UCNRLF ^B 7Mq ES& lilAL REVIEW FIRST SIX MONTHS WAR D BY R'S CY E AND COMPANY LTD. LONDON GIFT or ^^.^S^ '^>'^— tV ^ ' i THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW OF THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE WAR >^ Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2008 with funding from IVIicrosoft Corporation http://www.archive.org/details/frenchofficialreOOreutrich THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW ' OF THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE WAR AS ISSUED BY R EU TE R' S AGENCY • • * . » , CONSTABLE & COMPANY LTD. LONDON 1915 CONTENTS PAGE I. — The French Set-Backs in August. The Operations in Alsace — The Operations in Lor- raine — The Operations in Belgium and Luxemburg — The Operations between the Sambre and the Meuse. 1 IL — The Retreat and the Preparation of the Offensive . 6 III. — The Victory of the Marne : Sept. 6th to 13th. The Action of F^re-Champenoise — The Operations of our Right 12 IV. — The Rush to the Sea. General Character of the Action — Deployment of a first new Army — Deployment of a second new Army — The Transport of the British Army — The Arrival of the Belgian Army — The French Army of Belgium 20 V. — ^The German Defeat in Flanders. The Scope of the German Attack — The Check of the German Attack along the Coast — The German Defeat at Ypres 28 VI. — Operations from November 30th to February 1st . 35 VII. — The French Army as it is : Officers and Men . . 38 VIII. — The French Army as it is : Materiel — Artillery, Supplies, Transport 46 308415 vi CONTENTS PAOB IX. — The German Army and its Losses in Men. The German Effort — The German Aim and the German Method — The German Losses — The German Troops Available for 1915 . . . .56 X. — The German Losses in OrncERs, Materiel and Moral. The German Losses in Officers — Wastage of German Guns — Moral Wastage of the German Army . . 64 XL — The German Supplies. The scarcity of Primary Materials for Projectiles — The Insufficiency of Food Supplies . . . .73 XII. — Conclusions and the Future. The Significance of the German Failure — The Signi- ficance of the French Success — The Three French Superiorities — The Offensive Faith of the French Army 79 This historical review, emanating from the most competent French official source, of the operations in the western theatre of war, from their beginning up to the end of January, that is to say, during the first six months of the war, was originally received and issued by Reuter's Agency, The plans of General Joffre are set forth and explanations are given as to how and why they could not always be carried out, how they were modified from time to time, and in what manner they were eventually successful. The review closes upon a resonant note of satis- faction at the results achieved and of the most perfect confidence in the final issue. It should be understood that the narrative is made purely from the French standpoint. In some portions, on account of length or for other reasons, it has not been possible to quote textually. Throughout the report, the numbered German army corps are Prussian corps unless otherwise specified. ▼ii THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW I.-THE FRENCH SET-BACKS IN AUGUST The first month of the campaign began with successes and finished with defeats for the French troops. In what circumstances did these come about ? THE OPERATIONS IN ALSACE Our plan of concentration had foreseen the possibihty of two principal actions, the one on the right between the Vosges and the Moselle, the other on the left to the north of the Verdun — Toul line. This double possibility involved the eventual variation of our transport. On August 2nd, owing to the Germans passing through Belgium, our concentration was substantially modified by General Joffre, in order that our principal effort might be directed to the north. Awaiting the moment when the operations in the north could begin, and to prepare for it by retaining in Alsace the greatest possible number of German forces, the General-in-Chief ordered our troops to occupy Mulhouse, to cut the bridges of the Rhine at Huningue and below, and then 2 THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW to flank the attack of our troops operating in Lorraine. This operation was badly carried out by a leader who was at once relieved of his com- mand. Our troops, after having carried Mulhouse, lost it and were thrown back on Belfort. The work had therefore to be recommenced afresh, and this was done from August 14th under a new command. Mulhouse was taken on the 19th, after a brilliant fight at Dornach. Twenty-four guns were captured from the enemy. On the 20th we held the approaches to Colmar, both by the plain and by the Vosges. The enemy had undergone enormous losses and abandoned great stores of shells and forage, but, from this moment, what was happening in Lorraine and on our left pre- vented us from carrying our successes further, for our troops in Alsace were needed elsewhere. On August 28th the Alsace army was broken up, only a small part remaining to hold the region of Thann and the Vosges. THE OPERATIONS IN LORIIAINE The purpose of the operations in Alsace, namely, to retain a large part of the enemy's forces far from the northern theatre of operations, it was for our offensive in Lorraine to pursue still more directly by holding before it the German army corps operating to the south of Metz. This offensive began brilliantly on August FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE WAR 3 14th. On the 19th we had reached the region of Sarrebourg and that of the Etangs (Lakes), we held Dieuze, Morhange, Delne, and Chateau SaUns. On the 20th our success was stopped. The cause is to be found in the strong organisation of the region, in the power of the enemy's artillery, operating over ground which had been minutely surveyed, and finally in the default of certain units. On the 22nd, in spite of the splendid behaviour of several of our army corps and notably of that from Nancy, our troops were brought back on to the Grand Couronne, while on the 23rd and 24th the Germans concentrated reinforcements — three army corps at least in the region of Luneville — and forced us to retire to the south. This retreat, however, was only momentary. On the 25th, after two vigorous counter-attacks, one from south to north and the other from west to east, the enemy had to fall back. From that time between the Germans and ourselves a sort of balance was established on this terrain. Maintained for fifteen days, it was afterwards, as will be seen, modified to our advantage. THE OPERATIONS IN BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG There remained the principal business, the battle of the north, postponed owing to the desirability of waiting for the British Army. On August 20th the concentration of our lines 4 THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW was finished and the General-in-Chief gave orders for our centre and our left to take the offensive. Our centre comprised two armies, our left con- sisted of a third army reinforced to the extent of two army corps, a corps of cavalry, the reserve divisions, the British Army, and the Belgian Army, which had already been engaged for the previous three weeks at Li^ge, Namur, and Louvain. The German plan on that date was as follows : Seven to eight army corps and four cavalry divisions were endeavouring to pass between Givet and Brussels, and even to prolong their movements more to the west. Our object was therefore, in the first place, to hold and dispose of the enemy's centre, afterwards to throw our- selves with all available forces on the left flank of the German grouping of troops in the north. On August 21st our offensive in the centre began with ten army corps. On August 22nd it failed and this reverse appeared serious. The reasons for it are complex. There were in this affair individual and collective failures, imprudences committed under the fire of the enemy, divisions ill-engaged, rash deployments, and precipitate retreats, a premature waste of men, and finally the inadequacy of certain of our troops and their leaders, both as regards the use of infantry and artillery. In consequence of these lapses, the enemy, turning to account the FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE WAR 5 difiBcult terrain, was able to secure the maximum of profit from the advantages which the superiority of his subaltern cadres gave him. THE OPERATIONS BETWEEN THE SAMBRE AND THE MEUSE In spite of this defeat our manoeuvre had still a chance of success, if our left and the British Army secured a decisive result. This was unfor- tunately not the case. On August 22nd, at the cost of great losses, the enemy succeeded in cross- ing the Sambre and our left army fell back on the 24th upon Beaumont — Givet, alarmed by the belief that the enemy was threatening its right. At the same time, the British Army retreated and the enemy was enabled to cross the Meuse, and, by fortifying it, to accelerate the action of his right. The situation at this moment may be thus summed up : Either our frontier had to be defended on the spot, under conditions which had been rendered extremely perilous, or we had to execute a strategic retire- ment, which, while delivering up to the enemy a part of the national soil, would permit us on the other hand to resume the offensive at our own time, with a favourable disposition of those troops, still intact, which we had at our command. The General-in-Chief determined on the second alternative. II.— THE RETREAT AND THE PREPARA- TION OF THE OFFENSIVE Henceforward the French command devoted its efforts to preparing the offensive. To this end three conditions had to be fulfilled :— 1. The retreat had to be carried out in order, under the protection of a succession of counter- attacks which would keep the enemy occupied. 2. The extreme point of this retreat had to be fixed in such a way that the different armies should reach it simultaneously, ready, at the moment of occupying it, to resume the offensive all together. 3. Every circumstance permitting of a resump- tion of the offensive before this point should be reached had to be utilised by the whole of our Army and by the British forces. The counter-attacks executed during the retreat were brilliant and often fruitful. On August 29th we successfully attacked St. Quentin to relieve the pressure on the British Army. Two other corps and a reserve division engaged the Prussian Guard and the 10th German THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW 7 Army Corps, which was debouching from Guise. By the end of the day, after various fluctuations, the enemy was thrown back on the Oise and the British front was freed. On August 27th we had also succeeded in throwing back upon the Meuse the enemy who was endeavouring to gain a foothold on the left bank. Our successes continued on the 28th in the woods of Marfee and of Jaulnay. Thanks to them, we were able, in accordance with the orders of the General-in- Chief, to fall back on the line Buzenoy-le-Chesne — Bouvellemont. Further to the right another army took part in the same movement, and carried out successful attacks on August 24th on the Othain and in the region of Spincourt. On the 26th these different units recrossed the Meuse without being disturbed and were able to join in the action of our centre. Our armies were therefore again intact and available for the offensive. On August 26th a new army was constituted, composed of two army corps, five reserve divisions, and a Moorish brigade. This army was to assemble in the region of Amiens, between August 27th and September 1st, and take the offensive against the German right, uniting its action with that of the British Army operating on the line Ham — Bray-sur-Somme. But the hope of resuming the offensive was from this moment rendered vain by the rapidity of the march of the German right wing. This 8 THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW rapidity had two consequences which we had to parry, before thinking of advancing. On the one part our new army had not time to complete its detraining, and on the other hand, our left flank on August 31st was too exposed to the enemy's attack. Our line, thus modified, contained waves which had to be redressed before we could pass to the offensive. To under- stand this it is sufficient to consider the situation created by the quick advance of the enemy on the evening of September 2nd. A corps of cavalry had crossed the Oise and advanced as far as Chateau Thierry. The First Army (General von Kluck) comprising four active army corps and a reserve corps, had passed Compiegne. The Second Army (General von Biilow) — three active army corps and two reserve corps — was reaching the Laon region. The Third Army (General von Hansen) — two active army corps and a reserve corps — had crossed the Aisne between the Chateau Porcien and Attigny. More to the east, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Armies, namely, twelve army corps, four reserve corps, and numerous Ersatz formations, were in contact with our troops, the Fourth and Fifth Armies between Vouziers and Verdun, and the others, in the position indicated above, from Verdun to the Vosges. It will therefore be seen that our left, if we accepted battle, might be in FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE WAR 9 great peril. A defeat in these conditions would have cut off our armies from Paris and from the British forces and at the same time from the new army which had been constituted to the left of the British. We should thus be running the risk of losing, by a single stroke, the advantage of the assistance which Russia was to furnish later on. General Joffre resolutely took the course which avoided these risks, that is to say, a postponement of the offensive and a continuance of the retreat. In this way he remained on ground which he had chosen. He waited only until he could engage under better conditions. In consequence, on September 1st, he fixed as an extreme limit for the movement of retreat, which was still going on, the line Bray-sur- Seine — Nogent-sur- Seine — Arcis-sur-Aube — Vitry-le-Francois — the region to the north of Bar-le-Duc. This line was to be reached if the troops were compelled to go back so far. They would attack before reaching it, should there be a possibility of bringing about an offensive disposition permitting the co-oper- ation of the whole of our forces. On September 5th it appeared that this desired situation existed. The First German Army, carrying audacity to temerity, had continued to endeavour to envelop our left, had crossed the Grand Morin, and reached the region of Chauffry B 10 THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW to the south of Rebais and of Esternay. It aimed, then, at cutting our armies off from Paris, in order to begin the investment of the capital. The Second Army had its head on the hne Champaubert — Etoges — Bergeres — Vertus. The Third and Fourth Armies reached to Chalons- sur-Marne and Bussy-le-Repos. The Fifth Army was advancing on two sides from the Argonne as far as Posesse to Triancourt-les-Islettes and Julvecourt. The Sixth and Seventh Armies were attacking more to the east. But, and here is a capital difference between the situation of Sep- tember 5th and that of September 2nd, the envelopment of our left was no longer possible. In the first place our Left Army had been able to occupy the line Sezanne — Villers-St. Georges — Courchamps. Furthermore, the British forces gathered between the Seine and the Marne, flanked on their left by the newly created army, were closely connected with the rest of our forces. This was precisely the disposition which the General-in-Chief had wished to see achieved. On the 4th he decided to take advantage of it and ordered all the armies to hold themselves ready. He had taken from his right two new army corps, two divisions of infantry, and two divisions of cavalry, which were distributed between his left and his centre. On the evening FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE WAR 11 of the 5th, he addressed to all the commanders of armies a message ordering them to attack. " The hour has come," he wrote, " to advance at all costs, and to die where you stand rather than give way." b2 III.-THE VICTORY OF THE MARNE : SEPT. 6th to 13th If one examines on the map the respective positions of the German and French Armies on September 6th as previously described, it will be seen that, by his inflection towards Meaux and Coulommiers, General von Kluck was exposing his right to the offensive action of our left. This is the starting point of the victory of the Marne. the operations of our left On the evening of September 5th our Left Army had reached the front Penchard — Saint Souflet — Ver. On the 6th and 7th it continued its attacks vigorously with the Ourcq as objective. On the evening of the 7th it was some kilometres from the Ourcq, on the front Chambry — Marcilly — Lisieux— Acy-en-Multien. On the 8th, the Ger- mans, who had in great haste reinforced their right by bringing their 2nd and 4th Army Corps back to the north, obtained some successes by attacks of extreme violence. They occupied Betz, Thury-en-Valois, and Nanteuil-le-Haudouin. 12 THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW 13 But in spite of this pressure our troops held their ground well. In a brilliant action they took three standards, and being reinforced, prepared a new attack for the 10th. At the moment that this attack was about to begin the enemy was already in retreat towards the north. The attack became a pursuit, and on the 12th we established ourselves on the Aisne. Why did the German forces which were con- fronting us, and, on the evening before, attacking so furiously, retreat on the morning of the 10th ? Because, in bringing back, on the 6th, several army corps from the south to the north to face our left, the enemy had exposed his left to the attacks of the British Army, which had imme- diately faced round towards the north, and to those of our armies which were prolonging the English lines to the right. This is what the French command had sought to bring about. The events of September 8th, which allowed of the development and rehabili- tation of the position, were as follows. On the 6th the British Army had set out from the line Rozoy — Lagny and had that evening reached the southward bank of the Grand Morin. On the 7th and 8th it continued its march, and on the 9th had debouched to the north of the Marne below Chateau-Thierry, taking in flank the Ger- man forces which on that day were opposing our Left Army on the Ourcq. Then it was that 14 THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW these forces began to retreat, while the British Army, going in pursuit and capturing seven guns and many prisoners, reached the Aisne between Soissons and Longueval. The r61e of the French Army, which was operating to the right of the British Army, was threefold. It had to support the British attacking on its left ; it had on its right to support our centre, which from the 7th September had been subjected to a German attack of great violence ; finally, its mission was to throw back the three active army corps and the reserve corps which faced it. On the 7th it made a leap forward, and on the following days reached and crossed the Marne, seizing, after desperate fighting, guns, howitzers, mitrailleuses, and 1,300,000 cartridges. On the 12th it estab- lished itself on the north edge of the Montagne- de-Reims in contact with our centre, which for its part had just forced the enemy to retreat in haste. THE ACTION OF FfiRE-CHAMPENOISE Our centre consisted of a new army created on August 29th and of one of those which, at the beginning of the campaign, had been engaged in Belgian Luxemburg. The first had retreated on August 29th to September 5th from the Aisne to the north of the Marne and occupied the general front Sezanne — Mailly. The second, more to the east, had drawn back to the south of the line FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE WAR 15 Humbauville — Chateau Beauchamp — Bignicourt — Blesmes — Maurupt-le-Montoy. The enemy, in view of his right being arrested and the defeat of his enveloping movement, made a desperate effort from the 7th to the 10th to pierce our centre to the west and to the east of Fere Champenoise. On the 8th he succeeded in forcing back the right of our new army, which retired as far as Gourgangon. On the 9th, at 6 o'clock in the morning, there was a further retreat to the south of that village, while on the left the other army corps also had to go back to the line Allemant — Connantre. Despite this retreat the General commanding the Army ordered a general offensive for the same day. With the Morocco Divison, whose behaviour was heroic, he met a furious assault of the Germans on his left towards the marshes of Saint-Gond. Then, with the division which had just victoriously overcome the attacks of the enemy to the north of Sezanne and with the whole of his left army corps, he made a flanking attack in the evening of the 9th upon the German forces, and notably the Guard, which had thrown back his right army corps. The enemy, taken by surprise by this bold manoeuvre, did not resist, and beat a hasty retreat. On the 11th we crossed the Marne between Tours-sur-Marne and Sarry, driving the Germans in front of us in disorder. On the 12th we were in contact with the enemy to the 16 THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW north of the Camp de Chalons. Our other army of the centre, acting on the right of the one just referred to, had been entrusted with the mission, during the 7th, 8th, and 9th, of disengaging its neighbour, and it was only on the 10th that, being reinforced by an army corps from the east, it was able to make its action effectively felt. On the 11th the Germans retired. But perceiving their danger they fought desperately, with enor- mous expenditure of projectiles, behind strong entrenchments. On the 12th the result had none the less been attained and our two central armies were solidly established on the ground gained. THE OPERATIONS OF OUR RIGHT To the right of these two armies were three others. They had orders to cover themselves to the north and to debouch towards the west on the flank of the enemy which was operating to the west of the Argonne. But a wide interval, in which the Germans were in force, separated them from our centre. The attack took place nevertheless, with very brilliant success for our artillery, which destroyed eleven batteries of the 16th German Army Corps. On the 10th, the 8th and 16th German Army Corps counter- attacked and were repulsed. On the 11th our progress ^continued with new successes, and on the 12th we were able to face round towards the FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE WAR 17 north in expectation of the near and inevitable retreat of the enemy, which in fact began on the 13th. The withdrawal of the mass of the German force involved also that of the left. From the 12th onwards, the forces of the enemy operating between Nancy and the Vosges retreated in a hurry before our two armies of the east, which immediately occupied the positions that the enemy had evacuated. The offensive of our right had thus prepared and consolidated in the most useful way the result secured by our left and our centre. Such was this seven days' battle in which more than two millions of men were engaged. Each Army gained ground step by step, opening the road to its neighbour, and at the same time, supported by it, taking in flank the adversary which the day before it had attacked in front. The efforts of one coincided closely with those of the other, a perfect unity of intention and method animating the supreme command. To give this victory all its meaning, it is necessary to add that it was gained by troops who for two weeks had been retreating and who, when the order for the offensive was given, were found to be as ardent as on the first day. It has also to be said that these troops had to meet the whole German Army, and that from the time they marched forward they never again fell back. Under their pressure the German retreat at 18 THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW certain times had the appearance of a rout. In spite of the fatigue of our men, in spite of the power of the German heavy artillery, we took colours, guns, mitrailleuses, shells, more than a million of cartridges, and thousands of prisoners. A German corps lost almost the whole of its artillery, which, from information brought by our airmen, was destroyed by our guns. The French narrative has next a long chapter upon the Siege War from the Oise to the Vosges, which lasted from September 13th to November SOth. Most of the incidents in this prolonged and severe warfare have been recorded in the daily bulletins. The operations were of secondary importance and were conducted on both sides with the same idea of wearing down the troops and the artillery of the enemy, with the view of influencing the decisive result in the great theatre of war in the north. During the first part of this period until the 15th October, the British Army remained on the Aisne and a high tribute is paid, in the French review, to the tenacity and brilliance with which the British troops maintained their positions. The next chapter to be given verbatim deals with the rush to the sea from September 13th to October 23rd, 19 IV.-THE RUSH TO THE SEA GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE ACTION As early as the 11th of September the Com- mander-in-Chief had directed our Left Army to have as important forces as possible on the right bank of the Oise. On September 17th he made that instruction more precise by ordering " a mass to be constituted on the left wing of our disposition, capable of coping with the outflanking movement of the enemy." Everything led us to expect that flanking movement, for the Germans are lacking in invention. Indeed, their effort at that time tended to a renewal of their manoeuvre of August. In this parallel race the opponents were bound in the end to be stopped only by the sea ; that is what happened about October 20th. The Germans had an advantage over us, which is obvious from a glance at the map, the concentric form of their front which shortened the length of their transports. In spite of this initial inferiority we arrived in time. From the middle of September to the last week in October fighting went on continually to the north of the THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW 21 Oise, but all the time we were fighting we were slipping northward. On the German side this movement brought into line more than eighteen new army corps (twelve active army corps, six reserve corps, four cavalry corps). On our side it ended in the constitution of three fresh armies on our left, and in the transport, into the same district, of the British Army and the Belgian Army from Antwerp. For the conception and realisation of this fresh and extended disposition, the French command had, in the first place, to reduce to a minimum the needs for effectives of our armies to the east of the Oise, and afterwards to utilise to the utmost our means of transport. It succeeded in this, and when, at the end of October, the Battle of Flanders opened, when the Germans, having completed the concentration of their forces, attempted with fierce energy to turn or to pierce our left, they flung themselves upon a resistance which inflicted upon them a complete defeat. DEPLOYMENT OF A FIRST NEW ARMY The movement began on our side only with the resources of the army which had held the left of our front during the Battle of the Marne, rein- forced on September 15th by one army corps. This reinforcement, not being sufficient to hold the enemy's offensive (district of Vaudelincourt — Mouchy — Baugy), a fresh army was transported 22 THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW more to the left, with the task " of acting against the German right wing in order to disengage its neighbour .... while preserving a flanking direction in its march in relation to the fresh units that the enemy might be able to put into line." To