m
i
1
i
^
1
M
i
SSeSbSobk
^^^^
^^^^^sm
ljiiKT|ttLjrhCi
jrrsnragwi
*
ira
^
s^
5T^
GIFT OF
SEELEY W. MUDD
and
GEORGE I. COCHRAN MEYER ELSASSER
DR. JOHN R. HAYNES WILLIAM L. HONNOLD
JAMES R. MARTIN MRS. JOSEPH F. SARTOR!
to the
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
SOUTHERN BRANCH
JOHN FISKE
tJNIVEKSlTY of CALIFOMHI^.^
AT
LOS ANGELES
UBRAKY
DEFENCE
OF THE
CONSTITUTIONS of GOVERNMENT
OF THE
UNITED STATES of AMERICA.
By JOHN ADAMS, LL. D.
AND A MKMBXR OP THI ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SC1KNCS8
AT BOSTON.
An nature's ^fference keeps all nature''s peace. Porx*
LONDON:
PRINTED FOR C. DILLY, IN THE POULTRT
J4.PCC.I.XXXV1J.
V. 1
' PREFACE.
THE arts and fciences, in general, during
the three or four laft centuries, have had a
regular courfe of progreflive improvement. The
inventions in mechanic arts, the difcoveries in na-
tural philofophy, navigation, and commerce, and
the advancement of civilization and humanity,
have occafioned changes in the condition of the
y world, and the human charadler, which would
; ,7 have aftonilhed the mod refined nations of anti-
quity. A continuation of fimilar exertions is
every day rendering Europe more and more like
one community, or fingle family. Even in the
o theory and pradlice of government, in all the fim-
.^ pie monarchies, confiderable improvements hav
' been made. The checks and balances of re-
c) publican governments have been in fome degree
tt) adopted by the courts of princes. By the erec-
U^ tion of various tribunals, to rcgillei- the laws,
and exercife the judicial power by indulging the
petitions and remonftrances of fubjedts, until by
habit they are regarded as rights a controul has
been eftablillied over minifters of ftate, and the
royal councils, which approaches, in fomc de-
gree, to the fpirit of republics. Property is ge-
nerally fecure, and perfonal liberty feldom in-
vaded. The prefs has great influence, even where
a it
ii Preface.
it is not exprefsly tolerated ; and the public opi-
nion mufl be refpeded by a minifter, or his place
becomes infecure. Commerce begins to thrive :
and if religious toleration were cftablilhed, and
perfonal liberty a little more protected, by giving
anabfolute right to demand a public trial in a
certain reafonable time and the ftates invefted
with a few more privileges, or rather reftored to
fome that have been taken away thefe govern-
ments would be brought to as great a degree of
perfedion, they would approach as near to the
charaler of governments of laws and not of men,
as their nature will probably admit of. In fo ge-
neral a refinement, or more properly reformation
of manners and improvement in knowledge, is it
not unaccountable that the knowledge of the
principles and conftruftion of free governments,
in which the happinefs of life, and even the fur-
ther progrefs of improvement in education and
fociety, in knowledge and virtue, are fo deeply
interefted, fhould have remained at a full (land
for two or three thoufand years ? According to a
flory in Herodotus, the nature of monarchy, ari-
ftocracy, and democracy, and the advantages and
inconveniences of each, were as well underftood at
the time of the neighing of the horfe of Darius,
as they are at this hour. A variety of mixtures
of thefe fimple fpecies were conceived and at-
tempted, with different fuccefs, by the Greeks
and Romans. Reprefentations, inflead of collec-
tions, of the people a total feparation of the
'"xecutive
Preface, lii
executive from the legiflative power, and of the
judicial from both and a balance in the legifla-
ture, by three independent, equal branchesarc
perhaps the three only difcoveries in the confti-
tution of a free government, fince the inftitution
of Lycurgus. Even thefe have been fo unfortu-
nate, that they have never fpread : the firft has been
given up by all the nations, excepting one, who
had once adopted it; and the other two, reduced to
pradice, if not invented, by the Englifh nation,
have never been imitated by any other except their
own defendants in America. While it would be
rafli to fay, that nothing further can be done to
bring a free government, in all its parts, ftill nearer
to perfe6tion-*-the reprefentations of the people
are moft obvioufly fufceptible of improvement.
The end to be aimed at, in the formation of a re-
prcfentative alTembly, feems to be the fenfe of the
people, the public voice : the perfe<5bion of the
portrait confifts in its likencfs. Numbers, or pro-
perty, or both, Ihould be the rule ; and the pro-
portions of dehors and members an affair of cal-
culation. The duration fhould not be fo long
that the deputy fhould have time to forget the
opinions of his conftituents. Corruption in elec-
tions is the great enemy of freedom. Among the
provifions to prevent it, more frequent eledions,
and a more general privilege of voting, are not all
that might be devifed. Dividing the diflrifts,
diminifhing the diftance of travel, and confining
the choice to rcfidents, would be great advances
a 2 towardc
IV Preface'.
towards the annihilation of corruption. The
modern ariftocracies of Holland, Venice, Berne,
&c. have tempered themfelves with innumerable
multitudes of checks, by which they have given
a great degree of (lability to that form of govern-
ment : and though liberty and life can nevtr be
there enjoyed fo well as in a free republic, none is
perhaps more capable of profound fagacity. Wc
fhall learn to prize the checks and balances of a
free government, and even thofc of the modern
ariftocracies, if we recollect the miferies of Greece
which arofe from their ignorance of them. The
only balance attempted againft the ancient kings
was a body of nobles , and the confequences were
perpetual altercations of rebellion and tyranny,
and butcheries of thoufands upon every revolution
from one to the other. When the kings Vv'ere
aboliflied, the ariftocracies tyrannized j and then
210 balance was attempted but between arifto-
cracy and democracy. This, in the nature of
things, could be no balance at all, and therefore
the pendulum was for ever on the fwing. It is
ilimDfBble to read in Thucidydes, lib. iii. his ac-
count of the fadions and confufions throughout
all Greece, which v/ere introduced by this want
t>f an equilibrium, without horror. During the
few days that Eurymedon, with his troops, conti-
nued at Corcyra, the people of that city extended
the maflacre to all whom they judged their ene-
mies. The crime alleged was, their attempt to
overturn the democracy. Some periflied merely
tlirough
Preface. v
through private enmity -, fom?, for the money
they had lent, by the hands of the borrower.
Every kind of death, every dreadful ad, was
perpetrated. Fathers flew their children ; fomc
were dragged from altars, fome were butchered
at them ; numbers, immerfed in temples, were
ftarved. The contagion fpread through the whole
extent of Greece : faflions raged in every city ;
the licentious many contending for the Athenians,
and the afpiring few for the Lacedcemonians.
The confequence was, feditions in cities, with all
their numerous and tragical incidents. Such
things ever will be, fays Thucidydes, fo long as
human nature continues the fame. But if this
nervous hiftorian had known a balance of three
powers, he would not have pronounced the dif-
temper fo incurable, but would have added -f
long as parties in cities remain unbalanced. He
adds Words loft their fignification : brutal ra(h-
nefs was fortitude ; prudence, cowardice ; modef-
ty, effeminacy ', and being wife in every thing, to
be good for nothing : the hot temper was manly
valour ; calm deliberation, plaufible knavery ; he
who boiled with indignation, was trultworthy ;
and he who prefumed to contradid:, was ever fuf-
peded. Connexion of blood was lefs regarded
than tranfient acquaintance : alTociations were
not formed for mutual advantage, confident with
law, but for rapine againll all law: truft was only
conimunication of guilt : revenge was more va-
lued, than never to have fuffered an injury : per-
a q iuries
vi Preface.
juries were mafter-pieces of cunning , the dupe*
only blufhed, the villains moft impudently tri-
umphed. The fource of ail thefe evils is a thirft
of power, from rapacious or ambitious paffions.
The men of large influence, fome contending for
the juft equality of the democratical, and others
for the fair decorum of ariftocratical government,
by artful founds, embarraffed thofe communities,
for their own private lucre, by the keeneft fpirit,
the moft daring projedls, and moft dreadful ma-
chinations. Revenge, not limited by juftice or
the public welfare, was meafured only by fuch re-
taliation as was judged the fweeteft by capital
condemnations, by iniquitous fentences, and by
glutting the prefent rancour of their hearts with
their own hands. The pious and upright condudl
was on both fides difregarded ; the moderate
citizens fell victims to both. Seditions introduc-
ed every fpecies of outrageous wickednefs into the
Grecian manners. Sincerity was laughed out of
countenance : the whole order of human life
was confounded : the human temper, too apt to
tranfgrefs in fpite of laws, now having gain-
ed the afcendant over law, feemed to glory that
it was too ftrong for juftice, and an enemy to all
fuperiority. Mr. Hume has colledied, from Dio-
dorus Siculus alone, a few maflacres which hap-
pened in only fixty of the moft poliftied years of
Greece: From Sybaris 500 nobles baniftied j of
Chians, 600 citizens j at Ephefus, 340 killed,
1000 baniftied \ of Cyrenians, 500 nobles killed,
7 all
Preface. vii
ali the reft banifhed ; the Corinthians killed
120, banifhed 500 ; Phsebidas banifhed 300
Boeotians. Upon the fall of the Lacedaemonians,
democracies were reftored in many cities, and
fevere vengeance taken of the nobles : the ba-
nifhed nobles returning, butchered their adverfa-
ries at Phialas, in Corinth, in Megara, in Phliafia,
where they killed 300 of the people ; but thefe
again revolting, killed above 600 of the nobles,
and baniilied the reft. In Arcadia, 1400 ba-
nifhed, befides many killed ; the banifhed retired
to Sparta and Pallantium ; the latter were deli-
vered up to their countrymen, and all killed.
Of the banifhed from Argos and Thebes, there
were 509 in the Spartan army. The people, be-
fore the ufurpation of Agathocles, had baniflied
600 nobles; afterwards that tyrant, in concurrence
with the people, killed 4000 nobles, and banifhed
6000 i and killed 4000 people at Gela : his
brother banifhed 8000 from Syracufe. The in-
habitants of -^gefta, to the number of 40,000,
were killed, man, woman, and child, for the fake
of their money : all the relations of the Libyan
army, fathers, brothers, children, killed : 7000
exiles killed after capitulation. Thefe num-
bers, compared with the population of thofe
cities, are prodigious ; yet Agathocles was a man
of character, and not to be fufpeded of cruelty,
contrary to the maxims of his age: fuch were the
fafhionable outrages of unbalanced parties.
a 4 In
viii Preface.
In the name of human and divine benevolence,
is fuch a fyftem as this to be recommended to
Americans, in this age of the world ? Human na-
ture is as incapable now of going through revo-
lutions with temper and fobriety, with patience
and prudence, or without fury and madnefs, as it
was among the Greeks fo long ago. The latcft
revolution that we read of was conducled, at leaft
on one fide, in the Grecian ftyle, with laconic
energy j and with a little attic fait ; at leafl:, without
too much patience, forefight, and prudence, on
the other. Without three orders, and an effec-
tual balance between them, in every American con-
flitution, it mull be deftined to frequent unavoid-
able revolutions : if they are delayed a few years,
they muft come, in time. The United States are
large and populous nations, in comparifon of the
Grecian commonwealths, or even the Swifs can-
tons i and are growing every day more difpropor-
tionate, and therefore lefs capable of being held
together by fimple governments. Countries that
increafe in population fo rapidly as the States of
America did, even during fuch an impoverifhing
and deftrudive war as the laft was, are not to be
bound long with filken threads : lions, young
or old, will not be bound by cobwebs. It would
be better for America, it is neverthelefs agreed, to
ring all the changes with the whole fet of bells,
and go through all the revolutions of the Grecian
ftates, rather than eftablifh an abfolute monarchy
among them, notwithilanding all the great and
real
Preface, ix
real improvements made in that kind of govern-
ment.
The objedion to thefe governments is not be-
caufe they are fupported by nobles, and a fubor-
dination of ranks ; for all governments, even
the moft democratical, are fupported by a fubor-
dination of offices, and of ranks too. None ever
exifted without it but in a ftate of anarchy and
outrage, in a contempt of law and juftice, no bet-
ter than no government. But the nobles, in the
European monarchies, fupport them more by
oppofing than promoting their ordinary views.
The kings are fupported by their armies : the
nobles fupport the crown, as it is in full pofTeflion
of the gift of all employments ; but they fupport
it ftill more by checking its minifters, and pre-
venting them from running into abufcs of power,
and wanton defpotilm : otherwife the people would
be pufhed to extremities and infurredions. It is
thus that the nobles reconcile the monarchical au-
thority to the obedience of the fubjeds ; but take
away the (landing armies, and leave the nobles to
themfelves, and they would overturn every mo-
narchy in Europe, in a few years, and ere6l arifto-
cracies.
It is become a kind of falhion among
writers, to admit, as a maxim, that if you could
be always fure of a wife, adive, and virtuous
prince, monarchy would be the beft of govern-
rrients. But this is fo far from being admiffible,
that it will for ever remain true, that a free go-
vernment has a great advantage over a fimple
monarchy.
af Preface,
monarchy. The bed and wifeft prince, by means
of a freer communication with his people, and the
greater opportunities to colle<5t the bell advice
from the beft of his fubjedts, would have an im-
menfe advantage in a free ftate more than in a
monarchy. A fenate confiding of all that is mofl
noble, wealthy, and able in the nation, with a
right to counfel the crown at all times, is a check
to minifters, and a fccurity againft abufes, that a
body of nobles who never meet, and have no fuch
right, can never accomplifh. Another afiembly,
compofed of reprefentatives chofen by the peo-
ple in all parts, gives the whole nation free ac-
cefs, and communicates all the wants, knowledge,
projed:s, and wifhes of the nation, to government ;
excites an emulation among all clalTes, removes
complaints, redrefles grievances, affords opportu-
nities of exertion to genius though in obfcurity,
and gives full fcope to all the faculties of man ;
opens a paiTage for every fpeculation to the legif-
lature, to adminiftration, and to the public : it
gives a univerfal energy to the human character,
in every part of the ftate, which never can be ob-
tained in a monarchy.
There is a third particular which deferves atten-
tion both from governments and people. The mi-
nifters of ftate,in a fimple monarchy, can never know
their friends from their enemies : cabals in fccrec
undermine their influence, and blaft their reputa-
tions. This occafions a jcaloufy ever anxious and
irritated, which never thinks the government fafe
without
Prefact.
without an encouragement of informers and fpies,
throughout every part of the ftate, who interrupt
the tranquillity of private life, deftroy the confi-
dence of families in their own domeftics and one
another, and poifon freedom in its fweeteft retire-
ments. In a free government, on the contrary,
the minifters can have no enemies of confequence
but among the members of the great or little
council, where every man is obliged to take his
fide, and declare his opinion, upon every qucftion.
This circumftance alone, to every manly mind,
would be fufficient to decide the preference in
favour of a free government. Even fecrecy,
where the executive is entire in one hand, is as
eafily and furely preferved in a free government
as in a fhTiplc monarchy ; and as to difpatch, all
the fimple monarchies of the whole univerfe may
be defied to produce greater or more examples of
it than are to be found in Englifh hiftory. An
Alexander, or a Frederic, pofieffed of the prero-
gatives only of a king of England, and leading
his own armies, would never find himfelf embar-
rafled or delayed in any honeft enterprize. He
might be reftrained, indeed, from runing mad, and
from making conquefts to the ruin of his nation,
merely for his own glory : but this is no argu-
ment againft a free government. There can be no
free government without a democratical branch in
the conftitution. Monarchies and ariftocracies are
in poflefllon of the voice and influence of every
univerfity and academy in Europe. Democracy,
fimple
xii Preface,
fimple democracy, never had a patron among mer^
of letters. Democratical mixtures in govern-
ment have loft almoft all the advocates they ever
had out of England and America.
Men of letters muft have a great deal of praifc,
and fome of the neceflaries, conveniences, and or-
naments of life. Monarchies and ariftocracies
pay well and applaud liberally. The people have
almoft always expefted to be ferved gratis, and
to be paid for the honour of ferving them ; and
their applaufes and adorations are beftowed too
often on artifices and tricks, on hypocrify and
fuperftition, on flattery, bribes, and largefles. It
is no wonder then that democracies and democra-
tical mixtures are annihilated all over Europe,
except on a barren rock, a paltry fen, an inaccef-
fible mountain, or an impenetrable foreft. The
people of England, to their immortal honour, are
hitherto an exception ; but, to the humiliation of
human nature, they ftiew very often that they arc
like other men. The people in America have
now the beft opportunity, and the greateft truft,
in their hands, that Providence ever commit-
ted to fo fmall a number, fince the tranfgeffion
of the firft pair : if they betray their truft,
their guilt will merit even greater puniftiment
than other nations have fufFered, and the indig-
CD
nation of heaven. If there is one certain truth to
be collefted from the hiftory of all ages, it is this :
That the people's rights and liberties, and the de-
mocratical mixture in a conftitution, can never be
prclerved wiLhout a ftrong executive, or, in other
word.s .
Preface. xili
words, without feparating the executive power
from the legiflative. If the executive power, or
any confiderable part of it, is left in the hands
cither of an ariftocratical or a democratical aflem-
bly, it will corrupt the legiflature as neceflarily as
ruftcorrupts iron, or as arfenic poifons the human
body ; and when the legiflature is corrupted the
people are undone.
The rich, the well-born, and the able, acquire
an influence among the people, that will foon be
too much for fimplc honefty and plain fenfe, in
a houfc of reprelentatives. The mofl illuftrious
of them muft therefore be feparated from the
mafs, and placed by themfelves in a fenate : this
is, to all honed and ufeful intents, an oftracifm. A
member of a fenate, of immenfe wealth, the mofl
refpefted birth, and tranfcendent abilities, has no
influence in the nation, in comparifon of what he
would have in a fingie reprefentative affembly.
When a fenate exifts, the moft powerful man in
the ftate may be fafely admitted into the houfc
of reprefentativcs, becaufe the people have it in
their power to remove him into the fenate as
foon as his influence becomes dangerous. The
fenate becomes the great obje6l of ambition ; and
the richefl: and the mofl: fugacious wi(h to merit
an advancement to it by fervices to the public
in the houfe. When he has obtained the obje<5t
of his wiflics, you may ftill hope for the benefits
of his exertions, without dreading his pafllons ;
for
%{v Prefacf,
for the executive power being in other hands, he
has loft much oF his influence with the people,
and can govern very few votes more than his own
among the fenators.
It was the general opinion of ancient nations,
that the divinity alone was adequate to the im-
portant office of giving laws to men. The Greeks
entertained this prejudice throughout all their
difperfions , the Romans cultivated the fame po-
pular dclufion i and modern nations, in the con-
fecrations of kings, and in feveral fuperftitious
chimeras of divine rights in princes and nobles,
are nearly unanimous in preferving remnants of
it: even the venerable magiftrates of Amersfort
devoutly believe themfelves God's vicegerents.
Is it that obedience to the laws can be obtained
from mankind in no other manner? Is the
jealoufy of power, and the envy of fuperiority,
fo ftrong in all men, that no confiderations of
public or private utility are fufficient to engage
their fubmiffion to rules for their own happinefs ?
Or is the difpofition to impofture fo prevalent
in men of experience, that their private views of
ambition and avarice can be accomplifhed only
by artifice ? It was a tradition in antiquity that
the laws of Crete were dictated to Minos by the
infpiration of Jupiter. This legiflator, and hig
brother Rhadamanthus, were both his fons :
once in nine years they went to converfe with
their father, to propofe queftions concerning the
wants
Preface. xr
wants of the people ; and his anfwers were record-
ed as laws for their government. The laws of
Laced^mon were communicated by Apollo to
Lycurgus ; and, left the meaning of the deity
ftiould not have been perfectly comprehended,
or corredly exprcfled, were afterwards confirmed
by his oracle at Delphos. Among the Romans,
Numa was indebted for thofe laws which pro-
cured the profperity of his country to his con-
vcrfations with Egeria. The Greeks imported
thefc myfteries from Egypt and the Eaft, whofc
defpotifms, from the remoteft antiquity to this
day, have been founded in the fame folemn em-
piricifm ; their emperors and nobles being all de-
fcended from their gods. Woden and Thor were
divinities too ; and their pofterity ruled a thou-
fand years in the north by the ftrength of a like
credulity. Manco Capac was the child of the
fun, the vifible deity of the Peruvians ; and tranf-
mitted his divinity, as well as his earthly dignity
and authority, through a line of incas. And the
rudeit tribes of favages in North America have
certain families under the immediate proteflion
of the god war, from which their leaders are al-
ways chofen. There is nothing in which man-
kind have been more unanimous; yet nothing
can be inferred from it more than this, that the
multitude have always been credulous, and the
few artful. The United States of America have
exhibited, perhaps, the firft example of govern-
ments
kvi Preface.
mcnts ereded on the fimple principles of na-
ture : and if men are now fufficiently enlightened
to difabufe themfelves of artifice, impofture, hy-
pocrify, and fuperftition, they will confider this
event as an aera in their hiftory. Although the
detail of the formation of the American govern-
ments is at prefent little known or regarded ei-
ther in Europe or America, it may hereafter be-
come an objed of curiofity. It will never be
pretended that any perfons employed in that fer-
vice had any interviews with the gods, or were
in any degree under the infpiration of heaven,
any more than thofe at work upon fhips or
houfes, or labouring in merchandize or agricul-
ture : it will for ever be acknowledged that thefc
governments were contrived merely by the ufe of
reafonandthefenfes. As Copley painted Chatham,
Weft, Wolf, and Trumbull, Warren and Mont-
gomery ; as Dwight, Barlow, Trumbull, and
Humphries compofed their verfe, and Belknap
and Ramzay hiftory ; as Godfrey invented his
quadrant, and Rittenhoufe his planetarium , as
Boylfton prailifed inoculation, and Franklin
eledricity , as Paine expofed the miftakes of
Raynal, and JefFerfon thofe of Butfon, fo unphi-
lofophically borrowed from the Recherches Phi-
lofophiques fur les Americains, thofe defpicable
dreams of De Paw neither the people, nor
their conventions, committees, or fub-commit-
tees, confidered legiflation in any other light
than
Preface, xvii
than ordinary arts and fciences, only as of more
importance. Called without expeflation, and com-
pelled without previous inclination, though un-
doubtedly at the beft period of time both for
England and America, to ere6t fuddenly new
fyftems of laws for their future government,
they adopted the method of a wife architeft,
in erefling a new palace for the refidence of his
fovereign. They determined to confult Vitru-
vius, Palladio, and all other writers of reputa-
tion in the art 5 to examine the mod celebrated
buildings, whether they remain entire or in ru-
ins ; compare thefe with the principles of wri-
ters , and enquire how far both the theories and
models were founded in nature, op created by
fancy : and, when this fhould be done, as far
as their circum>ftanccs would allov/, to adopt
the advantages, and rejeft the inconveniences, of
all. Unembnrrafkd by attachments to noble
families, hereditary lines and fuccefTions, or any
confiderations of royal blood, even the pious
myftery of holy oil had no more influence than
that other of holy water : the people univerfally
were too enlightened to be impofed on by arti-
fice-, and their leaders, or more properly follow-
ers, v;ere men of too much honour to attempt
it. Thirteen governments thus founded on the
natural authority of the people alone, without a
pretence of miracle or myftery, which are def-
tined to fpread over the northern part of that
b whele
xvVii Prefacg.
whole quarter of the globe, are a great point
gained in favour of the rights of mankind. The
experiment is made, and has completely fuc-
ceeded : it can no longer be called in queftion,
whether authority in magiftrates, and obedience
of citizens, can be grounded on reafon, mora-
lity, and the Chriftian religion, without the
monkery of prieRs, or the knavery of politi-
cians. As the v/riter was perfonally acquaint-
ed with moft of the gentlemen in each of
the dates, who had the principal fhare in the
firft draughts, the following letters were really
written to lay before the gentleman to whom
they are addrefied, a fpecimcn of that kind of
reading and reafoning wliich produced the Ame-
rican conflitutions.
It is not a little furprifmg that all this kind of
learning tliould have been unknown to any illuf-
trious philofopher and llatefman, efpecially one
who really was, what he has been often called,
" a v/ell of fcience." But if he could be unac-
quainted with ir, or it could have efcaped his
memory, we may fuppofe millions in America
have occafion to be reminded of it. I'he wri-
ter lias long ken with anxiety the facility with
which pliilofophers of greateft nam.e have under-
taken to v/rite of American affairs, without
knowing any thing of them, and have echoed
and re-echoed each other's vifions. Having nei-
ther talents, leifure, nor inclination, to meet fuch
champions in the field of literary controverfy,
.^ he
PrefacT. Slix
he little thought of venturing to propofe to them
any queftions : circumftances, however, have
lately occurred, which feemed to require that
fome notice (hould be taken of one of thenii
If the publication of thefe papers fhould contri-
bute any thing to turn the attention of the
younger gentlemen of letters in America to this
kind of enquiry, it will produce an eifefl of
fome importance to their country. The fubje6t
is the moft interefbing that can engage the un-
derftanding or the heart , for whether the end
of man, in this ftage of his exiftence, be en-
joyment or improvement, or both, it can never
be attained fo well in a bad government as a
good one.
The prafticability or the duration of a repub-
lic, in which there is a governor, a fenate, and
a houfe of reprefentatives, is doubted by Taci-
tus, though he admits the theory to be lauda-
ble :" Cunflas na- ones et urbes, popuius,
** aut priores, aut fin^ali, regunt. Delcda ex
*' his et conftituta reipublicce forma, iaudart
*' facilius quam inveniri ; vei, fi eveniu, haud
" diuturna efle poteft." Ann. lib. iv. Cicero
aflerts " Statuo efle optime conftitutam rcm-
" publicam, qua; ex tribus generibus iilis, re-
*' gali, oprimo, et populari, modice cor'rufa.'*
Frag. in fuch ptrcTiprory terms the luperio-
rity of fuch a government to all other forms,
that the lofs of his book upon republics is much
b 2 10
XX Prefacs.
to be regretted. From a few paffages that have
been preferved, it is very probable he entered
more largely into an examination of the compo-
fition of monarchical republics than any other
ancient writer. He was fo far from apprehend-
ing "difputes" from a variety of orders, that
he alHrms it to be the firmeft bond of juftice,
and the flrongeft anchor of fafety to the com-
munity. As the treble, the tenor, and the bafs
exift in nature, they will be heard in the con-
cert : if they are arranged by Handel, in a fkil-
ful compofition, they produce rapture the moft
exquifite that harmony can excite-, but if they
are confufed together without order, they will
" Rend with tremendous found your ears
" aflmder."
*' Ut in fidibus ac tiblis, atque cantu ipfo,
a vocibus concentus efl quidam tenendus ex
diftinctis fonis, quern immutatum ac difcre-
pantem aures eruditse ferre non poffunt ; if-
que concentus, ex dijfimillimarum vocum mode-
rat i one ^ concors tamen ejficitur et congruens : fie
ex- fummis et hifjnis et mediis interjetlis ordi-
nibus, ut fonis, moderata raiioiie, civitas con-
fenfu diffimillimoium concinit; et qu2e har-
monia a muficis dicitur in cantu, ea eft in
civitate concord ia, arctiiTimum atque opti-
mum omni in repubiica vinculum incolumi-
tatisj qu fine juftitia nuUo pado eflie po-
I " teft/!
Preface. xxl
'* teft." Cicero, Frag, de Repub. As all the
ages of the world have not produced a greater
ftatefman and philofopher united in the fame
character, his authority Ihould have great weight.
His decided opinion in favour of three branches
is founded on a reafon that is unchangeable ;
the laws, which are the only poffible rule, niea-
fure, and fecurity of juftice, can be fure of pro-
tedion, for any courfe of time, in no other form
of government : and the very name of a repub-
lic implies, that the property of the people
fhould be reprefented in the legiflature, and
decide the rule of juftice. *' Relpublica eft res
" populi. Populus autem non omnis coetus
*' multitudinis, fed coetus juris conl'enfu, et uti-
litatis communione fociatus." Frag, de Rep.
" Refpublica res eft populi, cum bene ac
jufte geritur, five ab uno rege, five a paucis
" optimatibus, five ab univerlb populo. Cum
vero injuftus eft rex, quem tyrannum voco ;
aut injufti optimates, quorum confenfus fac-
tio eft ; aut injuftus ipfe populus, cui no-
'* men ufitatum nullum reperio, nifi ut etiam
" ipfum tyrannum appellem \ non jam vitiofa,
fed omnino nulla refpublica eft ; quoniam non
eft res populi, cum tyrannus eam fadliove
*' capcflat ; nee ipfe populus eft fi fit injuftus,
quoniam non eft multitudinis juris confenfu,
et utilitatis unione fociata. '' Frag, de Re-
pub.
b3 " Ubi
(C
5ixii Prqace.
" Ubl vero juftitia non eft, ncc jus pouit
*^' effe; quod enim jure fir, profe<5to jufte fit;
' quod autem fit injufte, nee jure fieri poteft.
*' Non enim jura dicenda funt, vel putanda, in-
*': iqua hominum conftituta, cum illud etiam ipfi
*' jus efTe dicant quod de juftici^ fonie manave-
'' rit ; falfumque fit, quod a quibufdam non
^' redle fentientibus dici folet, id jus efTe, quod
*': ei, qui plus potefl, utile efl." According to
this, a fimple monarchy, if it could in reality be
what it pretends to be a government of laws,
might be juftly denominated a republic. A li-
mited monarchy, therefore, efpecially when li-
mited by two independent branches, an arifto-
cratical and a democratical power in the confti-
tution, may with ftridl propriety be called by
that name.
If Cicero and Tacitus could revifit the earth,
and learn that the Engliih nation had reduced
the great idea to practice, and brought it nearly
to perfedlion, by giving each divifion a power
to defend itfelf by a negative , had found it the
mofl folid and durable government, as well as
tlie mofl free ; h^d obtained, by means of it, a
profperity among civilized nations, in an enlight-
ened age, like that of the Rornans among bar-
barians : and that the Americans, after having
enjoyed the benefits of fuch a conititution a
century and a half, were advifed by fome of the
greateft philofophers and politicians of the age
Preface. xxiii
to renounce it, and fee up the governments of
ancient Goths and modern Indians what would
they fay ? That the Americans would be more re-
prehenfible than the Cappadocians, if they fliould
liften to fuch advice. It would have been much
to the purpofe to have inferted a more accurate
inveftigation of the form of government of the
ancient Germans and modern Indians ; in both,
the exiftence of the three divifions of power is
marked with a precifion that excludes all con-
troverfy. The democratical branch, efpecialiy,
is fo determined, that the real fovereignty re-
fided in the body of the people, and was exer-
cifed in the afiembly of king, nobles, and com-
mons together. Thefe inftitutions really colle6r-
ed all authority into one center of kings, nobles,
and people. But fmall as their numbers, and
narrow as their territories v/ere, the confequence
was confufion ; each part believed it governed
the whole: the chiefs thought they were fove-
r^^ign ; the nobles believed the power to be in
their hands , and the people flattered themfelve^
that all depended upon them. Their purpofes
were well enough anfwered, without coming to an
explanation, while they were few in numbers, and
had no property , but when fpread over large
provinces of the Roman empire, now the great
kingdoms of pAirope, and grown populous and
rich, they found the inconvenience of not know-
iig each its place. Kings, nobles, and peopie
b -^ claimed
xxiv Preface.
claimed the government in turn : and after all
the turbulence, wars, and revolutions, which
compofe the hiflory of Europe for fo many
ages, we find fimple monarchies eflablidied every
where. Whether the fyflem will now become
llationary, and laft for ever, by means of a few
further improvements in monarchical govern-
ments, we know not -, or v/hether flill further
revolutions are to come. The moft probable, or
rather the only probable change is, the intro-
dudlion of democratical branches into thofe go-
vernments. If the people fnould ever aim at
more, they will defeat themfelves j and indeed
if they aim at this, by any other than gentle
means, and by gradual advances , by improve-
ments in general] education, and informing
the public mind. The fyftems of legiflators are
experiments made on human life and manners,
fociety and government. Zoroafter, Confucius,
Mithras, Odin, Thor, Mahomet, Lycurgus, So-
lon, Romulus, and a thoufand others, may be
compared to philofophers making experiments
on the elements. Unhappily a political experi-
ment cannot be made in a laboratory, nor deter-
mined in a few hours. The operation once be-
gun, runs over whole quarters of the globe, and
is not finifhed in many thouiands of years. The
experiment of Lycurgus lafted itw^^n hundred
years, but never fpread beyond the limits of La-
conia, The procefs of Solon blowed out in one
century ^
Freface. xxt
century , that of Romulus lafted but two cen-
turies and a half; but the Teutonic inftitutions,
defcribed by Csefar and Tacitus, are the moft
memorable experiment merely political, ever yet
made in human affairs. They have fpread all
over Europe, and have lafted eighteen hundred
years. They afford the ftrongeft argument that
can be imagined in fupport of the point aimed
at in thefe letters. Nothing ought to have more
weight with America, to determine her judgment
againft mixing the authority of the one, the few,
and the many, confufedly in one affembly, than
the wide-fpread miferies and final flavery of al-
moft all mankind, in confequence of fuch an
ignorant policy in the ancient Germans. What
is the ingredient which in England has preferved
the democratical authority ? The balance, and
that only. The Englilh have, in reality, blend-
ed together the feudal inftitutions with thofe of
the Greeks and Romans ; and out of all have
made that noble compofition, whiqh avoids the
inconveniences, and retains the advantages, of
both. The inftitutions now made in America
will never wear wholly out for thoufands of
years : it is of the laft importance then that
they fhould begin right , if they fet out wrong,
they will never be able to return, unlefs it be by
accident, to the right path. After having known
the hiftory of Europe, and of England in par-
pcular, it would be the height of folly to go
back
Preface.
back to the inftltutions of Woden and of Thor,
as they are adviled to do : if they had been
counfelled to adopt a fimple monarchy at once,
it would have been lefs myfterious. Robertfon,
Hume, and Gibbon have given fuch admirable
accounts of the feudal inftitutions, and their
confequences, that it would have been more dif-
creet to have referred to them, perhaps, without
faying any thing more upon the fubjed. To col-
led tof^ether the legiflation of the Indians, v/ould
take up much room, but would be well worth
the pains. The fovereignty is in the nation, it is
true, but the three powers are ftrong in every
tribe i and their royal and ariftocratical dignities
are much more generally hereditary, from the
popular partiality to particular families, and the
luperftitious opinion that fuch are favourites of
the God of War, than the late writers upon this
fubjed have allowed.
Grofvenor Square^
January i, 1787.
CONTENTS.
CONTENTS.
I-ETTER
Page
I.
pRelminary Ohfer-vations
3
II.
"-"
5
DEMOCRATICAL REPUBLICS,
III.
St. Marino
,
S
IV.
Bifcay
i5
The Grifons
21
The United Provinces of the
Low
Countries
22
V.
S':x;itzerland
ib.
Jppenzel
23
VI.
Underwald
iG
VII.
Claris -^
28
yiii.
Zug
T^
IX
31
. Uri
xxviii CONTENTS.
LETTER Page
IX. Uri * m^ ^2
X, Switz 24
ARISTOCRATICAL REPUBLICS.
XI. Berne 35
XII. Fribourg "^39
XIII. Sokure -42
XIV". Lucerne 45
XV. Zurich 47
XVI. Schaffhaufe -49
Mulhoufe 5/Vm5 50
XVII. 5/. G^// 51
Geneva 52
XVIII. iL^f^ Genoa ""5^
XIX. Venice 58
ST^^ United Provinces of the Low
Countries 69
MONARCHICAL REPUBLICS.
XX.
England -
70
XXI.
Poland
72
XXII.
Poland
74
XXIII.
Recapitulation
r 91
ANCIENT
CONTENTS. XXIX
LETTER Page
ANCIENT REPUBLICS, AND OPINIONS OF
PHILOSOPHERS.
XXIV. Dr. Swiff 97
XXV. Dr. Franklin 105
XXVI. Dr. Price 121
MIXED GOVERNMENTS.'
XXVII. Machiavel Hi
Sidney H^
XXVIII. Monteffiuieu i53
ANCIENT REPUBLICS, AND OPINIONS F
PHILOSOPHERS.
XXIX. Harrington 158
XXX. P^'/}'^/^^ -* 169
XXXI. Fclybius ^77
XXXII. Dionyfms Halicarnajfenfis Va-
lerius -^ I ^4
XXXIII. Flato 188
XXXIV. Sir "Thomas Smith "^ 207
ANCIENT DEMOCRATICAL REPUBLICS.
XXXV. Carthage -^ 210
ANCIENT
XXX CONTENTS.
LETTER Page
ANCIENT ARISTOCRATICAL REPUBLICS.
XXXVI. Rome 215
ANCIENT MONARCHICAL REPUBLICS.
XXXVII. "Tacitus 22
XXXVIII. Homer Ph^acia 2,^2
XXXIX. Homer Ithaca 237
" Homer -'242
D
ANCIENT ARISTOCRATICAL REPUBLICS.
XL. Lacedamon 249
ANCIENT DEMOCRATICAL REPUBLICS.
XLI. Athens * 260
XLII, Antalcidas -* -2 85
XLIII. Achaia ' 295
XLIV. Crete
305
XLV. Corinth 308
XLVI. Argos * ' 311
XLVII. Iphitus - "^ ^^5
XLVIII. rhehes 318
ANCIENT ARISTOCRATICAL REPUBLICS.
XLIX. Crotom Pythagoras < 322
ANCIENT
CONTENTS. xxx;
LETTER
rage
ANCIENT DEMOCRATICAL REPUBLICS.
L.
Syharis Charondas
327
LI.
Locris ZakucHS
3Z^
LII.
Rome
CONCLUSION.
334
LIII.
Congrefs
:62
LIV.
Locke^ MilioHy and Hume
3(^5
LV.
Ccndujion
372
Pojlfcript r*
r-
3 S3
LETTER
LETTER L
GROSVENOR-uQLrARE, Ocloher /\.^ I786.
My dear Sir,
^I^HREE writers in Europe, of great abili-
JL tics, reputation, and learning, Mr, Turgot,
the Abbe De Mably, and Dr. Price, have turned
their attention to the conftitutions of government
in the United States of America, and have writ-
ten and publiflied their criticifms and advice.
They had all the mod amiable characters, and
unquefrionably the pureft intentions. They had
all experience in public affairs, and ample in-
formation in the nature of man, the neceflities of
fociety, and the fcience of government.
There are in the produitions of all of them,
amonj); many excellent things, fome fentiments,
however, that it will be difficult to reconcile to
reafon, experience, the conftitution of human na-
ture, or to the uniform teftimony of the greatefl:
ftatefmen, lej;iIitors, and philolophers of all en-
lightened nations, ancienc and modern.
Mr. T^v^jI^ in his letter to Dw Price, con-
feffes, *' tliat he is not fatisfjed with the coniti-
tutions which have h:dierto been formed for
the d life: en t ibues of America." He obferves,
that by mod of them the cuiloms of England
are im;ia:ed, without any particular motive.
Inllead of collecfting all autlv.rity into one ccn-
" ter, tnat of the nation, thev have ellabliflied
B 2 ' *' dilierent
Preliminary Obfervations.
" different bodirs, a body of reprefentatives, a
*' council, and a governor, becaufe there is in
" England a houle of commons, a houfe of
lords, and a king. They endeavour to ba-
lance thefe different powers, as if this equili-
brium, which in England may be a neceffary
check to the enormous infiiience ot royalty,
could be of any ule in rcpublicks tounded
upon the equality of all the citizens, and as if
cilablilbrng different orders of men was not a
fource of divifions and difpucts,"
There has been, from the beginning of the re-
volution in America, a party in everv flate, who
have entertained fentiments fimilar to theie of Mr,
Turgot. Two or three of them have eftabiifhed
governments upon his principle : and, by ad-
vices from Bofton, certain committees of coun-
ties have been held, and other conventions pro-
pofed in the MafFachuIetts, with the exprefs pur-
pofe of depofing the governor and fcnate, as ufe-
lefs and expenfive branches of the conilitution ;
and as it is probable that the publication of Mr.
Turgot*s opinion has contribueed to excite fuch
difcontents among the people, it becomes necef-
fary to examine it, and, if it can be fhown to be
an error, whatever veneration the Am.ericans very
juftly entertain for his memory, it is to be hoped
fhey will not be mifled by his authority.
LETTER
Preliminary Ohfervations.
LETTER li.
My dear Sir,
MR. Turgot is offended-, becaufe the cufLoms
of, England are imitated in moft of the
new cunftitucions in America, without anv parti-
cular motive. But, if we fuppofe that Englifh
cuftoms were neither good nor evil in themfelves,
and merely indifferent ; and the people, by their
birth, education, and habits, were tamiliarly at-
tached to them ; was not this a motive particular
enough for their prefervation, rather than endan-
ger the public tranquillity, or unanimity, by re-
nouncing them ? It thofe cuftoms were wife,
juft, and good, and calculated to fecure the li-
berty, property, and iafety of the people, as well
or better than any other inftitutions ancient or
modern, would iVlr. Turgot have advifed the na-
tion to reject them, merely becaufe it was at that
time juflily incenfed againll the Englifh govern-
ment ? What P^nglifh cuftoms have they retained
which may with any propriety be called evil ?
Mr. Turgot has inftanced only in one, viz. " thac
** a body of reprefentatives, a council, and a go-
" vernor, has been eftabliflied, becaufe there is
" in England a houfe of commons, a houfe of
" lords, and a king." It was not fo much be-
caufe the legiflature m England confifted of three
branches, that fuch a divifion of power was
adopted by the ftares, as becaufe their own af-
femblies had ever been fo conltituted. It was not
fo much from attachment by habit to fuch a plan
of power, as from convidtion that it was founded
in nature and reafon, thac it was continued.
B 3 Mr;
6 Preliminary Ohfervations.
Mr. Turgot Teems to be of a different opinion^
and is for " colle6linp: all authority into one cen-
*' ter, the nation." It is eafily underftood how
all authority may be colie6"ted into " one center "
in a defpot or monarch ; but how it can be done,
when the center is to be the nation, is more diffi-
cult to comprehend. Before Vv/e attempt to dif-
cnls the notions of an author, we (hould be care-
ful to afcertain his meaning. It will not beeafy,
after the mod: anxious refearch, to dilcover the
true fcnfe of this extraordinary pafiage. If, after
the pains of " coliefting all authority into one
" center," ;hat center is to be the nation, we
fnall remain exactly where we began, and no col-
lection of authority at all will be made. The na-
tion will be the authority, and the authority the
nation. The center will be the circle, and the
circle the center. When a number of men, wo-
men, and children, are fimply congregated together,
there is no political authority am.ong them , nor any
natural authority, but that oi parents over their
children. To leave the women and children out
of the queftion for the prefenc, the men will all
be equal, \\tQ^ and independent of each other.
Not one Vv'ill have any authority over any other.
The firlt '^ colledcion " of authority mull be an
unanimous agreement to form themfelves into a
nation, people, cornviunity, or body politick, and to
be governed by the majority cf lulfragcs or
voices. But even in this cafe, although the au-
thority is collected into one center, that center is
no longer the nation, but the mc.ioriiy of the
nation. Did Mr. Turgot mean, that the people
of '\ irginia, for example, half a million of fouls
fcattered over a territory of two hundred leagues
fquare, fhould itop here, and have no other au-
thority
Preliminary Ohfervaiions. 7
thority by which to make or execute a law, or
judge a caufe, but by a vote of the whole peo-
ple, and the decifion of a majority ! Where is
the plain large enough to hold them ; and what
are the means, and how long would be the time,
neceflary to afTemble them together ?
A fimple and perfed democracy never yet ex-
ifted among men. If a village of half a mile
fquare, and one hundred families, is capable of
exercifing all the legiflative, executive, and judi-
cial powers, in public affemblies of the whole,
by unanimous votest or by majorities, it is more
than has ever yet been proved in theory or expe-
rience. In fuch a democracy, the moderator
would be king, the town -clerk Icgiflator and
judge, and the conftable ilieriff, for the moft
part ; and, upon more important occafions, com-
mittees would be only the counfellors of both the
former, and commanders of the latter.
Shall we fuppofe then, that Mr. Turgot in-
tended, that an alfembiy of reprefentatives Ihoukl
be choi'en by the nation, and vefted with all the
powers of government; and that this alfembiy
Ihall be the center in which all the authority fhall
be collefled, and Ihall be virtually deemed the
nation. After long refledlion, 1 have not been
able to difcover any other icnit in his words, and
this was probably his real meaning. To examine
this fyftem in detail may be thought as trifling an
occupation, as the laboured reafonings of Sidney
and Locke, to fliew t!ie abfurdity of Filmar's
fuperftitious notion';, appeared to Mr. Iluine in
his enlightened days. Yet the nfillakes of great
men, and even the ablurdicies of fools, wlien
they countenance the prtjudiccs of numbers ot
people, efpecially in a young country, and ui^dcr
new governments, cannot be too fully con/uted.
ii J. You
S JDemocratical Repuhlicsl
You will not then efteem my time or your own
milpent, in placing this idea of Mr. Turgot in
all its lights; in conlidering the confequences of
it , and in coUeding a variety of authorities
againft ,it.
LETTER III.
ST. MARINO,
My dear Sir,
" \ S O C I E T Y of gods would govern them-"
Jt\, " felves democratically," fays the eloquent
philolbpher of Geneva ; who however would
have agreed, that his " gods " muft not have
been the claffical deities : fince he knew from the
higheft authority, the poets, who had their infor-
mation from thofe divinities the Mufes, that all
the terrors of the nod, the arm, and the thun-
derbolts of Jupiter, with all the energy of his
tindifputed monarchy, were infufficient to hold
them in order. As it is impoflible to know what
"would have been his definition of the gods, we
may quietly purfue our enquiry, whether it is
pra6licable to govern men in this v/ay. It would
be very furprifing, if, among all the nations
that have exiited, not one has difcovered a fecret
of fo mu:h importance. It is not neceflary for
us to prove that no fuch government has exifted ;
it is incumbent on him who Ihall embrace the
opinion of Mr. Turgot, to name the age, the
country, and the people, in which fuch an ex-
periment has been tried. It might he eafier to
determine tne qucilion concerning the practicabi-
lity
St. Marinol
lity or impradicability, the utility or inutility, of
a fimple democracy, if we could find a number
of examples of it. From the frightful piftures
of a dcmocrarical city, drawn by the mafterly
pencils of ancient philofophers and hiftorians, it
may be conjedVured that fuch governments exifted
in Greece and Italy, at Icail tor fhort fpaces of
time: but no paiticular hiftory of any one of
them is come down to us ; nor are we able to
procure any more latisfa<5lion to our curiofity
from modern hiftory. If fuch a phenomenon is
at this time to be feen in the world, it is pro-
bably in fome of thofe ftates which have the
name of democracies, or at leaft in fuch as have
preferved fome fhare in the government to the
people. Let us travel to fome of thofe countries,
and examine their laws.
The republic of St. Marino, in Italy, is fome-
times quoted as an inftance; and therefore it is
of fome importance to examine, i. Whether in
fa(5l this is a fimple democracy ; and, 2. Whe-
ther, if it were fuch, it is not" owing to particu-
lar circumftances, which do not belong to any
other people, and prove it to be improper for any
other, efpecially the United States of America,
to attempt to imitate it.
The republic of St. Marino, as Mr. Addifon
informs us, ftands on the top of a very high
and craggy mountain, generally hid among the
clouds, and fometimes under fnow, leven when
the weather is clear and warm in all the coun-
try about it.
This mountain, and a few hillocks that lie
fcattered about the bottom of it, is the whole
qircuit of the dominion. They have, what they
call, three cafties, three convents, and five
4 churches.
lo Democraticd Republics.
churches, and reckon about five thoufand fouls in
their community.
St. Marino was its founder, a Dalmatian by-
birth, and by trade a mafon. He was employed,
about thirteen hundred years ago, in the repara-
tion of Rimini, and after he had finifhed his work,
retired to this folitary mountain as very proper
for the life of a hermit, which he led in the
greateft aufterities of religion. He had not been
long here, before he wrought a reputed miracle,
which, joined with his extraordinary fandtity,
gained him fo great an efteem, that the princefs
of the country made him a prefent of the moun-
tain, to difpole of it at his difcretion. His repu-
tation quickly peopled it, and gave rife to the
republic which calls itfelf after his name. The
bed of their churches is dedicated to the faint,
and holds his afhes. His flatue Hands over the
high altar, with the figure of a mountain in his
hands, crowned with three caftles, which is like-
\vife the arms of the commonwealth. They at-
tribute to his protection the long duration of the
Hate, and look on him the greateft faint next the
bleffed Virgin. In their ftatute-book is a law
againft fuch as fpeak difrefpectfully of him, who
are to be punillied in the fame manner as thofe
v/ho are convicted of blafphemy. This petty
republic has lafted thirteen hundred years, while
all the other ftates of Italy have feveral times
changed their mafters and forms of government.
Their whole hillory confifts in two purchafes of
a neighbouring prince, and two wars, in which
they affifted the pope againft a lord of Rimini.
They would probably fell their liberty as dear
as they could to any that attacked them ; for
there is but one road by which to climb up to
them.
St. Marino. ri
them. All that are capable of bearing arms, are
exercifed, and ready at a moment's call.
The fovereign power of the republic was
lodged, originally, in what they call the arengo,
a great council, in which every houfe had its re-
prefentative -, but, becaule they found too much
confufion in fuch a multitude of ftatefmen, they
devolved their whole authority into the hands of
the council of fixty. The arengo, however, is
Hill called together in cafes of extraordinary im-
portance , and if, after due fummons, any mem-
ber abfents himfelf, he is to -be fined. In the
ordinary courfe of government, the council of
fixty, which, notvvithflanding the name, confifts
but of forty perfons, has in its hands the admi-
nillration of afi^airs, and is made up of half out
of the noble families, and half out of the ple-
beian. They decide all by ballotting, are not
admitted until five-and-twenty years old, and
choofe the officers of the commonwealth.
No fentence can ftand that is not confirmed by
two thirds of this council ; no fon can be admitted
into it during the life of his father, nor two be in
it of the fame family, nor any enter but by eleclion.
The chief officers of the commonwealth are the two
(cipitant'os^ who have fuch a power as the old l^oman
confuls had, but are chofen every fix months. Some
have been capitamos fix or feven times, though the
office is never to be continued to the fame perfons
twice fuccefilvely. The third ofiicer is the com-
mififary, who judges in all civil and criminal
matters : but becuufe the many alliances, friend-
fiiips, and intermarriages, as well as the perfonal
feuds and animolirics tJiat happen among fo fmail
a people, might obllrucft the courle of jufiice, if
one of their own number had tlie diifnbution of
it, they have always a foreigner for this employ,
1 1 V, iiom
12 Democratical Republics.
whom they choofe for three years, and maintain
out oi the public ftock. He mult be a dodtor
of law, and a man of known integrity. He is
joined in commiffion with the capitaneos^ and a6t:i!
fomcthing like the recorder of London under the
lord mayor. The fourth man in the ftate is the
phyfician : another perfon, who makes no or-
dinary figure in the republic, is the fchoolm after.
Few in the place but have fome tindure of
learning.
The people are efteemed very honefl, and ri-
gorous in the execution of juffcice, and feem to
live more happy and contented among their rocks
and fnows, than others of the Italians do in the
pleafanteft vallies in the world. Nothing indeed
can be a greater inilance of the natural love
mankind has for liberty, and of their averfion
to arbitrary government, than fuch a favage
mountain covered with people, and the Campa-
nia of Rome, which lies in the fame country,
almoft deftitute of inhabitants.
This is the account of St. Marino. Yet, if
all authority is here colleded in one center, that
center is not the nation. Although the original
reprefentation in the arengo was of houfes, that is
to fay, of property, rather than of the perfons
of the citizens, and confequently not very equal,
as it excluded all perfonal property, as well as
all wiio had no property ; yet even fuch an
agrarian, it ftems, was not a fufficient check
to licentioufnefs, and they found it neceffary to
inftitute a fenate of forty men. Here, at leaft,
commenced as complete an ariilocracy as that of
ancient Rome ; or, lo exprefs it more exactly, as
complete a feparation of the ariftocratical from
the democratical part of the community : and
there are two remarkable circumilanccs in confir-
mation
St. Marhw'. 13
mation of this -, one is, that there are not only
noble families in this illujirijjimd repuhlicd San5ii
Marini, but theconftitution has limited the choice
of the eledors fo far as to oblige them to choofe
one half the fenate out of thefc nobles ; the other
is, that the names of the agents for the common-
wealth, of the notary, and the witnefles to two
inftruments of purchafes made at feventy years
diftance from one another, one in 1 100, the other
in 1 170, are the fame. It is not credible that
they were the fame perfons : they were probably
fons or grandfons which is a ftrong proof of
the attachment to anftocratical families in this
little ftate, and of their defire to continue the
fame blood and the fame names in public em-
ployments, like the Oranges, Fagels, De Lin-
dens, &c. in Holland, and like innumerable other
examples in all naiions.
Another remarkable circumftance is, the reluc-
tance of the citizens to attend the afTcmbly of the
arengOt which obliged them to make a law, oblig-
ing themlelves to attend, upon a penalty. This is
a defe6V, and a misfortune natural to every de-
mocraticai conftitution, and to the popular part
of every mixed government. A general or too
common difinclination to attend, kaves room for
perfons and parties more active to carry points
oy fadlion and intrigue, which the majority, if
all were prefenr, would not approve.
It is curious to iee how many checks and li-
mitations are contrived for this legiflative afTcm-
bly. Half nobles, half plebeians all upwards
ot five-and-twcrnty years old two thirds mull
agree no fon can fit with his father j never two
of the fame family.
The capitaneos have the executive, like the Ro-
jnan coniuls, and the commilfary has the judi-
cial.
14 Democrattcal Republics,
clal. Here again are remarkable limitations:
he muft be a foreigner, and he is for three years.
This is to give fome degree of {lability to the ju-
dicial power, and to make it a real and powerful
check both to the executive and legiflative.
We are not indeed told whether the council of
forty are elected annually or for life. Mr. Addi-
fon may, from his well-known characEler, be fup-
poied to have been more attentive to the grand
and beautiful mionuments of ancient arts of every
kind which furrounded him in Italy, than to this
rough hillock, although the form of government
might have excited his curiofity, and the fimpli-
city of manners his efteem , he has accordingly
given a very imperfeft fKCtch of its conftit!;,:oa
and hiitory. Yet enough appears to fhew incon-
teftibly, that St. Marino is by no means a per-
fed democracy. It is a mixture of monarchy,
ariftocracy, and democracy, as really as Sparta
or Rome were, and as the MaiTachufetts, New-
York, and Maryland now arcj in which the pow-
ers of the governor, fenate, and affcmbly, are more
exacl:ly afcertained and nicely balanced, but they
are not more diftinct than thofe of the capitaneos^
council of forty, and the arengo are in St. Ma-
rino.
Should it be argued, that a government like
this, where the fovereignty refidcs in the whole
body of the people, is a democracy, it may be
anAvsred, that the right of fovereignty in all na-
tions is unalienable and indivifible, and does and
can refide no where elfe ; but not to recur to a
principle fo general, the exercife, as well as right
of fovereignty, in Rome, refided in the people, but
the government was not a democra'^y. In Ame-
rica, the right of fovereignty relides indifputably
in the body of the people, and they have the
whole
Sl Marino. rs
whole property of land. There are no nobles or
patricians all are equal by law and by birth.
The governors and fenates, as well as reprefenta-
tive afTemblies, to whom the exercife of fove-
reignty is committed, are annually chofen. Go-
vernments more democratical never exifted ; they
are vaftly more fo than St. Marino. Yet the an-
nual adminiftration is divided into executive, le-
giflative, and judicial powers ; and the legiilature
itfelf is divided into monarchical, ariftocratical,
and democratical branches ; and an equilibrium
has been anxioufly fought for in all their deli-
berations and aftions, v/ith infinitely more art,
judgment, and fkill, than appears in this little
Italian commonwealth.
The liberty and the honefty of thefe people is
not at all furprifing. In fo fmall a ftate, where
every man perfonaily knows every other, let the
form of government be what it will, it is Tcarcely
podible that any thing like tyranny or cruelty can
take place. A king, or a decemvirate intruded
with the government, would feel the cenfures of
the people, and be conftantly confcious of the
facility of affembling the whole, and apprehenfive
of an exertion of their ftrength.
The poverty of this people appears, by the
fine of one penny impofed upon ablence from the
arengo , and by the law, that an ambaffkdor
fliould have a Hiilling a day. This however is a
falary in proportion to the numbers of the people,
as thirty guineas a day would be to an ambaf-
fador from x.\\c United States. It appears alfo,
irom the pliyfician's being obliged to keep a
hoiTe, probably there is not a carriage, nor ano-
ther laddle-horfe, in the commonwealth.
An handful ol" poor people, living in the fim-
pleil manner, by hard labour, upon the produce
of
i6 Democratkal Repuhlicsl
of a few cows, (heep, goats, fwine, poultry, and
pigeons, on a piece of rocky, inowy ground, pro-
tedied from every enemy by their liruation, their
fuperftition, and even by their poverty, having
no commerce nor luxury, can be no example
for the commonwealth of Penfilvania, Georgia, or
Vermont, in one of which there are poffibly half a
million of people, and in each of the other ac
leaft thirty thoufands, fcattered over a large ter-
ritory.
Upon the whole, a ftronger proof cannot be
adduced of the neceffity of different orders, and
of an equilibrium between them, than this com-
monwealth of St. Marino, where there are fuch
ftrong fymptoms of both in a fociety, where the
leaft occafion for them appears that can be ima-
gined to take place in any conceivable fituation.
LETTER IV,
jB I s c A y.
Dear Sir,
IN a refearch like this, after thofe people \n
Europe who have had the fkill, courage, and
fortune, to preferve a voice in the governmenr,
Bifcay, in Spain, ought by no rreans to be omit-
ted. While their neighbours have long fince re-
figned all their pretenfions into the hands of
kings and priefls, this extraordinary people have
preferved their ancient language, genius, laws,
government, and manners, without innovation,
longer than any other nation of Europe. Of
Celtic extradion, they once inhabited fome of
the
Bifcay. 1 7
the fined parts of the ancient Boetica ; but their
love of liberty, and unconquerable averfion to a
foreign fervitude, made them retire, when invaded
and overpowered in their ancient feats, into thefe
mountainous countries, called by the ancients
Cantabria. They were governed by counts, fent
them by the kings of Oviedo and Leon, until
859, vviien finding themfelves without a chief*
becaufe Zeno, who commanded them, was made
prifoner, they rofe and took arms to refift Or-
dogne, fon of Alfonfus the Third, whofe domi-
nation was too fevere for them, chofe for their
chief an iffuc of the blood-royal of Scotland, by
the mother's fide, and fon-in-law of Zeno their
governor, who having overcome Ordogne, in 870,
they chofe him for their lord, and his pofterity,
who bore afterwards the name of Haro, fucceed-
ed him, from father to fon, until the king Don
Pedro the Cruel, having put to death thofe who
were in pofTe/Tion of the iordfhip, reduced them
to a treaty, by which they united their country^
under the title of a Iordfhip, with Caflile, by
which convention the king of Spain is now lord
of Bifcay. It is a republic ; and one of the pri-
vileges they have moft infifted on, is not to have
a king : another v/as, that every new lord, at his
accefTion, fhould come into the country in perfon,
with one of his legs bare, and take an oath to
preferve the privileges of the lordfliip. The pre-
fent king of Spain is the firft who has been com-*
plimenred with their confent, that the oath fhould
be adminiftered at Madrid, though the other hu-
miliating and indecent ceremony has been long
laid afide.
Their folicitude for defence has furrounded
with walls all the towns in the diftrid. They
C arg
1 8 Democratlcal Repuhlics.
are on-and-twcnty in number ; the principal of
which are, Orduna, Laredo, Portugalete, Duran-
go, Bilbao, and St. Andero. Bifcay is divided
into nine merindades, a fort of Jurifdidion like a
bailiwick, befides the four cities on the coaft.
The capital is Bilbao. The whole is a collection
of very high and very fleep mountains, rugged
and rocky to fuch a degree, that a company of
men pofted on one of them might defend itfelf as
long as it could fubfift, by rolling rocks on;
their enemy. This natural formation of the coun-
try, v/hich has rendered the march of armies im-
pradticable, and the daring ipirit of the inhabi-
tants, have prefervcd their liberty.
A6tive, vigilant, generous, brave, hardy, in-
clined to war and navigation, they have enjoyed,
for two thoufand years, the reputation of the beit
foldiers and failors in Spain, and even of the beft
courtiers, many of them having, by their wit
and manners, raifed themfelves into offices of con-
fcquence under the court of Madrid. Their va-
luable qualities have recommended them to the
efteem of the kings of Spain, v/ho have hitherto
left them in pollefiion of thcfe great immunities
of which they are fo jealous. In 1632, indeed^
the court laid a duty upon fait : the inhabitants
of Bilbao rofe, and maffacred all the officers ap-
pointed to collecl it, and ail the officers of the
grand admiral. Three thoufand troops were fenE
to punifli them for rebellion : thefe they fought,
and totally defeated, driving moft of them mto
the fea, which difcouraged the court from pur-
fuing their plan of taxation , and fince that time
the king has had no officer of any kind in the
lordffiip, except his corregidor.
Many writers afcribe their flouriffiing Gom-
Bifcny. 19
ttierce to their fituation ; but, ps this is no better
than that of Ferrol or Coriinna, tliat advantage
is more probably due to their liberty. In riding
through this little territory, you would fancy
yourfelf in Connedicut , inftead of miferable
huts, built of mud, and covered with ftraw, you
fee the country full of large and commodious
houfes and barns of the farmer ; the lands well
cultivated; and a wealthy, harpy yeonanry. The
roads, fo dangerous and impaffable in moil other
parts of Spain, are here very good, having been
made at a vaft expence of labour.
Although the cTovernment is called a democra-
cy, we cannot here find all authority collefted
into one center-, there are, on the contrary, as
many diftindl governments as there are cities and
merindades. The general government has two
orders at lead ; the lord or governor, and the bi-
ennial parliament. Each of the thirteen fiibor-
dinate divifions has its organized government,
with its chief magiftrate at the head of it. We
may judge of the form of all of them by that of
the metropolis, which calls itfelf, in all its laws,
the noble and illuftrious republic of Bilbao,
This city has its alcalde, who is both governor
end chief juftice, its twelve regidores or counfel-
lors, attorney-general, &c. and by all thcfe, af-
lembled in the confillorial palace under the titles
of confejo^ jujlicia^ y regimiento^ the laws are made
in the name of the lord of Bifcay, and confirmed
by him.
Thefe officers, ic is true, are ele<5led by the ci-
tizens, but they mufl: by law be ekifled, as well
as the deputies to the biennial parliament or jun-
ta general, out of a few noble families, unllained,
both by the fide of father and mother, by any
mixture with Moors, Jews, new converts, peni-
C 2 tcntiarics
to Democratical Republics.
tentiaries of the inquifition, &c. They muft be
natives and refidents, worth a thoufand ducats,
and mull: have no concern in commerce, manu-
factures, or trades , and, by a fundamental agree-
ment among all the merindades, all their depu-
ties to the junta general, and all their regidores,
findics, fecretaries, and treafurers, muft be no-
bles, at leaft knights, and fuch as never exer-
cifed any mechanical trades themfelves or their
fathers. Thus we fee the people themfelves have
eftablifhed by law a contracted ariftocracy, under
the appearance of a liberal democracy. Ameri-
cans, beware !
Although we fee here in the general govern-
ment, and in that of every city and merindad,
the three branches of power, of the one, the
few, and the many ; yet, if it were as democra-
tical as it has been thought by feme, we could
by no means infer, from this inftance of a little
flock upon a few impracticable mountains, in a
round form of ten leagues diameter, the utility
or practicability of fuch a government in any
other country.
The difpofition to divifion, fo apparent in all
democratical governments, however tempered with
ariftocratical and monarchical powers, has fnewn
itfelf, jn breaking off from it Guipufcoa and Al-
laba i and the only prefervativc of it from other
divifions, has been the fear of their neighbours.
They always knew, that as foon as they fhould
fall into faiStions, or attempt innovations, the
court of Spain would interpol'c, and prefcribe
them a government not fo much to their tafte.
THE
fhe Grifins, 21
THE ORISONS.
I N the republic of the Three Leagues of the
Grifons, the fovereign is all the people of a great
part of the ancient Rhetia. This is called a de-
mocratical republic of three leagues, i. The
League of the Grifons. 2. The League Caddee.
3. The League of Ten Jurildidions. Thefe
three are united by the perpetual confederation
of 1472, which has been feveral times renewed.
The government refides fovereignly in the com-
mons, where every thing is decided by the plu-
rality of voices. The commons eledl and inftru^t
their deputies for the general diet, which is held
once a year. Each league elects alfo its chief or
prefident, who prefides at the dietes, each one in
his league. The general diet affembles one year
at Ilanz, in the league of the Grifons ; one year
at Coire, in the league Caddee ; and one year at
Davons, in the league of Ten Jurifdiftions. There
is another ordinary aflembly, compofcd of chiefs
and of three deputies from each league, which is
held at Coire, in the month of January. Befidcs
ihele regular aflemblicb, they hold congrefles
whenever the neceflities of theftate require them;
fometimes of the chiefs alone, fomctimes of cer-
tain deputies from each league, according to the
importance of the cafe: thefe aflemblies are held
at Coire. The three leagues form but one body
in general affairs , and, although one league has
more deputies than another, they count the voices
without dittindion of leagues. They conduct
feparately their particular affairs. Their country
Ts thirty.fivc leagues in length, and thirty in
breadth.
C 3 Fven
22 Beiwcratical Republics.
Even in this happy country, where there is
more equality than in almoft any other, there are
noble families, who, although they live like their
neighbours by the cultivation of the earth, and
think it no difgrace, are very proud of the im-
nienie antiquity of their defcent, and boaft of it,
and value themfelves upon it, as much as Julius
C^far did, who was defcended from a goddefs.
THE UNITED PROVINCES OF THE LOW
COUNTRIES.
There are in Friefland and Overyfiell, and
perhaps in the city of Dort, certain remnants of
democratical powers, the fragments of an ancient
edifice, which may pofiibly be re-eredted , but as
there is nothino; which favours Mr, Turgot's idea..
I fhall pafs over this country for the prefent.
LETTER V.
SWITZERLAND.
My dear Sir,
IT is commonly faid, that fome of the cantons
of Sv/itzerland are democratical, and others
ariftocratical : and if thele epithets are undcrflood
only to mean, that one of thefe powers prevails
in fome of thofe republics, and the other in the
reft, they are juft enough ; but there is neither a
fimple democracy, nor a fimpleariitocracy, among
them. The governments of thefe confederated
ilateso
Switzerland. Q.%
flates, like thofe of the United Provinces of the
Netherlands, are very complicated, and there-
fore very difficult to be fully explained ^ yet the
moft fuperficial enquirer will find the moft evi^
dent traces of a compofition of all the three pow-
ers in all of them.
To begin with the cantons commonly reputed
democratical.
DEMOCRATICAL CANTONS.
A P P E N Z E L.
The canton of Appenzcl confifls of a ferles
of vallies, Scattered among inaccelTible rocks and
mountains, in all about eighteen miles fquare.
The people are laborious and frugal, and have no
commerce but in cattle, hides, butter, cheefe,
and a little linen made of their own fiax. It has
no walled towns, and only two or three open bo-
roughs, and a few fmall villages : it is, like New
England, almoft a continued village, covered with
excellent houfes of the yeomanry, built of wood,
each of which has its territory of pailure grounds,
commonly ornamented with trees j neatnefs and
convenience are lludied without, and a remark-
able cleanlinefs within. The principal part of the
inhabitants have preferved the fimplicity of the
paftoral life. As there are nor, at moft, above
iifty thoufand louls, there cannot be more than
fen thouiand men capable of bearing arms. It is
not at all furprifing, among fo much freedom,
fb.ough among rocks and herds, to hear of lite-
rature, and men of letters who are an ornament to
their country.
C 4 Never-
24 Democratical Cantons.
Neverthelefs, this fimple people, fo fmall in
number, in fo narrow a territory, could not agree.
After a violent conteft, in which they were in
danger of a civil war, by the mediation of the
other cantons, at the time of the Reformation,
they agreed to divide the canton into two por-
tions, the Outer and the Inner Appenze), or
Rhodes Exterior and Rhodes Interior. Each dif-
tridl has now its refpeftive chief magifcrate, court
of juftice, police, bandarer, and deputy to the
general dier, although the canton has but one
vote, and confequently lofes its voice if the two
deputies are of different opinions. The canton is
divided into no lefs than twelve communities ; fix
of them called the Inner Appenzel, lying to the
eafl ; and fix the Outer, to the weft. They have
one general fovereign council, which is compofed
of one hundred and forty-four perfons, twelve
taken from each community.
The fovereignty refides in the general aflembly,
which, in the interior Rhodes, meets every year
at Appenzel, the laft Sunday in April ; bur, in
the exterior Rhodes, it affembles alternarely at
Trogen and at Hundwyl. In the interior Rhodes
are the chiefs and officers, the land amman, the
tything-man, the governor, the treafurer, the cap-
tain of the country, the direftor of the buildings,
the direftor of the churches, and the enfign. The
exterior Rhodes have ten officers, viz. two land
ammans, two governors, two treafurers, two cap-
tains, and two enfigns. The interior Rhodes is
lubdivided into fix kifer ones, each of which has
fixteen counfellors, among whom are always two
chiefs. The grand council in the interior Rhodes,
as alfo the criminal jurifdidion, is compofed of
(5ne hundred and twenty-eight peifons, who af-
fembls
Appenzel. 2$
fcmble twice a year, eight days after the general
aflembly, and at as many other times as occafions
require. Moreover, they have alfo the little
council, called the weekly council, becaufe it
meets every week in the year. The exterior
Rhodes are now divided into nineteen communi-
ties ; and the fovcreignty of them confifts in the
double grand council of the country, called the
old and new council, which aflembles once a year,
eight days after the aflembly of the country, at
Trogen or at HerilW, and is compofed of ninety
and odd perfons. Then follows the grand coun-
cil, in which, befides the ten officers, the reign-
ing chiefs of all the communities have feats, the
diredors of the buildings, the chancellor, and the
fautier, which make thirty-five perfons; the reign-
ing land amm.an prefides. After this comes the
little council from before the fittern, which is
held every firft Tuefday of each month at Tro-
gen ; the reigning land amman is the prefident,
to whom always afiifts, alternat;ely, an officer,
with a member of council from all the thirteen
communities, the chancellor of the country, and
the fautier, and confifts of twenty and odd perfons.
The little council from behind the fittern is held
under the prefidency of the reigning land am-
man, whenever occafion requires ; it is held at
Herifaw, Hundwyl, or Urnaefchen : at it affift
the chancellor of the country, and the fautier,
with the counfellors of the fix communities be-
hind the fittern, appointed for this fervice.
Let me alk, if here are not different orders of
men, and balances in abundance ? Such aa
handful of people, living by agriculture, in pri-
mitive fimplicity, one would think might live
very quietly, almoft without any government at
iW-f yet, inllead of being capable of collecling
a 6 Democralical Cantons.
all authority into one aflembly, they feem to
have been forcibly agitated by a mutual power
of repullion, which has divided tht^m into two
commonwealths, each of v/hich has it monarchi-
cal power in a chief magiiirate ; its ariftocratical
power in two councils, one for Icgifiation, and
the other for execution ; befides the two more
popular aflemblies. This is furely no I'lmple de-
mocracy.- Indeed a fimple democracy by repre-
Jentation is a contradi6cion in terms.
LETTER VI.
U N D E R W A L Do
My dear Sir,
THE canton of Underv/ald conHfts only of
villages and boroughs, although it is twen-
ty-five miles in length, and feventeen in breadth.
Thefe dimenfions, it feems, were too extenfive to
be governed by a legiflation fo imperfeclly com-
bined, and nature has taught and compelled them
to feparate into two divifions, the one above, and
the other below, a certain large foreft of oaks,
which runs nearly in the middle of the country,
from north to fouth. The inferior valley, below
the foreft, contains four communities -, and the
fuperior, above it, fix. The principal or capita!
is Sarncn. The fovereign is the whole country,
the fovereignty refiding in the general afiembly,
where all the males of fifteen have entry and fuf-
frage , but each valley apart has, v;ith refpe6l to
its interior concern?, its land amman, its officers
f admin ifrration, and its public aflcn.bly, com^
IQ pofcd
Underwald, t'j
pofed of fifty-eight fenators, taken from the com-
munities. As to affairs without, there is a ge-
neral council, formed of all the officers of adnii-
niftration, and of fifty-eight fenators chofen in
the faid councils of the two valleys. Eefides this,
there are, for juftice and police, the chamber of
{tvcn^ and the chamber of fifteen, for the up-
per valley, and the chamber of eleven for the
lower.
Here again are arrangements more complica-
ted, and ariftocratical preferences more decided,
in order to counterpoife the democratical aflem-
bly, than any to be found in America, and the
land amman is as g'eat a man in proportion as an
American governor. Is this a fimple democracy?
Has this little clan of graziers been able to col-
led all authority into one center } Are there not
three aflemblies here to moderate and balance
each other ? and are not the executive and judi-
cial powers feparated from the legiflative .? Is it
not a mixed government, as much as any in
America ^. although its conflitution is not by any
means fo well digefted as ten at lead of thofe of
the United States ; and although it would never
be found capable of holding together a great
nation,
LETTER
28 JDemocratical Cdntons.
LETTER VII.
CLARIS*
My dear Sir,
THE canton of Claris is a mountainous
country, of eight miles long and four wide,
according to their own authors, perhaps intend-
ing German miles , but twenty-five miles in length
and eighteen in breadth, according to fome Eng-
iifh accounts. The com^merce of it is in cheeie,
butter, cattle, linen, and thread. Ten thou-
fand cattle, and four thoufand fheep, paftured
in fummer upon the mountains, conftitute their
wealth.
The inhabitants live together in a general equa-
lity, and mofl perfeft harmony ; even thofe of
the different perfuafions of Catholics and Proteft-
ants, who fometimes perform divine fervice in
the fame church, one after the other : and all the
offices of Hate are indifferently adminiftered by
both parties, though the Proteftants are more in
number, and fuperior both in indullry and com-
merce. Ail the houfes are built of wood, large
and folid, thofe of the richeft inhabitants differ-
ing only from thofe of the poorer, as they are
larger.
The police is well regulated here> as it is
throughout Switzerland. Liberty does not dege-
nerate into licentioufnefs. Liberty, independence,
and an exemption from taxes, amply compenfate
for a want of the refinements of luxury. There
are none fo rich as to gain an afcendency by lar-
geffes. If they err in their councils, it is an
error of the judgment, and not of the heart. As
there
Claris, ig
there is no fear of invafion, and they have nocon-
quefts to make, their policy confifts in maintain-
ing their independence, and preferving the pub-
lic tranquillity. As the end of government is the
greateft happinefs of the greateft number, faving
at the fame time the ftipulated rights of all, go-
vernments like thefe, where a large fhare of power
is prelerved by the people, defer ve to be admired
and imitated. It is in fuch governments that hu-
man nature appears in its dignity, honeft, brave,
and generous.
Some writers are of opinion, that Switzerland
was originally peopled by a colony of Greeks.
The fame greatnefs of foul, the fame fpirit of in-
dependence, the fame love of their country, has
animated both the ancients and the moderns, to
that determined heroifm which prefers death to
(lavery. Their hiflory is full of examples of vic-
tories obtained by fmall numbers of men over
large armies. In 1388 the Auftrians made an
irruption into their territory, with an army of fif-
teen thoufand men ; but, inftead of conquering
the counrry as they expefled, in attacking about
four hundred men polled on the mountains ac
Nicfel, they were broken by the ftones rolled
upon them from the fummit : the Swifs, at this
critical moment, rufhed down upon them with
fuch fury, as forced them to retire with an im-
inenfe lofs. Such will ever be uiie characfler of a
people, who prefer ve fo large a fiiare to themfelves
in their legiflature, while they temper their con-
ftitution, at the fame time, with an executive
power in a chief magiftrate, and an arillocratical
power in a wife fenate.
The government here is by no means entirely
democratical. It is true, tliat the fovereign is
the whole country, and the Ibvereignty refides in
the
go Democratical Cantons,
the general aflembly, where each male of fifteenj^
with his Iword at his fide, has his feat and vote.
It is true, that this affembly, which is annually-
held in an open plain, ratifies the laws, lays
taxes, enters into alliances, declares war^ and
makes peace.
But it has a firft magifirate in a land amman,
who is the chief of the republic, and is chofen
alternately from among the Proteftants and from
among the Catholics. The Proteftant remains
three years in office ; the Catholic two. The
manner of his appointment is a mixture of elec-
tion and lot. The people choofe five candi-
dates, who draw lots for the office. The other
great officers of ftate are appointed in the fame
manner.
There is a council called a fenate, compofed
of the land amman, a ftadthalder, and fixty-two
fenators, forty-eight Proteftants and fourteen Ca-
tholics, all taken from fifteen tagwen or ccrvees,
into which the three principal quarters or parti-
tions of the country are fubdivided for its more
convenient government. In this fenate, called
the council of regency, the executive power re-
fides. Each tagwcn or corvee furnifhes four fe-
nators ; befides the borough of Glaris, which fur-
nifhes fix.
Inftead of a fimple democracy, it is a mixed
government, in which the monarchical power in
the land amman, fiadthalder or pro-conful, the
ariftocratical order in the fenate, and the demo-
cratical in the general airembly, are diftin<ftly
marked. It is, however, but imperfeftly ba-
lanced i fo much of the executive power in an
ariftocratical aflfembly v/ould be dangerous in
the higheft degree in a large ftate, and among a
rich people. If this canton could extend its do-
minion.
minion, or greatly multiply its numbers, it would
foon find the necefTity of giving the executive
power to the land amman, in order to defend the
people againft the fenate; for the fenate, although
it is always the refervoir of wifdom, is eternally
|he very focus of ambition.
LETTER VIIL
Z U G.
My dear Sir,
THE canton of Zug is finall, but rich, and
divided into mountains and plains. The
fovereign is the city of Zug, and part of the
country. It is divided into live quarters, which
polTcfs the fovereignty ; the city of Zug is two,
and the country three, Mentzingen, Egeri, and
Bar. The government is very complicated, and
the fovereignty refides in the general affembly of
the five quarters, where each male perfon of fif-
teen years of age has admittance and a voice. It
aflembles annually, to enad laws, and choofe
their magiftrates. Thus thefe five quarters make
a body of a democratical republic which com-
mands the reft of tiie canton. They furnifli al-
ternately the land amman, the head or chief of
the ftate, who mull always refide at Zug v/ith
the regency of the country, although he is chofen
by the fuffrages of all the quarters colledively.
He continues three years in ofiice when taken
from the diftrid of Zug, and but two wheii
chofcn from any of the others.
The
52 Democraiical Cantons,
The council of regency, to whom the general
adminiftration of affairs is intruded, is compofed
of forty fenators, thirteen from the city, and
twenty-feven from the country.
