the lea in 
 an earthquake that happened not long before 
 the battle of Leuftra ; which cities are Parra, 
 Dyma, Phara, Trytjea, Leontium, .-^"gira, Pel- 
 lene, ^gium, Bura, Ceraunia, Olenus, and 
 Helice. After the death of Alexander, and fince 
 the Olympiad we have mentioned, thefe cities 
 fell into dangerous diffenfions, chiefly by the 
 7 *' artifices
 
 Achaia. 299 
 
 artifices of the Macedonian princes, when every 
 city apart meditated on nothing but their own 
 private profit and ends, to the prejudice and 
 defl:ru(flion of their neighbours , and this gave 
 occafion to Demetrius and Caflander, and after- 
 wards to Antigonus Gonatus, to put garrifons 
 in fume of their cities ; and that others were 
 invaded and governed by tyrants, who, in thofc 
 *' days, were very numerous in Greece. But 
 about the 124 Olympiad, v/hen Pyrrhus in- 
 vaded Italy, thefe people began to fee the 
 error of their dilTenfions, and laboured to re- 
 turn to their former union. Thofc who gave 
 the firft example were Dyma, Patra, and Pha- 
 ra : five years afterwards, ^gium, having cad 
 out the garrifon that was placed over them, 
 were received into the confederacy. Bura fol- 
 lowed their example, having firft killed the ty- 
 ' rant ; and foon after Ceraunia did the like ; 
 * for Ifeas their tyrant, confidering how that 
 ' thofe of 7I']gium had expelled their garrifon, 
 ' and he who governed in Bura was already flain 
 " by the practices of Marcus and the Achaians, 
 " and that it would be his lot to have tliem all 
 " quickly for enemies, he therefore refigned the 
 " dominion, after having firft ilipulaccd with the 
 '* Achaians for his indemnity for what was pafied, 
 '' and fo incorporated the city into the union of 
 " the Achaians. 
 
 " The cities then we have mentioned con- 
 " tinued for the fpace of five-anci-twenty years to 
 " preierve this form of government unchanged, 
 '* chuhng in their general ailembly two pra-^tors 
 *' (or prcfidcnts) and a fecretary. Afterwards 
 ^' they concluded to have but one prxtor only, 
 who fiiould be charged with the management 
 cf i:h':^;r .itiairs ; and the rirft who enjoyed that 
 
 " dignity 
 
 (( 
 
 ff
 
 300 Ancient Democratical Republics. 
 
 " dignity was Marcus the Carian, who, after four 
 " years of his adminifiration, gave place to Ara- 
 *' tus the Sicyonian, who, at the age of twenty 
 " years, after he had, by his virtue and refolu- 
 " tion, refcued his country from tyranny, joined 
 " it to the commonwealth of the Achaians, fo 
 " great a veneration had he from his youth for 
 *' the manners and inftitutions of that people. 
 *' Eight years after, he was a fecond time choil^n 
 " prsetor, and won Acro-corinth, which Antigo- 
 '* nus had fortified with a garrifon, whereby Aratus 
 '' freed all Greece from no fmali apprehenfion. 
 " When he had reftored liberty to Corinth, he 
 *' united it to the Achaians, together with the 
 *' cicy of Megara, which he got by intelligence 
 *' during his prcetorfhip. in a word, Aratus, 
 " who, in a fhort fpace, brought many and great 
 " things to pafs, made it manileft, by his councils 
 *' and aclions, that his greatetl aim was the ex- 
 *' puifion of the Macedonians out of Pclopon- 
 *' nefus, to fupprefs tyranny, and afiert the liber- 
 " ty of his country : fo that, during the whole 
 ** reign of Antigonus Gonatus, Aratus conftantly 
 *' oppofed all his defigns and enterprizes, as he 
 
 " and, as in all the tranfactions of his adminif- 
 " tration he gave fmgular evidences of a fteady 
 " mind and firm refolution, all his attempts fuc- 
 " ceeded accordingly, notwithftanding many dates 
 " confederated to hinder the union, and to deflroy 
 " the commonwealth of the Achaians. After the 
 *' death of Antigonus the Achaians entered into a 
 " league with the /Etoliam, and generoufly af- 
 ** fifted them in their war againft Demetrius ; lo 
 *' that the ancient hatred between thefe two peo- 
 " pie feemed for ri.e preient extinguilhed, and 
 
 Li>w
 
 'Achata. 501 
 
 the defire of concord began, by degrees, to 
 grow in the minds of the i^itolians. Demetrius 
 died, when many great and noble occafions were 
 given to the Achaians of finifhing the projeft 
 they had conceived; for the tyrants who reign- 
 ed in Peloponnefus, having loft: the fupport of 
 Demetrius, who greatly favoured them, began 
 now to defpair; and, on the other hand, being 
 awed by Aratus, who admonilhed them to quit 
 their governments, on promife of great honours 
 and rewards to luch as voluntarily refigned, 
 and threatening others with hoflility who re- 
 fufed ; whereupon they refolved to defpoil 
 themfelves of their dignities, reftore their peo- 
 " pie to liberty, and incorporate them with the 
 *' Achaians. As to Lyfidas, the Megalopolitan, 
 he, wifely forefeeing what was likely to come to 
 pafs, frankly renounced his dominion during 
 the life of Demetrius, and was received into 
 the general confederacy of rights and privileges 
 with the whole nation. Ariftomachus, tyrant 
 of the Argicus, Xeno of the Hermionians, and 
 Cleonymus of the Phliatians, refigning their 
 authority at the time we mention, were likcwifc 
 received into the alliance of the Achaians. In 
 the mean time the iEtolians began to conceive 
 jealoufies at tiie growing greatnefs and extra- 
 ordinary fuccefs of the Achaians, and bafely 
 entered into a Ica^Tue with Antigonus, who at 
 tliat time governed Maccdon, and with Cleo- 
 menes, king of the Lacedaemonians. Thefc 
 three powers, Macedonia, Lacedaemon, and 
 iEcolia, were to invade Achala on all fides ; 
 but the great political abilities of Aratus de- 
 feated the enterprize. lie confidered that An- 
 tigonus was a mian of experience, and wiilino" 
 enough to make allianceb ; and that princes
 
 3<52 Ancient Democratical Rfpublics. 
 
 " have naturally neither friends nor enemies, buc 
 meafure amities and enmities by the rules of 
 intereft : he therefore endeavoured, after a good 
 underftanding with that prince, and determined 
 to propole the joining the forces of the Acha- 
 *' ians to his. He propofed to cede him fome 
 towns ; 2.nd the alliance was formed, and the 
 Cleomenic v/ar commenced. In the profecution 
 of it, Cleomenes and his Spartans difplayed the 
 utmoft ferocity and cruely, particularly at 
 " 7?igium, where he put in pradtice fo many out- 
 " rages and cruelties of war, that he left not fo 
 *' much as any appearance that it had been ever 
 " a peopled place." There is great reafon to fuf- 
 pe6l that the Achaians were not lefs guilty of 
 cruelty , for Polybius profelTes to follow the ac- 
 count given by Aratus himfelf, in a hiftory which 
 that pr^tor wrote of Achaia, who may be well 
 fufpefted of partiality ; and Polybius himfelf was 
 the fon of Lycortas of Megalopolis, who perfeded 
 and confirmed the confederacy of the Achaians, 
 and difcovers throughout his hiflory a ilrong at- 
 tachment to this people. If the hiitory of Ciear- 
 chus was extant, we might pofTibly fee that the 
 Achaians, the Spartans, and Macedonians, were 
 equally liable to the accufation of inhumanity. 
 Mantinsca was fubjeCted to unfpeakable calamities 
 as well as i^gium , but Polybius endeavours to 
 cover this over with a veil by abufing Clearchus, 
 accufmg him with departing from the dignity of 
 hiftory and writing tragedies, by reprefenring wo- 
 men with dilhevelled hair and naked brealis, em- 
 bracing each other with melting lamentations and 
 tears, and complaints of men, womien, and chil- 
 dren, dragged away promifcuoufly. He attempts 
 to juftify the punifhment of this city, by charg- 
 ing it with treacheroufly betraying itlelf into the 
 
 hands
 
 Achaia, 3^5 
 
 hands of the Spartans, and maflacring the Achaian 
 garrifon : but this was no more than the ufual' 
 cffed: of the continual revolutions in the Greek 
 cities, from democracy to arillocracy, from that 
 to monarchy, and back again through the whole 
 circle. In every one of thefe cities there were 
 three parties ; a monarchical party, who defired 
 to be governed by a king or tyrant, as he was 
 then called ; an ariftocratical party, who wiihed 
 to erect an oligarchy ; and a democratical party, 
 who were zealous for bringing all to a level. 
 Each fadlion was for collecting all authority into 
 one center in its own way ; but unfortunately 
 there was no party who thought of a mixture of 
 all thel'e three orders, and giving each a negative 
 by which it might balance the other two : ac- 
 cordingly the regal party applied to Macedonian 
 kings for aids and garrifons ; the ariftocratical 
 citizens applied to Sparta for the like afliftance ; 
 and the democratical factions applied to Aratus 
 and the Achaian league. The confequence was, 
 as each party prevailed, they brought in a new 
 garrifon, and maflacred the old one, together 
 with the leaders of the faction fubdued. But is 
 fuch a fyftem to be recommended to the United 
 States of America ? If the Americans had no 
 more difcretion tlian the Greeks, no more hu- 
 manity, no more confideration for the benign and 
 peaceful religion they profcfs, they would ftiU 
 have to coniidcr, that the Greeks had in many 
 places forty flavcs, and in all places ten, to one 
 free citizen j that the flavcs did all the labour, 
 and the free citizens had nothing to do but cue 
 one anothers throats. Wars did not coft money 
 in Greece , happily for the world, at prelent 
 they are very expenfive. An American Ibldier will 
 not ferve one year, without more money for pay 
 
 than
 
 ^04 'Ancient Democratkal Repuhlics". 
 
 than many of thefe Greek cities had for their 
 whole circulating medium. There is but one pof- 
 fiblc means of realizing Mr. Turgot's idea. Let 
 us examine it well before we adopt it. Let every 
 town in the Thirteen States be a free fovereign 
 and independent democracy : here you may nearly 
 colled all authority into one center, and that 
 center the nation. Thefe towns will immediately 
 go to war with each other, and form combina- 
 tions, alliances, and political intrigues, as ably as 
 the Grecian villages did : but thefe wars and 
 negotiations cannot be carried on but by men at 
 leifure. The firft ftep to be taken then, is to de- 
 termine who lliall be freemen, and who flaves. 
 Let this be determined by lot. In every fifty 
 men, forty are to be flaves, and flay at home un- 
 armed, under certain overfeers provided with good 
 whips and fcourges, to labour in agriculture and 
 mechanic arts. All commerce and navigation, 
 filheries, &c. are to ceafe of courfe. The other 
 ten are to be free citizens, live like gentlemen, 
 eat black broth, and go out to war ; fome in fa- 
 vour of tyrants, fome for the well-born, and fome 
 for the multitude : for, even in the fuppofuion 
 here made, every town will have three parties in 
 it ; fome will be for making the moderator a 
 king, others for giving the whole government to 
 the feleft men, and a third fort for making and 
 executing all laws, and judging all caufes, crimi- 
 nal and civil, in. town meeting. Americans will 
 well confider the confequences of fuch fyftems of 
 policy, and fuch multiplications and divifions of 
 ilates, and will univerfally fee and feel the necef- 
 fity of adopting the fentiments of Aratus, as re- 
 ported by Plutarch : " That fmall cities could 
 *' be preferved by nothing elfe but a continual 
 '' and combined force, united by the bond of 
 
 12 !' common
 
 Crele, 505 
 
 " common interefl j and as the members of the 
 " body live and breathe by their miicuai com- 
 " munication and connection, and wht-n once fe- 
 " paratcd pine away and putrify, in the fame 
 *' manner are cities ruined by being difmembered 
 *' from one another, as well as preferved when, 
 *' linked together into one great body, they en- 
 *' joy the benefit of that providence iind council 
 " that governs the whole." Thefe were the {tuci' 
 tiraents which, according- to the fame Plutarch, 
 acquired him fo much of the confidence of the 
 Achaians, *' that fince he could not by law be 
 " chofcn their general every year, yet every other 
 *' year he was, and by his councils and aftions 
 " was in effed: always fo ; for they perceived that 
 " neither riches nor repute, nor the friendfliip of 
 " kings, nor the private intercfb of his own coun- 
 *' try, nor any other thing elfe, was fo dear to him 
 " as the increafe of the Achaian power and greac- 
 " ncfs." 
 
 LETTER XLIV. 
 
 CRETE. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 THIS celebrated ifland, with the fantafljic.^l 
 honour of j;iving birth to fome of the gods 
 of Greece, had the real merit and glory of com- 
 municating to that country many ufcful improve- 
 ments. Their infular iituation defended them from 
 invalions by land, and tlieir proximity to Egypt 
 afforded t!iem an eafy intercourfe of conjmerce by 
 
 X fea
 
 3o6 Ancieni Bemocrntical Repiihlics. 
 
 fea with the capital of that kingdom ; where 
 Rhadamanthus in his travels had colledled thofe 
 inventions and inftitiuions of a civilized people, 
 which he had the addrefs to apply to the con- 
 firmation of his own authority. Minos is ftill 
 more diftinguifhed : in his travels in the eaii, he 
 faw certain families pofleiTed of unrivalled ho- 
 nours and unlimited authority, as vicegerents of 
 the Deity. Although the Greeks would never ad- 
 mit, in the fuUeft latitude of oriental fuperftition 
 and defpotifm, this odious profanation, yet Minos, 
 taking advantage of his own unbounded reputa- 
 tion, and that enthufiafm for his perfon which his 
 fkill and fortune in war, his genius for fcience, 
 and talents for government, had excited among 
 wandering credulous lavages, fpread a report that 
 he was admitted to familiar converfations with 
 Jupiter, and received from that deity his fyftem 
 of laws, with orders to engrave it on tables of 
 brafs. The great principle of it Vv'as, that all 
 freemen fhould be equal, and therefore that none 
 lliould have any property in lands or goods , but 
 that citizens ll:iould be ferved by Daves, who 
 fhould cultivate the lands upon public account. 
 The citizens Ihould dine at public tables, and 
 their families fubfift on the public flock. The 
 monarch's authority v>/as extremely limited, ex- 
 cept in war. The magidracies were the recom- 
 pence of merit and age , and fuperiority was al- 
 lowed to nothing elie. The youth were reftrained 
 to a rigid temperance, modeily, and morality, en- 
 forced by law. Their education, which was pub- 
 lic, was direfted to make them foldiers. Such 
 regulations could not fail to fecure order, and 
 what they called freedom to the citizens ; but 
 nine-tenths of mankind were doomed to flavery 
 10 fupporc them in total idlenefs, excepting thofe 
 
 exercifes
 
 Crete. 307 
 
 exercifcs proper for warriors, become more necef- 
 fary to keep the flaves in fubjeftion, than to de- 
 fend the fiate againft the pirates and robbers 
 with whom the age abounded. Idomcneus, grand- 
 fon of Minos, and commander of the Cretan forces 
 in the I'rojan war, was among the mod powerful 
 of the Grecian chiefs, and one of the few who re- 
 turned in fafety from that expedition. Here was 
 a government of all authority in one centre, and 
 that centre the moft aged and meritorious perfons 
 of the nation, with little authority in the king, and 
 none in the reft of the people-, yet it was not of 
 fufficient ftrengtii to hold together. The venera- 
 ble old men could not endure the authority, or 
 rather the pre-eminence, of the king. Monarchy 
 muft be abolifhcd \ and every principal city be- 
 came early a fcparate independent commonwealth ; 
 each, no doubt, under its patriarch, baron, noble, 
 or archon, for they all fignify the fame thing : and 
 continual wars cnfued between the fevcral repub- 
 lics within the ifland ; and Cretan valour and 
 martial flvill were employed and exhaufted in 
 butchering one another, until they turned all 
 the virtues they had left againft mankind in gene- 
 ral, and exerted them in piracies and robberies, 
 to their univerlal infamy throughout: all Greece : 
 nor was Crete cvir oi any weight in Grecian 
 politics after the Ticjan v.'ur. 
 
 X 2 LETTER
 
 5o8 Ancient BemGcratical Repuhlia. 
 
 LETTER XLV. 
 
 C O R I N T Ft. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 MONARCHY remained in this emporium 
 of Greece longer than in any other of the 
 principal cities j but the noble families here 
 could no better endure the fuperiority of a mo- 
 narch, than others in all countries ; and with nu- 
 merous branches of the royal family (named Bac- 
 chidse, from Bacchis, fifth monarch in fucceffion 
 from Aletes) at their head, they accordingly put 
 to death Teleftes, the reigning monarch ; and 
 ufurping the government, under an afTociation 
 among themfelves, inilituted an oligarchy. An 
 annual firft magiftrate, with the title of Frytanis, 
 but with very limited prerogativer, like a doge of 
 Venice, was chofen from among themfelves. Seve- 
 ral generations pafled away under the adminiilra- 
 tion of this odious clicrarchy , but the people at 
 length finding it intolerably opprefiive, expelled 
 the whole junto, and let up Cuypfelus as a mo- 
 narch or tyrant. He had long been the head of 
 the popular party, and was defervediy a popular 
 character, polfelled of ihe confidence and aficclioa 
 of his fellow-cnizcns lo a great deerce, or he 
 never ccui.. have retuicd the guard which was 
 offered him r.,r the pottclion ot his perfon againO: 
 the attemp.. of the defeated oligarchy. His mo- 
 deration and clemency are allowed by all; yet 
 he is univcrfaily called by the Grecian writers 
 
 8 Tyrant
 
 Corinth. 309 
 
 Tyrant of Corinth, and his government a Tyran- 
 ny. Ariftotle, 1. v. c. 12, informs us that his 
 tyranny continued thirty years, becaufe he was a 
 popular man, and governed without guards. Pe- 
 riander, one of the feven wife men, his fon and 
 fuccefTor, reigned forty-four years, becaufe he was 
 an able general. Pfampfneticus, the fon of Gor- 
 gias, fucceeded, but his reign was fliort ; yet this 
 fpace of fcventy feven years is thought by Arif- 
 totle one of the longefi: examples of a tyrrany or 
 an oligarchy. At the end of this period the no- 
 blts again prevailed ; but not without courting 
 the people. The tyranny was demoliflied, and a 
 new commonwealth eftablifhed, in which there was 
 a mixture of oligarchy and democracy, to prevent 
 the hrfl from running into excefs of opprefilon, 
 and the other into turbulence and licence. 
 
 Here we find the ufual circle : monarchy firfl: 
 limited by nobles only ; then the nobles, becom- 
 ing envious and impatient of the monarch's pre- 
 eminence, demolifli him, and fet up oligarchy. 
 This grows infolenc and oppreffive to the people, 
 who let up a favourite to pull it down. The new 
 idol's polLcrity grow infolent -, and the people final- 
 ly think of introducing a mixture of three regular 
 branriies of power, in the one, the few, and the 
 many, to controul one anotlicr, to be guardians 
 in turn to the laws, and feeure equal liberty to 
 all. 
 
 Ariiloile, in this chapter, cenfurcs fome parts 
 of the eighth book of Plato, and fays, *' That in 
 " general, when governments alter, they chanorc 
 into the contrary Ipecies to \vhat tl.ey before 
 were, and not into one like the former : and 
 " this reafoning holds true of other changes. For 
 *' he fays, tliat trom the Lacedaemonian form it 
 *' changes into an oligarchy, and from thence 
 
 X ^ " into
 
 310 ^Ancient Democratical Republics. 
 
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 <c 
 
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 4C 
 
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 <( 
 
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 ec 
 
 (C 
 
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 cc 
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 cc 
 cc 
 
 into a democracy, and from a democracy into 
 a tyranny ; and fometimes a contrary change 
 takes place, as from a democracy into an oli- 
 garchy, rather than into a monarchy. With re- 
 fped: to a tyranny, he neither fays whether 
 there will be any change in it ; or, if not, to 
 what caufe it will be owing , or, if there is, in- 
 to what other ftate it will alter : but the reafon 
 of this is, that a tyranny is an indeterminate 
 government ; and, according to him, every ftate 
 ought to alter into the firib and moft perfed: : 
 thus the continuity and circle would be pre- 
 ferved. But one tyranny often changed into 
 another ; as at Syria, from Muros to Clif- 
 thenes ; or into an oligarchy, as was Antileos 
 at Chalcas ; or into a democracy, as was Cha- 
 rilaus's at Laccd^Emon, and at Carthage. An 
 oligarchy is alfo changed into a tyranny : fuch 
 was the rife of moft of the ancient tyrannies in 
 Sicily : at Leontium, into the tyranny of Pa- 
 ncetius ; at Gela, into that of Cleander ; at 
 Rhegium, into that of Anaxilaus -, and the like 
 in many other cities. It is abftird alfo to fup- 
 pofe, that a ftate is changed into an oligarchy 
 becaufe thofe who are in power are avaricious 
 and greedy of money ; and not becaule thofe, 
 who are by far richer than their fellow-citizens, 
 think it unfair that thofe who have nothing 
 fhould have an equal fhare in the rule of the 
 ftate with themfelves, who poftefs fo much : for 
 in many oligarchies it is not allowable to be 
 employed in money - getting, and there are 
 many laws to prevent it. But in Carthage, 
 which is a deajocracy, money-getting is credit- 
 able ; and yet their form of goverment re^ 
 mains unaltered." 
 