cover the detrainments of this fresh army in the district Clermont — Beauvais — Boix, a cavalry corps and four territorial divisions were ordered to establish themselves on both banks of the Somme. In the wooded hills, however, which extend between the Oise and Lassigny, the enemy displayed increasing activity. Nevertheless the order still further to broaden the movement towards the left was maintained, while the territorial divisions were to move towards Bethune and Aubigny. The march to the sea went on. From the 21st to the 26th, all our forces were engaged in the district Lassigny— Roye — Peronne with alterna- tions of reverse and success. It was the first act of the great struggle which was to spread as it developed. On the 26th, the whole of the Sixth German Army was deployed against us. We retained all our positions, but we could do no more. Consequently there was still the risk that the enemy, by means of a fresh afflux of forces, might succeed in turning us. Once more reinforcements, two army corps, were directed, not this time on Beauvais, but towards Amiens. The front was then again to FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE WAR 23 extend. A fresh army was constituted more to the north. DEPLOYMENT OF A SECOND NEW ARMY From September 30th onwards, we could not but observe that the enemy, already strongly posted on the plateau of Thiepval, was continually slipping his forces from south to north, and every- where confronting us with remarkable energy. Accordingly, on October 1st, two cavalry corps were directed to make a leap forward, and, operating on both banks of the Scarpe, to put themselves in touch with the garrison of Dunkirk, which, on its side, had pushed forward as far as Douai. But on October 2nd and 3rd, the bulk of our fresh army was very strongly attacked in the district of Arras and Lens. Confronting it were two corps of cavalry, the Guards, four active army corps and two reserve corps. A fresh French army corps was immediately trans- ported and detrained in the Lille district. But once more the attacks became more press- ing, and on October 4th it was a question whether in view of the enemy's activity both west of the Oise and south of the Somme and also further to the north, a retreat would not have to be made. General Joffre put this alternative firmly aside and ordered the offensive to be resumed with the reinforcements that had arrived. It was, how- ever, clear that, despite the efforts of all, our 24 THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW front, extended to the sea as it was by a mere ribbon of troops, did not yet possess the sohdity to enable it to resist with complete safety a German attack, the violence of which could well be foreseen. In the Arras district the position was fairly good. But between the Oise and Arras we were holding our own only with difficulty. Finally, to the north on the Lille — Estaires— Merville— Haze- brouck— Cassel front, our cavalry and our terri- torials had their work cut out against eight divisions of German cavalry, with very strong infantry supports. It was at this moment that the transport of the British Army to the northern theatre of operations began. THE TRANSPORT OF THE BRITISH ARMY Sir John French had, as early as the end of September, expressed the wish to see his army resume its initial place on the left of the Allied Armies. He explained this wish on the ground of the greater facility of communications that he would have in this new position, and also of the impending arrival of reinforcements from Great Britain and from India, which would be able to deploy more easily on that terrain. In spite of the difficulties which such a removal involved, owing to the intensive use of the railways by our own units, General Joffre decided, at the beginning of October, to meet General FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE WAR 25 French's wishes and to have the British Army removed from the Aisne. It was clearly specified that, on the northern terrain, the British Army should co-operate to the same end as ourselves, the stopping of the German right. In other words the British Army was to prolong the front of the general disposition without a break, attacking as soon as possible, and at the same time seeking touch with the Belgian Army. But the detraining took longer than had been expected, and it was not possible to attack the Germans during the time when they had only cavalry in the Lille district and further to the north. THE ARRIVAL OF THE BELGIAN ARMY There remained the Belgian Army. On leaving Antwerp on October 9th, the Belgian Army, which was covered by eight thousand men of the British Naval Brigade and six thousand French bluejackets, at first intended to retire as far as to the north of Calais, but afterwards determined to make a stand in Belgian territory. Unfortunately the condition of the Belgian troops, exhausted by a struggle of more than three months, did not allow any immediate hopes to be based upon them. This situation weighed on our plans and delayed their execution. On October 14th we reached the front Ypres — c 26 THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW Messines — Neuve Eglise — Merville — Lestrem — Richebourg— Saint Vast. On the 16th we made progress to the east of Ypres. On the 18th our cavalry even reached Roulers and Cortemark. But it was now evident that, in view of the continual reinforcing of the German right, our left was not capable of maintaining the advan- tages obtained during the previous few days. To attain our end and make our front inviolable, a fresh effort was necessary. That effort was immediately made by the despatch to the north of the Lys of considerable French forces which formed the French Army of Belgium. THE FRENCH ARMY OF BELGIUM The French Army of Belgium consisted, to begin with, of two territorial divisions, four divisions of cavalry and a naval brigade. Directly after its constitution it was strengthened by ele- ments from other points on the front, whose arrival extended from October 27th to November 11th. All together these reinforcements were equivalent in value to five army corps, a division of cavalry, a territorial division, and sixteen regiments of cavalry, plus sixty pieces of heavy artillery. Thus was completed the strategic manoeuvre defined by the instructions of the General-in-Chief on September 11th and developed during the five following weeks with the ampleness we have FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE WAR 27 just seen. The movements of troops carried out during this period were methodically combined with the pursuit of operations, both defensive and offensive, from the Oise to the North Sea. On October 22nd our left, bounded six weeks earlier by the Noyon district, rested on Nieuport, thanks to the successive deployment of five fresh armies — three French Armies, the British Army, and the Belgian Army. Thus the co-ordination decided upon by the General-in-Chief attained its end. The barrier was established. It remained to maintain it against the enemy's offensive. That was the object and the result of the Battle of Flanders, which lasted from October 22nd to Novem- ber 15th. c 2 V.-THE GERMAN DEFEAT IN FLANDERS THE SCOPE OF THE GERMAN ATTACK The German attack in the two Flanders was conducted strategically and tactically with re- markable energy. The complete and indisputable defeat in which it resulted is therefore significant. The forces of which the enemy disposed for this operation between the sea and the Lys comprised : — (1) The entire Fourth Army commanded by the Duke of Wurtemberg, consisting of one naval division, one division of Ersatz Reserve (men who had received no training before the war) which was liberated by the fall of Antwerp, the 22nd, 23rd, 26th, and 27th Reserve Corps, and the 48th Division belonging to the 24th Reserve Corps. (2) A portion of another army under General von Fabeck, consisting of the 15th Corps, two Bavarian corps, and three (unspecified) divisions. (3) Part of the Sixth Army under the command of the Crown Prince of Bavaria. This army, more than a third of which took part in the THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW 29 Battle of Flanders, comprised the 19th Army Corps, portions of the 13th Corps and the 18th Reserve Corps, the 7th and 14th Corps, the 1st Bavarian Reserve Corps, the Guards and 4th Army Corps. (4) Four highly mobile cavalry corps prepared and supported the action of the troops enumer- ated above. Everything possible had been done to fortify the moral of the troops. At the be- ginning of October, the Crown Prince of Bavaria in a proclamation had exhorted his soldiers " to make the decisive effort against the French left wing," and " to settle thus the fate of the great battle which has lasted for weeks." On October 26th, Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria declared in an army order that his troops " had just been fighting under very difficult conditions," and he added, " It is our business now not to let the struggle with our most detested enemy drag on longer .... the decisive blow is still to be struck." On October 30th, General von Deimling, commanding the 15th Army Corps (belonging to General von Fabeck's command) issued an order declaring that " The thrust against Ypres will be of decisive importance." It should be noted also that the Emperor proceeded in person to Thielt and Courtrai to exalt by his presence the ardour of his troops. Finally, at the close of October, the entire German Press incessantly proclaimed the importance of the " Battle of 80 THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW Calais." It is superfluous to add that events in Poland explain in large measure the passionate resolve of the German General Staff to obtain at all costs a decision in the western theatre of operations. This decision would be obtained if our left were pierced or driven in. To reach Calais, that is, to break our left ; to carry Ypres, that is, to cut it in half ; through both points to menace the communications and supplies of the British Expeditionary Corps, perhaps even to threaten Britain in her island ; such was the German plan in the Battle of Flanders. It was a plan that could not be carried out. THE CHECK OF THE GERMAN ATTACK ALONG THE COAST The enemy, who had at his disposal a consider- able quantity of heavy artillery, directed his effort at first upon the coast and the country to the north of Dixmude. His objective was mani- festly the capture of Dunkirk, then of Calais and Boulogne, and this objective he pursued until November 1st. On October 23rd the Belgians along the railway line from Nieuport to Dixmude were strengthened by a French division. Dixmude was occupied by our marines {fusiliers marins). During the subsequent days our forces along the railway developed a magnificent resistance against an enemy superior in numbers and powerfully backed FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE WAR 31 by heavy artillery. On the 29th the inundations effected between the canal and the railway line spread along our front. On the 30th we recap- tured Ramscapelle, the only point on the railway which the Belgians had lost. On the 1st and 2nd of November the enemy bombarded Furnes, but began to show signs of weariness. On the 2nd he evacuated the ground between the Yser and the railway, abandoning cannon, dead and wounded. On the 3rd our troops were able to re-enter the Dixmude district. The success achieved by the enemy at Dixmude at this juncture was without fruit. They succeeded in taking the town. They could not debouch from it. The coastal attack had thus proved a total failure. Since then it has never been renewed. The Battle of Calais so noisily announced by the German Press, amounted to a decided reverse for the Germans. THE GERMAN DEFEAT AT YPRES The enemy had now begun an attack more important than its predecessor in view of the numbers engaged. This attack was intended as a renewal, to the south, of the effort which had just been shattered in the north. Instead of turning our flank on the coast, it was now sought to drive in the right of our northern army under the shock of powerful masses. This was the Battle of Ypres. 32 THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW In order to understand this long, desperate, and furious battle, we must hark back a few days in point of time. At the moment when our cavalry reached Roulers and Cortemark (Oc- tober 18th) our territorial divisions from Dunkirk under General Bidon had occupied and organised a defensive position at Ypres. It was a point d^appui enabling us to prepare and maintain our connections with the Belgian Army. From October 23rd two British and French army corps were in occupation of this position, which was to be the base of their forward march in the direction of Roulers — Menin. The delays already explained and the strength of the forces brought up by the enemy soon brought to a standstill our progress along the line Poelcapelle — Passchendaele — Zand- vorde — Gheluvelt. But in spite of the stoppage here, Ypres was solidly covered and the con- nections of all the Allied forces were established. Against the line thus formed the German attack was hurled from October 25th to November 13th, to the north, the east, and the south of Ypres. From October 26th onward the attacks were renewed daily with extraordinary violence, obliging us to employ our reinforcements at the most threatened points as soon as they came up. Thus on October 31st we were obliged to send supports to the British cavalry, then to the two British corps between which the cavalry formed the connecting link, and finally to intercalate FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE WAR 33 between these two corps a force equivalent to two army corps. Between October 30th and November 6th, Ypres was several times in danger. The British lost Zandvorde, Gheluvelt, Messines, and Wytschaete. The front of the Allies, thus contracted, was all the more difficult to defend ; but defended it was without a recoil. The arrival of three French divisions in our line enabled us to resume from the 4th to the 8th a vigorous offensive. On the 10th and the 11th, this offensive, brought up against fresh and sharper German attacks, was checked. Before it could be renewed the arrival of fresh reinforce- ments had to be awaited, which were despatched to the north on November 12th. By the 14th our troops had again begun to progress, barring the road to Ypres against the German attacks, and inflicting on the enemy, who advanced in massed formations, losses which were especially terrible, because the French and British artillery had crowded nearly three hundred guns on to these few kilometres of front. Thus the main mass of the Germans sustained the same defeat as the detachments operating further to the north along the coast. The support which, according to the idea of the German General Staff, the attack on Ypres was to render to the coastal attack, was as futile as that attack itself had been. During the second half of November, the 34 THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW enemy, exhausted, and having lost in the Battle of Ypres alone more than 150,000 men, did not attempt to renew his effort, but confined himself to an intermittent cannonade. We, on the con- trary, achieved appreciable progress to the north and south of Ypres, and ensured definitely, by a powerful defensive organisation of the position, the inviolability of our front. The compiler of the report here adds a footnote stating that over forty thousand German corpses were found on the battlefield during these three weeks of battle. VI.