The city, moreover, has its chief, its council,
and its officers apart, and every one of the other
quarters has the fame.
It is a total mifapplication of words to call
this government a fmiple democracy ; for, al-
though the people are accounted for fomething,
and indeed for more than in moft other free go-
vernments ; in other words, although it is a free
republic, it is rather a confederation of four or
five republics, each of which has its monarchical,
ariftocratical, and democratical branches, than a
limple democracy. The confederation too has its
three branches -, the general affembly, the regen-
cy of fenators, and the land amman \ being dif-
ferent orders tempering each other, as really as
the houfe, council, and governor, in any of the
United States of America.
LETTER IX.
U R I.
My dear Sir,
THE canton of Uri, the place of the birth
and refidence of William Tell, fhook off
the yoke of Auttria in 1308, and, v/ith Switz and
Underwald, laid the foundation of the perpetual
alliance of the cantons, in 13 15. The c:.ntoa
confifts only of villages and little towns or bour
Uri. 33
gades, and the whole is divided into ten genoffa-
men, or inferior communities. It has no city.
Altdorf, where the general afiemblies are held,
and the land amman and regency refides, is the
principal village.
The land amman and the principal magiftrates
are elefted in the general aflcmbly, in which all
the male perfons of fifteen years of age have a
right to a feat and a vote.
The fenate or council of regency, in whom is
vefted the executive power, is compofed of fixty
members, taken equally from each genoffamen,
though they refidc at the capital borough. From
this council are taken all the neceffary offi-
cers.
There are two other councils , one called the
chamber of feven, and the other the chamber of
fifteen, for the management of lefTer affairs.
The valley of Urferen, three leagues in length
and one in breadth, marches under the banners
of Uri i but it is but an ally, conneded by
treaty in 1410. It has its proper land amman
and council, and has alfo a bailiwick fubjcift
to it.
The village of Gerfaw is a league in breadth,
and two in length : there are about a thoufand
inhabitants. This is the fmalleft republic in Eu-
rope : it has however its land amman, its coun-
cil of regency, and its general afiembly of bur-
gefles, its courts of juilice and militia, although
It is faid there is not a fingle horfe in the whole
empire. Such a diminutive republic, in an ob-
fcure corner, and unknown, is interfiling to
Americans, not only becaufe every fpot of earth
on which civil liberty flourilhes defervcs their ef-
tecm, but upon this occaiion is particularly im-
D portanr.
34 Denwcratical Cantons. Switz',
portant, as it fhews the impoffibility of eredling
even the imalien: government, among the poorett
people, without different orders, councils, and ba-
lances.
LETTER X.
SWITZ.
My dear Sir,
THE canton of Switz has the honour of giv-
ing the name to the whole confederation,
becaufe the firft battle for independency was fought
there : yet it confifts only of villages divided into
fix quarters, the firll of which is Switz, where the
ordinary regency of the country refides. The fo-
vereign is the whole country ; that is to fay, the
fovereignty refides in the general affembly of the
country, where all the males of fifteen years of
age have a right of entry and fuffrage.
Yet they have their land amman , and their or-
dinary regency, at which the land amman pre-
fides, compofed of fixty counfellors, taken equally
from the fix quarters. All the necefifary officers
are taken from this council.
There are, befides, the fecret chamber, the
chaniber of feven, and the chamber of nine, for
finance, juftice, and police.
LETTER
Arljiocratical Cantons. Berne. 35
LETTER XI.
ARISTOCRATICAL REPUBLICS.
THE CANTO M OF BERNE.
My dear Sir,
IT is fcarcely poffible to believe that Mr. Tur-
gor, by collecting ail authority into one cen-
ter, could have intended an ariftocratical aiTcm-
bly. He muft have meant, however, a fimpie
form of government of Tome kind or other; and
there are but three kinds of fimple forms, demo-
cracy, ariftocracy, and monarchy. As we have
gone through moil, if not all, the governments
in Europe in which the people have any fhare j it
will throw much light upon our fubjedl: if we
proceed to the ariftocracies and oligarchies ; for
we fliall find all thefe under a necellity of eilab-
lilhing orders, checks, and balances, as much as
the democracies. As the people have been al-
ways heceffitated to ellablifli monarchical and
ariltocratical powers, to check tlicmiclvc's from
rufiiing into anarchy , lo hav e ariilocratical bo-
dies ever been obliged to contrive a number of
divifions of their povv^ers to ch.eck themielves from
running into oligarchy.
The canton of Berne has no other fovercign
than the fingle city of Berne. The fovercign:y
refides in the grand council, vvl^icli has the legif-
lative power, and the power of making peace,
^var, and alliances, and is compoll-d of two. hun-
[) 2 died
3 6 Arijlocratical Cantons.
dred counfellors and ninety-nine affcflbrs, the
eledion of whom is made, by rlie feizeniers and
the ienate, from the citizens, from whom they
are fuppofed virtually to derive their power-, but
a general afTembly of the citizens is never called
together, en any occafion, or for any purpofe,
not even to lay taxes, nor to make alliances or
war. To be eligible into the grand ccLincil, one
muft be a citizen of Berne, member of one of
the focieties or tribes, and at leail in the thirtieth
year of his age.
The executive power is delegated by the grand
council to the fenare or little council, which is
compofrd of twenty-feven perfons, including the
two avoyers or chiefs of ilic republic, the two
treafurers of the German cuntry, and of the
pays de Vaud, and the four bannerets or com-
manders of the militia, taken from the four firft
tribes, for the four diftriifls of the city. Vacan-
cies in this fenate are filled up by a complicated
mixture of ballot and lot : tv.'enty-fix balls, three
cf which are gold, are drav;n our of a box by
the feveral fenators , thofe who draw the golden
cnes nominate three eleftors out of the little
council ; in the fame m.anner, feven members are
defignated from the grand council, who nominate
feven electors from their body \ tl..:;e ten no-
minate ten candidatfs to be voted for in the
grand council : the four of thefe who have the
mod votes, draw each of them a ball out of a
box, which has in it two of gold and two of fii-
ver ; the two who draw the gold arc voted for in
th grand council, and he who has the moft
votes is chofen, provided he be married, and has
been ten years in the grand council.
Vacancies in the grand council are filled up, at
certain periods of about ten years, and two new
member!
Benie. 37
members are appointed by each avoyer, one by
each feizenier and fenaror, and two or three others
by other officers of (late : if there are more va-
cancies, they are filled by the election of the fei-
zeniers and fenators.
The fcizeniers, who have this elccflive power,
are drawn by lot from among thole members of
the grand council vvho have held the office of
bailiffs, and who have finiilied the term of their
admini^dration. The bannerets and feizeniers
have, by the conRitution, an authority, for three
days in Eafter, refembling that of the cenfors in
ancient Rome, and may deprive any member of
either council of his place ; but, as their kn-
tence mull be confirmed by the great council,
they never exerciie their power. There are fix
noble families at Berne, who enjoy the precedence
of all the other fenators, although more ancient
members, and have rank immediately after the
bannerets.
The principal magiflrates are, the two avoycrs,
who hold their offices for life ; the two treafu-
rers, who continue for fix years -, and the four
bannerets, who remain only four. The avoyers
officiate alternately a year j and the reigning avo-
yer, although lie prefides in coumci!, in an ele-
vated feat under a canopy, anu has the public
feal before him, has no vote except in cales of
equd divifions, and never gives his opinion un-
lefs it is requ red. The avoyer, out of office,
is the fiill lenator and prefident of the lecrec
council.
The fecret council is compofed of the avover
out of office, the four bannerets, the two trea-
furers, and two other fecret counleilors talvcn
from the fenate. In this body all aHairs that re-
D 3 quic
38 Arijlocratical Cant ens.
quire fecrecy, and Tome of thefe are of great im-
portance, are debated and determined.
The grand council afiembles and deliberates
by its own authority at dated times, and fuper-
intends all affairs, although the moil important
are delegated generally to the fenate. The whole
adminiftration is celebrated for its uncommon
moderation, precifion, and difpatch.
There are feventy-two bailiwicks, diftributed
in four clafles, comprehending a country of fixty
leagues in length, or a third part of all Switzer-
land, fubieft to this city. The bailiffs are ap-
pointed by lot from the grand council. They
were formerly chofen, but this method rendering
all the members dependent upon a few, who had
the moft influence, it had too flrong a tendency
to an oligarchy. The bailiwicks are the moil
profitable places, and are filled from the grand
council. The bailiffs live in much fplendour,
and are able to lay up tv>^o or" three thoufand
pounds flerling a year, befides difcharging all
their expences. They reprefent the fovereign au-
thority, put the laws in execution, collect the re-
venues, aft as judges in civil and criminal caufes ;
but an appeal lies to Berne, in civil caufes to the
courts of iuftice, and in criminal to the fenate :
but as the judges on appeal are perfons who ei-
ther have been or expect to be bailiffs, there fS
great reafon to be apprehenfive of partiality.
There is no Handing army, but every male of
fixteen is enrolled in the militia, and obliged to
provide himlelf an uniform, a nuid'ct, powder
and ball ; and no peafant is allowed to marry,
without producing his arms and uniform. The
arms are infpecled every year, and tlie men cx-
ercifed. There are arfenals of arms at Ecrne, arKJ
v.\
Berne, 39
In every bailiwick, fufficient for the militia of the
diftri6l, and a fum of money for three months pay.
The dragoons are chofen from thefii'oftantial farm-
ers, who are obliged to provide their own horfcs
and accoutrements. There is a council of war,
of which the avoyer out of place is prefident, in
peace ; in war, a general is appointed to command
all the forces of the ftate.
There is a political feminary for the youth,
called the exterior ftate, which is a miniature of
the whole government. "Jhe young men aflem-
ble and go through all the forms ; they have
their grand council, fenate, avoyers, treafurers,
bannerets, fcizeniers, &c. : the poft of avoyer is
fought with great afllduity. They debate upon
political fubjedls, and thus improve their talents
by exercife, and became more capable of ferving
the public in future life.
The nobility in this country are haughty, and
much avcrfe to mixing in company, or any fami-
liar converfation with the common people : the
commons are taught to believe the nobles fupe-
riors, whofe right it is to rule ; and they believe
their teachers, and are very willing to be go-
verned.
LET T E R Xir.
F R I B O U R G.
My dear Sir,
Tn E canton of Fribours; Is ariOorr;
not having more than fortv ;. .uiiic-
Can have any part in the govern 1 :\'.,
live very nobly that is to fay, w\z\.:-
manuhicturcSj ur trades.
40 Arijiocratical Cantons.
The fovereignty and legiflative authority refides
in the council of two hundred perfons, compofed
of the two avoyers, who are for life-, twenty-
two counfellors ; four bannerets; fixty other coun-
lellors, from whom the twenty four who com-
pofe the fenate, in which refides the executive
power, are taken when they are to be replaced 5
and one hundred and twelve others, whom ihey
call the grand fenate of two hundred.
The two avoyers are elected by the plurality
of fulTrages of all the citizens. They hold their
offices for life, and prefide alternately a year.
The rwenty-two counfellors are alfo for life, and
are defignated by lot, as well as the bannerets,
whofj charges continue but three years. The
fixty alfo arc nominated by lor, and are drawn
from the hundred and twelve, called the two
hundred. Thefe laft come forward in the rtate
by the prefcntation and nomination of the fecret
chamber, compofed of twenty-four befides the
bannerets, who are the chiefs of it. This
chamber, which is fovereign, befides the right of
rjomination to the ftate, has alone that of correc-
^on, and of propofing regulations.
The two avoyers, the twenty-two counfellors,
and the four bannerets, form the little fenate,
which hears and determines civil caufes, and af-
fembles every day.
The affairs of ftate are carried before the o-rand
fenate of two hundred.
The tribes are corporations of tradefmcn, who
have no part in government, and who alfemble
in their abbays, only for the affairs of their oc-
cupations, and all their ftatutes are approved or
rejected by the fenate.
There are thirty-one bailiwicks fubjevfl to this
caniono The method of determining th? mem-
bers
Fribourg'. 41
bers of the little fenate and fecret council is ano-
ther check. The names of the candidates in no-
mination are placed in a box, containing as many
partitions as there are perfons : the ballots are
thrown into this box by the eledors, without
knowing how the names are placed -, and the can-
didate whofe name occupies the divifion, which
receives by accident the moft ballots, has the lor.
This is to guard againft the influence of families;
for, among thofe few families from which alone
any candidate can be taken, fome have more in-
fluence than others. The canton contains flxty-
fix thoufand fouls. Its land produces good paf-
ture, fome corn, and little wine -, it has no com-
merce, and not much literature. It has more troops
in foreign fervice than any other canton in pro-
^portion. As the rivers and lakes have a dired:
communication with the fea, th.ey might have a
valuable commerce; but as none of the perfons
concerned in government can be merchants, no
commerce can ever be in fafliion, except that of
their noble blood to foreign fovcreigns. It is no
doubt much to the honour of their fidelity and
valour to be chofen fo generally to be the life-
guards of princes-, but whether they can vindicate
fuch a traffic, upon principles of juilice, huma-
nity, or policy, or from the imputation of a
more mercenary fpirit than that of ordinary com-
merce, is for them to confidtr. The confervation
of the oligarchy is entirely owing however to this
cuftom: for a youthful fiery nobility, at home m
idlenefs, would necelfarily become ambitious of
popularity, and either procure, by intrigues and
infurrections, a greater fhare of importance to the
people, or let up one of the greacelt genius and
cnterprize among them lor a celpor. In fo:eign
fervice they exhault their refllels years, and re-
turn.
:^2 Arijlocratical Cantons.
turn, after the deaths of their fathers, fatigued
with diffipation, to enjoy their honours and
eftates -, to fupporc thofe laws which are fo par-
tial to their wilhes -, and to re-aflume the manly
(implicity of manners of their native country.
LETTER XIIL
S O L E U R E.
My dear Sir,
TH E canton of Soleure, {^vtn leagues m
breadth and twelve in length, contains fifty
thoufand fouls, and the Patrician families are in
quiet poffeffion of all the public offices. The
fovereign is the city of Soleure ; and the fove-
reignty refides in the grand council, conliiling of
two avoyers, who prefide alternately, and whofe
cledlion depends upon the council, and all the ci-
tizens in general, who are divided into eleven
tribes -, of twenty-three of the thirty-three fena-
tors taken from the tribes, each of which furnifhes
three , and of fixty-fix members who reprefenr
the citizens, and are taken alfo from the tribes in
equal numbers, viz. fix f-om each tribe.
The fenate is compofed of the two avoyers, and
the thirty-three fenators taken from the tribes,
making thirty-five in all, who are called the little
council, conduft the affairs of ftate, and judge
caufes civil and criminal. The two councils
make together the number of one hundred, with-
out computing the avoyer in office, who prefides
in chief. This body, named the grand council,
makes laws and ftatu.tes i treats of alliances^ peaci
Soleure. 43
and war; decides appeals in the laft refort-, clefts
the treafurer, the fourth in rank in the ftatc, and
the exterior bailiffs. The thirty-three fenators
confift of eleven alt-raths or fenior counfellors, and
twenty-two yunk-raths or juniors. Upon the
removal by death of one of the alt-raths, the
eldeft of the yunk-raths fuccecds him, and this
vacancy is filled, out of the great council, by
eledlion of the eleven alt-raths. From among the
alt-raths, the two avoyers, the banneret, and the
treafurer, the four principal magiftrates of the
commonwealth, are chofen ; and on the death of
an avoyer, the banneret fucceeds to his place,
after having gone through the formality of a no-
mination by the general affembly of citizens.
Vacancies in the grand council are fupplied by
the alt-raths, from the lame tribe to vv'hich the
deceafed member belonged. There is an annual
meeting of the whole body of the citizens, in
which the avoyers and banneret are confirmed in
their places : the fenior and junior counfellors
at the fame time mutually confirm each other.
All thefe confirmations are matters of courfe,
and mere form. All other public employments
are difpofed of by the fen ate.
The revenues of the public, and falaries of of-
fices, are very confiderable, and afi\)rd the few
diftinguiihed families very profitable emoluments.
The grand fautier is annually eleded by all the citi-
zens. I'here are feveral tribunals and chambers :
the fccret council, formed of the two avoyers,
the banneret, the treafurer, the mod ancient of
the fcnators of the firfl; order or alt-raths, the
fecretary of (late, and attorney-general : the
council of war: the council of juttice, whuh
is compofcd of fix men^bers of the little coui'C,;^
and eleven members of the orand councii, ou'j
44 Arifiocratkal Cantons.
of whom is furniflied by each tribe; the grand
fautier prefides in it, inflead of the avoyer in of-
fice : the confiftory, and the chamber of or-
phans. This canton has a large country fubjed:
to it, comprehending eleven bailiwicks.
The foil is extremely fertile, yet there is a want
of hands for agriculture, and population decreafes ;
although commodioufly fituated for commerce,
they have none. Thefe circumftances are enough
to Ihew the bleffings of a government by a few
noble families. They fhew another thing, ftill
more curious; to wit, the confequences of mixing
the nobles and commons together. The latter
have here been induced to reduce their own con-
ilitutional Ihare in the government to a mere form,
and complaifantly to refign all the fubflance into
the hands of thofe Vvhom they think their natu-
ral fuperiors : and this will eternally happen,
fooner or later, in every country, in any degree
confiderable for extent, numbers, or wealth,
where the v/hole legiflative and executive power
are in one affembly, or even in two, if they have
not a third pov/er to balance them.
Let us by no means omit, that there is a grand
arfenal at Soleure, as there is at Berne, well itored
with arms in proportion to the number of inhabi-
tants in the canton, and ornamented with the tro-
phies of the valour of their anceftors.
Nor fliould it be forgotten, that a defenfive
alliance has fubfiited between France and feveral
of thefe cantons, for more than a century, to the
great advantage of both. Thefe republicans have
found in that monarchy a ileady, faithful, and
generous friend. In 1777 the alliance was renev/-
cd in this city of Soleure, Vv-here the French
ambalTador refides ; and extended to all the can-
tons. In the former treaty an article was inferted,
that
Lucerne. 45
that if any dififenfions fhould arife between the
cantons, his majefty fhould, at the requeft of one
of the parties, interpofe his mediation by all gen-
tle means to bring about a reconciliation : but if
thefe fhould fail, he fhould compel the aggrefTor
to fulfil the treaties between the cantons and their
allies. As this article was manifeflly incompa-
tible with that independence which republicans
ought to value above all things, it has been
wifely omitted in the new treaty ; and it would
have become the dignity of the Swifs character
to have renounced equally thofe penfions, which
are called Argents de Paix et d'AUiance, as in-
confiftent not only with a republican fpirit, but
with that equality which ought to be the foun-
dation of an alliance.
LETTER XIV.
LUCERNE.
My dear Sir,
TH E canton of Lucerne comprehends a
country of fixteen leagues long and eight
wide, containing fifteen bailiwicks, befides feveral
cities, abbays, monafleries, feigniories, &c. The
inhabitants are almoft wholly engaged in agricul-
ture, and the exportation of their produce.
Their commerce might be greatly augmented,
as the river Reufs iffues from the lake, pafTes
through the town, and falls into the Rhine.
The city contains lefs than three thoufand
fouls, has no manufaftures, little trade, and no
encouragement for learning : yet the fovereign is
this fingle city, and the fovcreignty rcfides in the
little
4^ Arijtocratical Cantons.
little and great council, having for chiefs two
avoyers, who are alternately regents. There are
five hundred citizens in the town, from whom a
council of one hundred are chofen, who are no-
minally the fovereignty ; out of this body are
formed the two divifions, the little council,
ienate, or council of ftate, confifting of thirty-
lix members, divided into two equal parts of
eighteen each, one of which makes choice of the
other every half year. The whole power is ac-
tually exercifed by this body, the two divifions
of which adminiiler the government by turns.
They are fubjeft to no controul, are neither con-
firmed by the fovereign council, nor by the citi-
zens ; the divifion which retires confirming that
"which comes in. As the vacancies in the fenate are
filled up by themfelves, all power is in pcflelTion
of a few Patrician families. The fon fucceeds the
father, and the brother his brother.
The grand council confids of fixty-four per-
fons, taken from the citizens, v;ho are faid to have
their privileges; but it is hard to guefs what
they are, as the eleftions are made by the little
and great council conjointly.
The adminillration, the police, the finances,
and the whole executive power, is in the fenate,
which is conRantly fitting.
The grand council is aflembled only upon
particular occafions, for the purpofe of legiflation.
I'he fenate has cognizance of criminal caufes, but
in capital cafes the grand council is convoked to
pronounce fentence ; in civil caufes an appeal lies
irom the fenate to the grand council ; but thefe
appeals can be but mere forms, the fame fenators
being in both courts.
As the fenate conftitutes above a third of the
grand council, choofe their own members, confer
5 all
Zurich. 47
all employments, have the nomination to ecclefi-
aftical benefices, two thirds of the revenues of the
canton belonging to the clergy, their influence
muft be uncontroulable.
The iwo avoyers are chofen from the fenate by
the council of one hundred, and are confirmed
annually. The relations of the candidates are
excluded from voting : but all fuch checks againft
influence and family connexions in an oligarchy
are futile, as all laws are cyphers. There are alfo
certain chambers of juftice and police.
In fome few inftances, fuch as declaring war
and making peace, forming alliances or impofing
taxes, the citizens muft be affembled and give
their confent, which is one check upon the power
of the nobles.
LETTER XV.
ZURICH.
My dear Sir,
THE canton of Zurich contains one hun-
dred and fifty thoufand fouls, upon an area
of forty miles by thirty, abounds in corn, wine,
and all the ordinary productions of excellent paf-
tures. Literature has been encourngcd, and has
conftantly flourifhed in this country, from the
time of Zuinglius to that o{ Gei'ncr and Lavarer.
The inhabitants are induftrious, their manufac-
tures confidcrable, and their commerce extenfive.
In the city is a public granary, an admirable
refource againft fcarcity, and a magnificent arfe-
iial well filled with cannon, arms, and ammuni-
tion, panicularly mufqucts for tliiny thou land
48 Arijiocratical Cantons.
men; the armour of the old Swifs warriors, and
the bow and arrow with which William Tell Ihoc
the apple on the head of his fon
Who with the generous ruilics fate,
On Uri's rock, in clofe divan.
And wing'd that arrov/, (ure as fate,
W'hich fix'd the facred rights of man.
The fovereign is the city of Zurich. The
fovereignty refides in fhe two burgomafters, in
the little council compofed of forty-eight mem-
bers, and the grand council compofed of one
hundred and fixty-two members -, all taken from
thirteen tribes, one of which is of the nobles, and
the other twelve of citizens.
Although there are twelve thoufand fouls in
the capital, and one hundred and fifty in the can-
ton, there are not more than two thoufand citizens.
In early times, when the city had no territory round
it, or a fmall one, the citizens were in pofTeffion
of the government -, when they afterwards made
additions by conqueft or purchafe, they ftill ob-
flinately held this power, and excluded all their
new fubjects. It is an hundred and fifty years
fince a nev/ citizen has been admitted : befides
elefting all the magiflrates and holding all offices,
they have maintained a monopoly of commerce,
and excluded all firangers, and even fubjeds of
the canton, from conducing any in the town.
Such are commons, as well as nobles and princes,
whenever they have power unchecked in their
hands!
There is even in this commercial republic a
tribe of nobles, who confider trade as a humi-
liation.
9 The
Zurich, 49
The leglflative authority is veiled in the grand
council of two hundred and twelve, including
the fenate.
The fenate confifts of twenty-four tribunes,"
and four counfellors chofen by the noble?, to
thefe are added twenty, elefted by the fovercign
council; making in all, with the two burgomafters,
fifty: half of them adminifter fix months, and arc
then fucceeded by the reft. The burgomafters
are chofen annually by the fovercign council,
and one of them is prefident of each divifion of the
fenate, which has the judicial power, in criminal
matters, without appeal, and in civil, with an
appeal to the grand council.
The members of the fenate are liable to be
changed, and there is an annual revifion of them,
which is a great reftraint.
The ftate is not only out of debt, but faves
money every year, againft any emergency. By this
fund they fupported a war in 1712, without any-
additional taxes. There is not a carriage in the
town, except it be of a ftranger.
Zurich has great influence in the general diet,
which Ihe derives more from her reputation for
integrity, and original Swifs independence of fpirir,
than from her power.
LETTER XVI.
SCHAFFHAUSE.
My dear Sir,
TH E fovereign is the city of Schaffhaufe.
The citizens, about fixteen hundred, are
divided into twelve tribes, one of which confifts
of nobles, and eleven are ordinary citizens.
E The
^0 Arijlocratical RepuUics.
The fovereignty refides in the little and grand
councils.
The fenatc, or little council of twenty-five, has
the executive power.
The great council, comprizing the fenate, has
the legiilative, and finally decides appeals.
The burgomaflers are the chiefs of the repub-
lick, and alternately prefide in both councils,
Befides thefe there are, the fecret council, of
feven .of the higheft officers ; the chamber of
juflice, of twenty-five, including the prendent-,
the praetorian chamber, of thirteen, including
the prefident; the confiftory, of nine-, and the
chamber of accounts, of nine. The city has
ten bailliwicks fubjcfl to it.
THE CITY OF MULHOUSE.
The fovereign is the city : the fovereignty re-
fides in the little and the grand council. The
ieffer council is compofed of twenty-four perfons i
viz. three burgomafters, v/ho prefide by turns,
each one fix months, nine counfellors, and
twelve tribunes, who fucceed by eledion, and are
taken from the grand council.
The grand council is compofed of feventy-
eight, viz. the twenty-four of the lefier council,
thirty- fix members of the tribes, fix from each,
and eighteen taken from the body of the citizens,
and eieded three by each one of the fix tribes.
THE CITY OF BIENNE.
The republick of Bienne contains lefs than fix
thoufand fouls.
The
^he City of Blenne] t
The regency is compofed of the great council,
in which the legiflative authority refides, confift-
ing of forty members ; and of the little council,
compofed of twenty-four, who have the execu-
tive.
Each of thefe councils ele^l their own mem-
bers, from the fix confraternities of the city.
The burgomafter is chofen by the two coun-
cils, prefides at their meetings, and is the chief
of the regency , he continuc-s in office for life,
although he goes through the form of an annual
confirmation by the two councils, when the other
magirtrates fubmit to the fame ceremony. The
burgomafter keeps the feal, and, with the ban-
neret, the treafurers, and the fecretary, forms the
ceconomical chamber, and the chamber of or-
phans.
This town fends deputies to the general diets,
ordinary and extraordinary.
LETTER XVII.
THE REPUBLIC OF ST. G A L L^
My dear Sir,
THE republic of St. Gall is a league and a
half in circumference, and contains nine
thoufand fouls. The inhabitants are very induf-
trious in manufa(5tures of linen, muflin, and em-
broidery, have an extenfive commerce, and arts,
fciences, and literature, are clteemed and culti-
E 3 vatcd
5 Arijiocralical Republic si
vated among them. They have a remarkable
public library, in which are thirteen volumes of
original manufcript letters of the prft rerormers.
To fee the different effe6ls of diiicrent forms of
government on the human charader, and the nap-
pinefs and profperity of nations, it would be
worth while to compare this city with Conflance,
in its neighbourhood.
This happy and profperous, though diminutive
republic, has its grand counc;i of ninety perfons,
its little council of twenty-four, and three burgo-
mafters. The little council confifts of the three
burgomafters, nine fenators, and twelve tribunes.
The grand council confifts of all the little coun-
cil, and eleven perfons from each tribe; for the
city is divided into the fociety of the nobles, and
fix tribes of the artifans, of whom the weavers
are the principal.
Befides thele there are, the chamber of juftice,
the chamber of five, and fome others.
GENEVA.
In the republic of Geneva, the fovereignty re-
fidcs in the general council, lawfully convened^
which comprehends all the orders of the ftate,
and is compofed of four fmdics, chiefs of the
republic, prefidents of all the councils , of the
lefTer council of twenty-five ; of the grand coun-
cil of two hundred, though it coniiils of two
hundred and fifty when it is complete ; and of
all the citizens of twenty- five years of age. The
rights and attributes of all thefe orders of the
ftate are fixed by the laws. The hiftory of this
ity deliervcs to be ftudied with anxious attentioa
by
Geneva. 53
by every American citizen. The principles of
government, the neceffity of various orders, and
the fatal effeds of an imperfe<5t balance, appear
no where in a ftrongcr light. The fatal (lumbers
of the people, their invincible attachment to a
few families, and the cool deliberate rage of thole
families, if iuch an expreffion m^ay be allowed,
to grafp all authonty into their own hands, when
they are not controuled or over-awed by a power
above them in a firft magiftrate, are written in
every page. I need only refer you to Dr. d^l-
vernois's Hiftorical and Political View of the Con-
ftitution and Revolutions of Geneva in the Eigh-
teenth Century, which you received from the au-
thor, to convince you of this.
Let me add here, that the fads relating to the
Swifs cantons, and their environs, mentioned in
thefe letters, are taken from the ^arante 1'ables
Poliliqties de la Suijfe, par C. E. Faber^ Bernois,
Pafteur, a Bijhviller, in 1 746 ; with fome addi-
tional obfervations from the beautiful Sketches of
Mr. Coxe, which I fend you with this letter ;
and which you will find as inftrudive as they are
entertaining.
The petty council is indifferently called the
council of twenty five ^ tht petit council^ or they^-
nate.
The council of fixty is a body elected by the
fenate, and meets only for the dilcuffion of fo-
reign affairs.
The grand council, and council of two hun-
dred, are one and the lame body , it is ftill called
the council of two hundred, though it now con-
uils of two hundred and fifty members.
The general council, called indifcriminately
the [overeipi council^ the general ajfcmhly, the fove-
E 3 reipi
54 'Arijlocratical Republics.
reign ajjembh^ the ajfembly of the people, or the ccuncil
general, is compokd ot all the citizens or freemen
of twenty-five years of age.
At the time of the Reformation, every affair,
important or trifling, was laid before the general
afTembly ; it was both a deliberating and afting
body, that always left the cognizance of details
to four findics : this was neceffary, in that time
of danger, to attach the affections of the citizens
to the fupport of the commonwealth by every en-
dearing tie. The city was governed by two fin-
dics of its own annual eledion. The multipli-
city of affairs had engaged each findic to nomi-
nate fome of the principal citizens to fcrve as af-
fefibrs during his adminiftration -, thefe afTcirors,
called counfellors, formed a council of twenty-
five perfons. In 1457 ^^'^ general council de-
creed, that the council of tv.'enty-five lliould be
augmented to fixty. This body, in 1526, was
augmented to two hundred.
Thus far the ariflocratical gentlemen proceeded
upon democratical principles, and all is done by
the general affembly. At this inftant commences
the firtl overt act of arifcocratical ambition.
Warm in their feats, they were loth to leave thrm,
or hold them any longer at the will of the peo-
ple. With all the fubtlety, and all the fagacity
and addrefs which is charaderiliic of this order
of mien in every age and nation, they prevailed on
the people to relinquifh for the future the right
of elefling counfellors in the general afTembly ;
and the people, with their characteriftic fimpli-
ciry, and unbounded confidence in tb.eir rulers
when they love them , became the dupes, and
rgiTed a law, that the two councils fhould for the
^VJtUfe elcctj or at ieaft approve and ainnn, each
other,
Geneva. 55
other. This is a natural and unavoidabje eflfedt
of doing all things in one affembly, or coUefling
all authority into one center. When nriagiftrates
and people meet in one affembly, the former will
for ever do as they pleafe, provided they proceed
with any degree of prudence and caution.
The confequence was, that the annual reviews
were a farce; only in a very few inftances, for
egregious faults, were any excluded : and the tvv'o
councils became perpetual, and independent of
the people entirely. The illufions of ambition
are very fubtle : if the motives of thefe magif-
trates, to extend the duration of their authority,
were the public good, we muft confefs they were
very ignorant, li is mofb likely they deceived
themfelves as well as their conftituents, and mif-
took their own ambition for patriotifm : but this
is the progreffive march of all alTemblies *, none
can confine themfelves within their limits, when
they have an opportunity of tranfgreffing them.
Thefe mao-iltrates foon It-arned to conlider their
authority as a family property, as all others in
general, in fimilar circumftances, ever did, and
ever will.
They behaved like all others in another refpeft
too : their authority being now permanent, they
immediately attack the findics, and transfer their
power to themfelves.
The whole hiftory of Geneva, fmce that pe-
riod, follows of couife : the people, by their fu-
pinenefs, had given up all balances, and betrayed
their owii privileges, as well as the prerogatives
of their iirll' magilbates, into the hands ot a tew
f:imil:es.
Tr-e people of Geneva, as enlightened as any,
have never confidered the neceflity of joining with
the fmdicSj nor the fmdics that of joining the
E 4. people,
^6 Arijlocratical Repuhlics.
people, but have conftantly aimed at an impofli-
bility, that of ballancing an ariflocratical by a
democratical aflembly, without the aid of a third
power.
T
LETTER XVIII.
L tr c c A.
My dear Sir,
HE government of this republic is faid to
be purely ariflocratical ; yet the fupreme
power is lodged in the hands of two hundred and
forty nobles, with the chief magiftrate at their
head, who is called confalloniero, or ftandard-
bearer, and has the executive power. This ma-
giftrate is affifted by nine counfeliors, called am-
ziani, whofe dignity lafts but nine months ; he
has a life-guard of fixty Swifs, and lives in the
republic's palace, as do his counfeliors, at the
public expence : after fix years he may be re^
chofen. The eleftion of all officers is decided in
the fenate by ballot.
GENOA.
The legiflative authority of Genoa is lodged
in the great fenate, confifting of feniors, or the
doge and twelve other members, with four hun-
dred noblemen and principal citizens, annually
eleded. All matters of ftate are tranfaded by
th'i
Genoal 57
the feniors, the members of which hold their
places for two years, afTifted by fome other coun-
cils ; and four parts in five of the fenate muft
agree in pafling a law. The doge is obliged to
refide in the public palace the two years he en-
joys his office, with two of the feniors, and their
families. The palace where he refides, and where
the great and little council, and the two colleges
of the procurator! and gouvernatori alTemble, is
a large ilone building in the center of the city.
At the expiration of his time, he retires to his
own houfe for eight days, when his adminiftra-
tion is either approved or condemned ; and in the
latter cafe, he is proceeded againft as a criminal.
At the eleftion of the doge, a crown of gold is
placed on his head, and a fceptre in his hand, as
king of Corfica ; he is attended with life-guards,
is clothed in crimfon velvet, and ftyled Moft Se-
rene, the fenators Excellencies, and the nobility
Illuftrious.
The nobility are allowed to trade in the whole-
fale way , to carry on velvet, filk, and cloth ma-
nufactures ; and to have fhares in merchant fhips ;
and Ibme of them, as the Palavacini, are adlually
the greateft merchants in Genoa.
The extent is about one hundred and fifty-two
miles, the breadth from eight to twenty miles.
BETTER
55 Arijtocratical Republics.
LETTER XIX.
VENICE.
My dear Sir,
THE republic of Venice has exifted longer
than thofe of Rome or Sparta, or any other
that is known in hiftory. It was at firft demo-
eratical , and their magiftrates, under the name
of tribunes, were choien by the people in a ge-
neral afiembly of them. A tribune was appointed
annually, to diftribute juftice on each of thofe
iflands which this people inhabited. Whether
this can be called col!e6ling all authority into one
center, or whether it was not rather dividing it
into as many parcels as there were iQands, this
fimple form of government fufficed, in fo fmall a
community, to maintain order for fome time ;
but the tyrannical adminiftration of the tribunes,
and their eternal difcords, rendered a revolution
necefiary ; and after long altercations, and many
projefts, the people, having no adequate idea of
the only natural balance of power among three
orders, determined that one magiftrate fliould be
chofen, as the center of all authority the eter-
nal refource of every ignorant people, harrafied
with democratical diilradions or ariilocratical en-
croachments. This magiftrate mull not be called
king, but duke, and afterwards doge , he was to
be for life, but at his death another was to be
chofen-, he was to have the nomination of ?.ll
magiftrates, and the power of peace and war.
The unbounded popularity and great real merit
of Paul Luc Anafefte, added to the prefture of
tribunary tyranny, and the danger of a foreign
enemy.
Venice,
, enemy, accomplifhcd this revolution. The new
do^e was to confult only fuch citizens as he
fhould judge proper : this, inftead of giving him
a conilitutional council, made him the mafter ;
he however fent polite meflages to thofe he liked
bcft, praying that they would come and advife
him. Thei'e were foon called pregadi, as the
doge's council is ftill called, though they are now
independent enough of him. The firft and fe-
cond doge governed mildly , but the third made
the people repent of their confidence : after ferv-
ing the ftate by his warlike abilities, he enflaved
it ; and the people, having noconftitutional means
to reftrain him, put him to death in his palace,
and refolved to abolifli the office. Hating alike
the name of tribune and of doge, they would have
a mafter of the militia, and he fhould be annu-
ally eligible. Fa6l;ons too violent for this tran-
fient authority arofe ; and, only five years after,
the people abolilhed this office, and reltored the
power of the doge, in the perfon of the fon of
him whom in their fury they had afTaffinated For
a long courfe of years after this, the Venetian
hiftory difclofes fcenes of tyranny, revolt, cruel-
ty, and affaffination, which excite horror. Doges,
endeavouring to make their power hereditary, af-
fociating their eldtft fons with them in office, and
both together oppreffing the people , thefe rifing,
and murdering them, or driving them into ba-
nillirnent, never once thinking of introducin;_', a
third order, between them and their firft magif-
trate, nor any other form of government by
which his power or theirs might be limited. In
the tenth century, a fon of their doge took arms
againft his father, but was defeated, banifh-d,
and declared incapable of ever bcinn- doce : vet
no looner was the father dead, than this wortiikis
'on
o Arijlocratical Republics,
fon was elecled, and brought back in great pomp
to Venice : he became foon a tyrant and a mon^
Her, and the people tore him tc pieces, but took
no meafure to frame a legal government. The
city increafed in commerce, and by conquefts,
and the new fubjeds were not admitted to the
privileges of citizens : this acceffion of dominion
augmented the influence of the doge. There was
no affembly but that of the people, and another
called the council of forty, for the adminiftra-
tion of juftice. This body, in the twelfth cen-
tury, formed fomething like a plan of govern-
ment.
Although the defcendants of the ancient tri-
bunes and doges were generally rich, and had a
fpontaneous refpedl fl^iewn to the antiquity of their
families, they were not properly a nobility, hav-
ing no legal rights, titles, or jurifdiclions. As
any citizen might be eleded to a public office,
and had a vote in the aflemblies, it was neceffary
for the proudeft among them to cultivate the good
will of the multitude, who made and murdered
doges. Through all thefe contefts and dilTen-
fions among a multitude, always impatient, often
capricious, demanding, at the fame time, all the
promptitude and fecrecy of an abfolute monar-
chy, with all the licence of a fimple democracy,
two things wholly contradidlory to each other,
the people had, to their honour, flill maintained
their right of voting in aflembly, which was a
great privilege, and nobody had yet dared to
aim a blow at this acknowledged right of the
people.
The council of forty now ventured to propofe
3 plan like that of Mr. Hume in his idea o; a
pcrf^cr. commonwealth, and like that which our
IP friend,
Venice. i
ffiend, Dr. Price, informs us was propofed in the
convention of MafTachufett's.
The city was divided into fix diftrids, called
feftiers. The council of forty propofed, that
each of thefe partitions fhould name two elec-
tors, amounting to twelve in all, who fhould
have the power of choofing, from the whole city,
four hundred and feventy, who fhould have the
whole power of the general afTembly, and be call-
ed the grand council.
The people were amufed with line promifes of
order and regularity, and confoled with afiertions
that their right of election ftill continued, and
that thole who fliould not be chofen one year,
might be the next; and, not perceiving that this
law would be fatal to their power, fuffered that
ariftocracy to be thus founded, which fubfifts to
this hour. The next propofal was, that a com-
mittee of eleven fhould be appointed, to name the
doge. Though the defign of reducing the people
to nothing might have been eafily feen in thefe
manoeuvres, yet the people, wearied, irritated,
and difcouraged, by eternal difcords, agreed to
both.
The council of forty, having thus fecured the
people, turned their eyes to the doge, whofe au-
thority had often been perverted to the purpofes
of oppreffion, and, having no legal check, had
never been reftrained but by violence, and all
the confufions which accompany it. They pro-
pofed that a privy council of fix fliould be ap-
pointed for the doge, one from each divifion of
the city, by the grand council themlelves, and
that no orders fhould be valid without their con-
currence : this palled into a law, witii unanimous
applaufe. They then propofed a lenate of fixty,
V^ho were to be eleded out of the grand council,.
and
6l Arijtocratical Repuhlics.
and to be called the pregadi : this too was ap-
proved. The grand council of four hundred and
fevenry, the fenate of fixty, the fix counfellors,
and eleven electors, were accordingly all chofen,
and the laft were fworn to choofe a doge, without
partiality, favour, or affedion : and the new-
chofen doge, having taken care to diftribute mo-
ney among the multitude, was received with uni-
yerfal acclamations. In his reign was inftituted,
by permiffion of the pope, the curious ceremony
of wedding the fea, by a ring call into it, in
fignum vert et perpetui imperii. Under the next
doge the avogadors were inftituted, to fee that
the laws were fully executed.
In the thirteenth century, fix new magiftrates,
called corredors, were created by the fenate, to
enquire into all abufes during the reign of a de-
ceafed doge, and report them to the fenate ; and
it was enaded, that the fortune of the doge Ihould
indemnify the ftate for whatever damage it had
fufFered during his adminiftration : and thefe cor-
redors have been appointed, at the deceafe of
every doge fince that time. In the next reign,
a new tribunal of forty was erected, for the trial
of civil caufes. In the thirteenth century, a new
method of appointing the doge, by the famous
ballot of Venice, a complicated mixture of choice
and chance, was adopted.
Each of the grand counfellors, now augmented
to forty-one to avoid the inconvenience of an
equal divifion, draws a ball out of a box, con-
taining thirty gilt, and the reft v/hite , thofe who
draw the gilt ones go into another room, where
is a box with thirty balls, nine of which are
gilt , draw again, and thole who obtain the gilt
balls are thtfirji dehors \ who choofe forty, com-
prehending themfelves in that number j the ionyy
by
Venicft 63
by repeating the whole procefs, are reduced to
twelve fecond dehors, the firft of whom names
three, and the reft two a piece : thefe twenty-five
draw again from as many balls, nine of which are
gilti this reduces them to nine third ekoiors, each
of whom choofes five : which forty-five are re-
duced, by a repetition of the ballot, to eleven
fourth ele^ors, and they have the appointment of
forty-one, who are the direl eledlors of the doge.
The choice generally turns upon two or three
candidates, whofe names are put into another box,
and drawn out : the firft whofe name is drawn
retires, and proclamation is made for objections
againft him , if any are made, he comes in, and is
heard in his defence: then the eledors proceed to
determine by ayes and noes ; if there are twenty-
five ayes, he is chofen, if not, another name is
read, and the fame decifion repeated, until there
are twenty- five in the afiirmative.
The grand council, ever anxious to limit the
power of the doge, foon thought it improper that
the public ads Ihould be figned by chancellors
appointed by him, and accordingly determined
to appoint tiiis officer themfclves.
The fcnate then began to think it too great a
refpect to the people to have the new doge pre-
fented to them for their acclamations, and or-
dained that u iyndic fnould congraiuh^te him in
the name of the people on his election. The
populace,wiio had v.'cckly lurrcndered their rights,
wcie very angry at being deprived of this fhow,
and proclaimed a doge of their own ; but he v/as
atraid of the contcft, and retired, and the people
having no man of weight to head them, gave up
this point.
Tlic new doge, \vi;o had much contempt for
popular government, and lomc refentment for the
iz flight
64 Arifiocratical Republics,
(light oppofitlon he had met with, procured i.
law to be pafled, that all the members of the
grand council fhould hold their places for life,
and tranfmit them to their pofterity, and that their
eleftions by the people's eledlors fhould ceafe.
This eftablifhment of an hereditary legiflative
nobility, no doubt fhocked the citizens in gene-
ral, but chiefly thofe of ancient families, who
were not at that moment members of the grand
council ; to filence thefe, the moft powerful of
them were received into the grand council, and
others were promifed that they fhould be admit-
ted at a future time. Commerce and wars foon
turned the attention of the reft of the people
from all thought about the lofs of their privileges.
Some few, however, fome time after formed a plan,
not to convene the people in a body, and new-
model the conftitution, but to aflaflinate the doge
and council all together. The plot, which was
carried on by the plebeians, was difcovered, and the
chiefs executed. Another originated amongft the
nobles, fome of them of the grand council, who
being of very ancient families, could not bear to
fee fo many citizens raifed to a level with them-
felves, and others of the moft diftinguiflied of
thefe, who were not of the grand council, and
had not been received afterwards according to
promife. This produced a fkirmifli in the city,
but fome of the confpiring nobles were killed,
the reft routed, and many executed, but it was
thought prudent to admit feveral of the moft dif-
tinguiftied families. Thefe two confpiracies pro-
duced a council of ten, upon which were after-
wards engrafted the ftate inquifition.
Great care is taken in Venice, to balance one
court againft another, and render their powers
mutual checks to each other. The college called
the
J'emce'i 65
tne feigniory, was originally compofed of the
doge and fix counfellors ; to thefe were added fix
of the grand council chofen by the fenate, and
called the favii or fages j then five more for land
affairs, and then five for fea affairs, in the room of
wliom, five young noblemen are now cholen every
fix months, who attendj without a vote, for their
education i to thefe were added the three chiefs of
the criminal court, from a jealoufy of the power of
the college, which is both the cabinet council, and
the reprefentative of the (late, giving audience and
anfwers to ambaffadors, to agents of towns, and
generals of the army ; receives all petitions, fum-
mons the fenare, and arranges its bufinefs.
There is one inftaiice of a doge's concertino- a
confpiracy, to ihake off the controul of the fenate ;
but as it was an old man of fcurfcore, whofe
young wife, on whom he doted, was not treated
with fufficient rel'pecfl by the nobility, we need not
wonder, that he had not fenfe enough to think of
introducing a regular, well-balanced conftitution,
by a joint concurrence of the people, and the no-
bility : the whole plan was to maiHicre the grand
council ; and although he engaged in his defign
iome of the higheft officers, and a large party,
the plot was difcovered, the doge himfelf tried,
condemned, and beheaded, as fo infamous a piece
of mad villainy juftly deferred.
A puntfrual execution o^ ttie laws, is no doubt
cfleniial to the exillence of this Hate, and there
arc tlriking inftances of perfons punifhing their
iieared relations, with the motl unrelenting^ feve-
rity ; without this, the doge on one hand, or the
{leople on the other, would foon think of a union
agamll the ruling nobflity. The ariflocracy is
i always fagacious, and knows the neccfilty of a ri-
gorous impartiality, in order to prtlcrve its
F p'jwcr-
66 Arifiocratical Repuhlics.
power, and all the barriers we have defcribed
have been ere6led for this purpofe : but all would
be infufficient to reftrain their paflions, without the
lions mouths and the ftate inquifitors; thefe were
engrafted on the council of ten. This terrible
tribunal, is fovereign in all crimes againfl: the
ftate ; it confifts of ten chofen yearly by the grand
council ; the fix of the feigniory affift, and the
doges prefide when they pleafe. Three chiefs,
appointed monthly by lot, to open all letters,
feize the accufed, take examinations, and profe-
cute the prifoner , who is clcfely confined, al-
lowed no council, and finally acquitted or con-
demned to death, in public or private, by the plu-
rality of voices. This was the original tribunal,
but it was not found fufRcient, and the ftate in-
quifitors were erefted in the beginning of the (ix-
teenth century. This tribunal confifts only of
three perfons, all taken from the council often,
who have authority to decide, without appeal, on
the life of every citizen, the doge himfelf not ex-
cepted. They employ what fpies they pleafe j if
they are unanimous, they may order a prifoner to
be ftrangled in gaol, or drowned in the canal,
hanged in the night, or by day, as they pleafe ^
if they are divided, the caufe muft go before the
council of ten, but even here, if the guilt is
doubtful, the rule is to execute the prifoner in
the night. The three may command accefs to the
houfe of every individual in the ftate, and have
even keys to every apartment in the ducal palace,
may enter his bed-chamber, break his cabinet,
and fearch his papers. By this tribunal, have
doge, nobility, and people, been kept in awe,
and reftrained from violating the laws, and to
this is to be afcribed the long duration of this
ariftocracy.
Such
Venice. 67 -
Such arc the happy effefts of the fpirit of fa-
milits, w!ien they are not bridled by an executive
authority, in the hands of a firft magiftrate oa
one hand, and by an alTrmbly of the peopk in
perfon, or by adequate reptefentation, on the
other. Such are the blefnngs which, in courfe of
ages, fpring from a negleft in tfie beginning, to
eflablifh three orders, and a perfe6l balance be-
tween thcin There can be, in the nature of
things, no balance v/ithout three powers. The
ariflocracy i." always more fagacious than an af-
leinbly of the people collectively^ or by repre-
iencation, and always proves an overmatch in po-
licy, fooner or later, l^hey are always more cun-
ning too than a firfl magirtrate, and always make
of him a doge of Venice, a mere ceremony, un-
lefs he makes an alliance with the people to fup-
port him againft them. What is the whole hif-
tory of the wars of the barons but one demon-
ftration of this truth ! What are all the Handing
armies in Europe, but anorh^r. Thefe v/ere all
given to kings by the people, to defend them
againft arillocrncies. The people have been ge-
nerally of Mr. Turgot's mind, that balances,
rind different orders, were iinneceflary, and, harraf-
ied to death with the domination of noble fa-
milies, rhcy have generally furrounded the thrones
with troops, to humble them. Ti)ey have fuc-
! ceeded lo far as generally to make the nobles de-
j pendent on the crown, but having given up
the balance which they miglu have held in their
own hands, they are rtill fubjefl to as much
ariftocratical domination, as the crov/ns think
proper to permit- InVenice, the arillocratical paf-
fion for curbing the prince and the people, has
been carried to its utmoft length. It is *iVonilh-
T 2 in^
68 u^HJiocraiical Republics.
ing to many, that any man will accept the office
of doge. Thefe fagacious nobles, who always
know at leaft the vices and weaknefies of the hu-
man heart better than princes or people, iliw that
there would be generally vanity enough in an in-
dividual to flatter himfelf, that he had qualities
to go through his adminiilration without incur-
ring cenfure, and with applaufe ; and farther,
that the frivolous diftinftion of living in the ducal
palace, and being the firtl man in the nation,
though it were only the firrt: among equals, would
tempt moft men to riique their lives and fortunes,
and accordingly it has fo happened. There has
been an uncommon folicitude ail along to reftrain
his power : this no doubt was to prevent him from
a polTibility of negociating with the people againit
them : on the other hand, there has been uncom-
mon exertions to annihilate every power, every
hope in the people: this was to prevent them
from having a legal poiTibility of applying to the
doge for afliftance. All this together, would not
however have fucceeded, if death, in thefliape of the
inquifition, had not been made to ftare both doge
and people in the face, upon the firft thought of
conferrino; together.
The nobles are divided into fix claHe-.
I. Twelve of the mod ancient families. 2. Four
families that in the year 880 lubfcribed to the
building of the abbey of St. George. ^. Thole
whofe names were written in the golden boolc, in
1296. 4. Thofe that were ennobled by the public
in 1385. 5. Thofe who purchaled their nobility
for one hundred thoufand tiucats in 1646. And
6. The itrangcrs who have been received into the
number of nobility : the whole make about two
thou land five hundred.
There
Venice. 6<)
There arc four councils : i. The doge and fix
fignoria. 2. The configlio grande, in which all
the nobles have feats and voices. ^. Configlio
de pre<radi, of 250, and is the foul of the repub-
lic. 4. Configlio proprio delli dieci and the itats
inquifitors.
THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED PR.0-
VINCES OF THE LOW COUN' TRIES.
Here were a Stadtholder, an alTeinbly of the
States General, a council of fi:ate : the Stadtholder
hereditary had the command of armies and navies,
and appointment of all officers, &c.
Every province had an afifcmbly btfides, and
every city, burgo mailers, counfellors, and fche-
pens or judges, befides an hooft officer, and his
dienders, for the police.
The hiftory of this country, and its compli-
cated conftitutions, affords an inexhauftible (lore
of materials to our purpofe, bur, confidering the
critical fituation of it, prudence dicStates to pafs it
over : with all the fagacity, and more wifdom
than Venice or Berne, it has always had more
confideration of the people than either, and has
given more authority to the firft magiitrate : they
have never had any exclufive preferences of fami-
lies or nobles. Offices have, by law at leaft, been
Open to all men of merit.
F3 LETTER
^r Monarchical or regal Republics.
LETTER XX.
ENGLAND.
My dear Sir,
POLAND and England. The hidorics of
thefe countries would confirm the gciierai
principle we contend for : the lait efpecially. But
who can think of writing upon this fubjed after
De Lclme, v/hofe book is the beft defence of the
political balance of three powers that ever was
written.
If the people are not equ'tably reprefented in
the houfe of commons, this is a departure in
pra6lice from the theory. If the lords return
members of the houfe of commons, this is an
additional difturbance of the balance : whether
the crown and the people in fuch a cafe will not
fee the neceflity of uniting in a remedy, are
queftions beyond my pretenfions : I only contend
that theEnglifn conflitution is, in theory, the moil
ilupendous fabrick of human invention, both tor
the adjuftment of the balance, and the prevention
of its vibrations \ and that the Americans ough':
to be applauded inllead of cenfured, for imitating
it, as fir as they have. Not the formation of lan-
guages, not the whole art of navigation and fliip
building, dees more honour to the human under-
Handing than this fyftem of government. The
Americans have not indeed imitated it in giving a
negative, upon their legillature to the executive
power \ in this refpel their balances are inccm-
pleat, very much I confcfs to my mortification :
in other rcfpe<5ts, tl-iey have feme of th-rrn fallen
Ihort
England. 7 f
fhort of perfcftion, by giving the choice of fomc
militia officers, &c. to the people chefe are how-
ever fmall matters at prefent. They have not
made their firft magiftrates hereditary, nor their
fenators: here they differ from the Englifh confti-
tution, and with great propriety.
The Agrarian in America, is divided into the
hands of the common people in every (late, in fuch
a manner, that nineteen twentieths of the property
would be in the hands of the commons, let them
appoint whom they could for chief magiftrate and
fenators : the fovereignty then, in fad, as well as
morality, mull refide in the whole body of thtf
people; and an hereditary king and nobility, who
Ihould not govern according to rhe public opmion,
would infallibly be tumbled inftantly from their
places : it is not onlv moft prudent then, but ab-
Iblutely neceff" y, .o avoid continual violence, to
give the people a legal, conllitutional, and peace-
able mod': of changing thefe rulers, 'v henever they
difcover improper principles or difpofuions in
them. In the prefent ftate of fociety, and with
the prefent manners, this may be done, not only
without inconvenience, but greatly for the happi-
nefs and profperity of the country. In fucurc
ages, if the prefent ftates become great nations,
rich, powerful, and luxurious, as well as numerous,
their own feelings and good fenie will dictate to
them what to do : they may make tranfiuions to
a nearer refemblance of the Britifli conftitution,
by a fredi convention, without the fmallcft inter-
ruption to liberty. But this will never become
neceflary, until great quantities of property fhall
get into few hands.
The truth is, that the people have ever go-
verned in America : all the weight of the royal
governors and councils, even backed with fleets
F 4 and
72 Monarchical Republics.
and armies, have never been able to get the ad-
vantage or chem, who have always ftood by iheir
houfes ot repreientatives in every inftance, and
carried all rheir points ; and no governor ( ver
Hood his ground againit a repreftntative allembly 5
as long as he governed by their advice he v/as
happy -, as foon ah iie differed from tb.cin he wa--^
wretched, and fooa obiiaed to retire.
t LETTER XXI.
POLAND.
My dear Sir,
TH E king of Poland is the firft rnagiilrate
in the republic, derives all his authority
from the nation. Ele has not the power to make
laws, raife taxes, contract alliances, or declare
war, nor to coin money, nor marry, without the
ratification of the diet.
The fenate is compofed of the clergy and nobi-
lity, the third eftate, or people, is not lb much as
known. The grand marfnal, the marfhal of the
court, the chancellor, vice chancellor, and the
treafurer, are the firil fenators.
The nobility, or gentry, polTefs the dignities
and employments, in whici) ihey never permit
llrangers, or the commonalty, to have any partici-
pation : they elect their king, and would never
fuffer the fenate to make themjtK cs maftcrs of this
eledtion. The peafants are Haves to the fjentry ,
having no property, all their a. quifitions are made
for their matters, and are expoled to all their paf-
ixons, and are opprefTed with impunity.
The
Poland. 73
The general diets, which are ufucilly held at
Warfaw or Grodno, are preceded by particular
iifleinblies of palatinates, in which the deputies are
cliofen for the general aflembly, and infirLided :
I he deputies afiembled in general diet, proceed to
the ejedion of a marfhal, who has a very extraor-
dinary power, that of impoling filence on whom
he pleafes ; he is the chief or fpeaker of the af-
fembly.
At the death, abdication, or depofition of a
king, the priniate calls the afiembly of the elec-
tors to an open field near Warfaw. Here the
eledlors take an oath, not to feparate until they
fhall have unanimoufly eleded a king, nor to
render him when eledted any obedience, until he
has fworn to obierve the Pa^a Convcnta^ and the
laws.
The candidates muft let their gold glitter, and
give fplendid entertainments, which muil be car-
ried into debauch : the nobility are captivated,
with the arrractions of mao-nificence and Hunga-
rian wine, and mfallibly declare in favour of the
candidate who caufes it to flow in the greateft
profbfion. The ambaifadors enter upon intrigues,
even in pubbc : the nobility receive liieir prefcnts,
fell their fuffrages with impunity, and render the
throne venal, but often behave with little fidelity
to the candidate in whole interell they pretend to
be cno;iif.;ed, and, forgetting the prelents they have
received, elpoufe the caufe of a more wealthy
competitor without hcfitation. When the candi-
date has gained all the fuffrages, he is de<:lared
king, and fworn to obfervc tlie Patfa Ccnventa,
an.; the laws, and then crowned. The Poles are
polite and friendly, but magnificence is the foible
of the nobility, and they lacrifice all things to
luxury : as they feldom fee any perfon fuperior to
them
74 Mofiarchical Republics.
them In their own country, and treat their infe-
riors with an air of abfolure authority, they live
in all the fpkndor of princes. Tliis is the account
of the Abbe des Fontaines in the year 1736 ; ic
is to be hoped things have fmce changed for the
better, but if this account was then true, who can
wonder at what has happened fince.
Here again is no balance , a king, and an af-
fembly of nobles, and nothing more : the nobles
here difcover their unakerabie dilpofition, when-
ever they have the power, to limit the king's au-
thority ; and there being no mediating power of
the people, collectively or reprelentatively, between
them, the confequence has been, what it always
will be in fuch a cafe, confufion and calamity.
LETTER XXII.
P O L A N D.
My dear Sir,
SINCE the letter conceriiing Poland was ieiu
y6u, Mr. Coxe's travels into that kingdom,
&c. have fallen into my hands : and they contain
fo many favls material to our argument, that
It is very proper to fend you the fubllance of this
account -, indeed there is fcarcely a book in the
world, in any manner relative to the hiflory of
government, or to thofe branches of philofopiiy
on which it depends, which is not much to our
purpofe.
In the mofb ancient times, v/hich records or
hiftory elucidate, the monarchy of Poland, like
Poland. 75
all others denominated feudal, was in theory, and
pretenfion, abfolute. The barons too, in this
country as in all others, were very often impa-
tient under luch reftraint. When the prince was
an able ftatefman and warrior, he was able to
preferve order-, but when he was weak and indo-
lent, it was very common for two or three borons
in conjunction to make war upon him ; and fome-
times it happened that all together leagued againfb
him at once. In every feu'Jal country, where the
people had not the fenfe and fpirit to make them-
lelves of importance, the barons became an
ariftocracy, inreflancly encroaching upon the
crown, and, under pretence of limiting its autho-
rity, took away from it one prerogative after
another, until ir was reduced down to a mere doge
of Venice, or avoyer of Berne; until the kings, by
incorporating cities and granting privileges to the
people, fet them up againft the nobles, and ob-
tained by their means (landing armies, fufficient
to controul both nobles and commons.
The monarchy of Poland, nearly abfolute,
funk in the courfc of a few centuries, without any
violent convulfion, into an ariftocracy.
It came to be difputed whether the monarchy
was hereditary or eledlive, and whether its autho-
rity was fovereign or limited. The firft queftion
is refolved, by luppofing that the crown continued
always in the fame family, although, upon the
death of a king, his fucceflbr was recognizrd
in an aflembly of the nobles. The fecond,
may be anfwered by fuppofing, that when the
king was adfive and capable, he did as he
plealed , but when he was weak, he was diiftatcd
to by a licentious nobility. Caflimir the Grc it
retrenched the authority of the principal barons,
snd granted immunities to the leffer nobility and
gentry >
76 Monarchical Republics.
gentry , well aware that no other expedient could
introduce order, except a limiration of the vaft
influence, pofiefled by the Palatines or principal
nobility. If this prince had been pofiefled of any
ideas of a free government, he might eafily have
formed the people and inftrior gentry into an af-
icmbly by themfelves, and, by uniting his piowcr
with theirs, againft the encroachments of the no-
bles upon both, have preferved it. liis nephew,
Louis of Hungary, who fucceedcd him, being a
fpreigner, was obliged by the nobility to fubfcribe
conditions at his acceffion, not to impofe any
taxes by his royal authority, without the confent
of the nation, that is of the nobles, for no other
nation is thought on : that in cafe of his demife
without male heirs, the privilege of appointing a
king fliould revert to the nobles. In conl'equence
of this agreement Louis was allowed to afcend
the throne: having no fon, with a view of infur-
ing the fucccflion to Sigifmund his fon in law,
he promiled to diminifli the taxes, repair the for-
trefles at his own expence, and to confer no offices
or dignities on forcio;ners.
Louis died : but Sigifmund Vr'as emperor, and
therefore powerful, and might be formidable to
the new immunities. The Poles, aware of this,
violated the compaft with Louis, neglected Sigif-
mund, and eledled Ladiflaus, upon his ratifying
Louis's promifes, and marrying his daughter.
Ladiflaus, having relinquifhed the right of im-
pofing taxes, called an aflembly of prelates, ba-
rons, and military gentlemen, in their refpecftive
provinces, in order to obtain an additional tribute.
Thefe provincial aflfemblies gave birth to the Die-
tines ; which now no longer retain the power of
raifmg money in their feveral diltrifts, but only
cle6t the nuncios or reprefentatives fqr the diet.
Ladiflaus
Poland. 77
LadiQaus the third, the Ton of the former,
purchalcd his right to the fuccefllon, during the
life of his father, by a confirmation of all the
concelTions before granted, which he folemnly
ratified at his acceffion. Caffimir the third, bro-
ther of Ladillaus the third, confented to feveral
further innovations, all unfavourable to regal
prerogative One was the convention of a na-
tional diet, inverted with the fole power of grant-
ing fupplies. Each palatinate or province was
allowed to fend to the geiicral diet, befides the
Palatines and other principal barons, a certain
number of nuncios or rcprcfenratives, chofen by
the nobles and burghers. Is it not ridiculous,
that this reign fhould beconfidered by the popular
party, as the aera, at which the freedom of the
conftitution was permanently eftabliflied ? This
frecdoHi, wliich confifts in a king without autho-
rity ', a body of nobles in a itate or uncontrouled.
anarchy , and a peafantry groaning under the
yoke of feudal defpotifm : the greaieil inequality
of fortune in the world ; the extremes of riches
and poverty, of luxury and mifery, in the neigh-
bourhood of eacii other , a univerfal corruption
and venality pervading all ranks; even the firlb
nobles not blufhing to be penfioners of foreign
courts-, one proiefling himfeif publicly an Auf-
tnan, another a Prulfian, a third a Frenchman,
and a fourth a Kudian -, a country without manu-
fiiilures, without commerce, and in eveiy view
the moft diftrcficd in the world. But to proceed,
with an enumeration of the meafures by v^'hicli
tlicy have involved themfclves in thcfe pitiable
circumllances :
Calnmir was involved in feveral unfuccefsful
wars, which exhaulled liis treafuics : lie applied
to the diet for fubfiuies.
Everv
yS Monarchical Republics.
Every fupply was accompanied with a lift of
grievances, and produced a diminution of the
royal prerogative. The barons, at the head of
their vafTals, were bound to fight, and the king
could require fuch feudal fervices in defence of
the kingdom : but Caffimir the third, to obtain
pecuniary aids, gave up the power of fummon-
irio; the nobles to his ftandard, and of enadintr
any law without the concurrence of the diet.
John Albert, to procure an elecftion in preference
to his elder brother, aflented to all the immunities
extorted from his predecefTors, and fwore to their
obfervance, in 1469. Alexander, his fucccfibr,
declared in 1505, the following limitations of
fovereign authority to be fundamental laws of the
kingdom. i. The king cannot impofe taxes.
2. He cannot require the feudal fervices. 3. Nor
alienate the royal domains. 4. Nor enadl laws.
5. Nor coin money. 6. Nor alter the procels in
the courts of juftice. Sigifmund the firft, fuc-
ceeded Alexander, and under his reign the Polilh:
conftitution was the moft tolerable, as the pro-
perty of thefubjeft was beft fecured, and the crown
had confiderable influence : but this did nor
fatisfy the nobles. Under Sigifmund Auguftus,
fon and fuccelTor of Sigifmund the firft, that fa-
vourite objed of the Polifh nobles, the free elec-
tion of the king, v/as publicly brought forward,
and the king obliged to agree, that no future
monarch fhould fucceed to the throne, unle!?
freely eleded by the nation : before this, the fo-
vereigns upon their accefTion, though formRily
raifed by the confent of the nation, ftill refted
their pretenfions upon hereditary right, always
ftiling themfelves heirs of the kingdom of Poland,
Sigifmund Auguftus was the laft who bore that
title 5 at his death, in 1572, all title to the crown
fron:;
Poland. 79
from hereditary right was formally abolifhed,
and the abfolute freedom of eledion eftablilhcd
upon a permanent bafis : a charter of immunities
was drawn up at a general diet, a ratification of
which it was determined to exaft of the new fove-
reign, prior to his eledion. This charter, called
paSia com-enta, contained the whole body of privi-
leges obtained from Louis, and his fucceffors,
with the following additions: i-That the king
fhould be eledive, and that his fucceflbr fhould
never be appointed during his life. 2. That the
diets, the holding of which depended folely upon
the will of the kings, (liould be afiembled everr
two years. ^. That every noblemian or gentleman
in the realm fhould have a vote in the diet of elec-
tion. 4. That in cafe the king fhould infringe
the laws and privileges of the nation, his fubjects
fhould be abfolved from their oaths of allegiance.
From this period the pacla convent a^ occafionally
enlarged, have been confirmed by every Ibvereigri
at his coronation.
Henry of Valoir, brother of Charles the ninth
of France, who afcendcd the throne after the con-
flitution was thus new modelled, fecureJ his
< led ion by private bribes to the nobles, and by
llipulating an annual penfion to the republic from
the revenues of France. His example has been
followed by every fuccecding king, v.'ho, befides
an unconditional ratifjcation of the padla convenra,
lias always been conftraincd topurchafe the crown,
by a public laigefs, and private corruption. Such
is Polilli liberty, and fuch the blefTings of a mo-
narchy eledlive by a body of nobles.
Under Stephen Bathori, the royal authority,
or rather the royal dignity, was farther abridged,
by the appointment of lixreen fenators, chofen
at each diet, to attend the king., and to give their
z opinion
So Monarchical Republics.
opinion in all matters of importance, fo that he
could not iflue any decree without their conient.
Another fatal blow was given to the prerogative
in 1578, by taking from the king the fupreme
jurifdidion of the caufes of the nobles : it was
cna6led, that without the concurrence of the king,
each palatinate (hould eledl in their dietines their
own judges, who fhould form fupreme courts of
" juftice, called trihunalia regni^ in which the caufes
of the nobles fliall be decided without appeal, a
mode which prevails to this day.
In the reign of John Caffimir, in 1652, was
introduced the libe'rum "jcto^ or the power of eacii
nuncio to interpofe a negative, and break up a diet,
a privilege which the king himfclfdoes not enjoy.
When the diet was debating upon tranfactions oi
the utmoft importance, which required a fpeedy
decifion, a nuncio cried out, " 1 ftop the pro-
" ceedings," and quitted the afiem.bly : and a
venal faction, who fupported his proceft, unheard
of as it was, obtained the majority, and broke up
the affembly in confufion. The conftitution
was thus wholly changed, and an unlimited fcope
given to facflion. The innovation was fupported
by the great officers of (late, the general, trea-
furer, and marlhal, who being once nominated
by the king, enjoyed their offices for life, refpon-
fible only to the diets, confcious that they could
at all times engage a nuncio to proteft, and thus
elude an enquiry into their adminiilration ; it was
alfo fupported by the adherents of many nobles
accufed of capital crimes before the diet, the only
tribunal before v/hich th-y could be tritd : ail the
nuncios who oppofed the raifmg of additional
fubfidies by taxes, which tlie exigencies of the
ftate then demanded, feconded the propofal of
putting an end to the afiembly. But the principal
caufe
Poland, 8 1
caufe of all were the foreign powers, interefted to
foment confufions in the Polifh councils. Before
this, they were obliged to fecure a majority ; af-
terwards, thrcy might put an end to any diet, un-
friendly to their views, by corrupting a fingle
member. This veto broke up feven diets in the
reign of John Cafimir, four under Michael, fe-
ven under John Sobiefki, and thirty during the
reigns of the two Augufti. In confequence of
this neceflity of unanimity, which they call the
deareft palladium of Polifh liberty, Poland has
continued above a hundred years almoft without
laws, s
But as the king ftill bellowed the flaroflies, or
royal fiefs, which are held for life, and confer-
red the principal dignities and great offices of
ftate, he was ftill the fountain of honour, and
maintained great influence in the councils of the
nation ; but this laft branch of the royal prero-
gative was lately wrefted from the crown at the
eftablifliment of the permanent c. uncil.
Thus it appears in the hiftory of Poland, aa
in that of Venice, Genoa, Berne, Soleure, and
all others, that the nobles have continued with-
out interruption to fcramble for diminutions of
the regal authority, to grafp the whole executive
power, and augment their own privileges , and
have attained a dire6t ariftocracy, under a mo-
narchical name, where a few are above the con-
troul of the laws, while the many are deprived
of their protedlion.
The prefcnt wretched ftate of the towns, com-
pared with their former flourilhing condition ,
the poverty of the peafants, whofe opprefllons
have increafcd in proportion to the power of the
nobles, having loft a protedor when the king
G loft
82 Monarchical or regal Repuhlics.
loft his weight in the conftitution ; the total con-
fufion in all public affairs ; the declenfion of im-
portance, and lofs of territory all fliew that ab-
folute monarchy is preferable to fuch a republic.
Would twelve millions of inhabitants, under an
Englifh conftitution, or under the conftitution
of any one of the United States, have been par-
titioned and difmembered ? No -, not by a league
of all the abfolute fovereigns of Europe againft
them at once. Such are the effeds of collecting
all authority into one center, of neglecting an
equilibrium of powers, and of not having three
branches in the legiflature.
The pradice of cantoning a body of foldiers
near the plain where the kings are elected, has
been adopted by fevcral foreign powers for near a
century ; and, although it may be galling to the
nobility, prevents the effuGon of blood that for-
nierly deluged the afiembly. This was done, at
the election of Staniflaus Auguftus, by the cm-
prefs of Ruffia and the king of PrufTia j five
thoufand Ruffian troops were ftationed at a fmall
diftance from the plain of Vola.
Staniflaus was in the thirty-fecond year of his
age when he afcended the throne, in 1764. From
his virtues and abilities, the faireft hopes were
conceived of his raifing Poland from its deplo-
rable fituation -, but his exertions for the public
good were fettered by the conftitution, by the
factions of a turbulent people, and the intrigues
of neighbouring powers. His endeavours to in-
troduce order at home, and independence abroad,
which would have increafcd the power of his
country, and her confideration with foreign na-
tions, alarmed the neighbouring powers. The
fpirit of religious intolerance produced a civil
war.
Poland. 83
war, and the fenate petitioned the ambaflador
from Peterfburg, not to withdraw the Ruffian
troops. The royal troops, aided by the Ruf-
fians, whofe difcipline was fuperior, were in fa-
vour of religious liberty. The Confederates, fe-
cretjy encouraged by Auftria, affifted by the
Turks, and fupplied with money and officers by
the French, were able to protradl hoftilities from
1768 to 1772: during this period the attempt
was made to alfaffinate the king.
Count Pulafki, who was killed in the fervice
of the United States, is faid to have planned an
enterprize fo much to his diffionour. No good
caufe ever wa?, or ever will be, ferved by afTaffi-
nation ; and this is happily, in the prefent age,
the univerfai fenfe of mankind. If a Papal nun-
cio was found in Poland, capable of bleffing the
weapons of confpirators againil this tolerant king,
he was a monfter, whofe bloody bigotry the libe-
ral fpirit of the Pope himfelf muft, at this en-
lightened period, abominate. The king did him-
feli-' immortal honour, by his interceffion with the
diet to remit the tortures and horrid cruelties de-
creed by the laws of mod kingdoms in Europe
againft treafon, and by his moderation towards all
the confpirators.
We are now arrived at the confummation of all
panegyrics upon a fovereignty in a fingle afiem-
bly the Partition.
Pruffia was formerly in a (late of vaflTalage to
this republic ; Ruffia once faw its capita) and
throne pofleffcd by the Poles ; and Auftria was
indebted to John Sobiefl^i, a fovereign of this
country, for compelling the Turks to raifc the
fiege of Vienna, but a century ago. A republic
fo lately the protestor of its neighbours, would
not, without the moft palpable imperfe<5lions in
G 2 the
84 Monarchical or regal Republics.
the orders and balances of its government, h&vc
declined in an age of general improvement, and
become a prey to any invader much Icfs would
it have forced the world to acknowledge, that
the tranflation of near five millions of people,
from a republican government to that of abfo-
lute empires and monarchies, whether it were done
by right or by wrong, is a bleffing to them.
The partition was projected by the king of Pruf-
fia, who communicated it to the emperor and
cmprefs. The plague was one circumftancc, and
the Ruffian war againft the Turks another, that
favoured the defign , and the partition-treaty was
figned at Peterfburg, in February 1772, by the
Ruffian, Auftrian, and Pruffian plenipotentiaries.
The troops of the three courts were already in
pofieffion of the greateft part of Poland, and
the Confederates were foon difperfed. The par-
titioning powers proceeded with fuch fecrecy, that
only vague conjectures were made at Warfaw,
and that lord Cathcarr, the Englifh minifter at
Peterfburg, obtained no authentic information of
the treaty until two months after its fignature.
The formal notification, to the king and fenate
at Warfaw, was made, by the Imperial and Pruf-
fian ambaffadors, in September 1772, of the pre-
tenfions of their courts to the Polilh territory.
The remonftrances of the king and fenate, as well
as thofe of the courts of London, Paris, Stock-
holm, and Copenhagen, had no effedt ; and the
moft humiliating record, that ever appeared in the
annals of a republic, is leen in the king's fum-
mons " Since there are no hopes from any
" quarter, and any further delays will only tend
" to draw down the moft dreadful calamities
** upon the remainder of the dominions which
*' are left to the republic, the diet is convened
" for
Poland. ^5
** for the 19th of April, 1773, auording to thf
*' will of the three courts ; neverthelcfs, in order
" to avoid all caufe of reproach, the king, with
"*' the advice of the fenate, again appeals to the
" guarantees of the treaty of Oliva." It is not
to be doubted, that if there had been in Poland
a people in exiftence, as there is in Holland, to
have given this amiable prince only the autho-
rity of a ftadtholder, he would have faid, " 1 will
*' die in the laft ditch."
Of the difmembered provinces, the Ruffian,
which is the largeft territory, contains only one
million and a half of fouls; the Auftrian, which
is the mod populous, contains two millions and
a half; the Pruffian, which is the mod commer-
cial, commanding the navigation of the Viftula,
contains only eight hundred and fixty thoufand,
and has given a fatal blow to the commerce of
Poland, by transferring it from Dantzick to Me-
mcl and Koniglburg.
The finilhing ftroke of all remains.
The three ambafladors, on the 13th of Sep-
tember, 1773, delivered, *' A part of thofe car-
" dinal laws, to the ratification of which our
*' courts will not fufFer any contradidion.
I. The ciov;n of Poland (hall be for ever
cledlive, and all order of fuccefTion profcribed :
any perfon who fliall endeavour to break this
law Ihall be declared an enemy to his country,
and liable to be punifhed accordingly.
" II. Foreign candidates to the throne, being
*' the frequent caufe of troubles and divifions,
" fhall be excluded ; and it fhall be enabled,
that, for the future, no perfon can be chofen
king of Poland, and great duke of Lithuania,
*' excepting a native Pole, of noble origin, and
** pofTcfTing land within the kingdom. The fon,
G 3 " or
8 6 Monarchical or regal Repuhlics.
" or grandfon, of a king of Poland, cannot be
" eleded immediately upon the death of their
" father or grandfather ; and are not eligible, ex-
" cepting after an interval of two reigns.
" III. The government of Poland fhall be for
*' ever free, independent, and of a republican
" form.
" IV. The true principle of faid government
*' confiding in the ftrift execution of its laws,
" and the equilibrium of the three eftates, viz.
*' the king, the fenate, and the equeftrian order,
" a permanent council fhall be eRablifhed, in
" which the executive power fhall be vefled. In
" this council the equeftrian order, hitherto ex-
" eluded from the adminiftration of affairs in
" the intervals of the diets, fhall be admitted, as
'' fhall be more clearly laid down in the future
((
arrangements.
Thus the fupreme legiflative authority refides
in the three eltares of the realm, the king, the
fenate, and equeftrian order, affembled in a na-
tional diet ; but each eftate has no negative upon
the other, and therefore is no balance, and very
little check. The great families and principal
palatines will ftiU govern, without any effedlual
contrcul.
The executive power is now vefted in the fu-
preme permanent council ; but here neither have
they any checks, all being decided by the majo-
rity, and the fame principal families will always
prevail.
Thefe auguft legiflators have acknowledged
the principle of a free republican government,
that it confifts in a ftrid execution of the laws,
and an equilibrium of eftates or orders : but how
^rti the laws to govern? and how is' the equili-
brium to be preferved f Like air, oil, and warer^
% fhakea
Poland. 87
fhaken together in one bottle, and left in repofe ;
the firft will rife to the top, the laft fink to the
bottom, and the fecond fwim between.