 Whether thefe obfervations pf Ariftotle upon 
 
 Plat(^
 
 Argos. 311 
 
 Plato be all juft or nor, they only ferve to 
 ftrengthen our argument, by (hewing the muta- 
 bility of fimple governments in a fuller light. 
 Not denying any of the changes Hated by Plato, 
 he only enumerates a multitude of other changes 
 to which fuch governments are liable , and there- 
 fore fliews the greater necefTity of mixtures of 
 different orders, and decifive balances, to preferve 
 mankind from thofe horrible calamities which re- 
 volutions always bring with^them. 
 
 LETTER XLVL 
 
 A R G S. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 IN order to form an adequate idea of the mife- 
 ries which were brought upon the Greeks by 
 continual and innumerable revolutions of govern- 
 ment, it fhouki be confidered, that the whole Pe- 
 loponnefus was fcarcely two hundred miles in 
 length, and one hundred and forty in breadth, 
 not much more extenfive than the Imalleft of the 
 Thirteen States of America. Such an inherent 
 force of repulfion, fuch a dir[)ofition to fly to 
 pieces, as poflefTed the minds of the Greeks, 
 would divide America into thoufands of petty 
 defpicable Hates, and lay a certain foundation for 
 irreconcileable wars. 
 
 Although Thucidydes and Ariftotle, as well 
 
 as Homer, inform us, that kingdoms were here- 
 
 X 4 ditary.
 
 3 1 2 Ancient Democratical Republics. 
 
 dit. ry, and of limited authority, yet the limita- 
 tions appear to be very confufed , they v;ere the 
 limitatinns of nobles rather than of neople , and 
 the firft ftruggles for power were between kings 
 and archons. The kings had no ftanding ar- 
 mies ; and all the forces under their authority, 
 even when they took the field, could be com- 
 manded only by the nobles, who had their pecu- 
 liar diftrids of land and people to govern : thefe 
 were illuilrious and independent citizens ; like 
 the barons who demanded the great charter, com- 
 municated to each other their grievances, and 
 took meafures to remove them : but, being ge- 
 nerally as averfe to popular as to regal power, 
 their conilant aim was an ariilccracy -, they ac- 
 cordingly extinguifhed monarchy, but did nor 
 fecure the -rights of the people. The immediate 
 efFe6l of this revolution only multiplied evils. 
 OppreiTed by kings, Greece was much more op- 
 prelTed by archons; and, anciently too much di> 
 vided, was ftill more fubdivided under the new 
 forms of government. Many inferior cities dif- 
 daincd the juriididlion, and even the fuperior in- 
 fluence, of their refpeclive capitals ; affeiled inde- 
 pendent fovereignty ; and each town maintained 
 war with its neighbours. Each independent flate 
 had a right to fend tvv'o members to the Amphic- 
 tyonic council. The abolition of royalty render- 
 ing the independent ilates more numerous, in- 
 creafed the number of Amphic:yons to one hun- 
 dred me^nbers, and more ; and an oath was re- 
 quired, that the mem.ber fhould never fubvert 
 any Amphictyonic city: yet every excels of ani- 
 mofity prevailed among the Grecian republics, 
 notwirhitanding the interpofition of the Am- 
 phidyons. 
 
 Argos
 
 Argos, 313 
 
 Argos was founded by Danaus, the Egyptian, 
 about the time that Athens was fettled by Ce- 
 crops. At the Trojan war it was the firft of the 
 ftates, and ever continued the rival of Sparta. 
 Though the royal dignity feemed more firmly 
 lettled under Agamemnon than under any other 
 chief, yet Argos was one of the firft of the ftates 
 upon the continent to abolilli monarchy, and that 
 as early as on the death of Celfus, fon of Teme- 
 nus, tiie defcendant of Hercules. No account of 
 Its nt vv conllitution is preferved : but, from ana- 
 logy, we may be convinced, that a relllcfs body 
 of nobles overturned the monarchy ; and, as it 
 was fubjecfl to frequent and violent diforders, that 
 the archons could not agree upon the form of 
 their olif2;archy; and fet up for independency m 
 their different diftridls, ftates, or cities, a littie 
 iooner than in other republics. The higlier and 
 lower ranks were continually at variance-, the de- 
 mocratical faction was commonly fuperior; fome- 
 times tyrants were let up over all , and once, ac- 
 co!\lii)g to Herodotus *, the flaves got poiTeliion 
 of the city, took upon them the adminiftration of 
 affairs, and exercifed the ma^iftracies. 
 
 The government muft have been ill confti- 
 tutcd, as no Rhadamanthus or Minos, no Ly- 
 curgiis or Solon, no Zaleucus or Charondas, nor 
 any otlier legiilator of lupcrior wildom and pro- 
 bity, ever acquired the power; and no fortunate 
 coincidence of circumftances ever occurred, to 
 unite liberty and adminiftration, Ic^w and govern- 
 ment, upon a ftable bafis. One famous tyrant, 
 rheidon, lineal fucceftbr of Hercules, a prince 
 of great abilities but no moderation, raiTed him- 
 IcJr, rather than his country, to a luperijrity 
 
 Lib. vi. 
 
 which
 
 314 Ancient Bemocratkal Republics. 
 
 which ceafed with him. For want of diflin6l 
 orders, and fteady balances, by which the wills 
 and the forces of the people might have been 
 fubjefled to the laws, Argos loft that pre-emi- 
 nence among the Grecian ftates, which it had ob- 
 tained under a monarchy. Every little town in 
 Argolis was feized with the caprice of indepen- 
 dence, and oppofed the general government, at 
 the fame time that the metropolis betrayed an 
 ambition to domineer over the inferior towns. 
 Civil wars enfued : Mycens, Trcezenc, Epi- 
 daurus, and other villages of lefs confequence, 
 were often conquered and garrifoned, but never 
 lubdued. Necellity taught them to unite. They 
 reproached Argos with tyranny, and Argos the 
 others with rebellion. Union enabled them to 
 let at defiance their capital, by means of in- 
 trigues and alliances with Laced^emon, the never- 
 failing refource of one party or the other in every 
 democratical ftate. The pretence v/as, the Per- 
 fian war, which Argos declined. This was call- 
 ed a bafe dereliftion, and excited, by the help of 
 Spartan emiflaries, hatred and contempt in Si- 
 cyon, Naupila, Heliasa, and other towns, be- 
 iides thofe mentioned before. Argos alone, of 
 all the cities inthcPeloponnefus, openly efpoufed 
 the caufe of Athens. This circumftance alone, 
 if it was not accidental, is enough to fhow, that 
 this city had more fenfe and profound wifdom 
 than all the reft ; for Sparta was certainly then 
 Jeading all Greece to deftruftion. In other re- 
 fpedls the Argives difcovered the fame temper, 
 and the fame underftanding, with all the others j 
 for they led their whole forces againft Mycen^, 
 took it by ftorm, decimated the inhabitants, and 
 demoliftied the town. Is it not fublime wifdom, 
 to rulh headlong into all the diftradions and di- 
 
 vifionsj
 
 IphiiHS. 315 
 
 vifions, all the aflafTinations and maflacrcs, all 
 the feditions, rebellions, and eternal revolutions, 
 which are the certain confequence of the want of 
 orders and balances, merely for the fake of the 
 popular caprice of having every fifty families go- 
 verned by all authority in one centre ? Even 
 this would not fatisfy j the fifty families would 
 foon diflblve their union, and nothing would ever 
 content them fhort of the complete individual in- 
 dependence of the Mohawks -, for it may be de- 
 pended on, that individual independence is what 
 every unthinking human heart aims at nearly or 
 remotely. 
 
 LETTER XLVII, 
 
 I P H I T U S. 
 
 Dear Sir, 
 
 ELEIA had been the fcene of athletic games, 
 celebrated with great pomp by aflemblies of 
 chiefs from various parts of Greece. Iphitus, a 
 grandfon of Oxylus, fucceeded to the throne of 
 Elis. A6live and enterprifing, but not by in- 
 clination a foldier, he was anxious for a remedy 
 for the diforderly fituation of his country. Among 
 all the violence, feuds, and wars, fuperftition 
 maintained its empire, and the oracle of Delphi 
 was held in veneration. 
 
 Iphitus lent an embafly to fupplicate informa- 
 Vion from the deity, " How the anger of the gods, 
 
 :' which
 
 3 1 6 Ani^knt Deynocratlcal Repullics. 
 
 '* which threatened total deflruclion to Pelopon- 
 *' ncfus, throufzh the endlcfs hoftilities among 
 its people, might be averted ?'* He received 
 an anfwer, which he had probably d:<5lated, " That 
 " the Olympian feftivai mull be rtllored : for 
 *' that the negieft of that foiemnity had brought 
 *' on the Greeks the indignation of Jupiter and 
 *' Hercules; to the firft of whom "it was dedi- 
 " cated, and by the laft of whom it had been in- 
 *' ftituted." Iphitus proceeded to model his in- 
 flitution , and ordained that a fcfbival fhould be 
 held at the temple of Jupiter at Olympia, near 
 Pila in Eleia, for ail the Greeks to partake in, 
 and that it fhould be repeated every fourth year; 
 that there lliould be facrihces to Jupiter and Her- 
 cules, and games in honour of them -, that an ar- 
 miftice fhould take place throughout Greece for 
 fome time before the commencement of the fefti- 
 val, and continue fome time after its conclufion. 
 A tradition was reported, that the Heraclides had 
 appointed Oxyius to the throne of Elis, and the 
 guardianfnip of the temple of Olympian Jupiter, 
 and confecrated all Eleia to the god. A reputa- 
 tion of fandfity became attached to the whole peo- 
 ple of Eleia, as the hereditary priefthood of Ju- 
 piter ; and feCiUdcd them from all neceffity of 
 cngp.ging in politics or v/ar. But it v.-as not 
 poffible, by any inftitutions of religion, to de- 
 Itroy that elailicity given by nature to the mind 
 cf man, v/hich excites coniinualiy to adion, often 
 palpably againfl men's interefts, which was ftrong 
 in the general temiper of the Greeks, and which 
 can never be fubdued or reftrained in any nation 
 but by orders and balances. Reftlefs fpirits arofe, 
 not to be fatisfcd. The Eleians often engaged 
 as auxiliaries in the wars of other ftates, on pre- 
 tence of ailcrting the caufe of religion ; but even 
 
 in
 
 Iphitus, 317 
 
 in that caufe itfclf they could not agree among 
 themfelves. While monarchy fubfilled in the 
 pollerity of Iphitus, as it did for Ibme genera- 
 tions, Eleia continued under one government; 
 but at length the fpirit of democracy prevailed 
 there, as elfewhere in Greece, and with the fame 
 efFccls : every town claimed independency ; Pifa 
 and Eiis became feparate commonwealths. Olym- 
 pia was fituated within the territory of Pifa, on 
 the northern bank of the river x\lpheius, which 
 alone feparated it from that city. Elis was thirty 
 miles diilant; but the Kleians retained the guar- 
 dianfhip of the temple, and fuperintendency of 
 the feilival. The Pifseans now ddputed their 
 right ; wars arcfe between the two cities ; each 
 endeavoured to gain allies. At one time, Phei- 
 don, tyrant of Argos, claimiing to be by birth 
 the proper reprcrcntative of Hercules, took to 
 himfeif the guardianfliip of the temple, and pre- 
 fided at the games ; at another tiine the Pifii^ans 
 prevailed, and prefided at foir,e Olympiads. Ac 
 length the Eleans deflroyeu Pifa lb entirely, that 
 not a ru.n was left; and ever arter, excepting ;a 
 the 104th Olympiad, when the Arcadians vio- 
 lently interfered, tlicy h'_id the preiidency undif- 
 turbed. 
 
 \i a democracy could ever, in any cafe, hold 
 togcciier, it v/oald be nati'.ral to expect it in this 
 i:iilitution of Ipliitu:;, wh.i. ]i, ibunded wholly on 
 religion, had procjred lo nvjch prolperity and 
 veneration to ;::s pe;i:j!e : but it is as rational to 
 cxpcCt that a glais bubble, with a drop of water 
 inchMl'd in ir, v/iil r'.fifl ih.c heat of the iire : the 
 vapour vyiL!i:n v/il! loiall it liuo dull and atoms. 
 
 L E 1' T E R
 
 3 1 8 Ancient Dembcratical Repullks, 
 
 LETTER XLVIIL 
 
 THEBES, 
 
 Dear Sir, 
 
 FABLE, and hiftory too, relate that this citj^ 
 was governed anciently by kings , fixteen of 
 whom, from Cadmus the Phoenician, who founded 
 it, to Xanthus, are enumerated. After the death 
 of the lall, the Thebans changed their govern- 
 ment to a democratical republic. Their orders 
 and balances are not known , but their factions 
 and divifions, as well as their dulnefs, is remem- 
 bered. From the analogy of all the other Gre- 
 cian dates, it is probable that archons prefided 
 over the feveral cities of Boeotia, as their fepa- 
 rate diftridls, and had a king at their head, like 
 Ulyffes in Ithaca, and Alcinous in Phseacia , that 
 the king, whofe domain was Thebes, had fome- 
 times an inclination to favour his capital more 
 than the fubordinate towns ; and that the archons 
 grew impatient of his monarchy, and afpired ac 
 independency : the jealoufy and rivalry of cities 
 favoured the factious views of the archons, and 
 were probably fomented for that purpole. 
 
 Is it an initance of their want of penetration, 
 or was it from neceffity, that they chofe the two 
 heads of oppofite fadions for their highefl: annual 
 magiftrates ? Ifmenias was one ; an honefl man, 
 a friend to liberty, and confequently an advo- 
 cate for an equilibrium of pov/crs in the confti- 
 tution. Leontidas, the other, was ambitious of 
 the whole power to himfclf, and of governing 
 
 by
 
 ^hehes: 3 if 
 
 "by a council of his friends-, but, finding his rival 
 more popular than himfelf, he fold the citadel to 
 a Spartan general, upon condition that he and 
 his party fhould rule. When this was eflfefted, 
 he feized his colleague, and had him tried, con- 
 demned, and executed, for caballing againjl the gO" 
 vernment. The friends of Ifmenias fled in a pa- 
 nic, and were baniflied by a public edi6l ; for it 
 feems that a revolution without banilhments and 
 confifcations, at lead, is a degree of moderation 
 and felf-government of which nations are wholly 
 incapable. The exiled citizens, who in this cafe 
 were the honeft men and friends of liberty, among 
 whom was Pelopidas, returned from Athens ia 
 difguife, deftroyed the tyrant and his crew, and, 
 with the help of Epaminondas and his friends, 
 regained the citadel. Thefe two fages and heroes 
 had now enough to do : firft, to infpire a little 
 iinderftanding and unanimity into their fellow- 
 citizens , then to difcipline them for war, and 
 conquer their enemies ; and, at laft, to frame a. 
 good conftitution of government. They accom- 
 plifhed all but the laft, to their immortal glory : 
 but Pelopidas was killed in battle, before the 
 war was finilhed ; and Epaminondas grew unpo- 
 pular, and was rejedled by faction even from the 
 command of the army : a fufficient proof that 
 the ariftocratical and democratical fatStions were 
 nearly equal. He was reinftated, indeed, after 
 the blunders and defeats of liis fuccefTor had 
 brought the citizen! to repentance-, but was (lain 
 in battle at the moment of vidory : fo that the 
 Theban republic never had the benefit of his ad- 
 vice in the formation of a new code of laws ; 
 as flie had never made any figure, excepting a 
 momentary fame under thcfe two srcat men, and 
 was at length totally deftrovcd by Alexander. 
 
 I ' ' The
 
 320 Ancient Bemocratkal Republics. 
 
 The ruin of Bceotia was occafioned by the fi- 
 nefle of Antalcidas, in his Peifian treaty. Tlie 
 Thehans, as well as Argives, had withheld their 
 afiiftance in the Perfian war. Antalcidas knev/ 
 that the fubordinate cities of I'hcfpis, Platea, 
 Aulis, Anthemon, Larymna, Afchra, Coronca, 
 Labadea, Delium, Alalkomene, .Leu(5tra, Chas- 
 ronea, all wifhed for independence \ they accord- 
 ingly rejefted the jurifdidtion and fovereignry of 
 Thebes. The Thebans folicited Sparta to take 
 a part in their domeftic quarrels ; and, againft 
 her own favourite treary, made by her artful am- 
 bafiador, fhe accepted the propolal. The vir- 
 tuous and amiable Spartan fenate perceived that 
 it was equally their intereft that Argos fhould 
 lofe her jurifdidion over her revoked tov^ns, 
 and that Thebes, the rival neighbour of Athens, 
 Ihould recover her authority in Eceotia ; but, not- 
 withftanding partial fuccclTes, fiie could not re- 
 gain her auihority over all the cities, until Epa- 
 minondas arofe, after eighty years of civil wars. 
 Had there been a governor in Eceotia, and a fe- 
 nate, and a houfe of reprefentacives, compofed 
 of an equitable proportion of deputies from 
 Thebes and all the lefier cities and each of rhefe 
 branches polTefied of an independent negative in 
 the legiPiature, while the whole executive was in 
 the governor would thtfe civil wars have hap- 
 pened ? thefe endiefs contendons between the no- 
 bles and people, the capital and fubordinate ci- 
 ties ? theie intrigues of one party with Athens, 
 and another with Sparta ? The very difinclina- 
 tion, both in Thebes and Argos, to engage in 
 the Ferfian war, arofe wholly from tlicir domeltic 
 diffenfions; and thefe from the want of judicious 
 orders and balances. 
 
 After
 
 Thebes. 321 
 
 After the abolition of monarchy in Boeotia, 
 there was an effort to colled all authority into 
 one center ; but the nation found, that, although 
 laws might be thus made, they could not be io 
 executed. There muft, therefore, be an execu- 
 tive magiftrate ; but not being able to agree, in 
 drder to pleafe both fides, the leader of each 
 faftion mult be chofen. They could not agree, 
 as might have been forefeen, and fplit the na- 
 tion at once into two hoftile armies ; one of 
 which fought the alliance of Sparta, and the 
 other that of Athens, Thus it ever was, and 
 ever will be, in fimilar cafes. It is much to be 
 regretted, that Epaminondas did not live to dif- 
 play his talents as a legiflator ; the world might 
 pofllbly have been bleffed with fomcthing like an 
 Englifh conftitution, two or three ch^ufand yearfi 
 fooner th^n it v/as. 
 
 LETTER
 
 322 Ancient A^ijlocratical RspuMh 
 
 LETTER XLIX. 
 
 ANCIENT ARISTOCRATICAL 
 REPUBLICS. 
 
 C R O T O N A. 
 PYTHAGORAS. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 PYTHAGORAS, as well as Socrates, Plato, 
 and Xenophon, were perfuaded that the hap- 
 pinefs of nations depended chiefly on the form of 
 their government: they were fully fenfible of the 
 real mifery, as well as dangerous tendency, both 
 of democratical licentioufnefs and monarchical ty- 
 ranny ', they preferred a well-tempered ariftocra- 
 cy to all other governments. Pythagoras and 
 Socrates, having no idea of three independent 
 branches in the legiflature, both thought, that 
 the laws could neither prevent t!ie arbitrary op- 
 preflions of magiftrates, nor turbulent infolence 
 of the people, until mankind were habituated by 
 education and difcipline to regard the great du- 
 ties of life, and to confider a reverence of them- 
 felves, and the efteem of their feilov.'-citizens, as 
 the principal fource of their enjoyment. In fmall 
 communities, efpecially where the fiaves were 
 many, and the citizens few, this might be plau- 
 fible ; but the education of a great nation can ne- 
 ver accomplifh io great an end. Millions muft be 
 
 brought
 
 brought up, whom no principles, no fentiments 
 derived from education, can reftrain from tram- 
 pling on the laws : orders of men, watching and 
 balancing each other, are the only fecurity ; 
 power muft be oppofed to power, and intereft to 
 intercll. Pythagoras found this by experience ac 
 Crotona, where the inferior ranks, elated v;ith. 
 the deftruftion of Sybaris, and inftigated by an 
 artful ambitious leader, Cylon, clamoured for an 
 equal partition of the conquered territory : this 
 was denied them, as inconfiflent with an arifto- 
 cratical government ; a confpiracy enfued againft 
 the magiilrates, who were furprifed in the fenate- 
 houfe, many put to death, and the refl: driven 
 from their country. Pythagoras was one of the 
 baniflied, and died foon afterwards, in extreme 
 old age, at Metapontum. The Crotonians had 
 foon caufe to repent their iniurre6lion -, for they 
 were defeated, with all their forces, by the Lo- 
 crians and Rhegians, with fmaller numbers. 
 