-OPERATIONS FROM NOVEMBER 30th —FEBRUARY 1st During this period, the French supreme com- mand has not thought it advisable to embark upon important offensive operations. It has confined itself to local attacks, the main object of which was to hold in front of our armies as large a number of German corps as possible, and thus to hinder the withdrawal of the troops which, to our knowledge, the German General Staff was anxious to despatch to Russia. As a matter of fact the numbers transported to the eastern front have been very moderate. Of the fifty-two army corps which faced us on the western front, Germany has only been able to take four and a half corps for the eastern front. On the other hand climatic conditions, the rain, mud, and mist, were such as to diminish the effectiveness of offensive operations and to add to the costliness of any undertaken. This was another reason for postponing them. Further, from now on the Allied forces can count upon a steadily expanding growth, equally in point of numbers and units as of material, while the German 85 36 THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW forces have attained the maximum of their power and can only diminish now, both in numbers and in value. These considerations explain the character of the siege warfare which the opera- tions have assumed during the period under review. Meanwhile it is by no means the case that the siege warfare has had the same results for the Germans as for us. From November 15th to February 1st, our opponents, in spite of very numerous attacks, have not succeeded in taking anything from us, except a few hundred metres of ground to the north of Soissons. We, on the contrary, have obtained numerous and appreci- able results. The French writer here proceeds to strike a balance of gains and losses between the Allied and the German forces in France during the winter campaign. The result he sums up as follows : — (1) A general progress of our troops, very marked at certain points. (2) A general falling-back of the enemy except to the north-east of Soissons. To complete the balance it must be added that : — (1) The German offensive in Poland was checked a month ago. (2) The Russian offensive continues in Galicia and the Carpathians. FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE WAR 37 (3) A large part of the Turkish Caucasian army has been annihilated. (4) Germany has exhausted her resources of officers (there are now on an average twelve officers to a regiment), and henceforth will only be able to develop her resources in men to the detriment of the existing units. (5) The Allied armies, on the contrary, possess the power of reinforcing themselves to a very considerable extent. It may therefore be declared that in order to obtain complete success, it is sufficient for France and her Allies to know how to wait, and to prepare victory with indefatigable patience. The German offensive is broken. The German defensive will be broken in its turn. i*M ^ •/ :. VII.-THE FRENCH ARMY AS IT IS: OFFICERS AND MEN After the foregoing account of the operations from the outbreak of War to the end of January, the Report now deals exhaustively with the condition of the Army after sice months of war, the higher command, the supply of officers and non-com- missioned officers, and of munitions of war of all kinds, and the transport and auxiliary services. The compiler, beginning his review on February 1st, states that on that date : — The condition of the French Army is excellent and appreciably superior to what it was at the beginning of the war, from the three points of view of numbers, quality, and equipment. In the higher command important changes have been made. It has in fact been rejuvenated by the promotion of young commanders of proved quality to high rank. All the old generals, who, at the beginning of August, were at the head of large commands, have been gradually eliminated, some as the result of the physical strain of war, others by appointment to territorial commands. This rejuvenation of the higher ranks of the Army has THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW 39 been carried out in a far-reaching manner, and it may be said that it has embraced all the grades of the military hierarchy from commanders of brigades to commanders of armies. The result has been to lower the average age of general officers by ten years. To-day more than three- fourths of the officers commanding armies and army corps are less than sixty years of age. Some are considerably younger. A number of the army corps commanders are from 46 to 54 years of age, and the brigade commanders are usually under 50. There are in fact at the front extremely few General Officers over sixty, and these are men who are in full possession of their physical and intellectual powers. This rejuvenation of the higher command was facilitated by a number of circumstances, notable among which were the strengthening of the higher regimental ranks carried out during the three years preceding the war. As a result, at the outset of the campaign, each infantry regiment had two lieutenant- colonels, and each cavalry and artillery regiment a colonel and a lieutenant-colonel. Helpful also has been found the system of promotion for the duration of the war. Many officers who began the war as colonels now command brigades. Some are even at the head of divisions or army corps. Ability proved on the field of battle is now immediately recognised and utilised, and in this way it has been possible to provide in the most favourable manner for the vacancies 40 THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW created by the changes in command which were considered necessary in the first weeks of the war. The higher grades of the French Army are inspired by a remarkable unity in the matter of mihtary theory, and by a soHdarity of spirit which has found striking expression in the course of the numerous moves of army corps, which have been carried out since the beginning of the war, from one part of the theatre of operations to another. The cavalry, after six months of war, still possess an excess of officers. There are on an average thirty-six officers to a regiment instead of the thirty-one considered to be the necessary minimum. The artillery, which has suffered relatively little, has also an excess of officers, and is further able to count upon a large number of captains and other officers, who, before the war, were employed in the arsenals or in technical research. Finally, the reserve artillery officers have nearly all proved to be excellent battery commanders. The losses in the junior commissioned ranks have naturally been highest in the infantry. There is, however, nothing like a want of officers in this arm. Many captains and lieutenants who have been wounded by machine-gun fire (such wounds are usually slight and quickly healed) have been able to return speedily to the front. The reserve officers have, in general, done remark- ably well, and in many cases have shown quite FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE WAR 41 exceptional aptitude for the rank of company commanders. The non-commissioned officers promoted to sub-lieutenancies make excellent section leaders and even show themselves very clever and energetic company commanders in the field. It must be remembered also that, thanks to the intellectual and physical development of the generation now serving with the colours, and thanks, above all, to the warlike qualities of the race, and the democratic spirit of our Army, we have been able to draw upon the lower grades, and even upon the rank and file for officers. Many men who began the war on August 2nd as privates, now wear the officer's epaulettes. The elasticity of our regulations regarding promotion in war time, the absence of the spirit of caste, and the friendly welcome extended by all officers to those of their military inferiors who have shown under fire their fitness to command, have enabled us to meet all requirements. The state of our infantry cadres on January 15th was very satisfactory and much superior to that of the German infantry. On an average each of our regiments has forty-eight officers, including eighteen regular officers, fifteen reserve officers, and fifteen non-commissioned officers. In each regiment six of the twelve companies are com- manded by captains who are regular officers, three by captains of the reserve, and three by lieutenants. Each company has at least three D 42 THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW officers. In sum, the state of the Army as regards the commissioned ranks from the highest to the lowest may be termed exceptionally brilliant. The Army is led by young, well-trained, and daring chiefs, and the lower commissioned ranks have acquired the art of war by experience. Finally a warm tribute is paid to the work of the staffs of the armies and of the army corps, which were formed three years ago, and have thrown themselves into their work with entire unanimity both of views and methods. Including all ranks, France now has more than 2,500,000 men at the front, and every unit is, or was on January 15th, at war strength. The infantry companies are at least 200 strong. In many regiments the companies have a strength of 250 or more. In the other arms, which have suffered less than the infantry, the units are all up to, or above, regulation strength. This fact constitutes one of the most important advantages of the French Army over the German. While Germany has created a great number of new units, army corps or divisions, which absorbed at a blow all of her available resources in officers and men, the French supreme command has avoided the formation of new units, except in limited number. It has only admitted exceptions to this rule when it was able to count with certainty on being able to provide amply for both the present and future requirements of the new FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE WAR 48 units, as regards all ranks, without encroaching upon the reserves needed for the existing units. At the same time, thanks to the depots in the interior of the country, the effectives at the front have been maintained at full strength. The sources of supply for this purpose were the remainder of the eleven classes of the reserve, the younger classes of the territorial army, and the new class of 1914. A large number of the men wounded in the earlier engagements of the war have been able to return to the front, and these have been incorporated in the new drafts thus providing them with a useful stiffening of war-tried men. With regard to the supplies of men upon which the Army can draw to repair the wastage at the front, we learn that there are practically half as many men in the depots as at the front, in other words about 1,250,000. Further sup- plies of men are provided by the class of 1915, which has already proved to be more than a fifth more numerous than the official estimate, and the revision, in consequence of ministerial decree, of the various categories of men of military age exempted on ground of health or for other reasons from the duty of bearing arms. As a result of this measure, nearly half a million men have been claimed for the army, almost all of whom, after a rigorous physical test, have been declared fit for military service. In the depots in which the new soldiers are D 2 44 THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW being trained, the services of many officers and non-commissioned officers, discharged as con- valescents after being wounded, are utihsed in order to give a practical turn to the instruction. There are still many voluntary enlistments, and with all these resources of men the Army can count upon reinforcements, soon to be available, which will consequently considerably augment its offensive power. The quality of the troops has improved per- ceptibly since the beginning of the war. The men have become hardened and used to war, and their health — largely owing to the excellence of the commissariat — is extremely satisfactory. In spite of the severity of the winter hardly any cases of disease of the respiratory organs have occurred, and the sanitary returns of the Army show an appreciable improvement on those of the preceding winter. With regard to the reserves, experience has verified the dictum of the Serbian and Bulgarian generals in the war of 1913, namely, that " two months in the field are necessary in order to get at the full value of reserves." Our infantry is now accustomed to the rapid and thorough " organisation " of the defensive. In August it neither liked, nor had the habit, of using the spade. To-day those who see our trenches are astounded. They are veritable improvised fort- resses, proof against the 77 millimetre gun and often against artillery of higher calibre. During FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE WAR 45 the past five months not a single encounter can be cited in which our infantry did not have the advantage over the German infantry. All the enemy's attacks have been repulsed, except to the north of Soissons, where their success was due to the flooded state of the Aisne and the carrying away of our bridges. Our attacks on the other hand have yielded important results, and have been carried out with plenty of spirit, although without the imprudence which cost us such heavy losses in August. The cavalry has made remarkable progress. Throughout October the cavalry was called on to eke out the inadequate numbers of the infantry, and showed itself perfectly adapted to the necessities of fighting on foot. Several regiments of cavalry have been used as infantry and, armed with rifles, have rendered the most valuable service. The artillery has displayed a superiority in the use of its admirable materiel, which is recog- nised by the Germans themselves. This chapter of the report concludes with a tribute to the work of the aviators and to the less brilliant but not less useful work of the engineers, who in the trench warfare which is now being waged have naturally been called upon to display intense activity. VIII.