Our countrymen will never run delirious after
a word or a name. The name republic is given
to things, in their nature as different and contra-
diftory as light and darknefs, truth and falfehood,
virtue and vice, happinefs and mifery. There
are free republics, and republics as tyrannical as
an oriental defpotifm. A free republic is the
beft of governments, and the greateft blelTing
which mortals can afpire to. Republics which
are not free, by the help of a multitude of ri-
gorous checks, in very fmall dates, and for fhort
fpaces of time, have preferved fome reverence for
the laws, and been tolerable -, but there have been
oligarchies carried to fuch extremes of tyranny,
that the defpotifm of Turkey, as far as the hap-
pinefs of the nation at large is concerned, would
perhaps be preferable. An empire of laws is a
charafteriftic of a free republic only, and fhould
never be applied to republics in general. If
there fhould ever be a people in Poland, there
will foon be a real kingj and if ever there fhould
be a king in reality, as well as in name, there
will foon be a people : for, inflead of the trite
faying, " no bifliop, no king," it would be much
more cxa6t and important truth to fay, no peo-
ple, no king, and no king, no people, meaning
by the word king, a firfl magiftrate poflelTed ex-
clufively of the executive power. It may be Idd
down as a univerlal maxim, that every govern-
ment that has not three independent branches in
its legiflature will foon become an abfolute mo-
narchy i or, an arrogant nobility, increafing every
day in a rage for fplendor and magnificence,
will annihilate the people, and, attended with
G 4 their
S8 Monarchical or regal Republic si
their horfes, hounds, and vaflals, will run down
the king as they would hunt a deer, wifhing for
nothing fo much as to be in at the death.
The philofophical king Staniflaus felt moft fe-
verely this want of a people. In his obferva*
tions on the government of Poland, publiihed in
the CEuvres du Philofophe hienfaifant^ torn. iii. he
laments, in very pathetic terms, the miferies to
which they were reduced.
" The violences," fays he, " which the pafi-
** cians at Rome exercifed over the people of that
city, before they had recourfe to open force,
and, by the authority of their tribunes, ba-
lanced the power of the nobility, are a ftriking
pidure of the cruelty with which we treat our
plebeians. This portion of our ftate is more
debafed among us than they were among the
Romans, where they enjoyed a fpecies of li-
berty, even in the times when they were moft'
" enflaved to the firft order of the republic.
We may fay with truth, that the people are,
in Poland, in a ftate of extreme humiliation.
We muft, neverthelefs, confider them as the
principal fupport of the nation ; and I am per-
fuaded, that the little value we fet on them
will have very dangerous confeqijences. Who
are they, in faft, who procure abundance in
the kingdom ? who are they that bear the bur-
thens, and pay the taxes ? who are they that
'* furnifh men to our armies } who labour our
^' fields ? who gather in the crops .'' who fuftain
*' and nourifh us ? who are the caufe of our in-
*' activity .? the refuge of our lazinefs .'' the re-
" fource for our wants ? the fupport of our lu-
*' xury ? and indeed the fource of all our plea-
1^' fu}'es } Is it not that very populace that we
"' trta;
Poland. 89
** treat with fo much rigour ? Their pains,
** their fwear, their labours, do not they merit
*t
any better return than our fcorn and difdain ?
We fcarcely diftinguilh them from the brutes,
*' which they maintain for the cultivation oi our
*' lands ! we frequently have lefs confideration
** for their ftrength, than we have for that of
*' thofe animals ! and too frequently we fell them
" to matters as cruel as ourfelves, who imme-
** ^lately force them, by an excefs of hard la-
*' bour, to repay the price of their new flavery !
" I cannot recoiled without horror that law which
*' impofes only a fine of fifteen livres upon a
" gentleman who fhall have killed a peafant.
** Poland is the only country where the populace
** are fallen from all the rights of humanity, we
" alone regard thefe men as creatures of another
" fpecies, and we would almoft refufe them the
" fame air which they breathe with us. God, in
" the creation of man, gave him liberty what
" right have we to deprive him of it ? As it is
" natural to fhake ofi^ a yoke that is rough, hard,
** and heavy, may it not happen that this people
" may make an effort to wreft themfelves frpm
** our tyranny ? Their murmurs and complaints
" muft, fooner or later, lead to this. Hitherto,
" accullomed to their fetters, they think not of
** breaking them ; but let one fingle man arife,
** among thefe unfortunate wretches, with a maf-
*' culine and daring fpirit, to concert and foment
*' a revolt, what barrier (hall we oppofe to the
** torrent ? We have a recent inftance, in the,
** infurredion in the Ukraine, which wgs only
*' occalioned by the vexations of thofe among us
** who had there purchafed lands. We defpifed
f* the courage of the poor inhabitants of that
'' country
90 Monarchical or regal Republics. Poland.
*' country they found a refource in defpair, and
*' nothing is more terrible than the defpair of
*' thofe who have no courage. What is the con-
" dition to which we have reduced the people of
" our kingdom ? Reduced by mifery to the ilate
*' of brutes, they drag out their days in a lazy
** ftupidity, which one would almoft miftake for
*' a total want of fentiment : they love bo arr,
*' they value themfelves on no induftry -, they
" labour no longer than the dread of chaftifement
*' forces them ; convinced that they cannct enjoy
" the fruit of their ingenuity, they ftifle their ta-
" lents, and make no eflays to difcover them.
*' Hence that frightful fcarcity in which we find
*' ourfelves of the mod common artifansl Should
*' we wonder that we are in want of things the
*' moft neceffary, when thofe who ought to fur-
** nifh them, cannot hope for the fmalleft profit
** from their cares to furnifh us ! It is only
" where liberty is found, that emulation can
[' exift."
It would be a pleafure to tranflate the whole ;
but it is too long. It is a pity that the whole
people, whofe mifery he describes and laments,
were not as fenfible of the neceflity of a lefs cir-
cumfcribed royal authority.
I- E T T E R
Recapitulation . g t
LETTER XXIIL
RECAPITULATION.
My dear Sir,
AS we have taken a curfory view of thofc
countries in Europe, where the government
may be called, in any realbnable conftruftion of
the word, republican -, let us now paufe a few
moments, and rcfled upon what we have feen.
Among every people, and in every fpecies of
republics, we have conftantly found a firji magif-
trate, ahead, a chief, under various denominations
indeed, and with different degrees of authority,
with the title of ftadtholder, burgomafter, avoyer,
doge, confalloniero, prefident, fyndick, mayor,
alcalde, capitaneo, governor, or king : in every
nation, we have met with a dillinguifhed officer :
if there is no example in any free government,
any more than in thofe which are not free, of a
focicty without a principal perfonage, we may
fairly conclude, that the body politic cannot fub-
fift without one, any more than the animal body
without a head. If Mr. Turgot had made any
difcovery, which had efcaped the penetration of
all the legiflators and philolophers, who had lived
before him, he ought at leaft to have communi-
cated it to the world for their improvement-, but
as he has never hinted at any fuch invention, we
may fafely conclude that he had none , and there-
fore, that the Americans are not juftly liable to
cenlures, for m^iiuun^ ^overmrs^
Jn
92 Recapitulation,
In every form of government, we have {ctn 2
fenate, or little council^ a compofition, generally, of
fhofe officers of ftate, who have the moft experi-
ence and power, and a few other members feleft-
cd from the higheft ranks, and moft illuftrious
reputations. On thefe leflTer councils, with the
firft magiftrate at their head, generally refts the
principal burden of adminiftration, a fliare in the
Icgillative, as well as executive and judicial au-
thority of government. The admiffion of fuch
fenates to a participation of thefe three kinds of
pov/er, has been generally obferved to produce in
the minds of their members an ardent ariftocrati-
cal ambition, grafping equally at the prerogatives
of the firft magiftrate, and the privileges of the
people, and ending in the nobility of a few fami-
lies, and a tyrannical oligarchy : but in thofe
ftates, where the fenates have been debarred from
all executive power, and confined to the legifla-
tive, they have been obferved to be firm barriers
againft the encroachments of the crown, and often
great fupporters of the liberties of the people.
The Americans then, who have carefully confined
their fenates to the legiflative power, have done
wifely in adopting them.
We have feen, in every inftance, another and
a larger affembly, compoled of the body of the
people, in fome little ftates ; of reprefentatives
chofen by the people in others ; of members ap-
pointed by the fenates, and fuppofed to reprefenc
the people, in a third fort; and of perfons ap-
pointed by themfelves or the fenate, in certain
ariftocracies ; to prevent them from becoming
oligarchies. The Americans then, whofe afiem-
blies are the moft adequate, proportional, and
fouitable reprefcntacions of the people, that are
known
' Recapitulation, 93
Tcnown in the world, will not be thought erro-
neous in appointing houfes of reprefentacives.
In every republic, in the fniallcfl: and moft po-
pular, in the larger and more ariftocratical, as
well as in the largeft and moft monarchical, we
have obferved a multitude of curious and inge-
nious inventions to balance, in their turn, all
thofe powers, to check the paflions peculiar to
them, and to controul them from rufliing into
thofe exorbitancies to which they are molt ad-
di6led the Americans will then be no longer
ccnfured for endeavouring to introduce an equi-
librium, which is much more profoundly medi-
tated, and much more efFedual for the protedion
of the laws, than any we have feen, except in
England : we may even queftion whether that is
an exception.
In every country we have found a variety of
orders^ with very great diftinclions. In America,
there are different orders of offices^ but none of
men ; out of office all men are of the fame fpecies,
and of one blood ; there is neither a greater nor
a lefler nobility Why then are they acculed of
eftablifhing diflerent orders of men ? To our
inexprelfible mortification we muft have remark-
ed, that the people have preferved a fhare of
power, or an exiftence in the government, in no
country out of England, except upon the tops
of a few inacceffiblc mountains, among rocks and
precipices, in territories fo narrow that you may
Ipan them with an hand's breadth, where, living
unenvied, in extreme poverty, chiefly upon paf-
turagc, deftitute of manufadures and commerce,
they ftill exhibit the moft charming pidlure of
life, and the moft dignified chara(fler of human
natufe.
Wherever
54 Recapitulation.
Wherever we have feen a territory fomewhac
larger, arts and fciences more cultivated, com-
merce flourifhing, or even agriculture improved
to any great degree, an ariftocracy has rifen up
in a courfe of time, confifting of a few rich and,
honourable families, who have united with each
other againft both the people and the firft ma-
giftrate ; wrefted from the former, by art and by
force, all their participation in the government,
and even infpired them with fo mean an efteem
of themfelves, and fo deep a veneration and ftrong
attachment to their rulers, as to believe and con-
fefs them a fuperior order of beings.
We have feen thele noble families, although
neceflitated to have a head, extremely jealous of
his influence, anxious to reduce his power, and
conftrain him to as near a level with themfelves
as poffible , always endeavouring to efiablifh a
rotation by which they may all equally in turn be
entitled to the pre-eminence, and equally an-
xious to preferve to themfelves as large a fliare
of power as polTible in the executive and ju-
dicial, as well as the legiilative departments of
the ftate.
Thefe patrician families have alfo appeared
in every inftance to be equally jealous of each
other, and to have contrived, by blending lot
and choice, by mixing various bodies in the elec-
tions to the fame offices, and even by the horrors
of an inquifition, to guard againft the fm that fo
eafily befets them, of being wholly influenced
and governed by a junto or oligarchy of a few
among themfelves.
We have feen no one government, in which is
a diftin(51: feparation of the legiflative from the
executive power, and of the judicial from both,
or
Recapitulation, 95
or in which any attempt has been made to ba-
lance thefe powers with one another, or to form
an equilibrium between the one, the few, and
the many, for the purpofe of enabling and exe-
cuting equal laws, by common confent, for the
general intereft, excepting in England.
Shall we conclude, from thefe melancholy ob-
fervations, that human nature is incapable of li-
berty, that no honeft equality can be preferved
in fociety, and that fuch forcible caufes are al-
ways at work as muft reduce all men to a fub-
miilion to defpotifm, monarchy, oligarchy, orarif-
tocracy ?
By no means. We have feen one of the firft
nations in Europe, poflefled of ample and fertile
territories at home, and extenfive dominions
abroad, of a commerce with the whole world,
immenfe v/ealth, and the greateft naval power
which ever belonged to any nation, who have
ftill preferved the power of the people, by the
equilibrium we are contending for, by the trial
by jury, and by conftantly refuGng a Handing
army. The people of England alone, by pre-
ferving their mare in the legiflature, at the ex-
pence of the blood of heroes and patriots, have
enabled their kings to curb the nobility, without
giving him a (landing army.
After all, let us. compare every conflitution
we have feen, with thofe of the United States of
America, and we fhall have no reafon to blulli
for our country ; on the contrary, we fliall feel
the ftrongell motives to fall upon our knees, in
gratitude to heaven for having been gracioufly
pleafed to give us birth and education in that
country, and for having deftined us to live under
her laws ! We fhall have reafon to exult, if we
make
g5 Recapitulation.
make our comparifon with England and he Eng-
lifli conftitution. Our people are undoubtedly fo-
vereign all the landed and other property is ir
the hands of the citizens not only their repre-
fcntatives, but their fenators and governors, arc
annually chofen there are no hereditary titles,
honours, offices, or diftindtions the legiQative,,
executive, and judicial powers are carefully fepa-
ratcd from each other the powers of the one,
the few, and the many, are nicely balanced in
their legiflatures trials by jury are preferved ii>
all their glory, and there is no (landing army
the habeas corpus is in full force the prefs is the
moft free in the world and where all thcfe cir-
cumftances take place, it is unneceflary to add
that the laws alone can govern.
LETTER
Dr. Swift 97
LETTER XXIV.
ANCIENT REPUBLICS, AND OPINIONS
OF PHILOSOPHERS.
DR. S V/ I F T.
My dear Sir,
THE authority of legiflators and philofo-
phers, in fupport of the fyftem we contend
for, is not difficult to find. The greatefb lights
of humanity, ancient and modern, have approved
it, which renders it difficult to explain how it
comes, in this enlightened age, to be called in
queftion, as it certainly has been, by others as
well as Mr. Turgor. I ffiall begin with one,
who, though feldom quoted as a legiflator, ap-
pears to have confidered this fubjedt, and fur-
niOied arguments enough, for ever to determine
the queilion. Dr. Swift, in his Contefts and
DiiTcnfions between the Nobles and Commons of
Athens and Rome, obfervt's, that the belt legii-
lators of all ages agree in this, that the abfolutc
power, which originally is in the whole body, is
a truil too great to be committed to any one man
or allcmbly , and therefore, in their feveral infti-
tutions of government, power in the lad refort,
was always placed by them in balance, among the
one, the few, and the many ; and it will be an
eternal rule in politics, among every free people,
that there is a balance of power to be held by
every Hate within itlelf. A mixed governmenr,
vartaking of the known forms received in the
H fchools
g% Ancierit Republics, 6fr.
fchools, is by no means of Gothic invention, bur
hath place in nature and reafon, and feems very
well to agree with the fentiments of moft legifla-
tors : for, not ro n^ention the feveral republics
of this compofuion in Gaul and Germany, de-
fcribed by Csfar and Tacitus, Polybius tells us,
the belt government is that which confifls of three
forms, regno^ optimatium, et populi imperio. Such
was that of Sparta in its primitive intlitution by
Lycurgus, who, obferving the depravations to
which every one of thele was fubjeft, com-
pounded his fcheme out of all ; fo that it was
made up of r^^^^j-, fenicres, et pcpulns. Such alio
was the itate of Rome, under its coni'uls ; and
fuch, at Carthage, was the pov/cr in the lall re-
fort : they had their kings, fenate, and people.
A limited and divided power feems to have been
the moft ancient and inherent principle, both of
the Greeks and Italians, in matters of govern-
ment. The dilTerence between the Grecian mo-
narchies and Italian republics was not very great.
The power of thofe Grecian princes, who came
to the fie^e of Troy, was much of a fize with
that of the kings of Sparta, the archon of Athens,
the fuffctes at Carthage, and the confuls at Rome,
Thefeus ellablilhed at Athens rather a mixed mo-
narchy than a popular ftate, afflgmng to himfelf
the guardiandiip of the laws, and the chief com-
mand in war. This inditution continued during
the feries of kings to the death of Codrus, from
whom Solon was defcended, who, finding the
people engaged in two violent factions, of the
poor and the rich, and in great confufion, refu-
fing the monarchy which was offered him, chofe
rather to caft the government after another mo-
del, wherein he made due proviiion for fettling
ibe balance of fowcvy choofing a fenate of four
hundred.
Dr. Szvift, 99
liundred, and difpofing the magiftracies and of-
fices according to men's eftates, leaving to the
multitude their votes in electing, and the power
of judging certain procelTes by appeal. This
council of four hundred was chofen, one hundred
out of each tribe, and feems to have been a body
reprefcntative of the people, though the people
collective referved a fhare of power to them-
felves.
In all free ftates, the evil to be avoided is ty-
ranny ; that is to fay, x.\\ftfumma imperii^ or unlimit-
ed power, folely in the hands of the one, the few,
or the many. Though we cannot prolong ihe
period of a commonwealth beyond the decree of
heaven, or the date of its nature, any more than
human life beyond the ftrength of the feminal
virtue; yet we may manage a fickly conltitution,
and preferve a (trong one , we may watch, and
prevent accidents , v/e may turn off a great blow
from without, and purge away an ill humour
that is lurking within ; and render a ftate long
lived, though not immortal. Some phyficians
have thought, that if it were pracflicable to keep
the feveral humours of the body in an exa6t ba-
lance of each with its oppofite, it might be im-
mortal ; and fo perhaps would a political body,
if the balance of power could be always held ex-
actly even.
All independent bodies of men feem naturally
to divide into the three powers, of the one, the
few, and the many. A free people met toge-
ther, as loon as they fall into any afts of civil
fociety, do of themfelves divide into three ranks.
The firft is, that of fome one eminent fpirit, who,
having hgnalized his valour and fortune in de-
fence of his country, or by the practice of po-
pular arts at home, comes to have great influence
jrl 2 on
lOo Jncient Republics, ^c.
on the people-, to grow their leader in warlike
expeditions ; and to prefide, after a fort, in their
civil affemblies. The fecond is, of fuch men as
have acquired large poflcfTions, and confequently
dependencies, or defccnd from anceflors who
have left them great inheritances, together with aa
hereditary authority j thefe, eafily uniting in opi-
nions, and ading in concert, begin to enter upon
meafures for fecuring their properties, which
are bed upheld by preparing againll invafions
from abroad, and maintaining peace at home:
this commences a great council, or fenate, for the
v;eiglity affairs of the nation. The laft divifioii
is, of the mafs of the people, whofe part of
power is great and indifpurable, whenever they
can unite, either collectively or by deputation, to
exert it.
The true meaning of a balance of power is beft
conceived by confideringwhat the nature ofa balance
is. It fuppofes three things: firft, the part which is
held, together with the hand that holds it; and then
the two fcales, with whatever is weighed therein.
In a ftate within itfelf, the balance muft be held
by a third hand, who is to deal the remaining
power, with the utmoft exaftnefs into the feveral
fcales. The balance may be held by the weakeft,
who by his addrefs, removing from eicher fcale,
and adding his own, may keep the fcales duly
poifed : when the balance is broken by mighty
weights falling into either fcale, the power will
never continue long, in equal divifion, between
the two remaining parties ; but, till the balance is
fixed anew, will run entirely into one. This is
made to appear by the examples of the Decemviri
in Rome, the Ephori in Sparta, the four hundred
in Athens, the thirty in Athens, and the Domi-
natio Plebis in Carthage and Argos.
In
Br. Swift. loi
In Rome, from the time of Romulus to Julius
Ca^far, the commons were growing by degrees
into power, gaining ground upon the patricians,
inch by inch, until at Jaft they quite overturned
the balance, leaving all doors open to popular and
ambitious men, who deftroyed the wifeft republic,
and enflaved the nobleft people, that ever entered
on the ftage of the world. Polybius tells us, that
in the fecond punic war, the Carthaginians were
declining, becaufe the balance was got too much
on the fide of the people , whereas the Romans
were in their greateft vigour, by the power re-
maining in the fenate. 1 he ambition of private
men did by no means begin, or occafion the war,
between Pompey ard Casfar, though civil diflen-
tions never fail to introduce and fpirit the ambi-
tion of private men ; for while the balance of
power is equally held, the ambition of private men,
whether orators or commanders, gives neither
danger nor fear, nor can poflibly enflave their
country , but that once broken, the divided par-
ties are forced to unite each to its head, under
whofe conduct or fortune one fide is at firft vic-
torious, and at lad both are flaves. And to put it
pall difpute, that the entire lubverfion of Roman
liberty was altogether owing to thofe meafures,
which had broke the balance between the patri-
cians and plebeians, whereof the ambition of pri-
vate men was but the effei^l and confequence ;
we need only confider, that when the uncorrupted
part of the lenate, by the death of Cselar, had
made one great etfort to reftore their liberty, the
uccefs did notanfwer their hopes ; but that whole
afiembly was fo funk in its authority, that thefe
patriots were obliged to fly, and give way to the
Riadncfs of the people, who by their own difpofK
H 3 tions
102 Ancient Republics^ ^c,
tions, flirred up by the harangues of their ora-
tors, were now wholly bent upon fingle and de-
fpotic (laveryj elfe how cculd fuch a profligate
as Anthony, or a boy of eighteen like Odlavius,
ever dare to dream of giving law to fuch an em-
pire and fuch a people? Wherein the latter fuc-
ceeded, and entailed the vilefl: tyranny, that
Heaven in its anger, ever inflicted on a corrupt
and poifoned people.
It is an error to think it an uncontroulable
jnaxim, that power is always fafer lodged in many
hands than in one : for if thefe many hands be
made up from one of thofe three divifions, it is
plam, from the examples produced, and eafy to be
paralleled in other ages and countries, that they
are as capable of enflaving the nation, and of
acting all manner of tyranny and opprefiion, as it
is poffible for a fingle perlon to be, though v/e
fhould fuppofe their nun^,ber not only to be four
or five hundred, but three thoufaiid. In order
to preferve a balance in a mix'-d fiiate, the limits
of power depofitcd with each party, ought to be
afcertained and gc-nerally known: the defe(5t of
this is the cauie of thole ilrugglcs in a flate, about
prerogative and liberty , about encroachments of
the few upon the rig'. is of the many, and of the
many upon the privileges of the few \ which ever
did, and ever will, conclude in a tyranny; firfl: either
ot the few or the many, but at lafl, infallibly, of a
Jjngk perfrm : for whichever of the three divifions
in a itate is upon the Icramble for more power
than its own, as one of the three generally is
(unlefs due care be taken by the other tv/o) ; upon
every new queftion that ariles, they will be fure to
decide in favour of thcmfelves-, they will make
large demands, and fcanry concelTionSj ever rom^
i in.f?
Dr. Swift. 103
ing off confiderable gainers-, thus at length the
balance is broke, and tyranny let in, from which
door of the three it matters not.
The dcfires of men, arc not only exorbitant,
but endlels: they grafp at all; and can form no
fchemc of perfect happinefs with Icfs. Ever fince
men have been formed into governments, the en-
deavours after univerfal monarchy have been
bandied among them: the Athenians, the Spar-
tans, the Thebans, and the Achaians, feveral
times aimed at the univerfal dominion of Greece :
the commonwealths of Carthage and Rome affedt-
ed the univerfal empire of the world : in like
manner has ablolute power been purfued, by the
feveral powers in each particular ftate, wherein
fingle perfons have met with moil fuccefs, though
the endeavours of the few and the many have
been frequent enough ; yet being neither lb uni-
form in their defigns, nor fo dired: in their
views, they neither could manage nor maintain
the power they had got, but v/ere deceived by
the popular ambition of fome fingle perfon : lo
that it will be always a wrong Hep in policy, for
the nobles or commons to carry their endeavours
after power fo far as to overthrow the balance.
With all relpefl for popular aflembl^es be it
fpoken, it is hard to recoiled one folly, infirmity,
or vice, to which a fingle man is fubjedt, and
from which a body of commons, either coUedive
or reprefented, can be wholly exempt ; from
whence it comes to pafs, that in their refults, have
fometimes been found the fame fpirit of cruelty
and revenge, of malice and pride ; the fame blind-
nefs, and obftinacy, and unfteadinefs -, the fame
ungovernable rage and anger; the fame injuftice,
fophiftry, and fraud, that ever lodged in the bread
of any individual. When a child grows eafy by
H 4 being
104 Antient Rspuhlics, ^c.
being humoured, and a lover fatisfied by fmall
compliances without further purfuits, then expe6t
popular aflemblies to be content with fmall con-
ceflions. \i there could one fmgle example be
brought from the whole compals of hiitory, of
any one popular affembly who, after beginning
to contend for power, ever fat down quietly with
a certain fhare-, or of one that ever knew, or pro-
pofed, or declared, what fhare of pow.r was their
due, then might there be fom.e hopes, that it was
a matter to be adjufted by reafonings, confe-
rences, or debates. An ufurping populace is its
own dupe, a mere under-worker, and a purchafer
jn truft tor fome fingle tyrant, whofe Hate and
power they advance to their ov>/n ruin, with as
blind an inftinft, as thofe worms that die with
weaving magnificent habits for beings of a fupe-
rior order. The people are more dextrous at
pulling down and letting up, than at preferving
what is fixed \ and they are not fonder of feizing
more than their own, than they are of delivering
it up again to the worft bidder, with their own
into the bargain. Their earthly devotion is fel-
dom paid to above one at a time, of their own
creation, whofe oar they pull with lefs murmuring
and more fkill, than when they fliare the leading,
or even hold the helm.
You will perceive by the ftyle, that it is Dr.
Swift that has been ipeaking; otherwife yoq
plight have been deceived, and imagined tl^at 1
was entertaining you with further reflections upon
the Ihort account prcvioiifly given you in thefc
letters, of the modern republics. I'here is not
an obfervation here that is not juftified by the
hiftory of every government we have confider-
cd. How much more maturely had this writer
weighed the fubjed, than Mr. Turgot Perhaps
thcrG
Br. Franklin, 105
tbere Is not to be found, in any library, fo many-
accurate ideas of government exprefled with fo
much perfpicuity, brevity, and precifion.
LETTER XXV,
DR. FRANKLIN.
My dear Sir,
AS it is impoffible to fuppofe that Mr. Turgot
intended to recommend to the Americans
a fimple monarchy or ariftocracy, we have admit-
ted, as a fuppofition the moft favourable to him,
that, by collecting all authority into one center,
he meant a fingle allembly of reprefentatives of
the people, without a governor, and without a
fenate ; and although he has not explained, whe-
ther he would have the aflembly chofen for life,
or years, we will again admit, as the moft benign
conftruftion, that he meant the reprefentatives
fhould be annually chofen.
Here we fhall be obliged to confider the reputed
opinion of another philofopher, I mean Dr. Frank-
lin : I lay reputed, becaufe I am not able to af-
firm that it is really his : it is, however, fo gene-
rally underftood and reported, both in Europe
and America, that his judgment was in oppofi-
tion to two alTemblies, and in favour of a fingle
one, that in a dilquifition like this it ought not to
be omitted. To be candid with you, a little be-
fore the date of Mr. Turgot's letter. Dr. Franklin
jiad arrived in Paris with the American conftitu-
pqns, and among the reft that of Penfylvania, in
which
io6 Ancient Republics^ i^c.
which there was but one aflembly : it was report-
ed too, that the dodtor had prefided in tiie con-
vention when it was made, and there approved it.
Mr. Turgot, reading over the conftitutions, and
admiring that of Peniylvania, was led ro cenfure
the reft, which were fo different from it. 1
know of no other evidence, that the doctor ever
gave his voice for a fingle aiTembly, but the com-
mon anecdote which is known to every body. Ic
is faid, that in 1776, in the convention of Pen-
fylvania, of which the dodor was prefidenr, a
projed of a form of government by one affenibly,
was before them in debate : a motion was made to
add another affembly under the name of a fenate
or council ; this motion was argued by feveral
members, fome for the affirmative, and fome for
the negative; and before the queftion was put
the opinion of the prefident was requefted : the
prefident rofe, and faid, that " Two afTembhes
*' appeared to him, like a pra6lice he had fome-
*' where feen, of certain waggoners who, when
*' about to defcend a fteep hill, wirh a heavy load,
** if they had four cattle, took off one pair from
** before, and chaining them to the hinder part
'* of the waggon drove them up hill ; while the
" pair before, and the weight of the load, over-
" balancing the ftrength of thofe behind, drew
" them flowly and moderately down the hill."
The prefident of Peniylvania might, upon fuch
an occafion, have recoUeded one of Sir Ifaac
Newton's laws of motion, viz. " that re-action
*' muft always be equal and contrary to aftion,"
or there can never be any reft. He might have
alluded to thofe angry affemblies in the Heavens,
which fo often overipread the city of Philadelphia,
till the citizens with apprehenfion and terror,
threatening to fee the world on fire, merely be-
cauf;,'
Dr. Franklin, 1 07
caufe the powers within them are not fufficiently
balanced. He might have recollcded, that a
pointed rod, a machine as fmiple as a waggoner,
or a monarch, or a governor, would be fufficient
at any time, filcntly and innocently, to difarm
thofe aflcmblies of all their terrors, by reftoring
between-them the balance of the powerful fiuid,
and thus prevent the danger and deftruftion to
the properties and lives of men, which often hap.
pen for the want of it.
However, allufions and illuftrations drawni
from paftural and rural life are never difagreeable,
and in this cafe might be as appofite as if they
had been taken from the fciences and the fkics.
Plarrington, if he had been prefenc in convention,
would have exclaimed, as he did when he men-
tioned his two girls dividing and choofing a cake,
"Oh! the depth of rhewifdom ofGod, which in the
fimple invention of a carter, has revealed to man-
kind the whole myftery of a commonwealth ;
which confifls as much in dividing and equalizing
forces ; in controuling the weight of the load and
the a<R;ivity of one part, by the itrength of another,
as it does in dividing and choofing." Harrington
too, inftead of his children dividing and choofing
their cake, might have alluded to thofe attrac-
tions and rcpuKions, by which the balance of
nature is prcferved : or to thofe centripetal and
centrifugal forces, by which the heavenly bodies
are contmued in their orbits, inftead of rufliing
to the fun, or flying off in tangents among co-
mets and tixed ftars : impelled, or drawn by dif-
ferent forces in dilFerent dire(5tions, they are blef-
fings to tliL-ir own inhabitants and the neighbour-
\r\i{ {yfler.is ; but if they were drawn only by one
they would introduce anarchy wherever they
fho'jld <^o. There i? no objedion to fuch allu-
fions,
loS Ancient Republics y ^c,
fions, whether fimple or fublime, as they may
amufe the fancy and illiiilrate an argumeni: ail that
is infilled on is, that whatever there is in them of
wit or argument, is all in favour of a complication
of forces, of more powers than one; of three
powers indeed, becaufe a balance can never be
fftablifhed between two orders in fociety, without
a third to aid the weakeft.
All that is furprifing here is, that the real force
of the fimile Ihould have been mifunderftood : if
there is any fimilitude, or any argument in it, it
is clearly in favour of two aflemblies. The
weight of the load itfelf would roll the waggon
on the oxen, and the cattle on one another, in one
fcene of deftrudion, if the forces v^/ere not di-
vided and the balance formed ; whereas by check-
ing one power by another, all defcend the hill in
fafety, and avoid the danger. It fhould be re-
membered too, that it is only in deicending un-
common declivities that this divifion of flrength
becomes neceffary. In travellmg in ordinary
plains, and always in afcsnding mountains, the
whole team draws together, and advances fafter
as well as cafier on its journey : it is alfo certain,
there are oftener arduous fteeps to mount, which
require the united flrength of all, with all the
H^ill of the director, than there are precipices tQ
defcend, which demand a divifion of :t.
Let us now return to Mr. Turgoi's idea of a
government confifling in a fingle aircmbly. He
tells us, our republics are '* founded on the equa-
** lity of all the citizens, and therefore " orders"
*' and "equilibriums," are unnecefTary, and occa-
** fion difputes." But what are we to underdand
here by equality ? Are the citizens to be all of
the fame age, fex, fize, llrength, ftature, activity,
touragCj h^rdinefs, indultry, patience^ ingcnui-r
ty.
Dr. Franklin, ic
ty, wealth, knowledge, fame, wit, temperance,
conftancy, and wifdom ? Was there, or will there
ever be, a nation, whofe individuals were all equal,
in natural and acquired qualities, in virtues, ta-
knrs, and riches ? The anfwer, of all mankind
muft be in the negative. It muft then be ac-
knowledged, that in every (late, in the MalTachu-
jet's for example, there are inequalities which
God and nature have planted there, and which
no human Icgiflator ever can eradicate. I fhould
have chofen to have mentioned Virginia, as the
moft ancient ftate, or indeed any other in the
union, rather than the one that gave me birth,
if I were not afraid, of putting fuppofitions,
which may give offence, a liberty which my
neighbours will pardon : yet I fhall fay nothing
that is not applicable to all the other twelve.
\n this fociety of Maflachufettenfions then,
there is, it is true, a moral and political equa-
lity of rights and duties among all the individu-
als, and as yet no appearance of artificial ine-
qualities of condition, fuch as hereditary digni-
ties, titles, magiftracies, or legal diftinflions ; and
no edablilhed marks, as ftars, garters, crolTes
or ribbons : there are, nevertheiefs, inequalities of
great moment in the confideration of a legillator,
bccaufe they have a natural and inevitable influ-
ence in fociety. Let us enumerate fome of them :
I. There is an inequality of wealth : fome indivi-
duals, whether by d^-fcent from their anceftors,
or from greater Ikill, induftry, and fuccefs in
bufinefs, have eftates both in lands and goods of
great value -, others have no property at all ; and
all the reft of the fociety, much the greater num-
ber, are pofTelled of wealth, in all the variety of
degrees, between thefe extremes : it will eafily be
cwiiceived, that all the rich men will have many
of
J 10 'Ancient Republics^ ^t.
of the poor, in the various trades, manufactures,
and other occupations in life, dependent upon
them for their daily bread : many of fm.aller for-
tunes will be in their debt, and in many ways
under obligations to them : others, in better cir-
cumftances, neither dependent nor in debt, nien
of letters, men of the learned profeffions, and
others, from acquaintance, converfation, and civi-
lities, will be connedted with them, and attached
to them. Nay farther, it will not be denied, that
among the wifeft people that lives, there is a
degree of admiration, abftracled from all depen-
dence, obligation, expeftation, or even acquaint-
ance, which accompanies fpiendid wealth, en-
fures fome refped, and beftows fome influence.
2. Birth. Let no man be furpriled, that this
fpecies of inequality is introduced here. Let the
page in hiftory be quoted, where any nation, an-
cient or modern, civilized or favage, is men-
tioned, among whom no difference was made be-
tween the citizens, on account of their extraction.
The truth is, that more influence is allowed to
this advantage in free republics, than in defpo-
tic governments, "or than would be allowed to it
in fimple monarchies, if fevere laws had not been
made from age to age to fee u re it. The children
of illuftrious families, have generally greater ad-
vantages of education, and earlier opportunities
to be acquainted with public charadlers, and in-
formed of public affairs, than thofe of meaner
ones, or even than thole in middle life , and Vv'hat
is more than all, an habitual national veneration
for their names, and the characters of their ancef-
tors deicribed in hiftory, or coming down by tra-
dition, removes them farther from vulgar jealoufy,
and popular envy, and fecures them in ibme de-
gree the favour, the afi^cdion, and refpect of the
public.
Dr, Franklin. 1 1 1
public. Will any man pretend that the name of
Androfs, and that of Winthrop, are heard with
the fame fenfations in any village of New Eng-
land J* Is not gratitude the fentiment that attends
the latter, and difguft the feeling excited by the
former? In the Maffachufett's then, there are per-
fons defcendcd from fome of their ancient gover-
nors, counfellors, judges, whofe fathers, grandfa-
thers, and o;reat o;randfathers, are remembered with
cfteem by many living, and who are mentioned in
hiftory with applaufe, as benefaflors to the coun-
try, while there are others who have no fuch ad-
vantage. May we go a flep farther Know
thyfelf, is as ufeful a precept to nations as to
men. Go into every village in New England, and
you will find that the office of juftice of the peace,
and even the place of reprefentative, which has
ever depended only on the freeeft eledlion of the
people, have generally defcendcd from generation
to oeneration, in three or four families at moft:.
I'he prefent fubjeft is one of thofe which all men
refpeft, and all men deride. It may be faid of
this part of our nature, as Pope faid of the
whole :
Of human nature, wit her word may write.
We all revere it, in our own defpight.
If, as Harrington fays, the ten command-
ments, were voted by the people of Ifrael, and
have been enafted as laws by all other nations -,
and if we fliould prefume to fay, that nations had
a civil right to repeal them, no nation would
think proper to repeal the fifth, which enjoins
honour to parents : if there is a difference between
right and wrong ^ if any thing can be facred -, if
there
Ii2 Ancient Repuhlics^ ^c,
there is one idea of moral obligation ; the dtcr^t
of nature mud force upon every thinking being,
and upon every feeling heart, the convidlion that
honour, affeflion, and gratitude are due from chil-
dren, to thofe who gave them birth, nurture, and
education. The fentiments and affedions which
naturally arife, from refledling on the love, the
cares, and the bleflings of parents, abflraded
from the confideration of duty, are fome of the
moft forcible and moft univerlal. When religion,
law, morals, affedlion, and even falliion, thus
confpire to fill every mind with attachment to
parents, and to ftamp deep upon the heart their
impreffions, is it to be expeded that men fnould
reverence their parents while they live, and begin
to delpife or negledl their memories as foon as
they are dead ? This is in nature impcffible ; on
the contrary, every little unkindnefs and fcverity
is forgotten, and nothing but endearments re-
membered with pleafure.
The fan of a wife and virtuous father, finds the
world about him fjmetimes as much difpofed as
he himfclf is, to honour the memory of his father;
to congratulate him as the fucceflbr to his eftate ;
and frequently, to compliment him with eledlions
to the offices he held. A fenfe of duty, his paf-
fions and his inierefl, thus confpiring to prevail
upon him to avail himfelf of this advantage, he
finds a few others in fimilar circumftances with
himfelf; they naturally afTociate together, and
aid each other. This is a faint Ikecch of the
fource and rife cf the family fpirit : very often
the difpofition to favour the family is as ftrong,
in the town, county, province, or kingdom, as it
is in the houfe itfelf. The enthufiafm is indeed
fometimes wilder, and carries away, like a torrent,
all before it.
I'hefe
Dr, Franklin. 113
Thefe obfervations are not peculiar to any age ;
we have feen the efFedts of them in St. Marino,
Bifcay, and the Grifons, as well as in Poland,
and all other countries* Not to mention any
notable examples, which have lately happened
near us, it is not many months fince I was witnefs
to a converfation between Tome citizens of MafTa-
chufett's : one was haranguing on the jealoufy
which a free people ought to entertain of their
liberties, and was heard by all the company with
pleafure ; in lefs than ten minutes the converfa-
tion turned upon their governor ; and the jealous
republican was very angry at the oppofition to
him. '* The prefent governor," fays he, *' has
" done us fuch fervices, that he ought to rule
** us, he and his pofterity after him for ever and
" ever." Where is your jealoufy of liberty ?
demanded the other. *' Upon my honour," replies
the orator, " I had forgot that ; you have caught
*' me in an inconfiftency j for I cannot know whe-
*' ther a child of five years old will be a fon of
*' liberty or a tyrant." His jealoufy was the
diftate of his underftanding: his confidence and
cnthufiafm the impulfe of his heart.
The pompous trumpery of enfigns, armorials,
and efcutchcons, are not indeed far advanced in
America. Yet there is a more general anxiety to
know their originals, in proportion to their num-
bers, than in any nation of Europe ; arifing from
the eafier circumflances and higher fpirit of the
common people : and there are certain families in
every ftate, as attentive to all the proud frivoli-
ties of heraldry. That kind of pride which looks
down on commerce and manufactures as degrad-
ing, may indeed, in many countries of Europe,
be a ufeful and neceflary quality in the nobility :
ic may prevent, in fome degree, the whole nation
I from
114 Ancient Repuhlics, &c.
from being delivered up entirely to the fpirit of
avarice : it may be the cauie, why honour is pre-
ferred by fome to money : it may prevent the
nobility from becoming too rich, and acquiring
too large a proportion of the landed property. In
America, it would not only be mifchievous, but
"would expofe the higheft pretenfions of the kind
to univerfal ridicule and contempt. Thofe other
hauteurs, of keeping the commons at a diftance,
and difdaining to converfe with any but a few of
a certain race, may in Europe be a favour to the
people, by relieving them from a multitude of
affiduous attentions and humiliating compliances,
which would be troublefome ; it may prevent the
nobles from caballing with the people, and gain-
ing too much influence with them in eleftior"^ 'ind
otherwife. In America, it would juftly >xcitc
univerfal indignation ; the vaineft of all muft be
of the people, or be nothing. While every office
is equally open to every competitor, and the
people muft decide upon every pretenfion to a
place in the legiflature, that of governor and fe-
nator, as well as reprefentative, no fuch airs will
ever be endured. It muft be acknowledged ftill,
that fome men muft take more pains to deferve
and acquire an office than others, and muft behave
better in it, or they will not hold it.
We cannot prefume that a man is good or bad,
merely becaufe his father was one or the other -,
and fhould always inform ourfelves firft, whether
the virtues and talents are inherited, before we
yield our confidence. Wife men beget fools,
and honeft men knaves ; but thefe inftances, al-
though they may be frequent, are not general.
If there is often a likenel's in feature and figure^
there is generally more in mind and heart, becaufe
education contributes to the formation of thefe as
well
Dr, Franklin, 115
well as nature. The influente of example is very
great, and almoft univerfal, efpecially of parents
over their children. Jn all countries it has been
obferved, that Vices, as well as virtues, run down
in families, very often, from age to age. Any man
may run over in his thoughts the circle of his
acquaintance, and he will probably recolletfl in-
ftances of a difpofition to mifchief, malice, and
revenge, defcending, in certain breeds, from grand-
father to father and fon. A young woman was
lately convifted at Paris of a trifling theft, barely
within the law, which decreed a capital punifh-
ment. There were circumftances, too, which
greatly alleviated her fault ; fome things in her
behaviour that feemed innocent and modeft : every
fpeflator, as well as the judges, was affedted at
the fcenc, and fhe was advifed to petition for a
pardon, as there was no doubt it would be grant-
ed. ** No," fays fhe, *' my grandfather, father,
and brother, were all hanged for ftealing , ic
runs in the blood of our family to fleal, and
be hanged ; if I am pardoned now, I fhall fteal
again in a few months more inexcufeably : and
thereforel will be hanged now."- An hereditary
pafTion for the halter is a ftrong inftance, to be
fure, and cannot be very common : but fome-
thing like it too often defcends, in certain breeds,
from generation to generation.
If vice and infamy are thus rendered lefs odi-
ous, by being familiar in a family, by the ex-
ample of parents, and by education, it would b^
as unhappy as unaccountable, if virtue and ho-
nour were not recommended and rendered more
amiable to children by the fame means.
There are, and always have been, in every ftate,
numbers poffefled of fome degree of family pride,
who have been invariably encouraged, if not flat-
I 2 tcred
1 1 6 Ancient Republics, ^c.
tered in it, by the people. Thefe have moft ac-
quaintance, efteem, and friendfhip, with each
other, and mutually aid each other's fchemes of
intereft, convenience, and ambition. Fortune, it
is true, has more influence than birch ; a rich man
of an ordinary family, and common decorum of
condud, may have, greater weight than any
family merit commonly confers without it.
3. It will be readily admitted, there are great ine-
qualities of merit, or talents, virtues, fervices,
and, what is of more moment, very often of repu-
tation- Some, in a long courfe of fcrvice in an
army, have devoted their time, health, and for-
tunes, fignalized their courage and addrefs, ex-
pofed themfelves to hardfhips and dangers, loft
their limbs, and fhed their blood, for the people.
Others have difplayed their wifdom, learning, and
eloquence in council, and in various other ways
acquired the confidence and affedtion of their fel-
low citizens, to fuch a degree, that the public have
fettled into a kind of habit of following their
example and taking their advice. 4. There are
a few, in whom all thefe advantages of birth, for-
tune, and fame are united.
Thefe fources of inequality, which are com-
mon to every people, and can never be altered by
any, becaufe they are founded in the conftitution
of naturej this natural ariftocracy among mankind,
has been dilated on, becaufe it is a fad eflential
to be confidered in the inftitution of a govern-
ment. Jt is a body of men which contains the
greateft colledion of virtues and abilities in a
free government ; is the brighteft ornament and
glory of the nation; and may always be made the
greateft blefling of fociety, if it be judicioufly
managed in the conftitution. But if ic is not, it
is always the moft dangerous j nay, it may be
added,
Dr. Franklin, 117
added, it never fails to be the deftruftion of the
commonwealth. What fhall be done to guard
againft it? Shall they be all mafTacred ? This expe-
riment has been more than once attempted, and
once at lead tried. Guy Faux attempted it in Eng-
land; and a king of Denmark, aided by a popular
party, effe<fled it once in Sweden ; but it anfwered
no good end. The moment they were dead, ano-
ther ariftocracy inftantly arofe, with equal art and
influence, with lefs delicacy and difcretion, if not
principle, and behaved more intolerably than the
former. The country, for centuries, never reco-
vered from the ruinous confequences of a deed fo
horrible, that one would think it only to be met
with in the hiftory of the kingdom of darknefs.
There is but one expedient yet difcovered, to
avail the fociety of all the benefits from this body
of men, which they are capable of affording, and
at the fame time to prevent them from under-
mining or invading the public liberty ; and that
is, to throw them all, or at lead the moft re-
markable of them, into one aflembly together,
in the legiflature ; to keep all the executive power
entirely out of their hands as a body , to ere6l a
firft magiftrate over them, invefted with the whole
executive authority ; to make them dependent on
that executive magiftrate for all public executive
employments , to give that firft magiftrate a ne-
gative on the legiflature, by which he may defend
both himfelf and the people from all their enter-
prizes in the legiflature ; and to ere<5t on the other
lide of them an impregnable barrier againft them,
in a houfe of commons, fairly, fully, and ade-
quately reprelenting the people, who fliall have
the power both of negativing all their attempts
at encroachments in the legiflature, and of with-
holding both from them and the crown all fup-
I 3 plies^
'iiS Ancient Republics y ^e.
plies, by which they may be paid for their fervices
in executive offices, or even the public fervicc
carried on to the detriment of the nation.
We have feen, both by reafoning and in ex-
perience, what kind of equality is to be found or
expeded in the fimpleit people in the world.
There is not a city nor a village, any more than a
kingdom or commonwealth, in Europe or Ame-r
rica ; not a hord, clan, or tribe, among the ne-
groes of Africa, or the favages of North or South
America; nor a private club in the world, in
which fuch inequalities are not more or lefs vifi-
ble. There is then a certain degree of weight,
ia the public opinion and deliberations, which
property, family, and merit will have : if Mr.
Turgot had difcovered a mode of afcertaining the
quantity which they ought to have, and had re-
vealed it to mankind, fo that it might be known
to every citizen, he would have deferved more of
their gratitude than all the inventions of philo-
fophers. But, as long as human nature fhall have
paflions and imagination, there is too much rea-
son to fear that thefe advantages, in many inftances,
will have more influence than reafon and equity
canjuftify.
Let us then reflect, how the fmgle afle;mbly in
the MaflTachufett's, in which our great ftatefman
wifhes all authority concentered, will be com-
pofed. There being no fenate nor council, all the
rich, the honourable, and meritorious, will ftand
candidates for feats in the houfe of reprefentatives,
and nineteen in twenty of them obtain eleftions.
The houfe will be found to have all the inequali-
ties in it, that prevailed among the people at large.
Such an afliembly will be naturally divided into
three parts.- The firfl: is, of fome great genius,
fpme mafterly fpirit, who unites in himlelf all
' ' 10 th
Df, Franklin^ 119
the qualities which conftitute the natural founda-
tions of authority ; fuch as benevolence, wifdom,
and power : and all the adventitious attradlions of
refpedl; fuch as riches, anccftry, and perfonal
merit. All eyes are turned upon him for their
prcfident or fpeaker. The fecond divifion com-
prehends a third, or a quarter, or, if you will, a
lixth or an eighth of the whole ; and confifts of
thofe who have the mod to boaft of refembling
their head. In the third clafs are all the reft,
who are nearly on a level in underftanding, and
in all things. Such an aflembly has in it, not
only all the perfons of the nation who are moft
eminent for parts and virtues, but all thofe who
are moft inflamed with ambition and avarice, and
who are moft vain of their defcent. Thefe latter
will of courfe conftantly endeavour to increafe
their own influence, by exaggerating all the attri-
butes they poflfefs, and by augmenting them in
every way they can think of; and will have friends,
whofe only chance for rifing into public view
will be under their proteftion, who will even
be more active and zealous than themfelves in
their fervice. Notwithftanding all the equality
that can ever be hoped for among men, it is
eafy to fee that the third clafs will in general be
but humble imitators and followers of the fecond.
Every man in the fecond clafs will have con-
ftantly about him a circle of members of the
third, who will be his admirers ; perhaps afraid
of his influence in the diftrifts they reprefent,
related to him by blood, connedled with him in
trade, or dependent upon him for favours.
There will be much envy too, among individuals
of the fecond clafs, againft the fpeaker, although
a fmcere veneration is fliewn him by the majority,
and great external refpedt by ail. I faid there
I 4 would
120 'Ancient RepuhUcs^ ^c\
would be envy; becaufe there will be, among the
fecond clafs, fevcral, whofe fortunes, families, and
merits, in the acknowledged judgment of all, ap-
proach near to the firft ; and, from the ordinary
illufions of felf-love and felf-intereft, they and
their friends will be much difpofed to claim the
firft place as their own right. This will introduce
controverfy and debate, as well as emulation; and
thofe who wifh for the firft place, and cannot ob-
tain it, will of courfe endeavour to keep down the
fpeaker as near upon a level with themfelves as
poffible, by paring away the dignity and import-
ance of his office, as we faw in Venice, Poland,
and every where elfe.
A fingle afiembly thus conftituted, without any
counterpoife, balance, or equilibrium, is to have
all authority, legiflative, executive, and judicial,
concentered in it. It is to make a conftitution
and laws by its own will, execute thofe laws at
its pleafure, and adjudge all controverfies, that
arife concerning the meaning and application of
them, at difcretion. What is there to reftrain
them from making tyrannical laws, in order to
execute them in a tyrannical manner ?
Will it be pretended, that the jealoufy and
vigilance of the people, and their power to difcard
them at the next election, will reftrain them ?
Even this idea fuppofes a balance, an equili^
brium, which Mr. Turgot holds in fo much con-
tempt ; it fuppofes the people at large to be a
check and controul to the reprefentative afiembly.
But this would be found a mere delufion. A jea-
loufy between the eledtors and the elefled neither
ought to exift, nor is poflible to exift. It is a
contradidion to fuppofe, that a body of elecflors
ihould have at one moment a warm affeflion and
entire confidence in a man, fo as to intruft him
with
Dr. Price. 121
with authority, limited or unlimited, over their
lives and fortunes , and, the next moment after his
eledion, to commence a fufpicion of him, that fhall
prompt them to watch all his words, atlions, and
motions, and difpofe them to renounce and puniili
him. They choofe him, indeed, becaufe they
think he knows more, and is better difpofed,
than the generality, and even than themfelves
very often. Indeed the beft ufe of a reprefenta-
tive affembly, arifes from the cordial affedion
and unrefcrved confidence which fubfifts between
it and the coUedive body of the people. It is
by fuch a kind and candid intercourfe alone, that
the wants and defires of the people can be made
known, on the one hand, or the necefllties of the
public communicated or reconciled to them, on
the other. In what did fuch a confidence in one
aflembly end, in Venice, Geneva, Bifcay, Poland,
but an ariftocracy, and an oligarchy ? There is
no fpecial providence for Americans, and their
natures are the fame with others.
LETTER XXVI.
DR. PRICE,
Dear Sir,
TO demonftrate the nccefllty of two aflem-
blies in the legiflature, as well as of a third
branch in it, to defend the executive authority ;
it may be laid down as a firft principle, that
neither liberty nor juftice can be fecured to the
individuals of a nation, nor its profperity pro-
moted.
122 Ancient Republics^ ^c.
moted, but by a fixed conftitution of government,
and ftated laws, known and obeyed by all. '
Mr. Turgot, indeed, cenfures the '* falfity of the
" notion, fo frequently repeated by almofl: all
*' republican writers, 'that liberty confifts in be-
" ingfubjedt only to the laws ;' as if a man could
** be free while opprefled by an unjuft la^v
" This would not be true, even if we coilj i'up-^
*' pole, that all laws were the work o.' an. ai tm-
** bly of the whole nation ; for certamiy every
*' individual has his rights, of which the nation
** cannot deprive him, except by violence,, Mid
** an unlawful ufe of the general power."
We often hear and read of free ftates, a aec
people, a free nation, a free country, a free king-
dom, and even ot free republics ; and we under^
Hand, in general, what is intended, although every
man may not be qualified to enter into philofo-
phical difquifitions concerning the meaning of
the word liberty, or to give a logical definition
of it.
Our friend Dr. Price has diflinguiihed very
well, concerning phyfical, moral, religious, and
civil liberty : and has defined the laft to be
** the power of a civil fociety to govern itfelf,
" by its own difcretion, or by laws of its own
*' making, by the majority, in a colledive body,
" or by fair reprefentation. In every free ftate,
*' every man is his own legiflator. Legitimate
** government confifts only in the dominion of
" equal laws, made with common confent, and
" not in the dominion of any men over other
" men."
Mr. Turgot, however, makes the dodor too
great a compliment, at the expence of former
Englifh writers, when he reprefents him as " the
'* firft of his countrymen who have given a
" juft
Dr, price. 123
** juft idea of liberty, and (hewn the falfity, fo
" often repeated by almoft all republican writers,
" that liberty confifts in being fubjed only to the
" laws."
I (hall chearfully agree with Mr. Turgot, that
it is very polTible that laws, and even equal laws
made by common confent, may deprive the mi-
nority of the citizens of their rights. A fociety,
by a majority, may govern itfelf, even by equal
laws, that is by laws to which all, majority and
minority, are equally fubjedV, fo as to opprefs the
minority. It may eftablifli an uniformity in re-
ligion i it may reftrain trade ; it may confine
perfonal liberty of all equally, and againft the
judgment of many, even of the befb and wifeft,
without reafonable motives, ufe, or benefit. We
may go farther, and fay, that a nation may be una-
nimous in confenting to a law reftraining their
natural liberty, property, and commerce, and
their moral and religious liberties too, to a de-
gree that may be prejudicial to the nation and
every individual in it. A nation of Catholics
might unanimoufly confent to prohibit labour
upon one half the days in the year, as feaft days.
The whole American nation might unanimoufly
confent to a Sunday law, and a warden adl, which
ihould deprive them of the ufe of their limbs one
day in feven. A nation may unanimoufly agree to
a navigation a6t, which fliould fliackle the com-
merce of all. Yet Dr. Price's definition of civil
liberty is as liable to this objedion as any other.
Thele would all be equal laws, made with common
(cnfent : thefe would all be aifts of legitimate
government. To take in Mr. Turgot*s idea, then,
we muft add to Dr. Price's ideas of equal laws by
common confent, this other for the general inferejl, or
the pulflic good. But it is generally fuppofed, that
nations
124 Ancient Republics, &c.
nations underftand their own intereft better than
another , and therefore they may be trufted to
judge of the public good : and in all the cafes
above fuppofed, they will be as free as they
defire to be ; and therefore may with great pro-
priety be called free nations, and their confti-
tutions free republics. There can be no way of
compelling nations to be more free than they
choofe to be.
But Mr. Turgot has miilaken the fenfe of
republican writers, efpecially of the Englifh ones.
What republican writers he had in view I know
not. There is none that I remember, of any
name, who has given fo abfurd a definition of
liberty. His countryman Montefquieu, who will
fcarcely be denominated a republican writer, has
faid fomething the moft like it -, but it is manifeft
that his meaning was confined to equal laws, made
by common confent. Although there may be
unjuft and unequal laws, obedience to which
would be incompatible with liberty ; yet no man
will contend, that a nation can be free, that is
not governed by fixed laws. All other govern-
ment than that of permanent known laws, is the
government of mere will and pleafure, whether it
be exercifed by one, a few, or many. Republican
writers in general, and thofe of England in parti-
cular, have maintained the fame principle with
Dr. Price, and have faid, that legitimate govern-
ments, or well-ordered commonwealths, or well-
conftituted governments, were thofe where the
laws prevailed , and have always explained their
meanings to be, equal laws made by common confent,
or the general will that is to fay, made by the
majority, and equally binding upon majority and
minority. As it is of importance to refcue the
good old republican writers from fuch an impu-
tation.
Br. Pria, 125
tation, let me beg your patience while we look
into fome of them.
Ariftotle fays, that " a government where the
** laws alone Ihould prevail, would be the king-
** dom of God." This indeed fhows that this
great philofopher had much admiration of fuch a
government : but is not the aflertion that Mr.
Turgot condemns, viz. that liberty confifts in
being fubjed to the laws only.
Ariftotle fays too, in another place, *' Order is
** law, and it is more proper that law Ihould go-
" vern, than any one of the citizens : upon the
" fame principle, if it is advantageous to place
" the fupreme power in fome particular perfons,
" they Ihould be appointed to be only guardi-
" ans, and the fervants of the laws." Thefe too
are very juft fentiments, but not a formal defini-
tion of liberty.
Livy too fpeaks of happy, profperous, and
glorious times, when " Imperia legum poten-
*' tiora fuerunt quam hominum." But he no
where fays that liberty confifts in being fubjeft
only to the legum imperio.
Sidney fays, " No fedition was hurtful to Rome,
" until, through their profperity, fome men gain-
ed a power above the laws."
In another place he tells us too, from Livy,
that fome, whofe ambition and avarice were impa-
tient of reftraint, complained that " leges rem
" furdam eflr, inexorabilem, falubriorem inopi
quam potenti."
And in another, that *' no government was
thought to be well conftituted, unlefs the laws
prevailed againft the commands of men." But
he has no where defined liberty to be fubje<5lion
to the laws only.
Harrington
126 Ancient Republics ^ tic,
Harrington fays, " Government de juYe^ or ad-
*' cording to ancient prudence, is an art, where-
" by a civil fociety of men is inftitiited and pre-
" ferved upon the foundation of common intereji %
" or, to follow Ariftotle and Livy, it is an em-
" pire of laws and not of men. And govern-
*' ment, to define it according to modern pru-
" dence, or de faio^ is an art, by which fome
" man, or fome few men, fubjefb a city or a na-
*' tion, and rule it according to his or their pri-
*' vate intereft ; which, becaufe the laws in fuch
" cafes are made according to the intereft of a
*' man, or a few families, may be faid to be the
" empire of men and not of laws."
Harrington, Politicafter, fcene 2, agrees, that
law proceeds from the will of man, whether a
monarch or people , and that this will muft have
a mover ; and that this mover is intereft : but the
intereft of the people is one thing it is the pub-
lic intereft ; and where the public intereft go-
verns, it is a government of laws, and not of
men : the intereft of a king, or of a party, is
another thing it is a private intereft , and where
private intereft governs, it is a government of
men, and not of laws. If, in England, there
has ever been any fuch thing as a government of
laws, was it not magna charta ? and have not our
kings broken magna charta thirty times ? Did
the law govern when the law was broken ? or
was that a government of men ? On the contrary,
hath not magna charta been as often repaired by
the people ? and, the law being fo reftored, was it
not a government of laws, and not of men ?
"Why have our kings, in fo many ftatutes and
oaths, engaged themfelves to govern by law, if
there were not in kings a capacity of govern-
ing.otherwife ? It is true, that laws are neither
made
Dr. Price. iij
made by angels, nor by horfes, but by men.'
The voice of the people is as much the voice of
men, as the voice of a prince is the voice of a
man ; and yet the voice of the people is the voice
of God> which the voice of a prince is not. The
government of laws, faid Ariftotle, is the go-
vernment of God. In a monarchy, the laws, be-
ing made according to the intereft of one man, or
a few men, muft needs be more private and par-
tial than fuits with the nature of juftice -, but in
a commonwealth, the laws, being made by the
whole people, muft come up to the public inte-
reft, which is common right and juftice and if
a man know not what is his own intereft, who
fhould know it ? and that which is the intereft of
the moft or greateft number of particular men,
being fummed up in the common vote, is the
public intereft.
Sidney fays, " Liberty confifts folely in an
** independency on the will of another ; and, by
*' a flave, we underftand a man who can neither
*' difpofe of his perfon or goods, but enjoys all
" at the will of his mafter." And again, " As
" liberty confifts only in being fubjed: to no
** man's will, and nothing denotes a flave but a
** dependence upon the will of another; if there
" be no other law in a kingdom but the will of a
'* prince, there is no fuch thing as liberty.'*
Mr. Turgot might have perceived in thefe wri-
ters, that a government of laws and not of men,
was intended by them as a defcription of a com-
monwealth, not a definition of liberty. There
may be various degrees of liberty eftablifhed by
the laws, and enjoyed by the citizens, in diffe-
rent commonwealchs ; but ftill the general will,
as well as the general intereft', as far as it is un-
derftood by the people, prevails in all that can
be
1^8 Ancient RepuMics, i^cl
be denominated free : as the fociety governs it-
felf, it is free, according to the definition of Dr.
Price. The enquiry of thefe writers, in fuch paf-
fages, was not into the higheft point of liberty,
or greateft degree of it, which might be efta-
blifhed by the general will, and the common fenfe
of intereft, in their refults or laws. They have
taken it for granted, that human nature is To
fond of liberty, that, if the whole fociety were
confulted, a majority would never be found to
put chains upon themfelves, by their own aft and
voluntary confent.
But all men, as well as republican writers,
muft agree, that there can be no uninterrupted
enjoyment of liberty, nor any good government,
in fociety, without laws, or where (landing laws
do not govern. In defpotic flates, in fimple mo-
narchies, in ariftocracies, in democracies, in all
poffible mixtures of thefe, the individual enjoys
continually the benefit of law, as he does thofc
of light and air, although, in moft of thofe go-
vernments, he has no fecurity for the continuance
of it. If the laws were all repealed at once, in
any great kingdom, and the event made knowa
fuddenly to all, there would fcarcely a houfe re-
main in pofTefilon of its prefent inhabitant, in the
great cities.
The great queflion therefore is, What combi-
nation of powers in fociety, or what form of go-
vernment, will compel the formation of good and
equal laws, an impartial execution, and faithful
interpretation of them, fo that the citizens may
conftantly enjoy the benefit of them, and be furc
of their continuance. The controverfy between
Mr.Turgot and me is-^v/hether a fingle aiTembly
of reprefentatives be this form. He maintains
the affirmative. I am for the negative : becaufc
fuch
Br. Price', 129
fuch an aftembly will, upon the firfl day of its
exiftence, be an ariftocracy; in a few days, or
years at leaft, an oligarchy , and then it will loon
divide into two or three parties, who will foon
have as many armies ; and, when the battle is
decided, the vi6lorious general will govern with-
out or with the advice of any council or afiembly,
as he pleafes : or, if the aiTembly continues uni-
ted, they will in time exclude the people from all
fnare even in elections, and make the government:
hereditary in a few families. In order to be fully
convinced of this, we mult take an extenfive view
of the fubject; and the firft enquiry fhould be,
what kind of beings men arc ? You and I ad-
mire the fable of Triftram Shandy more than the
fable of the Bees, and agree with Butler rather
than Hobbes. It is weaknefs rather than wick-
ednefs v/hich renders men unfit to be trulled with
unlimited pov;er. The pafilons are all unlimit-
ed i nature has left them fo : if they could be
bounded, they would be extinft-, and there is
no doubt they are of indifpenfable importance in
the prefent fyftem. They certainly incrcafe too,
by exercife, like the body. The love of gold
grows fader than the heap of acquifition : the
love of praife increales by every gratification,
till it (lings like an adder, and bites like a
P^rpent , till the man is miferable every mo-
ment when he docs not fnuff the incenfe : am-
bition itrengthens at every advance, and at lad
takes poffefTion of the whole foul fo abfolutely,
that ttie man fees nothing in the world of im-
portance to others, or himfelf, but in his object.
The fubtilty of thcfe three pafTions, which have
been fcleited from all the others becaufe they
arc ariliocratical pafiions, in fubduing all other;.,
K and
13d Ancient Republics^ ^c
and even the underftanding Itfelf, if not the cofi-
fcience too, until they become abfolute and im-
perious mailers of the whole mind, is a curious
fpeculation. The cunning with which they hide
themfelves from others, and from the man him-
felf too % the patience with which they wait for
opportunities ; the torments they voluntarily fuf~
fer for a time, to fecure a full enjoyment at
length ; the inventions, the difcoveries, the con-
trivances they fugged to the underftanding, fome-
times in the dullell dunces in the world, if they
could be defcribed in writing, would pafs for
great genius.
We are not enough acquainted with the phy-
fical or metaphyfical efixds they may have on
our bodies or minds, to be able to explain the
particular reafon v;hy every inftance of indulgence
ilrcngthens and confirms the fubfequent emo-
tions of defire. The caufe has been hitherto too
deep, remote, and fubtle, for the fearch of cor-
poreal or intelleclual microfcopes ; but the faft:
is too decided to deceive or efcape our obfer-
vation. Men fliould endeavour at a balance of
affedions and appetites, under the monarchy of
reafon and confcience, within, as well as at a ba-
lance of power without. If they furrender the
guidance, tor any courfe cf time, to any one paf-
fion, they may depend upon finding it, in the end,-
an ufurping, domineering, cruel tyrant. They
were intended by nature to live together in focie-
ty, and in this way to reiirain one anochtr, and
in general are very good kind of creatures ; buc
they know each other's imbecility lo v/ell, thas
they ought never to lead one another into temp-
tation. The pafijon that is lonf-*- induh^ed, and
continually gratified, becomes mad ; it is a Ipe-
cies
IE
Dr. Price, 131
cies of delirium ; it fliould not be called guile,
but infanity : but who would truft his life, liber-
ty, and property, to a madman, or an aflembly
of them ? it would be fafer to confide in knaves.
Five hundred or five thoufand together, in an af-
fembly, are not lefs liable to this extravagance
than one. The nation that commits its affairs to
a fingle alTembly, will aifurcdly find that its paf-
fions and defires augment as fall as thofeof aking;
and therefore fuch a conftitution mufl be circn-
tially defedlive.
Others have feen this quality in human nature
through a more gloomy medium.
Machiavel fays, thofe who have written on ci-
vil government lay it dov/n as a firft principle,
and all hiftorians dcmonftrate the fame, that who-
ever would found a ftate, and make proper laws
for the government of it, mud prefume that all
men are bad by nature; and that they will not
fail to fliew that natural depravity of heart,
whenever they have a fair opportunity ; and,
though poiTibly it may lie concealed for a while,
oh account of iome fccret reafon, which does not
then appear to men of fmall experience, yet time,
which is therefore juftly called the father of truth,
commonly brings it to light in the end. Ma-
chiavcl's tranQator remarks, t'lat akhouirh this
feems a harili luppofition, does not every Chrif-
tian daily jullify the truth of it, by confeffiiig ic
before God and the world ^ and are we not ex-
prefsly told the lame in ievtral paff.igrs of the
holy Icriptures, and in all fy items of human plii-
lolophy ?
Montciquieu fiys, " Conllant experience fl:ews
us, t;:.;r every man invelled with power is ape
to .ibule JL: he puilies o;!, liii he crimes 10
*' fonieiliing that limits iiim. Is it r.oc ilraniie,
K 2 ' fhfM!^^'l
i^i AncUnt Republics, l^c.
t
jhough trne, to fay, that virtue itfelf has need of
imits ? To prevent the abufe of power, it is necef-
fary, that, by the very difpofition of things, power
fhould be a check to power. A government may
be fo conltituted, as no man fliail be compelled to
do things to which the law dees not oblige him,
nor forced to abltain from things which the law
permits.
Swift, So cndlefs and exorbitant are the defires
of men, that they will grafp at all, and can form
no fcheme of perfe6l happinefs with lefs. It is
hard to recoiled one folly, infirmity, or vice, to
which a fmgle man is fubjeded, and from which a
body of commons, cclledive or reprefentative (and
he might have added a body ot nobles) can be
\?holly ex mpt.
Junius. Laws are intended, not to truft to what
men will do, but to guard againil what they may
do,
Beccaria. Ogni r.cmoft fa centra di iutie k ccmhina-
Jiioni del gloho.
Rochetaucault. The ambitious deceive them-
felves, when they propole an end to their ambition j
for that end, when attained, becomes a means.
JDe Lolme. Experience evinces, that the happieft
difpofitions are not proof againft the allurements of
power^ which has no charms but as it leads on to
new advances* Autliority endures not the very idea
of reftraint , nor does it ceafe to ftruggle, till it has
beaten down every boundary.
Hobbes, Mandeville, Rcchefaucnuit, havedravv-n
iVill more deteilable pidures; and RoufTtrau, in his
Jnequaiities among Mankind, gives a defcripdon of
a civilized heart, too black and horrible to be tran-
Icribed.
Even our amiable friends, tliofe benevolent
Chriftian philolbphers, Br. Price and Dr. Priciiiey,
cc
Dr. Price. 135
acquaint us, that they are conflrained to believe
human nature no better than it fhould be. The
latter fays, there is no power on earth but has grown
exorbitant, when it has met with nocontroul.
The former. " Such are the principles that govern
" human nature-, fuch the weaknefs and folly of
" men; fuch their love of domination, felfifhnefs,and
depravity, that none of them can be raifed to an
elevation above others, without the utmofb dan-
ger. The conflant experience of the world has
verified this, and proved that nothing intoxicates
*' the human mind fo much as power. In the
eftablifhnient, therefore, of civil government, it
would be prepofterous to rely on the difcretion
of any men. A people will never opprefs them-
felves, or invade their own rights \ but if they
truft the arbitrary will of a body or fucceffion of
men, they truil enemies."
Shall we fay that all thefe philofophers were ig-
norant of human nature? With all my foul, I wifli it
were in my power to quote any palfugcs in hiftory or
philofophy, which might demonllrate ail thefe iacircs
on our fpecies to be falfe. But the phenomena are all
*n their favour; and the only quetiion to be raifed
with them is, whetlicr the caufe is wickednefs, weak-
nefs, or infanity.'' In all events, we mull agree,
that human nature is not lit to be trufted with
Mr. Turgot's fyflem, of all authority in a fingle
aflembly.
A fingle aflembly will never be a fleady guardian
of the laws, it Machiavel is right, vvlien he fays,
Men are never good but through neccffity : on
" the contrary, when good and evil are left to their
" choice, they will not fail to throw every tiling
" intodiforder and confufion. Hunger and poverry
'* mav make men indudrious, but laws on!v can
K 3 " m.-.ktf
134 Ancient Republics^ ^c.
*' make them good -, for, if men were fo of them-
*',felves, there would be no occafion for laws; but,
*' as the cafe is far othervvife, they are abfolutely
*' necefiary. After the Tarquins were dead, v/ho
" had been fuch a check upon the nobility, fome
** other expedient was wanting to have the fame
" effeft ; fo that, after much confufion and difor-
*' der, and many dangerous contefts between the
*' patricians and plebeians, certain officers, called
*' tribunes, were created for the fecurity of the lat-
*' ter-, who, being vefted w^ith fuch privileges and
*' authority as enabled them to become arbiters
*' betwixt thofe two eftates, effeflually curbed the
*' infolence of the former:" or, in the language of
Dr. Franklin, the people infilled upon hitching a
yoke of cattle behind the wagi^on, to draw up hill,
when the patricians before fnould attempt to go
too faft : or, in the ftile of Harrington, the commons,
finding the patricians difpofed to divide the cake
unequally, demanded the privilege of choofmg.
If Harrington's authority is not of great weight
with fome men, the reafons he affigns in fupport of
his judgment are often eternal, and unanfwerable
by any man. In his Oceana he fays, " Be the in-
'* terefl of popular government right reafon, a
" man does not look upon realbn as it is right or
" wrong in itfelf, but as it makes for him> or
" againfc him : wherefore, unlefs you can fhew fuch
orders of a government, as, like thofe of God in
" nature,, fhail be able to conftrain this cr that
*' creature to lliake off that inclination which is
more peculiar to it, and take up that which re-
gards the common good or intereft ; all this is to
no more end, than to perfuade every man, in a
popular government, nor to carve for himfelf
" of that which he likes bell or defires mod", but
** to
Dr. Price. l^^^
to be mannerly at the public table, and give the
beft from himfeif to decency and iht common in-
tereft. But that fuch orders may be eftablifhed, as
may, nay mufl:,give the upper hand in all cafes to
common right and intereft, notwithftanding the
nearnefs that flicks to every man in private,
and this in a v/ay of equal certainty and facility,
is known even to girls-, being no other than
thofe which are of common practice with them
in diverfe cafes. For example: Two of them
have a cake, yet undivided, which was given
between them. That .each of them, therefore,
might have that which is due, *' Divide," fays
one, *' and I will choofe-, or let me divide, and
you fiiall choofe." If this be but once agreed
** upon, it is enough , for the one dividing un-
*' equally, lofes, in regard that the ether takes the
" better half-, wherefore flie divides equally, and
" fo both have right. And thus, what great philo-
*' fophers are difputing upon in vain, is brought
" to light by two harmlefs girls -, even the whole
" myftery of a commonwealth, which lies only ia
*' dividin'jf and choofino;."
Nov/, if all auiiionty is to be collefled into one
central afiembly, it will have the whole power of
divifion and choice ; and we may eafily conjefture
what divifion and choice it will be. It will foon
have pofiefiion of all the cakes, loaves, and iidies.
Harrington proceeds: "" Nor has God, if his
** works m nature be underllood, left fo much to
^* mankind to difpute upon, as who fhall divide
*' and who cltoole, but ciiftributed them for ever
*' into tw;) orders ; whereof the one has the natural
*' right of dividing, and the other of choofing.
*' For example: A commonwealth is but a civil
** focicty of men : let us take any numbpr of men,
K 4 * as
(C
136 Ancient Republics, ^c.
" as twenty, and immediately make a common-
wealth. Twenty men, if they be not all ideots,
perhaps if they be, can never come fo together,
but there will be fuch a difference in them, that
" about a third will be wifer, or at leaft lefs foolifh,
than all the reft. Thefe, upon acquaintance,
though it be but fmall, will be difcovered, and
" (as flags that have the largeft heads) lead the
herd: for while the fix, difcourfing and arguing
one with another, fhew the eminence of their
** parts, the fourteen difcover things that they
" never thought on, or are cleared in diverie truths
that formerly perplexed them : wherefore, in mat-
*' tersof commonconcernment, difficulty,ordanger,
they hang upon their lips, as children upon their
" fathers , and the influence thus acquired by the
*' fix, the eminence of whofe parts are found to be
*' a ftay and comfort to the fourteen, is the autho-
" riry of the fathers auEloritas -patriim. Where-
*' fore this can be no other than a natural arijlo-
*' <:r^n', diffufed by God throughout the whole body
*' of mankind, to this end and purpofe-, and there-
*' fore fuch as the people have not only a natural,
*' but a pofitive obligation to make ufe of as their
*' guides; as where the people of Ifrael are com-
*' manded to take wife men, and underftanding, and
*' known among their tribes, to be made rulers over
** them. The fix then approved of, as in the pre-
" fent cafe, are the fenate-, not by hereditary right,
*' or in regard to the greatnefs of their eftates
" only, which would tend to fuch powei as would
" torce or draw the people; but by election for
" their excellent parts, which tends to the advance-
'* ment oi the influence of iheir virtue or authority;
" that leads the people. Wherefore the office of
" the fenate is not to be ccmnanders, but coun-
\' fellors
Dr. Price. i^y
*' fellors of the people ; and that which is proper
" for counfellors is firft to debate, and after-
" wards to give advice in the bufinefs whereon
*' they have debated i whence the decrees of the
" fenate are never laws, nor fo called fenatus con-
*' fulta i and thefe, being maturely framed, it is
** their duty to propofe to the people: wherefore
*' the fenate is no more than the debate of the com-
" monwealth. But to debate is to difcern, or put
" a difference between things, that, being alike,
" are not the fame-, or it is feparating and vveigh-
" ing this reafon againft that, and that reafon
" againft this ; which is dividing.
" The fenate then having divided, who fhall
" choofe ? Afk the girls-, for if flie that divided
*' mud have chofen alfo, it had been little v/orfe
*' for the other, in cafe llie had not divided at
'* all, but kept the whole cake to herfelf ; in re-
" gard that, being to choofe too, fhc divided ac-
*' cordingly.
*' Wherefore, if the fenate have any further
*' power than to divide, t!ie commonwealth can
*' never be equal. But, in a commonzvealth confifiing
*'*' of a fingle council^ there is ',io other to choofe than
'* that which divided: whence ic is, that fuch a
" council fails not to fcrarnble^ that is, to be fac-
*' tious; there being no dividing of t!ie cake, in
*' that cafe, but among themfelves : nor is there any
" other remedy., but to have another council to choofe.
*'' The vvifdoni of the few may be the light of
*' mankind \ but the intereft of the few is not the
" profit of mankinJ, nor of a commonwealth :
" v/hcrefore, feeing we have granted intereil to be
** reafon, they mull not cliooie, left they put out
** their light. But as the council dividing confifts
** of the wildom of the commonweai:h, lo the af-
*' feinbly
1 3 5 Ancient Republics^ ^c.
fembly or council choofing fhould confifl: of the
** intereilof the commonwealth ; as the vvifdom of
*' the commonwealth is in the arillocracy, fo the in-
tereft of the commonvvealth is in the Vv'hole body
*' of the people : and whereas this, in cafe tlie
*' commonv/eakh confifts of a whole nation, is too
*' unwieldy a body to be aflembled, this council is
*' to confift of fuch a reprefenrative as may be
equal, and fo conftituted as it can never contra6t
any other intereft than that of the whole people.
But, in the prcfent cafe, the I'ix dividing, and the
fourteen choofing, m^uft of nccefficy take in the
whole interefb of the twenty. Dividing and
choofing, in the language of a commonwealth, is
debating and reiolving; and whatever, upon de-
bate of the fenate, is propofed to the people, and
refolved by them, is enacted by the authority of
the fathers, and by the power of the people ^
"^ auc^oritate patriim et jujfu pcpuU -^ which concur-
** ring, make a law."
Upon thefe principles, and to eilablifh a method
of enabling laws that mud of neceffity be wife
and equal, the people of moft of the United States
of America agreed upon that divifion of the le-
giflative power into two houfes, the houfe of repre-
fentatives and the fenate, which has given fo m^uch
difguft to Mr. Turgot. Harrington will (hew us,
equally well, the propriety and necefnty of the
other branch, the governor: but before v?e proceed
to that, it may be worth while to oblerve the fimi-
litude between this pafTage, and fome of thofe fenti-
ments and expreffions of Swift, v.'hich were quoted
in a former letter-, and there is in the Idea of a
Patriot King, written by liis friend Lord Boling-
broke, a paifage to the fame purpofe, fo nobly ex-
preffed, that 1 cannot forbear the pleafure of tran-
fcriDincr
Dr. Price. i.'?g
fcribing it. *' It feems to me, that, in orfJer to
*' maintain the moral fvftem of the univerfe ac
** a certain point, far below that of ideal perfec-
*' tion (for we are made capable of conceiving
" what we are not capable of attaining), it has
" pleafed the Author of Nature to mingle, from
** time to time, among the focieties of men, a few,
" and but a few, of thofe on whom he has been
gracioufly pleafed to confer a larger proportion of
the etherial fpirit, than, in the ordinary courfe of
his providence, he bellows on the fons of men.