 The other Greek, cities of Italy, which had imi- 
 tated the example of Crotona, in depofmg their 
 magiftrates, were haraffed with v/ars againft each 
 other, and againft their neighbours. In confe- 
 quence of thefe diftreffes, the difcipies of Pytha- 
 goras again recovered their reputation and influ- 
 ence-, and about fixty years alrci-rwards, Zaleucus 
 and Charondas, the one in Locris, and the other 
 in Thurium, revived the Pyrluigorean inftirutions. 
 In forty years more, a new revolution drove the 
 Pythagoreans entirely from Italy, and completed 
 the mifery of that beautiful country. Thus ex- 
 perience has ever fhewn, tiiat education as well 
 as religion, ariilocracy as W'A\ as democracv and 
 monarchy, are, lingly, totally inadequate to t!',e 
 bufinels of reftrain uig the pjfilons of men, of 
 preferving a fteady government, and protecciMg 
 
 1 2 ihw
 
 524 Ancient Arijiocratical RepuhBa, 
 
 the lives, liberties, and properties of the peaple. 
 Nothing has ever effe(5bed it but three different 
 orders of men, bound by their interelts to watch 
 over each other, and fland the guardians of the 
 laws. Religion, fuperftition, oaths, education,, 
 laws, all give way before paffions, intereft, and 
 power, which can be refifted only by pafTions, in- 
 tereft, and power. 
 
 It is no wonder that Mr. Turgot fhould have 
 entertained very crude conceptions of republican 
 legiflation , it is a fcience the Icall underftood of 
 any in the whole circle: all other orders of men 
 of letters in Europe, as well as phyficians, for a 
 long time, have thought it " litters nihil fanan- 
 ** tes." It is a kind of erudition which neither 
 procures places, penfions, embafiies, chairs in 
 academies, nor fame nor practice in the pulpit, 
 at the bar, nor in medicine. A minifter of ftate, 
 of great abilities and merit, as well as reputation, 
 advanced to the head of the affairs of a refpefta- 
 ble monarchy, by one of the greateft princes that 
 has ever lived, I mean the Baron de llertfberg, 
 has within a few years fet an example, in a royal 
 academy of fciences, of enquiry into this fubjed:. 
 In a learned and ingenious difcourfe, delivered by 
 himfelf, he has attempted to lliow the advantages 
 of fimple monarchy over ail kinds of republican 
 governments, even that beft fpecies of them, li- 
 mited monarchies : but did this worthy minifter 
 cxpedl: that any of his brother academicians would 
 conteft with him the merits of fuch governments ? 
 Men of letters are not fond of martyrdom in this 
 age, nor of ruining their reputations. It is not, 
 however, my defign to difcufs any queilicns atpre- 
 fent concerning abfolute monarchies, though the 
 principles I contend for might be traced through 
 the hiftgry of every monarchy and empire in Eu- 
 rope.
 
 Pythagoras. 325 
 
 rope. Even in thefe there are orders, check";, and 
 balances contrived, at lead againft abufes in ad- 
 minidration, and tor the prefervation of the laws. 
 The fcience of government has received very lit* 
 tie improvement fince the Greeks and Romans. 
 The neceffity of a ftrong and independent execu- 
 tive in a fingle perfon, and of three branches in 
 the legiflature inllcad of two, and of an equality 
 among the three, are improvements made by the 
 Englilh, which were unknown, at lead never re- 
 duced to pradice, by the ancients. Machiavel 
 was the firll who revived the ancient politics : 
 the bed part of his writings he tranilated almoft 
 literally from Plato and Aridotle, without ac- 
 knowledging the obligation ; and the word of the 
 fcntiments, even in his Prince, he tranilated from 
 Aridotle, without throwing upon him the re- 
 proach. Montefquieu borrowed the bed part of 
 his book from Machiavel, without acknowledg- 
 ing the quotation. Milton, Harrington, Sid- 
 ney, were intimately acquainted with the an- 
 cients, and with Machiavel. They were followed 
 by Locke, Hoadley, &c. The reputation which 
 is to be acquired by this kind of learning may 
 be judged of by the language of Mr. Hume: 
 *' Compofitions the mod defpicable, both for 
 " dyle and matter, fuch as Rapin Thoyras, 
 " Locke, Sidney, Hoadley, &c. have been ex- 
 " tolled, and propagated, and read ; as if they 
 " had equalled the mod celebrated remains of 
 *' antiquity." Hume's Hidory of England, vol. 
 viii. p. 323. Such is the ftyle in which this 
 great writer fpeaks of writings which he mod 
 probably never read. But although the time is 
 long fince paflcd when fuch writings were extolled, 
 propagated, or read, the contempt of them is as 
 tafliionablc, as likely to procure places and pen- 
 y 3 dons^
 
 326" Ancient Arijiocrattcal Republics . 
 
 fions, and to make a book fell now, as it was 
 v/hen Mr. Hume wrote. 
 
 The fads in thefe letters relative to Venice, 
 are taken from the Abby Laugier and Moor's 
 Travels , thofe relanve to the ancient republics, 
 excepting the authorities already quoted, are 
 taken from Robenfon, Montague, Potter, the 
 Univerfal Hiftory, and efpecially from Mitford, 
 Gillies, and Fergufon, three very valuable and 
 elegant productions, which deferve to be care- 
 fully ftudied by all America. I have made free 
 life of their expreffions as well as refleflions, 
 without noting them ; if you would fee how much 
 has been borrowed, you muft read. 
 
 Mr. Turgot was as little converfant in this 
 kind of erudition as Mr. Hume. The former, 
 however, was a lover of liberty ; but it was of 
 that kind of liberty which he meditated to intro- 
 duce into France, and could reconcile with a 
 fimple monarchy : he was too good a fubjedl to 
 think of introducing a free conflitution of go- 
 vernment into his own country. For the liberty 
 of commerce, the liberty of religious fentiments, 
 and the perfonal liberty of the fubject, fuch as 
 are eftablifhed by the laws, in a monarchy, he 
 was an enthufiaft ; and enthufiafm for liberty, 
 the common caufe of all mankind, is an amiable 
 fervor, which is pardonable even when it is not 
 according to knowledge : but he was neither an 
 enthufialt for a free conftitution of government, 
 nor did he know in v/hac it confifted. 
 
 LETTER
 
 Charondas. JJ27 
 
 LETTER L. 
 
 ANCIENT DEMOCRATICAL 
 REPUBLICS. 
 
 S Y B A R I S. 
 CHARONDAS. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 THE city of Sybaris was a Grecian colony 
 in Italy, planted by Achaians ; and, ac- 
 cording to Diodorus Siculus*, its beautiful fitua- 
 tion between two rivers, the Crathis and the Sy- 
 baris, the extent and fertility of its territory, and 
 the freedom of its laws, had, in a fhort fpace of 
 time, drawn together a prodigious number of in- 
 habitants, and greatly enriched them. 
 
 But the common fate of all nations and cities 
 attended them* They had three parties ; a chief, 
 a better fort, and a people. The mod powerful 
 citizens were caballing as ufual againft the chief, 
 whofe name was Telys, and, whatever his cha- 
 ra6ler for virtue was, appears to have had more 
 cunning than Grecian chiefs commonly had, at 
 Jeaft he difcerned better where the balance lay ; 
 for he courted the people, by flattering their fol- 
 lies. He excited a popular cry againft the arifto- 
 cratical party, drove them from the city, confif- 
 cated their fortunes, and diftributed them amono; 
 the reft of the citizens. The exiles fled to Croto- 
 na. Telys lent ambaffadors to demand them, on 
 pain of war. Pythagoras thought the caufe of his 
 
 Lib. xii. p. 6. 
 
 y 4 ariftocratical
 
 32? 'Ancient Democrat ical R epuhlics. 
 
 ariftocratical friends ju fir, and perfuaded his fel- 
 low-citizens to refuft; to deliver them up. The 
 Sybarites marched an army , but were met by 
 another from Crotona, with Milo, ih6 (Irong 
 man, at their head, whofe reputation prevailed , 
 the Sybarites were all maflacred, and their city 
 pillaged, and left a defart. Firfl: happy effect of 
 a. government without acknowledged orders and 
 legal balances ! Fifty-eight years afterwardsj 
 fome ThefTalians eftabliHied themfelves at Syba- 
 ris : they had not been there five years, when the 
 Crotonians came and drove them ouc. Under 
 Caliimachus, archon of Athens, it was repeo- 
 pled the third time, and had the name of Thu- 
 rium. A populous colony was fent there, un- 
 der Lampon and Xenocraies, who bulk a beau- 
 tiful city for a capital, and twenty-five fubor- 
 dinate cities : but the inhabitants could not 
 long live in good intelligence among tlicmielves ; 
 they fell into diffcnfions, grew extravagant, luxu-- 
 rious, and effeminate to a proverb. The quar- 
 rel began i-n this manner : The old inhabitants 
 of Sybaris erected themfelves into a kind of no- 
 bility, and arrogated to themfelves all the public 
 employments of any diflinclion, vcuchfafing to 
 the new-comers only thofe of lead importance ; 
 they infilled, moreover, that their wives flioukl 
 facrifice the firfl to the gods, and that the other 
 ladies fliould not commence their devotions till 
 the firfl had concluded : not content with diilinc- 
 tions fo afTuming, they went farther, and took, 
 to themfelves, in the diflribution of the lar.ds, all 
 thofe which were neareft the city, and left only 
 the more diflant to thole whoju they called fo- 
 reigners, The latter, being more numerous and 
 more brave, carried their refcntments fo far, as 
 %o put all the old families to death, and remained
 
 Charondasl 32(j 
 
 fole pofTefTors of all the territory within the walls. 
 Not having people enough left, they invited others 
 from various parts of Greece, divided houfes and 
 lands among them, entered into alliance with Cro- 
 tona, and became opulent. They divided the peo- 
 ple into ten tribes, and eftabliflied among them a 
 democratical government, and chofe for their le- 
 giflator Charondas, who, having examined to the 
 foundation the laws of all counrries, chofe out of 
 them, for his conntry, the wifefl: and moft con- 
 venient. Some others he added, drawn from his 
 own meditations. His laws are loil, and there- 
 fore his orders and balances are not known. It 
 is neverthelefs certain, that orders and balances 
 exifted in his inftitution, from certain regulations 
 preferved by Diodorus. 
 
 1. He excluded from all his public councils 
 all men who, having children, fhould marry a fe- 
 cond time , and thus mortify their children with 
 the authority of a ftep-mother. 
 
 2. As another check to his democracy, he or- 
 dained that all who fhould be convided of ca- 
 lumny, fhould be conduced through the flrcets 
 crowned with tamarin ; a punifliment fo infamous, 
 that feveral put an end to their own lives rather 
 than fubmit to it. 
 
 3. He prohibited all fociety with wicked men : 
 for, fays he, the dilpofition to evil is very (Iron"-; 
 and many of thofe who at firft love virtue, arc 
 often drawn in, by t!ie charms of fecret fedudions, 
 to the greatelt vices. 
 
 3. He ordained, that all the fons of every fa- 
 mily fhould learn to write and read under mafters 
 m the pay of the public. This law alone has 
 merit enough to confecrate to immortality the 
 memory of this legiflator, and defervcs to be imi- 
 tated by every free people at kali. 
 
 4. That
 
 350 Ancient Democratical Republics, 
 
 4. That the property of orphans Ihould be ad- 
 miniftered by the relations by the father , but 
 their perfons and education entrufled to thofe by 
 the mother. 
 
 5. All thofe who fhould refufe to take arms 
 for their country, or quit their ranks in the army, 
 inftead of being puniflied by death, fliould be ex- 
 pofed three days in a public fquare of the city in 
 women's clothes. 
 
 6. To preferve his democraiical arrangement, 
 he thought it neceffary tOjprohibit all propo- 
 fals of changes in his laws. His principle was, 
 that it was as advantageous to fubmit to the laws, 
 as it is dangerous to fubjed: the laws to individu- 
 als ; and therefore in trials he reprehended and 
 filenced all criminals, who fubftituted turns of 
 eloquence and arbitrary interpretations in place 
 of the letter of the laws, and charged them with 
 violating their authority and majefty. The quef- 
 tion is, faid Charondas, " Whether you fhali i^wo. 
 *' the law or the criminal ?" 
 
 7. Struck with the diforders and feditions which 
 he had feen in many democratical cities, he or- 
 dained that no citizen fliould prefent himfeif in 
 the public affembly, to propofe any reformation 
 or alteration in the law, without an halter about 
 his neck, which he iliould wear till the people had 
 deliberated and determined : if the people decreed 
 the propofed alteration hurtful or unneceffary, the 
 reformer fhould be ftrangled on the fpot. This 
 regulation filenced all new legiflators lo entirely, 
 that only three examples occurred of any changes. 
 
 Ail his precautions were infufficient : Return- 
 ing from the country with his fword, which he 
 had taken to defend himfeif againd highwaymen, 
 he found the afiembly in diviiion and confufion. 
 He haftened to compofe the tumult. One of his 
 2 enemies
 
 Charondas. 331 
 
 enemies reproached him with violat?ng his own 
 law, by coming into the affembly with an arm. 
 Charondas, who had forgotten the fword, cried, I 
 mean to obferve and enforce the law, and plunged 
 it into his own heart, wearied, mofl probably, into 
 a contempt of life by the diforders incident to 
 unbalanced parties. 
 
 When every legidator who has attempted a de- 
 mocratical eftablifhment, has confefled its inherent 
 tendency to immediate diflblution, by the ftrongefl: 
 rigours againft propofals of innovation, and num- 
 berlefs other provifions to controul it, which have 
 all been found incffedtual, is it worth while ftill 
 to cherifh the fond idea, when three branches are 
 found, by experience, fo efFcdually to check each 
 other; when in two independent aflemblies im- 
 provements and reformations may be fo eafily and 
 fafely propofed and adopted, and fuch as are not 
 beneficial rejedled ? 
 
 LETTER LI. 
 
 L C R I S. 
 
 Z A L E U C U S. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 ZALEUCUS was of Locris in Italy, not far 
 diftant from Sybaris. He was a difciple of 
 Pythagoras, of noble birth, and admirable morals. 
 Having acquired the efteem and confidence of his 
 fellow-citizens, they chofe him for their legiflator. 
 
 Unfortunately
 
 332 Ancient Democratical Republic s'. 
 
 Unfortunately little remains of his laws but their 
 preamble : but this is in a llyle fo fuperior to all 
 the other legiilators, as to excite regret for the 
 lofs of his code. In this preamble he declares, 
 that all thofe who fhall inhabit the city, ought, 
 above all things, to be perfuaded that there is a 
 God ; and if they elevate their eyes and thoughts 
 towards the heavens, they will be convinced, that 
 the difpofition of the heavenly bodies, and the or- 
 der which reigns in all nature, are not the work 
 of men, nor of chance ; that therefore they ought 
 to adore the gods, as the authors of all which life 
 prefents us of good and beautiful i that they 
 Ibould hold their fouls pure from every vice, be- 
 caufe the gods accept neither the prayers, offer- 
 ings, or facrifices of the wicked, and are pleafed 
 only with the jufi; and beneficent anions of virtu- 
 ous men. Having thus, in the beginning of his 
 laws, fixed the attention of his fellow-citizens up- 
 on piety and wifdom, he ordains, above all things, 
 that there fhould never be among them any irre- 
 concilable enmity ; but, on the contrary, that 
 thofe animofities which might arife among them, 
 ihould be only a paffage to a fure and fmcere re- 
 conciliation J and that he who would not fubmit 
 himfelf to thefe fentiments, ihould be regarded as 
 a favage in a civilized community. The chiefs of 
 his republics ought not to govern with arrogance 
 nor pride ; nor Ihould the magi(trates be guided 
 in their judgments by hatred nor by friendihip. 
 
 This preamble, inftead of addrefiing itfelf to 
 the ignorance, prejudices, and fuperftitious fears 
 cf favages, for the purpofe of binding them to an 
 abfurd fyftem of hunger and glory for a family 
 purpofe, like the laws of Lycurgus, places re- 
 ligion, morals, and government, upon a bafis of 
 philqfophy, which js rational, intelligible^ and eter- 
 nal^
 
 Zakucus. 335 
 
 nal, for the real happinefs of man In foclety, and 
 throughout his duration. 
 
 The principle adopted by this legiflator, as the 
 motive to a6lion next to the fenfe of duty and fo- 
 cial obligation, was the fenfe of honour, like that 
 of Lycurgus. As Zaleucus was a difciple of Py- 
 thagoras, whofe favourite plan of government was 
 a well-tempered ariftocracy, we may conjecture 
 that fuch was the form recommended to the Lo- 
 crians : but all are loft, and certainly no argument 
 can be drawn from them in favour of one popular 
 afiembly. If, in vifiting the Sybarites and Locri- 
 ans, we have found nothing in favour of Mr. Tur- 
 got's fyltem, nor any thing very material againft it, 
 we have found a greater advance towards civili- 
 zation than in all the laws of Lycurgus and Solon, 
 excepting only the trial by jury inftituted by the 
 latter; I mean in the preamble of Zaleucus, and 
 in the general education to letters in fchoolsj at 
 the public expence, by Charondas. 
 
 I. E T T E R
 
 334 Ancient Democratkal Republics. 
 
 LETTER LII. 
 
 ROME, 
 
 PLEBEIANS SCRAMBLING AFTER PATRICIANS; OR 
 DEMOCRACY HUNTING DOWN ARISTOCRACY ; 
 OR TRIBtfNES IN CHASE OF A SENATE. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 WE have before feen, in the hiftory of Rome, 
 with what eagernefs the ariftocracy pur- 
 fiied and demoliflied the monarchy : the kings 
 are commonly reproached with tyranny, and the 
 nobles are applauded for refiftance to it ; but it 
 is clear that the nobles were as tyrannical, and 
 that their eternal plots and confpiracies againft 
 the kings, their power, their crowns, and their 
 lives, were the caufe and the provocation to that 
 tyranny. It is impoffiblc to fay which were 
 worft, the nobles or kings , both certainly were 
 bad enough in general, and both frequently vio- 
 lated the laws, as it will ever happen when there 
 are but two branches. The people as yet had no 
 adequate power to aid or controul either. By the 
 inftitution of Romulus, indeed, the Roman peo- 
 ple, even the loweft clafs of the citizens, inftead 
 of being prohibited to engage in all kinds of la- 
 bour, after the example of the Spartans, were di- 
 redled to apply themielves to paflurage, agricul- 
 ture, and mechanic arts. This had its natural ef- 
 feft; and immediately afcer the revolution, by 
 
 which
 
 Rome, 3S5 
 
 which the monarchy was abolilhed, and arlftocracy 
 fee up, though we find the patricians at their ufua! 
 game of encroaching on the people, yet we find 
 there was a people, a numerous, hardy, courage- 
 ous people, who were not difpofed to fijbmit : 
 they loon began a refiftance, and to demand more 
 power to refill -, and having obtained one concef- 
 lion, they required another, until they obtained an 
 equality with the patricians. So far they were in 
 the right ; and if the two powers could have re- 
 mained equal, juftice, liberty, and happinefs, the 
 efi'ecl of equal laws, might have been enjoyed : 
 but human nature can never reft once in mo- 
 tion, it rolls, like the ftone of Sifv'phus, every in- 
 Itant when the refilling force is fulpendcd. Dio- 
 dorus Seculus is very right, lib. xix. when he fays, 
 " It is of the nature of man to afpire continually 
 *' at fomething greater than his preient condition, 
 " and to wifli that his power might increal'e in- 
 " ftead of decreafing, or refting as it is." Dr. Fer- 
 gulon, who follows very accurately Dionyfius of 
 Halicarnafllis, Livy, and Polybius, will furnifh us 
 with a good account of the fteps by which the 
 Roman people proceeded to augment their own 
 power, and diminifli that of the fenate, until they 
 obtained the whole. 1 (hall give an abridgment 
 of the llory very nearly in Fcrgufon's words. In 
 their career, however, the people loll their morals 
 and their wildom, as they ever will in fuch a courfe, 
 and were ready to confer the fovereignty on the 
 line of Cefars,even^beforet hey had completely ob- 
 tained it. Thofe irregularities, and that final ca- 
 taltrophe, were all occalioned by the imperfections 
 in their balance. \i the conluls had been pcificired 
 ol a negative in the legillature, and of all the exe- 
 cutive authority, and the fenate and people had 
 been made equal and independent in ll;e fitfcella-
 
 33^ Amknt "DmocraHcal Repuhltci, 
 
 blirhment of the commonwealth, it is impoffiblc? 
 for any man to prove that the republic v/ould not 
 have remained in vigour and in glory at this 
 hour. 
 