— THE FRENCH ARMY AS IT IS: M^TEl^/^L— ARTILLERY, SUPPLIES, TRANSPORT The French Official Review now turns to the state of the materiel of the Army after six months in the field. Beginning with the field gun, the famous " seventy -five, ^^ the compiler of the report, after rehearsing the splendid qualities of this weapon, its power, its rapidity of action, its incomparable precision, points out that it possesses a degree of strength and endurance which make it an implement of war of the first order. It may be stated without hesitation that our ''seventy-five" guns are in as perfect condition to-day as they were on the first day of the war, although the use made of them has exceeded all calculations. The consumption of projectiles was, in fact, so enormous as to cause for a moment an ammunition crisis, which, however, was com- pletely overcome several weeks ago. The methodical and complete exploitation of all the resources of the country, organised since the beginning of the war, has enabled us to 46 THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW 47 accumulate a considerable stock of fresh munitions and an increasing rate of production is hence- forth assured. We are thus sure of being able to provide, without particular effort, for all the needs of the campaign, present and future, how- ever long the war may last, and it is this certainty which has enabled us to supply projectiles to several of the Allied Armies, among others, to the Serbian and Belgian Armies. From the state- ments of German prisoners we have learned that the effectiveness of our new projectiles is superior to that of the old ones. Our heavy artillery was in process of re- organisation when the war broke out, with the result that we were indisputably in a position of inferiority in respect of this arm during the first battles. But to-day the roles have been reversed, and our adversaries themselves acknowledge the superiority of our heavy artillery by reason of its abundance, its power, its range and precision. The change has been brought about in various ways, partly by the intense activity of the cannon foundries in new production, partly by the employment at the front of the enormous reserves of artillery preserved in the fortresses. This source of supply is by no means exhausted. On the contrary, the very large number of heavy guns at the front represents only a part of the total number available for use. These guns have beeii altered and brought up to date in 48 THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW such a way as to give them the quahties of the most modern artillery, and such a variety of models are available that the French artillerists can adapt their fire to all the necessities of war as practised to-day. There is an abundant stock of projectiles for the heavy artillery, which, as in the case of the field-gun ammunition, is daily growing in importance. The same is true of the reserves of powder and other explosives, and of all materials needed for the manufacture of shells. The powerful industrial equipment of France and Great Britain, constantly fed from abroad thanks to the freedom of the seas, gives us full security in this respect. Dealing with the effects of the French artillery fire, the report quotes the statements of prisoners. Captives who have been exposed to a battering by the French gunners always remain in a sort of stupor for several hours. One prisoner said : " I have served through the whole campaign. I was at the battle of the Marne where our losses were terrible. But its terror was nothing com- pared to the artillery fire which we have had to endure these last few days, with its accuracy of aim and the destructive effect of its shells. I am glad to have escaped from that hell, and I do not think myself a bad German for saying so. I believe I have paid my debt to the Fatherland FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE WAR 49 by the mere fact of having been exposed to such a fire. I wonder that my reason did not give way. It was an accursed day." A German Heutenant of engineers said he could not understand the violence and the extra- ordinary accuracy of our fire. He said : "As long as the artillery fire lasts there is no use in thinking about making a move to bring up the reserves, and the last shot has hardly been fired at the trench when your infantry are there." A German non-commissioned officer thus de- scribed what he had seen : " You could see rifles and men hurtling through the air. All the defenders were blown to pieces or buried alive." Those who seek safety in flight are no better off. Said another prisoner : " The shells pursue the fugitives. The best thing to do is to fling oneself on the ground and leave the rest to God." The Germans have nicknamed our artillerymen " the black butchers." With regard to small arms, hand-grenades, bombs, and all the devices for life-taking which the trench warfare at short distance has brought into use, the position of the French troops is in every way favourable. Thanks to the ingenuity of the officers and engineers, and the resources of the national industry, the army in the field is now equipped with an entire arsenal of new weapons of this kind, perfected by experience in action and varied in type so as to be able to meet all the exigencies of the new mode 50 THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW of fighting. The superiority which the Germans enjoyed at the beginning in virtue of their " Minenwerfer " and similar engines has dis- appeared. There follows an interesting passage on the development of the machine-gun in this kind of warfare. Owing to the extended use of this weapon the number of them suppHed to the various units has been appreciably increased. Not only is each unit in possession of its full regulation com- plement of machine-guns, but the number of these guns attached to each unit has been increased since February 1st by one-third. On March 15th this number will be doubled. The efforts of the national industry, supplemented by foreign aid, make it possible to keep up a constant flow of machine-gun detachments, with a thoroughly- trained personnel, to the front. The supply of rifles, carbines, and other fire- arms has been and will be equal to all demands. The report next passes to the transport service, which has worked with remarkable precision since the beginning of the war. The work of the transport service divides itself into three heads. Its first great task is the transport of the " troupes de couverture," that FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE WAR 51 is, the troops sent to the frontier to meet the first shock of the enemy and enable the mobilisation of the main armies to be carried out undisturbed, and then the mobilisation and concentration of transports. The second is the regular supply of men, horses, provisions, ammunition and material to the armies in the field. The third is the trans- port of troops from one part of the theatre of war to another where their presence will contri- bute to the success of an operation. The transport of the " troupes de couverture " began on the day of the German proclamation of " the state of danger of war," that is July 31st, at nine p.m., and was completed on August 3rd at noon without any delay, either in the departure or arrival of trains, and before any of the ordinary train services had been suspended. Nearly 600 trains were required to carry out the operation on the Eastern system alone. The transport of troops, etc., in connection with the general mobilisation began on August 2nd, concurrently with the movement of the " troupes de couverture." On August 3rd and 4th nearly 600 more trains were despatched on the Eastern system alone. The transports needed for the concentration of the armies began at midday on August 5th and the first period, during which the most urgent transports were effected, ended on August 12th at the same hour. The second period of less urgent transports 52 THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW extended from 4 a.m. on August 12th to midnight on August 18th. During the first period, out of 2,500 trains despatched, about twenty were subjected to sUght delays which were made good in the second period. During the fourteen days nearly 4,500 trains were despatched, without counting 250 trains which carried siege supplies to the fortresses. It is noteworthy that these excellent results were obtained in spite of the fact that the original destination of four army corps was changed after mobilisation had begun. With regard to the ordinary supply transports, it is pointed out that this service, directed from the " control stations " on the railways, has worked with perfect regularity since the beginning of the war. During the retreat in August, the control stations had to provide for all sorts of unforeseen needs, such as the removal of military and other stores, and often of the inhabitants from abandoned towns, and the withdrawal of French and Belgian rolling stock, in spite of which not a single supply train or troop train was ever stopped. In the way of the transport of troops from one part of the theatre of operations to another, some remarkable feats have been performed. During the French offensive in Lorraine and Belgium in August, during the retreat beyond the Marne, during the subsequent advance, and again during the extension of our left to the North Sea, over FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE WAR 58 seventy divisions were moved by railway from one point to another, the journeys varying from sixty to 360 miles and necessitating the employment of over 6,000 trains. To the accurate working of the transport service we owe a large part of our success. In particular we owe to it the impassable barrier against which the enemy's desperate offensive hurled itself in vain in Flan- ders. The automobile transport has been corres- pondingly active. It has been freely drawn upon for the transport of troops, at least 250,000 men having been moved by automobile for distances of from 12 to 70 miles during September, October and November. On the automobile transport falls the duty of carrying material and supplies of certain sorts, notably fresh meat, and the removal of wounded to hospital. The service at present comprises over ten thousand motor vehicles, driven and kept in repair by 2,500 chauffeurs and mechanics. Of the work of the commissariat department some idea is gathered when it is remembered that each of the 2,500,000 men at the front daily receives the following campaign ration : bread 750 grammes, meat 500 grammes, bacon 30 grammes, sugar 32 grammes, coffee 30 grammes, tobacco 100 grammes (per week). Each man now receives a double ration of sugar and coffee, and in addition two grammes of tea and a third 54 THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW of a litre of wine a day. The menu is further enriched by joint purchases through the " or- dinaires." In addition to his ration of food each soldier receives a certain allowance of money, which he pays into the " ordinaire " of his company, which then buys for joint use such things as the Government does not supply, notably potatoes, fresh vegetables, sardines and chocolate, of which the commissariat has accu- mulated large stocks so that the troops can always obtain them even if they cannot be bought or requisitioned in the country where operations are being conducted. What the commissariat and the transport service can do is shown by the following details. On January 1st, every one of the 2,500,000 men at the front received the following ration of luxuries to celebrate the New Year : 100 grammes of ham, an orange, two apples, a handful of nuts, a cigar, half a litre of good wine, and a quarter of a litre of champagne. This good feeding has its natural results upon the physical and moral health of the troops. The men put on flesh on active service. The stocks of wheat and oats are so large that, in the zone of the armies, the crop of last year has not yet been threshed. For the meat ration, beef varies with mutton and pork, and fresh meat alternates with frozen. Endless stocks exist. Of the home supply of thirteen million FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE WAR 55 head of cattle, sheep and pigs, only 800,000 head have been slaughtered. This summary of the army supply service gives an idea of the commercial prosperity of the country. The transport of goods by railway and sea proceeds with an activity unknown in the most prosperous times. The ports are crowded with shipping and merchandise. Every- where it has been necessary to build new docks to deal with the flood of imports of all kinds arriving from abroad. Ports, which in time of peace are the least busy, are now crammed, and at the great ports like Havre, ships are obliged to wait for days to unload their cargoes for lack of quay space. Finally, the presence of the British Army in the north of France has brought about an intense activity of trade and an abundant circulation of gold in this part of the country. IX.