Thefe are they who engrofs almoft the whole
reafon of the fpecics. Born to dircd, to guide,
** and to preferve, if they retire from the world
*' their fplendour accompanies them, and en-
" lightens even the darknefs of their retreat. If
" they take a part in public life, the effed is never
* indifierent : they either appear tiie inilruments
" of divine vengeance, and their couife through the
*' world is marked by delolation and opprefijon, by
'* poverty and fervitude ; or they are the guardiaa
** angels of the country they inhabit, fcudious to
' avert the moiL diltant evil, and to procure peace,
*' plenty, and the greatcil of human blefTings
*' liberty."
If there is then, in fociety, fuch a natural arifto-
cracy as thefe great v/ritcrs pretend, and as all
hiilory and experience ciemonftrare, formed partly
by genius, partly by birth, and partly by riches,
how n^.all t!ic len;inator av;.:! himlllf of their in-
fluencc tor the equal benc.'ir of the public? and
how, on the other hand, fliall he prevent them from
difturbing the public iKippinefs ? I anfwer, by ar-
ranging them all, or at leall the mod conlpicuous
of rhem, together in ont; aifembly, by the name of
^ fenatei by leparating them frcm all prctenlions to
the
H/^o Ancient Republics^ ^c.
the executive power; and by contronling, in the
legiQature, their ambition and avarice, by an af-
fembly of rcprefentatives on one fide, and by the
executive authority on the other. Thus you will
have the benefit of their wifdom, without fear of
their paffions. If among them there are fome of
Lord Bohngbroke's guardian angels, there will be
fome of his inftruments of divine vengeance too:
the latter will be here reftrained by a three-fold
tie ; by the executive power, by the reprcfentative
afiembly, and by their peers in the lenate. But if
thefe were all admitted into a fingle popular afiem-
bly, the worft of them might in time obtain the
afcendancy of all the reft. In fuch a fingle afiembly,
as has been obferved before, almofi: the whole of
this ariftocracy will make its appearance; being re-
turned members of it by the election of the people :
thefe will be one clafs. There will be another fct
of members, of middling rank and circumftances,
who will juftly value themfelves upon their inde-
pendence, their integrity, and unbiafied afi'edion to
their country, and will pique themfelves upon be-
ins under no obligation. But there will be a third
clafs, every one ot vvhom will have his leader
among the members of the firft clais, whofe cha-
rafter he will celebrate, and whofe voice he v.'ill
follow; and this party, after a courfe of time, will
be the moft numerous. The quefticn then will be,
whether this ariftocracy in the houfe will urjite or
divide? and it is too obvious, that deftruftion to
freedom muft be the confequence equally of their
union or of their divifion. If they unite gc-nerallyin
all things, as much as they certainly will in refped;-
ing each others wealth, birth, and parts, and con-
dud themfelves with prudence, they will ftrengthen
themfelves by infcnfibie degrees, by playing into
each
Br. Price, 141
^ach others hands more wealth and popularity, until
they become able to govern eledlions as they pleafe,
and rule the people at difcrttion. An independent
member will be their averfion -, all their arcificeswill
be employed to deftroy his popularity among his
conftituencs, and bring in a difciple of their own in
his place.
But if they divide, each party will, in a courfc
of time, have the whole houfe, and confequently
the whole Hate, divided into two fadtions, which will
llruggle in words, in writing, and at lad in arms,
until Casfar or Pompey muft be emperor, and en-
tail an endlefs line of tyrants on the nation. But
long before this cataftrophe, and indeed throuo-h
every fcene of the drama, the laws, inftead of beino*
permanent, and affording conflant proteflion to the
livef, liberties, and properties of the citizens, will
be alternately the fport of contending faftions, and
the mere vibrations of a pendulum. From the be-
ginning to the end it will be a government of men,
now of one fet, and then of another i but never 3l
government of laws.
LETTER XXVII.
MIXED GOVERNMENTS.
MACHIAVEL's DISCOURSES UPOM THE FIRST DECADE
or LIVY. BOOK I. C. 2.
My dear Sir,
THE whole chapter is very much to the pur-
pofe, but the following paragraphs more
particularly fo. According to iowv^ authors, there
are but three forts of governments, viz. monarchy
Or
142 Mixed GGver'mnenh.
or principality, ariftocracy, and democracy ; and
that thofe who intend to ere6l a new flate, muft hav^
recourfe to fome one of thefe which he likes bed,
Others,and with more judgment, as many think, i^j
there are fix forts -, thrte of which are very bad, and
the other three good in themfelves-, but liable to be
fo corrupted that they may become the worft. The
three eood forts have been iuft; now mentioned: the
other three proceed from thefe; and every one ot
them bears fuch a refemblance to that on which it
refpeftively depends, that the tranfition from one to
the other is fhort and eafy; for monarchy often de-
generates into tyranny, ariftocracy into oligarchy,
and democracy into licentious anarchy and confu-
fion : fo. that whoever fets up any one of the former
three forts ot government, may alTurc himfelf it will
not be of any long duration -, for no precaution will
be fufncient to prevent its falling into the other that
is analogous to it, on account of the affinity v/hich
there feems to be in this cafe betwixt virtue and
vice, perfeclioR and imperfeclion.
This variety of governments among mankind ap-
pears to have been the effeft of chance: for in the
beginning of the world, the inliabitanrs beino; few^
they fometimes lived feparate from each other, like
beads; but afterwards, as they multiplied, they
began to unite for their mutual defence, and put
themlelves under the prore(5lion of fuch as were mod:
emjinent amon2;d them for couraa;e and ftrenn^th,
whom they engaged to obey and acknowledge a^
their chiefs. Hence arofe the diilindticn betwixt
honeft and difnoneft, juii and uniull;: for whea
any one injured his benefactor, his ingratitude ex-
cited a fort of fellow-feeling and indignation in
others, as v/ell as kindnefs and refpccl" for thofe
that behaved diiierentiy; and, as they confidered
that they rnigiu fome i;r.e or other, perhaps, be
treated
Machiavel. 143
treared in the fame manner thcmfelves, if proper
meafures were not taken to prevent it, they thought
fit to make laws for the reward of good men, and
the punilhment of offenders. This firft gave rife
to juftice in the worki ; and from this confidera-
lion it came to pafs, in procefs of time, that, in
the eledlion of a new chief, they had not fo much
regard to courage and bodily ftrength, as to wif-
dom and integrity : but afterwards, as this kind of
government became gradually hereditary inftead
of eleflive, the heirs ot thefe chieftains fcon began
to degenerate from the virtue of their anceftors, and
to behave themielves as if they thought the main
duty of a prince conillled in i'urpafling all other
men in luxury, extravagance, effeminacy, and every
fort of voluptuoufnefs i by wliich, in a while, they*
jBrll grew odious to their fubjeds, and then fo
jealous for them.lelves, that they were forced to dif-
trels and cut off others for their own fecurity, and
at lad: to become downright tyrants. This firft oc-
cafioncd con^ibinations and confpiracics for the
deftrudion of princes ; not amongli: the weak and
pufillanimous part of their fubjccls, but among
iuch as, being more eminent for their gencrofity,
niagnanimjity, riches, and birth, could not endure
any longer to lubniit to t:;e!e pitiiul and oppreffive
-"^overr.ircrjis.
Ti;c mukicudc, therefore, f.vayt'd by tlie authority
of the nobles, r.)ie in arms i-e'^infl their prince; and
being freed tioni \\v.i yc!:e, !;ran::ferred their alle-
giance X.O tiieir dijliverers, v^ho, being thoroughly
difjUi-ed :it n-!onarcny,c!Ki/:iied the form of govern-
ment, and took it inro their own hands: after
whie!: tht..y conducled bo:h themfelvcs and the
fiaic according to the plan tliey had formed, pre-
tcrriii,; the coa^.mon good to any particular advan-
tage j ana behaving, in private as well as })ublic
affairs,
144 Mixed Governments,
affairs, with affiduity and moderation ; whilft the
remembrance of their paft fufFerings continued frelh
upon their minds. But this authority afterwards
devolving upon their fons, who had not feen thefe
changes, nor experienced the miferies of tyranny,
they began to grow fo diflatisfied with that fort of
civil equality, that they caft off all reftraint, and
giving themfelves up to rapine, ambition, and lull,
foon changed the government again from arifto-
cracy into an oligarchy. Their adminiftration, how-
ever, becoming as infupportable, in a while, as the
tyranny of the other had formerly been, the people
naturally began to look out for fome deliverer 5
and, having fixed upon a leader, they put them-
felves under his banners, and eftablifhed oligarchy.
But when they had done this, and came to retledl
upon the oppreffions they fuitained under a tyrant,
they refolved never to be again governed by any
one man, and therefore agreed to let up a popular
government; which was confcituted in fuch a man-
ner, that the chief authority was not vefted either
in a prince or in a junto of the nobility.
Now, as all new eftabliflimcnrs are held in fome
degree of reverence and veneration at firft, this
form fubfifted for fome time -, though no longer
than thofe people lived, who had been the founders
of it: for, after their death, their defcendants dege-
nerated into licentioufnefs, and fuch a contempt for
ail authority and diftinftion, that, every man living
after his own caprice, there was nothing to be iiitn.
but confuficn and violence : lo that, either by the
advice of fome good and rcrpe(rcable man, or com-
pelled by the ablolute neceility of providing a re-
medy for thefe diforders and enormities, they at
laft determined once more to fubmit to the domi-
nion of one: from which ftate they fell again in
time, through tiie fame gradations, and from the
above-
Machtavel. 145
abovementioned caufes, into mifrule and licenti-
oufnefs. Such is the rotation to which all dates
are fubjed; neverthelefs they cannot often revere
to the iame kind of goveriiment, becaufe it is
not poflible that they fhould fo long exift: as to
undergo many of thele mutations: for it frequent-
ly happens, that when a ilate is labourii^g under
fuch convulfions, and is dcfticute both of ii-ength
and counfel, it fails a prey to fome other neig!i-
bouring community or nation that is better go-
verned j otherwile it might pafs t'lrough the feve-
ral abovementioned revolutions again and again to
infinity.
All thefe forts of government then, in my opi-
nion, are infirm and infecure; the three former
from the ufual fliortnefs of their duration, and
the three latter from the malignity of their owa
principles. The wifcfl: legifiators, therefore, being
aware of thefe defefts, never eftabliHied an'/ one
of them in particular, but contrived another that
partakes of them all, confilling of a prince, lords,
and commons, which they looked upon as more
firm and liable, becaufe every one of thele mem-
bers would be a check upon the otlier ; and of
t'lofe legifiators, Lycurgus' certainly merits the
higheft praife, wtio conftituted an eftabliflinvjnt of
this kind at Sparta, which killed above eight liun-
dred years, to his own great honour, as v/cil as
the tranquillity of the citizens.
Very different was liie fate of the government
eflabliflied by Solon at Athens, which, being a
llmple democracy only, was of fo fliurt continu-
.:nce, that it gave way to the tyranny of Pifiilra-
tus, before the death of the legillator : and
t!)ough, indeed, the heirs of that tyrant were ex-
pelled about forty years after, and the Atlieniuna
not uidy recovered their liberty, but rc-cilablilh-
L ' fd
146 Mixed Gcvemmmts',
ed Solon's laws and plan of governmentj yet the^
did not maintain it above one hundred years, not-
withftanding they made feveral new regulations
to reftrain the infolence of the nobles, and the
licentioufnefs of the commons -, the neceffity of
which Solon had not forefeen : fo that for want
of tempering his democracy with a fhare of
ariftocracy, and princely power, it was of fhort
duration in comparifon of the conltitution of
Sparta.
But to return to Rome. Though that city had
not a Lycurgus to model its conflitution at firfi:,
in fuch a manner as might preferve its liberty
for a long courfe of time ; yet fo many were the
accidents which happened in the contefts betwixt
the patricians and plebeians, that chance ef-
fected, what the lawgiver had not provided for:
fo that if it was not perfedl at the beginning, it
became fo after a while-, for though the firft laws
were deficient, yet they were neither incapable of
amendment, nor repugnant to its future perfec-
tion j fince not only Romulus, but all the reft of
the kings that fucceeded him, made feveral good
alterations in them, and fuch as were well calcu-
lated for the fupport of liberty. But> as it was
their intention to found a monarchy, and not a-
republic ; when that city had fiiaken off the yoke
of a tyrant, there feemed to be many provifions
itill wanting for the further maintenance of its
freedom. And notwithftanding tyranny was at
laft eradicated, by the ways and means above-
mentioned, yet thofe who had chiefly contributed
to it, created two confuls to fupply the place of
royalty ; by which it came to pafs, that the name
alone, and not the authority, of princes was ex-
tinguifned : fo that the fupreme power being
lodged only in the confuls aad fcnate, the govern-
ment
Macbiavel. i^y
hifent confided of ho more than two of the three
tftates, which we have fpoken of beforej that is,
of royalty and ariflocracy : it riemained, therefore,
ftill neccffary to admit the people into feme fhare
of the government : and the patricians growing
fo infolcnt in time (as I fhali fhew hereafter), that
the plebeians could no longer endure it, the lat-
ter took, arms, and obliged them to relinquifli
part of their authority, left they fhould lofe the
whole : on the other hand, the confuls and fena-
tors ftill retained fo much power in the commoti-
Vrealth, as enabled them to fupport their rank
and dignity with honour. This ftruggle gave
birth to certain officers, called tribunes of the peo-
ple i after the creation of whom, that ftate be-
came more, firm and compaft, every one of the
three decrees abovementioned having its proper
Ihare in the government ; and fo propitious was
fortune to it, that although it was changed from
a monarchy into ah ariftocracy, and afterwards
into a democracy, by the fteps and for the reafons
already affigned, yet the royal power was never
entirely abolilhed and given to the patricians, nor
that of the patricians wholly to the plebeians : on
the contrary, the authority of the three eftates be-
ing duly proportioned and mixed together, gave
it the higheft degree of perfedtion that any com.-
monwealth is capable of attaining to , and this
was owing in a great meafure, if not altogether,
to the diflentions that happened betwixt the patri-
cians and plebeians, as Ihall be fhcwn more at
large in the following chapters.
La LETTER
148 Mixed or compofed Gcvernmerns'.
LETTER XXVII.
MIXED OR COMPOSED GO-
VE R N M E N T S.
SIDNEY, PACE 22, lO,
Dear Sir,
SOME fmall numbers of men, living within
the precincTts of one city, have, as it were,
call into a common ftock, the right which they
had of governing themfelves and children, and,
by common confcnt, joining in one body, exercifed
fuch pov;er over every Tingle perfon as leemed
beneficial to the v/hole , and this men call perfed:
democracy. Others chof:^ rather to be governed
by a fclecl number of fuch as mofl excelled in
wiicicm and virtue ; and this, according to the
fjonification of the word, v,^as called ariftocracv.
Y/hen one man excelled ail others, the govern-
ment was put into his hands, under the name of
monarchy. But th.e v/ifefl, beft, and by far the
greatell part of mankind, reje6ting thefe fimple
fpccies, did form governments mixed or compoied
cf the three, as fliall be proved hereafter, which
commonly received their refpcctive denomination
from the part that prevailed, and did receive praife
cr blame, as they were v/ell or ill proportioned.
Sidney, p. 13'8. 16. 'I'he beft governments
of the world have been compofed of monarchy,
ariftocracy, and democracy.
As for democracy, I believe it can fuit only
with the convenience of a fmall town, accom-
panied with fuch circumftances as are feldorn
found.
Sidney. 149
found. But this no way obliges men to run into
the other extreme, in as niuch as the- variety of
forms, between mere democracy and abiclure mo-
narchy, is almioft infinite. And if I fliouki under-
take to iay, there never was a good gov.^rnment
in the world, that did not ccnfifL of the three
fmiple fpecies of monarchy, ariftocracy, and demo-
cracy, I think I may make it good. I'his at tiie
lead is certain, that the government of the He-
brews, inftituted by God, had a judge, the great
Sanhedrim, and general allemblies of the people.
Sparta had two kings, a lenate of twenty-eight
chofen men, and the like afiemblies. Ail the
Dorian cities had a chief magitlrate, a fenate,
and occafional afiemblies. The cities of Ionia,
Athens and others, had an Archon, the Areo-
pagit^, &c. and all judgments concerning
matters of the greateil importance, as well as
the election of magiltrates, were referred to the
people. Rome, in the beginning, had a king and a
fenate, while the election of kings, and judgments
upon appeals, remained in ttie people-, afterwards,
confuls reprefenting kings, and vefted with equal
power, a more numerous fenate, and more fre-
quent meetings of the people. Venice has at this
day, a duke, the fenate of t!ie pregadi, and the
great aflembly of the nobility, which is the whole
city, the rellof the inhabitants being only incols,
not cives ; and thofe of the other cities or coun-
tries are their fubjedts, and do nut participate in
the government.
Genoa is governed in like manner :, Lucca not
unlike to them. Germany is at this day governed
by an emperor, the princes or great lords in their
feveral piecinCls; the cities by their own magif-
trates ; and by general diets, in which the whole
power of the nation rcfidcs, and where the empe-
1^ ^ ror.
J50 Mixed or compofed Government^.
ror, princes, nobility, and cities have their places
in perfon, or by their deputies. All the northern
nations which, upon the diflblution of the Roman
empire, pofTefifed the beft provinces that had com-
pofed it, were under that form, which is ufually
called the Gothick polity. They had king, lords,
commons, diets, aflemblies of eftates, cortcs, and
parliaments, in which the fovereign powers of
thofe nations did refide, and by which they were
cxercifed. The like was pradtifed in Hungary,
Bohemia, Sweden, Denmark, Poland : and,
if things are changed in fome of thofe places
within thefe few years, they muft give better
proofs of having gained by the change, than arc
yet feen in the world, before I think myfelf obliged
to change my opinion.
Some nations, not liking the name of king,
have given fuch a power as kings enjoyed in other
places to one or more magiftrates, either limited
to a certain time, or left to be perpetual, as beft
pleafed themfelves : others, approving the name,
made the dignity purely elective. Some have in
their eledions principally regarded one family as
long as it lafted : others confidered nothing but
the fitnefs of the perfon, and referved to themfelves
a liberty of taking where they pleafed. Some
have permitted the crown to be hereditary as to
jts ordinary courfej but reftrained the power, and
inftituted officers to infped the proceedings of
kings, and to take care that the laws were not
violated. Of this fort were the Ephori of Sparta,
the Maires du Palais, and afterwards the conftable
of France, the jufticiar in Arragon, the reichs-
hofmeeter in Denmark, the high fteward in Eng-
land J and in all places, fuch afiembliesas are be-
forementioned under feveral names, who had the
power of the whole nation, &c.
Sidney,
Sidney* 151
Sidney, p." 147. 18. It is eonfefled, thit a
pure democracy can never be good, unlefs far a
imall town, &c.
Sidney, p. 160. 19. As to popular govern-
ment in the ftrifteft fenfe, that is, pure demo-
cracy, where the people in themfelves, and by
chemfelves, perform all that belongs to govern-
ment, I know of no fuch thing , and, if it be in
the world, have nothing to fay for it.
Sidney, p. i6i. It" it be faid, that thofe govern-
ments, in which the democratical part governs
moft, do more frequently err in the choice of
men, or the means of preferving that purity of
manners which is required for the well-being
of a people, than thofe wherein ariftocracy
prevails, I confefs it, and that in Rome and
Athens, the beft and wifeft men did for the
moft part incline to ariftocracy. Xenophon,
Plato, Ariftotle, Thucydides, Livy, Tacitus, Ci-
cero, and others, were of this fort. But if our
author there feck patrons for his abfolute monar-
chy, he will find none but Phalaris, Agathocles,
Dionyfius, Catiline, Cethegus, Lentulus, with the
corrupted crew of mercenary rafcals who did, or
endeavoured to fet them up : thefe are they, qui-
bus ex honefto nulla eft fpes : they abhor /i'^^'c-A/-
vioH of the law, becaufe it curbs their vices, and
make themfelves fubfervient to the lufts of a man
who may nourifti them.
Sidney, p. 165. 21. Being no way conc-ern-
cd in the defence of democracy, dzc. 1 may leave
our knighr, like Don Quixote, fighting againll
the phantafms of his own brain, and faying what.
he pleafes againft fuch governments as never were,
unlels in fuch a place as St. Marino, near Sini-
glaglia in Italy, where a hundred clowns govern
L 4 a bar-
152 Mixed or compofed Gcvcrnments.
a barbarous rock chat no man invades, and relates
roching to our qucfiion. The republic of St.
Marino, next to that: of Millingen in Switzerland,
is the frnalieft republic in Kurope. The limits of
it ^^xtend no farther than the bafe of the moun-
tain on vvhich it is fcated. Its infigniiicance
is its fecurity. No neighbouring psrince ever
thought it worth his while to deilroy the indepen-
dency of fuch a B;'ehive. See Blainville's Travels,
vol. ii. p. 227. Addifon's Remarks on feveral
parts of Italy.
Sidney, p. 258. However, more ignorance
cannot be expi effed, than by giving the name
of democracy to thofe governments that are corn-
poled of the three fr.nple fpecies, as we have
proved that all the good ones have ever been :
for, in a ftri6l fenfe, it can only fuit Vv'ith thcfe,
where the people retain to themielves the admini-
ilration of the fupreme power -, and more largely,
when the populir part, as in Athens, greatly over-
balances the oti;er two, and the denomination h
taken from the prevailing pan.
LETTER
Montefquku. 155
LETTER XXVIII.
MIXED GOVERNMENTS.
MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF LAWS, B. II. C- VI.
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND.
My dear Sir,
IN every government there are three forts of
power; the legiflative, the executive in refpedt
of things dependent on tlie law of nations, and
the executive in regard to things that depend on
the civil law.
By virtue of the firft (i, e. the legiflative power),
the prince or magiftrare enacts temporary or per-
petual laws, and amends or abrogates tiiofe that
have been already enaitcd. By the fecond, he
makes peace or war, fends or receives embaf-
lies, eftabliflies the public fecurity, and provides
againft invafions. By t!ie third, he puniflies cri-
minals, or determines the difputes tliat arife be-
tween individuals. The latter we fliall call the
judiciary power, and the other fimply tlie execu-
tive power of the Hate,
The political liberty of the citizen, is a tran-
quillity Oi mind, ariling from the opinion each
perfon has ot his fifety. In order to have this
liberty, it is rec]uifite the government be fo con-
itituted, as that one citizen need not be afraid of
another citizen.
When tJie legidative and executive powers are
united in the fame perfon, or in the fame body of
magiilrates, there can be no liberty , bccaufe
apprehenfions niay arife, Icll the fame monarch or
ienate, or die fame icnate fliould enad tyran-
nical
1 54 Mixed Governments.
nical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical man-
ner.
Again, there is no liberty, if the power of
judging be not feparated from the leg Native and
executive powers : were it joined with l;;^ Icgifla-
tive, the life snd liberty of the cinzens wnuid be
expofed to arbitrary controul ; for the juuge
would then be legiilator : were it joined to the
executive power, the judge might bJiavev/ith
all the violence of r^^ oppreiTor.
There would be .-/ end of every thing {tout
feroit perdu) were the f. me nian, or the fame body,
whether of princes, of the nobles, or of the people,
to exercife thofe three pov. 's; that of enafting
laws, that of executing ..: . public refolutions,
and that of judging the CD'.nes or differences of
individuals.
Moll kingdoms in Europe enjoy a moderate
government, becaufe the prince, who is inverted
with the two firft powers, leaves the third to his
fubjedls. In Turkey, where thefe three powers
are united h:- the fultan's perfon, the fubjeds
groan under the weight of a moft frightful oppref-
iion. In the republics of Italy, where thefe three
powers are united, there is lefs liberty than in our
monarchies. Hence their government is obliged
to have recourfe to as violent methods for its
fupport, as even that of the Turks i witnefs the
ftate inquifitors at Venice, and the lion's mouth,
into which every informer may at all hours throw
his written accufations: what a fituation mult the
poor citizen be in under thofe poor republics !
The fame body of magiftrates are polkfled, as
executors of the laws, of the Vv'hole power they
have given themfelves in quality of legiflaLors.
They might plunder the ftate by their general
determinations ; and as they have likewife the
judiciary power in their hands, every private
citizen
Montefquicu, 155
icitizen may be ruined by their particular deci-
ficns. The whole power is here united in one
body ; and though there is no external pomp thac
indicates a defpotic fway, yet the people feel the
efFe6ts of it every moment.
Hence it is, that many of the princes of Europe,
whofe aim has been levelled at arbitrary power,
have conftantly fet out with uniting in their own
perfons all the branches of magiftracy, and all the
great offices of ftate.
I allow, indeed, that the mere hereditary arif-
tocracy of the Italian republicks, does not anfwer
exadly to the defpotic power of the eaftern
princes. The number of magiftrates fometimes
ibftcns the power of the magiftracy ; the whole
body of the nobles do not always concur in the
lame defigns ; and different tribunals are erefted
^hat temper each other. Thus, at Venice, the
legiQative power is in the council, the executive
in the pregadi, and the judiciary in the quarantia.
JBut the mifchief is, that thefe different tribunals
jire compofed of magiftrates all belonging to the
fame body , which conftitutes almoft one and the
fame power.
The judiciary power ought not to be given to
^ ftanding fenate ; it (hould be exercifed by per-
fons taken from the body of the people, as at
Athens, at certain times of the year, and purfuant
to a form and manner prcfcribed by law, in order
to ered a tribunal that fliould laft only as long as
neceffity requires.
By this means the power of judging, a power
fo terrible to mankind, not being annexed to any
particular ftate or profeftion, becomes, as it were,
inviftble. People have not then the judges con-
tinually prefent to their viewj they fear the office,
but not the magiftrate.
156 Mh:ed Governments.
In accurations of a deep or criminal nature, it is
proper the pcrfon acciifed fhould have the privi-
lege of chuOng, in fome meaiure, his judges, in con-
currence with the law ? or, at leall, he fhouid have
a right to except againft fo great a number, that the
remaining part may be deemed Jiis own choice.
The other tv/o powers may be given rather to
magiftrates or permanent bodies, becauie they are
notexercifed on any private fubjecl:; one being no
more than the general v;iil of the iiate, and the
other the execution of that general will.
But though the tribunals ought not to be fixed,
yet the judgments ought, and to llich a degree as
to be always conformable to the exact letter of
the lav,'. Were they to be the private opinion of
thejudge, people vi^ould then live in fociety with-
out knov/ing exadly the obligations it lays them
under.
The judges ought likewiie to be in the fame
ftation as the accufed, or, in other words, his
peers, to the end that he may not imiagine he is
fallen into the hands of perlons inclined to treat
him with rigour.
If the legifiative leaves the executive power in
poffeffion of a right to impriibn tlioie fubjeds who
can give fecurity for their good behaviour, there
is an end of liberty ; uniefs they are taken up,
in order to anfwer, v/ithout delay, to a capital
crim.e , in this cafe they are really ittGy being fub-;
je6^ only to the pov/er of the law.
But fnould the legiilature think itfelf in danger,
by fome lecret confpiracy againft the fcate, or by
a correfpondence with a foreign enemy, it might
authoriie the executive power, for a fliort and
limited time, to imprifon fulpeded perions; who,
\n that cafe, would lofe their liberty only for a
while, to preferve it for eyer. And this is the
only
Montefquieu, 257
only reafonable method that can be fubftituted
to the tyrannical magiitracy of the Ephori, and
to the ftate inquifitors of Venice, who are alfo
dcfpotical.
As, in a free ftate, every man who is fuppofed a
f'-ee agent, ought to be his own governor; fo the
legiflative power fliould refide in the whole body
of the people. But fince this is impoffible in
large Itates, and in fmall ones is fubjetl to many
inconveniencies-, it is fit the people fliould execute
by tiieir reprekntatives what they cannot execute
by themfclves.
The inhabitants of a particular town are much
better acquainted with its wants and interefts,
than with thole of other places -, and are better
judges of the capacity of their neighbours, than
of that of the reit of their countrymen. The
members therefore of the legiflature lliould not
be chofen from the general body of the nation;
but it is proper, that in every confiderable place,
a reprefentative fhould be eleded by the inhabi-
tants.
The great advantage of reprefentatives, is
their being capable of difcufiing affairs , for this
the people collectively are extremely unfit, which
IT one of the greateft inconveniencies of a demo-
cracy.
It is not at all neceflary tliat the reprefentatives,
who have received a general iudruftion from their
electors, lin)uld wait to be particularly inilrudled
on every alrair, as is pradiled in the diets of
Germany, 'irue it is, that. by tins way of pro-
ceednig, the Ipeeclies of the deputies might with
greater propriety be called the voice of the na-
tion : but, on the other hand, this would throw
them into infinite delays ; would give each de-
I'Uty a power of controuling the airembly ; and
on
15^ Ancient RepuhlkSt and Opinions
on the moft urgent and prefling occafions, the
fprings of the nation might be flopped by a finglc
caprice.
LETTER XXIX.
ANCIENT REPUBLICS, AND OPINIONS
OF PHILOSOPHERS.
My dear Sir,
IN fearching for the principles of government^
we may divide them into two kinds : the prin-
ciples of authority, and the principles of power.
The firft are virtues of the mind and heart, fuch
as wifdom, prudence, courage, patience, tempe-
rance, jufticc, &c. : the fecond are the goods of
fortune, fuch as riches, extradlion, knowledge^
and reputation. I rank knowledge among the
goods of fortune, becaufe it is the efFeft of edu-
cation, fludy, and travel, which are either acci-
dents, or ufual efFeds of riches or birth, and is by
no means neceffarily connefted with wifdom or
virtue: but, as it is univerfally admired and re-
fpeded by the people, it is clearly a principle of
power. The lame may be faid of reputationji
which, abftrafted from all confideration whether it
is merited or not, well or ill founded, is another
fource of power.
Riches will hold the firft place, in civilifed
focieties at leaft, among the principles of power,
and will often prevail not only over all the prin-
ciples of authority, but over all the advantages of
birth, knowledge, and fame. For, as Harrington
6 fays,
of Philofophers. 159
fays, " Men are hung upon riches, not of choice
as upon the other, but of neceffity and by the
teeth : for as much as he who wants bread, is his
fervant that will feed him j and if a man thus
feeds a whole people, they are under his empire."
It already appears, that there muft be in every
fociety of men, fuperiors and inferiors, becaufe
God has laid in the conftitution and courfe of
nature the foundations of the diftinftion. And
indeed, as Harrington fays, " an army may as
well confift of foldiers without officers, or of
officers without foldiers, as a commonwealth con-
fifl: of a people without a gentry, or of a gentry
without a people."
" Let dates take heed," fays Lord Bacon, " how
their nobility and gentlemen multiply too fall,
for that makes the common fubje6t grow to be a
peafant and bafe fwain driven out of heart, and in
eficd but a gentleman's labourer. How fhall the
plow then be kept in the hands of the owners, and
not mere hirelings ? how fhall the country attain to
the charafter which Virgil gives of ancient Italy,
I'erra pot ens armis^ aique ubere gkba ? how, but by
the balance of dominion or property ?"
Notwithftanding Mr. Turgot's averfion to ba-
lances, Harrington difcovered, and made our, as
Toland his biographer informs us, that ** empire
follows the balance of property, whether lodged
in one, a few, or many hands." A noble difco-
very, of which the honour folely belongs to him,
as much as the circulation of the blood to
Harvey, printing to Laurence Colter, or of guns,
compafles, or optic glalfes to the feveral authors.
If this balance is not the foundation of all poli-
ticks, as Toland alferts, it is of fo much import-
ance, that no man can be thougljt a mailer of the
fubjeft
1 6o Ancient Repuhlics, and Opinions
fubje(!n:, without having well weighed it. Mi%"
Turgot, it is plain, had not the leail idea of it.
" Tillage," fays Harrington, " bringing up a
good foldiery, brings up a good conimonweakh :
for where the owner of the plow comes to have the
fword too, he will ufe it in defence of his ovvn.
"Whence it has happened, that the people of Eng-
land, in proportion to their property, have been
always free, and the genius of this nation has ever
had fome refemblance with that of ancient Italy,
which was wholly addicted to commonwealths,
2nd where Rome came to make the greateft ac-
count of her ruftic tribes, and to call her confuls
from the plow : for in the v/ay of parliaments,
"which was the government of this realm, men of
country lives have been ftill imruded with the
greatelt affairs, and the people have conRantly
had an averfion to the v/ays of the court. Ambi-
tion loving to be gay and ro fav/n, has been a
gallantry looked upon as having fom.cthing in it
of the livery; and hufbandry, or the country vi^ay
of life, though of a grofier fpihning, as the beft
lUiiTof a commonwealth, according to Ariitotle;
fuch a one, being the moll obltinate aiTertrefs of
her liberty, and the lead fubitft to innovation or
turbulency. C(^'mmonweaIths, upon wliich the
city life has had the greateil ir.fiuence, as Athens,
have feldom or never been qji^et: but at beil are
found to have iniured their own bufinefs by over-
doing it. Whence the U -ban trib^-s of Rome,
confiiiing of the tiirbaforc'iJisvAO, lihcrtiiius^ that had
received their freedom by m^^numifiion, were of
no reputation in comparifon of the rnlHcs. A
tommonvv'ealth, confifting but of ore city, would
doubtlefs be ftcrmiy, in regard tiiat ambition would
be every man's trade: but where it confifts of n
country, the plow in the i:ands or the ov/ner iindi
iiims
'of Phihfophers. i6i
Fiioi a better calling, and produces the mod inno-
cent and fteady genius of a commonwealth.
Oceana, p. 37. -Doineftic empire is founded
upon dominion, and dominion is property, real or
perfonal ; that is to fay, in Jands^ or in money and
goods. Landsi, or the parcels of a territory, are
held by the proprietor or proprietors of it, in fome
proportion ; and fuch (except it be in a city that
has little or no land^ and whofe revenue is in trade)
as is the proportion or balance of dominion or
property in land, fuch is the nature of the empire.
If one man be fole landlord of a territory, or
over- balance the people for example, three parts
in four he is grand feignior: for fo the Turk is
called from his property; and his empire is abfo-
lute monarchy. If the few, as a nobility and
clergy, be landlords, or overbalance the people to
the like proportion, it makes the Gothic balance,
and the empire is mixed monarchy, as thit of
Spain, Poland, and once of England: and if the
^hole people be landlords, or hold the lands fo
divided among them, that no one man, or num-
ber of men, within the compafs of th.e few, or
ariftocracy, over-balance them, the empire is a
commonwealth.
If force be interpofed in any of thefe tliree
cafes, it muft either frame the government to the
foundation, or the foundation to the government;
or, holding the government not according to the
balance, it is not natural, but violent : and there-
fore if it be at the devotion of a prince, it is
tyranny; if at the devotion of the few, oligarchy ;
or if in the power of the people, anarchy. Each
of which confulions, the balance Handing other-
wife, is but of fliort continuance, becaufe againft
the niature of the balance; which not dellroyed,
irfellroys that which oppofes it.
M Here
i6z 'Ancient RepuMes, andOpimcHJ
Here it would be entertaining to apply thcfc
obfervations to the force of fleets and armies, &c.
applied by Great Britain in the late conttd wiih
America. The balance of land, efpecially in
New England, where the force was firft applied,
was neither in the king nor a nobility, but im-
menfely in favour of the people. The intention
of the Britiih politicians was to alter this balance,
" frame the foundation to the government, by
bringing the lands more and more into the hands
of the governors, judges, counfellors, &c. &c.
v;ho were all to be creatures of a Britiih miniilry.
We have feen the effc6ls." The balance dcftroy-
ed that which oppofed it.
Harrington proceeds. But there are certain
other confufions, which being rooted in rhe ba-
lance, are of longer continuance, and of worfe
confequence-, as, firft, where a nobility holds half
the property, or about that proportion, and the
people the other half-, in which cafe, without
altering the balance, there is no remedy, but the
one muft eat out the other: as the people did tlic
nobility in Athens, and the nobility the people in
Rome. Secondly, where a prince holds about
half the dominion, and the people t're other half,
which was the cafe of the Roman emperors,
(planted partly upon their military colonies, and
partly upon thefenateand the people) rhe govern-
ment becomes a very fhambles, borii or the princes
and the people. It being unlav.ful in Turky
that any fliould pofTefs land but the grand feignior^
the balance is fixed by the hw/, and that em.pire
firm". Nor, though the kings often roll, was the
throne of England kncv/n to f.rke, until the
ftatute of alienations broke ;; s piila'?, by giving
way to the nobility to il-il thvir cJlatcs. While
Lacedemon held to the d!v;i;cn o; land made by
. Lycur.QUS,
tf Philofophers, 1^3
Lycurgns, it was immoveable ; but, breaking
that, couid (land no longer. This kind otlaw,
fixing the balance in lands, is called Agrarian,
and was firft introduced by God himfelf, who di-
vided the land of Canaan to his people by lot.
The public fword, without a hand to hold it,
is but cold iron. The hand which holds this
fword is the militia of a nation ; and the militia
of a nation is either an army in the field, or
ready for the field upon occafion. But an army
is a bead that has a great ocUy, and muft be
fed ; wherefore this will come to vv^hat pailurcs
you have, and what pnftures you have will
come to the balance of property, v/ithout v/hich
the public fword is but a namie^ He that can
graze this bead with the great belly, as the Turk
docs his timariots, may well deride him that ima-
gines he received his pou'cr by covenant. But if
the property of the nobility, flocked with their
tenants and retainers, be the pafture of that beaft,
the ox knows his mailer's crib ; and it is impofTi-
ble for a king, in fuch a conftitution, to reign
othcrwife than by covenant ; or, if he breaks it,
it is words that come to blov.-s.
Arillotle is full of this balance in divers
places, efpecially where he fays, tiiac immoderate
wealth, as where one man, or the few, have
greater poiTefrions than the equality or the frame
of the commonwealth will bear, is an occafion of
icdicion, which ends, for the greater part, in mo-
narchy ; and that, for tliis caufe, tlie oflracifm
has been received in divers places, as in Argos
rind Athens j but that it were better to prevent
the growth in the beginning, than, when it has
got head, to leek the remedy of fuch an evil.
Machiavel, not perceiving that if a common-
wi-rakh be galled by the gentry, it is by their
iVI 2 over-
1 64. Ancient Republics, and Opinions
over-balance, fpeaks of the gentry as hoftile to
popular governments, and of popular governmentrj
as hoftile to the gentry j which can never be
proved by any one example, unlefs in civil war-,
feeing that, even in Switzerland, the gentry arc
not only fafe, but in honour. But the balance,
as I have laid it down, though unfeen by Ma-
chiavel, is that which interprets him, where he
concludes, " That he who will go about to make
a com.monweakh where there be many gentlemen,
unlefs he firft deftroys them, undertakes an im-
poITibility. And that he who goes about to in-
troduce monarchy, where the condition of the
people is equal, fhall never bring it to pafs, un-
lefs he cull out fuch of them as are the moft tur-
bulent and ambitious, and make them gentlemeri
or noblemen, not in name, but in effect , that is,
by enriching them with lands, caftles, and trea-
fures, that miay gain them power among the reft,
and bring in the reft to dependence upon them ;
to the end that they, maintaining their ambition
by the prince, the prince may maintain his power
by them."
Wherefore, as in this place I agree with Ma-
chiavel, that a nobility, or gentry, over- balancing
a popular governmenr, is the utter bane and de-
llruftion of it, lb I ftiall iliew in another, that a
nobility or gentry, in a popular government,
not over-balancing it, is the very life and foul
of it.
The public fword, or right of the militia, be
the government what it will, or let it change how
it can, is infeparable from the over- balance in do-
minion.
;-!AR RING ton's
cf Philofophers] 165
Harrington's prerogative of popular go-
vernment, c. iii. p. 226.
The balance of dominion in land Is the na-
tural caufe of empire; and this is the principle
which makes politics a fcience undeniable through-
out, and the mod demonfirrable of any wiiatevcr.
If a man, having one hundred pounds a year,
may keep one fervant, or have one man at his
command, then, having one hundred times fo
much, he may keep one hundred fervants ; and
this multiplied by a thoufand, he may have one
hundred thoufand men at his command. Now
that the fingle peribn, or nobility, of any country
in Europe, that had but half fo many men at
command, would be king or prince, is that which
1 think no man can doubt. But " No money,
*' no Swifs." The reafon why a fingle perfon, or
the nobility, that has one hundred thoufand men,
or half fo many, at command, will have the go-
vernment, is, that the eftate in land, whereby
they are able to maintain fo many, in any Euro-
pean territory, mud over- balance the reft that
remains to the people, at leaft three parts in four.
Now, for the fame reafon, if the people hold three
parts in four of the territory, it is plain there can
neicher be any fingle perfon or nobility able to
difpute the government with them. In this cafe,
therefore, except force be interpofed, they govern
themfelvts. So that by this computation of the
balance of property or dominion in the land, you
have, according to the three-fold foundation of
roperty, the root or generation of the three-fold
ind of government or empire. W one man bs
fole landlord of a territory, or over-balance the
whole people, three parts in four, or thereabouts,
he is grand fcigniorj for fo the Turk, not from
M 3 his
I
1 66 Ancient Republics, and Opinions
his empire, but property, is called , and the em-
pire, in this cafe, is ablolute monarchy. It* the
few, or a nobility, or a nobility with a clergy, be
landlords to Juch a proportion as over- balances
tlie people in the like manner, t::ey may make
whom they pleafe king; or, if they bs not pleafed
with their king, down with him, and let up whom
they like better; a Henry the fourth, or kventh,
a Guiie, a Montfort, a Nevil, or a Porter, fhoiild
they find that belt for their own ends and pur-
pofes: for as not the balance of the king, but
that of the nobility, in this cafe, is the caule of
the government, lb not the eftate of the prince or
captain, but his virtue or ability, or fitnefs for
the ends of the nobility, acquires that command
or office. This for ariftocracy, or mixed mo-
narchy. But if the whole people be landlords,
or hold the lands fo divided among them, that
no one man, or number of men, v^'ithin the com.-
pafs of the few, or ariftocracy, over-balance them,
it is a comiinonwealth. Such is the branch in the
root, or the balance of property naturally pro-
ducinf^ eniDire.
Then follows a curious account of the lav.-s in
Ifrael againft ufury, and in Lacedemon againft
trade, Sec. which are well vvorch ftudying.
Page 254. That which, introducing two ef-
tates, caules divifion, or miakes a commonwealth
unequal, is net that fiie has a nobility, witiiout
which file is deprived of her inoil lixcial v^rna-
mcnr, and weakened in her conduct, but wnen
the nobility only is capable of magiilracy, or
of the fenate ; and where this is fo ordered, fce
is unequal, as Kome. But where the nobility
is no othervvife capable of magillracy, nor of
the fenate, than by t.leclion of the people, the
commonwealth confitls but of one order, and
of Philofcphers. 167
is equal, as Lacedenion or Venice. Where the
nobility holds half the property, or about that
proportion, and the people the other half, the
iliares of the land may be equal-, but in regard
the nobility have much among few, and the
people little among many, the few will not be
contented to have authority, v^hich is all their
proper fhare in a commonwealth, but will be
bringing the people under power, which is not:
their proper (hare in a commonwealth; where-
fore this commonwealth mull needs be unequal ;
and, except by altering the balance, as the Athe-
nians did by the recifion of debts, or as the Ro-
mans went about to do, by an agrarian, it be
brought to fuch an equality, that the whole power
be in the people, and there remain no more than
authority in the nobility, there is no remedy, but
the one, with perpetual feuds, will eat out the
other, as the people did the nobility in Athens,
and the nobility the people in Rome. Where
the carcafe is, there wiil be the eagles alio ; where
the riches are, there will be the power: fo if a
few be as rich as all the reft, a few wiil have as
much power as all the red-, in which cafe the
commonwealth is unequal, and there can be no
tnd of icavi[ig and tailing till it be brought to
tc|i:ali[y.
'I'he eftates, be they one, or two, or three, are
fuch, as v.'as laid by virtue of iht balance upon
whicli tilC govcriiment nmil naturally depend :
cxemplilkd in France, &C.
page 2'-6. Ai! government is of three kinds :
a governnient of iervant:,, a government of fub-
jei;ts, or a government of citizens. 1 lie lirft is
abloluie moiiarclr/, as that of Tiirlcy ; the Iccond
ariflocraiical monarchy, as tiiat of France; tiie
M 4 third
3 68 Ancient Republics^ and Opinions
third a commonwealth, as Ifrael, Rome, Hoi^
land. Of thele, the government of fervants i.s
harder to be conquered, and the eafier to be held,
The government of fubjefts is the eafier to be
conquered, and the harder to be held. The go-
vernment of citizens is both tlie hardeft to bs
conquered, and the hardeft to be held.
The reafon why a government of fervants is
hard to be conquered, is, that they are under a
perpetual difcipline and command. Vv hy a go-
vernment of fubjects is eafily conquered, is oa
account of the fa6tions of the nobility.
The reafons why a government of citizens,
where the commonwealth is equal, is hardeft to
be conquered, are, that the invader of fuch a
fociety muft" not only truft to his own ftrength,
inafmuch as, the commonwealth being equal, he
muft needs find them united; but in regard that
fuch citizens, being all foldiers, or trained up to
their arms, which they ufe not for the defence of
flavery, but of liberty, a condition not in this
world to be bettered, they have, more fpecially
upon this occafion, the higheft foul of courage,
and, if their territory be of any extent, the vafteft
body of a well-difciplined militia, that is poffible
in nature: wherefore an example of fuch a one,
overcome by the arms of a monarch, is not to be
found in the world.
In the Art of Law-giving, chap. i. he enlarges
fcill farther upon this lubjed; and inftances Jo-
feph's purchafeof all the lands of theEgyptians for
Pharaoh, Vv^hereby they became fervants to Pha-
raoh ; and he enlara;es on the Pntrlifti balance,
&c.
In America, the balance is nine-tenths on the
fide of the people: indeed there is bur one ordei -
vf Philofophers. i6<^
and Gur fenators have influence chiefly by the
principles of authority, and very little by thofe
<i)f powerj but this muft be poftponed.
LETTER XXX.
ANTIENT REPUBLICS, AND OPINIONS
OF PHILOSOPHERS.
My dear Sir,
MY defign is more extenfive than barely to
fliew the imperfedtion of iVIr. Turgot's
idea. This might be done in a few v^rords, and
a very fhort procefs of reafoning : but I wifli to
aflTemble together the opinions and reafonings of
philofophers, politicians, and hiftorians, who have
taken the moft extenfive views of men and fo-
cieties, whofe characters are defervcdly revered,
and whofe writings were in the contemplation of
thofe who framed the American conftitutions. It
will not be contefted, that all thefe chara6lers arc
united in Polybius, who, in a fragment of his
fixth book, tranflated by Edward Spelman, p.
c^gi, at the end of his tranflation of the Romaa
Antiquities of Dionyfiu*; Hallicarnaflenfis, fays:
*' It is cuftomary to ettablifli three forts of go-
vernments-, kingly government, arifl:ocracy, and
democracy : upon which one may very properly
alk them, whether they lay thefe down as tlie
only forms of government, or as the befl: j for in
both cafes they fcem to be in an oror, fince it is
manifeft.
I yo AncioH Republics^ and Op'mons
manifed, that the beft form of government is that
which is compounded of all three, This is founded
not only in reafon but in experience, Lycurgus
havino; fet the example of this form of govern-
ment in the infiirution of the Lacedemonian com-
monwealth."
Six kinds of government m.ufc be allowed :
kingly government and monarchy, ariilocracy
and oligarchy, democracy, and the government
of the multitude.
Lycurgus concluded, that every form of go-
vernment that is fimple, by foon degenerating
into that vice that is allied to it, muft be unlia-
ble. The vice of kingly government is mo-
r.archy ; that of ariftocracy, oligarchy ; that of
democracy, rage and violence-, into which, in
procefs of time, all of them muft degenerate.
Lycurgus, to avoid thefe inconveniences, form-
ed his government not of one fort, but united in
one all the advantages and properiies of the beft
governments ; to the end tliat no branch of ir,
by f-A/eliing beyond its due bounds, might dege-
nerate into the vice which is congenial [o it ; and
that, while each of them v^'cre mutually acted
upon by oppojlte pczvers^ no one part might in-
cline any way, or cut-weigh the reft-, but that the
commonwealth, being equally poifcd and balanced,
like a Jhip or a waggon^ acted upon by contrary
povjers, might long remain in tlie fame fituation-,
while the king was reftrained from excels by the
fear of the people, who had a proper fhare in
the commonvv^ealth , and, on the other fide, the
people did not dare to difregard :he king, from
their fear of the fenate, who, being ail elected for
their virtue, would always incline to the juftcii;
fide*, by which means, that branch which hap-
pened to be opprelled became always fupcrior,
and, by the accclfional v*'v;ight of the fenate, cut-
;,;--. ..,7
cf Philofiphers, ' 171
halanced the other. This fviLem prefcrved the
Lacedemonians in liberty longer than any other
people we have heard of ever enjoyed it.
All the three principal orders of government
were found in the Roman commonwealth ; every
thing was conftituted and adminiftered vvi:h that
equality and propriety by thefe three, that it v/as
not poflible, even for a Roman citizen, to af-
fert pofitively, whether the. government, in the
whole, was ariilocratical, democratical, or monar-
chical. For when we caft our eyes on the power
of the confuls, the government appeared entirely
monarchical and kingly ; \%\'\^r\ on that of the fe-
nate, ariftocratical; and when any one confidered
the power of the people, it appeared plainly de-
mocratical.
The confuls, when they are at Rome, and be-
fore they take the field, have the adminiflration
of all public affairs ; for all other magiitrates
obey them, except the tribunes of the people :
they introduce anibalTadors into the fenate ; they
alfo propoTe to the fenate thofe fubjeds of debate
that require immediate difpatch; and are lolely en-
trulled Vv'ith the execution of the decrees : to them
belongs the confidcration of all public affairs of
which the people have cognizance, whom they
are to affeiuble upon all occafions, and lay before
them the decrees of the fenate, then purfue the
relolutions of the majority. They have almoft an
abfolute power in evc:ry thing that relates either to
the [^reparations of war, or to the conduft of it
in the held ; for they may give what orders they
pleafe to their allirs, and appoint the tribunes-,
they may raife forces, and enlid thofe who arc
proper for the fervice : they alfo have a power,
when in the field, of punifliing any who ferve
under them ; and of expending as mgch ai they
pleafe
172 Ancient Republics, and Opinion;
pleafe of the public money, being always attend'
cd by a quasftor for that purpofe, whole duty it is
to yield a ready obedience to all their commands.
So that whoever cafts his eyes on this branch,
may with reafon affirm, that the iicvernment is
merely monarchical and kingly.
The fenate have, in the firft place, the com-
mand of the public money : for they have the
conduft of all receipts and difburfements , fincc
the qu^llors cannot iflue money for any particular
fervice without a decree of the fenate, except thofe
fums they pay by the direftion of the confuls.
It has the power over all difburfements made
by the cenfors, every fifth year, in ereding and re-
pairing public buildings; takes cognizance of all
crimes committed in Italy, fuch as treafons, con-
fpiracies, poifonings, and affaflinations , fends
cmbafiies out of Italy to reconcile differences,
ufe exhortations, fignify commands, admit allian-
ces, or declare war; determines, when ambafla-
dors come to Rome, in what manner they are to
be treated, and the anfvver to be given them. For
ihefe reafons, when a foreigner comes to Rome,
in the abfence of the confuls, the government ap-
pears to him purely ariftocratical.
There is ftill a moft confiderable fhare in the
government left for the people. They only have
the power of diftributing honours and punifh-
ments, to which alone both monarchies and
commonwealths, in a word all human inftitu-
lions, owe their liability : for wherever the diffe-
rence between rewards and punifhments is not
underftood, or injudicioufly applied, there no-
thing can be properly adminiftered, fince the
worthy and unworthy are equally honoured !
They often take cognizance of thofe caufes
where the fine is confiderable, if the criminals are
per fans
of PhilofcpherS; 173
pcrfons who have exercifed great employments ;
and in capital cafes they alone have jurifdiction i
and a cuftom prevails with them, to give thofe who
are tried for their lives a power of departing
openly to voluntary banifhment.
They have the power of conferring the magiftracy
upon thofe they think worthy of it, which is the
mod honourable reward of merit any government
can beftow.
They have the power of rejedling and confirm-
ing laws, and determine concerning peace and war,
alliances, accommodations, and conventions.
So that, from hence again, one may with reafon
afierr, that the people have the greateft fhare in
the government, and that the commonwealth is
democratical.
Thefe orders, into which the commonwealth is
divided, have the power to oppofe, afllft, and ba-
lance each other, as occafion may require.
Though the conful at the head of his army in
the field, feems to have an abfolute power to carry
every thing he propofes into execution, yet he ftili
(lands in need of the people and fenate, and with-
out their afiiftance can effecft nothing ; for neither
corn, clothes, nor pay, can be furnifhed to the army
without the confcnt of the fenate ; who have alfo
the power of fending another general to fucceed
him, as foon as the year is expired, or of continu-
ing him in the command. Again, they may either
magnify and extol, or obfcure and extenuate, the
viftories of the generals : for thefe cannot celebrate
their triumphs uniefs the fenate confents to it, and
furnilhes the neceffary expence.
As the power of putting an end to the war is
in the people, the generals are under a necefiity
of having their approbation, who have the right
of ratifying and annulling all accommodations and
conventions.
1 74 Ancient Republics^ and Opinions
conventions. It is to the people that the generalsj
after the expiration of their command, give an ac-
count of their condufl : fo that it is by no means
fafe for them to difregard the favour either of the
fen ate, or of the people.
The fenate is under a neceffity of fliewing a re-
gard to the people, and of aiming at their appro-
bation ; as not having the power to punilh crimes
of the fii ft magnitude v.'ith death, unlefs the peo-
ple confirm the previous decree : if a law is pro-
pofed, by which part of the power of the fenate
is to be taken away, their dignities abolifhed, or
even their fortunes diminiPneci, the people have it
in their power either to receive cr rejedl it. If
one of the tribunes of the people oppofes the
paffing of a decree, the fenate are fo far from
being able to ena6l ir, that it is not even in their
power to confult or aiTemble at all. For all thefe
reafons, the fenaie ftands in av/e of the people.
The people alio are fubjp'ft: to the power of the
fenate, and under an obligation of cultivating the
good-will of all the fenators. Vv'ho have mjany op-
portunities both of prejudicing and advantaging
individuals. Judges are appointed out of the
fenate in rnofi; caules that relate to contrads, pub-
lic or private. There are many rivers, ports,
gardens, mints, and lands, and many works relat-
ing to erecting and repairing public buildings, let
out by the cenfors, under the care of the lenate ;
all thefe are undertaken by the people ; fome arc
purchafers, others partners, fome iureties for tlie
contrafts. All thefe things are under [he controul
of the fenate, which has power to g:ve time, to
mitigate, and, if any thing has happened to render
the performance of the contract impraclicable, to
cancel it. The people, thus dependent on the
fenate, and apprehending the uncertainty of the
occafions
cf Philofcphers. 175
occafions in which they may (land in need of their
favour, dare nor refift or oppofe their will.
In like manner, they are nut eafily brought to
obdrud the defigns of the confuls, becaufe all of
them in general, and every one in particular,
become fubjed to their authority, when in the
field. '
Such being the power of each order to hurm
and affift eacii other, their union is adapted to all
contingencies, and // is mpojphle to inven' a more
"perfefi fyjlem. When the common fear of a foreign
enemy compels them to act in concert, fuch is
the ftrength of t'le government, that nothino- ne-
ceflary is omitted, or comes too late, fince all vie
with each other in directing their thoughts to the
public good, and their endeavours to carry their
defigns into execution. The commonwealth, from
the peculiar frame of it, becomes irrefiftible, and
attains whatever it propoles.
When, in confequence of victory, they live in
profperity and affluence, enjoying their good for-
tune free from the fear of a foreign enemy, they
grow, through eafe and flattery, infoient and proud ;
their commonwealth is then chicliV obferved to
relieve iticlf : for when any branch of it becomes
ambitious, and, fwelling beyond its bound-, aims
at unwarraPitabie power, being fubjcct to the
controul oi the other two, it cannot run into
any excefs of power or arrogance ^ but all three
mud remain in the terms prelcribcd by t'le con-
Ititution.
Thus, my dear Sir, you fee tliat Poiybii.:.s's 1
opinion of different orders, checks, and balances^ \
in a conimonwealth, is very different from thciC of
Mr. Turgor. I'he Roman conllitution formed
the noblcli people, and tlic greateft power, th.ii:
has ever exiiled. But if all the powers of the
S confuls.
iyS ^Ancient Republics, and Opinion^
confuls, fenate, and people, had been centered irr A
fingle affembly of the people, colledively or re-
prefentatively, will any man pretend to believe
that they would have been long free, or ever
great ?
The diftribution of power was however never
accurately or judicioufly made in that conftitu-
tion : the executive was never fufficiently fepa-
rated from the legiflative, nor had thefe powers a
controul upon each other defined with fufficient
accuracy : the executive had not power to inter-^
pofc and decide betv/ecn the people and the
fen ate.
As we advance in this correfpondence, we may
fee caufe to differ widely from the judgment of
Polybius, " that it is impojfibls to invent a more
perfect fyfiem of government." We may be con-
vinced that the conftitution of England, if its
balance is {^^n to play, in practice, according to
the principles of its theory that is to fay, if the
people are fairly and fully repiefented, io as to
have the power of dividing or choof.ng^ of drav^ing
up hill or dowjiy inftead of being difpofed of by a
few lords is a fyilem much more perfect. The
conftitutions of feveral of tlie United States, it is
hoped, will prove themfelves improvements, both
upon the Roman, the Spartan, and tlie Englilh
commonwealths.
1. E T T E ^
cf Phihfopherf,
LETTER XXXr.
ANCIENT RFPURLTCS, AND OPINIONS
OF PHILOSOPHERS.
My dear Sir,
TH E generation and corruption of govern-
ments, which may in other w rds be called
the progrrefs and courie or human paffions in fociety,
are fubjtifts which li;ivc- engaj:i;>rd the attention of the
greateii writers-, and whether the ellays mey have
left us were copied from hiflorv, or wrought ouc
of their own conjeftures and reafonings, they are
very much to our purpofe, to fliew the utility
and necefiity of different orders of men, and of an
equilibrium of powers and privileges. They de-
monfbrate the corruptibility of every fpecies of
fimple government, by which I mean a power
without a check, whether in one, a few, or many.
It might be fufficient to fliev/ this tendency in
fimpie democracy alone, for fuch is the govern-
ment of one afTembly, whether of the people col-
ledlively or reprefentatively : hut as the genera-
tion and corruption of all kinds of government
have a fnnilitude with one another, and proceed
from the fame qualities in human naturr:, it will
throw the tnore li<Tht upon our lul^ject, the more
particularly we examine it. I fliall confine my^-
felf chiefly to Plato, Polybius, and your name-
fake Sir Thomas Smith.
Polybius thinks it manifefb, both from reafon
and experience, that the bell form of government
is not iimple, but compounded, becaufe of the
N ten*
I'jB ^AncierJ RepuhUcs, and Opinions
tendency of each of the fimple forms to degene-
rate ; even democracy, in which it is an eftablifhed.
cuftom to worfhip the gods, honour their parents,^
refpedt the elders, and obey ibc laws, has a flrong
tendency to change into a government wh>:'re the
multitude have a power of doing whatever they
defire, and where infolence and conten:i)t of pa-
rents, elders, gods, and laws, foon fucceed.
From whence do governments originally fpring?
From the weaknels of men, and the confequent
neceflity to aflbciate, and he who excels in ftrength
and courage, gains the command and authority
over the reft ; as among inferior animals, who
are not influenced by opinion, the ftrvngeft are,
by common coni'ent, allowed to be maiteis. This
is monarchy. But when the nation, by living
together, acquires Ibme tindlure of honour and
juftice, gratitude, duty, and their oppoiites, and
the monarch countenances thcle moral qualities,
and treats every one according to his merit, they are
no longer afraid of violence, but iubmit to him,
and unite in fupporting his government, akhough
he may again become Vvcak and advanced wi years.
By this means a monarch infenfibly bjcomes a
king, that is, when the power is transferred from
courage and ftrength to reafon. This is the origin
oi Uut kingly governmeniy for the people preferve
the command, not only to them, but to their
defcendants, bemg perfuaded, that thofe who have
received their birth ..nd educ.uion from fuch men
will refemble them in their principles. But if
they are diffatisfied with their defcendants, they
then choofe magiftrates and kmgs, with regard
only to fuperior fenfe and lealon, and not to
Hrength and courage-, having by experience been
convinced of the difference between them. Thofe
wlio were once cholcn and invefted v/ich the royal
4 dignity,
cf Philofophers, 179
dignity, grew old in the enjoyment of it, poflcfled
themfelves of a territory, furrounded it with walls,
and fortified advantageous polls : thus confulting
the fecurity of their lubjedts, and fupplying thetn
v/ith plenty of provifions, differing little in their
clothes or tables from the people with whom
they paffed their lives, they continued blameiefs
and unenvied. But their pofterity, fucceeding to
the government by right of inheritance, and
finding every thing provided for fecurity and
fupport, they were led by fuperfluity to indulge
their appetites, and to imagine that it became
princes to appear in a different drefs, to eat in a
more luxurious manner, and enjoy, v/ithout con-
tradiction, the forbidden pleafures of love. The
firft produced envy, the other refentment and
hatred. By which means kingly government de-
generated into tyranny.
At the fame time a foundation was laid, and a
confpiracy formed, for the deftru6lion of thofe
who exercifed it; the accomplices of which v/ere
not men of inferior rank, but perfons of the mod
generous, exalted, and enterprizing fpirit i for
fuch men can leaft bear the infolence of thofe in
power. The people, having thefe to lead them,
and uniting againft their rulers, kingly govern-
ment and monarchy were extirpated, and arifto-
cracy began to be eftablifhed, for the people, as
an immediate acknowledgment to thofe who had
deflroyed monarchy, chofe thefe leaders for their
governors, and left all their concerns to them.
Thefe, at firil, preferred the advantage of the
public to all other confiderations, and adminiilered
all affairs, both public and private, with care and
vigilance. But their fons having fucceeded them
in the lame power, unacquainted with evils, flran-
ger$ to civil equality and libertv, educated from
IS 2 ' fcheir
1 So Ancient RepuMics, and Opinions
tlieir infancy in the folendor of the power and
dignities of their parents, fome t-iving themfelves
up to avarice, others to intemperance, and others
to the abufe of women, by this behaviour changed
the ariftocracy into an oligarchy.
Their cataftrophe became the fame with that of
the tyrants -, for if any perfon, obferving the gene-
ral envy and hatred which thefe rulers have incurred,
has the courage to fay or do any thing againft them,
he finds the whole body of the people infpired
with the fame pafiions they were before poffeffed
with againft the tyrant, and ready to affift him.
Thereupon they put fome of them to death, and
banifh others ; but dare not, after that, appoint
a king to govern them, being ftill afraid of the
injuftice of the firft j neither dare they entruft the
government with any number of men, having ftill
before their eyes the errors which thofc had before
committed : fo that having no hope, but in them-
selves, they convert the government from an oli-
garchy to a democracy^ and take upon themfeives
the care and charge of public affairs.
And as long as any are living, who felt the
power and dominion of the few^ they acquiefce
under the prefent eftablilhrnicnt, and look upon
equality and liberty as the greateft of bleffings.
But v/hen a new race of men grows up, thefe, no
longer regarding equality and liberty, from being
accuftomed to them, aim at a greater fhare of power
than the reft, particularly thofe of the greateft
fortunes, who, grown now ambitious, and being
unable to obtain the power they aim at by their
own merit, diffipate their wealth, by alluring and
corrupting the people by every method ; and
when, to ferve their wild ambition, they have
once taught them to receive bribes and entertain-
znents, from that moment th? democracy is at an
end.
of Philofophers. i8i*
end, and changes to force and violence^ For the
people, accuftomed to live at the expence of others,
and to place their hopes of a fupport in the for-
tunes of their neighbours, if headed by a man of
a great and enterprizing fpirir, v/ill then have re-
courfe to violence, and getting together, will mur-
der, banifli, and divide among themfelves the
lands of their adversaries, till, grown wild with
rage, they again find a mafter and a monarch.
This is the rotation of governments, and this
the order of nature, by which they are changed,
transformed, and return to the fame point of the
circle.
Lycurgus obferving that all this was founded
on neceflity and the laws of nature, concluded,
that every form of government that is fimple, by
fbon degenerating into that vice that is allied to it,
and naturally attends it, mull be unftable. For
as ruft is the natural bane of iron, and wormiS of
wood, by which they are fure to be deftroyed,
fo there is a certain vice implanted by the hand
of nature in every fimple form of government,
I and by her ordained to accompany it. The vice
I of kingly government is monarchy j that of arif-
tocracy, oligarchy ^ and of democracy, rage and
i 'violence \ into which all of them, in procefs of time,
I mull necefflirily degenerate. To avoid wiiicii
I Lycurgus united in one all the advantages of the
( bed governments, to the end that no bi.inch of ir,
] by fwelling beyond its bounds, might degenerate
into the vice that is congenial to it, and that, while
1 each was mutually acted upon by oppcfite pozcers,
I no one part might outweigli the rell. The
! Romans arrived ac the lame enU by the fame
means.
Polybius, you perceive, my dear Sir, is more;
charitable in his reprefcntaciua of hu.man nifure
N ; than
lS2 'Ancient Republics, and Opinions
than Hobbes, Mandeville, Rochefoucaulr, Machia-
vel, Beccaria, Ronfieau, De Lolme, or even than
our friend Dr. Price. He candidly fuppofes thac
the firft kingly government will be wifely and
honeftly adminifteied, during the life of the father
of his people , that the firil ariftccracy will be
conduced v/ith caution and moderation, by the
band of patriots to whom is due the glory of the
expulficn of the tyrant ; and that the people, for
a generation at leaft, who have depcfed the oli-
garchy, will behave with decorum.
But perjhaps it might be more exaflly true and
natural to fay, that the king, the ariftocracy, and
the people, as foon as ever they felt themfclves
fecure in the. polTcfiion ot their power, v/ould
begin to abufe it.
In Mr. Turgot's fingle alTembly, thofe wha
fliould think themfelves moft didinguifhed by
blood and education, as well as fortune, would
be moft ambitious , and if they found an oppo-
fition among their conftituents to their elections,
would immediarely have recourfe to entertain-
ments, fecret intrigues, and every popular art,
and even to bribes, to increafe their parties. This
would oblige their competitors, though they
might be infinitely better men, either to give up
their pretenfions, or to imitate thefe dangerous
praftices. There is a natural and unchangeable
inconvenience in all popular eledions. There
are always competitions, and the candidates
have often merits nearly equal. The virtuous
and independent eleclcrs are often divided :
this naturally caufes too much attention to the
moft profligate and unprincipled, who will fell
or give av/ay their votes for other confidera-
tions than wifdom and virtue. So that he who
has the deepeft purfe, or the feweft fcruples about
uling it, will generally prevail.
It
of Phikfophers* 183
It is from the natural ariftocracy in a fingle af-
fembly that the firft danger is to be apprehended
in the prefent Hate of manners in America-, and
with a balance of hinded property in the hands of
the people, fo decided in their favour, the progrefs
to degeneracy, corruption, rage, and violence,
might not be very rapid ; neverthelefs it would
begin with the firft eledtions, and grow fafter or
flower every year.
Rage and violence would foon appear in the
aflfembly, and from thence be communicated
among the people at large.
The only remedy is to throw the rich and the
proud into one group, in a feparate affembly, and
there tie their hands ; if you give them fcope
with the people at large, or their reprefentatives,
they will deftroy all equality and liberty^ with
the confent and acclamations of the people them"
fehes. They will have much more power, mix-
ed with the reprefentatives, than feparated from
them. In the firft cafe, if they unite, they
will give the law, and govern all j if they differ,
they will divide the ftate, and go to a decifion by
force. But placing them alone by themfelves,
the fociety avails itfelf of all their abilities and
virtues; they become a folid check to the repre-
fentatives themfelves, as well as to the executive
power, and you difarrn them entirely of the power
to do mifchief.
N 4 i- H T-
1 84 'Ancient Republics^ and Opinions
letter xxxii.
:ancient republics, and opinions
OF philosophers,
Dear Sir,
DIONYSIUS Haliearnaffenns, In his feventh
booi<:, has givt-n us an excellent fpcech in
the lenate, made by Manlius Valerius, a man ve-
jierable for his age and wifdom, and remarkable
for his conftant friendfbip ior the people.
" If any of you, fathers ! alarmed with an ap-
prehenfion that you will introduce a pernicious
cuftom into the commonwealth, if you grant the
people a power of giving their fufFrages againft
the patricians^ and entertain an opinion that the
tribunitian power, if confiderably ftrengthened,
will prove of no advantage, let them learn, that
their opinion is erroneous, and their imagination
contrary tc found reafoning : for if any meafure
can tend to prelerve this commonwealth, to aflfure
both her liberty and power, and to eftablifh a per-
petual union and harmony in all things, the mofl:
cfFedlual will be to give the people a fhare in the
government : and the mofc advantageous thing
to us will be, not to have a fimple and unmixed
form of government -, neither a monarchy, an oli-
garchy, nor a dcmiOcracy, but a conflitution tem-
pered with all of them : for each of thefe fornis,
\vhen fimple, very eafily deviates into abufe and
cxcefsj but when all of them are equally mixed,
that part which happens to innovate, and to exceed
the cudomary bounds, is always redrained by an-
j:ther that is fober, and adheres to the eitablifhed
order,
of rhikfophers', 1S5
order. Thus monarchy, when it becomes cruel
and infolent, and begins to purfue tyrannical
meafures, is fubverted by an oligarchy, confiding
of good men , and an oligarchy, compofed of the
belt men, which is your form of government, when
elated with riches and dependants, pays no re-
gard to juftice, or to any other virtue, and is de-
itroyed by a wife people : and in a democracy,
when the people, from being modell in their de-
portment, and obfervant of the laws, begin to
run into diforders and excelTes, they are forced to
return to their duty by the power with which,
upon thofe occafions, the belt man of the com-
monwealth is invelled. You, fathers, have ufed
all poflible precautions to prevent monarchical
power from degenerating into tyranny -, for, in-
llead of a fingle perfon, you have invefted two
with the fupreme power ; and though you com-
mitted this magiltracy to them, not for an inde-
finite time, but only for a year, you neverthelefs
appointed three hundred patricians, the mod re-
fpedtable, both for their virtue and their age,
of whom this fenate is compofed, to watch over
their conduft ; but you do not feem hitherto to
have appointed any to watch over your own, and
to keep you within proper bounds. As K/r
yourfelves, I am as yet under no apprehenfions,
left you fhould fuffcr your minds to be corrupted
by great and accumulated profperity, who have
lately delivered your country from a long tyran-
ny-, and, through continual and lading wars, have
not as yet had leifure to grow infolent and lux-
urious. But with regard to your fucccfibrs, when
I confider how great alterations length of time
brings with it, 1 am afraid, left the men of power
in the femite fl^ould innovate, and filently tranf-
form our conftitution to a monarchical tyranny :
whereasj
i86 Ancient Republics f and Opinions
whereas, if you admit the people to a fhare in the
government, no mifchief can Spring from the fe-
iiate ; but the man who aims at greater power
than the reft of his fellow citizens, and has form-
ed a faflion in the fenate, of all who are willing to
partake of his councils and his crimes (for
thofe who deliberate concerning public affairs
ought to forefee every thing that is probable)
this great, this awful perfon, I fay, when called
by the tribunes to appear before the people, mud
give an account both of his aflions and thoughts
to this people, inconfiderable as they are, and {o
jnuch his inferiors ; and, if found guilty, fuffer
the puniihment he deferves : and, left the people
themfelves, when veiled v/iih lo great a power,
fhould grow wanton, and, feduced by the worft-
of demagogues, become dangerous to the beft of
citizens, (for the multitude generally give birth
to tyranny) fome perfon of confummate pru-
dence, created didator by yourlelves, will guard
againit this evil, and not allow them to run iiuo
excefs , and being inverted v/ith abfolute powerj
and fubjed; to no account, will cut off the infed-
ed part of the commonwealth, and not fufrer that
which is not yet infected to be vitiated, reform
the laws, excite the citizens to virtue, and ap-
point fuch magiftrates a^ he thinks will govern
with the greateft prudence : and having effefted
thefe things within the fpace of fix months, he
will again become a private man, without receiv-
ing any other reward for thefe actions, than that
of being honoured for having performed them.
Induced, therefore, by thele confiderations, and
convinced that this is the moft perfed; form of
government, debar the people from nothing -, hut
as you have granted them a power of choofing
the annual magiftrates, who are to prefide over
the
of Philofophers", ' J 87
the commonwealth, of confirming and repealing
laws, of declaring war, and making peace, which
are the greatefl and moft important affairs that
come under the confideration of our government,
not one of which you have fubmitted to the ab-
folute determination of the fenate, allow them,
in like manner, the power of trying offen-
ders, particularly iuch as are accufed of crimes
againft: the ftate, of raifing a fedition, of aiming at
tyranny, of concerting meafures with our enemies
to betray the commonwealth, or of any other
crimes of the like nature -, for the more formida-
ble you render the tranfgreffion of the laws, and
the alteration of difcipline, by appointing many
infpedors, and many guards over the infolent and
the ambitious, the more will your conftitution be
improved.'*
It is furprifing that Valerius fhould talk of an
equal mixture of monarchical, ariitocratical, and
democratical powers, in a commonwealth where
they v/ere lb unequally mixed as they were in
Rome. There can be no equal mixture without
a negative in each branch of the legiflature. But
one example of an equal mixture has ever exifted
in Europe, and that is in England. The confuls
in Rome had no negative; the people had a ne-
gative, bur a very unequal one, becaufe they had
not the lame time and opportunity for cool deli-
beration. The appointment of tribunes was a
very inadequate remedy. What match for a
Roman fenace was a iin^i-le mao-jftrate feated among-
them ? his abilities could not be equal ; his firm-
ncfs could not be always depended on : but what
is worfe, he was liable to be intimidated, flattered,
and bribed. It is really atlonifliing, that fuch
people as Greeks and Romans fliould ever have
thouglit four or five cpheri, or a fingle tribune,
an
itB Ancient Republics, ^c.
er a college of ten tribunes, an adequnre repre-
fentation of themfelves. If Valerius had pro-
pofed, that the ccnful fnould have been made an
integral part of the legiflature, and that the Ro-
man people fhould choofe another council of two
or three hundred, equally reprefenting them, to
be another integral part, he would then have feen,
that the appointment of a didator could never in
any cafe become riecciTary.
LETTER XXXIII.
ANCIENT REPUBLICS, AND OPINIONS
OF PHILOSOPHERS.
Plat.
My dear Sir,
PLATO has given us the mod accurate detail
of the natural viciflltudes of manners and
principles, the ufual progrefs of the paflions in
ibciety, and revolutions of governments into one
another.
In the fourth book of his Republic, he defcribes
his perfect commonwealth, where kings are phi-
lofophers, and phiiofophers kings : where the
whole city migh: be in the happieft condition,
and not any one tribe remarkably happy beyond
the refl: in one word, where the lazvs gcz'sm^ and
juitice is eftablifned: where the guarciians of the
Jaws are fuch in reality, and prelerve the confli-
tution, inilead of deftroying it, and promote the
happinefs of the whole city, not their own parti-
cularly : where the ilatc is cne, not many: where
there
Plato] iZg
there are no parties of the poor and the rich at war
with each other : where, if any defcendant of the
guardians be vicious, he is difmilTcd to the other
claffes, and if any defcendant of the others be
worthy, he is raifed to the rank of the guardians :
where education, the grand point to be attended
to, produces good geniufes, and good geniufes,
partaking of fuch education, produce ftill better
than the former: where the children, receiving
from their infancy an education agreeable to the
laws of the conftitution, grow up to be worthy
men, and obfervant of the laws : where the
fyftem, both of laws and education, are contrived
to produce the virtues of fortitude, temperance,
wifdom, and juftice, in the whole city, and in all
the individual citizens : where, if among the
rulers, or guardians of the laws, there be one
furpaffing the reft, it may be called a monarchy,
or kingly government, if there be fcveral, an
ariftocracy.
Although there is but one principle of virtue,
thofe of vice are infinite ; of which there are four
which delerve to be mentioned. There are as
many fpecies of foul as there are of republics:
five of each. That which is above dekribed is
one.
In the eighth book of his Republic he defcribes
the other four, and the revokuioiis from one to
another. The firft he calls the Cretan, or Spar-
tan, or the ambitious republic-, the fecond, oli-
garchy; the third, democracy; and the fourth,
tyranny, the lall difeafe of a city.
As republics are generated by the manners of
the people, to which, as into a current, all other
things are drawn, of nectfluy there mull be as
many fpecies of men, as of republics. We have
already, in tlie fourth book, gone over that which
we have pronounced to be good and jult. Wc
arf
Il9^ ^^cieni RepuhlicSy ^c.
are now to go over the contentious and ambitious
man, who is formed according to the Spartan
republic; and then, him relembling an oligarchy,
then the democratic , and then the tyrannic man,
that we may contemplate the mod unjuft man,
and fet him in oppofition to the moil jufl, that
our inquiry may be completed! The ambitious
republic is firft to be confidcied : it is indeed dif-
ficult for a city in this manner conilitutcd, i. e.
like Sparta, to be changed; but as every thmg
which is generated is liable to corruption^ even fuch
a conjlitution as this i^jHI not remain for ever, hut he
dijfolved. (I fhall pafs over a!l the aftrolcgical
and myflical whimfies which we meet with fo
often in Plato, interfperCed apjong the moft fub-
lime wifdom and profound knowledge, and infert
only what is intelligible.) The amount of v/hat
he fays in this place about numbers and mufic,
is, that miflakes will infenfibly be made in the
choice of perfons for guardians of the laws; and
by thefc guardians, in the rewards and promotion
of merit. They will not always expertly diflin-
guifh the feveral fpecies of geniufes, the golden,
the filver, the brazen, and the iron. Whilft iron
Ihall be mixed with filver, and brafs with gold,
dilTimilitude, and difcord arife, and generate war,
and enmity, and fedition. When fedition is rifen,
two of the fpecies of geniufes, the iron and brazen,
will be carried away after gain, and the acquifi-
tion of lands and houfes, gold and lilver. But the
golden and filver geniufes, as they are not in
want, but naturally rich, will lead the foul
towards virtue and the original conftitution.