 The government of Rome, in the 244th year 
 from the building of the city after the expulfion 
 of Tarquin, was become wholly ariftocratical : 
 the nobles, exclufively, had the legiflative, execu- 
 tive, and judicial power^ without any third party 
 to hold the balance between them and the people 5 
 for the confuls, although they were executive ma- 
 giftrates, united in their perfons the dignities of 
 the ftate : thofe of judges, magiftrates, and mili- 
 tary leaders, were underftood to come in the place 
 of kings, and performed all the funftions of roy- 
 alty , yet they were only parts and minifters of 
 the fenate. While the exiled king was endeavour- 
 ing, by continual invafions, to recover his power, 
 dilputes aroie between the parties who had united 
 to expel him. Creditors, fupported by the arifto- 
 cracy, of which the nobles were now in full pof- 
 feffion, became fevere in the exaction of debts, or 
 the patrons laid claim to more than the clients 
 were willing to pay. The ftate was diftrafted at 
 once by its enemies from abroad, and by the dif- 
 fenfion of parties at home. The authority of the 
 new government not being fufficient to contend 
 with thefe difficulties, the lenate refolved to place 
 themfelves and the commonwealth for a limited 
 time under the power of a fmgle perfon, under 
 the title of dictator. 
 
 The inferior clafs of the people, almoll ex- 
 cluded from any fhare in the new govern- 
 ment, foon found, that under its influence 
 they had more oppre/Tion to fear from their pa- 
 trons than they had ever experienced from the 
 prince they had baniHied. So long as the king 
 
 I and
 
 Rome. 337 
 
 and the fenate fhared in the powers of the (late? 
 the one took part with the people, when the other 
 acrempted to opprefs them , and it was the or- 
 dinary intereft and policy of the prince to weaken 
 the nobles, by fupporting the plebeians againft 
 them. This effecft of the monarchy Hill, in !ome 
 meafure, remained, fo long as theVxiled king was 
 alive, maintained his pretenfions, and made the 
 united krvices of the people necefiary to the 
 kn.'ite ; bur, upon the death of the king, the 
 nobles availed tiiemulvcs of their power, and en- 
 forced their claims on tl:e people with extreme 
 fevcrity. In the capacity of creditors, they im^ 
 prifoned, ftripped, and enfiavcd thofe who were 
 iiidebred to them, and held the liberties and lives 
 of their fellow-ciiizens at their mercy. The whole 
 body of [plebeians w.is alarmed , they faw more 
 formidable enemies in the perfons of their owa 
 nobility, than in the armies of any nation whatever. 
 Many who had already fuffered under the rod of 
 their creditors, when called upon to cnlid, fliewed 
 their limbs galled with fetters, or torn with ilripes 
 which they had received by command of their 
 mercilels patrons. Thefe dillraftions obliged the 
 fenate to have recourfe to another dictator , c.\id. 
 Valerius, who was appointed for his popularity, 
 repelled the enemy. The fcnace, upon his return, 
 not fulfilling his promll'es to t'le people, they re^ 
 tired to tlie Sacred Mountain. I'he fenate was 
 obliged to negotiate, to niirigatc the feveriiies 
 ag^inil infolveiit debtors, and content to the ap 
 pointment of tribunes : t'^s was in the year 260, 
 lixteen years after the revolution. Had the ple- 
 beians difcontinued their colledive afiemblies for 
 every purpofc but cleilior.s, and increafed their 
 li ibunes to four or five hundred reprefcnratives, 
 even this would not have been a radical cure, 
 
 Z v.-:iuout
 
 3.1 8 Ancient "Democratkal Repuhlics. 
 
 without ieparating the confuls from the fenatCj 
 and giving them, or one of them, the executive 
 power, and a negative both upon the fenate and 
 popular alTembly in the legiflature : but there 
 was too much prejudice, and too little knowledge^ 
 for fo great an i^nprovement. The people con- 
 tented themfelves with the appointment of a leader 
 under the name of Tribune, who, without power 
 to prote6l them effectually, had enough to head 
 every popular tumult, and blow up every fpark 
 to a flame. An affembly of reprefentatives would 
 have had an equal right with the fenate to 
 propofe laws, to deliberate, debate, alter, amend, 
 improve : but the tribunes were authorized only 
 to forbid any meafure they thought injurious -, 
 but not to propofe any law, or move any refolu- 
 tion. Not permitted to mix with the fenators, they 
 had places at the door of the fenate houfe, as their 
 office was felt to be a dangerous one. Their per- 
 fons were made facred ; and every one was de- 
 voted to the infernal gops who fhould even ftrike 
 them. An oath was to be taken to obferve this 
 ]aw ; and the idea of the fandity of a tribune 
 . took fuch deep root, that the emperors after- 
 wards v/e;c protected from afiaffins by this facred 
 title of Tribune. I'iie college of tribunes at firfb 
 v,-as not limited to any nun^.ber ; but in procefs of 
 time they increafcd from tlirc^e to ten. i^atricians 
 could not by law be elected -, yet the people, to 
 fhev/ that they never vvill be f..eady to any law, 
 even to tliofe moil direcfiy contrived for their 
 benefit, fometimes departed from th.is. The tri- 
 bunes were at lirft elected in the curiae, where 
 the vote of the poorell citizen was equal to that 
 of the moil wealthy. But even here the patri- 
 cians, befides their great influence, had even a 
 ijegative on ail proceedings by holding the au- 
 6 fpices ;
 
 Romf, .^^9 
 
 fpices : for this reafon it was thought neceflary to 
 alter the form of the aflembly, in which the tri- 
 bunes were ele6led, to that of the tribes; dnd by 
 this means to enable the people to make their 
 eleflion without any controul from the nobles, 
 either in virtue of the authority of the fenate, or 
 the interpofition of the augurs. Thefe would have 
 been real improvements of the conftitutiorl, if 
 they had proportionally augmented the authority 
 of the confuls at the fame time ; but probably 
 there would have been as many prejudices againft 
 fuch a propoial among the people, as in the fenate. 
 All the popular jealoufies and alarms at regal au- 
 thority, would have been excited by demagogues 
 in the fenate as well as in the comitia ; for there 
 are in all nations ariftocratical demagogues as 
 well as democratical. Thefe expedients were 
 adopted by the fenate to quiet the animofities of 
 parties ; but tended, in faft, only to render the 
 conteft between them more equal, and to multiply 
 the fubjeds of difpute. The tribunes being veiled 
 with power to affemble the people, could not long 
 be confined to the mere negative with which they 
 were firft entruded. The party of the plebeians, 
 with thefe magillrates at their head, were then in 
 a pofturc not only to preferve their right, but 
 likewife to gain to their order continual acceHions 
 of power. Happily for the ftate there was yet 
 much ground to be pjained, without tranfj^refTmo: 
 the bounds ot order, or the auchority of equitable 
 government. The bar of hereditary diIiin6lion 
 was the ftrongeft obftacle which the popular 
 leaders in this career had to break through. The 
 nobles among tiie Romans, as well as among the 
 Greeks, generally traced back their lineage, in 
 fome manner or other, to gods and goddefies; and 
 the divine original of nobility, and the effential 
 Z 2 diilindion
 
 340 Ancient Denwcratkd Republics. 
 
 diftin^lion between the two orders of nobles and 
 commons, the one being believed a fuperior order 
 of beings to the other, v/as founded in their infti- 
 tutions of religion, and in popular belief: and 
 although fome pretenfions are let up ftill, in many 
 parts of Europe, to the divine right of nobility, 
 yet they are generally held in fo little eftimation, 
 that a modern can hardly form an idea of the dif- 
 ficulty the tribunes mufl have found to overcome 
 this inveterate prejudice of fuperftiticn. No per- 
 fonal merit, no adual fervice, no meafure of abi- 
 lity or virtue, could remove, as it was pretended, 
 the difqualification of plebeian birth. One of the 
 firft fteps towards abolifliing this diilindion, was 
 to preclude every other power in the flate from 
 a negative oti their proceedings. For this pur- 
 pofe it was enabled by the tribes, that no one, 
 under pain of death, or of a fine at difcretion, 
 Ihould interrupt a tribune while he was fpeaking 
 to the people. Nothing can be more curious 
 than thefe popular efforts to get the better of 
 their own fuperftitious prejudices : they could 
 not depend upon their own firmnefs to fupport 
 their own peculiar magiftrate, till they made them- 
 felves believe that his peribn was facred, as well as 
 the other magiftrates. Being thus provided againft 
 interruption, as they were by a former law againft 
 violence to their perfons, they not only took up 
 the complaints of their conftituents, but fuggefted 
 new claims to be made by them ; and at every 
 fucceffion to office, endeavoured to fignalize their 
 term by fome additional eftabliflinient for the 
 benefit of the people. They interrupted the flate 
 in its councils and wars, and hung upon the wheels 
 of government until the grievances they com- 
 plained of were redreffed, or the demands they 
 made were complied with. In order to increafc 
 
 the
 
 Rome. 341 
 
 the number of plebeian officers, whofe aid the 
 tribunes alleged was neceflary to themfelves, 
 they, foon after their own inftitution, procured 
 that of the sediles, who were to infpeci: the marker, 
 and have charge of the public buildings and pub- 
 lic fhows. The qualifications of candidates for 
 the office of conful, furnifhed, during fome ages, 
 the fubjed of continual debates : civil and mili- 
 tary tranfaftions were conftantly blended toge- 
 ther. The fenate frequently involved the flate 
 in war, in order to fufpcnd its inteftine divifions ; 
 and the people as often took occafion, from the 
 difficulties in which the community was involved 
 by its enemies, to extort a compliance with their 
 own demands. The firft fubjeft of contention 
 was the distribution of the corn which the fenate 
 had purchafed as a provifion againft the famine, 
 which the late interruption of induftry and agri- 
 culture, by the feceffion of the people, had occa- 
 fioned. Coriolanus was for compelling the peo- 
 ple, by hunger, to part v/ith their tribunes, and the 
 other conceffions which had been extorted from 
 the fenate. The younger nobility applauded his 
 fentiments ; but the majority were afraid of an- 
 other ftorm, and agreed to deliver corn from the 
 public granaries at a moderate price." The peo- 
 ple, however, were not appe.ifcd , they were 
 greatly incenfed againft Coriolanus ; and the tri- 
 bunes cited him to appear before the tribunal of 
 the people, to anfwcr for the iniult he hnd offered 
 them. The fenate and patricians were difpofcd to 
 protect him-, but expected to be able to acquit 
 him in the comitia of the centuries, the only tri- 
 bunal bcrore which any capital accufation of a 
 citizen had ever been tried. The tribunes, how- 
 ever, determined to introduce an innovation, and 
 infilled that the people fliould affemble in their 
 
 Z 3 tribes.
 
 '^42 '^Ancient Dcmocratkal Repuhlicsl 
 
 tribes. Coriolanus, feeing himfelf already con- 
 demned by this method of proceeding, withdrew, 
 and joined the enemies of his country. This no- 
 velty made a total change in the conftitution ; 
 for the aflembly of the centuries formed an arif- 
 tocracy, that of the tribes a democracy. As it 
 was not with any precifion determined by law 
 what bufinefs fnould be done in one aflembly, 
 and what in the other, the patricians and ple- 
 beians, inftead of balancing each other by regular 
 checks, were in danger of rendering the adminif- 
 tration of the ftate a continual fcene of contradic- 
 tions, which ferved to the laft hour of the re- 
 public as an objed of popular zeal, and fur- 
 niilied a fpecious pretence to ambitious and de- 
 figning men. This very uncertainty, producing 
 continual altercations and wars, produced great 
 Hatefmen and warriors, no doubt : but a regular, 
 well-ordered conftitution will never fail to bring 
 forth men capable of conducfting the national 
 councils and arms ; and it is of infinitely more 
 importance to the national happinefs, to abound 
 in good merchants, farmers, and manufacturers 
 good lawyers, priefls, and phyficians and great 
 philofophers, than it is to multiply what arc 
 called crreat flatefmen and great generals. It is a 
 miferable fervitude, whether you call it a repub- 
 lic or a defpotifmj, where the law is uncertain and 
 vinknovvn j and it is only under the fecurity of 
 certain and known laws, that arts, faiences, agri- 
 culture, commerce, and trades can ever be made 
 to flourifn. Another fubjefl of difpute v.'as foon 
 introduced, which ferved to the laft hour of the 
 republic as an object of popular zeal, and fur- 
 nifned a fpecious pretence to ambitious and de- 
 figning men to captivate the ears of the populace 
 ga equal divilion oi laaOj known by the name of 
 
 an
 
 Rome'. ^4r% 
 
 an Agrarian Law. By this was by no means meant 
 a community of goods and lands, or an equal 
 divifion of all the lands and goods , the Roman 
 people had too much fenfe and honefly ever to 
 think of introducing into praflice fuch an ab- 
 furd figment of the brain : but the Romans, 
 during the late ariftocratical times, and the wars 
 againil Tarquin, had fuffered the conquered lands 
 to pafs by connivance, occupancy, or purchafe 
 into the hands of powerful citizens, inRcad of di- 
 viding them equally among the people. Sp. Caf- 
 fius, the conful, who v/as in favour with tliC 
 people, and affeded flill farther popularity by 
 flattering the paflions of the inferior claffes, fore- 
 feeing that the tribunes would foon think of this 
 objedt, determined to make a merit to himfelf by 
 anticipating them. PoflelTing himfelf of fome of 
 thefc lands, he oftentatiouOy made a divifion of 
 them among the more indigent citizens-, and ob- 
 tained an appointment of three comminjoners, to 
 enquire into the evil, and confider of a remedy. 
 The patricians were alarmed , but Cafiius had 
 numbers on his fide, and was fo confident of fuc- 
 cefs, that he betrayed too foon his ambitious de- 
 fign, by off'ering the freedom of the city to aliens, 
 who at his invitation crowded from all parts 
 to vote in the aficmblies of the Roman people. 
 This convinced all parties that his views were, bv 
 the means of aliens and indigent citizens, to ufurp 
 the government. All parties combined againil 
 him, and he was condemned for treafon. The tri- 
 bunes had no fooner delboyed CafTius, than they 
 adopted his projeft, and infilled on the law for 
 the nomination of three commiflioners : from tlifs 
 time commences a flru2;j:le between tlic tribunes 
 and fenate, patricians and plebeians, tlie various 
 operations of which would take up too much 
 Z 4 fpacc
 
 344 Ancient Democratical Repuhlics. 
 
 fpace to relate. The tribunes were honoured 
 in proportion to the part they took in fupport of 
 the popular caufe, and their animofity againft the 
 fenate. Every new tribune endeavouicd to fig- 
 nalize his year, by fuggeiling Ibme new point to 
 be gained by the people. One law was obtained 
 to fubftitute the aflembly of the tribes for that of 
 the curiae, in the eledlion of tribunes ; another to 
 exclude the patricians entirely from the alTembiy 
 of the tribes. The agrarian law they frequently 
 moved in the interval of other pretenfions, or 
 together with other claims, in order to alarm the 
 fenate, and force them to a compromife. The 
 powers and artifices of both parties were foon ex- 
 erted in another conteft, in which the people were 
 in the right, and purfued the moft rational and 
 necedary object imaginable a new code of laws 
 which fhould regulate the forms of judicial pro- 
 ceedings , yet even this was not purfued fo much 
 from the love of juftice, or the fpirit of liberty, 
 as to gain a point from the patricians, whofe 
 power was greatly fupported by the difcretionary 
 judicial powers they had in their hands. This 
 great objefl, which the Engliili nation have pur- 
 fued for fo long a courfe of time, under the names 
 of Folcright or Common Law, they alone have 
 had the wifdom to accompany v^ith prerogatives 
 to the crown, and privileges to the nobility, which 
 have fccured thofe two branches of the confcitu- 
 tion 5 at the fame time that, by eitablilliing a 
 body of laws, and regular formal proceedings in 
 the courts ol juitice, they have fecured their own 
 rights and liberties. The Roinan people were 
 not fo wife ; by negleding to give any ade- 
 quate prerogatives to the confuls ; and by un- 
 dermining the power of the fenate in propor- 
 tion as they, introduced regular law to proteit 
 
 thtir
 
 Rome. 345 
 
 their own rights, they undermined every other 
 power in the conftitution, and devolved the 
 whole upon themfelves. In the career they 
 loft all their integrity and morals : they op- 
 poled an ardour not to be cooled or difcouraged, 
 or reftrained by fcruples in the choice of means, 
 to the great authority and addrefs of the nobles. 
 A popular party are apt to think that the rules of 
 veracity and candour may be difpenfed with, and 
 that deceit and violence may without any fcru- 
 ple be employed in their own favour. With lefs 
 honour and dignity to maintain than their adver- 
 faries, they are lefs afraid of imputations that de- 
 traft from either ; and their leaders, fupported 
 by the voice of the more numerous party, are lefs 
 apprehenfive of evil fame. In this conteft, ac- 
 cordingly, fictitious plots and confpiracies were 
 fabricated by the popular fide, and fidtitious de- 
 figns againft the liberties of the people were im- 
 puted to the patricians, in order to render them 
 odious, and to deter them from appearing in fup- 
 port of their real pretenfions. The fenate at laft 
 agreed to the nomination of three commiHioners, 
 to be fent to Greece, and make a collection of 
 laws. The report they made was accepted, and 
 the decemvirs appointed by fenate and people to 
 compile a body of laws. Thefe ten were in- 
 tended only as a committee to prepare a draught 
 for the confideration of the fenate and people: 
 yet they had fo much credit with the people as to 
 be vefted with a temporary foyereignty ; and fu- 
 perfeded the authority of the fenate as well as the 
 confuis , and had unlimited power over the lives 
 and fortunes of their fellow-citizens. They pre- 
 fcnted a number of laws, engraven on ten tables 
 cr plates, containing a fummary of the privileges 
 
 of
 
 34^ Ancient Democratical Republics'. 
 
 of the people, the crimes to be punifhed, and 
 the forms of judicial proceedings. They faid their 
 plan was unfinifhed ; and, defiring a renewal of 
 their powers, obtained it for another year : two 
 more tables were added, which, with the former 
 ten, made the Law of the Twelve Tables. In 
 thefe laws the diilindlion of patrician and plebeian 
 was fo great, that perfons of thefe different orders 
 were not permitted to intermarry. Bankruptcy 
 was made a crime ; and, without any diftindtion 
 between fraud and misfortune, expofed the infol- 
 vent debtor to the mercy of his creditors, who 
 might put him to death, diffedt, or quarter him, 
 and diftribute his m.embers among them. This 
 law was brought from Greece, and fhews the 
 atrocious ideas and manners of the age. Al- 
 though we have no account of the law being 
 executed in its utmoft extent, we know that, in 
 confequence of it, debtors were, by the courts 
 of law, delivered bound into the hands of credi- 
 tors, and frequently fcourged and whipped in a 
 mod cruel and unmerciful mjanner. Giving to 
 fathers the power of magiftrates, or the power 
 of life and death, over their children, may have 
 4bme reafons aiTigned for it : but nothing can 
 ever account for the people's accepting fuch a 
 lav/ of debtor and creditor among the Greeks 
 or Romans, but the fuppofition that property 
 was entirely in the hands of patricians , and that 
 the people had the blindeft fuperftitious opinion, 
 that the patricians, as defcendants of gods, were 
 a fuperior order of beings. It is no wonder 
 that the people, after this, often clamoured for 
 an abolition or diminution of debts ; why they 
 never demanded an abolition of the law, is ano- 
 ther queftion. One other of thefe laws deferves 
 
 particular
 
 Romel 347 
 
 particular notice. In private, every family were 
 free to worfliip the gods in their own way ; and 
 in public, though certain forms were required, 
 yet there was not any penalty annexed to the 
 omiflion of them, as the punifhment of offences 
 in this matter was left to the offended god. This, 
 probably, was the fource of that wife and hu- 
 mane toleration which does fo much honour to 
 the Romans, and reflefts difgrace on almolt 
 every Chriflian nation. The ardour of the peo- 
 ple to obtain this code had nearly cofl them their 
 liberties. The power of a magiftrate was fup> 
 pofed to determine only by his own refignation. 
 The decemvirs, taking advantage of this defcft 
 in the conftitution, continued the exercife of their 
 power ; and the people, to fhew that they never 
 can be jealous of men who are in poffefTion of 
 their confidence, acquiefced in their ufurpation ; 
 until the father of Virginia, by exercifing his 
 lawful authority in defence of his daughter's ho- 
 nour, exhibited a fpedlacle of horror which gave 
 a turn to the imaginations, and aroufed all the 
 paflions of the people to the expulfion of the 
 decemvirs, as fuch another event had before given 
 occafion to the abolition of mionarchy. Patricians 
 and plebeians now united, and a tide of mutual 
 confidence began to fiow. Two very popular 
 peribns were choien confuls : the confecration of 
 the tribunes was renewed, and extended to the 
 ssdiles, and other inferior oflicers who afted un- 
 der the tribunes in preferving the rights of the 
 people. The patricians contented to have the 
 a6ls of the fenate formally recorded, placed in 
 the temple of Ceres, and committed to the care 
 of the ardiles. As the confuls had been hitherto 
 the keepers and interpreters of their decrees, and 
 
 had
 
 34S Ancient Democratic at RepuhJics. 
 
 had often fupprelTed or carried into execution 
 their adls at their pieafure, this was a confider- 
 abie diminution of the power of the confuls. 
 