— THE GERMAN ARMY AND ITS LOSSES IN MEN The French Official Review now turns to a dis- cussion of the situation of the German Army, THE GERMAN EFFORT The military effort of Germany at the outset of the campaign exceeded all anticipations. Her design was to crush the French Army in a few weeks under a tremendous mass of troops. Nothing was neglected to bring that mass together. The number of German army corps in time of peace is twenty-five. When war began the German General Staff put in the field in the two theatres of operations : — (1) As fighting troops (active, reserve, Ersatz or Landwehr) sixty-one army corps. (2) As troops to guard communications and territory, formations of the Landsturm. In October, six and a half new army corps made their appearance, plus a division of sailors ; in all seven corps. From the end of November to the end of December there was only an insigni- ficant increase consisting of one division of sailors. In January, 1915, the number of fighting forma- 56 THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW 57 tions put into line by the German Army was, therefore, sixty-nine army corps divided as follows : — Active corps — twenty-five and a half. Reserve corps — twenty-one and a half. Ersatz brigades — six and a half. Reserve corps of new formation — seven and a half. Corps of Landwehr — eight and a half. Total, sixty-nine. THE GERMAN AIM AND THE GERMAN METHOD It is easy to understand the immense effort thus made by Germany, if, having regard to the position of Germany at the opening of the war, one considers that of the Allies. Germany de- sired to take advantage of the circumstances which enabled her to make a simultaneous mobilisation of all her forces, a mobilisation which the three Allied Armies could not carry out as rapidly. Germany wished, with her mass of troops, to crush first of all the adversary who appeared to her the most immediately dangerous. This effort, broken for the first time on the Marne, attained its maximum at the moment of the Battle of Flanders in which more than fifty army corps out of sixty-nine, were pitted against the French, British, and Belgian Armies. Here also the method followed by Germany is easily com- prehensible. At the end of October, the Russian E 58 THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW danger was beginning to become pressing, and it was necessary to win a decisive victory in the western theatre of war. It was imperative to give international opinion the impression that Germany remained, in that quarter, mistress of the operations. Finally, she intended by this victory to be able to transport a large number of army corps to Poland. We have seen that the Battle of Flanders instead of being a success for Germany was a marked defeat. This defeat was fraught with results, and it dominates the present position of the German Army. The plans above described of the German mobilisation, which had their justification in view of a prompt victory, were calculated to become extremely perilous once that victory failed to be gained. From that moment, in fact, Germany lost the initiative and the direction of the war. And, furthermore, she was condemned to suffer the counter effects of the enormous and precipitate effort which she had made in vain. From the point of view of her effectives and her regimental cadres she had undergone a wastage which her adversaries on the other hand had been able to avoid. She had, in the words of the proverb, "put all her eggs in one basket." In spite of her large population, she could no longer, owing to the immediate and sterile abuse which she had made of her resources, pretend to regain the superiority of numbers. She was reduced to facing as best FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE WAR 59 she could on both war fronts the ever increasing forces of the AlHes. She had attained the maximum of tension and had secured a minimum of results. She has thus landed herself in a difficulty which will henceforward go on in- creasing and the magnitude of which is evident when the wastage which her Army has suffered is closely studied. THE GERMAN LOSSES The wastage of effectives is easy to establish. We have for the purpose two sources, the official lists of losses published by the German General Staff, and the note-books, letters, and archives of soldiers and officers, killed and taken prisoners. These different documents show that by the middle of January the German losses on the two fronts were 1,800,000 men. These figures are certainly less than the reality because, for one thing, the sick are not comprised, and, for another, the losses in the last battle in Poland are not included. Let us accept them, however ; let us accept also that out of these 1,800,000 men five hundred thousand — ^this is the normal proportion— have been able to rejoin after being cured. Thus, the final loss for five months of the campaign has been 1,300,000 men or 260,000 men per month. These figures agree exactly with what can be ascertained when the variations of effectives in certain regiments are examined. E 2 60 THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW Here also the documents seized permit of the lists of losses being controlled. To cite some examples : The 13th Bavarian Regiment in a month and a half (August — September) lost 3,250 men. The 171st Regiment, from the middle of August to the middle of November, lost 2,560 men and sixty officers. The 99th Regiment in the same period had equal losses. The 15th Regiment of Infantry on the 18th of October alone, lost 1,786 men and thirty-seven officers. The 132nd Regiment lost, on November 16th near Ypres, 1,390 men. The losses were still higher in the new formations. The 205th Regiment had 2,400 men hors de combat in the one battle of the Yser. The 235th Regiment lost 1,320. The 244th Regiment 2,150. The 247th Regiment in that same battle 1,900. The 248th Regiment 1,800. The 17th Bavarian Reserve Regiment lost, at Messines and Wytschaete, thirty officers and 2,171 men. There follows in the Official Report a most detailed table showing the German losses in a very exact manner as learned from note-books, letters, statements of ^prisoners and official lists, and the conclusion is in these words : — It is therefore certain that the majority of the German Regiments have had to be completely renewed. What then is the situation created by these enormous losses ? FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE WAR 61 GERMAN TROOPS AVAILABLE FOR 1915 The total of German formations known at the beginning of January represented in round numbers four milHon men. According to the official reports on German recruiting, the entire resources of Germany in men amount to nine millions. But from these nine millions have to be deducted men employed on railways, in the police, and in certain administrations and indus- tries, altogether 500,000 men. The total resources available for the war were therefore 8,500,000. Out of these, about one half, say 4,000,000 are now at the front. The definitive losses represent at least 1,300,000 men. The available resources amounted, then, at the beginning of January to 3,200,000 men. Of what are these resources composed ? Chiefly of men who were untrained in time of peace, the trained reservists having almost all left the depots for the front. It has, moreover, to be noted that out of these 3,200,000 men there are, according to the statistics, 800,000 who are more than thirty-nine years of age and are therefore of only mediocre military value. Thus there remain 2,400,000. Finally the category of the untrained in peace comprises, according to the estimates of German military authorities themselves, one quarter of inefficients. The really available resources capable of cam- paigning are therefore just two miUions. These 62 THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW men, comprising the 1915, 1916, and 1917 classes, called out in anticipation, constitute — and this point cannot be too strongly insisted upon — the total of available resources for the operations during the twelve months of 1915. What the military value of these troops will be, considering the haste with which they have been trained, the formidable losses sustained in the Battle of Flanders by the newly-formed corps show very clearly. Their military value will be limited. These resources available in the course of 1915 may be divided into three categories, the first available at present, the second to be available in April, and the third between April and Decem- ber. The resources at present available repre- sent a maximum of 800,000 men, those for April 500,000 men, and the ultimate resources (classes 1916 and 1917 and untrained men of the Land- sturm between thirty and forty years of age) represent seven to eight hundred thousand men. When it is remembered that, according to the German documents themselves, the definite loss each month is 260,000 men, it is manifest that the available resources for the year 1915 will not suffice to fill the gaps of a war of ten months. It is then superabundantly established that, in the matter of effectives, Germany has reached the maximum of possible effort. If, with the 800,000 men at present available, she creates, as FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE WAR 63 it is certain that she is preparing to do at this moment, fresh formations, she will be preventing herself, if the war lasts another ten months, as is admissible, from being able to complete afresh her old formations. If she creates no new forma- tions she will have in 1915 exactly what is necessary and no more to complete the existing units afresh. Bearing in mind the ways of the German General Staff, one may suppose that, disregarding the eventual impossibility of re- completing, it is still addressing itself to creating new formations. The weakness to which Germany will expose herself in the matter of effectives has just been set forth, and it is easy to show that this weakness will be still further aggravated by the wastage in the regimental cadres. X.— THE GERMAN LOSSES IN OFFICERS, MATERIEL, AND MORAL THE GERMAN LOSSES IN OFFICERS Beyond all dispute the condition of the cadres in the German Army is bad. The proportion of officers, and notably of officers by profession, has been enormously reduced, and a report made in December showed that in a total of 124 companies, active or reserve, there were only forty-nine officers of the active army. The active regiments have, at the present time, an average of twelve professional officers, the reserve regiments nine to ten, the reserve regiments of new formation six to seven, and it is to be remembered that these officers have to be drawn upon afresh for the creation of new units. If Germany creates new army corps, and if the war lasts ten months, she will reduce almost to nothing the number of professional officers in each regiment, a number which already is very insufficient. The French Report admits that the cofumanders of German corps, commanders of active battalions, «4 THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW 65 and the officers attached to the commanders of army corps, are officers by profession, WASTAGE OF GERMAN GUNS It is easy to ascertain the German losses in artillery. On December 28th, the 66th Regiment of artillery entrained at Courtrai for Germany twenty-two guns, of which eighteen were used up. This figure is extremely high for a single regiment. The same facts have been ascer- tained as regards heavy artillery. On December 21st and 22nd, seventy-seven guns of heavy artillery which were no longer serviceable were sent to Cologne. These movements, which are not isolated facts, show how ill the German artillery has resisted the ordeal of the campaign. Other proofs, moreover, are decisive. For some weeks we have noted the very peculiar aspect of the marking on the bands of a great number of shells of the 77-gun. When these markings are compared with those of shells fired three months ago it is plain beyond all question that the tubes are worn and that many of them require to be replaced. This loss in guns is aggravated by the necessity, which has arisen, of drawing upon the original army corps for the guns assigned to the recently formed corps or those in course of formation. Several regiments of field artillery have in fact had to give up two batteries. These two phenomena— wearing out 66 THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW of material and drafts upon batteries — will in- evitably result in the reduction of batteries from six to four guns, or in a reduction of the number of batteries in the army corps, or in the partial substitution for 77-guns of 9-centimetre cannon of the old pattern, the presence of which has been many times perceived at the front. Furthermore, the German artillery lacks, and has lacked for a very long time, munitions. It has been obliged to reduce its consumption of shells in a notable degree. No doubt is possible in this respect. The statements of prisoners since the Battle of the Marne and still more since the Battle of the Yser, make it clear that the number of shots allowed to the batteries for each action is strictly limited. We have found on officers killed or made prisoner the actual orders prescribing positively a strict economy of munitions. For the last three months, too, we notice that the quality of the projectiles is mediocre. Many of them do not burst. On January 7th, in the course of a bombardment of Laventie, scarcely any of the German shells burst. The proportion of non-bursts were esti- mated at two-fifths by the British on December 14th ; two-thirds by the Belgians at Furnes in January ; and at two-thirds