Thus divided, drawing contrary ways, and living
in a violent manner, will not this republic be
in the middle, between ariftocracy and oligarchy,
imitating, in fome things, the former republic,
and in others oligarchy ? They will honour
their
Tlato] 191
tlieir rulers, their military will abftain from agri-
culture and mechanic arts -, they will have com-
mon meals, gymnaftic cxercifes, and contefts of
war, as in the former republic ; but they will be
afraid to bring wile men into the magiftracy, be-
caule they have no longer any fuch as are truly
fimple and inflexible, but fuch as are of a mixed
kind, more forward and rough, more fitted by
their natural genius for war than peace, efteeming
tricks and ftratagems , fuch as thefc fliall defire
wealth, and hoard up gold and filver, as thofe who
live in oligarchies. While they fpare their own,
they will love to fquander the fubftance of others
upon tlieir pleafures : They will fly from the
law, as children from a father, who have been
educated not by perfuafion but by force. Such
a republic, mixed of good and ill, will be mofl:
remarkable for the prevalence of the contentious
and ambitious fpirit.
What now fliall the man be, correspondent to
this republic ? He will be arrogant and rough
towards inferiors ; mild towards equals, but ex-
tremely fubmiflive to governors-, fond of dignity
and the magiftracy, but thinking that political
management, and military performances, not elo-
quence, nor any fuch thing, fhould entitle him to
them: while young he may defpife money, but
the older lie grows the more he will value it,
becaufe he is of the covetous temper, and not:
fincerely aflecled to virtue and reaion. Such an
ambitious youth refcmbles fucii a city, and is
formed fomehow in this manner: His father, a
worthy man, in an ill-regulated city, fliuns ho-
nours, and magiftracies, and law-fuits, and all pub-
lic bufmefs, that, as he can do no good, he may
have no trouble. The ion hears his mother
venting her indignation, and complaining that
192 ^Ancient Repuhlics, ^c'.
fhe is negle6led among other women, becaufe her
liufband is not in the magiftracy, nor attentive to
the making of money ; that he is unmanly and
remifs, and fuch other things as wives are apt to
cant over concerning fuch hufbands. The do-
meftics too privately fay the fame things to the
fons, ftimulating them to be more of men than
their father, and more attentive to their money.
When they go abroad they hear the fame things^
and fee that thofe who mind their own affairs are
called fimple, and fuch as mind not their affairs
are commended. The young man comparing
the condudl, fpeeches, and purfuits of his father
with thofe of other men, the one watering the
rational part of his foul, and the others the ccncu-
pifcible and irafcible, he delivers up the govern-
ment within himfelf to a middle power, that which
is irafcible and fond of contention, and fo he be-
comes a haughty and ambitious man. We have
now the fecond republic, and the fccond man.
This fecond republic will be fucceedcd by
oligarchy, founded on men's valuations, in which
the rich bear rule, and the poor have no fliare in
the government. The change from the ambi-
tious republic to oligarchy is made by that trea-
fury which every one has filled with gold: for
firfl of all they and their wives find out methods
of cxpence, and to this purpofe ftrain and dilpb, y
the laws, one obferving and riva'ling another, the
generality become of this kind ; and proceeding to
greater defires of making money, the more ho-
nourable they account this to be, the more will
virtue be thought difhonourable. Virtue is fo
different from wealthi that they always weigh
againft each other. Whilfl wealth and the wealthy
are held in honour in the city, both virtue and the
good muft be more difhonoured, and what is
honoured
Plato. 193
honoured is purfued, and what Is difhonoured is
negleded. Inftead then of ambitious men, they
will become lovers of gain. The rich they praife
and admire, and bring into the magiftrftqy, but
the poor man they defpife. They then make
laws, marking out the boundary of the conftitu-
tion, and regulating the quantity of oligarchic
power, according to the quantity of wealth ; more
to the more wealthy, and lefs to the lefs : fo that
he who hath not the valuation fettled by law is
to have no (hare in the government. What think
you of this conftitution? If we fliould appoint
pilots according to their valuation, but never
entruft a fhip with a poor man, though better
fkilled in his art, we fliould make very bad navi-
gation. 'Again, fuch a city is not one, but of
neccffity two-, one, confifcing of the poor, and
the other of the rich, dwelling in one place,
and always plotting againft one another. They
are, moreover, incapable to wage war, becaufe
of the necefllty they are under, either of em-
ploying the armed multitude, and of dreading
them more than the enemy, or to appear in bat-
tle, truely oligarchic, and at the lame time be
vinwiiling to advance money for the public fervice,
through a natural difpofition of covetoufnefs.
In luch a government almoft all are poor, ex-
cept the governors-, and where there are poor,
there are ibmewhere concealed thieves, and purfe-
cutters, and facrilegious perfons, and workers of
all other evils: thefe the magiftracy with dili-
gence and force rellrains : thefe arc drones in a
city with dangerous (lings.
This is oligarchy. Now let us confider the man
who refcmblcs it. The change from the ambi-
tious to the oligarchic man is chicliy in this man-
O ncr :
194- Ancient Repullics, ^c,
ner: The ambitious man, has a fon, who emu-
lates his father, and follows his fleps ; afterwards
he dafhes on the city, as on a rock, wafting his
fubftance in the office of a general, or fome other
principal magiftracy; then falling into courts
of juftice, deftroyed by fycophants, ftripped of
his dignities, difgraced, and lofing all his fub-
ftance. When he has thus fuffered, and loft his
fubftance, in a terror he pufties headlong from
the throne of his foul that ambitious difpofition;
and, being humbled by his poverty, turns to the
making of money, lives fparingly and meanly,
and applying to work, fcrapes together fubftance.
He then feats in that throne the avaricious difpo-
fition, and makes it a mighty king within himfelf,
decked out with Perfian crowns, bracelets, and
fcepters. Having placed the virtuous and ambi-
tious difpofition low on the ground, he reafons on
nothing but how lefler fubftance ftiall be made
greater, admires and honours nothing but riches
and rich people. This is the change from an
ambitious youth to a covetous one, and this is the
oligarchic man.
Democracy is next to be confidered, in what
manner it arifes, and what kind of man it pro-
duces when arifen. The change from oligarchv to
democracy is produced through the infatiable defire
of becoming as rich as polTible. As thofe who are
governors in it govern on account of their pofTefllng
great riches, they will be unwill'ng to reftrain by
law fuch of the youth as are dilfolute, from
having the liberty of fquandering and wafting
their fubftance -, that {o, by purchafing the fub-
ftance of fuch perfons, and lending them on
ufury, they may ftill become richer, and be held
in greater honour. While they negleft education,
and l\if?jr the youth to grow licentious, they
1 1 fome-
Plato. 105
fometimes lay under a necefTity of becoming poor,
fuch as are of no ungenerous difpofition : thefe
fit in the city, fome of thiem in debt, others in
contempt, hating and confpiring againft thofe
who poflfefs their fubftance, and with others very
defirous of a change. But the money-catchers,
ftill brooding over it, and drawing to themfclves
exorbitant ufury, fill the city with drones and
poor. They neglect every thing but maki:.-^; of
money, and make no more account of virtue than
the poor do. When thefe governors and their
fubje(5ts meet on the road, at public Ihovvs, in
military marches, as fellow foldiers or failors, or
in common dangers, the poor are by no means
contemned by the rich. A robuft fellow, poor and
funburnt, befide a rich man, bred up in the (hade,
fwoln With fiefn, and panting for breath, and in
agony in battle, thinks it is through his own and
his fellows fault that fuch men grow rich, and
fays. Our rich men are good for nothing. The
city foon grows into fedicion between the oligar-
chic and democratic parties; and the poor prevail-
ing over the rich, kill fome and banilh others, and
fliare the places in the republic, and the magiftra-
cies, equally among the remainder, and tor the
moft part the magKlracies are dilpofcd in it by
lot. \n what maiuicr do thefe live, and what lore
of republic is this? A democracy. The city is
full of all freedom of action and fpecch, and
liberty to do in it what any one inclines: ever/
one will regulate his own method of life in vviuit-
ever way he pleafes. In luch a republic v\ill
arife men of all kinds. Tliis is the finelt of all
republics, variegated like a robe with all kirds
ot flowers, and diverfihcd with all lorts of man-
ners. The multituJc, ic i:> likely, judge i!iis
republic the bed, like childrirn and won-icn gazii-.q;
O i a
igS Ancient Republics, ^c.
at variegated things. In truth it contains all kind's
of republics, and it appears neceflary for any
one, who wants to conftitute a city, as we do as
prefent, to come to a democratic city, as to a ge-
neral fair of republics, and choofc the form that
he fancies: he will not be in want of models.
Is not this a fweet and divine manner of life for
the prefent? To be under no neceffity to govern,
altiough you were able to govern ; nor to be
fubje(5t, unlefs you incline; nor to be engaged in
war when others are-, nor to live in peace when
others do fo, unlefs you be defirous of peace; and
though there be a law reftraining you from go-
verning or adminiftering juftice, to govern never-
thelefs, and adminifter juftice if you incline?
Have you not obferved, in fuch a republic, men
condemned to death or banifhment continuing
ftill, or returning like heroes, and walking up and
down openly, as if no one obferved them ? Is not
this indulgence of the city very generous, in mag-
nificently defpifing all care of education and dif-
cipline, and in not regarding from what fort of
purfuits one comes to adt in public affairs,
but honouring him, if he only fay he is well
afFefled towards the multitude? Thefe things, and
fuch as thefe ; are to be found in a democracy ; and
it would be a pleafant fort of republic, anar-
chical and variegated, diftributing a certain equa-
lity to all alike, without diO.indion.
Let us confider now the charader of a democra-
tical man, and how he arifes out of that parfimo-
nious one who, under the oligarchy, was trained
up by his father in his manners. Such a one by
force governs his own pleafures, which are expen-
five, and tend not to making money, and are called
unnecefiary. Eating, fo far as conduces to pre-
fcrve; life, health, and a good habit of body, is a
plea-
Plato. 197
pkafureof thenecefiarykind: butthedefireof thcfe
things beyond thefe purpofes, is capable of being
curbed in youth -, and, being hurtful to the body and
to the foul, with reference to herattainingwifdom and
temperance, may be called unnecelTary : in the fame
manner we fhail fay of venereal defires, and others.
We juft now denominated a drone the man who
was full of fuch defires and pleafures -, but the
oligarchic man, him who was under the neceffary
ones. The democratic appears to arife from the
oligarchic man in this manner: When a young
man, bred up without proper inft:ru6tion, and in
a parfimonious manner, comes to tafte the honey
of the drones, and aflbciates with thofe vehemenc
and terrible creatures, who are able to procure
pleafures every way diverfified, from every quar-
ter ; thence imagine there is the beginning of a
change io him, from the oligarchic to the demo-
cratic. And as the city was changed by the
afllllance of an alliance from without, with one
party of it, with which it was of kin, (liall not the
youth be changed in the lame manner, by the
alTiiftance of one i'pecies of defires from without,
to another within him, which refemble.s it, and is
akin to it? By all means. If any afTiftance be
given to the oligarchic party within him, by his
father, or the others ot his family, adinonifliing
and upbraiding him, then truly ariles ledition and
oppofition, and a fight within him, with himfelf.
Sometimes the democratic party yields to the
oligarchic , fome of the defires are deftroyed,
others retire, on the rife of a certain modefty in the
foul of the youth, and he is again rendered
fomcwhat decent. Again, when fome defires re-
tire, there are others akin to them, which grow
up, and through inattention to the father's in-
ifrudions, become both many and powerful,
O 3 draw
1 98 Ancient Repuhlics, &c.
draw towards intimacies among themfclves, and
generate a multitude, feize the citadel of the foul
of the youth, finding it evacuated of noble learning
and purfuits, and of true reafoning, which are the
bed watchmen and guardians in the underftand-
ings of men beloved of the gods -, and then falfe
and boailing reafonings and opinions, rufhing up
in their fiead, pofu-fs the fame place in fuch a
one. Thefe fa'.le and boafting reafonings, deno-
minating modefty to be fiupidity -, temperance, un-
inanlinefs ; moderation, rufticii:y; decent expence,
illiberality , thruft them all out difgracefully, and
expel them their territories, and lead in in triumph
tnfolence and anarchy, and luxury and impu-
dence, with encorniupns and applaufes, fhining
with a great retinue, and crcvvned with crowns.
Inlolence they denominate education , anarchy, li-
berty , luxury, magnificence , and impudence,
manhood. In this manner, a youth bred up witii
the neceffary defires changes into the licentiouf-
nefs and remiiTnefs of the unneceiTary and unprofit-
able pleafures ; his lire is not regulated by any or-
der, but deeming it pleafanr, free, and happy, he
puts all laws whatever on a level ; like the city,
he is fine and variegated, and mjany men and wo-
men too would defire to imitate his life, as he
hath in him a great many patterns of republics
and of mianners.
It remains, that we go over the mofl excellent
republic, which is tyranny, and the moPc excellent
man, who is the tyrant. The change is from de-
mocracy to tyranny, as from oligarchy to demo-
cracy. An infatiable defire of riches, and a ne-
glecl of other things, through attention to making
money, dellroys oligarchy , and an infatiable
thirfl: of liberty dellroys deinocracy. When a
city is under a detrjociacy, and is thirfting after li-
ber ty.
Plato'. 199
berty, and happens to have bad cup-bearers, and
grows drunk with an unmixed draught of it, be-
yond what is necefiliry, it punifhes even the go-
vernors, if they will not be entirely tame, and af-
ford a deal of liberty, accufinjr them as corrupted,
and leaning towards oligarchy. Such as are obe-
.dient to magiftrates are abufed, as willing flaves,
and good for nothing. Magiftrates who refemble
fubjecls, and fubje(Sts who refemble magiftrates,
are commended and honoured, both in public and
private-, in fuch a city they of ncceffity foon go
to the highefc pitch of liberty, and this inbred
anarchy dclcends into private families. The fa-
ther refcmbles the child, and is afraid of his fons.
The fons accuftom themfelves to refemble the
father, and neither revere nor ftand in awe of their
parents. Strangers are equalled with citizens.
The teacher fears and flatters the fcholars, and
che fcholars defpife their teacliers and tutors. The
youth refemble the more advanced in years, and
rival them in words and deeds. The old men,
fitting down with the young, are full of merri-
ment and pleafantry, mimicking the youth, that
they may not appear to be morofe and dcfpotic.
The flaves are no lefs free than thofc who purchafe
them ; and wives have a perfedt equality and li-
berty with their hufbands, and hufbands with
their wives. The fum of all ihefe things, colledled
together, make the fouls of the citizens fo delicate,
that if any one bring near to them any thing of
flavery, they are filled with indignation, and can-
not endure it ; and at length they regard not the
laws^ written or unwritten, that no one whatever,
by any manner of mearvs, may become their maf-
ter. This is that government fo beautiful and
youthful, whence tyranny fprings. But any
thing in cxcefs, in anipnal or vc2etabi<? bodies,
Q 4 in
20O Ancient Republics, ^c.
in feafons or in republics, is wont to occaHon a
mighty change to the reverfe ; and excefiive li-
berty feems to change into nothing but excefiive
flavery, both with a private perfon and a city.
Thus licentioufnefs defbroys the democracy. Out
of no other republic is tyranny conftituted but
out of democracy -, and out of the mod excefiive
liberty, the greatefl: and mofi: favage flavery. The
race of idle and profufe men, one part of which
was more brave, and were leaders, the ether more
cowardly, and followers, we compared to drones,
fome with filings, others with none. Thefe two
fpringing up in a republic, raife difturbance,
as phlegm and bile in a natural body. Let us
divide a democratic city into three, as it really is ;
for one fuch fpecies as the above grows through
licentioufnefs in it, no lefs than in the oligarchic,
but is much more fierce: in oligarchy, becaufe it
is not in places of honour, but is debared from the
magifi:racies, it is unexercifed, and does not be-
come ftrong J but in a democracy this is the pre-
fiding party, excepting a few; and now it fays
and does the mofi outrageous things. Some other
party is now always feparated from the multitude;
and while the whole are fomehow in purfuit of
gain, fuch as are the mofi: temperate become the
wealthieft, and have the greatefl quantity of ho-
ney ; hence the greatefi; quantity of honey, and
what comes with the greatefl: eafe, is prefixed
out of thefe by the drones. Such wealthy peo-
ple are the pafture of the drones. The people
who mind their own aff^airs, and meddle not with
any others, who have not much property, but
yet are the mofi: numerous, and the moft pre-
valent in democracy, whenever it is fully ajjemlledj
would be a third fpecies : but it will not often
fully aflTemble, if it does not get fome fi:iarc of the
honey. It does, however, always get a fliare, for
their
Plato. 20 1
their leaders rob thofe who have fubftance, and
give it to the people, that they may have the moll
themfelves. Thefe, then, who are thus defpoiled,
are obliged to defend themfelves, faying and doing
all they can among the people. Others, Then, give
them occafion to form defigns againft the people,
and fo they become oligarchic, even although they
fliould have no inclination to introduce a change
of government : thence they go to accufations,
law-fuits, and contefts, one with another, the lead-
ers flandering, and the drones (tinging.
The people are wont always to fet fome one in
a confpicuous manner over themfelves, to cherifh
him, and greatly to increafe his power. When-
ever a tyrant rifes, it is from this root, and from
nothing elfe, that he bloff-)ms. What then is the
beginning of a change, from a prefident into a ty-
rant ? The wolf in the temple of Arcadia, dedi-
cated to Lycsan Jupiter, had this infcription,
** That whoever tailed human entrails, mixed with
other facrifices, necefiarily became a wolf.*' la
the fame manner, he who, being prefident of the
people, and receiving an extremely fubmiffive
multitude, abftaineth not from kindred blood,
but unjuftly accufing them, and bringing them
into courts of juftice, ftains himfelf with blood-
fhed, and banifhes and flays, and propofes the abo-
lition of debts, and divifion of lands j mud not
fuch a one either be deftroyed by his enemies, or
exercife tyranny, and, from being a man, become
a wolf? He now becomes feditious towards thofe
who have fubftance, and when he fails he goes
againlt his enemies with open force, and becomes
an accompliflied tyrant , and if they be unable to
expel him, or put him to death by an accufation
before the city, they confpire to cut him off pri-
vately, by ^ violent death. On this account, all
ihofe
2C2 Ancient Republics, ^c.
thofe who mount up to tyranny invent the celcx-
brated tyrannical demand of the people, certain
guards for their perfons, that the alTiftance of the
people may be fecured to them. The people,
afraid of his fafety, but fee u re as to their ov/n,
grant them. Then thofe who have fubftance,
and the crime of hating the people, fly ; and if
any one of them is caught, he is put to death.
This prefident of a city, thus not behaving like
a truely great man, tumbles dov/n many others,
and fits in his chair a confumm.ate tyrant, inftead
of a prefident of the city. Confider now the hap-
pinefs of the man and the city in which fuch a
mortal arifes : in the firft days, he fmiles, and fa-
lutes every one he meets, fays he is no tyrant, pro-
mifes many things, both in private and in public,
frees from debts, diftributes lands, both to the peo-
ple in general and thofe about him, affects to be
mild and of the patriot fpirit towards all. But
when he has reconciled to himfelf fome of hisforeic-n
enemies, and tranquillity is reilored, he raifes wars,
that the people may want a leader, and that, being
rendered poor by the payrnent of taxes, they may
be under a neceflity of becoming intent on a daily
fuftenance, and lefs ready to confpire againft him.
If he fufpects any of them, who are of free fpirits,
will not allow him to govern, in order to have
fome pretext for defiroying them, he expofes them
to the enem.y. On thefe accounts, a tyrant is al-
ways under a neceflity of raifing war. While he
is doing thefe things, he muft become more hate-
ful to his citizens : fome of thofe who have been
promoted along v/ith him, and are in power, fpeak
out freely, both to him and among themfelves,
finding fault with the tranfactions. It behoves the
tyrant then to cut ofl^ all thofe who are of a more
manly fpirit, if he means to govern, till lie leave
r.Q
Plato, 203
no one, friend or foe, worth any thing; he muft
carefully obferve who is courageous, magnani-
mous, wife, rich, and of neceffity he muft be an
enemy to all thefe, and lay fnares, until he cleanfe
the city of them. Thus he muft live with wicked
people, and be hated by them too, or not live at
all -, the more he is hated, the more guards he will
want. But the worthy men being deftroyed, the
worft muft be his guards. What a blefied pof-
feflion! But this army of the tyrant, fo beautiful,
fo numerous, and multiform, muft be maintained.
If there be any lacred things in the city, thefe they
will fpend, and the people obliged to pay the
lighter taxes. When thefe fail, he and his drunken
companions and afibciatcs, male and female, fhall
be maintained out of the paternal inheritance; and
the people who have made the tyrant fhall nourifh.
him. It the people be enraged, and lay that they
did not make him to be (laves to his flaves, but
that they might be fet at liberty from the rich in
the city, who are now called good and worthy
men, and order him and his companions to be
gone out of the city, as a father drives out of his
houfe his fon, with his tumultuary, drunken com-
panions ; then indeed the people Ihall know what
a beaft they are themfelves, and what a beaft they
have generated, hugged, and bred up. While
they are the weaker, they attempt to drive out the
ilronger. The tyrant v^ill ftrip them of their ar-
mour. The people, defending themfelves againft
the fmoke of flavery, have fallen into the fire of
dcfpotifm i inftead of that excelTive and unfeafon-
able liberty, embracing tlie moft rigorous and
wretched flavery of bondmtfj. I'hus, to fpeak
modeftly, v/e have fufFiciently fliewn how tyranny
arifes out of democracy, and what it is after it
is rifen.
END or THE EIGHTH iOOK.
THE
204 Ancient Republics ^ ^c.
THE NINTH BOOK.
THE tyrannical man himfelf remains yet to
be confidereci, in what manner he arifes out
of the democratic, and what kind of man he is,
and whether he is wretched or happy ; of thofe
pleafures and defires which are not nccefTary, fome
are repugnant to laia; thefe indeed appear to fpring
up in every one, but being chajlifed by the laws^
and the better defires, along with reafon, they
either forfake fome men altogether, or are lefs in
number, and feeble ^ in others they are in greater
number, and more powerful. Thefe lawlefs
defires are fuch as are excited in fleep, when the
rational part of the foul which governs it is afleep,
and the part which is brutal and favage, being
filled with meats and drunkennefs, friflvs about,
and pufhing away fleep, wants to go and accom-
plifh its practices i in fuch a one it dares to do
every thing, as being loofed and difengaged from
all modefty and difcretion , for it fcruplcs not the
embraces, as it imagines, of gods, men, or beads ;
nor to kill any one ; in one word, is wanting in
no folly nor impudence. There is in every one
a certain fpecies of defires, which is terrible, fa-
vage, and irregular, even in fome who feem to us
to be entirely moderate.
Recolledl now what kind of man we faid the
democratic one was; educated from his infancy
under a parfimonious father, who valued the
avaricious defires alone ; but being afterwards
converfant with thofe who are more refined, run-
ning into their manner, and all fort of infolence,
from a deteftation of his father's parfimony , how-
ever, having a better natural temper than thofe
who corrupt him, and being drawn oppofite ways, '
he fettles into a manner in the middle of both, and
participating moderately, as he imagines, of eac|^
8
J^lato. 205
of them, he leads a life neither illiberal nor licen-
tious, becoming a democratic man from an arifto-
cratic. His fon is educated in his manners, but
the fame things happening to him as to his father,
he is drawn into all kinds of licentioufnefs, which
is termed, however, by thofe who draw him off,
the moft complete liberty. His father, the do-
meftics, and others, are aiding to thofe defires
which are in the middle: but when the tyrant-
makers have no hopes of retaining the youth in
their power any other way, they contrive to ex-
cite in him a certain love, which prefides over the
indolent defires, and fuch as minifter readily to
their pieafures ; and when other defires make a
noife about him, full of theit- odours and per-
fumes, and crowns and wines, and the pleafures of
the moft diffolute kind, then truly he is fur-
rounded with miadnefs -as a life guard, and that
prefident of the foul rages with phrenzy, till he
kills all modefty, is cleanJed of temperance, and
filled with additional madnefs. This is the for-
mation of a tyrannical man. After this there are
feaftings among them, and reveliings, banquetting,
and miftreffes, and all fuch things as may be ex-
peded where the tyrants love, drunkennefs, and
madnefs, govern ail in the foul, ii'^ter this there
is borrowing and pillaging of fubftance, and
fearching for every thing which they are able, by
rage and phrenzy, deceit and violence, to carry off;
pillfering and beguiling parents. When the fub-
ftance of father and niother fails, he will break
into houfes, rob in the ftreers, riile temples. Thofe
defires which heretofore were only loofe from their
Slavery in deep, when he was yet under the laws
and his father, when under democratic government,
now when he is tyrannized over by his pafTions,
fhall be equally as loufc when he is awake, and
from
4o6 Ancient Republics, and Opinions
from no horrid flaughter or deed fhall he abftain ;
but the tyrant within him, living without any rejlraint
of law and government^ fhall lead him on to every
rnad attempt. Such as thefe eftablifh as tyrant,
the man who among them hath himfelf mofl of
the tyrant, and in greateft ftrength within his own
foul. If the city relufts, he fhall bring in other
young people, and chaftife his formerly beloved
mother and father country^ as the Cretans lay. But
liberty and true friendfiiip the tyrannic difpofition
never tafted. Let us finifh then our worft man.
He will be awake fuch as we defcribed him afleep,
and he who appears the moft wicked, fliall really
be the moft wretched ; as many men as mjany
minds; as city is to city, as to virtue and happi-
nefs, fo will man be to man , kingly government
is the beft, and tyranny is the worft. No city is
more wretched than that which is under tyranny,
nor any more happy than that under regal power.
Both the city and the tyrant fhall be llavifh, poor,
timorous ; and you v/ill find more lamentations
and groans, weepings and torments, than in any
other city. We jhould not merely ccnjc^lure about
matters of fuch importance, but moft thoroughly enquire
into them, by reajoning of this kind, for the enquiry is
concerning the moft important w.atter, a good life and
a bad.
Such private men as are rich, and poflefs many
flaves, have this refemblance at leaft of tyrants,
that they rule over many : if they live fecurely,
and are not afraid of their domeftics, it is becaufe
the whole city gives affiftance to each particular
man : but if a god fhould lift a man, his wife and
children, with fifty flaves, out of the city, and let
them down in a defrtrt, in what kind of fear would
he be about himfelf, his wife and children, left
they fhould be deftroyed by the domeftics !
Such,
of Philofophers. 207
Such, and much worfe, is the tyrant in his
tyrannical city, envious, faithlefs, cowardly, un-
juft, unfriendly, unholy, and a fink and breeder
of all wickednefs.
Now tell me which is the firft and which the
laft, as to happinefs, the regal, the ambitious, the
oligarchic, the democratic, and the tyrannic man
and city. The befl and jufteft is the happieft.
Thus, Sir, you have fome of Plato's fentiments
of morals and politics, how much they are to Mr.
Turgot's purpofe, we may (hew in another letter;
mean time I am, &c.
LETTER XXXIV.
My dear Sir,
IPromifed you to add to the refearches of Po-
ly bius and Plato, concerning the mutability
of governments, thofe of Sir Thomas Smith, who,
as he tells us, on the 28th of March, 1565, in
the 7th of Eliz. and 51(1 year of his age, was
ambalTador from that queen to the court of France,
and then publiflicd " The Commonwealth of
England," not as Pinto made his Republic, Xeno-
phon his Kingdom of PeiTia, or Sir Thomas Moore
his Utopia, feigned commonwealths, fuch as never
were nor fhall be, vain imaginations, phantafies
of philofophers, but as England ftood, and was
governed at that day.
In his 7th chapter, and the two following, he
gives us his opinion of the origin of a kingdom,
an
%o8 Ancient RepuhlicSi and Opinions
an ariftocracy, and democracy. The third ht
fuppofes to grow naturally out of the fecond, and
the fecond out of the firft, which originated in
patriarchal authority. But as there is nothing
remarkable, either in favour of our fyftem or
againfl it, I fhould not have quoted the book in
this place, but for the fake of its title. The con-
ftitution of England is in truth a republic, and
has been ever fo confidered by foreigners, and by
the mod learned and enlightened Englifhmen,
although the word commonwealth has become
\inpopular and odious, fince the unfuccefsful and
injudicious attempts to abolilli monarchy and
ariftocracy, between the years 1640 and 1660.
Let us proceed then to make a few obfervations
upon the Difcourfes of Plato and Poiybius, and
fhew how forcibly they prove the neceffity of per-
manent laws, to reftrain the pafTions and vices of
men, and to fecure to the citizens the blefiings
of fociety, in the peaceable enjoyment of their
lives, liberties, and properties i and the neceffity
of different orders of men, with various and op-
pofite powers, prerogatives, and privileges, to
watch over one another, to balance each other,
and to compel each other at all times to be real
guardians of the laws.
Every citizen muft look up to the laws, as his
mafter, his guardian, and his friend; and when-
ever any of his fellow citizens, whether magiftrates
or fubjefts, attempt to deprive him of his right,
he muft appeal to the laws ; if the ariftocracy
encroach, he muft appeal to the democracy j if
they are divided, he muft appeal to the monarchical
power to decide between them, by joining with
that which adheres to the laws , if the democracy
is on the fcramble for power, he muft appeal to
the ariftocracy, and the monarchy, which by unit-
cf Philofophers. 209
in^ may reftrain it. If the regal authority pre-
lumes too far, he mufl: appeal to the other two.
Without three dlvifions of power, ftationed to
watch each other, and compare each other's con-
duct with the laws, it will be impoflible that
the laws fhould at all times preferve their autho-
rity, and govern all men.
Plato has fufficiently aflerted the honour of the
laws, and the necefTity of proper guardians of
them; but has no where delineated the various
orders of guardians, and the neceflity of a ba-
lance between them : he has, nevcrthelefs, given
us premifes from whence the abfolute necefTity of
fuch orders and equipoifes may be inferred ; he
has (hewn how naturally every fimple fpecies of
government degenerates. The ariftocracy, or am-
bitious republic, becomes immediately an oligar-
chy What Ihall be done to prevent it ? Place
two guardians of the laws to watch the arifto-
cracy : one, in the Ihape of a king, on one fide
of it ; another, in the fhape of a democratical
aflembly, on the other fide. The ariftocracy, be-
come an oligarchy, changes into a democracy -v
How ftiall it be prevented .? By giving the na-
tural ariftocracy in fociety its rational and juft
weight, and by giving it a regal power to ap-
peal to, againft the madnefs of the people. De-
mocracy becomes a tyranny How fhall this be
prevented ? By giving it an able independent ally
in an ariftocratical allembly, with whom it may
unite againft the unjuft and illegal defigns of any
one man.
LETTER
210 Ancient Bemocratical RepuUici,
LETTER XXXV.
ANCIENT DEMOCRATICAL
REPUBLICS.
CARTHAGE.
My dear Sir,
IN order to fhew the theory of Socr&tes, as re*
ported by Plato, in a clearer light , and to be
convinced, that he has not exaggerated in his de-
fcription of the tnutability in the characters of
men^ and the forms of government ; we fhould
look into the hiftory of thofe ancient republics^
from whence he drew his obfervations and rea-
fonings. Although it is probable that Greece
was his principal theatre, yet we may reafonably
fuppofe that Carthage, and a multitude of other
republics in Italy, befides that of Rome, were
not unknown to him.
The hiftory of Greece fhould be to our coun-
trymen, what is called in many families on the
continent a boudoir , an odagonal apartment in a
houfe, with a full-length mirror on every fide,
and another in the cieling. The ufe of it is,
when any of the young ladies, or young gentle-
men if you will, are at any time a little out of
humour, they may retire to a place where, in
whatever direction they turn their eyes, they fee
their own faces and figures multiplied without
end. By thus beholding their own beautiful per-
fonSj
Carthage, 2 1 1
Tons, and feeing at the fame time the deformity
brought upon them by their anger, they may re-
cover their tempers and their charms together.
A few fhort fl'ietches of the ancient republics
will ferve to fliew, not only that the orders wc
defend were common to all of them , that the
profperity and duration of each was in propor-
tion to the care taken to bahvice them \ and that
they all were indebted, for their frequent fedi-
tlons, the rife and progrefs of corruption, and
their decline and fall, to the imperfection of their
orders, and their defcds in the balance.
As there are extant no writings of any Cartha-
ginian phiiofopher, ilatefman, or hiftorian, we
have no exact information concerning the form of
their commonwealth, but what appears in a few-
hints of Greek and Roman authors. Their com-
merce and riches, their empire of the fea, and
extenfive dominion of two thoufand miles on the
fea-coaft, their obilinate military contelts with
Rome, and the long duration of their govern-
ment, prove both that their population and power
were very great, and their conllitution good ; ef-
pecially as, for the fpace of five hundred years,
their tranquillity was never interrupted by Jedi-
tion, nor their liberties attempted by the ambi-
tion of any of their citizvrns.
The national charader was military, as well as
commercial ; and, although they were avaricious,
they were not effeminate.
The monarchical power was in two fufurtc^,
the ariftocratical in the fenate, and thedcniocia-
tical was held by the people in a body. Thefe
are faid to have been nicely balanced, l>ut wc
know not in what manner. The chief magiflrates
were annually eledcd by the people. Tne fena-
i"' 2 tors
2 1 2 Ancient Democraticd Republics.
tors were elected too, and, although it is not cer-
tain, it is mod probable, by the people ; but it
appears, that three qualifications were indifpen-
fable in every fenator birth, merit, and wealth :
this laft requifite rendered commerce honourable,
even in the firft of the patricians and fenators
themfelves, and animated the commercial genius
of the nation. This government thus far refem-
bles thofe of the United States of America more
than any other of the ancient republics, perhaps
more than any of the modern : but when we en-
quire for the balance, it is not to be found. The
fuffetes had not more authority than Roman con-
fuls ; they had but a part of the executive power,
and none of the legiflative : much of the execu-
tive, and all the legiflative, was in the fenate and
people."^ The balance then could only be between
thefe two. Now it is impofTible to balance two
afTemblies, without introducing a third power ;
one or other will be moft powerful, and, which-
ever it is, it will continually fcramble till it gets
the whole : in fad, the people here had the
whole, as much as in any of our fiates ; fo that
while the citizens were uncorrupted, and gave
their votes honeftly for fuffetes and fenators, all
went well i and it is extremely remarkable, that
with all their acknowledged eagernefs for money,
this people were fo many centuries untainted with
luxury and venality ; and preferved their primi-
tive frugality of manners, and integrity in elec-
tions. As to the Roman accufations of infmce-
rity, there is no more reafon to believe them,
than there would be to believe a Carthaginian
who fliould retort the reproach. This, as well
as other inftances, may lead us to doubt the uni-
verfality of the do(^rine, that commerce corruprs
manners.
Carthage. 213
manners. There was another remarkable in-
fticution, that the fenate fhould always be un-
animous , and if any one fenator infilled upon
his own opinion, againft: all the reft, there could
be no decifion, but by an appeal to the people.
This again gave a ftrong democratical caft
to the conftitution. Such a tendency could only
be balanced by the laws, which, requiring a large
fortune for every fenator and public officer, in
order to fupport his dignity, and fecure him
againft the temptations to corruption, confined
the choice to the firft families and abilities united.
This was liable to great objeflion ; becaufe
great abilities might often be pofTefled by men of
obfcurer original, and fmaller property, who
were thereby excluded. To this law, neverthe-
lefs, may be afcribed the duration of the re-
public.
Another remarkable check, which was perhaps
the original model from whence the Venetian in-
quifition was copied, was a committee of one
hundred and four members of the fenate, ap-
pointed to w^tch the ambition of the great fami-
lies. To this body all their admirals and gener
rals were required to render an account of their
condudl at the end of every year.
Out of this body were elected a fub-committee
of five, who had very great power : their office
was for life; and they filled up their own vacan-
cies out of the one hundred and four, and all
the vacancies, even in the one hundred and four,
out of the fenate-, they had the fupreme tribu-
nal of criminal jurifdidtion. This power muft
have been terrible to all ; to' the people, fenate,
and fuffetes , yet it was the check which pre-
ierved the ilate from fedition and convulfions.
I' 3 It
214 Ancient Democratkal Repuhlics.
It grew unpopular ; and the law which at laft
made it annual and eledive, probably laid the
foundation of the ruin of the commonwealth, by
changing the balance, and introducing the domi-
mt'io phhis. The balances in thi?, the moll: demo-
cratical n-public of antiquity, contrived by the
people themillves to temper their own power,
are extremtrly reniarkable : the fuffetes reprefent-
ed, like i\\t ccnluls at l\ome, the mnjcfty of the
commonwealth, and had a fliare of executive au-
thority , tlie council of five had criminal jurifdic-
tion, and inouifitorial power j the one hundred
and four were a body chofen out of the fcnate,
by the five, for their I'upport-, then comes the
fenate ar large , and, lalt of all, the people at
large. Here are five orders completely diflind:,
befides the necelTary k-gal qualification of great
wealth : yet all thefe checks, although they pre-
ferved the ftate five hundred years, could not
prolong its period above \t\t\-\ hundred \ becaufe,
after all, the balance was not natural, nor effec-
tual. The executive power was not feparatcd
from the kgiflative-, nor the different parts of the
legiflature properly divided or balanced : the ex-
ecutive power and judicial were both chiefly in
legiflative hands.
The noble families, thus fecured in poffefiion
both of legifiative and executive pov/er, could
not be reftrained by all the ligaments which had
been contrived to preferve the equipoife betVv'een
thcmi and tlie people : they divided into two fac-
tions, with the family of Hanno at the head of
one, and that of Barcas of the other ^ firil at-
tacked the council of five, whofe power was un-
popular, as well as cdicjs to the r.obles -, eafily
procured a ].iw to make that annually elcci.ive,
or.
Carthage, 215-
or, in other words, an inflrument always in the
hands of the prevailing fa6lion, as fuch a fmall
body, fo changeable, muft ever be , and over-
turned the conftitution. The R.omans had all.
the advantage of thefe difienfions in the war, by
v/hich they finally deftroyed their rival power fo
ciFcdually, that fcarce a trace of it remains to be
feen, even in ruins. Their virtues were not ex-
tinguiilied to the laft, and foine of the greatelt
examples of patriotifm and heroifm were exhi-
bited even in their expiring agonies.
LETTER XXXVI.
ANCIENT ARISTOCRATICA]L
REPUBLICS.
ROME.
My dear Sir,
lONYSIUS HalicarnafTenfis has not only
D
given US his own judgment, that the moft
perfect form of government is that which con-
fifts of an equal mixture of monarchy, ariftocra-
cy, and democracy, in the fpeech which he puts
into the mouth of Valerius, but has repeated the
fame fentiment, in his own name, in other parts
of his work. In the fcventh fe<5tion of his fe-
CQn4 book of the Roman Antiquities, he fays
P4 of
2 1 6 Ancient Arijiocratical Republics.
of Romulus, that he was extremely capable of
inftituting the moft perfe6l form of govern-
ment. And again, " I fliall firft fpeak of the
form of government he inftituted, which I look
upon, of all others, to be the moft felf-fuffi-
cient to anfwer all the ends both of peace and
war." This is a mixture of monarchy, arifto-
cracy, and democracy, extolled by Polybius -, and
is nearly the fame with that of Lycurgus, infti-
tuted at Sparta about a hundred years before.
As the conftitutions of Rome and Sparta lafted
fo many centuries longer than others of Greece
and Italy, and produced effcfls fo amazing upon
the human charafler, we may rationally afcribe
that duration, and thofe eiFecls, to this compofi-
tion, although the balance v/as very imiperfefl in
both. The legal power, both of the kings and
people, in both, were uneoAial to that of the fe-
nate, and therefore the predominant character in
both was ariftocracy. In Sparta, the influence
of the nionarchy and democracy was derived
chiefly from the oath taken by the kings and
ephori to fupport each other, -An authority
founded thus in opinion, in religion, or rather
fuperftition, not in legal power, would keep the
fenate in feme awe, but not in any certain re-,
ftraint.
Romulus divided all the people into three
parts, and appointed a perfon of the firft rank to
be the chief of each of them. Then he fubdi-
vided each of thefe into ten others, and appoint-
ed as many of the braveft men to be the leaders
of thefe. The greater divifions he called tribes,
and the lefler curiae : the commanders of the
tribes were called tribuni ; and thofe of the cu-
riae, cunoqes, He then divided th? land into
thirty
Rome, 217
thirty portions, and gave one of them to each
curia. He diftinguiflied thofe who were eminenc
for their birth, virtues, and riches ; and to thefe
he gave the name of fathers. The obfcure, the
mean, and the poor, he called plebeians, in imi-
tation of the government at Athens, where, at
that time, thofe who were diftinguiflied by their
birth and fortune were called " well-born," to
whom the adminiftration of government was com-
mitted ; and the reft of the people, who had no
fliare in it, *' hufbandmen." Romulus appoint-
ed the patricians to be priefts, magiftrates, and
judges. The inftitution by which every plebeian
was allowed to choofe any patrician for his pa-
tron, introduced an intercourfe of good offices
between thefe orders, made the patricians emulate
each other in afts of civility and humanity to
their clients, and contributed to preferve the
peace and harmony of Rome in fo remarkable
a manner, that in all the contefts which happened
for fix hundred and twenty years, they never pro-
ceeded to bloodfhed.
The king, according to the inftitution of
Romulus, had feveral important funftions, viz.
I. Supremacy in religion, ceremonies, facrilices,
and worfliip. 2. The guardianlliip of the laws,
and adminiftration of juftice, in all cafes, whe-
ther founded on the law of nature, or the civil
law : he was to take cognizance of the greateft
crimes in perfon, leaving the Icfler to the fenate j
and to oblerve, that no errors were commitred in
their judgments : he was to affemble both the fe-
nate and the people ; to deliver his opinion firft,
and purfue the relolutions of the majority. Ro-
mulus, however, wifely avoided that remarkable
Spartan abfwrdity, of two kings.
The
1 1 8 .^ncient Arijiocratical Repuhlics^
The fenate were to deliberate, and determine,
by a majority of votes, all queftions which the
Icing fnould propofe to them. This inftitution
alfo Romulus took from the conftitution of the
Lacedaemonians. The kings, in both conftitu-
tions, were fo far from being abfolute, that they
had not the whole executive power, nor any ne-
gative upon the legiflature ; in fhort, the whole
power of the government was veiled in the fe-
nate.
The people had three privileges ; to choofe
magiftrates (yet all the great employments muft
be confined to the patricians) j to enadt laws ; and
to determine concerning war, when propofed by
the king : but the concurrence of the fenate be-
ing neceifary to give a fanftion to their decifions,
their power was not without controul.
To fsparate the executive from the legiflative
power, and the judicial from both, and to give the
king, the fenate, and people, each a negative in
the legiflature, is fo fmiple, and to us appears fo
obvious an improvement of this plan, that it is
furprifing it did not occur to Romulus, as well
as to Lycurgus : but, in thofe early times, per-
haps neither kings, nor nobles, nor people, were
willing to have their prerogatives and privileges
fo exadlly afcertained. The nobles, in both na-
tions, had almoft all the influence, and were no
doubt as jealous of royal as they were of popu^
lar power. It is certain that, although the go-
vernment was called monarchical, it was in rea-
lity ariftocratical in an high degree. There is a
remarkable example of ariftocratical art, in the
manner of obtaining the determination of the
people : they were not permitted to vote in one
common affembly j they were called in their cu-
Rome. 219
rins ; the majority of votes in a curia decided its
voice-, and a majority of curias was the refolve
of the whole people.
Had Romulus died in peace, and lefc a Ton,
his monarchy would probably have defcended in
his family ; but a conteH; arofe immediately here
(as it has done in all other nations where the peo-
ple had not a negative, and where the executive
power has been partly in the hands of a king,
and partly in a fenate) betv/een the king and the
nobles , and Romulus was put to death by the
patricians, for aiming, as they pretended, at more
power than his fliare. This enabled the patri-
cians to carry their firft point , for it is always
the firH: point of the ariftocracy to make the firft
magiftrate elective : in this they are always at
firft joined by the people , but, after feeing the
ufe which the nobles make of thefe eledlions a
few times, the people themfelves have always
made it hereditary.
Numa was chofcn, a man of peace, piety, and
humanity, v/ho had addrefs enough to make the
nobles and people believe that he was married to
the goddefs Egeria, and received from his celef-
tial conforc all iiis laws and meafures.
TuUus I-Joftilius, a man ot great merit, was
chofen in his ftead ; but after a glorious, at leaft
a viftorious, reign of thirty-two years, was mur-
dered by the patricians, headed by Ancus Mar-
cius, grandfon of Numa by his only daughter,
who thought his family-right prior to that of
TuUius.
Ancus was elc*5lcd king, and died a natural
death.
Liicius Tarquinius, after a reign of thirty-
eight years, in which he had enlarged the terri-
tory, beautified the city, and fhewn himfelf wor-
220 Ancient Arijiocratical Republics .
thy of the crown, was aflafllnated in his palace
by the two Tons of Ancus Marcius, who had
learned the family policy : but their project was
unfortunate ; the people loved Lucius, executed
the inllruments of the murder, baniihed the two
fons of Ancus, and confifcated their eftates.
Servius Tullius, who had married the daugh-
ter of Lucius, was now elevated to the throne
by the people, much againfl the will of the fe-
nate and patricians, becaufe Lucius was not one
of them, but of Greek extraftion. Tullius was
chiefly fupported by the people, always difagre-
able to the patricians, who held his advancement
to the throne to be illegal. The adminiftration
of Tullius is an artful fyftem of duplicity, to
preferve his chara6ler, of the man of the people,
and, at the fame time, appeafe the fury of the
patricians, by really undermining the aiuhority
of the people, and throwing the whole power
into their hands. In purfuance of his prin-
ciple to pleafe both fides, he made excellent
equitable regulations for rcgiftering the people,
eftablifhing a militia, and proportioning the bur-
dens of war according to the property and abi-
lities of all ranks ; but he fubdivided the fix
clalTes into one hundred and ninety-three cen-
turies : the firfl clafs was compofed wholly of
the rich, and contained ninety-eight of the cen-
turies. If the centuries of the firft clafs were
unanimous, as they generally were, they carried
every point by a majority of three ; if they dif-
ao-reed, the centuries of the fecond clafs were
called i if they difagreed, the third came for-
ward J and fo on, till ninety-feven centuries a-
arced: if the numbers continued equal, ninety-
fix to ninety-fix', the fixth clafs was called, which
was compofed wholly of the pooreft people, and
contained
Rome, 12 1
contained but one century -, but even the votes
of the fourth clafs were rarely called for, and the
votes of the fifth and fixth were generally ufelefs.
When the people voted by curias, the vote of
every citizen was given, and, as the poor were
moft numerous, they were always fure of a large
majority ; but when thus taken by centuries, that
numerous body of the poor, which compofed the
fixth century, were wholly infignificant, and thofe
of the fifth and fourth very nearly fo. By chang-
ing the votes from curias to centuries, Tullius
wholly changed the fundamental conftitution, and
threw the cleftions of magiftrates civil and mili-
tary, the power of enabling and repealing laws,
declaring war, and making peace, all into the
power of the rich patricians. The people had
not fenfe enough to lee this , nor to lee another
thing of more importance, viz. that the king had
been driven to the necelTity of this artful flattery
of the patricians, by his not being independent
of them, and by their fiiaring with him in the
executive power. Tullius had two daughters,
married to the grandfons of +iis predeceflbr,
Aruns and Tarquinius. The patricians were llill
caballing againlt Tullius, and (cz up Tarquin,
one of his Ibns-in-law, againil him ; but as a ma-
iority were not tor his drpofition, Tarquin and his
impious and inceftuous wife joined the cabal in the
murder of her firlt hufbind and Iier father. Tar-
quin, in time, murdered on all hands, patricians
and plebeians. lie was expelled by Brutus.
This whole hiltory, from Romulus to Tarquin,
is one continued (Irugglc ol the noble families
for the firft place; and another unanfwerable
proof of the necellUy of having t'nree orders, and
each order independent, in orJer to form an ef-
fectual equilibrium. The people were very little
regarded
622 Ancient Arijiocratical Republics,
regarded by the fenate or patricians ; the kings
only now and then courted the people for fup-
port againft their rivals among the patrician fa-
milies. The tyranny of Tarquin made the name
of king odious and unpopular : the patricians,
who were the principal conduftors of the revolu-
tion, took advantage of this ; for what ? To
reftore and improve Romulus's plan of a mixed
government ? No ; but to eftablilh their favou-
rite ariftocracy upon the ruins of monarchy. Two
confuls, in imitation of the two Spartan kings,
were to be eledted annually, by the votes of the
people, which carried the name of a democratical
power ; but the votes were taken by centuries,
jiot by tribes, which made the patricians mafters
of the elcdlions, and conftituted an ariftocracy in
reality. From this moment a haughty faction of
felfifii patricians appears, who afl'ecled to defpife
the people, to reduce them to fervitude, and ef-
tablifh a defpotic oligarchy. The people had fuf-
fered their prejudices to blind them fo far as to be
tricked out of their king, who was at leaft a bet-
ter friend to them than the patricians were, and
now the contefts were wholly between patricians
and plebeians : the former had now got the con-
fuls, and confequently the executive power, as
jmuch in their hands as ever the nobles in Venice
had their doge, or as the nobles in Poland have
their king.
The plebeians were now in a moft wretched
fituation. They were obliged to ferve in the wars,
to keep out theTarquins and their allies, at their
own expence, which frequently obliged them to
borrow money at exorbitant intereft of the patri-
cians, who had engrofled the greater part of the
wealth ; and, as the country was often ravag^ed
by the enemy, many loft all their effccls. Un-
able
Rome. 223
able to pay the principal, with accumulated loads
of intereil upon intereft, they were frequently
confined by their creditors in chains, and Icourged
with whips ; for the law, to which they had fool-
ifhly confented, had made the debtor a (lave to
the creditor. The people began to demand an
abolition of debts ; the Ibnate appointed a difla-
tor. A confufion of foreign wars and domeftic
diflenfions enfues, till we come to the (lory fo
feeautifully told by Livy and Dionyfius, of the
man who had been in twenty-eight battles, who
appeared before the people, and Ihewed on his
back the bleeding fears inflicted by a mercilefs
creditor. At this time the patricians had plunged
into their ufual difficulty, a violent conteft among
themfelves, between a furious headlong party
which always appears for an oligarchy, and the
moderate men, who defire to continue the ariilo-
cracy , the young patricians generally follow the
haughty Claudius, and the mild Valerius courts
the people. The olip;archy prevails, and the de-
cemvirate is cftablirticd : their tyranny drives the
people to the f'acred mountain ; and, at laO:, the
tribunate was eilablifhed. Here is the firft fymp-
tom of any fyftem purfued by the people : this
was a balance but what kind of balance ? No-
body thought of another council, a houfe of re-
prelentatives, who fliould have a negative; and,
if they had, it would not have availed without a
king i for iuch a new aflembly would loon have
been either wholly fubje^ficd to the fcnate,or would
have voted it ufelefs. In truth, the monarchical
power being fuppreffed, and the executive autho-
rity, as well as legiflative, b-ing now only in the
fenate and people, a ilruggle commenced between
thefe two.
Tlic
2^4 Ancient Arijlccratkal Republics]
The people were on the fcramble for more
powers and firfl: obtained a law, that all laws
pafled in their aflemblies by tribes, fhould have
equal force with thofe made in the aflembly by
centuries ; then, that all pofts and dignities fhould
be enjoyed by the plebeians equally with the pa-
tricians ; and that the decrees of the people fhould
have the fame force, and affeft the patricians in
the fame manner, as thofe pafled by the fenate.
All this was very juft, and only brought the de-
mocracy to an equality with the ariftocracy ; but
whenever thefe two are equal in legal power,
numbers will foon turn the balance in favour of
the democracy, unlefs there is a third power to
intervene. Accordingly it fo happened, and the
people went on from ftep to ftep, increafing their
own importance, and diminifhing that of the fe-
nate, until it was found fhut up in Utica; bur,
before this, the people were divided into parties,
and Csefar, at the head of one, pafled the Rubi-
con, that is, fet the mod facred law of his coun-
try at open defiance. From this time the govern-
ipjcnt became a government of men, and the worfl
of men.
From this example, as from all others, it ap-
pears, that there can be no government of laws
without a balance, and that there can be no ba-
lance without three orders ; and that even three
orders can never balance each other, unlefs each
in its department is independent and abfolute.
For want of this, the fl:ruggle was firft between
the king and fenate , in which cafe the king
muft always give v;ay, unlefs fupported by the
people. Before the creation of tribunes, the peo-
ple were in no fenfe independent, and therefore
could not fupport the kings. Afier the aboli-
tion of kings, the fenate had no balance either
way.
Radius] '2.1 S
"^ay, and accordingly became at once a tyran-
nical oligarchy. When the people demanded
their right, and obtained a check, they were not
fatisfied ; . and grafped at more and more power,
until they obtained all, there being no monarchi-
cal power to aid the fenate. But the moment
the power became colleded into this one center,
it was found in reality fplit into three; and as
Caefar had the largeft of the three fliares, he in-
ftantly ufurped the whole.
LETTER XXXVII.
ANCIENT MONARCFIICAL
REPUBLICS.
TACITUS.
Dear Sir,
EFORE we proceed to the Greeks, we may
B
even mention the favages. Every nation ia
North America has a king, a fenate, and a peopled
The royal office is eleftive, but it is for life;
his fachems are his ordinary council, where all the
national affairs are deliberated and refolved ia
the firft inftance : but in the greateft of all,
which is declaring war, the king and fachems
call a national afiembly round a great council
fire, communicate to the peopie their refolution,
and facrifice an animal. Thofc of the people who
approve the war, partake of the facrifice ; throw
ihc hatchet into a tree, after the example of the
Q. king;
22.6 Ancient Monr.r'chkal Repuhlics.
king ; and join in the fubfequent war fongg
and dances. Thofe who difapprove, take no part
of the facrifice, but retire.
ANCIENT GERMANS.
The ancient German nations mentioned by Ta-
citus, had among them st leaft two forts of govern-
ments. One was monarchy; and the king was ab-
folute, as appears by thefe words: " Exceptis iis
" gentibus quae regnantur , ibi enim et fuper inge-
*' nuoSjCt fuper nobiies, afcenduntliberti: apud ce-
" teros, impares libertini, libertatis argumentum*.
The other fpecies of govcrnnient was ariftocracy \
for though there was a mixture of monarchy, arif-
tocracy, and democracy, yet th'e power of the king
and people was fo feeble, and that of the nobles, as
comprehended under the titles of princes, dukes,
and counts, w^as fo pedominant, that the govern-
* There cannot be a ftronger proof than this, that the
monarchy was of the mcll abfolute kipd, that it was indeed
a fimple defpotifm ; and Tacitus himfelf gives the explana-
tion of it, in his account of the origin of this kind of fla-
very. " Aleam fobrii inter feria exercent, tanta lucrandi
*' perdendive temeritate, ut, cum omnia defecerunt, ex-
*' trcmo ac noviffimo jaftu, de libertate et de corpore
*' co'ntendant. Viftus voluntariam fervitutem adit ; quan-
** quam junior, quanquam robuftior, alligari fe ac venire
*' patitur: ea eft in re prava pervicacia ; ipfi fidem vocant.
Servos conditionis hujus per commercia tradunt, ut fe
" quoque pudore vidoris exfolvant. Liberti non multum
" fupra fervos funt, raro aliquod momentum in domo, nun-
** quam in civitate, exceptis duntaxat iis gentibus qua;
" regrantur," &c. If in thefe nations thofe freedmen, who
were nothing in the others, neither in the family or the
ftate, were held in more ellimation, and advanced to more
power, than the citizens, e\en than the nobles, thefe kings
inuft have been defpots, in the ftridtell fenfe of the word ;
otherwifc neither nobles nor people would have fuffered the
iodignity.
mcnt
Tacitus.. 247
ment muft be denominated arlftocratical. " De
" minoribus rebus principes confultant, de majori-
*' bus omnes; ita tamen, ut ea quoque, quorum penes
" plebem arbitrium eft, apud principes pertra6lcn-
'* tur." If thofe things which were m.ofl clearly in
the power of the people, were firft difcuffed among
the nobles, the reference to the people after-
wards feems to have been rather a communi-
cation to them of the refult of the fenate, than a
fubmifiion of it to the popular judgment.
The nature and extent of the royal dignity
and authority, appears from thefe words : " Reges
" ex nobilitate fumunt-, nee regibus infinita aut
" libera potcftas." Kings were taken from the
nobility, or kings were chofen for their noble de-
fcentj fo that ordinarily the office defcended to
the next of kin : but it is here exnrefsly afcertained
that their power was neither unlimited nor inde-
pendent. They had no negative, and might in
all things be over-ruled, at leaft by the nobles
and people conjointly.
The nature and extent of the ariftocratical dis-
nities and authorities, may be coUefted from what
follows: *' Duces ex virtute fumunt; et duces exem-
" plopotiusquamimperio, fi prompti, ficonfpicui:
*' fi ante aciem agant, admiratione pr^efunt." The
feudal hierarchy, even in thcle early times, was fully
cftabliOied, although it was afterwards enlarged.
The titles of dukes and counts, the rank and power
they conferred, defcended in families, although there
was the bare formality of an tledlion in the grand
council. *' Arma liimere, non ante cuiquam moris,
" quam ci vitas fufi'e^lurum probaverit: turn, in ip-
" lb confilio, vel principum aliqiiis, vel pater, vel
*' propinquus, fcuto tramcaque juvtnem ornant.
*' Infignis nobilitas, aut magna patrum meritii,
*' principis dignationcm etiam adolcfcentulis af-
(^2 ^'fignant.':
22S Ancient Monarchical Republics,
" fignant." " When the young men were firft ad-
" mitted into public fociety, it was in the great
" council i when fome one of the dukes, or the
*' father, or other relation, adorned the youth
*' with arms. And if he is of very noble birth,
" or his father has great merit, the dignity of a
*' duke is affigned to him, young as he is."
From this it is pretty clear that the crown, as well
as the titles of dukes and counts, defcended in
the family line-, although the formality of an ad-
mifllon into council was kept up. The nobles,
among whom the king was little more than the
iirft among equals at leaft he was not more fu-
perior to the dukes, than the dukes were to thf^
counts had the game in their own hands, and
managed a rude people as they plealed. This
will appear probable from other paffages : " Cas-
" teris robuftioribus, ac jam pridem probatis, a^-
" gregantur , nee rubor inter comites afpicf,
" gradus quinetiam et ipfe comitatus haber,
*' judicio ejus quern feclantur. Magnaque et
*' comitum a^mulatio, quibus primus apud prin-
** cipem Ilium locus ; et principum, cui plurimi
" ct acerrimi comites. Hasc dignitas, has vires,
*' magno femper ekflorum juvenum globo cir-
*' cumdari, in pace dccus, in bello prsfidium j
*' nee folum in fua gente cuique, fed apud fini-
" timas quoque civitates, id nomen, ea gloria
*' elf, fi numero ac virtute coniitatus emineatj
*' expetuntur enim legationibus, et muneribus or-
" nantur, et ipfa plerumque fama bella profli-
*' gant. Cum ventum in aciem, turpe principi
*' virtute vinci, turpe comitatui virtutem princi-
*' pis non adiEquare. Jam vero infame in omneni
*' vitam, ac probrofum, fuperftitem principi fuo
*' ex acie receffiife. Ilium defendere, tueri, fua
" quoque fortia fada glori ejus affignare, prce-
!' cipuuin
(I
TacUus. 229
cipuum facramenturn eft. Principes pro vic-
toria pugnant, cornites pro principc. Si civi-
tas, in qua orti funr, longa pace et otio torpear,
plerique nobilium adoleicentiuin petunt ultro
eas nationes quns timi bellum aliquod gerunc j
quia ct ingrata genti quies, ec tacilius inter
ancipitia clarefcunr, magnucr.que comitatum
non nifi vi bellocue tucarc : exi^unt enim
* principis fui libt^ralicate ilium bellatorem
*' equum, illam cruentam viclricenique fra-
*' meam : nam epulas, et quanquam incompti,
" largi, tamen, apparatus pro ftipcndio cedunt ;
*' materia magnificentice per belia et raptus.
Nee arare terram, aut expedlare annum, tani
facile perfuaferis quani vocare hoftes, et
vulnera mereri ; pigrum quinimo et iners vi-
detur, fudore acquirere quod pofTis languine
parare."
"When the foregoing ties, by which the people
or the common Ibldiers were attached to the
nobles, and the young and inferior nobles to the
fuperior, are confidcred, a better judgment may
be formed of the authority which the people
really had in the "rand council or national af-
fembly.
The powers and privileges of the people, in
aflembly, appears from the following palfages :
Coeunt, nili quid tortuitum et fubitum incide-
*' rit, certis dicbus, cum aut inchoatur luna aut
*' implctur -, nam agendis rebus hoc aufpicatilTi-
" mum initium creduiit. -Illud ex libertate vi-
tium, quotl non f, mill nee jujji convcmimt^ fed ec
" alter et tertius dies cunctatione coeuntium ab-
*' fumitur." By this it llioulJ feem that the peo-
ple were lb far from eltccming the pi ivilcgc of
irecting, that the king a;, U nobles could fciucely
;_^'.'t thi><ii together. They ha 1 lech an averfion to
C^ I tiicfe
230 Ancient Monarchical Republics.
thefe civil and political deliberations, that the
chiefs could hardly colle6l them to receive their
orders. '* Ut turbjE placuit, confidunt armati.
' Silenrium per facerdotes, quibus turn et coer-
" cendi jus eft, imperatur. Mox rex, vd prin-
" ceps, prout cetas cuique, prout nobilitas, prout
" decus bellorum, prout facundia, audiuntur,
" aucloritate luadendi magis quam jubendi po-
V teftate. Si liifplicuit lententia, fremitu afper-
*' nantur , fin placuit, frameas concutiunt."
Here is fome appearance of popular liberty : but
when it is confidtred that the nobles were pro-
bably all the Ipeakers -, that the numbers were not
counted, nor voices diftinclly taken -, affent ex-
preffed by a clafh of arms, and dilTcnt by a mur-
mur or a groan , and efpecially the dependence of
the people on their leaders, and attachment to
them by oath ; we may confider thefe affemblies
rather as called to receive the proclamation of the
laws or minds of the nobles, than as any efFe6lual
democratical check. There was one thing how-
ever, of great importance, done in thefe affemblies ;
judges, the poiTe comitatus, and juries, were here
appointed to adminifter juftice. " Eliguntur in
iifdem conciliis et principes, qui jura per pa-
gos vicofque reddunt. "Centcni fingulis ex
" plebe comites, confilium fimul et auftorita?,
*' adfunt." An hundred commoners attended
the judge, and out of thefe were juries appointed
10 give their opinion, " confilium j" and others,
or perhaps the fame, to afford their afiiftance,
auttoritas," in putting the fentences and judg-
ment into execution.
From other particulars related by Tacitus, it
is very probable there had been communications
between Germany and Greece ; from the wor-
ship of Hercules, Mars, Pvlincrva, &;c. j if not
from
Tacitus, 2^r
from the altar of Ulyfies, and the name of Laer-
tes, and the other monuments, and infcriptions
in Greek letters, of which he fpeaks more doubt-
fully. However this may have been, there is a
r^^markable analogy between thefe political infti-
tutions of the Germans, and ihole defcribed by
Homer in the times of the Trojan war. It was,
in both, the prerogative of the king to lead in
war, and to rule in peace ; but it is probable he
was not fond of deliberating, any more than of
fighting, without company : and though he may
have done both fometimes, yet numbers of his
followers were ready to attend him in either.
The nation acknowledged him for their leiider j
but they were accuftomed, on great occafions, to
aflemble ; and, without any ftudied farm of demo-
cracy, took the fovereignty upon themielves, as
often as their paflions were itrongly enough af-
fefted to unite them in a body. The fuperior
claflTcs among themielves came as naturally to hold
their meetings apart ; and affembled frequei.tly,
when the occafion was not fufficient to enH.c.,oc t.ic
attention of the whole. There is one remark iblc
difference between the Germans and the v.r.cks.
Among the former ih;: pritfts v/cie a dii'tinct bcdv,
and feem to have had more deciiivc .Uitlioricy tiiaii
the kings, nobles, or people in t!ie g'^^neral alicm-
blies '" Silcnrium per faccrdotcs, quibu:-, tum et
" coercendi jus eil, imp'. ra:ur:" v-litricao, among
the latter, the kings we.e tiiemlclvco at tnc head of
the pricllhood.
In this fecond kind of German governments,
we lee the three orders of king, nuoles, and com-
mons diliinil'.y marked -, but no balance lixed,
no delineation ot the powers Ox e^^ch : w hch left
room ior each to claim the }overe;g!.rv, as v/e
tnow they afterwards ciid j at leail tiic kirr^ rr.d ''
^4 " t'^c
'232 'Anfiient Monarchical Republics.
the nobles claimed and contended for it for many
2ges : the people fometimes claimed it, but at lalt
gave it up to the king, as the leail evil of the two,
in every country except England.
LETTER XXXVIII.
H O M B^ R.
P H ^ A C r A,
Dear Sir,
IN the kingdom, or rather ariftocracy, of Phx-
acia, as reprefented in the Odyfiey, we have a
picture at full length of thofe forms of govern-
ment which at that time prevailed in Greece.
There is a king Akinous ; there is a council of
twelve other kings, princes, archons, or peers,
for they are called by all thefe names ; and there
is a multitude : but the laft do not appear to
have any regular, legal, or cuftomary part in the
government. Thi^y might be fummoned together
by the heralds, or called by the found of trumpet,
or a horn, to receive information of the refults of
their chiefs ; to affift at a facrifice or prcc; (Tion ;
to fee a ftranger, or a fhow, or to partake of a
feaft *, or they might alTemble of themfelves in a
rage againft an'oppreflbr, from enchufiafm for the
royal fceptre, or other caufes : and the kings had
often much dependance on their attachment to
their hereditary right, their defcent from the
gods, and the facred authority of the poets, who
were generally royalifts. The archons too were
often afraid of the fuperfiition of their people for
the king, and his regal popularity. But the legal
power
Homsr, 233
power of the people was very far from being a
conftitutional check ; and the ftruggle lay be-
tween the kings and nobles. The lail finally pre-
vailed, as they ever will againft a king who is not
fuppo-ted by an adequate popular power. The
authority in Phaeacia was collected into one center,
and that center was thirteen kings confederated
together under a prefident only. Each archon
was a king in his own ifland, ftate, or diftri(fV, in
which his dignity and power were hereditary ; and
in cafe of a foreign war, he commanded his owa
dividon in the general camp.
Ulvfie'' is reprefented, at his firfl: entrance into
the Phgeacia.'i dominions, as obferving and admi-
ring the palaces of the archons, after having
furveyed the gardens, palace, and particular ter-
ritory of Alcinous ;
He next their princes lofty domes admires.
In feparate iQands crown'd with rifing fpires.'
Od. vii. 57.-
Alcinous is afterwards reprefented as defcrib-
ing the form of government to Ulyffcs :
Twelve princes in our realm dominion fhare.
O'er whom fjpreme imperial pow'r I bear.
Od, viii. 425.
Mr. Pope indeed, in this tranflation, has given
him the air of a Ibvereign ; but there is nothinfr
like it in the original. There Alcinous, with
all poITible fimplicity and modefty, only fays,
*' Twelve illuftrious kings, or archons^ rule over
*' the people, and I mylclf am the thirteenth.'*
Alcinous and his twelve archons were all prefent
at this interview :
Night
2^4- Ancient Monarchical Republics'.
Night now approaching, in the palacTe iland.
With goblets crown'd, the rulers of the land, &c.
Od. viii. 182.
The nobles gaze, with awful fear oppreft ;
Silent they gaze, and eye the godlike gueft, &c.
Od. viii. 192.
Pleas'd with his people's fame the monarch hears.
And thus benevolent accofts the peers, &c.
Od. viii. 421.
Th* aiTenting peers, obedient to the king.
In hafte their heralds fend the gifts to bring.
Od. viii. 433.
The precious gifts th' illuftrious heralds bear.
And to the court th' embodied peers repair.
Od. viii. 453.
Then to the radiant thrones they move in ftate.
Aloft the king in pomp imperial fate.
Od. viii. 457.
We mufl not forget the poet, who with his
infpiration from the Mufes was a principal fup-
port of every Grecian king. It was the bard who
fung the praifes of the king, and propagated the
opinion that he was fprung from Jupiter, and
inftru6ted as well as dearly beloved by him.
The bard an herald guides ; the gazing throng
"ong. __
Od. viii. 515.
Pay low obeifance as he moves along.
Beneath a fculptur'd arch he fits enthron'd.
The peers encircling form an awful round.
Lives
Hmerl 235
Lives there a man beneath the fpacious Ikies,
IVho facred honours to the bard denies ?
The Mufe the bard infpires, exalts his mind;
The Mufe indulgent loves th' harmonious kind.
O more than man ! thy foul the Mufe infpires.
Or Phcebus animates u^ith all his fires.
Od. viii. 5ij2j
Every peer, in his own diftrifk or ftate, had
another fubordinate council, and a people ; fo
that the three powers, of the one, the few, and the
many, appeared in every archonfhip j and every
archon, in his own diftrid, claimed his office to be
hereditary in his family : and all the archons
agreed together to fupport each other in this
claim, even by arms. This, therefore, was rather
a confederacy of thirteen little kingdoms, than
one great one. The firft archon of the confedera-
tion was called king of all the people, and claimed
his office as hereditary, and often as abfolute.
The other archons were always difpofed to dif-
pute the hereditary defcent, and to make it elec-
tive. The fubordinate councils of the archons,
in their feveral diftridts, were probably often dif-
pofed to deny their offices to be hereditary, and
to infift upon eledions. Ulyiles, who was him-
felf one of the greateft and ableft of the Grecian
kings, difcovers his pertedl knowledge of the
hearts of Alcinous, his queen, and nobles, in the
compliment he makes them. Addrcffing him-
lelf to the queen, the daughter of great Rhexenor;
To thee, thy confort, and this royal train,
I To all that ffiare the bicffings of thy reign,
^^ * ^ * ' ^
So may the gods your better days increijfe,
And all youi" joys defcend on all your race ;
Sc
236 Ancient Monarchical Republics.
So reign for ever on your country's brea(r.
Your people bleffing, by your people bleft.
This fupplication was addrefled to the king
and queen, the princes, archons, dukes, counts,
barons, peers, call them by what name you pleafe,
and it concludes with a compliment very flattering
to all. Ulyfles knew the ruling pafTion of Grecian
kings and nobles to be, that their dignities, even
fuch as had been conferred by the election of the
people, fhould become heredicary. Mr. Pope has
difguifed this fentiment, and made it conformable
to the notions of Englifhmen and Americans -,
but has departed from the fenfe of Homer, and
from the fact.
*' May you tranfmit to your children your
*' pofTelTions in your houfes, and v/hatever gifts,
*' rewards, or honours the people hath given
" you.'*
It is plain the kings claimed an hereditary rights
yet the fucceffion was fometimes fet afide in favour
of fome other noble, or branch of the royal blood:
and perhaps it was always fet afide when any one
of the nobles had more power than the heir appa-
rent. The nobles too claimed their honours to
be hereditary -, and they generally were fo : but
the people were fometimes bold enough to fet up
competitors, and give them trouble. But per-
haps there were never any very formal eledlions ;
prefenting a fucceffor, in prefence of the king and
the other nobles, to the people for their acclama-
tions, was probably the molt that was done : for
as there were no records, nor written conititution,
or laws, the right of kings, archons, and people^
mull have been very loofe and undefined.
LETTER
Homer, -237
LETTER XXXIX.
HOMER.
ITHACA.
Dear Sir,
THE court of Ithaca, in the abfence of Ulyf-
fcs, is an admirable example of the intrigues
of the archons, and their infatiable ambition. The
throne of Ithaca, and the fceptre of Laertes and
former kings, were the objefts which had fo many
charms in the eyes of the fuitors ; and Penelope*s
hand was chiefly courted, becaufe that would re-
concile the archon who Ihould pofiefs her to the
fuperftition of the people, and enable him to wield
the fceptre. The fuitors deny the fceptre to be
hereditary ; and Telemachus himfelf is doubt-
ful : he threatens indeed to call a council or af-
fembly of the people, but is afraid to truft them j
for fear they fhould fet up fome other Grecian
prince, whole blood might be nearer that of their
ancient kings.
To tempt the fpoufelefs queen with amorous
wiles,
Refort the nobles from the neighbouring ifles ;
From Samos, circled wirh th' Ionian main,
Dulichium, and Zacynthus' fylvan reign :
Ev'n,
5
t^t Ancient Monarchical Republics.
Ev'n, with prefumptuous hope her bed t'afcend.
The lords of Ithaca their right pretend.
Od. i. 315.
My fentence hear: with ftern diflafte avow'd.
To their own diftrids drive the fuitor crowd.
Od. i, 352.
I to the peers aflembled fliall propofe
The firm refolve 1 here in few difclofe;
No longer live the cankers of my court.
All to your feveral Jlates with fpeed refort ;
Wafte in wild riot what your land allows.
There ply the early feall and late caroufe.
Od. i. 47^:
If ruin to our royal race ye doom.
Be you the fpoilers, and our wealth confume;
Then might we hope redrefs from jufter laws,
And raife all Ithaca to aid our caule:
. But while youf fons commit th' unpunilh'd
wrong,
You make the arm of violence too ftrong.
Od. ii. 83,
Ele6t by Jove his delegate of fway,
"With joyous pride the fummons I'd obey.
Should factious pow'r difpute my lineal right,
* * * * *
Some other Greeks a fairer claim may plead.
To your pretence their title would precede.
At kaft, the fceptre loft, I ftill fhould reign
Sole o'er my vaffals and domeftic train.
Od. i. 501.^
Tq heaven alone
Refer the choice to fill the vacant throne ;
Your
llcmer. 239
Yt)ur patrimonial ftates in peace poffefs.
Undoubted all your filial claim confefs :
Your private rigiit fhould impious power in-
vade.
The peers of Ithaca would arm in aid.
Od. i. ^og.
It is thus agreed on all hands, that, as one of the
archons, his hereditary title of his eftates, vaf-
fals, and government was indifputable. This
was the common caufe of all the archons, and'
they would arm in fupport of the claim of any
one. But the throne and fceptre of Ithaca were to
be difpofed of by augury, by the will of Jove,
fignified by fome omen. To this Telemachus
pays fome refped, but ftill infifts on his right of
blood ', and fays, that if the omen ll:iould be un-
favourable to him, it would not promote the
hopes of any of the archons of Ithaca; but fome
other Greeks, nearer of kin to the royal blood,
would fet up their claims. The archons, not
likely to fucceed in their fcheme of getting the
fceptre by the marriage of Penelope, nor by per-
fuading Telemachus to fubmit the queftion to
Jupiter and his omens, and afraid to appeal -to
the peopk% or to call them out in arms to dif-
pute the fucccflion, knowing the family of Laer-
tes and Ulyfies to be more popular than ihcm-
fclves, they take the rcfolution to allallinatc the
young prince.
. But die he fliall-, and, thus condemn'd to bleed.
Be now the fcene of inllant death decreed:
Wait ye till he to arms in council draws
The Greeks, avcrfc too juftly to our caufe ?
Strike, ere the Hates convca'd the foe betray.
Our murd'rous ambufli on the wat'ry way.
Or
tj^O '^Anclent Monarchical Republics.
Or choofe yc vagrant from their rage to fiy,
Outcafts of earth, to breathe an unknown fky ?
But if fubmiffive you rengn the fway,
Slaves to a boy, go flatter and obeyj
Retire we inilanc to our native reign.
Nor be the wealth of kings confum'd in vain.
Od. xvi. 386.
Telemachus had before declared, that if any
archon of Ithaca, or any other Greek, obtained
the fceptre, he would no longer remain in the
confederation, but would reign feparately over
his paternal domain. Now Antinous declares,
that if the reft of the archons fubmit to the boy,
he will not, but will retire to his native archon-
Ihip.
Amphinomus afcends.
Who o'er Dulichium ftretch'd his fpacious reign,
A land of plenty, blefs'd with ev'ry grain.
O friends forbear, and be the thought with-
flood !
'Tis horrible to fhed imperial blood ;
Confult we firft th' all -feeing pow'rs above.
And the fure oracles of righteous Jove.
Neither in Poland nor in Venice' was the arif-
tocratical rage to render weak, unfteady, and un-
certain the royal authority, more confpicuous
than it was here. They were afraid of the peo-
ple and the auguries ; but neither v/as a legal
check : and we fhall fee hereafter that thefe
llruggles of the archons very loon abolifiied every
monarchy in Greece, even that of Sparta, until
it was renewed upon anocher plan by Lycurgus.
And the fame progrefs of pafTions, through fedi-
tions, rebellions, and maHacres, n;uii for ever
take
Plomei*. 241
take place in a body of nobles againft the crown,
where they are not effeftually reftrained by
an independent people, known and eftablifhed
in the iegiflature, colledliveiy or by reprefen-
tation.
That the Grecian kings, claiming from Jupi-
ter, and fupporced by their auguries and bards,
thought themfelves abfolute, and often punifhed
the crimes of the archons very tyrannically, is
true. Ulyfies is an example of it. Inftead of
bringing the fuitors to trial before the nation,
or their peers, he fhoots them all, without judge
or jury, with his own bow. A more remarkable
affertion of a claim to abfolute monarchy cannot
be imagined.
Antinous would retire to his native diftrifV,'
and fpend his revenues among his own people,
not confume his royal wealth by attendance at a
court of a confederation which would be no
longer to his talte. This was a popular fenti-
ment in his own dominions , his people wifhed
to have their kino- refide among; them^ and were
very willing to have the confederacy broken.
This principle it was that afterwards crumbled all
the Greek confederations to dult.
R LETTER
242 Ancient Monarchical Republics.
LETTER XXXIX.
ANCIENT MONARCHICAL
REPUBLICS.
homer;
My dear Sir,
THE fimilitude between the ancient Greek
mcnarchies, as they are generally called,
though the predotrdnance of ariiiocracy in all cf
them is very tr.anifeft, and the feudal aridocracies
defcribed by Tacitus, is very obvious. Tltc de-
mocratical power is neverthelefs much more re-
gular, though not independent, in the latter :,
for, in addition to what is before quoted, it ap-
pears, tiiat the judicial authority was commonly
exercifed in national alTernblies " Licet aoud
** concilium accufare quoque, et difcrimen capi-
tis intendcre. Diftindlio pcenarum ex deli($:to,
*' proditores ct transfugas arboribus fufpendunt j
*' ignavos, et imbellcs, et corpore infames, coeno
" ac palude, injecla infuper crate, mergunt. Di-
*' verlitas fuppiicii ilJuc refpicit, tanquam fce-
" lera oiiendi cpporteat dum puniuntur, flagiria
*' abfcondi. Scd et levioribus deliftis, pro modo
" pcsnarum, equorum pccorumque numero con-
" v'lt'd multantur; pars multx, regi vel civitati,
" pars ipfi qui vindicatur vel propincuis ejus ex-
" folvitur."
Although the mixture of monarchy, ariftocra-
cy, z:Yd democracy, is vinble in the republic of
rh:?:acia.