 The comitia were of three forts the curias, the 
 centuries, and the tribes. The centuries alone, 
 in which the patricians had an undoubted majo- 
 rity as well as in the fenate, had as yet the au- 
 thority of making laws for the commonwealth : 
 this itill preferved the ariftocratical character of 
 the republic. Now the plebeians denied the le- 
 giflative authority of the fenate ; and the fenate 
 denied the right of the tribes to make laws. 
 Equity required that the plebeians fhould have a 
 voice in the legiflature; but inftead of becom- 
 ing a branch of it, inllead of aiming at a delibe- 
 rative or negative voice in it, by which they 
 might concur with the fenate and comitia of the 
 centuries, or, which would have been infinitely 
 better, with the fenate and confuls as two inde- 
 pendent branches, they obtained a feparate and 
 independent power of legiflation. Hence the in- 
 tricacy of this conRitution , hence three diilind 
 fources of laws decrees of the fenate, ads of the 
 centuries, and refolutions of the tribes' fenatus 
 confulta, leges, plebifcita : a fource of divifion, 
 diftraftion, and tumult, which never ceaitd to 
 iffue ilreams till the authority of the fenate was 
 wholly deftroyed, and a dominatio plcbis began. 
 The plebeians, having removed thefe inequali- 
 ties, grew fo much the more impatient of thoi'e 
 which remained. They v/ere flill excluded from 
 the office of conful, from that of the priefihood, 
 and were forbidden intermarriage Vk'ith the nobles 
 In the year of the city 308, Canuleius, a plebeian 
 and a tribune, moved to repeal tlie law of the 
 twelve tables, which prohibited the internrarriage
 
 Rome. 349 
 
 of patricians and plebeians ; and the nine other 
 tribunes claimed ihac the office of conful Hiould 
 be held by plebeians as well as patricians. 
 
 The fenate, and the whole order of nobles, by 
 ftudied delays, and by the ufual artifice of invol- 
 ving the flate in foreign wars, fufpended the de- 
 termination of thefe qucftions ; but at length 
 were obliged to gratify the people \in\\ the inter- 
 marriages of different ranks, in order to pacify 
 them on the refulal of their claim on the confu- 
 late. To elude this demand, it was faid that the 
 facrificcs and other duties of the priedhood, many 
 of which were to be performed by the conful, 
 could nor, by the facred laws of religion, be per- 
 formed without profanation by perfons of ple- 
 beian extraction, or by any but thofe of noblr 
 birth. This atgument fiienced the people for 
 fome time -, but neither iuperdition nor the true 
 religion, any more than education, oaths, mo- 
 rals, or any other tie, will long reitrain an un- 
 balanced party, urged by its intereil, and ilimu- 
 lated by a growing pafiion for power : an ev:i- 
 fion, a mere change of a wotd, will anfwer th.", 
 purpofe of eluding fuptrrfticious lea.s, and eveii 
 the dicfates of confcience. The title of Conlui 
 was changed for th;^.t of Military Tribune; and no 
 facerdotal function being mcludcd in the duties 
 of this office, plebeians, th(.ui?Ji not qualified to 
 be coijfuls, were elcded military tribunes, with 
 confular power. The milirary and facerdotal 
 functions had before been united ; they were 
 now feparated, and, as the people thought, with- 
 out profanation. But another olricc remained to 
 tempt the people and their tribunes, that of Ccn- 
 for. 1 he cenlus had been a principal objcd: of 
 the executive power ; the k!nn;3 had always held 
 it, and after them the conful? : ac every period 
 
 of
 
 350 Ancient VemocraUcal Republics . 
 
 of five years, they could difpofe of every man'a 
 rank, afTiga him his clafs^ place him in the rolls 
 of the fenate or the knights, or ftrike him off of 
 either, degrade or disfranchife him, as they thought 
 proper. A power lb important, although it had 
 not been hitherto flagrantly abufed, might eafily 
 be fo; and the fenate would naturally dread ths 
 admiflion of the plebeians to it. While they ad- 
 mitted them, therefore, to be eleded tribunes 
 with confular power, they ftipulated that the 
 cenfus Ihould be feparated from it, and that this 
 charge fhould remain with perfons of patrician 
 birth. The invafion of the Gauls had burnt the 
 city, and, it was thought, extinguilhed the re- 
 public for ever : Manlius faved the capitol, and 
 Camillus reftored the commonwealth. Durino- 
 a period of one hundred and feventeen years 
 which followed, the Romans were involved in 
 perpetual wars againft the Equi, the Volfci, the 
 Hernici, the Etrufcans, and Ibme of their own 
 Latin confederates , yet thefe did not wholly fuf- 
 pend their internal convulfions, which gave birth 
 to new political inftitutions. The plebeians, far 
 from being fatisfied with their paft acquifitions, 
 made continual efforts to extend their privileges. 
 The tribunes, by traducing the fenate, and by 
 difplaying in their harangues the feverities of the 
 patrician creditor, and the fufferings of the ple- 
 beian debtor, ftill inflamed the animofity of the 
 popular party. The republic itfelf was fo feebly 
 eftablifhed, that ambitious citizens were encou- 
 raged, by means of fadions raifed among perfona 
 of the lower clafs, to entertain thoughts of fub- 
 verting the government. In this manner Man- 
 lius, the champion of the capitol, prefuming on 
 his merit, thought himfelf above the laws, and 
 incurred the imputation of alpiring to be king. 
 
 Four
 
 Romel 351 
 
 Four hundred citizens, whom he had redeemed 
 from their creditors, and releafed from chains 
 the fpoils of thirty enemies flain by himfelf in 
 battle forty badges of honour, conferred on him 
 by generals under whom he had ferved many 
 citizens whom he had refcued from the enemy, 
 among whom was Servilius, the fecond in com- 
 mand to the di6tator could not fave him from 
 being thrown from the rock on which he had fo 
 lately fignalized his valour. Such was the in- 
 fluence of the fenate ; fuch " the treafons for 
 '' which the friends of the people were to be fa- 
 " crificed to the fenate," as he faid , and fuch 
 the popular prejudice againft the name of a king. 
 Yet it is certain that the beft thing the Roman 
 people could have done at that time, would have 
 been to have made him a king, with a negative ; 
 preferving at the fame time their own negative, 
 and that of the fenate. The plebeians had been 
 now above forty years in poflelTion of a title to 
 hold the office of confular tribune, but had not 
 been able to prevail over the influence of the pa- 
 tricians at any eledtion : by the increafe of their 
 numbers in the flrfl; and fecond ciafTes, by their 
 intermarriages with patrician families, and by the 
 afiiduity and influence of individuals who afpired 
 to the office, they at laft obtained the dignity of 
 confular tribune for one of their own order, and 
 from thenceforward began to divide the votes of 
 the centuries with the patrician candidates. 
 They foon afpired to the title of confuls. Stolo 
 and Sextius were placed in the college of tri- 
 bunes, to urge this point. They propofed three 
 laws: I ft. For relief of infolvent debtors, by 
 cheating their creditors of part of their debts. 
 2dly. To limit eitates in land to five hundred 
 jugera, about three hundred acres, sdly. To 
 
 reftore
 
 352 Ancient Democratical Republics. 
 
 reftore the eledlion of confuls, in place of confu- 
 Jar tribunes, with an exprefs provifion that at 
 lead one of the confuls fhould be of plebeian 
 defcent. The patricians prevailed upon fome of 
 the tribunes to diffent from their colleagues, and 
 fufpend, by their negatives, all proceedings upon 
 thefe laws. Licinius and Sextius, in their turn, 
 fufpended the ufual eledion of magiftrates, and 
 put a {top to all the ordinary affairs of fcate. An 
 anarchy of five years cnfued. The patricians 
 flill infifled on the facrilege and profanation that 
 would be incurred by fufFering the rites ufually 
 performed by the confuls to pafs into plebeian 
 hands. The tribunes, to elude this myilerious 
 obje<5lion, v^/hich laid fafl hold on the fuperfti- 
 tious minds of the people, contrived a fhifr. 
 They moved, that the ordinary attendants on the 
 facrcd rights fhould be augmented from two to 
 ten ; and that of thefe one half fnould be named 
 of plebeian extradion. The patricians ftruggled 
 as long as they could, but were at lafb obliged 
 to give way ill. To the afts in favour of in- 
 folvent debtors. 2dly. To the agrarian law, or 
 limitation of property in land. sdly. To the 
 new eftablifhment relating to the priellhood, and 
 to the communication of the confulate itfelf to 
 perfons of plebeian rank. The plebeian party 
 prevailed in all their points, and raifed Sextius, 
 the tribune, to the oiiice of conful : and, from 
 one ftep to another, they obtained that all the 
 offices, whether of prscor or cedile, of dictator 
 or cenfor, were in procefs of time filled with 
 perfons of either rank, and the dillindlion of pa- 
 trician or plebeian became merely nominal. The 
 only effedt it now had was favourable to the ple- 
 beians, as it limited the choice of tribunes to 
 their own order j while, in common with the pa- 
 2 tricians.
 
 Rome. 353 
 
 ^riciafis, they had accefs to every other dignity 
 3n the ftate. In this account of the Roman con- 
 Ititution, we are now come nearly to that ftate of 
 its maturity, at which Polybius began to admire 
 the felicity of its inftitutions, and the order of 
 its adminiftration. The mafs, however, was far 
 from being fo well compadled) or the unity of 
 power fo well cftablilhedjj as it is in the Englifh 
 conftitution , the fenate and the popubr allem- 
 blies, in their legiflative capaciiies, counreradled 
 one another. However, from this time forward, 
 through a long period of v;ars, with Greeks, 
 Gauls, Italians, and Carthaginians, tiie donicllic 
 policy of the Itate appears to be wile and orderly. 
 The difl:in6lion between patrician and plebeian 
 was become altogether nominal ; the defcendants 
 of thofd who had held the higher ofHces of flare 
 were, in confequence of the preferments of their 
 anceftors, confidered as noble*, and, as the ple- 
 beians now found no difficulty in obtaining the 
 offices of ftate, they were continually opening the 
 way of their pofterity to the rank of nobles. The 
 plebeians were entitled by law to claim one of 
 the conful's feats, and frequently occupied both. 
 The authority of the fenate, the dignity of the 
 equcftrian order, and the manners of the people 
 in general^ were guarded, and in a great meafure 
 preferved, by the integrity and llrid: exercife of 
 the cenforial power. The wifeft and moft re- 
 fpeded of the citizens, from every condition^ 
 were raifed into office , and the aflemblies, whe* 
 ther of the fenate or the people, without envy 
 and without jealoufy, fuifered themfelves to be 
 governed by the counfels of a few able and vir* 
 tuous men. The fpirit of the people was, how- 
 ever, in a high degree democratical ; and thougfx 
 they fuftci^ed themfeiyes to be governed by the 
 
 A a filent
 
 554 Ancient Benweratkal Republics. 
 
 fileiit influence of perfonal authority in a few of 
 their citizens, yet they could not endure any fpecies 
 of uncommon pre-eminence, even that which arofe 
 from the luftre and well-founded pretenfions of 
 diitinguiihed merit. 
 
 The condud of the Romans towards the 
 Greeks fhould not be forgotten-, fince it appear* 
 to have been copied from the policy of Antalci- 
 das in his Perfian treaty. The llates of the 
 Achaean league, already on the decline, haften- 
 ed, by the temerity and diftraclions of their own 
 councils, the career of their fortunes to its ter- 
 mination. The Romans, even while they dif- 
 fered this famous republic to retain the (hew of 
 its independence, had treated its members, in 
 many particulars, as fubjecis. At the clofe of 
 the war with Perfeus, they had cited to appear 
 at Rome, or taken into cuftody as prifoners of 
 ftate, many citizens of Achaia : of thefe they had 
 detained about a thouland in different prifons of 
 Italy. After a period of feventeen years, three 
 hundred who remained alive were fet at liberty, 
 Polybius was one of them : he attached himfelf 
 to Scipio, the fon of Emilius, and no doubt con- 
 tributed much to his education and great cha- 
 ra6ler. 
 
 The Romans, while they detained fo many 
 Greek prifoners, aflumed the adminiftration of 
 affairs in Greece, difpofed of every diftinfiion, 
 whether of fortune or power, to their own tools. 
 l>.ey received appeals from the judgment of 
 the Achaean council, and encouraged its mem- 
 bers, contrary to the exprefs conditions of thcfr 
 league, to fend feparate embaffies to Rome. The 
 Spartans, having been forced into the Ach^ea* 
 confederacy, continued refractory in moff: of its 
 councils. By feme of their complaints at Kom?, 
 
 they
 
 Rome. 2S5 
 
 they obtained a deputation from the fenate, to 
 hear parties on the fpot, and to adjuft their dif- 
 ferences. The Achasan council, incenfed at this 
 infult which was offered to their authority, pro- 
 ceeded to enforce their own decrees againft the 
 republic of Sparta, marched an army, and de- 
 feated the inhabitants of that city who ventured 
 to oppofe them. The Roman commiflioners ar- 
 riving after thefe hodilities, fummoned the par- 
 ties to affemble at Corinth, and, in the name of 
 the fenate, gave fentence 'That Lacedamon, Co^ 
 rinth^ ArgoSy lieracka^ and OrchomenoSy not having 
 been original members of the Achaean confederacy^ 
 Jhoiild now he disjoined from it i and that all the 
 cities which had been refcued from the dominion 
 of Philip fhould be left in full poflelTion of their 
 freedom and independency. A war enfued, ia 
 which Metellus and jVlummius defeated the 
 Greeks, and the Achasan league was diffolved. 
 
 The enmity and the friendfhip of the Romans 
 was equally fatal. As the Achsean league was 
 diflblvcd, on having incurred their refentment ; 
 fo the remnant of the Spartan republic periflicd, 
 in having accepted their prote(5tion : and nothing 
 could be more juft than that the Spartans fhould 
 pcrifh under an infidious policy, which they 
 themfelves had firfl: invented, pradifed, and fug- 
 gefted to the Romans -, who, under the command 
 of Flaminius, about fifty years before this date, 
 in order to detach the Grecian cities from Philip, 
 proclaimed with fo much oflentation, at the Ifth- 
 mus of Corinth, general independence^ and the free 
 exercife of their own laws, to ail the republics of 
 Greece. The Achaean league was uiflbivcd, and 
 all their conventions annulled. The (tares which 
 had compofcd it were deprived of their love- 
 reignty, fubjedcd to pay a tribute, and placed 
 A a 2 under
 
 3 5 6 Ancient Bemdcratical Republics. 
 
 under the government of a perfon annually fent 
 from Rome with the title of Praetor of Achaia, 
 But the fuccefs of the Roman arms abroad, be- 
 came the fource of a ruinous corruption at home. 
 In the flate itfelf, the governing and the governed 
 felt feparate interefts, and were at variance from 
 motives of avarice, as well as ambition. Two 
 hundred and thirty years had elapfed fince the 
 animofities of patrician and plebeian were ex- 
 tinguilhed by the equal participation of public 
 honours. This diftinclion itfelf was, in a great 
 meailire, obliterated, and gave way to a new one, 
 which, under the denomination of nobles and 
 iommons, or illujiricus and obfcure^ without in- 
 volving any legal difparity of privileges, gave rife 
 to an ariftocracy, whicli was partly hereditary, 
 founded on the repeated fuccelTion to honours in 
 the fame family ; and partly perfonal, founded on 
 the habits of high ftation, and in the advantages 
 of education, fuch as never fail to diftinguifh tha 
 conditions of men in every great and profperous 
 ftate. Thefe circumftances conferred a power on 
 the nobles, v/hich, though lefs invidious, was not 
 lefs real than that which had been poffefTcd by the 
 ancient patricians. The exercife of this power was 
 lodged with the fenate, a body which, though by 
 the emulation of its members too much difpofed 
 to war, and ambitious of conqueft, was never fur- 
 pafTed in magnanimity, ability, or in fteadinefs, 
 by any council of (late whatever. The people had 
 fubmaitted to the fenate, as pofTefled of an authority 
 which was founded in the prevailing opinion of 
 their fuperior v/orth ; and even the moft afpiring 
 of the commons allowed themfelves to be govern- 
 ed by an order of men, amongft whom they them- 
 felves, by proper efforts and fuirable merit, might 
 hope to afcend. The knights, or the equeftrian 
 
 order.
 
 Homi. S57 
 
 order, being perfons poflelTed of eftates or efFed:s 
 ' 'f a certain valuation, and fecliided from the pur- 
 iuir of political emolument or honour, formed, 
 b' 'tween the fenate and the people, an intermediate 
 raiik, who, in confequen e of their having a capi- 
 tal, and being lefs engaged than the fenators in 
 affairs of ftate, became traders, contraflors, far- 
 mers of the revenue, and conftituted a fpecies of 
 moneyed intereft. Circumftances which appear to 
 be fixed in the political ftate of nations, are often 
 no more than a paflage in the fhifting of fcenes, 
 or a tranfition from that which a people have been, 
 to what they are about to become. The nobles 
 began to avail themfelves of the high authority 
 and advantages of their ftation, and to accumulate 
 property as well as honours. Citizens contended 
 for offices in the ftate, as the road to lucrative ap- 
 pointments abroad , and when they had obtained 
 this end, and had reigned for a while in fome pro- 
 vince, they brought back from their goverment a 
 profufion of wealth ill acquired, and the habit of 
 arbitrary and uncontrouled command. When dif-^ 
 appointed in the purfuits of fortune abroad, they 
 became the leaders of dangerous factions at home j 
 or, when fuddenly poffefred of great wealth, they 
 became the agents of corruption, to difieminate 
 idlenefs and the love of ruinous amufements in 
 the minds of the people. The city was gradually 
 crowded with a populace, who, tempted with the 
 cheap or gratuitous diftribution of corn, by the 
 frequency of public fliows, by the confequence 
 they enjoyed as members of the popular aflem- 
 blies, flocked to Rome. There they were 
 corrupted by idlenefs and indigence ; and the 
 order itfelf was continually dcbafed by the 
 frequent acceffion of emancipated flaves. A tur- 
 buitnt populace tyrannized, in their turn, over 
 A a 3 thf
 
 35$ Ancient Democrat ical Republics, 
 
 the mafters of the world, and wreaked on the 
 conquerors of fo many nations the evils which 
 they themfelves had fo freely inflicted on man- 
 kind. Citizens of this extradtion could not 
 for ages arrive at any places of truft, in which 
 they could, by their perfonal defe6ls, injure the 
 commonwealth i but they increafed, by their num- 
 bers and their vices, the weight of that dreg, 
 which, in great and profperous cities, ever finks, 
 by the tendency of vice and mifcondudt, to the 
 loweil condition. They became a part of that 
 faftion, who are ever actuated by envy to their 
 fuperiors, by mercenary views, or by abjecl fear , 
 who a e ever ready to elpoufe the caufe of any 
 leader, againft the reflraints of public order ; dif- 
 pofed to vilif' the more refpedlable ranks of men^ 
 and, by their indifference on the fubjefts of juftice 
 or honour, to fruftrate every principle that may 
 be employed for the government of mankind, be- 
 fides fear and compulfion. Although citizens of 
 this defcription were yet far from being the ma- 
 jority at Rome, yet it is probable that they were 
 in numbers fufficient to contaminate the whole 
 body of the people; and if enrolled promif- 
 cuoully in all the tribes, might have had a great 
 weight in turning the fcale of political councils. 
 This efFcft, however, was happily prevented, by 
 the wife precaution which the cenfors had taken, 
 to confine all citizens of mean or flavifh extrac- 
 tion to four of the tribes. Thefe were called the 
 tribes of the city, and formed but a fmall propor- 
 tion of the whole. Nctwithflanding this precau- 
 tion, we muft fuppofe them to have been very 
 improper parties in the participation of fovereign- 
 ty, and likely enough to difturb the place of al- 
 fembly with diforders and tumults. While the 
 inferior people funk in their characlers. or v/ere 
 