by ourselves in the same month. On January 3rd at Bourg-et- Comin, and at other places since then, shrapnel fell, the explosion of which scarcely broke the FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE WAR 67 envelope and the bullets were projected without any force. About the same time our 14th Army- Corps was fired at with shrapnel loaded with fragments of glass, and, on several points of our front, shell casings or shells of very bad quality have been found, denoting hasty manufacture and the use of material taken at hazard. From numerous indications it appears that the Germans are beginning to run short of their 1898 pattern rifle. A certain number of the last reinforcements (January) are armed with car- bines or rifles of a poor sort without bayonets. Others have not even rifles. Prisoners taken at Woevre had old pattern weapons. The upshot of these observations is that Ger- many, despite her large stores at the beginning and the great resources of her industrial pro- duction, presents manifest signs of wear, and that the official optimism which she displays does not correspond with reality. MORAL WASTAGE OF THE GERMAN ARMY The material losses of the German Army have corresponded with a moral wastage, which it is interesting and possible to follow, both from the interrogation of prisoners and the pocket-books and letters seized upon them or on the killed. At the beginning of the war the entire German Army, as was natural, was animated by an unshakable faith in the military superiority of 68 THE FllElsrCH OFFICIAL REVIEW the Empire. It lived on the recollections of 1870, and on those of the long years of peace, during which all the Powers that had to do with Germany displayed towards her a spirit of conciliation and patience which might pass for weakness. The first prisoners that we took in August showed themselves wholly indifferent to the reverses of the German Army. They were sincerely and profoundly convinced that if the German Army retired it was in virtue of a preconceived plan, and that our successes would lead to nothing. The events at the end of August were calculated to strengthen this con- viction in the mind of the German soldiers. The strategic retreat of the French Army, the facility with which the German armies were able to advance from August 24th to September 5th, gave our adversaries a feeling of absolute and final superiority, which manifested itself at that time in all the statements gleaned and all the documents seized. At the moment of the Battle of the Marne, the first impression was one of failure of compre- hension and of stupor. A great number of German soldiers, those notably who fell into our hands during the first days of that battle, believed fully, as at the end of August, that the retreat which they were ordered to make was only a means of luring us into a trap. German military opinion was suddenly converted when the soldiers I FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE WAR 69 saw that this retreat continued, and that it was being carried out in disorder, under conditions which left no doubt as to its cause and to its extent. This time it was really a defeat, and a defeat aggravated by the absence of regular supplies, and by the physical and moral de- pression which was the result. The severity of the losses sustained, the overpowering effects of the French artillery, began, from this moment, to be noted in the German pocket-books with veritable terror. Hope revives, however, at the end of some weeks, and there is to be found in the letters of soldiers and officers the announce- ment of " a great movement " which is being prepared, and which is to lead the German armies anew as far as Paris. This is the great " Battle of Calais," which, contrary to the anticipations of the enemy, was in reality fought to the east of the Yser. The losses of the Germans, which during those ten days exceeded 150,000 men, and may perhaps have reached 200,000, produced a terrifying impression on the troops. From that moment prisoners no longer declared them- selves sure of success. For a certain time they had been consoled by the announcement of the capture of Warsaw. This pretended success having proved to be fictitious, incredulity became general. During the last two months the most intelligent of the prisoners have all admitted that no one could any longer say on which side victory 70 THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW would rest. If we think of the absolute con- fidence with which the German people had been sustained, this avowal is of great importance. Letters found on a dead officer speak of the imminence of a military and economic hemming- in of Germany. It discusses the possibility of Germany finding herself after the war with " empty hands and pockets turned inside out." There is no longer any question of imposing the conqueror's law upon adversaries at his mercy, but of fighting with the energy of despair to secure an honourable peace. An officer of the General Staff, who was made prisoner on January 18th, said : " Perhaps this struggle of despair has already begun." This change of feeling is the more remarkable inasmuch as the German Government, from the beginning of the war, made a sustained effort to create in the Army an artificial state of mind based entirely upon lies. We have found many times, either by the interrogation of prisoners or the examination of papers found on the dead, that a scientific system of fables for the use of soldiers was in operation for these six months in the ranks of the German Army. Whenever the Germans were beaten, their soldiers were induced to believe that it was because they wished to be so. As regards the Battle of Flanders, the orders of the commanders and the articles of German newspapers leave no FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE WAR 71 doubt about the importance of the offensive plan which broke itself against our resistance. But the thing went further. The opportunity was frequently given us of ascertaining how the German commanding officers applied themselves to deceiving their men even to the extent of detail. The prisoners whom we captured to the north, to the east, and to the south of Ypres, often declared with evident good faith that Paris was a few kilometres behind the hills which bounded the horizon. Others, better instructed in geography, told us with perfect seriousness that the German Army had vacated Paris because cholera and plague had broken out there, and the doctors had ordered this hot-bed of contagion to be avoided. We found on prisoners, postcards in German entitled, " Souvenir of the capture of Warsaw." On the other hand the Russians found postcards entitled, " Souvenir of the capture of Calais." Thus an artificial opinion was kept up which is beginning to show rents. However docile and disciplined the Germans may be, one cannot help thinking that on the day when they perceive that they have been systematically and abominably deceived, a reaction will set in, of which the victims will be those very men who organised this attempt to dupe several millions of men. Comparable with the methods above recounted are the official communiques with which the 72 THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW German General Staff endeavours to extend to neutral Powers the same illusion that it strives to create in the ranks of its own Army. As events have proved many times, there is ground for disbelieving these communiques, A recent example is to be found in the affair of Soissons. This local success, which was due to the rise of the Aisne and the breaking down of bridges, was officially announced as a decisive victory, whereas, since January 15th, the Germans at this point have not even dared to attack. XI.-THE GERMAN SUPPLIES THE SCARCITY OF PRIMARY MATERIAL FOR PROJECTILES The chief explanation of the imperfections noted in the German projectiles is to be found in the bad quality of the primary material. In spite of her enormous supplies, Germany has already suffered, and will suffer more and more, from the impossibility of replenishing by sea. This impossibility weighs heavily on military manufacture. On this point, an extract from the following report, made at the beginning of December by a high American official, will be read with interest : " Everybody recognises that there is in Germany a terrible scarcity of rubber. It cannot be procured, and there was no great provision of it in the country when war broke out. There were scarcely any private motor cars running in Berlin when I left that city. The owners of cars, who had not supplied themselves with rubber before the war, can scarcely get any now. The sale of rubber has been prohibited in every form. Even india-rubber balls, such 73 J. 74 THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW as children play with, have been withdrawn from sale. Still more serious is the scarcity of copper which is indispensable for the manufacture of shells and munitions. The Germans are greatly alarmed by the fact that it is impossible for them to replenish their supply of this precious material. They really do not know how things will turn out for them. I have also every reason to believe that the question of powder is causing the General Staff the gravest anxiety. There is a want of saltpetre and of the nitrates necessary for its manufacture. Direct answers to all questions on this subject are carefully avoided, and people prefer to get round them by an evasive phrase. When you ask them why they are employing old munitions, they answer : ' We want to get rid of them.' It is in no way my intention to deny the existence of reserves, which are still immense, of munitions in the country. I only wish to say that my personal inquiries have convinced me that it is impossible for Germany, on the ground alone of the munitions, even if the con- sumption is far below the present consumption, to continue the war beyond June next. I am convinced that the most vital considerations of the present conflict relate to the scarcity of copper and gunpowder in Germany, as well as of the different materials required for the manu- facture of the diverse explosives now in use. " At the bottom of their hearts German official FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE WAR 75 circles fully understand that there can be only one issue of the present struggle in Europe. They know in reality that they are beaten. They are fighting to obtain the best conditions possible." The lack of food is also beginning to make itself felt, as is shown by the creationof a monopoly and distribution by rations of cereals, ordered by the Federal Council on January 27th. This is a measure without precedent except in the history of besieged places. It is, moreover, easy to show by some figures what effects the war is having upon German supplies : German Q)nsumption production. before the War. Saltpetre nil 785,000 tons Rubber nil 224,000 tons Petroleum 125,000 tons 1,100,000 tons Copper 37,000 tons 224,000 tons If one takes the figures of German imports in 1912 it is observed that they amounted to ten and a half milliards of marks, of which less than two and a half milliards came from countries with which Germany can still trade. Thus Ger- many is deprived by the war of four-fifths of her imports. German economists have always pointed out this peril and certain of them recognise it to-day. Below are some quotations from the German f2 76 THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW Press made both before and after the outbreak of war : — " In the hypothesis of a war in which the importation of articles of food to Germany is cut off, our position would be critical. The success of our arms, even great successes, would be of no avail, or could only be inadequately turned to account, if the enemy succeeds in imposing upon us new tactics : the tactics of hunger." (SchmoUer's Jahrbilcher^ 1912, pp. 590-591.) " If the war lasts more than eight months we shall have no more corn." Georg Helm (Frankfurter Zeitung, Oct. 20th, 1914). " The stock of articles of food is less this year, the year of war, than the stock in time of peace. If we preserve the habits of peace time this stock may be insufficient to allow us to wait for the harvest." Prof. Schu- macher (Bonn) {Kolnische Zeitung, Nov. 3rd, 1914). " If the w^ar lasts for a long time, and that is now certain, our situation will become difficult and very critical. We must make up our mind before it is too late to take measures." (Deutsche Tageszeitung, Organ of the League of Farmers, quoted by the Frankfurter Zeitung, Oct. 17th, 1914.) FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE WAR 77 " Better to be hungry than to die of hunger." Prof. Levy (Berliner Tageblatt, quoted by Frankfurter Zeitung, Sept. 20th, 1914). THE INSUFFICIENCY OF FOOD SUPPLIES It has furthermore been observed on several occasions since the outbreak of hostiUties that the revictuaUing of the German Army has not been as regular as that of the French. In the course of the Battle of the Marne and in the weeks which followed our victory, the German prisoners were famished. They threw themselves voraciously on the bread which was given them and all declared that they had eaten nothing for several days. It seems that the German supply service was not capable of coping with the consequences, which nevertheless could easily have been foreseen, of the destruction of railways by the French military authorities. Owing to this destruction, which was methodically planned and carried out, the bulk, one may even say the whole, of the German forces operating in France were, except on the two wings, deprived of all supplies by railway. The insufficiency of motor transport aggravated this condition of things, and for a fortnight the troops were in want of everything. The same irregularity in the matter of reprovisioning was observed during the Battle of Flanders. Moreover, the loaves which wc 78 THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW often find in the German trenches are of a more than mediocre quality. The prisoners consider the white bread of the French troops a treat. The German Army in the field lives chiefly on preserved food. It lacks both wine and beer. The situation of the country explains this state of affairs. The hour of famine will sound for Germany before the end of 1915. We have already seen that the Government has taken the first measures by which the unequal contest against scarcity is inaugurated. XII.