Homer. 243
Phreaci."., vet the king appears little more amoiig
tiie archons than the lirft among equals, and the
authority of the people is ftill more faint and fee-
ble. In Ithaca, there appears a ftrong claim of
fovereicrnty in the king, and as flrong a preren-
fion to it in the archons ; and, although the peo-
ple are dreaded by both, and their claim to in-
terfere in' the difpofition of the crown is impli-
citly acknowledged, yet it feems to be as judges
of certain religious ceremonies, by which the will
of Jupiter was to be coUecled, than as any re-
guliir civil authority.
Homer was a royaliil, at Icafi; as much as Plato
and Ariftotle.
*' Jove loves our chief, from Jove his honour
fprings.
*' Beware ! for dreadful is the wrath of kings.
" Be filent, v'retch ! and think not here ai-
low'd
" That word of tyrants, an ufurping crowd :
To one fole monarch Jove commits the fway j
" His are the laws, and him let all obey.
//. ii. 233241.
The name of a republic is not found in any of
his writings : yet, in every Grecian goverimient
defcribcd by him, we find a mixture, not only
of an arillocracy, confilling in a council of
princes-, but of a democracy, in an ailcmbly of
the people.
Agamemnon, in the fccond Iliad, calls toge-
ther tlie v.'hole body.
Bid him in arms draw forth th' embattled train.
Lead all his Grecians to the dullv p!:.in.
R 2 The
244- Ancient Monarchkal R epiihlics.
The king difpatch'd his heralds with command?-
To range the camp, and fummon all the bands.
The gath'ring hofts the monarch's word obey.
While to the fleet Atrides bends his way :
In his black fliip the Pylean prince he found.
There calls a fenate of the peers around.
Th* alTembly plac'd, the king of men exprell
The councils labouring in his artful brealt :
Friends and confed'rates ! with attentive ear
Receive my words, and credit what you hear;
111 fits a chief who mighty nations guides,
Dire(!:h in councils, and in war prefides.
To whom its fafety a whole people owes.
To wafle long nights in indolent repofe.
Now, valiant chiefs ! fince Heav'n itfelf alarms.
Unite, and roufe the fons of Greece to arms ,
But firft with caution try what yet they dare,
"Worn with nine years of unfuccefsful war.
To move the troops to meafure back the main
Be mine, and yours the province to detain.
The kings without delay
DifTolve the council, and their chief obey.
The fcepter'd rulers lead; the following holl,
Pour'd forth by thoufands, darken all the coalt.
Nine facred heralds now, proclaiming loud
The monarch's will, fufpend the lift'ning crowd.
The king of kings his awful figure rais'd.
High in his hand the golden fceptre blaz'd
Ye fons of Mars ! partake your leader's care.
Heroes of Greece, and brothers of the war.
Fly, Grecians, fly ! your fails and oars employ,
And dream no more of Heaven-defended I'roy.
His deep defign unknown, the hofts approve
Atrides' fpeech j the mighty numbers move.
Homer, 245
It appears from the whole narration, that the
great body of the people were difcontented, and
deftrous of raifing the fiege. The king, alarmed,
was obliged to call them together, with an artful
defign to obtain their confent to perfevere. He
feigns an intention to return home ; the people
were rejoiced at it. Then Ulyfles and the other
chiefs, in concert with Agamemnon, receives the
fceptre of command, and endeavours to perfuade
the people to make another effort. To this end
Ulyffcs harangues them.
He runs, he flies through all the Grecian train,
Each prince of name, or chief in arms ap-
proved,
He fir*d with praife, or with perfuallon mov*d.'
But if a clamorous vile plebeian rofe.
Him with reproof he check'd, or tam*d with
blows :
Be flill, thou fiave, and to thy better's yield.
Unknown alike in council or in field !
Ye gods ! what daftards would our hofl com^
mand !
Swept to the war, the lumber of the land.
Be lilenr, wretch ! and think not here allow'd
That word of tyrants, an ufurping crowd.
With words like thele the troops Ulyfles rul'd.
The loudeft filenc'd, and the fierceft cool'd.
Back to th' afl^embly roll the thronging train,
Defert the fhips, and pour upon the plain.
Therfites only clamour'd in the throngs
Loquacious, loud, and turbulent of ton2:ue :
Aw'd by no fliame, by no rerpc(51: controuPd,
In fcandal bufy, in reproaches bold.
With witty malice ftudious to defame.
Scorn all his joy, and laughter all his aim :
K 3 But
24^ Ancient Monarchical Repuhllcs.
But chief he gloried, with Iiceni:ious iiile
To lafli the grear, and monarchs to rcviie.
Spken to mankind his envious heart poxlcllj
And much he hated ali, but moll the beft ;
Ulylles or Achilles ftili his theme,
Vi'JX royal fcandal his delight lupreme.
Long had he iiv'd, the fcorn of ev'ry Greek,
Vext when he fpoke, yet ftill they heard hira
fpeak.
If from this onl;,', and the fubfequent harangue
of Therfites, we were to form a judgment, we
fhould conclude, that popular aiTcmbiies were
very frequent, and that the freedom of fpeech in
them was far advanced and well eftabliflied -, but
the furious anfwer of UlylTes, and the unmcrcifui
fio2:2;in2; he "ives him for his boklnefs, in the face
of the whole afiembly, which is applauded Ui;!-
verfally, fhews, that the demagogues had yet h\:x
very little influence, very litrie courage, and thai
popular alTeniblies had as yet very little co:irLi'.a-
tional power.
The principles of government were very l.'cilc
underitood, and all tlie political inftisutions ex-
tremely confufed, in the rimes of the Trojan War,
and from thence to Hom;er's time, Nothina- v/J3
precifeiy defined -, no laws v/ere v/rirten. TI:-":
moll diilincl rules, which arc wow to be traced,
were a luoremacv in kino-s, in n:lij;ion and war:
fom>ctimes they exercifed judicial power. Monar-
chies were generally herediiary \ yet a right of
the nation to interfere, and ah:cr the fucceilion, \i
admitted. The right of the ions of the ar;,ho;i3,
to fucceed to their ellatcs and difiridts, was an
agreed point among them ; but tliclc very arclions
ciiofe to keep open to competirion rhe fliccc'iion
Homer, 247
to the throne, fo that there might always be room
for the pretenfions of the mod' powerful, who
would cafily make themfelves thought the moil
worthy. The moft celebrated kings, when ad-
vanced in years, and unable uo luftain tlie fatigues
of war, and cares of government, were obliged to
refign their power. The anxiety of Achilles, ex-
preiicd to UlyfTes in the ihadcs, is a proof of
this.
Say if my fire, the reverend Peleus, reigns
Great in his Pthia, and his throne maintains ?
Or, weak and old, my youthful arm demands
To fix the fceptre Itedfaft in his hands ?
Oh might the lamp of life re-kindled burn.
And death releale me from the filent urn !
This arm, that thunder'd o'er the Phrygian
plain.
And Iweli'd the ground with mountains of the
ilain.
Should vindicate my injur'd father's fame,
Crulh the proud rebel, and affert his claim.
Od. ii. 60^,
Kings and their families, claiming their defcent
n:-.d power from Jupiter, contended very natu-
rally and confiilently that the one was heredi-
tary, and the other abfolute ; and accordingly,
v/hen the prince who fwayed the Iceptre was
active, brave, and able, he kept the archons in
:v.ve, and governed as he pleafed : but when he
was feeble, the archons grew ambitious, difputed
tiie fuccelfion, and limited tiie royal power. To
tl.is end both they and the kings, or heirs of
kings, lometimes looked to the people, and
fccmed to admit in them a right to be prefent
R 4 at
'tjfi ^Ancient Monarchical Republics.
at the religious ceremonies by which the will of
Jupiter was to be declared ; for all parties agree,
that the will of Jupiter confers the fceptre, not
the mere eleftion of the people.
The right of primogeniture was favoured by
popular opinion, as well as hereditary defcent,
becaufe the family was the family of Jupiter, re-
lated to him, and defcended from him by blood;
and it was natural to fuppofe, that Jupiter's in-
clinations for defcent and primogeniture refembled
thofe of other fathers of families.
The chiefs, who are all called kings, as well
as the head of them, or archons, were like the
Teutonic counts or feudal barons, who exercifed
royal rights within their own diftrifts, flates, or
feparate territories. This principle preferved the
real and legal power chiefiy in their hands, and
conftitu-.ed the whole government more properly
an ariftocracy than a royalty. This gave an un-
controulable pride to thefe nobles, which could
not willingly fubmit to the pretenfions of the
kings (as reprefentatives of Jupiter) to omnipo-
tence, at lead to unlimited pov/er. Hence the
continual ftruggle between the kings and archons,
from Homer's time to that great and memora-
ble revolution throughout Greece, from monar-
chy to ariftocracy; that is, from kmgs to archons.
The people not yet poffefling nor claiming an
authority fufRciently regular and independent to
be a check to monarchy or ariftocracy, the latter
at laft prevailed over the former, as it ever did
and ever v/il], where the conteft is merely between
thefe two.
The people, only in extraordinary cafes, in the
moft eliential matters, and when the chiefs were
gfpatly divided, were at all confulted ; yet, in the
courle
Homer I 24^
courfe of the ftruggle between the kings and ar-
chons, the multitude were fo often called upon,
and fo much courted, that they came by degrees
to claim the whole power, and prepared the
way, in many of the Grecian dates, for another
fubfequent revolution, from ariftocracy to demo-
cracy.
Through the whole of Tacitus and Horner^
the three orders are vifible both in Germany and
Greece -, and the continual flu6luations of law,
the uncertainty of life, liberty, and property, and
the contradidory claims and continual revolu-
tions, arofe entirely from the want of having the
prerogatives and privileges of thofe orders defined,
from the want of independence in each of them^
^nd a balance between them.
LETTER XL:
Ancient aristocratical
republics.
Lacedtemoj^,
My dear Sir,
FROM the days of Homer to thoTe of Licur*
gus, the governments in Greece were mo-,
narchicai in name and pretenfion, but ariftocra*
tical in reality. The archons were impatient of
regal government, conftantly ftruggling againft
their kings , and had prevailed in every other city,
except
2^0 Ancient Arifiocratical Republics.
except Sparta, to aboli fn the royal authority, and
fubilitute an ariftocracy of archons in its place.
In Laceda^mon, too, where there were eight-and-
tv/enty archons contending againft two kings, tiiey
had brought the whole country into the urmoil
confufion. The circumftance of two kings,
which perhaps prolonged the regal power longer
in Sparta than in any other city, originated in the
fondnefs of a mother. Ariiiodemus, one of the
defcendants of Hercules, to whofe fnare Laconia
fell, upon the divifion of the Peloponnefus, after
the return of that family from banilliment, leaving
twin fons, Eurifthenes and Procles j their mother
refufing to determine which had the right of pri-
mogeniture, it v/as agreed that both Ihould fuc-
ceed to the crown with equal authority, and that
the pofterity of each fhould inherit. The nobles
took advantage of all the jealounes which aroie
between the two famJlies, obliged each to court
them, and from time to time to mmke them con-
ceffions, until the royal authority was loft ; .-.nd
as the archons could not agree, each party now
began to court the people, and univerfal anarchy
prevailed.
Lycurgus, of the family of Procles, and only
in the tenth defcent from Hercules, fucceeded his
brother Polideftes ; but being told his brother's
widov/ was with child, he declared himfelf pro-
teclor only, and refigned the crown. Such a dif-
interefted indifference to a crown in any one of
royal or noble blood, was fo unexampled in that
age, that no wonder it was much admired and
very popular. The ambitious princefs, his filler,
offered to marry him, and remove out of his v.'ay
the only competitor, by procuring an abortion.
He deceived lier by counterfeited tendernefs ; and
diverted her from the thoughts of an abortion, by
prominn;.^;
Laced^emcn. 251
promifing to take the difpofition of the child up-
on himlclt when it (hould be born. The infant
was lent to him, when at Tapper with the principal
magifcrates: he took it in his arms, and cried, "A
" king, Spartans, is born to you," and placed it
in his own I'eat. The company were touched at the
tenderncls ot the fcene, and fell into a tranTporc
of enthufiaim, both of piety to the blood of Her-
cules, and admiration of the difinterefted integrity
of Lycurgus, who, like an able flatefman, per-
petuates the memory of the event, and the joy at
it, by the name with which, upon the fpot, he
chrillens the boy, Ciiarilaus, the peoples joy. But
all this exalccd merit, added to nis aci^nowledged
divine defcent, and the undoubted poiTcffion of
royal power, were not fufficient to ovcr-avvc the
jealouiy of the nobles, a ilrong parry of whom
joined the irritated c]ueen and her broth'.^r, and
railed continual factions againll him. Weary of
cabals, and fcimulated with a thirfh for knowledge,
he determined to travel ; vifited Crete and Eo;vpt,
the two Iburces of the theology and pohcy of
Greece i and brought home wirh him, on his re-
vwn to his own country, Thak^s the poet, and
the writings of IJomer, with the refoiution of
adopting the martial difcipline and political liber-
ty whiCii he read in the poet, and had leen cxrrn-
plif;cd in Cre:e. Nothing could be better cal-
cukued than his two poets, to infpire the nation
witii ti.at enthuliafm which he wanted, and con-
firm tiie belief, that kings were from Jupiter, and
beloved by him, ex-.ejning the reip;;nle of the
oracle, vvhich he took care to procure : " VVel-
con-;c, Lycurg'js, to th.is liappy place ; thou
tavourite of Heaven ! 1 itanu in dcjubt whetiier
I ihaii pron()U[ice ihee god or man : mclining
iliii to thiniv uhuu art a god ! " Herodotus.
The
252 Ancient Arijlocratical Republics.
The diforders in Sparta were now become infiip-
portable ; the kings had as little authority as the
laws. All parties, except the tv/o kings, in de-
fpair of their private fchemes, applied to the great
legiflator, pointed out to all, by his divine origi-
nal, the infpiration of Homer and Thales, his
own integrity, wifdom, knowledge, and com-
manding authority over the minds of men, as
well as his fpecial divine mifHon pronounced by
the oracle, to be the only man capable of new-
jnodelling the conftitution.
In Crete he had acquired a deep infight into
human nature, at lead he had informed himfelf
fully of the length and breadth, the heighth and
depth, of the pafTion of ambition in the human
heart -, that complication of affections, which is
called by fo many names j the love of efteem, of
praife, of fame, of glory ; that fenfe of honour ir\
which Montefquieu tells us monarchies are found-
ed; which Tacitus tells us made the ancient Teu-
tons fubmit quietly to be fold by their inferiors,
when they had gambled away their liberty, which
at this day enforces fo punctual a payment of
debts of honour contracted at play *, which fup-
ports againft all laws throughout Europe the
cuftom of duelling, and produces more fuicides
than any other caufe; which is commonly known
by the denomination of the point of honour^ and
may with as much propriety be called ambition ,
Lycurgus appears to have underitood better than
any other legiQator, and to have made the founda-
tion of his inititution : for this reafon, Plato with
great propriety calls it " The ambitious Re-
public."
Lycurgus in fecret confulted the nobles, but
not the kings , formed a powerful party, called
an. affembly of the people, before whom his friends
appeared
Lacedismon. 255
appeared in arms. Charilaus and Archllans were
not in the fecrer, but found themfelves obliged to
lubmit. What is all this but a body of nobles
completing, by the aid of Lycurgus, that aboli-
tion of monarchy which they had been purfuing
for ages,, unreftrained by any legal check in the
people, and unrefifted by any adequate power in
the crown ? But what was his new inflitution ?
In compliance with old prejudices, and from
attachment to his family, he confirmed the two
faniilies on the throne, eftablilhed the hereditary
defcent of the crown, but limited its authority.
The kings were to continue high priefts, to be
commanders in chief of the armies, and prefidents
of the fenate. Charilaus and Archilaus, terrified
by the fate of all the other kings of Greece,
agreed to accept of a certain, though limited au-
thority, in lieu of pretenfions more abfolute, and
more precarious.
The ancient dignities of the nobles were con-
firmed and enlarged: a fcnate of eight-and-twenty
of their chiefs was formed, at the head of whom
the two kings were placed. To the people he
committed the election of future fenators : but as
the prefent twenty-eight were for life, and the
influence of kings and fenators would be com-
monly ulcd with great unanimity, in favour of
the eldeft fon, to fill up a vacancy made by the
death of iiis lather ; and as tlie people were noc
permitted to debate, their choice was perhaps
little more than a confent by acclamations to a
nomination made by the king, and amounted to
the fame thing with an hereditary houfe of peers.
To this fcnate the whole executive power was
committed, and the molt important part of the
leQ-iQative ; for as all laws were to originate there
only, they had a negative before debate. Here
is
254 Ancient Arijiocratlcai Republics.
is indeed all authority nearly collefled into one
center, and that center the nobility, for the king
was but the firft among equals, having no nega-
tive upon the fenate. It the legiflature had refted
here, his inititution would have been in effedt
a fimple hereditary oligarchy, pofitfTed of the
whole legifl^tive, executive, and judicial pov/er,
and probably as reillefs as ever, to reduce the
kings 'to elections for life, or years, and then
to take from them the power of religion, the
command of armies, and then to change the
title from king to archon, or from the family of
Hercules to other houfes. Wirh a view to counter-
balance this dangerous authority, he inftituted
affemblies of the people, but intruited them only
with the power of confirming or rejecting v/hat the
fenate propofed, and expreisly forbade them all
debate. The citizens were to give their fimple
ayes or noes, without being allowed to fpeak, even
Jo far as to give a reafon for their vote. He in-
ftituted moreover, as a farther check upon the
fenate, five magiilrates to infpecl the adminiftra-
tion, and maintain the conftitution ; to convoke,
prorogue, and diilblve both the greater aifembly
of the people, compofed of nine thoufand inhabi-
tants of the city, and the lefTer, confifting of
thirty thoufand inhabitants of the country or infe-
rior villages. Thefe magiftrates v/ere called the
ephori, and vv'ere to be annually appointed. But
the lawgiver faw that the king and people were
both too wenk, and the fenate would ftill have
power to fcramble after both ; he therefore con-
trived a kind of folemn alliance to' be perpetually
renewed between x'nc. mop^archical and democrat!-
cal branches, by v/iiich the ienate might be awed
into moderation. He ordered an oath to be taken
every month, by the kings and the ephori : the
former
Laced<mon. 255
former fwore to obferve the laws, and the latter
iv;ore, for themfelves and the people whom they
reprelcnted, to maintain the hereditary honours
of the race of Flerciiles, to revere them as minif-
tcrs of religion, to obey them as judges, and fol-
low them as leaders. This was indeed a balance
founded in opinion and in religion, though not a
legal and independent check ; as it was not a ne-
gative in either. In this conditution then were
three orders, and a balance, not indeed equal to
that of England, for want of a negative in each
branch ; but the nearefi; refembling it of any we
have yet feen. The kings, the nobles, the fenate,
and the people in two aflemblies, are furely more
orders than a governor, fenate, and houfe. The
balance here attempted was as ftrong as religion
operating on human nature could make it, though
not equivalent to a negative in each of three
branches. Another balance was attempted, in the
rigorous feparation of the city from the country,
in tv/o aifemblies : it avoided the danger of jea-
loufies between town and country in the delibera-
tions of the people, and doubled the chances both
of the monarchy and democracy, for preferving
their importance in cafe of incroachments by the
fenate. If the fenate and nobles iliould prevail in
one affembly of tlie people fo far as to carry ?.ny
unconilitwfional point, the k'ngs and cphori
would find a refource in the other, to lead them
back. The Lacedaemonian republic may then,
v.-ith propriety, be called monarchical, and had
the three tfrenti:.! parts of the bell poffible go-
vernment , it was a mixure of monarchy, arillo-
cracy, and democracy. h failed, however, in
th.at elTential particular, tlie balance. The arifto-
cracy had a legil power, fu eminent above that
cr king or people, that it would loon have annihi-
q lated
2^6 Ancient Arifiocraiical Repuhlicsl
lated both, if other precautions had not been
taken, which deftroyed all the real merit of this
celebrated inftitution. That the glory of the
defcendants of Hercules, and of their republic,
Hiight be the pride of every citizen, and that a
fuperftitious atattachment to both might be perpe-
tuated, it was neceflary to extinguilh every other
appetite, pafTion, and afFeftion, in human nature.
The equal divifion of property ; the banifhment
of gold and filver ; the prohibition of travel, and
intercourfe with flrangers; the prohibition of arts,
trades, and agriculture ; the difcouragement of
literature , the public meals , the incelTant war-
like exerciles ; the doflrinc, that every citizen was
the property of the Hate, and that parents fhould
not educate their own children \ although they
ferved to keep up the conftant belief of the divine
mifiion of Lycurgus, and an cnthufiaftic paffion
for the glory of the republic, and the race of Her-
cules i and although they are celebrated by the
ariftocratical philolbphers, hiftorians, and flatef-
men of antiquity ; muft be confidered as calcu-
lated to gratify his own family pride, rather than
promote the happinefs of his people. Four hun-
dred thoufand Haves m.uft be devoted to forty
thcufand citizens i weak and deformed children
muft be expofed -, morality and humanity, as well
as all the comforts, elegancies, and pleafures of
life, muft be facrificed to this glaring phantom of
vanity, fuperftition, and ambition. Separated
from the reft of mankind, they lived together,
deftitute of all bufinefs, pleafure, and amuiemenr,
but war and politics, pride and ambition ; and
thefe occupations and pafiions they tranfmitted
from generation to generation, for feven hundred
years i as if fighting and intriguing, and not life
and happinefs* were the end of man, and fociety ;
4 as
Lacedamon. 257
as If the love of one's country, and of glory, were
amiable paffions, when not limited by jiiftice and
general benevolence ; and as if nations w^re to
be chained together for ever, merely that one
family might reign among them. Whether Ly-
CLirgus believed the defcent of his anceftor from
Jupiter, the divine inff)iration of Homer and
Thales, or the divinity of the Oracle, aoy more
than Mahomet beiicv^i'd his divine million, may
well be doubted. Whether he did or not, he
fliackled the Spartans to tlie ambitious views
of his family for fourteen fucceffion-; of Herculeaa
kings, at the cxpence of the continual 'JifLurh' mce
of all Greece, and the conftanc miiery of nis own
people. Amidft the conrradiclions of ancient and
modern writers, that account has been followed
concerning the inllitution of the ephori, vvhich
appears moll favourable to Lycurgus. The Ro-
man tribunes, and perhaps the Venetian inquiii-
tors, were borrowed from this inllitution.
Human nature perifhed under this frigid fyf-
tem of national and family pride. Population,
the furefl indication of national happinefs, de-
creafed fo fad, that not more than one thoufand
old Spartan families remained, v/hile nine thoufand
flrangers had intruded in fpite of all their prohi-
bitory laws. The conqueft of Athens gave them
a tade of wealth, and even the fear of the penalty
of death could not rellrain them from travcllinor.
Intercourfc with llrano-ers brouQ-ht in foreign
manners. The ephori were fomctimes bribed.
Divifions arole bccwecn the two l<in/s, Agis and
Leonidas : one joined with the people, the other
with the nobks, and the fedition procieden to
blood. Kings became (o tond of lu' Itiie^ tVom
foreign powers, tliat Agefilaus received tiiem i r;im
a king of Kgypt, and his enemy at tl:e lame
S time.
258 Ancient Arijlocratical Repuhlics]
time. Agis was murdered by the order of the
ephori, who, inftead of honouring the blood of
Hercules according to their oath, took the fove-
reign power into their own hands. Here the ba-
lance broke ; Cleomenes, who endeavoured like
Agis to reftore the old laws and maxims, fell a
facrifice, and nothing appears afterwards in the
hidory of Sparta but profligacy, tyranny, and
cruelty, lii<:e that in Rome under the word of the
Csfars.
The inftitutJon of Lycurgus was well calcu-
lated to prcfcrve the independence of his country,
but had no regard to its happinefs, and very lit-
tle to its liberty. As the people's confent was ne-
ceffary to every law, it had lo far the appearance
of political liberty : but the civil liberty of it was
little better than that of a man chained in a dun-
geon ; a liberty to reil as he is. The influence of
this boafted ies:iflation on the human character
was to produce warriors and politicians, and no-
thing elfe. To fay that this people were happy, is
to contradicl every quality in human nature, ex-
cept ambition. They had no other gratification :
fcience and letters were facrificed, as well as com-
merce, to the ruling pafllon -, and Milton had no
reafon to " wonder how mufelels and unbookifli
" they v/ere, minding nought but the feats of
*' war," fince it was not fo much becaufe Ly-
curofus was " addidfed to elegant learnino-, or
" to mollify the Spartan furlmeis with imooth
" fongs and odes, the better to plant among
*' them law and civility," that he brought the
fcattered works of Komer from Ionia, and Thales
from Crete, but merely to propagate his own and
his fam.ily impoflure. The plan was profound,
and means were with great ability fitted to the
end : but as a lyftem of legiflation, which fhould
never
Lacedtemon, 259
neve'f have any other end than the greateft happi-
nefs of the greateft number, faving to all their
rights^ it was not only the leatl relpedable, but
the moft deteftable in all Greece. To do it jul-
tice, however, it is much to be defired, that ex-
crcifes like thofe eftablifned by Lycurgus, run-
ning, wreftling, riding, fwimming, fcating, fenc-
ing, dancing, fhould be introduced into pub-
lic and private education in America, which
would fortify the bodies and invigorate the minds
of youth; inftead of thofe fedentary amufements
wiiich debilitate, and are taking entire polTeflion
of fociety all over the world. The ladies too
might honour fome of tliefe entertainments, though
not all, with their prefence and participation, to
the great advantage of their own health, and that
of polterity, without injury to their charms, or
their reputations. Bur, above all, the exiftence
of an all-perfect Intelligence, the parent of nature,
the wife and moral ruler of it ; the relponfibility
of every fubordinate intelled:ual and moral agent;
a future ftate of rewards and punifhments -, and
the facred obligations of oaths, as well as of the
relative duties of fecial life, cannot be too clear-
ly Bxed by rational arguments in the minds of
all the citizens. In this refpe(5l Lycurgus merits
praife.
But as a civil and political conftitution, taken all
together, it is infinitely inferior to another, which
Americans have taken for their model. The
Knglifii confticution is the refult of the moft ma-
ture deliberation on univerfal hiftory and philo-
lophy. If Harrington's council of legiflators had
read over the hillory, and iludied the conftitution
of every nation ancient and modern, remarked
the inconveniences and deteds of each, and bent
the wliole force of their invention to difcover a
S 2 remedy
26o Ancient Bemccratical Republics.
remedy for it, they would have produced r,o
other regulations, than thofe of the Englifii
conftitution in its theory, unlefs they had found a
people fo circumftanced as to be able to bear an-
nual eleclions of the king and fenate. This im-
provement the Americans, in the prefent ftage of
Ibciety among them, have ventured on ; fenfible,
however, of the danger, and knowing perfeclly
well a remedy, in cafe their ele6lions fhould be-
come turbulent. Of this, at prefent^ there is no
appearance.
LETTER XLI.
ANCIENT DEMOCRATiCAL
REPUBLICS.
ATHENS,
My dear Sir,
CECROPS, an Egyptian, condufred a cobn/
that fettled in Athens, and firft engaged the
wandering fliepherds and hunters of Attica to
unite in villages of hufbandmen. Although the
government of Esiypt was an abfolute monarchy,
he found it necefiary to eftablifh his own upon a
more limited plan.
The two rival families of Perfeus and Pelops,
anciently contended for the dominion of the Gre-
cian peninfula. The fortune of the defcendants of
the latter prevailed, and their fuperior profperity
led them to perfecute their enemies. The de-
fcendants of Hercules, who was a fon of Jupiter
by Alcmena, of the line of Perfeus, was ftripped
of all their pofleflions, and driven into exile. Af-
ter a feries of misfortunes, TemenuSj Crefphon-
tes.
Athens. 261
tes, and Arlftodemus, defcendants in the fifth de-
gree from Hercules, conduced an expedition into
Greece, and conquered the whole country.
The governments of the little ftates of Greece
in the firft ages, though of no very regular and
certain conftitution, were all limited monarchies.
When, therefore, the Heraclides pofiefTed them-
felves of Peloponnefus, they eftabliflied every
where that hereditary limited monarchy, which
was fche only government affimilated to the ideas
and temper of the age, and an equality among
themlelves. Thofe vigorous principles of arifto-
cracy, and fome traces of the fpirit of democracy,
which had always exifted in the Grecian govern-
ments, began to ferment ; and in the courfe of a
few ages monarchy was every v^/here aboliflied :
the very name of king was profcribed ; a repub-
lic was thought the only government to which it
became men to fubmit \ and the term Tyrant was
introduced to denote thofe who, in oppofition to
thefe new political principles, acquired monarchi-
cal authority. Abiblute monarchy was unknov;:i
as a legal conftitution. The title of king implied
a fuptriority of lawful dignity and authority in
one perfon, above all others, for their benefit, not
a right ot ablolute power. Legiilation was never
witiiin their prerogative. A dilliudion of fami-
lies into thole of liigiier and lower r.inlv obtained
very early throu;;h()ut Greece, and no where
more tlian at Athens, where, bv tiie conllitution
of Tiiefeus, the EupiitriJes, or nobly born, formed
a diiLinct order of the Race v/ith great privileges.
Atccrwards wea't'i b;:;came the principal crite-
rion of rank, wliich amounted probably to the
fame thing, as the nobiy born were generally mod
wealcliy. Every eiciz.'n \w every Grecian (late
was bound to military fervice, as in modern times
S ::; amone:
262 Ancient Democraikal P^epuhlics.
among the feudal kingdoms. It was natural that
the rich fhould ferve on horfeback -, and this was
the origin of knighthood both in ancient and
modern nations. Where the noble or the rich
held all the pov/er, they called their own govern-
ment ariftocracy, or government of the better
fort, or optimacy, government of the bed fort.
The people allowed the aopcllation of ariPcocracy
only to thofe governments where perfons, elected
by themfelves for their merit, held the principal
power. Democracy figiiified a government by
all the freemen of the ftate, or the people at
large, forming in aflembly the legal, ablblute
fovereign : but as this, above all others, was fub-
je6t to irregularity, confufion, and ablurdity,
when unchecked by fome balancing povver lodged
in fev^er hand?, it was called ochlocracy, or mob
rule. Muft of the Grecian itates had iome mix-
ture of tv/,) or more of the fe forms. Tlie mixtuie
of oligarchy and fiernocracy, in which the tormer
was fuperivjr, yet the latter fufficed to fecure liber-
ty and equal right to the people, might, according
to AriRotle, be called arii^ccracy. I'hat mixture
where the democratic pov.cr prevailed, yet was in
fome degree balanced by authority lodged in
fteadier hands, is diftinguirned by that great au-
thor by the name of polity. An equal mixture
of all three v;as never known in Greece, and there-
fore never obtained a diitincc name in chat lan-
guage.
A war happened between the Athenians and
Peloponnefians ; the armies wee ei^.^aniped near
each other, and the Delphian oracle was con-
fuked. The anf-vver of the Pythonei's implied, that
the Peloponnefians would be vidoriou.s, provided
they did not kill the Athenian king. Codrus dif-
guifUig himiclf like a clown, with a faggot on his
Ihoulder,
Athens, 263
fhoulder, and a fork in his hand, determined to
devote his life, entered the enemy's camp, and
was killed. The Peloponnefian chiefs finding the
body to be Codrus, and fearing the prophecy,
withdrew their forces, and a peace enfued. Me-
don, the eldeft Ion of Codrus, wc;s lame; and bo-
dily ability was held in fo high rank in popular
efteem, that his younger brother difputed the fuc-
cefllon. Each had a powerful party, but the dif-
pute brought forward a third, which was for aho-
lifhing the royalty, and having no king but Ju-
piter. Fatal diflenfions were apprehended, wlien
a declaration of the oracle was procured in favour
of Medon ; and it was amicably accommodated
that IMedon (hould be firft magiftrate, with title
of archon, but not king. Although the honour
was to be hereditary, and that the archon fhould
be accountable to the afiembly of t!ie people for
his adminirtration, it was agieed that a colony
ihould be fent to Afia Minor, under Nelius and
Androclus, younger fons of Codrus, The moit
reltiefs fpirits joined in the migration, and no fur-
ther materials for hiitory remain for fcveral gene-
rations.
From the period where Homer's hillory ceafes,
to that in whicii the firft profe hiilorians lived, a
fpace of 250 years, there is little light to be ob-
tained. Twelve archons are named, who followed
Medon by liereditary lucccfriun, and filled up 300
years. On the death ot Alcmcon, Charops was
railed to the archonfliip, upan condition of holding
it for ten years only. Six archons followed Cha-
rops, by appointment, tor ten years \ but on the
expiration of the archonlhipot Eryxias, it was re-
folved that the otnce fliould be annual, and that
there fhould be nine perlons to execute it. 7'hey
had not all equal dignity, nor the fame fundions :
S 4 one
2^4 .Ancient Dcmccraticd Repuhlicsl
one reprefented the majefty of the ftate, and was
ufualiy called the archon ; the fecond had the title
of king, and was head of the church ; the pole-
march was third, and chief of military affairs. The
other fix had the title of thcimoihc^crs ; they pre-
fided as judges in ordinary ccuris of juftice. The
Tiine together formed the council of fi.ate : here
methinks I fee the Poiifh nobles running covvn
the king, or thofe of Venice tlie doge, and di-
viding the fpoils of his prerogatives among
themfiilves. Legiflation was in the afiembiy
of the people j but the whole adminifLraticn,
civil, military, religious, and judiciary, was with
the archons, who were commonly appointed by
lot ', but fometimes the affembly of the people
interfered, and exercifed the power of naming
them. From the appointment of annual archons
there was nothing but inteftine troubles. That
weight which, from earlieft times, a few principal
families poiTeiTed among the Attic people, and
which was in a o-reat degree confirmed to them
by the conliitution of Thefeus, remained, amid
all the turbulence of democracy, to a late period.
Among thofe families th^e Alcm2on;des, claiming
fome connection by blood with the perpetual ar-
chons and kings of the ancient Neleid line, were
of great fame. Megacles, head of this family,
was archon when Cylon, a man of a very ancient
and powerful family, attempted to acquire the
fovereignty of his country. He feized the citadel
of Athens with fome troops he rc^ceived fro:n
Theagerus, tyrant of I^.icgara, whofc daughter he
had married. Flis vanity w.is excited not only
by his birth and marriage, but his perfonal m.erir,
having been victor in a cliariot race at the Olympic
games. The people ran to arms under their ar-
chons, and laid feigc to tlie citadel. Cylon fled.
Athens. 265
and his party fled to the altars : they were pro-
mifed pardon, but condemned and executed.
This was an atrocious infidelity, and made the
adtors in it as odious, as it rendered Cylon and
his party again popular and powerful.
The miieries of a fludluating jurifprudence be-
came infufferable, and all parties united at laft in
the refoiution to appoint a lawgiver. Draco was
raifed to this important oliice ; a man whofe mo-
rals and integrity recommended him to the peo-
ple, but whofe capacity was equal to no im-
provement in the political conilitution, and to no
greater invention for reforminij; the judicatures,
than that of infliding capital punifnments m all
offences : and the knowing ones had no other
remedy than to get the oracle lo pronounce that
the laws of Draco were written in blood ; an ex-
preffion which ftruck the imagination and touch-
ed the heart, and therefore foon rendered this fyf-
tem unpopular.
Salamis, perceiving the divifions at Athens, re-
volted, and allied itielf to Megara. Several at-
tempts to recover it having failed, the lower peo-
ple, m oppofition to their chiefs, carried a law,
making it capital to propofe a renewal of tiie en-
terprize. Solon, of an ancient royal famiiy, who
had hitherto purfued nothing but literature and
poetry, perceiving tiiat this raih act of tiie popu-
lace began to give general difgud and repeni:..nce,
efpecially to the young Atlienians, ventured to
lead the people to repeal it. He cauied it to be
reported that he was mad, and for fome time kept
his houfe : in this retirement he compofed a \) lem,
fuch as he thought would excite the mukMide-,
then watching his op[)ortunity, during an affem-
bly of the people, he ran into the Agora like one
frantic.
266 Ancient Democratical Republics.
frantic, mounted on a rock, and read his poem
to the people. Some of his friends, who were
in the fecrer, were prcfent, and ready to wonder
and applaud. The enthufiafm fpread, the law
was repealed, and an expedition fent under So-
lon's friends, which, being fi-riifully conducled,
recovered the ifland. But the party of Cvlon
were dill clamorous againft the partifans of Me-
gacles, for their breach of faith. Solon perfuad-
ed the accufed tfi fubmit to a trial : they were
condemned to banifhment , but this punifhment
not being fufficient to appeafe the deity, the bones
of thole who had been executed were removed be-
yond the mountains. During thefs troubles Sa~
lamis was retaken. Superftition now gained the af-
cendant-, phantoms and omens were feen, and expia-
tions and purifications were neceffary. Kpimenides,
a Cretan philofopher, of great reputation for reli-
gious knowledge, and an intimate friend of Solon,
was invited to Superintend the religion of Athens.
Epimenides was the odenfible diredor, but So-
lon concerted with him the various improvements
in jurifprudence. By means of religious pomp,
ceremony, facrifices, and procefJions, he amuied
the people into fome degree of order and fufpcn-
lion of their faftions : but the tranquillity was
rot likely to be lafting. Three political parries
exiflcd : one for democracy, compofed of the land-
holders of the mountains; anotlicr for an arifto-
cracy, of the rich, confifting of the poffciTors of
the plain , a third preferred a mixture ot" oligar-
chy and democracy, confifting of the inhiibitaiits
of the coafr, and the moil difinierclted u.en.
There was another divifion of the people, into i\\Q
parties of the rich and the poor. Dangerous con-
vuUions
Athens. i6y
vulfions were fo apprehended, that many fober
men thought the eliablilliment of a tyranny, in
one, neceilary to prevent greater evils. Solon's
reputation for wildom and integrity was univer-
fal ; and, as he had friends in all parties, they
procured the place of archon, with power to re-
form the conllitution. His firrt objctt was to
reconcile the rich with the poor : this he accom-
pliihed by lowering the interefb without annulling
the debt, and by taking from the creditor the ex-
orbitant powers over the perfon and family of the
debtor. He found fuch a predileftion for de-
mocracy in the minds of the citizens, that he
fireferved to every free Athenian his equal vote
in the alfembly of the people, which he made ib-
preme in all cafes, legiflative, executive, and ju-
fiicial. He had not, probably, tried the experi-
ment of a democracy in his own family, before
he attempted it in the city, according to the ad-
vice oi" Lycurgus ; but was obliged to edablifh
fucii a government as the people would bear, not
that which he thought the belt, as he faid him-
felf.
As the laws of Solon v/cre derived from Crete
and -^" gypt, were afterwards adopted by the Ro-
mans as their model, and have by thrm been
tranfmitted to all Europe, they arc a molt inte-
refting lubject of enquiry -, but it is not pofllble
to aicertain exactly which were his, wiilch were
thofe of Epimenides or I'heicus, or w!iat was, in
facit, the cop.ibtucion of Athens. '\\\c firit en-
quiry is, Wlio wcire cirizcns ? By a poll that
was taken in t!ie tirneot i'ericles, they were f uir.J
to be fourteen thouland pcrlons. liy another, in
tht time ot Demetrias Pi) derius, they were twen-
ty-one tiioufand : at tlic fame time there were
ten
268 Ancient Bemocratkal Republics.
ten thoufand freemen, confifting of foreigners and
freed flaves, and four hundred thoufand fouls in
aftual bondage, who had no vote in the aflembly
of the people. The perfons therefore who fhared
the power, being not a tenth part of the nation,
were excufed from labour, in agriculture as well
as manufaftures, and had time for education ,
they were paid too for attendance on public af-
fairs, which enabled the poorer citizens to attend
their duty. This is one circumftance which ren-
dered a government fo popular praclicable for a
time : another was, the divifion of Attica into
tribes and boroughs, or diftricts, like the Ame-
rican counties, towns, and pariftes, or the fliires,
hundreds, and ty things of England. The tribes
at firft were four, afterwards ten. Each tribe
had its prefiding magiftrate, called phylarchus,
analogous to the Englifn fneriif ; and each bo-
rough, of which there were one hundred and fe-
venty-fcur, its demarchus, like a conftable or
headborough. As the title of king was prefer ved
to the high-prieft, fo the perfon prefixing over
the religion of each tribe v,'as called philobafileus,
king's friend, and was always appointed from
among the nobly born, eupatrides. Thus reli-
gion was always in the hands of the ariuocratical
part of the community. As the oracles and
priefts were held by the people in fo much fa-
cred veneration, placing them, with all tl";cir
fplendid fhews and rites, always in the power of
the ariftocratical families, or perfons of befc edu-
cation, was as great a check to the democracy as
can v/ell be imagined. It fliould be here recol-
lefted too, that almcfc ail thefc eupatrides or no-
bles, among the Greeks, were beii-.-ved to be de-
fcended from the gods, nearly or remotely. No-
bility,
lO
Athens. t6q
bflity, as well as royalty, were believed of divine
right, becaufe the gods and goddefTes had con-
defcended to familiar intercourfes with women
and men, on purpofe to beget perfons of a fupe-
rior order to rule among nations. The fuperi-
ority of priefts and nobles were aiTumed and con-
ceded with more confiftency than they are in Po-
land, Switzerland, and Venice, and they mull
have had a proportional influence with the peo-
ple.
Another check to this authority in one center,'
the nation, efl:abli(hed by Solon, was countenan-
ced by precedent introduced by Thefeus, who
divided the Attic people into three ranks : all
magiftrates were taken exclufivcly out of the
firll, Solon, by a new divifion, made four ranks,
determined by property, and confined all magif-
tracies to the firft three. By this regulation, he
excluded all thofe who had no will of their own,
and were dependent on others , but by Hill al-
lowing to the fourth, who were more numerous
than all the others, their equal votes in the af-
fembly of the people, he put all power into
hands the leaft capable of properly ufing it ; and
accordingly thefe, by uniting, altered the conili-
tution at their pleafure, and brought on the ruin
of the nation. By thefe precautions, however,
we fee the anxiety of Solon to avail himfelf of
every advantage of birth, property, and religion,
which the people would reJ"peft,to balance the love-
reign democracv. With the fame view, he inltitut-
ed a I'enate, of one hundred perfons out of each of
the four tribes j and this great council, to whxh
he committed many of the powers of the archons,
he hoped would have a weight which all the ar-
chons together had not been able to preferve. it
was afterwards increafed to five hundred, when
the
270 Ancient Democratical Repuhlks.
the tribes were increafed to ten, fifty out of each,
and was then called the council of five h'j.ndrt;d.
They were appointed annually by lot -, but cer-
tain legal qualifications were required, as well as
a blamelcfs life. The members of each tribe in
turn, for thirty-five days, had luperior dignity,
and additional powers, with the title of prytanes,
from v.'hence the hall was called Prytaneium. The
prytanes were by turns prefiuents, had the cufto-
dv of the feal, and the keys of the treafury and
citadel, for one day. The whole aflembly formed
the council of ilate of the commonwealth, and
had the confiant charge of its political affairs ; the
moft important of which was the preparation of
bufinefs for the affembly of the people, in which
nothing was to be propufed which had not firfc
been approved here. This was Solon's law ;
and, if it had been obferved, would have formed
a balance of luch importance, that the common -
wealr.h would have lafted longer, and been more
Heady. But factious demagogues were often found
to reniind tlie people, that all authority v/as col-
lefted into one center, and that the lovereign ai-
fcmbly was taat center , and a popular afTembJy
being, in all ages, as much d^poled, v/hen un-
checked by an abfolute negative, to overleap the
bounds of law and conftitution as the nobles or
a king, the laws of Solon were often fpurned,
and the people demanded and took all power,
whenever they thought proper.
Senfible that the bufinefs of approving and re-
jecting magiiirates, receiving accuiations, cata-
logues of fines, enacting lav/s, giving audience
to ambafTadors, and difcufTions of religion, would
very often be uninterefting to many even of the
moll judicious and virtuous citizens-, that every
man's bufinefs is no man's -, Solon ordained it cri-
minal
Athens, 271
minal in any not to take a fide in civil diftur-
bances. Certain times were flated for the meet-
ino- of the general aflembly j all gates were fliut,
but that which led to it ; fines were impofed for
non-attendance -, and a fmall pay allowed by the
public to thofe who attended pundually at the
hour. Nine proedri were appointed from the
council , from whom the moderators, epidates,
were appointed too by lor, with whom fat eleven
nomophylaces, whofe duty it was to explain the
tendency of any motions contrary to the fpirir of
the conltitution. The prytanes too had diflin^t
and confiderable powers in the afiembly. Whea
any change in the law was judged neceffary by
the people, another court, conlilling of a thou-
fand perfons, called nomothetes, v/ere directed to
confider of the beft mode of alteration, and pre-
pare a bill ; after all, five fyndics were appointed
to defend the old law before the aflembly, be-
fore the new one could be enafted. A law, paflfed
without liaving been previouQy publiilied, con-
ceived in ambicruous terms, or contrary to any
former law, fubjedted the propofer to penalties.
It was ufual to repeal the old law before a new
one was propofed, and this delay was an addi-
tional fecurity to the conltitution. The regular
manner of enafting a law was this: A hiil was
prepared by the council ; any citizen might, by
petition or memorial, mai<e a propofirion to the
jjrytanes, whofe duty it was to prcient it to the
council if approved by them, it became a pro-
boulema , and, being written on a tablet, was
expofed, for feveral days, for public coniidera-
tion, and, at the next alfembly, read to the peo-
ple then proclamation was made by a crier.
Who of thofe above fifty years of age chool'cs
" to fpeak ?" When thele had made their ora-
8 tions.
272 Ancient DcKtccratlcal Republics.
tions, any other citiztn, not difqualified by law
for having fied from his colours in battle, being
deeply indebted to the public, or ccnvidled of
any crime, had an oppcttuniiy to fpeak \ but
the prytanes had a general power to enjoin fi-
lence on any man, fubject no doubt to the judg-
ment of the aBembly : v/ithouc this, debates might
be endiefs. When the debate was finilhed, the
crier, at the command of the proedri, proclaimed
that the queftion waited the determination of the
people, which was given by holding up the hand :
in fome uncommon cafes, particularly of impeach-
ments, the votes were given privately, by calling
pebbles into urns. The proedri examined the
votes, and declared the majority ; the prytanes
difmifled the affembly. Every one of thele pre-
cautions demonftrated Solon's convidion of the
necefiity of balances to fuch an afiembly, though
they were found by experience to be all ineffec-
tual. From the fan.e joliciiude for balances
againft the turbulence of democracy, he reftored
the court of Areopngus, improved its conllitu-
tion, and incrcafcd its povver: he compofed it of
thofe who had held with reputation the office of
archon, and admitteci them into this dignity and
authority for life. Tlie experience, the reputa-
tion, and permanency of thele Areopagites muft
have been a very powerful check. From the
Areopagus alone no appeal lay to the people ;
yet if they chofe to intertere, no balancing power
exifted to refiif their defpotic will. The confti-
tution authorized the Areopagus to ftcp the judi-
cial decrees of the afiembly of the people; annul
an acquittal, or grant a pardon to direct all
draughts on the public treaiury to punifii im-
piety, immorality, and diibrdcrly conducl to
luperintend the education of youtiii punifn idle-
nefs
'Athens. 273
nefs to enquire by what means men of no pro-
perty or employment maintained themfelves. The
court fat in the night, without light, that the
members might be lefs liable to prejudice. Plead-
ers were confined to fimple narration of fafts, and
application of laws, w/ithour ornaments of fpeech,
or addrefs to the paffions. Its reputation for
v/ifdom andjuitice was fo high, that Cicero faid,
the commonwealth of Athens could no more be
governed without the court of Areopagus, than the
world without the providence of God.
The urgent neceffity for balances to a fovereiga
afiembly, in which all authority, legiflative, exe-
cutive, and judicial, was collected into one cen-
ter, induced Solon, though in fo fmall a Hate, to
make his conftitution extremely complicated : no
lefs than ten courts of judicature, four for crimi-
nal caufcs, and fix for civil, befides the Areopa-
gus and general aficmbly, were eftablillied at
Athens. In conformity to his own faying, cele-
brated among thole of the feven wife men, that
*' the moll perfect government is that where an
*' injury to any one is the concern of all," he di-
rcled that, in all the ten courts, caufes fliould
be decided by a body of men, like our juries, ta-
ken from among the people; the archons only
prefi'-iing like our judges. As the archons were
appointed by lor, they v.'cre often but indifferent
lawyers, and cliofe two perlons of experience to
adilt them , thefe, in time, became regular con-
flitiitional officers, by the name of Paredri, af-
feflbrs. The jurorr. v.cre paid for their fervice,
and appointed by lor. Th.is is the glory of So-
lon's laws : it is tl-.at dcpartm.ent which ou2;ht to
belong to the people at hirge , they are moll com-
petent for this : and the property, libertv, cqua-
T ' lity.
2 74 Ancient Democratical Republics.
lity, and fecurity of the citizens, all require that
they alone fliould pciTefs it. Itinerant judges,
called the Forty, were appointed to go through
the counties, to determine aflaults, and civil ac-
tions under a certain Turn.
Every freeman was bound to military fervice.
The multitude of flaves made this necefiary, as
well as pratlicablc. Rank and property gave no
other diftindion than that of ferving on horfeback.
The fundamental principle of Solon's govern-
ment was the moft like Mr. Turgot's idea of any
we have feen. Did this prevent him from efta-
blifliing different orders and balances ? did it not
render neceffary a greater variety of orders, and
more complicated checks, thaa any in America ?
yet all were iniiifficicnt, for want of the three
checks, ubfolute and independent. Unlels three
powers have an ahfolute %-cio, or negative, to eve-
ry law^, the conftituiion can never be long pre-
ferved , and this principle we find verified in the
fubfequent hiflory of Athens, notwithftandilig the
oath he had the addrefs and influence to per-
fuade all the people to take, that they would
change none of his inftitutions for ten years.
Soon after his departure, the three parties of the
highland , ' , land?, and coalls, began to fhevv
themfelves afrefh. Thefe were, in fail, the party
of the rich, who v.-anted all power in their own
hands, and to keep the people in abfolute fub-
jedlion, like the ncbles ii Poland, Venice, Ge-
noa, Eerne, Soleure, &c. ; the democratical par-
ty, who wanted to abolifii the council of five
hundred, the Areopagus, the ten courts of judi-
cature, and every other check, and who, with
furious zeal for equality, v'erc the readied inllru-
ments of dcfpotilm J and the party of judicious
and
Athens* 275
snd moderate men, who, though weaker than
either of the others, were the only balance be-
tween them. This lafb party, at this tiiriC, was
fupported by the powerful fa-.Tiily of the Alc-
mcRonides, of whom Megacles, the chief, had
greatly increafed the wealth and fnlc-ndour of his
hoiife, by marrying the daughter of the tyrant of
Sicion, and h3d acquired fame by victories in the
Olympian, I'ytbJan, and Iflhmian games : the
head of the oligarchic parry was Lycurgus, not
the Spartan lawgiver : the democratical party was
led by Pififtratus, claiming dcfcent from Codrus
and Neftor, with great abilities, courage, addrefs,
and reputation for military conduft in feveral en-
terprizes. Upon Solon's return, after an ab-
lence of ten years, he found prejudices deeply
rooted ; attachment to their three leaders dividinsc
the whole people. He was too old to dire6l the
ftorm : the fa6lions continued their manoeuvres ;
and at length Pififtratus, by an artifice, became
mailer of the commonwealth. Wounding him-
felf and his horfes, he drove his chariot violently
into the Agora, where the aflembly of the people
was held ; and, in a pathetic ipeech, declared
'' that he had been waylaid as he was going into
" the country that it was for being the man
" of the people that he had thus fufi'ered that
*' it was no longer fafe for any man to be a
" friend of the poor it was not fafc for him to
" live in Attica, unlefs they would take hini
*' under their protedion." Arillon, one of Iiis
partilans, moved for a guard of litty men, to de-
fend the perfon of the triend of the peopk% the
martyr for tb.eir caufe. In ipite of the utniult
oppofition of Solon, though Pififtratus v/as his
friend, this point was carried : Pififtr.itus, wiih
his guards, feizcd the citadel \ and, his oppo-
T 2 nents
27^ Ancient Bemocratical Repuhlics.
nents forced into fubmifiion or exile, he became
the firft man, and from this time is called the
Tyrant of Athens , a term which meant a citizen
of a republic, who by any means obtained a fo-
vereignty over his fellow-citizens. Many of them^
were men of virtue, and governed by law, after
being raifed to the dignity by the confent of the
people-, fo that t!ie term Tyrant was arbitrarily
iifed by the ancients, fometimes to fignify a law-
ful ruler, and fometim.es an ufurper. Piiiftratus,
of whom Solon faid, " Take away his ambition,
*' cure him of his luft of rcisinino;, and there is not
" a mian of m.ore virtue, or a better citizen," chang-
ed nothing in the confiitution. The laws, afiem-
bly, council, courts of juftice, aiid magiftrates, all
remained j he himfelf obeyed the fummons of the
Areopagus, upon the charge of murder. Solon
truiled to his old age againfl: the vengeance of
the tyrant, and treated him in all companies with
very iniDrudent freedcmjs of fpecch. But Pinf-
tratus carried ail his points with the people; and
had too much I'cn'i'i to regard the venerable legif-
lator, or to alter his fyilem. He returned his
reproaches vviih the higheft refneft ; and gained
upon him, according to feme authors, to conde-
fcend to live with him in great familiarity, and
afiift him in his adminifi:raticn. Others fay that
Solon, after having long braved the tyrant's rc-
ientment, and finding the people lofc to all fcnfe
of their danger, left A^thens and never returned.
Solon died at the age of eighty, tv/o years after
the ufurpation. Tlie ufurper foon fell. The de-
preiTed riva> chiefs, Megacles and Lycurgus,
imiting their parties, expelled him , but the con-
federated rivals could not agree. Mcgacles pro-
poled a coalition with Pififjratu.-, and offered him
his dangh'ter in marriage. I'he condition was ac-
cepted 5^
Athens. 2/7
cepted ; but the people in afiembly muft be gain-
ed. To this end they drefiVd a fine girl with all
the ornaments and armour of Minerva, and drove
into the city, heralds prochiming before them,
" O Athenians, receive Pififtratus, vdiom Mi-
nerva honouring above all men, hcrfelf conduds
into your citadel." The people believed the maid
to be a goddeis, woriliipped her, and received Pi-
fiftratus again into tlie tyranny. Is tiiis govern-
ment, or the waves of the lea ? But Pifiilratus
was loon obliged to retire to Erctria, and leave
the party of Megacies mailers of Athens. He
ftrengthened his conneflions , and in tiie eleventh
year of this his fecond banilhment, he returned to
Attica with an army, and was joined by his friends.
The party of Megacies met him v^/ith another
army, ill difciplined and commanded, from the
city ; were attacked by iurprize, and defeated.
Pififtratiis proclaimed that none need fear, who
would return peaceably home. The known honour,
humanity, and clemency of his character, procured
liim confidence ; his enemies fied, and he entered
tiie city v/ithout oppofition. He made no funda-
mental change in the conilitution, though, as head
of a porty, he had the principal influence. 1 le de-
pendeil urnjn a larce fortune of his own, and a sood
underfL ii.wing with Thebes and Argos, to fupporc
him in it. lie died \n peace, and left his fon
fuccclTor to his indumce. Both his fons, Hip-
pias and Hipparchub, were excellent characters ;
and arts, agiicuiture, gardening, and literature, as
well as Vv^ildom and virtue, were iingularly culti-
vated by ti.e whole race of tliele tyrants. 1 lar-
modiu=; and ArilcOgeton, however, conipired tiic
deatli both of Hip[)ias and iiipparchus; the lat-
ter was killed, and ilippias v/as led to feve;iti',s :
riany x'Vthenians were put to death, liippias, to
i 3 ilrenL^cheii
27 S Ancient Democratical Republics.
flrengthen his intereft v^ith foreign powers, mar-
ried his only daughter to the fon of the tyrant of
Lampfacus. Ker epitaph fnews that the title of
Tyrant was not then a term of reproach : " This
" duft covers Archedice, daughter of Hippias, in
" his time the firft of the Greeks. Daughter,
*' filler, wife, and mother of tyrants, her mind
" was never elated to arrogance."
The oppofite party were watchful to recover
Athens, and to increafe their inrertft with the
other Grecian ftates for that end. The temple of
Delphi was burnt. The Alcira^onidcs, to ingra-
tiate themfclves v/ith the oracle, the Amphidyons,
and all Greece, rebuilt it with Parian marble, in-
Itead of Forine ftone, as they had contracled to
do, without afking any additional price. The
confequence was, that whenever the Lacedaemo-
nians ronfulted the oracle, the aniwer alv/ays con-
cluded with an admonition to give liberty to
Athens. At length the oracle was obeyed -, and,
after fom.e varieiy of fortune, the Alcmasonides,
aided by Cleomcnes the Spartan, prevailed, and
Hippias retired to Sigeium. It v/as one maxim
of the Spartans, conflantly to favour aridocratical
power ; or rather, wherever they could, to efiablilh
an oligarchy : for in every Grecian city there was
always an ariftocratical, oligarchical, and demo-
cratical fadion. Whenever the Grecian ftates had
a war with one another, or a {edition within them-
felves, the Lacedaemonians were ready to inter-
fere as mediators. Thf^y conducted the bufinefs
generally v^ith great caution, moderation, and fa-
gacity , but never loft fight of their view to ex-
tend the inSuence of their ftatej nor of their fa-
vourite m.eafure for that end, the encouragemjeni:
of ariftocratical power, or rather oligarchical :
for a few principal families, i.ndebted to Laced^e-
mon.
Athens. 279
mon for their pre-eminence, and unable to retain
it without her afllftance, were the beft inftruments
for holding the ftate in alliance. This policy they
now propofcd to follow at Athens. Cleifthenes,
fon of Megacles, head of the Alcmsonides, was
the firft perfon of the commonwealth. Having no
great abilities, a party was formed againft him
under Ifagoras, with whom moft of the principal
people joined. The party of Cleifthenes was
among the lower fort, who being all powerful in
the general aflembly, he made by their means
fome alterations in the conflitution favouring his
own influence. Cleifthenes was now tyrant of
Athens, as much as Pififtratus had been. In the
contefts of Grecian fa6lions, the alternative was
generally victory, exile, or death ; the inferior
party therefore reforted fometimes to harili expe-
dients. Ifagoras and his adherents applied to La-
cedasmon. Cleomenes, violent in his temper, en-
tered with zeal into the caufe of Jlagoras, and lent
a herald to Athens, by whom he iinpcrioufly de-
nounced banifhment againll Cleifthenes and his
party, on the old pretence of criminality for the
cxecu:ion of the partilans of Cyion. Cleifthenes
obeyed. Exulted by this proof of a dread of
Spartan power, he went to Athens with a ihiall
military force, and banilhed fevcn hundred fami-
lies at once : fuch was Athenian liberty. He
was then proceeding to change the conllitution,
to fuit the views of ^Spartan ambition, by diftblv-
in .; the council of five hundred, and committing
tiie whole power to a new council ot three hundred,
all partifans of liaaoras. Atliens was not fo tar
humbled. Tiie five hundred rellfted, and excited
the people, who flew to arms, and beficg-rd Cleo-
menes and Ifagoras in the citadel , who the third
day furrcndered, upon condition that theLacediC-
T 4 monians
2 So A'rKient Bunocrathsd Republics.
monians migl^.t depart in i^S'^ity. Ifagoras went
with them. Many of his party were executed,
and Cleifthenes, and the exiled families, returned;
but confcious of their danger from their hoftile
fellow-citizens in concert with Lacedsmon, they
fent to folicit an alliance with Artaphernes, the
iatrap of Perfia. The anfwer was. If they would
give earth and water to Darius they might be re-
ceived, otherwife they muft depart. The ambaf-
fadors, confidering the imminent danger of their
country and party, confented to thefe humiliating
terms. Ahhous-h Athens was diftra.fted with do-
meuic fadlions, and prefled with the fear of an
attack from Cieonienes, the conduct of her am-
bafladors, in acknowledging fubjeilion to the Per-
fian king, in hopes of his proteclion, was highly
reprobated upon their return -, and it does not
appear that Perfian afllfcance was further defired :
yet the danger which huiig ever Athens was very
great. Cleonv.nes, bent on revenge, formed a
confederacy a2;ainft them, of the ThebanSj Corin-
thians, and Chalcidians. Thefe could no: agree,
and the Athenians gained fome advantages of two
of them. Cleom.enes then pretended that Sparta
had a6ted irreligiouily in expelling Hippias, who
ought to be reftored \ becaufe, when he was be-
fieged in the citadel at'Athens he had difcovered
a collufion between' the Delpi^ic priells and the
Alcmsonides. Sparta was wiiiing to reltore Hip-
pias ; but Corintli, their ally, was nor. Ilippias,
defpairing of other means, now in his turn applied
to Perfia, and brought upon his country tlie Per-
fian war , from v.'hich it v/as delivered by Miltia-
d-^is^ at the bairle of Marathon. M:!:i:.:.:e:i became
tne tnvy of the A}cn:,;con;Jc family. Xancidppus,
one of the nriricioal meii of Athens, v/ho had mar-
i'icd a daughter of Mc-racies. the great opponent
I "^ ' cf
Athens. 281
of PifiRratus, conduded a capital accufation
againil him : he was condemned in a fine of
fifty talents, more than he was worth. His wound,
which prevented him from attending the trial,
mortified, and he died in prilbn. In order to
brand the family of Pififtratus, the fame of Har-
modius and Ariftogeron was now cried up. They
had afTaflinated Hipparchus from mere private
revenge % but tiiey were nosv called afierters of
public lib'jrty. The tyrannicide, as it was called,
was celebrated by fongs, ftatucs, ceremonies, and
religious feftivals.
\i m-jft be acknov/lcdged that every example
of a g'lvernment, v/hich has a large mixture of
democratical power, exhibits fomeihing to our
view v/hich is amiable, noble, and I had almoft
faid, divine. h\ every ftate hitherto mentioned,
this oblcrvation is verified. What is contended
for, is, tliat the people in a body cannot manage
the executive [)ower, and therefore that a fimple
democracy is impraclicable -, and that their fliare
of the legillative power inuil be always tempered
with two others, in order to enable them to pre-
ferve tlieir fharc, as well as to correct its rapid
tentlency to abufe. Without this, they are but a
tranfient glare of glory, winch paHes away like a
ilafh of lightning, or like a momentary appear-
ance ot a goddels to an ancient liero, which, by
revealing but a glimpfe of celetlial beauties, only
excited regret that he Iiud ever [c<:n them.
Tlie republic of Athens, the fchool-miilrefs of
the whole civilized world, for more than three
tiioiilar.d years, in art?, eloquence, and phiiofo-
phy, ;us well as in p.olitcneij and wit, was, for 11
ihort [x-riod of her duration, the moll democrati-
cal comn::on\vcalth of Greece. Unfortunately their
iiijlory, between (lie .'.buiicion of their kings and
the
2S2 Anchnt 'Dcmocratkal Rcpuhlics.
the time of Solon, has not been circu:rifl:antiaily
preferved. Durinn; this period, they Teem to have
endeavoured to colitcl aii authority into one cen-
ter, and to have avoided a compofition of orders
and balances as carefully as Mr. Turgot : but
that center was a group of nobles, not the nation.
Their government confided in a fingle affembly
cf nine archons, chofen annually by the people.
But even here v/as a checlc -, for by lav,- the archons
muft all be chofen out of the nobility. But this
form of government had its ufual efreds, by intro-
ducing anarchy, and fuch a general profligacy of
manners, that the people could at length be re-
ftrained by nothing Ihort of the ultimate punifli-
ment from even the moll ordinary crimes. Draco
accordingly propofed a law, by which death fl:iould
be inflidted on every violation of the law. Hu-
manity fhuddered at fo fhocking a feverity ! and
the people chofe rather that all ohfences fhould go
unpuniihed, than that a law thus written in blood,
as they termed it both in horror and contempt,
fhould be executed. Confufions increafed, and
divided the nation into three factions ; and their
miferies became fo extreme, that they offered So-
lon an abfolute monarchy. He had too much
fenfe, as well as virtue, to accept it \ but employed
his talents in new-modelling the government.
Senfible, from experience, of the fatal efTeCiS of a
government too popular, he wifhed to introduce
an ariftocracy, moderated like that of Sparta ;
but thought the habits and prejudices of the peo-
ple too llrong to bear it. The archons he con-
tinued ^ but, to balance their authority, he creeled
a fenate of four hundred, to be choien by ballot
of the peonle. He alfo revived the court of Are-
opagus, wnich had jurifdi6lion in criminal cafes,
and the care of religion. He excluded from the
8 executive.
j^fhc/is. 283
executive, or the magifrracy, al the citizens who
were not pofieired of a certain fortune , but vt fted
the fovereignty in a legiOative afTtrmbly of the
people, in which all had a right to vote. In this
manner Solon attempred a double balance. The
Areopagus was to check the executive in tiie
hands of the archons ; and the I'enate of four
hundred, the fichlenefs and fire of the people.
Every one muil; fee that thefe devices v/ould have
been no effectual controul in either cale ; yet they
were better than none. It was very right that the
people fhould have all elections , but democra-
tical prejudices were fo invetera:c, that he was
obliged not only to make them, aficmbled in a
body, an efiential branch of tlie legillature, but to
fnve them cognizance of appeals from all the fu-
pcrior courts Solon himlelt, in his heart, muft
have agreed with Anacharfis, that this conftitu-
tion was but a cobweb to bind the poor, while the
r:ch would cafily break through it. Pififtratus
foon proved it, by bribing a pariy, procurin;T
himfelf a guard, and demolifiii'-.g Sr)ion's vyhoie
fyllem before his eyes, and tiiajliihing a fino-le
tyranny. The tyrant was expclicd fcverai tliivjs
by the oppofition, but as often i;;ougI:t; bi. I:, ar.d
finally tranfmiticd his monarchy tv) '11s f j::s. O.ie
of thefe was afialLn.itcd by Marniodius an J. Arillo-
gctcn-, and the other driven inro baniilvnent by the
oppofition, aided bv the nelg'ibou'-ing ll.iie, Spar-
ta. He fljd to the t-'err!;ins, t^:c;:ed Darius aff,'.in!t
his country, and w.is killed at M.uatiion. Tlicfe
c;'!aniiMcs inlpired iiie people v;ith lucii terrors of
a f n^;!e tyrant, thpr, imrcad (n'thinkm;; to b.dmce
effctlually th^ir '' orders," they eikiblilkjJ t:-- ol-
tracilrn, to prevent any m.ui troni becoming too
popular : a clicck iiaked, but a very injudicious
one J for it only baniihed their belt men. llUlory
no
2S4 Ancient Democratical Repuhlics.
no where furnifhes fo frank a confeffion of the
people themfclves, of their own infirmities, and
unfitnefs for managing the executive branch of
o-overnment, or an unbalanced fhare of the lecifla-
ture, as this infcitution. The lanrriiage of it is,
" -We know ourfeives fo well, that we dare not
*' truft cur own confidence and aaeclions, our
*' own admiration and gratitude for the greatelt
*' talents and fublimeft virtues. We know our
" heads will be turned, if we fuffer fuch charac-
*' ters to live among us, and we fnall always make
*' them kings." What more melancholy fpeclacle
can be conceived even in imagination, than that
.inconftancy which eredls ftatues to a patriot or a
hero one year, baniOies him the next, and the
third erects frcfn fbatues to his memory ?
Such a conftitution of governnienr, and the
education of youih which foilov/s neceffarily from
it, always produces fuch charadlers as Cleon and
Alcibiadcs ; mixtures of good c]ualitie3 enough to
acquire the conildence of a party, and bad ones
enough to lead them to dcllruftion ; whofe lives
ihew the miferies and final catallrophe of fuch
imperfect polity.
From the example of Athens it is clear, that
the governinent of a fmgie aiTembly of archons
chofen by the people, was found intolerable ; that,
to remedy the evils of it, Solon efiabliihcdfourfeve-
ral orders, an aflembly of the people, an affembly
of four hundred, an affembly of a."chons, and ti^e
Areopagus , that he endeavoured to bah^unce one
fingly bv anotiier, inftead of forming his balance
out of tlii'cc branch;ts. I'hus thcfe atreriipis at an
equilibrium v*'ere intrifetftual ; produced a never-
ending tiucluation in the national councils, con-
tinual factions, maifacres, proicriptions, banilh-
nienr. and death of the belt citizens; and the hif-
torv
Athens. 285
tory of the Pcloponncfian War by Thucidydes,
will inform us how the rag-ino- flames at lalt
burnt out.
The people in each of the United States have,
after all, more real authority than they had in
Athens. Planted as they are over large domi-
nions, they cannot meet in one afTcmbly, and
therefore are not expofed to thofe tumultuous
comimotions, like the ragins; waves of the lea,
which always agitated the ecclefia at Athens.
They have all eledions, of governor and fenators,
as well as reprcfentatives, lo prudently guarded,
that there is fcarce a pofTibility of intrigue. The
property required in a reprefentative, fenaror, or
even governor, is fo fmall, that multitudes have
equal pretenfions to be cholen. No eledlion is
confined to any order of nobility, or to any great
wealth , yet the legiflature is fo divided into three
branches, that no law can be pafied in a pafTion,
nor inconfiftent with the conftitution. The exe-
cutive is excluded from the two legiflative aflem-
blies ; and the judiciary power is independent, as
well as feparate from all. This will be a fair
trial, whether a government fo popular can pre-
ferve itfelf. If it can, there is reafon to hope
for all the equality, all the liberty, and every
other good fruit of an Athenian democracy, with-
out any of its ingratitude, levity, convulfions,
or factions.
LETTER
2 86 Ancient Democratical Repuhlics,
LETTER XLIL
ANTALCIDAS.
Dear Sir,
IN the year 1774, a certain BritiHi officer, then
at Bcfton, was ofren heard to fay, " I wifli
I were Parliarr.ent : I would not lend a fhip
or troop to this country ; but would forthwith
pafs a ftatutc, declarjnjr cvc^ry town in North
America a tree, Ibvereign, and independent
commonwealth. This is what they all dcfire,
and I would indulge them , I fiiould foon
have the picafure to fee them all at war with
one another, from one end of the continent to
the other." This was a gentleman of letters,
and perhaps had learned hie; politics from Antai-
cidas, whofe opinion concerning the government
of a fmgle afiembly, is very remarkable i but the
Greek and the Briton would both have found
their artiiices in Am,erica ineffec^tual, l"he Ame-
ricans are very far from beinp- defirous of fuch
multiplications and divifions of ilates, and know
too well the mifchiefs that would follow from
them : yet the natural and inevitable efrecl of
Mr. Turgot's fyftem of government, would, in a
courfe of time, be llich a fpirit among tlie peo-
ple.
It is not very certain whether Antalcidas was a
Spartan or not. If he was, he had violated the
law of Lycurgus by travel, and had refided long
if!
Antalcidas, 287
in Perfia, an.i maintained an intercourfe and cor-
refpondence with feveral noble families. He was
bold, iubtle, infinuating, eloquent -, but his vices
and corruption were equal to his addrefs. The
ftern Spartan fcnate thought him a proper inftru-
mcnt to execute an infidious ccmmiffion at a pro-
fligate court. The inftitutions of his own coun-
try, Sparta, were the objefls of his ridicule ; hut
thofe of the democratical fcates of Greece, of his
fovereign contempt. The ancient maxim of fome
of the Greeks, " "That cjery thing is lawful to a
man in the fervice of his country " was now ob-
folete, and. had given way to a purer morality ;
but Antalcidas was probably one of thofe philo-
fophers, who thought every thing lawful to a man
which could ferve his private intcieft. The Spar-
tan fenate never adled upon a princi]:ile much
better ; and therefore might, upon tliis occafion,
have given their ambaflhdor the i.iilrLicticn which
he pretended, viz. to oiTer *' to refign all preten-
" lions to the Greek cities in Afia, which they
would acknowledge to be dependencies of the
" Perfian empire-, and to decl.T:e all the cities
'' and iflands, fmall and great, totally indepen-
" dent of each other." Thefc aiticlcs, in conl'c-
qucnce of which there would not be aiiv republic
powerful enough to difturb the tranquillity of
Perfia, were more advantageous to thern than the
mod iniblent courtier would Iia'^'C ventured to
propofe. The ambaifaJor was rcvvaided by a
magnificent prefcnr ; and tlic terr.KS of ])eace tranf-
mitted to court, to be rarifiedt by vlrtaxerxcs.
The negociation however langu^fn-d, and the war
was carried on with violence lor Icveral years ; and
all the art, activity, and addrefs of /Antalcidas
were put to the trial, before he obtained the r.'ti-
fication. The treaty was at la'il co.TDleced
i. Aai
28 Anc'lent Bemocratical Reptihlics^.
" That all the republics, fmall and great, {liould
*' enjoy the independent government of their own
" hereditary laws ; and whatever people rejcdted
" thefe conditions, '^o evidently calculated for
" preferving the public tranquillity, muft cxpedt
*' the uti-ncft indignation of the Great King, who,
in conjunction with the republic of Sparta,
would make v/ar on their perverfe and dange-
rous obflinacy, by lea and land, with fnips
and money."
Antalcidas, and Teribazus the Perfian fatrap,
"with whom he had concerted the treaty, had fore-
feen, that, as Thebes mud refign her authority
over the inferior cities of Bceotia as Argos muft
withdraw her garrifon from Corinth, and leave
that capital in the power of the ariftocratic or
Lacedaemonian faction ^and as Athens mud
abandon the fruits of her recent victories there
might be an oppofition to the treaty made by
thefe three ftates : to guard againll which, they
had provided pov^erful armaments by fea and
land, which, with Spartan and Perfian threats, lb
intimidated all, that all at laft fubmiited.
This peace of Antalcidas forms a difgraceful
asra in the hiftory of Greece. Their ancient con-
federacies were difiblved ; the fmaller towns were
Icoiened from all connedion with the larp-e cities;
all were weakened, by being difunited. Wh:'.t
infamy to the magillrates of Sparta, and their in-
triguing, unprincipled ambalTador ! But Athens,
Thebes, and Argos, by vat friendfliip of the de-
rnocratical cities and confederacies, had become
powerful, and excited tlieir haughty jealoufy.
The article which declared the fmaller cities inde-
pendent, was peculiarly uieful to the views of
Sparta -, it reprefented them as the patrons of li-
berty, amcr.g the free. The flern policy cf
Sparta
Antakidas] 289
Sparta had cruflied, in all her fecondary towns,
the hope of independence. The authority of
Athens, Thebes, Argos, and all the democrati-
tical confederacies, were lefs imperious ; the ic>
vereign and fubjcdl were more nearly on a foot-
ing of equality j and the Spartans knew, that
" men are difpofed to reject the juft rights of
their equals, rather than revolt againft the ty-
** ranny of their mafters :" their own flaves and
citizens had furniflied them with conftant proof
of this.
But Sparta, by this mafter- piece of rorrucry,
meant not only to hold ftiil all her own fubordi-
nate cities in fubjeftion, not only to detach the
inferior communities from her rivals, but to add
them to her own confederacy. To this end fhe,
by her emiflaries, intrigued in all the fubordinate
cities. How ? by promoting liberty, popular go-
vernment, or proper mixtures of a well-ordered
commonwealth ? By no nieans ; but by fupport-
ing the ariilocratical faclions in all of ti:em, fo-
menting animofuies among the people againit
each other, and elpecially againit their capitals.
Complaints, occafioned by thefe cabals, were re-
ferred to the Spartan fenatc, v^hich had acquired
the reputation of ilie patron of the free, the weak,
and the injured, and always decided in their own
favour. But the ambition of Spartans, cool and
cunning as it v.-as, had not patience to remain
long fatisfied with iuch legal uTurpaiions , they
determined to mix the terror of their arnis with
the feduclion of policy. Before we proceed to
an account of their operations, we mull develop
a little more fully the policy of Antakidas,
Befides the free republics of Attica, Tlicbes, ar.d
Argos, which conliiled of fevcral cities, govern-
ed by thci- ^.,2. m.J<^iilrate, fenate, and pr; -'.!:%
U ' iji
290 Ancient Demecraiical Republics.
m which the fubordinate cities always complain-
ed of the inordinate influence of the capital -,
there were feveral republics reputed ftill more
popular, becaufe they were governed by fingle
aflemblies, like Bifcay, the Grilons, Appcnzel,
Undervvald, Claris, &c. Thele republics con-
fifted of feveral tov/ns, each governed by ics own
firfl magiftrate, council, and people ; but con-
federated together, under the fuperintendance of
a fingle diplomatical aifembly, in which certain
common laws were agreed on, and certain com-
mon magiftrates appointed, by deputies from
each town. Thele confederacies are the only ex-
amples of governments by a fingle afTembly
which were known in Greece. Antalcidas knew
that each of thefe towns was difcontented with the
adminiftration of their common aficmibly, and in
their hearts wiQied for independence. It was to
this foible of the people that he addrefled that
policy, in his Pernan treaty, by which he twilled
to atoms, as if it had been a rope of fand, every
democraticai city and confederacy, and every one
in which democracy and ariftocracy were mixed,
throughout all Greece. The firft viclim of this
ambitious policy v/as Arcadia, in the center of
Peloponnelus, vvliole principal town was Manti-
n^ea. Arcadia v/as a fertile and beautiful valley,
furrounded by lofty mountains : the fcattered vil-
lages of fhepherds, inhabiting thefe hills and
vales, had grown into cities, by the names of
Tegea, Stymphaiis, Herrea, Orchomonus, and
Mantinsea. The inhabitants were diftinguifhed by
their innocence, and the fimpiicity of their man-
ners , but, whenever they had been obliged, from
neceflity, to engage in war, they had difplayed
fuch vigour, energy, and intrepidity, as made
their alliance very defirable. The dangerous
neigh-
Antalcidas. 2gi
neighbourhood of Sparta had obliged them to
fortify their towns, and maintain garrifons ; but
jealoiifies arofe between Tegea and Mantinxa,
and emulations to be the capital. The year af-
ter the treaty of Antalcidas, ambafladors were
fent by the Spartan fenate to the aflembly at
Mantiniea, to command chem to demolifh the
walls of their proud city, and return to their
peaceful villages. The reafons afligned were, thac
the MantinjEans had difcovered their hatred to
Sparta, envied her profperity, rejoiced in her
misfortunes, and, in the late war, had furnifhed
fome corn to the Argives. The Mantinasans re-
ceived the propofal with indignation ; the ambaf-
fadors retired in difguft : the Spartans proclaimed
v/ar, demanded the aid of their allies, and march-
ed a powerful army under their king Agefipolis,
and invaded the territory. After the molt de-
ftruftive ravages of the country, and a long fiege
of Mantinsea, they were not able to lubdue the
fpirit of this people, until they turned the courfe
of the river Ophis, and laid the wills of the city
under water; thefe, being of raw bricks, dif-
folved, and fell. The inhabitants, intimidated,
offered to demolilh the walls, and follow Sparta
in peace and war, upon condition they might be
allowed to continue and live in the city. Agefi-
polis replied, t!i.\t while they lived together in
one city, their numbers expofed them to the de-
lufior.s of feditious demagogues, whofe addrefs
and eloquence feduced the multitude i'rom their
true interelt, and delboyed die influence of their
fuperiors in rank, wealth, and wifdom, on whofe
attachment alone the Lacedaemonians could de-
pend ; and therefore, that they mull deilroy their
houfes in the city, leparate into four communi-
ties, and return to thole villages which their an-
U 2 ceftors
592 Ancient Democratkal Republics,
ceftors had inhabited. The terror of an imme-
diate aflault made it neceflary to comply ; and
the Spartans made a mighty merit of fuffering
fixty of the moft zealous partifans of democracy
to fly, unmurdered, from their country.