 5 debafed
 
 Ram. 35 
 
 ^d^bafed by the circumftances mentioned, the fu- 
 perior ranks, by their application to affairs of 
 ilate, by their education, by the ideas of high 
 birth and family diftin6lion, by the fuperiority of 
 fortune, began to rile in their eftimation, in their 
 pretenfions, and in their power , and they enter- 
 tained fome degree of contempt for perfons, whom 
 the laws ft ill required them to admit as their fel- 
 low-citizens and equals. In this difpofition of 
 parties, fo dangerous in a commonwealth, and 
 amidft materials fo lilcely to catch the fiame, fomc 
 fparks were thrown, that foon kindled up ane\v 
 all the popular animofities which feemed to have 
 been fo long extinguifhed. Tiberius Gracchus, 
 born of a plebeian family, but ennobled by the 
 honours of his father, by his defcent, on the fide 
 of his mother, from the tirft Scipio Africanus, 
 ^nd by his alliance with the fecond Scipio, whc? 
 had married his filter, being now a tribune of th 
 people, and poiTcired of all the accptpplilhments 
 required in a popular leader, great ardour, relblu- 
 tion, and eloquence, formed a projcvil in itfelf ex- 
 tremely alarming, and in i:s confequences danfyer- 
 ous to the peace of the republic. Joeing called 
 to account for his conduct as quseilor in Spain 
 the feverity he experiencetl from the fcnate, an^ 
 the protection he obtained from the people, fillc4 
 his brcaft with aniniofity to the one, and a prepof- 
 feffion in favour of the other. Actuated by theff 
 difpofitions, or by an itiea not uncommon to en- 
 thufiaftic minds, that //v unequal dijlvibuticn cf prO' 
 ferty^ fo favourable to the rich, is an injury to the 
 poor, he propofed a revival of the law of Licinius, 
 by v,^hich Roman citizens had been rellrained 
 from accumulating eilatcs in land above the value 
 of five luindred jugera, little more than half aj 
 many acres. I'his was become iinpra(^ticable, and 
 
 A a 4 even
 
 '^66 "Ancient T)emocratkal Republic f. 
 
 even dangerous, in the prefent (late of the repub- 
 lic. I'ke diftin^ions of f cor end rich are as neceffary^ 
 in fiat es of ccnfiderahk extent, as labour atid good go- 
 vernment The poor are dejlined to labour \ and the 
 rich^ by the advantages of education, independence^ and 
 leifure, are qualified for fuperior ftations. The empire 
 was now greatly extended, and owed its iafetyj 
 and the order of its government, to a rtfpeftable 
 ariftocracy, founded on the poiTeffion of iortune, 
 as well as perfonal qualities and pubic honours. 
 The rich were not, without feme violent convul- 
 iion, to be ftript of ellates which they themfelves 
 had bought, or which the-y had inherited from 
 their anceftors. The poor were not qualified at 
 once to be raifed to a ftate of equality with per- 
 fons inured to a better condition. The projedt 
 feemed to be as ruinous to government as it was 
 to the fecurity of property, and tended to place 
 the members of the commonwealth, by one rafh 
 and precipitate llep, in fuuafions in which they 
 were not at all qualified to adr. For thefe rea- 
 fons, as well as from motives of private intereft 
 affecfling the majority of the nobles, the projedl of 
 Tiberius was ftrenuoufly oppofed by the jenate , 
 and, from motives of envy, interelt, or miflaken 
 zeal for juftice, as warmly lupported by the op- 
 pofite party. Acting in concert with Appius 
 Claudius, whofe daughter he had married, a fe- 
 nator of the family of Craflus, who was then at 
 the head of the priefthood, and Mutius Sc^vola 
 the conful, he exhaufted all his art, and difplayed 
 all his eloquence in declamation ; but when he 
 came to propofe that the law fhould be read, 
 he found that his opponents had procured M. 
 06lavius, one of his colleagues, to interpoie his ne- 
 gative, and forbid any further proceeding in the 
 bufinefs, Here^ according to the law and the coifii- 
 
 tution
 
 Romel J 6 1 
 
 ^ution^ the matter Jhould have dropped : but inflamed 
 and unbalanced parties are noc to be reftrained by 
 laws and conftitutions. The tribunes were infti- 
 tuted to defend their own party, not to attack 
 their opponents ; and to prevent, not to promote 
 innovations. Every fingle tribune had a negative 
 
 on the whole. The reft of the ftory I muft 
 
 leave. The conftitution thus violated, Gracchus 
 next violated the facred charadter of his colleasue 
 the tribune. The fenate were tranfported with 
 indignation ; violence enfued, and the two Gracchi 
 fell. Afterwards Marius carried the popular pre- 
 tenfions ftill higher; and Sylla rnight, if he would, 
 have been emperor. Caefar followed, and com- 
 pleted the cataftrophe. 
 
 This commonwealth, by the fplendor of its 
 afllons, the extent of its empire, the wifdom of 
 its councils, the talents, integrity, and courage of 
 a multitude of characters, exhibits the faireft pro- 
 fpeft of our fpecies, and is the moft fignal exam- 
 ple, excepting England, of the wifdom and uti- 
 lity of a mixture of the three powers in a com- 
 monwealth : on the other hand, the various vicif- 
 fitudes of its fortune, its perpetual domeftic con- 
 tcfts, and internal revolutions, are the cleared 
 proofs of the evils arifing from the want of com- 
 plete independence in each branch, and from aR 
 jncffe($tual balance. 
 
 LETTER
 
 36* Condujion. 
 
 LETTER LIU, 
 
 CONGRESS. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 BY the authorities and examples already re- 
 cited, you will be convinced, that three 
 branches of power have an unalterable foundation 
 in nature ; that they exifl in every fociety natural 
 and artificial ; and that if all of them are not ac- 
 knowledged in any conftitution of government, it 
 will be found to be imperfeci:, unliable, and foon 
 enflaved : that the legiflative and executive au- 
 thorities are naturally diilind: j and that liberty 
 and the laws depend entirely on a feparation of 
 them in the frame of government : that the legif- 
 lative power is naturally and neceflarily fovereign 
 and fupreme over the executive ; and therefore 
 that the latter muft be made an effential branch 
 of the former, even with a negative, or it will not 
 be able to defend itfelf, but will be foon invaded, 
 undermined, attacked, or in fome way or other 
 totally ruined and annihilated by the former. This 
 is applicable to every ftate in America, in its indi- 
 vidual capacity : but is it equally applicable to 
 the United States in their foederal capacity ? 
 
 The people of America, and their delegates in 
 congrefs, were of opinion, that a fingle alfembly 
 was every way adequate to the management of all 
 their foederal concerns ; and with very good rea- 
 fon, becaufe congrefs is not a legiflative alfembly, 
 nor a reprefentative affembly, but only a diplo- 
 matic
 
 Cojjgrep. g6g 
 
 matic aflembly. A fingle council has been found 
 to anfwer the purpofes of confederacies very well. 
 But in all fuch cafes the deputies are refponfible 
 to the dates j their authority is clearly afcertain- 
 ed , and the ftates, in their feparate capacities, are 
 the checks. Thefe are able to form an effeftual 
 balance, and at all times to controul their dele- 
 
 fates. The fecurity againft the dangers of this 
 ind of government will depend upon the accu- 
 racy and decifion with which the governments of 
 the feparate ftates have their own orders arranged 
 and balanced. The neceflity we are under of fub- 
 mitting to a foederal government, is an additional 
 and a very powerful argument for three branches, 
 and a balance, by an equal negative, in all the 
 feparate governments. Congrefs will always be 
 compofed of members from the natural and arti- 
 ficial arirtocratical body in every ftate, even in the 
 northern, as well as in the middle and fouthern 
 ftates. Their natural difpofitions then in general 
 will be (whether they ftiall be fenfible of it or not, 
 and whatever integrity or abilities they may be 
 poflefled of) to diminifti the prerogatives of the 
 governors, and the privileges of the people, and 
 to augment the influence of the arirtocratical par- 
 ties. There have been caufes enough to prevent 
 the appearance of this inclination hitherto -, but a 
 calm courfe of profperity would very foon bring 
 it forth, if eftcftual provifion againft it be not 
 made in feafon. It will be found ablolutely ne- 
 cedary, therefore, to give negatives to the gover- 
 nors, to defend the executives againft the influence 
 of this body, as well as the fenates and reprcfen- 
 tatives in their feveral ftates. 7'he necelTity of a 
 negative in the houle of reprefcntatives, will be 
 called in qucftion by nobody. 
 
 Dr.
 
 ^^4 Conclufa'ii. 
 
 Dr. Price and the Abbe de Mably are zealous 
 for additional powers to congrcls.' Full power in 
 all foreign affairs, and over foreign commerce, 
 and perhaps fome authority over the commerce of 
 the ftates with one another, may be neceiTary ; 
 and it is hard to fay, that more authority in other 
 things is not wanted : yet the fubjeCL is of fuch 
 extreme delicacy and difficulty, that the people 
 are much to be applauded for their caution. To 
 collect together the ancient and modern leagues 
 the Amphydtionic, theOlynthian, the Argivc, the 
 Arcadian, and the Achasan confederacies, among 
 the Greeks the general diet of the Swifs can- 
 tons, and the ftates' general of the United Nether- 
 lands the union of the hanie tov^ns, Src. which 
 have been found to anlwer the purpofes both of 
 government and liberty j to comjpare them all, 
 with the cifcumftances, the fituation, the geo- 
 graphy, the commerce, the Dopulation, and the 
 forms of government, as well as the climate, the 
 foil, and manners of the people, and confider 
 what further fcederal powers are wanted, and may 
 be fafely given, would be a ufeful work. If your 
 public engagements allow you the time to under- 
 take fuch an enquiry, you will find it an agreeable 
 amufement. 
 
 X. E T T E R
 
 Locke, Milton, and Himil gB^ 
 
 LETTER LIV. 
 
 LOCKE, MILTON, and HUM E,' 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 CHIMERICAL fyftems of leglflatlon are nei- 
 ther new nor uncommon, even among men 
 of the mod refplendcnt genius and extenfive learn- 
 ing. It would not be too bold ro fay, that fome 
 parts of Plato and fir Thomas More, are as wild 
 as the ravings of Bedlam. A philofopher may be 
 perfeft mafterof Defcartes and Leibnitz, may pur- 
 iue his own enquiries into metaphyfics to any 
 length you pleafe, may enter into the inmoft re- 
 cefles of the human mind, and make the nobleft 
 difcoveries for the benefit of his fpecies , nay, he 
 may detifnd the principles of liberty and the rights 
 of mankind, witli great abilities and fuccefs ; and, 
 after all, when called upon to produce a plan of 
 iegiflation, he may aftonifli the world with a fig- 
 nal abfurdity. Mr. Locke, in 166^, was em- 
 ployed to trace out a plan of Iegiflation for Caro- 
 lina; and he gave the Vv-hole authority, executive 
 and legi dative, to the eight proprietors, the lords 
 Berkley, Clarendon, Albemarle, Craven, and Afh- 
 ley ; and meflleurs Carteret, Berkley, and Colle- 
 ton, and their heirs. This new oligarchical fove- 
 reignty created at once three orders of nobility : 
 barons, with twelve thouland acres of land -, ca- 
 ciques, with twenty- four thoufand, &c. ; ard 
 landgraves, with eighty thoufand. Vv'ho did this 
 iegiflator think would live under his government ? 
 
 He
 
 ^66 Conclujion, 
 
 He fhoiild have firft created a new fpecies of be- 
 ings to govern, before he inflituted fuch a go- 
 vernment. 
 
 A man may be a greater poet than Homer, 
 and one of the moft learned men in the world ; 
 he may fpend his life in defence of liberty, and 
 be at the fame time one of the moft irreproachable 
 moral characters ; and yet, when called upon to 
 frame a conftitution of government, he may de- 
 monflrate to the v/orld, that he has refle(5led very 
 little on the fubjedt. There is a great hazard in 
 faying all this of John Milton j but truth, and 
 the rights of mankind, demand it. In his " Ready 
 and Eafy Way to eftablifh a Free Commonwealth,'* 
 this great author fays, " I doubt not but all in- 
 *' genuous and knowing men will eafily agree 
 " with me, that a free commonwealth, without 
 *' fingle perfon, or houfe of lords, is by far the 
 *' belt government, if it can be had ; for the 
 ** ground and bafis of every juft and free govern- 
 *' ment, is a general council of ableft men chofen 
 *' by the people to confult of public affairs, from 
 *' time to time, for the common good. In this 
 *' grand council muft the fovereignty, not tranf- 
 *' ferred, but delegated only, and, as it were, de- 
 " pofited, refide ; with this caution, they muffc 
 *' have the forces by fea and land committed to 
 *' them for prefervation of the common peace and 
 " liberty , muH raife and manage the public re- 
 *' venue, at leaft with fome infpeflors deputed 
 " for fatisfa(ftion of the people how it is employ- 
 *' ed ; muft make or propole civil laws, treat of 
 *' commerce, peace, or war with foreign nations; 
 *' and, for the carrying on fome particular affairs 
 " with more fecrecy and expedition, . muft elecft, 
 " as they have already, out cf their own number 
 *' and others, a council of ftyae. And aithouQ;h it 
 
 may
 
 Locke, Miltofty and Hume. 367 
 
 may feem ftrange at firft hearing, by reafon that 
 men's minds arc prepoflelTed with the notion of 
 fuccefTive parliaments, I affirm that the grand 
 council, being well chofcn, fhould be perpetual \ 
 for fo their bufinefs is, or may be, and often- 
 times urgent , the opportunity of affairs gained 
 or loft in a moment. The day of council can- 
 not be fet as the day of a feftival, but muft be 
 ready always, to prevent or anfwer all occafions. 
 By this continuance they will become every 
 way fkilfulleft, beft provided of intelligence 
 from abroad, beft acquainted with the people 
 at home, and the people with them. The lliip 
 of the commonwealth is always under fail ; 
 they fit at theftern, and if they ftcer well, what 
 need is there to change them, it being rather 
 dangerous ? Add to this, that the grand coun- 
 cil is both foundation and main pillar of the 
 whole ftate , and to move pillars and founda- 
 tions, not faulty, cannot be fafe for the build- 
 ing. I Cee not, therefore, how we can be ad- 
 vantaged by fucceftive and tranfitory parlia- 
 ments-, but that they are much likelier continu- 
 ally to unfettle, rather than to fettle a free go- 
 vernment i to breed commotions, changes, novel- 
 ties, and uncertainties -, to bring negle(5l upon 
 prefent affairs and opportunities, while all minds 
 are fufpence with ex}>e<5lation of a new affem- 
 bly, and the affembly, for a good fpace, taken 
 up with the new fettling of itfelf, i^c. But if 
 the ambition of fuch as think themfelves in- 
 jured, that they alfo partake not of the go- 
 vernment, and are impatient to be chofen, can- 
 not brook the perpetuity of others chofen be- 
 fore them ; or if it be feared that long con- 
 tinuance of power may corrupt fmcereit men, 
 
 ** the
 
 gSS Condufion. 
 
 ** the known expedient is, that annually a third 
 " part of fenators go out," &c. 
 
 Can you read, without fhuddering, this wild re-= 
 verie of the divine immortal Milton ? If no bet- 
 ter fyftems of government had been propoled, ii; 
 would have been no wonder that the people of 
 England recalled the royal family, with all their 
 errors, follies, and crimes about them. Had 
 Milton's fcheme been adopted, this country would 
 have either been a fcene of revolutions, carnage, 
 and horror, from that time to this, or the liber- 
 ties of England v/ould have been at this hour the 
 liberties of Poland, or the iQand would have been 
 a province of France, What ! a fingle affembly 
 to govern England ? an aflembly of fenators for 
 life too ? What ! did Milton's ideas of liberty 
 and free governrnent extend no further than ex- 
 changing one houfe of lords for another, and 
 making it fupreme and perpetual? What ! Crom- 
 well, Ireton, Lambert, Ludlow, Waller, and five 
 hundred others, of all feds and parties, one quar- 
 ter of them mad with enthufiafm, another with am- 
 bition, a third with avarice, and a fourth of them 
 honeft men, a perpetual council, to govern fuch 
 a country ! It would have been an oligarchy of 
 decemvirs, on the firft day of its fitting ; it 
 would have inftantly been torn with all the agita 
 tions of Venice, between the ariftocracy and oli- 
 garchy, in the aflembly itfelf. li^ by ballots 
 and rotations, and a thoufand other contrivances, 
 it could have been combined together, it would 
 have dripped the people of England of every 
 fhadow of liberty, and grown in the next gene- 
 ration a lazy, haughty, oftentatious group of pa- 
 latines : but if they had fallen into divifions, 
 they would have deluged the nation in blood.
 
 Locke, Milton, and. Hume, 369 
 
 ti!l one defpot would have ruled the whole, 
 John Milton was as honcll a man as this nation 
 ever bred, and as great a friend of liberty : but 
 his greatnefs mod certainly diJ not confill in the 
 knowledge of the nature of man and of govern- 
 ment, if we are to judge from this performance, 
 or from " The prefent Means and brief Delinea- 
 " tion of a free Commonwealth," in his letter 
 to General Monk. Americans in this age are too 
 enlightened to be bubbled out of their liberties, 
 even by fuch mighty names as Locke, Milton, 
 Turgot, or Hume , they know that popular elec- 
 tions of one eflential branch of the legiQature, fre- 
 quently repeated, are the only pofTible method of 
 forming a free conftitution, or of preferving the 
 government of laws from the domination of men, 
 or of preferving their lives, liberties, or properties 
 in fecurityj they know, though Locke and Milton 
 did not, that when popular eledions are given up, 
 liberty and free government muft be given up. 
 Upon this principle, they cannot approve the plan 
 of Mr. Hume, in his " Idea of a perfeft Common- 
 *' wealth." ** Let all the freeholders of twenty 
 *' pounds a year in the county, and all the houle- 
 *' holders worth five hundred pounds in the town 
 ** parifhes, meet annually in the parifh cliurch, 
 and choofe, by ballot, fome freeholder of the 
 county for their member, whom we fhall call 
 the county-reprefentative. Let the hundred 
 county -reprefentatives, two days after their 
 ** ele<51:ion, meet in the county-town, and choofe 
 ** by ballot, from their own body, ten county- 
 *' magiftrates, and one fenator. There are thcre- 
 ** fore, in the whole commonwealth, one hun- 
 '* dred fenators, eleven hundred county-magif- 
 *' trates, and ten thoufand county-reprefentativcs; 
 *' for we ftiall beftow on all fenators the autho- 
 B b - rity
 
 370 Conclufion. 
 
 " rity of county-magiftrates, and on all countyi^, 
 *Vmagiftrates the authority of county-reprefenta- 
 " tives. Let the fenators meet in the capital, 
 ** and be endowed with the whole executive 
 *' power of the commonwealth ; the power of 
 " peace and war, of giving orders to generals, 
 *' admirals, and ambafiadors, and, in fhort, all 
 " the prerogatives of a Britifh king, except his 
 *' negative. Let the county-reprefentatives meet 
 ** in their particular counties, and poflefs the 
 *' whole legiilative power of the commonwealth ; 
 ** the greater number of counties decidino- the 
 
 queftion j and where thefe are equal, let the 
 " fenate have the cafting-vote. Every new law 
 " muft firft be debated in the fenate ; and, though 
 '* rejeded by it, if ten fenators infift and proteft, 
 *' it mufb be fent down to the counties : the fe- 
 *' nate, if they pleafe, may join to the copy of 
 ** the law their reafons for receiving or rejedling 
 " it." &c. The fenate, by the ballot of Venice 
 or Malta, are to choofe a proteftor, who re- 
 prefents the dignity of the commonwealth, and 
 prefides in the fenate j two fecretaries of fiate, 
 and a council of flate, a council of religion and 
 learning, a council of trade, a council of laws, 
 a council of war, a council of the admiralty 
 each of five perfons, all fenators ; and feven com- 
 miflioners of the treafury. 
 
 If you compare this plan, as well as -thofe of 
 Locke and Milton, with the principles and exam- 
 ples in the foregoing letters, you will foon torm 
 a judgment of them ; it is not my defign to enlarge 
 upon them. That of Hume is a complicated ariflo- 
 cracy, and would foon behave like all other anfto'- 
 cracies. It is enough to fay, that the reprefcnta- 
 tives of the people may by the fenators be de- 
 prived of a voice in the Icgillature \ becaufs the 
 
 . ^ ' 2 * knats
 
 Locke, Milion] and Humf* 371 
 
 fenate have their choice of fending the laws down, 
 either to the county-magiftrates or county-repre- 
 fentatives. It is an ingenious device, to be fure, 
 to get rid of the people and their reprefentatives $ 
 befides that the delays and confufions would be 
 endlefs, in fending the laws to be debated in as 
 many fcparate commonwealths as there are coun- 
 ties. But the two decifive objeftions are, i. Let- 
 ting the nobility or fenate into t\\t management 
 of the executive power ; and, 2. Taking the eyes 
 of the people off from their reprefentatives in the 
 legiflature. The liberty of the people ds^pends 
 entirely on the conftant and direct communication 
 between them and the legiQatiire, by means of 
 their reprefentatives. 
 