— CONCLUSIONS AND THE FUTURE Having finished his survey of the operations of war from the beginning of August to the end of January^ with its early failures and final successes, having described in detail the present splendid condition of the French Army in the matter of officers, men, materiel, transport, and stores, and having then exposed to a minute and relentless criticism the corresponding condition of the German Army, its materiel and moral, the writer of the Official Review proceeds to draw his conclusions. These he places under four heads : — 1. The significance of the German failure. 2. The significance of the French success. 3. The three French superiorities. 4. The offensive faith of the French Army. 1.— THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GERMAN FAILURE. Of the events of which an abridged recital has now been completed, it remains to draw the conclusion, that is to say, to appraise the results of these six months of war and to define the possibilities which those results have in store for 79 80 THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW us in the further operations. It may first of all be affirmed that the fundamental plan of the German General Staff has completely failed. This plan has been superabundantly set forth by German military writers, and also in the Reichs- tag, by the Ministers of War. It aimed at crushing France by an overwhelming attack, and at reducing her to a condition of helplessness in less than a month. Germany has not suc- ceeded in this. Our Army is, as we have seen, not only intact, but strengthened, full of trust in its leaders and profoundly imbued with the certainty of final success. Germany has not attained then the essential object which she publicly set before herself. But the defeat which she has sustained does not apply only to her fundamental plan. It extends also to the various operations in which she has essayed to secure partial advantages over us, in default of the decisive advantage which she had failed to win. In the three days which followed the declaration of war, the German General Staff massed great forces in front of Nancy. With what purpose ? A sudden attack which from its very beginning should break our lines. This attack did not take place, because the reinforcements of our frontier force at the end of 1913 and the defensive organisa- tion established on the Grand Couronne dis- couraged the enemy from an enterprise which, though possible a year sooner, had become full of FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE WAR 81 risk. Being unable to strike at Nancy, the German command directed all its resources to the outflanking manoeuvre which, by enveloping our left, would permit of the investment of Paris. Our left was not enveloped. Paris was not invested. And the German Army was obliged in the second week of September to save its own threatened communications by a precipitate retreat. With a desperate effort the General Staff of the enemy attempted to off-set the effect of this retreat by piercing our centre in Champagne. There, as elsewhere, he failed and had to with- draw in great haste. In the month of October, with more extended lines, he endeavoured to repeat his enveloping manoeuvre and to turn our left ; but right up to the North Sea we built an impassable barrier against him. He accumulated his forces in Belgium to outflank us by the coast and reach our maritime bases. His attack was broken. With desperation he sought to cut our forces to the south of Ypres : we maintained all our positions. To sum up, the German General Staff has placed upon its record since the beginning of the campaign — apart from the failure of its general plan, which aimed at the crushing of France in a few weeks— seven defeats of high significance, namely, the defeat of the sudden attack on Nancy, the defeat of the rapid march on Paris, 82 THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW the defeat of the envelopment of our left in August, the defeat of the same envelopment in November, the defeat of the attempt to break through our centre in September, the defeat of the coast attack on Dunkirk and Calais, and the defeat of the attack on Ypres. The German Army, powerful and courageous as it may be, has therefore succeeded in gaining the advantage upon no single point, and its forced halt after six months of war condemns it to a retreat, the pace of which may or may not be accelerated by the Russian successes, but the necessity for which is now in any case a foregone conclusion. 2. — ^THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FRENCH SUCCESS Against the extent of the German failure has to be placed that of the French success. All that our enemies have failed to gain we have gained, and first and foremost confidence in ourselves. It is certain, and it could not be otherwise, that at the outset our troops and the country as a whole still remained under the impression of the defeats of 1870. The victory of the Marne, confirmed by the victory of Flanders ; the impassable barrier set up against the most formidable effort which has ever been attempted in the military history of the world, have created a feeling of security which grows stronger every day. Everyone is aware, in fact, that, in order FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE WAR 83 to gain the day against the coalition which encloses her, Germany needed a rapid success. This rapid success lacking, her defeat is certain. For three months the German Press has been seeking to find favourable arguments, out of the small amount of change that the western front has undergone, on which to base the state- ment that the situation is finally crystallised. This is merely a sophism, which it is easy to expose. In the first place, even admitting the German thesis, Germany would none the less be condemned, condemned to die of hunger. But this thesis cannot be admitted because, if for the last three months the French command has not engaged in a general offensive, it has had three decisive reasons for this. The first is that, having time on its side, it intends to make its effort only after it has assembled all the means upon which it can, in the near future, rely with absolute certainty. The second is that, taught by the example of the Germans at Ypres, it has realised what may be the price of an offensive, vigorous indeed, but insufficiently prepared. The third is that the weather has been almost inces- santly bad, and that it is useless to engage in great operations in water, mud, and fog, and in a season of short days. We have seen that the French Army is strength- ening itself every day, in heavy artillery, in explosive weapons for the trenches, and in pro- 84 THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW jectiles. It is known that the British Army in France, which at first consisted of four divisions, has been heavily reinforced. It is known also that the number of troops now with the colours and being trained in England is very large. It is known that the Belgian Army, which is reconstituting itself, will shortly have six divisions of infantry and two divisions of cavalry. It is known that the Serbian Army, supplied afresh with material and munitions, is once again prepared to show its splendid qualities. It is known finally that Russia continues to draw upon the immense reservoir of her recruits, having up to the present utilised only the twentieth part. These are the reasons why the French command has not hurried and awaits the hour which it considers favourable, and these reasons, being based on precise and easily tested motives, are irrefutable. 3.— THE THREE FRENCH SUPERIORITIES If then we turn to the future we note that : — (i) The wastage of the German Army is in all respects greater than that of the French Army, the principal cause of this being the superiority of our artillery and the fighting methods of the German infantry which attacks in closer formation than does ours. It is now certain that the losses of our adversaries are double the number of our own. FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE WAR 85 (ii) The possibilities of the German Army, from the point of view of effectives, will go on decreasing more and more. The German popu- lation capable of bearing arms is, in comparison with the French population, in the proportion of three to two. Now at the present time, Landsturm included, Germany is employing on the French front a number of men representing two-thirds of her resources against one-third on the Russian front. On account of the Austrian defeats, Germany will be obliged to strengthen her forces against Russia more and more. The number of troops opposed to France will therefore continually decrease. Our position will further be improved by the number of German losses, which will always remain larger than ours, and finally, by the large reinforcements which the British will send to the Continent. (iii) The capacities of the German Army in the matter of regimental organisation, already inferior to ours, are becoming so still more. Granted that our adversaries at the beginning of the war had more cadres than ourselves, the text books show that their superiority in this respect was considerably less than their superiority in men. It was not as much as three to two. Now it is an established fact that the German losses in officers are greater than ours. We shall, therefore, certainly have the advantage from this point of view if indeed we have it not already. 86 THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW 4.— THE OFFENSIVE FAITH OF THE FRENCH ARMY Out of all these elements has been born the offensive faith of the French Army and its leaders. We have before us two systems. The one, the German, demanded a rapid success at the opening of the campaign, a success against France before the Russians could come upon the field, before the British reserves could intervene, before the economic trouble could make itself felt. Hence the creation, in all haste, of new corps, whether or not the supply could be kept up for a long time. By predetermination the victory was to be immediate. Now this necessary victory the Germans have not won. The other system, the French, consists, with the advantage of the freedom of the seas, in main- taining in good and complete form a number of sufficient formations, and in creating new ones only in the measure in which they can with certainty be kept up, and suitably and durably equipped with regimental organisation. This system is established with a view to a prolonged war. Of these two systems, which, after six months of trial, shall triumph ? To put the question is to answer it. The Germans can no longer oppose us with forces superior to ours. They will, therefore, not be able to do in the future what FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE WAR 87 they could not do in the past, when they were one-third more numerous than ourselves. Consequently our final victory must follow by the imperious necessity of the concordant force of facts and figures. Our effort, too, is from now onwards directed towards that offensive which we shall take at our own good time, and the issue of which cannot be doubtful. Our reinforce- ments are being trained in the instruction camps with a view to that offensive. It is in view of the offensive that, from day to day, our stores of munitions, food, and transport are being in- creased. It is in view of the offensive that important reserves of telegraphic, telephonic, railway, and shipping material have been con- stituted. It is in view of the offensive that preparation has been made for the re-occupation of the railway systems of Belgium, Luxemburg, and Alsace-Lorraine, and that a military com- mission, English, French, and Belgian, is pre- paring to work them. It is in view of the offensive that, to our ten thousand heavy lorries, we have added, with the powerful aid of our automobile industry, more than four thousand new transport waggons since the beginning of the war. Against all this, which on our side is sure and available, Germany can offer nothing either equivalent or analogous. The large resources in men, officers, material, and munitions which she had at her disposal six 88 THE FRENCH OFFICIAL REVIEW months ago have been largely expended in the hope of crushing, under the effort of mass and the effect of surprise, the forces opposed to them. To-day they are scarcely sufficient, after the defeat of that attempt, to offer even defensive resistance. The military wastage goes on pro- gressively at the same time as the economic wastage, and the moral wastage which is the consequence of both. The creation of new units can have no other object than to re-establish the equilibrium of the balance of numbers which leans more and more to the side of the Allies. Every further development given to the order of battle will result in a diminution of the general value of the German armies and accelerate their wastage. It will also bring nearer the moment when Germany will be at the end of her military resources and incapable of ever again regaining her numerical superiority. At that moment France, taken by surprise in August by a premeditated act of aggression, will begin the war in very truth and with the fulness of her strength. tHJNTtl) IN QBEAT BBITAIK BI R. CLAT AND SONS, 1 ID.. BEUNSWICK 3TEEET. STAMFOED STBEET, S.E., AND BCNQAT, SUFFOLK. RETURN TO the circulation desk of any University of California Library or to the NORTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY BIdg. 400, Richmond Field Station University of California Richmond, CA 94804-4698 ALL BOOKS MAY BE RECALLED AFTER 7 DAYS • 2-month loans may be renewed by calling (510)642-6753 • 1 -year loans may be recharged by bringing booi