The little republic of Phlius too, like every
other where a balance is not known and preferv-
ed, was diftra(5led by parties. The popular party
prevailed, and baniflied their opponents, the
friends of ariftocracy. The Spartans threatened,
and the ruling party permitted the exiles to re-
turn; but not meeting with refpeclful treatment
enough, they complained, and the Spartans, un-
der Agefilaus, appointed commifnoners to try and
condemn to death the obnoxious leaders of the
people in Phlius. This odious oflice was exe-
cuted with fuch unexampled feverity, as terrified
thole who furvived into an invariable attachment
to Sparta.
The confederacy of Olynrhus was next at-
tempted. A number of towns, of which Olyn-
thus was the principal, between two rivers, had
been incorporated or ailbciated together, and
grown into feme pov/er, and greater hopes. This
was enough to aroule the jcaloufy of Sparta. They
fent four or five fucceflive armies, under their
ablefl: kings, to take the part of the ariftocratical
fadtion, and conquer this league. Such was the
fpirit and relburces of this little fpor, that they
defended themfelves for four or five campaigns,
and then were forced to fubmir.
Thebes had been torn with ariflocratic and
democratic factions, in confequence of the peace
of Antaicidas, and Sparta joined the latter, which
ultimately produced long and obftinate wars, and
the exalted characters of Pelopidas and Epami-
ncndas, who, however, with all their virtues,
were
Antakidas. ig^
were not able finally to eftabliih the independen-
cy of their country, though both perifhed in the
atten-pt ; H.paminondas, to the lafl-, refufing to
the leveral comnunities of Boeotia their heredi-
tary laws and government, although he was one
of the democraiical party.
Sparta, in the next place, fent a detachment to
fiipport the partidins of ariftocracy in Argoiis,
Achaia, and Arcadia, but were obliged to eva-
cuate that country by Pelopidas and Epaminon-
das; but the latter fupportcd ariHocratic govern-
ment. As foon as he retired, the Arcadians com-
plained againfl him, that a people, who knew by
their own exj)crience the nature of ariftocracy,
jQiould have confirmed that fevere form of go-
vernment in an allied or dependent province.
I'he multitude in Thebes condemned the pro-
ceedings of F.paminondas, and fent commiflion-
crs into Achaia, who aflllled the populace, and a
body of mercenaries, to diflblve the ariftocracy,
and banifli or put to death the nobks, and infti-
tutc a democracy. The foreign troops were
fcarccly departed, when the exiles, who were
very numerous and powerful, returned, and, after
a defpcrate and bloody llruggle, recovered their
ancient inPaicnce : tlie leaders of the populace
were now, in tlieir turn, put to death or expelled 5
the ariftocracy rc-e(labliflicd j and tlie magiftrates
craved tiie protediion of Sparta, which was rea-
dily granted.
It would be endlefs to purfue the confequences
of the peace ot Antalcidas : uninterrupted con-
ttlls and wars in every democratical ftate in
Greece were the confequence of it -, ariftocratical
and democratical fadiojis eternally dilputing for
fupciiority, mutually banifhing and butchering
U 3 each
294 Ancient Democraticd Republics.
each other; profcriptioRS, affafiinations (of which
even Pelopidas was not innocent), treacheries,
cruelties without number and without end. But
no man, no party, ever thought of introducing
an effediual balance, by creating a king, with an
equal power, to balance the other two. The
Romans began to think of this expedient, but it
was referved for England to be the firft to reduce
it to praflice.
Would Mr. Turgot have faid, that if Thebes,
Athens, Argos, and the Achasan, Arcadian, and
Olynthian leagues, had been each of them go-
verned by a legillature compofed of a king, fe-
nate, and alTembly, with equal authority, and each
a decifive negative, that the caufe of liberty, in
all Greece, would have been thus crumbled to
diift by fuch a paltry trick of Antalcidas ?
Would the child ifh humour of feparaiing into
as many ftates as towns have ever been indulg-
ed or permitted ? Moft certainly they would
not. And if the power of negociation and trea-
ties, and the whole executive, had been in one
man, could the perfidious ambaffadors of Spar-
ta, and the other liates, have intrigued, and em-'
JDroiied every thing as they did ?
L E T T E H
Achaia. 29 ^
LETTER XLIII.
ACHAIA.
Dear Sir,
THE Achseans, whofe republic became fo fa-
mous in later times, inhabircd a long but
narrow ftrip of land along the Corini!i;an gulph,
which was deftitute of harbours, and, as its fnores
were rocky, of navigation and commerce ; but
the impartial and generous fpiric of their laws,
if we are to credit Polybius and their other pa-
negyrifts, were fome compenfation for the natu-
ral difadvantages of their fituation and territory.
They admitted ftrangers into their community on
equal terms with the ancient citizens ; and, as
they were the firft, and, for a long time, the only
republic of Greece which had fuch liberality, it
is not ftrange that they fhould have* enjoyed the
praifes of all foreigners. In all orhcr (iates of
Greece, in which the people had any fhare in
government, there were conftant complaints, that
one powerful capital domineered over the inferior
towns and villages, like Thebes in Boeotia, A-
thens in Attica. In Laconia, Lycurgus avoided
this inconvenience by two popular allcmblies,
one for Sparta, and one for the country ; but in
Achaia there was no commercial town, and all
were nearly equal, havj^-.r; common laws and in-
ftitutions, and common weights and mealurcs.
Helice, which is diftinguiihrd by Homer as tlie
moft confiderable town of Ach:;ia, was t!ie place
.1 or
2<^6 Anchnt Bemocratical Republics.
of avic-mbly of the congrefs, until it was fwal-
lowed up in an earthquake ; then ZEcr^e became
the feat of congrefs, v/ho annually appointed pre-
fident<? ill rotation, and generals, who wer-e re-
fponfible to the congrels, as the members of con-
grefs were to ihe cities t'jey reprefcnted. Tiiis
is faid to be an excellent fyiieri) of gov.; ;-',
becaufe it checked the ambition of Achaia, le
it maintained its independence : and Poivbius is
full of the prailes of this people for their *"' vir-
*' vcc and probity in ail their ncgociations, which
" had acquired them the good opinion of the
" whole world, and procured them to be chofeii
" to be arbitrators between the Lacedsemonians
*'' and Thebans ; for their wife councils, and
** good dilpofitions , for their equality and liber-
*' ty, which is in the uLmofb perfection among
" them , for their laws and infcitutions-, for their
" moderation, and freedom from ambition," &c.
Yet vdioever reads his own hiilory, will fee evi-
dent proofs, that much of this is the fond par-
tiality of a patriot for his country ; and that they
had neither the moderation he afcribes to them,
nor the excellent government. Better indeed than
the other republics of Greece it might be ; and
its congrefs, as a diplomatic aPfembly, might have
governed its foreign afEiirs very vvch', if the cities
rcprefented in it had been wcil cohuituted of a
mixture of three independent powers : But it is
plain they were not , but were in a continual
itruegle between tlicir nrtl magifcrates, nobles,
and people, for fuperiority, wliich occafioned their
fliort duration, and final ruin. As this exan)ple
defcrves to be fully examined by every Am.eri-
can, let us explain it a little more particularly.
Atreus, king of Argos and Mycene, was tlie
fon of Pelups, and father of /iga.memnon, who
was
Achaia. 297
was the father of Oreftes, who was the father of
Tifamenus : Pelops, after wKom Peloponnefus
was named, was rhc fon ot Tantalus, a king of
Phrygia-, and Tantalus was the fon of Jupiter,
by the nymph Plota.
Tilamcnus, flying from Sparta, upon the return
of tiie Heraclicise governed in Achaia, and was
tiie firfl; king of that people. The dominion by
him there founded was continued, in a rightful
fucceiTion, down to Gyges. Notwithftanding his
delcent from Jupiter, his government was pro-
bably like that of Alcmous in Phasacia : Twelve
archons prtTided oyer the twelve cities, v/ho, each
in his diilncl:, was the firfl magiftrate ; and all
able to make out, fome way or other, their con-
neclion with ibme of the ancient families, who
were all alike honourably defcended, at lealf, from
an inferior god or goddefs. Tilamenus made the
thirteenth, and was firft among equals at leaft.
The fons of Gyges not governing by law, but
defpotically, the monarchy was abolifhed, and re-
duced to a popular Hate ; probably it was only
an ariftocracy of the twelve archons. Thefe hints
at the genealogy of thefe kings are to fliew how
intimately theology was intermixed with politics
in every Grecian llate and city -, and, at the fame
time, to IIkvv that the whole force of fuperlti-
tion, although powertul enough to procure crowns
to tiicfe perions, yet, for wane of the balance we
contend for, was not fuificient to rellrain the paf-
fions of tlie nobles, and prevent revolutions al-
molt as rapid as the motion of a wheel : nothino-
has ever been found to fupply the place of the
balance of three powers, 'Ihe abolition of this
limited monarciiy was not effected by the people,
for the [Durpofe of introducing democracy, or a
mixed governaient j but by the nobles, for the
fake
tgS Ancient Bemccratlcal Repuhlics.
fake of eftablifhing an ariftocracy. The new go-
vernment, confequently, was a confederation of
twelve archons, each ruling as firil magiilrate in
a feparate city, with his council and people, as
an independent ftate. The twelve archons met in
a general aflembly, fometimes in perfon, and
fometimes by proxy, to confult of general affairs,
and guard againft general dangers. This whole
ftate could not be larger than another Bifcav, and
each city muft have been lefs than a nritrindade,
and its general affembly like the junta general :
yet fuch is the pafTion for independence, that this
little commonwealth, or confederacy of common-
wealths, could not hold together. The general
affembly was neglefted ; the cities became inde-
pendent : fome were conquered by foreigners,
and fome loft their liberties by domeftic tyrants,
that is, by their firft magiftrates affuming arbi-
trary power. Polybius difcovers as much affec-
tion for this little republic as Rouffeau did for
Geneva, and is very loth to confels their faults :
He colours over the revolutions they un-
derwent for a courfe of ages, by laying, that
though their affairs v/ere governed according
to the diverfity of times and occurrences, all
poffible endeavours were ufed to preferve the
form of a popular ftate. The commonwealth
was compofed of twelve cities, which are in
being at this day, Olenus and Helice only ex-
cepted, which were fwallowed up by the lea in
an earthquake that happened not long before
the battle of Leuftra ; which cities are Parra,
Dyma, Phara, Trytjea, Leontium, .-^"gira, Pel-
lene, ^gium, Bura, Ceraunia, Olenus, and
Helice. After the death of Alexander, and fince
the Olympiad we have mentioned, thefe cities
fell into dangerous diffenfions, chiefly by the
7 *' artifices
Achaia. 299
artifices of the Macedonian princes, when every
city apart meditated on nothing but their own
private profit and ends, to the prejudice and
defl:ru(flion of their neighbours , and this gave
occafion to Demetrius and Caflander, and after-
wards to Antigonus Gonatus, to put garrifons
in fume of their cities ; and that others were
invaded and governed by tyrants, who, in thofc
*' days, were very numerous in Greece. But
about the 124 Olympiad, v/hen Pyrrhus in-
vaded Italy, thefe people began to fee the
error of their dilTenfions, and laboured to re-
turn to their former union. Thofc who gave
the firft example were Dyma, Patra, and Pha-
ra : five years afterwards, ^gium, having cad
out the garrifon that was placed over them,
were received into the confederacy. Bura fol-
lowed their example, having firft killed the ty-
' rant ; and foon after Ceraunia did the like ;
* for Ifeas their tyrant, confidering how that
' thofe of 7I']gium had expelled their garrifon,
' and he who governed in Bura was already flain
" by the practices of Marcus and the Achaians,
" and that it would be his lot to have tliem all
" quickly for enemies, he therefore refigned the
" dominion, after having firft ilipulaccd with the
'* Achaians for his indemnity for what was pafied,
'' and fo incorporated the city into the union of
" the Achaians.
" The cities then we have mentioned con-
" tinued for the fpace of five-anci-twenty years to
" preierve this form of government unchanged,
'* chuhng in their general ailembly two pra-^tors
*' (or prcfidcnts) and a fecretary. Afterwards
^' they concluded to have but one prxtor only,
who fiiould be charged with the management
cf i:h':^;r .itiairs ; and the rirft who enjoyed that
" dignity
((
ff
300 Ancient Democratical Republics.
" dignity was Marcus the Carian, who, after four
" years of his adminifiration, gave place to Ara-
*' tus the Sicyonian, who, at the age of twenty
" years, after he had, by his virtue and refolu-
" tion, refcued his country from tyranny, joined
" it to the commonwealth of the Achaians, fo
" great a veneration had he from his youth for
*' the manners and inftitutions of that people.
*' Eight years after, he was a fecond time choil^n
" prsetor, and won Acro-corinth, which Antigo-
'* nus had fortified with a garrifon, whereby Aratus
'' freed all Greece from no fmali apprehenfion.
" When he had reftored liberty to Corinth, he
*' united it to the Achaians, together with the
*' cicy of Megara, which he got by intelligence
*' during his prcetorfhip. in a word, Aratus,
" who, in a fhort fpace, brought many and great
" things to pafs, made it manileft, by his councils
*' and aclions, that his greatetl aim was the ex-
*' puifion of the Macedonians out of Pclopon-
*' nefus, to fupprefs tyranny, and afiert the liber-
" ty of his country : fo that, during the whole
** reign of Antigonus Gonatus, Aratus conftantly
*' oppofed all his defigns and enterprizes, as he
" and, as in all the tranfactions of his adminif-
" tration he gave fmgular evidences of a fteady
" mind and firm refolution, all his attempts fuc-
" ceeded accordingly, notwithftanding many dates
" confederated to hinder the union, and to deflroy
" the commonwealth of the Achaians. After the
*' death of Antigonus the Achaians entered into a
" league with the /Etoliam, and generoufly af-
** fifted them in their war againft Demetrius ; lo
*' that the ancient hatred between thefe two peo-
" pie feemed for ri.e preient extinguilhed, and
Li>w
'Achata. 501
the defire of concord began, by degrees, to
grow in the minds of the i^itolians. Demetrius
died, when many great and noble occafions were
given to the Achaians of finifhing the projeft
they had conceived; for the tyrants who reign-
ed in Peloponnefus, having loft: the fupport of
Demetrius, who greatly favoured them, began
now to defpair; and, on the other hand, being
awed by Aratus, who admonilhed them to quit
their governments, on promife of great honours
and rewards to luch as voluntarily refigned,
and threatening others with hoflility who re-
fufed ; whereupon they refolved to defpoil
themfelves of their dignities, reftore their peo-
" pie to liberty, and incorporate them with the
*' Achaians. As to Lyfidas, the Megalopolitan,
he, wifely forefeeing what was likely to come to
pafs, frankly renounced his dominion during
the life of Demetrius, and was received into
the general confederacy of rights and privileges
with the whole nation. Ariftomachus, tyrant
of the Argicus, Xeno of the Hermionians, and
Cleonymus of the Phliatians, refigning their
authority at the time we mention, were likcwifc
received into the alliance of the Achaians. In
the mean time the iEtolians began to conceive
jealoufies at tiie growing greatnefs and extra-
ordinary fuccefs of the Achaians, and bafely
entered into a Ica^Tue with Antigonus, who at
tliat time governed Maccdon, and with Cleo-
menes, king of the Lacedaemonians. Thefc
three powers, Macedonia, Lacedaemon, and
iEcolia, were to invade Achala on all fides ;
but the great political abilities of Aratus de-
feated the enterprize. lie confidered that An-
tigonus was a mian of experience, and wiilino"
enough to make allianceb ; and that princes
3<52 Ancient Democratical Rfpublics.
" have naturally neither friends nor enemies, buc
meafure amities and enmities by the rules of
intereft : he therefore endeavoured, after a good
underftanding with that prince, and determined
to propole the joining the forces of the Acha-
*' ians to his. He propofed to cede him fome
towns ; 2.nd the alliance was formed, and the
Cleomenic v/ar commenced. In the profecution
of it, Cleomenes and his Spartans difplayed the
utmoft ferocity and cruely, particularly at
" 7?igium, where he put in pradtice fo many out-
" rages and cruelties of war, that he left not fo
*' much as any appearance that it had been ever
" a peopled place." There is great reafon to fuf-
pe6l that the Achaians were not lefs guilty of
cruelty , for Polybius profelTes to follow the ac-
count given by Aratus himfelf, in a hiftory which
that pr^tor wrote of Achaia, who may be well
fufpefted of partiality ; and Polybius himfelf was
the fon of Lycortas of Megalopolis, who perfeded
and confirmed the confederacy of the Achaians,
and difcovers throughout his hiflory a ilrong at-
tachment to this people. If the hiitory of Ciear-
chus was extant, we might pofTibly fee that the
Achaians, the Spartans, and Macedonians, were
equally liable to the accufation of inhumanity.
Mantinsca was fubjeCted to unfpeakable calamities
as well as i^gium , but Polybius endeavours to
cover this over with a veil by abufing Clearchus,
accufmg him with departing from the dignity of
hiftory and writing tragedies, by reprefenring wo-
men with dilhevelled hair and naked brealis, em-
bracing each other with melting lamentations and
tears, and complaints of men, womien, and chil-
dren, dragged away promifcuoufly. He attempts
to juftify the punifhment of this city, by charg-
ing it with treacheroufly betraying itlelf into the
hands
Achaia, 3^5
hands of the Spartans, and maflacring the Achaian
garrifon : but this was no more than the ufual'
cffed: of the continual revolutions in the Greek
cities, from democracy to arillocracy, from that
to monarchy, and back again through the whole
circle. In every one of thefe cities there were
three parties ; a monarchical party, who defired
to be governed by a king or tyrant, as he was
then called ; an ariftocratical party, who wiihed
to erect an oligarchy ; and a democratical party,
who were zealous for bringing all to a level.
Each fadlion was for collecting all authority into
one center in its own way ; but unfortunately
there was no party who thought of a mixture of
all thel'e three orders, and giving each a negative
by which it might balance the other two : ac-
cordingly the regal party applied to Macedonian
kings for aids and garrifons ; the ariftocratical
citizens applied to Sparta for the like afliftance ;
and the democratical factions applied to Aratus
and the Achaian league. The confequence was,
as each party prevailed, they brought in a new
garrifon, and maflacred the old one, together
with the leaders of the faction fubdued. But is
fuch a fyftem to be recommended to the United
States of America ? If the Americans had no
more difcretion tlian the Greeks, no more hu-
manity, no more confideration for the benign and
peaceful religion they profcfs, they would ftiU
have to coniidcr, that the Greeks had in many
places forty flavcs, and in all places ten, to one
free citizen j that the flavcs did all the labour,
and the free citizens had nothing to do but cue
one anothers throats. Wars did not coft money
in Greece , happily for the world, at prelent
they are very expenfive. An American Ibldier will
not ferve one year, without more money for pay
than
^04 'Ancient Democratkal Repuhlics".
than many of thefe Greek cities had for their
whole circulating medium. There is but one pof-
fiblc means of realizing Mr. Turgot's idea. Let
us examine it well before we adopt it. Let every
town in the Thirteen States be a free fovereign
and independent democracy : here you may nearly
colled all authority into one center, and that
center the nation. Thefe towns will immediately
go to war with each other, and form combina-
tions, alliances, and political intrigues, as ably as
the Grecian villages did : but thefe wars and
negotiations cannot be carried on but by men at
leifure. The firft ftep to be taken then, is to de-
termine who lliall be freemen, and who flaves.
Let this be determined by lot. In every fifty
men, forty are to be flaves, and flay at home un-
armed, under certain overfeers provided with good
whips and fcourges, to labour in agriculture and
mechanic arts. All commerce and navigation,
filheries, &c. are to ceafe of courfe. The other
ten are to be free citizens, live like gentlemen,
eat black broth, and go out to war ; fome in fa-
vour of tyrants, fome for the well-born, and fome
for the multitude : for, even in the fuppofuion
here made, every town will have three parties in
it ; fome will be for making the moderator a
king, others for giving the whole government to
the feleft men, and a third fort for making and
executing all laws, and judging all caufes, crimi-
nal and civil, in. town meeting. Americans will
well confider the confequences of fuch fyftems of
policy, and fuch multiplications and divifions of
ilates, and will univerfally fee and feel the necef-
fity of adopting the fentiments of Aratus, as re-
ported by Plutarch : " That fmall cities could
*' be preferved by nothing elfe but a continual
'' and combined force, united by the bond of
12 !' common
Crele, 505
" common interefl j and as the members of the
" body live and breathe by their miicuai com-
" munication and connection, and wht-n once fe-
" paratcd pine away and putrify, in the fame
*' manner are cities ruined by being difmembered
*' from one another, as well as preferved when,
*' linked together into one great body, they en-
*' joy the benefit of that providence iind council
" that governs the whole." Thefe were the {tuci'
tiraents which, according- to the fame Plutarch,
acquired him fo much of the confidence of the
Achaians, *' that fince he could not by law be
" chofcn their general every year, yet every other
*' year he was, and by his councils and aftions
" was in effed: always fo ; for they perceived that
" neither riches nor repute, nor the friendfliip of
" kings, nor the private intercfb of his own coun-
*' try, nor any other thing elfe, was fo dear to him
" as the increafe of the Achaian power and greac-
" ncfs."
LETTER XLIV.
CRETE.
My dear Sir,
THIS celebrated ifland, with the fantafljic.^l
honour of j;iving birth to fome of the gods
of Greece, had the real merit and glory of com-
municating to that country many ufcful improve-
ments. Their infular iituation defended them from
invalions by land, and tlieir proximity to Egypt
afforded t!iem an eafy intercourfe of conjmerce by
X fea
3o6 Ancieni Bemocrntical Repiihlics.
fea with the capital of that kingdom ; where
Rhadamanthus in his travels had colledled thofe
inventions and inftitiuions of a civilized people,
which he had the addrefs to apply to the con-
firmation of his own authority. Minos is ftill
more diftinguifhed : in his travels in the eaii, he
faw certain families pofleiTed of unrivalled ho-
nours and unlimited authority, as vicegerents of
the Deity. Although the Greeks would never ad-
mit, in the fuUeft latitude of oriental fuperftition
and defpotifm, this odious profanation, yet Minos,
taking advantage of his own unbounded reputa-
tion, and that enthufiafm for his perfon which his
fkill and fortune in war, his genius for fcience,
and talents for government, had excited among
wandering credulous lavages, fpread a report that
he was admitted to familiar converfations with
Jupiter, and received from that deity his fyftem
of laws, with orders to engrave it on tables of
brafs. The great principle of it Vv'as, that all
freemen fhould be equal, and therefore that none
lliould have any property in lands or goods , but
that citizens ll:iould be ferved by Daves, who
fhould cultivate the lands upon public account.
The citizens Ihould dine at public tables, and
their families fubfift on the public flock. The
monarch's authority v>/as extremely limited, ex-
cept in war. The magidracies were the recom-
pence of merit and age , and fuperiority was al-
lowed to nothing elie. The youth were reftrained
to a rigid temperance, modeily, and morality, en-
forced by law. Their education, which was pub-
lic, was direfted to make them foldiers. Such
regulations could not fail to fecure order, and
what they called freedom to the citizens ; but
nine-tenths of mankind were doomed to flavery
10 fupporc them in total idlenefs, excepting thofe
exercifes
Crete. 307
exercifcs proper for warriors, become more necef-
fary to keep the flaves in fubjeftion, than to de-
fend the fiate againft the pirates and robbers
with whom the age abounded. Idomcneus, grand-
fon of Minos, and commander of the Cretan forces
in the I'rojan war, was among the mod powerful
of the Grecian chiefs, and one of the few who re-
turned in fafety from that expedition. Here was
a government of all authority in one centre, and
that centre the moft aged and meritorious perfons
of the nation, with little authority in the king, and
none in the reft of the people-, yet it was not of
fufficient ftrengtii to hold together. The venera-
ble old men could not endure the authority, or
rather the pre-eminence, of the king. Monarchy
muft be abolifhcd \ and every principal city be-
came early a fcparate independent commonwealth ;
each, no doubt, under its patriarch, baron, noble,
or archon, for they all fignify the fame thing : and
continual wars cnfued between the fevcral repub-
lics within the ifland ; and Cretan valour and
martial flvill were employed and exhaufted in
butchering one another, until they turned all
the virtues they had left againft mankind in gene-
ral, and exerted them in piracies and robberies,
to their univerlal infamy throughout: all Greece :
nor was Crete cvir oi any weight in Grecian
politics after the Ticjan v.'ur.
X 2 LETTER
5o8 Ancient BemGcratical Repuhlia.
LETTER XLV.
C O R I N T Ft.
My dear Sir,
MONARCHY remained in this emporium
of Greece longer than in any other of the
principal cities j but the noble families here
could no better endure the fuperiority of a mo-
narch, than others in all countries ; and with nu-
merous branches of the royal family (named Bac-
chidse, from Bacchis, fifth monarch in fucceffion
from Aletes) at their head, they accordingly put
to death Teleftes, the reigning monarch ; and
ufurping the government, under an afTociation
among themfelves, inilituted an oligarchy. An
annual firft magiftrate, with the title of Frytanis,
but with very limited prerogativer, like a doge of
Venice, was chofen from among themfelves. Seve-
ral generations pafled away under the adminiilra-
tion of this odious clicrarchy , but the people at
length finding it intolerably opprefiive, expelled
the whole junto, and let up Cuypfelus as a mo-
narch or tyrant. He had long been the head of
the popular party, and was defervediy a popular
character, polfelled of ihe confidence and aficclioa
of his fellow-cnizcns lo a great deerce, or he
never ccui.. have retuicd the guard which was
offered him r.,r the pottclion ot his perfon againO:
the attemp.. of the defeated oligarchy. His mo-
deration and clemency are allowed by all; yet
he is univcrfaily called by the Grecian writers
8 Tyrant
Corinth. 309
Tyrant of Corinth, and his government a Tyran-
ny. Ariftotle, 1. v. c. 12, informs us that his
tyranny continued thirty years, becaufe he was a
popular man, and governed without guards. Pe-
riander, one of the feven wife men, his fon and
fuccefTor, reigned forty-four years, becaufe he was
an able general. Pfampfneticus, the fon of Gor-
gias, fucceeded, but his reign was fliort ; yet this
fpace of fcventy feven years is thought by Arif-
totle one of the longefi: examples of a tyrrany or
an oligarchy. At the end of this period the no-
blts again prevailed ; but not without courting
the people. The tyranny was demoliflied, and a
new commonwealth eftablifhed, in which there was
a mixture of oligarchy and democracy, to prevent
the hrfl from running into excefs of opprefilon,
and the other into turbulence and licence.
Here we find the ufual circle : monarchy firfl:
limited by nobles only ; then the nobles, becom-
ing envious and impatient of the monarch's pre-
eminence, demolifli him, and fet up oligarchy.
This grows infolenc and oppreffive to the people,
who let up a favourite to pull it down. The new
idol's polLcrity grow infolent -, and the people final-
ly think of introducing a mixture of three regular
branriies of power, in the one, the few, and the
many, to controul one anotlicr, to be guardians
in turn to the laws, and feeure equal liberty to
all.
Ariiloile, in this chapter, cenfurcs fome parts
of the eighth book of Plato, and fays, *' That in
" general, when governments alter, they chanorc
into the contrary Ipecies to \vhat tl.ey before
were, and not into one like the former : and
" this reafoning holds true of other changes. For
*' he fays, tliat trom the Lacedaemonian form it
*' changes into an oligarchy, and from thence
X ^ " into
310 ^Ancient Democratical Republics.
<c
cc
<c
(c
cc
<c
<c
<c
<c
cc
cc
(C
4C
c
<(
cc
ec
(C
cc
i(
cc
cc
cc
cc
cc
into a democracy, and from a democracy into
a tyranny ; and fometimes a contrary change
takes place, as from a democracy into an oli-
garchy, rather than into a monarchy. With re-
fped: to a tyranny, he neither fays whether
there will be any change in it ; or, if not, to
what caufe it will be owing , or, if there is, in-
to what other ftate it will alter : but the reafon
of this is, that a tyranny is an indeterminate
government ; and, according to him, every ftate
ought to alter into the firib and moft perfed: :
thus the continuity and circle would be pre-
ferved. But one tyranny often changed into
another ; as at Syria, from Muros to Clif-
thenes ; or into an oligarchy, as was Antileos
at Chalcas ; or into a democracy, as was Cha-
rilaus's at Laccd^Emon, and at Carthage. An
oligarchy is alfo changed into a tyranny : fuch
was the rife of moft of the ancient tyrannies in
Sicily : at Leontium, into the tyranny of Pa-
ncetius ; at Gela, into that of Cleander ; at
Rhegium, into that of Anaxilaus -, and the like
in many other cities. It is abftird alfo to fup-
pofe, that a ftate is changed into an oligarchy
becaufe thofe who are in power are avaricious
and greedy of money ; and not becaule thofe,
who are by far richer than their fellow-citizens,
think it unfair that thofe who have nothing
fhould have an equal fhare in the rule of the
ftate with themfelves, who poftefs fo much : for
in many oligarchies it is not allowable to be
employed in money - getting, and there are
many laws to prevent it. But in Carthage,
which is a deajocracy, money-getting is credit-
able ; and yet their form of goverment re^
mains unaltered."
Whether thefe obfervations pf Ariftotle upon
Plat(^
Argos. 311
Plato be all juft or nor, they only ferve to
ftrengthen our argument, by (hewing the muta-
bility of fimple governments in a fuller light.
Not denying any of the changes Hated by Plato,
he only enumerates a multitude of other changes
to which fuch governments are liable , and there-
fore fliews the greater necefTity of mixtures of
different orders, and decifive balances, to preferve
mankind from thofe horrible calamities which re-
volutions always bring with^them.
LETTER XLVL
A R G S.
My dear Sir,
IN order to form an adequate idea of the mife-
ries which were brought upon the Greeks by
continual and innumerable revolutions of govern-
ment, it fhouki be confidered, that the whole Pe-
loponnefus was fcarcely two hundred miles in
length, and one hundred and forty in breadth,
not much more extenfive than the Imalleft of the
Thirteen States of America. Such an inherent
force of repulfion, fuch a dir[)ofition to fly to
pieces, as poflefTed the minds of the Greeks,
would divide America into thoufands of petty
defpicable Hates, and lay a certain foundation for
irreconcileable wars.
Although Thucidydes and Ariftotle, as well
as Homer, inform us, that kingdoms were here-
X 4 ditary.
3 1 2 Ancient Democratical Republics.
dit. ry, and of limited authority, yet the limita-
tions appear to be very confufed , they v;ere the
limitatinns of nobles rather than of neople , and
the firft ftruggles for power were between kings
and archons. The kings had no ftanding ar-
mies ; and all the forces under their authority,
even when they took the field, could be com-
manded only by the nobles, who had their pecu-
liar diftrids of land and people to govern : thefe
were illuilrious and independent citizens ; like
the barons who demanded the great charter, com-
municated to each other their grievances, and
took meafures to remove them : but, being ge-
nerally as averfe to popular as to regal power,
their conilant aim was an ariilccracy -, they ac-
cordingly extinguifhed monarchy, but did nor
fecure the -rights of the people. The immediate
efFe6l of this revolution only multiplied evils.
OppreiTed by kings, Greece was much more op-
prelTed by archons; and, anciently too much di>
vided, was ftill more fubdivided under the new
forms of government. Many inferior cities dif-
daincd the juriididlion, and even the fuperior in-
fluence, of their refpeclive capitals ; affeiled inde-
pendent fovereignty ; and each town maintained
war with its neighbours. Each independent flate
had a right to fend tvv'o members to the Amphic-
tyonic council. The abolition of royalty render-
ing the independent ilates more numerous, in-
creafed the number of Amphic:yons to one hun-
dred me^nbers, and more ; and an oath was re-
quired, that the mem.ber fhould never fubvert
any Amphictyonic city: yet every excels of ani-
mofity prevailed among the Grecian republics,
notwirhitanding the interpofition of the Am-
phidyons.
Argos
Argos, 313
Argos was founded by Danaus, the Egyptian,
about the time that Athens was fettled by Ce-
crops. At the Trojan war it was the firft of the
ftates, and ever continued the rival of Sparta.
Though the royal dignity feemed more firmly
lettled under Agamemnon than under any other
chief, yet Argos was one of the firft of the ftates
upon the continent to abolilli monarchy, and that
as early as on the death of Celfus, fon of Teme-
nus, tiie defcendant of Hercules. No account of
Its nt vv conllitution is preferved : but, from ana-
logy, we may be convinced, that a relllcfs body
of nobles overturned the monarchy ; and, as it
was fubjecfl to frequent and violent diforders, that
the archons could not agree upon the form of
their olif2;archy; and fet up for independency m
their different diftridls, ftates, or cities, a littie
iooner than in other republics. The higlier and
lower ranks were continually at variance-, the de-
mocratical faction was commonly fuperior; fome-
times tyrants were let up over all , and once, ac-
co!\lii)g to Herodotus *, the flaves got poiTeliion
of the city, took upon them the adminiftration of
affairs, and exercifed the ma^iftracies.
The government muft have been ill confti-
tutcd, as no Rhadamanthus or Minos, no Ly-
curgiis or Solon, no Zaleucus or Charondas, nor
any otlier legiilator of lupcrior wildom and pro-
bity, ever acquired the power; and no fortunate
coincidence of circumftances ever occurred, to
unite liberty and adminiftration, Ic^w and govern-
ment, upon a ftable bafis. One famous tyrant,
rheidon, lineal fucceftbr of Hercules, a prince
of great abilities but no moderation, raiTed him-
IcJr, rather than his country, to a luperijrity
Lib. vi.
which
314 Ancient Bemocratkal Republics.
which ceafed with him. For want of diflin6l
orders, and fteady balances, by which the wills
and the forces of the people might have been
fubjefled to the laws, Argos loft that pre-emi-
nence among the Grecian ftates, which it had ob-
tained under a monarchy. Every little town in
Argolis was feized with the caprice of indepen-
dence, and oppofed the general government, at
the fame time that the metropolis betrayed an
ambition to domineer over the inferior towns.
Civil wars enfued : Mycens, Trcezenc, Epi-
daurus, and other villages of lefs confequence,
were often conquered and garrifoned, but never
lubdued. Necellity taught them to unite. They
reproached Argos with tyranny, and Argos the
others with rebellion. Union enabled them to
let at defiance their capital, by means of in-
trigues and alliances with Laced^emon, the never-
failing refource of one party or the other in every
democratical ftate. The pretence v/as, the Per-
fian war, which Argos declined. This was call-
ed a bafe dereliftion, and excited, by the help of
Spartan emiflaries, hatred and contempt in Si-
cyon, Naupila, Heliasa, and other towns, be-
iides thofe mentioned before. Argos alone, of
all the cities inthcPeloponnefus, openly efpoufed
the caufe of Athens. This circumftance alone,
if it was not accidental, is enough to fhow, that
this city had more fenfe and profound wifdom
than all the reft ; for Sparta was certainly then
Jeading all Greece to deftruftion. In other re-
fpedls the Argives difcovered the fame temper,
and the fame underftanding, with all the others j
for they led their whole forces againft Mycen^,
took it by ftorm, decimated the inhabitants, and
demoliftied the town. Is it not fublime wifdom,
to rulh headlong into all the diftradions and di-
vifionsj
IphiiHS. 315
vifions, all the aflafTinations and maflacrcs, all
the feditions, rebellions, and eternal revolutions,
which are the certain confequence of the want of
orders and balances, merely for the fake of the
popular caprice of having every fifty families go-
verned by all authority in one centre ? Even
this would not fatisfy j the fifty families would
foon diflblve their union, and nothing would ever
content them fhort of the complete individual in-
dependence of the Mohawks -, for it may be de-
pended on, that individual independence is what
every unthinking human heart aims at nearly or
remotely.
LETTER XLVII,
I P H I T U S.
Dear Sir,
ELEIA had been the fcene of athletic games,
celebrated with great pomp by aflemblies of
chiefs from various parts of Greece. Iphitus, a
grandfon of Oxylus, fucceeded to the throne of
Elis. A6live and enterprifing, but not by in-
clination a foldier, he was anxious for a remedy
for the diforderly fituation of his country. Among
all the violence, feuds, and wars, fuperftition
maintained its empire, and the oracle of Delphi
was held in veneration.
Iphitus lent an embafly to fupplicate informa-
Vion from the deity, " How the anger of the gods,
:' which
3 1 6 Ani^knt Deynocratlcal Repullics.
'* which threatened total deflruclion to Pelopon-
*' ncfus, throufzh the endlcfs hoftilities among
its people, might be averted ?'* He received
an anfwer, which he had probably d:<5lated, " That
" the Olympian feftivai mull be rtllored : for
*' that the negieft of that foiemnity had brought
*' on the Greeks the indignation of Jupiter and
*' Hercules; to the firft of whom "it was dedi-
" cated, and by the laft of whom it had been in-
*' ftituted." Iphitus proceeded to model his in-
flitution , and ordained that a fcfbival fhould be
held at the temple of Jupiter at Olympia, near
Pila in Eleia, for ail the Greeks to partake in,
and that it fhould be repeated every fourth year;
that there lliould be facrihces to Jupiter and Her-
cules, and games in honour of them -, that an ar-
miftice fhould take place throughout Greece for
fome time before the commencement of the fefti-
val, and continue fome time after its conclufion.
A tradition was reported, that the Heraclides had
appointed Oxyius to the throne of Elis, and the
guardianfnip of the temple of Olympian Jupiter,
and confecrated all Eleia to the god. A reputa-
tion of fandfity became attached to the whole peo-
ple of Eleia, as the hereditary priefthood of Ju-
piter ; and feCiUdcd them from all neceffity of
cngp.ging in politics or v/ar. But it v.-as not
poffible, by any inftitutions of religion, to de-
Itroy that elailicity given by nature to the mind
cf man, v/hich excites coniinualiy to adion, often
palpably againfl men's interefts, which was ftrong
in the general temiper of the Greeks, and which
can never be fubdued or reftrained in any nation
but by orders and balances. Reftlefs fpirits arofe,
not to be fatisfcd. The Eleians often engaged
as auxiliaries in the wars of other ftates, on pre-
tence of ailcrting the caufe of religion ; but even
in
Iphitus, 317
in that caufe itfclf they could not agree among
themfelves. While monarchy fubfilled in the
pollerity of Iphitus, as it did for Ibme genera-
tions, Eleia continued under one government;
but at length the fpirit of democracy prevailed
there, as elfewhere in Greece, and with the fame
efFccls : every town claimed independency ; Pifa
and Eiis became feparate commonwealths. Olym-
pia was fituated within the territory of Pifa, on
the northern bank of the river x\lpheius, which
alone feparated it from that city. Elis was thirty
miles diilant; but the Kleians retained the guar-
dianfhip of the temple, and fuperintendency of
the feilival. The Pifseans now ddputed their
right ; wars arcfe between the two cities ; each
endeavoured to gain allies. At one time, Phei-
don, tyrant of Argos, claimiing to be by birth
the proper reprcrcntative of Hercules, took to
himfeif the guardianfliip of the temple, and pre-
fided at the games ; at another tiine the Pifii^ans
prevailed, and prefided at foir,e Olympiads. Ac
length the Eleans deflroyeu Pifa lb entirely, that
not a ru.n was left; and ever arter, excepting ;a
the 104th Olympiad, when the Arcadians vio-
lently interfered, tlicy h'_id the preiidency undif-
turbed.
\i a democracy could ever, in any cafe, hold
togcciier, it v/oald be nati'.ral to expect it in this
i:iilitution of Ipliitu:;, wh.i. ]i, ibunded wholly on
religion, had procjred lo nvjch prolperity and
veneration to ;::s pe;i:j!e : but it is as rational to
cxpcCt that a glais bubble, with a drop of water
inchMl'd in ir, v/iil r'.fifl ih.c heat of the iire : the
vapour vyiL!i:n v/il! loiall it liuo dull and atoms.
L E 1' T E R
3 1 8 Ancient Dembcratical Repullks,
LETTER XLVIIL
THEBES,
Dear Sir,
FABLE, and hiftory too, relate that this citj^
was governed anciently by kings , fixteen of
whom, from Cadmus the Phoenician, who founded
it, to Xanthus, are enumerated. After the death
of the lall, the Thebans changed their govern-
ment to a democratical republic. Their orders
and balances are not known , but their factions
and divifions, as well as their dulnefs, is remem-
bered. From the analogy of all the other Gre-
cian dates, it is probable that archons prefided
over the feveral cities of Boeotia, as their fepa-
rate diftridls, and had a king at their head, like
Ulyffes in Ithaca, and Alcinous in Phseacia , that
the king, whofe domain was Thebes, had fome-
times an inclination to favour his capital more
than the fubordinate towns ; and that the archons
grew impatient of his monarchy, and afpired ac
independency : the jealoufy and rivalry of cities
favoured the factious views of the archons, and
were probably fomented for that purpole.
Is it an initance of their want of penetration,
or was it from neceffity, that they chofe the two
heads of oppofite fadions for their highefl: annual
magiftrates ? Ifmenias was one ; an honefl man,
a friend to liberty, and confequently an advo-
cate for an equilibrium of pov/crs in the confti-
tution. Leontidas, the other, was ambitious of
the whole power to himfclf, and of governing
by
^hehes: 3 if
"by a council of his friends-, but, finding his rival
more popular than himfelf, he fold the citadel to
a Spartan general, upon condition that he and
his party fhould rule. When this was eflfefted,
he feized his colleague, and had him tried, con-
demned, and executed, for caballing againjl the gO"
vernment. The friends of Ifmenias fled in a pa-
nic, and were baniflied by a public edi6l ; for it
feems that a revolution without banilhments and
confifcations, at lead, is a degree of moderation
and felf-government of which nations are wholly
incapable. The exiled citizens, who in this cafe
were the honeft men and friends of liberty, among
whom was Pelopidas, returned from Athens ia
difguife, deftroyed the tyrant and his crew, and,
with the help of Epaminondas and his friends,
regained the citadel. Thefe two fages and heroes
had now enough to do : firft, to infpire a little
iinderftanding and unanimity into their fellow-
citizens , then to difcipline them for war, and
conquer their enemies ; and, at laft, to frame a.
good conftitution of government. They accom-
plifhed all but the laft, to their immortal glory :
but Pelopidas was killed in battle, before the
war was finilhed ; and Epaminondas grew unpo-
pular, and was rejedled by faction even from the
command of the army : a fufficient proof that
the ariftocratical and democratical fatStions were
nearly equal. He was reinftated, indeed, after
the blunders and defeats of liis fuccefTor had
brought the citizen! to repentance-, but was (lain
in battle at the moment of vidory : fo that the
Theban republic never had the benefit of his ad-
vice in the formation of a new code of laws ;
as flie had never made any figure, excepting a
momentary fame under thcfe two srcat men, and
was at length totally deftrovcd by Alexander.
I ' ' The
320 Ancient Bemocratkal Republics.
The ruin of Bceotia was occafioned by the fi-
nefle of Antalcidas, in his Peifian treaty. Tlie
Thehans, as well as Argives, had withheld their
afiiftance in the Perfian war. Antalcidas knev/
that the fubordinate cities of I'hcfpis, Platea,
Aulis, Anthemon, Larymna, Afchra, Coronca,
Labadea, Delium, Alalkomene, .Leu(5tra, Chas-
ronea, all wifhed for independence \ they accord-
ingly rejefted the jurifdidtion and fovereignry of
Thebes. The Thebans folicited Sparta to take
a part in their domeftic quarrels ; and, againft
her own favourite treary, made by her artful am-
bafiador, fhe accepted the propolal. The vir-
tuous and amiable Spartan fenate perceived that
it was equally their intereft that Argos fhould
lofe her jurifdidion over her revoked tov^ns,
and that Thebes, the rival neighbour of Athens,
Ihould recover her authority in Eceotia ; but, not-
withftanding partial fuccclTes, fiie could not re-
gain her auihority over all the cities, until Epa-
minondas arofe, after eighty years of civil wars.
Had there been a governor in Eceotia, and a fe-
nate, and a houfe of reprefentacives, compofed
of an equitable proportion of deputies from
Thebes and all the lefier cities and each of rhefe
branches polTefied of an independent negative in
the legiPiature, while the whole executive was in
the governor would thtfe civil wars have hap-
pened ? thefe endiefs contendons between the no-
bles and people, the capital and fubordinate ci-
ties ? theie intrigues of one party with Athens,
and another with Sparta ? The very difinclina-
tion, both in Thebes and Argos, to engage in
the Ferfian war, arofe wholly from tlicir domeltic
diffenfions; and thefe from the want of judicious
orders and balances.
After
Thebes. 321
After the abolition of monarchy in Boeotia,
there was an effort to colled all authority into
one center ; but the nation found, that, although
laws might be thus made, they could not be io
executed. There muft, therefore, be an execu-
tive magiftrate ; but not being able to agree, in
drder to pleafe both fides, the leader of each
faftion mult be chofen. They could not agree,
as might have been forefeen, and fplit the na-
tion at once into two hoftile armies ; one of
which fought the alliance of Sparta, and the
other that of Athens, Thus it ever was, and
ever will be, in fimilar cafes. It is much to be
regretted, that Epaminondas did not live to dif-
play his talents as a legiflator ; the world might
pofllbly have been bleffed with fomcthing like an
Englifh conftitution, two or three ch^ufand yearfi
fooner th^n it v/as.
LETTER
322 Ancient A^ijlocratical RspuMh
LETTER XLIX.
ANCIENT ARISTOCRATICAL
REPUBLICS.
C R O T O N A.
PYTHAGORAS.
My dear Sir,
PYTHAGORAS, as well as Socrates, Plato,
and Xenophon, were perfuaded that the hap-
pinefs of nations depended chiefly on the form of
their government: they were fully fenfible of the
real mifery, as well as dangerous tendency, both
of democratical licentioufnefs and monarchical ty-
ranny ', they preferred a well-tempered ariftocra-
cy to all other governments. Pythagoras and
Socrates, having no idea of three independent
branches in the legiflature, both thought, that
the laws could neither prevent t!ie arbitrary op-
preflions of magiftrates, nor turbulent infolence
of the people, until mankind were habituated by
education and difcipline to regard the great du-
ties of life, and to confider a reverence of them-
felves, and the efteem of their feilov.'-citizens, as
the principal fource of their enjoyment. In fmall
communities, efpecially where the fiaves were
many, and the citizens few, this might be plau-
fible ; but the education of a great nation can ne-
ver accomplifh io great an end. Millions muft be
brought
brought up, whom no principles, no fentiments
derived from education, can reftrain from tram-
pling on the laws : orders of men, watching and
balancing each other, are the only fecurity ;
power muft be oppofed to power, and intereft to
intercll. Pythagoras found this by experience ac
Crotona, where the inferior ranks, elated v;ith.
the deftruftion of Sybaris, and inftigated by an
artful ambitious leader, Cylon, clamoured for an
equal partition of the conquered territory : this
was denied them, as inconfiflent with an arifto-
cratical government ; a confpiracy enfued againft
the magiilrates, who were furprifed in the fenate-
houfe, many put to death, and the refl: driven
from their country. Pythagoras was one of the
baniflied, and died foon afterwards, in extreme
old age, at Metapontum. The Crotonians had
foon caufe to repent their iniurre6lion -, for they
were defeated, with all their forces, by the Lo-
crians and Rhegians, with fmaller numbers.
The other Greek, cities of Italy, which had imi-
tated the example of Crotona, in depofmg their
magiftrates, were haraffed with v/ars againft each
other, and againft their neighbours. In confe-
quence of thefe diftreffes, the difcipies of Pytha-
goras again recovered their reputation and influ-
ence-, and about fixty years alrci-rwards, Zaleucus
and Charondas, the one in Locris, and the other
in Thurium, revived the Pyrluigorean inftirutions.
In forty years more, a new revolution drove the
Pythagoreans entirely from Italy, and completed
the mifery of that beautiful country. Thus ex-
perience has ever fhewn, tiiat education as well
as religion, ariilocracy as W'A\ as democracv and
monarchy, are, lingly, totally inadequate to t!',e
bufinels of reftrain uig the pjfilons of men, of
preferving a fteady government, and protecciMg
1 2 ihw
524 Ancient Arijiocratical RepuhBa,
the lives, liberties, and properties of the peaple.
Nothing has ever effe(5bed it but three different
orders of men, bound by their interelts to watch
over each other, and fland the guardians of the
laws. Religion, fuperftition, oaths, education,,
laws, all give way before paffions, intereft, and
power, which can be refifted only by pafTions, in-
tereft, and power.
It is no wonder that Mr. Turgot fhould have
entertained very crude conceptions of republican
legiflation , it is a fcience the Icall underftood of
any in the whole circle: all other orders of men
of letters in Europe, as well as phyficians, for a
long time, have thought it " litters nihil fanan-
** tes." It is a kind of erudition which neither
procures places, penfions, embafiies, chairs in
academies, nor fame nor practice in the pulpit,
at the bar, nor in medicine. A minifter of ftate,
of great abilities and merit, as well as reputation,
advanced to the head of the affairs of a refpefta-
ble monarchy, by one of the greateft princes that
has ever lived, I mean the Baron de llertfberg,
has within a few years fet an example, in a royal
academy of fciences, of enquiry into this fubjed:.
In a learned and ingenious difcourfe, delivered by
himfelf, he has attempted to lliow the advantages
of fimple monarchy over ail kinds of republican
governments, even that beft fpecies of them, li-
mited monarchies : but did this worthy minifter
cxpedl: that any of his brother academicians would
conteft with him the merits of fuch governments ?
Men of letters are not fond of martyrdom in this
age, nor of ruining their reputations. It is not,
however, my defign to difcufs any queilicns atpre-
fent concerning abfolute monarchies, though the
principles I contend for might be traced through
the hiftgry of every monarchy and empire in Eu-
rope.
Pythagoras. 325
rope. Even in thefe there are orders, check";, and
balances contrived, at lead againft abufes in ad-
minidration, and tor the prefervation of the laws.
The fcience of government has received very lit*
tie improvement fince the Greeks and Romans.
The neceffity of a ftrong and independent execu-
tive in a fingle perfon, and of three branches in
the legiflature inllcad of two, and of an equality
among the three, are improvements made by the
Englilh, which were unknown, at lead never re-
duced to pradice, by the ancients. Machiavel
was the firll who revived the ancient politics :
the bed part of his writings he tranilated almoft
literally from Plato and Aridotle, without ac-
knowledging the obligation ; and the word of the
fcntiments, even in his Prince, he tranilated from
Aridotle, without throwing upon him the re-
proach. Montefquieu borrowed the bed part of
his book from Machiavel, without acknowledg-
ing the quotation. Milton, Harrington, Sid-
ney, were intimately acquainted with the an-
cients, and with Machiavel. They were followed
by Locke, Hoadley, &c. The reputation which
is to be acquired by this kind of learning may
be judged of by the language of Mr. Hume:
*' Compofitions the mod defpicable, both for
" dyle and matter, fuch as Rapin Thoyras,
" Locke, Sidney, Hoadley, &c. have been ex-
" tolled, and propagated, and read ; as if they
" had equalled the mod celebrated remains of
*' antiquity." Hume's Hidory of England, vol.
viii. p. 323. Such is the ftyle in which this
great writer fpeaks of writings which he mod
probably never read. But although the time is
long fince paflcd when fuch writings were extolled,
propagated, or read, the contempt of them is as
tafliionablc, as likely to procure places and pen-
y 3 dons^
326" Ancient Arijiocrattcal Republics .
fions, and to make a book fell now, as it was
v/hen Mr. Hume wrote.
The fads in thefe letters relative to Venice,
are taken from the Abby Laugier and Moor's
Travels , thofe relanve to the ancient republics,
excepting the authorities already quoted, are
taken from Robenfon, Montague, Potter, the
Univerfal Hiftory, and efpecially from Mitford,
Gillies, and Fergufon, three very valuable and
elegant productions, which deferve to be care-
fully ftudied by all America. I have made free
life of their expreffions as well as refleflions,
without noting them ; if you would fee how much
has been borrowed, you muft read.
Mr. Turgot was as little converfant in this
kind of erudition as Mr. Hume. The former,
however, was a lover of liberty ; but it was of
that kind of liberty which he meditated to intro-
duce into France, and could reconcile with a
fimple monarchy : he was too good a fubjedl to
think of introducing a free conflitution of go-
vernment into his own country. For the liberty
of commerce, the liberty of religious fentiments,
and the perfonal liberty of the fubject, fuch as
are eftablifhed by the laws, in a monarchy, he
was an enthufiaft ; and enthufiafm for liberty,
the common caufe of all mankind, is an amiable
fervor, which is pardonable even when it is not
according to knowledge : but he was neither an
enthufialt for a free conftitution of government,
nor did he know in v/hac it confifted.
LETTER
Charondas. JJ27
LETTER L.
ANCIENT DEMOCRATICAL
REPUBLICS.
S Y B A R I S.
CHARONDAS.
My dear Sir,
THE city of Sybaris was a Grecian colony
in Italy, planted by Achaians ; and, ac-
cording to Diodorus Siculus*, its beautiful fitua-
tion between two rivers, the Crathis and the Sy-
baris, the extent and fertility of its territory, and
the freedom of its laws, had, in a fhort fpace of
time, drawn together a prodigious number of in-
habitants, and greatly enriched them.
But the common fate of all nations and cities
attended them* They had three parties ; a chief,
a better fort, and a people. The mod powerful
citizens were caballing as ufual againft the chief,
whofe name was Telys, and, whatever his cha-
ra6ler for virtue was, appears to have had more
cunning than Grecian chiefs commonly had, at
Jeaft he difcerned better where the balance lay ;
for he courted the people, by flattering their fol-
lies. He excited a popular cry againft the arifto-
cratical party, drove them from the city, confif-
cated their fortunes, and diftributed them amono;
the reft of the citizens. The exiles fled to Croto-
na. Telys lent ambaffadors to demand them, on
pain of war. Pythagoras thought the caufe of his
Lib. xii. p. 6.
y 4 ariftocratical
32? 'Ancient Democrat ical R epuhlics.
ariftocratical friends ju fir, and perfuaded his fel-
low-citizens to refuft; to deliver them up. The
Sybarites marched an army , but were met by
another from Crotona, with Milo, ih6 (Irong
man, at their head, whofe reputation prevailed ,
the Sybarites were all maflacred, and their city
pillaged, and left a defart. Firfl: happy effect of
a. government without acknowledged orders and
legal balances ! Fifty-eight years afterwardsj
fome ThefTalians eftabliHied themfelves at Syba-
ris : they had not been there five years, when the
Crotonians came and drove them ouc. Under
Caliimachus, archon of Athens, it was repeo-
pled the third time, and had the name of Thu-
rium. A populous colony was fent there, un-
der Lampon and Xenocraies, who bulk a beau-
tiful city for a capital, and twenty-five fubor-
dinate cities : but the inhabitants could not
long live in good intelligence among tlicmielves ;
they fell into diffcnfions, grew extravagant, luxu--
rious, and effeminate to a proverb. The quar-
rel began i-n this manner : The old inhabitants
of Sybaris erected themfelves into a kind of no-
bility, and arrogated to themfelves all the public
employments of any diflinclion, vcuchfafing to
the new-comers only thofe of lead importance ;
they infilled, moreover, that their wives flioukl
facrifice the firfl to the gods, and that the other
ladies fliould not commence their devotions till
the firfl had concluded : not content with diilinc-
tions fo afTuming, they went farther, and took,
to themfelves, in the diflribution of the lar.ds, all
thofe which were neareft the city, and left only
the more diflant to thole whoju they called fo-
reigners, The latter, being more numerous and
more brave, carried their refcntments fo far, as
%o put all the old families to death, and remained
Charondasl 32(j
fole pofTefTors of all the territory within the walls.
Not having people enough left, they invited others
from various parts of Greece, divided houfes and
lands among them, entered into alliance with Cro-
tona, and became opulent. They divided the peo-
ple into ten tribes, and eftabliflied among them a
democratical government, and chofe for their le-
giflator Charondas, who, having examined to the
foundation the laws of all counrries, chofe out of
them, for his conntry, the wifefl: and moft con-
venient. Some others he added, drawn from his
own meditations. His laws are loil, and there-
fore his orders and balances are not known. It
is neverthelefs certain, that orders and balances
exifted in his inftitution, from certain regulations
preferved by Diodorus.
1. He excluded from all his public councils
all men who, having children, fhould marry a fe-
cond time , and thus mortify their children with
the authority of a ftep-mother.
2. As another check to his democracy, he or-
dained that all who fhould be convided of ca-
lumny, fhould be conduced through the flrcets
crowned with tamarin ; a punifliment fo infamous,
that feveral put an end to their own lives rather
than fubmit to it.
3. He prohibited all fociety with wicked men :
for, fays he, the dilpofition to evil is very (Iron"-;
and many of thofe who at firft love virtue, arc
often drawn in, by t!ie charms of fecret fedudions,
to the greatelt vices.
3. He ordained, that all the fons of every fa-
mily fhould learn to write and read under mafters
m the pay of the public. This law alone has
merit enough to confecrate to immortality the
memory of this legiflator, and defervcs to be imi-
tated by every free people at kali.
4. That
350 Ancient Democratical Republics,
4. That the property of orphans Ihould be ad-
miniftered by the relations by the father , but
their perfons and education entrufled to thofe by
the mother.
5. All thofe who fhould refufe to take arms
for their country, or quit their ranks in the army,
inftead of being puniflied by death, fliould be ex-
pofed three days in a public fquare of the city in
women's clothes.
6. To preferve his democraiical arrangement,
he thought it neceffary tOjprohibit all propo-
fals of changes in his laws. His principle was,
that it was as advantageous to fubmit to the laws,
as it is dangerous to fubjed: the laws to individu-
als ; and therefore in trials he reprehended and
filenced all criminals, who fubftituted turns of
eloquence and arbitrary interpretations in place
of the letter of the laws, and charged them with
violating their authority and majefty. The quef-
tion is, faid Charondas, " Whether you fhali i^wo.
*' the law or the criminal ?"
7. Struck with the diforders and feditions which
he had feen in many democratical cities, he or-
dained that no citizen fliould prefent himfeif in
the public affembly, to propofe any reformation
or alteration in the law, without an halter about
his neck, which he iliould wear till the people had
deliberated and determined : if the people decreed
the propofed alteration hurtful or unneceffary, the
reformer fhould be ftrangled on the fpot. This
regulation filenced all new legiflators lo entirely,
that only three examples occurred of any changes.
Ail his precautions were infufficient : Return-
ing from the country with his fword, which he
had taken to defend himfeif againd highwaymen,
he found the afiembly in diviiion and confufion.
He haftened to compofe the tumult. One of his
2 enemies
Charondas. 331
enemies reproached him with violat?ng his own
law, by coming into the affembly with an arm.
Charondas, who had forgotten the fword, cried, I
mean to obferve and enforce the law, and plunged
it into his own heart, wearied, mofl probably, into
a contempt of life by the diforders incident to
unbalanced parties.
When every legidator who has attempted a de-
mocratical eftablifhment, has confefled its inherent
tendency to immediate diflblution, by the ftrongefl:
rigours againft propofals of innovation, and num-
berlefs other provifions to controul it, which have
all been found incffedtual, is it worth while ftill
to cherifh the fond idea, when three branches are
found, by experience, fo efFcdually to check each
other; when in two independent aflemblies im-
provements and reformations may be fo eafily and
fafely propofed and adopted, and fuch as are not
beneficial rejedled ?
LETTER LI.
L C R I S.
Z A L E U C U S.
My dear Sir,
ZALEUCUS was of Locris in Italy, not far
diftant from Sybaris. He was a difciple of
Pythagoras, of noble birth, and admirable morals.
Having acquired the efteem and confidence of his
fellow-citizens, they chofe him for their legiflator.
Unfortunately
332 Ancient Democratical Republic s'.
Unfortunately little remains of his laws but their
preamble : but this is in a llyle fo fuperior to all
the other legiilators, as to excite regret for the
lofs of his code. In this preamble he declares,
that all thofe who fhall inhabit the city, ought,
above all things, to be perfuaded that there is a
God ; and if they elevate their eyes and thoughts
towards the heavens, they will be convinced, that
the difpofition of the heavenly bodies, and the or-
der which reigns in all nature, are not the work
of men, nor of chance ; that therefore they ought
to adore the gods, as the authors of all which life
prefents us of good and beautiful i that they
Ibould hold their fouls pure from every vice, be-
caufe the gods accept neither the prayers, offer-
ings, or facrifices of the wicked, and are pleafed
only with the jufi; and beneficent anions of virtu-
ous men. Having thus, in the beginning of his
laws, fixed the attention of his fellow-citizens up-
on piety and wifdom, he ordains, above all things,
that there fhould never be among them any irre-
concilable enmity ; but, on the contrary, that
thofe animofities which might arife among them,
ihould be only a paffage to a fure and fmcere re-
conciliation J and that he who would not fubmit
himfelf to thefe fentiments, ihould be regarded as
a favage in a civilized community. The chiefs of
his republics ought not to govern with arrogance
nor pride ; nor Ihould the magi(trates be guided
in their judgments by hatred nor by friendihip.
This preamble, inftead of addrefiing itfelf to
the ignorance, prejudices, and fuperftitious fears
cf favages, for the purpofe of binding them to an
abfurd fyftem of hunger and glory for a family
purpofe, like the laws of Lycurgus, places re-
ligion, morals, and government, upon a bafis of
philqfophy, which js rational, intelligible^ and eter-
nal^
Zakucus. 335
nal, for the real happinefs of man In foclety, and
throughout his duration.
The principle adopted by this legiflator, as the
motive to a6lion next to the fenfe of duty and fo-
cial obligation, was the fenfe of honour, like that
of Lycurgus. As Zaleucus was a difciple of Py-
thagoras, whofe favourite plan of government was
a well-tempered ariftocracy, we may conjecture
that fuch was the form recommended to the Lo-
crians : but all are loft, and certainly no argument
can be drawn from them in favour of one popular
afiembly. If, in vifiting the Sybarites and Locri-
ans, we have found nothing in favour of Mr. Tur-
got's fyltem, nor any thing very material againft it,
we have found a greater advance towards civili-
zation than in all the laws of Lycurgus and Solon,
excepting only the trial by jury inftituted by the
latter; I mean in the preamble of Zaleucus, and
in the general education to letters in fchoolsj at
the public expence, by Charondas.
I. E T T E R
334 Ancient Democratkal Republics.
LETTER LII.
ROME,
PLEBEIANS SCRAMBLING AFTER PATRICIANS; OR
DEMOCRACY HUNTING DOWN ARISTOCRACY ;
OR TRIBtfNES IN CHASE OF A SENATE.
My dear Sir,
WE have before feen, in the hiftory of Rome,
with what eagernefs the ariftocracy pur-
fiied and demoliflied the monarchy : the kings
are commonly reproached with tyranny, and the
nobles are applauded for refiftance to it ; but it
is clear that the nobles were as tyrannical, and
that their eternal plots and confpiracies againft
the kings, their power, their crowns, and their
lives, were the caufe and the provocation to that
tyranny. It is impoffiblc to fay which were
worft, the nobles or kings , both certainly were
bad enough in general, and both frequently vio-
lated the laws, as it will ever happen when there
are but two branches. The people as yet had no
adequate power to aid or controul either. By the
inftitution of Romulus, indeed, the Roman peo-
ple, even the loweft clafs of the citizens, inftead
of being prohibited to engage in all kinds of la-
bour, after the example of the Spartans, were di-
redled to apply themielves to paflurage, agricul-
ture, and mechanic arts. This had its natural ef-
feft; and immediately afcer the revolution, by
which
Rome, 3S5
which the monarchy was abolilhed, and arlftocracy
fee up, though we find the patricians at their ufua!
game of encroaching on the people, yet we find
there was a people, a numerous, hardy, courage-
ous people, who were not difpofed to fijbmit :
they loon began a refiftance, and to demand more
power to refill -, and having obtained one concef-
lion, they required another, until they obtained an
equality with the patricians. So far they were in
the right ; and if the two powers could have re-
mained equal, juftice, liberty, and happinefs, the
efi'ecl of equal laws, might have been enjoyed :
but human nature can never reft once in mo-
tion, it rolls, like the ftone of Sifv'phus, every in-
Itant when the refilling force is fulpendcd. Dio-
dorus Seculus is very right, lib. xix. when he fays,
" It is of the nature of man to afpire continually
*' at fomething greater than his preient condition,
" and to wifli that his power might increal'e in-
" ftead of decreafing, or refting as it is." Dr. Fer-
gulon, who follows very accurately Dionyfius of
Halicarnafllis, Livy, and Polybius, will furnifh us
with a good account of the fteps by which the
Roman people proceeded to augment their own
power, and diminifli that of the fenate, until they
obtained the whole. 1 (hall give an abridgment
of the llory very nearly in Fcrgufon's words. In
their career, however, the people loll their morals
and their wildom, as they ever will in fuch a courfe,
and were ready to confer the fovereignty on the
line of Cefars,even^beforet hey had completely ob-
tained it. Thofe irregularities, and that final ca-
taltrophe, were all occalioned by the imperfections
in their balance. \i the conluls had been pcificired
ol a negative in the legillature, and of all the exe-
cutive authority, and the fenate and people had
been made equal and independent in ll;e fitfcella-
33^ Amknt "DmocraHcal Repuhltci,
blirhment of the commonwealth, it is impoffiblc?
for any man to prove that the republic v/ould not
have remained in vigour and in glory at this
hour.
The government of Rome, in the 244th year
from the building of the city after the expulfion
of Tarquin, was become wholly ariftocratical :
the nobles, exclufively, had the legiflative, execu-
tive, and judicial power^ without any third party
to hold the balance between them and the people 5
for the confuls, although they were executive ma-
giftrates, united in their perfons the dignities of
the ftate : thofe of judges, magiftrates, and mili-
tary leaders, were underftood to come in the place
of kings, and performed all the funftions of roy-
alty , yet they were only parts and minifters of
the fenate. While the exiled king was endeavour-
ing, by continual invafions, to recover his power,
dilputes aroie between the parties who had united
to expel him. Creditors, fupported by the arifto-
cracy, of which the nobles were now in full pof-
feffion, became fevere in the exaction of debts, or
the patrons laid claim to more than the clients
were willing to pay. The ftate was diftrafted at
once by its enemies from abroad, and by the dif-
fenfion of parties at home. The authority of the
new government not being fufficient to contend
with thefe difficulties, the lenate refolved to place
themfelves and the commonwealth for a limited
time under the power of a fmgle perfon, under
the title of dictator.
The inferior clafs of the people, almoll ex-
cluded from any fhare in the new govern-
ment, foon found, that under its influence
they had more oppre/Tion to fear from their pa-
trons than they had ever experienced from the
prince they had baniHied. So long as the king
I and
Rome. 337
and the fenate fhared in the powers of the (late?
the one took part with the people, when the other
acrempted to opprefs them , and it was the or-
dinary intereft and policy of the prince to weaken
the nobles, by fupporting the plebeians againft
them. This effecft of the monarchy Hill, in !ome
meafure, remained, fo long as theVxiled king was
alive, maintained his pretenfions, and made the
united krvices of the people necefiary to the
kn.'ite ; bur, upon the death of the king, the
nobles availed tiiemulvcs of their power, and en-
forced their claims on tl:e people with extreme
fevcrity. In the capacity of creditors, they im^
prifoned, ftripped, and enfiavcd thofe who were
iiidebred to them, and held the liberties and lives
of their fellow-ciiizens at their mercy. The whole
body of [plebeians w.is alarmed , they faw more
formidable enemies in the perfons of their owa
nobility, than in the armies of any nation whatever.
Many who had already fuffered under the rod of
their creditors, when called upon to cnlid, fliewed
their limbs galled with fetters, or torn with ilripes
which they had received by command of their
mercilels patrons. Thefe dillraftions obliged the
fenate to have recourfe to another dictator , c.\id.
Valerius, who was appointed for his popularity,
repelled the enemy. The fcnace, upon his return,
not fulfilling his promll'es to t'le people, they re^
tired to tlie Sacred Mountain. I'he fenate was
obliged to negotiate, to niirigatc the feveriiies
ag^inil infolveiit debtors, and content to the ap
pointment of tribunes : t'^s was in the year 260,
lixteen years after the revolution. Had the ple-
beians difcontinued their colledive afiemblies for
every purpofc but cleilior.s, and increafed their
li ibunes to four or five hundred reprefcnratives,
even this would not have been a radical cure,
Z v.-:iuout
3.1 8 Ancient "Democratkal Repuhlics.
without ieparating the confuls from the fenatCj
and giving them, or one of them, the executive
power, and a negative both upon the fenate and
popular alTembly in the legiflature : but there
was too much prejudice, and too little knowledge^
for fo great an i^nprovement. The people con-
tented themfelves with the appointment of a leader
under the name of Tribune, who, without power
to prote6l them effectually, had enough to head
every popular tumult, and blow up every fpark
to a flame. An affembly of reprefentatives would
have had an equal right with the fenate to
propofe laws, to deliberate, debate, alter, amend,
improve : but the tribunes were authorized only
to forbid any meafure they thought injurious -,
but not to propofe any law, or move any refolu-
tion. Not permitted to mix with the fenators, they
had places at the door of the fenate houfe, as their
office was felt to be a dangerous one. Their per-
fons were made facred ; and every one was de-
voted to the infernal gops who fhould even ftrike
them. An oath was to be taken to obferve this
]aw ; and the idea of the fandity of a tribune
. took fuch deep root, that the emperors after-
wards v/e;c protected from afiaffins by this facred
title of Tribune. I'iie college of tribunes at firfb
v,-as not limited to any nun^.ber ; but in procefs of
time they increafcd from tlirc^e to ten. i^atricians
could not by law be elected -, yet the people, to
fhev/ that they never vvill be f..eady to any law,
even to tliofe moil direcfiy contrived for their
benefit, fometimes departed from th.is. The tri-
bunes were at lirft elected in the curiae, where
the vote of the poorell citizen was equal to that
of the moil wealthy. But even here the patri-
cians, befides their great influence, had even a
ijegative on ail proceedings by holding the au-
6 fpices ;
Romf, .^^9
fpices : for this reafon it was thought neceflary to
alter the form of the aflembly, in which the tri-
bunes were ele6led, to that of the tribes; dnd by
this means to enable the people to make their
eleflion without any controul from the nobles,
either in virtue of the authority of the fenate, or
the interpofition of the augurs. Thefe would have
been real improvements of the conftitutiorl, if
they had proportionally augmented the authority
of the confuls at the fame time ; but probably
there would have been as many prejudices againft
fuch a propoial among the people, as in the fenate.
All the popular jealoufies and alarms at regal au-
thority, would have been excited by demagogues
in the fenate as well as in the comitia ; for there
are in all nations ariftocratical demagogues as
well as democratical. Thefe expedients were
adopted by the fenate to quiet the animofities of
parties ; but tended, in faft, only to render the
conteft between them more equal, and to multiply
the fubjeds of difpute. The tribunes being veiled
with power to affemble the people, could not long
be confined to the mere negative with which they
were firft entruded. The party of the plebeians,
with thefe magillrates at their head, were then in
a pofturc not only to preferve their right, but
likewife to gain to their order continual acceHions
of power. Happily for the ftate there was yet
much ground to be pjained, without tranfj^refTmo:
the bounds ot order, or the auchority of equitable
government. The bar of hereditary diIiin6lion
was the ftrongeft obftacle which the popular
leaders in this career had to break through. The
nobles among tiie Romans, as well as among the
Greeks, generally traced back their lineage, in
fome manner or other, to gods and goddefies; and
the divine original of nobility, and the effential
Z 2 diilindion
340 Ancient Denwcratkd Republics.
diftin^lion between the two orders of nobles and
commons, the one being believed a fuperior order
of beings to the other, v/as founded in their infti-
tutions of religion, and in popular belief: and
although fome pretenfions are let up ftill, in many
parts of Europe, to the divine right of nobility,
yet they are generally held in fo little eftimation,
that a modern can hardly form an idea of the dif-
ficulty the tribunes mufl have found to overcome
this inveterate prejudice of fuperftiticn. No per-
fonal merit, no adual fervice, no meafure of abi-
lity or virtue, could remove, as it was pretended,
the difqualification of plebeian birth. One of the
firft fteps towards abolifliing this diilindion, was
to preclude every other power in the flate from
a negative oti their proceedings. For this pur-
pofe it was enabled by the tribes, that no one,
under pain of death, or of a fine at difcretion,
Ihould interrupt a tribune while he was fpeaking
to the people. Nothing can be more curious
than thefe popular efforts to get the better of
their own fuperftitious prejudices : they could
not depend upon their own firmnefs to fupport
their own peculiar magiftrate, till they made them-
felves believe that his peribn was facred, as well as
the other magiftrates. Being thus provided againft
interruption, as they were by a former law againft
violence to their perfons, they not only took up
the complaints of their conftituents, but fuggefted
new claims to be made by them ; and at every
fucceffion to office, endeavoured to fignalize their
term by fome additional eftabliflinient for the
benefit of the people. They interrupted the flate
in its councils and wars, and hung upon the wheels
of government until the grievances they com-
plained of were redreffed, or the demands they
made were complied with. In order to increafc
the
Rome. 341
the number of plebeian officers, whofe aid the
tribunes alleged was neceflary to themfelves,
they, foon after their own inftitution, procured
that of the sediles, who were to infpeci: the marker,
and have charge of the public buildings and pub-
lic fhows. The qualifications of candidates for
the office of conful, furnifhed, during fome ages,
the fubjed of continual debates : civil and mili-
tary tranfaftions were conftantly blended toge-
ther. The fenate frequently involved the flate
in war, in order to fufpcnd its inteftine divifions ;
and the people as often took occafion, from the
difficulties in which the community was involved
by its enemies, to extort a compliance with their
own demands. The firft fubjeft of contention
was the distribution of the corn which the fenate
had purchafed as a provifion againft the famine,
which the late interruption of induftry and agri-
culture, by the feceffion of the people, had occa-
fioned. Coriolanus was for compelling the peo-
ple, by hunger, to part v/ith their tribunes, and the
other conceffions which had been extorted from
the fenate. The younger nobility applauded his
fentiments ; but the majority were afraid of an-
other ftorm, and agreed to deliver corn from the
public granaries at a moderate price." The peo-
ple, however, were not appe.ifcd , they were
greatly incenfed againft Coriolanus ; and the tri-
bunes cited him to appear before the tribunal of
the people, to anfwcr for the iniult he hnd offered
them. The fenate and patricians were difpofcd to
protect him-, but expected to be able to acquit
him in the comitia of the centuries, the only tri-
bunal bcrore which any capital accufation of a
citizen had ever been tried. The tribunes, how-
ever, determined to introduce an innovation, and
infilled that the people fliould affemble in their
Z 3 tribes.
'^42 '^Ancient Dcmocratkal Repuhlicsl
tribes. Coriolanus, feeing himfelf already con-
demned by this method of proceeding, withdrew,
and joined the enemies of his country. This no-
velty made a total change in the conftitution ;
for the aflembly of the centuries formed an arif-
tocracy, that of the tribes a democracy. As it
was not with any precifion determined by law
what bufinefs fnould be done in one aflembly,
and what in the other, the patricians and ple-
beians, inftead of balancing each other by regular
checks, were in danger of rendering the adminif-
tration of the ftate a continual fcene of contradic-
tions, which ferved to the laft hour of the re-
public as an objed of popular zeal, and fur-
niilied a fpecious pretence to ambitious and de-
figning men. This very uncertainty, producing
continual altercations and wars, produced great
Hatefmen and warriors, no doubt : but a regular,
well-ordered conftitution will never fail to bring
forth men capable of conducfting the national
councils and arms ; and it is of infinitely more
importance to the national happinefs, to abound
in good merchants, farmers, and manufacturers
good lawyers, priefls, and phyficians and great
philofophers, than it is to multiply what arc
called crreat flatefmen and great generals. It is a
miferable fervitude, whether you call it a repub-
lic or a defpotifmj, where the law is uncertain and
vinknovvn j and it is only under the fecurity of
certain and known laws, that arts, faiences, agri-
culture, commerce, and trades can ever be made
to flourifn. Another fubjefl of difpute v.'as foon
introduced, which ferved to the laft hour of the
republic as an object of popular zeal, and fur-
nifned a fpecious pretence to ambitious and de-
figning men to captivate the ears of the populace
ga equal divilion oi laaOj known by the name of
an
Rome'. ^4r%
an Agrarian Law. By this was by no means meant
a community of goods and lands, or an equal
divifion of all the lands and goods , the Roman
people had too much fenfe and honefly ever to
think of introducing into praflice fuch an ab-
furd figment of the brain : but the Romans,
during the late ariftocratical times, and the wars
againil Tarquin, had fuffered the conquered lands
to pafs by connivance, occupancy, or purchafe
into the hands of powerful citizens, inRcad of di-
viding them equally among the people. Sp. Caf-
fius, the conful, who v/as in favour with tliC
people, and affeded flill farther popularity by
flattering the paflions of the inferior claffes, fore-
feeing that the tribunes would foon think of this
objedt, determined to make a merit to himfelf by
anticipating them. PoflelTing himfelf of fome of
thefc lands, he oftentatiouOy made a divifion of
them among the more indigent citizens-, and ob-
tained an appointment of three comminjoners, to
enquire into the evil, and confider of a remedy.
The patricians were alarmed , but Cafiius had
numbers on his fide, and was fo confident of fuc-
cefs, that he betrayed too foon his ambitious de-
fign, by off'ering the freedom of the city to aliens,
who at his invitation crowded from all parts
to vote in the aficmblies of the Roman people.