 The improvements to be made in the Englifli 
 conftitution lie entirely in the houfe of commons,' 
 If county-members were abolilhed, and reprefen- 
 tatives proportionally and frequently chofen in 
 fmall dillri(5ts, and if no candidate could be chofen 
 but an eftablifhed long-fettled inhabitant of that 
 diftridt, it would be impofllble to corrupt the 
 people of England, and the houfe of commons 
 might be an immortal guardian of the national li- 
 berty. Inftead of projects to abolifli kings and 
 lords, if the houfe of commons had been attended 
 to, wild wars would not have been engaged in, 
 nor countlefs millions thrown away, nor would 
 there have remained an imperfedbion perhaps ia 
 the Englifh conllitution. Let the people take 
 care of the balance, and efpccially their part of 
 it : but the prefervation of their peculiar part of 
 it will depend ftill upon the exiftence and inde- 
 pendence of the other two ; the inftant the other 
 branches are deftroyed, their own branch, their 
 own deputies, become their tyrants. 
 
 Bb 2 LETTER
 
 372 Conclujien] 
 
 LETTER LV. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 Grofvmor-fquare^ Dec. 21, 1786. 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 ACCORDING to Mr. Turgot's Idea of a 
 perfect commonwealth, a fmgle aflembly is 
 to be poffeiTed of all authority, legiflativc, exe- 
 cutive, and judicial. It will be a proper conclu- 
 sion of all our fpeculations upon this, the molt 
 interefting fubjedt which can employ the thoughts 
 of men, to confider in what manner fuch an af- 
 fembly will conduct its deliberations, and exert 
 its power. The executive power is properly the 
 government ; the laws are a dead letter until an 
 adminiftration begins to carry them into execu- 
 tion. Let us begin then with this. If there is 
 an army to raife, this fingle aflembly is td ap- 
 point ali its officers. The man of the moft am- 
 ple fortune, the moft honourable defccnr, the 
 greateft abilities, efpecially if there is any one 
 among them who has had experience, rendered 
 important fervices, and acquired fame in war, 
 will be cholen general. This event is a great 
 point gained by the ariftocracy ; and a great ad- 
 vance towards the fele<5lion of one, in cafe of con- 
 vulfions and contufions, for monarchy. The ge- 
 neral has vaft influence, of courfe, with the whole 
 
 nationg
 
 Conck/ion, 37.:? 
 
 nation, and efpeclally with the officers of his ar- 
 my i whofe articles of war, and whofe habits, 
 both of obedience and command, eftablilh a fyf- 
 tem of fubordination of which he is the center, 
 and produce an attachment that never wears out. 
 The general, even without being fenfible of it, 
 will naturally fall in with the views of the arifto- 
 cratical body, in promoting men of family, pro- 
 perty, and abilities ; and indeed, in general, it 
 will be his duty to do this, as fuch are undoubt- 
 edly, in general, the fitteft for the fervice : his 
 whole corps of officers will grow habitually to 
 refpefl fuch only, or at lead chiefly , and it muft 
 be added, becaufe experience proves it, and the 
 truth requires it to be mentioned, to entertain 
 fome degree of contempt for the reft of the peo- 
 ple, as " rank and file.'* The general's recom- 
 mendation will have great weight in the alTem- 
 bly, and will in time be given chiefly, if not 
 wholly, to men who are either of the ariftocrati- 
 cal body themfelves, or at leaft recommended by 
 fuch as are fo. All the other officers of the army 
 are to be appointed by this aflt:mbly -, and we 
 muft fuppofe that all the general officers and 
 field officers will be of patrician families, be- 
 caufe each candidate will be unknown to nine- 
 tenths of the aflTcmbly. He comes from a part 
 of the ftate which a vaft majority of the mem- 
 bers of the aflTembly do not particularly reprefent, 
 and are unacquainted with ; they muft therefore 
 t;ike his charafler upon truft from his patron in 
 the houfe, fome member who is his neighbour, 
 and who perhaps owes his eledlion to him or his 
 particular friends. Here is an endlcfs fource of 
 debate and delay. When there are two or more 
 candidates for a commiffion, and there will ge- 
 B b 3 nerally
 
 574 Conclufion, 
 
 nerally be feveral, how fball an alTembly of Jive 
 hundred or one hundred men, colle6led from all 
 the moft diftant parts of a large ftate, become in- 
 formed of the merits and pretenfions of each can- 
 didate ? It can only be done in public or in pri- 
 vate. If in public, it expofes the charadttrs of 
 the candidates to a public difcuffion, which few 
 rnen can bear ; it confumes time without end j 
 ^nd it will frequently happen, that the time of the 
 "whole affembly fhali be wafted, and all the pub- 
 lic affairs delayed, for days and weeks, in delibe- 
 rating and debating, affirming and denying, con- 
 trad'(5ting and proving, in the appointment of a 
 fingle officer; and, after all, he who has friends 
 of the moft influence in the houfe, who will be 
 generally of the ariftocratical complexion, will 
 be preferred. It is moderate to fay that the lols 
 of time and delay of bufmefs will be a greater 
 burthen to the ftate than the whole fupport of a 
 governor and council. If there is a navy, the 
 fame procefs muft be gone through rcfpedting ad- 
 mirals, captains, and all other officers. All the 
 officers of revenue, police, juftice, muft be ap- 
 pointed in the fame way. Ambaffadors, confuls, 
 agents to foreign countries, muft be appointed 
 too by vote of afiembly. This branch of bufi- 
 nefs alone would fill up the whole year, and be 
 more than could be done. An affembly muft be 
 informed before it can acl. The underftanding 
 and confcience of every member ffiould be clear- 
 ly fatisfied before he can vote. Information is 
 to be had only by debate, and examination of 
 evidence. Any man may fee that this muft be 
 attended with difficulty ; but no man, who has 
 not feen the infide of fuch an affembly, can con- 
 ceive the confufion, uncertainty, and procrafti- 
 
 natica
 
 CoKclufion. 375 
 
 nation of fuch proceedings. The American pro- 
 vincial congreflcs had experience enough of this ; 
 and gentlemen were more convinced, by what 
 they there faw, heard, and felt, of the neceflity 
 of three branches, than they would have been by 
 reafoning or reading ; it was generally agreed, 
 that the appointment of officers by lot would 
 have been a more rational method. But this is 
 not all : the army, the navy, revenue, excife, 
 cuftoms, police, juftice, and all foreign minifters, 
 muft be gentlemen, that is to fay, friends and 
 connections of the rich, well-born and well-edu- 
 cated members of the houfe ; or, if they are not, 
 the community will be filled with (lander, fufpi- 
 cion, and ridicule againft them, as ill-bred, ig- 
 norant, and in all rcfpefts unqualified for their 
 trufts } and the plebeians themfelves will be as 
 ready as any to join in the cry, and run down 
 their characters. In the fecond place, there ne-| 
 ver was yet a people who muft not have fome-, 
 body or fomething to reprefent the dignity of the' 
 Itate, the majefty of the people, call it what you 
 will a doge, an avoyer, an archon, a prefident, 
 a conful, a fyndic ; this becomes at once an ob- 
 ject of ambition and difpute, and, in time, of di- 
 vifion, fadion, fedition, and rebellion. The next 
 enquiry is, concerning the adminiftration of juf- 
 tice. Shall every criminal be brought before this 
 affcmbly and tried ? fliall he be there accufed be- 
 fore five hundred men ? witnefles introduced, 
 counfel heard ? This again would take up more 
 than the whole year ; and no man, after all, 
 would confider his life, liberty, or property, fafe 
 in fuch a tribunal. Thefe all depend upon the 
 difquifitions of the counfel, the knowledge of the 
 law in the judges, the confrontation of parties 
 B b 4 and
 
 ^yS Conclufion, 
 
 and witnefles, the forms of proceedings, by which 
 the fads and the law are fairly dated before the 
 jury for their decifion, the rules of evidence, by 
 which the attention of the jury is confined to 
 proper points, and the artifices of parties and 
 counfel avoided. An afiembly of five hundred 
 men are totally incapable of this order, as v/eil 
 as knowledge ; for, as the vote of the majority 
 rnuft determine, every member muft be capable, 
 or all is uncertain : befides, it is the unanimity 
 of the jury that preferves the rights of mankind 
 muft the whole five hundred be unanimous ? 
 Will it be faid that the aflembly fhall appoint 
 committees to try caufes ? But who are to make 
 thefe appointments ? Will not a few haughty pa- 
 latines m the alTembly have influence enough to 
 determine the election in favour of their friends? 
 and will not this make iwt judges the tools of z, 
 party ? If the leaders are divided into parties, 
 will not one prevail at one year, and another the 
 next ? and will not this introduce the mod 
 wretched of fervitudes, an uncertain juriipru- 
 dence ? Will it be faid that the affembly fhall 
 appoint committees for the nomination of offi- 
 cers ? The fame intrigues, and greater ftruggles, 
 would be introduced for the place of a com- 
 mittee-man i and there would be frequent ap- 
 peals from thofe committees to the body that 
 appointed them. Shall the afiembly appoint a 
 governor or prefident, and give him all the exe- 
 cutive power ? Why fhould not the people at 
 large appoint him ? Giving this power to the 
 afiembly will open a wider door to intrigue for 
 the place , and the ariftocratical families will be 
 fure, nine times in ten, to carry their choice in 
 this way ^ and, what is much worie, the fird ma- 
 
 giftratQ
 
 Conclufwn. 377 
 
 giftrate will be confidered as dependent on every 
 obfcurc member of the houfe, but in reality he 
 will be dependent only on a dozen or a fcore, 
 perhaps on two or three, of the whole. He will 
 be liable to daily motions, debates, and votes of 
 cenfure. Inllead of thinking of his duty to the 
 people at large, he will confine his attention chief- 
 ly to the affembly, and believe, that if he can 
 fatisfy them, or a majority of them, he has done 
 his duty. After all, any of thefe devices are only 
 changing words ; they are, in reality, ereding dif- 
 ferent orders of men, and aiming at balances, 
 as much as the fyrtem which fo much difpleafes 
 Mr. Turgot ; they are introducing, in effed, all 
 the inequalities and difputes that he fo greatly 
 apprehends, without any of that fecurity to the 
 laws which ought to be the principal objedl -, they 
 render the executive power, which is in truth the 
 government, the inftrument of a few grandees. 
 It thele are capable of a combination with each 
 other, they will feldom diiagree in their opinion, 
 which is the richell man and of the firft family ; 
 and, as thefe will be all their enquiries, they will 
 generally carry their election : if they are divided, 
 in conftant wrangles with each other, and perpe- 
 tual attacks upon the prefident about the dilcharge 
 of his fundions, they will keep the nation an- 
 xious and irritated, with controverfies which can 
 never be decided nor ended. If they agree, and 
 the plebeians ftill carry the vote againlt them, 
 the choice w.il neverthelefs probably fall upon 
 one of their number, who will be dilpofed to fa- 
 vour them too much ; but if it falls upon a ple- 
 Ipeian, there commences at once a feries of con- 
 tefts between the rich and the poor, which will 
 ppver cp4 but in the ruiji of the popular power 
 
 and
 
 gyS Condujion. 
 
 and the national liberty or at leaft in a rcvo-- 
 lution and a new conftitution. As the executive 
 power, the effence of government, is ever odious 
 to popular envy and jealoufy, it will ever be in 
 the power of a few iiluftrious and wealthy citizens 
 to excite clamours and uneafinefs, if not commo- 
 tions and feditions, againft it. Although it is the 
 natural friend of the people, and the only defence 
 which they or their reprefentatives can have 
 againft the avarice and ambition of the rich and 
 ' diftinguifhed citizens, yet fuch is their thought- 
 lefs fimplicity, they are ever ready to believe that 
 the evils they feel are brought upon them by the 
 executive power. How eaiy is it then for a few 
 artful men, among the arillocratical body, to make 
 a prefident, thus appointed and fupported, unpo- 
 pular, though he condufts himfelf with all the 
 integrity and ability which his office requires ? 
 
 But we have not yet confidered how the legif- 
 lative power is to be exercifed in this fingle af- 
 fembly ? Is there to be a conftitution ? Who 
 are to compofe it ? The affembly itfelf, or a 
 convention called for that purpofe ? In either 
 cafe, whatever rules are agreed on for the prefer- 
 vation of the lives, liberties, properties, and cha- 
 ra6ters of the citizens, what is to hinder this af- 
 fembly from tranfgreding the bounds which they 
 have prefcribed to themfelves, or which the con- 
 vention has ordained for them ? The convention 
 has publiftied its code, and is no more. Shall a 
 new convention be called, to determine every 
 queftion which arifes concerning a violation of 
 the conftitution ? This would require that the 
 convention fhould fit whenever the affembly fits, 
 and confider and determine every queftion which 
 i agitated in it. This is the very thing we con- 
 tend
 
 Conclujlon, 379 
 
 tend for, viz. that there may be two aflemblies ; 
 one to divide, and the other to choofe. Grant 
 me this, and I am fatisficd, provided you will 
 confine both the convention and aflembly to le- 
 gidation, and give the whole executive power to 
 another body. 1 had almoft ventured to propofe 
 a third aflfembly for the executive power ; but 
 the unity, the fecrecy, the difpatch of one man., 
 has no equal; and the executive power fhould be 
 watched by all men -, the attention of the whole 
 nation Ihould be fixed upon one point, and the 
 blame and cenfure, as well as the impeach- 
 ments and vengeance for abufes of this power, 
 fhould be diredted folely to the minifters oi one 
 man.-^But to purfue our fingle aflembly. The 
 firfb year, or the firft feven years, they may be 
 moderate ; efpecially in dangerous times, and 
 while an exiled royal family, or exiled patricians 
 or nobles, are living, and may return ; or while 
 the people's paflions are alive, and their attention 
 awake, from the frefh remembrance of danger 
 and diilrefs : but when thefe tranfitory caufes pafs 
 away, as there is an afFeftion and confidence be- 
 tween the people and their reprefentatives, fup- 
 pofe the latcer begin to make diftindlions, by 
 making exceptions of themfclves in the laws .'' 
 They may frank letters ; they are exempted from 
 arrefts ; they can privilege fervants One little 
 diftindion after anotlier, in time makes up a 
 large fum. Some few of the people will comp^ 
 plain ; but the majority, loving their reprefenta- 
 tives, will acquieice. Prefently they are ex- 
 empted from taxes. Then their duration is too 
 ihort ; from annual they become biennial, trien- 
 nial, leptennial, for life ; and at lengtli, inftead 
 of applying to conflituents to fill up vacancies^ 
 
 the
 
 ^^o Condufion. 
 
 the affembly takes it upon itfelf, or gives it to 
 their prefident. In the mean time, wars are 
 conduded by heroes to triumph and conqueft, 
 negotiations are carried on with fuccefs, com- 
 merce flourifties, the nation is profperous j the 
 citizens are flattered, vain, proud of their feli- 
 city, envied by others : it would be the ba- 
 feft, the moft odious ingratitude, at lead it would 
 be fo reprefented, to find fault with their rulers. 
 In a word, as long as half a fcore of capital 
 chara6ters agree, they will gradually form the 
 houfe and the nation into a fyftem of fubordi- 
 nation and dependence to themfelves, and go- 
 vern all at their difcretion a fimple ariftocracy 
 or oligarchy in effed:, though a fimple demo- 
 cracy in name : but, as every one of thefe is 
 emulous of others, and more than one of them 
 is conftantly tormented with a defire to be the 
 firft, they will foon difagree ; and then the houfe 
 and the nation gradually divides itfelf into four 
 parties, one of which at leaft will wifh for mo- 
 narchy, another for ariftocracy, a third for de- 
 mocracy, and a fourth for various mixtures of 
 them ; and thefe parties can never come to a 
 decifion but by a ftruggle, or by the fword. 
 There is no remedy for this, but in a convention 
 of deputies from all parts of the ftate : but an 
 equal convention can hardly be obtained, except 
 in times like thofe we have lately feen, when the 
 danger could only be warded off by the aid and 
 exertions of the whole body of the people : when 
 no fuch danger from without fhall prefs, thofe 
 who are proud of their wealth, blood, or wir, 
 will never give way to fair and equal eftablifh- 
 ments. All parties will be afraid of calling a 
 convention *, but if it mud be agreed to, the 
 
 ariftocraticai
 
 Conclujionl jS i 
 
 ariftocratical party will pulh their influence, and 
 obtain eleftions even into the conventions for 
 themfelves and their friends, fo as to carry points 
 there, which perhaps they could not have carried 
 in the aflembly. 
 
 But (hall the people at large deS: sl governor 
 and council annually to manage the executive 
 power, and a fingle aflembly to have the whole 
 legiflative ? In this cafe, the executive power, 
 infl:ead of being independent, will be the infl:ru- 
 ment of a few leading members of the houfe ; 
 becaufe the executive power, being an objeft of 
 jealoufy and envy to the people, and the legifla- 
 tive an objed; of their confidence and afi^edlion, 
 the latter will always be able to render the for- 
 mer unpopular, and undermine its influence.- 
 But if the people for a time fupport an executive 
 difagreeable to the leaders in the leo-iflative, the 
 conftitution will be difregarded, and the nation 
 will be divided between the two bodies, and each 
 mufl: at laft: have an army to decide the quefl:ion. 
 A conftiitution confift:ing of an executive in one 
 fingle aflfembly, and a legiflative in another, is 
 already compofed of two armies in battle array ; 
 and nothing is wanting, but the word of com- 
 mand, to begin the combat. 
 
 In the prefent fl:ate of fociety and manners in 
 America, with a people living chiefly by agri- 
 culture, in fmall numbers, fprinkled over large 
 tradls of land, they are not fubjeft to thofe pa- 
 nics and tranfports, thofe contagions of madnefs 
 and folly, which are feen in countries where large 
 numbers live in fmall places, in daily fear of pe- 
 rilhing for want : we know, therefore, that the 
 people can live and increafe under almofl: any 
 kind of government, or without any government 
 
 at
 
 3 ^2 Cmckjion.' 
 
 at all. But It is of great importance to begin 
 well ; mifarrangements now made, will have great,- 
 cxtenfive, and diftant confequences ; and we are 
 now employed, how little foever we may think 
 of it, in making eftablifhments which will affedt 
 the happinefs of an hundred millions of inhabi- 
 tants at a time, in a period not very diflanr. 
 ,A11 nations, under all governments, muft have 
 parties; the great fecret is to controul them: 
 (there are but two ways, either by a monarchy 
 \ and Handing army, or by a balance in the con- 
 l flitution. Where the people have a voice, and 
 there is no balance, there will be everlafting fluc- 
 tuations, revolutions, and horrors, until a Hand- 
 ing army, with a general at its head, commands 
 the peace, or the neceflity of an equilibrium is 
 made appear to all, and is adopted by all. 
 
 I am. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 With much efteem and affedion. 
 Yours, 
 
 John Adams. 
 
 JVilUam Stephens Smithy Epi, 
 
 postscript;
 
 ( 53 ) 
 
 P O S T S C R I P T. ' 
 
 ^TpHE foreign gazettes and journals have an- 
 nounced to the world that the Abbe De Ma- 
 bly was applied to by the United States of Ame- 
 rica for his advice and afliftance in the formation of 
 a code of laws. It is unneceflary to fay any thing to 
 this, only that it is a part of a million volumes of 
 lies, according to the beft computation, which are 
 to be impofed upon polterity, relative to Ameri- 
 can affairs. The Abbe himielf, in his obferva- 
 tions, has faid that I defired his fentiments. This;! 
 is true , but the manner of the rcqueft ought to 
 be known, that thofe who think it of any con- 
 fequence may underftand in what fenfe it is true. 
 Upon my arrival in Paris, in Odlober 1782, upon 
 the bufmefs of the peace, the Abbe De Mably*s 
 book, upon the manner of writing hiftory, was 
 put into my hands. At the conclufion of that 
 publication he declared his intention of writing 
 on the American revolution. Meeting the Abbe 
 foon afterwards, at dinner, at Monfieur De Cha- 
 lut's, the farmer general, my friends the Abbes 
 De Chalut, and Arnowe, who were of the party, 
 informed me that their friend was about writinor" 
 the hiftory of the American revolution, and would 
 be obliged to me for any fafts or memorials that 
 might be in my power. The queftion was afked. 
 What part of the revolution he mcended to write ? 
 The whole. Where had he obtained the mate- 
 rials ? It was fuppoled they might be obtained 
 from the public papers, and enquiry of indivi- 
 duals.- In anfwer to this a few difficulties were 
 ftarted, and the converfation fpun into length. 
 At laft the gentlemen afked to have, in wriLing, 
 what had been then faid upon the fubjed, as, the 
 converfation bcinp; in French, it mi:ht not have 
 been tuily comprehended. Accordingly, in a few 
 
 days.
 