This convinced all parties that his views were, bv
the means of aliens and indigent citizens, to ufurp
the government. All parties combined againil
him, and he was condemned for treafon. The tri-
bunes had no fooner delboyed CafTius, than they
adopted his projeft, and infilled on the law for
the nomination of three commiflioners : from tlifs
time commences a flru2;j:le between tlic tribunes
and fenate, patricians and plebeians, tlie various
operations of which would take up too much
Z 4 fpacc
344 Ancient Democratical Repuhlics.
fpace to relate. The tribunes were honoured
in proportion to the part they took in fupport of
the popular caufe, and their animofity againft the
fenate. Every new tribune endeavouicd to fig-
nalize his year, by fuggeiling Ibme new point to
be gained by the people. One law was obtained
to fubftitute the aflembly of the tribes for that of
the curiae, in the eledlion of tribunes ; another to
exclude the patricians entirely from the alTembiy
of the tribes. The agrarian law they frequently
moved in the interval of other pretenfions, or
together with other claims, in order to alarm the
fenate, and force them to a compromife. The
powers and artifices of both parties were foon ex-
erted in another conteft, in which the people were
in the right, and purfued the moft rational and
necedary object imaginable a new code of laws
which fhould regulate the forms of judicial pro-
ceedings , yet even this was not purfued fo much
from the love of juftice, or the fpirit of liberty,
as to gain a point from the patricians, whofe
power was greatly fupported by the difcretionary
judicial powers they had in their hands. This
great objefl, which the Engliili nation have pur-
fued for fo long a courfe of time, under the names
of Folcright or Common Law, they alone have
had the wifdom to accompany v^ith prerogatives
to the crown, and privileges to the nobility, which
have fccured thofe two branches of the confcitu-
tion 5 at the fame time that, by eitablilliing a
body of laws, and regular formal proceedings in
the courts ol juitice, they have fecured their own
rights and liberties. The Roinan people were
not fo wife ; by negleding to give any ade-
quate prerogatives to the confuls ; and by un-
dermining the power of the fenate in propor-
tion as they, introduced regular law to proteit
thtir
Rome. 345
their own rights, they undermined every other
power in the conftitution, and devolved the
whole upon themfelves. In the career they
loft all their integrity and morals : they op-
poled an ardour not to be cooled or difcouraged,
or reftrained by fcruples in the choice of means,
to the great authority and addrefs of the nobles.
A popular party are apt to think that the rules of
veracity and candour may be difpenfed with, and
that deceit and violence may without any fcru-
ple be employed in their own favour. With lefs
honour and dignity to maintain than their adver-
faries, they are lefs afraid of imputations that de-
traft from either ; and their leaders, fupported
by the voice of the more numerous party, are lefs
apprehenfive of evil fame. In this conteft, ac-
cordingly, fictitious plots and confpiracies were
fabricated by the popular fide, and fidtitious de-
figns againft the liberties of the people were im-
puted to the patricians, in order to render them
odious, and to deter them from appearing in fup-
port of their real pretenfions. The fenate at laft
agreed to the nomination of three commiHioners,
to be fent to Greece, and make a collection of
laws. The report they made was accepted, and
the decemvirs appointed by fenate and people to
compile a body of laws. Thefe ten were in-
tended only as a committee to prepare a draught
for the confideration of the fenate and people:
yet they had fo much credit with the people as to
be vefted with a temporary foyereignty ; and fu-
perfeded the authority of the fenate as well as the
confuis , and had unlimited power over the lives
and fortunes of their fellow-citizens. They pre-
fcnted a number of laws, engraven on ten tables
cr plates, containing a fummary of the privileges
of
34^ Ancient Democratical Republics'.
of the people, the crimes to be punifhed, and
the forms of judicial proceedings. They faid their
plan was unfinifhed ; and, defiring a renewal of
their powers, obtained it for another year : two
more tables were added, which, with the former
ten, made the Law of the Twelve Tables. In
thefe laws the diilindlion of patrician and plebeian
was fo great, that perfons of thefe different orders
were not permitted to intermarry. Bankruptcy
was made a crime ; and, without any diftindtion
between fraud and misfortune, expofed the infol-
vent debtor to the mercy of his creditors, who
might put him to death, diffedt, or quarter him,
and diftribute his m.embers among them. This
law was brought from Greece, and fhews the
atrocious ideas and manners of the age. Al-
though we have no account of the law being
executed in its utmoft extent, we know that, in
confequence of it, debtors were, by the courts
of law, delivered bound into the hands of credi-
tors, and frequently fcourged and whipped in a
mod cruel and unmerciful mjanner. Giving to
fathers the power of magiftrates, or the power
of life and death, over their children, may have
4bme reafons aiTigned for it : but nothing can
ever account for the people's accepting fuch a
lav/ of debtor and creditor among the Greeks
or Romans, but the fuppofition that property
was entirely in the hands of patricians , and that
the people had the blindeft fuperftitious opinion,
that the patricians, as defcendants of gods, were
a fuperior order of beings. It is no wonder
that the people, after this, often clamoured for
an abolition or diminution of debts ; why they
never demanded an abolition of the law, is ano-
ther queftion. One other of thefe laws deferves
particular
Romel 347
particular notice. In private, every family were
free to worfliip the gods in their own way ; and
in public, though certain forms were required,
yet there was not any penalty annexed to the
omiflion of them, as the punifhment of offences
in this matter was left to the offended god. This,
probably, was the fource of that wife and hu-
mane toleration which does fo much honour to
the Romans, and reflefts difgrace on almolt
every Chriflian nation. The ardour of the peo-
ple to obtain this code had nearly cofl them their
liberties. The power of a magiftrate was fup>
pofed to determine only by his own refignation.
The decemvirs, taking advantage of this defcft
in the conftitution, continued the exercife of their
power ; and the people, to fhew that they never
can be jealous of men who are in poffefTion of
their confidence, acquiefced in their ufurpation ;
until the father of Virginia, by exercifing his
lawful authority in defence of his daughter's ho-
nour, exhibited a fpedlacle of horror which gave
a turn to the imaginations, and aroufed all the
paflions of the people to the expulfion of the
decemvirs, as fuch another event had before given
occafion to the abolition of mionarchy. Patricians
and plebeians now united, and a tide of mutual
confidence began to fiow. Two very popular
peribns were choien confuls : the confecration of
the tribunes was renewed, and extended to the
ssdiles, and other inferior oflicers who afted un-
der the tribunes in preferving the rights of the
people. The patricians contented to have the
a6ls of the fenate formally recorded, placed in
the temple of Ceres, and committed to the care
of the ardiles. As the confuls had been hitherto
the keepers and interpreters of their decrees, and
had
34S Ancient Democratic at RepuhJics.
had often fupprelTed or carried into execution
their adls at their pieafure, this was a confider-
abie diminution of the power of the confuls.
The comitia were of three forts the curias, the
centuries, and the tribes. The centuries alone,
in which the patricians had an undoubted majo-
rity as well as in the fenate, had as yet the au-
thority of making laws for the commonwealth :
this itill preferved the ariftocratical character of
the republic. Now the plebeians denied the le-
giflative authority of the fenate ; and the fenate
denied the right of the tribes to make laws.
Equity required that the plebeians fhould have a
voice in the legiflature; but inftead of becom-
ing a branch of it, inllead of aiming at a delibe-
rative or negative voice in it, by which they
might concur with the fenate and comitia of the
centuries, or, which would have been infinitely
better, with the fenate and confuls as two inde-
pendent branches, they obtained a feparate and
independent power of legiflation. Hence the in-
tricacy of this conRitution , hence three diilind
fources of laws decrees of the fenate, ads of the
centuries, and refolutions of the tribes' fenatus
confulta, leges, plebifcita : a fource of divifion,
diftraftion, and tumult, which never ceaitd to
iffue ilreams till the authority of the fenate was
wholly deftroyed, and a dominatio plcbis began.
The plebeians, having removed thefe inequali-
ties, grew fo much the more impatient of thoi'e
which remained. They v/ere flill excluded from
the office of conful, from that of the priefihood,
and were forbidden intermarriage Vk'ith the nobles
In the year of the city 308, Canuleius, a plebeian
and a tribune, moved to repeal tlie law of the
twelve tables, which prohibited the internrarriage
Rome. 349
of patricians and plebeians ; and the nine other
tribunes claimed ihac the office of conful Hiould
be held by plebeians as well as patricians.
The fenate, and the whole order of nobles, by
ftudied delays, and by the ufual artifice of invol-
ving the flate in foreign wars, fufpended the de-
termination of thefe qucftions ; but at length
were obliged to gratify the people \in\\ the inter-
marriages of different ranks, in order to pacify
them on the refulal of their claim on the confu-
late. To elude this demand, it was faid that the
facrificcs and other duties of the priedhood, many
of which were to be performed by the conful,
could nor, by the facred laws of religion, be per-
formed without profanation by perfons of ple-
beian extraction, or by any but thofe of noblr
birth. This atgument fiienced the people for
fome time -, but neither iuperdition nor the true
religion, any more than education, oaths, mo-
rals, or any other tie, will long reitrain an un-
balanced party, urged by its intereil, and ilimu-
lated by a growing pafiion for power : an ev:i-
fion, a mere change of a wotd, will anfwer th.",
purpofe of eluding fuptrrfticious lea.s, and eveii
the dicfates of confcience. The title of Conlui
was changed for th;^.t of Military Tribune; and no
facerdotal function being mcludcd in the duties
of this office, plebeians, th(.ui?Ji not qualified to
be coijfuls, were elcded military tribunes, with
confular power. The milirary and facerdotal
functions had before been united ; they were
now feparated, and, as the people thought, with-
out profanation. But another olricc remained to
tempt the people and their tribunes, that of Ccn-
for. 1 he cenlus had been a principal objcd: of
the executive power ; the k!nn;3 had always held
it, and after them the conful? : ac every period
of
350 Ancient VemocraUcal Republics .
of five years, they could difpofe of every man'a
rank, afTiga him his clafs^ place him in the rolls
of the fenate or the knights, or ftrike him off of
either, degrade or disfranchife him, as they thought
proper. A power lb important, although it had
not been hitherto flagrantly abufed, might eafily
be fo; and the fenate would naturally dread ths
admiflion of the plebeians to it. While they ad-
mitted them, therefore, to be eleded tribunes
with confular power, they ftipulated that the
cenfus Ihould be feparated from it, and that this
charge fhould remain with perfons of patrician
birth. The invafion of the Gauls had burnt the
city, and, it was thought, extinguilhed the re-
public for ever : Manlius faved the capitol, and
Camillus reftored the commonwealth. Durino-
a period of one hundred and feventeen years
which followed, the Romans were involved in
perpetual wars againft the Equi, the Volfci, the
Hernici, the Etrufcans, and Ibme of their own
Latin confederates , yet thefe did not wholly fuf-
pend their internal convulfions, which gave birth
to new political inftitutions. The plebeians, far
from being fatisfied with their paft acquifitions,
made continual efforts to extend their privileges.
The tribunes, by traducing the fenate, and by
difplaying in their harangues the feverities of the
patrician creditor, and the fufferings of the ple-
beian debtor, ftill inflamed the animofity of the
popular party. The republic itfelf was fo feebly
eftablifhed, that ambitious citizens were encou-
raged, by means of fadions raifed among perfona
of the lower clafs, to entertain thoughts of fub-
verting the government. In this manner Man-
lius, the champion of the capitol, prefuming on
his merit, thought himfelf above the laws, and
incurred the imputation of alpiring to be king.
Four
Romel 351
Four hundred citizens, whom he had redeemed
from their creditors, and releafed from chains
the fpoils of thirty enemies flain by himfelf in
battle forty badges of honour, conferred on him
by generals under whom he had ferved many
citizens whom he had refcued from the enemy,
among whom was Servilius, the fecond in com-
mand to the di6tator could not fave him from
being thrown from the rock on which he had fo
lately fignalized his valour. Such was the in-
fluence of the fenate ; fuch " the treafons for
'' which the friends of the people were to be fa-
" crificed to the fenate," as he faid , and fuch
the popular prejudice againft the name of a king.
Yet it is certain that the beft thing the Roman
people could have done at that time, would have
been to have made him a king, with a negative ;
preferving at the fame time their own negative,
and that of the fenate. The plebeians had been
now above forty years in poflelTion of a title to
hold the office of confular tribune, but had not
been able to prevail over the influence of the pa-
tricians at any eledtion : by the increafe of their
numbers in the flrfl; and fecond ciafTes, by their
intermarriages with patrician families, and by the
afiiduity and influence of individuals who afpired
to the office, they at laft obtained the dignity of
confular tribune for one of their own order, and
from thenceforward began to divide the votes of
the centuries with the patrician candidates.
They foon afpired to the title of confuls. Stolo
and Sextius were placed in the college of tri-
bunes, to urge this point. They propofed three
laws: I ft. For relief of infolvent debtors, by
cheating their creditors of part of their debts.
2dly. To limit eitates in land to five hundred
jugera, about three hundred acres, sdly. To
reftore
352 Ancient Democratical Republics.
reftore the eledlion of confuls, in place of confu-
Jar tribunes, with an exprefs provifion that at
lead one of the confuls fhould be of plebeian
defcent. The patricians prevailed upon fome of
the tribunes to diffent from their colleagues, and
fufpend, by their negatives, all proceedings upon
thefe laws. Licinius and Sextius, in their turn,
fufpended the ufual eledion of magiftrates, and
put a {top to all the ordinary affairs of fcate. An
anarchy of five years cnfued. The patricians
flill infifled on the facrilege and profanation that
would be incurred by fufFering the rites ufually
performed by the confuls to pafs into plebeian
hands. The tribunes, to elude this myilerious
obje<5lion, v^/hich laid fafl hold on the fuperfti-
tious minds of the people, contrived a fhifr.
They moved, that the ordinary attendants on the
facrcd rights fhould be augmented from two to
ten ; and that of thefe one half fnould be named
of plebeian extradion. The patricians ftruggled
as long as they could, but were at lafb obliged
to give way ill. To the afts in favour of in-
folvent debtors. 2dly. To the agrarian law, or
limitation of property in land. sdly. To the
new eftablifhment relating to the priellhood, and
to the communication of the confulate itfelf to
perfons of plebeian rank. The plebeian party
prevailed in all their points, and raifed Sextius,
the tribune, to the oiiice of conful : and, from
one ftep to another, they obtained that all the
offices, whether of prscor or cedile, of dictator
or cenfor, were in procefs of time filled with
perfons of either rank, and the dillindlion of pa-
trician or plebeian became merely nominal. The
only effedt it now had was favourable to the ple-
beians, as it limited the choice of tribunes to
their own order j while, in common with the pa-
2 tricians.
Rome. 353
^riciafis, they had accefs to every other dignity
3n the ftate. In this account of the Roman con-
Ititution, we are now come nearly to that ftate of
its maturity, at which Polybius began to admire
the felicity of its inftitutions, and the order of
its adminiftration. The mafs, however, was far
from being fo well compadled) or the unity of
power fo well cftablilhedjj as it is in the Englifh
conftitution , the fenate and the popubr allem-
blies, in their legiflative capaciiies, counreradled
one another. However, from this time forward,
through a long period of v;ars, with Greeks,
Gauls, Italians, and Carthaginians, tiie donicllic
policy of the Itate appears to be wile and orderly.
The difl:in6lion between patrician and plebeian
was become altogether nominal ; the defcendants
of thofd who had held the higher ofHces of flare
were, in confequence of the preferments of their
anceftors, confidered as noble*, and, as the ple-
beians now found no difficulty in obtaining the
offices of ftate, they were continually opening the
way of their pofterity to the rank of nobles. The
plebeians were entitled by law to claim one of
the conful's feats, and frequently occupied both.
The authority of the fenate, the dignity of the
equcftrian order, and the manners of the people
in general^ were guarded, and in a great meafure
preferved, by the integrity and llrid: exercife of
the cenforial power. The wifeft and moft re-
fpeded of the citizens, from every condition^
were raifed into office , and the aflemblies, whe*
ther of the fenate or the people, without envy
and without jealoufy, fuifered themfelves to be
governed by the counfels of a few able and vir*
tuous men. The fpirit of the people was, how-
ever, in a high degree democratical ; and thougfx
they fuftci^ed themfeiyes to be governed by the
A a filent
554 Ancient Benweratkal Republics.
fileiit influence of perfonal authority in a few of
their citizens, yet they could not endure any fpecies
of uncommon pre-eminence, even that which arofe
from the luftre and well-founded pretenfions of
diitinguiihed merit.
The condud of the Romans towards the
Greeks fhould not be forgotten-, fince it appear*
to have been copied from the policy of Antalci-
das in his Perfian treaty. The llates of the
Achaean league, already on the decline, haften-
ed, by the temerity and diftraclions of their own
councils, the career of their fortunes to its ter-
mination. The Romans, even while they dif-
fered this famous republic to retain the (hew of
its independence, had treated its members, in
many particulars, as fubjecis. At the clofe of
the war with Perfeus, they had cited to appear
at Rome, or taken into cuftody as prifoners of
ftate, many citizens of Achaia : of thefe they had
detained about a thouland in different prifons of
Italy. After a period of feventeen years, three
hundred who remained alive were fet at liberty,
Polybius was one of them : he attached himfelf
to Scipio, the fon of Emilius, and no doubt con-
tributed much to his education and great cha-
ra6ler.
The Romans, while they detained fo many
Greek prifoners, aflumed the adminiftration of
affairs in Greece, difpofed of every diftinfiion,
whether of fortune or power, to their own tools.
l>.ey received appeals from the judgment of
the Achaean council, and encouraged its mem-
bers, contrary to the exprefs conditions of thcfr
league, to fend feparate embaffies to Rome. The
Spartans, having been forced into the Ach^ea*
confederacy, continued refractory in moff: of its
councils. By feme of their complaints at Kom?,
they
Rome. 2S5
they obtained a deputation from the fenate, to
hear parties on the fpot, and to adjuft their dif-
ferences. The Achasan council, incenfed at this
infult which was offered to their authority, pro-
ceeded to enforce their own decrees againft the
republic of Sparta, marched an army, and de-
feated the inhabitants of that city who ventured
to oppofe them. The Roman commiflioners ar-
riving after thefe hodilities, fummoned the par-
ties to affemble at Corinth, and, in the name of
the fenate, gave fentence 'That Lacedamon, Co^
rinth^ ArgoSy lieracka^ and OrchomenoSy not having
been original members of the Achaean confederacy^
Jhoiild now he disjoined from it i and that all the
cities which had been refcued from the dominion
of Philip fhould be left in full poflelTion of their
freedom and independency. A war enfued, ia
which Metellus and jVlummius defeated the
Greeks, and the Achasan league was diffolved.
The enmity and the friendfhip of the Romans
was equally fatal. As the Achsean league was
diflblvcd, on having incurred their refentment ;
fo the remnant of the Spartan republic periflicd,
in having accepted their prote(5tion : and nothing
could be more juft than that the Spartans fhould
pcrifh under an infidious policy, which they
themfelves had firfl: invented, pradifed, and fug-
gefted to the Romans -, who, under the command
of Flaminius, about fifty years before this date,
in order to detach the Grecian cities from Philip,
proclaimed with fo much oflentation, at the Ifth-
mus of Corinth, general independence^ and the free
exercife of their own laws, to ail the republics of
Greece. The Achaean league was uiflbivcd, and
all their conventions annulled. The (tares which
had compofcd it were deprived of their love-
reignty, fubjedcd to pay a tribute, and placed
A a 2 under
3 5 6 Ancient Bemdcratical Republics.
under the government of a perfon annually fent
from Rome with the title of Praetor of Achaia,
But the fuccefs of the Roman arms abroad, be-
came the fource of a ruinous corruption at home.
In the flate itfelf, the governing and the governed
felt feparate interefts, and were at variance from
motives of avarice, as well as ambition. Two
hundred and thirty years had elapfed fince the
animofities of patrician and plebeian were ex-
tinguilhed by the equal participation of public
honours. This diftinclion itfelf was, in a great
meailire, obliterated, and gave way to a new one,
which, under the denomination of nobles and
iommons, or illujiricus and obfcure^ without in-
volving any legal difparity of privileges, gave rife
to an ariftocracy, whicli was partly hereditary,
founded on the repeated fuccelTion to honours in
the fame family ; and partly perfonal, founded on
the habits of high ftation, and in the advantages
of education, fuch as never fail to diftinguifh tha
conditions of men in every great and profperous
ftate. Thefe circumftances conferred a power on
the nobles, v/hich, though lefs invidious, was not
lefs real than that which had been poffefTcd by the
ancient patricians. The exercife of this power was
lodged with the fenate, a body which, though by
the emulation of its members too much difpofed
to war, and ambitious of conqueft, was never fur-
pafTed in magnanimity, ability, or in fteadinefs,
by any council of (late whatever. The people had
fubmaitted to the fenate, as pofTefled of an authority
which was founded in the prevailing opinion of
their fuperior v/orth ; and even the moft afpiring
of the commons allowed themfelves to be govern-
ed by an order of men, amongft whom they them-
felves, by proper efforts and fuirable merit, might
hope to afcend. The knights, or the equeftrian
order.
Homi. S57
order, being perfons poflelTed of eftates or efFed:s
' 'f a certain valuation, and fecliided from the pur-
iuir of political emolument or honour, formed,
b' 'tween the fenate and the people, an intermediate
raiik, who, in confequen e of their having a capi-
tal, and being lefs engaged than the fenators in
affairs of ftate, became traders, contraflors, far-
mers of the revenue, and conftituted a fpecies of
moneyed intereft. Circumftances which appear to
be fixed in the political ftate of nations, are often
no more than a paflage in the fhifting of fcenes,
or a tranfition from that which a people have been,
to what they are about to become. The nobles
began to avail themfelves of the high authority
and advantages of their ftation, and to accumulate
property as well as honours. Citizens contended
for offices in the ftate, as the road to lucrative ap-
pointments abroad , and when they had obtained
this end, and had reigned for a while in fome pro-
vince, they brought back from their goverment a
profufion of wealth ill acquired, and the habit of
arbitrary and uncontrouled command. When dif-^
appointed in the purfuits of fortune abroad, they
became the leaders of dangerous factions at home j
or, when fuddenly poffefred of great wealth, they
became the agents of corruption, to difieminate
idlenefs and the love of ruinous amufements in
the minds of the people. The city was gradually
crowded with a populace, who, tempted with the
cheap or gratuitous diftribution of corn, by the
frequency of public fliows, by the confequence
they enjoyed as members of the popular aflem-
blies, flocked to Rome. There they were
corrupted by idlenefs and indigence ; and the
order itfelf was continually dcbafed by the
frequent acceffion of emancipated flaves. A tur-
buitnt populace tyrannized, in their turn, over
A a 3 thf
35$ Ancient Democrat ical Republics,
the mafters of the world, and wreaked on the
conquerors of fo many nations the evils which
they themfelves had fo freely inflicted on man-
kind. Citizens of this extradtion could not
for ages arrive at any places of truft, in which
they could, by their perfonal defe6ls, injure the
commonwealth i but they increafed, by their num-
bers and their vices, the weight of that dreg,
which, in great and profperous cities, ever finks,
by the tendency of vice and mifcondudt, to the
loweil condition. They became a part of that
faftion, who are ever actuated by envy to their
fuperiors, by mercenary views, or by abjecl fear ,
who a e ever ready to elpoufe the caufe of any
leader, againft the reflraints of public order ; dif-
pofed to vilif' the more refpedlable ranks of men^
and, by their indifference on the fubjefts of juftice
or honour, to fruftrate every principle that may
be employed for the government of mankind, be-
fides fear and compulfion. Although citizens of
this defcription were yet far from being the ma-
jority at Rome, yet it is probable that they were
in numbers fufficient to contaminate the whole
body of the people; and if enrolled promif-
cuoully in all the tribes, might have had a great
weight in turning the fcale of political councils.
This efFcft, however, was happily prevented, by
the wife precaution which the cenfors had taken,
to confine all citizens of mean or flavifh extrac-
tion to four of the tribes. Thefe were called the
tribes of the city, and formed but a fmall propor-
tion of the whole. Nctwithflanding this precau-
tion, we muft fuppofe them to have been very
improper parties in the participation of fovereign-
ty, and likely enough to difturb the place of al-
fembly with diforders and tumults. While the
inferior people funk in their characlers. or v/ere
5 debafed
Ram. 35
^d^bafed by the circumftances mentioned, the fu-
perior ranks, by their application to affairs of
ilate, by their education, by the ideas of high
birth and family diftin6lion, by the fuperiority of
fortune, began to rile in their eftimation, in their
pretenfions, and in their power , and they enter-
tained fome degree of contempt for perfons, whom
the laws ft ill required them to admit as their fel-
low-citizens and equals. In this difpofition of
parties, fo dangerous in a commonwealth, and
amidft materials fo lilcely to catch the fiame, fomc
fparks were thrown, that foon kindled up ane\v
all the popular animofities which feemed to have
been fo long extinguifhed. Tiberius Gracchus,
born of a plebeian family, but ennobled by the
honours of his father, by his defcent, on the fide
of his mother, from the tirft Scipio Africanus,
^nd by his alliance with the fecond Scipio, whc?
had married his filter, being now a tribune of th
people, and poiTcired of all the accptpplilhments
required in a popular leader, great ardour, relblu-
tion, and eloquence, formed a projcvil in itfelf ex-
tremely alarming, and in i:s confequences danfyer-
ous to the peace of the republic. Joeing called
to account for his conduct as quseilor in Spain
the feverity he experiencetl from the fcnate, an^
the protection he obtained from the people, fillc4
his brcaft with aniniofity to the one, and a prepof-
feffion in favour of the other. Actuated by theff
difpofitions, or by an itiea not uncommon to en-
thufiaftic minds, that //v unequal dijlvibuticn cf prO'
ferty^ fo favourable to the rich, is an injury to the
poor, he propofed a revival of the law of Licinius,
by v,^hich Roman citizens had been rellrained
from accumulating eilatcs in land above the value
of five luindred jugera, little more than half aj
many acres. I'his was become iinpra(^ticable, and
A a 4 even
'^66 "Ancient T)emocratkal Republic f.
even dangerous, in the prefent (late of the repub-
lic. I'ke diftin^ions of f cor end rich are as neceffary^
in fiat es of ccnfiderahk extent, as labour atid good go-
vernment The poor are dejlined to labour \ and the
rich^ by the advantages of education, independence^ and
leifure, are qualified for fuperior ftations. The empire
was now greatly extended, and owed its iafetyj
and the order of its government, to a rtfpeftable
ariftocracy, founded on the poiTeffion of iortune,
as well as perfonal qualities and pubic honours.
The rich were not, without feme violent convul-
iion, to be ftript of ellates which they themfelves
had bought, or which the-y had inherited from
their anceftors. The poor were not qualified at
once to be raifed to a ftate of equality with per-
fons inured to a better condition. The projedt
feemed to be as ruinous to government as it was
to the fecurity of property, and tended to place
the members of the commonwealth, by one rafh
and precipitate llep, in fuuafions in which they
were not at all qualified to adr. For thefe rea-
fons, as well as from motives of private intereft
affecfling the majority of the nobles, the projedl of
Tiberius was ftrenuoufly oppofed by the jenate ,
and, from motives of envy, interelt, or miflaken
zeal for juftice, as warmly lupported by the op-
pofite party. Acting in concert with Appius
Claudius, whofe daughter he had married, a fe-
nator of the family of Craflus, who was then at
the head of the priefthood, and Mutius Sc^vola
the conful, he exhaufted all his art, and difplayed
all his eloquence in declamation ; but when he
came to propofe that the law fhould be read,
he found that his opponents had procured M.
06lavius, one of his colleagues, to interpoie his ne-
gative, and forbid any further proceeding in the
bufinefs, Here^ according to the law and the coifii-
tution
Romel J 6 1
^ution^ the matter Jhould have dropped : but inflamed
and unbalanced parties are noc to be reftrained by
laws and conftitutions. The tribunes were infti-
tuted to defend their own party, not to attack
their opponents ; and to prevent, not to promote
innovations. Every fingle tribune had a negative
on the whole. The reft of the ftory I muft
leave. The conftitution thus violated, Gracchus
next violated the facred charadter of his colleasue
the tribune. The fenate were tranfported with
indignation ; violence enfued, and the two Gracchi
fell. Afterwards Marius carried the popular pre-
tenfions ftill higher; and Sylla rnight, if he would,
have been emperor. Caefar followed, and com-
pleted the cataftrophe.
This commonwealth, by the fplendor of its
afllons, the extent of its empire, the wifdom of
its councils, the talents, integrity, and courage of
a multitude of characters, exhibits the faireft pro-
fpeft of our fpecies, and is the moft fignal exam-
ple, excepting England, of the wifdom and uti-
lity of a mixture of the three powers in a com-
monwealth : on the other hand, the various vicif-
fitudes of its fortune, its perpetual domeftic con-
tcfts, and internal revolutions, are the cleared
proofs of the evils arifing from the want of com-
plete independence in each branch, and from aR
jncffe($tual balance.
LETTER
36* Condujion.
LETTER LIU,
CONGRESS.
My dear Sir,
BY the authorities and examples already re-
cited, you will be convinced, that three
branches of power have an unalterable foundation
in nature ; that they exifl in every fociety natural
and artificial ; and that if all of them are not ac-
knowledged in any conftitution of government, it
will be found to be imperfeci:, unliable, and foon
enflaved : that the legiflative and executive au-
thorities are naturally diilind: j and that liberty
and the laws depend entirely on a feparation of
them in the frame of government : that the legif-
lative power is naturally and neceflarily fovereign
and fupreme over the executive ; and therefore
that the latter muft be made an effential branch
of the former, even with a negative, or it will not
be able to defend itfelf, but will be foon invaded,
undermined, attacked, or in fome way or other
totally ruined and annihilated by the former. This
is applicable to every ftate in America, in its indi-
vidual capacity : but is it equally applicable to
the United States in their foederal capacity ?
The people of America, and their delegates in
congrefs, were of opinion, that a fingle alfembly
was every way adequate to the management of all
their foederal concerns ; and with very good rea-
fon, becaufe congrefs is not a legiflative alfembly,
nor a reprefentative affembly, but only a diplo-
matic
Cojjgrep. g6g
matic aflembly. A fingle council has been found
to anfwer the purpofes of confederacies very well.
But in all fuch cafes the deputies are refponfible
to the dates j their authority is clearly afcertain-
ed , and the ftates, in their feparate capacities, are
the checks. Thefe are able to form an effeftual
balance, and at all times to controul their dele-
fates. The fecurity againft the dangers of this
ind of government will depend upon the accu-
racy and decifion with which the governments of
the feparate ftates have their own orders arranged
and balanced. The neceflity we are under of fub-
mitting to a foederal government, is an additional
and a very powerful argument for three branches,
and a balance, by an equal negative, in all the
feparate governments. Congrefs will always be
compofed of members from the natural and arti-
ficial arirtocratical body in every ftate, even in the
northern, as well as in the middle and fouthern
ftates. Their natural difpofitions then in general
will be (whether they ftiall be fenfible of it or not,
and whatever integrity or abilities they may be
poflefled of) to diminifti the prerogatives of the
governors, and the privileges of the people, and
to augment the influence of the arirtocratical par-
ties. There have been caufes enough to prevent
the appearance of this inclination hitherto -, but a
calm courfe of profperity would very foon bring
it forth, if eftcftual provifion againft it be not
made in feafon. It will be found ablolutely ne-
cedary, therefore, to give negatives to the gover-
nors, to defend the executives againft the influence
of this body, as well as the fenates and reprcfen-
tatives in their feveral ftates. 7'he necelTity of a
negative in the houle of reprefcntatives, will be
called in qucftion by nobody.
Dr.
^^4 Conclufa'ii.
Dr. Price and the Abbe de Mably are zealous
for additional powers to congrcls.' Full power in
all foreign affairs, and over foreign commerce,
and perhaps fome authority over the commerce of
the ftates with one another, may be neceiTary ;
and it is hard to fay, that more authority in other
things is not wanted : yet the fubjeCL is of fuch
extreme delicacy and difficulty, that the people
are much to be applauded for their caution. To
collect together the ancient and modern leagues
the Amphydtionic, theOlynthian, the Argivc, the
Arcadian, and the Achasan confederacies, among
the Greeks the general diet of the Swifs can-
tons, and the ftates' general of the United Nether-
lands the union of the hanie tov^ns, Src. which
have been found to anlwer the purpofes both of
government and liberty j to comjpare them all,
with the cifcumftances, the fituation, the geo-
graphy, the commerce, the Dopulation, and the
forms of government, as well as the climate, the
foil, and manners of the people, and confider
what further fcederal powers are wanted, and may
be fafely given, would be a ufeful work. If your
public engagements allow you the time to under-
take fuch an enquiry, you will find it an agreeable
amufement.
X. E T T E R
Locke, Milton, and Himil gB^
LETTER LIV.
LOCKE, MILTON, and HUM E,'
My dear Sir,
CHIMERICAL fyftems of leglflatlon are nei-
ther new nor uncommon, even among men
of the mod refplendcnt genius and extenfive learn-
ing. It would not be too bold ro fay, that fome
parts of Plato and fir Thomas More, are as wild
as the ravings of Bedlam. A philofopher may be
perfeft mafterof Defcartes and Leibnitz, may pur-
iue his own enquiries into metaphyfics to any
length you pleafe, may enter into the inmoft re-
cefles of the human mind, and make the nobleft
difcoveries for the benefit of his fpecies , nay, he
may detifnd the principles of liberty and the rights
of mankind, witli great abilities and fuccefs ; and,
after all, when called upon to produce a plan of
iegiflation, he may aftonifli the world with a fig-
nal abfurdity. Mr. Locke, in 166^, was em-
ployed to trace out a plan of Iegiflation for Caro-
lina; and he gave the Vv-hole authority, executive
and legi dative, to the eight proprietors, the lords
Berkley, Clarendon, Albemarle, Craven, and Afh-
ley ; and meflleurs Carteret, Berkley, and Colle-
ton, and their heirs. This new oligarchical fove-
reignty created at once three orders of nobility :
barons, with twelve thouland acres of land -, ca-
ciques, with twenty- four thoufand, &c. ; ard
landgraves, with eighty thoufand. Vv'ho did this
iegiflator think would live under his government ?
He
^66 Conclujion,
He fhoiild have firft created a new fpecies of be-
ings to govern, before he inflituted fuch a go-
vernment.
A man may be a greater poet than Homer,
and one of the moft learned men in the world ;
he may fpend his life in defence of liberty, and
be at the fame time one of the moft irreproachable
moral characters ; and yet, when called upon to
frame a conftitution of government, he may de-
monflrate to the v/orld, that he has refle(5led very
little on the fubjedt. There is a great hazard in
faying all this of John Milton j but truth, and
the rights of mankind, demand it. In his " Ready
and Eafy Way to eftablifh a Free Commonwealth,'*
this great author fays, " I doubt not but all in-
*' genuous and knowing men will eafily agree
" with me, that a free commonwealth, without
*' fingle perfon, or houfe of lords, is by far the
*' belt government, if it can be had ; for the
** ground and bafis of every juft and free govern-
*' ment, is a general council of ableft men chofen
*' by the people to confult of public affairs, from
*' time to time, for the common good. In this
*' grand council muft the fovereignty, not tranf-
*' ferred, but delegated only, and, as it were, de-
" pofited, refide ; with this caution, they muffc
*' have the forces by fea and land committed to
*' them for prefervation of the common peace and
" liberty , muH raife and manage the public re-
*' venue, at leaft with fome infpeflors deputed
" for fatisfa(ftion of the people how it is employ-
*' ed ; muft make or propole civil laws, treat of
*' commerce, peace, or war with foreign nations;
*' and, for the carrying on fome particular affairs
" with more fecrecy and expedition, . muft elecft,
" as they have already, out cf their own number
*' and others, a council of ftyae. And aithouQ;h it
may
Locke, Miltofty and Hume. 367
may feem ftrange at firft hearing, by reafon that
men's minds arc prepoflelTed with the notion of
fuccefTive parliaments, I affirm that the grand
council, being well chofcn, fhould be perpetual \
for fo their bufinefs is, or may be, and often-
times urgent , the opportunity of affairs gained
or loft in a moment. The day of council can-
not be fet as the day of a feftival, but muft be
ready always, to prevent or anfwer all occafions.
By this continuance they will become every
way fkilfulleft, beft provided of intelligence
from abroad, beft acquainted with the people
at home, and the people with them. The lliip
of the commonwealth is always under fail ;
they fit at theftern, and if they ftcer well, what
need is there to change them, it being rather
dangerous ? Add to this, that the grand coun-
cil is both foundation and main pillar of the
whole ftate , and to move pillars and founda-
tions, not faulty, cannot be fafe for the build-
ing. I Cee not, therefore, how we can be ad-
vantaged by fucceftive and tranfitory parlia-
ments-, but that they are much likelier continu-
ally to unfettle, rather than to fettle a free go-
vernment i to breed commotions, changes, novel-
ties, and uncertainties -, to bring negle(5l upon
prefent affairs and opportunities, while all minds
are fufpence with ex}>e<5lation of a new affem-
bly, and the affembly, for a good fpace, taken
up with the new fettling of itfelf, i^c. But if
the ambition of fuch as think themfelves in-
jured, that they alfo partake not of the go-
vernment, and are impatient to be chofen, can-
not brook the perpetuity of others chofen be-
fore them ; or if it be feared that long con-
tinuance of power may corrupt fmcereit men,
** the
gSS Condufion.
** the known expedient is, that annually a third
" part of fenators go out," &c.
Can you read, without fhuddering, this wild re-=
verie of the divine immortal Milton ? If no bet-
ter fyftems of government had been propoled, ii;
would have been no wonder that the people of
England recalled the royal family, with all their
errors, follies, and crimes about them. Had
Milton's fcheme been adopted, this country would
have either been a fcene of revolutions, carnage,
and horror, from that time to this, or the liber-
ties of England v/ould have been at this hour the
liberties of Poland, or the iQand would have been
a province of France, What ! a fingle affembly
to govern England ? an aflembly of fenators for
life too ? What ! did Milton's ideas of liberty
and free governrnent extend no further than ex-
changing one houfe of lords for another, and
making it fupreme and perpetual? What ! Crom-
well, Ireton, Lambert, Ludlow, Waller, and five
hundred others, of all feds and parties, one quar-
ter of them mad with enthufiafm, another with am-
bition, a third with avarice, and a fourth of them
honeft men, a perpetual council, to govern fuch
a country ! It would have been an oligarchy of
decemvirs, on the firft day of its fitting ; it
would have inftantly been torn with all the agita
tions of Venice, between the ariftocracy and oli-
garchy, in the aflembly itfelf. li^ by ballots
and rotations, and a thoufand other contrivances,
it could have been combined together, it would
have dripped the people of England of every
fhadow of liberty, and grown in the next gene-
ration a lazy, haughty, oftentatious group of pa-
latines : but if they had fallen into divifions,
they would have deluged the nation in blood.
Locke, Milton, and. Hume, 369
ti!l one defpot would have ruled the whole,
John Milton was as honcll a man as this nation
ever bred, and as great a friend of liberty : but
his greatnefs mod certainly diJ not confill in the
knowledge of the nature of man and of govern-
ment, if we are to judge from this performance,
or from " The prefent Means and brief Delinea-
" tion of a free Commonwealth," in his letter
to General Monk. Americans in this age are too
enlightened to be bubbled out of their liberties,
even by fuch mighty names as Locke, Milton,
Turgot, or Hume , they know that popular elec-
tions of one eflential branch of the legiQature, fre-
quently repeated, are the only pofTible method of
forming a free conftitution, or of preferving the
government of laws from the domination of men,
or of preferving their lives, liberties, or properties
in fecurityj they know, though Locke and Milton
did not, that when popular eledions are given up,
liberty and free government muft be given up.
Upon this principle, they cannot approve the plan
of Mr. Hume, in his " Idea of a perfeft Common-
*' wealth." ** Let all the freeholders of twenty
*' pounds a year in the county, and all the houle-
*' holders worth five hundred pounds in the town
** parifhes, meet annually in the parifh cliurch,
and choofe, by ballot, fome freeholder of the
county for their member, whom we fhall call
the county-reprefentative. Let the hundred
county -reprefentatives, two days after their
** ele<51:ion, meet in the county-town, and choofe
** by ballot, from their own body, ten county-
*' magiftrates, and one fenator. There are thcre-
** fore, in the whole commonwealth, one hun-
'* dred fenators, eleven hundred county-magif-
*' trates, and ten thoufand county-reprefentativcs;
*' for we ftiall beftow on all fenators the autho-
B b - rity
370 Conclufion.
" rity of county-magiftrates, and on all countyi^,
*Vmagiftrates the authority of county-reprefenta-
" tives. Let the fenators meet in the capital,
** and be endowed with the whole executive
*' power of the commonwealth ; the power of
" peace and war, of giving orders to generals,
*' admirals, and ambafiadors, and, in fhort, all
" the prerogatives of a Britifh king, except his
*' negative. Let the county-reprefentatives meet
** in their particular counties, and poflefs the
*' whole legiilative power of the commonwealth ;
** the greater number of counties decidino- the
queftion j and where thefe are equal, let the
" fenate have the cafting-vote. Every new law
" muft firft be debated in the fenate ; and, though
'* rejeded by it, if ten fenators infift and proteft,
*' it mufb be fent down to the counties : the fe-
*' nate, if they pleafe, may join to the copy of
** the law their reafons for receiving or rejedling
" it." &c. The fenate, by the ballot of Venice
or Malta, are to choofe a proteftor, who re-
prefents the dignity of the commonwealth, and
prefides in the fenate j two fecretaries of fiate,
and a council of flate, a council of religion and
learning, a council of trade, a council of laws,
a council of war, a council of the admiralty
each of five perfons, all fenators ; and feven com-
miflioners of the treafury.
If you compare this plan, as well as -thofe of
Locke and Milton, with the principles and exam-
ples in the foregoing letters, you will foon torm
a judgment of them ; it is not my defign to enlarge
upon them. That of Hume is a complicated ariflo-
cracy, and would foon behave like all other anfto'-
cracies. It is enough to fay, that the reprefcnta-
tives of the people may by the fenators be de-
prived of a voice in the Icgillature \ becaufs the
. ^ ' 2 * knats
Locke, Milion] and Humf* 371
fenate have their choice of fending the laws down,
either to the county-magiftrates or county-repre-
fentatives. It is an ingenious device, to be fure,
to get rid of the people and their reprefentatives $
befides that the delays and confufions would be
endlefs, in fending the laws to be debated in as
many fcparate commonwealths as there are coun-
ties. But the two decifive objeftions are, i. Let-
ting the nobility or fenate into t\\t management
of the executive power ; and, 2. Taking the eyes
of the people off from their reprefentatives in the
legiflature. The liberty of the people ds^pends
entirely on the conftant and direct communication
between them and the legiQatiire, by means of
their reprefentatives.
The improvements to be made in the Englifli
conftitution lie entirely in the houfe of commons,'
If county-members were abolilhed, and reprefen-
tatives proportionally and frequently chofen in
fmall dillri(5ts, and if no candidate could be chofen
but an eftablifhed long-fettled inhabitant of that
diftridt, it would be impofllble to corrupt the
people of England, and the houfe of commons
might be an immortal guardian of the national li-
berty. Inftead of projects to abolifli kings and
lords, if the houfe of commons had been attended
to, wild wars would not have been engaged in,
nor countlefs millions thrown away, nor would
there have remained an imperfedbion perhaps ia
the Englifh conllitution. Let the people take
care of the balance, and efpccially their part of
it : but the prefervation of their peculiar part of
it will depend ftill upon the exiftence and inde-
pendence of the other two ; the inftant the other
branches are deftroyed, their own branch, their
own deputies, become their tyrants.
Bb 2 LETTER
372 Conclujien]
LETTER LV.
CONCLUSION.
Grofvmor-fquare^ Dec. 21, 1786.
My dear Sir,
ACCORDING to Mr. Turgot's Idea of a
perfect commonwealth, a fmgle aflembly is
to be poffeiTed of all authority, legiflativc, exe-
cutive, and judicial. It will be a proper conclu-
sion of all our fpeculations upon this, the molt
interefting fubjedt which can employ the thoughts
of men, to confider in what manner fuch an af-
fembly will conduct its deliberations, and exert
its power. The executive power is properly the
government ; the laws are a dead letter until an
adminiftration begins to carry them into execu-
tion. Let us begin then with this. If there is
an army to raife, this fingle aflembly is td ap-
point ali its officers. The man of the moft am-
ple fortune, the moft honourable defccnr, the
greateft abilities, efpecially if there is any one
among them who has had experience, rendered
important fervices, and acquired fame in war,
will be cholen general. This event is a great
point gained by the ariftocracy ; and a great ad-
vance towards the fele<5lion of one, in cafe of con-
vulfions and contufions, for monarchy. The ge-
neral has vaft influence, of courfe, with the whole
nationg
Conck/ion, 37.:?
nation, and efpeclally with the officers of his ar-
my i whofe articles of war, and whofe habits,
both of obedience and command, eftablilh a fyf-
tem of fubordination of which he is the center,
and produce an attachment that never wears out.
The general, even without being fenfible of it,
will naturally fall in with the views of the arifto-
cratical body, in promoting men of family, pro-
perty, and abilities ; and indeed, in general, it
will be his duty to do this, as fuch are undoubt-
edly, in general, the fitteft for the fervice : his
whole corps of officers will grow habitually to
refpefl fuch only, or at lead chiefly , and it muft
be added, becaufe experience proves it, and the
truth requires it to be mentioned, to entertain
fome degree of contempt for the reft of the peo-
ple, as " rank and file.'* The general's recom-
mendation will have great weight in the alTem-
bly, and will in time be given chiefly, if not
wholly, to men who are either of the ariftocrati-
cal body themfelves, or at leaft recommended by
fuch as are fo. All the other officers of the army
are to be appointed by this aflt:mbly -, and we
muft fuppofe that all the general officers and
field officers will be of patrician families, be-
caufe each candidate will be unknown to nine-
tenths of the aflTcmbly. He comes from a part
of the ftate which a vaft majority of the mem-
bers of the aflTembly do not particularly reprefent,
and are unacquainted with ; they muft therefore
t;ike his charafler upon truft from his patron in
the houfe, fome member who is his neighbour,
and who perhaps owes his eledlion to him or his
particular friends. Here is an endlcfs fource of
debate and delay. When there are two or more
candidates for a commiffion, and there will ge-
B b 3 nerally
574 Conclufion,
nerally be feveral, how fball an alTembly of Jive
hundred or one hundred men, colle6led from all
the moft diftant parts of a large ftate, become in-
formed of the merits and pretenfions of each can-
didate ? It can only be done in public or in pri-
vate. If in public, it expofes the charadttrs of
the candidates to a public difcuffion, which few
rnen can bear ; it confumes time without end j
^nd it will frequently happen, that the time of the
"whole affembly fhali be wafted, and all the pub-
lic affairs delayed, for days and weeks, in delibe-
rating and debating, affirming and denying, con-
trad'(5ting and proving, in the appointment of a
fingle officer; and, after all, he who has friends
of the moft influence in the houfe, who will be
generally of the ariftocratical complexion, will
be preferred. It is moderate to fay that the lols
of time and delay of bufmefs will be a greater
burthen to the ftate than the whole fupport of a
governor and council. If there is a navy, the
fame procefs muft be gone through rcfpedting ad-
mirals, captains, and all other officers. All the
officers of revenue, police, juftice, muft be ap-
pointed in the fame way. Ambaffadors, confuls,
agents to foreign countries, muft be appointed
too by vote of afiembly. This branch of bufi-
nefs alone would fill up the whole year, and be
more than could be done. An affembly muft be
informed before it can acl. The underftanding
and confcience of every member ffiould be clear-
ly fatisfied before he can vote. Information is
to be had only by debate, and examination of
evidence. Any man may fee that this muft be
attended with difficulty ; but no man, who has
not feen the infide of fuch an affembly, can con-
ceive the confufion, uncertainty, and procrafti-
natica
CoKclufion. 375
nation of fuch proceedings. The American pro-
vincial congreflcs had experience enough of this ;
and gentlemen were more convinced, by what
they there faw, heard, and felt, of the neceflity
of three branches, than they would have been by
reafoning or reading ; it was generally agreed,
that the appointment of officers by lot would
have been a more rational method. But this is
not all : the army, the navy, revenue, excife,
cuftoms, police, juftice, and all foreign minifters,
muft be gentlemen, that is to fay, friends and
connections of the rich, well-born and well-edu-
cated members of the houfe ; or, if they are not,
the community will be filled with (lander, fufpi-
cion, and ridicule againft them, as ill-bred, ig-
norant, and in all rcfpefts unqualified for their
trufts } and the plebeians themfelves will be as
ready as any to join in the cry, and run down
their characters. In the fecond place, there ne-|
ver was yet a people who muft not have fome-,
body or fomething to reprefent the dignity of the'
Itate, the majefty of the people, call it what you
will a doge, an avoyer, an archon, a prefident,
a conful, a fyndic ; this becomes at once an ob-
ject of ambition and difpute, and, in time, of di-
vifion, fadion, fedition, and rebellion. The next
enquiry is, concerning the adminiftration of juf-
tice. Shall every criminal be brought before this
affcmbly and tried ? fliall he be there accufed be-
fore five hundred men ? witnefles introduced,
counfel heard ? This again would take up more
than the whole year ; and no man, after all,
would confider his life, liberty, or property, fafe
in fuch a tribunal. Thefe all depend upon the
difquifitions of the counfel, the knowledge of the
law in the judges, the confrontation of parties
B b 4 and
^yS Conclufion,
and witnefles, the forms of proceedings, by which
the fads and the law are fairly dated before the
jury for their decifion, the rules of evidence, by
which the attention of the jury is confined to
proper points, and the artifices of parties and
counfel avoided. An afiembly of five hundred
men are totally incapable of this order, as v/eil
as knowledge ; for, as the vote of the majority
rnuft determine, every member muft be capable,
or all is uncertain : befides, it is the unanimity
of the jury that preferves the rights of mankind
muft the whole five hundred be unanimous ?
Will it be faid that the aflembly fhall appoint
committees to try caufes ? But who are to make
thefe appointments ? Will not a few haughty pa-
latines m the alTembly have influence enough to
determine the election in favour of their friends?
and will not this make iwt judges the tools of z,
party ? If the leaders are divided into parties,
will not one prevail at one year, and another the
next ? and will not this introduce the mod
wretched of fervitudes, an uncertain juriipru-
dence ? Will it be faid that the affembly fhall
appoint committees for the nomination of offi-
cers ? The fame intrigues, and greater ftruggles,
would be introduced for the place of a com-
mittee-man i and there would be frequent ap-
peals from thofe committees to the body that
appointed them. Shall the afiembly appoint a
governor or prefident, and give him all the exe-
cutive power ? Why fhould not the people at
large appoint him ? Giving this power to the
afiembly will open a wider door to intrigue for
the place , and the ariftocratical families will be
fure, nine times in ten, to carry their choice in
this way ^ and, what is much worie, the fird ma-
giftratQ
Conclufwn. 377
giftrate will be confidered as dependent on every
obfcurc member of the houfe, but in reality he
will be dependent only on a dozen or a fcore,
perhaps on two or three, of the whole. He will
be liable to daily motions, debates, and votes of
cenfure. Inllead of thinking of his duty to the
people at large, he will confine his attention chief-
ly to the affembly, and believe, that if he can
fatisfy them, or a majority of them, he has done
his duty. After all, any of thefe devices are only
changing words ; they are, in reality, ereding dif-
ferent orders of men, and aiming at balances,
as much as the fyrtem which fo much difpleafes
Mr. Turgot ; they are introducing, in effed, all
the inequalities and difputes that he fo greatly
apprehends, without any of that fecurity to the
laws which ought to be the principal objedl -, they
render the executive power, which is in truth the
government, the inftrument of a few grandees.
It thele are capable of a combination with each
other, they will feldom diiagree in their opinion,
which is the richell man and of the firft family ;
and, as thefe will be all their enquiries, they will
generally carry their election : if they are divided,
in conftant wrangles with each other, and perpe-
tual attacks upon the prefident about the dilcharge
of his fundions, they will keep the nation an-
xious and irritated, with controverfies which can
never be decided nor ended. If they agree, and
the plebeians ftill carry the vote againlt them,
the choice w.il neverthelefs probably fall upon
one of their number, who will be dilpofed to fa-
vour them too much ; but if it falls upon a ple-
Ipeian, there commences at once a feries of con-
tefts between the rich and the poor, which will
ppver cp4 but in the ruiji of the popular power
and
gyS Condujion.
and the national liberty or at leaft in a rcvo--
lution and a new conftitution. As the executive
power, the effence of government, is ever odious
to popular envy and jealoufy, it will ever be in
the power of a few iiluftrious and wealthy citizens
to excite clamours and uneafinefs, if not commo-
tions and feditions, againft it. Although it is the
natural friend of the people, and the only defence
which they or their reprefentatives can have
againft the avarice and ambition of the rich and
' diftinguifhed citizens, yet fuch is their thought-
lefs fimplicity, they are ever ready to believe that
the evils they feel are brought upon them by the
executive power. How eaiy is it then for a few
artful men, among the arillocratical body, to make
a prefident, thus appointed and fupported, unpo-
pular, though he condufts himfelf with all the
integrity and ability which his office requires ?
But we have not yet confidered how the legif-
lative power is to be exercifed in this fingle af-
fembly ? Is there to be a conftitution ? Who
are to compofe it ? The affembly itfelf, or a
convention called for that purpofe ? In either
cafe, whatever rules are agreed on for the prefer-
vation of the lives, liberties, properties, and cha-
ra6ters of the citizens, what is to hinder this af-
fembly from tranfgreding the bounds which they
have prefcribed to themfelves, or which the con-
vention has ordained for them ? The convention
has publiftied its code, and is no more. Shall a
new convention be called, to determine every
queftion which arifes concerning a violation of
the conftitution ? This would require that the
convention fhould fit whenever the affembly fits,
and confider and determine every queftion which
i agitated in it. This is the very thing we con-
tend
Conclujlon, 379
tend for, viz. that there may be two aflemblies ;
one to divide, and the other to choofe. Grant
me this, and I am fatisficd, provided you will
confine both the convention and aflembly to le-
gidation, and give the whole executive power to
another body. 1 had almoft ventured to propofe
a third aflfembly for the executive power ; but
the unity, the fecrecy, the difpatch of one man.,
has no equal; and the executive power fhould be
watched by all men -, the attention of the whole
nation Ihould be fixed upon one point, and the
blame and cenfure, as well as the impeach-
ments and vengeance for abufes of this power,
fhould be diredted folely to the minifters oi one
man.-^But to purfue our fingle aflembly. The
firfb year, or the firft feven years, they may be
moderate ; efpecially in dangerous times, and
while an exiled royal family, or exiled patricians
or nobles, are living, and may return ; or while
the people's paflions are alive, and their attention
awake, from the frefh remembrance of danger
and diilrefs : but when thefe tranfitory caufes pafs
away, as there is an afFeftion and confidence be-
tween the people and their reprefentatives, fup-
pofe the latcer begin to make diftindlions, by
making exceptions of themfclves in the laws .''
They may frank letters ; they are exempted from
arrefts ; they can privilege fervants One little
diftindion after anotlier, in time makes up a
large fum. Some few of the people will comp^
plain ; but the majority, loving their reprefenta-
tives, will acquieice. Prefently they are ex-
empted from taxes. Then their duration is too
ihort ; from annual they become biennial, trien-
nial, leptennial, for life ; and at lengtli, inftead
of applying to conflituents to fill up vacancies^
the
^^o Condufion.
the affembly takes it upon itfelf, or gives it to
their prefident. In the mean time, wars are
conduded by heroes to triumph and conqueft,
negotiations are carried on with fuccefs, com-
merce flourifties, the nation is profperous j the
citizens are flattered, vain, proud of their feli-
city, envied by others : it would be the ba-
feft, the moft odious ingratitude, at lead it would
be fo reprefented, to find fault with their rulers.
In a word, as long as half a fcore of capital
chara6ters agree, they will gradually form the
houfe and the nation into a fyftem of fubordi-
nation and dependence to themfelves, and go-
vern all at their difcretion a fimple ariftocracy
or oligarchy in effed:, though a fimple demo-
cracy in name : but, as every one of thefe is
emulous of others, and more than one of them
is conftantly tormented with a defire to be the
firft, they will foon difagree ; and then the houfe
and the nation gradually divides itfelf into four
parties, one of which at leaft will wifh for mo-
narchy, another for ariftocracy, a third for de-
mocracy, and a fourth for various mixtures of
them ; and thefe parties can never come to a
decifion but by a ftruggle, or by the fword.
There is no remedy for this, but in a convention
of deputies from all parts of the ftate : but an
equal convention can hardly be obtained, except
in times like thofe we have lately feen, when the
danger could only be warded off by the aid and
exertions of the whole body of the people : when
no fuch danger from without fhall prefs, thofe
who are proud of their wealth, blood, or wir,
will never give way to fair and equal eftablifh-
ments. All parties will be afraid of calling a
convention *, but if it mud be agreed to, the
ariftocraticai
Conclujionl jS i
ariftocratical party will pulh their influence, and
obtain eleftions even into the conventions for
themfelves and their friends, fo as to carry points
there, which perhaps they could not have carried
in the aflembly.
But (hall the people at large deS: sl governor
and council annually to manage the executive
power, and a fingle aflembly to have the whole
legiflative ? In this cafe, the executive power,
infl:ead of being independent, will be the infl:ru-
ment of a few leading members of the houfe ;
becaufe the executive power, being an objeft of
jealoufy and envy to the people, and the legifla-
tive an objed; of their confidence and afi^edlion,
the latter will always be able to render the for-
mer unpopular, and undermine its influence.-
But if the people for a time fupport an executive
difagreeable to the leaders in the leo-iflative, the
conftitution will be difregarded, and the nation
will be divided between the two bodies, and each
mufl: at laft: have an army to decide the quefl:ion.
A conftiitution confift:ing of an executive in one
fingle aflfembly, and a legiflative in another, is
already compofed of two armies in battle array ;
and nothing is wanting, but the word of com-
mand, to begin the combat.
In the prefent fl:ate of fociety and manners in
America, with a people living chiefly by agri-
culture, in fmall numbers, fprinkled over large
tradls of land, they are not fubjeft to thofe pa-
nics and tranfports, thofe contagions of madnefs
and folly, which are feen in countries where large
numbers live in fmall places, in daily fear of pe-
rilhing for want : we know, therefore, that the
people can live and increafe under almofl: any
kind of government, or without any government
at
3 ^2 Cmckjion.'
at all. But It is of great importance to begin
well ; mifarrangements now made, will have great,-
cxtenfive, and diftant confequences ; and we are
now employed, how little foever we may think
of it, in making eftablifhments which will affedt
the happinefs of an hundred millions of inhabi-
tants at a time, in a period not very diflanr.
,A11 nations, under all governments, muft have
parties; the great fecret is to controul them:
(there are but two ways, either by a monarchy
\ and Handing army, or by a balance in the con-
l flitution. Where the people have a voice, and
there is no balance, there will be everlafting fluc-
tuations, revolutions, and horrors, until a Hand-
ing army, with a general at its head, commands
the peace, or the neceflity of an equilibrium is
made appear to all, and is adopted by all.
I am.
My dear Sir,
With much efteem and affedion.
Yours,
John Adams.
JVilUam Stephens Smithy Epi,
postscript;
( 53 )
P O S T S C R I P T. '
^TpHE foreign gazettes and journals have an-
nounced to the world that the Abbe De Ma-
bly was applied to by the United States of Ame-
rica for his advice and afliftance in the formation of
a code of laws. It is unneceflary to fay any thing to
this, only that it is a part of a million volumes of
lies, according to the beft computation, which are
to be impofed upon polterity, relative to Ameri-
can affairs. The Abbe himielf, in his obferva-
tions, has faid that I defired his fentiments. This;!
is true , but the manner of the rcqueft ought to
be known, that thofe who think it of any con-
fequence may underftand in what fenfe it is true.
Upon my arrival in Paris, in Odlober 1782, upon
the bufmefs of the peace, the Abbe De Mably*s
book, upon the manner of writing hiftory, was
put into my hands. At the conclufion of that
publication he declared his intention of writing
on the American revolution. Meeting the Abbe
foon afterwards, at dinner, at Monfieur De Cha-
lut's, the farmer general, my friends the Abbes
De Chalut, and Arnowe, who were of the party,
informed me that their friend was about writinor"
the hiftory of the American revolution, and would
be obliged to me for any fafts or memorials that
might be in my power. The queftion was afked.
What part of the revolution he mcended to write ?
The whole. Where had he obtained the mate-
rials ? It was fuppoled they might be obtained
from the public papers, and enquiry of indivi-
duals.- In anfwer to this a few difficulties were
ftarted, and the converfation fpun into length.
At laft the gentlemen afked to have, in wriLing,
what had been then faid upon the fubjed, as, the
converfation bcinp; in French, it mi:ht not have
been tuily comprehended. Accordingly, in a few
days.
3^4 Pofifcript,
days, I wrote the Abbe a letter, the tranflation of
which, by a friend, into French, is here inclofed -,
the original, in Englifh, not being in my poflef-
fion. By this you will fee, that the requeil to the
Abbe to write upon American affairs, was a mere
civility ; and rather a defire that he would not
expofc himfelf, by attempting an hiftory that he
was altogether unprovided for, than any formal
requeft that he fhould write at all. We ought to
be obliged to any gentleman in Europe who will
favour us with his thoughts : but, in general, the
theory of government is as well underftood in
America as it is in Europe-, and by great num-
bers of individuals is every thing, relating to a free
conftitution, infinitely better comprehended than
by the Abbe De Mably or Mr. Turgot, amiable,
learned, and ingenious, as they were.
A Monfieur VAhbe de Mably,
*' C'eft avec plaifir que j'ai appris votre defTcin
d'ecrire fur la Revolution Americaine^ parce que
vos autres ecrits, qui font beaucoup admires
des Americains, contiennent des principes dc
Legiflation, de Politique & de Negociation qui
font parfaitement analogues aux leurs ; de forte
que vous ne pourrez guere ecrire fur ce fujet
fans produire un ouvrage qui fervira a Tinftruc-
tion du public, & furtout a celle de mes Conci-
toyens. Mais j'efpere que vous ne m'accufe-
rez pas de prefomption d'affe(5tation ou de fin-
gularire, fi je hazarde de vous dire que je fuis
d'opinion qu'il eft encore trop-tot pour entre-
prendre une Hiftoire complette de ce grand
evenement, & qu'il n'y a perfonne ni en Europe
ni en Ameriquc, qui, julqu'a prefent, foit en
etat de la faire & qui ait les materiaux requis
ou neceffaires pour cela."
*' Pour entrepreadre un tel ouvrage, un Ecri-
cc
cc
<c
cc
<c
cc
cc
cc
cc
cc
cc
cc
cc
cc
cc
cc
cc
** vain
pDJifcript, f^^S
^'^ vain devralt divifer I'Hiftoire de TAmeriquc en
*' plufieurs periodes.'*
*' 1*. Depuis le premier etablifTement des Co-
" lonies en 1600, jufqu'au commencement de
'* leurs brouilleries avec la Grande-Bretagne in
*' 1761.
" 2*. Depuis ce commencement (occafionne
*' par un ordre du Bureau de Commerce & des
" Plantations dans la Grande-Bretagne, donne aux
" officiers de la Douane en Amerique, de faire
'' executer d'une maniere plus rigourieufe les
'* aftes du Commerce, & d'avoir recours aux
" cours de la juftice pour avoir des decrets d'af-
" fiftance a cette fin) jufqu'au commencement
" des hoftilites, le 19 d'Avril 1775. Pendant
" cette periode de 14 ans il n'y eut qu'une guerre
" de plume.
" 3*. Depuis la Bataille de Lexington jufqu'a
*' la fignature du Trairc avec la France, le 6 Fe-
** vrier 1778. Durant cette periode de 3 ans, la
" guerre fe fit uniquement entre la Grande-Bre-
*' tagne & les Etats-Unis.
" 4*. Depuis le Traite avec la France jufqu*-
" aux hoftilices entre la Grande-Bretagne 6c la
** France premierement ; puis avec TEfpagnc,
" enfuite jufqu'au developpement de la Neutra-
" lite armee, & a la guerre contre la Hollande.
" Enfin, toutes ces ffenes trouvent leur denoument
*' dans les Negociations de la Paix.
" Sans une connaiflance diftindte de PHifloirc
" des Colonies dans la premiere periode, un Ecri-
" vain fe trouvera toujours embarafle, depuis le
*' commencement de fon ouvrage jufqu'a la fin,
*' pour rendre compte des evenements & des ca-
" rafteres qui fe prefenteront a decrire a chaquc
'' pas, a mefure qu'il avance vers la fcconde, la
'* troifieme, & la quatricme periodes. Pour ac-
*' querir une connaiflance fufiifante de la premiere
C c periode
5 Pcftfcript.
perlode, 11 faudrait lire toutes les Chartes accor-
dees aux Colonies^ & les Commijp.cns i^ Injiruc-
tions donnees aux Gouverneurs^ tous les Codes de
Loi des differentcs Colonies (& Treize Volumes
in Folio de Statues lees & rebutans qui ne fe
lilent guere avec plaifir ni en peu de terns) tons
les Regi/lres de hi Legijlaturs des differentcs Colo-
nies; que Ton ne trouvera qu'en manufcrit &
'' en voyageant en perfonne, depuis News-Hamp-
" liiire jufqu'a la Georgie ; les Regi/lres des Bu-
*' reaux de Commerce &: des Plantations dans la
" Grand- Bretagne depuis ieur inftitution jurqu''a
" Ieur diffoiution, comme auffi ks Papiers des
*' Bureaux de qiielqiies-unes des Secretaireriss d'Etat.
"" II y a une autre branche de ledure, dont Ton
" ne faurait fe difpenfer, quand Ton pourrait fe
" pafler des autres. Je parle de ces ecrits qui
*' ont paru en Amerique de terns a autre, je nc
" pretends cependant pas, dans la place oil je Tuis,
*' eloigne de tous les livres & ecrits, en faire une
" exadle enumeration Les Ecrits des anciens Gou-
'uerneurs Winthrop &' fVinJlow, du Dr. Mather.,
Mr. Prince ; Ncals Hijloire de la Nouvelle Angk-
terre ; Douglas Sommaire fur les premieres Planta-
tions ; Vaymlioratio7i progreffrce dies terres & ritat
prefent des Colonies Britanniqiics ; Hutchinfon Hif-
toire de Mafachujfetts-Bay ; Smith Hijloire de
New-Tork ; Smith Hijloire de New-Jerfey., les
Ouvrages de William Penn , Dummers Defenfe
des Chartes de la Ncuvelle- Angkterre , VH'ifioira
de Virginie, & plufieurs autres. Tout ccla etait
anterieur a la difpute prcfenre, qui commcnfa
^' en 1 76 1.
" Durant la feconde periode, les ecrits font pli:^
*' nombrcux, & plus difHcil^s a It procurer; il
*' fut alors donne au public des Ouvrages de
*' grande importance : dans les de'ixirs cntre ceui^
*' qui furent adteurs dans ctltc l!;ene en qualito
'^ crEcrivains.
Pojifcript, 387
' d'Ecrivains, il en eft qui merltent d'etre dif-
tingues. On coinpte parmi eux les Gouver-
neurs du Roi Pownal^ Bernard, & Hutchinfon%
Le Lieutenant Gouverneur Oliver ; Mr. Sewal^
Juge d'Amiraute pour Halifax, Jonathan May-
hew^ D. D. James Otis., Oxenbridge Thatcher ;
Samuel Jdams ; Jofiah ^iniy., Jofeph Warren ;
& peut-ctres les luivancs n'ont pas ete moins
importants qu'aucun des autres, favoirles ecrits
de Mr. Dickinfon, de Mr. Wilfon & du Dr.
Rujh de Philadelphic, de Mr. hivin^fton & de
Mr. Dougal de New- York , du Colonel Bland
& d^ Arthur Lee de Virgi?iie., & de plufieurs au-
tres. L.es Rcgijtres de la Filk de Bojton & par-
ticulierement d'un Comitc dc Correfpondance \ du
Bureau des CGmmiJJior,: de la Douane , de la Cham-
bre des Reprefcntans & du Bureau du Confeil de
Majfachufctts-Bay \ en outre les Gazettes de la
Ville de Boflon clanr, les derniers terns, pour ne
pas dire celles de Nczv-I'ork Cs? de PhiladelphiCy
doivent etre ramairecs & examinees depuis I'an
1760, Tout cela eft ncceiraire pour ecrire
avec precifion & en detail THiftoire des debats
avant que les hoililites cuifent commence, com-
pris la periode de i'annee 1761 jufqu'au 19
Avril 1775.
" Durant les trciflcmc Zz quatricme periodes
les Regiftres, P^.niphiets 5i Giizertesdes Treize-
Etats doivent etre recueillis, ainfi que les Jour-
naux du Cr.'n;\-s (diont ccoendant une partie eft
encore Iccreic) (llv la Couc'-icn des Ncuvelles Con-
jfitutions dr.s divers EJlrJs, le Rcmcmlrancer be le
Regifire Awiiud^ papiers periodiques publies ea
Angleterre. Les Affaires de V Anglcterre o de
l^irncriquc, & Ic Mcrcure de France^ publie a
Paris, & le Politifi'je Holhuulais imprimc a Am-
Ilerdani, toute la iuire de la Cc: ejpcnddn'cc /
Gin^ral IFa/Jjington avec le Congres depuis le
C c 2 y mois
3^3 Pcjlfcript.
mois de Juillct 1775 jufqu'a ce jour, qui n'a
pas encore ete public, & qui ne le icra pas non
plus jufqu'a ce que le Congres I'ait ordonne
" oil pcrmis ; & permertez-moi de vous dire qu'a
^' moins que cette vafte fource foit ouverte, il ne
fera guere pofTible a perfonne d'ennrcpretidre
" une Hiftoire de la Guerre Americaine : II eft
** encore d'autres ecrits d'importance da7js les Bu-
reaux du Comite Secret^ dans le Comite du Com-
merce^ dans le Comite des Affaires Urangeres^ dans
" le Comite de la T'refcrerie^ dans le Comite dela Ma-
rine^ dans le Bureau de la Guerre (autant qu'il
*' fubfifte) & du Departemenc de la Guerre, de
*' la Marine, des Finances & des Affaires ecran-
" geres, depuis leur inftitution. II y a aufii
'* des Lettres des Minijlrcs Jmericaim en Francs^
*' Efpagne^ Hollandc^ & d'autres panics de I'Eu-
" rope.
" La plupart des documents & materiaux etant
** encore fecrets, c'ell un demarche prematuree
*' que d'entreprendre une Hiftoire generale de la
*' Revolution Americaine , mais I'on ne faurait
" mettre trop d'a6livice & de foins a faire la col-
*' ledlion des materiaux. II exifte cependant, a
*' la verire deja deux ou trois Hiftoires generales
" de la Guerre & Revolution Americaine, pu-
" bliees a Londrcs, & dex ou trois autres pu-
*' bliees a Paris i celles en langue Ang-laife ne lont
que des materiaux informes & confus fans dif-
** cernementj & routes ces Hiftoires foit en An-
*' glais foit en Francais, ne font autre chofe que
*' des monuments de I'ignorance complette de
" leurs auteurs fur ce fujec.
" II faudrait la vie eiiiiere & la plus longue, a.
" commencer des I'age de 20 ans, pour aflembler
" /- tuut-e? les Nations &: de toutes les parties
"^ du monde, dans iefquels ils font depofes, les
'' documents propres a former une Hiftoire com-
" plettc
Pofifcript, Z^9
** plette de la Guerre Americainc; parce que c'eft
'*' propremenc I'Hiftoire du Genre-humain dans
" tome cette epoqiie. II faut y reunir rHiftoire
** de France, d'Efpagne, de Hollande, d'Angle-
*' terre, & des Puiffances neutres, aufTi bien que
" de I'Annerique. Les maceriaux en devraient
*' ctre affembles de toutes ccs Nations, & les do-
** cuments les plus importans de tous, aufll bien
** que les caracleres des A6teurs & les reflbrts fe-
*' crets des A6lions, font encore receies dans ks
*' Cabinets & en chiffres.
" Soit que vous, Monfieur, enterpreniez de
" donner une Hiftoire gcnerale, ou fimplement des
" remarques & obfervations, femblables a celles
" que vous avez donnees fur les Grecs ^ ks Ro-
" fnnins ; vous produirez un Ouvrage extreme-
" ment intcreiTant & inltru6lif, pour la Morale,
" la Politique, la Lcgiflation, & je me ferais un
*' honneur &: un plaifir de vous fournir tous les
" petits fecours qui feront en mon pouvoir pour
" la facilite de vos recherches. II m'efl impofli-
*' ble de vous dire fi le Gouvernement de ce pays
ibuhaiterait de voir quelque ouvrage profonde-
mcnt ccrit, & par un Auteur d*une grande ce-
Icbritc, en langue Fran9aiie. II eft queftion
d'expofcr des principcs de gouvernement, ft
differens de ce qu'on trouve en Europe, fur-
tout en France, qu'on ne verrait peut-etre pas
une entreprife pareille d'un ceil indifferent :
c'eft ccp' I jant une chofc dent je ne me crois
pan le juge competent.
** Permeitcz, Monfieur, que je finiiTe cette Let-
tre en vous donnant une clef pour toute cette
Hiftoire. li y a une analogie generale dans las
Gouvcrnem.ents & les Carai5leres de tous les
Trdizc Etats , mais ce ne fut que lorfque les
debats & la guerre commencerent en Mafla-
chufletts-Bay, la principals Province de la
I r Nouvelle.
390 Pojlfcript.
*' Nouvelle-Angleterre, que les inftituti'ons pri-
mitives firent leur premier effet. Qiiatre de ces
" inftitutions devraient ecre bien ecudiees & am-
" plement examinees par quiconque voudraic
ecrire avec connaiffance de caufe Tur ce fujet ;
car elles ont produit un elTeL decifif, non-ieule-
ment dans les premieres determinations des de-
bats, dans les Confeils publics, & les premieres
refolutions de refifter par les armes, mais aufli
par i'influence qu'elles eurent fur les efprits
des autres Colonies en leur donnant Texemple,
d'adopter plus ou moins les memes inftitutions
& des mefures femblables.
Les quatre inftitutions mentionnecs font
1. Les Villes ou Diftrids.
2. Les Eglifes.
ij. Les Ecoles.
4. La Miiice.
I. " Les Villes font de certaines etendues de
pays, ou diftricls de territoire, dans lefquels
etiiint divifes le MalTachurerts Bay, le Connec-
ticut, le Nev/-Hampfljire & le Rhode-Ifland.
Chaque Vilie contient i'une dans Tautre fix
milles ou deux lieues quarrees. Les habitans
qui vivent dans ces limites doi'/ent former, en
vertu de la loi, des corporations ou corps po-
litiques, & font invcftis de certains pouvoirs
& privileges : comme par exemple, de reparer
les grands chemins, d'entrenir les pauvres, de
choilir les elus, ks conftables, les colleftcurs
des Taxes & d'autres cfficiers, & furtout leurs
Reprefentans dans la Legiflaturei comme aufli
du droit de s'afTembler toutes les fois qu'ils
font avertis par leurs Elus, dans les alTemblees
de Villes, afin de deliberer fur les affaires pu-
bliques de la Ville, ou de donner des inftrudions
a leurs Reprefentans. Les confequences de
." ceue
Pcftfcript, S9X
cette inftltution ont ete, que tons les habitants
ayant acquis des leur enfance une habitude de
difcuter, de deliberer, & de juger des affaires
publiques, 9'a etc dans cette ctendue de Villes
ou diltri(fts, que les fentiments du Peuple Tc
font tornics premierement, & que leurs refolu-
tions one etc prifes, depuis le commencement
jufqu'a la fin des debats & de la guerre.
2. " Les Eglifes Ibnt des Societes Religieufes,
qui comprennant le Peuple entier. Chaque
diftrift contien: une Paroiffe & une Eglife. JLa
plupart n'cn ont qu'une, & quelques-uns en one
plufieurs. Chaque ParoifTe a une maifon d'af-
lemblce, &: un Miniftre entretenu a fes propes
depens. Les Conftitutions des Eglifes font
extremement populaires, & le Clergc a pea
d'infiuence ou d'autoritc, a I'exception de celles
que leur propre pietc, leur vertu, leurs lumieres
leur donnent naturellcment. lis font choifis
par le peuple de leur ParoifTe, & refoivent
leur ordination du Clerge voifin. lis font tous
marics, ont des families, & vivent avec leurs
Paroillicns d:ins une parfaite amitie & intimite.
lis vont voir les malades, exercent la charite
cnveis les pauvres, alTillent a tous les mariages
& enterremens, & prcchent deux fois chaque
Dimanche-, le moindre reproche fait a leur ca-
raftere moral, leur ferait perdre leur influence,
&: leur nuirait a jamais. De forte que ce font
des hommes fages, vertueux & pieux. Leurs
fentiments font en general adaptes a ceux du
peuple, & ils font amis jiloux de la Libertc.
3. *' II y a des Ecoles dans chaque ville ; elles
font ecablics par une Loi expreffe de la Colo-
nie , chaque ville confillant en Ibixante families,
eft obligee, fous peine d'amende, de maintenir
conftamment une Ecole &: un maitre qui en-
feigne a lire, a ecrire, rurithmeiiquej fc le^ prin-
'' cipes
392 Poftfcript.
" cipes des langues Latine & Grecque. Tous
*' les cnfans des habitans, ceux des riches comme
" des pauvres, ont le droit d'alier dans cettc E-
*' cole publique. On y forme les Etudians pour
*' les Colleges de Cambridge, de New-Haven, de
" Warwich, & de Darthmouth ; & dans ces Col-
*' leges on eleve des Maitres pour ces Ecoles,
" des Miniftres pour I'Eglile, des Dofteurs en
' Droit & en Medecine, & des Magiftrats &
" OfEciers pour le Gouvernement du Pays.
4. " La Milice comprend tout le Peuple, En
*' vertu des Loix du pays chaque habitant male
" entre 16 & 60 ans, eft enrole dans une Com-
*' pagnie & Regiment de Milice, completemenc
*' pourvu de tous fes ofEciers. II eft oblige de
" tenir toujours dans fa maifon & a fes propres
'* depens, un moufquet en bon ordre, une corne
*' a poudre, une livrc de cette poudre, douze
" pierres a feu, vingt quatre balles de plomb,
** une boete a cartouche, & un havre-fac. De-
" forte que toute la Contree eft prete a marcher a
*' fa defenfe au premier fignal. Les Compagnies
" & Regiments font obliges de s'affembler a un
*' certain terns de Tannee, fur les ordres de leurs
*' officiers, pour la vifitation de leurs armes 6^
" munitions, & de faire leurs manoeuvres.
" Voici, Monfieur, une petite efquifie des
*^ quatre fources principals de cette fagefte dans
*' les Confeils, de cette habiletc, de cette bravoure
" militaire, qui ont produit la Revolution Ame-
** ricaine, 8f qui, j'elpere, feront faintement con-
*' fervees comme les fondemens de la Liberte, du
*' bonheur & de la profperite du peuple. S'il
*' eft d'autres particularites fur lefqueliesje puifle
" vous donner des informations, vous me ferez
** I'amitie de me le faire favoir. J'ai I'honneur
" d'etre
1782. !'JOHN AT>KUS:'
This book is DUE on the last date stamped below
1.... _. f^l: '
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY
Los Angeles
This book is DUE on the last date stamped below.
^^ MAY28 19S6
OCT 5 1992
,^f r-' '
Fo
^\)6 i i
\99
#1
3 1158 00967 6692
UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY
A A 000113 93