 3^4 Pofifcript, 
 
 days, I wrote the Abbe a letter, the tranflation of 
 which, by a friend, into French, is here inclofed -, 
 the original, in Englifh, not being in my poflef- 
 fion. By this you will fee, that the requeil to the 
 Abbe to write upon American affairs, was a mere 
 civility ; and rather a defire that he would not 
 expofc himfelf, by attempting an hiftory that he 
 was altogether unprovided for, than any formal 
 requeft that he fhould write at all. We ought to 
 be obliged to any gentleman in Europe who will 
 favour us with his thoughts : but, in general, the 
 theory of government is as well underftood in 
 America as it is in Europe-, and by great num- 
 bers of individuals is every thing, relating to a free 
 conftitution, infinitely better comprehended than 
 by the Abbe De Mably or Mr. Turgot, amiable, 
 learned, and ingenious, as they were. 
 
 A Monfieur VAhbe de Mably, 
 
 *' C'eft avec plaifir que j'ai appris votre defTcin 
 d'ecrire fur la Revolution Americaine^ parce que 
 vos autres ecrits, qui font beaucoup admires 
 des Americains, contiennent des principes dc 
 Legiflation, de Politique & de Negociation qui 
 font parfaitement analogues aux leurs ; de forte 
 que vous ne pourrez guere ecrire fur ce fujet 
 fans produire un ouvrage qui fervira a Tinftruc- 
 tion du public, & furtout a celle de mes Conci- 
 toyens. Mais j'efpere que vous ne m'accufe- 
 rez pas de prefomption d'affe(5tation ou de fin- 
 gularire, fi je hazarde de vous dire que je fuis 
 d'opinion qu'il eft encore trop-tot pour entre- 
 prendre une Hiftoire complette de ce grand 
 evenement, & qu'il n'y a perfonne ni en Europe 
 ni en Ameriquc, qui, julqu'a prefent, foit en 
 etat de la faire & qui ait les materiaux requis 
 ou neceffaires pour cela." 
 *' Pour entrepreadre un tel ouvrage, un Ecri- 
 
 cc 
 cc 
 <c 
 cc 
 <c 
 cc 
 cc 
 cc 
 cc 
 cc 
 cc 
 cc 
 cc 
 cc 
 cc 
 cc 
 cc 
 
 ** vain
 
 pDJifcript, f^^S 
 
 ^'^ vain devralt divifer I'Hiftoire de TAmeriquc en 
 *' plufieurs periodes.'* 
 
 *' 1*. Depuis le premier etablifTement des Co- 
 " lonies en 1600, jufqu'au commencement de 
 '* leurs brouilleries avec la Grande-Bretagne in 
 
 *' 1761. 
 
 " 2*. Depuis ce commencement (occafionne 
 *' par un ordre du Bureau de Commerce & des 
 " Plantations dans la Grande-Bretagne, donne aux 
 " officiers de la Douane en Amerique, de faire 
 '' executer d'une maniere plus rigourieufe les 
 '* aftes du Commerce, & d'avoir recours aux 
 " cours de la juftice pour avoir des decrets d'af- 
 " fiftance a cette fin) jufqu'au commencement 
 " des hoftilites, le 19 d'Avril 1775. Pendant 
 " cette periode de 14 ans il n'y eut qu'une guerre 
 " de plume. 
 
 " 3*. Depuis la Bataille de Lexington jufqu'a 
 *' la fignature du Trairc avec la France, le 6 Fe- 
 ** vrier 1778. Durant cette periode de 3 ans, la 
 " guerre fe fit uniquement entre la Grande-Bre- 
 *' tagne & les Etats-Unis. 
 
 " 4*. Depuis le Traite avec la France jufqu*- 
 " aux hoftilices entre la Grande-Bretagne 6c la 
 ** France premierement ; puis avec TEfpagnc, 
 " enfuite jufqu'au developpement de la Neutra- 
 " lite armee, & a la guerre contre la Hollande. 
 " Enfin, toutes ces ffenes trouvent leur denoument 
 *' dans les Negociations de la Paix. 
 
 " Sans une connaiflance diftindte de PHifloirc 
 " des Colonies dans la premiere periode, un Ecri- 
 " vain fe trouvera toujours embarafle, depuis le 
 *' commencement de fon ouvrage jufqu'a la fin, 
 *' pour rendre compte des evenements & des ca- 
 " rafteres qui fe prefenteront a decrire a chaquc 
 '' pas, a mefure qu'il avance vers la fcconde, la 
 '* troifieme, & la quatricme periodes. Pour ac- 
 *' querir une connaiflance fufiifante de la premiere 
 C c periode
 
 5 Pcftfcript. 
 
 perlode, 11 faudrait lire toutes les Chartes accor- 
 dees aux Colonies^ & les Commijp.cns i^ Injiruc- 
 tions donnees aux Gouverneurs^ tous les Codes de 
 Loi des differentcs Colonies (& Treize Volumes 
 in Folio de Statues lees & rebutans qui ne fe 
 lilent guere avec plaifir ni en peu de terns) tons 
 les Regi/lres de hi Legijlaturs des differentcs Colo- 
 nies; que Ton ne trouvera qu'en manufcrit & 
 '' en voyageant en perfonne, depuis News-Hamp- 
 " liiire jufqu'a la Georgie ; les Regi/lres des Bu- 
 *' reaux de Commerce &: des Plantations dans la 
 " Grand- Bretagne depuis ieur inftitution jurqu''a 
 " Ieur diffoiution, comme auffi ks Papiers des 
 *' Bureaux de qiielqiies-unes des Secretaireriss d'Etat. 
 "" II y a une autre branche de ledure, dont Ton 
 " ne faurait fe difpenfer, quand Ton pourrait fe 
 " pafler des autres. Je parle de ces ecrits qui 
 *' ont paru en Amerique de terns a autre, je nc 
 " pretends cependant pas, dans la place oil je Tuis, 
 *' eloigne de tous les livres & ecrits, en faire une 
 " exadle enumeration Les Ecrits des anciens Gou- 
 'uerneurs Winthrop &' fVinJlow, du Dr. Mather., 
 Mr. Prince ; Ncals Hijloire de la Nouvelle Angk- 
 terre ; Douglas Sommaire fur les premieres Planta- 
 tions ; Vaymlioratio7i progreffrce dies terres & ritat 
 prefent des Colonies Britanniqiics ; Hutchinfon Hif- 
 toire de Mafachujfetts-Bay ; Smith Hijloire de 
 New-Tork ; Smith Hijloire de New-Jerfey., les 
 Ouvrages de William Penn , Dummers Defenfe 
 des Chartes de la Ncuvelle- Angkterre , VH'ifioira 
 de Virginie, & plufieurs autres. Tout ccla etait 
 anterieur a la difpute prcfenre, qui commcnfa 
 ^' en 1 76 1. 
 
 " Durant la feconde periode, les ecrits font pli:^ 
 *' nombrcux, & plus difHcil^s a It procurer; il 
 *' fut alors donne au public des Ouvrages de 
 *' grande importance : dans les de'ixirs cntre ceui^ 
 *' qui furent adteurs dans ctltc l!;ene en qualito 
 
 '^ crEcrivains.
 
 Pojifcript, 387 
 
 ' d'Ecrivains, il en eft qui merltent d'etre dif- 
 tingues. On coinpte parmi eux les Gouver- 
 neurs du Roi Pownal^ Bernard, & Hutchinfon% 
 Le Lieutenant Gouverneur Oliver ; Mr. Sewal^ 
 Juge d'Amiraute pour Halifax, Jonathan May- 
 hew^ D. D. James Otis., Oxenbridge Thatcher ; 
 Samuel Jdams ; Jofiah ^iniy., Jofeph Warren ; 
 & peut-ctres les luivancs n'ont pas ete moins 
 importants qu'aucun des autres, favoirles ecrits 
 de Mr. Dickinfon, de Mr. Wilfon & du Dr. 
 Rujh de Philadelphic, de Mr. hivin^fton & de 
 Mr. Dougal de New- York , du Colonel Bland 
 & d^ Arthur Lee de Virgi?iie., & de plufieurs au- 
 tres. L.es Rcgijtres de la Filk de Bojton & par- 
 ticulierement d'un Comitc dc Correfpondance \ du 
 Bureau des CGmmiJJior,: de la Douane , de la Cham- 
 bre des Reprefcntans & du Bureau du Confeil de 
 Majfachufctts-Bay \ en outre les Gazettes de la 
 Ville de Boflon clanr, les derniers terns, pour ne 
 pas dire celles de Nczv-I'ork Cs? de PhiladelphiCy 
 doivent etre ramairecs & examinees depuis I'an 
 1760, Tout cela eft ncceiraire pour ecrire 
 avec precifion & en detail THiftoire des debats 
 avant que les hoililites cuifent commence, com- 
 pris la periode de i'annee 1761 jufqu'au 19 
 Avril 1775. 
 
 " Durant les trciflcmc Zz quatricme periodes 
 les Regiftres, P^.niphiets 5i Giizertesdes Treize- 
 Etats doivent etre recueillis, ainfi que les Jour- 
 naux du Cr.'n;\-s (diont ccoendant une partie eft 
 encore Iccreic) (llv la Couc'-icn des Ncuvelles Con- 
 
 jfitutions dr.s divers EJlrJs, le Rcmcmlrancer be le 
 Regifire Awiiud^ papiers periodiques publies ea 
 Angleterre. Les Affaires de V Anglcterre o de 
 l^irncriquc, & Ic Mcrcure de France^ publie a 
 Paris, & le Politifi'je Holhuulais imprimc a Am- 
 Ilerdani, toute la iuire de la Cc: ejpcnddn'cc / 
 Gin^ral IFa/Jjington avec le Congres depuis le 
 C c 2 y mois
 
 3^3 Pcjlfcript. 
 
 mois de Juillct 1775 jufqu'a ce jour, qui n'a 
 pas encore ete public, & qui ne le icra pas non 
 plus jufqu'a ce que le Congres I'ait ordonne 
 " oil pcrmis ; & permertez-moi de vous dire qu'a 
 ^' moins que cette vafte fource foit ouverte, il ne 
 fera guere pofTible a perfonne d'ennrcpretidre 
 " une Hiftoire de la Guerre Americaine : II eft 
 ** encore d'autres ecrits d'importance da7js les Bu- 
 reaux du Comite Secret^ dans le Comite du Com- 
 merce^ dans le Comite des Affaires Urangeres^ dans 
 " le Comite de la T'refcrerie^ dans le Comite dela Ma- 
 rine^ dans le Bureau de la Guerre (autant qu'il 
 *' fubfifte) & du Departemenc de la Guerre, de 
 *' la Marine, des Finances & des Affaires ecran- 
 " geres, depuis leur inftitution. II y a aufii 
 '* des Lettres des Minijlrcs Jmericaim en Francs^ 
 *' Efpagne^ Hollandc^ & d'autres panics de I'Eu- 
 " rope. 
 
 " La plupart des documents & materiaux etant 
 ** encore fecrets, c'ell un demarche prematuree 
 *' que d'entreprendre une Hiftoire generale de la 
 *' Revolution Americaine , mais I'on ne faurait 
 " mettre trop d'a6livice & de foins a faire la col- 
 *' ledlion des materiaux. II exifte cependant, a 
 *' la verire deja deux ou trois Hiftoires generales 
 " de la Guerre & Revolution Americaine, pu- 
 " bliees a Londrcs, & dex ou trois autres pu- 
 *' bliees a Paris i celles en langue Ang-laife ne lont 
 que des materiaux informes & confus fans dif- 
 ** cernementj & routes ces Hiftoires foit en An- 
 *' glais foit en Francais, ne font autre chofe que 
 *' des monuments de I'ignorance complette de 
 " leurs auteurs fur ce fujec. 
 
 " II faudrait la vie eiiiiere & la plus longue, a. 
 " commencer des I'age de 20 ans, pour aflembler 
 " /- tuut-e? les Nations &: de toutes les parties 
 "^ du monde, dans iefquels ils font depofes, les 
 '' documents propres a former une Hiftoire com- 
 
 " plettc
 
 Pofifcript, Z^9 
 
 ** plette de la Guerre Americainc; parce que c'eft 
 '*' propremenc I'Hiftoire du Genre-humain dans 
 " tome cette epoqiie. II faut y reunir rHiftoire 
 ** de France, d'Efpagne, de Hollande, d'Angle- 
 *' terre, & des Puiffances neutres, aufTi bien que 
 " de I'Annerique. Les maceriaux en devraient 
 *' ctre affembles de toutes ccs Nations, & les do- 
 ** cuments les plus importans de tous, aufll bien 
 ** que les caracleres des A6teurs & les reflbrts fe- 
 *' crets des A6lions, font encore receies dans ks 
 *' Cabinets & en chiffres. 
 
 " Soit que vous, Monfieur, enterpreniez de 
 " donner une Hiftoire gcnerale, ou fimplement des 
 " remarques & obfervations, femblables a celles 
 " que vous avez donnees fur les Grecs ^ ks Ro- 
 " fnnins ; vous produirez un Ouvrage extreme- 
 " ment intcreiTant & inltru6lif, pour la Morale, 
 " la Politique, la Lcgiflation, & je me ferais un 
 *' honneur &: un plaifir de vous fournir tous les 
 " petits fecours qui feront en mon pouvoir pour 
 " la facilite de vos recherches. II m'efl impofli- 
 *' ble de vous dire fi le Gouvernement de ce pays 
 ibuhaiterait de voir quelque ouvrage profonde- 
 mcnt ccrit, & par un Auteur d*une grande ce- 
 Icbritc, en langue Fran9aiie. II eft queftion 
 d'expofcr des principcs de gouvernement, ft 
 differens de ce qu'on trouve en Europe, fur- 
 tout en France, qu'on ne verrait peut-etre pas 
 une entreprife pareille d'un ceil indifferent : 
 c'eft ccp' I jant une chofc dent je ne me crois 
 pan le juge competent. 
 
 ** Permeitcz, Monfieur, que je finiiTe cette Let- 
 tre en vous donnant une clef pour toute cette 
 Hiftoire. li y a une analogie generale dans las 
 Gouvcrnem.ents & les Carai5leres de tous les 
 Trdizc Etats , mais ce ne fut que lorfque les 
 debats & la guerre commencerent en Mafla- 
 chufletts-Bay, la principals Province de la 
 I r Nouvelle.
 
 390 Pojlfcript. 
 
 *' Nouvelle-Angleterre, que les inftituti'ons pri- 
 mitives firent leur premier effet. Qiiatre de ces 
 " inftitutions devraient ecre bien ecudiees & am- 
 " plement examinees par quiconque voudraic 
 ecrire avec connaiffance de caufe Tur ce fujet ; 
 car elles ont produit un elTeL decifif, non-ieule- 
 ment dans les premieres determinations des de- 
 bats, dans les Confeils publics, & les premieres 
 refolutions de refifter par les armes, mais aufli 
 par i'influence qu'elles eurent fur les efprits 
 des autres Colonies en leur donnant Texemple, 
 d'adopter plus ou moins les memes inftitutions 
 & des mefures femblables. 
 
 Les quatre inftitutions mentionnecs font 
 
 1. Les Villes ou Diftrids. 
 
 2. Les Eglifes. 
 ij. Les Ecoles. 
 4. La Miiice. 
 
 I. " Les Villes font de certaines etendues de 
 pays, ou diftricls de territoire, dans lefquels 
 etiiint divifes le MalTachurerts Bay, le Connec- 
 ticut, le Nev/-Hampfljire & le Rhode-Ifland. 
 Chaque Vilie contient i'une dans Tautre fix 
 milles ou deux lieues quarrees. Les habitans 
 qui vivent dans ces limites doi'/ent former, en 
 vertu de la loi, des corporations ou corps po- 
 litiques, & font invcftis de certains pouvoirs 
 & privileges : comme par exemple, de reparer 
 les grands chemins, d'entrenir les pauvres, de 
 choilir les elus, ks conftables, les colleftcurs 
 des Taxes & d'autres cfficiers, & furtout leurs 
 Reprefentans dans la Legiflaturei comme aufli 
 du droit de s'afTembler toutes les fois qu'ils 
 font avertis par leurs Elus, dans les alTemblees 
 de Villes, afin de deliberer fur les affaires pu- 
 bliques de la Ville, ou de donner des inftrudions 
 a leurs Reprefentans. Les confequences de 
 
 ." ceue
 
 Pcftfcript, S9X 
 
 cette inftltution ont ete, que tons les habitants 
 ayant acquis des leur enfance une habitude de 
 difcuter, de deliberer, & de juger des affaires 
 publiques, 9'a etc dans cette ctendue de Villes 
 ou diltri(fts, que les fentiments du Peuple Tc 
 font tornics premierement, & que leurs refolu- 
 tions one etc prifes, depuis le commencement 
 jufqu'a la fin des debats & de la guerre. 
 
 2. " Les Eglifes Ibnt des Societes Religieufes, 
 qui comprennant le Peuple entier. Chaque 
 diftrift contien: une Paroiffe & une Eglife. JLa 
 plupart n'cn ont qu'une, & quelques-uns en one 
 plufieurs. Chaque ParoifTe a une maifon d'af- 
 lemblce, &: un Miniftre entretenu a fes propes 
 depens. Les Conftitutions des Eglifes font 
 extremement populaires, & le Clergc a pea 
 d'infiuence ou d'autoritc, a I'exception de celles 
 que leur propre pietc, leur vertu, leurs lumieres 
 leur donnent naturellcment. lis font choifis 
 par le peuple de leur ParoifTe, & refoivent 
 leur ordination du Clerge voifin. lis font tous 
 marics, ont des families, & vivent avec leurs 
 Paroillicns d:ins une parfaite amitie & intimite. 
 lis vont voir les malades, exercent la charite 
 cnveis les pauvres, alTillent a tous les mariages 
 & enterremens, & prcchent deux fois chaque 
 Dimanche-, le moindre reproche fait a leur ca- 
 raftere moral, leur ferait perdre leur influence, 
 &: leur nuirait a jamais. De forte que ce font 
 des hommes fages, vertueux & pieux. Leurs 
 fentiments font en general adaptes a ceux du 
 peuple, & ils font amis jiloux de la Libertc. 
 
 3. *' II y a des Ecoles dans chaque ville ; elles 
 font ecablics par une Loi expreffe de la Colo- 
 nie , chaque ville confillant en Ibixante families, 
 eft obligee, fous peine d'amende, de maintenir 
 conftamment une Ecole &: un maitre qui en- 
 feigne a lire, a ecrire, rurithmeiiquej fc le^ prin- 
 
 '' cipes
 
 392 Poftfcript. 
 
 " cipes des langues Latine & Grecque. Tous 
 *' les cnfans des habitans, ceux des riches comme 
 " des pauvres, ont le droit d'alier dans cettc E- 
 *' cole publique. On y forme les Etudians pour 
 *' les Colleges de Cambridge, de New-Haven, de 
 " Warwich, & de Darthmouth ; & dans ces Col- 
 *' leges on eleve des Maitres pour ces Ecoles, 
 " des Miniftres pour I'Eglile, des Dofteurs en 
 ' Droit & en Medecine, & des Magiftrats & 
 " OfEciers pour le Gouvernement du Pays. 
 
 4. " La Milice comprend tout le Peuple, En 
 *' vertu des Loix du pays chaque habitant male 
 " entre 16 & 60 ans, eft enrole dans une Com- 
 *' pagnie & Regiment de Milice, completemenc 
 *' pourvu de tous fes ofEciers. II eft oblige de 
 " tenir toujours dans fa maifon & a fes propres 
 '* depens, un moufquet en bon ordre, une corne 
 *' a poudre, une livrc de cette poudre, douze 
 " pierres a feu, vingt quatre balles de plomb, 
 ** une boete a cartouche, & un havre-fac. De- 
 " forte que toute la Contree eft prete a marcher a 
 *' fa defenfe au premier fignal. Les Compagnies 
 " & Regiments font obliges de s'affembler a un 
 *' certain terns de Tannee, fur les ordres de leurs 
 *' officiers, pour la vifitation de leurs armes 6^ 
 " munitions, & de faire leurs manoeuvres. 
 
 " Voici, Monfieur, une petite efquifie des 
 *^ quatre fources principals de cette fagefte dans 
 *' les Confeils, de cette habiletc, de cette bravoure 
 " militaire, qui ont produit la Revolution Ame- 
 ** ricaine, 8f qui, j'elpere, feront faintement con- 
 *' fervees comme les fondemens de la Liberte, du 
 *' bonheur & de la profperite du peuple. S'il 
 *' eft d'autres particularites fur lefqueliesje puifle 
 " vous donner des informations, vous me ferez 
 ** I'amitie de me le faire favoir. J'ai I'honneur 
 " d'etre 
 1782. !'JOHN AT>KUS:'
 
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